THE DISAPPEARANCE OF FLQ TERRORISM AND THE CYCLE OF SOCIAL PROTEST IN QUEBEC 1963-1976

by

Paul W. Lynd

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the social conditions responsible for the lack of sustained insurgent terrorism in Quebec. Through the use of social movement and collective action theory, the relationship between FLQ terrorism and other forms of protest is investigated and compared with the growth of labour and separatist organizations. The years 1963 to 1976 are examined in an attempt to explain how terrorist activity changed over these years as the organization of the separatist movement changed. It was found that as the separatist movement grew and evolved into large and complex organizations, FLQ terrorism was replaced with conventional mass-based protest and other forms of collective action. The FLQ and future would-be FLQ cells became absorbed by the PQ and other more organized mass-based groups using more efficient methods of protest. Connections between separatist organizations and labour organizations were forged in attempts to provide another outlet of expression for this separatist sentiment.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ALQ	Armée de libération du Québec
ARQ	Armée révolutionnaire Québécois
ASIQ	Action socialiste pour l'indépendance du Québec
CEGEP	Collèges d'enseignement général et professionel
CEQ	Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec
CIC	Corporation des instituteurs catholiques
CIPP	Comité d'information sur les prisonniers politiques
CIS	Comité indépendance-socialisme
CLC	Canadian Labour Congress
CSD	Centrale des syndicats démocratiques
CSN	Confédération des syndicats nationaux
FCAL	Fédération cannadienne des associations libres
FLQ	Front de libération du Québec
FLP	Front de libération populaire
FQF	Front du Québec français
FRAP	Front d'action politique
FRI	Front républicain pour l'indépendance
LIS	Ligue pour l'intégration scolaire
MDPPQ	Mouvement pour la défense des prisonniers politiques du Québec
MIS	Mouvement pour l'intégration scolaire
MLQ	Mouvement de libération québécoise
MLT	Mouvement de libération du taxi
MNQ	Mouvement national des québécois
MQF	Mouvement Québec français
MSA	Mouvement souveraineté-association
PIQ	Partisans de l'indépendance du Québec
PQ	Parti Québécois
PRQ	Parti Républicain du Québec
PSQ	Parti socialiste du Québec
QFL	Quebec Federation of Labour
RIN	Rassemblement pour l'indepéndance nationale
RN	Ralliement National
RQL	Rassemblement Québec libre
R.R.	Réseau de Résistance
SSJB	Société Saint Jean Baptiste
UCC	Union des cultivateurs catholiques
UGEQ	Union générale des étudiants du Québec

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

Between the years 1963 and 1970, a number of terrorist events enveloped Quebec, committed by left-wing separatist cells of the Front de Libération du Québec. The terror of this period involved almost two hundred bombings of public buildings and mailboxes (some of which resulted in human casualties), and culminated in the kidnap and assassination of Quebec Minister of Labour, Pierre Laporte. But by 1973, separatist terrorism had virtually vanished and the FLQ cells were largely defunct.

The purpose of this study is to discover and describe the social conditions responsible for this lack of sustained insurgent terrorism in Quebec. Although acts of terrorism have become commonplace in such areas as Northern Ireland (where a similar upsurge of terrorism occurred at approximately the same time), in Canada they are anomalies. Few attempts have been made to analyze why some countries have fewer occurrences and lower probabilities of sustained insurgent terrorism than do others. For example, terrorism in Northern Ireland has become sustained since it reappeared in the late 1960's, while in Quebec it did not endure. This raises the question of why a situation similar to that of Northern Ireland did not develop in Quebec.

The aim of this research is to develop a theory to explain the decline (and eventual absence) of separatist terrorism in Quebec through a historical sociological

analysis of terrorism and its relationship to other forms of social protest in Quebec. In an attempt to more fully understand separatist terrorism and determine what makes it decrease, one must analyze it within the cycle of social protest in which it exists. Drawing on social movement theory, this research traces the increases and decreases of terrorist attacks in association with the growth and development of the key social movements in Quebec from 1963-1976. The inclusion of social movement and collective action theory in this research is very important, as one cannot examine terrorism on its own. As stated by Schmid (1983,422):

> The most general deficiency of most of the literature of terrorism is that the terrorist organization or movement is studied in isolation rather than in its socio-political context.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this research involves a historical sociological analysis of the FLQ crisis in Quebec along with the rise of separatist organizations. Minor comparative reflections with the sociology of terrorism in Northern Ireland and Spain are also used in order to highlight differences explaining why Quebec terrorism vanished.

Attention is focussed on the disappearance of terrorism after 1970, its relationship to possible changes in separatist movements and organizations, and the changing nature of the social and political structures in Quebec.

This is done through a content analysis of sampled issues from Le Devoir (an influential small-circulation French newspaper in Montreal) and the Montreal Star (a major large-circulation English newspaper in Montreal) for the period 1963-1973. Secondary source information is used to further extend the perimeter study date to 1976. The year 1963 is chosen as the beginning date. Although separatist sentiment has always existed in one form or another in Quebec, most literature indicates that the source of the FLQ and the present separatist organizations stem from a more mobilized separatist sentiment that formed around 1960 (Myers 1964; Kwavnick 1965). It was also the first year in which FLQ terrorism occurred. The date 1973 is chosen as a study boundary, as most historians agree that the FLQ was definitely defunct by then. As Crelinsten (1988,59) asserts, by 1972 the police had infiltrated the movement so deeply that they, in effect, were the FLQ.

Information was gathered on all terrorist events attributed to the FLQ and compared with information collected on all other forms of protest events in Quebec during the time period. This helped clarify and explain where and how FLQ terrorism fit in the cycle of social movement protest in Quebec. Further information on FLQ terrorist events and Quebec protest events was collected from other sources to validate and qualify the newspaper database. This method draws on techniques of data

collection done by della Porta and Tarrow (1986) in their research on Italian terrorism and protest, as well as Rucht and Ohlemacher's (1992) study on German social movements.

This research codes only a sample of newspaper issues. The Monday and Thursday issues of both the *Montreal Star* and *Le Devoir* are coded in alternating weeks from 1963 to 1973. Monday issues are chosen for sampling as more protest events are reported on Mondays than other days because two days are reported on instead of just one. Also, more people are available for protest activities on the weekend (Rucht and Ohlemacher 1992:97). The use of Thursdays controlled the Monday bias, allowing for the study of major protest events that occurred later in the week. The use of both French and English newspapers control any cultural bias that might influence reporting trends. For a full examination of the stated time period, almost 5000 newspaper issues would require coding which would cause problems in the areas of time and money. Validity and reliability are still protected in studying sampled issues, as Rucht and Ohlemacher (1992,93) state that:

> it could be asked whether it would not be sufficient to code only certain weeks, months or even years as long as the emphasis is more on longitudinal analysis than on narrow time periods.

For the purposes of this research, a "terrorist event" is defined as a systematic deliberate use (or <u>attempted</u> use) of violent force (by one or more people) against property or individuals with the purpose of opposing the existing

government with the intent to effect a change in the political power structure. This definition encompasses bombings and kidnappings, as well as those events where FLQ bombs were found and defused before detonation. A "protest event" is defined as an observable form of direct action which asserts a claim on others and disrupts (or attempts to disrupt) the activities of elites, institutions, or third parties.[1] This definition encompasses petitions, assemblies, strikes, marches, and public demonstrations. It is important to make the distinction between a terrorist event and a protest event that turns violent. Terrorism is the deliberate and intentional use of violent force, and is not to be confused with protest events that spontaneously become violent during confrontations with police or other groups.

For each terrorist and protest event, information is gathered on; 1) the actors involved (social group, ideological stance as long as explicitly stated), 2) the number of participants, 3) the type of action (i.e. strike, bombing, march, etc.), 4) the source of protest/terrorism (what is held responsible by the actors for their grievance), 5) the object of protest/terrorism (what is physically attacked/occupied/ disrupted), 6) ideological

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[1]This definition is taken from the della Porta and Tarrow (1986) study.

label of event (separatist/labour).[7]

Aside from the primary source data collected from the newspapers, secondary source data is collected from related books and documents. For perspectives from inside the FLQ, information is collected from books and documents written by former FLQ members such as Francis Simard, Pierre Vallières, and Pierre Charette, as well as Gustave Morf's Terror in Quebec which contains interviews with the Chenier cell members while in jail. These sources provide insight into the relationships of the terrorist members to the separatist social movement (as well as other social movements). Books written solely on Quebec separatism and the development of the independence movement (such as René Lévesque's Memoirs) are also used. Data is also collected from history texts on Quebec published both in Ontario and Quebec. Collecting books published from both inside and outside Quebec provides control for biased socio-cultural interpretations authors may have by providing different perspectives on Quebec, separatism, FLQ terrorism, and the October Crisis. Books and articles on social movement theory and cycles of protest are also utilized. It is important to note that this research places some reliance on secondary sources, which most believe to be inferior to primary ones. But secondary sources can be a valuable and dependable foundation for

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[7]These coding variables are taken from the research of both della Porta and Tarrow (1986), and Rucht and Ohlemacher (1992).

research if certain precautions are taken. As Skocpol (1984:382) notes,

> redoing primary research for every investigation would be disastrous... If a topic is too big for purely primary research- and if excellent studies by specialists are already available in some profusion- secondary sources are appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a given study. Using them is not different from survey analysts reworking the results of previous surveys rather than asking all questions anew.

But Skocpol continues to say that one must be very systematic in searching out secondary sources to avoid using material produced only by mainstream historians. That is what this research attempts to do in its data collection. In collecting information, this research is sensitive to the fact that authors of various data have their own motivations for recording observations and that these motivations affect the subsequent interpretations recorded. To minimize the threat to validity, as stated above, source data (other than newspaper articles) is collected from a variety of perspectives, including data from within and outside Quebec, authored by both advocates and critics of the terrorism experienced there.

METHODOLOGY PROBLEMS

The use of newspaper articles as a database poses a number of problems with respect to empirical validity and representativeness. As Franzosi (1987:6) states, one can never be fully sure that patterns of historical events are being measured as opposed to patterns of news reporting.

Newspapers are also subject to geographical reporting bias and selective attention. But Franzosi also states that no data source is without error, including official statistics, and that newspapers are usually the only source of information available on social movement events. He also states that the form of bias in newspapers is not false information, but rather silence or emphasis on a social movement, as "language is the tool of media manipulation" (Franzosi 1987:7). Furthermore, what is often misrepresented in newspapers is not the type of action (i.e. strike, riot, etc) but rather the reasons which motivated the event. Therefore, as stated by Franzosi (1987:7), "Newspaper data lacks validity only in certain non-random ways." As long as one is sensitive to the nature of this threat to validity, newspaper data can be considered valid.

Representativeness is strengthened through the use of preexisting enumerations of terrorist and protest events to augment and validate the newspaper data. Geographical bias is overcome as both newspapers are based in Quebec and especially in the use of newspapers established in Montreal, where most of the terrorist events occurred. Additionally, the categories "terrorist event" and "protest event" are mutually exclusive to prevent overlap. Collecting data from both French language and English language sources helps prevent cultural bias.

It is important to make the distinction between the

method of historical sociology used in this research and that of traditional history. As stated by Barnes (1948:4):

> Historical sociologists and historians deal with the same data and periods of history. But the task of the historian is chiefly descriptive and concrete.

Conversely, historical sociology is more concerned with the interpretation and analysis of historical trends and transitions. Where conventional history places more emphasis on narration, historical sociology concentrates on explanations of society and social change. The use of the historical sociological approach is best suited for this study because it allows general causal inferences to be made about macro level processes. Other forms of research are not as well suited for studying terrorism on this scale, and are not practical given the nature of this research. An advantage of studying history is the discovery of how change occurs, and the use of historical sociological analysis best reveals that certain social and political processes are responsible for preventing terrorism from becoming a sustained phenomenon in Quebec.

PART II: THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

This research is oriented around a combination of terrorist theory and social movement theory in an attempt to place terrorism in context within the cycle of social protest in Quebec. As will be shown, there have been few attempts to study terrorism within the framework of the social movements and collective actions occurring around it. The following sections describe the prevailing terrorist theories and relate their shortcomings to this research. Theories of collective action and social movements are also reviewed, with emphasis on their usefulness in placing FLQ terrorism in relationship to other social movements occurring during the same time.

(A) Terrorist Theory

There is a large amount of literature dealing with theories on insurgent terrorism. Most of these theories separate the structural foundations of terrorism into two factors: permissive and precipitant causes (Ross 1993; Crenshaw 1981). Permissive causes of terrorism are structural factors in a society that make it possible for terrorism even to exist for any period of time. Precipitant causes are unique structural phenomena that exist in certain societies and serve to ignite terrorist activity (Schmid 1983:225). Permissive causes act as fertile ground for terrorism, while precipitant causes directly produce it.

Terrorism develops when the right combination of permissive and precipitant conditions emerge in a society. But a problem one immediately faces when dealing with literature on terrorism, is that identical social conditions are sometimes described as both precipitant and permissive causes by different researchers. There is no real solid agreement on what factors are exclusively permissive and which are solely precipitants. For the purposes of this theoretical orientation, no distinction is made between permissive and precipitant. Both are referred to as conditions for terrorism.

One commonly stated condition is the existence of a modernized social structure (Ross 1993; Crenshaw 1981; Howard 1992; Turk 1982). The higher the level of modernization of a society (i.e. urbanization and communication levels, transportation systems, etc.) the greater degree of terrorism that can be created and sustained. Another condition is the type of political system of the state. Both Ross (1993) and Crenshaw (1981) have stated that democracies produce more fertile conditions for terrorism than autocracies do. They have argued that this is due to guarantees of fundamental freedoms, civil liberties, and allowances of legal forms of protest, which place restraints on what types of security measures can be enforced.

Along similar lines is a theory put forth by Harry

Targ, which states that terrorism is more likely to occur in pre- and "post-industrial" societies (Targ 1979:119). Industrial societies have the potential to build mass-based revolutions, and hence do not need terrorism. But pre- and post-industrial societies lack the occupational and class prerequisites for revolutionary movement. Post-industrial societies are those societies that have distinctly changed social structures due to a persistent increase in modernization and exist in an advanced stage of capitalism. The economy is more based on services than on goods, there is a preeminence of the professional and technical classes, and the working class is quite affluent (Targ 1979:127).[1] In post-industrial societies, poverty is found in isolated ethnic areas, and corporations have more power and capital than the state. This transformation of modern society affects the chances of revolutionary movements, and thus increases the probability of terrorism. With a switch to a service reliant economy, workers see themselves more as middle class, and act on the basis of bourgeois notions of competition and thus, do not identify as a group. As stated by Targ (1979:134):

> The social context of post-industrialism inhibits class consciousness, reduces people's perceptions of shared exploitative experiences, and impairs the formulation of radical or revolutionary movements for social change. It is proposed here that terrorist acts become permanent

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[1]The notion or existence of a "post-industrial" society is a disputed concept. For a more detailed explanation and analysis, see Daniel Bell (1973) The Coming of Post Industrial Society.

features of the social landscape.

Thus terrorism becomes the alternative to the lack of large organized mass social movements or outlets for beliefs held by a minority. A similar argument is made by Crenshaw (1981:384), as she states that terrorism results when discontent is not generalized enough to provoke the majority of the population to action against a regime. The structure of society becomes resistant to change, and this resistance is socialized into the population to form "popular inertia". Thus, as Crenshaw (1981:384) states, "Terrorism is the resort of an elite when conditions are not revolutionary."

But in contrast to both Targ and Crenshaw, Ross (1993) has implied that even within organized social movements, the presence of certain forms of unrest relating to grievances can also act as a catalyst for terrorism. The existence of strikes and riots can lead to a heightened sense of the grievance of the subgroup, and begin to legitimate the use of violence against the state in the eyes of the disaffected class (Ross 1993:323). Therefore according to Ross, even where the possibility of mass based social revolution exists, terrorism is likely. Terrorism is usually a sign of desperation, of the shared perception of a subgroup that no other options are available. Along with this, if there is a perception of the state failing to be effective with its counterterrorist agencies, a self-reinforcing cycle becomes established. Terrorists begin to feel they can win through

violence (Ross 1993:324).

Some researchers have stated that the existence of a previously conquered subgroup (which is still identifiable) in a country is an important condition for terrorism (Schmid 1983). Similarly, Ross (1993) generalizes that the longer an identifiable subgroup exists within a dominant majority, the tendency to express grievances about their historical conquest will grow, as will their attempts to undo it. Organizations develop to produce this, radicals split, and terrorism is created.

The social control mechanisms of the state also increase the chances of terrorism if they respond to protests (whether peaceful or otherwise) with the use of violent force in lieu of nonviolent alternatives (Turk 1982:126). Violent control efforts always tend to produce increased awareness and resentment of political inequality. The use of unexpected or unusual force by the government has been responsible for aiding in the creation of terrorism in Russia and Ireland. The development of the Russian Narodnaya Volya was in part due to the Tsarist overuse of force, as was the development of the I.R.A. aided by the British government's execution of the heroes of the Easter Rising (Crenshaw 1981:385). Knowledge of this phenomenon can also be seen in an address to the Canadian nation by Prime Minister Pierre E. Trudeau during the FLQ crisis in 1970, as he stated:

> It is a well known technique of revolutionary groups who attempt to destroy society by unjustified violence to goad the authorities into inflexible attitudes. The revolutionaries then employ this evidence of alleged authoritarianism as justification for the need to use violence in their renewed attacks on the social structure. (cited in Pelletier 1971:14)

A final but possibly very important condition for terrorism is the formation of a radical intelligentsia and its situation within society (Rubenstein 1987:82). Certain social structures can produce a social base conducive to terrorist activity. Most research shows that social class and youth are related to the process of moving from resentment to terrorism (Turk 1982; Crenshaw 1981). According to Crenshaw (1981:384), the majority of terrorists are young, educated, middle to upper class individuals, and a great deal of terrorism can grow out of student unrest. Turk (1982:126) agrees in stating that the lower classes are less likely to resort to terrorism when compared with upper classes, due to their habitual experience of deprivation and defeat. They are more likely to be resentful without resorting to terrorism. Quite frankly, it is theorized that they are resigned to their condition, although this position contrasts with Targ's argument outlined previously, which states that there are simply more effective outlets than terrorism for the working class. Conversely, it is theorized that the middle and upper classes are used to privilege, and more inclined to take decisive action and challenge authority openly when displeased. They are

not used to deprivation and defeat, and will actively plan resistance (Turk 1981:126).

Problems with Terrorist Theory

A major problem with much of the literature on terrorism is that there is a lack of actual direct analysis of insurgent terrorism from a purely sociological standpoint. Many studies focus on situational and permissive causes of terrorism in the international environment (Ross 1993), while other theories that have asserted their approach to be sociological have generated primarily psychological conclusions. For example, Ferracuti (1982) in talking about a sociopsychiatric interpretation of terrorism tells of the importance of a "fantasy war" in the minds of the terrorists. This is the belief that they are involved in a war with an enemy (the government) which refuses to accept or acknowledge this. Furthermore, Ted Gurr's much acclaimed book Why Men Rebel (1970) gives a largely psychological explanation for terrorism. Gurr's "relative deprivation" theory sees terrorism and violence connected to a group's expectations of what they deserve materially, compared to what they actually have.

Another principal problem with research in the area of terrorist theory is that the term "terrorism" is not adequately defined (Schmid 1983:5). Studies have equated terrorism with everything from guerrilla warfare to street

fights (Crenshaw 1981; Ross 1993). The semantic range of the word terrorism is extremely broad, and Turk (1982:120) has correctly stated that "the word (terrorism) has been used more as an ideological weapon than as an analytical tool." Furthermore, the often quoted "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" illustrates that any definition cannot be separated from the defining agency. As stated in Schmid (1983:6) the ideal definition would be one that both adherents and abhorrers of terrorism agree on, but since this is unlikely, the best one can hope for is a definition acceptable to social science analysts. Certain elements contained within the semantic meaning of "terrorism" seem to be agreed upon by most researchers, or at least more commonly assumed than others. Some of the concepts that figure prominently in most definitions are the concepts of the use of force/violence, the political nature and intent behind this force, the emphasis on creating fear, and the fact that the violence is organized, deliberate, and systematic. These concepts were among the top five ranked in the results of a study by Schmid (1983:73) in which, through questionnaires and content analysis, he attempted to determine the degree of agreement among a number of authors in the field on the definition of terrorism. It is these things that most researchers say separate terrorism from other forms of violence. In light of this lack of agreement on the definition of terrorism, the use of the word in this

research is explicitly defined in terms of specific violent events experienced by Quebec from 1960 to 1973.

And although an abundance of research does exist on the etiology of terrorism, very little research has been directed at analyzing the social dynamics responsible for explaining why terrorism appears in some places, and then fails to thrive or become sustained. As can be seen in the above literature, researchers on terrorism have centered around analyzing the causes of terrorism in a particular area, and their conclusions have not been directed to explain why it does not exist in others. Further to this, there is a discernible lack of theoretical research on the FLQ crisis itself. Aside from the works of Myers (1964), Reilly (1973), Crelinsten (1988), and Laurendeau (1973), there has been very little <u>theoretical</u> examination of FLQ terrorism or Quebec separatism in general.[4] Although there does exist an abundance of writings on the October Crisis, the overwhelming majority of these are journalistic and descriptive, rather than theoretical or analytical. And although the above researchers do put forth theoretical speculations on the FLQ crisis, they too fail to address reasons why it disappeared.

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[4]Reilly (1973) discussed behavioral, social structural, and rational-purposive theories applied to the October Crisis. Crelinsten (1988) investigated the organization, structure, and dynamics of the FLQ cells. Laurendeau (1973) separated Quebec terrorism into nine distinct phases, and outlined a form of "frustration-aggression" model to explain some of the violence.

The deficiency of the existing literature on terrorism can be illustrated through a quick analysis of Quebec. Quebec fits many of the prescribed conditions for terrorism outlined above, yet it does not experience sustained terrorism. Quebec has a modernized social structure, a democratically elected government, and contains an identifiable subgroup with grievances. Its brief terrorism was met with the War Measures Act, what many would consider an "unpredicted use of force" and what Turk (1982) stated was an important condition facilitating terrorism.[5] Yet despite all these permissive structural conditions, the existing literature cannot explain why terrorism never became a sustained phenomenon in Quebec. To solve some of these problems and to more fully analyze separatist terrorism in the broader context of the cycle of social protest in which it fits, theories of collective action and social movements must be used.

(B) Theories of Collective Action

This research places a heavy reliance on theories of collective action and social movements. There have been few attempts to explore the relationship between terrorism and other social movements, as well as other forms of collective

[5]Until the murder of Laporte, many saw the War Measures Act and the restriction of civil liberties as an excessive response by the government. In his own writings on the crisis, FLQ member Francis Simard (1982) stated that he never thought the government would respond so harshly.

action that are occurring during the same time. As previously stated, terrorism cannot be studied in isolation. FLQ terrorism must be viewed in context as part of the larger Quebec nationalist social movement. There are important dynamics between terrorism and other attempts at collective action in Quebec during the 1960's and 1970's that must be explained. The process of growth and change in one affects the other. These theories of collective action and social movements help to show terrorism's place in the cycle of social protest in Quebec during this period.

Many theorists see terrorism and other forms of collective violence as a by-product of organized collective action (Tilly, Tilly & Tilly 1975; Tarrow 1991; 1994). Therefore the same conditions responsible for collective movements apply to collective violence. Crelinsten (1988:82) states that in analyzing terrorism, consideration should be given to the relationship between "radical political parties and their extremist fringes who differ on strategy, such as the use of violence, though they share the same goals." He goes on to say that any study of the FLQ must involve research on the Parti Québécois (PQ), Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN) and other separatist movements, as extremist fringes of these organizations provided potential supporters and recruits for FLQ activities. FLQ terrorists Paul Rose and Jacques Lanctot were both members of the PQ and RIN at one point in

their lives. As stated by Crelinsten (1988:83):

> it is important to understand the relationship between a terrorist group and other groups which are active before, during and after its lifetime.(...) Careers of individual members often reveal patterns which help to understand the rise and fall of the terrorist strategy in the life of a particular political conflict.

Similarly, in their descriptive book on the October Crisis, Ron Haggart and Aubrey Golden (1971) state that FLQ terrorism was just part of the outer fringe of a much larger independence movement. If Targ (1979) is correct and terrorism occurs more in societies without broad based radical social movements, one should examine what it is about social movements and organizations that acts to inhibit terrorism. Therefore, the social forces that govern terrorism can be illuminated through studies of collective action, collective movements and their relationship to collective violence.

In their work on the changing nature of collective action, Tilly, Tilly and Tilly (1975) state that as social movements become more organized and complex, violence decreases. Collective violence becomes less prevalent as the character of collective action shifts from a reactive form (resistance to infringements on resources currently under their control, such as loosely organized food riots) to a proactive form (laying claims to resources not under their control, such as highly-organized strikes). This concept of the evolution of collective movements into more complex organizations as a reason for diminishing collective

violence is also hinted at by Tarrow (1991) as he describes how collective action moves in cycles. Tarrow (1991:48) states that collective violence is at first caused by ad hoc assemblies creating protest (similar to the Tillys' reactive stage) and increases up to the peak of the cycle, where it is most intense and becomes controlled by movement organizations. Tarrow then states that as this intense violence subsides (due to repression, lack of public support, etc.) it is replaced by more conventional protests and the collective action now becomes quasi-institutionalized (Tarrow 1991:53).

A similar viewpoint is put forth by Huntington (1968) who states that political violence is the result of rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions.[6] Violence is a result of a lag in the development of political institutions behind a mobilization of a new political group. These new groups lack complex organizations to act as vehicles for their collective action, and violence becomes a by-product as there are no structures in place to channel and control these new social forces. Violence begins to subside once

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[6]It should be noted that Huntington is talking about violence and instability of modernizing countries, and not specifically terrorism. His argument is that economic development of a country does not produce political stability (which is a common Western belief) unless there is political development at the same rate. What is important to this research is his analysis of an organization's evolution and its relationship in reducing collective violence.

social and political organizations evolve to a more complex level, gain strength, and become institutionalized.

It is necessary to note that, although most collective action theorists deal with large, national collective movements, their concepts and ideas are quite relevant to a study of the FLQ crisis. One cannot study the FLQ while ignoring the Quebec nationalist movement. Furthermore, these theories also inspect the changing face of collective violence in connection with the evolution of social movements, and provide insight as to why FLQ terrorism may have vanished. As stated by Tarrow (1994:103), violence is a form of collective action and "is the easiest kind of collective action for small groups to initiate without encountering major costs of coordination and control."

The literature on collective action implies strong, underdeveloped links between terrorism and social movements. Terrorism can only be seen in relation to the evolution of social movements, and it should be investigated where terrorism fits into a cycle of social protest. Della Porta and Tarrow (1986) found Italian terrorism and violence to occur during the <u>decline</u> of a social movement, but in the case of Quebec, terrorism occurred during the ascension of certain social movements, and as will be shown, the evolution of social movements explains its decline.

Movement vs. Organization

A rudimentary distinction must be made between the concepts of movement and organization within this thesis. For the purposes of this research, a *movement* is defined as the growing mobilization, contemplation, and acceptance of a collection of conceptual ideas, an intangible wave of thinking and feeling that sweeps through a population in a given period of time. It is often expressed through limited and unorganized actions. The concept of separatism or independence was a movement that began to sweep through Quebec in the early 1960's. On the other hand, *organizations* are structures and institutions (political or social) that control and direct movements. The Parti Québécois is an organization directing the separatist movement. It is useful to think of it as being similar to water flowing in a current in the ocean. A movement is similar to the flowing water, while organizations are analogous to the channels which control the direction of the water. It is the relationship between these concepts and terrorism that is important in this research. Processes within social movements and organizations affect increases or decreases in terrorist events in ways which will be outlined and illuminated in Part III.

(C) Application of Theory to Quebec

An examination of the FLQ crisis and the Quebec separatist movement involves an investigation into the social and political evolution of separatist organizations and institutions. Quebec in the 1960's experienced rapid separatist mobilization which possessed limited institutionalized or organized outlets through which to express itself. Quebec nationalism grew under Premier Jean Lesage's "quiet revolution" from 1960-1966. Francophones were promoted to leading positions in society, the Quebec electric companies were nationalized, and Quebec began to assert an international presence through officially establishing contacts with France and other Francophone countries (Durocher, Linteau, Robert and Ricard 1991:308). The RIN (at first an ideological movement only) was founded in Montreal in 1960, and its goal was to promote Quebec independence through education. Daniel Johnson (Union Nationale) who defeated Lesage in 1966, leaned his party towards separatism and advocated special status for Quebec. The fervour surrounding separatism at the time is illustrated in that the 1968 federal election was dominated by the constitutional question on Quebec. Yet at this time, there were few organizations to act as expressions of grievances or as vehicles for collective action. Aside from René Lévesque's Parti Québécois (which was in its infancy in 1968), and the RIN (which had become a political party from

1963-1968 and helped mobilize sentiment through organized street demonstrations), there were very few organized broad-based separatist movements. This was also a time of civil unrest, as a number of strikes and demonstrations unconnected to the separatist movement occurred, many of which became violent. The period 1963-1970 witnessed the majority of FLQ terrorist activities as well. This may be indicative of a reactive stage of protest in Quebec.

According to collective action theorists, terrorism becomes a by-product of this social situation. Government repression (War Measures Act in 1970), may have effectively controlled FLQ terrorism and demobilized the FLQ cells, slowing the development of separatist groups and ideology long enough to allow the development and evolution of socio-political separatist organizations (such as the Parti Québécois). It may be that the separatist movement has entered what the Tillys (1975) termed a proactive stage, and now consists of complex organizations and institutions which provide enough outlets for the full continuum of separatist ideology. The period 1960-1983 also coincides with the rise and development of labour militancy in Quebec. The Quebec Federation of Labour (QFL) is the largest trade union in Quebec and has openly supported the PQ (Durocher et al. 1991:419). The sociological dynamics of this situation could preclude and control the possibility of terrorism. These organizations are strong enough to make the government

listen to them without needing to use violence to get attention. They also have a degree of political power they never had in the past, and it is more economical and efficient to use that power to work for change within the system. The Tillys (1975:283) state that powerless movements are often involved in violence since the range of effective actions open to them is small. Separatist political parties such as the Parti Québécois are now quite large and powerful institutions. Terrorism is now seen as unnecessary and unproductive, and would damage the separatist movement more than it would help. The labour movement also experienced major growth during these years, culminating in a Common Front in 1971 and a General Strike in 1972. It was also a key social movement during the years of terrorism, and it too reached a position of power and strength as terrorism diminished. These social movements are just two examples of more evolved outlets of social protest.

Part III of this thesis investigates and details the growth and decline of FLQ terrorism correlated with the evolution of the separatist and labour movements in Quebec. These following sections show that as the size, base, and complexity of the separatist movement grew, terrorism diminished as it became replaced with mass based collective action. Terrorism as a vehicle for social protest existed only until more effective and advanced forms of organized

dissent evolved through such groups as the PQ. In 1973, the separatist movement reached a stage where it was headed by a complex organization which could act as an effective vehicle for collective action, and as a result, terrorism disappeared from the social landscape of Quebec. Part III also illustrates that the growth of the labour movement and its subsequent connections with the separatist movement provided more outlets and opportunities for nationalist social protest, which in turn helped reduce terrorism.

The data in Part III is guided by attempts to answer two questions of paramount importance to this thesis; 1) To what extent did terrorist activity in Quebec change as the character, organization, and complexity of the separatist movement changed?, and 2) What is the importance of the connections between FLQ terrorism and labour, and what difference did the growth of the labour movement make in reducing FLQ terrorism? The answers to both of these questions are more directly addressed in the conclusions.

PART III
TERRORISM AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN QUEBEC

Introduction

This introduction provides a brief temporal domestic and international social backdrop against which to measure FLQ terrorism and separatism. The years 1960 to 1966 have commonly been referred to as the "Quiet Revolution" in Quebec's history, as they were a time of swelling nationalism mixed with rapid social and economic reform. During this period of extensive reform, Prime Minister Lester Pearson appointed a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to investigate the growing disputes between Quebec and Canada. This Commission was chaired by André Laurendeau (editor of the French language daily *Le Devoir*) and Davidson Dunton (President of Carleton University in Ottawa), and in 1965 their conclusion was that Canada was now passing through the greatest crisis in its history (McNaught 1988:308). It found that French-Canadians faced many disadvantages in attempts to advance economically and still retain their culture and language, and the commission greatly endorsed bilingualism and the concept of "two nations". Federal centralization of powers was relaxed and Quebec began to have a greater say in national affairs.

This was also a time when decolonization was sweeping the world. In 1960, seventeen African nations had gained independence from colonial rulers, and successful revolutions had occurred in both Algeria and Cuba (Fournier

1984:21). In some countries where independence was blocked, such as Northern Ireland and Spain, terrorism was beginning to become the popular form of resistance. For example, the Basque terrorist group ETA[1] (founded in 1959) displayed a pattern very similar to that of the FLQ in that its form of resistance began with graffiti and elevated to bombings in 1961 (Fournier 1984). This time period was also characterized by the Black Power Movement in the United States which was marked by massive demonstrations and riots.

The following sections trace the increases and decreases of terrorist attacks in each time period, and correlate them with the level of organization and prominence of the separatist and labour movements (two key social movements during these years). Using the size, number, and changing methods of collective action as indicators of evolutionary growth of these movements, terrorist attacks, methods, and groups were compared and contrasted to the actions and growth of these movements to place them in context within the cycle of social protest in Quebec. The relationship between terrorism and other modes of collective action are illustrated in each time period through analysis and comparison of the most popular forms of demonstration of the time. The following sections show that as conventional mass-based methods of demonstration and collective action grew, terrorism diminished. As the separatist and labour

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[1]Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Liberty)

movements grew and evolved, FLQ terrorists (and future would-be terrorists) joined these organizations as the opportunities for power and effective action was greater.

PHASE I- THE QUIET REVOLUTION (1960-1966)

This period involved a rising separatist movement coinciding with rising terrorist activity. These six years saw 70 terrorist attacks, perpetrated by a number of clandestine terrorist groups such as the FLQ, RQL, ALQ, and ARQ. Yet this period contained no organized or institutionalized outlets for separatist expression. According to Targ (1979:123), three important factors relating to terrorism are 1) the size of existing social movements, 2) the level of party organizations, and 3) the level of class consciousness (or in this case, separatist mobilization). The deficiency of all three of these factors in Quebec aided to the rise of terrorism (and their subsequent growth in the early 1970's helped reduce terrorism). A number of separatist organizations were in their infancy, but failed to evolve into stable, complex, structures (such as the FRI, ASIQ, Alliance Laurentienne, Bloc du Québec, etc.). Only the RIN survived to develop into a political party with some minor semblance of structure and organization. Terrorism and social violence formed a by-product of this situation, as rising nationalist unrest had little substantial or organized outlets of

protest. Nationalist protest was therefore expressed in unorganized and reactive ways (as occurred during Victoria day demonstrations in 1964 and 1965) and through such ad hoc groups as the FLQ. Nationalist unrest was accompanied by growing labour unrest which can be seen in the rising number of strikes over the years 1963 to 1966 (373 in all).

CONDITION OF THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONS

The years 1960-1966 involved the mobilization of the separatist movement in Quebec. Such events as the Quiet Revolution contributed to a high level of fervour and theorizing around the concept of independence. Yet, this was a time where solid structures that could control this new separatist activity either did not exist or were in their infancy. Organizations (both semi-refined and ad hoc) quickly began popping up in attempts to act as vehicles for separatist expression. The Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) was just one of these ad hoc structures. As stated by Chodos and Auf der Maur (1972:10):

> The FLQ got most of the headlines, but it was only one of a plethora of nationalist and left-wing groups that had started to spring up.

From 1957 to 1967, a number of separatist organizations appeared, most of which were short lived. The earliest organization was the *Alliance laurentienne*, founded in January 1957 by Raymond Barbeau, which never held more than a modest membership. On August 9, 1960, the leftist *Action*

socialiste pour l'indépendance du Québec (ASIQ) was founded under the leadership of Raoul Roy, a communist who has often been referred to as the "spiritual leader" of the FLQ (Fournier 1984:18). The ASIQ eventually dissolved, with many members joining the *Mouvement ouvrier pour la libération nationale*, which was a short-lived organization as well. Other separatist organizations included the *Regroupement nationale* which was formed by 13 militants of the RIN under the leadership of Dr. René Jutras in 1964 (*Le Devoir* 28 September 1964), and the *Front républicain pour l'indépendance* (FRI). In 1966, the *Ralliement des Créditistes* and the *Regroupement nationale* merged to form the *Ralliement National* (RN) under the leadership of Gilles Grégoire (*Le Devoir* 28 March 1966). One nationalist political party (but not fully separatist) was the *Parti socialiste du Québec* (PSQ), which was a result of a split with the New Democratic Party over the national question. One fairly important nationalist social organization was the *Société St. Jean Baptiste* (SSJB) which promoted French culture and ultimately independence (*Montreal Star* 29 November 1965).

There was also a number of organizations that surfaced and dissolved over very short periods of time. One such group was *Le Bloc du Québec*, which was formed September 2, 1965, and dissolved three weeks later. The FLQ can be considered as similar to these groups, as it was a vehicle

for separatist expression that arose at roughly the same time as many of these groups, and ended up being absorbed into larger organizations as well. But the proliferation and short lifespan of some of these groups show the confusion and lack of institutionalization of separatist organizations at this time. Only one separatist organization evolved into a semi-complex political and social structure during this time period, the Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale.

Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN)

The RIN was the only important lasting and popular separatist organization of this time period. Founded in Montreal in 1960 by a collection of Ottawa civil servants, Montreal lawyers, intellectuals, and artists, the RIN began as an ideological movement promoting independence through education (Fournier 1984:16). Its first president was André D'Allemagne and its vice-president was Marcel Chaput, previously a biochemist with the National Defense Research Council who would go on to lead the *Parti Républicain du Québec* (PRQ) for a short period before returning to the RIN. In March of 1963, the RIN became a political party under Guy Pouliot, with a left of center orientation (*Le Devoir* 4 March 1963). It counted its membership at 5,500 (*Le Devoir* 3 October 1963). A large majority of the memberships of the previously stated separatist groups joined the RIN when

their own organizations folded.

The RIN was a unique party, as it actively organized street demonstrations, supported strikes, and openly talked of social revolution (Durocher et al. 1991:524; Fournier 1984:17). The RIN had a grass roots origin, and held its meetings in the private homes of its members. But even by 1965, it was still small by political party standards although it was the most popular of the separatist organizations. FLQ terrorist Francis Simard (1982:63) stated that when he worked for the RIN in 1965, the regional Longueuil office consisted of a small room with one chair, two tables, and one phone.

Evidence of growing nationalist sentiment and organization can be seen in the provincial election results of 1966. On June 5, 1966, separatist political parties obtained roughly 11% of the popular vote. The RIN obtained 7.8%, while the RN received 3.2% (Bellevance 1972:9-11). As will be shown, this trend would grow over the next few years.

According to Huntington (1968:408), a political party is strong to the extent that it has institutionalized mass support. This was not the case for the RIN (or any separatist political party) from 1963-1966. The RIN was not what you would call an institutionalized organization as it had very little real power. Huntington (1968:409) states that the institutional strength of a political party is

measured by its organizational complexity, depth, and connections to other socio-economic organizations such as business and *labour unions* (italics added). The RIN did not have a complex hierarchy divided into many intricate sub-organizations, and no serious structural connections with the labour movement (or business community) had been made yet. The separatist movement would accomplish that from 1967 to 1973. Numerous separatist organizations quickly developed at the beginning of the quiet revolution, along with spontaneous FLQ cells appearing to act as vehicles and expressions of the movement in lieu of any institutionalized powerful organization.

Publications

A little should be said of the various separatist and terrorist publications in existence at the time. From 1963 to 1967, the FLQ published an underground tabloid that was never infiltrated by the police. It was called *La Cognée*[2], and published about eight pages, twice a month, expressing some political theorizing and much propaganda. But the writers recognized the importance of complex and structured organizations, as it communicated in its first issue in October, 1963:

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[2]"The Axe" which is a tool and a weapon. The name was inspired by a quotation from Jean-Paul Desbiens (1960) Les Insolences du Frère Untel. Editions de l'homme. *I do my work with an axe. This is no time for being subtle in Quebec.* See Fournier (1984:45-46).

> A well organized revolution requires one or two years of preparation. We have been waiting two centuries for national liberation; lets not get off on the wrong foot by starting before we are ready. Any uncoordinated action will threaten the security of the movement and the effectiveness of the revolution. (cited in Fournier 1984:45)

Another publication that openly supported the FLQ in the early years was a left-wing monthly called *Parti Pris*. It was influenced by anti-colonial writings and some of its writers also wrote under pseudonyms for *La Cognée* (Fournier 1984:49). It too recognized the disorder of the separatist movement and the lack of appropriate organizations as it wrote in its first issue in 1963, "We are partisans without a party".

One last separatist publication that deserves mention is a radical Marxist journal called *Révolution Québécoise* that began circulation in September 1964. It advocated independence accompanied by socialism (not one before the other), and its editor was Pierre Vallières, the president of a local newspaper union (La Presse) and a man who would be deeply involved in FLQ terrorism and *La Cognée* in 1965-1966.

TERRORISM 1960-1966

Most FLQ members were active participants in separatist and leftist groups. The vast majority of terrorists met and developed connections in the RIN. Most left the RIN for the FLQ, charging its marginality and lack of influence as

reasons for adopting terrorism (Laurendeau 1973:94).

The first underground organization for the pursuit of separatism was developed by four RIN activists on October 31, 1962 (Fournier 1984:25). It was called the *Comité de libération nationale* and its goal was to create an underground infrastructure for future direct action. Most of its members later became FLQ terrorists. In November 1962, another underground organization was set up by members within the RIN. It was called *Réseau de Resistance* (R.R.) and would undertake direct action through minor acts of sabotage and graffiti (Fournier 1984:27). The R.R. painted separatist slogans on official buildings, monuments, and over unilingual English signs. But the lack of structure and discipline in both the Comité and the R.R. led to internal dissention and dissolution, as members felt these organizations did not go far enough.

The *Front de libération du Québec* (FLQ) was formed in February 1963 by three RIN activists who had met in the R.R. (Fournier 1984:28). The three founders were Georges Schoeters (33), Gabriel Hudon (21), and Raymond Villeneuve (19). Most of the other FLQ members of this cell were the friends of Villeneuve, who was also an ex-member of the ASIQ. This short preliminary synopsis of organizations already displays the social confusion and disarray produced by the separatist movement. By the time the first FLQ cell formed, many of these individuals had already moved through

several organizations, searching for the appropriate organization to fulfill their expression. When one could not be found, they created their own. As stated by Crelinsten (1988:61):

> Terrorist groups are not monolithic entities that remain constant over time, divorced from the political life in which they exist... Like any social organization, they adapt to their changing environment in a variety of ways, often splintering into different entities or merging with other groups.

Something must be said here of the structure of the FLQ. The FLQ cells that continued to emerge in Quebec for a decade never really organized into a complex structure, such as happened with other terrorist organizations in Ireland and the Middle East. Most FLQ cells were formed spontaneously and had little contact with other cells except through already established friendships, and they (like other nationalist organizations) ended up dissolving into other, more established groups. There was no central leadership or established revolutionary schedule for the FLQ. There was very little organizational complexity, and many FLQ terrorists were active in successive cells. The vast majority of FLQ cells had socialist political views, but this trend would become more pronounced over time. The FLQ is best described by a former FLQ terrorist Pierre Vallières, when he stated:

> There has never been an FLQ organization as such, but rather a collection of groups or cells with little or no contact between them, with no guiding nucleus and no real strategy. All they had in common was their choice of the three letters FLQ (cited in Fournier 1984:314).

The first FLQ terrorist attacks began in March, 1963, with the bombing of three armouries in Montreal. In all, the years 1963-1966 contained 70 terrorist bombings or attacks, most of which were aimed at symbols of colonialism or the Canadian army. The first wave of FLQ terrorist attacks ended in June 1963, with the arrest of a number of terrorists.[3] At the end of 1966, FLQ terrorism[4] had been responsible for three deaths and one serious crippling injury. The first death occurred in April 1963, when a bomb exploded behind an Army Recruiting Centre in Montreal, killing the night watchman (Wilfred O'Neill) as he was walking by. In May of the same year, Sergeant-Major Walter Leja was critically injured when a bomb exploded in a Westmount mailbox as he was attempting to defuse it. The next casualty did not occur until May 1966, when a bomb exploded in the LaGrenade shoe factory, killing Thérèse Morin. The last fatality of this period occurred in July of that year when FLQ member Jean Corbo was killed by the premature explosion of a bomb he was attempting to plant at

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[3]For an excellent account, division and timeline of FLQ cells and their members, see Laurendeau (1973) Les Québécois Violents

[4]During this period, a number of terrorist attacks were committed by groups other than the FLQ. For example, *Rassemblement Québec libre (RQL)*, *Armée revolutionnaire Québécois (ARQ)*, and *Armée de libération du Québec (ALQ)*, were the names of a few groups to take credit for attacks. Since most claimed to be "military wings" of the FLQ, and the FLQ is the most recognized terrorist group in Quebec, I have used the term FLQ terrorism to refer to any and all terrorist attacks in Quebec.

Dominion Textiles in Montreal.

In contrast to later periods, where terrorist attacks supporting labour would rise dramatically, from 1963-1966 three FLQ attacks were directed at strike bound establishments in support of the labour movement. The first occurred May 3, 1963 when a bomb exploded in the washrooms of Solbec Copper Mines (Morf 1970:8). No FLQ direct action in support of workers would occur again until May 1966, when bombs exploded at the LaGrenade shoe factory (which had been on strike for a year), and the Dominion Textiles plant in Drummondville. These last two attacks would be the beginning of a pattern of FLQ bombings in support of the labour movement which would become much more pronounced and apparent in the years 1967-1970.

Nationalist Collective Action

There were a couple instances of violent nationalist collective protest that must be mentioned during this period, that would set a trend for the following four years. It is necessary to note that not all demonstrations were violent, but rather these are mentioned here due to the increased news coverage they received, and were used as indicators of rising nationalist sentiment and the changing nature of violence in the separatist movement. The first occurred on Victoria Day, May 18, 1964, as approximately 1000 nationalists demonstrated to express their desire to

have Victoria Day renamed in honour of Dollard des Ormeaux.[5] Violence erupted with police, resulting in a number of injuries and arrests (*Montreal Star* 19 May 1964). Another violent demonstration occurred during a visit by the Queen to Montreal in October of 1964. An RIN-led protest against the Queen's visit resulted in such a violent display with the police that the day was termed "Samedi de la Matraque"[6] by the media (*Le Devoir* 12 October 1964). On Victoria Day in 1965, there was more nationalist violence once again, as separatist protest demonstrators clashed with police (*Le Devoir* 27 May 1965). These events were only preludes to the levels of violence and collective action that were to come in the next four years, but they do show the rising level of nationalist sentiment of the times along with associative levels of violence.

CONDITION OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONS

As already stated, the years 1960-1970 were a time of development for the labour movement and its organizations as well as the independence movement. During these years, unionization rose from just under 30% to 40% of the labour force (Education Committees of CSN and CEQ 1987:198).

The largest and most established union organizations at

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[5]Dollard des Ormeaux was a French Canadian who saved Montreal from an Indian attack.

[6]"Truncheon" or "Police-Club Saturday"

this time were the *Quebec Federation of Labour* (QFL), which was the provincial arm of the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), the *Confédération des syndicats nationaux* (CSN), and the *Union des cultivateurs catholiques* (UCC). One growing labour organization that would become prominent in the late 1960's was a Quebec teachers' union called the *Corporation des instituteurs catholiques* (CIC). This was a time of rising labour militancy accompanied by an increased number of workers earning the legal right to strike. The number of strikes in Quebec in each year increased from 73 in 1963, to 98 in 1965, and finally to 137 in 1966 (Labour Canada 1963:9; 1965:11; 1966:15). In 1964 the public services acquired the right to strike, followed by Quebec teachers in 1965. The student unions (such as the *Union générale des étudiants du Québec* (UGEQ) were also very active in this period.

But few labour organizations at this time were concerned about the national question. No structural connections with any of the separatist organizations existed, and there was no open direct support of any separatist political party by labour organizations. The only real attempt at a combined separatist-labour organization was the split with the NDP to form the *Parti socialiste du Québec* (PSQ), with its provisional council composed almost exclusively of trade unionists from the QFL and CSN (CSN and CEQ 1987:217). In fact, most of the large

labour organizations rejected the concept of separatism. In 1963, the QFL rejected separatism as detrimental to workers and the country (*Le Devoir* 25 November 1963). This objection to independence was repeated in 1966 by the CSN, the QFL, and the UCC, with all endorsing adapted federalism (*Le Devoir* 29 September 1966). As will be shown, this situation completely changed from 1967-1973.

Of all the major labour disputes occurring during the years 1960-1966,[7] FLQ terrorism only really got involved with two of them; the LaGrenade strike and the Dominion Textiles strike. This too changed in the following years, as labour and separatist organizations (as well as labour and FLQ attacks) became increasingly linked. Both attacks are commonly presumed to have been directed under the leadership of Pierre Vallières, although this was never proven (Morf 1970; Fournier 1984). Throughout the next four years, both protest demonstrations and terrorist attacks would increase culminating in the October Crisis and the War Measures Act in 1970. During this time, both labour and separatist organizations would grow and evolve into more complex institutions which would eventually utilize collective action as a more effective alternative to isolated acts of violence and terrorism.

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[7]1964- La Presse strike, Quebec Liquor Board strike
1965- Federal Postal strike
1966- Construction workers strike, Dominion Ayers strike

PHASE II- THE OCTOBER CRISIS (1967-1970)

This period contained the peak level of nationalist violence and protest in the cycle of the separatist movement. These four years had 127 terrorist attacks, almost double the previous four years, and involved two kidnappings and one assassination. This period also saw an explosive propagation of radical separatist and nationalist organizations taking active participation in organized social action. No longer were the RIN and FLQ the only nationalist radicals on the social scene. Groups like the FQF, LIS, FLP, CIS, and MSA were quickly organizing and becoming very socially militant. This period was a peak time for nationalist social violence as well as terrorism, as a number of violent nationalist social demonstrations occurred involving the above stated groups (CEGEP occupations, McGill français, St. Jean Baptiste Parade 1968, Operation Congrès, Operation Libération, etc.). The FLQ was no longer the only organization using violence. This situation illustrates the growing use of collective action over isolated violence. At first only small groups (FLQ) used terrorism, but now semi-structured organizations (such as the LIS) were using violence in association with mass demonstrations. Eventually this violent aspect would diminish as organizations and their use of collective action grew (PQ).

Labour unrest continued to grow during this period, as

these four years involved 538 strikes. Preliminary connections with the separatist movement were being forged at this time as well. This is important as grievances previously being expressed solely through separatist organizations now found vehicles for expression through labour organizations. A structure of mutual dependence was being formed, through a form of "tapping" another source of social protesters.[15] The labour organization provided another release valve for protest, as now instead of just the FLQ or PQ, radical individuals could choose organizations such as the CSN, QFL, or CEQ to express dissent. This can be seen in the growing support for labour by both semi-structured organizations as well as terrorist attacks.

CONDITION OF THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONS

The years 1967 to 1970 produced a rise in the development of more organized and militant separatist groups combined with an intensification of nationalist sentiment. A number of occurrences in Quebec contributed to this. On July 24, 1967, visiting French President Charles de Gaulle shouted "Vive le Québec libre!"[16] to a crowd while in Montreal, which may have added to the escalation of

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[15]Tarrow (1991:54) has stated that building structures of mutual dependence between organizations is one way groups attempt to keep mobilization of militants high.

[16]Long Live Free Quebec!

separatist emotions running through Quebec. In June 1967, the Quebec parliament passed a declaration that from then on, the Fleur-de-lys (the flag of Quebec) would be flown from all government buildings in the province (*Montreal Star* 26 June 1967). In November of the same year, the States General of French Canada's[17] meeting was dominated by talk of nationalism and separatist attitudes. Separatism was ultimately rejected (*Montreal Star* 27 November 1967). On July 29, 1967, the provincial member for Dorion, François Aquin, quit the Liberal Party to sit as the first separatist independent (Bellevance 1972:12).

The RIN, MSA, and the PQ

A number of important changes were taking place within and around separatist organizations. During the RIN convention of October 1967, a resolution was passed in favour of unifying the forces of independence in Quebec. It was presented by five ex-FLQ members, one of whom was Raymond Villeneuve (Fournier 1984:113). Another resolution succeeded in transforming the RIN into a workers' party, and urged closer ties with labour organizations. The resolution read: "The RIN's struggle for independence coincides with the Quebec workers struggle against American economic domination" (Fournier 1984:114).

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[17]This organization was first conceived of by the *Société St. Jean Baptiste* to deal with constitutional issues.

One very important event that would have far reaching effects on the separatist movement occurred in October of 1967. René Lévesque, the member of parliament for Laurier, lost his bid to move the Quebec Liberal Party to a separatist position. He had presented the option of a sovereign Quebec in a new union with Canada, but the resolution was rejected by the Liberal Party (*Montreal Star* 16 October 1967). Lévesque resigned to sit as an independent, and in mid-November he formed his own separatist political party, *Mouvement souveraineté-association* (MSA). In December of 1967, the MSA undertook negotiations with the RIN and RN to investigate the possibilities of merging to form one unified separatist party.

In March of 1968, the left-wing of the RIN split, led by Andrée Bertrand-Ferretti. This group split again to form two separatist leftist parties, the *Front de libération populaire* (FLP) led by Ferretti, and the *Comité independance-socialisme* (CIS) which was led by François Mario Bachand, an ex-FLQ member. (Fournier 1984:125). The CIS took a harder Marxist line than the FLP, but Bachand eventually broke with the CIS for a more pro-FLQ stand, forming the CIS-gauche. The FLP took a pro-labour position and organized the first worker committee (*Comité ouvrier de Saint-Henri*). It undertook a number of actions and demonstrations with the *Comité d'aide Vallières et Gagnon*

which will be discussed shortly.

To illustrate the growing popularity and sophistication of separatist organizations, in January, the *Montreal Star* reported that the Union Nationale government was more concerned with the rising popularity of Lévesque's party than with the official opposition (*Montreal Star* 22 January 1968). On October 14, 1968, merger negotiations between the MSA and the RN were successfully completed and the two groups unified to form the *Parti Québécois* (PQ) (Bellevance 1972:12). The RIN had declined to join due to economic and language issues. René Lévesque was elected President, and the membership of the new PQ was counted at 14,280. Less than ten days later, the RIN officially dissolved and invited its members to join the PQ (of which approximately 12,000 did) (Fournier 1984:137). The PQ presented itself as a "national front" of separatist parties and adopted a social democratic stance. It is interesting to note that prior to merger, the RN had 4,800 members and the RIN had approximately 14,000 members (Bellevance 1972:8-12). This shows the amazing growth of the separatist movement and its organizations, as back in November of 1964, just four years earlier, the RIN (the only semi-structured separatist party at the time) had a membership of only 7,500 (*Le Devoir* 9 November 1964). Therefore, from 1964 to 1968, Quebec organized and mobilized approximately 25,000 more people into separatist political organizations, most of whom ended

up in the PQ.

The April 29, 1970 provincial election had an unprecedented 469 candidates competing (*Montreal Star* 16 April 1970). Before the election, the PQ counted its membership at 33,000. The election was somewhat disillusioning for the forces of separatism, as it brought to light a form of gerrymandering of the electoral map. The Liberals won the election with 44% of the popular vote, electing 72 members. The PQ received 24% of the popular vote but only elected 7 members, mostly in ridings where they had large labour support (Bellevance 1972:14). Both the UN and Ralliement Créditistes (RC) received less popular support (20% and 12% respectively), yet they elected more members than the PQ (17 and 12). One defeated PQ candidate was reportedly quoted as saying "We have tried to use the electoral system and we have witnessed a gigantic fraud... Now we will have to try other means."(*Montreal Star* 30 April 1970). Shortly after the election, the PQ's membership soared to 82,000, by far the highest number of members any separatist group had ever attained.

Other Separatist Organizations

A number of other militant separatist organizations quickly arose during this time period. One such organization was the *Mouvement pour l'intégration scolaire* (MIS) which formed in the east-end Montreal Italian/French

suburb of St. Léonard in 1968 to contest school board elections. The MIS soon became the *Ligue pour l'intégration scolaire* (LIS) under the leadership of Raymond Lemieux. The LIS wanted French as the only language of education, fearing that the increasing number of immigrants learning English would soon make them a minority in their own province (Chodos and Auf der Maur 1972:14). The LIS candidates won the election, but in 1969 their platform led to a number of violent demonstrations and riots between French and Italians, who preferred English as the language of education. For example, on September 10, 1969, an LIS-led demonstration turned into a riot when about 1000 French protesters confronted police in front of the Jérôme Le Royer school in St. Léonard. Violence erupted, and the police responded with tear gas (*Le Devoir* 11 September 1969). A similar violent incident had occurred six days previous, when a fight erupted between Italians and French at a meeting in St. Léonard to discuss the problem (*Montreal Star* 4 September 1969). Terrorism was also a by-product of this situation, as Mario Barone, the deputy mayor of St. Léonard and the leader of the Italian community, was the target of a couple of FLQ attacks in November and December of 1969. The LIS also participated in other separatist and nationalist demonstrations in Quebec.

Another important separatist organization which formed during this period was the new *Front de libération populaire*

which resulted from a merger of the old FLP and the CIS in the spring of 1969. Its priorities were to create worker committees, and organize strikes and demonstrations. It published two newsletters, *La Masse* and *Mobilisation*, and had a strong pro-FLQ attitude inspired by such members as Pierre Vallières, Charles Gagnon, and François Mario Bachand (Fournier 1984:156). Many considered the FLP as an "above-ground" version of the FLQ, almost as the "legal" branch of the movement, just as *Sinn Fein* in Ireland is seen as the above ground version of the *Irish Republican Army* (IRA) (Crelinsten 1988:60). The leader of the new FLP was Stanley Gray, a dismissed professor from McGill who had led a four day occupation of the McGill administration building in November of 1967 in protest of charges of undesirable writing against a *McGill Daily* editor. He (along with 30 Socialist Action Committee members) had also disrupted a McGill senate nominating committee meeting on January 24, 1969, and a month later had been dismissed as an "agitator" and charged with "impeding the business of the University" (*Montreal Star* 10 July 1969). Gray was also one of the leaders of the *McGill français* movement which will be addressed later.

In October of 1969, over 80 French language organizations united to form *le Front du Québec français* (FQF). This union included such groups as the LIS, and SSJB, as well as some labour groups, most notably the

Montreal Council of the CSN. It was originally formed as a front against Bill 63, the provincial government's language of education bill which stated that English language education would be provided where it was needed (Chodos and Auf der Maur 1972:15). It was seen by the province as the solution to the St. Léonard affair. Most Anglophones were behind it, but many Francophones were not, and the FQF organized a number of large demonstrations and encouraged boycotts of classes by teachers and students to protest Bill 63 (*Le Devoir* 3 November 1969). Bill 63 eventually passed and Lévesque stated that this event had helped PQ membership more than anything else, almost tripling their regular recruitment levels (*Montreal Star* 27 November 1969).

One last organization that deserves mention was the *Mouvement pour la défense des prisonniers politiques du Québec* (MDPPQ). This group was formed from the ashes of the *Comité d'aide Vallières-Gagnon* which was a collection of nationalists who had spontaneously formed this group to support Vallières and Gagnon when they were charged as terrorists. The *Comité* had raised bail money for the defendants, and constantly demonstrated for their release. The MDPPQ was formed on June 30, 1970, and its aim was to raise bail for all prisoners held for political reasons, which included those suspected of FLQ activity as well as individuals arrested during demonstrations (Fournier 1984:203). It was led by Serge Mongeau, who had been a

separatist candidate in the South Shore riding of Taillon in the April provincial election in 1970. The MDPPQ also participated in a number of nationalist demonstrations.

As can be seen, in the years 1967-1970, separatist organizations had become larger, more organized, more complex, and more militant. They were also becoming more connected with labour organizations, as will be addressed later. They were also becoming more prominent in street demonstrations, many of which became confrontational and violent. The following section will address these events in more detail, along with the increased FLQ terrorism of this period.

Nationalist Social Protest

The increasing number of militant nationalist and separatist organizations forming began involving themselves in violent demonstrations during this time period. The separatist movement as a whole had become more bold and public. One such violent event occurred at the annual Saint Jean Baptiste parade in Montreal on June 24, 1968. There was a Federal election scheduled for the following day, and Prime Minister Pierre E. Trudeau had decided to be present at the parade. The Montreal police were on edge, as RCMP intelligence had reported that the FLQ were going to attempt to assassinate Trudeau at the parade (Fournier 1984:130). A number of militant RIN members were present in the crowd, a

few empty bottles flew towards Trudeau, the police charged the crowd, and a riot ensued. The chaos ended with a count of 250 severe injuries (46 of them were police officers), and 292 arrests (one of which was RIN president Pierre Bourgault) (*Montreal Star* 25 June 1968). Two FLQ members, Jacques Lanctôt and Paul Rose, who would later play a major role in the October Crisis were also arrested at this demonstration and met for the first time in a police van (Fournier 1984:131). The following day, Canada elected its first majority government since 1962, under Liberal leader Pierre Trudeau.

Another outbreak of social violence occurred in October. In 1967, the provincial government had created new junior colleges to turn out new technicians for Quebec's future. These *Collèges d'enseignement général et professionel* (CEGEP's) were supposed to be pre-university way-stations to help prepare students for modern jobs and entrance into universities. But no jobs were waiting for graduates, and there were limited seats available in universities. On October 8, 1968, the CEGEP-Lionel Groulx in Ste. Thérèse was occupied by approximately 1100 students (Chodos and Auf der Maur 1972:13). Discontent quickly spread throughout Quebec. A number of other CEGEPS were occupied, some high schools staged sit-ins in support of the CEGEP student revolt, and 200 McGill students marched in support and demanded an improvement of the education system

(*Montreal Star* 17 October 1968). There were some minor acts of violence, mostly to property, and a number of student marches occurred in the cities of Quebec, Montreal, and Chicoutimi (*Le Devoir* 21 October 1968). Another FLQ terrorist who would later become famous in 1970, Jacques Cossette-Trudel, was the leader of a student protest at the CEGEP in Maisonneuve, and was arrested for his actions (Laurendeau 1973:80).

Another important nationalist demonstration occurred on March 28, 1969. With the support of the FLP and the CIS, Stanley Gray and the LIS led the *McGill français* march to McGill University. The movement demanded the conversion of McGill, an English-language university in the heart of Montreal, to a French unilingual institution. Over 8000 protesters marched on the university, and the demonstration soon became violent, resulting in $50,000 to $100,000 damage and some clashes with police (*Montreal Star* 31 March 1969). The intensity of emotion was so great in Montreal that the army was put on alert (Chodos and Auf der Maur 1972:14). FLQ terrorists Francis Simard, Jacques Rose, and Paul Rose all participated in the demonstration (Simard 1982:120).

The next violent protest event was termed *Opération Congrès* and occurred on June 21, 1969. A demonstration of dissatisfied civil servants, the FLP, LIS, and the St. Jacques Citizen's Committee formed at the Coliseum in Quebec City where Jean Jacques Bertrand was being confirmed as

leader of the Union Nationale party. The event, which included from 5000 to 7000 participants, was a protest against the Union Nationale party as anti-democratic and anti-working class. It too turned into a riot, resulting in fights with police, fires, arrests and injuries. At one point, tear gas was dropped on the crowd from circling helicopters (*Montreal Star* 23 June 1969). FLQ terrorists Jacques Lanctôt and Marc Carbonneau were arrested at this event (Fournier 1984:160).

The last large violent social demonstration to occur in this time period was *Opération Libération* on November 7, 1969. The *Comité d'aide Vallières et Gagnon* (with the help of the Montreal Council of the CSN as well as the FLP and LIS) had organized a protest march for the release of FLQ terrorists Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon, who had now been in prison for three years. It was also a protest against Bill 63 and demanded the resignation of Quebec Minister of Justice Rémi Paul (Fournier 1984:169; Chodos and Auf der Maur 1972:15). The protesters marched to the Montreal City Hall and then down the financial district of St. James Street[18], where the event became violent and a number of buildings were attacked and vandalized (*Montreal Star* 10 November 1969). A few days after this last event, Montreal Mayor Jean Drapeau passed a bylaw prohibiting

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[18]St. James Street has the same financial importance to Montreal as Bay Street has to Toronto or Wall Street to New York.

demonstrations for thirty days. On November 10, 1969, Rémi Paul stated he was accumulating evidence that there were approximately 3000 terrorists in Quebec (*Montreal Star* 10 November 1969).

As these events illustrate, there was a high level of social and nationalist discontent in this period which was not only translated into terrorism, but other forms of collective action as well. Terrorism was just another display of this discontent, and a by-product of the growing separatist movement and organizations during this period. The years 1967 to 1970 witnessed the formation of a large number of militant separatist organizations along with a large number of violent social demonstrations. It is not surprising that these years also contain the highest number of FLQ terrorist attacks recorded.

TERRORISM 1967-1970

In November of 1967, *La Cognée* was replaced with a new FLQ publication called *La Victoire*, which appeared intermittently until the summer of 1968. It was very professional looking, promulgating bomb-building techniques and advertising methods of hiding in forests from federal agents (*Le Devoir* 23 November 1967). It was produced by former FLQ members who had also worked on *La Cognée* (Fournier 1984:118).

Quebec separatist terrorism had become such a

phenomenon by this time period that the State Department in Washington created a "Quebec desk" and assigned American diplomat Charles Bohen to watch developments in Quebec (*Montreal Star* 8 February 1968). The number of terrorist attacks escalated throughout this time period, with seven (7) in 1967, forty (40) in 1968, and forty-three (43) in 1969. The year 1970 witnessed a slight decline in the number of terrorist attacks with only thirty-seven (37), but this year experienced two kidnappings, one assassination, and the imposition of martial law in Quebec. The entire period 1967-1970 contained 127 terrorist attacks, compared with only 70 attacks that occurred in the first four years (1963-1966).

Terrorist acts had also become more sophisticated. FLQ bombs had become increasingly stronger in payload.[19] FLQ terrorists (like the Basques in Spain) had also moved from graffiti, to bombings, to kidnappings. In February of 1970, the Montreal anti-terrorist squad discovered and stopped one FLQ cell's plot to kidnap the Israeli consul in Montreal Moshe Golan (Saywell 71:30). In June of the same year, the police arrested FLQ members François Lanctôt and Roy Morency for conspiracy to attempt to kidnap the American consul in Montreal, Harrison Burgess (Crelinsten 1988:67). FLQ

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[19]For example, the bomb that ripped through the Montreal Stock Exchange in February 1969, or the 141 sticks of dynamite found set to destroy the Metropolitan boulevard overpass in Montreal in March 1969.

terrorism and the separatist movement was being seen more and more as two arms of the same entity, and the line between them was continually being blurred. Quebec Justice Minister Rémi Paul said publicly on April 26, 1970, that while all those in the PQ are not terrorists, all terrorists are in the PQ, and called Lévesque the "Fidel Castro of Quebec" (*Montreal Star* 27 April 1970). In August of 1970 Pierre Nadeau of the television documentary "*Perspectives*" interviewed two FLQ members in the Middle East who had just completed a Fedayin terrorist training camp in Jordan. These two individuals stated that they would be returning to Quebec to carry out selective assassinations (Fournier 1984:207).

The October Crisis

On October 5, 1970, British Trade Commissioner Richard James Cross was kidnapped by one FLQ cell.[20] Five days later on October 10, 1970, Quebec Minister of Labour and Immigration Pierre Laporte was kidnapped by a different FLQ cell.[21] Among some of their demands for the release of

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[20]This cell was called the *Libération* cell, and consisted of FLQ members Jacques Lanctôt (24), Marc Carbonneau (37), Yves Langlois (22), Jacques and Louis Cossette-Trudel (23), and Nigel Hammer (23).

[21]The *Chenier* cell, which consisted of Paul Rose (27), Jacques Rose (22), Francis Simard (22), and Bernard Lortie (18). These cells had very little organized communication or strategy throughout these events. For a detailed account see Saywell (1971), and Haggart and Golden (1971).

their captives were the freedom of FLQ members already in prison, $500,000 in a "voluntary tax" to the FLQ, transportation to Cuba, and reinstatement of the Lapalme mail workers.[7] Shortly after Cross was first taken, an "FLQ Manifesto" which had been prepared earlier by the *Libération* cell, was read over the radio. It was a nationalist discourse full of socialist overtones and many direct references to labour problems in Quebec. Many in Quebec agreed in principle with the content of the manifesto, if not the actions taken by the terrorists (Saywell 1971:46). In Paris, a group calling itself the "European Contingent of the FLQ" threatened to blow up Canadian air and rail communications outside Quebec (Saywell 1971:76). FLQ appointed lawyer and mediator Robert Lemieux began urging students to boycott classes and attempted to organize a mass student general strike in support of the FLQ (Saywell 1971:79). Many students complied and skipped classes for "study sessions", and University of Québec students occupied their administrative office. Recently freed terrorists Vallières and Gagnon were out giving public speeches about social revolution in Quebec.

On October 16, 1970, at 4:00 AM, the War Measures Act (WMA) was proclaimed. It declared martial law, and the Canadian army occupied strategic points in Ottawa, Montreal,

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[7]This reference will be more fully explained in the following section on the Labour movement.

and Quebec. It gave police broad powers of search, seizure, arrest, and detention, effectively suspending the Charter of Rights. Police raided the houses and businesses of known nationalists, as well as members of left-wing organizations and trade unions, and made a number of arrests. Among those picked up were Vallières, Lemieux, a number of CSN trade unionists, Stanley Gray, and Andrée Bertrand-Ferretti (Fournier 1984:249). Those arrested could be held incommunicado, with no contact with their lawyers or the outside world. Many wondered if the War Measures Act was being used to crush terrorism, or the separatist movement as a whole (Saywell 1971:95). On October 18, 1970, the strangled body of Laporte was found in an abandoned car, and public opinion against the FLQ hardened instantly. By the end of the year, 468 arrests had been made under the WMA, with 408 of those being released without charges laid. Only 41 remained in prison in January 1971 (Saywell 1971:125). Cross was freed on December 4, 1970 as the FLQ negotiated a flight to Cuba with the government during a stand-off. Laporte's killers were caught on a farm on December 28. The Canadian army withdrew on January 4, 1971, but a state of emergency remained in effect until April 30, 1971.

Separatist terrorism had reached its peak in Quebec, and would decline after 1970. In late February 1970, in his own analysis of terrorism, Charles Gagnon stated that the accomplishments of the FLQ had been great and "without it

the Parti Québécois would not have been possible" (Fournier 1984:182). Terrorism in this period had also become quite close to the labour movement and its struggles. As stated by Jacques Lanctôt:

> There's no need to list all the strikes which became more and more radical from 1967 to 1970, or the increasingly popular and massive demonstrations for independence. The national and social oppression of the people of Quebec are two aspects of the same reality. Consequently, the struggle for national liberation and the socialist revolution, far from being two separate stages, are two inseparable elements in the process of total liberation (Fournier 1984:227).

As previously stated, in the first four years of FLQ terrorism three attacks had been committed in support of labour struggles. In these second four years (1967-1970) sixty-five (65) terrorist attacks (or 51.2% of all attacks in this period) were done in support of the labour movement (such as attacks at Provincial Ministry of Labour buildings, at homes of presidents of striking companies, etc).[23] Thirty-two (32) attacks (25.2%) occurred right at strike-bound establishments. Only 55 attacks (43%) during this period were aimed at other targets (such as statues, symbols of colonialism, etc.).

The years 1967-1970 were a time of high discontent in general, manifested through both the labour and separatist movements. FLQ terrorism, separatist organizations, and the labour movement and organizations were all becoming closer

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[23]These statistics were computed from the total number of terrorist attacks recorded throughout this research.

to supporting each other and joining together on certain causes. A further investigation of the labour movement and union organizations during this period will further clarify this relationship.

CONDITION OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONS

This period was a time of extensive growth for the labour movement. Total union membership in Quebec had been 540,000 in 1966 (35% of the active labour force), and had grown to 700,000 (39% of the labour force) by 1970 (CSN and CEQ 1987:292-293). In 1967, the CIC became the *Corporation de l'enseignement du Québec* (CEQ), and along with the QFL and the CSN, became one of the big three unions to dominate the labour landscape. It is during this period that one can see the preliminary associations between labour and nationalism beginning to form and develop. In June of 1968, QFL vice-president Fernand Daoust publicly stated that if Quebec's economic problems were not soon cleared up, labour might have to look towards an alliance with separatist causes (*Montreal Star* 10 June 1968).

The labour movement itself began cooperating more during this time period. In 1969, a labour-based mass circulation weekly paper called *Québec-Presse* was published with the participation and financial backing of the CSN, QFL, and CEQ (CSN and CEQ 1987:216). In the spring of 1970, the first joint labour committee was formed and conferences

were held by the big three unions in efforts to improve the organization of the labour movement. The years 1967-1970 experienced a growing militancy of labour, as a number of disputes became quite violent. A great number of these disputes also had the growing support of separatist organizations as well as the FLQ. As stated earlier, there was a large number of FLQ attacks at strike-bound establishments from 1967-1970. There were ten bombings alone that were done in support of the construction strike which began in May of 1969. To better illustrate this increasing nationalist presence in the labour movement, the following synopsis of some important struggles during this period is provided in the following section.

Labour Disputes and Terrorism

On June 15, 1967, QFL workers at the Seven-Up plant in the Town of Mount Royal initiated a strike which was to last 13 months. Injunctions were eventually granted against pickets due to the increasing number of violent demonstrations occurring as joint CSN-QFL pickets clashed with police who were protecting the company's use of strikebreakers (CSN and CEQ 1987:207). In October of 1967, an FLQ cell claimed responsibility for a bomb that had exploded at the plant. The strike had the support of the separatist movement, and on February 27, 1968, strikers were joined by demonstrators from the RIN, NDP, and MSA to show

their support. Violence resulted from conflicts with police, and former RIN secretary and FLQ terrorist Pierre-Paul Geoffroy (24) was arrested for assaulting a police officer (Fournier 1984:128). He would later go on to place a number of bombs at strike-bound establishments in the name of the FLQ. One such bomb was defused at the Seven-Up plant in May of 1968.

On June 23, 1968, approximately 3000 employees of the Quebec Liquor Board initiated a strike for higher wages. The strike had the support of the RIN, who had created a support fund for the striking workers (*Montreal Star* 23 September 1968). Also in support of this strike, Geoffroy's FLQ cell planted six bombs between June and November, mostly at liquor outlets (*Montreal Star* 7 March 1969).

On July 18, 1968, approximately 1300 employees of Domtar Paper initiated a strike which would last until late January 1969. On November 3, 1968, about 150 workers led a 26 hour occupation of the Windsor Mill, causing an estimated $100,000 damage (*Montreal Star* 6 January 1969). Three FLQ bombings occurred in support of Domtar workers, including one at the home of one of the directors of Domtar, Perry Fox.

On October 6, 1969, Montreal firemen and police demonstrated at City Hall to protest their wages and contract. The following day, they conducted a 24 hour strike in which rioting and looting occurred in downtown

Montreal (*Montreal Star* 9 October 1969). During the night of this strike, a group called the *Mouvement de libération du taxi* (MLT) drove 75 cabs down to the Murray Hill Limo Service garage. The MLT was attempting to organize taxi drivers and had actively been protesting the Murray Hill monopoly on shuttle traffic between Montreal and the airport (Crelinsten 1988:62). A previous MLT demonstration (done with the support of separatist organizations) had turned violent on October 30, 1968, as 850 protestors attacked Murray Hill Limos during a picket at Dorval airport (*Montreal Star* 31 October 1968). A similar but less violent MLT demonstration was conducted on December 18, 1968, with the support of Marxist-Leninist groups (*Le Devoir* 19 October 1968). On the night of the police strike, the MLT protest at Murray Hill again turned violent, as guards on the roof of the garage opened fire into the crowd. The only fatality was undercover Quebec Provincial Police officer Robert Dumas. Both FLQ terrorists Marc Carbonneau and Jacques Lanctôt were part of the MLT and were present at this demonstration (Crelinsten 1988:62).

The last major conflict of this period involved a group of workers termed *Les gars de Lapalme*[24], who were Montreal mail truck drivers. On February 3, 1970, they initiated a series of rotating strikes against the postal system due to the fear that they would lose their jobs and hard fought

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[24]The Lapalme Boys

union rights and seniority clauses in April when the Federal government reorganized the Post Office. In April, the Federal government did withdraw the contract from the Lapalme company, and refused to allow the 450 drivers to join the civil service under their own union (CSN and CEQ 1987:212). Les gars de Lapalme conducted a violent strike, attacking scab trucks and workers. Between March and June of 1970, eight FLQ bombs exploded in support, mostly in mailboxes, post offices, and at companies such as D & D Transport and Phillips Security Agency.[25] By August of 1970, the toll from violence stood at 1692 post boxes damaged, 104 post stations damaged, 662 trucks attacked, 102 arrests, and 75 injuries (Chodos and Auf der Maur 1972:43). As already stated, one of the FLQ demands for Cross's release during the October Crisis was the rehiring of the Lapalme workers.

The FLQ manifesto broadcast during the October Crisis also named a number of other labour struggles that it supported.[26] The Separatist and Labour movements were also together on their condemnation of the War Measures Act. In the 1970 provincial election, a number of unions invited their members to vote for the *Parti Québécois*, most notably

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[25]D & D Transport was a trucking firm hired to pick up the slack from the striking Lapalme workers. Phillips Security Agency was the firm hired for post office security.

[26]Lord and Co., Domtar, Quebec Liquor Board, Seven-Up, etc. See *The Manifesto of the Front de libération du Quebec* (Daniels 1973:116-121).

the Montreal Central Council (CSN). Many labour groups were beginning to believe that although the PQ was not a real worker party, independence had to be acquired first before socialism could be obtained. As stated by the education committee of the CSN and CEQ (1987:247),

> The labour movement also tried to link its vision of a socialist society with Quebec independence, or at least greater sovereignty for Quebec.

The increasing support of labour for separatism can be seen in the history of the *Front d'action politique* (FRAP) which formed to fight Montreal Mayor Jean Drapeau in the October 25, 1970 civic election. FRAP was an organization of trade unions, local committees, students and intellectuals, directed under its president Paul Cliche. FRAP formed as an alternative to Drapeau, but suffered through the October Crisis when it never really publically condemned the FLQ, especially under the atmosphere of persecution during the War Measures Act. Insinuations were actually made that FRAP was a front for the FLQ, and Drapeau won the election (Saywell 1971:111).

As shall be shown, in the next few years the separatist and labour movements would join forces and become even closer linked through support of each other, culminating in the election of the PQ in 1976. Terrorism and nationalist social violence would also decline as separatist and labour organizations grew and evolved through this previously stated cooperation.

PHASE III- THE RISE OF MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS (1971-1976)

This period involved the rise of separatist organizations and collective action, and the decline of terrorism and nationalist social violence. There were 21 terrorist attacks during these years, all within 1971 and 1972. FLQ terrorism effectively ended in 1973. This period did not see the explosive growth of new nationalist organizations that occurred during the last period, but did involve the growth and evolution of the PQ into a large, complex and powerful organization that eventually became a provincial government in 1976. As was found in the Tillys' (1975) study, the course of violence (in this case terrorism) followed the evolution of power and government in Quebec. There was a decline in nationalist social violence as well, as there were no large violent demonstrations such as were seen in the last four years.

The labour movement continued to grow, as the first four years of this period (1971-1974) involved 871 strikes. By 1976 the number of total strikes would reach 1,591. Violence now only occurred within large, mass social demonstrations, such as the La Presse affair and some incidents during the General Strike. Official connections with separatist organizations were formed (PQ-QFL), providing more access and outlets for social protest between the nationalist and labour movements.

CONDITION OF THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONS

The years following the October Crisis witnessed extensive sophisticated growth in the organization of the separatist movement, or more specifically, the Parti Québécois. Unlike the preceding years, there was no great proliferation of new separatist organizations during this period. Rather than generating the explosion of more embryonic organizations devoted to Quebec's independence, the years 1971 to 1976 produced more of a streamlining of separatist collective action into mostly just one stable and growing organization, the PQ.

The PQ experienced tremendous structural, financial, and political growth during this period. In 1973, membership was counted at 100,000, which would grow to 130,000 by the time of the 1976 provincial election. By 1980, membership had reached 238,220 (Fraser 1984:370-374). This is significant, as at the birth of the PQ in 1968 there were only approximately 26,000 members, and in a little over ten years the PQ had grown and involved more than 200,000 people in its organization. What makes this important is that all of these people were now integrated into one single political party, and no longer spread out among numerous smaller organizations which only weakened the separatist movement. The financial resources of the PQ also developed during this period. For example, between the months of March and May of 1972, over $600,000 was collected (double

their anticipated amount), all from individuals, not corporations (*Montreal Star* 8 May 1972). The legitimation of the PQ was furthered by the gaining of such personalities as economist Jacques Parizeau and provincial-federal relations expert Claude Morin in 1972.

A pivotal point in this time period was the provincial election on October 29, 1973. Although Bourassa and the Liberals were re-elected, the PQ won 30% of the popular vote, making them the official opposition. This victory was very important, as now the separatist movement had reached a stage where it was being led by a complex and stable organization which had a powerful say in real government activity. This separatist organization was no longer a "fringe group" with little resources or structure. It is interesting to note that the year 1973 was the first in ten years to have no FLQ terrorist attacks. The next provincial election was held on November 15, 1976, and the PQ won 41% of the popular vote, elected 71 members and formed the provincial government of Quebec.

At this point, a separatist organization was now a government, having access to power, wealth, and other resources. The separatist movement was now in a complex, advanced stage headed by a large and powerful organization. Terrorism dwindled out during these years, as it now became an unnecessary and inefficient form of protest. Most would-be terrorists could effect more change by joining the PQ

than by blowing up mailboxes (as will be shown in the following section, many old FLQ members joined the PQ). The separatist movement now had real access to the power structure. It was no longer in the "developing stage" as it had been during the years of the RIN, which held meetings in homes of its members due to lack of financial resources. PQ conventions were now held in plush expensive hotels. In short, the separatist movement had reached a level where it was headed by an organization with governmental power, financial resources, structural stability, and organized sophisticated goals aimed at independence as laid out by Lévesque's *Option Québec*.[27]

Other Nationalist Organizations

As previously stated, there were not as many new militant separatist organizations surfacing during this period. Given the growth in membership experienced by the PQ, it is possible that most nationalist individuals simply joined the PQ rather than form new organizations. The same may be true of most FLQ-minded individuals. But the formation of a few marginal groups deserves mention here. One group, *Le front commun pour la défense de la langue*

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[27]See the English language version:
Lévesque. René. 1968. An Option For Quebec. translated by McClelland and Stewart. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

français[28] was a loose organization of various militant nationalists drawn mostly from socialist youth groups and the LIS (*Montreal Star* 2 September 1971). It was headed by Reggie Chartrand, who had been personally very active in many of the nationalist demonstrations in the late 1960's.[29] This group mainly participated in nationalist protests and on the anniversary of the institution of the War Measures Act. Another organization of some significance was the *Comité d'information sur les prisonniers politiques* (CIPP), which was formed by a group of progressive lawyers to fill the gap left by the disbanded MDPPQ. The CIPP's actions consisted mainly of lobbying for the release of suspected and convicted FLQ prisoners (Fournier 1984:328). In June of 1972, the *Société St. Jean Baptiste* officially changed its name to *Le Mouvement national des Québécois* (MNQ) and stated its aim to become more socially radical and support the Common Front (*Le Devoir* 12 June 1972). The last new organization to be in the news often was a group called *Le Mouvement Québec Français* (MQF). The MQF had the backing of labour unions and other nationalist organizations, and its goal was to make French the national language of Quebec by establishing it as the official language of work and education in the province (*Le Devoir* 24 February 1972).

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[28]*The Common Front for the Defense of the French Language*

[29]Chartrand was also head of a small nationalist organization known as *Les chevaliers de l'indépendance* which participated in many demonstrations.

However, although these groups participated in demonstrations and lobbied political parties, none were as violently disruptive or actively militant as the young nationalist organizations had been in the previous period. Small scale instances of social violence (such as terrorism) were giving way to more proactive, controlled, and effective forms of collective action.

TERRORISM (1971-1976)

The FLQ had a difficult time attempting to reorganize and develop after the War Measures Act and subsequent police repression. The RCMP and Sûreté du Québec engaged in intrusive and illegal police countermeasures in desperate efforts to suppress any further terrorism. Although this cannot be taken to mean that police repression was or is completely effective in thwarting terrorism (as the case of Northern Ireland illustrates), but in Quebec after 1970, police tactics may have helped slow down the radical extremist fringe of the separatist movement long enough to allow the growth and further development of the PQ, and subsequently help push radical individuals towards this and other legitimate organizations. The police were under extreme pressure after the October Crisis, and embarked on a course of infiltrating suspected FLQ cells, producing informers, as well as intimidating and harassing suspects. The RCMP security service even went as far as to create

their own FLQ cells, issued communiques, and even committed crimes to create credibility (Fournier 1984:277). As stated by Fournier (1984:294):

> Under the emergency legislation, the FLQ's few activities had been closely watched, even operated by remote control, by the police.

In spite of increased police repression, FLQ cells attempted a revival. In January of 1971, a new FLQ cell published a small newsletter called *Patriotes*, which promised future issues with technical information on how to build bombs. In February, another cell published its FLQ-newsletter called *Vaincre*, which was more Marxist-Leninist than *Patriotes* and appeared until the fall of 1971 (Fournier 1984:282). At this time, Pierre Vallieres published his own FLQ-newsletter called *Organisons-Nous*, which attempted to provide activists with military training and political ideology (Fournier 1984:309). It stressed organization building and urged readers not to strike prematurely. This is important as it gives insight into the changing nature of terrorist action and strategy. FLQ terrorists were now advocating structure and proactivity, <u>not</u> spontaneous action. Vallières' paper also had an article on women in the revolutionary movement, making feminism an objective in an independent Quebec.

<u>Terrorist events</u>

FLQ terrorism tapered off two years after the October

Crisis. Between the years 1971-1976, only 21 bombings or attempted bombings occurred, all in 1971 and 1972. As previously stated, no terrorist attacks occurred at all in 1973, the year the PQ became the official opposition. The trend in targets of attacks did however continue throughout this period, with 12 of the 21 attacks being committed in support of the labour movement (57% of total attacks). It is interesting to note that no FLQ attacks occurred in support of the Common Front general strike in 1972.

During this period in Quebec, terrorism was being replaced more and more by broad-based organized social protest in the form of labour unions and the PQ. Many old FLQ terrorists began leaving terrorism to adopt these more viable alternatives. On December 13, 1971, Pierre Vallières publicly broke with the FLQ and supported the PQ, stating that the PQ was more dangerous to Ottawa and that more could be accomplished towards separatism within this organization (*Le Devoir* 13 December 1971). He stated that the FLQ had made it possible for the PQ to emerge and for trade unions to become more radical, but it was now no longer useful. Terrorist François Mario Bachand, living in exile in Paris, echoed Vallières' sentiments and recommended support for the PQ (Fournier 1984:285). In August 1972, *Liberation cell* members Louise and Jacques Cossette-Trudel (living in exile in Cuba) also broke ties with the FLQ (Fournier 1984:329). In 1971, Charles Gagnon left the FLQ and in November of

1972, formed a socialist worker organization called *En Lutte*. Gagnon split with Vallières over his support of the PQ, and even abandoned the idea of separatism in 1974 due to his aversion to the PQ (Fournier 1984:335). Popular collective action was being seen as more effective than marginal terrorism.

From 1978 to 1982, just two years after the PQ took power, many FLQ terrorists living in exile began returning to Quebec, many to serve prison terms. Many other FLQ terrorists joined the PQ. For example, Jean Denis Lamoureux, an ex-FLQ terrorist who had been convicted in the 1963 Westmount mailbox bombings, was hired by the PQ to be its new communications director in 1984 (*Winnipeg Free Press* 24 August 1984). In the early 1990's, Paul Rose made an attempt to become a candidate for the New Democratic Party in Quebec. In 1995, Raymond Villeneuve who had been active in the first FLQ cells in 1963, attempted to found a new separatist party called *Le Mouvement libération national du Québec* (which was condemned by the PQ as violence-prone) (*Halifax Chronicle Herald* 11 December 1995). Villeneuve was also a member of the PQ.

By illustrating the careers of some FLQ terrorists, insight can be gained into the changing direction of the cycle of social protest in Quebec. The separatist movement, as can be seen in the life cycles of Vallières, Gagnon, Villeneuve, and others, transformed over the years 1963 to

1976 from centering around loosely organized spontaneous reactive violence (FLQ terrorism) to a proactive complex movement headed by a powerful organization. As stated by Jacques Lanctôt at his trial in 1979:

> It is very clear to me that there is no point in starting to do over again today what was done in 1970. The situation has evolved on a broad scale and in a radical way, to the point, where we now have a provincial government which proposes, in the foreseeable future, to make Quebec independent. (Fournier 1984:342)

CONDITION OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONS

As previously stated, terrorism and small scale acts of violence were being replaced by mass based organized social protest. Although this time period contained little terrorist activity, it was a highpoint for labour movement action.

Labour Organizations

The three big unions (QFL, CEQ, CSN) continued to dominate the labour landscape in Quebec. By this time, the QFL had grown to become the largest of the big three unions in Quebec, containing more than 50% of total union members in the province (CSN and CEQ 1987:230). The majority of its members were from the private sector, and it had began moving towards a more "Quebec-based" attitude with more autonomy from the Canadian Labour Congress. In November of 1972, the CEQ (whose membership contained about 10% of unionized workers) changed from *Corporation* to *Centrale de*

l'enseignment du Québec, and attempted to organized all workers in the education field. By the late 1970's, the CSN contained approximately 20% of the labour force, but distinguished itself from both the QFL and CEQ as more than half of its members were from the public sector (CSN and CEQ 1987:231). One noteable event in labour organizations occurred in June of 1972, when the right wing of the CSN split to form the *Centrale des syndicats democratiques* (CSD). The CSD started with approximately 30,000 members, 90% of whom were from the private sector. This split occurred in the midst of the Common Front and in part was a rejection of the CSN's goal of a socialist society (CSN and CEQ 1987:232).

The big three unions also published manifestos during this period, which were Marxist-oriented critiques of capitalism.[30] As will be shown in their activity, these union organizations became more radical and action oriented during this period. Delegates at the QFL convention in 1971 described it as "more radical than at any other convention" (*Montreal Star* 6 December 1971). Likewise, the CEQ executive commented in 1973 that it seemed like their organization was being flooded with radical members (*Le Devoir* 9 July 1973).

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[30]1971-CSN: "Ne comptons que sur nos propres moyens"
1971-QFL: "L'Etat, rouage de notre exploitation"
1972-CEQ: "L'Etat au service de la classe dominante"

Links with Separatism

At this time, these labour groups began forging more organizational links with the separatist movement (more specifically, the PQ). At their convention in 1972, the CEQ declared it was in favour of separatism, but would not support any specific political party (*Montreal Star* 3 July 1972). However, the CEQ did contribute to the victory of the PQ in 1976 and had a number of its members elected under the PQ banner (still without officially supporting the PQ). Similarly, the CSN also contributed to the PQ without official support (CSN and CEQ 1987:249). The QFL had already displayed signs of support for separatism in the late 1960's. In 1972, Vice-President of the QFL Jean Gérin-Lajoie came out in favour of separatism, but called it a personal endorsement, not representative of the QFL organization (*Montreal Star* 17 August 1972). In 1973, the QFL removed support for the NDP party from its constitution and in 1975 officially gave it to the PQ (CSN and CEQ 1987:247). It was the only labour organization to officially support the PQ during the 1976 election.

Organized Labour Action

This period contained some impressive instances of organized mass activity. There were a number of large strikes that occurred, such as the Hydro Quebec strike of 5000 workers in June 1971, the Quebec Provincial Police

walkout (3200 members) in September 1971, and 3000 Montreal firemen in October 1971. But unionized workers were not the only ones using organized mass activity as a form of protest. There were a number of events where regular citizens organized protests to express their grievances. On August 16, 1971, about 125 citizens of Chibougamau organized a roadblock to protest to the province the fact that one unpaved road was their only connection to the rest of Quebec (*Montreal Star* 16 August 1971). This had been their third blockade demonstration. Similarly, on September 1, 1971, about 1000 citizens of Lac-des-Iles organized a highway blockade to protest the closing of two wood processing mills in their community (*Montreal Star* 2 September 1971). Likewise, on September 22, 1971, the citizens of Cadillac organized a highway blockade to protest the closing of a mine which was the city's main source of employment (*Montreal Star* 27 September 1971). These events illustrate the contagious use of organized social protest in lieu of isolated acts of violence.

But some minor acts of violence did occur during this period. In February 1972, les gars de Lapalme occupied the CSN offices to protest the slowness of the CSN in aiding their cause. Also, in June 1972 a number of bombs exploded at a private garbage collection firm in Montreal in the midst of a manual labour strike by the city (*Montreal Star* 8 June 1972). However, these bombs were never claimed by

nationalists, or the FLQ, and these acts of violence were quite minor compared to the previous period. The most important labour activities of this period were large, mass based organized demonstrations.

La Presse Affair 1971

On July 19, 1971, a seven month long lockout was declared against 320 pressmen who were resisting job-threatening technological change. The PQ, several nationalist organizations, and all of organized labour declared support for the strikers. The FLQ declared support by planting a bomb near the home of Power Corporation Vice-President William Turner.[31] La Presse continued to publish until October 28, 1971, when publication was ceased due to the increasing number of violent acts occurring around the building (car vandalisms, fights, etc.)(*Montreal Star* 28 October 1971). La Presse was also preparing for a planned labour demonstration on October 29. Mayor Drapeau enacted the Montreal anti-demonstration bylaw, but the demonstration went ahead as planned. On October 29, between 8000 and 10,000 people (members from CEQ, CSN, and QFL) held a mass protest demonstration against La Presse (*Le Devoir* 1 November 1971). Violence erupted with the police, resulting in injuries and a number of arrests. There was one fatality as a young woman, Michèle Gauthier, had an asthma attack in

[31]La Presse is owned by Power Corporation

the crowd and died as a result. The La Presse affair was a preliminary cooperation among labour organizations, and led to a more impressive united protest in the form of the Common Front.

Common Front and General Strike 1972

In 1972, a common front of 210,000 public workers (QFL, CSN, CEQ) elected to bargain together with the government. One of their demands was a minimum weekly wage earning of $100. On March 28, 1972, the Common Front held its first 24 hour strike to back its demands. On April 11, 1972, the Common Front initiated a 10 day general strike, which was not supported by the PQ. The government ordered Hydro Quebec and hospital workers back, but many refused. In some places entire towns and radio stations were occupied by workers (Chodos and Auf der Maur 1972:119). On April 21, 1972, Premier Bourassa introduced Bill 19, which ordered the striking workers back to work with harsh penalties for disobedience. The leaders of the big three unions, Marcel Pépin (CSN), Louis Laberge (QFL), and Yvon Charbonneau (CEQ) urged workers to disobey the legislation, but most returned to work. These leaders were arrested and charged for recommending workers to ignore Bill 19, and on May 8, 1972, all three were sentenced to one year in jail. Beginning May 9, a sympathy strike erupted across the province, as about 300,000 workers (both private and public) walked out in

protest. However, no FLQ terrorist attacks occurred during these events. All three union leaders did the full year, and were released May 16, 1973. Labour would again use the common front tactic in dealing with the government in 1975-1976.

The actions of organized labour during this period display the growing use of organized mass protest over small scale violence. By this period, labour organizations had evolved into a powerful and complex force which utilized mass action much more effectively than isolated acts of violence.

ANALYSIS

As has been shown in the outlined history above, as the separatist social movement grew and evolved into complex and powerful organizations, terrorism (and accompanying nationalist social violence) grew relationally, but was gradually replaced with mass-based collective conventional protest. The pattern of FLQ terrorism and its relationship to the separatist movement closely followed the theories of the Tillys, Tarrow, and Targ, and as the size, base, and party organization of the separatist movement expanded, terrorism gradually diminished. Terrorism's place in the cycle of social protest was in the ascension of the separatist movement. Separatist organizations (the PQ to be specific) evolved to the point where the range of effective action open to them was quite large, and collective action became much more efficient and appealing than disruptive acts of violence and terrorism. In short, the separatist movement reached a stage where it was headed by a complex and developed organization which could act as an effective vehicle for collective action.

To present evidence of this theory, this section will highlight specific correlations of terrorist organizations and attacks with the growth of conventional mass-based nationalist organizations and labour unions. To further illustrate substantiation of this theory, the careers of some FLQ terrorists will be traced to reveal the dynamics

and relationship of terrorism to opportunities and availabilities of mass-based complex social organizations. This section will clearly highlight answers to the previously stated guiding questions; 1) To what extent did terrorist activity change as the character, organization, and complexity of the separatist movement changed? and 2) What is the importance of the connections between the FLQ and the labour movement, and what difference did the growth of the labour movement make in reducing FLQ terrorism?

(I) THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT: EVOLUTION AND TRANSFORMATION

As the separatist movement evolved, important changes and shifts occurred among organizations within the movement. A somewhat simplified representation of the separatist movement can be seen in Figure 1, from fringe organizations advocating and using violence, to moderate structured organizations utilizing collective action. This diagram helps illustrate what happened to the FLQ cells and why they no longer exist.

As indicated by the arrows, groups and individuals in the movement were not static, but were in a constant state of flux and change. Individuals continually left organizations to join others throughout the cycle of the movement. Thus, as previously stated, many FLQ members came from the RIN, occasionally participated in semi-structured organizations and demos (LIS, etc.), and many eventually

returned to conventional, mass-based organizations (PQ). During the rise of the separatist movement, complex structured mass-based organizations (those surrounded by the double border) did not exist or were in their infancy. Therefore separatist minded individuals were forced to participate and express protest through other, less organized groups, such as the FLQ.

FIGURE 1. SEPARATIST MOVEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONS.



At this time, groups on the left side of the flowchart in Figure 1 were more prominent, as was the increasing use of violence. During the peak of terrorism (1967-1970), advanced complex separatist organizations were just beginning to develop and evolve. High levels of terrorism and social violence were the result of the increasing mobilization of separatist individuals into organizations,

as groups on the left and center of the flow chart were growing. After 1970, a shift in the separatist movement occurred from the left and center of the flowchart, to complex collective action organizations on the right. Individuals and support for extremist (FLQ) and semi-structured groups (LIS, CIS, etc.) who used terrorism or social violence was drained and funnelled into complex structured social organizations (PQ) who used mass collective action. As the Tillys (1975:241) found in their study, as a cycle of social protest progresses, people begin to identify more with organizations and conventional peaceful protests replace violence. This explains why FLQ terrorism and FLQ cells disappeared. As the separatist movement evolved, complex organizations grew and evolved, and violence was replaced with conventional mass protests and collective action. The FLQ was absorbed by the PQ and other more organized groups who were using more efficient methods of social protest.

(II) To What Extent did Terrorism Change as Separatist Movement Changed?

(A) Terrorist Organizations

As the separatist movement evolved throughout the cycle, there was a gradual coalescence of separatist and some nationalist groups into one large organization, the PQ. This also happened to a lesser degree in terrorist organizations. During the rise of terrorism (1963-1966),

there was a whole array of groups with different names taking part in terrorist attacks (FLQ, ALQ, ARQ, PIQ, etc.) After 1967, any and all terrorist attacks were claimed by groups calling themselves FLQ only. This perhaps can be taken as a somewhat simplistic attempt at organizing among terrorist organizations, but before these groups could reach a sophisticated level of organization, the separatist movement had evolved to a point in the cycle where mass based collective action organizations became dominant. Simply put, the majority of terrorist members joined more organized and powerful groups who had more access to real change.

(B) Terrorist Attacks and the Growth of the PQ

As the graph (Figure 2) displays, one can see the change in terrorist attacks over the cycle of the separatist movement. The years 1963-1966 (Phase I) on the graph show rising and falling levels of terrorist events, indicative of an unorganized reactive level of violence that occurred during the rise of the separatist movement. Phase II (1967-1970) displays the highest levels of terrorism. These years also saw high levels of violence in nationalist demonstrations. At this time, the PQ (although developing quickly) was still in its infancy. As Tarrow (1991:53) states, once the intense conflict that is prominent at the peak of a movement cycle passes, it is replaced by more



FIGURE 2

TERRORIST EVENTS IN QUEBEC 1963-1973[1]

[1]This data was collected from newspaper reportings and supplemented with information from bibliographical sources.



FIGURE 3

STRIKES IN QUEBEC 1963-1976[2]

[2]Information compiled from Labour Canada (1963-1976).

conventional protests with more instrumental goals. As can be seen during the years of Phase III (1971-1976), terrorism dropped dramatically and the use of mass-based conventional protest rose. When one correlates this information with the graph in Figure 3 (Strikes in Quebec), one can see this relationship in the drastic rise of strikes in Quebec from 1972 on. These years also correlate with the growth of the PQ into the official opposition and eventually the provincial government. The growth of the PQ can be more readily seen in the following section.

The growing memberships of separatist groups shows the increasing level of organization of the separatist movement. As can be seen in the following tables, separatist groups organized people much more rapidly in later years after 1968 than before.

RIN	MEMBERSHIPS
1963	5,500
1964	7,500
1968	14,000

TABLE 1. RIN.

PQ	MEMBERSHIPS
1968	14,280
1970	33,000
1971	82,000
1973	100,000
1976	130,000

TABLE 2. PQ.[1]

As can be seen, it took the RIN four years to double their

[1]The membership level for 1968 does not include the estimated number of RIN activists who joined the PQ after the RIN folded.

membership from 1964, and six years total to reach a significant organizational size of over 10,000 members. Conversely, the PQ had 14,000 members upon its creation, and it only took two years to double its membership. It is easy to see the rapid growth of separatist organizations after 1970, as the PQ had more than doubled its membership within a year, and had tripled it within three years. Prior to 1970, it had taken the RIN six years to organize 14,000 people. After 1970, in the same amount of time, the PQ had organized 100,000 people. This swift rise in membership could be explained in terms of the FLQ's disappearance, as current and future FLQ terrorists were absorbed into the growth of the PQ. To potential terrorists, the power and collective action strategies of the PQ were more appealing than that of a FLQ terrorist cell. As stated by Tarrow (1991:54), terrorist groups do not encourage terrorism because they prefer it, but rather because it is all they can offer.

(III) WHAT DIFFERENCE DID THE GROWTH OF LABOUR MAKE IN REDUCING FLQ TERRORISM?

As previously stated, the growth and evolution of the labour movement and the subsequent connections forged with separatist organizations provided more outlets (collective action) and vehicles for nationalist expression and protest. Legitimate separatist organizations were not the only ones supporting the labour movement. FLQ terrorists had

initiated preliminary support through specific bombing targets beginning back in 1963. As the graph in Figure 4 illustrates, terrorist support for labour struggles gradually rose over the years, to rather high percentages of total attacks during the years 1968 to 1972. Between 1967 and 1970, half of all terrorist attacks during this period were executed in support of the labour movement. This trend also continued into 1971 and 1972, when the last FLQ attacks occurred. Like legitimate separatist organizations, terrorist groups were beginning to link with other organizations to more effectively voice protests.

Labour unrest had steadily grown throughout the years, as the number of strikes in Quebec in a given year gradually increased. But as the graph in Figure 3 shows, the number of strikes drastically increased after 1972, reaching 390 in 1974. As already stated, the years 1971-1973 were a time of increased mass-based collective action as the favoured form of social protest. They are also the years that FLQ terrorism trailed off and disappeared. The growth of the labour movement with greater use of mass protest might have also absorbed many FLQ-minded individuals and budding FLQ organizations by giving them more efficient and powerful opportunities to protest than FLQ cells did. The evolution of the labour movement to this point in the cycle of social protest and its subsequent connections to separatist causes might have helped in preventing further terrorism due to the



FIGURE 4

PERCENTAGE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS SUPPORTING LABOUR MOVEMENT[3]

[3]This data was collected from newspaper reportings and bibliographical sources.

increasing use of mass-based social protest as an effective vehicle for social change.

(IV) TERRORIST CAREERS IN THE CYCLE OF SOCIAL PROTEST

Tracing the careers of FLQ terrorists throughout the separatist movement will further illustrate the validity of this theory. Through this method, one can see the dynamics and changes that occurred within FLQ cells as separatist organizations grew.

As already shown, many terrorists originated and met one another within the fledgling RIN. During the rise of the separatist movement, many of these terrorists were also part of other organizations. For instance, Raymond Villeneuve was also in the ASIQ, François Bachand was in the CIS, and Marc Carbonneau and Jacques Lanctôt were both radicals in the MLT. These individuals were looking for appropriate organizations to express protest, and when none were found adequate, utilized FLQ terrorism. As the separatist movement evolved into 1968 and 1969, more and more nationalist organizations spontaneously originated and many FLQ terrorists circulated back and forth into these new groups as the flowchart in Figure 1 illustrates. Many terrorists participated in the violent mass demonstrations of these years. For instance, Paul Rose and Jacques Lanctôt were both involved in the St. Jean Baptiste Parade riot of 1968, Jacques Cossette-Trudel led a CEGEP occupation, and

Marc Carbonneau and Jacques Lanctôt were active in Opération Congrès. As the separatist movement continued on its cycle into the early and mid 1970's, terrorism began to diminish as terrorists began leaving the FLQ. As the use of mass-based conventional collective action increased, terrorists such as Pierre Vallières, Charles Gagnon, Bachand, and Villeneuve left the FLQ, abandoned terrorism, and advocated change through advanced complex social organizations. Many ended up in the PQ. This transition followed by individual terrorists, from the use of terrorism in the FLQ to the use of violence and mass demonstration in semi-structured organizations (such as LIS, etc.), to the use of primarily mass-based collective action in the PQ, outlines the path of the separatist movement itself as it evolved throughout the cycle of social protest in Quebec.

COMPARISONS WITH NORTHERN IRELAND

The comparative example of terrorism in Northern Ireland is useful here to highlight tenets of the central theory of this thesis of why FLQ terrorism vanished. This section is only an exploratory comparison, with the aim of using Northern Ireland to better clarify and illustrate the changing dynamic of the cycle of social protest in Quebec which was responsible for the diminishing of terrorism. The roots and causes of Irish terrorism are much deeper and diverse than those of the FLQ in Quebec, to the extent that terrorism and the paramilitary organizations in Ulster have practically become institutionalized.[1] What is important to this thesis is the comparison of the dynamic and evolution of social protest between Quebec and Northern Ireland, and the differences between the development of separatist organizations in Quebec and republican organizations in Northern Ireland.

Collective Action

Similar to the French in Quebec, Irish Catholics living in Ulster were subject to many forms of discrimination, such as unfair electoral representation, employment availabilities, housing opportunities, and a lower standard of living (Coyle 1983:50). Unlike the French in Quebec,

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[1]The IRA even act as an unofficial police force in some Catholic areas in Northern Ireland. See Drake (1995:90)

grievances of Irish Catholics have found few methods and vehicles of effective expression. Where the Québécois, over time, formed organizations that became powerful enough and used collective action to effect real change, Irish Catholics have found few organizations and outlets that are capable of effecting social change. As stated by Coyle (1983:65), the only group that ever seems to offer this opportunity is the IRA. Many attempts at mass based collective action and overt organizational growth by Irish Catholics have been violently repressed. Examples of this can be seen in 1972's Bloody Sunday, the internment of Catholics in the early 1970's, and the failure of the attempt at power sharing in the 1974 Sunningdale Accord (Coyle 1983; Farrell 1980; O'Day 1995). On Bloody Sunday, January 30, 1972, British troops opened fire on Catholic demonstrators in Derry, killing thirteen. The Sunningdale Accord was an attempt at establishing a power sharing agreement between Catholics and Protestants. It was opposed by Protestants and eventually brought down by a Protestant industrial strike (Coyle 1983:81).

Organizational Growth

Similar to FLQ terrorism, IRA terrorism is part of the larger republican social movement most often represented by the political organization *Sinn Fein*.[2] Since 1981, *Sinn*

Fein has been allowed to participate in Northern Irish elections but it has never held any level of power even close to that of the PQ in Quebec. In fact, *Sinn Fein*'s effectiveness has been deliberately contained and marginalized by the British and Northern Irish governments. In 1982, *Sinn Fein* was banned from Britain and in 1989, from the airwaves, which affected the party's ability to expand its base and support (Munck 1995:160). In Quebec, the PQ experienced minor police resistance to growth and evolution which was eventually overcome. But in Northern Ireland there has been what Munck (1995:161) calls:

> a coherent and decisive package of security and political measures implemented, designed to achieve the military containment of the IRA and the political marginalisation of Sinn Fein.

These actions are partly responsible for keeping Irish terrorism alive and active. The republican movement is forcibly held in the early stages of the cycle of social protest. FLQ terrorism decreased as the PQ had the opportunity to grow and acquire power through the use of mass based collective action. IRA terrorism remains common because Irish Catholic collective action is physically and psychologically discouraged, and *Sinn Fein* is prevented from expanding its power and size. Overt Irish Catholic organizations are obstructed in their development to act as

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[2]*Sinn Fein* ("By Ourselves") is a political organization originally from the Republic of Ireland that advocates Northern Ireland's unification with the Republic. It is commonly considered the legal arm of the IRA.

vehicles for social change, so the republican movement has been forced to use a covert clandestine organization in the IRA. Where the separatist movement in Quebec eventually evolved to the point where it became an institutionalized form of social protest in the make of the PQ, the opposite has occurred in Northern Ireland. The republican movement has been impeded in its development, and therefore, the IRA and terrorism have become institutionalized as one of the few outlets of social protest.

CONCLUSIONS

It can be then attested that FLQ terrorism in Quebec occurred during the ascension of the separatist social movement, and was eventually replaced by large complex social organizations using mass-based collective action as the preferred method of social protest. This change developed over time as the separatist movement grew and evolved to eventually become headed by a large and complex separatist political party with real access to power that could act as an effective vehicle for collective action. Would-be terrorists and the majority of violent and unorganized nationalist political expression became absorbed by this large and developed separatist organization. It is the development of this cycle of the separatist social movement that is responsible for the disappearance of FLQ terrorism.

Although the conclusions of this research are not easily applied to other countries experiencing terrorism, some broad generalizations can be made. As has been already stated, many other countries have active separatist movements (such as Northern Ireland, Spain, India, etc.). Yet these countries continue to experience recurring bouts of separatist terrorism while Canada and Quebec do not. The answer may be that, in these other countries (as has been posed in the case of Northern Ireland), the evolutionary cycles of these separatist movements have been continually

impeded (by such things as repression) and therefore prevented from developing mass based organizations to act as vehicles for collective action. These movements are forcibly kept in the early stages of the cycle of a social movement, one where violence and terrorism are the most conducive and efficient methods of social protest available. Such postulations have even been made by the British government concerning "the troubles" in Northern Ireland. For example, in 1973, London speculated about legalizing *Sinn Fein* in Northern Ireland and allowing them to participate in elections in the possibility that this action might reduce terrorism (*Montreal Star* 26 April 1973). Many of these separatist movements are never allowed to develop into complex organizations or legalized to participate in elections and other methods of legal demonstration or social protest.

This thesis has demonstrated that a relationship exists between terrorism and other social movements that has gone largely uninvestigated by researchers. Although this research has placed FLQ terrorism within the context of other modes of social protest, it could be suggested that more work be done on the effect of police repression on this relationship. This is one area that has been largely ignored in this thesis. Furthermore, as this research focussed on the relationship between <u>domestic</u> terrorism and social movements, future research could be directed at the

relationship between international terrorism and specific social movements, as well as other international forms of collective action, such as the sociology of the United Nations and its social effects on some terrorist groups. It is interesting to note that theorists such as Crenshaw (1981) and Ross (1993) have stated liberal democratic states provide great opportunities for terrorism, yet this thesis demonstrates that liberal democracies permit the dissipation of terrorism through their allowance of different forms of protest. But these suppositions are not contradictions. Liberal democracies allow more opportunities for the emergence of terrorism and make possible its eventual integration into other forms of social protest. Conversely, autocracies (or repressive environments as has been suggested in Northern Ireland) may provide less opportunities for terrorism to form, but once it has originated, actually aid in preventing it from ever diminishing. More direct and focussed comparative research needs to be done in this area.

This research has also not thoroughly investigated the importance of the structure of the Canadian state in reducing terrorism. Little mention has been given to the power and importance of the province of Quebec in federal politics, and the differences this would make in the federal government's decisions and reactions to allowing the formation of a separatist political party. Lastly, more

research could be directed at the changing relationships between different terrorist organizations within the same social movement (such as the FLQ and ARQ), and their effect on events of terrorism.

APPENDIX A
Chronology of Terrorist Attacks in Quebec 1963-1973

1963

March -- Bomb explodes at the Royal Montreal Regiment in Westmount
-- Bomb explodes at Victoria Rifles on Cathcart St.
-- Bomb explodes at the Fourth (Châteauguay) Battalion of Fusiliers Mont Royal on Côte des Neiges
-- Vandalism of Wolfe monument on Plains of Abraham

April -- Bomb explodes on CNR tracks near Lemieux moments before the passing of the election train of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker
-- Bomb at Department of National Revenue, Montreal
-- Bomb defused at CFTM Mt. Royal Communications Tower
-- Bomb at RCMP Headquarters in Westmount
-- Bomb at Army Recruiting Centre in Montreal (one dead: Wilfred O'Neill)
-- Bomb defused in Central Station in Montreal
-- Bomb defused near station CKGM in Montreal

May -- Bomb at Royal Canadian Legion Hall, St Johns, Quebec.
-- Bomb defused in La Prévoyance building in Montreal
-- Bomb at the Regiment de Châteauguy Armoury in Montreal
-- Bomb at the Black Watch Armoury in Montreal
-- Bomb at the RCAF Technical Unit building in Montreal
-- Bomb at an east-end Montreal oil refinery (Golden Eagle)
-- Bomb in front of the RCEME armoury in Montreal
-- Eleven bombs in Westmount mailboxes (one maimed: Sergeant-Major Walter Leja)
-- Arson at neighbouring house to Montreal's Anti-Terrorist Squad Chief by Partisans de l'indépendance du Québec (PIQ)
-- Bomb explodes at Solbec Copper Mines
-- Eighteen (18) sticks of dynamite are placed in Quebec City mailboxes without detonators

July -- Dynamite explosion topples Queen Victoria monument in Quebec city

August -- Bomb at CPR lift bridge across St. Lawrence between LaSalle and Caughnawaga
-- Arson at Fusiliers Mont Royal
-- Arson at Regiment de Maisonneuve
-- Arson at Canadian Legion in Laval
-- Arson at CNR shelter on Ile Bigras

September -- Bomb threat and FLQ vandalism at Montreal highschool
-- Bomb defused at Catholic School Commission Headquarters in Montreal

October -- Bombs defused at two post offices in Montreal, planted by a group called Rassemblement Québec Libre (RQL)

1964

March -- Group called Armée de Libération Québécois (ALQ) vandalize English words on signs and pull down British flags in Montreal
-- Bomb wrapped in the Union Jack defused at the base of the main flagpole in the Plains of Abraham

April -- ALQ threaten terrorist attacks at all English firms in Quebec City
-- Bomb explodes near a military drill hall on Craig Street.
-- ALQ destroy CNR tracks at Ste. Madeleine and Ste. Hyacinthe
-- ALQ bomb defused at base of Queen Victoria statue in front of McGill University on Sherbrooke

May -- ALQ bomb defused on Victoria Bridge in Montreal
-- ALQ destroy CPR tracks near Ste. Lajore
-- Bomb defused near legislature buildings in Quebec city, at the base of the Boer War monument

November -- Bomb explodes at the transmission tower of the English-language radio and television station CFCF in Caughnawaga

1965

April -- Bomb defused at the Palais de Justice in Montreal

May -- Bomb explodes at Place Victoria in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes at the U.S. consulate in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes at the head office of Prudential Insurance
-- Bomb defused at a central post office on Peel St.

June -- Derailment of two CNR trains and a molotov cocktail in a third
-- Bomb defused at the entrance to RCMP headquarters in Quebec city

July -- Bomb explodes at the head office of Canadian

Imperial Bank of Commerce
-- Bomb explodes outside Westmount Town Hall
-- Bomb explodes at the transmission tower of Sherbrooke's English-language radio station CKTS

August -- Bomb explodes on tracks near Ste. Madeleine
-- Bomb defused on railway bridge near Bordeaux

November -- Bomb explodes at a Pearson rally in Montreal

1966

May -- Bomb at La Grenade shoe factory (three hurt, one dead: Thérèse Morin)
-- Bomb at Dominion Textiles in Drummondville
-- Bomb explodes at the base of the Dollard des Ormeaux statue

June -- Bomb at Paul Sauvé Arena in Montreal during meeting of Quebec Liberal Party

July -- Bomb at Dominion Textiles in Montreal (one dead: FLQ member Jean Corbo in premature explosion)
-- Bomb explodes near City Hall of Westmount

1967

January -- Bomb explodes in a mailbox in the financial district of Montreal

February -- Bomb explodes in a mailbox in Montreal

June -- Bomb explodes at Chambly City Hall in protest of Canada's centennial (responsibility claimed by group called Mouvement de libération québécois)

July -- Bomb defused at city hall in Greenfield Park

September -- Two bombs defused at MacDonald High School in Ste-Anne de Bellevue on West Island

October -- Bomb explodes at Seven-Up plant in Mount Royal

1968

May -- Bomb defused at strike bound Seven-Up plant in Mt. Royal

August -- Bomb explodes at Société des Alcools du Québec

-- Car-bomb explodes at home of SAQ negotiator Alphonse Lagacé
-- Bomb explodes at Victoria Precision Works plant in east-end Montreal

September -- Bomb explodes behind Quebec liquor store on St. Denis St. in Montreal
-- Bomb defused at the headquarters of the Black Watch in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes in front of Quebec liquor store on Sherbrooke St. in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes near Bordeaux jail behind home of warden Albert Tanguay

-- Bomb defused at base of John A MacDonald statue in Dominion Square
-- Bomb explodes at a Quebec liquor store

October -- Bomb defused at Provincial Ministry of Labour building in Montreal
-- Bomb defused at the Union Nationale's Renaissance Club in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes at the Liberal Party's Reform Club in Montreal
-- Bomb defused at the Chambre de Commerce in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes at Lord Company plant in east-end Montreal
-- Bomb explodes at the Montreal offices of Centre des dirigeants d'enterprise
-- Bomb explodes at Voyageur Terminus

November -- Bomb defused under the carriage of a truck at Domtar Corrugated Products Division in Montreal
-- Bomb defused in front of a Lord & Co. building in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes in front of Standard Structural Steel in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes in front of a Quebec liquor store on St. Lawrence Blvd in Montreal
-- One bomb explodes and one bomb defused at Eatons in Montreal
-- Bomb defused at Trans-Island Motors Ltd in Montreal
-- Fuse found leading to barrels of oil at Domtar Pulp and Paper in Windsor, Que.
-- Bomb explodes at Central Station
-- Bomb defused at entrance of Chambre de Commerce and Board of Trade in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes at Crèmerie Crête in Shawinigan
-- Bomb explodes on a bus in Murray Hill garage

December -- Bomb defused at house of the president of Canadian Structural Steel, Roger Brochu (responsibility claimed by the Front de Libération Populaire)
-- Bomb explodes in front of residence of the president of Murray Hill (Charles Hershorn) in Westmount
-- Bomb explodes in front of the house of one of the directors of Domtar (Mr. Perry Fox)
-- Bomb defused near garage of Chambly Transport in Chambly
-- Bomb defused near garage of Chambly Transport in St. Hubert.
-- Bomb explodes at the house of the president of Chambly Transport, Charles Sénécal
-- Molotov cocktail thrown at the old residence of Judge Yves Leduc (who had previously condemned several FLQ members to prison)
-- One bomb explodes and one is defused near City Hall in Montreal
-- Bomb defused in front of the National Revenue building in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes near home of manager of Lord Company (André Marceau)

1969

January -- Bomb explodes at L'école Secondaire St. Luc in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes at Fédération canadienne des associations libres in Montreal (2 injured)
-- Bomb explodes at Bank of Nova Scotia building in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes outside the offices of Noranda Mines
-- Eleven (11) sticks of dynamite found in a garbage can in front of the Quebec Federation of Labour
-- Bomb explodes near home of Montreal Police chief Jean-Paul Gilbert

February -- Bomb explodes in front of the Technical Services Branch of the Canadian Forces in the Town of Mount Royal (1 injured)
-- Bomb explodes in front of the Montreal branch of the Quebec Ministry of Labour
-- Bomb explodes in front of the building of le Régiment de Maisonneuve (1 injured)
-- Bomb explodes behind the Liberal Party Reform Club in Montreal (4 injured)
-- Large bomb explodes at the Montreal Stock Exchange (27 injured)

-- Bomb explodes behind the Queen's Printer bookstore in Montreal

March -- Large bomb (141 sticks of dynamite) defused under the overpass of Metropolitan Boulevard in Montreal
-- Bricks thrown through the windows of the Federal Department of Health in Montreal with attached note: *FLQ pas mort* (FLQ is not dead)

April -- Molotov cocktail thrown onto a Montreal bus
-- Molotov cocktail thrown into the residence of Union Nationale member Paul-Emile Savageau

May -- Two bombs explode near the headquarters of L'Association des Constructeurs in Montreal
-- Three bombs explode at construction sites of Nord Construction Company in Montreal

June -- Two bombs explode at the Hotel Château Frontenac in Quebec City

-- Bomb explodes at the headquarters of Société St. Jean Baptiste in Sherbrooke
-- Bomb explodes in a mailbox in Quebec
-- Bomb explodes in the parking lot of a motel in Ste. Foy

July -- Car bomb explodes in Cap-Rouge, Quebec
-- Bomb explodes in an office of the Ministry of Labour in Quebec city
-- Bomb explodes at Dominic Supports and Forms Ltd. in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes at the offices of Spino Construction Ltd.
-- Bomb explodes at the entrance of A. Jahin Co. Ltd.
-- Bomb explodes at the entrance of Wallcrete of Canada Ltd.
-- Bomb explodes at the entrance of Secant Construction

August -- Bomb explodes in front of the National Revenue building in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes in an office of Industrial Acceptance Corporation in the Town of Mount Royal
-- Bomb explodes in the offices of la Confédération des syndicats nationaux in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes at the Provincial Ministry of Labour building in Ste. Foy
-- Bomb planted at Ministry of Labour building in Montreal

September -- Bomb explodes behind the residence of Montreal Mayor Jean Drapeau

November -- Bomb explodes in front of the residence of Mr. Barone in St. Léonard
-- Bomb explodes at Loyola college in Montreal

December -- Bomb explodes on the campus of McGill University
-- Another bomb explodes at the residence of Mr. Barone in St. Léonard
-- Bomb explodes in a postal delivery truck in Montreal

1970

March -- Molotov cocktail at Philips Security Agency in Montreal
-- Molotov cocktail at D & D Transport in Montreal
-- Molotov cocktails in three postal branches in Montreal

May -- Molotov cocktail in a postal substation in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes at old Board of Trade building in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes at Canadian General Electric
-- Two bombs explode near the University of Montreal
-- Bomb explodes at Queen Mary Veteran's Hospital
-- Bomb explodes at the home of Mr. Nobbs in Westmount

June -- Bomb explodes at the headquarters of Financial Collection Agency
-- Bomb explodes at the home of Peter Bronfman in Westmount (President of Great West Saddlery Ltd.)
-- Bomb explodes at the home of Samuel Bronfman in Westmount (President of Distillers Corporation-Seagrams Ltd.)
-- Bomb explodes at an empty house in Westmount
-- Bomb explodes at the home of Hugh McCuaig (member of Doherty, Roadhouse and McCuaig Brokers and Securities)
-- Bomb explodes at the home of Gabriel Macoosh (of l'organization de l'Aviation civile internationale)
-- Bomb explodes in University of McGill engineering faculty
-- Bomb explodes in a postal substation in Longueuil
-- Bomb explodes in a postal substation in Montreal
-- Bomb defused at the research laboratories of Domtar Chemicals Ltd.
-- Two bombs defused at IBM Canada Ltd.
-- Bomb explodes at Banque Canadienne Nationale in Sorel
-- Bomb explodes at home of financier Jean Louis Lévesque in Outremont

-- Bomb explodes at Canadian Club

July -- Bomb defused at offices of Wawanesa in Town of Mont Royal
-- Bomb defused at Bank of Montreal on Rue St. Jacques
-- Bomb defused in front of the Royal Bank of Canada in Montreal
-- Bomb defused outside Hotel Victoria in Québec City, where Premier Bourassa was staying
-- Bomb explodes at Petrofina refinery in Pointe-aux-Trembles

September -- One bomb explodes and one bomb defused at Canadian Anglo Pulp Company in Forestville
-- Car bomb defused behind the Bank of Montreal Headquarters in Montreal

October -- Kidnapping of British Trade Commissioner Richard James Cross
-- Kidnapping and assassination of Quebec Minister of Labour and Immigration Pierre Laporte

1971

January -- Bomb explodes at the police training center at Cardinal Newman School in east-end Montreal

March -- Bomb explodes at drill hall of the Royal 22e Regiment on Boulevard Ste-Joseph
-- Bomb explodes at CNR installations at Ste-Hyacinthe

August -- Bomb explodes at Steinberg food store at Arvida

September -- Bomb explodes at Bell Canada Centre in Dorion
-- Bomb explodes at Ste-Rita de Ahuntsic school in Montreal
-- Bomb explodes at FCAL building in Montreal

October -- Another bomb explodes at Newman School
-- Bomb explodes outside St. Grégoire Street barracks
-- Bomb defused in Westmount near home of Power Corporation Vice-President William Turner

November -- Bomb planted under patrol car at No.3 police station
-- Bomb explodes at Youville Post Office
-- Bomb explodes under prison van near No.18 police station

December -- Bombs explodes at two postal substations in

Westmount
-- Bomb explodes in post office truck at depot on Hochelaga street
-- Bomb explodes at Rémi Carrier upholstering plant in east-end Montreal
-- Car-bomb explodes at Lucky One bottling plant

1972

January -- Bomb defused at Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce in west-end Montreal
-- Bomb explodes at La Presse

May -- Bomb planted at Casa d'Italia in Montreal

APPENDIX B
Chronology of Important Social Protests in Quebec 1963-1973

1964

MAY 18 -- Separatist riot in downtown Montreal on Victoria Day

OCT 9 -- Violent RIN demonstration protesting Queen's visit

DEC 14 -- Approximately 3000 Quebec Liquor Board employees (QLB) strike

1965

JAN 23 -- Separatists (Reggie Chartrand's *Chevaliers de l'indépendance* protest in support of striking QLB employees.

APRIL -- Workers at *La Grenade* strike

MAY 24 -- Separatist riot in Montreal on Victoria Day.

1966

MAR 20 -- Workers at *Dominion Textiles* in Drummondville strike

AUG 3 -- Workers at *Dominion Ayers* in Lachute strike

OCT 23 -- A protest by *Dominion Ayers* strikers and the RIN at the Ayers residence turns violent, resulting in injuries and arrests

1967

JUNE 17 -- *Seven-Up* workers strike

1968

JUNE 24 -- Separatists riot at the presence of Pierre Trudeau at the St. Jean Baptiste Parade in Montreal

JUNE 26 -- QLB back on strike

JULY 18 -- Workers at *Domtar* in Windsor and East Angus strike

OCTOBER -- Numerous student occupations of CEGEPS across Quebec

NOV 11 -- *Domtar* strikers occupy Windsor mill for 26 hours

1969

MAR 28 -- McGill français march results in violence

JUNE 21 -- Opération Congrès at U.N. convention

SEPT 10 -- LIS riot in St. Léonard

OCT 7 -- Montreal Police and Firemen strike. Looting and rioting occurs in downtown Montreal. MLT have a violent clash with Murray Hill

OCT 30 -- Mass student marches and boycotts to protest Bill 63

NOV 7 -- Operation Libération riot on St. James St.

1970

FEB 3 -- *Les gars de Lapalme* strike

MAY 14 -- Approximately 25,000 construction workers strike

MAY 14 -- Postal workers strike

AUG 10 -- Workers strike at *Anglo Canadian Pulp and Paper* Mill

1971

JULY 19 -- *La Presse* lockout begins

OCT 29 -- Solidarity demonstration against *La Presse* by QFL-CSN-CEQ results in violence (1 dead- Michèle Gauthier)

1972

MAR 28 -- First 24 hr. strike by 210,000 Common Front public service workers

APR 11 -- A 10 day general strike by the Common Front begins

MAY 9 -- General sympathy strike by 300,000 workers over the sentencing of the Big Three labour leaders

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VITA AUCTORIS

NAME:	Paul W. Lynd
PLACE OF BIRTH:	Windsor, Ontario
YEAR OF BIRTH:	1971
EDUCATION:	Kennedy Collegiate Institute, Windsor 1985-1990
	University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario 1990-1994 Honours B.A. Criminology
	University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario 1994-1996 M.A. Sociology

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











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Phone: 716/482-0300
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