

'Your fyre shall burn no more': Iroquois Policy  
Towards New France and Her Native Allies to 1701

Jose Antonio Brandao

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
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**Canada**

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## Abstract

"'Your fyre shall burn no more': Iroquois Policy Towards New France and Her Native Allies to 1701."

J.A. Brandão

The Iroquois fought for prestige, revenge, and for captives to be used for torture or to replace dead kin. These motives were not superceded or eliminated by a desire to capture furs or to eradicate tribes that lived in prime fur bearing areas in order to profit from the sale of furs. A statistical analysis of Iroquois raids in the period up to 1701 revealed that raids against native groups for which economic gain was a prime or sole motive for attacking represented less than 6% of all Iroquois recorded hostilities.

Nor was control of the fur trade for economic reasons the cause of Iroquois enmity towards the New France. The French were perceived as a threat to the Iroquois for several reasons: they forged alliances with foes of the Iroquois (and later traded arms to them), and the Iroquois perceived that French policy was aimed at attempting to hem them in and steal their lands. The fur trade was an important tool which the Iroquois tried to use to offset growing French power, but profiting from the trade was not the end goal of their policy and was not the reason the Iroquois fought the French and their allies.

## Preface

The Five Nations Iroquois were, and to some extent still are, the great "bogeymen" of seventeenth century Canadian history. Few school children, either in French or English Canada, were not introduced to the stories of Canada's heroic first settlers struggling to overcome adversity and settle a new land. Adversity had two faces: one was the harsh environment (one of the great themes of Canadian literature). The other face of adversity was Iroquois and it was inevitably painted for war. If contemporary sensibilities have led to kinder treatment of natives and the environment in text books, they had not when I began my education. Then the "cruel" wars the Iroquois waged against New France were the fire that forged the metal of Canada's "new" peoples.

Often, that was all the exposure to the history of the Iroquois most Canadians received. Even if one carried on to university, one could hope to learn little more than that-- certainly not in the general textbooks that were assigned reading. If one was fortunate enough to land at a university that taught the history of New France (it is surprising how many places in Canada do not consider as essential the history of the nation up to 1763), one might learn more about early Indian-European contact, but with rare exceptions the Iroquois were still used as a means to make points about European valour. Through no foresight of my own I ended up at

university where one of those rare exceptions taught.

Nonetheless, if the focus on the Iroquois was to study them in their own right for a change, the warfare they waged, and their hostility towards New France were still a central concern of most readings. This suited me just fine since political and military history interested me. Yet, fascinating as research into aspects of Iroquois-French relations was, I also found it perplexing. The documentary record did not really seem to support aspects of the views espoused in the secondary literature, and raised questions to which I could find no answers. I was encouraged to pursue the questions my research had raised and, thinking that I was undertaking nothing more than an interesting research puzzle, I did just that. The search for answers to those questions led to graduate school and, eventually, to this dissertation.

When I defined my dissertation topic and began researching, I had no idea where my questions might lead me. When I completed it, I had no notion of the audacity of the answers I had arrived at. The latter has, however, been made more than abundantly clear in responses to presentations made at conferences and papers submitted for publication. Naive as I may have been when I began, and as unprepared as I was for some of the responses to my research, I recognize that my conclusions are, in places, at odds with what others have written about the Iroquois. This, however, did not stem from

any desire to rehabilitate the image of the Iroquois in Canadian history, nor to question a historiographical tradition of Iroquois-Indian and Iroquois-European relations that was over 100 years old. What I wanted to do was resolve what appeared to be inconsistencies between the views of the Iroquois presented in the books I read, and the documents those books were supposed to have been based upon. As I pursued my education in matters Iroquois, it dawned on me that the discrepancies between the secondary literature and the historical record were, in places, so vast that an inaccurate picture of the Iroquois had developed. My research led me to conclude that resolving the questions that had intrigued me and presenting a more satisfactory picture of the Iroquois required challenging aspects of existing interpretations. (Given that shedding new light on the past is goal of a doctoral dissertation, I found my decision in this matter rather apropos, and comforting.)

The end result is, of course, for others to judge. I claim no hold on the "Truth" about the past. I hesitate even to speak of "truths" about certain events. I view my efforts in less ambitious terms. When I began studying the Iroquois, all I wanted to do was answer some questions and satisfy my curiosity about them and their history. I do not think that I have found all the answers I sought, nor do I want to stop searching. Certainly my curiosity about the Iroquois remains unabated. However, the rules of the historical discipline,

and of a graduate program, require finite limits to such a process. (Although, God knows, I have tried to stretch them.) They require that at some point I arrive at some conclusions or, at least, summarize my findings. This then is the status report on my understanding of Iroquois relations with some of their Indian and European neighbours in the seventeenth century. If it differs from that of others, that is as it should be. If it leads to debate about the Iroquois, all the better.

## Technical Notes

All spelling and punctuation in quotations follow the original source. The exceptions are the abbreviations for "the", "they", and the ampersand "&", which have been spelled out fully. Spelling of French and Indian proper names, and place names, are as found in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography and the Historical Atlas of Canada respectively. Spelling of Indian tribal names follows the practice of Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 15, The Northeast. The dates given, with one exception, are as they appear on the document cited. Dates in the French and Dutch sources were in the New Style, while those in English sources were in the Old Style. Throughout the seventeenth century Old Style dates were 10 days behind those in New Style. Thus April 25, 1680 (N.S.) in New France was April 15, 1680 (O.S.) in New York. As well, the New Year began on January 1 (N.S) and on March 25 (O.S.). In English documents dates between January and March were often written with both years. (Eg.: Feb. 12, 1674/75). In these instances the date in the new year only is used. (Eg.: Feb. 12, 1675).

## Acknowledgements

Over the course of my studies I have had the support of many people and institutions without whose help completion of this work would not be possible. The Ontario Graduate Scholarship Program, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and Laven Associates provided financial support during my doctoral studies. The Graduate Program in History at York University and its Directors also merit a special note of thanks. Professors A.S. Kanya-Forstner, J.L. Granatstein, and J. Saywell have all been remarkably supportive over the years. Not only have they been accommodating to my research interests and needs, they have cut through mountains of red tape on my behalf. The good Fathers at the Maison des Jésuites in St. Jérôme extended me every kindness during my stay with them, and Father Lucien Campeau generously allowed me to consult the material he had compiled from various Jesuit archives in Rome and Paris for his Monumenta Nova Franciae. Monsieur Pierre Gasnault, Conservateur en Chef of the Bibliothèque Mazarine in Paris kindly arranged to have a microfilm copy of "Nation Iroquoise" made for me.

My friends have not only given me moral support, but have provided a wide range of material help as well. All they ever asked in return was that I finish the damn thesis. It was a selfless wish and I am happy to oblige them.

While many people have contributed to my education the influence of several stand out. Professor W.J. Eccles encouraged me to pursue my interest in the Iroquois and suggested the topic that led me to this dissertation. His insistence on solid documentary proof for my assertions and the example of his scholarship have shaped my approach to history. I do not know if Prof. Eccles will agree with what I have written, but if I have learned anything from him, he should have a hard time proving me wrong. And that, I think, would please him.

My work has benefited from the input of my supervisors Professors Ramsay Cook and Conrad Heidenreich. Professor Cook took on this task after claiming that he knew less about the Iroquois than I did about split infinitives. No one could know that little about the Iroquois. Over the years it became evident just how modest that assessment of his knowledge of the Iroquois was. Professor Cook's insightful comments on content and style have immeasurably improved this work. I am still at a loss about split infinitives.

To Professor Heidenreich I owe a special thanks. As a result of our discussions ideas were fleshed out, concepts sharpened, overlooked details discovered, and obscure place references and native groups were identified. His willingness to share his vast knowledge of this period and of the native peoples of the Northeast saved me countless hours of research and even more errors.

Lastly I wish to thank my family: my wife for almost single handedly raising our son, and for putting up with the privations that being married to a graduate student inevitably brings; my kid sister because she typed and improved everything I have ever submitted while managing to complete her own university education; my parents for constant support, moral and fiscal, over the years. Esta dissertação é dedicado os meus pais. É pouco recompense para todos os seus sacrificos, mas por entretanto tem de chagar.

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## Introduction

In the seventeenth century the Five Nations Iroquois Confederacy was composed of the Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, and Mohawk nations. When first encountered by Europeans they may have numbered over 25,000.<sup>1</sup> Their villages were located south of Lake Ontario in an area bounded by the Genesee River in the west, and the Mohawk River in the east. Aside from their tribal homelands, the Five Nations also claimed land north and west of Lake Ontario, and some tribes contended that the land around present day Montreal and Quebec City were once occupied by them. Despite these traditions, and nineteenth and early twentieth century beliefs of Iroquois origins in Canada, current archaeological work suggests that the groups that came to be known as the Five Nations developed in the area south of Lake Ontario, or migrated from further south.<sup>2</sup>

Along with a geography, the Five Nations also shared a

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix C, Iroquois Population Estimates to 1701.

<sup>2</sup> A good introduction to all aspects of the history and culture of the Iroquois is the series of articles, by various authors, in B.G. Trigger, ed., The Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 15, the Northeast (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978). The bibliography there, and that in Paul L. Weinman's, A Bibliography of the Iroquoian Literature (New York State Museum and Science Service, Bulletin 411, 1969), are good points of departure for works on specific aspects of Iroquois history and culture. The most recent overview of the Iroquois and their world is Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).

culture and system of government. The Iroquois were an Iroquoian linguistic group, traced descent through the female blood line, and divided work and many social activities along gender lines. While men cleared the forest for fields, women planted and harvested the crops. Men did the hunting, but women usually carried and cleaned the game. Women raised the children and mourned the dead, but curing the sick fell to men. If the activities each sex was expected to carry out did not always reflect a fair division of labour, they nonetheless illustrate the symbiotic relationship between men and women in Iroquois society.

The Iroquois lived in communal longhouses, each occupied by one or more extended families. Their villages varied in population, from several hundred to several thousand, and were usually palisaded. Every few decades old villages were abandoned in favour of new ones with fewer pests, less refuse, more abundant supplies of wood, and fresh fields to cultivate the staple crops of beans, squash, and corn. Each village, and each tribe, was self sufficient and sustained itself from hunting, fishing, and agriculture. The Iroquois traded among themselves for mostly ceremonial and social reasons, and appear to have engaged in very little trade with other groups.

Central to Iroquois culture and government was their clan system. It defined relationships among people in villages, and served as a means to facilitate joint actions among villages and tribes. The mechanisms by which clans made

decisions, and who made them, also served as the basis for decision making in villages, between villages, between tribes, and among the members of League of the Iroquois as a whole. This unification of the five tribes into a confederacy took place at some unknown period prior to contact with Europeans. The Iroquois worked out differences which had led to war among themselves, and made a League of Peace.

However, despite their traditions of peace, it was their warfare against natives and Europeans that made them so important. The warfare of the Iroquois played a large role in shaping the course of the religious, political, and economic history of New France, in particular, and of North Eastern North America, in general. It is not surprising, then, that their warring first attracted, and continues to hold, the attention of historians of the Iroquois, New France, and those of other native groups in the Northeast. Over the years many scholars have studied Iroquois history and sought to explain the reason for the wars they waged against natives and Europeans, especially against the French in Canada. The hypothesis which has come to dominate historians' explanations of Iroquois hostilities in the seventeenth century, the period of heaviest fighting, is that known as the "Beaver Wars" interpretation. It is a view of events which is quite old, and it has been modified over the years, but aspects of it continue to shape the understanding of Iroquois-Indian and

Iroquois-European history.<sup>3</sup>

Yet, the "beaver wars" interpretation rests upon little or no evidence, and upon assumptions of a type of culture and behaviour that is at odds with what the documentary record reveals to be the way Iroquois culture functioned. Take for example the view that the Iroquois attacked Huron fur brigades in order to rob them of the furs they were carrying to the French. In most works that have adopted the "beaver wars" interpretation this is stated to be, among other things, a prime motive of war. Following the historical practice, a few raids are cited as examples of this general pattern. The "impression" left is that this was a widespread practice. But none of the works indicated how many Iroquois attacks were launched against fur brigades, nor what percentage of all Iroquois attacks those against fur brigades represented. These are important considerations in assessing the relative merit of this new motive for warring since most European contemporaries indicated that the Iroquois did not war to steal. A study of Iroquois raids against natives and Europeans, however, reveals that attacks against fur brigades represented a small percentage of all Iroquois warfare.<sup>4</sup>

In short, despite their much studied past, and despite the consensus among many historians about the nature of

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<sup>3</sup> The historiography of the "beaver wars" is discussed in the first chapter.

<sup>4</sup> See Appendix D, The Statistics of War, Table D.1.

Iroquois society, and what motivated it, in the seventeenth century, there appears to be a need to reconsider aspects of Iroquois culture, politics, and warfare in the years up to 1701. This dissertation looks at one aspect of the Iroquois past, that of their history with, and policy towards, New France and her native allies in the seventeenth century.

What follows here is not a social history of the Iroquois. No attempt is made at offering a comprehensive explanation of all aspects of Iroquois life and culture. Only aspects of culture and society relevant to explaining Iroquois relations with the French and their allies are dealt with. Nor is this a history of Iroquois relations with all the groups in the Northeast. The focus of the dissertation is the nature of Iroquois-French relations seen from the perspective of the Iroquois. But for several reasons Iroquois relations with a variety of native and European groups cannot be avoided. Iroquois relations with the Hurons, for example, were part of the overall policy considerations of the Iroquois. What happened between these two groups could or, most likely, did influence Iroquois policy towards the French. Equally important, the Hurons, and many other groups, were allies of the French. Thus French relations with the Hurons or other natives were also likely to have an impact on Iroquois policy towards New France.

Neither is this a study of the "beaver wars"--it is

doubtful they ever existed as such. Yet, the specific interpretation of Iroquois relations with natives and Europeans that is embodied in this phrase cannot be overlooked. In various shapes and guises, especially since 1940, this interpretation has influenced the way that scholars of the Iroquois and of New France have viewed Iroquois-French relations. It is at the very heart of the historiography of this subject and is so deeply entrenched and widely accepted that it has become heresy in some circles to even question it. In the end, I found myself caught up in this debate. It seemed important to establish why the "beaver wars" interpretation should be reconsidered, if not rejected, before I could present my own explanation for Iroquois actions towards New France. For these reasons it possibly receives more attention than it merits. However, the purpose of this work remains trying to come to grips with what the Iroquois hoped to accomplish in their dealings with the French in New France in the years up to 1701.

The dissertation begins with a discussion of the historiography of the "beaver wars" and shows how over the years that literature has come to dominate the interpretations historians of New France have presented of Franco-Iroquois relations. Subsequent chapters deal with the way that the Iroquois governed themselves, the role warfare played in their culture, and how that culture and warfare were affected by contact with European society. These chapters can be viewed

in two distinct, although not contradictory, ways. Since all of these elements are central to the various versions of the "beaver wars" interpretations, and since my reconstruction of these aspects of Iroquois culture is at variance with the accepted view, these chapters can serve as detailed refutations of most of the unfounded assumptions at the heart of the "beaver wars" interpretations. They are, however, intended to establish a context within which to interpret Iroquois actions. Much of our understanding of Iroquois policy is derived from records of their action, not from documents that revealed what they said. For this reason it is extremely important that those actions and behaviour be understood as the Iroquois intended; that is, in ways that made sense to their culture. Finally, the last chapters outline Iroquois policy towards New France and her native allies.

Throughout the dissertation numerical data are presented. This information is distilled from tables that can be found in various appendices at the end of the dissertation. The reasons for each of these tables, the sources from which they were compiled, the methods used, and any caveats are discussed in detail preceding each table. However, a word about why a quantitative approach was in part used may not be out of order here.

The purpose of using a quantitative approach to this subject was to try to arrive at precise numbers for elements

of interpretations that have often been based on imprecise "impressions" of what the documents revealed. It was not an attempt to supplant documentary sources; rather it was a bid to extract more information from those traditional sources. The historical record on the Iroquois is not perfect. But if evidence is fragmentary, all the fragments should be considered, not just a selected few. Moreover, to recognize that the sources available are limited is not a reason to keep from mining what there is to its fullest extent. I use the statistical data culled from the documents in full recognition of their limitations. I remain, nonetheless, convinced of the need to take that data seriously into account.

It may seem that I am obsessed with documentation. This is partly true. Native history, more so than other fields of historical enquiry, requires a great deal of speculation and hypothesis building. This stems from the fact that Indians had no written language, although among some native societies pictographs and oral histories served as a type of record for specific events. Thus, while there is a fair record of Indian actions as noted by Europeans, the historian of Indian groups is usually left to speculate about the concerns or the goals that motivated those actions. This is equally true of portions of this work. However, since it is my contention that much of Iroquois history written in the past one hundred or so years is based upon unsupported speculation and assumptions, I feel a need to try and establish as clearly as

possible the basis of my interpretation. This means providing in as much detail as possible the evidence I have relied on, as well as showing how and why I have used those data.

Given the paucity of sources for some facets of Iroquois history, and our inability to answer key questions about aspects of Iroquois development, some of our understanding of that history must remain speculative. But conjecture cannot remain a basis for history--certainly not when evidence for portions of that history exists.

PART: 1  
THE IROQUOIS

## Chapter 1

## Iroquois-French History and Historians

Until the 1940s, the religious, secular, and nationalist ideologies which produced differing perspectives on New France's history and evolution also gave shape and impetus to the interpretations of French-Iroquois relations written by the colony's historians.<sup>1</sup> But as history divided itself into sub-fields and specific areas of study, and as monographs on the Iroquois and other native groups became available, the historians of New France began to incorporate those findings into their own works. The result was that no longer were the Iroquois enemies of New France because Champlain had attacked them in 1609. No more were Iroquois incursions against New France and her native allies seen as one more challenge thrown by God at the little Catholic colony to test its mettle. After 1940 the Iroquois attacks against New France were viewed as part of a general pattern of economic warfare waged to gain

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<sup>1</sup> For the impact of these factors on the image of Indians presented by historians of New France see, B.G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada's "Heroic Age" Reconsidered (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), 20-39. On the influence of nationalism in Quebec historiography see Serge Gagnon, Quebec and its Historians: 1840 to 1920 (Montreal: Harvest House, 1982); idem, Quebec and its Historians: The Twentieth Century (Montreal: Harvest House, 1985); Fernand Ouellet, "La modernisation de l'historiographie et l'émergence de l'histoire sociale", Recherches Sociographiques, 26, 1-2 (1985): 11-83. None of the above works deal with the way nationalist and religious ideologies shaped interpretations of Iroquois-French relations.

control of the fur trade from the Hurons and their French allies. This view of events has come to be known as the "beaver wars" interpretation.

The roots of the "beaver wars" explanation for Iroquois wars can be traced back to Francis Parkman, the American historian of New France. This interpretive model was given its fullest treatment by George Hunt in 1940, and has come to dominate the way historians of the Iroquois accounted for Iroquois relations with a wide range of European and native groups.<sup>2</sup> Historians of New France writing after 1940, concurred with the findings of these authorities, and their interpretations of French-Iroquois relations reflected the growing predominance of the "beaver wars" theory. Yet Hunt did not work in a vacuum. By the time his book was published, most of the ideas he espoused had been current for decades.<sup>3</sup> It was in part the longevity of those ideas in both Canada and the United States that gave Hunt's work such currency when it

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<sup>2</sup> It is not really clear when the term was coined. Neither Parkman nor Hunt use it to explain Iroquois aggressions. It appears to have worked its way into the literature as a generalization for the elaborate theory that, when reduced to its simplest, argues that the Iroquois waged war to obtain furs. It has also come to be accepted by most historians of other native groups to explain the relations between the Iroquois and the particular native group they deal with. This will be discussed below.

<sup>3</sup> It is difficult to establish how much Hunt drew from others, and how much was his own work. Certainly he could have arrived independently at ideas held by others. But, with few exceptions, all the major works which preceded his, in which one can find aspects of Hunt's thesis, are listed in his bibliography. He does not, however, always attribute them as sources for the ideas he uses.

appeared over fifty years ago. Unfortunately, ethnocentrism, specious logic, and little or no evidence are at the heart of the "beaver wars" interpretation that has served historians of New France so long as a basis for their explanations of the nature of Iroquois-French relations.

If Francis Parkman can be credited for being among the first, if not the first, to contribute to the development of the "beaver wars" theory, that is certainly not the interpretation he is known for, and his contribution has remained obscured by his more sensational pronouncements. Parkman was among the first and most widely read of New France's historians. Yet he was not sympathetic to the French. Focusing on New France was a means to tell the tragic tale of a colony doomed to fail. In the struggle between Protestant liberalism and Catholic absolutism and feudalism, liberalism was destined to triumph.<sup>4</sup> Parkman's writings on

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<sup>4</sup> W.J. Eccles, "The History of New France According to Francis Parkman", William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., XVIII, 4 (April 1961): 163-175. These types of contradictions appear throughout his works. For example, he admired the heroism of the Jesuits but was critical of their blind faith. "Their virtues", he wrote, "shine amidst the rubbish of errors...". Parkman, The Jesuits in North America in the Seventeenth Century [1867] (Toronto: George N. Morang and Co., 1907), 449. In his eagerness to tell a great story and to make it conform to his preconceived notions (after all the story was tragic because the bravery was wasted on supporting doomed causes-- that of French power, Catholic absolutism, and civilizing the Indians) he missed a crucial point. As his friend the Abbé Casgrain suggested, the heroism he admired in the Jesuits stemmed from the faith he denigrated. Letter from Abbé Casgrain, quoted in Howard Doughty, Francis Parkman [1962] (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 307. This was

Indians reflected a similar lack of empathy and a duality of purpose. In most of his works the Indians, especially the Iroquois, figured prominently. In part, this was a logical outcome of reading French documentary sources which stressed the impact of the Iroquois on the social, economic, and religious development of the colony. However, more than just being influenced by his sources, Parkman's treatment of Indians reflected his interest in them<sup>5</sup> and allowed him to make a larger point about their inevitable destruction as a consequence of their inability to adapt to civilized ways and because they stood in the way of progress.<sup>6</sup> More important to Parkman, focusing on the Iroquois served as a means to tell a great story. In an early journal entry, made while hiking in the Berkshires, one finds evidence of most of the sentiments that would shape his writings on the Iroquois. While the "[f]ierce savages" that "roamed like beasts" in the Northeast had passed away, Parkman found that the "scenes of

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Casgrain's basic criticism of all of Parkman's works. Parkman's intellectual preconceptions made it impossible for him to understand the people he wrote about. "Rejetant le surnaturel, il se perd en conjectures, il suppose mille motifs humains pour expliquer les actes d'heroisme que la foi et le zèle apostolique inspiraient à nos aieux." Abbé H.-R. Casgrain, Francis Parkman (Quebec: C. Darveau, 1872), 65.

<sup>5</sup> Parkman to George Ellis, [1864], in Wilbur Jacobs, ed. Letters of Francis Parkman, 2 vols., (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), 1: 175-184. Hereafter, Parkman Letters.

<sup>6</sup> Francis Jennings, "Francis Parkman: A Brahmin among the Untouchables", William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., XLII, 3 (July 1985): 316-320; Eccles, "New France According to Parkman", 172-173.

fear and blood" that marked that passing were "not without a horrid romance".<sup>7</sup> The Iroquois, then, added colour and drama to a bold, but tragic, tale of adventure, and furnished a moral lesson about the eventual progress of Protestant liberalism and civilization.<sup>8</sup>

Despite the importance of Indians, and particularly the Iroquois, to Parkman's narrative, he did not think much of Indians. They were, along with blacks, "outcasts of humanity".<sup>9</sup> After spending a few weeks with a Dakota tribe he wrote:

"For the most part, a civilized white man can discover very few points of sympathy between his own nature and that of an Indian... Nay, so alien to himself do they appear, that, after breathing the air of the prairie for a few months, he begins to look upon them as a troublesome and dangerous species of wild beast."<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Parkman, July, [18]44, in Mason Wade, ed., The Journals of Francis Parkman, 2 vols., (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1947), 1: 257. Hereafter, Parkman Journals.

<sup>8</sup> Hunt thought Parkman's focus on the Iroquois was to "furnish a lurid background of fire, blood, and villainy against which to draw in bold lines the failure of New France." George Hunt, The Wars of the Iroquois: A Study in Intertribal Trade Relations [1940] (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972), 187.

<sup>9</sup> Parkman to E.G. Squier, April 2, 1850, Jacobs, ed. Parkman Letters, 1: 68. Parkman sometimes called blacks "negroes", but equally often referred to them as "niggers" and was convinced they were an "inferior race". See Parkman to G. Hale, Oct. 6, [1844], *Ibid*, 1: 18; Parkman to G. Cary, Dec. 15, 1844, *Ibid*, 20; Journal entry for Oct. 1, 1846, Wade, ed. Parkman Journals, 2: 483.

<sup>10</sup> Francis Parkman, The Oregon Trail: Sketches of Prairie and Rocky-Mountain Life [1849] (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1882), 267-268. This is a revised version. In the original serialized publication of this book, and in the first

These biases were reflected in his portrayal of Indians in his works. He missed few opportunities to cast natives in a negative light. A headman could be called a chief or a sachem, but "greasy potentate" was also used by Parkman.<sup>11</sup> Children were almost invariably found "screeching".<sup>12</sup> The derogatory term "savage" was used to qualify nearly all aspects of Indian action and behaviour: Indians were a "race of savages"<sup>13</sup>; Indian negotiators were "savage politicians"<sup>14</sup>; surprised Indians were "awe-struck savages"<sup>15</sup>; Indian minds were "thoroughly savage"<sup>16</sup>; and, groups of Indians were "savage hordes"<sup>17</sup>.

However, it was not enough for Parkman's purpose to portray Indians in denigrating terms. To add drama to his

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book versions, he finished off this thought with: "and if expedient, he could shoot them with as little compunction as they themselves would experience after performing the same office upon him." See E.N. Feltskoq, ed., Francis Parkman, The Oregon Trail (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 627.

<sup>11</sup> Francis Parkman, Pioneers of France in the New World [1865, revised 1885] (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1909), 207.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 208, 213.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 344.

<sup>14</sup> Parkman, Jesuits, lxi.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 115.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 212.

<sup>17</sup> Francis Parkman, The Old Régime in Canada (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1874), 5.

story, and to make the Iroquois liberty's instrument in helping destroy New France, as well as to show how inevitable the fall of Indians before progress, they had to be worthy opponents.<sup>18</sup> Thus, even though he thought the Iroquois were, "like all savages, mere grown-up children",<sup>19</sup> he stressed their 'fierceness'. Parkman often used animal imagery to depict Iroquois actions and describe their behaviour. Iroquois warriors, he wrote, "followed like hounds"<sup>20</sup>, "prowled like lynxes"<sup>21</sup>, and when shot, went down "foaming like slaughtered tigers."<sup>22</sup> In one particularly purple passage, the Iroquois were made out to be both animals and mad: "The threatened blow had fallen, and the wolfish hordes of the five cantons had fleshed their rabid fangs in a new victim."<sup>23</sup> His bias towards Indians left Parkman convinced that his one sided assessment of the Iroquois was an accurate

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<sup>18</sup> Parkman, Jesuits, 448; Eccles, "New France According to Parkman", 172.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 8. This too is a common theme in his works. See Parkman, Oregon Trail, 130.

<sup>20</sup> Parkman, Jesuits, 213.

<sup>21</sup> Francis Parkman, Count Frontenac and New France Under Louis XIV [1877] (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1905), 175.

<sup>22</sup> Parkman, Pioneers, 366.

<sup>23</sup> Francis Parkman, La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West [1879] (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1907), 192-193. This work first appeared by this title in 1879. The first version of this work was titled The Discovery of the Great West: A Historical Narrative and was published in 1869. After Parkman gained access to documents that further illuminated La Salle's role in the west, Parkman revised the work and changed the title.

portrayal of their character.<sup>24</sup> In any case, whether such a portrait of the Iroquois was a true reflection of their character was irrelevant to Parkman because it suited his needs. Indeed, Parkman's antipathy towards Indians extended to deliberately falsifying evidence to make them appear irrational and to diminish their actual roles in historical events.<sup>25</sup>

The negative, even hostile images, of the Indians in Parkman's work reflected a deep-rooted belief that Indians were an inferior race. As far as Parkman was concerned, Indians, Iroquois included, were incapable of reaching the social and intellectual levels required to be "civilized".<sup>26</sup> To support these conclusions he drew on the then controversial and now discredited theories of craniologist S.G. Morton. Morton related intelligence to cranial capacity. Since Indians had, on average, smaller heads than Europeans, Morton and his followers concluded that they were less intelligent. Even the obvious inconsistencies in this theory did not force

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<sup>24</sup> An impression strengthened by support for his work from such as L.H. Morgan. See L.H. Morgan to F. Parkman, June 5, [1867?], quoted in Jacobs, ed., Parkman Letters, 2: 14. The date is in question because Morgan wrote to Parkman after the book was published, but Jacobs has the letter dated as 1865.

<sup>25</sup> Francis Jennings, "Francis Parkman: A Brahmin among the Untouchables", 305-328. According to Jennings the purpose was to justify the genocidal Indian policy of the American government. Ibid, 316-318: On the relationship between images of the Indian and government policy see, Robert F. Berkhofer Jr., The White Man's Indian (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 113-175.

<sup>26</sup> Parkman, Jesuits, lxxv-lxxvi, lxxxix, 447.

Parkman to rethink his acceptance of it. Parkman, for example, found it "remarkable that the internal capacity of the skulls of the barbarous American tribes...[was] greater than that of either the Mexicans or Peruvians."<sup>27</sup> But since the areas of the skull that were largest were the regions "of the animal propensities", it was easy enough to explain the "ferocious, brutal, and uncivilizable character of the wild tribes."<sup>28</sup> Parkman's friendship with Louis Agassiz, a supporter of Morton's views, probably only reinforced those convictions.<sup>29</sup> By today's measure, Parkman would be labelled a racist. The worst that can be said, however, is that by the standard of his day he was as ethnocentric as most<sup>30</sup> and less enlightened than some.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid, xliii, note 1.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Parkman at one time hoped to marry Agassiz's daughter Ida. See F. Parkman to Mary Dwight Parkman, Dec. 6, 1863, Jacobs, ed., Parkman Letters, 1: 168-170. On Agassiz as supporter of Morton's race origins theory see Justin Winsor, "The Progress of Opinion Respecting the Origin and Antiquity of Man in America", in Justin Winsor, ed., Narrative and Critical History of America, 8 vols. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1884-1889), 1: 373.

<sup>30</sup> Berkhofer, White Man's Indian, 55-61, 105-106, 108.

<sup>31</sup> More than one contemporary rejected Morton's 'scientific' findings, and that research was available to Parkman. See D.D. Wilson, "Supposed Prevalence of One Cranial Type Throughout the American Aborigines", Canadian Journal of Industry, Science and Art, New Ser., (November 1857): 406-435. Wilson, a leading critic of one theory posited by Morton, also referred to Indians by that word, rather than "savage" which was Parkman's preferred adjective. Justin Winsor lists others critical of Morton, and stated that it "is certainly evident that skull capacity is no sure

Given Parkman's biases and purposes, it is not hard to understand his explanations of Iroquois wars against the French and other natives. The fullest explication of the nature and causes of Iroquois hostilities is found in Parkman's history of the Jesuit missions in New France, published in 1867. Iroquois wars, in general, were products of an "insensate fury" and "mad ambition"<sup>32</sup>. Indeed, the very "organization" and "intelligence" of the Iroquois were "merely the instruments of a blind frenzy."<sup>33</sup> The wars against the Hurons and Algonquins in the mid-seventeenth century were clearly efforts at "annihilation" during a period when the Iroquois were in the "transports of pride, self-confidence, and rage for ascendancy."<sup>34</sup> This same "audacious pride and insatiable rage for conquest", coupled with a "homicidal frenzy", accounted for Iroquois attacks against the Neutrals, Eries, and Susquehannocks.<sup>35</sup> Warfare waged against the French was, in part, due to a desire for revenge for Champlain's attacks against the Iroquois in 1609

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measure of intelligence...". Justin Winsor, "The Progress of Opinion Respecting the Origin and Antiquity of Man in America", in Winsor, ed., Narrative and Critical History of America, 1: 372-375, quote on p. 372, note 14.

<sup>32</sup> Parkman, Jesuits, 448, 434.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 434.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 336, 337.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 436-445. Quotes from p. 436.

and 1615, fuelled, no doubt, by that "insensate fury."<sup>36</sup> Access to guns, provided by the Dutch, furnished the Iroquois the means to carry out their plans.<sup>37</sup> It should be stressed that the desire for conquest and annihilation seem to have had no broader purpose. It was the product of these various 'savage' and 'irrational' passions of the Iroquois.<sup>38</sup>

This is the interpretation for which Parkman has come to be known. It has been dismissed, and rightly so, for its ethnocentric assessment of the character of the Iroquois, and

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 211. In accepting this as the cause of Iroquois attacks against New France Parkman was probably following his Quebec contemporaries Faillon and Ferland, whose works he read and used. See Parkman to Ferland, Sept. 10, 1856, Jacobs, ed., Parkman Letters, 1: 119-120; Parkman to Shea, July 26, 1858, Ibid, 132; Parkman to Casgrain, March 28, 1866, Ibid, 2: 7-8.

<sup>37</sup> Parkman, Jesuits, 211, 241.

<sup>38</sup> Parkman was not the first to dwell on Iroquois "ferocity". Bacqueville de la Potherie, a contemporary of the Iroquois and historian of New France, assessed Iroquois character and its impact on their relations with native groups in the following terms: "Les Iroquoise [sont] toujours insatiable du sang humain, et par consequens ennemies irreconciliables de toutes [les] nations de ce vaste pays...". La Potherie au Ministre, 11 aout, 1700, Archives Nationales de France, Archives des Colonies, Series C11A, 18: 147. (Hereafter, AN, C11A) Parkman saw and ordered this document transcribed. But it is not clear if he was influenced by it prior to writing the Jesuits. Casgrain wrote that Parkman visited the Paris archives in 1858-59, (Casgrain, Parkman, 33), but Parkman himself made no mention of working there during that trip. (See letters of Parkman from Paris to various people in Jacobs, ed., Parkman Letters, 1: 133-138) In his book, La Potherie modified his view and wrote that the Iroquois, while fierce, were not "toujours avides du sang humain." Bacqueville de la Potherie, Histoire de L'Amérique Septentrionale, 4 tomes [1722] (Paris, Chez Brocas, 1753), 3: preface.

for the superficial delineation of their motives.<sup>39</sup> However, this is a modern reaction to Parkman's work. Most of Parkman's contemporaries thought his book and his views of the Iroquois quite sound.<sup>40</sup> Yet, few of those who read Parkman for his views on the Iroquois relied on this version of events when writing of the Iroquois themselves. A few years later he offered another motive for Iroquois wars, and it was this interpretation that his contemporaries came to use to explain Iroquois relations with Europeans and natives.

Writing in 1869 Parkman sought to explain Iroquois wars against the Miamis and Illinois in the 1680s. Certainly Iroquois 'ferocity' had a role to play in these wars.

Yet it was not alone their homicidal fury that now impelled them to another war. Strange as it may seem, this war was in no small measure one of commercial advantage. They had long traded with the Dutch and English of New York, who gave them, in exchange for their furs, the guns, ammunition, knives, hatchets, kettles, beads, and brandy which had become indispensable to them. Game was scarce in their country. They must seek their beaver and other skins in the vacant territories of the tribes they had destroyed; but this did not content them. The French of Canada were seeking to secure a monopoly of the furs of the north and west; and, of late, the enterprises of La Salle on the tributaries of the Mississippi had especially

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<sup>39</sup> See for example Hunt, Wars of the Iroquois, 5, 7, 187; Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984), 18, 100.

<sup>40</sup> Bancroft commended Parkman for, among other things, "excellent judgment", while Morgan called the Jesuits a "splendid contribution to American History and Ethnology." George Bancroft to Parkman, May [n.d.], 1867 and L.H. Morgan to Parkman June 5, [1867?], both quoted in Jacobs, ed., Parkman Letters, 2: 14.

roused the jealousy of the Iroquois, fomented, moreover, by Dutch and English traders. These crafty savages would fain reduce all these regions to subjection, and draw thence an exhaustless supply of furs, to be bartered for English goods with the traders of Albany.<sup>41</sup>

In his biography of Frontenac, published in 1877, Parkman offered a more precise analysis of Iroquois motives:

This movement of the western Iroquois had a double incentive,--their love of fighting and their love of gain. It was a war of conquest and of trade. All five tribes of the league had become dependent on the English and Dutch of Albany for guns, powder, lead, brandy, and many other things that they had learned to regard as necessities. Beaverskins alone could buy them; but to the Iroquois the supply of beaver was limited. The regions of the west and northwest, the upper Mississippi with its tributaries, and above all, the forests of the upper lakes, were occupied by tribes in the interest of the French...whose traders controlled their immense trade...It was the purpose of the Iroquois to master all this traffic, conquer the tribes who had possession of it, and divert the entire supply of furs to themselves, and through themselves to the English Dutch.<sup>42</sup>

In these passages are most of the essential elements of what has come to be the "beaver wars" interpretation--the dependence on European goods, the implicit destruction of Iroquois culture, the extinction of beaver in Iroquois lands, and the attempt to divert the furs of others to trade for needed goods. Parkman made no attempt to support the central

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<sup>41</sup> Francis Parkman, Discovery of the Great West: A Historical Narrative (London: John Murray, 1869), 203. This passage remained unaltered when Parkman revised this book and published it in 1879 as La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West [1879] (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1907). See p. 204.

<sup>42</sup> Parkman, Frontenac, 79-80.

assumptions of this hypothesis with documentary evidence. There was, as far as Parkman was concerned, no reason. It was obvious to him that native culture was inferior to that of Europeans and that the Iroquois would naturally see the advantage of European goods over those they produced themselves. This view flowed naturally from his negative conceptions of Indians. In short, the basis of the "beaver wars" theory rests on an ethnocentric belief in the superiority of European society; at heart it is as inherently biased as Parkman's view of Iroquois character.

Nonetheless it remains significant that, while not denying Iroquois 'ferocity' as a motive, Parkman stressed an 'economic' motive for the wars of the 1680s. Parkman did not try to use this motive to explain Iroquois wars against any other groups in this or earlier periods. He did state that the Iroquois hunted on the lands of the Hurons and others, but this seems to be an effect of the wars produced by "homicidal fury" rather than a cause of those wars. The implications of this view for Iroquois relations with the French were left unstated, but seem clear nevertheless: to revenge and "insensate fury", one must now add the motive of competing to control the fur trade as causes of the Iroquois wars against New France.

It did not take long for this interpretation to work its way into histories of English-Iroquois, French-Iroquois, and Iroquois-Native relations written by Americans. With the

publication of Justin Winsor's Narrative and Critical History of America in the mid-to-late-1880s it seems to have established itself as a significant interpretative model.<sup>43</sup> Andrew M. Davis, for example viewed Iroquois hostility towards New France as a response to Champlain's attacks, but also stressed that the Iroquois were bound to be drawn to the English because their interests lay in opposing French expansion; "[i]f the Iroquois permitted the Indians of the Northwest to negotiate with the French, and interposed no obstacle to the transporting of peltries from the upper lakes to Montreal and Quebec, they would forfeit all the commercial benefits which belonged to their geographical position."<sup>44</sup> And in his essay on natives in America, George Ellis explained the changes in native life as products of the European struggle for control of the fur trade and Indian-European alliances being shaped, in part, from desires to gain access to "coveted goods".<sup>45</sup> This stress on the role of the fur

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<sup>43</sup> It did not, however, completely replace the view that Champlain's raids were the cause of Iroquois aggression against New France. In 1905 R.G. Thwaites accounted for Iroquois hostilities against the colony based solely in terms of Champlain's actions. R.G. Thwaites, France in America, 1497-1763 [1905] (Facsimile reprint, New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1968), 35-37.

<sup>44</sup> Andrew M. Davis, "Canada and Louisiana", Winsor, ed., Narrative and Critical History of America, 5: 2.

<sup>45</sup> George E. Ellis, "The Red Indian of North America in Contact with the French and English", in *Ibid*, 1: 283, 285, 286. Indeed, Parkman's work served as a basis for this analysis. His authoritative discussion of New France's history and of Indian nature was praised in the "Critical Essay on the Sources of Information" by Winsor and Ellis which followed

trade and the Iroquois seeking to take commercial advantage of it are clearly the product of Parkman's influence.<sup>46</sup>

Parkman's interpretation of the causes of Iroquois warfare, however, appears to have had little influence on the historiography of Franco-Iroquois relations in Quebec in the nineteenth century. While some Quebec historians appreciated his bringing the history of New France to a wider audience,<sup>47</sup> most resented the condescending tone of his histories and the anti-Catholic bias that were deemed inherent in any work by a

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Ellis' chapter. (Ibid, 316-317, and 317, note 1.) This is not surprising since Parkman was good friends with Winsor and Ellis, and on several occasions gave Ellis advice and information about Indians. See Jacobs, ed., Parkman Letters, 2: 139, note 1; Parkman to Ellis, 7 May, 1875, Ibid, 80-81.

<sup>46</sup> In 1747 Colden had stressed the importance of the fur trade to the English and how significant the Iroquois were in that trade, but the emphasis was on how important the trade was to New York, not how central it was to accounting for Iroquois wars. Cadwallader Colden, The History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada, Which are dependent on the Province of New-York in America, and Are the Barrier between the English and French in that Part of the World (London: T. Osborne, 1747, facsimile reprint, Toronto: Coles Publishing, 1972.) The importance of the Iroquois to New York's trade was made clear in the book's subtitle, and in documents appended to the 1747 edition. See especially, "A MEMORIAL concerning the Furr-Trade of New York", C. Colden, 10 Nov., 1724, 25-42. The section of documents has a separate pagination from the History.

<sup>47</sup> The most notable of these was the Abbé Casgrain, although even he was not averse to criticizing Parkman for what Casgrain thought were errors inspired by Protestant bias. Casgrain, Parkman, 11, 65. See also Parkman's letters to Casgrain in Jacobs, ed., Parkman Letters, vol. 2, passim.

Protestant.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, French Canadian historians of New France had their own ideological axes to grind. Of Parkman's contemporaries, four stand out: François-Xavier Garneau, Abbé Ferland, Abbé Faillon, and Benjamin Sulte.<sup>49</sup>

As in Parkman's case, the views Garneau, Ferland, Faillon, and Sulte held about Indians, no doubt, played a part in shaping their interpretations of Franco-Iroquois relations. Garneau tended to portray Indians, in general, in rather idealized terms.<sup>50</sup> As Catholic priests, Faillon and Ferland had their views of Indians shaped by the dogmas of that religion. They believed that Indians were living in a 'barbaric' and 'graceless' state because they did not know

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<sup>48</sup> See Parkman to Pierre Margry, 13 Jan., 1880, Jacobs, ed., Parkman Letters, 2: 137. Serge Gagnon has called Parkman "the foreign writer most frequently criticized" by French-Canadians in the nineteenth century. (Gagnon, Quebec and its Historians: 1840 to 1920, 143, note 6.) Benjamin Sulte was particularly hostile to Parkman. (Ibid, 68, 99)

<sup>49</sup> François-Xavier Garneau, Histoire du Canada, [1845-1852], 5th ed., rev, 2 vols. (Paris: Librairie Félix Arcan, 1913-1920); Abbé Jean-Baptiste-Antoine Ferland, Cours d'histoire du Canada, 2 vols. (Quebec: Augustin Coté, 1861 and 1865); Abbé Etienne-Michel Faillon, Histoire de la Colonie Française en Canada [1534-1682], 3 tomes (Villemarie: Bibliotheque Paroissiale, 1865-1866); Benjamin Sulte, "La guerre des Iroquois, 1600-1653", Mémoires de la Société Royale du Canada, deuxième série, vol. 3, sect. 1 (1897): 63-92.

<sup>50</sup> This was probably the consequence, as Gagnon observed, of his use of natives as a tool to criticize contemporary society. Gagnon, Quebec and its Historians: 1840 to 1920, 29. Gagnon's efforts to make Garneau's pronouncements on Indians seem ahead of their time, however, seem far fetched. No one who claims, as did Garneau, that there was little difference among North American Indians in "leurs personnes, leurs moeurs, [et] leurs usages" can be considered a perceptive student of Indians. Garneau, Histoire, 1: 121.

God. Knowledge of God and European ways would make Indians both civilized and welcome members of God's Kingdom.<sup>51</sup> Sulte painted a more negative image of Indians than the others writing that they did not know "comment s'élever au dessus de la brute et ne le desirant pas. C'est le bas de l'échelle de l'humanité."<sup>52</sup> In the end, though, these views were not always clearly reflected in their explanations of Franco-Iroquois relations. Garneau, for example, despite his "noble savage" view of Indians accounted for Iroquois warfare by stressing their "barbarity", and Sulte, despite his low opinion of their place on the scale of humanity, credited a refined and shrewd policy as the source of Iroquois hostility towards New France.<sup>53</sup>

Of greater significance to their interpretations of Iroquois relations with the French was their nationalism. Faillon and Ferland were 'clerico-nationalists'. For them, the history of New France was the story of the growth of a French-Catholic people and the religious institutions that made that development possible.<sup>54</sup> Garneau and Sulte were 'secular nationalists'. For Garneau the history of New France

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<sup>51</sup> Ferland, Histoire du Canada, 1: 96; Faillon, Histoire, 1: 298-301. See also Gagnon, Quebec and its Historians: 1840 to 1920, 58-59.

<sup>52</sup> Sulte, "Guerre des Iroquois", 65.

<sup>53</sup> See the discussion below.

<sup>54</sup> Ferland, Histoire du Canada, 1: III-VI; Faillon, Histoire, 1: xii-xiii.

was the story of a struggle towards a liberal and democratic society.<sup>55</sup> For Sulte it was the a story of a pastoral people surviving in the face of materialistic forces, and at times, despite of the religious organizations.<sup>56</sup> The role of the Iroquois in New France's history was subordinated to those broader interpretations. Thus, if for Ferland and especially Faillon the history of New France was the delineation of God's visible hand at work, then the Iroquois were God's tool, just as for Parkman they had been liberty's.<sup>57</sup> The Iroquois were the means by which God tested the mettle of the colony and how He showed His mercy by ultimately saving the colony from this peril. If for Sulte the story of New France was one of long struggle to establish an agrarian paradise, the Iroquois served as both vivid example of the hurdles to be overcome to reach that goal, and of the calamities drawn upon the colony by materialist and mercantile desires to exploit the fur trade at the expense of agricultural settlement. For Garneau the wars against the Iroquois show "vivement la situation de nos ancêtres, le dangers auxquels ils étaient continuellement exposés, le courage et la constance qu'ils montraient dans ces

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<sup>55</sup> Garneau, Histoire, 1: xlii- lii. See also, Gagnon, Quebec and its Historians: 1840 to 1920, 9-43.

<sup>56</sup> Gagnon, Quebec and its Historians: 1840 to 1920, 71, 86-88. Sulte, for example, was vehemently anti-Jesuit. He resented their focus on mission activities to the detriment of parish work and because it drew the hatred of natives upon the French. Ibid, 78-82.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 52-53. Even Sulte did not rule out the work of providence. Ibid, 76.

luttres barbares".<sup>58</sup> In short, they were an obstacle that French Canadians had to face on their road towards creating a liberal democratic nation.

François-Xavier Garneau's explanation of Franco-Iroquois relations is based on a rather simplistic and crude notion of the causes of Indian warfare, and because of this it is less sophisticated than those of his nineteenth century French compatriots. Garneau recognized that Indians fought for many reasons. They warred for right of passage through, or access to, hunting territories, to defend their lands, for revenge, and because of love of battle "ou du pillage".<sup>59</sup> But of all these reasons, it was love of battle which Garneau seems to have felt was the most significant cause of native warfare. Like Parkman, he ascribed to Indians a type of "bloodlust", an almost physiological reaction, produced by the thought of warring, and which led to war.

Le seul mot de guerre excitait chez les jeunes sauvages un frémissement plein de délices, venant d'un profond enthousiasme. Le bruit de la mêlée, la vue d'ennemis palpitants dans le sang, les envraient de joie. L'imagination sans cesse enflammé par le récit des exploits des leurs pères, ils brulaient des se distinguer comme eux dans les combats.<sup>60</sup>

This desire for war is never stated to be the sole reason for hostilities against New France, but it seems to underly and

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<sup>58</sup> Garneau, Histoire, 1: 335.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 124.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, 123-124.

give added impetus to other causes of war.

In Garneau's view, New France's problems with the Iroquois began when Champlain involved the French in longstanding native hostilities. Champlain's battles against the Iroquois had the effect of leading to 100 years of war against the colony.<sup>61</sup> Garneau does not explain how or why that was so (possibly it was the result of the "need" to war), nor does he blame Champlain. Indeed, Champlain tried to bring peace to the warring tribes around the colony, but since they were "rendus au dernier degré de décadence" they would not heed his advice.<sup>62</sup> Native wars continued apace until the early 1640s. After 1640, angered at French settlements in their lands, the Iroquois turned against the Hurons and Algonquins. They needed to avenge these insults and, since they had a "supériorité décidée" over these tribes they attacked them rather than the French.<sup>63</sup> The Hurons could not resist the Iroquois who wanted to make but one people and one land with them.<sup>64</sup> Animated by their victories in the Great Lakes, the Iroquois turned in earnest against the French.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid, 76.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, 149.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, 158. Garneau's reasoning here implies that the Iroquois were too weak or cowardly to attack New France, the true source of their anger.

<sup>64</sup> Garneau, *Histoire*, 1: 159. Like others who would come across this clearly stated goal of Iroquois policy, Garneau did not make anything of it.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, 169.

French military expeditions bought the colony some peace until the 1680s when war again broke out. This war, Garneau concluded, was fostered by the English who were using the Iroquois to try and gain sole control of the fur trade.<sup>66</sup> As French and English commercial rivalry heated up towards the end of the century, the Iroquois, "qui ne demandaient qu'à combattre", became, because of their "barbarie", "d'aveugles instruments" of these competing forces.<sup>67</sup>

Elements of Garneau's view of events can be found in the works of Faillon, Ferland, and Sulte. The role of Champlain in bringing the wrath of the Iroquois down upon the French is only one assumption shared by all four. But there are also significant differences. Indeed, Faillon, Ferland, and Sulte offer more complex interpretations of Franco-Iroquois relations than does Garneau.

The interpretations of Faillon and Ferland shared much in common, but Ferland's was by far the more complete. Both Faillon and Ferland viewed Iroquois-French relations in the broader context of Iroquois-native relations that were being played out prior to European settlements in Canada. The Iroquois fought the Algonquins and their Huron allies before the advent of the French.<sup>68</sup> When Champlain arrived he joined

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid, 315.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, 319.

<sup>68</sup> Ferland, Histoire du Canada, 1: 146; Faillon, Histoire, 1: 136.

the Algonquin and Huron side, killed some Iroquois, and as a result incurred the lasting hatred of the Iroquois.<sup>69</sup> Thus the wars against New France were not a new phenomena, but rather the extension of existing wars now to include the French. Central to the interpretations of each historian was the role of Champlain. For Faillon, Champlain's actions were a type of "délit originel" and, as in Adam and Eve's case, the fault of one extended to and was to be atoned for by all.<sup>70</sup> The penance for Champlain's sin was to be paid for by eighty years of Iroquois attacks against the whole colony. Ferland offered a less mystical answer. He devoted a good deal of space to explaining the role of revenge, clan obligations, and individual freedom in propagating Iroquois wars.<sup>71</sup> Although he did not state it explicitly, the implication was that it was these cultural constraints and rules to avenge deaths and attacks that led to the continued Iroquois incursions against New France. For Ferland, Champlain's error was unwittingly involving the French in the endless cycle of native wars.

For both men the factors that explained the early

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<sup>69</sup> Ferland wrote that the attack "des Français contre une des cinq nations fut le commencement et, probalement, la cause des hostilités" between French and Iroquois, while Faillon stated unequivocally that Champlain's attacks made the Iroquois "ennemies irréconciliables de la France." Ferland, Histoire du Canada, 1: 148; Faillon, Histoire, 1: 138.

<sup>70</sup> Faillon, Histoire, 1: 355. He even pointed out that the Mohawk warned the French not to get involved in their wars. Ibid, 141.

<sup>71</sup> Ferland, Histoire du Canada, 1: 110, 133.

Iroquois wars against natives and the start of them against New France also helped to account for their persistence throughout the seventeenth century. Indeed, while Faillon detailed attacks against the colony, and even the destruction of the Hurons, no reasons for these wars were given.<sup>72</sup> While Faillon did not fail to point out the motives behind specific Iroquois dealings with the colony, the implicit assumption was that the overall motive for attacks against New France was revenge for Champlain's actions, while the destruction of the Hurons and other tribes was the continuation of timeless intertribal feuds.<sup>73</sup> For Ferland, too, the motives for warring remained constant through out the century, and revenge seemed to be the operative motive.<sup>74</sup> He did suggest that there might have been a greater overall purpose to these wars. Ferland thought that "[la] politique des Iroquois semble, vers cette époque, [the 1650s] avoir été d'entourer leur pays d'une vaste solitude, et d'entendre sans cesse ce cercle de désolation, par la destruction ou la dispersion des tribus environnantes."<sup>75</sup> Unfortunately, if there was some other consideration behind this attempt to create space, or a buffer zone, between the Iroquois and their Indian neighbours,

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<sup>72</sup> Faillon, Histoire, 2: 28-29, 63, 111-113, 370, 391-392; Ibid, 3: 13.

<sup>73</sup> See his analysis of Iroquois peace efforts in 1641 and 1645. Faillon, Histoire, 1: 361-367; Ibid, 2: 34-42.

<sup>74</sup> Ferland, Histoire du Canada, 1: 423-424.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, 387.

Ferland failed to explain what it might have been. In any case, once the Hurons were destroyed the Iroquois turned their attention towards the French. Now they could exact revenge for Champlain, and this accounted for the renewed vigour of Iroquois attacks against the colony.<sup>76</sup>

Sulte's interpretation of Iroquois motives was in places similar to that of Faillon and Ferland. Like them, he stressed the longevity and on-going nature of native warfare before the arrival of the French.<sup>77</sup> He also attributed the early hostility of the Iroquois to Champlain's actions. But, unlike Faillon and Ferland, and much like Garneau, Sulte did not blame Champlain. According to Sulte, Champlain had only acted in self defense.<sup>78</sup> Nor did revenge help to account for all Iroquois hostilities throughout the century. As far as Sulte was concerned, revenge and ancient tribal hostilities became increasingly insignificant factors in explaining Iroquois wars against natives and French. By the 1630s new causes for war had developed. The Dutch were putting pressure on the Iroquois for furs at the same time the French were expanding their efforts in the fur trade.<sup>79</sup>

Les Iroquois avaient donc devant eux leurs anciens

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid, 388-389.

<sup>77</sup> Sulte, "La guerre des Iroquois", 66-67.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, 67.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, 68. He does not suggest that the Iroquois had no furs, but that the best furs were from "Haut Canada" and that the Hurons and Iroquets were trading these to the French.

ennemis doublés d'Européens accapareurs, comme ils avaient derrière eux d'autres hommes de race blanche prêts à tout envahir. Ils décidèrent d'employer la diplomatie afin de n'être pas serrés entre ces deux influences et de les exploiter à leur profit. De ce plan, qui fut poursuivi avec une tenacité et une adresse rares, naquit la guerre contre les Hurons et les Français...<sup>80</sup>

The aim of Iroquois policy was both "unique" and "à double effet: contenir les Européens [et] agrandir la domination des Iroquois".<sup>81</sup> In their desire for furs the Iroquois "anéatit les Hurons qui le gênaient et enveloppa dans sa vengeance les hommes blancs qui favorisaient ses ennemis héréditaires."<sup>82</sup> In short, French efforts to exploit the fur trade were the cause of Iroquois wars against the colony because they brought the French into conflict with Iroquois plans for the fur trade.<sup>83</sup>

If in his focus on economic motives and on the role of the fur trade Sulte came close to Parkman's interpretation of events, he nonetheless presented a more complex and less complete interpretation. Parkman accounted for the early wars

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid, 69.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. What is not made clear is why the Iroquois wanted to contain the Europeans nor to what end they wanted to increase their power. Given the context one can assume that it was to control the fur trade, but that is neither that obvious nor could other possible motives be ruled out.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> This is a central theme of Sulte's work and is part of his criticism against the government and religious organizations of the colony. For him, the efforts at trade in place of agricultural development were the root of the colony's ills. Ibid, 70, 83, 86-87, 89.

in terms of senseless fury while the latter wars were products of Iroquois desire to gain furs to trade for goods upon which they had become dependant. For Sulte, the desire for furs accounted for the wars against the Hurons and, one suspects, for all the later wars as well.<sup>84</sup> But, unlike Parkman, Sulte left the overall aim of gaining furs rather vague. He did not claim that the Iroquois were dependant on European goods, and it is not clear why the Iroquois wanted to "contenir les Européens" or "agrandir" their "domination", nor how having furs to trade would facilitate either goal. Nevertheless, there was very little that was 'irrational' about Iroquois policy in Sulte's analysis. For him the aims of the Iroquois were clear, and Sulte was convinced that the Iroquois were both methodical and determined in their efforts to achieve them.<sup>85</sup> This stands in contrast to Parkman who claimed that Iroquois passions led them to actions that were against their best interests.<sup>86</sup> Very much like Parkman, however, Sulte offered no proof for his assertions. Each historian presented his interpretation and then proceeded to focus on other aspects of the narrative as if their views were self evident.

In the end, though, the views of Parkman's French Canadian contemporaries were largely ignored. The "beaver wars" interpretation was primarily developed by American

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<sup>84</sup> Sulte did not address the later wars in this article.

<sup>85</sup> Sulte, "Guerre des Iroquois", 69.

<sup>86</sup> Parkman, Jesuits, 434.

historians. After 1940, when it came to be widely accepted by historians of New France, it was the version that traced its roots back to Parkman.

The most notable feature in next phase of the evolution of the "beaver wars" theory was the development of the view that Indians were, in some ways, like Europeans. While this attitudinal change in historians was an important step away from the virulent ethnocentrism of Parkman, it led to an image of the Iroquois that was as distorted and as far off the mark as Parkman's. Unlike Parkman, the next generation of historians did not try to establish what the Iroquois were like; they assumed they were like Europeans, or at least had similar attitudes in certain analogous situations. In its crudest form this view ignored the cultural context of the Iroquois altogether. The more refined versions contended, even if they did not demonstrate, that cultural change had led the Iroquois to become acculturated to European ways. Among values shared by Iroquois and European was the desire for accumulation of material wealth. This view lay at the heart of the next major interpretations that sought to answer the question of why the Iroquois warred against natives and Europeans.

The transformation of the Iroquois from ruthless warriors to what one critical scholar has called "capitalist

entrepreneurs in moccasins"<sup>87</sup> began in earnest in 1915 with the publication of Peter Wraxall's manuscript of "An Abridgement of the Records of Indian Affairs contained in Four Folio Volumes, transacted in the Colony of New York from the year 1678 to the Year 1751".<sup>88</sup> In the introductory essay the editor, Charles McIlwain, first suggested that the Iroquois were acting as "middlemen" in the trade between natives and English.<sup>89</sup> Given the centrality of his views to later historiography, they are worth citing at length. According to McIlwain

The great role of the Iroquois was that of middlemen between the "Far Indians" and the English, a role which enabled them not only to obtain material benefits, but to retain that position of superiority over the Indians of the eastern half of the United States which they had probably first secured through their knowledge of

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<sup>87</sup> W.J. Eccles, Essays on New France (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1987), preface [xi].

<sup>88</sup> He compiled the abridgement to make a case for the need for an agent to handle relations between the colony of New York and her native allies. It was published as Peter Wraxall, An Abridgement of the Indian Affairs contained in four folio volumes, transacted in the colony of New York, from the year 1678 to the year 1751, Charles H. McIlwain, ed., [1915] (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1968). Hereafter, Wraxall, Indian Affairs.

<sup>89</sup> He did not define what he meant by the term middleman. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary gives the following definition for the term: "a dealer or agent intermediate between the producer of goods and the retailer or consumer." The purpose of the activity is to make some material gain in the process of carrying out the transactions. The meaning of the term has not changed over the years and it seems safe to assume that it was this practice that McIlwain had in mind. The universality of the phrase probably accounts for why he did not explain it, but it seems important to make clear here to what he was referring.

the white man's firearms, but could now no longer hope to hold by mere force alone, ... They hoped to retain by peaceable means what they could not expect any longer to keep by force. This could be done by alliance and by trade alone, and by English trade alone...

The Iroquois were fully alive to the great advantages their situation gave them. It became, therefore, a consistent part of their policy to do their utmost to induce the nations of the interior to desert the French and accept English goods...

The very existence of the Five Nations depended on this. There were no beaver left in their own country. As early as 1671, we have a French memoir to the effect that hardly a single beaver could be found south of Lake Ontario. The Iroquois had to get their beaver from the Indians farther west or get none, and beaver they must have or lose the rum, the clothing, guns and ammunition which had become necessary to their happiness and even to their existence... Particularly important to them at one period were the Hurons and the Tobacco Nation, who were in such a position geographically that they could intercept all furs coming from the west to Canada. To intercept trade there was to turn it southward, where it must pass through the Iroquois country to Albany. It is easy to see the bearing of conditions such as these on the history of the Indians at this time,--the Fox Wars, the desperate struggle with the Hurons, the war between the Iroquois and the Illinois, the alliance between Iroquois and Miamis, the general influence of the Iroquois over the tribes as far as the Mississippi. It is little wonder the Iroquois valued a connection with the English which lay at the bottom of such influence and power...<sup>90</sup>

In places this interpretation was little more than a repetition of what Parkman had claimed some forty-six years earlier. McIlwain again mentioned the dependence on European goods, the lack of furs among the Iroquois, and how the Iroquois tried to divert the fur trade in order to trade for those goods upon which they had become dependant. But he went

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<sup>90</sup> McIlwain, introduction to Wraxall's, Indian Affairs, xlii-xliv.

further than Parkman did and claimed that these items were vital to Iroquois survival. Which trade goods were more important was not specified. New as well was the claim that these were causes of the wars against the Hurons and Petuns, even though he indicated, based on one source, that the Iroquois ran out of furs only in 1671, some twenty years after both those tribes were dispersed by Iroquois invasions.<sup>91</sup> But the most significant departure from past interpretations was the claim that the Iroquois were acting as middlemen in the trade between the western tribes and the English. By acting as middlemen, the Iroquois would reap some material advantage and maintain political superiority over other native groups. Whether that "material advantage" was profit, the general purpose of being a middleman, or something else is not made clear. The political goals were achieved, one assumes, by controlling access to cheap English trade goods.

What is lacking from McIlwain's interpretation is any documentary evidence to substantiate it. Like Parkman he claimed that the Iroquois were dependant on European goods, but offered no evidence to support that contention. His interpretation also suggested that the Iroquois were trading for profit, as middlemen did, and that they were using that position for political purposes. But in a communal society accumulation of personal wealth, or working for the sake of

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<sup>91</sup> This is the first reference to that effect in the American literature. Sulte had made this same contention in Canada in 1897.

making a profit, were alien characteristics. He ignored this aspect of Iroquois society and did nothing to show how it had been altered so that these foreign concepts had become part of Iroquois culture. It does not appear unreasonable to claim that the Iroquois were trying to use the fur trade for political ends, but again, no examples of this behaviour were provided.<sup>92</sup>

McIlwain also failed to furnish evidence for his point about the Iroquois acting as middlemen. Parkman's analysis of Iroquois motives, especially the 1877 version, might appear to hint at a middlemen type of behaviour, but McIlwain did not cite Parkman in support of this claim. Moreover, a careful reading makes it clear that Parkman was contending that the furs were getting to the English because the Iroquois were forcibly taking them from the other tribes and trading them to the English for goods for themselves, not because they were taking English trade wares to those tribes in return for furs.<sup>93</sup> In support of his assertion that the Iroquois and English valued their relationship because it gave power to the Iroquois and furs to the English, McIlwain cited a passage from the work of the eighteenth-century French historian

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<sup>92</sup> Sulte had already claimed that the Iroquois were using the fur trade (in some unspecified way) for political ends. But Sulte did not prove that point nor did McIlwain cite him as authority.

<sup>93</sup> This view is strengthened when one takes into account the 1869 version of this interpretation. Moreover, Parkman did not support his views with documentary evidence.

Charlevoix.<sup>94</sup> In it McIlwain may have thought he saw support for his description of the Iroquois as middlemen, but that is not the case. Charlevoix wrote:

A la vérité les Anglois, ansi que je l'ai déjà remarqué, partageoient dès-lors avec les François la Traite des Pelleterie; & c'est principalement ce que engageiot à fomenter la guerre entre nous & les Iroquois, parce qu'ils ne pouvoient avoir de bonnes Pelletries, qui se tirent des Quartiers du Nord, que par le moyen de ces Sauvages, lesquels ne pouvoient gueres se reconcilier avec nous, sans leur fermer cette précieuse Mine.

Ce n'est pas que les Iroquois soient grands Chasseurs; mais outre qu'ils enlevoient souvent à nos Alliés & à nos Voyageurs les Pelleteries, que ceux-ci portoient à Montreal, ils engageoient plusieurs Nations, & souvent même nos Coureurs de Bois, à traiter avec les Anglois de la Nouvelle York, & le profit, qu'il tiroient de ce commerce, dont leur Pays devenoit nécessairement le centre, les retenoit dans les intérêts des Anglois.<sup>95</sup>

This passage bears a striking resemblance to Parkman's analysis. It is not unlikely that Charlevoix influenced Parkman on this point, but in the end it seems clear that Charlevoix also meant that the English got the furs because the Iroquois took them from others, and not because they were middlemen. Whether the "profit" the Iroquois derived from their actions was economic or political, Charlevoix did not state. In short, neither the older aspects of the growing 'beaver wars' thesis nor its additions were substantiated by

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<sup>94</sup> McIlwain in Wraxall's Indian Affairs, xliv, note 1.

<sup>95</sup> Pierre Francois-Xavier Charlevoix, Histoire et Description General de la Nouvelle France, avec le Journal Historique d'un Voyage fait par ordre du Roi dans l'Amérique Septentrionale, 6 tomes (Paris: Chez Rollin Fils, , 1744), 3: 387-388.

McIlwain's work.

Lack of evidence did not hinder the acceptance of McIlwain's interpretation. In 1925 it formed the basis of Louise Kellogg's analysis of the role played by the Iroquois in the development of Wisconsin and the Northwest.<sup>96</sup> In 1930 Harold Innis used it to explain the role of natives in the fur trade in his seminal work The Fur Trade in Canada.<sup>97</sup> And in 1933 John Brebner, in his work on the exploration of America, argued that as early as 1615 the Iroquois and Huron were competing middlemen in the fur trade and that this was the cause of their wars at the time Champlain began his explorations.<sup>98</sup>

The single most important use of the 'beaver wars' theory came in 1940 with the publication of George Hunt's The Wars of the Iroquois: A Study in Intertribal Trade Relations.<sup>99</sup> It

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<sup>96</sup> Louise Kellogg, The French Régime in Wisconsin and in the Northwest [1925] (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1968), 222, 243.

<sup>97</sup> Harold Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada [1930, revised 1956] (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 20. To his credit Innis tried to show how native culture had been altered and weakened by contact with Europeans. Ibid, 15-21.

<sup>98</sup> John Bartlet Brebner, The Explorers of North America: 1492-1806 [1933] (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955), 142.

<sup>99</sup> Reviewers greeted Hunt's book with a critical eye. Yet, while they were quick to point out the strong economic bias and monocausal nature of his interpretation, they were also in accord that it was an important book and a scholarly contribution to the history of the Iroquois and the colonial era. Hindsight reveals that they seriously underestimated the impact of Wars of the Iroquois. See, American Anthropologist, 42, 4 (October-December, 1940): 662-664; American Historical

was the first modern work of history devoted to explaining the wars of the Iroquois and essentially from the perspective of the Indian. Hunt put all the features of the "beaver wars" theory to use in his effort to explain the causes of Iroquois wars against a wide range of native groups.

Hunt's work began with the generally accurate assumption that in northeastern North America, trade was a significant basis of early Indian-European contact and relations. Unfortunately, Hunt then went on to develop a highly speculative picture of changes in native society as a result of trade-based contact. He believed that the advent of permanent European settlements permitted the "constant participation of every native" in the trade and that natives "were usually frantically eager" to do so.<sup>100</sup> The result was a change, "almost overnight", in the "fundamental conditions of the aboriginal economy."<sup>101</sup> The fur trade became the determining factor in Indian-Indian relations, and as old skills were lost, Indians became dependant on European goods for survival and fought each other for the furs that would

Review, 46, 2 (January, 1941): 415-416; Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 27, 2 (September, 1940): 287-288; Canadian Historical Review, 31, 2 (June, 1940): 211-212. Hunt died April 18, 1947 at the age of 48. (American Historical Review, 52, 4 9 (June, 1947): 835). He appears not to have elaborated upon, or revised his views in print after 1940.

<sup>100</sup> Hunt, Wars of the Iroquois, 4.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

purchase those goods.<sup>102</sup>

Providing absolutely no evidence to support this appraisal of the consequences of early Indian-European contact on the various cultures in the Northeast, he applied these conclusions to the Iroquois.<sup>103</sup> Taking his scenario as proven, Hunt then explained all major aggressions in the years before 1690 as products of Iroquois economic necessity. To survive in their geographic location the Iroquois had to gain a middleman status in the fur trade. Because of dependency on European goods, their socio-economic survival required attaining such a position. The Hurons, however, controlled this function. When the Iroquois ran out of their own supply of furs and could not get any by peaceful means, the Five Nations made a decision to dislodge the Hurons, even if it meant destroying them.<sup>104</sup> For Hunt it was this singular and persistent motive that accounted for the Iroquois wars against the Hurons and other native groups.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid, 4-5. Or as Hunt dramatically put it, "old institutions and economies had profoundly altered or disappeared completely at the electrifying touch of the white man's trade..." Ibid, 5.

<sup>103</sup> Heidenreich, for example, has shown that it took several years of concerted effort to get the Hurons to come to trade with the French, and that when they did show up it was as much to form a political alliance as it was a trade one. Heidenreich, Huronian: A History and Geography of the Huron Indians, 1600-1650 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 232-237.

<sup>104</sup> Hunt, Wars of the Iroquois, 11, 19, 34, 135, 159.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, 159.

One of Hunt's underlying assumptions was that the Iroquois were pretty much like Europeans, at least insofar as they waged war for economic reasons.<sup>106</sup> By showing that the Iroquois acted as middlemen (that is, they were motivated by materialism and economic self-interest), and that wars were produced by desires to attain that position, he would support that broader thesis.<sup>107</sup> To his credit, Hunt did start out with the intention of supporting his middleman thesis. This is an approach those who had espoused aspects of the "beaver wars" theory before him had failed to attempt. But, what he in fact did was assume that his views about culture change and economic self-interest were valid. This allowed him to interpret Iroquois actions in light of those views. His interpretation of those actions then served as proof for his views of culture change and warfare being brought on by economic concerns. This is sophistry. Moreover, as Allen Trelease has pointed out, Hunt based his middleman interpretation on a few references, distorted his sources, and found "clear-cut evidence where actually it was obscure or

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid, 12. He was particularly disdainful of Parkman's "insensate fury" argument, and wished to show that the Iroquois had perfectly logical reasons for their wars. Ibid, 5.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, 21. Like some later writers, he defined self-interest in only one way. See for example, Bruce Trigger, "Early Native North American Responses to European Contact: Romantic versus Rationalistic Interpretations", Journal of American History, 77, 4 (March, 1991): 1195-1215.

non-existent".<sup>108</sup> Also, as Hunt's reviewers pointed out when his book was published and as Trelease again stressed twenty-two years later, Hunt ignored all the other factors that motivated the Iroquois to war.<sup>109</sup> Revenge, pride, and need for captives for adoption and torture all continued to be goals of Iroquois warfare.<sup>110</sup>

The problems with Hunt's work flowed from his assumption that people were all the same. But the Iroquois of 1640 were similar to Americans in 1940 only in the range and complexity of emotions, drives and cultural limitations each had to deal with. Hunt failed to take into account the multiplicity of motives and the differences of culture. Unfortunately for the history of the Iroquois, Hunt was all too successful. His simplistic, monocausal, and economically deterministic explanation seemed to have resolved the question of why the Iroquois engaged in wars against other natives. Historians of the Iroquois, other native groups, and European colonies have come to rely almost exclusively on Hunt's work for their assessments of Iroquois motives.

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<sup>108</sup> Allen Trelease, "The Iroquois and the Western Fur Trade: A Problem in Interpretation", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 49, 1 (June 1962): 32-51, quote on 37.

<sup>109</sup> See sources cited in note 99 above, and Trelease, "The Iroquois and the Western Fur Trade", 36, 50.

<sup>110</sup> These points will be discussed in later chapters, but see also George Snyderman, Behind the Tree of Peace: A Sociological Analysis of Iroquois Warfare. Pennsylvania Archaeologist, 18, 3-4, (Fall 1948): 3-93; Daniel Richter, "War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience", The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., XL, 4 (October 1983): 528-559.

Of all the works on French-Iroquois relations, the least satisfactory is Robert A. Goldstein's French-Iroquois Diplomatic and Military Relations, 1609-1701.<sup>111</sup> The book was published in 1969 but, with the exception of a few works, the bibliography dates from 1940 and prior.<sup>112</sup> Indeed, the list of sources is a mere three pages long, contains no manuscript sources, and no material on the French which had not appeared in translation.<sup>113</sup> For a work that purported to deal with relations from the French perspective, these were not minor omissions. In reality all Goldstein did was accept Hunt's thesis wholesale while shifting the focus of Hunt's work to the French from the Iroquois. For him the cause of the Iroquois-Hurons war was the Iroquois desire to become middlemen in the fur trade. The introduction of European goods had destroyed old skills and led them to become dependant on trade goods. The struggle to control the fur trade, added to the hostility still felt at Champlain's actions, accounted for Iroquois wars against New France.<sup>114</sup>

A more substantial work is Léo-Paul Desrosiers' Iroquoisie, 1534-1645.<sup>115</sup> Desrosiers was a writer of fiction

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<sup>111</sup> The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1969.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, 205-208.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, 10, 24, 60, 62.

<sup>115</sup> Montreal: Études de l'Institute d'Histoire de l'Amérique Française, 1947.

and history, although he is usually best remembered for his novels.<sup>116</sup> The book on the Iroquois was originally intended to be part of a five-volume history, but his biographer has implied that the publication of such a large work was too much for anyone to take on.<sup>117</sup> Only volume one ever made it to press.<sup>118</sup> When it became clear that the rest would not be published in book form, he opted to publish the remaining sections as articles.<sup>119</sup> From 1952 until 1966 he annually published an article on the Iroquois in the Cahiers des Dix.<sup>120</sup> His first piece picked up where the book had left off, but after that he published self-contained articles on various aspects of French-Iroquois history in no chronological order. These articles carried on the themes and the style of his book.

Despite the title, Iroquoisie was not really a book about

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<sup>116</sup> Julia Richter, Léo-Paul Desrosiers (Ottawa: Éditions Fides, 1966), 28.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, 95.

<sup>118</sup> It was eventually published under the auspices of his good friend Abbé Groulx. Even then it really did not receive lavish treatment. It was a small tightly spaced book, with no bibliography, no index, and no chapter titles.

<sup>119</sup> Richter, Desrosiers, 95. However, all of the articles on the Iroquois are not equal to four volumes. At best they would make up one book.

<sup>120</sup> He had been publishing in that journal since 1942, but it was only in 1952 that his subject matter became restricted to French-Iroquois relations in the seventeenth century. He also published several articles in the Revue d'Histoire de l'Amérique Française. For a full bibliography of his work see, Richter, Desrosiers, 159-174.

the Iroquois. Desrosiers focused mostly on the Mohawks, and his concern was the French.<sup>121</sup> Indeed, the first one hundred pages dealt mostly with Champlain. The Iroquois were mentioned because in establishing the colony one of Champlain's problems was dealing with the Iroquois. For Desrosiers, like Hunt, the central goal of all Indian behaviour was to control or take advantage of the fur trade.<sup>122</sup> His view of the causes of Iroquois wars against natives and New France reflected that belief. According to Desrosiers the Mohawks soon came to realize "les secrets, comme quoi la peau d'un castor, d'une loutre peut leur procurer des haches...; comme quoi enfin, les intermédiaires, les agents entassent de profits aux dépens des autres, et peuvent en vivre."<sup>123</sup> The desire to assume the middleman role and the pressing need for furs is what led to hostilities with the Hurons and Algonquins.<sup>124</sup>

Desrosiers' explanation of Iroquois hostilities against New France relied on a curious blend of economic determinism and inevitability. The struggle for the fur trade between the Iroquois and the French would have sooner or later led to

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<sup>121</sup> Desrosiers, Iroquoisie, 7-8.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid, 91-92.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid, 109.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid, 131, 226, 235, 255.

conflict.<sup>125</sup> The actions of the participants influenced only the timing. For Desrosiers it was obvious that Iroquois enmity towards New France was the product of Champlain siding with the Algonquins in the early years of French settlement, "est ici que se décident vraiment les guerres iroquoises".<sup>126</sup> But equally apparent was the fact that "[l]e conflit franco-iroquois est inévitable dès le début, car il est dans la nature des choses. Rien ne saurait l'empêcher".<sup>127</sup> As the Mohawks ran out of furs and became "pirates de la pelleterie" they began to affect the life blood of the colony and this led to conflict.<sup>128</sup> The pressure from the Dutch for furs, the Mohawk need for goods, and the fear of the French trading those wares to their enemies all put pressure on the Mohawks to do this. The question for the Mohawks was: "ou obtenir des pelleteries, ou rétrograder vers leur civilisation primitive, en laissant leurs ennemis recevoir à flot les marchandises européennes".<sup>129</sup> The answer was to rob others of furs when the middleman position either did not produce the desired results, or could not be maintained.

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<sup>125</sup> Desrosiers seems to have decided out of hand that the French and Iroquois could have worked out some peaceful settlement.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid, 25.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid, 38. He later added that "apparemment" New France and the Iroquois "ne peuvent subsister en même temps". Ibid, 127.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid, 39, 184, 185, 207. Quote on p. 185.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid, 209.

Desrosiers, like Hunt, placed great emphasis on the role of the fur trade. For him economic motives were at the heart of Mohawk actions, even if he was not as rigid in his interpretation as Hunt had been.<sup>130</sup> But, if he differed in detail, he did not in substance.<sup>131</sup> If in stressing a predestined conflict Desrosiers seemed to hark back to the religious overtones of Faillon and Ferland, in the economic basis of that struggle one can clearly find the influence of McIlwain and Hunt. The historians of New France who wrote after the 1940s could refer to Hunt or Desrosiers with equal assurance that there would be found support for their claims that it was an Iroquois desire to play middleman in the fur trade that accounted for their wars against the colony. If the historians of native groups began to move away from Hunt's middleman thesis to some vaguer notion of economically motivated warfare, the historians of New France never seriously rejected the middleman interpretation.<sup>132</sup>

Abbé Groulx was the last of the great clerico-nationalist

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<sup>130</sup> He did not try to ascribe all actions to one motive and often suggested that cultural considerations, or non-economic motives influenced Iroquois behaviour. See his analysis of the 1645 Mohawk treaty efforts. Léo-Paul Desrosiers, "La Rupture de la Paix de 1645", Cahiers des Dix, 17 (1952): 169-181.

<sup>131</sup> For Desrosiers the gaining of goods was to elevate Iroquois culture above the primitive (Iroquoisie, 10-11, 209), rather than for Hunt's less well defined "survival" motive, but he too stressed the dependence on European goods as a motive for war.

<sup>132</sup> This point will be discussed below.

writers to turn his attention to the history of New France. For him the early history of Quebec was important because it showed the benevolent role of the Church in helping God form a special French and Catholic people.<sup>133</sup> He focused on the Iroquois because of the obstacles that they represented to the growth of that unique society.<sup>134</sup> Like Desrosiers, he felt that the struggle between the Iroquois and French was inevitable.<sup>135</sup> The Iroquois struggle for hemogeny over the tribes in North America "pu être fatale à la Nouvelle-France".<sup>136</sup> The competition between French and Iroquois for control of the fur trade meant that sooner or later these two powers would clash.<sup>137</sup> The Iroquois needed to control the fur trade because they had not enough furs to satisfy their appetite for European goods.<sup>138</sup> Groulx was less precise about Iroquois motivations than Desrosiers, but in the end, it remained that Iroquois desires for furs to trade for goods, worthy of attaining for their own sake, were at the heart of Iroquois aggressions.

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<sup>133</sup> Gagnon, Quebec and its Historians: 1840 to 1920, 113.

<sup>134</sup> Lionel Groulx, Histoire du Canada Français, 2 vol. [1950] (Montreal: Fides, 1976), passim, but see especially p. 64 where this view is given almost explicit voice.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid, 100.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid, 65. He did not link the Iroquois desire for mastery over the other tribes to the fur trade.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid, 125-131.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

For Gustave Lanctot, the Iroquois were of central importance to the history of New France and thus were featured prominently in his work.<sup>139</sup> Major and minor raids against the colony were noted, often in detail. Lanctot's implicit assumption was that the cause of these attacks against the French was really an extension of the reasons for the wars versus the Hurons and other French native allies.<sup>140</sup> Lanctot recognized that wars could be caused by infringements on hunting territories, desire to assert political supremacy, and individual aspirations for honour.<sup>141</sup> But the Dutch sale of firearms to the Iroquois for beaver pelts fuelled old rivalries. "With an economic pretext for war, the Iroquois now deliberately sought to annihilate the Huron peoples so that they might become the sole middlemen" in the trade between the western Indians and the "Europeans on the Atlantic seaboard".<sup>142</sup> Lanctot did not completely dismiss traditional motives for leading to war, but he subordinated them to this broader economic motive. For example, he recognized that some raids against the Hurons were made solely to capture people. But for him that was part of a broader policy of trying to incorporate all the Hurons into the Iroquois Confederacy in

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<sup>139</sup> Gustave Lanctot, A History of Canada [1534-1763], 3 vols. (Toronto: Clark, Irwin & Co., 1963-1965).

<sup>140</sup> Ibid, vol. 1: 202-203, 229-230, 248.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid, 170.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

order that the Iroquois would "become the sole intermediaries and beneficiaries in the trade with the Dutch".<sup>143</sup> The Iroquois wars against New France were also tied to Iroquois ambitions in the fur trade. As a result of pressure from the Dutch, and later the English, whom the Iroquois needed as suppliers, the Iroquois sought to eliminate French competition from the fur trade.<sup>144</sup> In short, it was the "[e]conomic ambitions and atavistic instincts" of the Iroquois which "determined the unflinching hostility" they showed towards New France.<sup>145</sup>

If Lanctot left room for non-economic motives to account for some Iroquois hostilities, Marcel Trudel did not. In his work one can find Hunt's thesis accepted without qualification. The wars against native groups were to gain a middleman status, a position made necessary because the Iroquois had run out of furs and were dependant on them for

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid, 179-180, quote on p. 180. He was not alone in this tendency. Jean Leclerc in his biography of Denonville, Le Marquis de Denonville, gouverneur de la Nouvelle-France, 1685-1689 (Montreal: Fides, 1976) also recognized various motives for Iroquois wars, but in the end he too made it all part of economic warfare. For him the power of the Iroquois came from their role as middlemen (Ibid, 52), but their success "modifie la mentalité" of the Iroquois and they became "plus militaristes, voire imperialistes...afin de realiser leurs objectifs économiques". (Ibid)

<sup>144</sup> Lanctot, History of Canada, 1: 333; Ibid, 2: 126.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid, 1: 333.

survival.<sup>146</sup> The wars against New France were simply the extension of these motives to the Iroquois' major competitor. Trudel was rebelling against the clerico-nationalist writers who had preceded him.<sup>147</sup> He focused on the economic development of the colony to show that trade, as much, or more so than religious preoccupations led to its founding and shaped its growth. It was only natural that his conception of the role of the Iroquois would be coloured by this approach. Hunt's work, with its emphasis on economic motives, and the role of the fur trade, fitted into Trudel's framework. If New France was shaped by economic, rather than religious forces, what better example to cite than the destructive competition waged with the Iroquois over control of the fur trade?<sup>148</sup>

For different reasons, but in much the same spirit of rebellion, W.J. Eccles came to rely on Hunt's interpretation. Among the most eminent historians of New France in both French and English speaking Canada, Eccles published his original and critical study of Governor Frontenac in 1959.<sup>149</sup> In it the Iroquois were major players, and the success of Frontenac's

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<sup>146</sup> Marcel Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 1524-1663 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1973), 57, 149, 217-224.

<sup>147</sup> Gagnon, Quebec and its Historians: The Twentieth Century, 35, 40-50.

<sup>148</sup> Unlike Sulte, however, Trudel did not use this example to cast blame. Rather it served as proof of the predominance of economic forces in shaping the colony.

<sup>149</sup> W.J. Eccles, Frontenac, The Courtier Governor [1959] (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1965).

career was judged, in large part, by his Indian policy. Unfortunately, Eccles did not turn the same critical eye to the interpretations then current about Iroquois policy. He accepted Hunt's thesis wholesale and it has formed the basis, until recently, of his interpretation of Iroquois-Native and Franco-Iroquois wars. Eccles concluded that the hostilities of the Iroquois were "an attempt to divert the fur trade of the Huron and the Ottawas from New France to Albany" with the Iroquois keeping "the middle-man's profit" for themselves.<sup>150</sup> The struggle against New France was part of that fight over control of the fur trade. In some shape or form this view was to be found in his writings and Hunt's work, economic bias duly noted, recommended reading.<sup>151</sup> For Eccles, Hunt served as a "useful corrective to...Parkman who ignore[d] or rejecte[d] economic factors".<sup>152</sup> Recently Eccles has written that he erred in accepting Hunt's economic interpretation.<sup>153</sup> Eccles has now concluded that the Iroquois wars were for power

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<sup>150</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>151</sup> W.J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760 [1969] (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978), 112-116, 218; Eccles, France in America (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside Ltd., 1972), 45 (note 37), 90, 262.

<sup>152</sup> Eccles, France in America, 262.

<sup>153</sup> In an introduction written for a new edition of Canadian Frontier, he questioned the economic motivation interpretation. In a 1986 review of Bruce Trigger's Natives and Newcomers, Eccles lambasted Trigger because his interpretation of Iroquois-native relations was "little more than a version of the discredited thesis of" Hunt. Eccles, Review of B.G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers, The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., XLII, 3 (July 1986), 381.

or control over the lands in which they warred, "rather than [for] mere commercial advantage". Iroquois wars against New France proceeded from these same motives.<sup>154</sup> He is the only historian of New France to reject the "beaver wars" interpretation in particular, and "economic" explanations of Franco-Iroquois relations in general.

Unlike most historians of New France, recent historians of the Iroquois and other native societies have, for the most part, rejected Hunt's specific middleman thesis.<sup>155</sup> They do, however, continue to argue that warfare for economic ends was a significant motive for Iroquois hostilities. They contend that either for financial profit, or because the Iroquois were dependant on European goods, and because they lacked their own, or a sufficient, supply of furs, the Iroquois warred to obtain furs. The furs thus stolen went to trade for those needed goods. The struggle for the furs of others is what led

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<sup>154</sup> W..J. Eccles, "Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century Imperialism", The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., XL, 3 (July 1983), 343; W.J. Eccles, France in America (revised edition, Markham: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1990), 46-47, 91, 95-96.

<sup>155</sup> Although not all have. See, Theda Perdue, "Cherokee Relations with the Iroquois in the Eighteenth Century", in Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell, eds., Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 136, and Gilles Havard, La grande paix de Montréal de 1701: les voies de la diplomatie franco-amérindienne (Montreal: Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, 1992), 46, 92-93.

to the wars of the Iroquois.<sup>156</sup> For some of these writers this motive was central to explaining Iroquois wars; for others it was but one of several motives for war. Daniel K. Richter, for example, while suggesting that economic factors grew to be the most important causes of Iroquois warfare, also recognized the role of cultural factors, such as the need to replace people lost to war and disease, as motives for warfare.<sup>157</sup> But for all, economic motivations are at the root of Iroquois hostilities. Recently two historians of native groups have come to reject economic explanations for understanding the Iroquois wars in the seventeenth century. Conrad Heidenriech and Lucien Campeau, scholars of the Hurons, have played down the role of economic warfare and suggested that the causes of Iroquois hostility can be found in cultural practices related to war and in responses to population losses

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<sup>156</sup> Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), *passim*, but see especially, 50-74; Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 85, 93, 100; Richard Aquila, The Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Colonial Frontier, 1701-1754 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983), 37; Denys Delâge, Le pays renversé: amérindiens et européens en Amérique du nord-est, 1600-1664 (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1985), *passim*; B.G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada's "Heroic Age" Reconsidered (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), 260-262; *Idem*, The Children of Aataentsic: A History of the Huron People to 1660, 2 vols. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976), *passim* but see especially vol. 2: 617-633; E. Tooker, "The Iroquois Defeat of the Huron: A Review of Causes", Pennsylvania Archaeologist, 33, 1-2 (July 1963), 115-117.

<sup>157</sup> Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 32-38, 50-74.

brought on by new diseases.<sup>158</sup> Their views remain largely ignored.<sup>159</sup> Thus in the 125 years since Francis Parkman articulated its essential elements, the "beaver wars" interpretation has been fleshed out somewhat, but remains virtually unaltered and dominant.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> Conrad Heidenreich, "History of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes area to A.D. 1650" in Chris Ellis and Neal Ferris eds., The Archaeology of Southern Ontario to A.D. 1650 (Occasional Publication of the London Chapter, Ontario Archaeological Society, No. 5, 1990): 475-492; Lucien Campeau, S.J., La Mission des Jésuites chez les Hurons, 1634-1650 (Montreal: Éditions Bellarmin, 1987), 289-290, 345-349. Heidenreich's present work represents a rejection of the "beaver wars" interpretation that he accepted in his 1970 monograph, Huronnia.

<sup>159</sup> This is due, in part, to reluctance to consider a different view point and because of the tendency to lump their work together with the writings of those who reject the economic explanation, but offer fanciful and unsupported explanations in its stead. See, for example, K.H. Schlesier, "Epidemics and Indian Middlemen: Rethinking the Wars of the Iroquois, 1609-1653", Ethnohistory, 23, 2 (Spring 1976): 129-145, who tries to draw a direct cause and effect relationship between disease and Iroquois warfare against the French, but overlooks several epidemics and the fact that most diseases which afflicted the Iroquois came from their allies, not the French. Also in this category of interesting but unproven is Mathew Dennis's thesis that the Iroquois warred against Indian and European in order to extend to them the benefits of peace. Mathew Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in Seventeenth-Century America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

<sup>160</sup> Thus, if after 1940, and into the 1990s, specialists on the Iroquois and other native groups continued to argue that the Five Nations waged war for economic ends, it should come as no surprise that historians of New France accepted these views. After all, they were usually writing general political or economic histories of the colony and were not particularly sensitive to the native side of events. In recent years work on New France has been in the nature of local or specialized studies, most with strict social or economic focuses. While many of these works are important contributions to the historiography of New France, natives rarely enter the picture, and when they do they are quickly

The "beaver wars" theory of Iroquois policy has come to dominate how historians of New France account for Iroquois hostilities against that colony. From its origins in works on the history of New France, it has gone on to become the basis of interpreting Iroquois-Native relations and worked its way back to be the foundation for understanding the nature of Franco-Iroquois relations. Parkman's original thesis has been modified and expanded upon over the years, and it has grown in stature with the repeating, but it remains essentially a series of unproven assumptions. If Hunt's work seemed to give it respectability by cloaking it in apparently rational economic garb, he nonetheless did so by ignoring Iroquois culture and continuing to hold that it was inferior to that of their European contemporaries.

Worse still, Canadian historians of the Iroquois and New France have ignored the suggestive contributions of two of their earliest writers. Ferland, like Parkman, pointed to Iroquois culture as the place to find the answer to the riddle of Iroquois aggressions against native and French alike, but did not denigrate that culture. Sulte, while not as sympathetic to Indians, contended that the Iroquois response to the fur trade was to manipulate it to further their political agenda, one that had a variety of objectives.

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relegated to the background. See for example, Louise Dechêne, Habitants et Marchands de Montréal au XVII<sup>e</sup> Siècle (Montreal and Paris: Librairie Plon, 1974).

Parkman's thesis was premised on the view of the Iroquois as a savage people from a doomed culture responding in only one manner to a supposedly better way of life. Ferland and Sulte's work suggested a multifaceted people responding to change based on the needs of a active culture.

The search for solutions to the complex problems of culture contact and the wars that the Iroquois waged during the seventeenth century have produced simplistic interpretations. But the wars of the Iroquois were not merely products of an "insensate fury" and they were certainly more than just the upshot of "intertribal trade relations" gone sour. If the historiography of the "beaver wars" can be of use in helping come to grips with what caused those hostilities, it is as reminder that little can be accomplished by continuing to portray the Iroquois as one dimensional people from a doomed and inferior culture. It may have been in the process of change, but Iroquois culture was very much alive, and its processes and values shaped the response to Europeans and their cultural baggage.

## Chapter 2

## Government and Social Organization Among the Five Nations

Few aspects of Iroquois culture are as essential to understanding Iroquois policy and conduct as are the means of group and individual control, the decision-making processes at the various levels of government, and the nature of the government of the Five Nations. Strikingly different from authoritarian New France, decision-making and government among the Iroquois reflected a deep and overriding concern with individualism. Indeed, government among the tribes that made up the Confederacy was not so much a political system as it was an extension of the individual control process to a more complex level. Another feature of Iroquois culture--the clan system--provided the basic framework for cooperative effort at both the tribal and inter-tribal levels.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The aim of this chapter is to establish how the Iroquois governed themselves in the seventeenth century. While Europeans knew of the Iroquois by 1603, it was not until the 1650's that detailed analyses of their culture were made, and these did not cover all aspects under study here. This makes it necessary to rely on eighteenth century data to flesh out the picture. The question of how the Iroquois were governed before the 1650s or whether that process was the same or significantly altered by mid century, remains unresolved. Further, because detailed seventeenth and eighteenth century accounts of the same processes are rare, comparisons about changes between mid 1600s and the early 1700s were also not possible. Indeed, while later sources often provided more detail about matters touched on briefly by earlier authorities, one can rarely be certain whether different informants were revealing a changed process, or if the variant descriptions simply reflect powers of observation and/or degrees of familiarity with the Iroquois. A consequence of using sources from different centuries is that Iroquois

The Iroquois of the Five Nations were a proud and independent people. As A.F.C. Wallace has written, they held autonomous responsibility to be an ideal, and "self reliance and independence of spirit were sedulously inculcated" in their young.<sup>2</sup> This inclination toward individual freedom and a strong sense of pride and honour were fundamental features of Iroquois society. Frederick Post noted that there was "not a prouder or more high minded people in themselves than the Indians,"<sup>3</sup> while the Jesuit Joseph Lafitau concluded that

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society appears static. This was not true of culture in general and probably not of government. But if the sources do not allow for complex comparisons of change over time, they nonetheless yield a clear picture of how the Iroquois governed themselves in the latter half of the seventeenth century. It may only be informed speculation to suggest that the process worked in a similar fashion prior to the 1650s, but it is unlikely that question will be resolved unless new sources for Iroquois culture history are found.

<sup>2</sup> A.F.C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca (New York: Vintage Books, 1972) 30, 34, quote, 36. Cornelius Jaenen has also noted this and suggested that independence of action was so rampant it sometimes threatened established authority. C. Jaenen, Friend and Foe: Aspects of French-Amerindian Cultural Contact in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 92.

<sup>3</sup> Journal of Frederick Post, 1758, in R.G. Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels, 1748-1846, 38 vols. (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clarke Co., 1904-1907) 1: 230. Writing around 1780 the Moravian missionary David Zeisberger echoed these sentiments. David Zeisberger, History of Northern American Indians [1745-1778], A. Butler and W.N. Schwarze, eds., in Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society Publications, 19 (1910), 18. An anonymous French observer, writing about 1762, noted that while the Iroquois were proud, they were not vain. [Anon.], "Memoire sur les coutumes et usages des cinq nations Iroquoises du Canada", in Jean-Baptiste Suard and François Arnaud, eds., Variétés Littéraires, ou Recueil de Pièces, tant originales que traduites, concernant la Philosophie la Littérature et les Arts, 4 tomes [Paris, 1804] (Geneva:

"it is really honour which forms the mainspring of their actions."<sup>4</sup> This sense of pride and honour was so strong that fear of disgrace was sufficient to keep most Iroquois from behaving in a manner unacceptable to society.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, suffering public disapproval or humiliation often led members of Iroquois society to commit suicide.<sup>6</sup> This practice was

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Slaktine Reprints, 1969), 1: 471-472. This document has been published in translation. See Michael Cardy, "The Iroquois in the Eighteenth Century: A Neglected Source", Man in the Northeast, 38 (Fall, 1989): 1-20. Cardy attempts to determine authorship of the document, but his case is weakened by factual errors. Cardy claims that the document was written in the Bastille in 1763 and first appeared in print in 1804. It must have been written early in, or prior to, 1762 since it first appeared in two parts in the April (pp. 123-147) and May (pp. 5-24) instalments of the Journal Étranger of that year. A more accurate publication record of the document and another conclusion as to who penned it can be found in Michèle Duchet, "Bougainville, Raynal, Diderot et les sauvages du Canada: Une source ignoré de l' 'Histoire des Deux Indes' ". Revue d'Histoire de la France, 2 (avril-juin, 1963): 228-236. A well researched attempt to determine authorship of this document remains to be written.

<sup>4</sup> Joseph François Lafitau, Moeurs des Sauvages Ameriquains Comparées Aux Moeurs des Premier Temps, 2 vols. [1724], translated and edited by W.N. Fenton and E.L. Moore as Customs of the American Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times, 2 vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society Publications, vols. 48-49, 1974 and 1977) 2: 61. (Hereafter, Lafitau, Moeurs.)

<sup>5</sup> Zeisberger, History, 125. "Fear of disgrace keeps them from open wrong-doing for they do not wish to have a bad name."

<sup>6</sup> Father Cholenec in [Dablon's] Relation of 1676 and 1677, in R.G. Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, 1610-1791, 73 vols. [1896-1901] (New York: Pageant Book Co., 1959), 60: 287. (Hereafter JR.) See also Jean de Lamberville to [Father Superior], 25 August, 1682, JR, 62: 63; Zeisberger, History, 83. The definitive studies of this cultural trait are: W.N. Fenton, "Iroquois Suicide: A Study in the Stability of a Culture Pattern," Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 128 (Washington, 1941): 79-138; Fenton, "A

compounded by the fact that the Iroquois were very sensitive and "easily affronted."<sup>7</sup> Because of this the Iroquois went so far as to contain visible signs of their anger in order not to offend members of their society.<sup>8</sup> The tendency to avenge insults also played a strong role in keeping personal relations amicable.<sup>9</sup> As a consequence of these values and beliefs, respect for the rights of others served as the underlying principle which guided interpersonal relations. Each Iroquois, wrote Lafitau, regarded "others as masters of their own actions and themselves, lets them conduct themselves as they wish[,] and judges only himself."<sup>10</sup>

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Further Note on Iroquois Suicide", Ethnohistory, 33, 4 (Fall, 1986): 448-457.

<sup>7</sup> Father Cholenec in [Dablon's] Relation of 1676 and 1677, JR, 60: 287; Journal of Frederick Post, 1758, Western Travels, 1: 231.

<sup>8</sup> Zeisberger, History, 19. Father Le Jeune noted this behaviour among the Montagnais ([Le Jeune's] Relation of 1634, JR, 6: 231) and Father Brébeuf observed it among the Hurons ([Brébeuf's] "Huronian Report", 1636, JR, 10: 211). Subtle slander through humour, and sorcery were the ways to release pent up anger against someone. See A.I. Hallowell, "Some Psychological Characteristics of the Northeastern Indians," in Frederick Johnson, ed., Man in Northeastern North America (Andover: Robert S. Peabody Foundation for Archaeology, Vol. 3, 1946), 211-216.

<sup>9</sup> La Potherie, Histoire, 3: 28; Journal of Frederick Post, 1758, Western Travels, 1: 231; Zeisberger, History, 19, 77.

<sup>10</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 300. This, however, did not mean that individuals, even young ones who had least authority, could not make their desires felt. It simply meant that care had to be taken and imagination used so that protocols were not broken. For example, a young Christianized Iroquois wanted to prevent some of his elder tribesmen from drinking. He could not command an end to this behaviour because as a young man he

All these values were reflected in the Iroquois authority structure and control process. The Iroquois recognized some members of their society as leaders, usually based on generosity, wisdom, and skills as a hunter or warrior.<sup>11</sup> The clan matron was also a recognized leader.<sup>12</sup> Yet these leaders were severely constrained in their exercise of authority, because they had to pay deference to the right of the individual to determine his own course of action. Clan matrons, for example, could intercede to put an end to a revenge raid, and village elders would appeal to them to do so if the planned action threatened to produce conflict in relations between two tribes. Yet, aside from whether or not it suited the clan matrons' interest to intervene, they tended not to because they were "not eager to set in motion [their] means of prestige and authority to constrain others against their will."<sup>13</sup> Chiefs were likewise restricted, and as

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did not have that authority and he had to respect his elders. Instead he got up, pretended to stumble and deliberately knocked over the kettle with the alcohol. The others, amused at his clumsiness, as it appeared, were not offended. The young man thus had put an end to the drinking without offending his elders by overstepping the bounds his youthful status had assigned him. See Father Cholenec in [Dablon'] Relation of 1677 and 1678, JR, 61: 59.

<sup>11</sup> [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 442-443.

<sup>12</sup> [Dablon's] Relation of 1670-71, JR, 54: 281; Fr. Millet [1674], in [Dablon's] Relation of 1673-74, JR, 58: 185; [Antoine Raudot] Relation par Lettres de l'Amérique Septentrionale, P. Camille Rochemonteix, ed. (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1904) 186; [Anon], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 442.

<sup>13</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 102.

Governor Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil and the Intendant Antoine-Denis Raudot noted in their dispatch to the Minister of the Marine in 1708:

il est vray que les Sauvages ont des chefs entreux, mais ces chefs ne commandent point absolument ils disent seulement qu'ils faudroit faire un certain chose et après les autre le font sils veulent, ny ayant point de punission entre eux il ne peut avoir aucune subordination...<sup>14</sup>

Further, in order not to infringe on individual rights or offend someone's honour, when a chief did wish to attain a specific end he phrased his commands as requests either directly to a person or through an intermediary who was a relative of the person.<sup>15</sup> This point is extremely important and reveals much about the complex nature of social interaction and control among the Iroquois. By making his wishes known in the form of a request, the chief respected the rights of the individual by not directly ordering him to perform a task. He also shifted the onus for compliance to

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<sup>14</sup> Vaudreuil et Raudot au Ministre, 13 Novembre, 1708, AN, C11A, 28: 62; [Raudot] Relation par Lettres, 189; René Bréhant de Galinée, "Ce que s'est passé de plus remarquable dans le voyage de M.M. Dollier et Galinée" [1669-1670], James H. Coyne ed., Ontario Historical Society, Papers and Records, vol. 4 (Toronto, 1903), 16. (Hereafter, Galinée, "Voyage de Dollier et Galinée"). At a conference with the Iroquois in 1700, some Iroquois leaders told the English authorities that they could not confirm their request to send 100 warriors to staff a proposed fort "because it is the young men [who] must do the service, and they must be consulted about it." Conference, [Aug. 2 to Sept. 4], 1700 in E.B. O'Callaghan and B. Fernow, eds., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, 15 vols. (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Co., 1856-1883), 4: 737. (Hereafter, NYCD.)

<sup>15</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 293; Father Fremin quoted in [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1667-68, JR, 51: 213-215.

the individual who had been asked because the person asked ran the risk of public disapproval if he did not comply.<sup>16</sup> To deny a favour was looked upon as ungenerous--a quality disapproved of by the Iroquois.<sup>17</sup> The person who acted as intermediary also assumed responsibility since by acquiescing to the chief's request he had to help persuade the individual to do as the chief had asked.<sup>18</sup> Had the chief phrased his desire as a command, he would have risked public disapprobation for his disrespectful manner and might have suffered a loss of prestige if his orders had not been followed.<sup>19</sup> The fear of public defiance was another reason that a clan relation of the individual in question was used as an intermediary to obtain a response. Defiance by the

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<sup>16</sup> [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 446.

<sup>17</sup> The Iroquois were considered very generous by their French neighbours. [Raudot], Relation par Lettres, 190; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 472; [Anon.] "Abregé des vies et moeurs et autres Particularitez de La Nation Iroquoise laquelle est diviséé en Cinq villages. Sçavoir Agnez, Onney8t, Nontagué, Goyog8an et Sonnont8ans", Bibliothèque Mazarine, Paris, ms 1964, 11. This document was written sometime in the seventeenth century by a French man who was captured by the Iroquois. At some later point a cover and the title "Nation Iroquoise" was added. It is written in a different hand from the rest of the text. For the sake of simplicity, it will hereafter be cited as "Nation Iroquoise". A transcript of this document was made in 1931 for the Public Archives of Canada and can be found there as "Nation Iroquoise", MG 7 II IV.

<sup>18</sup> Father Fremin quoted in [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1667-68, JR, 51: 213-215.

<sup>19</sup> By the same token, war chiefs did not order their men to war so as not to be held accountable to their families in the advent of the death of a warrior. [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 446-447.

individual asked could be a very real possibility since the individual affronted through a command would not likely suffer another blow to his pride by actually carrying out the command. A request, however, was much more likely to be performed since it allowed individuals to persuade themselves (and society) that they obeyed out of generosity rather than because they had been instructed to do so.<sup>20</sup>

Decisions which affected groups of Iroquois were handled in much the same way but in councils. Invariably, a great deal of skill was required, but by pursuing the same principles used to reconcile the apparently opposite needs of individual self-determination and the necessity for social control, the political integrity of village and tribe could be respected and intra-village and intra-tribal cooperation could be affected.<sup>21</sup> Thus, while the views of recognized tribal leaders influenced the decisions reached at public councils, everyone was permitted to voice his or her opinion.<sup>22</sup> Joint

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<sup>20</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 293.

<sup>21</sup> Each socio-political group among the Iroquois conducted its affairs as if independent of all other groups and informed others of their decisions only if they felt it might be of concern to them. Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 287; [Anon.], "Nation Iroquoise", 5.

<sup>22</sup> [Raudot], Relation par Lettres, 185; [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 4v. Even among Christianized mission Iroquois, decisions continued to be made by the whole group. At councils held to convince the community to undertake a given course, speakers continued to take their guidance from elders. Fr. Chauchetière, "Narration Annuelle de la Mission du Sault depuis la fondation jusques a l'an 1686", JR, 63: 163.

decisions were reached by consensus and those villages or tribes which had not agreed to the final outcome were not bound to that decision.<sup>23</sup> While those in favour of a course of action tried to persuade those who voted against it, they could only do so in the same manner as persuading an individual. The councils themselves had no other means to make sure that their decisions were carried out even by those who had voted in favour.<sup>24</sup> It was a good thing that the Iroquois liked to discuss political affairs.<sup>25</sup> While this system was particularly well adapted to Iroquois cultural needs, the necessarily complex manner of resolving internal matters, added to external political concerns, meant that a great deal of the time of an Iroquois leader was spent dealing in political matters.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> J. Megapolensis, "A Short Account of the Mohawk Indians, 1644", in J.F. Jameson, ed., Narratives of New Netherland, 1609-1664, [1909] (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1959), 179 (Hereafter NNN); [Raudot], Relation par Lettres, 186. This continued to be a feature of Iroquois politics. See, L.H. Morgan, League of the Iroquois, [1851] (Facsimile Reprint, Seacaucus: Citadel Press, 1975) 111; E. Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois: Its History, Politics, and Ritual", in B.G. Trigger, ed., Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 15, The Northeast (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 422.

<sup>24</sup> Indeed, even when a decision was made to war, the war chiefs were asked to go to war and efforts were made to persuade them to do so, but the war chiefs decided for themselves whether or not they would engage in hostilities. [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 6.

<sup>25</sup> Zeisberger, History, 116.

<sup>26</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 308; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 441; [Raudot], Relation par Lettres, 185.

Possibly because so much time was spent in councils, the procedures to be followed were clearly established.<sup>27</sup> When a council was to be held, a messenger was sent to announce the time and place, or an elder called out the announcement.<sup>28</sup> In cases when these councils involved people from outside the village or tribe, the arriving delegates were greeted with ceremonies outside the village and given a pipe to smoke.<sup>29</sup> In meetings with Europeans it was common practice to fire a gun salute to greet arriving delegates.<sup>30</sup> The delegates were then led to a cabin set aside for their use. In this

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<sup>27</sup> In what follows I have tried to rely only on seventeenth and eighteenth century sources. For more detailed discussions on various aspects of council procedures, terms, and ceremonies based on nineteenth and twentieth century field work among the Iroquois see the various articles in Francis Jennings, ed., The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties of the Six Nations and Their League (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985). Fenton has concluded, based mostly on this modern evidence, that part of the procedures of councils were derived from the Iroquois Condolence Council. See W.N. Fenton, "Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making", in *Ibid*, 18-21.

<sup>28</sup> La Potherie, Histoire, 3: 31; Fr. Millet in [Dablon's] Relation of 1673-74, JR, 58: 187.

<sup>29</sup> Fr. Millet in [Dablon's] Relation of 1673-74, JR, 58: 189. Father Millet does not describe the ceremonies.

<sup>30</sup> When these procedures were not followed, the Iroquois were quick to complain. On one occasion when the Iroquois came to meet with the French and were not saluted with the usual gunfire, General Montcalm noted in his journal that "ils ont insinué modestment dans leur haranque qu'ils avoient été surpris de n'avoir pas été reçu avec les cérémonies ordinaires." Journal du Marquis de Montcalm, 1756-1757, in H.R. Casgrain, ed., Collection des Manuscrits Du Maréchal Lévis, 12 vols. (Montreal: C.O. Beauchemin, 1889-1895), 7: 123.

procession

one of the notable men walks at the head, and pronounces a long string of words which have been handed down to them by tradition, and which are repeated by the others after him. The ambassador who is to be the spokesman comes last of all, singing in a rather agreeable tone; he continues his song until he has entered his cabin, around which he also walks five or six times, still singing; then he sits down. There the pledges of friendship are renewed, and presents are given to dispel fatigue; to wipe away tears; to remove scales from their eyes, so that they may easily see one another; and, finally, to open their throats and give freer passage to their voices.<sup>31</sup>

The formalities over, the delegates were fed, news was exchanged, and the actual business of the visit was put off for the next day or later.<sup>32</sup>

Once at the meeting, the various delegates sat at assigned places, depending on their position in the confederacy.<sup>33</sup> All propositions were discussed by one tribe, "handed" across the fire to be discussed by another tribe, and eventually returned to the first tribe.<sup>34</sup> At Confederacy

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<sup>31</sup> Fr. Millet in [Dablon's] Relation of 1673-74, JR, 58: 189.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> [Anon.], Untitled Document, [1666], AN, C11A, 2: 264v. This document, a description of the Iroquois clan system, is not dated or signed. It follows documents dated 1666 and takes its tentative date from that. This document has been translated and published. See "The Nine Iroquois Tribes", NYCD, 9: 47-51. For some unknown reason the original French word "famille" meaning family, and in this case clan, has been translated as tribe. The editor's notes should also be disregarded.

<sup>34</sup> [Anon.], Untitled Doc., [1666], AN, C11A, 2: 264v; La Pause, Relation de l'Ambassade des Cinq Nations, RAPO, 1932-33, 328. This practice was also followed at Iroquois-European

councils this procedure was based on the position of the tribe in the Confederacy structure, or more properly, based on its moiety affiliation; the "elder" moiety of tribes discussing an issue first.<sup>35</sup> After a few speeches, the council was adjourned for the day to give delegates time to prepare answers. As the English traveller John Bartram noted, "there is nothing they contem so much as precipitation in publick councils; indeed they esteem it at all times a mark of much levity in anyone to return an immediate answer to a serious question."<sup>36</sup> Speeches at these councils were made by trained speakers well versed in the proper protocol. They could be subtle and evasive enough to give an answer which the other side wished to hear, but without actually committing their

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councils, although there who spoke first depended on a variety of factors. The most important determinants seem to have been who initiated the conference and who was acting as host. See, Michael K. Foster, "On Who Spoke First at Iroquois-White Councils: An Exercise in the Method of Upstreaming", in Michael K. Foster, Jack Campisi, and Marianne Mithun, eds., Extending the Rafters: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Iroquoian Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 183-207.

<sup>35</sup> [Anon.], Untitled Doc., [1666], AN, C11A, 2: 264v; Tooker, "League of the Iroquois," Handbook, 429.

<sup>36</sup> John Bartram, Observations on the Inhabitants, Climate, Soil, Rivers, Productions, and other matters worthy of Notice Made by Mr. John Bartram In his Travels From Pensilvania To Onondago, Oswega, and the Lake Ontario In Canada, [1751], reprinted in A Journey From Pennsylvania to Onondaga in 1743 by John Bartram, Lewis Evans, [and] Conrad Weiser (Massachusetts: Imprint Society, 1973), 74. See also La Pause, Relation de l'Ambassade des Cinq Nations, RAPO, 1932-33, 329; [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 5. When a tribe made a proposition for which delegates had not received instructions, the adjournment was probably even longer.

tribes to a specific course of action. David Zeisberger observed that when speakers wished to be obscure they could "speak so cleverly and with so much circumstance that even Indians must puzzle at the true sense of their allusions."<sup>37</sup> It was probably witnessing one of their conferences that led Bartram to characterize the Iroquois as a "Subtile, prudent and judicious people in their councils."<sup>38</sup>

As each proposition was made, the speaker of the tribe being addressed handed out a small stick to one member of his delegation. That person was then responsible for bringing up the proposition at the meeting in which the tribe prepared a response to the earlier speech.<sup>39</sup> By this means the speaker was not under pressure to recall exactly every proposition in the usually long speeches, and this practice ensured that every chief would be able to take an active part in ensuing discussions. After every proposition the speaker who held the floor handed over a belt or string of wampum to the tribe he

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<sup>37</sup> Zeisberger, History, 143.

<sup>38</sup> Bartram, Observations, 90. For a fuller discussion of Iroquois oratory, see Robie, "Kiotsaeton's Three Rivers Address: An Example of "Effective" Iroquois Oratory", American Indian Quarterly, 6, 3 and 4 (Fall/Winter, 1982): 238-253, and W.R. Reynolds, "Persuasive Speaking of the Iroquois Indians at Treaty Councils, 1678-1776", Ph.D., Columbia University, 1957.

<sup>39</sup> David De Vries, "Korte Historiae...1633-1643", NNN, 230-231; Conference, Governor Burnet and the Five Nations, August 1721, The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader Colden, 9 vols., New York Historical Society Collections, vols. 50-56, 67-68 (New York, 1917-1923, 1934-1935), 1: 132. (Hereafter, Colden Papers).

was addressing. These served as mnemonic devices to recall the content of the speech and as a material confirmation of the verbal message.<sup>40</sup> The length, width, colour, and design of the belts varied with the contents of the speech (the more important the speech, the larger the belt), but as a general rule the belts were about two feet in length and six inches wide.<sup>41</sup> When the Iroquois sent a report by messenger unaccompanied by wampum, it meant that the sender could not vouch for the veracity of the message but was passing it along anyway.<sup>42</sup> Any message confirmed by wampum was deemed to be true. At the councils and conferences the belts and strings were displayed, in the order in which they would be presented,

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<sup>40</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 308; Zeisberger, History, 32, 94. For detailed descriptions of these belts see, Journal of Conrad Weiser...[1748], Western Travels, 1: 30; Zeisberger, History, 95. On the uses and history of wampum see Lynn Ceci, "The Value of Wampum Among the New York Iroquois: A Case Study in Artifact Analysis", Journal of Anthropological Research, 38, 1 (Spring 1982): 97-107; F.G. Speck, "The Functions of Wampum Among the Eastern Algonkian", American Anthropological Association Memoirs, VI, 25 (1919): 3-71; André Vachon, "Colliers et ceintures de porcelaine dans la diplomatie indienne", Le Cahiers Des Dix, 36 (1971): 179-192; Vachon, "Colliers et ceintures de porcelaine chez les indiens de la Nouvelle-France", Le Cahiers Des Dix, 35 (1970): 251-278. For an interesting discussion on how the Iroquois viewed the role of wampum see, Michael K. Foster, "Another Look at the Function of Wampum in Iroquois-White Councils", in Francis Jennings, ed., The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, 99-114.

<sup>41</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 310; La Pause, Relation de l'Ambassade des Cinq Nations, RAPO, 1932-33, 325; Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 60. On the size of the belts see La Potherie, Histoire, 1: 333; La Pause, Relation de l'Ambassade des Cinq Nations, RAPO, 1932-33, 325.

<sup>42</sup> Wraxall, Indian Affairs 93, 94.

on a string or rope, strung across two poles stuck in the ground.<sup>43</sup> While delegates to conferences were furnished with extra belts to deal with unexpected proposals, if they ran out, they confirmed a speech with sticks which would later be replaced with belts.<sup>44</sup> The wampum used at Iroquois councils and at Iroquois-European conferences was contributed by individuals in a given village at the request of a chief.<sup>45</sup> At both types of gatherings, when the speaker presented a belt, he announced which village or tribe had sent the belt.<sup>46</sup> While at each level of council belts were presented on behalf of all (either village, tribe, etc.), it was still important to identify who had furnished the belt.

This last point about wampum underlines an important aspect of Iroquois government: the essentially independent spirit of its members. The clearly specified process at decision-making councils was not the result of some government commission which met and decided that this would be the most efficient way to conduct business. Instead, the established protocol represented the accumulation over time of customs

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<sup>43</sup> [Vimont's] Relation of 1644-45, JR, 27: 253; Zeisberger, History, 97.

<sup>44</sup> "Continuation of Colden's History", Colden Papers, 9: 416, 418, 419.

<sup>45</sup> Fr. Millet in [Dablon's] Relation of 1673-74, JR, 58: 185.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 187; La Pause, Relation de l'Ambassade des Cinq Nations, RAPO, 1932-33, 332. At village councils, they would indicate which family had provided the wampum.

which developed as these people sought to protect the integrity of village and tribe, while still recognizing the need and advantages of cooperative effort.<sup>47</sup> The Iroquois had no permanent overseeing governing body, constantly in session and directing policy. What they had instead was a framework which allowed for effective joint action when the member tribes felt the need for it. The rest of the time each village and tribe conducted its affairs as best suited them.<sup>48</sup> Even when all five tribes agreed on a course of action, when it was no longer convenient for a given tribe to adhere to it, the tribe would do what it could to ignore that policy, or to negate its effects.<sup>49</sup> The Confederacy had no ruling body to control such renegade groups, and efforts to bring them back into line were made only by those tribes still in favour of the course selected at the Confederacy Council.

This problem was compounded by the accepted practice of one tribe negotiating business with other groups on behalf of the whole Confederacy, and often informing the affected group

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<sup>47</sup> At conferences with Europeans, for example, the Iroquois appointed one speaker to state the Confederacy's views, but each tribe still had a speaker present its particular contribution or viewpoint on that Confederacy decision. See, for example, Answer of the five Nations...23 Sept., 1689, [Robert Livingston], The Livingston Indian Records, Lawrence Leder, ed. (Gettysburg: Pennsylvania Historical Association, 1956), 154-158.

<sup>48</sup> Colden, History of the Five Nations, 2; Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 287.

<sup>49</sup> Tooker, "League of the Iroquois," Handbook, 430.

after the fact.<sup>50</sup> Sometimes individuals seeking their own ends did this. In 1700, for example, the English learned that the Senecas and Cayugas were treating for peace with the French. It turned out, however, that the Cayugas knew nothing of this and that only two Seneca chiefs, Assicchqua and Awenano, were involved. Even the rest of the Senecas were unaware of their actions.<sup>51</sup> These Iroquois leaders probably calculated that the pro-French groups among the Senecas and Cayugas would support their actions when they presented their tribes with a *fait accompli*. Yet for Awenano at least, the motive was not to circumvent tribal policy for some vain reason. Awenano had lost most of his family in raids by the French and their Indian allies, and he simply wanted to speed up the protracted peace talks to prevent further losses.<sup>52</sup> Awenano even went so far as to take his own wampum, and not that contributed by the council, in order to keep the reasons for his visit to Canada a secret.<sup>53</sup> While behaviour of this sort did not always meet public approval, it was sometimes difficult to negate the effects of such actions because it was only possible to do so by getting the person who had committed

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<sup>50</sup> Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 165; Conference, 7 September, 1726, NYCD, 5: 789.

<sup>51</sup> Report of some Onondaga Sachems, 26 April, 1700, NYCD, 4: 658.

<sup>52</sup> Conference with Five Nations, 30 June, 1700, NYCD, 4: 694.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

the action to agree to change his mind. In 1726, for example, the Onondagas granted the French permission to build a fort in Seneca territory against Seneca wishes. In this case, however, even though the Senecas managed to convince the Onondagas to withdraw their permission, the damage was done because the French fort was by that time established and the French refused to tear it down.<sup>54</sup>

Despite this lack of central authority and the wide range of freedom accorded its members, the Five Nations Confederacy managed its political concerns with such shrewdness that the Iroquois earned the praise of being "une Nation la plus fine [et] la plus politique de l'univers."<sup>55</sup> Father Lafitau clearly recognized Iroquois political capacity and he credited "a most refined policy" on the part of these Indians for making them a dominant power in the region between New York and New France.<sup>56</sup> He wrote further that,

it is affairs of state which carry off the

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<sup>54</sup> Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 165-169; Conference with Iroquois, Sept. 7-14, 1726, NYCD, 5: 789-790.

<sup>55</sup> La Potherie, Histoire, 4: 193-194. This was a view shared by other French observers. See [Raudot], Relations par Lettres, 185; [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 10.

<sup>56</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 297. The extent of that power it still being debated. Recently, Francis Jennings has taken umbrage at earlier writers for their acceptance of what he calls the myth of the Iroquois Empire. Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with the English Colonies (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984). Along similar lines see J. David Leberman, "The End of the Iroquois Mystique: The Oneida Land Cession Treaties of the 1780s", The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., XLVII, 4 (October 1990): 523-547.


principal attention. Constant distrust of their neighbours keeps the Indians alert to the advantage of all favourable occasions either to cause disorder [in neighbouring states] without seeming to do so or to form alliances by making themselves necessary. Their skill in this respect has infinite resources which they keep always active and stirring, and while they humour their allies by frequent visits and all the duties of reciprocal courtesy, they are always occupied and observing and deliberating endlessly the least events.<sup>57</sup>

The need for endless debate over the least matter reflects the consensus approach to government and the daily preoccupation with politics that resulted from having to reconcile the various needs of the villages and tribes of the Confederacy. The dominant role of the Iroquois among the European and native nations of the St. Lawrence and Hudson Valley underscores how successful the Iroquois were in reconciling the strong feelings of personal and collective independence fostered by their culture, with the need for unified efforts to keep from being overwhelmed by their Indian and European neighbours. It must be admitted that the need for individual, village, and tribal autonomy was not always adequately reconciled, nor the consequences of that behaviour effectively counterbalanced or negated when it contradicted a Confederacy council decision. Nonetheless, the Iroquois Confederacy did, for the most part, resolve these problems, and what facilitated such success as they were able to attain, and formed the basis of government among these independent minded people, was their clan structure.

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<sup>57</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 308.

The Iroquois clan system, at its least complex, can be described as follows: two or more maternal lineages (extended families) composed a clan, several clans constituted a moiety, and two moieties (halves) made up a tribe.<sup>58</sup> Diagrammatically it can be represented thus:



In reality, however, the system was much more complex. Clans could have more than two lineages, while each tribe had at least three clans.<sup>59</sup> In fact, except for the Mohawks and the Oneidas, all the other tribes of the Confederacy had more than three clans--the Onondagas alone had nine.<sup>60</sup> Further, most tribes were divided into two or more villages, and each

<sup>58</sup> Fenton, "Iroquois Culture Patterns," Handbook, 309-310.

<sup>59</sup> Colden, History of the Five Nations, 1-2; Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 287; La Potherie, Histoire, 1: 360-361; [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 4v-5.

<sup>60</sup> [Anon.] Untitled document, AN, C11A, 2: 264-264v. See also, Tooker, "League of the Iroquois," Handbook, 426-428.

village had at least three clan groups and two moieties.<sup>61</sup> And while moieties were usually made up of two or more clans, among those tribes which had only three clans, the Mohawks and Oneidas, a single clan (the Bear) comprised a moiety.

There appears to be little doubt that the clan system of the Iroquois was one of the most significant features of their culture. The rules and obligations of the clans affected almost every aspect of Iroquois life, from where a person lived in a village,<sup>62</sup> to whom he could marry, when to wage war, and who would mourn his death.<sup>63</sup> Even in their dealings with Europeans the customs of clans were followed. In 1700, for example, at a meeting requested by Governor Bellomont of New York with two chiefs of each tribe, the Iroquois brought along three, "saying it was their custom to transact all Business of moment by the 3 tribes [clans] or Ensigns that the

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<sup>61</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 287; La Potherie, Histoire, 1: 360-361.

<sup>62</sup> Longhouses in villages were grouped according to clan affiliation and each longhouse also had its clan symbol painted over the entrance. La Potherie, Histoire, 1: 360-361; [Anon.], Untitled Doc., [1666], AN, C11A, 2: 264v; Diary of Cammerhoff and Zeisberger, 1750, Moravian Journals, 69. There is some evidence to suggest that among the Mohawk, at least, villages were occupied by one clan or dominated by one. Megapolensis, "A Short Account of the Mohawk Indians", NNN, 178-179; Van den Bogaert, "Narrative of a Journey into the Mohawk and Oneida Country, 1634-35", Ibid, 144. One French source claims that prior to the Iroquois confederation, each village was occupied by a single clan. [Anon.], Untitled Doc., AN, C11A, 2: 264v.

<sup>63</sup> It was the obligation of one moiety to mourn a death of someone from the other. "Continuation of Colden's History", Colden Papers, 9: 363-364; [Livingston], Indian Records, 201.

5 Nations consisted of viz. the Bear, the Wolf and the Turtle, one from each of these Ensigns in each Nation was to be present."<sup>64</sup> (These three clans were the only ones present among all five tribes). Even when the Iroquois made treaties with the French or English, it was their clan symbol which they drew beside their name rather than an "x".<sup>65</sup> This latter point is extremely important in that it points towards the Iroquois tendency to associate themselves more as representatives of clan groups than of tribes.

Indeed, if the Iroquois felt more of an attachment to their respective clans than to their tribes, it was because they defined themselves through their clan affiliations. The clan system established the parameters of relationships and obligations between individuals.<sup>66</sup> Everyone in Iroquois society knew exactly his or her role in relation to others.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Albany Conf. 29 August, 1700, Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 34-37. Quote is on page 35. For a lengthier version of this conference see NYCD, 4: 727-746. The same quote, with minor variations, is on page 736.

<sup>65</sup> Colden, History of the Five Nations, 1-2. See, for example, Deed From the Five Nations to the King, NYCD, 4: 910, and Acte authentique des six nations iroquoises sur leur independance, 2 nov., 1742, RAPO, 1921-22, unnumbered plate following page 108.

<sup>66</sup> For example, it was the obligation of those who had marriage ties to a clan, not actual members of the clan who had lost a member, to avenge a death. Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 99.

<sup>67</sup> For a similar interpretation see J. Campisi, "The Iroquois and the Euro-American Concept of Tribe", New York History, LXIII, 2 (April 1982), 108. For a different view of the role of clans, one that holds that their function was not to maintain genealogical connections but rather originated to facilitate trade over North America see E. Tooker, "Clans and

When no real blood relationships existed, they called each other by kinship terms rather than proper names, "observing exactly the degree of subordination and all proper relationships" that the name conferred.<sup>68</sup> Thus a child who was adopted to fill the place of a grandfather found himself treated with the respect due a grandfather by those who were older than he.<sup>69</sup> This need to establish the boundaries of relationships was so great that the Iroquois extended names of consanguinity to other tribes and to Europeans.<sup>70</sup>

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Moieties in North America", Current Anthropology, 12, 3 (June 1971): 357-376.

<sup>68</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 72.

<sup>69</sup> Colden, History of the Five Nations, 9; Bartram, Observations, 91.

<sup>70</sup> See, for example, Conf., River Indians and Five Nations, 10 August, 1747, Colden Papers, 3: 415-416; Indian Conference, 26 December, 1755, in James Sullivan, et al, eds., The Papers of Sir William Johnson, 14 vols. (Albany: The University of the State of New York, 1921-1965), 9: 332-333, and Indian Conference, 19 February, 1756, Ibid, 364. Indeed, one of the matters public speakers had to be well versed in was "what title to apply to...other nations, whether brother or nephew or uncle". (Zeisberger, History, 142). The calling of the English "brother" or "brethern", and the French "Father" was a conscious choice and signified how the Iroquois viewed their relationship to these powers. Thus in the case of the English, the Iroquois viewed themselves as equals, while with the French they acknowledged respect--rather more likely due to their military might, than from affection. This latter point can be inferred from the fact that the "father figure", as represented by age and wisdom, was a respected one among Indians. (Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 291. It did not, however, carry all the emotional connotations associated with the word father in Western culture.) But more directly, by the speech of some Abenaki who came to treat for peace with the Mohawk in October of 1700. As the Abenaki speaker noted: "To call you Brethern is nothing in comparison to Father, therefore we take you as Fathers". (NYCD, 4: 758).

More important for the Iroquois, the clan system served to facilitate inter-tribal activities. A closer look at this complex social system will help to show how. Among the Cayugas, the Wolf, Snipe, and Heron clans comprised one moiety, while the Turtle, Bear, Deer and Ball clans constituted the other. Thus, in any Cayuga village two clans from one moiety and at least one from the other would have to be present. This was important for several reasons; first, since clans were exogamous an individual had to marry someone from another clan. Second, it is quite probable that, as the nineteenth-century anthropologist Henry Morgan suggested, the moieties were also exogamous, and that the individual not only had to marry outside his clan but also outside his moiety.<sup>71</sup> This would certainly help explain the presence of two moieties even in tribes with just three clans. In both cases, this process reinforced relationships between clans and moieties through intermarriage. Third, inter-group relations were further strengthened because, since each village had at least three clans and two moieties, one of these clans would have members of its clan, or a clan in the same moiety, in another village, thereby providing a kinship link with that village.

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<sup>71</sup> Morgan, League of the Iroquois, 83. Fenton ("Iroquoian Culture Patterns", Handbook, 310) appears to doubt this was the case. He does not suggest any reasons, however, and concludes by stating that if this was true, it is no longer practised among modern Iroquois. It is important to note that even if the moieties were not exogamous, they still served an integrative function by providing the Mohawks and Oneidas with the same social structures as the other tribes in the Confederacy, and thus the same linking process.

Thus, in a simplified example, if one Cayuga village moiety consisted of the Wolf and Snipe clans and the other of the Turtle, the other village would have to include members of the same clans or moieties. In the case of the Turtle clan, it would be members of this same clan or members of the Bear, Deer, or Ball clans who were part of the same moiety. The same type of network was found at the tribal level with each tribe having similar clans found among other tribes, but with moiety composition slightly different. These kin relationships, and their attendant reciprocal obligations, facilitated inter-village and inter-tribal cooperative action by providing the necessary links between individuals and communities in a society with no "formal" hierarchal political structure.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> For example, it was the obligation of one moiety to mourn the death of a leader in the other by bringing presents. (Continuation of Colden's History, Colden Papers, 9: 363-364; Indian Conference, 18-19 February, 1756, Johnson Papers, 9: 356-357.) It is true, as Fenton has noted, that at this level the obligations were symbolic. (Fenton, "Iroquoian Culture Patterns", Handbook, 314). But that was all that was needed. At the village level, if someone died the women of the same clan were responsible for preparing the burial and mourning the deceased. ([Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 9v-10; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 460-461.) When a tribe in the opposite Confederacy moiety arrived to mourn the same death they merely reproduced the socially integrating function of the mourning act because all the other aspects had been dealt with by those responsible at the village or tribal level. The very act and costs of travelling large distances provided visible proof to the family and tribe of the deceased of the seriousness with which the other tribe viewed its obligations to the Confederacy and its members. Even so, the visiting tribe still provided presents to "cover" the dead. Interestingly, as Father Le Jeune noted, the gifts given to console the bereaved were eventually returned during the distribution of the deceased's effects among the mourners.

Nowhere is the role of the clan system more noticeable, or more important, than in the process by which the Iroquois governed themselves: the clan system was the foundation of their government.<sup>73</sup> Before a matter of concern received the attention of the village or the tribe, it first had to have been dealt with at the household level, that is within one lineage of a clan.<sup>74</sup> If the clan leaders and matrons decided the matter was of importance to the rest of the village, the other clan leaders were notified. It is most likely that the lineage which had decided the issue merited more attention first contacted other lineages from the same clan. The clan then informed members of its' moiety in the village. Each clan presented their view and furnished wampum, and discussion

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([Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, JR, 43: 271.) This, too, reinforced social ties.

<sup>73</sup> This is not a particularly novel assertion. Fenton is only the latest in a long line of distinguished anthropologists to note that "Iroquois political organization extends the basic patterns of social structure". (Fenton, "Structure, Continuity, and Change", 12) Nineteenth and early twentieth century studies of the League of the Iroquois all detail the role of clans in its workings. (Morgan, League of the Iroquois; H. Hale, The Iroquois Book of Rites (Philadelphia: D.G. Brinton, 1883); A.C. Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations or the Iroquois Book of the Great Law, New York State Museum Bulletin, No. 181, (April 1, 1916) (Albany: University of the State of New York.) What follows here, however, is based directly upon seventeenth century evidence about how the clan system worked at the local government level.

<sup>74</sup> The evidence upon which the following paragraph is based was culled from: [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 4-5; Fr. Millet in [Dablon's] Relation of 1673-74, JR, 58: 185-189; [Raudot], Relation par Lettres, 185-187; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 442-443. The procedures at these councils were as described above.

continued until some consensus was reached. If it was a matter that involved war, a war chief of the clan(s) was asked to participate. If the council decided that the issue merited the involvement of other villages or tribes, the message and wampum to be used were agreed upon, and one or two representatives of each clan were sent to the villages or tribes concerned. Since messengers going to other villages announced information to the whole, it is likely that representatives of each clan were sent in order to make certain that links existed with each clan or moiety in the village. This process was repeated until the matter, if of sufficient import, was brought up at the Confederacy council.

Even the ad hoc administration of the Confederacy reflected the impact of the clan system. For example, village leaders were chosen from clan leaders who were selected from candidates picked by the clan matron from her lineage.<sup>75</sup> Village leaders were picked from this group, while tribal leaders were chosen from village leaders, and Confederacy chiefs were in turn selected from among tribal leaders.<sup>76</sup> The Confederacy itself was divided into two moieties, the tribes in each having reciprocal obligations. The Senecas, Onondagas, and Mohawks composed the "elder brother" moiety, and the Oneidas and Cayugas (later the Tuscaroras and

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<sup>75</sup> Tooker, "League of the Iroquois", Handbook, 424-426; Hewitt, "Status of Women in Iroquois Polity before 1784", 479.

<sup>76</sup> Fenton, "Iroquoian Culture Patterns", Handbook, 314; Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 287, 291; La Potherie, Histoire, 3: 29.

Delawares) made up the "younger brother" one.<sup>77</sup> Further, tribal representation and responsibilities in Confederacy councils were related to clan affiliations and to the number of clans in a tribe rather than on the tribe's population.<sup>78</sup> In short, clan leaders, using a complex system of personal contacts, relationships and diplomacy, ran "local" and "national" councils. At village, tribe, and Confederacy levels, these councils were the government of the Iroquois.

All this is not to suggest the Iroquois were one large homogeneous group. Indeed, archaeological evidence demonstrates that the Iroquois divisions predate European contact by at least 800 or more years.<sup>79</sup> At the same time the Iroquois must have recognized that on some occasions all five tribes would have to co-operate and submerge their independence, at least briefly, in order to survive. It was these pressures that probably led to the formation of the Iroquois Confederacy.<sup>80</sup> To be sure, it was difficult for the

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<sup>77</sup> Tooker, "League of the Iroquois", Handbook, 428; Campisi, "The Iroquois and the Euro-American Concept of Tribe", 168.

<sup>78</sup> Tooker, "League of the Iroquois", Handbook, 421, 424-428.

<sup>79</sup> Indeed differences in languages developed among the five tribes. F.G. Lounsbury, "Iroquoian Languages", Handbook, 335-336.

<sup>80</sup> Whether the Confederacy was formed to stop inter-tribal feuding, either for defence or to expedite war, is not as important in this context as the fact that it was created. W.N. Fenton in "Problems in the Authentication of the League

Iroquois to decide, given their independent nature, what situations called for these actions and the best policy to pursue in each case. But when the occasion arose and a consensus could be reached on the course of action to follow, the network of relationships established through the clan system facilitated the decision-making process and the carrying out of the chosen policy. However, when a consensus could not be reached, the tenuous nature of Iroquois government became apparent. The framework which the clan system furnished, important as it was, could not be a substitute for a government with the means to enforce decisions and to carry them out in the face of opposition--a type of government which existed in New France but which the independent nature of the Iroquois did not permit to develop

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of the Iroquois", in J. Campisi and L. Hauptman, eds., Neighbours and Intruders: An Ethnohistorical Exploration of the Indians of the Hudson's River (Ottawa: National Museum of Man Mercury Series, Canadian Ethnology Service, Paper No. 39, 1978), 261-268, traces the various stages of the League's development. He also deals with the problem of a founding date for the League and concludes that trying to establish one is probably futile since the evidence is scant and contradictory. Despite this, attempts continue. Recently D.K. Richter has argued that while the League may be old, the Confederacy council was a product of responses to Europeans in the historic period. (D.K. Richter, "Ordeals of the Longhouse: The Five Nations in Early American History", Beyond the Covenant Chain, 11-27.) I have been unable to determine that such a difference existed. "League", from the French word "ligue", is the older of the two words in the documentary literature. It was the word French observers used to describe what in English is best described as a confederacy. Even in the unlikely prospect that the League and the Confederacy of the Iroquois were two different bodies, there is no evidence that the Iroquois leaders were picked by a different process or that government in either body functioned in a different manner.

in their tribal areas.

In order to arrive at some assessment of Iroquois policy towards New France, and to show how Iroquois behaviour reflected their goals, the complex and fragile nature of Iroquois government must be kept in mind.

## Chapter 3

## Warfare Part 1: The Process and Goals of War

War was a constant fact of every day life among the Five Nations who were almost always actively engaged in hostilities with some tribe.<sup>1</sup> In 1701 an Iroquois chief, asked how many tribes the Iroquois were at war with, replied that there "are six nations that make war upon us that wee know besides those that wee do not know".<sup>2</sup> That number either represented a conservative estimate, or the Iroquois had considerably reduced the number of their enemies, because in the years between 1603 and 1701 the Iroquois were attacked by at least 20 different groups or combination of groups. In return, the Iroquois attacked 51 groups or combination of groups.<sup>3</sup> In

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<sup>1</sup> It is difficult to determine what motivated the Iroquois to war before contact with Europeans, or how much that contact altered the goals and processes of "traditional" warfare. However, it is not difficult to establish what those goals and processes were in the seventeenth century. As well, many of these goals were central features of eighteenth century Iroquois warfare. In what follows I have added data from the eighteenth century. I do not seek to make the case that the goals and processes were unaltered for two hundred years. The importance of some objectives grew while that of others diminished. Changes also occurred in the rituals of war. However, the fact that they endured, and that the Iroquois modified rather than abandoned these goals and processes, speaks to their importance in Iroquois culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The question of culture change and economic warfare will be the subject of the next chapter.

<sup>2</sup> Conference [with the Five Nations, 10 July to 21 July,] 1701, NYCD, 4: 899.

<sup>3</sup> Compiled from Appendix D, Table D.1.

this same period the Iroquois were involved in at least 465 hostile encounters of which they initiated 354.<sup>4</sup>

Warfare, then, was a central element of seventeenth century Iroquois culture. Among the Five Nations warfare was at times an extension of the political process and, on other occasions it defied the decisions of the political leaders. Warfare was a means of satisfying personal needs and of fulfilling clan and public duty. Warfare was an expression of the Iroquois world view and served as a means by which to find release from the constraints and strictures of daily life. In short, warfare was a complex and integral part of Iroquois culture and daily existence. This was reflected in the process by which warfare was waged, and in the goals for which it was fought.

Among the Iroquois, the decision to wage war was made by a council. The village elders joined the female clan leaders in their council, called Houtouissaches.<sup>5</sup> At this joint assembly the wrongs committed against the Iroquois by the

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid. The Iroquois waged war in small groups rather than in one large army. Even in inter-tribal wars, when fighting parties were larger, the Iroquois tended to send out one group after the return of the first, or send them to different areas. (See, for example, the raids in 1653 against various groups in different locations. Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1653.) This practice is reflected in the high number of raids. Lafitau remarked that warring was so omnipresent that there were almost always some parties in the field. Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 101.

<sup>5</sup> [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 5v; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 442.

intended target group were enumerated and discussed. Once the council agreed that war was justified or necessary the war chiefs were asked to join in the deliberation.<sup>6</sup> At the combined council a speaker for the elders and clan matrons spoke to the "Chefs deguère et leur fait conoitre la necessité indispensable qu'ils ont de se venger contre ceux dont ils croyent avoir été insultés".<sup>7</sup> After the speech, the war chiefs met apart from the elders to consider what they had heard. When the war chiefs reached a decision they returned to the main council and informed the elders and clan matrons of their intentions.<sup>8</sup> If war was decided upon each captain sang his war song. When the projected expedition involved more than one village or tribe, the civil and war leaders of the village initiating the action met, decided the merit of the project, and sent emissaries to other villages and tribes to ask them to send their representatives.<sup>9</sup> If the combined group agreed to war, then a starting date was set and the war captains of the respective tribes returned to their villages to enlist volunteers and prepare for war.<sup>10</sup> The conduct of the war was left to the war chiefs.

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<sup>6</sup> [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 5v.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>9</sup> See the discussion of this process in chapter 2.

<sup>10</sup> [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 6.

Revenge or adoption raids were initiated in much the same way. The clan matron decided, probably in consultation with other matrons of her clan or lineage, that it was necessary to avenge a death or replace a lost relative. A warrior or war captain was approached, given a wampum belt, and asked if he would avenge the death of some individual.<sup>11</sup> The warrior had the right to decide whether or not he would accept the request. However, given the honour attached to being asked, such requests were rarely turned down.<sup>12</sup> Once the request was accepted, the person who was to go out raiding decided for himself who to attack and how many people, if any, would be in his party.

Lafitau, in his analysis of warfare, distinguished between these small raiding parties, what he called "private wars", and council-initiated public ones. According to Lafitau, "war may be regarded either as private when it is made by little parties, some of which are nearly always in the field, or as general, when it is carried on in the name of the tribe".<sup>13</sup> However, it should be stressed that this did not necessarily involve different motives. Councils, as well as individuals, could wage war for purposes of revenge. Nor did small raids necessarily conflict with council decisions. The

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<sup>11</sup> [Anon.], *Nation Iroquoise*, 8; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 446-447.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Lafitau, *Moeurs*, 2: 101.

council could decide that the best way to achieve its war aims was through continual harassment of a tribe by small raiding parties. Moreover, as Lafitau himself observed, the elders were "not opposed to them [raids] when the interest of the tribe is not itself unfavourably affected. They are, on the contrary, very glad to see their people exercising and enjoying themselves in the warlike spirit".<sup>14</sup> In short, both types of warfare were manifestations of social pressures among the Iroquois. Council approved hostilities and personal revenge raids differed only insofar as council initiated wars were sometimes fought as a means of carrying out a political policy decision.

Once the decision to go to war was reached, the leader of a war party invited other young men to join him in his expedition. For large inter-tribal wars, the "war captains" performed this task. Since there was always some injury to avenge, and Iroquois seeking to increase their reputation as warriors, there was usually no shortage of recruits.<sup>15</sup> The night before the party set off, the leader invited the warriors to his longhouse to feast on a dog which had been prepared for the occasion.<sup>16</sup> During the evening the men

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<sup>14</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 101.

<sup>15</sup> R. Livingston to P. Schuyler, August 23, 1720, NYCD, 5: 559-561. Livingston complained about the constant state of warfare, and the readiness of the youth to engage in it.

<sup>16</sup> Colden, History of the Five Nations, 6; Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 111-113; Zeisberger, History, 103. The latter stated that hogs were used more often. This was probably

painted for war, sang and danced, and asked for divine intervention to make them successful over their enemies.<sup>17</sup> On the following morning the warriors paraded past the villagers in single file behind the expedition's leader.<sup>18</sup> Some distance from the village the men removed their ceremonial dress and gave it to the women to take back to the village. The women, who had been waiting for the men, gave them the clothes they would use on the trip, as well as their provisions and some camping utensils.<sup>19</sup>

After the women left, the men stripped some bark off a nearby tree and engraved a pictorial account of the mission they were about to undertake, with canoes facing away from the village to indicate they were leaving. The information left on the tree included the number of warriors in the party, the village or nation of the group, and clan of the war chief.<sup>20</sup> On their return the successes and losses of the journey were

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because hogs were more widely available after 1750 (when Zeisberger lived among the Iroquois) and became preferred because they carried more meat. Zeisberger noted that dogs were still used, but usually more than one at a time because "Indian dogs are very lean". (Ibid).

<sup>17</sup> Ibid; [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 6v.

<sup>18</sup> Colden, History of the Five Nations, 7; Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 114-115; Zeisberger, History, 103.

<sup>19</sup> Colden, History of the Five Nations, 7; Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 114-115. Part of the reason for leaving in ceremonial finery was for the benefit of the watching villagers; the other was to emphasize the solemnity and grandeur of the mission.

<sup>20</sup> [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 448.

added. Here too clan symbols were used to designate how many scalps and prisoners were taken by each family.<sup>21</sup> Unfortunately, while this unique endeavour of a people without a written history to record their exploits is often noted, no real attempt to explain why the Iroquois did this is provided. If nothing else, pictographs reveal the importance attached to warfare by Iroquois men, and their readiness to leave in a public place the record of their deeds.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> [Anon.], Untitled document, AN, C11A, 2: 265-265v; Colden, History of the Five Nations, 7-8; Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 37; Zeisberger, History, 114. The Iroquois also left pictographs at battle sites to indicate the number of captives taken, the size of their party, and the number of wounded and killed on their side. [Anon.], Relation officielle de l'entreprise de Cavelier de La Salle de 1679-1681, in P. Margry, ed., Découvertes et établissements des Français dans l'ouest et dans le sud de l'Amérique septentrionale, 1614-1754, 6 vols. (Paris: D. Jouaust, 1876-1886), 1: 519. The Iroquois "recorded" their martial exploits in other ways as well. After he was captured by the Mohawks Pierre Radisson noted that his adopted father had tattoos on his thigh marking how many men he had killed. [Pierre Radisson], The Explorations of Pierre Esprit Radisson, Arthur T. Adams, ed. (Minnesota: Ross and Haines, 1961), 27. As well, the Iroquois sometimes left a war club beside a corpse to indicate who the attacker had been. ([Anon.], Untitled document, AN, C11A, 2: 265; [Anon., Relation of 1694-95], Ibid, 14: 90v.) This latter document has been misdated. When the French archivists put together the volumes of series C11A they combined the "Relation de ce qui s'est passe deplus remarquable en Canada..." for 1694-95 with that for 1695-96 and put it all in volume 14 of this series (ff. 35-99v.) In reality the Relation of 1695-96 is only that material in ff. 35-64v. Folios 65-99v are part of the Relation of 1694-95. The rest of the Relation of 1694-95 appears untitled, in AN, C11A, 13: 219-244v.

<sup>22</sup> Cammerhoff and Zeisberger in their Diary of 1750 (Moravian Journals, 41,) noted a clearing filled with trees marked in this way. Their Cayuga guide pointed out two trees which outlined his deeds in war.

In the past the weapons of an Iroquois warrior had been the bow and arrow, ball headed war club, shield, spear and wooden armour.<sup>23</sup> With the introduction of the musket the defensive weapons were discarded because they were no longer effective against lead shot and brass or iron spear and arrow heads. The bow and arrow were, however, still used because guns were not always available in large enough quantities for everybody to have one. The war club continued to be used and, along with an iron hatchet, a knife, rope to tie captives with, extra moccasins, a small light kettle, and a mat, formed part of the "war kit".<sup>24</sup> But it is safe to assume that the musket, whenever available, was the main weapon.

In journeying to a given destination the Iroquois travelled by the most convenient method possible. When progress could be made quickly by water

...they speedily make a canow of bast [bark]...These canows are fashioned of one piece of bast, both ends sharply pointed and securely sewn with bast, the inside being stretched out by a ribbing of bent wooden rods, which keep the canow in its proper shape.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 115-116.

<sup>24</sup> J. Megapolensis, "A Short Account of the Mohawk Indians...1644", in J.F. Franklin, ed., Narratives of New Netherland [1909] (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1937), 176; Spangenberg's Journal, 1745, Moravian Journals, 10; Bartram, Observations, 62; Colden, History of the Five Nations, 9; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 447.

<sup>25</sup> Zeisberger, History, 23. Iroquois canoes were fragile and rarely lasted more than one year, but Zeisberger claimed that they knew how to keep their "canows water-tight so that they do not leak". Ibid. And he should know since he spent a great deal of time travelling in them and helped to build

When the waterway became impassable and portaging was not feasible, the canoe was filled with rocks and sunk, to be retrieved on the return trip.<sup>26</sup> Another way to get a canoe, of course, was to find one that had been left behind in this fashion and use it.<sup>27</sup> By these methods Indians were able to travel about fifty miles a day,<sup>28</sup> and undertake journeys of five or six hundred miles in order to capture a prisoner or two.<sup>29</sup>

During the trip, the warriors hunted and, when the weather turned foul, built bark shelters for protection.<sup>30</sup> Once in enemy territory they hunted less, because the closer they came to their foes the greater the chance of being caught or of giving away their position to enemy warriors or hunters.<sup>31</sup> For the same reasons, if food was needed, the bow

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canoes on more than one occasion. Diary of Zeisberger and Frey, 1753, Moravian Journals, 189.

<sup>26</sup> Diary of Zeisberger and Frey, 1753, Moravian Journals, 156, 159.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, 160.

<sup>28</sup> Diary of Cammerhoff and Zeisberger, 1750, Moravian Journals, 33.

<sup>29</sup> [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 8; Zeisberger, History, 40.

<sup>30</sup> Diary of Cammerhoff and Zeisberger, 1750, Moravian Journals, 27, 37, 38. Both missionaries and their Iroquois guides did this. On many occasions they were spared the trouble of constructing their own by coming across "abandoned huts". Bartram (Observations, 39-40) described how his Iroquois guides erected one of these lean-to's. A similar method of stripping bark was most probably used when that material was needed to make canoes.

<sup>31</sup> Zeisberger, History, 40.

and arrow were used. These weapons did not make the type of noise likely to attract enemy attention, and using them saved ammunition. While they were in ambush, however, no one hunted and the warriors lived off the game which they had caught along the way and had managed to save.<sup>32</sup> Because food supplies were not replenished during the time just prior to attacking, food was stored at designated spots along the way to be used when retreating.<sup>33</sup> The Iroquois also built temporary fortifications to be used as staging areas or to fall back to in case of sustained pursuit by foes.<sup>34</sup>

Surprise was a key element of Iroquois warfare.<sup>35</sup> This was particularly true as a strategy for small raiding parties, but was also an important consideration when larger groups were involved. If the Iroquois did not think they could

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Untitled document, AN, C11A, 2: 265; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 448. If it could be spared, ammunition was also stored for later use.

<sup>34</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1640-41, JR, 20: 63.

<sup>35</sup> [Vimont's] Relation of 1642, JR, 22: 247-249; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 448; Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 141. Despite this the Iroquois did not post guards at night. Instead they relied on the report of the scout who was sent ahead to check that the intended campsite was safe. Nor did they post guards when returning with prisoners. However, the Iroquois faith in their methods of securing prisoners was not always well founded. On at least one occasion the captives turned on their sleeping "hosts" and killed them all. Spangenberg's Journal, 1745, Moravian Journals, 10.

surprise their foe they tended not to attack.<sup>36</sup> When the Iroquois did attack, they initiated the engagement by letting out loud cries, followed by a volley of arrows or musket fire, and then rushed in for hand to hand combat or to scalp those that had fallen after the initial round of fire.<sup>37</sup> Abandoning the use of shields, which followed the advent of metal projectile points, may have led to more deaths than

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<sup>36</sup> The Iroquois' unwillingness to provide convenient targets particularly frustrated the French. In one instance Governor Frontenac complained that the Iroquois, "sauvages comme ils sont" hid in the woods and did not come out into the open "ou on n'aurait pas manqué de les charger". Frontenac au Ministre, 11 Novembre, 1692, AN, C11A, 12: 46-48v. The wisdom of Iroquois strategy seems to have escaped Frontenac.

<sup>37</sup> Pierre Boucher, Histoire véritable et naturelle des moeurs & productions du pays de la Nouvelle France, vulgairement dite le Canada, (Paris, 1664, facsimile reprint, Société Historique de Boucherville, 1964), 122; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 448; [Vimont's] Relation of 1642-43, JR, 24: 277; Henri Tonti, "Mémoire envoyé en 1693 sur la découverte du Mississipi et des nations voisines...", in Pierre Margry, ed., Mémoires Inédits pour servir a l'histoire de la France dans les pays d'outre-mer (Paris: Challamel, 1867), 9. Two partial studies of Iroquois military tactics in the seventeenth century are, K. Otterbein, "Why the Iroquois Won: An Analysis of Military Tactics", Ethnohistory, 11, 1 (Winter 1964): 56-63, and Otterbein, "Huron vs. Iroquois: A Case Study in Inter-Tribal Warfare", Ethnohistory, 26, 2 (Spring 1979): 141-152. In the former article Otterbein concluded that Iroquois strategy, not weapons superiority, accounted for Iroquois successes against native foes. In the latter work he provides one example of this assertion. For a discussion of Iroquois weapons and tactics during the war of 1812 see, Carl Benn, "Iroquois Warfare, 1812-14", in R.. Bowler, ed., War Along the Niagra: Essays on the War of 1812 and its Legacy (Youngstown: Old Fort Niagra Association, 1991): 61-76. A full analysis of Iroquois military strategy awaits its historian.

formerly during this stage of battle.<sup>38</sup> Whether or not the Iroquois emerged victorious, they made every effort to remove their dead and wounded from the battle field.<sup>39</sup>

If the raid were successful, the all-important prisoners were brought back to the warriors' home village.<sup>40</sup> Some captives, of course, were killed, because the party brought back only as many as they could safely control without fear of being overpowered by them. Those captives who were spared made the trip to Iroquoia with their arms tied behind their backs (above the elbows), and were usually subjected to minor torments along the way.<sup>41</sup> At night prisoners were tied to stakes.<sup>42</sup> Another method was to secure prisoners with

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<sup>38</sup> It is not clear how shields had been used by the Iroquois. If they were only used to block arrow volleys and then discarded for close fighting, their having fallen into disuse would not entail greater casualties during hand to hand fighting.

<sup>39</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1647, JR, 32: 21; François Dollier de Casson, Histoire du Montreal, edited and translated by Ralph Flenley as A History of Montreal, 1640-1672 (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1928), 127, 175. The dead were cremated.

<sup>40</sup> The records do not indicate if the same procedures were followed in instances when hundreds of captives were taken.

<sup>41</sup> On the method of binding prisoners see Untitled document, AN, C11A, 2: 263. The torments were minor only in comparison to what would follow for those destined to be tortured.

<sup>42</sup> Prisoners were bound hand and foot to stakes as in a St. Andrew's cross. Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 148-149; La Potherie, Histoire, 2: 23. Father Jogues, who was captured by the Iroquois, described this as the way he was tied while he was in the village proper and not while en route. He was "étendu sur les dos et lie en forme de croix de Sant-André por les pieds, les mains et le milieu du corps". "Narré de la prise de père Isaac Jogues", RAPO, 1924-25, 8.

stakes. Two stakes, one with an area hollowed out to fit a part of the anatomy, were planted in the ground. A captive's arm or leg was then placed between the two stakes, and the stakes were tied together at the top.<sup>43</sup> The stakes used to restrain prisoners were sometimes painted.<sup>44</sup> Along the way home, if the group passed villages of allied tribes or those of their own people, runners were sent ahead to inform the villagers. The inhabitants then came to the outskirts of the village and formed a double row down the middle of which the prisoners ran while being assailed with blows from all sides. Once the captives were inside the village, the punishment stopped.<sup>45</sup> Still, as a rule, these beatings were not as harsh as the ones the prisoners received at the last stop, where the same process was followed.

About one day before the Iroquois came to their home village, they sent a runner ahead to announce the outcome of the excursion.<sup>46</sup> If an Iroquois in the war party had died, the family of the deceased was consoled and then the community went to the outskirts of the village to "welcome" the warriors

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<sup>43</sup> Untitled document, AN, C11A, 2: 265v.

<sup>44</sup> Journal of Frederick Post, July 15 to September 20, 1758, Western Travels, 1: 190; Zeisberger, History, 104; Diary of Cammeroff and Zeisberger, 1750, Moravian Journals, 37.

<sup>45</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1669-70, JR, 54: 23; Colden History of the Five Nations, 9; Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 153.

<sup>46</sup> [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 8v; Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 152; La Potherie, Histoire, 2: 23; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 449.

and their captives.<sup>47</sup> According to Father Lamberville, as victor and vanquished approached a member of the war party cried out "koué, koué, koué; these are shouts of rejoicing and victory, which denote the coming of as many captives as the number of times they are repeated".<sup>48</sup> The inhabitants then went to the outskirts of the village and formed two lines down which passed the expedition's leader followed by the warriors and prisoners. The village elders waited at the end of the line closest to the village and the fire.<sup>49</sup> The reception of Father Isaac Jogues in 1642 at the hands (and feet) of the Mohawks was typical of the process:

le père, comme le plus considerable, fut salué de quantité de bastonnade de coups de pieds et de poings, de telle sort qu'il était tout en sang...Après cela on dispose les captifs, on les met en ordre pour faire mieux voir la magnificence du triomphe. Entre chaque prisonniers on met des Iroquois, afin de les empêcher de marcher vite...En même temps ils se fait une harangue à la Jeunesse pour l'exhorter à saluer les prisonniers à la facon du pays; elles ne s'y épargne pas.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 149-150. This greeting can be viewed as a cruel parody of the traditional welcoming ceremony for guests during which their tears were dried, their throats cleared, etc. See the discussion of this in chapter 2.

<sup>48</sup> Jean de Lamberville to [Father Superior], 25 August, 1682, JR, 62: 79. See also, [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 8v.

<sup>49</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1669-70, JR, 54: 23-25.

<sup>50</sup> The passage is taken from "Narré de la prise de père Isaac Jogues", RAPO, 1924-25, 7. The narrative was written by Father Buteux, who was killed by the Iroquois in 1652. This process remained more or less the same into the eighteenth century. See, Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 149-150; Journal of Frederick Post, October 1758-January 1759, Western Travels, 1: 254; Zeisberger, History, 105-106.

Prisoners were not usually killed during this process. If the raid was one undertaken at the request of a clan matron in order to capture someone to replace a dead clansmen, then the warrior had some incentive to make sure that the captive was not so abused that he or she would not make a suitable adoptee.<sup>51</sup> As well, in such cases the person for whom the captive was intended could step in front of the prisoner and thus spare him the worst of the abuse.<sup>52</sup> However, the final decision on the prisoner's fate was made by only the village council.<sup>53</sup> The French trader and explorer Pierre Radisson, for example, escaped from the Mohawk after he had already been adopted. When he was recaptured, his "parents" recognized him in the reception line to the village and his "mother" quickly led him away. But, she did not untie him and he was not allowed to return to his former family until his "father" pleaded for his life before the village council.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 152. James Lynch, "The Iroquois Confederacy, and the Adoption and Administration of Non-Iroquoian Individuals and Groups Prior to 1756", Man in the Northeast, 30 (Fall 1985), 86-88, has suggested one reason prisoners could be harshly treated in the period shortly after capture was because they had yet to be adopted into a family.

<sup>52</sup> Galinée, "Voyage de Dollier et Galinée", 30; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 450.

<sup>53</sup> [Radisson], Explorations, 69; Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 153.

<sup>54</sup> [Radisson], Explorations, 16-24. In escaping, or in killing some Mohawk in the process, Radisson had forfeited his status as a member of his mother's clan.

If warfare seemed to be a vital part of everyday existence among the Iroquois, it was because this was the case. And warfare was so central to Iroquois culture because of the many functions it served.

For the tribes of the Five Nations Confederacy, waging war was an honoured pastime. While there could be, and often were material rewards for engaging in war, more powerful and enduring reasons for the almost constant warfare by the Iroquois were the pursuit of glory, honour, and the taking of revenge against those who had done them injury or slighted their pride. As Pierre Boucher, a soldier and interpreter for the government of New France noted,

La guerre qu'ils se font les uns aux autres ne se fait point pour conquerir des terres, ny pour devenir plus grands Seigneurs, ny meme pour l'interest, mais par pure vengeance...<sup>55</sup>

In his history of the Iroquois, published in 1727, Cadwallader Colden wrote that

It is not for the Sake of Tribute...that they make War, but from Notions of Glory which they have ever most strongly imprinted on their Minds; and the farther they go to seek an Enemy, the greater the Glory they think they gain.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Pierre Boucher, Histoire veritable, 117.

<sup>56</sup> Colden, History of the Five Nations, 4, see also vi. Lafitau felt that Iroquois warfare "exposes their courage to the rudest tests, [and] furnishes them frequent occasions to put in its brightest light all the nobility of their sentiments and the unshakeable firmness of a truly heroic greatness of mind". Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 98.

General Thomas Gage writing in 1772 to the Superintendent of Indian affairs, William Johnson, echoed Boucher and Colden's observations:

I never heard that Indians made War for the sake of Territory like Europeans, but that Revenge, and eager pursuit of Martial reputation were the motives which prompted one Nation to make War upon another...<sup>57</sup>

These inducements to warring were instilled in Iroquois youth until the end of the eighteenth century. Both Joseph Brant and John Norton, Iroquois leaders and warriors in the war of 1812 between Canada and the United States, recalled that in their youth they were urged to be "daring and indefatigable in war",<sup>58</sup> and that the "chief thing inculcated into the minds of young men was a principal of honour as a warrior".<sup>59</sup>

Another incentive for warring, and one closely related to honour, was the need to avenge an injury, whether it was for an insult or for a death incurred during a previous raid. While it is true that presents could be given to atone for a death, Father Lafitau stated that

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<sup>57</sup> Thomas Gage to William Johnson, October 7, 1771 Johnson Papers, 12: 994-995.

<sup>58</sup> John Norton quoted in Douglas W. Boyce, "A Glimpse of Iroquois Culture History Through the Eyes of Joseph Brant and John Norton", American Philosophical Society Proceedings, 117, 4 (August 1973), 293.

<sup>59</sup> Joseph Brant quoted in *Ibid*, 290. Brant and Norton's responses were taken from a questionnaire made by Reverend Miller of the Six Nations Reserve, which Boyce found. While the questions have disappeared, the answers give some indication of what was asked.

...even though these presents are accepted, if the omens are not favourable for taking complete vengeance for the assassination at that time, they [the guilty party] should not flatter themselves that the insult is entirely forgotten. The dressing put on this wound only covers, without curing it...The council keeps an exact register of people killed on occasions of this sort [small raids] and the memory of these events is refreshed until conditions are such that the most magnificent satisfaction can be gotten for them.<sup>60</sup>

At a conference in Detroit in 1704, a Seneca spokesman summed up the Iroquois philosophy on revenge to a group of Hurons: "You know, my brothers, our customs which are to avenge, or to perish in avenging our dead".<sup>61</sup> One can assume that for the Hurons this was a superfluous reminder.

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<sup>60</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 102-103. See also Zeisberger, History, 19; La Potherie, Histoire, 3: 28.

<sup>61</sup> Conference, July 1704, Cadillac Papers, [Papers of Cadillac and others pertaining to the Founding and Early History of Detroit]. Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society Collections, Vols. 33, 34 (Michigan, 1904, 1905), 33: 191. (Hereafter, Cadillac Papers). Daniel Richter, referring to essentially this same process, has called it the "mourning war". Richter, "War and Culture", 528-559. This phrase captures one aspect of Iroquois warfare--the grief over the loss of a family member that led to raids to capture people to replace the deceased or to be tortured as a means of easing or appeasing the sense of loss caused by the death of a family member. However, it masks the broader significance of these revenge raids. Revenge in these instances was not just to mourn over the past. Rather, it was an effort by the Iroquois to establish a link with the past in order to face the present. The adoption of prisoners as new family members represented a renewal of life and a belief in the continuation of the individual's spirit. In short, these types of revenge raids were not so much to mourn the loss of life as they were a means to face and renew life.

Revenge raids were launched either as the result of dreams or, more frequently, at the request of a clan matron.<sup>62</sup> In the latter case not just anyone was requested to avenge a death in the household, nor indeed anyone from the clan. This obligation belonged

to all those men who have marriage links with that house, or their Athonni, as they say; and in that fact, resides the advantage of having men born in it. For these men, although isolated at home...marry into different lodges. The Children born of these different marriages became obligated to their fathers' lodge to which they are strangers, and contract the obligation of replacing [those slain in war].<sup>63</sup>

This meant that in the case of the death of a person in one clan, the matron asked the child of a male from her clan, but one who lived with the mother, to avenge that death. The child was a stranger to his "father's lodge" because "marriage did not require of those contracting it that either one pass into the other's Lodge, both remaining in their own".<sup>64</sup> Further, since clans were exogamous, the mother of the child was from another clan and, because descent was traced through

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<sup>62</sup> Adventure raids were usually undertaken as a result of a vision in a dream. La Potherie, Histoire, 2: 20. On the various roles of dreams in Iroquois society see A.F.C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), 59-75.

<sup>63</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 99; [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 8. On the Athonni see also La Potherie, Histoire, 1: 360.

<sup>64</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 243; Barclay to Colden, 7 December, 1741. Colden Papers, 8: 282. Barclay was a missionary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and he lived among the Mohawk for some time. Barclay's letter (Ibid, 279-285) was paraphrased by Colden and used as the introduction on Iroquois culture in his History of the Five Indian Nations.

the mother's line, so was the child.<sup>65</sup> Thus the responsibility to avenge the death of a person belonged to another clan, and prisoners who were brought back for adoption were given by the warriors to "their father's households".<sup>66</sup> This aspect of revenge warfare served as a means to reinforce ties among the clans. In fact the role of clans was so important that even the prisoners who were rejected for adoption and destined to die, were tortured by another clan, and not by the one which had refused the captive.<sup>67</sup>

The clan matron could also put an end to a revenge raid. If the raid was to be against a tribe with which the village council was trying to maintain good relations, the chiefs would try "underhanded measures to stop the leaders" of a war party.<sup>68</sup> But the best way to put an end to an expedition was to "reach the matrons of the Lodges, where those who are engaged with the Leader have their Athonni [paternity] for these have only to interpose their authority to turn aside all the best devised plans".<sup>69</sup> Yet, much to the displeasure of

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<sup>65</sup> Fenton, "Iroquoian Culture Patterns", Handbook, 311-312.

<sup>66</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 152.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, 156.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, 101.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. The French Indian agent to the Onondagas, Charles Le Moyne de Longueuil recognized that the problem was a complex one. In his efforts to keep that tribe from waging war he addressed his appeal to all the parties involved in the process: "Children I desire that the young men shall be obedient and do what the old Sachims shall order...the

colonial officials, these small raids were not easily put aside.<sup>70</sup> The clan matrons were not very willing to ignore their obligation (and need) to replace those lost in war.<sup>71</sup>

The impulse for revenge (blood feuding) was so strong that not only individuals, but at times, tribes broke treaties with friendly nations, Indian and European, in order to fulfil this obligation. In 1712, for example the Mohawks passed a war belt among the other four tribes of the Confederacy in order to raise an army to attack the English in New York, because some English colonials had killed several Mohawks.<sup>72</sup> While nothing came of this (the other tribes recommended against it), it is a good example of the extremes to which some Iroquois were prepared to go in order to avenge deaths. After all, the English were not only allies of the Five Nations, but could prove to be powerful foes since they controlled the gun supply (for the most part) of the Iroquois.

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sqaas...should give good advice to the young men". Propositions of the French at Onondaga, [reported] 7 May, 1711, NYCD, 5: 243-244. For a somewhat different version of this speech see "Continuation of Colden's History of the Five Indian Nations, 1707-1720", Colden Papers, 9: 401.

<sup>70</sup> Speech to Six Nations, Acting Governor George Clarke, Albany, [12] August, 1740. NYCD, 6: 173. The document dates this opening speech as being on 16 August, and the response on 12 August. The latter is probably the correct date for the opening speech, and 16 August when the transcripts of the conference were completed. After all, the Iroquois would not respond to a speech four days before it was made.

<sup>71</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 102.

<sup>72</sup> [Conference] 14 June, 1712, Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 93.

Needless to say, the emphasis on blood feuding continually thwarted efforts to effect peace between various Indian tribes.<sup>73</sup> The Iroquois had difficulty in making colonial officials understand the reasons for these excursions, but explained that they were the result of the ungovernable passions of the young, or the work of an evil spirit.<sup>74</sup> The strength of "blood revenge" as a motive for war may be evinced by the fact that as late as the 1900's this behaviour was still in the process of "giving way to white law enforcement on the reservation."<sup>75</sup> Admittedly, wars were not being waged at this point, but for some Iroquois at least, revenge was still an accepted means of settling disputes.

Revenge could be achieved by several means: bringing back a few prisoners or scalps were two. As one French

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<sup>73</sup> [Report to Albany Indian Commissioners], 26 July, 1738, *Ibid*, 210-211. English efforts in July 1738 to bring about peace between the Senecas and the Catawbias were halted after a Seneca was murdered by some Catawbias. The Senecas quickly sent out a small raiding party to make the Catawbias atone for this. Wraxall also reported that a much sought after treaty was concluded between the Ottawas and the Iroquois on June 9, 1710, but that by January 1711 Iroquois war parties were setting off to Ottawas country to avenge a few murders. *Ibid*, 72-73, 80. The desire for revenge could also be used to the advantage of the Europeans as William Johnson discovered during the War of Austrian Succession (1744-48). In July 1747 Johnson managed to get a Pro-French Seneca village to support the English because some warriors from that village had been killed by a party in which a few French were present. Johnson to Gov. Clinton, 17 July, 1747, *NYCD*, 6: 386-387.

<sup>74</sup> Such was the reason given when Conrad Weiser, trader and Indian agent, was sent to inquire why the Iroquois had attacked, and taken prisoners (in the 1740's) in Carolina. *Journal of Conrad Weiser, 1748, Western Travels*, 1: 33-34.

<sup>75</sup> W.N. Fenton, "Iroquois Suicide", 134.

observer remarked, a group of three or four hundred Iroquois that obtained four or five scalps and an equal number of prisoners "reviennent aussi glorieux que s'ils avoient gagné une bataille entier".<sup>76</sup> In fact, taking prisoners and scalps were in themselves motives for war because they reflected a warrior's skill.<sup>77</sup> More than one observer noted that the Iroquois "tuent rarement ceux qu'ils peuvent faire prisonniers, car l'honneur et le profit de la victoire est de conduire des prisonniers au village".<sup>78</sup> There was, of course, no need for these objectives to be mutually exclusive. An Iroquois who set out to avenge a death, and brought back prisoners and scalps would thereby furnish proof of his skills as a warrior, and that the murder of a fellow Iroquois had been atoned for. But the search for scalps and prisoners as

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<sup>76</sup> [Anon.], *Nation Iroquoise*, 7.

<sup>77</sup> Scalps were one of the material signs of a successful raid. [Le Mercier's] *Relation of 1669-70*, JR, 53: 245; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 2: 22. See also, Nathaniel Knowles, "The Torture of Captives by the Indians of Eastern North America", *American Philosophical Society Proceedings*, 32, 2 (March 1940), 152. While scalps could be used to replace the dead, that is "scalps which take the place of a captive and replace a person", it is most likely that in such cases the scalp served more as a sign that the death of the person had been avenged. Lafitau, *Moeurs*, 2: 163. For a discussion on the various ways in which scalps were taken see, Gabriel Nadeau, "Indian Scalping Technique in Different Tribes", *Bulletin of History of Medicine*, X, 2, (July 1941): 178-194. On the longevity of this native practice see, James Axtell, *The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 16-35.

<sup>78</sup> [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 448; Colden, *History of the Five Nations*, 9.

proof of martial skill was cause enough for warring even when deaths were not to be avenged by the undertaking. These trophies of martial valour continued to be sought well into the eighteenth-century. Baron La Pause noted in 1758 that among French allied Indians (some of whom were Mohawks from Caughnawaga), a few scalps and prisoners was all they desired, and that they would stop fighting after getting these:

Lorsqu'on ne compta que sur les partis des sauvages on en fera très peu, attendu qu'ils se retirent dès qu'ils ont fait une chevelure au prisonnier.<sup>79</sup>

The Iroquois warrior gained glory by returning with prisoners because captives served various important functions in Iroquois society. Captives, for example, were used for public torture. Despite the significant body of evidence left on Iroquois torture rituals, a definitive study of this practice has not emerged.<sup>80</sup> That work which does exist

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<sup>79</sup> La Pause, *Memoire Sur la Campagne a Faire en Canada, L'Annee 1757*, RAPO, 1932-33, 338. See also, La Pause, *Relation de L'affaire de la Belle-Riviere, 1755*, in *Ibid*, 308-309. After chasing Braddock's defeated army the Indians returned with some spoils of war, some prisoners, and "un nombre infini de chevelures". Zeisberger noted the persistence of this attitude into the 1780's. "If they can bring back a captive or a scalp they regard themselves as amply rewarded for all weariness and need they have suffered and danger to which they have been exposed". Zeisberger, History, 40-41.

<sup>80</sup> Knowles, "The Torture of Captives", 151-225; Bruce Trigger, The Huron: Farmers of the North (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 47-53. While much of value can be extracted from these works, the focus of each is not to explain Iroquois torture. Knowles was concerned with documenting the various methods of torture and in tracing links between them in order to ascertain questions of diffusion. Trigger's work dealt mostly with the Huron. Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, devotes one paragraph to the

suggests that the Iroquois engaged in torture to strike fear into opponents, for emotional release and revenge, and for religious purposes.<sup>81</sup> While these all seem reasonable suggestions, the reality was more complex.

There is no doubt that revenge and emotional release were served by torture, but it was not always so.<sup>82</sup> Certain rules made the Iroquois rein in the very passions that led them to want prisoners for torture. For example, a clan matron may have initiated a raid in order to avenge a previous loss. But, if the prisoner given to that clan was rejected for adoption and was given up for torture "the members of the household to which he has been given do not touch him. It would not be suitable for them to become torturers of one who has been offered to represent some member of their family".<sup>83</sup> Rules of propriety, in this case those of clan obligation, meant that direct venting of grief and rage had to be deferred. As well, intended torture victims were often clothed, given a kin relationship, and even given a going away

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role of torture. Ibid, 69-70.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. Wallace (The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, 44-48) has suggested that warfare in general served to maintain social equilibrium by providing a way to release tensions.

<sup>82</sup> A Huron explained his nation's attitude to prisoners: "We have nothing but caresses for them a day before their death, even when our minds are filled with cruelties, the severity of which we afterward find all our pleasure in making them feel." [Lalemant's] "Huron Report, 1641-42", JR, 23: 93.

<sup>83</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 156.

feast before being killed.<sup>84</sup> Why did the Iroquois initiate a symbolic tie to the person whom the captive was to replace and then kill him anyway? In what sense did the torture of such victims represent revenge or emotional release for the family that had initiated the raid to replace a lost relative?

Equally unclear is the religious aspect of Iroquois torture. There is some evidence that the torture and/or death of a captive had religious significance. The Iroquois made every effort to prolong torture and to ensure that the victim did not die prior to dawn.<sup>85</sup> There is one reference, albeit among the Hurons, which suggests that the delay was to allow the sun or war god to witness the process.<sup>86</sup> On the other hand, the dawn death may have had no sacrificial meaning at all. It may have had more to do with the Iroquois belief in the after life and killing people at a time when their souls might see the path to their final destination rather than at night when they might lose their way and stay about the Iroquois villages and harm them. The Iroquois fear of retribution from the soul of a deceased torture victim was the purpose of the ceremony, undertaken in the evening after a

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<sup>84</sup> Boucher, Histoire Veritable, 125-126; Galinée, "Voyage de Dollier et Galinée", 30-32; [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1669-70, JR, 54: 27.

<sup>85</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1668-69, JR, 52: 167-169; [Radisson], Explorations, 16-24.

<sup>86</sup> [Le Mercier's] "Huron Report, 1637", JR, 13: 61.

the longhouses in a bid to drive out any remaining spirits.<sup>87</sup>

Matters are made more complicated because, even if it is not clear that torture served a religious purpose, it seems evident that aspects of the torture process reflected Iroquois spiritual beliefs. Certainly drinking a brave victim's blood and washing it over the heads of children reflected the Iroquois belief that doing so would transfer some of that individual's strength and courage to them.<sup>88</sup> As well, intended torture victims were painted before being tortured and killed, again, implying some ritual if not spiritual connection.<sup>89</sup> The difficulty with all of this is that it is hard to establish links between these practices and the capture of people. Were people captured specifically to be tortured as fulfilment of some religious rites? Or do the rituals and processes surrounding torture simply reflect the influences that shaped all aspects of Iroquois life, that is, their clan system and their animistic world view? While it is probably the latter, these questions point to the need for a

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<sup>87</sup> Galinée, "Voyage de Dollier et Galinée", 34; [W. Greenhalgh], "Wentworth Greenhalgh's Journal of a Tour to the Indians of Western New-York", NYCD, 3: 252; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 454; Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 157.

<sup>88</sup> Radisson, Explorations, 21; Galinée, "Voyage de Dollier et Galinée", 34.

<sup>89</sup> Jean de Lamberville to [Father Superior], 25 August, 1682, JR, 62: 87, 91; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 451; Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 155.

new and detailed study of the role of torture in Iroquois society.<sup>90</sup>

For whatever reasons the Iroquois engaged in this activity, they had certainly refined the process of torture to include the most pain and the least real harm to the body in order to make the torment a prolonged one. Iroquois torturers, wrote Lafitau, had a habit of starting "at the extremities of the feet and hands, going up little by little" to the body.<sup>91</sup> The first phase of torture was also limited to minor abuses (at least minor in relation to what would follow), such as ripping off finger nails, cutting or chewing off fingers, and slicing off bits of flesh from legs.<sup>92</sup> The victim suffered great pain as a result of these practices, but

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<sup>90</sup> One of the difficulties that will face any researcher tackling this problem is how to deal with disparate descriptions of the torture process. Are they different because they reflect dissimilar practices or because some observers omitted aspects included in the reports of others? As well, prisoners captured as part of an adventure raid were treated differently from those brought in as part of a revenge raid. ([Anon.], *Nation Iroquoise*, 8-8v; Galinée, "Voyage de Dollier et Galinée", 30-34; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 450). The different torture processes may reflect this. Without knowing the reasons for the raid one cannot properly evaluate what the evidence on torture reveals.

<sup>91</sup> Lafitau, *Moeurs*, 2: 156-157. See also Father Millet's observation in [Le Mercier's] *Relation of 1668-69*, JR, 52: 169. Father Le Mercier, writing over thirty years before, had noted that the Huron burned the legs first "so that he [the prisoner] might hold out until daybreak". [Le Mercier's] "Huron Report, 1637", JR, 13: 61, 67.

<sup>92</sup> See the personal accounts of Father Bressani ([Bressani's], *Breve Relatione*, JR, 39: 55-77), Father Jogues (in [Lalemant's] *Relation of 1647*, JR, 31: 39-51), Father Poncet (in [Le Mercier's] *Relation of 1652-53*, JR, 40: 133-137), and Radisson ([Radisson], *Explorations*, 16-24).

his body did not sustain the type of damage that could lead to a quick death.

The Iroquois were also shrewd enough to avoid cutting major arteries and veins in order to prevent severe blood loss and an unwanted early death.<sup>93</sup> The Iroquois recognized that torture by fire aided in prolonging life by cauterizing veins and stemming blood flow. This goal seems to be the purpose behind such practices as putting stubs of fingers in pipes or placing burning ashes on scalped heads. These tortures had the combined effect of producing excruciating pain and prolonging the victim's period of suffering.<sup>94</sup> However, if a specific type of torture did not stop the blood flow, the Iroquois wrapped the body part in question to ensure the victim did not die before they were done with him.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Indeed, the most common torture method was to burn the victim slowly. The effectiveness of these methods can be evinced from the fact that victims sometimes endured for days. [Raudot], Relation par lettres, 184; [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 452. However, by then, as the anonymous author of the latter work observed, the body of the victim "n'est plus qu'une masse informe". Ibid, 451.

<sup>94</sup> Father Poncet recalled how one Iroquois wanted to place the stub of his finger in his pipe in order to stem the flow of blood. [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1652-53, JR, 40: 133-135. La Potherie (Histoire, 2: 25), noted that this was the purpose of putting burning sand and ashes on the victim's head after he was scalped. "Après qu'on l'a bien grillé on lui enleve la chevelure...[et] on lui applique sur la tête une ecuelle pleine de sable brulant pour lui etancher le sang". The Huron also used fire in torture to the same end. [Lalemant's] "Huron Report, 1642-43", JR, 26: 191.

<sup>95</sup> Father Poncet in [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1652-53, JR, 40: 133-135; Father Jogues in [Lalemant's] Relation of 1647, JR, 31: 45.

In short, the Iroquois had mastered the torture process. They had learned how much abuse the body could sustain and developed and refined torture practices which delayed a victim's demise as long as possible. Even if the full role of torture is not clear, it seems reasonable to conclude that it was an essential aspect of Iroquois culture and that taking prisoners to be put to death in this fashion was an important goal of warfare.

Another, more important, use of prisoners was to replace those who had died in war or of some other cause.<sup>96</sup> The Iroquois selected from among their captives those they felt would be most suitable to adoption and either killed the others or saved them for torture.<sup>97</sup> Even those captives destined for torture were usually given first to some family to replace one who had died, but were rejected because they were somehow unsuitable.<sup>98</sup> Those who underwent torture more

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<sup>96</sup> [Anon.], *Nation Iroquoise*, 8. As one Iroquois speaker explained, it is the "Custom to give such Prisoners as are taken of the Enemy, to those families that have lost their relatives in battle, who have the sole disposal of them, either to kill them or keep them alive". Onondaga speaker, Albany Conference, 20 August, 1711, *NYCD*, 5: 269.

<sup>97</sup> Megapolensis, "A Short Account of the Mohawk Indians", *NNN*, 175; [Anon.], *Nation Iroquoise*, 7; Lafitau, *Moeurs*, 2: 195. Some prisoners were not adopted immediately. [Lalemant's] *Relation of 1647*, *JR*, 31: 53. This may have been part of some test of suitability or some prisoners might have been deliberately set aside to be exchanged for Iroquois taken captive by other groups.

<sup>98</sup> Boucher, *Histoire Veritable*, 125-126; Lafitau, *Moeurs*, 2: 156. Interestingly enough the torture of the prisoner did not end the obligation to replace the dead which continued, wrote Lafitau, "until life is given a person representing the

than likely suffered this fate because the family in question wanted revenge more than they wanted to add to the strength of the clan by adopting a new member.<sup>99</sup> However, a prisoner, once adopted, was treated as if he had always been an Iroquois, and if he replaced someone who had died, he assumed all the rights and privileges of the deceased.<sup>100</sup> It was this practice which enabled the Iroquois to retain a large enough population to remain a powerful political force well into the 1700s.<sup>101</sup> In fact, capturing people for adoption grew in importance as a goal of warfare and led to a decrease

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one whom they wish to resuscitate". Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> In one case a woman who had been given a captive to replace her son, could not bear to see the captive live. Galinée, "Voyage de Dollier et Galinée", 30. In another, some eight people were killed in revenge for the death of one Oneida warrior. [Anon.], *Nation Iroquoise*, 7v.

<sup>100</sup> La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 46, 47; Lafitau, *Moeurs*, 2: 171-172; [Anon.] "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 450; Colden, *History of the Five Nations*, 9. When whole tribes were taken, they were often allowed to live in their own village and given a kinship term to symbolize their relationship to the Iroquois. Thus the Wyandots were called "nephews" and in turn called the Six Nations "Uncles" after they were adopted in 1748. (Journal of Conrad Weiser, 1748, *Western Travels*, 1: 35-36). More significant was the adoption of the Tuscaroras. In 1713-14 the Iroquois began receiving refugee Tuscaroras (an estimated 500 families), and in 1722-23 this group was formally adopted into the Five Nations and given a position in one of the moieties. The Confederacy even went so far as to change its name to that of Six Nations in order to acknowledge the position among them of the new tribe. David Landy, "Tuscarora Among the Iroquois", *Handbook*, 519-20. On the reasons for adopting people and tribes among the Iroquois, see James Lynch, "The Iroquois Confederacy, and the Adoption and Administration of Non-Iroquoian Individuals and Groups Prior to 1756", 83-99.

<sup>101</sup> La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 43-44; Lafitau, *Moeurs*, 2: 172; Zeisberger, *History*, 40-41.

in the frequency of torture.<sup>102</sup> According to Lafitau, the need to replace lost kin and to shore up clan lineages made war a "necessary exercise for the Iroquois".<sup>103</sup>

Nonetheless, not all prisoners were sought just for torture or to replace dead kin. Political and military concerns also created pressure to capture people. The Iroquois used captives to add to their ranks in order to ensure they had enough warriors to provide adequate defence against their enemies. Many able bodied male captives were spared death in order to bolster Iroquois military

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<sup>102</sup> "Now their numbers being very much diminished...they very politically strive to Strengthen themselves not only by alliances with their neighbours, but...[by] prisoners they take; they are almost always accepted by the relations of a warrior slain...This custom is as antient as our knowledge of them, but when their number of warriors was more than twice as many as now, the relations would more frequently refuse to adopt the prisoners but rather chuse to gratify their thirst of revenge". Bartram, Observations, 91. See also, [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 452.

<sup>103</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 98. Recently it has been suggested that "slavery was practiced by Northern Iroquoians in the context of what has been previously and exclusively described as an adoption complex". W. Starna and R. Watkins, "Northern Iroquoian Slavery", Ethnohistory, 38, 1 (Winter 1991): 34-57. It is tempting to view this as another reason why captives were important, since the contention might be made that captives were sought to be used as slaves as well as for torture and adoption. But, while the authors make a convincing case that some captives were not fully integrated into Iroquois society, and not accorded the same freedoms as native born Iroquois, their definition of "slavery" (loss of honour, control over one's person, or actions) does not imply the rigid type of "chattel slavery" needed to support an argument that captives were specifically sought to be used as slaves.

strength.<sup>104</sup> It was thus, Father Ragueneau wrote, "that the Hiroquois swell their troops."<sup>105</sup> Enemies of the Iroquois knew this was their practice. In 1665 the Hurons advised Sieur de Tracy that the first step to success against the Iroquois was to lure away the captives they held. The strength of the Iroquois lay in these people whom the Iroquois made to fight on their behalf.<sup>106</sup>

Even if the Iroquois were not fighting a losing battle against population decline they sought to increase the size of their fighting force as a means to carry out military or political objectives.<sup>107</sup> As the Hurons told the French in the 1650s, the Iroquois may have wanted to incorporate the remaining Hurons because the Iroquois wished to "strengthen themselves with our colony, and compel us, when we are with them, to take up arms against you [the French]".<sup>108</sup> In 1681

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<sup>104</sup> Often captives made up part of predominantly Iroquois war parties. However, in some cases captives came to identify themselves, and be seen, so thoroughly as Iroquois that raiding parties were entirely composed of former prisoners. In June of 1660 one such group of "Iroquoised Huron", as the Jesuits called them, attacked the French in the Quebec area. Journal des Pères Jésuites, JR, 45: 155, 157.

<sup>105</sup> [Ragueneau's] Relation of 1651-52, JR, 38: 49, 51. See also, Louis Henri Baugy, Journal d'une expédition contre les Iroquois en 1687 (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1883), 50-52.

<sup>106</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1664-65, JR, 49: 233.

<sup>107</sup> The relationship between population decline and increased warfare is discussed in chapter 6.

<sup>108</sup> Huron quoted in [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1653-54, JR, 41: 49. The Jesuits felt Iroquois peace efforts in the 1650s were merely attempts to garner French aid and to take the Hurons in the colony to Iroquoia to swell Iroquois warrior

the Onondagas attacked the Piscataways for a similar dual purpose. The Onondagas hoped to capture some Piscataways because they wanted to "strengthen themselves as much as they could with other Nations" because their relations with the Senecas were strained and they feared an armed confrontation.<sup>109</sup> Military and political considerations, then, even led to war against groups that were not a real threat to the Iroquois as a means to derive captives.

The blood feud nature of native warfare also made the capture of people an important military strategy. A good way to ensure defeat and demoralization of the enemy, was to capture them. The surest way to defeat a foe and prevent reprisal raids was to leave few or none capable or willing to engage in revenge raids.<sup>110</sup> At a conference in June 1711, the Onondaga leader Teganissorens recounted to Governor Hunter

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ranks. [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1657-58, JR, 44: 151.

<sup>109</sup> [Court Minute], 22 Aug., 1681, in Archives of Maryland, William Hand Browne, et al, eds. (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1883- ), 17: 3-5. (Hereafter Md. Arch.)

<sup>110</sup> Father Lalemant wrote that this was the purpose of the Hurons practice of capture and torture. It served to "ruin and exterminate their enemies by killing them, and to frighten them from coming to war against them." [Lalemant's] "Huron Report, 1639-40", in [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1640, JR, 19: 81. It is important to noted that he penned this observation before the Huron-Iroquois wars reached their nadir. Gabriel Sagard, the Recollet missionary, writing in 1623 before the French had witnessed large scale native warfare, also remarked that the goal of Iroquoian warfare was to exterminate their enemies. Gabriel Sagard, The Long Journey to the Country of the Hurons, G.M. Wrong, ed., H.H. Langton, trans. (Toronto: Champlain Society, vol. 25, 1939), 163. See also, Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 145.

of New York what he had recently told some French envoys at Onondaga. The Iroquois, said Teganissorens,

...are not like you CHRISTIANS for when you have taken Prisoners of one another you send them home, by such means you can never rout one another, We are not of that Nature, When we have war against any nation Wee endeavour to destroy them utterly.<sup>111</sup>

A clearer statement of Iroquois military strategy would be difficult to find.

For a wide range of reasons, then, the capture of people was an important goal of Iroquois raiding. In fact, it seems clear that if there was one objective of seventeenth century Iroquois warring that outweighed all others in significance it was the capture of people. As early as 1643 Father Jogues, writing from among his Mohawk captors, informed the French that capturing and incorporating the Hurons into the Iroquois tribes accounted for the Iroquois wars against that nation.<sup>112</sup> By 1660 the Iroquois had captured and incorporated so many people into their villages that the Jesuit Lalemant could write that the Iroquois were "for the most, only aggregations of different tribes whom they have

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<sup>111</sup> Propositions made by...the [Five Nations], 10 [June], 1711, NYCD, 5: 274. In NYCD the date is given as "Albany, 10th, 1711" and follows some material dated late August. Wraxall (Indian Affairs, 87-90) puts this conference in June of that year. This seems to make more sense than the NYCD implied date of August. By August Nicholson, not Hunter, was governor of New York.

<sup>112</sup> Father Jogues in [Vimont's] Relation of 1642-43, JR, 24: 297.

conquered".<sup>113</sup> In some cases captive groups comprised as much as two thirds of the overall village population.<sup>114</sup> This Iroquois policy was so well known that, by the end of the seventeenth century, the Intendant Antoine Raudot could generalize about it and the means by which it was accomplished:

Ils employoient toute leur industrie pour engager les autres nations à se donner à eux; ils leur envoioient des presens et les plus habiles gens de leur nation pour les haranguer, et leur faire connoitre que s'ils ne se donnoient pas à eux ils ne pourroient éviter d'être detruits...; mais qu'au contraire s'ils vouloient se rendre et se disperser dans leurs cabanes, ils deviendroient les maitres des autres hommes...<sup>115</sup>

In short, there can be little doubt that capturing people was a deliberate, and important, Iroquois strategy. Indeed, traditional accounts of the founding of the Iroquois League make receiving new people into the Iroquois "Longhouse" a central goal of Iroquois policy towards other natives.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1659-60, JR, 45: 207. Father Le Jeune also commented on the diversity of groups found among the Five Nations. Iroquois villages, he noted, "contain more Foreigners than natives of that country. Onnontaghé counts seven different nations, who have come to settle in it; and there are as many as eleven in Sonnontouan." [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, JR, 43: 265.

<sup>114</sup> Huron speaker in [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1664-65, JR, 49: 233; Journal of Fathers Fremin, Pierron and Bruyas, in [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1667-68, Ibid, 51: 187; Father Bruyas to [Father Superior?], 21 January, 1668, Ibid, 51: 123; [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1668-69, Ibid, 52: 179.

<sup>115</sup> [Raudot], Relation par lettres, 184.

<sup>116</sup> Horatio Hale, The Iroquois Book of Rites (Philadelphia: D.G. Brinton, 1883, facsimile reprint, 1972), 88-89, 95; Arthur C. Parker, The Constitution of the Five

The Iroquois' effectiveness in carrying it out can be seen by the number of different peoples found among the Iroquois, and by the geographical redistribution that resulted as various native groups sought to put vast distances between themselves and the people grabbing Iroquois.<sup>117</sup>

Nations, New York State Museum Bulletin, No. 184, (Albany, 1916), 50-52; [Chief John Gibson, et al.], "The Traditional Narrative of the Origin of the Confederation of the Five Nations", [1900], in ibid, 101, 105. Unresolved, however, is the question of whether taking in new people was to be done by peaceful means or by war. Parker (Constitution, 52) makes it clear that war was to be used to bring peace to those who did not see the light right away. Hale (Iroquois Book of Rites, 92, 94), suggests war was the natural consequence of not having an effective peace settlement, but does not indicate that League "rules" called for war against those who would not join the Iroquois League. The "Traditional Narrative", written in 1900 by a group of Iroquois chiefs at the Six Nations Iroquois settlement in Brantford Ontario, makes no mention of what to do with those who did not join the League. The issue is further complicated by questions about the origins of the League: was it created to foster peace or facilitate war. Matthew Dennis (Cultivating a Landscape of Peace, passim, but see especially, 76-115) has recently argued that the League was created not only to bring peace to the Five Nations, but to others as well. Deganawidah, the League's mythical creator, gave this "mission" to the Iroquois. Unfortunately, this hypothesis overlooks the contradictory traditions of the League's founding, and the fact that, as John Norton, a Mohawk, wrote in the early 1800s, "no traditions exist to inform us" as to whether the League was begun to promote defense or aggression. [John Norton], The Journal of Major John Norton, 1816, Carl F. Klinck and James J. Talman, eds. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1970), 105. What is certain, however, is that, regardless of the League's original purpose(s) and rules, the Iroquois did war a great deal, and they did bring new peoples into the "Longhouse" once they had defeated them.

<sup>117</sup> On the impact of Iroquois wars on the human geography of the Northeast see, L. Campeau, Catastrophe Démographique sur les Grands Lacs (Montreal: Éditions Bellarmin, 1986); C. Heidenreich, Plates 18, 37-39, in R.C. Harris, ed., Historical Atlas of Canada, vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).

Warfare, then, was an essential part of Iroquois culture in the seventeenth century. In modern society warfare is an expression of a political decision, and serves as a means to obtain some military or political end. Among the Iroquois, warfare was this too, but it was also an expression of social and cultural imperatives. The need to gain honour, revenge, as well as the clan system and its attendant obligations, made warfare almost inevitable. Insofar as warfare was an expression of cultural, political, and military dictates no goal of warring was as crucial to the Iroquois as was the capture of people. Prisoners were central to almost all the functions served by warfare. Without captives brought back from raids warriors did not gain as much esteem, victims for torture were lacking, revenge could not be satiated, and grief would not be assuaged. More important, without prisoners to be adopted into Iroquois society to take the place of the deceased, and to bolster Iroquois fighting strength, the Iroquois would wither away and die. The decline in population would lead to the fragmentation of their clan system and with it the social and political structures of their society.

## Chapter 4

## Warfare Part 2: Culture Change and "Economic" Warfare

Despite evidence that the Iroquois waged war for a variety of reasons, historians and most ethnohistorians have persisted in describing Iroquois warfare as "economically" inspired.<sup>1</sup> Iroquois contact with Europeans, it is claimed, led to wholesale cultural change. The Iroquois became dependent on European trade goods but soon ran out of the furs they needed to purchase those wares. The Iroquois then attacked other tribes to steal their furs, drive them off fur bearing lands, or to win control of the fur trade between natives and Europeans in order to use stolen, trapped or bartered furs to trade for European goods. In support of these assumptions, and as evidence of this new "economic" goal of Iroquois warfare, scholars have pointed to Iroquois attacks against native and European fur brigades and smaller groups of traders. Indeed, the Iroquois wars of the 1600s have come to be known as the "beaver wars" because of this interpretation, which reduces almost all Iroquois warfare to efforts to obtain beaver pelts.

Any monocausal explanation should be suspect, and this one is no exception. The "beaver wars" interpretation is an economically reductionist and simplistic explanation which

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<sup>1</sup> See the discussion in chapter one and the sources cited there. The meaning of "economic" warfare will be discussed below.

down plays both Iroquois cultural resilience and other important goals of seventeenth century Iroquois warfare. A closer look at the central tenets of this economic interpretation reveal several reasons for questioning its validity; the most important is that there is little or no evidence to support it. Wars continued to be fought for a wide variety of reasons, and the Iroquois never became "like Europeans" in their value system. As well, even if the Iroquois did become dependant on some European goods, a systematic study of seventeenth century Iroquois hostilities reveals that raids against fur brigades or trading groups did not take place in significant numbers. A study of the evidence requires us reject the view that economic goals were a major feature of Iroquois warfare.

The issue of cultural change is central to any examination of the Iroquois wars, but is has not been dealt with satisfactorily. It has long been recognized that Iroquois society underwent change as a result of contact with Europeans.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, aspects of Iroquois society were in the

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<sup>2</sup> C. Colden, History of the Five Nations, 11; B.G. Trigger, "Early Iroquoian Contacts with Europeans", Handbook, 344-356; T.J. Brassler, "Early Indian European Contacts", Ibid., 78-88. For a more speculative and impassioned discussion of this matter see F. Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (New York: Norton Library, 1976), 3-174. The most comprehensive and nuanced discussion of the impact of cultural contact, on natives and Europeans, is James Axtell's, The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

process of changing prior to contact with Europeans, and archaeological work has allowed Iroquoianists to determine some of the changes.<sup>3</sup> However, the ability to document material change has led to the development of a false confidence in the ability to measure changes which took place in value systems. The question that is begged, however, is changed from what? It is possible to look at material culture and see how things were modified due to contact with Europeans, but we do not know what the Iroquois valued or fought for prior to contact with Europeans.

Lack of understanding has not prevented speculation about what Iroquois warfare was like prior to European contact and the result has been a tendency to romanticize the past. Many writers, for example, depict pre-contact warfare as little more than a violent version of "hide and seek" that turned destructive with the introduction of new weapons and because of "economic" motives.<sup>4</sup> This despite archaeological evidence, and that from the early historic period, which clearly reveals that large scale destructive warfare predated European

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<sup>3</sup> James A. Tuck, "Northern Iroquoian Prehistory", Handbook, 322-333; Mary Ann Niemczycki, "Seneca Tribalization: An Adaptive Strategy", Man in the Northeast, 36 (Fall 1988): 77-87.

<sup>4</sup> Hunt, Wars of the Iroquois, 20, 22; Snyderman, Behind the Tree of Peace, 7-8; Trigger, The Huron: Farmers of the North, 42-44; Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 54, 74. This view has not been restricted to explanations of Iroquois warfare. It has also been used to account for changes in native warfare in general. Innis, The Fur Trade, 20; C. Jaenen, Friend and Foe, 127-138.

arrival. Palisaded prehistoric villages, and the heavily palisaded village of Hochelaga, with its galleries filled with rocks to throw down at those who tried to breach the walls, all indicate that large scale warfare, including sieges against fortified villages, antedate European arrival on the St. Lawrence.<sup>5</sup> That these raids were destructive is attested to by the death of close to 200 Stadaconans in 1533 at the hands of the Toudamans who breached the Stadaconan's temporary fortification.<sup>6</sup>

Adding to the distortion is the tendency to equate possession of European goods with accepting European values, and to view change as equal to displacement, that to accept something new is to lose something that existed.<sup>7</sup> This view

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<sup>5</sup> Tuck, "Northern Iroquoian Prehistory", Handbook, 326; J.V. Wright, The Ontario Iroquois Tradition, (Ottawa: National Museum of Canada Bulletin, No. 210, 1966), 22; William D. Finlayson, The 1975 and 1978 Rescue Excavations at the Draper Site: Introduction and Settlement Patterns (Ottawa: National Museum of Man, Mercury Series, Paper 130, 1985), 438-440; [Jacques Cartier], The Voyages of Jacques Cartier, H.P. Biggar, ed., (Ottawa: Publications of the Public Archives of Canada, No. 11, 1924), 155-156. (Hereafter, Cartier, Voyages.)

<sup>6</sup> Cartier, Voyages, 177-178. For a similar view see, T. Abler, "European Technology and the Art of War in Iroquoia" in D.C. Tkaczuk and B.C. Vivian, eds., Cultures in Conflict: Current Archaeological Perspectives (Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Archaeological Association of the University of Calgary, 1989): 273-282. Abler contends that there is strong evidence to suggest that post contact warfare was no more violent than that in the precontact period.

<sup>7</sup> The ready exception to this is the work of William Fenton who has devoted his life to the study of the Iroquois and to showing how continuity and adaptation played a role in their survival. A full bibliography of his important contributions in this area can be found in M. Foster, et al,

overstates the power of those goods and represents a simplistic perception of how cultures work. It is possible to add to a culture or modify aspects of it without losing completely that which existed. As James Axtell has observed,

the mere presence of [European] goods in native society, even on a large scale, did not necessarily denote a significant change in Indian culture. Material objects, no less than people, receive their cultural status only by being assigned meaning and value by members of a society. The form and the function of an object, therefore, are far more important culturally than the material from which it is made. An artifact may be made of several alternative materials, but if its traditional form and function do not change, neither does its cultural meaning.<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, in any discussion of cultural change it is vital to distinguish between profound changes and superficial ones which do not always equal a transformation in the values of a culture. As A.F.C. Wallace has noted, a "culture can undergo drastic modifications while the personality structure of a society yields only slightly, and that in a regressive way."<sup>9</sup>

If those arguing for cultural change have created an idyllic picture of Iroquois society as the starting point from which change took place, that does not mean that one is limited to discussing cultural change or stability within that framework. After all, given that basis, to argue for strong

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Extending the Rafters, 401-417.

<sup>8</sup> Axtell, European and the Indian, 256.

<sup>9</sup> A.F.C. Wallace, "Some Psychological Determinants of Culture Change in an Iroquoian Community", in W.N. Fenton, ed., Symposium on Local Diversity in Iroquois Culture, Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 149 (Washington, 1951), 59.

cultural stability is to appear to endorse a vision of Iroquois society that hints at aspects of the "noble savage" myth. What is important is to establish what values existed among the Iroquois in the period under study, and if (and how) they were altered and became like European values. It is crucial to establish that such changes occurred before one can contend that "economic" warfare took place. Moreover, claims of cultural change must be based on more than simplistic notions that possession of European goods made the Iroquois into Europeans.

Among the Iroquois, acceptance of European goods did not always lead to their use as Europeans employed them, nor to changes in Iroquois values. By 1700 many Iroquois used cloth rather than furs for parts of their dress. However, as more than one observer remarked, they "have changed only the material of the clothing, keeping their former style of dressing".<sup>10</sup> Because an Indian wore European clothes, did not mean he had to adopt European values, in this case, a European sense of clothing style. Swords were also not used as Europeans intended. The Iroquois did not take up swordsmanship, rather the handles of the swords were broken off and the blades attached to the ends of spears because they were effective projectile points.<sup>11</sup> The new weapon was

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<sup>10</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 30. See also, Adrian Van der Donck, A Description of the New Netherlands, [1656], in New York Historical Society Collections, 2nd Series, 1: 194, 195.

<sup>11</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 116.

adopted to improve an ancient tool, not to replace it. Moreover, because an Iroquois used an iron knife to lift a scalp rather than a flint one, did not change the intent or the meaning and value of the act, merely the means by which it was accomplished.

Using cloth instead of pelts, and iron instead of stone, were in themselves changes. It is also true that the fur trade brought much more to the Indians than just goods. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Indians were able to internalize many changes, and make them fit into their value systems. Even alcohol, which wrought havoc on Indian culture, was used to suit Indian values.<sup>12</sup> They drank to get drunk, in order to achieve a dream state, or to carry out some act which society did not normally permit.<sup>13</sup> The Iroquois even incorporated alcohol into their traditional feasts and medicines.<sup>14</sup> But they did not get together for a brandy after work, or have a drink before dinner, or a cup of wine with their meals.

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<sup>12</sup> Drunken binges, lasting three to four days--until the alcohol was used up, invariably led to murders and accidental deaths. Fathers Fremin, Pierron, and Bruyas, in [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1667-68, JR, 51: 217; [Dablon's] Relation of 1679, Ibid, 61: 161; Father Jean de Lamberville to [?], 25 August, 1682, JR, 62: 67.

<sup>13</sup> Boucher, Histoire Veritable, 116-117; Father Carheil in [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1668-69, JR, 52: 193; Father Lamberville in [Dablon's] Relation of 1679, Ibid, 61: 173; Father Trouvé in Dollier, Histoire du Montreal, 355.

<sup>14</sup> [Anon.], "Memoires sur les...Iroquoises", 475.

The Iroquois also adjusted new religions to suit their cosmology. There is no doubt that missionaries had an impact on native religion.<sup>15</sup> But while the Iroquois incorporated what would fit into their cosmology, the vast majority of them did not give up their own views and practices.<sup>16</sup> They tolerated the opinions of the Jesuits and expected that theirs would likewise be respected.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, the various French Orders never managed to convert large numbers of Iroquois, and most of those baptized were given the sacrament only when on the verge of death. Of the 3,199 Iroquois baptized between 1667 and 1679, almost all were children, and at least 2,002 children and adults died shortly after baptism.<sup>18</sup> The largest obstacle to conversion was not really the religious exactions, but rather the cultural proscriptions which

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<sup>15</sup> Axtell, The Invasion Within, *passim*. On the Jesuits as initiators of change in general see, J. Axtell, Beyond 1492: Encounters in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 152-170.

<sup>16</sup> [De Quen's] Relation of 1655-56, 135. Father Brébeuf wrote that one problem to conversion was that he could not get the Indians to understand Christian concepts as intended by Christian doctrine. The Indians took the expressions he used and related them to their cosmology. Brébeuf in [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1635, JR, 8: 133.

<sup>17</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1668-69, JR, 52: 153.

<sup>18</sup> Appendix A, Table A.2. The Jesuits did not consider this a failure. In baptizing an Iroquois they had saved a soul from eternal damnation, and this was what they had come to do. In terms of their influence on Iroquois culture, these deaths meant that the potential disruptive cultural impact of new Christians on Iroquois society was minimized.

accompanied the switch from "pagan" to "true believer".<sup>19</sup> While the Iroquois resisted the cultural changes, they nonetheless incorporated elements of Christian doctrine, not because they rejected their own, but because it made sense to add the powerful European god to their pantheon of gods.

The point, then, is not whether transformations occurred in Iroquois society--they did--but rather how these changes were handled. Take for example, the question of trade in Iroquois culture. Prior to contact with Europeans the Iroquois engaged in very little trade with non-Iroquois groups, and trade among themselves served mostly to reinforce social and political ties.<sup>20</sup> This situation changed after contact and the Iroquois carried on trade with the Dutch, French, and English settlers who surrounded their homelands. But if trade took on an economic importance it had not had, there is every indication that trade continued to be used to strengthen social and political ties among the Iroquois and between them and their European neighbours. Iroquois efforts to make peace and establish trade with the French in the 1650s

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<sup>19</sup> Axtell, Invasion Within, 71-127. Axtell has argued convincingly that most healthy adult converts to Christianity adopted their new religious beliefs sincerely. J. Axtell, After Columbus, 100-121.

<sup>20</sup> Kuhn, "Trade and Exchange among the Mohawk-Iroquois: A Trace Element Analysis of Ceramic Smoking Pipes", Ph.D. Dissertation, University at Albany, State University of New York, (1985), 1-2, 14-18; Dean R. Snow, "Iroquois Prehistory", in Michael K. Foster, Jack Campisi, and Marianne Mithun, eds., Extending the Rafters: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Iroquoian Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 257.

were related to desires to gain the support of the French in their wars with the Neutrals, and Eries.<sup>21</sup> Trade with the Dutch was carried on, in part because the Iroquois recognized that their political alliance with that nation depended on their bringing them furs.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, relations between the Iroquois and various nations, whether economic or political, were based on fictive kinship ties, and gift exchanges.<sup>23</sup> Nor did the increased importance of the economic aspects of trade with Europeans alter the social nature of exchange among the Iroquois. The goods given to Iroquois leaders to cement political and economic ties continued to be distributed among their followers.<sup>24</sup>

It is, of course, quite possible that new products were valued by Indians. A copper kettle may have been a mere reproduction of a clay one, but it was more durable, more efficient, and came to the Iroquois only through trade. For these reasons it may have been more valuable than a clay

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<sup>21</sup> See chapter 8.

<sup>22</sup> See the discussion in chapter 6.

<sup>23</sup> Matthew Dennis (Cultivating a Landscape of Peace, 154-179, 213-271) provides countless examples of this process, although the conclusions he draws from them are suspect.

<sup>24</sup> Information furnished...by Mr. Miller...[to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, Sept. 4, 1696], NYCD, 4: 183; Robert Livingston to the Lords of Trade, May 13, 1701, Ibid, 876.

one.<sup>25</sup> Yet, the new goods were not stored up and saved, in fact the person who had the most goods gained honour and esteem by giving them away, not by keeping them.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, reciprocal gift giving was a method of sharing wealth, trading goods, and a significant part of the intersocial binding that helped unify the Iroquois.<sup>27</sup> The new goods did not undermine the value systems or the redistribution procedures of Iroquois society in the seventeenth century. If anything, European trade goods made these ceremonies more important. Certainly, this was in itself a modification, but the purpose of giving away presents and the reinforcing of social ties did not undergo real transformation.

The practice of putting goods in graves provides another example of how the advent of European wares changed an ancient custom but neither its underlying significance nor the values it reflected. Prior to European contact the Indians placed

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<sup>25</sup> Yet, for all that, Indians did not stop producing clay kettles or forget how to cook with them. Sagard, Journey to the Hurons, 84, 102, 109; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1633, JR, 5: 97.

<sup>26</sup> Colden, History of the Five Nations, 2. Even presents given to Iroquois leaders by Europeans were shared among all the people. Information furnished...by Mr. Miller...[to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, Sept. 4, 1696], NYCD, 4: 183; Robert Livingston to the Lords of Trade, May 13, 1701, Ibid, 876.

<sup>27</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, JR, 43: 271; Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 184; Colden, Colden Papers, 9: 363-364. This continued to hold true even for converted Iroquois. See Father Chauchetiere, "Narration Annuelle de la Mission du Sault depuis la fondation jusuques a l'an 1686", JR, 63: 165.

few material artifacts in the graves with the dead.<sup>28</sup> In the post contact period more goods were placed in graves. Even Iroquois converts to Christianity who lived in missionary settlements could not be dissuaded from this practice.<sup>29</sup> Buried goods naturally included European wares as well as goods of Iroquois manufacture. It is quite possible that the European goods were included in the burials because the Iroquois valued them in this world and did not want to be without them in the next. But the Iroquois put items in graves because of their utilitarian functions, not their material value. European kettles were buried, as had been clay ones, because they held food for the deceased to use in the after life.<sup>30</sup>

As the burial of the goods, and their continued redistribution, indicates, it was the purpose for which trade objects were used, and not any intrinsic value, which made them desirable. The Dutch Minister Megapolensis noted, for example, that when a Mohawk leader was told how much a "rix-dollar" was worth, the Iroquois laughed and suggested the

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<sup>28</sup> W.C. Noble, "Some Social Implications of the Iroquois "in situ" Theory", Ontario Archaeology, 13 (June 1969), 23; James A. Tuck, "Northern Iroquoian Prehistory", Handbook, 332-333; Axtell, The European and the Indian, 115-116.

<sup>29</sup> Axtell, The European and the Indian, 121-122; Potherie, Histoire, 3: 8; [Raudot], Relation par Lettres, 188.

<sup>30</sup> Robert D. Kuhn, "Trade and Exchange among the Mohawk-Iroquois", 64, 66.

Dutch "were fools to value a piece of iron so highly".<sup>31</sup> The Jesuit Father Le Jeune remarked on a similar attitude among French Indian allies. The Indians were amused at European's willingness to exchange such a wide range of goods for furs.<sup>32</sup> The Iroquois, however, were not fools. They understood well enough how the Dutch economy worked, the role of money, and why furs were important to Europeans. What they could not sympathize with was the effort that Europeans put into accumulating those skins and money. Nor did the Iroquois believe that the European approach to goods and their exchange was superior to theirs.

The Iroquois did not want more than they could use, and they placed no value on having goods simply for the sake of amassing wealth.<sup>33</sup> The Iroquois were a communal society, and shared all amongst themselves. As Father Le Jeune wrote after his first visit among them, a "whole village must be without corn, before any individual can be obliged to endure privation".<sup>34</sup> That willingness to share was extended to

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<sup>31</sup> Megapolensis, "A Short Account of the Mohawk", NNN, 176.

<sup>32</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1634, JR, 6: 297-299.

<sup>33</sup> Letter from Father Bruyas, January 21, 1668, JR, 51: 129. The Iroquois were not alone in questioning Europeans' materialism. See J. Axtell, After Columbus, 142-143.

<sup>34</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, JR, 43: 271. This attitude, and interdependent nature of the clan system and its obligations, worked against the development of individual "capitalist" behaviour necessary to theories of the Iroquois being middlemen or fighting to gain goods.

other groups--native and European--and continued to be a feature of their culture throughout the seventeenth century.<sup>35</sup> Proximity to Europeans, who took advantage of that generosity but failed to reciprocate when called upon, led to some modification in this aspect of Iroquois culture.<sup>36</sup> But generosity continued to be a major characteristic of Iroquois tribal society well into the eighteenth century.<sup>37</sup> In short, acceptance of European goods did not make the Iroquois like Europeans in their value system.

Nor did the Iroquois accept everything. For example, Father Lafitau, who lived among the Iroquois for years, remarked that "since their first contact with Europeans, the use which they have been able to make of such improvements [European farming practices] has not inspired them to alter their ancient folkways."<sup>38</sup> Indeed, both Lafitau and David Zeisberger assert that in one of the most demanding tasks, that of forest clearing, the Iroquois had not given up the traditional method; "the Europeans brought them sharpened

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<sup>35</sup> [Anon.], Nation Iroquoise, 11; Boucher, Histoire Veritable, 114-115;; Father Trouvé in Dollier, Histoire du Montreal, 357; [Raudot], Relation par lettres, 190.

<sup>36</sup> Father Trouvé in Dollier, Histoire du Montreal, 357; Rev. H. Barclay to Cadwallader Colden, December 7, 1741, Colden Papers, 8: 279.

<sup>37</sup> [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 472; Rev. H. Barclay to Cadwallader Colden, December 7, 1741, Colden Papers, 8: 279.

<sup>38</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 91.

steel and set the example of felling trees and sawing them. Nonetheless they did not make much use of this method and went on using their former one which was to girdle the trees, strip them of their bark so that they die and let them dry standing".<sup>39</sup>

The Iroquois saw that along with acceptance of European goods, the newcomers also wanted them to adopt European values, and they resisted. They considered themselves superior to other peoples, Europeans included, and saw no reason to change.<sup>40</sup> This was a common view among natives in the Northeast. Well into the eighteenth century they told colonists that they had no desire to be like them: "We are Indians and don't wish to be transformed into white men. The English are our Brethren, but we never promised to become what they are."<sup>41</sup> And as David Zeisberger, the Moravian missionary was told, "each creature, bear, deer, or other animal continues to live its own way and it has never been observed that an animal had adopted the habits of another. The same principle, ...applies to Indians and Europeans."<sup>42</sup>

At the end of the seventeenth century a French observer remarked that it was possible to find French influences in

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<sup>39</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 71; Zeisberger, History, 30.

<sup>40</sup> Colden, History of the Five Nations, 3.

<sup>41</sup> Bishop A.G. Spangenberg's Journal of a Journey to Onondaga in 1745, Moravian Journals, 7.

<sup>42</sup> Zeisberger, History, 121.

native religions and in the fact that Indians used French arms and other trade goods. However, not one native group, the Iroquois included, had adopted the French form of government or way of life. He concluded that it would be the work of "plusieurs siecles" to "reduire" the Indians to "prendre nos usages et nos coutumes".<sup>43</sup> Contact with Dutch, English, and French cultures during the seventeenth century did not transform the Iroquois into a predominantly Christian, patriarchal, and hierarchial society. Despite the examples and efforts of Europeans, the Iroquois did not abandon their way of life. They did not change how and by whom they were governed, how they maintained cultural stability, nor what they considered important. Iroquois society was not the same in 1700 as it was in 1600, but then again, it was not in 1500 as it had been in 1400. Cultural evolution took place, but the nature of change was conditioned by existing cultural values. Iroquois culture underwent some changes and took in some new material goods, but it remained one that was governed by its own people, principles and values, not those of Europeans.

Even if the Iroquois did not "cherish" goods for their own sake, and did not value them beyond their utilitarian function, could they not have become dependent on them? The term dependent has a variety of meanings, but they usually

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<sup>43</sup> [Raudot], Relation par lettres, 61, 62.

refer to essentially the same thing: a dependent person is someone who needs something. The question of cultural dependency, at least as it relates to the causes of Iroquois wars, revolves around how much the Iroquois needed those new goods.<sup>44</sup> Did Iroquois survival as a people depend on kettles, knives, guns, and other trade items?<sup>45</sup> Dependency of this nature is hard to prove--certainly no one has. One would have to demonstrate that certain goods were essential for Iroquois survival (the latter word being carefully defined), and establish that the Iroquois could not make those

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<sup>44</sup> The debate over Iroquois dependency has not really risen above this level. No Iroquoianist has offered a nuanced definition such as that in Richard White, The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), xvii-xix. The closest that the Iroquois have come to being put into the Wallerstein model of world economic development--of subsistence economies being exploited, changed, and made dependent on newly emerging capitalist societies--is Denys Delâge's Le Pays Renversé: Amérindiens et européens en Amérique du nord-est, 1600-1664 (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1985). Delâge tests out a theory of "unequal exchange" and how the participation of the Iroquois and Huron in this exchange system made them part of the new European economy, and led to cultural change and dependence. Unfortunately, Delâge, like his less methodologically sophisticated predecessors, reduces everything to a matter of economics, and Iroquois warfare is explained as simply a desire to control the fur trade. Iroquois society, he argues, was altered by the unequal nature of the exchange process, which led to the development of a market driven economy, and Iroquois wars were fought over the furs needed to participate in the rewards of the new world economy. The Iroquois have gone from being just dependent on European technology to also dependent on the European economic system.

<sup>45</sup> Daniel Richter is only the latest in a long line to argue that it did. Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 76, 87, 104, 180.

goods they needed to survive. It is difficult to imagine a culture falling apart because it did not get enough kettles. After all, they could always have made clay ones again. Guns and ammunition may have been more important, but even here the Iroquois showed independence of mind. In the 1690s Governor Fletcher of New York wrote to London to ask that "light Fuzees" be sent to give to the Iroquois as presents because "they will not carry the heavy firelocks I did bring over with me...".<sup>46</sup> Dependent people would hardly refuse to use a product because they preferred a different brand.

Nonetheless, it may be conceded that even if the Iroquois were not dependent on the products of European technology, they wanted them. But did they want them enough to destroy other groups in order to get at their furs in order to trade for those goods? Suggestions in the literature that this was the case are based on several interconnecting assumptions:<sup>47</sup> the Iroquois ran out of furs to trade for goods, or could not get enough to meet their needs; the Iroquois were a unified people capable of long term strategic planning and had the means to ensure that plans were carried out; other goals of warfare were displaced by this new "economic" motive; and finally, that there is evidence that the Iroquois warred to

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<sup>46</sup> Gov. Fletcher to the Committee of Trade, 9 Oct., 1693, NYCD, 4: 57; Gov. Fletcher to Duke of Shrewsbury, 30 May, 1696, Ibid, 149.

<sup>47</sup> See for example, Hunt, Wars of the Iroquois; Trigger, The Children of Aataentsic; Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse.

steal furs. The first two assumptions are debatable, and will be taken up in the next chapter. However, even if they were correct, as we have already seen, the other motives for war did not go away. The question that remains is whether there is any proof that "economic" warfare was significant.

Warfare may be defined as "economic" when the goal of specific raids, or systematic raiding against various groups, was to gain furs or drive groups out of certain areas so that the Iroquois could gain access to the fur bearing animals of those groups.<sup>48</sup> Without direct evidence from the Iroquois that such was their intent historians must ascertain their goals from the results of their actions.<sup>49</sup> An important piece of evidence in this process is that of so-called "economic" raids against fur brigades or smaller trading parties. Because these groups carried furs or goods, historians have assumed that the Iroquois attacked them to

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<sup>48</sup> This is my definition. No Iroquoianist has defined the term, but these are the types of activities most scholars refer to when they claim the Iroquois waged "economic" war.

<sup>49</sup> Some might contend that Iroquois intent may be gleaned from what they said at conferences with Europeans. This is true. Unfortunately, most scholars who use this type of evidence view it through lenses distorted by "beaver wars" tinted glasses and make the data fit into that interpretative framework. The most glaring example of this is the constant misreading of Iroquois efforts to lure French native allies to trade at Albany. Despite the fact that the evidence shows the Iroquois were trying to weaken the French alliance system by providing French trading partners direct access to traders at Albany, writers continue to cite this behaviour as evidence that the Iroquois wanted to act as middlemen. (Havard, La grande paix, 92-93.) If providing direct access is indicative of middleman behaviour, either the Iroquois or modern scholars have seriously misunderstood the concept.

steal the items they carried.<sup>50</sup> And, since raiding to steal goods or furs produces a material benefit, it is therefore considered an "economically" motivated activity. These raids are also made to serve as "evidence" of cultural change and as "proof" that "economic" concerns were central to Iroquois policy as ends of that policy. Furthermore, this line of reasoning allows writers to argue that raids for which little detailed evidence remains were "economic" raids. That is, even if a given foray did not produce furs or goods, and even if the benefits to the Iroquois remain unclear, because we "know" they fought for "economic" ends (ie. material gain), scholars have assumed that the raid reflected overall Iroquois policy, which was to derive some "economic" advantage.<sup>51</sup> Surely this is poor historical method. One cannot assume on the basis of some well documented raids that other raids, for which little data exists, were carried out for the same or similar reasons. Instead, the results of each raid must be taken into account, and if the outcome of the foray is

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<sup>50</sup> Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 2: 634, 658, 661. Even writers who feel non-economic motives were of significance do not fail to claim that attacks against fur brigades and traders were to steal the furs or goods they carried. See, Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 57, 64, 144; Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 93.

<sup>51</sup> See for example Trigger, Natives and Newcomers, 263. After describing some raids, he assumes that theft took place, and that "seizure of furs and European goods appears to have been an important objective of these raids". Without a shred of evidence, Trigger provided both "result" and "motive".

unknown, one must concede that the motives could well have been diverse.

Nonetheless, more information is available about the outcome of Iroquois raids than past writers have supposed. A careful reading of the standard sources of Iroquois history yields a surprising wealth of details and numerical data about seventeenth-century Iroquois warfare.<sup>52</sup> The results cast doubt on the view that such warfare was carried out for "economic" ends.

A comprehensive data bank listing all Iroquois raids up to 1701 reveals that raids for the purpose of economic gain (or theft raids) did not take place in significant numbers. The Iroquois were involved in 465 recorded hostile encounters prior to 1701: they initiated 354. In these attacks against natives, Europeans, men, women, traders, hunters, warriors, soldiers, farmers, and fishermen, theft of goods or furs was reported in only 20 of them. This represents only 5.6% of all raids. If one includes raids against trading parties, possible trading parties, and fur brigades, where theft of furs or goods are not recorded but may have been intended, 14 more raids are added to the total. In all, then, there were 34 raids, or 9.6% of the total, for which economic

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<sup>52</sup> See the introduction to Appendix D for a discussion of the sources, methods, and limitations of the data used here. Unless otherwise indicated, the data which follows was culled from Table D.1 in Appendix D.

gain--capture of goods or fur--could be ascribed as the goal or sole motive for the attack.<sup>53</sup>

Theft raids, then, were hardly a significant feature of Iroquois warfare. This becomes all the more obvious when the results of these raids are compared with the results of other Iroquois raids. For example, in this same time period at least 25% of all Iroquois raids resulted only in people, not goods, being taken. Given that Indians and Europeans resisted capture, and that such opposition might lead to unintended deaths, this is a significant percentage. If raids in which some people were captured and some were killed (30%) are added to those in which people only were captured, that produces a figure of 55% of all Iroquois raids in which at least some people were taken captive. Indeed, the Iroquois captured well over 6,000 people between 1600 and 1701.<sup>54</sup>

A closer examination of the 34 theft-motivated raids supports a case for diminishing the role of "economic" warfare, and specifically it calls into question both the notion of widespread attacks against fur brigades and trading parties and the assumption that those raids produced large quantities of furs or goods for the Iroquois. Of those 34

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<sup>53</sup> This is not to suggest that in other raids goods or furs were not taken; after all it was common practice to loot those defeated in war. But this practice can hardly be said to be the only motive for every raid. Between 1600 and 1666, at least 33% of Iroquois attacks against the Hurons were against women farming or men fishing. Little material wealth could be expected from such raids.

<sup>54</sup> See Appendix F, Table F.1.

raids, 14 raids in which goods were reported taken were not against native fur brigades or trading parties: four attacks were against missionaries and/or their escorts taking supplies to various missions; three were incursions against enemy villages; and seven were against the homes of French or English settlers. Of the 20 attacks against native fur brigades or trading groups, in only nine instances (2.5% of all raids) was the group carrying furs. The other eleven times the groups were returning after trading their furs. More significant, in light of claims that these attacks were important sources of furs and/or goods for the Iroquois, is the fact that materials were actually stolen only six times.<sup>55</sup> That is, successful attacks against native or European fur brigades or groups of traders (assuming theft was indeed the goal), represent 1.7% of all Iroquois raids. In only three of those six raids, were the traders carrying furs. Thus raids against fur brigades that resulted in furs for the Iroquois represent 0.8% of all Iroquois raids.

Of course, it may be contended that the Iroquois did not attack more fur brigades in order not to cut off completely the flow of furs coming down to the French--that is, they did not want to kill the golden goose. Given how few attacks

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<sup>55</sup> While it is possible that goods were taken in the other raids, it is equally possible none were taken.

netted them furs this is not a persuasive argument.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, general blockades of the main river routes, a tactic the Iroquois often used, also kept native traders and their furs at home.<sup>57</sup> That the Iroquois began using this tactic on the St. Lawrence River long before it became a regular route for upriver native fur brigades would seem to suggest that blockades were undertaken for reasons other than bushwhacking fur brigades.<sup>58</sup> Nor should the low figure of 0.8% really come as a surprise. Dutch and later English trading partners of the Iroquois repeatedly lamented that the wars and raids of the Iroquois led to a decline--not an increase--in the number of furs traded.<sup>59</sup> In short, both statistical evidence and that from seventeenth-century contemporaries of the Iroquois suggest that attacking fur brigades to steal furs simply was not an important Iroquois strategy.

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<sup>56</sup> More to the point, most scholars argue the opposite--that is, attacks against fur brigades took place often.

<sup>57</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1647-48, JR, 32: 179.

<sup>58</sup> [Samuel de Champlain], The Works of Samuel de Champlain, 6 vols., H.P. Biggar, ed. (Toronto: Champlain Society Publications, 1922), 1: 137.

<sup>59</sup> Jonas Michalelus to A. Smoutious, [Aug. 11], 1628, NNN, 131; W. Kieft to K.V. Rensselaer, Sept. 11, 1642, in A.J.F. Van Laer, ed., The Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts, New York State Library Bulletin, No. 7 (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1908), 625; Stuyvesant to Directors, April 26, 1664, NYCD, 13: 372-373; Information furnished by...Mr. Miller...[to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations], Sept. 4, 1696, ibid, 4: 183.

The insignificance of raiding for "economic" gain can be demonstrated in other ways as well. For example, if results are to be the only basis of determining intent, then those raids against brigades and trading parties in which theft did not take place (14 raids) should not be included as part of the 34 "economic" gain raids. Theft may have been the objective, but it did not take place.<sup>60</sup> It is entirely possible that other concerns motivated the Iroquois. Indeed, some attacks against fur brigades seem to have been unintentional.<sup>61</sup> One must also consider that in these 34 raids there were a variety of results. In 26 of the 34, people were also captured or killed. Of the 20 raids in which goods or furs were reported stolen, in 16 of them captives were taken and/or people were killed. Given the importance of prisoners and revenge, one cannot deny that capture of individuals or taking of scalps were equally likely motives for these raids. That leaves only 4 instances where theft can be said to have been the sole motive.

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<sup>60</sup> Indeed, in 11 of those 14 instances only deaths or captures were reported.

<sup>61</sup> In July 1648 some Iroquois had come north to the Three Rivers area to try to free some of their people held by the French. When they spotted a few Huron canoes they attacked them. Unfortunately for the Iroquois those canoes were followed by the larger Huron fur brigade. The Iroquois were defeated and plundered of their possessions. Appendix D, Table D.1, entry for [July 17 or 18], 1648. A similar mistake against an Ottawa fur brigade was rectified before the Iroquois sustained any losses. Ibid, entry dated [Late Aug. to early Sept.], 1660.

The particular circumstances of a given raid may, of course, indicate a primary motive. But, a closer examination of the available evidence for many of these raids indicates that "economic gain" was seldom the principal motive for these hostilities--even when goods and furs were taken.

Of the 20 raids in which goods were taken, seven were against the homes of settlers in New France and in the English colonies. Throughout the late summer and early fall of 1681 the Iroquois were accused of a wide range of attacks against Marylanders, especially in Charles County.<sup>62</sup> It is not clear how many of these attacks were actually carried out by the Iroquois. In the past they had been accused, and later exonerated, of similar behaviour.<sup>63</sup> It appears likely that the Iroquois were participants in at least two of these attacks in which they stole some belongings and released Indians held as servants by the colonists. However, it seems clear that the Iroquois were as intent on creating havoc as they were in taking linen.<sup>64</sup> Moreover, as the colonial authorities recognized, these raids were by-products of the Iroquois war against the Piscataways.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated [Late Aug. to mid Sept., 1681].

<sup>63</sup> Phillip Calvert, [et al] to H. Chickley, 13 Sept., 1681, Md. Archives, 17: 22-23.

<sup>64</sup> See the various letters introduced into Council in Ibid, 18-25.

<sup>65</sup> Order in Council, 26 Sept., 1681, Ibid, 27-28; Declaration...8 Oct., 1681, Ibid, 37-42.

Two other incidents of theft can also be listed under the heading of offshoots of Iroquois-native tensions. In June 1687 a party of 300 Iroquois attacked the Weanocks at the head of the James River.<sup>66</sup> After taking some prisoners, the Iroquois broke off their attack against the Weanocks and ransacked several English homes in the vicinity of the Weanocks' fort. Similar circumstances account for a May 1656 incident in which the Mohawks "pillaged" some abandoned French homes on Ile d'Orleans.<sup>67</sup> The Mohawks had come to take by force the Hurons living on the island. The Hurons had agreed to relocate to Iroquoia, but were not making the move quickly enough to suit the Mohawks. In the process of taking the Hurons, the Mohawks broke into the French homes.

While it seems clear that in all the above cases ransacking the settler's homes was for the purpose of robbery, it is important to note that the Iroquois had travelled to the areas in question for other reasons. The thefts were offshoots of their expeditions, not the reasons for them.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated June 27, 1687.

<sup>67</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated May 19-20, 1656.

<sup>68</sup> This may also have been true of the three other attacks against homes of French settlers in which goods were taken. See Appendix D, Table D.1, entries dated March 6, 1647; [May 2], 1650; May 6, 1651. Despite numerous references to these three attacks, the information is too scant to allow one to arrive at a firm conclusion about Iroquois intent. The attacks may have been part of a general policy of harassment against the French (Ibid, entries of Iroq vs. French, 1647-1654), and some of the captured in these raids were subject to severe torture, but it cannot be denied that theft may have been intended as well.

Of the four attacks against Jesuit missionaries and their escorts, unqualified desire for goods rarely accounted for the theft that took place. On August 2, 1642 Father Isaac Jogues and his Huron escorts were attacked and robbed as they headed to Huronia with supplies.<sup>69</sup> The Iroquois had planned an attack against the new French fort being built on the Richelieu River.<sup>70</sup> The group that attacked Jogues may have come up for this purpose. In any case the raid against the Jesuit proved fortuitous since the Iroquois managed to capture 8,000 livres (money value) worth of goods. Among them, according to Marie de l'Incarnation, the Iroquois found "tout ce qui leur falloit pour nous faire la guerre, outre ce qu'ils avoient eu des traitres Hollandois".<sup>71</sup> It is obvious she was alluding to firearms.<sup>72</sup> The attack she was referring to was against the fort on the Richelieu, and there the Iroquois used guns against the French. Whether the Mohawks knew that firearms were being carried by Father Jogues' group is open to question. Certainly they knew the French had them and had

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<sup>69</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated Aug. 2, 1642.

<sup>70</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated Aug. 20, 1642.

<sup>71</sup> Marie de l'Incarnation a le Mère Ursule de Ste.-Caatherine, 29 Sept., 1642, in Marie de l'Incarnation, Ursuline (1599-1672), Correspondance, Guy Oury, ed. (Abbaye Saint-Pierre, Solesmes, 1971), 168. (Hereafter, Correspondance.)

<sup>72</sup> Faillon, Histoire de la Colonie Française, 2: 3, also read Marie de l'Incarnation to have stated that firearms, powder and ammunition were taken. These, he wrote, were what the Hurons "venaient de se pourvoir dans leur traite".

approached the French the previous year in order to trade for them.<sup>73</sup> Also in 1641 Governor Montmagny had authorized the sale of guns to new Christians.<sup>74</sup> The Iroquois probably knew that much.<sup>75</sup> If the Mohawks suspected that firearms were being taken to the Hurons and attacked to steal them, then the motive was theft, but with strategic overtones. Not only would the Mohawks get guns, but equally important, they would keep guns out of the hands of their foes.

This double edged motive for theft may also have accounted for at least one other raid against Jesuits and their native escorts. However, little is known of the raid that took place September 15, 1643, other than that nine Huron were killed and the supplies were lost.<sup>76</sup> If theft was the main motive for this raid, it appears not to have been a particularly significant motive for the raid in April of 1644, against Father Bressani and his escorts.<sup>77</sup> It is unlikely that the Iroquois anticipated meeting this group. The Jesuits had deliberately sent Father Bressani off early in the spring in the hopes of his getting past the Iroquois before they

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<sup>73</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1640-41, JR, 21: 23-53.

<sup>74</sup> Campeau, La mission de Jésuites chez les Hurons, 347.

<sup>75</sup> The extent of the French gun trade in this period remains uncertain. See chapter 8 and Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 627-632.

<sup>76</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated [Sept. 15], 1643. It is assumed that the Iroquois took the supplies rather than that they fell into a river.

<sup>77</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated April [28-30], 1644.

could set up at their ambush locations.<sup>78</sup> The Iroquois who attacked him were most likely part of a larger group that had raided in the Montreal area earlier in the year.<sup>79</sup> In fact, the group that captured Father Bressani was said to be attacking in reprisal for an earlier loss at Montreal, and the Jesuit was given to an Iroquois family to replace a relative lost in war.<sup>80</sup>

Theft was even less of a motive for the May 1656 attack against the Jesuits and their escorts.<sup>81</sup> Indeed, the Jesuits were being escorted by the Onondagas when they were attacked by the Mohawks. The Mohawks ill treated all, and "pillaged" the canoes. The real reason for the attack was because the Jesuits were going to establish a mission among the Onondagas and the Mohawks were upset about this. They feared this might lead the Hurons under Jesuit guidance to relocate to Onondaga rather than moving to Mohawk villages.<sup>82</sup> It was to prevent that happening that the Mohawks attacked the Huron at Isle d'Orleans a few nights later.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> [Vimont's] Relation of 1643-44, JR, 26: 29-31.

<sup>79</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated March 30, 1644.

<sup>80</sup> [Vimont's] Relation of 1643-44, JR, 26: 35.

<sup>81</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated May 18, 1656.

<sup>82</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, JR, 43: 187, 189; Marie de l'Incarnation à son fils, 14 aout, 1656, Correspondance, 583-584.

<sup>83</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated May 19-20, 1656.

Theft appears to have been a motive in all six attacks against native traders. However, in all but two cases the evidence suggests that theft was not the only, or even most important reason for the attack.<sup>84</sup> In a raid of June 9, 1643, 40-60 Hurons were attacked by 40 Iroquois.<sup>85</sup> In all 11 canoes and 23 Hurons on their way to Montreal to trade were captured as they passed a spot where the Iroquois lay in ambush not far from the town. However, the Iroquois were waiting to capture Frenchmen and the Huron trading party just wandered into the trap. Shortly after they attacked the Hurons, the Iroquois attacked some Frenchmen, killed three of them, and carried away two more as captives.<sup>86</sup> The Iroquois then killed some thirteen Hurons, and left behind over thirty beaver robes because they needed room in the canoes for the prisoners.<sup>87</sup> If the raid had been solely to gain furs they

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<sup>84</sup> In one incident the Iroquois took some prisoners and some furs. In another they took the supplies that the fleeing group left behind, as well as some 20 captives or scalps. Appendix D, Table D.1, entries dated May 9, 1643; [Late July to early Aug.], 1643.

<sup>85</sup> See Appendix D, Table D.1, the first of two entries under this date.

<sup>86</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, second entry dated June 9, 1643.

<sup>87</sup> [Vimont's] Relation of 1642-43, JR, 24: 277. Dollier de Casson, Histoire du Montreal, 109, states that it was the Hurons who told the Iroquois of the French presence at Montreal. It is unlikely that the Iroquois were unaware of this. This "treachery" on the part of the Hurons was probably invented by Dollier in order to justify Governor Masonneuve's awarding the abandoned furs to his men rather than returning them to their rightful owners. Some Hurons had escaped the Iroquois ambush. Ibid, 111.

would hardly have left so many behind. There also would have been no need to risk capture or death by feigning an attack on the French fort while other Iroquois captured the Frenchmen working a few hundred paces from that fort. An attack against the French seems to have been the major reason for the Iroquois presence on Montreal Island.

Theft and revenge against an old enemy also appear to be the motives in the June 1647 attack against Algonquin traders.<sup>88</sup> The Algonquins were preparing to come to trade with the French when the Iroquois struck. The Iroquois took their furs, but also brought along forty captives. At one point the Iroquois were said to have refrained from chasing escaping Algonquins to ensure hanging on to the furs they had taken from the latter. It is much more likely that the Iroquois, only five canoes of them, felt that forty captives were more than enough.

Even when theft was a prime objective of a raid, it often served as a means to other ends.<sup>89</sup> This was true in the case

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<sup>88</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated [Spring-Summer, 1647].

<sup>89</sup> Father Vimont is one of the few Iroquois contemporaries to claim theft was a major purpose of Iroquois raiding. Not surprisingly, he made that observation in 1643 when 4 of the 6 successful attacks against fur brigades took place. Significantly, he did not repeat that observation, and he claimed this to be a motive for Mohawk raids--he did not ascribe this motive to the other Iroquois tribes. ([Vimont's] Relation of 1642-43, JR, 24: 271.) More importantly, he recognized that the goal of the Mohawk was to gain furs to trade for guns so that the Mohawk could "ravage everything and become masters everywhere". (Ibid.)

of the two attacks against French traders and their allies during which goods were taken. In 1684, while enroute to a planned attack against Fort St. Louis, the Iroquois came across some French traders taking supplies to the pay d'en haut. They attacked the convoy and plundered 15-16,000 livres (money value) worth of goods.<sup>90</sup> Given the value of the cargo, and the fact that only seven canoes were going up, the goods must have included firearms.<sup>91</sup> The Seneca, who initiated the attack, justified their hostility on just those grounds. They were going to attack the fort because the French were trading arms to their enemies, and when they spotted the supply convoy attacked it for the same reason. The Seneca were angry that the Governor of New France forbade the Iroquois from making war "on any of the Nations with whom he trades; and at the same Time furnishes them with all sorts of Ammunition, to enable them to destroy us".<sup>92</sup>

A similar motive explains the attack against Algonquin traders and their French escort in 1692.<sup>93</sup> The Iroquois

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<sup>90</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated End of Feb., 1684.

<sup>91</sup> It is not clear, but it seems that this represents the cost of the goods taken, not their expected sale price. It is hard to conceive of even seven large trading canoes taking that much worth of kettles. Kettles cost about 1 Livre per livre weight. Guns cost about 10 Livres each. Estat des marchandises necessaires pour la traite du fort Bourbon, [1697], AN, C11A, 15: 258.

<sup>92</sup> [Conference], 5 August, 1684, Colden, Five Indian Nations, 61-63. See also [Conference], 5 August, 1684, Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 12-13.

<sup>93</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated End of May, 1692.

were at war with the French and their allies in the 1690s.<sup>94</sup> A group of Iroquois had set themselves up on the Ottawa river and from that position launched a series of raids against the French colony during the summer of 1692. The Iroquois were also there to block the route to the upper country and to keep the French from supplying their Indian allies.<sup>95</sup> When a group of Algonquins carrying weapons and ammunition tried to get up the river, they were attacked. As Intendant Champigny observed, this defeat of French Indian allies served to make the Iroquois insolent and, at the same time gave them the means to carry on their war against the French.<sup>96</sup> Of course, it also kept the weapons out of their enemies' hands. In sum, if theft was the primary goal of either of these attacks, it was once because of broader strategic military concerns.

Attacks against villages, where looting took place, also were not undertaken simply to steal the wares of their inhabitants. There is no clear evidence why the Iroquois attacked and decimated the villages of certain tribes. The view that this was to steal the goods or furs accumulated in them is not based on evidence, but rather on assumptions about

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<sup>94</sup> The Iroquois launched 37 raids against the French and their allies during this decade. Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1690 to 1701.

<sup>95</sup> Frontenac au Ministre, 15 sept., 1692, AN, C11A, 12: 25; Relation de ce qui s'est passé en Canada Au sujet de la guerre..., par Champigny, 5 oct., 1692, *ibid*, 98; Calliere [au Ministre], 20 sept., 1692, *ibid*, 97-98.

<sup>96</sup> Relation...par Champigny, 5 oct., 1692, *ibid*, 94.

the role of economic warfare. However, based on the known goals of warfare, and on the results of these attacks, it is certainly possible to suggest that capture of people was a major motive. In two of the three attacks against villages where goods were reported taken, the Iroquois removed between 1,300 and 1,800 people.<sup>97</sup>

Even if theft was not a primary goal of Iroquois attacks, what of broader notions of "economic" warfare? It seems difficult--even ludicrous, some would argue--to deny "economic" motives for war. In reality it is not. Hunt's middleman interpretation was to serve as support for his contention that the Iroquois were motivated by "economic" concerns. That is, since the Iroquois acted as middlemen, which qualifies under most definitions as an "economic" activity, and they fought to protect that position, it was obviously "economic" warfare. In rejecting that theory, most historians of native groups also reject the one serious effort to establish "economic" motivation for Iroquois warfare. They seem to realize this, and point to Iroquois efforts to attack fur brigades as further proof of "economic" motivation, that is theft. As we have seen, that simply was not the case:

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<sup>97</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entries dated March 16, 1649; April, 1680. The other attack against a village in which goods were taken was against the North Indians [Abenaki]. Houses in the area of the Fort were plundered, but it is not clear to whom they belonged. Ibid, entry dated [April 30-May 3, 1662].

these raids represented a fraction of all Iroquois hostilities.

"Economic" warfare, of course, can refer to something more than raiding for immediate material gain. Determining what that may be can, however, be a problem. In the Iroquoian literature, "economic motive" and "economic warfare" are rarely defined and are very broadly interpreted. Most writers seem to have adopted the view of Marshall Sahlins who suggests that anything that "provisions" a society can be an economic activity.<sup>98</sup> That definition means that practically everything the Iroquois did can be labelled an "economic" action.<sup>99</sup> Such an amorphous definition also means that the terms "economic motive" and "economic warfare" serve no explicative purpose and have little descriptive value. For example, if the Iroquois robbed others for furs to trade for guns, this can be said to fall within the category of an "economic" activity. But, if the guns were then used to exact revenge on some nation for a perceived wrong, then the final motive for the robbery had little to do with "economic" warfare, or with "economic" gain. One has come no closer to knowing the reason for the attack against the fur brigade

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<sup>98</sup> Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1972), 185-186, notes 1-2.

<sup>99</sup> Writers who accept this view see no problem in contending that post contact Iroquois warfare became more violent due to "new economic" motives. However, if almost anything is an economic activity, precontact warfare must also have been fought for economic reasons.

simply by recognizing that it fit the criteria of an "economic action", and labelling it as such.<sup>100</sup> Similarly, fighting to protect a territory can be considered an "economic" action, but automatically describing such behaviour as "economic" does not end the obligation to try and discover the ultimate purposes for the territorial wars. In this sense, then, to reject the notion of "economic" warfare is merely to abandon a label that serves more to obscure than clarify explanations of Iroquois actions.

But even if such raids are not defined as "economic", can one reasonably exclude material gain--which is clearly an "economic motive"--as an objective of raiding? Some writers of native history have been reluctant to accept the idea that material gain was a minor aspect of Iroquois warfare or that other motives can account for Iroquois hostilities against various groups. Indeed, Bruce Trigger has labelled as "romantic" and "irrational" those who assert that native responses to the fur trade were conditioned by cultural imperatives.<sup>101</sup> According to Trigger, in the early contact

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<sup>100</sup> Indeed, it seems that the description of the action has become the explanation for why the action took place. It is important to note that modern society has created the definition of economic activity. An action that meets that definition may be said to be economic. However, defining an action does not necessarily explain why it took place.

<sup>101</sup> B.G. Trigger, "Alfred G. Bailey--Ethnohistorian", Acadiensis, (Spring, 1989), 16-19. This theme has been elaborated in B.G. Trigger, "Early Native North American Responses to European Contact: Romantic versus Rationalistic Interpretations", The Journal of American History, 77, 4

period cultural precepts informed natives' responses, but as they came to understand Europeans, "rational" self-interest modified their original responses.<sup>102</sup> Unfortunately, Trigger has a limited definition of "self-interest", and no definition of "rational".<sup>103</sup> What Trigger has done is define self-interest in strictly economic or materialistic terms and ignored the cultural values that continued to shape native strategies towards Europeans. A raid undertaken to avenge a death or to prove martial valour was no less a product of native self-interest.

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(March, 1991): 1195-1215. By labelling his interpretation rational, he implies that the views of others are not. Indeed, in one article he compared those who did not follow the "rationalistic" approach to Francis Parkman because "they share with Parkman a minimization of aboriginal rationality". Trigger, "Alfred Bailey", 18. In suggesting that native actions were rational only after they became more like those of Europeans, it is Trigger who seems to be minimizing natives' rationality.

<sup>102</sup> Trigger, "Early Native North American Responses to European Contact", passim.

<sup>103</sup> As an example of a cultural response that was eventually replaced by one based on rational self-interest, Trigger cited the case of Moctezuma not resisting Cortés' invasion because he was thought to be a god. As natives learned the truth and came to resent being exploited they rebelled against the Spanish. Trigger, "Early Native North American Responses to European Contact", 1202, 1211-1212. What is not clear is why leaving Cortés unharmed was not a rational decision that reflected Moctezuma's self-interest. Surely angering or killing a god would bring harm to Moctezuma and his people. We know Cortés was not a god, but Moctezuma did not and acted accordingly. Moctezuma's perception of Cortés was wrong, but he acted rationally based on what he did believe. On the vagueness of Trigger's definitions see also, James Axtell, "Columbian Encounters: Beyond 1492", William and Mary Quarterly, XLIX, 2 (April 1992), 346.

Historians, it seems, are eager to attribute a variety of motives to Europeans, but not to the Iroquois. For example, it is impossible to deny that Iroquois raids produced some material rewards. There can also be little doubt that goods or furs were taken in some raids and went unrecorded. But why should these all be classified as "economic" raids and be made to serve as evidence of the "economic" orientation of Iroquois policy? After all, looting was a normal part of native and European warfare.<sup>104</sup> For Europeans the spoils of war were an incentive to enlist in armies and were often given to soldiers in lieu of pay. To the Iroquois goods and furs were important for many of the same reasons as were scalps and prisoners: they were symbols of a successful raid. Thus, to say that theft--or looting--when it took place, was the only motive for a raid is to misjudge the purpose of looting.

To use such reasoning to support claims that Iroquois policy was dominated by "economic" concerns is even more specious. This is an ethnocentric view that is based on applying criteria to the Iroquois that are not used when assessing their European counterparts. For example, there are several instances of French attacks undertaken deliberately to

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<sup>104</sup> Father Ragueneau also remarked on the fact that the Iroquois stole goods from the Hurons. Again, he wrote shortly after the period of the few successful attacks. More to the point, he wrote that the Hurons "too have had, in their turn, successes in warfare, have put to flight the enemy, and have carried off their spoils and some number of captives". [Ragueneau's] "Huronian Report, May 1645 to May 1646", JR, 29: 247, 251.

steal furs. The most famous (albeit unsuccessful) of the French thieves was Dollard des Ormeaux.<sup>105</sup> But even French governors filled up their loot bags. In 1666 the French under Governor De Tracy attacked the Mohawks. He destroyed and looted some of their villages, and returned to New France with the spoils of war, including some 400 kettles.<sup>106</sup> Yet not a single historian has contended that French wars against the Iroquois were waged solely to steal their furs or that De Tracy attacked the Mohawks to steal their kettles.

To sum up, all the evidence points to the fact that warfare served a wide range of functions among the seventeenth century Iroquois. It is difficult to determine the goals of specific raids, and lack of data often makes it impossible. However, little is gained by ignoring a complex reality in favour of simplistic interpretive solutions, or from assuming what is convenient to make those interpretations work. The reality is that theft of furs or goods were the least

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<sup>105</sup> John A. Dickinson, "Annaotaha et Dollard vus de l'autre coté de la palissade", Revue D'Histoire de l'Amérique Française, 35, 2 (Sept. 1981): 163-178.

<sup>106</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1665-66, JR, 50: 141-145, 203; Marie de l'Incarnation à son fils, 12 Novembre, 1666, Correspondance, 772-776. The same thing happened in the July-August 1687 attack against the Senecas, and in the February 1693 attack against the Mohawks. Denonville au Ministre, 25 aout, 1687, AN, C11A, 9: 61-77; Acte de prise de possession du Pays des Iroquois dit sonont8ans, 19 juillet, 1687, *ibid*, 41; Baugy, Journal d'une expédition contre les Iroquois en 1687, 105; Fr. Bechefer a Monsieur Cabart de Villermont, Sept. 19, 1687, JR, 63: 275; [Anon.], "Relation de ce qui s'est passé en Canada... [Sept. 1692 a Nov. 1693], AN, C11A, 12: 187.

important of all the goals of warfare. Theft did not represent a primary goal of a significant percentage of Iroquois raids. When theft did occur, it was almost always a by-product of raiding or the means to other ends. Without other evidence to support the idea that "economic" concerns dominated Iroquois policy, and without theft inspired raids to support such a claim, one is left to wonder at what caused the Iroquois wars.

PART: 2

IROQUOIS POLICY TOWARDS NEW FRANCE'S NATIVE ALLIES

## Chapter 5

### The Early Wars

The Iroquois had been warring against the Hurons and St. Lawrence River and Ottawa valley Algonquins prior to the establishment of French settlements in Canada. Their hostilities may even have predated France's first contacts in the St. Lawrence interior. The arrival of the French, and their alliances with the Hurons and Algonquins, may have complicated matters for the Iroquois, but that did not alter Iroquois enmity towards their native foes. The Hurons and Algonquins became New France's most important allies in the first half of the seventeenth century, but they remained enemies of the Iroquois until--and for some, even after--their respective nations were defeated, driven from their lands, and incorporated into Iroquois villages.

Before outlining Iroquois policy some important points need to be addressed. Assessing Iroquois policy is a difficult task because often one has to rely on European accounts of Iroquois actions, rather than on records left by the Iroquois of their council decisions and policy objectives. This dearth of direct evidence and the complexity of Iroquois society, especially the diverse aims of warfare and the diffuse nature of government, make it difficult to determine just how those actions reflect Iroquois Confederacy policy.

To further complicate matters, even if one is certain what objective any given action reveals, one must often guess as to whether or not the actions of one tribe represent the position of other Confederacy members. While tribal councils often appeared to share similar views and the Confederacy was apparently consistent in its policies towards certain groups, it is not at all clear if the continuity in Iroquois policy was the product of well thought out long term Iroquois planning, the result of the constant nature of the perceived threat posed by given groups, the outcome of lack of Iroquois options, or the consequence of the process of historical enquiry. In what follows, then, despite the apparent coherence of Iroquois policy, it is best to think of Iroquois policy as referring to the immediate decisions of a tribal or Confederacy council on a given issue.

Warfare, of course, was an important indicator of Iroquois policy.<sup>1</sup> But, however vital military actions are to revealing Iroquois objectives against various groups, care must be exercised when interpreting that data.<sup>2</sup> Because the Iroquois fought for so many reasons, and because a full range of data does not exist for every Iroquois raid, one cannot

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<sup>1</sup> Because, as von Clausewitz so aptly observed, warfare is "the continuation of politics by other means".

<sup>2</sup> Nor should the diplomatic efforts of the Iroquois, those recorded at conferences with Europeans and those noted in passing in the historical record, be ignored. It was in councils that the Iroquois gave explicit voice to their concerns--even if the records give us that voice only in translation.

assume that every raid was a reflection of a policy decision-- I certainly do not. A raid could have been the result of any number of political and/or cultural imperatives. Indeed, it is not clear why Iroquois warriors fought even when they participated in raids initiated for political ends. Warriors may have known of the political purpose of a raid, but went along to get a captive, to avenge a loss, or to gain honour. These were not mutually exclusive objectives. Nor should every war against every native group be viewed as one deliberately provoked as part of some "master" policy. A raid to gain honour may have led to reprisal raids which, in turn, led to more protracted and significant warfare between two groups. In such instances any "policy" that was developed would have been a response to circumstances, not part of some well thought out plan.

Lastly, it is worth stressing that for all the above reasons, and because the Iroquois fought so many peoples, it is not possible to discern Iroquois policy towards every group in the Northeast. The Iroquois fought against 51 groups or combinations of groups. The reasons for hostilities against some of these peoples will remain unknown--in some cases there simply is no evidence upon which to base a reasonable explanation of Iroquois behaviour.<sup>3</sup> In suggesting reasons for

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<sup>3</sup> See, for example, the Iroquois raid against the Saponi. Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated Spring, 1685. In some cases even the group attacked remains a mystery. Ibid, entry dated June 17, 1676. In all there were 11 instances, just over 3% of all raids, for which it was not possible to

wars against certain groups there is no intent to imply that those reasons were equally valid for all groups. Studies of Iroquois relations with individual tribes must be undertaken to determine the nature and cause of Iroquois policy towards specific tribes. Where evidence is lacking to account for Iroquois actions with a given tribe historians must accept those limitations. Certain native groups receive attention here because there is some evidence to help account for Iroquois policy towards those tribes, and because Iroquois interaction with those groups had a bearing on Iroquois-French relations and policy.

The Hurons and Algonquins were the most important native allies of New France in the first half of the seventeenth century. Iroquois relations with, and policy towards, these tribes seems to have centred on access to the St. Lawrence river valley. The origins of that dispute may date back to the early 1500s and to the disappearance of the Hochelagans and Stadaconans who lived along the St. Lawrence when Jacques Cartier travelled there in 1534, but who had disappeared by the time Samuel de Champlain first began exploring the area. Both the scant historical evidence and early recorded oral traditions point to possible Iroquois involvement in these events.

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determine the identity or composition of the group the Iroquois attacked.

It is difficult to explain the disappearance of the St. Lawrence Iroquoians because the evidence is fragmentary and often contradictory. In 1642, for example, the Jesuit Vimont recorded the accounts of two Algonquins who claimed that they were descendants of the inhabitants of Montreal Island and that their people had been driven from their home by the Hurons. In 1645-46, the Jesuit Lalemant recorded a similar story by another Algonquin. In all three accounts the time of the dispersion can be dated to about 1560-1580.<sup>4</sup> In 1615, however, the Recollet Denis Jamet recorded that wars destroyed the early inhabitants of Montreal Island but cited a Huron who claimed that the Iroquois were the attackers. This, too, can be dated to the latter half of the sixteenth century.<sup>5</sup> Marc Lescarbot, writing in 1610 and referring to Iroquois-Algonquin and Huron wars, suggested that theirs was a long-standing enmity and that the Iroquois were determined to exterminate the present inhabitants of the St. Lawrence much, as it is believed, they once destroyed the St Lawrence's

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<sup>4</sup> [Vimont's] Relation of 1642, JR, 22: 207-215; [Lalemant's] Relation of 1645-46, Ibid, 29: 173.

<sup>5</sup> Relation de Pere Denis Jamet, Recollet du Quebec au cardinal de Joyeuse, 15 juiellet, 1615, in R. Le Blanc and R. Baudry, eds., Nouveaux Documents sur Champlain et son epoque, vol. 1, 1560-1622 (Ottawa: Publication des Archives Publiques du Canada, No. 15, 1967), 350. Jamet wrote that his informant could recall seeing the village of those defeated by the Iroquois. Depending on the informants age, that places the defeat of the St. Lawrence group in the latter half of the 1500s.

inhabitants of Cartier's time.<sup>6</sup> Champlain suggested warfare in general produced the displacement of St. Lawrence groups, but he was not specific about what tribes were involved.<sup>7</sup> None of the accounts identifies who started the wars.<sup>8</sup>

At best, all that can be said is that some type of warfare probably caused the dispersal of the St. Lawrence Iroquoians. (There may have been other factors involved but the sources hint at nothing else). Whether one group was responsible for this devastation or whether the Hochelagans were destroyed by one native foe and the Stadaconans another is difficult to determine. There is evidence to suggest that this was the case but it is hardly conclusive. For example, in support of the Algonquins' version of events is Cartier's observation that the people of Hochelaga were at war with the Agojudas, a "bad people" who lived somewhere up a river (usually thought to be the Ottawa R.), and who wore armour

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<sup>6</sup> Marc Lescarbot, "La Conversion des sauvages qui on este baptizes en la nouvelle-france cette annee, 1610", in Lucien Campeau, S.J., ed., Monumenta Novae Franciae, 1: La Premiere Mission D'Acadie, 1602-1616 (Quebec: Presses de l'Universite Laval, 1967), 90-91.

<sup>7</sup> [Samuel de Champlain], The Works of Samuel de Champlain, 6 vols., H.P. Biggar, ed. (Toronto: Champlain Society Publications, 1922), 2: 77, 91. (Hereafter, Champlain, Works.)

<sup>8</sup> There seems to be an assumption by historians that because the Iroquois may have been involved in the wars, and appear to have won, that they began the hostilities. They may have become engaged in warfare in the St. Lawrence valley in retaliation for raids against them by the tribes living there.

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<sup>9</sup> Cartier, Voyages, 171.

made of sticks.<sup>9</sup> This description of the armour fits well with the description of that later observed to be common among the Hurons, as does the indication that these people came from somewhere up the Ottawa. Cartier admitted to not understanding whether the Agojudas were at war with the Hochelagans or warred amongst each other.<sup>10</sup> However, even if one accepts the testimony of the Algonquins and Cartier's evidence as conclusive proof that the Hochelagans were at war with the Hurons (they certainly were at odds with someone or else they would not have bothered to go to the trouble of pallisading their village) there is still the testimony of the Huron recorded by Jamet. Even if this is dismissed as an attempt of a "guilty" party trying to exculpate himself, which is highly unlikely given the prestige attached to victorious raids, the fact remains that what evidence exists about the Hochelagans has most experts convinced that they were of Iroquoian, not Algonquian linguistic stock.<sup>11</sup>

One way to reconcile the Algonquins' and Hurons' versions of events is to suggest that they were referring to different time periods. The Hochelagans, an Iroquoian group, were destroyed first by the Five Nations Iroquois or other Iroquoian groups. If Cartier was wrong about, or if

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<sup>9</sup> Cartier, Voyages, 171.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> B. Trigger and J. Pendergast, "Saint Lawrence Iroquoians", Handbook, 357-361.

historians have misinterpreted, the direction in which the Agojudas were located this is a possible scenario. The Agojudas may have been other St. Lawrence Iroquoians living up the St. Lawrence, or the historic Five Nations group.<sup>12</sup> The Algonquins may then have moved into the area abandoned by the Hochelagans and were in turn driven out by the Hurons. This makes more sense than at first appears. Traditionally the large number of St. Lawrence Iroquoian pottery found on Huron sites has led archaeologists to suggest that the Hurons attacked the St. Lawrence Iroquois and captured the women who made the pottery.<sup>13</sup> This view tends to support Cartier's account and dismisses the Algonquins' claims that they lived on Montreal Island. However, archaeologists cannot determine conclusively how the St. Lawrence material got to Huron sites. The Hurons might have captured the St. Lawrence Iroquoians, or they may have fled to the Hurons to escape the attacks of some other group. If the latter were true, these refugees then may have pushed the Hurons to attack those that had taken up their lands.

Evidence that the Stadaconan's were destroyed by the

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<sup>12</sup> St. Lawrence Iroquoian pottery has been found in sixteenth century Five Nations sites. Robert Kuhn, Robert Funk, and James Pendergast, "The Evidence for a St. Lawrence Iroquoian Presence on Sixteenth Century Mohawk Sites", Northeast Anthropology, (forthcoming).

<sup>13</sup> A short, but extremely useful, critique and overview of the archaeological work on the St. Lawrence Iroquoians and the various theories derived from it is James B. Jamieson, "The Archaeology of the St. Lawrence Iroquoians", Ellis and Ferris, eds., The Archaeology of Southern Ontario, 385-404.

Iroquois is less contradictory because there is less of it, but it is no more conclusive. Lescarbot is the only observer to suggest that they were destroyed by war. The only other reference to the Stadaconans being at war with someone was Cartier's relation of a story told him by Donnacona, a Stadaconan head man, of a continual war between the Stadaconans and the Toudamans.<sup>14</sup> This group is usually identified as the Micmac, but there are grounds for questioning this view.<sup>15</sup> To begin, Donnacona seems to indicate that he knew of the existence of the Iroquois and their location. He described a hostile people who lived one months journey up the [Richelieu] river who wore furs as they did.<sup>16</sup> Once again Cartier stated that the groups there fought one another, but Donnacona could have meant that his people fought them. These stories were, after all, told by signs, pointing, and drawing because neither group could speak the language of the other. Making a distinction between "they fight each other", and "we fight each other" could not have been easy by such means. Moreover, the Toudamans were clearly

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<sup>14</sup> Cartier, Voyages, 177-178.

<sup>15</sup> Trigger and Pendergast, "Saint Lawrence Iroquoians", 357-361.

<sup>16</sup> Cartier, Voyages, 203. Cartier speculated that the reference to the southern origins of this group meant they came from Florida. That deduction was based on Stadaconans' responses to questions about oranges and other fruits. It is extremely unlikely that the Stadaconans knew what an orange looked like, even if Cartier drew one for them. Moreover, Florida was more than a 30 day canoe trip from Quebec, and there was not much need of furs there.

identified as a group who lived to the south.<sup>17</sup> Since the Stadaconans travelled to the Gaspé to fish and had met Cartier there, it is hardly likely that they would be confused about the habitat of the Micmac, if that was who their enemy the Toudamans were. Moreover, when Cartier first met the Stadaconans they were fishing in the Gaspé region not too far from a Micmac group and there were no signs of hostility between the two.<sup>18</sup> Nor does it seem likely that the Micmac could mass an army to destroy two hundred Stadaconan's, since they were themselves composed of a number of small independent bands.

In fact the only reason for suggesting the Toudamans were Micmac is a confused passage in the translation of Cartier's journal in which the Stadaconans recounted a story about a Toudamans attack as they were resting overnight, while enroute to their fishing spot on the Gaspé.<sup>19</sup> Both the French and English texts suggest that it was a war trip--although why there would be women and children on such an excursion is not clear--and that it was towards the Gaspé. However, only the English translation states that the raid was against the Toudamans, thus implying that they were located in the Gaspé.<sup>20</sup> The French text simply states that the Stadaconans

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 54-63.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 177-178.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

were going to war in the Gaspé area when they were attacked by the Toudamans on an island opposite the Saguenay. Since the Toudamans were the traditional foes of the Stadaconans, and lived to the south, and not to the north east, it is highly unlikely they were the Micmac. Thus it is possible that the Iroquois were the Toudamans that attacked, and maybe even, destroyed the Stadaconans. Whether they were also responsible for removing the tribes who lived between Hochelaga and Stadacona is even more conjectural.

In the end, however, all the above scenarios are, at best, informed speculation and, at worst, conjecture. And, as Major John Norton, the nineteenth century Mohawk warrior wrote, "it is useless to say much on conjectures, which have no demonstrative certainty to support them, and which, though to one person may appear probable, another perhaps will hardly allow them to be possible".<sup>21</sup>

Even if the Iroquois played no role in the destruction of the St. Lawrence Iroquoian groups, it is clear from the testimony of the Algonquins and Hurons that Iroquois hostility towards the Hurons and Algonquins dates from an early period and that the St. Lawrence river valley was a main theatre of war. Several other recorded versions of native oral traditions also bear this out. What is consistent in all the accounts is that the Iroquois lived somewhere on the St. Lawrence, either at Quebec or Montreal, and were driven out by

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<sup>21</sup> [John Norton], Journal, 87.

the Hurons or Algonquins.<sup>22</sup> These traditions accord well with the pattern of warfare evident in the early 1600s. Then the Iroquois were on the run from the Hurons and Algonquins.<sup>23</sup> However, the traditions of Iroquois flight from the St. Lawrence contradict archaeologists' contentions that the Five Nation Iroquois developed "in situ", and that they were culturally distinct from the St. Lawrence Iroquoians.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, theories derived from archaeological evidence are often based on assumptions and hypotheses. The evidence uncovered is real, but how it got to the site and what that means is informed guess work. Different assumptions often lead to different interpretations, and archaeologists are continually reevaluating data and reformulating hypotheses.<sup>25</sup> It may yet be possible to

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<sup>22</sup> Radisson, Explorations, 46-48; Lafitau, Moeurs, 1: 86; Colden, History of the Five Indian Nations, 22-23; Morgan, League of the Iroquois, 5-8; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1636, JR, 9: 159.

<sup>23</sup> The Iroquois initiated only one of the eleven raids recorded between 1603 and 1628. Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1603 to 1628. In 1660 Father Lalemant recorded an account of Iroquois-Algonquin hostilities that, once again, placed the Iroquois (in this case, specifically the Mohawk) on the defensive from Algonquin attacks around 1600. [Lalemant's] Relation of 1659-60, JR, 45: 205.

<sup>24</sup> See Handbook under the names of the various tribes and J. Pendergast, "Huron-St. Lawrence Iroquois Relations in the Terminal Prehistoric Period", Ontario Archaeology, 44 (1985), 26.

<sup>25</sup> Pendergast and Jamieson, looking at the same evidence on St. Lawrence Iroquoians, and working from similar assumptions came to different conclusions about the significance of St. Lawrence Iroquoian pipes on Huron sites. Pendergast, "Huron-St. Lawrence Iroquois Relations", 34;

reconcile the historical, oral, and archaeological data, but for now John Norton's advice seems best.

If establishing the earliest date the Iroquois became involved in the St. Lawrence is difficult, native oral traditions hint at, and are in accord about, the reasons for the warfare evident by 1600. The wars were fought to avenge previous wrongs committed by one side against the other. Either jealousy, a dream, or a misunderstanding caused the initial confrontation.<sup>26</sup> The retributive nature of Indian warfare accounts for the escalation and enduring consequences of the initial encounters. If these appear to be vague explanations, they nonetheless fit well with what is known of native warfare in the seventeenth century. It may be contended that these traditions are vague because the real cause is unknown. That, however, is an ethnocentric assessment based on modern writers willingness to accept as "legitimate" only causes that appear "rational" by modern societies standards. Oral histories served to account for and

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Jamieson, "Archaeology of the St. Lawrence Iroquoians", 403. Recently Dean Snow contended that a reexamination of some archaeological evidence suggests that the Mohawk, at least, may have moved into their historic homelands rather than have developed "in situ". Dean Snow, "Archaeological Evidence for an Iroquoian Incursion Around AD 900", Paper presented at the Conference on Iroquois Research, Oct. 1991.

<sup>26</sup> Radisson, Explorations, 46-48; Colden, History of the Five Indian Nations, 22-23; [Anon.] "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 444; Morgan, League of the Iroquois, 5-8; Norton, Journal, 105-110.

justify aspects of a groups past. In the sources cited above different tribes were blamed for initiating the wars. Thus, if more important, or to be cynical, more self-serving, reasons could be found or invented they would have been. The fact that the Iroquois, Hurons, and Algonquins felt their traditions provided adequate explanation for the devastating wars they were engaged in should be reason enough to accept that these were the causes of the wars as they understood them. More importantly, the hostilities persisted, in part, because those reasons continued to be valid ones for war.

Despite this, some writers claim that a desire for economic gain from the fur trade caused the Iroquois to war in the St. Lawrence valley sometime after 1535 and that the pattern which emerges around 1600 is a concrete manifestation of a new type of warfare: one produced by the new goal for warring--economic gain.<sup>27</sup> This view is based on an unsupported and illogical interpretation of one incident between the Stadaconans and Jacques Cartier. It is contended that Donnacona, the Stadaconan headman, opposed Cartier's visit to Hochelaga because he wanted to keep the position of

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<sup>27</sup> Hunt, Wars of the Iroquois, 17, 21; Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 1: 223. Both writers, however, fail to explain why the Iroquois did not participate in the St. Lawrence fur trade after having defeated those that had stood in the way of that ambition. See, Heidenreich "History of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes Area", 483.

middleman, and/or somehow profit economically from the fur trade.<sup>28</sup> This incident then serves as proof of a new motive introduced into Indian culture. All patterns of warfare that emerge afterwards, such as the Iroquois presence on the St. Lawrence, are said to have been produced by this motive. That this motive for Iroquois warfare was not particularly significant in the later settlement period might be reason enough to dismiss it as an important motive in the early contact period.<sup>29</sup> However, there are more compelling reasons to do this. The most significant reason is that there are no grounds to substantiate such a view of Donnacona's actions.

Donnacona could not want to keep a middleman status, nor to profit from the fur trade, because he never occupied such a position and because there was no established fur trade. Cartier gave a few axes, but mostly trinkets, to the

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<sup>28</sup> Desrosiers, Iroquoisie, 13; Trigger and Pendergast, "St. Lawrence Iroquoians", Handbook, 361. Early historians of New France also accounted for Donnacona's behaviour by reference to desires to take advantage of the French. Faillon thought Cartier was held up possibly because Donnacona "aurait voulu profiter seul des avantages qu'il se promettait du séjour de ces étrangers dans son pays". (Faillon, Histoire de la Colonie Française, 1: 15) Ferland suggested that Cartier's trip was opposed because the Stadaconans "regardaient-ils avec jalousie ceux de Hochelaga, qui prétendaient exercer une espèce de suzeraineté sur les bourgades de Donnacona; ou bien ils craignaient que les présents Français ne fussent partagés entre les deux peuplades". (Ferland, Histoire du Canada, 1: 27)

<sup>29</sup> Certainly the discussion in the preceding chapters should allow one to, at least, call into question the monocausal nature of this view.

Indians.<sup>30</sup> Cartier himself put no great value on furs and traded for them as a means of maintaining the friendship of the Indians.<sup>31</sup> Indeed most of the groups he met on the St. Lawrence offered food, and traded him food not furs.<sup>32</sup> In 1542 Spanish sailors questioned about what they knew of Cartier recalled the ships he had and what the Indians had told him, but made no mention of a fur trade.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, Cartier was commissioned to return to Canada to find (what turned out to be) a mythical kingdom, not to establish a fur trade.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, no serious efforts were made to exploit the upper St. Lawrence fur trade until the 1580s.<sup>35</sup> There is evidence that the lack of trade in the intervening years was due to native opposition.<sup>36</sup>

There is little data on the fur trade in the sixteenth century and what little there is comes, not surprisingly, from the latter decades. By the 1580s furs began to arrive in

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<sup>30</sup> Cartier, Voyages, 150.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 52, 150.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 120-121, 142, 150.

<sup>33</sup> Examination of Newfoundland Sailors regarding Cartier, 23 Sept., 1542, in H.P. Biggar, ed., A Collection of Documents Relating to Jacques Cartier and the Sieur de Roberval (Ottawa: Publications of the Public Archives of Canada, No. 14, 1930), 447-467.

<sup>34</sup> Cartier, Voyages, 250.

<sup>35</sup> Trudel, Beginnings of New France, 54-70.

<sup>36</sup> Heidenreich, "History of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes Area to A.D. 1650", 480-481.

Europe in sufficient numbers to attract attention. Richard Hakluyt, a promoter of English colonization, noted that he saw in Paris furs to the value of "five thousand crowns" in 1584. The furs came, he wrote, from "the most nether parts of those countries whereunto our voyage of inhabiting is intended".<sup>37</sup> One assumes this means the north east coast of North America. What five thousand "crowns" represents in pelts is difficult to say. A silver crown was worth five shillings and during the 1600s a beaver pelt was worth about one pound sterling.<sup>38</sup> That means five thousand crowns represented about 1,250 furs. If furs were more valuable in this early period, then even fewer furs would be required to produce the same value.

Furs were an attraction and were valued probably because so few arrived. Even by the 1600s large fur shipments seem to have been rare.<sup>39</sup> If they arrived they have so far escaped

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<sup>37</sup> Richard Hakluyt to Sir Francis Walsingham, 7 January, 1584 in W.N. Sainsbury, et al, eds., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 44 vols. (London: Her Majesties Stationary Office, 1860-1969), 9: 24. (Hereafter, CSP). He does not mention how long it took to accumulate that store of furs.

<sup>38</sup> The value of beaver was calculated on the following basis: one pound sterling was worth about six Dutch guilders during the 1600s (Peter Christoph and Florence Christoph, eds., Andros Papers, 1674-1676: Files of the Provincial Secretary of New York During the Administration of Governor Sir Edmund Andros (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1989), xxvi). In the same period beaver sold in New Netherland for about six to eight guilders. (Directors to Stuyvesant, 4 April, 1652, NYCD, 14: 165-174.)

<sup>39</sup> Marcel Trudel quotes, and seems to accept, Hakluyt's assertion that in 1584 five fur laden ships arrived in France from the St. Lawrence area. (Trudel, Beginnings of New France, 58.) This seems far fetched. Even after the French

historical scrutiny. Indeed, evidence suggests that the volume of the early fur trade was not that high. In 1607 Saint Malo merchants were granted the right to trade freely in Canadian furs. In 1609 they were ordered to pay 6,000 livres (about 1,000 furs) for this privilege.<sup>40</sup> The French Crown can hardly be said to have reached an advantageous decision in this matter if the number of furs traded annually was in the tens of thousands. However, it appears that the Crown decision was not that one sided. The few references to lots of furs put up for sale in France reveal that the number of pelts offered was in the low hundreds.<sup>41</sup> Further, Sieur de Monts, in asking for compensation for furs shipped without his permission while he still held the monopoly on the fur trade, put in a claim for just over 1,700 beaver pelts.<sup>42</sup>

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established and organized the St. Lawrence trade two ships were most often enough to take all the furs traded. C. Lalemant to J. Lalemant, August, 1626, JR, 4: 207.

<sup>40</sup> Arrêt du Conseil d'Etat permettant aux habitants de Saint-Malo et du pays basque de trafiquer librement au Canada..., 6 octobre, 1609, Nouveaux Documents sur Champlain et son époque, 1: 191-193. On the selling price of beaver in this period see Vente par Jean Sorel..., 2 mars, 1609, ibid, 182. Eccles, France in America, 15, and Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 91 state that this right was granted in 1607. I have followed them in this matter.

<sup>41</sup> Vente par Jean Sorel..., 2 mars, 1609, Nouveaux Documents sur Champlain et son époque, 1: 182; Prêt de 772 livres...par Mathieu Duisterlo..., 23 décembre, 1609, ibid, 200.

<sup>42</sup> Procuracion donnée par Pierre de Gua...20 octobre, 1607, ibid, 145-156. The early Dutch trade does not seem to have been of much greater volume. The Dutch fur take in 1614, from one years trading by three different traders on the Hudson and down towards Delaware, does not appear to have

That the fur trade was profitable seems obvious. But that this required large volumes of fur is not. The price of trade goods was low, the Indians did all the potentially costly labour intensive part of fur gathering, and ships could fill out their holds with fish to ensure a full return cargo. There is no need to assume that eye witness accounts of profitable journeys necessarily involved large volumes of furs. In 1583, for example, a voyage by the French merchant Bellenger, produced 400 crowns worth of furs in return for 40 crowns worth of trade items.<sup>43</sup> This ten fold return on investment obviously represents a significant profit margin, and must have provided a good incentive to return to Canada to engage in the fur trade again. But, based on the same calculations as above, this represents only 100 pelts.

In short, there is little evidence that even by 1600 the fur trade was of such volume and significance to Indians that they refocussed their lives, seasonal patterns, and cultures to provide furs to Europeans in order to obtain European trade goods. It is too much to credit that Donnacona foresaw the French desire to develop a vast and rewarding fur trade (that would keep the French interested in Canada) before the French figured it out. Even by 1618 Champlain felt that while the

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exceeded 2,500 pelts. Simon Hart, The Prehistory of the New Netherland Company: Amsterdam Notarial Records of the First Dutch Voyages to the Hudson (City of Amsterdam Press, 1959), 31-32, 80-86.

<sup>43</sup> Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 57-58.

fur trade was valuable to New France, other resources held a greater potential benefit.<sup>44</sup> However, the almost complete lack of European trade goods on any of the pre-1600 St. Lawrence sites serves as clear evidence that what furs were reaching Europe were not from the St. Lawrence interior.<sup>45</sup> (Either that or the Europeans were trapping their own furs or the natives were giving away their fur catches.) Moreover, if keeping a middleman position or profiting from the fur trade was all important to Donnacona and his people, the Stadaconans would hardly have harassed their main supplier to the point that Cartier was forced to abandon his stay in Canada.<sup>46</sup>

Donnacona did not hesitate to escort Cartier to Hochelaga because he wanted to protect some nonexistent economic arrangement. Fear appears to be a more reasonable explanation

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<sup>44</sup> Champlain, Works, 2: 339-345.

<sup>45</sup> Heidenreich, "History of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes Area", 481; Jamieson, "Archaeology of the St. Lawrence Iroquoians", 403; Pendergast, "Huron-St. Lawrence Iroquois Relations", 24-25; J.V. Wright, "Archaeology of Southern Ontario to A.D. 1650: A Critique", Ellis and Ferris, eds., Archaeology of Southern Ontario, 502. This fact is often overlooked by those who wish to make Iroquois desires to participate in this early fur trade the root cause of their wars. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that "economic gain" was a significant motive for Iroquois warfare, why would the Iroquois war with the St. Lawrence Iroquoians if they were not heavily involved in the fur trade? Certainly not to steal the few European goods they may have gotten through casual trade contacts, and certainly not to gain access to the few fishermen that might have wandered into the St. Lawrence interior looking for furs. The Iroquois could hardly be said to have attacked to steal furs since few would wish to claim that they had exhausted their fur reserves by the 1560s.

<sup>46</sup> Cartier, Voyages, 259, 264-265.

for his behaviour. According to Cartier the Stadaconans were subjects of Hochelaga.<sup>47</sup> Whether or not this was the case, Donnacona apparently objected to the visit upriver for fear that Cartier would either strengthen the Hochelagans' grip, or possibly form an alliance with them. When he first objected to Cartier's visit one of his complaints was that Cartier "and his people carried so many weapons when they on their side carried none."<sup>48</sup> Later Donnacona sought to establish an alliance with Cartier and formalized it by giving the Frenchmen some children, a traditional practice, as a "sign of alliance".<sup>49</sup> The preoccupation with the weapons, however, continued unabated and Donnacona asked Cartier to fire off the ship's cannons since he had never heard the like. After this, when Cartier insisted on going upriver, he was asked to leave a hostage behind, indicating a continued distrust of Cartier.<sup>50</sup> Uncertainty over Cartier's motives was probably due to the fact that when Donnacona gave Cartier a few of his people, Cartier did not give Donnacona any of his in return as native custom required.<sup>51</sup>

Cartier suspected that the two Indians he had taken with

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 161.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 129.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, 133. This desire was not confined to Donnacona. As Cartier passed up river, at least one other native leader sought, and made, an alliance with Cartier. Ibid, 143.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, 140.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, 132-134.

him to France were leading the opposition and he was possibly right. In Indian society, however, all individuals have input into the decision making process. The fact that Donnacona's concerns may have been fuelled by Domagaya and Taignoagny does not invalidate the above interpretation. If any one could tell Donnacona of the power of French arms it would have been those two since they had probably had first hand observation of them in France during welcoming ceremonies and other functions designed to impress them with French power and wealth.<sup>52</sup> Throughout all this the behaviour of Donnacona is consistent with that of a cautious leader. He sought to establish peaceful relations with Cartier as he might have with any Indian leader. When Cartier failed to do things in the manner he was accustomed to, Donnacona tried to prod him into doing so. Donnacona's actions reveal that his goals were simply to establish sure bonds between himself and the powerful, and potentially dangerous, stranger who wanted to go to a group who either had defeated his people, or could with the weapons that stranger possessed. There is nothing in Donnacona's behaviour to indicate that he was motivated by desires of economic gain.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> It was common practice to put on public displays of, and for, natives brought to France. Olive Dickason, The Myth of the Savage and the Beginnings of French Colonialism in the Americas (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984), 205-217.

<sup>53</sup> It is true that the Indians were eager for the trinkets Cartier provided, but to suggest that desire for these few trifles produced war of sufficient magnitude to destroy an

But even had there been a fur trade in the 1530s, and had Donnacona sought to take advantage of it, there still remain several problems with this "economic" interpretation. To begin, there is no conclusive evidence that the Iroquois preoccupation with the St. Lawrence was new, and in fact may have predated Cartier's arrival. More to the point, there is absolutely no evidence that the Iroquois were motivated by the same concerns as Donnacona. He was not a headman of any of the Five Nations Iroquois. Using Donnacona's concerns, even if known, to account for the actions of peoples living hundreds of miles away, and who may have been his enemies, not his followers, is, to say the least, weak historical reasoning.

In short, it is impossible to accurately assess the time when, the extent to which, or the reasons why the Iroquois

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entire people is far fetched. Indians did not value material possessions to such an extent. There are other reasons that help explain this early eagerness for goods. Cartier was regarded as something of a god and people sought to touch him and have him touch and "lay hands" on their young. (Cartier, Voyages, 151, 162-165) Given Indian mysticism, the trinkets Cartier gave out were probably seen to be charms; either because of peoples perceptions of Cartier, or because of their novelty. In any case, they were not so attached to them that they acted irrationally or out of character. While they were willing to trade for these items, if they did not get a good deal for their provisions they did not trade. (ibid, 217) By 1541, when Cartier's was proving to be an undesirable presence, the Indians forced Cartier to abandon his stay among them. (ibid, 259, 264-65) This type of behaviour was hardly to be expected from a people so dedicated to profiting from a fur trade that one can suggest they exterminated others to attain that end.

became involved in the St. Lawrence theatre of war. What can be affirmed is that by 1600 they had claimed it as their own and had established themselves as foes of the Hurons, Algonquins, and Montagnais. By the time Champlain arrived, most areas along the St. Lawrence (the Richelieu River, Lake Champlain, and Lake Ontario) were recognized as belonging to, or claimed by, the Iroquois.<sup>54</sup> By 1603 the Iroquois had already made passage along the St. Lawrence a risky endeavour. Champlain even suggested building a settlement at Three Rivers because it "would be a boon for the freedom of some tribes who dare not come that way for fear of their enemies, the said Iroquois, who infest the bank all along the said river of Canada."<sup>55</sup> A settlement was built at Three Rivers, but it did not stop Iroquois attacks against New France's native allies. Not even after most of them had been driven from their homelands did the Iroquois relent in their wars against the Hurons and Algonquins.

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<sup>54</sup> A. Forbes, "Two and a Half Centuries of Conflict: The Iroquois and the Laurentian Wars", Pennsylvania Archaeologist, 3-4, 40 (December, 1970), 5-6.

<sup>55</sup> Champlain, Works, 1: 137. Some years later French Indian allies made this same observation. Ibid, 3: 31. It seems worth stressing here that this blockade of the St. Lawrence began long before it became the regular route for taking furs to New France.

## Chapter 6

"One people and one land": Iroquois Policy Towards  
New France's Native Allies to 1663

If establishing the causes of Iroquois hostilities towards some French native allies prior to 1600 is difficult, the reasons for Iroquois warfare seem clearer for the period after 1600. Regardless of who started their wars, the evidence suggests that their hostility towards each other was ancient. After 1600 the revenge cycle continued to give impetus to raiding, as did the Iroquois military strategy of capturing people to weaken their foes and strengthen their own forces. The importance of capturing people even led to intensified and new wars because of the Iroquois need to replace populations decimated by warfare and disease. Nor can one discount native traditions explaining these wars because buried in these accounts is an implicit cause for war. In their focus on the St. Lawrence, and in the consistency with which the wars were said to have started as a result of murders that occurred as groups hunted near each other, is the suggestion that the wars were in part fought over territory-- either to gain it or protect it. As the fur trade grew in importance for the Iroquois tribes, defending their territories must have taken on new significance. Land was needed to hunt for furs for clothing and trade, it was a source of food, and served as a buffer between the Iroquois

and their enemies.

There is little direct evidence about the importance of revenge, honour, and capture of people as specific causes of the Iroquois wars against the Hurons and the Algonquins. That is, no Iroquois council record has been found in which the Confederacy leaders are reported to have agreed to "attack the Hurons and Algonquins to avenge ourselves on them, and to capture their people in order to replenish our dwindling numbers". But the evidence left by European observers and the Iroquois confirm the importance of revenge, honour, and the need to capture people as objectives of raiding.<sup>1</sup> Reason alone dictates that these general causes of war must have been operative factors and can serve to explain hostilities against, or policy towards, specific groups such as the Hurons and Algonquins.

Nonetheless, in the case of capturing people, one need not rely solely on persuasive logic. The data on the numbers of people captured and killed by the Iroquois confirms the significance of the capture of people as a goal of Iroquois warfare in the seventeenth century. By 1701 the Iroquois had captured at least 3,810 to 4,176 people. If one adds to this total people said to have been "lost" to the Iroquois (2,277-2,795) but whom were almost all captured rather than killed,

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<sup>1</sup> See chapter 3 and the discussion there.

Table 6.1<sup>2</sup>

## Population Losses to the Iroquois to 1701

Type of Loss	Captured	Killed	Lost	Total
Due to Iroquois Raids	3,791- 4,157	1,738- 2,065	2,150- 2,667	7,679- 8,889
Due to Own Raids	19	278-293	127-128	424-440
TOTAL	3,810- 4,176	2,016- 2,358	2,277- 2,795	8,103- 9,329

this puts the total number of people captured by the Iroquois at 6,087 to 6,971. During this same period they killed between 2,016 and 2,358 people. Thus the Iroquois captured twice, probably three times, as many people as they killed. Given this type of data, it would not appear unduly sanguine to suggest that capture of people was an important policy of the Iroquois.

At first glance the suggested numbers of people captured might appear high. But, depending on what one accepts as the overall Iroquois population, the above figures are either fairly accurate or they underestimate the number of captives among the Iroquois. If the Iroquois population is placed at about 10,000 to 12,000, as first suggested by Parkman, and one accepts the various assertions of the Jesuits that half to two thirds of the population of Iroquois villages were made up of

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<sup>2</sup> The following data is based on Table F.1, Appendix F.

captives, then the total of 6,087 to 6,971 seems an accurate reflection of the number of prisoners taken by the Iroquois.<sup>3</sup> If the Iroquois population is placed at 20,000 to 25,000 then the above total of captives appears to be a conservative one.<sup>4</sup> If one applies the Jesuit observation on the percentage of villagers who were not Iroquois to this higher population figure, then the number of captives should be about 12,000 to 15,000.

But where were all these people going? After all, there were limits to how many captives could be tortured and how many dead kin the Iroquois needed to replace. The answer is, quite simply, that high as the number of captives may have been, they were still not enough to offset Iroquois population losses. The Iroquois were continually losing people due to the raids of their enemies and as a result of disease. They also lost not a few people, mostly males, as a result of their own raids.<sup>5</sup> Epidemic disease, when it struck may have meant

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<sup>3</sup> Parkman, Jesuits, lxvi, note 1; Hunt, Wars of the Iroquois, 6.

<sup>4</sup> Morgan, for no apparent reason, placed the figure at 25,000. (Morgan, League of the Iroquois, 27) Trigger (Children of Aataentsic, 98), also without explanation placed it at 20,000. My own calculations put the Iroquois population at 23,000 to 25,000. (See Appendix C). William Starna's work on the Mohawk population seems to point to a growing willingness to accept higher population figures, at least in the pre-epidemic era. See, W. Starna, "Mohawk Iroquois Populations: A Revision", Ethnohistory, 27, 4 (Fall 1980): 371-382.

<sup>5</sup> The Jesuits early on recognized that Iroquois raiding exacted a heavy toll on them. [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, JR, 43: 265; Father Pierron in [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1669-70, Ibid, 53: 155.

a more dramatic and tragic death toll, but slow and gradual depopulation seems to have been the rule in the intervening periods.<sup>6</sup>

Indeed, it can be argued that Iroquois population losses were greater even than those listed in Table 6.2. For example, the "Other Causes" column lists non-war related deaths--mostly deaths due to illness, and disease, both foreign and native to the Iroquois.<sup>7</sup> Of the total of

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<sup>6</sup> See Appendix A, Table A.2; Appendix E, Table E.1. Based on the numbers in Tables A.2 and E.1, years of epidemic disease did not always produce significantly higher mortality figures than those years in which epidemic disease did not strike. The accepted view is that natives died off in tremendous numbers due to new diseases introduced from Europe. The mortality rates due to smallpox, for example, range from 30% to 70%. Heidenreich, Huronian, 97-99; A. Crosby, Jr., The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1972), 44. While all these figures may be accurate, what is impossible to determine among the Iroquois is how many people contracted a disease during any given outbreak. Without that information it is impossible to ascertain the mortality rate, or the total deaths due to epidemic disease. Based on Table A.2, assuming that the Jesuits managed to baptize more or less the same percentage of dying Iroquois during epidemic and non-epidemic periods, then the evidence suggests a significant death rate due to epidemic disease, but over the long run, not huge population declines per epidemic. However, it is likely that the Jesuits did not manage to baptize the same percentage of people in epidemic years as in non-epidemic years. If that is true, that leaves one no further ahead when trying to assess the impact of epidemics on the Iroquois.

<sup>7</sup> Among the health problems indigenous to precontact Iroquoians were tuberculosis, arthritis, infections of all types from open wounds and broken bones, and probably syphilis. Robert Larocque, "Les maladies chez les iroquoiens préhistoriques", Recherches Amérindiens au Québec, X, 3 (1980): 165-180. For the debate on the possible North American origins of syphilis see Crosby, Columbian Exchange, 122-147.

Table 6.2<sup>8</sup>

## Iroquois Population Losses to 1701

Type of Loss	Captured	Killed	Lost	Total
Due to Raids by Others	855-892	1,270-1,378	724-839	2,849-3,109
Due to Own Raids	108	486-509	414-425	1,008-1,042
Other Causes		3,905		3,905
Total	963-1,000	5,661-5,792	1,138-1,264	7,762-8,056

3,905, a large portion, 2,002, represent only the number of baptized Iroquois that died between 1667 and 1679.<sup>9</sup> The total number of unbaptized Iroquois that died in those twelve years went unrecorded. As well, the figure of 3,905 includes deaths from only seven, possibly eight, separate epidemics.<sup>10</sup> There was no evidence concerning the number of lives lost in the other seven or eight outbreaks of epidemic disease that struck the Iroquois during the 1600s. However, if loss of life was no more severe during those epidemics for which no death records exist, and if the annual death rates in non-epidemic years was similar in other years to the rate for the period 1667 to 1679, then one can postulate a like number of dead per

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<sup>8</sup> The following data is based on Table E.1, Appendix E.

<sup>9</sup> Appendix A, Table A.2; Appendix B, Table B.1.

<sup>10</sup> Appendix B and Table B.1.

year--that is, 2,002 deaths over twelve years, or 167 deaths per year.<sup>11</sup> If one multiplies that figure by the remaining years in the century (167 x 89), that would put the number of non-war related Iroquois deaths at 14,863.<sup>12</sup> In short, there was no need to be concerned with where to put those that came to replace the dead. It was Iroquois cemeteries, not their longhouses, that were crowded.

Be all that as it may, is there evidence that raids to capture people were related to these population losses? Again, reason, if nothing else, should indicate that this was indeed the case. Since raiding to capture people was, according to both European contemporaries and the statistical analysis of Iroquois hostilities, an important goal of warfare, one may assume that population losses heightened

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<sup>11</sup> This may seem far fetched, but it seems to be a conservative approach. For example, it is by no means certain that the Jesuits baptized all those on the verge of death, or the same ratio of dying Iroquois in epidemic years as in non-epidemic years. Thus the 2,002 baptized dead in this twelve year period probably under represents the actual number of deaths.

<sup>12</sup> The above discussion has some interesting implications for assessing overall Iroquois population size. For example, if the total of Iroquois dead up to 1701 was, in fact, around 21,000 (167 deaths/year x 101 years = 16,867; approx 4,000 war related deaths + 16,867 = approx 21,000), then the Iroquois must have had a higher population than most experts have estimated. Certainly to arrive at 1701 with a population of 8-10,000 as most authorities concur, and having captured somewhere around 6,000 people, they must have started out with a population of 23,000 to 25,000. Either that, or the Iroquois had a population of 10,000 and captured 21,000 people to offset their losses. Or, equally unlikely, very few Iroquois died, and the 6,000 people they captured more than offset their losses.

pressure to capture people and led to increased raiding for this end. There are two other compelling pieces of evidence to support this conclusion. Graph 6.1 charts the number of Iroquois raids against all groups by year. Also marked on this graph are the years during which serious disease or epidemic struck the Iroquois. Almost without exception the years during which epidemics struck, or shortly after, are followed by an increase in raiding.<sup>13</sup> There does not seem to be a direct relationship between the number of raids and the number of captives taken.<sup>14</sup> This of course can be the result of the vagaries of war. It also suggests that the increase in warfare was the result of many small raiding parties that did not necessarily capture large numbers of people.<sup>15</sup> There is no evidence to confirm that such attacks against specific groups were part of overall Confederacy policy. On the other hand there is a clear relationship between large scale attacks and the number of captives taken. For example, the Iroquois

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
<sup>13</sup> The one notable exception is the period in the early 1660s. While the number of raids increased after the first and second epidemic, they soon dropped off. This decline can be explained by the severity of the epidemics, the instability in New York caused by Dutch and English struggles to control the colony, thus creating uncertainty in Iroquois gun and ammunition supplies, and by the news that the French were about to receive troops to be used against the Iroquois. The combined effect of all these events may have caused Iroquois warriors to stay at home to conserve ammunition and protect their villages.

<sup>14</sup> Appendix F, Table F.1.

<sup>15</sup> On the size of raiding parties during these "active" periods see Table D.1, Appendix D.

Graph 6.1  
**IROQUOIS HOSTILITIES TO 1701**

Source: Appendix D, Table D.1



armies sent against the Hurons, Neutrals, Susquehannocks, Eries, Illinois, and Miamis, all returned with large numbers of captives.<sup>16</sup> Perhaps not so surprisingly, all followed shortly on the heels of years when disease struck the Iroquois.<sup>17</sup>

In short, increased hostilities against a variety of foes after periods of epidemic or disease reflected, at the least, the response of individuals who sought to assuage their grief by capturing people for torture or to replace those recently deceased. At times, population decline seems to have been a factor in Confederacy decisions to war against certain groups in order to capture people. A closer look at the results of Iroquois aggressions against some of these groups, especially against the Hurons--their linguistic cousins--reinforces the importance of capturing people as a goal of Iroquois warfare against them.

The first clearly recorded Iroquois attack against a group composed solely of Hurons took place in 1631 and the last in 1663. During these years the Iroquois attacked the

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<sup>16</sup> The Hurons, Eries, and Neutrals were among some of the tribes Father Lalemant found among the Iroquois by 1660. [Lalemant's] Relation of 1659-60, JR, 45: 207.

<sup>17</sup> See Appendix D, Table D.1, entries dated: July, 1648; March 16-19, 1649; Autumn, [prior to Aug. 30, 1650]; Spring, [1651]; [Winter, 1652]; [Fall, 1654 to Winter, 1655]; [April], 1663; Sept., 1680; [Approx. Dec., 1680]; 1681; Aug. 25, 1682; Nov. 4, 1686.

Hurons 73 times.<sup>18</sup> In this same period the Hurons were also attacked nine times when they were part of other groups targeted by the Iroquois. The results of the 73 raids against the Hurons were 300-304 Hurons captured, 523-531 killed, and 1,241-1,255 lost to the Iroquois.<sup>19</sup> In all, the Iroquois were responsible for the removal of just over 2,000 Hurons from a post 1630 population estimated to have been between 8,700 and 10,000.<sup>20</sup> This represents between 1/5 and 1/4 of the total Huron population. If the Iroquois goal was to capture and kill Hurons to exact revenge on them, or to deplete the Hurons' population in order to exterminate them, then the above totals suggest that Iroquois policy achieved a certain measure of success.

However, it seems that Iroquois policy towards the Hurons, whether to exterminate them or not, was geared towards capturing rather than killing off the Hurons. At first glance the data on the human toll exacted on the Hurons by the Iroquois may not appear to support the contention that capturing people was an important reason for Iroquois raids

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<sup>18</sup> Appendix F, Table F.3. While not all the Hurons were killed off by 1663, they were no longer the focus of Iroquois aggression. Moreover, while some most certainly died at the hands of the Iroquois after this date, it was often when they took part in attacks launched by the French and their Indian allies. The records often do not mention what native groups were part of the attacking party, nor the break down of losses by tribe. The same is true in cases when Hurons were known to be part of a group attacked by the Iroquois.

<sup>19</sup> Appendix F, Table F.3.

<sup>20</sup> Heidenreich, Huron, 98.

against the Hurons. After all, only 300 out of 2,000 Hurons taken by the Iroquois were clearly recorded as having been captured. However, the number of Hurons "lost" to the Iroquois should be considered as people captured not killed. The Jesuits, who left the most detailed accounts of the raids during which Huronia was destroyed, use the word "lost" to convey the sense of living people who have been taken from the reach of their ministrations and lost to the sway of the Iroquois. This is, admittedly, an impression derived from reading the sources, and, of course, one favourable to the case being advanced here. However, if true, it puts the number of Hurons captured at about 1,550--or three times more captured than killed.

Nonetheless, whether one accepts 300 or 1,550 as the total number of Hurons captured by the Iroquois it may be contended that both figures are far too low. For example, in 1651 the Jesuits reported that the Hurons from St. Michel, as well as those from St. Jean-Baptiste had given themselves freely to the Senecas. By 1657, one whole village among the Senecas was made up of these Hurons.<sup>21</sup> It is not clear how much of the estimated (pre-epidemic) Huron population of 3,600

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<sup>21</sup> Journal des Pères Jesuites, 1651, JR, 36: 141-143; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, ibid, 44: 21; [Dablon's] Relation of 1672-73, ibid, 57: 193. It seems clear that they should be included among the total of captured Hurons. The fact that they relocated before being attacked reveals they understood that their capture was a goal of Iroquois raiding against them. By voluntarily moving to Iroquoia they avoided the unpleasantness that would follow a defeat and a more forced resettlement.

in these two villages relocated to Iroquoia.<sup>22</sup> But it seems certain that the Huron refugee village referred to in 1657 was that of Gandougaraé. In 1669 Father Fremin reported that this village was composed entirely of people from captured nations.<sup>23</sup> Gandougaraé was one of the smaller Seneca villages which observers stated was made up of about thirty longhouses.<sup>24</sup> Based on an average of three or four central fires per longhouse and two families (ten people) per hearth, the estimated population of this village alone was 900 to 1,200 mostly, if not entirely, Huron refugees.<sup>25</sup> As well, in 1667 the Jesuits reported that one Mohawk village, where Father Jogues had been killed, was made up of only one third Mohawks. Hurons and Algonquins made up the other two thirds of the population.<sup>26</sup> This village was known by several names, but by the 1660s was called Caughnawaga.<sup>27</sup> The village contained about 24 houses in 1677.<sup>28</sup> If the refugee

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<sup>22</sup> On the village populations see Heidenreich, Huronia, 102.

<sup>23</sup> Father Fremin in Relation of 1669-70, JR, 54: 81. On Gandougaraé as the refugee village, see also Thomas Abler and Elisabeth Tooker, "Seneca", Handbook, 505-506.

<sup>24</sup> Galinée, "Voyage de Dollier et Galinée", 24; [Greenhalgh], "Journal of Wentworth Greenhalgh", 251-252.

<sup>25</sup> See Appendix C and the discussion there.

<sup>26</sup> Journal of Fathers Fremin, Pierron, and Bruyas in, [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1667-68, JR, 51: 187.

<sup>27</sup> W. Fenton and E. Tooker, "Mohawk", Handbook, 467.

<sup>28</sup> [Greenhalgh], "Journal of Wentworth Greenhalgh", 250.

population of that village was evenly divided, which is by no means certain since the Hurons were attacked and captured in greater numbers than the Algonquins, then one could surmise that the Hurons occupied approximately eight longhouses (1/3 of 24 houses). Based on the same calculations as above, this puts the Huron population of Caughnawaga at 240 to 320.

Thus the number of captive Hurons found in just two Iroquois villages (1,140 to 1,520) exceeds the number of Hurons clearly said to have been captured by the Iroquois (300). Indeed, the number of Hurons in these two Seneca and Mohawk villages equals even the most optimistic estimates derived from records of raids (1,550). Moreover, this figure does not even begin to take into account the numbers of Hurons scattered among the other Seneca and Mohawk villages, and among the villages of the Cayugas, Onondagas, and Oneidas.<sup>29</sup>

Even if no data existed on the number of Hurons the Iroquois captured, one could still contend that the capture of Hurons was a major goal of Iroquois warfare against them. The Iroquois certainly made no secret that this was their policy. As early as 1642-43 Father Isaac Jogues, writing from among his Mohawk captors, informed his superiors at Quebec that

The design of the Iroquois, as far as I can see, is to take, if they can, all the Hurons; and, having put to death the most considerable ones and a good part of the other, to make of them but one people

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<sup>29</sup> Hurons were found living among these other tribes, but the data does not permit one to attempt population estimates. [De Quen's] Relation of 1655-56, JR, 42: 73.

and only one land.<sup>30</sup>

Indeed, some Hurons, recognizing this to be the aim of Iroquois attacks against them, chose to join the Iroquois rather than suffer at their hands.<sup>31</sup> An incident in the Spring of 1650 serves to reveal how clearly the Hurons recognized Iroquois policy. That year a Huron who was on his way to raid against the Iroquois ran into a band of Iroquois warriors. To save himself, he said:

I am going to my country, to seek out my relatives and friends. The country of the Hurons is no longer where it was,--you have transported it into your own: it is there that I was going, to join my relatives and compatriots, who are now but one people with yourselves: I have escaped the phantoms of a people who are no more.<sup>32</sup>

Doubtless the circumstances in which this Huron found himself influenced his eloquence. But, in what he chose to say to his possible captors he revealed what he understood was Iroquois policy towards his people, as well as what he hoped would

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<sup>30</sup> Father Jogues in [Vimont's] Relation of 1642-43, JR, 24: 297.

<sup>31</sup> The Hurons from the villages of St. Michel and St. Jean Baptiste serve as the most dramatic examples of large groups relocating to the Iroquois before the rest of their nation was destroyed, but there are hints in the historical record that individuals and small groups of Hurons went over to the Iroquois for similar reasons. Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1651, JR, 36: 143; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, JR, 44: 21; [Dablon's] Relation of 1672-73, Ibid, 57: 193; Dollier, Histoire du Montreal, 139. The result of this process of voluntary defections, or of not resisting their captors once caught, wrote Dollier, was that the Iroquois strength was increased. Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Huron quoted in [Ragueneau's] Relation of 1649-50, JR, 35: 219.

appease the Iroquois and save his skin.

The Iroquois policy of incorporating the Hurons into their tribes did not end with the destruction of Huronia. In the summer of 1650 the starving Hurons on Christian Island were told by some Iroquois that they had come in peace and were entreated to "take refuge" among the Iroquois so that "in future they might be but one people".<sup>33</sup> Throughout the rest of the 1650s various Iroquois tribes even competed among themselves to attract to their respective villages the remnants of the Huron nation. In August of 1653 an army of 500 Mohawks beseiged the town of Trois Rivières. During ensuing peace negotiations, which were conducted at Montreal and which dragged on until November, the Mohawks sent a secret offer to the Hurons settled on Ile d'Orléans "in order to attract the hurons into their country".<sup>34</sup> A condition of the final peace settlement was that the Hurons live among the Mohawks and "inhabit but one land, and be but one people with

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<sup>33</sup> [Ragueneau's] Relation of 1650-51, JR, 36: 183. The Jesuits suggest that the Iroquois offer was not sincere. This is a natural enough reaction considering the destruction wrought by the Iroquois. The good Fathers may also have cast doubt on the Iroquois offer in order to make the Hurons attack against this possibly peaceful group look better. However, given Iroquois desires to incorporate the Hurons, it seems plausible to suggest that the Iroquois were sincere in their offer, if somewhat undiplomatic in suggesting refuge from destruction among those who had brought it on. Even if the Iroquois offer was not made in good faith, the fact that they used it as a strategy suggests they expected it to have some appeal to the Hurons--again, because this goal of their warring against the Hurons was so well known.

<sup>34</sup> Journal des Pères Jesuites, 1653, JR, 38: 199. Emphasis in the original.

them".<sup>35</sup> In January of 1654 the Onondagas came to New France seeking a similar arrangement to the one the Mohawks had made in November of the previous year.<sup>36</sup> And in the Fall of 1656 the Oneidas made their bid to attract some Hurons to their villages. The Hurons, claimed the Oneidas, should relocate to their villages because formerly the two groups had "comprised but one Cabin and one Country".<sup>37</sup> In short, regardless of the origins of the Iroquois-Hurons war, it seems clear that by the early 1600s capture of people was a major, if not the most important, goal of Iroquois warfare against the Hurons.

Nor, it seems, should this objective of Iroquois policy be excluded as a factor in explaining Iroquois wars against other native groups. Indeed, even if tribes other than the Hurons had no convenient historical or mythical link to the

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<sup>35</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, JR, 43: 187.

<sup>36</sup> Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1654, JR, 44: 19. The Hurons, however, did not respond quickly enough to the Mohawks offer to relocate peacefully and "inhabit but one land and be but one people with them". In 1656 some Hurons were attacked and taken to Mohawk villages as captives because the Mohawks felt the Hurons were renegeing on the agreement made in November of 1653. [De Quen's] Relation of 1655-56, JR, 42: 231; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, *ibid*, 43: 117, 119, 189, 213.

<sup>37</sup> Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1656, JR, 42: 253. It is tempting to take the Oneidas' statement at face value. If true, Iroquois desires to incorporate the Hurons could be explained as efforts to reunite lost kin and add to the Iroquois Confederacy. However, the Oneida claim contradicts current archaeological knowledge about the Hurons and the Iroquois. (See Handbook, under the respective tribes). But, even if the Oneidas' contention is little more than a rhetorical flourish, it does emphasize the consistency of Iroquois policy to make the Hurons and they "one people".

Iroquois, the evidence points to capture of people as a possible explanation for Iroquois wars against many of them. For example between 1631 and 1695 the Iroquois launched 27 raids against Algonquin groups living near the St. Lawrence between the Ottawa River and the town of Quebec.<sup>38</sup> Of these attacks, 25 took place between 1631 and 1660. In all the Iroquois captured 220 to 246 people and killed 69--or about three times as many captives as people killed. Further, as noted above, the large scale invasions against the Eries, Neutrals, Susquehannocks, Miamis, and Illinois, all led to significant numbers of captives. Given that relationship, it would seem reasonable to conclude that those armies were sent, at least in part, to obtain captives.

Moreover, despite the fact that capture of people was not a novel part of Iroquois policy by the latter half of the seventeenth century, it continued to draw comment from French observers. In 1682, after learning of the arrival among the Iroquois of 600 Eries from Virginia who had given themselves up rather than be taken by force, Father Lamberville observed that the Iroquois "Bring prisoners from all parts and thereby increase their numbers."<sup>39</sup> This indicates the enduring

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<sup>38</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1. Unless otherwise indicated, the following data was also taken from this source. Only rarely was the St. Lawrence Algonquin group identified by name in the sources. Most often the French simply indicated that they were Alonguins who lived near their settlements.

<sup>39</sup> Jean de Lamberville to [Father Superior], Onondaga, August 25, 1682, JR, 62: 71.

nature of this aspect of Iroquois policy.

Doubtless there were other factors that led the Iroquois to war with these and other groups. As far as one can determine the Iroquois war against the Neutrals began as an effort to avenge an insult against the Senecas.<sup>40</sup> The war against the Eries started when the Iroquois attempted to avenge a Seneca death. The Eries, urged on by refugee Hurons among them, chose to engage in war rather than try and appease the Senecas with the usual tokens of condolence.<sup>41</sup> Captives among the Iroquois also put pressure on them to war. The Hurons from St. Michel who relocated to the Iroquois tried, unsuccessfully, to convince the Senecas to ally themselves with the French and war against the Mohawks.<sup>42</sup> In the late 1670s and early 1680s the Susquehannocks among the Iroquois were more successful. Once established in Iroquois villages, they managed to convince their new partners to help them exact

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<sup>40</sup> The Neutrals allowed the Hurons to take captive a Seneca in one of their villages. [Ragueneau's] "Huronian Report, 1647-48", JR, 33: 81-83. Father Lafitau wrote that Father Garnier had informed him that the war started when "war games" led to an Iroquois death which the Iroquois then sought to avenge. Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 105-106. John Norton tells of a similar tradition as the cause of the wars against the Susquehannocks. Norton, Journal, 209-210.

<sup>41</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1653-54, JR, 41: 79-83. Norton, without mentioning the role of Huron refugees, also attributes this war to the Eries failure to make reparations for the Seneca death. Norton, Journal, 206.

<sup>42</sup> Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1651, JR, 36: 143.

revenge on their former foes the Piscataways.<sup>43</sup> Yet, for whatever reasons any given war may have started, and whether or not the need to capture people was a cause, the numbers of captives taken in these wars clearly indicate that capture of people became important if for no other reason than it was a key military strategy.

But what of the "beaver wars" explanation for Iroquois wars in the first half of the seventeenth century? Even if one rejects the broad sweeping assumptions that inform this interpretation, what of the suggestion that the Iroquois fought to obtain fur bearing lands to trap furs to use in trade for European goods? This question can best be answered by a discussion of the role of land and the fur trade among the Iroquois.

According to modern researchers, the Iroquois did not "own" land as did Europeans. They expressed their relationship to land more in terms of their belonging to, and sharing an identity with, a specific region.<sup>44</sup> The Iroquois had, nonetheless, a clear idea of who belonged to which land and who could hunt on it. One group or nation gained the right to hunt in certain areas based on precedent and

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<sup>43</sup> [Council Minute], June 13, 1678, Md. Archives, 15: 175; [Conference, March 19, 1679], *ibid*, 239; Capt. R. Brandt to [Charles Calvert], May 16, 1680, *ibid*, 283; [Council Minute] August 23, 1681, *ibid*, 17: 6.

<sup>44</sup> See, Robert Vachon, "The Mohawk Nation and its Communities", Interculture, XXV, 1 (Winter 1992), 14-20.

continued use of the area. A river, lake, or meadow served to demarcate each tribes' hunting lands.<sup>45</sup> Thus, even if the Iroquois did not own their lands, they might still have fought to preserve their right to its use, or against encroachments to their hunting lands.

The Iroquois and Hurons' traditions of warfare certainly seem to suggest that control, or use, of the St. Lawrence area lands was of significance to them, and may have been a cause of their early wars. There is some evidence that it was a factor in their hostilities in the seventeenth century. In early 1641 the Mohawks captured two Frenchmen as a means of initiating peace talks with the French. On their return one of them informed colonial authorities that he had learned that Mohawk desires for peace were designed to isolate the French from their native allies. The Mohawks, he said, wanted to eliminate French support "in order that they might take all the savages, our confederates, ruin the whole country, and make themselves masters of the great river".<sup>46</sup> Along with emphasizing the goal of capturing people as a means to their destruction, this fascinating assessment of Iroquois policy also suggests that the removal of the native groups allied to the French was to give the Mohawks access to the St. Lawrence

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<sup>45</sup> [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 464.

<sup>46</sup> François Marguerie in, [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1640-41, JR, 21: 37.

lands.<sup>47</sup>

However, inability to determine who encroached on whose territory presents a problem when trying to make a connection between the Iroquois wanting access to fur bearing lands and warfare to obtain them. French authorities, of course, had no problem stating that it was the Iroquois who were trespassing on the lands of France's native allies along the St. Lawrence and towards the north shore of Lake Ontario when the Iroquois hunted there.<sup>48</sup> This view reflected French preoccupation with the fur trade and their fears of losing access to, or control over, fur bearing lands. It also helped justify their own hostilities towards the Iroquois and their support of natives who were at war with the Iroquois. The Iroquois, on the other hand, had a different perception of whose land it was, and who the trespassers were. The Iroquois and Hurons and Algonquins had been fighting in, and probably over, the St. Lawrence River valley for some time prior to French settlement in these areas. Who claimed it first, and who was defending it from whom, is not clear. But it is obvious from their respective oral traditions that the Hurons, Algonquins, and Iroquois all claimed some part of the St. Lawrence river

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<sup>47</sup> The wording of this statement also suggests that one purpose of capturing French native allies was to help facilitate that conquest. The Mohawks desire to become masters of the St. Lawrence also seems to imply that the French presence there might not be welcome.

<sup>48</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1645-46, JR, 28: 279, 287; Frontenac au ministre, 2 nov., 1672, AN, C11A, 3: 240.

valley. The French may have supported their allies' claims to certain areas because it suited their needs, but that did not make those claims valid, acceptable to the Iroquois, nor can that serve as evidence that the Iroquois were the ones encroaching on these lands.

Also in question is why the Iroquois, Hurons, and Algonquins sought access to, or possibly control, over these areas. The French, again, because of the importance of the fur trade to them, assumed that the Iroquois were hunting along the St. Lawrence primarily to obtain furs in order to participate in the fur trade, and had fought to get at this land for that reason. However, not all trips into enemy territory that produced furs were launched solely to obtain furs. In the spring of 1653, for example, the Mohawks took the recently adopted French trader Pierre Radisson on an extended trip towards Lake Erie. The reason for the trip was to avenge a Mohawk death, but the group hunted people and game with equal determination and success.<sup>49</sup> But, whether these tribes were fighting to protect, gain, or regain ancestral lands, it is likely that they did so because they needed the resources in these areas. Certainly by the 1660s onward there

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<sup>49</sup> Radisson, Explorations, 27-35. Some five decades later, in the Spring of 1700, the Senecas used a hunting trip towards the country of the Miamis as a pretext for a raid against that tribe. La Potherie au ministre, 11 aout, 1700, AN, C11A, 18: 147; La Potherie au ministre, 16 oct., 1700, Ibid, 155. French allies also did this. In August of 1633 some Hurons headed off into the Lake Champlain area to hunt beavers and Iroquois. Mercure François, 19: 862.

is ample evidence of the Iroquois using the St. Lawrence from Montreal to present day Kingston, and the north shore of Lake Ontario, as hunting areas.<sup>50</sup> In the 1640s and 1650s more than one observer commented on the abundance of game in the St. Lawrence around Montreal.<sup>51</sup> Whether game was abundant in these areas prior to 1600, and whether the Iroquois, Hurons, and Algonquins fought to get at this abundant game can only be guessed at.

Even if in the postcontact period the Iroquois wanted the areas for hunting one should not make the mistake the French did, and assume that all of it was geared to obtaining furs to

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<sup>50</sup> Father Chauchetière, "Narration Annuelle de la Mission du Sault depuis la fondation jusques a l'an 1686", JR, 63: 153, 155, 175; [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1669-1670, Ibid, 54: 117; Galinée, "Voyage de Dollier et Galinée", 38; Lom D'Arce de Lahontan, Louis-Armand, New Voyages to North America, [London, 1703], 2 vols., R.G. Thwaites, ed., [Chicago, 1905] (reprint, New York: Burt Franklin, 1970), 323; Anon., "Relation de...[1695-1696], AN, C11A, 14: 36. It may have been one of these areas that the Iroquois had in mind when they told the Dutch at Albany they needed guns to "fetch the beavers through the enemy's country". [Conference with Iroquois] July 23, 1660, NYCD, 13: 185. The Iroquois, either the Senecas or one or more of the upper tribes, may have been playing up the beaver trapping angle to appeal to Dutch interests and to obtain weapons for their wars. Nonetheless it does suggest that some of their fur came from enemy lands. None of this evidence, however, is proof that wars were waged exclusively to clear this land in order to hunt for furs. Indeed, the Iroquois presence in these areas came after their wars, and might simply have reflected the Iroquois taking advantage of unpopulated lands.

<sup>51</sup> [Vimont's] Relation of 1642-43, JR, 24: 231; [Vimont'] Relation of 1643-44, Ibid, 25: 107; [Lalemant's] Relation of 1645-46, Ibid, 29: 147; Father Poncet in [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1652-53, Ibid, 40: 151-153; [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1653-54, Ibid, 41: 67; Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1665, Ibid, 49: 171.

trade. Land, after all, was important for a variety of reasons and not just because it contained fur bearing animals. While the Iroquois were agriculturalists, they depended to a large degree on hunting for food.<sup>52</sup> If their population was anywhere near 23,000 to 25,000, one can reasonably postulate that demand for meat made land to hunt for food of prime significance to the Iroquois. As the deer populations fluctuated due to humans, animal predators, and enviromental related factors, the land required for hunting a sufficient number of animals expanded and contracted.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, whatever their population, the evidence shows that game for food was needed in large quantities. Thousands of deer were required annually for each tribe.<sup>54</sup> Iroquois agricultural and land use practices, also made land important to them. The "slash and burn" method of agriculture, failure to use soil fertilizers, depletion of useable wood around villages, and insect infestations, made it necessary for the Iroquois to

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<sup>52</sup> W.N. Fenton, "Northern Iroquoian Culture Patterns", Handbook, 298.

<sup>53</sup> William A. Starna and John H. Relethford, "Deer Densities and Population Dynamics: A Cautionary Note", American Antiquity, 50, 4 (1985): 825-852.

<sup>54</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1645-46, JR, 28: 287; Adriaen van der Donck, A Description of the New Netherlands..., [Amsterdam, 1656], in New York Historical Society Collections, (2nd Series, vol. 1: 125-242), 169; [Dablon's] Relation of 1671-72, JR, 56: 49.

relocate their villages every 10 to 20 years.<sup>55</sup> All of these factors must have created pressure on the Iroquois to maintain a large land base--whatever they claimed it was. Even if the Iroquois did not need to expand their land base, they may have fought to keep others from using up the resources of their land.

One, of course, cannot deny that furs were a resource which the Iroquois took from their lands. But, how important was this goal in wars that may have been fought over land? Historians from Parkman on have contended that lack of furs drove the Iroquois to war to get furs to trade for European goods, and that this was a central goal of all of their warfare, not just wars fought over land.<sup>56</sup> But only George Hunt ever sought to establish that the Iroquois ran out of furs. Unfortunately Hunt's evidence was either edited, or invented, to help him make his case and thus his claims about the Iroquois exhausting their fur supply by 1640 remain unproven.

As evidence of Iroquois fur depletion, Hunt cited a May 1640 letter by Killiaen van Rensselaer, the Patroon of the Fort Orange area, in which van Rensselaer defended himself against charges that he was outbidding the West India Company

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<sup>55</sup> Lafitau, Moeurs, 2: 69-70; Fenton, "Northern Iroquoian Culture Patterns", Handbook, 302; William A. Starna, George Hamell, and William L. Butts, "Northern Iroquoian Horticulture and Insect Infestation: A Cause for Village Removal", Ethnohistory, 31, 3 (1984): 197-207.

<sup>56</sup> See chapter 1 and the discussion there.

and diverting the fur trade to himself.<sup>57</sup> Hunt quoted this letter and ended it thus: "Now, as far as I can see, the trouble is not with the price of skins but with the quantity, which is a great paradox to me that I can not understand".<sup>58</sup> Hunt then accused van Rensselaer of having ulterior motives, and that he understood the "paradox of high prices and no beavers".<sup>59</sup> Why van Rensselaer would want to cover up the Mohawks lack of furs is not clear, but as proof that van Rensselaer knew that the Iroquois had run out of furs, Hunt cited a 1633 document in which the Patroon claimed Indians in New France had more furs than the Mohawks, but that the Mohawks would not allow those groups to trade with the Dutch.<sup>60</sup>

Unfortunately, Hunt edited both documents to make them fit his conclusions. In the 1640 letter Hunt omitted the part of the letter in which van Rensselaer clearly stated that there was no lack of furs, and left out the rest of the sentence in which van Rensselaer explained the "paradox". He was being charged with diverting the fur trade, he wrote,

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<sup>57</sup> K. van Rensselaer to Willem Kieft, May 25, 1640, in A.J.F. van Laer, ed., The van Rensselaer-Bowier Manuscripts, New York State Library History Bulletin, No. 7 (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1908), 472-485.

<sup>58</sup> Hunt, Wars of the Iroquois, 34.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. For the document in question see, "Memorial presented by K. van Rensselaer to the Assembly of the Nineteen of the West India Company, Nov. 25, 1633", van Rensselaer-Bowier Manuscripts, 235-250.

because the Company had few furs, yet the high prices he paid for furs should have drawn in more furs. The resolution to this quandary, van Rensselaer suggested, was to be found in the Company's low prices for furs and lack of merchandise which probably drove the Mohawks to trade with the English.<sup>61</sup> As early as 1634 the Mohawks had threatened to take their furs to New France because of low Dutch prices for their furs.<sup>62</sup> Van Rensselaer might further have suggested that deliberate efforts by the English to divert the trade, illegal trade by the Company's own employees, and the opening up of the fur trade to colonists, could also account for any down turn in their fur intake.<sup>63</sup> That fact that van Rensselaer increased the quantity of trade merchandise he was sending to be used for the fur trade, and increased the insurance on his reported fur take three fold, all seem to suggest that furs continued to be available, even if the West India Company was not

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<sup>61</sup> van Rensselaer to Kieft, May 25, 1640, van Rensselaer-Bowier Manuscripts, 483-484.

<sup>62</sup> Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert, A Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country, 1634-35, Charles T. Gehring and William A. Starna, eds. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 1.

<sup>63</sup> See [Appendix, Nov. 1, 1633, added to the letter of] Mr. Joachim to the States General, May 27, 1634, NYCD, 1: 81; Wouter van Twiller to Directors of West India Company, August 14, 1636, A.J.F. van Laer, trans., New York State Historical Association Quarterly Journal, 1, xviii (1919), 49; Ordinance prohibiting trade in furs, 1638 in A.J.F. van Laer, ed., New York Historical Manuscripts: Dutch, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1974), 4: 3-4; Ordinance against Clandestine trade, June 7, 1638, Ibid, 10-12. For people charged with illegal trade see Ibid, 33-34, 37-40, 250, 252-253.

getting all it wanted.<sup>64</sup>

As for the 1633 document, it is not clear how van Rensselaer's claims that more furs could be garnered from New France serves as proof of anything other than the fact that the Patroon wanted access to that trade. Hunt seemed to want to leave the impression that the Mohawks opposed Dutch trade with New France's Indians because they had no furs of their own and did not want to lose their ties to the Dutch. To this end Hunt omitted van Rensselaer's explanation that Mohawk opposition to Dutch trade with New Frances' Indians was due to the fact that the Mohawks and those tribes were "hostile" to each other.<sup>65</sup> Twenty years later, Mohawk hostility towards the Canadian tribes was again blamed for the Dutch inability to gain access to the furs of those tribes.<sup>66</sup>

The supposed lack of furs among the Iroquois, of course,

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<sup>64</sup> van Rensselaer to Toussaint Muysart, April 20, 1641, van Rensselaer-Bowier Manuscripts, 546-547; van Rensselaer to Arent van Curler, July 18, 1641, *Ibid*, 562.

<sup>65</sup> "Memorial presented by K. van Rensselaer..., Nov. 25, 1633, van Rensselaer-Bowier Manuscripts, 248. Eight years later van Rensselaer still had "not given up the hope, if the Lord will grant me a few years more, of diverting to the colony a large part of the furs of the savages who now trade with the French in Canada...". van Rensselaer to Toussaint Muysart, June 6, 1641, *Ibid*, 553.

<sup>66</sup> [Directors to Stuyvesant], June 6, 1653, NYCD, 13: 35. The Mohawks naturally opposed granting their foes access to the Dutch. Even if the Iroquois could be certain the Dutch would not sell guns to their foes, the Iroquois did not want their enemies travelling through their lands and using up game enroute. Access to the Dutch would also provide Iroquois enemies with an opportunity to be among the Iroquois and carry out reprisal raids under the pretext of coming to trade.

stemmed from their over hunting in order to trade animal pelts for ever more European wares. As an indication of the extent of Iroquois over trapping, Hunt speculated that by 1633 the Iroquois brought in as many as 30,000 pelts.<sup>67</sup> This claim, unfortunately for his theory, is also false. Dutch fur intake figures for the late 1620s and early 1630s do not indicate who brought in furs, but they reveal that the Dutch fur take averaged around 6,600 pelts a year. Indeed, a document Hunt lists in a footnote, but which he either chose to ignore or did not read, clearly puts the Dutch beaver trade for 1633 at just under 9,000 pelts.<sup>68</sup> In short, there is no evidence that the Iroquois over trapped and ran out of furs prior to 1640.

It seems incredible that the question of whether the Iroquois had furs or not, so crucial to the "beaver wars" interpretation, rests on such spurious reasoning and "evidence". Admittedly, the extent, or lack, of the Iroquois fur supply is difficult to establish. The Iroquois kept no records, and detailed statistics on the early Dutch fur trade, the Iroquois' major trading partners, do not exist. However, the fact that no Dutch authority is on record complaining about lack of Iroquois furs, and that the French make this claim only after 1670, speaks volumes about the inadequacy of

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<sup>67</sup> Hunt, Wars of the Iroquois, 33.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, 33, note 23. On the Dutch fur trade and sources see Table 6.3 below.

this as a goal of Iroquois warfare prior to 1670. Indeed, in the early 1620s and again in 1645 the Mohawks tried to use access to their lands as bargaining tools in peace talks with the French and their allies.<sup>69</sup> Admittedly a goal of the 1645 peace effort was to isolate the Algonquins from their French allies, but the Mohawks offer of hunting on lands they claimed was full of beaver would not have been much of an incentive if everyone knew that they were bereft of game.<sup>70</sup> The Algonquins, in any case seemed to accept the Mohawks offer. In February of 1646, the Algonquins asked the French not to leave them out of peace negotiations and that the "chase be everywhere free; that the landmarks and the boundaries of all those great countries be raised; and that each one should find himself everywhere in his own country".<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> [Champlain], Works, 5: 73-74, 77; Untitled Document, AN, C11A, 1: 66; [Vimont'] Relation of 1644-45, JR, 27: 245-291; Marie de l'Incarnation à son fils, sept. 14, 1645, Correspondance, 257.

<sup>70</sup> Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1646, JR, 149-151.

<sup>71</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1645-46, JR, 28: 299. It might be claimed that the Mohawks had asked to use the Algonquins land in 1645 and in 1646 the Algonquins agreed to the request. This is not likely. If the Mohawks had run out of furs in 1640, why would they wait five years to make a move to gain more fur bearing lands? They certainly did not seem to be trying to accomplish this through warfare. Of the 38 Iroquois initiated raids between 1640 and 1645, only 8 were against the Algonquins. Appendix D, Table D.1. Moreover, it was the French who initiated these peace talks, not the Mohawks. [Vimont's] Relation of 1644-45, Ibid, 27: 245. It is extremely unlikely that the French would agree to sell out the Algonquins and lose their lands as well. They had no assurance that the Mohawks would trade any furs they trapped on Algonquin lands to the French. The French would have gained nothing and lost much by such an arrangement.

Even after 1670, French claims about the lack of Iroquois furs rest on assumptions that Iroquois hunters on the North shore of Lake Ontario were there primarily because they had no furs and that those were not Iroquois lands. But, even if the land never belonged to the Iroquois, the search for food and pursuit of martial objectives, including the capture of old enemies, were equally likely explanations for the Iroquois presence in these areas. The Dutch may have dreamed, as did the French, of controlling the entire North American beaver trade, but that is not proof the Iroquois ran out of furs.

If the Iroquois did not run out of furs, did they have enough to meet their needs? If they did not they may have warred to obtain land primarily to get at fur bearing animals. Unfortunately, this question is almost impossible to answer. The data on the volume of furs the Iroquois traded does not exist, nor has anyone ever found a list indicating the Iroquois' monthly or annual requirement of European goods. What little data exists about the Dutch and English fur trade in the seventeenth century is suggestive, but raises more questions than it answers.

According to Killiaen van Rensselaer the West India Company had a "good" year in 1636, and took in 8,000 skins.<sup>72</sup> The 1636 fur take was, in fact, above average. Based on the data in Table 6.3, the average number of pelts

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<sup>72</sup> K. van Rensselaer to Johannes de Laet, Oct. 6, 1636, van Rensselaer-Bowier Manuscripts, 334.

taken from 1624 to 1635 was roughly 6,600. This fits nicely

Table 6.3

Dutch Fur Intake, 1624-1635<sup>73</sup>

Year	Beaver Pelts	Otter Pelts	Guilders Value
1624	4,000	700	27,125
1625	5,295	463	35,825
1626	7,258	857	45,050
1627	7,520	370	12,730
1628	6,951	734	61,075
1629	5,913	681	62,185
1630	6,041	1,085	68,012
1632	13,513	1,661	143,125
1633	8,800	1,383	91,375
1635	14,891	1,413	134,925

with van Rensselaer's estimate that 5,000 to 6,000 pelts were taken every year in the Fort Orange area in the fifteen years leading up to 1640.<sup>74</sup> The only anomalies in these averages

<sup>73</sup> Extract from De Laet's New World, New York Historical Society Collections, 2nd Series, vol. 1: 385. Other references give slightly different totals for some of the same years listed by De Laet. In a letter to the States General, Peter Schagere puts the number of beaver pelts for 1626 at 7,246 and that of otter at 853. Peter Schagere to States General, [Nov. 5, 1626], NYCD, 1: 37. Wassenaer, "Historisch Verhael", NNN, 87, wrote that two ships returned with 10,000 pelts from New Netherland in 1628. Capt. John Mason to [Secretary Coke], April 2, 1632, CSP, 1: 144 reported that the Dutch had shipped 15,000 beaver skins in 1632. Rather than the slight differences, what is remarkable is how closely the disparate sources agree on the volume of trade.

<sup>74</sup> K. van Rensselaer to Willem Kieft, May 25, 1640, Ibid, 483. In 1629 the Assembly of the Nineteen informed the States General that the New Netherland fur trade could at best be valued at 50,000 Guilders. Assembly of the XIX to States General, Oct. 23, 1629, NYCD, 1: 40. The actual average of

are the totals for 1632 and 1635. But in both cases the data for the preceding year is missing, and the totals for 1632 and 1635 are just about double the yearly take. Further, after each of the abnormally high yield years, the figures return to the level of the twelve year average. Thus it appears reasonable to conclude that the higher numbers are the result of combining the fur take for two years, rather than astronomically good years of trading. This was, apparently, not an unheard of occurrence. In the 1650s the Directors of the West India Company threatened to delay supplies to New Netherland unless the annual supply ships brought back beaver as return cargo.<sup>75</sup>

There is some evidence of Dutch fur trading in the 1640s, but it makes the data for the late 1620s and early 1630s, incomplete as it is, look remarkably comprehensive. In 1688 Symon Groot gave evidence that he came to New Netherland in 1638 and lived and worked at Fort Orange for seven years. The Dutch, he claimed, carried on a "great Trade with the Sinnekes" and other westward Indians during that period. In one year he helped trade and pack up 37,000 furs for the West India Company.<sup>76</sup> The other reference to the Dutch fur trade

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Guilder value of skins in the period from 1624 to 1629 was 40,636.

<sup>75</sup> Directors to Stuyvesant, April 4, 1652, NYCD, 14: 167.

<sup>76</sup> [Deposition of Symon Groot], July 2, 1688, Livingston Indian Records, 144. The Dutch often used "Sinnekes", or a variant spelling of this word, to refer to one or more of the four Iroquois tribes to the west of the Mohawks. It is not

in the 1640s hints at an even higher volume of trade. Adrian van der Donck claimed that 80,000 beaver furs were traded annually during this decade.<sup>77</sup> One, of course, may question the accuracy of these figures. Groot, after all, was only 12 years old in 1638. Moreover, his deposition was made to try and establish English claims to sovereignty over the Iroquois. He also may have conflated the trade for 1657, when he would have been about 31 years, and which was 37,000 beavers, into this earlier period. Van der Donck's figure is even more dubious.<sup>78</sup> Certainly if the trade volume had been this high Symon Groot would have used this as his example of a peak year. At the end of the century some English officials bemoaned the poor beaver trade and, looking on the past through rose coloured glasses, imagined a vast fur trade volume during the Dutch occupation of New York, but none ever claimed it was that high.<sup>79</sup> In the end, even if Groot's recollection is accurate, 37,000 was, by his own admission, not representative of the annual fur trade. If it was, it suggests a significant fur trade in the 1640s, and is clear

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clear what tribe Groot meant.

<sup>77</sup> van der Donck, Description of the New Netherlands, 210, 221.

<sup>78</sup> It is even more suspect when one considers that the Iroquois were too busy warring to do much trapping and trading during most of the decade.

<sup>79</sup> Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, Nov. 28, 1700, NYCD, 4: 789. Bellomont claimed that one year the Dutch exported 66,000 beaver pelts.

proof that the Iroquois had not run out of furs.

The records for the 1650s and 1660s are equally scanty, but appear more reliable. A list of furs shipped from June 20 to September 20 1657, probably from Fort Orange, reveals that 37,640 beaver pelts were sent down the Hudson that year.<sup>80</sup> There is no comparable list for 1660, but the trade for that year was estimated at 25,000 to 30,000 beaver pelts.<sup>81</sup>

This data about the Dutch fur trade sheds little light on the question of whether or not the Iroquois fur supply was adequate to their needs. There is no way to determine how many of the furs were brought in by the Iroquois. One may assume that prior to 1670, and the establishment of a clandestine trade from New France to Albany, most of these furs came from the Iroquois.<sup>82</sup> But how much is not certain,

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<sup>80</sup> [Furs shipped from Fort Orange], June 20 to Sept. 27, [1657] in J. Pearson, ed., Early Records of the City and County of Albany, [1654-1678], vol. 1, [1869], in J. Munsell, ed., Collections on the History of Albany, from its Discovery to the Present Time, 4 vols. (Albany: J. Munsell, 1865-1871) 4: 244. The list in question is also referred to in an editorial note in NYCD, 13: 27. In both the published reference to this list, and in the actual list itself, the total of furs shipped is put at 40,940. However, if one adds up the daily shipments, the total comes to 37,640.

<sup>81</sup> Stuyvesant to Directors, Oct. 6, 1660, NYCD, 14: 484. A year later an anonymous writer reported that the beaver skins shipped out of New Netherland annually exceeded the value 20,000 Pounds Sterling. [Anon.], "Description of the Towne of Mannadens, 1661", NNN, 424. At approximately 6 Guilders to 1 Pound Sterling, and beaver selling for 7 Guilders each, that comes to just over 17,000 beaver pelts annually.

<sup>82</sup> For example, Governor Dongan claimed that New Yorks' fur trade averaged around "35 or 40000 Beavers besides Peltry". Instructions from Governor Dongan to Captain Palmer,

and the proportion must have changed from year to year, especially during periods when the Iroquois were at war. Even if the bulk were brought in by the Iroquois, was it enough to satisfy their demands? The answer to that question depends on estimating Iroquois demand and the price of the goods they wanted. However the evidence is, again, too spotty to allow for firm conclusions.

Weapons, for example were highly sought after by the Iroquois and, despite their relatively low cost to the Dutch, the Iroquois were charged exorbitant prices for them. In the 1630s and 1640s firelocks could be had for about 12 Guilders, muskets for as little as 3 Guilders, and powder for 2 Guilders a pound.<sup>83</sup> Yet the Iroquois paid as much as 120 Guilders (about 20 beaver pelts) for a musket and 10 to 12 Guilders for a pound of powder.<sup>84</sup> Despite the cost, 300 to 400 Mohawks had muskets by 1648. Assuming they were all charged 120 Guilders per musket, it would require about 6,000 to 8,000 beaver pelts to purchase the muskets. Supplying the estimated 2,000 warriors of the Confederacy would, at these same prices,

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Sept. 8, 1687, NYCD, 3: 476. He does not explain who brought the furs in and from where. On the illegal trade from New France in the 1670's see, Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 121-122.

<sup>83</sup> Invoice of Goods sent to the Colony, April 20, 1634, van Rensselaer-Bowier Manuscripts, 264, 265; Account of Ammunition for Rensselaers Steyn, Sept. 10, 1643, Ibid, 706; [Court Minute], 1648, in A.J.F. van Laer, ed., Minutes of the Court of Rensselaerswyck, 1648-52 (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1922), 211.

<sup>84</sup> "Journal of New Netherland, 1647", NNN, 274.

require 40,000 beaver pelts. That certainly does not seem to exceed the Iroquois's trapping capabilities. A hunter could trap 40 to 80 beavers in one season.<sup>85</sup> Moreover, the Iroquois certainly did not all pay the same price, nor all purchase their weapons in one year. The cost of arming themselves would thus be lower and spread across several years. On the other hand, the dearth of information about Iroquois demand for, and prices of, "house hold" goods means that one cannot estimate the Iroquois' overall ability to meet their demand with the furs they could trap.

The Dutch fur trade data also does not help clarify the relationship between fur supply and warfare for fur bearing lands. For example, the increase in the volume of Dutch trade appears to have taken place in the 1640s. This was at the time of the Iroquois' heaviest wars, and wars--Dutch authorities stated--resulted in fewer furs being traded. However, if one considers as reliable only the data from 1657 to 1660, then part of the problem is solved. These were peaceful years for the Iroquois, and they were free to devote themselves to hunting. But this raises several more questions. Was the higher volume of Iroquois trade due to increased time to pursue hunting, or was it because the Iroquois had gained access to more lands? If it was the

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<sup>85</sup> van der Donck, Description of New Netherlands, 210. In 1634 one Mohawk hunter was said to have trapped 120 beavers. [Bogaert], Narrative of a Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country, 5-6.

latter, had the Iroquois fought to reclaim or claim that land primarily to exploit its fur resources? In the end it simply does not appear possible to prove or disprove that the Iroquois ran out of furs or did not have enough to meet their needs.

Despite ambiguity about the extent of the Iroquois fur supply, there is evidence to suggest that the Iroquois fought over land. One reason, possibly even the most important reason, for land wars was to exploit the fur resources of the area. As the century wore on, this objective of Iroquois policy probably grew in significance. But the Iroquois wanted furs and participated in the fur trade for their own reasons. It is not enough to say that the Iroquois needed furs to trade for Europeans goods because the Iroquois had become acquisitive like Europeans, or dependant in various vague and unspecified ways on weapons and European luxury and "house hold" goods. There is no doubt that the Iroquois wanted these items, and sought to obtain good value for their furs when they exchanged them for European wares.<sup>86</sup> They may not have had the habits of modern "economic man", but they were not fools and did not like to think they were being cheated.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Almost any conference between the Iroquois and their European allies touches on trade matters.

<sup>87</sup> E.E. Rich, Arthur Ray, and Donald Freeman have shown that unlike most modern consumers, Indians had fixed demands. When prices of goods dropped and the Indians could get more for the same furs than previously, they did not necessarily increase the amount they purchased. They simply brought in fewer furs to purchase what they required. E.E. Rich, "Trade

But while obtaining "house hold" goods was part of the reason for Iroquois participation in the fur trade, and why furs were needed, a more important reason for Iroquois participation in the trade was to establish political and trade links to European suppliers. That relationship was needed in order for the Iroquois to gain access to weapons so that they could carry out their political and military policies against their native foes.

At a conference with the Dutch at Fort Orange in 1659 a Mohawk spokesman summed up the tenuous nature of their relationship. The Dutch, he complained, "say we are brothers and joined together with chains, but that lasts only as long as we have beavers, after that no attention is paid to us".<sup>88</sup> If the Iroquois had been looking for military allies when they first established their relationship with the Dutch, the Dutch made it clear that all they wanted was an economic arrangement and that the Iroquois had to pay in full for what they desired. But while the Iroquois complained about Dutch parsimony, they too seemed content with an economic link to

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Habits and Economic Motivation among the Indians of North America", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 26, 1 (February 1960): 35-53; Arthur J. Ray and Donald Freeman, Give us Good Measure: An Economic Analysis of Relations Between the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company Before 1763 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), passim, but see especially 218-228.

<sup>88</sup> Minutes of the Court of Ft. Orange, Sept. 6, 1659, NYCD, 13: 109. For a slightly different version of this speech see, A.J.F. van Laer, ed., Minutes of the Court of Fort Orange and Beverwyck, 1652-60, 2 vols. (Albany: The University of the State of New York, 1920, 1923), 2: 211-213.

the Dutch and later with the English of New York.<sup>89</sup> And what they wanted from both were weapons and ammunition to help them in their wars. The Iroquois made no bones about their goal: it was trade "which induc[ed] us at first to make the Covenant Chain together".<sup>90</sup> They also made no secret that the trade they wanted most was in arms, and that it was because of those weapons that they "conquered their Enemies and rooted them out so that where they then inhabited is now become a Wilderness".<sup>91</sup>

All this is not to suggest that every Iroquois tribe had the same policy and adhered to it throughout the century. Different tribes surely developed different strategies in response to the time and circumstances they found themselves in. A closer examination of Iroquois relations with individual tribes would show what those strategies were. But

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<sup>89</sup> At least this was true at the start of their dealings with the English. Later in the century the relationship changed to include military co-operation.

<sup>90</sup> Conference of the Earl of Bellomont with the Indians, August, 1700, NYCD, 4: 733. See also, Acte authentique des six nations Iroquoise sur leur indépendance, 2 novembre, 1748, Rapporte de l'Archiviste de la Province de Québec, 1921-1922, between pages 108 and 109. (There is no pagination within the document.) The Iroquois again stress that a desire to trade for guns first induced them to establish trade ties to Europeans.

<sup>91</sup> [Conference Minute], July 7, 1712, Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 95. For a slightly different version of this speech, [Cadwallader Colden], "The Continuation of Colden's History of the Five Indian Nations, for the years 1707 through 1720", in The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader Colden, 9 vols. (New York Historical Society Collections, vols. 50-56, 67-68, 1917-23, 1934-35), 9: 411. (Hereafter, Colden Papers.)

it seems obvious that at heart of Iroquois policy was their desire to survive as a people. Ensuring that survival underlay the actions and policy of the Iroquois towards various native groups. Indeed, according to their traditions it was the threat to their survival that had led them to end their internecine feuding and to form the now famous League of the Iroquois sometime before Europeans came to settle in North America.<sup>92</sup> The arrival of Europeans led to changes in political relations, and presented the Iroquois with new challenges, as well as with new opportunities. But, even if the Iroquois added new foes to their list of enemies, they also continued to fight the same tribes they had long been warring with. Regardless of their origins, by 1600 the Iroquois had decided that their survival depended on winning those wars. An important strategy to accomplish that end was to capture their foes and incorporate them into Iroquois society--to make "but one people, and but one land" with their foes, as they had done among themselves. The depopulation brought on by new epidemic diseases increased the importance of this strategy, and probably led to more wars.

The fur trade came to play an important part in overall Iroquois military and diplomatic policy. Furs were needed to purchase the weapons the Iroquois wanted to carry on their warfare. Whether war was waged to gain honour, exact revenge, or to capture people for torture and/or adoption; whether war

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<sup>92</sup> See chapter 3 and the discussion there.

represented the decision of an individual or of a council of elders, European weapons were sought to help facilitate the outcome of the raid. This meant that land, already vital to the Iroquois because of its food resources, grew in importance. Protecting their land against the encroachments of others, or expanding their land base, thus also led to wars against native groups. But in the end, access to land was still only a means to social and political survival for the Iroquois. After all, they had been fighting long before there was a fur trade.

PART 3:

IROQUOIS POLICY TOWARDS NEW FRANCE

Chapter 7  
The Failure of Peace

The statistical results of Iroquois warfare against the French in Canada reveal what historians of New France have long claimed: if the English in the Thirteen Colonies represented the largest obstacle to the expansion of the French empire in the eighteenth century, the Iroquois were New France's most serious obstacle to growth and development in the seventeenth.<sup>1</sup> The Iroquois were the colony's major foe, and warfare with the Iroquois cost the French more lives (and money) than warfare with any other group in that century.<sup>2</sup> After 1640 New France was rarely free of either Iroquois attacks, or of the fear of impending war. Between 1633 and 1697--the first and last attacks against groups composed solely of French--the Iroquois launched 123 raids against the

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<sup>1</sup> Hostile relations with the Iroquois threatened the economic basis of the colony, helped shape the military nature of its society, and affected almost every facet of life in the colony. See the discussion in chapter 1 and, Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> The need to build and maintain forts, reaffirm alliances with gift exchanges, outfit allies for war, and send the occasional army against the Iroquois, all used up limited French resources. In the first nine months of 1691 warring cost New France over 60,000 livres, and Champigny had to budget 24,000 livres for presents to French allies. Champigny au Ministre, octobre 12, 1691, AN, C11A, 11: 281-282. Even when the French fought against the English and the Iroquois, French authorities still claimed that warring against the Iroquois caused the greater part of the expenses. Champigny au Ministre, octobre 14, 1698, *Ibid*, 16: 102-103.

French.<sup>3</sup> The result of these direct attacks by the Iroquois was the removal of 675 to 694 people from the French colony. If one includes French losses incurred in raids against groups of which the French formed a part, the figure rises to 756 to 775 French taken by the Iroquois.<sup>4</sup> This breaks down as 343 to 356 people captured and 404 to 410 people killed.<sup>5</sup>

The data on Iroquois raids against the French also reflects some interesting aspects of Iroquois policy towards New France. For example, the distribution of raids against the French (Graph 7.1) shows clearly that almost all raiding



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<sup>3</sup> See Appendix F, Table F.2. Unless otherwise indicated, the data that follows were taken from this source.

<sup>4</sup> The French were attacked 16 times when they were part of combined French and native groups. Indeed, the Iroquois attacked the French more than any other group.

<sup>5</sup> If one includes French losses sustained as a result of their own attacks against the Iroquois the total human cost of Iroquois warfare was 831 to 852 French removed from their population. John Dickenson, "La guerre Iroquoise et la mortalité en Nouvelle-France, 1608-1666", Revue D'histoire de l'Amerique Française, 36, 1 (juin 1982), 36 puts French losses due to war with the Iroquois up to 1666 at 153 killed and 143 captured for a total of 296 lost to the Iroquois. My figures for the period up to 1666 are: 133-134 captured, 125-128 killed, and 9 lost, for a total of 267 to 271 French lost to the Iroquois. That separate studies should arrive at not too dissimilar totals is rather reassuring. The different totals are partly the result of the methods of inclusion we each used. Probably a more significant cause of the different totals is that Dickenson was able to determine the outcome of raids that my sources noted as "some more raids" during which "some more people were lost". Because of the vagueness of my sources, such references could not be included in my calculations. François de Belmont de Vachon, Histoire du Canada, [1608-1700], (Société Littéraire et Historique du Quebec, 1840), 36 estimated that 600 French were killed or captured in the years 1680 to 1700. My figures for this period are 564 to 581 captured or killed by the Iroquois.

Graph 7.1  
IROQUOIS ATTACKS ON THE FRENCH TO 1701



against the French occurred in two distinct periods; from 1641 to 1666 and from 1687 to 1697.<sup>6</sup> If revenge raiding was a factor in wars against the French, then the Iroquois were quite capable of controlling that impulse. The Iroquois forgave Champlain his transgressions against them in 1609, 1610, and in 1615, and were prepared to bide their time to avenge Sieur De Tracy's insolence in 1666.

Equally revealing are the numbers of French captured and killed, and when those losses occurred. (Graph 7.1) Unlike the case in attacks against native foes where the Iroquois captured twice, possibly three times as many people as they killed, the Iroquois killed more French than they captured. This suggests that capture of French was not a primary goal of Iroquois attacks against them, or it might reflect an ambivalence in Iroquois policy towards New France. However, the fact that twice as many French were killed in the period

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<sup>6</sup> Dickenson, "La guerre Iroquoisie", 36, has suggested, based on the results of raids, a periodization of Iroquois hostilities which he says reflects Iroquois policy towards New France up to 1666. Open hostility towards the French only began in 1642. From then until 1649 warfare was sporadic. The period from 1650 to 1653 marked open war, and 1654 to 1659 was one of uncertain truce. The years 1660 to 1661 signalled a renewed intensity to Iroquois hostility, while those of 1662 to 1666 reflected raiding whose goal was to keep pressure on New France until a durable peace could be negotiated. Based, however, on the number of Iroquois attacks, not on their unpredictable outcome, another periodization is possible. The year 1642 does seem to augur the start of Iroquois hostilities. But the periods of intense warfare are clearly those from 1650 to 1655 and from 1658 to 1662. While the years from 1653 to 1656 also marked a period of active Iroquois-French peace talks, the continued raiding against the French reveals clearly that not all Iroquois agreed with that course of action.

1687 to 1701 than in the much longer period ending in 1666, and that less than half the number of raids were required to do this, indicates that any Iroquois ambivalence about attacking the French was overcome by the mid-1680s.<sup>7</sup>

The size of Iroquois raiding parties in these two periods also shows the changing nature of Iroquois policy. Most attacks against the French up to 1666 were either by small (3-12 men), or medium sized (30-60 men) groups of Iroquois.<sup>8</sup> On only two occasions did the Iroquois send armies of over 500 men against the French. In each instance they were composed mostly of Mohawks.<sup>9</sup> In the years after 1684, raiding parties averaged 200 men and the Iroquois sent armies of over 1,000 men against the colony on three separate occasions. Because no one Iroquois tribe alone could field an army that large, groups of this size reflected the joint effort of all Five Nations and the intent of the Iroquois to conquer the French.

But Iroquois hostility towards New France was neither inevitable, nor constant throughout the seventeenth century. After Champlain's initial attacks against the Iroquois both the Iroquois and French tried to establish peace with one

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<sup>7</sup> The Iroquois attacked groups composed solely of French 88 times up to 1666, and only 35 times from then to 1701. As Graph 7.1 shows, the post 1666 raids were concentrated in the years 1687 to 1697.

<sup>8</sup> Large groups, 100-200, while not unheard of, were rarer. See Appendix D, Table D.1, "Iroq. vs Fr."

<sup>9</sup> See Appendix D, Table D.1, entries dated Aug. 22, 1653 and [End of May], 1660. In the latter raid 500 of the 700 strong Iroquois army were Mohawks.

another. Unfortunately, neither side was prepared to accept the terms the other offered. The failure of peace efforts led to war.

Despite, possibly because of, Champlain's attacks against the Mohawks, and Onondagas or Oneidas, none of these groups, nor the Confederacy as a whole, were eager to wage war against the new French settlers and their native allies. Instead, the Iroquois tried to make peace with their native foes. In the early 1620s, and again in the early 1630s the Mohawks sought to conclude truces with the Algonquins and Montagnais who lived along the St. Lawrence, and the Senecas made a short lived peace with the Hurons. The goals of the Senecas remain a mystery, as do those of the other tribes who were also said to be ready to make peace with the Hurons, but the Mohawks clearly wanted access to the French and some sort of trading arrangement.<sup>10</sup> In the end, none of these negotiations led to any lasting peace. Sooner or later one side or the other jeopardized the peace process, or the tentative truce, by a raid on their ancient foes.

As the French native allies continued to press the attack against the Iroquois, the Mohawks decided to take another

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<sup>10</sup> Untitled doc., AN, C11A, 1: 66; Champlain, Works, 5: 74-79, 117, 130; Ibid, 6: 33-4; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1632, JR, 5: 29; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1634, Ibid, 7: 215; [Brebeuf's] "Huronian Report, 1635", Ibid, 8: 69, 115, 117; [van den Bogaert], "Narrative of a Journey into the Mohawk and Oneida Country", NNN, 139; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1635, JR, 8: 25.

tack.<sup>11</sup> In early 1641 they tried to negotiate a peace directly with the French. The Mohawks were willing to conclude a peace with New France, but not with the Hurons, and especially not with the Algonquins. In return for peace, and a present of guns, the Mohawks offered to bring their pelts to the French, and said they were prepared to accept a French trading post nearer to them.<sup>12</sup> Governor Montmagny refused this offer because he did not trust the Mohawks. He thought their offer was made only to keep the French out of their wars as a means to destroy French native allies. Moreover, even if French allies were spared, granting the Iroquois unhindered access to French posts might discourage other tribes from coming to trade with the French for fear of running into the Iroquois.<sup>13</sup> The French were not prepared to abandon their allies and jeopardize their fur trade. The talks ended in gunfire.

The French refusal of the Mohawk offer is of interest because it reflects an attitude towards the Iroquois which dominated Franco-Iroquois relations throughout the seventeenth century. Despite the fact that it was they who first attacked the Iroquois, the French did not trust the Iroquois. The French seem to have accepted the claims for, and legitimacy

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
<sup>11</sup> Up to 1640 the French native allies took the war to the Iroquois. It was only after that date that balance shifted in favour of the Iroquois. See Graph 7.2.

<sup>12</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1640-41, JR, 21: 27-59.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

Graph 7.2  
IROQUOIS HOSTILITIES BY DECADE, 1600-1701

Source: Appendix D, Table D.1



of, the wars waged against the Iroquois by groups that came to be French allies. Without objective proof, and because it suited their political and economic needs, the French concluded that the Iroquois were the aggressors in these wars. As the belligerent party is often assumed to be in the wrong, that belief led to a concomitant view which deprived Iroquois actions of a moral legitimacy. Opposing the Iroquois thus became justifiable.

The French, of course, did not support war against the Iroquois just because they thought their allies more virtuous, but rather because they believed it was to their advantage. This policy developed gradually, and not all French officials adhered strictly to it, but its inception can be dated back to Champlain. Even though he had aided the Algonquins, Hurons, and Montagnais against the Iroquois, Champlain did not appear to rule out the hope of peace among these groups. Indeed, at first Champlain had looked favourably on peace efforts between the Iroquois and his native allies because he thought it would lead to an increase in the fur trade.<sup>14</sup> But by 1633 he had changed his mind. If not a threat to the French directly, the Iroquois were, nonetheless, enemies of French allies, and the constant warring endangered the fur trade. Rather than try to establish a lasting peace, Champlain became convinced that the

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<sup>14</sup> Champlain, Works, 5: 74. The Jesuits also approved of peaceful relations because they would gain access to more natives and thus reap a richer harvest of souls. Le Jeune to Father Provincial, [August], 1634, JR, 6: 59.

interests of the French and their fur trade would be better served by conquering the Iroquois. A combined French and native force should be sent to destroy the Iroquois and make the country side safe for trade.<sup>15</sup> By the end of the century, the French had decided that peace with the Iroquois was desired, because it would save French lives, but that peace between the Iroquois and French native allies was to be discouraged for the sake of preventing their trading partners from taking their furs to the English.<sup>16</sup> The French did not want to engage in competition with other European traders and the hostile Iroquois would ensure this.<sup>17</sup> The possibility

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<sup>15</sup> [Champlain], ["Relation du Sieur de Champlain en Canada, 1633"], Mercure François, 19: 841-843, 858-859. According to Champlain, an added advantage of such a move would have been to show their allies that the French were powerful and could protect them. That knowledge, and the fact that once the Iroquois were gone the French would be left as the most powerful force in the region, would help bring French native allies more firmly under French control. On the "Relation" as the work of Champlain, see Lucien Campeau, S.J., ed., Monumenta Novae Franciae, 2: Etablissement à Quebec, 1616-1634 (Quebec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 1979), 88. By 1642, even the Jesuits had come to accept that New France was not safe unless the Iroquois were "won over or exterminated", and Father Le Jeune was sent to France to plead with the Crown to send help against the Iroquois. [Vimont's] Relation of 1642, JR, 22: 35. The Jesuit concern, it should be needless to add, was for their missions, not for the fur trade.

<sup>16</sup> LaHontan, New Voyages to America, 1: 394; Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 135.

<sup>17</sup> Eccles, Frontenac, 66, 99-100. The Iroquois, then, were the first barriers to trade between what would become Canada and the United States of America. The French efforts to use the Iroquois to promote economic growth in New France, much as Sir John A. Macdonald used tariff walls to bolster Canadian manufacturing in the late nineteenth century, suggests that protection from competition was Canada's

that, with effort, peace could be maintained, and that the French could attract the Iroquois fur trade did not seem worth the challenge.

But in 1641 Champlain's plan had come to nothing, the idea of balancing war between the Iroquois and French native allies had yet to take shape, and Governor Montmagny was prepared to entertain thoughts of peace with the Iroquois, if not exactly on the terms they presented. He simply could not see the advantages of the proposal suggested by the Mohawks. For Montmagny, the Iroquois did not appear to be a serious threat to the colony or the fur trade. The number of pelts traded to the French continued to grow, and French native allies more than held their own against the Iroquois in the years up to 1640.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, amicable relations between the French and the Five Nations would not guarantee peace with French native fur suppliers, and might facilitate their

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National Policy long before Macdonald "invented" it.

<sup>18</sup> See Graph 7.2. A complete set of data of French fur intake does not exist. While the available information is scattered, it suggests that the wars of the Iroquois did not prevent a growth in the number of furs traded to New France. For example, in 1626, Charles Lalemant observed that 12,000 to 15,000 furs were traded annually in New France and that 22,000 was a good year. (C. Lalemant to J. Lalemant, August, 1626, JR, 4: 207.) At approximately 1.5 pounds per beaver pelt (Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada, 4), that is 18,000 to 22,000 pounds of furs annually, or 33,000 pounds in a good year. In 1645, 30,000 pounds, or roughly 25,000 furs were traded. (Journal des Pères Jesuites, 1645, Ibid, 27: 85.) Interestingly enough, these figures also help put to rest the myth that Iroquois attacks against fur brigades seriously impeded the flow of furs to New France. The existing data on the French fur intake is summarized in Historical Atlas of Canada, 1: Plate 48.

destruction. Worse, if the Iroquois destroyed French fur suppliers the French could not be sure the Iroquois would bring their furs to the French.<sup>19</sup>

For the Iroquois, however, this rejection and other French actions in the early 1640s seemed to present them with both clear evidence of New France's hostile intent, and with few options to pursue in response. It is doubtful, for example, if the Mohawks saw the logic in New France's refusal of their peace offer. The advantages to the French of an alliance with the Algonquins rather than with them, were not readily apparent to the Mohawks, and they were angered by the rejection.<sup>20</sup> Father Jogues who was captured and tortured by the Mohawks a year after the failed peace effort concluded that the Mohawks had attacked the French because they were "enraged against the French because...[they] had not been willing to accept the peace" on the Mohawks' terms.<sup>21</sup> Whether the Mohawks most wanted an alliance or guns is not clear, but years later the French explorer Pierre Radisson was told by an old Iroquois that the French "should have given us

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<sup>19</sup> Montmagny appears not to have worried that if peace was established among them all, his native allies might want to trade with the Dutch and the English.

<sup>20</sup> Indeed, some decades later a Mohawk spokesman wondered why Europeans had bothered to get involved in Indian wars in the first place. Answer of the Maquase..., Aug. 6, 1687, NYCD, 3: 442. It was, he clearly implied, none of their concern.

<sup>21</sup> Father Jogues in [Lalemant's] Relation of 1647, JR, 31: 29.

[guns to] kill the Algonquins". If they had, he was assured, the Iroquois would not have warred against the French and would have traded their furs to them.<sup>22</sup> In any case, Montmagny's rejection of the Mohawks peace offer, meant that they were free to war with New France.

Fast on the heels of this snub in 1641, and as further evidence of New France's non-accommodating position, came two bold expansionist moves into land claimed by the Iroquois. In 1642 Fort Richelieu was started at the mouth of the Richelieu river and Chomedey de Maisonneuve planted a colony on Montreal Island. The fort was set up to hinder Iroquois access to the St. Lawrence, and Ville Marie was created to further the missionary effort of converting the Indians to Christianity.<sup>23</sup> The Iroquois, however, were unaware of Maisonneuve's beneficent intent and both enterprises were viewed as threats to the Iroquois and immediately attacked. It is not clear if the Iroquois attacked these places because they were on Iroquois lands, or because they felt it was an

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<sup>22</sup> Radisson, Explorations, 58. The words in square brackets, [guns to], were either added by the editor of Radisson's manuscript to fill in a missing word, or to reflect what he thought the word or words were. The original text is in badly written English. It is possible that Radisson wrote the word "weapons" or "help", or meant either one, rather than "guns". In any case, the meaning of the passage remains that if the French had helped the Iroquois against their foes, they would not have warred against the French.

<sup>23</sup> [Vimont's] Relation of 1642, JR, 22: 35. On the origins and purpose of Montreal see Dollier de Casson, Histoire du Montreal. Louise Dechêne, Habitants et Marchands de Montréal, provides a more secular history of Montreal.

attempt to circumscribe their mobility--probably a little of both. These types of concerns were expressed later in the century, and there is no reason to believe that they were not factors in the 1640s.<sup>24</sup> The fact that both places were attacked so soon after they were established, Fort Richelieu as it was being built, indicates that the Iroquois opposed their existence in those areas. Both continued to be favoured targets of Iroquois aggression throughout the century.<sup>25</sup> The French should have expected as much and should have been aware that such a move would not be well received by the Iroquois. In the peace efforts of the 1620s questions of hunting in these areas had been a topic of negotiations.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, the Richelieu river was known as the "Rivière des Iroquois", and continued under that designation in maps until the 1650s.<sup>27</sup> This suggests that even if the French were not prepared to concede Iroquois rights to the area, they recognized that the Iroquois used that route on their travels. They should not have been surprised that a fort there would be unwelcome.

Added to French expansion into Iroquois lands, was their

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<sup>24</sup> This matter will be discussed below, but since Fort Richelieu was created to hinder the passage of the Iroquois one may assume that, given its location, the Iroquois were aware of this purpose and resented it.

<sup>25</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1.

<sup>26</sup> Forbes, "Two and a Half Centuries of Conflict", 5-6; Champlain, Works, 5: 73-74, 77.

<sup>27</sup> See, for example, the maps in C. Heidenreich, "An Analysis of the 17-th Century Map 'Nouvelle France'", Cartographica, 25, 3 (1988): 67-111.

apparent arming and aiding of Iroquois foes. The extent of the French gun trade to their native allies, and thus to the foes of the Iroquois, is not clear, but there is some evidence that the French did sell or give guns to their native allies.<sup>28</sup> Almost all historians acknowledge that, in general, the French prohibited the sale of guns to natives in the 1640s. But some guns sales were permitted to native converts to Christianity, and no one knows if, or how many, were traded illegally. Certainly the Mohawks knew that the French had guns and tried to obtain some as a price for peace with them in early 1641.<sup>29</sup> Knowledge of French guns sales went even further abroad. In 1644 the English at New Haven passed an ordinance prohibiting the sale of guns and ammunition to the French and Dutch because they "...doe sell and trade to the Indians, guns, pistolls and warlike instruments".<sup>30</sup> The Dutch appear to have been the worst offenders in these years, but the fact that the French were also mentioned suggests that the French traded guns, and that knowledge of this practice was not a very well kept secret.

References to French gun sales, of course, could have

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<sup>28</sup> The Iroquois complained throughout the century about the French trading guns to Iroquois enemies. The strongest evidence of a French gun trade is for period after 1650. This will be discussed below.

<sup>29</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1640-41, JR, 21: 27-59.

<sup>30</sup> [Council Minute,] The General Court, Oct. 25, 1644, in J.H. Trumbull and C.J. Hoadly, eds., The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, vols. 1-4, [1636-1706] (Hartford, 1850-1868), 1: 113-114, quote, p. 113.

been to those sold to native converts. This type of trade was legalized by Montmagny in 1641.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, the Mohawks attack against a convoy taking supplies to Huronia in August of 1642 netted them guns being carried to Huronia.<sup>32</sup> The guns could have been the property of Huron converts, or they could have been for the use of Jesuit donnés who were allowed to carry weapons. By 1641 there were seven such servants working in the Huron mission.<sup>33</sup> But even if the reality of French gun sales to their native allies, and the military support that a few donnés could provide the Hurons, was far less than it appeared, the Mohawks had no real way to determine this in 1641. All they knew was that the French had refused to trade guns to them and appeared to be trading them to one of their enemies, and sending armed Frenchmen to live among them.

Unfortunately for the French, others were willing to sell

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<sup>31</sup> Campeau, La mission des Jésuites chez les Hurons, 347. Bruce Trigger has argued that this type of trade did not provide the Hurons, for example, with many guns because they were sold only to individuals, a Huron had to be a Christian trader to come get his gun, and there were never more than 120 Christian Huron traders. Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 2: 633. However, there is no reason why a Huron convert, even if he was not a trader by capacity, could not accompany a fur brigade to New France in order to purchase his allotted gun. By 1643 there were 300 active Christians among the Hurons. Campeau, La mission des Jésuites chez les Hurons, 238. If even only half of them were male, that is 150 Hurons with guns. That figure does not include others who converted after 1643, nor those who might have obtained guns illegally.

<sup>32</sup> Marie de l'Incarnation à le Mère Ursule de Ste.-Catherine, sept. 29, 1642, Correspondance, 168.

<sup>33</sup> Campeau, La mission des Jésuites chez les Hurons, 187-189, 211.

guns to the Mohawks. Although the sale of guns in New Netherland was condoned only in 1648, the consequence of opening up the trade in fur in 1639 was the widespread sale of guns to the Mohawks.<sup>34</sup> From that year until the gun trade was legalized, ordinances prohibiting the sale of guns were issued almost annually.<sup>35</sup> That they had to be issued so often is proof that they were of little effect and that gun sales continued unabated. Indeed, gun smuggling in New Netherland was widespread and well organized. Some gun running ships put in at New Haven and Dutch smugglers went there to pick up their supplies. Others placed guns in sealed casks and dropped them off the ships near shore before they could be boarded or reached port for inspection. Waiting accomplices rowed out from shore to fish in the profitable catch.<sup>36</sup> However they got to the Mohawks, by 1641 they had

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<sup>34</sup> [West India Company] to P. Stuyvesant, April 7, 1648, New York Historical Society Collections, 2nd Ser., 2: 310; "Journal of New Netherland", NNN, 273-274.

<sup>35</sup> Ordinance prohibiting the sale of fire arms to Indians, March 31, 1639, in A.J.F. van Laer, ed. and trans., New York Historical Manuscripts: Dutch, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1974), 4: 42-43; Ordinance...July 18, 1641, van Rensselaer-Bowier Manuscripts, 565-566; Ordinance..., Oct. 10, 1642, Ibid, 626-627. In one instance Dutch authorities felt constrained to illustrate the gravity of the problems gun sales produced by mentioning that the King of France had complained to Holland about the impact of gun sales to natives. Ordinance..., Feb. 23, 1645, New York Historical Manuscripts: Dutch, 4: 256-257.

<sup>36</sup> Propositions submitted...by the Honorable Director General Stuyvesant, June 23, 1648, New York Historical Manuscripts: Dutch, 4: 525-526; Propositions..., Aug. 1, 1648, Ibid, 546-548, 549.

at least 36, and boasted that they would "go well armed" to meet the French.<sup>37</sup> It was not an idle boast; by 1643 they were reported to have 300 guns, and had increased that total to 400 by 1644.<sup>38</sup> That means that more than half the Mohawks warrior population of this period had guns.<sup>39</sup>

In short, the French refusal to trade or give the Mohawks guns to use against their native foes, their apparent military support of the Hurons, and their attempt to circumscribe Iroquois movements by building a military fortification, possibly on Mohawk land, all seemed to confirm New France's hostile intent towards the Iroquois.<sup>40</sup> Since the French had already refused peace, the Mohawks decided to declare war against New France. Had the Mohawks not had access to guns from the Dutch, they would not have had the technological parity needed to take on the French directly, and might have

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<sup>37</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1640-41, JR, 21: 37; [Vimont's] Relation of 1642, Ibid, 22: 251.

<sup>38</sup> [Vimont's] Relation of 1642-43, Ibid, 24: 271; J. Megapolensis, "A Short Account of the Mohawk Indians", NNN, 176.

<sup>39</sup> See Appendix C, Table C.4. How many more they obtained before the trade was legalized, and to what extent the other four Iroquois tribes participated in this trade is open to speculation.

<sup>40</sup> The French knew the Mohawks had guns because they brought 36 with them when they came treat with the French in 1641. [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1640-41, JR, 21: 37. The French had to know that the reason the Mohawks wanted more guns was to pursue their native foes. It is extremely difficult to believe that the Mohawks were audacious enough to ask the French to supply them with weapons to use against New France.

tried to make a peace more suitable to the French.<sup>41</sup> As it was, they did not have to do that. In the end, a unique combination of events and misunderstandings, all of which took place in the span of about one year starting in 1641, led to the Iroquois decision to war against New France. Perhaps not so surprisingly, it was about this time that Iroquois attacks directly against the French began.

Some attacks against New France in this period, of course, may have been the result of accident. As one Iroquois spokesman explained, "the French hold the Hurons and Algonquins in their arms; so it is not to be wondered at if, when we wish to strike those of one Nation, the blows sometimes fall upon the others".<sup>42</sup> Most likely, however, this was the Iroquois' metaphorical way of telling the French that one reason for Iroquois anger against them was that had chosen to make alliances with Iroquois foes. In any event, by the end of 1641 it was obvious that the Mohawks at least, had had enough and were prepared to declare themselves enemies of New France. In that year French authorities recognized that, at last, the Iroquois were at war with New France, not just

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<sup>41</sup> The Iroquois were not the only native groups who had guns. In 1637 the Abenakis were reported to have some, and in 1643 the government of Maryland prohibited the sale of guns to Indians without license because of the possible harm to the colony due to "...the great number of gunnes, now in the hands and use of Indians, in and about this colony". [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1637, JR, 12: 189; [Proclamation, Jan. 2, 1643], Md. Archives, 3: 144.

<sup>42</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1657-58, JR, 44: 217.

with their native allies.<sup>43</sup>

Nonetheless, while the Iroquois attacked New France, the colony did not immediately become a major target of their aggression. If the Iroquois, especially the Mohawks, were prepared to fight the French, the Mohawks were either unwilling or incapable of persuading the rest of the Confederacy to pursue all out war. The Iroquois had yet to resolve their wars with the Hurons and other native foes, and attacks against these groups continued to account for the largest percentage of raids in the early 1640s.<sup>44</sup> It is possible that the Iroquois even stepped up their raids against these groups in order to capture natives to bolster their armies in preparation for war against New France.<sup>45</sup> Still, if the French did not become the Iroquois' most hated foe, they became regular targets as the Iroquois increased their raiding against the French and their native allies.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> As Father Le Jeune astutely observed, the other tribes had a hand in Mohawk wars, but it was at the initiative of the Mohawks. [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1640-41, JR, 21: 21.

<sup>44</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for the 1640s.

<sup>45</sup> This was apparently the motive behind attempts, in the mid 1650s, to lure the remnants of the Hurons nation to Iroquoia. [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1653-54, JR, 41: 49. Other observers commented on this purpose for raiding against French native allies in the 1680s. This will be discussed below.

<sup>46</sup> In 1641 the French became regular targets of the Iroquois and were struck five times in 1644. In the years prior to 1641 the Iroquois had never launched more than 3 raids per year against native groups. In 1642 they struck

Montmagny probably had not anticipated this type of Iroquois response to his policies. New France's native allies had more than held their own against the Iroquois until 1641, and the Iroquois had never seriously attacked the French. Possibly the French even assumed that Fort Richelieu, located on a main Iroquois war route, would be sufficient to deter further incursions. But, if anything, the new fort seems to have angered the Mohawks and led to raids directly against the French. This, and the noticeably increased number of attacks against French native allies after 1641, must have worried the French. As early as 1643 Montmagny was trying to encourage peace between his native allies and the Iroquois.<sup>47</sup> Those efforts may have taken on greater urgency when he learned that the Hurons were undertaking such a course on their own.<sup>48</sup> In any case, whether for fear of continued Iroquois incursions, fear of damage to the trade, or for fear of being left out of talks between the Iroquois and Hurons, Montmagny again tried to initiate talks between the Mohawks and his allies in 1645, and sent an envoy to the Mohawks.

The Mohawks accepted Montmagny's offer to negotiate a peace. The Mohawks may have concluded that their attacks had

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French native allies 8 times; in 1643, 7 times; and, in 1644, 5 times. See Graph 6.1. The decrease in attacks against native groups in 1644 seems to be due to more raids being carried out against the French in that year.

<sup>47</sup> [Vimont's] Relation of 1643-44, JR, 26: 63.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 67-71.

frightened the French, or that they had finally come to their senses. The Mohawks certainly acted as if they had the upper hand and tried again to negotiate a peace with the French that excluded the Algonquins.<sup>49</sup> Montmagny, while unprepared to abandon Algonquin converts, was willing to give the Mohawks tacit approval to continue their war against the non-Christian Algonquins.<sup>50</sup> During these negotiations the Mohawks also pressed the Hurons to resume the negotiations they had begun sometime in 1643. The Hurons were encouraged to by-pass the French and come directly to the Mohawks to negotiate.<sup>51</sup> The Mohawks were obviously trying to work out a separate arrangement with the Hurons. This and the attempt to exclude the Algonquins from the peace with the French suggests that the Mohawks were trying to separate the French from their allies. The French may have assumed, as they had in 1641, that this was a means to destroy their native allies, but the Mohawks may have also pursued this policy in order to isolate the French in order to attack them. In any case, a peace was

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<sup>49</sup> Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1646, JR, 28: 149-151. In May of 1646, the Algonquins again urged the French not to exclude them from the peace. [Lalemant's] Relation of 1645-46, Ibid, 29: 299.

<sup>50</sup> Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1646, Ibid, 28: 149-151.

<sup>51</sup> [Vimont's] Relation of 1644-45, Ibid, 27: 262; Marie de l'Incarnation à son fils, sept. 14, 1645, Correspondance, 257.

concluded between the Mohawks and the French.<sup>52</sup>

Like other peace efforts before it, this one was short lived. Less than one year after it was concluded the Mohawks killed Father Isaac Jogues and relations between the French and the Mohawks resumed their hostile footing. Despite the historiographic debate over what impelled the Mohawks to take this action, the evidence seems fairly clear.<sup>53</sup> To begin, the Mohawks still did not seem to trust the French, nor had they reason to. The French had not razed Fort Richelieu and Montreal, in fact both places had been strengthened since their inception, and they continued to sell or give guns to the Hurons and Algonquins.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, the peace was initiated by the French, not the Mohawks. The latter agreed to meet with the French in hopes of fulfilling their own agenda, but it is not clear that the French met all the Mohawks demands. Added to this was the fact that during early negotiations the Mohawks were warned by a Huron not to trust

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<sup>52</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1645-46, Ibid, 28: 275. The other tribes in the Confederacy seem not to have wanted to conclude formal peace--probably because they were not as concerned with the French as they were with the Hurons.

<sup>53</sup> A standard interpretation of what this treaty was about, and why it was broken is George Hunt's in his Wars of the Iroquois, 77-86. Leo-Paul Desrosiers, "La rupture de la paix de 1645", Cahiers de Dix, 17 (1952): 169-181, and Bruce Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 2: 647-658, dispute Hunt's economic interpretation and present their own economic version of events.

<sup>54</sup> In July of 1643 some 12 Iroquois were held off in their bid to defeat seven Algonquins because the Algonquins were more effective in their use of guns than the Iroquois. [Vimont's] Relation of 1642-43, JR, 24: 289-291.

the French.<sup>55</sup>

Even if the Mohawks did not mistrust the French, two events served to raise doubts about the sincerity of French motives. In the fall of 1645 Father Jogues, while working out the details of peace between the French and Mohawks, had tried to include the Onondagas in the discussions. He had, however, suggested that the French go directly to the Onondagas rather than through the Mohawks.<sup>56</sup> To the Mohawks, this could only seem an attempt to conclude a separate peace, possibly one detrimental to their interests.<sup>57</sup> The events that followed must have only served to confirm the Mohawks suspicions of French duplicity. When Father Jogues returned to New France in the fall of 1645 he had left behind a small black box among the Mohawks. Shortly after that, disease and pestilence struck the Mohawks and their crops. Already warned by Huron captives about the Jesuit's destructive powers, the Mohawks concluded that Father Jogues left the box to destroy them.<sup>58</sup> For this reason he was killed in the manner usually reserved

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<sup>55</sup> [Vimont'] Relation of 1644-45, JR, 27: 269.

<sup>56</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1645-46, JR, 29: 57.

<sup>57</sup> They certainly were familiar with this type of tactic, having just tried the same thing with the Hurons a few weeks earlier. Since the Mohawks efforts to conclude a separate peace with the Hurons was probably not for pacific reasons, they may have concluded that the French goal in concluding a peace with the Onondagas was for equally warlike ends. This may have both angered and worried them.

<sup>58</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1647, JR, 30: 115-117, 227-229; Marie de l'Incarnation à son fils, [été], 1647, Correspondance, 323-335.

for sorcerers, rather than tortured to death.<sup>59</sup> As far as the Mohawks were concerned Jogues' death did not mark the renewal of the war against New France, the French had started that when they had sent the priest to work his witchcraft on them.<sup>60</sup>

Nonetheless, if the French had started the war, the Mohawks were prepared to continue it. Even before they killed Father Jogues in October of 1646, they had sent presents to the other tribes in the Confederacy in order to try and persuade them to war against the French and their allies.<sup>61</sup> The results of this effort are not clear, but it appears that the rest of the Confederacy was prepared to continue to war against their native foes, and possibly against the French, but they did not want all out war with New France--at least they did not launch a full scale attack against the French.<sup>62</sup> Unfortunately, the Iroquois left no records of their decisions or why they made them. It is, however, possible to suggest

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1647, JR, 30: 229. Even during his captivity in 1642 Father Jogues had been considered a sorcerer and was accused of bringing bad luck to the hunters he accompanied as a servant. Ibid, 31: 73.

<sup>61</sup> Marie de l'Incarnation à son fils, [été], 1647, Correspondance, 325; [Lalemant's] Relation of 1647, JR, 30: 227.

<sup>62</sup> The sources do not often enough identify the attacking Iroquois tribe by name. When they do, it still appears to be the Mohawks that attack the French and one of the other tribes that raid against New France's native allies. See Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1646 to 1649.

reasons for their reluctance to fight. The loose nature of government among the Iroquois, based as it was on their clan system, meant that each tribe pursued policies that best suited them. If one or more tribes could not convince the others in the Confederacy of the efficacy of their plan, each tribe did as it thought best.<sup>63</sup> The Mohawks may simply have been unable to convince the Onondagas, Oneidas, Cayugas, and Senecas that their interests would be served by fighting the French. Rivalry among the tribes may also have been a factor.<sup>64</sup>

On the other hand, the Confederacy may have agreed to war against New France and was simply waiting for a more propitious moment. They may have wanted to bolster the size of their fighting force by gaining more captives. They may have wanted to attack French native allies to weaken the French power base, or they may have wanted to augment their gun supply. It appears to be more than mere coincidence that the French came to be major targets of the Iroquois after 1649 and the destruction of the Hurons.<sup>65</sup> However, since the attacking tribe is often not clearly identified in the historical record, this may have been just the Mohawks

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<sup>63</sup> See chapter 2.

<sup>64</sup> The Jesuits suggested that the Onondagas receptivity to Huron peace overtures in 1648 may have been due, in part, to Mohawk arrogance. [Ragueneau's] "Huron Report, 1647-48", JR, 33: 123.

<sup>65</sup> See Graph 7.1 and Tables F.2 and F.3 in Appendix F.

pursuing the French because they now had more time and resources after the defeat and capture of the Hurons. Although it is highly likely that warriors from the other tribes struck against the French and joined Mohawk war parties, Iroquois other than the Mohawks are not regularly identified as attacking the French until after 1656.

The political machinations of the early 1650s to the mid 1660s, however, suggest that whatever decision the Confederacy had arrived at in 1646, it had not fully resolved to destroy New France. If it had, some tribes at least were prepared to reconsider that position, and pursue other options in light of new circumstances.

Chapter 8  
Conflict and Uncertainty

After the defeat of the Hurons and the Neutrals, and as New France was reeling from Iroquois attacks, came news in the summer of 1653 that some members of the Iroquois Confederacy were interested in peace with the French. The Onondagas--and, shortly after, the Oneidas--wanted to conclude a formal first peace with the French. The Onondagas in particular wanted priests and a French post among them.<sup>1</sup> The French were, of course delighted, and the Jesuits credited God for this miraculous change in Iroquois policy and for their willingness to learn of Christianity.<sup>2</sup> The joy, however, was to be shortlived. If in 1653 the talk was of peace, the next decade was filled with conflict and uncertainty. The whole confederacy could not agree on a policy towards New France and within a few years the Onondagas too were at war with the colony.

Regardless of God's role, the Onondagas sought peace with

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<sup>1</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1652-53, JR, 40: 89-91, 185-191; Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1653, Ibid, 38: 179, 183.

<sup>2</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1652-53, JR, 40: 93. Leo-Paul Desrosiers provides the most detailed discussion of the events surrounding this treaty, and what led to the Onondagas' decision. See, L.-P. Desrosiers, "Les Onnontagués", Cahiers des Dix, 18 (1953): 45-66, and especially L.-P. Desrosiers, "La paix-miracle (1653-60)", Ibid, 24 (1959): 85-112.

New France in 1653 for decidedly secular reasons.<sup>3</sup> They were being hard pressed by the Eries and possibly they had heard that a large army of Iroquois foes and French allies were massing to strike against the Iroquois.<sup>4</sup> The Onondagas may have wanted ties to the French, and French among them, in the hopes that the French would help defend them against this large group, or even prevent them from attacking the Onondagas if they became French allies as well. In any case, the Onondagas clearly wanted French aid against the Eries. What they seem to have wanted most was guns, and the French obliged the Iroquois and traded them guns shortly after peace was concluded in 1653.<sup>5</sup> By 1655 the Onondagas were openly asking for both guns and French soldiers to help them against the Eries.<sup>6</sup>

Another reason for the Onondagas desire for peace was, the Jesuits suggested, that rivalry had developed between the Onondagas and the Mohawks, and that the Onondagas sought to open trade links to the French to by-pass the increasingly

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<sup>3</sup> The Jesuits were, however, pragmatic men and they understood that some Iroquois saw their missions and presence among them as part of the price of ensuring peace with New France. Father Pierron in [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1669-70, JR, 53: 223, 225.

<sup>4</sup> On the Erie attacks see Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1652-54. On the allied army, estimated at 1,000 strong, see Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1653, JR, 38: 181.

<sup>5</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1653-54, JR, 41: 83; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1657-58, Ibid, 44: 151.

<sup>6</sup> [De Quen's] Relation of 1655-56, JR, 42: 53, 57.

arrogant Mohawks. The Mohawks were said to have resented this because it would hurt their trade. This implies that the Mohawks exacted toll charges from their Confederacy partners, and that the dispute between the Mohawks and Onondagas was over trade.<sup>7</sup> Both views seem unlikely. For example, it was customary among native societies in the Northeast that the group that first made contact with another had the right to that trade.<sup>8</sup> The Mohawks may have wanted to uphold that right with the Dutch since they had made first contact with them,<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1653-54, JR, 41: 201-203; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, Ibid, 43: 129; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1657-58, Ibid, 44: 151. These views have had some influence on the historiography of this event. Desrosiers, "La paix-miracle", 88, and Hunt, Wars of the Iroquois, 74, concluded from these statements that the Mohawks charged tolls. Gustave Lanctot, Histoire du Canada: des Origines au Régime Royal (Montreal: Librairie Beauchemin, 1960), 268 thought the Mohawks were middle men between the western tribes and the Dutch at Fort Orange.

<sup>8</sup> Heidenreich, Huronion, 221-222.

<sup>9</sup> The date of the earliest treaty between the Iroquois and the Dutch is unknown. A document used as evidence to support claims of a treaty made in 1613 between the Dutch and Mohawks has been shown to be a forgery. Charles T. Gehring, William A. Starna, and William N. Fenton, "The Tawagonshi Treaty of 1613: The Final Chapter", New York History, 68, 4 (October 1987): 373-393. Daniel K. Richter has suggested that the first treaty was made sometime around 1618 between the Mohawks and a Dutch trader, and that a formal treaty with the Dutch government and all Five Nations was made in 1642. Daniel K. Richter, "Rediscovered Links In the Covenant Chain: Previously Unpublished Transcripts of the New York Indian Treaty Minutes, 1677-1691", American Antiquarian Society, Proceedings, 92 (1982), 48-55. Whether or not the first treaty was concluded in 1618, it seems likely that the first one between the Mohawks, Onondagas, Oneidas, and Dutch authorities was made in 1634-35 during van den Bogaert's visit to these tribes rather than in 1642. van den Bogaert, Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country, 15-19.

but they did let other members of the Confederacy trade directly with the Dutch.<sup>10</sup> Having done this, it is unlikely they charged tolls or exacted tributes for right of passage. Given the importance of ceremony and reciprocal gift exchange among the Iroquois, it seems more reasonable to postulate that the Mohawks expected that those who traversed through their lands would meet with them, ask for permission to pass by, and exchange gifts. While for some observers this may have appeared a toll, the Iroquois were merely following the protocol required when tribes met each other.<sup>11</sup>

There is, of course, evidence that the Onondagas desired a closer relationship with the French, and if they sought military aid from New France, they also wanted peace in order to gain access to French weapons. But, while trading for guns is still trading, it is not evidence that the Onondagas wanted to trade with New France because of trade problems with the Mohawks. A more likely reason for the Onondagas desire to establish trade links to the French was the fact that the Dutch had little to trade and were charging high prices for what they did have.<sup>12</sup> The shortage was probably due to the

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<sup>10</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1661-62, JR, 47: 205.

<sup>11</sup> That possibly four large trade convoys passed almost annually, probably meant that the Mohawks received quite a few gifts. However, the reciprocal nature of gift exchanges meant that the Mohawks had to give many gifts in return.

<sup>12</sup> [Court Minute, July 15, 1654], in A.J.F. van Laer, ed., Minutes of the Court of Fort Orange and Beverwyck, 1652-1660, 2 vols. (Albany: The University of the State of New York, 1920, 1923), 1: 170.

fact that a Dutch-English war (1652-54) had broken out and this was having an impact on shipping. More significant, the Dutch, apparently due to this same war, had prohibited the sale of ammunition to natives. In 1654 a special resolution was passed to allow sales to the Mohawks only.<sup>13</sup> Thus, even if the Onondagas wanted to trade with the Dutch, they could not get the supplies they wanted most--those they needed to carry out their defense against the Eries.

The Mohawks anger at the Onondagas can best be accounted for by their policy disagreements about what to do with New France. The Onondagas were making direct contact with the French, the Mohawks' enemies, and they had not followed the proper route through the Eastern door of the Confederacy, thus seemingly slighting the Mohawks position in the Confederacy.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, while it is not clear if the Onondagas peace offer to the French was a break from Confederacy policy, it appears that the Onondagas acted on their own initiative and obviously in contradiction of the Mohawks's policy. The Oneidas, for example, were asked to

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<sup>13</sup> Resolution to Provide the Mohawks with...Powder and lead, 1654, NYCD, 13: 35. It is not clear if the restrictions were due to shortages or for fear of the uses to which the natives would put the ammunition.

<sup>14</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1653-54, JR, 41: 87. Father Jogues efforts, in 1645, to establish direct Onondaga-French relations had upset the Mohawks for similar reasons. [Lalemant's] Relation of 1645-46, Ibid, 29: 57. On the process of Confederacy council protocol, and the status of the five tribes within it see, E. Tooker, "The League of Iroquois: Its History, Politics, and Ritual", Handbook, 422-429.

participate in the peace talks only after the Onondagas had confirmed that the French were willing to consider peace with the Onondagas.<sup>15</sup> While the Jesuits reported that the Senecas and the Cayugas had also been prepared to discuss peace, there are no references to these groups being at the peace talks.<sup>16</sup> In fact, the Senecas came to New France to talk of peace only in 1655 and then just to say that they were interested and would send a larger delegation the following year to confirm a peace with the French and the Algonquins and Hurons.<sup>17</sup> It is unlikely that the Senecas, at least, had seriously consented to peace in 1653. They had promised to aid the Mohawks against the French if they helped them against the Neutrals, and the Mohawks had done this.<sup>18</sup> The Mohawks certainly had not agreed to peace. In August of 1653 they sent an army, composed mostly of Mohawks, against Trois Rivières and ravaged the countryside.<sup>19</sup> Thus, whether the Onondagas had contravened Confederacy policy, or had just not consulted the other members, it is obvious that their peace overtures to the French in 1653 caught the Mohawks, if nobody else, by

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<sup>15</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1652-53, JR, 40: 91; Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1653, Ibid, 38: 183.

<sup>16</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1652-53, JR, 40: 163.

<sup>17</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, JR, 43: 99.

<sup>18</sup> [Ragueneau's] Relation of 1651-52, JR, 38: 61-62.

<sup>19</sup> Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1653, JR, 38: 191-195; [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1652-53, Ibid, 40: 103-113. It is not clear what part of the non-Mohawks component, if any, the Senecas made up.

surprise and the Mohawks did not like it.<sup>20</sup> At last the Mohawks seemed to have New France ready to crumble, they had apparently garnered the support of the powerful Senecas, and then the Onondagas offered the French a respite.

Nonetheless, the Mohawks were nothing if not adaptable. Despite having an army at the French doorstep, the Mohawks agreed to discuss peace with the French. They did so for several reasons. Some Mohawks had been captured during the most recent skirmishing and at first they may have wanted an opportunity to recover them.<sup>21</sup> But this was not the motive for continuing the peace talks since the Mohawks managed to recover most of their people in a raid before negotiations with the French were seriously under way.<sup>22</sup> Several more likely motives account for the Mohawks continued participation in the talks. While unwilling to see the Onondagas and Oneidas become allies of their worst enemies, the Mohawks did not want them to strike some arrangement with the French that would be to their detriment. They might have felt they could better monitor events if they took part in the negotiations. As well, while the Onondagas sought French aid, which the

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<sup>20</sup> At first the Mohawks even intercepted the Onondagas' ambassadors and took their peace presents. Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1653, JR, 38: 195. They were later released and their presents returned to them. [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1652-53, Ibid, 40: 183.

<sup>21</sup> Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1653, JR, 38: 189; Dollier, Histoire du Montreal, 181-183.

<sup>22</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1652-53, JR, 40: 115.

Mohawks must have known the French would never extend to the Mohawks, the latter used the opportunity presented by the peace talks to try and lure the remnants of the Hurons population to their villages.<sup>23</sup> During the siege of Trois Rivières, some Hurons in the area made contact with the Mohawks in the hopes of learning about their captured relatives.<sup>24</sup> Whether or not this event inspired the Mohawks, they clearly sought to take advantage of the peace talks secretly to convince the other Hurons in the colony to relocate among the Mohawks.<sup>25</sup>

Finally, the Mohawks agreed to peace with the French and their native allies because they had no intention of keeping it. The continued raiding against the French and their allies in the years following the supposed peace of 1653 is clear proof of that duplicity. The Mohawks were identified as the attackers in 10 of the 18 raids launched by the Iroquois

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<sup>23</sup> The French did, however, give the Mohawks guns as presents. [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1655-56, JR, 43: 165, 171.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 113.

<sup>25</sup> Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1653, JR, 38: 199; [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1653-54, Ibid, 41: 47. Father Le Mercier reported that some Hurons were convinced that the Mohawks only motive for continuing peace talks with the French was "to conceal their game, and to afford them more means of speaking with us [the Hurons] without suspicion and of conducting this whole affair [the secret offer to the Hurons] smoothly and effectively". Ibid. The Onondagas do not appear to have thought of this, and it was not an original strategy of theirs. It was only in January of 1654 that they came to the French and asked for treaty similar to that which they learned the Mohawks had made. Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1654, JR, 41: 19.

against the French and their allies from 1654 to the end of 1657. In this same period--before the other tribes also began sustained attacks against the French--eight of the 18 raids were against the French, and the Mohawks were clearly responsible for at least five of those.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, no sooner had the Mohawks supposedly agreed to peace, than they went to the Dutch at Fort Orange to tell them to write to the French to ask them to stay out of any war that might develop between the Mohawks and French allies.<sup>27</sup> This continued hostility towards New France's native allies should not be surprising. The Mohawks had apparently, once again, tried to isolate the French from their native allies, and refused to include the Algonquins and Hurons in the truce. The French had agreed to exclude French allies not living in the colony proper from the peace talks and the Iroquois were free to attack those tribes.<sup>28</sup> However, the French continued their efforts to have the Hurons and Algonquins included in the peace treaty.<sup>29</sup>

The last of the Iroquois nations to join in the truce were the Senecas. In September of 1655 they came to New

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<sup>26</sup> See Appendix D., Table D.1, entries for 1654 to 1657.

<sup>27</sup> Propositions made...on the Part of the Maquaas, Dec. 25, 1653, Minutes of the Court of Fort Orange and Beverwyck, 1: 90.

<sup>28</sup> Marie de l'Incarnation a son fils, oct. 12, 1655, Correspondance, 564.

<sup>29</sup> [De Quen's] Relation of 1655-56, JR, 42: 93.

France to indicate their willingness to be included in the treaty reached between the Onondagas and the French, and in January of 1656 a delegation of ten Senecas confirmed their nation's adherence to peace with the French.<sup>30</sup> Possibly, as the Jesuits suggested, because of their wars with the Eries, they wanted to limit the number of enemies they faced. The Senecas may also have wanted access to French guns as had the Onondagas. They may even have sought peace in order to get in on the partition of the Hurons in New France.<sup>31</sup> In 1657 the Senecas accompanied a group of Onondagas that came to escort some Hurons to Iroquois villages.<sup>32</sup> But, whatever their reasons the French were happy to include the Senecas on their list of friendly Iroquois.

Yet for all the talk of, and actions to confirm, Iroquois peace with New France, it was not a Confederacy policy. Peace with the French seems to have been an ad hoc policy that developed as individual tribes pursued their respective self-interests. Indeed, the events of the mid-1650s reveal if not a rift in the Iroquois Confederacy, at least lack of consensus among the tribes about what policy was best to pursue towards

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<sup>30</sup> Copies of two letters sent From New France, [1655], JR, 41: 217; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, Ibid, 43: 99-101.

<sup>31</sup> If so they would not have been the last to try this. In October of 1656, following in the footsteps of the Mohawks and Onondagas, the Oneidas tried to lure some Hurons to their villages. Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1656, JR, 42: 253.

<sup>32</sup> Letter of Father Ragueneau, Aug. 9, 1657, in [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, JR, 44: 69.

the French, and that which would best benefit each tribe as they sought to deal with their respective problems. The Onondagas, or at least a leading group of them, seemed convinced that peace with New France was in their best interest while the Mohawks were obviously committed to war. The Oneidas, Senecas, and possibly the Cayugas--the latter do not appear in the records for these years--were also prepared to maintain peace with New France. Yet neither the Onondagas nor the Mohawks were able to convince each other of the merits of their respective positions, and each continued to pursue their opposite policies. And, if they did not actively try to thwart each others plans, their endeavours to carry their policies to fruition certainly interfered with their respective efforts. Indeed, the disagreements between the Mohawks and other tribes in the Confederacy about peace vs. war with the French, and the competition over the remnants of the Hurons, created serious rifts among the tribes, and even led to some killings.<sup>33</sup> The Mohawks admitted to killing an

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<sup>33</sup> On the efforts to attract the Hurons see, Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1656, JR, 42: 253; Journal des Pères Jesuites, 1657, Ibid, 43: 59-61; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, Ibid, 43: 117-119, 187; Father Ragueneau's letter, Aug. 9, 1657, appended to [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, Ibid, 44: 69-77; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1657-58, Ibid, 44: 151; Marie de l'Incarnation à son fils, oct. 15, 1657, Correspondance, 591-592; [Radisson], Explorations, 45-55. The struggle for the Hurons in New France is summarized in Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 2: 801-815. L. Campeau, Gannentaha: Première mission iroquoise (1653-1665) (Montreal: Les Éditions Bellarmin, 1983), 1-53, covers these events, as well as the establishment and abandonment of the first Jesuit mission among the Iroquois.

Onondaga chief in 1654, were accused of killing two Senecas in 1655, and admitted to shooting accidentally a Seneca negotiator in 1656.<sup>34</sup> Since each of these events took place as either the Onondagas or Senecas tried to solidify their peaceful relations with the French, one may assume that the actions of the Mohawks reflected their displeasure, and were efforts to thwart the peace process.

Needless to say, these killings, and the continued pursuit of the Hurons, kept tension and mistrust at a high level among some of the Confederacy tribes. The extent of that distrust can be seen in the Mohawks efforts to turn the French against the Onondagas. In the spring of 1656 the Mohawks asked the French "to close the doors of his houses and of his forts against the Onnontageronnon, who wishes to be my enemy, and who is hatching some plot of war against me".<sup>35</sup> The Mohawks even tried to have the French join them in an alliance with the Dutch.<sup>36</sup> By June of 1656 French authorities apparently believed that the various Iroquois

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<sup>34</sup> A Dutch document dated January 6, 1654, but found between two others dated January 1655, records that the Mohawks asked the Dutch to help them "compose difficulties which have arisen" because the Mohawks have killed a chief of the "Sinekens of Onnedaego". [Court Minute], January 6, 1654, Pearson, ed., Early Records...of Albany, 1: 217. Since that chief was killed in the fall of 1654 as he returned with Father Lemoyne (Campeau, Gannentaha, 19), the actual date for this document should read January 6, 1655. On the killing of the Senecas see, [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, JR, 43: 101, 103.

<sup>35</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, JR, 43: 109.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 107-109.

tribes had reconciled their differences.<sup>37</sup> But if so, the Mohawks were not certain that all had been forgiven, and one year later they went to Fort Orange to ask the Dutch for shelter for their women and children, and to request cannon for their villages in case they should go to war with the "Sinnekes".<sup>38</sup> As late as 1660, Dutch authorities still seemed to accept that relations between the Mohawks and the some of the other tribes of the Confederacy (they used the term Sennekes to refer to all the tribes but the Mohawks), were tense. At a conference in that year they asked the "Sinnekes" not to use the gift of powder they were given against the Mohawks.<sup>39</sup>

Divine revelation would be useful to help explain what happened next, because in 1658, just as it seemed that the Onondagas had brought most of the Confederacy around to their point of view, and as conflict with the Mohawks threatened to lead to internal war among the Confederacy, their differences were put aside and the Onondagas and Oneidas joined with the Mohawks and renewed their war against the French.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, JR, 43: 169.

<sup>38</sup> Propositions of Three Mohawk Castles..., June [16-22], 1657, NYCD, 13: 73. See also Minutes of the Court of Fort Orange and Beverwyck, 2: 45, 47-48.

<sup>39</sup> [Council Minute], July 27, 1660, Ibid, 186.

<sup>40</sup> True, there were several more attempts at peace in 1658 and 1659, but these were half hearted efforts designed to regain Iroquois from various tribes that had been captured

Beginning in the Spring of 1658 these three tribes were repeatedly identified as those attacking the French, and they continued to lead the war against New France for the next few years.<sup>41</sup> One, of course, cannot be certain that renewed war was any less an ad hoc process than peace had been. In fact, it seems reasonable to suggest that either Mohawk pressure on the other tribes, or continued Mohawk raiding in the years prior to 1658, encouraged some tribes, or factions of some tribes, to pursue war.

Factional strife certainly appears to have been a factor in the Onondagas decision to war. While the Onondaga headman Garakontié consistently and sincerely sought peace with New France, and even with some of her allies, others in his tribe did not. In 1656 a member of his own delegation jeopardized Garakontié's plans, and the nascent French mission and post in Onondaga, by attacking the very Hurons Garakontié had managed to lure to his tribe.<sup>42</sup> In 1658, despite his continued desire for peace, a group of his own tribe agreed to renew war against the French. Garakontié was forced to warn the French

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when the Iroquois had attacked New France. [Council Minute], Aug. 13, 1658, NYCD, 13: 88-89; Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1658, JR, 44: 113-115, 121, 125; Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1659 and 1660, Ibid, 45: 81-87, 103.

<sup>41</sup> See Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1658 to 1662. On the marked increase in raiding against the French starting in 1658 see Graph 7.1.

<sup>42</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1640-41, JR, 21: 27-59.

among the Onondagas of this in order to save their lives.<sup>43</sup> Nor did this problem disappear. A few years later, as Garakontié tried to patch up damaged Onondaga-French relations, another Onondaga headman, Otreouti, was engaged in attacking the French.<sup>44</sup> By 1664 the Jesuits despaired that factionalism would stymie Garakontié's peace efforts. They knew that there were other clans in his tribe that were "too envious and too much opposed to him" to allow Garakontié to conclude a "general peace with the French".<sup>45</sup>

But in the end, what is certain is that by 1658 Mohawk pressure and action led to renewed war against New France. And, if up to 1660 the raiding had been by small groups of Iroquois and did not reflect tribal consensus, the Mohawks still had not given up hopes of larger scale incursions, and in the Spring of 1660 an army of 500 Mohawks set off to attack New France. In May of that year they met up with 200 Onondagas and defeated a small group of French and Hurons.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1657-58, JR, 44: 157-165; Campeau, Gannentaha, 42.

<sup>44</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1660-61, JR, 47: 69-79. See also, Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated [Aug.29], 1661.

<sup>45</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1663-64, JR, 49: 143.

<sup>46</sup> This is the now famous battle of Dollard des Ormeaux against the Iroquois. See Appendix D, Table D.1, entry dated [End of May], 1660. There were some Oneidas among the 700 Iroquois, but the sources do not indicate how many. The original target was Quebec, but the French forced the Iroquois' hand when they went out from Trois Rivières to try and steal the Iroquois' furs. Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1659-1660, JR, 45: 153; Marie de l'Incarnation à son fils, juin 25, 1660, Correspondance, 619. Campeau, Gannentaha, 56

It is not clear if the Onondagas had gone up to the colony to join with the larger Mohawk army. The French had left their fort because they expected some returning Iroquois hunters and hoped to steal their furs. Given the size of the Onondagas group, and that of the Mohawks, it seems likely that the Onondagas had gone to New France to join the Mohawks and had done some hunting while awaiting the arrival of the Mohawks. A more telling indicator that the Onondagas had gone to the colony to war was the fact that in June of 1660 the Mohawks went to the Onondagas and invited them to "once more" join their forces. The Mohawks obviously hoped to follow up the recent success, and this time "sweep away the French Colony of three Rivers".<sup>47</sup> The French also learned that the following year, 1661, the entire Confederacy was going to meet at Onondaga to develop a joint plan of attack against the French.<sup>48</sup> The Confederacy did, in fact, meet in 1661, but most of the tribes decided to renew peace with the French.<sup>49</sup> Yet, if no more major invasions of New France were launched, and some members of the Confederacy looked for a peaceful resolution of their problems with the French, others did not,

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suggests that the original goal of the attack was to capture the remaining Hurons. This may have been true, but I suspect that revenge against the French was an equally likely motive.

<sup>47</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1659-60, JR, 46: 121.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 123.

<sup>49</sup> Father Lemoyne to Father Lalemant, Aug. 25 and Sept 11, 1661, in [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1660-61, Ibid, 47: 69-70.

and the Mohawks, and some Oneidas and Onondagas continued to press the French.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, the Mohawks did not stop raiding against the French until 1666.<sup>51</sup>

Why were the Mohawks prepared to continue fighting and some factions, or other tribes, willing to listen to them and also pursue war? Certainly revenge may have had something to do with the Mohawks position. Over the years they had lost a number of people to the French, and most certainly sought to kill and capture French people to avenge those losses or to replace dead Mohawks.<sup>52</sup> Possibly the motivation for the Mohawks' hostile policy in these years, and for that of those other Iroquois who agreed with them, is best summed up by that shrewd observer of life in New France, Marie de l'Incarnation. She had no doubt that the "dessein des Hiroquois" was to drive the French out of Canada. The reason was, she wrote, that the Iroquois wanted to live and hunt free of fear of attacks. They desired to "rester seuls en toutes ce contrées, afin d'y vivre sans crainte, et d'avoir toutes les bêtes pour vivre et

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<sup>50</sup> See Graph 7.1, and Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1660 to 1662.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, entries for 1662 to 1666.

<sup>52</sup> The French explorer and trader Pierre Radisson was only one of the many inhabitants of New France who was captured and adopted by the Mohawks. Revenge and capture, needless to add, may also have been goal of other tribes in their raids against the French.

pour en donner les peaux aux Hollandois".<sup>53</sup> The French, she implies, were obviously a threat to this future; otherwise there was no need to remove them. It was not, she added, that the Iroquois necessarily liked the Dutch better than the French, but rather that they had to make use of someone to trade with, and the Dutch were closer.<sup>54</sup> She might have added that the Iroquois, the Mohawks in particular, had stuck with the Dutch because their attempts to deal with the French on Mohawk terms had been rebuffed and because the Mohawks still did not trust the French.

Indeed, the French had done little to alter their apparently hostile posture towards the Mohawks. In 1655, for example, the Mohawks told the Dutch that they suspected the French were opposed to their peace with French allies, and said that "their promises...[are] mingled with many lies".<sup>55</sup> They most likely blamed the reluctance of the Hurons to relocate to Mohawk villages on the French, and they were partly correct. In 1654, when the French learned of the

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<sup>53</sup> Marie de l'Incarnation a son fils, nov. 2, 1660, Correspondance, 648. Her emphasis on land as a buffer and means of sustenance addresses the continuing importance of territory in Iroquois policy, but does not shed any light on the question of whether the Iroquois were seeking to expand into new lands, or were defending what they believed was theirs. It is worth stressing that she mentions land for furs last in the sequence of reasons why the Iroquois wanted to remove the French.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Propositions made by...the Mohawks, Nov. 19, 1655, Pearson, Early Records of Albany, 1: 237

various Iroquois offers to the Hurons, they counselled the Hurons to agree to them in order to prevent more attacks against the Hurons, and to buy time so that the French could help stop such a move.<sup>56</sup> But if protecting the Hurons and keeping a goodly number of native warriors in the colony to bolster its fighting strength, was a reasonable policy for New France to follow, to the Mohawks it might seem that the French were interfering in their plans. When the French sent Jesuits and Hurons to Onondaga, thereby helping to thwart the Mohawks efforts to gain the Hurons for themselves and, at the same time, bolstering the strength of the Onondagas, it could only have confirmed New France's hostile intent towards the Mohawks.

New France's continued arming of their native allies, who were foes of the Iroquois, can only have reinforced Iroquois doubts about the sincerity of French professions of peace with the Iroquois. The extent of the French gun trade in this period is not clear, but selling guns to natives appears to have been a fairly common practice. In 1656, for example, a returning Ottawa fur brigade gave away their position to the Iroquois because they fired their newly acquired weapons.<sup>57</sup> In 1660 the French trader Radisson chastised the Ottawas for not taking better care of their guns, and for fearing to go with their furs to New France. After all, he said, his

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<sup>56</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1653-54, JR, 41: 61-65.

<sup>57</sup> [De Quen's] Relation of 1655-56, JR, 42: 229.

partner Groseilliers had more to fear from the Iroquois because he had "long since" been the one that had furnished the enemies of the Iroquois "with arms".<sup>58</sup> By 1662 the Ojibways had guns, and the Jesuits reported in their journals that "powder and firearms" were what groups such as the Ottawas sought in their trade with the French.<sup>59</sup> While the sale of guns to their allies was a logical thing for the French to do, it must have seemed the height of duplicitousness to some Iroquois. They may even have harboured fears that the French were encouraging native wars in order to kill off the Iroquois.

All of these reasons, then, help explain the continued hostility of the Iroquois towards New France. Indeed, these reasons may have provided those who wished to pursue war against the French colony with the ammunition to dissuade groups considering a more peaceful path. As well, French actions may have weakened the position of those Iroquois who had advocated peace with the French. For example, the credibility of those Iroquois who sought closer ties to New France in order to obtain military help must have been diminished by the French response. Not only did the French continue to arm Iroquois foes, but the French had not provided

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<sup>58</sup> [Radisson], Explorations, 99, 103. The fact that French traders should fear Iroquois wrath for trading guns to French allies indicates that they knew this practice upset the Iroquois.

<sup>59</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1662-63, JR, 48: 75; Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1665, Ibid, 49: 245.

men for their wars. Instead, they had sent priests who told them their view of the world and their customs needed to be changed.<sup>60</sup> The altered political and military situation of the late 1650s may also have meant that calls for war fell on more receptive ears. By 1658 the Eries and the Neutrals had been defeated, and the Iroquois appeared to be holding their own against their remaining foes.

Still if some Iroquois wanted to wage war against New France others did not. Between 1660 and 1664 the Onondagas, Cayugas, Senecas, Oneidas, and even the Mohawks tried, to renew peace with the French.<sup>61</sup> The reasons for these peace overtures varied with each tribe and year. Some Onondagas, of course, had never wanted to breach the peace. Garakontié had tried to patch up Onondaga-French relations as soon as other members of his tribe, and of the Confederacy, had harmed

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<sup>60</sup> On the early Jesuit mission to Onondaga, and their hopes of extending their ministry to the other tribes see Campeau, Gannentaha, 20-44. On the Jesuits' methods of converting natives to Christianity see, François-Marc Gagnon, La conversion par l'image: un aspect de la Mission des Jésuites auprès des Indiens du Canada au XVIIe siècle (Montreal: Éditions Bellarmin, 1975); J. Axtell, The Invasion Within, 43-127. A good brief overview of the Jesuit's methods for bringing about change, and of their efficacy, is James Axtell's, "Agents of Change: Jesuits in the Post-Columbian World" in his Beyond 1492: Encounters in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 152-170.

<sup>61</sup> [Lalemant'] Relation of 1659-60, JR, 46: 117; [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1660-61, Ibid, 47: 69-79, 97-103; [Lalmant's] Relation of 1663-64, Ibid, 49: 139-149; Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1664, Ibid, 48: 239.

them.<sup>62</sup> Thus his efforts to establish a firm Onondaga-French peace were merely the continuation of a process he had begun years earlier. As for the Senecas and Cayugas, they had not actively raided against the colony of New France after they had agreed to peace in 1655 as had done the Mohawks, Oneidas, and some of the Onondagas.

But peace with New France took on an added urgency in the early to mid-1660s, even for the Mohawks. The optimistic military situation of the late 1650s had quickly altered. The renewal of war between the Senecas and the Susquehannocks in 1660 did not go quite as well as the Senecas may have hoped. The Susquehannocks early on received military support and weapons from the English government of Maryland, and this thwarted Seneca war efforts.<sup>63</sup> The Mohawks, on the other hand, met with some costly losses against eastern Algonkians in 1663 and 1664.<sup>64</sup> These military setbacks, added to famine and disease led the various tribes of the Confederacy

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<sup>62</sup> Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1658, JR, 44: 113.

<sup>63</sup> Assembly Proceedings, May 2, 1661, Md. Archives, 1: 407; [Lalemant'] Relation of 1662-63, JR, 48: 77. As early as 1642 the Maryland Assembly had prohibited "lending arms to Indians". Assembly Proceedings, July 26, 1642, Md. Archives, 1: 134. This would seem to suggest that arms trading was taking place. In 1650, when colonists were allowed to trade freely with the Indians, the prohibition on trading arms was repeated. An Act Concerning Trade with Indians, [April, 1650], Ibid, 307.

<sup>64</sup> For these raids and their results see, Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1661 to 1664. The Onondagas and Cayugas took part in the Senecas' wars against the Susquehannocks. Ibid.

to seek peace with New France in the hopes of obtaining weapons, military aid, or to reduce the number of those actively at war with them.<sup>65</sup>

Political and trade uncertainty, the result of English-Dutch conflict over what came to be New York, may also have played a part in Iroquois desires to seek a peaceful relationship with the French. In 1663 Connecticut took parts of New Netherland, and in the summer of 1664, the whole colony fell to the English. In these same years the Dutch were also engaged in war against the Esopus Indians. The latter event may even have led to restrictions of gun and ammunition sales to the Iroquois. Indeed, the lack of ammunition to carry out a defense was one reason for New Netherland's capitulation to the English.<sup>66</sup> Given all of this, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the supply to the Iroquois for their own wars was affected. In any case, these events could not have failed to cause some concern among the Iroquois about the security of their supply sources. This may have led some to want peace with the French as a means to gain access to a more stable supplier, or because war against the colony would be difficult to sustain without the guns and ammunition

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<sup>65</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1662-63, JR, 48: 79-81; [Lalemant's] Relation of 1663-64, Ibid, 49: 139-143. Between 1660 and 1663, the Iroquois were struck by three epidemics of smallpox. See the discussion in Appendix B, and Table B.1.

<sup>66</sup> Letter of the Town Council of New Amsterdam, Sept. 16, 1664, NNN, 452; Report of the Surrender of New Netherland by Peter Stuyvesant, Oct. 16, 1665, Ibid, 458-466.

supplied by the Dutch.

Yet, if the diplomatic and military events of the 1650s and early 1660s reveal anything, it is the complexity of Iroquois policy--due, in part, to their decentralized government--and the enduring hostility of the Mohawks towards the French. As the Jesuit Lalemant observed, with the Indians,

one cannot assume any other standard than that of their own self interests...Nothing but the terror and fear of our arms, or the hope of some considerable profit in their trading, or the aid to be obtained from us against their enemies, can hold them in check; and even that will not prevent some from separating from the rest and coming by stealth to slay us."<sup>67</sup>

Thus in 1664, even as most of the Confederacy appeared to want peace, some Iroquois--most likely the Mohawks--conceiving their self-interest differently from the rest of the Confederacy, once again renewed the war against the French.<sup>68</sup>

But by 1666, French government officials had had enough. They either did not understand the complex and diffuse nature of Iroquois government and politics, did not care, or thought that repeated offers of peace in the face of continued raiding were part of some Machiavellian scheme on the part of the

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<sup>67</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1661-62, JR, 47: 217. "Profit", in the above quote, should be read to mean "advantage" or "benefit" in a general sense, rather than profit as in modern usage, meaning the part of a price above the cost of a given good.

<sup>68</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1664 to 1666. The French were attacked 9 times by the Iroquois in these years, but the sources only identify the specific tribe once. In that instance, the Iroquois tribe in question was the Mohawks.

Iroquois Confederacy. In any case, New France had passed under direct royal control in 1663 and the colony now had greater resources.<sup>69</sup> One of the first changes made was to provide it with coordinated military leadership and a small professional army for its defense. The result was that in 1666 two expeditions were launched against the Mohawks.<sup>70</sup> The aftermath of these attacks was, at last, a firm peace between all of the Iroquois and the French.<sup>71</sup>

It is an accepted view that the French attacks against the Mohawks finally instilled the fear of French military strength necessary to keep the Confederacy loyal to a peace treaty.<sup>72</sup> This may be partly true; after all, the Mohawks could not help but be convinced of the French ability to strike a serious blow against them after De Tracy's destruction of their villages in 1666. But, while this view helps to account for the Mohawks readiness to come to terms with the French in 1666, it overlooks other, equally important reasons for the Mohawks' and the Confederacy's decision to

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<sup>69</sup> W.J. Eccles, Canada Under Louis XIV: 1663-1701, and Eccles, Frontenac: The Courtier Governor, remain the definitive studies of the political and military history of New France in the second half of the seventeenth century.

<sup>70</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entries dated Jan. 9 to March 8, 1666; Sept. 28 to Nov. 5, 1666.

<sup>71</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1665-66, JR, 50: 135-139; Journal des Pères Jésuites, 1666-67, Ibid, 50: 191. The Mohawks confirmed their peace with the French in 1667.

<sup>72</sup> Goldstein, French-Iroquois Military and Diplomatic Relations, 98, 101; Eccles, France in America, 70.

make peace, and keep it for almost two decades. This interpretation, for example, overlooks the fact that most of the Confederacy had not been interested in war with New France since at least 1655. They did not need the threat of French arms to convince them that peace was desirable, they already felt that way. As well, the strength of their foes' resistance helps explain why most of the Confederacy still sought peace and why the Mohawks were ready to consider peace in 1666-67. The western Iroquois, the Senecas especially, were still being hard pressed by the Susquehannocks, while the Mohawks continued to have difficulties to the east.<sup>73</sup> Indeed, their wars against other groups was an important reason why peace with New France was kept for so many years. It was not until 1677 that the Susquehannocks were finally defeated.

Other reasons also played an important role in persuading some Confederacy members that peace with New France had long been a good course to follow, and in convincing the Mohawks to make, and keep, peace for a while. One of the most significant was that time was needed to establish political and trade relations with the new English rulers of New York, formerly New Netherland. In September of 1664, the year the

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<sup>73</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1667 to 1677. The Mahicans, Loups in French sources, were proving to be particularly difficult on the Iroquois. Ibid and, [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1666-67, JR, 51: 83, 203, 243. A peace between the Mohawks and the Mahicans, made in 1666, apparently broke down. Peace between the Maquase and the Mahicanders, Aug. 31 to Sept. 10, 1666, Livingston Indian Records, 34-35.

agreed to furnish the Mohawks and the "Synicks" with the same goods as had the Dutch.<sup>74</sup> However, one must wonder at their ability to establish traders, supply lines, and native trust quickly enough not to disrupt the flow of goods, especially weapons, to the Iroquois. Indeed, it is questionable just how willing the English were to continue arming tribes that had been allied to those they had just conquered. Eventually the Dutch traders at Albany (formerly, Fort Orange) kept hold of the trade, but they too must have struggled at first to establish new suppliers, and to overcome English reluctance to allow their newly conquered subjects to engage in arms trading.<sup>75</sup> In any case, until the English could prove themselves reliable trade partners, or possibly political allies, it would not be wise to renew war against New France.

Disease, new wars, and the influence of the Jesuits, may also have contributed to Iroquois reluctance to renew war against New France. At the same time that some of their foes were providing strong resistance, and their access to guns and ammunition was less than certain, the Iroquois were also suffering from continued epidemics. Between 1668 and 1682, the Confederacy was struck by epidemic disease on five separate occasions.<sup>76</sup> If the widespread illness and death did not sap

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<sup>74</sup> Articles between Col. Cartwright and the New York Indians, Sept. 24, 1664, NYCD, 3: 67.

<sup>75</sup> Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 43, 83-85.

<sup>76</sup> Appendix B, Table B.1.

the Iroquois will to fight, it most certainly impaired their ability to do so as the Confederacy lost well over 2,200 people in these years.<sup>77</sup> Efforts to gain new peoples to replace those lost to disease and new wars begun at the instigation of newly adopted peoples, also kept the Iroquois pre-occupied enough that they could forget about wars with New France.<sup>78</sup> Nor should one discount the influence of the Jesuits among the Iroquois tribes during the years 1667 to 1682. They most certainly worked to keep French-Iroquois relations harmonious.<sup>79</sup>

Yet, despite all the reasons for wanting and maintaining peace, and despite the fact that the peace of 1666-67 lasted longer than any other before it, it too finally broke down. And, if the years up to 1666-67 had been marked by constant Mohawk hostility and peaceful overtones tinged with ambivalence on the part of the rest of the Confederacy, the wars of the 1680s and 1690s reflected no such doubts or divisions. This time the Iroquois were united in their

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<sup>77</sup> Appendix A, Table A.2.

<sup>78</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1668 to 1684. As we have already seen in chapter 3, the wars against the Piscataways in the early 1680s were the result of the recently adopted Susquehannocks using their new military strength to exact revenge on their old foes.

<sup>79</sup> Various priests played key roles as emissaries and translators, and these efforts are covered in their biographies but, unfortunately, the exact role of the Jesuits in French-Iroquois political affairs in the seventeenth century have yet to be studied systematically.

determination to extinguish the French "fyres" in North America.

## Chapter 9

## "Your fyre shall burn no more"

Why, despite all the reasons for peace, and almost 20 years of relatively amicable relations between the Iroquois and the French, did the Iroquois decide to renew war against New France in the early 1680s? French authorities, even if they did not all arrive at the same conclusion, were not at a loss for answers to this question. For some French officials, Iroquois desires to be feared, and dreams of continental mastery explained why they sought the destruction of New France. The Iroquois war against the colony was simply part of their efforts to "dominer sur toutes les autres et a sen faire craindre".<sup>1</sup> Others, such as Governor La Barre, saw the destruction of New France as part of an Iroquois plan to control the fur trade.<sup>2</sup> Needless to say, since the 1680s marked the beginning of Anglo-French commercial and imperial struggles in North America, these types of assessments reflected the political and economic aspirations of French

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<sup>1</sup> [Anon.], *Memoire pour Eclaircir la dispositions dans les quelles Monsieur le Comte de Frontenac a l'aissé le Canada a l'Egard des Sauvages et principalement des Iroquois*, [1682], AN, C11A, 6: 21; De Meulles au Ministre, nov. 12, 1682, Ibid, 85.

<sup>2</sup> Dans l'assemblée tenue 10 octobre, 1682..., Ibid, 68-70. The Jesuits also recorded this meeting. See, *Assembly at Quebec*, Oct. 10, 1682, *JR*, 62: 157.

officials more than they did the goals of the Iroquois.<sup>3</sup>

Yet, if French officials projected their concerns onto the Iroquois, and found in Iroquois actions and policy the type of goals they were themselves motivated by, the causes of renewed Iroquois hostility against New France were not that far hidden. The simple answer is that French actions and policy conflicted with, and threatened, the security and survival of the Iroquois. True, some warfare, such as the attack against the French village of Lachine, represented Iroquois efforts to exact revenge for previous losses at the hands of the French.<sup>4</sup> But in the long run Iroquois hostility was the product of the threats they felt were posed by New

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<sup>3</sup> Helen Broshar, "The First Push Westward of the Albany Traders", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 7, 3 (Dec. 1920): 228-241; A.H. Buffington, "The Policy of Albany and the and English Westward Expansion", *Ibid*, 8, 4 (March 1922): 327-366; Eccles, "The Fur Trade and Eighteenth Century Imperialism", 341-362. La Barre for example, focused on the threat to the fur trade because he was so concerned with profiting from it. While Baron LaHontan's charge that La Barre's 1684 expedition against the Iroquois was a mere cover for a trading venture seems an exaggeration, the Intendant De Meulles' report that La Barre would not have run out of materiel to wage war if he had not used his military supply convoys to transport trade merchandise for his personal ventures, lends some credence to the view that La Barre took advantage of the occasion to further his trade interests. It also seems to confirm the extent of his interest in, and desire to profit from, the fur trade. Lahontan, New Voyages, 1: 86; De Meulles au Ministre, oct. 10, 1684, AN, C11A, 6: 389. See also, Robert la Roque de Roquebrune, "Le Febvre de la Barre", Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 1: 442-446. Eccles, Frontenac, 157-172, presents a more sympathetic account of La Barre's actions.

<sup>4</sup> Monseignat, Relation de ce qui S'est passé deplus remarquable en Canada... [Nov. 1689 to Nov. 1690], AN, C11A, 11: 7-8; Answer of the five Nations..., Sept. 23, 1689, Livingston Indian Record, 157.

France's expansionist policy.

Among the French actions that threatened and angered the Iroquois was the continual French expansion of their network of Indian allies. The Iroquois found it most suspicious that the French allied themselves with tribes with whom the Iroquois were at odds, and that the French asked the Iroquois to give up warring against these French native allies who, meanwhile, continued to strike against the Iroquois. As one Seneca asked Governor Courcelle,

For whom does Onnontio take us?...He is vexed because we go to war, and wishes us to lower our hatchets and leave his allies undisturbed. Who are his allies? How would he have us recognize them when he claims to take under his protection all the peoples discovered by the bearers of God's word through all these regions; and when everyday, as we learn from our people who escape from the cruelty of the stake, they make new discoveries, and enter nations which have ever been hostile to us,--which, even while receiving notification of peace from Onnontio, set out from their own country to make war upon us, and to come and slay us under our very palisades?<sup>5</sup>

It is clear that the Iroquois suspected the French of building up this network of native allies to help them destroy the Five Nations.

The fact that their foes, and new French allies, were armed with guns when they attacked the Iroquois and encroached

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<sup>5</sup> [Dablon's] Relation of 1670-71, JR, 54: 263-265. Onnontio was the name the Iroquois gave to all French governors. It means "great mountains" and was a literal translation of Montmagny, the name of the first French governor they had sustained contact with.

upon Iroquois lands must have further confirmed Iroquois misgivings about French policy towards them. If in the years up to 1680 French gun sales to natives had been sporadic and, possibly, unauthorized (and this is by no means certain--it is the lack of data that leaves this impression), by the 1680s the French had finally overcome their reluctance to arm their allies. Both French traders and government authorities traded and gave guns to French native allies. For example, in January of 1680 La Salle journeyed to the Illinois and agreed to sell them "armes et...munitions".<sup>6</sup> The extent of the "armes" sold is unknown, but in 1684 one French trade convoy on its way to resupply a fort in Miami and Illinois territory, carrying goods valued at 15,000 Livres, was attacked because guns were part of the shipment.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, arms and ammunition probably accounted for the high value of the trade cargo. In 1697 the trade list for Fort Bourbon showed that 620 guns, 10,000 livres weight of powder, and 12,000 livres weight of

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<sup>6</sup> Relation officielle de l'entreprise de Cavelier de La Salle de 1679 a 1681, in Margry, Découvertes et établissements, 1: 469.

<sup>7</sup> Instructions que Sieur de la Barre...donne a Sieur de Salvaye, juiellete 24, 1684; [Conf. with Iroquois], Aug. 5, 1684, Colden, Five Indian Nations, 61; Lahontan, New Voyages, 1: 81. The Iroquois did not change their story about why they attacked this convoy. In 1687 they again repeated to English authorities that they had attacked the French because they were carrying arms to Iroquois foes. Information given by the...[Iroquois], August 2, 1687, Pennsylvania Archives, Penn Manuscripts, vol. 1: 1, in W.S. Jenkins, comp., Records of the States of the United States (Library of Congress, 1949)

lead for making balls, were valued at 15,330 Livres.<sup>8</sup> If the gun trade at other forts matched that at Fort Bourbon, then one can suggest that the French were trading guns to natives in large quantities. Nor did French allies obtain guns just by trade. A significant number of guns were given to French native allies during conferences as a means of cementing their allegiance and to encourage them to war against the Iroquois. In 1686 the Illinois were given 150 guns to this end, and at a conference in 1693 some 158 guns were distributed as presents among the tribes in attendance.<sup>9</sup> The Iroquois did not fail to complain of the deleterious effects that the French gun trade was having on their ability to war and hunt successfully.<sup>10</sup>

More annoying, and threatening, to the Iroquois was French expansion into, and building of military posts in,

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<sup>8</sup> *Estat des marchandises necessaires pour la traite du fort Bourbon*, [1697], AN, C11A, 15: 258. These prices do not include the cost of holsters/scabbards for the guns, pistols, nor that of pre-made lead balls. In that same year, 1,200 livres weight of kettles was worth 1,320 Livres. *Ibid.* Since guns were more valuable than kettles (about 10 Livres worth to 1 Livres worth respectively) it would require a larger number of kettles than guns to make up the same value of cargo. It is unlikely that seven canoes--the number attacked in the 1684 convoy--could carry that much worth of kettles.

<sup>9</sup> *Champigny au Ministre*, nov. 5, 1687, AN, C11A, 9: 192-193; *Estat des marchandises est Munitions distribuées en 1693 aux nations sauvages eloignez dela colonie...*, *Ibid.*, 12: [290].

<sup>10</sup> [Conf. with the Iroquois], Aug. 5, 1684, Colden, *Five Indian Nations*, 61; Lahontan, *New Voyages*, 1: 81. See also, [Conf. with the Iroquois], Aug. 5, 1684, Wraxall, *Indian Affairs*, 12-13.

lands claimed and used by the Iroquois. Between 1666 and 1701 the French built almost 30 forts and fortified posts in the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes Basin.<sup>11</sup> Of these, at least seven were located around lakes Ontario and Erie--lands claimed by the Iroquois as their own and used by them for hunting.<sup>12</sup> The French built most of their forts in order to secure the fur trade, their religious missions, and militarily important areas against the encroachments of the Iroquois and the English in the Thirteen Colonies. Indeed, by the eighteenth century it became official French policy to use these forts, and to build more of them, to hem the English in along the eastern seaboard and not let them into the western interior.<sup>13</sup> That policy of containing the English, however, was first considered for, and used on, the Iroquois. Fort Richelieu, built in 1642 at the mouth of the Richelieu river, was put up to try and impede Iroquois access to New France. In 1666 three more forts were built further up that river for

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<sup>11</sup> C. Heidenreich, Plate 37, Historical Atlas of Canada, vol. 1, provides a comprehensive list of French forts, when they were established, and the years they were occupied. Plates 37 to 38 show the geographical distribution of most of the forts listed.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> On the origins of France's imperial policy towards the English colonies in America see, Eccles, Frontenac, 334-337; Eccles, Canada Under Louis XIV, 246-248. As Eccles points out, this strategy of Versailles', undertaken "to achieve the ends of France in Europe rather than France in North America", merely recognized the reality that had developed in New France during the closing decades of the seventeenth century as the colony's leaders and businessmen sought to protect their trade interests. Ibid, 246.

a similar purpose, and in 1673 Fort Frontenac was established, among other things, to monitor Iroquois movements at the eastern end of Lake Ontario.<sup>14</sup> By the early 1690s officials in New France were giving serious consideration to a plan to build a series of forts to keep the Iroquois from going much beyond the western end of Lake Ontario and to confine them to the areas south of that lake.<sup>15</sup>

The Iroquois objected to these incursions into their lands for several reasons. First, they opposed them on principal. These were their lands the French were settling on, and they had no right to them. To the French claim that such lands were theirs by right of conquest, by which the French meant the destruction of Iroquois villages in 1666 and 1687, the Iroquois replied that they had never been conquered.<sup>16</sup> For the Iroquois conquest meant the total destruction of an enemy and the incorporation of the defeated foe into the victor's society. The French had certainly not accomplished this in their raids against them. Moreover, if conquest of a tribe was grounds for claiming their lands, then, the Iroquois responded,

we can claim all Canida, for we not only did soe, [that is, they conquered it] but subdued whole nations of Indians that liv'd there, and demolished there castles in

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<sup>14</sup> Frontenac au Ministre, nov. 2, 1672, AN, C11A, 3: 240; Voyage de Monsieur Le Comte de Frontenac Au Lac Ontario en 1673, Ibid, 4: 12.

<sup>15</sup> Lahontan, New Voyages, 1: 273-274.

<sup>16</sup> [Conf. Minute], juin 15, 1688, AN, C11A, 10: 48.

so much, that now great oake trees grow where they were built, and afterwards we plyed the French home in the wars with them, that they were not able to go over a door to pisse.<sup>17</sup>

The Iroquois also opposed French expansion onto their lands because they had serious concerns about the impact of such incursions on their livelihood. They saw French expansion in general, and the building of French forts and posts on Iroquois land, and along the borders of their hunting areas, as threats to their control over their hunting areas.<sup>18</sup> As well, encouraged by the French presence, their enemies might start hunting more freely on lands claimed by the Iroquois and use up their food and fur resources. Certainly the Iroquois complained that increased hunting by others was depleting their fur supply. In 1683, when asked why they brought so few furs to trade, the Mohawks replied that when they were at war with "other Indians, those Indians would not dare to come on their hunting places; but now they are all in peace; the Indians catch away the Beaver so fast that there be but a very few left".<sup>19</sup> Those tribes hunting

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<sup>17</sup> Answer of the Six Nations...Feb. 13, 1688, NYCD, 3: 534. The view expressed in this quote seems to imply that wars were not fought for land per se. If conquest of a tribe was grounds for claiming rights over their land, the Iroquois would not question the French tactic, but rather just their claim to have conquered the Iroquois. This, in turn, suggests that Iroquois concerns over lands, and wars to that effect, were to protect what they considered theirs and to keep it for their uses, rather than to conquer tribes for their land.

<sup>18</sup> Abstract of the Proposals of the Onouendages and Cayouges, Aug. 2, 1684, NYCD, 3: 347.

<sup>19</sup> [Conf.] Oct. [4], 1683, NYCD, 14: 772.

on Iroquois lands may have felt it was safe to do so because of the general peace, but, no doubt, French forts in these areas helped bolster their confidence.

Worse still for the Iroquois, the presence of French forts on their lands and along their borders were a threat to their security. The forts might draw their foes closer to the Iroquois, and serve as staging areas for raids against the Iroquois and as havens for their enemies when pursued by the Five Nations--as happened after the start of Iroquois hostilities against New France--and would threaten the Iroquois as they hunted on their own land. Indeed, the Iroquois often complained that their foes, now armed by the French, attacked their hunters.<sup>20</sup>

In short, the Iroquois saw French expansion, and particularly the strategic locations of French posts in their lands, for what they were--an attempt to encircle them and to circumscribe their hunting and military endeavours. Time and again the Iroquois expressed their concerns about the threats posed to their lands, livelihood, and security by the string of French forts. The French, they said, "build forts around us and penn us up". They felt enslaved and as if they were "in prison so long as they are standing", and saw the forts as the first step to the eventual French usurpation of

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<sup>20</sup> [Conf. with the Iroquois], Aug. 5, 1684, Colden, Five Indian Nations, 61; Propositions of the Five Nations..., Aug. 5, 1687, NYCD, 3: 442; Gov. Dongan's Proposals [to the Iroquois], April 25, 1687, Livingston Indian Records, 113.

all their lands.<sup>21</sup>

No French establishment in the latter half of the seventeenth century raised Iroquois ire as much as did Fort Frontenac located in modern day Kingston Ontario. It seems to have served as an example of all the Iroquois feared the other posts could be: a direct invasion of their territory, a precursor of further encroachments, a threat to their hunting grounds, and a constant military menace. In 1673, when Governor Frontenac began building the fort the Iroquois had little choice but to accept it. The Dutch and English were once again struggling over control of New York, and the Albany merchants had little to offer in the way of war goods.<sup>22</sup> Still fighting against the Susquehannocks and the Mahicans, the Iroquois could not afford to turn down French arm supplies.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, at the meeting during which the Iroquois resigned themselves to let the French build the fort they asked the French for aid against the Susquehannocks.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Dongan to the Lord President, Feb. 19, 1688, NYCD, 3: 510; [Conf. with the Iroquois, July 20-27, 1698], in Propositions made by the Five Nations...[to the] Earl of Bellomont (New York: William Bradford, 1698), 5; [Conf. with the Five Nations], July 10-21, 1701, NYCD, 4: 900, 905, 907; Conference [with Iroquois, et al, July 9 to Aug. 15], Ibid, 988. These concerns continued well into the eighteenth century. See, for example, [Conf. with the Iroquois], Sept. 7-14, 1726, Ibid, 5: 790.

<sup>22</sup> Eccles, Canada Under Louis XIV, 103.

<sup>23</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1670 to 1677.

<sup>24</sup> Voyage de Monsieur Le Comte de Frontenac Au Lac Ontario en 1673, AN, C11A, 4: 21.

However, by 1675 the circumstances changed. The English were firmly in control of New York, the Susquehannocks defeated, and some Iroquois were prepared to renew war against New France by destroying Fort Frontenac.<sup>25</sup> At a meeting with the Iroquois in 1676, Governor Frontenac managed to convince the Iroquois to leave the fort alone, but it was eventually razed by the French in 1689 as the French withdrew their troops closer to the heart of the colony in response to an all out Iroquois attack against New France.<sup>26</sup>

French efforts to reestablish Fort Frontenac in the 1690s called forth the most vivid expressions of Iroquois opposition. They resented the danger the fort had posed in the past, and might pose again, to their travel to and from hunting and warfare, and again because it encroached on their lands.<sup>27</sup> When Governor Frontenac asked the Iroquois to meet with him at the site of the fort in 1690, they refused, and

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<sup>25</sup> Present Conditions of the Missions..., 1675, [by Father Dablon], JR, 59: 251; Father Jean Enjalran to [Father General], Oct. 13, 1676, Ibid, 60: 135.

<sup>26</sup> Le Roy a Frontenac, avril 28, 1677, Archives Nationales, Paris, Archives des Colonies, Ser. B, 7: 95; Eccles, Frontenac, 194.

<sup>27</sup> [Conf. with the Iroquois, July 20-27, 1698], in Propositions made by the Five Nations...[to the] Earl of Bellomont, 5; [Conf. with the Five Nations, July 10-21, 1701, NYCD, 4: 907; [Conf.], Aug. 16, 1694, Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 26. Colden, Five Indian Nations, 171-175, has a more detailed version of the August 16, 1694 conference.

asked him: "Don't you know that your Fire<sup>28</sup> there is extinguished? It is extinguished with Blood".<sup>29</sup> A few years later, in an eloquent and impassioned speech, Kaqueendara, an Iroquois spokesman, made their opposition to the fort (called Cadaracqui by the Iroquois and the English) even clearer.

Onnontio your fyre shall' burn' no' more at Cadracqui it shall never be kindled again. You did steale that place from us and wee quenched the fyre with the blood of our children[.] You thinke yourselves the ancient inhabitants of this cuntry and longest in possession yea all the Christian Inhabitants of New York and Cayenquiragué<sup>30</sup> thinke the same of themselves[.] Wee warriors are the firste and the ancient people and the greatest of You all, these parts and country's were inhabited and trodd upon by us the warrior's before any Christian...Wee shall note suffer Cadaracqui to be inhabited again. Onontio we Canossoené<sup>31</sup> do' say we shall never suffer you to kindle your fire at Cadaracqui; I repeat this again and again.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> In the metaphorical speech of the Iroquois, to establish a "fire" is to claim that place for oneself, or one's tribe. To "extinguish", or "put out" a fire is to leave that place or remove from it those who had lived there. A useful overview of this, and other metaphors, of Iroquois speech is "Glossary of Figures of Speech in Iroquois Political Rhetoric", in Jennings, ed., The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, 115-124.

<sup>29</sup> [Conf. at Onondaga], Jan. 22, 1690, Colden, Five Indian Nations, 111. This statement, and others like it, seem to suggest that the Iroquois considered the closing of the fort, the result of the 1689 attacks against the colony which began with the capture of some people near Fort Frontenac, a product of their attacks. It may even have been a major objective of their warfare for that year.

<sup>30</sup> This was the name the Iroquois applied to New York governor Benjamin Fletcher.

<sup>31</sup> This term, "people of the longhouse", is the Iroquois name for themselves.

<sup>32</sup> Message From the Governor of Canada to the Five Nations and their Answer, [Jan. 31-Feb. 4], 1695, NYCD, 4: 122.

Unfortunately for the Iroquois, they could not stop the French from re-occupying the site without English help and, despite promises of such aid, the English did not send men to help the Iroquois drive out the French.<sup>33</sup> Kaqueendara's speech, however, makes it clear that the Iroquois considered the land around Cadracqui theirs and the building of the French fort there a usurpation of their lands.

To add insult to injury, as if arming Iroquois foes and invading their lands were not bad enough, the French also angered the Iroquois by encouraging Iroquois converts to Christianity to leave Iroquoia and settle in New France. By 1676 there were 300 Iroquois living at Prairie de la Madeleine, and an unspecified number more at Lorette.<sup>34</sup> In all, by 1700, as many as 1,000 Iroquois may have settled in New France.<sup>35</sup> The Iroquois saw this French inspired population drain as a deliberate effort to weaken them in

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<sup>33</sup> [Conf.], Aug. 20. 1694, Colden, Five Indian Nations, 177-178; [Conf.] Sept. 18, 1695, Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 27-28; [Conf. with the Iroquois, July 20-27, 1698] in Propositions by the Five Nations... [to the] Earl of Bellomont, 10-11.

<sup>34</sup> Father Jean Enjalran to [?], Oct. 13, 1676, JR, 60: 145. By 1682 the Mohawks alone accounted for at least 180 of the Iroquois to be found at the missions of Praire de la Madeleine and St. François Xavier du Sault. [Dablon's] Relation of 1679, JR, 61: 241; Claude Chauchetière to [Father Superior], Oct. 14, 1682.

<sup>35</sup> B.G. Trigger, Plate 47, Historical Atlas of Canada, vol. 1.

order to destroy them.<sup>36</sup>

In all these actions by the French there was little to persuade the Iroquois that the French did not have some evil design up their sleeves, and much to convince them that French intentions were less than friendly. Yet, despite all this the Iroquois still did not launch a war against New France. In fact, the Confederacy only decided that the French "fyres" in Canada should be extinguished in 1687, and then only after the French had already attacked them. Until then, the only raids the Iroquois launched against the French were against traders supplying arms to their foes.<sup>37</sup> In that year, 1684, the French sent an army against the Iroquois in reprisal for those two raids. The French forces never reached their target and the French were obliged to conclude a peace with the Iroquois.<sup>38</sup> After that treaty no French groups or

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<sup>36</sup> Conference [with the Five Nations, July 10-21], 1701, NYCD, 4: 907. See also, D. K. Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois: Jesuit Missions and Christianity in Village Politics, 1642-1686", Ethnohistory, 32, 1 (1985), 11-12.

<sup>37</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entries dated 1680 to 1687.

<sup>38</sup> Presens des onontaguéz faits a onontio, a la famine sept. 5, 1684, AN, C11A, 6: 299-300. This is the official version of the treaty signed by La Barre. Lahontan, who was part of the French force, gives a much less flattering version of what transpired. Lahontan, New Voyages, 1: 75-84. Colden, Five Indian Nations, 65-71, paraphrases Lahontan. Even in La Barre's account the fact that the Iroquois had the upper hand is evident in their metaphors and light sarcasm. In their opening speech they say that give La Barre an "unpleasant drink" to rid the French of all that they suffered on their trip. Presens des onontaguéz..., sept. 5, 1684, AN, C11A, 6: 299. They knew the French had no choice but to take the bitter medicine. La Barre even had to give approval for the Iroquois war against the Illinois. When told the Iroquois were going

settlements were attacked until Governor Denonville attacked the Senecas in the summer of 1687. Thus if one is searching for the answer as to why the Iroquois decided to war against New France in the 1680s, it was because, as far as the Iroquois were concerned, they had been provoked beyond endurance.

It is true, of course, that if the Iroquois did not attack the French they did war against French native allies, and the French saw this as a threat. But, even if the Iroquois did not have grounds to be suspicious of this increasing network of armed French allies, the Five Nations had their own reasons for carrying on wars against native groups in the latter half of the seventeenth century. The traditional goals of warfare did not disappear; martial honour and revenge continued to be important motives for warfare, and help to account for raids by both individuals and tribes.<sup>39</sup> Pursuit of one enemy led to encounters with, and deaths at the hands of, new tribes who were then added to the roster of those from whom revenge had to be exacted. As the Mohawks' spokesman Sindachsegie put it, "it is our Custome amongst Indians to warr with one another" if they killed one of their

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to continue hostilities against that group, all he could do was ask them to be careful not to strike against the French in Illinois country. Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> See chapters 3-4.

people.<sup>40</sup> It was apparently such a scenario that accounted for the Iroquois wars against the Illinois and the Miamis. The Illinois were encountered as part of the Iroquois war against the Ottawas, and the Miamis seem to have become foes as a result of events that arose from the wars against the Illinois.<sup>41</sup> Once that feuding process was begun, revenge and the tactical practice of eliminating a foe as a means of terminating the war took over as an impetus to raiding.<sup>42</sup>

Hunting lands were also a factor in Iroquois wars against some native groups allied to New France. Time and again the Iroquois reported that the murderous incidents that required avenging began as one tribe--according to the Iroquois, always the other native group--knocked their hunters over the head during some non-hostile hunting trip.<sup>43</sup> This suggests that

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<sup>40</sup> Answer of the [Five Nations], Aug. 6, 1687, Penn Manuscripts, vol. 1: 3.

<sup>41</sup> Duchesneau, *Memoire pour faire connoistre....*, nov. 13, 1681, AN, C11A, 5: 309; Jean de Lamberville to [Father Superior], Aug. 25, 1682, JR, 62: 73-87, 95. In response to the questions about why the Iroquois warred against the Illinois, the Onondaga leader Teganissorens is reported to have answered "il merit  la mort; il m'a tu ; on n'osa point r pondre". Belmont, Histoire du Canada, 16. While this is a dramatic response, it accurately reflects the role of revenge in the start of these hostilities. The Iroquois war against the Ottawas probably started in a similar fashion as the Five Nations pursued the remnants of the Huron nation into Ottawa lands.

<sup>42</sup> Jean de Lamberville to [Father Superior], Aug. 25, 1682, JR, 62: 81; Father Thiery Beschefer to Father Provincial, Oct. 21, 1683, *Ibid*, 213.

<sup>43</sup> "Relation officielle...de La Salle" Margry, ed., D couvertes 1: 505; [Conf. Minute], Mar. 31, 1687, in Richter, "Rediscovered Links", 78; [Conf. with the Iroquois], Aug. 5,

wars against some native groups were fought as the Iroquois sought to protect their land against the encroachments of others. Indeed, this should not come as a surprise. The Iroquois sought to protect their land against French encroachments, so it is natural that they sought to hold it against the advances of New France's armed native allies. As New France's native allies became better armed, the Iroquois must have placed greater emphasis on preserving the fur resources of their lands in order to use them to purchase even more weapons to use in their defense. Certainly, the Iroquois complained often enough that other groups hunted in their lands, and at least one source puts the cause of the Iroquois war against the Illinois and Miamis as being due to these tribes hunting in Iroquois lands.<sup>44</sup>

Self-justification and hyperbole by the Iroquois aside, there is evidence to suggest that it was, indeed, the other groups who were invading Iroquois territory. As we have seen, the Iroquois hunted primarily along the St. Lawrence from the

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1684, Colden, Five Indian Nations, 61; Propositions of the Five Nations..., Aug. 5, 1687, NYCD, 3: 442; Gov. Dongan's Proposals [to the Iroquois], April 25, 1687, Livingston Indian Records, 113.

<sup>44</sup> [Conf.] Oct. [4], 1683, NYCD, 14: 772; Journal of Messrs. Bleeker and Schuylers Visit to Onondaga, [June 2-29, 1701], Ibid, 891. Lahontan, New Voyages, 1: 82. Lahontan suggests that the wars started because the Illinois and Miamis hunted, indeed--over hunted, in Iroquois lands. This may be true, but it is likely that the wars began as a result of deaths that occurred when one group attacked the other as they hunted near each other, rather than because the Miamis and Illinois trespassed onto Iroquois lands.

Ottawa River to Lake Ontario, and from present day Kingston towards present day Niagara falls. These continued to be their hunting grounds.<sup>45</sup> It was because these areas were their major hunting grounds that they so vehemently opposed the building of Fort Frontenac and later that of Detroit, and it was, in part, because these areas were excellent hunting and fur bearing lands that the French wanted to build forts there in the first place.<sup>46</sup> Given all that, it is not surprising that other native groups wanted to, and did, hunt there as well.<sup>47</sup> Indeed, it was access to hunting lands in these areas that French officials used to encourage Hurons and Miamis to relocate their villages to the vicinities of Forts Frontenac and Detroit.<sup>48</sup> There is even evidence that by 1700 some tribes may have needed to use these areas because they had over trapped their own and run out of beaver. In 1701 an Ottawa chief apologized for his small gift of beaver and excused himself by saying that they had stripped the

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<sup>45</sup> Lahontan, New Voyages, 1: 323; [Anon.], Relation [de ce qui s'est passé en Canada, 1695-1696], AN, C11A, 14: 36; Callieres et Champigny au Ministre, oct. 18, 1700, Ibid, 18: 3; Colden, Five Indian Nations, 181. Lahontan, like many other French writers, thought that the Iroquois were forced to range out of their lands to go to these areas. As far as the Iroquois were concerned, these were their lands.

<sup>46</sup> Robert Livingston's Report of his Journey to Onondaga, [April, 1700], NYCD, 4: 650. On the reasons for building forts Frontenac and Detroit see, Eccles, Frontenac, 79-83; Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 136.

<sup>47</sup> La Potherie, Histoire, 4: 179, 182-183.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 254-255.

beaver from their lands. Deputies from other nations echoed his plaint.<sup>49</sup> Doubtless the Iroquois hunted in other areas, and hunted in the lands of other tribes as they went to those areas to war. But in the end, it seems clear that they, for the most part, hunted in their own areas and fought to preserve the food and fur resources of those areas against the depredations of others.

As in past wars against native groups the Iroquois also fought to capture people. Between 1680 and 1698 the Iroquois captured 2,384 to 2,608 people.<sup>50</sup> Some of the captives may have been needed to offset population declines brought on by epidemic disease. In 1672, 1676, 1679, and again in 1682 the Iroquois were struck by disease.<sup>51</sup> Military considerations also created a demand for large numbers of captives. Not only was depopulation of an enemy a way to destroy them, it also served to bolster the Iroquois' own armies. The French were convinced that much of the Iroquois warfare against the colony's native allies was geared to this end. The Iroquois, they believed, wanted to destroy New France's allies in order to leave the colony with out adequate numbers of men to draw upon for its defense. Worse, they suspected, the Iroquois were using the captives to strengthen their own forces for a

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid, 203-204, 207, 221-222.

<sup>50</sup> Appendix F, Table F.1. Of that number, all but approximately 210 (about 8.7%) were Indians. Ibid, Table F.2.

<sup>51</sup> Appendix B, Table B.1.

large scale attack against the French. The Iroquois did little to dissuade them from this line of thinking. A letter to Governor Frontenac from Father Jean de Lamberville, who was stationed at Onondaga, is typical of French thinking on this issue.

Every year they profit by our losses; they annihilate our allies, of whom they make Iroquois; and have not the least scruple in saying that after enriching themselves with our spoils, and strengthening themselves with those who might have aided us to make war against them, they will all together fall upon Canada, to overwhelm it in a single Campaign. They have strengthened themselves, in this and the preceding years, with more than nine hundred men armed with muskets.<sup>52</sup>

If the expected attack did not materialize, it may have been because the Iroquois were still unsure of the timing, or possibly the favourable treaty they exacted from the French in 1684 put a halt to war plans. In any case, the French seemed to have discovered one important reason for Iroquois attacks against their native allies.

Nor did the Iroquois try to isolate the French from their allies strictly by military means. Throughout the latter part of the century the Iroquois tried diplomacy to wean French

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<sup>52</sup> Jean de Lamberville to Gov. Frontenac, Sept. 20, 1682, JR, 62: 153. For similar views see, [Gov. La Barre], Dans l'assemblée tenue 10 octobre, 1682..., Ibid, 68-70; Lahontan, New Voyages, 1: 395; Louis Henri Chevalier de Baugy, Journal d'une expédition contre les Iroquois en 1687 (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1883), 50-52. The Iroquois continued to practice this strategy in the eighteenth century. See [Conf. at Onondaga], June 6-10, 1710, Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 71-74.

native allies away from the French.<sup>53</sup> The Iroquois even used the English and their trade as a means to break up the French network of native alliances. They actively encouraged French native allies to come via Iroquois lands to trade with the English and Dutch at Albany, and cautioned those traders and officials to keep the prices of their goods low in order to show French allies the advantages of trade with Albany over that at Montreal.<sup>54</sup> Some French officials thought that the

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<sup>53</sup> See for example the efforts to get the Hurons, Ottawas, Ojibwas, Missisaugas, and the Iroquois living on the reserves in New France, to make peace with the Iroquois and/or relocate to Iroquoia. [Conf.], Feb. 3, 1690, Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 15; [Conf.]. Jan. 22, 1690, Colden, Five Indian Nations, 106-112; [Anon.], Relation de ce que s'est passé de plus Conséderable En Canada..., [1690 to 1691], AN, C11A, 11: 46; Champigny au Ministre, mai 10, 1691, Ibid, 256; Père Bruyas a Frontenac, avril 4, 1691, AN, C11E, 10: 9-11; Callieres au Ministre, oct. 19, 1694, AN, C11A, 13: 105; Frontenac et Champigny au Minstre, nov. 10, 1695, Ibid, 296; Propositions of the Five Nations..., June 30, 1700, NYCD, 4: 694-695; Conference [with the Iroquois, Aug. 26 to Sept. 4], 1700, Ibid, 732, 736. In one instance, when the English asked the Iroquois to capture some Jesuits, the Iroquois responded that this was not a wise policy since it might alienate some of the tribes they were trying to lure closer to them and who listened to the priests. Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> [Conf. Minute], Sept. 23, 1678, Richter, "Rediscovered Links", 76; Propositions to the Five Nations..., Aug., 5, 1687, NYCD, 3: 442-443; Groenendyke and Provoost to Commissioners, June 16, 1700, Ibid, 4: 691; Conference [with the Iroquois, Aug. 26 to Sept. 4], 1700, Ibid, 741. If there is still any doubt that the Iroquois did not serve as middlemen in the fur trade between Albany and the western tribes, this policy of the Iroquois should put it to rest. If the Iroquois brought in the furs of the western tribes they would hardly have allowed, or encouraged, those tribes to have direct access to their suppliers. Economically, the Iroquois had much to loose if they did. They would have lost their supposed middleman's profit, and would have allowed former foes access to their lands and its resources. The only reason for allowing the western tribes access to Albany, and taking such a security risk, was because the benefit to be gained--

Iroquois undertook the latter policy at the urging of, and for the benefit of the English trade.<sup>55</sup> Doubtless the traders at Albany were interested in the economic aspects of this Iroquois policy, and encouraged them to pursue it because of the profits they hoped to reap. However, it was the political and military advantages of this policy that interested the Iroquois. As the Iroquois remarked on the occasion of one anticipated relocation, luring to Iroquoia natives that were "in allyance with the French of Canida...will strengthen us and weaken the enemij."<sup>56</sup>

The policy of capturing people and getting them to relocate peacefully among the Iroquois was, of course, an old practice of the Iroquois. And, the Iroquois did have reasons other than mistrust of the French for undertaking such a policy. However, the threatening actions of the French, and later, New France's attacks against the Five Nations, could only have added new urgency to this Iroquois policy. Moreover, whether the French liked it or not, and whether or not they believed these wars against their native allies were

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weakening of the French--was worth the price.

<sup>55</sup> [Barrillion et Bonrepas?], *Memoire Pour Monseigneur le Marquis De Seignelay*, 1687, AN, C11A, 9: 249; [Denonville], *Memoire Instructif de L'Etat Des affaires de la Nouvelle france...*, aout 10, 1688, Ibid, 10: 67.

<sup>56</sup> *Propositions of...the Five Nations*, [June to July, 1693], *NYCD*, 4: 45. Moreover, given that the Iroquois had long before adopted the practice of capturing people to bolster their forces, it is unlikely that the English had to suggest such a course to them or point out the strategic benefits.

interference in their affairs or not, the Iroquois were equally convinced of their right to pursue their objectives as they saw fit. Indeed, in their opinion it was the Europeans who were meddling in their affairs. As Sindachsegie, an Iroquois spokesman, put it: "but what has the Christians to do with...[joining] one side or [the] other" in their wars.<sup>57</sup>

Once the French attacked the Iroquois in 1687, the Confederacy seemed determined not only to extinguish the French "fyres" in North America, but to remove every sign that they had ever been lit. In the ten years from 1687 to 1697 the Iroquois launched 33 raids against the French alone, sent armies of 1,000 men or more against the colony three times, and captured or killed close to 600 people.<sup>58</sup>

The Iroquois, however, recognized that they were outmanned by the French and their native allies, and that the French held a technological edge.<sup>59</sup> Luckily for them the

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<sup>57</sup> Answer of the [Five Nations], Aug. 6, 1687, Penn Manuscripts, vol. 1: 3. He was quick to add, however, that since the French were so actively supporting their native allies, the English might like to consider doing likewise. Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> See, Graph 7.1; Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1687 to 1697; Appendix F, Table F.2.

<sup>59</sup> In 1687 Denonville had amassed an army of 2,000 to war against the Iroquois. Append D, Table D.1, entry dated July to Aug., 1687. In their 1689 attack against Lachine, the best the Confederacy could do was a force of 1,200 to 1,500. Ibid, entry dated Aug. 5, 1689. However, the overall population of New France, about 15,000 in 1690, was comparable to, or slightly lower than that of the Iroquois. On the French population see, Hubert Charbonneau and R.C. Harris, Plate 46,

English in New York, impelled by the imperialist desires of England, were prepared to abet the Iroquois war with New France, and even, on occasion, to help them fight. Thus the Iroquois tried to use their European allies to further their military plans, just as the French used their native allies for those ends. The Iroquois rarely missed an opportunity to encourage the English to pursue the war against New France more vigorously, and even gave them advice on the methods best suited to bring about a victory over the French in Canada. Time and again the English were told that a combined land and sea attack was necessary to destroy the French. Time and again the Iroquois advised the English in the various colonies to join their forces and to go in large numbers to attack and besiege the French towns.<sup>60</sup>

Unfortunately for the Iroquois, the English were not particularly useful allies. They provided the weapons the Iroquois needed, but at a price.<sup>61</sup> Worse still, inter-

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Historical Atlas of Canada, vol. 1. On the Iroquois population see, Appendix C.

<sup>60</sup> Answer of the five Nations..., Sept. 23, 1689, Livingston Indian Records, 155; [Propositions of the Mohawks], March 25, 1690, Colden, Five Indian Nations, 117, 119; Proposals of the Commissioners...to the Indians, May 3, 1690, NYCD, 3: 714; Answer of the Five Nations..., June 2, 1691, Ibid, 776-777; Propositions of the Senecas and Mohawks..., Sept. 4, 1691, Ibid, 807; Answers of the Five Nations, June 6, 1692, Ibid, 842-844; Answer of the Five Nations to Governor Fletcher, Feb. 25, 1693, Ibid, 4: 22-23.

<sup>61</sup> The Iroquois complained that they received little ammunition for their beaver pelts. This stinginess, they said, was not all in line with the English requests for them to prosecute the war. Answer of the Five Nations..., June 2,

colonial bickering and disunity, not to mention incompetence, meant that the combined military might of New France's foes was never brought to bear on the colony. The Iroquois did not fail to castigate their partners for their lack of unity, incompetence, and laxness.<sup>62</sup> Indeed, the authorities in New York recognized that their disunity and military weakness were responsible for Iroquois desires to consider peace with the French.<sup>63</sup> However, they were able to do little to correct these problems and the Iroquois were left feeling that they bore the brunt of the war effort. The Mohawk spokesman Rode, when asked to continue to harass the French responded: "you Sett us on dayly to fight and destroy your Enemies and bidd us goe on with Courage, but wee see not that you doe anything to

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1691, NYCD, 3: 774-777.

<sup>62</sup> Journal of Benjamin Bullivant..., [Feb. 13 to May 19], 1690, CSP, 13: 264. These complaints led to renewed requests by the King for the other colonies to contribute more to the war effort. But while some colonies were offended by the Iroquois' charges, little more concrete help was offered and the Kings requests went unheeded. [Board of Trade to Nicholson], Sept. 2, 1697, Md. Archives, 23: 207-212; Robert Treat and Council to...Fitz John Winthrop, Nov. 12, 1696, in Charles Hoadly, et al, eds., Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society, 30 vols. (Connecticut, 1869-1960), 24: 126-127; Fitz John Winthrop to King William, [No date], Ibid, 128-129.

<sup>63</sup> Council Minutes, Aug. 17, 1692, Journal of the Legislative Council of New York, [1691-1743] (Albany: Weed Parsons, 1861), 18; Council Minute, March 22, 1693, Ibid, 54; Governor Fletcher to the Committee of Trade and Plantations, March 28, 1694, NYCD, 4: 84-85; Earl of Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, April 13, 1699, Ibid, 487; Earl of Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, Feb. 28, 1700, Ibid, 608.

it yourSelfe".<sup>64</sup> The Iroquois' frustration at the lack of English aid is evident.

The inconstant help of the English, not to mention their separate peace with the French, played no small part in the Iroquois decision to conclude a truce with the French in 1701. There were, however, other reasons as well. The Iroquois sustained tremendous losses to their warrior population in the years between 1687 and 1698. One English estimate suggests that the Confederacy's male population (mostly or exclusively warriors) went from 2,550 to 1,230.<sup>65</sup> This represents a loss of 1,320 people and a 51% drop in the size of the Iroquois fighting force. While the 1689 figure of 2,550 warriors may be somewhat high, the number of people lost compares favourably with those that can be obtained from other records.<sup>66</sup> A tally of the number of Iroquois captured, killed, or lost due to warfare reveals that the Confederacy lost 1,144 to 1,346 people in the period 1689 to 1698.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Answer of [the Five Nations], Aug. 14, 1692, Livingston Indian Records, 165. See also [Conf., June 2-4, 1691], Colden, Five Indian Nations, 125.

<sup>65</sup> [Anon.], Comparative Population of Albany and the Indians in 1689 and 1698, April 19, 1698, NYCD, 4: 337.

<sup>66</sup> The estimate of 2,550 warrior is often considered high because the Iroquois were thought to have lost many people in the wars up to 1689. However, as noted above, both the statistical data, and the accounts of French observers indicate that the Iroquois had significantly bolstered the size of their forces with the capture of other native groups.

<sup>67</sup> Appendix E, Table E.1. This total does not include the 500 estimated deaths due to disease in 1690.

Since most of these losses were sustained in attacks against Iroquois war and hunting parties, and during Iroquois initiated attacks, most of those captured or killed were males.

These Iroquois losses were the product of the raids of the French and their Indian allies. Governor Frontenac, and other French officials, had finally learned that the best way to war against the Iroquois was to wage the same style of "petite guerre". It was a lesson born of necessity, but it worked.<sup>68</sup> Between 1687 and 1698 the French and their native allies launched 33 raids against the Iroquois.<sup>69</sup> This represented 36% of all the hostilities launched against the Iroquois in the seventeenth century. Of those 33 raids 17, more than half, were joint enterprises of the French and their allies, and three were by the French alone.<sup>70</sup>

There can be little doubt that these losses were important factors in inducing the Iroquois to make peace with the French and their allies. One, however should not be left with the impression that the Iroquois were cowering in fear at the sound of approaching French war parties. They gave as good as they got. In those same years the Iroquois launched 49 attacks against the French and their native allies and

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<sup>68</sup> Eccles, Frontenac, 244-272.

<sup>69</sup> See Graph 7.2, and Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1687 to 1698.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

captured or killed 648 to 673 of their foes.<sup>71</sup> Moreover, it was the French who, as early as 1690, began offering the Iroquois peace and who almost annually continued to proffer them the olive branch.<sup>72</sup> Nor did considering the French peace offers stop the Iroquois from raiding.<sup>73</sup> Indeed, the French were convinced that the Iroquois were agreeing to truces in order to stop French raiding in order that they could hunt to get the furs they needed to purchase weapons and ammunition to continue the fight.<sup>74</sup>

In fact, weakened though they were by the war, the Iroquois were prepared to continue the fight against New France. As late as 1696 the Iroquois were still urging the English to pursue the French.

We are not able of ourselves to destroy them. We are become a small people and much lessened by the warr. If all the people of Virginia, Maryland, Pensilvania, the Jerseys, Conneciticutt and New England who have put their hand to the Covenant Chain will joyne with the inhabitants of this place [New York], we are ready to go and root out the French and all our enemies out of Canida...We are now down upon one knee, but we are not quite down upon the ground; lett the Great King of England send the great canoes with seaventy gunns each,

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<sup>71</sup> Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1687 to 1698.

<sup>72</sup> [Conf.], Jan. 22, 1690, Colden, Five Indian Nations, 111; Council Minute, Dec. 11, 1693, New York Council Minutes, 7: 36; Journal of Major Dirck Wessel's Embassy to Onondaga. [Aug., 1693], NYCD, 4: 59-63; Propositions of the Five Nations..., [Feb. 2-9], 1694, Ibid, 85-87; Message from the Governor of Canada to the Five Nations and their Answer, [Jan. 31 to Feb. 4], 1695, Ibid, 120-122; Propositions Made by the [Onondagas], June 4, 1697, Ibid, 279.

<sup>73</sup> Champigny au Minstre, aout 11, 1695, AN, C11A, 13: 339.

<sup>74</sup> Champigny au Ministre, nov. 6, 1695, Ibid, 360.

and let the brethren of Virginia, Maryland, Pensilvania, the Jerseys, Conneciticutt and New England awake, and we will stand up straight againe upon our feet; our heart is yet stout and good; we doubt not but to destroy the enemy.<sup>75</sup>

Unfortunately for the Iroquois, the English soon after made peace with the French and they were not prepared to continue the fight. The French were to remain firmly rooted in Canada.

After the English made peace with the French, the Iroquois had little choice but to come to terms with their old foes as well. Weakened by war and disease, they could not hope to defeat New France and her allies unaided. The Iroquois were even in danger of losing their hunting lands to the French and their allies. It was the Iroquois fear that they could no longer hold their lands by force that induced them to cede their hunting lands to the English. They might have hoped that if the English had a direct stake in these areas they would work to protect them.<sup>76</sup> Indeed, when the

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<sup>75</sup> Sanonguirese, [Conf., Oct. 1-3, 1696], NYCD, 4: 237 and 240.

<sup>76</sup> Deed of the Five Nations to the King of their Beaver Hunting Ground, July 19, 1701 NYCD, 4: 908-911; Peter Wraxall, *Some Thoughts upon the British Indian Interest in North America...*, [1755]. *Ibid*, 7: 18; Seneca Speaker in Schuyler's *Journal of a Visit to Seneca Country*, April 23, 1720, *Ibid*, 5: 545. The Iroquois had tried this approach in the early 1680s as a means to protect their interests in the Susquhanna valley from the encroachments of Pennsylvania. Abstract of the Proposals of the Onouendages and Cayouges, Aug. 2, 1684, *Ibid*, 3: 347; Propositions of the Cayugas and Onondagas..., Sept. 26, 1683, in van Laer, ed., Early Records of Albany, 2: 198. In 1726, they again deeded part of their lands to the English in the hopes they would stop French encroachment. This time it was to try and stop the building of the French fort at Niagara. Deed in Trust from three of the Five Nations of Indians to the King, Sept. 14, 1726, NYCD, 5: 800-801.

Iroquois learned that the French were planning to build a fort at Detroit they expected the English to be "busy" in their "books and mapps" to prevent such a disaster.<sup>77</sup> As well, part of the peace with the French included some establishment or, more likely, recognition of hunting area boundaries.<sup>78</sup> The Iroquois, it seems also wanted the French to help them keep French native allies out of Confederacy territory.

Despite their rather limited options, the decision to accept the French peace offer was not easily reached. Individualism, and the loose structure of government among the Iroquois, made it difficult to arrive at a decision. Some groups wanted to accept peace, while others were reluctant to give up the war.<sup>79</sup> As one group was pursuing peace talks with the French, other Iroquois were encouraging the English to renew their military efforts.<sup>80</sup> Some tribes went so far

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<sup>77</sup> Conference [with the Five Nations, July 10-21], 1701, NYCD, 4: 906.

<sup>78</sup> The clearest reference to this arrangement is in Schuyler's Journal of a Visit to Seneca Country, April 23, 1720, NYCD, 5: 545. During the actual negotiations both the Iroquois and the French merely agreed not to have controversy over hunting areas. Teganissorens in, Journal of Messrs Bleeker and Schuyler's Visit to Onondaga, [June 2-29, 1701], Ibid, 891; Ratification De la Paix..., aout 4, 1701, AN, C11A, 18: 41; La Potherie, Histoire, 4: 183, 243, 254-255.

<sup>79</sup> The Iroquois openly acknowledged their division between those that would follow the advice of the English and those that wanted to accept French proposals. Propositions of the Five Nations..., June 30, 1700, NYCD, 4: 694.

<sup>80</sup> The diplomatic efforts of this period are remarkably complex. The various reports, journals, and conference records found in NYCD, volume 4, especially pages 372 to 565 cover the events from the view point of the Iroquois and the English.

as to deliberately exclude others from their negotiations if they knew that they would oppose the course they had chosen.<sup>81</sup> If some Iroquois distrusted the French and wanted to continue warring, others clearly did not want to carry on fighting. Some Iroquois may even have begun to distrust the English. Even if the Iroquois did not know that the leader of their allies had been instructed to take whatever opportunity that arose to buy "great tracts of land...for small sums", the land swindles perpetrated against some of them must have given them pause about how safe their lands were from the English.<sup>82</sup> Possibly some Iroquois had even begun to think

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The French side is presented in [Conf. with the Iroquois], juillet 18, 1700, AN, C11A, 18: 81-83; [Conf. with the Iroquois], sept. 3-9, 1700, Ibid, 84-88; La Potherie au Ministre, oct. 16, 1700, Ibid, 150-159; La Potherie, Histoire, 4: 193-266. Gilles Havard, La grande paix, passim; Richard Haan, "The Problem of Iroquois Neutrality: Suggestions for Revision", Ethnohistory, 27, 4 (Fall 1980): 317-330 and A.F.C. Wallace, "Origins of Iroquois Neutrality: The Grand Settlement of 1701", Pennsylvania History, 24, 3 (July 1957): 223-235 discuss the events leading to the treaty in 1701.

<sup>81</sup> [Conf. with the Onondagas and Oneidas], Feb. 3, 1699, Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 31.

<sup>82</sup> Instructions for the Earl of Bellomont, Aug. 31, 1697, NYCD, 4: 290. On Iroquois land swindles, see Fraudulent Purchase of Land from the Mohawk Indians, May 31, 1698, Ibid, 345-347. The Iroquois also complained that the English had gotten rich off their hunting, and were still charging too much for trade goods. [Conf., June 13-14, 1699], Ibid, 571. So upset were the Iroquois with the prices that the English at Albany charged, some tribes concluded trade arrangements with Pennsylvania to avoid trading at Albany. [Minute of Indian Affairs], Aug. 23, 1699, Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 33; Council Minute, New York Council Minutes, 8, part 1: 131.

that both the French and the English were a threat to them.<sup>83</sup> In short, peace with New France seems not so much to have been a Confederacy policy decision, but rather an acceptable compromise until a unified solution could be attained. As the Iroquois knew from past experiences, no decision of peace or war need be permanent.

In the end, then, the Iroquois fought against New France because their policies conflicted with each other. The French chose and supported as allies, whether by ignorance, or because they cared not, those native groups with whom the Iroquois were at war. Iroquois efforts to make peace with the French early in the century did not fit with the ambitions the French had for controlling the fur trade and fur bearing regions. The result was a threat to Iroquois relations with their native adversaries, a threat to their lands and their survival, and eventually war with New France.

After peace was established between the Iroquois and New France in 1666, the French pursued their own policies as if the Iroquois were no longer of consequence and, once again, threatened the security of the Confederacy. If the French failed to recognize, or chose to ignore, that in their own actions lay most of the causes of Iroquois fears and

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<sup>83</sup> By 1750 this view seems to have been quite common. Cayuga speaker, Conference, May 15, 1750, NYCD, 10: 206. See also Wraxall, Some thoughts on the British Indian Interests..., [1755], Ibid, 7: 18.

hostility, it was because of an ethnocentric myopia that allowed them to see only French behaviour and policy as legitimate. But the views and goals of the Iroquois were no less valid. The Five Nations had every right to protect themselves and their interests as best they could. When the French threatened Iroquois plans and survival, they went to war again. Better armed than in the first half of century, and with the encouragement and munitions of the English at New York who wanted to remove the French for their own reasons, the Iroquois determined to rid themselves of the French menace.

In the end the Iroquois failed. The English proved to be too unreliable as allies. They encouraged the Iroquois to pursue war, but when called upon to hold up their end of the fight, colonial disunity, or imperial considerations in London almost always prevented striking the decisive blow. The French, too, turned out to be a more resilient foe than the Iroquois had anticipated. They had changed, adapted the Iroquois style of war and, with the help of native allies eager to exact revenge on the Iroquois for past injuries, proved themselves a match for the warriors of the Confederacy.

As well, Iroquois government was not cohesive enough to bring Iroquois plans, even when unity of purpose was attained, to fruition. Their loose form of government was adequate to the task of handling their policy towards native groups because that policy better incorporated the various goals of

Iroquois society and its warfare. However, the policy towards New France required a greater degree of cohesion and unified action than the Confederacy could muster. By 1701 not all the Iroquois agreed that eliminating New France was the best policy to pursue, and in that year the Iroquois agreed to peace. The peace of 1701 marked another ceasefire in their almost century long feud with New France. It was once again time for the Iroquois to rethink their policy towards their foes and allies. The Iroquois had survived in spite of their failure to extinguish the French 'fyres'. The challenge that remained was how to keep their own fires from being smothered by foes and allies alike.

### Conclusion

Iroquois policy towards New France in the seventeenth century, while not fixed in stone, was essentially a hostile one. At times throughout the seventeenth century different considerations influenced Iroquois actions towards the French, but in the end the French in New France came to be enemies of the Iroquois because French policy in North America put them in conflict with the Iroquois and threatened their survival. As part of the French desire to exploit the fur trade, spread Catholicism, and later, to further Versailles' imperialist ambitions, the French leagued themselves with native groups that were foes of the Iroquois. As the French pursued their various interests, and increasingly supported and armed their native allies who were crucial to the outcome of those policies, they came into conflict with Iroquois policy towards their enemies.

Iroquois attempts to reach a peace with the French failed because the terms offered by the Iroquois were unsuited to French needs. These rejections, French expansion into lands claimed by the Iroquois, and continued alliances with groups that were foes of the Iroquois, seemed to confirm New France's hostile intent. The result was that the French went from being a threat by association and incidental target of Iroquois military policy, to a direct threat, and thus, the focus of Iroquois hostilities.

Iroquois warfare with, and policy towards, New France's native allies in the latter half of the seventeenth century reflected some of the same causes and goals of warfare as in the years up to 1666. Some hostilities were the result of revenge motivated raiding; some started as the Iroquois and various tribes with whom they had no established peaceful relations hunted near each other, others as the Iroquois pursued old enemies into new lands. The Iroquois also fought to protect their land against the encroachments of others, often native allies of New France who were armed and encouraged by the French in their eager pursuit of furs. And, whether begun as a means to capture people or not, military strategy and the need to replace those lost to disease and war, meant warfare to obtain captives continued to account for some attacks against native allies of New France.

The fur trade played an important part in Iroquois policy. The French were worried that the Iroquois would take over the fur trade. However, the Iroquois did not want to control the fur trade; they sought only to use it. The fur trade provided the Iroquois with a way to obtain the goods they desired for domestic use. It also furnished them with those items they wanted to help them carry out their political, military, and cultural objectives against their native foes, and against the French. The Iroquois even used the fur trade to get at the French. Supported by colonial authorities in New York, because it fit in with English

desires to weaken or eliminate French power in North America, the Iroquois tried to lure French Indian allies away from the French trade network. While the English would have welcomed the furs brought by the northern tribes, the benefit to the Iroquois of such a trade pattern was that it might isolate the French from their allies and leave the French more susceptible to Iroquois military efforts to extinguish the French 'fires' in North America.

Iroquois policy failed. They did not drive the French out of North America--their "fires" still burn bright. But, contrary to the "beaver wars" interpretation, the Iroquois failed precisely because they did not change enough. Had the Iroquois adopted European materialist values, sought to accumulate wealth, and fought to control the fur trade, they might have gained enough economic clout to withstand the pressures put upon them by their European neighbours. Instead they sought to preserve their values and way of life. Warfare continued to be fought for a variety of reasons, and it never became just an instrument for carrying out political and economic goals. Government continued to be based on a social system where the rights of the constituent parts seemed to prevail over that of the whole. There is no doubt that contact and interaction with Europeans brought changes to Iroquois society. The introduction of new diseases threatened to wipe out their population. Guns, on the other hand, seemed to provide them with the means to recoup their losses by

conquering other natives to replace those taken by disease. Europeans and their cultural baggage complicated and threatened Iroquois society, but life remained a struggle to survive and the Iroquois responded to that challenge informed and constrained by values and processes that were uniquely Iroquois. In short, they fought to live, not for furs.

## APPENDICES

Key to Short Title References Used in Appendices

AN, C11A	Archives Nationales, Paris, Colonies, Series C11A
ASJCF	Archives de la Compagnie de Jésus au Canada français, Saint-Jérôme
<u>Correspond.</u>	Marie de L'Incarnation, <u>Correspondance</u> , G. Oury, ed.
Champlain, <u>Works</u>	Champlain, <u>Works of Samuel de Champlain</u> , H.P. Biggar, ed.
<u>CSP</u>	<u>Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series</u> , N. Sainsbury, ed.
Dollier, <u>Histoire</u>	Dollier de Casson, <u>Histoire du Montréal</u> , R. Flenley, ed.
<u>Indian Affairs</u>	Wraxall, <u>An Abridgement of Indian Affairs...Transacted in the Colony of New York</u> , C. McIlwain, ed.
<u>JR</u>	<u>The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents</u> , R.G. Thwaites, ed.
Lahontan, <u>New Voyages</u>	Lahontan, <u>New Voyages to North America</u> , R.G. Thwaites, ed.
<u>LIR</u>	Livingston, <u>Livingston Indian Records</u> , H. Leder, ed.
Margry, <u>Découvertes</u>	<u>Découvertes et établissements des François dans l'ouest...</u> , P. Margry, ed.

- Margry, Relations                    Relations et mémoires inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la France..., P. Margry, ed.
- Md. Archives                        Archives of Maryland,  
W.H. Browne, ed.
- MNF                                    Monumenta Novae Franciae,  
L. Campeau, S.J., ed.
- NNN                                    Narratives of New Netherland,  
J.F. Jameson, ed.
- NYCD                                   Documents Relating to the Colonial History of the State of New York,  
Fernow and O'Callaghan, eds.
- Radisson, Explorations            [Radisson], The Explorations of Pierre Esprit Radisson, Adams, ed.

Key to Abbreviations Used in Appendices

M	Male
F	Female
C	Child
mc	Male Child
fc	Female Child
K	Killed
capt.	Captured
lost	Lost (Could mean either captured or killed)
Fr	French
FIA	French Indian Allies
TR	Trois Rivières (area)
TR Ft	Trois Rivières, Fort
Tad	Tadoussac (area)
LSP	Lac Ste. Pierre
Mont	Montreal Island
Mont Ft	Montreal Fort, Ville Marie
Que	Quebec (area)
Ft Rich	Fort Richelieu
Rich R.	Richelieu River
L	League
Ott R.	Ottawa River
Sag	Saguenay River
St. Law	St. Lawrence River

Key to Abbreviations of Native Groups Used Appendices

Iroq	Iroquois, unspecified tribe of Confederacy
Moh	Mohawks
On	Oneidas
Onon	Onondagas
Cay	Cayugas
Sen	Senecas
Huron	Hurons, unspecified tribe
Susq	Susquehannocks
Algk	Algonquins, unspecified tribe
Abnk	Abenakis, unspecified tribe
Ill	Illinois, unspecified tribe
Mah	Mahicans
Mt	Montagnais, unspecified tribe
Ot	Ottawas, unspecified tribe
Nip	Nipissings
Pisct	Piscataways
Shaw	Shawnee

The above list represents the groups most often noted in the tables that follow. For a full listing of the tribes in the Northeast, their linguistic affiliations, and their geographic locations over time, see the masterful analysis by C.E. Heidenreich in R. Harris, ed., Historical Atlas of Canada, vol. 1, plates 18, 37, 38, 39.

## Appendix A

Rebirth and Death: Iroquois Baptisms and Mortality,  
1667-1679

In order to assess the impact Iroquois population decline may have had on their policy towards various native and European groups it is essential to determine just how many Iroquois were dying yearly. The purpose of Tables A.1 and A.2 is to provide some sense of the number of Iroquois who died annually in the Iroquois villages.<sup>1</sup> The Jesuits, who left us the most detailed records on the Iroquois, did not list deaths among the Iroquois in general, but did note the number of Iroquois who received baptism and, sometimes, the number of baptized who eventually died. From these various letters and reports of individual missionaries it is possible to arrive at an estimate of total deaths, and what portion of those were adults or children. (See Table A.2) Unfortunately the number of years for which data is available is limited. But even if we do not have complete data for a prolonged period, at least we can be thankful that we have this 12 year period in which

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<sup>1</sup> Table B.1, in Appendix B, will present data on when epidemics struck the Iroquois in order to provide a sense of how representative the annual death rate might be. Table D.1, Appendix D, will show, among other things, how many Iroquois died as a result of hostilities undertaken by and against the Iroquois. This data joined to that of Tables A.1 and A.2 here should provide a relatively clear picture of Iroquois annual mortality. Table C.1, Appendix C, will introduce Iroquois population estimates so that one can attempt to assess what impact these annual death rates may have had on Iroquois society and their policy.

we can gain a sense of how many Iroquois died in the villages.

One of the difficulties of trying to do a quantitative study based on the Jesuit Relations is that they had no idea that their work would be put to such use and, in general, were not very exact in their accounting. Moreover, even were it possible to be precise, the Relations were intended for a general readership, and it was the moral lessons to be derived from them that were important, not statistics about population numbers and death rates.<sup>2</sup> The number of baptized was important because it reflected the success of the missions, but even here precise numbers were not necessary and therefore not always given.<sup>3</sup> Thus, even though the letters and reports of the various priests noted how many baptisms they had performed, the Relations provide few yearly totals for the different Iroquois tribes. Even the one overall total for the Iroquois confederacy lists no tribal breakdown, nor for what time period that total applies. Writing in the Relation of 1679, Father Dablon claimed that "more than 4 thousand iroquois" had been baptized, and a "goodly part" of them had

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<sup>2</sup> L. Pouliot, Etudes sur les Relations de Jésuites de la Nouvelle-France, 1632-1672, (Montreal, 1940), p. 7, says the purpose of the Relations was to attract benefactors for the missions in New France and inspire missionary zeal.

<sup>3</sup> Pouliot, *ibid*, p. 223, also notes the imprecise nature of Jesuit figures in this regard.

died.<sup>4</sup> That figure of 4,000, however, cannot be arrived at by adding up the few yearly totals provided in the Relations, nor by adding up the numbers of baptisms individual priests reported for their missions. (See Table A.1) One must conclude that Father Dablon either had more precise data at his disposal, or he may have been referring to a longer time frame than that being considered here, probably a combination of both.

The data in Table A.1 was derived from the Jesuit Relations for the relevant years. The total number of baptized for each year, and for the period from 1667 to 1679 are those that I arrived at. The editors of the Relations rarely provided yearly totals, and when they did they never coincided with the totals that can be derived by compiling the data found in the various mission reports. When such annual totals provided by the editors of the Relations were available they were included in the totals column in parenthesis {}. Furthermore, the totals in the table include only hard data. That is, when the sources indicate that "half", "some", or "most died", no attempt was made to attach a quantifiable number to such expressions. Thus the tabular totals reflect only the actual numbers provided in the sources.<sup>5</sup> It will be

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<sup>4</sup> [Dablon's] Relation of 1679, JR, 61: 163. As to the "goodly part" that died, Father Dablon makes no attempt to put a number to that expression.

<sup>5</sup> Table A.2 will provide totals based on estimates arrived at by attaching number values to such imprecise expressions, as well as providing the reasons and methods by

noted that often the number of adults and children said to have been baptized or to have died does not equal the total numbers of baptized or dead for the year or the period. This is because often there was no specific breakdown in the sources of how many of the baptized or dead were children or adults. When such information was provided it was noted.

It should be pointed out that in Table A.1 the annual totals, and that for the twelve year period, do not include the yearly aggregates provided by the Jesuit editors, except for the years 1678, and 1679. No other figures of dead or baptized were available for those years and it seemed unwise to exclude such large numbers even if they could not be verified by checking against the accounts for the individual missions. If the annual totals provided by the editors of the Relations are taken into consideration the number of baptized Iroquois from each tribe that I arrived at remain unaltered because the data is not precise enough. However, inclusion of the Relations' editors few yearly totals would produce different Confederacy totals for several years and for the twelve year period. In some years the editors' totals are higher than mine, and for other years the case is reversed (See totals for 1669-70 and those for 1670-71 for example). If the years 1678 and 1679, which were used in calculating the overall total, are excluded, then the number of Iroquois baptized according to Jesuit editors is 1,201 while this

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which those estimates were obtained.

authors figures for the same years (based on adding up accounts from individual priests) produce a total of 1,142 baptized--a difference of 59. Since the Jesuits did not consistently provide annual totals, and the difference is slight, I thought it best to stick to the my annual totals in calculating the period totals, and avoid complicating the tables any further. Moreover, as Table A.2 indicates, the actual number of Iroquois who were baptized and died is greater still.

Table A.1

Symbols used:

a= adults                      c= children

b= baptized                  d= died

Annual Iroquois Baptism/Death Rate						
Year	Mohawk	Oneida	Onondaga	Cayuga	Seneca	Total for All Tribes
1667 (f/W)		56 c b; 4 a b				60 b(56 c, 4 a)
1668					120 b most a, more than 90 a d; 150 other [a unbapt.] d	120 b most a, more than 90 a d; 150 others d
1668-69	251 b; over half d	30 b, more than half d	over 30 b, most d	28 b; half d	60 b, 33 d	399 b; 33 d
1669-70		32 [b] c d	40 b, most c or dying a, of these 16 [b] [c] d	25 c b; 12 a b; large part d		109 b(73 c, 12 a); 48 d(48 c) {50 c b, most d; 3 a b}

Annual Iroquois Baptism/Death Rate						
Year	Mohawk	Oneida	Onondaga	Cayuga	Seneca	Total for All Tribes
1670-71	84 b, 74 d, most c under 7			62 b, 35 d, most dead c	110 b	256 b; 109 d {318-20 b, over half d}
1671-72		30 b, most c, and d	39 b, of these 16 [b] c d, 4 [b] a d	30 c & a b, most d	40 b, 33 d, nearly all c	139 b(16 c. 4 a); 53 d(16 c, 4 a) {200 b}
1672-73	36 b & d	34 b, of these, 16 [b] d	over 30 b & d, 19 were c, [11 a?]	44 c b, 18 d; 11 a b & d	43 c b, 29 d; 12 a b, 9 d; 38 b, of these, 7 a d, 8 c d at least	248 b(114 c, 41 a); 164 d(74 c, 38 a) {80 a & 200 c b, majority d}
1673-74		45 b	18 a b, 12 d; 27 c b, 24 d	22 c b; 5 a b & d	10 a b & d; 14 c b & d	141 b(63 c, 33 a); 65 d(38 c, 27 a)
1675	80 b		72 [c] b, 40 [c] d	21 c b & d; 11 a b & d	100 b; 50 d annually after b	284 b(93 c, 11 a); 72 d(61 c, 11 a)

Annual Iroquois Baptism/Death Rate						
Year	Mohawk	Oneida	Onondaga	Cayuga	Seneca	Total for All Tribes
1676	50 b, half d; 50 b, 9-10 d; 3 unbapt. also d		7 a b & [d]; 45 c b, 40 d	38 [c] b, 33 d; 6 a b, 3 d	90 b, most c, 50 of those [b] c d; 40 c b & d; 14 a b & d; 60 c [unbapt.] d	340 b(173 c, 27 a); 196 d(163 c, 24 a); 63 [unbapt.] d(60 c) {350 b; 27 a & 171 c d
1677	40 b, most d	52 b	36 & 23 a b, all but 12 d	over 50 b; over 40 [b] c d	212 b, 70 were c, portion d	453 b(110 c, 59 a); 87 d(40 c, 47 a)
1678						{350 b}
1679						{over 300 b}
Totals	591 b; 119 d; 3 unbapt. d	283 b(88 c, 4 a); 48 d(32 c)	367 b(195 c, 99 a); 236 d(155 c, 81 a)	405 b(190 c, 45 a); 177 d(112 c, 30 a)	903 b(225 c, 133 a); 337 d(141 c, 130 a); 210 [unbapt.] d (60 c)	3,199 b (698 c, 281 a); 917 d(440 c, 241 a); 213 [unbapt.] d(60 c, 150 [a])

Sources: Thwaites, ed. The Jesuit Relations

If we can not come close to Father Dablon's total of baptized, can we at least determine what that "goodly" part who died represents in real numbers? As Table A.1 shows, 917 of those baptized died (28%). But while that may be a "goodly" number, when the sources list both those who were baptized and how many of those died (31 instances), the percentage of baptized who died is 71%. In the case of children, the percentage of baptized who died is 82%. This is certainly in keeping with the observation made by Father Le Mercier that the "children who die after Baptism being the surest fruit of Evangelical labours, especial pains are taken not to let a single one die without conferring" baptism upon them.<sup>6</sup> Pouliot, in his study of all natives baptized between 1632 and 1672, arrived at a total of 16,014 baptized, and 1,948 dead according to the figures in the Relations.<sup>7</sup> However, he estimated that two thirds of the baptized actually died (about 10,600), and that 265 of the baptized died annually.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, as the various entries in Table A.1 show, most of those baptized were children, and most of those who

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<sup>6</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1668-69, JR, 52: 159. Writing a few years later Father Dablon noted that the Iroquois resisted baptism because they believed it caused death. He added that he did not find it strange that they thought this since baptism was "...administered only to children at the point of death; and, in fact, nearly all who are baptized die immediately afterward." [Dablon's] Relation of 1673-74, JR, 58: 225

<sup>7</sup> Pouliot, Etudes sur les Relations, p. 223. See also p. 308, notes 1-2 for the yearly breakdown.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 224.

were baptized, children or adult, died. The question then becomes how to reconcile these differences? Is it possible to arrive at a total number of dead that reflects the Jesuit observation--confirmed by what little hard data does exist--that most who were baptized died? The answer is, I think, yes. As Table A.1 shows, many times the Relations state that "some", "half", or even "most" of the baptized of a tribe died. If we can put numeric equivalents to such imprecise expressions we might attain a better understanding of how many of the baptized were adults, how many were children, and how many from both groups died.

It is possible to come to some fairly precise, and not too speculative numeric values for these non numeric expressions. Some are quite easy to resolve. If "half" of a given number of people were baptized or died, then the given number is divided in two to arrive at numeric equivalent of "half". If the number is not one given to equal division (say 27), then the number can be divided in half, and the resultant number (in this case, 13.5) will be rounded to the nearest whole number (13). Others phrases proved more difficult to translate into numbers. For example it is impossible to state just what could be meant by the terms "over", "majority", or "most". If "over 30 were baptized", it could be 31 or 39. It is equally difficult to formulate a numerical value when the expression "the majority" is used. If 100 were baptized a majority could be from 51 to 99. There is no way to

determine which could be meant. In the first example the solution was to accept the number given and make no attempt to speculate how much beyond the given number was intended by the expression "over". For the second example one can accept half plus one as a simple majority. The same rule was used if the "majority" of a given number were said to be either adults or children. It also follows that if the majority of a given number were of one group, the remainder must be of another. If 50 people were baptized, the "majority" children (26 children), then the remainder must have been adults (24 adults). In the case of the expression "most", it seems to be used interchangeably with "majority", and so the same rule of thumb was used for it. One recognizes that in following the above procedures one is accepting lower estimates, but since it is best to err towards understatement, this should present no major dilemma.

The most serious problem in terms of quantification is presented when trying to determine child/adult ratios for baptisms and deaths, or how many died when all the sources reveal is that a given number were baptized. While it is true that children outnumber adults in totals baptized, this was not always the case in every tribe, and one can never be sure if one is dealing with an exception in a particular instance. Given that there seemed to be no way to resolve this, it was thought best not to attempt to attach any specific adult/child ratio to numbers in those instances. As to determining how

many died when all that was given was the total baptized, it is clear from both the precise numbers and the expressions employed by the Jesuits (See Table A.1) that most of those baptized died. As noted above, when precise figures are available the data reveal that 71% of the baptized died. It does not appear unreasonable to accept this figure. Again, no attempt was made to assign a child/adult ratio to the dead.

Several results of Table A.2 bear commenting on. The number of baptized who died based on this Table is approximately 63%. This is close to the figure Pouliot arrived at for his study.<sup>9</sup> In terms of the test of accuracy it should be remarked that the ratio of dead children to dead adults is still roughly 2 to 1, just as it was in Table A.1 where no estimates were used. If one uses the ratio of 2 dead children for every dead adult, then we can estimate that of this total of 2,002, roughly 1,200 were children. If we add to this total of dead baptized Iroquois that number of unbaptized Iroquois who died in the villages of disease (213), then the total number of Iroquois who died is 2,215. One should consider that this total does not include those Iroquois lost through warfare (either captured or killed as a result of raids by or against the Iroquois),<sup>10</sup> of those that died in the villages but whom the Jesuits could not baptize

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 224.

<sup>10</sup> During the years in question the Iroquois lost, either captured or killed, 70 people in warfare. Most were males. See Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1667-1679.

(mostly adults). It is impossible to state whether this death rate is constant over any other period. No data exists to compare with it. As well, there were several recorded outbreaks of disease among the Iroquois during this period. On the other hand no period has as complete a record as this one, so that it is impossible to know if disease was equally prevalent in other epochs, but simply went unrecorded. What does seem relatively clear is that during this period the Iroquois experienced a serious population drain.<sup>11</sup>

Note: In the following table, only the total numbers of dead are listed. The symbols used are the same as in Table A.1.

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<sup>11</sup> To gain sense of how significant a portion of the overall population this was, see Appendix C, "Iroquois Population Estimates".

Table A.2

Annual Baptized Iroquois Death Rates							
Year	Mohawk	Oneida	Onondaga	Cayuga	Seneca	Total for all Tribes	
1667		40 c d; 3 a d				43 d(40 c, 3 a)	
1668					90 a d; 150 other [a unbapt.] d	90 a d; 150 other [a unbapt.] d	
1668-69	126 d	16 d	16 d	14 d	33 d	205 d	
1669-70		32 [b] c d	16 [b] [c] d	18 c d; 8 a d		74 d(66 c, 8 a)	
1670-71	74 d, (38 c, 36 a)			35 d, (18 c, 17 a)	78 d	187 d(56 c, 53 a)	
1671-72		16 c d	16 [b] c d; 4 [b] a d	16 d	33 d, 23 were c	85 d(55 c, 4 a)	
1672-73	36 d	16 d	19 c d; [11 a d]	18 c d; 11 a d	37 c d; 16 a d	164 d(74 c, 38 a)	
1673-74		32 d	24 c d; 12 a d	16 c d; 5 a d	14 c d; 10 a d	113 d(54 c, 27 a)	
1675	57 d		40 [c] d	21 c d; 11 a d	50 d	179 d(61 c, 11 a)	
1676	34 d; 3 unbapt. d		40 c d; 7 a d	33 c d; 3 a d	90 c d; 14 a d; 60 c [unbapt.] d	221 d(163 c, 24 a)	

Annual Baptized Iroquois Death Rates						
Year	Mohawk	Oneida	Onondaga	Cayuga	Seneca	Total for all Tribes
1677	21 d	37 d	47 d	75 d, 40 were c		180 d(40 c, 47 a)
1678						248 d
1679						213 d
Totals	339 d(38 c); 3 unbapt. d	173 d(81 c, 2 a)	252 d(155 c, 81 a)	272 d(158 c, 37 a)	453 d(158 c, 130 a)	2,002 d(609 c, 305 a); 213 [unbapt.] d(60 c, 150 [a])

Source: Table A.1

## Appendix B

## Epidemics and Disease Among the Iroquois, 1634-1690

When did the Iroquois suffer from disease and what impact did it have on their population? Did the advent of new deadlier diseases affect Iroquois relations with native and European groups, and if so, how? In order to address these queries a reliable chronology of when epidemic diseases struck the Iroquois is needed. Despite the central importance of these questions no such list can be found in the secondary literature. Karl Schlesier, for example, has tried to show a direct cause and effect relationship between Iroquois epidemics and their relations with the French in Canada.<sup>1</sup> Yet he has overlooked one or two possible epidemics, and misdated the one most crucial to supporting his thesis.<sup>2</sup> In brief discussions of the impact of epidemics on the Iroquois and Iroquoians, Daniel Richter and Bruce Trigger have provided more reliable, but nonetheless, partial lists of epidemics and stop at 1662.<sup>3</sup> In "Sixteenth-Century Depopulation: A View from the Mohawk Valley", Dean Snow and William Starna provide the fullest chronology to date, focusing mainly on the Mohawk,

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<sup>1</sup> "Epidemics and Indian Middlemen: Rethinking the Wars of the Iroquois, 1609-1653", Ethnohistory, 23, 2 (Spring 1976): 129-145.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, 142.

<sup>3</sup> D.K. Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 58-59; B.G. Trigger "Early Iroquoian Contacts with Europeans", Handbook, 352.

but also omit several epidemics.<sup>4</sup>

If one is to be left with an accurate view of when disease hit the Iroquois, and if such a chronology is to be of use to other scholars, vague and questionable sources must be explained and distinctions made, whenever possible, about the groups that were affected. What follows then, is a discussion of what various historical sources reveal about when epidemic disease hit the Iroquois in the years covered by this study. The results will then be presented in table format. It should be noted that the groups listed below are those that can be clearly confirmed to have suffered from epidemics. Because a group is not listed does not mean that the epidemic did not reach them, just that the sources do not indicate that such was the case.

In his 1983 book "Their Number Become Thinned": Native American Population Dynamics in Eastern North America, Henry Dobyns argued that pandemic disease seriously diminished native populations prior to the 1600's. His critics have shown that his claims can be sustained either by distortion of evidence, or by ignoring it altogether. In short, no real support exists for his claims of widespread pandemic disease in North America, and none at all for disease hitting the

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<sup>4</sup> American Anthropologist, 91, 1 (March 1989), 144.

Iroquois prior to 1600.<sup>5</sup> Dobyns has responded to his critics, but he has failed to establish his case any more firmly.<sup>6</sup> Until archaeologists uncover new evidence, one must conclude with Snow and Lamphear that the first epidemic to hit the Iroquois was in 1634.

The first mention of disease among the Iroquois was an outbreak of smallpox among the Mohawks recorded on December 13, 1634.<sup>7</sup> Van den Bogaert, the Dutch surgeon who left posterity this first clear indication of disease among the Iroquois, does not give the impression that it was current. In fact one Mohawk chief had already relocated and set up a house away from the village where smallpox was said to have hit. At another village a "good many" graves were noted. Van den Bogaert does not mention anyone suffering from the disease, thus indicating its passage. Throughout the rest of the account of his journey to the Mohawks and Oneidas no further mention was made of disease, nor were the Onondagas noted to be suffering from anything when they came to meet among the Oneidas in January 1635. In short, the first

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<sup>5</sup> See David Henige, "Primary Source by Primary Source? On the Role of Epidemics in New World Depopulation", Ethnohistory, 33, 3 (Summer 1986): 293-312; Dean R. Snow and Kim M. Lamphear, "European Contact and Indian Depopulation in the Northeast: the Timing of the First Epidemics", Ethnohistory, 35, 1 (Winter 1988): 15-33.

<sup>6</sup> See the comments of Dobyns, Snow and Lamphear, and those of Henige in, "Commentary on Native American Demography", Ethnohistory, 36, 3 (Summer 1989): 285-307.

<sup>7</sup> ([van den Bogaert], "Narrative of a Journey into the Mohawk and Oneida Country, 1634-35", in NNN, 139-162.

recorded evidence of smallpox among the Iroquois was December of 1634, but the evidence suggests that the disease struck earlier. It would also seem that by this time it was no longer active among the Mohawks, and either did not spread to the other tribes, or had worked its way through them as well.

The next time disease was recorded among the Iroquois it was again among the Mohawks. Writing on February 20, 1637, the Jesuit Le Mercier noted that the Hurons believed that the disease afflicting them came from the Mohawks who in turn had picked it up from the Susquehannocks.<sup>8</sup> Le Mercier went on to explain that the Hurons believed these groups have been infected with disease by Ataentsic as punishment for their evil ways.<sup>9</sup> It is not clear how the Mohawks had picked up the disease from the Susquehannocks, how the intervening Iroquois groups were spared getting it, nor how the Mohawks passed it on to the Hurons. It could have reached the Hurons easily enough through prisoners captured during raids, but the one raid in 1636 in which the Hurons captured Iroquois, was against the Onondagas.<sup>10</sup> The Hurons were reported to have arrived with their prisoners on September 2, 1636, and they

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<sup>8</sup> Le Mercier, "Huron Relation of 1636-37", in [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1637, JR., 14:9. Snow & Starna ("Sixteenth-Century Depopulation", 144), put this epidemic in 1637. But the Huron were first struck by this disease in September of 1636. If they picked up the contagion from the Mohawk, then the latter must have been hit by it in 1636.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Le Mercier's "Huronian Report, 1636-37", in [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1636-37, JR, 13: 37-45.

were afflicted by disease in the autumn of 1636, before mid-September.<sup>11</sup> Bruce Trigger has suggested that blaming the disease on the Mohawks was an effort by Hurons traders to take pressure off the Jesuits who were really thought to be to blame for the disease.<sup>12</sup> However, the timing of the disease and its spread, as described by Trigger, tends to coincide with the arrival and distribution of the Onondagas prisoners among the Huron. If the Onondagas did bring the disease, why blame the Mohawk? Or could Father Le Mercier have been wrong about the origins of the Hurons' captives? Given that there is no clear evidence of how the disease got to the Hurons, all that can be said is that it is possible, even probable, that some Iroquois tribe was suffering from some contagious disease in 1636 and passed it on to the Hurons. But the evidence is far from conclusive as to which Iroquois group it could have been.

In the winter of 1639-40, recorded the Annales de l'Hotel-Dieu de Québec, disease swept through native groups in New France.<sup>13</sup> The disease started out as smallpox but then became something that "les prenoit a la gorge" and killed the natives within twenty-four hours. Among the groups listed as affected were the Iroquois. It is not clear which of these maladies they suffered from, nor how the good sisters at

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<sup>11</sup> Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 2: 526.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 544-545.

<sup>13</sup> Annales de l'Hotel-Dieu de Québec, 24-25.

Sillery knew of the contagion in Iroquoia. They might have received the news from some of their Algonquin charges, or they might have been confusing this outbreak with the one of the following year. The chroniclers of the Annales were not always very accurate with dates. Be that as it may, they do clearly list the Iroquois among the groups suffering from disease in the winter of 1639-40.

One of the most commonly noted outbreaks of disease among the Iroquois was that in the winter of 1640-41. While visiting the Neutral tribe, Fathers Brebeuf and Chaumonaut reported that an epidemic was ravaging the enemy.<sup>14</sup> Since the Iroquois were the most obvious enemy of the Hurons, and the closest Iroquois tribe to the Neutrals was the Seneca, that is how this reference is usually interpreted. However, there is no real reason to suppose that the Jesuits were referring to any one group to the exclusion of others. The Jesuits were fully cognizant of the fact that the Mohawks were also implacable foes of the Hurons. The term enemy could refer to the whole Confederacy.

A few years later disease was once again noted among the Mohawks. Some time after June of 1646 until at least March of 1647, the Mohawks were afflicted by disease. It began sometime after Father Jogues left in June of 1646. It was believed that he caused the malady and crop failure of that

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<sup>14</sup> Lalemant's "Huronian Report, 1640-41", in [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1640-41, JR, 21: 211.

year and it led to his death. An Algonquin prisoner who was captured in March of 1647, and who escaped a short time later, reported that the Mohawks were "afflicted with a general malady".<sup>15</sup>

In 1655 disease was first clearly noted among the Onondagas. But the source reveals little more than that.<sup>16</sup> In 1660 the Mohawks were again struck by disease. The reference, however, is open to question. In the Annales de l'Hotel-Dieu de Québec Catherine Tekawitha was said to have been orphaned at the age of four when both her parents died of the smallpox that hit their Mohawk village.<sup>17</sup> Since she was born in 1656 this would place the epidemic in 1660.<sup>18</sup> The question is how sure can we be of the record of her birth, and her age when her parents died? Indians did not issue birth certificates, and all the information about her early life was gathered much later. If the record is off by one year that would place her parents death in the clearly recorded epidemic of 1661-62. However, the sources do not specifically note that the Mohawks were struck in that one. Unless evidence to the contrary appears, it seem unreasonable to exclude the 1660 reference from the chronology, but it is by no means a

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<sup>15</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1647, JR, 30: 229, 273 (quote on p. 273); Ibid, JR, 31: 121; Marie de l'Incarnation a son fils [été], 1647, Correspondance, 323.

<sup>16</sup> [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1656-57, JR, 43: 291.

<sup>17</sup> Annales de l'Hotel-Dieu de Québec, 198.

<sup>18</sup> DCB, 1: 635.

certainty that an epidemic struck that year.

Sometime between the fall of 1661 and the summer of 1663, the Iroquois suffered one long epidemic or were hit by two separate ones. The Jesuit Simon Le Moyne was among the Onondagas from July 1661 to August 1662. In a letter from Onondaga dated 11 September, 1661, he made no mention of disease.<sup>19</sup> Writing a year later, after Le Moyne's return, Father Lalemant noted that Le Moyne was busy during his stay because the smallpox was prevalent among the Onondagas.<sup>20</sup> If it had struck before Le Moyne wrote his letter it is probable that he would have mentioned it. In any case during his stay Le Moyne baptized over 200 children, of whom more than 120 died.<sup>21</sup> He also baptized 60 more children from a passing Senecas "caravan". They too were afflicted with smallpox.<sup>22</sup> It is not clear if they had it prior to arriving among the Onondagas, picked it up while there, or even it was they that carried the disease to the Onondagas.

It is tempting to postulate that the Senecas brought the disease to the rest of the Confederacy as the result of their trip. There is evidence that smallpox hit the Iroquois (the Oneidas were clearly mentioned) at least between August of

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<sup>19</sup> See the letter in [Le Jeune's] Relation of 1660-61, JR, 47: 69-93.

<sup>20</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1661-62, JR, 47: 193.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 205.

1662 and sometime in 1663. But there is no record of when the Senecas passed by the other tribes, probably in winter of 1661-1662, and no clear idea of when the Oneidas got the disease, except that it came to French notice sometime after August of 1662. That was plenty of time for the virus to arrive from a number of other places.

What the sources reveal is that a Frenchman who was captured August 25, 1662, and who was among the Oneidas for nineteen months suffered from a variety of adventures including surviving a smallpox epidemic that carried off more than 1,000 souls.<sup>23</sup> Writing in 1663, just after describing an attack by the Susquehannocks in the spring of that year, Lalemant noted that these defeats, added to the smallpox which has "wrought havoc in their villages", has kept the Iroquois on the defensive.<sup>24</sup> Since Lalemant implied that the disease had passed by the time of his writing the Relation, usually in the fall, if not earlier, of 1663, and the French witness was caught in August of the previous year, one can contend that the disease struck sometime between August of 1662 and, at least, the spring of 1663. It may even have lasted for that period of time.

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<sup>23</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1664-65, JR, 50: 59, 63. Writing two years earlier Lalemant gives figures that come close to 1,000 baptized. [Lalemant's] Relation of 1661-62, JR, 47: 193, 205; [Lalemant's] Relation of 1662-63, JR, 48: 83.

<sup>24</sup> [Lalemant's] Relation of 1662-63, JR, 48: 79, 83. Lalemant added that French captives among the Iroquois had baptized 300 children and a like number of adults as a result of disease. Ibid, 83.

The evidence is not strong enough to conclude that the epidemics of 1661-62 and 1662-63 were continuous, but if the figure of 1,000 dead is accurate, this seems more reasonable for the longer, almost two year period than for the less than one year span. Certainly the mortality rate a few years later does not indicate the same drastic death rate in such a short time frame.<sup>25</sup> It is unlikely that immunities built up in such a brief period of time to account for so vastly different mortality rates.

As the Jesuits established firmer contact with the Iroquois, the record of epidemics and illnesses among that people became, if not overly detailed, at least less vague. At the end of 1668 Father Fremin found a contagious disease ravaging the Senecas. He baptized 120 people, nearly all adults, more than 90 of whom died. He also wrote that 150 others, presumably unbaptized, also died.<sup>26</sup> From June to September 1672, a pestilence marked by severe headaches and fever struck the Mohawks.<sup>27</sup> In 1676 influenza struck one Seneca village and more than 60 children died in one month.<sup>28</sup> From the number of baptisms and projected deaths among the other Senecas, it seems safe to conclude that more than one

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<sup>25</sup> See Appendix A, Table A.2.

<sup>26</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1669-70, JR, 54: 79, 81.

<sup>27</sup> [Dablon's] Relation of 1672-73, JR, 57: 81, 83.

<sup>28</sup> [Dablon's] Relation of 1676 and 1677, JR, 60: 175.

village was hit.<sup>29</sup>

Three years later the Onondagas and Oneidas were struck by smallpox. They failed to attend conferences with the English in the fall because of the "Sickness of feavor and Small Pox Reigning soo violently" in their lands.<sup>30</sup> In a letter to the King, Governor Frontenac of New France gloated over the unfortunate circumstances of the Five Nations and left the impression that the malady was fairly widespread and devastating.<sup>31</sup>

Between 1680 and 1701 the records only note two more epidemics among the Iroquois. Sometime before August, 1682, the "bloody flux" hit the Onondagas and the Cayugas. Ten people died at Onondaga after the Jesuits ran out of medicine,

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<sup>29</sup> Appendix A, Table A.2.

<sup>30</sup> Message from the Sachims of Onondage...6 Oct., 1679, Livingston Indian Records, 51-52; The Oneydes Answer...31 Oct., 1679, Ibid, 55-57.

<sup>31</sup> He wrote that there was an "grande quantité" of dead. Frontenac au Roi, 6 Nov., 1679, C11A, 5: 12. Snow and Starna ("Sixteenth-Century Depopulation", 144) claim that this epidemic lasted during the winter of 1679-80, but the source they cite suggests otherwise. Under the entry of 23 March, 1680 Jasper Danckaerts wrote that the news from Albany was that a great number of Indians had died in the early part of winter of small pox. (Danckaerts, Journal of Jasper Danckaerts, 1678-80, 181) The winter obviously started in 1679, and that this was when the disease was raging is confirmed by the messages of the Iroquois. Moreover, Danckaerts noted the disease almost every where he went in 1679, but made no mention of it in 1680 except to state that it "had prevailed so much the last year". (Ibid, 50, 58, 141, 149. Quote on page 239)

and sixty at Cayuga of the same disease.<sup>32</sup> Intriguingly, Father Lamberville also noted that three Senecas were killed because they were believed to be "the authors of the Present ills."<sup>33</sup> This may imply that the disease came via the Senecas. On the other hand it could be that the three Senecas were thought to have used magic to cause the disease. It is, nonetheless, an intriguing hint that the Senecas might also have been afflicted. In the spring of 1690 smallpox was reported among the Mohawks gathering to attack New France. It had yet to spread to the rest of the tribes (with the army or in Iroquoia?) because they were out hunting. By the fall of that year the French reported that 100 Iroquois with the army had died of smallpox, and 400 others had died in their villages.<sup>34</sup>

Knowledge of European diseases among the Iroquois required the presence of those who would record the diseases-- just as that contact brought the diseases. This relationship presents several problems when assessing to what extent the Iroquois suffered from epidemics. The tribes that had most

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<sup>32</sup> Jean de Lamberville to [Father Superior], 25 August, 1682, JR, 62: 97, 99.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, 99.

<sup>34</sup> Council of Connecticut to the Council of Massachusetts, 28 May, 1690, Connecticut Historical Collections, vol. 21: 320; Monseignat, *Relation de ce qui s'est passé de plus remarquable en Canada...*[Nov. 1689 to Nov. 1690], C11A, 11: 38.

contact with Europeans were most likely to catch diseases, and also most likely to have Europeans record such. Does lack of information about disease among the interior tribes reflect inadequate historical record or does it mean that distance from large European settlements made them less prone to catch these diseases? Not having eyewitnesses among all tribes makes it impossible to know if they suffered diseases at the same time as those which the sources indicate were afflicted by contagious illnesses, or if these other groups were struck at other times.

Certainly we cannot assume that every time one Iroquois tribe was hit, every other tribe also suffered. By the late 1660's the Jesuits were among the Iroquois. In some villages they reported contagious disease while at others no mention was made of any malady. Does this reflect bad reporting on the part of the Jesuits or active avoidance of afflicted groups by uninfected tribes?<sup>35</sup> If it was the latter, how widespread was this practice? Unfortunately this question of how to interpret the data available is no more easily resolved than that of how representative of reality that data is. Like so many other aspects of Iroquois history and culture no resolution to these questions seems forthcoming in the foreseeable future. The best that can be said is that the available data at least reflects when the major outbreaks of

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<sup>35</sup> There is evidence that as early as 1634 some Mohawk relocated to avoid disease. [van den Bogaert], "Narrative of a Journey to the Mohawk...", NNN, 141.

disease took place and what tribes were most seriously affected.

Table B.1

Disease Among The Iroquois to 1701		
Year	Group	Disease/Symptoms
1634, Dec.	Mohawk	Smallpox
1636	Mohawk or Onondaga?	No details
1639-40, Winter	Iroquois [not specified]	Smallpox and/or unspecified throat ailment [mumps?]
1640-41, Winter	Iroquois [not specified]	No details
1646-47, Summer to Spring	Mohawk	No details
1655	Onondaga	No details
1660	Mohawk	Smallpox
1661-62, [Winter?]	Onondaga & Seneca	Smallpox
1662-63, [Winter?]	Iroquois	Smallpox
1668, [Fall to Winter?]	Seneca	No details
1672, June to Sept.	Mohawk	Severe headache and fever [Influenza?]
1676	Seneca	Influenza
1679 [Winter]	Onondaga, Oneida & possibly all Iroquois tribes	Smallpox and fever [Influenza?]
1682	Onondaga & Cayuga & possibly Seneca	Bloody flux [Influenza?]
1690, Spring [to Fall]	Mohawk & possibly rest of Iroquois tribes	Smallpox

## Appendix C

## Iroquois Population Estimates to 1701

Estimating the size of the Iroquois population is difficult. There are a variety of methods that can be pursued, but the two most common ones are the "historical" and "archaeological" approaches. Neither method is without flaws. Historians tend to accept the population figures of European contemporaries. This leaves us at the mercy of the widely varying powers of observation of these witnesses. One can never be certain if shifts in population figures represent real trends or reflect the accuracy of the particular chronicler. This approach is made even more difficult because these estimates are usually given in terms of Iroquois fighting strength and to arrive at a total population for the Iroquois one must multiply those warrior totals by a constant that represents the proportion of warriors in the society. Arriving at that constant usually involves even more speculation.

More scientific is the archaeologist's approach.<sup>1</sup> Using data from excavated village sites that reveal size of villages, longhouses, storage structures, and numbers of hearths per longhouse, archaeologists speculate about the

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<sup>1</sup> At least the process by which things are dug up, categorized, and dated is scientific. The speculations and theorizing based on that unearthed data can often be less disciplined and balanced than that of historians.

number of people per house based on size of the dwelling, and the number of hearths in it. This approach is not without its problems as well. It is difficult to date village occupation very precisely and to establish which villages were occupied at the same time. In order to do this one has to use the archaeological material in conjunction with historical sources. An almost insurmountable problem with this process is that excavations take a great deal of time and in the end the data is never complete or even at comparable levels for all tribes. Moreover, unless all sites are found that were occupied during the historical period, it is extremely difficult to discuss changing population sizes over time. These strike me as major reasons to continue to use evidence from documentary sources such as contemporary warrior population estimates.

In order to approximate Iroquois populations, two approaches will be used. The first is to make population estimates based on house totals, hearths per house, and people per hearth ratios. This will be followed by a discussion of population size based on warrior to general population ratios. Finally, some attempt will be made to check population figures arrived at by these two different means. While this involves one speculative method used to verify another equally speculative process, it seemed worth the effort.

Determining the number of hearths per longhouse and the size of an Iroquois family is central to using the hearth

count approach. The number of people per family is difficult to ascertain, but the consensus is that among Iroquoian groups there were about four to eight people per family, and that two families shared one hearth.<sup>2</sup> Establishing the number of hearths per longhouse involves less speculation because the historical record can be augmented by archaeological findings. Most sources concur that Iroquoian longhouses had an average of three to four central hearths, often augmented by small fires.<sup>3</sup> Since these smaller fires were used by members of the same groups that shared the central hearths, one need not take them into account when determining the number of hearths in a house.

Tables C.1 and C.2 present data used to arrive at Iroquois population estimates for the years 1634, 1669, and 1677. Table C.3 presents population estimates for these same

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<sup>2</sup> Heidenreich, Huronian, 99. In the Relation of 1667-668, (JR, 52: 49) Le Mercier cites a letter of 8 November in which the Bishop of Petreaea writes that the natives usually have two to three children, "rarely do they exceed the number of four." Pierre Radisson, however, claimed that his adopted Mohawk mother had nine children. Two girls died at an unspecified age, and three sons were killed in war. [Radisson], Explorations, 26-27.

<sup>3</sup> Heidenreich, Huronian, 99; William Starna, "Mohawk Iroquois Populations: A Revision", Ethnohistory, 27, 4 (Fall 1980), 377, 379. However, in a recent article on Mohawk population Dean Snow and William Starna depart from most other studies in suggesting an average of 6 hearths per Mohawk longhouse in the historic period. D. Snow and W. Starna, "Sixteenth-Century Depopulation: A View from the Mohawk Valley", American Anthropologist, 91, 1 (March 1989), 144. They write that the source they used provides figures for this conclusion and refer to an unpublished manuscript in which this is explained. (Ibid) This claim is not supported by evidence in the published article.

years. These were the only years for which the historical record provided evidence about how many houses were in Iroquois villages. Since we do not have archaeological data on longhouses among all the Iroquois tribes, it was decided to use only the house totals provided by seventeenth century contemporaries of the Iroquois. Table C.1 lists the various sources that remarked on house numbers among the Iroquois, and their estimates. Table C.2 shows estimates of how many hearths per tribe this would represent at three and four hearths per longhouse. Finally, Table C.3 presents Iroquois population estimates derived from people to hearth ratios. The estimates are given based on averages of three and four hearths per longhouse. It was assumed that two families shared a hearth and that this represented ten people per hearth.

Table C.1

Total Houses Among Iroquois			
Year	Tribe	# of Houses	Source
1634	Mohawk	180	H. Van den Bogaert, <u>A Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country</u> , 4, 7, 13
	Oneida	66	
1669	Seneca	360	Galinée, "Voyage de Dollier et Galinée", 24
1677	Mohawk	96	Wentworth Greenhalgh's Journal...1677, <u>NYCD</u> , 3: 250-252
	Oneida	100	
	Onondaga	164	
	Cayuga	100	
	Seneca	324	

Table C.2

Total Hearths per Tribe			
Year	Tribe	at 3 per house	at 4 per house
1634	Mohawk	540	720
	Oneida	198	264
1669	Seneca	1,080	1,440
1677	Mohawk	288	384
	Oneida	300	400
	Onondaga	492	656
	Cayuga	300	400
	Seneca	972	1,296

Table C.3

Iroquois Population Estimates Based on People per Hearth			
Year	Tribe	3 Hearths per Longhouse	4 Hearths per Longhouse
1634	Mohawk	5,400	7,200
	Oneida	1,980	2,640
1669	Seneca	10,800	14,400
1677	Mohawk	2,880	3,840
	Oneida	3,000	4,000
	Onondaga	4,920	6,560
	Cayuga	3,000	4,000
	Seneca	9,720	12,960
Total for 1677	All Tribes	23,520	31,360

The population estimates in the documentary sources are almost all given in terms of fighting men. To come to a total population for each of the five tribes, and for the confederacy, such figures are usually multiplied by numbers of three to five. These two numbers represent the upper and lower estimates within the accepted range of possible children and wives an Iroquois warrior could have. The assumption among those that write about the Iroquois seems to be that when the sources refer to warriors they mean married adult males. No real attempt has been made to see if something other than this was intended. Thus if one accepts that each warrior had one wife, and an average of two to three children,

one multiplies the total number of warriors by five to determine the overall tribal population.

The problem is that there is no proof that "warrior" simply equates with married adult male. Moreover, even if this was the case, the multiple of five would be too high. One would have to assume that each warrior was indeed married, and had been long enough to have produced his full compliment of children at the time of the estimate, that his wife was still alive, and that fathers never lived long enough to fight along side unmarried sons.<sup>4</sup> But these assumptions beg too many questions, and rest on no evidence. For example, on what grounds can one claim that all warriors were married and had the exact quota of children? Two to three surviving children seems to be what the primary sources suggest was common in the post epidemic period from which the statistics below were culled, and the Iroquois were monogamous. But some could, and some certainly did, have more children than that. On the other hand, some warriors must certainly have been widowed or abandoned by wives who would not appreciate the lack of food, support, and affection that sustained warring inevitably produced.<sup>5</sup> Given these types of variables it seems more in

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<sup>4</sup> Radisson observed that his adopted father, still an active warrior, had five sons who were also warriors. Radisson makes no mention of any of them being married. [Radisson], Explorations, 26.

<sup>5</sup> Many warriors married old. [Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 453, 455. This would limit how many children they could father.

keeping with the historical record to multiply the warrior totals by three than by five to arrive at overall population estimates.

Yet, the historical sources suggest a need for a multiple higher than even five. In 1669 the Cayugas were said to be capable of fielding over 300 warriors out of a population of over 2,000 people.<sup>6</sup> If one deducts the number of warriors from 2,000, and divides by 300, that produces a figure of 6.6 people for every warrior. (The source makes clear that the warrior total was part of the 2,000.) In that same year the Senecas were said to have about 1,000 to 1,200 warriors.<sup>7</sup> Three years later the tribe was estimated at 12,000 to 13,000 people.<sup>8</sup> If we accept the lowest estimates in each case, and deduct the warrior figure from the population total, that produces a ratio of eleven people for every warrior. One year later the Seneca warrior total was estimated at 800.<sup>9</sup> This estimate seems too low. No epidemic hit the Senecas between 1669 and 1672, nor were there any major war losses in this period.<sup>10</sup> However, if this figure is correct and the population estimate is still valid, this produces a ratio of

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<sup>6</sup> [Le Mercier's] Relation of 1668-69, JR, 52: 193.

<sup>7</sup> Galinée, "Voyage de Dollier et Galinée", 24.

<sup>8</sup> [Dablon's] Relation of 1671-72, JR, 56: 27.

<sup>9</sup> Fr. Garnier to Gov. Frontenac, July 6, 1673, JR, 57: 27.

<sup>10</sup> Appendix B, Table B.1; Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for 1669-1672.

one warrior for every 14 people.

These scraps of data present several problems in assessing warrior/population ratios. Are these cases representative? Is this ratio consistent for these tribes over time? Do the ratios for the other tribes fall within this range? The answers are, however, fewer than the questions. We can assume that the same ratio could apply to the other three Iroquois tribes, but we cannot be sure. However, it is possible to check the validity of this assumption. If we take the estimated tribal populations for 1677 (see Table C.3), divide those by the estimated warrior strength of each tribe for that same year (see Table C.4), and deduct the warrior total from the population total, then we get the following range of ratios for the five tribes:

Mohawk: 1:8 and 1:12

Oneida: 1:14 and 1:19

Onondaga: 1:13 and 1:17

Cayuga: 1:9 and 1:12

Seneca: 1:9 and 1:12

The fact that the Cayugas' and Senecas' ratios are so close to those derived from documentary sources indicates that Iroquois population estimates based on hearth totals and those derived via the warrior to general population ratios produce similar population totals. If this is the case, the warrior to population ratios for the other tribes can be deemed equally valid. This may seem farfetched, especially in the

case of the Oneidas and Onondagas. But it is possible to suggest that it is not. If we take the ratio of 1:14, multiply that by the number of warriors estimated in each tribe in 1677, (see Table C.4) we get an Oneida population of 3,000 living in 100 houses, or 30 people per house. The Onondaga population comes to 5,250 people living in 164 houses, or 32 people per house. This is the low end of the range of people that could live in a longhouse.<sup>11</sup> In the case of the Mohawks, if the 1:8 ratio is used, that produces a population of 2,700 living in 96 houses, or 28 people per house. While this does not serve as conclusive proof that the ratios are valid across time, and for all tribes, it does suggest that they are not as far fetched as they at first might appear, and that different tribes had different warrior to population ratios. It also suggests that there might be some value to deriving population estimates based on those ratios. All the caveats listed above for not ascribing a large family to each warrior still seem to hold true. What seems equally true, and what the evidence indicates, is that the missionaries and other chroniclers of seventeenth century native society had more in mind than simply a married adult male when they spoke of warriors, and that Iroquois society was made of more than an aggregate of nuclear families.

In Table C.4 the warrior strength estimates are presented as recorded by various observers. In Table C.5 tribal and

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<sup>11</sup> Starna, "Mohawk Iroquois Population", 375.

confederacy population estimates are presented based on multiplying those figures by the lowest applicable ratio. That is in the case of Mohawks by 8, Oneidas and Onondagas by 14, Cayugas by 7, Senecas by 11.<sup>12</sup> In instances where the sources provide only warrior estimates for the whole confederacy the multiple of 11 was used. It was close to the average of the five, and in any case the tribes with the higher ratios were the most populous. It was felt this would more accurately reflect the overall population trend. These general confederacy warrior totals are more often than not lower than those arrived at when individual tribal warrior strengths are added up. The result is that when these confederacy warrior estimates are used they produce lower population estimates. In Table C.5 the total tribal population is arrived at by multiplying the warrior total by the ratio numbers and then adding the warrior population estimate to that figure. As noted above, the warrior total was deducted from the overall population in order to obtain the ratio of warrior to population. To obtain the overall tribal and confederacy population the warrior total must be factored back in.

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<sup>12</sup> In the case of the Seneca and the Cayuga these figures were the ones derived from the figures provided in documentary sources.

Table C.4

Iroquois Warrior Strength Estimates, 1643-1712			
Year	Group	# of Warriors	Sources
1643	Mohawk	7-800	JR, 24: 271
1659-60	Mohawk	500	JR, 45: 207
	Oneida	100	
	Onondaga	300	
	Cayuga	300	
	Seneca	1,000	
1661	All Iroq.	2,000	JR, 47: 105
1665	Mohawk	3-400	JR, 49: 257-259
	Oneida	140	
	Onondaga	300	
	Cayuga	300	
	Seneca	1,200	
1668	All Iroq.	2,000	JR, 51: 139
1669	Oneida	160	JR, 53: 247
	Cayuga	300	JR, 52: 193
	Seneca	1,000 to 1,200	Galinée, "Voyage du Dollier et Galinée", 24
1672	Cayuga	300	JR, 56: 51
1673	Seneca	800	JR, 57: 27
1677	Mohawk	300	NYCD, 3: 250-252
	Oneida	200	
	Onondaga	350	
	Cayuga	300	
	Seneca	1,000	
1681	All Iroq.	2,000	AN, Colonies, C11A, 5: 309
1682	Seneca	1,500	JR, 62: 163

Iroquois Warrior Strength Estimates, 1643-1712			
Year	Group	# of Warriors	Sources
1689	Mohawk	270	<u>NYCD</u> , 4: 337
	Oneida	180	
	Onondaga	500	
	Cayuga	300	
	Seneca	1,300	
1691	Mohawk	130	<u>NYCD</u> , 3: 815
1698	Mohawk	110	<u>NYCD</u> , 4: 337
	Oneida	70	
	Onondaga	250	
	Cayuga	200	
	Seneca	600	
1710	All Irog.	1,000 to 1,100	[Raudot], <u>Relation par lettres</u> , 189
1712	All Iroq.	1,200	[Anon.], "Memoire sur les...Iroquoises", 445

Table C.5

Iroquois Population Estimates Based on Warrior to People Ratios			
Year	Group	Tribal Totals	Confederacy Totals
1643	Mohawk	6,300	
1659-60	Mohawk	4,500	24,900
	Oneida	1,500	
	Onondaga	4,500	
	Cayuga	2,400	
	Seneca	12,000	
1661	Confederacy		23,000
1665	Mohawk	2,700	26,100
	Oneida	2,100	
	Onondaga	4,500	
	Cayuga	2,400	
	Seneca	14,400	
1668	Confederacy		23,000
1669	Oneida	2,400	
	Cayuga	2,400	
	Seneca	12,000	
1672	Cayuga	2,400	
1673	Seneca	9,600	
1677	Mohawk	2,700	25,350
	Oneida	3,000	
	Onondaga	5,250	
	Cayuga	2,400	
	Seneca	12,000	
1681	Confederacy		23,000
1682	Seneca		18,000*

Iroquois Population Estimates Based on Warrior to People Ratios			
Year	Group	Tribal Totals	Confederacy Totals
1689	Mohawk	2,430	30,630*
	Oneida	2,700	
	Onondaga	7,500*	
	Cayuga	2,400	
	Seneca	15,600*	
1691	Mohawk	1,170	
1698	Mohawk	990	14,590
	Oneida	1,050	
	Onondaga	3,750	
	Cayuga	1,600	
	Seneca	7,200	
1710	Confederacy		12,000 to 13,200
1712	Confederacy		14,400

[\* These population totals are too high. The number of warriors may have gone up as a result of captives gained in warring, and the latter may have led to increased total population, but nothing in the historical record provides justification for such massive overall population increases.]

As a comparison of Tables C.3 and C.5 indicates, the total population of the Iroquois in 1677, arrived at by different means, reveals a remarkable degree of compatibility (23,520 and 25,350 respectively). And as noted above, the warrior to people ratios that could be compared also produce similar numbers. As to the pre-contact population, that is even more problematic. By the time we have a complete confederacy population estimate the Iroquois had already been hit by epidemics. We do not know mortality rates among the

Iroquois, nor data precise enough to indicate which tribes had been hit. The best that can be done is some calculated guessing in the face of contradictory evidence. For example, the house totals for the Mohawks indicate a population decrease of 50%. But by the time that second house total was recorded in 1677 major wars had been undertaken and population figures based on warrior totals show an increase in population from 1634 to 1643, and then a drop again by 1659-60. In the case of the Oneidas, house totals and population estimates based on warrior ratios, indicate an increase in population over time--not a decrease.

Table A.2 in Appendix A indicates that at least 2,215 people died in the period from 1667 to 1679, although the figures in Table C.5 barely reflect any population decline. If we assume the population estimate for 1677 to be correct, then the total of Iroquois who died in the villages represents 8.7% of the whole population, and thus an 8.7% population decline over a 12 year period during which epidemics struck the Iroquois four separate times.<sup>13</sup> In 1663 the Iroquois may have lost as many as 1,000 people in an epidemic.<sup>14</sup> This represents 3.8% of the population estimated to be 26,100 in 1665. Even if twice as many died as were noted in the Jesuit Relations, this would indicate a significant, but gradual

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<sup>13</sup> See Appendix B, Table B.1.

<sup>14</sup> Appendix B.

mortality rate/depopulation.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, even if the Mohawks, the tribe most often struck by disease, did suffer a 50% mortality rate, is it wise to assume that all the others did as well?<sup>16</sup> Until archaeologists uncover a historic village and a cemetery with thousands of skeletons, little more than conjecture is possible. Surely if the Iroquois were dying off in such massive numbers the physical remains of such devastation will eventually be found.

Based on this study it seems possible to conclude that if the Iroquois population was halved as a result of disease, it was a gradual process. Either that or the Iroquois capture and adoption of over 6,000 people was enough to offset much of the population drain brought on by disease.<sup>17</sup> The above discussion and tables also indicate that Iroquois population was much higher than most experts have in the past estimated. Despite a series of epidemics, the Iroquois managed to maintain relatively stable population levels, at least insofar

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<sup>15</sup> To determine a true mortality rate, one would have to know how many people contracted a disease, and how many from among them died. Mortality rate here, as in most studies of this nature, actually refers to the overall decline in population as result of an epidemic or of several epidemics over time.

<sup>16</sup> Indeed, even the high Mohawk mortality rate can be skewed by comparing a high pre-epidemic population with a post-epidemic population that is lower than it might be. See Snow and Starna, "Sixteenth-Century Depopulation", 146, 147-148. While the pre-epidemic figure appears reasonable, the population for the Mohawk in 1644 is based on multiplying the warrior total by 5, rather than 8, as my calculations suggest.

<sup>17</sup> This total was derived from Table D.1 in Appendix D.

as the rather insensitive methods used here could reflect such things. The significant drop in the size of the Iroquois Confederacy during the historic period seems to have been confined to the latter part of the seventeenth century and does not appear to be attributable to any one single factor. Moreover, this observed population decline could be the result of method. The wars of the 1680's and 1690's took a heavy toll on Iroquois warrior populations.<sup>18</sup> Because overall population figures are based on warrior totals, the rapid decline in warrior strength during this latter period may not reflect as rapid a decline in the overall population. Given that at present there does not seem to be any more reliable way to obtain population figures for all the Iroquois, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the above population totals reflect to the best of our knowledge Iroquois population during most of the seventeenth century.

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<sup>18</sup> They may have lost as many as 1,300 warriors in the last twelve years of the century. Appendix D, Table D.1, entries for period 1689 to 1701

## Appendix D

## The Statistics of War: Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Central to the study of the Iroquois wars have been the questions of whom they attacked and why? The following table was created in an attempt to answer these and several other questions: who initiated a raid, against whom was it intended, when was it launched, where did the attack take place, and what were the results of these aggressions? In each case could the cause of the raid be determined, and was it possible to ascertain any relationship between a given raid and Iroquois policy? It was possible to chart answers to all but the last two questions. Nonetheless, it was hoped these more specific questions could help answer the general queries more precisely, while the data generated from the recorded answers to these questions might then allow for a critical assessment of past interpretations of the causes of the wars. The latter have often been based on less than precise answers to the broader questions of whom the Iroquois attacked and why.

Sources

The bulk of information used in compiling the table was taken from the writings of French observers, and other French sources. Few colonies in North America, especially in the early period of contact, had as much interaction with Indians

as did the French, and fewer still left such detailed records.<sup>1</sup> Among the most important documentary sources were the Jesuit Relations. While every effort was made to find other sources to corroborate and fill in information lacking in the Relations, this was not always possible and the work of the French Jesuits headed the list of primary sources--especially up to 1666. Prior to this date records of New France's history consist primarily of the Jesuit Relations and other--mostly published--memoirs. Many of the latter are wholly, or partially, based on the Relations.<sup>2</sup>

It might be expected that the historical record on the Iroquois would be somewhat more diversified. The area that is now New York state was occupied by the Dutch and later by the English. These two European colonizers came to be, each in their turn, allies of the Iroquois. It would be natural enough to turn to their records for information about the Iroquois and to compensate for the biases present in the French sources. And, indeed, the Dutch colony along the Hudson River had at one time a full documentary record. A fair quantity of data was also left from the period of English occupation.

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<sup>1</sup> That the best sources for writing a history of the Iroquois come from their enemies, and not their allies, is an irony not to be overlooked.

<sup>2</sup> Even the French Crown had to rely on published memoirs of French explorers when referring to the early period of New France's history. To bolster some claims of sovereignty over the Iroquois by right of conquest, the French Crown had no other reference than Champlain's published journals. Untitled Document, AN, Colonies, C11A, 1: 66-69

However, the bulk of the material from the period of Dutch occupation, in the form of the Dutch West India Company records, was sold off in the 1850's, possibly as early as 1674.<sup>3</sup> As well, many of the documents from both the Dutch and English periods of occupation were destroyed or damaged by fire. Moreover, much of the Dutch and English material which survived the fire, and that which did not, was not based on close personal contacts with, or direct observations of, the Iroquois in their tribal lands. This is the type of material required to answer the questions raised by the patterns present in the Relations evidence. In short, there is no Dutch or English equivalent to the Relations of the French Jesuits.<sup>4</sup>

The problems presented by this bias in the sources should not be overlooked. It meant that it was possible to formulate a view of Iroquois relations with the French and their allies, but much less so of Iroquois relations with other European and Indian groups--the latter could only be approximated roughly.

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<sup>3</sup> E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., NYCD, vol. 1, preface; van den Bogaert, H., A Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country, 1634-1635, C. Gehring and W. Starna eds. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1988), p. xxiii.

<sup>4</sup> The Dutch did not make much effort to convert the Iroquois, and did not send missionaries to live among them. Later on the English, feeling threatened by the Jesuit impact on the Iroquois, tried to establish missions. But the ministers usually wanted too much money and too many creature comforts to overcome their reluctance to live among the "savages". On the unsuccessful English missionary effort during the years of this study see, J. Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 254-259.

As well, a reliance on European observers for information meant that one was confined to examining Iroquois relations with groups that had dealings with some colonial power. Otherwise records of Iroquois relations with these groups did not survive. As well, because information was so scarce it was almost impossible to cross check accounts of events and properly evaluate any emerging patterns. For example, because one could not go much beyond the Jesuit Relations as a source prior to 1666 it was difficult to assess if a shift in a developing trend was the result of changing Iroquois tactics, or if the authors and editors of the Relations simply felt other matters were of greater concern for a given year. Was the noticeable increase in Iroquois raiding in the 1640's a real increase, or were that many raids occurring prior to that time but only in the 1640's did the Jesuits decide to publicize the fearful impact of the Iroquois? Without independent sources against which to check the Relations data, it was impossible to answer these questions. After 1666, the slightly wider range of sources available mitigated this problem somewhat.

Another consideration about the sources is their representativeness. Actually, the question of representation revolves around two main concerns: how accurately do the historical sources reflect the actual number and range of hostilities engaged in by the Iroquois, and how well does this table reflect the number of raids recorded in those sources.

It seems to me next to impossible to fully resolve questions of how well the sources reflect the reality of the period. As noted above, the sources used for this study were limited in terms of origins, and this did lead to some readily noticeable colouring of results in terms of working out Iroquois relations with some Native and European groups. And the problems with the records did not end with bias: years passed without activities recorded, at times groups appeared and disappeared from the historical record without any indication as to why or how the Iroquois became involved with them, nor how matters were resolved. Even in years for which data was available, it was impossible to state if records left to posterity had captured the full extent of Iroquois activities for that period. But meagre and incomplete as they are, they are all that we have to work with. Unless some huge cache of documents covering the seventeenth century is unearthed, it appears unlikely that these lacunae can be addressed, or that we will ever know how well or how poorly the sources presently relied on have served us. It is small consolation to note that these are problems shared by all those that do research on this period of Iroquois history.

As the preceding implies, I do feel I have been comprehensive in my research. As to how well the table reflects the sources available--I suppose only time and critics will tell. I have tried to read all the sources that seemed might have some bearing on the questions listed at the

outset of this section. I have no doubt that some sources were overlooked and that local archival deposits, which time and finances did not allow me to consult, may contain material that could serve to illuminate aspects of raids listed here, and may provide evidence of raids that the sources I have consulted omitted deliberately or failed to record. The range of data available from these sources and the extent to which it can alter the information and patterns that this table reveals is, at present, a moot point.

Equally uncertain is the degree of error in the table.<sup>5</sup> Aside from raids that may have been overlooked, how accurately have those entered in the table been recorded? It would only be natural to wonder if some events have been misdated. Have accounts that actually refer to two separate raids been mistakenly lumped together to make one raid, or vice versa? The vagueness of some sources make such errors almost inevitable, and some have been detected and corrected already. How many more remain uncorrected is anyone's guess. However, I do not consider this table to be a complete and finished product, nor do I intend that it be viewed as such. It is merely in the development stage and it, as well as the conclusions derived from it, will be modified as more research is undertaken and mistakes are discovered and pointed out.

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<sup>5</sup> The following does not refer to interpretative differences, but rather to factual data. Although, at times arriving at a "fact", such as a date, could be a matter of interpretation.

All that can be said is that the mistakes of omission and commission are the product of honest errors of judgement. They reflect the limitations of analytical capacity and the amount of research one individual can undertake. Time, it is hoped, will help rectify both problems.

#### Method

In writing up the table many subjective decisions had to be made. The first and most obvious was what to include as a "raid"? Should rumours of raids be noted? What of accounts of raids that were from questionable sources--that is, sources that were known not to have been eyewitnesses to events? It was decided not to list passing references to groups going to raid unless it could be confirmed that the raid was carried out. A band of warriors may have decided to go to war and some omen put a stop to the expedition long before the intended target group was reached. A record of a war party setting off to raid was not sufficient evidence that the action was carried out. Since most raids were recorded by other than the actual participants, it would be self defeating to eliminate all but eyewitness accounts. This did not mean that efforts to try and corroborate as many accounts as possible could be forsaken, but still one would have to assume that unless the accounts could be proven to be false, they reflected what the observer who left the written record believed to have happened. However, some known raids (few--

but some nonetheless) were omitted from the table because it was impossible to date when they occurred and there were not enough other details about the raid. Without a date, sufficient clues to arrive at a probable date, or adequate particulars to match or distinguish one raid from another, it was futile to try and determine whether or not that raid had already been entered in the table. Rather than run the risk of "padding" the table it was deemed best not to list such raids. In no instance was a raid rejected for inclusion in the table because the source or the account seemed "unreliable". When the source or the account appeared dubious, for whatever reason, the raid was recorded in the table, and any reservations about the events or the source were noted in the "Comments" column.

For those who might wish to check the veracity of the interpretation of the raid, it was decided to list the sources upon which the decisions were made. The sources listed after each raid refer to the actual accounts of the raid, and also to where evidence can be found to justify aspects of my interpretation of the raid--either the time, place, who should be designated aggressor, why a particular group is clearly designated as the target when the actual account does not make it apparent, and so on. If more than one account of a raid was found, it was included in the list of sources. Often the various accounts did not differ in substance, but equally often they provided some significant detail that helped

clarify the course of events.

At times it was difficult to determine who the "initiating" tribe was in accounts of a particular raid. If the Huron decided to go to war, and while enroute were attacked by the Iroquois in Huronia, several points are clear: both groups were set on an offensive policy, but the Iroquois deserve aggressor status because to arrive in Huronia they had to have implemented their decision to go to war before the Huron. At the same time the Huron offensive role should be noted. This type of information, necessary to minimize the distortion that mere listing can produce, is to be found in the "Comments" column. In the "Groups Involved" column, the group listed first was that deemed the aggressor, or more properly, the group initiating the encounter.

The vagueness of some of the sources about dates, locations, target groups, and results of raids meant that far too often it became necessary to determine where raids took place, when, and just what groups were involved. If the sources provided some clues, or logical reasons could be adduced for arriving at some conclusion concerning one or more of these matters, an estimate was made. The reasons for that assessment were then noted in the "Comments" column, and whatever clues the estimates were based on were listed in the "Sources" column.<sup>6</sup> At times the dates given in the sources

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<sup>6</sup> I would like to express my deepest thanks to Professor C.E. Heidenreich for his help in identifying native groups and geographical locations based on often sketchy details. No

reflected when the news of the raid reached the group which/ or observer who left the record of the event, and not when it took place. If reasonable grounds existed for estimating when the raid took place, the estimated date was used, and the time the raid was brought to an observers attention and the reasons for the estimate were noted in the "Comments" column. If estimating the actual date of the raid was not possible or proved to be too conjectural, the time that the raid was recorded was used, and this fact was noted in the "Comments" column.

All numbers of killed, wounded, captured, and the size of groups involved, are as given in the sources. Those numbers range from wild speculation to informed estimates. Where numbers of participants, etc., differed in various accounts, the range of numbers was used. If the sources were clear about how many people were in the target group, that number was used. It was not assumed that the number reported as captured or killed during any encounter reflected the total size of the target group. Because two Huron were caught was not reason enough to conclude that only two were targeted. There may have been forty Huron in the group, only two caught, while the rest escaped.

Wherever my estimates are included in the table, they are enclosed in square brackets [ ]. This included any part of a

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atlas or map could provide the range of information about the human and physical geography of the Northeast that he brought to bear on the questions asked of him.

date that was not clearly specified in the account of a raid and/or tribal names. If the sources used an obscure form of a tribal name, the modern name was used and placed in square brackets.<sup>7</sup> Where a tribal name used in a document did not correspond clearly to any known tribe, the original name, as spelled in the source, was used and the possible modern corollary was put in square brackets. Any blank spaces in any column means that more details were not available.

The purpose of creating this table was to see if by listing all Iroquois raids data could be generated that would help explain aspects of Iroquois-Native and Iroquois-European relations. In arriving at some of that numerical data--used throughout the dissertation--certain decisions were made when faced with vague terms. Expressions such a "some" or "several" were taken to mean at least two people. Thus "some killed" would add two deaths to the total number of people killed by the Iroquois. At times the size of the attacked group was recorded but the source did not provide precise numbers of captured or killed. In such instances the source might have indicated that "half", "most", or "almost all" were killed. If this was the case the numerical equivalent could be determined. Thus if the group was 100 strong and half were killed that would equal 50 deaths. If the record indicated most were killed, half plus one was used

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<sup>7</sup> The standard source used for all tribal names was the Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 15, The Northeast, B.T. Trigger, ed.

and the figure was put at 51 dead. If almost all were said to have been captured a range was used; in this same example that would mean 90-100 captured. When assessing the number of raids undertaken in a year or decade by the Iroquois, raids that may have occurred in the winter of one year or the spring of the next, were attributed to the first year in which they might have happened. A raid recorded as having taken place in the winter of 1663 or spring of 1664 was counted as a 1663 raid.

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
May 27, 1603	1,000 Mt, Algk, & Etechemins vs. Iroq [Moh?]	100 Iroq scalped [K?]	Mouth of Rich R.	Raid was earlier. This was the celebration of the success they had. Champlain gives impression raid was a recent one.	Champlain, <u>Works</u> , 1: 103
July 29, 1609	60-100 Huron, Algk, & Champlain vs. 200 Iroq [Moh]	10-12 Iroq capt., 50 beheaded [scalped or K?]	L. Champlain		Champlain, <u>Works</u> , 2: 67-101; <u>MNF</u> , 1: 91
June, 1610	Algk, Mt, & Champlain vs. 100 Iroq	15 Iroq capt.	[Mouth of Rich R.]	Champlain was awaiting Huron with Mt, to go attack Iroq when news arrived that Algk had surprised Iroq. He and Mt proceeded to battle. Huron arrived too late.	Champlain, <u>Works</u> , 2: 125-138
Oct 9-16, 1615	Champlain, at least 200 Huron vs. Iroq [On or Onon]	4 Iroq M, 3 F, 1 mc, 3 fc capt., & unspec. no. K; 20 Fr & Huron wounded, one of whom died	Iroquoia, at village of target group	Capt. Iroq were on way to fishing spot, one of captives was Algk capt. some time previously. Much killing took place, but no numbers given, nor which side suffered most. Susq were to be part of raid, but did not arrive in time.	Champlain, <u>Works</u> , 3: 64-78; <u>JR</u> , 18: 219
[Oct-Nov] 1615	Fr & Huron vs. Iroq	4 Iroq [M] K, 2 capt		E. Brulé and some Huron on way to Susq to ask for aid in Fr & Huron raid vs. Iroq, when ran into Iroq.	Champlain, <u>Works</u> , 3: 53-54, 58, 78, 215-217

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Spring] 1616	Iroq vs. ?	E. Brulé capt.		Brulé was returning from wintering amongst Susq when he ran into Iroq war party. Iroq target group unknown. Brulé escaped first group, but in escape efforts ran into other Iroq. Suffered minor tortures & released.	Ibid, 3: 217-224
[Fall, 1623]	Huron [Bear tribe] vs. [Iroq]	60 Iroq K	Frontiers of Enemy	Some killed on spot, others brought back to Huronia, tortured and K. Sources speak of enemy and Neutral are mentioned, but gives clear impression that war with Neutral had yet to break out.	Sagard, <u>Journey to the Huron</u> , 151, 152, 157
July, 1626	Mah & Dutch vs. Moh	4 Dutch M & 24 Mah M K	1 L from Ft Orange	Mah asked for Dutch help. Group were surprised by Moh who apparently anticipated the attack or spotted the approaching attackers.	<u>NNN</u> , 84; Champlain, <u>Works</u> , 5: 208-209, 214

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
1626	Mah vs. Moh	Moh abandon village		Writing in 1635 Bogaert reported that his Moh guide pointed out a village site abandoned 9 years previously when the Mah forced them out. This would put the attack(s) in 1626. When in that year is not clear. It may have been revenge for the above incident, but that is pure speculation. The village seems to have been located close to the Hudson, but exactly where is uncertain.	<u>NNN</u> , 157
June, 1627	Mt vs. Iroq [Moh]	3 Iroq capt.	Mouth of Rich R.	Mt decide to send envoys to apologize for errors of youth. Envoys were K.	Champlain, <u>Works</u> , 5: 224, 229-231
{Spring}, 1628	Mah vs. Moh	Mah defeated and abandon lands	Albany area	Sources imply the Mah are the aggressors.	<u>NNN</u> , 89; Van <u>Rensselaer Bowier Manuscript</u> , 306
Fall, 1631	Iroq [Moh] vs. Algk	1 Algk [M] K, several F & C capt.		Captives were later returned.	Champlain, <u>Works</u> , 6: 3

Table D.1

Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Mid May], 1632	Que Algk & Mt of Tad vs. Moh	9 Iroq capt., 1 Iroq M, & 7 F K	Moh village	News of raid rec'd June 6. Raid probably carried out in May. Prisoners tortured to death--6 at Que, 2 at Tad. One child was spared by Tad area Mt.	Ibid, 6: 4; JR, 5: 21, 27, 29, 45, 49
June 2, 1633	28-40 Moh vs. Fr	2-3 Fr. M K	St. Law, near TR	Iroq surprised some Fr towing a boat against the current. Iroq scalped dead, & fled at sight of armed Fr re-enforcements.	JR, 5: 213- 215, 251; JR, 21: 21; Sagard, Journey to the Huron, 262
Oct. 24, 1633	Algk vs. Iroq	1 Algk [M] K, & 1 capt.			JR, 5: 93
[Spring], 1634	1,500 Sen vs. 500 Huron	200 Huron [M] K, 100 capt.	[South of Huronian]	Huron had planned to attack, but Sen learned of it and struck first as Huron travelled south.	JR, 6: 145; Ibid, 7: 213- 215, Ibid, 8: 69, 115, 149
[July], 1635	Iroq vs. Algk (Petite Nation)	7 canoes[ful] of Petite Nation destroyed [21 K ?]		News was rec'd Aug. 10 from TR. Raid must have taken place earlier, but not clear when.	JR, 8: 59; Ibid, 9: 227
[Early Oct.], 1635	20 Indians of TR [Mt] vs. Iroq	1 Iroq capt.		Group returned 23 Oct. Raid took place earlier in month.	JR, 8: 23
[1634-1635]	Iroq vs. Algk [of Allumette Island]	23 Algk K		March 28 Algk are reported among Huron seeking aid vs. Iroq for the massacre of 23 of their people since the peace [of 1634?]	JR, 10: 75-77

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
June 13, 1636	Iroq vs. Huron	12 Huron [M] K	Near village of Contarea	A group of Huron warriors heading south to attack the Iroq were surprised in their camp outside the village. Not clear if they were of that village. Rest of Huron escaped.	JR, 10: 83, 95
[late July], 1636	100 Mt of Tad vs. Iroq	28 Iroq M, F, C, capt. & K	Fishing spot near Iroq village	Mt caught 2 Iroq who led warriors to fishing spot to spare their own lives. Mt surprised group of Iroq, K some on spot, others on return trip. Indians above TR [Mt] got 2 Iroq M & 1 fc to torture. Indians of Que [Mt] got 1 Iroq M & 1 F.	JR, 9: 235-237, 251-255
Aug. 14, 1636	Petite Nation Algk vs. Moh	1 Moh capt. tortured [to death]		Jesuits passing via village note the torture.	JR, 9: 65; Ibid, 13: 83
Aug. 24, 1636	Moh vs. English	Some English K	Connecticut		Winthrop Papers, 3: 318
Sept. 2, 1636	Huron (Rock, Cord, & Bear) vs. Onon	7 Onon capt., 1 K	Fishing spot, [S. Shore] Lake Ontario	Huron attacked 25-30 Onon as were fishing. Prisoners were divided among tribes that had participated in raid. The victors arrived Sept. 2. Raid was likely in mid-August.	JR, 13: 37, 45

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Early May], 1637	Mt & Algk vs. Iroq [Moh]	Mt & Algk captains K, unspec. others capt. & K	Field outside Iroq village	Left to raid 24 April, so raid must have been in May. Route was down Rich & L. Champlain area, so probably vs. Moh. Attackers chased 1 Iroq into a group clearing fields & were overwhelmed.	JR, 12: 153, 155-159
June 27, 1637	Iroquet vs. Iroq	13 Iroq capt.		News rec'd 27 June. Algk outnumbered Iroq. Iroq were all tortured [to death?]. One Iroq capt. was sent TR to [Mt]. Those who had lost relatives to Iroq in Mt raid of April 24 were particularly vicious.	JR, 12: 181- 183
July 1, 1637	Moh & Pequot vs. English & Indians	Some K	Connecticut	Moh are also said to "trouble" the Narragansett Indians.	Winthrop Papers, 3: 438
Aug. 6-11, 1637	500 Iroq vs. Huron [& Fr ?]	30 Huron capt., 1 K	TR & LSP	Iroq appeared before fort and tried to lure Fr and Indians out to fight. Had blockaded western end of LSP. Caught Huron, most of whom were traders, as returned to Huron. Some were youths headed for the seminary at Que. Huron goods most certainly taken. Either because objectives met, or because of fear of Fr reinforcements, Iroq withdrew.	JR, 12: 99, 101, 199-215

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[1637 ? to] before fall 1638	Iroq vs. Wenro	600 Wenro abandon lands and relocate to Huronia		Wenro arrive among Huron of Ossossane around fall 1638. Withdrawal of Neutral support left them vulnerable to Iroq attacks. Not clear when Iroq began attacking, but at latest had to be around 1637.	JR, 15: 159; Ibid, 16: 253; Ibid, 17: 25-29
[Fall 1638 to Spring 1639]	Iroq vs. Algk	Algk were defeated	TR	Very confused chronology of events, because dating is speculative, and all information is very vague.	JR, 16: 41, 51, 65, 213
[Fall, 1638 to before] Dec. 4-5	300 Huron & Algk vs. 100 Iroq [On ?]	80 Iroq capt.	[Iroquoia]	Huron and Algk scouts were capt. by Iroq, lied about size of their force, led Iroq to fight. Iroq were outnumbered. 17-18 were K, some escaped, at least 3 were tortured to death at Huron (Deer) village. Raid may have been against the Oneida, at least one prisoner was said to be of that tribe. But raid was clearly against one of "upper" Iroq.	JR, 15: 171, 173; Ibid, 17: 63, 65, 71-77
May 27, 1639	Huron (Bear) vs. [Seneca]	12 Sen capt., most K		Prisoners arrived in village this day, raid was earlier. In 1638 a Huron had killed a Sen [during above raid?]. Rather than atone for this, a general war had been decided upon.	JR, 15: 185, 187; Ibid, 17: 105, 111

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Summer], 1639	[Iroq] vs. Huron	4-5 Huron K	Hurononia, fishing spot, near Bear village of St. Xavier	Were attacked as fished. 3-4 Huron K on the spot, one died of wounds later.	JR, 18: 27; Ibid, 19: 223- 227
[Late April], 1640	Huron [Bear] vs. [Iroq]	1 Iroq capt., tortured & K		Date is of arrival of prisoner at the Huron village.	JR, 18: 29
[Summer], 1640	Huron vs. Iroq	Huron defeated, unspecified number K		Huron on way to attack Iroq were ambushed by Iroq. Some Huron stayed to cover retreat of others and were K.	JR, 18: 43-45
[Summer], 1640	Huron [Cord] vs. Iroq	1 Iroq capt. & tortured [to death]			JR, 21: 169
Aug. 2, 1640	[Sen] Iroq vs. Huron	1 Huron scalped & K	Hurononia, 3 L from St. Marie	One of Jesuits most faithful converts, was attacked by Iroq as he was working in his fields.	JR, 20: 79, 81; Ibid, 21: 211
Late 1640	[Iroq] vs. [Petun]	Village of Ehwaé destroyed, many taken capt.	[Perth County Ont.]	Greater part of cabins burned. Many also died of smallpox.	JR, 21: 181
[Late Fall, 1640 to Spring 1641]	Algk [Allumette], Petite Nat., & Mt vs. Iroq	Were defeated by Iroq	LSP	Attacking group was discovered and ambushed by Iroq who were on the lake.	JR, 20: 167- 169

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Late winter 1640, to early Spring], 1641	[Iroq] vs. Huron	1 Huron mc K	Hurononia	A Huron boy was K while in his mother's arms.	JR, 21: 235
Feb. 20, 1641	[60] Iroq (Moh) vs. Fr	2 Fr M capt.	TR	90 Iroq had set out, 30 went to Mont area, rest to Tr. The 2 Fr M were returned June 5, 1641 by Moh and were apparently capt. as means to initiate talks with the Fr.	JR, 21: 23, 25, 27, 35, 37, 45
[Early June], 1641	Iroq [Moh] vs. 3 Algk	1 Algk F & 1 M K, 1 Algk M escaped	TR	Iroq were part of a group of 350 mostly or all Moh, that had arrived June 5 to return Fr capt. Attacked 3 Algk in their canoe as awaited Fr governor to begin talks.	JR, 21: 41
[Mid June to mid Sept.], 1641	Algk vs Iroq [Moh]	Many Iroq F & C K; 5-6 Algk [M] capt. or K	Iroq village	Algk set out to avenge above loss. Moh as target based on this. Gained Iroq village, lost 5-6 (must have been males) during retreat and pursuit by Iroq. Date based on time of initial Iroq attack (June) and date news reported (Sept. 16).	Correspond., 143-144
Summer, [1641]	Huron (Arendaronnon) vs. Iroq	Huron defeated, one war captain K		Huron raid was led by Atironta & his brother Aeotahon. Atironta was K, & Aeotahon took his name.	JR, 23: 159, 167

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Summer, [1641]	Huron (Cord) vs. Iroq	At least 1 Iroq K, unspecified number also K, some capt.	[L. Ontario]	Huron led by Ahatsiscari. Both groups were warriors, but Huron get initiating status because to arrive at "great lake which separates the Hurons from their Enemies" they had to have undertaken their journey first.	JR, 23: 25, 27, 33
[Late summer to fall, 1641]	50 Huron (Cord) vs. 300 Iroq or 300 Iroq vs. 50 Huron (Cord)	Some Iroq capt.		The 50 Huron were again being led by Ahatsiscari when encountered Iroq on way to attack. Ahatsiscari attacked Iroq. Boldness of this move put Iroq to flight.	JR, 23: 25
[Winter, 1641 to 1642]	Iroq [Moh] vs. Algk	Many M & older F K, 30 younger F spared	"Island" far into Algk lands [Manitoulin ?]	Iroq were part of a group 200 strong that had split up. Started out in fall, followed Algk that had abandoned TR area to avoid Iroq attacks. After raid questioned capt. about results of raid "last year" with Fr at TR. This would indicate that this raid was carried out very close to, if not at, start of 1642. Moh identified based on reference to skirmishing between themselves & Fr at TR. Moh were clearly the group at TR in June 1641.	JR, 22: 43, 51, 129, 249, 251, 253, 265

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Spring, 1642	Iroq [Moh] vs. Iroquet	some Iroquet K, 2 families capt.		Moh designated because prisoners made by Moh in above raid were brought along by this group, part of 300 who had set off in spring to war, as baggage carriers. That would indicate these Iroq were Moh as well.	JR, 22: 267, 269
Spring, 1642	Iroquet vs. Iroq [Moh]	some Iroq K, their baggage taken	[Iroq territory]	A "score" of Iroquet & some converts from TR set off to avenge above raid. Some of the attackers returned, but those that carried on found some Iroq & attacked them. Moh identified because it was assumed Iroquet were attacking those that had attacked them.	JR, 22: 53, 55; Ibid, 24: 249, 253
[June, 1641 to June, 1642]	Apparently many raids between the Iroq and the Huron were carried out between June 1641 and June 1642, but went unrecorded. Writing around June 10, 1642, when he finished the Huron Report, Father Lalemant informed Father Vimont that several expeditions were raised to go fight the Iroq, but disunity, defeat in battles, and ambushes have meant that "nearly all...have ended only in disaster". The Iroq, meanwhile, "have everywhere and at almost all seasons of the Year committed massacres". The available data for this time frame did not reflect that activity.				JR, 22: 305
[Summer, after June 10, 1642]	Iroq vs. Huron village	All Huron "destroyed" [capt. or K], except a "score" [20]	Huron "Frontier" village [Arendaron-non?]	Date is based Lalemant's June, 1643 observation that raid took place shortly after he finished last year's relation. That was June, 10, 1642.	JR, 26: 175

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Summer, after June 10, 1642]	Huron vs. Iroq	Huron defeated		Raid said to have occurred about same time as above one. Huron outnumbered Iroq 6 to 1.	JR, 26: 175, 179
Summer, [1642]	2 Iroq vs. 2 Huron F	Huron F scalped & later died	Field outside village	Of all the small attacks that took place this summer, this was the only one recorded.	JR, 26: 225
Summer, [1642]	Throughout this summer the Iroq continued to attack the Huron. The only one of these small raids recorded was that noted above. The toll exacted by the Iroq in these raids went unremarked. The Huron, however, managed to capt. 2 Iroq.				JR, 26: 179
Aug. 2, 1642	30 Iroq vs. 3 Fr & 40 Huron	3 Fr M capt., 19 Huron capt. & 3 K; 1 Iroq M K	15 L from TR [St. Law, past LSP]	This was the raid in which Father Jogues was capt. The Iroq was K by one of the French who in turn was capt. The Iroq took the supplies being carried up to the Jesuits in Huronia. The rest of the Huron escaped.	JR, 22: 269; Ibid, 31: 21, 23, 31-37; <u>Correspond.</u> , 167; <u>NNN</u> , 175; <u>Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts</u> , 625
[Aug. 2, 1642]	Iroq [Moh] vs. 11 canoes of Huron traders	4 Huron capt.	Island, 50-60 L above Mont [Alumettes or Calumet I, Ott R.?)	This raid was said to have occurred at the same time as above one. Moh identified based on Jogues meeting these 4 capt. among the Moh. The Huron were attacked while stopped to hunt on the Island. Iroq capt. some who were hunting. No mention of furs being taken.	JR, 22: 273; Ibid, 26: 195

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Aug. 20, 1642	200-300 Iroq [Moh] vs. Fr	1 Fr M K, 4 wounded; 5 Iroq [M] K, some wounded	Ft Rich	The Iroq attacked as Fr were building the fort. Jogues, who met the attacking group as he was being taken to the Moh, put the size of army at 200. Others at the fort made it out to be 300 strong. The Iroq may have picked up more people between the time Jogues saw them and the actual attack.	JR, 22: 277, 279; Ibid, 24: 23, 281; Ibid, 25: 69; Ibid, 28: 123; Ibid, 31: 31
Fall, [1642]	20 Iroq vs. 40 Huron (Cord)	several Huron K, at least 1 was M	Near village of Teanaustaye	Huron had gone to gather hemp when were attacked at night by Iroq.	JR, 23: 241; Ibid, 26: 203, 205
[Oct., 1642 to March, 1643]	Moh vs. Abnk	20 Abnk capt., unspecified number tortured & K		Date based on arrival of group in March, 6 months after they had left for war.	JR, 31: 85, 87
[March], 1643	24 Algk (some Alumette & others Petite Nation) vs. Iroq [Moh]	4 Algk capt. or K, some wounded; 1 Iroq K	Down Rich R. [Iroq territory]	Moh identified based on fact that raiders went down the Rich to attack. Date based on late Feb. gathering to start and return of Algk in April. The Algk split up into two groups, one of 15 & the other of 9. Losses are for larger group. No details for group of 9, except that it was one of their number that K Iroq.	JR, 24: 205, 207, 231, 233, 255, 259, 261

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
May 9, 1643	19 Iroq vs. 8 Algk traders	2 Algk K, 6 capt. & 2 pelt laden canoes taken	4 L from TR	Algk were returning from Huronia.	JR, 24: 273, 275
June 9, 1643	40 Iroq [Moh] vs. 60 Huron traders (11-13 canoes)	23 Huron capt., 13 later K, Iroq take furs	Mont, half a L from Ft	Moh identified because Iroq bragged they had other Fr capt. Only Iroq group known to have Fr prisoners were Moh. The Iroq were on the Island waiting for Fr or Huron. (See raid below). Iroq left over 30 beaver robes behind. When Maisonneuve learned of this he sent his men out to claim them as booty.	JR, 23: 247, 249, 267; Ibid, 24: 275, 277, 279; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 109, 111
June 9, 1643	30 Iroq [Moh] vs. 5-6 Fr	3 Fr K, 2-3 capt.	Mont Ft	Iroq were part of above group & attack took place same day. 10 Iroq stayed with Huron capt. 20 Iroq went to front of fort to draw Fr attention while 10 Iroq attacked those Fr working in nearby fields. It was via the escaped Fr that Maisonneuve learned about abandoned furs. (See above).	JR, 23: 247, 249, 267; Ibid, 24: 275, 277, 279; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 109, 111
July 30, 1643	2 canoes of Iroq (one with 12 M) vs. 7 Algk	2 Iroq fatally wounded, 1 Algk wounded	Near Mont	Algk were setting out to hunt. Both sides exchanged fire & Iroq withdrew.	JR, 24: 289, 291

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Late July to early Aug.], 1643	Iroq vs. 120 Huron	over 20 Huron capt. or K	After journey of 100 L, near huge water fall [Rideau Falls?]	The date is based on arrival of survivors in Huronia in early August. The group of Huron, if not traders, were carrying supplies. In eagerness to escape they left them behind and Iroq took them. The same group of Huron was attacked twice on this trip; once at the falls, and few days previous. It seems the attacks were by same Iroq, but this is not certain.	JR, 26: 183, 235, 237
Summer, [1643]	over 100 Huron vs. 700 to 800 Iroq	over 100 Huron capt. or K	Frontiers of Iroquoia	The Huron, 100 Christian converts and some "pagan" Huron, went to lay ambushes against Iroq. Not clear which group attacked nor how battle started, but after a long fight, the Huron were defeated.	JR, 28: 45
Aug. 15, 1643	20 Iroq vs. 12 Algk	3 Algk & 1 Huron capt., 1 tortured to death, 2 escaped; K & wounded on both sides	St. François R.	Algk were out hunting. Both sides had guns.	JR, 24: 291

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Sept. 15], 1643	Iroq vs. Huron	9 Huron K, many more wounded		Writing Sept. 30, Marie de l'Incarnation stated the raid had taken place 15 days prior. The Huron were carrying supplies to the Jesuits in Huronia. Brébeuf claimed that the supplies were lost. It is assumed that means the Iroq took them.	JR, 23: 251, 269; <u>Correpond.</u> , 201
[1643]	Writing in March of 1644, and summing up the impact of the Iroq on the Hurons in 1643, Father Lalemant noted that they had closed up the route to the French, and defeated those who had attempted passage of it. Huron efforts to pursue Iroq attackers in Huronia had also ended in defeat. The data for this year seems to accurately reflect that general assessment. What is not reflected is information to flesh out his observation that, "[n]early everyday, unfortunate women were killed in their fields", and that "captives were taken by [the] hundreds" from Huronia.				JR, 27: 63-65
March 30, 1644	80 Iroq vs. 30 Fr	Some Iroq K, some wounded; 3 Fr K, 2 capt. & later tortured to death	Mont Ft	Fr went out to attack what they thought was small group of Iroq that had come to raid in area. Dollier claims Iroq group was 200 strong, but he was writing years after. The Jesuit data was used here.	JR, 26: 35-37; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 117- 121; ASJCF (MNF, forthcoming)
[March to April, 1644]	40 Iroq vs. Algk	All the Algk capt., most later K at Iroq village	R. des Prairies	News reported by Huron who escaped from Iroq that capt. Father Bressani. This raid then, must have occurred before the end of April.	JR, 26: 37

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
April [28-30], 1644	30 Iroq vs. 1 Fr M, 1 Fr mc, 6 Huron converts	1 Fr M, 1 Fr mc, & 5 Huron capt., 1 later escaped; 1 Huron K.	Marguerie R.	Father Bressani, a young boy going to serve as an assistant, and the Huron converts were returning to Hurononia when were attacked. The Iroq took the goods that were being carried up to the Jesuits in Hurononia.	JR, 25: 193; Ibid, 26: 21, 29, 31, 33,
June, 1644	Iroq vs. 16-18 Huron	16-18 Huron capt.		Some or all of these Huron were released or escaped as a result of a Huron raid. See raid below.	JR, 26: 37; ASJCF (MNE, forthcoming)
[July], 1644	Huron & Algk vs. Iroq [Moh]	3 Iroq capt.	Ft Rich area	Group returned from raid July 26, 1644. 60 Huron had come to attack Iroq. Did not meet any before they got to TR. They learned of Iroq in area and, accompanied by some Algk went to raid. An off shoot of this group struck against 10 Iroq that had set out to ambush Fr near the Ft. As a result of either this attack, or of the general movements of the larger Huron and Algk group, some Hurons capt. in June were released, or escaped to this group. Probably the latter. The Algk gave their prisoner to Fr. In 1645 he was sent to Moh to intiate peace talks. Iroq identified as Moh based on this.	JR, 26: 53-57; Ibid, 27: 245; ASJCF (MNE, forthcoming)

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Summer, [1644]	Iroq vs. 2 canoes of Huron converts	2 Huron K		Most of the Huron escaped. Of those capt., two were K when arrived at Iroq villages.	ASJCF, Recueil du lettres du P. Charles Garnier, No. 95
End of Summer, [1644]	Iroq vs. Huron	1 Huron K	La Conception	The Huron was a convert to Christianity.	ASJCF, Recueil du lettres du P. Charles Garnier, No. 95
Sept. 14, 1644	4-5 Iroq vs. 1 Fr M	1 Fr M wounded	Ft Rich	The soldier was attacked as he worked in a field near the fort.	JR, 27: 221
[Mid to late Sept.], 1644	Iroq vs. Huron	10-12 Huron capt.	Rich R.	The raid was said to have taken place shortly after that of Sept. 14.	JR, 27: 223
Nov. 7, 1644	Iroq vs. 1 Fr M	1 Fr M K	Ft Rich	The soldier was K after having strayed ahead of his small hunting party.	JR, 27: 223-225
Dec. 12, 1644	Iroq vs. 7 Fr M	1 Fr M scalped, but he lived.	Ft Rich	The soldiers had gone out to gather hemp when were attacked.	JR, 27: 225
Beginning of Spring [1645]	Iroq vs. Huron F	Huron F all capt.	Near Huron frontier village	The women were going to work in the fields when were attacked by unspecified number of Iroq. 200 Huron gave chase to no avail.	JR, 29: 240

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
April 1645	7 Algk vs. 14 Iroq [Moh]	9-11 Iroq K, 1 drowned, 1-2 escaped, 2 capt.	Island, L Champlain	The Algk also took the Iroq guns. The Iroq are identified as Moh because these capt. were used to bring Moh to talk of peace later that year. Marie de L'Incarnation stated that 9 Iroq were K, 1 drowned, 2 escaped & 2 were capt.	JR, 27: 229-231, 237; <u>Correspond.</u> , 250
End of summer, [1645]	Iroq vs. Huron	Huron defeated, some K		Iroq & Huron ran into each other in woods. Iroq managed to convince Huron that they wanted a peaceful resolution. When most Huron had withdrawn, the Iroq attacked. Unspecified number of Huron K. It seems clear both groups were war parties, but it is not obvious whom to designate as initiator.	JR, 29: 249-251
Oct. 29, 1645	7 Oneida vs. Algk	Some Algk K	Mont	The news was received this day. At first the Moh were suspected, but it was later confirmed to have been the On.	JR, 27: 99-101; Ibid, 28: 281; <u>Correspond.</u> , 280

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[1645]	Iroq vs. 2 Huron M	2 Huron M K	St. Joseph [Cord villlage]	Iroq attacked two guards of the Village. The Huron avenge this raid by an attack vs. the Sen, which may indicate that the Iroq were Sen. See raid below. This and the raid below took place some time in 1645, when is not clear. Both were noted as among the more memorable raids of the year. Others occurred, but went unrecorded.	JR, 29: 253, 255
[1645]	Huron (Cord) vs. Sen	2 Sen M K	Sen village	In reprisal for the above attack the Huron attack 2 Sen M while they slept in their longhouse & set the house on fire before making a successful escape.	JR, 29: 253, 255
Spring [after May], , 1646	Iroq [Onon & On] vs. Huron	Huron village nearly destroyed	Huron village	The attack must have been after May because the Huron Relation for 1645-46 was sent in May and made no mention of this event. Two separate references point to the Onon & On as the attackers, but neither is conclusive.	JR, 29: 59, 147, 149
Aug. 15, 1646	17 On vs. Algk	1 Algk M K, 2 F capt.	Above "Long Sault" [Ott R.]	News received about this date. The capt. were released as a result of the raid below.	JR, 28: 225; Ibid, 29: 149

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[After Aug. 15, 1646]	30 Huron vs. 17 On	1 On M capt.		As the On returned with their two capt. they ran into Huron warriors. Both groups resolved to fight, but fled after war shouts convinced each that the other group was larger. Alqk F were let go. One of them met & explained to Huron the size of On group. Huron then set out to round up On. Managed to capt 1 M.	JR, 28: 225; Ibid, 29: 229, 231, 233
[After Sept. 22, 1646]	Iroq vs. Huron	At least 1 Huron M capt.	"great lake"	The canoe of Hurons, part of returning fur brigade, broke off from main group to go via the "great lake" & were attacked. 2 Huron escaped.	JR, 28: 231
Around Nov. 17, 1646	Iroq vs. Huron	4 Huron capt.	Mont area	Three Huron reported, Nov. 17, the capt. of one of their group. They were capt. a few days after when they went in search of their capt. companion.	JR, 30: 229-231; <u>Correspond.</u> , 325; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 135
Nov. 30, 1646	Iroq vs. Fr	2 Fr M capt.	Mont	The Fr were capt. not far from the settlement.	JR, 30: 231; <u>Correspond.</u> , 325; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 135
Beginning of Winter [Jan.-Feb.], 1647	Onon vs. Huron	Some Iroq K, some capt.	Huron Frontiers	The Onon were spotted, pursued and defeated. The saving of one Onon leader led to peace talks between the two groups.	JR, 33: 117

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
March 5, 1647	Moh vs. Algk (Petite Nation)	2 Iroq M K; 80-100 Algk M, F, & C capt., at least 3 Algk M K, along with old and weak of all sexes	TR	Moh, accompanied by some On, capt. 2 Algk M and 2 F. From these they learn the locations of the larger band that was hunting on the North & South shores of St Law around TR and attack them. Most older M were later distributed to other Iroq tribes to be tortured and K.	JR, 30: 161, 231-245; <u>Correspond.</u> , 325-327; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 135
March 6, 1647	Iroq vs. Fr	2 Fr houses robbed of clothing, blankets, powder, lead, & guns	Near TR	The houses were robbed as inhabitants attended Ash Wednesday services.	JR, 30: 161; <u>Correspond.</u> , 325; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 135
[Around May 20, 1647]	FIA & 5-6 Fr vs. Iroq	2 Huron capt., & 1 K	"faverel" R, LSP	FIA, Christian converts from St. Joseph mission, & Fr set out to prowl St. Law to capt. Iroq. The 2 Huron were in a canoe that was too far ahead of main body, and was attacked. The Iroq later retreated in the face of superior odds, but not before shooting a Huron who had gone to scout their camp.	JR, 30: 173; Ibid, 31: 173, 175

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Spring-Summer, 1647]	Iroq vs. Algk	40 Algk capt., 3 K, & furs taken	"Island" [Manitoulin?]	The Algk, from various tribes, were capt. on an Island as they awaited the Huron to go with them to trade. Iroq were led to spot by former Huron. One eyewitness said Iroq did not persue more captives because were greedy to take the furs. But having 40 capt. may have been enough. Besides, more capt. would have meant more carriers for the furs.	JR, 30: 287-289
June, 1647	7-8 Algk (some of Petite Nation) vs. Iroq	10 Iroq K, 10 Algk capt. released		An Algk, heading to "Island" to warn other of the major defeat of Algk at TR, spotted above Iroq group. He returned at night with more men and K 10 Iroq and freed 10 Algk capt. The Algk, being unable to carry away furs abandoned by Iroq, threw them into the water.	JR, 30: 283-289, <u>Correspond.</u> , 330-331
Summer, [1647]	300 Sen vs. Neutral (Aondironnon)	Many Neutral K, & many more capt.	Neutral village near Huronia		JR, 33: 81
End of Summer, [1647]	Iroq vs. Christian Hurons	4-5 Hurons K, 7 Huron M F & C capt.; 2 Iroq capt.	"lonely Island" [L. Huron]	The Hurons had gone to fish. An escapee went for help. The Iroq were pursued, 2 were capt., & Huron capt. released.	JR, 33: 91, 93

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Aug. 17, 1647	Iroq vs. Alqk	6-7 Alqk capt.	"La poterie" [Que]	News received this day.	JR, 30: 191-193
[Early] Sept., 1647	[20] Iroq [Moh] vs. Fr or Fr & FIA	6 Fr wounded, 1 later died, 2 FIA K; 7 Iroq wounded, 2 K, & 1 Iroq capt. and later K	[Que?]	News of returning party noted this time. Moh identified because next Spring Moh ask for Iroq capt. during this raid. Iroq attacked Fr or FIA canoes. Fr & FIA go out to pursue Iroq. Fr took guns abandoned by Iroq.	JR, 30: 193-195; Ibid, 32: 19-21, 145
[Sometime before Oct. 20, 1647]	Moh vs. 6 Huron	3 Huron capt., 2 escaped,		Jesuits note that only 6 Huron came down to Mont this year. This was their fate. They may have been traders, converts come to get supplies, etc. Neither the date of the attack, nor the nature of the group is clear.	JR, 32: 29
Nov. 4, 1647	Iroq vs. Huron	2 Hurons capt.	TR		JR, 30: 195
End of Winter [Feb. to March, 1648]	Sen vs. Huron (Cord tribe of St. Ignace)	7 Huron K & 24 Huron M & F capt.	"2 days journey" [Southwest of village]	300 people from tribe had gone hunting. Sen fell on one cabin of this group.	JR, 33: 83

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[End of Winter, Feb. to March, 1648]	100 Moh vs. Huron (Cord Tribe of St Ignace)	40 Huron K or capt.	4-5 L from village	Date is based on the observation that this raid took place a few days after above one. The 300 Huron had returned to gather meat left after first attack. As were returning to village in scattered groups were struck by Moh.	JR, 33: 89
April, 1648	100 Moh vs. 6 Huron	4 Huron K		The Huron were envoys in peace talks under way between the Huron & the Onon. This is most likely the same group of Moh as above.	JR, 33: 125
May 30, 1648	FIA (2 Algk & 1 Huron) vs. 3 Iroq [Moh]	2 Iroq capt., 1 K	TR	2 Iroq hunting in area gave themselves up to Fr--not clear why. When Fr & FIA went back to convince 3 other Iroq to come to Fr, they ran. Were pursued by FIA.	JR, 32: 151
June 20, 1648	29 Iroq [Moh] vs. Fr	2 Iroq capt.	TR	29 Iroq came up to raid. Did not seem to know Fr had prisoners, but when did discover this, tried to dupe Fr into freeing prisoners. Fr instead kept two envoys as capt.	JR, 32: 155-157

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
July 4, 1648	80 Iroq [Moh] vs. Fr & Huron	1 Fr M K, 2 capt.; 1 Huron [M] K, 2 capt.; 2 Iroq [M] K, 2 wounded	TR	Fr attacked as tended cattle, Huron had come to their aid. The Iroq attacked because were told by one of the prisoners capt. May 30, and since released, that rest of prisoners were being badly treated. One of the Fr was eventually returned. The Moh are identified as participants in all three raids because one of those capt. May 30 was clearly a Moh, and the sources make clear that the other groups were of his countrymen.	JR, 32: 95-99, 151, 157-159

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[July 17 or 18], 1648	100 Iroq vs. 250 Huron [Traders]	17-20 Iroq [M] capt., [15-17 K]	3 L below TR, on St. Law	100 Iroq said to have been involved. A band had come up to try and free the prisoners, so were probably Moh. Were dissuaded from attacking. Not clear how they came to set up on St. Law, but that total of 100 is probably a combination of the above two groups & this band. In any case they saw a few canoes of Huron &, not realizing they were followed by many more Huron, they attacked and ran right into the incoming Huron fur brigade. It is assumed the canoes attacked were carrying traders and furs. They may, however, have been scouts for the larger group. The Iroq were defeated, and plundered of their possessions.	JR, 32: 97, 163-183; <u>Correspond.</u> , 352-353
July 28, 1648	12-13 Iroq vs. Fr [M]	1 Fr [M] K, 1-2 Iroq K or wounded	Mont	Iroq shot at some Fr as they were gathering hay in a meadow. Fr returned fire.	JR, 32: 169
July, 1648	Iroq vs. Huron [Cord]	700 Huron capt. & K. Mostly F & C. 1 Fr M K.	Huronia, Teanaustaye	2 Huron villages attacked and destroyed in a dawn raid. Teanaustaye was central village, had about 400 families. Jesuit Antoine Daniel K.	JR, 33: 259-261; Ibid, 34: 87-91, 99; <u>Correspond.</u> , 364

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
March 16-19, 1649	1,000-1,200 Iroq vs. Huron, the Cord & Ataronchronnon	630 Huron capt. & K, at least 230 of whom were M, and were K. 2 Fr M K. 140 Iroq M K, 30 capt.	Huronia, villages of St. Louis & St Ignace	The Iroq losses came at St. Louis were the Huron put up a valiant defence. The Iroq had plans to attack St. Marie, but the offensive of the Bear tribe warriors, mostly Christians from Ossossane, and the ensuing losses put an end to that. On March 19 the Iroq left with their captives and their spoils of war. 700 Deer tribe warriors gave chase, but abandoned pursuit after 2 days. The Jesuits Brébeuf & Lalemant were K.	JR, 34: 27, 123-137, 213, 217
May 30, 1649	Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr M capt.	Mont		JR, 34: 53
May 30, 1649	Iroq vs. [FIA]	some Indians capt. & K	Mont		JR, 34: 53
June 12, 1649	Iroq vs. Algk [Petite Nation?]	14 Algk capt.	Third rapid above TR [Ott R.]	Learned of raid this date.	JR, 34: 55
[June], 1649	Petite Nation vs. Iroq	7 Iroq K		Shortly after news of above raid came this news. Could above raid have been against Petite Nation & this one against Iroq as they were fleeing with capt.? Identification of Algk group as Petite Nation in raid above is based on this reasoning.	JR, 34: 55

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
June [15], 1649	Iroq vs. Huron	Some Huron capt. & K	Huronian, mainland near [Christian Island]	Father Ragueneau wrote that "massacres" continued to take place throughout the summer against the Huron.	JR, 35: 83, 91
Dec. 7, 1649	Iroq [some Onon] vs. Petun	Many capt. & K, 1 Fr Jesuit K	Village of St. Jean, [South of Nottawasaga Bay]	Petun warriors had gone out to ambush Iroq who they learned were coming to attack. Iroq came via another route, capt 2 Petun, learn of defenceless state of village & attack in mid afternoon. Some of the Jesuits effects were later found among Onondaga. Village was said to hold 500-600 families.	JR, 35: 107- 113; Ibid, 41: 121
March 25, [1650]	Iroq vs. Huron	150 Huron capt. & K	[Huronian, mainland, opposite Christian Island]	Huron were fishing group, had split up into several bands.	JR, 35: 187
[April 18, 1650]	Iroq vs. Huron	Group capt. & K	[Huronian, mainland, opposite Christian Island]	Group had gone out to hunt, were starving on Island. Group left day after Easter. A few days later news arrived of their fate. Easter Sunday was April 17 this year.	JR, 35: 37-41, 189;
[Late April, 1650]	Iroq vs. Huron	Group capt. & K	[Probably same as above]	This group too had gone out to hunt. New arrived 8 days after above news.	JR, 35: 191

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Late April to Early May], 1650	Algk from TR & St. Joseph vs. Iroq	1 Iroq [M] capt. Many Algk K, some capt.	[Iroquoia?]	Algk set off to attack Iroq. Capt. 1 but decided to push on to village. A scout of their group was caught, divulged size of party to Iroq, & Algk were routed. News arrived around May 13, probably via escaped Algk. Raid must have been earlier.	JR, 35: 43, 217-221
[Before May 9], 1650	Iroq vs. Fr	At least 1 Iroq M capt.	TR	News arrived at Que that day. Raid was probably very late in April, or in first days of May.	JR, 35: 41; <u>Correspond.</u> , 389
[May 2], 1650	Iroq vs. Fr	2 Fr [M] K, 1 house burned	Que [Cap Rouge?]	Iroq attacked one house, K 2 servants, sacked the house & and set fire to another house not too far away.	JR, 35: 41; <u>Correspond.</u> , 389; <u>Annales de L'Hotel-Dieu</u> , 76-77
Shortly before May 13, 1650	[Iroq vs. FIA?]	2 Indians K, 2 wounded	L. Champlain	Not clear what happened. Sources just note 2 Indians K & 2 wounded. Since the Jesuits ususally only note attacks by Iroq, it is assumed this ref is to that. Since Indians are not said to be enemy, it is further assumed they were allies of Fr or at least enemies of Iroq.	JR, 35: 43
Spring, [1650]	Iroq vs. Nipissing	Many capt. & K	[L. Nipissing]	Iroq wintered nearby to attack in Spring.	JR, 35: 181, 201

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Mid June, 1650]	10 Iroq vs. 25-40 Fr traders & 20-30 Indians, [mostly Huron], 60 in all	7 Huron K, Father Bressani wounded. 6 Iroq K, 2 capt., & 2 escaped	[Ott R.] 60 L above TR	Iroq had wintered in area. Snuck into camp and murdered Huron before others awoke and retaliated. The group was going up to Huronia to aid Hurons. They left TR June 7, 1650.	JR, 35: 45, 201-203
Summer [June to July, 1650]	300 Iroq vs. Huron	Huron group "defeated"	12 L from Christian Island. [Georgian Bay?]	The Huron from the above group had proceeded to Huronia. Were defeated on the Great Lake.	JR, 35: 203-205; Ibid, 36: 119-121, 181
Summer [June to July, 1650]	300 Iroq vs. 50 Petun men [Traders or warriors?]	Petun "defeated"	[Either in Huronia or on Ott R. on way south to TR]	This group of Petun had been following the trail of fleeing Huron led by Ragueneau to Que. Were attacked by same group of Iroq that took part in above raid. Ragueneau gives impression raid was soon after he left Huronia in June.	JR, 36: 181
Summer, [1650]	30 Iroq vs. Huron	Many Huron K	[Christian Island, at fort]	Iroq set up fortified position in front of Huron fort to trap Huron as they leave. Huron attack Iroq, sustain losses & Iroq escape.	JR, 36: 181
Toward end of Summer, [1650]	Iroq vs. Huron	8 Huron capt.	Little Island opposite [Christian I.]		JR, 36: 119

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Aug. 10, 1650	Iroq vs. Fr	9 Fr capt. and/or K	At TR	News arrived at Que this day. Attack was a few days earlier.	JR, 35: 51
Aug. 22, 1650	25-30 Iroq [Moh] vs. 60 Fr	Some Fr M K, others greviously wounded	Near TR	News arrrived at Que this day. Attack was a few days prior. Fr had gone out to try and recapture those taken in raid above. Iroq were in ambush. Fired at Fr & ran. Continued this approach until Fr gave up chase. Fr K were soldiers. Iroq were led by "Flemish Bastard", so were probably Moh.	JR, 35: 53, 211-213; <u>Correspond.</u> , 394
Autumn, [1650]	7 Iroq vs. Huron	3 Huron K	[Huronian?]	The Huron had returned, or were, returning to Huronia.	JR, 36: 121
Autumn, [prior to Aug. 30, 1650]	600 [Sen?] Iroq vs. Neutral	Neutral village taken [many capt.?]. 200 Iroq capt. or K	Neutral Frontier	News rec'd around Aug. 30. The Iroq were K and capt. during a reprisal raid by Neutral & Huron among Neutral. The sources seem to suggest that it was as Iroq were returning. Because of this, it is not listed as a seperate raid. The Iroq vowed to avenge this loss. One source reveals a severe loss by Sen in a raid vs. Neutral.	JR, 36: 119, 121, 177; Ibid, 37: 97; <u>Correspond.</u> , 399
Toward end of Autumn, [1650]	100 Iroq [Onon] vs. Huron	30 Iroq M K	Village, Christian I.	Iroq tried to dupe Huron. Huron did not fall for it. Once Iroq were inside the village the Huron attacked them. Rest of Iroq left.	JR, 36: 123, 181-189

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Nov. 22, 1650	17-18 Moh vs. Huron	7 Huron capt.	Mont	News rec'd this day. Were capt. within sight of 10 other canoes of Huron who fled at the capt. of these. The capt Huron may have been a group that had left Que for war Oct. 15.	<u>JR</u> , 35: 55, 59
March 1, 1651	40 Iroq vs. [Fr?]	Shots exchanged	Mont	The Iroq appeared before Mont, were discovered & shots were exchanged.	<u>JR</u> , 36: 119
Spring, [1651]	1,000-1,200 Iroq vs. Neutral	Neutral Village of Teoto'ntdiaton capt., many K, huge number capt.	Neutral frontier	Young and old were K, women kept to be adopted. Jesuits stated that this disaster, added to earlier fall attack, has meant the destruction of the Neutral nation.	<u>JR</u> , 36: 141, 177; <u>Correspond.</u> , 395
Spring, [1651]	Iroq [Moh] vs. Huron	2 Huron M capt.		Capt. as were hunting. One later escaped from Moh.	<u>JR</u> , 36: 123, 133
April 27, 1651	Iroq vs. 2 Fr	1 Fr died of wounds	[Que?]	Iroq try to take 2 Fr alive, a third fires on Iroq & drives them off. Iroq join some others & fire at house of another Fr.	<u>JR</u> , 36: 121, 246
End of April, 1651	3 Iroq vs. [Huron?]	1 F K, her 6 year old son, capt.		The name is of Huron origins.	<u>JR</u> , 36: 123
[End of April, 1651?]	Iroq vs. Fr			2 Iroq were spotted about to attack house of Fr. 2 others, with same intent, were spotted home of other Fr. [Were driven off?]	<u>JR</u> , 36: 123

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
May 6, 1651	8-10 Iroq vs. 2 Fr	1 Fr M K, 1 Fr F K, 1 Fr M scalped	Mont, near fort	Iroq attack house of Fr, behead M, brutally butcher his wife and scalp another Fr M. This latter lived 14 more years. House of Fr was partially robbed, and the millers house was also robbed. Iroq part of a group of 40-50.	JR, 36: 125, 165; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 155-157
May 14, 1651	6 Algk vs. Iroq	2 Iroq K		New rec'd this day. 1 Iroq was K on spot. The other, a captain, was tortured & K at Mont.	JR, 36: 123-125
May 24, 1651	10 Iroq vs. 2 Fr	1 Fr fatally wounded, 1 wounded	TR in sight of fort	Attack had taken place shortly before this date. Fr had gone to take in fishing line.	JR, 36: 125-127
May 24, 1651	4 Iroq vs. Huron	1 Huron K	TR	Same time as above attack. 4 Iroq from above group of 10 then go into nearby fields and K 1 Huron.	JR, 36: 127
June 18, 1651	50-60 Iroq vs. Fr	1 Iroq captain was K, several Iroq wounded. 1 Fr fatally wounded, 3 others wounded	Pointe St. Charles, Mont	Dollier says 25-30 Iroq were K. It is unlikely that many were K and the Jesuits would fail to note it. Dollier was writing some years after the event, and the Jesuits at the time it took place. Their estimates were used.	JR, 36: 133; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 157-159
June 29, 1651	5 Iroq vs. Algk	2 Algk [M] capt.	La Chaudière Falls, [Que]	Capt. at a fishing spot. 1 Later escaped.	JR, 36: 131

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
June 30, 1651	5 Iroq vs. Algk	1 Algk [M] capt.	"la Poterie", [Que]	1 Algk escaped. The capt. Algk later escaped also. This raid and above raid, by same Iroq.	JR, 36: 131
July 4, 1651	50 Iroq vs. Tangwaonronnons [Algk]	Tang. were defeated & massacred. F & C taken capt.	L. Nip.	News rec'd this day. Were fishing. Some escaped.	JR, 36: 131, 189
July 15, 1651	Iroq vs. 6 Huron	1 Huron [M] K, 1 capt.	Opposite TR	Had gone to get hay. 4 other Huron escaped. Iroq also K several cattle in area.	JR, 36: 135
July 26, 1651	60 Iroq vs. [Fr]		Mont Ft.	Only casualty was a gunner who died when the cannon he was firing blew up. No other details.	JR, 36: 137
Aug. 7, 1651	Iroq vs. 1 Fr M	1 Fr M K	[TR]	Fr was shot twice, and had hatchet buried in his head. Was alone, had gone out to hunt.	JR, 36: 135
Sept. 18, 1651	3 Iroq vs. Fr.	1 [Fr] F K	[Sillery]	K in her house.	JR, 36: 139
[Between end of June & Oct. 25, 1651]	Iroq vs. Attikamek	19-20 Att. capt. 3 M K.	L. Kisakami	Iroq attacked a cabin at night. Most M were off hunting. Occupants of nearby cabin fled.	JR, 36: 147; Ibid, 37: 69-71
Nov. 15, 1651	Iroq vs. Huron	1 Huron M capt.	Mont		JR, 36: 149

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Feb. 17, 1652	4 FIA vs. 8 Moh	3 Huron M capt., 1 Algk M escaped	1 days journey from [Moh villages]	FIA set off to attack. Moh picked up their trail shortly after they left Mont. Attacked when caught up with them.	JR, 37: 97
March 2 or 3, 1652	Iroq vs. 12 Huron M, 6 Algk M & 10 Algk F	7 Algk F capt., 3 escaped, as did 5 Algk M & 2 Huron M. [1 Algk M K?], 4 Huron M K, 6 capt.	LSP	Were heading for Mont. 1 Huron M later escaped.	JR, 37: 93, 101
March 6, 1652	Iroq vs. Huron	1 Huron M K, at least	R. de-la-Madeleine, TR	Huron were going out vs. Iroq when were ambushed. Huron leader was K. The others, who had survived attack, were spared. 1 Huron escaped.	JR, 38: 49, 51
[Winter, 1652]	1,000 Iroq vs. Susq	130 Iroq lost [K]. 500-600 Susq capt., mostly men	Susq village		JR, 37: 97, 103-105, 111
Toward end of Winter, [1652]	Iroq vs. Attikamek		Att. [lands]	Vague on details. Sources refer to Iroq striking a considerable blow and to large number being K.	JR, 37: 103, 203; Ibid, 38: 53

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
End of Winter, [1652]	Iroq vs. Algk	25 Algk capt.		Sources say Iroq went towards "Paisans" and capt. 25 Algk. Not clear if Paisans is place or group. Could be a corruption of Poisson Blanc, Attikamek, but group capt. is clearly noted as Algk.	JR, 37: 103-105
[Late March or early April, 1652]	75 Iroq [Moh] vs. 3 Fr M	2 Fr M K & beheaded, 1 Fr M capt.; 1 Iroq M wounded	Ouvamsis R. [LSP near TR]	This was the raid in which Radisson was capt. The dating is difficult to explain, but about 6 weeks after he was capt. he escaped & was recapt. At that time the group that got him was carrying 11 Algk scalps. That particular raid was on May 16, 1652. See below, this date.	Radisson, <u>Explorations</u> , 1-16
May 10, 1652	14 Iroq vs. 2 Fr M & 1 Huron M	2 Fr M K, 1 Huron capt.	[St. Maurice R], Third rapid above TR Ft	Jesuit Buteux and Fr M were K on way up to Attikamek. The Huron later escaped.	JR, 37: 99, 141-143
May 13, 1652	14 Iroq vs. Algk of TR	1 Iroq M K, 1 Algk M K	[St. Maurice R], Third rapid above TR Ft	Same group of Iroq as above. Algk were going to Attikamek to trade.	JR, 37: 99; Ibid, 38: 51
May 15, 1652	50-60 Iroq vs. 2 Huron F & 1 mc	2 Huron F & 1 mc capt.	Mont	Women had gone to get meat.	JR, 37: 101

Table D.1

Iroquois Hostilities to 1701						
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources	
May 15, 1652	Iroq vs. Huron	1 Huron F and her 2 C capt.	Mont	She was in field with her children when were attacked. Probably by part of group above.	JR, 38: 51	
May 16, 1652	[20] Iroq vs. 11 Algk of TR	Algk cut to pieces for most part, some escaped	LSP	Had set out to ambush Iroq in revenge for attack vs. their people May 13. Unfortunately ran into Iroq already on LSP. These Iroq may have been part of a party 150 strong.	JR, 37: 101; Ibid, 38: 51; Radisson, Explorations, 16	
May 21, 1652	Iroq vs. 1 Fr & 1 Algk M	1 Algk M died of wounds, 1 Fr M wounded	St. Law opposite TR	The 2 had gone to work on a fish line. Iroq retreated in face of pursuit by forces from TR.	JR, 37: 101; Ibid, 38: 51	
May 26, 1652	50 Iroq vs. 1 Fr M	1 Fr M K	Mont	The Fr was a cowherd. It is assumed he was alone when K.	JR, 37: 101- 103	
May 26, 1652	Iroq vs. 1 Fr. F	1 Fr F wounded	Mont, in sight of Ft	She survived her 5-6 wounds.	JR, 37: 113, Ibid, 38: 51- 53; Dollier, Histoire, 165- 167	
June 8, 1652	Iroq vs. 2 Huron M	2 Huron M K & scalped	TR	Iroq were pursued so quickly that left behind baggage and scalps.	JR, 37: 105; Ibid, 38: 53	
[Before mid June, 1652]	Iroq vs. Ekaetouton [Petun?]	A "capture" was made		News rec'd this day. Raids were probably in Spring, but no evidence either way.	JR, 37: 111	
[Before mid June, 1652]	Iroq vs. Askikwannhe [Nip.]	Made a "capture"	[L. Nip.?)	See above for date.	JR, 37: 111	

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
July 2, 1652	80 Iroq [Moh] vs. Fr & FIA	2 Iroq K	TR	8 Iroq attack two canoes of Hurons going to fish. They escape. During protracted manouvering 2 Iroq M capt. 1, Aontarisa'ti, was leader of the group. He was Moh. Both Iroq tortured to death.	JR, 37: 107-109; Ibid, 38: 53-55, 57
Aug. 7, 1652	100 Iroq vs. 80-100 Algk & Huron [FIA]	1 Algk M K, 1 Huron M K, 3 Iroq M K	Mont	FIA had set out July 25 to attack Iroq. Iroq attacked them as the were returning to Mont.	JR, 37: 111-113, Ibid, 38: 55-57
Aug. 18, 1652	Iroq vs. 4 Fr M	2 Fr M K, 2 capt.	Between TR and the Cap [de-la-Madeleine]	8 Iroq canoes. Two Fr were K on the spot.	JR, 37: 113; Ibid, 38: 57
Aug. 19, 1652	120 On & Moh vs. 40-50 Fr & 10-12 Indians [FIA]	15 Fr M capt., at least 5 K	TR	Fr went to regain some Fr, capt. when had gone to round up some cattle scattered by Iroq. Attacked entrenched Iroq group that had come up to avenge death of Aontarisa'ti at hands of TR FIA.	JR, 37: 113-115; Ibid, 38: 57-59; Ibid, 40: 97
Aug. 19, 1652	Iroq vs. 1 Huron M & F	1 Huron M & F K	TR, not far from Ft.	Iroq were part of above group.	JR, 37: 115; Ibid, 38: 57
Aug. 30, 1652	Iroq vs. Huron	1 Huron M capt.	TR		JR, 37: 115; Ibid, 38: 61
Sept. 16, 1652	Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr M K	Mont, near Ft.		JR, 37: 119

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Oct. 14, 1652	Iroq vs. Fr	1 Iroq M K, 1 Fr M K. Wounded on both sides.	Mont	Iroq came to attack, 24 Fr went out to meet them. Were outnumbered, and retreated. Dollier notes 37 Iroq wounded. This would appear to be speculation.	<u>JR</u> , 37: 117; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 171-175
Oct. 25, 1652	Iroq vs. Huron	1 Huron F K	TR		<u>JR</u> , 37: 117
Oct. 26, 1652	Iroq vs. Fr	2 Fr M K, 1-2 Fr M wounded	Cap [de-la-Madeleine]		<u>JR</u> , 37: 117; <u>Ibid</u> , 38: 61
[End of Oct, 1652]	Iroq vs. Algk	1 Algk M & 2 Algk F capt.	St. Croix [Que]	News rec'd Nov. 1, and raid was recent.	<u>JR</u> , 38: 61
Dec. 17, 1652	Iroq vs. Huron	2 Huron capt.	1 L from TR		<u>JR</u> , 38: 169
March 29, 1653	Iroq vs. Huron	1 Huron M capt.	Cap [de-la-Madeleine]	He was bringing mail from TR to Que.	<u>JR</u> , 38: 171

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Spring, [1653]	11 Iroq (Radisson, 9 Moh, & 1 On) vs. ? [Probably Petun or Neutral]	22 of enemy K [5-7 F, 1 C, 5-10 M, rest undetermined]; 1 Iroq M K	[N. shore L. Erie & L. Ontario?]	This group set out to raid to avenge the death of one of Radisson's adopted brothers. They travelled around hunting & raiding for some time. The fatalities were inflicted in several small raids vs. unidentified groups. All that is said about one is that they had some Huron words in their language. Given this clue & the probable location, it is conjectured that at least one of the attacked groups was Petun.	Radisson, <u>Explorations</u> , 27-35
[Before April 21, 1653]	Iroq vs. Huron	2 Huron M capt.		News rec'd this day. Were going from Que to TR.	<u>JR</u> , 38: 171
[Before April 21, 1653]	Iroq vs. Huron	1 Huron M capt.	TR	News rec'd this day. Was hunting around TR.	<u>JR</u> , 38: 171
May 13, 1653	Iroq vs. 5 Fr	2 Fr K	TR	Fr were working in field. Pursued Iroq abandoned baggage.	<u>JR</u> , 40: 101
May 28, 1653	Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr C K	Near TR Ft		<u>JR</u> , 40: 101
May 28, 1653	20 Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr M K	TR, at the Commons		<u>JR</u> , 38: 177

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
May 30, 1653	20 Iroq vs. Nipissing	1 Nip. M capt.	L. Nipissing, [Sturgeon Falls]	This M later escaped.	<u>JR</u> , 38: 177
May 30, 1653	Iroq (1 Sen & 3 former Huron capt.) vs. Fr	1 Huron M capt., 1 Sen K., 3 former Huron capt., 2 tortured to death	TR	The Huron who was capt. was a sentry for some Fr farmers that the Iroq intended to attack. 12 Huron and Algk from TR set out to free their compatriot, (and did). Sen was K on spot, 2 former Huron tortured to death, the third was allowed to live.	<u>JR</u> , 38: 177; <u>Ibid</u> , 40: 101-103
June 2, 1653	Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr M K	Cap de-la-Madeleine		<u>JR</u> , 38: 177
June 9, 1653	Huron vs. 20-30 Iroq	Iroq were "plundered"	[TR]		<u>JR</u> , 38: 177
June 10, 1653	Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr M K, 2 Fr M & 1 mc capt.	Cap Rouge	5 Canoes of Iroq.	<u>JR</u> , 38: 175
June 21, 1653	Iroq vs. 2 Indians [Huron]	2 Indians capt.	TR		<u>JR</u> , 38: 179
July 20, 1653	Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr [M] K	Mont		<u>JR</u> , 38: 183
Aug. 16, 1653	8 Iroq vs. Huron	2 Huron capt.	Island, at TR		<u>JR</u> , 38: 191

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Aug. 20, 1653	10 Iroq vs. Fr	2 Fr M capt., 1 later K, 1 released	Cap Rouge	Father Poncet was later released. Attackers were 4 Moh, & 6 former Huron.	JR, 38: 191; Ibid, 40: 121, 139-141, 155
Aug. 21, 1653	30 Huron vs. 17 Moh	1 Iroq K, 5 capt. 2 Huron K, 2 seriously wounded	I. St. Hélène	New rec'd this day. Iroq were going to ambush some Fr when Huron fell on them. The Iroq prisoners & the victorious Huron fell into the hands of the Moh army besieging TR a few days later.	JR, 38: 189, 195; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 179- 183
Aug. 22, 1653	500 Moh vs. Fr	1 Huron wounded, 2 Iroq M K	TR Ft	Army of Moh besiege TR Ft. The shooting and skirmishing before the seige led to the deaths. Nothing came of this & peace talks were initiated with the Moh.	JR, 38; 193- 199; Ibid, 40: 103-117, 171- 193

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Winter 1652? to Spring 1654]	Erie vs. Sen	Sen village taken & burned	Sen village	The dating on these three is very problematic. The Onon inform the French of these events, the consequence of a "fresh" war against the upper Iroq, & suggest that it was this that led them to think of peace with Fr & their allies. If this is the case these raids may have begun as early as the winter of 1652, because by spring to summer of 1653 the Onon are coming to Fr to talk of peace. What is certain is that they have occurred prior to summer of 1654. The capt. of the Onon M, one a famous warrior, appears to have been between the summer of 1653 and spring of 1654. Another M capt. with him escaped was beaver hunting. Later released.	JR, 40: 89; Ibid, 41: 77-81, 111-113; Ibid, 42: 177-179
	Erie vs. Onon	80 Onon "cut to pieces".	On return from [L Huron]		
	Erie vs. Onon	2 Onon M capt., one escaped	Near Onon village		
April, 1654	12 On vs. Fr	1 Fr M capt.	Mont	gapt. with him escaped was beaver hunting. Later released.	JR, 41: 67, 69
[April to June, 1654]	[120] Petun & Ott vs. 8 Sen & 5 Mah	8 Sen capt.		Petun & Ott group of traders ran into this group. Sen released later. No mention of what happened to Mah.	JR, 41: 79, 111
Aug. 9, 1654	Erie vs. Onon	3 Onon [M] K	Near Onon central village		JR, 41: 107

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Fall, 1654	Iroq vs. 1 Fr M	1 Fr M K, 1 Iroq M wounded & capt.	Mont	A sentry was K. Fr caught 1 Iroq & nursed him back to health as a means to arrange peace.	Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 197-199
[Fall, 1654]	[Huron] vs. Iroq	8 Iroq K, 3 capt. & later K	[Mackinac I.]	[Grosilliers & some Huron] Indians went out to ambush some Iroq that were thought to be in area. Found them & attacked.	Radisson, <u>Explorations</u> , 88
[Fall, 1654 to Winter, 1655]	1,200 -1,800 Iroq vs. 3,000-4,000 Erie	Erie villages destroyed, great massacre of Erie. Heavy Iroq losses	Erie villages [S-East shore L. Erie]	Dating is difficult. Writing in 1656 Jesuits note raid as "last year"--so in 1655. In August of 1654 a Jesuit among Onon notes army of 1,800 to set out "as soon as possible". If it did, the raid was in the Fall of 1654. The army could have been delayed, & the actual attack have occurred in 1655. Despite references to only the Onon, the other Iroq must have participated--the Onon could not field an army of that size alone. The Moh, at least, were part of this army.	JR, 41: 121; Ibid, 42: 113, 177-183; Ibid, 45: 209
[Early May?, 1655]	Iroq [Moh] vs. Fr	1 Fr M & 1 Fr F K, [4 fc] capt.	Ile aux [Noix]	Husband & wife K, 2 daughters capt. 2 daughters of another Fr capt. Were all later released.	Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 199-201; <u>Correspond.</u> , 563

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
May 29, 1655	Moh vs. Fr	1 Fr M K,	Sillery	He was a Jesuit layman. K as went to investigate shots he'd heard. Could be attack noted below.	JR, 41: 213, 215, 217; Ibid, 42: 263; <u>Correspond.</u> , 563
[Spring, maybe May 29, 1655]	5 Iroq [Moh] vs. Algk	2 Iroq M K	[Sillery?]	Iroq attack & capt. 1 Algk M. His wife attacks & K 2 Iroq, releases husband. Could be reference to above raid?	JR, 41: 215; <u>Correspond.</u> , 563
[May 31, 1655]	Iroq [Moh] vs. Fr	1 Fr M K	[Mont]		Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 201
[Late May?, 1655]	Iroq vs. Fr	4 Fr [M?] K	[Que]		<u>Correspond.</u> , 563
[Late May to early June, 1655]	Iroq [Moh] vs. Fr	At least 5 Iroq M capt.	Mont	Raid took place after that of May 31 above. Iroq came to attack, were capt. as tried to land. Another group capt. when came to negotiate. Led to Moh peace talks with Fr & release of fc capt. at Ile aux Noix.	Doller, <u>Histoire</u> , 201-205
Feb. 12, 1656	Onon vs. Erie & ?	3 scalps from unidentified group & 2 Erie capt.		Unidentified group spoke a language different from Iroq.	JR, 42: 191-193
April 25, 1656	2 Moh vs. 2 Huron	1 Huron [M] K, 1 Iroq M K	Que	The escaped Huron got news to 20 other Huron who pursued the Moh. Moh had split up & Huron capt. 1 Iroq who was tortured to death.	JR, 43: 105-107

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
May 18, 1656	300 Moh vs. Fr, Onon & Huron	Wound some Fr, ill treat all, pillage canoes	12 L above Que	This was rear guard of group of Onon & Jesuits going to set up Mission among Onon. All were released. This group of Moh had come up to carry off the rest of the Hurons to their villages.	JR, 43: 135
May 19-20, 1656	400 Moh vs. Huron	Some Huron K, 71-85 lost or capt.	I. d' Orleans	Moh snuck past Mont & attack christian Hurons. They say the Huron had agreed to relocate & they came to make sure the promise was fulfilled. Moh pillaged abandoned Fr houses. No harm was done to Fr.	JR, 43: 117, 119, 187-189; <u>Correspond.</u> , 583-584
June 29, 1656	Moh vs. Amikwa	4 Amikwa [M] scalped, 1 F & 2 C capt.		Moh were seen returning this day. There were 3 canoes of Moh. At the end of Oct., 1655, 60 On had set out to attack the Amikwa as well.	JR, 42: 75, 77-79: Ibid, 43: 145
Aug. 30, 1656	[120] Moh vs. 250 Ot & Huron	1 Fr M K, unspec. no. of Huron K & capt. (possibly 13 "lost"), unspec. no. of Ot & Moh wounded & K.	St. Law. [between Mont & TR]	Ot were returning fur brigade. Huron were part of group, somewhat ahead of main body, when paddled into ambush. Jesuit Garreau was also part of this advance group. Ot came to defense, but Moh had fortified position. Ot attacked it, but to no avail. Ot abandoned some supplies & siege. Moh apologized for killing the Jesuit.	JR, 42: 227-231, 235-239; Ibid, 43: 213; Radisson, <u>Explorations</u> , 81-84

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
May 12, 1657	Onon vs. Huron	1 Huron K	[Que]	Onon & Moh spent most of this year trying to lure Huron to relocate to Iroquoia. This Huron was most likely K when the one of the Onon who came to bring Huron to Iroq tried to capt. a Huron.	JR, 43: 43
Aug. 3, 1657	Onon vs. Huron	[7-13] Huron K, 40 capt.; 1 Iroq M K	Island on St. Law., 4 days journey above Mont	A group of about 50 Huron were going with 16 Sen & 30 Onon to relocate among Onon. Were attacked enroute. Radisson, who was along, puts Iroq group at 80 & Huron at 100 F & 10-12 M. He also recorded that by time of attack both groups had people leave.	JR, 43:59; Ibid, 44: 69-77, 151; <u>Correspond.</u> , 591; Radisson, <u>Explorations</u> , 51-55
Oct. 25, 1657	Iroq [On] vs. Fr	3 Fr M K	Mont	On & Onon were spotted in area prior to attack, but Moh said it was On who attacked. Radisson, among Moh at time, attributed this attack to the Anojot [Oneida].	JR, 43: 59, 67; Ibid, 44: 85, 87-89, 99; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 221; Radisson, <u>Explorations</u> , 71
Nov. 3, 1657	9 Algk vs. Onon	1 Onon scalped	Rich R. Islands	Rec'd news this day. The Algk had set out 24 Oct.	JR, 43: 65, 69
[Spring, 1658]	Iroq [Moh?] vs. Mt	3 Mt bands defeated	[Mistassini R.]	The dating of this raid, & Moh participation is based on very sketchy data.	JR, 44: 203-205; Ibid, 45: 233

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
June 13, 1658	6 On Iroq vs. 3 Fr M	3 Fr M capt.	TR	2 Fr were later released, 1 was K.	JR, 44: 101, 109, 111, 115, 125
July 13, 1658	Iroq vs. Mt & Algk	1 Mt F K, 2 Algk F wounded	[Que]	Women were working in the field.	JR, 44: 101-103
Aug. 21, 1658	Iroq vs. 1 Fr	Fr M escaped	Cap Rouge		JR, 44: 105
Aug. 30, 1658	Iroq vs. Huron	1 Huron capt.	Sillery	4 Iroq capt. the Huron near the Jesuit mill.	JR, 44: 107
Sept. 16, 1658	Onon vs.? Fr	11 Onon capt., 2 K	Mont	News rec'd this day. They all escaped on Oct. 19. No details on how were capt.	JR, 44: 109-111, 119
Sept. 25, 1658	On vs.? Fr	5 On capt., 3 K, 1 released	TR	Prisoners arrived at Que this date.	JR, 44: 111, 117
Oct. 20, 1658	Fr vs. Moh	3 Moh capt.	[Que]	Moh were going to war at Tad when canoe broke down. Were capt. when came ashore.	JR, 44: 119
Nov. 5, 1658	12 Moh vs. Fr	8 Fr [M] capt.	TR & LSP	4 Fr were capt. as worked in field, & 4 as returned from hunting. 1 was released. This was probably a means to get their people released.	JR, 44: 121

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Winter, 1658 to 1659]	Iroq [Moh] vs. [Mascouten]	Some Iroq losses		End of Aug., 1658 200 Iroq said to be going to war vs. [Mascouten]. In July of 1659 Moh were condoled on losses suffered "last winter" vs. [Mascouten].	JR, 44: 115; Ibid, 45: 101
June 27, 1659	Onon vs. Fr	3 Fr capt.	Rich R. Islands [near TR]	News arrived this day. 1 Fr M was K, the other two escaped. The Iroq had been spotted earlier in the month. It appears that they wanted to capt. some Fr to exchange for Iroq of various tribes held by Fr.	JR, 45: 35, 97-105,
Aug. 10, 1659	Moh vs. Algk or Mt	1 Algk or Mt F K, 1 Moh M K	Tad	News rec'd this day. Sources not conculsive about nationality of F. Iroq was shot on the spot.	JR, 45: 107, 211

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Aug. 21, 1659	Iroq vs. Sault Ind. (7 canoes) & Ot (6 canoes)	18 Iroq K, 6 FIA K and 7 wounded	[Ott R.?] a days journey above Mont., below 40 ft. falls.	Fatalities were the result of battles with different Iroq bands. Radisson & Grosiliers were heading north with Sault Indians to trade. Met Ot & then ran into ambush Iroq had laid for Ot. Outnumbered, the Iroq left. Next day FIA run into returning Iroq hunters & K 3 Iroq. FIA then encounter first Iroq group they thought had given up desire to fight. Rest of casualties took place during this battle. 21 August the Jesuits report the arrival of unidentified FIA with 9 Iroq scalps. Radisson says that they took 10 scalps & capt. 4 Iroq during this battle. They were later K when more Iroq were encountered. FIA decided not fight & got away during night.	JR, 45: 107; Radisson, <u>Explorations</u> , 112-119
Aug. 25, 1659	60-100 Moh vs. Fr	8 Fr capt.	Near TR		JR, 45: 107- 109, 117
Sept. 12, 1659	8 Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr M capt.	Cap Rouge	Fr were eel fishing.	JR, 45: 113
[End of Sept.], 1659	Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr M K	TR		JR, 45: 115

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Nov. 1, 1659	FIA vs. Iroq [Moh]	2 Iroq M K, 1 mc capt.		This group of FIA had set out from Que Aug. 29, to raid towards TR, & returned this day. The raid was probably to avenge the losses suffered Aug. 25. They had set out 17 canoes full of Algk & Huron. Given the length of time they must have had to go to Iroquoia to make the raid.	<u>JR</u> , 45: 109, 117
May 15, 1660	[FIA] vs. Iroq	4 Iroq K		New rec'd this day. 3 Iroq were K on the spot, 1 tortured to death. The FIA were from Tad, but said to be Algk.	<u>JR</u> , 45: 153; <u>Correspond.</u> , 619

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[End of May], 1660	500 Moh & 200 Onon vs. 40 Huron, 17 Fr & 4 Algk	20-30 Huron capt., 12 Fr K, 5 Fr capt., 14-20 Iroq K, 19 wounded	Chaudière Falls [Ott R.]	News rec'd June 3 at Mont, June 8 at Que. Iroq were coming to attack Fr. Huron had decided to go out to ambush Iroq returning from hunting. Fr decided to go along when all ran into Iroq. Some Oneida along, but not clear how many of 700. This is the now legendary battle of Dollard des Ormeaux. The commonly held view is that the heroic defense prevented further incursions vs. New France. Further attack vs. the colony was prevented but, as Marie de l'Incarnation pointed out, because the goal of striking a blow at the Fr had been met, not out of fear of what more Fr could do.	JR, 45: 157, 245-261; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 253-265; <u>Correspond.</u> , 622-628; NYCD, 13: 175; Radisson, <u>Explorations</u> , 104-106
June 5, 1660	8 Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr F K & 4 C capt., 7 Iroq K	Petite Cap [Que]	Iroq were former Huron. 8 Fr & 20 Mt & Algk went in pursuit. 3 Iroq drowned (presumably attempting to escape), 5 were capt, 4 of whom were tortured to death. The Fr F died of her wounds, her children were saved.	JR, 45: 157; <u>Correspond.</u> , 621

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Between 8 & 19] July, 1660	Iroq vs. Algk	1 Algk K, 1 capt	TR	Gov. of Que, who happened to be at TR gave chase with 100 others. Ran into Iroq ambush. Managed to get out with only 1 of party wounded. Radisson, describing what is certainly the same event, states that 11 Iroq were K. It is hard to accept that the Jesuits would have overlooked such a significant number of dead, especially as it would redound to the Governor's credit.	JR, 45: 159; Radisson, <u>Explorations</u> , 107-109
[Shortly after] Aug. 4, 1660	Fr vs.? Cay	12 Cay capt.	Mont	50 Cayuga came up saying they came in peace. Fr suspected otherwise & capt. 12 in order to negotiate release of Fr among Iroq. It is by no means certain that Cay had other intentions, but if they did Fr acted first.	JR, 45: 161; Ibid, 46: 117-119
Aug. 15, 1660	20-25 Iroq vs. Fr	2 Fr M capt.	TR	New rec'd this day.	JR, 45: 161

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Before Aug. 19], 1660	100-150 Iroq vs. 500 FIA (Ot, Saulteux, Amikwa, Sioux & Ticacon [Kiskakon?])	5 Iroq [M] K, 2 FIA wounded	[Ott R]	Radisson, coming back to colony with this group states that Iroq were outnumbered 5 to 1, and were too intimidated to attack at first, 30 L from Calumet Falls. Later on down river, Near the Long Sault, they set up an ambush, but were out manned, left their baggage & got away during the night. These Iroq were probably remnants of the larger army that had come up to attack the colony.	Radisson, <u>Explorations</u> , 100-104
[Late Aug. to early Sept.], 1660	100 Onon vs. 300 Ot	3 Ot [M] lost	[Chaudière Falls, Ott R]	Onon attack advance scouts of returning Ot fur brigade. When realize size of group, Onon withdraw. Possibly part of same group above that wanted to avenge earlier losses.	JR, 45: 161-163; Ibid, 46: 121
Feb., 1661	160 Iroq vs. Fr	13 Fr M capt., some later K	Mont		JR, 46: 171, 207; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 271
March, 1661	Iroq vs. Fr	6 Fr M capt. & 4 Fr M K, 1 Iroq M K	Mont	Dollier claims that 260 Iroq were involved in this attack.	JR, 46: 207; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 271
April 8, 1661	Onon vs. Fr	14 Fr M capt.	TR	News rec'd this day.	JR, 46: 167

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[April 8, 1661]	70-80 Moh vs. [28 Attikamek & 2 Fr M]	Almost all Att. K or capt., 2 Fr M K, 24 Iroq K	TR [St. Maurice R.]	Attacked group were traders returning to trade for furs.	<u>JR</u> , 46: 179, 209; <u>Correspond.</u> , 666
[End of May, 1661]	Iroq vs. 14 [Huron-Petun]	4 M of attacked group K, [rest capt.?)	[L. Superior]	Iroq "fell" upon this group. No more details.	<u>JR</u> , 46: 143
[May, 1661]	During this month notices appear of conflict between the Upper Iroq tribes & the Susq. At the beginning of the month the assembly of Maryland agree to furnish military aid to the Susq. This would imply that hostilities have already taken place. By the end of the month the Dutch authorities on the Hudson are apprised of Maryland's actions and are told that the Iroq & Susq are at war. No details as to causes or casualties, if any.				<u>Md. Archives</u> , 1: 407; <u>NYCD</u> , 12: 344, 345-346
June 6, 1661	60-70 Moh vs. Fr	3 Fr M K	Tad	Fr had gone to check fishing lines.	<u>JR</u> , 46: 173-175
June 8, 1661	Iroq vs. Fr	3 Fr M K	TR	News rec'd this day.	<u>JR</u> , 46: 175
June 10, 1661	Iroq vs. [Maryland]	Some farms of Finns & Swedes "ravaged"	[Maryland]	News rec'd this day.	<u>NYCD</u> , 12: 345
June 18, 1661	[60-70 Moh] vs. [Fr or FIA?]	15 [Fr or FIA] lost	Beaupré & Ile d'Orleans	8 were from Beaupré & 7 from Isle d'Orleans. This was said to be same group that had hit at Tad June 6. Not noted who target group was.	<u>JR</u> , 46: 179

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
June 22, 1661	40 Iroq vs. 8 Fr M	8 Fr M K	Ile d'Orleans	Leader of Fr had gone to warn a relative of Iroq presence. Ran into Iroq ambush.	JR, 46: 179, 211-215
[June, 1661]	Iroq [Moh] vs. Squirrel	[80 people capt. or K] Nation utterly defeated	[Between L Asssinca & L Mistassin]	Location is based on <u>Historical Atlas of Canada</u> , Plate 18.	JR, 46: 289; Ibid, 47: 149-151 [Ibid, 56: 183?]
[Approx. July 21, 1661]	Moh vs. Fr	1 Fr M capt.	TR	He was kept alive by the Moh.	JR, 47: 83
[Mid to end July, 1661]	Susq vs. Cay	3 Cay K	Near Cay villages	Cay were in their fields.	JR, 47: 71
Aug. 1, 1661	[Moh] vs. Fr	1 Fr M capt.	TR	Was encountered in Moh village.	JR, 47: 85
[Aug. 29], 1661	[40-50 Onon] vs. 9-14 Fr M	2 Fr M K	Mont	The attack was led by Otreouati in revenge for being held in a Mont prison some time before. The Fr had gone to a field to reap some wheat. This attack took place at the same time as Garaconté, a fellow Onon, was trying to establish a firmer peace between Fr & Onon.	JR, 46: 189, 217-219; Ibid, 47: 71-73, 95; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 275-277

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Oct. 25, 1661	[35 Oneida] vs. 14 Fr M	3 Fr M K on spot, 2 capt. & later K; 1 Iroq M K	Mont	Fr had gone to cut stone on "Ile à la Pierre". On his way to Mont to negotiate peace Garacontie had gotten a band of On to agree not to attack Fr. Either this band had changed their minds, or another band struck the blow.	JR, 46: 189; Ibid, 47: 97, 157, 177; Ibid, 50: 55-57; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 283-285
Oct. 26, 1661	Iroq vs. [Delaware]	12 [Delaware] K	Delaware R.	News reported this day. The Iroq were said to have attacked the "river-savages" who lived above the Swedish settlement [Altena?].	NYCD, 12: 357
[End of 1661]	Writing in the fall of this year two different sources put French losses to the Iroq at 100 to 114 people. The Jesuits wrote that the colony lost 114 people killed, 70 of them French. Marie de l'Incarnation wrote that the French lost more than 100 people captured and killed. If we add up the numbers for this year we get only 39 K & 22 capt., for a total of 61 lost. If their numbers are correct we must conclude that many raids went unrecorded, and what Iroq raids were chronicled were only the major ones. There are references to this in the sources. At times after describing a raid a writer will note "that many more raids" or "many more captures" were made.				JR, 46: 219-221; <u>Correspond.</u> , 665
[Winter, 1661-1662]	Onon vs. [Shawnee]	Some F & C K	[Upper Ohio Valley]	This was a reprisal for Onon deaths incurred 8-9 years past when Onon had attacked Shawnee.	JR, 47: 145-147
Feb. 7, 1662	200 Onon vs. Fr	4 Fr M K	Mont	Onon had attacked. Fr group of 26-27 went to aid of those being attacked. 4 Fr K were of this group.	JR, 47: 155, 277; Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 287

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Late March to early April], 1662	Iroq vs. Fr	2 Fr wounded, unspecified no. of Iroq wounded	Mont	News rec'd this day, an Easter Sunday	<u>JR</u> , 47: 277
[April 30 to May 3], 1662	[200 to] 260 Mohawk vs. [Eastern Abenaki]	Some [Abenaki] K & capt.	Penobscott Ft.	The English sources indicate the attack was vs. the North Indidans, while the Jesuits note a Moh party out to attack the Etchemins--a term they often used to refer to the Abenaki. The area of the Ft. is the tribal area of the Abenaki. There is also a reference to a Moh attack against an entire village of Abenaki. A house in the area of the Ft. was plundered. Not clear who it belonged to.	<u>JR</u> , 47: 139-141, 279; <u>NYCD</u> , 13: 226-227
May 6, 1662	Iroq vs. Fr	Several Iroq wounded, possibly 1 Iroq M K	Mont	Several other raids were said to have occurred, and some Fr K, but no details as to when.	Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 291
Spring, 1662	Sauteur [Ojibway] vs. 100 On & Moh	Almost all Iroq lost [K or capt.], a few escaped	[L. Huron]	Iroq had gone to attack the Ot. While hunting for food were spotted by & eventually attacked by the Ojibway band. The Ojibway had muskets.	<u>JR</u> , 48: 75-77
Sept. 10-11, 1662	Iroq vs. [Fr?]	2 [Fr?] M K	Ile d'Orleans	7 canoes of Iroq.	<u>JR</u> , 47: 287
Sept. 30, 1662	Iroq vs. Huron	1 Huron M, F, & [fc] capt.	Ile d'Orleans	Thought to be by same group as above.	<u>JR</u> , 47: 291

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Oct. 6, 1662	Iroq vs. Fr	2 Fr M K	Tad	News rec'd this day.	JR, 47: 291
Oct. 6, 1662	Iroq vs. Hurons	1 Huron M & F capt.	[Sillery]	Hurons were working their fields.	JR, 47: 291
May, [1663]	Moh vs. Huron	1 Huron M K, 1 F wounded, 3 fc capt., 1 mc escaped	Mont	Moh said they came in peace. At night attacked people in whose cabin they were staying. 7 Moh had come but only 4 involved in the attack.	JR, 48: 87
[May 5, 1663]	40 Iroq, mostly Moh, but with some On vs. Fr	2 Fr M capt.	Mont	French were working in fields. One prisoner, the one given to Moh was released when the Moh band fell into ambush of Algk. See below.	JR, 48: 93, 97, 105
[Between May 5 & May 24], 1663	Sillery Algk vs. [Moh]	10 [Moh] K & scalped, 3 capt., 2 of whom later K	L. Champlain	The Algk returned May 24. They had set out, unaware of above raid, to strike a blow vs. Iroq. Had gone as far as L. Champlain when spotted this group returning from New France with prisoner. The Algk had set out 3 weeks prior, but raid was obviously after May 5 since they released prisoner caught in that raid.	JR, 47: 303; Ibid, 48: 99-111

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[End of May to beginning of June], 1663	Huron vs. 5 Onon	1, possibly 2, Onon M K, rest wounded & turned over to Fr	[Mont]	The Huron attacked this group because they considered Onon to be spys, & to avenge the loss caused by the Moh in the attack vs. their hosts May [1663]. See entry this date above.	<u>JR</u> , 48: 89-91
[April], 1663	800 Iroq [Sen, Onon, & Cay] vs. Susq village	At least 25 Iroq noted K, 10 capt., plus unspecified no. said to have been K	[Ohio R.]	Susq village was better fortified than expected, so Iroq tried subtlety. 25 Iroq "ambassadors" capt. and K. Susq went out and engaged small groups of Iroq, & capt. 10 more, & drove off Iroq. K unspecified number.	<u>JR</u> , 48:7-79; <u>NYCD</u> , 12: 431
June 24, 1663	Susq vs.? Iroq	A few Iroq capt.		News reported this day, but raid was recent.	<u>NYCD</u> , 12: 433
[June?], 1663	Moh vs. [Micmac or Nova Scotia colonists?]		Nova Scotia	Gov. Temple wrote July 6, 1663 to complain of Moh attack vs. "his people at their" fort. The raid was therefore earlier. Who was attacked is not clear. The Moh told him to keep out of their war with the [Abenaki]. Thus indicating that any attack against natives or colonists in that region was part of that conflict.	<u>NYCD</u> , 13: 297-298

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
July 23-25, 1663	Iroq vs. English	4 English [M?] K	Maryland	News rec'd these days of deaths in two separate attacks. The attacks were either off shoots of Iroq-Susq hostilities, or deliberate Iroq attacks for English support of the Susq vs. the Iroq. No way to confirm either interpretation.	<u>NYCD</u> , 12: 435, 436
Sept. 1, 1663	Moh vs. [Susq] & [Delaware?] River Indians	3 [Susq] F K, 2 [Delaware?] River Indian [F] K	[Iroquoia?]	The Susq & [Delaware?] River Indians were K as returned from Moh. Had gone to make presents to Moh (of peace, to join them vs. rest of confederacy?). Moh decided to join rest of Iroq vs. Susq.	<u>NYCD</u> , 12: 439
Autumn [Late Oct. to Nov.], 1663	Moh vs. 2 Fr M	2 Fr M capt.	TR	Prisoners were later freed, and returned to Fr.	<u>JR</u> , 49: 119, 125, 135, 145-147
[Nov. 24 to Dec. 12] 1663	Iroq vs. [Sokoki] [Western Abenaki]	30-40 [Sokoki] K, 20 Iroq wounded, unspecified no. of Iroq K, rumor had it at 200-300.	[Conn. R.]	The Iroq are reported leaving Nov. 24, & returning Dec. 11-12. The Sokoki had offered peace & the Moh wanted to accept, but the Onon & Sen did not. Moh later ask for Dutch aid to negotiate a peace & get their people back.	<u>NYCD</u> , 13: 308-309, 355, 356, 378

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Mid May], 1664	100 FIA (Algk & Mt) vs. 30-33 Iroq Ambassadors	Some Iroq K & capt.	[St. Law?], "below the great sault"	The embassy was being led by Garacontie, & presumably was made up of several Iroq tribes. The FIA had gone out raiding in that area. One source suggests that intent was specifically to nab envoys. This implies an effort to jeopardize peace process. FIA refused to heed pleas of Iroq that they came in peace, hacked up Iroq & stole their goods.	JR, 48: 233-235; Ibid, 49: 139, 145-147; <u>Correspond.</u> , 728
[Mid May], 1664	Iroq vs. Fr	2 Fr fc capt.	Ile d'Orleans & TR	The women were capt. in two separate raids, about the same time. 1 fc was 12 years old.	JR, 49: 119; <u>Correspond.</u> , 728
June 6, 1664	160-200 Sen & On vs. Susq	1 Sen, & 2 On [M] capt., 2 On [[M] later K	Maryland	News reported this day.	<u>Md. Archives</u> , 3: 499-500
June 27, 1664	Sen vs. English	Some English K	[Maryland]	News reported this day.	<u>Md. Archives</u> , 3: 502-503
[Aug.?], 1664	Iroq vs. Fr	3-4 Fr M K or wounded, 1 Iroq M K	Mont	No clear date for this event, but precedes one in Aug., & since were hunting, it could also have been late summer.	Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 297
Aug., 1664	Iroq vs. Fr.	2 Fr M K	Mont	Were shot dead in their canoes.	Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 297

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Oct., 1664 to before Feb. 6, 1665]	Moh vs. [Pocumtuck]	1 Pocumtuck M K & his wife & C capt., villages abandoned	[Pocumtuck villages]	Notice of this war by Moh vs. the [Sokoki], [Pocumtuck], & the [Penacook] was revealed Sept. 24, 1664. On Feb. 6, 1665, authorities reported the death of a Pocumtuck leader, and the relocation of his tribe, that of the [Norwottucks], & also the abandoning of [Squakheag], a Sokoki area. It is not clear if these tribes were also hit, moved for fear of being attacked, or how permanent the moves were. The date is based on the earliest possible start date after the conference in Sept., and the reporting of the results in early Feb. Raid was to avenge death of Moh ambassadors at the hands of one of these tribes.	<u>NYCD</u> , 3: 68; <u>Massachusetts</u> <u>Historical</u> <u>Society</u> <u>Collections</u> , 4th Ser., 6: 531

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Mid-Winter, [1664-1665]	[30] Iroq vs. Mt	11 Mt M & 1 F K, 5 Mt M capt., 2 escaped; 20 Iroq M K & 2 F capt.	L. Piagouagami	100 Moh & Onon had split up into 3 groups to go raiding. Data is for one of these, composition of group not clear, but about 30 of them. In first attack Iroq K 5 Mt M & 1 F. Learn of others, capt. 2 Mt M, 1 escapes & brings aid. Mt attack Iroq. Iroq K 4 Mt M & capt. 3 while losing 2 of their M K. 1 Mt escapes & brings aid. Mt attack Iroq & K 18 Iroq M, capt. 2 Iroq F, lose 2 of their M in fight & relase their people held captive.	JR, 50: 37-41
[April 24, 1665]	Iroq vs. 4 Fr	2 Fr M K, 2 capt.	Mont	4 Fr M were working on the hospital. 1 was K on the spot, 1 died of wounds, 2 were capt. 1 of these may have escaped. Around the same time as this raid a Fr M arrived at TR from Mont having escaped Iroq.	Morin, <u>Histoire simple et véritable</u> , 137; JR, 49: 159

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[June to July, 1665]	20-30 Iroq vs. 300 Ot traders	Some K, but not clear from what group(s).	[Upper Ott R]	Iroq waiting to ambush Ot traders shortly after they left to go to New France to trade. When saw size of group encouraged Ot to proceed. After a few skirmishes Ot did just that. Date based on arrival of Ot in New France Aug. 3, & average of 30 days to make trip down. Place of ambush based on Ot tribal location & usual route taken to trade.	<u>JR</u> , 49: 163, 245-247
July, 1665	Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr M capt.	Ile Ste. Thérèse	Sieur Le Moyne capt. He was returned by the Onon, but it is not clear which tribe he was capt. by.	Dollier, <u>Histoire</u> , 299-301; <u>JR</u> , 50: 127
July, 1665	Iroq vs. Fr	Some Fr K & some capt.	TR	Raid took place shortly before arrival of De Tracy at TR around July 23.	<u>JR</u> , 49: 239
[Late July to early Aug., 1665]	Iroq vs. 300 Ot traders	Some Ot M K	"Cap de massacre" [West end, LSP]	This is the same brigade of traders attacked, June to July of this year. Not clear if Iroq attackers were the same ones that struck then. The Iroq in this attack just fired on a few canoes of stragglers & then fled. The date is based on the location of the attack & the fact that the Ot arrived at TR to trade Aug. 3	<u>JR</u> , 49: 247-249

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Oct. 28, 1665	Iroq vs. 20 Nip M & families	7 Nip M K, 12 Nip M capt. along with some F	"Toward the Petite Nation"	News rec'd this day. The location is as recorded. Both the Nip and Petite Nation were living, for most part, near TR.	JR, 49: 173
Jan. 9 to March 8, 1666	500 Fr vs. Moh	4 Iroq & 6 Fr K	[Near Moh villages]	The villages were abandoned. The deaths took place during a small skirmish as Fr retreated, Feb. 20. The Fr deaths do not include the 60 or so who died of cold & hunger.	JR, 50: 131-135, 183
[Mid to late May], 1666	Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr [M?] K	Mont	Rec'd news June 4. This & the raid below took place in "past' 3 weeks. That puts them in mid to late May.	JR, 50: 189
[Mid to late May], 1666	Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr [M?] K	Ft. Chambly	See comment above.	JR, 50: 189
July 11, 1666	Iroq vs. Hartford area Indians	Some K & 9 capt.		News reported this day. Raid was said to have taken place recently. The tribes located in this area were the Tunxis & the Podunk.	NYCD, 3: 120-121
[Mid July, before], July 20, 1666	Moh vs. Fr	2-3 Fr M K, 4 Fr M capt.	Ft. Ste. Anne	News rec'd July 20.	JR, 50: 139, 193

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Sept. 28 to Nov. 5, 1666	1,200 Fr & 100 Huron & Algk vs. Moh	4 Moh villages destroyed, crops & supplies burned, & villages looted	Moh villages	The Moh had intended to fight, but sight of massed army caused them to abandon those plans. Fr were unopposed.	JR, 50: 141- 145, 203; Correspond., 772-776
[Late Aug. to early Sept., 1667]	Mah vs. Moh	1 Moh F scalped. Later died of wounds	Outside village of Gandaouagué	Date is based on Jesuits leaving Ft St. Anne Aug. 24, & arriving among Moh shortly after. Jesuits were delayed at village while Moh went in pursuit of Mah, so raid was about time of their arrival.	JR, 51: 187- 189
[Fall, after mid Sept., 1667]	Mah vs. Moh	1 Moh M K	Outside village of Gandaouagué	Date based on internal references that suggest this raid occurred at least 20 days after the above raid.	JR, 51: 189- 197
June 25, 1668	Moh vs. Nantick [Niantic?]	1 Nantick M & F capt.		News reported this day. Moh are also killing livestock of English near Groton.	Conn. Archives, vol. Indians, vol. 1, Prt. 1, ff. 8
Towards end of Oct., 1668	Onon vs. Susq	Some Susq capt. 1 Susq M & F K		Prisoners arrived at Onon this time. At least 2 were tortured to death, but impression is left that more than this were capt. & tortured to death.	JR, 52: 161, 167-171, 173

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Late June, 1669]	Fr vs. 7 On & 1 Sen	7 On [M] & 1 Sen [M] K, several Fr M K	Near Mont	Galinée left Mont July 6 & says the incident happened 8-15 days before his departure. The Fr attacked the Iroq to rob them of their pelts. The Fr M K, were K by the French authorities for this crime which some thought might lead to war with the Iroq.	JR, 53: 33-35, 241; Ibid, 54: 113; Galinée, "Voyage de Dollier et Galinée", 8, 18
[July to Aug., 1669]	Susq vs. Sen	10 Sen M K	[Near a Sen village]		Galinée, "Voyage de Dollier et Galinée", 18, 20
[Mid to late Aug., 1669]	Sen vs. [Shawnee]	1 [Shawnee] M capt. & tortured to death		The war party returned around this time.	Galinée, "Voyage de Dollier et Galinée", 32, 34
Aug. 18, 1669	Mah vs. Moh	4 Mah F & 6 M capt., 50 Mah M K, 40 Moh K	Moh village	The Mah attacked & the Moh then went in pursuit. Sometime after this the Moh went to avenge this but no engagement took place.	JR, 53: 137-159
Aug. 26, 1669	2 On vs. Susq	1 On M K	[Susq village]	The survivor returned this day. Had gone to attack Susq. 1 On M was capt. & tortured to death by Susq.	JR, 53: 243

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Aug. 26, 1669	Iroq (4 On & 1 Sen) vs. [Shawnee]	2 [Shawnee] capt.		The Iroq returned around this date. There is no certainty as to when the raid was carried out.	JR, 53: 245; Ibid, 54: 113, 115
Aug. 26, 1669	[60] [Amikwa] vs. 5 Iroq (3 On, 1 Onon, & 1 Sen)	2 On, 1 Onon, & 1 Sen capt. or K		This was reported on this date by the above returning Iroq. He was the sole survivor of this attack. The party above was returning home when were attacked. Given Shawnee location, the Amikwa must have been out to attack some Iroq. The Shawnee were capt. as well.	JR, 53: 247-247; Ibid, 54: 113, 115
[Fall to winter, 1669]	500 Sen & unspecified Number of Cay vs. [Shawnee]			Sept. 1 Father Fremin noted the departure of these warriors. In July of 1670 an Iroq leader defended Sen against charges that they had attacked Algk first, & said they had only done injury to the [Shawnee]. This would indicate that some fighting occurred.	JR, 53: 47-49; Ibid, 54: 117
[Sept. 20, 1669 to Jan. 27, 1670]	[120] On, 50 Onon, & 10 Cay vs. Susq	6 Susq M & 3 F capt., later 6 M & 1 F tortured to death		These Iroq groups left Sept 20, & arrived with prisoners Jan 27. The prisoners were divided among the tribes who had contributed warriors to raid. A Susq ambassador had been among Cay. When prisoners arrived he & his nephew were K. He had come to talk of peace.	JR, 53: 247, 253-255; Ibid, 54: 23, 29-31, 75

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
March, 1670	20-22 Iroq (18-20 were Sen) vs. 106 Outagami [Fox] (100 F & C, & 6 M)	All Outagami K except 30 F capt. [70 F & C, & 6 M K]	Foot of L. Michigan	2 Iroq, escaped from Potawatomi, led Sen to 6 Cabins of Outagami. Most M of that group were out hunting. After massacre some Algk pursued Iroq to no avail. [See also raid below.]	JR, 53: 39-49; Ibid, 54: 219-221, 227
[Between March & before April 26, 1670]	Algk [Mostly Ot] vs. Iroq [Sen]	Iroq all defeated, 3 Iroq scalped		After the failure of the above pursuit, a group of Algk, mostly Ottawa--but including their allies, went to avenge this injury. Attacked a group of Iroq hunters. Might have been against Sen, but it is not clear. The date is based on time of above raid & the assumption that the 4 [Miami] who appeared among the Outagami with 3 Iroq scalps April 26 had gotten them in this reprisal raid.	JR, 53: 39-49; Ibid, 54: 219-221, 227, 265
[Spring, 1672]	Susq vs. On	2 On F [K]	On village	F K fifty paces from village.	JR, 56: 37
[Late April to Late May, 1672]	20 Sen & 40 Cay vs. Susq	1 Sen M K, 1 capt., 8 Cay M K, 15 wounded, 15-16 Susq M K		Date is based on raid beginning Ascension day, 40 days after Easter. Sen ran into group of 60 Susq boys, 15-16 years old, who attacked them then went after the Cay.	JR, 56: 55-57

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[1674?]	Cay vs. Susq	3 Susq K		No details, it is simply observed in passing that 3 Susq prisoners were baptized before death at hands of torturers.	<u>JR</u> , 58: 227
Feb. 6, 1674	Iroq vs. Mt [Porcupine tribe]	A massacre took place	[L. St. Jean]	News reported this day. The defeat caused a general panic in the area.	<u>JR</u> , 59: 39-41
[1675]	Iroq vs. Susq	Susq utterly defeated		The Jesuits note this year that since the Susq have been defeated the Sen have become increasingly insolent. There are no details as to what might have happened in this war, & there is a hint that it could have could have taken place from 1674 to 1675, but even this much is speculative. However, by Dec of 1675 the Susq & Iroq are holding peace talks, & by May of 1676 the Susq are beginning to relocate closer to the Iroq.	<u>JR</u> , 58: 237, 241; <u>Ibid</u> , 59: 251; <u>NYCD</u> , 12: 546, 553; <u>Md. Archives</u> , 5: 152-154
[Winter, 1675-1676]	Moh vs. Narragansett	11 Narragansett K	5 K near Ft. Albany, 6 at [Squakheag]	News reported 29 April, 1676.	<u>Conn. Historical Coll.</u> , 21: 241-242

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Feb., [1676]	300 Moh vs. King Phillip & 500 of his followers	Drove off Phillip, K some [possibly 79], capt. some	40 miles west of Ft. Albany	A report from Boston, May 18 refers to a Moh attack vs. the "enemy" & states the Moh K 79. This may be an exaggeration, but probably refers to the same raid.	<u>NYCD</u> , 3: 255; <u>CSP</u> , 9: 395
June 17, 1676	Onon vs. ?	50 capt. from 2 different tribes, of whom 6 F, 5 M, 1 mc, & 1 C were K	200 Leagues Southwest	The Onon are reported returning around this time. Other Iroq may have been involved. One of these groups of captives might have been Shawnee. Those K were tortured to death as group travelled through Sen villages on way to Onon.	<u>JR</u> , 60: 185; <u>NYCD</u> , 3: 252
June 4, 1677	80-100 Moh vs. Mah & North Indians [Western Abnk]	18 people capt., most later returned	[Albany area]	Moh reproached for this attack this day.	<u>NYCD</u> , 13: 508; <u>LIR</u> , 40-41
June 27, 1678	60 Moh vs. [Niantic]	3 [Niantic] K, & 3 M, 17 F, 2 mc, & 2 [fc] capt.	6 miles from Suddberry	The Moh are noted as returning this day. Albany officials suspected most of the prisoners were later K. Niantic were [working] in a field when attacked.	<u>P. R. of Conn.</u> , 3: 262-263, 490; <u>NYCD</u> , 13: 520-527
Aug. 7, 1678	20 Moh vs. North Indians [Western Abnk]	5 North Indians K, & 2 M, 1 F, & 3 mc capt.		Moh are noted as returning this day. 4 other North Indians had escaped.	<u>NYCD</u> , 13: 531
Aug. 19, 1678	Sen & Susq vs. [Pisct]	Some Pisct K		News reported this day.	<u>Md. Archives</u> , 15: 183

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Between May 3, 1677 & before end of 1678]	Iroq vs. Illinois	Iroq defeated	Illinois territory	The Jesuits learn of this attack in [1678]. Father Allouez left the Illinois after May 3, [1677] & made no mention of such an attack. It probably occurred after he left, but when that was, & when in [1678] the Jesuits learned of it is not clear.	<u>JR</u> , 60: 165-167
May 10-12, 1680	200-300 Susq & [Iroq] vs. Pisct		[Pisct Ft]	There is no mention of casualties on either side. The Susq wanted revenge for some of their leaders K in earlier wars, & prisoners held by Maryland freed. The Susq-Iroq group eventually withdrew.	<u>Md. Archives</u> , 15: 280, 281, 283
Sept, 1680	500-600 Iroq (Sen & Onon, at least) vs. Illinois	700-1,200 Mostly F & C of Tamoroa Illinois capt. or K, 30 Iroq M lost [K]	Grande Riviere [Illinois Territory]	Iroq took M & F as well as some trade goods Tonty had brought up. The process began in early Sept. Most of Ill men were either at war or hunting. Iroq agreed to peace then pursued Ill as they left to go further north. Attacked the Tamoroa after they had split off from main group & were no longer expecting the attack.	<u>AN</u> , C11A, 5: 310; Margry, <u>Découvertes</u> , 1: 506-520, 584-588; Margry, <u>Relations</u> , 9-12

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Approx, Dec., 1680]	{400} Iroq vs. 2 cabins of Miami hunters	{30-40 Miami and Illinois K, 300 capt. 180 Iroq K} Unspecified number of Miami capt. & K, 8 Iroq K & 13-14 "Cascacia" Ill K	{Oumamis R.} [St. Joseph's R]	The Iroq had detached themselves from army above or were the army in question. Iroq attacked Miami & proceeded to a Miami village. 100 "Cascacia" Ill returned from hunting, learned of Tamoroa defeat, & set off in pursuit of Iroq. They were discovered & defeated. Iroq left with the Miami prisoners. This last part differs from Lahontan's account where the Iroq are said to have been defeated & the prisoners freed. His numbers also seem exaggerated. If the Iroq were bringing even half of the 1,200 Illinois reported as capt. & K, they would hardly spare so large a detachment to raid. The data in parenthesis {} is found in Lahontan's account.	AN, C11A, 5: 310; Margry, <u>Découvertes</u> , 1: 527-528; Lahontan, <u>New Voyages</u> , 2: 486-488
Jan. 1, 1681]	Susq & [Cay] vs. Mattawoman	Most of Mattawoman "cut off"			<u>Md. Archives</u> , 15: 329, 374, 382-384; Ibid, 17: 5

Table D.1

Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
June 18, 1681	200 Susq & [Cay] vs. Pisct	13 Pisct capt.	[Pisct Ft]	News reported this day. The original intent had been to attack Pisct, but for some reason talks were held. Pisct capt. were probably envoys in the talks.	<u>Md. Archives</u> , 15: 353, 359, 374, 375
[Aug. 24-30], 1681	300 Iroq (70-100 were Moh, the rest Cay, On, Onon,) vs. Pisct	1 Pisct M K & 9 M, 4 F, & 4 fc capt.	[Pisct Ft]	The spokesmen for the On & Onon stated that they came to raid to capt. people to bolster their population because they feared hostilities with the Sen.	<u>Md. Archives</u> , 17: 3, 5, 14, 15
[Late Aug. to mid Sept. 1681]				Throughout this period the Iroq are accused of various raids against Marylanders, especially in Charles County. It is hard to determine how to assess these. It is by no means certain that the Iroq did cause the attacks. In the past they have been blamed for attacks and later exonerated. In Virginia too, the authorities recognize that often the Iroq are blamed for acts based solely on rumour. The hostile acts were probably committed by local tribes using the Iroq threat as a means to exact their own revenge. Certainly the Maryland authorities recognize that even in the two to three attacks that are probably legitimately attributable to the Iroq, these are but off shoots of the major group noted above, and that the Iroq are more interested in freeing captives held by Marylanders than in stealing their linen.	<u>Md. Archives</u> , 17: 18-25, 27-28; <u>CSP</u> , 11: 93
1681	Iroq vs. Illinois	700-900 Illinois capt., 3-600 K	[Illinois territory]	There is no clear indication of when this happened. The first notice of it was Aug., 1682, but the raid was said to have occurred in 1681.	JR, 62: 71, 159-161, 185; Margry, <u>Relations</u> , 22

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Feb. 6, 1682	Sen vs. ?	35 people capt. at one location & 4-5 from another		New reported this day. Writing from Mt. Paradise Virginia, C. Jones notes 35 capt. in an attack 300 miles SSW from his location and 4-5 capt. from some villages "under the Mountains", 500 miles away. Not clear if in same direction.	<u>CSP</u> , 11: 193
Summer, 1682	Onon vs. Pisct	3 Pisct capt. (2 of whom were F), & some K		The On deny that the Pisct prisoner they have was brought by their warriors. They make no denial about the K Pisct. This would lead one to conclude that Onon were primarily responsible. The Onon K their two F capt.	<u>Md. Archives</u> , 17: 214, 215; <u>JR</u> , 62: 59
[Between June 4 & 18], 1682	100-104 Iroq vs.?	Iroq defeated?		This is date Tonty encountered Iroq towards "Ouabache". In one version of this event Tonty has Iroq out to raid vs. Tamoroa Ill. In an earlier version he states Iroq were defeated by "Scioux". It is not clear if the Iroq were out vs. "Scioux" or if meeting was accidental, or he or his transcriber made an error in the group's name.	<u>Margry, Relations</u> , 21; <u>Margry, Découvertes</u> , 1: 611

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Early to mid July], 1682	50 On vs. Choptank	54 Choptank capt., & several English K	[Choptank village]	News reported Aug. 4, with notice that raid had occurred about three weeks prior. 14 captives were eventually returned. The rest refused to leave the On. Apparently several English were also K, & their properties looted of tobacco.	<u>Md. Archives</u> , 17: 214, 229, 369; <u>NYCD</u> , 13: 565; <u>JR</u> , 62: 67
Aug. 25, 1682	Iroq vs. [Erie]	600 Erie (M, F, & C) surrendered	Near Virginia	This news reported this day. The Jesuits say that the Erie surrendered rather than be forced to relocate. This does not really seem a raid, but does indicate that the threat of force is what produced the Erie move.	<u>JR</u> , 62: 71
Aug. 25, 1682	Onon vs. [Miami]	At least 6 Miami M & 1 F capt., 4 of the M & the 1 F were tortured to death		Prisoners reported arriving around this date. 3 M & 1 F capt. by one group, & 3 M capt. by another. Apparently more Miami were K during the attacks, but numbers not specified.	<u>JR</u> , 62: 73, 79, 81, 87, 91, 93

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Sept. 15, 1682	On vs. Dowaganhaes [Algk]	50 Dowaganhaes capt.		The On report this news this day & say that warriors had done this lately. This is not a reference to the raid vs. the Choptank. At the time this news was announced, those out vs. the Choptank had yet to return. Dowaganhaes was a general term used by the Iroq to designate Algk speaking groups.	<u>Md. Archives</u> , 17: 215
Feb. 15 or 20, 1683	400 Outagami [Fox] vs. 1000 Iroq	500 Iroq M K, 100 Fox M K & 30 wounded	Fox hunting area	No other source makes note of this massive defeat of the Iroq. It is extremely unlikely that such an event would go unnoticed by French & English authorities. Nor does it seem plausible that 400 Fox would risk attacking an army of 1,000. Lahontan makes mention of this event in connection with his voyage down the mythical Long River. This account, it would appear, is equally dubious.	Lahontan, <u>New Voyages</u> , 2: 488-494
Aug., 1683	Iroq vs. English of Virginia	5-6 English K, 2- 3 Iroq [M] K, & 300 head of cattle	Head of Rappahann- ock R.	Iroq apparently went on a rampage & English were K only when tried to protect their property & fired on Iroq, who returned the fire.	<u>LJR</u> , 70-71
Nov. 21, 1683	Sen vs. Chickahominy [and/or] Rappahannock	Many K. Of one group attacked, only 3 people survived	Chick. [and/or] Rap. Ft.	News reported this day, but appears to have been a recent raid.	<u>LJR</u> , 125; <u>CSP</u> , 11: 549, 551

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
End of Feb., 1684	200 Sen & Cay vs. 14 Fr traders	7 canoes of goods pillaged, Fr detained, but eventually released	Towards Illinois	These Iroq were on their way to attack Ft St. Louis. The traders were attacked because they were carrying guns & ammunition to the enemies of the Iroq.	AN, C11A, 6: 261, 265, 269, 273; Colden, <u>Five Indian Nations</u> , 60- 62; Wraxall, <u>Indian Affairs</u> , 12-13
Mar. 20-21, 1684	200 Sen & Cay vs. Fr	Fr Ft attacked, Iroq driven off	Ft St. Louis	This attack took place after the above attack vs. the traders. The Iroq were upset at the Fr having a Ft in enemy territory.	AN, C11A, 6: 261, 269; Margry, <u>Découvertes</u> , 1: 614; Margry, <u>Relations</u> , 22
July to Aug., 1684	1,800 Fr & FIA vs. Iroq	Fr make peace		The intended attack vs. the Iroq by la Barre came to nothing. That is, it was launched, but the differences were resolved peacefully.	AN, C11A, 6: 267, 287-288, 299-300, 388- 391
[July to Aug.?, 1684]	Iroq vs. [Appamatuck]		[James R.]	This raid took place at or, shortly after the time of the conference between Iroq & the Governor of Virginia in July of this year.	<u>LIR</u> , 85, 87, 88

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[July to Aug.?, 1684]	[On] Iroq vs. English in Virginia	3 Indian boys, servants of Englishman, capt.	Near Appamatock R. Falls	This raid happened at about same time as above raid. The group was probably an offshoot of the one vs. Appamatuck. The Iroq excuse themselves of this action by saying the warriors had yet to learn of peace. (See above) 2 of the boys went to On & 1 to Moh, thus suggesting they were probably the ones who attacked. The Moh, however deny taking part.	<u>LIR</u> , 85
[July to Dec.?, 1684]	Iroq vs. [Nottoway]	1 Nottoway K	South side, James R.	Raid seems to have taken place after the Virginia-Iroq conference of July, & sometime before 1685.	<u>LIR</u> , 85
[July to Dec.? 1684]	Iroq vs. [Nansatico]	1 Nansatico capt.	[R]appa-hannock R.	On date see above.	<u>LIR</u> , 85
Spring, 1685	Iroq vs. [Saponi]	Some Saponi wounded & 1 capt.	Below the mountains		<u>LIR</u> , 85
[Mid July], 1685	Iroq vs. English in Virginia	1 Indian girl, servant of Englishman, capt.	Near Appamatock R. Falls	This was the same Englishman that had lost 3 male servants to the Iroq sometime last year. The raid was by a small group.	<u>LIR</u> , 85
May 21, 1686	Sen vs. [Wyandot]	70 Wyandot capt.		News reported this day. The raid could have been either the winter of 1685 or early spring of this year. 5 of the captives were later released.	<u>LIR</u> , 100

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Nov. 4, 1686	Iroq vs. Ounicanicks [Miami?]	500 Miami capt., 29 Iroq [M] K	[Miami territory]	News reported this day. Father Lamberville, writing from among the Onondaga, gives the impression that the raid was some time this year. 2 Iroq were K during capt. of Miami, & 27 were K when the Touloues [?] & Illinois attacked Iroq to try & free prisoners. However, the impression was left that capt. did make it to Iroquoia. The attacking Iroq group may have been the Sen. The document, however, is too vague to make this any more than conjecture.	<u>CSP</u> , 12: 276
End of March, 1687	60 [Iroq, possibly Sen] vs. [Appamatuck] & English of Virginia	3 English K, several Appamatuck K & several wounded, 5-6 Sen K	Head of James R.	The attacked group were deer hunting. The Iroq apologized for killing the English--they claim that they thought them to be Indians. A messenger sent to get aid was killed as he returned to battle scene. Iroq then left. On identity of Iroq see below.	<u>LIR</u> , 135-136

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
June 27, 1687	300 [Irog, Sen &/or On] vs. Waynoake [Weanock] & English of Virginia	6 Weanock F & 1 mc capt., English homes ransacked & looted of, among other things, clocks	Head of James R.	In the <u>LIR</u> the Seneca are clearly designated as attackers in this & in above raid. In another document the On are castigated for this attack & it was they who returned the six prisoners. Later the Gov. of Virginia complains about both these attacks but states that he does not know which Iroq group was responsible. It is not clear if Robert Livingston confused the Virginia term Sinnikus (or one of its many variants) for Seneca. Sinnikus was often used as a general term for all Iroq. Or it may have been that both groups participated in this raid & he had this information. The same may be true for the raid noted above.	<u>LIR</u> , 125, 137- 138; <u>CSP</u> , 12: 429-430

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
July to Aug, 1687	2,000 Fr & FIA vs. Sen & Cay	6-7 Fr & 5 FIA M K, 11-15 FIA & 15 Fr M wounded; 28-50 Sen M K, 60 wounded, 200 Cay (150 F & C, & 50 M) capt., 1 M & 1 F K, Sen villages looted & destroyed	Seneca villages	On the way south to Sen, Denonville's army capt. some Cay villagers, & possibly destroyed their villages on the north shore of L. Ontario. All the killing took place when the Fr army was ambushed on their way to the Sen villages. The abandoned villages were destroyed. Lahontan, as usual has higher mortality figures. Those presented here are based on the official Fr accounts.	AN, C11A, 9: 32-38, 61-77, 104-120; Baugy, <u>Journal</u> , 68-109; JR, 63: 269-281; Lahontan, <u>New Voyages</u> , 1: 121-122, 129; Margry, <u>Relations</u> , 26
[Between Mid Aug. & Sept.], 1687	Iroq vs. Fr	9 Fr M K	Between Cataraqui & Mont		JR, 63: 279
Sept. 7, 1687	60 Iroq vs. Fr	3 Iroq M K, 1 Indian capt. K & 1 F K	Ile St. Helene, Mont	Iroq attacked a house. It is not clear what the Indians capt. by the Iroq were doing there, or if were capt. there.	JR, 63: 279; AN, C11A, 9: 142
[Sept. to Oct.], 1687	Iroq vs. Fr	[9] Fr M K		The Iroq are said to be attacking & burning Fr property, & in several raids have K 18 Fr M. If the raid in which 9 Fr M were K is excluded, then we may conclude that in the process of these "burning" raids 9 more Fr have been K.	JR, 63: 279, 287

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Approx. Oct. 22-27], 1687	200 Iroq vs. Fr.	5-6 Fr M K & some wounded, 3 Iroq M K & some wounded	Mont		JR, 63: 289; AN, C11A, 9: 142; Ibid, 10: 148
Nov. 8, 1687	Moh vs. Fr	1 Fr M & 1 F capt. & several other Fr K; 2 Moh K	Ft Chambly	News reported this day. This group may have captured some Fr. The Albany authorities mention M F & C being sent by the Moh. But it is not clear if these are Fr or are Moh being sent to Eng for protection while Moh are out warring.	LIR, 139
[Late 1687]	40 Iroq (Moh, Onon & On) vs. Fr	1 Fr F & 3 Fr M capt.	Near Ft Frontenac	The 3 Fr M were soldiers. The Fr F & 12 other Fr captives were released in 1688.	AN, C11A, 10: 86-87, 89
[Late Dec.], 1687	22 Huron vs. 40-64 Sen hunters	14 Sen M & 4 F capt., 2 Sen escaped, the rest [20-44] were K, 3 Huron [M] K	[50 L south of Ft St. Joseph]	The Huron were from Michilimackinac. The higher figures & the number of capt. were furnished by Lahontan.	AN, C11A, 10: 70; Lahontan, <u>New Voyages</u> , 1: 141-142
Spring, 1688	25-30 Iroq vs. 2 Fr M	2 Fr M K		The 2 K were stragglers, part of a convoy of 120 returning from Ft. Frontenac. Iroq made no attempt at the larger group.	AN, C11A, 10: 88

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Spring], 1688	60 Iroq vs. Miami	59 Miami M & F capt.	[Miami territory]	The returning Iroq war party was attacked & the captives freed when they ran into a group of Fr & FIA who had set out to strike some blow vs. the Iroq. See raid of July 28-August 4, 1688.	Lahontan, <u>New Voyages</u> , 1: 157-160
[Spring to Summer], 1688	Ill vs. Iroq	12 Iroq capt., 6 later K		Some 13 Ill parties, 300 M in all, had left in Jan. to raid vs. Iroq. This was result of one raid.	Margry, <u>Découvertes</u> , 3: 589
[Summer], 1688	300 Onon vs. 80 Miami warriors	4 Miami K	[North shore L. Erie?]	The Miami had set out to attack Iroq. Were dissuaded by Fr authorities & were attacked as made way back to Ft. St. Joseph.	Lahontan, <u>New Voyages</u> , 1: 161-163
[Summer], 1688	Iroq vs. Fr	Fr & Fr settlements attacked	See "Comments"	Near La Presentation a canoe with 3 Fr M, stragglers from a supply convoy to Ft Frontenac was attacked. No details as to outcome. At same time groups of Iroq, the Moh are specifically noted, "ravage" the countryside at St. François, Rivière de Loups, Sorel, Contrecoeur, and St. Ours. It is unlikely the Moh were doing this alone. Moreover, two armies of about 600 Iroq each were spotted in the colony.	AN, C11A, 10: 88-89

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
July 28-Aug. 4, 1688	Fr. & FIA (40 Sauteurs & unspecified no. of Fr & Ot) vs. 60 Iroq	15 Iroq [M] K, 5 wounded & 12 capt.; 4 Sauteurs K; capt. Iroq had were freed	South shore, L. Erie	Fr & FIA had gone out to raid at a Cay fishing site. Spotted large Iroq group & decided to abandon plans. On way back came upon Iroq returning with Miami capt. The casualties were result of two separate engagements between these two groups.	Lahontan, <u>New Voyages</u> , 1: 155-160
[Late summer to early fall], 1688	Huron vs. 4 Iroq	1 Iroq [M] K	[Possibly Near Mont]	The Huron Le Rat attacked what turned out to be 4 members of Otreouati's peace delegation. Lahontan has 40 Iroq attacked by 100 of Le Rat's men.	AN, C11A, 10: 90, 100-101; Lahontan, <u>New Voyages</u> , 1: 220-223
[Late summer to early fall], 1688	FIA (Moh from Prairie de-la-Madeleine) vs. Iroq	4 Iroq scalped [K]	St. Law	The FIA were Moh from Prairie de Magdlaine. This raid was said to have taken place around the same time as that noted above.	AN, C11A, 10: 90
Oct. 30, 1688	Abnk vs. Iroq	7 Iroq M K	Chambly R.	News reported this date. The raid was probably carried out earlier, but there is nothing in the document to suggest when.	AN, C11A, 10: 90
[Winter, 1688-1689]	Ill vs. Iroq	At least 80 Iroq capt., possibly all K	[Iroq lands?]	Writing in March, 1689, Tonty reports that Ill have brought 80 Iroq prisoners, out which they made a "bonne grillade". More were K during the battle. It is implied that the Sen were the target group.	Margry, <u>Decouvertes</u> , 3: 564

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Before Aug. 5, probably late July], 1689	300 Iroq vs. Fr	4 Fr. M capt.	Ft. Frontenac	The 300 Iroq were part of the army on their way to attack La Chine. The Iroq did not attack the Ft. It is not clear under what circumstances Fr. Millet & the 3 others were capt.	JR, 64: 67-75
Aug. 5, 1689	1,200-1,500 Iroq vs. Fr	200 Fr K, 120-130 Fr M F & C capt., houses & fields burned	La Chine	Although various sources note this destruction, none provide exact figures on how many M F & C were capt. or K, nor are any Iroq losses reported. It seems extremely unlikely that some Iroq were not K. After this the Iroq continued to harrass the Fr & capt. Fr M & F, but the sources provide no data as to how many, nor in what areas.	JR, 64: 71; NYCD, 3: 599, 620-621; Lahontan, <u>New Voyages</u> , 1: 224-225; AN, C11A, 10: 219, 244
Early Oct, 1689	Sen vs. 30 Fr soldiers	12-18 Iroq [M] K, 3 capt. & later tortured to death	"sur un lac" [LSP?]	The French claim 18 Iroq were K, but the Sen put the number at 12. It is not certain, but the Fr might have been out on patrol for Iroq in light of their continual depredations against the colony.	AN, C11A, 10: 244; Ibid, 11: 9
Nov. 13, 1689	150 Iroq (On & Onon) vs. Fr	At least 8 Fr capt., 4 later K & 4 were returned; houses burned	[Lachenaie] & Ile Jésus	Only 2 people from Lachenaie escaped. The 8 capt. were taken by the Onon. The number taken by the On is not specified.	AN, C11A, 10: 207; Ibid, 11: 9

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
June 2, 1690	13 canoes of Iroq [Moh?] vs. 149-170 Fr	4 Fr [M] K, some wounded; over 30 Iroq K, some wounded, 4 Iroq (2 M & 2 F) capt., 1 M later K	3 L above "les chats" [Ott R.]	The Fr were on way up to Michilimackinac when were lured into an ambush by Iroq. Fr then sent men in behind Iroq & trapped them in a cross fire. 4 canoes of Iroq escaped. If these were the large Iroq war canoes, the Iroq party could have been over 130 people strong. Since F were along, they may have been hunting as well. The Iroq group may have been Moh. See second [June], 1690 raid below.	AN, C11A, 11: 15, 86; Colden, <u>Five Indian Nations</u> , 121-122
[June], 1690	Iroq vs. [Fr?]	15-16 [Fr?] capt. & later K	"R. Puante", opposite TR	The capt. were K by Iroq in order to make a faster escape. Were being pursued. This raid was said to have occurred prior to the one below. On reasons for date, see below. The source does not make clear who was capt. Since most attacks seem directed against the Fr, & the source is referring to attacks vs. the colony, it is assumed that Fr were the target, but this is not a certainty.	AN, C11A, 11: 19; Colden, <u>Five Indian Nations</u> , 122

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[June], 1690	25 Fr vs. Iroq [Moh?]	25 Iroq M K; 12 Fr [M] K	Point aux Trembles	The Iroq, thought to be the survivors from the June 2 raid, were planning some action vs. Fr. They were spotted & 25 Fr set up an ambush. Iroq charged Fr, casualties were inflicted & both sides retreated. An English document, dated July 7, 1690 states that the Moh had fought the Fr & lost 55 K. This is the total K for this & the June 2 raid. If this reference is to either or both of these raids, then these Iroq were the Moh. Since this group was believed to be remant of that of June 2 group, that would make them Moh as well. This raid is dated in June because of location--not far for fugitives of June 2 raid to travel--& because for Boston to be aware of either of the raids in question so early in July, the raids had to have been in June.	AN, C11A, 11: 19; CSP, 13: 296; Colden, <u>Five Indian Nations</u> , 122

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Summer?], 1690	Iroq vs. [Fr] C	5-6 Fr C capt., 4 later freed, 1 K; 1 Iroq [M] K, 3 Iroq [M] capt. & K	Sorel, near Ft.	[Fr] C were capt. as herded cattle. 1 C K as Iroq fled Fr pursuers. 1 Iroq K during pursuit. 4 "Iroq" were later capt., one, it turns out, was an Englishman. It is implied they were part of group that capt. Fr C. All 4 were K.	AN, C11A, 11: 19; Colden, <u>Five Indian Nations</u> , 122
Sept. 4, 1690	167 [Iroq] & English vs. Fr	21 Fr M (11 farmers, 10 soldiers), 4 Fr F capt. Later 2 Fr M & 4 Fr F K; 1-6 Iroq K; 150 head of cattle K	"La Fourche", 1/4 L from Prairie de-la-Madeleine	The French source attributes this as an Iroq raid, but the group was composed of 125 [Iroq] 42 English [Dutch from Albany really] led by P. Schuyler. In his account he stated that attack took place Aug. 23 & that only 1 Iroq was K.	AN, C11A, 11: 27; Doc. <u>History of New York</u> , 2: 285-288
Sept. 22, 1690	34 Fr vs. Iroq	[18] Fr [M] K or capt.	Ft. near LSP	Fr discover Iroq, muster 34 M to pursue. Attack Iroq who flee to join up with a larger group. Pursuing Fr get caught "no more that half escaped".	AN, C11A, 11: 28

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Winter 1690 to 1691]	FIA (Indians from Michilimackinac) vs. Iroq	15-20 Iroq K	[Iroq lands]	Champigny learned from the Moh in April, 1691 that FIA had struck a blow vs. Iroq and 15-20 people were K. In a conference in May, 1691 at Michilimackinac FIA reported that they had already begun their attacks vs. the Iroq & that the Ill & Miami were also out vs. Iroq. More precise identification of group & time does not seem possible.	AN, C11A, 11: 49, 258
[Late March to before April 5], 1691	120 Moh & 20 Dutch vs. FIA (Indians of the Sault & La Montagne)	10 FIA capt	Ft Chambly area	FIA were capt. as were hunting. All were returned. Purpose of capt. was apparently to initiate peace talks.	AN, C11A, 11: 46-47, 258; AN, C11E, 10: 9-11; JR, 64: 57-61
May 7-8, 1691	800-1000 Iroq vs. Fr	2-3 Fr K, 5-6 Fr capt., 25 houses burned	Mont [See "Comments"]	The areas hit include "lower end of Montreal Island", La Chine, R. des Prairies, & Point aux Trembles. After this initial assault, which may have been by only 400 of the army, the Iroq broke up into smaller groups to raid in area of Mont & shores opposite the Island. Some Fr were capt. as attempted spring planting season. No details as to how many.	AN, C11A, 11: 49-50, 202, 251

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Spring to summer], 1691	Iroq vs. FIA F	Some FIA F capt., 2-3 FIA [M] wounded; some Iroq "lost" [K]	Near La Montagne	Iroq, likely offshoot of larger army, capt. the F as they worked in the fields. Help came & rest of casualties were in the ensuing fighting.	AN, C11A, 11: 51
[Spring to summer], 1691	200 Fr vs. 30-50 On	4-5 Fr K; 5 On capt. 4 later K, 1 On escaped, rest [24-44] died in fighting or in burning house	Repentigny	On--again, likely offshoot of larger army--were spotted by Fr patrol, & were soon joined by another patrol. Attacked On as were sleeping. Those few On that were not capt. or escaped were K during fighting, as tried to escape the fire the Fr had set to the house they were in, or died in the flames. Gov. Callières of Mont claimed only 30 On were in house.	AN, C11A, 11: 52-53; Ibid, 12; 97
[Late Nov. to mid Dec.] 1691	10 Iroq [Moh] vs. FIA	4 FIA MC & 1 FIA F capt.	Prairie [de-la- Madeleine?]	Raid is first reported Dec. 30, & Fr "Relations" ending [Nov. 12] make no mention of this. The Indians were led by Caristasie, a Moh. His son was also along.	<u>NYCD</u> , 3: 815

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Late Nov to mid Dec.] 1691	29-34 Iroq (at least 18 Moh & 11 On) vs. 22-23 FIA (one source suggests these were Moh)	8 FIA M K, 6 FIA M & 10 F capt.; 15-17 Iroq [M] K, 2 Iroq [M] wounded, 14 Iroq [M] capt., 4 Iroq [M] escaped	Sorell to Chambly & L Champlain	Raid took place after the one above. Caristasie & his son met this group as were returning & were persuaded to join this group of 18 Moh & 11 On going up to raid vs. Fr. Iroq attacked 2 cabins of FIA hunters, K 4 M & capt. 6 M & 10 F. Iroq lost 1 On K & 2 Iroq were wounded. A FIA escaped, went for help. 40 Sault St. Louis FIA & possibly some Fr, went after Iroq & caught them on L Champlain. 4 more FIA M were K & Iroq had 15-16 of their people K & 14 capt. The 16 FIA capt. were released.	AN, C11A, 12: 25, 93, 97; NYCD, 3: 815, 817
Beginning of March, 1692	120 Fr & 205 FIA vs. 50 Sen	24 Sen K, 16 capt. & 10 escaped; 5 FIA [M] K, 1 Fr [M] K & 5 of Fr & FIA group wounded	Ile de Tonniate, 50 L from Mont [Gonanaque area, possibly Wells I.]	Fr & FIA set out in Feb to raid vs. Iroq. Came upon Sen as Sen were hunting. Fr & FIA freed 3 Fr capt. Sen had with them. 1 capt., Sieur de la Plante, had been a capt. for 3 years.	AN, C11A, 12: 25, 93, 97-98
April, 1692	Iroq vs. FIA	1 FIA K	R St. François, above TR		AN, C11A, 12: 93

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
End of May, 1692	Iroq [Onon] vs. Algk ("têtes de Boule") & 36 Fr	21 Fr & 3 Algk "lost", 15 as capt. [thus, 8 K]	Long Sault [Ott R]	This group of Iroq were said to be same ones defeated later this year by Vaudreuil. That group was said to have been Onon & 140-150 strong. The Iroq took ammunitions & merchandise which the Algk had traded for. Not clear how many of the 29 canoes of Algk that had come to trade were attacked. Fr officials claim intent of Iroq was to blockade the Ott R to prevent Ot Algk coming to trade & Fr from going to them. [Probably to prevent the Ot Algk from being furnished with the very type of war supplies the Iroq took from this group]	AN, C11A, 12: 25, 93-94, 97-98
Early July, 1692	Iroq [Onon] vs. Fr	2 Fr farmers [M] capt.	Near Ft Roland, 4 L above Mont	Iroq said to be of same group as that later identified as Onon.	AN, C11A, 12: 94
[Early July], 1692	Iroq [Onon] vs. Fr	9 Fr [farmers M] capt.	Lachenaie	Raid said to have occurred after above one. Iroq said to be of same group as that later identified as Onon. The Fr sent out parties, as had in early April when news of a large Iroq party was rec'd. On each occasion the Fr withdrew when they realized they were outnumbered.	AN, C11A, 12: 94

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
{July}, 1692	Iroq [Onon] vs. Fr	2 Fr [farmers M] capt. & burned a barn	Ile Jèsus	Raid took place after the one above. Iroq said to be of same group as that later identified as Onon. In this, & the above 2 raids, it is uncertain how many of the 140-150 Iroq were taking part.	AN, C11A, 12: 94
28 July, 1692	39 Moh & Mah vs. 33 Fr	4 Fr M K & 2 wounded	LSP, Richelieu Islands		AN, C11A, 12: 94
[After 28 July], 1692	39 Moh & Mah vs. Fr or FIA	1 Fr or FIA F (15-16 yrs old) capt.; 1 Moh or Mah wounded	St. François	Raid was carried out after above one, by same group. The girl's mother was also capt., but escaped when the Indian carrying her was wounded by a shot.	AN, C11A, 12: 94

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[July, to before Aug. 5] 1692	400-500 Fr [& FIA] vs. 140-150 Onon	20 Iroq lost (K &/or capt.), 9 Iroq F & 4 Iroq C capt.; 10 Fr M K, 4 FIA K, 6 of FR & FIA wounded	Long Sault [Ott R]	Took place after raids in early July and before Aug. 5 when Ot brigade arrived unmolested down that river. After attacking in the colony the Iroq had returned to what was obviously a fortified hunting camp. [Had been hunting & women & children were along] The Fr hoped to exact revenge, free their people that had been captured & get at what furs the Iroq had taken. Fr freed 6-12 of their people, plundered the Iroq camp, but were unable to find the two large caches of Iroq furs. Frontenac wrote that group was 200 strong & most were K or capt., but none of the other, more detailed accounts bear this out. The 200 figure is possible if one includes the 60 F and 20 C said to have been part of the Iroq camp.	AN, C11A, 12: 25, 94, 98-99

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Jan. to Oct., 1692]	FIA vs. Iroq	42 Iroq K or capt.	[Iroq hunting areas & villages]	Raids were likely carried out during the winter of 1691 to 1692, or in the spring of 1692. In "past year" 800 FIA (Misissauga, Huron, Ill, Ot & Upper Nations) in various sized parties, have attacked Iroq as they hunted & near their villages. Have "defeated" 42 Iroq, including those capt. & scalped.	AN, C11A, 12: 24, 95
[Mid Oct. to before Nov. 11], 1692	400 Iroq (Cay, Onon, & Sen) vs. FIA	Some K on both sides; 5-6 [Fr or FIA?] capt. or K	Ft of the Sault [Mont]	Date is based on date of Frontenac's last letter which did not mention the raid & date of the report in which this raid was reported. Iroq did not attack the fort. People were K in some skirmishes. This was apparently part of a larger effort that came to nothing. Another army of 400 (Moh, Mah, & English) also came up, but when they discovered that the other group had retreated, they left as well. Some 40-50 stayed in area & raided in small bands. 5-6 people were capt. or K by one of these groups.	AN, C11A, 12: 46-47

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Feb. 1693	425-430 Fr (100 soldiers, the rest [325-330] habitants & officers) & 200 FIA (Huron, Iroq, & Abnk) vs. Moh	3 Moh villages plundered & destroyed, supplies destroyed, 18-30 Moh K, 280-300 Moh capt. (80-100 M, 180-200 F, C, & old M); 14-27 Fr & FIA K, 17 wounded	Moh villages	The Fr attack vs. the villages was successful, most of the men were off warring or hunting. As the Fr retreated they were engaged by group of Iroq & English. It was here that the Fr & FIA suffered their casualties. As a result of this attack some 40-50 Moh capt. were released. Because of poor food supplies & other difficulties, only 58 Moh capt. made it to New France. The others were either released or escaped.	AN, C11A, 12: 185-191, 256-258, 318; Colden, <u>Five Indian Nations</u> , 144-147
[Spring to Summer], after May, 1693	Iroq vs. 18-20 Fr & 20 FIA (Christian converts)	3 Fr [M] K & some capt.	Rapids, head of Mont Island [Lachine?]	The party left in May & was sent to Michilimackinac to bring back men to colony. They were attacked on their trip back to the colony. 1 Iroq was capt., but it turned out he was a Sault Indian who had early been capt. by the Iroq.	AN, C11A, 12: 193, 258-259; Colden, <u>Five Indian Nations</u> , 150
before June 25, 1693	Nip vs. Iroq (3 canoes)	1 canoe of Iroq defeated	Ft Frontenac area	The Nip had come down with 60 Amikwa to raid vs. Iroq.	AN, C11A, 12: 198-199
Beginning of August, 1693	Iroq [Moh?] vs. Fr	1 Fr M K, 2 Fr M capt., 1 of whom later died	St François	Iroq attacked about 15-16 Fr & capt. the sieigneur of place [Crévier]. He later died of his wounds.	AN, C11A, 12: 260; CSP, 14: 177, 178

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Winter to spring], 1694	Fr & FIA vs. Iroq	3 Moh capt., some Iroq K	Iroq villages	Fr authorities state that parties of Fr & FIA have been out vs. Iroq & some Iroq have been K & capt. In one raid 15 Sault Indians & 2 Fr returned April 15 with 3 Moh capt., and some scalps. Details of other raids were not recorded.	AN, C11A, 13: 5; Ibid, 14: 74
Nov. 5, 1694	Ill vs. Iroq	400-500 Iroq K or capt.		Date news reported. There is no specific time frame for when this action was to have taken place, & it is most likely a cumulative total for 1 or 2 years. This news was furnished to Frontenac & Champigny by a Jesuit living among the Ill.	AN, C11A, 13: 19-20
Before April 15, 1695	15 FIA (Indians of the Sault) & 2 Fr vs. Moh	3 Moh capt.	[Moh lands]	The group of FIA returned this date. This group likely set out early this year.	AN, C11A, 14: 74

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Spring, 1695	100-150 Iroq (Sen & Onon) vs. Wagenhaws [General name for Algk]	10 Wagenhaws capt., 9 later K	St Law, Ft Frontenac area	The group was coming down to colony. In Wraxall the impression is left that two raids took place. One in which a group of Wagenhaws were entirely defeated by 100 Iroq, & one in which some Sen & Onon capt. 10 Wagenhaws. In Colden this is all given as one incident. Because Wraxall is not precise enough to justify interpreting this as two raids, I have followed Colden's version.	Wraxall, <u>Indian Affairs</u> , 28; Colden, <u>Five Indian Nations</u> , 181
Spring, 1695	200-400 Iroq (Sen & Cay) vs. Fr & Miami	50-60 Iroq [M] lost [K], 30 wounded; 3 Miami F & 3-4 C capt.	Post in Miami country [Ft St. Joseph]	A group of 200 Sen & Cay were reported to have set out to attack the Miami. The Fr report the Iroq group that struck them was 250. The commander put the group at 300-400 Iroq. It is assumed these were the same groups. The Iroq first capt. the Miami F & C working in the fields then attacked the fort.	AN, C11A, 13: 340; Ibid, 14: 76, 80-82

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
June, 1695	Iroq vs. FIA & Fr	1 Fr M K; [6 Iroq K or wounded?]	Lake of Two Mountains	The Iroq attack at village of Lake of Two Mountains. Results of this not stated. 1 Fr & 7 FIA set out [to avenge this] & run into 15 Iroq. Fr M was K. FIA claim to hav K 6 Iroq. Since they did not have scalps, it is possible Iroq were only wounded.	AN, C11A, 14: 78-79
[June, 1695]	Iroq vs. Fr	3 Fr [M] K	R. des Prairies	Raid said to have taken place about same time as that above.	AN, C11A, 14: 79
June 13, 1695	2 Moh vs. 2 Fr	1 Fr [M] wounded; 2 Iroq [M] wounded, 1 later capt. by FIA	L. Champlain		AN, C11A, 14: 77
July, 1695	Iroq vs. 10-13 canoes of Fr & FIA	1 FIA K, 1 FIA & 1 Fr wounded		This group, possibly traders, were coming from the upper country.	AN, C11A, 14: 80
Aug. 12 or 13, 1695	30 Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr F & 1 Fr M K, 2 Fr F, 1 M, & 4 C capt.	"Tremblay" [Point aux Trembles]	In one account 8 people were said to have been capt.	AN, C11A, 13: 343; Ibid, 14: 83
[Early to mid Aug.], 1695	5 FIA vs. Iroq	1 Sen F K, 2 capt.; 1 Onon M K; 1 FIA M K, 1 wounded & 1 capt.	Between On & Onon villages	The FIA came upon the Sen F as they travelled between Onon & On villages. 3 Onon came upon body of F & pursued FIA. Onon lost 1 K when engaged FIA. Other 2 Onon went to On for help & pursued FIA. FIA incurred losses in that fight.	<u>LIR</u> , 172-174

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Aug. 22, 1695	13 Algk vs. Moh	2 Moh scalped [K], 3 Moh F [2 were "girls"] capt.		Group of Algk return this date. No indication of when raid took place.	AN, C11A, 14: 62
Aug. 29, 1695	Iroq vs. Fr	2 Fr [M?] K & 4 capt.	Prairie de-la-Madeleine	Fr were taken during harvest time. It is not clear if were actually engaged in bringing in crops at time of attack.	AN, C11A, 14: 90
Aug. 29, 1695	Iroq (Moh and/or On) vs. Fr	1 Fr [M?] K	Boucher-ville	The Moh and/or the On were said to be involved in this raid.	AN, C11A, 14: 90
Aug. 31, 1695	Iroq (Moh and/or On) vs. Fr	3 Fr [M?] capt.	Cap St Michel	The Moh and/or the On were said to be involved in this raid.	AN, C11A, 14: 90
[Sept], 1695	FIA [Sault Indians] vs. Onon	1 Onon F & 2 M capt. & later K; some FIA K	Near Onon village	The FIA had set out to raid vs. Iroq. Capt. the 3 Onon but were pursued & K the Onon. Only 1 of the unspecified number of FIA returned. Survivor returned this date.	AN, C11A, 14: 92

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Sept], 1695	Fr & 10-12 FIA vs. Iroq [Moh and/or On]	5 Iroq [M] K, 1 capt. & later died; 2 Fr [M] K; 2 Iroq [M] capt. & 2 scalped [K]	[Boucherville]	Upon learning of Iroq presence in Boucherville area Fr sent out a party to attack them. 5 Iroq & 2 Fr K during this attack. 1 Iroq capt. later died of wounds. FIA of Sault went in pursuit of others & returned with 2 scalps & 2 capt. Iroq are identified based on group known to have been in area at time.	AN, C11A, 14: 92-94, 95
[Winter 1695 to spring 1696]	200 Algk (Ot & Potawatami--30 of the latter are identified) vs. Iroq	30-50 Iroq K [30 scalps taken], 40 [M] drowned [not clear if drowned are included in the K total], 34-52 M, F, & C capt., Iroq goods & beaver, 400-500 pelts, taken		The attack took place as Iroq were returning to Iroquoia after hunting. It was likely in the spring but not a certainty. In one version the Ot are said to attack the Iroq they had hunted with. In another account it is suggested Ot had been hunting with Iroq & decided to attack after met Potawatami on way to attack. Another source states Iroq had been hunting with the Huron. Some Ot could have been part of the Huron party. The Huron became aware of plans to attack the Iroq & tried to warn them.	AN, C11A, 14: 43, 45, 119-121, 183

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
March, 1696	300 Fr & FIA vs. Iroq	7 Iroq capt. (1 M, 1 F, & 1 C are identified), 4 later K; 3 Fr [M] K	Between Ott R. & Rich R.	Of the capt. Iroq 4 are identified as Onon and were K. 2 Sen were spared as was the C, a grandson of Garacontie who was obviously also Onon.	AN, C11A, 14: 36
Mid May, 1696	Fr & FIA vs. Iroq	3 Iroq [M] K & scalped			AN, C11A, 14: 183
Mid May, 1696	Fr & FIA vs. Iroq	8 Iroq capt.		This raid took place three days after the above one. It is implied that this & above raid were by same group. They left from Ft Frontenac. Thus raids may have been into Iroq territory.	AN, C11A, 14: 183
May, 1696	[Fr & FIA] vs. Moh	2 Moh [M] capt.		In this raid & the one below the attacking group is not stated. Since Fr & FIA were usually raiding in joint parties, it was assumed reasonable to credit them with being the ones carrying out the raids.	AN, C11A, 14: 37
[May, 1696]	[Fr & FIA] vs. Moh	2 Moh [M] capt.	Near village of the Sault	Date is based on observation that this raid took place about same time as the one above.	AN, C11A, 14: 37
[May], 1696	Iroq vs. Fr	2 Fr M capt.	Lachenaie		AN, C11A, 14: 37

Table D.1					
Iroquois Hostilities to 1701					
Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[May], 1696	Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr wounded	Longueuil	This attack was not carried out by same group that struck at La Chenaie.	AN, C11A, 14: 37
July to Aug., 1696	2,150 Fr & FIA (500 of this total were FIA) vs. Onon & On	Onon & On villages, crops & supplies destroyed, 4 Iroq M K, 1 Iroq F capt.; 1 Fr M & 3 FIA K	Onon & On villages	The Iroq were well aware of Fr plans & had abandoned their villages. All the Fr found were 2 old people at Onon, the M they K. The 1 Fr M & 2-3 FIA K by the Onon were stragglers from the army. In these little incursions 3 more Onon were K.	AN, C11A, 14: 48, 55, 60, 119-120, 148-149, 184, 193; JR, 65: 27-29
[July to Aug.], 1696	Iroq vs. [Fr or FIA]	20-30 people [Fr or FIA] capt.	Between TR & LSP	This was said to have taken place about the time of Fr attack of that year. The time is not specified, nor is it clear who was capt. or if it was the result of one or more raids. This/these action/s were attributed to the Moh.	JR, 65: 29
Sept., 1696	Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr M capt.	Ft Frontenac	A group of soldiers were attacked. All but 1 made it safely back into the fort.	AN, C11A, 15: 6
July 2, 1697	6 Iroq vs. Fr	1 Fr M, 1 fc & 1 mc K	Prairie St. Lambert [Mont]	The mc died of wounds.	AN, C11A, 15: 10

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
[Fall], 1697	FIA vs. Sen or Sen vs. FIA	Over 100 Sen [M] capt. or K 40 Iroq K, 15 capt.; 4 FIA (Miami) K		Writing in the Fall, French authorities claim that since the Spring FIA have taken over 100 Sen. In one raid the Miami K 40 Sen, capt. 15, and lost only 4 K. In the Fr sources the group is not identified, but an English account of what is most certainly the same incident the Cay tell the Albany authorities it was the Miami. The Sen were said to have fought the Miami & suffered their losses as they retreated.	AN, C11A, 15: 13-14, 96; <u>NYCD</u> , 4: 294
Fall, 1697	Iroq vs. [Fr]	1 [Fr] K, 1 scalped but lived; 2 Iroq [M] K	Prairie de-la-Madeleine		AN, C11A, 15: 13
Fall, 1697	34 Algk vs. 30-40 Onon	18-20 Iroq K, 8 (6 M & 2 F) capt.; 6 [M] Algk K, 4 wounded	Ft Frontenac area	Onon were hunting. Algk had set out to raid vs. Iroq & capt. 1 Onon F. Onon attacked to get back F. Only 20 of Onon group were M.	AN, C11A, 15: 25-26, 166
[Nov.], 1697	Huron vs. 20 Iroq	Iroq were entirely defeated		Iroq were said to be heading off to attack Ot when were surprised by Huron.	AN, C11A, 15: 98
Sept. 14, 1699	Dowangenas [Algk] vs. Sen	5 Sen [M] K & scalped	Near Sen village	The Sen group was out hunting.	<u>NYCD</u> , 4: 597; <u>CSP</u> , 17: 475

Table D.1

## Iroquois Hostilities to 1701

Date	Groups Involved	Results	Location	Comments	Sources
Spring, 1700	Iroq (Sen) vs. Miami	58 Iroq capt. or K	Miami area	Iroq went to area under pretext of hunting.	AN, C11A, 18: 146-147, 155
Spring, 1700	Ot vs. 28 Iroq	9 Iroq K, 17 capt.	Ot hunting area	Iroq were hunting when were attacked by the Ot. Ot claimed not to know of on going peace efforts.	AN, C11A, 18: 78
Sept. 26 or 27, 1700	Dionndades [Huron-Petun] vs. Onon, On, & Sen	3 Sen F & 2 M K	Iroq villages	A combined Iroq force was sent off to avenge this simultaneous attack vs. these three Iroq tribes.	NYCD, 4: 768, 800, 805
Aug. 27, 1701	Iroq (On) vs. Ondadeonwas	1 Ondadeonwas capt.	"Behind" Carolina & Maryland	The On arrived with the prisoner this day.	NYCD, 4: 918

## Iroquois Population Losses to 1701

The following table lists Iroquois population losses by year. The figures in the Captured, Killed, and Lost, columns represent losses incurred as a result of warfare. They were derived from Table D.1 in Appendix D. In each column distinction is made between losses suffered due to enemy initiated attacks, and those casualties that resulted from raids begun by the Iroquois. The numbers in square brackets [] represent losses due to Iroquois initiated raids. The "Other Causes" column lists all Iroquois deaths due to "natural causes". These causes include illnesses the Iroquois normally contracted, and those introduced by Europeans. These figures were taken from Table A.2 in Appendix A, and from the discussion of epidemics in Appendix B. Little is known of the impact of disease among the Iroquois until the Jesuits established permanent missions among the Iroquois in the late 1660s. This means that population decline due to natural causes and disease are seriously under represented in this table. On the limitations of the data on disease and mortality see the discussions in Appendices A and B. The years marked with an asterisk (\*) indicate that epidemic disease struck some time during that year.

Table E.1					
Iroquois Population Losses to 1701					
Year	Captured	Killed	Lost	Other Causes	Total
1603		100			100
1609	10-12	50			60-62
1610	15				15
1615	13	4			17
1623		60			60
1627	3				3
1635	1				1
1636	7	2	28		37
1637	13	2			15
1638	80				80
1639*	12				12
1640*	2				2
1641*	4	1			5
1642		[6]	2		8
1643		1; [2]			3
1644	3				3
1645	2	11-13			13-15
1646*	1				1
1647*	[2]	10; [5]			17
1648	2; [19-22]	1; [17-19]			39-44
1649	[30]	7; [140]			177
1650	1; [7]	[36]	[200]		244
1651	1	2			3
1652		[7]	[130]		137
1653	7; [1]	81; [6]			95
1654	8; [1]	14			23

Table E.1					
Iroquois Population Losses to 1701					
Year	Captured	Killed	Lost	Other Causes	Total
1655*	[5]	[2]			7
1656		[1]			1
1657		1; [1]			2
1658	3; [16]	[5]	[2]		26
1659	1	2; [19]			22
1660*	12	4; [25-31]			41-47
1661*		3; [26]		120	149
1662*		[1]	90-100	1,000	1,091- 1,101
1663*	6-7; [10]	13-14; [25]			54-56
1664	2; [3]	2; [23]			30
1666		4			4
1667		2		43	45
1668*				240	240
1669		58; [1]	4	205	268
1670		3		74	77
1671				187	187
1672*	[1]	2; [8]		85	96
1673				164	164
1674				113	113
1675				179	179
1676*				284	284
1677				180	180
1678				248	248
1679*				213	213
1680		[8]	[30]		38

Table E.1					
Iroquois Population Losses to 1701					
Year	Captured	Killed	Lost	Other Causes	Total
1682*				70	70
1683		[2-3]	500		502-503
1686		[29]			29
1687	218	48-94; [13-14]			279-326
1688	18	33			51
1689		[15-21]			15-21
1690*	2; [3]	40-45; [36-41]		500	581-591
1691	1; [14]	28-48; [17-19]	[2-3]		62-85
1692	29	24	62		115
1693	280-300	18-30			298-330
1694	3	2	400-500		405-505
1695	44-62; [1]	45-65; [6]	[50-60]		146-194
1696	16	11			27
1697	23	58-60; [2]	60-65		143-150
1699		5			5
1700	17	14			31
TOTALS	855-892; [108]	1,270- 1,378; [486-509]	724-839; [414-425]	3,905	7,762- 8,056

### Iroquois Warfare: The Human Toll

The following tables list the price Iroquois warfare exacted on the human populations of the Northeast. Table F.1 lists the total number of people captured, killed, or lost to the Iroquois due to Iroquois initiated warfare. Tables F.2 and F.3 present the results of Iroquois raiding against the French and the Hurons.

Table F.2 lists only losses incurred due to Iroquois attacks against groups composed solely of French. Further only those captured, killed, or lost as a result of direct Iroquois attacks were listed. These limitations were necessary if one hoped to contend with some assurance that Iroquois attacks against the French were indeed to strike some blow against them. If the attacked group contained a variety of other peoples one could not be assured which ones the Iroquois had targeted. These same criteria, and for the same reasons, apply to the Huron data in Table F.3. French and Huron losses resulting from attacks against groups which they were part of, and from raids initiated by the French and/or Hurons, are discussed following the respective tables.

The data in all three tables was taken from Table D.1 in Appendix D. Years marked with an asterisk (\*) indicate that disease or epidemic struck sometime during that year.

Table F.1				
Population Losses to the Iroquois to 1701				
Year	Captured	Killed	Lost	# of Raids
1616	1			1
1631	2	1		1
1633			2-3	1
1634*	100	200		1
1635		44		2
1636*		14		2
1637	30	3		3
1638				1
1639*		4-5		1
1640*		2		3
1641*	32	2		3
1642	51-56	8		10
1643	21-22	28	20	8
1644	33-37	10		10
1645		6		4
1646*	9	1		5
1647*	143-164	12-13		10
1648	28	14	740	8
1649	19	237	400	6
1650	15	16	19	18
1651	28-29	11		19
1652	567-667	37		29
1653	13	30		16
1654	1	1		3
1655*	4	8		6
1656	2	13	84-98	6
1657	40	11-17		3

Table F.1				
Population Losses to the Iroquois to 1701				
Year	Captured	Killed	Lost	# of Raids
1658	12	1		9
1659	12	8		6
1660*	32-42	16	3	6
1661*	33	47	121-123	19
1662*	7	10		8
1663*	7	39-49		8
1664	9	20-21		7
1665	17	13		6
1666	13	6-7		4
1668*	4	2		2
1669	4	8		5
1670	30	76		1
1672*		15-16		1
1674		3		2
1675		11		2
1676*	37	92		2
1677	18			1
1678	30	10		4
1680		13-14	700-1, 200	3
1681	730-930	300-600		6
1682*	746-747	9		7
1683		5-6-		2
1684	4	1		6
1685	2			2
1686	570			2
1687	13	32-33		8
1688	59	6		4

Table F.1				
Population Losses to the Iroquois to 1701				
Year	Captured	Killed	Lost	# of Raids
1689	128-138	200		4
1690*	23-24	26-27		4
1691	33-34	10-11		5
1692	29	14		8
1693	3	5		2
1695	21-22	19		10
1696	23-33			4
1697		4		2
1700			58	1
1701				1
TOTALS	3, 791- 4, 157	1, 738- 2, 065	2, 150- 2, 667	7, 679- 8, 889

The above totals do not include those losses to the Iroquois that resulted from attacks initiated by their enemies. If those numbers are included (19 captured; 278-293 killed; 127-128 lost), then the toll the Iroquois exacted on their foes climbs to 8, 103 to 9, 329 people.

Table F.2				
French Population Losses to the Iroquois to 1701				
Year	Captured	Killed	Lost	# of Raids
1633		2-3		1
1641	2			1
1642	1			1
1643	2-3	3		1
1644		6		4
1646	2			1
1647				1
1648		1		2
1649	1			1
1650		4	9	4
1651		6		9
1652	3	9		7
1653	4	8		9
1654	1	1		2
1655	4	8		5
1657		3		1
1658	11			5
1659	12	1		4
1660	6	1		2
1661	33	27		11
1662	8			5
1663	4			2
1664	2	5-6		3
1665	5	4		3
1666	4	4-5		3
1684				2
1687	6	27-28		6

Table F.2				
French Population Losses to the Iroquois to 1701				
Year	Captured	Killed	Lost	# of Raids
1688		2		2
1689	128-138	200		4
1690	23-24	26-27		4
1691	5-6	2-3		1
1692	13	4		4
1693	1	2		1
1695	14	8		6
1696	3			3
1697		4		2
TOTALS	298-311	368-374	9	123

The result of Iroquois attacks was the removal of 675-694 people from the various French communities along the St. Lawrence. If one includes French losses incurred during attacks against the French and their Indian allies, or attacks against Indian groups that resulted in French deaths (45 captured; 36 killed), and French losses due to their own attacks against the Iroquois (57-59 killed; 18 lost), then the total human toll of Iroquois warfare was 831-852 French lives.

Table F.3				
Huron Population Losses to the Iroquois to 1701				
Year	Captured	Killed	Lost	# of Raids
1634	100	200		1
1636		12		1
1637	30	1		1
1639		4-5		1
1640		2		2
1642	2	3		6
1643	10	22	20	4
1644	26-30	3		4
1645		4		3
1646	5			3
1647	14	6-7		4
1648	24	11	740	5
1649	2	232	400	2
1650	15	3	10	9
1651	6	2		5
1652	7	6		8
1653	8			5
1656		3	71-85	3
1657	40	8-14		2
1658	1			1
1662	5			2
1663	3	1		1
TOTALS	300-304	523-531	1, 242- 1, 255	73

If one includes Huron losses incurred when the Hurons were part of other groups (60-70 captured; 10 killed), and

those sustained during Huron initiated raids (3 killed; 100 lost), then the total population drain due to Iroquois warfare was 2, 237-2, 273. This figure represents about one quarter of the Hurons' population.

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