Carleton Island 1778-1783:

Imperial Outpost during the American Revolutionary War

by

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Abstract

This thesis studies the experiences of a cosmopolitan community garrisoning an imperial outpost during the American Revolutionary War. Between 1778 and 1783, the inhabitants of Fort Haldimand on Carleton Island played a key role in maintaining imperial links between Quebec's upper country and Britain's Atlantic Empire. The focus of this study is upon the apparent paradox of the Fort's existence, at once removed from the imperial centre but also charged with protecting the empire's possessions and values. Rather than interpreting the Fort's historic significance in light of its physical disconnection from central authorities, this thesis explores its imperial connections. Drawing upon trends of interpretation in military history, social history and ethnohistory, this thesis reconstructs a balanced picture of life on the island. The resulting portrait of the islanders' social relations, activities and conflicts suggests that a broad range of factors —from the practical to the psychological—bound the periphery to the centre. It also suggests that a close symbiotic relationship existed between centre and periphery.

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Acknowledgments

Just as a plurality of perspectives composed Fort Haldimand's experiences, a variety of viewpoints other than my own helped give form and substance to this thesis. I hereby acknowledge the debts I owe to colleagues, family and friends.

I must thank the professionals and scholars who helped me navigate the peculiar organised disorder of the archival world. Patricia Kennedy of the National Archives of Canada explained how General Frederick Haldimand arranged his papers by centre of command. She revolutionised my research tactics and deepened my understanding of Haldimand's administration. She also generously shared her research into the court records of the Montreal Gaol. George Henderson and Stewart Renfrew of the Queen's University Archives could not have been more helpful and encouraging. The staff of the New York State Archives courteously answered my inquiries and supplied information. Dr. Fred Thorpe of Ottawa also shared research that proved invaluable to this work.

I am indebted to my supervisors and professors, past and present, for directing me in my study of Carleton Island. Dr. Donald Swainson suggested that I choose Carleton Island as a topic and supervised an undergraduate directed study on the subject. Under Dr. James Pritchard's supervision, the study grew not only in length but also in complexity as he urged me to place the island's experiences in a broader imperial context. Dr. Jane Errington's graduate seminar at Queen's University also stimulated my thinking on the relationship between colonial societies and imperial centres. I must also thank a scholar whom I know only through his work, David Hancock. His book, *Citizens of the World,* is a model of scholarship and expression. All other academic debts I acknowledge in the footnotes. Only the flaws, errors and inaccuracies that this thesis

may contain belong entirely to me

Family and friends provided an environment just as necessary for the completion of this thesis. My parents, Jack and Kathie Gibson, encouraged and supported me, not only through this thesis, but also through years of schooling. My brother, Andrew Gibson, helped with the computer stuff. My aunt, Ellen Henderson, obliged with invaluable editorial help. My grandmother, Jessie Henderson, provided an example of courage and endurance under adverse conditions.

Thanks is due to Annette Hayward for her continual support, to Dan Malleck for teaching me so much, to Michelle Ball for keeping me grounded in this century, to David Mulvenna for the insights into mercantilism, to Betsey Baldwin for advice on how to finish and to Judy Tse for being a steadfast friend. Thanks also to David Mills and Carol Harris for keeping me together, body and soul.

I considered it a mater of moral responsibility to represent the islanders' lives in such a manner that they would have recognised themselves and I can only hope that I succeeded in half that aim.

August, 1999

Simcoe Island, Ontario

Abbreviations

CO	Colonial Office
DCB	*Dictionary of Canadian Biography*
HP	Haldimand Papers
MG	Manuscript Group
NAC	National Archives of Canada
QUA	Queen's University Archives
RG	Record Group
WO	War Office

Introduction

> ***When we first went to Carleton Island, the Summer was almost over and the Winter season was fast approaching. The Troops were all in Tents, and the very ground, on which [Fort Haldimand] was to be erected was covered with trees of which it was, in the first place, necessary to clear it. There was soon however a number of Hutts erected, and in some of these Hutts, the contracted artificers, who to a man, exerted themselves to the utmost in forwarding the Service, lived during the whole winter. The first object was to put the [Fort] into a posture of defence...***

In August 1778 a force of three hundred British soldiers and a handful of women left Montreal on a two-hundred-mile journey up the St. Lawrence River. They stopped at Carleton Island, twelve miles from the foot of the Lake Ontario. There they built, then garrisoned, Fort Haldimand. First the soldiers and their wives arrived and contemplated the land in its natural state, an isolated island covered with trees and winter menacingly close. Then they cleared the land and reinvented it in their own image. European-style houses replaced Mississaugan wigwams. Trees disappeared, transformed into palisades and "the best wooden barracks in Canada." [1] Geological formations assumed new identities, the stamp of the occupier's imperial vision. Bays and peninsulas became Schank's Harbour, Government Harbour and Merchant's Point, safe-landing places for fleets of bateaux and vessels engaged in supplying Quebec's western territory.

The tide of traffic deposited a complex collection of people on the island. The

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[1] Great Britain, War Office, Judge Advocates General Office, WO 71, vol. 56, p. 39, 61, NAC, MG 13, transcript, "The Court Martial of James Glenie," 24 July 1780, hereafter: "The Court Martial of James

mixed garrison of Englishmen, Lowland and Highland Scots, Irish, Germans, Americans, Canadians, Algonkian-speaking Mississaugas, Iroquois-speaking Six Nations Indians, free blacks and enslaved blacks represented an exotic phenomenon in a Mississaugan hunting ground. Their plurality surprised them, and they congratulated themselves upon the complexity of their community: "tho we are of all nations, of all colours and of all professions there has not been any disagreement between any two people on this winter," their captain reported.[2] Their life style imitated their transatlantic world-view. They ate Irish salted-pork and fresh venison, English dried peas and Indian corn and drank Jamaican rum, port wine and spruce beer. This collection of goods and people represented the basis upon which the British would defend their imperial title to the province of Quebec. The fort, its storehouses and dockyard made Carleton Island the crowning jewel of Quebec's western defensive system: "The Great Depot of Provisions for the Upper Posts."[3] For the next five years Carleton Island became a stage for the pageant of military operations and a miniature representation of the British Empire in the Lake Ontario region.

But the wilderness and isolation of the region undermined the island's well-ordered military landscape. The isolation filled the garrison with a sense of futility. The trees hemmed their collective imagination. Lieutenant James Glennie of the Royal Engineers declared that "only business or necessity" could convince the garrison members to "walk among the trees." Trader Richard Cartwright reflected that the Lake Ontario region was a "howling wilderness." Glennie depicted it as "a desert far removed

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Glennie". James Glennie signed his name with a double "n" therefore that spelling will be used.

[2] British Library, Haldimand Papers, Additional Manuscripts, 21787, 119, QUA, microfilm, Captain Fraser to Haldimand, 21 March 1780, hereafter: QUA, HP, and volume number.

from the Intercourse of Mankind." Cartwright's trading partner, Robert Hamilton, complained that he was "Shutt up from all Communication with the rest of the World" and that the "Barren island" could not "afford great Matter of Epistolary Entertainment." Captain Alexander Fraser of the 84th Regiment of Foot (formerly the Royal Highland Immigrants) begged to turn down his command on the island and be sent home. He felt cut off from the centre of power and social order and desired to return to Britain where his friends could secure him a majority.[4] Other members of the garrison felt as he did. Personal dissatisfaction and outrage was directed at other members of the garrison. Tempers frayed. The fort's disconnection from the social, economic and political centres of the province was psychologically arduous.

The two hundred water-miles separating the island from Montreal imprisoned the Carleton Islanders in an environment of scarcity. All the personnel and materiel of war was carried up the St. Lawrence River to the island by thousands of river bateaux, an undertaking that always left the island lacking necessities. Shortages of labour and supplies bedevilled the fort's construction. Fresh food was scarce and scurvy claimed the health, lives and morale of many. Theft of the government stores was rampant. Officers fought each other over control of resources. Traders defrauded the military, the military defrauded the Indians, and a flourishing trade in rum provided a deadly lubricant to this three-way relationship. The garrison seemed to unravel under the weight of the island's hardships.

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[3] QUA, HP 21851, 120, Captain Mathews to Nathaniel Day, 17 February 1780.
[4] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 8, 28. [Richard Cartwright], *Letters of an American Loyalist,* nos. IX. Quoted in Jane Errington. *The Lion, the Eagle, and Upper Canada: A Developing Colonial Ideology,* Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987, 3. Robert Hamilton to Francis Goring, 25 March 1780 printed in J.H. Durham *Carleton Island in the Revolution: The Old Fort and its Builders.* Syracuse New

Significant contrast marked the Carleton Islanders' experiences. In one light the fort appeared as an extension of British imperial sovereignty, civilised society's triumph over the wilderness.[5] Glennie's first-hand description, which opens this thesis, captures the romance of the colonial experience. The rhythm of his narrative fuels the myth; it has the cadence of progress as the soldiers first contemplated then reordered the landscape. But the record of the Carleton Islanders' subsequent outrageous behaviour cast the mission in another light. Personal passions and ambitions emerged naked and incomprehensible against a backdrop of war, rigid military hierarchy, and a bewildering wilderness. What did this picture mean? On the surface it appeared that Carleton Island was spiralling out of Britain's control. Yet, the garrison persisted for five years. Even Robert Hamilton had to admit that though he had "spent a very idle" winter on the "barren" isolated island, it was "in other respects not a very uncomfortable winter. Plenty to eat and Drink, and a good deal of other Amusements have made the winter pass pretty pleasantly."[6] How did the food and drink that Hamilton consumed arrive at such an isolated spot? With whom did he socialise if they did not arrive at the island from some distant place? Is it possible to reconcile the paradox of this outpost, at once isolated from and integrated with the British Empire?

The story of why and how the British occupied Carleton Island is the story of the

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York: C.W. Bardeen Publishers 1889, 99. QUA, HP 21787, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 29 October 1779, 97.

[5] The germ of this thesis began as a study I did of Carleton Island as an undergraduate at Queen's University. In that first effort I largely ignored the extensive shipping activities that brought rations to the island and connected it with Montreal and Niagara. Consequently, I interpreted many of the Carleton Islanders' experiences in the negative light of the island's isolation and of the fort's physical marginality. In this thesis I revise that negative assumption and offer a more balanced look at the community's experiences. Sarah K. Gibson, "Fort Haldimand's Community on Carleton Island: The Experiences of a British Fort during the American Revolutionary War 1778-1783." *Historic Kingston*, 46 (1998): 5-30.

[6] Richard Hamilton to Francis Goring, 25 March 1780, printed in Durham *Carleton Island in the*

island's political, economic and social connections with the British Atlantic Empire. Carleton Island was an imperial outpost in the fullest sense of the expression—the empire's representative in a geographically isolated region. The term 'outpost' suggests images of the marginal or the unimportant but only the geographic isolation of Carleton Island made it a peripheral place. It was a self-contained (but not self-supporting) extension of Britain's sovereign arm.

In 1778 General Haldimand, Quebec's military and civil governor, designed Carleton Island to be the key of his defensive system for the province's western territory. He fortified the island at the height of the American Revolution and the nadir of Britain's colonial power on the continent. In 1777, after two years of hostilities American rebels defeated a British army at the Battle of Saratoga; only Quebec, Nova Scotia and Florida remained under British control.[7] Quebec's governor General Frederick Haldimand was responsible for preserving one third of Britain's imperial holdings in North America.

At this time the mantle of Quebec's provincial status extended thousands of miles into the Great Lake's region; the term "Canada" applied only to the settled regions of the St. Lawrence Valley.[8] The province's western territory was of vital importance to the security of the whole because Quebec's economy depended upon the fur trade carried out in this nether region, and the trade depended upon the continuing alliance with the western Indians. Britain maintained its dominion in the West with a string of posts that co-operated to keep communication and transportation links open. The new fort at Carleton Island would act as the fulcrum of this system by protecting the vulnerable

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Revolution: The Old Fort and its Builders, 99.

[7] Piers Mackesy, *The War for America 1775-1783*, London: Longmans, 1964, 184.

[8] Stuart Sutherland, Pierre Tousignant and Madeleine Dionne-Tousignant, "Haldimand, Sir Frederick,"

transhipment point at the confluence of the St. Lawrence River and Lake Ontario. The fort's garrison members monitored trading activities, forged diplomatic relations with several Indian nations, launched a series of vicious raids into rebel territory and provided shelter for refugee Loyalists. Fort Haldimand's *raison d'être* was to preserve Britain's imperial presence in Quebec's western territory; thus the very nature of its operations drew the fort into a close association with the British transatlantic community engaged in fighting the war for America.

This study of Carleton Island speaks to a larger body of historical writing exploring the relationship between the British Empire and its colonial periphery. The historiography is divided over the quality of colonial North America's connections with the empire. One school of thought posits that bonds of authority weakened over distance, thus facilitating the emergence of distinct colonial identities. Another school argues that transatlantic shipping connected the colonies and Britain in a web of shared intellectual and commercial ties.[9] This thesis belongs to the second school, because it examines one small sliver of the system Britain used to conduct an overseas war during the American Revolution: how the British under General Haldimand extended the Crown's sovereignty into the wilderness of Quebec's West. It focuses upon the quality and nature—from the practical to the psychological—of Carleton Island's imperial connections rather than upon the obvious factors of distance and undeveloped communication that separated geographical locations.

DCB, vol. 4, Francess Halpenny, General Editor, Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1779, 895.

[9] For analysis of this question see Ian K. Steele, "Colonisers into Colonised," *Canadian Review of American Studies*, 19 (3) 1988, 353-358 and Gregory Nobles "Breaking in the Backcountry: New Approaches to the Early American Frontier, 1750-1800," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 46 (4) 1989, 642-70.

Carleton Island was a microcosm of British Quebec. The study of the islanders' experience shows how the materiel of war that General Haldimand faithfully distributed to the upper posts served as the glue of the imperial bonds. The supply system integrated the posts into Britain's transatlantic community because all the trade items, rations, tools, and troops, came from Britain. Equally significant, this study identifies the nature of imperial bonds. The transportation system that delivered the goods also solidified individual's ties with the empire. News, information and letters flowed in the wake of the military traffic and bound the upper posts to Britain in a web of social, political and business connections. Military supplies and trade items in themselves strengthened imperial links because they provided tangible evidence of British authority. British pay packets, supplies, and goods insinuated their recipients into a reciprocal-dependant relationship with the Crown and tied their futures to the success of Britain's imperial agenda. Carleton Island was geographically isolated from British headquarters at Quebec, but the men and women who composed Fort Haldimand's garrison were culturally and psychologically integrated with the British Empire.

The significance of Carleton Island's achievement of extending the British Empire into the wilderness has gone unnoticed in the historiography of the American Revolution. The lack of attention reflects the historiography's preoccupations rather than the fort's historic significance. Historians have often viewed the American Revolution as a lightning rod for constructing national and ethnic identities.[10] This preoccupation with

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[10] For the Americans historians the revolution has become a prism for identifying component parts of American society. For example, see Colin Gordon, "Crafting a Usable Past: Consensus, Ideology, and Historians of the American Revolution," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 46 (4) 1989, 671-95. For the British, the loss of their colonies was a blow to their imperial pride, and a much-studied chapter of their parliamentary and political history. See Mackesy, *War for America 1775-1783*, Norman Baker,

the emergence of distinct colonial identities naturally excluded an exploration of the nature of the colonies' connections to the empire's centre. Nevertheless three schools of history studying the effects of the American Revolution upon the development of national, local and group identities have allowed Carleton Island to maintain a steady, if low profile. Their treatment of the island is passing and cursory because the island does not fit the parameters of their aims. The national, local and group histories of the war rely upon benchmarks of analysis inimical to the study of Carleton Island: scale, the *longue-durée* and homogeneous group-membership.

Histories of Canada's nationhood are studies of its political, economic, military and social development. Historians document the country's progress through time. The breadth of their vision brings order and shape to a subject of majestic geographic and temporal sweep. Ironically, the scale of the national vision required a vantage that is limited in scope. Historians take the view from the top, that of the of the policy makers, authority figures and economic trends, in order to view the aggregate picture. Thus, Canada's history in these scholars' hands becomes a study of comparative wealth, relative power, and hierarchical relationships. Yet, the subjects of these works, trends, policies, and laws, exist only in the ether, in theoretical realms, and contain little reference to the practical reality. A. L. Burt's ironic description of Carleton Island

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Government and Contractors: The British Treasury and War Supplies, 1774-1783, London: The Athlone Press, 1971, David Syrett *Shipping and the American War 1775-1783: A Study of British Transport Organisation,* London: The Athlone Press, 1970, and Arthur Bowler's *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775-1783,* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1975. America's bid for independence also challenged other groups to reassess their position in the world system. In 1967, the year of Canada's centenary, two works appeared in French Canada which drew on historical precedent to explain Quebec's peculiar cultural and political position: Marcel Trudel *La révolution américaine: pourquoi la France refuse le Canada, 1775-1783,* Sillery, Québec: Editions du Boréal Express, 1976 and Gustave Lanctôt, *Canada and the American Revolution*: 1774-1783, Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1967. For the Loyalists experience see William Canniff *The Settlement of Upper Canada*.... 1869 Reprint Belleville,

underscored the tension inherent in this approach. He, like the historians who preceded him and those who followed him, offered Carleton Island as an example of General Haldimand's defensive system.[11] He observed that upon its fortification "Carleton Island at once became one of the most important places in Canada," yet the brief paragraph he devoted to the subject was not commensurate with the weight of his statement.[12] The reach of Burt's work did not allow him to explore how or why Carleton Island was so important.

Similarly, the drive to analyse the aggregate picture of Haldimand's defence of Quebec has led historian John Dendy and geographer Faye Whitfield to advance unrealistic portraits of the island-fort. Dendy's 1972 study presented a classic analysis of the military and strategic parameters of the war in Quebec. Twenty years later, Faye Whitfield amplified our understanding of Haldimand's Quebec by describing and mapping Haldimand's administration in the West. Both works are useful because they build pictures of the province's military and administrative frameworks, but their cosmology was that of the British military's hierarchical order. Carleton Island emerged as a second or even third-rate post. Dendy's exclusive focus upon Haldimand's defence priorities in the settled St. Lawrence Valley led him to characterise Carleton Island as a minor listening-post of limited defensive and offensive capabilities. The island's vital role as a transhipment centre for the westward delivery of supplies and trade items went

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ON: Mika Silk Screen Ltd. 1971.

[11] See William Kingsford, *The History of Canada*, vol. 4, Toronto: Roswell & Hutchison, 1893, 486. A. L. Burt's *The Old Province of Quebec*, 1933. Reprint Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1968. Vol. 2, 12. Hilda Neatby. *Quebec: The Revolutionary Age 1760-1791*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1966, 177. J. Mackay Hitsman. *Safeguarding Canada: 1763-1871*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968, 42.

[12] Burt, *The Old Province of Quebec*, 12.

unexplored because Dendy considered that "the activity in the West had little relation to the main threat Haldimand saw to the inhabited portion of the province." Haldimand recognised that these "activities," the conduct of the fur trade and the distribution of the presents to the Indians, were the vital underpinning of the whole province's economic structure. But such economic and diplomatic concerns fell outside the margins of Dendy's narrow military-defensive inquiry.[13]

Whitfield's study differed from Dendy's in that she focused upon Haldimand's defence concerns in the West. But she employed a similar mode of analysis. She based her evaluation of the western posts' integration within Quebec upon a hierarchy of geographic distance, administrative function, garrison size and rank of the commanding officer.[14] The degree of each post's integration into the system depended upon the degree to which they possessed these attributes. According to her criteria, Carleton Island was of tertiary administrative importance behind Montreal and Niagara despite the obvious fact that Carleton Island was the link between them.[15] If the ships did not sail from Carleton Island, Niagara would fall. Dendy's and Whitfield's administrative and policy orientated studies described the nature of Haldimand's defence system but they did not describe how it operated. A policy is only as effective as its implementation in the field.

The second body of work that heeds Carleton Island's role during the American Revolution is the study of community formation on the shores of Lake Ontario. The local study is the close relative of the national narrative because it documents the evolution of

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[13] John Oliver Dendy, "Frederick Haldimand and the Defence of Canada, 1778-1784," PH D Dissertation, Duke University 1972., 36-41, 49-50.

[14] Faye Whitfield, "The Geography of the British Northern Interior Frontier of Defense during the Haldimand War Administration of Quebec 1778-1784." PH D Dissertation McMaster University 1992, 10.

a particular community over time. Its attention to the development of identity is even more pronounced because it is limited in geographic scope to one particular community. The emerging histories are eclectic, absorbing all details that relate to human settlement of a particular area; long-term occupation of place is the only necessary ingredient for the stories of community development and progress. The local history has a subtle Janus perspective; it is at once a historical study, an exploration of the past, but the thrust of the analysis is progress oriented. In these histories, place—more specifically, an historical trend in the use of that place—promoted the development of the modern community. Historians who document Kingston's civic progress hearken to Fort Haldimand and its builders as the city's precursor and ignore the nature and purpose of the Fort's five-year existence. Richard Preston styled Carleton Island "the Fore-runner of the British Settlement at Kingston." Hindsight will admit the veracity of Preston's assessment but he glossed over Carleton Island's real function: to preserve the thirteen colonies so that the Loyalists-refugees could return home: neither Haldimand nor Carleton Island's garrison consciously determined to plant British civil society in the wilderness of the Lake Ontario region.[16] Kingston's historians either ignore Carleton Island or falsely associate it with

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[15] *Ibid, 13.*

[16] For American authors who have investigated Carleton Island see: Benson Lossing, *Field Book of the War of 1812* ... . N.D. Reprint Glendale N.Y.: Benchmark Publishing Corporation 1970, Sir John Johnson, *Orderly Book of Sir John Johnson during the Oriskany Campaign 1776-1777*, microfiche, annotated by William L. Stone, Albany, N. Y.: J. Munsell, 1882, Franklin Hough, *A History of Jefferson County*..., Watertown, N. Y.: Sterling and Riddell, 1854, Nelie Horton Casler, *Cape Vincent and Its History*, Watertown, N. Y.: Hungerford-Holbrook co.,1906., John A. Haddock. *The Picturesque St. Lawrence River. A souvenir: The Thousand Islands of the St. Lawrence River from Kingston and Cape Vincent to Morristown and Brockville.* Albany, N.Y.: Weed-Parsons Printing Co., 1895, J. H. Durham, *Carleton Island in the Revolution: The Old Fort and Its Builders* ... , Syracuse N.Y.: C.W. Bardeen Publishers 1889. Canadian historians have not directed as much attention to Carleton Island because after 1817 it became American territory. Nevertheless, the following works make reference to the island: Canniff *History of the Province of Ontario,* Agnes M. Machar, *The Story of Old Kingston,* Toronto: Musson Book Co. 1908, James A. Roy *Kingston, The King's Town.* Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1952. Adrian Cate, ed, *Pictorial History of the Thousand Islands of the St. Lawrence River,* Brockville, ON: Besancourt Publishers

the city's development.

Carleton Island enjoys a ubiquitous, but undeveloped presence, in a third group of works: the histories of a specific individual's or group's experiences during the war. This body of literature includes social histories of women's experiences of the war, ethno-historians' reconstruction of the Native perspective of the war and the regimental histories of the British army.[17] The recovery of these groups' experiences expands the prevailing conception of the war as a military affair of political consequence. Women, Indians, and regiments of particular ethnic composition or professional status participated in the war differently. The studies reveal that the British war-effort was an amalgam of interests, but they do not explore the dynamic interaction between the plurality of interests. Thus, the phenomenon of Carleton Island's ethnically, racially and professionally complex society only appears after a reading of a cross-section of these narratives. The coming together of these people at an isolated outpost provides an excellent opportunity to examine the quality of the daily interaction between different groups and to study how they maintained group identity across great distances.

Individually, the foregoing histories—the national, local, and group studies—are too limited to accommodate the complexity and anomalies of Carleton Island's

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1982, Brian S. Osborne and Donald Swainson, *Kingston: Building on the Past*, Westport, ON: Butternut Press Inc, 1988.

[17] For studies of women, natives and regiments associated with Carleton Island see Janice Potter-MacKinnon, *While the Women Only Wept: Loyalist Refugee Women in Eastern Ontario*, Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993. Earle Thomas, *The Three Faces of Molly Brant: A Biography*, Kingston: Quarry Press, 1996. H. Person Gundy, "Molly Brant: Loyalist," *Ontario History* 45, 1953: 97-108. Isabel Thompson Kelsay, *Joseph Brant 1743-1807: Man of Two Worlds*. Syracuse New York: Syracuse University Press 1984. Barbara Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, Syracuse New York: Syracuse University Press, 1972. Jean-Pierre Wilhelmy. *German Mercenaries in Canada*, translated by Honey Thomas, Beloeil, Quebec: Maison Des Mots, 1985. Louis Pelletier, *John Warren et son époque*, Quebec: Association des descendants de John Warren, 1988. E. Cruikshank, *King's Royal Regiment of New York*, reprint from the Ontario Historical Society's Papers and Records, volume 27, 1931. E. Cruikshank, *Butler's Rangers: The Revolutionary Period*, 1893, reprinted Owen Sound, Ontario: Richardson, Bond and

community during the Revolutionary War. Canada's national historians minimise the plurality of interests in revolutionary era Quebec because their goal is to define a Canadian history that is distinct from the British and the American histories. Local historians tailor their reconstruction of the past to fit an existing community and ignore or misconstrue discordant elements. Historians of particular groups extract their subjects' experiences from the whole, the intellectual antithesis of creating an integrated picture. The basic unit of analysis in all three of the reviewed schools, identity, naturally excludes the possibility of looking at Carleton Island as a community socially, economically and politically integrated with the British Empire.

In contrast to the forgoing works stands Jean McIlwraith's 1926 biography of Sir Frederick Haldimand. This work contains a model study of the "upper posts," the forts west of Montreal. The study is compelling because it integrated perspectives and thus revealed the extent of the island's integration with the empire. The study eschewed bald consideration of each post's importance and explored their interconnections instead. McIlwraith identified the military supply lines, the conduct of Indian diplomacy, the fur trade and personal affiliation as the ligaments attaching the western territory to Quebec's settled regions and to the British Empire. The work reveals the extent to which extra-military concerns, personality, economic competition, and ethnic tensions could complicate and complement Haldimand's authority. These divisive personal and political interests converged at each post, creating "self-reliant" microcosms, yet drawing all the posts into a mutually "dependent," relationship, like "links in a chain."[18] Thus Carleton

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Wright, 1975.

[18] Jean McIlwraith, *Sir Frederick Haldimand: The Makers of Canada Series*. London and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1926, 145.

Island's role as Niagara's lifeline and military subsidiary is not a contradiction but a practical reality. McIlwraith demonstrated that interconnections between people could transcend geographic distance to integrate the periphery with the centre.

The study of Carleton Island benefits from a growing appreciation in colonial historiography of the variety and subtlety of connecting elements between centre and periphery. The dominance that geographical determinism has held over Canadian history contributed to Carleton Island's lack of importance in the historiography. Dendy and Whitfield, for example, evaluated the province's integration based upon the limits of eighteenth-century communication and transportation abilities. Dendy concluded that Haldimand was only marginally successful at extending his influence in Quebec's west because he had to delegate authority to his officers on the frontier. Whitfield also argued that Haldimand's difficulties in supplying the western posts meant that the strength of his authority "decayed" on the frontier. This focus upon the physical disconnection mutes the role that power, patronage, and ethnicity played in the province during the Revolution.[19]

An emerging body of historiography is challenging the strict dichotomy between centre and periphery. Ian Steele, for example, argued that the Atlantic Ocean during the eighteenth century should be regarded as an agent of integration not separation. Expanding shipping and trading routes allowed an economic, social and intellectual fertilisation across the Ocean. These practical links allowed more informal psychological and social bonds scope to tie colonials to the heart of the empire.[20] The British Empire

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[19] Dendy, "Frederick Haldimand and the Defence of Canada," 154-5. Whitfield, "The Geography of the British Northern Interior of Defence during the Haldimand War Administration of Quebec, 1778-1784," 9.
[20] David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London merchants and the integration of the British Atlantic*

was a unifying concept, one that people on the periphery could adopt, or not, just as well as people at the centre.[21]

Study of the networks and communities forged at Carleton Island will provide insight into the practical and social relationships between the centre and peripheries of the British Empire. The Carleton Islanders had two frames of reference: their immediate experiences on the island and their sense of connection to the empire. Their two realities were coterminous, not mutually exclusive. Exploring the interrelation between the islanders' points of reference will require an interpretative format that will draw together military, political, social and economic narratives. The lacunae of the reviewed historiography make it clear that Carleton Island's historian must forge an interpretation that is part local history, part traditional political-military narrative, and part social history.

The historical record contains all the seeds for an inquiry into Carleton Island's far-reaching connections.[22] The principle source of material is contained in the Haldimand Papers. General Haldimand's private collection of letters, instructions,

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Community, 1735-1785, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995. Ian K. Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675-1740,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-century France,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

[21] See Benedict Anderson *Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism.* London: Verso, 1983, 19, and Kenneth Lockridge, "Colonial Self-Fashioning: Paradoxes and Pathologies in the Construction of Genteel Identity in Eighteenth-Century America." In *Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections on Personal Identity in Early America,* edited by Ronald Hoffman, Mechal Sobel and Fredrika J. Teute, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997, 274-339.

[22] Early references to European occupation of the island now known as Carleton Island are confused by English mistranslation of French names. The French gave two islands in the area similar names: *Isle aux Chevreuils*, translated as Roe-Buck Island and present day Grenadier Island N.Y., and *Isle aux Chevreaux*, Goat Island, present day Carleton Island N.Y. The British mistranslated the island's names calling *Isle aux Chevreaux*, Deer, Buck or Biche Island, when it should have been called Goat Island. In August 1778 Lieutenant Twiss of the Royal Engineers perceived the British translation error and called the island they have been calling Deer Island to Carleton Island in order to avoid future confusion. Durham, *Carleton Island during the Revolution,* 33-36., NAC, *Haldimand* MSS, B 154, p. 40-3, Lieutenant Twiss to General Haldimand, 17 August 1778, printed in Preston, *Kingston before the War of 1812,* Toronto: The Champlain

returns and receipts constitute the prolonged conversation he had with his superiors at Whitehall and his subordinates in Quebec. The present organisation of the papers preserves a ghostly impression of the organisational structure of Haldimand's administration.

The island's appearance in these documents illustrates the role it played within the province. The two hundred volumes of correspondence are separated according to command centres. The correspondence between Carleton Island's officers and General Haldimand comprise three volumes, and the island appears frequently in the volumes relating to the province's overall administration. The letters and records of the War Office, the British Headquarter Papers, the British Military and Naval Records, and the Colonial Office Records complete the picture of the island's military administration by providing the necessary statistical information.

Extensive though these papers are, they present an overwhelmingly military perspective of the island. The invisible and the voiceless, Carleton Island's women, blacks and Indians, were a yawning absence. But the military record does preserve some fragments of their experiences. The private papers of a Quebec merchant also provide an alternate perspective to that of the military.

This text uses an eighteenth-century vocabulary in a few instances. The words maintain consistency between the text and quoted documents and preserve historical accuracy. Specifically, the terms "Indian" and "Provincial Navy," even though their meaning can be vague, offensive, and inaccurate, can be very informative of an eighteenth-century state of mind. The use of the collective term "Indian" rather than

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Society, 1965, 5-6.

reference the specific Indian nations mirrors the British inability or reluctance to recognise different tribal aims, the main source of tension between themselves and their Indian allies. Referring to specific nations when appropriate restores the plurality of the Indian perspective.

Also, the term Provincial Navy is used to describe the transportation service on Lake Ontario, though the term "Provincial Marine" more properly describes its status. The lake-service was not affiliated with the Royal Navy, nonetheless Haldimand and his officers called it the "Naval Department." This misleading appellation was important for Haldimand because he wished to advertise the provincial service's adoption of the Royal Navy's standards of pay and procedure in order to lure qualified Naval officers to serve on the Great Lakes.[23] He was announcing the lake's integration into the imperial system.

The following three chapters of this thesis are a series of linked studies.[24] Ideas and themes – the different aspects of imperial integration – provide the link between each chapter, but the five years of Carleton Island's occupation remain a touchstone and ultimately the main subject of the investigation.

Chapter One seeks to synthesise the Carleton Islanders' immediate experiences on the island with the political and military backdrop of the war. It considers the island in the imperial, martial context in which it rose to prominence. It also explores the context of the island as it appeared to the members of Fort Haldimand's garrison: a small, isolated, wild outpost, where scarcity and depravation plagued their lives. The fort—its function and physical layout—mediated between those two realities by reproducing the

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[23] Carol McLoed, "The Tap of the Garrison Drum: The Marine Service in British North America, 1775-1813," Canada: Parks Canada Historical Research Division, 1970, 128.
[24] Rhys Isaac, *The Transformation of Virginia 1740-1790*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982, 5.

social and administrative bonds that the community lost by being disconnected. This chapter provides a static view of the island, the fort and the garrison.

Chapter Two puts the Carleton Islanders' world in motion to reveal a highly dynamic and integrated community. The chapter opens with a discussion of the nature and quality of the island's transportation and communication links with military headquarters in Eastern Quebec. It moves to an exploration of how those links supported the intricate relations between military, civil, mercantile, and Indian interests upon which Haldimand's defence of the province depended.

Chapter Three unites the themes of the first two chapters by investigating how the inhabitants of Carleton Island balanced their own interests with their loyalty and service to the Crown. It challenges the argument that geographical distance frustrated and weakened British administration on the frontier. Conflict between garrison members arose as individuals negotiated the tension in their lives. But these conflicts, rather than challenging Haldimand's authority on the frontier, supported and reiterated his legitimacy.

1
The British Come to Carleton Island
"We are of All Nations, of all Colours and of all Professions..."

The shock waves caused by the British defeat at Saratoga in 1777 washed a complex community of British-sympathisers onto small Carleton Island. In March 1780, at the end of the island's second winter of occupation by the British, Captain Alexander Fraser of the 84th Regiment of Foot surveyed Fort Haldimand's garrison. He noted with surprise that "tho we [the garrison] are of all Nations; of all Colours and of all Professions, there has not been, during this winter, the smallest disagreement between any two individuals on the island."[1] The commander recognised that the British war effort during the American Revolution was an amalgam of many interests, oftentimes mutually exclusive. General Haldimand's design to plant an outpost on Carleton Island was the product of his integrated view of Quebec. The island played a supporting role in this plan and naturally drew to its shore individuals representing many facets of his war effort. The resulting community comprised a microcosm of Haldimand's Quebec.

This first chapter explores the relationship between Fort Haldimand's synthetic community and the imperial centre that organised its formation. Distance, isolation, and deprivation weakened the bonds between the island and military headquarters. Despite the hardships, the islanders continued to formulate their everyday activities with reference to the concerns that affected the empire. Why? This chapter considers two aspects of that question: first, Haldimand's reasons for fortifying the island and second,

individuals' reasons for becoming part of its garrison. General Haldimand occupied the island in response to a military crisis of imperial proportions and he mapped out the island to compliment those military priorities and goals. The imperative that dictated Carleton Island's fortification left an imprint upon the land. The very fortifications reduced the effects of isolation by reminding the members of the garrison why they were there. The men and women who came to live on the island willingly took their assigned positions in this imperial paradigm. They reproduced the social and administrative bonds they had lost by being disconnected. Even the harshness of their experiences demonstrated, in relief, the Carleton Islander's continuing connection with the empire. But their society was brittle and inelastic. It would not survive without constant outside support.

A thin line of cause and effect criss-crossed the Atlantic Ocean from Saratoga, New York, to London, to Quebec and brought the British to Carleton Island in 1778. A major threat to the British Empire changed Quebec's status within the empire and installed Lieutenant General Frederick Haldimand as the military and civilian governor. Haldimand's unique perspective on the province led him to devise a defensive system that integrated military, political and social interests. He determined to protect and sustain the vulnerable nerves of this integrated system at the head of the St. Lawrence River. The fort he planted there, named Haldimand Fort in his honour, was an expression of Britain's wartime imperialism. It constituted one of the many elements that bound its colonial periphery to its centre.

Quebec's status in the British Empire changed after the military disaster at

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[1] QUA, HP 21787, 119, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 21 March 1780.

Saratoga in 1777. General John Burgoyne's drive down the Hudson River from Quebec failed to crush the rebel forces and ignited a political storm in Britain. The defeat of the British Army by an ill-assorted force of rebel volunteers was an imperial embarrassment. All the Commanders-in-Chief in North America resigned and returned to London, first among them Quebec's Governor, Guy Carleton.[2] The disgruntled generals and King George III's ministers hastily re-evaluated their defensive strategy in America. The tenacity of New England's militia prompted them to abandon their effort to subdue the northern colonies. Accordingly, they demoted Quebec to a defensive theatre of war. Britain's display of military weakness also invited France to enter the war on side with the American rebels, a significant threat to British rule in Quebec. Fifteen years were not enough to dull the Canadians' longing for French rule.[3] But Whitehall's ministers were distracted from Quebec. France's Navy was a threat to Britain's colonial holdings across the Atlantic Ocean and the once-limited brushfire war was now a world war. The government redirected its energy and resources towards conquering the southern colonies and towards a naval war with the French.[4] Britain still considered Quebec an important asset but was unwilling to divert resources away from more pressing matters.[5] The Lords of Whitehall chose uniquely qualified Frederick Haldimand to undertake the challenge of

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[2] Carleton did not resign as a result of the Burgoyne campaign but because of its design. In 1776 the British cabinet stripped Carleton of his military command of Quebec and gave it to the ill-fated General Burgoyne, Carleton's subordinate. Carleton tendered his resignation on 27 June 1777 but waited in Quebec until 1778 when General Haldimand could replace him. G. P. Browne, "Guy Carleton, 1st Baron Dorchester." *DCB* vol. 5, Francess Halpenny, General Editor, Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1983, 147. Mackesy, *The War for America,* 148.

[3] The French threat to Quebec was illusory. The American Congress did not support the restitution of French power to the north of their new nation. Similarly, France did not want its erstwhile colony to contribute to the Congress' increasing economic power. British officials did not learn of this pact until much later. Mackesy, *The War for America,* 159. Neatby, *Quebec: The Revolutionary Age,* 174.

[4] Neatby, *Quebec: The Revolutionary Age,* 158.

[5] *Ibid,* 175.

defending the province's sprawling territory with the minimum of military support.[6]

The exact reasons for Haldimand's appointment are not known, but his experience in North America and his status within the British military made him suitable for the position.[7] Frederick Haldimand was a Swiss-born mercenary soldier who had twenty-five years of experience in North America. Next to General Thomas Gage, he was the most qualified British officer on the continent. Of most practical importance to his appointment in Quebec was his fluency in French and his military knowledge of the province. He was familiar with Quebec's defensive system; during the Seven Years War, he had defended the British post at Oswego and led the van of General Jeffrey Amherst's assault on Montreal.[8] He had governed the French-speaking Canadians at Trois Rivières for six years after the conquest.[9] Haldimand was also socially suitable for the position. His status as a foreign-born officer in the British Military made him politically stable and therefore appealing to the Secretary of State for the American Department, Lord George Germain. Haldimand's foreign birth had frequently denied him significant posts in America. It also confined him to the periphery of the social and patronage circles that could have secured his advancement. His experience governing the Canadians, coupled with his own personal experiences as a foreigner in the British Service, made him particularly sensitive to the minorities' perspectives of the war.

The nature of Haldimand's command allowed him to see Quebec as a geographic, economic and political whole. Whitehall gave him comprehensive control over the

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[6] Dendy, "Frederick Haldimand and the Defence of Canada," 8.
[7] *Ibid*, 8.
[8] C.C.J. Bond, "The British Base at Carleton Island," *Ontario History*, 52 (1960), 1, note. Sutherland, Tousignant and Dionne-Tousignant, "Frederick Haldimand," *DCB*, 4: 888.
[9] Matthew G. Hatvany, "Overcoming Ethnic and Social Barriers in Colonial British America: The

province by making him both military and civil governor. His command was complicated. He only had 6,700 troops to deploy across one thousand water-miles from the Atlantic Ocean to Michilimackinac in Lake Erie and to the Illinois country.[10] A week after he arrived in Quebec in June 1778 he conducted a reconnaissance to determine his province's defence priorities. Haldimand found the settled regions of the province prey to rebel propaganda inciting sedition, and the posts guarding the unsettled West barely defensible.[11] East and West were equally unstable.

In the East ninety thousand French-speaking Canadians and a few English-speaking merchants clustered in the St. Lawrence Valley. The fertile banks of the St. Lawrence River were the province's administrative, social and agricultural nucleus and it was far from secure.[12] The British had little confidence in Canadian loyalty. Governor Guy Carleton had been deeply insulted by the habitants' tepid support of the British during the 1775 rebel siege of Quebec and France's entry into the war heightened British apprehensions of a Canadian revolt.[13] In 1775 Guy Carleton had controlled his temperamental population by proclaiming martial law in order to regulate the formation of the militia and to resurrect the detested *corvée* duty of the *Ancien Regime.*[14] The *corvée* required all Canadian men to provide paid labour for the military by cutting

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"Meritorious" Career of Frederick Haldimand" *Historian* 53 (3) 1996, 589, 594, 596, 600, 602.

[10] Of the available troops, 600 were ill, 900 scattered at western posts and another 1000 engaged in garrisoning Quebec, Montreal, Chambly, St. John, and Ile aux Noix. Haldimand could only raise four thousand troops in the event of an emergency. Burt, *The Old Province of Quebec,* 2:3. Whitfield, "The Geography of the British Northern Interior Frontier of Defence during the Haldimand War Administration of Quebec 1778-1784," 156.

[11] On the 28 July 1778 Haldimand reported to Whitehall that "the fortifications of Quebec [were] entirely rotten" and that the western posts were "in a very defenceless state." NAC, Colonial Office Records, Series Q, vol. 15, p. 169-176 printed in *A History of the Organisation, Development and Services of the Military...,* 49. Dendy "Frederick Haldimand and the Defence of Canada, 1778-1784," 31-34.

[12] *Ibid,* 3.

[13] Neatby, *Quebec: The Revolutionary Age,* 174.

[14] *Ibid,* 156.

firewood, transporting military goods and performing other sundry services; it remained a source of conflict between the Canadians and the British until the end of the war.[15]

The British also feared that the merchants' quest for profit would lead them to a clandestine trade in arms with their erstwhile partners at Albany, New York.[16] In 1777 Carleton curtailed the merchants' legal liberties.[17] Of more immediate impact, however, were his restrictions upon private shipping on the Great Lakes. Henceforth, no private ships were allowed past the head of the St. Lawrence River. All trade goods requiring transportation on the Great Lakes would have to await the convenience of the King's vessels. [18] Relations between merchants and the military government remained tense until the end of the war. Carleton's authoritarian measures exacerbated the deep rifts in Canada's civil society. Ironically, he let go of the reins of power in the West. Haldimand modelled his governance of the lower country after Carleton, but he took a very different view of security issues in the West.

In contrast to the compact society of the lower province was the sprawling western territory beyond Montreal. These were the hunting grounds of the fur trade and thus the lower province's economic underpinning.[19] The Quebec Act of 1774 returned the region to Quebec's provincial jurisdiction. But war rendered civilian government moot: only a string of military posts maintained British authority and protected the fur

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[15] Between 1775 and 1777 payment for the *corvée* service was suspended. Failure to comply with the *corvée* resulted in fines, imprisonment or confiscation of firearms. *Ibid,* 162-63.
[16] Fernand Ouellet, *Economic and Social History of Quebec, 1760-1850 Structures and Conjonctures,* 1966, translated by Institute of Canadian Studies, Carleton University. Ottawa: Gage Publishing Limited 1980, 112.
[17] Carleton also took advantage of the merchant's minority status to abolish the practise of English common law in the province. In 1777 he removed the King's bench, the only civil court that applied English common law. Thereafter, Quebec's English Merchants had no access to the legal system that their London creditors knew and trusted. Neatby, *Quebec: The Revolutionary Age,* 163.
[18] McLoed, "The Tap of the Garrison Drum", 112.

trade.[20] When Haldimand arrived in Quebec in June 1778 he found the officers of the upper posts starved for direction and British rule in the region poised on the edge of disaster. When Guy Carleton lost his military command in 1776, he stopped giving instructions concerning military action in the West where an Indian war was brewing. He opposed Indian participation in a white-man's conflict.[21] By 1778, however, Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton at Detroit was gathering British forces and courting Indian allies. The Iroquoian, Algonquian and Siouan groups of the Great Lakes broke their neutrality and supported the British. Henceforth, the British sent presents to the upper posts to solidify their alliance with the Indians.[22] The distribution of goods exacerbated the tension between the military and the merchants. The Indians now traded their

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[19] Ouellet, *Economic and Social History of Quebec, 1760-1850,* 106.

[20] The Quebec Act provided four Lieutenant Governors for the western territory: one at Kaskaskia, Vincennes, Detroit, and Michilimackinac. By 1777 only Henry Hamilton had reached Detroit and Edward Abbot, Vincennes. Besides these administrative points, the British maintained a series of military posts: Fort George on Lake Champlain, Lachine, The Cedars and Oswegatchie on the St. Lawrence River, Fort Niagara, Fort Detroit, Fort Michilimackinac on the Great Lakes and Fort Miami, St. Joseph, Vincennes on the Wabash River, Kaskaskia on the Mississippi and Cahokia. The rebels captured Vincennes and Kaskaskia in February 1779 and in 1780 Lieutenant Governor Sinclair abandoned Fort Miami and St. Joseph. Whitfield, "The Geography of the British Northern Interior Frontier of Defence during the Haldimand War Administration of Quebec 1778-1784," 160. Neatby, *Quebec: The Revolutionary Age 1760-1791,* 173.

[21] Carleton considered the Indians unpredictable and their war tactics barbaric and so resisted forming a military alliance with the Indians until 1776. The whites found it difficult to control Indian allies because their traditions of warfare were antithetical. Indian warriors attacked women, children, the aged and men indiscriminately, an outrage to European conceptions of warfare. They also consistently resisted white leadership. Browne, "Guy Carleton," *DCB,* 5: 147. Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution,* 21.

[22] Iroquoian groups included the tribes of the Six Nations, the Seneca, the Cayuga, the Tuscarora, the Onondaga and the Oneida living in New York State and their dependants living in the West. Algonquian groups include the Shawnee, Illinois, Miami, Sauk, Fox, Kickapoo, Potawatomi, Menominee, Mascouten, Siouan-speaking Winnebago, Ottawa, and the Chippewa. Lyle M. Stone and Donald Chaput, "History of the Upper Great Lakes Area.," in *Handbook of North American Indians.*, vol. 15 "Northeast" edited by Bruce G. Trigger, Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978. 602. Charles Callender, "Great Lakes-Riverine Sociopolitical Organisation.," in *Handbook of North American Indians.*, vol. 15 "Northeast" edited by Bruce G. Trigger. Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978, 610. Robert S. Allen, "The British Indian Department and the Frontier in North America, 1755-1830," in *Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History,* volume 14, Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs, 1975, 22.

military services, not furs, for goods.[23] British sovereignty in the West consisted of a delicate balance between military, mercantile, and Indian interests.

Haldimand comprehended that the respective security of East and West were intimately bound, though thousands of water miles separated the two centres of conflict. His greatest defensive challenge was to maintain internal stability. In the West military authority would have to be supported and bolstered by the regular delivery of supplies, troops and provisions. In the East, Haldimand trod softly. He feared that a weakening of the economy would ignite the habitants' smouldering resentment. The most expedient way to retain territorial integrity was to protect the elements common to both regions and this, in Haldimand's opinion, was the fur trade. If Britain lost control of the fur trade, it would then lose "Possession of the lower and cultivated part" of the Province. If that went, then "America [would] most probably be lost to Great Britain for ever."[24] He also reported that Quebec's security depended "entirely upon the exertions of the Indians which ever have and ever will be governed by the presents they receive."[25] The fur trade was the province's economic lifeline and the foundation of Britain's alliance with the Indians.

The fortifications Haldimand envisioned on Lake Ontario were the physical manifestation of his defence policies. The fort's primary function was to unite the province, East and West. It guarded the East by watching for rebels entering the province from the head of the St. Lawrence River. The post's physical distance from cosmopolitan centres also contributed to political stability in the St. Lawrence Valley.

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[23] Burt, *The Old Province of Quebec*, vol.2, 25-26.
[24] QUA, HP 21682, 11, General Haldimand to Lord George Germain, 25 July 1778.
[25] General Haldimand quoted in Norman Baker, *Government and Contractors: The British Treasury and*

Haldimand consciously avoided "intimidating the [Canadian] People" by not rebuilding the citadel at Quebec, instead deploying his resources on the frontiers. More importantly, the fortifications contributed to the security of the upper country. The eastern end of Lake Ontario was a traditional transhipment point where merchants and military suppliers unloaded their goods from river bateaux to lake-going vessels. When Haldimand arrived in the province, this link was very vulnerable. The supply line between Montreal and Niagara was open to rebel assaults emanating from the Mohawk River. A secure post and dockyard at the base of Lake Ontario would strengthen transportation links between Montreal and Niagara. The merchants would have a "safe place" to "send their goods." Indian allies could resort to the island to receive their presents. Each line of interest that threaded through the new fort's harbours linked Quebec together and helped the province maintain its place within the British Empire.[26]

In July 1778, General Haldimand dispatched Lieutenant William Twiss, commander of the Royal Engineers in Quebec, and a body of two hundred men and women to survey the eastern end of Lake Ontario.[27] They were to secure the region and realise Haldimand's defensive plans by rebuilding the old French fort at Cataraqui on the Lake's northern shore. But when Fort Frontenac proved unsuitable, Twiss redirected his attention to small Deer Island, later renamed Carleton Island. This island's geographical amenities made it a suitable vector for British imperial aims. Twiss laid a new mantle of imperial sovereignty over the island and redefined its landscape. The island's defences

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War Supplies 1775-1783, London: The Athlone Press 1971, 199.

[26] NAC, Colonial Office Records, Series Q, vol. 15, 169-176, "Sketch of the Military State of the Province of Quebec" 28 July 1778. Haldimand Papers Series B Vol. 54 25-30, General Haldimand to Lord George Germain, 14 October 1778. Both references printed in *A History of Organisation, Development and Service of the Military*...49-50, 69. Burt, *The Old Province of Quebec*, 2:10.

rather than the future garrison's comfort dictated the fort's environment.

Carleton Island lies twelve miles from the entrance to Lake Ontario, on the southern side of Grande Isle (Wolfe Island, Ontario). Carleton Island is small and "squat", one mile wide by two miles long and "contains 1,274 acres of land."[28] Its western limit sheers off into a vertical limestone cliff that rises thirty or forty feet out of the water. Below the cliffs curve two small bays attached to the island by a slender isthmus. Two channels, each close to a mile wide, separate the island from Grande Isle to the north and the New York mainland to the south.[29] In the latter half of the eighteenth century a dense stand of pine, oak and scrub covered the land.[30]

British merchants and military men had used Deer Island as a depot and transhipment point since the mid-1770s. A few man-made dwellings and clearings dotted its landscape, and the bays hummed with activity and life. The 8th Regiment of Foot had a fortified encampment on the north western shore.[31] In the commodious harbours, hundreds of bateaux met the lake's two transport vessels, the sloops *The Seneca* and *The Caldwell* to tranship their burden of merchant and military goods intended for the western posts.[32] Lieutenant Twiss and his party arrived in Lake Ontario in early August 1778 and made camp at Deer Island. A few days later Captain Schank, commissioner of the Great

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[27] Preston, *Kingston before the War of 1812*, 4, note.
[28] Bond, "The British Base at Carleton Island," 2. Lossing, *The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812*, 656, note.
[29] NAC, HP Series B, vol., 54, 25-30, Haldimand to Lord George Germain, 14 October 1778, transcribed in *A History of Organisation, Development and Service of the Military...*, 69.
[30] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 39, 47.
[31] William Stone and J.D. Durham both consider it likely that the British first occupied Deer Island in 1774 or 1775. It was certainly a well-occupied site in 1777 when Colonel Barrimore St. Leger camped there with his auxiliary force before they advanced upon the Mohawk Valley in support of General John Burgoyne's campaign. The post had a commanding officer, Captain Potts, and even had ovens for baking bread. Durham, *Carleton Island during the Revolution*, 48. Sir John Johnson, *Orderly Book of Sir John Johnson during the Oriskany Campaign 1776-1777*, 64, note, 65, 92. "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 46.

Lakes Naval Department, joined the party.[33] The next day the officers examined Cataraqui.

After conducting their survey of the Fort Frontenac at Cataraqui, Twiss and Schank concluded that Deer Island was better suited to support Haldimand's defence plans.[34] After careful consideration the officers decided that the little island was the best place in the region to carry out Haldimand's vision of a secure fort and dockyard.

Deer Island possessed three main advantages over Cataraqui. It offered better shipping opportunities, it was more secure and it had richer natural resources. As custom suggested, it was suited as a shipping centre. Schank enthused that the channels around the island were "excellent roads for vessels of any Burden whatever" and they were uniformly deep so that any vessel could take shelter in the island's lee in case of bad weather. Bateaux could approach the island without risk. Furthermore, two deep natural

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[32] McLoed, "Tap of the Garrison Drum,"113-114.

[33] John Schank was a lieutenant seconded from the Royal Navy. In 1778 General Haldimand gave him the local rank of "master and commander" in the Great Lakes Naval Department and made him the most senior officer on Lake Ontario. While in service on the Great Lakes he was generally referred to as Captain Schank; probably to give nominal recognition to Schank's stipulation that while he served in the provincial Naval Department no Royal Naval Officer with a rank junior to him could take precedence over him. He did not want to lose status in the Royal Navy for his service in Quebec even if Haldimand could not guarantee him a promotion. Later, Haldimand was able to secure him a promotion in the Royal Navy as a post Captain. See the Haldimand Papers volumes 21787, 21788, 21801, 21802, 21803, 21804 passim. McLoed, "Tap of the Garrison Drum," 121,125, 129., W.A.B. Douglas "The Anatomy of Naval Incompetence: The Provincial Marine in Defence of Upper Canada before 1813," *Ontario History* 1979, 71(1), 4-5.

[34] Twiss and Schank found Cataraqui disappointing as a potential shipping centre. The region's situation would comprise the post's security. Numerous small islands blocked the view of Lake Ontario and the high ground behind Fort Frontenac left it open to a rearguard attack. Of equal consideration, the site could not support efficient military operations. The fort's century-long occupation had denuded its environs of trees, making it an impracticable place to build either ships or barracks. The bays were too shallow to accommodate "vessels of any considerable size" and were difficult to navigate. Further more, bateaux men would have to cross the open lake, into the prevailing wind to reach Cataraqui's bays. Finally, the officers noted that the proximity of a "nauseous swamp at the head of the Bay" would compromise the garrison's health. The region could not support a secure post, an active shipyard, or a healthy garrison. NAC, *Haldimand* MSS, B 154, 37-9 Lieutenant Schank and Lieutenant Twiss to General Haldimand, 17 August 1778, B 141, 11-14. Lieutenant Schank to General Haldimand 17 August 1778, printed in Preston, *Kingston before the War of 1812*, 7-10.

Figure 1- Comparative View of Carleton Island and Cataraqui (Kingston) [α]



[α] W.F.W. Owen "A Survey of the River St. Lawrence, from Lake Ontario to the Galop Rapids...1818." Chart 338, Sheets 1-2 [facsimile], [1.25 to one nautic mile], London: Hydrographic Office British Admiralty, 1812 As reproduced by National Archives of Canada, National Map Collection [NMC 21943-4].

bays at Deer Island's western end provided natural harbours where vessels of at least twelve feet draft could load and dock for repairs. The island was also more secure. It was self-contained, safe from cannon fire, and could be patrolled by boat rather than by labour intensive foot patrols. It commanded a better view of Lake Ontario, and steep cliffs protected its bays. The garrison would enjoy the psychological benefit of dominating the land. Finally, the garrison could live on the island in comfort: the "free circulation, and Agitation of the Water all round [the] island [would] keep it pure, and wholesome." There was enough land for the garrison to grow vitamin-filled vegetables, and there were plenty of trees to hand for construction. Deer Island presented the basis for a successful venture. Twiss renamed it Carleton Island and began clearing ground to build Fort Haldimand.[35]

The engineer's "first object of ... attention" was to ensure the fort's defensibility.[36] Twiss laid out the fortifications to maximise the defence of the island. That fall, he erected the fort on top of the western cliff face where it commanded a view of Lake Ontario and provided an admirable cover for the bays below. It encircled five hundred yards of ground. Over the next few years the fort's walls came to protect the officers' House, the barracks, the magazine, the general hospital, the bakery and some storehouses. The fort was shaped like a "three-eighths" section of an octagon.[37] The fort's longest face was parallel with the cliff and was naturally defensible. Inland, multiple defensive works protected the fort. Three evenly spaced bastions overlooked the

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[35] NAC, *Haldimand* MSS, B 154, 40-3, Lieutenant Twiss to General Haldimand 17 August 1778. *Haldimand* MSS B 154, 37-9 Lieutenant Schank and Lieutenant Twiss to General Haldimand, 17 August 1778. *Haldimand* MSS B 141, 11-14. Lieutenant Schank to General Haldimand, 17 August 1778. All printed in Preston, *Kingston before the War of 1812*, 5-10.

[36] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 46.

island. Each bastion held four guns pointing over a shallow ditch protected by an eight-foot high log parapet. At the fort's periphery the soldiers cut back the underbrush beneath the trees. The thirty yards of open brush followed the ring of trees left standing and eighty yards of bare land beyond that created an exposed bluff between the shore and the fort.[38] The remaining trees on the island continued to stand as added security. The fort was commanding and impressive, but it played only a supporting role on the island. Its walls protected the members of the garrison and their supplies. More importantly, its sentries and guns watched the shipping activities in the bays below.

Figure 2- Detail of Fort Haldimand[39]



Fort Haldimand's main function was as a depot and shipbuilding centre and the lowland near the island's bays became the fort's nerve centre. The harbours provided the river

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[37] NAC, *Haldimand* MSS, B 154, p.48-9, Lieutenant Twiss to General Haldimand, 28 August 1778, printed in Preston, *Kingston before the War of 1812*, 10. Durham, *Carleton Island during the Revolution*, 109-110.
[38] "The Court Martial of James Glennie,"47

bateaux and lake vessels a safe place to discharge their burden. The engineers built a pier thirty or forty feet in width to protect the northern bay now called Schank's Harbour. The pier lay due North and extended into three fathoms of water and afforded protection for the wintering ships. In the summer, the river bateaux and lake vessels docked at Schank's Harbour and its southern compliment Government Harbour. An isthmus, six hundred yards wide, separated the two bays.[40] This was the transportation services' central command. Barracks for the naval officers, the seamen, the naval and engineering artificers, the shipwrights, and innumerable storehouses crowded the small piece of land. Besides being a transhipment depot it was also a shipbuilding yard. Carpenters and blacksmiths' workshops, saw pits, timber yards and a "rope walk" added to the mêlée.[41] By 1782 Navy Point had become so built up that it was a fire hazard.[42] A blockhouse mounted with three guns, a stockade and an abatis added to the congestion but also protected this vital centre of activity.[43] The bulk of the fortifications protected only a fraction of Carleton Island's landscape: a few hundred square yards of land on the cliff and six hundred yards between the bays.

Gradually, the soldiers drew other parts of the island into the imperial paradigm. A detachment of thirty soldiers guarded several labouring parties on the north eastern

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[39] Reproduced in Bond, "The British Base at Carleton Island," 3..
[40] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 44, 46, Captain Samuel Anderson's Orderly Book," 59, NAC, *Haldimand* MSS, B 141, p. 11-14, Lieutenant Schank to General Haldimand, 17 August 1778, printed in Preston, *Kingston before the War of 1812*. 9.
[41] QUA, HP 21788, 76, General Haldimand to Captain Fraser, 16 April 1780. "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 46.
[42] QUA, HP 21787, 294, Major Ross to General Haldimand, 20 February 1782.
[43] QUA, HP 21787, 119, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 21 March 1780. HP 21759, 127 "State of the Works and Disposition of Ordnance at Carleton Island and its Dependencies," 10 September 1782. HP 21787, 58, Captain McDougall to General Haldimand, 2 June 1779. HP 21787, 288, Major Ross to General Haldimand, 7 December 1781.

shore.[44] There, the soldiers processed all the primary materials for the construction of the fort and of the dockyards. Artificers cut timber on Grand Isle and rafted it to the island. Others burnt lime for mortar, cut stone in an improvised quarry, or burnt charcoal to provide fuel for the winter.[45] A wide road joined this work area with the fort. It ran east north east and was forty feet wide, designed to accommodate wheeled carriages. The island's four draft horses hauled the cut wood along the road to the fort or the dockyards. The road also increased the island's security because soldiers could rush gun carriages along it to defend the shore. The soldiers also cleared land for an exercise and parade ground.[46]

More importantly, they cleared space for the King's Garden. From the fall of 1778 the fort's commanders had adopted a forward-looking attitude towards growing vegetables for the garrison. Captain Aubrey planted twenty apple trees, and cleared the ground and planted Indian corn, and potatoes. The following spring General Haldimand hired Joseph Franklin, commissary of the Engineering Department, as a farmer to oversee the King's garden. Until the end of the hostilities, Franklin lived with his wife and family in a small hut outside the fort where he grew wheat and oats to augment the King's stores. By 1780 the garrison had cleared one hundred and fifty acres of land for the garden.[47] The soldiers made many incursions into Carleton Island's treed landscape, but

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[44] QUA HP 21787, 4, Captain Aubrey to General Haldimand, 2 September 1778.
[45] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 53.
[46] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 13-14, 45-46. New York State Library, Manuscripts and Special Collections, photocopy, "Lukes' Plan of the Fort at Buck Island, August 1781," (74757) 1781.
[47] QUA HP 21787, 15, Captain Aubrey to General Haldimand, 17 November 1778. QUA, HP 21814, 119, Lieutenant Twiss to General Haldimand, 19 March 1779. QUA, HP 21787, 164, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 8 September 1780. QUA, HP 21759, 117, "Survey of the Government Farm at Carleton Island," 10 September 1782. NAC, *Haldimand* MSS, B 127, p. 338, "Return of the Loyalists, Male and Female, on Carleton Island... ," 26 November 1783, printed in Preston, *Kingston before the War of 1812*, 47.



Figure 3 Map of Carleton Island with Detail of Fort Haldimand[1]

[1] A.Gray "Plan of Carleton Island" No III Upper Canada, [facsimile], [1' to 500 feet], Quebec: Quarter Master General's Office, 1 June 1811. As reproduced by National Archives of Canada National Map Collection [NMC 24348},

even after the fort was built and the harbours operational, trees remained the land's dominant characteristic. Haldimand wanted the trees on the island left standing to add protection.[48] The forest dwarfed the human landscape.

General Haldimand's defence plans resulted in the congeries of individuals representing different facets of the war at Carleton Island. People of "all nations, of all colours and of all professions" implicated in Quebec's defence met on the island, drawn by their personal desire to maintain British authority in North America.[49] A babble of languages and accents echoed against the trees and announced the far-reaching consequences of the war.

By 1779, over a thousand people crowded in and around the fort's minimal clearing.[50] The core of Carleton Island's population was its military garrison. Its strength fluctuated between two hundred and eight hundred men. During the island's five-year occupation, four detachments of the regular army, two provincial corps, three professional army departments and one corps of mercenary German soldiers variously composed the garrison's number.[51] Mississauga and Iroquois Indians made up the rest of the garrison's military strength. The Mississaugas were a constant but seasonal presence on the island, their numbers rose and fell between two hundred and six hundred warriors, women and children.[52] Iroquois did not resort to the island until after rebel Major

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[48] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 13, 47.
[49] QUA, HP 21787, 119, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 21 March 1780.
[50] QUA, HP 21852, 113, "The Distribution of Provision July 1779-July 1780," 6 June 1779.
[51] Based on garrison returns found in: Great Britain, Colonial Office Records, CO 42, vol. 39, 145, NAC, MG 11, microfilm, "State of His Majesty's Garrison at Carleton Island," 1 November 1778. Great Britain, War Office Records, WO 28, vol. 6, 105, 107,115, 143, 151, 161, 166, 168, NAC, MG 13, microfilm, States of the Garrison of Carleton Island, 1 January 1782, 1 February 1782, 1 May 1782, 16 January 1783, 23 February 1783, 24 June 1783, 24 July 1783, 24 September 1783. QUA, HP 21759, 123, 131, Field Returns of the Troops at Carleton Island, 16 September 1782, 16 January 1782, 24 August 1783.
[52] In June 1779 there were 70 Mississauga warriors and 150 women and children on the island. In 1783 the

General John Sullivan devastated their ancestral lands in the Mohawk Valley in the summer of 1779. But during the winter following the raid, Fort Haldimand sheltered a collection of 206 Indians of the Onondaga, Tuscarora, Mohawk, Oneida, Mohican, Cayuga, Delaware, Shawnee and Nanticoke of Susquehanna nations.[53] Civilians composed the remainder of Fort Haldimand's population, but it is more difficult to estimate their numbers. There may have been between three and six women and their children for every one hundred soldiers on the island.[54] Women refugee Loyalists and their children added to this number.[55] Carleton Island's traders played a more visible role

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numbers gathered rose to a total of 582 men women and children. QUA. HP 21787, 64. Captain McDougall to General Haldimand, 12 June 1779. HP 21885, 197. "Return of Indians in the District of Quebec." 7 July 1783. There were 2 "chiefs of the village," 6 chief warriors, 3 messengers, 184 warriors, 230 women and 42 children between the ages of 3 and 12. I am assuming that this is a return of Mississauga Indians. The other districts included in the return were clearly those officially under the control of the Indian Department division responsible for the Indians of Canada with whom the Indian Department categorised the Mississauga.

[53] The next spring many Six Nations Indians may have left the island. But the continuing presence of an Indian Department officer and of Molly Brant, a well respected Mohawk Matron, suggest that some Six Nations Indians and their dependants made Carleton Island their home for the rest of the war. QUA. HP 21769, 46. "Return of Officers and Indians of the Department of Indian Affairs under the Command of Guy Johnson... ," 24 March 1780.

[54] Military practice allowed between 3 and 6 percent of the soldiers within a regiment or company to marry. Haldimand appears to have followed military tradition in allowing three wives of officers of the Royal Highland Emigrants to go to Carleton Island. He drew the line at children: none "upon any account whatever" were to be of the part. In practice the number of women who accompanied the army exceeded the restricted number. Thus it is possible that there were many more women on the island. Walter Hart Blumenthal estimated that the aggregate gender ratio of the British Army in North American in 1777 was one woman for every eight men. Edward Curtis *The Organisation of the British Army in the American Revolution* London: Oxford University Press, 1926, 11 note. QUA HP 21788, 27, General Haldimand to Major Nairne, 7 June 1779. Walter Hart Blumenthal, *Women Camp Followers of the American Revolution*, New York: Arno Press, 1974, 19.

[55] In 1783 forty-four refugee women and children resorted to the island. Some of the women were wives of the Provincial soldiers on the island, others were heads of their own households. All were considered Loyalists as opposed to military wives. Again, it is difficult to determine how many Loyalist women were on the island. The 1783 return may give an inflated impression of the island's Loyalist population. Throughout the war Haldimand followed a policy of discouraging Loyalist families from living at the upper posts. But at the end of the war Haldimand issued a proclamation that all the refugees should repair to certain forts, among them Carleton Island. The result of the proclamation probably inflated the Loyalists population on Carleton Island in 1783. Garrison returns for 1782 indicate that there were fewer than twenty Loyalist on the island, but evidence suggests that in 1780 the number may have been much higher. In 1780 Haldimand was outraged to find Captain John Jost Herkimer drawing provisions for 72 for his company of bateaux men when he had barely enough men to conduct two boats. Each bateau required five men thus Haldimand concluded that Captain Herkimer was distributing the extra sixty-or-so rations to

in the lives of Fort Haldimand's garrison but only a handful of traders lived on the island in any given year.[56] Black slaves composed the final minority presence: at least one black man worked as a labourer and seven women and men were domestic slaves.[57] The members of Fort Haldimand's population shared the same self-contained space, and shared a common goal: to preserve British rule in the colonies. But as a community they did not form a cohesive whole.

The social bonds that dictated the islanders' interrelations did not grow organically from their experiences on the island. Rather, Haldimand, from his seat at Quebec or Sorel, orchestrated their interactions in order to preserve the operating

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women and children. NAC, *Haldimand* MSS, B 127, p. 338, "Return of the Loyalists, Male and Female, on Carleton Island... ,"26 November 1783, printed in Preston, *Kingston before the War of 1812,* 47. NAC, MG 13, WO 28, vol. 6, 105, 107, 115, microfilm, States of the Garrison of Carleton Island, 1 January 1782, 1 February 1782, 1 May 1782. Canniff, *The Settlement of Upper Canada,* 62. QUA HP 21788, 116 Captain Mathews to Captain Herkimer, 12 October 1780.

[56] It is only possible to know the minimum number of traders present at Carleton Island. In 1778 Archibald Cunningham agent for Robinson of Detroit maintained a small store on the island. In 1779, Grant F. McMullan, Robert Macaulay, Allen Morrison and Archibald Cunningham did business on the island. In 1780 the merchant population changed; Robert Hamilton replaced Cunningham and Alexander Campbell, Robert Macaulay, Mary MacKay, Mr. Patterson and Mr. Thompson all set up stores or did business there. In 1781 Jacob Adams, a former interpreter for the Indian Department was trading liquor for ginseng with the fort's Indian population. By 1783, Robert Hamilton and Richard Cartwright had opened a joint store. NAC, MG 24, D 4 "Goring Papers" [hereafter Goring Papers], 14 Archibald Cunningham to Francis Goring, 26 May 1778., 21787, 56, Grant F. McMullan to General Haldimand, May 1779., NAC "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 73., QUA. HP 21787, 120 "Goods belonging to Forsyth and Dyce, Merchants of Detroit now laying at Carleton Island." Signed Robert Hamilton. 20 April 1780., HP 21787, 121 "Goods Belonging to Thomas Robinson Merchant of Niagara Now Laying at Carleton Island." Signed Robert Hamilton, 20 April 1780., HP 21787, 122. "Return of Alex Campbell's stores at Carleton Island." Signed Alex Campbell, 20 April 1780., HP 21787, 123. "Account of Sundry Goods in Possession of Robert Macaulay." Signed Robert Macaulay, 20 April 1780., HP 21787, 125. "Return of Merchandise in Custity [sp] of Mary MacKay." Signed Hugh MacKay for Mary MacKay, 21 April 1780., HP 21877, 84. QUA, HP 21787, 281, Major Ross to General Haldimand, 27 November 1781. George Rawlyk and Janice Potter "Richard Cartwright" *DCB* vol. 5, Francess Halpenny, General Editor, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983, 168.

[57] The unnamed black labourer was kidnapped by rebel Indians in the summer of 1779. The seven domestic slaves appear on a Loyalist return for 1783. Joe and Violet belonged to Richard Cartwright's household, Juba and Jane Fundy and Abraham Johnston to Molly Brant, London and Montreal to Sarah McGinnis. At least five of the above Blacks, those belonging to Brant and McGinnis, lived on the island for four and three years respectively. QUA, Haldimand Papers 21787, 64, Captain McDougall to General Haldimand, 12 June 1779. NAC, *Haldimand* MSS, B 127, p. 338, "Return of the Loyalists, Male and Female, on Carleton Island... , " 26 November 1783, printed in Preston, *Kingston before the War of 1812.* 47.

structure of his administration on the periphery. The garrison's community was too short-lived and too transitory to break down social barriers between members. The garrison's composition changed continually with the progress of the war and with the seasons. In one month the garrison could fall from 664 rank and file to 133.[58] Equally significant, there was no continuity of direction; in five years the fort had seven commanders.[59] Haldimand counterbalanced the community's lack of internal cohesion by laying out the fort to schematically reproduce on the land the social and political framework of British wartime administration. The fort offered the visual cues and its regime a ritualised behaviour that acted as reminders of Haldimand's continuing legitimacy on the periphery. The members of the garrison knew and kept their place within the fort and, by extension, within Haldimand's Quebec.

The island was not a self-contained administrative centre; many layers of power and authority devolved there. Thus, reproducing the imperial administrative structure became imperative. The Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers provided the island's defensive infrastructure. The Commissariat Department organised and supervised the transportation of goods and stores.[60] The Indian Department's interpreters maintained

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[58] Comparison of the returns for 16 January 1783 and 23 February 1783. NAC, MG 13, WO 28, vol. 6, 143, 151, microfilm, States of the Garrison of Carleton Island, 16 January 1783, 23 February 1783.

[59] See Appendices, Table I.

[60] Two other departments besides the commissary were responsible for supplying the army: the quartermaster and the barrack master but the commissariat staff on the Island absorbed the tasks of those departments. Hugh MacKay described himself as an "assistant commissary" and the island's "acting Barracks Master." The island's other assistant commissaries also held titles that suggested they were acting in the stead of the quartermaster general, the department responsible for "the ordering, issuing and care and maintenance of camp and field equipment of the army" and transportation. Working under Neil McLean, the assistant commissary general were Alexander Fisher, assistant commissary of transport and John McNab, assistant commissary to the garrison. Arthur Bowler, *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775-1783."* 23, 29. QUA HP 21854, 211., QUA. HP 21854, 219. "A Return of the Assistants Belonging to the Commissariat Department in Canada and the Upper and Back Posts." 25 December 1782. "Memorial of Hugh McKay" 19 December 1782. HP 21851, 152, General Haldimand to Nathaniel Day, 10 April 1780.

diplomatic relations with the Indians. The Naval Department repaired, augmented and navigated the Lake's fleet of transportation vessels. All the departments fell under the supervision of Fort Haldimand's commanding officer who had authority over "the Fort, Vessels, Officers and troops." But he was forbidden to "interfere... with the interior arrangements of Departments."[61] Each department had its own inviolate sphere of authority and store of supplies. The senior member of a Department controlled the stores and received instructions from his superiors in Canada.[62] Fort Haldimand's strategic function dictated the presence of certain military departments on the island but convention and policy dictated their relationship with each other.

In order to preserve the distinction between the departments, Haldimand literally divided the island between them. He apportioned parcels of land on Government Point to different departments, probably to distinguish between storehouses. Similarly, the departments divided the space within the fort between themselves.[63] If officers wished to borrow any tools or men, the request was to be accompanied by a "written order or Voucher." Haldimand insisted upon it. Every department head was responsible to Haldimand for "the money and the stores expended" by the department. In this way he maintained "a general system of regularity ...in every department of the Army, without which a general confusion must be the consequence."[64] The Board of Ordnance, for example, uniquely supplied the Engineers and the Artillery, whereas the Treasury and the

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[61] QUA HP 21722, 102, General Haldimand to Captain Aubrey, 31 October 1778.
[62] QUA HP 21788, 12, General Haldimand to Captain McDougall, 29 April 1779. The Engineers reported to Lieutenant Twiss, the Officers of the Naval Department reported to Lieutenant Schank and the assistant commissaries reported to Quebec's Commissary General, Nathaniel Day and the Indian Interpreters reported to one of two Superintendents of the Indian Department. Guy Johnson managed the affairs of the Six Nations Indians; Colonel Campbell those of all the other Indians resident in Canada.
[63] NAC, CO 42/72 Q volume 49, microfilm, C-11901, 236, Lord Dorchester to Lord Grenville, 10 November 1790.

War Office supplied the needs of the army.[65] Men living within feet of each other, isolated from the rest of the province, were separated by the weight of imperial administration.

This departmental distinction was particularly acute in the case of the Naval Department, which occupied a unique place in Haldimand's regime and on the island. Carleton began revamping the Naval Service on the Great Lakes and Haldimand completed its improvement by rebuilding it along the lines of the Royal Navy. His purpose was to attract officers of the Royal Navy and the Canadian merchant-seamen with at least four years experience to the Department's ranks. Likewise he sought seamen with comparable experience to fill the department's rank and file.[66] As far as possible, Haldimand wished the service to enjoy the same position and privileges upon the island that the Royal Navy enjoyed with respect to the British military. The Naval Department was an autonomous body and controlled all its own tools, men and supplies.[67] Haldimand entrenched the Naval Department's arms length autonomy in the island's soil. He "indulged" the department by allowing them to occupy "most of the neck of land." The officers maintained their own barracks and gardens. Physical distinction between Departments served as an insurance against a blurring of command. The officers' control over the troops depended upon a clear knowledge of the scope of

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[64] QUA HP 21722, 102, General Haldimand to Captain Aubrey, 31 October 1778.
[65] Curtis, *The Organisation of the British Army in the American Revolution,* 35, 40-41
[66] For example, Haldimand instituted a tariff on the transport of merchants' goods. The proceeds went towards pension and widows' funds, benefits in line with those offered by the Admiralty. Haldimand also complied with his sailors' demands for a "thirteenth pay month," in accordance with Royal Naval policy. McLoed, "The Tap of the Garrison Drum" 122, 125, 128, 131, 134, 136.
[67] Still, Haldimand found it difficult to convince officers of the Royal Navy to serve more than "one season for fear of loosing naval preferment." McLoed, "Tap of the Garrison Drum,"125-126, 129. NAC, Haldimand Papers, Series B, vol. 96, p.113-115, 30 April 1779, printed in *A History of Organisation, Development and Service of the Military...*, 104-105. Douglas, "The Anatomy of Naval Incompetence,"

their own command.

Integrating the troops into a cohesive force on Carleton Island was a challenge. Britain's shortage of troops forced Whitehall to draw men from across the empire. The result was a collection of men of varying skill and professional status. The men of the regular army corps and departments, the 8th or King's Regiment of Foot, 34th Regiment of Foot, 47th Regiment of Foot, the 84th Regiment of Foot, were professional soldiers and career officers from England, Scotland and Ireland. Their participation in the American War stemmed from the natural duty they owed to King George III, the Commander-in-Chief.[68] The German mercenary soldiers of the Hesse-Hanau Chasseurs were an elite corps of marksmen recruited from Germany's forests. A treaty signed between Britain's ministers and their prince governed their daily activities on the island.[69] In contrast were the men of the provincial corps: the first and second battalions of the King's Royal Regiment of New York and Butler's Rangers. The men who joined these regiments risked property and livelihood to support the British Empire but they had little or no

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25. A History of the Organisation, Development and Services of the Military..., 105.

[68] Members of the British army entered the service for several reasons. The officer corps of the British Army during the American Revolution were "sons of the great nobility and landed gentry (who dominated high command positions), offspring of poorer but good families for whom military service offered an attractive career, members of traditional service families, Scots, foreigners, and former non-commissioned officers." The members of the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers were "a group apart" within the structure of the British Army. Unlike officers of the regular army, the officers of these 'Scientific Corps' received a professional military education at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. Aristocratic officers regarded the officers of the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers as social inferiors and looked askance upon their specialised training. The common soldiers were recruited through voluntary enlistment in return for a bounty and by pardoning criminals in return for service. The term of their service was for life. Many of the men recruited during the American Revolution were Scottish clansmen dispossessed after "the military power of the chieftains had been broken in 1745." Scottish tradesmen also enlisted in great numbers. The government found it difficult to enlist men elsewhere in Great Britain. In England many people did not support the Government's colonial policy, and in Ireland, an agricultural boom precluded the need for men to enlist. Armstrong Starkey, "War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British Army in America, 1755-1781," *War and Society*, 8 (1) 1990: 12. H.C.B. Rogers, *The British Army of the Eighteenth Century*, London: George Allen and Unwin Limited, 1977, 34. Curtis, *The Organisation of the British Army in the American Revolution*, 53-55.

[69] The treaty restricted the scope of their involvement in the war to strictly military duties. Wilhelmy,

military training and on the field they were subordinate to the regular troops.[70] The successful deployment of this "mixed service" depended upon finding a balance between their loyalty to their corps and their duty upon the island.[71]

Haldimand directed the occupation of the fort and the daily activities of the men with a view to integrating, co-ordinating and accommodating the melange of military corps of different status. Off duty, each corps operated as a unit. They occupied the same barracks; their own officers inspected their quarters daily and oversaw the proper preparation of the day's meals.[72] But for active duty, the corps divided up into working groups, commanded by officers of different regiments. Inevitably, confusion arose. But the daily roll call assured the smooth transfer of authority over the men from their detachment commander to Fort Haldimand's commanding officer.[73] Garrison court-martials existed to punish recalcitrant men and emend the system.

German Mercenaries in Canada, 178, 292.

[70] Sir John Johnson, a landowner in the Mohawk Valley, raised the first Battalion of the King's Royal Regiment of New York in 1776. He drew his men from among his friends and tenants in the Mohawk Valley. The corps was largely composed of Scottish Highlanders, mainly the Mcdonells of Glengarry, who had arrived in New York in 1773. They were Gaelic-speaking Catholics, much frowned upon by the New England Protestants. In 1778 the battalion numbered 298 rank and file and needed another 207 men to complete its ranks. By 1780 Sir John's ranks had grown sufficiently that he was able to form a second battalion that absorbed the independent Loyalist companies of Captain Robert Leake, Major McAlpin.

Major John Butler, Superintendent of Indian Affairs at Niagara, raised a company of rangers in 1777. The men, drawn from the Mohawk Valley and able to speak Indian languages, were very highly paid. But like other provincial corps, they had to pay for their own arms and uniforms.

MacKinnon argued that the men of the Loyalist regiments were part of "an acute refugee movement;" unfavourable conditions in the colonies forced them to flee to British-held territory. Few chose to support the British for ideological reasons. Cruickshank, *The King's Royal Regiment of New York*, 1, 3, 5, 7, 21, 43. Cruickshank, *The Story of Butler's Rangers*, 37. Paul Smith. *The Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964. 64. MacKinnon, *While the Women Only Wept*, 33.

[71] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 26.

[72] NAC, MG 23 B23, file 4, p. 51, 64, "Captain Samuel Anderson's Orderly Book for the First Battalion of the King's Royal Regiment of New York May 1779-August 1780." [Hereafter "Captain Samuel Anderson's Orderly Book"]

[73] At five o'clock in the morning the garrison paraded before the officer of the day or the fatigue officer who first inspected, then took charge of them. The officer of the day and the fatigue officer changed everyday, thus the soldiers often worked under officers of another corps. 48.

Military ritual also maintained the strict social division between the officers and the men. The officers' superior material goods marked their status. The commanding officer lived in a house, while junior officers shared barracks. But where twenty-four rank and file crowded into each barracks room, only two or three officers shared quarters.[74] When an officer passed by, the soldiers gave him due reverence.[75] Even the soldiers' physical deportment had the effect of maintaining the social distinction between officers and men.

The blanket of imperial rule not only covered the military men, but the Indians and civilians living on the island as well. Haldimand orchestrated the rhythm of daily life on the island to reinforce cultural barriers between whites and Indians. He insisted upon maintaining physical distance between the two people. All the Indian encampments were placed well outside the fortifications. In 1781, for example, the Indians encamped on the north eastern shore, separated from the fort by the King's garden.[76] No Indians were allowed inside the fort or near the shipping activities, "to avoid the possibility of suffering from their treachery," and to protect the ships from arson.[77] Similarly, soldiers were strictly forbidden to go near Indian encampments or "to have the least Intercourse with the Indians."[78] Fort commanders also encouraged Indians to leave the island in the winter so that they would not be a burden upon British stores.[79] Haldimand's policies were so successful that the whites and Indians might well have been living on different

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[74] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 3. QUA, HP 21759, 133, "Return of the Barracks in Fort Haldimand at Carleton Island specifying the Number of Rooms, with the number of men each room may contain," September 1782.
[75] "Captain Samuel Anderson's Orderly Book", 53, 60.
[76] "Lukes Plan of the Fort at Buck Island, August 1781."
[77] 10 November 1779 Haldimand to Fraser HP 21788, 71.
[78] "Captain Samuel Anderson's Orderly Book," 63.
[79] QUA HP 21787, 119 Captain Fraser to General Haldimand 21 March 1780, HP 21787, 205, Captain

islands. The whites had little notion of what transpired in Indian villages. A rumour that Mississaugan warriors had raped white women prisoners spread around the fort, a charge vigorously denied.[80] The Indians appeared to be likewise ignorant of white activities. In 1783 the commander hid an outbreak of measles among the garrison from them while taking the precaution to quarantine the sick at "the most remote part of the island." He did not want to be blamed if the Indians caught the disease.[81] The physical distance reinforced mental distance between Indians and whites on Carleton Island.

But the fort could not dispense with the Indians altogether. Haldimand executed a double standard in directing the Indians' lives on the island. He placed them outside the fort's sphere of activity but he also placed them where they would be most useful. Haldimand instructed Captain Fraser to "position the Indian encampments so that they can act as first alarm." Likewise, when Fraser sent the Indians from the island in the winter, he made sure that they were "stationed so as to discover any movement of the enemy towards the Post."[82] Commanders deplored the Indians who loitered around the fort drunk, but still encouraged their presence on the island.[83] The fort depended upon the vital military and practical support they provided. In the summer the warriors went on scouting and raiding parties.[84] In the winter they carried letters and hunted for venison.[85] The Indians' physical existence on Carleton Island mirrored their place in

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Fraser to General Haldimand, 30 January 1781,
[80] QUA HP 21787, 141 Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 2 June 1780.
[81] NAC, *Haldimand* MSS, B 128, p.125, Captain Mathews to Major Harris, 2 November 1783, printed in Preston *Kingston before the War of 1812*, 41.
[82] QUA HP 21788, 71, General Haldimand to Captain Fraser 10 November 1779. HP 21787, 119, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 21 March 1780.
[83] QUA HP 21787, 126, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 2 May 1780.
[84] QUA HP 21787 passim.
[85] QUA HP 21787, 108, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 1 December 1779. HP 21787, 119 Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 21 March 1780.

Haldimand's Quebec. The British wished to absorb the Indian allies into their sphere of influence, yet mistrust and misunderstanding prevented a close association. Haldimand reproduced this ambivalence on the island and placed a barrier of trees between the two cultures.

The Indians may have been very grateful for the buffer that symbolically delineated their alliance. The Mississauga and the Six Nations Indians participated in the war to achieve their own aims.[86] Mississauga and Six Nations Indians (members of two traditionally hostile nations) the Algonquin and the Iroquois, forged a common identity during the war and served together on Carleton Island. Both peoples regarded their participation in the war as an investment in cultural survival.[87] They resorted to the island because the British provided them with the material goods that enabled them to participate in the war. But they were not wholly dependent upon British goods. They traded with the island's merchants to procure the materials they needed. The merchants' influence over the Indians was part of the reason Haldimand exerted strong controls over merchant activity on the island.

Merchant's Cove and Merchant's Point were a monument to Haldimand's tense

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[86] Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 22.

[87] The Six Nations Indians entered the war on their own terms and "implemented the classic play-off policy" in order to guard their cultural "status quo." An alliance with the British appeared to offer the best chance to protect their way of life and their lands, while the encroaching American rebels were clearly a threat to their homelands between the Hudson River and Lake Erie. The Mississaugas were traditional enemies of the Six Nations, they also entered the war for similar reasons. Like the Iroquois, the Mississauga Indians regarded the British as their best way to protect their lands in south eastern Ontario. The Mississauga were a sub-group of the Ojibwa, an Algonkian-speaking nation, and relatives of the western tribes. They declared for the British as soon as hostilities broke out. Neighbouring Algonkian tribes to the West, the Delaware and the Shawnee kept them apprised of their constant struggle against the encroaching American settlers. The Mississauga foresaw the same fate to their lands if the rebels were not subdued. Anthony F.C. Wallace, *The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca* New York: Vintage Books, 1972, 21, 128. Donald B. Smith, "The Dispossession of the Mississauga Indians: A Missing Chapter in the Early History of Upper Canada." *Ontario History*. 73, 2 (1981),71., Peter S. Schmalz, *The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario*., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991, 4, 97.

relationship with Quebec's merchants. He required that the traders and merchants, like the Indians, build their houses and storehouses well outside the protection of the fort. Merchants' Cove, on the island's north western shoreline became the merchants' preserve. The cove was a well-fortified place; it seems likely that it was also the site of the 8th Regiment's modestly fortified encampment.[88] The merchants built their storehouses on the low ground, safe from interfering with the defence of the fort but Twiss's road joined the settlement to the fort.[89] Merchants had access to the fort and the harbours but lived a self-contained existence, well outside the fort's protection. Haldimand's disdain for commercial activity and for the men engaged in it, lay behind the injunctions upon the merchants' actions. Confining merchant activities to these enclaves enabled Haldimand to control and define the traders' relationship with the fort.

Haldimand was of two minds regarding the merchants. He knew the security of his province rested upon the stability of the fur trade but he did not trust the actions of individual merchants. Thus at Carleton Island he effected a compromise. He provided "a safe place for the traders to send their goods," thus ensuring the fur trade's vitality, but he also exercised strict controls over their activities to prevent their self-serving business from subverting military goals. He continued to limit the issue of trading passes and licences. He also controlled the daily lives of the traders on the island. He decreed that no part of Carleton Island be considered private property: "the whole must entirely

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[88] It was a natural evolution of the shore's occupation. In the spring of 1778 Captain Mompesson had allowed Thomas Robinson a merchant from Niagara, to build a storehouse within the lines. The works of the 8th Regiment built were still standing when Twiss and Schank arrived to redefine the place's function by naming it Merchant's Cove and Merchant's Point. "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 46. "The Goring Papers," 14-5, Archibald Cunningham to Francis Goring, 26 May 1778.

[89] QUA HP 21788, 12-3, General Haldimand to Captain McDougall, 29 April 1779.

belong to government."[90] Merchants built their own storehouses, but did not retain complete control over them.[91] He also restricted their right to sell liquor to the seamen, and soldiers.[92] From General Haldimand's perspective, the restrictions were a sensible precaution; he retained complete control over the island and its inhabitants. From the merchant's perspective, the restrictions increased the risk of trading on the frontier.

But merchants entered into this relationship willingly, if with grumbling. Many endured the harsh political climate of wartime Quebec because the province offered superior commercial opportunities. Quebec's merchants may have expressed considerable discontent with Guy Carleton's application of the Quebec Act, but the strength of their political dissatisfaction did not match that of their rebel peers. Merchants who continued to trade in Quebec during the hostilities did so because they were unwilling to give up their trading connections with Britain.[93] Carleton Island's traders further chose to submit to military law on the island so that they could benefit from government-subsidised transportation and sell their goods to a captive garrison market. [94] They became indispensable to the Fort garrison and part of the landscape. Soldiers, for example, identified the western gate of the fort as the one leading to trader

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[90] QUA HP 21722, 34, General Haldimand to Captain Aubrey, 22 August 1778. HP 21788, 12-3, General Haldimand to Captain McDougall, 29 April 1779.

[91] Each trader signed a contract permitting the commanding officer to burn or destroy their houses and their stores in a military emergency. Under normal conditions Haldimand allowed the merchants to recoup their investment by selling the house with the commanding officer's permission. "Goring Papers", 15 Archibald Cunningham to Francis Goring, 26 May 1778.

[92] "Captain Samuel Anderson's Orderly Book," 68, 87.

[93] D.G. Creighton, *The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence 1760-1850,* Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1937. 57-58.

[94] Other options were available. Many of Quebec's traders opted to trade in the deep west. They circumvented the military-controlled transportation on the Great Lakes by taking canoes up the Grand River [Ottawa River] to the Grand Portage at the head of Lake Superior. Canadian traders on Lake Ontario, elected to ignore British law completely. They conducted an illicit trade in rum with the Mississauga.

Macaulay's house. Officers fraternised with them.[95] And the merchants did a good business with the Indians and the soldiers. The traders' presence made it possible for soldiers to bring their wives to the island. The extra goods merchants imported created another dimension to the garrison's social structure because they enabled soldiers' families and refugee Loyalists to live on the island.[96]

Loyalist families submitted to military law for practical but not ideological reasons. Some women choose to support the British, others were drawn in by their husbands' declaration of allegiance to the Crown.[97] Escaped black slaves gained most by supporting the British: the British offered Blacks their freedom if they volunteered their services; several enlisted with the King's Royal Regiment or Butler's Rangers.[98] As with all other social and administrative arrangements on the island, Haldimand made room for the women and their households of children and slaves according to their perceived utility to British interests.

Haldimand reserved no part of Carleton Island for Loyalist refugees and their households. Women and children were not welcome at the western posts because it was so difficult to transport the food they needed to survive to the West.[99] Most Loyalist families lived at Yamachiche, north of Lake Champlain, in a military-style encampment.[100] Nevertheless, the Loyalists families did resort to the island where they

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[95] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 21, 66.
[96] QUA HP 21787, 1, Captain Aubrey to General Haldimand, 28 August 1778.
[97] MacKinnon, *While the Women only Wept*, 44.
[98] The British hoped to strangle the economy of the Southern colonies and to reinforce their dwindling troops by enticing slaves away from the rebel owners. Robin Winks, *The Blacks in Canada: A History*, Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1971, 29, 31. Rick Neilson, "George Mink, A Black Businessman in Early Kingston," *Historic Kingston* 46 (1998): 113.
[99] MacKinnon, *While the Women Only Wept*, 105.
[100] Raymond Douville. "Conrad Gugy" *DCB* vol. 4, Francess Halpenny, General Editor, Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1979, 317.

crowded into the barracks with the soldiers. Their minority presence on the island reflected Haldimand's dim view of their participation in the war.

Haldimand considered the island a healthy and safe place to plant a garrison but no more. Life would be harsh and comfortless. He expected the garrison's members to sacrifice "not only the Luxuries but even the conveniences of Life to promote the Public Service."[101] The isolated islanders began to lose their perspective of their place in the empire and of their role in the war.

The members of Fort Haldimand's garrison, Mississauga Indians excepted, were interlopers in the region and expressed a deep sense of alienation from their environment. According to the Quebec Act all land west of Montreal fell under British control. But as Lieutenant Twiss noted when he led his retinue into the mouth of Lake Ontario, they were all "entire strangers" in those parts.[102] They were vulnerable. The charts and maps he had to guide him in the region were "very erroneous" and limited in scope.[103] Ignorance grew a stem of fear. Disorder blossomed.

Haldimand's buffer of trees oppressed rather than protected the garrison. They forested Carleton Islanders' minds with dread. As Glennie explained in 1779, a soldier of the garrison was "limited to a space for Exercise, less than 200 Yards square, unless he chose to walk amongst the Trees, which nothing can induce him to do but Business or necessity."[104] An incident later that season revealed the source of the latent fear the trees held for the garrison members. The report of a wigwam in the forest threw the garrison

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[101] QUA, HP 21804, 65, General Haldimand to Captain Schank, 23 May 1779.
[102] NAC, *Haldimand* MSS, B 154, p.30, Lieutenant Twiss to General Haldimand, 8 August 1778, printed in Preston, *Kingston before the War of 1812*, 4.
[103] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 46, QUA, HP 21801, 11, Captain Schank to General Haldimand, 17 August 1778.

into a state of alert. Captain Thomas Aubrey of the 47th Regiment of Foot reacted as though the island were under siege. He moved all the stores into the fort and he sent a gun bateau into the night water to view Indian campfires on the island's shores.[105] Perhaps Aubrey feared that the wigwam belonged to a rebel-sympathising Indians. Whatever the precise source of his alarm, it correlated with a perception of the island's forest as threatening and unknowable. The trees represented an impassable psychological barrier.

The extent of European alienation from the land is evident in Lieutenant Glennie's description of the region. He declared that Fort Haldimand was "erected in a desert far removed from the intercourse of mankind."[106] Glennie was looking at the land from a European perspective when he described the entrance to Lake Ontario as a wasteland devoid of human presence. Mississauga Indians were a constant presence in the region and frequently provided the garrison with venison during the winter. But from Glennie's point of view, the verdant, unending vista of trees and the presence of hunter-gathers were as bountiful and helpful to him as an uninhabited desert. He did not want for wood—what he missed was a secure supply of hay for his horses, tools, rations and medicines for his men—all the materials his European experience dictated were necessary for the survival of Fort Haldimand.

The island was entirely dependent upon an outside source of supplies and, paradoxically, the islanders' very cultural integration contributed to the duress of their experiences. Men and women sacrificed comfort and health to maintain a culturally

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[104] "The Court Martial of James Glennie", 8.
[105] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 60, 79.
[106] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 28.

defined decorum.[107] The engineers built the "finest barracks in all of Canada" but divided them into several rooms so that only the room next to the chimney was warm.[108] The Islanders also had insufficient relationship with the land to prevent scurvy from thinning their ranks: most years men died from scurvy despite the region's lush environment. The "country remedies" failed and the garden did not always yield a sufficient crop of vegetable to supply the garrison's vitamin c requirements. Thus, each year Fort Haldimand's commanding officers ordered medicines, hemlock, vinegar, molasses, rum and sauerkraut to cure their scurvy. The medicines' effects ranged from the lethal to the benign. This scarcity undermined morale and also compromised the fort's security.[109]

The fort was a monument to European techniques but Glennie had to scavenge artillery pieces from disused fortifications in the region to mount on its walls and there were frequently not enough men to mount regular foot or bateaux patrols. The island was

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[107] Kerry A. Trask, "To Cast Out the Devils: British Ideology and the French Canadians of the Northwest Interior, 1760-1774." *American Review of Canadian Studies*., 1985, Volume XV, 3, 249-262. Armstrong Starkey, "War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British Army in America," 8.

[108] "The Court Martial of James Glennie" 61, 83.

[109] The vitamin c content of the soldiers' daily diet of wheat flour, salted meat, oatmeal, dried peas, cheese, and butter was negligible and every year so many islanders fell ill with scurvy that the fort commander was frequently prevented from mounting a proper guard or sending men out on scout. The officers knew that nothing cured scurvy as well as "the influence of the sun and a Vegetable diet;" nonetheless their crops often failed and they had to rely upon the accepted cures and imported medicines from Britain. In particular they relied upon the healing effects of rum, vinegar, molasses, spruce beer and sauerkraut. Captain Fraser even witnessed some soldiers trying to cure themselves with hemlock, but not surprisingly they died. Of the other medicines, only spruce beer and sauerkraut contained enough vitamin c to ward off the disease. Potatoes would have been another constant and ready source of vitamin c on Carleton Island. Kenneth J. Carpenter, *The History of Scurvy and Vitamin C*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 221, 91. QUA, HP 21787, 75, Major Nairne to General Haldimand, 1 August 1779. QUA HP 21787, 129, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 9 may 1780. HP 21787, 133, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 18 May 1780, HP 21787, 253, Major Ross to Captain Mathews, 22 September 1781. NAC, MG 13 WO 28, vol. 8, 263, Captain McDonell to Major Lernoult, 10 November 1782. QUA, HP 21788, 88, General Haldimand to Captain Fraser, 18 June 1780.

far from secure. [110] In the summer of 1779, Major Nairne, then the fort's commander, complained that he did not have enough powder, ammunition or artillery men to make use of the guns to protect the labouring parties; already, rebel Indians had kidnapped several labourers working on the western shore.[111] Tall reeds off the island's southern shore provided cover for canoes arriving or leaving the island covertly.[112] Though General Haldimand ordered the reeds beaten down, rebel spy, John Luke evidently was able to penetrate the island in 1781; his detailed map of the fortifications and of the human activity on the island suggests first hand knowledge.[113] Throughout Fort Haldimand's occupation the garrison would be short of healthy victuals and short of men to both defend the fort and carry on its works.

A flourishing trade in rum provided an ironic and deadly counterpoint to this environment of depravation. During the winters, a pall of "riotous debauchery" fell over the garrison. Sixteen hundred pounds sterling worth of rum changed hands every week

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[110] Lieutenant Twiss probably followed the current European trend in fort-building, the "bastioned fortification," when he designed and built Fort Haldimand. Twiss adapted the style to suit Carleton Island's particular location but the fort was designed to repel an artillery attack. It did not provide adequate defence against silent night invaders intent upon kidnap and arson. Nevertheless, the engineers armed the fort for an attack. By the summer of 1779, Glennie had armed the Fort Haldimand's bastions with eight iron nine-pounder guns retrieved from among the abandoned ordinance at Oswegatchie, Fort William Augustus [Chimney Island] and Fort Frontenac. André Charbonneau, Yvon Desloges, M. Lafrance, *Quebec, the Fortified City; from the 17th to the 19th century*. Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1982, 85, 185. Durham, *Carleton Island in the Revolution*, 114. NAC, *Haldimand* MSS, B 154, pp.40-3, Lieutenant Twiss to General Haldimand, 17 August 1778, *Haldimand* MSS, B 141, pp.11-14, Captain Schank to General Haldimand, 17 August 1778: both printed in Preston, *Kingston before the War of 1812*, 7, 10. QUA HP 21787, 72, "Return of Iron Guns brought from Oswegatchie to Carleton Island, 6 July 1779." HP 21787, 73, Captain McDougall to General Haldimand, 7 July 1779.

[111] Two years later Captain Ancrum and Major Ross complained about Fort Haldimand's lack of small arms. QUA, HP 21787, 76, Major Nairne to General Haldimand, 7 July 1779. HP 21787, 64, Captain McDougall to General Haldimand, 12 June 1779. NAC, MG 13 WO 28, vol. 8, 254, Major Ross to Major Lernoult, 6 March 1782, MG 13, WO 28, vol. 8, 258, Captain Ancrum to Major Lernoult, 1 May 1782.

[112] QUA, HP 21788, 25, General Haldimand to Captain McDougall, 31 May 1779.

[113] In August 1781 rebel spy, John Luke, drew a plan of Fort Haldimand on Carleton Island for the Commander of Fort Plain. In 1780 the main post at the Fort Plain Settlement on the Mohawk River was Fort Rensselaer, the headquarters for Colonel Lewis Dubois. "Lukes' Plan of the Fort at Buck Island, August 1781," Gavin K. Watt, *The Burning of the Valleys: Daring Raids from Canada against the New*

Figure 4- Map of Carleton Island Drawn by a Rebel Spy, 1781 [α]



[α] New York State Library, Manuscripts and Special Collections, photocopy, "Lukes' Plan of the Fort at Buck Island, August 1781," (74757) 1781.

during the winter of 1779-80, and that was only the reported rum trade. Mr Gill, the doctor was "every night drunk". He forgot to order medicines and lavished attention "every night" on the "Beauty's of the island." A Mississauga warrior killed well-respected Chief Hawksbill in a drunken rage. Another Mississauga shot a Canadian bateau-man in the face because he wanted rum. Thefts from the government storehouses were rampant. Some islanders even resorted to animal abuse and in 1779 the post commander had to issue an edict, forbidding people to kick the hogs "or other youssful animals."[114] The island's environment of scarcity and depravation posed a clear challenge to Haldimand's operating structure.

The garrison's continuing stability depended upon its connections with military headquarters in Quebec and London. Fort Haldimand's cross-section of people arrived at Carleton Island because they were all willing to defend the integrity of Britain's empire. The society they formed in the fort's environs was a miniature replica of the British empire, but it was a mechanical reproduction. The community's internal structure was fragile and inflexible. Regular injections of imperial support, supplies and news

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York Frontier in the Fall of 1780, Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997, 248.

[114]QUA, HP 21 787, 52, Lieutenant Glennie to General Haldimand, 20 May 1779. HP 21 787, 127, Captain Alexander Fraser to General Haldimand, 2 May 1780. John Clunes to Francis Goring, 25 March 1779, printed in Durham *Carleton Island in the Revolution*, 82-83. NAC, "Johnson Family," MG 19 F2, vol. 3, 65a, microfilm, W.R. Crawford to Colonel Campbell, February 1782. QUA HP 21787, 194, Captain Fraser to Captain Mathews, 17 November 1780. "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 23. "Captain Samuel Anderson's Orderly Book," 98.

sustained the fort: solidifying the islanders' psychological connections to the empire. Fort Haldimand and its garrison community survived on the strength of its imperial connections not upon Carleton Island's bounty. They formulated their activities with reference to imperial goals; the Lake Ontario region held little attraction for them.

2
"The Great Depot of Provisions:"
Preserving Links with Empire.[1]

On 25 March 1780 the *Haldimand*, one of Lake Ontario's transport vessels, arrived at Carleton Island, an ordinary occurrence most times of the year. But in March it was the harbinger of spring and breathed new life into Fort Haldimand's garrison. Trader Robert Hamilton greeted the vessel's arrival as a re-initiation into the extended world of Quebec's traders. He seized the opportunity to write a letter to his friend and fellow trader Francis Goring. But his salutation was desultory:

> As I would not wish to pass an opportunity of writing, I embrace this tho' it has no great Chance of reaching you before the Vessel. Shutt up from all Communication with the rest of the World, you cannot expect that this Barren island will afford great Matter of Epistolary Entertainment...[2]

His letter was an expression of frustration, not a rational evaluation of Carleton Island's connection to the world beyond its confines. The island was never completely isolated; even during the winter Carleton Island's post commander communicated with Quebec every month. The islander's experience of being integrated set expectations and standards and gave Hamilton the luxury to complain.[3] Nonetheless, Hamilton's feelings cannot be dismissed. Other Carleton Islanders felt equally isolated.

This chapter balances an examination of Carleton Island's communication and

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[1] QUA, HP 21851, 120, Captain Mathews to Nathaniel Day, 17 February 1780.
[2] Robert Hamilton to Francis Goring, 25 March 1780, printed in Durham *Carleton Island During the Revolution*, 99.
[3] Ian Steele advocated this mode of interpretation in " Moat Theories and the English Atlantic, 1675 to

transportation links with the islanders' sense of frustration. First, it lifts the veil of the Carleton Islanders' perspective to reveal an outpost that was highly integrated with the British Empire. Fort Haldimand was the keystone of the supply system that sustained the upper posts and maintained Quebec's territorial integrity. The demands of the supply system ensured a voluminous traffic and a constant interchange of information between headquarters in Quebec and the upper posts. Second, it explores the fashion in which the communication and transportation links bound the islanders to the empire. A traffic in human concerns flowed in the wake of the transportation brigades and fleets. Goods, rations, trade items, pay packets, promotions, and news were the currency of integration, drawing the islanders into a reciprocal relationship with the empire's military, economic and diplomatic centres. The men and women of Carleton Island were conscious of belonging to a world far exceeding the island's limits because their survival and livelihood depended upon it. Paradoxically, the island's integration contributed to their sense of isolation. The island appeared insignificant compared with their awareness of the war's far-reaching consequences.

For seven months of the year Carleton Island presented the bizarre tableau of a geographically isolated island bustling with activity like a port town. It was the gateway of the St. Lawrence River-Great Lakes transportation corridor. River bateaux carried goods up the St. Lawrence River and deposited them at Carleton Island. The sailing vessels on Lake Ontario collected the goods and carried them to Niagara. The transportation brigades and fleets formed the basis of Haldimand's supply system to the west. They also provided the infrastructure to allow regular and efficient communication

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1740." *Historical Papers of the Canadian Historical Association* 1978, 25.

between the upper posts and military headquarters.

The Carleton Islanders' material culture confirmed their integration into a larger Atlantic world. The agricultural scheme on the island was not entirely successful.[4] Like the entire army in Quebec, the islanders subsisted upon British goods. Canadian agricultural production was too modest to serve as a source for military supplies. All the army's victuals and materiel of war travelled from Britain across 3,000 miles of ocean to the port of Quebec.[5] The members of the garrison who received British rations ate bread, salted pork, butter, peas, oatmeal, and biscuits and drank spruce beer and rum that came from East Anglia in Britain, Ireland, and Britain's exotic west-Indian holdings.[6] The rest of the islanders' supplies, from medicines to barracks furniture to small arms, hailed from Britain. The fare was bland and the supplies basic, but their origins spanned the geographic scope of the empire. They were also vital to the garrison's survival. Delivering the goods to the upper posts constituted the soft, vulnerable, wholly vital underbelly of General Haldimand's war effort.

The exigencies of war, geography, and the limitations of eighteenth-century transportation technology rendered the supply of the upper posts difficult. The garrison members of the upper posts required a prodigious volume of rations and stores to survive.

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[4] In 1779 heat, drought and insets destroyed the garden's maiden harvest. In 1782, grasshoppers ate their spring crops of wheat and oats. These disasters coincided with crop failures in the lower province in 1779 and 1781. In 1781, however, the garden was able to supply Fort Niagara's garrison with 45 bushels of seed potatoes. QUA, HP 21787, 75, Major Nairne to General Haldimand, 1 August 1779. HP 21787, 214, Major Ross to General Haldimand, 13 April 1781. HP 21759, 117, "Survey of the Government Farm at Carleton Island," 10 September 1782. *A History of the Organisation, Development and Services of the Military...* , 207

[5] At best Haldimand could only secure half the required flour supply in Quebec, and the flour that he could buy spoiled easily because it came from poor wheat and was milled with rudimentary facilities. Bowler, *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America*, 7, 231. Ouellet, *Economic and Social History of Quebec*, 16.

[6] Baker, *Government and Contractors*, 22, 64. Whitfield, "The Geography of the British Northern Interior Frontier of Defense during the Haldimand War Administration of Quebec 1778-1784," 155.

In 1778 Haldimand distributed 124 rations to the garrison at Oswegatchie, 337 at Carleton Island, 1,376 at Niagara, 59 at Fort Erie, 900 at Detroit, and 225 at Michilimackinac. In total Haldimand supported 3,021 men and women in the upper country. But in 1779 a series of military disasters increased the numbers to 6,000.[7] When, in early 1779 Detroit's Lieutenant-Governor Henry Hamilton failed to retake the posts at Vincennes and Kaskaskia, he strained Detroit's supplies. Hamilton had rallied several hundred Indians to the British cause by promising them British supplies in return for their support. Later that same year, rebel General John Sullivan's campaign against the Six Nations in the Mohawk Valley sent a flood of Indian refugees to seek shelter at Niagara. The upper posts' demand for supplies doubled. For the rest of the war Haldimand supported 250 soldiers, refugees and Indians at Oswegatchie, 1,000 at Carleton Island, 2,500 at Niagara, 100 at Fort Erie, 1,850 at Detroit and 300 at Michilimackinac. Haldimand worried that "even this quantity will not entirely supply the additional numbers of women and children drove in by the enemy from different Savage Villages." The strain upon the supply system was considerable. Each member of the garrison consumed fifteen pounds of food per week.[8] This volume, multiplied by fifty-two weeks and by the needs of six thousand other mouths, represented a significant volume of goods requiring transportation.[9] The system's capacity was limited, and the province's waterways were only free of ice for seven months of the year. But Haldimand

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[7] QUA, HP 21852, 31, "Return of provisions & stores forwarded from Lachine & the Cedars to the upper posts to November 7th 1778...." QUA, HP 21852, 113. "The Distribution of Provisions July 1779-July 1780," 6 June 1779. Neatby, *Quebec: The Revolutionary Age*, 174. Bowler, *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America*, 236. Burt, *The Old Province of Quebec*, 2: 14. Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 221-2.

[8] A weekly ration consisted of seven pounds of bread, six pounds of pork, six ounces of butter, three pints of peas and a half-pound of oatmeal. Baker, *Government and Contractors*, 22.

[9] See Appendix II.

could not even count upon that brief time; British supply ships rarely reached Quebec before late summer.[10] The transportation system was strained to the limit.

In particular, Haldimand found that the supply system on Lake Ontario was weak; it was inefficient and vulnerable. The absence of resident shipwrights to repair the vessels significantly reduced the lake fleet's capacity. Similarly, the lack of a fortified winter depot shortened the available time for transportation on the lake. In 1777 the *Haldimand,* a sloop with a 150 tons burden, had been laid up at Niagara for the whole season because it was too dilapidated to sail. Only two vessels, the *Seneca,* a 200-ton snow, and the *Caldwell,* a 40-ton sloop, had remained to transport goods between the depot at Deer Island and Niagara. The combined volume of military and mercantile supplies proved too great for the two ships and a backlog of goods amassed at Deer Island. In September, Governor Guy Carleton had sent a detachment of the 8th Regiment of Foot to oversee the clearing of the island, but winter arrived before the last items could be transported to Niagara. The detachment of the 8th Regiment had proceeded to their winter quarters at Niagara and left Deer Island without a military guard.[11] Any goods remaining on the island had been sent back down the river to Lachine. Such had been the fate of merchant John Askin's goods; not only had Mr. Askin had to wait seven months to move his goods, but he had also lost three weeks the next season, just to send his goods to Deer Island again.[12] There was little Haldimand could do to improve the supply system; he could influence neither the weather, the arrival of the fleet nor the mode and speed of conveyance. But he could provide a year-round depot and shipbuilding centre at

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[10] Bowler, *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America,* 128.
[11] McLoed, "The Tap of the Garrison Drum," 113.
[12] QUA HP 21759, 3, "Memorandum for His Excellency Sir Guy Carleton, Knight of the Bath, Captain

the eastern end of Lake Ontario.

Haldimand envisioned Carleton Island as the "great Depot of Provisions for the upper posts." The island's fortifications effectively extended the transportation season on Lake Ontario by sheltering goods on the island over the winter. Thus transportation to the upper posts could begin at the first thaw. The island's role as a depot transformed it into the control centre for all west-bound traffic. All bateaux intended for the upper posts stopped at its shores. The staff of Carleton Island's Commissary Department received and sorted all the military goods brought by the bateaux and stored them while they awaited transport to Niagara.[13] Between April and November, an average of thirty-four bateaux, loaded with military provisions and troops, arrived every week.[14] As well, all trade convoys stopped at the island. Two hundred and sixty merchant bateaux added to the military traffic every year.[15] Cargo intended for the western posts was unloaded on the island to wait for transport in one of the King's vessels. Curiously, even mercantile traffic intending to travel to Michilimackinac up the Grand (Ottawa) River had to make a

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General Re: the Trade to the Upper Posts," 20 January 1778.

[13] Packages travelling up the St. Lawrence River were "all marked and numbered" for Carleton Island. The commissaries cross-referenced the arriving goods with a master list, inspected the transhipments and kept a meticulous record of the goods that were damaged or missing. Bowler, *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America*, 23, 29. QUA, HP 21851, 120, Captain Mathews to Nathaniel Day, 17 February 1780. HP 21851, 50, Nathaniel Day to General Haldimand, 6 January 1779.

[14] The St. Lawrence River's rapids and narrows restricted the mode of conveyance to flat-bottomed bateaux rigged with square sails and crewed by five men. With four men to row and one to steer, the bateaux-men used oars and poles to navigate the boats through the rapids. For seven months of the year, bateaux travelled between Lachine and Carleton Island in brigades of 8 and 14 boats. The round trip from Lachine to Carleton Island took three weeks. In the spring and fall the trek up to Carleton Island from Lachine took 16 days and the journey back down took three or four days. Similarly, a bateau's capacity changed with the season and the depth of the water: in the spring and fall each bateau could carry 26 barrels or 2600 rations, in the summer they could only carry 24 barrels or 2300 rations. G.P. de T. Glazebrook, *A History of Transportation in Canada*, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1938, 66. QUA, HP 21849, 259. Anonymous memorandum, HP 21849, 175, "Return of Batteaux sent from Lachine to Carleton Island with Stores and Provisions for the Upper Posts in the Month of June 1782."

[15] Burt, *The Old Province of Quebec*, 2: 12.

detour to Carleton Island to present their passes.[16] All traders showed their trading pass to Carleton Island's commander confirming each convoy's cargo, destination, and crew members. But the island's utility as a clearinghouse for goods depended upon the strength of the transportation service that carried the goods across the lake to Niagara.[17]

Accordingly, Haldimand revitalised the Lake Service on Lake Ontario. He established a replica of the Royal Navy and brought highly skilled craftsmen and seamen to the lake. He imported shipwrights and craftsmen from the dockyards of the Royal Navy in Chatham and Portsmouth to the island. They composed the "Land Service" of the new department.[18] Only officers with four years service at sea received commissions to navigate the Lakes' vessels in the departments' "Water Service." Likewise only seamen with four years experience were classed "able."[19] In 1778 Carleton Island superseded Niagara's Navy Hall as the Provincial Marine's headquarters. For five years the department built and repaired vessels, adding considerably to the capacity, efficiency

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[16] Similarly all Canadian *engagés* travelling to join the fur traders in the West were required to report to Carleton Island either on their way to or return from the West. Without the post commanders' approbation, the shipments could not continue their journey. A detachment of the Royal Highland Emigrants stood guard at the Grand River's rapids. They verified passes and expected to see that the merchants had travelled by Carleton Island. If this regulation was strictly followed, then between 90 and 100 of the merchant's bateaux at Carleton Island were actually intended for the Grand River trade to Michilimackinac. QUA, HP 21848, 21, R. Matthews to Captain Mauer, 7 May 1781. HP 21759, 81, Captain Grant to General Haldimand, 24 April 1780. HP 21788, 21, General Haldimand to Major Nairne, 21 May 1779.

[17] See Appendix III.

[18] In 1778, nearly eighty men followed Schank to Carleton Island to build, maintain and administer the naval works on the island. Four storekeepers and one clerk looked after the administration and loading of the ships. Eight or nine shipwrights, sawyers, carpenters and blacksmiths oversaw a body of 58 artificers and labourers. Looking after the ships' accoutrements were two master sail makers and their crew, two boatmen of the yard and a foreman of the rigger with his crew. One ship's surgeon looked after all the department's members. After 1779 Captain Laforce headed the Land Service on Carleton Island and he oversaw a service of seventeen British craftsmen, thirty Canadians and one master ship builder, John Coleman. NAC British Military and Naval Records, NAC, "C-Series" RG 8, vol. 722A, p.38, "General Return of the Naval Arrangement, 1779." McLoed, "The Tap of the Garrison Drum," 135.

[19] Captain Schank had the direction of the whole service on the Lake Ontario but his role as commissioner of the Lake Service required him to stay in the lower province. Captain James Andrews, the most senior officer on the Lake, was acting head of the Water Service. In 1779 he had 91 seamen, 4 ships and 1 galley under his command. McLoed, "The Tap of the Garrison Drum," 122, 125. QUA, HP 21801, 133, "A

and security of transportation on the Lake.

The land service increased the transportation system's security and capacity. By June 1779, naval artificers had completed two gunboats and rigged and armed three bateaux with twelve-pounder guns. The gunboats patrolled the island and accompanied the bateaux brigades into the St. Lawrence River. They also served as "expresses" and delivered mail to Niagara.[20] More importantly, the dockyards increased the fleet's capacity. Shipwrights maintained existing ships to prevent their decay and they also built two transport vessels.[21] By 10 May 1780 they completed and launched the *Ontario*, a 230-ton snow.[22] After the *Ontario* foundered in November of that same year the shipwrights replaced her with a sister ship, the *Limnade,* a 230-ton snow, launched in September 1781.[23] Until the end of the war, then, the *Haldimand*, the *Seneca*, the *Mohawk*, and the *Limnade* ferried goods and supplies between Carleton Island and Niagara.

But the ships did not sail themselves.[24] The skilled officers and seamen of the Water Service employed their experience to navigate the ships efficiently and safely. Theoretically, the lake ships could make eleven voyages between Carleton Island and Niagara each season, but the vagaries of wind and weather reduced the opportunities for

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monthly Return of the Naval Department on Lake Ontario," 27 June 1779.

[20] QUA HP 21801, 30, Captain Schank to General Haldimand, 26 June 1779.

[21] In the spring of 1779 the *Seneca*, for example, was so damaged, her captain could "thrust the caulking out with [his] fingers." She was repaired and made it through the season, but the following year, the shipwrights increased her capacity by raising her decks. The *Haldimand* also benefited from the shipwrights' presence. By 1782 she was so dilapidated, she could no longer sail in fall weather; only constant repairs kept her seaworthy for reduced service during the summer months. "The Court martial of James Glennie," 88. HP 21 787, 201, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 13 December 1780. HP 21759, 126 "General Return of the Force and Burthen of His Majesty's Armed Vessels on Lake Ontario." 10 September 1782.

[22] QUA HP 21787, 133, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 18 May 1780.

[23] QUA HP 21787, 188, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 8 November 1780. HP 21787, 259, Major Ross to General Haldimand, 27 September 1781.

sailing.[25] Poor breezes left the fleet becalmed for days.[26] The crew stayed alert, ready to sail "the moment the weather will permit," even if that meant waiting to sail at two o'clock in the morning.[27] The skilled crews pushed the transportation season to its limits; they navigated the ships safely through sudden storms in the fall and floating ice in the spring.[28] But the risk was great. In November 1780 when the *Ontario* foundered in a sudden storm, thirty miles below Niagara, all on board were drowned.[29] But because the vessel was returning from Niagara and not loaded with military supplies, the disaster did not cripple the upper posts; however, merchants must have suffered because a "rich cargo of furrs" was lost.[30] In general the Naval Department operated a secure, efficient transportation service on Lake Ontario.

The ships and bateaux carried more than goods. They were also vectors of communication. The islanders transmitted information regularly and quickly between Montreal and Niagara, though travel from east to west took longer than travel west to east. Dispatches travelling from Montreal to Carleton Island could arrive within a

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[24] See Appendix IV.
[25] QUA HP 21832, 166. "Return of the Vessels upon the upper Lakes, their Burthen in barrels Bulk, Estimation of the number of Troops that may be carried with the number of Voyages in the Summer Season." No Date (probably before 1780.)
[26] In 1780 three ships already loaded and ready to sail waited ten days for a fair wind to take them across the Lake. QUA, HP 21787, 129. Captain Fraser to Haldimand, 9 May 1780. HP 21787, Major Naime to General Haldimand, 14 November 1779.
[27] QUA HP 21759, 31, Captain Brehm to General Haldimand, 1 May 1779.
[28] Ice storms in late December 1778 trapped the *Seneca* at Carleton Island, though her captain made six attempts to return to Niagara. In May 1778, Captain Jean-Baptiste Bouchette, a Canadian merchant seaman, demonstrated his value to the lake's service when he saved the *Seneca* from perishing in storm by throwing the ship's guns overboard. QUA, HP 21801, 73, Lieutenant Chiquet to Captain Bouchette, 29 February 1779. Douglas, "Jean-Baptiste Bouchette" in *DCB*, 5:100-101. McLoed. *The Tap of the Garrison Drum*, 132.
[29] NAC *Haldimand* MSS, B 127, p.200, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 8 November 1780, printed in Preston, *Kingston before the War of 1812*, 14.
[30] Smith, *Legend of the Lake*, 132.

week.[31] Information sent from Carleton Island to Montreal could expect to arrive in three or four days.[32] Communication with Niagara was similarly convenient; it took a week to sail from Carleton Island to Niagara against the prevailing wind.[33] The journey in the opposite direction was swifter. In the summer months, Carleton Island's post commanders exchanged a dozen letters with General Haldimand every month.[34] In the winter, a few trusted individuals carrying letters from Carleton Island and Niagara to Montreal by snowshoe ensured that Fort Haldimand's commander exchanged letters with General Haldimand every month.[35] Even the transportation of essential goods continued after the river and lakes froze.[36] Thus, despite their isolation, Carleton Islanders maintained steady contact with the outside world.

Fort Haldimand's Naval Department provided the necessary transportation services to ensure Carleton Island's integration with the rest of Quebec. The fleets brought news, information and goods, tangible and intangible evidence of British authority. The islanders, soldiers, merchants, and Indians manipulated these connections into an ongoing dialogue with the central authorities in order to secure their place in the empire.

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[31] QUA. HP 21787, 126. Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 2 May 1780.
[32] In September 1779, Captain Schank reached Montreal after a three-day journey from Carleton Island. In his exceptionally quick journey he overtook the messengers from Carleton Island. QUA, HP 21801, 179, Captain Schank to General Haldimand, 30 September 1779.
[33] QUA HP 21759, 31, Captain Brehm to General Haldimand, 1 May 1779. HP 21759, 35, Captain Brehm to General Haldimand, 8 May 1779.
[34] Calculated over five years between 1779-1783. These figures are a minimum estimation, for they are based upon only those letters saved in the Haldimand Papers which, though voluminous, are not necessarily complete.
[35] Once in Montreal the messengers waited for ten or twelve days in order to collect letters intended for the upper posts. The journey there and back, including the turnaround time in Montreal, could be accomplished comfortably in less than a month. QUA, HP 21 788, 71, General Haldimand to Captain Fraser, 10 November 1779. HP 21787, 108, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 1 December 1779. HP 21789, 97, Brigadier Allan McLean to Captain Mathews, 17 January 1780.
[36] QUA, HP 21787, 119, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 20 April 1780.

None of the Carleton Islanders conducted the business of war in isolation from the rest of the province. Fort Haldimand's secure place within the transportation and supply system allowed military, Indians, and merchants to base their information-gathering operations on the island. The commanders planned and executed campaigns in concert with Haldimand's defence plans. The island's merchants similarly conducted business by forging commercial relationships with a geographically dispersed association of men. Finally, the island's relative proximity to the Mohawk Valley and its stable supply of goods made it an excellent meeting place for representatives of the Six Nations, the Mississauga, and the Indian Department. The extensive networks confirmed Carleton Island's integration with the British Empire despite its physical distance from the province's cosmopolitan centres.

Fort Haldimand's garrison enjoyed a close symbiotic relationship with Haldimand's headquarters. Quebec's overall defensive needs directed military activity on Carleton Island and influenced the garrison's strength and composition. Information collected and disseminated at Carleton Island allowed Haldimand to envision a large-scale image of the province's strategic position.[37] He planned military operations, allocated troops and issued trading passes based upon reports from the upper posts.[38] As a result of this interchange of information, Carleton Island played a significant supporting role in a number of offensive operations on the frontier, a situation made possible by its being a secure depot and its constant contact with military headquarters. The officers' and the soldiers' concerted actions on behalf of Haldimand's regime heightened their

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[37] Whitfield, "The Geography of the British Northern Interior Frontier of Defense during the Haldimand War Administration of Quebec 1778-1784," 159.
[38] QUA, HP 21759, 25, General Haldimand to Lieutenant Brehm, 19 April 1779. HP 21759, 81, Charles

focus upon the centre of military power and upon their relationship with the central authorities.

Haldimand gradually solidified his strategic position on Lake Ontario by expanding British knowledge of the region. Carleton Island's engineers mapped and sounded parts of Lake Ontario. Lieutenant Twiss left standing orders for the island's engineers to take "correct and daily observations on the Ice, the rise of the Water, and the Effects of the different Winds." James Glennie conducted intensive surveys of the island and the surrounding water. The crew of the *Caldwell* sounded Irondequoit Bay, "70 Miles from Carleton Island and 45 miles South West from Oswego."[39] Captain Laforce mapped the water between Carleton Island and Cataraqui.[40] The new knowledge gave the vessels greater latitude to sail in adverse winds. Consequently, the Naval Department increased the frequency of voyages on the lake. Previously the fear of being blown into uncharted waters had restricted the opportunities for the vessels to sail.[41] This fresh confidence also gave the British greater latitude to plan more effective assaults on the Mohawk Valley. The British gradually moved away from their vulnerable position as "entire strangers" in the region with "erroneous" maps to a tentative mastery over the water. Strengthening their position on the land was another matter.

Haldimand required constant infusion of information from the colonies to the south to assess and react to the likelihood of a rebel invasion in the province. Nature and

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Grant to General Haldimand, 24 April 1780.

[39] The *Caldwell's* crew discovered that Irondequoit Bay was very shallow and "only fit for Bateaux." Irondequoit was a Seneca council ground and in 1777 it served as the meeting place for the Seneca and British officials. QUA HP 21787, 37, Lieutenant Baker to Captain Aubrey, 9 May 1779. Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 120.

[40] QUA, HP 21801, 238, Captain Laforce to General Haldimand, 20 September 1780.

[41] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 44. QUA, HP 21801, 11, Captain Schank to General Haldimand, 17 August 1778. HP 21801, 238, Captain Laforce to General Haldimand, 20 September 1780.

the exigencies of war prevented Haldimand from following British fortunes in the colonies with ease. Often the only information he received of British fortunes was from his scouts. Nonetheless, Haldimand built an image of his province's strategic circumstances from the piecemeal information he gleaned from different posts.[42] Carleton Island's scouting parties became Haldimand's eyes and ears in the Mohawk Valley.[43] Groups of thirty to one hundred whites and Indians went scouting every month of the year, weather permitting. Haldimand required "timely intelligence of everything that [passed] in [their] Neighbourhood."[44] The scouts gathered information about rebel movements and sought rebel newspapers with accounts of the war in the southern colonies. Rebel prisoners were particularly prized sources of information. Haldimand directed scouts to kidnap rebel farmers, not soldiers, because "a good inhabitant would be more likely to give authentic information than any [rebel] troops, and may be more easily come at." The prisoner was to be kept and "well treated" on the island and the intelligence transmitted to Haldimand. The news the scouts collected kept the island and ultimately Haldimand apprised of Britain's fate in the colonies.[45]

Carleton Island's geographic position and integration with his headquarters also gave Haldimand flexibility to execute defensive manoeuvres. Its location, halfway

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[42] Dendy, "Frederick Haldimand and the Defence of Canada, 1778-1784," 36. Whitfield, "The Geography of the British Northern Interior Frontier of Defense during the Haldimand War Administration of Quebec 1778-1784,"159.

[43] The scouts could penetrate rebel territory to the Mohawk River and Canada Creek (or Wood Creek) in three of four days. In particular, the road to Fort Stanwix from Carleton Island was "good; with few rivers and those fordable and every mountain easily avoided." QUA, HP 21 787, 156, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 1 July 1780. HP 21788, 96, General Haldimand to Captain Fraser, 1 September 1780.

[44] QUA HP 21722, 26, General Haldimand to Captain Mompesson, 10 August 1778.

[45] One particularly success scouting mission returned with news of General Charles Cornwallis' movements in the South, of General George Washington's retreat from Fish Kill and Benedict Arnold's sack of Virginia. Major Ross, then commander of Fort Haldimand gave the members of the scout a gratuity for their efforts. QUA HP 21787, 262. Major Ross to General Haldimand, 29 September 1781.

between Montreal and Niagara, placed it at the centre of any military activity in the west. Troops waited on the island, ready to "be got down to Montreal in three of four days at the furthest" or sent to Niagara according to where Haldimand apprehended danger.[46] Consequently, throughout the war, the garrison's composition changed in response to strategic situations further afield.[47] Several times, the business of war came right to the island's shores.

The availability of transport and men at the island allowed Fort Haldimand to provide essential logistical support for a series of significant initiatives against the rebels. Three of these campaigns gathered strength at Carleton Island.[48] The raids were far from full-scale offensive activity but required considerable support—discreet support.[49] Haldimand blanketed the operations in secrecy. He did not want to attract rebel notice by sending troop reinforcements and supplies westward. Thus, only Fort Haldimand's well-

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[46] QUA, HP 21759, 27, Captain Brehm to General Haldimand, 26 April 1779.

[47] For example, the garrison at Carleton Island changed in response to Henry Hamilton's defeat at Vincennes in 1779. Hamilton's actions put Detroit's security in jeopardy. When Haldimand heard the news in mid-April he found detachments of the regular army, the 8th and 47th regiments were ready to hand at Carleton Island. He ordered them to proceed to Niagara to bolster the defences of the upper posts. Provincial soldiers of Sir John Johnson, the King's Royal Regiment of New York, took their place. QUA HP 21722, 41, General Haldimand to Colonel Bolton, 27 August 1778. *A History of the Organisation, Development and Services of the Military* ...3: 9. Sutherland, Tousignant and Dionne-Tousignant, "Frederick Haldimand," *DCB,* 4: 895.

[48] In September 1779 General Haldimand sent Sir John Johnson to support the Six Nations after General Sullivan devastated their villages in the Mohawk Valley. The following two summers General Haldimand sanctioned retaliatory raids into the Mohawk Valley. In 1780 Sir John Johnson took his raiding party to Carleton Island on his way to Oswego. Fort Haldimand's commander, Major Ross of the RRNY, planned and executed, in co-ordination with the garrison at Niagara, another devastating raid from Carleton Island in 1781.

[49] In September 1779 over five hundred individuals converged at Carleton Island within the space of a few days. British military men and Indian Department officials rushed out west to meet the crisis. Sir John Johnson led 380 men, his Royal Yorkers, a detachment of the 34th regiment, and a company of German Chasseurs to succour the Six Nations in the Mohawk Valley. Accompanying him, was Captain Alexander Fraser with a force of St. Regis Indians. The Mississauga, likewise alarmed by rebel movements in the valley joined the mix; all the members of that tribe on the Lake repaired to the island. Guy Johnson, superintendent of the Six Nation's Indians brought two hundred Indian warriors and their families. Accommodating the transportation needs of this congeries of people disrupted but did not overwhelm the transportation of provisions that year. Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 214, 223, QUA, HP 21766, 5, Guy Johnson to General Haldimand, 30 September 1779. QUA. HP 21789, 40.

equipped harbours, populous barracks, and full storehouses ensured the campaigns' success.[50] The 1779 campaign was abortive, but those in the 1780 and 1781 achieved their aim. The raiders burned fields, stole cattle, and terrorised the settlements of the Mohawk Valley. The repeated assaults destroyed the valley's faltering agricultural economy and ate away at the rebels' morale. [51] The campaigns were successful and important, but the islanders' knew that their efforts were small in comparison with the war's scope. The real battles of the Revolution were being fought in the southern colonies and on the Atlantic Ocean.[52]

Events far from the island had a direct impact on the soldiers' lives. The constant interchange of news and instructions focused the Carleton Islanders' attention consistently upon the grand scale of Britain's imperial aims. The islanders' activities appeared insignificant when continually placed in an imperial context. Lieutenant James Glennie fell prey to doubt that the garrison's presence upon the island was futile, an empty gesture. In his view, there was the same likelihood of rebels attacking as there was of the "island being swallowed up [...] by an Earthquake, or all the Trees on it being

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Brigadier Allan McLean to General Haldimand, 7 October 1779.

[50] In September 1780 Sir John Johnson collected a party of 300 men at Carleton Island and led them to Oswego. There they met with the rest of the raid's contingent of soldiers and Indians from Niagara. The total party numbered 893 men. The expedition required 18 bateaux to carry provisions and artillery down the Oswego River. One hundred Indian warriors gathered at the island and joined the raiders in the Mohawk Valley. The island provided the necessary supplies and bateaux for Major Ross's expedition the following year. Again, the island provided the necessary supplies and bateaux, but this time the fort also supplied the bulk of the troops. Fort Haldimand's garrison was sufficiently strong to allow Ross to take 273 men on expedition and still leave the fort well garrisoned. Watt, *The Burning of the Valleys*. 157, 161, 163. Cruikshank, "The King's Royal Regiment of New York," 74.

[51] Barbara Graymont described General Haldimand's response to Sullivan's campaign in 1779 as " too little or too late." By the time he decided to send forces to the Valley, Sullivan had already left. Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution.*, 214. Watt, *The Burning of the Valleys*, 259. Cruikshank, "The King's Royal Regiment of New York," 80.

[52] Mackesy, *The War for America*, 367.

rooted up by a Whirlwind."[53] The provincial troops found their modest role in the war unequal to the sacrifices they made. They fought and endured life on the island in hopes of regaining their livelihood in the Mohawk Valley. But the "unpleasant tidings" they received from "every quarter" informing them that their "little properties on the Mohawk river [were] taken possession of by the New Englanders" depressed their spirits and turned their thoughts towards deserting. Only fear prevented some of them from leaving the British while that empire's power waned.[54] Haldimand co-ordinated that island's military ventures to meet Britain's overall strategic position in North America. But his ability to direct his troops' efforts depended upon the continuing legitimacy of his authority on the periphery.

Haldimand distributed rewards for service in order to keep his troops and officers attentive. He issued the soldiers clothes and accoutrements in order to maintain their confidence in the empire and to keep their moral up. They were liable to desert if he didn't.[55] In 1782 the English seamen deserted at Carleton Island because they had not received the rations they deserved.[56] Officers similarly expected remuneration for their services, but they sought military honours, appointments and promotions.[57] War and active service represented the chance for promotion and advancement; officers considered the absence of war "Dead Peace [with] no Prospect of active service for promotions."[58] Thus, Carleton Island's officers naturally kept one eye upon their duty, the other eye upon their place within the hierarchical British military.

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[53] "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 8.
[54] Cruikshank, *The Story of Butler's Rangers*, 104.
[55] Cruikshank, "The King's Royal Regiment of New York," 45.
[56] QUA, HP 21802, 182, Captain Schank to General Haldimand, 6 May 1782.
[57] Starkey, "War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British Army in

An officer's tour of duty on Carleton Island and his place within the military hierarchy were separate realities, but it was possible to conflate the two as Captain Alexander Fraser did to his detriment. He equated the island's geographic distance from Montreal with his marginalisation within the military. Haldimand's aide, Captain Brehm strongly recommended Fraser for the post. Carleton Island was a "post of much consequence" and would benefit from Fraser's ability to speak French, his high-ranking position in the Indian Department and his engineering skills.[59] Nonetheless, Fraser did not want to be on the island. In 1779 he requested to return to Canada "in order to solicit the Interests of some of [his] friends in England to get [him a] promotion, or His Majesty's permission to quit the Service."[60] The following year Haldimand grievously insulted Fraser by not allowing him to lead a significant scout from the island and by giving it to a junior officer.[61] Fraser conflated the physical place with the political; he was not able to bridge the gap between his experience of being psychologically integrated with the military system but physically disconnected from the centres of power.

The transportation and communication links brought tangible and intangible signs of British authority to Carleton Island. The fleets delivered the physical wherewithal for Carleton Island's troops to make war on the rebels. The outward manifestations of Britain's imperial presence strengthened individuals' confidence in the imperial imperative. The supply system also intensified the islanders' sense of integration by providing an opportunity for an interchange of news and information. The islanders were

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America, 1755-1781," 17.
[58] QUA, HP 21801, 30, Captain Andrews to General Haldimand, 3 October 1778.
[59] QUA, HP 21759, 32, Captain Brehm to General Haldimand, 1 May 1779.
[60] QUA, HP 21787, 97, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 29 October 1779.
[61] QUA, HP 21787, 170, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 20 September 1780,

continually immersed in an imperial culture and continued to think and act in imperial terms. The material of war and its psychological implications formed a flexible, pliable compound that bound the empire's periphery to its centre.

Carleton Island's developed connections played a subtly different role for the British Indian Department and the King's Indian Allies. Instead of linking a military or economic centre to its periphery, the island became a meeting place for two worlds. Communication in this paradigm meant language translation and diplomacy. Mississauga and Six Nations Indians repaired to the island to meet representatives of the English King, the officers of the British Indian Department. The transportation system became important to the Indian Department and the Indian allies because they brought Indian presents from Britain to the island. The presents became the symbolic medium by which the British, Mississauga, and Six Nations Indians continually negotiated their relationship. But mutual misapprehension about their relationship locked the British and Indians into their respective modes of thinking. The British used the goods to exert influence over the Indians, while the Indians accepted British help as a means to retain cultural independence in the face of rebel encroachments.

Haldimand posted interpreters from the British Indian Department on the island to draw the King's Indian allies into the empire's sphere of influence. On the most elementary level Indian Department interpreters facilitated communication between Whites and Indians by bridging the language gap. Jacob Adams, who served as Carleton Island's interpreter between 1778 and 1780, spoke "the Mississauga tongue" and could "make himself intelligible to the Six Nations by speaking Huron."[62] He exchanged

[62] After Jacob Adams left, interpreters "Lynes and Christian" replaced him. Lieutenant Crawford also

military information with various tribes and refuted misinformation spread by rebel-sympathising Indians.[63] He engaged in modest diplomatic exercises by sealing British declarations with strings of wampum "according to the weight of his message" so that they would be accepted at Onondaga, the council place of the Six Nations.[64] The underlying imperative of these overtures was a desire to define Britain's relationship with the Indian allies.

Adams delivered messages to the Indians reminding them of the contours of their alliance. The British had forged a diplomatic relationship with the Indians by adopting the French practice of distributing gifts in exchange for military service. The exchange of goods cemented "metaphorical ties of kinship" between the English and the Indians because "liberality was an attribute of paternity."[65] Adams acted as Haldimand's mouthpiece, relaying praise to the Indians for their submission to British direction, what was termed "good Conduct and Service." He reminded them that their co-operation would prevent the Rebels from over-running their lands. Adams also re-extended the King's protection to the Indians. While they remained under the King's "care and

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acted as an Indian agent for the Mississauga Indians. All three both appear to have had language skills similar to those of Adams. NAC, "Claus Family Papers," MG 19, F 1 vol. 26 41-44, transcripts on microfilm, Daniel Claus to Jacob Adams, 13 November 1778. QUA HP 21771, 120, Colonel Campbell to General Haldimand, 24 June 1779. HP 21771, 142, Colonel Campbell to Captain Mathews, 30 July 1779. HP 21771, 207, Colonel Campbell to General Haldimand, 19 June 1780.

[63] Rebel Caughnawaga and St. Regis Indians went "among the Oneidas and are influencing them and the 6 Nat's with a parcell [sp] of falsehoods from this country." They reported that all the Canadians and Indians were in favour of the revels because of their longstanding alliance with the French. They also claimed that the River St. Lawrence was blocked up by a French Fleet & that Canada must fall next campaign. NAC, "Claus Papers," MG 19, F1, vol. 26, 46, transcripts on microfilm, Daniel Claus to Haldimand 18 November 1778.

[64] Wampum played an important diplomatic role in Iroquois culture. Diplomats accompanied verbal messages with a string or belt composed of white or purple beads of shells as a testament to the messages' good faith, veracity and sacredness. No formal messages were accepted without Wampum. Wampum belts were also used a mnemonic devises and wampum records were guarded at Onondaga, the capital of the Six Nation's Confederacy; "the wampum belts at Onondaga were thus the national archives of the Confederacy." Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 16.

Protection" they would be able to "live in peace and quietness enjoying their hunting, fishing and Trade unmolested." The gifts that Adams distributed were a sign of the good will, authority, influence and bounty of the English King. But the British also used the Indian presents as indirect and direct means to impose a hierarchical European command structure on them.[66] In theory, Indian Department officials used the distribution of goods to control and absorb Indian manpower, not to negotiate with them on equal terms. But in practice, the Indian Department found it very difficult to usurp the Indians' self-determination.

The Indians interpreted British promises of presents and support as a means of preserving Indian identity and way of life. British promises to the Indians led erstwhile enemies, the Six Nations and the Mississaugas, to recognise their common ethnic identity. In 1775, Mohawk warrior Joseph Brant accompanied members of the Indian Department to Britain in order to present Mohawk grievances to the King of England. The American Secretary, Lord George Germain promised to support their land claims in

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[65] Catharine Desbarats, "The Cost of Early Canada's Native Alliances: Reality and Scarcity's Rhetoric" *William and Mary Quarterly* 52(4), 1995,

[66] The British used the distribution of presents symbolically to demarcate the men they believed wielded the most influence in Indian circles: war chiefs received more elaborate clothes than the warriors. In part this distribution of goods reflected British misapprehension of Indian culture. But it was also an attempt to exert some controls over warriors actions in the fields. The Indian style of warfare was very "individualistic" and war chiefs led their parties by persuasion not authority. The Indians did not recognise hierarchical authority and the British officers had difficulty controlling them on campaign. Gifts of "ammunition, Vermilion, Knives and Tomahawks" to war chiefs increased individual chief's dependence upon the British because he gained status by distributing the goods among his warriors. But, Department officials did not rely entirely upon the gifts and placed white chiefs at the head of small raiding parities thereby imposing a hierarchical command structure on the Indian's traditionally autonomous style of warfare. Timothy J. Shannon "Dressing for Success on the Mohawk Frontier: Hendrick, William Johnson and the Indian Fashion." *The William and Mary Quarterly* 53 (1), 1996, 17., QUA HP 769, 17 "An Account of What has been Usually given...to an Indian...to a Woman... to the Chiefs and Principle Warriors," 31 March 1779. Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 21-2, 244. QUA HP 21769, 46, "Return of Officers and Indians of the Department of Indian Affairs under the Command of Guy Johnson...." 24 March 1780.

return for military support. The promise broke the neutrality of the Six Nations.[67] It also provided the Mississauga with evidence that an alliance with their former enemies might prove wise. When General Sullivan drove the Six Nations into Mississaugan lands, a local chief welcomed them since there "were all Indians...and are bound to help each other."[68]

The goods that the bateaux carried with them to Carleton Island had an ideological value but in the field they played a very practical function. The Indians expected provisions, ammunition and clothing as due return for their sacrifices in "what they called "a Warr amongst" the British. The warriors could not "hunt or plant when at Warr" and had to leave their families without protection and "exposed to an Enemy." They also requested the presence of "white people" in their war parties because they did not want to bear the brunt of the war.[69] Far from accepting British direction, the Indians believed they were receiving due compensation for their efforts.[70] The giving of gifts did not bridge the gap between Whites and Indians because each attached their own cultural definition to the act. Each party remained sealed within their own culture on the island; their interactions only served to reinforce their sense of White or Indian identity.

Other imperial links forged at Carleton Island proved sturdier. The island's traders bolstered the fort's connection to the British by importing products from London merchants. Macaulay, Campbell, Cartwright, Hamilton and Mackay provided the necessary goods to allow the Whites to maintain a sense of European decorum. The

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[67] Five of the six Iroquois nations, the Cayuga, Seneca, Mohawk, Tuscarora and the Onondaga declared for the King. The sixth, the Oneida under the influence of a rebel missionary, Samuel Kirkland, sided against Britain. The decision broke the Iroquois body politic. Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 128

[68] Schmaltz, *The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario*, 101.

islanders who could afford extras enlivened their palates with vinegar, pepper, sugar, coffee, tea, chocolate, and port wine imported from London. The traders imported cotton calicoes, woollen serges, strouds, Irish linens, and English dress patterns. They provided life's modest luxuries: stationery, hosiery, haberdashery, shoes, violins, and gut strings. They sold stoves and pipe staves to keep the islanders warm during the winter.[71] Traders were indispensable to the soldiery, selling them rum when their own supplies ran short. The traders also equipped the Indians to continue their fight against encroachments upon their lands. Indians traded venison, ginseng and furs for blankets, ammunition, gunpowder, muskets, tobacco and pipes. But the traders did not support the military community out of an exaggerated sense of duty. They were busy solidifying their trading links with the empire.

Carleton Island's role as "a safe place for the traders to send their goods" allowed traders to play a part in this economic expansion. Government control over merchant shipping on Lake Ontario was inconvenient, but the regulations also effectively established a government-subsidised transportation system and allowed men of little capital and few business contacts to enter the fur trade.[72] Fort Haldimand's traders were men of limited circumstance. They built and extended their business on the strength of

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[69] QUA, HP 21759, 36, Captain Brehm to General Haldimand, 8 May 1779.
[70] QUA, HP 21787, 90, Captain Alexander Fraser to General Haldimand, 29 September 1779.
[71] QUA. HP 21787, 120, "Goods belonging to Forsyth and Dyce, Merchants of Detroit now laying at Carleton Island," signed by Robert Hamilton, 20 April 1780. HP 21787, 121, "Goods Belonging to Thomas Robinson Merchant of Niagara Now Laying at Carleton Island," signed Robert Hamilton, 20 April 1780. HP 21787, 122, "Return of Alex Campbell's stores at Carleton Island," signed Alex Campbell, 20 April 1780. HP 21787, 123, "Account of Sundry Goods in Possession of Robert Macaulay," signed Robert Macaulay, 20 April 1780. HP 21787, 125, "Return of Merchandise in Custity [sp] of Mary MacKay," signed Hugh MacKay for Mary MacKay, 21 April 1780. HP 21877, 84, "The Petition of Robert Macaulay" No date., Durham. *Carleton Island in the Revolution.* 105. Smith, *The Legend of the Lake,* 82.
[72] Bruce G. Wilson. *The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton: A Study of Wealth and Influence in Early Upper Canada 1776-1812.* Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1983. 10.

Carleton Island's communication and transportation links. They formed trading partnerships with traders at other posts, thereby pooling their resources and extending their business's reach. The associations and friendships they formed with traders at other posts allowed the dispersed group of men to maintaining a sense of common interest and identity.

The traders and merchants' agents of Carleton Island were minor players in an international trade. During the war Quebec's economy expanded and became increasingly integrated with Britain's home market. Political discord and war removed American competition in the trade in furs with Great Britain. Quebec's traders filled the void that the Albany traders left and expanded and solidified the province's economic links with Britain, and through Britain with an international market. The trade in furs reached "unequalled heights."[73] Between 1779 and 1780, Quebec traders exported £200,000 worth of beaver, racoon, muskrat, mink, otter, marten, sable and wild cat furs to Great Britain; one-quarter of these furs came from the environs of Niagara and Detroit.[74] For Carleton Island, this meant that £6,000 worth of commerce and several hundred bateaux-men in the employ of the merchants annually passed through its harbours.[75] The island's local economy was also directly tied to British markets. Traders imported British goods to sell to isolated garrison communities and to the Indian refugees. On Carleton Island alone, five traders operated little stores. A more exotic trade in ginseng collected by the Indians confirmed the island's participation in a world market; the

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[73] Ouellet, *Economic and Social History of Quebec,* 106, 109.
[74] One half of the furs came from Michilimackinac, Lake Huron and Michigan and the remaining quarter came from the "lower Inhabited part of the province." QUA. HP 21759, 81, Mr. Grant to General Haldimand, 24 April 1780. Ouellet, *Economic and Social History of Quebec,* 109.
[75] QUA. HP 21759, 138, No Name and No Date.

ginseng was sold in Chinese markets.[76] The "desert" landscape that Lieutenant Glennie described about the island was Quebec's bounty that gained its entry into international markets.

Carleton Islanders insinuated themselves into the imperial markets by forging links with traders at other posts. A tenuous line of debt and credit connected the traders with London merchants. The traders of the upper country were men of "low circumstances." They financed their business by buying goods on credit from Montreal merchants, who in turn borrowed from London merchants. The traders were "indebted from Year to Year until a return [was] made in Furrs" to London. Military controls over their goods made their existence even more precarious; the traders had to consign their livelihood to the hands of the military. Careless handling of their goods by the soldiers or lengthy delays in the transportation of their goods could ruin them.[77] They were "destitute of every means to pay their debts" if their venture failed.[78] Rarely did small-time traders have the capital or the business connections to bear the risks of the fur trade. But military control also proved beneficial to small traders and a boon to economic development. Military control over shipping reduced the capital investment required for men entering the trade. Where merchants built and operated their own sailing vessels before the war, new traders only paid for freight and toll charges.[79] The war's risks also promoted consolidation of the fur trade. In 1779 eight trading companies grouped

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[76] Brian L. Evans, "Ginseng: Root of Chinese-Canadian Relations" *Canadian Historical Review,* 66 (1) 1985: 20.
[77] McLoed, "The Tap of the Garrison Drum," 142.
[78] QUA, HP 21759, 81, Captain Grant to General Haldimand, 24 April 1780.
[79] Wilson, *The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton,* 10.

together to form the Northwest Trading Company.[80] Some Carleton Islanders' followed suit on a much smaller scale.

Robert Hamilton's experiences as a clerk, then as a trader, on Carleton Island are illustrative. Hamilton entered into several associations and partnerships that allowed him to conduct business over great distances. In the late fall of 1779, he worked as a clerk in Montreal for well-to-do fur traders, the Ellice brothers. Gradually he built up his own business by working in co-ordination with two clerks in the employ of Thomas Robinson, a fur trader based at Niagara.[81] The clerks took advantage of Robinson's organisation to make informed business decisions. They divided the province between them, Hamilton in Montreal, Archibald Cunningham at Carleton Island, and Francis Goring at Niagara. They maintained a steady correspondence in order to organise the purchase of the most profitable goods and to anticipate the garrisons' needs. In Montreal, Hamilton bought goods, received shipments, ascertained market prices and supervised loading freight intended for the west. In "his part of the world," Goring took the pulse of the garrison markets. While, he evaluated the garrison's needs at Niagara, presumably Archibald Cunningham did the same at Carleton Island. Hamilton then used his best judgement and "pick[ed] out a few articles that [answered their joint] concern."[82] Hamilton spent the winter of 1779-1780 minding the stores of several merchants on Carleton Island. He had his own store of goods for sale as well.

By 1780 Hamilton was ready to set up his own business. He moved to Niagara,

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[80] Ouellet, *Economic and Social History of Quebec*, 109.
[81] Robinson was the chief merchant at Niagara engaged in the fur trade. His business appears to have been prosperous because he was able to build a storehouse on Carleton Island to protect his goods and to employ at least two clerks. Wilson, *The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton*, 20.
[82] "Goring Papers," 56-57, Robert Hamilton to Francis Goring, 3 September 1779. "Goring Papers," 63,

where he entered into partnership with Richard Cartwright, who later also lived on Carleton Island. The agreement allowed them to share the costs of doing business. Together they built a network of concerns that linked them with cosmopolitan centres and the sources and markets of the west. The fledgling businessmen boasted the elite fur-trading firm of Todd and McGill as their creditors in Montreal. John Askin, a prosperous merchant at Detroit, looked after their interests in the western markets.[83] Hamilton and Cartwright opened a store on Carleton Island sometime before 1783, and in 1782 also opened a store at the newly refurbished post at Oswego. While the war's end in 1783 found Cartwright and Hamilton in debt to McGill, the military's transportation services allowed men of little capital like Hamilton and Cartwright take advantage of Quebec's growing economy. Despite their indebtedness, Hamilton and Cartwright were well positioned to continue their commercial activities after the war.

Reliable transportation and communication links also helped the merchants maintain a sense of group identity across distance. They managed their own mail service.[84] Banding together, they sent common petitions when they wanted Haldimand to redress military policy detrimental to their business.[85] They also considered the economy in global not local terms and the war in economic terms in which they existed apart as "a whole community."[86] They regarded each other as friends; or at least Hamilton referred

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Francis Goring to Robert Hamilton, 8 September 1779. "Goring Papers," 53, Robert Hamilton to Francis Goring, 22 August 1779.

[83] *The John Askin Papers,* edited by Milo Quaife, Volume I: 1747-1795, Detroit: The Detroit Library Commission, 1928, 188-192.

[84] Merchants collected their transatlantic mail in Montreal and sent it by boat to the upper posts. Hamilton instructed Goring at Niagara to charge the letter's recipients with the postage marked on the letter. "Goring Papers," 26, Robert Hamilton to Francis Goring, 25 July 1779.

[85] As an example see: QUA HP 21877, 240, "The Memorial of the Merchants of Montreal trading to the Post of Niagara and Detroit," 21 September 1782.

[86] QUA, HP 21759, 82, Charles Grant to General Haldimand, 24 April 1780.

to his business partners as friends. Hamilton's springtime letter to Francis Goring, part of which introduced this chapter, provides insight into the integrated world-view of a trader. He was writing to Goring in order to apprise his friend of the war's progress. Events far beyond the confines of the island affected the quality of his life—hence his morose description of Carleton Island. He concluded his letter with news of a British naval victory over the French. Since his business associations tied him to the British market, British dominance upon the seas was of crucial concern to Hamilton. His intense interest in imperial news made him oblivious to the fact that the rest of his letter was a portrait of Carleton Island's communication links. He revealed that he had received the news by express from Quebec and a ship was due to depart soon, he hoped with his letter. At that moment of his writing, Hamilton considered himself as well informed of the war's progress as any other person in Canada. He confidently relayed his information westward.[87] Hamilton and other traders on Carleton Island manipulated these communication and transportation links to their personal advantage and drew the Cataraqui region into a world market after them.

Despite geography, weather, and the limited eighteenth-century technology, the island-fort maintained a year round contact with headquarters and acted as a funnel for all traffic heading westward. The exigencies of war demanded it; the western posts' security and viability rested upon the secure and timely delivery of goods and rations. The island's storehouses, the fort, the dockyards and ships anchored the supply line in Lake Ontario. They also provided the practical means for the islanders to remain integrated with the British Empire. The constant exchange of information and the availability of

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[87] Robert Hamilton to Francis Goring, 25 March 1780, printed in Durham *Carleton Island During the*

goods allowed the post's military community to act and react to the strategic demands of the war. The traders spliced their business with military interests by taking advantage of military-subsidised transportation to trade with the empire. Indians came to the island to negotiate their alliance with the British and offer their services in return for supplies. The community grew outwards as each group extended their contact with peers in other parts of the province. The Carleton Islanders' reinforced sense of identity as a soldier, trader or Indian competed with the self-abnegation that life on the island and duty to the Crown required of them.

Revolution, 99.

3
Negotiating Loyalty on Carleton Island
"In the King's Service:"[1]

This chapter revisits Captain Alexander Fraser's description of Carleton Island's garrison. In 1780 he commented upon his garrison's national, ethnic and professional diversity and boasted that not even "the smallest disagreement between any two individuals on the island " troubled their peace.[2] Fraser was either lucky, or sanguine. Conflict was the leitmotif of Carleton Island's occupation. Petty and deadly disputes marked relationships within the military and among the military and the merchants, the Indians, and the refugees.

The discord that flourished on the island provides a useful window into the islanders' relationship with Haldimand's central authority. The social and operational structure Haldimand designed for his polyglot garrison was well defined, but rooted in the empire not the land. The island's developed communication and transportation system stabilised the community but also underlined the physical isolation from the rest of the province. Dissonance between the islanders' two frames of reference resulted. Antagonisms burgeoned as individuals negotiated a balance between their desire to support the King and their self-interest. But the conflicts among the islanders did not indicate that they were spiralling out of Haldimand's control. Rather, they constituted a

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[1] QUA, HP 21788, 12, General Haldimand to Captain McDougall, 29 April 1779.
[2] QUA, HP 21787, 119, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 21 March 1780.

reiteration of his rule.[3]

Strife among the Carleton Islanders represented the dynamic readjustment of military policy to the island's conditions. A dissection of the conflicts reveals their root in differing interpretations of loyalty to the Crown. General Haldimand defined loyalty as a total commitment to the "Common Cause," and encouraged the islanders to subsume their personal interest in favour of the "the Public Service." The challenges of war lowered the threshold for self-interest but did not remove it entirely. Scarcity of resources pitted the officers against one another as they executed their particular duty to the Crown. Indians and merchants chafed under Haldimand's chauvinistic view of loyalty because it did not recognise their stake in the war. Haldimand placed loyalty to the Crown even over family loyalty. Consequently, refugee women appeared as burdens not as legitimate participants in the war. The significance of these conflicts lies in their causes and Haldimand's ability to resolve them. They originated from the islanders' desires to secure their political, economic, diplomatic or social place within the empire. The strength of Haldimand's authority rested upon the respect the islanders' accorded the empire and thus upon their good will which Haldimand cultivated by judiciously acceding to their anxieties. Compromise between centre and periphery muted the discord

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[3] Richard White argued that in the western territory of the Great Lakes the lines of power stretching from imperial centres frayed over distance leaving "an imperialism that weaken[ed] at its periphery." He founded the thesis for his work, *The Middle Ground*, on this image of weak imperial controls. He argued that the absence of imperial control in the Great Lakes region balanced power between Whites and Indians and allowed them to seek cultural accommodation, a middle ground. Faye Whitfield likewise argued that the extension of authority on the frontier was subject to decay over distance. Thus, the lag in communication time and the tenuous supply system gave the fort commanders latitude or "autonomy" to create their own policies. Both authors argue that individuals on the periphery acted independently from imperial policy and charted their own course. This chapter challenges both claims by examining the extent to which individuals on the periphery rooted even their rebellious behaviour in the empire. Richard White *The Middle Ground* xi, Faye Whitfield, "The Geography of the British Northern Interior Frontier of Defense during the Haldimand War Administration of Quebec 1778-1784," 158

and knit imperial interests over great distances.

Jurisdictional, professional and ethnic wrangling plagued the fort's officer corps. The inadequacy of its labour force and the limited supply of resources pitted officers against one another. But those involved in the conflicts were competing for the same resources in order to earn the same reward—Haldimand's favour. Stability in the fort's governance required officers to align their personal aspirations with the goals of the military power. It also required Haldimand to reward their career aspirations. Often the process of healing or binding cleavages within the military affirmed and reiterated the system's validity.

The island's scarce resources acted as a lightning rod, concentrating officers' attention upon the pre-existing divisions within Haldimand's army. Severe supply shortages in 1778-79 prevented Haldimand from increasing the number of troops in the province.[4] Consequently, Fort Haldimand's officers were short of men to do guard, scouting and fatigue duty at the fort and in the dockyards. The labour deficiency placed the Engineering Department, the Naval Department and the fort's general operation in competition. It also inverted the command structure. The need to build the fort and the ships prioritised the work of the Engineering and Naval Departments and gave precedence to the officers in charge of those departments though they were junior to the fort's commander. Haldimand relied upon his officers' sense of duty to adapt to this perversion of order. He expected his officers to "be perfectly unanimous and most heartily assist each other in every Instance Where the Common Cause is Concerned." Ironically, he appealed to the officers' self-interest, declaring he would "promote only

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[4] *A History of the Organisation, Development and Services of the Military,* 15.

those who promot[ed] the King's Service," thus undermining his own edict to encourage co-operation. Inter-departmental feuds raged. Social disdain and resentment divided Provincial and Regular officers into opposing camps. Ethnic tension between English and Canadian officers exacerbated professional anxieties.

While departmental conflicts among the officers appeared to be the result of a dogmatic adherence to an administrative structure designed by central authorities, they actually demonstrated the system's stabilising effects on the periphery. Lieutenant James Glennie's petty disputes with the fort's doctor over a haystack are illustrative. Glennie's refusal to lend the doctor hay out of the Engineering Department's store was an act of preservation not of a mean spirit. The fort's commander, Captain Aubrey of the 47th Regiment of Foot, had mismanaged his supply of hay and Glennie had a responsibility to feed the Engineering Department's four horses; he could not send to market for more supplies. Aubrey was similarly cavalier with other engineering stores and with the personnel of the Naval Department. Over the fort's first winter, Aubrey systematically gained control over the resources of those departments in order to reduce their sphere of influence and bolster his own. The consequences to the fort's general order were serious. Aubrey's meddling slowed the construction of the fort and cost the Crown an additional £500 in expenses. He interfered with the operation of Lieutenant Yves Chiquet's Naval Department and nearly precipitated a serious marine disaster.[5] But the weight of the

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[5] Aubrey co-opted the labour of Glennie's cooks, sawyers and artificers. He had gained control of the Engineering Department's rum ration and consequently the men's labour. The soldiers working for Glennie grew recalcitrant because "they did not care whether the Engineer checked them of their Rum, as their Captain [Aubrey] would give it to them himself." Construction on the fort slowed. Aubrey also took control of the seamen, labourers and carpenters who should have been under Lieutenant Chiquet, the most senior officer of the Naval Department on the island. The result was disastrous. He ignored a written report from Chiquet that the ship *Seneca* would be too dilapidated to sail if the carpenter were not freed to work on her. Aubrey ordered the ship's loading instead of sending the carpenter. Only the timely arrival of

imperial administrative structure acted as ballast for the destabilised community.

The junior officers referred to imperial ideals, laws and administration to re-establish control on the island. The officers mounted a quiet revolt against their commander and attacked Aubrey's reputation.[6] They also took advantage of a routine garrison court-martial to chastise Aubrey's style of command. They charged that Aubrey's treatment of the provincial troops violated the articles of war, the collected British legislation governing the army's conduct. But the officers' most effective recourse was to appeal to their superiors in Canada. Captain Schank responded swiftly to news of a Naval Department in shambles. Though he was stationed at Sorel, Aubrey's abuse of power on Carleton Island was a threat to his career. He complained to Haldimand that it would "never be in [his, Schank's] Power to Execute [Haldimand's] Orders," if Aubrey interfered with the operation of his department.[7] Haldimand took advantage of an opportune moment to transfer Aubrey to Niagara where he would be under Colonel Bolton's supervision. The chaos created by Aubrey's meddlesome command exposed the interplay of interests between centre and periphery. The fort's

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the Lake's senior Naval Officer, Captain Andrews, prevented the ship from sailing. "The Court Martial of James Glennie," passim, 26, 38.

[6] Foreman John Clunes spread the word to Niagara that Aubrey had behaved so ridiculously that only two officers would associate with him. Lieutenant Bunbury started a campaign of whispers staining Aubrey's reputation by reporting that the Officer's Mess of the 47th Regiment in Boston, broke up on "Aubrey's account, and that the subalterns would not admit him to theirs." Lieutenant Glennie organised a petition against Aubrey and publicly insulted him as "a Rogue, a Villain and Guilty of Everything that was bad." John Clunes to Francis Goring. Printed in Durham. *Carleton Island in the Revolution*, 82. N.B. the date printed in Durham's work is 25 March 1777. It is clear however from James Glennie's court martial that event recorded in the letter took place in 1779. "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 97.

[7] Haldimand reproved Aubrey for not respecting the divisions between departments. But, ironically, it was James Glennie who was found guilty of insulting the imperial military system. In March 1779 Captain Aubrey arrested Glennie for 'having signed a false return and likewise for having behaved unbecoming the character of an Officer and a Gentleman." At his trial, a year later, he was found guilty of having failed to behave as a gentleman. In his zeal to expose Aubrey's abuses Glennie misrepresented to General Haldimand a letter Aubrey had sent to him. Thus, Glennie insulted the foundations upon which the imperial system operated; upon the honest, forthright behaviour of disinterested "gentlemen." QUA HP

junior officers desired to preserve the system's validity and their place in it. Haldimand did not tolerate the local abuse of power because it interfered with central control over the periphery.

Aubrey's command also revealed deep professional and ethnic cleavages in Haldimand's military, tensions that continued long after Aubrey left the island. Divisions of status, experience, and sacrifice marked by haughtiness and resentment divided the British regulars from the provincial troops. The source of the daily antagonism was systemic. Officers of the seasoned regular troops held the inexperienced provincial troops in disdain.[8] Typically, Aubrey treated the Provincial troops in a lordly fashion and the latter coalesced into his chief body of detractors.[9] The officers of the Sir John Johnson's corps, the Royal Regiment of New York, practised a more refined resistance. They refused to sit with officers of the regular establishment at a garrison court-martial until Haldimand cleared up the confusion surrounding their rank respective to the regular officers.[10] Provincial troops resented their subordinate status within the military. They risked life, limb, and livelihood to support the King but received little support in return.[11]

21788, 7, General Haldimand to Captain Aubrey, 21 April 1779. "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 108.

[8] One regular officer disparaged Sir John Johnson's troops as infirm and too old to be taught. He resented being in charge of them and wished only to do duty with his own regiment. Conversely, Captain Alexander Fraser of the 84th regiment of Foot complained that they were too young to be trusted upon duty. NAC, Headquarter Records, MG 13 War Office 28, Volume 8, 258. Captain Ancrum to Major Lernoult, 1 May 1782., QUA HP 21787, 156. Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 1 July 1780.

[9] It is not clear how openly the provincial troops displayed their displeasure. Captain Aubrey accused Lieutenant Glennie of organising all the troops to revolt against him and "to go in a body to Captain Anderson of the RRNY." Glennie denied the charge. Whatever the true state of affairs Aubrey's perception that the provincial troops were uniting against him is significant in itself. It underlined the hostility and mistrust that exacerbated the professional division between the regular and provincial troops. "The Court Martial of James Glennie," 5, 87.

[10] QUA, HP 21787, 108, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 1 December 1779.

[11] Britain offered several inducements to encourage Loyalists to enlist in the provincial corps. The financial and administrative responsibility for raising provincial corps fell upon wealthy Loyalists. The men retained command of the regiment and the right to choose their officers and were allowed to grant

The murmuring of dissent on Carleton Island echoed Sir John Johnson's attempts in 1779 in Montreal to get the regiment put on the British regular establishment.[12] It was not within the scope of Haldimand's power to fulfil Sir John's request however; he could only uphold the system. Haldimand stated unequivocally that Sir John Johnson's officers at Carleton Island were to do duty as provincials. But the regiment did get some satisfaction; in 1780 the King extended more benefits to his provincial troops.[13] In some instances only the very centre of the empire could resolve the islander's discontent.

Ethnic tension also compounded administrative problems in the transport services where British and Canadians, former antagonists, served together. Many of the officers and crewmen of the *Seneca* and the *Mohawk* were Canadians, and the head of the Lake Ontario Land Service, Captain Laforce, was also a Canadian.[14] Also, an average of 171

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each recruit a parcel of land. The men enlisted for two years or the duration of the war. Officers and men received the same pay as the regular troops and Britain supplied their stores. But they were not awarded important benefits to defray the risks of war. There were no hospital, nursing or orderly facilities available for their use; maimed and wounded officers were not eligible for the same gratuities regular officers were. Most significantly, both officers and troops took subordinate rank to their counterparts in the regular establishment. Military headquarters wished to avoid the risk of placing formally trained troops under the command of an untrained provincial officer. Finally provincial officers enjoyed "neither permanent rank in the army nor half pay upon reduction." Inconsistencies in British policy towards provincial troops "stimulated jealousy and discontent rather than confidence and respect for Britain." Paul H. Smith. *Loyalists and Redcoats; A Study in British Revolutionary Policy*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964. 62-65.

[12] Sir John Johnson lobbied Haldimand to have his troops made into a regular corps. Sir John Johnson was insulted that after he sacrificed everything for the honour of "King and Country" and raised his regiment "without any Expense to Government" that it should still be considered a provincial corps. Cruickshank, *Royal Regiment of New York*, 32

[13] By 6 September 1780, the Crown made some concessions to the provincial troops in the province. The provincial troops' status did not change but "in order to reward" their "faithful" and "Spirited" service the King offered them more benefits. As in the regular regiments, provincial officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of the provincial corps wounded or maimed during the war now received a gratuity of one year's advanced pay. Provincial officers likewise received benefits similar to regular officers. The Crown made provincial ranks permanent in America and offered the men a pension of their half-pay after the war was over. As a final concession to the provincials, all officers zealous enough to complete a whole regiment with 10 companies of 56 Rank and file were given bounty money for each man they got into the service. QUA, HP 21743, 71, "General Orders issued by General Haldimand," 6 September 1780.

[14] Captain René-Hippolyte Laforce was a Canadian merchant seaman and he brought his crew of Canadian seamen with him to Lake Ontario in 1776 where they manned the *Seneca*. In 1779 Laforce was appointed head of the land service at Carleton Island and Captain Jean-Baptiste Bouchette, also a Canadian merchant

Canadian bateaux men arrived on the island every week of the transport season as they fulfilled their *corvée* duty for the militia.[15] Much as language differences, social disdain, and suspicions about Canadian loyalty pitted the English and French speakers against each other, jurisdictional confusion lay at the core of their antagonisms.[16] Captain Fraser reported that disputes between the head of the Land Service, Captain Laforce, and the head of the Water Service, Captain Andrews, were "heightened by the parties being of different Countries."[17] It is possible the Andrews resented competing for favour with an erstwhile enemy; during the last war, Andrews had served as a midshipman for the British Navy while Laforce had commanded a French ship on Lake Ontario and even engaged in a skirmish against the British.[18] But Captain Andrews' representation of the situation revealed a deeper source of malaise. Haldimand was then introducing new regulations in the Naval Department and the changes almost "entirely unhinged"

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seaman, took over the *Seneca's* command. The Canadians served at the upper posts by Haldimand's design. Both Haldimand and his predecessor Guy Carleton attempted to recreate the *troupes de la marine* of the French regime that accorded social status to its officers. The appointed officers owed their elevated social status to the state's preference and so served its interests. In this way Haldimand hoped to keep potential Canadian leaders employed in a military service rather than plotting with the rebels. QUA HP 21804, 95, General Haldimand to Captain Schank, Carol McLoed "Tap of the Garrison Drum," 131., Fernand Ouellet, *Economy Class and Nation in Quebec: Interpretive Essays*, 98-9, 106. Desloges, "René-Hippolyte Laforce," *DCB*, 5: 470. Douglas, "Jean-Baptiste Bouchette," *DCB*, 5: 100.

[15] See Appendix III.

[16] Language difference played a concrete role in the Lieutenant Chiquet's conflict with Captain Aubrey. Chiquet admitted that he might have misunderstood some of Aubrey's orders because he had little understanding of English. But Aubrey and Dr. Gill, a friend of Aubrey's, took advantage of Chiquet's limited grasp of English to usurp the lieutenant's powers. Dr. Gill offered to help Chiquet write Aubrey a letter of apology. Witnesses agreed that the resulting letter, of which Chiquet had only a limited grasp, was so rude that "it was calculated to ruin Lieutenant Chiquet effectually." Fort Niagara's Colonel Bolton is reported to have said "if he had received such a letter from an inferior Officer, he would have sent him down a Prisoner to Canada." Fears about Canadian loyalty may have been an underlying cause in other conflicts. But only Colonel Bolton articulated this particular fear. In 1778 he did not want the Canadian crew of the *Seneca* to winter at Carleton Island away from his supervision at Niagara because he was afraid that they would desert. QUA, HP 21801, 73, Lieutenant Chiquet to Captain Bouchette, 25 February 1779. McLoed, "The Tap of the Garrison Drum," 115-6.

[17] NAC, *Haldimand* MSS, B 127, p.202-3, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 10 November 1780, printed in Preston *Kingston before the War of 1812*, 16.

[18] QUA, HP 21801, 30, Captain Andrews to General Haldimand, 3 October 1778. Douglas, "René-Hippolyte Laforce," *DCB*, 5: 470.

Andrews. It appeared to him "that [Haldimand and Schank were] trying every possible Means to get quit of [him], and to give [the] Lake to Captain Laforce and the Canadians."[19] Andrews exposed the root cause of the conflicts: personal insecurity. The scope of his command was unclear and he did not know where he stood in the department. But he did see the preferential treatment Haldimand accorded the Canadians in the service.[20] Haldimand solved the problems by regularising Captain Andrews' position and making clear that his appointment superseded that of Captain Bouchette, another Canadian in the naval service.[21] But further reform to the Naval Department was rendered moot after Captain Andrews drowned when the *Ontario* foundered in 1780.

Haldimand had leeway in solving ethnically based disputes when both parties desired the same thing but it was out of his power to exercise such control over the Canadian bateaux men. The *corvée* duty interfered with the Canadians' livelihood on the farm. and Haldimand was wary of making any untoward demands of the bateaux men because he did not want to generate "excited murmuring" of sedition.[22] Thus, when officers, desperate for extra manpower on the island detained the bateaux men, Haldimand responded swiftly, instructing his officers not in interfere with them.[23]

The experiences of the German mercenary troops offer a useful contrast. British officers had little leverage to incite the German troops to work because mercenaries owed

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[19] Captain James Andrew to Collin Andrews, 16 July 1779, printed in Smith *Legend of the Lake*, 43.
[20] For example, Haldimand allowed Canadian seamen to leave Carleton Island and winter with their families in the lower province. QUA, HP 21804, 95, General Haldimand to Captain Laforce, 10 October 1779.
[21] McLoed, "The Tap of the Garrison Drum," 133.
[22] The Canadians disliked the *corvée* duty. Between 1779 and 1787, over forty percent of the fines levied at Montreal were for neglect of it. Neatby, *The Administration of Justice under the Quebec Act*, 304., QUA HP 21851, 167, unsigned to Nathaniel Day, 12 June 1780. NAC Haldimand Papers Series B, vol. 50, p. 30-46, General Haldimand to Lord George Germain, 15 October 1778, printed in *A History of the Organisation, Development and Services of the Military*, 72.

allegiance to their German prince. The inelastic terms of a treaty defined their relationship with the British. Fort Haldimand's commanders and even the German troops' own officer could not control their behaviour. They refused to help build the fort, or to take on extra guard duty. They sold their spruce beer for rum and fell ill with scurvy. Fraser recognised that their recalcitrance stemmed from their different perspective. Captain Fraser explained the problem to Haldimand "for though [the German troops] do the duties with arms with an exactness worthy of imitation of our best troops" they were not fit for service in North America. Thus, he did not interpret their resistance as an insult to his authority; but he was glad when they left the island.[24]

The competing officers on Carleton Island frustrated Haldimand but they did not unduly alarm him. He was inclined to view their conflicts as the clash of personalities rather than as a fundamental challenge to his authority.[25] Nonetheless, he acted swiftly to re-establish order by removing dissidents and patronising the faithful. He provided the incentive for soldiers to sublimate their internal rifts for the common cause. But the military's ethos of complete devotion opened another plane of conflict in Carleton Island's garrisons, between the military authorities and those who did not share their interpretation of loyal service. The military vision did not easily embrace the different aims of people of "all nations, of all colours and of all professions," nor did it

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[23] QUA, HP 21788, 42, General Haldimand to Major Nairne, 1 July 1779.

[24] Fraser's problems with the German troops reflected province-wide frustrations. Colonel Bolton at Niagara sent the Chasseurs down to Carleton Island because he could not persuade them to help repair Fort Niagara. Haldimand was equally fed up with the mercenaries. He considered them unsuited, either by temperament or experience to serve in North America. QUA, HP 21787, 126. Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 21 March 1780. QUA HP 21787, 119, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 20 April 1780. NAC, Colonial Office Records, Series Q, vol., 16-1, pp.111-117, General Haldimand to Sir Clinton. 26 May 1779, quoted in *A History of the Organisation, Development and Services of the Military...*, 109, J.P. Wilhelmy, *German Mercenaries in Canada*. 178.

[25] In his opinion dissension between officers "usually originate from trifles and then increase for want of a

acknowledge women's contributions. The political, commercial, and survival interests of the Indians, merchants, and Loyalists collided with Haldimand's common cause.

The chauvinism of the military ethos, the surrender of personal autonomy to the service of the Crown, compounded the cultural divisions between the British and the island's Indian allies. The two cultures shared a similar goal in the war, to subdue the rebels, but they did not interpret their alliance in a similar fashion. Cultural misapprehension and unmet expectations created dissension in the field.
The dissatisfaction took on racist overtones. The conflicts between the two groups cannot be attributed to intolerance alone—they were also an inarticulate expression of personal frustration; the misunderstandings between the parties could damage an individual's status with their respective culture. Haldimand found the best means to maintain control was to give his support to Molly Brant, wife of the former head of the British Indian Department and Mohawk matron. She was able to negotiate the terms of Indian loyalty because she had access to the centres of power both in the British Empire and in the Six Nation's federation.

Fort Haldimand's officers complained bitterly about the "behaviour" of Carleton Island's Mississauga Indians and Six Nations Indians. They took a dim view of the Mississauga, complaining that they created "uproars," "misbehaved" and exacted too many "requirements" before they would go out on scout. The Six Nations Indians had a better reputation with the British; Haldimand ordered a contingent of them placed on the island to "overawe" the Mississauga. But the British were also disappointed in the Six Nation's conduct. Mohawk, Onondaga and Cayuga Indians frequently ignored the white

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friendly explanation." QUA HP 21804, 65, General Haldimand to Captain Schank, 23 May 1779.

officers that accompanied them on scout. Furthermore, they persuaded the already independent-minded Mississauga to follow suit.[26] The officers considered such behaviour treasonous.[27] White officers grew distrustful of the Indians. Two officers at Carleton Island reported that the Six Nations and rebel sympathising Indians exchanged the whites in their scouting parties in order to have prisoners to take back to their camps, "the same as they did in the last war."[28] British officers, thwarted in their mission to control the Indians, expressed an inarticulate rage. Captain Alexander Fraser, a ranking official of the British Indian Department, declared that he "abominated them as the most treacherous worthless and Ungrateful race of men on the face of the earth." [29]

The Indians' behaviour was often inexplicable to the White officers beyond misbehaviour, wilfulness or wantonness. But then, the officers were not seeking to understand Indian behaviour but merely to mitigate its deleterious effects on their careers. Furthermore, an officer's ability to direct the Indians in war affected Britain's ability to secure his goals in battle and consequently adversely affected his career. Captain Alexander Fraser author of the stinging condemnation of his Indian charges knew this at first hand. In 1777 Fraser had acted as deputy to Colonel Campbell, then superintendent of the British Indian Department, on General Burgoyne's expedition to Saratoga. Burgoyne had blamed Campbell and Fraser for the battle's failure. In the British House

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[26] Michael Ripmeester, "Vision quests into Sight Lines: Negotiating the place of Mississaugas in south eastern Ontario, 1700-1876." PH D Dissertation, Queen's University, 1995, 106.
[27] QUA, HP 21787, 95, Alexander Fraser to General Haldimand, 29 October 1780.
[28] QUA, HP 21787, 64, Captain McDougall to General Haldimand, 12 June 1779. HP 21787, 141, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 2 June 1780.
[29] Major Nairne called the Indians "Intolerable greedy" and "inoportunate." Even when officers encountered co-operative Indians, they appeared to regard their ethnicity an unfortunate condition. Major Ross reported that Mohawk David Vanderhayden provided invaluable service for the fort but condescended that "he is a mere Indian and acts pretty much the same all the time." QUA HP 21787, 74, Major Nairne to General Haldimand, 7 July 1779. HP 21787, 97, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 29 October 1779.

of Commons, he had condemned the pair for their incompetence and "probity of character." Whether the accusations were valid or not, Fraser's reputation, and his career aspirations suffered great damage.[30] Now with his career in tatters, Fraser bore the Indians at Carleton Island considerable ill will because he knew he could not control their actions.

The Indians entered the war in order to fulfil their own aims and resented overt British efforts to control them. Fraser and his counterparts found it difficult to lead them, because the Indians did not want to be led. They considered it "degrading of Indians to receive orders from white men as if they had not people of sense among themselves."[31] Warriors of the Six Nations garnered respect and prominence among their people for acting independently and responsibly and European-led scouts disturbed the internal function of Indian society. Warriors wanted to demonstrate their "independence [of] the Whites [in order to] make themselves respected." Indians refused to let Whites send them on scout without first consulting their warriors.[32]

Indian desire to retain close control over their participation was not unreasonable considering how frequently the British broke their promises. An Indian council met at Carleton Island in the fall of 1779 to chastise the British for not producing the promised military support. General Haldimand had responded too late to General Sullivan's devastation of the Six Nations homeland. Mohawk, Onondaga, Cayuga and Delaware

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HP 21787, 237, Major Ross to Captain Mathews, 3 August 1781.

[30] Historian Stephen Strach contends that Fraser did speak Indian languages but within eighteenth century circles of the British Indian Department, Fraser's reputation was besmirched. Stephen Strach "A Memoir of the Exploits of Captain Alexander Fraser and his company of British Marksmen 1776-1777: Part III. *The Journal for the Society of Army Historical Research*, (63) 1985: 165-166, note. Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 154.

[31] QUA, HP 21787, 96, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 29 October 1779.

[32] QUA, HP 21787, 97, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 29 October 1779. Wallace, *The Death and*

chiefs spoke against the British. The chiefs accused them of "having suffered the Rebels to have destroyed the Five Nations [...] without affording the Indians the assistance promised to them." The Indian officials recording the speeches condemned them for their "harsh and insolent terms."[33] The Anglo-Indian alliance hung by a thread during the winter of 1779-80.

But General Haldimand maintained a balance between the Indians and the British on the island by placing his trust in Molly Brant. Brant was a well-connected Mohawk; she was the consort of the late superintendent of the British Indian Department Sir William Johnson, and sister to the respected warrior Joseph Brant. Moreover, she was the head of the Society of Six Nations Matrons, and this gave her "a great deal to say among the young men, particularly in time of war."[34] In Iroquois society women controlled food production and this accorded them considerable political and religious authority. They could veto warriors' plans to go to war by withholding provisions.[35] Thus General Haldimand was inclined to treat Molly Brant with respect and he extended his protection to her and her family and also provided them with material support.[36]

Brant solidified her personal status and influence in both societies by accumulating and distributing goods. Haldimand thought she was "unreasonable in her demands for her own family and favourites," but he also knew it was economically expedient to give her the supplies because "she checked the demands of others for

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Rebirth of the Seneca, 30. Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 21.

[33] QUA HP 21787, 90-1, Captain Alexander Fraser to General Haldimand, 29 September 1779.

[34] Quoted in Gundy, "Molly Brant-Loyalist," 102.

[35] Judith K. Brown, "Iroquois Women: an Ethnohistoric Note", in *Towards an Anthropology of Women* ed. Rayna, R. Reiter. New York: Monthly Press Review, 1974, 249.

[36] Haldimand took an active interest in Molly Brant and in her children's progress at school and expressed his desire to "shew her every friendly attention in His Power." QUA, HP 21774, 208, Daniel Claus to Captain Mathews, 26 July 1781. HP 21774, 210, Captain Mathews to Daniel Claus, 30 July 1781, 210.

presents and provisions."[37] Haldimand reaped an important yield from his investment in Brant's interests and family.

Over the winter of 1779-80 she met with the chiefs on the island and orchestrated their forgiveness of the slow British response to Sullivan's raid.[38] Fraser reported that the change of heart was to be "in a great measure to be ascribed to Miss Molly Brant's Influence over [the Indians], which is far superior to that of all their chiefs put together."[39] Brant used her twin status in white and Indian society to stabilise relations on the island and uphold both British authority and her nation's cultural values and aims.[40]

Personal insecurity lay at the root of racial conflicts between the British and the Indians. Independent British actions threatened the legitimacy of imperial control in North America. White manipulation of Indians threatened the Indian's self-respect and independence. Despite their respect for Molly Brant, the British rarely attributed self-will to their Indian counterparts. They blamed other whites for the Indians' "misbehaviour." In Haldimand's analysis it was by "the avidity of the Traders that the service suffers and that our Indians are Rendered debauched." He accused the traders of "tampering with them" and encouraging them "to torment their chiefs and Interpreters everlastingly to

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[37] QUA, HP 21788, 74, General Haldimand to Captain Fraser, 16 April 1780. HP 21787, 118, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 21 March 1780.

[38] Thomas explicitly attributed this change of heart to Molly Brant's efforts. Thomas, *The Three Faces of Molly Brant*. 114.

[39] Brant was amply rewarded for her services. Haldimand successfully petitioned Whitehall to give her a small pension. He also had a comfortable house built for her at Carleton Island, while Captain Fraser expressed his gratitude by having a garden dug for her. NAC, Colonial Office Records, Series Q, vol.17-2, p. 70-5, General Haldimand to Lord George Germain, 17 March 1780, printed in *A History of the Organisation, Development and Services of the Military,* 148. QUA, HP 21787, 149-52, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 21 June 1780. QUA HP 21787, 118. Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 21 March 1780.

[40] Gretchen Green, "Molly Brant, Catharine Brant, and their Daughters: A Study in Colonial Acculturation." *Ontario History* 81, 1989, 240.

give them rum."[41] Typically, the assessment did not give the Indians enough agency. Conversely, Haldimand ascribed too much contrary and malicious intent to the traders' actions.

The antagonisms flourished between Fort Haldimand's officers and traders because military and commercial ideology clashed and their economic interests converged. Military and mercantile ability to compromise and sustain the fur trade exposed the evidence of their mutual interest. Haldimand could not control the merchants to his satisfaction without choking the trade completely. The merchants thus retained some freedom of action, some to abuse Haldimand's system, some to support it. Quebec's military security was important to most traders because they made their living by selling furs to Great Britain. The underlying recognition that the war bound their interests provided the necessary framework for the traders' reaffirmation of their loyalty and a reiteration of Haldimand's authority.

At Carleton Island, Fort Haldimand's commanders echoed complaints made across the province about the trade in the West: that the merchants' activities were compromising military security. Traders, most of Canadian origin, subverted military control over the Indians. They employed the warriors to collect ginseng or to hunt venison in exchange for European goods—frequently, rum. The merchants thus "ruined [the Indians] for war" by reducing their dependence upon the military's subsidies. The fort was sometimes left without Indians to do guard duty, to hunt for venison or to go on scouts.[42] The traders also ate away at the islanders' comfort by raising the cost of

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[41] QUA, HP 21791, 75, General Haldimand to Brigadier McLean, 3 May 1780.
[42] QUA, HP 21787, 15, Captain Aubrey to General Haldimand, 17 November 1778., HP 21787, 119, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 21 March 1780., HP 21787, 256, Major Ross to General Haldimand.

living.[43] Still other merchants rebelled against or ignored the trade restriction. One result of this "fraudulent conveying of Goods" was a large illicit trade in rum that officers were powerless to prevent.[44] The commanders reacted by exercising even tighter control over commercial activity.

The alienated merchants cast themselves as the war's martyrs, believing they were bearing its economic burden. In 1780 an inquiry into the Indian trade reported that the western trade was carried on at "Great expense and labour and risk to both men and property."[45] A memorandum to General Haldimand complained that some officers at Carleton Island were giving traders preferential treatment by "transporting their goods out of turn," to "the great detriment" of several traders.[46] Twenty-five of Montreal's leading merchants petitioned Haldimand because £60,000 of goods were mouldering on the island. They complained that the long delays in having their goods transhipped threatened their credit with London merchants; the poor state of the island's storehouses was damaging their goods and exposing the merchants to more hardships. The merchants held the military responsible for paralysing their businesses.[47]

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26 September, 1781.

[43] Captain Fraser complained that "articles cost double the price [there] than they [did] at the Upper Posts." QUA HP 21787, 126, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 2 May 1780.

[44] QUA HP 21788, 88, General Haldimand to Captain Fraser, 18 June 1780.

[45] The debate between the military and merchant interests is showcased in a series of reports and memoranda contained in volume 21759 of the Haldimand Papers. In 1780 General Haldimand requested a Mr Charles Grant to inquire into the Indian trade of the upper country. Grant replied in April 1780 with a letter containing ten articles outlining the benefits of commercial activities to Quebec's security and the hardships the merchants endured during the war. The report elicited an anonymous but scathing rebuttal. Its anti-mercantile tone suggests that it came from a military source. QUA, HP 21759, 81. Mr. Charles Grant to General Haldimand, 24 April 1780. HP 21769, 84-68, "Notes on Memorandums Concerning the Indian Trade," No Date, No Name.

[46] QUA HP 21759, 138-139. No name, no date.

[47] QUA HP 21877, 240. "The Memorial of the Merchants of Montreal trading to the Post of Niagara and Detroit." 21 September 1782. Among the signatories were one of the Ellice brothers, Todd and McGill, William Kay, Benjamin and Jos. Frobisher and Thomas Frobisher, and James Finlay, all identified by historian Fernand Ouellet as the "élite" of Montreal's traders. Fernand Ouellet *Economic and Social*

The merchants' and traders' accusations and counter accusations all reflected the filter of their perception of the war. An ideological clash between the military and merchants over the wartime role of commerce divided them into opposing camps. Haldimand believed that war was "not time to push commerce."[48] His view was the result of the deeply held prejudice of men of his profession and class. Commercial activity and those who engaged in it insulted the very precepts upon which military service was based: service to the Crown, not to one's self.[49] The complaints from Fort Haldimand's officers reinforced his views about the traders' cupidity. He condemned Carleton Island's traders for being "blind to everything but their own interest" and disparaged their motives as an "insatiable desire for gain."[50] Yet he knew that the viability of the fur trade translated into territorial sovereignty for Quebec: Fort Haldimand's very strategic importance lay in protecting the fur trade from encroaching Americans.[51] Haldimand appealed to the traders' sense of loyalty in order to be able to control the trade without smothering it. He followed the custom established between Guy Carleton and the traders to issues passes only to those "who [were] worthy."[52] He allowed trader Mr. Patterson to trade to Carleton Island because "his personal attachment and services to the government, in common with those of his family merited that attention."[53] It is unfortunate that Mr. Patterson took advantage of Haldimand's good

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History of Quebec, 106.
[48] Burt, *The Old Province of Quebec*, 2: 25. Neatby, *Quebec: The Revolutionary Age*, 179.
[49] Wilson, *The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton*, 12
[50] QUA, HP 21788, 88, General Haldimand to Captain Fraser, 18 June 1780.
[51] QUA, HP 21784, 32, General Haldimand to Captain Harris. 12 March 1783.
[52] QUA, HP 21759, 3, "Memorandum for His Excellency Sir Guy Carleton....Re: Trade to the Upper Country," 20 January 1778.
[53] QUA, HP 21791, 76, General Haldimand to Captain Fraser, 3 May 1780.

will because his actions reinforced the General's dim view of trade.[54]

The merchants' definition of loyalty was diametrically opposed to Haldimand's view. In their estimation, their individual and combined activities contributed to imperial sovereignty. The strength of the fur trade was external evidence of Britain's imperial power. Hence, they played a vital role in retaining control over the West. They contended that at any sign of deficiency in trade, the Indians would desert the British "under pretence that the Rebels had got the better of us." The merchants painted the consequences to Quebec's security in lurid terms: British subjects "might probably fall [victim] to the furry and Rage of the disappointed Barbarians."[55] Shrewdly the merchants did not limit the scope of their contributions to the security of Quebec West, but pointed out their role in the province's and the empire's economy. Interference with their business, they argued, could occasion "great debasement to the trade of the Province in general" but equally important, could be "very hurtful to the Merchants of London." In sum, their activities were an "object deserving of all the encouragement and protection which Government [could] with propriety give to that trade."[56] Herein lay the basis for a mutual recognition of military and merchants needs; the merchants required security and protection and the posts required goods.

The scarcity of goods at the upper posts limited Haldimand's ability to control the trader's activities as closely as he wished. Haldimand's response to complaints about traders' abuses on Carleton Island demonstrated the strengths and limits of his authority.

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[54] In 1780 Mr. Patterson took advantage of the departmental divisions on the island to have different officers sign for more goods than he should have been allowed to bring to the island. QUA HP 21787, 126, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 2 May 1780.
[55]QHU HP 21759, 81, Mr. Charles Grant to General Haldimand, 24 April 1780. HP 21877, 241 "The Memorial of the Merchants of Montreal Trading to the Posts of Niagara and Detroit," 21 September 1782.

He instituted more controls. Each trader had to declare "of what Public Stores or Articles [he] may have for Officers upon the island [....] Specifying the Officer's Names and the Packages." Fort Haldimand's commanding officers had the authority to confiscate any goods brought to the island under false pretences. Ultimately, the plan's effectiveness rested upon each trader's honesty. Some did not even bother to present their passes on the island, but traded with the Mississaugas in the woods.[57] Nor did Haldimand have the resources to verify and examine every merchant's shipment as one captain on Carleton Island suggested. More importantly, he could not afford to irritate the merchants who would attribute any losses or delays in transportation their goods suffered "to over interference." Haldimand relied upon the traders to make up a short fall in supplies when the King's Store ran out and issued passes accordingly, even when it was against his better military judgement. [58]

The general's ability to control the traders rested upon the recognition of their mutual interests. Some merchants pointed out that the laws could be easily transgressed and appealed to him not to increase controls for the "sake of a few bad men" and so punish all "the other friends of government." Some "friends" took a practical view of their mutual needs.[59] The security of the fort and the shipping operations concerned both the military and the merchants. Early in 1780 the island's merchants "offered to take a considerable share of the duty by patrolling all night round the garrison and shipping

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[56] QHU HP 21759, 81. Mr. Charles Grant to General Haldimand, 24 April 1780.
[57] QUA HP 21787, 15, Captain Aubrey to General Haldimand, 17 November 1778. HP 21787, 119, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 21 March 1780.
[58] Haldimand had a healthy respect for the palliative effects of rum on his troops. Despite his sense of moral outrage against the "pernicious article" he allowed the traders to import several barrels of rum to quiet the growing demand on the island. But he strictly limited the quantities they "brought up." QUA, HP 21788, 88, General Haldimand to Captain Fraser, 18 June 1780.
[59] QUA HP 21759, 83, Mr Charles Grant to General Haldimand, 24 April 1780.

[operations] until the ice breaks up."[60] Others had an ideological interest in Britain's success in the war. Hamilton, for example, was sometimes resentful of military controls but on the whole "he did not have any objections to anything (in the military state)." Likewise, Cartwright, Hamilton's partner, supported the British for ideological not commercial reasons.[61] Loyalty could overcome economic interest. Robert Hamilton willed God to grant Major Butler success on his military campaign even though Butler "add[ed] greatly [to the] Trade" of rival merchants at Niagara.[62] In 1780 he and his partner demonstrated their respect for the military. They lent, not sold, rum to the garrison at Niagara when no other merchants would.[63] The pair made an abstract investment in their reputation with the military.[64] It was possible to twin commercial interest with belief in the Crown.

The intersection between military and mercantile interest laid the stage for peaceable relations and for the amicable resolution of conflicts. Haldimand could only influence those traders who desired something from the military: either access to garrison markets, transportation or protection. The traders consequently valued the good will of the military regime. But they were not above using their control over the province's resources to make demands of Haldimand and promote their businesses. Carleton Island's other civilians did not have that sway over Haldimand. Women and children did

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[60] QUA HP 21787, 119, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 21 March 1780.
[61] Rawlyk and Potter, "Richard Cartwright" *DCB*, 5: 168.
[62] Goring Papers, 26 Robert Hamilton to Francis Goring, 25 July 1779. Goring Papers, 57, Robert Hamilton to Francis Goring, 3 September 1779. Wilson, *The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton*, 14.
[63] Fort Niagara's commander described Cartwright's and Hamilton's gesture as "very kind" because they could not replenish the store and could have sold the spirits profitably. All they asked for in exchange was that a shipment of "the same bulk weight" as the rum travel on the next King's vessel so that they would "not loose their market for both." QUA, HP 21763, 104, Brigadier McLean to General Haldimand, 11 May 1783.
[64] The pair did later gain the right to set up a store at Oswego. Wilson, *The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton*,

not offer Haldimand support that he valued.

Fort Haldimand was not only an administrative post; it was a temporary home to the wives, children and slaves of the provincial troops. The families' presence reflected the full import and impact of the Loyalists' sacrifices for the King. The violence of war impoverished and traumatised families. A few refugee women eked out a life for themselves on Carleton Island. But in the process of providing for their families' material welfare they clashed with Haldimand's military establishment. His impatience with refugees was twofold. He viewed the women as more a hindrance than a help to the running of the fort. He also regarded their presence as a competing source of loyalty to his men. The weight of Haldimand's authority prevailed and women's needs and contributions went unrecognised. But Carleton Island's women and children offered a source of stability to the military garrison, a sense of community, a reminder of the cost of war.

In Haldimand's estimate, the women and their families consumed more in provisions than they contributed to the military running of the fort. He likened government support of them to nursery or hospital care for unproductive members of society. In his view the women and children could "be as well taken care of and at much less expense to government in the lower parts of the province."[65] In his world of scarce supplies and defensive challenges Haldimand viewed supplying women and children in the upper posts as an intolerable burden.[66]

But Carleton Island's women were not a dead weight upon Haldimand's supply

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[65] QUA HP 21788, 116 Captain Mathews to Captain Herkimer, 12 October 1780.
[66] MacKinnon, *While the Women Only Wept*, 105.

system. A veil falls over the daily activities of Carleton Island's women but their experiences probably mirrored those of British army wives in other parts of North America. Women attached to the army during the revolutionary period, wives and camp followers, performed traditional services for the men as cooks, laundresses, and cleaners, and were rewarded with government rations.[67] Thus at Carleton Island, women may have mended and washed clothes and cooked meals in return for their rations. Certainly the rough life of raiding and labouring was hard on precious clothes.[68] Women also grew their own food to augment and supplement their families' diet. Molly Brant kept a garden to support her large household. Indian women, living in the Indian villages, served as an advance warning for the fort when their men-folk went on scout. [69] In some instances, women's contributions to the garrison could be calculated in monetary terms. One woman living on the island with her family earned a wage as a nurse.[70] Lieutenant Twiss hired two women to cook for the artificers. Their work "saved six shillings sterling a day for government" and freed two more men for the working parties.[71] But Haldimand was blind to women's economic contributions. He was more concerned about maintaining military regularity on the island to which the women posed a threat.

The presence of families on the island set up a competing system of loyalty for his officers and men. Hugh McKay ran afoul of the military regime when he appeared to put the interests of his family ahead of those of the King's. The Commissariat's operation on

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[67] Frey, *The British Soldier in America*, 36, 61, 64.
[68] As Sir John Johnson explained to Haldimand, "from the nature of the Service the troops destroy their Cloaths surprisingly." Civilian men also needed to maintain their clothes. Richard Cartwright wore his pants until they were so ragged he had to order a new pair from Niagara. Cruikshank, *"The King's Royal Regiment of New York,"* 45. Goring Papers, 49. Richard Cartwright to Francis Goring, 15 August 1779.
[69] Bond, "The British Base at Carleton Island," 11.
[70] Between 1778 and 1779 Dr. Gill paid her a wage of about £3 per day. QUA, HP 21787, 198, "Disbursements for the hospital from 1st July 1780 to date," 1 December 1780.

Carleton Island depended upon its men's honesty and their willingness to sacrifice comfort and convenience to the service. Both McKay and another assistant Commissary Hugh McLean built the department's storehouses with their own funds and waited indefinitely for repayment.[72] For McKay the sacrifice was too much. He had seven daughters and was hard pressed to support them. Mary McKay, Hugh's wife, and their eldest daughter opened a small store at Carleton Island to help relieve the family's distress.[73] Haldimand was aghast to hear that one of his commissaries was engaged in the Indian Trade. He did not distinguish between Mary's store and her husband's job. McKay was relieved of his command at Carleton Island. As a sign of compassion, Haldimand did not revoke his position in the Commissariat; there would still be a pension at the end of the war.[74] But he did send him down to the lower province where he could be more closely supervised. The great sin McKay had committed was in proving to be not "a disinterested Man." It was well known that men of "Contrary Character" had the power to influence the Indians negatively.[75] He proved to be no more trustworthy than a merchant; his family of women was an agent of disorder on the periphery.

But women did help the islanders' retain a sense of belonging to the empire. The women provided companionship and offered a tenuous connection to the normality of life that war destroyed. The sense of community they brought counterbalanced the island's physical isolation from cosmopolitan centres. Gilbert Tice, an agent with the Indian

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[71] QUA HP 21787, 52, Lieutenant Glennie to General Haldimand, 20 May 1779.
[72] Neil McLean the other assistant Commissary at Carleton Island was in a similar position. He had not been paid for three years and was paying interest on borrowed money. He considered himself the "Drudge of the Department." QUA HP 21851, 169, Neil McLean to Captain Mathews, 22 June 1780.
[73] Her store was very modest. In 1780 she had 192 Gallons of Jamaican spirits [rum], two pieces of "shrouding" and one hundred assorted blankets. QUA HP 21787, 125 "Return of Merchandize in Custity of Mary McKay," 21 April 1780.
[74] QUA HP 21851, 153, General Haldimand to Nathaniel Day, 10 April 1780.

Department, reported that after "Miss Molley" and her daughters came to stay, they passed the "time very agreabel Considering all things." "Wee have a boll once a week and Several other things to pass the time," he boasted.[76] These social activities appear to have been a bright light in the otherwise gloomy winter Robert Hamilton spent on the island. He conceded that the atmosphere of conviviality and "a good deal of other Amusements have made the winter pass pretty pleasantly." Romances blossomed. Elizabeth Johnson met her future husband, Dr. Robert Kerr.[77] Mary Herkimer met two future husbands, first John Clark, the Naval Storekeeper, then after his death, Robert Hamilton.[78] As with his interactions with other individuals on Carleton Island, Haldimand considered the immediate exigencies of war and the security of his supply system; women were not elements of social stability but burdens.

The Carleton Islanders' loyalty to General Haldimand and the British Empire was the sum of individual self-interest. The presence of groups and individuals with differing interests competing for a limited supply of resources and imperial attention naturally fell into conflict. But the quarrels that erupted between individuals can be recast as conflicts with Haldimand's central authority. Haldimand exercised his authority over distance by retaining a strong hold over his islanders' personal fortunes. He smoothed ripples in the fort's military administration by offering rewards and increased personal status. He provided Molly Brant with goods to allow her to maintain her status with the Six Nations to their mutual benefit. The even-handed distribution of trading passes bridged the

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[75] QUA HP 21787, 126, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 2 May 1780.
[76] Thomas, *The Three Faces of Molly Brant*, 113.
[77] Gundy. "Molly Brant- Loyalist,"106. Robert Kerr was a surgeon with Sir John Johnson's 2nd Battalion. Charles G. Roland. "Robert Kerr." *DCB* vol.6, Francess Halpenny, General Editor, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987, 374.

ideological gap between military man and merchant by continuing to allow trade. Haldimand's prohibition against women's presence on the island provides a contrasting view of his ethos of stability. Women consumed valued supplies and reduced Haldimand's leverage over the men by representing a competing loyalty. The islanders' interactions with Haldimand demonstrated that personal relationships composed the strongest bond between centre and periphery.

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[78] Wilson. *The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton*, 205, note.

Conclusions

Carleton Island, Fort Haldimand and its multifaceted garrison composed the fulcrum of Quebec's territorial sovereignty during the American Revolutionary War. For five years between 1778 and 1783, the island's fort, dockyard, storehouses, ships bateaux and inhabitants preserved the communication, trading, diplomatic and supply lines that linked Quebec's East and West, and Quebec with the British Empire. The very links that the islanders nurtured also sustained their loyalty to the Crown. Imperial authorities absorbed them into their sphere of influence by defining their place within the system as regular soldier, provincial troop, mercenary soldier, sailor, artificer, merchant, Indian, woman and slave. In exchange for sustenance and future promises, the men and women accepted their roles until the war's end. The people and the fort they garrisoned both earned and kept their place within the British Empire.

But after 1782, the British Empire changed and the lives of Fort Haldimand's garrison altered with it.[1] In October 1781 the rebels drove General Charles Cornwallis from Yorktown, Virginia and with this defeat, the American colonies were lost to Britain.[2] But the war dragged on for another two years while the British Navy successfully defended the West Indies and so the daily routine at Carleton Island continued.[3] But in May 1783 Haldimand received news that a proclamation of General Peace had been signed in November of the preceding year. He instructed the members of Fort Haldimand garrison to cease their activities; construction on the fort and the

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[1] Mackesy, *The War for America*, 505.
[2] Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 251.
[3] 12 March 1783. Haldimand to Harris. HP 21784, 32. Major John Adolphus Harris began his command at

transportation of goods and stores to the upper posts, Indian presents excepted, were to halt immediately.[4] Five years after the British humiliation at Saratoga sent Lieutenant Twiss to occupy the base of Lake Ontario, this last British defeat at the hands of the rebels also required a reordering of Lake Ontario's landscape. The terms of peace suggested that Carleton Island would have to be ceded to the American Congress.

Haldimand began to cast about for another site for a British stronghold on Lake Ontario. Once again he sent an envoy to survey the ground at Cataraqui as a potential base. Since Lieutenant Twiss and Captain Schank had rejected Cataraqui in favour of Carleton Island in 1778 Britain's imperial position had changed. Likewise, British requirements for a land post had also changed: settlement and town planning constituted the new priority. Quebec's Surveyor-General Major Samuel Holland now found Cataraqui well suited as a place to plant the refugee Loyalists. Shores that Twiss and Schank considered destitute of wood for shipbuilding struck Holland as "fine natural Meadows" and "the soil [...] rich at some distance, fit for all purposes of Agriculture." The site of old Fort Frontenac was no longer a strategic liability but an asset because its fortifications covered "a sufficient space for a Town." Even the harbours that Twiss and Schank rejected as problematic appeared in a different light. Holland now considered them "good and most conveniently situated to command Lake Ontario."[5] Major Harris of the 84th Regiment of Foot moved Fort Haldimand's entire administrative apparatus and three houses to Cataraqui.[6]

Carleton Island in November 1782 and remained to oversee the fort's evacuation in the summer months of 1783. Preston, *Kingston before the War of 1812*, 393.

[4] QUA, HP 21784, 32, General Haldimand to Captain Harris, 26 May 1783.

[5] QUA, HP 21784, 11-12, Major Samuel Holland to General Haldimand, 26 June 1783.

[6] QUA HP 21784, 12. Major Ross to Captain Mathews, 17 August 1783.

Haldimand did not entirely abandon the old post. He cannily noted that the border between the British colony and the new republic described in the peace negotiations was vague with regard to Carleton Island."[7] For the next twenty-nine years, Britain maintained a token garrison at Carleton Island to oversee the still-active harbours. When hostilities between Canada and the United States broke out in 1812, an American farmer, his son, and a neighbour overwhelmed the British garrison composed of a sergeant, three sick soldiers and two women. The three Americans captured Carleton Island and set fire to Fort Haldimand; only the barracks' stone chimneys were left standing. In 1817, Carleton Island officially became American territory, ending all British association with the post.[8]

The intervening years between the post's abandonment and its final relinquishment to the Americans highlighted, in relief, the fort's role during the war. While Cataraqui grew into a significant settlement, the fortifications at Carleton Island mouldered. Just four years after its abandonment in 1783, Captain John Enys noted that the whole works on Carleton Island "were very much gone to decay."[9] One year after Enys' visit, surveyor John Collins reported that the fort walls and parapets were all crumbling because they had been built from green wood.[10] But such wood was a hallmark of the imperial necessity that had impelled the fort's construction. Haste and expediency directed the building of the fort and ships, an entirely natural response to the

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[7] Bond, "The British Base at Carleton Island," 15.
[8] George F.G. Stanley, "Kingston in the Defence of North America." in *To Preserve and Defend: Essays on Kingston in the Nineteenth Century* edited by Gerald Tulchinsky. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976. 87. Lossing, *The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812*, 659-60. Bond, "The British Base at Carleton Island," 16.
[9] NAC MG 24 I 26 "John Enys Travel Diary" entry 22 June 1787.
[10] " Deputy Surveyors General Collin's Report," in *Third Report of the Bureau of Archives for the Province of Ontario: 1905,* edited by Alexander Fraser, Toronto: L.K. Cameron, 1906, 349.

war's exigencies.[11]

Carleton Island's fortifications were a creature of Haldimand's Quebec. Haldimand did not design the fort to outlive the war. Neither Haldimand nor any of the members of the garrison intended the fortifications to be a precursor to settlement in the region. Even if the British did lose the war, they could not settle the Loyalists on such a small piece of land. More importantly, to envisage a permanent place in the region would be to admit defeat. Instead, they regarded their presence as an uncomfortable, temporary arrangement while they waged or waited out the war. Many hoped to return home to the Mohawk Valley, others to Britain. The short-term consequences of Britain's changing strategic position engaged the islanders' attention; the world beyond the island's shores was their consuming interest because battles fought far afield affected their futures. Their presence in the unsettled wilderness of the Lake Ontario region was bound with the fate of the empire.

This thesis has suggested that Carleton Island's importance lay in the strength of the ties that bound it to empire. The subject of study was limited to the five-year existence of one island-fort and a few of its inhabitants. Nevertheless, the islanders' combined experiences shed light on the extension of the empire's authority into Quebec's periphery during the war. First, the islanders' experiences challenged the representation of the centre and the periphery as exclusive, dichotomous realities. Second, their activities demonstrated that a combination of practical and psychological links bound

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[11] Even the Ships were built out of green wood. Haldimand exhorted the shipbuilder to finish their projects as quickly as possible, not heeding to "the idea of making your Vessels more durable." QUA HP 21804, 72 General Haldimand to Captain Schank, 10 June 1779.

people together over long distances. Third, their conflicts revealed the relationship between the periphery and the centre to be a reciprocal relationship, one that required constant readjustment. In the islanders' experience the empire transcended its geographical manifestation to become a mode of thinking and identification.

A hierarchy of place did not define the relationship between Carleton Island and the central authorities.[12] Rather, a practical appreciation of the empire's precarious position in North America solidified the centre's and the periphery's mutual interest. Haldimand never visited the fort named in his honour, but it existed in his mind as an important strategic reality. Even the Lords of Whitehall understood the post's importance. Haldimand informed them that "if Carleton Island should fall into the Enemy's hands, Niagara & Detroit would infallibly be lost."[13] The same Lords also sanctioned the fortification's £20,000 cost as an investment in territorial sovereignty.[14] The effectiveness of their investment, however, depended upon the men and women who garrisoned the post. Their willingness to live on the island and to submit to Haldimand's direction was a condition of their belief in British war aims. The islanders undertook their daily activities and interpreted their experiences with reference to the empire, despite the great physical distances separating them from the centre of power.

But the harshness of the island environment and the mundaneness of garrison's daily activities tended to erode the islander's sense of connection. Some members of the

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[12] Faye Whitfield argued that because "frontiers are usually geographically distant from their centres of government, and policies created for their administration can suffer from a diminishing relevance, proportionate to the accessibility of the frontier to the centres of administration." Faye Whitfield, "The Geography of the British Northern Interior Frontier of Defense during the Haldimand War Administration of Quebec 1778-1784," 9.

[13] NAC, Haldimand Papers, B 57-2, General Haldimand to Lord George Germain, 28 November 1780. Printed in *A History of the Organisation, Development and Services*... p.190.

[14] Preston *Kingston before the War of 1812*, xxxix.

garrison felt cut off from more important centres of military administration and considered their duty on the island unimportant. Captain Alexander Fraser once opened a report to General Haldimand by stating "nothing has happened at this Post of late worth communication to Your Excellency." He then filled two pages with his tightly written hand about the daily goings on at Carleton Island: the transport of provisions to the upper posts, the garrison garden, and scouting missions.[15]

But those very activities underpinned the island's military, social and economic ties between empire and western Quebec. The seasonal transport of provisions supported British sovereignty in the West. Several times during the war the garrison at Niagara came within days of "evacuating for want of provision."[16] But it never did have to evacuate. Carleton Island's year-round garrison offset the inconvenience of the late-arriving supply fleets from Britain. The secure storehouses stored the goods through the winter and the members of the Naval Department's land and water services organised the goods' transport to Niagara in early spring. Not only did the islander's keep the western supply line open but Carleton Island's shipwrights increased its capacity by 1,740 barrels.[17] For seven months of the year thirty-four bateaux arrived at Carleton Island's shores every week, and four transport vessels travelled constantly between the island and Niagara. Communication was as efficient as the transportation links. Letters passed between the island and Montreal in the same time that it took papers to travel from the

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[15] QUA HP 21787, 164, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 8 September 1780.
[16] NAC, *Haldimand Papers*, Series B, vol. 147, 381-7, General Haldimand to Sir Henry Clinton, 29 September 1781, printed in *A History of the Organisation, Development and Services...*, 211.
[17] The dock hands repaired the *Haldimand* which had a bulk capacity of 750 barrels and they also built the *Ontario* and a sister ship to replace her when she foundered, the *Limnade*, Each of the foregoing ships had a similar capacity of 990 barrels. QUA HP 21759, 126 "General Return of the Force and Burthen of His Majesty's Armed Vessels on Lake Ontario." 10 September 1782.

desk of the Secretary of State to the tables of the Admiralty Board in England.[18]

The administrative, social and economic life of the island rode on the coat tails of the supply system. The islanders co-ordinated their various activities with their peers in other parts of the province and empire and so remained part of an integrated and extended community. Fort Haldimand's soldiers, working in tandem with the garrisons at other posts and with their Indian allies, contributed to Quebec's security by raiding the Mohawk Valley. The raids were so thorough that by the war's end Brigadier Powell at Niagara reported that Indians and troops from Carleton Island and Niagara had so long molested the Mohawk Valley that "that very few [settlements] remained for further operations."[19] Molly Brant, Mohawk diplomat, managed the delicate negotiations and renegotiations of the Anglo-Indian alliance from her "little box of a house" on Carleton Island.[20] Carleton Island's traders were also able to knit their business-interests with those of merchants at other posts and so contribute to the economic net that sustained the province during the war. All the islanders performed their daily works with continual reference to a world beyond the island's shores.

Paradoxically, the islanders' continual contact with the outer world heightened their sense of isolation. Sometimes the dissonance between their imperial points of reference and their lives on the island overwhelmed the residents and they fell into conflict. But these internal rifts reminded the islanders of their own identity and demonstrated their place in Haldimand's Quebec. Regular troops, provincial troops and

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[18] Information could be relayed from Carleton Island to Montreal within three days. Information travelling in the other direction could arrive within a week. Communication of information within Whitehall was comparable. According to historian David Syrett "[i]t often required many days for a paper to wend its way from the office of a secretary of state through the Admiralty Board." David Syrett *Shipping and the American War,* p.7.

mercenaries learned that their personal value to Haldimand's military regime rested upon their devotion to the "King's Service." Indian nations likewise learned that the British valued subservience and compliance, but their own experiences during the revolution reinforced their desire to retain cultural sovereignty. The tension between the military's disdain for commercial activity and the acknowledged importance of economic growth placed the island's traders in a social purgatory. Some could splice their interests with those of the military regime and ascend the social ranks as Richard Cartwright and Robert Hamilton did. Others could eschew the military order and remain obscure like some rogue traders in the Cataraqui region. Loyalist women learned that they were not valued members of society. Haldimand maintained and orchestrated this social order from his headquarters in Canada by appealing to the islanders' individual self-interest. He offered future rewards and honours in return for their "service to the Crown."

At the war's end the Carleton Islanders claimed the reward for their loyalty—land—and settled the Upper Canada region in much the same way that they had occupied the island.[21] They settled in ethnically defined groups. Many of the soldiers of the Kings' Royal Regiment of New York moved their families to Cataraqui; others to what would become the counties of Glengarry and Stormont.[22] Haldimand bought land from the Mississaugas and granted some of it to the Iroquois as recompense for their services and after an eighty-year dominance in the region, the Mississauga were replaced by the

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[19] Cruickshank *Butler's Rangers: The Revolutionary Period*, 97.
[20] QUA, HP 21787, 151, Captain Fraser to General Haldimand, 21 June 1780.
[21] Norman Knowles, *Inventing the Loyalists: the Ontario Loyalist Tradition and the Creation of Usable Pasts*, Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1997, 20.
[22] Cruickshank *The King's Royal Regiment of New York*, 118. Ian McCulloch, "Men bred in the rough bounds: The Scottish Military Tradition in Canada," *Beaver*, 73 (4) 1993, 10.

Iroquois.[23] General Haldimand's surveyors mapped out the Lake Ontario region, and directed the refugees' settlement patterns. Like at Carleton Island, the population of Upper Canada became an amalgam of distinct groups.[24]

For other Carleton Islanders the rewards of service were more nebulous, but just as important. For the officer corps, time served at Carleton Island and at Quebec was a necessary step on their career path. Lieutenant Twiss, Captain Schank and Lieutenant Glennie gained imperial recognition for their talents despite their sojourn on the empire's periphery.[25] Schank and Glennie both received fellowships to the elite ranks of the Royal Society. Lieutenant Twiss became the lieutenant governor of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. Two of Carleton Island's merchants built commercial empires on the basis of the military contacts they made during the war. Robert Hamilton built a commercial empire at Niagara, later Queenston, while Cartwright did the same at Cataraqui, later Kingston.[26]

This thesis has demonstrated how the actions of people, forced together by the exigencies of war, helped shape the eighteenth-century empire in Canada. The islanders helped pave the way for a century of colonial rule by upholding the empire's vision for Quebec—territorial integrity. Their refugee experiences allowed them to turn their loyalty into a source of identity, their experiences as beneficiaries of the Crown into an ideology of governance. Richard Cartwright opined that the success of Upper Canadian society was due to the "liberality which Government [had] shown towards the Loyalists

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[23] Barbara Graymont. "Thayendanegea" *DCB* vol.5, 806-808.
[24] Knowles, *Inventing the Loyalists*, 24.
[25] John C. Kendall, "William Twiss." *DCB* vol. 6, 789., W.A.B. Douglas "John Schank" *DCB* vol.6, 695. W.G. Godfrey "James Glenie" *DCB* Vol.6, 348.
[26] George Rawlyck and Janice Potter. "Richard Cartwright." *DCB* vol. 5, 168, Bruce G. Wilson, "Robert

who first settled it."[27] Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe was thus able to impose his vision of a little England upon the Lake Ontario's wilderness; from legislative procedure to place names, he remodelled the region on imperial lines. The actual shape of the society was more complicated; nevertheless, the community's experiences during the war allowed the British Empire to shape their lives.

Human relations, actions and problems composed the substance of this thesis. But the island itself is the drama's central character. Its specific environment of possibility and frustration sustained and moulded the garrison. Significantly, the island's name became synonymous with its fortifications. Rarely did people of Haldimand's Quebec speak of Fort Haldimand but rather of Carleton Island. Perhaps they preferred the later appellation because it referred to the fort's geographic site, its defining characteristic. The island-post symbolised British mastery over both the land and water of Quebec's interior.

Hamilton," *DCB*, vol. 402, Bruce G. Wilson, *The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton*, 20, 22.
[27] Quoted in Errington, *The Lion, the Eagle and Upper Canada*, 20-2.

Appendices

Appendix I

List of Commanding Officers on Carleton Island 1777-1786[1]

Officer	Regiment	Length of Term
Captain William Potts	8th Regiment of Foot	Summer 1777[2]
Captain John Mompesson	8th Regiment of Foot	?- August 1778[3]
Captain Thomas Aubrey	47th Regiment of Foot	August 1778- May, 1779
Captain George McDougall	47th Regiment of Foot	May 1799 – July, 1779
Captain (Major) John Nairne	84th Regiment, or Royal Highland Emigrants	July, 1779 – Nov.,1779
Captain Alexander Fraser	84th Regiment of Foot	Nov., 1779 - Dec.,1780
Captain (Major) John Ross	34th Regiment of Foot	2 Dec. 1780 – April, 1782
Lieutenant Dambourgés - Assistant Engineer	84th Regiment of Foot	Sept.- Nov. 1780 while Ross led raid.[4]
Captain William Ancrum	34th Regiment of Foot	April 1782 - Nov. 1782
Major John Adolphus Harris	84th Regiment of Foot	Nov. 1782- 1783

[1] Unless otherwise indicated all information taken from Preston. *Kingston Before the War of 1812*, 393.
[2] Preston, *Kingston before the War of 1812*, 4, note. Sir John Johnson, *Orderly book of Sir John Johnson during the Oriskany campaign, 1776-1777*, 76.
[3] QUA HP 21789, 15, Captain John Mompesson to Brigadier General Powell, 26 July 1778., HP 21722, 34, General Haldimand to Captain Aubrey, 22 August 1778.
[4] E.A. Cruikshank, "The King's Royal Regiment," 78.

Appendix II

Bulk Quantities of Rations Transported to the Upper Posts,
Oswegatchie, Carleton Island, Niagara, Fort Erie, Detroit, and Michilimackinac.
1778-1783.[1]

Year	Flour lb.	Pork lb.	Pease Bushels	Butter lb.	Oatmeal lb.	Vinegar gal.	Rum gal.	Rice lb.	Corn Bushels	Pumpkin Seed gal.	Biscuit lb.
1778	1,064,777	611,944	7,058.5	57,330	76,501	1,040	3,010	-	-	-	-
1779	2,190,774	1,251,764	70,192	87,163	100,320	1,077	263,491	1,785	-	-	7,907
1780	2,427,548	1,077,607	11,546.5	125,172	123,547	1,655.5	39,679	809	270.4	6.5	-
1781	1,751,640	721,062	10,685	15,459	63,840	438	41,189	-	698	1.5	3,200
1782	3,288,000	1,878,857	22,017	176,142	234,857	64	5,610	-	179.5	-	-
1783	328,372	71,968	1,490	23,870	12.5[2]	155	132,621	250			

[1] These figures represent the bulk quantities of provisions required to fill 6,000 rations for 365 days with the exception of 1778 when only 3,021 rations were filled. The figures for 1780 and 1781 represent the volume of goods that arrived undamaged at the upper posts. Approximately two percent of provisions were lost, damaged or stolen on the trip up the St. Lawrence River. The figures for 1779 and 1782 represent the sum of provisions delivered up until the date of the season's late return and the provisions still awaiting transportation. QUA. HP 21852, 31, "The Return of Provisions and store forwarded from Lachine & The Cedars to the upper posts to November 7th 1778...." HP 21852, 61, "State of Provisions & Stores forwarded to the Upper Posts by 670 Batteaux in 55 Divisions until 31 October 1781." HP 21852, 140, "State of the Transport of Provisions & Stores from Coteau du Lac & Lachine for the Upper Posts in 1780." HP 21852, 165, "State of Provisions & Stores forwarded to the Upper (of back) Posts by 635 Batteaux in 67 Divisions between 6th May & 31st October 1781." HP 21852, 207, "Return of Provisions & Stores forwarded to Carleton Island between the 1st May & 13th October 1782 for the Upper Posts." HP 21852, 223,"Return of Provisions & Stores sent from Lachine & Coteau to the Upper Posts, 1783."

[2] This is measured in gallons

Appendix III

Number Bateaux Required to Conduct Provisions and Stores up the St. Lawrence River to Carleton Island

Year	Length of Transport Season	Number of Weeks	Number of Bateaux			Approximate Number of Bateaux Arriving Per Week	Approximate Number of Canadians Arriving Per Week
			With Troops and Stores	With Provisions	Total		
1779	1 May- 19 September[1]	20	?	670	670	33.5	168
1780	1 April – 20 November[2]	26	102	885	987	32.8	164
1781	6 May- 31 October	25	?	635	635	25.4	127
1782	1 May- 18 November	29	279	1,020	1,299	44.8	224
Average over four years		25	-	803	898	34.1	171

[1] The statistics for the years 1779 and 1781 were only available from the Commissary General's Returns in the Haldimand Papers not the Quartermaster General's Returns in the same collection. Consequently, the statistics for those years are incomplete regarding the additional numbers of bateaux carrying troops and cover a shorter span of the transportation season. The numbers represent the minimum traffic for those years. QUA HP 21852, 61, "Return of Provisions and Stores forwarded from Lachine and the Cedars...by 670 Batteaux in 55 Divisions." 19 September 1779., HP 21852, 165, "State of Provisions and Stores forwarded to the Upper (of Back) Posts by 635 Batteaux in 67 Divisions between 6th May & 31 October 1781."

[2] The returns for 1780 and 1782 appear complete. It is not clear from the Quartermaster Records when the transportation season in 1782 began. But according to the Commissary General's Returns in began on 1 May. QUA HP 21849, 102. "Return of the Number of Batteaux sent to Carleton Island with Troops, Stores and Provisions..." 20 November 1780. QUA HP 21849, 190, "Return of Batteaux sent from Lachine to Carleton Island with Troops, Stores and Provisions....," 18 November 1782.,. QUA HP 21852, 207. "Return of Provisions Forwarded to Carleton Island between the 1st of May and 13th of October 1782."

Appendix IV

The Fleet at Carleton Island 1778-1783[1]

Name	Year Built	Rig	Commander	Number of Men	Force		Tons Approx.	*Burden*			
								Hold Full		*Troops and Stores*	
					Guns Pdr.= Pounder	Swivels		*Troops*	*Barrels*	*Troops*	*Barrels*
Haldimand	1771	Snow	William Baker	26	2 x 4 pdr.	4	194	150	750	250	350
Seneca	1777	Snow	Baptist Bouchette	40	2 x 4 pdr.	-	205	130	800	230	400
Caldwell	1775	Sloop	David Cowen	12	2 x 2 pdr.	-	47	40	180	60	90
Mohawk	1778	Cutter	Yves Chiquet	14	2 x 2 pdr.	-	47	40	200	60	100
Ontario (foundered 1780)	1780	Snow Or Brig	James Andrews	Approx. 45	4 x 4 pdr.	12	231	?	"near a Thou-sand"[2]	?	?

[1] Unless otherwise specified, all information taken from QUA HP 21759, 126 "General Return of the Force and Burthen of His Majesty's Armed Vessels on Lake Ontario," 10 September 1782. Information relating to the ships' rigging and to the *Ontario*, indicated exceptions not withstanding, are from: Smith *Legend of the Lake*, 94.

[2] 25 March 1780. Richard Cartwright to Francis Goring. Printed in Durham, *Carleton Island in the Revolution: The Old Fort and Its Builders*, 99-100.

The Fleet at Carleton Island 1778-1783, Continued

Name	Year Built	Rig	Commander	Number of Men	Force		Tons Approx.	*Burden*			
								Hold Full		*Troops and Stores*	
					Guns Pdr.= Pounder	Swivels		*Troops*	*Barrels*	*Troops*	*Barrels*
Limnade (Sister Ship to the *Ontario*)	1781	Snow	David Betton	39	6 x 6 pdr.	14	224	150	990	250	490
3 Gun Boats	1779-1780	Cutter[3] or Lugger	-	14[4]	1 x 12 pdr. Each if needed.[5]	-	-	-	-	-	-
Row Galley[6]	1779	Lanteen	-	?	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Two small scows for loading the vessels											

[3] QUA HP 21801, 130. Captain Schank to General Haldimand, 26 June 1779.
[4] QUA HP 21801, 133. "A Monthly Return of the Naval Department on Lake Ontario" 27 June 1779.
[5] QUA HP 21801, 130. Captain Schank to General Haldimand, 26 June 1779.
[6] The galley was present at Carleton Island in 1779, but not necessarily built there. NAC, *Haldimand Papers*, Series B, vol. 144, pp. 140-9, "General Return of Vessels on Lake Ontario, 1st January 1779." printed in *A History of the Organisation, Development and Services of the Military...*, 86.

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