

**Japanese Imperialism and Civic Construction in Manchuria:
Changchun, 1905 - 1945**

by

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Abstract

This study explores some of the urban visions inherent in Japanese colonial modernity in Manchuria and how they represented important aspects of the self-consciously modernizing Japanese state. Perceiving the northeastern Chinese city of Changchun as a *tabula rasa* upon which to erect new and sweeping conceptions of the built environment, Japanese used the city as a practical laboratory to create two distinct and idealized urban milieus, each appropriate to a particular era. From 1905 to 1932 Changchun served as a key railway town through which the Japanese orchestrated informal empire; between 1932 and 1945 the city became home to a grandiose, new Asian capital. Yet while the façades the town and later the capital—as well as the attitudes of the state they upheld—contrasted markedly, the shifting styles of planning and architecture consistently attempted to represent Japanese rule as progressive, beneficent, and modern. More than an attempt to legitimize empire through paternalistic care, however, Japanese perceptions of these built environments demonstrate deeper significance. Although Japanese intended Changchun's two built environments to appeal to subject populations, more fundamentally they were designed to appeal to Japanese sensibilities in order to effect change in Japan itself.

Imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries involved policies of dominance and exploitation that included a range of endeavors central to the creation of contemporary societies. It is in part because Japanese believed they were acting progressively in places like Changchun that many Japanese in the postwar era have had difficulty acknowledging the entirety of Japanese activities on the mainland in the first half of the twentieth century.

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Abbreviations

CCB	Capital Construction Bureau (<i>Kokuto kensetsu kyoku</i>)
CER	The China Eastern Railway
Da De	<i>Da De budongchan gufen youxian gongsi</i> (Da De Real Estate Corporation, Ltd.)
Bōsan	<i>Tokubetsu kaisha Manshū bōsan kabushiki kaisha</i> (Manchuria Home Construction, Inc.)
Kantōgun	The Kwantung Army (the Japanese military garrison on the Liaodong Peninsula in southern Manchuria)
Manden	<i>Manshū denshin denwa kabushiki kaisha</i> ; (Manchuria Telegraph and Telephone Corporation)
Mangyō	<i>Manshū jūkōgyō kaihatsu kabushiki kaisha</i> (Manchuria Heavy Industries Development Corporation)
Mantetsu	<i>Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha</i> (South Manchuria Railway Corporation; the SMR)
MKZ	<i>Manshū kenchiku zasshi</i> (<i>The Journal of Manchurian Architecture</i> ; also <i>Manshū kenchiku kyōkai zasshi</i>)
PRC	People's Republic of China
STKH	<i>Shinkyō toshi kensetsu hōsaku</i> (<i>Plans for the Construction of Shinkyō</i>)
SMR	South Manchuria Railway Corporation
TK	<i>Toshi kōron</i> (<i>The City Planning Review</i>)
Tōdai	Tokyo University (formerly Tokyo Imperial University)

Preface

Assuming that within local contexts lie trends more global in nature, this study began as an investigation of the courses and consequences of imperialism in one corner of the world. While I still think this assumption to be valid, I was only half able to attain my initial goals. What began as a comprehensive consideration of the Chinese and Japanese experiences of imperialism in Changchun has come for the moment to focus almost entirely on certain central aspects of the Japanese plans for the city. My investigation of what life was like under these plans, especially for Chinese, must necessarily await future research. It was only with some reluctance that I made this purely procedural decision—I was a graduate student in Chinese history before I was a doctoral student in Japanese history, and the absence of Chinese voices, like the proverbial silence, is overwhelming. To do justice to the entirety of the imperialist experience in Changchun, however, is for the moment impracticable because of temporal and financial constraints.

This dissertation, then, is best considered a work in progress, and I look forward to when I may contrast the experiences of the many who lived in Changchun to the structures and organizations described here.

I wish to thank those whose guidance and aid has proven invaluable to this project: Dr. William Wray, Dr. Diana Lary, and Dr. Terry McGee. I would also like to thank the many helpful librarians and archivists at the University of Tokyo, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, the Changchun Municipal Library, the Jilin Provincial Archives, and the Asian Library of the University of British Columbia. Last, I must also recognize the enduring patience of my wife, Cheryl, and family.

Select Chronology of Events

<u>1895</u> April 17	Russo-Asiatic Bank founded (with French capital) Treaty of Shimonoseki ends Sino-Japanese War
<u>1896</u>	Triple Intervention Sino-Russian mutual assistance treaty
<u>1897</u>	Formation of the CER company
<u>1898</u> May	Scramble for Concessions Completion of Shanhaiguan-Yingkou railway with British funds; later extended to Xinmindun Construction of CER begun
<u>1900</u>	Russian occupation of Manchuria during Boxer Rebellion
<u>1902</u> January 30 November	Anglo-Japanese Alliance signed in London CER completed between Harbin and Port Arthur
<u>1903</u>	CER begins operations in January
<u>1904</u> February 10	Japanese Declaration of War against Russia
<u>1905</u> September 5 September 26 November 26 December 22	Treaty of Portsmouth between Russia and Japan Japanese form Guandong administration Inaugural meeting of Mantetsu Treaty of Beijing between China and Japan
<u>1906</u> June 8	Incorporation of Mantetsu (Imperial Order No. 142)
<u>1907</u> April 15 April	Sino-Japanese treaty on Changchun-Jilin railway Mantetsu's Research Department founded, headquartered in Dalian
<u>1910</u> August 22	Japan annexes Korea
<u>1911</u> October 10	Chinese Revolution begins in Wuhan

<u>1912</u> October	Outer Mongolia declares independence Changchun-Jilin railway completed
<u>1915</u> January	Japanese present "Twenty-One Demands" (signed in May)
<u>1918-22</u>	Japanese intervention in Siberia
<u>1924</u>	China and Soviet Union renegotiate CER
<u>1926-7</u>	Chinese Northern Expedition
<u>1928</u> May 3-11 June 4	Jinan Incident Zhang Zuolin assassinated
<u>1931</u> September 18 December 10	Liutiaohu Incident (beginning of the Manchurian Incident) Lytton Commission appointed by the League of Nations
<u>1932</u> January 28 February 25 March 1 March 9 March 10 March April 1 September 16 October 2	Shanghai Incident begins; truce signed May 5 Puyi declares commencement of Datong Era State of Manchukuo proclaimed Puyi named as Regent Changchun renamed Xinjing (Shinkyō) and made <i>guodu</i> Inauguration of Manchukuo's First Five Year Plan Puyi arrives in Xinjing (Shinkyō) Formation of the Capital Construction Bureau (CCB) Lytton Commission Report published
<u>1933</u> February April 19 May 31	League of Nations condemns Japan; Japanese withdrawal Kantōgun occupies Rehe Province and Shanhaiguan Pass Shinkyō Special Municipality (Shinkyō tokubetsu shi) Tanggu Truce
<u>1934</u> March 1	Puyi becomes Kangde Emperor
<u>1935</u> January	Soviet Union agrees to sell CER to Manchukuo in March for ¥17,000,000; renamed North Manchuria Railway

- April-May Puyi's first state visit to Japan
August 31 Former CER track adjusted to standard gauge
- 1936
June 10 Japan renounces unequal treaty rights within Manchukuo
December 12-25 Xian Incident
- 1937
July 7 Marco Polo Bridge Incident
September 16 Festivities commemorate Shinkyō's first five year plan
- 1938
January 1 Inauguration of Manchukuo's Second Five Year Plan
November 3 Prime Minister Konoé Fumimaro proclaims Japan's 'New Order in East Asia'
- 1939
April-September Nomonhan Incident
- 1940
March 30 2600th anniversary of Emperor Jimmu celebrated in Japan
Wang Jingwei regime established in Nanjing; recognized by Manchukuo, Japan, Germany, and Italy (and Axis allies)
May Puyi's second state visit to Japan
September 27 Signing of the Tripartite Pact
- 1941
December 7-8 Japanese attack Pearl Harbor, Philippines, and Hong Kong
- 1942-3 Arrests of Mantetsu research personnel
- 1943
November 5 Signing of Greater East Asia defense pact
- 1945
August 6, 9 Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
August 8 Soviet Declaration of War against Japan
August 14 Japanese surrender
- 1946
January 5 Guomindang troops enter Changchun
- 1948
October 18 Changchun liberated by the People's Liberation Army

Terminology

While most foreign words in this study are Japanese, some are Chinese, something that is evident from the context. If both are offered the format is to place Chinese words first (according to the pinyin system of transliteration), following the initials “Ch,” and Japanese second, following the letter “J,” such as in the name of the SMR: Ch, *Mǎntiě*; J, *Mantetsu*. All Japanese words are transliterated with macrons, if necessary, to denote long vowels. The only exceptions to this are place names with familiar English spellings such as Tokyo (Tōkyō), Kyoto (Kyōto), Osaka (Ōsaka), and Hokkaido (Hokkaidō).

The somewhat anglicized ‘Manchukuo’ (“Kingdom/Country of the Manchus”) is used here rather than the pinyin *Manzhouguo* or the Japanese *Manshūkoku*. This is intended to offer a sense of continuity with the equally problematic term ‘Manchuria.’¹ Note that although Japanese and Chinese postwar publications typically put ‘Manchukuo’ inside quotation marks or preface it with the prefix “false,” or “fictitious” (Ch, *wěi*; J, *gi*), that practice is not followed here for the sake of simplicity. For the same reason the name

¹ Created by Europeans, ‘Manchuria’ referred originally to the homeland of the Manchus, the ethnic group that produced imperial China’s final dynasty, the Qing. The Manchu homelands, however, only belonged to what could properly be called eastern Manchuria. Western Manchuria belonged entirely to certain Mongol princes, allies of the Manchus in their conquest of China. As many Chinese also immigrated to Manchuria before 1644, the term thus failed its original intent. Today the term is anathema in the People’s Republic because it implies possible autonomy and ignores the long history of association with China. Chinese now prefer the term *dongbei* (J, *tōhoku*), meaning simply “northeast.” In Japan, while not a pejorative the term is antiquated and used most by scholars, occasional rightist agitators, and the generation that experienced the war. Here, prior to 1934, Manchuria refers to what were traditionally the “three eastern provinces” (Ch, *Dōngsānshěng*; J, *Tōsanshō*) of Heilongjiang in the north, Fengtian (today Liaoning) in the south, and Jilin in the center. After 1934 and the Japanese incorporation of Rehe into Manchukuo, Rehe too is included. Just north of the Great Wall on the Inner Mongolian border, Rehe—the northern half of what was once called Zhili Province—included strategic mountain passes between central Manchuria and Beijing that Japanese strategists knew would be useful for further penetration west and south.

'Manchukuo' is not put in quotation marks, nor is the term 'state' when referring to Manchukuo.

Place names in Manchuria appear according to their Chinese pronunciations because they are, after all, Chinese. (For Japanese pronunciations see Table 1.1.) Likewise, areas under nominal Chinese authority—the 'commercial zone' (*shangbu*) and 'national capital' (*guodu*)—are also rendered in Chinese. The most obvious exception to this rule is the city of Mukden—once called Fengtian but now known as Shenyang, Mukden is used for historical flavor. Japanese pronunciations of particular locales are used only for the railway's 'attached lands' (*fuzokuchi*)—directly administered by Japanese—and the name of the new capital, Shinkyō—the capital of the puppet state. This is to acknowledge that these two areas were Japanese creations under Japanese control.

A more complicated matter is the Kantōgun, the Japanese army of Manchuria. The name is based on an alternate Chinese term for Manchuria: "Guandong," meaning "east of (Shanhaiguan) gate."² Some may more readily recognize an earlier transliterated form of "Kwantung," not that it was rendered according to the once more common Wade-Giles method of transliteration ("Kuantung"). Thus, the Kantōgun (*gun* meaning "army") and the Kwantung Army are one and the same.³

Finally, the names of individual Chinese and Japanese are rendered in the Asian fashion with surnames first, except for those scholars of Asian descent whose work has been published in English and have adopted the European standard of placing their surnames in the final position. All Chinese names

² The gate at Shanhaiguan is near where the Great Wall meets the Bohai Sea.

³ Note also that what was once commonly called the Kwantung Peninsula is also called the Liaodong (J, *Ryōtō*) Peninsula, meaning the peninsula "east of the Liao (River)."

are rendered in roman letters according to the pinyin method of transliteration, including that of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek).

Table 1.1 Transliterated Equivalents

Cities

<u>Chinese (Pinyin)</u>	<u>Chinese (Wade-Giles)</u>	<u>Japanese</u>
Changchun	Changchun	Chōshun
Xinjīng	Hsinking	Shinkyō
Kuanchengzi	K' uanch'engtzu	Kanjōshi
Jilin	Chilin ⁴	Kitsurin
Dalian ⁵	Talien	Dairen
Lushun ⁶	Lushun	Ryojun
Harbin	Harpin	Harupin

Regions

Manzhou ⁷	Manchou	Manshū
Manzhouguo	Manchoukuo	Manshūkoku
Guandong	Kuantung	Kantō
Liaodong	Liaotung	Ryōtō

Provinces

Jilin	Chilin ⁸	Kitsurin
Fengtian	Fengt'ien	Hōten
Liaoning	Liaoning	Ryōnei
Heilongjiang	Heilungkiang	Kokuryūkō
Rehe	Jehe ⁹	Nekka

Zones

fushudi	fushuti	fuzokuchi
shangbu	shangpu	shōfu(chi)
guodu	kuotu	kokuto

⁴ Sometimes written "Kirin."

⁵ Dalian was at one time the Russian city of Dalny (ДАЛЬНИЙ).


⁶ Lushun was at one time called in English Port Arthur.

⁷ "Manchuria."

⁸ Sometimes written "Kirin."

⁹ Sometimes written as "Jehol."


Figure 1.1 Map of Manchuria



2. Korea and Manchuria


Source: Beasley, W. G., *Japanese Imperialism*

Figure 1.2 The SMR and the Willow Palisade



Source: Jilinsheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Jilin shengzhi*, vol. 43, *Wenwuzhi*, Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1991. (Changchun is where four roads meet just above the center of the map.)

Figure 1.3
Kuanchengzi, the Changchun Fuzokuchi, and Changchun



Chapter 1. Introduction

As Japanese society was the first, and so far the only, society outside Europe or the European cultural sphere to achieve industrial prominence, Japan's transition from feudal solitude to technocratic and commercial affluence is of global significance. Many scholars recommend the Japanese experience as a developmental or role model for other societies.¹ Others promote an innovative Japan as a cultural leader, a "yellow Athena," despite the problematic biases that perspective entails.² These studies ignore the reality that the development of the Japanese state included political repression, expansionary militarism, racism, and economic hardship, aspects rival interpretations highlight. Although often also biased, these rival interpretations serve as an important reminder: asserting Japan as a cultural leader often naively repeats Japanese wartime formulations defending and urging expansion.³ Typically emphasizing one or the other of these extremes, studies of Japan tend to portray Japanese society as either exemplar or suspect. This is incongruous. A society cannot at the same time be either of these extremes, although, as we shall see, it can be both.

¹ While some, such as E. Wayne Nafziger, *Learning from the Japanese: Japan's Pre-War Development and the Third World*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, expand upon Japan's prewar experience, others recommend postwar Japanese methods, such as Ippei Yamazawa, *Economic Development and International Trade: The Japanese Model*, Honolulu: Resource Systems Institute, East-West Center, 1990. An institutional study that at one time was quite popular is Ezra Vogel, *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

² David Williams, *Japan: Beyond the End of History*, London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 1-9, 157-70. For a controversial consideration of the inherent racism involved in European interpretations of their Athenian roots, see Martin Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*, London: Free Association Books, 1987, vol. 1, pp. 1-38 and *passim*.

³ To illustrate, because many Japanese in the 1930s perceived Japan as the inheritor of the best of both Asian and Western traditions, they thought Japan a crucible for cultural synthesis and advancement. Japan was thus uniquely positioned, and even destined, to expand its influence and lead the world. See, for example, Miki Kiyoshi, "The China Affair and Japanese Thought," *Contemporary Japan*, Vol. VI, No. 4, March 1938, pp. 601-10.

Japanese or any society is difficult to pigeonhole, but viewed from overseas, the 'imagined community' of Japan occupies an exceptional and mixed conceptual space.⁴ Geographic, linguistic, and ethnic barriers allow, and perhaps encourage, idolizing and scapegoating, but observers often incompletely perceive Japanese history because of other, more inherent biases as well. For example, theorizing Japanese society as the only non-Western society to join the West affirms a homogeneous "West" and a simplified, oriental "other." Methodological concerns further complicate the matter because reified and rationalist nineteenth century terminology obscures important distinctions.⁵ Depending upon one's perspective, Japan too easily becomes either dogged hero or Machiavellian upstart— notions too easily transferable elsewhere.⁶

Properly speaking, Japanese successes were unique, partial, and qualified. They were unique in that the Japanese creation of a modern society depended to an enormous extent upon indigenous developments occurring within Japan before closer integration with the outside world, as well as upon finding particular solutions to contemporary dilemmas compatible with Japanese conditions.⁷ Japanese successes were partial because transformative change

⁴ While Benedict Anderson's seminal phrase focused on societies experiencing the development of nationalism, the point here is one step removed: how do people in one society, itself developing a nation-state and attendant nationalism, perceive the formation of another society creating its own nationalism? Cf., Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised and extended edition, London: Verso, 1991.

⁵ To counter this tendency, Immanuel Wallerstein suggests, for example, replacing the term "society" with "historical system" and developing "complex, dense interpretative schema" rather than "elegant sparse laws." See Immanuel Wallerstein, "Should We Unthink the Nineteenth Century?" pp. 185-91 in Francisco O. Ramirez, ed., *Rethinking the Nineteenth Century: Contradictions and Movements*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc, 1988.

⁶ For example, overly adulatory interpretations of Japan later helped promote similar but equally problematic perceptions of economic excellence among overseas Chinese communities. See Yao Souchou, "The Romance of Asian Capitalism: Geography, Desire, and Chinese Business," in Mark T. Berger and Douglas A. Borer, eds., *The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century*, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, pp. 221-40.

⁷ Rather than applying overly broad theoretical constructs derived from European and American experiences to situations elsewhere, scholars are increasingly assessing other societies on their own terms. See, for example, Gary Hamilton, "Why No Capitalism in China? Negative

occurred in society piecemeal, or segmentally. Successes were qualified because for most of the twentieth century Japan was militarily and economically weaker than most of the rival, affluent societies of western Europe and North America.⁸

Because history is a politically charged subject, contemporary circumstances also influence historical writing, sometimes subtly. Especially pernicious are the justificatory requirements of the modern nation-state that often underlie historical perspectives—until recently, scholars tended to assume the nation-state as the fundamental unit of analysis or were motivated by concerns for it. Given that the twentieth century witnessed the replacement of empires and other societies by nation-states the world over, the continuing preoccupation with the nation-state is unsurprising. Yet even if theorists are becoming cognizant of its various influences, the nation-state continues to dominate discourse at both the national and international level.⁹

Noting that histories of nation-states emerged dynamically within coalescing national societies, Prasenjit Duara suggests that such histories tend to assume linear progress towards a contemporary context: “a national history secures for the contested and contingent nation the false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through time.” In response, Duara constructed “bifurcated histories” that attempted to “grasp both the dispersal of the past and its transmission over time in the same moment.” This required a consideration for historical projects that failed to become national narratives. In other words, a

Questions in Historical Comparative Research,” *Journal of Developing Societies* 1: 2, December 1985, pp. 187-211.

⁸ Paul Kennedy thought Japan through the post-World War One era was an “industrial and financial lightweight.” Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, London: Fontana Press, 1988, pp. 265-9. That relative weakness in many respects has not changed; see *ibid.*, pp. 591-608 and Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, Toronto: HarperCollins, 1993, pp. 137-62.

⁹ Immanuel Wallerstein, “The National and the Universal: Can There Be Such a Thing as World Culture?” in Anthony D. King, ed., *Culture, Globalization and the World System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, pp. 91-105.

useful remedy to nationalist teleology is to consider history as “multiple narratives.”¹⁰ Alternatively, postcolonial critics like Arif Dirlik suggest a wider perspective, one that explores the milieu nation-states are situated within:

One of the fundamental contributions of postmodernism—indeed a defining feature of postmodernity—is the questioning of the teleology of the modern, and of other teleologies imbedded in economic, political, and cultural narratives that have constituted the idea of the modern; so that it becomes possible once again to conceive the past not merely as a route to the present, but as a source of alternative historical trajectories that had to be suppressed so that the present could become a possibility.¹¹

The basic premise of this study is that a wider analytical outlook examining the fuller spectrum of Japanese activities more usefully enhances historical understanding. In practice this means two kinds of awareness. One kind of awareness considers the creation of the nation-state in Japan with an awareness for the more complete spectrum of Japanese history. Processes that many consider to be ‘positive,’ such as industrialization, could not occur without other, ‘darker’ processes, such as imperialism. Implicit in either, moreover, is its opposite: just as the ‘positive’ goal of economic development entailed the repugnant realities of repression and exploitation, the nakedly aggressive goals of militarism and imperialism entailed concerns that policy makers thought at the time to be progressive.¹² As such their ideals could appeal to others. In

¹⁰ Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 4, 51.

¹¹ Arif Dirlik, *The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, p. 3. In this collection of essays, Dirlik’s overriding concern is similar to Duara’s in that he seeks to replace the accommodating and unrevolutionary perspective of multiculturalism, at heart embodying only manipulable and reified culturalisms, with “multi-historicalism.” This perspective “presupposes the historicity of cultures, and different historical trajectories out of different pasts, that provide “outsides” from which to view contemporary structures of power and the ideologies that legitimize them.” Dirlik, *ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

¹² Terms like “positive,” “negative,” “darker,” and “better” are of course relative. Imperialism was once a “positive,” and development today is often a “negative.” This study proceeds with this awareness and in the interest of brevity hopes the reader allows such simplifications.

Europe, it should be recalled, despite its various guises fascism spread as a popular and modern phenomenon too.¹³

The other kind of awareness is global. The transformation of Japanese society is indeed significant, but not simply because of a developmental utility. While Japanese society faced, in the creation of a nation-state, issues common to the entire world, Japanese solutions must be considered as singular. Still, rather than seeking to find potential applicability elsewhere, such solutions are more enlightening when considered as part of the global transition to a modern society. As both latecomers and ethnic outsiders, Japanese benefited from earlier constructions of the modern by using hindsight to manage the transformation of their own society more efficiently. The resulting rapidity in which Japanese society adjusted suggests further that Japanese experienced perceptual shifts of Kuhnian proportions more swiftly than other societies.¹⁴ This compacted change within individual mentalités offers much to the historical evaluation of the modern world. Michel Foucault suggested that despite the “shattering...of the Western *episteme*” at the beginning of the nineteenth century due to the sudden awareness of separate evolutionary histories, “at a deep level, there exists a historicity of man which is itself its own history but also the radical dispersion that provides a foundation for all other histories.”¹⁵ Japanese history pursued as multiple narratives provides a valuable platform for the coherent study of global

¹³ See Geoff Eley, “What Produces Fascism: Preindustrial Traditions or a Crisis of a Capitalist State,” *Politics and Society* 12:1, January 1983, p. 71. A useful work showing how average citizens came to support Nazism is William Sheridan Allen, *The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922-1945*, revised edition, New York: Franklin Watts, 1984.

¹⁴ For a discussion of the extent of change involved in what Kuhn called a ‘paradigm shift,’ see Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, second edition, enlarged, 1970.

¹⁵ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, New York: Vintage Books, 1970, pp. 367, 370.

phenomena and can contribute meaningfully to the reconstruction of a humanistic “grand theory,” something perhaps already in progress.¹⁶

Individual communities expressed the fuller spectrum of Japanese history coherently, especially the newer ones on the Japanese periphery. Developments outside the center occasionally even contributed independently to Japanese capitalist transformation at large.¹⁷ Moreover, it was in the peripheral regions that Japanese found the freedom to weave social fabrics they thought best, fabrics that reflected the issues and actors most prominent at the political center. The colonization and incorporation of Hokkaido, for example, replicated in miniature the goals and mechanisms that energized the early Meiji state.¹⁸ Later undertakings further afield similarly displayed the fundamental motives and means of Japan as a modern, imperialist state.¹⁹ The empire advanced as a totality, simultaneously involving a number of diverse, sometimes rival, aspects.²⁰ While certain elements were grim and merciless, others were deemed progressive and benevolent. The Japanese empire blossomed holistically,

¹⁶ Quentin Skinner, “Introduction: The Return of Grand Theory,” in Quentin Skinner, ed., *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 3-20. Skinner’s point is that taken together, the work of Foucault, Derrida, Habermas, Lévi-Strauss and others has provided “an unashamed return to the deliberate construction of precisely those grand theories of human nature and conduct which Wright Mills and his generation had hoped to outlaw from any central place in the human sciences.” *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁷ See, for example, the gradual proto-industrialization of the fishing industry in Hokkaido independent of external influences in David L. Howell, *Capitalism from Within: Economy, Society, and the State in a Japanese Fishery*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

¹⁸ John A. Harrison, *Japan’s Northern Frontier: A Study in Colonization and Expansion with Special Reference to the Relations of Japan and Russia*, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1953, p. 142 and *passim*.

¹⁹ Dirlik describes local resistance to the contemporary world order as “repudiation of Enlightenment metanarratives and the teleology of modernity.” To Dirlik, these disparate acts are natural and autonomous responses to homogenizing global capitalism. See his “The Global in the Local,” esp. pp. 96-102, in *The Postcolonial Aura*. In contrast, Japanese activities in small enclaves like Changchun are best understood as local initiatives seeking to expand a global paradigm, ultimately seeking to normalize colonial relations of difference.

²⁰ The strongest statement in recent literature to this effect is Louise Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

including both thorns and flowers. Only through a study of the entirety can sense be made of its separate components.²¹

Aims

This project began with the intention of exploring two important and interrelated themes. One was the examination of imperialism as a local phenomenon in order to assess its operation and evolution in one locality. The other was an analysis of the Japanese creation of modernity in one region of the empire and how it reflected hopes and concerns notable in Japan itself. Although distinct, these two themes are inseparable. For prewar Japanese, just as constructing a modern state and society required the creation of an empire, creating an empire required engendering modernity. A key center in two different eras, Changchun readily demonstrates the range of meanings inherent in Japanese colonial modernity.

It is the latter of these two themes—the Japanese creation of colonial urban modernity—that is the focus here. The examination of the life experiences of Chinese, Japanese and others who resided within these two urban milieus awaits

²¹ Moreover, a holistic approach can more properly aid contemporary understanding. Japanese efforts in places like Changchun were essential to the creation of modern Japan, and any denigration of them involves calling into question fundamental aspects of contemporary society. This goes to the heart of the contemporary textbook controversy in Japan. Until recently, Japanese historians tended to dwell upon the beneficial aspects of their rule in Manchuria and only sketched the unpleasant, thereby misrepresenting both. See Bill Sewell, "Postwar Japan and Manchuria," in David Edgington, ed., *Joining Past and Future: Japan at the Millennium*, University of British Columbia Press, forthcoming. As a pioneer revisionist in a different time and place once suggested, "[a] re-examination of twentieth-century...foreign relations (and the relationship between foreign policy and the domestic economy) offers the most promising approach to...confront [ing] directly what happened. We learn the ideas and the actions of the men who made or influenced policy, and the consequences of those events at home and abroad. ...[A]t the end of such a review of the past, we return to the present better informed...[and] that increased knowledge and understanding may help us to muster the nerve to act in ways that can transform the tragedy into a new beginning." The events to examine, he insisted, included not only the political and economic but also the humanitarian. See William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, revised and enlarged edition, New York: Dell, 1962, p. 9. If stabler relations in Asia are to be established, Japanese too must acknowledge the detrimental consequences of their past actions, including those considered 'progressive.'

future research.²² In no way should this be construed as an attempt to avoid the unpleasant realities of Japanese imperialism.²³ It is more an acknowledgment that both themes are worthy of lengthy consideration.²⁴

Changchun lies near the geographic center of what was once called Manchuria and is today the capital of Jilin Province in the People's Republic of China (Figure 1.1). For centuries this region, a plateau encircled by mountains on three sides, was a crossroads for Mongols, Koreans, Han Chinese, and a variety of other peoples emerging from the Siberian steppe.²⁵ The most well-known of these were the Manchus, who became powerful by welding a several of these disparate groups together. After conquering China, the Manchus attempted to keep their sparsely populated ancestral lands for themselves by prohibiting immigration.²⁶ In this they failed. Beginning in the eighteenth century,

²² As the journals examined here only indirectly betray Japanese attitudes towards the native inhabitants of Manchuria, and nothing about the inhabitants' views of Japanese, the exploration of this theme requires a new set of source materials.

²³ Some recent discussions of these realities are Jie Xueshi, *Wei Manzhouguo shi*, Beijing: Renmin chubanshi, 1995, revised, and the series Sun Bang, ed., *Wei Man shiliao congshu*. Jilin: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1993-4. For a discussion of evolving Japanese perspectives of these events since the war see Sewell, "Postwar Japan and Manchuria."

²⁴ Nor is this an attempt to separate the two themes. The increasingly dreadful means of enforcing Japanese rule were obviously related to the inability of Japanese authorities to secure (even at times Japanese) acceptance of new modernist visions. Although this line of argument is suggested below in chapters 7 and 9, it too must await future research for fuller analysis.

²⁵ On the early history of the peoples of this region in English see Juha Janhunen, *Manchuria: An Ethnic History*, Helsinki: The Finno-Ugrian Society, 1996, Herbert Franke, "The Forest People of Manchuria: Kitans and Jurchens," in Denis Sinor, ed., *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 400-23, and Henry G. Schwarz, *The Minorities of Northern China: A Survey*, Bellingham, Washington: Western Washington University, Center for East Asian Studies, 1984. Janhunen distinguishes nine groups of forest peoples, seven groups of Mongols, and two groups of Manchus present today in the region. See Janhunen, *Manchuria*, pp. 43-74. A political history focusing on longstanding Chinese linkages is Li Chi, "Manchuria in History," *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, 16:2 July 1932, pp. 226-59. To William Skinner, Manchuria was one of China's nine identifiable macroregions, although he did not examine it in detail. See G. William Skinner, "Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth-Century China," and "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems," in G. William Skinner, ed., *The City in Late Imperial China*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977, pp. 211-36, 281-301.

²⁶ On the history of the Manchus and of Manchuria during the Qing see Robert H. G. Lee, *The Manchurian Frontier in Ch'ing History*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, Joseph Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c. 1800," in John King Fairbank, ed., *The Cambridge History of China*,

Manchuria drew the attention of more distant peoples, ultimately becoming the strategic—in both a military and a conceptual sense—spearhead for first Russian and later Japanese imperialism in China.

As the cornerstone for their empire in China, Japanese rushed to endow Manchuria in a manner they thought progressive. Changchun's brief history encapsulates this larger history.²⁷ Located within its boundaries are the vestiges of a nineteenth century Chinese frontier city, a Russian railway outpost, a Japanese railway town, and the one-time, grandiose capital of the puppet state of Manchukuo.

Changchun ("Eternal Spring") took its name from a gate in the Willow Palisade²⁸ just east of the city that fenced off hereditary Manchu lands (Figure 1.2).²⁹ Driven by famine, Chinese rural migrants—primarily from Shandong and Zhili—there found Mongols willing to sell land under their jurisdiction in defiance of the Qing prohibitions.³⁰ The Mongol head of the Front Gorlos banner attempted to legitimize such sales by memorializing the throne in 1791 to accept the presence of Chinese tenants at Changchun. To this the Qing acceded, but only because the Jilin garrison commander reported in 1799 that the Changchun

Volume 10, "Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part I," London: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 39-47, and Pamela Kyle Crossley, *The Manchus*, Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.

²⁷ The area around Changchun, of course, had long been part of Chinese history. Only some fifty kilometers to the west, for example, lay the ruins of the Liao and Jin dynasty city of Xinzhou as well as a neolithic and bronze age sites. For a discussion of that and other ancient cities in Jilin Province see Jilinsheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Jilin shengzhi*, vol. 43, *Wenwuzhi*, Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1991, pp. 16, 26-7, 76-8 and *passim*. On the Liao, Jin, Ming, and Qing era road networks from Mukden passing north of Changchun see *ibid.*, pp. 127-37.

²⁸ For a description of the Willow Palisade see Jilinsheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Jilin shengzhi*, vol. 43, *Wenwuzhi*, Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1991, p. 117-20.

²⁹ Unless otherwise indicated, material for this and the following paragraph is taken from Koshizawa Akira, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku: Tōkyō no genzai to mirai wo tou*, Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 1988, pp. 32-5, Satō Masaru, *Manshū zōen shi*, Tokyo: Nihon zōen shūkei kyōkai, 1985, p. 71, and Lee, *Manchurian Frontier*, pp. 19-20, 73, 136, 161-2. Early Japanese perspectives are Kuroda Kashirō, *Manshū kiyō*, np: Mantetsu, vol. 1, 1910, Hatori Nobiru, *Manshū*, Tokyo: Seikyōsha, 1913, and Mantetsu chōsaka, ed., *Manshū gendaishi*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1925.

³⁰ At the same time, however, the Qing at times encouraged Han immigration. On the *Liaodong kaikenli* of 1653 see Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin congshu bianjibu, *Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin*, Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1991, vol. 2, p. 340.

pao (J, *hō*), or walled village, on the right bank of the Yitong river exceeded 3,330 households farming 265,648 *mou* of land.³¹ Because there were too many Chinese to remove forcibly, the Qing attempted to confine them the following year by establishing Changchun *ting* (J, *chō*), or subprefecture, measuring 230 by 80 *li*, outside of which farming was forbidden. The court also placed Changchun under the jurisdiction of Jilin *ting*, based in the city of Jilin, itself founded only in 1747. Another attempt to shore up imperial authority saw the Qing assigning garrisons of soldier-farmers throughout their homeland, but it was too late—Manchuria was spinning out of the Manchus' control. Continuing to grow, by 1806 the Chinese population in Changchun numbered some 7,000 households.

In 1825 the subprefecture's offices moved west across the Yitong and the district as a whole shifted to the north. In 1864, in response to bandit raids but without official permission, citizens dug a moat and raised brick walls measuring sixteen feet high and stretching twenty *li*. The court eventually recognized Changchun as its own prefecture in 1889. On the eve of the 1911 revolution, Changchun was the headquarters of one of Jilin Province's four intendencies with jurisdiction over two prefectures, one independent sub-prefecture, one sub-prefecture, and seven districts. In 1912 the new government replaced Changchun *fu* (prefecture) with Changchun *xian* (county); in 1925 the walled city became a municipality (*shizheng*).³²

Despite Changchun's swift development, however, until the 1930s the city of Jilin, one hundred kilometers to the east and the traditional seat of Qing regional authority, overshadowed Changchun. The slow reversal of relative significance between the two began with the Russian construction of the China Eastern

³¹ Traditional Chinese measurements varied, but roughly 6.6 *mou* comprised one acre. One *li* was roughly equivalent to a third of a mile, about 570 meters. Another source suggests in 1800 there were only 2,000 households (though 7,000 people) farming 260,000 *mou*. See Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin congshu bianjibu, *Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin*, vol. 2, p. 340.

³² Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin congshu bianjibu, *Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin*, vol. 2, p. 340.

Railway (CER) in 1898 and the establishment of a maintenance yard a few kilometers northwest of Changchun at Kuanchengzi.³³ Seven years later the Treaty of Portsmouth granted all Russian holdings up to and including Changchun (but not Kuanchengzi) to Japan, making Changchun the border between the Russian and Japanese spheres of influence in China. The Japanese immediately built a new settlement between the old walled city and the Russian station, laying it out so that contact between Russians and Chinese was circuitous. Meanwhile, a mercantile district (Ch, *shāngbù*; J, *shōfuchi*) gradually sprang into being between the new Japanese settlement and the walled Chinese city that served to integrate Changchun into Japan's empire in Manchuria (Figure 1.3).

Planned and administered by Japan's largest prewar corporation, the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR), Changchun stood for a quarter-century as the northernmost outpost of a string of railway-run towns stretching from the southern tip of the Liaodong peninsula and the Korean border. Seven hundred kilometers north of the busy port of Dalian, Changchun was the railway's staging area for the penetration of western and northern Manchuria and an important crossroads in its own right. The Manchurian "incident" of 18 September 1931, however, challenged the railway's domination when autonomous elements of the Japanese military seized the whole of Manchuria. Renamed in Chinese *Xinjing*, in Japanese *Shinkyō*, "New Capital" in both languages, Changchun became the capital of the new puppet state administered jointly by the Kwantung Army and the SMR (Figure 1.4).³⁴ With the gradual displacement of Mantetsu by the military, the city became the site of the Japanese military's best effort to put

³³ One survey of the history of Kuanchengzi is Changchunshi nanguanqu difang shizhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Changchunshi Kuanchengquzhi*, Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1993.

³⁴ Because this work focuses on Japanese activities, the Japanese pronunciation of the new capital is used. On the significance of the new capital's name, see chapter 5 below.

an acceptable face on their Manchurian activities. Changchun remained Manchukuo's administrative hub until the Soviet invasion in 1945 and the subsequent reversion of Manchuria to Chinese rule.

Changchun's history presents four avenues of historical inquiry. First is an attempt to periodize and capture the evolving tone of Japan's prewar empire. Although Changchun's history does not encompass Japanese imperialism before 1905, it does display the style and intent of four later phases of Japanese empire-building. While the Japanese creation of empire before 1905 was initially cautious and calculated, between 1905 and the first world war empire expanded in a more experimental fashion, though still restrained. Outside of the "Twenty-One Demands" in 1915, Japanese were careful to act as imperialists in ways similar to the other powers. Between the war and 1932, however, reflecting increased capabilities at home and overseas, the Japanese became more confident and assertive. Still, Japanese showed a willingness if not a desire to collaborate with other powers. After 1932, however, with the institution of Manchukuo, the empire demonstrated its most exuberant growth yet as Japanese leapt to the creation of a new and different means of imperialist control. Changchun's role in this was central. Just as Manchukuo served as a model for the wartime incorporation of the Philippines and other former Western colonies into the Japanese empire, Changchun served as a propaganda piece for the creation of a new kind of civilization for all of Asia. In the final phase, between 1937 and 1945 Changchun demonstrated the diminished activity and gradual stagnation that the empire experienced as a whole with the onset of war and military requisitioning.

Changchun's evolving façades and roles reflect these phases concretely, yet within these stages lies a common theme—the Japanese creation of their version of the modern world. This study's second focus is the evolution of Japanese

definitions of modernity in Changchun. Japanese were state-building at home at the same time they were empire-building overseas, and between the two there occurred significant overlap. Japanese in Changchun focused consistently on the creation of a modern society that they perceived to be on a par with, if not superior to, the other imperialist, modern societies of the world. Indeed, as one of several key laboratories for Japanese officials and administrators, creations in Changchun sometimes foreshadowed events in Japan itself.

The literature on imperialism often neglects this aspect of empire-building. Generally, discussions of imperialism speak to contemporary purposes reflecting current discrepancies in power and wealth and tend to portray imperialism as either a positive or negative phenomenon. A more practical approach would blend the useful analytical elements of each outside the reverberations of the present and speak more to the historical and global environments. Contributing to the formulation of such an approach is this study's third task.

It is more fruitful to study imperialism as an aspect of the creation of modernity. The imperialized regions of the world provided the imperialist cores with more than simply markets, resources, and geostrategic locations. They also provided relatively unrestricted laboratories conducive to the forging of new perspectives, ideas, and images, many of which later became popular and even customary at home.³⁵ In turn, with independence the majority of the imperialized regions of the world appropriated many of these perspectives for themselves. Thus, considering imperialism as inherent in the creation of the contemporary world encourages, as Tani Barlow suggests, scholars to examine instances of colonial modernity in a way that allows for the merging of theories

³⁵ An important statement of this perspective is Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.

of discourse and political economy so as to comment constructively on the present.³⁶

In a similar vein, while the literature on imperialism documents the brutal and impersonal aspects of imperialist rule of subject peoples, often missing is an awareness for how governments of the imperialist countries treated their own citizens during the process of creating modern states. Official persecution and harassment of “anti-government” forces was common in not only the colonies but also at home. Of course, the scale and systemization of oppression differed tremendously, but it remains that imperialist governments did not always treat their own citizens well. This is perhaps especially true in the case of Japan³⁷—something that might shed light on why the Japanese in Manchuria proved to be the most injurious imperialist rulers of all. A further consideration, as perhaps implied first by Joseph Conrad in the novel *Heart of Darkness*, is the relationship between the nature of imperialist rule and the method of modern warfare. Trench and gas warfare did not simply spring into being on Flanders’ or China’s fields; it was the product of an extended perception of and experimentation on subject lands and peoples. This line of thought recommends a broader treatment of the nature of Japanese rule, one that encompasses issues like the “comfort women” and the formation of organizations like Unit 731 along with the means of economic development and innovative organizations.³⁸ While the *Einsatzgruppen* and the concentration camps are understandable given the

³⁶ Tani E. Barlow, “Introduction: On ‘Colonial Modernity,’” in Tani E. Barlow, ed., *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia*, Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1997, pp. 3-7, 19-20.

³⁷ See, for example, the discussion in Sheldon Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.

³⁸ The euphemism “comfort women” refers to those women, primarily Chinese and Korean, who Japanese police and military forced into sexual bondage during the Second World War. Unit 731 was one of several bacteriological warfare units of the Japanese Imperial Army.

contexts of Nazism and the modern bureaucratic state, the basic Japanese contexts of the 1930s are only now being meaningfully explored.³⁹

The fourth goal of this work considers Changchun between 1932 and 1945 as the capital of Manchukuo, a period demonstrating a transition in the nature of imperialism. The last official colony Japan acquired was Korea, in 1910. The League of Nations assigned islands in the south Pacific as mandates, and other regions held other statuses. The “puppet state” of Manchukuo was anomalous among Japanese possessions. More important than the legal bases of organization, however, were the means of imperialist integration. Before 1932 Manchuria falls into the category of “informal” empire, but after 1932 it does not exactly merit the appellation “formal.” At this point it became something new—a directly administered kind of colony. Or was it? Superficially an independent state, Manchukuo also experienced levels of investment far above the needs of colonial development. Of course, the puppet state was entirely subservient to Japanese authorities and the need for the rapid creation of a complementary trading partner was equally evident, but the means of administering the new “state” are curious. The Kwantung Army wanted something that was more than a colony, something they could use to influence others.⁴⁰ They thus sought to run Manchukuo in a manner superior to the manner in which they thought the contemporary political system ran Japan. Japanese authorities in Manchukuo did this by organizing and legitimizing their efforts through the pursuit of two basic policies. One rested on reinterpreting Asian traditions to meet

³⁹ Simple categorizations of Japanese as robots or innately aggressive are insufficient to explain Japanese actions. See, for example, the discussion sparked by Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*, New York: Penguin, 1997.

⁴⁰ Although the Japanese occupation of Burma and the Philippines allowed a degree of autonomy, their administrations were based on the Manchukuo model. See Hatano Sumio, *Taiheiyō sensō to ajia gaikō*, Toshidaigaku shuppansha, 1996, pp. 115-6.

contemporary needs; the other promised the grail of development and the creation of a modern state.

The military required new sources of legitimacy because Tokyo offered little and the world none. Beyond that, however, was a wider awareness in Japanese society that imperialism was no longer a viable means of forging international relations. Imperialism had entered its twilight. Although the extant colonies would continue for several decades, the forces of independence were already at work, including reappraisals of imperialism within the imperialist core states. A new means of ordering international affairs was necessary, and Japanese planners attempted to legitimize their rule not only through the tentative claims of a bygone tradition but also through implementing progress. In fact, in Manchukuo the latter of the two was the more serious, something reflected as clearly in the design of the new capital as in the policies it issued forth. As such the capital and regime represented goals and attitudes emerging directly out of the general Japanese search for modernity at home.

Under the guise of implementing modernity, the means of running Manchukuo suggest something different—a transition from a formal colony of the nineteenth century variety to the indirect means of influence found after the imperialist era. As such, it resembled in some ways the later Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and American activities in South Vietnam. In both instances, the core powers sought territorial and economic security not through colonization but through implementing the promise of a core-defined vision of future progress. Although still requiring detailed supervision, subject regions did not require wholesale occupation, except in moments of crisis, something less expensive to maintain and more palatable to domestic publics. Neither formal nor informal, these were instances of a more indirect form of imperialism.

These four issues—periodization, imperialism as inherent in modernity, assessing Japanese contexts, and identifying a post-“formal” stage of imperialism—are accessible through local history. Local histories allow for the detailed analysis of one locale over time and, if the site is appropriate, allow for wider reference. One of the three key cities involved in Japan’s informal empire in China before 1932 and the model capital of an ideal state after 1932, Changchun’s significance to Japanese imperialism and its relevance for global issues is clear.

Contexts

There are two important contexts to bear in mind when considering Manchuria. One is international. The Japanese were not the first to attempt to reorganize society in Manchuria—the region has a long history of external involvement. Thus, Japanese policies in Manchuria reflected not only the goals of the Japanese state but also the shifting contexts of international influence.

First migrating into southern Manchuria *en masse* during the Ming, Chinese succeeded in recreating their own social and economic dynamics there that appealed to peoples like the Manchus. In the Manchus’ view, Mongol control of China during the Yuan Dynasty lapsed because of the Mongols’ refusal to adapt to Chinese means of governance. The ultimate Manchu triumph in 1644 was made possible by experimentation and the application of new modes of social organization by a frontier people in competition with others for local dominance.

The Manchus failed to retain that dominance, however, because in order to rule China many Manchus (and their allies) migrated south in the seventeenth century, thereby depopulating the region. Subsequent Chinese immigration tilted the demographic balance increasingly in favor of the Han, a development that gained new significance when other foreign societies refused to participate

in the traditional Chinese means of international trade and tribute. The Treaty of Tianjin (1861) and the British establishment of a treaty port at Yingkou (Newchwang) in 1864 opened Manchuria to world commerce, events that would ultimately transform the Manchurian economy. The subsequent introduction of rail transport and the world market encouraged the extension of the traditional portage network. This in turn fueled indigenous commercialization.⁴¹ The long-distance trade in soybeans especially resulted in rapid economic growth and increased Chinese migration.⁴²

The treaty port system also restructured accepted legal practices and external relations. The product of war and the European desire to access the China market, the treaty port system was designed by representatives of the imperialist powers to facilitate economic exploitation while assuring their personal security.⁴³ Unlike colonial frameworks in preceding centuries, however, it affirmed superiority not only militarily but civilizationally. Deeming Chinese legal and economic arrangements backward, Europeans required the use of their own institutions, and sometimes their own personnel. The treaty port system was thus not simply a legal and economic system but also an implicit expression of European modernity.

Although the treaty ports as a whole did not revolutionize Chinese society, over the century-long period of the treaty port system's existence they did help

⁴¹ An example of another Chinese city undergoing similar change is William T. Rowe, *Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984, and William T. Rowe, *Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796-1895*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989.

⁴² David D. Buck, "Railway City and Utopian National Capitol: The Two Faces of the Modern in Changchun," in Joseph Esherick, ed., *Constructing the Modern in the Chinese City*, (forthcoming).

⁴³ See John King Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-54*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, two volumes, 1953, and John King Fairbank, "The Creation of the Treaty System," pp. 213-63 in John King Fairbank, ed., *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 10, "Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part I," London: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

numerous Chinese cities take on new economic and cultural roles.⁴⁴ Growth was most pronounced in the regions centered on Shanghai and southern Manchuria, the two major hubs of which were Dalian and Mukden.⁴⁵ Because of rail connections and coordinated Japanese control, Dalian's port and Mukden's factories and financial establishments can be considered as a single unit exercising economic leadership over the whole of south central Manchuria.⁴⁶ The interplay between hinterland and metropolis is important—even if Chinese handicraft production did not transform into modern manufacturing in this period, growth in the metropolis and its hinterlands occurred as an integrated whole.⁴⁷ As such the system helped endow regions of China with key institutional arrangements and elements of a modern economic infrastructure.

The treaty port system, it should be recalled, appeared briefly in Japan as well.⁴⁸ Japanese society, however, proved more quickly adaptable to imperialist "civilizational" requirements. Significantly, Japanese were able to adapt politically, economically, and militarily, allowing them to renegotiate the

⁴⁴ As the system began with the conclusion of the Opium War and ended with the establishment of the PRC, it can be said to have existed roughly from 1842 to 1949. On its economic relevance see Albert Feuerwerker, "Economic Trends in the Late Ch'ing Empire, 1870-1911," pp. 1-69, in John King Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu, eds., *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 10, "Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part II," London: Cambridge University Press, 1980, Albert Feuerwerker, *Economic Trends in the Republic of China*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977, and Zhang Zhongli, ed., *Chengshi jinbu, qiye fazhan he Zhongguo gendaihua (1840-1949)*, Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kuxueyin chubanshe, 1994.

⁴⁵ Thomas G. Rawski, *Economic Growth in Prewar China*, Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1989.

⁴⁶ Mukden lies at the north end of the Liao River valley, at the mouth of which sits the port city of Yingkou. Dalian lies near the southern end of the Liaodong (east of the Liao) Peninsula. Rather than share Manchurian trade with other imperialists at Yingkou, the Japanese channeled goods through Dalian. See below, chapter 8.

⁴⁷ The strongest statement of the need to examine urban development in this way is William Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West*, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991. Another study encouraging a regional approach is D. W. Meinig, *The Great Columbia Plain: A Historical Geography, 1805-1910*, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1968.

⁴⁸ J. E. Hoare, *Japan's Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements: The Uninvited Guests, 1858-1899*, Kent, UK: Japan Library, 1994.

unequal treaties as an equal. A proactive effort, it resulted also in the Japanese becoming imperialists themselves.⁴⁹

Imperialist designs on Manchuria, however, did not begin with either the British or the Japanese. Nor did China's relations with Europeans begin in a context of inequality. Sino-Russian relations and trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries proceeded initially on a basis of equality. This relationship too the treaty port system challenged. By the middle of the nineteenth century, half of Russia's exports of manufactured goods went to China, and Britain's sudden domination of the China trade in the wake of the Opium War, along with the growing presence of American whalers in the western Pacific, compelled a change in Russian policy.⁵⁰ The latter half of the nineteenth century thus witnessed the steady expansion of Russian predominance both north and south of the Amur River, to which the Qing responded only weakly.⁵¹

Russian expansion eastward inevitably brought conflict with Japan.⁵² Japanese responded more actively than the Qing, however, securing not only Tsushima but also Hokkaido (formerly Ezo) and the Kuriles, although Japanese needed to acquiesce to Russian control of Sakhalin (Karafuto) in 1875 in exchange for recognition of Japan's sovereignty over the Kuriles.⁵³ This was part of a post-Restoration, concerted Japanese effort to seize all the islands nearest Japan before

⁴⁹ W. G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 14-40.

⁵⁰ Joseph Fletcher, "Sino-Russian Relations, 1800-62" in John King Fairbank, ed., *The Cambridge History of China*, Volume 10, "Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part I," London: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 334-5.

⁵¹ In addition to Fletcher, "Sino-Russian Relations," see Rosemary Quesed, *Sino-Russian Relations: A Short History*, North Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1984, pp. 50-89, and John J. Stephan, *The Russian Far East: A History*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, pp. 20-90.

⁵² Astoundingly, under wartime conditions some Japanese asserted that Russian expansion eastward began in 1032, even before the period of Mongol domination of Russia. See Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkan shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō tokubetsushi kōsho, 1942, p. 13.

⁵³ See Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, pp. John J. Stephan, *The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974, and John J. Stephan, *Sakhalin: A History*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

they could fall to any other power. This included the Ryūkyūs, the Bonins, and the Volcano islands. It also led to Japanese encroachment upon Korea.⁵⁴ Russians and Japanese then set about consolidating their expansion, the Russians through the construction of a Trans-Siberian Railway, begun in 1891.⁵⁵ A technological triumph, this project emboldened Russian expansionary designs and fanned Japanese fears. Following the Treaty of Shimonoseki, in 1896 the Russians rerouted the line to cut across Manchuria south of the Amur. This not only cut the length of the new railway by six hundred kilometers but also played nicely into Qing foreign policy attempting to play the various foreign imperialists off one another: Russian expansion in Manchuria intensified Japanese anxieties. The Russian taking of Port Arthur in 1897, after compelling the Japanese return of the city to China, and the completion of a connecting rail line to it from Harbin in 1898 demonstrated Russian designs on Manchuria plainly. The 1897 formation of a Russo-Korean bank also challenged Japanese control of Korea, recently won from China in 1895, setting the stage for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.

The Treaty of Portsmouth (September 1905) ending that war, ratified by the Chinese government by the Treaty of Beijing (December 1905), brought the Japanese to Changchun. Japanese claims were tenuous, based entirely on the presence of Japanese guerrillas active behind Russian lines. Japanese thus had little information about Changchun when it became the northernmost point of their empire in Manchuria. Japanese did, however, know the legal context of

⁵⁴ Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, pp. 41-54, Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960 and Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

⁵⁵ Except in the east, the creation of a single railway across Siberia did not so much reflect the creation of an entirely new line as it did a consolidation and linking of a number of other lines expanding east over the course of the entire nineteenth century. Ministers considered seriously plans to lay the eastern end as early as the 1880s. J. N. Westwood, *A History of Russian Railways*, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1964, p. 108.

their expansion: the Treaty of Beijing approved of the transfer of the rights Russia achieved through negotiation in 1898. These rights included the right to station troops along the railway as well as to establish garrison towns.⁵⁶

At the same time, Japanese did not enter into imperialism in Manchuria as novices. Many Japanese administrators and architects gained practical experience in Taiwan or Korea previous to joining the SMR. Upon retirement many even elected to stay to help further colonial development.⁵⁷ Neither was Manchuria's more extreme climate entirely novel—three decades of colonizing Hokkaido provided many in the Ministry of Works the inspiration and experience to use western, especially American, techniques and architecture.⁵⁸

Japanese arriving in Manchuria were aware they were in a new and different land. Yet more impressive to Japanese planners and architects than Chinese constructions of the built environment were Russian. In Dalian Japanese discovered grand boulevards and grandiose structures reflecting the late nineteenth century monumental tastes of Europe that Japanese found appealing. Moreover, Harbin's assortment of art nouveau structures suggested other architectural avenues to explore. But the most enduring Russian influence on the Japanese in Manchuria was less obvious. Having driven the Russians out of southern Manchuria by force of arms, Japanese feared always a Russian war of revenge. To prevent this, the Japanese not only prepared Manchuria militarily but civilizationally. Through what they considered to be enlightened planning and administration, Japanese attempted to cement Manchuria irrevocably within Japan's grasp. Changchun became one of the premier examples of this effort.

⁵⁶ Along with Dalian and Shenyang, Changchun was also one of the designated stations for railway firefighters. See Mantetsu no kenchiiku to gijutsujin henshū i'inkai and Mantetsu kenchiikukai, eds., *Mantetsu no kenchiiku to gijutsujin*, Tokyo: Mantetsu kenchiikukai, 1976, p. 49.

⁵⁷ Nishizawa Yasuhiko, *Umi wo watattanihonjin kenchiikuka: 20 seiki zenhan no Chūgoku tōhoku chihō ni okeru kenchiiku katsudō*, Tokyo: Shōkokusha, 1996, p. 100.

⁵⁸ Dallas Finn, *Meiji Revisited: The Sites of Victorian Japan*, New York: Weatherhill, 1995, pp. 51-63, and Harrison, *Japan's Northern Frontier*, *passim*.

The presence of other Asians and their traditions also influenced Japanese efforts, but not initially. While Changchun was a treaty port, Japanese perceived other Asians in a manner similar to the other imperialists, as colonial others needing paternalist edification. With the creation of Manchukuo, however, Japanese appeared to shift to treating Chinese as allies. As the capital of the puppet state of Manchukuo, Changchun became the showplace of that effort. The reality behind that façade, however, was keenly apparent to any who scratched the surface of that façade. Changchun was in reality a symbol of dominance and repression, not of pan-Asian harmony.

A second important context to consider involves the recorded perceptions of Japanese activities in Manchuria. Manchuria's historiographical record centers on economic administration and development. This is understandable given that the foremost Japanese goal in Manchuria was the creation of a stable trading partner that secured access to raw materials.⁵⁹ With regard to Changchun in particular this is evident in works as early as Izumi Renji's *Chōshun no jijō* (*Conditions in Changchun*) and Inoue Nobuō's *Chōshun enkaku shi* (*History of Changchun*).⁶⁰ Mantetsu, the Kantōgun, and the Japanese Foreign Ministry supplemented these with studies of their own on Changchun and other Manchurian cities, but the focus was invariably chiefly economic.⁶¹ The Manchukuo government continued this basic orientation, but added a propagandistic aspect focusing on the creation of a new culture and nation.⁶²

⁵⁹ See, for example, Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū keizai no hattatsu*, 1932, and Kanda Noboru, *Manshūkoku sangyō gaikan*, Shinkyō: Manshū gyōsei gakkai, 1937.

⁶⁰ Izumi Renji, *Chōshun no jijō*, Tokyo: Manshū Chōshun Nihōsha, 1912, and Inoue Nobuō, *Chōshun enkaku shi*, Dairen: Manmō Bunka Kyōkai, 1922.

⁶¹ Kantōgun shireibu, *Minami Manshū jūyō toshi keizai jōtai*, 1924, pp. 359-401, Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku, *Chōshun jijō*, np, 1929, and Mantetsu Chōshun chihō jimusho, *Chōshun jijō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1932. A work that considers all the *fuzokuchi* is Mantetsu sōseishitsu, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, Dairen, 1939 (1977 reprint), three volumes.

⁶² On Changchun as the new capital of Shinkyō see *Shinkyō keizai no kihonteki dōkō*, Shinkyō: Mantetsu Shinkyō shisha gyōmuka, 1938; *Shinkyō no gaijō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō shōkōkai, 1942; and *Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka hensan*, *Kokuto Shinkyō: Kenkoku jūshūnen kinan*,

Studies of Manchuria in Japanese and English continued this economic emphasis in the postwar era.⁶³ In Japan this made sense because of the orientation of postwar Japanese society towards reconstruction and recovery.⁶⁴ English language studies often agreed with Japanese studies because of their reliance on Japanese sources and because of their interest in developing a general developmental paradigm.⁶⁵ Chinese studies, however, differed, affirming the more brutal aspects of the Japanese occupation and downplaying any developmental contributions Japanese made to Manchuria's economy or infrastructure.⁶⁶

Among more recent Japanese studies of Changchun are popular examinations of daily life during the occupation.⁶⁷ Others explored Changchun as a means of

Shinkyō: Shinkyō tokubetsushik kōsho, 1942. On Manchukuo see, for example, Tamura Toshikazu, *Manshūkoku no rinen to jittai*, 1940; Tanaka Tetsuzōrō, *Yakushin no Manshū keizai*, Shinkyō: Manshū chūō ginkō shōsaka, 1940; and Umemoto Sutezō, *Dai Manshū kenkokushi*, 1944.

⁶³ The classic account is Manshikai, ed., *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi*, Tokyo: Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi kankōkai, 3 vols, 1964-5. Others affirmed Japanese progressive contributions to Manchuria less statistically, such as Kokusai zenrin kyōkai, *Manshū kenkoku no yume to genjitsu*, Tokyo: Kenkōsha, 1975.

⁶⁴ For an examination of Japanese studies of Manchuria in the fifty years following 1945 see Sewell, "Postwar Japan and Manchuria."

⁶⁵ The classic accounts in English of the Manchurian economy are similarly inclined: Kang Chao, *The Economic Development of Manchuria: The Rise of a Frontier Economy*, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, no. 43, Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1982; Ann Rasmussen Kinney, *Japanese Investment in Manchurian Manufacturing, Mining, Transportation and Communications, 1931-1945*, New York: Garland, 1982; Ramon Myers, *The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria, 1932-1945*, New York: Garland, 1982; and Kungtu Sun, *The Economic Development of Manchuria in the First Half of the Twentieth Century*, Harvard East Asian Monographs, no. 28, Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 1973.

⁶⁶ Jie Xueshi, *Wei Manzhouguo shi*, Beijing: Renmin chubanshi, 1995, revised, and Zhengxie Jilinsheng weiwenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, ed., *Wei Manzhouguo Dashiji*, Dairen: Dairen shuppansha, 1990. There is also the series *Wei Manshi liacongshu*, including Sun Bang, ed., *Wei Man wenhua*, Jilin renmin chubanshi, 1993, and Sun Bang, ed., *Jingji lueduo*, Jilin: Jilin renmin chubanshi, 1994.

⁶⁷ One study is Fujise Takayuki, *Chōshun-Shinkyō Hagoromomachi*, Kagoshima: Fujise Takayuki, 1993. A fictional account based on recollections of former residents is Tani Miyuki, *Chōshun monogatari*, Nagoya: Maruzen, 1989. The investigation of one altruistic man's efforts is Komatsu Noriyuki, "Kyū Manshūkoku sekijūjūshū Shinkyō rōa gakuin-shodai gakuin Tashiro Kiyō ni tsuite," *Miyagi kyōiku daigaku kiyō: nibun satsu shizen kagaku-kyōiku kagaku*, 24 (1989), pp. 127-40. Popular are photographic works, such as Kokubun Hisafumi, *Saraba Shinkyō*, Tokyo: Kokusho kankōkai, 1979 and Kitakōji Ken and Watanabe Manabu, *Chōshun, Kitsurin*, Tokyo: Kokusho kankōkai, 1982.

reacquainting Japanese with post-Mao China.⁶⁸ Among academics the study of Changchun and other Manchurian cities has been pursued most vigorously by Koshizawa Akira. His *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku: Tōkyō no genzai to mirai wo tou* (*The Planning of Manchukuo's Capital: An Inquiry into the Present and Future of Tokyo*) explores Changchun through a focus on urban planning. His ultimate goal, however, is apparent in the subtitle—Koshizawa is interested in examining urban planning in Changchun because it represents a lost path for Japanese urban planners at home. Through an investigation of Japanese creations on the mainland, Koshizawa sought to demonstrate Japanese planners' potential for creating a more ideal society at home should the focus on economic growth lessen.

This work disturbed Nishizawa Yasuhiko because the general impression of Koshizawa's—and too often other works dealing with colonial issues—is that imperialist activities were largely beneficial. In his view, researchers all too often excuse civilians for imperialism.⁶⁹ For Nishizawa, imperialism was a system that encompassed almost every aspect of Japanese society in Manchuria, including progressive efforts like urban planning and architecture.⁷⁰ In this a number of contemporary scholars elsewhere, such as Edward Said, would agree.⁷¹ So would Gwendolyn Wright, who has emphasized specifically the fundamental linkages between colonial urban planning, architecture, and imperialism.⁷²

⁶⁸ Kanai Saburō, *Pekin, Harupin, Chōshun, Shin'yō no tabi*, Nagano: Kanai Saburō, 1985 recounts the first return visit of a former resident. Others examine current events, such as Ishige Naomichi and Kenneth Ruddle, "Genkan no Chōshun jiyō shiba," *Kikan Minzoku Gaku*, 10:1, 1986, pp. 28-37; Yoshida Fujitake, "Dairen, Shin'yō, Chōshun, Harupin no tabi," *Fainansu*, 24:5, August 1988, pp. 58-69; and Okawa Yoshio, "Chōshun no jidōsha kōgyō," *Chiri*, 34:6, April 1989, pp. 92-99.

⁶⁹ Nishizawa Yasuhiko, "Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku," *Ajia Keizai*, No. 38, August 1989, pp. 109-13.

⁷⁰ Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta*, pp. 3-9.

⁷¹ Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, New York: Knopf, 1993.

⁷² Wright, *Politics of Design*.

An awareness for this fuller context is one that simply must remain at the forefront of any inquiry into Japanese activities in Manchuria. The construction of model cities in Manchuria involved not only a 'progressive' outlook that encouraged Japanese to build as if no one else was there but also a racist denigration of Manchuria's inhabitants that eventually led to gruesome biological experimentation and mass atrocities. Implementing modernity involved always these darker aspects, and Changchun's role in this too was central.⁷³

English language studies of Changchun are few but tend also to praise Japanese accomplishments. Changchun's architecture and spaciousness impressed one early postwar visitor.⁷⁴ Fifty years later, the modernity intrinsic to Changchun's urban environment impressed another.⁷⁵ Both of these works, however, miss a salient point: Japanese imperialist modernity entailed the brutal along with the progressive. While aware that the empire as a whole contained barbaric elements, such studies do not find that implicit in either the planning or the architecture of the capital city itself.

Perhaps the most limiting context of studies to date involves the sources. Changchun's—and Manchuria's—contemporary historiographical contexts reflect their sources, the bulk of which are the analyses conducted by the Economic Research Bureau of the South Manchuria Railway.⁷⁶ This

⁷³ Writing in the communist daily *Akahata (Red Flag)* Morimura Sei'ichi was perhaps the first to discuss biological experiments publically in Japan. See Morimura Sei'ichi, *Akuma no hoshoku*, Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 1983, revised edition. On some of Changchun's role in this see chapter 9. Some of the atrocities involved in the Japanese occupation are still coming to light only fifty years after the war. Unfortunately, a more detailed examination of this important dimension of Japanese imperialism and the role played by Changchun must at this time must await future research. A brief discussion of evolving Japanese perceptions of this aspect of the occupation is Sewell, "Postwar Japan and Manchuria."

⁷⁴ Norton Ginsburg, "Ch'ang-ch'un," *Economic Geography* 23:4, 1947, pp. 290-307.

⁷⁵ David D. Buck, "Railway City and Utopian National Capitol: The Two Faces of the Modern in Changchun," in Joseph Esherick, ed., *Constructing the Modern in the Chinese City*, (forthcoming).

⁷⁶ As the exact name of this research organization changed often it is referred to here as simply the Economic Research Bureau. On the history of this fascinating institution see Joshua A. Fogel,

organization's output was enormous.⁷⁷ The reports that survived the war provided a concrete foundation for postwar study. The Economic Research Bureau's oeuvre, however, resulted in more than simply a large body of quantitative analysis. Consisting of an overwhelmingly economic focus, as a whole it formed not only a backbone but a boundary for scholarly analysis. The research bureau's work thus reveals an underlying and unitary dimension to Japanese imperialist modernity in Manchuria. Kantōgun reports and official Manchukuo publications reinforced this narrow view. Together they affirmed the primacy of economic matters and strategic analysis.⁷⁸

Other sources clarify this mindset. While individual postwar perspectives provide some insight, they cannot but help reflect the knowledge that Japanese endeavors eventually led to disaster.⁷⁹ Of greater utility are contemporary Japanese journals, especially those that included contributions by both academics and bureaucrats that reflect Japan's 'official mind.'⁸⁰ With regard to urban development in Manchuria, the most useful are the *Toshi kōron* (usually translated as *The Municipal Review* but sometimes *The City Planning Review*), and the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* (*The Journal of Manchurian Architecture*). The former began publication in 1918, the offspring of Gotō Shimpei (1857-1929), a

Life Along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo, Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1988 (originally published as Itō Takeo, *Mantetsu ni ikite*, Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 1964); John Young, *The Research Activities of the South Manchurian Railway Company, 1907-1945: A History and Bibliography*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966; Egami Teruhiko, *Mantetsu ōkoku*, Tokyo: Sankei shuppan, 1980; Hara Kakuten, *Mantetsu chōsabu to Ajia*, Tokyo: Sekai shobō, 1986; Imura Tetsuo, *Mantetsu chōsakabu: Kankeisha no shōgen*, Tokyo: Ajia keizai kenkyūjo, 1996; and Kobayashi Hideo, *Mantetsu: "Chi no shūdan" no tanjō to shinu*, Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1996.

⁷⁷ In addition to a wide range of independent publications, monthly reports and analyses included the *Mantetsu Chōsa Geppō* and the *Manshū Hyōron*. In English see the *Manchukuo Yearbook* and *Reports on Progress*.

⁷⁸ Sewell, "Postwar Japan and Manchuria."

⁷⁹ See, for example, Komai Tokuzō, *Tairiku he no higan*, Tokyo: Dai Nihon yūben kōdankai, 1952, Takasaki Tatsunosuke, *Manshū no shūen*, Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihonsha, 1952, and Hoshino Naoki, *Mihatenu yume: Manshūkoku gaishi*, Tokyo: Diamondo, 1963.

⁸⁰ Cf., Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*, London: Macmillan, 1961.

significant figure in not only the Japanese development of Manchuria but also the development of the modern Japanese state.⁸¹ The *Toshi kōron* included articles by important bureaucrats, politicians, and professors.⁸² Published by Gotō's research facility in downtown Tokyo, this important journal explored new concepts in urban planning gathered from around world. Many articles reported the results of study missions to North American and western Europe. Targeting the issues facing urban planners in the twentieth century that were most prominent, the *Toshi kōron* examined urban density, pollution, transportation, green spaces, and water supply in a global context. As such the journal provided planners with both theoretical knowledge and practical advice as to how to fashion urban society in Japan.⁸³

The *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* began publication in 1921 under the supervision of Onoki Toshiharu (1874-1932), the head of Mantetsu's Construction Department.⁸⁴ As with many Mantetsu personnel, Onoki, an 1899 Tokyo Imperial University (Tōdai) graduate, received his first practical training in Japan's first colony, Taiwan.⁸⁵ The *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* embodied an unflagging commitment by Japanese architects to introduce modernity to the Manchurian plains.⁸⁶ Its pages

⁸¹ See Chapter 2.

⁸² Gotō's vice-chairman, for example, at the Toshi kenkyūkai was former Home Minister Mizuno Rentarō. The directors included Ikeda Hiroshi (chair of the Home Ministry urban planning department), Sano Toshikata, Watanabe Tetsuzō, and Kataoka Yasushi, all men who played roles of significance in the development of Japanese urban administration.

⁸³ Tokyo's reconstruction in the wake of the disastrous Kantō earthquake of 1923, for example, received significant attention. Elsewhere, Gotō congratulated the association, and himself, for becoming so useful to planners outside of Tokyo in Gotō Shimpei, "Toshi keikaku to sōgoteki seishin," *TK* 7;6, June 1924, p. 2.

⁸⁴ The MKZ was originally the *Manshū kenchiku kyōkai zasshi*, but in 1934 the name shortened to *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*. The association that published the journal was formed in November 1920. For more on the initial impetus behind the journal see Onoki Toshiharu, "Kaikan shinchiku sōritsu sanshūnen kinengo no hakkō ni saishite," *MKZ* 4:3, March 1924, pp. 2-3.

⁸⁵ Nishizawa Yasuhiko, "*Manshū*" *toshi monogatari*, Tokyo: Kawade shobō shinsha, 1996, p. 116.

⁸⁶ Playfully experimenting with new styles of *kanji* (Chinese characters), even the magazine's covers suggested modern reformulations of traditional techniques. See especially the covers for July 1926 (6:7), January 1928 (8:1), and October 1930 (10:10).

included a startling variety of topics, from floor plans and sketches of contemporary constructions to historical discussions of gardens and European architectural symbolism. Some articles explored new technologies for heating and air defense while others examined concepts like the “garden city” and other urban developments. As the Manchurian environment differed greatly from Japan, many articles dealt with residential construction as Japanese wanted to insure that their overseas personnel were well housed. Other articles examined the histories of gardens in Asia and Europe, including their associated architecture, or provided periodic reports on architectural developments overseas in Japan, North America, and Europe. A few offered reports on architecture, gardens, and temples in Manchuria. Legal excerpts also occasionally appeared, such as Manchukuo’s 1936 urban planning law.⁸⁷

In the first issue, Oka Ōji (1889-1962), a 1912 Tōdai graduate, explained the journal’s mission by suggesting that in the wake of the post-World War One depression, the association wanted to encourage development using Western construction techniques only recently introduced to Japan. He saw the need especially to go beyond the traditional Japanese inclination for wood construction. In doing so, however, Oka thought that because it would also improve Chinese construction, such expansion was for the benefit of both China and the empire.⁸⁸ Other contributors agreed, many going so far to say that they were creating a new culture in Manchuria that embodied the best of several worlds: Japanese, Chinese, and Western.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ “Toyū keikaku hō,” *MKZ* 18:9, September 1938, pp. 15-20.

⁸⁸ Oka Ōji, “Manshū kenchiku kyōkai no shimei,” *MKZ* 1:1, March 1921, pp. 9-15.

⁸⁹ See, for example, Seikatsu kaizen dōmei, “Jūtaku no madori oyobi setsubi no kaizen,” *MKZ* 4:4, April 1924, pp. 14-22, and *MKZ* 4:5, May 1924, pp. 15-24. Elsewhere the journal attempted to bridge the linguistic differences between these spheres by publishing lists of architectural terms in English, Chinese, and Japanese.

Other journals reinforced this perspective, notably the *Toshi mondai* (*Urban Problems*), and *Kaizō* (*Reconstruction*). Publishers of the latter, well-known journal also published the journal *Tairiku* (*The Continent*) that, beginning in 1938, promoted Japanese development on the Asian mainland. Unlike its parent publication, however, *Tairiku* was more bellicose in its calls for Japanese expansion and reorganization.

Journals like these were integral not only to the Japanese development of Manchuria but also to the construction of Japanese perceptions of Manchuria. More intriguing, while insightful about Japanese motives on the mainland, these perceptions also demonstrate how Japanese defined themselves. For John Thompson, the growth of a mass communications industry was as important to the creation of modernity as the role played by national administrations. It redefined the nature and experience of publicness as well as the production and reception of cultural forms, transforming individual lives and realigning relationships of political power. To Thompson this occurred not simply because of the existence of any particular media but also because of the messages media carried. Media content helped define new ideologies, something Thompson considered “meaning in the service of power.”⁹⁰ Integral to mass politicization and the formation of industrial capitalism, the ‘mediation’ of cultural forms was a necessary condition for the emergence of a nationalist identity.⁹¹

In these journals, the public debate on modernity assumed central stage. What emerges in their pages is a central concern for Japanese progress, usually defined by the manipulation of a Western ‘other.’ Although the nations of western Europe and North America were diverse, Japanese tended to group them together under terms like *taisei* (“the Occident”) or *rekkyō* (“the Powers”).

⁹⁰ John B. Thompson, *Ideology and Modern Culture*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990, p. 7.

⁹¹ John B. Thompson, *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, pp. 51, 62-3.

This Japanese perception justifies the use of the term “Western,” but its proper meanings here are only two: it can be used in an abbreviated fashion to mean the societies of western Europe, Russia, and North America, or it can be used as a means of designating a foreign conglomeration that Japanese perceived as different from themselves. Around the turn of the century Japanese perceived the West comparatively: the West was ‘advanced’ while the Japanese were ‘behind.’ As the process of creating a modernity of their own encouraged Japanese to redefine their views, however, that perspective gradually reversed.

Japanese imperialist modernity ultimately manifested itself as Manchukuo, a state Yamamura Shin’ichi described as a “chimera”—the Kantōgun was the lion’s head, the imperial system the sturdy goat’s body, and Puyi the dragon’s tail. Japanese supporting one part did not necessarily condone the actions of the others but all lived together as a single organism.⁹² While a useful description of imperialism, it does not explain. That task requires deeper analysis.

The modern world is the product of numerous forces, but a wide number of recent historical actors have shared a common emphasis: a rational means of organizing society. Beginning in the eighteenth century, scientific rationalism replaced revealed faith gradually but steadily as the most common means of legitimating society. This was particularly apparent among the agents of social organization—modern bureaucracies. Crystalizing between 1868 and 1900, the Japanese imperial bureaucracy developed into a standardized institution insulated from the political process and predicated towards manufacturing stability and progress.⁹³ Its singleness of purpose was possible because of the central role of Tōdai and its graduates. Their dominance of official bureaucracy

⁹² Yamamura Shin’ichi, *Kimera: Manshūkoku no shōzō*, Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1993.

⁹³ Bernard S. Silberman, *Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993.

at home and overseas insured a confluence of mindsets over what constituted progress and how Japanese should set about creating it.

Other factors contributed to this confluence of mindsets, the most important of which was a change in institutional arrangements implicit in Japanese society over the course of the Tokugawa era that encouraged a kind of perceptual unity among influential segments of Japanese elites.⁹⁴ Another factor was the seizure of power in 1868 by some of those elites, an educated group of Japan's "service intelligentsia," and their articulation of institutional changes as a basis for reordering society.⁹⁵ They subsequently formalized changes so as to preserve their control while denying the fundamental equality for society's constituents that they publicly pledged. This, they assumed, would secure not just the system but their, and their followers', bases within society so that they may continue to direct its course.⁹⁶ Fukuzawa Yukichi, their earliest, most prominent spokesman, exemplified this best when he explained that equality of opportunity existed as long as individuals knew their proper "place" (*bungen*).⁹⁷

The bureaucracy's road to a commanding role in Japanese society resulted in the creation of a particular kind of modern society. The creation of multiple modernist visions in places like Changchun help point to the path the society took to get there.

⁹⁴ John P. Powelson, *Centuries of Economic Endeavor: Parallel Paths in Japan and Europe and Their Contrast with the Third World*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997, pp. 13-41.

⁹⁵ The trained 'service intelligentsia' cohort thesis can be found in Thomas Huber, *The Revolutionary Origins of Modern Japan*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981, pp. 201-31.

⁹⁶ This is also the argument in J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, *The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

⁹⁷ See Earl H. Kinmonth, "Fukuzawa Reconsidered: Gakumon no susume and Its Audience," *Journal of Asian Studies* 37:4, August 1978, pp. 677-96 and Earl H. Kinmonth, *The Self-Made Man in Meiji Japanese Thought: From Samurai to Salary Man*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981, pp. 45-54.

Chapter 2. Envisioning the Modern in Japan and Manchuria

The Changchun railway town and the Manchukuo capital were wholly new creations, each on the surface displaying few attributes typically Japanese. Both featured foreign-inspired planning, architecture, infrastructure, and amenities. Both also entailed novel goals. While the railway town was an orderly treaty port intended to integrate a non-Japanese society into Japan's imperial orbit, the puppet capital was conceived as a sprawling metropolis through which Japanese hoped to secure popular approval if not outright submission. Designed as much to impress as they were to function, both urban landscapes were explicitly modern. Neither, however, was entirely novel. Both were the results of careful deliberation over what was appropriate for Japan's evolving needs and status. As such they were distinct products of Japanese society and reflected more than imperialist ambitions: the railway town and the imperial capital demonstrated shifting bases of national identity. Although acquiring certain foreign forms, Japanese chose those forms through a deliberation over specific identities. The reasoning behind their determinations is instructive, involving as it does the dynamic inherent in Japan's transition to a modern society. That dynamic explains not only the process by which Japanese society presented itself, but also the ways it evolved.

Integral to Japanese society's ability to transform itself into new integrative frameworks in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries were indigenous developments transpiring over centuries. These included competitive economic endeavors¹, negotiated institutional arrangements², and new intellectual

¹ Thomas C. Smith, *The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959, William B. Hauser, *Economic Institutional Change in Tokugawa Japan: Osaka and the Kinai Cotton Trade*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974, Susan B. Hanley and Kozo

formulations.³ By the middle of the nineteenth century, even if Japan remained economically and militarily weaker than the other imperialist states, Japanese society evolving independently approximated many of the changes that occurred in Europe.⁴ This allowed Japanese to address relative weaknesses quickly.⁵

Having also a tradition of consciously utilizing foreign—especially Chinese—practices, Japanese were comfortable selectively borrowing European techniques and concepts.⁶ Along with latent Japanese capabilities, this capacity to borrow intelligently and develop ideas pragmatically resulted in Japan's joining a second global wave of developing states that witnessed the development of powerful nationalisms alongside industrial capitalism in each.⁷ Like the ecological crisis Japanese faced during the seventeenth century, contact with the West thus did not induce novel responses so much as it catalyzed already extant domestic capabilities.⁸

Yamamura, *Economic and Demographic Change in Preindustrial Japan, 1600-1868*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, and Thomas C. Smith, *Native Sources of Japanese Industrialization*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

² Powelson, *Centuries of Economic Endeavor*, pp. 13-41.

³ Robert Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion: The Values of Pre-Industrial Japan*, 1957, Tetsuo Najita, *Visions of Virtue in Tokugawa Japan: The Kaitokudō Merchant Academy of Osaka*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, and Yamamoto Shichihei, Takeuchi Manabu and Lynne E. Riggs, tr., *The Spirit of Japanese Capitalism and Selected Essays*, Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1992.

⁴ Commercialization in Japan may well have been part of a global process. In addition to Howell, *Capitalism from Within*, see Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, pp. 104-7 and *passim*.

⁵ See the discussion in Moses Abramovitz, "Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind," *Journal of Economic History* 46:2, June 1986, pp. 385-406 that emphasizes the need for what Abramovitz calls "social capability" in order to make technological catching up possible.

⁶ See David Pollock, *The Fracture of Meaning: Japan's Synthesis of China from the Eighth through the Eighteenth Centuries*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986 and Takeshi Ishida, *Japanese Political Culture: Change and Continuity*, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1983, pp. 69-86.

⁷ The Meiji Restoration of 1868 was practically simultaneous with other events that restructured societies elsewhere to be more conducive to the growth of industrial capitalism. These included the creation of constitutional government in Austria (1860) and the Dual Monarchy (1867), the emancipation of Russian serfs (1861), and the unifications of Italy (1870) and Germany (1871).

⁸ On the ecological imperative and reform measures during the Tokugawa see Conrad Totman, *The Green Archipelago: Forestry and Conservation in Seventeenth Century Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, and Conrad Totman, *Early Modern Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 223-79.

Perceiving Japanese initiatives simply as reactions to a Western presence in Asia was a common error among historians in the early postwar era. Another was the attempt to understand Japanese activities as “modernization,” an approach that at its most simplistic posited a discoverable developmental road to a teleologically satisfactory end—the West itself.⁹ Defining ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ as unidimensional, polar opposites of a binary pair, it was a perspective later historians challenged not only for its utility but its validity.¹⁰

Japanese initiatives in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, occurred against an identifiable background: a foreign threat defined militarily and civilizationally. Although Japanese actions against this threat depended upon trends implicit in earlier social evolution, with the end of seclusion those efforts took on or were justified by Western forms. Because these forms were of recent vintage and comparable to similar efforts elsewhere in the world, these endeavors can be considered broadly as a group. They can be categorized under the general rubric of ‘modernity.’

Like ‘tradition,’ modernity is an invented term that is useful if qualified.¹¹ First, as an abstract, heuristic device, modernity enables a broad classification of events distinguishable from those preexisting by recognizing the galvanizing role of progress.¹² Contrasting with ‘traditional’ views that posit stable societies and concomitant world views antithetical to progress, modernist perspectives nourish individual inquiry and analysis. Marshall Berman defines “modernism

⁹ This was most evident in the *Studies in the Modernization of Japan* series published by Princeton University Press.

¹⁰ See, for example, the discussion in John Dower, “E.H. Norman and the Uses of History,” in John W. Dower, ed., *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E.H. Norman*, New York: Pantheon, 1975, pp. 3-108.

¹¹ On the uses and misuses of ‘tradition’ see Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 1-14.

¹² See the discussion in Stephen Vlastos, “Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History,” pp. 1-16, in Stephen Vlastos, ed., *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

as any attempt by modern men and women to become subjects as well as objects of modernization, to get a grip on the modern world and make themselves home in it." Individual motivations occur because "[t]he innate dynamism of the modern economy, and of the culture that grows from this economy, annihilates everything it creates—physical environments, social institutions, metaphysical ideas, artistic visions, moral values—in order to create more, to go on endlessly creating the world anew."¹³ Following Berman, modernity is best conceived as multiple mirages—continually changing because successive generations shape and define new visions.¹⁴ Generations across geographic and temporal space create varying modernities.¹⁵

Second, as a global phenomenon, modern society assumed an array of forms but on the whole it exhibited key similarities. These included the dominance of secular forms of political power and authority, monetized exchange, the replacement of traditional social hierarchies with new class formations, and the

¹³ Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity*, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1988, pp. 5, 288.

¹⁴ Anthropologist Lisa Rofel, more sensitive to relations of power, considers modernity in a more complex fashion: "modernity persists as an imaginary and continuously shifting site of global/local claims, commitments, and knowledge, forged within uneven dialogues about the place of those who move in and out of categories of otherness. By opening out the imaginary space of modernity we pay attention to its gaps, fissures, and instabilities, those moments when "others" unsettle forms of domination enacted in the name of modernity. This space is filled with culturally positioned projects formed within intersecting global imaginations." Lisa Rofel, *Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China after Socialism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, p. 3.

¹⁵ Jeffrey Herf argues: "(t)here is no such thing as modernity in general. There are only national societies, each of which becomes modern in its own fashion." Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 1. The thesis here is actually not too far from Herf's: modernity does exist as a loose, general era (or stage or concept), but depends heavily on trends within national societies for specific forms. Moreover, modernity depends upon a temporal component, as successive national societies may create different modernities. Prewar Japan and Nazi Germany, for example, each attempted to implement modernities that other, neighboring societies forcibly rejected. Postwar Japan and Germany eventually created alternative modernities that differed in certain fundamental ways but continued key trends implicit in their national societies. For an enlightening discussion of nativist thought that fails to completely disappear in Japan see Harry D. Harootunian, *Things Seen and Unseen: Discourse and Ideology in Tokugawa Japan*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988.

decline of a religious world view in favor of rationalist, individualistic, and materialist cultures.¹⁶ The application of rationalism to aspects of society as diverse as architecture and administration especially resulted in a broadly shared underlying framework. This too was integral to modernity—while its rational dimension encouraged people to question fundamentally almost every aspect of the society in which they lived, its cosmopolitan dimension encouraged a confluence of thought and action.¹⁷

Despite these common features, however, modernity did not appear as a homogenizing, transnational paradigm. Local societies interpreted modernity variously, conceiving modernity only in manners that met local needs. Thus, although sharing a number of techniques and perspectives, modern societies applied them in differing ways, inevitably resulting in multiple modernities.¹⁸

Involving more than the development and extension of industrialism, capitalism, and the nation-state, the appearance of modernity included also a fundamental reorganization of the attitudes and activities involved in social integration. For Anthony Giddens, the “peculiarly dynamic character of modern social life” came from separating perceptions of time from conditions of space, disembedding social institutions through creating systems of symbolic representation and expertise, and regularizing knowledge of human life so that it could be organized and transformed. Through the abstraction of these elements, society gained power over itself. In doing so, however, it did more than, as Berman suggested, make people ‘subjects as well as objects’ of their own

¹⁶ Stuart Hall, “Introduction,” in Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, and Kenneth Thompson, eds., *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, pp. 8 and *passim*. For an enlarged discussion of modernity and its formation in Europe and North America, see the four volume work from which this book is abstracted, *Understanding Modern Societies*.

¹⁷ As Gwendolyn Wright observed, “[t]he image of modernity seemed necessarily universal, rather than inherently specific to a place and a culture.” Wright, *French Colonial Urbanism*, p. 300.

¹⁸ Rofel and Dirlik especially make this point.

transformation. It also made human life subject to continual reappraisal and revision. This “reflexivity,” writes Giddens, is “not incidental to modern institutions, but constituent of them—a complicated phenomenon, because many possibilities of reflection about reflexivity exist in modern social conditions.”¹⁹ Reflexivity, especially institutional, provides a third, useful means of interpreting modernity. Indeed, as Duara suggests, when the agent becomes the nation-state, this reflexivity becomes all the more important to understand.²⁰

‘Reflexivity’ involves comparative considerations of identity. To postcolonial critics like Dirlik, “(d)ifference is important not just as a description of a situation, but more importantly because it shapes language, and therefore, the meaning of identity: every representation of the self carries upon it the trace of the “other.” Identity, it follows, is never “essential,” but the product of relationships....(D)ifference and the negotiation of difference becomes crucial to the construction of identity and, by extension, of culture.”²¹ The result of negotiation and hybridity, cultural productions, either linguistic or physical, like art, thus serve as metaphors for all cultural encounters, and provide avenues of inquiry regarding relations of power:

...the most significant politics is the politics of identity, how identity is constructed at the level of local encounters and according to local circumstances. Since the individual is not a mere expression of “essentialized” group identity, but an active participant in the formation of group identity in numerous localized encounters with others, these encounters, rather than structures that may confine the “heterogeneity” of the individual must provide the point of departure for analysis—as well as meaningful politics. Indeed, insistence on structures, or master narratives of any kind (from capitalism to imperialism, from nationalism to revolution to ethnicity, class, and gender) implies an essentialism that subordinates the local to imagined and invented

¹⁹ Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, pp. 14-20.

²⁰ Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*.

²¹ Dirlik, *The Postcolonial Aura*, p. 5.

categories that reproduce the categories that hegemonic structures of power have imposed upon the world.²²

An uneven process, Meiji Japanese broke with tradition in key ways to establish reflexive, modern identities of their own. Urban studies, a field that began in Japan not long after it did in other countries, is a good example of one such perspective.²³ On the whole, secular rationalism and the needs of the Japanese nation-state rather than custom became the primary means of ordering society. And, as time-honored mores and ethics receded, ancient forms and motifs increasingly disappeared. Despite a growing existential angst among many who sought to preserve traditional elements, many Japanese rushed to construct viable Japanese modernities they thought best.²⁴ Japanese too enshrined progress at the new state's core.²⁵

Western modernities emerging in the middle of the nineteenth century could only appeal to Japanese because their own historical evolution prepared them for it. Yet in addition to making Japanese ripe to embrace perspectives of rationalist progress, that evolution also helped Japanese succeed dramatically in creating a modern society of their own, one that entailed a nation-state assuming globally prevailing, modern modes of operation, namely rationalism, industrial capitalism, and imperialism. Japanese proved able to appropriate these modes and apply them usefully to their own circumstances. In that effort, Manchuria played a central role. Given Manchuria's proximity and natural wealth, the imperialist interests of the Japanese state in Manchuria were logical. More significant, Manchuria's relative sparseness of population allowed for the

²² Dirlik, *The Postcolonial Aura*, p. 6.

²³ On the historical development of urban studies see Peter Saunders, *Social Theory and the Urban Question*, London: Hutchinson, 1981.

²⁴ Marilyn Ivy, *Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995.

²⁵ See also the discussion in Robert J. Smith, *Japanese Society: Tradition, Self, and the Social Other*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

untrammelled creation of two, distinct Japanese imperialist modernities, each of which was articulated and embedded in particular moments in space and time.²⁶

The Emergence of Modern Japan

The five decades following Japan's opening to the world witnessed the forging of imperial Japan as a modern society. It emerged quickly as a well-integrated society keenly aware of its needs and place in the world. Empire in Manchuria, and the means of administering it, were products of this short interlude. Yet constructing empire's outposts in Manchuria involved more than organizing railways, insuring their security, and integrating possessions into a far-flung empire. Imperial installations included new means of urban organization, architecture, and civic life. In order to understand the diversity of activities apparent in places like Changchun it is necessary first to examine the Japanese approach to the creation of empire in the Meiji era. Moreover, since Japan's becoming imperialist was a means of becoming modern, it is necessary also to consider the perspectives on modernity Meiji society entailed. The Japanese railway town in Changchun depended entirely upon these definitions for its form and content.

Perhaps the most obvious motivation in the creation of a modern Japanese state involved national security. This began with concerns for the territorial

²⁶ In making these efforts, especially the second, Japanese assumed the role of a non-Western vanguard promoting cultures and politics of difference long before any in the West suspected that Asia or the Pacific could rival Western hegemonic patterns. Theorists outside Asia and the Pacific have long ignored the potential for innovation and creation within that region, choosing instead to invent their own intellectual constructions of Asia, the Pacific, and later, a Pacific Rim. Indeed, because of the externality of the hegemonic discourse, native discourses tends to appear as resistance. See Rob Wilson and Arif Dirlik, "Introduction: Asia/Pacific as Space of Cultural Production," in Rob Wilson and Arif Dirlik, eds., *Asia/Pacific as Space of Cultural Production*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1995, pp. 1-14, esp. p. 6. Thoughtful critiques of tropes about the Asia and Pacific regions originating in the West can be found in Arif Dirlik, ed., *What is in a Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea*, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998.

security of the home islands. In the face of Western expansion and the withering of Chinese influence, this extended, naturally, to those islands in Japan's immediate vicinity. Enhanced military capabilities were integral to this concern as well, and Japanese leaders were careful to renovate the military accordingly. Initially, Meiji leaders also selected manageable opponents.²⁷ Continued successes, however, encouraged the gradual widening of definitions of strategic interests to include more distant lands. Imperial Japan eventually took part in four wars and a number of isolated "incidents" that, with the important exception of the Manchurian Incident, were not qualitatively different from the actions of any other imperialist power in the previous century. Proving to be a quick study, Japanese successes were impressive. By 1942 the Japanese empire spanned almost a fifth of the globe. Changchun, gained by the Japanese in 1905 through war and diplomacy, remained integral to geostrategic considerations until 1945.

Definitions of national security, however, meant more than territorial security and military competence. As military preparedness, not to mention national livelihood, also required a modern infrastructure and economy, national security also meant economic security.²⁸ This included access to overseas resources and markets. The timing of Japan's emergence as an imperialist power accentuated

²⁷ Given that Japanese leaders were well aware of the competition inherent in the incipient global imperialist order—during the years of *sakoku* (national seclusion) Japan was not as isolated as often thought—the cautious pragmatism inherent in Meiji foreign policy and subsequent expansion is understandable. On Tokugawa contacts see Ronald P. Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984. On Meiji foreign policy see Ian Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942*, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1977, and James B. Crowley, "From Closed Door to Empire: The Formation of the Meiji Military Establishment," in Bernard S. Silberman and H. D. Harootunian, eds., *Modern Japanese Leadership*, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966, pp. 261-85.

²⁸ The involvement of the military and the state in not only industrialization but in international trade friction is often underestimated, especially in the case of industrial latecomers. For an analysis that emphasizes this, see Gautam Sen, *The Military Origins of Industrialisation and International Trade Rivalry*, London: Frances Pinter, 1984. Although Sen features the Japanese experience, a deeper consideration of imperialist activities would enhance Sen's analysis.

this concern, beginning as it did during the final expansionary wave of Western imperialism dividing the world for diverse imperial projects. As a result, the Japanese means of securing places like Changchun involved economic integration as much if not more than military occupation.²⁹

Of course, improving military strength and state economic power were lessons that did not have to be taught the leaders of the new state. Their prior experience in *han* (fief) administrations had long inculcated this axiom. At the same time, this experience imbued leaders with a tradition of administrative activism that was particularly apparent among Meiji Japanese. The central government's role in encouraging the creative but pragmatic adoption of foreign techniques and technologies is important—a similar process occurred later in Manchuria.³⁰

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed the extension of empires into every corner of the world. Yet on the surface, imperialist states did not always race to divide the globe for purely selfish reasons. Many voiced altruistic concerns, usually presented as a version of *la mission civilisatrice*, something budding Japanese imperialists also embraced.³¹ Even if more justificatory than actual, in public discussion this perception was central because it helped define national identities: imperialist societies at the turn of the century

²⁹ Of course, the two were often inter-connected. The railway from Andong to Mukden, for example, began as a light railway for military needs during the Russo-Japanese War.

³⁰ It was also a contemporary global phenomenon not limited to Japan. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, occurring also in part to ameliorate social tensions, ushered in a similar period of state-fostered economic growth. As a rule, the governments of Austro-Hungary, Japan, and other late industrializing group such as Germany and Russia focused on speedy industrial development heedless of the markets for capital, land, and labor. Indeed, it was usually the more economically backward nations that produced military-industrial complexes. See Ian Inkster, *Science and Technology in History: An Approach to Industrial Development*, London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1991, pp. 154-6, 168-70.

³¹ On altruistic European views of imperialism see Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*, New York: Vintage, 1987. On similar Japanese views of imperialism see Marius B. Jansen, "Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives," in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 61-79.

clothed imperialist actions in humane benevolence. This attitude galvanized many into action overseas and helped endow imperialists with a sense of who they were through comparisons with colonial others. Europeans defined themselves—and at the same time the bases of colonial authority—through theoretically ‘disinterested’ representations of non-Europeans.³²

Unexpectedly, however, imperialist benevolence led also to changes at home. While colonial societies served as practical laboratories for the implementation of progressive activities overseas, because those activities originated as issues of concern at home, such creations eventually served often as models for later endeavors in the metropole.³³ Colonial outposts, moreover, provided administrators with practical experience useful not only in the colonies but also for later careers at home. Not only did Japan’s most promising bureaucratic elites serve early in their careers in positions of authority throughout Manchuria, Japanese themselves often referred to Manchuria as a laboratory.³⁴

At the confluence of national security and the ‘civilizing mission’ stood turn-of-the-century imperialists, eager to make their societies powerful and respected. The term “Great Power,” though value-laden and in some ways antiquated, expresses the identity associated with this goal neatly. The term signifies an exclusive club of nations that militarily overwhelmed the world trying to imbue it with specific values and tastes while incorporating it into certain economies

³² Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage, 1978.

³³ To Koshizawa, the colonies provided Japanese bureaucrats and theorists with laboratories in which to construct new “social systems.” See Koshizawa Akira, “Taiwan, Manshū, Chūgoku no toshi keikaku,” in *Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi*, vol. 3., Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1993, p. 183. On European imperial projects see Wright, *French Colonial Urbanism* and Gwendolyn Wright, “Tradition in the Service of Modernity: Architecture and Urbanism in French Colonial Policy, 1900-1930,” pp. 322-45 in Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, Berkeley: California University Press, 1997.

³⁴ An architect demonstrated this perspective clearly in a public discussion that was later published in a popular journal: “Manchuria was a laboratory for Japan’s sake, and not simply for architecture but for everything.” See “Tairiku kenchiku zadankai,” *Gendai Kenchiku* 8, January 1940, p. 55.

and empires. Connoting a society's physical and mental organizational frameworks, the term combines perfectly the concerns for national security with an honorable identity. The desire to achieve or maintain the status of Great Power, moreover, helped fuel more than imperialism—competition inherent in the Great Power system was at the root of the first world war³⁵ and fueled global transformations.³⁶ These transformations were at the heart of creating modernity. Japanese emerging from relative seclusion against a backdrop of Great Power rivalries concluded that if Japan was also to be perceived as 'Great,' Japan too needed to construct and maintain an empire.³⁷

The development of Japan's empire in Manchuria addressed several issues simultaneously. From a military perspective, the Japanese occupation of southern Manchuria hypothetically protected Korea, pushed back the Russian threat, and provided a forward base near the Chinese capital. From an economic perspective, it secured Japanese access to the Manchurian hinterland, a promising region near Japan not yet extensively explored by imperialist rivals. From a demographic perspective it allowed Japanese migration so as to strengthen Japan's grip and alleviate population pressure among the rural poor

³⁵ A popular study of the expansion of Europe that focuses on economic and strategic competition is Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, pp. 20-38. It must be noted, however, that nowhere does Kennedy define the term "Great Power," nor does he discuss the values inherent in the term. Edward Said to some extent does, though his analysis suggests that since every progressive aspect of imperialism is inextricably bound up with the harmful, the term "great" is ironic. See Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993. Said, however, ignores the opposite—that bound up with the harmful there were also progressive goals intended by policy makers. Because many Japanese intended to create something great, often ignoring the brutal. In this study both implications are intended.

³⁶ William H. McNeil, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982. A case study demonstrating the fundamental interconnectedness of nationalism, transformative economics, and the international arms race is William Manchester, *The Arms of Krupp, 1587-1968*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964.

³⁷ Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987, pp. 18-21 and *passim*. Beasley, however, believes that the quest for domination is a natural human endeavor. See Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, pp. 12-13.

at home.³⁸ From the perspective of national identity, it allowed Japanese the opportunity to demonstrate the finer points and potentialities of Japanese rule, not only to Chinese and other imperialists but to Japanese as well. Last, considered as a whole, empire in Manchuria furthered transformative processes in Japan. It made Japan a Great Power.

Japan's drive for Great Power status entailed important ramifications for places like Changchun because military, economic, and identity issues were foremost in the minds of Japanese arriving there to build a new town. Although Japanese concerns for national security and identity predated the Meiji era, many of the considerations of the new era were novel. Before Meiji it was sufficient to keep foreign armies out of Japan and to assert nativist sentiments against the influx of Chinese influences. Towards the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate, however, Japanese society suddenly appeared vulnerable in a way it had never been before. This vulnerability was not simply military, but civilizational.³⁹ Ensuing Japanese initiatives attempted to fortify Japanese society in both respects. Of course, Japanese ultimately escaped imperialist fetters in large part because imperialist eyes remained fixed more on China than Japan, but another reason is the nature and efficacy of the Japanese contestation of Western imperialist expansion. That contestation involved political, military, economic, and cultural undertakings. These undertakings proved to be of great consequence for colonial settings like Changchun because they provided the impetus for empire's actual forms.

The Meiji Restoration provided a new means of political integration through the careful removal of possible rivals and the instigation of a modernist system

³⁸ Claiming land in Manchuria as Japanese involved Koreans too. See Michael Weiner, *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan*, London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 41, 54, 159-65.

³⁹ On the apprehensive Japanese political and intellectual milieu prior to the Restoration see W. G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972, pp. 48-97.

that mixed native wisdom with foreign examples. In essence this meant the creation of a nation-state, meaning administrative and financial centralization as well as the careful adoption of institutional practices acceptable to Western definitions of civilization and power. Such adoptions, however, were always qualified. Seemingly Western in inspiration, new Meiji forms were decidedly Japanese in substance.⁴⁰ This was as true for architecture and urban planning as it was for other aspects of Japanese society.

Japanese succeeded in keeping foreign imperialists at bay by adjusting Japanese society to at least superficially be more akin to their rivals. Joining the imperialist ranks, however, had two repercussions. First, having demonstrated that Japanese were capable of behaving in ways the more puissant powers deemed appropriate, Japanese succeeded in persuading Western imperialists to end the unequal treaty relationships. Second, as the threat of occupation and dismemberment passed and Japanese national strength expanded, Japanese found themselves better able to take part in imperialist competition themselves. Although Japanese instituted changes initially to insure national survival, in time increasing numbers assumed imperialism to be imperative to assure Japan's significance in world affairs.⁴¹ In seeking to keep imperialism out of Japan, Japanese became imperialists themselves.⁴²

⁴⁰ An illustrative example of this process is Japan's civil code adopted in 1898. After twenty years of French tutelage, in the end the new code added also an emphasis on traditional practices despite that making it a document embodying gross contradictions. See Hirakawa Sukehiro, "Japan's Turn to the West," Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, tr., in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, ed., *Modern Japanese Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 71-5. The best systemic discussion of Japanese creatively adapting elements of foreign institutions so that they met Japanese requirements is D. Eleanor Westney, *Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987. With regard to foreign technologies see Nafziger, *Learning from the Japanese*, pp. 37-50. On the limits of even an enthusiastic Westernizer see Ivan Parker Hall, *Mori Arinori*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973, especially pp. 478-84. A study that usefully explores the context of this era is Hirakawa Sukehiro, *Wakon yōsai no keifu: Uchi to soto kara no Meiji Nihon*, Tokyo: Kawade shobō shinsha, 1987, revised.

⁴¹ The diary of Mutsu Munemitsu (1844-1897), foreign minister during the Sino-Japanese War and Triple Intervention, reveals clearly the intimate relationship between treaty revision and war

This is not to say, however, that Japanese became imperialists purely for defensive reasons. Japanese also perceived imperialism as progressive. To become an imperialist Great Power meant not simply an improved international status but also material and cultural parity for Japanese. Because the international context in which they found themselves was imperialist, international issues were at the heart of defining the new state and society, and not only for the relatively few leaders at the top of Meiji society.⁴³

Becoming imperialist required important intellectual adjustments, something changed Japanese perceptions of international relations demonstrated ably. It also meant action. Japanese could not simply stand by while the Powers divided Asia. By the turn of the century Japanese proved able to adopt completely the system of international relations created by Western imperialism, an evolution in perception and action integral to the creation of modernity at large in Japan. Although Japanese no longer proceeded according to the traditional Chinese model of superior and inferior states, by becoming modern they were able to retain a sense of superiority to other Asian states.

Jettisoning traditional rubrics, Meiji Japanese joined the international arena as a Western-defined competing state helping to destroy the Sino-centric international order. This change was an about-face, because for most of the Tokugawa era, Japanese uncompromisingly rejected the growing foreign presence. Within only a few decades, however, Japanese were acting as

in Korea. It reveals further the understanding and complete adoption of international legalities by Japanese. Mutsu proved able to use them to Japan's advantage in Korea, despite the Korean desire to adhere to the traditional Chinese international order. See Mutsu Munemitsu, *Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95*, Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1982, especially pp. 66-76, 113-37.

⁴² One early discussion of this perspective is Helen Mears, *Japan: Mirror for America*, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1948, pp. 162-3, 179-83, 200-4.

⁴³ Sandra Davis documents these sentiments among emerging popular parties in Sandra T. W. Davis, "Treaty Revision, National Security, and Regional Cooperation: A Mintō Viewpoint," pp. 151-73 in Hilary Conroy, Sandra T. W. Davis, Wayne Patterson, eds., *Japan in Transition: Thought and Action in the Meiji Era, 1868-1912*, London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1984.

aggressively and hypocritically as the Western powers they initially feared and condemned. Although new Japanese visions of international relations in the imperialist era often included a sense that Asians needed to cooperate in the face of Western military might and political encroachment, it was also apparent to many Japanese that they had to act self-servingly at key junctures if Japan was to become a Great Power.⁴⁴ Elsewhere Japanese proved adept at turning the nuances of international, that is to say Western, law to their own advantage.⁴⁵

Japanese successes before 1900 imbued Meiji society with a sense of confidence that enabled action further afield. Takahashi Sakue (1867-1920), an 1894 Tōdai law graduate and later professor, underscored this in his *Manshū mondai no kaiketsu* (*The Manchurian Question*).⁴⁶ Writing a year prior to the Russo-Japanese war he argued that Japanese action in Manchuria was a “right” (*kenri*)

⁴⁴ The Japanese incorporation of the Ryūkyūs, for example, occurred despite Japanese recognition of a dissimilar society on that island chain. Some perceived Korea in a similar fashion. See Davies, “Treaty Revision, National Security, and Regional Cooperation,” p. 170.

⁴⁵ The 1874 dispatch of troops to Taiwan on behalf of Ryūkyūan sailors paved the way for the creation of Okinawa prefecture in 1879. See Mori Toshihiko, *Taiwan shuppei: Dai Nihon teikoku no kaimaku geki*, Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1996. It also internationally legitimized increasing Japanese control of Okinawa since the seventeenth century despite Chinese suzerainty. The opening and later annexation of Korea was similar. Japanese first compelled the Korean government to accept the internationally defined status of an independent nation-state as a new national identity. Then, through the judicial use of military force and diplomacy, Japanese painstakingly achieved international acceptance of Japanese primacy in Korea. Of course, some in the Meiji establishment initially perceived Korea not too differently from other neighboring areas like Hokkaido or the Ryūkyūs. On the influence of enduring perceptions of Korea and *kokugakusha* on Meiji policy towards Korea see Donald Calman, *The Nature and Origins of Japanese Imperialism: A Reinterpretation of the Great Crisis of 1873*, London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 312-26, and *passim*. On the activist nativism spurring expansion in late Tokugawa society see J. Victor Koschmann, *The Mito Ideology: Discourse, Reform, and Insurrection in Late Tokugawa Japan, 1790-1864*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. On the Japanese incorporation of Korea see Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868-1910: A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960. On Japanese perspectives of Korea and the use of military force see Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. On the international context see Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, pp. 85-90.

⁴⁶ Having served in the Sino-Japanese War, Takahashi helped draw up the surrender terms presented to Li Hongzhang. He went on to become a legal scholar and a member of the House of Peers. Biographical data on Takahashi can be found in the *Meiji jinmei jiten*, volume 1, Tokyo: Nihon tosho sentaa, 1976 (originally 1913), pp. 124-5, *Nihon jinmei daijiten*, Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1979 (originally 1937), p. 42, and Biographical Research Department, Rengo Press, *Japan Biographical Encyclopedia and Who's Who*, Tokyo: Rengo Press, 1964-65, third edition, pp. 1557-8.

and a “duty” (*gimu*). It was a right because the terms of the treaty that ended the Sino-Japanese War charged Japan to keep the peace in East Asia. It was a duty because of precedent: Japan had acted previously to secure the peace in the Ryūkyūs, Taiwan, and Korea, and Japan should continue to act accordingly. In Takahashi’s view, it was the Russian advance into Asia that destabilized the region. Takahashi went on to conclude that Russian expansion threatened the existence and viability of the Japanese state. The establishment of a Russian naval threat in the Yellow and Japan Seas threatened Japanese command of the seas around Japan. More abstractly, the Russian penetration of Manchuria constrained Japanese potential growth and confined the Japanese to Japan. Takahashi, for one, already envisioned a Japanese role on the Asian mainland beyond Korea. He insisted, however, that in rectifying the situation Japan needed to act strictly in accordance with prevailing standards of international law and precedent. He concluded that future Japanese actions against Russians in Chinese territory were legally justifiable, basing his conclusions on incidents like the 1838 Caroline incident in which British marines in Canada acting in self-defense destroyed destabilizing forces in American waters.⁴⁷

Takahashi represents well the combined concerns for national security and identity. He also demonstrates changed Japanese perceptions by the turn of the century: Japan was no longer secluded, feudal, or maintaining only intermittent contact. Nor did he or the majority of Japanese question whether or not Japan

⁴⁷ Takahashi’s ultimate solution to Russian expansion through was not through the use of force. Instead he argued for the formation of a Chinese buffer state between the two empires, something he rationalized through European precedent dating back to the treaties of Utrecht and Westphalia. He envisioned China’s new status protected by a four power treaty including Russia, Japan, Britain and the United States. See Takahashi Sakue, *Kokusaihō gaikō ronsen dai ni: Manshū mondai no kaiketsu*, Tokyo: Takahashi Sakue, 1904, pp. 20-56. The Caroline incident involved a steamer that had been taken by rebel forces and moored on an island in the river above Niagara falls. During a night assault, British marines captured the ship, burned it, and cast it over the falls. The commander’s version of events is Rear Admiral Drew, *A Narrative of the Capture and Destruction of the Steamer “Caroline” and Her Descent over the Falls of Niagara On the Night of the 29th of December, 1837*, London: Spottiswoode & Co., 1864.

needed to adopt Western forms of society, nation, or international action. He assumed that Japan had important needs overseas that were there for the taking.⁴⁸ In this view China had no role, though Japan did because Japan was a Great Power. Japan was no different from any other modern, imperialist state.

The Japanese defined the drive for Great Power status through two popular slogans: *fukoku kyōhei* (“rich country, strong army”) and *bunmei kaika* (“civilization and enlightenment”). The first described neatly the goals of military strength and economic power, goals that were apparently achieved with Japan’s stunning victories over Qing China in 1895 and Tsarist Russia in 1905. Yet military victories, though spectacular, are by nature sporadic, and exhortations to increase national wealth are not always universally inspiring. A more constant standard by which Japanese judged national fitness was modernity, the essence of *bunmei kaika*. Japanese perceived that in order to become a great power in a material sense it was also imperative to become a great power in a cultural sense. Japanese adoptions therefore included not just techniques and technologies but housing, clothing, diet, and other ephemera of daily life, especially in urban environments.

Scientific advances, along with the spread of a comprehensive educational system, turned concerns like these into academic disciplines capable of influencing society. While some academics contributed to the redefinition of Japanese perceptions of neighboring societies,⁴⁹ others examined new aspects of life such as the built environment. New forms of academia thus paralleled

⁴⁸ Beasley shows that the actual makers of Japanese foreign policy did not go to war with Russia with the intent of establishing a sphere of influence in Manchuria. They were more concerned with commercial opportunity and maintaining Japanese control of Korea. Elements of the Japanese literate public, however, did propose greater Japanese influence in Manchuria, something Beasley suspects men like Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō may have quietly supported. Komura at least negotiated for that later at Portsmouth. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, pp. 78-84.

⁴⁹ Stefan Tanaka, *Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

spreading imperialist influences, much in the way cartographic subjugation paralleled territorial growth.⁵⁰

More significant redefinitions involved not just the physical trappings of society. Post-Restoration Japanese defined modernity perceptually and in so doing redefined some of their most central institutions. This process is perhaps most clearly observable in the person of the Meiji Emperor. His advisors manipulated his lifestyle consciously in order to re-signify his person for Japanese. In so doing the royal advisors created new focuses for society.⁵¹

Of course, modern forms did not immediately or entirely replace traditional ones.⁵² Moreover, despite the reduction of Japanese enthusiasm for Western ways in the 1880s, a broad attitudinal shift appeared as Japanese society as a whole shifted from parochial and traditional perceptions to ones more flexible and cosmopolitan.⁵³ This redefined Japanese politics and reinforced modernity as increased political participation expanded the definition of *han*, or incipient nationalist, loyalty. In Meiji the pursuit of power alone as carried out by Tokugawa Ieyasu or any other *sengoku* warlord became sublimated into a larger quest for the construction of a new society centered on the new perceptions of the emperor. The Japanese quest for learning mirrored this concern—in Japan,

⁵⁰ It is significant that the only two societies in the entire world not colonized by Western imperialists both boasted strong militaries and were concerned with control of their borders. On the role of the perceptions of borders and their demarcations upon the development of nationhood see Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994, pp. 16-9, 101, 111, 119-39, 164-74.

⁵¹ Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, and Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

⁵² Westney, *Imitation and Innovation*, Hirakawa, "Japan's Turn to the West" and Susan B. Hanley, "The Material Culture: Stability in Transition," in Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman, eds., *Japan in Transition from Tokugawa to Meiji*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 447-69.

⁵³ Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, pp. 27-34 and Hirakawa, "Japan's Turn to the West," pp. 86-8.

education assumed implicitly national ends.⁵⁴ *Bunmei kaika* could only be achieved through the simultaneous attainment of *fukoku kyōhei*. Only together could these slogans light the way for the new society.

This new society, however, unconsciously constrained its own conceptual parameters. Despite the international quality of Japan's new society a recurring sameness was apparent.⁵⁵ Japanese defined modernity by means of a Western other. Although Japanese chose carefully in borrowing and adopting concepts and institutions to Japanese needs, Japanese borrowed exclusively from only certain countries—those they considered the advanced countries. Thus, while western science and technology determined many of the physical manifestations of Japan's new society, the western imperialist mindset also influenced things more intangible. Modern transportation, industry, and weapons meant Western European and North American, but so did modern conceptions of law, art, and architecture. The empire reflected this heritage. In creating enclaves like Changchun, Japanese sought to demonstrate achievements of modernity that were the equal of other imperialist constructions elsewhere in China. They hoped that in doing so other imperialists would recognize Japan as an equal. Empire was one of the proving grounds for Japanese to demonstrate to the world, and themselves, that Japan was a Great Power.

The spirit of national commitment in this endeavor cannot be downplayed.⁵⁶ The context in which the creation of Japanese empire in Manchuria occurred

⁵⁴ Thomas P. Rohlen, "Learning, The Mobilization of Knowledge in the Japanese Political Economy," in Shumpei Kumon and Henry Rosovsky, eds., *The Political Economy of Japan, Volume 3: Cultural and Social Dynamics*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992, pp. 321-63.

⁵⁵ Lafcadio Hearn may have been the first to note this. See Hirakawa, "Japan's Turn to the West," pp. 88-91.

⁵⁶ Even Kennedy, not a specialist in Japanese history, notes the morale with which Japanese approached empire. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, p. 267.

included not just fear of foreign domination but also personal sacrifice.⁵⁷ The Japanese paid dearly for their position in Manchuria, both financially and in blood.⁵⁸ The strain of prolonged tension in Japan resulting from war and the threat of war underscored this. The Triple Intervention, which witnessed the gathering of the Pacific fleets of three Powers off Japanese shores, and the subsequent Russian absorption of the Liaodong Peninsula in 1898 cast a dire pall in Japan that was not lifted until the conflict of 1904-5.⁵⁹ Even then victory over the Russians did not ease feelings of inferiority. For their part, the Russians, along with the other imperialists, continued to wait and see just what Japan would do with its newly won empire.⁶⁰ Changchun, the border between the

⁵⁷ Except for certain deposits of coal and silver, Japan is a land poor in natural resources. As a result, personal determination and motivation to succeed despite material shortage has long been nurtured as positive characteristics, something that may have been boosted by the dire ecological crisis the society faced a century before its opening to the world. For a brief discussion of this see Conrad Totman, *Early Modern Japan*, pp. 223-79. This was important also to new merchant mentalités. See Yamamoto et al, *Spirit of Japanese Capitalism*.

⁵⁸ Japanese casualties in the Russo-Japanese war totaled over 81,000 dead, close to half the number of Japan's prewar active forces. In comparison, Japanese casualties for the Sino-Japanese war amounted to over 17,000 dead. The financial drain was also tremendous—over the course of the war the national debt quadrupled. Mikiso Hane, *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, second edition, pp. 161, 177, 179. By the end of the war fifty-three percent of Japan's annual revenues were devoted to the war effort. R. M. Connaughton, *The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: A Military History of the Russo-Japanese War 1904-5*, London: Routledge, 1988, p. 271. War expenses totaled 1,900,000,000 yen. Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta nihonjin kenchikuka*, p. 46. On the crucial yet unforeseen aid given Japan by certain Jewish bankers in apparent retaliation for pogroms see Kojima Noboru, *Nichi-Ro sensō*, Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1994, volume 2, pp. 353-95 (8 vols.). Afterwards, Japanese mentioned often that they had expended 100,000 men and two billion yen in the war. Alvin D. Coox, "The Kwantung Army Dimension," in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, & Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 407. The third *Report on Progress* insisted that although Japan lost 120,000 lives and spent two billion yen in the war and received no indemnity, Russia paid 100,000,000 rubles to cover the costs of Russian prisoners of war. *Report on Progress, 1907-1932*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1932, pp. 36-7.

⁵⁹ Siam experienced a similar, nearly simultaneous, catastrophic loss of territory that cut deeply in the national psyche for decades to come. See Winichakul, *Siam Mapped*, pp. 140-56.

⁶⁰ Koshizawa relates an incident in which a Russian official told first Mantetsu president Gotō Shimpei explicitly that although Russia may have lost the war to Japan, that by no means implied that Japan was the equal of European and American civilization. Over the next few years they would be watching for Japan to reveal its defects. See Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 71-2.

Russian and Japanese spheres of influence, was a vehicle for Japanese to demonstrate pointedly their best modern efforts.

Mantetsu's Manchuria

Reflecting the government's cautious approach to international relations, Tokyo did not leave the consolidation of Japanese influence in Manchuria to occur haphazardly. At the same time, Japanese officials intended that Mantetsu be more than simply a railway company. Centered on the railway, Mantetsu's jurisdiction ultimately included not only commercial enterprises such as mines and foundries but also the duties of local government, including the construction and administration of roads, schools, hospitals, hotels, and other aspects of daily life. Mantetsu ultimately proved to be a gigantic corporation accumulating enormous profits from the soy product and soybean trade which it plowed into other endeavors in the 1,300 square miles it oversaw on the Guandong Peninsula and the 100 square miles the railway controlled along its lines in the interior.⁶¹ Along those lines the railway could station guards to the limit of 15 per square kilometer.⁶²

⁶¹ Mantetsu's net profits, for example, amounted to ¥36,274,320 in 1927. By 1928, all Japanese investments in Manchuria amounted to some two billion yen. *Report on Progress in Manchuria, 1907-1928*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1929, pp. 2, 50.

⁶² These forces were part of the Japanese division of some 12,000 troops under the command of the Guandong Governor-General. Initially some guards were even detailed to individual trains to repulse attacks from "mounted bandits." The Governor-General was by Imperial Ordinance a military man in charge of communication with Chinese authorities, the consular police within the railway zone, and of hearing appeals from consular courts within that zone. These courts were streamlined versions of Japanese legal practice, giving civil administrators judicial powers. They were also empowered to apply limited means of torture to Chinese litigants as was the custom of Qing China. See K. Asakawa, "Japan in Manchuria—II," *Yale Review*, November 1908, pp. 268-302, and Coox, "The Kwantung Army Dimension," pp. 395-8. On Qing legal customs see Sybille van der Sprenkel, *Legal Institutions in Manchu China: A Sociological Analysis*, London: The Athlone Press, 1966.

Recognizing the importance of local leadership, the government granted Mantetsu the freedom to do as the company saw best.⁶³ This was by no means an isolated event. In creating the Japanese state the art of flexible organization proved consistently to be a Japanese forte. Initially lacking in capital, experience, and technological expertise, Japanese showed repeatedly an adaptability that allowed them to overcome these deficiencies through the productive interplay of state and private enterprise.⁶⁴ The development of empire was an extension of this process, and the construction of the Changchun railway town an excellent example.

Japanese achieved Great Power status through the long and dedicated work of a host of talented individuals. Mantetsu's first president, Gotō Shimpei, is a good example (Figure 2.1).⁶⁵ His career paralleled that of the rising Japanese state, eventually earning him a barony in the post-Restoration aristocracy. Like Takahashi Sakue, Gotō's career demonstrated the interplay of concerns for national security and identity implicit in creating modernity.

Born to an impoverished samurai family from northeast Japan and attracted to the western civilizations like so many of his peers, Gotō became a doctor, a profession that stood as a standard bearer of the modern age. At twenty-five the

⁶³ Not that Mantetsu was entirely autonomous—Mantetsu was a joint creation of the Foreign, Finance, and Communications Ministries. Having organized Mantetsu's operation, including assigning control of the *fuzokuchi* and requiring appropriate civil services, together they provided also a means of administrative oversight. See Koshizawa, "Taiwan, Manshū, Chūgoku no toshi keikaku," p. 194.

⁶⁴ Nafziger calls this "guided capitalism." See Nafziger, *Learning from the Japanese*, pp. 53-60 and *passim*. A view that affirms a stronger Japanese government role in development is Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982. Kenneth Pyle suggests that while the government helped shape an environment suitable for growth and expansion, "there was emerging a new breed of men in the private sector whose ambition, inventiveness, and opportunism contributed immensely to the expansion of commerce and industry in this period." Although Pyle refers here to the late nineteenth century, the same may be said for the early twentieth. See Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Making of Modern Japan*, Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath & Co., 1978, pp. 77-88.

⁶⁵ The following discussion of Gotō's career is taken from Kitaoka Shinichi, *Gotō Shimpei: Gaiko to bijyon*, Tokyo: Chūō Koronsha, 1988, and Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 9, 12-15, 61-7.

president of the Nagoya Medical school, Gotō distinguished himself through a number of articles on sanitation and through his work at the military hospital in Osaka during the Satsuma rebellion. He entered the Home Ministry's medical bureau in 1883 and at the age of thirty-five became its head (*kyokuchō*) in 1892 after a short period of study in Germany. While at the ministry, in 1890 he published *Kokka eisei genri* (*Principles of National Health*) and took part in the creation of new sewage and water facilities in Tokyo. This recommended Gotō to Army Vice-Minister Kodama Gentarō who in 1895 made Gotō chief of the Army Quarantine Office looking after the return of the more than 230,000 soldiers from the war. After the war Gotō returned to the Home Ministry but remained involved in overseas affairs, advising the new Japanese administration on Taiwan about health issues such as those involved with opium. In 1896 Kodama, now governor-general of Taiwan, asked Gotō to join him there, eventually appointing Gotō his deputy and civil governor of the island in 1898.⁶⁶

On Taiwan Gotō turned his attention to colonial development. Ordering detailed studies of preexisting local conditions, Gotō fostered industrial development through the construction of infrastructure, railroad construction, and establishing official monopolies for the camphor and salt trades. He also took an interest in city planning, all the while keeping his administration in the black. This experience served later as the blueprint for Gotō's ambitions in Manchuria.⁶⁷ It also provided Gotō with the opportunity to recruit and train a

⁶⁶ Kodama initially summoned Gotō to help deal with the teeming tropical viruses to which Japanese were unaccustomed. In this way Japan's beginning of empire coincided with the relatively late European penetration of Africa, when medical technology and supply, an often ignored element in the creation of modernity, finally enabled the domination of that continent. See Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 58-79.

⁶⁷ Overseeing Taiwan's 436 kilometers of railway led him supposedly to boast to Kodama at one point about the potential for "original Japanese management" (*Nihon dokujī de eisei dekimasu*) of the Manchurian railway. See Kubota Naoyuki, *Manshū no tanjō: Nichi-Bei no masatsu no hajimari*, Tokyo: Maruzen, 1996, pp. 138-9.

like-minded following who followed him to Manchuria. The second Mantetsu president was Nakamura Zekō, a Finance Ministry bureaucrat who first worked with Gotō in the Taiwan civil administration. As rising bureaucrats, their paths crossed repeatedly in the years to come.⁶⁸

Perhaps the most significant result of Gotō's work in Taiwan was that it cemented the trust of Kodama Gentarō, an influential Chōshū general.⁶⁹ It was Kodama, later Army Chief of Staff during the Russo-Japanese War, who requested that Gotō become first president of the new SMR, a position Gotō held until July 1908.⁷⁰ When Kodama died suddenly in August of 1906, Gotō repaid Kodama's trust by dedicating himself to completing the task they had set for themselves. By that time he had also free range to do as he saw fit.

Gotō modeled the SMR, most studies suggest, on the British East India Company. He had become impressed by the way that company enriched England through subjugating India.⁷¹ Another source suggests the company's model was more modern—the Russian Chinese Eastern Railway which used joint ventures with Chinese banks as a tool of imperialist encroachment.⁷² In

⁶⁸ Nakamura also served as a minister in the Hara cabinet and Mayor of Tokyo.

⁶⁹ Kitaoka, *Gotō Shimpei*, pp. 56-7.

⁷⁰ Beasley narrates an important meeting of elder statesmen in May of 1906 in which Kodama squared off against Itō Hirobumi over Japanese control of Manchuria. Citing American and British concerns, Itō wanted greater cooperation with Chinese, but Kodama asserted that a single Japanese administration of the area would be more beneficial to all parties. In this clash one finds the makings of what proved to be the fundamental debate in Japanese foreign policy—whether Japan should work with Britain and America or establish a more completely Japanese sphere. See Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, pp. 96-8.

⁷¹ Tsurumi Yūsuke, *Gotō Shimpei den*, *Manshū keiei henjō*, *Taiheiyō Kyōkai*, p. 5, in *Manshūkai*, ed., *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi*, Tokyo: *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi kankōkai*, 1964, vol. 1, p. 30. The impetus for a preliminary study along this line supposedly occurred as Kodama's troops crossed the Yalu in 1904. Gotō, however, may not have intended to create a position for himself—his eye was apparently on a position in Korea. Gotō did write a preliminary proposal for Kodama's consideration entitled *Manshū keieisaku kōgai* (*Outline of Administrative Policy for Manchuria*) focusing first on the development of the port at Dalian and a regional railway infrastructure. See Kitaoka, *Gotō Shimpei*, pp. 83-5.

⁷² Christopher Howe, "Japan's Economic Experience in China before the Establishment of the People's Republic of China: a Retrospective Balance-Sheet," in Ronald Dore and Rodha Sinha

either case, or both, not only is the role of the foreign model evident, but so is the presence of intelligent adaptation.

Gotō intended that the SMR solidify Japanese control of the region, in part because of a fear of a Russian return.⁷³ The SMR, however, did not proceed simply as either the East India Company or the CER. It became something more. Surrounding himself with talented men from business, government, and academia, Gotō created an organization that focused on the creation of modernity not only through the construction of infrastructure and securing profits, but also through a large investigative organization that could examine local conditions objectively and in detail.⁷⁴ It was process that resulted from practice: Manchuria witnessed the flowering of a method Gotō originally pioneered on Taiwan.⁷⁵

eds. with Mari Sako, *Japan and World Depression: Then and Now, Essays in Memory of E. F. Penrose*, London: Macmillan, 1987, p. 159.

⁷³ Tsurumi, *Gotō Shimpei den*, pp. 31-3, in Manshikai, ed., *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi*, vol. 1, pp. 43-4. There was also apprehension among Japanese for other rivals, especially America. See Manshikai, ed., *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi*, vol. 1, pp. 43-55.

⁷⁴ See the discussion in Kitaoka, *Gotō Shimpei*, pp. 94-103. According to Koshizawa, Gotō's hallmark was his insistence on using educated analytical teams. This was true not only in Taiwan but also in Manchuria and in Japan. See Koshizawa Akira, "Gotō Shimpei to shinsai fukkō keikaku," *Tōkyōjin*, August 1989, p. 112. For a discussion of his early assistants see Kitaoka, *Gotō Shimpei*, pp. 87-9.

⁷⁵ Gotō rounded out his career in Japan where he had the opportunity to implement his ideas and experience at home as mayor of Tokyo. In 1908 Gotō became Minister of Communications and the Director-General of the Colonization Bureau in Katsura Tarō's second cabinet. Later he became the director of Japan's Railway Agency, Mayor of Tokyo, and Minister of Home Affairs. Gotō and his protégés were also instrumental in organizing the field of urban planning in Japan, in part through his founding of the Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research (*Toshi kenkyūkai*) in 1917. Gotō remained its president until he died in 1929. Gotō's greatest opportunity to remake Japan's urban environment occurred six years earlier, after the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923. Gotō envisioned reconstructing Tokyo on a monumental and majestic scale, a project that would have amounted to 800 million yen at a time when the entire Tokyo municipal budget was 130 million yen and the national budget 1.5 billion yen. It is ironic that cost-conscious bureaucrats ultimately thwarted Gotō's plans for Tokyo, an obstacle he did not have to face in Manchuria. In addition to Kitaoka see Koshizawa Akira, "Gotō Shimpei to shinsai fukkō keikaku," *Tōkyōjin*, August 1989, pp. 108-14, Koshizawa Akira, *Tōkyō no toshi keikaku*, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991, pp. 11-86, Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 65-7, and Koshizawa, *Shokuminchi Manshū no toshi keikaku*, pp. 25-33. In English see Edward Seidensticker, *Tokyo Rising: The City since the Great Earthquake*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990, pp. 5-11, 21-31, 50-2.

Gotō's vision for Manchuria centered around four main goals.⁷⁶ These included transforming Dalian into a first-rate international port, strengthening Manchuria's rail network, inducing half a million Japanese to migrate to Manchuria, and carrying out other urban construction projects modeled on the city of Dalian.⁷⁷ Gotō and others approved of Russian construction at Dalian because Russian goals coincided with their own goals for Manchuria. The Russians had intended to incorporate Manchuria into their empire through military occupation and railway imperialism, much as they had Siberia and central Asia.⁷⁸ A warm water port at the terminus of the trans-Siberian railways, Dalian reflected this as well as the Russian desire to impress Asians with European styles of architecture and urban planning.⁷⁹ It certainly influenced the Japanese. Dalian offered broad boulevards, scenic vistas, uncluttered housing, and monumental architecture. Although the Russians were unable to finish their new project on the Bohai Sea, a point more southern than any Russian port in the Crimea, Japanese finished constructing Dalian accordingly. Then, extrapolating from Dalian, Gotō laid plans for the remainder of Manchuria that were similar. His hope was that eventually Japanese raised on the continent and based in cities like Dalian would embrace new conceptions of modernity and induce this vast land to reach its potential. Manchuria's vitalized cities, like Changchun, were at

⁷⁶ In addition to Kitaoka see Kubota, *Manshū no tanjō*, pp. 139-42, 152-6.

⁷⁷ The Russians had not built much along the railway tracks between Dalian and Harbin, but what they built at Dalian impressed the Japanese immensely. Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, 1988, p. 44. For an analysis of the urban planning of Dalian see Koshizawa Akira, "Dairen no toshi keikaku shi (1898-1945)," *Nitchū keizai kyōkai kaihō*, Nos., 134, 135, 136, 1984: Oct-Dec. On Gotō's goal of 500,000 see migrants see Gotō Shimpei, *Gotō Shimpei den*, in Manshikai, ed., *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi*, vol. 1, p. 32.

⁷⁸ The Russians expected to use their stations along the CER as advance bases for Russian imperialism. See Koshizawa Akira, *Shokuminchi Manshū no toshi keikaku*, Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyūjo monograph No. 271, 1978, p. 9, and Steven G. Marks, *Road to Power: The Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Colonization of Asian Russia, 1850-1917*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.

⁷⁹ In fact, Dalian was to be a commercial port. The Russian military base was nearby at Port Arthur, the name of which came from an 1860 visit by a British Captain Ward who named it after a son in law of Queen Victoria. Koshizawa, "Dairen no toshi keikaku shi," No. 134, pp. 2-3.

the heart of Gotō's dream. An official Mantetsu history later noted that although the Japanese identified fifteen former Russian towns as places to develop "cultural cities" (*bunmeiteki toshi*), Japanese eventually designated plans for one hundred and forty.⁸⁰

In new towns like Changchun, Gotō ordered the replication of Dalian's street pattern, a grid interrupted by large traffic circles and long, diagonally boulevards. He also demanded zoning and parks. Insuring that commerce would not be impeded by excessively academic planning, Gotō insisted that railways and warehouses be closely connected and that facilities be able to cope with the primary mode of transportation of most Chinese at the time, horse-drawn carts.⁸¹ Gotō's new cultural cities were to be functional as well as aesthetic.

These cities served a diplomatic function as well. In towns like Changchun Gotō and his successors attempted to create new urban spaces that ameliorated the effects of imperialism. Gotō attempted to improve relations with Chinese by improving their health and sanitation standards.⁸² More significantly he terminated the Russian practice of segregation by allowing Chinese to live in new towns like Changchun.⁸³ The new cities also sought to accommodate preexisting Chinese towns by encouraging economic intercourse between the two. Gotō's experience in Taiwan is manifest: in both Taiwan and Manchuria he attempted to encourage Chinese acceptance of Japanese control of political and military power with economic and social incentives. Given that until then the

⁸⁰ Koshizawa, *Shokuminchi Manshū no toshi keikaku*, pp. 19-21.

⁸¹ Gotō apparently scolded Changchun's first city planner for wanting to limit the use of horse carts in the new town. Koshizawa, *Shokuminchi Manshū no toshi keikaku*, pp. 29-30.

⁸² The period of Gotō's leadership of Mantetsu coincides with a "golden age" in Sino-Japanese relations. See Douglas R. Reynolds, *China, 1898-1912: The Xinheng Revolution and Japan*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.

⁸³ Russian discriminatory practices did, however, continue in the areas around Dalian. Koshizawa, *Shokuminchi Manshū no toshi keikaku*, pp. 21-4.

majority of Chinese—as well as Japanese—had not yet experienced having state-guaranteed individual political liberties, Gotō's actions defined him as an enlightened administrator of empire.

At the same time, however, Gotō worked closely with the military. He had no qualms, for example, using military force to subjugate Taiwanese resistance.⁸⁴ Later, having encouraged the establishment of a Bank of Taiwan branch on the Asian mainland at Xiamen (Amoy), it fell to Gotō to plan that city's occupation after the burning of a Honganji temple there when the Boxer Rebellion broke out.⁸⁵ He also unhesitatingly encouraged Japanese expansion, siding, for example, with the sending of troops to Siberia in 1919. These incidents, however, along with the necessity of initially subjugating Taiwan taught Gotō that economic development rather than military force was the surest means of dealing with Chinese in the long term. Indeed, Gotō and Kodama together developed a policy of administration based on what they called "biological principles" (*seibutsugaku no genri*), meaning that they would induce Chinese acceptance of Japanese rule through encouraging Chinese progress and development while acknowledging local customs of self-government.⁸⁶ With the establishment of the SMR, Gotō continued to promote cooperation between Chinese and Japanese as a means of reducing strife.⁸⁷ Be that as it may, Gotō became the first president of the SMR enjoying wide powers in large part because he was acceptable to the military. Not only did Kodama back him, but

⁸⁴ Edward I. Chen, "Gotō Shimpei, Japan's Colonial Administrator in Taiwan: A Critical Reexamination," in *The American Asian Review*, 13:1, Spring 1995, pp. 29-59.

⁸⁵ The occupation did not materialize however when Tokyo expressed concerns over possible British and Russian reactions. Kitaoka, *Gotō Shimpei*, pp. 64-5, Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, p. 76.

⁸⁶ Kitaoka, *Gotō Shimpei*, pp. 38-45 and Koshizawa, "Taiwan, Manshū, Chūgoku no toshi keikaku," p. 185.

⁸⁷ Kitaoka, *Gotō Shimpei*, pp. 106-10.

in the end Gotō enjoyed also the support of Yamagata Aritomo and Terauchi Masatake.⁸⁸

The basic thrust of Gotō's life work was the promotion of modernity. Not simply improving living standards and economic foundations, he tried to integrate them into a new and modern vision of empire. To this end he insisted that the new towns in Manchuria create schools even before temples and hospitals.⁸⁹ Indeed, Gotō grounded his 'biological principles' in "recent scientific policies" (*kagaku teki seisaku*).⁹⁰ It is not accidental that one of Gotō's biographers describes Gotō's activities in Taiwan as "civilizing" (*bunmeika suru*), noting that Gotō took pride in bringing to one corner of Asia the aspects of western culture he cherished.⁹¹

While sanctifying imperialist domination, however, this was a perspective that rested upon problematic assumptions. Imperialists like Gotō assumed that obvious disparities in technology, organization, and military might were the products of divergent religious, cultural, and even racial heritages.⁹² Concluding humanitarily, they thought, they opted to act rationally, even 'scientifically.'

⁸⁸ Kitaoka, *Gotō Shimpei*, pp. 85-7. Before leaving to join Kodama in 1905, Gotō met repeatedly with Yamagata, Itō Hirobumi, and then Prime Minister Katsura Tarō, presumably to discuss plans for the occupation of Manchuria. Kubota, *Manshū no tanjō*, pp. 134-6.

⁸⁹ Gotō was, however, more often concerned about Japanese migrants than Chinese. See Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 65.

⁹⁰ Koshizawa, "Taiwan, Manshū, Chūgoku no toshi keikaku," p. 185. Mizuno Rentarō, vice-Minister when Gotō was Home Minister recollected in 1930 that Gotō's goal in Taiwan's cities was to create "civilized urban societies" (*bunmei tokai*). *Ibid.*, p. 187. On the role of industrialization in European expansion in this vein see Geoffrey Barraclough, "Industrialism and Imperialism as Revolutionary Forces," in Harrison M. Wright, ed., *The "New Imperialism": Analysis of Late-Nineteenth-Century Expansion*, Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., second edition, 1976, pp. 159-70.

⁹¹ Kitaoka, *Gotō Shimpei*, pp. 54-5. Kitaoka's assessment of Gotō in this vein also points to the degree to which the positive aspects of empire are still highlighted in Japan. In another passage he describes Gotō's approach to empire as "most cunning" (*tottemo kōkatsu na teikokushugi*), a somewhat myopic view in that Kitaoka misses the fundamental issue of imperialism, the issue of control. See Kitaoka, *Gotō Shimpei*, p. 103.

⁹² This was part of the fracturing of Enlightenment universalism to which Foucault referred. See Chapter I.

This was the age of Herbert Spencer's "social Darwinism," a man whose views Japanese often viewed positively.⁹³ Japanese at the turn of the twentieth century were receptive to this line of thinking because it affirmed notions of progress and suggested that society as a whole must compete, a perspective reinforced by the existence of competitive Western others. For Gotō in particular, the perception that he was civilizing was genuine. His work in the colonies was clearly a Japanese version of *la mission civilisatrice*, a cultural as much as an economic and political phenomenon.⁹⁴ In helping to form this kind of attitude his influence on not only Japanese colonial administration overseas but municipal administration in Japan itself is difficult to overestimate.

In creating a modern state Gotō involved himself in issues as diverse as urban planning and the creation of the Japanese Boy Scouts. After presiding over Mantetsu he returned to Japan to take charge of railway development for the whole of Japan.⁹⁵ He did so, however, as part of an international effort, developing close ties with like minded thinkers overseas, such as the American revisionist historian and political commentator Charles A. Beard (1874-1948). A controversial figure, Beard's work demonstrated an optimistic, empirically grounded, liberal and humanist vision that Gotō admired.⁹⁶ His 'scientific'

⁹³ Tōdai and the Meiji government were the primary vehicles for the introduction of Spencer's thought to Japan. See Yamashita Shigekazu, "Herbert Spencer and Meiji Japan" in Hilary Conroy, Sandra T. W. Davis, Wayne Patterson, eds., *Japan in Transition: Thought and Action in the Meiji Era, 1868-1912*, London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1984, pp. 77-95.

⁹⁴ On similar perceptions of European imperialism see Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*, pp. 76-83.

⁹⁵ For a brief but inside view of work with Gotō in Tokyo (and Mantetsu after Gotō) see Bill Hosokawa, *Old Man Thunder: Father of the Bullet Train*, Denver: Sogo Way, 1997, pp. 22-55, 66-100.

⁹⁶ Because of Beard's experience as the director of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research between 1917 and 1922 Gotō invited Beard to visit Japan in 1922 to help teach public urban administration. Beard returned after the 1923 earthquake to help in the planning of Tokyo's reconstruction. They apparently became good friends and remained in contact until Gotō's death. Japanese have since acknowledged Beard's contributions to the creation of a modern society in Japan in a number of articles and honors. In 1948 Gotō's Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research invited Beard to return once more to help with the planning then, but the elderly Beard at that time could not make the journey. A postwar newspaper noted that had the Gotō-Beard plan for the reconstruction of Tokyo in 1923 been implemented, "Tokyo would not have burned like a celluloid village" during the war. See Mary Ritter Beard, *The Making of Charles A. Beard: An*

perspectives on human nature and his activist personality appealed to Gotō.⁹⁷ More significantly Beard's work also embodied conceits about progress and the utility of imperialism that paralleled Gotō's.⁹⁸

Gotō and Beard were internationally attuned. Their hopes for ideal societies never ignored foreign affairs, as reflected by the kind of construction Gotō ordered at places like Changchun. Sensitive to Chinese and other perceptions of Japanese activities, he also attempted to ameliorate friction more directly. In 1907 he visited the Chinese emperor and heir apparent in Beijing and later met with Yuan Shikai, the dominant personality in the final years of the Qing dynasty.⁹⁹ He also attempted to promote cooperation with other Chinese by contributing to their railway rights recovery movement and by working with them on issues like Asian emigration to America. Both issues were central to not only international relations but also to Asian perceptions of themselves as participants in the unfolding of the modern world.

Gotō also attempted to improve relations with Russia by cooperating in the development of Manchuria.¹⁰⁰ To ease tensions with the United States, Gotō

Interpretation by Mary Ritter Beard, New York: Exposition Press, 1955, pp. 24-6, 69-71. English versions of Gotō's inaugural address to the Tokyo Institute of Municipal Research and some of his correspondence with Beard are in M. Beard, *The Making of Charles A. Beard*, pp. 39-62.

⁹⁷ See Bernard C. Borning, *The Political and Social Thought of Charles A. Beard*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962. Mary Ritter Beard, Charles' wife and intellectual partner, was of a similar mindset: optimistic and headstrong. As one biographer notes, "(i)t was not unusual for feminist leaders who matured during the Progressive era to have a messianic perception of their role." The mindsets of both Charles Beard and Gotō were similar. People like the Beards and Gotō felt modernity's call to create a better world keenly. Barbara K. Turoff, *Mary Beard as Force in History*, Dayton, Ohio: Wright State University Monograph Series Number 3, 1979, p. 51.

⁹⁸ See Thomas C. Kennedy, *Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy*, Gainesville: The University Presses of Florida, 1975, especially pp. 9-11, 29, 59.

⁹⁹ Kitaoka, *Gotō Shimpei*, pp. 106-7.

¹⁰⁰ In 1907 Japanese and Russian diplomats concluded agreements over commerce and fishing rights and agreed not to seek railroad or telegraph concessions in the other's sphere of influence in China. They also promised not to interfere with the other's interests in Korea or Outer Mongolia. In part this agreement was pressed upon the Russians—the French government wanted Russia free to face Germany in Europe. It is significant that while a Franco-Japanese entente was concluded in 1907, a Russo-Japanese entente did not occur until 1910. See Raymond

insisted that some of the Mantetsu bonds be floated there so that American capital could participate in the opening of Manchuria. The SMR also purchased rolling stock in the U.S. In these ways he sought to mollify lingering frustrations over the Harriman Incident.¹⁰¹

Like Beard's, Gotō's modernity was internationalist. In bringing the railway to Manchuria he incorporated Manchuria into a global economy. Manchuria, after all, was to China what Hokkaido was to Japan, a relatively undeveloped periphery. And, as in Hokkaido, Gotō made use of English and American personnel and capital. Another goal involved the railway itself—Manchuria was to serve as the first connecting step in a longer route that linked Japan physically with two other corners of the earth, Moscow and Singapore.¹⁰²

Gotō and Beard were part of a loose international movement aspiring to renovate the world along new lines, men Eric Hobsbawm once described as "impersonal missionaries" of the bourgeois world. Their influence, Hobsbawm asserted, would ultimately prove more powerful than any religion. Yet rather than seeking converts to "(bourgeois) truths of political economy and liberalism," it is more accurate to conceive of men like Gotō and Beard as men seeking to establish new visions of modern society that agreed on the necessity of progress but disagreed over what progress actually entailed.¹⁰³ In fact, their views were anything but impersonal. The late nineteenth century was the age of nationalism *par excellence*, and acquiring empire was crucial to it.¹⁰⁴

A. Esthus, *Double Eagle and Rising Sun: The Russians and the Japanese at Portsmouth in 1905*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1988, pp. 197-8, 202-3.

¹⁰¹ Kitaoka, *Gotō Shimpei*, pp. 106-13. For an intriguing if sensationalist account of this see Kubota, *Manshū no tanjō*, pp. 101-24.

¹⁰² Komai Tokuzō, *Tairiku he no higan*, pp. 78-80. While British advisers predominated in Manchuria, Americans did in Hokkaido. On Americans in Hokkaido see Harrison, *Japan's Northern Frontier*, pp. 34-8, 68-71, 110-1.

¹⁰³ Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*, pp. 67-8.

¹⁰⁴ Compare Hobsbawm's conceptions of "impersonal missionaries" with emerging nationalisms in Hobsbawm, *ibid.*, pp. 87-105 and Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*, pp. 142-64. Only certain elements of the nineteenth century bourgeois order appealed to nationalists.

Empire, however, meant different things to different societies. Japanese empire in Manchuria contrasts distinctly with American attempts to penetrate the China market. The Open Door Notes of 1899 and 1900 represent a belated effort to secure a toehold in China for American business with little to support it but bluster. The Harriman mission, supposedly a purely technological 'impersonal mission,' sought similarly to secure a footing for American railroads at a late stage. That was not the case and it did not succeed, demonstrating a fundamental difference between American and Japanese imperialism in China. While American imperialism in China manifested itself as irregular and dilatory, Japanese empire in Manchuria proceeded on the basis of long-term investment. Each embodied a different style of empire.¹⁰⁵ Of course, because each was imperialist both shared the perception that Chinese were incapable of creating a modern state on their own. Given the Japanese commitment to improving China through development, however, and the later, restrictive measures against Asian immigrants in California, it appears that during this period at least Japanese attitudes towards Chinese were less demeaning than American. While Japanese, led by academics, came to perceive China in a paternalist fashion, Americans, led primarily by missionaries, came to perceive Chinese society as stagnant and decadent, and Chinese as dishonest and corrupt. Far from a paternalist view, Americans saw their own society and Chinese society at opposite ends of a global spectrum—the newest, most vigorous and therefore noblest civilization against the oldest, most stale, and thus most base civilization in the world.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ The conquest of the American West was similarly a more haphazard affair having more to do with the immediate extraction of profits than planning for the long-term. Yet at the same time, American historians before the Great Depression realized that economic necessity, agrarianism, immigration, and certain cultural values promoted American expansionism there too. See Gerald D. Nash, *Creating the West: Historical Interpretations, 1890-1900*, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1991, pp. 3-39.

¹⁰⁶ Compare Tanaka, *Japan's Orient*, with James C. Thomson, Jr., Peter W. Stanley, and John Curtis Perry, *Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia*, New York: Harper

Of course, the creation of the Japanese empire in Manchuria was not altruistic. Japanese wanted to create in Manchuria something useful to themselves and catered more to their own needs than those of Chinese. Denied the fruits of victory in 1895, many Japanese arrived in southern Manchuria in 1905 with a strong sense of proprietary ownership that did not sit well with Chinese or Westerners.¹⁰⁷ The Liaodong leased lands even maintained segregation laws introduced by the Russians not visible in places like Changchun. This apparently eased the minds of many Japanese because Japanese began to move to Manchuria, especially Dalian, in large numbers.

Japanese in the construction industry were well represented in the empire. An examination of the 1910 registry of the Japan Architects Association (*Nihon kenchiku gakkai*) for example, shows 22 full and 268 part-time members living in Korea, Taiwan, and China—roughly thirteen percent of the total. This representation increased over time. By 1942 the numbers increased to 496 full members, 1,999 part-time members, and twenty percent of the overall figure.¹⁰⁸

Nishizawa Yasuhiko calls the Japanese who went overseas to design the architecture of empire “architect adventurers,” an adaptation of the British seekers of wealth known as “merchant adventurers.” To Nishizawa, although these men did not create or staff empire, their evolving creations reflected the changing assumptions and goals of empire.¹⁰⁹ As such they also demonstrated the absolutely central role played by modernity in *bunmei kaika* and *fukoku kyōhei*.

Colophon, 1982, pp. 12-17. The thesis that Japanese were more committed to developing their colonies than the Europeans or Americans is also implicit in postwar works like Manshikai, ed., *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnenshi*, 1964, vol. 1, p. 2 and *passim*.

¹⁰⁷ Esthus, *Double Eagle and Rising Sun*, pp. 199-200.

¹⁰⁸ The 1942 figures also include Koreans and Chinese. Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta nihonjin kenchikuka*, 1996, pp. 3-4.

¹⁰⁹ Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta nihonjin kenchikuka*, p. 5 and *passim*. It should be noted that in Japan architecture is considered a subject of engineering and that the term *kenchiku* means both architecture and construction.

Having diligently assimilated new forms of Western knowledge, Meiji engineers, no less than officials, energetically sought to display mastery of it.¹¹⁰

Initial constructions in Manchuria were naturally part of the war effort of 1904-05. Nishizawa identifies Maeda Matsuoto as the first of these architect adventurers, arriving in Dalian in September 1904 two months after graduating from Tōdai and seven months after the outbreak of the war. During the war, Maeda oversaw construction of supply depots for the forward armies in Yingkou and Liaoyang. Maeda's *senpai* (mentor) was Ikeda Kentarō, an 1896 Tōdai graduate, who came to Dalian in November to oversee the construction of the Imperial headquarters. After the fall of Port Arthur, Maeda returned to Dalian to join a former coworker from Yingkou, Okada Jitarō, at the engineering firm Okada brought over from Tokyo, Okada Engineering. Okada was a childhood friend and one-time assistant to Tatsuno Kingo (1854-1919), in 1879 one of the four members Tōdai's first graduating class in architecture, and eventually one of its first Japanese instructors.¹¹¹

Tatsuno was enormously influential as a teacher and an architect. Among his oeuvre, some of which Okada worked on, are several of the more influential buildings of the Meiji era, such as the main building of the Bank of Tokyo (as well as six of its branches), the Tokyo Fire Insurance building, and Tokyo Central Station.¹¹² Tokyo Station, in the words of one analyst, "was to become no less than a temple to progress and a monument to empire" reflecting Japanese technological competence, the significance of railways in the centralization of

¹¹⁰ See Rohlen, "Learning," p. 324-7 for an expanded discussion of this dynamic.

¹¹¹ Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta nihonjin kenchikuka*, pp. 17-18, 148. Tōdai at the time was known as *Kōbudai*, the Imperial College of Engineering.

¹¹² In building Tokyo Station, then director of the National Railways Gotō Shimpei reportedly asked Tatsuno to make something that would impress the world. Edward Seidensticker, *Low City, High City. Tokyo from Edo to the Earthquake: How the Shogun's Ancient Capital Became a Great Modern City*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 78.

state power, and internationalism.¹¹³ If any single building defined modernity in late Meiji Japan, Tokyo *eki* was it (see Figure 2.2). A double domed and red-bricked neo-classical façade set upon a steel framework, Tokyo station was the trendsetter for first the surrounding Marunouchi financial district and eventually downtown centers throughout the empire. Taught by the English architect Josiah Conder (1852-1920), Tatsuno's instructor and the designer of the Ginza Bricktown and over a dozen of Mitsubishi's buildings in the Marunouchi district, Tatsuno gained further experience working and studying in Europe between 1880 and 1883.¹¹⁴ Upon his return his work in the renaissance and neo-classical styles established the basic tone of Meiji architecture.¹¹⁵ Meiji architecture in turn became the model for empire.¹¹⁶

Nishizawa's "architect adventurers" worked closely with government officials to give concrete definition to the face of Japan's budding empire. Maeda went on to work in the new government engineering department in Dalian where officials asked him to help write regulations for the industry. These included maintaining a Western style of architecture. Concerns for public safety, sanitation, and fire prevention were also paramount. Ikeda Kentarō inspected

¹¹³ Earlier, discarded plans attempted to repeat more traditional themes in the station's architecture. See William H. Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority in Japan*, London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 222-39. As the centerpiece of new Tokyo this building's significance cannot be underestimated.

¹¹⁴ Josiah Conder (1852-1920) came to Japan in 1877 at the age of 25 and stayed to help create many of the new structures of the new society. He designs included the Rokumeikan, the Nikolai Cathedral and a number of sumptuous houses of Meiji elites. No matter what style he worked in, however, his trademark seems to have been red brick with white stone trim. See Fujimori Terunobu, *Nihon no kindai kenchiku*, volume 1, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993, pp. 169-95, Seidensticker, *Low City, High City*,, p. 68-9, 78, 115, 244. For more on Conder see Chapter 4.

¹¹⁵ For more on Tatsuno and his work see Fujimori, *Nihon no kindai kenchiku*, pp. 218-35. His role in defining the architectural profession in Japan was central. Not only did Tatsuno take part in important projects like the planning of the new Diet building, Tatsuno was one of the co-founders of the Japan Architects Association and helped to create the journal that spread Western building concepts in Japan. Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority*, pp. 232-3.

¹¹⁶ Tokyo Station was also the gateway to empire. By the 1920s passengers could buy return tickets there for some twenty-five destinations in China. Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority*, p. 223.

the work before its publication.¹¹⁷ In this way those Japanese who designed the first structures in Dalian had a great deal of influence over later projects not only there but also throughout the new empire in Manchuria.¹¹⁸ Such guidance, however, was probably unnecessary, as the men who oversaw other projects were of similar minds and connections.¹¹⁹ Those who designed buildings in Dalian even designed buildings elsewhere, such as Maeda's successor in the Guangdong Government, Matsumuro Shigemitsu, the designer of the new post office and police station in Changchun.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta nihonjin kenchikuka*, pp. 19-23. In 1907 Maeda returned to become a professor at the Tokyo Higher Engineering School (*Tōkyō kōtō kōgyō gakkō*). *Ibid.*, p. 27. Photos of some of Maeda's constructions can be found in *ibid.*, p. 25.

¹¹⁸ For a discussion of early buildings in Dalian see Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta nihonjin kenchikuka*, pp. 29-44.

¹¹⁹ Many among the earliest had previously also worked together on Taiwan. The majority also were practically classmates, graduating between 1898 and 1905 from either Tōdai or Kōshū Gakkō (the predecessor to Kōgakuin University, a prestigious private technological institute in Shinjuku). Most of the others graduated from other noteworthy institutions across Japan. See Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta nihonjin kenchikuka*, pp. 52-5, 58-9.

¹²⁰ Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta nihonjin kenchikuka*, p. 35. Discussed below in Chapter 3. Like many of the Japanese involved in Manchuria, Maeda stayed in Dalian only three years, returning afterwards to work in Tokyo. See Maeda Matsuoto, "Manshūyuki zakki," *MKZ* 23:1, p. 35.

Figure 2.1 Gotō Shimpei as Mantetsu President



Source: Mantetsu, *Mantetsu kabushiki kaisha sanjūnen shi*, p. i

Figure 2.2 Tokyo Station



Source: Coldrake, *Architecture and Authority in Japan*, p. 243

Chapter 3. Planning a Modern Railway Town

In 1905, Japanese formal empire in Manchuria outside of the Guandong leased lands extended only to the cities and towns under Mantetsu jurisdiction and to the corridor along the rail lines connecting them. This slender network of civilian commercial beachheads rapidly became invasive centers of informal empire linked to the surrounding countryside. Mantetsu planners envisioned five types of urban centers along the SMR. Changchun, along with Mukden and Liaoyang, was of the largest category.¹ These three *fuzokuchi* (Ch, *fūshūdi*; "lands attached" to the railway), or 'railway zones,' each neighbored large Chinese towns and developed adjoining mercantile districts. Changchun and Mukden, however, were of added importance to Japanese. Mukden's roles as the pre-Qing Manchu capital and later political center of the Zhang warlord regime made it important for reasons of symbolism and local politics.² Mukden rapidly also became Manchuria's industrial hub. Not as renowned but commercially important just the same, Changchun was significant for subtler, geostrategic reasons. First, Changchun was the key to the open frontier zone of central—and eventually northern—Manchuria. As such, Changchun had not only an economic but a military role: it was the port through which Japanese surreptitiously fed early Mongol and Manchurian independence movements.³ The city also played a role in

¹ The five types of Japanese *fuzokuchi* were distinguished by expected size and commercial significance. The plans of each of the important cities focused on the station and entailed a "grid" format with parks, roundabouts, and use zoning. See Koshizawa, "Taiwan, Manshū, Chūgoku no toshī keikaku," pp. 196-8.

² On Zhang Zuolin (1875-1928) see Gavan McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911-1928: China, Japan, and the Manchurian Idea*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977. Recently, numerous popular histories of Zhang (and his son) have appeared also in the PRC.

³ See Robert B. Valliant, "Japanese Involvement in Mongol Independence Movements, 1912-1919," *Mongolia Society Bulletin*, 11: 2, Fall 1972, pp. 11-3.

the Japanese occupation of Siberia in 1918.⁴ Second, as the transfer point between the SMR and the CER, Changchun served as Japan's gateway to Europe. Third, because it was also the place where the Japanese and Russian empires rubbed shoulders, Japanese were sure to endow the city appropriately.

Japanese had three long-range goals in creating empire in Manchuria, all pragmatic and urban oriented. One was to consolidate Japan's position in Manchuria. Japanese wanted to shore up legal claims based on the Treaty of Portsmouth with permanent, secure settlements worthy of those claims.⁵ As the northern terminus of the SMR and the border outpost demarcating the Japanese sphere of influence, Changchun's role in this endeavor was important. A second goal was to transform Manchuria into a productive region useful to the needs of the growing Japanese state and empire. Changchun's role in this was also key, serving as a regional hub for the integration of the central Manchurian steppe into the imperial economy. Eventually, Changchun also served as the springboard for Japanese economic penetration of northern Manchuria. A third goal, though abstract, was pragmatic just the same. Japanese in Manchuria wanted to demonstrate their country's fitness as a Great Power. Having joined in the imperialist exploitation of China through victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) and demonstrated military prowess locally superior to a European power in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), Japanese next wished to prove their mettle as competent imperialists. The creation of the Changchun *fuzokuchi* was part

⁴ See Mantetsu tetsudō sōkyoku eigyōkyoku ryokakuka, ed., *Shinkyō*, Mukden: Mantetsu tetsudō sōkyoku, 1937, pp. 9.

⁵ Japanese later confirmed legal rights to the SMR settlements in the "Twenty-One Demands." See Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, pp. 108-15. For a list of these demands see David J. Lu, *Japan: A Documentary History*, Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1997, pp. 382-6.

of a larger effort showcasing Japanese imperialism. Thus, Changchun helped Japanese define a particular national identity.

At the same time, Changchun was primarily a commercial town. Gaining the city through negotiation, Japanese provided nothing beyond the needs of local military security until after the Manchurian incident.⁶ Until then, commercial success, political stability, and the creation of a new urban milieu defined the Japanese presence.

Following European initiatives elsewhere in China, Japanese visions for the new outpost at Changchun were tidy and undramatic. That is to say, the forms and essence of Japanese imperialism did not vary too greatly from European constructions in other treaty ports. Despite the scarcity of other, rival imperialists in Manchuria and the greater availability of open land, Japanese created urban centers similar to the other treaty ports. This was not simple imitation—urban planning in the Changchun *fuzokuchi* was one of many efforts to digest foreign forms that once learned, Japanese would seek to surpass.

The Changchun *Fuzokuchi*

In the Treaty of Beijing (December 22, 1905), the Chinese government acknowledged the transferal to Japan of Russian possessions and rights in Manchuria “south of Changchun,” as agreed at Portsmouth. To the Russians however, the Treaty of Portsmouth meant south of the Chinese city called Changchun and did not include the station at Kuanchengzi recently completed in 1903. Eventually they agreed to share the facilities, but this

⁶ In an effort to establish a greater Japanese presence in northern Manchuria, in 1915 then Guandong Governor-General Nakamura Satoru suggested moving troops based in Gongchuling north to Changchun, but in the aftermath of the twenty-one demands few were willing to support such a move. See Alvin D. Coox, “The Kwantung Army Dimension,” p. 401.

proved impossible in practice. Thus, further negotiations in 1907 and 1910 fixed Mantetsu's northern terminus on a Chinese-built light rail spur southeast of Kuanchengzi, the beginning of the line to Jilin.

Running towards the old town of Changchun, the line terminated northwest of it. This eventually became the site of Changchun station. Although Japan received compensation for returning half ownership of Kuanchengzi, Japanese still had to purchase new lands from Chinese for what was to become the Changchun *fuzokuchi*. At the time the land was primarily *gaoliang* fields and home to scattered farmers, but cossacks were also quartered near the old town. Japanese had to oversee not only their transferal to new quarters but also had to deal with lingering claims from the original Mongol owners of the land. With the help of Mitsui, Japanese land purchases almost remained secret, but in the end a certain degree of bribery proved necessary.⁷ Intriguingly, the various negotiations over Changchun witnessed the involvement of a number of important Japanese.⁸


The need to create a new station meant that the Japanese construction of Changchun began with a clean slate and did not need to follow preexisting arrangements. Japanese choices are therefore instructive. Japanese chose to build the railway town between Kuanchengzi and Changchun so that it

⁷ Satō Yasunoske and Kamata Yanosuke, later employed by Mantetsu but at the time both of the Kwantung Army, arranged the original purchase, an amount that varies between 560,393 and 650,000 rubles depending on the source. See Manshikai, ed., *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnenshi (hokan)*, 1965, vol. 3, p. 65, and Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, 1988, pp. 47.

⁸ War Minister and chairman of the Mantetsu board of directors Terauchi Masatake helped in the determination of the specific site for the railway. Gotō Shimpei doubled the original minimum requirements for the settlement from 100,000 square *tsubo* (331,000 square meters) to 200,000 (662,000 square meters). (One square *tsubo* equals 3.31 square meters.) This was to bring the *fuzokuchi* more in line with the size of the Russian railway town of Kuanchengzi (160,000 square *tsubo*). Later purchases in 1913 and 1924, however, fixed the total area at roughly 153,000 square *tsubo* (506,430 square meters), costing ¥450,000. See *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, vol. 3, Tokyo, Ryūkei shobō, 1977 (originally 1939), p. 338, Koshizawa Akira, "Chōshun no toskikaku shi, 1905-1945," *Nitchū keizai kyōkai kaihō*, No. 165, May 1987, pp. 46-8 and Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 47-50.

physically impeded communication between Russians and Chinese (see Figures 1.3 and 3.1). Dominating railway access to the old city was undoubtedly a goal. Collectively turning their back on the Russians was perhaps another. The new town faced south, and streets radiated away from the Russians. Yet Japanese did choose to repeat certain Russian motifs. Most of the Russian treaty ports in Manchuria, including Kuanchengzi, were rectangular in shape. While not exactly rectangular, Changchun's negotiated boundaries allowed for a rectangular town south of the railway. Extending north and east beyond the railway, the boundary also included a creek bed to the south. While the lands north and east were set aside for railway use, the creek to the south eventually became a park, still in use today.

Figure 3.1 Schema of the Changchun Area
(not to scale)



A rectangular shape recreated the logical grid pattern that pleased Japanese in the south. According to Changchun's first urban planner, Katō Yonokichi, an 1894 Tōdai civil engineering graduate, that and the tendency for modern urban planning to usually use rectangles were behind this decision. Another reason for choosing this shape was practical. Level ground allowed him to

focus attention on the railroad by putting it at the center of one of the long sides.⁹

The new *fuzokuchi* nestled snugly between three rail lines. Looking south from Changchun station, one line curved away on the right going south to Port Arthur, a second veered to the left towards the old city, and a third snuck out behind towards Kuanchengzi. Three main streets of the town echoed this orientation. One diagonalled southwest, paralleling Mantetsu's line to Port Arthur, another southeast towards the old city, and a third ran due south to the creek bed, away from the Russians and towards Dalian.

Katō made the first surveys of Changchun in July 1907. His 1908 plans included some 396 hectares for the town and 127 hectares for the railway (Table 3.1). Not including the railway and woods, by 1922 this plan translated into fifteen percent of the town space zoned for residential use, thirty-three percent for commercial, thirty-one percent for stables and fodder (primarily for horses), nine percent for public parks, and eleven percent for public works. In general, the northern third of the *fuzokuchi*, north of the station, was given to railroad, storehouses, and stables. Offices and government buildings clustered around the town center immediately south of the station. The remainder of the *fuzokuchi* was split between residential on the west and commercial use on the east, though space north of the station was also designated for commerce.

Katō and Gotō intended that the new *fuzokuchi* be uncluttered and spacious, unlike the Chinese city of Changchun or even much of Tokyo. It was also different from the other treaty ports in China. Organized in a grid

⁹ Katō Yonokichi, *Mīnami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha doboku jūrokunen shi*, Tokyo: Mantetsu chihōbu dobokuka, 1913, in Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 53. Katō also designed the *fuzokuchi* at Mukden and went on to become head of Mantetsu's department of engineering between 1914 and 1923. Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 51-2.

pattern, broad avenues described blocks measuring 218 meters long by 109 wide. Given that the *fuzokuchi's* corners were clipped the town was not exactly rectangular, but it measured roughly nine blocks long from east to west and seven blocks wide from north to south. Four diagonal streets cut across the block pattern to relieve the grid's monotony and create large open spaces where they intersected with major cross streets. The largest was North Plaza, directly in front of Changchun Station, measuring ninety-one meters in diameter. From it radiated the town's three main boulevards. About five blocks down either of the diagonalling streets were the two other large public squares within the town, East and West Plazas (Ch, *guangchang*; J, *hiroba*).

Table 3.1 Land Allocation in the Changchun *Fuzokuchi*

<u>Use</u>	<u>square <i>tsubo</i></u>	<u>hectares</u>
Railway use	385,700	127.29
Buildable space	673,700	222.34
Park space	107,100	35.34
Roads	259,300	85.57
Drainage	6,200	2.05
Riverbeds	28,600	9.44
Electric Power	23,500	7.76
Cemetery	2,400	0.79
Crematorium	2,400	0.79
Barracks	17,900	5.90
Farmland	19,800	6.53
Woods	<u>1,400</u>	<u>0.46</u>
Total	1,528,100	504.26

Source: Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 51¹⁰

¹⁰ One square *tsubo* equals 3.31 square meters. Inoue reported somewhat smaller figures actually in use in 1922 for most of these categories in order to enlarge the electric power plant and make room for administrative needs. Although the figures for the *fuzokuchi* total, as well as those for the railway, barracks, roads, drainage, cemeteries, and the crematorium were substantially the same, the Guandong administration (Kantōchō) occupied a separate 12,633.253 square *tsubo*, farmland sat upon only 13,559.997 square *tsubo*, housing was subdivided into leased (369,421.607 square *tsubo*) and to be leased (299,357.426 square *tsubo*) land (for a total of 668,779.640 square *tsubo*), park land was divided in two (West Park sitting on 102,314.708 and East Park on 4,798.182 square *tsubo*), riverbeds occupied only 24,052.830 square *tsubo* and the electric power plant sat upon a larger 28,066.600 square *tsubo*. Inoue also noted

Public squares in Changchun were circular in shape, integrated into Changchun's streets. For Katō, this created a "grand" (*kōsō*) street plan that would enable citizens to show their public spirit in a manner that all "magnificent" (*idai*) cities realized their potential.¹¹ The convergence of four streets at the East and West Plazas created eight corner sites on each plaza upon which Japanese could erect buildings with impressive façades. It also made possible distant vistas in several directions from each plaza. Clustered around the larger North Plaza in front of the station were the most important buildings of the *fuzokuchi*, including the Mantetsu headquarters and the Yamato Hotel. Banks fronted the East Plaza and houses circled the West Plaza. Not far from the East Plaza was also the Japanese consulate.

The high percentage of space reserved for roads is significant. Planners set aside twenty-three percent of the total area for streets.¹² There were six classes of roads, the widest of which was 36.3 meters, or twenty *ken* across, and the narrowest 10.9 meters, or six *ken*. All but the smallest (the sixth class) had sidewalks. Changchun Boulevard (Ch, *Changchun Dajie*; J, *Chōshun Taikai*), the wide road that ran due south of the station, was a class one street. The two broad streets heading southwest and southeast from the station, West Diagonal Boulevard (Ch, *Xīxiéjiē*; J, *Seishakai*) and East Diagonal Boulevard (Ch, *Dōngxiéjiē*; J, *Tōshakai*) were class two streets, 27.3 meters (fifteen *ken*) wide.¹³ Most streets in the residential area were either class five (14.52 meters

that the railway lands included some 50,000 square *tsubo* for coal storage. Inoue Nobuō, *Chōshun enkakushi*, Dalian: ManMō bunka kyōkai, 1922, pp. 35-36.

¹¹ Katō, *Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha doboku jūrokunen shi*, in Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto*, pp. 53-4.

¹² Compare the following percentages of road area to total area: Changchun: 24.5%, Tokyo: 11%, Paris: 25%, Berlin: 26%, New York: 35%, Vienna: 35%, Washington D.C.: 54%. See Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 54.

¹³ Streets running north-south were class five, 16.3 meters (eight *ken*) across, and named by their distance from Changchun Dajie, such as West First Street (Ch, *Xīyītiáotōng*; J, *Sei'ichijō dōri*) running parallel to the central boulevard but one block to the west. Streets running east-west varied in size, the ones around the periphery being class two but those within the

or 8 *ken*) or six (10.9 meters or 6 *ken*) wide. Even these relatively wide streets, however, proved unsatisfactory for areas around warehouses. Chinese reliance upon horse carts (Ch, *mǎchē*; J, *basha*), as big as two tons¹⁴, dictated that in the future class one roads would be required in commercial areas.¹⁵

Based on his experience in Tokyo, Katō initially wanted the widest roads to be only fifteen *ken* across and to limit the use of horse carts in the *fuzokuchi* fearing they would tear up the roadways. Gotō, however, overruled Katō, explaining that the Japanese had to adapt themselves to the needs of Chinese.¹⁶

It wasn't just wider roads that improved transportation in the *fuzokuchi*. Paving with macadam and coal tar was another useful innovation. Manchurian roads were typically dirt and best when frozen. Otherwise they were muddy, and the four centimeter wide wooden wheels of the horse carts often sank to their axles after it rained.¹⁷

Another important innovation was parks. Making use of the natural contours of the land, Katō designated creeks and otherwise unusable lands as park space. Not only did this ensure green space within the town, it also helped prevent flooding. Changchun's main park was West Park (today Victory Park), which ran along the western half of the southern end of the

fuzokuchi only class six. They were organized in a fashion familiar only to Japanese, using the *i-ro-ha* arrangement. For example, while the most northerly street was *Izumi machi* (Ch, *Héquánjiē*), the second was *Rogatsu machi* (Ch, *Lòuyüejīē*). In a similar fashion, neighborhoods were organized according to the Japanese *a-i-u-e-o* arrangement: *Hidemachi*, *Fujimachi*, etc. See Shinkyō tokubetsushū chōkan shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, p. 16.

¹⁴ Izumi Renji reported that these horsecarts came in various sizes would also take passengers for fares. Izumi Renji, *Chōshun jijō*, Changchun: Izumi Renji, 1912, pp. 146-152.

¹⁵ Planners discovered that important conduits like East Fifth Street (Ch, *Dōngwūtíáojiē*; J, *Tōgojōkai*), connecting the eastern end of the town with the area north across the rail tracks were too crowded when only between 8 and 14 *ken* across. Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 54-6.

¹⁶ Koshizawa, *Shokuminchi Manshū no toshi keikaku*, pp. 29-30, and Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 62-4.

¹⁷ Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 56-7. Horses apparently drowned upon occasion on Manchurian roads. See Lee, *Manchurian Frontier*, pp. 5-6.

fuzokuchi. Its relatively steep topography insured its continued greenery. The creek bed within emptied into the Yitong River just east of the *fuzokuchi*. East Park, higher in altitude than West Park and not situated on a creek bed, was originally the site of a copse of old trees but gradually diminished in size as the wood was appropriated for construction projects nearby.¹⁸ In it stood two “grotesque” animal statues and a commemorative tablet to Itō Hirobumi.¹⁹ West Park, designed by Tōdai professor Shirasawa Yasumi, was the site of a Japanese memorial stele to those who died in the war with Russia. It also offered space for athletics, boats, flower beds, a merry-go-round, a small zoo, and other children’s amusements. The park was also the intended site of the *fuzokuchi*’s Shinto shrine, but that was eventually built just to the north.²⁰

Laws concerning urban use zoning appeared in the Changchun *fuzokuchi* a decade earlier than in Japan, resulting in a neatly organized town. Some Japanese unused to Mantetsu’s strict zone controls criticized such policies.²¹ However, not only a means of integrating Japanese and Chinese, as well as insuring adequate transportation, sanitation, hygiene, and development, zoning was also an attempt to control urban space by locating similar economic entities nearby one another that would eventually allow for self-regulation by industry.²² After 1932 it became also a means of economic control as it allowed for more efficient monitoring of economic activities.

¹⁸ Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 57-8.

¹⁹ Mantetsu tetsudō sōkyoku eigyōkyoku ryokakuka, ed., *Shinkyō*, Mukden: Mantetsu tetsudō sōkyoku, 1937, p. 4.

²⁰ This shrine, *Chōshun Jinja*, eventually became *Shinkyō Jinja*. Mantetsu tetsudō sōkyoku eigyōkyoku ryokakuka, ed., *Shinkyō*, 1937, p. 4, and Satō, *Manshū zōen shi*, pp. 81-2.

²¹ Of course, to a certain extent medieval Japanese castle towns were also organized by something like use zoning, but no modern urban use laws existed until 1919. See Koshizawa, “Taiwan, Manshū, Chūgoku no toshi keikaku,” pp. 200-1.

²² Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 59-60.

Mantetsu maintained control over other constructions in the *fuzokuchi* through its control of loan policies.

Negotiations over the purchase of the Changchun *fuzokuchi* were completed by September 1907. Construction began almost immediately, and by 1910 already over half of the roads were finished. Construction of Changchun's new station began in August 1910.²³ Other early work followed Gotō Shimpei's priorities: infrastructure, schools, and hospitals came first (Table 3.2). Among the first buildings constructed, before even much in the way of any housing, were the post office, the police office, the Mantetsu regional office, and the Yamato hotel, a stylish building in which negotiations could be held. While the latter two sat across from the train station on either side of Changchun Boulevard, the former pair fronted the main boulevard on the east side, three blocks south.

Table 3.2 Initial Expenditures for the Changchun *Fuzokuchi*

	<u>1908</u>	<u>1909</u>	<u>1910</u>	<u>1911 & total</u>
roads and drainage	1,829,335	138,487,756	278,163,876	842,980,337
markets	—	4,077,987	—	4,077,987
parks	—	2,107,666	1,361,000	3,468,666
cemetery, crematorium	—	1,427,282	—	1,427,282
hospital	2,617,030	37,657,973	44,670,000	158,905,113
elementary school	42,300,954	7,954,427	1,107,516	76,692,947
sanitation	—	2,369,925	—	2,369,925
apartment housing	1,418,800	—	—	1,418,800
office construction	—	—	58,451,850	59,109,650
totals	¥47,877,189	¥194,084,016	¥383,753,242	¥1,160,614,487

Source: Izumi Renji, *Chōshun jijō*, 1912, pp. 8-9.²⁴

²³ Satō, *Manshū zōen shi*, p. 71.

²⁴ The total includes the first four months of 1911.

With the creation of this basic infrastructure, construction of the rest of the township proceeded apace. As trade improved, industry developed, and a large influx of migrants arrived, both Chinese and Japanese.²⁵

The *fuzokuchi* was not the only site of urban change in Changchun. Outside the sixteen Manchurian *fuzokuchi* the Treaty of Beijing also sanctioned the creation of *shangbu* (J, *shōfuchi*) or 'mercantile areas,' zones where the Qing allowed foreigners to purchase land but the Chinese magistrate, or *daotai*, retained authority. Changchun's *shangbu* was located outside the north gate of the old city, between it and the *fuzokuchi*. It was opened in 1908. Taking a keen interest in the *fuzokuchi*, Yan Shiqing, Changchun's second magistrate, ordered the construction of roads connecting the old city and the railway town as well as new offices (*yamen*) in the *shangbu* into which he moved in 1910.²⁶ Changchun's fourth magistrate Meng Xian'i further encouraged the development of the *shangbu* by organizing a local consortium to construct parks, theaters, and brothels there in 1911 and 1912. Thus, not only did the Changchun *fuzokuchi* facilitate the integration of the older city into the Japanese sphere of influence, one of Mantetsu's original goals for the *fuzokuchi*, it encouraged new, modern means of Chinese urban planning and construction as well.²⁷ This influence in fact, extended beyond even the *shangbu*, as new buildings appeared also along other new roads extending into the countryside.²⁸

²⁵ See Chapter 8 below.

²⁶ Expenses for renovating the road from the old city's South Gate and extending it to the *fuzokuchi* amounted to 120,000 yuan. Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkan shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, p. 18.

²⁷ Russian plans, in comparison, envisioned keeping Chinese more removed. See *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku shi zenshi*, vol. 1, p. x., and Koshizawa, "Taiwan, Manshū, Chūgoku no toshi keikaku," pp. 200-2.

²⁸ Inoue Nobuō, *Chōshun enkakushi*, 1922, pp. 8-9 and Kantōgun shireibu, *Minami Manshū shuyō toshi keizai jōtai*, npl: np, 1924, vol. 2, p. 361.

New roads extending into the countryside, in turn, suggested the increasing integration of the *fuzokuchi* into the Japanese empire in another way: new roads appeared on new maps. As such they illustrated graphically the extension of Japanese influence. At the same time, maps could also be used in other ways, such as manipulating the terms appearing on them. In Changchun, for example, the names of prominent features of the *fuzokuchi* eventually became purely Japanese. While Changchun Boulevard became Chūō Dōri (Central Avenue), the boulevard diagonalling across the east side of the *fuzokuchi* gained a new orientation: Nihonbashi, the "Bridge of Japan," the name of an actual bridge in Tokyo from which distances in the empire were once measured. In a similar vein, East Park became Nihonbashi Park, and West Diagonal Boulevard became Shikishima Dōri. Shikishima, the 'islands that are spread out,' is a traditional appellation for Japan.

This change in Japanese attitudes is significant, occurring as it did not long after the "Twenty-One Demands," a bald Japanese attempt to force concessions from Chinese while the other imperialists were engaged in World War One.²⁹ Along with the Japanification of street names in places like Changchun, these actions represent more than growing self-confidence. They show the marginalization of colonized peoples inherent in the imperialist process, part of the same process that transformed Japanese perceptions of China from a respected source of cultural heritage to a needy recipient of Japanese leadership and tutelage. That sentiment was widespread at the time of the Manchurian incident.

²⁹ Several of the demands referred explicitly to Manchuria. Not only did Japanese succeed in extending the leases on Port Arthur and Dalian to ninety-nine years, which otherwise would have terminated in 1923, but the government succeeded also in gaining new economic rights throughout Manchuria. See Yamamuro Shin'ichi, *Kimera*, 1993, pp. 24-5 and Lu, *Japan*, pp. 382-6.

Gotō Shimpei originally intended the *fuzokuchi* to be a means of integrating Japanese and Chinese communities. To that end he terminated the Russian policy of segregation and endeavored to make Chinese feel comfortable by organizing the *fuzokuchi* with familiar, Chinese names.³⁰ Later officials, however, were not so concerned and did not feel the need to placate Chinese sensitivities. Renaming not only the streets but also the town's subdivisions was significant. It demonstrated rising Japanese confidence to recreate society without the need to compromise.

Japanese reports of the new *fuzokuchi* were overwhelmingly positive. A mimeographed description by a Kwantung Army observer suggested that by 1924 Changchun had entered a "different age" (*kakusei*).³¹ A visual record documented Changchun's streets, the train station, and significant buildings like the Yamato Hotel as photographs appeared in books, journals, and newspapers from Changchun to Tokyo. They figured prominently along side photos from Dalian, Port Arthur, Mukden, Andong, and elsewhere showing that these were not isolated events. Everywhere there were wide, paved streets, sidewalks, and western inspired architecture. Manchuria as a whole seemed to be improving, encouraging one author to write about Manchuria's "inevitable development" (*hitsuzen hassei*) and "final destiny" (*shūkyoku meibun*) as early as 1913.³² Another commented in 1925 that Manchuria had finally entered modern history.³³ Although propagandistic, these kinds of records contained kernels of truth—Japanese were creating a clean and

³⁰ Koshizawa, "Taiwan, Manshū, Chūgoku no toshi keikaku," p. 200.

³¹ Kantōgun shireibu, *Minami Manshū shuyō toshi keizai jōtai*, 1924, vol. 2, p. 360. This view was echoed by a Kantōgun accounting report by (Rikugun nitō shukei sho) Yamada Kyūtarō, *ManMō toyū zenshi*, Tokyo: Nikkan Shina jijōsha, 1926, vol. 2, p. 24.

³² Hatori Nobiru, *Manshū*, Tokyo: Seikyōsha, 1913, pp. 466, 473.

³³ Dazai Matsusaburō, *Manshū gendaishi*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1925, p. 11.

modern township where before there was apparently nothing. This was how Manchuria entered popular imagination at home.

Prewar Japanese Urban Planning

Japanese urban planning in Changchun evidenced attitudes and values central to urban planning in Japan. Indeed, urban planning experiences in Changchun and elsewhere in Manchuria contributed to the creation of Japan's first urban planning law, passed in 1919. Urban planning, in turn, contributed enormously to the debate on creating modernity in Japan. The overseas experiences of men like Gotō Shimpei proved invaluable in helping to establish both.³⁴ Mantetsu employees returning to Japan often found easy employment in the official, business, or academic worlds.

An editorial in an early issue of the influential *Toshi kōron* intoned that urban development was key to national progress.³⁵ This important journal was the official publication of Gotō's Urban Research Society (*Toshi kenkyūkai*) and the vehicle through which influential members of academia and government expressed their opinions.³⁶ Gotō himself declared that the mission of urban planners was to help usher in a "new age in urban life" by providing new solutions for new problems.³⁷ Despite statements like this, however, Gotō was more of a realist than an idealist. For him, practical urban

³⁴ Urban planning in America too, for example, gained enthusiastic support as part of a general reformist attitude explicitly predicated on creating the modern. See Jon C. Teaford, *Cities of the Heartland: The Rise and Fall of the Industrial Midwest*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993, esp. chapter five, "In the Cultural Vanguard," pp. 136-65.

³⁵ *Toshi kenkyūkai*, "Toshi keikaku to hōritsu hitsuyō," *TK* 2:2, September 1919, p. 1.

³⁶ Gotō's contributions to urban planning in Japan were lauded in *Toshi kenkyūkai*, "Toshi kaizō to chūsūteki jinbutsu," *TK* 4:1, January 1921, pp. 92-5. His political influence was celebrated in "Gotō kaichō ikkō kaki junkō no ki," *TK* 8:9, September 1925, pp. 50-62. His death was announced in 12:5, May 1929, p. 1.

³⁷ "*Shin jidai no seikatsu.*" Gotō Shimpei, "Toshi kaizen to toshi kenkyūkai no shimei," *TK* 4:1, January 1921, pp. 2-8.

planning was as necessary for Japanese modernity as expansion.³⁸ In addition to helping prevent Japanese streets from becoming like those of earthworms (*mimizu*), planning was necessary because it was fundamental to all the Great Powers, all of which had already implemented some form of it. To Gotō, Japanese cities were not keeping up with the times.³⁹ Another important rationale for modern urban planning to Gotō was that it also provided a means of inspiring popular participation in contemporary society. As such it was a means of introducing a kind of democracy.⁴⁰ Even if Japanese perceived the benefits of democratic society in the early twentieth century more in terms of mass mobilization in the service of the state than as an end in itself, that too was a modernist goal for urban planners.⁴¹ In this planners demonstrated their intellectual solidarity with other progressive Japanese bureaucrats.⁴²

³⁸ On his dim views of Wilsonian diplomacy and the necessity of Japanese expansion, see Kitaoka, *Gotō Shimpei*, pp. 187-9.

³⁹ "Waga kuni no toshi ha jidai fu sō'ō." Gotō Shimpei, "Toshi no kairyō to shimin no kakugo," TK 3:1, January 1920, p. 3.

⁴⁰ Gotō, "Toshi no kairyō to shimin no kakugo," pp. 2-10. Gotō was at least aware of one contradiction this approach implied, since he hoped that popular rule would eventually replace bureaucratic rule. See Gotō Shimpei, "Toshi keikaku to sōgoteki seishin," TK 7:6, June 1924, pp. 2-3. At the same time, however, Gotō also thought that civic leaders, including the members of the Toshi kenkyūkai, had a duty to pay society a "gentleman's tax" (*shinshi zei*), a spiritual and physical contribution to enhancing society without any expectation of reward. See Gotō Shimpei, "Jichi seido to shinshi zei," TK 4:2, February 1921, pp. 2-10, esp. p. 9.

⁴¹ Gotō was not alone among urban planners in perceiving democracy this way. Ōmura Sei'ichi, for example, echoed Gotō clearly when he explained that urban planning was implicit to the development of a mass society because urban planning remedied more than the ills of urban congestion. It reformed peoples' lives and through engaging popular participation and thus encouraged the development of democratic thought in society as a whole. Ōmura Sei'ichi. "Toshi keikaku no seishin," TK 13:9, September 1930, pp. 12-25.

⁴² A work that demonstrates the role of the civil bureaucracy, more than the political parties, in educating and involving Japan's urban masses in the new state at this time is Sally Ann Hastings, *Neighborhood and Nation in Tokyo, 1905-1937*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995. Hastings shows clearly that such activities occurred as responses to urban issues rather than as a means of integrating society with the needs of the military. Sheldon Garon termed those in the Home Ministry working to alleviate social unrest "social bureaucrats." Several were protégés of Gotō. See Sheldon Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, p. 74 and *passim*.

Most of the articles in the *Toshi kōron* dealt with the concerns most pressing in Japanese cities, such as transportation, housing, building safety, public health, and air quality. Many contributors were appalled by the problems associated with urban sprawl.⁴³ Physical improvements, however, were not the only topics of consideration. A number of articles addressed the more intangible aspects of municipal life, such as education, national health insurance, and care of the unemployed. Nor were Japanese conditions considered in a vacuum—a number of articles examined urban planning and conditions overseas, especially in America and Europe. First drawn to urban planning after a visit to Berlin in 1900 and 1901, former Home Minister Mizuno Rentarō argued that urban planning was directly relevant to national fortunes.⁴⁴ Later, because of the obvious connection between economic development and a growing urban citizenry, he pointed to a fundamental relationship between urban planning and social policy.⁴⁵ Similarly noting progress elsewhere, Uchida Yoshikichi, a member of the House of Peers, suggested the need for urban planning in Japan was urgent. To make it feasible, however, Uchida thought it would require not only the government to enlighten the populace but also for citizens to contribute financially to constructing improvements.⁴⁶ Other arguments were more abstract. Hozumi Shigetō, for example, recommended an Italian's suggestion to create "internationally attuned cities" (*kokusaiteki chūshin toshi*) that were not simply transportation hubs but centers of moral and spiritual development.⁴⁷

⁴³ One thought cities in Japan were erupting like "pimples" (*nikibi*) growing on vines. See Isotani Michikazu, "Shōrai no toshi keikaku ni tsuite," *TK* 10:2, February 1927, p. 40.

⁴⁴ Mizuno Rentarō, "Toshi kairyō mondai," *TK* 2:2, February 1919, pp. 2-15. Mizuno had earlier served as vice-Minister to Gotō Shimpei.

⁴⁵ Mizuno Rentarō, "Toshi no hatten to toshi keikaku," *TK* 8:1, January 1925, pp. 2-11.

⁴⁶ Yoshikichi Uchida, "Toshi kairyō no kyūmu," *TK* 2:8, August 1919, pp. 2-18.

⁴⁷ Hozumi Shigetō, "Sekai chūshin toshi sōken no keikaku ni tsuite," *TK* 2:7, July 1919, pp. 25-36, and "Sekai chūshin toshi sōken no keikaku ni tsuite," *TK* 2:8, August 1919, pp. 27-33.

Urban planning meant improving a range of urban conditions in an international context.⁴⁸ More significantly, urban planning to Japanese meant creating modernity and as such displays concerns for both national security and national identity. Issues of national security were apparent in discussions of urban renewal because improving the lives of Japan's urban residents made them more economically productive and prevented the stirrings of revolutionary fervor. Issues of national identity were also implicit, especially in discussions that focused on the nature of urban space and society. Thus, a city's beauty was also of interest.⁴⁹ Geared to enhancing the efficiency and aesthetic value of urban life, urban planning appeared rational and progressive. Of course, the subtext of this debate was that if Japanese could re-create their cities, then society as a whole could be made modern.⁵⁰

Parks and green space, for example, were important means of expressing modernity for early Japanese urban planners—traditional Japanese society made room for little.⁵¹ Reporting from America in 1919, Takei Takashirō found seven kinds of parks in Europe and America that he discussed with reference to Japan. Even more significant than this variety, however, was

⁴⁸ A number of articles examined Japanese urban planning only in light of planning overseas. See, for example, Seki Hajime, "Kinsei toshi no hatten to toshi keikaku," TK 7-12, December 1924, pp. 2-22. Seki at that time was the mayor of Osaka. Takei Takashirō took a long-term perspective, going back as far as ancient Babylon to consider urban issues. Takei Takashirō, "Toshi hatten no genin," TK 8-10, October 1925, pp. 15-20. The praise lavished on Japan's central planning by the chairman of Britain's Town Planning Institute, G. Montague Harris, O.B.E., similarly did not go unnoticed. His speech was promptly translated and appeared as "Kakkuni ni okeru kindai no toshi keikaku gaikan," TK 11:6, June 1928, pp. 2-18.

⁴⁹ Shigenaga Hisomu, "Toshi no bikan mondai," TK 8:7, July 1925, pp. 13-20, and Okada Shūzō, "Toshi keikaku to toshi no fūchi bikan," TK 9:9, September 1926, 2-16.

⁵⁰ Given the traditional reasons behind establishing cities, Takayanagi Mitsunaga suggested that the development of modern culture at all in Japan was surprising. Takayanagi Mitsunaga, "Toshi hatten no kenkyū," TK 10:5, May 1927, p. 60.

⁵¹ The first official park in Tokyo was at Ueno, established in 1873. Japan's first park of modern design was Hibiya which opened in 1903. Seidensticker, *Low City, High City*, pp. 116-25.

that while modern cities overseas were investing proudly in the creation of parks, because it was such a “rational” endeavor few complained of the expense. In the end he reminded readers that parks were not simply for current residents, but for one’s descendants too.⁵² Shigenaga Hisomu echoed this concern with a call for creating physical space for youth to exercise and be entertained. Not only was it good for their health, he intoned, but it helped decrease crime.⁵³ Thus, as a number of contributors pointed out, parks were going to be hallmarks of the future.⁵⁴ Similar discussions surrounded the topics of transportation, sewage, and sanitation.

Japanese urban planners wanted to remake Japan’s cities so that they were more efficient, more capable of progress, and more accommodating of expanding populations. Architecture, transportation, regional planning, and shelter from natural disasters were all different aspects of the same phenomenon.⁵⁵ What was more, accomplishing this was part of securing national pride (*kokū’i*) and dignity (*igen*).⁵⁶ Initially perceiving their cities to

⁵² Takei Takashirō, “Toshi no kōen keikaku,” *TK* 2:11, November 1919, pp. 36-42 and *TK* 2:12, December 1919, pp. 42-8.

⁵³ Shigenaga Hisomu, “Yūen no kinō ni tsuite,” *TK* 5:1, January 1922, pp. 48-50.

⁵⁴ Ōta Kenkichi & Kitamura Tokutarō, “Toshi keikaku to kōen,” *TK* 6:7, July 1923, pp. 24-36. Of course, it was only with the Great Kantō Earthquake (September 1, 1923) that the replanning of Tokyo could really take place. For one early appraisal of the use of parks in the new Tokyo see Ōya Ryōshiro, “Teito fukkō to kōen,” *TK* 7:3, March 1924, pp. 15-20.

⁵⁵ For a discussion that argues this explicitly see Sano Toshikata, “Daitoshi no kenchikubutsu,” *TK* 3:3, March 1920, pp. 18-28 and Sano Toshikata, “Toshi kenchiku no kaizen,” *TK* 5:9, September 1922, pp. 15-31. Sano, popularly called Riki, was a frequent contributor to the *Toshi kōron* and an important figure in Japanese urban planning. A 1904 Tōdai graduate and later professor, he helped pioneer Japanese methods in anti-earthquake engineering. Shimonaka Kunihiko, ed., *Nihon jinmei daijiten: gendai*, Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1979, p. 370. Sano, who opined that the largest problem facing Japanese cities was road repair, was feted in *TK* 3:9, September 1920, pp. 105-6. For an example of Sano’s writing about earthquakes before the Great Kantō Earthquake see Sano Toshikata, “Toshi kenchiku ni tsuite—Marunouchi bekken,” *TK* 6:6, June 1923, pp. 24-32. For after the earthquake see Sano Toshikata, “Toshi to taishin taika kenchiku,” *TK* 6:11, November 1923, pp. 50-6. (See chapters 6 and 8 below for discussion of some of his roles in Manchukuo.)

⁵⁶ See the discussion in Anami Tsunehito, “Toshi keikaku no sekkyokuka,” *TK* 5:5, May 1922, pp. 33-48.

be worse off than foreign cities allowed municipal revisions to be portrayed as both loyal and modern.⁵⁷ The passage of Japan's first urban planning law in 1919 was an important step towards strengthening this modernity. It went into effect in 1920 in Tokyo and Japan's five largest other cities but ensuing years witnessed its adoption by smaller towns throughout the country.⁵⁸

The Changchun *fuzokuchi* predated these discussions, and its successful construction, along with other towns elsewhere in Manchuria that Gotō Shimpei oversaw, helped him influence others to pay attention to urban space in Japan. Continuing reports from the continent, such as Kitamasu Rōhoshi's glowing description of Russian-built Dalian, doubtlessly furthered this perspective.⁵⁹ Other reports in the *Toshi kōron* informed readers of contemporary developments in Europe and North America.⁶⁰

Japanese urban constructions in Manchuria in many respects echoed urban planning in North America.⁶¹ Anticipating the exploitation of resources from the surrounding countryside, railway companies created towns in a similar manner—the railway appeared first, key institutions second, and the people third. North American railway companies also played important roles in promoting what they themselves often called the “colonization” of the American West.⁶² For reasons of cost and simplicity

⁵⁷ See, for example, Yoshikichi Uchida, “Toshi kairyō no kyūmu,” and “Toshikenkyūkai shu'isho,” *TK* 3:1, January 1920, pp. 1-2.

⁵⁸ Hirata Kiichi, “Shōwa san'nen toshi keikaku,” *TK* 12:1, January 1929, pp. 2-5, 27, and Uchida Yoshikichi, “Kindai no toshi keikaku,” *TK* 11:9, September 1928, pp. 8-19.

⁵⁹ Kitamasu Rōhoshi, “Manshū toshi keikaku gaikan,” *TK* 4:11, November 1921, pp. 38-40. Kitamasu also reported from Qingdao.

⁶⁰ Although urban planning in Japan developed on the heels of urban planning in North America, Americans too marveled at the Russian creation of Dalny. See Clarence Cary, “Dalny, A Fiat-City,” *Scribners* 33, April 1903, pp. 482-93. I am indebted to Dr. John Reys for informing me of this article.

⁶¹ Perhaps also to towns along the eastern section of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

⁶² Numerous nineteenth century sources use this term explicitly and positively. Perhaps the classic account of railway boosterism is Sig Mickelson, *The Northern Pacific Railroad and the*

town builders in North America also imposed a familiar grid pattern upon just about all of the towns built there because it was regular and suited the needs of the railway. Town builders did leave room for schools, parks, and other civic institutions, but their actual creation lagged.⁶³

Japanese planners of towns in Manchuria learned from towns of the American West as well as more contemporary influences like that of the City Beautiful movement, a “fresh native expression” for American architects and planners.⁶⁴ Other concerns were also apparent in towns like Changchun, just as they were later in Japan: efficiency of transportation, parks, sanitation, and culture. Still another influence was the urban reformist efforts in Germany and England at the turn of the century, efforts that eventually became known as the Garden City movement. Into these cities zoning, architecture, street layouts, and green spaces came together to produce a more harmonious city, theoretically free of the vices of industrial capitalism that would lead to the creation of an abused and angry working class.⁶⁵ A number of articles in the *Toshi kōron* examined the Garden City movement, but never exactly as Ebenezer Howard, one of its founders, envisioned.⁶⁶

Selling of the West: A Nineteenth-century Public Relations Venture, Sioux Falls, South Dakota: The Center for Western Studies, 1993 (originally 1940).

⁶³ See John W. Reys, *Cities of the American West: A History of Frontier Urban Planning*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, pp. 525-631.

⁶⁴ Blake McKelvey, *The Urbanization of America (1860-1915)*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1963, pp. 121-6. See also Teaford, *Cities of the Heartland*, pp. 136-65 and William H. Wilson, “The ideology, aesthetics and politics of the City Beautiful movement,” in Anthony Sutcliffe, ed., *The Rise of Modern Urban Planning, 1800-1914*, London: Mansell, 1980, pp. 165-98.

⁶⁵ See Franziska Bollery and Kristiana Hartmann, “A patriarchal utopia: the garden city and housing reform in Germany at the turn of the century,” in Anthony Sutcliffe, ed., *The Rise of Modern Urban Planning, 1800-1914*, London: Mansell, 1980, pp. 135-64. In Japan this movement manifested itself perhaps most famously in the creation of Den'en Toshi outside Tokyo. See Shun-ichi J. Watanabe, “Garden city Japanese Style: the case of Den-en Toshi Company Ltd., 1918-28,” in Gordon E. Cherry, ed., *Shaping an Urban World*, London: Mansell, 1980, pp. 129-43.

⁶⁶ Howard aimed for the creation of a more decentralized society in more than just a geographic sense. See Robert Fishman, *Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century: Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Le Corbusier*, New York: Basic Books, 1977, pp. 23-88.

Two important differences separated Mantetsu's towns from those of the North American plains and prairies. First was intent. Unlike Mantetsu, the North American railways were designed to either reach an ultimate point somewhere further along the line or to open up new lands for settlers. Manchuria, however, was not as unpopulated as the North American plains and prairies, especially after disease took its toll on native American populations. While Japanese town-planning had to incorporate preexisting Chinese cities, North American town planners preferred sites completely empty of previous inhabitants so that the railways for whom they worked could monopolize land sales and maximize profits. Mantetsu had somehow to accommodate the native population because future income depended upon Chinese use of the railway to transport themselves or their goods.

The profit motive suggests a second distinction. Although Mantetsu town builders concerned themselves with profits, that was not their only concern. Another goal was the creation of modernity, and Mantetsu towns like Changchun showed that Japanese urban investment consistently exceeded that of North American railway towns. In contrast, American railway companies wanted immediate profits in order to finance continued expansion of the rail net's main trunk lines.⁶⁷ The American West was a more competitive stage for new towns; it was never clear which would grow and which would fold.⁶⁸

The creation of the Changchun *fuzokuchi* helped prod urban planning in Japan, but Changchun and other Mantetsu towns were more than that. They were also a means of expressing national power. The *fuzokuchi* defined

⁶⁷ James E. Vance, Jr., *Capturing the Horizon: The Historical Geography of Transportation Since the Transportation Revolution of the Sixteenth Century*, New York: Harper & Row, 1986, pp. 307-9 and Reys, *Cities of the American West*, p. 580.

⁶⁸ See John C. Hudson, *Plains Country Towns*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985 for a cogent analysis of railway investment strategies and town development.

Japanese as subjects of a Great Power and declared their equality with western imperialists. As such, the *fuzokuchi* were also aimed at Chinese—they were a means of expressing Japanese superiority to Chinese while attempting to lure Chinese to the benefits of the Japanese empire.

The means of defining Great Power status in urban milieus, however, shifted as the century progressed, both in Japan and elsewhere. While urban planners in Japan remained greatly interested in planning overseas, especially in England, Italy, Germany, and the United States,⁶⁹ globally there was a marked and mutually reinforcing tendency towards theorizing becoming more abstract.⁷⁰ This lead eventually to the celebration of state power for its own sake—along with newly efficient forms of modern bureaucracies—requiring new means of display in urban settings in the 1930s. Although the most vigorous and influential proponent of this vision was Le Corbusier, Japanese planners gravitated to similar perceptions.⁷¹ In 1932, some of Japan's prominent urban planners acquired the opportunity to endow one city with what they thought were the most modern means of urban planning. That city, in turn, was to invigorate an entire society towards a new vision of city and society superior to anything the West offered. That city was Changchun, reincarnated as Shinkyō.

⁶⁹ See, for example, "Kakkuni ni okeru kindai no toshi keikaku gaikan," TK 11:6, June 1928, pp. 2-18. Later issues included short articles and pictures from projects around the world.

⁷⁰ See, for example, Ōsuga Iwao, "Risō teki toshi," TK 18:8, August 1934, pp. 43-56 and 18:10, October 1934, pp. 37-52.

⁷¹ On Le Corbusier see Fishman, *Urban Utopias*, 1977, pp. 163-263. Not all Japanese planners, however, agreed with Le Corbusier. Gotō Shimpei, for example wanted Japanese society to develop in a more liberal democratic fashion than what ensued in Japan or its colonies. His style of authority was more of the patrician than the total state variety, something apparent in his many essays about producing a new citizenry through self-government. See, for example, Gotō Shimpei, "Gendai no jichi seikatsu," TK 4:6, June 1921, pp. 2-8, "Jichi seido to shinshizei," TK 4:2, February 1921, pp. 2-10, and "Toshi keikaku to sōgoteki seishin," TK 7:6, June 1924, pp. 2-7. In 1928 Gotō Shimpei still thought that Japanese cities were insufficiently modern and retarding Japanese development, but these were conclusions he continued to arrive at through comparisons with the West, not through idealized theories. See Gotō Shimpei, "Toshi no kaizen to shimin to kakugo," TK 11:6, June 1928, pp. 2-18.

Chapter 4. Modern Architecture in Japan and Manchuria

Architectural discourse gives tangible expression to issues of communal identity. It also demonstrates evolving perceptions of that identity over time. Conceived individually, architectural visions reflect issues of wider awareness because the architect's relationship with society is interactive and because designs require negotiation and group cohesion to become material. Lewis Mumford thought architecture defines and exhibits shared ideals, especially during defining periods "of rapid social crystallization...when the community acquires, through critical inquiry and self-conscious re-orientation, a firm collective insight into its own purposes and a passionate faith in the possibility of a new attitude and a profound societal change."¹

More generally Mumford held that:

In the transformation of the environment, architecture has a peculiar part to play. This arises not merely because buildings constitute such a large part of man's daily surroundings; but because architecture reflects and focuses such a wide variety of social facts: the character and resources of the natural environment, the state of the industrial arts and the empirical tradition and experimental knowledge that go into their application, the processes of social organization and association, and the beliefs and world-outlooks of a whole society. In an age of social disintegration and unrelated specialism...architecture loses most of its essential character: in an age of social synthesis and construction, it steps forward once more as the essential commanding art.²

Mumford concluded that because "architectural form crystallizes,...it endows with special significance the impulses and ideas that shape it....[T]he

¹ Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938, p. 299.

² *Ibid.*, p. 403.

very notion of planning owes more to this art than to any other.”³ For the Changchun *fuzokuchi* and later *guodu* (J, *kokuto*), or “national capital,” both entirely new and systematically planned, these insights are particularly true. These two urban contexts encapsulated the heady years of two momentous periods in Japanese history.

Japanese architecture in Manchuria was not the result of any peripheral dilettantism—it emerged as part of a general Japanese discourse on the built environment. Trained at Japan’s most prestigious institutions and usually employed in an official capacity, Japanese architects in Manchuria envisioned more than the features of new townscapes in distant colonial settings. Through those features they articulated themes and issues meaningful to Japanese society at large. The creation of a new urban environment in Changchun proved intrinsic to the creation of modernity in Japan.

Like Japanese urban planners, the concerns of Japanese architects were more than simply imperialist. Their concerns were civilizational. Japanese architects wanted to display the empire for domestic and foreign audiences in a manner fitting a great power. In keeping with treaty revisions and the spirit of *fukoku kyōhei* and *bunmei kaika*, their overriding interest was in demonstrating progress, something they could show architecturally in two ways. One means was style. In an effort to showcase the Meiji state and endow it with a suitable architectural idiom the first five decades of the new state witnessed Japanese architects ranging the entirety of the European and American stylistic spectrum. Success in mastering Western architectural forms, however, did not result in developing a new, synthetic style, except under the anomalous exigencies of economic emergency in the 1930s. Not exactly a failure, this reflected the global trends that Japanese architects

³ *Ibid.*, p. 403.

followed keenly. Their inability to produce a homegrown idiom occurred over precisely the same years that foreign architects disengaged themselves from their own traditions and opted to work instead in a new, specifically international style. In this task Japanese architects collaborated willingly because in that they could join as an equal at the dawn of a new era.

Another architectural means of demonstrating Japanese progress was technology. Considered from the outset as a subsection of engineering, modern architecture in Japan demanded technological competency of its practitioners.⁴ Part of that sector of Meiji society most eager to learn foreign technologies, architects succeeded in creating structures employing steel, reinforced concrete, gas lighting, and electricity at virtually the same time as architects elsewhere. They also learned to adapt foreign construction to create structures more resistant to Japan's earthquakes.⁵

Japanese architects were essentially educated public officials committed to improving society. They did so in two ways. One was to contribute publicly to an empire-wide debate on the nature of Japan's emerging, modern society through publications and informal discussions.⁶ Another was to house society, including its imperialist apparatus overseas, in appropriate structures. Buildings served as public platforms to advertise an array of new ideals.

A common education insured a similarity of vision among Japanese architects. A similarity of clients, predominantly government ministries

⁴ An important distinction between architects in Japan and elsewhere is that the title of "registered architect" did not exist in Japan until 1950. Architecture in Japan is officially a kind of engineering requiring technical skills. See Noboru Kawazoe, David Griffith, tr., *Contemporary Japanese Architecture*, Tokyo: Kokusai bunka shinkokai, 1965, pp. 13, 17-19.

⁵ Brick wall construction was only viable in Japan with post and beam support, though Japanese learned quickly to replace wooden frames with steel members. Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority*, p. 238.

⁶ Architects contributed their perceptions to journals like the *Kenchiku zasshi* (*Architecture Journal*), Japan's oldest architectural publication, which began publication in 1913, or, in Manchuria, to the *Manshū kenchiku kyōkai zasshi*; later the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* (*Journal of Manchurian Architecture*), which began publication in 1921.

though increasingly private corporations, helped fix that vision. What was more because the vast majority of new projects required novel construction methods involving steel or reinforced brick, especially in the Meiji era, Japan's new generation of architects monopolized public building projects.⁷

In Manchuria, Mantetsu architects designed buildings similar to those found in contemporary Japan and the other imperialist powers. Many were elegant and refined, leading eventually to a host of postwar accounts lamenting their loss.⁸ The more idiosyncratic architecture of Manchukuo, associated as it was with militarism and war, was initially less well remembered, but in time become also a subject of favorable, or at least nostalgic, attention.⁹ Cultured grace, however, was not the only architectural goal of Japanese architects in Manchuria. Another was modernity. Japanese architects sought to dress Manchurian cities in as modern a raiment as possible. In this they succeeded, but it was only because architects targeted both goals that they gained contemporary and postwar approval.

Nostalgic or elegiac postwar Japanese perceptions of empire pose a conundrum. Chinese views typically condemn all facets of Japanese activities

⁷ Initially under the supervision of the Ministry of Technology (1870-85), the instruction of modern architecture became a purely academic province in 1886 when the Imperial College of Engineering (*Kōbudai*) and the architectural section of the Kaisei Gakkō, the ministry's liberal arts college established in 1873, became part of Tokyo Imperial University. Although Tōdai architects thereafter predominated, standardization was further assured with the establishment of the *Nihon Zōka Gakkai* (Japanese Institute of Construction) in 1886. See David B. Stewart, *The Making of a Modern Japanese Architecture: 1868 to the Present*, Tokyo: Kodansha, 1987, pp. 23, 31, 37-38.

⁸ The stately railway cars and polished hotels of the SMR have particularly been acclaimed as lost legacies of the imperialist era, a sentiment reflected generally in works like *Manshū kaikoshū kankōkai*, ed., *Aa Manshū*, Tokyo: Manshū kaikoshū kankōkai, 1965 and Sekai bunkasha, ed., *Wasureenu Mantetsu*, Tokyo: Sekai bunkasha, 1988. Fifty years after the destruction of empire Japanese remain as fascinated with it, especially as exemplified by Mantetsu, as they are with that other fashionable and modern, doomed juggernaut embedded in popular imagination—the *Titanic*. See Bill Sewell, "Postwar Japan and Manchuria."

⁹ Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto* is one example. For others see Nishizawa Yasuhiko, *Zusetsu Manshū toshi monogatari: Harubin, Dairen, Shin'yō, Chōshun*, Tokyo: Kawade shobō shinsha, 1996, Kokubun Hisafumi, *Saraba Shinkyō*, Tokyo: Kokusho kankōkai, 1979, and Kitakōji Ken and Watanabe Manabu, *Chōshun, Kitsurin*, Tokyo: Kokushō kankōkai, 1982.

in China as inherent in Japanese aggression, refusing to acknowledge any aspect of empire as untarnished.¹⁰ Scholars like Edward Said would agree—in his view an imperialist agenda is intrinsic to any endeavor in an imperialist society, including the arts.¹¹ The historical perspectives of former imperialists and the formerly imperialized often contrast diametrically, and the subject of architecture is no exception. Oppositional views such as these, however, result often in an unproductive stalemate. Nostalgia and reproach offer antagonistic and slippery foundations for historical assessment. In order to understand the Japanese imperialist project, it is more useful to consider Japanese architecture in Manchuria as Japanese architects intended it—progressive and imperialist.

Rival, obscurantist discussions of imperialist architecture occur elsewhere. Mark Crinson finds a similar debate with regard to colonial Victorian architecture in that the two most common, and totalizing, perceptions are either nostalgic eulogies or condemnations as expressions of a racist hierarchy. Approaches like these, he argues, are analytically myopic because to hold them is “to foreclose enquiry, to caricature and therefore to misunderstand the complex magnitude both of colonialism and architecture.” Revealing them only unidimensionally they cloud rather than explore issues. Indeed, for Crinson a careful study “without false neutrality...can demythologize this architecture [and] offer compelling insight not just on nineteenth-century British architecture and imperial history, but perhaps also on architecture in today’s globalized, supposedly post-colonial

¹⁰ See, for example, Jie Xueji, *Wei Manzhouguoshi xinbian*. One Chinese scholar, however, credits Japanese architecture under Mantetsu with helping to destroy ingrained traditions and promoting modern forms in Changchun. See Li Weiwei, “Yuanwei Manzhouguo ‘guodu’ Changchun,” in Yang Jiande, ed., *Zhongguo jindai chengshi yu jianju, 1840-1949*, Beijing: Zhongguo jianju gongye chubanshe, 1993, p. 258.

¹¹ Said, *Culture and Imperialism*.

era.”¹² Comprehending particular architectural intents provides insight into wider—and current—issues. This is especially true when considering architectural discourse as an aspect of global exchange.

Clarence Aasen’s study of the political and cultural dimensions of Thai architecture underscores this. Aasen found architecture there to be not only a “primordial” expression of Thai culture but also “one of the most important means of attaining cultural power and identity” of the Thai state.¹³ Adopting styles exterior to the Thai ethnolinguistic group was not a process of simple imitation—appropriated styles represented conscious choices made in the furthering of state prestige and authority. Although Thai society is often considered a passive recipient of allegedly superior traditions, Aasen found that Thais adopted specific foreign features to blended into an indigenous new style in a process that appropriated foreign modes of expression and endowed them with a specific Thai meaningfulness.¹⁴ Dexterous adaptations of European architectural forms in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries differed little in essence from earlier selections from Indian, Chinese, Khmer, and other traditions. In this both the Thai and Japanese imperial governments differed markedly from the Chinese. While the latter refused to accord any standing to European forms by refusing to exhibit Chinese officialdom in Western architecture, both of the former rushed to build imperial palaces and other structures of the highest significance in competent European styles.¹⁵ Only after 1911 did occasional Chinese warlord regimes

¹² Mark Crinson, *Empire Building: Orientalism and Victorian Architecture*, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 1.

¹³ Clarence Aasen, *Architecture of Siam: A Cultural History Interpretation*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998. p. 1.

¹⁴ Aasen, *Architecture of Siam*, p. 236.

¹⁵ Compare the Akasaka Palace (completed 1909) or the Hyōkeikan (opened 1909) in Tokyo with the Chakri Maha Prasat Throne Hall (1876-1882) in the Grand Palace complex or the Ananta Samakhom Throne Hall (commissioned 1907) in Bangkok. All are competent

attempt to display their offices in Western forms, but financial and political weakness doomed those limited efforts to relative insignificance.¹⁶

The Japanese and Thai willingness to consider foreign architectural means of expressing indigenous imperial authority occurred because of local traditions that allowed and even encouraged assimilation and syncretism. Such a dynamic—if not altogether conscious—strategy resulted simultaneously in the domestication of the alien and the rejuvenation of the native.¹⁷ Thai and Japanese societies could only do so, however, because of their underlying vigor and cohesion, something contemporary Chinese society in comparison lacked. In general, while the Chinese tradition also allowed occasional borrowing, this was less common and tended to diminish during periods of dynastic decay. The Chinese state at the end of the imperial era could not incorporate the challenge represented by foreign identities that assumed equality among world societies. Until the *xinzheng* reforms, including the termination of the ancient examination system in 1905, and the recognition of the need to significantly reform Chinese society, official institutions were more desirous of maintaining unquestioned allegiance to the Chinese tradition than in experimenting with other expressions.¹⁸ They could not use foreign forms as a means of expressing issues of identity because doing so challenged that allegiance. Japanese and Thai societies, on the other hand, more receptive and accustomed to foreign challenges accepted them and quickly proved themselves stronger for it, though their adopted

compilations in an eclectic and grand style. (The Japanese imperial palace completed in 1888 apparently fit more the category of hybrid.) See Dallas Finn, *Meiji Revisited: The Sites of Victorian Japan*, New York: Weatherhill, 1995, pp. 94-5.

¹⁶ See, for example, the governing compound of Zhang Zuolin and his son Zhang Xueliang in Mukden. The eclectic mixing of traditional Chinese courtyards and housing with European structures demonstrates a reluctance to express their authority entirely in foreign forms.

¹⁷ It should be noted that European architects too have periodically rejuvenated their own societies by selectively borrowing foreign architectural motifs.

¹⁸ On the significance of these reforms see Reynolds, *The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan*.

foreign architectural vocabularies were not the same. While Thai architecture resulted in its contemporary imperial distinctiveness, Japanese architecture turned more wholly towards an internationally modernist style. Thai society, traditionally more pluralistic and more threatened geopolitically, retained stronger links to its historical roots. Because of its relative isolation and comparative homogeneity, Japanese society, especially as resurgent during late Meiji, could safely jettison its historical links and join the modern world as what they thought was an equal. Once the initial encounter had become regularized, Western architecture presented less of an alien threat for Japanese. Indeed, its foreignness could instead represent a common ideal for which all Japanese could strive.

The context in Manchuria, however, differed. In Manchuria Japanese suddenly found themselves overseas and confronting a more diverse demographic milieu. Yet while the Japanese architectural movement in Manchuria flourished, there was little effort initially to establish an architectural dialogue with anyone other than Europeans or Americans. Until the 1930s, they consciously ignored Asian forms that were historically too close to the identity they were trying to redefine.

Japanese architecture in Manchuria before the Manchurian Incident demonstrated forms thought to be cosmopolitan and international, but in fact were purely Western in tone. Although occasional Shinto shrines dotted urban settings, the Japanese-built environment emulated closely that of Europeans and Americans, attempting to demonstrate an equality with the societies of those lands while at the same time seeking to demonstrate superiority towards the indigenous inhabitants.

With the purchasing of the land for the Changchun *fuzokuchi* in 1907, the laying out of streets began the following year. Much of the eastern side of the

fuzokuchi was completed by 1910.¹⁹ Few buildings appeared in the early years, but their appearances surely startled Changchun's earlier residents.

Meiji Roots of Modernist Japanese Architecture²⁰

Throughout Manchuria the Japanese built public structures first. Two of the first permanent structures in the Changchun *fuzokuchi* were the post office and the police headquarters. Begun respectively in 1907 and 1908, they were completed in 1910, before the surrounding street grid.²¹ Located on the east side of the southern axial street, three and four blocks south of the large square fronting the station, they stood near the center of the *fuzokuchi*. (The street between them was the street that connected the east and west *hiroba*.) Matsumuro Shigemitsu, the successor to Maeda Matsuoto—Nishizawa's first architect adventurer²²—in the Guandong government engineering department, designed them. Matsumuro was a busy architect, designing public structures across Manchuria.²³ He was also an active contributor to the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*, exhorting Japanese to make life in Manchuria better through improvements in education and daily life. In his opinion,

¹⁹ Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto*, p. 70, Nishizawa, "*Manshū*" *toshi monogatari*, p. 103.

²⁰ The Meiji era refers to the reign of the Meiji Emperor (1867-1912) but the events that era encompassed imbued it with wider meaning. As the emperor's accession coincided with the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868—and thus of the old order—his reign came to symbolize Japanese resurgence, particularly as evident in the creation of a modern society in Japan and an empire overseas. For a discussion of some of the ideological dimensions of this era see S.N. Eisenstadt, *Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996, pp. 23-49 ("The Meiji State and Modern Japanese Society") and *passim*. For a discussion of the extent of change apparent in Meiji society see Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman, eds., *Japan in Transition from Tokugawa to Meiji*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. On the significance of the Meiji Emperor himself, see Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, and Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*. After his death the Meiji Emperor was commemorated through the construction of the Meiji Shrine and Meiji Memorial Picture Gallery in Tokyo and a mausoleum in Momoyama, near Kyoto.

²¹ Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto*, p. 71, Nishizawa, "*Manshū*" *toshi monogatari*, p. 105.

²² See Chapter 2.

²³ Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta nihonjin kenchikuka*, pp. 33-9.

new kinds of structures designed by architects schooled on the continent were the best means to attain these ends.²⁴

Through the engaged Tuscan columns flanking the doorway and its smoothly arched windows the Changchun post office evoked a classical air (Figure 4.1). Its sloping dome, however, was more reminiscent of the European Baroque. The new police headquarters was similarly eclectic. More classically domed, its windows were square and a Gothic turret protruded from at least one corner. Both were two stories and constructed of stone.²⁵ A European would have instantly recognized the pair as products of his or her own architectural heritage, begging an important question: how does one account for the Japanese construction in Manchuria of structures derived from ancient, medieval, and early modern Europe?

The two structures did not reflect a Japanese preoccupation with foreign styles owing to any assumed European superiority. Since Japanese architects had a number of styles from which to choose, the historical eclecticism of the Changchun post and police offices reflected more than the historical origins of their façades. They reflected also their functions. From an international perspective both the architectural style and the systems the two buildings represented were completely modern. Like contemporary post and police offices built in Japan, the pair represented civilizational progress.²⁶

²⁴ Matsumuro Shigemitsu, "Manshū daigaku to kenchikuka," *MKZ* 1:1, March 1921, pp. 2-4, and Matsumuro Shigemitsu, "Seikatsu kaizen no kenchiku," *MKZ* 1:2, April 1921, pp. 2-14.

²⁵ A good photo of the two can be found in Nishizawa, "*Manshū*" *toshi monogatari*, p. 105. A photo of the police station from the roof of the post office is in Umemoto Ietada, *Manshū*, Tokyo: Manshūkai, 1975, pp. 5-6.

²⁶ The systems the two buildings represented were Japanese modifications of modern European systems. As the significance of new post offices extended beyond the delivery of parcels to include telegraph, telephone, and savings facilities, their combined communications and banking services made them important fixtures in Meiji society. The same was true for police stations as police duties included inspections and the dissemination of information as well as upholding law and order. For a brief discussion of Meiji post and police offices and the buildings that housed them see Finn, *Meiji Revisited*, pp. 172-4. On the development of the Meiji postal and police systems see Westney, *Imitation and Innovation*, pp. 33-145.

The pair represented the degree to which Japanese by the turn of the century embraced and made their own these systems and forms. Chapter two introduced Tokyo Station (1914), perhaps the most prominent example of the blending of classical, Gothic, and Baroque elements from the European tradition. Earlier buildings in this emerging style included Japan's new Law Courts (1895) and adjacent Ministry of Justice (1896). It was true that the Changchun pair did reflect a general Japanese enthusiasm for European eclectic revivalism in the late Meiji era, but that eclecticism originated in Europe after prolonged debate. It was because European architects at the turn of the century viewed the eclectic style as representing modernity that it could be a discourse that Japanese designers felt equal to join.²⁷

At the start of the nineteenth century, European architectural styles assumed particular meanings for an architecturally literate public. Greek or neo-classical Revivalism, for example, implied aristocratic connections while Renaissance Revivalism suggested wealth. The Gothic Revival was part of a mid-century reassertion of idealized Christian values and the cultural heritage of northern Europe. The final quarter of the century witnessed the spread of a more imperial style as seen in the the Viennese Ringstrasse and in the reconstruction of Paris after the Franco-Prussian War. This usually involved the use of Baroque elements and constructions of scale, as exemplified by the Berlin Reichstag (1884-94).

The nineteenth century European architectural discourse was varied and passionate, but it was singularly inspired—it was rooted in the past. Because of these historical linkages, for most of the century a building's function

²⁷ The perception of Japanese as an equal of Western societies by the turn of the century is perhaps illustrated best by Fukuzawa Yukichi's "Datsu-A ron," in which he encouraged distance from other Asians but not the emulation of Western societies that had by that time demonstrated an assortment of inherent problems. See Fukuzawa Yukichi, "Datsu-A ron," in *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1960, vol. 10, pp. 238-40.

generally determined its style, such as classical or Renaissance for commercial structures and Gothic or Romanesque for churches. This correlation of style and function, however, diminished as the century progressed. One reason was because of the competitive application of styles to different types of buildings, including those that were altogether novel, such as railway stations. Gothic popularizers, for example, succeeded in spreading the Gothic style from cathedrals to secular structures of significance like London's Houses of Parliament (1838-68) and Law Courts (1868-1882).

Another impetus to change the relationship between style and purpose involved capabilities. The Gothic Revival especially celebrated the virtues and piousness of medieval craftsmen, an intent that increasingly became impossible to sustain as industrialization and mechanization continued. By the end of the century, moreover, European architects were building larger buildings and using new technologies, especially cast iron and steel framing, that allowed new arrangements of traditional forms. This resulted in transforming structural elements into decorative motifs.²⁸ Rendered ornamental, styles became physically easier to combine, especially as increasingly larger buildings provided architects the room to flow from one style to another on a single surface in smooth transition.

The ornamentalization of architectural elements changed architectural meaningfulness by altering or eliminating historical linkages. Greek forms became simply classical and Baroque more broadly European. Gothic Revivalism evolved from a fundamentalist to a nationalist agenda. Once embraced by secular Victorian society and carried overseas by British

²⁸ For an expanded discussion of this dynamic see George L. Hersey, *High Victorian Gothic: A Study in Associationism*, Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972, and Georg Germann, Gerald Onn (tr.), *Gothic Revival in Europe and Britain: Sources, Influences and Ideas*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1972.

architects it became also an overtly imperialist style.²⁹ At the end of the nineteenth century, amid the final surge of European imperialist expansion, the debate on architectural form assumed global implications.

John Ruskin (1819-1900), longtime champion of Gothic Revivalism and perhaps the most influential architectural critic of the nineteenth century, combined in his person the twin concerns of architectural form and empire. For Ruskin, natural geographies shaped national characters and architecture expressed the interaction of the two. He assumed further that national cultures declined when races lost touch with their natural environs.³⁰ This made him an impassioned imperialist and led him in his 1870 inaugural lecture at Oxford to opine:

There is a destiny now possible to us, the highest ever set before a nation to be accepted or refused...Will you youths of England make your country again a royal throne of kings, a sceptred isle, for all the world a source of light, a centre of peace; mistress of learning and of the Arts, faithful guardian of time-honored principles? This is what England must either do or perish; she must found colonies as fast and as far as she is able, formed of her most energetic and worthiest men; seizing every piece of fruitful waste ground she can set her foot on, and there teaching these her colonists that their chief virtue is to be fidelity to their country, and their first aim is to be to advance the power of England by land and sea.³¹

In architectural forms Ruskin saw moral imperatives that resonated loudly in Victorian society.³² The British empire was unique in history and

²⁹ Eventually they returned to England with Byzantine and other variant styles for Britons to re-absorb. Crinson, *Empire Building*, *passim*.

³⁰ Crinson, *Empire Building*, pp. 48-50, 58-9.

³¹ Quoted in James (now Jan) Morris, *Heaven's Command: An Imperial Progress*, Bungay, Suffolk: Penguin Books, 1979, p. 380.

³² For Ruskin art could never be pursued solely for itself or emptied of moral content. "Every art is properly called fine which demands the exercise of the full faculties of heart and intellect. For though the fine arts are *not* necessarily imitative or representative, for their essence is in being occupied in the actual production of beautiful form or colour, still the highest of them are appointed also to relate to us the utmost ascertainable truth respecting visible things and moral feelings." (Italics original.) Such assumptions lead him to postulate that "(t)he art, or general productive and formative energy of any country, is the exponent of its ethical life." Sir Kenneth Clark, *Ruskin at Oxford*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947, pp. 10, 12, 16-19.

among Britons increasingly commanded a sense of duty and even righteousness as the century drew to a close. As the form displaying government offices and civic monuments like the Albert Memorial (1872), as well as numerous structures overseas, the Victorian Gothic became the unofficial style of empire and the architectural expression of late nineteenth century British imperialism.

Soon thereafter Gothic Revivalism made numerous appearances in Japan. From the bronze decorations of mythical beasts on the Nihonbashi (1911), the symbolic center of Japan's transportation network, to the Gothic turret on a police station in far off Changchun it appeared throughout the empire in small but surprising ways.³³ The intention behind its application, however, was different. For Japanese architects too, Gothic Revivalism entailed an imperialist legacy, but generally it meant simply the proud ornamentation of a civilized society. This was possible because not only did Japanese see Gothicism as purely a style, but Europeans themselves did so too.

Ruskin and others succeeded in popularizing the Gothic style, but in applying that style to new circumstances Europeans unconsciously created new associated meanings by making it common. The unspoken significance of Gothic Revivalism, for example, changed radically over the nineteenth century, from reflecting deep issues of eternal morality to a vague recollection of a historicized past. The Queen Anne style of the 1870s and 1880s completed the ornamentalization of the Victorian High Gothic and rendered it a motif.

When Japanese first sought tutoring in modern architecture they apprenticed themselves to men eminent in the field. Their choice was 1876

³³ See for example the Niigata Assembly Hall (1883), the Lake Biwa canal tunnel (1890?), the High Point Reservoir Building (1912), the Imperial Guards Headquarters, now the Craft Gallery of the Tokyo National Museum of Modern Art (1910), and a number of schools and mansions in Finn, *Meiji Revisited*, pp. 35, 153, 154-5, 163, and *passim*. As in England it also eventually became the dominant style of Japanese university campuses such as Tōdai and Keiō.

Soane medalist Josiah Conder, a brief employee of William Burges (1827-81), another of England's most famous Gothic Revivalists.³⁴ Conder arrived in Japan in 1877 to find European architects already at work, but most of the early structures were hybrids true to neither Japanese nor foreign traditions.³⁵ Conder helped change that by encouraging Japanese to build in more coherent styles. His own architectural legacy served as a guide as his more than seventy structures included important buildings in the Marunouchi business district, the *Rokumeikan*, the St. Nicholas Cathedral, a number of elite mansions, and the building that eventually became the Tokyo Imperial Museum at Ueno, designed in a Hindu-Saracenic style. All were historical, but all were true to one era. Not as antiquarian as Burges, Conder applied European styles practically to Japanese structures based on their functions, thereby instilling in Japan's first generation of architects a strong sense of historicized significance.³⁶

Until 1888, Conder taught the first classes of architecture at Tōdai. His first class of four graduated in 1879, and within a decade his students were designing practically all of Japan's important structures. They did not do so, however, based solely on his teaching. Japanese architects were keen to learn

³⁴ Burges, less a purist than Ruskin, urged British architects in 1862 to visit Japan in order to understand the medieval mind still alive. Hersey, *High Victorian Gothic*, pp. 47-8, 187. On Conder's life outside Japan see Neil Pedlar, *The Imported Pioneers: Westerners who helped build modern Japan*, Sandgate, Folkestone, Kent: Japan Library, 1990, pp. 139-43.

³⁵ These structures, often called *giyōfu* ("pseudo-Western style") attempted to mix European and Japanese styles and means of construction, resulting in buildings with loggia and stone quoining, for example, with polychrome friezework and *namako-kabe* (sea cucumber wall) fireproofing. Early structures like this are the Tsukiji Hotel (1867-8), the First Mitsui Bank Headquarters (1871-2) of Shimizu Kisuke II, and the Yokohama French Naval Hospital in Fujimori, *Nihon no kenchiku*, vol. 1, pp. 91-6 and Stewart, *Modern Japanese Architecture*, pp. 23-7. Within two decades many of these structures were considered embarrassing and were torn down. Finn, *Meiji Revisited*, p. 17.

³⁶ The *Rokumeikan* was built at the behest of the Foreign Ministry. Finn, *Meiji Revisited*, pp. 97-8. On Conder see also Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority in Japan*, pp. 217-8, Fujimori, *Nihon no kindai kenchiku*, pp. 169-95, Seidensticker, *Low City, High City*, pp. 68-9, 78, 115, 244, and Stewart, *Modern Japanese Architecture*, pp. 35-8.

architecture as an international medium, and many traveled overseas to immerse themselves entirely in European architectural discourse. One of the first four of Conder's graduates was Tatsuno Kingo, the designer of Tokyo Station. Before becoming a professor at Tōdai himself in 1884, he studied in England and dreamed of developing a uniquely Japanese modern style.³⁷ Another was Katayama Tōkuma (1853-1917), designer of the Akasaka Detached Palace and the Imperial Museums at Nara and Kyoto. Before attempting such structures he too studied in Europe, focusing particularly on European palaces. In building the Akasaka Detached Palace his artistic capabilities were matched by his technical competency—the palace suffered no damage during the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923.³⁸ Kawai Kōzō (1856-1934), a graduate of Conder's fourth class, designed the new Law Courts and Ministry of Justice that anticipated Tatsuno's Tokyo Station.

Tatsuno and Katayama are generally thought to be the most important of Japan's first official architects. Tsumaki Yorinaka (1859-1913), educated in part by Conder but also in America, at Cornell, and Berlin, was a third. As a group they helped guide Japanese architecture, both as teachers and through the *Nihon Zōka Gakkai* (Japanese Institute of Construction), founded in 1886. The first generation of modern Japanese architects learned to work competently in a number of styles and combinations. While Tatsuno's Bank of Japan (1896) demonstrated the solid appeal of neo-classicism, his design for the new engineering building (1888) at Tōdai's Hongō campus reinforced the curious melding of neo-classicism and Gothic towers. Nothing championed

³⁷ Tatsuno succeeded Conder as head of Tōdai's department of architecture. On Tatsuno see Fujimori, *Nihon no kindai kenchiku*, vol. 1, pp. 218-35, Kawazoe, *Contemporary Japanese Architecture*, p. 15, Finn, *Meiji Revisited*, pp. 93, 101, and Stewart, *Modern Japanese Architecture*, pp. 37-8, 48-55.

³⁸ Fujimori, *Nihon no kindai kenchiku*, vol. 1, pp. 249-57, Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority in Japan*, pp. 218-21, and Stewart, *Modern Japanese Architecture*, pp. 55-62.

neo-classicism more than Tsumaki's new Nihonbashi, modeled perhaps on the Alexander III Bridge across the Seine, built for the Paris Exposition of 1900.³⁹

Elsewhere, the Ministry of Education adopted the French Classical Revivalist style of the first Napoleonic empire as its more or less official style.⁴⁰ In contrast, the Second Empire became popular among graduates of Tōdai's College of Engineering.⁴¹ This was understandable given that the Second Empire's Neo-Baroque was at the time becoming the preferred means of expressing state power around the world—even if not all states were capable of working well with it.

It was only through the conjunction of state, architect and industry that it was possible to build structures capable of expressing the new discourse.⁴² It is significant that Japanese architects and builders became competent in these styles themselves and did not rely on importing foreign assistance for long. Architecture and construction proved as easy for the Japanese to absorb as technology, law, and other devices of the European modern world.

Notably, late Meiji architecture demonstrated a striking lack of traditional Japanese motifs.⁴³ Indeed, no important late Meiji structures included elements implicit to traditional architectural discourse—Japanese architects shunned traditional motifs in designing their new civic edifices. The

³⁹ Finn, *Meiji Revisited*, pp. 99-103, 148-50, and Fujimori, *Nihon no kindai kenchiku*, vol. 1, pp. 236, 242-8.

⁴⁰ Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority in Japan*, p. 240, Finn, *Meiji Revisited*, pp. 106-11, 174-85.

⁴¹ Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority in Japan*, p. 240.

⁴² Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority in Japan*, p. 250.

⁴³ It is ironic that while many Westerners like Conder came to Japan to teach Japanese the secrets of Western society, others, such as Lafcadio Hearn, mourned the disappearance of traditional Japan. It is doubly ironic because contemporary European artists from William Morris to Vincent Van Gogh idealized traditional Japanese aesthetics profoundly influencing Western art and architecture.

karahafu, the traditional and elegant cusped gable reserved often to demarcate space for those with the rank of a *daimyō* or higher was pointedly omitted in designing the Imperial entrances for Tokyo Station and the new Diet Building. Instead the selection committees opted for purely European façades and rejected anything orientalizing.⁴⁴ There were no *daimyō* in the new Japan, and the selection committee wanted to exhibit the imperial entrance in novel but appropriate language, something in keeping with the spirit of the times. Purely European forms were the order of the day, as was the use of foreign technology. This tendency only grew as architects gained experience and confidence. For example, in contrast to Tatsuno's earlier, restrained domes, Tokyo Station's domes were neither tentative nor amateurish—together they added authority and assuredness to Tokyo's new transportation hub. Made possible by sturdy steel framing, they also demonstrated Japanese technical competence and confidence in a seismically active area.

Late Meiji architecture, however, exhibited more than technical skill. Its styles too defined an era, and the post-Restoration resurgence of Tokyo was its primary symbol. As the capital of the new state, Tokyo represented the hope for future progress and development of the entire country.⁴⁵

Japan's first generation of new architects, most of them Conder's students, organized themselves as the *Nihon Zōka Gakkai* (Japanese Institute of Construction) in 1886. As a group they repeated several themes. Their style

⁴⁴ Proposals containing *karahafu* or pagoda-like structures were eliminated, something only foreigners included in their designs. Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority in Japan*, pp. 232, 250. Tatsuno and others preferred a new form of national architecture that put Japan forward in a new perspective. Kawazoe, *Contemporary Japanese Architecture*, pp. 15-17. For more on the debate that postponed the Diet's construction see Fujimori, *Nihon no kindai kenchiku*, vol. 1, pp. 235-41. Finn, *Meiji Revisited*, pp. 98-9, and Stewart, *Modern Japanese Architecture*, pp. 38-40.

⁴⁵ Stewart, *Modern Japanese Architecture*, p. 41. It was also to showcase Japanese progress to foreigners and foreign utilities to Japanese. Henry D. Smith, "Tokyo as an Idea: An Exploration of Japanese Urban Thought until 1945," *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 4:1, Winter 1978, pp. 53-7.

was usually historical eclecticism, but only if coordinated in a coherent, mature fashion. They also prized symmetry. Perhaps the most noted trait in Meiji architecture was a recourse to brick, especially red, something that in time became emblematic of the Meiji era.⁴⁶ Through devices such as these Japan's new architects provided more than a new style for modern Japan. In taming foreign architectural idioms and mastering new methods of construction, they succeeded in articulating one aspect of Japanese modernity. They replaced traditional and hierarchical means of ordering the Japanese built environment with rational and secular perceptions of architectural form. They also accepted the grail of progress as a norm. It was these underlying architectural meanings that motivated Japanese architects most in designing new structures in Manchuria.

Japanese Architecture in Manchuria

The architecture of the Japanese empire was for the most part designed by Conder's and his associates' students, which explains why similar themes appeared in Matsumuro's post office and police station in Changchun.⁴⁷ These two structures were thus only the initial salvos of a concerted effort to enlighten the continent. Ichida (after 1925 Aoki) Kichijirō, a 1906 Tōdai graduate who joined Mantetsu the following year, designed the three most prominent structures that first greeted visitors upon disembarking in Changchun—the three structures circling the largest plaza. All were

⁴⁶ A recourse to brightly colored brick was also a hallmark of the Queen Anne style.

⁴⁷ Matsumuro was an 1897 Tōdai graduate. A work emphasizing the English style in Manchurian architecture is Manshikai, ed., *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi*, supplement, esp. pp. 300-5.

Mantetsu structures.⁴⁸ The Changchun *fuzokuchi*, after all, was a railway town.

The three structures were the station, the railway's regional headquarters, and the railway hotel. Standing on the northern edge of the square and facing south, the station was in the Renaissance style (see Figure 4.2). Completed in 1914, its symmetrical wings flanked a central gabled roof supported by a row of columns.⁴⁹ The long, two storied structure dwarfed the nearby Russian station at Kuanchengzi.⁵⁰ It contrasted markedly with the other major train stations along the SMR, especially that of Mukden station completed in 1910 in what was becoming known as the "Tatsuno style."⁵¹ Across the plaza on the southwest corner stood the first Mantetsu regional office. Completed in 1910, it was a massive, symmetrical, three story structure capped on either end with tall gothic spires.⁵² The third building designed by Ichida fronting the main plaza was the Yamato Hotel, Changchun's preeminent hotel, begun in September 1907 and completed in 1909 (see Figure 4.3). Its role was to shelter important bureaucrats and foreign dignitaries in a suitable manner. It did so

⁴⁸ As a Mantetsu architect Ichida worked often with men like Onoki Toshiharu. In fact they, and others, worked together on the design for the Anshan steel works and probably on a number of other structures in the new city. See Manshikai, ed., *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi*, supplement, pp. 305-7. On Ichida's change of surname to Aoki, see Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta*, p. 55, note 9.

⁴⁹ Descriptions can be found in Mantetsu no kenchiku to gijutsujin henshū i'inkai & Mantetsu kenchikukai, eds., *Mantetsu no kenchiku to gijutsujin*, Tokyo: Mantetsu kenchikukai, 1976, p. 60.

⁵⁰ The Russian *fuzokuchi* at Kuanchengzi never developed into anything more than a local station, as evidenced by its structures. While the hospital and station were relatively small and eclectic in style, the train platform's roof was a low, pitched, wooden structure reminiscent of the steppes.

⁵¹ For more on the "Tatsuno style" and its partial derivation from the work of Briton Richard Norman Shaw, see Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta*, p. 68. Mukden Station was designed by Mantetsu Architect Ōta Takeshi, designer of the domed and more unmistakably Renaissance style Yokohama Specie Bank branch in Dalian, as well as the Dalian Yamato Hotel.

⁵² A postwar publication by former Mantetsu employees describes the spires as being in an "English Gothic style." It lists, however, two architects other than Ichida for the design. Mantetsu kenchikukai, eds., *Mantetsu no kenchiku to gijutsujin*, p. 86.

with modern conveniences. It did so also with a modern flourish, its style the natural progression from historical eclecticism—art nouveau.⁵³

Art nouveau reached Manchuria first through Russia, where it was called *style moderne*. It furthered the creation of a popular, rational architecture by demolishing the need for a historically based architecture. Based instead upon organic, flowing motifs derived from biology, art nouveau adopted new technologies while rejecting the increasingly meaningless historicism of the other revivals. In Europe, the Viennese Secession proclaimed this independence pointedly. In Russia, *style moderne* appeared most notably in the work of Fyodor Shekter who designed commercial buildings and Moscow's striking Yaroslav Station. Although the Russians exoticized the style by tending to exaggerate the decorative façades—although not to the extreme of Gaudí—because it combined novel aesthetics, functions, and technologies, *style moderne* entailed explicitly modernist meanings.

Russian architecture in Dalian originally intended to impress Chinese with monumentality and grandeur. Drawing on Europe's cultural heritage and technical capabilities, the buildings there were large and historically eclectic. Greco-Roman and Renaissance motifs dominated. Construction in the northern rail-town of Harbin, however, exhibited not only eclecticism but also a great deal of *style moderne*, most notably in its central station and associated railway offices. A new railway town like Changchun, founded in 1898, Harbin developed rapidly into an important transportation hub that defined itself by its novelty and freedom from preexisting constraints.⁵⁴

⁵³ One pamphlet described the hotel as the city's "representative Western-style hotel" (*daihyōteki yōshiki ryokan*). See Mantetsu tetsudō sōkyoku eigyōkyoku ryokakuka, ed., *Shinkyō*, Mukden: Mantetsu tetsudō sōkyoku, 1937, p. 8.

⁵⁴ The city also boasted wide avenues and plentiful trees. Harbin central station was built around 1900. Many of Harbin's most important buildings were also built in according to the prevailing tastes resulting in a comparative concentration of art nouveau construction exceeding that of Paris or Vienna. To Koshizawa this was an unfettered expression only possible in a

Other buildings in the Secession style appeared elsewhere in China, most notably in Qingdao and Jinan, two former German possessions in the nearby province of Shandong that had come under Japanese control during the first world war.⁵⁵

While Japanese architects in Manchuria worked mainly in the style of historical eclecticism, several important exceptions represented art nouveau, such as Maeda Matsuoto's Dalian fire station (1907), Nishizawa's first architect adventurer.⁵⁶ In Changchun, the important exception was the Yamato Hotel, the only hotel owned by the SMR built in that style.⁵⁷ Completed six years after the first art nouveau structure in Japan, it anticipated Nakamura Junpei's designs for the first Secession style structure in Japan, the Tokyo-Taishō Exhibition in Ueno (1914).⁵⁸ The hotel was a two story brick building with a sleek façade.⁵⁹ Ichida's careful attention to the interior showed that the Japanese study of the style was not superficial.

The decision to build one of the earliest and most significant structures of the *fuzokuchi* in this style is instructive. According to Nakamura Zekō, Gotō Shimpei's successor as Mantetsu president, constructing the *fuzokuchi* occurred in a context of responding to Russian intimations that, despite

colonial periphery. Koshizawa Akira, *Harupin no toshi keikaku, 1898-1945*, Tokyo: Sōwasha, 1989, p. 86 and *passim*, Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta Nihon kenchikuka*, pp. 188-201, and Nishizawa, *Manshū toshi monogatari*, pp. 22-6.

⁵⁵ See Nishizawa Yasuhiko et al., eds., *Higashi Ajia no kindai kenchiku*, Tokyo: Muramatsu Teijirō sensei taikan kinenkai, 1985, Section six, nos. 21-7.

⁵⁶ Nishizawa, *Manshū toshi monogatari*, p. 71.

⁵⁷ Although the first Yamato Hotel in Dalian was a small, wooden affair with Gothic spires, the later hotel there as well as the one in Mukden were enormous Neo-Renaissance structures. Hotels in smaller cities were variously eclectic and smaller than the one in Changchun.

⁵⁸ On early art nouveau in Japan see Fujimori, *Nihon no kindai kenchiku*, vol. 2, pp. 31-9. On Nakamura see Stewart, *Modern Japanese Architecture*, pp. 92-3. Stewart defines the Secession style as a blend of art nouveau, expressionism, and a revived classicism.

⁵⁹ Photos of the Yamato Hotel are in many sources. See, for example, Nishizawa, *Manshū toshi monogatari*, p. 104. For an early photo and a brief description see *Manshū kenchikukai*, eds., *Mantetsu no kenchiku to gijutsujin*, pp. 15, 37, 112.

military victory in 1905, Japanese were culturally backwards.⁶⁰ Thus, as Japan's prestige depended in part on conducting diplomatic negotiations in suitable halls, architects leapt to the challenge.⁶¹ Harbin lay only a few hours north of Changchun by train, and the new Yamato hotel demonstrated that Japanese were capable of constructing in any style the Russians could. Russo-Japanese competition proceeded after 1905 by non-military means.⁶²

At the same time, however, art nouveau did not captivate Japanese architects as it did many Europeans. The Japanese use of art nouveau for Changchun's Yamato Hotel did not result from any crusading rebelliousness.⁶³ Instead it demonstrated a desire to demonstrate technical competency in a powerful, new style.⁶⁴ In reality, Japanese preferred to work mostly in historical styles. This was because Japanese were more concerned with achieving Great Power status than in trying to overthrow traditional European aesthetics. Thus, the Changchun elementary school (1908), identical to the one in Mukden, was a quaint neo-Gothic, wooden structure consisting of a single story surmounted with an imposing spire on either end

⁶⁰ Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 71-3.

⁶¹ Perhaps the most well known talks that took place in the hotel were those called the Changchun Conference, taking place September 4-25, 1922 between representatives of Japan and the infant Soviet government. Popular, though simplified discussions of it are *Sekai panfuretto tsūshin* (112): *Chōshun kaigi zenki*, Tokyo: Sekai shichō kenkyūkai, 1922 and *Fujin panfuretto dai yongō: Chōshun kaigi*, Tokyo: Fujin bunka kenkyūkai, 1922. Another important set of negotiations probably took place in this hotel, the negotiations in July 1929 between Soviet Consul-General in Harbin Melnikoff and a representative of the Jilin Provincial Government, General Zhang Zuoxiang. *Report on Progress to 1934*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1934. pp. 60-66.

⁶² Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta*, p. 66, Nishizawa, *Manshū toshi monogatari*, p. 105.

⁶³ In the first issue of the *MKZ*, for example, one-time Columbia University student Ono Takeo called for the use of the Secession style in Manchuria simply because it reflected global trends. Ono Takeo, "Manshū seseshon—shiki kenchikuka no tame ni," *MKZ*, 1;1, March 1921, pp. 26-9.

⁶⁴ Of course Japanese constructions in the art nouveau style were not few. They were occasionally even on a grand scale, such as Ōta Takeshi's residential neighborhood in Dalian which also embodied elements of Ebenezer Howard's garden city of Letchworth. The Japanese tendency to work in a variety of styles instead of only one suggests, however, that none of the Mantetsu architects embraced the style as completely as, say, Antoni Gaudí or Hector Guimard, for whom it was consuming.

and a single bell tower in the middle. This was a style that was in keeping with many of the school houses in Japan.

A consistency of styles emerged in all of the new *fuzokuchi* because Mantetsu's architects oversaw most construction. They were thus in a position to insure that the various elements of Japanese imperialism were housed in a manner befitting their function. For this reason the new headquarters of the Jilin-Changchun railway line, completed in Changchun in 1924, was reminiscent of Changchun station.⁶⁵ Another example was that of the Changchun Hospital complex, built between 1909 and 1911. It displayed striking stepped gables throughout its associated structures, a style consistent with hospitals in Mukden and elsewhere in Manchuria.⁶⁶ The rationale behind this particular style must have involved functionality: hospitals' exaggerated gables drew viewers' attention upwards so as to evoke humility or passivity in those entering. At the same time these buildings' clean lines and lack of other decorations reminded viewers of new conceptions of medicine. Sanitized environments were similarly clean and uncluttered by notions of medieval forces. The same was true for school buildings—although busier, the Gothic style dominant in Japan too proclaimed unsubtly that the content of new kinds of education even in places like Changchun was greatly influenced by the West.

Mantetsu architects, however, could not oversee the construction of all new structures in the Changchun *fuzokuchi*, yet most structures were

⁶⁵ See the photo and details in *MKZ* 5:6, June 1925, 22-3. (*NB*: this journal did not number the pages of its photographs.)

⁶⁶ Some of the similarities among Mantetsu's hospitals can be attributed to Onoki Toshiharu who, in order to redesign the Dalian hospital in 1916—work having begun on it in 1912—studied existing hospitals in Beijing, Tianjin, Jinan, Qingdao, and elsewhere first. In Beijing he studied specifically the Xiehe Hospital, also known as the Peking Union Medical College, built in 1915 by John D. Rockefeller. *Manshikai*, ed., *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi*, supplement, p. 304, and Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta*, p. 83, note 57.

similarly consistent. In part this was achieved through a building code, extracts of which appeared in the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* in 1925.⁶⁷

Another reason was that non-Mantetsu organizations also wished it. For example, between 1909 and 1912 the Foreign Ministry had one man, Mihashi Shirō, design the consulates in Changchun, Mukden, Jilin, Yingkou, and elsewhere, as well as oversee the restoration of the consulate in Andong.⁶⁸

Changchun's commercial structures also exhibited a consistent style.⁶⁹ Each of the banks most integral to Japanese imperialism established branches in Changchun. The builder of each was Nakamura Yoshihei, a man not employed by Mantetsu. Nakamura's construction firm in Seoul built banks and other structures throughout Japan and the empire. While the Changchun branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank (1922) was solidly neo-classical, the Bank of Korea (1920) was a more streamlined version of the Late Meiji style (Figure 4.4).⁷⁰ Japanese bankers in the colonies wanted their branches to be similar to banks in Japan itself.

The cleaner lines of the Bank of Korea foretold an important innovation. Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson, in their seminal work *The International Style: Architecture Since 1922*, published in 1932, declared brashly that a wholly new style had emerged that was not only appearing

⁶⁷ "T. N. sei", "Kenchiku oyobi kenchikubutsu ni kansuru minpō no bashō," *MKZ* 5:3, pp. 69-72.

⁶⁸ Since Mihashi split his time between Tokyo and Manchuria, this kept him in touch with developments in both regions. Much of his work was in stone or brick in the quietly assertive "Tatsuno style," but what more generally could be called the Late Meiji style. He also helped introduce Harbin's art nouveau to Japanese through published articles and informal communications. Eventually, along with men like Onoki Toshiharu, Ōta Takeshi and Yasui Takeo, who also worked in Manchuria, Mihashi helped set the less ornate and more refined tone of architecture for Japan's second generation of modern architects. This was despite his early death in 1915 while working on the Japanese consulate in Vladivostok. See Nishizawa, *Manshū no toshi monogatari*, p. 123.

⁶⁹ Matsumuro Shigemitsu, the designer of the post office and police station, also designed the Changchun stock exchange, completed in 1918 in a flamboyant renaissance style.

⁷⁰ On Nakamura see Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta nihonjin kenchikuka*, pp. 165-70, and Nishizawa *Manshū no toshi monogatari*, pp. 121-3. Nakamura's company also built the classically domed Yokohama Specie Bank branch in Dalian.

around the world but was expressly modern. Three principles characterized it: a concern for creating volume and not simply mass, regularity in line and form rather than simple symmetry, and the use of construction materials themselves as decorative façades rather than any frivolous ornamentation.

Like their counterparts elsewhere, Japanese architects in the 'twenties similarly expanded interior volumes and rejected ornamentation, perspectives apparent in the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*.⁷¹ In 1925, for example, Shimada Katsura declared that much of the decorations that graced buildings he saw in Europe were ostentatious or frivolous.⁷² In 1928, however, an anonymous writer looked elsewhere. Noting that borrowing was a common transformative technique in Japan's architectural heritage, resulting in each period demonstrating newly contemporary ideals, "H. H." held other foreign examples aloft for Japanese to admire. He insisted that not only was modern industrial architecture scientific and economic, it too was inspired by technique and notions of beauty.⁷³

Although it exhibited a reflexive symmetry in its windows and buttress-like projections, Changchun's Bank of Korea branch eliminated historicized ornamentation and expanded the work space within. Similar was the dormitory of Changchun Commercial College.⁷⁴ Adjacent the Bank of Korea on the East Plaza were the offices of the Changchun Telephone Company (1930), representing the emerging International Style in Changchun more

⁷¹ Although Hitchcock and Johnson included only one example of Japanese architecture in 1932, in a later preface they admitted that more Japanese projects could easily have been cited. See Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson, *The International Style*, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995.

⁷² Shimada Katsura, "Kenchiku mudabanashi," *MKZ* 5:2, February 1925, 7-12.

⁷³ "H. H. sei," "Shizen oyobi kōsei no biteki chūshin ten," *MKZ* 8:2, February 1928, pp. 19-24, and 8:4, April 1920, pp. 21-40.

⁷⁴ Photos and descriptions for the *Chōshun shōgyō gakkō kishukusha* can be found in *MKZ* 6:12, December 1926, pp. i-v.

than any other structure (Figure 4.5).⁷⁵ Designed by the Guandong Government's civil engineering department, it was a graceful three story structure with rounded corners and a off-center elevator tower. Six "beehive" profile windows near the tower reminded the viewer of Ishimoto Kikuji's Asahi Newspaper Offices (1927) in Tokyo, itself suggestive of earlier German and Dutch architecture in the Secessionist style.⁷⁶ The *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* listed its style simply as "modern" (*kindai shiki*).⁷⁷ A similar structure was the office of the Changchun Mantetsu Consumers Cooperative (*shōhi kumiai*), designed by Mantetsu's construction department and built on the West Plaza in 1930. Also labeled "modern" but more boxy and ornamented was the Changchun Library (1931), built and owned by Mantetsu. Plainer was the Changchun branch of the Japan Tourist Bureau, but a row of multiple arches on the ground floor suggested a Central Asian flavor.⁷⁸

Japanese architects in Manchuria perceived themselves to be participating in an international debate. Their learning to work in new styles and with new materials reveals that historical eclecticism, art nouveau, and the International Style were successive points on a continuum, each an effort to create a newly modern form. Another way Japanese architects in not just Changchun but all of Manchuria sought to engender modernity was through changes in daily life. This was suggested variously. One common theme in the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* involved making use of new technologies.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ The building's description and a photo of it can be found in *MKZ* 11:1, February 1931, pp. ii-iv, 40.

⁷⁶ See Stewart, *Modern Japanese Architecture*, p. 96.

⁷⁷ *MKZ* 11:1, February 1931, p. 40.

⁷⁸ Photos of these buildings, including some floorplans, can be found in *MKZ* 12: 4, April 1932, pp. i-viii, 30.

⁷⁹ Although many were simple descriptions of means and methods overseas, some suggested how to do so more exactly, such as the six part series by Warashina Asayoshi, "Kenchikubutsu ni okeru kikaiteki setsubi," that appeared in 1925 and 1926.

Another was revolutionizing daily life through residential construction. By improving basic living conditions *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* architects thought they could improve Japanese themselves. Munekata Shuichi made this explicit in the first issue of the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* when he suggested that Japanese home construction was bounded by tradition and had inherited certain bad practices. Manchuria's more extreme conditions, he thought, made it a perfect laboratory to help create more efficient and more practical styles of residence. For Munekata this involved more than learning to deal with a new climate—it was part of a fundamental reorientation of daily life. Changes in constructing homes were to him the creation of a generally more practical and modern life. He therefore encouraged abandoning construction in wood even though it appealed to Japanese tastes in order to use something more practical and efficient—brick.⁸⁰

For Munekata and others, adopting new styles of residential housing was similar to another hallmark of Meiji transitions, changes in clothing styles. Just as many Japanese gave up swords and samurai dress fifty years earlier, Munekata urged new styles of housing for precisely the same reasons: the old ways were backwards.⁸¹ Mantetsu's Ueda Kyōsuke's analogy was that just as fifty years earlier Japanese learned not to wear a *haori*, a short Japanese coat, with a silk hat, Japanese now needed to learn not to mix architectural styles.⁸² Kifuji Yoshimi, the dean of Dalian's women's high school, added that young women dressing in more Western styles was a good example of this kind of

⁸⁰ Munekata Shuichi, "Manshū to jūtaku kairyō," *MKZ* 1:1, March 1921, pp. 16-25. Of course, brick had been extensively used in Japan itself in a number of new constructions. See Fujimori, *Nihon no kindai kenchiku*, vol. 1, *passim*. Perhaps the most celebrated use was in the Ginza Bricktown. See Seidensticker, *Low City, High City*, pp. 59-60, 119.

⁸¹ A later anonymous article echoed this perception. See "Seikatsu kaizen to seikatsu risō no tettei," *MKZ* 1:7, September 1921, pp. 14-22.

⁸² Ueda Kyōsuke, "Manshū kyojū hōjin no jūtaku ni tsuite no shiken," *MKZ* 2:7, July 1922, pp. 5-7.

change. Protesting the current “double life” in Japanese society, meaning that Japanese were beholden to two traditions, he enjoined Japanese to cleave to a single, modern one.⁸³

Improving daily life through new kinds of buildings was integral to the creation of a new and modern Japanese society. Matsumuro Shigemitsu, the busy Mantetsu architect in Changchun and elsewhere, established that link clearly when he called for a revolution in daily life through the creation of new structures that required modern technology.⁸⁴ In this way a new “cultural lifestyle” (*bunka seikatsu*) could emerge that integrated the physical (*nikutai teki*) and the mental or spiritual (*seishin teki*) aspects of existence, as another article postulated.⁸⁵

Practically speaking, however, new styles could only emerge through a process of compromise and mixing. In the early years of the Changchun *fuzokuchi*, Japanese first found accommodation in the old town or in temporary structures. Mantetsu sheltered many of its first workers in Changchun in a company dormitory, a usual procedure for Japanese corporations. Mantetsu initially built dorms in only three cities—Dalian, Mukden, and Changchun. Built between 1908 and 1909, Changchun’s used brick and provided three rooms to each apartment. Rooms had “Japanese ceilings” and used the traditional Japanese means of defining floorspace: tatami mats. For heating, however, apartments included a Korean-style *ondul*, heated floorboards, on the ground floor and a Russian *pechka*, a large ceramic stove, on the second.⁸⁶ Mantetsu eventually built rental apartments

⁸³ Kifuji Yoshimi, “Nijū seikatsu to jūtaku,” *MKZ* 2:7, July 1922, pp. 8-11.

⁸⁴ For Matsumuro, improvements in lifestyle meant generally improvements in thinking (literally, the “brain”—*zunō*) that could best be achieved through revolutionizing patterns of daily life. Specifically this meant warmer buildings and more sanitary conditions. See Matsumuro Shigemitsu, “Seikatsu kaizen to kenchiku,” *MKZ* 1:2, April 1921, pp. 2-14.

⁸⁵ “Seikatsu kaizen to seikatsu risō no tettei,” *MKZ* 1:7, September 1921, pp. 14-22.

⁸⁶ Mantetsu kenchikukai, eds., *Mantetsu no kenchiku to gijutsujin*, pp. 114-8.

of five grades, the highest two built of Japanese brick, the next two of Chinese brick, and the lowest built of wood. Rents varied accordingly, between 1.5 and 0.6 yen per *tsubo*.⁸⁷

Proper heating was a major concern for Japanese architects. Changchun's average lows in December and January were between minus twenty and twenty-five degrees Celsius. Even the summers were cool as the lows ranged from fifteen to twenty.⁸⁸ As a result, architects paid great attention to window sizes and placement, building materials, and foreign techniques. The *ondul* and the *pechka* were only two of many such adoptions, but it was these kinds of useful technologies that encouraged the debate on revolutionizing daily life. As Mantetsu architect and later chairman of the Manchurian Architects' Society Onoki Toshiharu noted early, much of the Japanese development of Manchuria would be based on Russian foundations.⁸⁹

Japanese in the 1920s, of course, were only participants in a longer running debate. An initial mania for things foreign in the 1870s and 1880s had shifted to a more nationalist assessment of borrowing around the turn of the century. Japanese architects in the 'twenties, however, rekindled that debate, arguing that there was still much to learn overseas. Moreover, architects added that if they proceeded intelligently they could contribute to a more modern society that did not displace all things Japanese.

Matsumuro Shigemitsu framed this debate in an eight-part series explaining why he thought that Japanese architects stood at a "fork in the road." Matsumuro perceived a dual role for architects in society. Enmeshed

⁸⁷ Izumi, *Chōshun jijō*, p. 12. (1 *tsubo* = 3.3 square meters.)

⁸⁸ Kondō Isaburō, "Manshū ni okeru saitei ondo zuhyō ni tsuite", *MKZ* 1:7, September 1921, pp. 23-5.

⁸⁹ Onoki Toshiharu, "Tōshin tetsudō yori keishōseru Mantetsu shataku," *MKZ* 2:7, July 1922, pp. 23-8. Onoki joined Mantetsu in 1907 as chairman of a regional architecture section (*Mantetsu chihōbu kenchiku kachō*) but later became chairman of the architecture department itself. His association with Matsumuro Shigemitsu was long and fruitful.

in government administration, architects were technologists capable of devising a better, more modern society. Architects were therefore not simply public officials, but crusading scientists, a perception widespread in Meiji society regarding its civil servants. Responding to criticism regarding his unapologetic use of Western forms and technology, Matsumuro argued that Japanese as a society had the choice of being either isolated, insular, and conservative or cosmopolitan and progressive. Because at the time Western forms were superior, it was still important to learn from them, but ultimately Japanese needed to find some sort of a compromise. Cultural mixing was already a well-established Japanese path he thought, and now it was up to architects to help lead the way to a more modern society.⁹⁰ Referring to improvements in residential housing, Tanabe Toshiyuki reinforced the need for continued compromise as preparation for a culture of the future.⁹¹

Not all were so zealous however. Hisatome Hirofumi cautioned a basic tenet of Western modernity—the division of labor. Although it permitted efficiency and mechanization, he thought it also unnecessarily divided society. This meant that architects had a responsibility to spatially unify organizations.⁹² Yet most were more sanguine, especially with regard to residential construction. An anonymous four-part *MKZ* editorial predicted that, among other changes, Japanese homes in the future would have chairs and specialized rooms, and that rooms would be taller and wider. Doors and walls would be thicker, and homes would be safer from fire.⁹³ Another

⁹⁰ Matsumuro Shigemitsu, "Kiro ni tatsu kenchikuka," *MKZ* 2:1, January 1922, pp. 10-12, *MKZ* 2:2, February 1922, pp. 2-12, *MKZ* 2:3, March 1922, pp. 2-17.

⁹¹ Specifically Tanabe wanted a "Japan-West compromise style" (*wayō setchū shiki*). Tanabe Toshiyuki, "Manshū ni okeru jūtaku mondai no kichō," *MKZ* 2:7, July 1922, pp. 2-4.

⁹² Hisatome Hirofumi, "Kenchiku ni araharetaru bungyōshugi no heigai," *MKZ* 2:5, May 1922, pp. 2-7.

⁹³ "Jūtaku no madori oyobi setsubi no kaizen," *MKZ* 4:4, April 1924, pp. 14-22, *MKZ* 4:5, May 1924, pp. 15-24, *MKZ* 4:6, June 1924, pp. 35-43, and *MKZ* 4:7, July 1924, pp. 38-43.

writer envisioned new residential suburbs in the countryside that, given their locations, would be cheaper and more sanitary. But at the same time he too recommended learning from foreigners, especially Russians, Germans, and even Chinese.⁹⁴

The changes these writers recommended would affect Japanese lifestyles directly, occurring in schools, hospitals, libraries, stock exchanges, and in a host of other aspects of the built environment. They would affirm modernity by their envelopes as much as by their very existence. Thus, not only contemporary technologies and organizations but architectural styles too represented Japanese society as culturally and technically sophisticated as that of any other power. They also showed Japanese willingness to take part in the global debate on the built environment.


In enhancing Japan's status and revolutionizing living conditions, architects presented themselves as progressive and cosmopolitan. They were also zealous, seizing every opportunity possible to advance their ideas. The Kantō earthquake of 1923, for example, resulted in renewing many of their motivations to improve the urban environment.⁹⁵ Nine years later, the establishment of Manchukuo provided a similar impetus—but by then the context of the debate was altered. Still, looking back from what he thought to be a splendid and comfortable new capital city in 1942, a later president of the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* could not help but be grateful to the likes of Maeda Matsuoto, Onoki Toshiharu, Matsumuro Shigemitsu and others for their free experimentation and willingness to explore new paths.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Suzuki Masao, "Atarashii ie," *MKZ* 4:3, March 1924, pp. 66-70.

⁹⁵ For one example among many of this era, see Matsumuro Shigemitsu, "Shokuminchi ha yoroshiku dokuritsu shitaru bunka wo kensetsu subeshi," *MKZ* 4:3, March 1924, pp. 6-15.


⁹⁶ He was also cognizant of the role experimentation in Taiwan and Korea played, as well as the guidance Russian creations in Dalian and Port Arthur offered, in developing Manchurian architecture. See Oka Ōji, "Manshū kenkoku jūnen to kenchiku zakkan," *MKZ* 22:10, October 1942, pp. 1-4.

Figure 4.1 Changchun Police Station and Post Office



Source: Nishizawa, *"Manshū" toshi monogatari*

Figure 4.2 Changchun Station




Source: Nishizawa, *"Manshū" toshi monogatari*

Figure 4.3 Yamato Hotel, Changchun




Source: Nishizawa, *"Manshū" toshi monogatari*




Source: Mantetsu, *Mantetsu kabushiki kaisha sanjūnen shi*

Figure 4.4 Bank of Korea, Changchun Branch



Source: Photo by author

Figure 4.5 Changchun Telephone Company



Source: Photo by author

Chapter 5. Envisioning Manchukuo

The Manchurian Incident was a watershed event in northeast Asia. Japanese conceptions of national security and identity differed markedly before and after it. At the same time, in response to the Japanese seizure of Manchuria and the outbreak of fighting in Shanghai, Chinese popular nationalism grew increasingly bellicose. Similarly committed to achieving national security and producing a modern state, Japanese and Chinese struggled over conflicting visions of national progress.

Until September 18, 1931, the basic nature of Japan's empire in Manchuria did not change—the Changchun *fuzokuchi* functioned as a vibrant commercial hub representative of the Japanese potential. As a source of imperialist authority and domination, however, it contributed also to growing friction between Japanese and Chinese. Thus, the successful development of the railway town and *shangbu* (“commercial zone”), as well as of other peripheral lands nearby, resulted in heightened Japanese fears for the security of their investments. Rising Chinese nationalism threatened those investments, a factor that helps explain why many overseas Japanese embraced the new regime.¹ The fact that the new regime also advocated continued development further enhanced that support.

The Manchurian Incident resulted in the eventual installation of Henry Puyi as “Emperor” of Manchukuo and the creation of a national apparatus seemingly

¹ As early as ten years before the Manchurian Incident Japanese demonstrated in Changchun against the withdrawal of troops from the *fuzokuchi* because of the fear of an increased risk of crime. See, for example, *Chōshun jitsugyō shimbun*, August 15, 1922, p. 1. The Japanese consul-general of Mukden between 1925 and 1928, Yoshida Shigeru, one of postwar Japan's most powerful politicians, even advocated expanding Japanese authority in Manchuria to secure investments and stabilize society. See John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 58-88.

centered on his person.² In reality, elements of the Kwantung Army orchestrated the new government, not always in accordance with Mantetsu and the Foreign Ministry, the other two traditional pillars of Japanese stability in Manchuria. Still, there was room for agreement on certain issues. From its inception, the Puyi regime was more than simply the legalizing motif of a puppet state—the Kantōgun dreamed bigger than that. Indeed, it was more important to Kantōgun officers to assuage Japanese public opinion at home than world opinion, and to do that the new capital had to be invested with a style and spirit understandable there. As products of that society themselves, Kantōgun planners insured that key issues in Japan contributed most to Shinkyō's specific forms.³

The Manchurian Incident and Changchun

Changchun's role in the Manchurian Incident was small but important.⁴ Receiving orders just after midnight on September 19, 1931, Third Brigade Commander Hasebe, in charge of the Changchun garrison, dispatched the main part of his Fourth Regiment south to Mukden while the remainder he made ready for local deployment. The chief concern around Changchun was a Chinese

² Puyi, of course, only discovered the charade after coming to Manchuria: "I soon found out that the powers of the 'Chief Executive' existed on paper only." Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi, *From Emperor to Citizen: The Autobiography of Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964, vol. 2, p. 257. Kramer's rendering of Puyi's perspective is more dramatic: "I soon discovered that the power and authority of the Chief Executive were only shadows and without substance." Paul Kramer, ed., *The Last Manchu: The Autobiography of Henry Pu Yi, Last Emperor of China*, New York: Pocket, 1987 (originally 1967), p. 165.

³ As both popular and intellectual circles promoted development in Manchuria, the Manchurian Incident and the creation of Manchukuo were portrayed in Japan positively. See Young, *Japan's Total Empire*.

⁴ Sōga Kensuke, the CCB's first head architect, recounted in 1942 the major events of the Manchurian Incident in this order: first was the "bombing" near Liutiao Lake and the subsequent destruction of Chinese troops there, second was the destruction of Chinese troops in and around Changchun, and third was the surrender of Chinese troops all over Manchuria. He suggested that in destroying the Chinese troops, because of their insolence as much as their military challenge, Japan acted to preserve its "national prestige" (*kokū'i*). Sōga, originally a Mantetsu employee, was sent to investigate Mukden and Changchun one week after the outbreak of the incident. He reported finding much evidence of fighting. See Sōga Kensuke, "Kenkoku zengo no omoidasu," *MKZ* 22:10, October 1942, pp. 5-7.

artillery unit in Nanling just south of the old city, about where Jilin Industrial College stands today. While two companies and a machine gun squad set out at 3:50 AM to neutralize that threat, another company waited an hour to march fifteen hundred meters north across the tracks to engage an infantry barracks just south of the Russian station of Kuanchengzi. The barracks was an old Russian construction made of brick more than 50 centimeters thick housing 650 soldiers. The artillery unit in Nanling numbered 36 cannon and some 2,350 soldiers and was protected by a three meter high brick perimeter wall. Eschewing roads, Japanese troops approached it through *gaoliang* fields.⁵ The attack on the barracks began first, just before 5:00 AM, and at Nanling twenty-five minutes later. Both attacks carried out in the early morning hours had the element of surprise and succeeded in forcing the Chinese to flee. Japanese casualties amounted to two officers and forty-one enlisted men dead and fifty-two wounded. Another group of 320 Chinese soldiers in the old city were the next target.⁶ By the evening of the nineteenth, Changchun, the northern terminus of the SMR, was firmly in Japanese hands and units were free to move on to secure Jilin and important railway points south. From Changchun units later deployed north towards Harbin and Qiqihar in violation of directives from Tokyo.⁷

As the bombing of the rail line near Mukden station occurred at around 10:15 PM on September 18, the rapid deployment and simultaneous attacks in

⁵ Sōga reported that the cannon in Nanling were thought to have been aimed at the *fuzokuchi*. Sōga, "Kenkoku zengo no omoidasu," p. 6.

⁶ See the discussion and maps in Mantetsu Chōshun chihō jimusho, *Chōshun jijō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1932, pp. 169-72. In the discussion of the timing alone, this book, published in July 1932 and only a half year after the incident, suggests immediately the planning and coordination of forces that the Kwantung Army was so vehemently denying.

⁷ For a discussion of the wider incident see Mark R. Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West*, Princeton University Press, 1975, Sadako N. Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, and Takehiko Yoshihashi, *Conspiracy in Manchuria: The Rise of the Japanese Military*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. A provocative reappraisal that examines the incident in the imperialist milieu is Izumi Tarō, *Manshū jihen no shimjutsu*, Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1997.

Changchun betray the careful hands of the planners of the incident. In the assaults on both the barracks and the Nanling garrison the Japanese executed coordinated, enfilading maneuvers only hours after heavy fighting broke out in Mukden at 1:30 AM.⁸ The care taken around Kuanchengzi is particularly significant, for the barracks there were adjacent the Russian railway town and southern terminus of the CER. Given that the Kwantung Army was small—never a true army in size—requiring clockwork precision to bring Manchuria under Japanese control, it was understandably difficult for anyone to believe that the incident was ever the result of Chinese machinations.⁹

One of the two pretexts usually cited among the rationales behind the Manchurian Incident occurred near Changchun.¹⁰ This was the Wanbaoshan Incident, beginning in April 1931, in which Koreans and Chinese battled over land and water rights in Wanbaoshan village on the Yitong River some 18 miles south of Changchun. Koreans had long lived in Manchuria, but their new status as citizens of the Japanese empire changed their identity and brought new significance to them.¹¹ When conflict between new Korean immigrants and Chinese occurred, the Chinese authorities asked them to leave but the Japanese consular in Changchun sided with the Koreans. A Chinese mob of some four hundred farmers, seeing the Koreans as Japanese tools, responded violently and

⁸ It seems that the Chinese troops in Mukden were not even armed as Zhang Xueliang's means of avoiding conflict with the Japanese was to lock up his troops' weapons at night. See Meirion and Susie Harries, *Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army*, New York: Random House, 1991, pp. 152-4.

⁹ Other elements pointed to Japanese complicity from the outset, such as the fact that the initial bombing took place north of Mukden and not south which would have caused greater problems for Japanese transportation.

¹⁰ The other is the Lt. Nakamura affair in which Lt. Nakamura Shintarō, an intelligence officer caught spying in northern Manchuria, was executed by a Chinese firing squad in June 1931. See Izumi, *Manshū jihen no shinjutsu*, pp. 191-7.

¹¹ As part of the annexation of Korea, the 1909 Treaty of Jiandao provided that all Koreans in China were to be treated as Japanese subjects. Izumi, *Manshū jihen no shinjutsu*, pp. 186-92. Of course, the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 also encouraged Korean emigration and flight to Manchuria and helped swell their numbers there.

Japanese police had to step in to calm matters forcibly. This event ultimately served the nationalist causes of both Chinese and Japanese because it allowed for representatives of each to make their case publically and noisily, giving added impetus to both anti-Japanese Chinese nationalists and Kantōgun plotters.¹² Some Japanese already blamed Chinese restrictions for the nonfulfilment of Gotō Shimpei's dream of seeing five million Japanese migrating to Manchuria.¹³ As such the incident contributed to a general worsening of relations between Japanese and Chinese and to a climate of increasing violence in Manchuria.¹⁴

The Manchurian Incident achieved its operational goals quickly. Seizing Manchuria's vital arteries, the Kwantung Army efficiently placed itself in a position to dominate the region and attempt to remedy the deficiencies they perceived in Mantetsu's means of administering southern Manchuria. Yet while the Incident achieved success in a way that preempted immediate countermeasures, it did not do so without long-term costs detrimental to their cause. The incident dismayed important political elites in China, Europe, the Soviet Union, the United States, and, more importantly, in Japan itself. In China, the expulsion of Zhang Xueliang and his Manchurian troops made possible the 1936 Xian Incident and the second "United Front" of Communists and Nationalists. Official European and American attitudes likewise hardened. Only

¹² On demands for government action to end Chinese "outrages" see Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria*, p. 18. On the incident's context in Japan see Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, pp. 38-39.

¹³ As Mantetsu president, Gotō anticipated that the opening of sixteen Japanese ports in Manchuria would make this goal possible within twenty years. The elapse of twenty-five years, however, had witnessed only the migration of 240,000. *Report on Progress to 1934*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1934, p. 16. Of course, one of the reasons inhibiting Japanese migration was the fact that Chinese labor costs consistently undercut Japanese, a fact noted as early as 1912 in Mantetsu chōsaka, *Minami Manshū ni okeru Nippon no keizai teki seiryoku*, npl: Mantetsu, 1912, pp. 31-34.

¹⁴ Another Japanese complaint involved "bandit" raids occurring in the railway zone. Although less than one hundred occurred annually between 1906 and 1918, more than two hundred occurred each year between 1924 and 1927, with 352 in 1928 and 368 in 1929. Mantetsu estimated some 50,000 bandits—often a euphemism for communist irregulars—to be operating in Manchuria in 1930. Japanese were expending twenty million yen a year by 1930 on soldiers and police in the railway zone. See *Second Report on Progress to 1930*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1931, pp. 7, 17.

the Soviet Union acquiesced to Japanese expansion, eventually selling the CER, but they also responded by reinforcing their Manchurian borders.¹⁵ The Kwantung Army, ever fearful of a Soviet invasion, in effect made their own position in Manchuria more precarious by this act. Temporarily stronger than the thinly spread Soviet army, in the long run the Imperial Japanese Army could not hope to keep up with a determined Soviet buildup.¹⁶ Success was therefore transitory, and ultimately the affair jeopardized the very goals the Kwantung Army sought to achieve. Why did the Kantōgun perceive the need to take such drastic measures? The answer is important because it helped define the parameters for later constructions in Changchun.

The Manchurian Incident resulted from the initiative and aspirations of an activist cohort of junior officers in the Japanese Army. Their major concerns were a fear of losing Japanese possessions and influence in Manchuria to rising Chinese nationalist sentiments, a lingering fear of Soviet interference and war of revenge, and a desire to act decisively in a way that would help stabilize Japanese society in the wake of the Great Depression.¹⁷ Japanese primary goals, then, were based on geo-strategic considerations, economic needs, and domestic politics—the same motivations propelling the initial stages of Japanese imperialism. Yet underlying all in 1931 was a search for stability, something that

¹⁵ The Soviets, wishing to keep the peace on their eastern frontier, responded quickly to Japanese requests to sell the CER so as to reduce the possible sources of friction between the two spheres of influence. Yet the Soviets also more than doubled their military forces in the region and compelled mass migration to the Far Eastern Republic so as to provide an economic base capable of supporting a larger military garrison. See Stephan, *The Russian Far East*, pp. 182-7, 190-9, 212-3, 233-5, Jonathan Haslan, *The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992, and George Alexander Lensen, *The Damned Inheritance: The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Crises*, Tallahassee, FL: The Diplomatic Press, 1974.

¹⁶ On Japanese military weakness vis-a-vis the Soviets see Coox, "The Kwantung Army Dimension," pp. 422-3, and Alvin D. Coox, *Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985.

¹⁷ There were actually several attempts to separate Manchuria from China in the twenty years prior to the final incident. See Coox, "The Kwantung Army Dimension," pp. 395-409.

resulted from thirty years of imperialist occupation.¹⁸ Japanese now wanted to protect their investments. Of course, one could also argue that thirty years earlier the goal of stability was also inherent: becoming an imperialist power was a means of stabilizing Japanese society against the threat of other imperialists. Yet unlike before, in 1931 that stability was endangered not by imperialist rivalries but by Chinese nationalism and global depression. These factors changed the equation dramatically, and though the Kantōgun planners attempted to address them, in the end they failed entirely.

The Kantōgun attempted to deal with these changed circumstances in two ways, both of which only repeated versions of earlier efforts to stabilize Japanese influence in Manchuria. They involved the means of asserting Japanese dominance. First, in attempting to stabilize the imperialist system in northeast China—strictly for Japanese benefit—the plotters of the Manchurian Incident chose to use military force, the means by which Japanese established dominance in northeast China in the first place. This was nothing new. Military power has long been the primary means of deciding borders, but the clumsy way in which the planners portrayed this particular incident to the world backfired.¹⁹ It led, perhaps inescapably, to Matsuoka Yōsuke walking out of the League of Nations and Japan's ensuing international isolation despite the Lytton Commission's recognition of Japanese interests in Manchuria.²⁰ Japanese "autonomous

¹⁸ The perception that Japanese acted aggressively overseas as a means of stabilizing society at home is a recurring theme in Japanese historiography. See James Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966 and Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

¹⁹ It is important to consider why the plotters went to such pretensions at Mukden. In addition to providing a pretext the Kantōgun were probably also responding culturally. The Japanese political tradition had long sanctioned the use of legal fictions, but against the backdrop of emerging Chinese nationalism and increasing Western sympathies for China this was clearly an inappropriate choice. The incident did, however, play well in Japan. On the war fever of 1931-33 see Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, pp. 55-78.

²⁰ The Lytton report acknowledged important Japanese economic interests in Manchuria, and that "Japanese dependence on China is greater than Chinese dependence on Japan. Hence Japan

diplomacy,” as Japanese came to call it, precluded compromising and only encouraged Chinese intransigence.

It is cliché to remark that pursuing the military option, as the Kantōgun did, often leads to other, unintended wars. Still, this logic gained added meaning in the twentieth century with the growth of nationalism. The traditional means of peace settlements—the cession of land—has proved consistently unworkable when differing ethnic groups are involved. All efforts to establish peace on this basis, such as the Treaty of Versailles which put large concentrations of ethnic Germans outside German borders, failed. Similar Japanese efforts did likewise.

The Japanese use several names to describe the Pacific side of the Second World War, one of which is the “Fifteen Year War” (*jūgonen sensō*). This term implies that the Manchurian Incident was the actual start of the war between China and Japan, one that recommenced in earnest at the Marco Polo Bridge in July 1937. It is a perspective that downplays the hiatus in actual fighting between 1933 and 1937 and instead assumes long-term Japanese expansionary goals in China, emphasizing a basic continuity in Japanese policy. It ignores, however, the Tanggu Truce (May 1933) in which the Nationalist Chinese government of Jiang Jieshi acknowledged Rehe Province to be part of Manchuria, conceded control of Shanhaiguan pass to Japan, and demilitarized the area north of Beijing (at the time, Beiping) and Tianjin. It also ignores the fact that although the takeover of Manchuria was planned in detail, subsequent incidents, including the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, were not.²¹ To claim that the

is the more vulnerable and has more to lose in case of disturbed relations.” See *The Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Sino-Japanese Dispute*, The League of Nations Association of Japan, npl.: nd., p. 199 and *passim*.

²¹ Ishiwara Kanji, one of the two main plotters of the Manchurian Incident, for example, not only scorned later, poorly planned initiatives but actively, if vainly, strove to curb the actions of lower ranking officers. See Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji*. On Japanese unpreparedness for the Marco Polo Incident see Crowley, *Japan's Quest*, pp. 325-47 and Coox, “The Kwantung Army Dimension,” pp. 420-1.

Kwantung Army wanted still to expand after 1933 is to misconstrue a few trees for the larger forest. Although some elements of Japanese society, particularly in the military, did want further expansion, with the Manchurian Incident concluded at Tanggu, the upper levels of the Japanese military preferred peace. This would have allowed time to integrate newfound gains and reorganize the new "country."²²

It is significant that while the plotters of the Manchurian Incident kept their superiors informally apprised, so as to assure later approval of their actions, plotters of subsequent events in north China and Inner Mongolia later worked almost entirely in secret. This difference is crucial. While later Kwantung Army "hotheads" hoped to present the army with a *fait accompli* that they could not ignore, Ishiwara and Itagaki worked with their superiors to present the civil government with a *fait accompli*. Because the Meiji Constitution guaranteed the Army and Navy ministers the independence of supreme command (*tōsuiken dokuritsu*), Ishiwara and Itagaki did have legal, if tenuous, validity to their actions. Although Ishiwara and Itagaki could have been made the scapegoats in the event of failure, it is significant that they proceeded with a kind of high level approval that later would-be instigators of incidents lacked.

Subsequent, emulatory attempts to separate parts of China were a second unintended consequence of using military means to settle the Kantōgun's dissatisfaction with Manchuria.²³ In fact, because it contributed to Chinese rallying around Jiang Jieshi, this proved to be more immediately fatal than

²² The army purge in the wake of the February 26, 1936 Incident strengthened this position as reflected in the new Hirota government's "Fundamental Principles of National Policy." In addition to Crowley, *Japan's Quest*, see Shiroyama Saburo, *War Criminal: The Life and Death of Hirota Koki*, John Bestor, tr., Tokyo: Kodansha, 1977.

²³ Examples of unasked for actions include Doihara Kenji's several attempts to create an autonomous region under Japanese control in North China and Tanaka Ryūkichi's effort to bring about an independent Greater Mongolia under Japanese protection. See Coox, "The Kwantung Army Dimension," pp. 414-20.

pushing the Soviet Union to bolster its Asian defenses or strengthening American and British suspicions of Japanese activities. While the expulsion of the Young Marshall's troops made possible the Xian incident, it was the continued poorly planned and piecemeal activities that pushed Chinese tolerance past the breaking point. The Chinese victory in Suiyuan against one such Japanese effort bolstered Chinese confidence with regard to confronting the Imperial Army and stiffened Chinese resistance at the Marco Polo Bridge.²⁴

The second repetition in the assertion of Japanese dominance in Manchuria involved the goals of the new "state." As in the preceding era, Japanese asserted their preeminence through the creation of modernity, only this time of a new sort. The replacement of the means of administering Japanese influence produced a new definition of modernity, one more in keeping with the times. At the center of this was the replacement of bureaucrats who had staffed informal empire with those of a new breed. This new breed did not act so much upon detailed studies as it did upon idealistic commands. While Manchuria demonstrated visions of state-nurturing, Manchukuo's visions can best be described as state-dominating. The new capital was built upon this orientation.

Creating modernity in Manchukuo, however, entailed a similar goal with regard to the Chinese inhabitants. Just as Mantetsu attempted to encourage Chinese support through the fostering of local economies and the demonstration of Japanese cultural excellence via technological prowess and artistic vision, so too did the rulers of Manchukuo purpose, but on a scale far grander. In this way the Japanese empire sought to accommodate Chinese nationalism.

²⁴ Chinese wrongly assumed that the poorly trained Mongolian irregulars were Kwantung Army regulars. Coox, "The Kwantung Army Dimension," pp. 418-9, and Coox, *Nomonhan*.

The New State and its Capital

Although created by a military conspiracy and policed by a military apparatus never far away, Manchukuo was not purely a military affair. The puppet state was an experiment of greater proportions than that. Japanese publications commonly referred to the new state explicitly as “renovationist” (*kakushin*).²⁵ It thus encompassed the major reform goals of contemporary Japanese society and involved issues of state-supervised economic development, autarky, rural plight, political reform, pan-Asianism, and Japan’s role in Asia.²⁶ Prior to the incident, vocal elements of the Japanese military had much to say about these issues, but only after the incident did they finally have the opportunity to implement their prescriptions. To Manchukuo they subsequently invited leading Japanese figures in diverse fields to help organize the new society. At the same time, however, Japanese in Manchuria continued to inspire re-evaluations on their own.²⁷

The showpiece and headquarters for organizing Manchukuo was the new capital. It served as both a physical base for those ordering the new society and as a fresh landscape on which to portray concretely the aims of the new order. The capital was thus a harbinger of the new modernity—not only for China, but for Japan as well.²⁸ Many of those implementing new visions later served important roles in Japanese society at home. Tourist pamphlets encouraged visitors and provided the address and phone numbers for information and

²⁵ See, for example, Manshū jijō annai sho, ed., *Manshūkoku chihō shi*, Shinkyō: Manshū jijō annai sho, 1940, p. 1.

²⁶ See Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*, pp. 40-6.

²⁷ See, for example, the consideration of regional planning on the Guandong peninsula in Kanaya Eijirō, “Kantōshū shūkeikakurei ni tsuite,” and the newly published code, “Kantōshū shūkeikakurei,” *MKZ* 18:4, April 1938, pp. 34-42. See also the thoughtful evaluation of received concepts about urban planning in Ikeda Hiroyoshi, “Aranaru toshi keikaku he (1),” *MKZ* 18:7, July 1938, pp. 25-39, and “Aranaru toshi keikaku he (2),” *MKZ* 18:8, August 1938, pp. 27-37.

²⁸ Changchun also helped portray the Manchurian Incident to the Japanese public in a modern fashion. The January 1932 film *Ah! The Thirty-Eight Heroes of Nanling* (*Aa Nanrei no sanjūhachi yūshi*) was filmed on location in Mukden and Changchun. Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*, p. 74.

hotels. Some even provided routes through which one could most efficiently see the best sights the city had to offer, as well as transportation prices and the usual amount of time required to get around.²⁹

Economic concerns were at the heart of this new vision. Two main factors guided the new economy: state-supervised five year plans, based on the Soviet model, and economic autarky based on the conception of a self-sufficient Japan-Manchukuo economic bloc. At the time, autarkic blocs appeared to many to be the best solution to the dilemmas of the Great Depression, and talk of them appeared among economists in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy, as well as the British and French empires. These blocs, in turn, were energized by new bureaucrats that oversaw fields as diverse as industrialization, communications, agricultural improvement, and mass migration.³⁰

Manchukuo's new capital reflected both of these economic goals. Not only did buildings appropriate to housing enlightened bureaucrats have to be constructed, but Shinkyō itself was built according to five year plans.

The new capital reflected changing ideals in personnel and corporate identities too. Just as thirty years earlier the Japanese government carefully selected Gotō Shimpei and created a new kind of corporation to manage the new holdings in Manchuria, the careful selection of new bureaucrats occurred along with the creation of new companies to manage Manchukuo's development. Owing to the effects of the Great Depression, many workers also gravitated to Manchuria where they found employment.

²⁹ See, for example, Mantetsu tetsudō sōkyoku eigyōkyoku ryokakuka, ed., *Shinkyō*, Mukden: Mantetsu tetsudō sōkyoku, 1937, pp. 7-8. The number for Shinkyō information was 3-3276.

³⁰ A state-run apparatus was created to help more than five million Japanese move to Manchuria as a means of relieving population pressure, and hence, it was assumed, rural poverty. At the same time migration was assumed to be creating a new, loyal Manchukuoan peasantry. See Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, p. 44.

New visions of Manchukuo also involved political issues. Many Japanese had long commented on the inadequacies of the Meiji political system, and in the wake of the Great Depression it became increasingly difficult to defend the Meiji political system.³¹ Liberal democracy in early twentieth century Japan did not live up to what many conservatives like Gotō expected of it—devices to secure widespread political support. What was more, the Great Depression seriously discredited liberalism, making statism and fascism increasingly popular as progressive and modern alternatives.³² Of course in Manchukuo the Japanese never considered installing a liberal democracy, but at the same time they could not simply install a monarchical system.³³ Nor did they consider a new colonial arrangement as that too was considered outmoded.³⁴ The army turned instead to a monarchical system centered on Puyi combined with a mass party system through which the state could both encourage activities and keep track of its people. This was the Concordia Association, or *Kyōwakai*, which served as a model for future Japanese rule elsewhere in Asia.³⁵ More than simply an

³¹ Peter Duus, *Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, and Gordon Mark Berger, *Parties Out of Power in Japan, 1931-1941*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

³² The growth of fascism can not be ascribed simply to “structural” weaknesses. Neither was it an “historical aberration.” For a critique of the traditional literature that assumes so in the German context see David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Fascism spread in part by preaching positive and modern, not backward and feudal, rationales. See Geoff Eley, “What Produces Fascism: Preindustrial Traditions or a Crisis of a Capitalist State,” *Politics and Society* 12:1, January 1983, p. 71.

³³ To his utter frustration, Puyi was unable to wear the imperial dragon robes of the Qing dynasty, hidden safely for twenty-two years, to his 1934 coronation, though he was to the Temple of Heaven (Ch, *tiānán*; J, *tendān*; or Ch, *jiāojīchǎng*; J, *kōsaijō*) when announcing his accession. Instead he wore the dress uniform of a Grand Marshall of the Land, Sea, and Air Forces of Manchukuo, a “foreign-style uniform.” Pu Yi, *From Emperor to Citizen*, vol. 2, pp. 275-6, and Kramer, *The Last Manchu*, pp. 176-8. The Temple of Heaven is discussed below in Chapter 6.

³⁴ The two decades following the First World War showed that imperialism was increasingly less attractive as a means of organizing international affairs. Expanding colonial populations amidst the Great Depression pressed already burdened imperialist systems just as humanistic reappraisals of imperialism at home questioned its utility. See R.F. Holland, *European Decolonization, 1918-1981: An Introductory Survey*, London: Macmillan, 1985, pp. 1-33.

³⁵ See below, Chapter 8.

element of state security, this political vehicle was also an aspect of modernity in Manchukuo. Through it Japanese could effect not only mass mobilization and monitoring but also another important modernist goal, rational state planning.

State planning promised a rational reorganization of national resources in the service of the nation. As such it attracted radical theorists among the military and academia. For them, fascism was a means of social development as much as mobilization for total war.³⁶ Overseas, state planning fit well with another aspect of a new modernity, "Pan-Asianism." This was an idealized approach to international relations that posited an Asian corporate body capable of coordinated action against a Western imperialist other.³⁷ Although quietly ensuring Japan's leading role, Japanese propaganda emphasized Japanese as just one of many Asian races fighting against foreign imperialism.

Japanese perspectives like these mixed in the 1930s to form an interlocking and mutually supporting whole. Industrial development, a single mass party, state-planning, and Pan-Asianism formed the pillars of a new modernity. Underlying all, however, was a long-standing, rationalist foundation. Policies were often dependent on research, and many Japanese academics validated their research, even if historical, as scientific. This fundamental orientation did not fade. Leaping at the opportunity to study Manchukuo scientifically in 1933, the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Cultural Works Bureau (*Gaimushō bunka jigyōbu*) sponsored the largest Japanese scientific expedition ever, including professors

³⁶ See the discussions in William Miles Fletcher III, *The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982, Sheldon Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, and Andrew Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

³⁷ See Joshua A. Fogel, *Politics and Sinology: The Case of Naitō Konan (1866-1934)*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984, pp. 252-64, and Kimitada Miwa, "Japanese Policies and Concepts for a Regional Order in Asia, 1938-1940," in James W. White, Michio Umegaki, and Thomas R.H. Havens, eds., *The Ambivalence of Nationalism: Modern Japan Between East and West*, Boston: University Press of America, 1990, pp. 133-56.

from many of Japan's most prominent universities, to investigate Manchukuo between June and October. Published by Waseda University, the expedition's report covered six sections: geology, geography, botany, zoology, anthropology, and archaeology. Anachronistically, some of the members of the expedition are photographed wearing pith helmets.

The report's goals illustrate Japanese perspectives: "with mutual assistance, Japan and Manchukuo are exerting themselves to enlighten the people of the new state, and to explore the natural resources of the land....It can safely be said, however, that the general lines of Manchukuo civilization are still in a crude condition; the people can be active in no proper way to develop productive industry, mining, industry, and other important undertakings of the country." Many Manchukuoans were simply "uncivilized." Continuing generally, the report hoped that from the "angle of pure scientific observation, contributions in the cause of Asian civilization" can be made, as well as to the "industrial development of Manchukuo."³⁸ Nor did these academics labor alone: the cultural and civilizational development of the new state, including the new capital's role in that effort, was the subject of numerous publications highlighting Japanese efforts.³⁹

Manchukuo was more than simply a military-installed puppet regime. Architects contributed to this expanded meaning by blending Asian motifs and Western modernism to create a new Asian style especially for Manchukuo's new capital. Part of a larger effort hoping to confirm Japan's leading role in Asia, Japanese attempted to endow Changchun with global significance.

³⁸ Tokunaga Shigeyasu, *Dai'ichiji ManMō gaku jutsu chōsa kenkyūtan hōkoku*, Tokyo: Dai'ichiji ManMō gaku jutsu chōsa kenkyūtan hōkokutan, 16 volumes, 1934-1940, vol. 1, pp. 45-7, 53. Significantly, the commencing and concluding ceremonies of the expedition were held at Shinkyō's Shinto temple.

³⁹ Two official publications in this vein are *Manshū teikoku seifu*, *Yakushin kokuto*, npl.: KōA insatsu, 1937, and *Manshūkoku kokumin kōhōsho*, *Manchukuo: A Comprehensive Pictorial Presentation*, Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1942.

Changchun was an interesting choice for the site of the Manchukuoan capital. Before 1932, Changchun was a relative backwater, popularly called “Bean Town” (Ch, *dòudū*; J, *mame no to*).⁴⁰ Dalian was the commercial hub and longest held Japanese urban locale in Manchuria. Dalian was also Mantetsu’s headquarters. Harbin and Mukden each boasted a population of half a million, four times that of Changchun. Mukden was the budding industrial center and the home of the Manchu tombs, not to mention the former center of Zhang family power.⁴¹ Harbin sat astride the important confluence of the SMR, CER, and the Songhuajiang, and was at the center of the north Manchurian plain.⁴² Even Jilin was larger to not only Chinese but Japanese commerce. While Jilin merited a regular Japanese consulate, along with Dalian and Mukden, Changchun only received the posting of a minor diplomatic official.⁴³

Changchun’s relative isolation was significant. It meant that Changchun was free of prior connections. In Changchun the Kantōgun could bypass any lingering ties to the Zhang regime. The same could be said for Mantetsu. Since the Mantetsu offices in Changchun were relatively small, they too would require upgrading to match their new importance, putting Mantetsu and the Kantōgun on a more equal footing. Harbin of course had Russian and Soviet ties and influences, anathema to Kantōgun officers. Jilin had been the former Qing

⁴⁰ Nakano Kinjirō, “Kokuto Shinkyō no kensetsu,” *Dōro no kairyō* 15:12, December 1933, p. 166.

⁴¹ Because most of the Japanese in Manchuria outside the leased lands lived in Mukden, the choice of Changchun shocked many. The Mukden chamber of commerce went so far as to petition the Kantōgun to reconsider the choice of Changchun. Failing in that, the chamber of commerce then petitioned Mantetsu and the Manchukuo and the Japanese governments that Mukden be made into an industrial city (*kōgyō toshi*) so as to secure its future. See Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 93.

⁴² Sano Toshikata, “Manshū no kokuto kensetsu keikaku,” *TM* 17:2, August 1933, pp. 38-9.

⁴³ Before 1933 Changchun was accorded the same kind of consular office, a *ryōjikan*, as Andong, Qiqihar, and Manzhouli. In Jilin, Jiandao, Mukden, Harbin, Khabarovsk, Tianjin, and Shanghai the government posted consular offices one grade up: *sōryōjikan*. In 1933 Changchun’s office was changed to a *sōryōjikan* to reflect its new status. Gaimushō, *Gaimushō shokuin byō*, 1931, 1933.

regional center, and boasted a larger economy than Changchun, but because it was connected to the SMR by only a trunk line it was a bit inconvenient.

The choice of Changchun as the site for Shinkyō seems entirely to have been a Kantōgun decision. A top secret mission in February 1932 studied Changchun's viability. After determining what buildings would serve temporarily for the new government, the mission proceeded to Jilin to negotiate with Chinese authorities directly. The borders of the new municipality were decided at that time. The Changchun consul and local Mantetsu administrator were apparently both indignant at this act of arrogation when they heard about it.⁴⁴ Not to be left out, however, Mantetsu dispatched its own surveyors to Changchun soon thereafter, where they found a scarcity of suitable government buildings.⁴⁵ Because of the potential implicit in Changchun's position as a transportation hub, however, Mantetsu officials eventually agreed with the choice. Indeed, they found a number of reasons to support it.

One factor in the Kantōgun decision was cost.⁴⁶ Land prices around Changchun were less, precisely because it was a backwater. A February 1932 promulgation against land sales within forty *li* (twenty-four kilometers) insured this by preventing speculation.⁴⁷

Another reason was location. Changchun sat at about the center of the new country, and was well connected to not only the rest of Manchuria but to Korea as well. Six 'national highways' (Ch, *guódào*; J, *kokudō*) and three county trunks (Ch, *xìandào*; J, *kendō*) converged at Changchun. River transport via the Yitong

⁴⁴ Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 93.

⁴⁵ Nishizawa Yasuhiko, "Ōdōrakudo no katachi," in Ueno Kunikazu & Katagi Atsushi, eds., *Kenchikushi no sōzōryoku*, Kyoto: Gakugei Shuppansha, 1996, p. 131.

⁴⁶ Nakano, "Kokuto Shinkyō no kensetsu," p. 166.

⁴⁷ Nakano reports a radius of 30 *li*. See Nakano, "Kokuto Shinkyō no kensetsu," p. 167, and Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 93.

and Songhuajiang was also accessible.⁴⁸ As for rail access, to the south stretched the SMR and Dalian, while to the north ran the CER and Harbin, putting Changchun in rail contact with both Europe and Asia. Future links were also imagined. To the east lay the short railway to Jilin from where another trunk would eventually connect to Korea. A trunk northeast to Tumen was planned to open in September 1933.⁴⁹ Other lines were planned to integrate other regions of Manchuria with the main rail net.

Another reason behind the choice of Changchun involved the *fuzokuchi*. The *fuzokuchi* was Mantetsu's largest northern agricultural market.⁵⁰ Along with the old, walled city, Changchun already offered basic infrastructural necessities.⁵¹ Branch offices of all the elements of the Japanese informal empire were in place, and the old city offered a sufficiently large population base from which to recruit and organize labor. Because of its modernity, Mantetsu's Gomibuchi Hajime suggested that the *fuzokuchi* could serve well as Shinkyō's "vestibule" (*genkan*).⁵²

A final reason Mantetsu agreed with the location of the capital in Changchun involved future plans for national development. The untapped potential of Manchuria lay north, not south.⁵³ Judging by the enormous number of studies

⁴⁸ See Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Shinkyō toshi kensetsu hōsaku*, npl: np, 1935 (*STKH*), pp. 17-18, 24-28, 46-8, Sano, "Manshū no kokuto kensetsu keikaku," p. 39, and Sano Toshikata, "Manshū no kokuto kensetsu," *Kensetsu zasshi* 47: 575, September 1933, p. 1245.

⁴⁹ Nakano, "Kokuto Shinkyō no kensetsu," p. 166.

⁵⁰ *STKH*, p. 25. Nakano suggested Changchun was the largest agricultural market in all of Manchuria. Nakano, "Kokuto Shinkyō no kensetsu," p. 166.

⁵¹ CCB chief architect Sōga Kensuke thought that since there were not quite 10,000 Japanese living in the Changchun area, sufficient surplus housing and structures suitable for government use existed that could be appropriated. This would allow for rapid growth, even if many of the buildings were small, "substandard" (*fujaku*), and unsanitary Chinese structures. As it turned out, because of military appropriations and since Chinese accommodations proved worse than expected, initially there was a housing shortage. Officials had to sleep four or five to a four and one-half tatami mat sized room, unable to separate public life from private. Sōga, "Kenkoku zengo no omoidasu," pp. 7-8.

⁵² *STKH*, pp. 27-8.

⁵³ Gomibuchi called attention to the potential for expansion in Qiqihar and "Tairai"—a Qing dynasty term for eastern Heilongjiang—as early as October 1932 in *STKH*, p. 25.

carried out before and after the Manchurian incident, northern Manchuria was the natural choice for future development. Indeed, northern Manchuria was eventually where the bulk of Japanese immigration was encouraged. The central region south of Manchuria was at this point more or less occupied, and expanding east or west would have brought colonists into more mountainous and less productive terrain. Northern Manchuria offered vast open spaces upon which to build. The biggest difficulty, outside of the climactic extremes, was the continued Soviet presence along the CER. But locating the capital city on the CER could only increase the pressure to secure a Soviet withdrawal from northern Manchuria, including the CER, something the Kantōgun had long desired. Indeed, with the Manchurian Incident Japanese began pressing for the CER's handover almost immediately. In January 1935 the Soviet Union agreed to sell, but did not officially hand the railway over to Mantetsu control until March 1935, at which point the CER became the North Manchuria Railway (*Hoku-Man tetsudō*).⁵⁴ Japanese quickly switched its gauge so that it matched Mantetsu's.

Along with gaining control of the CER, locating the capital at Changchun could also influence the only metropolitan area in Manchuria not under Japanese dominance—Harbin. As part of the CER, Harbin had to that point carried on a more or less autonomous existence, outside of the control of Chinese, Japanese, or even Soviet authorities.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ The negotiations can be found in George Alexander Lensen, *The Damned Inheritance: The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Crises*, Tallahassee, FL: The Diplomatic Press, 1974, pp. 212-334. An excellent analysis of initial Soviet weakness and appeasement of Japan can be found in Jonathan Haslan, *The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992, pp., 5-24, 42-8. Both show that the Kwantung Army in fact controlled much of the railroad and acted with impunity along it in the course of tracking down those who opposed the Manchurian Incident, and that rather than face further humiliations or even the possibility of a Japanese preemptive invasion the Soviets felt it better to acquiesce to Japanese demands. As noted above though, this only encouraged Soviet military preparations on Manchukuo's borders.

⁵⁵ See the discussion in David Wolff, *To the Harbin Station: The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898-1914*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, John J. Stephan, *The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925-1945*, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978, and Viktor Petrov, *Gorod na Sungari*, Washington D.C.: Russko-Amerikanskoe istoricheskoe obshchestvo,

Being further inland presented a possible benefit that did not appear in the various discussions of the new capital: distance from the coast afforded greater military security. Ishiwara Kanji once hypothesized that since Japan was an island country in the coming age of "total war" the Japanese archipelago might be impossible to hold and defend, thus necessitating the transference of the Japanese state to the Asian mainland.⁵⁶ A location away from the coast, before the age of long-range heavy bombers, was safer. And while Dalian was vulnerable to attack from rival navies, Mukden was vulnerable to attack from communist and warlord guerrillas, as well as conceivably from China proper. Changchun was further from the Great Wall and in the open range of the Manchurian plateau, away from both other large settlements and China proper. It was also still a great distance from the Soviet border.⁵⁷

Yet another possible consideration was that, unlike the industrial centers of Mukden and Dalian, Changchun's population was not large enough to support extensive communist activities. Mao Zedong and the Eighth Route Army were at this time still experimenting with the possibilities of rural revolution in Jiangsi, and the threat of peasant guerrillas was not as yet considered.

Most significant, however, and a thread implicit in all discussions of the new capital, was that Changchun provided a clean slate. Uninhabited terrain meant complete freedom—there would be no need to compromise with either Chinese or Japanese rivals in this new space. There was room to grow on the wide,

1984. Harbin itself could not become the new capital because, as one official suggested, it would not have been appropriate given that 60,000 Russians lived there. Sano, "Manshū no kokuto kensetsu keikaku," p. 39.

⁵⁶ Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji*.

⁵⁷ Perhaps a concern for air attacks is present. See *STKH*, p. 1. On the other hand, it was not until 1937 that rapid (less than four days) mail service between Tokyo and London was established, and thus a consideration for air power may not have been important before that. When this link was established, however, it was apparently celebrated as joyously as Lindbergh's crossing of the Atlantic because it meant an end to Japan's geographic isolation. Percy Noël, *When Japan Fights*, Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1937, pp. 161-3.

unused space due south of the railway town and southwest of the Chinese city. Manchuria meant to many Japanese a new beginning, something not unlike what the American West meant to American pioneers.⁵⁸ The creation of a shining vision where once was nothing implied that *everything* was to be new and inferentially better—modernity’s most dominating motif. It was thus a vision that could beckon to others. The new city was to be spacious, in contrast to Tokyo and elsewhere, and to represent the new, lofty ideals of a new kind of civilization and Pan-Asian spirit. Changchun, in effect, provided a physical *tabula rasa* upon which a variety of reformist dreams could be erected—a contemporary Xanadu. Even the name bespeaks this purpose. This was not just to be a “northern capital” (Beijing), a “southern capital” (Nanjing), an “eastern capital” (Tōkyō) or even another “capital city” (Kyōto).⁵⁹ This was to be an expressly “new” (Ch, *xīn*; J, *shin*) capital, and as such was to symbolize the dawn of a new age. Focusing explicitly on the city’s newness, Onoki Toshiharu, chairman of the organization that published the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* suggested that the new country and capital were without precedent in world history.⁶⁰ The new city was even to surpass those in Japan.⁶¹ Oka Ōji, vice chair to Onoki and a professor at the South Manchurian College of Engineering, hoped the city would display the “culture of modern technology” at its finest.⁶²

Bureaucrats arriving in the new capital absorbed this spirit. Arriving in July 1932, newly appointed Manchukuoan Finance Minister Hoshino Naoki found not only wider, more open fields of *gaoliang* than he did in southern Manchuria

⁵⁸ A contemporary perspective on the merged development of industry, education, and the colonies for Japan is James A. B. Scherer, *Japan’s Advance*, Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1935.

⁵⁹ The character *jīng* in Mandarin is the same as *kyō* in Japanese, meaning “capital.”

⁶⁰ Onoki Toshiharu, “Manshūkoku shuto kensetsu ni tsuite,” *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932, p. 3.

⁶¹ This is apparent in discussions in the *STKH*, particularly with regard to the use of space. See Chapter 6 below.

⁶² “*Gendai gijutsu bunka.*” Oka Ōji, “Manshūkoku shuto kensetsu ni kansuru toshi keikaku narabi ni kenchiku ni taisuru iken,” *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932, p. 8.

but also no parties of welcome. This was fine, he thought, because everyone seemed to him to be caught up in the spirit of establishing a new country.⁶³

Changchun provided practical logistics, comparative safety, and, most of all open space. It was, however, noticeably colder than many cities, something Japanese had already learned. Situated at 43.55 degrees north and 125.18 degrees east, at an elevation between 200 and 240 meters, the city was consistently cooler year round than Seoul, Vladivostok, or even Moscow. It was at least dry in the winter, although not so in late summer. Average temperatures in December and January were minus 17.3 and minus 14.2 Celsius respectively.⁶⁴ Japanese ingenuity would be tested in this and other ways in order to render the new city a “kingly paradise.” The climate did not suit traditional Japanese architecture.

A November 1932 (Datong 1) municipal publication, the *Shinkyō shisei gaiyō* (An Outline of Shinkyō’s Municipal Government), provides a good idea of some of the ideas the new city was to embody. The eventual goal was “a modern and civilized national capital (*gendaiteki bunmei kokuto*) that could function as the focal point for the citizens’ culture, government, and economy.”⁶⁵ Embodied in the new capital were concerns for politics, administration, and aesthetics. Another thing that impressed the reader was the scale of the enlarged city—pre-1932 Changchun was less than a twenty-fifth of the planned city.⁶⁶ A central axis road dropped due south from Changchun station for a distance of several kilometers (see Figure 1.4). Until just beyond the *fuzokuchi*, on the east side of that road lay the old city, but farther south opened new space for housing, colleges, and parks. To the west, but east of the SMR tracks, lay the spacious allotment for government offices, more parks, and the imperial palace. West of the railway

⁶³ Hoshino, *Mihatenu yume*, p. 22.

⁶⁴ *STKH*, pp. 29-31.

⁶⁵ *Shinkyō tokubetsushi kōsho*, *Shinkyō shisei gaiyō*, Shinkyō: np, 1932, p. i.

⁶⁶ *Shinkyō tokubetsushi kōsho*, *Shinkyō shisei gaiyō*, p. 3.

was additional space for housing, a race track, and an airport. South of the axis road lay more park land and north of the station (and infant industrial zone) lay the radiotelegraph platform. Surrounding all was an enormous greenbelt.

Not only anticipating population growth, planners also took into consideration changing sources of construction materials as well as expected future administrative changes, such as the need to levy taxes. They therefore included plans for employment and other facilities along with sewage, education, housing, sanitation, transportation, and hospitals from the outset.

The planners of the new capital had a large corpus of urban theory with which to work. Le Corbusier's visions of a renewed Paris and Burley Griffin's plans for Canberra were known, and as the decade progressed other projects in fascist countries focused on redefining the state spatially.⁶⁷ Beginning in 1929, Jiang Jieshi also began replanning Nanjing as a new national capital, and the 1930s witnessed large, urban projects in Osaka.⁶⁸ The creation of a new capital at Changchun represented one of many efforts around the world attempting to demonstrate state power through the built environment.

In contrast to some of these other efforts, Shinkyō differed in that it was entirely planned. Real estate brokers were not permitted to operate in the capital so as to avoid what were thought to be the undue effects of unrestrained capitalism.⁶⁹ Shinkyō's modernity was of the variant that later became dominant in Japan itself, that of the military and its concern for complete planning in preparation for total war.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ See Peter Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.

⁶⁸ A contemporary Japanese perspective of Shanghai is Yoshimura Tokio, "Shanghai no toshi keikaku," *Gendai kenchiku*, 4, September 1939, pp. 26-35.

⁶⁹ Nakano, "Kokuto Shinkyō no kensetsu," p. 166.

⁷⁰ See, for example, the discussion in Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*, pp. 136-61 and Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, pp. 116-56.

The spirit of the times is summed up nicely in the timely *ShinManshū he no rihyō* (*Milestones on the Way to the New Manchuria*) by Senta Manzō, published in May 1932 in part by the Mantetsu Employee Society (*Mantetsu shainsha*). Written in the immediate aftermath of the Manchurian Incident, Senta tried to show logical reasons for establishing a new order in Manchuria outside of the purely defensive ones stated by the military. Looking at the past, he examines the general political and economic situation to show that the former was unstable and the latter was too important to leave unstable. He then goes on, however, to discuss the two potentialities that are at the heart of the creation of Manchukuo: economic gain and cultural leadership. Generally speaking, under Japanese leadership, not only Japan, but the Chinese who live in Manchuria would benefit. Education, sanitation, and social institutions would all stand to improve, indeed as they already had to a certain extent. In this way Japan would be fulfilling *la mission civilisatrice*, although Senta's phrasing is more absolute: creating "daybreak amid the chaos" (*konton yori reimei he*).⁷¹

Japanese administrators flocked to Manchukuo.⁷² Many promoted Japanese efforts in popular journals. Architects did the same. Many, like Waseda professor Satō Takeo, noted that because Manchukuo's defining characteristics were control and planning, Manchukuo's architecture would naturally follow its political nature.⁷³ Others discussed Manchukuo more grandly, basing their arguments on what happened in Shinkyō. In January 1937, Naitō Tarō described in the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* how Manchukuo's new capital, as a "modern, idealistic city" (*gendai risōteki no toshi*), was helping to renovate (*kakumei*) not

⁷¹ Senta Manzō, *ShinManshū he no rihyō*, Tokyo: Senshinsha, 1932, p. 187 and *passim*. Senta's book was by no means the only work at this time of this sort—in fact Senta noted that by the end of 1931 over a hundred books were available on the Manchurian Question alone. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁷² For a discussion of the transfer of experienced bureaucrats from Japan to Manchukuo in the construction industry see Nishizawa Yasuhiko, "Manshūkoku no kensetsu jigyō," pp. 383-88, in Yamamoto Yūzō, ed., "Manshūkoku" no kenkyū, Tokyo: Ryokuin shobō, 1995.

⁷³ Sanō Takeo, "Manshūkoku no kenchiku ni tsuite," *MKZ* 22:11, November 1942, p. 8.

only architectural forms but civilization itself. As such, Manchukuo was portrayed with almost a religious fervor, as a “newly rising country” (*shinkō kuni*).⁷⁴ Writing in 1942, Sōga Kensuke, originally a Mantetsu man but the Capital Construction Bureau’s first head architect, considered Manchukuo’s development to be a “global wonder” (*zen sekai no kyō’i*) that, with the conclusion of the war with China, would become a model (*shihan*) for the Chinese Republic.⁷⁵ Tōdai professor Kishida Hidetō went even further. To him it seemed that Japanese military and state-building activities in Manchuria were somehow restarting Asian history.⁷⁶ Other propaganda reinforced these perspectives through pictures and discussions of key projects not only in the new capital but throughout the new state. Works of this genre equated an explicitly “modern” capital with a “new” architecture with projects like the new Shuifeng dam on the Yalu River (the world’s largest at that point), enormous industrial undertakings, and sleek Mantetsu trains. Most works like this also emphasized youth. Photographs and discussions of youthful participants in military, athletic, and political events figure prominently.⁷⁷

Once a slow-growing frontier post “on the northern edge of southern Manchuria,” Changchun suddenly burst into the limelight as the representative of a new order.⁷⁸ For five years, between 1932 and 1937, the Japanese empire experienced relative peace, granting the new state the opportunity to demonstrate its virtues and earn public support. Despite rapid growth, however,

⁷⁴ Naitō Tairō, “Yakushin Manshūkoku no bunka to kenchiku,” *MKZ* 17:1, January 1937, pp. 4-5.

⁷⁵ Sōga, “Kenkoku zengo no omoidasu,” p. 7.

⁷⁶ “[N]antonaku Ajia no atarashii rekishi ga hajimari s[ō] na tairiku no utsurikawari ni kokorohikarete....” Kishida Hidetō, “Manshūkoku kenkoku jūshūnen to sono kenchiku,” *MKZ* 22:11, November 1942, p. 1.

⁷⁷ The association between modernity, gigantism, youth, and the military was commonplace. See, for example, *Manshūkoku kokumuin kōhōsho, Manchukuo: A Comprehensive Pictorial Presentation*, Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1942.

⁷⁸ This was how the planners perceived Changchun’s location. *STKH*, p. 25.

on the whole the visions Shinkyō embodied failed. More significant, despite the enormous construction projects and avowedly progressive manner in which Japanese ran the new state, it remained second class news in Japan. There were two reasons for this. One involved the nature of the visions for the new capital. Overly idealized, neither the puppet state nor its capital attracted genuine, mass appeal. The second reason was that after June 1937 renewed war in China overshadowed Manchuria. Finding itself in conditions of wartime scarcity, the capital's development after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident necessarily slowed. So extensive were the initial undertakings, however, that it was not until 1940 that construction expenditures there and in the new state as a whole declined.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Indeed, construction in the new capital may have accounted for over half of the construction costs in all of Manchukuo. See Fueki Hideo, "Gyōkai no konjyaku," *MKZ* 22:11, November 1942, pp. 42-3.

Chapter 6. Planning Manchukuo's Capital

Urban planning in Manchuria under the supervision of Gotō Shimpei and his associates revealed an internationalist, though primarily Western, inclination. Since in their view Japan was a Great Power, their urban constructions reflected a character similar to the other Powers, a perspective that continued through the nineteen-twenties. Japan only struck out on a different path in 1932, one that consciously rejected some of the forms of Western imperialism in favor of new ones they thought might appeal to or impress the native population more forcefully. The new capital thus served important propagandistic purposes aimed at the residents of Manchuria. The planners, however, simultaneously dreamed bigger than that, and intended that the new capital serve also as a model for the rest of Asia, including Japan. Suddenly the center stage for the assertion of a new state and society, Changchun displayed visions that entailed continental and even global implications.

Planners consequently endowed Shinkyō with new forms reflecting new ideals, yet many of the fundamental goals were the same as in the previous era. Still attempting to integrate Manchuria more closely into the empire, Japanese hoped to organize it more efficiently in ways that would inspire changes in Japan itself. As such, the new capital continued to serve as a stage for nationalistic statements of Japanese modernism. At the same time, however, Manchukuo was also a means of appealing to Chinese. Yet while it asserted certain traditional Chinese conceptions, the puppet state did so through the vocabulary of modernity. Thus, in constructing Manchukuo's new capital, planners showed that the new order in Manchuria continued to

depend upon a modernist vision based on rational progress and material development. The chief difference was in kind. While the *fuzokuchi* demonstrated Western affinities, the new capital attempted to express pan-Asianism. In doing so, however, planners demonstrated that ideal to be but a trapping. A more overriding goal was exhibiting state power and authority. Behind the carrots of Asian harmony and material progress lay an organized and efficient administrative stick.

This did not, however, preclude non-Asian approval of the new capital. An American geographer visiting Changchun in 1947 could not help praising Japanese constructions. He found Changchun to be a city with "wide boulevards and elm-lined streets; parks dot the city and its suburbs; large modern buildings of brick, concrete and stone rise from what was the site of soy bean farms."¹ Although designed with propagandistic ideals in mind, the new capital could appeal to an American geographer because it manifested a modernity that was not altogether foreign. In creating a city both technologically advanced and aesthetically appealing, Japanese planners utilized not only wartime ideals but also the lessons derived from a global debate on the urban milieu that appeared in the interwar era. Thus, Changchun after 1932 continued to serve as a laboratory for Japanese urban planning and was not simply a wartime contrivance.

An Imperial Capital

Although it reflected the hopes and aspirations numerous planners and architects, the capital's planning was the product of a small group.² Just as

¹ Norton Ginsburg, "Ch'ang-ch'un," *Economic Geography* 23:4, 1947, pp. 290-307.

² The June 1932 (12:6) issue of the *MKZ* was devoted to the new capital and displayed a range of thought then current. Still, many emphasized that the cumulative experience of Japanese endeavors throughout Manchuria helped shape the city's design.

one generation of Japanese created the Changchun *fuzokuchi* by company directive, another created the new capital by executive fiat. This proved to be the exception in Manchukuo, however, as only the construction of Shinkyō and the new port at Dadong at the mouth of the Yalu River were under the direct control of the prime minister and the Manchukuo Government. Other cities were left to determine their own plans, although it was assumed they would follow the new capital's lead. Not only did this mean only these two locales eventually met the puppet government's expectations, but, according to Koshizawa, they may have been more progressive and 'rational' (*gōriteki*) than any large scale project at the time in Japan itself.³

The new capital and its environs was a 'special municipality' (Ch, *tèbié shì*; J, *tokubetsu shi*), an administrative zone outside any provincial jurisdiction.⁴ Its construction proceeded under the supervision of a special agency, the Capital Construction Bureau (CCB: Ch, *gúodū jiànshè jú*; J, *kokuto kensetsu kyoku*).⁵ Its directives were published in June 1933, betraying the influence of a number Mantetsu architects.⁶ Mantetsu's Economic Research Bureau and the Kantōgun, however, also played a role in designing the city.⁷ Most of the

³ Koshizawa Akira, "Shinkyō to Daitōkō no kensetsu kōsō," *Doboku gakkaiishi*, 78:8, July 1993, p. 22. The twin goals of progressiveness and rationality are themes Koshizawa found throughout Japanese colonial urban planning, beginning with Gotō Shimpei. See Koshizawa, "Taiwan, Manshū, Chūgoku no toshi keikaku," pp. 184, 207.

⁴ Initially Shinkyō and Harbin were the only two such zones, but a September 1937 reorganization left only Shinkyō with that designation.

⁵ For an account of its own early days see *Manshū teikoku rinji kokuto kensetsu kyoku, Kokuto kensetsu ni tsuite*, Tokyo: Manshū teikoku rinji kokuto kensetsu kyoku, 1940, pp. 25-30 and *passim*. The Capital Construction Bureau was only one of many boards established to develop the country in a rational manner. The *Kensetsu jigyō keikaku* (Construction Industry Plan) and the *Sangyō richi keikaku* (Location of Industry Plan), for example, provided similar guidance for specific projects within the National Economic Development Outline (*Manshūkoku keizai kensetsu kōyō*). See Nishizawa, "Manshūkoku no kensetsu jigyō," and Chapter 8 below.

⁶ Manshikai, ed., *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi*, supplement, p. 312.

⁷ Kantōgun surveyors assisted in mapping out the new city. Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p.112. Although willing to work with Mantetsu officials in developing Shinkyō, however, because of the Soviet threat the military was not as compromising when it came to other projects, such as planning railroads and highways elsewhere in Manchukuo essential to

urban planners involved were young, in their forties, and many would later achieve prominence in Japan.⁸ Some, like Sano Toshikata, were already prominent, having participated in the reconstruction of Tokyo or worked in other government bureaus.⁹ Many had contributed articles to the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* or the *Toshi kōron*. In fact, some were members of the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* association—in November 1932 the CCB sent a written request to the president asking that five men be allowed to work with the new board.¹⁰

Kantōgun officials began investigating Changchun in February 1932. Mantetsu organized a committee to study the capital's construction the following month.¹¹ Representing Manchukuo, the CCB became official in April under the leadership of Maruyama Etsurō, but it too began meeting unofficially in March. The general manager was Yūki Seitarō. Meeting

the new state's defense. See Nishizawa, "Manshūkoku no kensetsu jigyō," 1995, p. 408. Sōga Kensuke recalled having to submit to military authority for certain decisions, as well as the "confusion" (*konran*) that entailed. Sōga, "Kenkoku zengo no omoidasu," p. 9.

⁸ The CCB included Mizoe Satsuki, a 1916 graduate of Hokkaido University who, having studied also at the Universities of Wisconsin and Chicago, worked in the Osaka municipal government before coming to Manchuria. At the time of the Manchurian Incident, Mizoe was chairman of the Mukden Government Construction Office. Another was Kondō Yasukichi, a 1916 Tōdai graduate who worked on the reconstruction of Tokyo.

⁹ Most were Tōdai graduates, though some were graduates of Kyoto or Waseda Universities. On the backgrounds of some see Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta Nihonjin kenchikuka*, 106-19. The Manchukuo government employed many Japanese officials, especially men from the important Home and Communications ministries. See Nishizawa, "Manshūkoku no kensetsu jigyō."

¹⁰ The five to work under Sōga Kensuke were Oka Ōji (later president of the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* association), Suzuki Masao (Tokyo Industrial College, 1911), Kariya Tadama (Waseda University, 1914), Mita Nobuske (Tōkyō kōtō kōgyō gakkō fusetsu kyōin yōseiyo, 1905), and Osono Tadasuke. See Oka Ōji, "Manshū kenkoku jūnen to kenchiku zakkan," MKZ 22:10, October 1942, pp. 2. Sōga himself was a Mantetsu employee, sent to investigate Mukden and Changchun one week after the Manchurian Incident. Sōga Kensuke, "Kenkoku zengo no omoidasu," MKZ 22:10, October 1942, p. 5.

¹¹ Mantetsu's committee included Mukden railway department vice-chairman Gomibuchi Hajime, a 1912 Tōdai graduate and postwar mayor of Yokote, Aichi Prefecture, and Orishita Yoshinobu, a former parks section head in the Tokyo reconstruction bureau. Orishita was invited to Manchuria at the behest of Sogō Shinji, then a Mantetsu employee but also a 1909 Tōdai graduate, a long time associate-of Gotō Shimpei, and "father" of the postwar bullet train. For others, as well as an idea of the maneuvering that occurred in the organization of Mantetsu's independent study group, see Sōga, "Kenkoku zengo no omoidasu," p. 7.

jointly in August, October, and November, the three committees decided upon the city's general outlines. The CCB completed the final plan in December and submitted it to the Prime Minister in January 1933. Manchukuo's State Council ratified it the same month and promulgated it as law in April.¹² A degree of urgency was apparent.¹³ Until agreeing upon Shinkyō's new form, urban projects elsewhere remained on hold.

Some of the suggestions made by the Kantōgun and Mantetsu planners in the fall of 1932 were published in 1935 as the *Shinkyō toshi kensetsu hōsaku* (*Plans for the Construction of Shinkyō*; hereafter *STKH*), one of a series of publications on urban planning that included Mukden, Harbin, Tumen, Beian, and Mudanjiang.¹⁴ Although it does not include the city's final plan, perhaps demonstrating Mantetsu's growing political marginality, the *STKH* does provide some insight into the debate on Shinkyō's planning. In it, planners agreed that the new capital would be modern and rational, but also that it was to be more than a capital. On one hand, constructing Shinkyō was not simply building a new city at Changchun. It was the building of a focused and unified government for Manchukuo's thirty millions, requiring that planners carefully construct a "grand appearance" (*iyō*) for the new national executive. On the other hand, planning Shinkyō also included concerns for

¹² An official list of pertinent meetings and key representatives is Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Shinkyō toshi kensetsu hōsaku*, npl: Mantetsu(?), 1935, pp. i-iv, a list Koshizawa supplements in Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 93-5, 110-11. Sano Toshikata reported that the plan's main features were already decided by the summer of 1932 and that although the law was not promulgated until April, it became legal in February. The rapid, large scale construction occurring thereafter reminded him of the rebuilding of Tokyo after the earthquake of 1923. Sano Toshikata, "Manshū no kokuto kensetsu keikaku," *TM* 17: 2, August 1933, p. 51.

¹³ Despite living like "canned goods" (*kanzume*), Sōga recalled himself and others initially working often from seven in the morning until two at night, and sometimes all night. Sōga, "Kenkoku zengo no omoidasu," p. 8.

¹⁴ Mantetsu published discussions similar to the *STKH* on these five cities as well as a general guide to planning Manchurian towns: Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū toshi kensetsu ippan hōsaku*, npl: Mantetsu, 1935.

the city's economy, public peace, and air defense.¹⁵ Shinkyō was not simply to be a capital for a puppet government, but a planned metropolis—a city on a hill. As such, public discussions of the city's plans occurred in a number of journals.¹⁶

In the *STKH*, the Kantōgun delegation introduced discussion of the new city with a declaration that the city should provide a firm economic foundation for its expected future population. While the current population was thought to be around 150,000, planners expected it to reach 500,000 within twenty years. This was the usual minimum size for capital cities around the world, observed Yūki in a later article.¹⁷ The military wanted growth to occur in “an orderly fashion” (*chitsujo aru hatten*) as well as under “municipally unified supervision” (*toshi keikakusha kikan no tōsei ni*).¹⁸ At the crossroads of seven major highways, the new capital's role as an important hub city was also not forgotten.¹⁹ Mantetsu's proposals, put forward by Gomibuchi Hajime, agreed. Shinkyō was to be the “capital of a rising Manchukuo” (*shinkō Manshūkoku no shuto toshite*) and to be a “modern, civilized city” (*kindaiteki bunmei toshi*) where growth was “controlled” (*tōsei aru hatten*).²⁰ While the military and the CCB proposed building Shinkyō

¹⁵ *STKH*, pp. i, 17.

¹⁶ See, “Manshūkoku kokuto kensetsu keikaku gaiyō,” *MKZ* 13:11, November 1933, pp. 34-40. A map on p. 35 shows just how the new city interlocked with existing construction.

¹⁷ Yūki Seitarō, “Kokuto dai-Shinkyō kensetsu to nisan no mondai,” *Manshū gijutsu kyōkaishi*, 10:58, October 1934, p. 548, and Yūki Seitarō, “Kokuto kensetsu no kaiko to tenbō,” *MKZ* 14:2, February 1934, pp. 35-7. Yūki validated a number of decisions for Shinkyō's future based on comparisons with Tokyo and Washington, DC.

¹⁸ *STKH*, p. 6. At Shinkyō's founding, there were 38,700 residing in the *fuzokuchi*, including 17,000 Japanese (2,400 were Koreans), 21,300 Manchukuoans, and 450 foreigners. In the old city and *shangbu* there were 106,600 Manchukuoans. Roughly 5,000 people lived in Kuanchengzi, and some 50,500 in the surrounding countryside. Shinkyō's growth was expected to average about 30,000 people per year. Nakano, “Kokuto Shinkyō no kensetsu,” p. 166.

¹⁹ *STKH*, p. 10.

²⁰ *STKH*, p. 24. Mantetsu planners expected, however, much more vigorous growth than the military, given the experience of other political cities elsewhere in the world. *STKH*, pp. 17,

according to five-year plans, something to which Mantetsu only eventually relented, all agreed on the need for zoning control.²¹ The ultimate goal, in Gomibuchi's words, was an "ideally planned region" (*risō teki yotei chi'iki*).²² Careful planning was also a common theme among the members of the Manchurian Construction Association.²³

Planners endowed Shinkyō with a spacious two hundred square kilometers that included all of the existing urban locales around Changchun.²⁴ The generous size was to avoid the "cancers" (*gan*) apparent in other large cities.²⁵ Planners also agreed to proceed gradually; half of the two hundred square kilometers was reserved for future projects. The first five year plan, however, focused only on twenty square kilometers, ten square kilometers each for public and private use (Table 6.1), though the total area ultimately developed in the first five-year plan came to 21.4 square kilometers. In comparison, the old city of Changchun encompassed about eight square kilometers, the Japanese *fuzokuchi* five, the *shangbu* four, and the Russian *fuzokuchi* at Kuanchengzi four. Subtracting these twenty-one square kilometers from the initial one hundred, seventy-nine square kilometers of nearly empty land were ready for development in the very near future.²⁶ The reason behind this large size was that planners expected an

19, 24. *Shinkō* is a term often used to describe new religions, and if considered in that vein captures some of the enthusiasm apparent to planners' energies in creating Shinkyō.

²¹ Five year plans are put forward on *STKH*, pp. 9, 78, 81, 90, 94, 97-9, 117. The military proposed four kinds of residential zoning (based on population density), three commercial (wholesale, retail, and 'trading' [*shōkan*]), two industrial (heavy and light industry), and one special (agricultural). *STKH*, p. 10.

²² *STKH*, p. 26.

²³ See the various articles in the special issue devoted to the new capital, *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932.

²⁴ To compare, Tokyo originally included only eighty square kilometers. Sano, "Manshū no kokuto kensetsu keikaku," p. 42.

²⁵ *STKH*, pp. 6, 103.

²⁶ Only occasional farmhouses were preexisting. Sōga Kensuke reported some resistance by those who lost their farmlands, including one suicide by an old woman refusing to lose the land farmed by her ancestors for two hundred years. Sōga, "Kenkoku zengo no omoidasu," p. 9.

influx of between one hundred and one hundred and twenty thousand people.²⁷

Table 6.1 Construction in the First Five Year Plan (km²)

Palace and Administration	2.0	Residential	6.5
Public Facilities	1.5	Commercial	2.0
Parks	2.0	Industrial	1.0
Roads	4.5	Agriculture and Livestock	0.5

Source: *STKH*, p. 9, and Kokumuin kokuto kensetsukyoku sōmusho, ed., *Kokuto dai Shinkyō*, Mukden: Manshū teikoku kokumuin kokuto kensetsukyoku sōmusho, 1934, third edition, p. 13

As to the specific recommendations for development, despite eight months of negotiations the Kantōgun and Mantetsu planners remained in partial disagreement (see Table 6.2). Assuming Kantōgun planners intended that land set aside for agriculture and animal husbandry was for producing daily needs in locations near homes, that figure can be included with residential use, making a combined figure roughly equivalent to those of Mantetsu's plans. Other than that discrepancy, the military wanted more land for government offices, industry, and their own use, while Mantetsu wanted more land for commerce, parks, and infrastructure. Yūki, general affairs manager (*sōmu shochō*) of the CCB, believed that Shinkyō could manage with less of an economic emphasis than Mantetsu suggested. Both Tokyo and Washington D.C. were large capital cities that allowed nearby cities like Osaka and New York to dominate commerce.²⁸ At the same time, Yūki

²⁷ *STKH*, p. 78, 92, Kokumuin kokuto kensetsu kyoku sōmusho, ed., pp. 9-11, and Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 100, 104.

²⁸ Yūki, "Kokuto dai-Shinkyō kensetsu to nisan mondai," p. 548. An official CCB publication repeated this assertion, saying that Anshan and Fushun could serve for Shinkyō as Osaka and Kitakyūshū served Tokyo. *Manshūkoku seifu kokumu'in kokuto kensetsu kyoku, Kokuto dai-Shinkyō*, npl: np, 1933, p. 11.

thought that Shinkyō could mature into a city for Asians (*Tōyōjin*) in much the same way that Edo became Tokyo for Japanese.²⁹

Table 6.2 Proposed Proportions for Land Use in Shinkyō

	<u>Kantōgun</u>	<u>Plan 1</u>	<u>Plan 2</u>	<u>Plan 3</u>	<u>First Five Year Plan</u>
Palace and Administration	6.5	4.43	5.08	6.56	11.9
Military	9.0	3.44	3.68	2.55	—
Residential	27.0	35.75	40.50	39.20	28.0
Commercial	8.0	10.80	9.78	9.71	11.0
Industrial	6.0	4.79	5.00	4.97	6.0
Parks	7.0	8.68	10.00	10.66	13.0
Public Facilities	3.5	4.76	5.00	3.18	see note
Communications	—	10.11	10.25	10.18	—
Agriculture and Livestock	12.0	—	—	—	—
Roadways	21.0	19.23	18.58	18.26	22.0

Sources: Figures for the first four columns are from *STKH*, pp. 8-10, 21-2, and Kokumuin kokuto kensetsu kyoku sōmusho, ed., *Kokuto dai Shinkyō*, p. 14. The last column is from Nagami, "Manshūkoku sandai toshi no kōen," p. 31.³⁰

Relative priorities reflected divergent opinions over what constituted Manchukuo's modernity. Given the military's initially stated desire to create a sound economic backbone for the new city, the desire to create a new

²⁹ Yūki's thoughts included the central political role Tokyo served. Shinkyō would similarly gather banks and other policy makers. See Yūki, "Kokuto kensetsu no kaiko to tenbō," p. 35.

³⁰ These figures represent the proportions for the first 21.4 square kilometers built during the first five-year plan. The figures for public facilities and administration are combined, and the figure for roadways includes plazas. "Communications" includes railways, an airport, and a wireless station. Kantōgun plans assumed 100 square kilometers for the new city. Mantetsu plans assumed 79.32 square kilometers for plan one, 81.86 for plan two, and 82.35 for plan three. The Mantetsu plans were much more specific in terms of land use. The Mantetsu military proportions include allocations for parade grounds, and Mantetsu public facilities include allocations for cemeteries, universities, a golf course, and a horse track. Each of the Mantetsu proportions adds up to more than one hundred percent because some of the figures include roadways accounted for in the roadways category. Gomibuchi contrasts the features of the three Mantetsu plans, but his report also seems to have consolidated some of their suggestions. See *STKH*, pp. 17-72. A fourth plan also existed, apparently more concerned with defense, but Gomibuchi did not present much of its details. *STKH*, pp. 74-5. The CCB submitted a preliminary report dated November 13, 1932 that followed the military's plan almost verbatim. *STKH*, pp. 102-9.

industrial sector rather than expand existing commercial activities indicates an inclination towards the more idealistic goals of war preparation and autarky rather than expanding existing institutions. Mantetsu plans reflected the discussions found in the pages of the *Toshi kōron* and the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*. Gomibuchi suggested learning from sixty-five years of experience in Tokyo and providing the best possible means of modern infrastructure, including roads, water, sewage, electricity, telephones, and gas. This was “holistic planning” (*zentai teki keikaku*).³¹

The use of physical space is central to understanding Shinkyō. Open land was a key feature attracting many Japanese to Manchuria before 1932, and planners ensured Shinkyō continued this allure. While Tokyo averaged 37 square meters of land per person, and Osaka 80, the Changchun *fuzokuchi* already provided 126 and the (still mostly open) *shangbu* 179. The old city provided 86. Contemporary Paris allowed 27, London 67 (Greater London 237), Boston 166, and New York 138. The figures for Beijing and Tianjin were 63 and 46. Gomibuchi suggested that the goal for Shinkyō was to provide 150 square meters per person, to be accomplished through a judicious use of parks, streets, and an encircling greenbelt.³² A 1939 publication reported that figure raised to two hundred, roughly double the space of most Japanese big cities.³³ Unlike older cities, Shinkyō was not to be cluttered. Modernity found traditional cities claustrophobic.

Besides roomy, Shinkyō was also orderly, something Gomibuchi thought sound economic development depended upon.³⁴ Laid out in a grid pattern, Shinkyō's city blocks were much larger than that of the *fuzokuchi*. Like the

³¹ *STKH*, pp. 26-7.

³² *STKH*, pp. 33-6.

³³ Nagami Ken'ichi, “Manshūkoku sandai toshi no kōen sonota,” *Kōen ryokuchi* 3: 4/5, March-April 1939, p. 31.

³⁴ *STKH*, p. 37.

fuzokuchi, however, broad, diagonal streets radiating from large, circular plazas bisected the city. Planners also continued to incorporate the several gullies emptying into the Yitong River by turning them into long parks that crisscrossed the city. In this way they devised a modern city that was neither monotonous in pattern nor too complex in design (see Figure 1.4).

This was apparent in the organization of the city's transportation, described as *yondōri hattachi*, meaning four main boulevards and eight significant spots to be connected.³⁵ Extending Chūō Dōri south, planners renamed it Datong Dajie (J, *Daidō Taikai*), taking its name from the plaza to which it lead, Datong (Great Unity) Plaza, the first era name for Puyi.³⁶ Here the CCB located important ministries as well as their own headquarters, in an area one called a "civic center" (*shipiggu sentaa*).³⁷

Shinkyō's central concern, however, was its role as a national capital. The city's dimensions and grand boulevards were part of a layout that expressed state power and modernity. The core of that expression was the space dedicated to the central organs of government, especially the imperial palace, where the "foundation of national reverence" (*kokumin sūhei no kongen*) began.³⁸ To that end, planners agreed upon certain features. One was to orient the palace so that it faced south, thereby replicating traditional Chinese urban planning motifs evident in Beijing's Forbidden City.³⁹ Agreeing to

³⁵ *STKH*, p. 78, Nakano, "Kokuto Shinkyō no kensetsu," p. 166. Harbin's street grid was similar. Sano, "Manshū no kokuto kensetsu keikaku," pp. 38-9 and Sano, "Manshū no kokuto kensetsu," p. 1245.

³⁶ The word *datong* entails important historical and philosophical significances: ancient commentaries suggest that Confucius envisioned a utopian "Great Community" by that name, and the late Qing reformer Kang Youwei named his metaphysical masterpiece after it (*Dàtóngshū*).

³⁷ *STKH*, p. 79.

³⁸ *STKH*, p. 37.

³⁹ According to traditional Chinese beliefs, the correct orientation of the imperial seat insured stability in the empire—and the universe—through exact rituals in proper locations. Imperial authority issued from the throne south, past temples and halls replicating cosmological actors

endow it with an appropriate size and style, they also located the imperial residence conveniently with respect to major transportation routes so as to facilitate the conduct of state affairs.⁴⁰ Though grounded in traditional forms, Shinkyō's modernity was to be efficient and organized.

Shinkyō's planners, however, did not agree initially over some of the specific definitions of the city's—and by extension the state's—modernity. Two of the three Mantetsu plans originally envisioned a palace more in keeping with those of Europe, complete with gardens and panoramic vistas. Given the topography and other structures, these plans would have required the palace not to face south. CCB representatives, however, insisted on a southern orientation. Mantetsu planners perceived modernity stemming more from a European, rather than an Asian, background.⁴¹

on earth, through Tiananmen and into the world. On the planning of the Forbidden City, see Laurence G. Liu, *Chinese Architecture*, London: Academy Editions, 1989, pp. 35-53, 247-56, Nancy Shatzman Steinhardt, *Chinese Imperial City Planning*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990, Bo Xinian, "Guanyu Mingdai gongdian tanmiaodeng dajianzhuqun zongti guihua shoufa de chubu tantao," in He Yaju, ed., *Jianzhu lishi yanjiu*, Beijing: Zhongguo jianzhu gongye chubanshe, 1992, pp. 25-48, and Zixuan Zhu and Reginald Yin-Wang Kwok, "Beijing: The Expression of National Political Ideology," in Won Bae Kim, Mike Douglass, Sang-Chuel Choe, and Kong Chong Ho, eds., *Culture and the City in East Asia*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 127-30.

⁴⁰ *STKH*, pp. 19, 38.

⁴¹ Only the first of the three Mantetsu plans discussed by Gomibuchi entailed a southern orientation for the palace. *STKH*, pp. 19, 37-43. Mantetsu conceded to a south face by acknowledging that the other plans poorly connected the palace with the existing old city. Two locations were under consideration, the eventual location at Xinghuacun (J, Kyōkamura), and Nanling (J, Nanryō), on the southeast side of the city. In choosing Xinghuacun, in the southwest section of the city, planners suggested it would be freer of smoke from the city center—the predominant winds were from the southwest. Some of the internal debate on the southern facing of the palace is *STKH*, pp. 87-99. Since construction halted on the palace in 1942, however, this debate ultimately proved moot. See Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 95-100. Nanling ultimately became the site for Shinkyō's zoo. Early Mantetsu plans for the palace at Nanling entailed using 2.88 square kilometers. Smaller than Beijing's Forbidden City (6.25 square kilometers), it would have been larger than the imperial palace in Kyoto (0.875), or even all of Heian Kyō (1.4). *STKH*, p. 131. An early map and discussion in the *MKZ* conformed to the southern facing. "Manshūkoku kokuto kensetsu keikaku gaiyō," *MKZ* 13:11, November 1933, pp. 34-40. Alternative plans for Shinkyō can also be found in the *STKH bessatsu*.

In a similar vein, military and Mantetsu planners clashed over the means of financing Shinkyō's construction. While the military initially recommended a budget for the first five-year plan of 31,595,000 yen, Mantetsu recommended a budget of 43,000,000 yen. For the difference Mantetsu advocated borrowing overseas. The military was reluctant, suggesting that borrowing overseas was like building official structures in a Western style; it was not in keeping with the spirit of Manchukuo's 'kingly way' (Ch, *wángdào*; J, *ō d d ō*). For some, it was a matter of retaining control because they assumed that large loans might make it possible for creditors to compel the adoption of their own ideas regarding Shinkyō's planning.⁴² Despite adopting the military's position on financing, a 1939 report predicted the cost of the new city's construction would eventually total 100,000,000 yen.⁴³

Shinkyō's urban planners ultimately chose to implement a vision of modernity that was fiscally conservative and Asian in character. This was perhaps most evident in Puyi's palace. The palace grounds did not entail extravagant gardens. Smaller than what Mantetsu initially envisioned, they sat enclosed, north of the palace, just as the private imperial courtyards did in Beijing. On Puyi's order, however, the gardens were in a Japanese, not a Chinese, style, in the manner of the Akasaka Detached Palace.⁴⁴

⁴² This discussion occurred against a background of an official "open door" to foreign investment in Manchukuo. *STKH*, pp. 12-14, 78-9, 81-5. Eventually, the military position won; the first five-year plan's budget was 30,596,000 yen, and Japanese only borrowed some five million yen, only from the Manchurian Central Bank. See Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 100-8. The reason behind the borrowing was to allow final land purchases—something Mantetsu estimated would cost another nine million yen. *STKH*, p. 97-8. The debate in 1932 foreshadowed the difficulties later Mangyō chief Ayukawa Yoshisuke had in trying to import capital to spur the growth of Manchukuoan industry. See Udagawa Masaru, *Shinkō Zaibatsu*, Kyoto: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 1984, and Udagawa Masaru, "The Move into Manchuria of the Nissan Combine," *Japanese Yearbook of Business History*, 1990, No. 7., pp. 3-29.

⁴³ Nagami, "Manshūkoku sandai toshi no kōen," p. 31.

⁴⁴ Satō, *Manshū zōen shi*, p. 199.

Another aspect of traditional Chinese urban planning involved the relationship of the palace to other significant structures. The Forbidden City in Beijing, for example, occupied a central and axial location in relation to the city's walls and temples. On the whole, Shinkyō did not replicate this. The palace did not occupy either a central or an axial position, nor did the outlines of the new capital approximate a square—or any simple geometric figure—for the palace to sit at the center of.⁴⁵ The new palace did, however, repeat a localized relationship to other important buildings (Figure 6.1).

Due south of Beijing's Forbidden City lay the 'outer court' (Ch, *wàicháo*; J, *gaichō*) the zone of the official bureaucracy; the 'inner court' north of Tiananmen was the domain of the imperial family and their servants. Physically, the outer court combined two rectangular courts in the shape of a "T": an east-west 'front court' (Ch, *qiáncháo*; J *zenchō*⁴⁶) just in front of Tiananmen and a north-south "Thousand-Pace Corridor" (Ch, *qiānbù láng*; J, *senbu rō*) along which offices of the imperial bureaucracy stemmed. The facing of Shinkyō's palace to the south allowed a similar organization. Before it lay Shuntian ("Obeying Heaven") Plaza (Ch, *Shùntiān guǎngchǎng*; J, *Junten hirōba*), stretching about six hundred meters across (east-west) and four hundred deep. Corresponding roughly to the Forbidden City's 'front court,' it provided a public space directly before the palace that allowed for interaction between the emperor and his people. The nature of that interaction, however, differed. In the front court in Beijing emperors or their representatives proclaimed imperial edicts to those fortunate few able to gain access within the bureaucracy's walls. In contrast, the front court of the palace

⁴⁵ The location of the palace at Xinghuacun meant it would only be "near the center of the city" (*shichūshin ni chikai*), requiring that state bureaucratic offices (discussed below) be even further from the city center. *STKH*, p. 19.

⁴⁶ Or *zentei*, as Gomibuchi and Koshizawa use the term *tei* (Ch, *tíng*) for 'court.' *STKH*, p. 39, and Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 166.

Manchukuo government offices occupied a position corresponding to those in Beijing, but instead of a walled, hidden enclave, the sixty meter wide, tree-lined Shuntian Avenue descended south from the palace. On the eastern side of the street, at the northern end nearest the palace sat the Hall of State (Ch, *Gúowùyuan*; J, *Kokumuin*), and to the south of it, its annex. This housed Manchukuo's executive arm, the State Council. Across Shuntian Avenue sat the Ministry of Public Security, which in 1943 became the headquarters of the Manchukuo military. South of that sat Shuntian Park, and south of the park stood the Ministries of the Economy and Transportation. Opposite the Ministry of the Economy on the east side of the avenue stood the Ministry of Justice. Both occupied positions about half way along the length of Shuntian Avenue, which ran for a total of one and one-half kilometers.

The official state buildings occupied about 200,000 square meters.⁴⁸ Shuntian Avenue only ran about nine blocks, about a kilometer and a half, before ending in a traffic circle at Anmin Plaza. South of that stretched the enormous South Lake Park, in the eastern half of which sat South Lake, a man-made lake with a 680 square meter surface. A little to the west lay Shinkyō's second largest park, Huanglong Gongyuan (Yellow Dragon Park).

Anmin Plaza was an important hub. From there ran a road to the northwest and the SMR, where planners envisioned Shinkyō's new South Station. The station sat about a kilometer and a half due west of the palace along the road that separated the palace's 'front court' from the Hall of State and Ministry of Security. About a kilometer and a half east of both Anmin Plaza and the palace ran the southern extension of the main avenue of the *fuzokuchi*, Datong Dajie.

⁴⁸ Sano, "Manshū no kokuto kensetsu keikaku," p. 43.

Traditional Chinese urban planning also located the palace with respect to other significant sites. In Beijing, commoners and market places were relegated to the northern areas of the city. In Shinkyō the *fuzokuchi* already lay northeast of the palace, but old Changchun, home of most Chinese in the area, was east-northeast. New residences appeared all over the city, but the greatest expansion occurred northwest of the palace, on the other side of the SMR. Shinkyō's planning thus generally replicated this aspect of Chinese urban planning, but only accidentally. Unbounded by medieval walls, Shinkyō's expanding population took up particular residences more because of convenience than traditional constraints.

Of greater relevance to traditional Chinese urban planning was the location of the palace with respect to temples. In Beijing, the Forbidden City sat roughly equidistant between the Temples of Heaven and Earth (in the south and north), and the Temples of the Sun and Moon (in the east and west). All were Ming dynasty creations, but the Qing refurbished and continued religious observances at them. Shinkyō quickly raised its own altars in two of the four cardinal directions while incorporating a third, but planners did not rigorously adhere to the traditional means of locating them. North of the palace and just southwest of West Park was the Monument to the War Dead (Ch, *Zhōnglíngtǎ*; J, *Chūreitō*). South of South Lake stood the National Foundation Shrine (Ch, *Jiàngúocháo*; J, *Kenkokubyō*). East of the palace near the Yitong River sat the Temple to the God of War (Ch, *Guāndìcháo*; J, *Kanteibyō*). Chinese traditionally believed that imperial ceremonies insured the proper functioning of the universe. Shinkyō's altars were not so cosmically significant. Only one replicated traditional rites, the Temple to the God of War, and that was a local protective temple dating from

1800.⁴⁹ The other two were more modern in inspiration, serving the needs of a modern nation-state rather than religious observance.⁵⁰

The modern sources of planners' inspirations are more important. Emphasizing the significance of the south-facing of the palace and the use of traditional principles like geomancy (Ch, *fēngshǔi*; J, *fūsui*), Koshizawa Akira overstates the degree to which planners used concepts from traditional Chinese urban planning. Mantetsu only accepted the importance of using "ancient practices" (*kojitsu*) in locating the new palace after heated debate, and did not list that as one of the merits in originally comparing the various plans.⁵¹ Neither did the military suggest that a southern orientation was necessary in their earliest report in the *STKH*.⁵² In fact, in calling attention to the preference for a southern facing of the palace, the CCB did not defend that

⁴⁹ A discussion of this temple as well as other Guandi temples in Manchuria is Murata Jirō, "Kanteibyō kenchikushi no kenkyū," *MKZ* 9:12, December 1929, and 10:2, October 1930.

⁵⁰ Shinkyō's version of the Temple of Heaven (Ch, *tiāntán*; J, *tendan*; or Ch, *jiāojīchāng*; J, *kōsaijō*) appeared on what was to become the western side of the palace grounds. More centrally located than the one in Beijing, it was built in 1934. Fueki Hideo, "Gyōkai no konjaku," p. 37. A photo of the simple earthen platform appears in the *MKZ* 14: 3, March 1934. Its floorplan is on p. 22. While Puyi, however, reports that the temple, or altar, was located in "the eastern suburbs of Changchun," Kramer's translation puts the temple in "Apricot Flower Village," or Xinghuacun—where the palace was eventually built. In 1934 much of that area was still unbuilt, perhaps explaining the apparent distance—Kramer also writes that after the ceremony Puyi returned "to the city." See Pu Yi, *From Emperor to Citizen*, vol. 2, p. 276, and Kramer, *The Last Manchu*, p. 177. The significance of the Temple is discussed in Murata Jirō, "Ten wo matsuru kenchiku," *MKZ* 14:3, March 1934, pp. 3-12.

⁵¹ Although suggesting that a southern facing had merit, Mantetsu planners did not explain why. At the same time, however, Mantetsu continued to affirm the importance of seeking out the advice of specialists in constructing the "rising country" (*shinkō kokka*). *STKH*, pp. 19, 100.

⁵² *STKH*, pp. 5-14.

choice through recourse to the Chinese tradition.⁵³ Having given up on geomancy long before, Japanese were not eager to suggest its use.⁵⁴

Shinkyō's planning displayed only a selective adoption of elements from the Chinese urban planning tradition. Occurring piecemeal and outside a holistic, cosmological perspective, they were at best traditionalistic. Lending support to pan-Asianism and the person of Puyi, such features were superficial gestures. They were more part of an effort to give Japanese efforts a Chinese flavor than a genuine resurrection of traditional values.⁵⁵ Modernity, rather than tradition, inspired Shinkyō's planners more. Thus, traditionalistic gestures proved to be a subset of modernity, a tool calculated to win hearts by appealing to nationalist rather than eternal principles.

A Modern Capital

Modernity appeared in Shinkyō in a variety of ways. It started with locating the palace and the bureaucracy appropriately, but planners went beyond that to create a municipal master plan that also created new residences, a new southern train station, an industrial sector, and a municipal administrative center. This was not a plan based on cosmological principles.

⁵³ *STKH*, pp. 87-99. Of course, the *STKH* is not comprehensive and arguments citing the importance of using the Chinese tradition may simply be missing. The lack of any debate on the use of this tradition, however, suggests its relative insignificance. The *STKH* did include the report of a Mantetsu representative on some of the cosmological significances involved in traditional Chinese planning, but he did not apply it specifically to Shinkyō. *STKH*, pp. 127-30.

⁵⁴ While Japanese imitated Chinese planning concepts in situating Kyoto's imperial palace, the shogunal and later imperial palace in Tokyo faced east, reflecting a certain autonomy in Japanese planning even before opening to the West.

⁵⁵ Koshizawa suggests that the south-facing of the palace, the construction of a bureaucratic zone south of the palace, and the use of circular shapes for traffic circles constituted a revival of traditional techniques. Traditional Chinese urban planning, however, was more complex than this. See Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 93-100, Koshizawa, "Taiwan, Manshū, Chūgoku no toshi keikaku," p. 208, and "Shinkyō to Daitōkō no kensetsu kōsō," p. 24. A critique of Koshizawa along these lines is Zhang Zhenjia and Yang Jianping, "Watakushitachi kara mita 'Shinkyō to Daitōkō no kensetsu kōsō,'" *Doboku gakkai shi*, 79: 12, October 1994, pp. 53-55.

It was a plan that involved the needs of the modern state: proper amenities, civic order, and economic development. As such, planners endowed the city with a modern infrastructure and modern principles of urban organization.

Shinkyō's new infrastructure included mass transit, electrical power, water supply, sewage disposal, garbage incineration, and other modern amenities. The product of a global search, albeit primarily in Japan and the West, Shinkyō's infrastructure offered solutions to problems raised in journals like the *Toshi kōron* and the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*.⁵⁶ Indeed, at times efficiency and technology almost physically replaced geomantic sensitivities.⁵⁷

Shinkyō's spatial organization was similarly inclined. Planners wanted to confine light industry north of the *fuzokuchi* and east of Kuanchengzi, or, along with heavy industry, north of Shinkyō's East Station on the line to Jilin, so that the prevailing winds blew pollution away, towards the east. These locations were also convenient to rail and river transport. For the same reason planners confined railroad expansion to the north of the old Changchun station.⁵⁸ Other definable centers eventually emerged elsewhere in the new capital, such as an educational district east of South Lake and an area dedicated to sports south and east of the zoo. Along with the city's

⁵⁶ See the discussion below in Chapter 8.

⁵⁷ Initially the CCB planned Datong Dajie to run unobstructed due south. Just south of Mudan Park, however, stood the Xiaozichao (J, Kōshibyō), or Dutiful Son Temple. If it were not for the intercession of Manchukuo Prime Minister Zheng Lixu the temple and the elm tree under which it stood would have been destroyed to make way for the broad boulevard. See Mantetsu sōkyoku Hōten tetsudō kyoku ryokaku gakari, *Shinkyō*, Mukden: Mantetsu sōkyoku Hōten tetsudō kyoku ryokaku gakari, 1941, p. 3, Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, pp. 210, and *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, pp. 110-1.

⁵⁸ *STKH*, pp. 12, 18, 43, 80, and Nakano, "Kokuto Shinkyō no kensetsu," p. 167. See also the map in Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 103. For an analysis of Shinkyō's prevailing wind patterns see *STKH*, appendix 1. Air quality was a consistent interest of Japanese in the TK and the MKZ, something that encouraged their keeping an eye on overseas developments. See, for example, the publishing of an American article in translation by H.B. Miller and L.L. Sisson from the *Architectural Record* in 1934: "Toshi ni okeru kiki no oson ni tsuite," *MKZ* 14:7, July 1934, pp. 26-32, and 14:8, August 1934, pp. 26-9.

smooth transportation, Japanese commentators praised this regional specialization.⁵⁹

The 'civic center' on Datong Plaza at the heart of Shinkyō expressed modernist goals vividly.⁶⁰ Located at the center of the city atop a small plateau, a little more than a kilometer northeast of the palace, broad avenues radiated to the north, south, northeast, northwest, southeast and southwest that made the plaza accessible from all quadrants of the city.⁶¹ Looking north, the fifty-four meter wide Datong Dajie led straight to the first train station; south it continued unbroken for five kilometers.⁶² The plaza was the first constructed space of the new city, and the site of the headquarters for such institutions as the Central Bank of Manchukuo, the Manchukuo Telephone and Telegraph Company, Public Security, and the Capital Construction Bureau itself. A large new hotel was also planned.⁶³ Each of these institutions occupied an entire block between one of the six radiating avenues, and each planners endowed with appropriate architectural forms.⁶⁴ Although reminiscent of the Russian circular interchanges first seen in Dalian and Mukden, Datong plaza was much larger. Three hundred meters across and covering some 70,000 square meters, the plaza allowed frontages of over one hundred meters for the six sites facing it.⁶⁵ Correspondingly large buildings later appeared on these locations, set back to provide even more

⁵⁹ Some saw the city developing as an "organism" (*yūkitai*). See SōA *kenchiku renmei*, "Manshū kenchiku no tenbō," *Gendai kenchiku* 8, January 1940, p. 3.

⁶⁰ The creation of a civic center was a common theme in the June 1932 issue of the *MKZ* focusing on the new capital, several of whom were inspired by the work of Le Corbusier.

⁶¹ A schematic drawing showing the topography is in Nakazawa Kiyoshi, "Shinkyōto keikaku ni taisuru shoken," *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932, p. 36.

⁶² Unconfirmed rumors suggest that an underground secret railway ran north from the Bank of Manchukuo, on the northwest corner of the plaza, to the station.

⁶³ Sano, "Manshū no kokuto kensetsu keikaku," p. 43.

⁶⁴ Discussed in Chapter 7 below.

⁶⁵ These are the figures for the total surface area, including the streets. The park within the paved area spanned 187.6 meters. Satō, *Manshū zōen shi*, p. 94.

room for frontal façades. Gomibuchi thought this appropriate. In order to endow Shinkyō with the proper "dignity" (*iyō*) of a national capital, he listed forty-four sites throughout the city he thought required such large proportionality, including the Japanese embassy.⁶⁶

Datong Plaza centralized Shinkyō's administration efficiently and impressively. The palace and national offices lay just southwest, the original *fuzokuchi* to the north, and the old city to the east. Buildings lining Datong Dajie to the south included universities and the Monument to National Foundation. A memorial tablet to the city's founding sat at the very center.⁶⁷

In addition to size, space was another means of constructing modernity in Shinkyō. Shinkyō's boulevards were unusually wide for Asian streets, and their lengths emphasized their space. To Kitakōji Ken, raised in Dalian and later a teacher there, Shinkyō's spacious atmosphere contrasted markedly with the port to the south. Indeed, Kitakōji considered Dalian very Japanese.⁶⁸

Shinkyō's large city blocks and broad avenues made it difficult, however, for pedestrians to be able reach their destinations quickly on foot. Thus, unlike the *fuzokuchi*, Shinkyō's size required mass transit to not only connect residents with the airfield, golf course, and horse track in the surrounding countryside, but simply to integrate the city. In doing so planners originally called for a fixed rail system, but settled in the short run for a bus system because of the noise and expense.⁶⁹ By 1937, eight bus routes

⁶⁶ *STKH*, pp. 66-9. The size of the plaza is from Nagami, "Manshūkoku sandai toshi no kōen," p. 32.

⁶⁷ Sano, "Manshū no kokuto kensetsu keikaku," p. 43.

⁶⁸ Kitakōji wrote often about Manchuria in the postwar era. For example see Kitakōji Ken and Watanabe Manabu, *Chōshun, Kitsurin*, Tokyo: Kokusho kankōkai, 1982.

⁶⁹ Eventually a fixed rail system did appear in the city in 1941. In 1942 an average of seventeen electric trams plied four tracks totaling 186 kilometers of track daily. Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, p. 107. *Shinkyō no gaiikyō*, pp. 43-4.

served the city; six more connecting with the surrounding countryside.⁷⁰ By 1942 eleven routes ran within the city, and thirteen without. Along with sightseeing busses conducting tours in Japanese and Chinese, the industry employed eleven hundred people.⁷¹ At the same time, however, planners continued to allow the use of traditional horse-pulled carts, though eventually taxis and other vehicles began gradually to supplant them.⁷²

Planners did not, however, ignore pedestrians and proposed paved sidewalks and trees to line Shinkyō's boulevards.⁷³ Although intended to be like the grand avenues of Hausmann's Paris, Shinkyō's boulevards differed fundamentally from the streets of late nineteenth century Paris. Along Shinkyō's avenues few shops would develop; all attention focused on the buildings housing the state apparatus.

Some attention, however, could not help but be diverted, as witnessed by the American geographer in 1947. Green space was ubiquitous in Shinkyō, and almost unseen in Asian cities. Old Changchun, for example, did not build one until 1907. Situated on the grounds of a former Muslim cemetery, it measured 1.7 hectares.⁷⁴ Both Mantetsu and the military agreed in stressing the need for civic green space. Their concerns for sanitation, health, public peace, and municipal beauty led them to suggest the creation of parks, athletic fields, race tracks, and the opening of other spaces within the city and across

⁷⁰ Shinkyō shōkō kaigijō, *Dai Shinkyō keizai gaikan*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō shōkō kaigijō, 1937, pp. 37-8.

⁷¹ Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, pp. 106-7. *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, pp. 39-43.

⁷² Along with the roughly 11,000 horse carts, rickshas averaged 1,444 between 1939 and 1941. Three-wheeled vehicles appeared in 1941, 752 of them. Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, pp. 107-8, 175.

⁷³ *STKH*, p. 49.

⁷⁴ Satō, *Manshū zōen shi*, p. 19.

the Yitong River.⁷⁵ Gomibuchi further suggested insuring “picturesque scenery” (*keiryō*) near the residences and offices of foreign officials so as to maximize the impact of Shinkyō’s greenery on foreign opinion.⁷⁶ Another reason for extensive green space involved the city’s defense from air attack. Torita Ryūichi argued in the *Toshi kōron* that wide avenues and vacant fields within the city reduced possible damage.⁷⁷ Some of Shinkyō’s planners were also aware of the defensive implications of urban greens space, remarking that it provided reservoirs of running water for combating fire and obstructing poison gas.⁷⁸

Eight large parks and a number of athletic fields eventually appeared in Shinkyō (Table 6.3). Three parks ran east from the palace area as far as Datong Dajie along intermittent creek beds that eventually emptied into the Yitong. Beginning at the palace grounds, Baishan (White Mountain) Gongyuan and Mudan (Peony) Gongyuan led to Datong Gongyuan, which sat just southeast of Datong Plaza.⁷⁹ Shuntian Gongyuan began at a lake southwest of the palace and led to Ertong (Children’s) Gongyuan, which eventually became a zoo. East of this lay a planned athletic complex with fields slated for baseball,

⁷⁵ For Gomibuchi, trees and water soothed the nervousness inherent in civilization’s progress (*bunmei no shinpo*). *STKH*, pp. 11, 20-1, 61-2.

⁷⁶ *STKH*, p. 101.

⁷⁷ Torita Ryūichi, “Toshi bōkū to kūchi,” *TK* 14: 8, August 1931, pp. 15-20. Colonel Kuwabara Shirō reinforced this by suggesting planner should endow cities with numerous small parks rather than a few large parks in order to decrease damage and provide refuge. Noting also that a dispersed city not using tall buildings was the opposite of industrially-oriented urban planning, Kuwabara urged a general rethinking of urban planning concepts. (Rikugun Taisa) Kuwabara Shirō, “Toshi keikaku to bōhō,” *TK* 15: 5, May 1932, pp. 12-6. In the aftermath of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan adopted a new air defense law on October 1, 1937 that was made use of in Manchukuo. See Ikeda Hiroyoshi, “Aranaru toshi keikaku he (1),” *MKZ* 18:7, July 1938, p. 26. A report on German preparations for air defense was *Tōkyōshi kikakubu keikakuka*, “Doitsu ni okeru bōkū bōka taisaku,” *MKZ* 18:9, September 1938, pp. 24-30.

⁷⁸ *STKH*, p. 96.

⁷⁹ Datong Gongyuan included a pool and locker rooms. A photo and floor plan is in *MKZ* 21:6, June 1941.

track, hockey, horsemanship, and other sports comprising some 1,440,000 square meters.⁸⁰

Table 6.3 Shinkyō's Parks in 1939

<u>park name</u>	<u>area (m²)</u>	<u>percent water</u>	<u>cost</u>	<u>completion</u>
Datong Gongyuan	273,975	12.3	256,890	3/1933
Baishan Gongyuan	166,333	0.4	86,721	4/1934
Mudan Gongyuan	138,171	0.3	100,491	3/1934
Shuntian Gongyuan	560,000	12.1	186,750	7/1934
Heshun Gongyuan	136,474	42.9	8,575	4/1934
Huanglong Gongyuan	1,286,000	37.7	201,844	10/1936
Xi Gongyuan	276,333	—	753,167	4/1914
Wumalu Gongyuan	17,387	—	—	1907
Total	2,854,673			

Source: Satō Masaru, Eguchi Hidematsu, and Toyoshima Masayoshi, "Shinkyō tokubetsushi no rokuchi keikaku ni tsuite," *Kōen rokuchi* 3: 4/5, May 1939, pp. 9-11.⁸¹

Green spaces also filled Shinkyō's streets. Nearly eleven thousand trees, mostly willows, covered more than one hundred twenty thousand square meters throughout the city as planners incorporated trees into the street grid.⁸² Trees lined the major avenues or appeared in traffic strips to separate vehicular and horse-drawn traffic. Green space also lay within six traffic circles of the city's largest intersections, providing some 6,353 square meters.⁸³

⁸⁰ Discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. Kokumuin kokuto kensetsukyoku sōmusho, ed., *Kokuto dai Shinkyō*, pp. 19-21.

⁸¹ Xi Gongyuan is the West Park (J, *Nishi Kōen*) that lay just south of the original *fuzokuchi*. Heshun Gongyuan sat on the east side of the Yitong River just south of the East Station. Wumalu (Fifth Horse Road) Gongyuan is the small park in the old city built on a Muslim graveyard. The cost is in yen. The percentages for water area are from Nagami, but he provides different totals for some parks: Datong, 325,700; Baishan, 166,000; Mudan, 138,200; Shuntian, 360,000; Heshun, 136,500; Huanglong, 1,586,000; and Xi, 349,000 square meters for a total of 3,061,400. Nagami, "Manshūkoku sandai toshi no kōen," pp. 33-4.

⁸² A postwar publication described Changchun as a "city of groves" (*mori no to*). Kitakōji Ken and Watanabe Manabu, *Chōshun, Kitsurin*, p. 40.

⁸³ Satō Masaru, Eguchi Hidematsu, and Toyoshima Masayoshi, "Shinkyō tokubetsushi no rokuchi keikaku ni tsuite," p. 11.

Along Shuntian and Xing'an Boulevards ran enough green space to qualify as 'street parks' (Ch, *jīeyúan*; J, *kai'en*).⁸⁴ Other green spaces surrounded important landmarks, such as the Jianguo and Zhonglingtaqien Plazas, which sat in front of the two national monuments (Table 6.4). The enormous Xiehe Plaza, located just south of the zoo, provided room for 150,000 to assemble.⁸⁵ Small parks, a golf course (330,000 square meters), a horse track (also 330,000 square meters), nurseries, cemeteries, and small tracts among residential neighborhoods completed Shinkyō's green space, although the zoo and sports complex awaited the second five year plan.⁸⁶ Plans to celebrate Manchukuo's tenth year inspired the creation of still more public green spaces, including on the former warlord government offices and the battlegrounds involved in the Manchurian Incident. Planners also added a small forest adjacent the new reservoir built for the new capital.⁸⁷

Table 6.4 Shinkyō's Plazas in 1940 (m²)

<u>plaza name</u>	<u>area</u>	<u>plaza name</u>	<u>area</u>
Datong Plaza	27,648	Shuntian Plaza ⁸⁸	120,758
Anmin Plaza	16,875	Zhonglingtaqian Plaza	9,964
Xing'an Plaza	11,340	Xing'A Plaza	12,106
Jianguo Plaza	2,700	Xiehe Plaza	366,640
South Plaza	1,662	Total	569,657

Source: Satō, *Manshū zōen shi*, p. 94

⁸⁴ Shuntian dajie jīeyuan included 26,946 square meters and Xing'an dalu jīeyuan 1,560 square meters. Satō Masaru, Eguchi Hidematsu, and Toyoshima Masayoshi, "Shinkyō tokubetsushi no rokuchi keikaku ni tsuite," p. 11.

⁸⁵ Satō, *Manshū zōen shi*, pp. 94-5.

⁸⁶ Nagami, "Manshūkoku sandai toshi no kōen," p. 34 and *Shinkyō shigai chizu*, Tokyo: Kenkōsha shikabu, 1982 (originally 1941).

⁸⁷ Satō Masaru, "Shinkyō tokubetsushi no kenkoku jūshūnen kinen jigyō," *Kōen rokuchi*, 17: 9, September 1942, pp. 27-31.

⁸⁸ Shuntian Plaza was the square before the palace.

In comparison with the West, Asian cities traditionally offered little green space, so Shinkyō's planners endeavored to endow the city amply. Shinkyō's parks eventually entailed walking paths, boats and other amenities. Based on the percentages allocated for parks in Table 6.2, a population of 500,000 would have found 714 people per Shinkyō hectare under the Kantōgun plan, and nearly the same or fewer for the Mantetsu plans.⁸⁹ This would have put Shinkyō's green space on about par with many large American cities, superior to European cities, and far superior to cities in Japan (see Table 6.5). Since many had long bemoaned the paucity of natural beauty in Japan's cities, Shinkyō's was created with this in mind.⁹⁰ Of course, others had long promoted the benefits of creating parks, focusing on the utility of leisure.⁹¹

Table 6.5 Relative Allocations of Urban Green Space

<u>City</u>	<u>People per hectare</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>People per hectare</u>
London	1,680	Baltimore	669
Greater London	1,175	Boston	519
Birmingham	1,570	Philadelphia	645
Liverpool	1,550	Kansas City	403
Paris	1,422	Saint Louis	659
Berlin	4,540		
Düsseldorf	368	Tokyo	10,700
Cologne	2,100	Yokohama	3,900
Leipzig	2,630	Kyoto	40,800
New York	1,710	Osaka	36,700
Washington DC	1,193	Kobe	27,300
Chicago	1,521	Nagoya	33,200

Source: *STKH*, pp. 62-3

⁸⁹ Plan 1 would have meant 726 people, plan 2 would have provided 611, and plan 3 would have translated into 570 people per hectare.

⁹⁰ See, for example, an article by the mayor of Nagoya, Ōiwa Toshio, "Toshibi no hatsuyō to biteki kyōyō no kanyō," *TK 15*: 1, January 1932, p. 4.

⁹¹ Kitamura Tokutarō, "Kōen ha naze hitsuyō to naruka," *TK 15*: 2, February 1932, pp. 27-37. In an ensuing article Kitamura weighed the positive and negative aspects of parks and suggested a scheme by which to classify them. Kitamura Tokutarō, "Kōen ha naze hitsuyō to naruka," *TK 15*: 3, March 1932, pp. 42-53. See also the discussion in chapter 3.

To one reporter, Shinkyō's green space surpassed anything in Japan and offered the appearance of "great-natural-park-ism."⁹² Yet bringing nature to man in Shinkyō was only one of the motivations behind the city's planners. The creation of green space was more fundamentally another means of creating modernity⁹³ To the reporter above, Shinkyō's parks were "progressive" (*shinkōburi*).⁹⁴ Satō Masaru, a Shinkyō official, described the city parks after the war as "civilized" (*bunka teki*) because of the technical expertise involved in their civil engineering. Satō also confessed that for those involved, work overseas was more significant than anything comparable in Japan itself. This was because in Manchukuo Japanese were attempting (literally, "groping" [*mosaku*]) to create a new Manchurian culture. This was not an act of pure benevolence to Satō; it was a means of invigorating Asian culture as a whole against that of the West. To that end, Oka Ōji, head of the architecture department within the Manchukuo bureaucracy, was working on developing a new Chinese style for the palace's outer gardens when the war ended.⁹⁵

To men like this, building parks was a kind of competition. After the war, Satō reflected proudly that in 1940 Shinkyō's total green space (Table 6.6)—including parks, plazas, cemeteries, athletic fields, and seedbeds—at last reached the level of Europe and North America, about 453 people per hectare.⁹⁶ More than simply green space, parks were integral to Shinkyō's

⁹² "(D)ai shizen kōen shugitaru fūbō." Nagami, "Manshūkoku sandai toshi no kōen," p. 32.

⁹³ The creation of sufficient green space was a key concern among the contributors to the June 1932 issue of the MKZ.

⁹⁴ Nagami, "Manshūkoku sandai toshi no kōen," p. 34.

⁹⁵ Satō, *Manshū zōen shi*, pp. 198-9. Satō's former municipal title was *Shinkyō tokubetsu shi kōsho zenkachō*. Nagami, "Manshūkoku sandai toshi no kōen," p. 25. Oka published more than fifty articles in the MKZ on gardens in China and Manchuria.

⁹⁶ Total greenspace measured 1,087.6 hectares and the population totaled 493,100. Based on the data found in the STKH (Table 4), Satō's comparison with Europe is not exactly accurate, but his conflation of Europe and America is revealing. Satō, *Manshū zōen shi*, pp. 74, 77.

modern life.⁹⁷ They included facilities for recreation and relaxation by providing space for places of interest like zoos and for strolling amid natural surroundings. They were also technically superior. In designing Shinkyō's parks, planners summoned experienced professionals from across Japan.⁹⁸ This allowed planners to present their parks to the residents as "oases" allowing unhindered recreation and places for refuge in emergencies.⁹⁹

Table 6.6 Total Green Space in Shinkyō in 1940

	<u>square meters</u>
parks	6,100,591
zoos	716,627
recreational facilities	778,132
plazas	202,647
green space along streets	228,184
nurseries	1,751,935
cemetaries and gardens	3,877,097
total	13,656,213

Source: Manshū teikoku rinji kokuto kensetsu kyoku, *Kokuto kensetsu ni tsuite*, Tokyo: Manshū teikoku rinji kokuto kensetsu kyoku, 1940, p. 45.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Numerous publications championed Shinkyō's green space as part of the cultivation of the city's beauty. For one example see *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō shōkō kōkai, 1942, p. 13.

⁹⁸ Satō, *Manshū zōen shi*, pp. 81-100, and *passim*.

⁹⁹ Kokumuin kokuto kensetsukyoku sōmusho, ed., *Kokuto dai Shinkyō*, p. 7, and Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, p. 203.

¹⁰⁰ Note that the green belt outside the city included another 980,000 square meters. Note also these figures are larger than the 10,876,000 square meters Satō asserts in Satō, *Manshū zōen shi*, pp. 74, 77. The Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1940, pp. 105-6 gives a figure of 10,769,894 square meters in 1940. The Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, pp. 199-201 gives a figure of 13,123,355. Both of these latter figures, however, add the caveat that 4,600,000 square meters of green space outside the city are not included. The nurseries in Shinkyō were two, one south of South Lake and one east of the Nanling academic and sport complexes—the constant replanting of Shinkyō's gardens required large nurseries. Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1940, p. 111, and Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, pp. 205.

Japanese presented the new capital as a “model city” (*mohan toshi*) for the rest of Manchukuo.¹⁰¹ The urban planning law of June 1936, passed one year before the beginning of the second five year plan, acknowledged that thereafter attention was to shift to Manchukuo’s five other important cities (Harbin, Mukden, Andong, Jilin, and Qiqihar) as well as to smaller towns.¹⁰² Thus, Shinkyō’s plans were significant in a wider sense, as planners elsewhere followed the capital’s lead. By 1940, forty locales were using an urban planning law based on Shinkyō’s, including inspectors.¹⁰³

Shinkyō’s modernity thus replicated itself throughout Manchuria. One means was through the ‘greenification’ (*midorika*) of Manchukuo’s towns and cities. This involved the construction of flower beds and other public green spaces¹⁰⁴ as well as occasionally the incorporation of natural settings into residential neighborhoods.¹⁰⁵ The full import of the capital’s significance, however, was felt more fundamentally through the creation of a functional municipal infrastructures. Carefully planned city sections included not only structures but adequate transportation, water, and power systems. In transferring authority to a Capital Inspection Bureau (*Shuto keisatsu chō*) the urban planning law also created a regular administrative means of insuring standards and controlling construction.¹⁰⁶ Given Manchukuo’s fundamental orientation towards state planning and the

¹⁰¹ Kokumuin sōmuchō jōhōsho, *Manshūkoku no gairan*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō kōshō, 1934, p. 113.

¹⁰² Comparing the new law in relation to urban planning elsewhere in the empire, Nagami thought the Manchukuo urban planning law generally more progressive than the law in Japan itself. As such it signified the development of the Japanese themselves. While Japan’s urban planning law was passed in 1919, Korea’s was passed in 1934, and Taiwan’s in 1938. Nagami, “Manshūkoku sandai toshi no kōen,” p. 27.

¹⁰³ Urban planning laws in Japan and Korea were similar. See Makino Masaoto, “Manshūkoku no kenchiku torishimori gaikyō,” *MKZ* 19:1, January 1939, pp. 35-6.

¹⁰⁴ Nagami, “Manshūkoku sandai toshi no kōen,” p. 25, Satō, *Manshū zōen shi*, p. 199.

¹⁰⁵ Discussed below.

¹⁰⁶ This was the perspective of the CCB. See *Manshū teikoku rinji kokuto kensetsu kyoku, Kokuto kensetsu ni tsuite*, pp. 47-8.

construction of a modern society, Shinkyō's creation must be considered as one element of a coherent national policy and central to Japanese goals.¹⁰⁷

The result was a city that was not only large, grand, and green, but one that was thought to be thoroughly modern. This included a consideration also for some of the problems inherent in modern society. Public parks were only one response. Another dealt with the repercussions of installing an electric power grid. An early law forbade the use of any unsightly above-ground power lines—all had to be buried. Nor were there telephone poles, as telegraph, telephone, and power lines for electric lights all ran underground, as was thought done in major cities in the West.¹⁰⁸ The consideration of these kinds of issues in the construction of Shinkyō puts the city in the mainstream of other urban issues. Shinkyō's planning was the result of modern scholarship, practical experience in both Japan and the colonies, and a utopian vision abstracted from current trends in Japanese political discourse.

Early analyses of Shinkyō were glowing. The creation of a modern city explicitly the equal of anything the West had to offer excited many.¹⁰⁹ As such planners emphasized the city's modernity. Murai Osamu called it a "city of modern ideals" (*kindai teki risō toshi*).¹¹⁰ Sano Toshikata effused about its size and spaciousness in articles in two prominent Japanese journals, *Toshi mondai* and *Kenchiku zasshi*. Manchukuo itself, after all, was almost twice the size of the Japanese empire, and deserving of an

¹⁰⁷ Nishizawa has argued that Manchukuo's construction projects are indispensable to comprehending the puppet state. Nishizawa, "Manshūkoku no kensetsu jigyō," 1995, p. 377.

¹⁰⁸ Nakano, "Kokuto Shinkyō no kensetsu," p. 168.

¹⁰⁹ See Nakano, "Kokuto Shinkyō no kensetsu," and Sano, "Manshū no kokuto kensetsu keikaku."

¹¹⁰ Murai Osamu, "Manshūkoku kokuto kensetsu keikaku no shōkai," *Kenchiku gyōsei* 3:9, May 1939, p. 19.

appropriately sized capital. Moreover, as a stage for Japanese development Sano thought it also demonstrated Japan's wealth and power to the world.¹¹¹

The early pictures of Shinkyō are startling. They reveal a comprehensive effort to address a number of issues on a grand scale. Photographs show the foundations of large buildings being erected aside already delineated but still dirt roads running straight and disappearing into the distance. In that distance, large tracts of open land with only the occasional edifice appear. These pictures appeared in print in numerous publications in Japan.¹¹² This was also how the Kantōgun portrayed Manchukuo to Japanese at home.

These kinds of pictures, of Shinkyō-in-progress, served a purpose besides that of informing people what was being built. They reinforced the main import of Shinkyō—that here was a new society being constructed, one that anyone could join in and contribute to constructively and concretely. It was a new modernity. As such it fits snugly with the wider, more popular visions of Manshūkoku. Not just a new country but a new culture was a common theme. Here at last were Japanese going to be free to develop a new society, one that would lead the world, including Japan, to a brighter future.¹¹³ It was also, it was noted, a future that was arriving quickly. The new capital's roads stretched 312 kilometers by 1937.¹¹⁴

This reinforced the messages implicit to the city's creation. Shinkyō was at the same time both a political center and more than simply a political center.

¹¹¹ While the Japanese empire covered 680,000 square kilometers, Manchukuo included between 1,150,000 and 1,500,000 square kilometers. The figure was uncertain because of border disputes. Still, an area about the size of Japan's main islands (about 382,000 square kilometers) lay open and waiting for new tillers. Sano, "Manshū no kokuto kensetsu keikaku," p. 37, and Sano, "Manshū no kokuto kensetsu," p. 1243. Today Japan includes some 366,560 square kilometers.

¹¹² See, for example, "Kokuto Shinkyō kensetsu no gaikan," *Kenchiku zasshi* 52:642, September 1938, pp. 167-82.

¹¹³ See Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, and below.

¹¹⁴ *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō shōkō kōkai, 1942, p. 11.

Centralizing the puppet state's administrative apparatus and housing it appropriately could only occur in a context of economic and intellectual development. As such, the city represented a vision of modernity. The values that vision implied, however, differed markedly from other visions elsewhere. In emulating Beijing, Japanese planners attempted to legitimate their efforts, but a broader comparison with Beijing reveals other characteristics. Both cities were meticulously planned capitals, but the vision that created Beijing was more logically consistent. The Forbidden City emphasized dynastic rulers as the rulers of a coherent whole. Shinkyō marginalized the new dynasty and enthroned instead an unrooted state power. Shinkyō's long, unbroken streets and large city blocks did not focus attention on an identifiable target. Broad streets, spacious parks, and specific corners away from the main thoroughfares designated to handle daily activities reflected rationally inspired goals only. Technically competent, it was a vision that was fundamentally empty. It entailed a nationalist goal without a genuine nation-state. This, of course, was implicit to Japanese intentions. In Shinkyō Japanese wanted to create a city that glorified their leadership. Its main purpose was to impress Asians, including Japanese.

Shinkyō's second five year plan demonstrated this clearly. Expecting the population now to soar to one million, planners added 460 hectares of green space (Table 6.7).¹¹⁵ This meant there would be on average 646 people per hectare. However, if one included land along the Yitong as well as the green space to where the population could easily escape in the surrounding countryside, the ratio dropped to 167 people per hectare.¹¹⁶ In time, this

¹¹⁵ Some early discussions already expected the population to reach a million, such as Nakano Kinjirō, "Kokuto Shinkyō no kensetsu," *Dōro no kairyō* 15:12, December 1933, p. 166.

¹¹⁶ Satō, *Manshū zōen shi*, pp. 77, 79.

surrounding area fell under Shinkyō's control because the area under the city's direct jurisdiction eventually expanded to 440 square kilometers.¹¹⁷

Table 6.7 Shinkyō's Parks in 1944 (m²)

<u>park name</u>	<u>area</u>	<u>park name</u>	<u>area</u>
Kodama Kōen	276,330.80	Wumalu Gongyuan	17,387.84
Ribenqiao Gongyuan	6,186.00	Cuihua Gongyuan	7,144.00
Datong Gongyuan	391,109.25	Andajie Gongyuan	7,108.65
Baishan Gongyuan	166,213.60	Shuntian Gongyuan	566,261.67
Mudan Gongyuan	161,211.92	Nanhu Gongyuan	2,242,954.00
Heshun Gongyuan	136,474.97	Huanglong Gongyuan	1,170,000.00
Zhonglingta Waiyuan	34,888.30	Huanxiling Gongyuan	304,803.84
Total:	5,488,047.84	square meters	

Source: Satō, *Manshū zōen shi*, pp. 80-1¹¹⁸

Expansive public and extensive green space were tools used by Japanese planners to impress people with their wisdom and foresight. The unspoken implication was that if Japanese planners could be trusted with the physical creation of a new city, then they could also be trusted with the creation of a new country and society.¹¹⁹ This strategy failed because in Shinkyō, as well as in Manchukuo at large, the façade mattered more than the content. That is to say, although Shinkyō had the appearance of a magnificent city, its content was hypocritical. Superimposing an Asian veneer on a modern city

¹¹⁷ Manshū jijō an'naisho, ed., *Manshūkoku chihōshi*, Shinkyō: Manshū jijō an'naisho, p. 4.

¹¹⁸ Kodama Kōen (Ch, Eryu Gongyuan) is the former West Park at the southern end of the *fuzokuchi*, renamed in honor of general Kodama Gentarō on November 3, 1938. (Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, p. 201.) Ribenqiao (J, *Nihonbashi*) Gongyuan is the former *fuzokuchi*'s East Park. Zhonglingta Waiyuan is the gardens outside the Monument to the War Dead. Cuihua Gongyuan was built in the old city section in 1939. Ertong Gongyuan had at this point become the zoo.

¹¹⁹ This suggests a cosmopolitan dimension to Japanese policy. Colonial regimes around the world were typically at the forefront of promoting ecological awareness and conservationist systems. Although this was in response, of course, to the ecological and social destruction incurred during colonial rule, emerging environmentalism was considered progressive among many in planning and scientific communities. See Richard H. Grove, *Ecology, Climate and Empire: Colonialism and Global Environment History, 1400-1940*, Cambridge: The White Horse Press, 1997.

contrasted opposing organizational frameworks. Neither did the reality and appearances of political arrangements correspond. In Shinkyō it was apparent that despite the city's rapid growth, almost half of the population continued to live in the area once designated as the old city, rendering access to new parks and other modern features problematic (Table 6.8). Another large concentration of people occurred in the Heshun and Dongrong districts, those areas east of the Yitong River where planners concentrated the capital's industrial facilities. Together with the two districts comprising old Changchun, these four districts included two-thirds of the population of the capital's inner ten districts, over half of the city's entire population.¹²⁰

Nineteen-thirty two found many Japanese willing to participate in the creation of a new modernity centered around Japanese capabilities and the needs of the Japanese state. Making a few concessions to Chinese sensitivities, this new vision focused idealistically on the creation of a new civic order, one that championed rational state planning, mass mobilization, and Japanese leadership. For five years, until the outbreak of war in 1937, Japanese attempted to articulate this vision. After that, war exigencies required the diminishing of resources for the construction of the capital. Still, the planning of the capital city reflected many of the goals important to Japanese, especially the preoccupation with state power.

Another goal was to express Shinkyō's Asian heritage. CCB general manager Yūki Seitarō suggested in 1934 that just as Tokyo emerged from Edo, so too could Shinkyō transform itself into an "Oriental city" (*tōyōjin no*

¹²⁰ Not all of these were Chinese. Some of the people living in the outer six districts were Japanese colonists organized by the government. For example, 29 households from Kumamoto Prefecture immigrated to Jiangyue in April of 1937, 21 households from Shīmane settled in Beihedong in April of 1940, 23 households from Shizuoka arrived in Nanhedong two months later, and 21 households from Gifu landed in Helong in April of 1941. *Kokuto Shinkyō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō tokubetsushi kōsho, 1942, p. 93.

machi) capable of organizing the region. As such, however, even he acknowledged that a strong military presence was inescapable.¹²¹ Shinkyō's Asian-ness was clearly superficial.

Table 6.8 Distribution of Population within Shinkyō in 1942

	<u>area</u>	<u>households</u>	<u>population</u>
Shikishima	4.96	12,234	67,033
Kuanchengzi	11.90	3,956	19,565
Changchun	3.96	24,372	136,518
Datong	3.57	19,069	107,137
Shuntian	8.64	12,943	60,962
Anmin	21.7	2,637	10,199
Xiyang	18.26	918	4,861
Dongguang	15.62	4,359	19,811
Heshun	10.32	15,054	79,824
Dongrong	8.52	8,625	40,175
(total of ten inner districts)	107.45	104,167	546,085
Jingyue	124.01	2,579	15,753
Nanhedong	50.76	1,557	11,565
Beihedong	38.31	1,412	8,899
Helong	39.31	6,295	35,787
Dacun	34.23	2,638	15,564
Shuangde	50.12	2,050	11,523
(total of six outer districts)	336.74	16,531	99,081
Total	444.19	120,698	645,166

Source: Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, pp. 56-7.¹²²

¹²¹ Yūki, "Kokuto dai-Shinkyō kensetsu to nisan mondai," p. 548, and Yūki, "Kokuto kensetsu no kaiko to tenbō," p. 35.

¹²² The area is in square kilometers. The capital was divided into sixteen districts (Ch, *qū*; J, *ku*) in January 1942. While Shikishima corresponded roughly to the old *fuzokuchi*, Kuanchengzi corresponded to the old Russian *fuzokuchi* plus land to the east of the former CER. Changchun corresponded to the *shangbu* and northwestern part of the old city and Datong corresponded to the southeastern half of the old city. Shuntian corresponded to the area around the new palace and government offices, Anmin to the southwest of that, and Xiyang to west of the SMR. Xiyang, Anmin, and Kuanchengzi included large tracts of land as yet undeveloped. Dongguang district was east of Datong Dajie but south of the old city and west of the Yitong

In an article in November 1942, Tōdai professor Kishida Hidetō stated that of all the significant changes he marked upon returning to Manchukuo, the capital city was the most changed. Not only had Changchun grown tremendously in size, but now an “ideal city plan” (*risō teki na toshi keikaku*) had grown steadily to fill that space.¹²³ What made it ideal demonstrated the overriding concerns of Japanese planners: the creation of a new definition of modernity, one preoccupied with state power and Asian identity. Both but especially the latter of these concerns could also be expressed by other means. Shinkyō's planning thus served additionally as a structural framework upon which more illustrative means of portraying Asian identities could hang.

River. Heshun designated the new development east of the Yitong River along the road to Jilin. Dongrong district included the area north of Heshun, still east of the Yitong River. The outer six districts encompassed the capital's green belt and the watershed for Jingyue reservoir. Each district had its own mayor and administration. *Kokuto Shinkyō*, pp. 66-8. Slightly different population figures for 1942 are in *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, pp. 16-9.

¹²³ Kishida Hidetō, “Manshūkoku kenkoku jūshūnen to sono kenchiku,” p. 2.

Chapter 7. Manchukuo's Façades

In arranging Manchukuo's capital, planners attempted to affirm the state's authority through the use of space. Wide boulevards, abundant parks, and the strategic situating of key structures conveyed specific meanings regarding the nature of the new society. Aiming beyond Manchukuo, however, planners also used their command of the urban environment to demonstrate their technical authority to a more global audience. Thus, although appealing to Asian cultural sentiments through a superficial incorporation of traditional elements, Shinkyō's planning manifested more fundamentally a modern nature—new conceptions of state power and technical expertise overshadowed Asian ornamentation. The same proved true for the new capital's architecture: pointedly traditionalistic, it too was more consistently modern.

Underlying this similarity was a fundamental concern. Manchukuo's administrators wanted the new state to evince capable leadership. Planners thought this would help secure popular support, lessen the civil strife inherent in seizing Manchuria, and prepare the state as a useful ally. In other words, building Manchukuo was a means of rebuffing and taming Chinese nationalism. Yet a second, simultaneous audience was Japanese. The early 1930s witnessed an intensifying struggle between loose but rival coalitions over the future direction of the country. For one of these coalitions, building Manchukuo was a tool useful for winning Japanese to their perspective.¹

At the same time, there remained still a third, global audience. Japanese wanted to demonstrate capable leadership to the West as well so as to validate

¹ Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, pp. 115-80, 241-303.

the Japanese incorporation of Manchuria in an age where imperialism was increasingly less acceptable.

Japanese activities in Manchuria cannot be understood without grasping these contexts. Seizing natural resources and controllable markets were never the only rationales for expansion on the continent. Advocates of expansion also supported increased state planning and the reorganization of Japanese society at home. In effect, this meant a revolution. More to the point, to those supporting a 'Shōwa Restoration,' just as to those supporting the Meiji Restoration half a century earlier, enhanced means of urban planning meant greater rationalization and efficiency, perhaps the hallmarks of modernity. The new capital, the focus of the new state, was the stage upon which Japanese renovationists constructed their best face.

Like the capital's planners, Shinkyō's architects attempted to endow Manchukuo's new capital with appropriate forms, forms that in turn betrayed their overriding interest in contributing to the discourse on modernity. Despite the use of architectural expressions derived from Asian traditions, Shinkyō's new architectural vocabulary proved fundamentally modern.

The use of traditional motifs, however, served two important purposes. Most obviously it was an attempt to encourage Chinese nationalism to assume a different and, from the Japanese perspective, more helpful form. At the same time, an unspoken yet more fundamental goal was to reorient all Asians towards a variant definition of modernity, one that was theoretically superior to the modernity determined in the West and studied by Asians for five decades. One of the subtexts of the new discourse was that it was time for Asians to stand up and find their own path.²

² A subtext of this argument noted that famous foreign architects like Frank Lloyd Wright and Bruno Tautman, having come to Japan with the mission of introducing modern architecture to

Unlike the various *fuzokuchi*, Shinkyō did not represent equality with the West. It represented superiority. This pointed, however, at underlying Japanese intentions. The new and specifically Asian modernity was a vehicle for Japanese leadership, and the appropriation of culturally and ethnically identifying characteristics had more to do with legitimizing Japanese efforts than Asian egalitarianism. Because modernity is intrinsically cosmopolitan, however, and cannot constrain itself to national or even cultural boundaries, this effort eventually, and entirely, failed. The capital's new style proved of limited appeal, even within the puppet state itself.

An Imperial Style

In a 1924 article in the *Toshi kōron*, Osaka Mayor Seki Kazu suggested that there were only two types of cities: those that developed historically and those more idealized.³ A similar argument can be made concerning states. Just as old Changchun and the *fuzokuchi* represented respective instances of the historical and the idealized, so did China and Manchukuo. Expressing Manchukuo's national pretensions most cogently, Shinkyō's idealizations were even more central than those the *fuzokuchi* illustrated for Mantetsu.

The most noticeable trait of Manchukuo's official architecture was its use of Asian motifs, especially for the roofs. This was inspired by several sources. Most well-known are the pan-Asian sentiments publicly expressed in Japan by writers like Ōkawa Shūmei (1886-1957), an increasingly popular perspective as the 1930s progressed. Reversing Fukuzawa Yukichi's famous *datsu-A* thesis, pan-Asianism reconceived Japan as an Asian society and legitimized Japan's leadership in place of Western colonialism. For many,

Japan were ultimately influenced deeply by Japan themselves. Saitō Noburō, "Nihon ni okeru kaigai kenchikuka," *Tōyō kenchiku*, June 1937, pp. 144-147.

³ Seki Kazu, "Kinsei toshi no hatten to toshi keikaku," *TK 7: 12*, December 1924, pp. 2-22.

this renewed a commitment to a Japanese version of *la mission civilisatrice* to lead Asia to a brighter future.⁴

This view is exemplified by Naitō Tairō, a *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* editorialist. In January 1937, Naitō suggested that while in the past Japan absorbed much culture from China, in the end Japan managed to retain a separate culture, truly one of Japan's major achievements. Naitō expected that the apparent "strength of the Japanese race" (*Yamato minzoku no chikara*), rendered even powerful because of the Japanese mastering of modern science, woven into Manchukuo's fabric would secure the new state's future. Thus, a new architectural style reflecting the "spirit of ethnic harmony" (*minzoku kyōwa no seishin*) was intrinsic to that effort.⁵

The perspective of Oka Ōji, a 1912 Tōdai graduate and a professor at the South Manchurian College of Engineering, was more comprehensive. In an August 1936 editorial he commented that modern architecture in Japan was only "limping" (*hakō*) along. In his opinion, the occasional, sudden bursts of progressive activity, like that which produced creations like the well-known *Maru biru* (1923) were admirable. But at the same time, he noted, more traditional wood constructions continued to appear. Still, this he thought also good. While on the one side Japanese society was "enterprising and progressive," on the other it retained important traditional components that allowed it to advance along two paths simultaneously. Thus, the "true nature of the Japanese racial spirit stands up, and returns."⁶ Oka thought this

⁴ Miki Kiyoshi thought that although by 1938 this sentiment was found widely in popular culture, its origins lay in the Manchurian Incident of 1931. See Miki Kiyoshi, "The China Affair and Japanese Thought," *Contemporary Japan*, Vol. VI, No. 4, March 1938, p. 601.

⁵ Naitō, "Yakushin Manshūkoku no bunka to kenchiku," p. 5.

⁶ "Nippon minzoku seishin no honsei ni tachikaeri."

a good balance, because otherwise society would become caught in the middle of a whirlpool of modern thought.⁷

Oka thought that Japanese society was in a good position to lead. Others, however, conceived Japan's role less prominently. In 1924, Matsumuro Shigemitsu, the designer of the post office and police station in the Changchun *fuzokuchi*, argued that the act of coming to Manchuria enabled Japanese to mix with Chinese, Koreans, Europeans, and even Americans to develop a new, more genuinely internationalist culture, one that would eventually include a new architectural style. Matsumuro, for one, perceived contributions from each of these societies positively.⁸ Others agreed.⁹ Indeed, the potential for cultural blending inspired many Japanese, even during more extreme wartime conditions.¹⁰

For many, however, the proclamation of the state of Manchukuo provided an opportunity to create something wholly new, resulting in a tide of administrators, including architects, rushing to Manchuria.¹¹ Many settled in Shinkyō¹² and contributed to a burgeoning bureaucracy.¹³ Signifying a

⁷ Oka Ōji, "Kindai kenchiku no hakō wo ikaga," *MKZ* 16:8, August 1936, p. 1.

⁸ Matsumuro Shigemitsu, "Shokuminchi ha yoroshiku dokuritsu shitaru bunka wo kensetsu subeshi," *MKZ* 4:3, March 1924, pp. 6-15 and "Shinseikatsu no hyōjun," *MKZ* 4:4, April 1924, pp. 2-7. Matsumuro went so far as to suggest that Manchuria could provide examples for Tokyo in the wake of the Kantō earthquake. See Matsumuro Shigemitsu, "Kenchiku no minshū kyōiku," *MKZ* 4:7, July 1924, pp. 2-5.

⁹ See, for example, Aoi Rō, "Kaikan shinchiku, sōritsu sanshūnen wo shukushite kyōkai no shōrai ni kibōsu," *MKZ* 4:3, March 1924, pp. 16-18 and Suzuki Masao, "Atarashii ie," *MKZ* 4:3, March 1924, pp. 66-70.

¹⁰ The tall Russian buildings of Harbin and the mixed Sino-Tibetan structures in Chengde impressed Kishida Hidetō, a Tōdai professor of engineering, most during a 1939 visit to Manchukuo. See *Nihon kōsaku bunka renmei shusai*, "Tairiku kenchiku zadankai," *Gendai Kenchiku* 8, January 1940, p. 54.

¹¹ Oka Ōji, "Manshū ni okeru shinkō kenchiku ni taibōsu," *MKZ* 13:6, June 1933, p. 1, and Nishizawa, "Manshūkoku no kensetsu jigyō."

¹² Of the 131 advisors the *MKZ* listed in 1936, 61 were in Dalian, 25 were in Shinkyō, 19 were in Mukden, 6 were in Harbin, 2 were in Jilin City, and the rest were scattered throughout the new state. Since Changchun before 1932 was smaller than Jilin, the sudden rise of high profile members living in Shinkyō indicates the scale of new construction in the new capital. Yet it also shows that Dalian and Mukden continued to be of great significance to Japanese. "Shōwa

new age, the capital 'dawned' like a beckoning star.¹⁴ Yet it seemed to those who went there was never enough personnel and much to do. Some even lamented that although Mantetsu's staff provided thirty years of experience, because their designs used primarily brick and reinforced concrete much of that experience was out of date.¹⁵

Another consideration encouraging architects to come to the new capital involved the capital's scale. Not only did the capital's planners seek to control all of the city's façades, they also sought to oversee the whole of its details. The various *fuzokuchi* were small, and before 1932 Japanese administrators paid scant attention to Chinese outside their jurisdiction. Even in Dalian Japanese left Chinese to their own devices in areas reserved for Chinese residences. The new capital, however, was different. Although larger, planners hoped to oversee construction in its entirety so as to insure all proceeded according to their prescriptions. Most obviously this involved insuring that structures were suitably safe, especially fire-proof. Given that Shinkyō was not in an earthquake zone, more inexpensive structures of brick

11-nendo hyōgi'in," MKZ 16:5, May 1936, p. 55. This trend, however, slowed. The 1941 announcements indicate only one of fifteen new members living in Shinkyō. "Kaihō," MKZ, 21:9, September 1941, p. 36.

¹³ By the end of 1936 some 8,243 buildings were in use by the government for work and residence, most newly constructed. "Kokuto kensetsu no jōkyō," MKZ 17:10, September 1937, pp. 14-17.

¹⁴ The imagery of daybreak was common to a number of articles about the capital published in the MKZ in 1932 and 1933.

¹⁵ This was the opinion of Tsuchiura Kishiro, a specialist in company housing in Andong and Jilin (city). See Nihon kōsaku bunka renmei shusai, "Tairiku kenchiku zadankai," *Gendai Kenchiku* 8, January 1940, pp. 49-50. Others thought differently. With regard to residential construction, Mantetsu's experience and stable of some twenty companies proved very useful. See Fujii, "Manshū jūtaku kyōkyū jigyō jūnen no ato," p. 26. Makino Masaoto, head of Shinkyō's architecture department in 1942, suggested that it was only Manchukuo's sudden establishment that made Mantetsu's experience difficult to utilize. Indeed, he thought the lack of recognition for Mantetsu in books like Tokutomi Sohō's *Manshū kenkoku tokuhon* was a glaring omission. See Makino Masaoto, "Kenkoku jūnen to kenchiku bunka," MKZ 22:10, October 1942, pp. 16-7.

proved ultimately acceptable, but concerns for general sanitation and running water remained ever-present.¹⁶

In addition to the demand for skilled labor, the promotion of Japan's 'civilizing mission,' excitement about 'cultural blending,' and the creation of a new architectural form, another motivation for architects involved historical interest, albeit of recent vintage. Since its inception, the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* had published numerous articles on non-Japanese architectural traditions, especially those of Europeans and Chinese. It was not until 1928, however, that Murata Jirō published an "Outline of the History of Manchurian Architecture." In it Murata explored the roots of Manchurian architecture, something he traced back to early Chinese influences. He found, however, that Manchurian architecture in turn eventually influenced structures in Korea and eastern Siberia and eventually helped establish a cultural connection with Central Asia.¹⁷

The assertion of a Manchuria as an independent scholarly topic served propagandistic purposes. It began, however, for Japanese before 1932, though the Manchurian Incident provided added momentum. In time a number of

¹⁶ Apparently a large earthquake occurred in 1854 centering on Jinjiu, but that was an anomaly. Tanaka Kuniyaku, "Manshūkoku kenchiku hōki seiteijō no konpon yōken ni tsuite," *MKZ* 12:7, July 1932, p. 13.

¹⁷ Murata Jirō, "Manshū kenchiku shi gaiyō," *MKZ* 8:4, April 1928, pp. 2-20. Arriving as an instructor at the South Manchurian Engineering Technical College in 1924, Murata went on to become an important historian of imperial Chinese urban forms, including several of the non-Han northern dynasties. See, for example, Murata Jirō, *Chūgoku no teito*, Kyoto: Sōgeisha, 1981. The first he wrote about the Manchus appears to have been on the mausoleum for Nurhaci (1559-1626), the first Manchu overlord in Murata Jirō, "Hōten fukuryō no rekishi," *MKZ* 15:8, August 1935, pp. 9-22. Murata was also interested in Manchuria's religious architectural heritage. See Murata Jirō, "Manshū ni okeru kaikyōji kenchikushi no kenkyū," *MKZ* 10:7, July 1930, pp. 1-27, Murata Jirō, "Manshū ni okeru Shinsho ramakyō no kenchiku," *MKZ* 10:11, November 1930, pp. 1-19, Murata Jirō, "Manshū satsumankyō no kenchiku," *MKZ* 11:3, March 1931, pp. 17-30, and Murata Jirō, "Ten wo matsukenchiku," *MKZ* 14:3, March 1934, pp. 3-12. Some of his research involved Changchun and Jilin. See Murata Jirō, "Kaigen-Chōshun no Seishinji," *MKZ* 9:2, February 1929, pp. 6-20, and Murata Jirō, "Kitsurin no kaikyōji," *MKZ* 7:10, October 1927, pp. 1-18. Oka Ōji celebrated Murata's work in Oka Ōji, "Murata Jirō-kun no sōto wo okuru," *MKZ* 16:6, June 1936, p. 1. A useful summary of traditional architecture centered on Murata's work is in Manshikai, ed., *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi*, supplement, pp. 293-297.

publications focusing on Manchurian studies appeared.¹⁸ With regard to architecture, Manchurian concerns were perhaps most evident in Japanese taking a leading role in the restoration of original Manchu structures.¹⁹ Others took a different tact, focusing on the role Japanese could play in awakening Manchurians' cultural self-consciousness.²⁰

Despite this concern for indigenous evolution, however, global developments continued to influence Japanese activities in Manchuria. Investigating overseas structures remained intrinsic to the creation of new structures in Manchuria, even if those new structures were reactions to those found overseas. Sōga Kensuke, head of the department of architecture at the Capital Construction Bureau, made this clear when he narrated the context in which the designs for the new palace emerged.²¹ As the later head of the Bureau of Court Construction, in September 1936 he set off to examine

¹⁸ See, for example, the journal *Man-Mōshi ronsō*, published in Kyoto beginning in 1938, that focused on the ancient history of Manchuria and Mongolia as well as the affairs of Chinese dynasties with regard to those two regions. More general information also made its way into print, such as ethnologies like Akiba Takashi, *Manshū minzoku shi*, Shinkyō: Man-Nichi bunka kyōkai, 1938. Another, sponsored by the *Manshū teikoku kyōwakai* (the Manchurian Imperial Concordia Society), was a useful dictionary of local Chinese, Manchu, Korean, Japanese, and even certain European words: Katō Tetsuya, *Tochi yōgo jiten*, Tokyo: Iwamatsu Dōshoten, 1939. Appendix 5 provided a historical timeline of kingdoms and nations in China, the West, Manchuria, Korea, and Japan. It also included three calendars: a Western one, beginning in “-700”, a Japanese one, beginning with Emperor Jimmu in the year zero and progressing to the approaching year of 2600, and a Manchurian calendar that began with “-2600” and ended with the year zero, the founding of Manchukuo!

¹⁹ On the 1938-9 restoration work at the mausoleum for Huang Taiji (1592-1643), the founder of the Qing, near Mukden see Yamaguchi Tadashi, “Hōten shōryōnai meirō fukugen gaiyō,” *MKZ* 21:1, January 1941, pp. 7-15. A 1998 plaque at the site (Beiling) reports restoration work occurring in 1935, but Yamaguchi reported that earlier work was not very good and necessitated later Japanese efforts. Oka Ōji investigated the relationship between the mausoleum's gardens and structures in Oka Ōji, “Kenchiku to teien,” *MKZ* 9:11, November 1929, pp. 1-14. In an article written in Chinese for a Fengtian newspaper praising the mausoleum's Asian style Oka pleaded with Chinese to preserve their heritage. See Oka Ōji, “Dui Fengtian zhaoling gongyuan jihua zhi yijian tanqu xinshi sheji qiebhui dongyang quwei,” *MKZ* 6:11, November 1931, pp. 22-25.

²⁰ See the discussion in *Gendai Kenchiku* 8, January 1940, pp. 58-60.

²¹ Sōga was a 1913 graduate of Tokyo Higher Engineering College (Tōkyō kōtō kōgyō gakkō) and before joining the CCB a member of Mantetsu's architecture section (*kenchikuka*).

palaces around the world. Returning in May 1937, he felt that through studying Europe's "past" (*kako*), the "direction in which America was heading" (*Beikoku no ikisugi*), and Japan's "development" (*shinten*), he had acquired a "global viewpoint upon which to proceed" (*sekai no shidō teki tachiba*).²² Others did not travel so far. Recounting his role in the design of the Hall of State, Ishii Tōru recalled visiting Beijing within a few months of coming to Manchukuo in the fall of 1933, a Chinese style of architecture having already been decided upon.²³

Some Japanese took a broader perspective. Onoki Toshiharu, chairman of the association that published the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*, suggested in 1930 that despite the sharing and universalization of styles and customs brought about by the development of international transportation and trade, national variations in modern architectural styles were increasingly apparent. Onoki was therefore confident that Japanese architects embracing "special characteristics" (*tokuchō*) would eventually emerge.²⁴

At the same time, it seemed to Onoki that because cities like Shanghai were more internationally attuned, no national style was emerging in China. This meant that in Manchuria, where he thought the development of industry was providing the conditions for the emergence of modern cities, a local style was possible.²⁵ In the wake of the Manchurian Incident it was thus easy for him to envision not only practical zoning measures and the construction of tall buildings in Shinkyō, but a certain style as well—an "internationally rising style based on Asian architecture."²⁶ Oka Ōji, Onoki's

²² Sōga, "Kenkoku zengo no omoidasu," p. 13.

²³ Ishii Tōru, "Kokumuin wo tateru goro," *MKZ* 22:10, September 1942, pp. 35-36.

²⁴ Onoki Toshiharu, "Gendai kenchiku zakkan," *MKZ* 10:10, October 1930, pp. 7-9.

²⁵ Onoki, "Gendai kenchiku zakkan," pp. 8-9.

²⁶ "Tōyō kenchiku wo kichō tosuru kokusaiteki shinkō yōshiki." Onoki Toshiharu, "Manshūkoku shuto kensetsu ni tsuite," *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932, pp. 1-2.

vice chair and eventual successor, echoed this vision, calling for a blending of science, rationality, revivalism, and Asianism.²⁷ Yumoto Saburō, chair of Mantetsu's civil engineering department in Dalian, was more explanatory. Since modern technology and materials rendered purely Chinese styles obsolete and planners did not want to simply replicate Western or Japanese styles, a "local" style was necessary.²⁸

The June 1932 issue of the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* focused almost exclusively on the new capital. Among the various contributors, a few common themes were apparent. In addition to agreeing that the new capital have a style that was aesthetically distinctive, all insisted that the style be economical and practical. Rather than a fanciful Xanadu, the Japanese planning community in Manchuria hoped for something that was a more natural expression of the times.²⁹ As such, many thought it imperative to go beyond received Western architectural discourse. While two explicitly suggested avoiding styles of Western architecture, several cited the revolutionary ideas of Le Corbusier and Walter Gropius.³⁰ Only one suggested adopting a Japanese style. This pragmatism extended to

²⁷ What Oka meant by this was showing the ways in which Asians were inherently different from Westerners. Oka Ōji, "Manshūkoku shuto kensetsu ni kansuru toshi keikaku narabi ni kenchiku ni taisuru iken," *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932, p. 12.

²⁸ "Rōkarukarāa." Yumoto Saburō, "Shinkokuto no kensetsu," *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932, pp. 6-7.

²⁹ Compare: Onoki Toshiharu, "Manshūkoku shuto kensetsu ni tsuite," *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932, p. 4; Oka Ōji, "Manshūkoku shuto kensetsu ni kansuru toshi keikaku narabi ni kenchiku ni taisuru iken," *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932, pp. 11-2; Naoki Shigeru, "Manshūkoku shinshuto kensetsu keikaku ni tsuite," *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932, p. 17; and Nakazawa Kiyoshi, "Shinkyōto keikaku ni taisuru shoken," *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932, p. 34. In the following issue see Kusano Tomio, "Kokuto kensetsu he no jokyoku," *MKZ* 12:7, July 1932, pp. 1-11, and Tanaka Kuniyaku, "Manshūkoku kenchiku hōki seiteijō no konpon yōken ni tsuite," *MKZ* 12:7, July 1932, pp. 12-8.

³⁰ Former Mantetsu personal secretary Ueda Kyōsuke suggested avoiding "Yankee style" (*yankii shiki*) construction that built on every corner. He also wanted to avoid the expenses inherent in Parisian apartments when he recommended designing the palace government in the style of Tokyo's Marunouchi district. Ueda Kyōsuke, "Chōshun wo shuto to suru gigi to shuto no toshi keikaku ni tsuite no kibō," *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932, pp. 40-1. Murata Seiji wanted to avoid American and European style realism (*chokusha shugi*), and suggested learning from experiences in Taiwan. Murata Seiji, "Ketsuron," *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932, p. 21.

endeavoring to make the city devoid of the ills of other modern cities and to consider its economic and other municipal elements.³¹ A year later, Oka Ōji confirmed this approach, but noted also some of the dissension between the military and Mantetsu over envisioning Manchuria's future.³² His solution was a rededicated effort to study both Manchuria's traditions and global developments. Manchukuo and the new capital were "models" (*hinagata*), but more important they also represented the "light of East Asia" (*tōA no hikari*). Oka hoped for a fusion of Japanese efforts and a focus on development in all its best intents.³³

Shinkyō's major public buildings were the products of a team led by Sōga Kensuke. Sōga's avowed goal was to create "architecture for the government offices of an ideal country's national capital" (*risō kokka no kokuto no kanga kenchiku*). Specifically, Sōga wanted something that would "show a Chinese style flavored with a modern style" (*shinafū wo hyōgen shi sore ni kindafū wo kamishi*). The result would be a "new style inextricably woven with an Asian style" (*shinyōshiki wo naimen teki ni tōyōfū wo orikoman*).³⁴ Sōga's reminiscences agreed with an early CCB publication foretelling grand buildings having "ancient elegance" and "modern clarity."³⁵ Makino Masaoto, the head of the municipal department of architecture assessed the significance of this style. Just as no other country in the world had a basis in ethnic harmony, Makino thought Manchukuo's "architectural culture" (*kenchiku bunka*) was without parallel. In Makino's opinion, this was

³¹ On the practical necessities of the city, see the discussion in Chapter 7. For an anonymous summation of the "mission of modern cities" (*kindai toshi no shimei*), including the avoiding of modern problems, see "Shinkyō sōgen," *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932, p. 59.

³² See the discussion in Chapter 6.

³³ Oka Ōji, "Manshū ni okeru shinkō kenchiku ni taibōsu," *MKZ* 13:6, June 1933, pp. 1-3.


³⁴ Sōga, "Kenkoku zengo no omoidasu," p. 8.

³⁵ "Gutaiteki yūga na dentō to kindaiteki meirō na taika kōrō." *Manshūkoku seifu kokumu'in kokuto kensetsu kyoku, Kokuto dai-Shinkyō*, np: npl, 1933, p. 9.

because so many of the small countries born after the First World War were consumed with international styles, and none affirmed their own heritage. Manchukuo's singularity was significant. To Makino, this was especially providential, because Manchukuo in turn could not help but stimulate Japanese culture.³⁶

Construction on the capital's first two major structures, the First and Second Government Buildings (*Dai ichi chōsha*, *Dai ni chōsha*), began in 1932 on Datong Plaza and finished in May and June of 1933 (Figure 7.1). Pictures and brief descriptions appeared in the November 1933 issue of the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*. Each was symmetrical, two storied, and had a square, twenty-eight meter high tower projecting from its geometric center. Although the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* labeled both their styles as "Manchurian" (*Manshū shiki*), their appearances differed radically. The First, housing the offices of the CCB, featured a flat roof and an ornamental parapet that repeated as a motif atop the porte-cochère and tower (Figure 7.3). Generally smooth in surface, it could have been the creation of architects almost anywhere in the world, though its sprawling wings hinted at a location with ample open space. The Second was structurally a twin, but its façade was distinctly Asian. Joining the central tower were four single-story towers, two at either end and two over the entry (Figure 7.4). Sloping, tiled roofs supported by engaged columns capped all five. The parapet was similarly sloping and tiled, sporting also traditional Chinese roof decorations such as mythical animals. Located upon either side of Datong Dajie on the southern side of Datong Plaza, the two offices faced the distant railway station like sentinels, reflecting the Western and Eastern aspects of Manchukuo's architectural heritage.

³⁶ Makino, "Kenkoku jūnen to kenchiku bunka," p. 17.

Figure 7.1 Schema of Datong Dajie and Datong Plaza³⁷

³⁷ Datong Dajie, marked by capital "X"s, runs north-south. Datong and Jianguo Plazas are outlined with capital "X"s. Dots represent a break in the length of Datong Dajie. Xingren Dalu is the street that runs east from the new South Station, between the palace and the Hall of State. At Datong Dajie it becomes Jilin Dalu, the road to Jilin city. A number of sources were used to compile this schema. See, for example, Shinkyō tokubetsushi kōsho, *Shinkyō shisei gaiyō*, Shinkyō: np, 1932; Mantetsu sōkyoku Hōten tetsudō kyoku ryokaku gakari, *Shinkyō*, Mukden: Mantetsu sōkyoku Hōten tetsudō kyoku ryokaku gakari, 1941; and *Shinkyō shigai chizu*, Tokyo: Kenkōsha shikabu, 1982 (originally 1941).

Makino Masaoto thought these two structures the most representative of Shinkyō's early construction.³⁸ The Second Government Building, however, also reflected an architectural movement in Japan. The 1917-18 competition for the new Diet building resulted in one design that incorporated a Japanese roof. Although never built, the competition apparently produced a name for subsequent buildings that emulated that style. This was the "Imperial Crown style" (*teikan yōshiki*), sometimes called *yane no aru* (having a [Japanese-style] roof). The first structure in this style was the Hobutsu Den at Meiji shrine, built in 1921. In the 1930s the style culminated in buildings standing four or five stories but retaining the distinctive roof. Some, like the Gunjin Kaikan (Soldier's Hall) in Tokyo's Kudan district, built in 1934, included only a section of the roof in a neotraditional manner (Figure 7.5). The Kanagawa Prefectural Office Building was similar. Others, like the Imperial Museum in Ueno, built in 1937, used a longer, traditional roof that ran the length of the building. Another version of the style appeared in competitions for the Aichi Prefectural Building (Figure 7.6). Built in the mid-1930s, it included a tall, square tower capped with an Asian roof in the center of a large, five-story complex. An Asian-style parapet ringed the main roof, and a porte-cochère extended from the entry hall. Reacting to the dominance of the West, these were part of a search for a modern but more distinctively Asian style.³⁹

The Second Government Building in Shinkyō differed from these structures in Japan in that it was lower, more spread-out, and offered additional turrets with Asian roofs. It also included traditional Chinese figures on the roof. Despite incorporating a greater number of traditional elements, however, viewers could not mistake it for a traditional structure. It

³⁸ Makino, "Kenkoku jūnen to kenchiku bunka," p. 19.

³⁹ Muramatsu Teijirō, *Nihon kindai kenchiku no rekishi*, Tokyo: Nihon hōsō shuppan kaisha, 1977, pp. 169-78, and Stewart, *Modern Japanese Architecture*, pp. 107-11.

was more a fusion of styles, reminiscent of the hybrid structures Japanese built in the early Meiji era.

Makino Masaoto thought these early buildings were the results of a period of chaos.⁴⁰ As such they are best understood as products of an era similar to the early Meiji. In contrast, the buildings south of the palace lining Shuntian Dajie represented the best effort to create a new style—the *kōA* or “revive Asia” style, as one scholar terms it (Figure 7.2).⁴¹ The centerpiece was the Fifth Government Building, the Hall of State (Ch, *Gúowùyuan*; J, *Kokumuin*), begun in 1934 and completed in 1936 (Figure 7.7).⁴² Sōga Kensuke recalled that the Hall of State was to represent the entire country, and that it needed to be appropriately endowed.⁴³ Influenced clearly by the First and Second Government Buildings as well as by the *teikan yōshiki* style, the Hall of State differed in key ways. Most noticeably, it sported a pagoda-like roof atop a central tower and two similar caps at either end of the building’s central section. A sloped, Asian-style parapet graced the remainder of the roof line. Even if it did not include mythical figures upon the ridges, the roof line was more similar to the Second Government Building on Datong Plaza than to anything in Japan. The Hall of State, however, was a more mature expression

⁴⁰ Makino, “Kenkoku jūnen to kenchiku bunka,” p. 21.


⁴¹ The palace, however does not. Begun in 1938, its construction lapsed in 1943. Chinese completed it, as a university, in the 1950s. (Puyi never lived in the palace. He lived instead in a private estate in the *fuzokuchi*. A description and photos of the interior of what were supposed to be his temporary lodgings can be found in MKZ 14:3, March 1934.) On the term “*kōA*” see Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 182 and *passim*. Historical sources do not use it, except for one that mentions generally a “new and revised Asian culture” (*atarashii kōA bunka*) and the need to establish a “theory for revived Asian architecture” (*kōA kenchiku riron*). See Wataru Karitake, “Shin tairiku kenchiku no juritsu he,” MKZ 19:11, November 1939, p. 3. Makino wrote that initially the buildings lining Shuntian Dajie were to be *yane no aru kenbutsu* (buildings having a [Japanese] roof). Later he termed it the “Manchukuo bureaucratic style” (*Manshūkoku kanchō kenchiku yōshiki*). Makino, “Kenkoku jūnen to kenchiku bunka,” pp. 20-1.

⁴² A photo of a model and some of the floorplans appeared in the MKZ 14: 8, September 1934. Photographs appeared in the MKZ first in 17: 1, January 1937.

⁴³ Sōga, “Kenkoku zengo no omoidasu,” p. 12.

because the caps at either end of the central section were better integrated into the overall structure than the four turrets that sat haphazardly atop the Second Government Building. Their pagoda-like roofs were also less fanciful than those of the Second Government Building.

Figure 7.2 Schema of Shuntian Dajie and Anmin Plaza⁴⁴



Beneath those caps reared freestanding columnar entryways with wings extended to either side, wings that further differentiated the Hall of State. The First and Second Government Buildings were basically long hallways ending at either end in expanded, square footprints, but in the Hall of State those expansions were transformed into arms jutting before and behind the central section, leaving the entire structure with an “H” shaped footprint. This made the Hall of State even more sprawling. It was also more monumental, as the central section stood five stories tall and the wings four.

⁴⁴ North is at the top of the page; Shuntian Dajie is marked by the vertical row of “X”s. For sources see Figure 7.1.

A massive, three-story, columned porte-cochère stood in front, the four columns of which served as a unifying motif: four columns appeared on each side of the central tower, as well as below the front face of the tower and above the porte-cochère. Four large columns also graced the entryways at either end of the central section. More prominent than the engaged columns of the Second Government Building, the free standing columns were also more striking than the columnular effects produced by the use of stone in the Nagoya Municipal Office and the Kanagawa Prefectural Office Buildings. Overall, the repetitive effect of the columns enhanced a sense of verticality.

Another important difference between the Hall of State and the Nagoya Municipal Office and the Kanagawa Prefectural Office Buildings was that the footprints of the latter two, as well as of the Gunjin Kaikan and the Imperial Museum in Ueno, were square, fitting each of those buildings into an identifiable city block. Sitting upon a much larger city block amid trees and lawns, the Hall of State was less compact and spanned more space. This extravagance emphasized state power. Like the four imperial crown style buildings in Japan, however, the Hall of State was similar in that the floor of the central section below the roof line was set back so as to give the roof a more traditional, cantilevered effect.⁴⁵ This did not occur in the wings, which repeated instead the windows and surfacing found in the central section so as to integrate the building's various parts.

The Manchukuo Hall of State was more than the agglomeration of the various aspects of its heritage. Structures in Japan of the Imperial Crown style seemed strange—the addition of a large tower with a sloping, tiled roof to an otherwise Western, steel-framed building produced a stark fusion of contrasts. Similar was Manchukuo's Second Government Building—

⁴⁵ For a discussion of this technique see Stewart, *Modern Japanese Architecture*, p. 110.

structurally an elongated hall, its accouterments were forced and disingenuous. The Hall of State, however, de-emphasized the central tower by reducing its proportional height while maintaining its role as a grand, central stairway. The building's dark coloration also made it more striking, leaving the white tower and columns to have a stark impact on the viewer.

The structure the most similar to the Hall of State sat several blocks to the south. This was the Seventh Government Building housing the Ministry of Justice (Ch, *sīfābù*; J, *shihōbu*), begun in 1935 and completed in 1936 (Figure 7.8).⁴⁶ Although not as large as the Hall of State, it was perhaps the most successful application of the *kōA* style. Standing three stories tall, the building was another long hall surmounted by a central tower. The tower, however, was relatively wide and extended only two floors before reaching its tile roof. Since the topmost floor of the tower was smaller, the effect was pyramidal, an effect that was reinforced by the use of triangular gables on each side of each floor of the tower and on the front of the porte-cochère. The roof of the main structure repeated this effect. Long, sloped, and tiled, the roof line turned forward at either end of the building and on either side of the tower to cover four projecting sections. Each of these sections ended in a pitched, triangular roof. Although European in style, the roof's materials and decorative ridges were distinctly Chinese. The four projections, lined vertically with white stone, integrated the main section with the foundation and roof by repeating the color above and the same white stone below. A row of white, pointed arches around each of the smoothly arched windows on the first floor further unified the structure visually by de-emphasizing the tower and giving the entirety a sense of balance. Columns occurred sparingly, appearing as free-standing only on either side of the window at the base of

⁴⁶ Photos and some floorplans were published in the *MKZ* 16:8, August, 1936.

each projection and around the porte-cochère. Four engaged columns stood below the central tower and between the two most central projecting sections.

Across from the Hall of State was the Ministry of Public Security (Figure 7.9), one of a few official structures oriented upon a corner.⁴⁷ The entryway of this massive, four-story building faced northeast, across the wide plaza before the palace. Extending only one floor above the rest of the building, the central section was capped with a sloping, tiled roof with an exposed gable. Similar to the Soldiers' Hall in Tokyo, this Asian 'hat' differed in that it was elevated above the rest of the structure, including the four capped and projected corners of the two wings. Decorative frieze work along the fourth floor interrupted an otherwise smooth façade of brick and windows.

Government Building Number Eight, completed in 1937, housed the Ministry of Transportation (Figure 7.10).⁴⁸ Like all the buildings on Shuntian Dajie, the main element to the structure was a long rectangular building, built of brick, three stories high. At either end the central section were wings that ran in a direction away from Shuntian Dajie, resulting in a footprint that was "C" shaped. The roof line was more innovative. Except for the center most section housing the central stairway, the entire roof was a crenelated parapet, a motif that reappeared on the port-cochère, a more or less standard technique. The center-most section, however, featured a traditional, exposed gable roof, but instead of a gable the external wall continued. The windows below were surrounded by stone molding that gave the appearance of four columns, thereby carrying on the quadruple columnular theme of the Hall of

⁴⁷ Built in 1935, in 1943 it became the headquarters of the Manchukuo military. No photos, floorplans, or discussion of it occurred in the *MKZ*.

⁴⁸ Photos and some floorplans were published in the *MKZ* 18:2, February 1938, where it was described as in the "rising Manchurian style" (*shinkō Manshū shiki*). *Ibid.*, p. 49.

State and the Ministry of Justice. The design and ornamentation of the central staircase and the landings to which it led also echoed other structures.

Sitting at the foot of Shuntian Dajie, southeast of Anmin Plaza and facing it, the Shinkyō central courthouse offered another variation (Figure 7.11).⁴⁹ Completed in 1938, its footprint included long wings almost the same length of the central section, but rounded corners and the oblique angles in which the wings extended gave the building a more expansive appearance. Another wing extended behind the building from the central section housing the actual courts. Three entryways pierced the central structure and two side wings, the main one located between two massive projections and a single pointed roof. The rest of the structure sat beneath a slanted, tile parapet.⁵⁰

These five buildings were the most noteworthy efforts to create a new style. Several others were similar but comparatively unremarkable facsimiles, like that housing the Ministry of the Economy.⁵¹ Still others, on Datong Dajie about a kilometer east of the Hall of State, were clearly not products of the same mind-set and reflected instead more hybrid façades. A good example was the Third Government Offices, completed in 1937, housing the Department of People's Livelihood (Ch, *Mínshēngbù*; J, *Mínseibu*) (Figure 7.12).⁵² This was a simple, two-story structure with a squat, square, pitched roof over the central section. Five columns supported the roof in front. Across the street sat the Ministry of Finance, (Ch, *Cáizhèngbù*; J, *zaiseibu*). Although larger, it was a similar, unimaginative structure.

⁴⁹ Photos and some floorplans were published in the *MKZ* 19:4, April 1939.

⁵⁰ In article in the *MKZ*, Makino discussed the Manchukuo legal system and its architectural requirements for the new state. This included the appropriate height for judges' seats and other means of dominating the building's internal physical space. He did so by means of comparing Shinkyō's needs with other facilities elsewhere in Manchuria and Japan. See Makino Masaoto, "Manshūkoku hōga chōsha sekkei yōkō," *MKZ* 18:6, June 1938, pp. 1-23.

⁵¹ This building sat north of the Ministry of Transportation and across from the Ministry of Justice. Photos and some of its floorplans appeared in the *MKZ* 19:11, November 1939.

⁵² Photos and a sketch of its floorplans appeared in the *MKZ* 14:1, January 1934.

The most arresting building in this sector was the Bureau of Mongolian Affairs building (Ch, *Měngzhèngbù*; J, *Mōseibu*), built in 1936 (Figure 7.13).⁵³ Oriented upon a corner, the structure's embedded columns and white stone quoining gave it an almost Renaissance air. Yet above, a small, almost insignificant tower juxtaposed against tiled roofs and a single decorative gable marked this building the least coordinated design of the new capital.

Other official buildings appeared in due course, but these were the ones featured most, either in journals like the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* or in numerous pamphlets and newspapers. As a rule, the buildings maintained certain similarities. First, all were symmetrical. In part this was a reaction to the asymmetricality of the International Style, but it probably also reflected a desire to demonstrate harmony and balance in built forms. Both meshed well with Japanese propaganda emphasizing tradition and harmony. A second, broad similarity that would have agreed with Japanese propaganda involved these buildings' size. Several were enormous, made larger by central towers. The size of these buildings reflected a desire to demonstrate state power by compelling citizens' upward gazes. Verticality reflected power and authority. Unconsciously, however, sudden verticality, sprawling footprints, and enormous size also reflected aspects of modern society, such as the engineer's goal of bridging space and the bureaucrat's fascination with power. Massive structures housing large, coordinated bureaucracies are clearly one of modernity's hallmarks.

A third similarity involved the roofs, but the incorporation of some form of an Asian roof line was more than simply a repeating motif serving to unite the various structures. It demonstrated the Asian taming of foreign forms. Situating modern organizations under recognizably Asian roofs was an effort

⁵³ Photos and some of its floorplans appeared in the *MKZ* 16:8, August 1936.

to showcase modernity in an Asian guise so as to make it more palatable to Asian viewers. But it was also an effort to revitalize the Asian tradition by blending it physically with the capabilities and concerns of a new era.

To Japanese, these structures were as significant as those in Japan having 'imperial crowns.' Fueki Hideo, for example, chief engineer at the Manchuria Civil Engineering and Architecture Society (*Manshū doboku kenchiku kyōkai kōmu kachō*) thought that the "Eastern taste" (*tōyō shumi*) visible in Shinkyō's bureaucratic offices, as well as in the Nagoya Municipal Office and the Kanagawa Prefectural Office Buildings, displayed the leadership inherent in the Japanese spirit. To his eye, as capitalism entered its final days, structures like these helped pave the way for a new and unimagined era.⁵⁴

Yet below the various Asian-inspired roofs, plainer surfaces dominated. This reflected the International Style's emphasis on materials in their natural state rather than painting or glazing. Implying solidity and permanence, exposed brick but especially stone subtly expressed power and authority.

Differences in external façades, however, did not translate into differences in internal spatial organization. The organization of all of these buildings was identical in key ways. In addition to symmetry and the use of central staircases (Figure 7.14), all were basically long hallways off which rows of offices appended. Luxury was tempered but ubiquitous. Meeting rooms offered plush interiors and electric lighting illuminated marbled halls, as pictures in the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* attest.

Bureaucratic structures were not the only means Japanese architects had to express their updated modern vocabulary. Another kind of building

⁵⁴ Shinkyō's official structures also showed to men like Fueki the leadership of key individuals like Sano Toshikata. Some apparently even suggested using his name to replace the outdated names of internationalism and rationalism: "Sano-ism" (*Sanoizumu*). Fueki Hideo, "Gyōkai no konjyaku," *MKZ* 22:11, November 1942, pp. 35-6.

involved those which ordinary citizens would frequent more: public monuments. Most significant to the needs of the new state was the Monument to National Foundation, built in 1940. The *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* published photographs of a model of it in 1937 and again in 1941 along with sketches and actual photos, including a photo of the main shrine—a lone tower set amid low walls.⁵⁵ It could be reached through a two large gateways, between which sat a square compound that included two other gateways on either side (Figure 7.15). Encircling trees and a nearby river repeated Shinkyō's embracing of public green space as well as insuring it to be a place of quiet repose.

The overall style of the monument was mixed.⁵⁶ Although roofed everywhere in a Chinese fashion, the open veranda surrounding the square courtyard was more reminiscent of structures in southern climates. The stylized pillars, ornamental support beams, and balustrades, however, were more in keeping with international styles. The main shrine, a stocky, square tower with a double roof, attempted to repeat the *kō A* trademarks of symmetry, massive verticality, and a traditional roof (Figure 7.16). The ceremonies held there were also hybrids, blends of traditional Japanese (Shinto) and Manchurian religious principles with contemporary needs. Here is where the Emperor prayed for the longevity and security of the new empire.⁵⁷ Here also is where he saluted Japanese victories after 1937.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ See *MKZ* 17:11, November 1937 and *MKZ* 21:1, January 1941. Another photo appeared in *MKZ* 23:1, January 1943.

⁵⁶ The monument's final form was the result of negotiations beginning in 1935 that included the art historian Murata Jirō. See the discussion in Yaoi Matasaburō, "Kenkoku shimbyō, kenkoku chūreibyō," *MKZ* 23:1, January 1943, pp. 4-13.

⁵⁷ Oka Ōji, "Aratanaru seiki no nentō," *MKZ* 21:1, January 1941, p. 1.

⁵⁸ Pu Yi, *From Emperor to Citizen*, vol. 2, p. 293. For his perspective on Japanese efforts to introduce elements of Shintoism to Manchukuo, see *ibid.*, pp. 298-302.

A second 'national' shrine was the Monument to the War Dead (Ch, *Zhōnglíngtǎ*; J, *Chūreitō*), one of nine such places scattered around Manchuria dedicated to those Japanese who died during the Manchurian Incident (Figure 7.17).⁵⁹ Designed by the military, it affirmed the indivisibility of Japan and Manchukuo.⁶⁰ Begun in April 1934, it was completed in December, and stood five stories tall. The monument was a mammoth stone tower with a pointed, tile roof and four echoing eaves below. Before it the government staged mass rallies, such as in 1938 on the first anniversary of the China Incident.⁶¹ It contrasted markedly with earlier monuments to the war dead, such as in Dalian and Mukden. These were smaller, stylized towers without any Asian references.⁶²

One intriguing monument was never built, although the government organized a competition to design it. This was a monument to celebrate the Puyi's first state visit to Japan (*Hōnichi senshōkinen tō*). The judges, including Sano Toshikata, Naitō Tairō, Oka Ōji, and Shinkyō Mayor Wei Yunjie, entertained two hundred submissions from Japan and seventy-four from Manchuria (sixty-seven from Japanese, seven from Manchurians). The winner was Ikeda Masasue of Tokyo for a design reminiscent of the *teikan yōshiki* of the Kudan Kaikan. The monument would have been a free-standing section of a massive Chinese city wall surmounted by a small central

⁵⁹ A number of other monuments recognized specific battle sites, such as the one in Nanling. See the photo and discussion in Mantetsu sōkyoku, "*Shinkyō*," Mukden: Mantetsu, 1937, pp. 11-12. There was another, larger one in Kuanchengzi. See the photos in Shinkyō shōkō kaigijo, *Dai Shinkyō keizai gaikan*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō shōkō kaigijo, 1937, p. x and Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkan somuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō tokubetsushi kōsho, 1942, p. xiii. The architecture of all of these monuments betrayed a similar streamlined but blunt verticality.

⁶⁰ On the military designing it, see Katō, "Kenkoku zengo no omoidasu," p. 12. On its dedication and affirmation of unity, see Yaoi, "Kenkoku shimbyō, kenkoku chūreibyō," p. 12. For sketches of Yukino Motoyoshi's winning design and its competition see MKZ 14:4, April 1934. A photo appeared in MKZ 14:12, December 1934.

⁶¹ Manshūkoku tsūshinsha, ed., *Manshūkoku gensei*, Tokyo: Hōwa shuppan, 1986, (originally 1939), p. 22.

⁶² Photos of each can be found in the MKZ 7:8, August 1932.

keep and Chinese roof. The monument was to represent the “spirit of Japan-Manchukuo harmony” (*yūwa no seishin*). It was to be located just south of Anmin Plaza, due south of the palace at the end of Shuntian Dajie, facing north. Its Asian features could probably have been anticipated, as judges expected that the winning entry would be in an “Eastern” style (*tōyōfū*). Runners-up were more streamlined but retained a central tower.⁶³

Another monument, again apparently not built, was to celebrate Mantetsu’s achievements in education. First place in this competition was a rectangular obelisk with a recessed alcove in which a Renaissance figure sat holding a book. Above the figure was inscribed the three characters “*kyōikutō*” (“Education Tower”). Above the alcove was the Mantetsu insignia.⁶⁴

Two other structures meriting attention involved athletics. One was purely Japanese, the *Jimmu den* (Jimmu Hall). Completed in 1940, it was a long hall built of reinforced concrete, though its low roof and multiple wings marked it as typically Japanese.⁶⁵ Located in Mudan Park, its 920 square meters provided a protected enclosure for fencing, judo, and archery.⁶⁶ Another recreational facility served political needs as well, the Nanling Athletic Complex. Just east of the zoo, it encompassed a variety of fields and pavilions. Because it provided a large space for spectators to gather, it was used to host the ten year anniversary celebrations of the puppet state in 1942.⁶⁷

⁶³ “Hōnichi senshōkinen kenzōbutsu sekkei zu’an nyūsen happyō,” *MKZ* 17:2, February 1937, pp. i-vi, 45-6.

⁶⁴ The sketches for the top twenty candidates appeared in *MKZ* 17:7, July 1937.

⁶⁵ The *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* even labeled its style as Japanese (*Nihon shiki*). See *MKZ* 21:4, April 1941. Early sketches appeared in *MKZ* 19:9, September 1939. *Jimmu*, of course, was Japan’s first emperor. The characters of his name suggest a martial nature.

⁶⁶ *Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka*, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, p. 202.

⁶⁷ Photos and diagrams of certain fields and buildings can be found in *MKZ* 22:10, October 1942.

Manchukuo's architects displayed their creations prominently. One means was holding architectural exhibitions, such as the one in Shinkyō held at the Nikkei Gallery on Datong Dajie in September 21-23, 1937.⁶⁸ Another, larger exhibition was in Datong Park in 1942.⁶⁹ Other exhibitions featured the products of Manchurian industry.⁷⁰ Another means involved popular publications, as Shinkyō received much attention in Japanese journals. Washio Kenzō, an editor at the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*, remarked in early 1939 after a brief visit to Shinkyō that, along with Mukden, Shinkyō surpassed Dalian as the center for innovation, demonstrating rapid scientific advances that revolutionized life. As such, it set Japanese firmly on a new, progressive path, one that would lead the cultural development of all of East Asia. Indeed, Washio cautioned that Dalian could well relinquish its leading role for Manchuria and the North China region.⁷¹

The new architecture impressed Japanese at home. Matsuki Genjirō noted that many of his fellow architects in Japan were astounded at the changes in Manchurian architecture.⁷² This encouraged Wataru Karitake to suggest that Japanese and Manchurians were entering a new age that would develop a new and defining architectural theory appropriate to a revived Asia.⁷³ A poignant description came from Maeda Matsuoto, Nishizawa's first "architect

⁶⁸ The exhibition featured some of the capital's latest structures. A medal with the exhibition's title (*Kokuto kensetsu kinen kenchiku tenrankai*) commemorated the event, featuring a burly laborer carrying large stone blocks in either hand towards buildings reminiscent of those on Shuntian Dajie. "Shinkyō bunkai kenchiku tenrankai kijō," *MKZ* 17:11, November 1937, pp. 39-40.

⁶⁹ Extending over 417,500 square meters, this exhibition used 27,700 square meters of displays to proffer examples of architectural styles from all over Manchukuo and the world. Sasakura Kiyoshi, "DaitōA kensetsu hakurankai kenchiku ni tsuite," *MKZ* 22:11, November 1942, pp. 45-6.

⁷⁰ "Shinkyō kenchiku tenrankai shuppin mokuroku," *MKZ* 14:11, November 1934, pp. 44-9.

⁷¹ Washio Kenzō, "Zuisō: Hōten, Shinkyō ni tsukawashite," *MKZ* 19:2, February 1939, pp. 25-9.

⁷² Matsuki Genjirō, "Manshū kenchiku gukan," *MKZ* 19:4, April 1939, pp. 32-4.

⁷³ Wataru Karitake, "Shin tairiku kenchiku no juritsu he," *MKZ* 19:11, November 1939, p. 3.

adventurer" but later in life a professor and Tokyo Engineering University. On a return visit in 1942, part of the ten year celebrations, Maeda found Shinkyō's tall buildings to affirm a distinctly Eastern, and beautiful, style. More pointedly he commented that while Japan itself could not escape lingering European and American influences, Shinkyō shone "purely and clearly" (*seimei ni*), radiating an "Eastern urban beauty" (*tōyō rashii toshi bi*).⁷⁴ Later publications echoed this sentiment, like one in 1942 that described the capital's new style by what it was not: an "architectural jumble deeply colored by individualism."⁷⁵

Maeda's dismissal of contemporary architecture in Japan is illuminating—he was not alone. At a public forum in Tokyo in the fall of 1939, later published in an article in the popular magazine *Gendai kenchiku* (*Modern Architecture*), Sakakura Junzō stated he was greatly impressed by Shinkyō and suggested that the city had advanced far beyond what was thought possible in Japan. Indeed, in a reverse fashion, Sakakura thought Shinkyō's potential had the power to influence Tokyo.⁷⁶ Horiguchi Suteno agreed. He suggested that eventually Manchurian forms could well find themselves reflected in Japan.⁷⁷

On August 30, 1939, the *SōA kenchiku renmei*, the Create Asian Architecture Federation, a society that included contributors to the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* like Muroi Osamu and Hideshima Tsutomu, sponsored Kishida Hidetō, a Tōdai professor of engineering, and Sakakura to talk to

⁷⁴ Intriguingly, Maeda saluted the capital's bureaucratic offices as works in a "Shinkyō style." In an addendum he more broadly describes them as "East Asian." Maeda Matsuoto, "Manshūyuki zakki," pp. 39-40.

⁷⁵ *Jiyū shugi teki shikisai no nōkō na kenchikubutsu no ranritsu. Shinkyō no gaikyō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō shōkō kōkai, 1942, p. 13.

⁷⁶ *Nihon kōsaku bunka renmei shusai, "Tairiku kenchiku zadankai," Gendai kenchiku* 8, January 1940, p. 51.

⁷⁷ "Manshū ha Nihon ni totte kekkyoku jibun no sugata wo utsushite miru kagamitai na mono desune." *Ibid.*, p. 61.

twenty-two members of their organization at the Shinkyō central bank club. Kishida, having visited Changchun in the mid-1920s and again in the summer following the Manchurian Incident, noted the extraordinary changes in the city. More important than the extent of changes, however, was the quality. In Kishida's eyes, this made Manchukuo fully capable of leading architectural progress. His sponsors agreed, citing that because Manchukuo was a multi-national society including five races, each was allowed to develop its own unique style in response to scientific advances. More significantly, they suggested, there was less governmental oversight, in comparison with Japan itself.⁷⁸

The *SōA kenchiku renmei* published a summary of their thoughts in January 1940 in *Gendai Kenchiku*. The ten authors agreed that the year 1932 marked the beginning of a major revolution introducing changes on a global scale. Shinkyō, reflecting a new social and ethnic constellation, was now the center of a new style and culture focused on creating the future. Whereas before 1932 the presence of Tungusic tribes, Han settlers, and Russian planners dictated traditional means of shaping much of the built environment, beginning in 1932 Manchurian architecture took new forms. This was especially true in the new capital, they thought, because an independent architectural style served ideological purposes for an "ethnically diverse country" (*fukugō minzoku kokka*) such as Manchukuo. Even more than ethnic considerations, however, were the temporal. Since architecture reflects society and received architecture reflected the development of capitalism, it was necessary for Manchurian architecture to break free of traditional constraints. To achieve this, comprehensive planning was

⁷⁸ "Manshū kenchiku zadankai," *MKZ* 19:11, November 1939, pp. 27-33.

necessary. The society noted proudly that Shinkyō's had been planned through 1955.⁷⁹

Despite their increasingly nationalistic and pan-Asian orientations, Japanese architects remained keenly aware of global perspectives, including overseas criticisms of Shinkyō's new architectural forms. In defense, Makino Masaoto replied that critics lacked vision and did not understand the immensity of what was occurring. Japanese technology and capital, unused to different conditions on the mainland, was making use of Chinese culture to adapt and continue to lead Manchurians. Makino, for one, took seriously the rhetoric of ethnic harmony.⁸⁰

Kishida defended the new style in a Dalian public lecture. Apparently some foreigners complained that Manchurian architecture was somehow worse than Soviet. Like Makino, Kishida thought such criticisms narrow. In his opinion, foreigners simply could not understand the revolutionary changes Shinkyō's official buildings represented. Moreover, the expansive style fit well with Manchurian geography and the use of brick reflected local customs. Architects were keen to utilize local resources.⁸¹ It also allowed young Japanese architects the opportunity to practice so that they might one day lead the regeneration of China. The product of three cultures—Japanese,

⁷⁹ SōA kenchiku renmei, "Manshū kenchiku no tenbō," *Gendai kenchiku* 8, January 1940, pp. 2-21. This was the same issue that published the discussion with Kishida and Sakakura.

⁸⁰ Makino also noted that even some Japanese who had yet to visit Manchukuo questioned what the new buildings meant and whether or not it reflected Japan itself. See Makino, "Kenkoku jūnen to kenchiku bunka," p. 24.

⁸¹ Muroi Osamu, head architect in the Toda Gumi in Mukden, provided a short survey of the varieties and characteristics of local trees useful in Manchurian construction in Muroi Osamu, "Manshū son shiyō moku kōzō no keisan shiryō," *MKZ*, 19:2, February 1939, pp. 1-7. In the end, however, bricks more than trees were used more in Manchukuo. Despite long-held Japanese preferences for using wood, Endō Hajime, formerly of the central bank, explained in 1942 why, at least from his own perspective, the bank opted for brick in the building of its club. Agreeing that Japan was "a nation of wood," referring to Japanese architecture, Endō noted that while trees grow from the soil, brick too was made of the soil and eventually return to it. Endō Hajime, "Chūgin kurabu no kōsō (renga ni kiku)," *MKZ* 22:10, September 1942, pp. 30-34. (The subtitle of the article means: "listen to the brick.")

Chinese, and Western—Kishida thought Manchurian architecture surpassed all.⁸²

Following Kishida at the podium was Waseda professor Satō Takeo. He emphasized Japanese leadership with a report on the facilities used to train young Japanese pioneers between the ages of fifteen and eighteen for life in northern Manchuria. These were to be the advance guard for an anticipated five million Japanese farmers moving to Manchuria, expected to constitute about one percent of the total Manchukuo population in twenty years. Their utopian ideals were clear—one of the pioneers contemporary slogans was “creating a second heaven.”⁸³

Like urban planning, architecture was clearly another means of expressing modernity. At the same time, architecture was also useful in expressing state power, something perceived in a global context. The November 1939 issue of the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*, for example, included pictures of contemporary Italian Fascist and Soviet monuments featuring large flags and enormous statues atop high pedestals. To the anonymous editorialist, these seemed similar to each other as well as to recent structures in the Third Reich.⁸⁴ The earlier discussion sponsored by the *SōA kenchiku renmei* also referred to Nazi activities in this way. Kishida, for one, thought Nazi architecture “boring” (*aji mo sokke mo nai*). Sakakura Junzō agreed, suggesting that political control stunted natural expression and growth. Others noted that although Japanese ideas helped form a new Manchurian style, Manchuria’s emptiness, or blank slate, allowed for completely new and vigorous

⁸² Kishida Hidetō, “Kenchiku jikan,” *MKZ* 19:1, January 1939, pp. 4-9. Despite several visits, however, Kishida apparently had second thoughts. See *Nihon kōsaku bunka renmei shusai*, “Tairiku kenchiku zadankai,” *Gendai Kenchiku*, January 1940, excerpted in Makino, “Kenkoku jūnen to kenchiku bunka,” pp. 23-4.

⁸³ “*Daini takamagahara no kensetsu.*” Satō Takeo, “*KitaMan no imin mura oyobi seinen giyūtai kunrenjo wo shisatsu shite,*” *MKZ* 19:1, January 1939, pp. 10-17.

⁸⁴ *MKZ* 19:11, November 1939, p. 4.

expressions.⁸⁵ Makino was also in agreement. To him, Nazi efforts to reinvigorate Germany with medieval motifs were completely backwards. In Manchukuo, the focus was only on the new.⁸⁶ Even an excerpted translation of Gerdy Troost's *Das Bauen in Neuen Reich* met with disagreement by the translator over Nazi nostalgia.⁸⁷ This was despite the fact that National Socialist architecture met the three loose criteria suggested above.⁸⁸

These views, however, contrasted markedly with some of their peers at home. Ōhira Tsutomu, for example, in the *Toshi kōron* praised Nazi policies regarding social security, public health, and highway creation, as well as the use of nationalism in motivating the population. Because of careful preparation, he argued, Germans would know where their expansionary activities would occur and would be more inclined to support them when war finally came.⁸⁹

Differences in Japanese perceptions of their German allies occurred because of the differing roles architecture played in their constructions of new modernities. The Nazis considered modern architecture not only decadent but foreign, implying Jewish or Bolshevik connections. The public buildings and fora of the Third Reich therefore sought to return to a premodern

⁸⁵ "Manshū kenchiku zadankai," *MKZ* 19:11, November 1939, p. 30.

⁸⁶ Makino, "Kenkoku jūnen to kenchiku bunka," p. 22.

⁸⁷ Frau Professor Gerdy Troost, Muroi Osamu, tr., "Shinkō kokka no kenchiku," *MKZ* 22:8, August 1942, pp. 27-34. A second installment appeared later. Professor Troost was a favorite of Hitler's. See Robert R. Taylor, *The Word in Stone: The Role of Architecture in the National Socialist Ideology*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, pp. 126-7, and *passim*.

⁸⁸ Like the *kōA* style, Nazi architecture was both symmetrical and massive, and although it did not include Asian roofs, the predilection for Greco-Roman styles may be construed as similar. With regard to this last point, however, the Japanese and German styles differed in terms of degree: while Shinkyō's Asian motifs were traditionalistic, Nazi structures attempted more to recapture the intent and organization behind traditional structures.

⁸⁹ Ōhira Tsutomu, "Nachizu Doitsu wo ichibetsu suru," *TK* 21:8, August 1938, pp. 108-13, *TK* 21:9, September 1938, pp. 55-65, esp. p. 62, and *TK* 21:10, October 1938, pp. 48-71.

conception of community untouched by undesirable traits. Theories of racial purity inevitably became manifest as architectural purity.⁹⁰

While the racial component of Japanese imperialism was strong, it did not manifest itself in an attempt to recreate courtly Japan or medieval China. Instead Japanese focused more on re-energizing the Asian tradition so that it could move on to a new and what they assumed to be more evolved stage. Thus, Japanese could disparage Nazis for holding too strong to an idealized past while at the same time admire policies that embraced modernity.⁹¹

Japanese architects were ideologues. Not only did their structures serve ideological purposes, but their public discourse revealed political concerns. Celebrating the two thousand six hundred and first anniversary of Emperor Jimmu's accession in the midst of the current "holy war" (*Shōwa seisen*), Oka Ōji used his annual address in the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* to promote not only the "new East Asian structures" (*shin tōA no kensetsu*) that his organization had created, but the war itself.⁹²

Shinkyō's new architecture was monumental and mixed. Designed to impress viewers with a sense of grandeur and power, it demonstrated also technical innovation. Whether it demonstrated cultural innovation is another question. Utilizing architectural vocabulary Chinese would understand, it attempted also to be modern, employing techniques

⁹⁰ See Barbara Miller Lane, *Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918-1945*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. The recourse to the use of Roman styles may also have been in part emulatory—the Nazis too dreamed of becoming a conquering empire. See Alex Scobie, *Hitler's State Architecture: The Impact of Classical Antiquity*, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990.

⁹¹ Of course, when constructing buildings housing modern amenities, such as factories and technical apparatus, the Nazis embraced modern architecture as if it were nostalgic. Indeed, both National Socialist architecture and their policies were often quite ambivalent with regard to modernity, wavering between the romanticized lure of a bygone era and the pressing need to industrialize. See John Zukowsky, ed., *The Many Faces of Modern Architecture: Building in Germany between the World Wars*, Munich: Prestel, 1994, pp. 11-12.

⁹² Oka Ōji, "Aratanaru seiki no nentō," *MKZ* 21:1, January 1941, p. 1.

emphasizing verticality, size, and expanse. Still, despite Japanese protestations to the contrary, the new style was essentially a hybrid. Raiding the historical treasury, the *kō A* style did little more than provide cover for Japanese imperial chauvinism.

Publicly, Japanese applauded the new style and what it stood for. Upon his retirement, Sōga Kensuke was reverently decorated for his work.⁹³ Paradoxically, however, despite the avowed pretenses made about the style's leadership, only a few structures elsewhere in Manchuria were ever in keeping with it.⁹⁴ Most new structures in Manchuria, like the rest of the capital, had more in common with traditions outside of Asia. Indeed, some structures, notably Mukden's central police station and Dalian's Manchuria Medical College, both completed in 1929, anticipated much of what later became the *kō A* style. The photos that appeared in the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* showed large, symmetrically balanced structures with wide wings and central 'keeps' strikingly similar to what later appeared on Shuntian Dajie.⁹⁵ Even Shinkyō's national monuments were often reminiscent of earlier monuments.⁹⁶ Like a number of other structures in the 1920s, all that was missing were the Asian motifs.

A Modern Style

Articles in Japan discussing the new capital invariably focused on the new architecture housing the national bureaucracy. The *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*,

⁹³ Sōga, "Kenkoku zengo no omoidasu," p. 13.

⁹⁴ The closest approximations were the train stations in Dongjīng, Jiamusi, and Chengde. Photos and some floor plans of each appeared respectively in *MKZ* 15:4, April 1935, *MKZ* 16:8, August 1936, and *MKZ* 16:10, October 1936. An intriguing variant was the mausoleum Japanese built for Genghis Khan in 1941 in western Manchukuo.

⁹⁵ Both even included porte-cochères. See the photos in *MKZ* 9:10, October 1929, and *MKZ* 9:11, November 1929.

⁹⁶ See, for example, the stepped Chūreitō monuments in Dalian and Mukden as well as the simpler but still vertically imposing monument to lost miners in Fushun. *MKZ* 7:8, August 1927.

however, included photos and floor plans of a host of other buildings, even if the journal provided little discussion about them. Structures drawing the most attention were those comprising the new 'civic center' at Datong Plaza. Of these, the most conspicuous was the headquarters for the Bank of Manchukuo (Figure 7.18).⁹⁷ This enormous, four story structure completed in 1938, occupied thirty thousand square meters. Its most outstanding feature was the open entryway. Spanning most of the frontal façade, its roof was supported by ten columns that rose three stories. Inside, twenty-eight additional columns, each over a meter in diameter, supported the cavernous roof of the main hall. Marble was ubiquitous.

The bank represented a distinctly Western modernity; massive and imposing, it expressed wealth and power in a manner similar to banks elsewhere around the world. This was doubtlessly because while ostensibly designed by Tokyo's Nishimura Construction, bank personnel and members of the CCB were also involved in its planning. Its progressive and modern features, both technical and architectural, were hailed at a public round table (*zadankai*) at the bank's private club in July 1938 as "new architecture" (*shinkōsha shinchiku*) for "new people" (*atarashii hitotachi*).⁹⁸

Facing Datong Plaza just southwest of the new bank was the headquarters of the Manchuria Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (*Manshū denshin denwa kabushiki kaisha*; hereafter Manden) (Figure 7.19). Completed in 1935, it was similarly modern—a four story (plus basement) monolith with a smooth brick façade, a port-cochère, and flanking entryways. Its footprint was

⁹⁷ A sketch of the bank first appeared in the *MKZ* 14:8, August 1934. A photo of a model followed in *MKZ* 17:11, November 1937. Photos and floorplans appeared in *MKZ* 18:10, October 1938.

⁹⁸ "Manshū chūō ginkō sōkō honkenchiku wo kataru zadankai," *MKZ* 18:10, October 1938, pp. 5-14.

C-shaped. A flat-roofed central tower rose three stories above the central stairwell while two smaller towers emerged above the flanking stairwells.⁹⁹

Kasahara Toshio, chairman of the Department of Maintenance and Supplies (*Kokumuin eizen juhin kyokuchō*) and later chairman of the Department of Architecture between 1940 and 1943, defended the use of European forms at a public lecture in Shinkyō in September 1938.¹⁰⁰ With the absorption of northern Manchuria and the CER, Kasahara thought that Manchukuo's roots included European architectural traditions, especially those of imperial Russia. Thus, while the new country's architectural style began with Chinese features, it seemed reasonable to Kasahara for the new style to grow and include new technologies and forms.¹⁰¹

The main offices of the Bank of Manchukuo and Manden repeated some of the key features of the *kō A* style. Both were symmetrical, and both were large. Neither, however, repeated Asian motifs, though the Manden headquarters hinted at the official style in four ways. One was the central tower, although in Manden's case it was more subdued. Another was the placing of large stone sculptures of jilins on either side of the port-cochère. Such figures represented a nod to Chinese tradition. Manden's jilins, however, were clearly not traditional. Smooth and stylized, they were modern versions of traditional protective statuary (Figure 7.20). A third motif was the repetition of four stylized columns in the port-cochère and center-most section. The fourth was a trim running below the topmost floor that was reminiscent of the cantilevered look on the Hall of State.

⁹⁹ A model appeared in *MKZ* 14:10, October 1934, and photos in *MKZ* 15:11, November 1935. The Japanese abbreviation of this corporation was *Denden*.

¹⁰⁰ Originally a law student, Kasahara earned a Tōdai doctorate in engineering in 1907 and later helped Sano Toshikata with the reconstruction of Tokyo. On his career see Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 16-18, 22, 25, 187, 189, 205.

¹⁰¹ Kasahara Toshio, "Manshū kenchiku shokan," *MKZ* 18:10, October 1938, pp. 1-3. This article appeared in the same issue as the public round table on the new bank headquarters.

Matsuki Genjirō, amazed by changes in Manchurian architecture, was especially approving of the buildings on Datong Plaza. They were modern and built of reinforced concrete. At the same time, they did not simply mimic Japanese constructions, demonstrating that it was not necessary to add Asian roofs in order to achieve something new.¹⁰²

Other buildings were similar to the Manden main office, such as the Tōtaku and Kaijō buildings (Figure 7.21).¹⁰³ These were large, four- and five-story structures that proffered smooth surfaces punctuated only by windows. They also included the stylized columns above the entryways and the use of a trim below the uppermost floor. Another was the new Mantetsu office building, completed 1936. Occupying the same plot as the original branch, it too was a four-story structure with stylized columns and a port-cochère.¹⁰⁴ The trim, however, was located differently from the others, sitting above the lowermost floor. Another large building in this style, without the trim, was the Department of the Guandong Peninsula.¹⁰⁵ The most prominent of all the buildings of this type was the Daikyō building, completed also in 1936 (Figure 7.22).¹⁰⁶ Designed by the staff who did the Bank of Manchukuo, it sat upon a busy street corner with the stylized pillars rising over a corner entry.

These structures were unapologetically modern. Demonstrating shared motifs, much like certain Mantetsu buildings did before 1932, they were also

¹⁰² Matsuki Genjirō, "Manshū kenchiku gukan," *MKZ* 19:4, April 1939, pp. 32-4.

¹⁰³ External and internal photos of each appeared in *MKZ* 19:3, March 1939. The Tōtaku building (1939?) was the new headquarters for the *Tōyō takushoku* (colonial development) corporation. It was located northeast of the Bank of Manchukuo on the east side of Datong Dajie. The Kaijō building (1939) was owned by an insurance corporation, the Tōkyō kaijō kasei hoken kabushiki kaisha, and was located a block north of the Tōtaku building.

¹⁰⁴ A summary of its features appears in Mantetsu kenchikukai, *Mantetsu no kenchiku to gijutsujin*, p. 55.

¹⁰⁵ A photo appeared in *MKZ* 15:11, November 1935.

¹⁰⁶ A photo appeared in *MKZ* 17:11, November 1937.

very similar to other structures elsewhere in Manchuria.¹⁰⁷ They were not, however, radically different from many of the buildings appearing in Japan at that time.¹⁰⁸ As such they are best understood in terms of an international architectural debate. Nor were they the only designs similar to structures overseas. Another type of building was imported from Japan, the imperial crown style itself.

Only three of Shinkyō's buildings can be described as having been built in the imperial crown style, but their locations and purposes were prominent. Most prominent of all was the headquarters for the Kantōgun, completed in 1935 (Figure 7.23).¹⁰⁹ Located north of the Daikyō Building just off Datong Dajie it could not be missed. It was a sprawling, three story structure with three 'crowns,' each reminiscent of the upper reaches of Japanese castles. While two were located at either end of the central section, a larger, three-story crown sat atop the central keep. Fueki Hideo thought it cut a "grand appearance" (*iyō*), something that helped ameliorate the area's troubled past. It was widely known that just south of the building was an execution ground. On that spot Japanese built bachelor's quarters of the highest quality.¹¹⁰

A second structure in this style sat just to the west, across Datong Dajie. This was the new Japanese embassy, completed in 1934. Although not as grand as the Kantōgun headquarters, the embassy's flanking position on Shinkyō's central avenue assured that passers by between Datong Plaza and

¹⁰⁷ Compare, for example, any of these structures (or any of the so-called *kōA* buildings) with buildings like the new Guandong Peninsula government offices, which appeared in *MKZ* 17:9, September 1937.

¹⁰⁸ See Fujimoto, *Nihon no kindai kenchiku*, vol. 2 and Muramatsu, *Nihon kindai kenchiku no rekishi*.

¹⁰⁹ Photos of it under construction are in *MKZ* 14:1, January 1934. Photos of the completed structure appeared in *MKZ* 14:10, October 1934 and 14:11, November 1934.

¹¹⁰ Fueki Hideo, "Gyōkai no konjaku," p. 37.

the train station could not miss Japanese roofs dominating the transition zone between the old *fuzokuchi* and the new civic center.

The third structure in this style was the Shinkyō Mitsubishi Kōtoku kaikan, occupying yet another prominent location.¹¹¹ Located on Datong Dajie across from the Kaijō building, it was a smoothly surfaced, four story structure with a single, slender tower standing over the entryway (Figure 7.24). The addition of an Asian roof to the tower gave it an imperial crown, but unlike the Kanagawa and Nagoya buildings the structure lacked a port-cochère. Instead the entryways were denoted by brief extensions resembling European castle gates (Figure 7.25). Designed in limited partnership with Mitsubishi, the building adopted Puyi's second reign name because it was a public hall.

The Kōtoku kaikan was not the only structure in Shinkyō that demonstrated European affinities. Immediately to the south appeared a modern department store. The residence of the Kantōgun commandant, just west of the new embassy but hidden in a small copse of trees, did so most pointedly. Built in 1933, it resembled a European castle, complete with crenellations and a tower (Figure 7.26).¹¹² The Kantōgun's accounting department (*keiribu*) designed it and the new embassy.¹¹³

Private residences for public officials were another means of expressing new visions. Only one, however, expressed an Asian heritage, the *Kokumuin sōrikantei*, the official residence of the prime minister. Situated

¹¹¹ A photo of it under construction appeared in *MKZ* 14:11, November 1934. A completed version and some floorplans is in *MKZ* 15:1, January 1935. First built in 1935, renovations were completed in 1936.

¹¹² Photos of it under construction are in *MKZ* 14:1, January 1934, and completed versions in 14:9, September 1934. Except for the tower, the Nichi-Man gunjin kaikan (Japan-Manchukuo Soldier's Hall), located southwest of the new embassy, was similar. Photos of it appeared in the *MKZ* 16:6, June 1936.

¹¹³ Fujimori Terunobu and Wan Tan, eds., *Zenchōsa tōAjia kindai no toshi to kenchiku*, Tokyo: Taisei kensetsu kabushiki kaisha, 1996, pp. 261-2.

just northwest of the palace, this sprawling brick mansion built in 1936 included steeply pitched tile roofs and a tall tower capped with a square roof. Like others in the *kō A* style, although its roofs were Asian, the interior was not.¹¹⁴ All other official residences were completely modern, including that of the governor of the Bank of Manchukuo.¹¹⁵

Residences for lesser officials and other Japanese followed suit. Although less grand, they represented important efforts to deal with two of the most basic problems Japanese faced in Manchuria: adapting to Manchuria's harsher climate and supply. Japanese knew that building a major metropolis in Changchun would test their skills.¹¹⁶ It would also test the new state's productive power. Even when wartime conditions led people to comment on how well Manchukuo's economy was developing, there would usually be an admission that there remained a shortage of housing.¹¹⁷

New forms of residential construction in Manchuria, especially Shinkyō, were as central to Japanese efforts after 1932 as they were before, receiving much attention in the popular press.¹¹⁸ As such, they meant more than

¹¹⁴ A photograph of it can be found in the Kenchiku gakkai Shinkyō shibu, ed., "Kokuto Shinkyō kensetsu no gaiken," *Kenchiku zasshi* 13:9, September 1938, p. 181.

¹¹⁵ In addition to the bank governor's residence in *MKZ* 15:7, July 1935, see the photos of the new residences for the Kantōgun chief of staff and the Mantetsu director in *MKZ* 14:1, January 1934, or for the prime minister's shadowy General Affairs Manager (Manshūkoku kokumuin sōmuchō chōkan) in *MKZ* 15:6, June 1936. These were large, two story structures that would not have looked out of place anywhere in Europe or North America. The latter exhibited also many motifs in keeping with Frank Lloyd Wright's Imperial Hotel in Tokyo. Other official residences elsewhere in Manchuria were similar, such as that for the Guandong Peninsula's chief bureaucrat. See the photos in *MKZ* 19:1, January 1939. Onoki Toshiharu's private residence was smaller but similar. See *MKZ* 14:12, December 1934. Some private residences mixed Western style rooms with rooms featuring Japanese tatami. See *MKZ* 16:4, April 1936.

¹¹⁶ Nakazawa Kiyoshi discussed some of the expected difficulties in Nakazawa Kiyoshi, "Shinkyōto keikaku ni taisuru shoken," *MKZ* 12:6, June 1932, pp. 28-36.

¹¹⁷ Oka Ōji, for example, admitted that the housing problem was one of the biggest issues society continued to face in the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident. Oka Ōji, "Seikyoku no kinpaku to jūtaku mondai," *MKZ* 23:6, June 1943, p. 2.

¹¹⁸ See, for example, "Kyō no Manshū jūtaku den," *Gendai kenchiku* 4, September 1939, pp. 62-3 and Hideshima Tsutomu, "Manshū ni okeru toshi keikaku to shūdan jūkusei," *Jūtaku* 27:6, No. 308, June 1942, pp. 174-82.

simply providing shelter.¹¹⁹ Redefining daily activities was intrinsic to creating modernity, a goal that was widely shared. Zheng Bingwen of the Mukden(?) department of architecture emphasized this concern in an address celebrating the tenth founding of Manchukuo. For reasons of economy and protection, before 1932 Manchurians lived together under one roof in large, extended families. This, he thought, was part of a “feudal extended family system” (*hōken teki na dai kazoku seido*), a natural development but one that had become antiquated. Since Japanese intended new Manchukuo to be less agricultural and more urban, new residential forms facilitated more “emancipated lives” (*dokuritsu shita seikatsu*). Moreover, Zheng noted that improvements in housing technology, sanitation, and supply improved citizens’ quality of life. By 1941, new housing for Manchurians in Shinkyō increased to 51,000 dwellings, leaving only a shortage of 3,000.¹²⁰ Others agreed, emphasizing the capital’s role in improving Manchurian’s lives with technological advances such as electric lighting, gas, and running water.¹²¹

Oka Ōji thought that, along with office buildings, residences were one of the two key means of revolutionizing society and architecture. Indeed, since offices were to a great extent the products of Japanese innovation in Japan itself, alterations in residential construction he thought had more to do with Manchuria itself.¹²² Such a perspective was possible because, by the time of Manchukuo’s founding and in order to adapt themselves to a different climate, Japanese architects had studied Chinese residential construction for

¹¹⁹ Fujii Sadamu thought that the technology and science Japanese displayed in creating new residential quarters overseas showed Japanese tradition and ingenuity at their best. Japanese solutions, moreover, were politically significant because the housing problem was a major factor constraining the new state. Fujii Sadamu, “Manshū jūtaku kyōkyū jigyō jūnen no ato,” pp. 33-4.

¹²⁰ See Zheng Bingwen (Tei Heibun), “Mankei jūtaku no dōkō ni tsuite,” *MKZ* 22:10, October 1942, pp. 25-9.

¹²¹ Fujii, “Manshū jūtaku kyōkyū jigyō jūnen no ato,” pp. 24-6.

¹²² Oka Ōji, “Manshū kenkoku jūnen to kenchiku zakkan,” *MKZ* 22:10, October 1942, pp. 2.

some time.¹²³ Some even studied Russian construction.¹²⁴ Other Japanese had long promoted new technologies in Manchuria,¹²⁵ but in the wake of the Manchurian Incident Japanese followed these efforts closely.¹²⁶ This was because the tide of Japanese had initially no choice but to resort to “borrowing gloomy Manchurian homes and making temporary but rapid renovations.” These alterations involved especially making structures more sanitary.¹²⁷

Remodeling existing new structures, however, was only a stopgap measure. Focusing on the new capital, the Manchukuo government took the

¹²³ Fukuoka Shōichirō was one such researcher, probably a Mantetsu employee. One of his studies focused entirely on windows and entryways: Fukuoka Shōichirō, “Manshū ni okeru jūtaku no madoiriguchi narabi ni shōtenjō no kairyō ni tsuite,” *MKZ* 6:8, August 1926. Focusing on Beijing, see Fukuoka Shōichirō, “Shina naichi ni okeru kenchiku no gaikyō,” *MKZ* 6:7, July 1926. A larger work he collaborated on is Kishima Katsumi, ed., *Shina jūtaku shi*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1932. Another researcher was Mantetsu’s Ōizumi Kazu. One of his articles reviewing Japanese experience in residential construction just before the Manchurian Incident is Ōizumi Kazu, “Manshū saisō no kokoromi ni yoru jūtaku shiken kaoku ni tsuite,” *MKZ* 7:9, September 1927, pp. 1-26. He too explored north Chinese residential construction in Ōizumi Kazu, “Kita Shina jūtaku no bekkai,” *MKZ* 10:1, January 1930, pp. 19-29.

¹²⁴ Ōizumi Kazu, “Kanchi ni okeru Rojin jūtaku (1),” *MKZ* 8:6, June 1928, and Ōizumi Kazu, “Kanchi ni okeru Rojin jūtaku (2),” *MKZ* 8:7, July 1928. A public round table held at the Manchuria Technology Association in Dalian on December 17, 1935 examined Russian construction: “Kindai Manshū kenchiku shi ni kansuru zadankai,” *MKZ* 16:2, February 1936, pp. 3-21. Yagasaki Takagi applied this experience to constructing residences further north. See Yagasaki Takagi, “KitaMan toshi jūtaku shian ni tsuite,” *MKZ* 19:5, May 1939, pp. 1-16.

¹²⁵ The November 1928 issue of the *MKZ* (8:11), entitled *Jūtaku to setsubi* (Housing and Facilities), focused on equipping Manchurian homes with electric appliances and other amenities. Heating was of particular interest. See especially the articles by Kuriyama Tōji (of the South Manchurian Electric Corporation), “Jūtaku to denki setsubi,” Warashina Asayoshi, “Jūtaku no danbō setsubi,” Ōizumi Kazu, “Jūtaku to kanki,” and Ōizumi Kazu, “Jūtaku to pechika.” In following issues Nagatake Shinji provided additional heating suggestions, such as the use of European ceramic stoves (Nagatake Shinji, “Attakai ie,” *MKZ* 9:1, January 1929, and 9:2, February 1929), Warashina provided a short description of a hot water heating mechanism in Warashina Asayoshi, “Jūtakuyō danbō onsuikan no hainetsu no riyō no ichirei,” *MKZ* 9:2, February 1929, pp. 21-3, and Ōizumi examined the merits of various kinds of brick construction with regard to geographic variations in Manchuria’s weather. Ōizumi Kazu, “Genji ni okeru Manshū no kishō to kenchiku,” *MKZ* 9:9, September 1929, pp. 1-22.

¹²⁶ A number of articles reported improving housing conditions for Japanese. See Endō Toshisumu, “ZaiMan hōjin no jūkyō ni tsuite,” *MKZ* 12:7, July 1932, pp. 6-12, and Tao Yuanguan, “Manshū ni okeru shinkō jūtaku kenchiku ni kansuru ikkō sasshi,” *MKZ* 13:6, June 1933, pp. 12-5. On sanitary conditions see Ikeda Hiroyoshi, “Manshū kenchiku to hōjin eisei no ikkō sasshi,” *MKZ* 15:1, January 1935, p. 27. Prominent photos of new housing projects can be found in *MKZ* 15:6, June 1935.

¹²⁷ “...[f]imejime shita Manjin kaoku wo kari ichijiteki na kyūgaizō ni yotte...” Ikeda Hiroyoshi, “Manshū kenchiku to hōjin eisei no ikkō sasshi,” *MKZ* 15:1, January 1935, p. 27.

lead in promoting new housing on a grand scale. Initially, this was handled by a single office in the Bank of Manchukuo, but realizing the inadequacy of that the bank organized a special firm in April 1934: *Da De budongchan gufen youxian gongsi* (Da De Real Estate Corporation, Ltd.; hereafter Da De).¹²⁸ Capitalized at three million yuan, Da De financed and oversaw the building and management of official residences, to which Da De received a commission of 3% of the building costs. In the event that did not insure adequate payment, the government agreed to compensate Da De, thereby insuring the company's solvency.¹²⁹

Da De built a number of apartment complexes for Manchukuo's bureaucracy, all just east of the bureaucratic center on Shuntian Dajie. The first government residential complex, completed in 1934, located east of the Hall of State and a few blocks north of Shuntian Park, cost one hundred million yuan. Officials began moving into its 390 apartment units from the *fuzokuchi* by the end of the year. Although equipped with flush toilets, it lacked external vegetation or anything else that made it seem homey, but within ten years it included a post office, a clinic, and a police *kōban*.¹³⁰ A second complex appeared the following year a little over a kilometer to the south, comprising 184 apartments and 39 bachelor's quarters (*dokushin*),

¹²⁸ The Chinese reading of the name Da De is used here because one of the characters in its name, *fen*, does not appear in Japanese dictionaries and is not typical of Japanese corporate names. Likewise, the Japanese reading of Bōsan (below) is used because Chinese do not use the term *kaisha* for businesses. Like the Japanification of street names in the *fuzokuchi* discussed in chapter three, the decision to use these particular terms may indicate both growing Japanese self-confidence in their enterprise as well as the marginalization of Chinese whom Japanese initially considered more intrinsic to their efforts.

¹²⁹ Fujii Sadamu, "Manshū jūtaku kyōkyū jigyō jūnen no ato," *MKZ* 22:11, November 1942, pp. 21-34.

¹³⁰ This lead Fujii to suggest that new forms of community like this required at least ten years to mature. This state of affairs, however, contrasted markedly with the initial experience. Heavy rains in July apparently made the local roads treacherous. Carts sank into the mud, killing several work horses, and railroad ties were laid to make the roads passable. Fujii, "Manshū jūtaku kyōkyū jigyō jūnen no ato," pp. 21-2. A *kōban* is a neighborhood police station. On the development of this institution see Westney, *Imitation and Innovation*.

while a third providing 208 apartments appeared next door in 1936.

Architects considered all of these units "Japanese" (*Nikkei*). The fourth complex, built in 1937 just to the west of the third complex and north of the Shinkyō Central Courthouse, provided not only an additional 308 units of these but 82 "Manchurian" (*Mankei*) units as well.¹³¹ By 1937, Da De's total construction in Shinkyō amounted to 1,090 Japanese style apartments, 83 Manchurian style apartments, 79 bachelor's quarters, 24 Japanese style houses, and nine bachelor's houses.

The government did not expect Da De to provide all housing for Japanese. A number of corporations took care of their own.¹³² To accelerate construction, in March 1938 the government founded a new, special corporation to absorb Da De, *Tokubetsu kaisha Manshū bōsan kabushiki kaisha* (Manchuria Home Construction, Inc., hereafter Bōsan). While Da De's activities focused on complexes in Shinkyō, as well as one in Harbin, Bōsan's activities included ten cities in 1938 and sixteen in 1939. These cities were primarily in northern Manchuria where there was a larger housing shortage for Japanese because few resided there prior to the Manchurian Incident. Once again, Shinkyō's experience paved the way for projects elsewhere.

¹³¹ Fujii, unfortunately, does not elaborate on what this meant, except to say that this fourth complex looked "somehow more lavish" (*Kensetsu kōjiki ha ikubun agari kimi wo shimeshite kita*). Fujii, "Manshū jūtaku kyōkyū jigyō jūnen no ato," p. 22. Later he acknowledged that initially, while the new country's foundations were as yet undetermined, Da De's main goal was to "stabilize public sentiments" (*minshin wo antei saseru tame ni*), but with time certain tendencies would reveal what *Mankei* was. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹³² The central bank organized residences for its employees in a long strip just northeast of the palace but south of Xing'an Dalu, the avenue running northwest from the civic center. A plan for the layout of this strip is in MKZ 15:7, July 1935. The government assigned other corporations their own sections to build on, such as Manden, Mangyō and certain mining firms which built south of Jilin Dalu near the various sports facilities. Photos and some floorplans for dormitories for employees of the central bank, Manden, and other corporations, as well as military and government personnel appear in MKZ 16:3, March 1936. Photos of housing for the nearby Jilin City administration appeared in MKZ 18:4, April 1938.

By mid-1942, Bōsan's constructions totaled more than 16,000 units across Manchukuo. Over six thousand of these were in Shinkyō, including 2,526 Japanese style apartments, 148 Manchurian style apartments, 699 bachelor's quarters, 2,390 Japanese style houses, and 317 bachelor's houses. Construction was apparently rapid—many of Shinkyō's bureaucrats gained a reputation for short stays as renters in the *fuzokuchi*, derisively earning the nickname "stay for one-hour" people (*ichiji tamari*). Large endowments made rapid construction possible—Da De's and Bōsan's combined expenditures amounted to almost forty-five million yuan in less than nine years. Each was also the affiliate of a specific bank, Da De with the Bank of Manchukuo and Bōsan with *Manshū kōgyō ginkō* (Manchuria Development Bank), established in December 1936. Bōsan also had a relationship with *Tōyō takushoku kabushiki kaisha* (Eastern Colonial Development, Inc.; hereafter Tōtaku), another government-established private corporation, founded in 1908.¹³³ It, in turn, helped develop the rest of Manchukuo.

Da De and Bōsan built mostly for Japanese residents. The capital's Chinese residents had to either find accommodation in the old city or *fuzokuchi* or find someplace new. Make-shift accommodations appeared northeast of the city, in the industrial sector. Planners, however, did set aside some room for new Chinese accommodations, on the east side of the Yitong River.¹³⁴

Not all urban projects in the new capital broke new ground. Makino Masaoto, chairman of Shinkyō's architecture department in 1942, was pleased to report the complete removal of what he called a "slum" (*suramu*),

¹³³ Neither company built Manchurian style houses. Bōsan also built more than 5,500 units in Mukden and one thousand in Mudanjiang, as well as some 92 apartments for railroad guards scattered around the state. Less than one thousand units were built in each of twenty other cities. These figures may not include units built by the Bōsan affiliate *Kenchiku kōgyō kabushiki kaisha*, created in 1940. See Fujii, "Manshū jūtaku kyōkyū jigyō jūnen no ato," pp. 24-5, 27-8, 32-3. Fujii attached thirty-two floorplans to this article.

¹³⁴ Yūki, "Kokuto kensetsu no kaiko to tenbō," p. 36.

referring to dark buildings of Russian construction, and their replacement by "bright and cheerful" (*meirō*) residential space.¹³⁵ Other new constructions occurred in the old *fuzokuchi*.¹³⁶

Officials lauded the capital's new residential construction.¹³⁷ Yamazaki Tadao of the central bank, reporting a discussion with a superior, wrote proudly how the new, smaller houses especially were advancing society by replacing historical styles with modern forms. Indeed, just as Japanese salary men (*sarariiman*) found Western attire more convenient to work in but clad themselves at home in Japanese attire, Manchuria's new culture was witnessing a fusion of east and west, thereby improving upon both.¹³⁸

At the same time, cultural mixing was not the only means of improving society—abstract theorizing were also part of the process of creating a superior society. In three later articles with the bank's Hamada Yoshio, Yamasaki explored the relationship between health and modern society. Assuming that the three basic factors of life to be clothing, food, and shelter, they speculated about the ability of not only modern science but modern architecture to improve healthfulness through careful attention to living arrangements in relation to natural occurrences like the sun and wind.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ Makino Masaoto, "Kenkoku jūnen to kenchiku bunka," *MKZ* 22:10, October 1942, p. 16.

¹³⁶ Fuse Tadashi, Washio Kenzō, and Takabayashi Masatoshi, "Kenbutsu kiso shūi no jiban tōketsusen ni tsuite," *MKZ* 21:10, October 1941. Floorplans for these structures also appear, as well as demonstrations of the proper construction of foundations with regard to the depth of frost below exterior grade.

¹³⁷ An exhibition of residential designs in Manchukuo was held June 2-6, 1939 at the Shinkyō Takarayama Department Store. See "Manshū jūtaku ni kansuru tenrankai," *MKZ* 19:6, June 1939, pp. 41-45.

¹³⁸ Yamazaki Tadao, "Shojūtaku no kōsei," *MKZ* 15:4, April 1935, pp. 3-9. The superior was Endō Hajime.

¹³⁹ Hamada Yoshio and Yamazaki Tadao, "Manshū kenkō jūkyō no kōsei (1)," *MKZ* 18:3, March 1938, pp. 21-28, "Manshū kenkō jūkyō no kōsei (2)," *MKZ* 18:4, April 1938, pp. 10-15, and "Manshū kenkō jūkyō no kōsei (3)," *MKZ* 18:5, May 1938, pp. 15-18.

Working in the abstract, however, required practical application, sometimes with surprising results. In the summer of 1943, Japanese held a competition to design Japanese-style housing (*kokumin jūtaku*) in Manchuria, attracting some three hundred submissions. As one of the men on the selection committee admitted, this was purely an effort to improve living conditions in Japan through experimentation in Manchukuo. Winning designs were printed in the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*, featuring furniture, kitchens and single purpose rooms.¹⁴⁰ One of the winners stated that despite the differences in traditions between Japanese on the one hand and Europeans and Americans on the other, their modern families were essentially the same.¹⁴¹ Another suggested, and others supported, the elimination of the use of *tatami* (straw mats) in Manchurian construction.¹⁴² Yet another commented that his four years of living in Shinkyō prepared him for the competition well.¹⁴³ Thus, even during wartime it was clear that some of Shinkyō's budding architectural elites were already distancing themselves from the Asian orientation that Manchukuo presumed.

Shinkyō's other buildings were variously eclectic. Two were very eclectic. After the long debate between Mantetsu and the Kantōgun over borrowing overseas to develop Manchukuo, only one structure in Shinkyō was the product of direct foreign influence. This was the Foreign Ministry building, built in 1936. Designed by a French firm, Brossard-Mopin, this odd structure was a busy mix of a variety of modern techniques. Situated north of the

¹⁴⁰ Shōbara Shin'ichi, "Kokumin jūtaku (Nikkei tekiō sumai) sekkei kenshō boshū' shinsa kōki," *MKZ* 24:1, January 1944, pp. 2-3.

¹⁴¹ Tanabe Kiyotaisuke, "Kokumin jūtaku sekkei shokan," *MKZ* 24:1, January 1944, pp. 3-5.

¹⁴² The competitor was Kōri Akio, "Tatami nashi jūtaku kara saishōkan jūtaku he," *MKZ* 24:1, January 1944, pp. 9-10, and the argument about *tatami*, a long-standing argument actually, was supported by Takahara Kazuho, "Mantaku no jūtaku ni tsuite," *MKZ* 24:2, February 1944, pp. 5-10.

¹⁴³ Ono Sakuji, "Sakusha no kotoba," *MKZ* 24:1, January 1944, pp. 5-6.

prime minister's residence, it did not influence other structures.¹⁴⁴ Another potpourri was the headquarters for the Kyōwakai, or Concordia Association. Located just south of the First Government Building on Datong Dajie, it too precluded simple classification.¹⁴⁵

The vast majority of Shinkyō's structures, however, revealed similarities to structures overseas, both in Japan and the west, such as the new theater, built in 1935.¹⁴⁶ Another was the *Manshū kōhō kyōkai*, the Manchurian Information Association, located on Chūō Dōri in the former *fuzokuchi*.¹⁴⁷ Both structures emphasized their presence with windows outlined in bold trims that highlighted horizontal, in the case of the theater, and vertical, in the case of the latter, dimensions. A prize-winning structure on Datong Dajie near the Kōtoku kaikan was the *Hōyū* (friendship) Building. Boldly designed with circular windows and broad horizontal trim, the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* labeled it proudly as "modern."¹⁴⁸ Despite the outbreak of the China Incident, Japanese continued to plan other, prominent buildings.¹⁴⁹

Not all structures, of course, merited eye-catching attributes. Some, like the Shuntian Dajie telephone exchange were more functional than

¹⁴⁴ Photos and a floorplan can be found in *MKZ* 16:7, July 1936.

¹⁴⁵ The Concordia Association was Manchukuo's means of simultaneously mobilizing and surveiling the Manchurian population. It grew rapidly with the inauguration of Manchukuo, absorbing various duties to help run and promote the puppet state. It is interesting to find, however, that before the Manchurian Incident there was already a *kyōwakai* and at least one structure built for it, the Mantetsu *kyōwakai* building in Dalian, built in 1927. See *MKZ* 8:5, May 1928.

¹⁴⁶ Photos appeared in *MKZ* 16:6, June 1936.

¹⁴⁷ Photos and floorplans appeared in *MKZ* 19:4, April 1939.

¹⁴⁸ *MKZ* 16:4, April 1936.

¹⁴⁹ See, for example, the various sketches and plans for the *Shinkyō kōgyō kaikan* (Industrial Center) in *MKZ* 19:3, March 1939, and the *Manshū tai'iku kan* (Recreational Center) in *MKZ* 19:9, September 1939. Recreational centers were planned in Manchukuo's seven largest cities. For a discussion of their facilities see Miyachi Jirō, "Shinkyō tai'ikukan sekkei yōshi," *MKZ* 19:9, September 1939, pp. 19-21.

distinctive.¹⁵⁰ Shinkyō Engineering College was larger, but similar.¹⁵¹ Three stories with symmetrical wings, it repeated the stylized four columned entryway found elsewhere, but otherwise was rather nondescript. It was thus not too different from earlier educational structures, such as the Changchun Commercial School.¹⁵²

Japanese urban planning in Manchuria involved planning entire communities, so architects and planners involved themselves in a variety of other kinds structures. Commercial districts, for example, were also the subject of a great deal of study.¹⁵³ Temples and churches were discussed publicly,¹⁵⁴ as were dance halls.¹⁵⁵ As a result, Japanese introduced a wide variety of technologies and built forms to Manchuria.¹⁵⁶ Wartime inspired a different array of technologies, such as the use of camouflage.¹⁵⁷ Another concern was aerial bombardment. To that end the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* published some of the Tokyo municipal guidelines for preparing urban areas

¹⁵⁰ Photos of this small, two story brick structure can be found in *MKZ* 19:10, October 1939.

¹⁵¹ Photos and floorplans appeared in *MKZ* 22:12, December 1942. Some preliminary sketches appeared in *MKZ* 21:5, May 1941.

¹⁵² Photos and floorplans can be found in *MKZ* 6:12, December 1931.

¹⁵³ See the special issue of the *MKZ* 9:6, June 1929 devoted to commercial structures. A new eight block commercial zone in Dalian was discussed in *MKZ* 11:1, January 1931. A number of photos of new commercial structures also appeared alongside those of new residences in *MKZ* 14:1, January 1934. The efforts of a retail cooperative to organize and build stores throughout Manchukuo is Yamada Eijirō, "Manshūkoku shōhi kumiai ni kansuru gaikan," *MKZ* 23:6, 3-13.

¹⁵⁴ On structures for the various indigenous religions, see the extended note on Murata Jirō above. For photos and floorplans of some of the Christian churches in Dalian see *MKZ* 8:12, December 1928. For a photo of the new Buddhist temple just northeast of Datong Plaza built to protect the new state see *MKZ* 14:1, January 1934.

¹⁵⁵ Tanaka Kunimasa, "Dansuhhōru no sekkei ni tsuite," *MKZ* 13:3, March 1933, pp. 10. This article examined dance halls around the globe. Photos of Shinkyō's new dance hall, the Monte Carlo, appeared in *MKZ* 16:7, July 1936.

¹⁵⁶ On the use, for example, of 'tomatex' for soundproofing and insulating rooms for warmth see Ama Nobusei, "Kan'netsu no zetsuen to sō'on, shikki bōshi mokuzai sen'iban tomattekusu ni tsuite," *MKZ* 13:6, June 1933, pp. 4-11.

¹⁵⁷ See Hoshino Masuichi, "Gisō to kenchiku," *MKZ* 18:8, August 1938, pp. 14-17, and the guidelines on camouflage and safe shelter in "Gisō shahei sankō shiryō," *MKZ* 18:9, September 1938.

for attack in 1939.¹⁵⁸ A later article provided more up to date information about modern planes and their capabilities, including a photo of bombed structures in London.¹⁵⁹ Subsequent articles described bombs and shelters.¹⁶⁰

Wartime also inspired fears of technological backwardness, and the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* obligingly explained the means and rationale behind the reorganization of Japanese and Manchukuoan scientists in order to meet the needs of the wider war.¹⁶¹ A municipal civil engineer in Dalian even philosophized about how reorganizing residential life could be a national activity and part of creating a new order.¹⁶² Despite the war, progress was still deemed possible.¹⁶³

Wartime hardships, however, were also apparent. Koinuma Hyōshirō, the head of the municipal department of residential construction in Shinkyō, admitted in 1942 that the housing problem became worse around 1937, and that despite Bōsan's efforts the situation had worsened. He also implied that planning construction for rapid growth in twenty-seven cities across Manchukuo was no easy task.¹⁶⁴ National officials admitted in 1944 that developing the country during wartime posed major problems. The solution

¹⁵⁸ Tōkyō shiyakusho, "Bōkū toshi keikaku yori mitaru bōgo shisetsu gaiyō," *MKZ* 19:2, February 1939, pp. 31-36 and *MKZ* 19:3, March 1939, pp. 32-43.

¹⁵⁹ Itō Hajime, "Kūshū-bakuon," *MKZ* 23:6, June 1943, pp. 14-24.

¹⁶⁰ Itō Hajime, "Bakudan no iryoku bunseki," *MKZ* 23:12, December 1943, and Itō Hajime, "Kūshū kiken ritsu," *MKZ* 24:1, January 1944. Hamada Yoshio and Yamazaki Tadao provided suggestions for living under conditions of commandeering and prolonged aerial bombardment in Hamada Yoshio and Yamazaki Tadao, "Jūkyō chōyō to bōkū taiō gijutsu," *MKZ* 24:2, February 1944, pp. 1-5.

¹⁶¹ Kuwabara Hidesada, "Kagaku gijutsu shintaisek ni tsuite," *MKZ* 22:1, January 1942, pp. 3-20, and Manshūkoku kyōwakai, "Kagaku gijutsu rengō bukai kessei yōkō setsumei sho," *MKZ* 22:1, January 1942, pp. 21-27.

¹⁶² Yakushikami Ken'ichi, "Kokumin jūtaku ronkō," *MKZ* 22:5, May 1942, pp. 1-10. He followed this article with additional thoughts on what constituted excellent residential architecture in "Jūtaku dangi," *MKZ* 22:8, August 1942, p. 35.

¹⁶³ For an example of the continued emphasis on the "scientific study of architecture" (*kenchiku no kagaku kenkyū*) see, among the other prefatory articles in this issue, Washio Kenzō, "Kenchiku kagaku kyōgikai setchi wo kibōsu," *MKZ* 21:1, January 1941, pp. 2-4.

¹⁶⁴ Koinuma Hyōshirō, "Jūtaku mondai ni tsuite," *MKZ* 22:9, September 1942, pp. 19-20.

was to adopt new rationalization measures in April 1944.¹⁶⁵ Indeed, this was part of a wider reaction—revisions to the urban planning law not only took into consideration aerial bombardment, but also the need for greater planning on a national basis.¹⁶⁶

In the final pages of the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*, Makino Masaoto publicly acknowledged that not only was 1944 a terrible year, but that 1945 could be worse for the members of the association. Still, he exhorted readers to continue to endure, reminding them of small achievements, like the 1944 mausoleum for Genghis Khan.¹⁶⁷ Wartime construction, however increasingly turned out buildings more like Shinkyō's warehouse-like new movie theater than anything inspiring.¹⁶⁸

Providing the concrete face to urban projects, architects are central to creating new notions of civic space. In the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, architects overseas supplemented imperialism by defining colonial urban spaces in a manner befitting the imperial power.

A contributor to the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* thought that the special characteristic (*tokuchō*) of Japanese was to make appearances more beautiful,

¹⁶⁵ Kokumuin kenchiku kyoku, "Kenchikubutsu senji kikaku settei kansuru kaisetsu," *MKZ* 24:5, May 1944, pp. 29-32. They did, however, also provide new residential plan ideas.

¹⁶⁶ Hideshima Tsutomu, "Shintoyū keikakuhō ni suite," *MKZ* 23:5, May 1943, pp. 3-21. Excerpts are printed in "Shintoyū keikakuhō oyobi dōshikō kisoku," *MKZ* 23:5, May 1943, pp. 24-46.

¹⁶⁷ Makino Masaoto, "Kōtoku jūichi nen Manshū kenchikukai no kaiko," *MKZ* 25:1, January 1945, pp. 23-4. This intriguing structure may also have been something less than a statement of the new official style. Except for the roofline, it bears a striking resemblance to the Meiji sōkakan, the large memorial to the Emperor Meiji completed in 1926 housing large murals commemorating the emperor's reign. (Personal interview with Dr. Nishizawa Yasuhiko.) If that proves to have been the inspiration, it would suggest an audacious link by architects indeed.

¹⁶⁸ See the photos in the *MKZ* 24:2, February 1944.

whether it be housing or food.¹⁶⁹ The problem for the Japanese in Manchuria, however, did not involve appearances so much as it involved substance. A narrow idealism constrained Japanese architectural statements in Manchuria from early on. Japanese focused entirely on rational and ideal forms for everything from residences to transportation grids. It is not surprising that there was an eventual nationalistic turn away from emotionally empty modernist structures. The resulting *kōza* style, however, fabricated and imposed, was similarly empty. Few structures adopted it outside of the CCB's administrative reach, and no structures in the new imperial capital sought to emulate it. What was more, the capital's officials themselves turned away from it. The Fourteenth Government Building, for example, immediately south of the Hall of State, was a two story structure with distinctly modern lines.¹⁷⁰

In his study of Thai architecture, Clarence Aasen noted:

In spite of the numerous homogenizing tendencies, the quality of Thai architecture, art, and settlements as a historically and culturally complex intermingling set of forces and trends which are continually being renegotiated and reconstructed has been maintained. While Thailand adopted many of the underpinnings of modernism and internationalism, nevertheless the cultural distinctiveness and diversity of the nation and its peoples remained and were continually reconstituted. As in previous periods, what was involved was not so much a wholesale and mindless adoption of inappropriate foreign models, although clearly this did sometimes occur, as strategically selective appropriations.¹⁷¹

Japanese made two "strategically selective appropriations" with regard to their architecture in the first half of the twentieth century. One was broadly

¹⁶⁹ Ikeda Hiroyoshi, "Manshū kenchiku to hōjin eisei no ikkō sasshi," *MKZ* 15:1, January 1935, p. 27.

¹⁷⁰ Photos and a floor plan are in *MKZ* 22:12, December 1942.

¹⁷¹ Aasen, *Architecture of Siam*, pp. 242-3.

shared, but the other was narrowly self-serving. The latter, more artificial one, the *kō A* style, did not spread because of its inauthenticity. The more genuine style, truer to the needs and goals of Japanese society, lasted. This was the style based on modernity, a style that survived because it was 'continually renegotiated and reconstructed.'

Stylistically, it made sense that only one style could take hold in the public imagination. In traditional China, horizontality expressed sedateness and harmony. A long roof represented the sky.¹⁷² In modern architecture, verticality expresses monumentality and power. Attempting to blend modernity with traditional motifs involved contradictory meanings.

The planning of Manchukuo's capital involved innovative techniques, enlightened concerns, and a desire to impress—perhaps intimidate—non-Japanese. Thus, despite qualitative differences in physical forms, the capital's underlying values remained consistent with the earlier railway town—both showed Japanese focusing on the creation of an ideal society, one that could serve as a blueprint for Japanese activities elsewhere in Asia. As such, both the railway town and the puppet capital represented successive visions of Japanese imperialist modernity, visions that become clearer in the capital's architecture. Shinkyō's façades, however, at the same time demonstrated contradictions inherent in the new state.

In the first decade of the post-World War I era, Japanese architects showed themselves to be of a mind similar to architects in Europe and North America. They were similarly successful in contributing to popular perceptions that their country was a Great Power having a modern society. In the 1930s, Japanese architects experimented with displaying a slightly different modernity, one that was more specifically Japanese. The biggest obstacle to


¹⁷² Liu, *Chinese Architecture*, p. 250.

that effort, however, was of their own making. Celebrating modernity through the creation of new architectural styles imbued those styles with connotations of modernity, and after removing historical meaning from the architectural palette it was impossible to reinject structures with historicized content. That is to say, while the International Style favored an abstract pride based on physical accomplishment, the subsequent creation of an explicitly nationalist style could not help being semantically empty. Modernity, having negated tradition, could not resurrect tradition for political ends. This proved especially true in Manchuria. Reasserting traditional elements while endowing Manchukuo with specifically modern attributes were contradictory efforts that detracted from the overall effort to establish the new state. Ultimately, the traditional aspects of that new definition of modernity could not help but become secondary to the more cosmopolitan and explicitly modern core.¹⁷³

New architectural forms were contradictory in a more general sense as well. Replacing traditional expressions of the built environment with a sleek functionality displaying prowess in engineering made modern architecture doubly modern. Technically developed, it was also internationally cosmopolitan. New structures attempting to be faithful to both a resurrected tradition and modern cosmopolitanism ultimately failed—they were hybrids having more in common with the clumsy efforts of Japan's efforts in the 1870s than the creation of new architectural vocabulary.

¹⁷³ This is why works like the *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi* can assert that Manchurian architecture consisted of only Chinese architecture (meaning the kind of architecture that existed before imperialists arrived in Manchuria), 'European style Russian architecture,' and 'Western style Japanese architecture' (*Seiyō shiki nihon kenchiku*). *Manshikai*, ed., *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi*, supplement, p. 293. In an effort to downplay Japanese wartime activities, the authors of texts like this ignore entirely innovative efforts like the *teikan yōshiki*—surely not a kind of 'Western style Japanese architecture.' What allows them to justify comments like this to themselves is the fundamental continuity in construction technology and methods between modern architecture and the abortive *kōA* style.

Figure 7.3 First Government Building



Source: Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 82

Figure 7.4 Second Government Building



Source: Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 82

Figure 7.5 Gunjin Kaikan, Kanagawa Prefectural Offices



Source: Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 81

Figure 7.6 Aichi Prefectural Offices



Source: Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 81

Figure 7.7 Hall of State (Fifth Government Building)



Source: Photo by author

Figure 7.8 Ministry of Justice (Seventh Government Building)



Source: Photo by author

Figure 7.9 Ministry of Public Security



Source: Photo by author

**Figure 7.10 Ministry of Transportation
(Eighth Government Building)**



Source: Photo by author

Figure 7.11 Shinkyō Central Courthouse



Source: Photo by author

Figure 7.12 Department of People's Livelihood




Source: Photo by author

Figure 7.13 Bureau of Mongolian Affairs




Source: Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 145
(The Bureau is on the right; on the left is the Department of Finance)

Figure 7.14 Hall of State Second Floor Stairwell




Source: Photo by author

Figure 7.15 Monument to National Foundation, Gateway




Source: Nishizawa, "Manshūkoku no kensetsu jigyō"

Figure 7.16 Monument to National Foundation, Central Shrine



Source: Nishizawa, "Manshūkoku no kensetsu jigyō"

Figure 7.17 Monument to the War Dead




Source: *Manshūkoku tsūshinsha, Manshūkoku gensei*, pp. 22, 29

Figure 7.18 Central Bank of Manchukuo



Source: Manshūkoku tsūshinsha, *Manshūkoku gensei*, p. 45




Source: Photo by author

Figure 7.19 Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Corporation




Source: Manshūkoku tsūshinsha, *Manshūkoku gensei*, p. 9



Source: Photo by author

Figure 7.20 Jilin (Kirin) at Manden Entryway




Source: Photo by author

Figure 7.22 Kaijō Building



Source: Photo by author

Figure 7.22 Daikyō Building




Source: Photograph by author

Figure 7.23 Kantōgun Headquarters



Source: Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, p. 65

Figure 7.24 Kōtoku kaikan




Source: Manshūkoku tsūshinsha, *Manshūkoku gensei*, p. 45




Source: Photo by author

Figure 7.25 East Entrance to Kōtoku kaikan



Source: Photo by author

Figure 7.26 Kantōgun Commandant's Residence



Source: Photo by author

Chapter 8. From Imperialist to Imperial Society

Designing the *fuzokuchi* and later *guodu* ('national capital') involved more than devising particular kinds of spatial organization and exterior façades. Urban planners and architects were aware that the built environment influenced numerous aspects of human life. That they intended wider changes in Japanese society was evident in their many articles in journals like the *Toshi kōron* and the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*. In making their expectations public, however, planners and architects did more than expound upon individual hopes and concerns. Their arguments propagandized the norms of a modern society, the nature of which is rational, progressive, and self-reflexive.

The lure Manchuria held for most Japanese involved this larger vision. More than simply a colonial possession, Manchuria provided a *tabula rasa* for not only urban planners and architects to mold new built environments conducive to new lifestyles but for a host of other professionals desirous of redefining Japanese society rationally, progressively, and self-reflexively.

At the same time, all of the activities aimed at transforming Manchuria were rooted in distinctly Japanese milieus—the contexts and needs of Japanese society were ever-present in Manchuria. Ostensibly, the *fuzokuchi* represented an imperialist society akin to those of Europe and the *guodu* a rejuvenated form of an Asian imperial society, but underneath those veneers each society was explicitly modern in ways deemed most suitable by Japanese in particular eras. Each entailed new and specific organizing principles and institutions. As such, both imperialist and imperial societies remained predicated upon the needs of Japanese society at home.

That Japanese embraced new Manchurian forms can be demonstrated demographically.¹ Manchuria witnessed the most significant, sustained migration of Japanese colonists since the occupation and conquest of the Japanese archipelago itself. The Japanese civilian population in Manchuria, only 16,000 in 1906, exceeded 200,000 in 1930 and surpassed one million by 1940 (Table 8.1). Because of the influx of Chinese migration, the various *fuzokuchi* grew even more rapidly (Table 8.2), and Changchun faster than average (Table 8.3). The large numbers of Chinese living in the *fuzokuchi* contrasted with population figures for Russian controlled Kuanchengzi, testifying to greater Japanese efforts to integrate Chinese into the empire.² Outside the *fuzokuchi*, of course, Chinese dominated the surrounding environs, as one Kantōgun estimate showed (Table 8.4). Sources suggest, however, that Chinese populations in the Changchun area were attracted as much to the *fuzokuchi* and as they were elsewhere (Table 8.5).

Table 8.1 Japanese Populations in Manchuria

	<u>Guandong Peninsula</u>	<u>Fuzokuchi</u>	<u>Elsewhere</u>	<u>Total</u>
1906	12,792	3,821	—	16,612
1910	36,668	25,266	14,407	76,341
1915	50,176	34,396	16,993	101,565
1920	73,894	61,576	24,590	160,060
1925	90,542	83,620	13,826	187,988
1930	116,052	99,411	18,368	233,749
1935	159,749	190,508	144,451	494,708
1940	202,827	—	862,254	1,065,072

Source: *Manshū kaihastu yonjūnen shi*, vol. 1, p. 84.³

¹ Population statistics vary both slightly and greatly depending on the source. What follows is an effort to suggest approximate figures and general trends through diverse sources.

² Growth was slower in Kuanchengzi; in 1922, for example, there were 18 Japanese, 642 Chinese, and 763 others—presumably Russians—totaling 1,553 people. Inoue Nobuō, *Chōshun enkakushi*, Dalian: ManMō bunka kyōkai, 1922, p. 18.

³ The 1906 total does not include any Japanese who may have been living outside the Guandong Leased Lands or the various *fuzokuchi*. The 1940 figures reflect the incorporation of the *fuzokuchi* into Manchukuo.

Table 8.2 Change in Populations for All *Fuzokuchi*

	<u>Japanese</u>	<u>Korean</u>	<u>Chinese</u>	<u>Foreign</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Increase</u>
1907	13,436	—	12,256	7	25,699	100
1908	15,652	—	15,016	38	30,706	119
1909	16,305	—	19,323	18	35,646	139
1910	24,676	—	25,807	9	50,492	196
1911	25,179	—	30,880	1	56,060	218
1912	26,478	—	38,841	31	65,350	254
1913	29,030	49	44,224	87	73,390	286
1914	31,568	184	49,618	145	81,515	317
1915	33,816	252	57,554	162	91,784	357
1916	37,071	394	63,104	187	100,756	392
1917	43,729	676	76,018	199	120,623	469
1918	51,647	935	89,286	185	142,053	553
1919	62,593	1,379	99,398	258	163,628	637
1920	64,682	1,614	102,415	359	169,070	658
1921	67,485	1,944	105,058	322	174,809	680
1922	66,782	1,934	120,419	816	189,951	739
1923	76,555	5,081	150,520	796	232,952	906
1924	81,141	6,340	168,357	1,319	257,157	1,001
1925	82,433	8,636	179,954	1,456	272,479	1,060
1926	84,618	9,477	185,654	1,653	281,402	1,095
1927	87,180	8,878	198,252	1,699	296,009	1,152
1928	90,756	11,354	219,480	1,803	323,393	1,258
1929	94,996	13,737	230,030	1,937	340,700	1,326
1930	99,411	15,901	235,016	1,769	352,097	1,370
1931	100,268	20,794	214,370	1,465	336,897	1,311
1932	116,589	27,956	216,839	1,336	362,720	1,411
1933	139,973	27,781	235,234	1,328	404,316	1,573
1934	165,375	27,855	251,832	1,180	446,242	1,736
1935	190,508	31,415	258,385	1,088	501,396	1,951
1936	203,234	30,787	297,568	1,004	532,593	2,072
1937	216,513	30,388	310,136	917	557,954	2,171

Source: Mantetsu sōseishitsu, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, vol. 1, pp. 152-3.⁴

⁴ The Japanese considered Koreans as Japanese subjects but sometimes maintained separate population figures for them as distinct from Japanese *naichijin*. Note that since all *fuzokuchi* were outside the Guandong Leased Lands, these figures do not include residents of the Guandong Peninsula. One estimate of the entire Japanese population in 1912 has 41,213 Japanese in the Guandong Leased Lands, 26,323 in the *fuzokuchi*, and 1,520 in other consular jurisdictions in Manchuria for a total of 81,059 Japanese throughout Manchuria. Mantetsu chōsaka, *Minami Manshū ni okeru Nippon no keizai teki seiryoku*, npl: Mantetsu, 1912?, p. 30.

Table 8.3 Demographic Change in the Changchun *Fuzokuchi*

	<u>Japanese</u>	<u>Korean</u>	<u>Chinese</u>	<u>Foreign</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Increase</u>
1907	687	—	566	2	1,255	100
1908	1,513	—	1,300	3	2,816	224
1909	1,688	—	3,284	14	4,986	397
1910	2,348	—	1,360	6 ⁵	3,714	296
1911	2,708	—	4,293	—	7,001	558
1912	2,728	—	5,052	29	7,809	622
1913	3,053	—	5,942	86	9,081	724
1914	3,378	—	6,832	143	10,353	825
1915	3,465	—	7,920	155	11,540	920
1916	3,947	59	10,143	179	14,328	1,142
1917	4,781	—	11,525	185	16,491	1,314
1918	5,821	224	13,517	161	19,723	1,572
1919	6,303	—	13,428	218	19,949	1,590
1920	7,749	209	15,856	273	24,087	1,919
1921	7,831	176	14,521	250	22,788	1,816
1922	7,668	217	15,058	353	23,296	1,856
1923	7,703	323	15,560	391	23,977	1,911
1924	7,718	417	16,123	303	24,561	1,957
1925	8,476	648	18,170	261	27,555	2,196
1926	8,954	685	18,230	565	28,434	2,266
1927	8,938	774	21,050	608	31,370	2,500
1928	9,109	981	22,463	509	33,062	2,634
1929	9,592	1,028	24,138	593	35,351	2,817
1930	10,097	1,166	23,307	520	35,090	2,796
1931	10,161	1,807	20,157	511	32,636	2,600
1932	15,627	2,494	22,162	446	40,729	3,245
1933	23,715	2,594	24,356	471	51,136	4,076
1934	30,109	2,693	25,693	377	58,872	4,691
1935	32,430	2,957	27,395	313	63,095	5,027
1936	33,281	3,186	27,272	286	64,025	5,102
1937	34,115	3,180	27,448	280	65,023	5,181

Source: Mantetsu chihōbu, *Chihō keiei tōkei nenpō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1938, pp. 40-1, Manshikai, *Manshū yonjūnenshi*, supplement, p. 66, and Mantetsu sōseishitsu, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1977 (originally Dalian: Mantetsu, 1939), vol. 1, pp. 151, 156-7, and vol. 3, pp. 340-1.⁶

⁵ One source reports a total of 239 foreigners "lodging" (*shukuhaku*) in the *fuzokuchi* in 1910: 184 Japanese, 2 Koreans, 19 English, 22 Russians, 2 French, and 10 Germans. Mantetsu sōseishitsu, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, vol. 3, p. 340.

⁶ In 1906, 248 Japanese appear to have been living in the Changchun area outside the as yet unconstructed *fuzokuchi*. See Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku, *Chōshun jūjū*, npl: 1929, p. 59.

Table 8.4 Populations in the Changchun Area in 1924

	<u>Japanese</u>	<u>Chinese</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Total</u>
<i>Fuzokuchi</i>	12,615	14,500	250	27,365
<i>Shangbu</i>	300	29,700	—	30,000
Old City	80	67,920	—	68,000
Total	12,995	112,120	250	125,365

Source: Kantōgun shireibu, *Minami Manshū shuyō toshi keizai jōtai*, volume 2, np, 1924, p. 360.⁷

Table 8.5 Chinese Populations in the Changchun Area

	<u>Within the <i>Fuzokuchi</i></u>	<u>Outside the <i>Fuzokuchi</i></u>	<u>Total</u>
1916	9,430	82,151	91,581
1921	15,851	79,180	95,031
1926	21,994	87,319	109,313
1927	21,658	87,158	108,816

Source: Gaimusho tsūshōkyoku, *Chōshun jijō*, np: 1929, p. 59. Including the old city, *shangbu*, and Kuanchengzi as outside the *fuzokuchi*, these figures differ slightly from Tables 8.3 and 8.4.

By the time of the Manchurian Incident, roughly 150,000 people inhabited the area that was to become Shinkyō.⁸ This population more than tripled

Demonstrating the range of population statistics, this source provides variant figures for 1908 (377 Japanese, but another 834 Japanese living outside the *fuzokuchi*), 1912 (2,813 Japanese within, 543 without), 1916 (3,721 within, 621 without), 1921 (7,958 within, 445 without), 1926 (10,089 within, 288 without), and 1927 (9,712 within, 235 without). Other, usually minor discrepancies exist between these figures and those found in Izumi Renji, *Chōshun jijō*, Changchun: Manshū Chōshun nippōsha, 1912, p. 22, Inoue, *Chōshun enkakushi*, p. 17, Manshikai, *Manshū yonjūnenshi*, supplement, p. 66, and other sources noted below. The largest discrepancy is with the Mantetsu chihō jimusho, *Chōshun jijō*, Changchun: Mantetsu chihō jimusho, 1932, p. 123, which suggests larger populations in 1930, especially for Chinese—27,622, larger by an additional 4,314.

⁷ These figures are repeated by (Rikugun nitō shukeishō) Yamada Kyūtarō, *ManMō toyū zenshi*, npl: 1926, vol. 2, pp. 22-3. Other sources, however, do not agree. According to Inoue Nobuō, 482 Japanese lived in the old city and *shangbu* along with 140,001 Chinese for a total there of 140,483 already in 1922. Inoue, *Chōshun enkakushi*, pp. 18. An earlier source estimated that the Chinese population of the old city in 1910 was between 120,000 and 130,000. Kuroda Kashirō, *Manshū kiyō*, npl: Mantetsu, 1910, p. 55.

⁸ One source estimated that in addition to the almost 41,000 living in the *fuzokuchi* in 1930 (10,161 Japanese, 1,807 Koreans, 20,157 Chinese, and 446 foreigners) and the just over 104,000 living in the old city and *shangbu* (101,156 Chinese, 1,397 Japanese, 1,700 Koreans, and 51

within eight years of the proclamation of the new capital (Table 8.6). This was mostly due to increased migration—the Japanese population in all of Manchuria more than tripled between 1930 and 1940, Shinkyō receiving the equivalent of almost a quarter of all new Japanese arrivals in the *fuzokuchi* in the first five years alone (cf.: Tables 8.1 and 8.3). At the same time, the new capital's growth also reflected continuing Chinese migration to Manchuria, even in the wake of the Manchurian Incident.⁹

By 1940 Shinkyō's role as a major provincial center eclipsed that of the city of Jilin, the province's traditional center of administration and commerce.¹⁰

foreigners), some 2,700 also lived in Kuanchengzi and 4,000 inhabited lands nearby. *Manshūkoku seifu koku mu'in kokuto kensetsu kyoku, Kokuto Shinkyō*, npl: 1933, pp. 5, 6, 12. (While some figures match data for other years in Table 8.3, the figure for Chinese in the *fuzokuchi* is probably a typographical error.)

⁹ In the mid-1920s Chinese migrants arriving in Manchuria exceeded those returning south of the Great Wall by around two hundred thousand a year, but from 1927 to 1930 that figure jumped to an average of six hundred thousand a year. After the Manchurian Incident, migration slowed but continued to favor migration into Manchuria by an average of eighty-six thousand a year, about what Kinoshita Ryūkō reported for the period between 1908 and 1911 in Mantetsu chōsaka, *Minami Manshū ni okeru Nippon no keizai teki seiryoku*, p. 4. See Mantetsu shomubu rōmuka, *Manshū kakō jijō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1931, pp. 3-14, *Report on Progress in Manchuria, 1907-1928*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1929, p. 14, *Report on Progress to 1936*, pp. 170-1 and *Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1939*, Tokyo: The Herald Press, 1939, pp. 161. This migration slowed further with the onset of war in 1937. A useful analysis of Chinese migration before 1930 is Manshikai, *Manshū yonjūnenishi*, vol. 1, pp. 93-5. Because of the difficulty enumerating all migrants, however, none of these statistics can be considered authoritative.

¹⁰ Although Changchun's population was about two percent of the provincial total and Shinkyō's more than six, Jilin's population may have hovered consistently around two. Kuroda estimated Jilin Province's population to be five million in 1910, and Mantetsu's Kinoshita Ryūkō suggested in 1912 it was four million. Kuroda, *Manshū kiyō*, p. 55 and Mantetsu chōsaka, *Minami Manshū ni okeru Nippon no keizai teki seiryoku*, p. 3. A 1922 estimate thought 6,612,000 people to be living in the province. Mantetsu shomubu chōsaka, *Kitsurinshō sangyō no genjō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1927, p. 5. Those figures suggest that the population of the Changchun area before the Manchurian Incident was about two percent of the provincial. Using the data from Table 8.6 and the official provincial population figure of 5,223,588 for 1937, the city's relative size triples to 6.4% of the provincial population. *Report on Progress to 1939*, p. 146. In contrast, while Changchun grew rapidly after 1931, by 1939 only 123,310 Manchurians (including Mongols and Chinese Muslims), 16,474 Japanese, 29 Europeans and Americans, and 99 stateless people called Jilin home, a total of 138,910. *Manshū jijō an'naisho, Kitsurin jijō*, Shinkyō: *Manshū jijō an'naisho*, 1941, p. 62. Yamada reported a 1926 population in Jilin of 85,000 Chinese, 1,089 Japanese, and 12 foreigners, demonstrating that this shift may have begun even before the Manchurian Incident. Yamada, *ManMō toyū zenshi*, vol. 2, p. 2. Lt. Yamada's figures, however, differed from 1924 Kantōgun estimates of 147,682 Chinese, 1,055 Japanese, and 48 foreigners. Kantōgun shireibu, *Minami Manshū shuyō toshi keizai jōtai*, vol. 2, pp. 402-3.

It did so with surprising speed—the transformation from obscure district center to major urban nexus took only a little more than a century to transpire. For Japanese the change was even more startling, because by 1940 more than a fifth of the roughly half-million people in the Shinkyō area were Japanese. This meant that Changchun's evolution from a frontier railway outpost of only a few hundred Japanese to a major city housing more than one-tenth of the over one million Japanese civilians in all Manchuria occurred over only thirty-three years. The more than thirteen percent of all Japanese outside the Guandong Leased Lands living in Shinkyō in 1940 made the city easily the second largest concentration of Japanese in Manchukuo.¹¹

Table 8.6 Demographic Change in Shinkyō

	<u>Japanese</u>	<u>Korean</u>	<u>Chinese</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
1931	10,630	1,837	114,354	731	127,543
1935	54,637	6,764	249,295	825	311,521
1937	65,222	7,045	261,691	734	334,692
1938	82,146	10,115	285,147	971	378,325
1940	114,306	14,252	359,278	1,389	489,225

Source: Data for 1931 and 1940 are from *Manshū teikoku rinji kokuto kensetsukyoku, Kokuto kensetsu ni tsuite*, Tokyo: 1940, p. 11. For 1935 see *Kokumuin sōmuchō tōkeisho, Manshū teikoku genzai kokō tōkei*, Shinkyō: Kōtoku zusho, 1936, pp. 1-10 and *Report on Progress to 1936*, Tokyo: The Herald Press, 1936, p. 151. For 1937 see *Report on Progress to 1939*, Dalian: Mantetsu, p. 146. For 1938 see *Ji'anbu keimushi, Manshū teikoku genzai kokō tōkei*, Shinkyō: Manshū shinbunsha, 1938, pp. 8-11.¹²

¹¹ In 1934, the 37,973 Japanese *naichijin* (that is to say, Japanese, not Koreans) in the Shinkyō area (30,109 within the *fuzokuchi* and 7,867 in the old city, *shangbu*, and nearby) as a group were second numerically within Manchukuo to only Mukden's 54,592 (50,366 in the *fuzokuchi* and 4,226 without). The next largest populations were in Harbin (14,773), Andong (13,701), Jilin (5,579), Yinzhou (2,949), and Qiqihar (2,971). Another fifteen cities had a thousand or less Japanese *naichijin*. Shinozaki Yoshirō, *Manshū juyō toshi ni okeru Nipponjin zōka taisei sūji ni arawaretaru Shinkyō no yakushin shin*, Tokyo: NichiMan jitsugyō kyōkai, 1935, pp. 2-18.

¹² The figures for 1931 and 1935 include the *fuzokuchi* population. The 1938 figures offer a new, undefined category, presumably for stateless Jews since the vast majority appeared in Harbin.

Of course, much of that growth had to do with the creation of a new administrative order overseeing the development of the puppet state. Yet that was not all. Shinkyō was also the linchpin in a larger experiment—an attempt to transform a non-Japanese Asian society into a newly ‘imagined’ state. If there had ever been any doubt about which of Japan’s overseas possessions was most valuable, after 1932 Manchuria was clearly Japan’s most tangible sphere of influence, resulting in Shinkyō garnering a premier role.

Colonial Development

Manchuria’s tangibility for Japanese involved more than population shifts. Among other things, it meant economic development, a key element in the creation of a modern society Japan itself. Changchun’s role in that development was significant, serving simultaneously as a location for investment, a center for commerce, and a promoter of industry, especially with regard to construction.

Table 8.7 Major Foreign Investment in Manchuria by 1929

Japan	¥ 1,510,754,000	France	¥ 21,086,000
Russia	¥ 465,015,000	Sweden	¥ 850,000
UK	¥ 39,590,000	Denmark	¥ 157,000
USA	¥ 26,400,000	Total	¥ 2,063,842,000

Source: Senta Manzō, *Shin Manshū he no rihyō*, Tokyo: Mantetsu, 1932, pp. 112-3. The original study Senta cited appears to have been Sada Kōjirō, *ManMō ni okeru Nihon tōshin gaku; ManMō ni okeru sekai kakkoku no tōshin gaku*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1929. Russian, British, and French investments were primarily in railways, though Russian investments also included mining and forestry operations. All invested in industry and commerce, but Russian, British, and American investment also included financial institutions.

While 28,419 appeared there, 846 were in Changchun. Presumably those people were added to the “other” category in 1940.

Japanese investment in Manchuria was much heralded. Senta Manzō's *Shin Manshū he no rihyō* (*Milestones on the way to New Manchuria*) celebrated Japanese investment as a legitimizing rationale for the Japanese takeover of Manchuria. Reproducing a 1929 Mantetsu study, Senta noted Japanese investments were almost three times as much as the other six major investors in Manchuria combined (Table 8.7). The implication was that Japanese intervention was justifiable if those investments were threatened.

Table 8.8 Breakdown of Japanese Investment to 1929

railways	¥ 356,316,000	24%	public facilities	¥ 302,569,000	20%
harbors	¥ 63,834,000	4%	agriculture, mining, and		
transportation	¥ 38,036,000	2%	forestry	¥ 241,045,000	16%
industry	¥ 110,121,000	7%	trusts	¥ 97,634,000	6%
commercial	¥ 117,753,000	8%	miscellaneous	¥ 49,458,000	3%
electric power	¥ 37,283,000	2%			
banks	¥ 106,705,000	7%	total	¥ 1,510,755,000	100%

Source: Sada, *ManMō ni okeru Nihon tōshin gaku*, pp. 1-2. Sada presents this as entirely Mantetsu investment, but the total figure as of 1929 is more than double the figure other Mantetsu writers offered in 1931, as seen in Table 8.9.

Japanese investment in Manchuria assumed a number of forms (Table 8.8), but before 1932 the bulk of Japanese investment was carried by a single vehicle: Mantetsu. Not surprisingly, the railway and its associated industries absorbed the lion's share of Mantetsu's funds, but towns within Mantetsu's domain also received large sums. Total Mantetsu investments in towns along the railway amounted to ¥127,000,000 by 1927, ¥157,000,000 if the various waterworks, electric plants, and tramway systems turned over to private interests were included.¹³ By 1929, those figures totaled ¥131,000,000

¹³ *Report on Progress in Manchuria, 1907-1928*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1929, pp. 91-2.

and ¥200,000,000 respectively.¹⁴ A breakdown of Mantetsu investments as of March 31, 1931, showed just how substantial municipal endeavors were in relation to other Mantetsu investments on the eve of the Manchurian Incident (Table 8.9). Included in this figure were daily operations—Mantetsu covered the expenses for all public services for towns within the railway zone exceeding the fees and rents the towns received as income (Table 8.10).

Table 8.9 Summary of Mantetsu Investments (March 31, 1931)

railways	¥ 270,230,960	37%	harbors	¥ 83,200,948	11%
railway workshops	¥ 6,465,032	1%	municipalities	¥ 146,125,530	20%
coal mines	¥ 117,871,977	16%	sanitation	¥ 15,842,006	2%
iron works	¥ 27,716,716	4%	education	¥ 14,304,671	2%
oil shale plants	¥ 8,824,461	1%	total	¥742,069,206	96%

Source: *Report on Progress, 1907-32*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1932. p. 48.

Table 8.10 Fuzokuchi Budgets and Mantetsu Aid

<u>Year</u>	<u>Income</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>Deficits Defrayed</u>
1907-08	¥ 120,794	¥ 251,006	¥ 130,212
1912-13	¥ 633,211	¥ 1,401,012	¥ 767,800
1917-18	¥ 1,930,284	¥ 3,538,709	¥ 1,267,560
1922-23	¥ 3,995,249	¥ 10,831,659	¥ 6,836,410
1927-28	¥ 6,098,234	¥ 19,104,447	¥ 13,006,210
1928-29	¥ 6,230,083	¥ 19,425,207	¥ 13,195,124
1929-30	¥ 4,689,833	¥ 18,288,336	¥ 13,598,503
1930-31	¥ 4,586,369	¥ 15,305,429	¥ 10,719,060
1931-32	¥ 4,488,883	¥ 15,366,294	¥ 10,877,411
1932-33	¥ 4,824,183	¥ 16,511,465	¥ 11,687,222

Source: *Report on Progress to 1934*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1934. p. 165.

¹⁴ *Second Report on Progress to 1930*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1931. pp. 125-6.

Mantetsu's profits were large, enabling it to support new towns within the railway zone with ease.¹⁵ Mantetsu's towns, however, were no mere window dressing for imperialist expansion. Mantetsu's sustained investment of large sums indicates that urban construction projects were vital to Mantetsu operations.¹⁶ The corporation's goal of creating a modern society was as important as the bottom line.¹⁷ Mantetsu did not, however, ignore the bottom line. Despite Mantetsu's initial large capitalization of ¥200,000,000—increased to ¥440,000,000 in 1920—the large expenditures on municipal infrastructure were only possible because of the commercial vitality of places like Changchun.

Mantetsu's investments in Changchun were substantial. The Changchun *fuzokuchi's* public expenditures soared from ¥9,452 in 1908 to ¥60,214 in 1912 to ¥408,024 in 1921, about half of which was paid for by local revenues and the other half from Mantetsu coffers.¹⁸ These figures did not include construction projects and other local expenses; total expenses for the Changchun regional office amounted to ¥17,480,477 in 1921 alone. About forty-three percent of this sum was paid for by borrowing from banks and just over four percent by payments from Mantetsu.¹⁹

¹⁵ Despite enormous outlays on non-performing assets, net profits in 1927, for example, were ¥36,274,320. *Report on Progress in Manchuria, 1907-1928*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1929, p. 50.

¹⁶ Koshizawa suggests that of Mantetsu's total expenses between 1907 and 1936 (¥833,920,000), twenty-three percent (¥193,480,000) was spent on regional administration. Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 41-2. (Given the statistics in Table 8.12, Koshizawa seems to have misconstrued the expenditures of one year for all of Mantetsu's history.)

¹⁷ A 1933 Manchukuo publication echoed this concern by listing the construction of Shinkyō and the creation of modern urban planning in Mukden and other towns along with plans for railway, roadway, port, and airport development in the country as a whole. Kokumuin sōmuchō, "Manshūkoku keizai kensetsu kōyō," in *Manshūkoku seifu kōhō*, March 1, 1933, pp. 2-7, in Nishizawa, " 'Manshūkoku' no kensetsu jūgyō," in Yamamoto Yūzō, ed., *'Manshūkoku' no kenkyū*, Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 1995, pp. 378-9.

¹⁸ Inoue, *Chōshun enkakushi*, pp. 29-30.

¹⁹ Inoue, *Chōshun enkakushi*, pp. 41-42.

Table 8.11 Mantetsu Expenditures in Select Cities in 1937

Mukden	¥ 38,249,874	Liaoyang	¥ 7,007,437
Dalian	¥ 23,320,604	Gongzhuling	¥ 6,046,970
Shinkyō	¥ 22,908,838	Yingkou	¥ 2,665,135
Andong	¥ 10,503,845	Harbin	¥ 1,576,850
Sipingjie	¥ 7,203,423	Jilin	¥ 629,578

Source: Mantetsu chihōbu, *Chihō keiei tōkei nenpō*, pp. 328-53.²⁰ Except for Dalian, payments rose gradually, though remaining relatively equivalent between the cities concerned. Shinkyō's payments grew fastest, up from ¥16,866,650 in 1932.

Table 8.12 Mantetsu Expenditures in Shinkyō, Mukden, and Andong, 1937

	<u>Shinkyō</u>	<u>Mukden</u>	<u>Andong</u>
land purchase	9,959,386	19,959,359	4,055,156
schools, libraries, halls	8,837,093	13,941,515	3,058,120
water supply	2,619,798	1,808,445	1,629,615
medical facilities	1,122,000	3,102,302	482,736
rental housing	1,697,149	1,792,872	16,284
sewage	717,710	1,569,531	1,059,365
sanitation facilities	330,058	239,829	63,221
parks	112,816	87,476	34,656
fire prevention	52,831	54,849	41,218
recreational facilities	39,855	202,067	20,345
streets & drainage	34,736	2,110,100	1,321,882
cemeteries, crematoria	6,769	34,691	7,584
miscellaneous	715	253,321	199,358
total	¥ 22,908,838	¥ 38,249,874	¥ 10,503,845

Source: Mantetsu chihōbu, *Chihō keiei tōkei nenpō*, pp. 328-53.

With the establishment of Manchukuo and the military's reluctance to rely upon loans, direct investment became the norm. As the capital of Manchukuo, Shinkyō's share was comparatively high. Of the ¥182,058,373 spent on local administration by Mantetsu in all its holdings in 1937, Shinkyō

²⁰ The *Chihō keiei tōkei nenpō* lists statistics for forty cities.

received almost ¥23,000,000, or more than twelve percent of Mantetsu's total urban investment, despite the change in focus to developing Manchukuo's cities outside the capital with the second five year plan. Only Dalian and Mukden received more (Table 8.11). Andong, another Mantetsu *fuzokuchi* at the mouth of the Yalu River, received the fourth highest investment. A comparison of Mantetsu expenditures in Shinkyō, Mukden, and Andong reveals the relative priorities in the new capital, an industrial center, and a southeastern port at the end of the first five year plan (Table 8.12). Shinkyō's disproportionately high expenditures for parks and water supply are prominent. Shinkyō's relatively smaller burden for cemeteries and miscellaneous expenses is also noticeable, due to the comparatively recent foundation of much of the city and its only recent growth.

It was Changchun's commercial potential that rendered the town worthy of significant investment, something immediately apparent to Japanese first arriving there. A 1910 account praising the potential for soybeans throughout Manchuria described Changchun in particular as having a substantial market attracting agricultural products from its surrounding environs, especially from its northwest.²¹ Certain mineral resources were also available to the southeast.²² This potential rapidly became reality. From October 1907 to March 10, 1908, 55,000 of the 176,000 tons—thirty-one percent—of goods shipped out of Dalian came from or via Changchun.²³ This added an economic rationale to the political imperative for Japanese incorporation of that distant region quickly into their Dalian-centered trade network.²⁴ Along

²¹ Kuroda Kashirō, *Manshū kiyō*, vol. 1, pp. 44-5, 75-6 and vol. 2, pp. 108-112.

²² Inoue, *Chōshun enkakushi*, p. 113.

²³ *U.S. Daily Consular and Trade Reports*, June 3, 1908, p. 2, as quoted in K. Asakawa, "Japan in Manchuria—II," *Yale Review*, November 1908, p. 274.

²⁴ Because a rival port at Yingkou (Newchwang) posed a threat to Dalian, Mantetsu insured that most freight went through their facilities at Dalian by undercutting freight charges to Yingkou from stations north of Tieling, about a quarter of the way to Changchun from Mukden.

with Dalian and Mukden, Changchun quickly became one of Mantetsu's three main hubs.²⁵ As the connecting point for Mantetsu, the CER, and other Chinese rail links, one Mantetsu report called Changchun "one of Manchuria's most important cities."²⁶ Changchun's subsequent development demonstrated it to be an integral component of Japan's informal empire in Manchuria.

It was an empire resting initially on the soybean. Fifty-two percent of Manchuria's exports in 1930 consisted of soybeans, soybean cake, and soybean oil²⁷, followed distantly by millet, *gaoliang*, and other cereals.²⁸ Changchun's local economy was no different, depending initially also on soybean cultivation as the major cash crop.²⁹ Already in 1922 some 50,000 horse-carts

(The major soybean producing region was north of Tieling.) Mantetsu managed to do this during its first years of operation despite the additional expense of changing the entire track between Dalian and Changchun from wide to standard gauge and beginning a number of major improvements to speed communications. The fact that Yingkou's port is relatively shallow and ice-bound several months of the year no doubt helped secure Dalian's eventual primacy, but Mantetsu's receipt of the contract to carry government salt insured it. See Asakawa, "Japan in Manchuria," pp. 281-8. A contemporary perspective on this rivalry is Mantetsu chōsaka, *Minami Manshū ni okeru Nippon no keizai teki seiryoku*, pp. 10-12.

²⁵ *Second Report on Progress to 1930*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1931. pp. 100-1.

²⁶ Mantetsu shomubu chōsaka, *Manshū ni okeru suisanbutsu no jukyū*, Dalian, Mantetsu, 1929, p. 293.

²⁷ For Manchuria as a whole, this share changed only with the onset of military-enforced industrialization: 57% in 1931, 59% in 1932, 54% in 1933, 51% in 1934, and 48% in 1935.

(Manshūkoku) Jitsugyōbu rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, *Manshūkoku juyō shōhin gaikoku bōseki tōkei*, Shinkyō: (Manshūkoku) Jitsugyōbu rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, 1937, pp. 1-9.

²⁸ *Second Report on Progress to 1930*, pp. 110-2, Mantetsu chihōbu nōmuka, *Manshū zairai nōgyō*, p. 40.

²⁹ For general conditions in 1912, including the quadrupling of soybean exports between 1907 and 1911, see Izumi Renji, *Chōshun jijō*, pp. 252-281. Mantetsu's often republished—at least four times—report on traditional Manchurian agriculture cited three main kinds of soybeans, but fifteen variants, two of which were found most commonly around the Changchun area. Mantetsu chihōbu nōmuka, *Manshū zairai nōgyō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1935 (originally 1918), pp. 115-8. Good land in the Changchun area, as well as in nearby Gongzhuling and Sipingjie, could produce more soybeans per hectare than comparable land further south. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10. A recent Chinese assessment of the Changchun area, including the availability of water, is Li Zhenquan et al, eds., *Jilinsheng dili*, Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1991, pp. 73-80, 365-78.

unloaded soybeans in Changchun.³⁰ Other crops were also growable in Manchuria, and Japanese assiduously studied the potential for a range of products.³¹ One such crop was flax, which Japanese grew on the many Mantetsu-sponsored experimental farms appearing throughout Manchuria, including the one in Changchun.³² Another was sugar beets, a crop that some thought could compete well with production in Hokkaido and the United States.³³ Another important local product was livestock. Both the *fuzokuchi* and the *guodu* allowed the keeping of livestock in certain areas so as to insure fresh supplies of meat and animal power. These numbers grew along with the human population.³⁴

Despite this productivity, neither agriculture nor animal husbandry made Changchun's economic role prominent; Changchun's share of Manchuria's total soybean production between 1923 and 1930 was only four percent.³⁵ The position of the *fuzokuchi* at the end of the rail line from Dalian, however, did. Despite the distance from Dalian's docks, soybeans from central Manchuria were profitable. Mantetsu made this possible by keeping transport fares low: between 1912 and 1931 those fees averaged only 15.3% of the Dalian

³⁰ Inoue, *Chōshun enkakushi*, p. 33. While soybeans accounted for 30% of all agricultural exports in 1921, *gaoliang* accounted for 25%, millet 20%, and wheat 10%. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

³¹ Other crops included hemp, herbs, and assorted vegetables. For a discussion of the various potentials of these crops, see Mantetsu chihōbu nōmuka, *Manshū zairai nōgyō*.

³² For the results of a 1914-18 study see Mantetsu keizai chōsaka, *Manshū ni okeru ama jijō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1935.

³³ Maeda Tadashi, *Manshūkoku to tensai tōgyō*, Tokyo: Maeda Tadashi, 1932.

³⁴ A 1939 report counted 6,164 head of cattle in Shinkyō (less than in Mukden, Hailar, Dalian, and Harbin only) and 50,171 pigs (fewer only than in Mukden and Dalian). Shinkyō's 242 horses were about the same as in Dalian (254) and Harbin (250), but more than in Mukden (106). Shinkyō's share of these animals was, respectively, nine, thirteen, and twenty-three percent of the urban totals for Manchuria's eleven largest cities. Mantetsu Shinkyō shisha chōsashitsu dai niki, *Manshū ni okeru jūshi no seisanyō ni tsuite*, Shinkyō: Mantetsu, 1942, p. 3. Even before the Manchurian Incident, the *fuzokuchi* averaged 3,254 cattle annually between 1930 and 1935. *Manshūkoku sangyōbu daijū kanbō shiryōka*, *Nikuchiku jūkyū ni kansuru chōsa hōkokusho*, npl: *Manshūkoku sangyōbu daijū kanbō shiryōka*, nd, pp. 112-113.

³⁵ Mantetsu chōsaka, *Manshū Shina gawa tetsudō ensen chihō ni okeru daizu no demawaru zōka jijō oyobi sono tai ōsaku*, Dalian, Mantetsu, 1931, pp. 1-2, 4.

market price for soybeans.³⁶ This encouraged the growth of soybeans throughout central Manchuria and the development of Changchun as the regional hub for their collection. So successful was this growth that eventually it may have encouraged further expansion—Japanese realized quickly that the greater potential for soybean production lay in northern Manchuria, meaning near Changchun and along the various rail lines extending from Changchun.³⁷

Energized by the collection of soybeans, Changchun's merchants took on another role—processing. New factories in Changchun increased local production of soybean oil, raising the area's share of Manchuria's total production between 1925 and 1929 from two to three percent.³⁸ Subsequent studies of Manchurian soybeans sought to illuminate which variety in what soil produced the most desired characteristics for the market.³⁹ Changchun's transformation into "bean town" (Ch, *dòudū*; J, *mame no to*) resulted from not

³⁶ Fares ranged from as low as 8% in 1917 to as high as 30% in 1931, but were most commonly between 14-16%. Mantetsu chōsaka, *Manshū Shina gawa tetsudō ensen chihō ni okeru daizu no demawaru zōka jijō oyobi sono tai ōsaku*, pp. 71-2.

³⁷ The three year average of soybeans and soybean products exported from northern Manchuria immediately before 1931 totaled 2,185,508 tons, constituting 88% of the exports from that area. (In contrast, southern Manchuria exported 1,798,527 tons constituting 81% of that export total—southern Manchuria's production of millet, *gaoliang*, maize, and wheat was correspondingly larger.) Between 1923 and 1930, Changchun's role in soybean production was small, averaging only about 6% of the northern Manchurian total. Yet while 11% of north Manchuria's total came from sources along the rail line to Jilin and further east, more than 81% came from sources along the CER. With the opening of a rail connection to Qiqihar in 1929, sources west of Changchun also began producing soybeans. Between 1929 and 1930 these northwestern sources contributed only between one and two percent of the northern total, but the potential was clear. See Mantetsu chōsaka, *Manshū Shina gawa tetsudō ensen chihō ni okeru daizu no demawaru zōka jijō oyobi sono tai ōsaku*, Dalian, Mantetsu, 1931, pp. 1-2, 4.

³⁸ By 1930 there were twelve factories in Changchun, as opposed to ten in Mukden though thirty-one in Liaoyang. See Mantetsu sōmubu chōsaka, *Manshū yūbō gensei*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1930, pp. 8-9, 19.

³⁹ Mantetsu rinji keizai chōsa i'inkai, *Manshū daizu hinshitsu tōkyū satei ni kansuru chōsa*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1929.

simply the production of soybeans but from the combination of production along with the distribution and processing of soybeans.⁴⁰

These activities, however, allowed also for something more. Increased storage and distributive capacities encouraged residents to exploit other resources in Changchun's vicinity. One such product was millet.⁴¹ Another was lumber. As Jilin province was also a major source of timber, Changchun served as a key node in the distribution of lumber to the rest of Manchuria.⁴² This in turn encouraged some Changchun residents to process the timber—a 1930 report listed forty-four woodworkers in the *fuzokuchi* and the *shangbu*.⁴³ Coal was also available nearby, useful for both the railway and local energy needs.⁴⁴ Initially mined by Chinese, this resource was first developed to supply the CER.⁴⁵

Yet another product passing through Changchun in increasing quantities was fresh and dried marine products, especially fish. Not only did these

⁴⁰ This nickname can be found in many sources. One that considers development after World War One is *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō shōkō kōkai, 1942, p. 1.

⁴¹ In 1921 and 1922 millet channeled through Changchun provided between one-quarter and one-third of the total amount of millet that Dalian exported, as well as about one-fifth of all Manchurian exports of millet. Mantetsu shomubu chōsaka, *Manshū awa ni kansuru chōsa*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1925, pp. 62-63, 91-111.

⁴² Kuroda, *Manshū kiyō*, vol. 2, p. 132, *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, 1942, p. 1, and Mantetsu rinji keizai chōsa i'inkai, *Manshū juyō toshi no mokuzai jukyū jōkyō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1930, pp. 244-276. The latter source indicates that by 1930, Andong and Jilin were the largest regional collection points for lumber in Manchuria (1,789,000 and 1,200,000 *roku*, respectively), followed by Mukden (583,000), Dalian (528,000), Changchun (345,000), and Harbin (325,000). A *roku* is about five bushels, or ten cubic feet.

⁴³ Mantetsu rinji keizai chōsa i'inkai, *Manshū juyō toshi no mokuzai jukyū jōkyō*, pp. 274-276.

⁴⁴ Mantetsu sōmubu chōsaka, *Minami Manshū ni okeru sekitangyō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1930, pp. 43-45. By 1939 there were four coal mines in Changchun county outside the capital city. *Manshūkoku kōgyō kantoku, Manshūkoku kōku*, Shinkyō: Manshū kōgyō kyōkai, 1939, pp. 33-34. Although most Manchurian mines were in southern Fengtian, gold and other minerals were available in Jilin province. See the discussion and map in Mantetsu chishitsu chōsajo, *Minami Manshū kōsanchi ichiran*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1924. Jilin's production, having grown gradually from 200 million tons in 1918 to 390 million in 1924, rose quickly to 4,700 million tons in 1928 and to 5,300 million tons in 1931. See Mantetsu shōjibu, *Manshū ni okeru tankō to sono sekitan shiba*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1933, p. 5. On increasing production as a factor of local currencies beginning in 1913, see *ibid.*, pp. 36-39.

⁴⁵ Inoue, *Chōshun enkakushi*, p. 113.

goods move north from the coasts of the Guandong peninsula, but marine products also came south from the Amur basin. From 1908 to 1926 the trade in both directions increased tenfold, as well as the seafood and fertilizer residents of Changchun itself consumed. Local fish merchants appeared accordingly, three Japanese and four Chinese shops in 1917, and five of each by 1920. After 1920 the number of Chinese merchants continued to grow, though the number of Japanese shops declined.⁴⁶

Despite minor setbacks for individual Japanese like this, on the whole Changchun developed much in the way Japanese hoped.⁴⁷ By 1930, the *fuzokuchi* was a modern town with a promising economic future. Only the growth of Chinese nationalism threatened that future, something Japanese attempted to subvert through the institution of Manchukuo.⁴⁸ The organization of the puppet state, however, was rooted in preexisting contexts. Industrialization depended upon commercialization, and the successful development of Japanese commerce in Manchuria depended upon the prior existence of an already commercialized and sufficiently monetized economy.

⁴⁶ A 22% decline in the volume of sales (51,712 to 40,552 *kan*) was evident between early 1918 and late 1926 as the total value of all fish products sold shrank by 41% (¥110,688 to ¥65,322). Since Chinese labor was less expensive than Japanese, Chinese merchants could lower prices and undercut prices in Japanese shops, especially during periods of economic downturn. Mantetsu shomubu chōsaka, *Manshū ni okeru suisanbutsu no jukyū*, pp. 293-5, 303-5. The creation of the puppet state, however, gave new life to merchants in the new capital: fourteen fish markets inhabited Yoshino-machi, the busy market area of the *fuzokuchi* founded in 1916. Unfortunately, sources do not reveal who owned what shops. Shinkyō shōkō kaigijō, *Dai Shinkyō keizai gaikan*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō shōkō kaigijō, 1937, p. 123.

⁴⁷ Japanese actually kept a close eye on Chinese merchants and labor, publishing detailed reports on numbers, costs, and locations. For an example of the former see Chōshun chōsain, *Chōshun ni okeru Kashō shiba narabi hanbai soshiki chōsa*, npl: np, 1926. For examples of Japanese studies of Chinese labor see Mantetsu shomubu chōsaka, *Manshū kōgyō rōdō jijō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1925, Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū rōdō tōsei hōsaku*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1935, and *Manshū no kūrī*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō shakai jigyō ren'aikai, 1938.

⁴⁸ Many Japanese were plainly aware of the threat posed by Chinese nationalism. An official publication noted that ultimately the origin of the Manchurian Incident involved the "reality" (*genjitsu*) of the "Chinese people's historical destiny" (*Shina minzoku no rekishiteki unmei oyobi shimei*) to throw off the leadership of Americans, English, and other foreigners. That was why Manchukuo purported to create an "ideal paradise in East Asia" (*TōA no risō teki rakudo*). Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkan somuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, p. 19.

In developing outposts like Changchun, Japanese exploited Chinese commercialization occurring previous to 1900 in response to population and other pressures. For example, not only did Changchun farmers grow soybeans for the portage-organized trading network that existed before the railways, there existed throughout Manchuria already by 1910 over 300 Chinese *hang* providing useful financial services.⁴⁹ Izumi Renji listed 29 in Changchun in 1912, dividing them into three grades, as well as other financial establishments.⁵⁰ In organizing places like the Changchun *fuzokuchi*, Japanese tapped into the burgeoning economic growth already inherent in late nineteenth century China.⁵¹

With regard to economic change, however, in one important way Japanese did help revolutionize Manchuria through places like Changchun. This was the encouragement of industrialization and its technological underpinnings—the flip side of modern architecture and urban planning. Neither side could exist without the other. While modern construction techniques required coal and industrially produced steel, the architecture and planning achieved with those capacities depended upon the overcoming of traditional forms of design dependent upon earlier physical constraints.

A 1910 report located the beginning of industrial growth in Manchuria during the late Qing, especially along the coast. With the Russian occupation of northern Manchuria, however, a second industrializing center began in Harbin. This competition induced Japanese to encourage the development of the industries of the interior, initially to process their own agricultural

⁴⁹ See also the discussion on traders. Kuroda, *Manshū kiyō*, vol. 2, pp. 138, 144-149.

⁵⁰ Izumi Renji, *Chōshun jijō*, pp. 95-104. He also divided a number of merchants within the old town into eight grades. *Ibid.*, pp. 160-176. Chinese and Japanese merchants in the *fuzokuchi* he separated, but did not classify. *Ibid.*, pp. 181-214.

⁵¹ In addition to a large number of soybean processors, soybean oil makers, and distillers already in Changchun in 1912, Izumi noted the presence of other traditional tradesmen such as brickmakers and tanners. *Ibid.*, pp. 219-233.

goods.⁵² Changchun was no exception: before the Japanese arrival Chinese manufacturers produced only soybean oil and liquor (*gaoliang*).⁵³ With the *fuzokuchi*, Changchun soon had not only newer distilleries but also a plant producing bone manure.⁵⁴ Japanese also built a *shōyu* (soy sauce) factory.⁵⁵

Other early industries depended on processing goods produced locally for export, such as textiles. The Changchun *fuzokuchi* quickly became the most important market for the gathering and spinning of cotton north of Mukden, producing more than 10,000 bales (*kōri*) of thread a year.⁵⁶ Changchun's first cotton cloth mill appeared in 1913, just in time to take advantage of the opportunity for growth when war broke out in Europe.⁵⁷ Before long, factories in Changchun were exporting cotton thread and cloth to Dalian, Mukden, Shanghai, and even Japan.⁵⁸ This fed the local knitted goods industry—four factories appeared in the old city and the *shangbu* between 1921 and 1925.⁵⁹ This eventually encouraged more complex forms of manufacturing. By 1933 Shinkyō had fourteen cotton textile factories.⁶⁰

⁵² Kuroda discusses early industrialization in detail in Kuroda, *Manshū kiyō*, vol. 2, pp. 123-38.

⁵³ Shinkyō shōkō kaigijo, *Dai Shinkyō keizai gaikan*, p. 139.

⁵⁴ Mantetsu chōsaka, *Minami Manshū ni okeru Nippon no keizai teki seiryoku*, pp. 36. Changchun witnessed the founding of seven *gaoliang* distilleries in 1912, 1914, 1920, 1922 (two), 1924, and 1925. Mantetsu sōmubu chōsaka, *Manshū ni okeru kōryō shujō zōgyō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1930, pp. 89-93. A 1933 report noted nine distilleries, only five of which were of the first seven. In comparison, in 1933 Mukden had fourteen distilleries, and Jilin five. (Manshūkoku) Zaiseibu, *Manshūkoku jōzōgyō chōsasho*, npl: 1934, pp. 116, 133-4.

⁵⁵ Shinkyō shōkō kaigijo, *Dai Shinkyō keizai gaikan*, p. 139.

⁵⁶ Mantetsu shomubu chōsaka, *Manshū ni okeru bōsekigyō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1923, p. 186. A 1931 publication noted three cotton thread factories in Changchun and four producing cotton cloth. Mantetsu sōmubu chōsaka, *Manshū no sen'i kōgyō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1931, pp. 33-5.

⁵⁷ Mantetsu sōseishitsu, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, vol. 3, p. 508.

⁵⁸ Izumi Renji, *Chōshun jijō*, pp. 282-286.

⁵⁹ Mantetsu shomubu chōsaka, *Manshū no meriyasu kōgyō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1929, p. 73-76.

⁶⁰ This number remained constant at least through 1941. In contrast, in that year Mukden had 69 mills, Yingkou 46 and Andong 40. Yokohama shōkin ginkō chōsaka, *Manshū mengyō no gaikan*, npl: Yokohama shōkin ginkō, 1941, p. 9. This evolution, it is important to note, was only possible given the supply created by the earlier handicraft industry. In 1931 there were 260 such locales in Changchun, more than in Mukden (174), Andong (42), Harbin (36), Yingkou (27) or even Tieling (253). Mantetsu, *Manshū no sen'i kōgyō*, p. 55.

Some industries sought to cater to the Chinese market, such as match factories, usually located outside the *fuzokuchi*. By 1929 there were four match factories in Changchun. Two were Japanese-owned and two were Swedish-Japanese joint ventures. By 1935, factories in Changchun and Jilin (city) produced 44% of the matches produced in Manchuria.⁶¹ One of the match firms was the *Nisshin matchi kabushiki kaisha*, originally a Chinese firm founded in 1906 that a Japanese firm bought in 1907. An industry that similarly exploited combustible minerals for a growing Chinese market was gunpowder. After 1918, Changchun hosted the provincial headquarters of the bureau of saltpeter and sulfur for the Zhang warlord regime.⁶²

Another industry that developed outside the *fuzokuchi* was glass manufacture. Three factories were in operation by 1923, two in the old city and one in the *shangbu*. Changchun's factories were capable of exporting ¥90,000 worth of glass annually, comparable in quality to that produced in Osaka or America.⁶³

Although not producing much in the way of industrial goods, commodities produced in Changchun were relatively diverse by the time of the Manchurian Incident (Table 8.13). The value of manufactures was not unsubstantial, totaling ¥10,766,076 in 1933 (Table 8.14). Changchun was poised for future growth. Unlike other cities in Manchukuo, however, Shinkyō did not benefit industrially from the creation of the puppet state.

⁶¹ Nearby Jilin had another branch of one of the joint ventures and three Chinese-owned factories. Mukden had only one match factory, Andong another, and Yingkou three, all of which were Chinese-owned. Izumi Renji, *Chōshun jijō*, pp. 233-236, *Mantetsu chōsaka*, *Minami Manshū ni okeru Nippon no keizai teki seiryoku*, pp. 35-6, *Mantetsu keizai chōsakai*, *Manshū kayakurui tōsei hōsaku*; *Manshū matchi kōgyō hōsaku*, npl: Mantetsu, 1935, pp. 36-7, and *Mantetsu sōseishitsu*, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, vol. 3, p. 516.

⁶² Production, however, seems to have been primarily in Jilin. *Mantetsu keizai chōsakai*, *Manshū kayakurui tōsei hōsaku*; *Manshū matchi kōgyō hōsaku*, p. 93.

⁶³ *Mantetsu shomubu chōsaka*, *Manshū ni okeru garasu kōgyō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1923, pp. 47-49, 209-210.

Although the Japanese installed heavy industry and chemical plants in Dalian, Fushun, and Anshan as a means of strengthening the puppet state, Shinkyō received initially only a cigarette factory. Cigarette production, however, climbed quickly, from 1,638 tons in 1933 to 4,355 tons in 1936.⁶⁴ At the same time, flour milling in the Shinkyō region expanded from 1,101,000 bags in 1934 to 4,934,000 bags in 1936.⁶⁵ Despite the lack of official support, the local economy continued to grow.

Table 8.13 Shinkyō's Mantetsu Exports, 1932-33

	tons			tons	
soybeans	147,870	38%	other beans	12,102	3%
<i>gaoliang</i>	37,983	10%	eggplants	11,385	3%
timber products	27,606	7%	iron and steel	4,800	1%
flax seeds	25,839	7%	cotton yarn and cloth	4,662	1%
maize	16,893	4%	livestock	3,867	1%
azuki beans	16,465	4%	total of above	324,218	83% ⁶⁶
soybean cake	14,746	4%	(total exports)	390,119	100%

Source: Mantetsu chihōbu shōkōka, *Manshū jūyō toshi shōkō benran*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1935, p. 69.⁶⁷

Although not as large a total output as Mukden or Dalian, Shinkyō's growth represented the continuing increase in importance of that city as a

⁶⁴ Shinkyō shōkō kaigijo, *Dai Shinkyō keizai gaikan*, pp. 139, 158-60.

⁶⁵ Manshūkoku jitsugyōbu rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, *Komugiko narabi ni seiko kōgyō ni kansuru chōsasho*, Shinkyō: Manshūkoku tosho kabushiki kaisha, 1937, p. 72.

⁶⁶ Missing from this total, presumably, is millet. A 1937 report indicates Changchun county produced slightly more millet than *gaoliang* in 1936. Kokumuin jitsugyōbu rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, *Nōsanbutsu bokukakugō chōsa shiryō*, Shinkyō: Manshūkoku tosho kabushiki kaisha, 1937, p. 2.

⁶⁷ These figures include only those goods shipped on the SMR. Likewise, Shinkyō's total 1932-33 imports amounted to 1,219,476 tons, the four largest categories of which were coal (41%), stone and gravel (5%), iron and steel manufactures (4%), and cement (3%). Other imports consisted of other building materials, cotton yarn and cloth, and food products. Exports along the railway to Tumen totaled 141,846 tons, consisting of mostly coal (24%) and food products, while imports from sources along that line totaled 263,771 tons, consisting of timber products (49%), soybeans, charcoal, and food products. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

regional center.⁶⁸ Shinkyō's industrial output in 1935 was more than one-fifth of the Manchukuo total.⁶⁹ Eventually, some Japanese did attempt to develop the city into a limited kind of industrial center.⁷⁰ With the securing of adequate water supplies, planners designated a special district east of the Yitong River as an industrial sector.⁷¹ By 1942 some 3,200 people were employed in heavy industry and 87,133 in light industry in the city.⁷²

Table 8.14 Shinkyō's Manufactures, 1933

	production locations	output	value	
wheat flour	3	14,845	¥2,015,909	19%
lumber	7	53,323	¥1,366,185	13%
furniture	21	—	¥1,313,027	12%
processed cereals	13	58,476	¥1,146,844	11%
soybean cake	15	14,635	¥713,967	7%
soy oil	15	2,363	¥535,402	5%
carts (and repairs)	4	—	¥504,691	5%
matches	4	64,953	¥368,204	3%
printing	14	—	¥361,048	3%
bricks	6	25,351,240	¥336,227	3%
brewing	7	14,981	¥324,643	3%
noodles	3	4,117	¥192,446	2%
soy sauce	14	—	¥141,516	1%
cotton cloth	14	56,615	¥132,160	1%
total	--	—	¥9,452,289	88%

Source: Lumber is calculated cubic meters, matches in boxes, bricks by pieces, alcohol in liters, and cotton cloth by rolls. All others are listed in tons. Mantetsu chihōbu shōkōka, *Manshū jūyō toshi shōkō benran*, pp. 70-71.

⁶⁸ In contrast, Jilin city's economic life was much smaller. Exports totaled 226,916 tons, imports 186,306 tons, and total manufactures were worth ¥722,249. Mantetsu chihōbu shōkōka, *Manshū jūyō toshi shōkō benran*, pp. 107-110.

⁶⁹ Mantetsu sōseishitsu, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, vol. 3, p. 509. Nine metal working facilities with a total capitalization of ¥487,500 dotted the city by 1935. *Ibid.*, pp. 513-514.

⁷⁰ In addition to the discussion in Chapter 6, see the Kantōgun publication, *Manshū keizai jijō an'naijo*, *Kokuto Shinkyō jijō*, Dalian: Manshū bunka kyōkai, 1933, pp. 2, 38-40.

⁷¹ Shinkyō shōkō kaigijō, *Dai Shinkyō keizai gaikan*, p. 139.

⁷² *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, pp. 48-66.

Shinkyō's role as a regional hub was particularly important. Beginning with Changchun's hinterlands, Japanese encouraged commercialization and development in an ever widening circle.⁷³ Both Mantetsu and later Manchukuo planners attempted to extend the city's reach beyond the immediately surrounding countryside.⁷⁴ At the same time, Japanese integrated the city more firmly into the developing northeast Asian transportation network. Initially focused entirely on the Yitong River, the city's enhanced railway⁷⁵, road⁷⁶, and air transport networks increasingly connected the city to the rest of Manchuria and beyond.⁷⁷ Enhancing the city's communications capacity, the *fuzokuchi* also received one of the first eight wireless transmitting facilities in Manchuria.⁷⁸

Concomitant with this growth was an expansion in energy consumption. Before the Manchurian Incident the Changchun *fuzokuchi* consumed on average 8.56% of all the coal consumed by the twelve largest Manchukuoan

⁷³ For a discussion of production of agricultural products, livestock, and timber in Changchun's hinterlands see Shinkyō shōkō kaigijō, *Dai Shinkyō keizai gaikan*, pp. 203-18, 230-2, 246-7.

⁷⁴ The line to Jilin was completed early, in 1909. Later, Mantetsu President Yamamoto Jōtarō and Zhang Zuolin agreed on October 15, 1927 to build five new rail lines, one from Changchun to Tailai, northwest of Changchun. Another of these rail lines was between Changchun and Yantongshan, about 70 miles to the southeast, completed between 1930 and 1931. Yantongshan itself sat on a separate line between Mukden and Jilin. Mantetsu chōsaka, *Chōshun-Entōsan aida tetsudō chōsa hōkokusho*, Mantetsu: Dalian, 1931. Other lines eventually led to Tumen in the northeast and Baichengzi near the border of Outer Mongolia.

⁷⁵ A Kantōgun publication emphasized the international character of the city's railway role as the knot tying together European and Asian trade, including trade from northern Korea. *Manshū keizai jijō an'naijō*, *Kokuto Shinkyō jijō*, p. 2.

⁷⁶ Eight highways radiated from Shinkyō in 1933, but four more were begun in the first five year plan. See *Manshū keizai jijō an'naijō*, *Kokuto Shinkyō jijō*, p. 2, 24-5 and Shinkyō shōkō kaigijō, *Dai Shinkyō keizai gaikan*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō shōkō kaigijō, 1937, pp. 37-8. One of these projects involved the renovation of the highway to Jilin. See Yoneda Masabumi, "Shinkyō Kitsurin kokudō kōji hōkoku," *Doboku gakkashi*, 21:11, November 1935, pp. 1611-26.

⁷⁷ With capital from Manchukuo, Mantetsu, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and others, Manchuria Airlines (*Manshū kōkū kabushiki kaisha*) began operations in 1932 connecting not only Manchurian cities but also those cities with cities in Japan and the USSR. *Manshū keizai jijō an'naijō*, *Kokuto Shinkyō jijō*, pp. 24-5 and Shinkyō shōkō kaigijō, *Dai Shinkyō keizai gaikan*, pp. 44-8.

⁷⁸ Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū tsūshin jigyō hōsaku*, npl: Mantetsu, 1936, pp. 73-77.

cities, but that figured turned to 9.6% in the year of the Manchurian incident and 12.7% in 1932.⁷⁹ Throughout this shift, Mantetsu supplied the bulk of Shinkyō's coal supplies, despite the difficulties that posed.⁸⁰

Changchun played a key role in Manchuria's electrification. An electrical plant was planned for the *fuzokuchi* from the outset. Headquartered in Dalian, the Manchurian Electric Company (*Manshū denki kabushiki kaisha*) initially operated plants in only four cities: Dalian, Mukden, Andong, and Changchun.⁸¹ While Dalian's plant began public service in 1907, Mukden's began in 1908, Changchun's in 1910, and Andong's in 1911. All depended upon coal, except for the plant in Andong which eventually also harnessed the Yalu River. Each plant functioned as a distributive node for one of four sections of Mantetsu administered territory; Changchun's district, the northern zone, ran as far south as Sipingjie, over one hundred kilometers away. The amount of electricity produced in the Changchun *fuzokuchi* was

⁷⁹ Mantetsu shōjibu, *Manshū ni okeru tankō to sono sekitan shiba*, pp. 41-42. The largest changes were for home-use and brick making. *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59. In 1929, 96,890 tons of coal were used in the home and 43,160 tons were used by industry. Changchun's two electrical plants burning 14,000 tons annually were the largest industrial consumers. Outside of coal, another 15,100 tons of other materials were consumed in Changchun homes. See Mantetsu rinji keizai chōsa i'inkai, *ManMō ni okeru kōgyōyō kajiyō nenryō juyō chōsa hōkokusho*, Mantetsu: Dalian, 1929, p. 9.

⁸⁰ Increasing coal use was despite the relatively higher expense of shipping coal from Mantetsu's main colliery in Fushun to Shinkyō, a factor that undoubtedly spurred production in other mines further north. (Shinkyō and Andong were located the furthest from Fushun, hence the higher freight rates.) Mantetsu shōjibu, *Manshū ni okeru tankō to sono sekitan shiba*, pp. 76-77, and *passim*. Nevertheless, Fushun had supplied most of Changchun's energy needs before the Manchurian Incident. In 1927, for example, Fushun provided 94,100 tons of coal to Changchun out of a total of 140,050 tons consumed. The nearby Huoshanling colliery provided another 40,500 tons. *ManMō ni okeru kōgyōyō kajiyō nenryō juyō chōsa hōkokusho*, Mantetsu: Dalian, 1929, p. 9. Both Fushun and Huoshanling were Mantetsu concerns. Total Mantetsu coal supplies to Changchun in 1926 were 159,882 tons, with another 42,561 tons arriving from other sources. By 1932 those figures were 251,263 and 69,289. Mantetsu shōjibu, *Manshū ni okeru tankō to sono sekitan shiba*, p. 41.

⁸¹ Although *Manshū denki* was actually founded in June 1926, sources often treat the initial plants as that company's forerunners.

initially second only to Dalian; not until 1920 did production in Mukden and Andong overtake that in Changchun.⁸²

Though slower, the expansion of the supply of electricity in Changchun was still substantial. Initially, a single 200 kw generator generated Changchun's supply, but that proved quickly to be insufficient and two more were added within seven months. The *fuzokuchi's* electrical plant added three 400 kw generators in 1914 and 1920, as well as two 1,000 kw generators in 1922 and 1923. Because no machines were retired, the productive capacity of the *fuzokuchi* at that point totaled 3,800 kw.⁸³ There was some excess, however, allowing the *fuzokuchi* to supply Kuanchengzi beginning in 1910, Gongzhuling in 1929, and Sipingjie in 1931. At that time the plant powered 41,277 lights within the *fuzokuchi* and 698 outside. In comparison, Mukden's plant in 1931 supplied 78,122 lights within that *fuzokuchi* (4,682 without), and Andong's 54,607 lights within the *fuzokuchi* (19,563 without).⁸⁴ With the establishment of the capital, Shinkyō's electric capacity expanded again, acquiring a 3,000 kw generator from Andong in 1933, a 7,000 kw generator in 1934, a 5,000 kw generator in 1935, and a 14,000 kw generator in 1936. Plans for purchasing a 15,000 kw generator were also being laid.⁸⁵ Shinkyō's electric

⁸² Despite declining costs, electricity was marginally but consistently more expensive outside Dalian, most of all in Changchun. Mantetsu shomubu chōsaka, *Minami Manshū kōgyō jijō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1929 (reprint, originally 1926), pp. 32-37 and Mantetsu denki kabushiki kaisha, *Sōritsugo gokanen wo keika shitaru minami Manshū denki kabushiki kaisha no gyōseki*, np: Mantetsu, 1931, p. 12 and *passim*.

⁸³ *Manshū denki kabushiki kaisha chōsakyoku*, *Manshū ni okeru denki kyōkyū jigyō gaisetsu*, Shinkyō: Manshū denki, 1937, p. 112.

⁸⁴ The plant in Dalian was Mantetsu's largest, supplying 260,131 lights. Mantetsu denki kabushiki kaisha, *Sōritsugo gokanen wo keika shitaru minami Manshū denki kabushiki kaisha no gyōseki*, np: Mantetsu, 1931.

⁸⁵ Not all of Changchun's generators were necessarily of Japanese make. While four of the ones listed were from Mitsubishi and one was from Hitachi, the makers of three others were "A.S.E.A.," "W.H.," and "Staaru." *Manshū denki kabushiki kaisha chōsakyoku*, *Manshū ni okeru denki kyōkyū jigyō gaisetsu*, Shinkyō: Manshū denki, 1937, pp. 66, 111-122.

output thus reached 18,400 kw in 1935 and 37,700 kw in 1937.⁸⁶ With regard to distribution, *Manshū denki* divided the capital into five zones: the old city, the capital core, a zone centered on a village east of the SMR in the process of becoming a suburb, a zone centered on another village (presumably to the southeast or south), and one zone for the *fuzokuchi*, Kuanchengzi, and a third village just to the north of the railway station, yet another suburb in formation.⁸⁷

The first plant in Changchun city began operations in 1911 using either a 200 kw or a 250 kw generator bought from a concern in Shanghai, enough to supply some 5,000 lights. When this proved insufficient, the city bought electricity from the *fuzokuchi*. In 1916, the first world war prevented the acquisition of a 500 kw generator from Europe, so instead a 300 kw generator was eventually purchased from General Electric. Adding a 500 kw generator in 1926, the *Changchun diandeng chang* was by 1930 providing 1,000 kw, enough to power 20,000 lights using 120 horsepower, and had plans to acquire a 1,500 kw generator because of continuing energy insufficiency.⁸⁸ A 1929 report noted more factories in Changchun used electric than steam power.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ *Manshū denki kabushiki kaisha chōsakyoku, Manshū ni okeru denki jigyō gaisetsu*, Dalian: *Manshū denki*, 1935, p. 108, *Manshū denki kabushiki kaisha chōsakyoku, Manshū ni okeru denki kyōkyū jigyō gaisetsu*, p. 112. A hydroelectric power plant on the Songhuajiang containing eight turbines also produced 70,000 kw in 1935. *Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin congshu bianjibu, Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin*, Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1991, vol. 1, p. 384.

⁸⁷ Most of Manchukuo's major cities were divided into five or six zones. *Manshū denki kabushiki kaisha chōsakyoku, Manshū ni okeru denki kyōkyū jigyō gaisetsu*, pp. 77-79.

⁸⁸ A different source suggests that in the city instead there was a 375 kva and a 625 kva generator. *Mantetsu denki kabushiki kaisha, ManMō ni okeru Shina gawa denki jigyō gaisetsu*, npl: Mantetsu, 1930, pp. 28-29. In comparison, the first plant in Jilin (city) opened in 1907, powered by a Siemens 250 horsepower generator. By 1930 the *Jilin diandeng chang* operated one 1875 kva and two 625 KVA generators, enough to power 40,000 lights at 260 horsepower. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31. Another source lists Jilin having by 1935 one 1,500 kw generator and two 500 kw generators with plans to acquire a 3,000 kva generator. *Manshū denki kabushiki kaisha chōsakyoku, Manshū ni okeru denki jigyō gaisetsu*, Dalian: *Manshū denki*, 1935, p. 116.

⁸⁹ It also noted that while there were ten that used electricity and six that used steam, twelve relied upon human power. *Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku, Chōshun jijō*, npl: Gaimushō, 1929, pp. 76-8.

Electric energy consumption in Manchuria as a whole increased a thousand-fold between 1907 and 1936, from 1,050,000 to 1,350,506,875 kilowatt-hours.⁹⁰ Despite that growth, as a rule energy shortages plagued Manchuria's and later Manchukuo's growth.⁹¹ Figures for the production of electricity in Shinkyō agree. The 1923—before substantial exports of electricity south—figure for kilowatts produced in the *fuzokuchi* represented 5% of the total produced by Japanese in Manchuria for that year. The 1930 figure for Changchun city represents 1.8% of the entire production of Chinese plants in Manchuria. In 1936, despite office construction and the expansion of productive capacities, the Shinkyō office of *Manshū denki* reported 75,487,350 kilowatt-hours, or 5.6% of the total consumed in Manchuria.⁹²

Perhaps the most successful case of industrial development in Changchun and Shinkyō was the construction industry. Large-scale Japanese investment and expansion enabled Japanese construction firms in Manchuria to find near constant work.⁹³ Some success stories have been alluded to in the chapters

⁹⁰ Japanese and Chinese initially consumed about equal amounts, but by 1933 Japanese consumed about six times as much electricity as Chinese. *Manshū denki kabushiki kaisha chōsakyoku, Manshū ni okeru denki kyōkyū jigyō gaisetsu*, pp. 15-16.

⁹¹ On Manchukuo see the discussion in Kawabata Sadao, "Denryoku fuzoku no fu'an to sono taisaku," *Manshū dengyō kabushiki kaisha chōsa shiryō*, 2: 2, April 1940, pp. 63-74.

⁹² By 1936, *Manshū denki* and its related firms produced only 43.4% of all the electricity in Manchukuo. *Manshū denki* did not, however, list any firms but their own producing energy in Shinkyō, having absorbed *Changchun diandeng chang*. Their 1936 figures also list only one city providing more kilowatt-hours than Shinkyō: Dalian (319,881,933). Because Dalian also supplied much of the Guandong Peninsula, however, this figure cannot be considered as representing only that city's needs. After Shinkyō were Andong (68,531,371), Harbin (64,647,799), Yingkou (18,955,860), and the Mukden branches of *Manshū denki* (5,869,000). This last figure is surprising, but that city imported electricity from a number of outside sources. *Manshū denki kabushiki kaisha chōsakyoku, Manshū ni okeru denki kyōkyū jigyō gaisetsu*, pp. 12-14, 18, 21-24.

⁹³ Foreign construction firms made few appearances in Manchuria—not at all in Changchun—the most conspicuous being the George A. Fuller Company of the Orient, builder of Mantetsu's Dalian Hospital (1925). Fuller was also prominent in Japan as builder of Tokyo's famous *Maru biru* and adjacent post office. See Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta nihonjin kenchikuka*, pp. 84-90. Japanese had great expectations for this hospital, even before it was built. See Ishiwara Asahara, "Fūraa no Manshūrai ni tsuite," *MKZ* 2:6, June 1922, pp. 14-18. This hopefulness resulted from a Japanese warm reception of the 'modern' style buildings in Tokyo, such as the *Maru biru*. See Nakazawa Kiyoshi, "Teito saikin no kenchikukai wo miru," *MKZ* 3:2, February

above, such as Nakamura Yoshihei, whose construction firm based in Seoul built the Changchun branches of the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Korea. His firm also built banks elsewhere in Manchuria like the Dalian branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank. Other firms enjoyed smaller success, such as the Sawai gumi, builder of not only Changchun's Yamato Hotel (1909) but the Renaissance style Mukden Station (1910).⁹⁴ Mase Engineering built the headquarters for the Changchun-Jilin Railway, just outside the old city's east gate.⁹⁵

The construction of Manchukuo's new capital required the participation of numerous Japanese construction firms.⁹⁶ Some participated in only a few projects, such as the Tatsumura gumi which built the Mantetsu Company Club (1936) and the Nishimatsu gumi which built Shinkyō Engineering College (1940). Some collaborated, such as the Maruyama gumi and the Hoshino gumi on the first government apartment buildings (1932). Another example of collaborative effort involved the new Mantetsu offices in Shinkyō (1936) by the Hasegawa gumi, the Ōkura gumi, and the Zenitaka gumi. Of course, these firms also worked alone. Ōkura, for example, built the multi-spired Japanese consular offices in Andong.⁹⁷

1923, pp. 53-62. Despite the paucity of projects in Manchuria, Fuller's Dalian manager praised Japanese construction, although he did recommend that Japanese study foreign techniques further. See Wilbur S. Sample, "What is the Foreign Contractor's Opinion of Local Buildings and Conditions?" *MKZ* 5:1, January 1925, pp. 17-24.

⁹⁴ The following partial list of structures and the firms that built them is taken primarily from Manshikai, ed., *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnen shi*, supplement, pp. 300-15.

⁹⁵ *MKZ* 5:6, June 1925.

⁹⁶ The 1936 annual report of the Shimizu gumi listed 108 competitors operating in Manchuria, 57 of which operated in Shinkyō—although the areas of operation were not listed for 18 firms, 11 of which were headquartered in the capital. Of those 108 firms, 45 were headquartered in Dalian, 26 in Shinkyō, 19 in Mukden, 4 each in Yingkou and Andong, 2 each in Fushun and Harbin, and one each in Jilin, Anshan, Tieling, and Port Arthur. Two were in other cities. The Jilin firm is listed only as operating in Shinkyō. Adding Shimizu would make 109 firms total. Shimizu gumi Manshū shiten, *Nenkan*, npl: Shimizu gumi Manshū shiten, 1936, pp. 53-61.

⁹⁷ *MKZ* 5:11, November 1925.

Several firms received larger contracts for work in the new capital. The Fukui-Takanashi gumi built Shinkyō's First and Second Government Buildings in 1932. The Ōbayashi gumi built the Kantōgun headquarters (1934), the Hall of State (1936), the Shinkyō Marine Insurance (*kaijō*) building (1938), and the Bank of Manchukuo (1938). The Takaoka gumi built the headquarters for the Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (1935) and the offices of the Guandong Peninsula government (1935). Takaoka also built the new Mitsui Building (1936) in Mukden.

Two firms in particular were well-known for building throughout Manchuria before building in the new capital. The Hasegawa gumi, having built the Second Dalian Wharf Office Building (1923) went on to build the Mukden Police headquarters (1936) as well as the Manchukuo Ministry of Transportation (1937) and the Fourteenth Government Building (1942), adjacent the Hall of State, in Shinkyō.

The Shimizu gumi was another such organization. Founded in 1804, for two centuries this prestigious company had been involved in many of Japan's more innovative construction efforts. Once a traditional construction firm, having even worked on Edo castle in 1838, Shimizu began experimenting with foreign techniques and styles as early as 1861, working often for Mitsui. It was Shimizu that built the Mitsui House, a bank, in 1871, one of the first hybrid structures in the *giyōfu* ("pseudo-Western style").⁹⁸ By the turn of the century, Shimizu was building banks, hotels, mansions, bridges, and factories in European styles across Japan. Many are justly famous, such as Tatsuno Kingo's Bank of Japan (1896). Other notable Shimizu endeavors included the engineering department (1922) and Yasuda Hall (*kōtō*) (1925) at Tokyo Imperial University, as well as buildings on the campus of Kyoto Imperial

⁹⁸ See Chapter 4.

University.⁹⁹ Shimizu also designed and built subway stations in Tokyo and Osaka. A structure of significance for this study was the Gunjin Kaikan (Soldier's Hall), near the imperial palace in Tokyo's Kudan district, built in 1934 with an 'imperial crown' (*teikan yōshiki*).¹⁰⁰

Shimizu expanded with the Japanese empire, building in Korea, Taiwan, and eventually Manchuria, opening a Dalian office in 1915.¹⁰¹ In Dalian, Shimizu built the Dalian City Hall (1919), the Dalian Wharf Office Building (1920), the Dalian Liaodong Hotel (1928), and the Dalian Shrine (*jinja*) (1931). The latter was designed by the *Manshū kenchiku kyōkai'in*, the group that published the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*. Several of the others were designed by Sōga Kensuke, later head of the Capital Construction Bureau in Shinkyō, and other Mantetsu architects. Outside Dalian, Shimizu's structures were also prominent, including such diverse structures as the Fushun Hospital (1926), the Shōwa Steel factory (1927) in Anshan, and the Mukden Yamato Hotel (1927). One particularly striking structure Shimizu built was the Jilin Eastern (Ch, *Dōngfāng*; J, *Tōhō*) Hospital (1922), a structure that attempted to blend circular Chinese temple construction with modern architectural techniques.¹⁰²

With the institution of Manchukuo, Shimizu found the economic conditions to be quite favorable, subsequently becoming involved in a host of projects across the new state. Renaming the Dalian office the "Manchurian"

⁹⁹ The clock tower of Tōdai's Yasuda Hall is perhaps the university's most recognizable symbol.

¹⁰⁰ Shimizu kensetsu hyakugojūnen shi hensan i'inkai, *Shimizu kensetsu hyakugojūnen shi*, Tokyo: Shimizu kensetsu kabushiki kaisha, 1953. Another structure with an imperial crown that Shimizu built was a new state museum in Kyoto, the Tairei kinen Kyōto bijutsukan (1933).

¹⁰¹ Shimizu opened branch offices in the Pescadores in 1902 and temporarily in Taipei in 1928 after building a military airfield on Taiwan, begun in 1926.

¹⁰² See MKZ 4:2, February 1924 and Nishizawa, *Umi wo watatta nihonjin kenchikuka*, pp. 73-4.

branch office (*Manshū shiten*) in 1932, the corporation opened new offices in Shinkyō in 1934, ultimately making that their main office in Manchuria in 1938.¹⁰³ Shimizu's more prominent structures in Manchukuo included Mukden's new City Hall (1937) and the Manchukuo Ministry of the Economy (1938) in Shinkyō, the latter designed by Sōga Kensuke and the Capital Construction Bureau. In the capital Shimizu also built the 1939 Tōtaku Building, the headquarters for the *Tōyō takushoku* (Colonial Development) Corporation, and hoped to become involved in national railway expansion, anticipated in 1936 to expand by 10,000 kilometers.¹⁰⁴

It is surprising that Shimizu did not build more in Shinkyō.¹⁰⁵ After a major reorganization of personnel in Tokyo in 1929, none other than Sano Toshikata became one of the firm's leading executives, recommended by the influential Shibuzawa Eiichi. Coming in at perhaps the most difficult economic period Shimizu had yet experienced, owing to the global depression, Sano promoted 'rationalism' (*gōrishugi*) with regard to corporate personnel and oversaw their reorganization. Sano immediately also began to arrange for government building contracts, particularly with the Home Ministry.¹⁰⁶ This could only help Shimizu later—with the installation of the

¹⁰³ Shimizu incorporated its Manchurian office as a legal Manchukuo corporation in 1940. At the same time, Shimizu also opened other offices in China: in Shanghai (1938), Nanjing (1942), and Hankou (1942). The effort to open a Tianjin office was interrupted by the outbreak of war in 1937. Shimizu kensetsu hyakugojūnen shi hensan i'inkai, *Shimizu kensetsu hyakugojūnen shi*, pp. 136, 147. Although this text mentions some of the early structures Shimizu built in Manchuria, it ignores many of the later ones.

¹⁰⁴ The corporation also hoped to expand in north China. Shimizu gumi Manshū shiten, *Nenkan*, 1936, pp. 39, 43-44.

¹⁰⁵ Shimizu did, however, oversee the design of water supply for the Guandong Peninsula. See Nishimura Kūichi, "Manshū hitotoku," *TK* 18: 12, December 1935, p. 82.

¹⁰⁶ Shimizu also built a number of department stores at this time, working for Mitsubishi, Shirokiya, Matsuya, Daiwa, and Daimaru. Shimizu kensetsu hyakugojūnen shi hensan i'inkai, *Shimizu kensetsu hyakugojūnen shi*, pp. 112-113, 121, 124-125, 147-148.

Puyi regime members of the Japanese Home Ministry especially stocked Manchukuo's administrative apparatus.¹⁰⁷

Firms like these profited greatly from the creation of Manchukuo. Much of the Japanese official investment in the new state went into construction, initially including both new and renovation work (Tables 8.15 and 8.16).¹⁰⁸ Of those expenses, Shinkyō's share was large, averaging about eighteen percent of total construction costs in Manchukuo between 1932 and 1938. In contrast, Mukden received about thirteen percent of all official construction expenses and Dalian about ten percent (Table 8.17).

Table 8.15 Manchukuo Expenditures and Construction Expenses, 1932-39

	(a) Total <u>Expenditures</u>	(b) New <u>Construction</u>	(c) Renovation <u>Costs</u>	(d) All <u>Construction</u>	b/d %	b/a %	d/a %
1932	¥150,822,752	¥1,600,000	¥900,000	¥2,500,000	64.0	1.1	1.7
1933	¥149,169,178	¥2,292,500	¥657,000	¥2,950,000	77.7	1.5	2.0
1934	¥188,725,085	¥6,587,407	¥408,837	¥6,996,244	94.2	3.5	3.7
1935	¥104,998,700	¥3,404,793	¥750,509	¥4,155,302	81.9	3.2	4.0
1936	¥219,405,000	¥7,778,002	¥997,665	¥8,775,667	88.6	3.5	4.0
1937	¥245,098,760	¥9,106,392	¥222,905	¥9,329,297	97.6	3.7	3.8
1938	¥304,555,000	¥16,724,592	¥140,000	¥16,864,592	99.2	5.5	5.5
1939	¥403,377,655	¥21,562,583	¥115,000	¥21,677,583	99.5	5.3	5.4
Total	¥1,769,152,130	¥69,056,269	¥4,192,416	¥73,248,685	94.2	3.9	4.1

Source: Kokumuin sōmuchō, *Manshūkoku seifu kōhō* and *Seifukōhō*, in Nishizawa, " 'Manshūkoku' no kensetsu jigyō," p. 423.

These figures, however, relate only some of the construction costs in Shinkyō. In addition to government offices, paid for by official expenditures, offices for many of Manchukuo's most significant firms also appeared in the

¹⁰⁷ Nishizawa, " 'Manshūkoku' no kensetsu jigyō," pp. 381-388.

¹⁰⁸ Until permanent buildings could be constructed and moved into, initially a fair amount of renovation work was required. Puyi, for example, never lived in any section of the new palace, preferring to stay in the former home of a wealthy merchant in the former *shangbu*.

new capital, paid for with corporate funds.¹⁰⁹ Mangyō, for example, opened its headquarters adjacent Mudan Park on Xingren Dalu, east of the palace and Hall of State but one block west of Datong Dajie. Alternatively, firms maintaining head offices elsewhere eventually opened branch offices in Shinkyō. This resulted in firms representing every major industry from mining and metalworking to chemicals and textiles appearing in Shinkyō.¹¹⁰

Table 8.16 Official Construction Projects in Shinkyō, 1933-1937

	<u>1933</u>	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u>	<u>Total</u>
state offices	5	2	5	2	3	17
other offices	2	9	7	68	3	88
special residences	547	971	1,225	258	...	3,001
general	160	795	1,325	1,342	1,928	5,550
to rent	...	185	538	344	...	1,076

Source: Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkan somuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, Shinkyō: Manshū jijō an'naisho, 1940, pp. 14-5. Figures for offices are the number of buildings, figures for other categories count the number of units (literally "doors"). A missing figure for certain categories means that for that year the count of that category was merged into the general category.

Corporate construction joined official construction to fuel Shinkyō's construction boom, multiplying the economic impact of government-sponsored construction and attracting even more attention to business opportunities in the new capital. Onoda Cement, for example, supplemented its Dalian facility by opening production in Anshan in 1933 in order to better supply demand in central Manchuria. Onoda went on to open other plants in

¹⁰⁹ To get a sense of the sheer number of corporations that set up in the capital, it is instructive to examine a list of early Manchukuo firms, such as is Mantetsu keikakubu gyōmuka, *Manshū jūyō kaisha teikanshū*, Dalian: Manshū keizai kenkyūkai, 1934.

¹¹⁰ See, for example, the 1944 listing of the members of the Manchuria Association of Mining and Industry in Manshū kōkō gijitsu'in kyōkai, *Manshū kōkō nenkan Kōtoku jūichi nenpan*, Shinkyō: TōA bunka toshokan kabushiki kaisha, 1944, pp. 303-469.

Harbin and Mudanjiang.¹¹¹ Shimizu's annual report noted that despite these new plants, Manchukuo continued to import cement from Onoda's plants in Korea.¹¹²

Table 8.17 Municipal Construction in Manchukuo, 1932-1938

	<u>1932</u>	<u>1933</u>	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>
Shinkyō	6,796,000	16,309,800	33,265,490	48,941,332
Dalian	2,815,000	13,239,150	17,589,960	19,710,564
Mukden	5,796,000	14,412,940	20,522,589	18,328,014
Mudanjiang	—	—	—	—
Anshan	300,000	3,627,900	6,133,147	2,099,454
Fushun	553,000	1,291,830	2,353,755	5,505,247
Harbin	—	3,665,940	11,249,233	17,764,572
Qiqihar	—	2,476,190	5,434,919	9,660,402
Jilin	—	—	—	—
Jinxian	—	—	—	—
Andong	621,000	1,447,140	954,042	2,389,707
Others	40,784,500	46,609,020	57,129,693	25,472,138
Total	57,566,500	104,074,010	154,632,828	149,871,432

	<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u>	<u>1938</u>	<u>Total</u>
Shinkyō	24,840,000	29,223,000	38,227,000	197,602,622
Dalian	18,580,000	14,605,000	17,471,000	104,010,674
Mukden	10,038,000	21,774,000	45,600,000	136,471,543
Mudanjiang	10,545,000	6,116,000	6,319,000	—
Anshan	2,617,000	4,464,000	17,673,000	36,914,501
Fushun	5,594,000	5,748,000	9,841,000	30,886,832
Harbin	6,550,000	4,296,000	10,008,000	53,533,745
Qiqihar	4,751,000	2,178,000	3,039,000	27,539,511
Jilin	1,110,000	1,642,000	2,307,000	—
Jinxian	2,233,000	1,019,000	3,306,000	—
Andong	1,292,000	843,000	966,000	8,512,889
Others	47,524,000	70,075,000	138,072,000	—
Total	135,674,000	161,982,000	292,829,000	1,056,629,770

Source: All figures are in yuan. Figures for 1932 to 1935 are from Shimizu gumi Manshū shiten, *Nenkan*, 1936, p. 36. Figures for 1936 to

¹¹¹ Profits from the Dalian plant grew from ¥240,000 in 1931 to ¥674,000 in 1937. Anshan's production began in 1934 with profits of ¥288,000. In 1937 they remained ¥95,000. *Nihon keizai shi kenkyūjo, Onoda semento hyakunen shi*, Tokyo: Onoda semento kabushiki kaisha, 1981, pp. 345-348, 359-366, 391-8.

¹¹² Shimizu gumi Manshū shiten, *Nenkan*, 1936, pp. 140-143.

1938 are from *Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1939*, Tokyo: The Herald Press, p. 107. Totals were not calculated for Mudanjiang, Jilin, Jinxian and others because while in the first set of data the data for those cities are mixed together but in the second set of data they are separate, rendering total comparisons of those categories impracticable. The data for Harbin and Qiqihar are calculable because Japanese did not gain control of these cities until 1932.

Nor was it only Japanese production that expanded. Constructing the new capital promoted local production by non-Japanese as well—new sites sprouted around the capital to produce brick and other materials, as well as a twenty-five kilometer light railway to haul quarried stone.¹¹³ Local mines around Shinkyō and Jilin supplied the capital's construction needs of aggregate. By 1935, nine timber merchants supplied the capital with lumber.¹¹⁴

Companies like Shimizu took advantage of local sources. For example, fifty-four percent of Shimizu's Manchurian office 1935 total purchases of tile—worth ¥8,5710.04—came from the *Xinjing jiancaishe*.¹¹⁵ Of course, many manufactured goods had still to be imported for the construction industry, but the quick development of local sources is significant.¹¹⁶ The

¹¹³ The local production of bricks, for example, jumped from 15 million red and 35 million black bricks a year before the Manchurian Incident to 170 million red and almost 80 million black bricks a year after the Manchurian Incident. For this and a good description of Chinese brick production see Shimizu gumi Manshū shiten, *Nenkan*, 1936, pp. 153-161. For a map of red brick production areas northeast of the Changchun *fuzokuchi* along the Yitong River, as well as a map of the light rail system within Shinkyō, see Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 113-114. The ownership of the light rail line is not clear.

¹¹⁴ On supplies of aggregate see Shimizu gumi Manshū shiten, *Nenkan*, 1936, p. 166. On lumber see *ibid.*, pp. 180-181. In contrast, Dalian had 10 lumber merchants, Mukden 5, Jilin 7, Harbin 6, and Andong 4.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 126. (*Xinjing* is the Chinese pronunciation of Shinkyō.)

¹¹⁶ For a partial list of imported manufactures for the construction industry see Shimizu gumi Manshū shiten, *Nenkan*, 1936, pp. 240-246.

speedy energizing of a local economy made it possible to support a rapidly growing population.¹¹⁷

In addition to encouraging the growth of the construction industry, the creation of Shinkyō impelled the growth of three additional industries in the city. The largest of these three was the bureaucracy, as Shinkyō witnessed an explosion in its population of bureaucrats. With the expansion of the official state apparatus, increasing numbers of official bureaucrats were recruited to look after burgeoning state interests, but an increasing number also appeared in the new capital to attend the needs of individual firms. Some, like the *Manshū takushoku kabushiki kaisha* (Manchurian Colonial Corporation) were semi-private semi-official concerns that promoted still more development. From its headquarters a few blocks west of the Mangyō offices, the *Manshū takushoku kabushiki kaisha* supervised further demographic growth throughout Manchuria, including the creation of new towns near the capital itself.¹¹⁸ To attend the needs of this enlarging bureaucracy there also appeared a growing hotel and restaurant industry.¹¹⁹

The second new industry appearing in the capital resulting from the transformation of Changchun into an administrative center was publishing. Before the Manchurian Incident the vast majority of Mantetsu and other Manchurian publications came out of Dalian. After 1931 that industry

¹¹⁷ The development of the construction industry was part of the general process of commercialization. As a point of comparison, workers in the construction industry in Germany expanded from about 10 to almost 16 percent of the total labor force, from one-half million in 1875 to 1.7 million in 1907. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*, New York: Vintage Books, 1987, p. 115. For an approach emphasizing the role of local wage labor in the construction industry as central to the urbanization process, see Linda Clarke, *Building Capitalism: Historical Change and the Labour Process in the Production of the Built Environment*, London: Routledge, 1992.

¹¹⁸ Not only Japanese but Koreans were encouraged to migrate to Manchuria. *Manshūkoku tsūshinsha, Manshū kaitaku nenkan*, Shinkyō, *Manshūkoku tsūshinsha*, 1942.

¹¹⁹ In 1933 there were two premier (*toku*) hotels, ten first-class, eight second-class, and eight third-class hotels in Shinkyō. *Manshū keizai jijō an'naijō, Kokuto Shinkyō jijō*, Dalian: *Manshū bunka kyōkai*, 1933, pp. 53-4.

gradually shifted to Shinkyō, although it never completely abandoned Dalian. Printing companies similarly moved to the capital.¹²⁰

The third entirely new industry was the film industry. To the west of Huanglong Park sat the offices of the new Manchurian studios.¹²¹ From these studios Japanese used this new and modern tool of propaganda to woo the hearts of Chinese. One particular tool was Yamaguchi Yoshiko, who made a triumphant debut in 1938. Born of Japanese parents in China, she ultimately adopted a Chinese name, Li Xianglan. Another tool was the film documentary, of which the studio produced many, such as the *Manchurian Movie News* (*Manshū nyūsu eiga*). Short documentaries relayed the highlights of a host of official ceremonies, as well as the visits of foreign officials, public rallies, and sports events. Some focused on particular aspects of Manchukuo's culture, such as Muslim or other associations.¹²²

Changchun's economic significance never matched that of some of the other cities of Manchuria, especially that of Mukden.¹²³ Unsurprisingly, Japanese analyses of Manchukuo's economic potential continued to favor the

¹²⁰ There were a number of publishers in Shinkyō, though perhaps the most commonly seen publisher outside official ones was the *Manshūkoku tosho kabushiki kaisha*, the offices of which were located in the former *shangbu*.

¹²¹ Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1938, p. 109 and Mantetsu sōkyoku Hōten tetsudō kyoku ryokaku gakari, *Shinkyō*, Mukden: Mantetsu sōkyoku Hōten tetsudō kyoku ryokaku gakari, 1941, p. 5.

¹²² Hu Chang and Gu Quan, *Manying—Guoce dianying mianmian guan*, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju chubanshe, 1990. See also Yamaguchi Takeshi, *Maboroshi no kinema Man'ei: Amakasu Masahiko to katsudō gunzō*, Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1989 as well as extant reels in film archives.

¹²³ In comparison, the Mukden *fuzokuchi*, having in 1907 a Japanese population of 907 and a Chinese population of 939, grew to a total of 42,786 people in 1930. Some 21,431 were Japanese, about double the Japanese population of the Changchun *fuzokuchi* at that time. This trend continued despite Changchun's becoming the capital of Manchukuo. In 1937 there were 70,073 Japanese out of a total of 93,530 in the Mukden *fuzokuchi*. Growth in Changchun, however, outpaced other areas like the port of Andong. In 1909, 836 Japanese out of a total of 1,326 called that *fuzokuchi* home, numbers that grew, respectively to 10,756 and 61,719 in 1930, and 16,271 and 77,274 in 1937. Mantetsu chihōbu, *Chihō keiei tōkei nenpō*, pp. 37, 42. An instructive comparison of Changchun's development with other cities is Mantetsu kōgyōbu shōkōka, *Minami Manshū juyō toshi to sono haigochi*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1927 and Sasaki Kōsaborō, ed., *Hōten keizai sanjūnenshi*, Mukden: Hōten shōkō kōkai, 1940.

southern central region.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, even if Changchun did not become the major commercial center of Manchuria—or of Manchukuo—it did become an influential urban center in other ways, and as such the city furthered the transformation of Manchurian society as a whole. Japanese intentions for the development of Manchuria and Manchukuo always involved more than economic issues.

Societal Transformations

Population growth and economic development were perhaps two of the more obvious dimensions inherent in the transformation of a peripheral Chinese locale into an administrative nexus dominated by a foreign power. These changes, however, were not the only kinds of change taking place. Just as new techniques in urban planning and architecture transformed the composition and ultimately the meanings of the Manchurian built environment, new but concomitant forms of social organization transformed the life experiences of those who inhabited Changchun and Shinkyō. Among the various innovations the Japanese modeled in Manchuria, three in particular made life explicitly more modern: new considerations of health, education, and leisure.

Health matters were constant concerns of Japanese in Manchuria, insuring the spread of contemporary notions of standards and sanitation. Given Gotō Shimpei's background, it is not surprising that sanitary concerns were part of the original planning of the various *fuzokuchi*. Arriving in Changchun in

¹²⁴ In part this was because Japanese occupied southern Manchuria first, but the sheer volume of analyses suggests an entrenched inertia. A 1940 report listed 858 studies of the geology of Fengtian Province, including several in foreign languages. At the same time a total of 202 studies examined Jilin Province but still only 19 for Heilongjiang. *Manshū teikoku chishitsu chōsajo*, *Chishitsu chōsajo sanjūichi nen shi*, Shinkyō: *Manshū teikoku chishitsu chōsajo*, 1940. Despite this fixed vision, the extractive industries did manage to gradually expand north. *Manshūjijō an'naijo*, *Manshū kōsan gaiyō*, Shinkyō: *Manshūjijō an'naijo*, 1940.

1907, Japanese instigated road inspections of carts passing through the *fuzokuchi* and contracted out to have garbage and sewage removed from the *fuzokuchi* for ¥230 a month. Complaints from personnel stationed in the *fuzokuchi* eventually led to direct management of waste removal in 1911.¹²⁵ The regular sprinkling of water on the streets of the *fuzokuchi* to prevent the spread of contagions began in 1910 at a monthly cost of ¥129. By 1921 the annual amount of water sprayed exceeded 15,000 *koku*, and 25,477 tons by 1935.¹²⁶ Inspections of the quality of drinking water began in 1907.¹²⁷

Vaccinations of Japanese and Chinese began in 1909, occurring in the spring and again in the fall. In 1917 officials began vaccinating people outside the *fuzokuchi*.¹²⁸ Japanese also took measures to contain contagions once broken out—perhaps the first time was during the cholera epidemic that broke out in Dalian and Yingkou in 1909. Cholera and typhus epidemics proved common in Manchuria, and Changchun's role in controlling the spread of epidemics was key, made possible by improved communications technologies. Plague introduced from Trans-Baikal broke out in August 1910, eventually killing some sixty thousand people, six thousand in the Changchun area after it reached there in November. The vast majority of these deaths were outside the *fuzokuchi*. Mantetsu spent ¥2,559,685 in 1910 and 1911 to prevent its spread. A second outbreak of the plague entered Manchuria from China in 1920 and killed 27,288 throughout Manchuria, including some 3,000 in the various *fuzokuchi*. Mantetsu spent ¥1,008,509 to combat it. Changchun's quarantine office, capable of handling 2,000 patients,

¹²⁵ Mantetsu sōseishitsu, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, vol. 3, pp. 437-8. The *fuzokuchi* also included public restrooms. Officials enlarged the two public restrooms the *fuzokuchi* began with in 1912, and increased their number to five in 1916. *Ibid.*, p. 444.

¹²⁶ *Akoku* is about five bushels, or ten cubic feet. Mantetsu sōseishitsu, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, vol. 3, p. 443.

¹²⁷ Mantetsu sōseishitsu, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, vol. 3, p. 445.

¹²⁸ Mantetsu sōseishitsu, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, vol. 3, p. 447.

was instrumental in its containment there—only 29 died in the Changchun area. A third outbreak entered Manchuria from Inner Mongolia at Manzhouli in 1927. Before that outbreak ran its course in 1930, some 1,300 contacted the plague in the Changchun area, but only 378 died.¹²⁹ There were almost no outbreaks of the plague or cholera in Shinkyō until 1940.¹³⁰

Changchun was more than a quarantine point. The *fuzokuchi* also received one of Mantetsu's five bacteriological laboratories and one of Mantetsu's fifteen hospitals.¹³¹ These were to treat more routine matters. Outside of plague, Japanese in Changchun suffered initially mostly from typhus, scarlet fever, smallpox, and dysentery.¹³² The first clinic, established in 1907, was initially a branch of the Mantetsu hospital in Dalian. It was located on Daiwa Dōri, just southwest of the East Plaza. In 1910, the *fuzokuchi* branch clinic opened its own branch clinic in old Changchun. In 1912 the branch as a whole was renamed Changchun Hospital. In 1932 it became Shinkyō Hospital, though sources occasionally continued to call it the "Mantetsu Hospital." Whatever the name, however, it was insufficient to meet growing needs, something that Japanese immediately realized.¹³³ Japanese added a second facility in 1936 near Datong Plaza, one that included underground facilities in case of air attack. This in turn was supplemented by a hospital attached to Shinkyō Medical University, a separate facility built in 1941 for Chinese located in the heart of what used to be the old city, a

¹²⁹ Japanese also sought to contain the spread of cattle epidemics. Mantetsu sōseishitsu, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, vol. 3, pp. 448-452, *Report on Progress in Manchuria*, pp. 170-176, *Second Report on Progress to 1930*, pp. 224-6. These latter two sources include pictures of quarantinees.

¹³⁰ Scarlet fever and typhus, however, continued to be a problem, albeit in small numbers. Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, pp. 177-8.

¹³¹ Traveling clinics also served the railway zone. *Report on Progress in Manchuria*, pp. 164-166.

¹³² Inoue, *Chōshun enkakushi*, p. 72.

¹³³ Manshū keizai jijō an'naijo, *Kokuto Shinkyō jijō*, Dalian: Manshū bunka kyōkai, 1933, p. 18.

recuperative rest area west of South Lake, and a number of other clinics and wards throughout the city. Several Japanese clinics addressed the problems caused by opium and other drug addictions.¹³⁴ Beginning in 1920, Japanese supplemented these various facilities with health insurance.¹³⁵

Japanese publications took great pride in the sanitation policies of places like Changchun. Many of these policies were of recent adaptation in Japan itself, and by performing them in Manchuria Japanese gave the impression of fulfilling the goal of *la mission civilisatrice*. Modern medical practices, however, were not introduced entirely by Japanese. By 1922, a French clinic joined the Mantetsu branch clinic in old Changchun while Soviet and English clinics appeared in the *shangbu*, just outside the north gate.¹³⁶ Comparatively speaking, however, Japanese investments in sanitation and medical facilities were greater. They also dovetailed with first Mantetsu's and later Manchukuo's means of attempting to secure Chinese acceptance of Japanese leadership.

Central also to the Japanese creation of modernity in Manchuria was a new educational establishment. In Changchun Japanese created an educational system that favored Japanese but did not entirely ignore others. Changchun's first elementary school for Japanese opened in 1908, a year before Mukden's first school.¹³⁷ (The first classes, however, apparently began in a room in the train station in 1907.) The second school opened in the

¹³⁴ *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō shōkō kōkai, 1942, pp. 31-5, and Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, pp. 168-73, 179-89. Of course, none of the Mantetsu or Manchukuo sources admit to Japanese encouragement of opium production in Manchuria, though other sources do. See Okada Yoshimasa, Tatai Yoshio, Takahashi Masae, eds., *Ahen mondai*, Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1986, and John M. Jennings, *The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895-1945*, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997.

¹³⁵ The Guandong Peninsular health insurance office, however, did not open a branch until 1936. Mantetsu sōseishitsu, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, vol. 3, pp. 453-459.

¹³⁶ Inoue, *Chōshun enkakushi*, pp. 75-6. The presence of these clinics suggests a useful topic for future investigation. They also beg the question, were there any Chinese?

¹³⁷ Sources do not always agree on the opening dates of the following schools.

fuzokuchi was for adults, a business school (*jitsugyō hoshū gakkō*) located in the Mantetsu offices that opened in 1910. By 1916 it was offering courses in Japanese, Chinese, English, Russian, mathematics, engineering, architecture, machinery, geography, and history.¹³⁸ The third school, opened in 1911, was a kindergarten. The fourth was a Chinese public school in 1912. This was followed by a Japanese girl's school in 1913¹³⁹ and a second commercial school in 1920 that focused on the instruction of English, Russian, Chinese, and Mongolian.¹⁴⁰ The *fuzokuchi* later supplemented these schools with a women's high school in 1923 and another elementary school for Japanese in 1925. All of these were Mantetsu facilities.¹⁴¹ Just south of the *fuzokuchi*, however, was a school that was run jointly by Mantetsu and a Korean residents' committee. For Korean students, it began operations in 1922.¹⁴²

Outside of Mantetsu, religious schools appeared quite early in the *fuzokuchi*. Schools attached to Buddhist temples opened in 1908 and 1915. There were two more in 1916. A school attached to a Shinto shrine began 1916. Christian schools began in churches in 1916 and 1921.¹⁴³

¹³⁸ Mantetsu opened language schools in a number of *fuzokuchi*, but not apparently in Changchun initially. See Shimada Michihiro, *Manshū kyōiku shi*, Dalian: Bunkyo-sha, 1935, pp. 533-43, and Inoue, *Chōshun enkakushi*, pp. 60-4.

¹³⁹ Mantetsu chihōbu chihōka, *Kyōiku shisetsu yōran*, pp. 30-1, 47-50, and *passim*. See also Gaimushō, *Chōshun no jijō*, p. 35.

¹⁴⁰ Inoue, *Chōshun enkakushi*, pp. 62-3.

¹⁴¹ Mantetsu chihōbu chihōka, *Kyōiku shisetsu yōran*, pp. 13-4, Shimada, *Manshū kyōiku shi*, pp. 361-3, 382-3, 394-5, 403-4, and Inoue, *Chōshun enkakushi*, pp. 62-3.

¹⁴² *Manshū keizai jijō an'naijo*, *Kokuto Shinkyō jijō*, Dalian: Manshū bunka kyōkai, 1933, p. 16.

¹⁴³ Gaimushō, *Chōshun no jijō*, pp. 29-31. These kinds of schools were common in the Mantetsu lands. See Mantetsu chihōbu chihōka, *Kyōiku shisetsu yōran*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1916, pp. 35-6. As for religious institutions in general, in 1932 the *fuzokuchi* offered one Shinto shrine, six Buddhist temples, two Tenrikyō churches, and three Christian churches and associations. In old Changchun and the *shangbu* there were six Buddhist temples, two Christian churches, and a mosque. Mantetsu Chōshun chihō jimusho, *Chōshun jijō*, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1932, pp. 39-41. By 1942 along with three Confucian shrines, three Daoist temples, and the mosque, there were representatives of at least eight forms of Buddhism from the continent, seven from Japan, and two "Shinto" sects: Tenrikyō and Kinkōkyō. *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, pp. 36-7.

Shinkyō's educational establishment was extensive.¹⁴⁴ Adding new elementary schools every year between 1934 and 1940 (inclusive)—two schools each in 1936 and 1940—by 1942 there were seven higher schools and ten elementary schools for Japanese students. There were also two new schools training youth for colonial development as well as a young adult school (*seinen gakkō*).¹⁴⁵ For Chinese, in 1933 Shinkyō offered a kindergarten, nineteen elementary schools, nine high schools, and two women's middle schools.¹⁴⁶ For students other than Japanese or Chinese there were limited accommodations.¹⁴⁷

At the post secondary level, in 1942 the capital included two teacher's colleges, a veterinary college, a law school, an engineering college, a medical college, and a foreign student's school.¹⁴⁸ Planners concentrated most of these institutions in one area, on the east side Datong Dajie, south of the athletic complex (See Figure 7.2). At the heart of this cluster was Datong Academy, intended primarily for Chinese students. Its name appropriated

¹⁴⁴ The number of elementary students alone grew from 8,316 in 1936 to 17,318 by 1940. Bunkyōbu gakumushi sōmuka, *Manshūkoku gakuji yōran*, Mukden: Bunkyōbu gakumushi sōmuka, 1936, p. 8 and Manshū teikoku minseibu kyōikushi, *Manshū teikoku gakuji yōran*, Shinkyō: Manshū teikoku minseibu kyōikushi, 1940, p. 39.

¹⁴⁵ Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, pp. 216-22.

¹⁴⁶ Shimada, *Manshū kyōiku shi*, pp. 761-2. Most of these, of course, were built by Chinese in old Changchun and the adjoining commercial district. By 1922 the old city and the *shangbu* already offered nine elementary schools, a provincial middle school, two girls schools, and a teacher's school. Inoue, *Chōshun enkakushi*, p. 63. A foreign ministry publication reported in 1929 that there were nine new elementary schools and a self-strengthening (*ziqiang*) school that does not appear in 1933. Gaimushō, *Chōshun no jijō*, pp. 32-3.

¹⁴⁷ For groups other than Japanese or Chinese the sources are less informative. In 1935, Shinkyō operated one school solely for Korean students but also set aside space within several Japanese schools for Koreans. Shimada, *Manshū kyōiku shi*, pp. 415-31, 464. For Mongols there was a lecture hall and a small library. *Ibid.*, pp. 786-7. A surprising number of foreign schools existed in 1935, including a day care center, elementary schools, a handicrafts school, a vocational school, a medical college, a women's high school, and a nursing school. *Ibid.*, pp. 551-3.

¹⁴⁸ Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1940, pp. 216-22.

from the era in which Puyi ruled as regent, Datong Academy was administered directly by the Hall of State's executive office.¹⁴⁹

This complex, however, did not monopolize academic institutions. Facilities appeared throughout the city, including specialized universities, such as the Manchukuo Institute of Technology and Engineering, founded in 1939.¹⁵⁰ Another was the Shinkyō Veterinary University in Kuanchengzi.¹⁵¹ Other institutions were more concerned with cultural affairs, like the *Man-Nichi bunka kyōkai*, the Manchuria-Japan Cultural Association, which oversaw restoration work of Manchuria's cultural heritage.¹⁵²

The centerpiece of Changchun's post secondary educational system was Jianguo (J, *Kenkoku*) University. Located about ten kilometers south of Shinkyō station, just south of the *Jianguochao* or the National Foundation Shrine, itself just south of the above-mentioned academic complex, the new university occupied a spacious compound on the west side of Datong Dajie: 650,000 *tsubo*, over two million square meters. Founded in 1938 in part with notions put forward by Ishiwara Kanji, one of the two instigators of the Manchurian Incident, its motivating spirit was supposedly "ethnic harmony" (Ch, *mínzú xiéhé*; J, *minzoku kyōwa*), one of the two most widely used slogans of the puppet state. The curriculum, however, included military training along with foreign languages and other academic subjects.¹⁵³ The university anticipated admitting from 150 to 180 students a year to a limit of one

¹⁴⁹ Manshū keizai jijō an'naijo, *Kokuto Shinkyō jijō*, Dalian: Manshū bunka kyōkai, 1933, p. 16.

¹⁵⁰ *Kokuritsu kōkō gijutsujin yōseijo*. See Hōten tetsudō kyoku ryokaku gakari, *Shinkyō*, Mukden: Mantetsu sōkyoku Hōten tetsudō kyoku ryokaku gakari, 1941, p. 7, and *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, p. 30.

¹⁵¹ *Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka*, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, p. 216.

¹⁵² *Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka*, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, p. 230.

¹⁵³ Other prominent military figures involved in the university's organization were Tōjō Hideki and Tsujī Masanobu. On the intellectual context of the university's formation, see Miyazawa Eriko, *Kenkoku daigaku to minzoku kyōwa*, Tokyo: Fūkan shobō, 1997, pp. 11-72.

thousand. The student body, composed of Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, Mongols, and white Russians, comprised the core of Manchukuo's future leaders.¹⁵⁴

In addition to public schools, by 1942 the private sphere offered a professional school (*shokugyō gakkō*), a commercial school (*shōgyō gakkō*), a technical school (*kōgakuin*), three typing schools, two automotive repair schools, and a school for the blind and dumb. Two private institutions also catered to Mongol education.¹⁵⁵

Opportunities for learning existed outside of academic education. In 1910 Mantetsu built a library in the *fuzokuchi*, though it moved in 1926 and 1931 as it expanded.¹⁵⁶ In April 1933 it became the Shinkyō Municipal Library.¹⁵⁷ Manchukuo's central museum appeared in 1939 on Datong Dōri, near Kodama Park.¹⁵⁸ In 1939 a music school was added and in 1940 an art museum. At that time, a second library and a national chemical laboratory were also planned, but it is uncertain they were ever built.¹⁵⁹ Other

¹⁵⁴ There were also Taiwanese students. The university's significance is underlined by its financial allocations. Jianguo University's 1938 budget was 494,651 yuan; 1,205,522 yuan the following year. This was larger than any of the budgets of the various other schools located in the academic complex a few kilometers to the north. The budget for Datong Academy in 1938 was 394,695 yuan—407,857 yuan in 1939. The budget for Shinkyō Medical University was 83,282 yuan in 1938 and 150,704 yuan in 1939. The budget for the Shinkyō law school in 1939 was 206,165. See *ibid.*, pp. 84-96, 285-7 and *passim*.

¹⁵⁵ *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō shōkō kōkai, 1942, pp. 28-9.

¹⁵⁶ Mantetsu Chōshun chihō jūmusho, *Chōshun jijō*, p. 37. A 1941 report on its holdings ran 103 pages—most were economic reports though monthly political publications were also present. See *Shinkyō tokubetsu shiritsu toshokan: Wakan tosho bunruni mokuroku*, npl: np, 1941.

¹⁵⁷ Jilinsheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Jilin shengzhi*, vol. 39, *Wenhua yishuzhi/shehui wenhua*, Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1992, p. 130.

¹⁵⁸ On display were a number of pieces originally on display in Mukden's museum as well as pieces donated by the Japanese foreign ministry. The museum offered special exhibitions of Siberian and Japanese subjects. It also published a monthly newsletter and occasional monographs on its collection and on Manchurian cultural history. Jilinsheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Jilin shengzhi*, vol. 39, *Wenhua yishuzhi/shehui wenhua*, Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1992, pp. 234, 237.

¹⁵⁹ *Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka*, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, pp. 226-9, *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, p. 36.

professional schools by 1942 included schools for the police, the *kempeitai*, and postal employees.¹⁶⁰ Finally, in order to familiarize Japanese personnel with local customs—as well as to teach Japanese immigrants traditional means of dealing with Manchuria's cold, arid climate—in 1940 a museum of Manchurian ethnology opened on the southern side of South Lake.¹⁶¹

Although educational policies in Japan's informal empire encouraged technical proficiency, Manchukuo's policies emphasized culture as well. Education was at the heart of a cultural revolution Japanese intended for Manchukuo. This was evident in a host of publications issued primarily from the new capital's institutions. Sakuda Masahito (1878-1973), for example, vice-chairman of Jianguo University, made this clear in the lead article of the first issue of the university's journal *Kenkoku* (Ch, *Jianguo*). The article was entitled "Light of Asia."¹⁶² In explaining just what that popular slogan meant, Sakuda proposed that having learned much from the "lights" (*hikari*) of Europe and America, Asians were progressing from reflecting those 'lights' to projecting ones of their own. Sakuda pointed out that this was a natural evolution—Europeans had originally absorbed much 'light' from western Asia in the form of religion, but after a period of primacy their 'light' was now declining. It was only natural that the once brilliant 'lights' of Asia re-emerge.¹⁶³

¹⁶⁰ *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, p. 30.

¹⁶¹ Separate halls focused on the various construction techniques involved in northern Manchurian, white Russian, Korean, Japanese, and southern Manchurian or Chinese rural houses. *Jilin shengzhi*, vol. 39, *Wenhua yishuzhi/shehui wenhua*, Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1992, p. 234.

¹⁶² Articles in this journal were in either Japanese or Chinese.

¹⁶³ Sakuda Masahito, "Ajia no hikari," *Kenkoku*, 1940, pp. 2-5. Before moving to Jianguo University in 1937, Sakuda earned a Ph.D. in economics and a law degree at Tōdai, specializing in international law. Teaching at various schools in not only Japan but China, Sakuda became a professor of economics at Kyoto University in 1930.

Tamura Toshio (b 1887), a professor and administrator at Datong Academy in the academic complex north of Jianguo University, wrote powerfully about Manchukuo's future, making it clear that his concerns were more than academic.¹⁶⁴ Suggesting in 1940 that Manchukuo become an "education state" because an "age of education" had arrived, Tamura intended that education had explicitly political purposes. Indeed, his viewpoint was wider than even that—it was "life-ist" (*seimei shugiteki*). Education was a means of revitalizing all of life.¹⁶⁵ This was modernity in its extreme.

Tamura did not focus only on the individual, reasoning that just as the individual could expand his own roles and capacities, so too could states. Tamura's perception of Japan's role in 1940 was unambiguous: Japan was leading the creation of a new order of Asian states, and Manchukuo's role was key. Manchukuo was the physical manifestation of the Japanese state on the Asian mainland. Manchukuo thus meant for Tamura a step in the evolution of the human race. It also meant that education would have to continue to adapt in order maintain progressive evolution. This led Tamura to conclude that ultimately an explicitly "rising Asia" (*kō A*) style of education was necessary. For these reasons Tamura recommended expanding Manchukuo's education establishment, including the energizing role of the Japanese language, throughout the new state. The 'education state' had still to be "constructed" (*kōzō*).¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Tamura was a Tōdai graduate in economics who worked as an administrator in Sendai until given the opportunity to come to Manchukuo in 1930. Beginning in the finance department, he held various positions in the Manchukuo government before moving to Datong Academy in 1938.

¹⁶⁵ Tamura Toshio, "Kyōiku kokka ron," in Datong Academy (Daitō gaku'in) *Ronsō*, Shinkō: Manshū gyōsei gakkai, 1940, pp. 162-4.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 181-4, 187-90, 265-70, 280. Tamura followed this line of reasoning in a book published in 1941, *Manchukuo, Ideas and Substance*, that argued that war provided the opportunity to revolutionize society as he suggested. Tamura Toshio, *Manshūkoku, rinen to jittai*, Shinkyō: Manshūteikoku kyōikukai, 1941.

Minagawa Toyoji focused on Japan's role more narrowly. Among all Asians, Minagawa thought Japanese had over the previous one hundred years made the most successful "racial effort" (*minzoku doryōku*) to advance. On the continent, that meant the improving education of Japanese was a practical means of advancing the whole of East Asian civilization. Yet Minagawa wanted to convey something more than technical abilities. Seeing that most countries were centered on ethnic identities, subject to ethnic friction, Japan's role as a leader and harmonizer in Manchukuo was plain. That role too was at the core of Manchukuo's future cultural evolution through education.¹⁶⁷

Sakuda, Tamura, and Minagawa were only a few who commented on education in Manchukuo.¹⁶⁸ Yet they and others shared points of commonalty, points that reveal much about the nature of the perspectives shared among the administrative elites of Manchukuo society. More than simply propaganda, the terminology suggested how the framers of the debate wanted the public to perceive the new state. The debate often revolved around two key phrases that all three of these authors, and others, used. One was a kind of 'spirit' associated with 'national foundation' (Ch, *jiànguó jīngshén*; J, *kenkoku seishin*). Focusing especially on the youth in Manchukuo's schools, this was part of an articulated effort to generate enthusiastic support for the new state, a reasoned attempt to instill an emotional response.¹⁶⁹ In

¹⁶⁷ Minagawa Toyoji, *Manshūkoku no kyōiku*, Shinkyō: Ōsakaya goshoten, 1939, pp. 1-8.

¹⁶⁸ Nor were these efforts confined to Shinkyō. The chief librarian of Mantetsu's Mukden library, for example, promoted Mukden's role in a new Manchurian culture as well. See Eitō Toshio, "Manshū bunkashi," in *Manshū sangyō kensetsu gakuto kenkyūtan hōsoku*, Tokyo: Manshū sangyō kensetsu gakuto kenkyūtan, 1934, vol. 2, pp. 136-147.

¹⁶⁹ There are numerous discussions that emphasize the role of youth in the creation of a new, ideal state. See, for example, the article by Lt. Mihashi Wataru, "Ōdō kokka kensetsu wo miru," in *Manshū sangyō kensetsu gakuto kenkyūtan hōsoku*, vol. 5, 1934, pp. 149-151. Mihashi wrote this while assigned to Hokkaido University and submitted it to the *Tōkyō nichinichi shōbun*.

contrast, the second phrase was designed to appeal to the intellect. In the words of the various propagandists, Manchukuo was an “ideal state” (Ch, *lǐxiǎng guójiā*; J, *risō kokka*), rationally planned and organized.¹⁷⁰ Entailing both emotional and intellectual dimensions, educational reforms were couched in the same language as other administrative reforms Japanese intended, betraying a common mindset instrumental to Japan’s new order in East Asia.

Writers continued to propagate these kinds of perceptions until 1945. After 1937, and perhaps especially after 1941, however, much of the debate became more concerned with the war effort, something academics could contribute to more usefully through comparative analyses of productivity and student capabilities. In this effort scholars in Japan often joined.¹⁷¹ In this context, calls for ‘spiritual’ mobilization and ‘idealistic’ visions sounded increasingly shrill, the increasingly delusive summons of a regime drawing near its extinction.

Japanese hopes for new systems of health and education centered in Shinkyō were entirely modern: rationally planned and inspirationally progressive, they were acutely self-reflexive. Like the more amorphous concept of ‘tradition,’ both health and educational concerns were manipulated objects, ultimately differing only in the moods displayed in their respective debates. While Japanese never lost a sense of pride in their development of sanitation and health standards in the new capital, the sense

¹⁷⁰ There are many examples of the use of the term in official and non-official publications. For one early example of Shinkyō as an “ideal city” see Shinkyō tokubestushi kōsho, *Shinkyō shisei gaiyō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō tokubestushi kōsho, 1934, p. 5. Of course, the capital itself was usually promoted as ideal, often conjoined with the concept of modern, as in an “ideally modern city” (*risō teki kindai toshi*). *Shinkyō no gaiyō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō shōkō kōkai, 1942, p. 2.

¹⁷¹ See, for example, the Datong Academy (Daitō gaku’in) *Ronsō*, Shinkyō: Manshū gyōsei gakkai, 1940 or the five issues of the Zaiman Nihon kyōikukai, *Zaiman kyōiku kenkyū*, Shinkyō: Zaiman Nihon kyōikukai, 1942-1945.

of approaching cataclysm apparent in discussions of education indicated that Japanese were all too aware of impending realities. A third aspect of modern society Japanese encouraged in places like Changchun and Shinkyō steered between these emotional extremes. This involved leisure pursuits, another constant consideration among Japanese in Manchuria. Leisure pursuits too were modern. Resulting from the commodification of time inherent in extended commercialization, leisure time was a new and powerful means of meeting public interests.

Both the *fuzokuchi* and the *guodu* offered a variety of means of spending leisure time. Perhaps the simplest means of doing so was using the lavish amounts of park land and green space.¹⁷² Not only did Shinkyō's parks include trees and grass, they also included flower beds and playgrounds. If that green space was too confining, hiking and other activities could be pursued in the city's outskirts, something school clubs took advantage of.¹⁷³

A variety of organized activities occurred within the city. A Mantetsu Employees Club appeared in 1912 that by 1933 included a membership of over one thousand.¹⁷⁴ Initially adjacent the Mantetsu offices, it was built anew in the western part of the city in 1933.¹⁷⁵ The first hall for the general public was consecrated in the name of the Taishō Emperor, completed in 1920. In 1934 it became the Shinkyō Memorial Public Hall (*Shinkyō kinen kōkaidō*) after extensive renovations.¹⁷⁶ It offered facilities for chess, billiards, and lectures,

¹⁷² See the discussions in Chapters 3 and 6 above.

¹⁷³ On school activities see Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, p. 174.

¹⁷⁴ *Manshū keizai jijō an'naijō*, *Kokuto Shinkyō jijō*, Dalian: Manshū bunka kyōkai, 1933, p. 18.

¹⁷⁵ Another source suggests that the original Mantetsu Club was located near the *fuzokuchi*'s East Park. Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkan somuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, p. 15.

¹⁷⁶ Mantetsu sōseishitsu, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, vol. 3, pp. 473-476.

as well as a cafeteria.¹⁷⁷ Other facilities on the outskirts of the new capital included a golf course and a horse race track.

Informal associations appeared, including a variety of small clubs.¹⁷⁸ Some were instructional, such as the Shinkyō Education League (*Shinkyō kyōiku renmei*) founded in 1929 and the Domestic School (*Kaji kōshūjo*), founded in 1930, that focused on improving conditions in the home. Some associations were integral to the expansion of empire. An imperial army association began meeting in the *fuzokuchi* in 1911 and a youth brigade in 1927. Other associations involved most every aspect of life in the city, including organizations for labor (1923), women (1931), and religion, of which there were many. One organization that began meeting in 1919 paid particular attention to the needs of Koreans, the *Shinkyō Chōsenjin iruminkai*. There were eight organizations for Chinese officially acknowledged in 1933, primarily religious.¹⁷⁹

The *fuzokuchi* and the *guodu* offered public entertainment. Two theaters appeared in the *fuzokuchi*, one in 1920 and another in 1925, both southeast of the Yamato Hotel near Nihonbashi Dōri.¹⁸⁰ Another theater was built in 1935, and a movie theater in 1944. Outdoor entertainment was also available. An outdoor music amphitheater opened in Datong Park in 1938 that could seat fifteen thousand. West Park initially contained a zoo, but that was moved with the inauguration of Shinkyō, though Kodama Park retained its

¹⁷⁷ *Manshū keizai jijō an'naijō, Kokuto Shinkyō jijō*, pp. 18-9.

¹⁷⁸ The proliferation of postwar memoirs has created a large corpus of oral history materials. Much of it has to do with daily life in the various *fuzokuchi* and Manchukuo. One example is that of the former employees of Manchurian Electric in which they reminisced about not only playing sports like rugby, baseball, volleyball, and ice hockey, but about boating, playing in brass bands and appearing on stage. See *Manshū dengyō gaishi hen i'inkai, Omoidasu no Manshū dengyō*, Tokyo: *Manshū dengyō kai*, 1977, esp. vol. 2: "supōtsu - bunka."

¹⁷⁹ *Manshū keizai jijō an'naijō, Kokuto Shinkyō jijō*, pp. 19-20.

¹⁸⁰ *Mantetsu Chōshun chihō jūmusho, Chōshun jijō*, pp. 44-5.

merry-go-round. The new, larger zoo opened in 1938 just north of the academic complex centered on Datong Academy. Through it drained streams from South Lake and Shuntian Park to the Yitong River. A smaller zoo also existed inside Mudan Park.¹⁸¹

With a focus on the mobilization of youth and a youthful 'spirit,' the city promoted physical exercise, taking an active role in encouraging most every sport, whether it was affiliated with a school program or not.¹⁸² Both the *fuzokuchi* and the *guodu* offered numerous opportunities to participate in sports, primarily in the various parks. In addition to the various boathouses and rental boats several parks offered, Kodama Park had a baseball diamond, inaugurated in 1923, as well as a four hundred meter race track. Datong Park included twenty-five meter and fifty-meter swimming pools, a sumo arena (that could seat ten thousand people), and four clay tennis courts. In winter it offered a skating rink. While four grass tennis courts could be found at Baishan Park, tennis courts of an unknown type could be found in Shuntian and Mudan Parks. Mudan Park also contained the Jimmu Den.¹⁸³

In addition to the parks, the *guodu* included an enormous athletic complex at Nanling, east of the zoo. Almost entirely completed in 1937 and comprising some 1,440,000 square meters, this facility offered fields for soccer, baseball, track, hockey, bicycling, basketball, and horsemanship. It hosted large events like the "Continental" and Japanese-Chinese-Manchukuoan

¹⁸¹ Hoshino Naoki refers to the zoo in Mudan Park in *Manshū teikoku rinji kokuto kensetsu kyoku, Kokuto kensetsu ni tsuite*, p. 58.

¹⁸² Indeed, recreation was a means of "arousing the national spirit raising ethnic harmony" (*kokumin seishin wo sakkō shi, minzoku kyōwa no jitsu wo aguru*). Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, pp. 173-4.

¹⁸³ *Manshū teikoku rinji kokuto kensetsu kyoku, Kokuto kensetsu ni tsuite*, p. 46, Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1940, pp. 107-110, and Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, pp. 107, 199-209. The Jimmu Den is discussed in Chapter 7.

"Olympic" competitions of 1940. Equipped with electricity and a loudspeaker system, it was as modern an athletic complex as could be expected.¹⁸⁴

Organized sport did not receive the same kind of publicity that health and education did. The record of its expanding interest was more apparent in newspapers and in the short newsreels put out by studios like the *Manchurian Movie News*, which spread news throughout Manchuria and Japan of events like rugby competitions, long-distance relay races, polo matches, and Mongol wrestling tournaments. In them Shinkyō's facilities figured prominently, thereby contributing to the popularization of sport throughout the empire. This development was no mere footnote. By the 1930s, corporate, college, and professional athletes and teams from not only all over Manchuria but from all over Japan traveled to meet in competitions within the empire.¹⁸⁵

Nor was sport the only new recreational industry that Shinkyō promoted. Further popularizing all of these various pursuits was the sightseeing industry. Both Japanese and Manchurians were encouraged to come and take in the sights as sightseeing busses conducted tours in both the Japanese and Chinese languages.¹⁸⁶ Not only did bus companies run daily tours of the city, but a host of publications included itineraries of the city's main highlights.¹⁸⁷ Shinkyō's boulevards even allowed for an innovation not possible elsewhere

¹⁸⁴ Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1940, p. 110, and Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, pp. 204-5.

¹⁸⁵ Statistics for this must await future research, but it is certain that Japanese baseball teams, sumo wrestlers and other prominent sports figures toured Manchukuo, competing against themselves and Manchurian opponents. Universities like Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, for example, continued to display in 1997 pictures of teams that traveled to Manchuria in the 1930s.

¹⁸⁶ Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, pp. 106-7. *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, pp. 39-43.

¹⁸⁷ For examples of itineraries and accommodations see *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, pp. 106-16 and *Hōten tetsudō kyoku ryokaku gakari*, *Shinkyō*, Mukden: Mantetsu sōkyoku Hōten tetsudō kyoku ryokaku gakari, 1941. On the development of the bus industry, see Chapter 6. On the JTB office in Shinkyō see *MKZ* 12: 4, April 1932.

in East Asia, the use of large busses; the first of which, made in Germany, toured the capital's streets beginning in 1938. It too appeared in the *Manchurian Movie News*.

New conceptions of health, education, and leisure were just some of the aspects of modern society that Japanese experimented with in Manchuria. Others were also present, many from the very outset of the Japanese arrival. For example, by 1908 the *fuzokuchi* offered Japanese versions of a fire department, a post office, and a police headquarters. Telegraph offices and a stock exchange were also soon constructed. With the proclamation of Shinkyō there appeared along with the city's enhanced electrical, plumbing, and technical capabilities an airport and a wireless station.¹⁸⁸ There were also improvements to perhaps the most basic commodity of all, Shinkyō's water supply.¹⁸⁹ Complimenting the city's new hospitals, universities, and other industries, these innovative institutions provided new kinds of services Japanese widely thought to be consistent with the needs of a modern society.


For the Japanese in Manchuria, health, educational, and leisure concerns were just as modern as architectural, technological, and economic endeavors. They were also just as manipulable, and the manners in which Japanese

¹⁸⁸ On enhanced communications facilities see Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū tsūshin jigyō hōsaku*, npl: Mantetsu, 1936.

¹⁸⁹ The CCB published its early guidelines for the capital's water supply as "Kokuto kensetsu kyoku suidō kyūsui shiji jōkō," npl: Kokumuin kokuto kensetsu kyoku, 1933. Several publications discussed the capital's new water infrastructure, such as Manshūkoku seifu kokumuin kokuto kensetsu kyoku, *Kokuto dai-Shinkyō*, pp. 18-20. For a picture of the capital's new twenty-two meter high water tower with a volume of one thousand cubic meters, see "Manshūkoku Shinkyō suidō no kyūsuidō," *Suidō kyōkai zasshi*, 24:5, May 1935, p. i. For reports on the city's waterworks as they developed, including Jingyue Reservoir southeast of the city, see "KitaMan oyobi Shinkyō no suidō," *Suidō kyōkai zasshi*, 22:1, January 1938, pp. 13-18, Manshūkoku kokuto kensetsu no zenbō," *Suidō kyōkai zasshi*, 22:1, January 1938, pp. 19-21, "Shinkyō jōsuidō keikaku gaiyō," *Suidō kyōkai zasshi*, 22:8, August 1938, pp. 51-4, Manshū teikoku rinji kokuto kensetsu kyoku, *Kokuto kensetsu ni tsuite*, pp. 37-42, Numata Soyao, "Shinkyō oyobi Hōten no jinkō kōsei ni tsuite," *Jinkō mondai*, 4:2, November 1941, pp. 53-7, and Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, 1942, pp. 24-5.

manipulated them sketched the dimensions of the modernist projects they entailed. The Mantetsu *fuzokuchi* and the puppet state of Manchukuo were activist efforts to establish ideal communities that would secure for Japanese particular kinds of society at home. Those particular societies, it is important to note, were future goals—they were cities on hills towards which sufficient numbers of Japanese agreed that Japanese as a society should be heading. There were, however, inherent constraints on the natures of those cities. Although constructing the imperialist and imperial societies of Changchun and Shinkyō could only be attempted through the use of available materials, those societies' ultimate forms depended upon visions derived from foreign experiences filtered through an evolving Japanese lens. And though the foreign experiences Japanese chose to emulate changed, the motivating force underneath those changes did not. Imperialist and imperial societies were both continuing Japanese efforts to create a society that was rational, progressive, and self-reflexive—a modern society.

Figure 8.1 Buses on Datong Dajie



Source: Umemoto Sutezō, *Manshū*, p. 55

9. Conclusions

Japanese perspectives on the built environment in Changchun in the first half of the twentieth century display concerns for social progress beyond the scope of architecture and urban planning. In an open letter to the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi*, for example, Matsumuro Shigemitsu, the designer of some of the *fuzokuchi*'s first structures, wrote about the astonishment he felt during a visit to his second "home" in 1928. Manchuria had come a long way in just two decades, he thought, and not simply because of the availability of new kinds of building materials. What pleased him most was that the members of the *Manshū kenchiku zasshi* association continued to be forward looking, focusing on the creation of modern cities that were efficient and grand. Because of their holistic approach, considering also the political and economic aspects of society, Matsumuro thought the association was genuinely committed to improving people's lives, including those of the poor. To him this was more than good planning—it was virtuous.¹

Assessing Shinkyō's architectural changes in November 1942, Tōdai professor Kishida Hidetō was similarly impressed—Shinkyō's structures involved the most recent scientific advances and technologies. Though some of the sources were Japanese, Kishida noted that a new and genuine "national architecture" (*kokumin yōshiki*) only emerged in Japan with time, beginning with the Meiji Restoration (1868). Something similar in Manchukuo would also have to emerge gradually, but because Kishida felt there was nothing to obstruct the further development of Japan's national architecture, by extension there was nothing to prevent a rosy future for Manchukuoan

¹ Matsumuro Shigemitsu, "Kenchiku zakkan," *MKZ* 8:7, July 1928, pp. 14-21.

architecture either. Both, he concluded, could look forward to continued progress with optimism. Indeed, even the China Incident implied further greatness, because in the opportunity to help progress in China, the roles of Japanese architects would naturally be central again.² Others agreed.³

Oka Ōji was one to agree. Celebrating the tenth anniversary of the new state, Oka boasted that never before had Manchuria witnessed such “majestic” (*ifu*) architecture. This was because, Oka mused, previously such large structures had not been needed. In his opinion, Japanese activities revolutionized not only the built environment but the whole of Manchurian society. By this Oka meant more than Japanese construction in Manchuria before the Manchurian Incident—he thought the ancestors of Shinkyō’s new façades included influential structures in Japan itself, structures such as the *Maru biru* and adjacent postal building, as well as the Tokyo Marine Insurance building. Thus, explicitly modern buildings central to Tokyo’s rejuvenation in the wake of the Great Kantō Earthquake (1923)—characterizing Shōwa Japan as much as Tokyo station did Meiji Japan—signified leadership not just for Japan but for East Asia as a whole.

This leadership did not, however, preclude possible roles for non-Japanese. For Oka, because “control” (*tōsei*) and the preservation and study of older architectural forms also characterized Shinkyō’s architecture, he suggested Shinkyō’s style was firm. This enabled it to serve as a model for “satellite” (*eisei*) cities throughout Manchuria that in turn would serve as a “guiding authority” (*jūchin*) for all of north Asia. Oka ultimately envisioned architects of varied backgrounds working in association—under Japanese

² Kishida Hidetō, “Manshūkoku kenkoku jūshūnen to sono kenchiku,” p. 3-4.

³ See, for example, Aibara Saburō, “HokuShi toshi kensetsu gairon,” *TK 27:6*, June 1944, pp. 8-19, and Aibara Saburō, “HokuShi toshi kensetsu gairon (2),” *TK 27:8*, August 1944, pp. 2-9.

leadership—throughout Asia to create a genuinely “Great East Asian architectural style” (*tōyō daiAjia kenchiku yōshiki*).⁴

Japanese publications in the first half of the twentieth century like these championed the urban constructions of their cohorts in Manchuria. Promoting first the Changchun *fuzokuchi* as a modern outpost of empire and a thriving economic center, the earlier publications portrayed the *fuzokuchi* as an innovative urban milieu at the forefront of contemporary society. As such, although of more recent vintage, it was much like the colonial treaty-ports of other imperialist powers.⁵ Indeed, the creation of *fuzokuchi* like the one in Changchun was part of a larger effort to cast Japan as a Great Power, equal in status and capability to any of the others.

Publications described the Shinkyō *guodu*, however, somewhat differently. On the surface, the *guodu* was part of an effort aimed at surpassing the Great Powers. Invariably the new capital was an “ideal” (*risō*) city capable of energizing a new Asian “spirit” (*seishin*). Yet at the same time the city was also the capital of a new “modern state” (*kindai kokka*). In fact, terms involving ‘modern’ seem to appear more frequently in discussions of the new capital and state than terms commonly associated with official propaganda like the “kingly way” (Ch, *wángdào*; J, *ō d ō*). While the definitions of modernity changed, the commitment to creating an ideal—even universal—modern society through the built environment remained unflagging. Although obviously propagandistic on one level, a close analysis of the layouts, structures, and contexts of the railway town and puppet capital,

⁴ Oka Ōji, “Manshū kenkoku jūnen to kenchiku zakkan,” *MKZ* 22:10, October 1942, pp. 1-4.

⁵ For a discussion of the architecture of the various imperialist powers in China with which the *fuzokuchi* were compared see Yang Jiande, ed., *Zhongguo jindai chengshi yu jianju, 1840-1949*, Beijing: Zhongguo jianju gongye chubanshe, 1993 and the sixteen individual city surveys in Zhu Tan and Fujimori Terunobu, general eds., *Zhongguo jindai jianju zonglan*, Beijing: Zhongguo jianju gongye chubanshe, 1992-6.

including the discourse surrounding them, reveals that in two distinct eras there was a broadly shared consensus among Japanese over the direction society needed to be heading.

On one level, a purely technical level, Japanese praised their contributions to the built environments in Manchuria for the proficiency involved in their design and construction. Japanese engineers and architects not only mastered foreign styles but learned to build in Manchuria an array of new structures appropriate for a climate very different from that of the home archipelago. A related technical consideration involved Japanese capacities to continue to progress by incorporating improvements in electricity, plumbing, and other techniques of construction. This was a physically measurable kind of progress.

An entirely different level of analysis concerns the implications of those capabilities. Japanese writing about the creations of their cohorts in Changchun and Shinkyō extrapolated symbolic significance from technical expertise. This was because affirming Japanese capabilities was a means of asserting the status of Japan as a whole. Utilizing notions of urban planning and architecture that their counterparts in the societies of the other Powers defined as modern, Japanese planners, architects, and officials leapt at the opportunities to demonstrate Japan's prowess. Thus, eager to place Japanese society on the same level as any of the other Great Powers, Japanese in the nineteen-teens and 'twenties constructed built environments not dissimilar from other imperialist projects overseas.

After 1932, Japanese were not so much interested in establishing a sense of equality with the societies of Europe and North America as they were in outdoing them. This too was progress, and in some ways Japanese tried to measure it. One means of doing so was through continued technical

proficiency. Another means was through the manipulation of an idealized Asian heritage as part of the creation of a pan-Asian nation-state. Yet another means involved an aesthetic appeal. Civic beauty too could be a powerful motivator of human action.⁶ Together, the confluence of these appeals encouraged people to agree with the assertions of the Capital Construction Bureau that their new city was a “source of national culture” (*ikkoku bunka no engenchi*) and a manifestation of “great ideals” (*dairisō*).⁷

That did not, however, change who new manifestations of the built environment were aimed at—as with before the Manchurian Incident, the main target of Japanese discussions of the significance of projects in Manchuria remained Japanese. Both imperialist and imperial urban milieus were vehicles by which Japanese planners and administrators sought to enroll Japanese at home in their projects for the creation of a modern society. This central point cannot be overemphasized. Although the Japanese overseers of empire wanted to either impress or woo non-Japanese with their efforts, urban creations in Manchuria were designed in large part to appeal to Japanese sensitivities. This was in order to effect change in Japan itself. Just as Mantetsu’s *fuzokuchi* manifested avowedly modern means of organization and infrastructure so that people like Gotō Shimpei could later attempt to implement similar concepts in Japan, Manchukuo’s economic planning, social regimentation, and Asian trappings were forerunners of Japan’s wartime national defense state and eventually the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In this light, the roots of Japanese involvement in the Second World War appear similar to those of Europeans in the First: the

⁶ Thus, the *Shinkyō no gaikyō* included a discussion of six “beautiful regions” (*bikan chiku*) of the new capital. *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, pp. 14-5.

⁷ *Manshū teikoku rinji kokuto kensetsu kyoku, Kokuto kensetsu ni tsuite*, pp. 19-20.

dynamic inherent in imperialist expansion and its justification ultimately impelled war with Japan's imperialist rivals.

This is apparent in Japanese perceptions of the significance of Manchukuo and its new capital. Just as Europeans justified their imperialist activities as 'civilizing missions,' Japanese described their activities in terms of Japanese, and Asian, 'historical development.' Statements such as Oka Ōji's above about the previous lack of grandiose structure in Manchuria, for example, demonstrated an attitude so condescending it bordered on hubris. This perception extended beyond architects. Hoshino Naoki, for example, a Finance Ministry bureaucrat who served at high levels in both the Manchukuo and wartime Japanese governments commented that Shinkyō heralded the birth of a new Asian order in Manchuria, one that signified the dawn of a new age for all of East Asia.⁸

Yet Hoshino realized something else. In order for Shinkyō's brilliance to truly shine, the city had to function. For Hoshino that meant Shinkyō had to be a "service city" (*hoshi no toshi*) capable of truly effecting change.⁹ The new capital had to administer a new system—a new culture—in order to fulfill the destiny Japanese so extravagantly charged it with. That was a tall order. Manchuria was large, both in terms of geographic size and population; Shinkyō's role as a dynamo could not help but be limited. Japanese investment and industrial power were also limited, constrained by the same policies of expansion and preparation for war that led to the seizing of

⁸ *Manshū teikoku rinji kokuto kensetsu kyoku, Kokuto kensetsu ni tsuite*, Tokyo: Manshū teikoku rinji kokuto kensetsu kyoku, 1940, pp. 49-54. Of course, Hoshino was by no means the only Japanese to make such a public observation, but Hoshino's postwar statements make his prewar pronouncements particularly striking. Hoshino maintained this perspective even after the war, despite his indictment as a war criminal. As late as 1975 he suggested in an article called "The Continental Dream Still Lives" that Manchukuo remained a fine example of the best ideals of the Japanese people. See Hoshino Naoki, "Tairiku no mune ha ikite iru," pp. 272-85, in *Kokusai zenrin kyōkai, Manshū kenkoku no yume to genjitsu*, Tokyo: Kenkōsha, 1975.

⁹ *Manshū teikoku rinji kokuto kensetsu kyoku, Kokuto kensetsu ni tsuite*, p. 62.

Manchuria in the first place. Continued investments in military endeavors further detracted from the potential for investment in any new society. It was therefore necessary for the Japanese in Manchuria to gain non-Japanese support. The Changchun *fuzokuchi* and the Shinkyō *guodu* represent two different means of attempting to enlist Chinese recognition and compliance.

The Changchun *fuzokuchi* was a small but thriving town. Gotō Shimpei dreamed that towns like it—in conjunction with a firm military presence—would induce Chinese acceptance of Japanese hegemony. In that the *fuzokuchi* failed. Although, from the Japanese point of view, the *fuzokuchi* was a successful example of informal empire in that it was economically viable and displayed Japanese capabilities and ideals in a manner that Japanese valued, it did not integrate well with the surrounding countryside in a political sense. Chinese refused to accept the imperialist presence, and Japanese efforts to either entice or browbeat Chinese failed. This failure encouraged some Japanese to try a different approach, an approach that manifested itself as the creation of Manchukuo and the transformation of Changchun into a *guodu*. Again, from the point of view of the Japanese, Shinkyō was superficially successful, a rapidly expanding conurbation displaying revised Japanese capabilities and ideals. Yet it too failed to achieve widespread acceptance by Chinese. Indeed, the new capital failed to become a fully functioning society for Japanese as well. While its economy was heavily dependent on external infusions of capital, the avowedly superior 'spirit' and culture it represented did not gain popularity even within Manchukuo. Shinkyō failed on most accounts to be anything more than an appendage of the Japanese empire. In the long run, the *fuzokuchi* and the *guodu* both failed to bring stability to Japan's national security.

The *fuzokuchi* and the *guodu*, however, did serve Japanese society successfully in one way: they were both integral to defining Japanese national identities in the first half of the twentieth century. The *fuzokuchi* and *guodu* operated as shells under which Japanese could tinker with various societal elements in an effort to make their own society at home more modern. Serving as a proud outpost of empire in a manner similar to the other imposed treaty-ports of China, between 1907 and 1931 the Japanese railway town at Changchun helped Japanese meet the civilizational threat posed by foreign imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In a similar manner, between 1932 and 1945 the new capital encouraged Japanese to imagine a society beyond that earlier definition of modernity, one that potentially could supplant it. Although it failed, it is notable that despite that failure certain aspects remained apparent in Japan after 1945, such as the concern for urban green space, the role of the bureaucracy, and the popularity of sports. Indeed, elements also appeared in China after 1945.¹⁰

Since it was Japanese who occupied the preferred positions in Manchukuoan society, it is fair to say that it was mostly Japanese who experienced the wealth of changes inherent in urban transformations in Changchun and Shinkyō. That, however, was not entirely the story. Chinese, Koreans, and other ethnic groups also participated in this Japanese-centered society, a privileged few in ways identical to Japanese. The majority, of course, did not—yet that majority did take part in other aspects of that society, in the process adapting to new forms of social organization that differed greatly from those of their forebears.

¹⁰ The following discussion concerning the experiences of Chinese, Korean, and other ethnic communities living within the Japanese empire in Manchuria is intended only to indicate the enormous potential implicit in this issue that must at this date await future research.

The most obvious transformation at work in Manchuria in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries involved the shift from a subsistence to a commercial economy. Of course, large, steady exports of Manchurian soybeans, soybean products, and other goods were only possible because of the commercialization already occurring in Manchuria before the Japanese arrived. Building railways and facilitating trade, the Japanese only hastened the fostering of rural entrepreneurship. In doing so, however, it is important to note that Japanese encouraged non-Japanese to participate in Japan's informal empire as agricultural producers or by becoming involved in the distribution of rural goods. Many did.

Other non-Japanese participated in Japan's informal empire in different ways. Many unable or unwilling to follow agricultural pursuits entered factories or engaged in other forms of (usually urban) wage labor. Made possible by a sufficiently commercialized and monetized economy, this was another means of earning a living and improving one's life. More to the point, it was another means of participating in Japan's informal empire, even if done less than wholeheartedly.

Some among the rural and the urban entrepreneurs prospered. Accumulating capital and inaugurating projects of their own, they furthered the commercialization process. In doing so, urbanites contributed to urbanization—the role of the local construction industry in particular stands out.¹¹ These kinds of activities dovetailed with Japanese efforts to expand the Manchurian economy. But that was not all they accomplished. Other economic activities challenged Japanese efforts. This meant participating in

¹¹ Cf., Clarke, *Building Capitalism*.

the Japanese-organized society in a different way—competing with Japanese entrepreneurs.¹²

In all of these cases, and in others that this simple overview does not include, in participating in Japan's empire, non-Japanese learned the means of social organization that Japanese either introduced or encouraged. Non-Japanese did so either to utilize those systems, compete with them, or circumvent them. In these various ways, and others, Japanese imperialist and imperial societies in Manchuria functioned as a model for non-Japanese inhabitants. They were targets to aim at, backgrounds for imperialized peoples to define themselves against. Japanese, having expropriated visions of modernity from overseas and applied them at home and on the Asian mainland, in turn found that eventually their own visions of modernity served as raw materials for the exploration of still newer conceptions of modernity by colonial others.¹³

Despite their variations, new conceptions of modernity in the first half of the twentieth century tended to include one element—an elimination of imperialist pressures. While Meiji Japanese sought to end the influence of foreign imperialism in Japan by becoming imperialists themselves, new visions of Japanese modernity in the 1930s suggested replacing imperialism with a pan-Asian solidarity, a vision that may have failed even if it had not been so manifestly hypocritical. Just as the vision of pan-Asianism promised to surpass the existing imperialist order, the vision of modernity Chinese

¹² This issue in particular suggests avenues for future research.

¹³ Arjun Appadurai suggests that it is mass migration and the electronic media that is of special consequence to creating new global modernities. Although their powerful influences have sharpened the imagining of modernities in the contemporary era, the globalization of modernity began long before by the export of modernity by imperial powers attempting to impose their 'imagined worlds' on other societies. Appadurai is correct though in understanding the potential for violence inherent in imagining modernities. See Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, pp. 1, 22-23, 33, 46-47.

eventually agreed upon was one that sought to surpass most pre-existing modernities, especially Japanese, through the promise of communism.

Yet beneath these differing visions of modernity lay certain fundamental realities. Japanese were able to eject unwanted treaty-ports on Japanese soil in the first decades of the twentieth century because Japanese society proved able to redefine itself by adapting foreign models to indigenous patterns of social evolution. A similar process occurred among Chinese under the Japanese occupation. Indeed, because Mantetsu and Manchukuo only accelerated processes already at work, Chinese resistance to Japanese developed relatively quickly.

Japanese attempted to secure Chinese and Korean acceptance of Japanese versions of modernity through two different political structures, both of which clearly failed. The form of the first, informal empire administered through treaty-ports like the one in Changchun, was inspired by the practice of European informal empires in China. The form of the second, inspired by the inadequacies of the first as much as by more authoritarian foreign models, involved asserting a potpourri of concepts generally labeled as 'traditional.' Centered on a former monarch and his attendant symbolisms, architecture was one means of displaying this rejuvenated tradition. Other means were more mundane yet omnipresent. Manchukuo's calendar, for example, kept track of years in the time-honored imperial fashion, by eras. While the years 1932-1934 were the first, second and third years of *Datong*, Puyi's name as Regent, beginning March 1, 1934, years were reckoned by Puyi's new reign name, *Kangde*.¹⁴

¹⁴ Thus, 1945, the final year of Manchukuo, was *Kangde* 12. The character *kang* (J, *kō*) includes several meanings, including 'peace' and 'health.' It was the first character of the name of the second Manchu emperor, Kangxi (1662-1723) and may have been chosen to associate Puyi with the grandeur of the early Qing. The character *de* means 'virtue.' It was the first character of the *miaohao*, or title conferred upon death, of the Guangxu emperor (1875-1908), Puyi's

Postage stamps were another example of a means of conveying official propaganda (Figure 9.1). Some conspicuously championed the new regime, such as depictions of Manchukuo's flag, map, imperial crest, or portraits of Puyi himself. Others transmitted political slogans such as "One Heart, One Soul," taken from an imperial edict of May 2, 1935, or more general reminders like that issued in 1944 insisting that "Japan's Progress is Manchuria's Progress." Some stamps sought popular approval more subtly. In addition to traditional pastoral scenes, Manchukuo's stamps depicted familiar messages like new year's greetings and dragon dances. Some slogans were pictorial, such as the allegory of national harmony—showing a fisherman, a farmer, a forester, and factories—and the allegory of ethnic harmony, showing women of five different races dancing together. Manchukuoans appeared on stamps in the manner that the government wanted them most to perform, such as soldiers or farmers bringing crops to market on horsecars. Architectural features were also prominent, including Mukden's Beiling¹⁵ (North Mausoleum) and Shinkyō's Hall of State. Like Manchukuo's architectural styles, stamps conveyed a similar definition of modernity involving contemporary values and a rejuvenated tradition.

Manchukuo's currency was a similar mix of symbolisms—modern and traditional architecture appeared along side historical portraits (Figure 9.2). Despite the redefinitions involved in Manchukuo's modernity, puppet state

predecessor and uncle. (It was Guangxu's robes that he wanted to wear so desperately in 1934 as a symbol of a Qing Restoration. See Pu Yi, *From Emperor to Citizen*, vol. 2, pp. 275.) In Japan that character is read *toku*, and is the first character of the family name of the last shogunal dynasty, the Tokugawa (1603-1868). The characters *kang* and *de* were occasionally used also by Japanese emperors for era names.

¹⁵ On Beiling, see the discussion in Chapter 7.

administrators sought always to make new forms of money, as well as postage stamps and even time, acceptable to Chinese subjectivities.¹⁶

Significantly, these definitions were accessible and comprehensible in Japan. Japanese too manipulated images on stamps and currency to coincide with official objectives. Japanese also continued to divide years by reign eras. Indeed, wartime Japan experienced a rejuvenation of the calendrical tradition: the year 1940 was deemed to be the year 2600, a calculation that began with the accession of Japan's semi-legendary first emperor, Jimmu Tennō. Appearances to the contrary, asserting 'tradition' in these ways was actually a very modern endeavor—it was part of an effort to contrive a sense of national solidarity and enthusiasm among the inhabitants of new states.¹⁷

The political motivation behind implementing modernity, of course, was an attempt to secure popular support. Another means of doing so involved the creation of a national administrative apparatus.¹⁸ Central to this effort in Manchukuo was the *Kyōwakai* (Ch, *Xiéhéhùi*), or Concordia Association. Supported by a mammoth police structure, the *Kyōwakai* was Manchukuo's answer to the nation-state's requirement of a mass political party.¹⁹

¹⁶ At the same time, however, currency could also be innovative: during the war the Manchukuo government minted five and ten *fen* (cent) coins in red fiber as official currency. Doubtless a response to economic scarcity, fifty years later the experiment could be perceived as foresighted. See the discussion in James E. Spaulding, *Coin of the Realm: An Introduction to Numismatics*, Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1984, pp. 14-5, 62.

¹⁷ To quote Vlastos, " 'tradition' contributed to the formation of national identity through the ideological function of collapsing time and reifying space." Vlastos, "Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History," p. 11.

¹⁸ A philosophical discussion of the new state's institutions is that of Kansai University professor Ōyama Hikoichi, "Manshūkoku ōdō seiji to kōtō seiji," in *Manshū sangyō kensetsu gakuto kenkyūtan hōsoku*, Tokyo: Manshū sangyō kensetsu gakuto kenkyūtan, 1934, vol. 3, pp. 2-37.

¹⁹ Brief descriptions of how the *Kyōwakai* organization officially blended into Shinkyō society are ubiquitous. See, for example, Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō tokubetsushi kōsho, 1942, p. 68. For the *Kyōwakai*'s own study of the early growth of the Manchukuo police, see (Manshūkoku) Minseibu keisatsu keimushi, *Manshūkoku keisatsu gaiyō*, Mukden: (Manshūkoku) Minseibu keisatsu keimushi, 1935. A useful analysis is Makuuchi Mitsuo, *Manshūkoku keisatsu gaishi*, Tokyo: San'ichi seibō, 1996.

Emphasizing Manchukuo's alleged status as a new country, the *Kyōwakai* asserted a responsibility for more than public security—the association suggested it revealed the essence of Manchukuo's "political ideals" (*seiji risō*).²⁰ Implicit in this organization was a concern that was often unstated in Manchuria but of central importance in Japan, the creation of a *kokutai* (Ch, *guó*), or 'national essence.'²¹ Significantly, the office of the *Kyōwakai* was located at the real heart of Shinkyō: one block south of Datong Plaza on Datong Dajie, behind the First Government Building.²²

Although the person of Puyi provided an important focal point for the ideological contestation of the new state of Manchukuo, as demonstrated by the film *The Last Emperor*, the monarchy, Mantetsu, and the *Kyōwakai* all disappeared with the destruction of the Japanese empire. Yet other elements implicit in the Japanese definition of modernity remained, elements that resonated well with newly forming Chinese, and other, definitions of modernity. Indeed, in ways very similar to the Japanese, Chinese after 1949, surely emboldened by the activities of the Japanese and other imperialists, sought to create a distinctly Chinese modernity that reflected the values of the new People's Republic—a Chinese Communist 'national essence' revolving around a new conception of modernity. Historians usually examine the culture and values of the PRC through studies of new political and economic organizations. There are a number of other avenues, however, that are

²⁰ *Manshū teikoku kyōwakai, Kyōwakai no gaibō*, Shinkyō: *Manshū teikoku kyōwakai*, 1936, pp. 6-7 and *passim*.

²¹ For one discussion, albeit fanciful, of the issues involved in creating a *kokutai* in Manchukuo, as well other issues facing Manchukuo's first leaders, see Yarita Ken'ichi, *Shinkyō: Manshū kenkokuki*, Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1943. Yarita was a novelist and theorist concerned especially with agrarian issues; the generally heroic tone of this work demonstrates well the Japanese effort to contrive a new nation-state, complete with its own set of founding fathers.

²² Despite a wealth of public pronouncements, the national organization it created from these offices was secret. For its own studies of its initial years see *Manshū teikoku kyōwakai*, ed., *Manshū teikoku kyōwakai soshiki enkakushi*, Tokyo: Funi shuppan, 1982 (reprints of confidential original reports issued between 1932 and 1936).

similarly enlightening.²³ Currency and stamps in the People's Republic, for example, have portrayed particular symbolic images dovetailing with the state's political and economic goals.²⁴ Novel political and economic forms, moreover, were introduced only along with new and appropriate forms of the range of expected necessities of a modern society, such as new forms of sanitation, education, leisure.

Improved sanitation and access to health care for all Chinese was central to consolidating popular support for the new state. New forms in Changchun assumed Japanese standards and infrastructure as a base, a base from which Chinese officials could demonstrate progress.²⁵ Educational matters were similar. Today Changchun is often called a "culture city" (Ch, *wenhua cheng*; J, *bunka jō*), owing to the over sixty universities and academic institutes that dot the city.²⁶ This was to a great extent possible because Chinese could take advantage of the many buildings Japanese built for academic purposes. This included non-academic structures, such as Manchukuo's, now Changchun's, central museum.²⁷ Chinese officials, however, increased that base by either building new facilities or transforming many of Manchukuo's governmental structures into academic institutes.

²³ One recent Chinese discussion of the history of Jilin Province since 1949 focusing on development is *Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin congshu bianjibu*, *Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin*, Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1991, 2 vols.

²⁴ Intriguingly, the paper currency in use until the 1980s containing images of happy workers and soldiers has given way to a current set of bills promoting ethnic harmony.

²⁵ This is very apparent in the multivolume accounts of the history of Changchun and the province of Jilin. See *Jilisheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui*, *Jilin shengzhi* and *Changchunshi nanguanqu difang shizhi bianzuan weiyuanhui*, *Changchunshi*, Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, especially the volume *Weishengzhi*.

²⁶ There are seven universities and over fifty other institutes listed in the *Changchunshi gaodeng jiaoyuzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui*, *Changchunshi gaodeng xuexiao jianjie*, npl: Changchunshi gaodeng jiaoyuzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui bangongshi, 1988. See also *Jilin shengzhi*, vol. 37, *Jiaoyuzhi*.

²⁷ *Jilisheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui*, *Jilin shengzhi*, vol. 39, *Wenhua yishuzhi/shehui wenhua*, Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1992, pp. 234-7.

While the structure that was to be Puyi's palace, for example, became the Institute of Geology, the former Hall of State became part of the Norman Bethune Medical University. Puyi's temporary headquarters in the former *shangbu* became in 1962 a museum dedicated to keeping alive the memory of the Japanese occupation.²⁸

Of course, Chinese experimentation with new educational—and other—forms began before 1945, and not only in Changchun. The first modern Chinese schools to appear in the Changchun area were in the *fuzokuchi* in 1908 and 1909—two of only eleven in the entire province. A library began to operate within one of them in 1910; the first in Jilin city opened only the year before. A second library, a municipal library, appeared on the southern edge of the old city in 1929.²⁹ Nor were these the only elements of a modern society Chinese were quick to adopt. Along with the three Japanese newspapers serving the Changchun area, four Chinese newspapers rapidly appeared, all founded between 1909 and 1924.³⁰

Chinese were slower, however, to adopt public parks—while nineteenth century Changchun, like premodern cities elsewhere, offered no athletic facilities and no green space, only one appeared during the period of this study—Wumalu Gongyuan, built on the site of a former Muslim cemetery in the old city. Officials of the People's Republic were similarly initially not as interested in urban green space and organized sport as prewar Japanese.

²⁸ *Jilin shengzhi*, vol. 39, *Wenhua yishuzhi/shehui wenhua*, p. 240 and Jilinsheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Jilin shengzhi*, vol. 43, *Wenwuzhi*, Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1991, pp. 152-3. Many of the buildings associated with the Puyi regime are now designated as heritage sites. See *ibid.*

²⁹ *Jilin shengzhi*, vol. 39, *Wenhua yishuzhi/shehui wenhua*, pp. 12-9, 109-10, 112.

³⁰ Mantetsu sōseishitsu, *Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi*, vol. 3 and Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku, *Chōshun jijō*, npl: Gaimushō, 1929, pp. 25-26. Although competition reduced the numbers, by 1942 there were still four main papers: one each in Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and English. These papers were the *Manshū shinbun*, *Datongbao*, *Man-Sen nippō*, and the *Manchurian Daily News*. *Shinkyō no gaikyō*, pp. 35-6.

Much of Shinkyō's park space and athletic facilities disappeared under an array of offices and housing projects. This is understandable given the official denigration of 'bourgeois' pursuits throughout much of the history of People's Republic. At the same time, the utilization of such facilities requires a population having a requisite amount of free time, something that until recently Chinese society has not been able to achieve.³¹

Chinese society in the post-Mao era, however, has reversed this trend and experienced a keen interest in greener cities and organized sport.³² The product of sustained economic growth enabling increases in disposable wealth and leisure time, leisure activities are a means by which the current government is asserting a new vision of modernity. This is evident in cities like Changchun. One recent publication proudly discusses the rapid growth of "mass sports activities" (Ch, *qúnzhòng tǐyù*; J, *gunshū tai'iku*) in Changchun and Jilin Province under the rubric of "building civilization" (Ch, *wénhuà jiànshè*; J, *bunka kensetsu*). It concludes with a discussion of the "scientific study of physical education," led in Jilin Province by an academy in Changchun.³³

Public discussion of new forms of sanitation, education, and leisure in the People's Republic reflect the varying concerns of the Chinese Communist Party. Indirectly, they also reflect the role of the party—the bureaucracy was one of a number of industries encouraged by the Japanese that took hold in Changchun. After liberation, Changchun became the capital of Jilin Province, thereby allowing bureaucrats there to continue to dominate

³¹ For a contrasting experience, see the example of the indigenization of cricket in Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*, pp. 89-113.

³² On urban 'greenification' (Ch, *lǜhuà*; J, *midorika*) beginning in the 1960s and developments in Changchun see Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin congshu bianjibu, *Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin*, vol. 2, pp. 527-9.

³³ (Ch, *tǐyù kāyán gōngzuò*; J, *tai'iku kaken kōsaku*). See Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin congshu bianjibu, *Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin*, vol. 2, pp. 168-91.

regional affairs, something reflected in their choice of housing. The area that was the 'civic center' under the Japanese continued to serve that function after 1949. While the former Japanese Embassy became the local headquarters of the Communist Party, across the street the Kantōgun headquarters became the offices of the Provincial Government. On the former Datong Plaza, renamed Stalin Square, the Bank of Manchukuo became a branch of the China People's Bank and the public security offices—the Second Government Building—became the municipal headquarters of China's national Public Security Bureau (Ch, *gōng'ānjú*; J, *kōankyoku*).³⁴

Along with Changchun's academic institutions, Changchun's bureaucracy enabled the continued viability of other Japanese-encouraged industries, such as publishing and the film industry. Changchun's studios were the headquarters of the very first film corporation run by the Chinese Communist Party.³⁵

With the installation of the People's Republic, China managed to 'stand up' and assert a new national identity. Most obviously this meant new means of political and economic organization, but at the same time this endeavor included wider concerns, such as sanitation, education, and leisure. The built environment similarly reflected this new vision. The re-naming of many of Changchun's streets, for example, reflected some of the key concepts adhered to by the new state. While Shuntian ("Obeying Heaven") Boulevard became Xinmin ("New People") Boulevard, Xingren ("Rising Benevolence") became Jiefang ("Liberation") Boulevard. Datong Boulevard became first Stalin and then in the 1990s Renmin ("People's") Boulevard.

³⁴ For a comparative perspective on the appeal of bureaucracy among colonized peoples, see Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*, chapter 6, "Number in the Colonial Imagination," pp. 114–135.

³⁵ See Changchunshi nanguanqu difang shizhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Changchunshi: Dianyingzhi*, Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1993, and Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin congshu bianjibu, *Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin*, vol. 2, pp. 90–108.

Of greater impact than the naming of streets were new architectural forms. Instead of looking to western Europe and North America for architectural guidance, however, the People's Republic in the main adopted styles derived from structures in the Soviet Union.³⁶ Common motifs included a concern for monumentality and modernism. Soviet architecture, however, was not the only source of inspiration.

Although Japanese after 1945 shunned anything resembling the *kōza* style, a wave of structures built in the late 1950s and early 1960s by architects in the People's Republic blended traditional Chinese motifs together with the international style that were distinctly reminiscent of Manchukuo's façades. Designed in an "ethnic style" (Ch, *mínzú xíngshì*; J, *minzoku keishiki*) these included structures as significant as the new Beijing Station (Figure 9.3), the Beijing Guest House—for many years the only hotel open to foreigners—and numerous halls at Beijing University.³⁷ It is tempting to distinguish this construction as entirely separate from those structures built during the Japanese occupation except that Changchun itself joined the movement by completing Puyi's new palace in the 1950s (Figure 9.4) and adding a wholly new structure—the Jilin Provincial Library (1960)—on the former Shuntian Dajie so that it blended in with the official Manchukuo structures (Figure 9.5).³⁸ Other structures in keeping with this style were the Changchun South

³⁶ A discussion of new expressions of the built environment in Beijing is Zixuan Zhu and Reginald Yin-Wang Kwok, "Beijing: The Expression of National Political Ideology," in Won Bae Kim, Mike Douglass, Sang-Chuel Choe, and Kong Chong Ho, eds., *Culture and the City in East Asia*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 131-47.

³⁷ See, for example, The Administration for City Planning, ed., *Modern Peking, Beijing*: Foreign Language Press, 1963, p. 20 and *passim*. See also the discussion in Koshizawa, *Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku*, pp. 215-8.

³⁸ During the era of its hegemony, the Guomindang also attempted new structures using traditional motifs, but the façades of many, like Shanghai's city hall, were more similar to traditional façades than to the international style.

Lake Guest Hotel and the towers flanking the main entrance to Changchun's renowned automobile manufacturing plant.³⁹

The 'ethnic style' of the People's Republic, however, entailed a different meaning than that of the Japanese *kō A* style. Whereas the *kō A* style hoped to inspire pan-Asian sentiments, the 'ethnic style' was more modern—it represented a more purely nationalist style. For Chinese, the blending of traditional motifs and contemporary techniques was a statement representing not only a new social synthesis and the successful integration of a society and its outlook, but also Han resurgence. It represented the values of a particular nation-state, initially what *teikan-yōshiki* (the 'imperial crown style') attempted to do in Japan itself.

One of the fundamental assumptions inherent in the 'new imperialism' of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was that imperialism as a 'civilizing mission' was progressive. Based on recently concocted scientific perceptions and a changed notion of time—linear, cumulative, and secular as opposed to cyclical, particular, and sacred—imperialist modernity sanctioned the domination and reformation of foreign societies so as to bring them too under modernity's wings. A 'universalizing and globalizing impulse' was implicit to the creation of modern society.⁴⁰

The problematic natures of that impulse, however, have become increasingly clear. Bruno Latour has gone so far as to suggest that the very effort to become modern is inherently contradictory and impossible to

³⁹ Changchun's auto plant was a post-liberation gift by the state to insure the city's economic stability. It became famous for its *Jiefang* (*Liberation*) trucks, until recently ubiquitous in the People's Republic.

⁴⁰ See the discussion in Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, *Telling the Truth about History*, New York: Norton, 1995, esp. chapter 2, "Scientific History and the Idea of Modernity," pp. 52-90.

achieve—would-be moderns have succeeded only in divorcing basic aspects of human life from one another in a manner that has rendered modern vision myopic. Those motivated by modernity's visions have ultimately only fooled themselves.⁴¹

Japanese, in their creation of new civic societies like the Mantetsu *fuzokuchi* and the Manchukuo *guodu*, fell into similar traps. The Changchun *fuzokuchi* and Shinkyō *guodu*, both aggressively modern, demonstrate also the dangers of modernist projects.

Japanese went about creating the new so much so that earlier heroes were overlooked. Makino Masao noted painfully that Manchukuo in general ignored Mantetsu's thirty years experience. Popular works such as Tokutomi Sohō's *Manshū Kenkoku tokuhon* (*A Primer on the Creation of Manchukuo*) even downplayed the far-reaching effects of Gotō Shimpei's administration, including the groundbreaking efforts involving infrastructure and investigation. This was because, of course, Mantetsu's modernity was based more solidly on western definitions, and thus seemed relatively "poor" (*hinkon*). Still, to Makino, Mantetsu's efforts marked the beginning of Japanese efforts to study and apply new kinds of structures necessary for much colder climates than Japanese usually faced. How much more difficult this would have been had Japanese come over to Manchuria without Mantetsu's pioneering work! In Makino's opinion, Japanese understanding of Chinese architectural forms would also have been a great deal less without Mantetsu's "accumulated potential energy."⁴²

⁴¹ Bruno Latour, Catherine Porter, tr., *We Have Never Been Modern*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.

⁴² "Chikusetsu shite ita potensharu enerugii." Makino, "Kenkoku jūnen to kenchiku bunka," pp. 16-7. In this essay, Makino went also to great lengths in an attempt to rehabilitate traditional Chinese architecture. His introduction is telling: "Garlic-eating people [should not be] judged (*wakaranai*) for stinking of garlic. Having lived in Manchuria for eight years I have been immersed in garlic, and I have come to feel that garlic-stinking construction (*ninniku*

At the same time, others did not feel that Shinkyō was revolutionary enough. Ishikawa Hideaki, for example, complained that not only were Mantetsu's earlier urban planning efforts, including the Changchun *fuzokuchi*, overly dependent upon the railway, they did not sufficiently privilege the administrative aspects—including the military—with regard to the new capital's planning. The fact that Shinkyō's new architecture was so eye-catching was also a drawback he thought. That rendered the capital too susceptible to air attacks. The capital in his opinion was thus "mediocre" (*chūyō*).⁴³

Perhaps most indicative of modernity's contradictory nature in the *fuzokuchi* and the *guodu* was the continued maintenance of a strong police force in the railway town and imperial capital despite official pronouncements of a prevailing harmony. The railway town included not only the treaty-sanctioned railway guards but a variety of other police organizations not agreed to by treaty, such as the consular police. Shinkyō's planners were similarly security conscious. Planners were careful to locate police and other guards strategically throughout the capital.⁴⁴ Periodic police reorganizations, like the one in 1940, assured that the municipal police

kusai kenchiku) is not strange to look at." *Ibid.*, p. 15. In addressing a Japanese audience in this way, Makino attempted to subdue a Japanese stereotype of Chinese so that Japanese could more acceptably learn from Chinese. Makino also reminded readers that Japan's own traditions were quite varied, including both fisher folk from the south Pacific and Tungusic central Asian hunters, implying that Japanese by tradition had borrowed much in Asia in order to 'form their ethnic selves' (*Yamato minzoku no kōsei*). Each tradition had valid reasons for creating structures as they did. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-8, and *passim*.

⁴³ See Ishikawa Hideaki, "Shina toshi keikaku kangae," *TK* 17:1, January 1934, pp. 139-58, Ishikawa Hideaki, "Shina toshi keikaku kangae (2)," *TK* 17:2, February 1934, pp. 39-56, and Ishikawa Hideaki, "Shinkyō toshi keikaku zehi ni tsuikisu," *TK* 17:3, March 1934, pp. 82-7.

⁴⁴ *STKH*, pp. 1, 38, 69, 74-5, 96. Excerpts of the official Manchukuo directives for the stationing of guards appeared in "Manshūkoku bōeihō," *MKZ* 18:9, September 1938, pp. 21-23. A large body of imperial bodyguards were stationed just north of the palace. Sano, "Manshū no kokuto kensetsu keikaku," p. 44.

organization kept pace with the city's expansion.⁴⁵ Another way to keep up with urban expansion was to organize neighborhood associations to maintain public peace (Table 9.1) and stifle suspect activities, as was done in Japan.

Table 9.1 Neighborhood Organizations in Shinkyō, 1942

	<u>sub-</u> <u>districts</u>	<u>total</u> <u>squads</u>	<u>leaders</u>		<u>total</u> <u>units</u>	<u>leaders</u>		<u>people</u> <u>/unit</u>
			<u>Ip</u>	<u>M</u>		<u>Ip</u>	<u>M</u>	
Shikishima	9	127	121	6	992	834	158	81
Kuanchengzi	4	42	27	15	304	109	195	64
Changchun	11	184	10	174	1,679	149	1,530	81
Datong	11	147	38	109	1,344	260	1,084	80
Shuntian	14	177	177	—	1,309	1,305	5	47
Anmin	3	49	49	—	283	283	—	36
Xiyang	2	25	24	1	152	146	6	32
Dongguang	3	53	39	14	444	292	125	45
Heshun	9	129	10	119	1,297	87	1,210	62
Dongrong	6	86	—	86	671	—	671	60
(total of ten inner districts)	72	1,019	475	524	8,575	3,464	5,011	64
Jingyue	3	222	3	19	136	7	129	116
Nanhedong	2	18	1	17	114	4	110	101
Beihedong	3	22	—	22	108	—	108	82
Helong	3	70	2	68	343	7	336	104
Dacun	4	53	4	49	218	4	214	71
Shuangde	3	22	—	22	101	1	100	114
(total of six outer districts)	18	207	10	197	1,020	23	997	97
Total	90	1,226	505	721	9,495	3,487	6,007	68

Source: Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō tokubetsushi kōsho, 1942, pp. 69-71. The people per unit column represents the number of people per unit or "group" based on the population provided in Table 6.8 *Distribution of Population within Shinkyō in 1942*.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Shinkyō tokubetsushi chōkanbō shomuka, *Kokuto Shinkyō*, Shinkyō: Shinkyō tokubetsushi kōsho, 1942, pp. 64-66.

⁴⁶ The city's districts were divided into sub-districts which in turn were divided into "squads" (Ch, *bān*; J, *hān*). Each squad was divided into "groups" (Ch, *zǔ*; J, *kumi*). Japanese neighborhoods were more tightly organized than Chinese, having fewer people per "group."

Military affairs were also important. In preparation for war, officials organized air defense drills, closely monitoring residential and industrial precautions.⁴⁷ But more commonly the Japanese military attempted to downplay its central role in the puppet state by entrenching itself north of the capital along the former CER in a ten square kilometer patch equipped with an autonomous airfield, a wireless facility, and barracks.⁴⁸

Beyond these preparations, however, was something unthinkable. In 1936, the nearby town of Mengjiatun, a few kilometers southwest of the city center, became home to Unit 100, comprising between six and eight hundred men. It was perhaps the second most active bacteriological warfare unit in Manchuria after the more notorious Unit 731. Occupying some twenty square kilometers, the station comprised a large farm, underground laboratories, three crematoria, and tight security. Under the command of Major Wakamatsu Yujirō, Unit 100 personnel conducted medical experiments on Chinese rounded up by Japanese police in the capital itself. Not content to study the effects of narcotics, pesticides, plague, anthrax and other diseases on human subjects in the laboratory, Unit 100 personnel were also active in the field. Like Unit 731, branch units existed throughout Manchuria, and personnel were active in China, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union throughout the war attempting to infect civilian populaces by airborne and other means. Field experiments apparently took place even in and around the capital—beginning in 1940 epidemics occurred in the capital and the surrounding environs.⁴⁹ This too was part of Shinkyō's modernity, part

the smallest unit in the system. The inner ten districts were also more tightly organized than the outer six. The lack of Manchurian leaders of either squads or units in certain sections demonstrates what parts of the city were inhabited more by Japanese.

⁴⁷ A report of a drill in 1937 is *Naimu shiryō geppō* 1:4, October 1937, pp. 62-7.

⁴⁸ Nakano, "Kokuto Shinkyō no kensetsu," p. 167.

⁴⁹ Mengjiatun (J, Mōkaton) lay on the SMR just southwest of the 1932 municipal boundary of the capital, only five kilometers from the new palace. See the discussion in Takasugi Shingo, 731

of an unreflective application of science and technology to meet immediate needs. Vastly inferior numerically to Chinese and technologically inferior to Soviet military power, Japanese resorted to whatever means they could to protect their economic and emotional investment on the continent.

The surveillance system the Japanese introduced and the biological experiments Japanese attempted exceeded anything comparable among colonial policies. Yet at the same time, along with new forms of architecture and administration, they represented logical extensions of a process already at work fifty years earlier—the untrammelled use of a foreign society as a laboratory to further an imperialist country's needs. They thus signify the potential for monstrosity inherent in any attempt to create society anew.

Yet they also represent something more—hesitant steps towards a postcolonial world. By the late 1920s, imperialism was increasingly perceived to be no longer an acceptable means of organizing international relations, and Japanese struggled to re-invent it. Manchukuo was at heart a grander experiment; it was an attempt to supplant an imperialist relationship with something new, a contrived nation-state directed at achieving a definition of modernity imposed from without. Not a colony in the late nineteenth-century sense, Manchukuo was a precursor to postwar Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and the American attempt to create a democracy in Vietnam. All of these entailed foreign-inspired visions of modernity implemented through native regimes. Ultimately, they also required foreign troops.

The overseas commitment of troops, however, was one of the reasons for imperialism's decline. Bringing colonial societies under control militarily

butai kinsen no ishi wo oe: Ima mo tsutsuku kyōfu no jintai jikken, Tokyo: Tokuma shobō, 1982, pp. 180-96, and Sheldon H. Harris, *Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover-Up*, London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 84-100. Along with Ishii Shirō and Kitano Masaji, Takasugi considered Wakamatsu one of the three most important figures involved in bacteriological warfare experiments in Manchuria.

proved consistently to be one of the more contentious drawbacks at home to imperialist policies overseas. Public opinion in the home countries increasingly questioned such policies because—among other reasons—simple military domination was not modern. Instead, Japanese, as well as later Soviet and American, authorities applied the rhetoric of nation-state building according to select principles current in their own country—rendering them acceptable to opinion at home—to native puppet regimes.

Conscious of needing to commit minimal numbers of troops, officials supplemented these visions with escalating technological solutions appropriated from other elements of modern society at home. With retreat an unacceptable option, heightened police and biological experiments reflected only the extreme ends of a continuum of potential bureaucratic and military responses. They were thus the product of the extended application of scientific rationalism to difficult, real life situations. In a similar manner to the Japanese in Manchukuo, the Soviet occupation of eastern Europe involved secret police and proxy troops and American aid to South Vietnam involved strategic hamlets and napalm.⁵⁰ In the post-colonial age, the over-commitment of national troops had to be avoided. What was more, troops could only be committed if there was an energizing vision of modernity to motivate them.

Japanese imperialism in Manchuria resulted in the brutal subjugation of Chinese and other peoples for whom modernist projects initially had little meaning. At the same time, however, the occupation resulted also in Manchuria becoming China's postwar industrial center. Contemporary

⁵⁰ There were also charges of American use of bacteriological warfare during the Korean War, including the rumored involvement of former Imperial Japanese Army personnel stationed in Manchuria. See Takasugi, *731 butai*, pp. 180-2, and *passim*, and Harris, *Factories of Death*, pp. 230-2.

problems in Sino-Japanese relations remain because each side tends to focus on only one dimension of this experience. While Chinese historians understandably emphasize the horrific, until recently Japanese historians have asserted primarily the more positive aspects of their rule. Caught in the contemporary projects of competing nation-states, perspectives in each society tend toward portrayals of themselves and the other that are either black or white. Coming to grips with the creation of modern societies, however, requires a great deal more gray. Japanese activities in northeast China were brutal, but Japanese for the most part perceived themselves to be acting progressively. Some of those activities, such as those involved in encouraging the formation of an industrial nation-state, are still widely considered to be progressive. To address this experience more fruitfully, a closer examination of the terms of this wider conception of modernity is necessary, and not only in Japan.

Figure 9.1 Manchukuo Stamps




Figure 9.2 Manchukuo Currency




Figure 9.3 Beijing Central Train Station




Source: The Administration for City Planning, *Modern Peking*, p. 20

Figure 9.4 Institute of Geology



Source: Photo by author

Figure 9.5 Jilin Provincial Library, Changchun



Source: Photo by author

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