INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA

UMI®
800-521-0600

A Tale of Two Videos:
Media Event, Moral Panic and the Canadian Airborne Regiment

Martha Armstrong
Graduate Program in Communications
McGill University, Montréal
December 1997

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and
Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree
of Master of Arts.

Acknowledgements

Many thanks go to my advisor, Professor Will Straw, whose prompt and insightful comments and encouraging feedback provided me with much needed direction and motivation. This thesis would also not have been possible without the assistance of Nancy MacKinnon; her knowledge of the military, and of the Airborne in particular, was invaluable. I am very grateful to the other journalists and military personnel who provided crucial information, both on and off the record, and to Sheri Zernentsch at Concordia for digging up her conference paper for me. Assistance was provided, whether they knew it or not, by many classmates and professors—in particular, Valerie Gideon and Professor Janine Marchessault—who directed me toward relevant resources. Special thanks to Heather MacDiarmid, for helping me focus, bringing articles to my attention and being a constant support. Thanks also to Caroline Olivier for her quick and professional translation services. And I am indebted to Scott Wylie and Janet and Russ Armstrong for their encouragement, patience and feedback.

Abstract

This thesis examines how and why two amateur videos, broadcast across Canada in 1995, contributed to the disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. A brief history of the Airborne highlights discipline problems that were known to exist before the videos were broadcast. Common assumptions about images, particularly amateur video images, are explored. The concept of the "media event" is used to show how mediation magnified the videos' impact. A detailed examination of the videos and their constructions as news stories demonstrates how narrative frames and the newsmaking process in general shaped what the public saw. A general content analysis of the media coverage surrounding the videos shows how a moral panic developed when Canadian values were threatened. It is argued that the videos and reaction to them shed more light on attitudes Canadians wanted to keep hidden than they did on any secrets the military harboured.

Le présent mémoire examine comment et pourquoi deux bandes vidéo amateurs, diffusées partout au Canada en 1995, ont contribué au démantèlement du Régiment aéroporté du Canada. Un bref historique du régiment met en évidence les problèmes de discipline qui étaient connus avant même la diffusion des bandes vidéo. Le mémoire traite également des idées préconçues à l'égard des images, et particulièrement des images des bandes vidéo amateurs. Le concept de « l'événement médiatique » sert à illustrer de quelle façon les médias ont exagéré l'effet des bandes vidéo. Une étude détaillée de ces bandes et de leur composition en tant que reportages démontre comment les structures narratives et le processus de création de la nouvelle pris dans son ensemble ont façonné ce que le public a vu. Une analyse générale du contenu de la couverture médiatique entourant la diffusion des bandes vidéo montre comment est né un vent de panique morale lorsqu'on a senti que les valeurs canadiennes étaient menacées. Le mémoire se fonde sur le fait que les bandes vidéo et la réaction qui a suivi leur diffusion a davantage mis en lumière les attitudes que la population canadienne voulait tenir cachées que les secrets détenus par l'armée.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1—Introduction

> They were wearing their trademark maroon berets when the news came in that their regiment, the elite unit of the Canadian Forces, had died on the political battlefield. The Airborne weathered, but barely, the torture killing of a 16-year-old Somali teenager, Shidane Arone. Maybe it could have survived the video documenting racist comments made by some soldiers in Somalia, but this finally killed it. The home video of a brutal hazing on Canadian Forces Base Petawawa provoked such outrage—not just from Canadians but from around the world—that politically, Defence Minister David Collenette had little choice. The Prime Minister and cabinet colleagues were unanimous: Disband the Airborne immediately.
>
> CBC National Reporter Susan Harada, *Prime Time News*, January 23, 1995. ("Airborne Report")

One commentator dubbed them "Canada's least funny home videos." They sparked not only the unprecedented disbandment of a supposedly elite military regiment, but also a constant stream of media coverage filled with expressions of shame, blame and attempts to explain how this could happen in Canada. Made by members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, the amateur videos appeared on television screens across the nation in January 1995. They were perhaps some of the most publicly galvanizing instalments in the Somalia Affair, which began in April 1993 when Canadians first learned that teenager Shidane Arone had died at the hands of at least one Airborne soldier on duty in Somalia. Scandal after scandal subsequently emerged surrounding that mission. Shortly after the videos became public, the government launched a commission of inquiry to investigate the Somalia mission and the allegations of mismanagement, racism and cover-up that

surrounded it. After two years in operation, and only part way through investigating its initial mandate, the government told the inquiry to wrap up. The commissioners concluded, among other things, that Canada's military had a severe leadership problem. Through all this, however, it was still the two home videos, each several years old when aired and made before Arone's death, that provoked the most quick and decisive action from the Canadian government and the strongest reaction from the Canadian public. Arguments that the Airborne had been significantly reformed since Somalia, and that many of its 660 members had not even been on that mission, had little impact. The videos had a power that went beyond such apparently rational arguments.

Today's lightweight and affordable video technology is often lauded as a "democratizing" tool. Accessible to average people, it lets them participate in—even shape—the newsgathering process. It is also praised for enabling people to watch the watchers and thus counteract the countless cameras that are trained on the populace. It is held up as an unquestionably reliable witness whose memory never fails. It is said to provide an irrefutable record of events, sometimes even evidence of criminal behaviour. Its presence is considered a deterrent against wrongdoing. At the very least, it allows people to make a lasting record of events in their personal lives.

Canada has not yet succumbed to the video craze quite the way the Americans have. Not only are there more camcorders per household in the United States,[1] but television stations there also actively solicit footage both for newscasts and for shows devoted to amateur video. CNN has a hotline for amateur videographers, it solicits material through commercials and it pays contributors $150 or more. Jack Reilly, an executive producer of

---

[1] In 1996, camcorders were found in 23% of American households but only in 16% of Canadian households (*The World Almanac* 293; Statistics Canada 20).

ABC's "Good Morning America," has said, "Home video has become in the last couple of years a part of network news" (Berko 71). Other shows rely solely on amateur video for their content—*America's Funniest Home Videos* being the most popular. Among the stream of others are the "reality" TV shows that usually centre around criminal behaviour or horrific violence accidently captured by amateur videographers or surveillance cameras. These shows (some are no longer on the air) include *Cops*, *Top Cops*, *Code 3*, *America's Most Wanted*, *The F.B.I: Untold Stories*, *American Detective*, *Manhunt International*, *Rescue 911* and *I Witness Video*. Tabloid shows such as *A Current Affair*, *Hard Copy*, or *Inside Edition* exist on the boundaries of the "reality" TV shows. Sometimes network news is not much further removed (Nichols 45).

The use of both amateur and surveillance images on television is not strictly a phenomenon of the last decade. In 1948, *Candid Camera* "attempted to incorporate living with surveillance into the social body through humor" (Berko 70). Abraham Zapruder's film of the 1963 Kennedy assassination is one of the most recognizable segments of amateur footage. But it is the 1991 footage of Los Angeles police officers beating black motorist Rodney King that is really symbolic of "the minicam revolution and of the potential power of the inadvertent 'glance' of the apparatus of surveillance" (Berko 72). After that, publications like *Newsweek* proclaimed, "Now anyone can be Dan Rather" (Alter 46). "The video boom lets Americans see each other as never before," claimed a press release for NBC's *I Witness Video* in 1992 (Waters 60).

On several fronts, the Canadian Airborne Regiment's amateur videos were to Canadians what the Rodney King video was to Americans. In both cases, the public glimpsed actions and attitudes that were not intended for its consumption. Viewers witnessed racist, violent and degrading behaviour. These acts or words were exhibited by members of the only institutions that democratic societies authorize to use deadly force as a means of social control—the military and the police. The amateur videos were given

directly to the media for broadcast, rather than to another arm of the control culture. The media packaged and circulated the images incessantly. But the images did more than just captivate and feed into viewers' voyeuristic interests, they also touched a nerve in each nation. Much of the public reacted with outrage, shame and calls for action. The images are now embedded in each nation's collective memory.

The Airborne videos are distinctive because they actually did not offer much new insight or information into the Regiment's problems. Even though no one outside the Regiment had actually *seen* the images, defence officials, politicians and even, to an extent, the public already knew such behaviour and attitudes existed. The videos did not bring to light something that was hidden. How, then, could two old videos cause such a stir? And what does the media, government and public reaction to them say about Canadian culture? The following chapters examine why and how the Canadian Airborne Regiment's home videos, or rather, their incarnations as news items circulated by the media, drew such an immediate, visceral, and at times conflicting reaction from many Canadians.

Chapter 2 establishes some necessary background as it outlines briefly the history of the Airborne Regiment and details some of its problems. It demonstrates what the government and defence leadership knew about these problems before the Airborne was disbanded, and argues that the videos were a significant factor in the Airborne's fate. It puts forth the idea that it was not so much the content of the videos, but their mediation—their broadcast across Canada and particularly in other countries—that brought an end to the Airborne.

John Fiske's concept of the "media event" is used in Chapter 3 to demonstrate the process by which an event and its meanings can become elevated and magnified through mediation. The chapter also explores the forces that invest images with meaning, how images can have multiple meanings when viewed through different gazes, and notions about what news is, how television stories are constructed, and the sense of "liveness"

surrounding television news. Because the only way the public sees amateur video is through the television media, the initial television stories about each video are examined in detail and alternative ways of framing the videos are explored.

For a media event to have any power, it must tap into a culture's deep-seated anxieties. Chapter 4 explores common myths Canadians may hold about themselves. It then loosely applies Stanley Cohen's framework for studying moral panics to the media coverage surrounding the Somalia Affair and specifically the Airborne's videos. The coverage of two national television networks, 10 daily newspapers and one national magazine is examined to identify broad themes. Moral panics are particularly noteworthy for masking root problems and addressing only surface issues and it is argued that the treatment of the videos did exactly that. Differences between Canadian civilian and military cultures are also explored, as well as the nation's inability to confront the systemic violence and racism in its own backyard.

Chapter 5 raises questions about what the furore over the videos and the Somalia Affair in general has really accomplished so far. It also touches on the troubles faced by the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia and mentions some of the Inquiry's conclusions.

Amateur videos are often thought of as tools to challenge, provoke or resist the cultural and political hegemony. But the masses usually only see such videos when they are filtered through the mainstream media. This process can cause much of their oppositional power, if they ever had any, to be lost. The videos provoke outrage, but in such a fashion that problems are swept aside rather than dealt with. Amateur images are often touted for their ability to shed light on hidden truths. But the truths revealed may not always be the ones people expect to see.

Chapter 2—The Airborne's Last Straw

> I recognize that many changes in personnel and procedures in the Airborne have been made over the past year and that the people now serving are, by and large, dedicated professionals. However, I believe the problems of the Regiment are systemic. Although our senior military officers believe the Regiment, as constituted, should continue, the government believes it cannot.
>
> [Former] Minister of National Defence, David Collenette, Press Conference, January 23, 1995.

The disbanding of the Canadian Airborne Regiment was an historic event for Canada. It was the first time the government had disbanded a military unit for disciplinary reasons, rather than as a cost-cutting or down-sizing measure. Not only was the move unusual for Canada, it was also rare among Western democratic countries. Since the Second World War, the only other military unit disbanded in such a fashion was a regiment of the French Foreign Legion in Algeria. That was in 1962 for rising up against the French government.

A complex set of reasons underlay the government's decision to disband what was considered Canada's elite military regiment. This chapter will touch on some of them as it documents the chronic discipline problems within the Regiment. It should be noted that what follows is by no means a comprehensive history of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. While some necessary background is given, the purpose here is to outline what the Canadian government, the media and the public knew about the Regiment's problems

before its disbandment. This is done in order to demonstrate the powerful role visual images played in the Airborne's fate.

The catalyst for the decision to disband the Regiment was what John Fiske would term a "media event" (xiv) or, in this case, several media events. Despite the Airborne's documented history of disciplinary problems, allegations of white supremacists in its ranks, and the torture killing of a Somali citizen by an Airborne soldier during the Regiment's tour with the U.S.-led mission to Somalia, it was the footage from two amateur video tapes shown on the nightly news that brought swift action from the government. The tapes, both several years old when broadcast, showed violent, racist and dehumanizing behaviour on the part of some Airborne soldiers. When announcing the disbandment, five days after the second tape aired, the Minister of National Defence, David Collenette, acknowledged the Regiment had undergone major changes since the videos were made. Yet he also said he believed that the behaviour exhibited within the videos, along with other events in the Airborne's past, could jeopardize Canada's proud military heritage. It was the government's responsibility to protect the Canadian military's reputation, both at home and abroad. Furthermore, the videos, along with two incidents of questionable conduct by Airborne soldiers on a recent mission to Rwanda, led Collenette to believe the Regiment's problems were systemic. The government was therefore disbanding the Regiment.

The use of visual images to relocate events in space and time, coupled with current cultural attitudes towards the value of video images—and amateur video in particular—played a significant role in the Airborne's demise and the public reaction surrounding it. The government's attempt to describe the soldiers' behavior in the videos as "the last straw" is not necessarily logical when the recent history of the Airborne is examined. As this chapter will demonstrate, it was not so much the Airborne's behavior—but rather the mediation of such behaviour through amateur video and television news—that proved to be the last straw.

***

In *The Canadian Revolution: From Deference to Defiance*. Canadian journalist and author Peter C. Newman suggests that, after the Second World War, peacekeeping was an activity tailor-made for the Canadian national mentality.

> It was perfect casting for a nation that had turned deference into its state religion. For the first time we could project our capacity for diffidence to a grateful world; the troops of no other country had been raised at their mothers' knees to become experts at being hit without hitting back. (83)

Former Canadian prime minister and Nobel prize winner Lester B. Pearson is commonly viewed as one of (if not *the*) founding fathers of modern-day peacekeeping. While serving as Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Pearson was instrumental in finding a peaceful solution to the Suez Crisis in 1956. He proposed the idea of a United Nations Emergency Force, which, under Canadian command, supervised the evacuation of British, French and Israeli soldiers from the Suez Canal zone. The following year, Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work.

Since the Second World War, Canada is the only country to have participated in every United Nations' peacekeeping operation. Canadian soldiers have been part of peacekeeping missions in Laos, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Nigeria, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia. By the 1990s, even though the country's population represented 1 percent of UN membership, Canada was contributing 10 percent of the UN's total peacekeeping force (Newman 84).

The Canadian Airborne Regiment did not exist during Canada's first 20 years of post-war peacekeeping. However, the Canadian Forces have had paratrooper capability since the Second World War. During the war, it was divided between the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion and the First Special Service Force. The Battalion, which left Canada in 1943 to join up with Britain's 6th Airborne Division, was involved in the airborne invasion on D-Day, the airborne crossing of the Rhine, and the subsequent advance to Wismar

where it met the Russians. The Battalion was disbanded when it returned to Canada in 1945. The First Special Service Force, which began as a Canadian-American formation for special operations in Europe, was better known as the Devil's Brigade. The Force was deployed in the Aleutian Islands in the summer of 1943, then sent to Italy where it distinguished itself in the successful assaults on Monte La Difense, on Monte Remetanea and at Anzio. It later served in the Allied invasion of southern France. The First Special Service Force was disbanded in 1944 (Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder" 2).

Between 1948 and 1968, the Canadian army spread its parachute specialists throughout its forces. Each infantry regiment included a company of airborne troops. In the 1960s, Canada's armed forces underwent some radical transformations. For reasons of economy and efficiency, Canada unified its army, navy and air force under a central command. It also attempted to create a Canadian military tradition and ethos by purging traditions that were, for the most part, British (Petrolekas B3). It was in this climate that Lieutenant-General Jean-Victor Allard first proposed the idea of a separate, all-volunteer airborne regiment. It would specialize in commando tactics and act as "Canada's premier force-in-readiness for the defence of Canadian territory or for overseas operations" (Bercuson 169). The new regiment's soldiers would receive training similar to those in the "elite" forces of other countries—training in mountain climbing, scuba diving, underwater demolition, clearing underwater obstacles, deep penetration patrols, high altitude/low opening parachute descents, and so on. Allard also stressed that the new unit not follow the Victorian regimental system. He wanted the men "fast in, fast out," meaning that they would only stay with the regiment for a few years and then return to their parent units. This way, the advanced skills learned by airborne soldiers would be diffused throughout the army's other infantry units. Allard saw the U.S. Army Green Berets or Britain's Special Air Service as forces comparable to the new airborne regiment he envisioned (Bercuson

173-175).

On April 8, 1968, the Canadian Airborne Regiment was formed in Edmonton. Although not exactly what Allard had envisioned, it quickly distinguished itself for the excellent training it gave its soldiers. By the mid-1970s any officer or non-commissioned officer (NCO) who wanted to advance knew he had to do a stint with the Airborne. In fact, for all ranks it was an essential posting for further advancement. In 1977, the Airborne Regiment moved to Canadian Forces Base Petawawa in Ontario to become part of a Special Service Force that was to provide a small general purpose force in central Canada (Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder" 3). Overall, the Canadian Airborne Regiment's primary role, according to the Department of National Defence, was to:

> ...provide a quick reaction force in support of national security, North American defence, and international peacekeeping. In addition to these roles, the Regiment must prepare for limited and general war in conjunction with other forces. It is designed and trained to carry out its infantry role after having been transported to the appropriate location by fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, and to parachute into action if necessary. (1)

The Airborne was distinct from other infantry units for its ability to operate without extensive logistical support. This enabled Airborne soldiers, in theory, to be dispatched anywhere in the world within 48 hours. They were trained to forage for food if necessary, and to parachute into areas with no airfields. These drops could involve a range of dangerous situations: soldiers might be required to parachute in the dead of night, at low altitudes, during high winds, carrying 65 kilograms of equipment (Hammond A19) or even behind enemy lines.

During its lifetime, the Airborne was never actually used for the reasons that it was created. The use of helicopter gunships to transport soldiers frequently eliminated the need to drop them in by parachute. This caused some to argue there was no longer a need for an airborne regiment. Others responded saying Canada should have parachute capability just in case. Furthermore, there was more to the Airborne than parachuting. The rigorous 10-day Airborne Indoctrination Course, which all those volunteering for the Regiment had to

pass, was set at a frantic pace and involved physical hardships, long hours, lack of sleep and limited rations. According to one paratrooper, "...it seems like torture, but it isn't. We're looking for people who can work efficiently in the worst conditions imaginable" (Wyczynski 13). The exceptional demands on soldiers in the Airborne Regiment meant that it, ostensibly, attracted Canada's toughest, strongest, and therefore best, soldiers. It was often referred to as Canada's "elite" regiment despite some soldiers' distaste for the label. Airborne soldiers also stood out for the distinctive symbols they bore: the maroon beret, the Airborne badge and the polished jump boots.

During most of its lifetime, the Regiment consisted of about 750 soldiers. The infantry element was comprised of three airborne commandos, which each drew soldiers from one of Canada's three regular regiments. Volunteers from the Royal 22nd Regiment (the Van Doo or Van Doos) based in Valcartier, Quebec, went into 1 Commando. The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) from Calgary (now Edmonton) and Winnipeg fed into 2 Commando. Three Commando was made up of soldiers from the Royal Canadian Regiment, based in Petawawa, Ontario, and Gagetown, New Brunswick. Two other units in the Airborne provided combat service support, and command and control. Soldiers served with the Airborne for three to five years and then returned to their home regiments. Officers were posted to the Airborne for three years or less.

In *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*, historian and author David Bercuson suggests that the Airborne was a regiment that attracted both the best and worst soldiers. When the leadership was strong, the Regiment performed well. However, under a weak commander, the unit could easily get out of control. According to Bercuson, this happened far too often. The problem was not just in the Airborne, but throughout the Canadian Forces. Starting in the 1960s, Bercuson writes, the lines between military and civilian leadership of the Canadian Forces began to blur. The senior ranks started "managing" their troops, rather than "commanding" them. This played

a major role in the Airborne's problems.

> Careerism, apathy, cynicism, simple gutlessness, and sheer chance had allowed the army's—and especially the Airborne's—problems, many of which can be traced back to the 1960s, to multiply and spread unchecked. The failure to address these problems would lead, finally, to the shocking murder of Shidane Abukar Arone. (216)

While stationed in Edmonton, the Airborne Regiment stayed out of trouble. It even achieved international distinction in 1974 when, on its first overseas mission, it helped save the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Cyprus during the Turkish invasion of the island. Two Regiment members were killed and many others wounded. The Airborne's international acclaim received little attention back in Canada ("Who are" A7). At home, the Airborne participated in two prominent domestic operations: in 1970 it served in Montreal during the October Crisis; in 1976 it acted as a commando force in case of a terrorist attack at the Olympic games in Montreal.

Problems started cropping up after the Regiment moved to the more isolated Canadian Forces Base Petawawa in 1977. Two years after the move, two Airborne privates assaulted an Ottawa cab driver and robbed him. In 1981, during a peacekeeping tour in Cyprus, some 60 soldiers from 1 Commando attacked a crowd at a disco with clubs and bats in retaliation for an alleged slight to one of the Regiment's members. Back in Petawawa, discipline was getting out of hand and in 1984, Brigadier-General R.I. Stewart, the commanding officer of the Special Services Force (of which the Airborne was part) issued a memo which stated:

> The problem in a nutshell, is that we have far too many cases of ill disciplined behaviour, assault, disobedience, disrespectful behaviour; theft of public and personal property by soldiers; impaired driving offenses; vehicle accidents; inadequate control of stores, ammunition/pyrotechnics, weapons and equipment that result in theft; and a general laxness in properly controlling soldiers, all of which contribute to erosion of disciplined/soldierly behaviour. (Bercuson 207-8)

Despite an attempt to crack down on discipline, violent incidents continued to occur. In 1985, an Airborne soldier killed one man with a machete and wounded another in a bar fight in Quebec. In 1989, half a dozen Airborne soldiers wearing hoods and masks went

into the barracks room of another soldier and beat him. One of the assailants was Private Stephane Menard who was discharged from the Airborne and then brutally murdered a cab driver (Egan A4).

The 1985 machete attack prompted the military to study anti-social behaviour at CFB Petawawa. The study, prepared by Major-General Bill Hewson, reported that the incidence of violence in the Special Service Force was no higher than in regular Canadian society. However, it also found that the force had a higher incidence of violent crimes, including sexual assault and spousal abuse, than other Canadian military units. The report concluded the problem was not that serious, but it had "potential to become so." It therefore recommended senior ranks spend more time with their soldiers, and that a public relations officer be assigned to the base to handle the increased media attention sparked by the machete incident. Furthermore, the report called for a closer examination of the high occurrence of alcoholism at Petawawa, and recommended the military keep closer tabs on soldiers with criminal records (Pugliese, "Almost 20%" A4).

Also in the mid- to late-1980s, reports began to surface that annual initiation parties were taking place. These were not part of the standard Airborne Indoctrination Course and thus were illegal according to the National Defence Act. Military investigations into the initiations showed that officers and senior non-commissioned officers knew they were going on, but no one was charged, and no one put a stop to them (Koring, "Tapes" A6).

Some commanding officers attempted to clean-up the Airborne, but because they normally served only two or three years with the Regiment before receiving a new posting, their efforts were often short-lived. For example, in 1986 Major Peter Kenward of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry took over as Commanding Officer of the Airborne's 2 Commando. While impressed with the majority of the troops, he noted some men had a "Rambo attitude," and had adopted several American characteristics, including the U.S. Confederate or Rebel flag. Since the PPCLI's hockey team was called The Rebels

and the PPCLI fed into the Airborne's 2 Commando. the Rebel flag might have be excused. However. it had not shown up until after the Airborne started training with the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Kenward saw some of the Canadian soldiers' attachment to the Rebel flag as a challenge to the chain of command. He also expressed concern about the skinhead or biker-gang values he saw some of 2 Commandos' more rebellious members embracing. Kenward cracked down, removing troublemakers and banning the Confederate flag. According to Kenward:

> ...in many ways that symbol [the flag] represented something that was anti-military in my view because it was closely associated with people who were undisciplined, attacked authority...and had views [in the United States] on everything from basic discipline to race that was completely unacceptable in a Canadian military environment. (Bercuson 211-212)

Two years later, Kenward moved on and trouble resurfaced again. In June 1990, the private vehicle of Captain Jonathan Ferraby, a platoon commander with 2 Commando, was burned and vandalized. The arsonist used a copy of the Airborne's routine orders to start the fire. No one was ever charged.

There was also growing concern about racism, and not just in the Airborne. A secret military report warned of "the ever-increasing number of Canadian Forces (regular and reserve) members becoming associated with neo-Nazi organizations, more specifically skinheads." The 1991 report said skinheads were systematically infiltrating the armed forces to get military training and access to weapons. A special unit called Security Intelligence Reporting on Skinheads (SIROS) was set up to examine the problem. By June 1992, it had five Airborne paratroopers on its list, but could not confirm that these men had continued their involvement with extremist groups once they'd entered the military. Three of the suspected skinheads later went on to Somalia (Canadian Press, "Skinheads" A3). One of them was Matt McKay. Several months after the SIROS investigation, in September 1992, his photo appeared in the *Winnipeg Sun* as part of an in-depth report on local white supremacist activity. The photo accompanied an article entitled "Neo-nazis open doors to

soldiers" and was taken in 1990 when McKay was stationed in Winnipeg with the PPCLI. It showed him wearing a Hitler T-shirt and standing beneath a swastika banner with one tattoo-covered arm raised in a fascist salute. By the time the *Sun* got the photo, McKay had moved on to Petawawa to serve with the Airborne. The newspaper contacted him there for an interview and McKay confirmed he'd been involved with neo-Nazi groups but said he'd "totally left that thing...early in '91." When the *Sun* asked McKay's superiors and National Defence Headquarters to comment, their reaction was mild—as long as McKay didn't do anything illegal he could do what he wanted. However, in his chapter on McKay in *Web of Hate: Inside Canada's Far Right Network*, Warren Kinsella argues that such behavior is an offence under various defence department regulations, which forbid soldiers from engaging in "disgraceful conduct" or actively participating in a political organization (Kinsella 335). It appears the SIROS investigation was not made public at the time.

Colonel Walter M. Holmes was given the job of getting the Airborne Regiment in order when he was brought in as commanding officer between 1990 and 1992. He had some impact, since offences for assault, impaired driving, drunkenness and weapons misuse declined under his command. But when compared to most other regiments and battalions, they remained high. The military police at CFB Petawawa studied the rate of such offences among the Special Service Force units between 1988 and 1992, and found Airborne members had more assault charges than members of other units and often, but not always, more weapons offences (Bercuson 215).

When testifying several years later at the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Colonel Holmes said he didn't believe the Airborne's problems were worse than those in any other outfit of a similar size. But he still had several explanations for the recurring problems within the Regiment, and particularly within 2 Commando. Cancelled missions and exercises had had a major impact. In the 1980s, the Airborne went on only two peacekeeping tours abroad—both to Cyprus. At

home, it was used for various domestic peace-time operations. In the mid-1980s, for example, the Regiment was deployed to Canada's North to conduct a radiation survey after a foreign satellite re-entered the atmosphere and scattered radioactive debris over a large area. The Regiment identified hazard areas and prepared the way for scientists and cleanup crews to be airlanded (Hammond A19). The Airborne, however, had missed out on several choice assignments: an exercise in Jamaica was washed out by a hurricane in 1989; another in Alaska was cancelled due to a plane crash; the Regiment geared up for the Oka crisis, but was never called; it hoped it might go to the Gulf War, but it didn't. Colonel Holmes also suggested the higher rate of problems within 2 Commando resulted from the actions of its parent regiment, the Princess Patricia's. "They [the Patricia's] didn't necessarily send the best to the Canadian Airborne Regiment and once there, they didn't necessarily want them back," he testified at the Somalia Inquiry (Canadian Press, "Airborne" A6A).

On June 24, 1992, Colonel Holmes handed over command of the Airborne Regiment to his deputy commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Morneault. Recent changes to the Airborne's size and structure enabled a lieutenant-colonel to hold a position previously reserved for colonels. Unlike his predecessors, then, Morneault had no experience commanding a formation the size of Airborne.

Just over a month after Morneault assumed command, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution to send peacekeepers to Somalia. The UN force would help prevent mass starvation, end hostilities and stabilize the country. Ever since the overthrow of dictator Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991, the east African country of six million had been torn apart by warring clans that prevented the distribution of food to a starving population. The UN was suggesting a traditional peacekeeping mission under Chapter 6 of its Charter, which meant UN forces would patrol zones separating the warring factions and allow relief agencies to deliver essential aid supplies. At the time of the UN resolution, Canadian troops were already serving in Cyprus, the Golan Heights, Cambodia, El Salvador, Kuwait, the

Western Sahara, Nicaragua, the former Yugoslavia and the Sinai Desert (Bercuson 222-223). The Chief of Defence Staff, General John de Chastelain, commented that Canada's military was "getting bulked out on UN missions" (Pugliese, "Anatomy" B1). But he still complied with the government's wishes to send troops. The Airborne Regiment was the only one available to take on Somalia. It was also considered long overdue for an overseas tour (Koring, "Unit" A4).

In August, the Conservative government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney promised the UN approximately 750 soldiers for the multi-national Somalia mission called Operation Cordon. The Airborne would form the core of Canada's commitment, which would be called the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group. The Group would also include engineers and support staff (Bercuson 222). As training began, more problems began to surface. The armoured regiment training with the Airborne found some of the soldiers apathetic. Then, a group of paratroopers celebrating the end of a rigorous training exercise got extremely drunk and set off two thunderflashes (which simulate the noise of a grenade), two smoke grenades and a flare on the grounds of the Petawawa base. The party then moved to Algonquin Provincial Park where there were more explosions and gunfire. At some point that night the regimental orderly sergeant's personal car was torched. Morneault was not able to find the perpetrators. This, along with other incidents, worried Brigadier-General Ernest Beno, who was in charge of the Special Service Force at Petawawa. He expressed concern to his superior, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, that Morneault was not able to handle the unit. His feelings were confirmed after the Airborne Battle Group completed a four-day exercise to test its readiness for the Somalia mission. Non-Airborne soldiers complained that some members of 2 Commando abused mock prisoners and were too quick to use their weapons (Pugliese, "Anatomy" B1). Beno believed the Airborne performed so poorly that he took the unprecedented step of removing its commander, Morneault, only a few weeks before the mission was to begin. Lieutenant-

Colonel Carol Mathieu took over and intensified the Battle Group's training. He also chose to drop six men from the order of battle, although there is still some controversy as to whether or not he should have dropped more (Bercuson 227).

Other problems with the mission were out of the Airborne's control. Most significantly, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) had difficulty deciding on the Rules of Engagement, which lay out how much force soliders are permitted to use in order to attain a stated objective. At first, NDHQ based Operation Cordon's Rules on those used by Canadian troops in the former Yugoslavia. But there were delays in passing these onto the troops who were destined for Somalia and, as Bercuson writes, "It is next to impossible to give soldiers mission-specific training when they don't know what [Rules of Engagement] they will be subject to" (Bercuson 223). Just days before the Airborne was to leave for Somalia, the United States asked the UN Security Council to change the Somalia mission. Given the chaos created by the warring factions in Somalia, the Americans felt something more than a Chapter 6 peacekeeping mission was needed and promised to supply more troops if the UN agreed to their request. It did and Operation Cordon was scrapped in favour of Operation Deliverance. The new mission came under U.S. military leadership, rather than UN, and was classified as a Chapter 7 peace-enforcement mission, the same category of intervention used in the Korean and Gulf wars. Chapter 7 missions permit greater use of deadly force than traditional Chapter 6 peacekeeping missions, thus giving soldiers the benefit of the doubt in potentially hostile situations. These changes to the Somalia mission meant the Airborne turned in their UN blue berets and replaced them with their own maroon ones. They would no longer be stationed in Somalia's more-peaceful north as originally planned, but in the central town of Belet Huen. Their job was to take possession of the town, run out the local warlord's militia, restore order, and patrol and police an area surrounding it. This also meant that the Rules of Engagement would have to change again. The confusion over the Rules would later come back to haunt the Airborne

(Bercuson; Worthington, "The Wrong" 33).

By late December 1992, without any debate in Parliament, almost 1200 members of the Canadian Forces were stationed in Somalia. The HMCS *Preserver* floated off the country's coast, providing supplies and logistical support. An expanded Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, which included a squadron of the Dragoons (armoured vehicles), a mortar platoon and other combat troops in addition to the Airborne, was stationed in Belet Huen, along with a helicopter squadron. Colonel Serge Labbé commanded the entire Canadian force from headquarters in Mogadishu. In order to keep the size of his force down, Labbé had chosen to cut back on the number of military police officers that accompanied the Battle Group, bringing only two instead of the usual eight. He did this despite a December 9 memo in which military police officials warned that headquarters should be aware "of the potential risks involved in having virtually no capacity to handle prisoner of war/detainees, investigate offences including war crimes and entire range of police/security services" (Pugliese, "Anatomy" B2).

For the most part, the Canadian troops performed impressively in Somalia's intense heat and brutal conditions. Besides patrolling the area and disarming Belet Huen's 14 warring factions, the soldiers helped build roads, bridges and schools. They repaired water trucks and got wells and pumps working. They fixed hospital generators and Airborne medics provided free medical treatment to Somalis. They recruited and began training the local constabulary (Worthington, "The Wrong" 34).

Some of members of the Airborne, however, also got into trouble. The problems with the mission to Somalia have been well-documented in the Canadian media and dealt with during the recent public inquiry into the mission. These problems will be outlined only briefly here.

In addition to misuse of alcohol and illegal attempts to ambush warring factions, there were several "significant incidents"—the military term for a death caused by a

Canadian soldier while on duty. The Department of National Defence maintains there were only four significant incidents, but some soldiers allege more were covered up. There is also evidence that prisoners were abused in violation of the rules of the Geneva Convention.

In two of the four incidents, military police investigated immediately and exonerated Canadian soldiers of any wrongdoing. In the other two, however, military police laid charges. The first of these occured on the night of March 4, 1993. Frustrated that thieves frequently managed to crawl under the razor wire surrounding the Canadian compound and take everything from food to (allegedly) helicopter parts, Lieutenant-Colonel Carol Mathieu ordered a patrol to go outside the wire and, using all necessary force, capture anyone trying to sneak in. Some soldiers later testified that food and water was left near the fence as bait to lure "thieves" (Pugliese, "Anatomy" B2). The patrol waited several hours and then spotted two Somali men approaching the compound. The patrol moved to apprehend them and the men fled. Both men were shot in the back as they ran away and one of them died. Major Barry Armstrong, the army doctor who performed the autopsy on the slain Somali, told Mathieu he suspected the man had been killed at close range, execution-style. Mathieu dismissed the allegation. He, along with the patrol's leader, Captain Michel Rainville, were later court-martialled for the incident. Mathieu for changing the Rules of Engagement to allow for such an encounter, and Rainville for "unlawfully causing bodily harm, assault, negligent performance of duty, possession of a prohibited weapon, and breach of disciplinary rules." Both were acquitted (Bercuson 237).

The second incident was the now infamous torture-killing of 16-year-old Shidane Abukar Arone. On March 16, a patrol caught Arone entering an abandoned compound adjacent to compound of the Airborne's 2 Commando. He was placed in handcuffs and put in a holding bunker. That day, word had circulated throughout 2 Commando that it was acceptable to "abuse" intruders. There is still confusion as to who said exactly what, and

how the word abuse actually passed down the chain of command. Nevertheless, the understanding that a certain amount of abuse would be tolerated contributed to the death of Arone. For more than two hours that evening, Master Corporal Clayton Matchee of 2 Commando punched and kicked Arone, beat him with a riot baton and metal bar, and burnt him with a cigarette. Private Elvin Kyle Brown watched while the beating took place and even kicked Arone a few times himself. He also took photos of Matchee posing with the bruised and bloodied teenager. Even though he worried Matchee might kill the prisoner, Brown did little to stop him. Over the course of the beating, as many as 15 soldiers, not all of them Airborne, stopped by the bunker to see what was going on. None of them did anything to stop Matchee either. Arone died around midnight and word of his death was sent to headquarters in Mogadishu and National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. A media release was issued in Mogadishu, but no journalists were around to pick up on it.

Back in Belet Huen, Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu was slow to start an investigation into the torture-killing and only did so under pressure from a group of 2 Commando's sergeants and Private Brown. Almost two weeks after the incident, Matchee was arrested for the murder and while in custody, tried to hang himself. He succeeded only in causing irreversible brain damage.

A Canadian journalist covering the Somalia mission found out about Matchee's suicide attempt, and subsequently learned about Arone's torture-killing. When he sent his story back to Canada, two weeks had already passed since Arone's death. The Department of National Defence had been hoping to contain the story because its minister at the time, Kim Campbell, was running for the leadership of the Progressive Conservative Party. According to notes from Captain Fred Blair of the Judge Advocate General's office, senior staff were told at a meeting not to make problems for the Minister. "During that (March 26) meeting the DM (Deputy Minister), echoed by the CDS (Chief of Defence Staff), exhorted all present that things must run smoothly between then and the end of the Tory leadership

campaign" (Pugliese "Anatomy of a Cover Up," B3). Once word was out, National Defence issued a brief statement on April 1, 1993, about the killing and Matchee's suicide attempt.

When questioned about the delay in making Arone's death public, Campbell said her Defence department staff had not kept her informed ("Into the Briar" 8; Pugliese B3). The incident received enough attention from the media and the opposition Liberal party to prompt her, on April 26, to announce a military Board of Inquiry into the way the Canadian Airborne Regiment conducted itself in Somalia. Part of the board's mandate would be to examine "the extent, if any, to which cultural differences affected the conduct of operations" (Kinsella 339).

Since January, the Liberal party had been conducting its own investigation into Matt McKay's white supremacist connections. It had been tipped off when a *Winnipeg Sun* reporter sent the Matt McKay photo and article to Liberal leader Jean Chrétien's office. After Campbell announced the Board of Inquiry, the Liberals decided to go public with the McKay story. (McKay had not been implicated in any of the incidents in Belet Huen.) They distributed copies of the *Sun* story at a House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence when Campbell was present, but no reporter questioned her about it. The next day, however, CBC television followed up with a story on *Prime Time News* about McKay and neo-Nazis in the military (Kinsella 340). Amidst a flurry of media coverage, the Opposition continued to question the Conservatives. For their part, the Conservatives maintained they'd instituted a zero tolerance policy towards racism. They, along with the department of National Defence, also asserted there was no proof that current members of the armed forces were actively affiliated with extremist groups or activities. But Kim Campbell made the situation worse when she admitted to reporters in Edmonton that she'd known "for ages" there were white supremacists in the armed forces. She later dismissed McKay's skinhead connections as "youthful folly." These comments shocked the Jewish

community and many minority groups. Weeks later, the government and the Defence department were forced to acknowledge that two armed forces personnel stationed at CFB Esquimalt in Victoria had been dismissed in 1992 for having links to the Aryan Nation (Kinsella).

On August 31, 1993, the Board of Inquiry into the Airborne's mission to Somalia released the first phase of its report to a packed press conference. The report detailed 2 Commando's fondness for the Rebel flag—a symbol with connections to neo-Nazi groups in the United States, but it had no evidence that the Airborne had adopted the flag's racist connotations. Another section of the report listed the nicknames some of the soldiers called Somalis, particularly the "enemy" Somalis; nicknames such as "gimmes," "niggers," "smufties" and "nig-nogs." The report also admitted it found evidence that some members of the Airborne Battle Group may have held white supremacist views, but this was, at worst, a tiny minority (Kinsella 345). Among other findings, the board reported that unofficial initiations were going on, and it warned that unless there was an official Airborne initiation, soldiers would set up their own which: "...might not mirror the appropriate values and attitudes or behaviour" ("Airborne Video").

In the fall of 1993, with an election fast approaching and facing numerous letters of complaint from the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Royal Canadian Legion, the Conservative government pointed again towards its zero tolerance policy towards racism in the military. It revealed that on August 19, without any sort of public notification, it had promulgated new regulations declaring "racist attitudes are totally incompatible with the military ethos and with effective military service, and any behavior or conduct which promote such attitudes cannot be tolerated" (Kinsella 347). The new regulations would include an education and awareness program to ensure all personnel understood the policy, and new screening procedures to ensure soldiers were impartial to the countries to which they were deployed. Also, with little public fanfare, the Defence department had taken a

number of steps to clean up the Airborne after it returned from Somalia at the end of May 1993. It had replaced Airborne Commanding Officer Lieutenant-Colonel Carol Mathieu with Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Kenward, a strict disciplinarian who had been in charge of 2 Commando in the late 1980s: changed over the leadership of the sub-unit commanders within the Regiment; changed over the personnel of the Regiment by 25 per cent; ensured appropriate actions were taken in regard to all disciplinary cases; and reproved Brigadier-General Ernest Beno for his negligence in not ensuring the unit readiness prior to deployment.

The Liberals won the federal election in the fall of 1993 and newly elected Prime Minister Jean Chrétien appointed David Collenette as Minister of National Defence. He inherited the Somalia file at a point when its profile was low. Nine soldiers had been charged in connection with Arone's death and other incidents in Somalia and investigations in preparation for their courts martial were in progress.

The first court martial took place in February and March of 1994. It was the trial of Private Elvin Kyle Brown, who was charged with manslaughter and torture in the death of Shidane Arone. He was convicted and sentenced to five years in military prison and dismissed from the army in disgrace. Over the next year, courts martial were held for six others charged in connection with the death. Master-Corporal Clayton Matchee, who had inflicted the bulk of the beating upon Arone, was declared unfit to stand trial due to the brain damage he suffered from attempting suicide. The other men, some of them officers, were charged either with negligence for telling soldiers they could, or should, abuse prisoners, or with negligence for failing to protect a prisoner. Three were acquitted and the other two received sentences of a year or less.

Some were outraged that the lowest ranking soldier—Brown—received the heaviest sentence for obeying what he thought was an order to abuse prisoners. In particular, Scott Taylor, the editor and publisher of the military magazine *Esprit de corps*, took up Brown's

cause, even before all the courts martial were finished. For several years, Taylor had used his magazine to wage a small war on National Defence Headquarters. With help from the Access to Information Act and various inside sources, he attempted to expose corruption in the armed forces' upper echelons. *Esprit* catered to the military's lowest ranks, and was therefore the ideal vehicle for Taylor to promote his belief that Brown was the scapegoat—Matchee was the real murderer, but he couldn't stand trial, so Brown was being punished instead. *Toronto Sun* columnist Peter Worthington, who himself had served with the Princess Patricia's, took up Taylor's crusade and wrote an in-depth cover story on Brown's plight, entitled "The Wrong Man," for *Saturday Night* magazine.

As the courts martial got underway, the army's generals were deciding what to do about the Airborne. In April 1994, following "a detailed analysis of the evidence," army commander Lieutenant General Gordon Reay pronounced the Airborne fit for duty. In a report to General John de Chastelain, Canada's Chief of Defence Staff, Reay wrote, "I am confident that the problems which arose have been addressed and the appropriate individuals disciplined, posted or released...Moreover the Regiment will inevitably remain under very close scrutiny, by both the public and the Canadian Forces, for some years to come." De Chastelain inspected the Airborne situation himself and told Defence Minister David Collenette that Canada needed paratroopers and such capability should continue to be provided by the Airborne Regiment. "I believe the concerns that led to the questioning of the Canadian Airborne Regiment's future have been answered by organizational, staffing and command decisions already taken," de Chastelain wrote in a June 1994 letter to Collenette (Pugliese, "Airborne Troubles" A1).

The Airborne was given a chance to redeem itself that August when Canada agreed to send peacekeepers on a humanitarian mission to Rwanda. Two Airborne platoons from 3 Commando (about 85 soldiers) accompanied the 300-member Canadian contingent to the war-torn African country. The Defence department was taking no chances this time; it

screened the soldiers carefully and gave them cultural sensitivity training before the mission. A spokesman for Defence Minister David Collenette said the government was sending the Airborne because there was no reason not to. "We wouldn't be sending them if we didn't have complete confidence in the ability and their professionalism," he said. "I think it's inappropriate that people should generalize the activities of a handful of people, one incident over 50 years of peacekeeping" (Canadian Press, "Paratroopers").

Major-General Guy Tousignant, the UN Force Commander for the Rwanda mission, commended the Airborne's performance there. "In this theatre, they were the best soldiers I had...If I had been given a full battalion of Airborne troops, I could have secured the four corners of Rwanda in half the time." Unfortunately, the Airborne's behaviour was not perfect. One soldier got drunk and fired a shotgun inside a building. He was immediately arrested, sent home, demoted to private and given 58 days in jail. Two others cut their hands in a blood-brother ritual and were sent home because their injuries left them vulnerable to infection and disease. They were given alcohol abuse counselling (Wallace 17). Because both incidents involved alcohol, the Canadian base in Rwanda immediately went dry after they occurred. A report detailing the incidents was published in November 1994, and stated, "No amount of training or preparation can entirely eliminate errors in judgment or prevent individuals from breaking established rules should they decide to do so." Collenette said he was satisfied with the report. "It seems to me that were are looking at two incidents that are somewhat isolated, but I think it's worthwhile putting people on notice that this kind of behavior will not be tolerated," he said (Canadian Press, "Booze").

The report on the Airborne's behaviour in Rwanda was the least of Collenette's concerns that month. Early in November, National Defence lifted a publication ban on 16 "trophy" photos used as evidence in Brown's court martial. They were the photos Brown had taken of Matchee with Arone. Brown also appeared in several of the pictures, posing with the beaten prisoner. Some journalists had described the photos in detail when they

were first exhibited at Brown's trial, but because of the publication ban, the public had never actually seen them. With the ban lifted, some newspapers and television stations decided Canadians had a right to see to see the photos. Among the newspapers that published some of the photos were: the *Ottawa Citizen*, the *Toronto Star*, the *St. John's Evening Telegram*, the *Mail-Star*, the *Montreal Gazette*, the *Toronto Sun*, the *Ottawa Sun*, the *Winnipeg Free Press*, the *Edmonton Journal* and the *Edmonton Sun*. CBC-TV and CTV also broadcast the photos in their lead items. The *Globe and Mail* and many other newspapers, including most of Quebec's francophone dailies, did not run the photos (Canadian Press, "Photos" 11).

The photographs showed a blindfolded Arone covered in bruises and blood. His hands were tied to a wooden riot baton behind his back and his feet were bound in plastic cuffs. Matchee was shown pointing at the prisoner and "clearly smirking" in one photo. In others, he was shoving a baton between Arone's lips, or using it to hold up his chin (Bindman, "Photos" B1). Brown appeared in a few of the photos, looking grim-faced. For the newspapers that chose to run at least one photo on the cover, and to run it in colour (such as the *Ottawa Citizen* and the *Toronto Star*), the public response was overwhelming and largely negative. The majority of responses criticized the papers' decisions to put a colour photo on the cover. There were also complaints that the photos ran at all, outrage against the military and/or its "few bad apples," and even some praise for the decision. The *Star* received more than 400 calls the day after it published the photos; the *Citizen* received 800 calls and letters. There was only a muted response at the television stations (Pugliese, "Grisly" A1).

Just as the furore was starting to subside, Major Barry Armstrong, the Airborne's medic in Somalia, came forward with allegations he'd been told by his superior to destroy evidence that showed Canadian soldiers had mistreated Somalis. He'd disobeyed the order and kept photographs of the abuse. These, he said, would only be turned over to a public

inquiry or court martial. Defence Minister Collenette had been for some time resisting demands for a public inquiry into the Somalia incidents. The closed military Board of Inquiry initiated by the Conservatives had been on hold since the courts martials started and wasn't to resume until they were completed. But its secrecy and limited scope had some, such as Scott Taylor at *Esprit de corps*, concerned that it would lack the power to expose what was beginning to look like a cover up at the highest levels. When Armstrong came forward with his allegations, Collenette had no choice but to act. The Minister said he'd always intended to call a public inquiry, but hadn't planned to announce it until the courts martial were completed in early 1995. Armstrong's allegations had changed his mind, Collenette said. He announced that an inquiry "completely open to the public" would begin as soon as the trials, and perhaps appeals, were over. The new inquiry would be wider in scope, and would look into political questions, such as the possibility National Defence had shielded Kim Campbell from the events in Somalia (Bindman, "Sweeping" A7).

The Airborne was still reeling over the publication of the torture photos. "It portrays us in the worst possible light. I was certainly horrified and angered by it [the publication of the photos]," Lieutenant-Colonel Kenward told reporters ("Soldiers" B1). He and the rest of the Regiment wanted to put Somalia behind them, but it refused to go away. Kenward, Scott Taylor and several others said the media's actions were a gratuitous grab for ratings and circulation. One soldier, Mark Boland, was disturbed that the photos showing Brown with Arone had been published along with those showing Matchee. Boland had pleaded guilty to negligent performance of duty in relation to Arone's death. Believing, like many others, that Brown was the scapegoat and Matchee was the real culprit, he went to Scott Taylor with a plan to help exonerate Brown. The soldier told Taylor he had a home video that was made in February and March 1993 by some of the 2 Commando soldiers in Somalia—a video that showed Brown in a positive light in contrast to several of his fellow troopers. Taylor already knew the tape existed and that as many as 50 copies had been

made. In fact, Brown had a copy or two, but would not let anyone see the video for fear it could be used against the Airborne. Taylor, however, took the tape and said he would try to get it some media coverage (Worthington, *Scapegoat* 242; Taylor, personal interview).

In January 1995, Scott Taylor handed copies of the videotape over to *The Ottawa Sun* and the CBC Newsworld show *Ottawa Inside Out*. He had screened the nearly two hours of tape and found it so boring he fell asleep. While most of the video was innocuous, Taylor knew some of the soldiers' language and attitudes might upset people unfamiliar with military culture. That didn't concern him much, though. More important was that Private Kyle Brown was shown *not* participating in any of the questionable behaviour. According to Taylor, Brown was a "real deep thinker," "a loner" and "not like the rest of the guys." He hoped the video would convey this (Taylor, personal interview). He also hoped the video would support his other pet cause—exposing the systemic leadership problems in the military.

Taylor handed over the tape on the condition neither the *Sun* nor *Ottawa Inside Out* do anything with it until Sunday, January 15—when he hoped few people would pay attention to the news. The other major media outlets caught wind of the videotape late Saturday and Taylor was already fielding an endless stream of media calls when a one-minute story by the CBC's Susan Harada aired on the noon newscast. Taylor hadn't stipulated who could use the tape so the producers at *Ottawa Inside Out* gave Harada a copy to work with. Harada's piece served to break the news and provide a lead in for the *Ottawa Inside Out* segment that followed. A detailed account of the videotape and its reconstitution in news story format will be provided in the next chapter. In essence, however, the stories showed various shots of the 2 Commando compound and the market place in Belet Huen. In addition to shots of the soldiers' living conditions and recreational activities, were clips of some—including the infamous Corporal Matt McKay—making comments about killing and doing violence to "niggers." Other clips conveyed some soldiers' cynicism towards

their mission. Kyle Brown is seen briefly, appearing uncomfortable and avoiding the macho posturing and racist language of those around him. In his six-minute interview on *Ottawa Inside Out*, Taylor tried to direct attention towards his goal to exonerate Brown. He also attempted to put the soldiers language in context, as he saw it. Harada's stories (a longer one aired after *Ottawa Inside Out*) made a passing reference to Brown.

The next day, the story was everywhere, and not as Taylor had envisioned. The soldiers' racist and violent comments were the focus, resulting in demands that the upcoming public inquiry be expanded to examine the issue of racism in the military. Collenette refused to comment or even view the entire video. He told CBC his legal advisors said he might end up in a conflict of interest if he commented on the tape, since he would be the one hearing final appeals on any military charges (*Ottawa Inside Out*). Collenette later said the tape would be important evidence in the upcoming inquiry and ordered an investigation into it. Meanwhile, Taylor was giving hundreds of interviews, doing damage control and trying to direct the media's, public's and politicians' attention towards his two goals: absolving Brown and exposing the military's leadership failings.

Just days after the video aired, a cameraman with the CTV affiliate in Montreal, CFCF, heard of another video. An ex-Airborne soldier in Quebec was doing some construction work at the cameraman's house and remarked that the Somalia video was tame compared to one he had. CFCF bought the tape for a small price and on the evening of January 18, CTV opened its national newscast with a lengthy and dramatic warning. "The story we start with tonight is so ugly it would be hard to believe if the evidence weren't so strong," said Anchor Lloyd Robertson gravely. He went on at length about the brutality of a hazing ceremony held by the Canadian Airborne Regiment at CFB Petawawa in 1992 before leading into the story. The segment showed amateur video footage of a group of drunken soldiers from the Airborne's 1 Commando vomiting, eating something indistinguishable and vomiting again, doing push ups, and urinating on other soldiers. The

voiceover from reporter Cynthia Drummond said new recruits were forced to eat urine-soaked bread, vomit and excrement. In closing, Drummond read a statement from David Collenette who expressed outrage and accused the Airborne of denigrating "our proud Canadian military heritage." He promised the Chief of Defence staff would investigate. ("Shocking video").

The next day the story was front page news. Many reports pointed out that the hazing ritual took place in broad daylight in front of the barracks at CFB Petawawa. Where were the leaders? they asked. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, on a trade tour in Trinidad, said, "The video of yesterday created an urgency and if we have to dismantle it [the Airborne], we'll dismantle it. I have no problem with it at all" ("Airborne video"). For the next few days, the future of the Airborne was a major focus in the mainstream media. Some articles tried to make sense of the hazing, which seemed to draw far more attention than the video shot in Somalia. Others criticized the media for showing the footage in the first place and pointed out the videos were old and the Airborne had been cleaned up. There were also demands to speed up the public inquiry. Liberal constituency offices across the country were apparently "swamped" with calls about the Airborne, and newspapers received numerous letters. The BBC, some of the American networks and TV stations in Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Asia ran segments of the videos (Pugliese, "How the Airborne" A1).

On January 23, 1995, Chief of Defence Staff General John de Chastelain gave Collenette his report on the videos. He recommended keeping the Airborne, reiterating that the videos were old and the Regiment's problems had been solved. Collenette did not agree. At a press conference that afternoon, he still refused comment on the first video, but said, "there are disturbing questions that arise out of a second video, the hazing and racist video, which shocked our nation." As a result, he announced plans to expand the forthcoming public inquiry to examine leadership and discipline from headquarters on

down to the Airborne. He went on to say that racist, violent and degrading behaviour was not and would not be tolerated in the armed forces and it was the government's job to ensure the forces had the respect and trust of Canadians.

> I am concerned that the conduct of some members of the Airborne Regiment over the past few years has questioned that trust and has denigrated the reputation of all members, past and present, of the Canadian Forces. This government will not allow that proud heritage to be jeopardized. ("Speaking notes")

Collenette admitted that when de Chastelain had given the Airborne a clean bill of health the previous June, he had been reluctant to make a decision on the Regiment's future until an inquiry was completed. "However, the incidents in Rwanda last fall, which were subsequently investigated by the Chief of Defence Staff, and in combination with these two videos, demands action." Collenette said he believed the Regiment's problems were systemic and therefore he was ordering the disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment and the re-assignment of its members to their home units.

"Airborne disbanded in disgrace" was the headline on the front of the *Globe and Mail* the next day. In the *Ottawa Citizen* it was, "Airborne dies in infamy—Public lost faith in unit, Grits decide." The *Toronto Sun* read "Airborne shut down—gross video `straw that broke the camel's back.'" Collenette appeared on CTV's *Canada AM* and elaborated on his reasons for the decision, fully admitting his motivation was political. Host Valerie Pringle pointed out that the death of a teenager resulted in an inquiry, whereas two disturbing videos, made before the teenager's death, led to the disbandment. Collenette responded saying the courts martial had already dealt with Arone's death and the videos were affecting Canadians' image in the world ("On disbanding").

Collenette's decision and the events leading to it were widely debated in the mainstream media for more than three weeks following the announcement of the disbandment. The announcement also received international coverage. Some argued that the disbandment drew more attention than the videos had because such an event was so rare. Few media outlets mentioned a Gallup Poll conducted the day of the disbandment. Even

though many politicians and commentators said the Airborne had to go because the public was outraged, the poll results did not strongly support this claim. Many of those polled were disgusted by what they saw on the videos, but only 32 per cent agreed with the decision to disband the Airborne; 50 per cent disagreed (Goldstein 11). A detailed analysis of the media discourse surrounding the videos and the disbandment will follow in the next two chapters.

Members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment were shocked and devastated by the government's decision. By this time, almost half of the approximately 650 members had not even been in the Airborne when the videos were made. The Regiment had been slated for a mission to Croatia in April to relieve Canadian peacekeepers already there. The soldiers had viewed the mission as their chance to fully redeem themselves, and were bitter that chance had been taken away. They were also angry at the media, who they held responsible for the disbandment, and CFB Petawawa was temporarily closed to journalists.

Other home videos of military exploits began emerging from the woodwork. CTV obtained a Navy video which eventually proved to be fairly innocuous. Then came news that National Defence had a copy of another Airborne hazing video made in 1994, after the Regiment was supposed to have been cleaned up. Again it was mostly innocuous, reports said. But a small segment showed soldiers shaving their heads and shocking themselves with a hand-cranked telephone (a device with the power of two D-cell batteries) to test their endurance (Vernon D8). Collenette was outraged when he found out and viewed this new revelation as justification for his decision to disband the Regiment. These actions, said Collenette, were illegal under the National Defence Act and had supposedly been banned from all military bases. Up to this point, the Minister had been able to distance himself from the Airborne's scandals because most had taken place under Conservative leadership. This latest video had happened on his watch, blurring the distinction between past and present governments. Recognizing this, Collenette again took quick action and removed a

high-ranking general who, he claimed, had not kept him informed.

The Canadian Airborne Regiment disbandment officially took place on the first weekend of March 1995. The cost of dispersing the soldiers, their families and an assortment of equipment to various bases around the country was estimated at $4 million (Eade A4). The Airborne was told to disband with dignity, and several events were held in its honour, including a giant parachute drop. The Airborne's regimental colours were officially laid to rest in a museum at CFB Petawawa. As the Airborne soldiers, standing at attention in their maroon berets and dress uniforms, were dismissed for the last time by Lieutenant-Colonel Kenward, cameras focused on the tears in the men's eyes. Few reporters failed to point out the contrast between these images and the ones that had helped bring the Regiment down.

Clearly, the videos on their own would not have caused Collenette to disband the Canadian Airborne Regiment. The videos were merely the catalyst. But of all the disturbing events in the Airborne's history, why were two home videos so powerful? Before January 1995, demands that something be done about the Regiment had been answered with "wait for the inquiry." Why then, after the videos were shown, could Collenette wait no longer? How did they create an "urgency," as Prime Minister Chrétien put it?

Those critical of Collenette's decision pointed out the lack of logic in his rationale. The videos were old, they said, made before the institution of the zero tolerance racism policy and significant changeover in the Regiment's personnel. The content of the videos was not new, they argued. The 1993 Board of Inquiry report had already revealed that some soldiers used offensive language in Somalia. The courts martial had exposed the violent behavior of other Airborne members. National defence had known about hazings since the 1980s, and were reminded of them in the 1993 report. What would the disbandment solve? critics asked. The Airborne soldiers had come from other regiments in

the armed forces, and would return to them, bringing any bad habits along. And Collenette's assertion—that the videos helped show the Regiment had systemic problems—just didn't wash, some said. He was acting as if the videos were taken yesterday when in fact, the Airborne of 1995 could be quite different than that of 1992-93. He hadn't given the soldiers a chance to prove it.

In the end, logic did not prevail—image did. Collenette and the Prime Minister openly admitted this. Because the video images of the Airborne endangered the proud reputation of Canada and its peacekeepers, action needed to be taken. (Undoubtedly, the Liberals were also worried about their own image and needed to show they could take decisive action.) Perhaps without realizing it, the Defence Minister disbanded the Regiment not so much for its behaviour, but because that behaviour was shown on television. The "last straw," then, was the media event. A media event is an event whose reality lies, in part, in its mediation (Fiske xiv). The mediation of the soldiers' actions, first through amateur video and then through television news presentations of the video, magnified what they really were. This magnification clashed with the images many Canadians are said to have about themselves. What's interesting, then, is not so much what the videos showed about military culture, but what they revealed about Canadian culture as the public, media and politicians attempted to make sense of them.

Chapter Three—The Media Event

> Video is a powerful tool. We had no idea how powerful it was until we released that thing. The video itself, it *seemed* so innocuous, for the most part...I didn't really think it was that big a deal."
>
> Scott Taylor, Editor, *Esprit de Corps*, Personal interview, November 6, 1995.

> It is absurd that this government, which was fully prepared to wait out the controversy over the 1993 murder of a teenager in Somalia at the hands of some Airborne members, was finally prompted into action by a video of a hazing that had taken place in Canada the year before that.
>
> "Dumb and Dumber," Editorial, *Toronto Sun*, January 25, 1995.

In a Letter to the Editor of the *Toronto Sun* on January 26, 1995, Cecil W. Buck wrote that Defence Minister David Collenette's decision to disband the Airborne Regiment "defies logic" (A14). Military reporter Nancy MacKinnon, in her weekly column in the *Pembroke Observer*, wrote the disbandment was "like executing the accused before the trial starts" (MacKinnon, "Airborne Regiment" 8). Journalist Joan Bryden wrote in the *Ottawa Citizen* that Collenette even admitted the move "in many ways defies logic, the principle of fairness and the military's operational needs" (Bryden A8). In the aftermath of Collenette's decision, many pointed out, often with analogies to the judicial process, that the Minister's approach to the Airborne was akin to shoot first, ask questions later. Such logorational arguments might have achieved the Airborne's acquittal in a courtroom. But as John Fiske points out, "television is not an Enlightenment institution, and logorationalism has never

been as central or powerful in it" (137).

In *Media Matters*, Fiske studies the role that mediation and discourse played in what's been called the Rodney King affair. He analyzes how the videotaped beating of black motorist Rodney King by four Los Angeles police officers, as well as the officers' court trial and acquittal, and the subsequent mass uprising in L.A., came to form what he calls a "media event." Many of his observations can be applied to an analysis of the Airborne videos.

Fiske examines the ways in which the grainy video images of Rodney King's beating, played repeatedly for American households and viewers worldwide, came to mean something quite different in a court of law. On television, their meaning was taken to be self-evident—a case of extreme police brutality. This attitude is clear in a statement from a source close to the District Attorney's investigation shortly after the video aired on national television: "Without the tape, the LAPD might have argued anything and been believed by a jury" (Leerhsen 53). For many, particularly African-Americans, the video images were even more significant for their *typicality*. From their standpoint, such beatings were not uncommon, they were just seldom caught on video. Now they had evidence to support longstanding claims of racism in the police force.

In the courtroom of the first trial (not the federal trial that followed the L.A. uprising), the low-tech, amateur video was made high-tech by the defence. It was cleaned up, slowed down, speeded up, written on and freeze framed. In addition, the officers' defence lawyers applied the logorational discourse of the courtroom to it. Fiske calls this the discourse of high power, with "logorational" encompassing notions of the power of the word, of God, of the law, as well as the rationality that accompanies these notions and the form of knowledge that they produce (132). While the prosecution lamely asked the jury to let the video speak for itself, the defence applied a narrative to the video that made it seem as though Rodney King was in control of the entire episode. It used the institutionalized

language of the police force to explain King's every move as a threat and the officers' responses as unquestionably appropriate, even defensive. This tactic left the jury with reasonable doubt and the officers were acquitted.

The defence lawyers' approach would not have worked on television, Fiske argues, because television had already inundated the public with the "videolow" version of the incident. The new, technologized version used by the defence would have highlighted the power to manipulate the image. Besides, the public had already decided what it wanted to believe.

> As a post-Enlightenment institution, television cannot deal in the singularity of truth; its voices are always multiple, its truths situated and thus provisional. The Rodney King video on television spoke with the authentic voice of the low only because that voice was, in this case, the one that most Americans wanted to hear, if only because it allowed them to disavow a racism whose overtness made it counterproductive. (137)

Fiske applies the term "media event" to an occurrence whose reality lies, in part, in its mediation. In the King example, the term refers to a composite reality encompassing everything from the point when George Holliday started videotaping King's beating, through to the video's countless viewings and reviewings on television and in the courts.

> The term *media event* is an indication that in a postmodern world we can no longer rely on a stable relationship or clear distinction between a 'real' event and its mediated representation. Consequently, we can no longer work with the idea that the 'real' is more important, significant, or even 'true' than the representation. A media event, then, is not a mere representation of what happened, but it has its own reality, which gathers up into itself that reality of the event that may or may not have preceded it. (2)

This explanation echoes Jean Baudrillard's ideas of hyperreality and simulacrum, which describe the implosion of the binary concepts of reality and representation (hyperreality) and the image with its referent (simulacrum). Media events are also hypervisual, according to Fiske, because they are widely distributed via technology and inserted into unpredictable social contexts. This differs from a non-mediated event whose social reality is confined to the immediate physical area of its occurrence (126).

To the notions of hyperreality and hypervisuality, Fiske adds the idea of struggle and uses discourse theory, largely influenced by Michel Foucault, to demonstrate it. Discourse, or language in social use, is determined by the social conditions from which it emerges and, in turn, it also affects those conditions. In practice, it has three dimensions: "a topic or area of social experience to which its sense making is applied; a social position from which this sense is made and whose interests it promotes; and a repertoire of words, images, and practices by which meanings are circulated and power applied" (3).

Fiske's concept of the media event, with its emphasis on both mediation and discourse, is useful for demonstrating why, despite its apparent lack of "logic," the Canadian government's decision to disband the Airborne Regiment is not all that surprising in a mediated world. Clearly, there are differences between the seconds or, at the most, minutes of video taken surreptitiously by George Holliday and the combined total of nearly three hours of home video footage taken of the Airborne with their knowledge. It is also important to stress here that in both the King and Airborne examples, the videos had non-mediated realities—King *was* beaten by police, some Airborne soldiers *did* utter racist comments and perform disgusting and violent acts. The videos were *evidence* of these occurrences and they were used as such, in the first case during the trial of the LAPD officers, and in the second example, during the public inquiry into the Somalia mission. But because the evidence was captured in audio-visual form, a form that can easily be circulated and combined with other audio-visual texts, and because these events tapped into "murky anxieties and political differences" (Fiske xv), the importance of the videos was magnified. The mediation of the action, the playing and replaying of the images on televisions screens across the continent, and the discursive frames placed around those images, all worked to give the videos their power.

Fiske focuses most of his discussion on the defence's use of the video in court; he does not conduct a detailed exploration of why the media handled the video the way it did.

Therefore, in addition to applying Fiske's concept of the "media event" to the Airborne Regiment amateur videos and the news stories resulting from them, this chapter will expand on several key issues: the social conditions that invest video and television news with meaning; the different gazes through which visual images can be viewed; ideas about what news is and how television news stories are constructed; and the sense of "liveness" and "perpetual present" fostered by television. A key factor—the cultural currents in Canadian society that were so crucial in investing the Airborne videos with meaning—will be the main focus of Chapter Four.

Early imaging technologies were the products of the positivist view that phenomena, or at least images of them, could be captured and studied objectively, provided that the mechanism doing the capturing operated free from human interference. In 1878, French physiologist E.J. Marey strove to develop mechanically generated images that would speak in the "language of the phenomena themselves" (qtd. in Daston and Galison 81). Marey and his contemporaries hoped to uncover the secrets of human anatomy, mental illness and criminal behaviour through methods that would "let nature speak for itself."

In *The Burden of Representation*, John Tagg explains how photography accrued power near the end of the nineteenth century. He describes the emergence of:

> ...a modern photographic economy in which the so-called medium of photography has no meaning outside its historical specifications. What alone unites the diversity of sites in which photography operates is the social formation itself: the specific historical spaces for representation and practice which it constitutes. Photography as such has no identity. Its status as a technology varies with the power relations which invest it. Its nature as a practice depends on the institutions and agents which define it and set it to work....Like the state, the camera is never neutral. The representations it produces are highly coded, and the power it wields is never its own. (63-64)

Near the end of the twentieth century, many uses of, and attitudes about photography, have been extended to video. Like Marey and his contemporaries in the nineteenth century, institutions such as the police, the courts, the media and medicine have all invested video

technology with varying degrees of power and frequently give its images the authority to "stand as evidence or register a truth" (64). The acceptance of this authority is evident in a 1991 *Newsweek* article about amateur video: "With its unblinking power to record events verbatim and in graphic detail, the video camera is a 'new truth-telling device that can cut through lies,' says Jack Nachbar, a professor of popular culture at Bowling Green University" (Beck et al. 43). But what truth are these images revealing? Images are seldom left to stand alone, especially those that circulate in the public sphere. They are usually contextualized somehow, to inform viewers what they are looking at, or rather, to tell them what truth they are seeing. But as theorists such as Roland Barthes have suggested, all images have the potential for multiple signification. This belief is by no means restricted to academe: the artistic community in particular continues to contest the taken-for-granted meanings of images. And the defence lawyers for the officers who beat Rodney King clearly knew they could make Holliday's video yield to the specific logorational discursive frames that best suited their purposes. Even journalism frequently concedes that the camera may not lie, but "it can lack context" (Russell 164). There persists, however, a pervasive positivist outlook towards images: what Chris Jenks and many others have called the conflation of the "seen" and the "known." This tendency results in only a "partial sight."

> The sustained visual constraint of the modern era has, in large part, been enabled through the collusion of science, or rather the ideology of scientism, in our cultural outlook. Scientism is not the professional practice of genuine scientists but the naive and popular attitude that ascribes the conferment of truth to the infrastructure of technicism around which the economy has developed. Science, or rather scientism, is bestowed the duty of 'imaging' reality, as part of the exercise of its role in manufacturing 'truth' throughout modernity. (Jenks 7)

The notion that pictures reveal a single indisputable truth is the essence of what John Murphy and Jung Min Choi call "imagocentrism"—the visual equivalent of logocentrism. "Both these terms are based on the idea that we can capture knowledge untrammelled by interpretation" (478-479). The risk inherent is this attitude is the tendency to focus on appearances at the expense of underlying factors. With both the Rodney King and Airborne

videos, the focus became the individual event rather than root causes such as institutionalized violence and racism.

The belief in the truth value of the image persists in Western culture and it underlies part of the power conferred to amateur video, which in turn contributes to the increasing prevalence of such images on the media landscape. Equally significant, however, is the belief that amateur video images originate from outside the institutions that have made them meaningful. In other words, even though the dominant social, political or economic apparatuses are what give images the power to register truth, there is still the sense that amateur video is a product of activity occurring on or beyond the limits of those apparatuses. Amateur video images have an "authenticity" that those taken by the professional news media do not, although some who use these images are at a loss to explain exactly why. "There's something about the unpolished quality that tends to make it seem more real," explains Elspeth Bloodgood, a producer at a Tulsa television station. She adds, "People tend to sanitize their actions when they know a station's news crew is there, while they are not as aware of the videotaping when people are shooting with a home video camera" (Luft 37).

To develop Bloodgood's first point further, her equation of "unpolished" with "real" must be examined. Her statement implies that professional, polished video images, such as those used in television news and some documentary styles, are somehow less real than amateur footage. This is recognition of the fact that when conventional newsmaking practices, which are supposed to make the news team seem objective and even invisible, are juxtaposed with amateur footage, the artifice of the former becomes evident. In *Making News*, Gaye Tuchman outlines how a "visual language" is created by the ways in which television news footage is framed and edited. News film/video images are the products of certain practices professional newsmakers use to reduce idiosyncratic occurrences to news, to deal with the various constraints of the news organization, and to give the appearance of

impartiality. "News film presents itself to us as actual representations, not as symbols and signs manipulated by set conventions" (Tuchman 108). But when held against the grainy, unfocused images of amateur footage, it becomes more evident that "polished" news footage is the product of the professional and organizational demands of the newsmaking process. If the amateur video is not part of the traditional news process, one could then conclude that it must be outside it. Fiske elaborates on the connection between amateur video, or "videolow," and authenticity.

> The videolow was characterized by its poor and unsteady focus, its unplanned camera position and angle and its subservience to 'real time' (no editing). This low-technicity meant that it was low in clarity but high in authenticity. The 'lowness' of its technology indexed the 'lowness' of the social position from and for which it spoke, and carried a sense of authenticity that depended upon the videolow's apparently continuous metonymic relationship with experiential truths (or 'true experiences') of the socially disempowered...This equation of low power with high authenticity has become conventionalized in film and television by a low-tech mode of representation, first in the handheld cameras of cinema verité, of naturalistic (as opposed to realistic) documentary, and recently through the miniaturization of video technology in what is called 'reality TV.' (Fiske 127)

The high authenticity of amateur images has been recognized by many marginalized groups. With video technology becoming cheaper, smaller and easier to use, these groups are wielding it as a weapon for resistance. "Video vigilante" is a term frequently applied to those whose take up camcorders in order to right wrongs, whether they are activists travelling the world in search of human rights abuses or parents spying on babysitters. Marginal groups and everyday citizens see the camcorder as an empowering, democratizing tool. As Lili Berko suggests, various new media technologies have "produced the possibility for each one of us to not only be the object of surveillance, but its subject as well" (63). And Fiske points out that the technology enables users to create alternative truths. "Low tech, verbal or visual, is not the exclusive terrain of the weak, for the weak have no territory that is theirs alone, but it is the terrain upon which they can best contest the strong" (Fiske 136).

TV producer Elspeth Bloodgood's second observation—that people change their

behaviour more when a news crew is videotaping—is also worth examining. Footage from video surveillance cameras is often viewed with the same fascination as amateur video, yet with surveillance footage, there is no socially disempowered individual behind the camera. In fact, surveillance cameras are the embodiment of established systems of social control. Their authenticity comes from their covert nature—the ability to catch people "in the act" or to relocate private actions in the public domain. Journalists have long recognized the appeal of hidden camera images which, in the last decade, have become the staple of such shows as ABC's *Prime Time Live*. This covert quality is extended to amateur video in the sense that home videos are intended for a very specific and usually small audience. They are not meant to be shown on national television. When people's private activities are broadcast via the mass media, the "situational geography of social life is changed" (Meyerowitz 308). The boundaries between public and private become blurred. There is a certain voyeuristic pleasure to seeing someone else's unguarded moments. The surprising (some would say appalling) success of *American's Funniest Home Videos* has

> revealed the intense interest that Americans [and Canadians] have in subjecting their image to public scrutiny and laughter. Home viewers of the program become empowered as interlocutors into the private lives of their fellow Americans while enjoying the power of anonymity (invisibility and unverifiability) offered by the apparatus of home video surveillance. (Berko 70)

The aura of authenticity or naturalness surrounding amateur video is dependent on its raw and low-tech appearance, its apparent origins from outside traditional institutions and its ostensible ability to capture "real" events in ways that television news cannot (despite its supposed adherence to realist tenets). There is a sense then, that amateur images are not part of the "regime of truth" in the same way the professional news media are. The regime of truth is a concept developed by Foucault:

> Each society has its régime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse it harbours and causes to function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true from false statements, the way in which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures which are valorised for obtaining truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (qtd. in Tagg 172)

The professional news media, with all their standardized practices for identifying, developing and producing news stories, are part of the regime of truth. Tuchman's work details these ordered procedures which, she argues, help legitimate the status quo rather than uncover contestatory truths.

> News, I have argued, is a social resource whose construction limits an analytic understanding of contemporary life. Through its dispersion of the news net, its typifications, the claimed professionalism of newsworkers, the mutual constitution of fact and source, the representational forms of the news narrative, the claim to First Amendment rights of both private property and professionalism—through all these phenomena, objectified as constraints or as resources—news legitimates the status quo. (Tuchman 215-216)

Amateur video is perhaps seen by some as representing an alternative regime of truth, a system that produces and circulates it own meanings regardless of, or in opposition to, those produced by the hegemony. This is its so-called democratizing or equalizing power. It should be remembered, however, that it is the dominant regime of truth that accorded video its power to stand as evidence in the first place. Amateur video would have no impact on the majority of viewers if it did not comply with the rules of what defines "truth" in society. As for amateur video's seemingly "untouched" quality, the camcorder is just as guilty as the television camera of recording only slices of reality. Of course, the "visual language" of amateur videographers is not nearly as codified as it is for news cameramen, but many home videos exhibit attempts to mimic news style. Additionally, those who attempt to use video as a tool for resistance or for revealing contestatory truths often rely on the professional news media, in its role as a producer and transmitter of truths supporting the dominant regime, to both circulate and legitimate amateur images. Tuchman has examined how marginal groups trying to work against the status quo often reluctantly found themselves relying on the mainstream media for coverage that legitimated their cause and circulated their message. Even amateur videographers who are not operating in support of any particular cause go first to the media with their footage rather than the police or some other institution. As a result, the public seldom sees amateur images in their raw, uncut

form: they are first packaged and framed by the news media before they are circulated for all to see. While amateur video may operate on the edges of the regime of truth, it is still part of it. And because the news media are instrumental in legitimating and circulating amateur images, any examination of such images must focus on how they are presented by the media.

Two of the main themes discussed above—resistance and voyeurism—were evident in the media event surrounding the Airborne videos. First, the idea of struggle. The belief that video can be used to bypass or at least augment traditional information gathering and dissemination processes was what motivated former Airborne sergeant Mark Boland to anonymously pass the first tape on to the media. Military culture is notoriously tight-lipped. Its procedures for disseminating information follow a strict protocol that gives the higher ranks tight control over who knows what. "One of the worst sins a member can commit is passing information to someone outside the chain of command before people in the chain have learned about it" (Harrison and Laliberté 23). This protocol includes how much information gets out to the public and media. Much like the police, the military has its own language, rife with jargon and acronyms that can seem impenetrable. Its detached, institutional lingo, also has a way of neutralizing the impact of the discourse (e.g. a term such as collateral damages is used to refer to innocent civilians killed by military crossfire).

According to *Esprit de Corps* publisher Scott Taylor, the anonymous soldier (Boland) gave him the tape because he felt Private Brown was the scapegoat in the murder of Shidane Arone. Senior officers who had allegedly condoned the abuse of prisoners were left virtually unpunished (this was before the appeals process, when some officers received slight sentences), while Brown was dishonourably discharged and sentenced to five years in prison for manslaughter and torture. *Esprit*'s Taylor said his informant was not the only soldier who felt this way. Apparently many of the lower ranks were displeased with the apparent lack of leadership and accountability shown by their leaders. By giving Taylor 2

Commando's home video to pass on to the mainstream media. Boland's act represented a significant rupture in the military chain of command. In the military, "there is no mechanism for collective dissent" (Harrison and Laliberté 25).

Boland and Taylor's efforts at resistance were diluted considerably once the tape reached the mainstream media. The lure of seeing what was not meant to be seen took over. This does not mean the journalists who handled the tapes necessarily dealt with them in a lurid or sensational fashion. Rather, the insertion of these glimpses of private military life into a mainstream civilian environment provided evidence for what many Canadians may had suspected or, in fact, known, but chose not to think about. Fiske describes a similar reaction in the case of the Rodney King video. "Like videoporn, it showed a close-up truth that was publicly unacceptable, however fascinating in private: it provoked white America to throw up its hands in moral outrage and thus drive its racism back under the surface where it properly belongs" (128).

The reasons why the second Airborne tape, the hazing video, was given to the media are less clear. It was passed on by an ex-soldier, who some called disgruntled and others claimed was motivated by the first tape to further expose the Regiment's racism and violence. After selling the tape to CTV, the ex-soldier received death threats and subsequently went into hiding. This tape provided a window onto the closed world of so-called male bonding rituals. Meant to be experienced only by its participants, this too found its way into the living rooms of most Canadians.

Underlying the motivations of both soldiers was the belief that the videos would speak for themselves. This is particularly clear in the case of the video made in Somalia. Both Boland and Scott Taylor thought it could be used to exonerate Kyle Brown. Several minutes of the almost two-hour tape showed Brown looking uncomfortable while soldiers around him made violent and racist remarks about Somalis. Taylor later admitted he was naive to think the media would view the video in the same way. He made the common

positivist assumption that imaging technologies simply capture a pre-existing reality. They can clearly function as evidence, but how that evidence is used depends on who looks at it. In their study of *National Geographic*, Catherine Lutz and Jane Collins echo Barthes' work by suggesting that photographs are dynamic sites "at which many gazes or viewpoints intersect" (363). While video is not as vulnerable as photography to the accusations that it "freezes the life out of a scene, or violently slices into time" (381), Lutz and Collins's approach to explaining the dynamism of photographs is useful for understanding the different gazes brought to bear on video images.

> This intersection [of gazes] creates a complex and multi-dimensional object: it allows viewers of the photo to negotiate a number of different identities both for themselves and for those pictured; and it is one route by which the photograph threatens to break frame and reveal its social context. (363-364)

The authors present a typology of seven kinds of gaze: the photographer's gaze; the institutional, magazine gaze: the reader's gaze; the non-Western subject's gaze: explicit looking done by Westerners in the photos; the gaze reflected through mirrors or photographs; and the academic gaze (364). Not all of these are relevant to the study at hand. Furthermore, colonialism and the power relationships it entails are not as key in the Airborne videos (although they do play a role). What the idea of gaze does provide, however, is a way to analyze how and why the Airborne-video media event turned out the way it did.

Take first the gaze of the soldiers doing the videotaping. Even though they cannot be interviewed, it is possible to get a sense of the points of view that influenced the videotaping process. In the first video, the soldier (or soldiers—there may have been more than one cameraman) took a travelogue approach. The cameraman can be heard providing a running commentary as he videos 2 Commando's compound near Belet Huen—including tents, latrines, helicopters and Somalis walking towards town on the other side of the barbed wire perimeter. The cameraman frequently asks his fellow troopers what they think of the tour, and usually receives a negative response ("It sucks" was a frequent comment).

Some soldiers interviewed send greetings to their families back home. Others complain about the heat, smell, boredom and bad food. In Belet Huen, the cameraman interviews the local police, asking them if they like Canadian soldiers. The response is always "yes." Other soldiers are interviewed and the marketplace is toured. Back at camp, there are more shots of soldiers off and on duty, and more interviews. Interspersed throughout are the comments that were later the focus of the news stories. It is clear from the cameraman's commentary and the questions he asks that he is cynical about the Canadians' role in Somalia. (Several times he asks soldiers how they like feeding all the *starving* Somalis. The soldiers respond that no one is starving and the military presence is just adding to the corruption that was already there.) While always professional and polite with the Somalis he interviews, the soldier also seems to have been ill-prepared to deal with the vast cultural differences between Canada and Somalia. It is also evident that he and the other soldiers are not ashamed of their views. Many comments indicate some soldiers intend to show the tape to their families. The contents of the tape, then, were considered suitable for an audience wider than that section of 2 Commando. Had the cameraman and his fellow soldiers known the tape would be broadcast on national television, though, their behaviour would likely have changed somewhat.

Both Boland and Taylor seem to have shared the cameraman's gaze to an extent. To them, the views expressed in the video and the language used to express them were not unusual. But to their gaze was added the dimension of resistance. Boland, as already discussed, wanted to exonerate Private Brown. This agenda fit well with Taylor's on-going battle with the military brass over, in his mind, its lack of leadership. They therefore must have regarded some of the behaviour in the video as at least somewhat inappropriate since they planned to present Brown as noble and upstanding in contrast to it. According to Taylor:

> To illustrate Brown's character, I'd hoped to use one short segment of film footage, in which several soldiers posture for the camera and make morale boosting

> statements in the form of vulgar racial slurs. Throughout this display, Kyle Brown is set apart from his squad mates and comes across as both introspective and reserved by comparison. (4)

Taylor was surprised, then, when the journalists did not see the video the same way. Instead, he felt they focused on the shocking and sensational. This simplistic attitude does not take into account the journalist's gaze, and the notions of what makes news that inform it. Given that a definition of news is hard to pin down, Taylor's mistake is not surprising. Furthermore, the guidelines that journalists think they use to identify news are not necessarily the same ones that non-journalists (e.g. academics) think journalists use. This discussion will deal first with the journalism profession's definitions of news and how those ideas influenced the ways in which the journalists transformed the Airborne's home videos into news stories.

"News is what interests people," writes Nick Russell, a journalism professor and author of *Morals and the Media*. "News is what makes people talk" and it's "information that helps people to live a full life." He also offers a list of news values that help journalists determine what news is. These include proximity, immediacy, impact, important people, conflict, disaster and human interest (13). In *Newsgathering* Ken Metzler suggests that, "the much-vaunted 'nose for news' is little more than a professionally disciplined curiosity, the kind that evolves from human nature" (21). He adds that the "journalist's job is to second-guess human nature and to anticipate the elements that audiences will find interesting, important and useful" (22). These and other journalistic definitions of news treat journalists as the link between the audience's needs and desires, and the events or issues that will satisfy them. Such definitions also view news as determined largely by objective criteria, that is, newsworthiness is inherent in the event itself. And, as will be evident in the following discussion surrounding the media's treatment of the Airborne videos, many journalists see news as something that is surprising, unusual or unexpected.

To continue, then, with the idea of gaze, the journalists who covered the Airborne

videos approached their stories with certain professional notions about what news is and how stories are constructed. They viewed the videos' content and context (its historical placement in relation to other events) as the main determinants of newsworthiness. The content was newsworthy because it ran counter to what the journalists felt were popular impressions of the military. In an attempt to keep their personal "gazes" out of the story, the journalists relied on the opinions of "experts" to establish the importance of the videos, and some even relied on conflicting experts to give viewers a sense of balance. One additional element of the journalistic gaze must be noted here. Because journalism is ultimately a business with news as its product, news organizations frequently find themselves competing for "scoops." While journalists may not be particularly aware of their role in "selling" news, they are conscious of the need to beat out rival media outlets for a story. When each journalist was presented with a video that few or no other media had, this doubtless influenced their gaze. A more detailed examination of the stories broadcast on Canada's two major English networks—CBC and CTV—will demonstrate how the journalistic gaze is evident through editing and discourse.

The video shot in Somalia was first given to CBC Newsworld's *Ottawa Inside Out*, a half-hour show about parliamentary affairs that aired on Sundays at noon. One of the show's producers recalled having this reaction after first viewing the video:

> It didn't take me long to conclude that this was an interesting document. There were early references to violence against the Somali people using racial epithets, a lot of sort of macho kind of posing with guns and talking about violence against the Somalis. The clips, the most extreme ones, are the ones we've all see now replayed many times on TV, but there were other less sort of extreme examples on their own, there was a constant sort of stream of this kind of thing that kept reinforcing the idea that this was basically a generally accepted kind of opinion about the Somalis and how they should be treated and so I watched the tape through and immediately made it clear that I would like to try to put it on the air. (Confidential interview 1)

The producer was aware of Taylor's plan to help Private Brown, but promised only to try

to "be fair in representing the sort of general content and presentation." Taylor says he gave it to the show's producers on the condition that they show two minutes of footage and then interview him (Taylor, personal interview). *Ottawa Inside Out* producers say they aired only two minutes because they were unsure who held the video's copyright. Their lawyer advised them to treat it as material they were reviewing, similar to a movie review. In that way, two minutes could be aired without violating the owner's copyright (Confidential interview 2).

The segment, which led the show on January 15, 1995, began with an introduction by host Denise Rudnicki. She reminded people of the scandals in Somalia and updated viewers on the progress of the courts martial of the soldiers charged in relation to the death of Shidane Arone. Then she stated, "Today we have videotape taken during that mission. Pictures never before released." (This clearly indicated CBC's "exclusive" over the other networks.) She called the video a memento of the tour in Somalia but also a "record of the racism of some of the soldiers in the two months before Shidane Arone was beaten to death in their compound." (Here she adds context by tying the video to events Canadians already know about.) In the two minutes of footage that followed, the show's producers took the unusual step of making the editing process obvious to viewers. Every time the producers made an edit, they used a wipe, which is a vertical yellow line that slides across the screen and signals the start of the next clip. This visual intrusion made it clear which edits were made by the show's producers, and which were made by the soldier/cameraman.

The two-minute montage contained no voiceover, only the video's actuality sound. It started with an establishing shot of the Airborne compound, taken from a watchtower. This was followed by shots of tents, the Airborne flag, off-duty soldiers playing chess, reading and sleeping. The soldiers are seen riding on a truck filled with bags of wheat. In the Belet Huen market, they chat with the Somalis, who say the Canadians treat them well. Interspersed with these images are the ones that resonated so strongly with the reporters.

politicians and public:

• A soldier is sitting in a tent holding a wooden riot baton. "What's that used for?" asks the cameraman. "Cracking those little fucking small Somalis...breakin' arms, legs, limbs." comes the reply.

• A tatoo-covered Corporal Matt McKay (of the nazi-salute photo) sits under an awning, drinking a beer and smoking. The cameraman asks, "Corporal McKay, what do you think about the tour?" McKay replies, "I think it sucks cock man, we ain't killed enough niggers yet." He laughs.

• A soldier is standing in front of the police station in Belet Huen. He says, "Let's get something straight, there's no one starving here, okay. This is a police station, this is where 150 people hang out and eat wheat. That's all they do. They never work, they're lazy, they're slobs, and they stink."

• Corporal David Brocklebank (later acquitted on charges of torture and negligence in the murder of Arone), covered in black face paint, stands in front of a tent holding a machine gun. The cameraman asks, "What's this operation called? Operation snatch nignog?" Brocklebank replies, "Exactly. Operation snatch niggas. Niggas!" He holds out the gun with his right arm and makes noises as if he's firing it. The camera pans left and zooms in on Private Kyle Brown who is going about his business, ignoring or pretending to ignore the camera and the behaviour of his fellow soldiers.

Host Denise Rudnicki appears again and identifies for viewers the last two men, Brocklebank and Brown. She then interviews Scott Taylor, asking where the tape came from and why he gave it to the media. She is careful to phrase questions using such language as "in your opinion," "what was your reaction" or "is it reasonable to assume" so as to maintain the impression of distance. Taylor uses this opportunity to explain his plan to show Kyle Brown in a different light. Rudnicki also gives Taylor the chance to put the soldiers comments in context, as he sees it. "It's like being in somebody's house," says

Taylor, adding:

> It's a very private look at what goes on, at what's being said. It doesn't in any way necessarily reflect on their professional attitude, which I think for the most part, the Regiment did well and that's one of the risks in releasing this tape is that it may be taken the *wrong* way. But these guys are not poodles, they're pitbulls....They're not diplomats. Soldiers are all about when diplomacy fails, so to see them in their own element may be shocking for some people but you've got to remember just what it is we ask those men to do. [Italics added.]

Taylor also points out that the tape will be useful when the public inquiry into the Somalia mission begins because it shows the layout of the camp and the futile task the soldiers were sent to do. He adds that it would be impossible for senior officers not to know the soldiers held these attitudes, and therefore this behaviour must have occured with official cognisance, if not sanction. Rudnicki concludes saying that Defence Minister David Collenette had been invited to comment on the tape, but he declined for legal reasons.

When *Ottawa Inside Out* received the video from Scott Taylor, the producers learned that the *Ottawa Sun* newspaper also had a copy. Knowing the *Sun's* story would appear first thing Sunday morning, the producers gave a copy of the video to CBC national reporter Susan Harada. She produced a story that ran on Newsworld's hourly newscasts on January 15, as well as the CBC's *Sunday Report* at 10:00 p.m. Harada, who had covered the courts martial and was well-acquainted with the Somalia mission, was told the tape came from Scott Taylor, but not about his desire to use the video to help Kyle Brown. She trusted the staff at *Ottawa Inside Out* to have verified the video's authenticity (Harada, personal interview).

Harada recalls her reaction when she first saw the whole tape:

> ...it seemed like some sort of goofy video that anyone would take in a situation like that...and then interspersed in this were those moments of...they were chilling, almost, because some of the characters were known characters. Matt McKay for example, although he was never involved in the Arone thing or the March 4th shooting. But what he was saying was quite chilling and it just seemed to sort of set a tone. And Brocklebank getting ready to go out on their little "reckie" patrol and the attitude that came through with that, and some of the other comments about Somalis being dirty and lazy....It spoke to an underlying attitude that could very well have led to some of the things that we have heard about. I don't buy what some people say, "Oh it's just a bunch of guys horsing around." There's fooling

around and there's fooling around which displays something intended or not.

Harada's story followed journalism's traditional narrative format, with a beginning, middle and end. It was introduced by *Sunday Report* host Wendy Mesley as "another dark chapter" in the Somalia Affair. She continued: "It [the video] was taken nearly two years ago by Canadian Airborne soldiers serving in Somalia. It features Canadian soldiers making racial slurs, and it was shot just before a Somali teenager was tortured and killed at Canada's base in Belet Huen." She also made sure to state that CBC had "obtained" the video.

The item begins on an ominous note. An airborne soldier looks at the camera and says, "We're about to take you on a lifetime experience of the town of Belet Huen. It's something you'll never forget and neither will we." In her voiceover, Harada explains that much of the video is what "almost any traveller in a foreign land" would take. The images show soldiers in various off-duty activities. These are followed by the same disturbing clips highlighted in the *Ottawa Inside Out* piece. The main characters are identified and attached to either their white supremacist connections or involvement in Arone's death. Harada concludes: "Most, if not all of the soldiers speaking on the videotape, are still members of the Canadian military, a military which just last year introduced a new racism policy calling for 'zero tolerance' of any racist behaviour." Host Wendy Mesley closes with Collenette's refusal to comment and his promise that a public inquiry into the Somalia mission will be held soon ("Somalia Soldiers").

Unlike the CBC, CTV did not have the luxury of several days to work on the story. Still, having been tipped off by the *Ottawa Sun* story, CTV's Ottawa Bureau Chief Craig Oliver managed to get a copy of the videotape in order to prepare a story about it by the 11:00 national newscast. His piece was introduced by host Sandie Rinaldo:

> There is shocking new evidence tonight about an ill-fated Canadian peacekeeping mission. Once again it has to do with the conduct of soldiers during the UN duty in Somalia two years ago. That aid mission has been called the darkest period in Canadian military history. And the video tape released today bears that out...As

Craig Oliver reports. the videotape sheds more light on the military's dark secret. The item begins with Brocklebank and his gun. Oliver's voiceover says the soldier was "later acquitted on charges of torturing civilians." (The charge applied to only one civilian—Arone.) The Matt McKay segment follows. and then the soldier with the wooden riot baton. Kyle Brown is shown briefly, described as "trying to distance himself from the others" followed by the clip of the soldier saying no one is starving. Oliver then uses two clips the CBC did not use: in one. a solider says. "My job is getting very boring"; in the other. a soldiers says. "I think we're just adding to the corruption that's already here." The piece concludes with a clip from Scott Taylor saying that the higher ranks had to have known about these racist attitudes. Oliver closes repeating Collenette's promise of an inquiry and that the military has. since Somalia. instituted a policy of zero tolerance towards racism ("Canada's Shame Caught on Video").

The Airborne might have survived the furore over the video shot in Somalia. Both major networks had reaction stories the next day: CTV's aired on *Canada AM*: CBC had two. one on *The National* and the other on *The National Magazine*. Private David Brocklebank. the one seen brandishing the gun and talking about "Operation Snatch Nigger" was the only soldier from the tape to comment. He told CBC. "Well, if I'm a racist then everyone is a racist I guess. I have lots of black friends and stuff. When you're all hanging out as soldiers. you're probably kidding around. saying different things, trying to be cool and act tough" ("Somalia Video"). Many of that item's other guests conveyed the belief that although the comments on the tape were clearly inappropriate. they were the result of a few bad apples and represented a failure of the military leadership which should have weeded them out. Taylor. who was interviewed on CBC. was particularly careful to advance these points. But then. CTV obtained 1 Commando's hazing video.

On January 17. 1995. CTV. in a rare move. actually bought the tape from an ex-Airborne soldier in order to obtain exclusive rights to the video. In this way, the network

could control who else got hold of the images. Reporter Cynthia Drummond, from CTV's Montreal affiliate CFCF, was assigned the story. "The tape was obviously revolting," said Drummond when she recalled watching it for the first time (Drummond, personal interview). She had wondered, however, if such behaviour was the norm in the military. Because CBC did not have the tape, Drummond had all of January 18 to work on the story. She went to Ottawa to find an "expert," someone who could confirm that the video did indeed show unacceptable behaviour. The person she found was Scott Taylor.

Taylor's assurance that the video depicted extreme behaviour, even by military standards, formed the basis of the stories that followed. His verbal description of what he saw (which later turned out to be slightly inaccurate) was reiterated by the broadcast and print media, many of whom had not seen the entire video themselves because of CTV's control over it.

On January 18, 1995, Anchor Lloyd Robertson opened CTV's *National News* with the following:

> The story we start with tonight is so ugly it would be hard to believe if the evidence weren't so strong. Unfortunately it is. The video we're about to show you was shot on Canadian Forces Base Petawawa in Ontario during what's called a hazing in the summer of 1992. A brutal ceremony for inductees of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. What's depicted is both illegal and repulsive. No warning could exaggerate its vulgarity so beware. The video contains scenes of racism and degradation so vile it was the bases for much heated discussion here at CTV News. Our policy is to avoid obscene material unless it is essential to understanding a particular story. In this case we think it is. Not for any gratuitous reasons but to help start the painful process of inquiry into this shocking episode.

Drummond's story opens with about 20 Airborne soldiers—the new recruits—standing in front of a barracks building that she describes as Canadian Forces Base Petawawa. The voiceover describes the blurry images, which depict the soldiers vomiting, eating something and vomiting again. One soldier urinates on a recruit. Another is forced to do push ups while dirt is kicked in his face. Drummond's voiceover says some soldiers were "Forced to eat bread on which other troops had urinated. Some became ill and others were forced to eat vomit. All were smeared with human excrement, a few

consumed it." The next shot shows Scott Taylor watching the video on a television, followed by a clip of him saying that duty officers were present at the hazing and because it happened in broad daylight on the base it had to have occurred with official cognisance. There are shots of the Commando's only black soldier with "J'❤ KKK" scrawled on his back. He's then shown being walked around on all fours like a dog. In another clip, a soldier whose identity is masked, says the black soldier was often asked questions like "Nigger, what are you doing here?" Another unidentified soldier suggests, "Maybe there should be psychological tests which could detect any sadistic or violent tendencies a soldier could have." The final clip is from Collenette: "I can only express my outrage and disgust with this sort of activity. The activities of these people denigrate our proud Canadian military heritage. I have instructed the Chief of Defence staff to investigate this matter and to report on it...." Drummond closes with mention of Collenette's promises that the inquiry will get to the bottom of the Airborne's problems. But she adds, "Military experts say it will take a top to bottom purge to rid the peacekeeping forces of problems which are rapidly becoming a source of national shame."

The segment is then followed by a "debrief" between Robertson and Bureau Chief Craig Oliver. In describing the likely fallout from the video, Oliver predicts the Airborne will be disbanded soon and describes the regiment as "rotten to the core." He dismisses the suggestion that hazing is useful for toughening up soldiers, saying, "anybody who would subject themselves to that kind of indignity and humiliation is stupid." (Such an expression of opinion is rare for a journalist, but the informal interview nature of the "debrief" put Oliver more in the position of an "expert" than a journalist.) He concludes by mentioning that hazing is illegal in the Canadian military and predicts that charges will be laid ("Shocking Video").

CBC's first item on the hazing video did not air until the next day and was therefore very much a reaction story. Susan Harada was again assigned the story and began by

interviewing various people who had seen the tape since she was unable to view it herself (CTV only released clips and still photos from the original hour-long tape). CBC *National* host Peter Mansbridge opened the newscast with the hazing story:

> Prime Minister Chrétien warned tonight that if the Airborne has to be dismantled, then it will be dismantled. First, Somalia, then this week, two home videos, the latest a video of an initiation rite that is being described with words like "sickening" and "vile." Chrétien calls it horrible and unacceptable.

Harada's story begins with a clip of a grime-covered soldier lying on his back in the muck and being punched in the stomach by another soldier. Then a clip from Scott Taylor: "You've got them eating feces, you've got them being defecated upon, you've got them engaging in imitated acts of sodomy, you've got imitated oral sex." Harada goes on to show the shots of the black solider with KKK on his back. Next the black soldier is taped to a tree. Other shots show recruits lying in muck, having dirt kicked in their faces. Harada's voiceover says there are sergeants present, and it is the middle of the day. Clips from soldiers reacting to the video follow: one is not surprised ("It's not a daycare..."); the other is disgusted by the video. A defence analyst suggests a failure in leadership has allowed this culture to grow and continue. Harada then shows the 1993 board of inquiry into the Airborne, which warned that unofficial initiations might be taking place. The next clip brings viewers back to 1995 where Collenette is demanding a full report into the video. Mention is made of the video shot in Somalia released earlier that week, and the clip of McKay is shown. Chrétien makes a comment from Trinidad that the video has "created an urgency" and he has no problem dismantling the Airborne. Harada closes by questioning whether the "few bad apples" theory can still be applied to the Airborne when at least 60 soldiers from a completely different part of the regiment participated in the hazing ("Airborne Video").

CBC, CTV and other networks such as Global carried extensive coverage of the videos on January 19 and 20. Most of the discussion revolved around the need for the Airborne, its history, how it could have arrived at this state, and who (in the military) was

responsible. Scott Taylor made frequent appearances on panel discussions and was interviewed extensively by the print media. Television coverage then died down until the disbandment was announced on January 23.

The gaze that the journalists and their producers brought to these stories was one that viewed news as being determined, more or less, by objective criteria, the most important of which is social significance (i.e., Canadians have a right to know about the private actions of its military when the behaviour is considered unacceptable). They also viewed news as information that is surprising or unexpected. This approach makes assumptions about the viewers' gaze. It assumes that Canadians hold certain perceptions—in this case, that our "peacekeepers" are out in the world keeping peace, that they would never intentionally hurt anyone, that they feel benevolence towards each other and the citizens of the countries in which they are stationed, that they are fair and impartial, and that the Shidane Arone torture-murder was an isolated incident. The journalist's role is to show Canadians that these perceptions are not necessarily valid and the videos, particularly the hazing tape, were crucial in demonstrating that. The amateur video images contrasted sharply with the contemporary images of the military to which many Canadians (and perhaps the journalists themselves) are accustomed: soldiers hugging wives and children as they head off to dangerous foreign lands; soldiers delivering food to starving people; soldiers keeping peace at home (e.g. the widely published photo of a Canadian soldier staring down Mohawk leader Lasagna during the Oka standoff). Scenes of soldiers making violent racist comments about people they're supposed to be helping, or, seemingly worse, eating each other's vomit and degrading a black soldier right here in Canada, ran counter to what was assumed to be attitudes Canadians held towards their military. If the journalists thought that Canadians already believed that their military was full of racist brutes (as some may have) then the parts of the Somalia tape showing the soldiers acting in

a friendly manner towards the locals would have been deemed newsworthy. The hazing tape may have provoked nothing more than lurid curiosity.

Comments from the journalists interviewed for this study seem to correspond with the approach outlined above. One *Ottawa Inside Out* producer said:

> ...the sheer frequency with which these kind of sentiments were not only expressed but were just sort of left on the record without any of the other soldiers taking them up on it or appearing to be vocally uncomfortable with it, suggested to me that this was more of a norm than an aberration and for those reasons I thought it was fair to portray it....For me that was the news value. It wasn't simply just a home video, but in fact it was exposing these people and very troublesome attitudes they held. (Confidential interview 1)

In the case of the hazing footage, Drummond felt her belief that the video showed unacceptable behaviour needed to be confirmed. She said she didn't realize how big the story was until she saw Scott Taylor's reaction to the video. His reaction confirmed her suspicions that the behaviour portrayed on the video ran counter to popular attitudes about the military if someone like Taylor, who had been in the army, found it appalling. The video, as anchor Lloyd Robertson said, had to be shown not for "gratuitous reasons" but to "help start the painful process of inquiry into this shocking episode."

It is common for the media to focus on the shocking and disturbing, not so much for the sake of increasing viewers or readers—a complaint lodged by many soldiers—but because of the assumption that Canadians, and citizens of other Western nations, live in a sanitized world and are not aware of the violence that surrounds them. Nick Russell writes in *Morals and the Media*:

> The world *had* to be shown pictures from Auschwitz after the Second World War, as well as photographs of some of the worst atrocities from Vietnam, such as the naked child fleeing her napalmed village, the monk burning himself to death in protest, or the cold-blooded shooting of a Viet Cong prisoner. These images are etched into people's memory. The viewers and readers, especially in the United States, needed to be shown the reality of war, a reality that the Pentagon wanted to sanitize precisely because of its enormity. (106)

As stated earlier, how journalists define news, and their role in reporting it, is not necessarily the same as how others, namely academics, would define it. Of course,

academics find it just as hard to describe what news is. In an effort to make it easier for students of communications to grasp the wide range of opinions surrounding the question "what is news?", Ross Eaman has categorized intellectual positions on news into four distinct groupings: Front-line Humanism, Elitist Ideology, Counter-Information and Elitist Communication.

The Front-line Humanism approach treats news as a form of knowledge that is constructed using, more or less, objective news criteria—the main one being social significance. In this category, the journalist is seen as an historian on the run, with little time to assess the relative importance of events within the big picture. This position takes a classical democratic view of the media, in which an informed citizenry is key. It suggests that even though journalists face constraints, they at least help the public construct a view of reality, even if they fall short of constructing a view themselves (46-50).

The News as Elitist Ideology position rejects any claim "that the selection, gathering, and presentation of news are objective processes in the sense that they are determined primarily by the nature of reality itself" (50-51). Like the first position, it treats news as a form of knowledge, but it differs in that it sees the nature of news production, not the events themselves, as determinants of news. Journalism, this position holds, imposes a narrative structure that is not necessarily inherent in reality to attract viewers. The news-making process is also said to construct a view of reality that benefits a particular power interest—namely the news owners and other elites. Journalists are either directly or indirectly influenced by elite interests. They also assume there is a "consensus within democratic societies about the legitimacy of existing political and economic arrangements" (52). People expressing views that run counter to these arrangements are treated as radicals, or out of touch.

The third position, News as Counter-Information, discards the idea of news as knowledge and instead treats it as a form of communication. It does so because, unlike

knowledge which is built up over time. news treats each story as a discrete entity. with little "attempt to integrate different news items into a systematic and comprehensive view of the world" (53). Journalists must depend on self-interested sources for information. therefore this position sees the media as the conveyor belt along which the views and opinions of others reach the public. It holds that news overwhelms people with a profusion of events, severs past from present. mixes the significant with the insignificant. and shuns the normal in favour of the catastrophic. But news is also seen as a way to counter propaganda and deception. This position suggests that journalists infer what audiences' norms and perceptions are, and therefore choose news on the basis of what will run counter to popularly held views. forcing audiences to modify their ideas. Although the journalist must make a personal assessment of what is seen as "counter-information" and. therefore. news, this position still views news criteria as more or less objective. That is. the journalists do not select news on the basis of what interests them personally. News selection is seen to be guided by the perceptions the journalists believe the public to holds.

The final position. News as Elitist Communication. has in common with the News as Elitist Ideology position the idea that the nature of the news gathering process is what determines news. not a set of objective criteria. It differs in that it suggests that journalists facilitate mass communication. mainly in the interests of the elite. Eaman quotes various studies that show those near the bottom of the "social pyramid" have less access to news coverage. When they are covered. the stories are usually violence-oriented and don't focus on underlying issues.

While none of these categories fits news and newsmaking as a whole particularly well. the last grouping. News as Elitist Communications. most closely fits with the approach taken in this study. It also echoes some of the ideas put forward by Tuchman (see above). Tuchman suggests that news has three key characteristics. First. "news imparts to occurrences their *public character* as it transforms mere happenings into publicly

discussable events." This means that news is, above all, an institutional method of making "making information available to consumers." Second, "news is an ally of legitimated institutions." Access to the media is limited to elites. And third, "news is located, gathered, and disseminated by professionals working in organizations. Thus it is inevitably a product of newsworkers drawing upon institutional processes and conforming to institutional practices." It is the product of social institutions, and is also embedded in relationships with other institutions (3-5).

Journalists gave the Airborne's videos their *public character* by transforming them into news stories. A key element in this process is discourse—the narratives used to describe segments of the videos and give them meaning for the viewers. Without such descriptions, few would know what they were looking at or its significance. But to reiterate a point made earlier, there is always more than one way to describe something:

> The way that experience, and the events that constitute it, is put into discourse—that is, the way it is made to make sense—is never determined by the nature of experience itself, but always by the social power to give it one set of meanings rather than another....We can know an event only by putting it into discourse, so an event is always continuous with its discursive construction, but it still always contains the potential to be differently constructed....No discourse event is ever complete in itself but always carries traces of the other, competing, discourse events that it is not. No piece of reality contains its own essential existence: equally, it cannot dictate the discourse into which it will be put. (Fiske 4)

In keeping with the position that news serves the interest of elites, Fiske writes, "The dominant discourses, those that occupy the mainstream, serve dominant social interests, for they are products of the history that has secured their domination" (5). Journalism relies on a story-telling format—with beginning, middle and end—to convey information. But this format in not inherent in reality. Therefore, more than one story about any particular event can be told. This is what Bill Nichols has called the "struggle for interpretive hegemony" (18). In his examination of the Rodney King video, he writes that images cannot show intent or motivation, they can only corroborate narrative accounts (33). The nature of television news, however, is such that these narrative constructions

become invisible and the viewers believe they are seeing, via clips of the video, what really happened. A videotape's meaning (as opposed to its indexical correspondence to a prior event, such as the King beating or the Airborne hazing) "is the signified of the interpretive frame's signifiers, not an external referent" (29). In other words, the videos have meaning not so much for what actual events they depict, but because of the narrative used to describe them. The meanings they have represent the social interests of those who are in the position to give them meaning.

The producers at *Ottawa Inside Out*, as well as Harada and Drummond all took similar approaches when constructing their stories. They viewed the tapes, decided which points *they felt* needed to come across, chose visuals to accompany those points, and arranged the script and visuals in traditional story-telling format. For the video made in Somalia, the journalists were intent on showing that, even though it was long and contained a variety of images and comments, an undercurrent of racism ran throughout. The video made it easier to understand how something like Arone's death could have happened. With the second video, the journalists wanted to show the extent of violence and racism the soldiers were capable of, that these problems were more pervasive in the Airborne than originally thought, and that such behaviour showed a breakdown in leadership. The social interests revealed here, despite professional attempts to be balanced and fair, are a desire to show the soldiers' behaviour as unacceptable and symbolic of larger problems, and the need for a public figure or figures to be held accountable. This gives the appearance that the "establishment" is being scrutinized when tougher questions—such as whether or not Canada even needs a military or why Canadian soldiers were in Somalia[2]—are left unasked. The military establishment is legitimated by the very desire to hold it accountable. From their positions in the professional, mainstream media,

---

[2] Belgium and Italy have also been scandalized by the behaviour of their soldiers in Somalia, which may indicate that the international community's decision to use military intervention was inappropriate.

the journalists are not equipped or authorized to question the legitimacy of established institutions.

Not only did overall story constructions reveal specific social interests, so did the individual words and phrases scattered throughout. (These will be discussed only briefly here: a more thorough analysis follows in Chapter Four.) Consciously or not, language is chosen because it is expected to resonate with the viewers. The introductions used by CTV, in particular, were clearly constructed with a specific point of view in mind. Descriptions such as "shocking new evidence about an ill-fated Canadian peacekeeping mission" ("Canada's shame") shed light on the social interests of those who constructed the story. CTV's journalists and producers seemed to expect viewers to be as "shocked" as they were by the video's contents. The viewers were in fact being instructed to be shocked before they even saw the footage. The words were meant to strike a chord with those who would still hope that the murder of Arone was an aberration. They spoke to an underlying concern that soldiers are misbehaving abroad, embarrassing Canada, and trying to keep it all quiet. This is the "military's dark secret" Craig Oliver was reporting on. The overall tone carried an anti-military sentiment, based perhaps in a true distaste for the armed forces and their duties, and/or a lack of understanding about the military. By calling the Somalia mission ill-fated, when many in both the military and civilian communities felt that overall the Canadian soldiers carried out their tasks well and fulfilled their mandate, the reporters and producers fed into the growing sense that the soldiers had failed Canadians. CTV also insisted on calling the soldiers peacekeepers—the irony of the word cannot be missed when used to refer to someone who occasionally kills—even though the soldiers were not acting as peacekeepers. (Harada does not use the word peacekeeper in her story on CBC.) Similar observations can be made about CTV's introduction into Drummond's story on the hazing video. In saying "No warning could exaggerate its [the video's] vulgarity so beware," CTV did just that because its own reporter, Drummond, felt the intro was overdone (Drummond,

personal interview).

The public's acceptance of one narrative account over another depends on how much the account corresponds with underlying assumptions. In the case of the Airborne videos, the narrative accounts of CBC and CTV meant the most to those who, ever since Shidane Arone's death and the subsequent courts martial, had been feeling a growing sense of unease over the possible presence of racism and other undesirable traits within the army. It is unclear, however, what proportion of CBC's and CTV's audiences actually felt this way.

Most other mainstream media outlets took disturbingly similar approaches when dealing with the videos. One that stands out from the crowd is the *Toronto Sun*. While soundly criticizing the military brass for failing to keep the rank and file in check, it staunchly supported the military institution as a whole and even attacked other media for their treatment of the videos. Columnist Peter Worthington, who had served with the Princess Patricia's and was a supporter of Private Brown, clearly saw at least the first video with a different gaze than most journalists did. Not surprisingly, he used his column to advance different social interests than those espoused by the other media. He wasn't the only one however. *Sun* columnist Christie Blatchford obtained the video shot in Somalia from Scott Taylor and used her space on January 18, 1995, to present a very different interpretation of it.

She begins with a scene from the video that could be seen as running counter to the images already shown repeatedly on television:

> In one scene, a young man pores through *Parents* magazine.
>
> "A new dad in the Som," cries a voice from the background. Someone else asks how old his baby is. "Two months in 10 days," says the young father. "You ain't seen it (the baby) yet," comes the inevitable needle. "Don't you feel like a cad?" (8)

Blatchford argues that the few minutes of racist remarks shown on television are an unfair representation, if not outright distortion, of the almost 120 minutes of video footage. She

points to other examples where the soldiers appear to interact with Somalis in a neutral and intelligent fashion. She points out that the soldiers were clearly frustrated with the way the food they risked their lives to bring was being sold by clans on the black market. Blatchford concludes:

> Because the video was taken shortly before the terrible death of Arone, it has been lent a significance it doesn't deserve. The suggestion is that 90 seconds of inappropriate remarks by a handful of bored young men, showing off for one another in a home movie, shows a regiment on the brink of the disaster that was to come.
>
> In truth, what the video shows is how mercifully rare and atypical are soldiers like Clayton Matchee. The film that has been described as brutally racist is in fact reflective of any army—long bursts of tedium interrupted by short bursts of action.
>
> It is particularly reflective, in my opinion, of Canadian soldiers, as notable for its civility—its lack of sexism and racism and bad language—as are most of them.

When the video from Somalia is seen in its entirety, it is easy to see how various storylines, including Blatchford's and those of CBC and CTV, could be derived from it. When only the news stories are seen, however, the process of story construction becomes invisible. The stories appear to refer back to the video and its indexical relation to actual events, when they in fact refer mainly to themselves and the narrative frames that formed them.

It is more difficult to envision alternatives for the hazing video. When asked how else she might have handled that video, Susan Harada responded, "I don't know what other context you can possibly put that in. It was what it was" (Harada, personal interview). It can be argued, however, that the stories about the hazing video actually diluted its disturbing nature. Throughout the hour-long video are many moments when the recruits are kicked, punched or forced to eat dirt, urine-soaked bread and toilet paper. What appears to be extensive coercion and violence fails to come across in the television stories—partly because many scenes showed male genitalia and were not appropriate for broadcast. Many of those present are laughing but others appear extremely drunk, or extremely unhappy. One soldier is asked what he likes best about the party. "La fin," he

responds. In another shot, some soldiers stomp on the black recruit's back yelling "White Power." Also, according to a military police report, there is "an unknown man with a tatoo of Odie (dog in Garfield cartoon) carrying a flag. [A soldier] points to the tatoo and says it is a 'Quebecer patriot that is ready to destroy Canada. Fuck you Canada'" (Department of National Defence "1 CDO").

The camera's presence seems to have had a major impact on the action. The cameraman frequently demands the recruits do something "pour le caméra" or "pour la postérité." Some soldiers have argued, then, that the video magnified the severity of the initiation. Knowing of actions that occurred outside the camera's frame would have lessened the video's impact. This was the approach taken by Corporal Christopher Robin when testifying at the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. Robin was the black soldier in the video. Despite attempts by inquiry lawyers to have him admit he'd experienced racism while with 1 Commando, Robin's testimony was evasive. He pointed out that, while not evident in the video, he was not the only recruit walked around like a dog. As well, the video did not show the soldiers who picked broken glass from the ground so that he would not crawl on it. In another instance, while tied to a tree with another soldier, he asked the initiators to loosen his bonds, which they did (Robin).

Overall, most of the coverage of both videos followed the format of what Nichols has called bourgeois morality tales: "Such tales dwell on the emotional intensities and individualized dilemmas that beset the class in the middle, afraid of falling and eager to rise" (Nichols 21). This is a class that decries overt expressions of racism and violence while questions about the structures that foster such problems go unanswered. Ultimately, the Airborne videos were treated as localized events, with a focus on the racist words uttered, the revolting bodily fluids consumed, and the people responsible for allowing such behaviour to occur. Broader societal questions were seldom asked.

One of the main forces directing the discourse around the videos was Scott Taylor. As Fiske suggests, all discourse events contain elements from various competing discourses. Despite his failed attempt to portray Brown in a positive light, Taylor, through numerous interviews the media called upon him to do, was instrumental in directing the discussion towards the theme that the military leadership had failed. He also played a significant role in highlighting certain aspects of the hazing video. Because of CTV's control over it, he was one of the few people who had seen the entire tape. He therefore acted not only as CTV's "expert" source, he became the surrogate viewer for the public who would never see the whole video. Taylor's remarks about the soldiers' actions involving bodily fluids were repeated time and time again throughout the media and became embedded in the public's mind. (For example, there was never any proof the soldiers consumed excrement, but because of Taylor's early assertions that they did, that detail was prominent in many of the stories about the video. It is possible many Canadians will long remember the Airborne most for a disgusting act the members did not actually commit.)

Taylor was less successful in shaping the discourse around the videos when he tried to point out that the tapes were old and that the military leadership and the media, if not the public, already knew such sentiments existed in the Airborne. The military Board of Inquiry conducted in 1993 had already made public that some Airborne soldiers used unacceptable racial slurs while in Somalia. It also mentioned that unofficial hazings were occurring and should be stopped—a point few reporters addressed when covering the videos. Taylor's point failed to make an impact because the public had not felt outrage when the Airborne's problems were made public in 1993. The public had not been outraged because the story was not prominently covered. It was not prominently covered, by television in particular, because there were no visuals to accompany it. This is what Canadian journalist Eric Malling has called the "tyranny of pictures" (Russell 164). The social and economic forces that underpin news stories are much harder to show than the

people who act them out. Journalism tries to bring drama to news, often by telling the story through a person. Telling the public about the Airborne's faults was one thing, *showing* them, even if it was two years later, made all the difference.

The attempts by Taylor, and others, to point out that the videos were old also failed because television operates in a state of "perpetual present" (Frederic Jameson qtd in White 288). In her essay "Television: A Narrative—A History," Mimi White calls broadcast journalism an

> unstable conglomeration of realism, liveness, personality, and immediacy....Events thus represented are both past and present, there-then and here now, ended and open-ended; they are already historicized as stories, and yet to be finalized. As a medium of recording and transmission, television positions itself to subsume these alternatives as simultaneous perspectives. (284)

Television's main selling point, its uniqueness, is based on its ability to bring images to its audience in real time. Yet it so rarely makes use of this quality. Many events that could be live—sports events, current affairs shows, even the news—are pre-taped and planned with advertisers in mind. Journalists rarely cover events live and even then, it's usually *after* something has happened. Journalists rarely capture actual violence on camera and this is what contributes to the impact of amateur videos, such as those of the Airborne. That they're several years old doesn't matter, what's new is that they're being seen *now*. The structure of the newscast blurs the distinctions between past and present so even when the narrative mentions when the videos were made, the actions they portray have their impact in the present.

> This illusion of presentness, built into the structure of the program through the bracketing function of the anchorman, works to convey an ideology in which the present frames and brackets the past. Individual news items are treated as discrete and separate entities, with little or no relation to other items or to a larger historical context. The illusion of presentness conveys the sense that events take place in a vacuum and are entirely self-contained. (Nelson 240)

Fiske's concept of the "media event" makes it possible to trace the process by

which the Airborne Regiment's two home videos came to take on particular, albeit contested, meanings that were then conveyed to the public. With the help of imaging technologies, the activities of the Airborne were dislocated from their original context and made malleable. These images, like many in Western culture, were accorded the power to register truth. They also had the added power of authenticity because of the "low" position from which they came, a position that appeared to operate outside the dominant "regime of truth." The images were subjected to a variety of gazes, but those in the position to give the videos meaning for the largest audience—the media—by and large viewed the videos with an homogenous middle-class gaze that was clearly not strongly pro-military. This social position informs the media's approach to what constitutes news, to what is considered socially significant. The media's role in broadcasting the videos also gave them legitimacy. Mediation elevated the contents of the videos to the level at which the representation carried as much, if not more significance than the "real." In this context, logorational arguments about the fairness of the government's decision to disband the Airborne failed to make much impact, at least initially.

> Our age may be that of the visual simulacrum, where what is seen is what matters, and any distinction between an unseen ('true') event and its ('false') representations no longer seems achievable. Much of the thrust of our cultural technology is to extend what can be made visible and to technologize a panoptic power that lies in the means of seeing as much as in what it sees....But this hypervisuality has not swept logorationality out of the picture—history is never dislodged as simply as that. Rather, the visual and the verbal enter complex relations with each other as they move up and down the social and discursive hierarchies, as they oppose or endorse each other's ways of knowing. (Fiske 133)

With the sense of perpetual present conveyed through television news, the contents of the videotapes seemed just as present as the stories about them. This was how actions from the past, committed by a regiment that had since been, supposedly, overhauled, could cause such a stir. The videos' ultimate power, though, lies in their ability to tap into deep-seated cultural fears and insecurities and bring them to the surface. The problem is that, due to the disconnected and fragmented nature with which journalism deals with stories, and Western

culture's imagocentrism, there is a tendency to treat social issues, such as racism and violence, in a localized fashion. Ultimately, the real problems are seldom addressed. As Clint Burnham noted in *Fuse* magazine, the "furore over the activities of the Canadian Airborne Regiment reveals that the Canadian media, in collusion with the government, is unwilling to deal with real violence and its causes in our society, but is ready to crack down on represented violence" (12).

Chapter Four—The Moral Panic

> Multilateral security cooperation is not merely a Canadian tradition: it is the expression of Canadian values in the international sphere. We care about the course of events abroad, and we are willing to work with other countries to improve the lot of all manner of peoples.
>
> Department of National Defence White Paper, Chapter 6, 1994.

> All Canadians, and in particular, African Canadians, are owed an explanation as to why "puke-sucking" incidents in the second video were of such greater concern to Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and Defence Minister David Collenette than were the "nigger-shooting" attitudes in the first.
>
> Letter to the Editor, *Toronto Star*, January 25, 1995. (Farrell)

Amateur videos on the news come and go, but the ones that have an impact, that generate a media event of significance, are the ones that give a specific form to "deeply flowing and deeply conflictual cultural currents" (Fiske xv). Because the images on the Airborne's videos were perceived as a threat to values that Canadians hold near and dear, they provoked embarrassment, outrage, and a rare example of swift government action. The extent to which this indignation was shared throughout Canadian society, however, is unclear. It will be argued here that many media outlets, politicians, "experts" and the newsmaking process in general helped generate a moral panic over the videos, which in

turn enabled the preservation of certain myths Canadians hold about themselves.

In *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, Stanley Cohen describes moral panic:

> A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself. (Cohen 9)

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Canadians, for the most part, like to see themselves as non-racist, non-violent, peace-loving people who help others. In a 1997 Angus Reid Poll, 94 per cent of Canadians saw their country as a world leader in working for peace and human rights around the world" (Angus Reid Group, "Canada Ranks"). Various texts about Canada support this assumption. On Canada's domestic and international image of tolerance. Cecil Foster, a Caribbean-Canadian journalist in Toronto, writes:

> In Canada, the prevailing view suggests, nobody has doors slammed in their faces because of the colour of their skin, for Canada has the potential to be one big, comfortable home for all people fortunate to live within its boundaries. And as that prevailing view holds, Canada has never practised the blatant racism so obvious in the United States, Europe and even parts of Africa and the Caribbean. Canada is viewed as a kinder and gentler place for minorities, where civil and human rights have been won through quiet persuasion—not in confrontation with water cannons, snarling police dogs, armed guardsmen and security forces who "bust head" at peaceful sit-ins. (Foster 31)

In terms of its peacekeeping mentality, Peter C. Newman has called Canada a "peaceable kingdom" and quotes historian C.P. Stacy, who referred to Canada as an "unmilitary community" (Newman 81). Canada's Chief of Defence Staff in 1995, General John de Chastelain, delivered a speech to an American audience entitled "Peacekeeping as an Expression of Canadian Values." In it, he described Canada's national personality as multicultural, built on tolerance, "even bland, even decaffeinated" (Chandwani A2). A few

writers have pointed out there is a certain smugness to these feelings. In his article on Shidane Arone's murder and the scapegoating of Private Brown, Peter Worthington wrote in *Saturday Night*, "It was a crime without modern precedent in the Canadian military, and there is no question that it shocked the nation and its sense of special virtue" (Worthington, "The Wrong" 32). On CBC, commentator Rex Murphy said, "A 16-year-old was mauled and tortured to death while in custody of peacekeeping forces of a country that likes to think, and openly boasts of itself as being an agent of mercy in international affairs" ("Point of View").

In reacting to the Airborne videos, Canadians attempted to further define and reinforce what constitutes the "Canadian way." In the *Ottawa Citizen*, a high school student wrote that peacekeeping is "the Canadian way to protect the weak from the strong, to feed those who are hungry, and to try to bring peace where there is war" (Martell C4). In several articles and editorials the soldiers' behaviour was labelled "unCanadian." More prevalent, however, are examples that it is more Canada's *reputation* for peace and tolerance that is threatened. These references started appearing after Arone's murder. In 1994, *Maclean's* editor Robert Lewis wrote, "The actions of the Airborne not only besmirch the peacekeeping tradition that has become, with medicare, a major source of this country's positive self-image in the world. They smear all of the armed forces" (Lewis, "Canada's Shame" 2). After the videos were broadcast, an editorial in the Halifax *Daily News* said: "It became far more than a domestic uproar over a few louts, partly because of Canada's global reputation for peacekeeping, built with blood and toil since the Second World War" ("Troubled Regiment" 18). In a letter to the *Ottawa Citizen*, Edward Seymour wrote, "Third World countries...view our armed forces' peacekeepers and care givers as an elite body. This image is now destroyed and Canadians are now considered racists and barbarians" (Seymour A8). These reactions suggest a national identity based on what others think and not necessarily on a clear sense of self. What Arone's murder and the

Airborne videos did was insert a wedge between the myths many Canadians held about themselves and the harsher reality underneath. This was a reality many Canadians did not want to acknowledge, much less allow anyone else to glimpse. The moral panic generated over the Canadian Airborne Regiment successfully masked the widespread issues of violence and racism in Canadian culture by focusing on the mediated images and by localizing the problem to issues of military leadership and culture, especially Airborne culture.

Stanley Cohen's approach to studying moral panics will provide a loose framework for examining the treatment of incidents involving the Canadian Airborne Regiment. In his book, Cohen examines the genesis and development of indignation and hysteria surrounding the clashes between the so-called Mods and Rockers in Britain in the 1960s. He has taken a model for studying disasters and condensed it to the following stages: Warning, Impact, Inventory and Reaction. The Warning phase is a time during which apprehension arises over a possible danger. Communication from others or signs from the approaching disaster itself warn of imminent danger. This phase may be absent or truncated in the case of sudden disaster. The Impact is the time during which the disaster strikes and there is an immediate, unorganized response to it. During the Inventory, those exposed to the disaster begin to form preliminary pictures of what happened and their own condition. This is followed by the Reaction phase which has several components. First, activities are geared to help survivors and the suprasystem begins to send aid. Then, more deliberate and formal activities are undertaken to relieve those affected. Finally, over an extended period, the community recovers its former equilibrium or adapts to the changes the disaster may have caused (Cohen 22-23).

To this model, Cohen has added the element of amplification. Examples of deviance, such as the actions of the Mods and Rockers or the Airborne, are not discrete events like natural disasters. As Cohen demonstrates in his example, deviance models are

amplifying and circular. Societal reaction to each example of deviance frequently has the effect of amplifying the level of deviance of the next impact stage, setting up a feedback system.

The Airborne example does not strictly adhere to Cohen's disaster/deviance amplification model. Most of the impact phases in the ongoing moral panic were not actual events, but media events. Except in the case of Arone's death, it was not so much the occurrence of deviance, but the mediation of it, that posed a threat to societal values. Therefore, instead of causing an amplification of deviance, growing societal concern over the Airborne increased the number of *revelations* about *past* deviance, which usually came in the form of visual images such as photos or videos passed on by the media.

Even when information about deviant actions reaches the public almost as soon as the acts have occurred, the news is still usually channelled through the media.

> In industrial societies, the body of information from which [ideas about deviance] are built, is invariably received second hand. That is, it arrives already processed by the mass media and this means that the information has been subject to alternative definitions of what constitutes 'news' and how it should be gathered and presented. The information is further structured by the various commercial and political constraints in which newspapers, radio and television operate. (Cohen 16)

The following analysis of the moral panic over the Airborne will involve a general examination of newspaper and television coverage of the Regiment starting with the death of Shidane Arone and ending with mention of the public inquiry into the Somalia mission. It will also include a more detailed study of the coverage from January 15 to January 31, 1995, the period during which the videos were aired, the Regiment's disbandment announced and the moral panic peaked and subsided. This is by no means a thorough content analysis, but rather an attempt to identify broad themes in the media coverage that either assuaged or contributed to the sense of moral panic. The daily media outlets examined in this two-week period are: CBC (*Sunday Report*, *Prime Time News*), CTV (*CTV National News*, *Canada AM*), the *Globe and Mail*, the *Toronto Star*, the *Toronto Sun*, the *Ottawa Citizen*, the *Montreal Gazette*, the *Hamilton Spectator*, the *Halifax Daily*

News, the *Calgary Herald*, the *Edmonton Journal* and the *Vancouver Sun*. *Maclean's* magazine is also examined. These outlets are chosen, in part, because they represent a variety of regions, ownerships and, to a small extent, ideologies. They are all mainstream outlets because the point here is to examine the messages reaching the majority of the population. It should be noted, however, that the accessability of archival material from each of these outlets also played a part in their selection. As well, the francophone media are not studied. For the most part, major francophone dailies picked up the story once the disbandment was announced, perhaps signalling the presence of different societal values that were less offended and threatened by the Airborne's actions.

The following study will also supplement Chapter 3's more detailed analysis of the initial television news stories about the amateur videos. These few stories could not generate such a level of outrage on their own. They must be seen in the context of ongoing media and political scrutiny of, and public anxiety toward, the Regiment.

The broader moral panic over the Airborne began on April 1, 1993, when then Army Commander, Lieutenant-General Gordon Reay, announced at a press conference in Ottawa that a Somali prisoner had died while in Airborne custody. This can be considered, using Cohen's model, the Impact stage of the panic—the point when the "disaster" strikes. The Warning phase preceding this event had largely been missed by the public, either because it failed to notice media coverage of discipline problems in the Airborne and military at large, or because these weren't well-publicized. Military leaders, however, were well-aware of the problems, as indicated in Chapter 2.

The Impact was followed by the Inventory phase, during which the media, public and politicians scrambled to make sense of this event, to understand how it could happen. By the third week of April, Defence Minister Kim Campbell's resignation was being called for. She reacted quickly and ordered an internal military inquiry into the leadership and discipline of the Airborne Regiment. Then another "disaster" hit when word of Corporal

Matt McKay's past white supremacist connections made national news. An image of a military rife with white supremacists began to develop as Campbell quickly expanded the inquiry to explore racism in the Airborne as well. "Racist Links Spark Outrage" ran the headline in the *Calgary Herald*. "Soldier's picture in Nazi garb outrages MPs" said the *Montreal Gazette* . The media, public and politicians were now sensitized to the issue of racism in the military. Attention was also drawn to the possibility that there had been a high level attempt to cover up Shidane Arone's death, and accusations implicated various officials including the Chief of Defence Staff, the Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence, and Kim Campbell.

Over the next year and a half, various events kept the Somalia issue in the news. There was the publication of the first phase of the military Board of Inquiry's report, which acknowledged the presence of white supremacists in the military, the use of racist language by soldiers while on tour, and the occurrence of unauthorized hazings. Then the courts martial began. As they progressed, they raised concerns about military leadership when the lowest ranking soldier (Private Brown) received the harshest sentence. Concern over the Airborne continued to simmer and reached a boil with several other events: the incidents of Airborne misconduct in Rwanda (which were relatively minor but received an inordinate amount of attention because people were already sensitized to the Airborne), the revelations of Major Barry Armstrong, who said he had been ordered to destroy evidence of abuse in Somalia, and the publication of the Shidane Arone photos. The photos in particular sparked a massive public outcry, but much of this was directed at the media for publishing the gruesome images, rather than for what the photos implied about Canadian soldiers. These events fuelled ongoing pressure to call a full public inquiry into the Airborne. Defence Minister David Collenette finally committed himself to one publicly, but said it must wait until after the courts martial were finished.

By January 15, when the first amateur video was broadcast, a low-level moral

panic, or at least uncertainty and malaise, over the Airborne had been present for almost two years. Many Canadians were aware of the threat the Airborne posed to the country's values and identity, they were sensitized to any new misdeeds that surfaced, they were fearful that the Airborne would misbehave again, and they wanted something done to ensure that it didn't. The broadcast of the videos began the disaster sequence all over again, but reaction to it was now amplified by the concerns generated by the previous deviant behaviour of some Airborne soldiers.

As Cohen has done in his study, most attention will be paid to the Inventory and Reaction phases of the moral panic. Cohen writes:

> I am concerned here with the way in which the situation was initially interpreted and presented by the mass media, because it is in this form that most people receive their pictures of both deviance and disasters. Reactions take place on the basis of these processed or coded images: people become indignant or angry, formulate theories and plans, make speeches, write letters to the newspapers. The media presentation or inventory of the Mods and Rockers events is crucial in determining the later stages of the reaction. (Cohen 30)

In this study of the Airborne Regiment's amateur videos, it will be argued that the media inventory helped determine the types of reactions and controls that followed.

The Inventory phase usually follows an unorganized response to a disaster. It is a time during which people take stock of what has happened and their own conditions. "During this period, rumours and ambiguous perceptions become the basis for interpreting the situation" (Cohen 29). With the Airborne videos, the actual event or Impact phase (the broadcast of the amateur footage) was channelled through the media, and was therefore already coded and processed with an inventory of meanings. Cohen breaks the Inventory phase down under three headings: exaggeration and distortion, prediction, and symbolization.

The first heading refers to the tendency of some media to exaggerate the seriousness of events, in terms of numbers taking part, sensational headlines, melodramatic vocabulary and deliberate heightening of those elements in the story considered as news. This includes

misleading headlines that don't fit the story and the use of the generic plural (e.g. "Airborne soldiers killed a Somali teen" instead of "an Airborne soldier killed a Somali teen"). The very way the amateur video from Somalia was edited for television newscasts would be considered a distortion under Cohen's definition (indeed, he implies throughout his study that the very nature of newsmaking distorts reality). Despite clear attempts in most television reports to stress that the segments shown were only a small part of the video, the examples of violence and racism, to which the media and public were already sensitized, were, not surprisingly, the focus. This heightened the sense that racism was prevalent amongst Airborne troops. There was also the use of loaded language. References to "another dark chapter" and the "military's dark secret" in the introductions to CBC and CTV coverage respectively on January 15 conveyed a sense of foreboding, threat and doom to the already Airborne-sensitive viewers. CTV also used the phrase "ill-fated Canadian peacekeeping mission," which carried with it several misleading and negative connotations. It implied that the soldiers did more harm than good in Somalia, when in fact their overall performance was praised and the objectives of their mission achieved. The use of the word "peacekeeper" was incorrect, since the Somalia intervention was not a peacekeeping mission. To many, this may be a minor technical detail, but the juxtaposition of the word peacekeeper when talking about a torture-murder, or about violent and racist comments, is particularly jarring. Furthermore, CTV's phrase implied that Canada led the mission, when it was only one of many countries involved. In another example, CBC examined the video on its January 16 magazine segment after the news. In introducing the segment, the host described the video as "featuring Canadian soldiers proudly recording racial slurs and more." The use of the word "proudly" was subjective and loaded, since others described the soldiers as "matter of fact." The "and more" left viewers to conjure up any number of hideous scenarios in their minds.

Most of the newspaper coverage following the video's broadcast mimicked the

television coverage. Papers repeated some of the descriptions of the video segments featured on the news, as well as some of the coded language, including the "ill-fated peacekeeping mission" phrase. Most notable for its exaggeration and distortion was the *Ottawa Sun* (the *Toronto Sun* picked up several of its stories). The January 15 cover, showing Private Brocklebank brandishing his weapon, blared the headline "Secret Somalia Video." Inside, the page 3 story was headlined "Video shows soldiers' hatred," a statement that implied the journalist or his editor could unequivocally determine motivation and emotion from words and actions on a videotape. The article highlighted the most disturbing aspects of the tape and said one segment was "inundated" with racist and bitter comments without specifying if the segment lasted 30 seconds or 30 minutes. A pull quote drew attention to the phrase "baton for breaking arms and legs" and the sidebar heading repeated the quote, "'Lazy slobs (who) stink'" (Rider and Gibbons 3). (Interestingly, articles on subsequent days began emphasizing the soldiers' cynicism and frustration more, and the racism less. The *Sun* soon became the most Airborne-friendly paper.) In another example of distortion, several media outlets continued to mention that nine soldiers had been court-martialled or charged with various offences in Somalia, but neglected to report that some of the soldiers had been (rightly or wrongly) acquitted (Kenny, "Racist Comments" A5; "Regiment's History").

Another element of the Inventory phase is prediction, or the assumption that the event will happen again. Predictions take the form of reported statements from prominent figures about what should be done "next time" or of immediate precautions that have already been taken. These predictions become part of a broader theme later whereby "discrepancies between expectations and reality are resolved by emphasizing those new elements which confirm expectations and playing down those which are contradictory" (Cohen 39).

The Somalia video was seen as a confirmation of predictions that had been made

since the Airborne came under public scrutiny. The attitude that the video was just another in a series of Airborne embarrassments was evident in the television coverage. "*Another* dark chapter has emerged...*this time* it's a video." reported CBC (italics added) on January 15. CTV called the video "shocking new evidence" that "once again" has to do with the conduct of soldiers in Somalia. These statements imply that there could be more to come, even though the video was two years old. On CBC's January 16 magazine segment, the video was called a "graphic new instalment" to the Airborne story. The host asked former Airborne officer Nicholas Stethem how the Airborne could be reformed. This question overlooked the fact that the Regiment had been significantly overhauled since Somalia. Newspaper reaction on January 16 and 17 included repeated pressure for a public inquiry ("Airborne home video renews call for inquiry" was the headline in the *Toronto Star*). B'nai Brith Canada, according to several print articles, was calling for Collenette to expand the inquiry to investigate racism in the Regiment. Demands for an inquiry stem from the need to know "how this happened." Implicit in this is the need to prevent "this from happening again."

A third element of the inventory is symbolization. "Communications, and especially mass communication of stereotypes, depends on the symbolic power of words and images. Neutral words such as place-names can be made to symbolize complex ideas and emotions" (Cohen 40). Examples of symbolization are not as obvious in the Airborne example as they were in Cohen's study of the Mods and Rockers. In that case, places like Clacton or Brighton (where the so-called riots occurred) and the styles the various youth subcultures sported, became associated with the deviant behaviour of the Mods and Rockers. For Canadians, Somalia—or the Somalia Affair as it is called—came to symbolize a national failure, a place where the country's troops had not only failed, but disgraced. One *Maclean's* article said the Canadian Airborne Regiment and the Canadian public were "haunted" by Somalia (Fisher, "Canada's Shame" 14). Shari Graydon, president of

MediaWatch, wrote, "Our shame over the death by torture of a teenager is reawakened every time we hear or read of Somalia" (Graydon A19). The Regiment itself, which was often described with adjectives like notorious, controversial and trouble-filled, and the unit's "distinctive maroon beret," symbolized the cause of that failure. The Somalia video did not so much create the symbols, as remind people of them and reinforce them. The symbolization phase had begun long ago when Arone's death became public.

The cumulative effects of the Inventory phase—the formation of a preliminary picture after a "disaster"—are summarized by Cohen as follows:

> i) the putative deviation had been assigned from which further stereotyping, myth making and labelling could proceed; ii) the expectation was created that this form of deviation would certainly recur; iii) a wholly negative symbolization in regard to [the deviants] and objects associated with them had been created; iv) all the elements in the situation had been made clear enough to allow for full-scale demonology and hagiology to develop. (Cohen 44)

Deviance inventories, suggests Cohen, are not rooted in an event, but in the newsmaking process. Once the subject of a story is fixed (e.g. violence between youth gangs, racism in the military), the "recurrent processes of news manufacture" determine the shape of subsequent stories. The media is predictable, presenting a stylized mode of reporting that presents a limited range of emotions and values. One could almost guess how the media would cover subsequent stories (Cohen 47).

The Reaction phase starts when images in the inventory crystallize into more organized opinions and attitudes. "Once the initial impact has passed over, the societal reaction to any sudden event, particularly if it is perceived as a dislocation of the social structure or a threat to cherished values, is an attempt to make sense of what happened. People talk less about the event itself and more about the implications of it" (49). Public opinion, of course, is complex and varied. However, certain themes emerge with sufficient regularity to justify thinking they are fairly widespread. Cohen organizes the opinions expressed in the media discourse into three groups: the emotional and intellectual standpoint from which the deviance is evaluated, opinions about the nature of the deviants and their

behaviour, and opinions about the causes of the behaviour (51).

The initial reaction to the first Airborne video was actually fairly moderate. In terms of an emotional and intellectual evaluation of the Airborne's behaviour, the most prevalent reaction, while not condoning the behaviour, was to attempt to place the comments "in context." Southam reporter Stephen Bindman, speaking on *Canada AM*, argued that "if I was sitting around with a bunch of guys watching a football game, I don't think that I'd want some of the comments broadcast on national television" ("Racist Comments"). Similar statements were made by the *Sun*'s Peter Worthington, who asserted that comments made in a locker room or newspaper management meeting could be just as embarrassing (Worthington, "Airborne Video" 11). The Canadian Press called on two psychologists to give the soldiers' comments some context (Canadian Press, "Somalia Video" A11). They suggested the soldiers were using "humour" to diffuse a frightening situation, or using exaggeration to relieve stress. Scott Taylor and Bindman also pointed out the demanding conditions the soldiers were living in—the heat, dust and boredom. Some, however, saw the video as context of a different sort. As suggested by a *Montreal Gazette* editorial ("The country's national shame") and by Nicholas Stethem, a military analyst and former Airborne officer ("Somalia Videotape—Interviews"), the video made it easier to understand how Shidane Arone could have died, and harder to accept that the rest of the Regiment was innocent of blame. CBC's Brian Stewart, when interviewing Stethem, went further, suggesting that because the video had been distributed to 50 soldiers, this indicated racism was more widespread than initially believed.

Opinions fitting into Cohen's second grouping (opinions about the nature of the deviants or their behaviour) overlap with those expressed above. Commentators seemed divided on whether the video revealed, as CBC's Brian Stewart put it, "brutality or bluster." Scott Taylor, commenting on the soldiers' behaviour, said the tape showed "a few warts." Nicholas Stethem's assessment was somewhat stronger; he said the tape showed a

"nasty edge." Retired Lieutenant-Colonel Shirley Robinson went farther and suggested racism, along with sexism and homophobia, permeated the military and were perhaps even more evident in the Airborne because of its "brutish training" in which they were "trained to hate" ("Somalia Videotape—Interviews").

This last comment ties in with the third category—opinions about the causes of the behaviour. The main one, forwarded by Taylor, Stethem and other retired military officers, was a failure in leadership. These paratroopers, they said, could have been kept under control, or the "bad apples" could have been weeded out, under good leadership. But this didn't happen. And, as Robinson implied, there was the issue of training. Robinson was among several who would suggest that the Airborne's problems stemmed from their training alongside American paratroopers. The impression left was that at least part of the Regiment was close to being out of control.

In addition to the opinions formed about the deviance, the Reaction phase also includes ways the organized system of social control responds to the images of the deviant group established in the inventory phase. One way is through sensitization, which Cohen describes as the reinterpretation of neutral or ambiguous stimuli as potentially or actually deviant. It also involves "the assignment of blame and the direction of control measures towards a specific agent thought to be responsible" (Cohen 77-78). The media, public and politicians were already sensitized to racist and violent behaviour in the Airborne because of the events leading up to the video's release. This affected the treatment of, and reaction to, the video. The video, in turn, further heightened sensitization towards the Airborne and their misdeeds. And as mentioned in the prediction stage, it also fed into the mounting pressure for the government to call a public inquiry. On January 16, the following appeared in a *Toronto Star* article:

> "We need to clean up the whole mess," said Reform defence critic Jack Frazer (Saanich-Gulf Islands), a former airforce pilot. "There should be a more rapid response to calls for an independent inquiry into the whole thing."

> "What is the role of racism in the Canadian Airborne Regiment and is anybody doing anything about it?" Rubin Friedman of B'nai Brith Canada asked yesterday. "We need an inquiry as soon as possible." (Thompson A2)

Embarrassment was at the root of some of these demands. A *Hamilton Spectator* editorial on January 19 demanded an inquiry to restore the "reputation of Canada's tarnished military" ("Our Soldiers" A6). But the Defence Minister's hands were tied. He promised a full public inquiry, as he had for months, but repeated that it would have to wait until the courts martial into the death of Shidane Arone were finished. One trial had yet to be completed and it was being held up by all the publicity generated first by the publication of the torture photos in November and then by the Airborne video. The same *Spectator* editorial also suggested Collenette charge the soldiers on the Somalia tape. "A message has to be sent...such behaviour will not be tolerated." But a spokesman for David Collenette said the soldiers in the video could not be punished because the Defence department's zero tolerance policy towards racism had been instituted after the video was made. It could not be applied retroactively (Aubry A4). To intensify matters, Collenette could not even comment on the tape. His legal advisors said that, as the person who would hear a final appeal on any military charges, he could end up in a conflict of interest. Collenette's inability to act, therefore, short-circuited a crucial aspect of the Reaction phase. It meant the society's control culture was never actually engaged. The agitation for a control policy, for "something to be done," was not satisfied by Collenette's repeated requests to wait for the inquiry. The best the Minister could do was order an investigation into the tape (Kenny, "Racist comments" A5).

The release of the video shot in Somalia was one more event feeding into and heightening the underlying current of moral panic already present in Canada. Still, the Airborne and Canada's "image" might have weathered this storm. Even though the images galvanized attention and seemed to provide irrefutable evidence that something was amiss, there was no actual physical violence shown. And the events were far away, in a foreign

land. Excuses were made for the soldiers' behaviour; some even conceded they may have behaved no better in the same situation. Apart from the examples of exaggeration and distortion already discussed, and the fact that the newsmaking process in general had been set up to draw out a particular storyline, many of the media used fairly neutral language when covering the story. Many reports stressed that only a small portion of the video had been shown, and that a zero tolerance policy toward racism had since been instituted. The sense that there was, or had been, a small rogue element within the Airborne, still seemed plausible.

Cohen's model shows how a strong societal reaction to deviance can actually amplify the severity of the next outbreak of deviance. With the Airborne videos, though, Canadians reacted to a media event that was dislocated by considerable time and space from the actual event it represented. The last time any Airborne soldiers had been in trouble was in the fall of 1994, when three were sent home from Rwanda. Instead of inciting new acts of deviance, then, societal reaction to the deviation (or its mediation) drew out of the woodwork those who had visual evidence of past deviance. When National Defence authorized the publication of the torture photos in November 1994, it unwittingly started a intermittent stream of revelations of misconduct, each inspired by those preceding it. For almost the next two years, visual evidence of apparent military misconduct, and not just in the Airborne, continued to appear in the media at periodic intervals. The most damning, however, was the video that appeared three days after the tape shot in Somalia first aired.

Much of the initial inventory, or stock-taking, of 1 Commando's hazing video was done by CTV and Scott Taylor. Many media outlets relied on statements and limited footage released by CTV, and commentary from Taylor, to present the initial picture of this new disaster, or threat, to Canada's reputation. Distortions, exaggerations and assumptions on the part of CTV and Taylor, were then repeated and sometimes magnified by the rest of the media who did not have direct access to the tape. It is hard to imagine that anyone could

view this video and not find it stomach-churning and disturbing. But the way in which certain aspects of it were focused on helped shape the ways the system of social control reacted to it.

CTV's melodramatic introduction to the video has already been discussed in Chapter 3. To reiterate, words such as ugly, brutal, vulgar, obscene and shocking set viewers' expectations for what they were about to see. The severity of the warning may have been due to the fact CTV couldn't show some of the worst parts of the video, so it was trying to convey the tape's overall effect through words. The story then led with details of the revolting bodily fluids the soldiers consumed followed by Taylor assuring viewers this event was quite extraordinary by military standards. A clip from Collenette expressing his outrage and disgust, saying "the activities of these people denigrate our proud Canadian military heritage" further alerted viewers to the threat these images posed.

The next day, the story and photos from the video were all over the front pages of major daily newspapers. The coverage was virtually identical from paper to paper, mainly because they either reprinted, or drew heavily from, a Canadian Press wire story about the tape. The CP story itself was based on CTV's broadcast and information released by the CTV affiliate that obtained the tape. The Canadian Press story reported that the station said it did not broadcast portions of the tape depicting soldiers "forced to eat human excrement and human vomit. There were also many examples of simulated sex and mutual urination" (Kenny, "Racist Comments" A5). These acts, not surprisingly, were selected as the most outrageous details of the tape, and six of the newspapers in this study included some of this information in their lead paragraphs. In two, it made the headlines. "Hazing video shows soldiers eating feces, vomit," said the Montreal Gazette. The *Toronto Sun*'s headline was virtually identical. All the stories also described the black soldier's treatment, Collenette's outrage, and questioned how the leadership could allow such a thing to happen. Of all the coverage in the Inventory and initial Reaction phases of the event, only CBC pointed out

that "this should not have taken the government and the military by surprise because they had been warned" in the 1993 military inquiry report. Now the Defence Minister "is expressing outrage and disgust and has ordered another investigation" ("Airborne Video"). Prime Minister Chrétien also expressed shock and outrage from his trade tour in Trinidad. Some of the strongest reaction to the video came, surprisingly, from Peter Worthington, a staunch Airborne supporter. He wrote that "words are insufficient to describe the horror of the videotape" which showed "perverted rites of passage" and an "orgy of obscenities." He went so far as to say the tape "shows depraved character" more than bad leadership (Worthington, "Video could ground Airborne" 11).[3] In much of the reporting, there was an assumption that Canadians as a group were shocked and outraged by the videos. A *Globe and Mail* editorial on January 20 wrote, "The behaviour of the Canadian Airborne Regiment continues to shock. Each revelation documents a new level of savagery" ("Time to ground" A22) The *Maclean's* magazine cover that week was entitled, "Canada's Shame: The shocking images that may ground the Airborne." The *Halifax Daily News* printed responses to a call-in about the Airborne's behaviour under the headline "Callers Condemn Paratroopers." The lead paragraph reported that callers to the News Hotline said soldiers could destroy Canada's image as peacekeepers. But then the story went on to say only 22 of 43 callers saw something wrong with the way the soldiers acted on the videos, not the overwhelming majority that the lead implied (Bornais). As the Airborne story developed, other distortions appeared. On January 20, CTV Lloyd Robertson announced there were "More troubling revelations tonight involving Canada's disgraced Canadian Airborne Regiment." Leaked letters said top officials had "grave concerns" about the Regiment nine months ago. But the story that followed did not refer to any grave concerns. Reporter Dave

---

[3] In his editorial, Worthington called for an investigation of 1 Commando's parent regiment, the Quebec-based VanDoos. As subsequent editorials and interviews would show, both Worthington and Scott Taylor felt the VanDoos were always treated with kid gloves. They listed a number of crimes, including murders, committed by VanDoos members that had received comparatively little media, political or military scrutiny. It possible that this belief fuelled the severe condemnation both men heaped on the hazing video.

Rinn mentioned only that the military had given the Regiment a clean bill of health nine months earlier. Analysts interviewed supported disbanding the Regiment, but nowhere in the story were there "more troubling revelations" as the intro had warned.

On January 20, the predictions that this could happen again started appearing. A *Montreal Gazette* editorial entitled, "The country's national shame: Canadians want assurances of Airborne cleanup," lamented the unravelling of Canada's proud military reputation. It said, "It seems unlikely that the vicious cruelties of a few years ago have been all wiped away" ("The country's national shame"). The *Toronto Star* asked, "How do we know this won't happen again?...The Airborne simply cannot be trusted" ("Fix the Airborne" A20). Overall, there was the impression that, first there was Somalia, then these two videos, what could be next?

The hazing video also reinforced the ongoing process of symbolization, which attached the Airborne and anything associated with it to a range of emotions including anger, threat, embarrassment and failure. Because this video depicted an entirely different part of the Regiment, now more than ever, anything connected with the Airborne became suspect. A new symbol emerged in this phase as well. The location of the hazing, CFB Petawawa, became part of the group of places and things that many Canadians connected with shameful acts. The first video had been filmed far away, but the second was close to home, on Canadian soil. Many of the excuses used to make sense of the video from Somalia could not be used here. (Repeated statements that the hazing had taken place "in broad daylight" no doubt led some people to conjure up images of the soldiers cavorting on the front lawn. In fact, though, a look at the video shows the hazing took place in a semi-enclosed courtyard or patio, and may indeed have been out of sight of senior officers who could have put a stop to it.)

The initial shock and repulsion over the videos merged with the more organized reactions that began to surface shortly after the broadcast. The implications of the video

became the focus of discussion. These opinions (the emotional and intellectual standpoint from which the deviance is evaluated, opinions about the nature of the deviants and their behaviour, and opinions about the causes of the behaviour) were based on the initial inventory of images conveyed through the media.

One overwhelming sentiment expressed from the Inventory through to the Reaction phase was a sense of shame. The Airborne had brought dishonour to Canada. There was a clear assumption, as mentioned above, that all Canadians felt this way, but little concrete evidence to support this view. Collenette was one of the first to express it, but certainly not the last. News reports, editorials, expert sources and letters to the editor also conveyed the idea of shame and embarrassment. CTV said the Regiment was "rapidly becoming a source of national shame" ("Shocking video"). The headline on page one of the *Hamilton Spectator* on January 20 read: "Airborne faces axe, latest video embarrassment leaves Regiment's future in doubt." The next day, a story in the same paper described the Regiment's impressive history, quoted those who referred to its current situation a "national tragedy" ("Who are these guys?" A7). Editorials in the *Toronto Star* and the *Ottawa Citizen* respectively said the Airborne "tarnish Canada's image abroad" and that taxpayers deserve disclosure on the "few men who insult the nation everytime they don a uniform." ("Fix the Airborne" A20; "Conduct unbecoming" A8). Experts interviewed in the *Citizen* on January 21 talked about "public outrage" towards the video (Pugliese, "Blame leaders" A3). A reader wrote in to say the "misdeeds of the Canadian Airborne Regiment have shocked and disgusted Canadians from coast to coast" (Seymour A8). CBC opened a story with: "Revelation after revelation about the Airborne Regiment has shocked and outraged and saddened Canadians" ("More Airborne"). On CTV's *Canada AM*, retired colonel Brian MacDonald said, "the events have just created such a level of horror and disgust amongst the Canadian public" that it would be political suicide for Collenette not to disband the Regiment ("Canadian Airborne Regiment will"). An *Edmonton Journal*

editorial written before the disbandment announcement said, "The airborne regiment has become a national embarrassment" ("Peackeepers or bigots" A6). The sense that the Airborne's behaviour, as seen in the videos, had the same psychological impact on all Canadians—that the country was collectively reeling and distraught from the videos—would play straight into Collenette's decision to disband the Regiment.

Another theme that emerged in this Reaction phase was a debate over the role of hazing. Some felt it had a place in the military. The video showed "consenting adults acting in a well-established (military) cultural tradition of initiation," said a *Montreal Gazette* editorial. Because Canadians are an "unmilitary" people, they don't understand the need for military culture to build unit loyalty (Kappler B5). In a letter to the *Ottawa Citizen*, one reader wrote that the military was not training maitre d's, "These boys are bred to play real hard in the real world" (Burns A8). A soldier interviewed by CBC pointed out they were not being trained for jobs in the foreign service where diplomacy would be expected ("Airborne video"). Even *Toronto Sun* Editor Lorrie Goldstein wrote that hazing had a place in the military. But then he went on to condemn the Airborne's actions. "This second 'Airborne' video showing the vile, shameful and racist 'initiation' procedures of these rogue 'soldiers' cannot be excused." He then implied that the first video *could* be excused because it took place in the desert sands of Somalia (Goldstein, "The Airborne's" 12). Goldstein's editorial is the second of two in the *Sun* on January 20 that suggest the second video is more disturbing than the first. The other said the first video showed the obvious, that the soldiers, while not choirboys, on the whole served Canada well. But the second one, "showing a vile and bizarre 'hazing' process by some Airborne members in Canada depicts clearly inexcusable behaviour" ("Lost command" 10). An *Edmonton Journal* editorial stated: "The Airborne's 'bonding' methods are little short of obscene. It is a regiment built on pillars of cruelty and prejudice that seem to belong to some Third World military junta. These are elite soldiers? Come on" ("Peacekeepers or bigots" A6). A

Calgary Herald editorial questioned the bonding value of the ritual: "But how much of the hazing rite breeds a sense of camaraderie and how much simply desensitizes them? Good soldiers don't deny themselves the capacity to be human" ("Friendly fire" A6). Two other media reports on hazing took a more neutral approach. A CTV story on hazing referred to hazing incidents in the U.S. Marine Corps, saying unit commanders usually turned a blind eye to such activities. An unidentified Canadian soldier talked about the peer pressure to participate, while another implied it was an essential bonding practice. Retired Colonel Brian MacDonald criticized the practice because of its tendency to cause counter-cultures to form within a unit, which would threaten military discipline ("Do these pictures"). *Maclean's* also probed the hazing question, quoting various experts who said the practice de-individualizes participants and builds unit cohesiveness (Chidley 18).

In conjunction with these reactions, images of the nature of the Airborne soldiers continued to develop, building upon "brutality or bluster" images generated by the previous video. Characterizations covered the spectrum from "rambunctious youth," to "gung-ho soldiers" who honed their "macho image," to "Rambos" to "thugs." The word *elite* often appeared after the hazing video surfaced, although it was seldom used before. It was frequently set off by quotation marks, in order to stress the contradiction between ideas of what it means to be elite and the behaviour of the Regiment. Two of the most prominent images developed were the notions of the soldiers as aggressive and out of control. References to their aggressiveness could either convey their status as a supposedly elite regiment, or carry connotations of the threat they could pose. They were described as "high-octane soldiers" (Wallace 17), "Canada's supposedly best-trained and toughest army regiment," (Marotte A1), "considered to have been the fittest and most aggressive soldiers" ("Do these pictures") and "highly motivated young men whose fighting skills have been sharply honed" (Sallot, "Airborne in danger" A1). To these references, add images of a regiment out of control and the potential threat increases: "The video seems evidence again

to doubt whether some of the Canadian peacekeepers were psychologically prepared..." ("Shocking video"); the Regiment's behaviour at home and abroad "shows a pattern of recklessness, racism, and unruliness that casts doubt on their training, their leadership and their fitness for sophisticated foreign operations" ("Time to ground" A22); "paratroopers who are walking time bombs reveal dark and persistent problems" ("Fix the Airborne" A20); a "real-life Apocalypse Now" (Goldstein, "The Airborne's" 12); and "obnoxious young men out of control" ("Rid Canada" A18). All these images, juxtaposed with constant references to "peacekeepers" and "humanitarian missions" further accentuated the impression that the Airborne posed a threat to Canada's image.

Much of the debate about the nature of the Airborne soldiers and their behaviour centered around the question of how representative the videos were. Did they show a "few bad apples" or a culture that was rotten to the core? The focus of debate shifted slightly from the former to the latter when the hazing video emerged. Scott Taylor was the main proponent of the bad apple theory, supported by a few editorial writers, retired officers and letters to the editor. But once the hazing video appeared, showing an entirely different part of the Regiment and approximately 60 people participating or observing, there was much less inclination to give the some 650 members of the Regiment the benefit of the doubt. "On the contrary, the videos show that the prevailing culture of the Airborne was one that tolerated, and perhaps encouraged, racism and sadism" ("The country's" B2). The Regiment's behaviour "tells of endemic racism. It is rife with brutality" said an *Edmonton Journal* editorial ("Peacekeepers or bigots" A6). Occasionally, commentators espoused both seemingly contradictory views. For example, while admitting there was no damning evidence against many Airborne soldiers, one writer still asserted the videos were emblematic of the Regiment's "engrained racism and lack of discipline" ("Conduct unbecoming" A8).

The main cause cited for the Airborne's problems was, again, a failure in military

leadership. Between January 15 and January 23, approximately 25 per cent of articles, editorials, letters, television stories and interviews made reference to the leadership failures that had brought the Regiment to shame. "Blame leaders, not soldiers," read the *Ottawa Citizen* headline on January 21. This article, and one from Canadian Press, quoted a number of retired military officers who held this view. Various edits of these two stories were reprinted throughout the Southam newspaper chain. Retired officers commented on the "possible vacuum in leadership" and repeated the motto "there are no bad soldiers, only bad officers." A *Toronto Sun* editorial proclaimed, "Not enough people are asking...just where was the military command in all these disasters? Not the soldiers, but the officers" ("Lost command" 10). A *Globe and Mail* headline read "Airborne leaders held culpable" (Sallot, "Airborne leaders" A4). The *Maclean's* cover story that week was headlined "Canada's Shame—Amid the outrage, one question lingers: Where were the officers?" (Fisher 14). Reform party leader Preston Manning also entered the debate to lay blame. "Canadians want some hard questions asked about the conduct of senior officers, not only the officers of the Canadian Airborne that allowed this kind of culture to exist under their command, but also the higher brass who failed to correct the problem once it came to their attention" (Canadian Press, "New regulations" A7).

While not as dominant a theme as the issue of leadership, the unique nature of military culture was also addressed as a way to either explain, excuse or condemn the Airborne's behaviour. The *Toronto Sun* condemned the hazing video, but said "One must also keep in mind that the standards of our politically correct media on what is seen as 'insensitive' or 'racist' in society at large are not standards that can fairly be applied to the military, particularly in combat or peacemaking situations" (Goldstein, "The Airborne's" 12). On CTV, retired colonel Brian MacDonald conceded that military culture was indeed somewhat different than civilian, but said it was counterproductive to stress the differences because this just provided "apologists" with ways to excuse the Airborne's deplorable

behaviour. He said soldiers could also be humanitarians ("Canadian Airborne Regiment"). *Maclean's* quoted sociologist Deborah Harrison, author of *No Life Like It: Military Wives in Canada*, who said that the military had a widespread problem with racism and macho-style bonding. "Maybe we should ask, given that military bonding causes so much misery to other people, how much do we need a military?" (Chidley 18). A black activist interviewed by the *Vancouver Sun* pointed out that white supremacists had also been identified in other parts of the military, "So it's not just the Airborne that has this kind of a problem. It is a general problem of racism in the culture" (Boei A12).

As part of the Reaction phase, the societal control culture began agitating for action and offering solutions to the Airborne problem. A *Halifax Daily News* editorial called for top down shakeup of the military to eliminate the bad apples (Saunders 17). A *Globe and Mail* editorial said the Airborne should be grounded until after an inquiry ("Time to ground" A22). The *Toronto Star* said, "Fix the Airborne or clip its wings" (A20). The *Star* also reported that "pressure to do something quickly about the Regiment comes not just from angry members of the public, who have flooded Mr. Collenette's office with telephone calls, but also from other members of the Canadian Forces, concerned that the misconduct of the paratroopers may reflect badly on all of them." Prime Minister Jean Chrétien may have had this information when, from Trinidad, he sent the first warning that the Airborne's death was imminent: "Before this latest incident, [Collenette] was dealing with the problem. But the video...created an urgency. If we have to dismantle it, we'll dismantle it" (Sallot, "Airborne in danger" A1). Demands for a comprehensive, fully public inquiry intensified further, but again Collenette said wait. He ordered Chief of Defence Staff John de Chastelain to have a report ready on the morning of January 23 that would explain how the hazing could have happened and why no one stopped it. This action was then publicly called a sham by Scott Taylor, who tried to remind people that hazings at CFB Petawawa had already been investigated long before the video was made public. His comments made

little impact. In an effort to respond to demands from the public and media that "something be done," and supported by constant assertions in the media that Canadians were horrified by the videos, the government interpreted or chose to interpret what was certainly a significant amount of public outrage as widespread. In his report on January 23, General de Chastelain assured Collenette that the Airborne of the home videos no longer existed. But Collenette disbanded the Regiment anyway because of what he termed its "systemic" problems. Yet he seemed to contradict himself, when, in the same speech, the Minister recognized "that many changes in personnel and procedures in the Airborne have been made over the past year and that the people serving are by and large dedicated professionals" ("Speaking notes"). Somehow he believed systemic problems only affected a few soldiers.

In interviews following the disbandment announcement, Collenette reiterated the view that there were serious problems with the Airborne culture, even though most of the Regiment had served Canada well. "We're not punishing the troops," Collenette told host Valerie Pringle on *Canada AM*. "What we're saying is that there's something wrong with the structure, with the institution, with the culture of that particular Regiment that can't wait for any third-party evaluation and inquiry. We're not arguing against the men and women today in Petawawa who have been serving in the Airborne" ("On disbanding"). This tactic allowed Collenette to pinpoint a villain—the Airborne as an institution—and at the same time retain some semblance of logic since to condemn the Regiment's current members without courts martial would not only have been unfair but also defamatory.

From the start, Collenette openly acknowledged the decision to disband the Airborne had little to do with the army's operational requirements and everything to do with Canada's reputation. "This [the videos] is affecting Canadians' image in the world. I've been shocked by the views of others around the world about Canada, and it's an unfair view" ("On disbanding"). "Because of the harm done to Canada's image throughout the

world, we felt Canadians wanted something to be done" (Thompson, "Airborne Regiment axed" A1). However, what Collenette failed to mention, or perhaps even notice, was that much of the international attention the story was receiving had been sparked more by the Prime Minister's quote about "dismantling" the Airborne, and the government's decision to do it, than by the broadcast of the videos. Disbanding a regiment for discipline problems was such a rare move in a Western democracy—only done once before in France—that it was bound to draw international attention to the story. The American network ABC first ran the story on January 20, after Chrétien spoke of disbanding the Airborne. A full-page article in *Time* also repeated the Prime Minister's quote. The *New York Times* didn't carry the story until two days after the disbandment. None of these stories quoted anyone other than Canadians expressing outrage or condemnation toward the Airborne's activities. The German magazine *Stern*, with an article headlined "Sadism Under the Blue Beret," as well as CNN and the BBC also picked up the story, although it is hard to determine at what point. In fact, it is difficult to gain an overall sense of the amount and tone of the international media coverage. But Collenette's claim that the videos alone had attracted condemnation from around the world seems questionable.

The disbandment announcement inspired a new deluge of media coverage, commentary and public feedback. The logic of the government's decision was the initial focus of debate. Talk soon shifted to "what happens now" types of discussions. As well, many of the themes that emerged before January 23 continued to be the focus of discussion.

Commentators quickly lined up to debate the wisdom of the disbandment decision. Those who supported the move agreed with the government that the Airborne's image had been so tarnished there was no way the public could support its continued existence. They argued that there was no room for "copy-cat Rambos" in Canada, that decisive action was needed to make it clear such behaviour was intolerable, and that the disbandment was

necessary to ensure this didn't happen again ("Disbanding the Airborne"; Norton A8; Danson A10; Grants A9). Preston Manning and others said the government had no choice because this is what "Canadians want[ed] done" (Pugliese, "Axe falls" A1).

Critics of the decision ranged from those who saw little wrong with the Airborne's actions to those who thought disbandment was no way to cure the Regiment's—and the military's—problems. The government's action was criticized for a host of practical reasons: a replacement would be needed for the Regiment's upcoming mission to Croatia; the army's operational abilities would be compromised with one less regiment; the cost of disbanding would be about $4 million; the disbandment would disrupt the soldiers' families ("Dumb and dumber" 10; Matthews A8; Coyle A10; Hamilton A14). Others saw the Airborne's actions as little more than "blowing off steam" (MacKay A18). Airborne commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Kenward, insisted the Airborne had been cleaned up and could have redeemed itself. Several letters to the editor accused the government of disbanding the Airborne to save money while others called the decision a band-aid solution that spoke more to concerns about image than anything else. When the Regiment disbanded, it was argued, the problem soldiers would return undetected and unpunished to their home regiments along with everyone else. One observation made by several editorial and letter writers is particularly noteworthy in the context of the broader argument being made here. They wondered why the problems the Airborne experienced before and during Somalia were not enough reason to disband it, but two old videos were. A *Toronto Sun* editorial added: "As it is, Canada now has no Airborne, no satisfactory explanation of Shidane Arone's death, a public inquiry into a regiment that no longer exists and no assurances that the same sort of thing could not happen again" ("Dumb and dumber" 10). This last point will be discussed in more detail later on in the chapter.

Tied in with all the debates about the disbandment decision were many of the themes that had begun to emerge after the videos first aired. Exaggeration and distortion

continued. with still more references to the soldiers as "peacekeepers" and to their mission as one of humanitarian assistance rather than peace enforcement. As well. the headlines. leads or intros of at least four stories about Collenette's announcement said the Airborne was "disbanded in disgrace" even though later on in most of those stories General de Chastelain was quoted saying the Airborne would disband "with dignity."

Attempts to put the soldiers behaviour "in context" and to explain the value of hazing also continued. Many pointed out that soldiers are trained to kill. something which the broader civilian population just can't understand. The expressions of shame and embarrassment continued unabated. via media reports and politicians claiming Canadians were embarrassed. or through letters to the editor in which people expressed their personal outrage. CBC even went so far to say that the videos "shocked the country and the world" ("Disbanding the Airborne").

The image of the Airborne as aggressive and out-of-control soldiers was built upon. They were called "sadistic brutes" and described as "smirking" in one of the videos ("Airborne grounded" A8). Another article reported that elite forces have been proven to be violent. so Canadians shouldn't be surprised by the Airborne's actions (Hume A15).

Leadership failings continued to be the main cause given for the Airborne's problems. with a least 14 articles or television broadcasts mentioning it in the week after the disbandment. The Regiment's problems were frequently described using disease metaphors—pointing to a concern that the Airborne's behaviour might be contagious; it was called a "cancer" in the Canadian Forces ("Disbanding the Airborne"). a "boil" that had to be lanced (Bryden A4). and a "festering pustule" (Hume A15). Those who worried the disbandment simply swept the army's problems under the rug said shutting down the Airborne was like amputating the foot when the problem was a brain tumour ("On disbanding") or that the "Airborne illness was symptomatic of rot in government echelons" (Johnston C4).

One argument that began to lose steam after Collenette's announcement was the theory that a "few bad apples" were the source of the Airborne's problems. Several Airborne commanding officers, past and present, as well as Scott Taylor and a few editorialists still supported the notion. But given Collenette's cue that there was something wrong with Airborne culture, much of the discussion dealt not only specifically with Airborne culture, but also with that of the military as a whole. A few even went further to discuss broader Canadian culture. These issues will be raised again later.

New threads of debate were sparked by Collenette's announcement. The media tried to make issue out of the apparent rift between the Defence Minister and the Chief of Defence Staff. Other articles focused on the cost of the disbandment or the ways in which Canada would maintain its paratrooper capability without the Airborne. Some stories addressed the poor morale in the armed forces, a problem that only got worse with the disbandment despite Chrétien's claims that the Airborne had to go "for the morale" of the army.

In the midst of all the analyses and discussion about the disbandment, one potentially significant piece of news was strangely overlooked. It appeared on CTV as a seven sentence script story on January 26, as two paragraphs in the *Globe and Mail* on January 28 and finally as the subject of a column in the *Toronto Sun* on February 3. The polling organization Gallup, on its own accord, had launched a poll the day the disbandment was announced and found that of the 1,003 adults surveyed, 71 per cent had seen coverage of at least one of the videos and another 10 per cent had read or heard about them. While most found the videos highly offensive, 50 per cent said they disagreed with the decision to disband the Airborne, 32 per cent agreed and 18 per cent had no opinion. These figures don't come close to backing up statements Collenette made when defending his decision on CBC. He said the decision was made to preserve public confidence in the military and added, "We've taken a look at what this problem is doing to Canada's image

abroad, what it's doing to the country. It's ripping it apart. And we said, 'Enough is enough'" ("Interview with David Collenette"). Ripping the country apart? There is little evidence to support this claim. Fifty-three per cent said that despite the videos, they continued to have a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of respect for the military, compared with 16 per cent who had "very little" respect. To put this in context, a 1994 Gallup poll measured public respect for 11 major institutions in Canada. Some of the results included: the Supreme Court of Canada with "high" respect at 43 per cent and "low" at 18 per cent; the federal government (high 21 per cent, low 30 per cent); and the press (high 33 per cent, low 19 per cent) (Goldstein, "Airborne supporters" 12). Despite the many shortcomings of opinion polls, this one still indicates that the so-called widespread public outrage and anger, as reported in the media and assumed by Collenette, was not necessarily as strong as believed. And while there was certainly a significant amount of real outrage out there, the end of the Airborne was not necessarily the action Canadians wanted to see. The government had either grossly misread the public, or simply used it as an excuse to downsize the military and/or avoid any further embarrassment the Airborne might cause. This disparity between public opinion and what the media and politicians reported is labelled "differential reaction" by Cohen. Societal reaction is not homogenous. "One cannot assume that the inventory images...diffused outwards to be absorbed symmetrically by all of society" (Cohen 65). The results of the Gallup poll do not provide enough information to identify the range of perception or attitudes held by those who thought the government over-reacted to the videos. Did they see a moral panic in the making and refuse to get swept up in it? Did they accept the videos as just one more example of the violence that occurs in Canadian society? Or did they, disturbingly, not see anything at all wrong with the soldiers' behaviour? It is difficult then, to ascertain more than a general impression of the various strands of public opinion on the whole matter or to discern whether or not the public reacted any less superficially than many politicians and the media. In other words, it

is hard to tell if the public was as transfixed by the video images as the policy-makers, media gate-keepers and "experts" seemed to be.

The furore over the Airborne's amateur videos began to subside over the weeks following Collenette's announcement, mostly because the media moved on to other supposed scandals. In February, word hit the news of a third hazing video that had been destroyed before the media or public could see it and in a move than many considered overly severe, Collenette fired a high-ranking general for not properly informing him about the tape. General Vernon was the only individual, officer or rank, to be disciplined in connection with the Airborne videos. Playing into the heightened sensitization surrounding the military hazing practices, CTV "uncovered" yet another hazing tape, this time from the navy. It showed a Crossing the Line ceremony during which, according to CTV's first reports, vomit was dumped on new recruits when the ship passed the Equator. The tape later turned out to be benign, the substance shown on it was only porridge. Incriminating photographs also continued to trickle into the media's hands over the next year. They included other photos from Somalia that allegedly showed abuse of prisoners, photos of Canadian soldiers in the Gulf War standing smiling beside the limbs of people who'd been killed by landmines, and a photo of Canada's first female infantry officer who'd been beaten and left tied to a tree barefoot in the snow for several hours during a training exercise.

The Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia also got underway a few months after the videos aired. As he'd promised, Collenette gave the public inquiry the power to examine questions of leadership and discipline throughout the chain of command. This was in addition to its original mandate to study problems in the Airborne. The Inquiry kept the Airborne and Somalia in the news, but soon it was issues of high level cover up and incompetence at National Defence headquarters that dominated discussion, culminating at one point with the resignation of the new Chief of Defence Staff.

General Jean Boyle. By August 1996, according to an Angus Reid/Southam News poll, a bare majority (51 per cent) of Canadians surveyed thought the military's problems were isolated incidents. A large 45 per cent minority (rising to 52 per cent in Quebec) thought the incidents of misconduct were "evidence of widespread, fundamental problems in the whole structure of Canada's armed forces" (Angus Reid Group, "National Angus Reid"). The Airborne's troubles, as many Canadians had grown to realize, were a symptom of a much, much bigger problem.

The moral panic surrounding the Airborne and, in particular, the broadcast of the Regiment's amateur videos, shared many key elements with the formula used by Stanley Cohen in *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*. To reiterate Cohen's definition: A group (the Airborne) emerged and was defined as a threat to societal values (humanitarianism, respect for all regardless of gender and race, peaceableness—or at least the appearance of all these); the group's nature was presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media (as gung-ho Rambos out of control, a Regiment rife with racists and murderers); the moral barricades were manned by various right-thinking people: socially accredited experts (editors, ex-army officers, Scott Taylor) pronounced their diagnoses and solutions (weed out the bad apples, hold the leadership accountable, eliminate elite regiments); ways of coping were evolved or resorted to (disbanding the Regiment); the condition then submerged and evolved (and was reborn in the public inquiry which broadened the scope of concern to encompass the Canadian Forces).

Cohen suggests throughout his study that moral panics stir up indignation and cause the societal control forces to act with increasing severity in an attempt to control each outbreak of deviance. Under these conditions, the root cause of the deviance is often never tackled and the actual values that are being threatened (in the Mods and Rockers example, it was private property) are never fully acknowledged. Moral panics, therefore, can mask the

heart of the issue that prompted the panic in the first place. An ongoing moral panic, incorporated with a media event involving amateur video and all the meanings it carries, make for a potent combination. The moral panic over the Airborne and the media event involving the two videos served to limit discussions that would have addressed the issues—or as Fiske calls them, the "conflicting cultural currents"—that underlay the Airborne's troubles. Two key issues that received only passing commentary will be discussed here: the apparent unwillingness of many Canadians to acknowledge the racism and violence prevalent in their own society and, tied in with that, the ambivalent relationship Canada has with its military.

As General John de Chastelain's comments at the beginning of this chapter indicate, peacekeeping is a fundamental part of Canada's self-image. So what happens when this key component is found to be far from perfect? Media coverage of the Airborne videos reveals a quick attempt on the part of politicians, the media and many Canadians to disassociate Canada's civilian culture from its military culture. This is accomplished, for the most part, in two ways. The first approach places blame at a localized or individual level so that fault lies with a "few bad apples," or with a platoon or with a regiment. This approach also chastises Canadians for not understanding military culture better. The second approach brands military culture as a whole as archaic and out of touch with Canadian values. These two approaches enable both the military's supporters and its opponents to distance themselves from acts of racism and violence that are seen as "unCanadian." As Clint Burnham put it in *Fuse* magazine, "The January videos confirmed the views of hysterical liberals: that those nasty soldiers should all be punished...and this confirmed the diehard Legion-Reform burghers' and politicians' views that those pansy liberals don't know what the world's all about" (13).

Neither standpoint, as Burnham and a small handful of other commentators have pointed out, acknowledges the presence of systemic racism and violence within Canadian

culture as a whole. Media, political and public reaction to the Airborne videos showed how unprepared and ill-equipped Canadians were to reconcile their national self-image to reality. "What other illusions are we harbouring in our collective bosom?" asked an Ottawa Citizen commentator (Kennedy A13), one of the few to address these deeper issues.

There is no doubt that much about military culture is distinct from how the rest of Canada lives. And it seems both the military and civilians have preferred it that way, with neither taking the time to get to know the other. Deborah Harrison and Lucie Laliberté explore the miliary's distinctive culture in *No Life Like It: Military Wives in Canada.* They argue that the military goes out of its way to cut its soldiers off from civilian culture in order to create an absolute dependence on the military for all life's necessities. This practice is intended to foster obedience, unit cohesiveness and combat readiness. The fact that the Canadian public has little interest in understanding military life tends to further the separation by causing military types to stick to their own. In the words of one armed forces member:

> We are a society unto ourselves, and we do what we want. I don't have to go to a civilian doctor, dentist, lawyer...and that's to make you look inward. You know what I'm saying? Everything I need is in the Armed Forces; therefore I think of nothing outside...It's the way we do things, it's parades, it's the Mess. It's all done that way to make the bonding this close. (28)

David Bercuson reiterates this notion in *Significant Incident:* "Traditionally, military organizations are highly structured and ordered meritocracies. They are stable, conservative and resistant to change. They operate under a special set of rules, have their own history and customs, and are governed by strict laws" (27). Conservatism and intolerance, argue Harrison and Laliberté, are significant aspects, if not cornerstones, of this close-knit culture. Although the military is expected to remain politically neutral, most soldiers tend to classify themselves as conservatives, mainly because liberal or socialist views are associated with civilianization, something the military wants to avoid at all costs (34-35). As well, soldiers are trained for combat, which "sets up a black/white antagonism between

'own' and 'other' that requires absolute loyalty and devotion toward own and completely reverse orientations toward other" (34). Unit cohesiveness, therefore, thrives on homogeneity, from uniforms to skin colour, to gender, to sexual orientation. Sameness is crucial for being "part of the team." And that team consists of "primarily young, urbanized, secondary school educated males with British or French ethnic backgrounds" (qtd. in Bercuson 100). Defenders of the Airborne's hazing often suggested such rituals were a vital aspect of this unit bonding.

The power of the military's homogenizing force, argues Tony Hall of the University of Lethbridge, is evident not only in the hazing video, in which Corporal Robin seemed to accept being denigrated and later refused to call the treatment racist, but also in Arone's murder. With the direct blame for Arone's death falling to Clayton Matchee, a Cree from Saskatchewan, and Kyle Brown, who is part Cree, Hall suggests:

> ...racial minorities in the Canadian Airborne seem to have been under enormous pressure to demonstrate their willingness to identify with the dominant values and perspectives of their peers. To the extent that these dominant values included racism, there is strong evidence to suggest that members of racial minorities were compelled to demonstrate symbolically that they too could be racists.... (Hall 31)

Harrison and Laliberté also point out that this culture of control and conformity is also conducive to a variety of other social problems including alcoholism, wife battering and the physical and sexual abuse of children. The incidence of these are often higher in the military than in the civilian population (43-44).

If Harrison and Laliberté's portrait of the military is accepted as at least somewhat accurate, then those who accuse the military of being out of step with broader societal values are making a valid point. Furthermore, Canadians cannot be expected to bear full responsibility for not understanding military culture when the military itself prefers to keep the public in the dark. But the distinction between these two cultures only goes so far. About 40 per cent of young soldiers (Bercuson 100) have neither come from military families nor spent any time as military cadets. They therefore spent their formative years

entirely in civilian society. In the coverage surrounding the Airborne videos, one Colonel claimed the military was a "mirror" to society (Berube A10). While this perspective is somewhat simplistic, it addresses that point that the Canadian military cannot be considered entirely removed from broader Canadian society.

No matter what the distinctions between military and civilian cultures, the fact remains that racism and violence occur everyday in Canada. It is just that the acts are not usually broadcast on television. The Canadian military was known to have racist and violent elements within it, but the furore over these did not reach full pitch until the videos depicting this behaviour hit the television news. It seems then, as previously stated, that it is the mediation of violence that is of concern, either because Canadians do not want to acknowledge that it exists in their own backyard, or they know it, but do not want the world to catch on.

Some authors suggest Canadians deny their own intolerance. Cecil Foster, in his examination of the experience of blacks in Canada, says this country practices a "benign" type of discrimination. "Racism, perhaps not as open as in the United States, is as pervasive in Canada. Racism with a smile on its face, as Canadian Blacks like to call the brand they live under" (Foster 320). The torture and photographing of Shidane Arone in Somalia was just a rare visible manifestation of it. In another of the handful of articles that explored deeper systemic issues after the Airborne videos were broadcast, Shari Graydon of MediaWatch wrote in the Vancouver Sun, "Let's face it: some Canadians discriminate against others on the basis of their skin colour or ethnicity." She criticized those who said the Airborne were just "blowing of steam" for not recognizing the continuum between violent words and violent actions. "Far from proving that the soldiers' behavior is not racist, however, this simply demonstrates that many in the civilian population harbor the same ignorant and destructive attitudes as some of those in the military," wrote Graydon (A19).

Hazing too is not restricted to the military and its purpose needs to be better understood. Laura Robinson, a journalist specializing in sports and gender issues, compared the Airborne hazing to similar rituals that occur on hockey teams.

> The Airborne initiations are a somewhat extreme version, but not particularly so, of the sick rites of passage that occur on aggressive male sports teams. Somehow, by humiliating and degrading a man, and stripping him of his humanity, he becomes less than a man. The only people who aren't men in this world are women, and as my soldier friend says—someone's got to take that role in a man's world where women don't exist. After all, the worst insult to a man is that he throws, catches, runs, shoots or cries like a woman.
>
> The initiation purges soldiers and athletes of any femininity that dares to exist in them. By the end, after the woman in them has been kicked, punched, smeared with excrement and sufficiently humiliated, they are purified. They are now a walking killing machine, able to torture teenagers to death, or inflict permanently disabling injuries on opposing players. (Robinson A21)

Robinson's analysis touches on two persistent and interrelated themes in Western culture: the practice of equating weakness with the feminine and the acceptance of a certain amount of male violence as natural. Attempts were made to dismiss the Airborne's actions as "bonding rituals" without examining what other ways soldiers, or men in general, could bond. Bercuson writes:

> Armies throughout history have learned that the subordination of fear—which is vital if soldiers are to go deliberately into harm's way—can be achieved when soldiers stand in ordered ranks with others whose respect they value above everything, including life...An army (and navy and air force) must, therefore, provide the order, the structure, the ritual, and the belief systems that will provide its members with the spiritual support they may eventually need if called upon to offer up their lives. (27-28)

The hazing seen on the Airborne's video crossed the line between bonding and degradation. Some tried to downplay this, pointing to worse acts of cruelty and dehumanization inflicted on recruits in other countries. For example, in 1991, during a ceremony known as "blood winging," recruits to a U.S. Marine Corps airborne unit had the pins they'd just received for completing paratrooper training smashed into their chests by the unit's senior members ("Brass call hazing"). But as Robinson pointed out, violent male rituals are not confined to the military.

The apparent unwillingness to acknowledge systemic violence in Canadian culture is tied in with Canada's ambivalent attitudes towards its military. After the Second World War, peacekeeping, an activity "tough enough for the right, flakey enough for the left" (Burnham 14) became the apparent raison d'etre of the Canadian military (although it did have other duties such as NATO commitments, search and rescue functions, etc.). Since then, it has proved a constant source of pride for the country. In fact, as defence analyst Martin Shadwick suggests, Canadians may place too much of their identity in the military. Under such circumstances, the revelations about the Airborne and other instances of military impropriety could reverberate throughout Canadian society. "Given the tendency of Canadians to identify—and, on occasion, over-identify—with peacekeeping and related assignments, damage also may have been inflicted upon the country's collective self-image" (Shadwick 32). In reality, Canadians are quite out of touch with what the military actually does. Burnham writes: "Canadians tend to have a Billy Bishop notion of military: the young lads off to war or, more recently, doing that blue-helmet peacekeeping thang..." (14). Peter C. Newman points to the lack of clear Canadian identity as the reason why the country does not know how to think about its military. "Armed forces mirror the character of the societies on whose behalf the are pledged to fight. If the ultimate purpose of Canada's military force was hard to pin down, it was because Canadians as a people lacked any definable creed or even a set of common beliefs" (Newman 84). Successive governments have not known how to treat the military either. Nicholas Stethem notes, "Canada's problem is a government obsessed with being politically correct...We operate with the fundamental belief that our forces will not fight, while it's fundamental to the Brits and the U.S. that their forces will" (Payne 13). Bercuson reiterates this point: "There is no parallel between war and anything else that people do. Canadians, however, are inclined to forget what real war means. We haven't fought a major war for half a century (Korea, 1950-1953)" (31). This attitude might partially explain why many journalists insisted on

calling soldiers "peacekeepers" even when they were not performing that function—some in the media would not or could not acknowledge that the Canadian military is just that, a military. Ashok Chandwani, writing in the Montreal Gazette, points out that Canadians have placed their soldiers in a difficult situation: "Having decided that after their valiant role in the world wars, our soldiers will be peacekeepers to the world, we expect them to instantly become models of culturally sensitive diplomats" (Chandwani A2). This jumble of attitudes towards the military—pride in its peacekeeping work but a desire for it not to fight or kill—has led to it being generally under-funded (despite having the largest budget of any government department) and ill-equipped. "Canada's attitude toward the military was best gauged by the quality of their peacetime equipment," writes Newman. "When a New Brunswick army reserve unit ran out of weapons, the troops marched to manoeuvres carrying broomsticks. The incident culminated in a remarkable exchange between to recruits who confronted one another:

> "You've had it, man," one of them yelled, pointing to his broom. "I shot you with this rifle."
> "No you didn't," came the calm reply. "I'm a tank." (Newman 81)

Operating under such a mixed mandate, Canada's military is sent out into a world whose geopolitics over the last decade have become increasingly confusing and unstable. There is now less peace to keep and much more to make. Canadian General Lewis Mackenzie estimated that over the past few years, the number of peacekeepers in the world grew from 5,000 to over 60,000 ("Death in Somalia" 17). In this environment, Canada's armed forces are expected to make the country proud, but they must do so without the proper equipment, without hurting anyone and without getting hurt themselves.

The violent, degrading or racist actions of some Airborne soldiers are not isolated events. They are rooted in the ways power is constructed and maintained in Canadian society and are perhaps more concentrated in, but not exclusive to, the military. While the military leadership failed to identify and remove soldiers possessing such attitudes,

Canada's ambivalence towards its own military is what allowed the leadership to arrive at its current state. These issues were seldom addressed in the moral panic around the Airborne videos, which were treated more as a threat to Canada's image than as evidence of wrongdoing. The videos made it easier to localize blame, to villainize specific soldiers, or the Regiment, or the military leadership. The societal control culture reacted by eliminating only the immediate threat—the Airborne. Despite fears that something like this "would happen again," the solution all but ensured that it would. As Ashok Chandwani wrote just before General John de Chastelain gave his report on the videos to the Defence Minister, disbanding the Regiment only addresses the immediate problem. "The larger issue of reconciling our self-image to reality as a prelude to achieving that elusive ideal of a truly just, peaceful and peace-minded society is going to remain with us for quite a while" (Chandwani A2).

Chapter Five—Conclusion

> From its earliest moments the operation went awry. The soldiers, with some notable exceptions, did their best. But ill-prepared and rudderless, they fell inevitably into the mire that became the Somalia debacle. As a result, a proud legacy was dishonoured. (Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Vol. 1, xxix)

On November 12, 1996, the Canadian government announced plans to send 1,500 troops to Zaïre. The Canadians were to lead a military force of 12,000 troops from more than 10 nations on a mission to help deliver food to starving Rwandan refugees trapped between fighting rebel forces and Zaïrean government soldiers. According to most accounts, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien had decided to commit the force after seeing images of the desperate Rwandans on CNN. He told reporters: "If the world does not act, more than a million lives are at stake" (Pugliese "Nobel Fever," 55).

The Zaïre mission was viewed as the military's opportunity to redeem itself after the Somalia Affair. It would also raise the Prime Minister's profile on the international scene. As journalist David Pugliese wrote in *Saturday Night*, "[N]othing can solidify a statesman's credentials, and simultaneously burnish the image at home, like successful peacekeeping" (55). But the day after details of the mission were announced, the situation in Zaïre changed and the refugees began to return home. Even so, the government kept to its original plan and sent 34 soldiers to Africa to lay the groundwork for a Chapter 7 peace-enforcement mission, the same type that had been used in Somalia. When the soldiers arrived in neighboring Rwanda, officials there confiscated their weapons and would not let them leave the capital, Kigali. Another group of 120 Canadian soldiers, part of the

multinational advance party, were not even allowed into the country. They sat waiting for permission in an abandoned airplane hangar in Entebbe, Uganda. The Americans began to have doubts about the mission and reduced the number of troops they would commit. Other countries began to reconsider their participation. As refugees streamed back over the border to Rwanda, the Canadian government still insisted the mission was vital to the survival of the refugees. The leaders of the Canadian force, however, were not able to do any ground-level reconnaissance until November 28, after which they began to wonder if the mission was necessary after all. They were not even sure if the refugees were actually starving. On December 13, Lieutenant General Maurice Baril+, who would have led the mission, announced the force was no longer needed and the troops came home a few weeks later.

The opportunity for both the government and the military to bask in the world spotlight was lost, but this may have been a blessing in disguise. According to retired Major General Dan Loomis, author of *The Somalia Affair*, "It's like the government and the military learned nothing. Here we were going off, once again, to a place where no-one wanted us, with an attitude of, 'Don't worry, we know what's best for you'" (Pugliese "Nobel Fever," 56). And once again, the troops were not prepared for the mission. Only weeks before the government sent the soldiers to Zaïre, defence officials had told the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts that they could send 800 to 900 troops if they had 90 days to prepare. Instead, the government committed 1,500 troops (some of which had been training to go to Bosnia), as well as significant air support, for a mission that held disturbing parallels with the Somalia intervention: the mandate was unclear, the troops were not adequately trained, the warring factions in Zaïre were unlikely to welcome outsiders, and no reconnaissance of the area had been done. A paper written several months after the mission by employees at the departments of defence and foreign affairs also noted shortcomings with the mission. Among other problems, the authors

---

+ General Baril became Canada's Chief of Defence Staff in 1997.

observed that: "The appropriate role for military force in this operation was often misunderstood or ignored." They also felt that "Some Government leaders. Humanitarian Agencies and reporters demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of the speed with which the military can deploy" (Appathurai and Lysyshyn 9. 12).

The desire to be the next Lester B. Pearson seems to afflict Canadian prime ministers on a regular basis. Both Brian Mulroney and Pierre Trudeau attempted to raise their status as world leaders by making international tours at the ends of their mandates. Jean Chrétien's eagerness to champion a "humanitarian" mission to Zaïre is just one more example of this trend. But it is also an example of an ongoing tendency to use Canada's peacekeepers as both personal and national image-boosters. The strong connection between peacekeeping and Canada's image or identity was seldom clearer than during the weeks when national attention was riveted on the Airborne Regiment's home videos. The videos and the initial reaction to them could have opened up opportunities for genuine soul-searching. Canadians could have explored their tendency to obsess over what other countries think, and they could have reflected more on the role they want the military to play, or whether they even want a military at all. They could have confronted the fact that the disturbing images on those videos had their roots in Canadian civilian culture or they could have recognized that the lack of leadership evident in the videos was, in part, a product of Canada's ambivalent attitude towards the military. Instead, the moral panic surrounding the videos demonstrated that the protection of a certain national image is foremost in the minds of many Canadians. The panic prevented close examination of root causes and underlying attitudes, thus allowing the government to come close to repeating past mistakes.

Ultimately, in the context of the whole Somalia Affair, the actual impact of the videos on the Canadian Forces will likely be minimal. The videos did spark the disbanding of a proud regiment, which caused significant grief to over 600 soldiers and their families.

And they did engrain disturbing images of the military, to go alongside many positive ones, into the minds of most Canadians. But in terms of their overall influence on the military, it is unlikely the videos will foster much change. Only one high-ranking soldier lost his job, for reasons only indirectly related to the two videos the country saw. To all other calls that individuals be punished for the soldiers' behaviour on the videos, then-defence minister David Collenette told people to wait for the public inquiry. That inquiry—the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia—began in June 1995 and ended two years later before it had the chance to investigate many of the issues Collenette had assured it would, including the death of Shidane Arone, questions of military leadership and accountability, and accusations of cover up.

While it is beyond the scope of this study to assess whether the whole Somalia Affair has led to any systemic change in either the Canadian Forces or in the government's behaviour toward them, several points should be reiterated or raised. First, the initial revelations about Shidane Arone's death started the military on the road to reforming itself even before Canadians saw the Airborne videos. As mentioned in Chapter 2, a zero-tolerance policy towards racism and cultural sensitivity training for soldiers were instituted in 1993. Second, the government and the Defence department have started implementing, or plan to implement, many of the 160 recommendations made by the Somalia Inquiry commissioners. Among these are recommendations on training, improving leadership and clamping down on racism (Pugliese "Grits shield" A4).

But other evidence suggests that fundamental issues have not been addressed. The government rejected many of the Inquiry's key recommendations that called for external agencies to become involved in military affairs. The Inquiry also called for a more vigilant Parliament. "Parliament must exercise greater diligence in critically monitoring the terms agreed to, or set by, the government for the employment of the Canadian Forces overseas, and safeguarding members of the armed forces from unreasonable risks..." (Commission

of Inquiry, Executive Summary, ES-47). But the government refused to give Parliament more of a role in deciding when soldiers would be sent on dangerous overseas missions, or to establish criteria and guidelines on which to base decisions about deploying troops. Its reluctance to do the latter, it has been suggested, stems from the fact that some current and recent missions (including those to Zaïre and Haiti) would not have passed the test (Pugliese "Grits shield" A4).

The unprecedented shutdown of the Somalia Inquiry is further evidence that the government and military may be unwilling to delve too deeply into the Defence department's problems. The Inquiry's mandate was extensive, as Collenette had promised it would be. It covered everything from the selection and preparation of the Airborne soldiers, to their performance and leadership in Somalia, to the allegations of a cover up that extended all the way up the chain of command. But after receiving several extensions, the Inquiry was terminated by Collenette's successor, Doug Young. Young told the House of Commons, "every Canadian...knows who pulled the trigger. Everybody in Canada knows exactly what happened on the ground in Somalia..." (Commission of Inquiry, Vol. 1, 356). His comment glossed over the fact that much of the Inquiry's mandate was to discover not just what had happened, but also *why* it had happened.

The Canadian Airborne Regiment's home videos were given to the media in the belief that they would shed light on hidden truths, that they would serve as evidence to support claims that the military had chronic leadership problems. The men who handed over the videos made the common positivist assumption that the videos were a literal depiction and would speak for themselves. Furthermore, being amateur videos, the images were seen to have more credibility or authenticity than those taken by the institutionalized newsmaking process. But as Chris Jenks writes, "Images become infinitely malleable once freed from their original context, whilst still retaining significations within that original

context (as poetry, hermeneutic theory, modern art and advertising all know—for good or ill.)" (Jenks 9). Images are also transportable, and can therefore be broadcast across the country. The Airborne videos sparked a media event—and therefore came to represent much more than the images they contained. Once framed and circulated by the media, the images took on meanings that the soldiers had not meant to stress. The racist, violent and disgusting behaviour shown in the videos became the focus, while the leadership question was secondary. More probing questions about Canadian values and attitudes towards the military received considerably less attention.

The treatment of the videos in the mainstream media differed little from one outlet to the next. As Tuchman has pointed out, the newsmaking process operates as a "means not to know" (179) and thus limits the types of discourse used to describe a news event. Newsmaking also focuses on social actors, not social issues.

> For example, the idea and so the issue of institutionalized racism entails a description of social processes involving the interrelationship of a host of institutions and social problems; it eschews an examination of the prejudices of specific individuals. But newswork emphasizes the primacy of the individual: the individual as source, as legitimated representative, as incumbent, as power broker. (Tuchman 134)

The coverage of the videos, then, focused mainly on issues of individual blame, rather than on systemic racism and violence in Canadian culture.

Media events draw their power from their ability to tap into deep-seated cultural anxieties. The Airborne videos, or rather, their broadcast across Canada and in several other countries, posed a threat to myths and beliefs that Canadians hold about themselves. The ensuing moral panic revealed just how unwilling many Canadians are to examine the systemic racism and violence in their own culture. It also revealed an ambivalence toward the military—a desire for it to bring prestige to Canada, but also an unwillingness to acknowledge the realities of the work it actually carries out.

The Airborne's videos, with all their apparent potential as tools for resistance, sparked a media event, which in turn sparked a moral panic. With attention focused on

individual blame and other surface issues, the videos ultimately had a negligible influence on remedying problems in the military. They did, however, shed light on one value that many Canadians seem to cherish, and that is their image in the eyes of the world.

Bibliography

"Airborne future." Susan Harada. *Prime Time News*. CBC. January 24, 1995.

"Airborne grounded." Editorial. *Ottawa Citizen*. January 24, 1995: A8.

"Airborne report." Susan Harada. *Prime Time News*. CBC. January 23, 1995.

"Airborne Regiment incidents not isolated ones." Valerie Pringle. *Canada AM*. CTV. January 20, 1995.

"Airborne video." *Prime Time News*. Susan Harada. CBC. January 19, 1995.

Alter, Johathan. "Now anyone can be Dan Rather." *Newsweek*. July 22, 1991: 46.

Angus Reid Group. "National Angus Reid/Southam News Poll—The public's assessment of the Canadian Armed Forces and Canada's peacekeeping role." Released August 3, 1996. <www.angusreid.com>. Read April 1997.

Angus Reid Group. "Canada ranks high in unique 20 country poll." News Release. April 1997. <www.angusreid.com>. Read April 1997.

Appathurai, James, and Ralph Lysyshyn. "Lessons learned from the Zaire mission." Unpublished paper. June 1997

Aubry, Jack. "Soldiers can't be punished for racist slurs on video." *Ottawa Citizen*. January 17, 1995: A4.

Beck, Melinda, et al. "Video Vigilantes." *Newsweek*. July 22, 1991: 42-47.

Bercuson, David. *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1996.

Bergman, Brian, and Luke Fisher. "A night of terror." *Maclean's*. March 28, 1994: 26-28.

Berko, Lili. "Surveying the Surveilled: Video, Space and Subjectivity." *Quarterly Review of Film and Video*. 14, 1-2: 61-91.

Berube, Jacques, Lt.-Col. Letter of the Day. "Disbandment of proud Airborne Regiment our collective loss." *Ottawa Citizen*. January 25, 1995: A10.

Bindman, Stephen. "Photos of beating were graphic evidence in courts-martial of Somali peacekeepers." *Montreal Gazette*. November 8, 1994: B1.

Bindman, Stephen. "Sweeping Inquiry called into forces' mission in Somalia." *Vancouver Sun*. November 18, 1994: A7.

"Blowing the Whistle -- Public inquiry ordered into the Canadian Airborne Regiment's conduct in Somalia." *Maclean's*. November 28, 1994: 41.

Boei, William. "Using word 'nigger' doesn't reflect racism. Reformer says." *Vancouver Sun*. January 21, 1995: A12.

Bornais, Stephen. "Callers condemn paratroopers." *Daily News* (Halifax). January 21, 1995.

"Brass call hazing video disgusting." *Calgary Herald*. February 1, 1997: A7.

Bryden, Joan. Analysis. "Outrage defeats elite regiment." *Ottawa Citizen*. January 24, 1995: A4.

Buck, Cecil W. Letter. "Mistake in logic." *Ottawa Citizen*. January 26, 1995: A14.

Burnham, Clint. "Image and representation: What the Canadian Airborne Regiment means for artists." *Fuse*. 18, 4 (Summer 1995): 12-14.

Burns, Edward. Letter. "Airborne soldiers trained to play real hard." *Ottawa Citizen*. January 23, 1995: A8.

Campbell, Murray. "Esprit de corps: The voice of the grunts." *Globe and Mail*. January 21, 1995: D5.

"Canada's shame caught on video." Craig Oliver. *CTV National News*. CTV. January 15, 1997.

"Canadian Airborne Regiment will probably be disbanded." Valerie Pringle. *Canada AM*. CTV. January 20, 1995.

Canadian Press. "Paratroopers going to Rwanda get special training." Canadian Press Newswire. August 4, 1994.

Canadian Press. "Photos provoke debate: Papers flooded by calls complaining about grisly images." *The Daily News* (Halifax). November 9, 1994: 11.

Canadian Press. "Booze blamed for Canadian soliders' shenanigans in Rwanda: Two embarrassing incidents in summer 1993 involving Canadian Airborne Regiment." Canadian Press Newswire. November 18, 1994.

Canadian Press. "Somalia video part bluster: experts." *Hamilton Spectator*. January 17, 1995: A11.

Canadian Press. "New regulations aimed at soldiers' racist behaviour." *Calgary Herald*. January 23, 1995: A7.

Canadian Press. "Airborne may have been dumping ground, inquiry hears." *Globe and Mail*. October 11, 1995: A6A.

Canadian Press. "Airborne unit's stonewalling like Mafia's code of silence: Incidents kept military police busy before tour, inquiry told." *Hamilton Spectator*. October 12, 1995: A6.

Canadian Press. "Skinheads in Airborne worried army: Continued growth of extremist groups still cause of concern to military leaders." *Hamilton Spectator*. October 13, 1995: A3.

Chandwani, Ashok. Column. "'Elite' soldiers' misdeeds raise deeper societal questions." *Montreal Gazette*. January 23, 1995: A2.

Chidley, Joe, et al. "Bonding and Brutality." *Maclean's*. January 30, 1995: 18.

Cobb, Chris. "Death of the Airborne: Feisty publisher regrets role in demise." *Ottawa Citizen*. January 26, 1995: A3.

Cook, Ramsay, et. al. *Canada: a modern study*. Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1977.

Cohen, Stanley. *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*. London: MacGibbon, 1972.

Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*. 5 volumes and executive summary. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997.

"Conduct unbecoming." Editorial. *Ottawa Citizen*. January 20, 1995: A8.

Confidential interview 1. November 7, 1995.

Confidential interview 2. November 7, 1995.

Coyle, Sharon. Letter. "Costly decision." *Ottawa Citizen*. January 25, 1995: A10.

Danson, Barnett J. Letter. "Sad day." *Ottawa Citizen*. January 25, 1995: A10.

"Death in Somalia: Rules of Engagement." CBC News in Review. December 1993.

Department of National Defence. "Backgrounder: The Canadian Airborne Regiment." Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, July 1991.

Department of National Defence. "White Paper 1994." 1994.

Department of National Defence. "1 CDO Canadian Airborne Regiment Misc - Other - Negligent Performance of Duty - CFB Petawawa." Military Police Report. January 25, 1995.

"Disbanding the Airborne: What does it solve?" Pamela Wallin. *Prime Time News. CBC. January 26, 1995.*

Dornan, Christopher. "Scenes from a scandal." *Globe and Mail*. January 21, 1995: D1, D5.

"Do these pictures spell the end for the Airborne." Cynthia Drummond. *CTV National News*. CTV. January 19, 1995.

Drummond, Cynthia. Reporter, CFCF-TV, Montreal. Personal interview. January 19,

1996.

"Dumb and Dumber." Editorial. *Toronto Sun*. January 25, 1995: 10.

Eade, Ron. "Regiment's burial cost put at $4 million: Largest expense will involve moving paratroopers back to home bases." *Vancouver Sun*. January 25, 1995: A5.

Eaman, Ross. *The Media Society: Basic Issues and Controversies*. Toronto: Butterworths. 1987.

Egan, Kelly. "Petawawa: Grief and resentent greet demise of Airborne 'family.'" *Ottawa Citizen*. January 24, 1995: A4.

Farnsworth, Clyde. "Canada ends top regiment after charges." *New York Times*. January 25, 1995: A7.

Farrell, Lennox. Letter. "Which video spurred action?" *Toronto Star*. January 25, 1995: A18.

Fisher, Luke. "We are soldiering on." *Maclean's*. March 28, 1994: 29.

Fisher, Luke. "Canada's shame." *Maclean's*. January 30, 1995: 14-16.

Fisher, Luke. "The Airborne's fall." *Maclean's*. February 6, 1995: 18-20.

Fiske, John. *Media Matters: Everyday Culture and Political Change*. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.

"Fix the Airborne or clip its wings." Editorial. *Toronto Star*. January 20, 1995: A20.

Foster, Cecil. *A Place Called Heaven: The Meaning of Being Black in Canada*. Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 1996.

"Friendly fire: Soldiers needn't endure humiliation to prove inner strength." Editorial. *Calgary Herald*. January 22, 1995: A6.

Grant, Frank. Letter. "Who wants to take a chance on Airborne?" *Edmonton Journal*. January 30, 1995: A9.

Graydon, Shari. Editorial. "The airborne's racism - it's all too Canadian." January 21, 1995: A19.

Goldstein, Lorrie. "The Airborne's Apocalypse Now." *Toronto Sun*. January 20, 1995: 12.

Goldstein, Lorrie. "Airborne supporters ignored." *Toronto Sun*. February 3, 1995: 12.

Goldstein, Lorrie. "Military revisionism." *Toronto Sun*. February 14, 1995: 12.

Hall, Tony. "Big racist thing." *Canadian Forum*. April 1995: 31.

Hamilton, Daphne. Letter. "Airborne soldiers decent, dedicated." *Ottawa Citizen*. January

26, 1995: A14.

Hammond, James. "How about a little respect for the Canadian Airborne?" *Globe and Mail*. January 31, 1995: A19.

Harada, Susan. Reporter, CBC Television. Personal interview. February 26, 1996.

Harper, Burt. Letter. "Less Canadian?" *Ottawa Citizen*. January 24, 1995: A8.

Harrison, Deborah, and Lucie Laliberté. *No Life Like It: Military Wives in Canada*. Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1994.

Hume, Stephen. "How right to kill off our Canadian killing machine." *Vancouver Sun*. January 27, 1995: A15.

"Interview with David Collenette." Pamela Wallin. *Prime Time News*. CBC. January 23, 1995.

"Into the Briar Patch." *Esprit de corps*. July 1994: 8-9.

Jenks, Chris. "The centrality of the eye in Western culture: An introduction." In *Visual Culture*. Edited by Chris Jenks. New York: Routledge, 1995: 1-25.

Johnston, Kenton. "Airborne illness symptomatic of rot in government echelons." *Ottawa Citizen*. January 27, 1995: C4.

Kappler, Brian. Editorial. "Army rite disgusting, but was it all wrong? Canadians shouldn't be too quick to disband crack regiment." *Montreal Gazette*. January 21, 1995: B5.

Kennedy, Janice. "What other illusions are we harbouring in our collective bosom?" *Ottawa Citizen*. January 27, 1995: A13.

Kenny, Eoin. "Racist comments on Somali peacekeepers' video target of Defence probe." *Ottawa Citizen*. January 19, 1995: A5.

Kinsella, Warren. *Web of Hate: Inside Canada's Far Right Network*. Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 1994.

Koring, Paul. "Tapes destroyed, inquiry is told." *Globe and Mail*. October 3, 1995: A1, A6.

Koring, Paul. "Unit was right for Somalia, general says." *Globe and Mail*. February 1, 1996: A4.

Leerhsen, Charles. "L.A.'s violent new video." *Newsweek*. March 18, 1991: 53.

Lewis, Robert. Editorial. "Canada's Shame." *Maclean's*. March 28, 1994: 2.

Lewis, Robert. Editorial. "The Chain of Command." *Maclean's*. February 6, 1995: 2.

"Lost command." Editorial. *Toronto Sun*. January 20, 1995: 10.

Luft, Greg. "When amateurs go after the news." *Columbia Journalism Review*. 30 (September/October 1991): 35-37.

Lutz, Catherine, and Jane Collins. "The photograph as an intersection of gazes: The example of National Geographic." In *Visualizing Theory: Selected Essays from V.A.R., 1990-1994*. Edited by Lucien Taylor. New York: Routledge, 1994: 363-384.

MacKay, Frank. Letter. "Airborne just blowing off steam." *Toronto Star*. January 25, 1995: A9.

MacKinnon, Nancy. "Airborne bound for Croatia." *Pembroke Observor*. January 5, 1995.

MacKinnon, Nancy. "Soldiers stunned by Airborne's demise." *Pembroke Observor*. January 24, 1995: 1.

MacKinnon, Nancy. Column. "Airborne Regiment gets verdict before trial." *Pembroke Observor*. January 24, 1995: 8.

Marotte, Bertrand, and Dave Todd. "Airborne faces the axe; Latest video embarrassment leaves regiment's future in doubt." *Hamilton Spectator*. January 29, 1995: A1.

Martell, Andrea. Opinion. "Disbanding regiment hurts our identity." *Ottawa Citizen*. January 27, 1995: C4.

Matthews, Moira. Letter. "Airborne problems: Fiendish plot or are media making too much of them?" *Ottawa Citizen*. January 24, 1995: A8.

McInnis, Sandra. Letter. "Contemptible act." *Ottawa Citizen*. January 26, 1995: A14.

Metzler, Ken. *Newsgathering*. 2nd edition. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1986.

"Military reaction to the demise of the Airborne Regiment." Dan Matheson. *Canada AM*. CTV. January 24, 1995.

"More Airborne." Susan Harada. *Prime Time News*. CBC. January 20, 1995.

"Mr. Collenette's political decision." Editorial. *Globe and Mail*. January 25, 1995: A18.

Murphy, John W., and Jung Min Choi. "Imagocentrism and the Rodney King affair." *Et cetera*. Winter 1992-1993: 478-484.

Nelson, Joyce. "TV news: A structure of reassurance." *Cinema Canada*. October 1982: 24-25.

Newman, Peter C. *The Canadian Revolution: From Deference to Defiance*. Toronto, Penguin Books Canada Limited, 1995.

Nichols, Bill. *Blurred Boundaries: Questions of Meaning in Contemporary Culture*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994.

Norton, Bill. Letter. "Aberrant behaviour." *Ottawa Citizen*. January 24, 1995: A8.

"On disbanding the Canadian Airborne Regiment." Valerie Pringle. *Canada AM.* CTV. January 24, 1995.

"One half of people polled don't think the Canadian Airborne should have been disbanded." Lloyd Robertson. *CTV National News.* CTV. January 26, 1995.

"Our soldiers: get rid of the racists." Editorial. *Hamilton Spectator.* January 19, 1995: A6.

Ottawa Inside Out. Transcript. January 15, 1995.

Payne, Steve. Editorial. "Soldiers aren't sissies." *Toronto Sun.* March 11, 1995: 13.

"Peacekeepers or bigots with bullets?" Editorial. *Edmonton Journal.* January 23, 1995: A6.

Petrolekas, George. "Too many Rambos." *Montreal Gazette.* January 27, 1995: B3.

Phillips, Andrew. "A few bad men." *Maclean's.* March 28, 1994: 24-25.

"Point of view." Rex Murphy. *Prime Time News.* CBC. January 19, 1995.

Prud'homme, Alex. "Police brutality." *Time.* March 25, 1991: 16-19.

Pugliese, David. "Grisly photos struck a nerve." *Ottawa Citizen.* November 9, 1994: A1.

Pugliese, David. "Airborne troubles solved, brass say; Disbanding was considered and rejected last year." *Ottawa Citizen.* January 21, 1995: A1.

Pugliese, David. "Blame leaders, not soldiers, say ex-officers." *Ottawa Citizen.* January 21, 1995: A3.

Pugliese, David. "How the Airborne killed itself." *Ottawa Citizen.* January 26, 1995: A1.

Pugliese, David. "Almost 20% of '85 Airborne unit had police record, report found: Study concluded problem was not that serious." *Ottawa Citizen.* October 4, 1995: A4.

Pugliese, David. "Nobel Fever." *Saturday Night.* May 1997: 52-62, 112.

Pugliese, David. "Anatomy of a cover-up." *Ottawa Citizen.* June 21, 1997: B1-B4.

Pugliese, David. "Grits shield military from scrutiny." *Ottawa Citizen.* October 15, 1997: A4.

Pugliese, David, and Herald Staff. "Axe falls on disgraced Airborne." *Calgary Herald.* January 24, 1995: A1, A2.

"Racist comments from Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia." Keith Morrison. *Canada AM.* CTV. January 16, 1995.

"Racist Links Spark Outrage." *Calgary Herald.* May 8, 1993: A3.

"Regiment's history fairly impressive." *Daily News* (Halifax). January 20, 1995.

"Rid Canada of this airborne scourge." Editorial. *Vancouver Sun*. January 21. 1995: A18.

Rider. Dave. and Rick Gibbons. "Video shows soldiers hatred." *Ottawa Sun*. January 15. 1993: 3.

Rider. Dave. and Rick Gibbons. "'Lazy slobs (who) stink.'" *Ottawa Sun*. January 15. 1993: 3.

Robin. Christopher. Corporal. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing. Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. Vol. 6. Oct. 12, 1995: 1037, 1052.

Robinson. Laura. Opinion. "Sick rituals purge men of all traces of femininity." *Toronto Star*. January 26. 1995: A21.

Rudolph. Barbara. "Racism in the ranks." *Time*. January 30. 1995: 31.

Sallot. Jeff. "Airborne in danger of being disbanded." *Globe and Mail*. January 20. 1995: A1. A8.

Sallot. Jeff. "Airborne leaders held culpable." *Globe and Mail*. January 21. 1995: A4.

Sallot. Jeff. "Elite unit needed to replace Airborne." *Globe and Mail*. January 25. 1995: A1. A4.

Sallot. Jeff. "General loses post over video." *Globe and Mail*. February 1. 1995: A1. A7.

Sallot. Jeff. and Susan Delacourt. "Airborne disbanded in disgrace." *Globe and Mail*. January 24. 1995: A1. A4.

Saunders. Charles. Op-ed. "True patriot hate." *Daily News* (Halifax). January 19. 1995: 17.

Seymour. Edward. Letter. "Image destroyed." *Ottawa Citizen*. January 23. 1995: A8.

Shadwick. Martin. "Courting Disaster." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*. 24. 3 (March 1995): 32.

"Shocking video of a regiment in chaos." Cynthia Drummond. *CTV National News*. CTV. January 18. 1995.

"Soldier's picture in Nazi garb outrages MPs." *Montreal Gazette* . May 13. 1993: B1.

"Soldiers upset by publication of Somali photos." *Montreal Gazette*. November 9. 1994: B1.

"Somalia Soldiers." Susan Harada. *Sunday Report*. CBC. January 15. 1995.

"Somalia video -- Reaction." Susan Harada. CBC. January 16. 1995.

"Somalia videotape -- Interviews." Brian Stewart. *Prime Time News*. CBC. January 16. 1995.

"Speaking Notes for the Honorable David Collenette, P.C. M.P. Minister of National Defence." Department of National Defence. Press Conference. January 23, 1995.

Statistics Canada. *Household Facilities and Equipment, 1996*. Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 1996.

Storey, John. *An Introductory Guide to Cultural Theory and Popular Culture*. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1993.

Tagg, John. *The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories*. Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.

Taylor, S.R. "Cowardice and Courage." *Esprit de corps*. July 1994: 4-5.

Taylor, Scott R. "Are you happy now that you killed the Airborne?" *Esprit de corps*. February 1995: 4-5.

Taylor, Scott. Editor and publisher, *Esprit de corps*. Personal interview. November 6, 1995.

"The Airborne Regiment disgraced, now disbanded." Craig Oliver. *CTV National News*. CTV. January 23, 1995.

"The country's national shame: Canadians want assurances of Airborne cleanup." Editorial. *Montreal Gazette*. January 20, 1995: B2.

"There are more troubling revelations involving Canada's disgraced First Airborne Regiment." Dave Rinn. *CTV National News*. CTV. January 20, 1995.

Thompson, Allan. "Airborne home video renews call for inquiry: Canadian troops in Somalia taped making racist remarks." *Toronto Star*. January 16, 1995: A2.

Thompson, Allan. "Airborne regiment axed in disgrace: Decision after shocking videos made over advice from top brass." *Toronto Star*. January 24, 1995: A1.

Thompson, Allan. "Wider Airborne violence revealed." *Toronto Star*. October 6, 1995: A1, A28.

Thompson, Allan. "Airborne video shown uncut." *Toronto Star*. October 12, 1995: A1, A21.

"Time to ground the Airborne." Editorial. *Globe and Mail*. January 20, 1995: A22.

"Troubled regiment had nowhere to go." Editorial. *Daily News* (Halifax). January 25, 1995: 18.

Tuchman, Gaye. *Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality*. New York: The Free Press, 1978.

"Videotape released of disgusting hazing on Petawawa base." Valerie Pringle. *Canada AM*. CTV. January 19, 1995.

Vernon, Mike. "In defence of two Airborne officers." *Globe and Mail*. October 7, 1995: D8.

Wallace, Bruce. "Fighting a Reputation." *Maclean's*. January 30, 1995: 17.

Ward, John (Canadian Press). "Colonel chewed out Airborne NCOs before Somalian mission started." *Montreal Gazette* . November 30, 1995: A13.

Waters, Harry F. "America's ugliest home videos." *Newsweek*. June 15, 1992: 56-60.

Wilson, J.M., Major. Transcript of evidentiary hearing. Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. October 24, 1995.

White, Mimi. "Television: A narrative–history." *Cultural Studies*. 3, 3 (October 1989): 282-300.

"Who are these guys? Disgraced by Somali torture death and disgusting hazing, regiment has a proud history." *Hamilton Spectator*. January 21, 1995: A7.

The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1997. Mahwah, New Jersey: K-III Reference Corporation, 1996.

Worthington, Peter. "The Wrong Man." *Saturday Night*. September 1994: 32-37, 65.

Worthington, Peter. "Airborne video shamefully exploited." Toronto Sun. January 19, 1995: 11.

Worthington, Peter. "Video could ground airborne." *Toronto Sun*. January 20, 1995: 11.

Worthington, Peter, and Kyle Brown. *Scapegoat: How the Army Betrayed Kyle Brown*. Toronto: Seal Books, 1997.

Wyczynski, Michel. "Ex Coelis: Training Canada's Paratroopers." *Esprit de corps*. 4, 12 (May 1995): 12-13.

Zerneutsch, Sheri. "Canadian Airborne representation: representing nationhood and Canadian national identity." Paper presented at Learneds' Conference, St. Catherine's, Ontario, May, 1996.