PSYCHOANALYSIS AND HOMOSEXUALITY:
QUE(E)RYING THE TROPE OF INVERSION

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses the tropes of inversion in the discourses of psychoanalysis with particular attention to issues of sexual orientation, race, and gender. I analyse inversion as both a rhetorical and a linguistic phenomenon and as it gives insight into the structure of psychoanalysis itself. Chapter one examines the celebrated Wolf Man case and scrutinizes Freud’s own complicated response to anality. By paying close attention to the preponderance of foreign words which call attention to themselves by their resistance to assimilation into the vernacular, I query to what extent these words are the textual index, that is, the somatic compliance of Freud’s ambiguous desire. Chapter two approaches inversion through the psychoanalytic notion of the specular economy. Fundamentally dialectic and inverted, the specular economies of the subject and of paranoia betray a particular anxiety around the ideation of ‘sameness’ in that difference — racial, gender, sexual orientation — must be reiterated, inculcated again and again. Chapter three, in analysing the tropes of disgust and orality, examines to what extent are Freud’s two ‘lesbian’ case studies abjected and asks how this presence of abjection is essential to the subject of psychoanalysis.

**Keywords:** Psychoanalysis, Homosexuality, Inversion, Lesbianism, Queer, Hermeneutics, Sigmund Freud, Julia Kristeva, Frantz Fanon, Psychoanalytic Case Studies, Homophobia, Paranoia, Abjection, Hysteria, Sodomy, Racial Discourse.
dedication

for my parents —
my father, Ken,
my step-mother, Laura Eileen.
and in memoriam, my mother, Joyce.
who always knew I was, and, who always knew I would be.
With love.

for Lorraine —
whose love, support, encouragement, prodding, and nurturance
helped form all that I am.
Always.

for One —
with love.
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Foreword: Or Que(e)rying My Orientation

Every psychoanalytic critic has a transference onto psychoanalysis, that is, a belief that psychoanalysis is the site of a “knowledge of meaning.”

(Gallop, Reading Lacan 29)

I do not remember what came first: my discovery of the problematic sexological term ‘inversion’ to name same-sex desire or my awareness of the preponderance of

1 I had originally intended to leave the writing of this introduction, which I had thematically envisioned with the title. “Forward.” to the end of my thesis. Acting out Freud’s psychoanalytic preoccupation with the structures of inversion, I believed it would be like the chiasmatic end-beginning to Freud’s indelible image of the Wolf Man’s traumatic reorganization of female genitalia as “the girls’ ‘front-bottom’” (“Infantile Neurosis” 254). Like the Wolf Man’s inverted and preposterous configuration, I would end my writing project with a clever return to the beginning. It would leave me, so I thought, with a retroactively clear vision of what I had done, disguised (perhaps clumsily) as its inception. However, events in the writing (and the non-writing) of my thesis and in my personal life (the death of my eldest brother and the immediate and subsequent break-up with my partner of nine years) altered that predetermined course of events.

After much interpretive silence, this “Foreword” comes into being half way through my writing/non-writing. It is, as I now write, a foreword interruptus, emerging out of the chasm of the third chapter and generating from feelings of loss and plentitude. And so, with disquieting apprehension, I write this project again.

1a When editing this paragraph I noticed my spelling error, “forward,” in place of its homophone, “foreword.” I chose to leave the misspelling. A testament to the power of parapraxis. “forward” connotes for me not only a sense of advancement, but also, adjectively, a quality of radicality and precocity.

2 Historically, the term ‘inversion’ is rooted in late nineteenth-century sexological discourse. In 1869, Carl Westphal first published the term konträre Sexualempfindung, “contrary sexual feeling,” to classify the psychosexual expression of a young woman who, “from her earliest years, liked to dress as a boy. cared more for boys’ games than girls’, and found herself attracted only to females” (Bullough, 7). However, in the medico-sexological writings of Krafft-Ebing, Albert Moll, P. J. Möbius, Havelock Ellis, Jean Martin Charcot, Valentin Magnan, and Magnus Hirschfeld, inversion could describe a plethora of psychosexual behaviours, identifications, proclivities, inclinations and orientations including those of transvestism and transsexuality. A loose classification within a complex taxonomy of sexual perversions, inversion denoted, as gay historian, Jonathan Katz, notes, “feelings, a temperament, or beings turned upside down or inside out, improperly reversed” (Gay Lesbian Almanac 147). Essentially predicated upon a binary model of reproductive sexuality, inversion [konträre Sexualempfindung] was understood as a turning of the genital, that is to say, procreative “instinct” away from its “natural” orientation toward a non-reproductive, degenerative, and morbid end.

Many of Freud’s theoretical papers and case studies, including, but not limited to, the cases
tropological allusions to inversion littered throughout numerous psychoanalytic texts. In whatever order they came to my attention, the notions of inversion and of psychoanalysis were, in my mind, inextricably implicated and bound. Their relationship — and, in turn, my relationship to them — seemed dizzying and knotted in some invertible way. What was it about inversion’s paradigmatic relationship to ‘orientation,’ specifically sexual orientation, that kept pulling me back to the tropic language and very structure of psychoanalysis? Moreover, as the presence of this thesis attests, was the pull of psychoanalysis on me, and on my (analytic) orientation, too strong for me to resist? Had I, like Freud, fallen for that which I was to analyse?3

of the Wolf Man and Dr. Schreber, theorize and construct homosexuality as a regressive psychic state in which the homosexual is anally fixated and primarily narcissistic. As understood within a heterosexist paradigm, the homosexual is essentially, or rather psychically, driven toward a love object which bears no difference. Caught in a precarious play with non-difference, homosexuality, as articulated by this simplistic paradigm, is symbolically reduced to thanatic drives and morbid ends. The notion of homosexuality as a type of morbidity will ear its phobic head again in the mid-1960 psychoanalytic writings of ego psychologists Irving Bieber and Charles Socarides in which the complicated psychological matrix of gay desire, societal shame, isolation and depression would be their evidentiary testimony to the morbid and pathological effects of such an anally stagnant and fixated desire. In the wake of the Right’s political and sexual backlash around the AIDS epidemic, contemporary queer theorists. Simon Watney and Leo Bersani, have chosen respectively to theorize the notions of morbidity and gay sex by evoking the ideologically telling question, “Is the rectum a grave?” In this sense, the satiric notion of morbid ends, sexologically situated in the practice of gay male sex, remains a current representation to the force of late nineteenth-century sexological underpinnings of ‘inversion’.

3 The notion of “falling for” analysis is a ripe, and perhaps even tired, joke of psychoanalysis. From Freud’s infatuated notions of Dora’s hysterical transference to Jane Gallop’s theoretical confession of a Lacanian seduction, psychoanalysis has seduced some of its most vigil proponents.

Freud evokes the metaphor of “falling” as a kind of seduction when he suggests in “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman” (1920) that the attempted suicidal plunge of his “beautiful and clever” patient was an enactment of an Oedipal wish-fulfillment, a wish both to become pregnant with her father’s child and to fall from her social standing in illegitimate disgrace. As explained by Freud’s English editors, Freud plays upon the German “niederkommen, which means both ‘to fall’ and ‘to be delivered of a child’” (389, n.1).

In Identification Papers (1995), Diana Fuss turns away from Freud’s Oedipal, that is to say.
At the fore, this thesis asks to what extent is the Freudian text inverted, that is to say, to what extent does the tropic language of Freud betray the underside of Oedipal desire, the abject, the inverted? Is Freud’s tropic propensity for inversion a sign of an unconscious desire, a desire that can only be articulated in terms of that which exceeds the seeming aridness of scientific discourse, a desire, I argue, that spills out in his figurative mimicry of his patients’ dreams, resistances, and identifications? Structurally, typographically, is Freud’s predilection for the subordinate footnote a sign of marginal interests and disorienting disruption? Just as Diana Fuss locates homosexuality as “an indispensable interior exclusion” (“Inside/Out” 3) to the formation of the heterosexual psychoanalytic subject, does inversion occupy a similarly vacillating and borderline position “within psychoanalysis as an essential waste ingredient” (Identification Papers

paternal attraction and suggests that Freud’s use of Newtonian and gravitational tropes, so evident in “The Psychogenesis.” further exemplify Freud’s notion of homosexuality as a kind of an identificatory retrogression into a retroactive, pre-Oedipal state. Fuss writes, “The girl’s fall back into a homosexual desire for the mother actually constitutes a particular kind of maternity in Freud’s reading — a fall equivalent to a deliverance” (65).

To “fall for” analysis suggests that, not only was I not watching where I was going in my critical attention to Freudian psychoanalysis and that I, like Freud, stumbled and succumbed to the transferent attraction of analysis, but more importantly, that in my critical interests I turned away from Oedipality and was delivered unto a pre-Oedipal state of homosexuality.

Freud’s tropic use of language performs. I argue, a kind of figurative translation of a desire that cannot be forthrightly expressed. Like the unconscious symptom, Freud’s mimicry of his patients’ dreams, resistances, and identifications can be read lacunately, cryptically, as a sign of homosexual desire. I cite here Freud’s identification with the Wolf Man’s dream-wolf as seducer, his verbal incorporation into the Rat Man’s anal rape phantasy, and his paranoic enactment of a defense against homosexuality in the form of his ongoing reproaches against his critics. I concur with Diana Fuss, nonetheless, that it would “be going too far to say that Freud’s entire theory of sexuality — or the institution of psychoanalysis itself — operates as an elaborate defense [hence an inverted, unconscious sign] against Freud’s repressed homosexuality” (“Pink Freud” 5). However, as Fuss rebuts, “at the same time some of Freud’s most original and contested theories emerge directly from the autoanalysis of his homosexual desires — desires that cannot, for that reason, be easily ignored” (5).
60), edging and punctuating the Freudian text as an excrementious footnote or a superfluous turn of speech?

This thesis approaches these questions in three chapters. In the first chapter, I argue that Freud’s spontaneous use of untranslated words and phrases in the case of the Wolf Man — *a tergo, more ferarum, banal, détour, siesta* —, is a sign of his uncanny desire for sodomitical relations. As Freud himself argues in "The Uncanny" [*das Unheimliche*], the uncanny is an effect of the ego projecting outward that which was once homely and familiar as something foreign to itself. In this sense, Freud’s uncanny sodomitical desire is a desire that shifts uneasily between what is foreign and homely and what is familiar and alien. Predicated upon a complex model of repression, translation and inversion, I argue that Freud’s use of the untranslated indexes the presence of an unstable

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5 I describe the Freudian footnote as excrementious for, although it falls away from the text, it violates the holistic, self-contained (*propre*) notion of the text by sticking to it like fecal matter. These violations happen in other ways as well. A classic example whereby the trope of inversion re-emerges as a structural device is the Freudian footnote which speaks most often from a position of hindsight and continuously interrupts the primary, ascendant text by commenting on and adding to it most often in the form of a qualified retraction. The Freudian footnote calls attention to its margins by literally imposing them on the primary text. Without the footnote, the Freudian text would be a very different thing indeed.

In order to queer the primary text of this thesis, to disrupt, and perhaps to spoil, its assumed seamlessness, I too use the interjective quality of the footnote to query what I have written — to disorient the reader, to force her, for at least a time, to encounter this thesis from its margins. However, I am self-consciously aware, as I write this, that marginality is not a guarantee of advantageous radicality. The pleasure bound up with marginality may well be, as Diana Fuss suggests, "[a] misplaced nostalgia for or romanticization of the outside" ("Inside/Out" 5).

Like Freud, I use the rhetorical, that is, typographical space of the footnote to continuously defer what I have asserted, to retrospectively challenge what I have written, to talk back to my primary text. The notion of thesis, for me, can never be a homogeneous argument. It will contain signs of conflict, paradox, and incompatibility. My excessive use of the footnote is my attempt at disavowing a false seamlessness of the intellectual project. Often fully self-conscious of both my mimicry of Freud and the footnote’s excessive presence, my use of the footnote represents, as Cixous suggests of Freud, "a typographical metaphor of repression which is always too near but nevertheless negligible" ("Fiction and Its Phantoms" 537).
and ambiguous queer desire. Mimicking the hysterical’s double gesture of concealment and revelation, Freud’s use of the untranslated, while cloaked in a particular kind of foreignness and incomprehensibility, ostentatiously demands the work of (analytic) translation, of making the foreign known. The notion of hysteria figures centrally in this chapter as a sign of ‘queerness,’ of ‘the feminized.’ Figured in a myriad of ways (the polyglotic utterance, the bisexual phantasy, the presence of the untranslated), the sign ‘hysteria’ implicates Freud in the nineteenth-century racist construction of the feminized Jew, an identity that, as Daniel Boyarin argues, propelled Freud and his theory of psychoanalysis toward the heteronormative, non-hysteric (that is to say, masculinized) model of Oedipality.

In chapter two, I approach inversion through the psychoanalytic notion of the specular economy. Looking specifically at the specular economies of the subject and of paranoia, I suggest that these economies, in their quest for differentiation, betray a particular anxiety around the ideation of sameness in that difference—racial, gender, sexual orientation—must be reiterated again and again. By looking to Frantz Fanon’s engaging essay, “The Fact of Blackness,” I compare the production of the psychoanalytic

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6 The economy of the subject is figured as specular because the anxious subject must continuously circulate its inverted imago as the not-me in order to stabilize his fragile and mistaken identity.

7 According to Freud, paranoia is a product of a repudiated and inverted homosexual wish in which the unbearable homosexual wish (‘desire’) turns against itself (‘hate’) and then turns outwards against the object of desire (‘you’). As is noted in chapter two, the desirous implications of both homophobia and racism are ripe.

8 This essay is more commonly known by its opening interpellation, “Look, a Negro!” (109).
subject with its attendant repudiated other to both the racist discourse of colonialism and
the paranoiac discourse of homophobia. The analytic scenario of transference:counter-
transference provides another apt example of the specular economy in which the
circulation of desire is similarly entangled in the play of mirrors. I suggest Freud’s
theoretical consideration of Dr. Schreber’s paranoid phantasies as inverted homosexual
wishes returns as both Freud’s feelings of analytic inferiority and suspicions of public
ridicule and psychoanalysis’ homophobic ravings of the imagined homosexual threat.

Using Julia Kristeva’s notion of the abject as the impossibly excluded, chapter
three re-reads the disgusting symptoms and improper identifications of Dora and “the
beautiful and clever girl” (“Psychogenesis” 375) as abject, that is to say, as something
which inspires revulsion, yet at the same time, as something psychically sacred, something
erotically nostalgic which abuts disturbingly onto the subject of psychoanalysis. I query
Freud’s relation to the *mater*iality of abjection through the tropes of disgust and orality
and argue that psychoanalysis’ debt to *material*ity is irrepressible, symptomatically
returning in classically over-determined ways: as Freud’s phantasy of auto-nascence, as
Dora’s disgusting symptoms and her distaste for men, as Freud’s eschewed counter-
transferent phantasy of fellatio, and as the beautiful and clever girl’s shameless ingestion of
lesbian identity. Overall, what binds these three chapters together is an inquiry into
Freud’s rhetorical and structural use of the pliable tropologies of inversion in his major
case studies and in his theories of sexuality.
Taking Lacan's interpretive dictum to heart, I am driven to read the Freudian narratives of the case study and of psychoanalysis' metapsychological theory à la lettre and to attend to the formal features of the discourse.9 Particularly, I am struck by Freud's repeated use of those signifiers that evoke the tropologies of inversion. For example, Freud's prosaic interpretation of the Wolf Man's primal phantasy/dream offers a particularly apt instance in which the signifiers themselves — 'behind,' 'a tergo,' 'Let's show our bottoms', 'his naughtiness' — demand an inverted sensibility to reading Oedipality in a straightforward manner. Put another way, Freud's writing demands an inverted sensibility of reading. Freud writes, "We must naturally expect to find that this material [i.e. the dream's manifest content] reproduces the unknown material of the scene in some distorted form, perhaps even distorted into its opposite" ("Infantile Neurosis" 264). The content of the Wolf man's dream must be read, so Freud prescribes, in an inverted way, that is to say, like the infantile phantasy, a tergo. This 'inverted' sensibility to/of interpretation, whether in Freud's scatological dictum of unearthing and bringing forward unconscious materials as the "conscientious archaeologist" ("Fragment of an Analysis" 41), or in Lacan's mirrored analytic transference of inverted desire, directs the reader of psychoanalysis toward a particular orientation.

As I am pulled toward a particular reading of the Freudian text, I am uncannily aware of my own (analytic) position. As a lesbian scholar, I am positioned outside and

9 Lacan writes in his Le Seminaire, Livre II (1954-5). "The task of the analyst is not to achieve some imaginary intuitive grasp of the analysand's 'hidden message', but simply to read [literally: à la lettre] the analysand's discourse as if it were a text, attending to the formal features of this discourse, the signifiers that repeat themselves" (qtd. in Evans, An Introduction 89).
against — in opposition to and butted against — Freud. Interminably, this thesis, as an inquiry into the act of interpretation, is an excavation of my desire. I am. I confess, irrevocably implicated in what Paul Ricoeur has called a “hermeneutics of desire” (qtd. in Casey 81). As imagined by David Willbern, psychoanalytic interpretation is “a type of intercourse ... an Oedipal act of revelation and violation” (99). Predictably, in Willbern’s “inter-penetration of dreams” (99), both the dreamer and his dreams are rooted to an Oedipal, and subsequently a heterosexual, reading. But as Diana Fuss, Lee Edelman, Judith Butler, and Daniel Boyarin have respectively theorized, the carnal knowledge upon which analytic knowledge is modelled may find its loci in more arcane places than that.

If psychoanalytic interpretation is a type of intercourse, then my probing into the Freudian text excavates a queer desire. But whose desire? Mine? Freud’s? Clearly the circuit of identification here is highly charged. Some may even argue it runs the risk of running amuck by privileging the homosexual. My apology is pointed. Like Jane Gallop, who, in her “PrefatHEory” to Reading Lacan (1985), denounces “the illusory and ideologically oppressive effects” (30) of the transference mastery of interpretation and who, at the same time, is “in no position simply to give it up” (30), my relationship to this thesis, to this text of mine, is similarly ambiguous. If this thesis is a kind of queer hermeneutics of psychoanalysis, which I claim it to be, then it is also as much a reading of my own queer desire, irrevocably bound up with a resist pleasure for interpretative mastery, as it is an exposure of psychoanalysis’ proclivity towards inversion.

As “[t]he work of psychoanalysis,” Diana Fuss argues, “is compelled to mime its object” (Identification Papers 4). I, then, am compelled to mime mine — that is. Freud
that is, Freud’s. I remember thinking after I had written the chapter on abjection how it was strange that I, a lesbian, a feminist, would have such an (analytic) appetite for anal(ytic) orientation. Did my appetite come out of my appropriative identification\(^\text{10}\) with Freud? Was the surfacing of my anal(ytic) orientation a deferred action? My odd coupling with Freud twisted my position as querist, by shifting — in an ass-backwards kind of way — my status in the text from analyst to analysand. I became, as Jane Gallop has noted of the desirous power of critical transference, “no longer analyst but patient” (30). This is a violation to which I am bound.

There is a sense, which I try to write in this thesis, by which psychoanalysis and inversion, as both a figure of thought and a particular kind of orientation, complicate each other, tie each other in knots. Arguably more than Pat White’s argument “that homosexuality is indeed within psychoanalysis, each having contributed to the other’s very invention” (qtd. in de Lauretis, *The Practice of Love* xi), I submit that the signifier ‘inversion’ is not only historiographically (inventively) implicated within psychoanalysis, but ‘inversion’, in its many significant forms, structurally and symbolically, provides the very fabric of psychoanalysis. Without inversion, psychoanalysis would literally unravel. I leave to my reader its/my knotted sense of desire.

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\(^{10}\) Julia Kristeva writes that “the propagation of psychoanalysis ... has shown us, ever since Freud, that interpretation necessarily represents appropriation, and thus an act of desire and murder” (“Within the Microcosm” 33).
Heimlich Manoeuvres: Freud’s Analytic Seduction of the Wolf Man

... psychoanalysis is an archaeology; it is an archaeology of the subject
(Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy 420)

Translation, however, is what psychoanalysis is all about; the unconscious itself, in Freud’s writings, is often compared to a foreign language, and Freud has literally defined the basic fact of repression as a constitutive “lack of translation.”

(Felman, Literature and Psychoanalysis 4)

Lis Møller, in The Freudian Reading, argues that the logic of deferred action [Nachträglichkeit], which Freud describes as memory’s “re-transcription” (xii), offers a new figurative language — textual — to the prolific archaeological one that permeates much of Freud’s writings. From a History of an Infantile Neurosis (1918), Møller argues, “presents us with a story of reading that constitutes a viable alternative to the archaeological story of excavation and reconstruction” (xiii). This textual reading of Freud’s emerges out of his inability, Møller contends, to “construct the primal scene as an authentic happening” (67). What is to be read, in fact, how Freud reads, she claims.

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1 Heimlich maneuver [sIC], a first-aid technique. The Heimlich maneuver [sIC] is the most commonly used first-aid technique for ejecting food or another obstruction from a choking person’s windpipe. The technique was developed by American surgeon Henry Jay Heimlich. The procedure is performed as follows: From behind the choking victim, the rescuer must place one of the rescuer’s fists, thumb down, palm out, just below the victim’s rib cage and wrap his other hand around this fist. The rescuer must then apply a quick, strong, upward thrust several times or until the obstruction is ejected and the victim can breathe again. This action forces air out of the victim’s lungs and then usually pushes any obstruction out of the windpipe. The rescuer should be careful, however, not to crack the victim’s ribs. This technique was first brought into common use in the late 1960s.

remains in-between the factuality of a primal scene and the fiction of a primal phantasy.

What is to be unearthed in the case of the Wolf Man, if you will, remains wedged in the “dialogical space of analysis” (Møller 84) between fact and phantasy, between analyst and analysand — the dialogic of "between."

Clearly, as evidenced by my epigraphic use of Ricoeur’s quotation, my preference is not to abandon unequivocally the archaeological model in order to read Freud’s queer desire as dialogic. In my reading of Freud’s reading of the Wolf Man’s infantile neurosis, I will not suggest the appropriateness of one metaphorical model over the other. Rather, I will work one into the other. By uniting them, I choose to work the archaeological metaphor in an assbackwards direction. Like Lee Edelman, who suggests Freud’s doubt about the factuality of the primal scene “only reenacts the doubt or skepticism that Freud already specified as an index of the Wolf Man’s anal-eroticism” (271), I suggest Freud’s use of untranslated words signals and, in fact, performs his unconscious, bisexual desire.

Taking Edelman’s insightful lead around the metaleptic structure of psychoanalytic logic as a type of (be)hindsight, I query Freud’s relation to sodomitical desire as a kind of ambiguous and metaleptic psychic structure. But I get ahead of myself. First, I must go

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2 In "Seeing Things." Edelman concocts the word (be)hindsight through the elision of behind and hindsight to reflect connotively both the "disarticulation of temporal logic" (268) and the anal (behind) eroticism so prevalent in the case study.

3 Edelman argues that the temporal revisions and inversions which mark the production of the psychoanalytic narrative and its theoretical structure "can be construed in terms of a metalepsis, the rhetorical substitution of cause and effect or effect for cause, a substitution that disturbs the relationship of early and late, or before and behind" (268). He writes, "And nowhere is this metaleptic structure — a structure I propose to discuss as (be)hindsight so as to figure its complicitious involvement in the sodomitical encounter — more evident than in Freud’s theorization of the Wolf Man’s primal scene" (268).
back and clearly delineate my analytic ground.

Within traditional psychoanalysis, the analytic ground has been the speaking subject. The unearthing of the subject’s unconscious materials was likened by Freud in 1905 to an archaeological dig in which the analyst, “like a conscientious archaeologist,” would “bring to the light of day after their long burial the priceless though mutilated relics of antiquity” (“Fragment of an Analysis” 41). Contemporary literary criticism, laying claim to psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic tool, refigures the ground of analytic inquiry by suggesting that “the text is viewed ... as ‘a subject presumed to know’ — as the very place where meaning and knowledge of meaning, reside” (Felman, 7). As I am unable to lay Freud before me and have him speak, I am left to probe his texts and case studies, those relics of psychoanalysis, in order to excavate his ambiguous and often queer desire.

The precedent of using a text as the ground for psychoanalytic inquiry and interpretation was defended by Freud himself in the introduction to the “Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia” (1911). Describing the apparent and readable nature of the paranoiac memoir, Freud wrote that the persecutory accusations of Dr. Schreber were an apt site for analytic inquiry, that in effect, the autobiographical memoir could stand in lieu of the analytic subject. In this one

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4 The archaeologist, not surprisingly, is one who digs in the dirt. The word in German for ‘dirt’ is Dreck which also denotes ‘filth, muck.’ To dig in dirt [Dreck], that is, to be an archaeologist, is symbolically a scatological endeavour. In his correspondence to Wilhelm Fliess, Freud describes his progress in interpreting dreams, hysteria, and obsessional neuroses as a “trampling along in Dreckology” (Complete Letters 290).

5 Freud’s interpretation of paranoia and paranoic defense as a sign of repressed homosexuality will be examined in the second chapter of this thesis.
substitutive move. Freud replaces what is spoken by what is written. The text replaces the analytic subject. I describe this move as translative for it speaks otherwise by displacing the oral with the textual, a move to which I call attention in my query of Freud’s uncanny displacement of what is foreign and what is homely as marked by his polyglotic interruptions throughout the Wolf Man’s case history.

There is another kind of translative move to which Freud confesses privileging that strengthens my resolve to use a purely textual analysis. In the “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” (1905), Freud’s first case history, he begins with a confession that indeed “the record is not absolutely — phonographically — exact” (38). This inexactitude, Freud reassures his reader, represents no interpretive loss: “exhaustive verbatim reports of the results of the proceedings during the hours of analysis would certainly be no help at all” (240). Freud writes, “like a conscientious archeologist, I have not omitted to mention in each case where the authentic [my emphasis] parts end and my constructions begin” (41). Against these “conscientious” and surely defensive reassurances, there is clearly a translative, and no doubt, a temporal displacement between what was heard and what is recorded. His defensive assurance about the integrity of the analytic record tells of the possibility of ellipsis and substitution. Furthermore, I take issue with the notion of analytic authenticity. Having undergone a series of translative and temporal displacements, what the patient has uttered and what is heard, and then written, by the analyst are no longer the same. Rather, they form a metonymic and elliptic relationship to each other. The verbatim accounts salvaged from “the hours of analysis” cannot be separated out from Freud’s “constructions.” Whereas they cannot be confused
as identical, they do become part of the same ground of analysis — the textual. Their
secrets— or rather, failed secrets\(^6\) —, claims Freud, remain buried, like a crypt, and
resistant, but not impenetrable, to interpretation.

My point of entry into the Freudian text is the untranslated. As a crack, so to
speak, in the analytic ground, the untranslated — *détour, siesta, a tergo, banal, more
ferarum* — ostentatiously reveals itself as difference, as a resistant sign to be noticed.
Why does Freud write these terms\(^7\) as the untranslated? What is it about foreignness that,
while it resists making native, it nevertheless demands translation? As Freud himself has
constructed psychoanalysis as an "uncanny practice" ("The Uncanny" 366) of psychical
translation, what is he asking his reader to perform, however laconically, with the
untranslated?

In one sense, these polyglotic utterances are already subjected to the act of
translation, that is to say, as utterances, they have escaped the psychical force of
repression through a conversion. Returning as a compromised formation, Freud theorizes
that the forbidden desire, the instinctual impulse, and the pleasurable unpleasure take their
manifestation as dreams, hysterical symptoms, parapraxes, jokes, and obsessional
neuroses. To paraphrase Freud in his 1915 essay, "Repression," the successful repression

\(^6\) The sign of the unconscious, as argued by Lacan and reiterated by literary theorist,
Shoshana Felman, is secret only in that it is displaced and not hidden; rather than hidden, it is
exposed in language. The sign of the unconscious fails as secret.

\(^7\) My selection of these words is not arbitrary but rather highly motivated. I omit two other
foreign terms which Freud does not translate: *non liquet* and *pars pro toto*. Of the foreign terms
which I do an analysis, *a tergo* and *more ferarum* are written three times in Freud's text and *banal,
siesta* and *détour* are only written once.
is boring, whereas, the failed repression begs our attention. The dual force of repression
[\textit{Verdrängung}], its drive against resistance, if successful, ensures that the instinctual
impulse, the forbidden desire, the pleasurable unpleasure will remain bound to the
unconscious "escap[ing] our attention" (153). Paradoxically, that which is inescapable, of
which we are bound to take notice, escapes the psychical forces of repression through a
translation. Expressed as a something else, the failed repression speaks otherwise.

Central to my analytic excavation of Freud’s untranslated utterances is the notion
of orientation, that is to say, of relational positionality. It is argued, in fact, by Edelman
and Møller respectively that orientation,— before and after, front and behind, Oedipal —,
specifically a queered orientation — \textit{Nachträglichkeit} and bisexuality — is the
hermeneutic key to Freud’s reading of the Wolf Man’s infantile neurosis. What interests
me is not the Wolf Man’s double identification, which Edelman asserts “allowed him
imaginatively to inhabit the positions of both his mother and his father in the spectacle of
coitus \textit{a tergo}” (274). but Freud’s orientation and the shifting and unstable position it
assumes in “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis.” Expressed another way, what
sort of posturing does Freud commit in his theorization of infantile sexuality?

Interestingly, Freud begins his case study of the Wolf Man with a lengthy footnote
in the form of a reproach against his psychoanalytic contemporaries, C.G. Jung and Alfred
Adler. In an apologia explaining his delayed publication of “From the History of an
Infantile Neurosis,” Freud declares that he was unable to publish his psychoanalytic
findings on the primacy of infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex immediately upon
completion because he was “still freshly \textit{under} the impression of [Alder’s and Jung’s]
twisted re-interpretations [Umdeutungen]” (my emphasis, 233 n.1). Now freed of their oppressive influence, he writes, “I have not allowed myself to be held back by a sense of my own inferiority” (345). As the patient “will always provide the text” (“Fragment of an Analysis” 158), I will read Freud’s subtextual apologia as evidence of a resistant sodomitical desire that can only be articulated in preposterous and ambiguous terms.

   Denotatively, the word ‘apologia’ signifies both an expression of regret and a defence. Clearly, as noted by the abrupt interruption of the first sentence of the text, Freud expresses a sense of regret in the four-year delay of the case study’s publication. But against what uncanny thing must he vindicate and defend himself? Interpreted psychoanalytically, Freud’s apologia may be read as a kind of defensive posturing, that is to say, as a translatore means of protecting his masculine ego from a dangerous forbidden wish or instinctual drive — a wish for (analytic) inferiority. The paradox of a psychic defense is, that while it protects the ego by subverting the dangerous wish, it approximates that very wish by signalling its unwanted presence.

   “At a time when Freud was engaged in developing the concept of defence,” Laplanche and Pontalis note, Freud was “making it the defining principle of hysterical phenomena” (109). Uncannily reminiscent of psychoanalysis’ embryonic scenario in which Freud and Breuer put their hysterical patients “under” hypnosis, subjecting them to a particularly seductive reading of hysteria’s aetiology, Freud’s choice of ideation — of

   8 The uncanny reminiscence is here both Freud’s and mine. As Freud noted of the hysterical that is, they “suffer mainly from reminiscences” (“On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena” 58). Freud’s reenactment of the scene and my recognition of it may be read as a sign of hysteria.
being "under," that is, rendered unconscious or incapacitated — replicates the hysteric's hypnotic and vulnerable state. In a fascinating ideological account of Freud's theoretical shift away from hysteria and traumas of infantile sexual abuse to the Oedipal complex with its attendant castration complex, Daniel Boyarin writes, "Hysteria, in short, while gendered as paradigmatically feminine, is not exclusively about women, but involves both women and 'feminized' men" (117). Accordingly, not only does Freud suggest a literal subordination to the influences of Jung and Adler, he figuratively imagines his former state as in some way "inferior" or made feminized. The addition of the hyperbole — "twisted impressions [Umdeutungen]" — further emphasizes a sense of the unnatural, of the inverted. Articulated in the form of a sodomitical gang rape, the claim of being "under the impression of twisted impressions [Umdeutungen]" appears unbearable for Freud and his masculine ego. Nevertheless, Freud's rejection of this phantastic, and hysteric, identifactory position, as signalled by his apologia, only serves to replicate what he claims to have overcome. Hence, in spite of Freud's defensive (masculinized) posturing, or rather, as a sign of it, the figuration of this uncanny scenario in the form of an apologia replicates the sign of hysteria and refigures Freud as the feminized — a ghostly identification of which Freud can never successfully rid himself.

Against Jung and Adler's "twisted interpretations [Umdeutungen]." to which he was once subjected, Freud suggests a correct(ed) methodology of analysis. Oddly, against Jung and Adler's "twisted" methodology, Freud repeatedly stresses the need for a circuitous analytic method, a détour, in order to excavate the aetiology of the Wolf Man's infantile neurosis. He asserts that only an analysis that has taken "a détour through the
prehistoric period of childhood” (246), successfully “descending into the deepest and most primitive strata of mental development” (236), deserves the name of analysis. Analytic approach can never be straightforward, contends Freud: it must penetrate the resistant psyche in a round-about means. As Edelman notes, the metaleptic logic and the metaphoric language of Freudian psychoanalysis reinscribes the anal eroticism of the Wolf Man’s recollection/phantasy of the act of coitus a tergo. Of Freud’s detoured analytic success with the “unapproachable” (237) and resistant Wolf Man, he boasts, “First he resisted and then he yielded” (323). Recognizing the psychic primacy of the sodomitical scene in “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis,” how then does Freud read “twisted interpretations [Umdeutungen]” and “détour” as psychically different? And what does this signify in relation to Freud’s analytic orientation? Again, I turn to the notion of the translated and the untranslated as an uncanny displacement of what is homely and what is foreign.

In my search for Freudian inversion, I am drawn back to his obliging translation9 of Umdeutungen as “twisted re-interpretations.” According to my attempt at a German-English translation, the prefix, U/m-, denotes a meaning of “round-about,” and of “after.”

9 According to Penguin Freud Library editor, Angela Richards. “The words ‘twisted re-interpretations’ in this footnote stand for the German Umdeutungen. The English version was suggested by Freud himself to his English translators, Alix and James Strachey” (233 n.1). In “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman,” Freud suggests the “obliging dream” (393) of the beautiful and clever girl is a negative index of resistance. Believing her of wanting both to mislead his analysis and to win his favour, Freud states that the dream of marriage and children produced by the homosexual girl is a deceitful attempt at providing a ready translation to analysis. He writes, “I told her one day that I did not believe these dreams, that I regarded them as false or hypocritical, and that she intended to deceive me just as she habitually deceived her father” (392). Freud’s obliging translation, I believe, can be read as similarly resistant. His obvious rebuke must be read, at the very least, cautiously for it offers the propensity for inversion.
As in the German *Umgang* meaning "circuit, intercourse." *Um-* connotes both a sense of sexual circuitry and a sense of detour and delay — the sodomitical scene is revisited. Whereas the noun *Deutung* translates as "interpretation" and its infinitive *deuten* translates as "to interpret," "to point out," the infinitive *deuteln* translates as "to interpret artfully," "to twist the meaning of." Thus, according to Freud's own translative reconstruction, *Umdeutungen* reads awkwardly as a composite of linguistic aggregates in which the "round-about" circuitry of a sodomitical encounter is redoubled ("re-interpretations") somehow becoming "twisted" in the process. The effect of Freud's reproach is uncanny.

As Freud notes of the eerie figure of the double in his essay, "The 'Uncanny'" [*Das Unheimliche*] (1919), the thing of terror — here, the "twisted" sodomitical encounter — is met with a defensive urge "which has caused the ego to project that material outward as something foreign to itself" ("The 'Uncanny'" 358). Paradoxically, in this case study, what is reviled and made foreign is what Freud obligingly makes native through the act of translation, whereas the untranslated, the foreign, — *détour* — evokes no terror or defense on Freud's behalf.\(^{10}\)

The explanation may be found in Freud's analytic translation of *das Heimliche* as "on the one hand ... what is familiar and agreeable, and on the other, what is concealed and kept out of sight" (345). This notion of familiar broadens to include that which is "homely" (341) and that which is "belonging to the house or family" (342). *Heimlich* as

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\(^{10}\) Although the analytic method of *détour* evokes no terror for Freud, the Wolf Man, as Freud notes, "remained unapproachable" (237) and at first resistant to Freud's in-depth penetration: "at first he resisted and then he yielded" (323). With the analytic seduction satisfied, Freud writes, "As regards these fertile [read: excremental] difficulties the case I am about to discuss left nothing to be desired" (237).
concealment takes the illicit form of "secret" (344), "to do something ... behind someone's back" (344), "love-affair, love, sin" (344). Clearly, the allusions to an incestuous union of coitus *a tergo* are plentiful. And like the Wolf Man's disavowal of castration, this vision of Freud's reveals itself as an "older notion" (316) of sexual intercourse, "the notion, namely, that sexual intercourse takes place at the anus" (316). Predating the notion of sexual difference, Freud argues that the cloacal theory erases the participation of women in the act of intercourse (read: reproduction) and displaces the vagina in favour of the intestine. Like the notion of the uncanny and its inseparable double — canniness —, the theory of cloacality is "in reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression" (363-4). Now what I am suggesting is that, in Freud's phantastic notion of analytic interpretation, the act of anal intercourse is uncannily stable; it is both *détour* and "twisted." What shifts, I argue, is Freud's position in the act. Though clearly positioned in the rear, Freud's position in the act of interpretation is remarkably unstable and ambiguous.

Before I support my own analytic interests by reading Freud's polyglotic utterances as a sign of his ambiguous orientation, I must note that Freud's analytic position was not always oriented in a retrospective fashion. As the Wolf Man recounts, Freud adopted the retrospective posture of analysis proper11 as a defense against the

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11 I describe the retrospective analytic methodology and the psychoanalytic scene of the seated analyst behind the prostrate analysand as the retrospective posture of analysis proper. Respectively, both Edelman, in "Seeing Things," and Derrida, in *The Postcard*, suggest that the retrospective posture of analysis proper evokes a phantastic scene of sodomitical desire.
attempts at seduction offered by his female hysteric patients while engaged in the face to face hypnotic encounter: “One female patient, exploiting this situation, made all possible — or rather impossible — attempts to seduce him. To rule out anything similar, once and for all, Freud moved from his earlier position to the opposite end of the couch” (qtd. in Lukacher, 144). What is striking is that, in order to avert seduction, Freud assumes an analytic posture that evokes the primal scene a tergo. Insofar as the Wolf Man scoffs at the possibility of a seduction by a female patient — the “rather impossible — attempts to seduce him” — he counters this impossible scenario of heterosexual seduction by writing that he “believed Freud himself desired to ‘use [him] from behind’” (Edelman, 268). Increasingly interesting, this sodomitical phantasy is echoed by Freud when he writes, “I was struck by the fact that from time to time [the Wolf Man] turned his face towards me, looked at me in a friendly manner as though to propitiate me, and then turned his look away from me to the clock” (272). Clearly, as Freud notes, some kind of offering or appeasement was being suggested; moreover, the idea of sodomitical seduction, whether an effect of transference or not, is no doubt a phantastic aspect of Freud’s own analytic scenario.

Freud’s continued inscription of the primal scene as a coitus a tergo, more ferarum, suggests a resistant, almost secret, idea of sexuality. Veiled in the learned language of Latin, the domain of such a secret lies firmly in the hands of the father, the

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12 In Primal Scenes, Ned Lukacher writes that this revised posture appears “more than a little reminiscent of the primal scene” (145).

13 In Sexuality and Its Discontents, Jeffrey Weeks suggests that the nineteenth-century sexologist, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, used Latin for graphic sexual descriptions in his sexological
father, that is, of psychoanalysis. In a provocative essay by Walter J. Ong, Ong suggests that, while Learned Latin excelled discursively in the exclusive male-domain of science and ecclesiastica,¹⁴ as a literary form, Learned Latin was "always distanced ... always insulated from the writer's infancy" (37). "It knew no baby talk," he writes, "it also means that the areas of consciousness and of the unconscious [which] surfaced in Finnegans Wake were unreachable in Learned Latin" (37). Unreachable, yet revisited in the form of the father's language. Freud's use of the signifier 'Latin' evokes an uncanny feeling. And like the uncanny, the foreignness of 'Latin' evokes a psychic inscription which "is secretly familiar [heimlich - heimisch], which has undergone repression and then returned from it" ('The 'Uncanny'" 368).

The uncanny secret, which returns displaced as a tergo, more ferarum, is

texts in order to exclude the lay reader. Weeks writes, "In the 12th edition, after, and because of, its great commercial success, the number of technical terms and the use of Latin increased" (77). Here, Weeks proposes that "because of" the great commercial success of Psychopatitha Sexualis its linguistic obscurity had to be intensified in order to curb any further success, that is to say, any further demand and subsequent publication. By reversing the logic of Weeks' assumption and subjecting it to the rhetorical pressure of chiasmus, the effect of linguistic obscurity is quite different: because of the increased use of Latin, the book enjoyed a greater commercial success.

¹⁴ In its usage, Freud may be trying to assert a certain position within the medical and scientific of fin-de-siècle Germany. By using Latin, the language of Church Fathers no less, Freud establishes a linguistic inclusion into an ideologically predominant gentile community. Citing an instance in which Freud was mocked for his theory of male hysteria — how could men suffer from hysteria, the audience member claimed, when hysteria clearly refers to the womb — Sander Gilman writes that Freud responded to his critic's charge of linguistic ignorance by offering hustera as the correct Greek form for uterus: "Thus the young Jew (and Freud had seen himself, since his exposition to the virulent 'scientific' anti-Semitism of the University of Vienna, as a Jew) showed his command over not only the language of science (represented by Charcot's discourse on hysteria) but also the language of culture (Greek)" (Freud, Race, and Gender 115). For a further discussion of Freud, medicine and race, see Gilman's The Case of Sigmund Freud: Medicine and Identity at the Fin de Siècle.
unearthed in Freud’s analysis of the Wolf Man’s dream. Freud writes the Wolf Man’s recollection of the dream as follows:

I dreamt that it was night and that I was lying in my bed .... Suddenly the window opened of its own accord, and I was frightened to see that some white wolves were sitting on the big walnut tree in front of the window. There were six or seven of them. The wolves were quite white, and looked more like foxes or sheep-dogs, for they had big tails like foxes and they had their ears pricked up like dogs when they pay attention to something. In great terror, evidently of being eaten up by the wolves, I screamed and woke up. (257)

His analysis, a preposterous aggregate of the Wolf Man’s terrifying dream of wolves, his neurotic symptoms of bowel disturbances and an “inexplicable naughtiness” (257) and his “predilection for female nates [buttocks] and for sexual intercourse in the posture in which they are especially prominent” (290) concludes that “behind the content of the dream there lay some such unknown [read: foreign] scene” (264). The “unknown scene” which re-emerges years later in the distorted form of a dream, Freud theorizes, is the phantastic scene of “coitus a tergo, more ferarum” (292) witnessed one afternoon by the Wolf Man at the age of one and a half years. Freud writes:

He had been sleeping in his cot, then, in his parents’ bedroom, and woke up, perhaps because of his rising fever, in the afternoon, possibly at five o’clock, the hour which was later marked out by depression. It harmonizes with our assumption that it was a hot summer’s day, if we suppose that his parents had retired, half undressed,4 for an afternoon siesta. When he woke up, he witnessed a coitus a tergo, three times repeated;5 he was able to see his mother’s genitals as well as his father’s organ; and he understood the process as well as its significance.6 (Freud’s footnotes. 268-9)

“But what is argued now,” Freud snaps at his imagined critics, “is evidently that they are the phantasies not of the patient but of the analyst himself, who forces them upon the
person under analysis on account of some complexes of his own” (286).

Perhaps more interesting than Freud’s notion of an infantile sexual affected under the sway of the primal scene, phantastic or not, is the idea that anality is an “older notion” (316) of sexuality than is the notion of sexual difference. According to Freud, the cloacal theory represents “the notion, namely, that sexual intercourse takes place at the anus” (316). Prior to the infant’s genital organization, he (and the theorized gender as masculine, I argue, is of the utmost significance) eroticizes the oral and anal zones of his body. The faecal mass, the by-product of oral incorporation, takes on a significant meaning for the infant; it is, claims Freud, “baby’s first ‘gift’” (Three Essays 103). Cast off from the body, Freud claims, the excretory function is “a prototype of castration” (322). However, this cloacal castration is narcissistically recuperated by the active stimulation of the bowel’s mucous membrane. Freud writes, “the column of faeces ... plays the part of an active organ in regard to it; it behaves just as the penis does to the vaginal mucous membrane” (322). In this sense, ‘faeces,’ ‘baby’ and ‘penis’ form a unified unconscious concept. The Wolf Man’s intestinal incontinence and later predilection for intercourse a tergo are remnants, Freud argues, of a wish against castration and a clinging to the sexual prehistory of cloacality.

In a footnote added in 1920 to Three Essays on Sexuality (1905), Freud praises a paper written by Lou Andreas-Salomé in which Andreas-Salomé argues that the first prohibition is against anal eroticism. Paraphrasing Andreas-Salomé, Freud states that “the infant has a glimpse of an environment hostile to his instinctual impulses, on which he learns to separate his own entity from this alien one” (104n.1). Through the prohibition of
anal eroticism, which is the infant’s first repression, Andreas-Salomé argues that faeces take on the meaning of ‘alien’ of something externally and symbolically other. Like the uncanny (das Unheimliche), what was once homely and familiar (and familial in the sense that faeces means baby), through the act of repression, becomes alien and other; foreign to the psychic constitution of the newly organizing symbolic self.

The Wolf Man’s naughtiness, in the form of sadistic behaviour which Freud likens to the anal drives, is satisfied by a passive supplication before the father; the masochist wish therefore is a type of sadism turned against the self. Freud writes, “By bringing his naughtiness forward, he was trying to force punishments and beatings out of his father, and in that way to obtain from him the masochistic sexual satisfaction that he desired” (257). Here the signifier ‘naughtiness’ must be read as both the Wolf Man’s misbehaviour and his behind, that is, his buttocks. Prostrating himself before the violent attention of the Oedipal, hence castrating, father, the Wolf Man attempts to avert castration by a passive seduction in which he identifies with the mother of the primal scene — a scene. Freud insists, in which coitus “must have been a coitus a tergo, more ferarum” (192).

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15 Freud claims that the Wolf Man described what he witnessed as “an act of violence,’ but the expression of enjoyment which he saw on his mother’s face did not fit in with this; he was obliged to recognize that the experience was one of satisfaction” (Freud’s footnote. 277).

16 The dynamic between the notion of vaginal versus anal intercourse disrupts Freud’s apparently Oedipal text from the very beginning. In his initial description of the mother, he writes that the mother “suffer[ed] from abdominal disorders” (240); later, he notes that the mother “lamented over her pains and haemorrhages” (313). The boy’s strong identification with the mother in the primal scenario neurotically produces his intestinal disturbances. “Dysentery was evidently his name for the illness which he had heard his mother lamenting about,” Freud writes. “he did not regard his mother’s disease as being abdominal but as being intestinal” (315). Believing that his mother had been made ill by what his father had done to her: Freud appends to a footnote. “a conclusion which was probably not far from the truth” (315n1).
Later, Freud argues, under the knowledge of sexual difference, this passive homosexual attitude becomes unbearable to the Wolf Man and undergoes a form of repression which causes it to draw back "as it were, into the intestinal symptoms, and expressed itself in the attacks of diarrhoea, constipation, and intestinal pain" (317). The neurosis of the Wolf Man, in a sense, allows Freud to play out his theory of cloacality amidst his insistence upon sexual difference, castration and Oedipality.

As read through the theory of cloacality, the scene of the primal seduction takes place without the mother. In favouring the intestine, the vagina is repudiated. It is now a scene between males, a liturgical scene\(^\text{17}\) between father and son,\(^\text{18}\) a scene in which faeces take on the symbolic value of ‘baby.’ In describing the symbolic exchange phantastically enacted by father and son, Freud translates the scream of terror ("In great terror, evidently of being eaten up by the wolves, I screamed and woke up") as a scream of sexual excitement which the infant-witness utters upon passing a stool. This interjection, which Freud theorizes as literally disturbing the primal couple, operates as a kind of symbolic usurpation in which the Wolf Man phantastically replaces the mother as the father's sexual object and presents him with a gift, the gift of the faecal-baby. As “the

\(^{17}\) I describe the scene as liturgical in two senses. First, Latin was the language of ecclesiastica “learned by males from other males” (Ong. 25). Second, Freud analyses the Wolf Man’s obsessional neurosis as wrapped up in the ruminations of whether “Christ had a behind” (298) and did he “used to shit too” (298) as a sign of psychic identification. Born on the same day, Freud argues that the Wolf Man thought himself to be Christ and furthermore, if “he was his father’s son” (301) and Mary was the mother of God, “then his father was God” (301).

\(^{18}\) Appearing resoundingly similar to the Wolf Man’s cloacal theory of paternality—that “he was his father’s son” (301), Peter Gay writes of Freud’s theoretical paternal interests: “It matters to the history of psychoanalysis that Freud was very much his father’s son. dreaming and worrying more about paternal than maternal relations, and unconsciously eager to leave some of his ambivalence about his mother unanalyzed” (Freud: A Life for Our Time 89).
dread was also a proof" (315) of the homosexual wish, Freud is “obliged to translate [the fear of being eaten by a wolf] into a fear of being copulated with by his father” (348). The price of this forbidden copulation, Freud asserts, is the sign of castration; however, under the repression of the older notion of cloacality, castration is kept at bay by the refusal to recognize sexual difference and its psychically contiguous privileging of anus-penis.

Freud’s position in this irreligious scenario is metonymically traceable through the sign of the ‘wolf.’ Of these subtle readings of the unpretentious remark, of the patient’s indifference, of the superfluous, Freud states, “begins to make the physician prick up his ears; and that at last he comes to recognize this despised fragment of a memory as the key to the weightiest secrets that the patient’s neurosis veiled” (328). Among the plethora of psychic overdetermination, by which most innocuous signs in the Wolf Man’s case study read as signs of inversion and of anality, it is the physician, Freud himself, who offers the choice metaphor of ‘pricking up one’s ears’ as an index of interest. Through Freud’s slip of the tongue, he becomes the wolf: “they [the wolves] had their ears pricked up like dogs.” Insofar as Freud metonymically reads the father as the wolf in the dream, Freud’s parapraxis performs a similar operation of identification: Freud identifies himself as the sexually active agent — the father. And as father-wolf, Freud’s analytic interest is clearly sodomitical.

Freud’s description of the sodomitical scene as “something entirely commonplace and banal” (269), I believe, is an inauthentic attempt to recuperate the mother and to repudiate the active homosexual wish. No longer writing in the paternal language of Latin, Freud’s italicization of ‘banal’ denotes the vernacular presence of French, a modern
example of what Ong describes as a Romantic mother tongue, in which *banal* translates as 'ordinary, commonplace, trite.' But, there is nothing, or rather, little that is trite or commonplace (homely, *das Heimliche*) about the primal scenario of anal intercourse. Freud's exaggerated assurance of the scene's banality operates as a defense against his own resistant and queer desire. The jarring topological contiguity of 'commonplace' and 'banal,' forced apart by the copula, can be better understood as a sodomitical wish if the 'b' in 'banal' is suppressed from print. Rewritten, the phrase reads, "commonplace and anal." In this sense, what is alien (*banal*) returns as native ('commonplace'). The *banal* is the father's uncanny place where the foreign, the abject, is made familiar. By the anus' very contiguity to the vagina, it spectres the homely. However, the coupling of 'commonplace' and 'anal' is an uncomfortable fit, an inexactitude, an odd couple forced together. This "older" psychic constitution of anal eroticism, in which sexual difference has no meaning, leaves no room for the mother. The only meaning granted by Freud in his theory of cloacality takes the form of active and passive, penis and anus.

For Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, the secret to be translated behind the Wolf Man's dream and neurotic symptomatology is not the foreignness of anality, but the familiality of a scene of incest. Analytic translation begins for them with the

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19 In playing with this notion of syllabic suppression, I venture to write anal(ysis), anal(yst), anal(ysand), anal(yshed).

20 The cloacal theory of anal intercourse symbolically re-routes the uncanny phantasy of intra-uterine existence to the vagina's abject other, the anus.
“consult[ation] of a Russian dictionary” (16). By performing a translative metonymical acrobatic, which they describe as a deconstructive “cryonymy” (19), Abraham and Torok repudiate the uncanny foreignness, which I believe Freud betrays through his utterances of the untranslated, and attempt to re-establish the presence of the mother. Their route, a kind of phonographic wanderlust, is anansemic. Their translator, Nicholas Rand, explains that “[u]sing their hypothesis of repression carried out on the word itself, Abraham and Torok were able to interpret the Wolf Man’s anal symptoms and their associative proliferation in Freud’s study as an effect of the obstruction put up against the association of the anus with the name of the Wolf Man’s sister Anna” (lx). For them, a tergo is a tiergo is Tierka is tieret.

“[H]aving no apparent phonetic or semantic relationship to the prohibited word.” Abraham and Torok describe their contiguous metonymy as a cryonym, that is, as “words that hide... because of their allusion to foreign and arcane meaning” (18). More than metonymic displacement, they claim that the cryonym resists utterance and single meaning. Through a single contiguous phonetic structure, they believe the anaseme will reveal its allosemic nature. The secret word, claim Abraham and Torok, is the Russian word tieret meaning to rub; to grind; to crunch; to wound; to polish. Its polysemic revelation of sexual intercourse and castration is unearthed by effecting a conversion of

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21 Russian is the Wolf Man’s native, that is, mother tongue. His analysis with Freud was in German. Interestingly, Freud described him as having a “foreign character” (345), that is to say, a character alienable to Freud, a character in need of translation.

22 Lukacher describes psychoanalysis as the work of anasemes. He defines the anaseme as “the unspoken word or sound that is always somehow adjacent to the spoken word, that is always ‘over,’ ‘under,’ or ‘beside’ the patient’s speech” (157).
the Latin *a tergo* into its Russian homophone *a tiergo*. This then is subjected to the approximate rhetorical inversion of chiasmus becoming *Tierka*, the "baptized name" (8) given to the sister by Abraham and Torok. They arrive at this name through a phantastic elision of the Russian *siestorka*, meaning sister, and *Tierek*, a river in the Caucasus mountains to which the Wolf man retreated after his sister's suicide. From *Tierka* they arrive at the verb *tieret*, the sign of masturbation and of castration. In effect, through the translation of the never-native Latin term *a tergo* (from behind) into the sister (both castrated/ castrating, and grinding), they offer an uncanny turn in the understanding of sexual relations with the father.

They argue that the act phantastically witnessed is not an intercourse *a tergo* between father and mother as Freud interprets, but rather an incestuous union between father and daughter. Citing Freud's observation, they write, "As was shown earlier, a 'pack of six,' a 'sixter' = *siestorka, siestorka*, does not denote a number but simply the sister. In a word: *There was the sister*" (37). According to their translation, the irrepresible secret to be repressed is incest ('the sister') and not Freud's notion of sodomitical relations ("*a tergo*").

Their translation of the Wolf Man's neurotic rebus is an interesting, if not a puzzling, one. Clearly resistant to the sodomitical scenario, Abraham and Torok look to the sister and to the Wolf Man's native language, Russian, in order to erase the foreignness of the scene. For my recuperative purposes, I suggest that their interest in

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23 Freud notes, "In imagination he had always had suspicions of his father's relationship with his sister" ("Infantile Neurosis" 321).
familial relations, albeit incestuous relations, produces an eerie notion of the canny. 

Ironically this satisfies my need to recuperate the mother. By using the native tongue of Russian to undo the encrypted secret, they effect a return of the mother to the scene — linguistically, orally, by way of the lingua and the oris. This linguistic incorporation of the mother, I believe, is a sign of their transferent desire, a desire that would, incidently, return the primal scene and the Oedipal encounter to a heterosexual matrix. But I contend that, despite Abraham and Torok’s suggestive linguistic contortions, the secret remains sodomitical and it is Freud’s.24

The sister, as a sign of the feminine, is not wholly erased in Freud’s analytic account either. Her presence is disguised in the literal and phonic forms of the siesta. In reading Abraham and Torok’s interpretation. I see siesta inscribed in the Russian word siestorka meaning sister. I also find it impossible to ignore the homophonic slippage between the Spanish word ‘siesta’ and the English word ‘sister.’ If her presence is indeed encrypted in the word siesta, what is her significance? What is the ‘sister’ to Freud? Abraham and Torok note that the diminutive of sister is “sis” and “sissy” (24); they, however, fail to extend the pun to include any knowledge of its pejorative: sissy.

24 Despite their resistance to a sodomitical encounter, Abraham and Torok appear to engage in it quite enthusiastically when they perform their linguistic analysis: “'Come, Professor, do these words to me. 'Cut,' oh! 'Cut me.' 'pull me.' 'rip me.' oh. confounded words. unsayable words. oh! Yes, rub, rub my genitals for me so that they stand up on two paws like a wolf disguised as a grandmother with a white bonnet on its head. Oh, yes ‘rip off (tiezebit) the wings of this wasp. of this S.P.’ [the Wolf Man’s real name was Sergei Pankejev. S.P.] (Wespe). rub, rub it for he cannot stand it — but ...” (25).
effeminate, homosexual. She is, as Freud tells his reader, "gifted, and precociously naughty" (241). If indeed she is having incestuous relations with the father, as the Wolf Man suspects, the Oedipal dynamics of the father-daughter encounter are represented preposterously. Returning in the coded "language of anal eroticism" (342), the sister's attributes and behaviour, as described by Freud, are figured as sodomitical. To be the sister, that is, to have sodomitical relations with the father, requires the Wolf Man to compete with the sister for the father's attention: naughtiness and giftedness. Not to be forgotten, it is the sister's suggestion of "Let's show our bottoms!" (248) and her seduction of the brother in the lavatory which, according to Freud, inverts his masculine sexual aim. Freud contends that the Wolf Man's "seduction by his sister had forced him into a passive role, and had given him a passive sexual aim" (257). The sister, uttered by Freud as 'siesta,' represents a displacement of the wish for the sodomitical encounter. Her enthusiastic sodomitical presence, nonetheless, carries with it the active invitation of seduction, that is to say, the possible threat of castration — a threat which Freud must continuously work to divert.

Freud's lame attempts at reincorporating the mother, that is, the sign of difference into the sodomitical encounter by using the French banal and the Spanish siesta suggest to me that his continued resistance to sodomy only reproduces it in the end. I cannot resist the temptation to misuse, that is, to corrupt Peter Brooks' observation of the Wolf Man's analysis: "it reveals (as most narratives do) both a drive toward the end and a resistance

25 Read together with the "Cut me, Professor" phantasy. I suggest that this unacknowledged piece of knowledge can be interpreted as a sign of their resistance to the homosexual wish.
to ending” (my italics, qtd. in Lukacher, *Primal Scenes* 138).
In “Freud’s Baby, Fliess’s Maybe,” Daniel Boyarin argues that around 1890 Freud abandoned his theory of infantile sexual abuse, of which “the dominating trope is hysteria,” in favour of a theory of “unresolved fantasies of sexual desire for the parents” (116), the Oedipal complex. This paradigm shift, explains Boyarin, displaced a psychic model which is “gendered paradigmatically as feminine” by one that is “gendered normatively and exclusively masculine” (116). Through a close reading of Freud’s intimate correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess and a theoretical consideration for what Sander Gilman has prolifically documented as the ideological matrix of Jewishness, pathology and feminization in anti-Semitic, fin-de-siècle Vienna, Boyarin claims “what is at stake in the suppression of the male hysterical and the desire for the father in the shift to the oedipal theory is the suppression of Freud’s own homoeroticism” (127).

Citing Elaine Showalter’s work on hysteria, Boyarin contends that Freud’s theory of hysteria is “not exclusive to anatomical women but to women and certain racially marked men” (118). Curiously, in a letter dated 1897 to Fliess in which Freud discusses the aetiology of hysteria, he remarks that his brother and several of his sisters suffer from hysteria caused, he believed, by the perverted attentions of their father. His implicit implication in this hysterical ‘family romance’ is made explicit when he writes to Fliess about his self-diagnosis as a hysterical.26 In his letter to Fliess of August 18, 1897, he

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26 “Freud had arrived at La Salpêtrière as a neurologist: he left it a ‘hysteric’ — having found that he was just hysterical enough to identify with Charcot’s patients” (Octave Mannoni, qtd. in Gilman, *Freud, Race, and Gender* 167).
writes:

The chief patient I am preoccupied with is myself. My little hysteria, though greatly accentuated by my work has resolved itself a bit further. The analysis is more difficult than any other. It is, in fact, what paralyzes my psychic strength for describing and communicating what I have won so far. (Complete Letters 261)

This “little hysteria,” manifested within Freud as an “intellectual paralysis” (Complete Letters 253), finds its somatic compliance in Freud’s disconsolate “feeling of being tied up inside” (Complete Letters 270), a feeling which Freud emblematically likens to the minor disturbances of the female period. Under the sway of Fliess’ wacky theories of the intimate relationship between the nasal passages and the genitalia and his rigid notions of periodicity, it is little wonder that Freud remarks that his “special dates that have been on the decline have appeared again (July 17 ⁹ [sic] menstruation in its most developed form, with occasional bloody nasal secretion before and afterward)” (My italics. Complete Letters 256). Freud’s self-diagnosis as hysteric, Boyarin claims, is “a representation that further configured him as female and thus, according to the ‘inversion’ model then current, as queer” (119).

The notion of a male menstruation, argues Gilman in The Case of Sigmund Freud, is highly racialized. A product of centuries of anti-Semitic medico-scientific discourse, the notion of Jewish circumcision as a sign of a “damaged sexuality” (98) found its locus of cultural anxiety displaced onto the “Jewish nose.” Consequently, a (Jewish) nose which bled would be perceived to be a nose that menstruates, a sign of “pathological bisexuality, of hermaphroditism” (99). Gilman argues, “But its significance for Freud and Fliess, who
desperately tried to escape classification as “Jews” in the racial sense and therefore as inferior and different, is a universal sign, a sign of the universal law of male periodicity that links all human beings, males and females” (99).

His keen observations on the production of racialized pathology notwithstanding, Gilman fails to acknowledge what Boyarin cites as “what can only be described as a highly erotic relationship with his friend [Fliess]” (124). Intent on exposing the complex, anti-Semitic production of the “bisexual” Jew, Gilman disavows any desire between Freud and Fliess, that is, any desire other than their desire for scientific respectability and prestige. Referring to their ‘congresses’ as “mock academic events” (94). Gilman states, “Their desire was to move the study of psycho- and sexual pathologies into a new area — that of neurology” (94). How then, I ask, can he ignore the erotic charge of such an inviting correspondence: “I am looking forward to our congress as to the slaking of hunger and thirst. I bring nothing but two open ears and one temporal lobe lubricated for reception” (Boyarin 124)?

Boyarin’s argument, while fundamentally contextualizing the production of the hysterical, feminized Jew within a specific historical cultural-political scenario, nonetheless emphasizes Freud’s “heartfelt homoerotic relationship” (129) with Fliess. He writes of Freud’s self-feminization: “Freud repeatedly figures his own creativity as the product of this congress; he fantasies (consciously?) that he is bearing Fliess’s child” (125). In a reference to Freud’s repeated tropological use of his own anal fertility, Boyarin argues that “[t]he association between the anus, anal penetration, shit, and birth-giving seems to be well established on the overt intertextual level within which Freud worked and can thus
be legitimately read in his own letters as well" (127).

What was constantly at stake, argues Boyarin, in Freud’s growing ambivalence toward Fliess and his theories of sexuality and toward his own theories of infantile seduction and the Oedipal complex, “was the tension between a theory of sexuality that would heterosexualize him via the repression of homoeroticism and a theory of sexuality that implicated him homoerotically, and that was mapped over a heartfelt homoerotic relationship” (129). Boyarin contends that Freud’s eventual “breakup” (129) from Fliess in 1900 and the invention of the heteronormativizing Oedipus model was precipitated by an ensuing sense of panic, a panic engendered by the virulent anti-Semitic and homophobic discourses of the late nineteenth century. Freud’s panic, however, only affected a chiasmatic inversion of his sexual theories. As Boyarin politically and insightfully remarks: “After the 1890’s no longer would a feminized male, father-desiring, pathic, hysterical Jewish queer be at the center of his thinking but an active, phallic, mother-desiring, father-killing, ‘normal’ (that is, gentile) man” (137).

“From the History of an Infantile Neurosis,” as I have argued above, does not wholly evidence the theoretical inversion which Boyarin claims Freud underwent eighteen years earlier. Freud indeed may posture as phallic and active, identifying with the father of the Wolf Man’s primal scenario, but his positioning is never straightforward. Moreover, I believe Freud’s posture as active and phallic is ambiguously unstable. His heteronormative orientation is shaky at best. I stake my claim in the polyglotic presence of the untranslated, of the foreign utterances — détour, a tergo, banal, more ferarum, siesta.

Alarmingly, the presence of Freud’s polyglotic interjections disrupts the linguistic
coherence of the Wolf Man’s case study. Echoing Anna O.’s hysterical polyglotism and
the spontaneous loss of her mother-tongue, Freud’s foreign utterances punctuate the
somatic cohesion of his text making it, for the instant, incomprehensible and foreign to
understanding. This incomprehensibility compels the reader to translate the foreign terms,
to give it meaning, to decode its uncanny secrets. Just as the hystericism of Wolf Man
was represented as a delirious bowel, simultaneously articulating and obfuscating anal
desire, Freud’s polyglot utterances reveal an unconscious desire in coded, that is, foreign
terms. Just as I have been compelled to translate ‘the foreign’ as a displaced signifier of
Freud’s repressed sodomitical desire, I am similarly compelled to translate the
spontaneous utterance of the foreign as a sign of Freud’s unabandoned hysteria, that is to
say, as a sign of his unresolved ambiguous desire.

It is interesting to note that, as a hysterical utterance, the foreign aggregate of
Latin and Romantic words revisit the text — the scene of psychoanalysis’ Symbolic — as
a corporeal assault of unrepressed (but disguised) desire. Clearly not pre-linguistic, the
hysterical foreign utterance comes as close as perhaps Freud could come to a notion of
Kristeva’s choric eruptions, that is to say, of a pre-linguistic, instinctual, and corporeal
rhythmic-oral expression. As a choric expression, Freud’s hysterical foreign utterances

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27 This is true whether we recognize the linguistic coherence in the native German or in the
English translation.

28 Freud writes that ‘in the course of the work his bowel began, like a hysterically affected
organ, to ‘join in the conversation’ [mitsprechen]” (312). In this sense, the delirium of the hysteric,
as in the polyglotism of Anna O., produces an incomprehensible babbling, a confusion of tongues
(homophonically, as in the Biblical notion of Babel), a somatic expression of prelinguistic
jouissance. Anally fixated, the babbling of the Wolf Man takes place at the anus.
may be understood antithetically to Walter Ong's thesis of Learned Latin as the language of the Fathers — the hysterical as a kind of infantile babble, a kind of "baby talk" (37). Viewed in this light, the foreign returns, suspiciously, as a maternalized expression of pre-Symbolic, pre-Oedipal desire.

In "Hysterical Phantasies and Their Relation to Bisexuality" (1908), Freud writes that "[h]ysterical symptoms are the expression on the one hand of a masculine unconscious sexual phantasy, and on the other hand of a feminine one" (93). Never without a sexual significance, the hysterical symptom "must necessarily represent a compromise between a libidinal and a repressing impulse; but it may also represent a union of two libidinal phantasies of an opposite sexual character" (93). If Freud's polyglotism is read as a compromised sign of his unrepressable hysteria, then the expression of his bisexual phantasy returns defensively as his reproaches against his critics and his own sense of analytic inferiority, and as the sodomitical scenario in which Freud is both the father and the mother of psychoanalysis. However, the phantasy plays out rather queerly. While Freud's apparent posturing in the phantastic scene a tergo as resiliently phallic, the phantasy of the sodomitical scenario itself, I argue, is resolutely sexually ambiguous. In the disavowal of sexual difference, the sodomitical phantasy privileges the ubiquitous anus over the feminine vagina. Exclusive of the female, but not of the active/passive sexual dynamic, the two privileged terms are phallus and anus. In this sense, Freud's bisexual feminine phantasy only approximates the feminine, by performing a physiological parapraxis, that is, a significant slip from vagina to anus.

Freud's phantasy of birthing psychoanalysis is a birthing a tergo, that is to say, this
Awry identification takes place at the anus. In a letter to Fliess, dated November 14, 1897, Freud writes, "after the frightful labor pains of the last few weeks, I gave birth to a new piece of knowledge" (Complete Letters 278). Citing Jay Geller, Boyarin remarks that much of Freud's correspondence with Fliess figured the notion of birthing and female menstruation with that of dirt. Freud writes, "everything related to birth, miscarriage, period goes back to the toilet via the word Abort [toilet] Abortus [abortion]" (qtd. in Boyarin, 125). Translated by Masson as "a collection of filth" (Complete Letters 293n.1). Freud's "Dreckologisch Report" makes a (defensive) pun on the 'dirtiness' of his sexual preoccupation with hysteria, dreams, and obsessional neuroses. Intellectual production, its difficulties, its obstacles and its breakthroughs were figured by Freud as anal and faecal.

In "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis," analysis figuratively returns as the "labourious" task of translating the peculiarities of patients whose "national character ... was foreign to ours" (345). Evoking the metonymic relationship of 'earth,' 'dirt,' 'fertilizer,' 'shit,' 'defecation,' the Wolf Man's resistance to analysis is described by Freud as "fertile difficulties" (237). A distant echo of Anna O.'s hysterical childbirth, the trope of labour as a sign of hysterical birthing returns as the father's "heavy breathing" (303). Insofar as Freud describes the Wolf Man's obsessional breathing, uttered upon seeing "cripples, beggars, and poor people" (303), as both an act of mimicry and of identification with the sickly father and as a wish to birth the father's child, his own 'labour' mimics the heavy breathing that symbolically performs both the masculine and the feminine position in the heterosexual dynamic. Obedient to his own theory of bisexuality (with which he aligns the Wolf Man), these two phantasies of identification are united within the hysterical
Freud. As he is the out-of-breath-father, the wolf-with-the-pricked-up-ears, he is
simultaneously the mother in labour, delivering his/her faecal-babies.

As Dianne Hunter suggests of Anna O., Freud's polyglotism "may reflect a refusal
of the cultural identity inscribed in the order of (coherent) German discourse" (qtd. in
Bernheimer, 9). If that cultural identity is read as heterosexual and gentile, as Boyarin and
Gilman suggest, then Freud's polyglotism may indeed be read as a sign of psychic
resistance, of cultural refusal. However, as the psychic position of the hysterical is
notoriously unstable, preferring a bisexual disposition to an Oedipal or a homosexual one,
then Freud's polyglotism must be read, not as a sign of refusal, but of duplicity. But
unlike the female hysterical, Freud's hysterical duplicity never fully articulates the choric.
The insurgent expression instead manifests as a disparate aggregate of foreign words, but
as words nonetheless. Whether foreign or native, Unheimliche or Heimliche. Freud's
hysterical utterance only mimics the feminine through approximation. And like the
Unheimliche: Heimliche relation, Freud's foreignness is but an inverted double to his
notion of native and homely and vice-versa.
The Psychoanalytic Subjects of (Homo)phobia and Paranoia

Noting the Specular

Identification is a phantasmatic trajectory and resolution of desire; an assumption of place; a territorializing of an object which enables identity through the temporary resolution of desire, but which remains desire, if only in its repudiated form.

(Butler, Bodies That Matter 99)

As noted in feminist, post-colonial, and gay/lesbian critical theory, psychoanalysis has a tendency to privilege specular economies. To define specularity is to take up the deconstructionist double gesture; it is, broadly speaking, and at its most elemental, a subject and his object, the scopic drive, the phantastic mise en scène of desire, and reflection/reflexivity. Traditionally, the psychoanalytic fascination with the specular has included Freud’s notions of the ego (1923) and of the fetish (1927), Jacques Lacan’s mirror stage (1949), D. W. Winnicott’s “the mother’s face” (1971), and Jessica Benjamin’s criticism of the intrapsychic (1986). The critical redress of psychoanalysis that is produced at its margins is itself an engagement with specularity that makes the subject of specularity take notice of itself — It is the looking me who is being looked at — and, perhaps, as betrayed by its difficult pleasure in excessive reading, the critical redress of

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2 My choice of pronoun is deliberate and follows Luce Irigaray’s criticism of the Lacanian post-Copernican subject: “We can assume that any theory of the subject has always been appropriated by the ‘masculine”’ (133). Furthermore, this paper will limit itself to the study of what Prado de Oliveira names “masculine paranoia” (171), a study of the case studies of male, not female, paranoiacs to which he himself will later turn.
marginality is itself a specular operation — an uncanny expression of paranoia.³

In order to redress the specularized subject, we must first address the subject

_propre_⁴ of psychoanalysis. The psycho-social constitution of the subject is necessarily produced, according to much of psychoanalysis, through the psychic processes of differentiation and of individuation. In the concentrating and delimiting negotiation of the self, the other is produced as both its phenomenological reflection, as a type of self-validating mirror, and its repudiated by-product. The specular economies of psychoanalysis rely upon the paradox of the self-validating/repudiated other to mirror the phantastic notions (corporeal and libidinal) of the subject to himself. This negotiation may be described as the circuitous exchange between the fluctuating and permeable boundaries of self in relation to the other, a topological field of specularity in which the production of the self and the other, _the_ clefted pair of psychoanalysis, is anxiously repeated _ad nauseam_ within the phantasy of origin and identity.

Significantly, the critique of psychoanalytic specularity has most often been voiced

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³ In his analysis of Freud’s 1922 essay, “Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality,” Barry Chabot states, “the paranoic (sic) assigns to the trivial actions of those close to him and to the accidental happenings in his environment — all of which he closely scrutinizes — a momentous, disproportionate significance. His problem is not a lack of attention to his world but _an excessive reading_ of it. This undoubtedly contributes to the unshakeable quality of his delusions: in a sense, he is always right: the signs _are_ (sic) there. he differs only in his suspicious reading of them” (italics mine, 40).

⁴ I write “the subject _propre_,” instead of “the proper subject,” in order to connote Julia Kristeva’s notion of the clean as extrapolated in her theory of the abject. The French adjective _propre_ means distinguishing quality (‘peculiar’), or that on which an identifying mark is founded, as well as ‘clean’ and ‘own’. As in the English ‘proper’, Kristeva’s translator, John Lechte, notes: “the French _propre_ also connotes propriety or correct behaviour” (Kristeva, “Approaching Abjection” 148 n.2). Aply, the French term connotes the exclusivity of the subjective constitution: “that which is unclean is also _not_ ‘me’” (148 n.2).
by those who have been produced as the threatening and repudiated reflection of the hegemonic subject of psychoanalysis, that is, as its phobogenic object: women, people of colour, the colonized, and gays and lesbians (the "inverts" of psychoanalysis). Unlike the Hegelian concept of "being for others," the repudiated otherness of psychoanalytic specularity is not produced as a dialectic of subjectivity. Rather, the specular economy of hegemonic psychoanalysis only circulates the inverted imago of the anxious subject. Lacking the subject's reciprocating recognition of itself as its mutual subject, the other merely acts as a phenomenological sound-board, absorbing and reverberating that which has been violently projected from the subject — an otherness from within which, in a sense, is mapped onto and reflected off of the phenomenological other.

For the Antillean psychoanalyst, Frantz Fanon, the specular economy of the psychoanalytic subject necessarily produces the black man as a phantastic corporeal reflection of the white man's psycho-moral repudiation. The black man, constrained within a racist schema of specular repudiation, symbolically represents the signs 'lust,' 'dirt,' 'terror,' and 'monstrosity,' to the white subject. Always produced in relation to the white man, and never being for himself but always being in kind, the black man is psycho-ontologically torn from his originality and fixed as "an object in the midst other

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5 This spelling of "phobogenic" is consistent with Fanon's spelling: "The Negro is a phobogenic object, a stimulus to anxiety" (151).

6 With the recognition that these voices of dissenting otherness are neither necessarily coherent nor mutually inclusive, and that their particular political, social and ethical agendas and concerns may be quite distinct, an observation about their imposed position within specularity can be made.

7 Describing this being in kind, Fanon cites the racist myths of the colonizer: "the Negro's sui generis odor ... the Negro's sui generis good nature ... the Negro's sui generis gullibility ..." (129).
objects" by the imperative of the colonial interpellation — to which Fanon brings our critical attention — “Look, a Negro!” (109):

Sealed into that crushing objecthood, I turned beseechingly to others. Their attention was a liberation, running over my body suddenly abraded into non-being, endowing me once more with an agility that I had thought lost, and by taking me out of the world, restoring me to it. But just as I reached the other side, I stumbled, and the movements, the attitudes, the glances of the other fixed me there, in the sense in which a chemical solution is fixed by a dye. (Fanon 109)

As Fanon implicitly suggests, the “Negro” of the colonial interpellation is never expected to respond with the reply. “Who, me?” Insomuch as he is never addressed as ‘you’ — as in the Althusserian hail. “Hey, you there!” — he can never assume the enabling place of the first person. He ‘stumbles’ into the universality of Negrohood, a place already made for him, a place that anticipates his arrival: “no. he is not a Negro but the Negro” (italics mine, Fanon 127). On the other hand, the Althusserian social subject, the interpellated, is produced necessarily by his obedient reply of recognition; success is conditioned upon this intended obedience. Insofar as the colonial interpellation denies

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*In her analysis of the performative recuperation of the injurious terms — “nigger” and “queer” — Butler suggests that the shaming interpellation. “Hey, you queer!” (a kind of homophonic que(e)rying of Althusser’s “Hey, you there!”) relies upon the force of its shaming performathe for the interpellant “you queer” to disavow that site of repudiated identity. Heterosexualization depends upon the accumulated force of the term “queer” to produce an obedient social subject who holds two incompatible positions at the same time - a schizoid subject who simultaneously recognizes difference (nominated as psychosexual pathology) and shamefully disavows it.

Unlike Fanon’s colonial interpellated “Negro,” who is never addressed as “you,” the hail “you queer” opens up a space of being, albeit a shameful and pathologized space of being, for the queer subject. All the queer subject has to do. Butler idyllically suggests, is to engage, that is, to perform that identity hyperbolically for him/herself in order to “recast queer agency in this chain of historicity” (Bodies That Matter 228). In effect, Butler claims, the taunt of homophobia has the potential to be subverted as an enabling violation (cf. G. Spivak in Bodies That Matter 122). Some injurious signs like “nigger,” Butler concedes without lengthy explanation, may however, never escape the force of their brutal historicity.
subjective reciprocity, it succeeds in producing its social other by fixing him/her in the place of non-subject, of "non-being." No obedient response is necessary for its constitution for "it is enough that somewhere [the colonial object] exist: It is a possibility" (Fanon 155). Hence, existence, not recognition, is the necessary condition for the production of the colonial other.9

The assurance of the other's potential existence may be sufficient for its production as the racialized stereotype; however, as Homi Bhabha argues, this knowledge and identification of the stereotype "vacillates between what is always 'in place', already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated" (18). In Bodies That Matter (1993), Judith Butler suggests that production of identity is never limited to, nor is it fixed by, a singular act. For her, like Bhabha, the founding interpellation must be continuously, anxiously, inculcated by a naming that is repeated over and over again. As Freud noted in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) in his observation of grandson Ernst's spool game of disappearance and return (the fort:da game), mastery is produced co-extensively with the threat of its loss; pleasure is bound up with unpleasure. Freud concluded that repetition, among other things, as told by a child's game, is the uneasy sign of this psychic ambivalence. Colonial phantasies of identification, like other specular scenarios of desire and identification, are necessarily maintained by that very oscillation between mastery and

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9 This assertion by Fanon, which privileges existence over recognition, inverts the logic of subjection/subjugation as produced through the Althusserian interpellation. Paradoxically, this may suggest a type of alterity which is simultaneously ontologically prior to the hail of the colonial subject but, nonetheless, enslaved by it. Fanon also seems to suggest that the phantasy of colonial territorialization, as represented by the scopic imperative ("Look!") claims for itself ("a Negro!") that which has a pre-existence as terra incognita — a radically foreign onto-morphology.
loss, pleasure and unpleasure, desire and derision. As Bhabha notes of the necessary ambivalence of the stereotype's fixity and phantasmatic quality, "the same old stories of the Negro's animality, the Coolie's inscrutability or the stupidity of the Irish must be told (compulsively) again and afresh, and are differently gratifying and terrifying each time" (29).

The danger of specularity, that is, its injurious attraction, its terrifying pleasure, is its ability to seduce and to confer mastery. The other's critical interest in psychoanalytic specularity, precariously situated at the margins of its discourse, is in danger of falling for specularity's phantastic play of self-reflection. Once engaged in the scenario of specular phantasy and subjected to its dynamic engagement of projection and introjection, the critical other may not be able to resist the complicated entanglement of the theory of specularity. To engage this phantasy of specularity — theoretically, critically — incurs the danger of entrapment within the play of mirrors. This notion may be demonstrated by looking to Marianne Hirsch's notion of the double self, a specular relationship between mother and daughter, which is critically informed by feminist object relations theory. Hirsch warns, "If the relationship being studied is itself a mirroring, then when the scholar who 'attempts to untangle' finds herself reflected in the parts which 'try to separate and delineate,' she is both observing a mirroring and acting it out" (ctd. in Gallop 17). The analytical theorist, in "her" attempt to untangle or disengage specularity, is in danger of

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10 Critical to note is theory's "etymological origins both in the Greek verb theorin, to look at, gaze, contemplate, survey, and in the Greek noun theoria, the group of representatives who oversaw and functioned as authoritative witnesses of public occurrences and sacred events" (Kreiswirth and Cheetham 2).
“stumbling,” falling for/into the scene of self-reflective desire and becoming one of its phantastic actors.
Commenting on a text is like doing an analysis.
(Lacan, I, 73, qtd. in Butler, Bodies That Matter 65)

In the analytic situation, this reflective *mise en scène* of desire takes the form of transference:counter-transference. As described by Laplanche and Pontalis in *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (1988), transference is the contextual site of analysis *par excellence* "where the subject finds himself face to face" with the existence, the permanence and the force of his unconscious wishes and phantasies" (458). Accordingly, the patient unconsciously inserts the analyst (the analysand’s other) into the *mise en scène* of a prototypical infantile conflict, metonymically displacing onto him/her feelings and reactions which apply to this prototype. This mechanism of transference "is triggered off precisely at the moment when particularly important repressed contents are in danger of being revealed" (Laplanche and Pontalis 458). In this sense, "transference appears as a form of resistance, while at the same time testifying to the proximity of the unconscious conflict" (Laplanche and Pontalis 458).

The analyst, warns Freud in his "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis" (1912), "should be opaque to his patients and, *like a mirror*, should

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11 It is critical to note that indeed the classic analytical situation is not "face to face," rather its positioning might well be described as *front to back*. As has been noted by Lee Edelman and others (Edelman cites Derrida’s *The Postcard*), the analytical scene of the seated analyst behind the prostrate analysand evokes a phantastic scene of sodomitical desire. Hence, in the transference situation, the analyst, like "the Negro," needs only to exist in order for the analysand to create the phantasy of the "face to face" *mise en scène*. 
show them nothing but what is shown to him” (italics mine, qtd. in Berman 10). Lacan echoes Freud’s sentiment of opaque specularity, stating that “the mere presence of the psychoanalyst, before any intervention” (“Intervention” 93) is sufficient to establish the dialogic requirements of the analytic scenario; the analyst’s engagement, argues Lacan, must restrict itself to “a positive nonacting” (“Intervention” 103). The counter-transference, that which Freud could not resist,\(^{12}\) is the failure of Lacan’s enigmatic dictate. Unable merely to mirror the analysand’s unconscious desires, the analyst falls victim to his own resistant desires, taking the analysand as his site of transference, and is interminably bound up within the play of mirrors of transference:counter-transference.

If to the analytic ear, colonial discourse is a type of transference, that is, a scenario of phantastic projections of the unconscious, then the critical interjection of Fanon, who is both analyst and “the Negro” of colonial discourse, may be understood as a type of counter-transference:

> “Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!” […] look, a nigger, it’s cold, the nigger is shivering, the nigger is shivering because he is cold, the little boy is trembling because he is afraid of the nigger, […] the handsome little boy is trembling because he thinks that the nigger is quivering with rage, the little white boy throws himself into his mother’s arms: Mama, the nigger’s going to eat me up. (Fanon 112)

Like Freud, who cannot help but thrust himself into and complete the Rat Man’s sadistic-

\(^{12}\) Later, Freud himself would suggest that his own failure to recognize his counter-transference at the time of Dora’s analysis led to the failure of her treatment and her eventual abandonment of analysis. According to his own theory of negative formations, Freud’s *failure to recognize*, like Dora’s “reproachments,” indicated the presence and the proximity of the unconscious conflict.
anal penetration phantasy. Fanon narrates the phobic phantasy of the white boy as if it were his own, syntactically making himself the object of phobic speculation and collapsing the subjective distinction between the white boy and himself: “Mama, the nigger’s going to eat me up.” Insofar as the quotation marks which delimit the white boy’s cry fall away from the phobic narration in Fanon’s phantastic rearticulation, the surety of whose phantasy is being articulated is shaken. Is it the white boy’s? Or is it Fanon’s phantasy of the white boy’s phantasy of “the Negro”? The most striking aspect of Fanon’s identification with the colonizer, in the figure of “the handsome little boy,” is his ambivalently articulated homosexual wish. Fear collapses into desire, repulsion into attraction. The phantasy of “being eaten,” necessarily disguised from consciousness through a series of syntactical inversions, displacements, and affective reversals into its opposite, signifies multivalently. Classically, as interpreted by Freud in the case of the Wolf Man, the fear of being eaten is foremost a castration.

By filling in the patient’s elliptical pauses and completing his unspoken/unspeakable thoughts, Berman argues that Freud’s violation reads as the active participation in the Rat Man’s anal rape phantasy.

The Wolf Man’s recollected dream, which Freud interprets to be both a phantasy of seduction and castration, ends: “In great terror, evidently of being eaten up by the wolves. I screamed (sic) and woke up” (“Infantile Neurosis” 259).
phantasy. Read within the strict codes of the hetero-compulsive doctrine of Oedipal theory which largely informs psychoanalysis, castration translates as the feminine, that is to say, passive, psychic position. Hence, to phantasize about castration, the anxiety around which notwithstanding, signifies, at some level, a passive identification with the feminine. Moreover, psychoanalysis reads the phantasy of castration, in this expressed form of sadistic orality — “being eaten up” — as a conflicted wish of fellatio — one of the two most phantastic scenarios of the imagined homosexual seduction. The other phantastic scenario, of course, is the anal penetration scenario.\(^{15}\) so aptly described by Dr. jur. Daniel Paul Schreber, psychoanalysis’s most celebrated paranoid, as the pleasurable:unpleasurable idea of being “a woman submitting to the act of copulation” (Freud, “Psychoanalytic Notes” 142).

It is this phantastic ideation and others.\(^{16}\) as described by Dr. Schreber in Memoirs

\(^{15}\) One example of the popularity of such an anal rape phantasy is illustrated by a homophobic statement from televangelist Jerry Falwell: “You [homosexuals] send for my children. You [homosexuals] want to sodomize and rape them and destroy them” (Kennedy 14).

\(^{16}\) According to Freud, Schreber’s paranoid delusional complex was ignited by the anxious idea of being “a woman submitting to the act of copulation” (142). His persecutory delusions, which Freud makes clear are the primary delusions of his paranoia and not the consequence of his subsequent Redeemer delusions, included the delusional belief that he was being poisoned by Flechsig, his doctor, that “his body was being handled in all kinds of revolting ways” (143) contrary to the Order of Things. that his “body [was being] used like a strumpet” (150) by God, that voices mocked his transformative disgrace by calling him “Miss Schreber” (150). and that “he was dead and decomposing” (143).

Responding to these sublime threats and unbearable violations, Freud concludes that Schreber’s ego had to defend itself through a transformative reconciliation in which Schreber’s body is invaded by “female nerves” (147) and in this new state of voluptuousness would become “God’s wife” (164) bearing onto Him a new race of men. Freud writes:

It was impossible for Schreber to become reconciled to playing the part of a female wanton towards his doctor; but the task of providing God Himself with the voluptuous sensations that He required called upon no such resistance on the part of his ego. Emasculation was no longer a disgrace: it became ‘consonant with the Order of Things.’ it took its place in a great cosmic chain of events, and was instrumental in the re-creation of humanity after its extinction. (183).
of My Nervous Illness (1903), upon which Freud bases his theory of persecutory paranoia as a psychic defence against a homosexual wish. According to Freud, who takes Schreber’s Memoirs, and not Schreber himself, as his primary analytic text of paranoia, paranoia is a psychic defence mechanism structured upon inversions of affect and syntactical displacements. Schreber’s intolerable wish of emasculation [Entmannung], as Freud describes it, is necessarily turned, by the masculine identified ego, into delusions of persecution, taking as its form the fear of sexual defilement, bodily and moral corruption, and death. The pleasurable homosexual wish — “it really must be very nice to be a woman [...]” — is necessarily transformed by the force of (heterosexist) repression into the mocking voices who call out, “Miss Schreber” and jeer, “this person who lets himself be f———d! (sic)” (“Psychoanalytic Notes” 142, 150).

Freud’s classic formula of paranoid inversion is articulated thus: “I do not love him — I hate him, because HE PERSECUTES ME” (Freud’s emphasis, “Psychoanalytic Notes” 201). The intolerable proposition, “I (a man) love him (a man),” must be loudly contradicted by the assertion, “I do not love him — I hate him.” Moreover, Freud claims, the mechanism of symptom-formation in paranoia requires “that internal perceptions — feelings — shall be replaced by external perceptions” (201) projecting outwards onto

17 In his introductory remarks to “Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoïdes)” (1911), Freud defends his analytic interpretation of a text in lieu of a patient stating that “the patients themselves [...] possess[ed] the peculiarity of betraying (in a distorted form, it is true) precisely those things which other neurotics keep hidden as a secret” (138). Furthermore, he notes that “[s]ince paranoids cannot be compelled to overcome their internal resistances, and since ... they only say what they choose to say. it follows that ... a written report or a printed case history can take the place of personal acquaintance with the patient. For this reason I think it is legitimate to base analytic interpretations upon the case history of a patient suffering from paranoia ... whom I have never seen, but who has written his own case history and brought it before the public in print” (138).
others what the paranoiac does not wish to recognize in himself. Consequently, the proposition “I hate him” becomes transformed by projection into another reversal: “He hates (persecutes) me, which will justify me in hating him.” In accordance with Barry Chabot, who notes of the mechanism of paranoid inversion, “the paranoic victimizes the person whose victim he perceives himself to be” (40). Freud states of Schreber: “there were certain people by whom he thought he was being persecuted and injured, and upon whom he poured abuse. The most prominent of these was his former physician, Flechsig, whom he called a ‘soul-murderer’” (143).

In “Corpus Juris (Hetero)sexualis,” Kendall Thomas remarks that Freud’s reading of paranoia as a psychopathological effect of the repression of homosexual desire, produced in a socially heterosexual man, has suffered a curious and preposterous fate. Thomas writes:

As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has noted, later interpretations of “Psycho-Analytic Notes” deployed Freud’s psychoanalysis of the Schreber Memoirs “not against homophobia and its schizogenic force, but against homosexuality” and homosexuals [Between Men 20, ctd. in Thomas]. This interpretive parapraxis led to a strange state of affairs in which the homosexual rather than the homophobe became the subject of mental illness. (34)

This turn of analytic interest has been noted by other critics of psychoanalysis. Citing the unsophisticated way in which Freud’s paranoid schema has been inverted by his

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18 For example, Sándor Ferenczi, an early Hungarian Freudian, writes, “Insufficiently repressed homosexuality can later, under certain circumstances, become once more manifest, or express itself in neurotic symptoms; this is especially the case with paranoia” (“Part Played” 250). The suggestion here is that paranoia is the effect of a manifest homosexuality.
epigones in order to serve heterosexist bias and homophobia. Guy Hocquenghem in *Homosexual Desire* (1993) claims that the phantastic idea of homosexual 'threat,' as produced by the repressive and civilizing force of Oedipal capitalism, undergoes a displacement from the heterosexual imaginary onto the homosexual patient of psychoanalysis, who "frequently suffers from a persecutory paranoia: he 'feels threatened’" (55). In the "meaningless" (49) production of homosexual desire, as articulated by anxious capitalism, the feeling of (sexual) 'threat' is evidenced, argues Hocquenghem, by the discursive acts of "medical men, judges, journalists and educators [which aim at] a permanent effort to repress the homosexual libido" (56). This persecutory discourse, itself an effect of "an interpretative delusion which leads it to discover all around it signs of a homosexual conspiracy" (*Homosexual Desire* 55), is read by Hocquenghem as a sign of the repudiated homosexual wish. The homosexual, argues Hocquenghem, is unable to withstand the prohibitive effect of this discourse of taboo desire: the homosexual internalizes the prohibition as threat.

Echoing this internalization, Hocquenghem posits a disturbing question: "Does the homosexual only feel threatened, or is he really threatened?" (56). The materiality and the

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19 Quoting W. H. Gillespie, a participant of the 1965 Stockholm psychoanalytic conference on homosexuality, Hocquenghem writes: "Similarly, Thorne stresses the persecutory anxiety in the aetiology of male homosexuality: the patient externalizes his internal persecutors and projects his anxiety on to them in the role of a sexual partner" (61).

20 Hocquenghem argues that the notion of homosexual desire, like heterosexual desire, is a "meaningless" signified, for desire "emerges in a multiple form ... in an unbroken and polyvocal flux" (50). This polyvocality of desire is impossible to name. Like a preposterous paradox, desire's components, as an arbitrarily frozen frame in multiplicity, are only divisible *a posteriori*. 
historicity of violence against gays and lesbians is opened up to speculation. A sense of incredulity is produced by the question. The very presence of such a question, I contend, confirms the preposterous fate of homosexuality and the theory of paranoia in which the (homosexual) object of paranoiac persecution is transformed into the paranoiac who is homosexual. Is this line of questioning merely a rhetoric effect used by Hocquenghem to illustrate the insidiousness of the forces of Oedipalization, or is Hocquenghem—as critical queer theorist—entangled in the specular economy of paranoia? To what extent is the reflexivity of the mechanism of paranoia inescapable, irresistible to homosexuals? Is such a line of questioning—in mine, his—intrinsically homophobic?

This persecutory anxiety which is internalized by the homosexual, argues George Weinberg in *Society and the Healthy Homosexual* (1972), manifests itself as a “self-

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21 Citing Jonathan Katz’s extensive historical almanac of lesbians and gay men in the United States, critical legal theorist Kendall Thomas, describes homophobia in explicit material terms: “Gay men and lesbians in America have been condemned to death by choking, burning and drowning: ... executed, [castrated], jailed, pilloried, fined, court-martialed, prostituted, fired, framed, blackmailed, disinherited, lobotomized, shock-treated, psychoanalyzed and] declared insane, driven to insanity, to suicide, murder, and self-hate, witch-hunted, entrapped, stereotyped, mocked, insulted, isolated ... castigated ... despised [and degraded]” (sic, “Beyond” 285).

22 George Weinberg originally coined the term “homophobia” in 1972. The assembled linguistic construction “homophobia” is readily contested by the queer academic community. “The word,” claims Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “is etymologically nonsensical” (219 n.1). Political theorist Anna Marie Smith admits that she too has “many reservations about the term ... I shall assume that it works well enough for now [as a general term for anti-lesbian and gay discourse]. although I do think that lesbian and gay activists need to come up with a better word” (244. n.6).

I also find the word “homophobia” problematic. Following Sedgwick and Smith, my uncasiness is further complicated by Freud’s definition of phobia. In “Obsessions and Phobias: Their Psychical Mechanism and Their Aetiology” (1895), Freud outlines a taxonomy of anxiety neurosis within which he identifies two groups of phobias. He states:

Among the phobias, also, two groups may be differentiated according to the nature of the object feared: (1) common phobias, an exaggerated fear of things that everyone detests or fears to some extent ... (2) contingent phobias, the fear of special conditions that inspire no fear in the normal man. (italics mine, 80)

If the fear and the anxiety of homosexuals can be defined as a “phobia,” then to which of the two groups
loathing” (5). For him, the homophobe is foremost the homosexual who hates himself (because his desire for other males is forbidden) and must project this hatred and anxiety onto his (desirous)-others whom he then takes as his persecutors. Hence, following this scenario of twists and turns, homosexuals suffer from what psychoanalyst Gerard van der Aardweg has called a “complaint sickness” (196), a particular homosexual psychopathology which expresses itself as, to paraphrase van der Aardweg, feelings of instability, over-anxiety, and inferiority. Such feelings, he concludes, are often accompanied by a distressed mood and a sense of unbelongingness and of general social isolation. I contend these twisted re-interpretations displace the exciting causes of self-loathing, which are the internalized imagos as figured in the law of Oedipal desire (Frommer 73), and “blunt the force of Freud's potentially subversive insights about the violent psychic pressures compulsory heterosexuality exerts on homosexual desire”

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does it conform? Defining homophobia as a “common phobia” only naturalizes the irrational and violent anxiety produced in those who detest homosexuals and lesbians. Accordingly, the homophobe’s manifest anxiety is merely an exaggeration of what “everyone” detests or fears to some extent. This popularization of the abhorrence of homosexuals only seeks to legitimate a neurotic behaviour. On the other hand, if homophobia is a “contingent phobia,” then the “normal man” should not suffer from it. How, then, can one account for the wide-spread, popular and disparate manifestations of the abhorrence of homosexuality? I remain dissatisfied with the idea that the fear and anxiety of homosexuality can be classed as a phobia. For this reason, my argument in this chapter will interrogate the relationship of paranoia (a delusional psychosis) to homosexuality.

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23 Ferenczi, in his discussion of ‘true’ inversion and its incurable condition, describes inversion’s (i.e. homosexuality’s) neurotic symptoms as “morbid anxiety” (“Part Played” 258). I will further explore this notion of morbid anxiety in relation to Schreber’s phantasies of decomposition and scenes before the mirror in the following, and last, section of this chapter.

24 In a footnote to the introduction of “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis” (1918), Freud criticizes the readings given by C. G. Jung and Alfred Adler of Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis. He describes these readings as Umdeutungen. Significantly, what may be accurately translated as “a round-about interpretation,” Freud suggested the English version of “twisted re-interpretations” (233, n.1) for the German Umdeutungen to his English translators, Alix and James Strachey. I chose to use the same wording for my criticism, the awareness of my reiterated bias notwithstanding.
(Thomas, “Corpus Juris” 34).

This “interpretive parapraxis” (Thomas, “Corpus Juris” 34), like any parapraxis, particularly in the analytic scenario, betrays unconscious materials through a blundered action. Commonly understood as slips of judgement, of the tongue, and of the pen, parapraxes also include misreading, forgetting, mislaying, and misrecognition. According to Freud in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901), however, the bungled actions of parapraxes are no mistake. These actions operate as a type of self-betrayal, a wish for apprehension. Paradoxically, that which goes to great lengths to elude the rigor of the preconscious’ censor, that is, to evade censorious scrutiny, reveals itself as a blundered, and disguised, action in the realm of consciousness. The blunder, claims Freud, wishes to be noticed by the surveillant ear/eye of psychoanalysis. If “falling,” as Fuss claims, “is the tropological model Freud selects to describe homosexual identity formations” (“Freud’s Fallen” 13), then this slip of the analytic tongue, which takes as its speculative object homosexuals and not homophobes (which, problematically, Weinberg believes can be one and the same thing), must reveal through parapraxis, at some level, the failed repression of homosexual desire.

Furthermore, the resistance of the analyst to recognizing such an analytical error as the syntactical reversal of Freud’s paranoid schema, like any analytic resistance, “register[s] the existence of a repression and its severity” (“Dora” 93). In the current re-evaluation of the mechanism of counter-transference and the analyst’s inevitable engagement in it, practicing psychoanalyst Martin Frommer writes, “Notably missing from psychoanalytic literature is a consideration of the analyst’s countertransference (sic) in the
treatment of patients who are homosexual” (65). Frommer, however, while noting this absence as “particularly conspicuous” (65), refuses to resolve the situation “too easily” by suggesting the analytic resistance, in the form of omission, is a sign of the analyst’s individual “homophobic feelings and reactions” (66). Frommer suggests that psychoanalysis itself, a theory ironically built upon a refusal to recognize its own subjectivity, supports the “objectifying and denigrating depiction of patients who were homosexual” [by foreclosing] any consideration of the analyst’s countertransference through masking the analyst’s subjective feelings toward them” (67). This objectification, argues Frommer in the tradition of Benjaminian feminist object relations theory, fails to recognize the essential, intersubjective dyadic structure of analysis. Insofar as both analysand and analyst are biased culturally, Frommer suggests that “[t]raditional psychoanalytic theory, specifically oedipal (sic) theory, has served to reinforce and promote these cultural attitudes and stereotypes” (73). Restricting himself to a critique of Oedipal theory as heterosexist, and ignoring its implicit homophobic demands in the psychic processes of hegemonic identification and desire, Frommer advocates the analyst’s need to identify and extricate himself from this bias.

Frommer’s belief in the destruction, or at least, the self-awareness of the specular economy of analysis, while suggestive, fails to account for the self-satisfying pleasure of

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25 Frommer cites two clear examples of this phobic misrecognition by prominent American psychiatrists: in 1956, Bergler wrote, “I have no bias against homosexuality [but] homosexuals are essentially disagreeable people, regardless of their pleasant or unpleasant manner [...]” and, in 1968, Charles Socarides wrote, “Homosexuality is filled with aggression, destruction and self-deceit. It is a masquerade of life [...]” (66-67).

26 Frommer acknowledges that his focus is “primarily on the psychoanalytic dyad in which the analyst is male and heterosexual and the patient is male and homosexual” (72).
specularity. What would it mean to psychoanalysis if it recognized itself in its specular play of desire? As Prado de Oliveira suggests of the troubling pleasure of specular inversion explicit in Freud's theory of paranoia: "And even, perhaps, to generalize what certain psychoanalysts might themselves say about homosexuality: There's no homosexuality in or between psychoanalysts. It's in them, the paranoids. Didn't Freud himself feel disconcerted by the similarities between his theory and Schreber's?" (173).
Phantastic Theories

All sorts of things in the world behave like mirrors.  
(Lacan, II, qtd. in Butler, Bodies That Matter 57)

One of the interesting things noted by Dr. Weber, in his 1899 medico-legal assessment of Schreber's sanity, an observation supported by Freud and by Laplanche and Pontalis, is that the paranoiac, while obsessed by ideas which "have formed themselves into a complete [delusional] system" (Freud, "Psychoanalytic Notes" 144), exhibits no weakening of the intellect, and in effect, is able to represent himself to "an observer who was untrained upon [the paranoiac's] general condition" (144) as anything but queer. The peculiarity of the paranoiac, to the untrained eye, remains practically unnoticeable; it would take, argues Freud, psychoanalysis's scrutiny and excessive reading to bring to light, not only the peculiarity of the paranoiac, but his camouflaged, repressed homosexual wish.

With this observation in mind, I would like to query the incestuous matrix of psychoanalytic textuality by which one text repeats, informs, and haunts another, thereby creating the spectacular apexes to the general theory of psychoanalysis. Specifically, I am thinking of the reflexive ways in which Freud's theories of paranoia, narcissism, and homosexuality implicate, mimic, recall and redouble each other to such an extent that any critical observation of one produces a simultaneous awareness of the others. Read with a keen and peculiar partiality to Weber's observation of paranoia, this funhouse effect of psychoanalytic intertextuality may be re-read as the "complete [delusional] system" of a
paranoiac.

I venture to theorize that Freud wants his reader of psychoanalysis to be aware, uncannily so, of the phenomenon of the double. In the 1919 essay, "The 'Uncanny'". Freud states that the phenomenon of the double figures as one of the key, recurring concepts of psychoanalysis. Freud metaphorically figures the trope of the 'double' in his notions of primary narcissism, the self-observing and self-critical super-ego, and the compulsion to repeat. The double, insists Freud, is always coupled with a "quality of uncanniness" (358), an uneasy, and often terrorizing, feeling of familiarity of the already-known.

... if this is indeed the secret nature of the uncanny, we can understand why linguistic usage has extended das Heimliche ['homely'] (sic) into its opposite, das Unheimliche ['uncanny']; for this uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression. ("The 'Uncanny'" 363-4)

The feelings of strangeness accompanied by the phenomenon of the double are oddly — yet never fully — ameliorated by Freud’s manifest production of psychoanalytic intertextuality. It is as if he reveals repeatedly the secret workings of psychoanalysis, and consequently, of the unconscious itself, in order to render them "commonplace and banal (sic)" ("Infantile Neurosis" 269).

Ideally, in Freud’s mind, the canny reader of psychoanalysis would already know (uncannily) what psychoanalysis had to uncover, in effect, discovering nothing new "but
something which is familiar and old-established.\textsuperscript{27} Hence, paranoia is not psychically dependent on a homosexual wish, nor is homosexuality regressively contiguous with narcissism, \textit{because} Freud tells his readers so again and again in (but not limited to) “Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia,” “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914), “A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Disease” (1915) and “Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality” (1922). Rather, the implicitness of Freudian theory suggests that reflexivity and uncanny familiarity is merely the effect of the unconscious brought to light under the scrutinizing practice of psychoanalysis. The practice of psychoanalysis would ideally bring to mind that which already haunts it.

This exercise of mastery played out in Freud's compulsion to repeat is a counterfeit attempt to render insignificant — “banal” — his psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious. Or, read another way, his private insecurities about the significance of his theory of psychoanalysis drove his compulsion to repeat, producing and simultaneously conferring mastery through a complex system of intertextuality. Either way, Freud's theory of psychoanalysis was to him something very spectacular indeed.\textsuperscript{28}

In order to re-read Freud's theories of paranoia, narcissism, and homosexuality as

\textsuperscript{27} Addressing the anticipated contention of “unauthorized readers” (“Fragment of an Analysis” 37) having access to the “intimacies” (36) of Dora's case study, Freud elicits Dora herself, insisting no harm will come to the reader with such a revelation: “But she will learn nothing from it that she does not already know” (37).

\textsuperscript{28} Arguing that Freud's preoccupation with the trope of the 'double' is a sign of his paranoia, I quote Freud: “[the characteristic tendency of paranoics (sic) [is] to construct speculative systems” (“On Narcissism” 91).
components of the delusional system of a paranoid, I engage Freud obliquely.29 I choose to come at Freud through his own defense, through his own general theory of psychoanalysis. As previously noted in this chapter's marginalia, Freud argues that the paranoid possesses "the peculiarity of betraying (in a distorted form, it is true) precisely those things which other neurotics keep hidden as a secret" ("Psychoanalytic Notes" 138).

In the case of Schreber, this peculiarity took the form of a self-written case history which was brought before the public in print. Written in a characteristically paranoid manner, Memoirs of My Nervous Illness reads both as an attack upon the clinical authority of Schreber's primary physician, Dr. Paul Emil Flechsig of the Leipzig psychiatric asylum, and as a megalomaniacal claim to an observable state of greatness: "I am of opinion that it might well be to the advantage both of science and of the recognition of religious truths if, during my life-time, qualified authorities were enabled to undertake some examination of my body and to hold some enquiry into my personal experiences" (Memoirs qtd. in Freud, "Psychoanalytic Notes" 139).

In fact, the act of public ostentation in the form of a written testimony or defence is notable in two other famous cases of paranoia: in Freud's "A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Disease" (1915) and in Sándor Ferenczi's "On the Part Played by Homosexuality in the Pathogenesis of Paranoia" (1912).

29 Monique Wittig in The Straight Mind and Other Essays (1992) suggests that lesbian and homosexual writers, and more generally, "All minority writers (who are conscious of being so) enter into literature obliquely" (62). She suggests that insight is connected to a point of view from ontological and epistemological standpoint. The minority subject, she claims, unlike the straight subject who is "self-centered" (61), is able (paradoxically) "to see clearly, from an oblique point of view" (46). As a lesbian writer, I authorize my marginal status and lay claim to Wittig's oblique insights.
In “A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Disease,” the woman who was “frightened by a noise, a kind of knock or click” (148) contracts a lawyer to bring a civil suit against her lover whom she believes had hired two men to photograph them in a sexually compromising situation. Believing she was being blackmailed by her lover whom she thought wanted “to bring disgrace on her and force her to resign the post she occupied” (147), she attempts to defend herself through legal recourse. Suspicious of the woman’s claim, her lawyer, who “was experienced enough to recognize the pathological stamp of this accusation” (147), appeals to Freud’s authority to validate her accusations.

In this case study of the woman who hears a knock and believes her lover is trying to blackmail her, Freud is faced with a conundrum. Either he must give up his belief that “the delusion of persecution invariably depends on homosexuality” and abandon everything that followed from the theory,” or he must declare the woman’s experience “correctly interpreted” (150) as malicious persecution. Unwilling to yield to either predicament, Freud sees “another way out” (150). Holding to the belief “that patients suffering from paranoia are struggling against an intensification of their homosexual trends — a fact pointing back to a narcissistic object-choice [and ...] that the persecutor is at bottom someone whom the patient loves or has loved in the past” (149). Freud’s second

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30 Freud writes. “My own observations and analyses and those of my friends had so far confirmed the relation between paranoia and homosexuality without any difficulty” (“Running Counter” 150). The reference to “my friends” is a reference to Sándor Ferenczi. Note the distinction of those who confirm Freud’s theories — “friends” — and those who do not — his rivals, C. G. Jung and Alfred Adler whose writings on psychoanalysis he calls “twisted re-interpretations” (“Infantile Neurosis” 233 n.1).
analysis of the woman refigures the persecutor as her mother instead of her male lover. In "On Narcissism," Freud discusses the libidinal disturbance of perverts and homosexuals claiming that such people in their later choice of love-objects take "as a model not their mother but their own selves. They are plainly seeking themselves as a love-object, and are exhibiting a type of object-choice which must be termed 'narcissistic'" (italics Freud's, 81). In the case of a woman who hears a knock, the taking of mother as love-object is doubly regressive: it is both narcissistic and pre-Oedipal in its organization.
masculine ego, argues Ferenczi, and not the “defenceless women,” which needs protection from the homosexual libidinally charged sight of the officer “partly in his shirt, with a bare chest” (italics Ferenczi’s, 145). After being involved in an “avalanche” (147) of lawsuits with the military, the newspaper owner then hires a lawyer to defend him against “being unjustly persecuted by his compatriots” (144). In his own defense of sanity and as a proof of his accusations, the paranoid submits to Ferenczi “a mass of newspaper cuttings, documents, and pamphlets, numbered and sorted in the most exemplary order, all of which he had written himself” (144) which he believes documents the violations to which he was witness.

Briefly, I want to remark on two peculiarities of the paranoiac not explicitly stated by Freud or Ferenczi. First, conforming to the paranoic demands of megalomania, the accusation of persecution appears to be linked to, if not conditional upon, a public demonstration: a lawsuit, a newspaper editorial. Second, the written accusation, itself an inflammatory attack, paradoxically represents to the paranoid personality a proof of his affliction and simultaneously functions as his defense. Merely responding to an anterior attack, the paranoiac believes he is driven to defend himself with a counter-attack: “I hate him, because he persecutes me” (“Psychoanalytic Notes” 201).

In a lengthy footnote that introduces the case study of the Wolf Man in the manner of an apologia, Freud makes reference to a time when he “was still freshly under the
impression of the twisted re-interpretations which C. G. Jung and Alfred Adler [his rivals] were endeavouring to give to the findings of psychoanalysis” (italics mine, “Infantile Neurosis” 233 n.1). Now, some four years later, freed from these impressions, Freud has published his study of an infantile neurosis as a defense against “the battle which is raging around psychoanalysis” (235). The battle, in this instance, to which Freud refers and against which he takes offence is the analysis of children’s neuroses. Of such an analysis conducted upon a neurotic child, Freud writes:

[it] must [...] appear to be more trustworthy, but it cannot be very rich in material; too many words and thoughts have to be lent to the child, and even so the deepest strata may turn out to be impenetrable to consciousness. (italics mine, “Infantile Neurosis” 235)

Defending his analysis of an infantile neurosis which was “analyzed not while it actually existed, but only fifteen years after its termination” (235), Freud attacks his rivals’ practice, believing that the analysis of children’s neuroses cannot produce anything but the shallowest of insights. Describing the work of child analysis practiced by Jung and Adler

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32 The English term “twisted re-interpretations” was suggested by Freud himself to his translators. Alix and James Strachey, as a translation for the German Umdeutungen. Umdeutungen reads awkwardly in the German as a composite of linguistic aggregates: the prefix, Um-, denotes a meaning of “round-about” and “after” which connotes circuitry (as in the German Umgang meaning “circuit, intercourse”), detour, delay: Deutung translates as “interpretation,” deuten as “to interpret,” “to point out,” and deuten as “to interpret artfully,” “to twist the meaning of.”

Collaborating with Freud’s observation that “the patient himself will always provide the text” (“Dora” 158), this translation indexes Freud’s own repressed homosexual wishes. I suggest the “re-” in “re-interpretations” reads as a sign of a ghosted or a projected notion of the original ‘interpretation’ in which the opinions of critic and analyst mirror each other. Hence, Freud and his desirous rivals are coupled in a twisted union or “round-about” (anal?) circuitry of analytic interpretation.

33 Describing the combative atmosphere of nascent psychoanalytic theory, Freudian biographer, Peter Gay, states. “In developing the theory of psychoanalysis, Freud was to have more enemies, and fewer friends, than he wanted. Failure was probable; hostility and ridicule were virtually certain” (55-6).
as inadequate, superficial and "twisted" (236). Freud advocates his analytic technique which "succeed[s] in descending into the deepest and most primitive strata of mental development" (236). "Only an analysis which has penetrated so far," states Freud, "deserves the name [of psychoanalysis]" (italics mine, 236).

Resoundingly familiar, Freud’s libidinally charged defense of psychoanalysis recalls an earlier rally against analytical misinterpretations and "the ill-will of narrow-minded critics" ("Fragment of an Analysis" 35). In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess dated January 25, 1901 (Letter 140), Freud anticipates the critical import of his theory of hysteria and its subsequent refutation: "Anyhow, it is the most subtle thing I have yet written and will produce an even more horrifying effect than usual" (ctd. in the editor’s introduction, "Fragment of an Analysis" 32). The apprehension of this horror to which Freud believed he would be subject delayed the publication of "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria"\(^{34}\) for four years. Eventually publishing the case study in 1905, Freud braced himself against, what he understood to be, "the judgement of the world" (35).

Sharpening his megalomaniac apprehensions into fullblown accusations, Freud wrote vehemently against what he predicted would be the unforgiving critical reproaches to his theory on the sexual aetiology of hysteria. Forestalling the speculative onslaught of petty bourgeois criticism, Freud writes in the preface of "Dora":

Only, whereas before I was accused of giving no information about my patients, now I shall be accused of giving information about my patients which ought not to be given .... Am I, then, to defend myself upon this

\(^{34}\) Hereafter named "Dora."
score as well? (italics Freud's, 35-37)\textsuperscript{35}

Attempting to ward off his critics' obstinate objections and reproaches about the content and the disclosure of Dora's "intimacies" (36), Freud cautioned his reader in the ways of reading. "Dora" was not to be read "as a roman à clef\textsuperscript{36} designed for [the reader's] private delectation" (37). Rather, Freud insisted the reading of "Dora" "presuppose[d] a knowledge of the interpretation of dreams" (39) and obliged a yielding to internal resistances. Admonishing the reader who was not versed in his theory of dream interpretation and psychoanalysis, Freud retorted:

\begin{quote}
Such a reader will find only bewilderment in these pages instead of the enlightenment he is in search of, and he will certainly be inclined to project the cause of his bewilderment on to the author and to pronounce his views fantastic. (39)
\end{quote}

Freud's vehement prognostication of bewitched readership is surprisingly accurate in that it reads the prurient reception of his audience and that it also performs Freud's embryonic theory of paranoia as projected defense. On the one hand, Freudian biographer, Peter Gay, substantiates Freud's fear of hostile reception confirming "[t]he resistance to psychoanalysis, whether through obtuse rejection, malicious gossip, or meaningful silence, was sustained and painful" (193). On the other hand, if we take Freud at his word, his defensive posturing against the assaults of his professional rivals and his

\textsuperscript{35} Commenting about the prefatory remarks of "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria." Gay notes. "it was unusually combative even for a writer not allergic to spirited controversy." (247).

\textsuperscript{36} This reproach of Freud's is ironic for Freud himself understands the unconscious as a mystery ("roman à clef"), a riddle whose secrets are vulnerable to, that is, are able to be unlocked by, the act of interpretation.
hostile public, signifies a repressed homosexual wish. My own indulgence causes me to read Freud’s complaint as: they are not worthy readers; I am not worthy to be read: I want to be read by them.

If authorized reading, that is, psychoanalysis, is an in-depth penetration of the unconscious, then, Freud’s wish to be read and read correctly may be interpreted as a coital wish to be penetrated deeply. Moreover, just as Ferenczi reads his paranoiac’s attempt to defend himself against the brutal assaults of military men as inverted expressions of repressed homosexual desire, Freud’s attempts to defend himself against prurient remarks and “twisted re-interpretations” suggest a desirous inversion. The effect of Freud’s reproaches is uncanny, echoing Schreber’s wish “to be a woman submitting to the act of copulation” and de Oliveira’s observation of paranoic homosexuality being in and between psychoanalysts — a very copulative image of meaningful exchange indeed.

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Freud, Kristeva, and those Disgustingly Clever Lesbians

Apropos of Kristevian Abjection

It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composites. The traitor, the liar, the criminal with a good conscience, the shameless rapist, the killer who claims he is saviour... Any crime, because it draws attention to the fragility of the law, is abject...

(Kristeva, Powers of Horror 4)

In my final chapter, I will consider Julia Kristeva’s notion of abjection as impossible exclusion through Freud’s most exclusive lesbian case study, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (‘Dora’)” (1905) with reference to “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman” (1920). Radically different from each other, sharing literally only the arousal of parental displeasure and Freudian analytical interest, these two case studies demonstrate psychoanalysis’s reading of homosexuality — that is, of lesbianism — as a sign of abjection. What interests me here is the way in which Freud

1 I am using “exclusivity” in two senses. First, I am making reference to the marginal positionality of these two case studies within the chronology of Freud’s case study framework. As Diana Fuss notes, “Dora” was the first of Freud’s six published case studies and “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman” was the last. Metaphorically, they are like bookends that bracket Freud’s case studies. Second, insofar as Dora is critically recognized as “the most famous of modern hysterics” (Findlay 323), the “beautiful and clever girl of eighteen” has received little critical attention. Diana Fuss describes the case study of the “beautiful and clever girl” as “one of the most underdiscussed texts in the psychoanalytic library” (1993, 1). Interestingly, whereas Fuss (1993) and Judith Roof (1990) see “Dora” and “Psychogenesis” as dissimilar — at one point, Roof describes “Psychogenesis” as a “reverse narrative of Dora” (21) —, Mandy Merck (1986) argues that there are numerous similarities that the cases share, including the ages of the women, the fathers’ insistences that the daughters be analyzed by Freud — which is described by Findlay via Lacan as the Symbolic’s “odious exchange” (323) of the young women —, and the eleven week duration of the analysis and its subsequent incompleteness.
produces lesbian desire as abject irrespective of the relative psychic health of his female patients. On the one hand, there is Dora, the resistant yet suffering Viennese hysterics, and on the other, "the [beautiful and clever] girl who was not in any way ill" ("Psychogenesis" 375). Resistance — to seduction, to Oedipal identifications, to analysis, and to illness itself — is the one sign which, for Freud, effectively collapses the two young women together as abject. It is not lack of psychic health, but impropriety and resistance that produces these women as dangers to Freud's Oedipal law of desire and of identification. As evidenced by Dora's disgust and the "maladroitness" ("Psychogenesis" 386) of the beautiful and clever girl, abjection looms at the very site of psychoanalysis's representation of lesbianism.

My aim in this chapter is not to call down abjection, to disavow the outlaw status of lesbianism, but rather to reorient the theoretical construct of abjection as something psychically sacred, something erotically nostalgic. In pursuing, and celebrating, an abject reading of Dora's hysterical disgust and of the maladroitness of the beautiful and clever girl, I will dally periodically with Jean Genet's A Thief's Journal (1949). I appeal to Genet in order to exploit abjection as heterosexuality's constructed realm of repudiated erotogeneity, an erotogeneity that, as Genet writes, delights in its rejected status as repulsive and disgusting. My dalliance with Genet's Journal may seem at odds with the markedly lesbian content of my analytical labour; however, as Hélène Cixous remarked of

2 I am stating here that Freud's production of lesbian desire as abject, while arguably problematic, needs to be understood as historically contingent upon the bourgeois investment in the normative production of sexuality, gender, and psychopathology — a production, I believe, that still enjoys hegemonic privilege. This note is not to be read as a defence of Freud's limitations, but rather as a conceded acknowledgement of them.
Genet's writing and the company in which she included him: "the only inscriptions of femininity [within twentieth-century France] that I have seen were Colette, Marguerite Duras, ... and Jean Genet" (248, n.3). Paradoxically, it is Genet's rhapsodic project of erotocizing abjection that includes him within the Cixousian notion of écriture féminine, that is, within "a passionate and precise interrogation of her (sic) erotogeneity" (Cixous 246). In this improper and intensely corporeal sense of écriture féminine, inclusion forms an abject community of strays and outcasts, a borderline colony of convicts, thieves, prostitutes and traitors to which Genet, Dora, and the "beautiful and clever girl" ("Psychogenesis" 371) belong.³

In order to engage Kristeva's notion of abjection as impossible exclusion, I must turn to her enigmatic essay on abjection, Powers of Horror (1980). For Kristeva, abjection is a symbolic production of horror, "a twisted braid of affects and thoughts [...] a name [that] does not have, properly speaking, a definable object (sic)" (1) that allows the subject's acquisition of language and entry into the symbolic order. Dependent upon the delimitation of the corps propre, the clean, proper and self-delimited body of the

³ This notion of an abject community closely parallels Luce Irigaray's notion of déréliction. As Margaret Whitford notes, Irigaray defines déréliction as "the original state of loss and separation constituted by being born, losing one's original home" (205 n.2). Whitford stresses, however, that Irigaray's critical point is that "the symbolic provides alternative homes for men" (205 n.2), whereas women are shut out and abandoned by the symbolic. Déřéliction, connoting in French the state of being abandoned by God, has for Irigaray women's ontological status. In The Ethics of Sexual Difference (1984), Irigaray argues that déréliction is "a state of fusion [un fusionnel] which does not succeed in emerging as a subject" (qtd. in Whitford 81). Whitford remarks that déréliction is strikingly correspondent with the psychoanalytic term. un fusionnel, signifying "merging or failure to differentiate and separate" (81). However, unlike Irigaray's provocative notion, my concept of this community of strays does not divide so easily along gendered ontologies. By including Genet in the community of écrivaines féminines, I have sought to complicate essential notions of difference and to reveal the abjected expanse of the outcasted.
symbolic order, abjection is "predicated on the very position of the logic of separation" (107). According to Kristeva, "what is abject, [...] the jettisoned object, is radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses" (2). In this sense, Kristeva is true when she is at a loss of words to describe abjection as *some-thing*, as a signified. "Properly speaking," abjection cannot be; that is to say, as it is radically expelled from what is proper (*propre*) for it cannot be incorporated by the symbolic order. Further, in that it is never wholly excluded, in that it abuts the *corps propre* of the symbolic, it is never wholly an object, an other:

> The abject is not an ob-ject facing me, which I name or imagine. Nor is it an ob-jest, an otherness ceaselessly fleeing in a systematic quest of desire. What is abject is not my correlative, which, providing me with someone or something else as support, would allow me to be more or less detached and autonomous. (1)

As Elizabeth Grosz makes explicit in her essay, "The Body of Signification," the child’s positioning as a stable enunciative subject in the symbolic order is conditional upon a meaningful structuration of space: of inside and outside the body, and of spaces between the subject and the object, and the self and the other. "Kristeva is fascinated," Grosz writes, "by the ways in which ‘proper’ sociality and subjectivity are based on the expulsion or exclusion of the improper, the unclean, and the disorderly elements of its corporeal existence that must be separated from its ‘clean and proper’ self" (86). According to Kristeva, maternal authority is “the trustee of that mapping of the self’s clean and proper body” (72). Through oral frustrations, prohibitions, and sphincteral training, the maternal trustee shapes "the body into a *territory* having areas, orifices, points and lines, surfaces and hollows, where the archaic power of mastery and neglect, of the differentiation of
proper-clean and improper-dirty, possible and impossible, is impressed and exerted" (72). Properly territorialized through the primal repression of the pre-Oedipal drives, the subject gradually adheres to the paternal laws of the symbolic order. However, as Kristeva emphasizes, "[i]f language, like culture, sets up separation and, starting with discrete elements, concatenates an order, it does so precisely by repressing maternal authority and the corporeal mapping that abuts against them" (72). This repression is precarious at best. In effect, Grosz argues, abjection, as the body's acknowledgement of this social territorialization, "testifies to the precarious grasp of the subject on its own identity, an assertion that the subject may slide back into impure chaos out of which it was formed. It is, in other words, an avowal of the death drive, a movement of undoing identity" (90).

Based on a binary logic, Grosz states, "[t]hese pairs need to be oppositionally coded in order for the child's body to be constituted as a unified whole and for its subjectivity to be definitely tied to the body's form and limits" ("The Body" 86).

Suggestive of the Lacanian méconnaissance of the formative subject who is produced through the mirror stage, the Kristevian subject, obedient to abjection, similarly recognizes/ misrecognizes itself as propre, unified and distinct from that which has been expelled. The abyss of non-meaning which abuts the subject's frail sense of integral coherence, the expelled, can never be fully obliterated. Kristeva writes:

The abject from which [the subject] does not cease separating is for him (sic), in short, a land of oblivion that is constantly remembered. Once upon blotted-out time, the abject must have been a magnetized pole of covetousness. But the ashes of oblivion now serve as a screen and reflect aversion, repugnance. (8)

Abjection, translated into the subject’s psycho-visceral responses of loathing, repugnance, and nausea, protects the subject from the threatening attraction of what has been radically excluded. Described by Kristeva as an ambiguous border, abjection “while releasing a hold, [...] does not radically cut off the subject from what [t]reatens it (sic) — on the contrary, abjection acknowledges it [the subject] to be in perpetual danger” (9). A primer of one’s culture, abjection deflects the dangerous attraction of non-meaning and “thrusts me to the side and turns me away from defilement, sewage and muck” (2). It protects the enunciative “I” where difference makes no difference at all, that is to say, where meaning collapses.

Why does corporeal waste, menstrual blood and excrement, or everything that is assimilated to them, from nail-parings to decay, represent — like a metaphor that would have become incarnate — the objective frailty of symbolic order? (70)

As Kristeva’s question suggests, that which falls away from the body, the expelled, threatens “the objective frailty of symbolic order.” The distinction between self and other, between “me” and my objects, is blurred by the presence of corporeal waste — faeces, tears, semen, mucous, menstrual blood, urine, pus, spit, and sweat. “[P]oint[ing] to the infinitude of the body proper” (108), corporeal waste simultaneously exceeds the body, exceeds the subject, while, at the same time, it acknowledges the subject’s debt to its interior materiality. Literally, the sign ‘corporeal waste’ is the subject spilling out of himself in order to be, properly speaking: “I expel myself, I spit myself out. I abject myself within the same motion through which “I” claim to establish myself” (Kristeva’s italics, 3). Within the construction and maintenance of subjectivity, the materiality of self,
particularly the materiality which exceeds the borders of the *corps propre*, of the subject's skin, are necessarily abjected so that the finitude of the enunciative "I" can maintain the fiction of a clean and proper self.

Insofar as "what goes out of the body, out of its pores and openings. ... gives rise to abjection" (108), the corpse "(or cadaver: *cadere*, to fall ...)" (3) is "the most sickening of wastes" (3). According to Kristeva, the corpse is an "I" without a proper border — an ambiguous "I" which is simultaneously "me" and not-"me." "If dung," she writes, "signifies the other side of the border, the place where I am not and which permits me to be, the corpse ... is a border that has encroached upon everything" (3). Like the stray, the corpse does not respect borders; it transgresses them. "It is death infecting life" (4). Abjection of the corpse, Kristeva argues, only temporarily protects the subject from his own (*propre*), harrowing material demise.

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A massive and sudden emergence of uncanniness, which, familiar as it might have been in an opaque and forgotten life, *now harries me as radically separate*, loathsome. Not me. Not that. But not nothing, either. A "something" that I do not recognize as a thing. (italics mine. 2)

In his book entitled, *Julia Kristeva* (1990), John Lechte questions the strength of the pull of the symbolic to effect the most primal and radical of separations, that between infant and mother. Suggesting that "the symbolic is not, of its own accord, strong enough to ensure separation," he posits that "there must have already been moves [before the

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5 Kristeva, as well as Lacan, is indebted to Freud's observation in *The Ego and the Id* (1923) that "[t]he ego is first and foremost a bodily ego: it is not merely a surface entity but is itself the projection of a surface" (364).
beginning of the symbolic, as he puts it], by way of the drives, towards expelling/ rejecting the mother” (159). Individuation of the subject, he insists “depends on the mother becoming abjected” (159).

Refusing to abandon the magnetic pull of the symbolic to the push of the drives as Lechte suggests, Kristeva posits a similar notion of the abjected mother by asking a more striking question: “By means of what turnabout is the mother’s interior associated with decay?” (italics mine, 101). Kristeva believes this inversion of the generative corporeality of the maternal is reproduced retroactively as the subject’s phantasy of self-birth. The psycho-visceral reaction of abjection, of the horror and fear realized by the maternal function, is the symbolic’s safeguard, its abjected amnesia of the “once upon blotted-out time.” Offering an example of this turnabout, Kristeva notes that the placenta is radically inverted by the demands of differentiation as “no longer nourishing but devastating” (101); the abjected remembrance of the forgotten placenta is that of a leprous threat of intermixture, of blurred boundaries and indistinct corporealities. The phantasy of birthing, she argues, is the subject’s primary violent act of expulsion and of radical separation: “The nascent body tears itself away from the matter of maternal insides” (101). This tearing away strips the subject of its founding relationship to mater/ matter. As archaic residue, maternal corporeality must be abjected in order for the subject to take its place in the symbolic order. However, materiality is impossible to escape. Like an atopic memorial, Kristeva notes that “[a]bjection preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-objectal relationship, in the immemorial violence with which a body becomes separated from another body in order to be” (italics mine, 10).
Kristeva argues that the phantasy of self-birth is a phantasmatic reconstruction of the subject’s entrance into the symbolic order in which *materiority* is violently and necessarily abjected. “[B]y fantasizing his own bowels as the precious fetus of which he is to be delivered” (101), the subject repudiates his debt to maternity. Effectively erasing the intermixture of biological processes and disavowing a self-awareness as a migrant being, who literally passes through the mother, the subject attempts to birth himself. Holding to the impossible phantasy of auto-nascence, the subject nevertheless cannot escape his relationship to what has become abjected. About the subject’s phantasy of an excretory birth, Kristeva writes, “and yet it is an abject fetus, for even if he calls them his own he has no other idea of the bowels than one of abomination, which links him to the ab-ject, to that non-introjected mother who is incorporated as devouring, and intolerable” (101-2). In effect, *materiority*, that which has been abjected, clings to the birthing subject as faecal matter.

Moreover, in the phantastic inversion of auto-nascence, the subject is no longer

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6 In *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905), Freud discusses popular childhood theories of birth. The riddle as to where babies come, he claims, is ubiquitous. Foregrounding Kristeva’s oral-anal sadistic phantasies of birth, Freud’s childhood theories of birthing include: “babies come out of the breast, or are cut out of the body, or the navel opens to let them through.... people get babies by eating some particular thing (as they do in fairy tales) and babies are born through the bowel like a discharge of faeces” (*Three Essays* 114).

Returning once more to Freud’s infamous paranoiac, Dr. Schreber. I would like to offer an example, albeit a paranoid example, of the phantasy of an excretory birth. Believing God is taunting him to defecate — ‘Why don’t you sh—?’ (“Psychoanalytic Notes” 157) —, Schreber describes defecating as both tortuous and sensual. Motivated by the curiosity of a God who knows little about living men, the “miracle” (157) of evacuation is ritualized for Schreber as the purgative act of a living organism. “Repeated several dozens of times at the least every day” (157). Schreber believes his faeces are “forced forwards (and sometimes backwards again) in [his] intestines” (157). Producing “an exceedingly strong feeling of spiritual voluptuousness” (158), the movement and expulsion of faecal matter metonymically signifies both an excretory insemination and a faecal birth. Here Schreber’s delusional phantasy of faecal birth promises the re-creation of man.
simply the waste of his mother; rather, it is the “non-introjected mother” who is “incorporated” and reproduced as the abject/ed, the dirt (*impropre*), the waste of the subject. In this way, as Kristeva suggests, “[f]ecal (sic) matter signifies, as it were, what never ceases to separate from a body in a state of permanent loss in order to become *autonomous, distinct* from the mixtures, alterations, and decay that run through it” (108).

Applied to the excretory birthing phantasy of the subject, in that he is produced as his own faecal fetus, he still remains the byproduct of the *maternal* whom he has already incorporated as devouring and intolerable.

The horror of this incorporated cannibalism is intolerable to the subject. Just as Freud states the eroticism of orality and anal sadism must give way to the primacy of genital organization and anaclitic object relations, Kristeva posits “[f]ear of the uncontrollable generative mother repels me from the body; I give up cannibalism because abjection (of the mother) leads me toward respect for the body of the other, my fellow man, my brother” (79). The morbidity of the auto-nascent phantasy propels the subject, literally, away from the breast, away from the familial, toward those external, homogeneous objects that are deemed by the Law of the Father to be pure, clean (*propre*)

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7 Put another way, I am tempted to write, “he is still *the remains*, the excretory residue, of the maternal.”

8 Freud writes, “The final outcome of sexual development lies in what is known as the normal sexual life of the adult, in which the pursuit of pleasure comes under the sway of the reproductive function and in which the component instincts, under the primacy of a single erotogenic zone, forms a firm organization directed towards a sexual aim attached to some extraneous sexual object” (*Three Essays* 116).
and, thus, able to be eaten.9

According to Kristeva's analysis of biblical abomination and Levitical laws, this complicated signification of abjection functions as a prohibition of improper (impropre) erotogeneity and of defiling nourishment. She argues that the logical motion of Levitical blood and food abomination is further developed as a prohibition of "hybrid and migrant beings" (103). A taxonomy structured on a design of separation and individual integrity,  

9 If the Law of the Father repels the subject away from the maternal body forbidding cannibalistic drives, then cannibalism may be alternatively described as an attempt to return to that most loving of incorporated states — the maternal. Here abjection fails to repel the subject; instead, what is abject is what is sought after, hungrily. The desire is to incorporate and to be incorporated. With such an alternative description in mind, Leo Bersani posits a fascinating reading of a rimming phantasy in Jean Genet's Funeral Rites (1953) that is uncannily reminiscent of Freud's Rat Man's anal rape phantasy. Bersani quotes directly from Genet:

Paulo’s behind was just a bit hairy. The hairs were blond and curly. I stuck my tongue in and burrowed as far as I could. I was enraptured with the foul smell. My mustache brought back, to my tongue’s delight, a little of the muck that sweat and shit formed along Paulo’s blond curls. I poked about with my snout. I got stuck in the muck. I even bit — I wanted to tear the muscles of the orifice to shreds and get all the way in, like the rat in the famous torture, like the rats in the Paris sewers which devoured my finest soldiers. (qtd. in Homos 157)

The eroticized morbidity of Genet’s cannibalistic rimming may be read. Bersani suggests, in psychoanalytic terms as a murderous impulse of orality. Rimming, here in particular, signifies a radical incorporation in which Genet orally devours Paulo and Paulo rectally devours Genet. This radical incorporation is further complicated by the “discursive dizziness” (158) the reader experiences in her/his knowledge that the phantasized Paulo is actually his lover's brother, Jean. Reoriented as a rimming scene between “Jean” and “Genet,” we experience a kind of specular vertigo in which “the respect for one’s brother” is passionately violated. Bersani writes, “The two have become one, and the slight discursive dizziness we experience in the constant references to ‘Jean’ and ‘Genet’ as two is at least fantastically cured when the specular relation of Jean to Jean is momentarily perfected as an identity between the two” (158-9).

Citing Sándor Ferenczi’s theory that “in intercourse with a woman, a man seeks unconsciously to return to the security of existence within the womb” (159), Bersani posits that “Genet’s fantasized ascent into Jean through his anus is a savage reversal of this coming back to a life-nourishing site in the mother’s body” (159). The savagery of the scene notwithstanding, this phantasy of rimming, of anal cannibalism, may be read as an attempt to return to that most loving of incorporated states — the maternal. I challenge Bersani’s insistence that “the ‘return’ is now staged as reproductivity sterile” (159). Under the Law of the Father, such a return is perverse and sterile. However, fully immersed in the forbidden delights of the abject, Genet’s rectal return to the mother is effected by the very matter through which he lovingly, voraciously burrows.
Levitical prohibition classifies the impure as those beings that "do not confine themselves to one element but point to admixture and confusion" (98). Echoing the Law of the biblical Fathers, she writes, "intercourse between same and same will have to be prohibited — neither promiscuity within families nor homosexuality" (103). Taken to its absolute teleological limit, Levitical prohibition, as read by Kristeva, (paradoxically) concludes with a prohibition of homogeneous elements — "same and same." What begins as a prohibition of intermixture and of heterogeneity concludes with a prohibition of homogeneity. It is as if paternal teleology is structured not on a logic of linearity, but of preposterous turnabouts and inversions. Ultimately, it seems that the most horrific outcome of the paternal *telos* is a return to the original and most archaic state of homogeneity — *maternity*, that suicidal slip back into "impure chaos out of which it was formed [which Grosz describes as] ... an avowal of the death drive, a movement of undoing identity" (Grosz 90). In this sense, the horror against which the paternal must protect itself, a horror to which it is teleologically propelled, is metonymically the deadly homogeneous relation, where difference makes no difference at all.

What is the demonical — an escapable, repulsive, and yet nurtured abomination? The fantasy (sic) of an archaic force, on the near side of separation, unconscious, tempting us to the point of losing our differences, our speech, our life; to the point of aphasia, decay, opprobrium, and death? (107)

Within the assumption of Christic subjectivity, Kristeva claims a "wholly different system of meaning, hence a wholly different speaking subject" (113) is produced. "[A]bjection is no longer exterior," she writes, "It is permanent and comes from within" (113). Reabsorbed into speech, its emergence takes the form of sin, "the
rock where one endures the human condition as separate: body and spirit, body jettisoned from the spirit; as a condition that is impossible, irreconcilable, and, by that very token, real" (120). Sin is anchored to orality and is “inherent to speech” (120). As orality, Kristeva argues, sin can never be fully purged from the speaking subject. It can, however, be subsumed in the act of avowal. The enunciation of sin, as exemplified by the medieval concept of felix culpa, suggests it can be indulged, denounced through its very act of confession. The promise of Christic subjectivity, as oral indulgence, she argues, brings hope of spiritual remitment to those who figuratively satiate themselves on Christ and communicate, or rather, confess, their mortality, their culpability, and their interiorized state of abjection.

[Abjection] finally encounters, with Christian sin, a dialectic elaboration, as it becomes integrated in the Christian Word as a threatening otherness — but always nameable, always totalizeable. (17)

Likening the reading of the New Testament to the analytic process, Kristeva suggests the Christic subject “is led, by elaborating on the archaic relation to his parents, particularly the oral relation to his mother, to introject the drive-quality attached to archaic objects” (116). Without that introjection, she argues, “pre-objects and abjects threaten from without as impurity, defilement, abomination, and eventually they trigger the persecutive apparatus” (116), producing, she cites, the abject notion of the non-introjected, devouring mother of the Old Testament.

As observed by Freud in Moses and Monotheism (1939) and supported by Kristeva, Christianity is a compromise between paganism and Judaic monotheism which attempts to reconcile the maternal principle. However, this reconciliation — Kristeva
christens it a ‘swallowing’ — of the maternal principle and its objects is not, as Kristeva suggests, “trouble free” (116). Interiorized within the speaking subject, evil and defilement return “as the ineradicable repulsion of [the subject’s] henceforth divided and contradictory being” (116). The Christic subject internalizes the clean/unclean, pure (pious)/impure (impious) dichotomy of Judaic prohibition. Split internally, the subject makes himself sick in his attempt to expel that which is self (impious corporeality) but not “I” (propre subjectivity).

One of the insights of Christianity, Kristeva argues, “is to have gathered in a single move perversion and beauty as the lining and the cloth of one and the same economy” (125). This heterogeneous economy is that of the flesh. Like Kristeva’s opening metaphor of the “milk cream” (3), that is, of the skin of the milk which “makes me balk“ (3), flesh is a border economy which signifies two modalities: the corporeal body and the “pneumatic” (124) body which is sublimated through the introjection of the symbolic, of the Eucharist. She writes, “the New Testament will propose a subtle elaboration of the splitting that contemporary analytic listening discovers in so-called split subjects: the boundary between inside and outside” (117).

“The division within Christian consciousness,” Kristeva states, “finds in that fantasy [of devouring], of which the Eucharist is the catharsis, its material anchorage and logical node” (118). She argues that the Eucharist — body as bread, blood as wine — tames the cannibalistic drive of the subject “[b]y surreptitiously mingling the theme of
'devouring' with that of 'satiating'” (118). The introjection of divine nourishment, in the form of the Eucharist, “invites a removal of guilt from the archaic relation to the first pre-object (ab-ject) of need: the mother” (118). Christianity's reconciliation with the maternal principle and the cannibalistic drives of the subject, claims Kristeva, “effects [abjection's] abreaction” (119). However, as the subject of the symbolic order is always in need, is always lacking, is always in a state of “lust for swallowing up the other” (118), this symbolic feeding on Christ must be continually re-enacted in order to effect a catharsis. Thus, Kristeva claims, while communion sanctifies the subject by offering him wholeness.

10 If Communion is cathartic, it is so because the introjection of symbolic matter, holy and sanctified, becomes the material for purgation. In this sense, nourishment is waste; prope is impropre. However, unlike the phantasy of auto-nascence, in which the subject is no longer simply the waste of his mother: rather, it is the “non-introjected mother” who is “incorporated” and reproduced as the abject/ed, the dirt (impropre). the waste of the subject, the cathartic waste of Communion signifies abjection abreacted. Communal waste is waste without horror.

In Jean-Paul Sartre's Forward to The Thief's Journal, he describes Genet's story of himself as "thief" not merely as an autobiography, but as a "sacred cosmogony" (7). It is in this sacredness, Sartre explains, that the reader "discover[s] the reflective myths: the Poet, the Saint, the Double, Art" (8). The discovery of this sacredness of Genet that Sartre defends, I believe, allows for the reading of Genet’s anal cannibalism in Funeral Rites as a kind of inverted Holy Communion. Just as Kristeva argues that "abjection is the underside of the symbolic" (qtd. in Grosz, 89), Genet’s world of inversion produces Genet, the rimming sodomite, as Sartre’s Saint Genet. Insofar as Christianity produces "perversion and beauty as the lining and the cloth of one and the same economy” (Kristeva 125). Genet produces himself and his literary world as an economy of abjected sacrificial/sacred abjection. The significance, henceforth, of Genet’s sexual cannibalism of corpses may be read as an abjected communion, a kind of spiritual/sexual hunger that is abreacted through its oral indulgence. Satiated by abjection, by the fucking/eating of corpses. Genet effects an interiorized inversion of the spiritual catharsis, purging all that is holy. Reversing the terms of the sacred, waste is now nourishment. impropre is now prope.

11 It is interesting to note that this psychic/spiritual catharsis produced through holy communion is resoundingly similar to Melanie Klein's (1986) notion of the anal-sadistic phase in which the child, in an attempt to recuperate his original lost object, constantly negociates in phantasy the introjection, the projection, and the re-introjection of good and bad objects.
it also reminds him of his perpetual state of incompletion.

“Christ alone ... is a body without sin”(120), argues Kristeva. The sublimity of Christ, achieved through His symbolic incorporation, promises a reprieve from sin through the abreaction of orality and confers a spiritual-(psychic) holism. However, Christ is the only sign of a heterogeneity — the spiritual and the substantial, the “Son of both God and [wo]Man” (my emphasis, 122) — that cannot be divided back into its components. In this sense, like the inevitable telos of Levitical prohibition, the Christic telos of a harmonizing heterogeneity returns as a radical homogeneity — sublimely morbid, but now not foreclosed as spiritually threatening. This time homogeneity returns, not as a radical state of prohibition against “same and same,” but as a radical state of subliminity toward which the Christic subject aspires. As sublime osmosis, Christ is a body (a materiality) without sin (abjection), a sign of difference (hence, fully symbolic) without lack.
In the field of psychoanalytic theory Dora is surely the patron saint of
disgust.

(Lukacher, "The Epistemology of Disgust" xiv-v)

Kristeva’s claim that the phantasy of auto-nascence necessarily repudiates its
inescapable debt to materiality\textsuperscript{12} is evidenced by Freud’s phantastic claim of birthing
psychoanalysis. “After the frightful labour pains of the last few weeks,” Freud announces
to Fliess in a letter dated November 14, 1897. “I gave birth to a new piece of knowledge”
(Complete Letters 278). Tropologically faecal and exclusively masculine, as argued by
Daniel Boyarin, the Freudian birth is as much the birth of Freud’s own analytic
subjecthood as it is a birthing of a new knowledge. Produced from Freud’s studies on
hysteria, obsessional neuroses and infantile sexuality, psychoanalysis is, as Freud writes, a
“collection of filth,” a “Dreckologisch,” a theory and a praxis of “smut” (Complete Letters
293n.1, 289). Represented as faecal matter, psychoanalysis, the precious fetus of Freud’s

\textsuperscript{12} In The Thief’s Journal, Genet lovingly abandons himself to the underworld of the abject. In one scene, believing he has spotted his aged mother, who abandoned him as an infant, begging on the street, Genet writes: “What if it were she?” I thought ... Oh! If it were, I would cover her with flowers, with gladioluses and roses, and with kisses! ... I’d be glad to slobber over her.” I thought ... (Does the word gâteau [gladiolus] mentioned above bring into play the word glaviens [gobs of spit]?) To slobber over her hair or vomit into her hands. But I would adore that thief who is my mother” (21). Insofar as he recognizes a kinship with the flower named génét (broom) blossoms, the desire “to cover [his mother] with flowers” suggests a desire to cover her with himself. Abjectly symbiotic, his covering re-enacts the fetal relationship in which her materiality envelops and nurtures him. Excessively unctuous in his desire, “kisses” metonymically signify “flowers” which signify “gobs of spit” which signify the intense corporality of his improper and desirous pleasures.
auto-nascence, is inescapably abject. Freud’s baby may have no mother (mater), but its essential composition as psychosexual ‘smut’ is inescapably material. Essentially, as Freud notes in his Latin dictum of the Church Fathers — *inter urinas et faeces nascimur* —, the self-birthing subject of psychoanalysis cannot escape its own (propre), disgusting (impropre) coming into subjecthood.

Disgust, Freud theorizes in his epistolary discussions of hysteria and repression, is a psycho-visceral reaction that occurs “in connection with a memory of excitations of the abandoned sexual zones” (*Complete Letters* 280). As an index of the archaic memory, disgust becomes “one of the [subject’s] means of affective expression in the sphere of sexual life” (“Fragment of an Analysis” 62) in which the attraction toward improper pleasure is turned into its negative feeling of disgust, repulsion and loathing. Freud writes:

> Such feelings seem originally to be a reaction to the smell (and afterwards also to the sight) of excrement. But the genitals can act as a reminder of the excretory functions; and this applies especially to the male member.... (“Fragment of an Analysis” 62)

Like the nose that turns away from the stinking object, the subject’s ego is overwhelmed and horrified by the presence of archaic and improper pleasure, and so it turns away — this, claims Freud, is repression. Inasmuch as Freud symbolizes disgust as primarily an olfactory defense, Kristeva figures it as “a gagging sensation and, still farther down, spasms in the stomach” which protect the subject from the “radically excluded” (*Powers of*...
Horror 2-3). Kristeva locates the psycho-visceral reaction of disgust, not in the nose as Freud metaphorically situates it, but in the alimentary zone — the mouth, the throat, the stomach, the bowels. Abjection stinks, argues Kristeva, because it is the subject’s inside(s) expelled out.

In “A Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria,”

Freud takes great pains to avert the arousal of improper pleasure in his reader, a pleasure that paradoxically he is unable to repress fully in himself. As the “Dora” case history is one which is “bound to involve the revelation of [the patient’s psychosexual] intimacies and the betrayal of those secrets” (36), Freud’s primary concern, he tells his readers, is to preserve the anonymity of his hysterical patient. Mimicking the classic response of the hysteric who “tears off her clothes with one hand, ... and with the other holds onto them” (Complete Letters 289), Freud simultaneously reveals, that is, betrays the sexual secrets of Dora while attempting to conceal her true identity as Ida Bauer. Freud writes, “I have allowed no name to stand which could put a non-medical reader upon the scent” (my italics, 37). Anonymity, Freud rationalizes, works to deter the “unauthorized reader[...]” (37), in effect, by masking the scent of the lascivious confessional, the confessional of analysis.

[14] Hereafter named “Dora.”

[15] The hysteric, argues Freud, is unable to keep a secret. In her sense of doubleness, her secret is both concealed and revealed. The hysteric body enacts the secret, confesses the forbidden desire through the disguise of the disgusting symptom. “If his [sic] lips are silent,” Freud writes, “he chatters with his finger-tips: betrayal oozes out of him at every pore” (114).

Commenting on Dora’s symptomatic act of playing with her reticule [a small drawstring bag], Freud writes that her opening it and putting her finger in it was “an entirely unembarrassed yet unmistakable pantomimic announcement of what she would like to do ... — namely, to masturbate” (113). The secret of Dora’s masturbation, Freud claims, is powerless over his powers of analytic observation. Figured as a type of confessional act, Dora’s hysterical pantomime is an index of what Kristeva describes as an act of felix culpa, an enunciation of one’s interiorized state of abjection.
In a similar strategy of depersonalization, Freud appeals to the aridity of a purely scientific and technical discourse in order to curb the prurient interests of his readers. But he fears that even the aridity of "proper names" will not repel the "revolting" (37) stimulation of some medical readers who "choose to read a case history of this kind not as a contribution to the psychopathology of the neuroses, but as a roman à clef" designed for their private delectation" (37). Under the sign of roman à clef, the mystery of identity becomes the prurient work of interpretation. Perhaps though, in this case, the more pertinent question of identity is not plainly "Who is Dora?" but, rather the quintessential hysterical question, "[Is she] a man or a woman, and what does that mean?"

In the Postscript to "Dora," Freud proclaims defiantly, "No one who disdains the key will ever be able to unlock the door" (156). In another statement, he claims, that

In "The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman" (hereafter named "Psychogenesis"), Freud flirts with the notion that the clever and beautiful girl may indeed be hysterical. Whereas, Freud states that the beautiful and clever girl "came to the analysis without even one hysterical symptom" (381), he states that her amorous behaviour toward her beloved "demi-mondaine" (378) was duplicitous, marked, on the one hand, by public demonstrations of openness, and on the other, by a certain deceitfulness towards her parents. The paradox, for Freud, of openness and deceitfulness may be better understood in the gay parlance of "out" and "in." It is the lived paradox of many lesbians and gays: it is the paradox of the closet.

16 Read literally. roman à clef translates, albeit awkwardly, as a "romance of the key."

17 The historical significance notwithstanding. Maria Ramas, in "Freud's Dora, Dora's Hysteria," states that the immensely popular "Dora" has been read as a "popular romantic fiction and, occasionally perhaps, even as soft core pornography" (149). Describing the titillating back cover of the Collier paperback, she argues that this particular edition was designed certainly "to entice a broader audience than psychoanalysts" (149). Quoting directly from Freud's gynacophilic footnote, the back cover reads like a cheap drugstore lesbian romance novel ever-so popular in the 1950's: "Dora — her homosexual ... love for Frau K. was the strongest unconscious current in her mental life" (Ramas 149). Popularly circulated as a kind of trashy romance novel of a dysfunctional Viennese family, Ramas argues, Freud's interpretation of the sexual aetiology of hysteria reads as smut.
“[s]exuality is the key” (156) to the psychoneuroses of the hysteria. Indeed, if sexuality is psychoanalysis’ ‘key,’ as Freud argues, then what does it open? — the unconscious? In a footnote added to Dora’s first dream of the jewel-case [Schmuck-kästchen],¹⁸ Freud offers a major clue as to the real significance of the ‘key.’ After barring Herr K. from her bedroom by locking herself in, Dora recounts that the next day the key was missing; she attributes its theft to Herr K. Of this incident, Freud writes:

I suspected ... that she had seized upon this element on account of a symbolic meaning which it [the acts of locking and unlocking a room] possessed. ‘Zimmer’ [‘room’] in dreams stands very frequently for ‘Frauenzimmer’ [a slightly derogatory word for ‘woman’; literally, ‘women’s apartments’]. The question whether a woman is ‘open’ or ‘shut’ can naturally not be a matter of indifference. It is well known, too, what sort of ‘key’ effects the opening of such a case. (102n.1)

Predictably, the Freudian rebus of ‘room’ and ‘key’ is figured around the symbolic representation of feminine and masculine genitalia. More important, however, is the effects of condensation and displacement on this trope of concealment and revelation. The ‘key’ is surely the phallus in the sense that (according to Freud’s wishful thinking) it opens the ‘room,’ the female genitals. Moreover, as the ‘key’ is also figured as sexuality, it opens the secrets (the ‘door’) of the unconscious (the ‘room’). “The sort of key” that “effects the opening” of the door to the room, then is Freud’s method of analytic penetration. As the ‘room’ is figuratively gendered as feminine, to open the room is to gain access to the secrets of the unconscious, to penetrate the uncannily feminine.

¹⁸ Freud translates Schmuck as meaning both ‘jewellery’ and ‘clean.’ He suggests it is a switch-word for Dora, that is to say, it acts like a kind of linguistic junction that turns the meaning of ‘clean’ into ‘dirty.’ Read through her disgusting symptom of catarrh (as described by Freud), Dora’s dream of the jewellery-case translates as the dream of the dirty (‘wet’) genitals.
Consequently, to “disdain[...] the key” is to reject the Freudian, that is, the phallic model of interpretive mastery.

But what of Dora’s claim to the ‘key’? And what of its loss? In a footnote, Freud comments that Dora’s first illness of a chronic breathing difficulty around the age of eight marks “the boundary between the two phases of her sexual life, of which the first was masculine in character, and the second feminine” (119n.1). “It was as though,” Freud muses, “she had been a boy up until that moment, and had then become girlish for the first time” (119n.1). What marks the moment for Freud as the turning point in Dora’s psychic character is the moment at which her childhood activity of masturbation ceases and subsequently finds somatic expression through a displacement onto her chest and oral cavity. Referring to Dora’s hysterical symptom of chronic dyspnoea, Freud writes, “after the ‘asthma’ she became quiet and well-behaved” (119n.1).

In rebelling against the passivity usually associated with femininity, she hystericizes, that is to say, phallicizes, not the whole of her body, but a hysterical zone. If we take Dora as an example (“Fragment”), Dora displaces genital pleasure into a form of hysterical choking. (Grosz, “Lesbian Fetishism?” 49)

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19 Freud equates the act of masturbation, particularly in children, as an exclusively phallic activity. Before the “recognition of castration” (“Female Sexuality” 390) and the rise of passive impulses, Freud argues that the girl child is fully immersed in the phallic stage of psychosexual development: “The sexual activity of this period culminates in clitorial masturbation” (“Female Sexuality” 387). Insofar as Freud theorizes that “masturbation, at all events of the clitoris, is a masculine activity ...[,] the elimination of clitoral sexuality is a necessary precondition for the development of femininity” (“Anatomical Sex-Distinction” 339).

20 Freud argues that the beautiful and clever girl never abandons her masculine complex. Remaining unruly and unlawful, as evidenced by her brazen “maladroitness” (386) and her resistance to Freudian analysis. “[s]he was in fact a feminist: she felt it to be unjust that girls should not enjoy the same freedom as boys, and rebelled against the lot of women in general” (397).
In this sense of somatic displacement, the phallus that Dora must reject returns as a plethora of hysterical symptoms: chronic dyspnoea, *tussis nervosa* [nervous cough], aphonia [loss of voice].\(^1\) Settling in her throat, the phallus returns as a disgusting symptom — or, so Freud would like to think it does.

It is by way of her mouth that she tries to present [*darstellen*] her father’s sexual relationship to Frau K., but she does not actually succeed in this; it can’t be swallowed, it veers off into the symptoms of voicelessness. Dora experiences everything by way of her mouth. (David-Ménard qtd. in Lukacher, “Epistemology” xv-vi)

Theorizing the hysterical symptom as “the representation ... of a phantasy with a sexual content” (80), Freud reads Dora’s spasmodic cough as an oral wish for the father. Faced with Dora’s paradoxical observation that “Frau K. only loved her father because he was ‘*ein vermögender Mann*’ [‘a man of means’]”\(^2\) (80), Freud makes sense of Dora’s conscious knowledge of her father’s syphilitic impotence by inverting the observation’s meaning: “behind this phrase its opposite lay concealed, namely, that her father was ‘*ein unvermögender Mann*’ [‘a man without means’]” (80). Her father’s impotence presents

\(^1\) Through the hysterical displacement of improper, that is, phallic pleasure, Dora both complies with and violates the symbolic demands of Oedipality. Straddling both a masculine and a feminine subject position, she is the uterine stray, “the in-between” (Kristeva, *Powers of Horror* 4), whose bisexuality threatens the fragility of the symbolic order. Freud argues that her laboured breathing, like that of the Wolf Man, is a stubborn index of fatherly identification. Believing that Dora has overheard her syphilitic father during intercourse. Freud writes, “‘I maintained years ago that the dyspnoea and palpitations that occur in hysteria and anxiety neurosis are only detached fragments of the act of copulation’” (116-7). In this identifactory way, the hysterical symptom of laboured breathing fulfills Freud’s notion of the phantastic bisexual element of hysteria. Not overtly active or phallic, her dyspnoea allows her to identify passively, that is, femininely as the father who is engaged in intercourse with one of the two objects of Dora’s desire: either her mother or her father’s mistress, Frau K.

\(^2\) Insofar as Freud’s editor translates *unvermögender* as ‘unable’ and ‘impotent,’ *vermögender* can signify ‘rich,’ ‘potent.’
no contradiction for Dora, Freud argues, for "[s]he knew very well, she said, that there was more than one way of obtaining sexual satisfaction" (81). Freud claims that when pressed by him Dora admits to a "use of organs other than the genitals for the purpose of sexual intercourse" (81); well-versed in Mantegazza’s *Physiology of Love*, she has the knowledge of oral sexual relations.23 He concludes "that with her spasmodic cough, which, as is usual, was referred for its exciting stimulus to a tickling in her throat, she pictured to herself a scene of sexual gratification *per os* between the two people whose love-affair occupied her mind so incessantly" (81).

Of this paternal fellatio phantasy, Freud worries that "[t]his short piece of the analysis may perhaps have excited in the medical reader — apart from the scepticism to which he is entitled — *feelings of astonishment and horror*" (my italics, 81).24 In fact, Freud’s apparent worries of inciting disgust in his readers are realized by Felix Deutsch’s inclusion of his researcher’s observation that Dora was "‘one of the most repulsive hysterics’ he had ever met” (43). Deutsch’s sentiments are echoed by Steven Marcus who writes, “For what happened to Dora in later life, see Felix Deutsch .... The story is extremely gruesome” (my italics, 85n.24). But disgust is always an imprint of desire; it is

23 Madelon Sprengnether, in “Enforcing Oedipus: Freud and Dora,” suggests that if “Dora’s reading of Mantegazza’s *Physiology of Love* has given her knowledge of the practice of fellatio, then it would make sense to suppose that she had equal knowledge of cunnilingus” (257). In a footnote to this statement, however, Sprengnether claims that in her reading of *Physiology of Love* she found no discussion of specific sexual practices. On the other hand, she states, if Dora turned to “the more explicit text by Mantegazza, *The Sexual Relations of Mankind*, then she would have discovered a full sexual vocabulary including references to lesbian lovemaking” (273n.6).

24 Similarly, in “Psychogenesis,” Freud describes the father’s displeasure as a kind of arousal. He writes, “his daughter’s homosexuality aroused the deepest bitterness in him” (373).
In an attempt to ward off his reader’s disgust, Freud rationalizes that this “perverted phantasy of sucking at the penis has the most innocent origin” (86). Maternal in its origin, the habit of sucking dates back to the “prehistoric impression of sucking at the mother’s or the nurse’s breast” (86). Like thumb-sucking, Freud states that the sucking of the penis is a displaced wish for the original object, the nipple. Retained as a kind of archaic residue, maternal desire finds ‘proper,’ albeit perverted, expression in the act of fellatio. Freud writes, “at a time when the sexual object proper, that is the male organ, has already become known, circumstances may arise which once more increase the excitation of the oral zone, whose erotogenic character has, as we have seen, been retained” (my italics, 86).

This “innocent” fellatious discussion returns as Freud’s rather invested discussion of “the smell of smoke” (109). In an addendum to Dora’s first dream, she tells Freud she awoke to the smell of smoke. In that “[t]here can be no smoke without fire” (109), Freud interprets this new piece of information as a sign of Dora’s sexual arousal. Through a metonymic chain of affective reversals, Freud argues that Dora’s enuresis, her bed-wetting, is both a sign of her desire (it indexes her sexual arousal through the sign of

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25 In Genet’s phantasy of the Spanish beggar, Stilitano, signifiers of ‘disgust’ — saliva, spittle, leech, blood — are signs of abject desire: “I used to wonder what could possibly be hidden behind that veil of saliva, what the secret meaning was of the unctuousness and whiteness of his spittle, which was not sickly but, on the contrary, thrillingly vigorous, able to stir up orgies of energy. I would conjure up the vision of his prick. At times I would imagine it black, alive, detached from him and standing upright and rigid, like a leech, and similarly swollen with blood” (The Thief’s Journal 168-9). Clearly, in this disgustingly arousing vision, racial abjection enters as the imagined black and leech-like penis.
'wetness') and a sign of her negation of desire (water extinguishes fire). Arguing that Dora's olfactory impression is a displaced "longing for a kiss, which, with a smoker, would necessarily smell of smoke" (110), Freud states, "Herr K. and her father were passionate smokers — as I am too, for the matter of that" (my italics, 109). Freud’s fellatious desire culminates when he claims that "the little 'thumb-sucker' .... would like to have a kiss from me" (110). Read through Freud’s own identifactory desire for fellatio, the act of sucking a penis is not disgusting at all. The mere analysis of it arouses Freud’s own oral desires.

Of Dora’s disgust, Freud argues that it is merely a hysterical reaction of arousal to Herr K.’s forced kiss. Feeling Herr K.’s sexual arousal against her genitals, Freud postulates that this sensation stirred up illicit feelings of excitement in Dora, to which she was already predisposed as a “thumb-sucker” (85), which under the psychic mechanism of reversal of affect turned pleasure into unpleasure. Moreover, Freud theorizes, there must have been a displacement of sensation: "Instead of the genital sensation which would certainly have been felt by a healthy girl in such circumstances, Dora was overcome by the unpleasurable feeling which is proper to the tract of mucous membrane at the entrance of the alimentary canal — that is by disgust" (Freud’s footnote, 60).

If the fellatio phantasy does not arouse disgust, if its object is proper and its drive is natural and innocent, as Freud claims, then what evokes such disgust from Freud’s readers? And what of Dora’s disgust? What does it signify in Kristevian terms? The

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26 Read in a completely different and queer way. Freud’s identification as a “passionate smoker” perhaps suggests a desire, not to be sucked, but to suck, to smoke. Whereas, as Freud has argued, sometimes a cigar is just a cigar, sometimes it may be a fellatious wish.
answer, I believe, can be found by re-reading Dora’s observation that “Frau K. only loved her father because he was ‘ein vermögender Mann’” through Felix Deutsch’s comment on Dora’s “distaste of men” (42). In his reading of the notion of ‘vermögender,’ Freud clearly eschews the act of cunnilingus in favour of fellatio. As an impotent ‘man of means,’ the only oral act that I can accurately imagine the father performing is that of cunnilingus.

Physiologically, as impotent, he would not have the means to engage in fellatio. His vermögender-ness, if you will, resides in his knowledge of sexual practices that can fulfill his mistress, not in his ability to achieve an erection. Re-read in this way, the act of orality that Freud fails to recognize is cunnilingus, not fellatio. In the addition of a post-scripted footnote, Freud confesses that he “failed to discover in time and to inform the patient that her homosexual (gynaecophilic) love for Frau K. was the strongest unconscious current in her mental life” (162n.1). Freud’s analytic failure, if you will, was the inability to recognize that her distaste for men symbolized her taste for women.

It is the taste for women that inspires such abjection in Freud’s readers, driving them in repulsion from her disgusting and improper orality. Symbolized as abject oral erotogeneity, Dora’s rejection of the phallus and her failure to incorporate its laws of differentiation and Oedipality threaten the fragility of symbolic order. Wanting only to ‘eat’ the duplicitous sign of homogeneity and maternity, Dora’s oral rejection of the phallus and “her disgust with heterosexuality” (Deutsch, 39) reconcile, albeit neurotically, materiality through its radical introjection. Articulated as a lust for swallowing up the ‘same,’ Dora’s lesbian desire must necessarily be repudiated, made improper, abjected by Freud and his readers in order for psychoanalysis and its principles of Oedipality to come
into being. If Dora is symbolically figured as abject, it is because she is psychoanalysis's
twice expelled out.²⁷

²⁷ My discussion of the beautiful and clever girl is indeed cursory. It is not so much a sub-
text to my analysis of Dora as it is a conclusive affirmation of resistant lesbianism, a lesbianism that
continues to disrupt, to speak from the margins. Like Dora, the beautiful and clever girl is a
displeasing figure who arouses “displeasure” (372) in the indulgence of improper desires.
Significantly, the beautiful and clever girl’s lesbian passion is figured by Freud as an all consuming,
radically incorporative act. He writes, “It was evident that this one interest had swallowed up all
others in the girl’s mind” (my italics. 372). Notions of the abject punctuate the case study in other
ways as well. Her unconcealed expression of love for a woman, whom Freud describes as a “demi-
mondaine” (378), suggests an attraction to Genet’s underworld of beggars, thieves, and prostitutes.
Like the notion of the uterine stray, the notion of the demi-mondaine suggests a borderline identity
that violates the symbolic conception of borders, that is to say, the border of proper and improper
social worlds.


Freud, Sigmund and Joseph Breuer. “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical


UP. 1990. 149-180.


