THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

# The Argument from Conflicting Appearances

by

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A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

JUNE, 1998

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# ABSTRACT

In the dissertation I answer an argument which I label the argument from conflicting appearances. Briefly put, this argument contends that the existence of conflicting appearances, for example water feeling hot to a cold hand but warm to a hand at room temperature, shows that we do not directly perceive external objects. I argue that the argument, though valid, is not obviously sound; the reason so many philosophers have thought it obviously sound, however, is that there is an assumption about perception at work in the background. This implicit assumption I label the revelatory standard of direct perception, which says that for direct perception to be valid, the subject cannot affect the nature of his perceptual awareness. The revelatory standard generates the argument because the existence of conflicting appearances shows that we do affect the nature of our perceptual awareness of external objects—which means, according to the standard, that we cannot be directly perceiving them. I argue that the revelatory standard should be discarded because it treats direct perception as causeless.

In the rest of the dissertation I present a view of perceptual awareness that is free of the revelatory standard yet capable of explaining the existence of conflicting appearances in direct realist terms. I argue that the subject does affect the nature of his perceptual awareness of the object, but that this does not mean, as is usually assumed, that he affects the nature of the object of his perceptual awareness—in some sense constituting or creating the object of his awareness. Rather, the subject affects the nature of his awareness of the external object. An implication of this approach is that sensory qualities are not intrinsic qualities of an object but relational qualities. They are the intrinsic properties of the external object as perceived by a specific subject in specific conditions of perception. I then show how this view of perceptual awareness can explain the existence

of conflicting appearances in direct realist terms. Conflicting appearances are cases where we directly perceive the same external object and intrinsic property but the nature of the awareness differs.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dennis for his advice and encouragement during this lengthy project.

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# CHAPTER ONE

## *INTRODUCTION*

### (1) The Aim of the Dissertation

The aim of the dissertation is (i) to argue that an argument which has been advanced throughout the history of philosophy to challenge the belief that we directly perceive external objects and states of affairs, an argument that I am calling the argument from conflicting appearances, is unsound; and then (ii) to develop an explanation of the existence of conflicting appearances compatible with the belief that we directly perceive external objects and states of affairs, that is, compatible with perceptual realism.

The term "conflicting appearances" is a broad term meant to capture a rather large range of cases and facts, but the common idea is that there can be variations in how an object appears to a subject, variations that are caused by something other than an actual variation in the object. At least the following sorts of cases fall under the term: variations in the appearance of objects because of changes in the surrounding conditions of perception (e.g., variations in the apparent colour of an object because of changes in the ambient level of lighting); variations in the appearance of objects because of changes in the medium of perception (e.g., a straight stick appearing bent when seen partially immersed in water); variations in the appearance of objects because of changes in the position of the perceiver (e.g., variations in the apparent size of a car when seen from two feet away versus when seen from atop a forty-story building); variations in the appearance of objects because of changes in the bodily conditions of the perceiver (e.g., a piece of food appearing sweet when the perceiver is healthy, bitter when he is

sick); and variations in the appearance of objects because of different perceivers possessing different sense organs (e.g., the variation in visual appearance between a perceiver with normal vision and one who is colour blind, or the variations in appearance of a mosquito when perceived by a human being and by a bat).[1] In other words, the term "conflicting appearances" designates many cases of perceptual relativity and many illusions.

Specific instantiations of the argument from conflicting appearances normally attempt to cast doubt on or, more usually but more strongly, to show the falsity of the idea that we directly perceive independently-existing external objects (like tables and chairs) by appeal to the existence of conflicting appearances.[2] It is from this perspective that the arguments will be considered in the dissertation. The idea that one directly perceives an object(s) is, roughly speaking, the idea that one is perceptually aware of the object(s) not in virtue of being aware of some intermediary object(s).[3] Arguments from conflicting appearances most often attack the directness of our perception of external objects. The arguments claim that the existence of conflicting appearances casts doubt on or, again more usually but more strongly, shows the falsity of the idea that we perceive external objects directly. At most, the claim usually is, we can perceive such objects only in virtue of being directly aware of some intermediary (mental) objects, such as sensations, perceptions, ideas, or sense-data. Such arguments have a long history. One can find versions of them in the philosophies of, among others, Democritus, the ancient Greek skeptics, Bayle, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill, Russell, Price, Broad, and Ayer.

The way that arguments from conflicting appearances proceed, as we shall see in much more detail in the next chapter, is, normally and roughly, in the following manner. The existence of conflicting appearances is taken to mean that the conflicting sensory qualities (e.g., water feeling warm to one hand, hot to another) cannot <u>both</u> be intrinsic properties of the object itself, since if they were intrinsic properties of the object they would be contrary

properties of the object, and an object cannot have contrary properties. It is therefore concluded that at least one of the two sensory qualities, since it cannot be "in" the object, as its intrinsic property, and since if it exists it must exist somewhere, exists not "in" the object but (since there seems to be no where else for it to exist) "in" the mind, as the intrinsic property of a mental item (an idea, a sense datum, etc.). Finally, since there seems to be no difference between the instance of perceptual awareness in question (say the water feeling hot to one hand), whose sensory qualities exists "in" the mind, and any other instance of perceptual awareness, it is concluded that what is true of the instance of perceptual awareness in question is true of all instances of perceptual awareness. What we directly perceive when we perceive objects with various sensory qualities are not external objects but internal objects, to which the sensory qualities attach as intrinsic properties.

One central issue which the dissertation will address is why such arguments have been prevalent for centuries in philosophy and why, given the attacks on both the validity and the soundness of the argument by such twentieth century writers as Hirst, Armstrong, Comman, and (perhaps most famously) Austin,[4] the argument nevertheless continues to win appeal. Snowdon, for instance, in a recent article seems to contend—as we shall see in the next chapter—that (i) the argument from conflicting appearances remains unanswered and (ii) what a perceptual realist (who believes that we do directly perceive external, physical objects) needs to do in order to answer the argument is develop an alternative to the traditional account of perceptual awareness and appearances. I think that criticisms like Austin's have failed to be decisive, leaving Snowdon and many others unconvinced, because they have failed to penetrate to the fundamental. My claim in the dissertation is that there is an underlying and fundamental assumption about the nature of direct perceptual awareness that generates the argument from conflicting appearances, an assumption shared by many philosophers who nevertheless disagree

about many other philosophical issues about perception, an assumption that has not yet been clearly identified and, for that very reason, has not yet been explicitly rejected. This fundamental assumption is the reason why the argument from conflicting appearances has been so prevalent and the reason why, so long as the assumption remains in place, so long as it is not explicitly rejected, more derivative criticisms of the argument from conflicting appearances will remain unpersuasive, at least to those who hold the assumption (and there are many such).

This fundamental assumption about the nature of direct perceptual awareness, often only held implicitly by a philosopher, I will call "the revelatory standard of direct perception." Briefly put, the standard holds that in direct perceptual awareness the way in which an object appears to a subject must be determined solely by the nature of the object. I will argue that the standard should be rejected completely.

An implication of the revelatory standard of direct perception, I will show, is that sensory qualities are viewed as intrinsic qualities of something, either of an external object or of an internal (mental or intentional) object. I will argue that sensory qualities should not be viewed as intrinsic qualities of anything but as relational qualities, and that when they are so viewed the existence of conflicting appearances can be explained while still maintaining that we directly perceive external objects. This issue will be the other central issue which the dissertation addresses. I will propose an alternative to the traditional account of perceptual awareness and appearances (which designates sensory qualities as intrinsic properties of something). I will argue that sensory qualities are the perceptual forms in which we are aware of the intrinsic properties of external objects. A sensory quality is a specific intrinsic property (or properties) of an object as it is perceived by the subject. As such, it is a relational quality and exists only in the interaction between the external object and the perceiving subject. Looking at the same idea from another perspective, my alternative account will hold that the

specific sensory qualities of our perceptual awareness are instances of how we are aware of the external world and external objects, which are what we are aware of. My alternative account of perceptual awareness will give us the means to interpret the existence of conflicting appearances in a different and new way, compatible with directly perceiving external objects, compatible, that is, with (some versions of) perceptual realism.

The above, then, is the aim of the dissertation. This means that the aim of the dissertation is not to develop a new theory of perception. And this means that many philosophical questions pertinent to the nature of perception will not be addressed in the dissertation, let alone answered. I think it is clear that given the two central issues which the dissertation is addressing, namely, (i) identification and rebuttal of the fundamental assumption that makes the argument from conflicting appearances seem sound and (ii) development of a new view of perceptual awareness and appearances, one that makes sensory qualities relational instead of intrinsic and that can explain the existence of conflicting appearances in direct realist terms, the dissertation is addressing a delimited problem. Its aim, therefore, is not and could not be to develop a new theory of perception but only a new view of perceptual awareness.

A view of perceptual awareness forms one part of a theory of perception. Berkeley's and Hume's views of the nature of perceptual awareness, for instance, are similar in that both accord the status of "in the mind" to perceived sensory qualities, despite the fact that they have different overall theories of the nature of perception. The main issue which a view of perceptual awareness addresses, as we will see, is how, in general terms, the causality involved in perception should be understood and conceptualized.

Because the dissertation focuses on a general and abstract assumption about the nature of perceptual awareness that I think accounts for the appeal of the argument from conflicting appearances, and then on replacing the assumption with a different view of perceptual

awareness, the discussion will often take place at a fairly abstract level. The appeal of the argument from conflicting appearances, in other words, I think does not live and breathe in the details (I am well aware that this goes against the mindset of many analytically-trained philosophers) but in the more abstract fundamentals.

## (2) Outline of the Dissertation

With the above said, it is I think now a good time to outline the dissertation chapter by chapter.

Of course this chapter, Chapter One, presents the aim and an outline of the dissertation.

Chapter Two will be devoted to giving some examples of the argument from conflicting appearances and then to discussing the basic structure of the argument as well as the need for identifying the fundamental assumption that makes the argument seem sound to so many. It may be that the reader will think that I have given more examples of the argument than is necessary, but it should be kept in mind that part of my reason for giving a number of examples is to show how prevalent and widely accepted the argument has been throughout the history of philosophy; this I think is the best way to show that even though the dissertation is addressing a quite specific philosophical issue about perception it is nevertheless addressing an important one. Furthermore, I will not return to discuss in any detail specific examples of the argument from conflicting appearances later in the dissertation, so the examples given at the outset must suffice to carry the whole discussion.

Chapter Three will identify and explain the fundamental assumption that generates the argument from conflicting appearances, namely, the revelatory standard of direct perception,

including, most importantly, its conceptualization of the causal processing (or lack thereof) involved in direct perceptual awareness.

Chapter Four will discuss three fairly recent direct perceptual realist explanations of the existence of conflicting appearances, Armstrong's, Charlesworth's, and Searle's, explanations that try to avoid the pitfalls involved in the argument from conflicting appearances and its assumption of the revelatory standard of direct perception, explanations that reject perceptual representationalism and idealism and want instead to maintain that we directly perceive external objects—that is, to uphold direct perceptual realism. I will explain why I find these explanations of the existence of conflicting appearances, as well as the more general accounts of perceptual awareness involved in the explanations, unsatisfactory.

Chapter Five will complete the discussion in Chapter Four, explaining why I do not think that the existence of hallucinations forces one to adopt an analysis of perceptual awareness that postulates the existence of perceptual experiences as a third element in perceptual awareness, over and above the external object and the subject perceptually aware of the external object (as Searle's account of perceptual awareness, for example, postulates).

Chapter Six will outline the main issues an account of perceptual awareness should address. The central issue, as we shall see, is how, in general terms, to conceptualize and understand the causality involved in perception.

Chapter Seven will present my view of the nature of perceptual awareness and appearances, of how, in general terms, to conceptualize and understand the causality involved in direct perception. Here I will explain why I think sensory qualities are relational, not intrinsic, qualities.

Chapter Eight will contrast my account of perceptual awareness to an account that may seem very close to mine, namely the one advanced by Tye.

Chapter Nine will present my explanation of the existence of conflicting appearances, an explanation compatible with my direct realist view of perceptual awareness.

Chapter Ten will deal with a significant objection to my whole approach: the objection that my general account of perceptual awareness, contrary to what I maintain, commits me to something like Putnam's internal realism. In distinguishing my view from Putnam's, I will explain why, unlike Putnam, I do not think that we fail to perceive reality as it "really is."

## NOTES

[1]Compare these to some of the ten modes of the ancient Greek skeptics, as listed by Sextus Empiricus. Sextus writes: "The older skeptics normally offer ten modes in number through which we are thought to conclude to suspension of judgement. (They use 'arguments' or 'schemata' as synonyms for 'modes'.) They are: first, the mode depending on variations among animals; second, that depending on the differences among humans; third, that depending on the differing constitutions of the sense-organs; fourth, that depending on circumstances; fifth, that depending on positions and intervals and places;...eighth, that deriving from relativity...." Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism: 12-13 (trs. Annas and Barnes).

[2]We will examine some specific examples of the argument in the next chapter.

[3]See Comman, Perception, Common Sense, and Science, chapter 1.

[4]See Hirst, The Problems of Perception; Armstrong, Perception and the Physical World; Comman, Perception, Common Sense, and Science; and Austin, Sense and Sensibilia.

# CHAPTER TWO

## *THE ARGUMENT FROM CONFLICTING APPEARANCES*

In this chapter I give four examples of the argument from conflicting appearances and then examine the basic structure of the argument. Note that in the examples the argument is presented with varying degrees of precision of expression and with similar, but by no means exactly the same, lessons being drawn from the argument (one can appreciate this more fully if one consults the actual texts to grasp the particular philosopher's full context and purpose). The various instances of the argument, as I said in the previous chapter, attempt to cast doubt on or show the falsity of the belief that we directly perceive external objects. Where the arguments mostly differ is in what they hold that we directly perceive instead. I have picked four examples of the argument (from various periods in the history of philosophy) that I think are relatively straightforward and clear. For lack of a better order, I have presented the examples in chronological order, but of course I am not presenting a historical survey of the uses of the argument from conflicting appearances.

### (1) Some Examples of the Argument from Conflicting Appearances

#### (a) Democritus

Let us begin with one of the earliest examples in Western philosophy of the argument from conflicting appearances, the case of Democritus. We will have to piece

together his argument, since unfortunately only fragments of his writings have survived. Consider some of these fragments:

> #1. The truth is that what we meet with perceptually is nothing reliable, for it shifts its character according to the body's dispositions, influences, and confrontations.
> #3. It has been demonstrated more than once that we do not discover by direct perception what the nature of each thing is or is not.
> #7. By convention there is sweet, by convention there is bitter, by convention hot and cold, by convention colour; but in reality there are only atoms and the void.
> #2. By this criterion man must learn that he is divorced from reality.[1]

The thrust of these fragments seems to be that because colour, sweetness and bitterness, hotness and coldness—in general, the perceived sensory qualities of an object—can vary when the object itself does not (fragment #1), sensory qualities are not intrinsic qualities of the object. Democritus's reasoning is probably something like this. When water, for instance, perceptually appears hot to one hand but cold to the other hand, at least one of these sensory qualities is not "in" the object since they are contrary qualities and the object cannot have contrary qualities. The sensory qualities of hot and of cold, however, will have the same ontological status. So if one is not "in" the external object, neither is the other. And if none of the perceived sensory qualities is "in" the external object, as one of its inherent properties, then we cannot be directly perceiving the external object; if we directly perceive anything, it is probably only the way in which the external object affects our mind. This leads to the conclusion that we are divorced from reality, at least at the perceptual level of awareness, because what we are directly aware of (the object and its sensory qualities that are appearing) is not inherent to (external) reality.

Putting the conclusion in more modern terms, we would say that we do not directly perceive external objects and their intrinsic properties. Consider for example how the commentator Owens describes Democritus's view:

> Only atoms and void...exist in reality. They are not perceived by the senses, and so are impervious to direct human knowledge. What they are in themselves, as distinguished from how they appear through sensation, cannot be known....Human cognition attains merely the effects of the moving atoms upon one's body. These effects vary according to the way in which the body happens to be disposed at the moment. Hence arises the conventional character of the sweet and the bitter and the other sensible perceptions. Against a quite obviously Parmenidean background, the world as reported by the senses is regarded as set up by the work of human cognition.[2]

Note that the point of calling sweet, cold, etc., "conventional" seems to be to stress that they are not inherent qualities of reality, that they are not "in" the external object but rather "in" the mind. As Burnyeat expresses the point:

> If we speak of honey as sweet it is because this is the response sanctioned by custom and convention, especially linguistic convention, to the way certain atoms impinge on our organs of taste, but there is no more to it than that: no more than a response to atomic stimuli. Terms like 'sweet' and 'bitter', 'white' and 'black', correspond to nothing in the collections of atoms which constitute things in the world around us. Our attributions of what were later called secondary qualities are a projection on to that world of our own, merely subjective affections.[3]

What we will be trying to identify in the dissertation is why so many think, along with Democritus, that if the perceptual awareness of an object varies when the object does not, we are not really directly perceiving the external object. Moreover, we will try to

identify why it is so often thought that if sensory qualities do not exist "in" the object, then the only other possible alternative is that they exist "in" the mind.

(b) Bayle

The arguments of the ancient skeptics often appealed to the existence of conflicting appearances in order to show why we should suspend judgment; these arguments resurfaced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, modified to suit the concerns of the day, and were thought to have considerable force. Bayle in his *Dictionaire historique et critique*, for example, claimed that some skeptical arguments for the "unreality" of secondary qualities worked equally well against the reality of primary qualities.

> Since the same bodies are sweet to some men, and bitter to others, it may reasonably be inferred that they are neither sweet nor bitter in their nature, and absolutely speaking: The modern Philosophers, though they are no Sceptics, have so well apprehended the foundation of epoche [suspension of judgment] with relations to sounds, odours, heat and cold, hardness and softness, ponderosity and lightness, savours and colours, etc., that they teach that all these qualities are perceptions of our mind, and do not exist in the objects of our senses [emphasis mine]. Why should we not say the same thing of extension? If a being, void of colour, yet appears to us under a colour determined as to its species, figure and situation, why cannot a being, without any extension, be visible to us, under an appearance of determinate extension, shaped, and situated in a certain manner? Observe, also, that the same body appears to us little or great, round or square, according to the place from whence we view it....It is not therefore by their proper, real, or absolute extension that objects present themselves to our mind: whence we may conclude that in themselves they are not extended.[4]

It is the same basic reasoning as Democritus's, but more explicitly formulated. If perceptual awareness varies when the external object remains unchanged, one cannot be directly perceiving the external object. Why? This is what we must answer in the dissertation. And notice again that the only two alternatives envisioned are that sensory qualities exist "in" the object or "in" the mind. Since it is thought that sensory qualities are not "in" the object, it is concluded that they must be "in" the mind—or, as Richard Popkin puts it, for Bayle "all qualities, whether primary or secondary, are reduced to the status of appearances or modifications of the soul."[5] Again, why are these the only two alternatives envisioned?

(c) Berkeley

Berkeley used the same kind of argument to advance his perceptual idealism. Consider, for instance, one of Berkeley's many uses of the argument in the first of the Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous.

> *Phil.* But for your farther satisfaction, take this along with you: that which at other times seems sweet, shall to a distempered palette appear bitter. And nothing can be plainer, than that divers persons perceive different tastes in the same food, since that which one man delights in, another abhors. And how can this be, if the taste was something really inherent in the food?
> *Hyl.* I acknowledge I know not how.[6]

Again the idea, though only briefly stated by Berkeley because it was common currency at the time, is that both sensory qualities, that of sweet and that of bitter, cannot be "in" the object since they are contraries and the object cannot have contrary properties.

The reasonable conclusion, it is thought, is that neither is "in" the object; and as everyone knows, Berkeley's positive conclusion is that both are "in" the mind. Thus we have very similar reasoning to that of Democritus and Bayle—except for the fact that Berkeley's ultimate conclusions about perception are not quite so skeptical.[7]

(d) Russell

In the first half of the twentieth century, arguments from conflicting appearances were widely deployed, and it seems that almost everyone thought them sound. One can see them used, for example, by such philosophers as Russell, Price, Broad, and Ayer. Let us look at an example from Russell. We will see that his argument is not new to the twentieth century but just a re-statement of arguments that have been advanced for centuries. Consider, for example, an argument that Russell gives in The Problems of Philosophy.

> We are all in the habit of judging as to the 'real' shape of things, and we do this so unreflectingly that we come to think we actually see the real shapes. But, in fact, as we all have to learn if we try to draw, a given thing looks different in shape from every different point of view. If our table is 'really' rectangular, it will look, from almost all points of view, as if it had two acute angles and two obtuse angles....All these things are not commonly noticed in looking at a table, because experience has taught us to construct the 'real' shape from the apparent shape....But the real shape is not what we see; it is something inferred from what we see....so that here again the senses seem not to give us the truth about the table itself, but only about the appearance of the table....
>
> Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing....
>
> Let us give the name of 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation....[8]

According to Russell, the external, public, physical table is rectangular; in other words, independently from the awareness of any perceiver, the table's real shape (as Russell puts it) is rectangular. Yet, according to Russell, the table does not (always) appear to have this rectangular shape. From this he concludes that we are not directly aware of the external, public, physical table and its shape. We have here again, in other words, the same pattern of reasoning as in Democritus, Bayle, etc. What we must explain is why it is thought to be sound.

## (2) The Basic Structure of the Argument from Conflicting Appearances

We now have a number of instances of the argument from conflicting appearances before us. It is clear I think that the argument from conflicting appearances has had a long history and that many first-rate philosophers have found it sound. But what is the argument's exact structure? And why do so many philosophers think that if the way an external object appears varies when the object itself does not, we are not directly perceiving the external object and its intrinsic properties? In his recent paper "How To Interpret 'Direct Perception'" Paul Snowdon gives an analysis of the general structure of some arguments from conflicting appearances (which he labels arguments from illusion).[9] I want to take a look at his analysis because I think it is accurate as far as it goes and accords closely with my own analysis.

Snowdon is careful at the outset to distinguish between epistemological and non-epistemological versions of the argument. Briefly, epistemological versions address the question of how we know, what justification we have for believing, that we are directly perceiving an external, physical object. Non-epistemological versions address the question

of whether in direct perception we do in fact perceive external, physical objects or rather some other type of thing (such as an image, a perception in the mind, etc.)—in other words, the ontological question of what we directly perceive. Our concern—and Snowdon's—is with non-epistemological, ontological versions of the argument.

Snowdon begins by giving a good characterization of direct perception; as I have said, the argument from conflicting appearances attempts to cast doubt on or, more strongly still, show the falsity of the idea that we directly perceive external, physical objects like tables and chairs. Snowdon begins by asking "Do our perceptual experiences enable us to *directly perceive external objects*? How should we interpret that question? Is *it* in good conceptual order?" and argues in the paper for the position that "once the confusions are set aside, there remains an interpretation of 'direct perception' which leaves a difficult and interesting question as to whether we do directly perceive external objects."[10] (This difficult and interesting question is raised of course by those who advance the argument from conflicting appearances.) What is the interpretation of direct perception of which Snowdon speaks?

Snowdon claims plausibly that in the type of argument under consideration, "S directly perceives O" is an extensional, two-place relation. This means that if it is true that S directly perceives O, then it follows that O exists at the time S perceives it or, at least, O existed prior to the time that S perceives it. Further, Snowdon claims that in the literature there are epistemological and non-epistemological uses of "directly perceive"; he is of course interested, as am I, in its non-epistemological use. An example of an epistemological use of "directly perceive" is the claim that a subject can directly perceive something if he can detect it without the need of inference. As Snowdon points out, such a use does not designate a relation in which a subject S might or might not stand to a

particular external object O. If S can directly perceive—can detect without inference—that the water is not boiling but cannot directly perceive—cannot detect without inference—that the water contains trace amounts of mercury, it seems to make little sense to ask: Does S directly perceive the water or not? What we want, therefore, is a non-epistemological use of "directly perceive," one that allows for an extensional notion.

Snowdon suggests that Hume points us to a tenable, non-epistemological use of "directly perceive." "Hume directs our attention to the objects we can single out in a demonstrative way in virtue of our experience....They, whatever they are, are the immediate [i.e., direct] objects of awareness.... Developing this, we can suggest that what we directly perceive is what we can demonstratively pick out."[11] This does not mean—as Snowdon realizes—that a creature incapable of demonstrative judgment is incapable of direct perception in this sense. Rather, the relation of direct perception "represents that subject-object relation which, when allied with the capacity for demonstrative judgement, guarantees the possibility of a *true* demonstrative thought."[12] Thus the capacity for demonstrative judgment and for direct perception are two different but related capacities; direct perception is an ability which underlies the ability for demonstrative (and then for even more complex) judgment.[13]

On such an approach, to directly perceive something is to be able to demonstratively pick it out because it is what appears or is present in one's perceptual awareness. On Snowdon's plausible characterization, then, to hold that we directly perceive external, physical objects like tables and chairs is to hold that external, physical objects like tables and chairs are what appear or are what are present in our perceptual awareness, that they are what we can focus our perceptual attention toward, single out, and demonstratively pick out. To hold that we cannot directly perceive objects like tables

and chairs is to hold that we cannot so focus our perceptual attention toward and single out such objects as tables and chairs. What we directly perceive, it might be held (e.g., by a representationalist), are ideas or sense-data because these are what we can focus our attention on and demonstratively pick out; we only indirectly perceive objects like tables and chairs in virtue of directly perceiving ideas or sense-data. Or it might be held (e.g., by an idealist) that we directly perceive appearances or sense-data and do not indirectly perceive anything.[14]

This then I think is a brief but plausible characterization of direct perception, one which allows us to separate views which hold that we directly perceive external, physical objects like tables and chairs, from views which hold that we cannot—and to understand what is at issue between those who argue that the existence of conflicting appearances shows that we do not directly perceive external objects and those who think that it does not show this.

To the arguments whose pattern Snowdon is attempting to analyze he gives, as I said, the label "Argument from Illusion," but he notes that strictly speaking the facts appealed to by such arguments range from illusions to cases of perceptual relativity. Thus even though we give the argument different names I think we are dealing with the same kind of argument. Indeed, the argument which Snowdon takes as a paradigm case of the type of argument he wants to analyze, one of Hume's arguments, is not one appealing to an illusion but to a case of perceptual relativity:

> The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it; but the real table, which exists independent from us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but an image, which was present to the mind...the existences, which we consider, when we say, *this house* and *that tree*, are nothing but perceptions in the mind. (Hume 1977, p.152)[15]

The pattern of such arguments from conflicting appearances, Snowdon contends, involves two steps: a Base Case and a Spreading Step. In the Base Case it is claimed that with regard to the case that is presently being discussed (such as the table appearing to diminish when we move away from it, as in Hume's argument), the perceiver is not directly perceiving an external, physical object. In the Spreading Step it is claimed that the conclusion for the present case can be extended to apply generally to all direct objects of perceptual awareness. I would add a third step, which we might call the Positive Result. In the third step, it is concluded that since the direct object and the sensory qualities are not "in" the external world they must be, in some sense or other, "in" the mind. In the example above, for instance, Hume concludes that what is directly perceived are "perceptions," which exist "in the mind." (As I said, Snowdon notes that this step is not strictly required: one might hold that nothing is directly perceived; however, most philosophers who advance the argument from conflicting appearances think some kind of object or other is directly perceived.)

Attempting to be as literal as one can, one might initially formulate Hume's argument in the following way:

> (P1) *That* ('the table we see', the directly presented perceptual item, whatever it is) seems to diminish in size during period p.
> (P2) The real table suffers no alteration, i.e., does not diminish in size during period p.
> ---
> (C1) *That* is not identical with the real table.
>
> (P3) *That* is identical either with the real table or with a perception in the mind.
> ---

(C2) *That* is identical with a perception in the mind.

But as Snowdon points out, such a formulation renders the argument invalid, since if the real table seemed to diminish in size but actually did not, "*that*" could be identical with the real table and so C1 could be false while P1 and P2 were true.

What is needed to make the argument valid, therefore, is a formulation like the following:

> (P1*) *That* ('the table we see', the directly presented perceptual item, whatever it is) seems to be and so is diminishing in size during period p.
> (P2*) The corresponding external object,[16] the table, is not diminishing in size during period p.
> ---
> (C1*) *That* is not identical with the corresponding external object, the table.
>
> (P3*) *That* is identical either with the corresponding external object, the table, or with a perception in the mind.
> ---
> (C2) *That* is identical with a perception in the mind.[17]

Note that, as I remarked before, specific versions of the argument from conflicting appearances differ in what they think the direct object of perception is. So for other versions of the argument than Hume's, the phase "perception in the mind" in P3* and C2 would have to be changed to "idea in the mind," "sense datum," etc.

As Snowdon observes, this argument cannot successfully be attacked by claiming that since we can account for and predict how the seen table will vary in size, there is no problem. It cannot successfully be attacked in this way because the argument is valid and we either directly perceive the external table or we do not. To attack the argument successfully, the truth of at least one of the premises must be challenged.

P2* clearly seems to be true. In the normal case, no one wishes to hold that the real external table is diminishing in size as we move away from it. Objections to P2*, such as questioning how one knows that the table is not diminishing in size, are only relevant, as Snowdon remarks, to epistemological versions of the argument.[18]

The truth of premise P1*, therefore, seem to be what we must challenge. And clearly, at first glance at least, it is the more suspect premise. Recall that in Hume's statement of the argument he said that the table seems to diminish in size. Even if one accepts that the table seems to diminish in size, one can object to the move of going from "the table seems to diminish in size" to "there is a seen table diminishing in size," a move needed to generate P1*.

(As I have remarked before, the truth of P3* can of course also be challenged: why are those the only two alternatives? But the more crucial step in showing the falsity of the belief that we directly perceive external objects like tables and chairs is of course the derivation of C1*, not that of C2, so it is the truth of P1* that should be the focus of attention.)

Before examining the truth of P1* more closely, let us consider briefly the second and third steps of the reasoning, the Spreading Step and Positive Result (the above was the Base Case). The Spreading Step claims that the conclusion C1* for the example under examination in the Base Case can be extended to apply generally to the objects of perception. Since the facts subsumed under the heading of conflicting appearances apply to many different objects and sensory qualities, and because there seems to be nothing distinctive or unusual about the perceptual awareness in the Base Case, it seems unobjectionable to draw the more general conclusion. If we do not directly perceive the external, physical table and similar objects, it seems acceptable to conclude that in general

we do not directly perceive external, physical objects. Finally, the Positive Result is that the positive conclusion C2 in the Base Case, namely, that we do not directly perceive the external object (the table, say) but rather directly perceive an appearance, perception, etc., "in" the mind, can be generalized: we never directly perceive external objects, we always directly perceive ideas or sense data or perceptions "in" the mind.

We now have the general structure of the argument from conflicting appearances before us. Let us now consider in more detail what can be said for the truth of P1*.

Most often the proponent of the truth of P1* takes its truth as obvious and in need of no argument (as Hume, for instance, seems to do). If he recognizes that an inference is actually necessary in order to generate P1*—and few of those who advance the argument from conflicting appearances explicitly recognize this—he takes the inference as unproblematic. That is, he considers it obvious and unproblematic that from the fact that in direct perception something is perceived with the sensory quality of squareness it follows that there is something that is square, that in direct perception if something appears F one can validly infer that therefore one is directly perceiving something that <u>is</u> F. Snowdon quotes Price as an example here. "When I say 'this table appears brown to me' it is quite plain that I am acquainted with [directly perceiving] an actual instance of brownness...This cannot indeed be proved, but it is absolutely evident and indubitable. (Price 1932, p.62)"[19]

In twentieth-century philosophy one can find many more examples of this inference being viewed as obvious and unproblematic. Broad, for instance, in discussing the distinction "between physical reality and sensible appearance" proposes a theory where "appearances are a peculiar kind of objects"; in other words, "whenever a penny looks to

me elliptical, what really happens is that I am aware of an object which is, in fact elliptical."[20] His generalized statement of the theory is:

> Whenever I truly judge that *x* appears to me to have the sensible quality *q*, what happens is that I am directly aware of a certain object *y*, which (a) really does have the quality *q*, and (b) stands in some peculiarly intimate relation, yet to be determined, to *x*. (At the present stage, for all that we know, *y* might sometimes be identical with *x*, or might literally be a part of *x*.)[21]

Broad quickly goes on to argue that in general *y* and *x* cannot be identical because they will have incompatible properties. But he offers no real justification for his theory nor of the move from "X appears F to S in direct perception" to "S is directly perceiving something which is F". He seems to consider the move unproblematic.

On the other hand, the proponent of the falsity of P1* most often takes its falsity as obvious and in no need of argument. Austin is a great example here. In his discussion of Ayer's case of a straight stick appearing bent when partially immersed in water, he says: "Does anyone suppose that if something is straight, then it jolly well has to *look* straight at all times and in all circumstances? Obviously no one seriously supposes this. So...what is the difficulty?"[22] But this just is what so many are supposing. If the stick is straight, then it has to look straight at all times; for if the stick sometimes can look (i.e., appear) bent, then one will be directly perceiving something that is bent; since the external stick is in fact not bent, one will not be directly perceiving the stick. This is why I said in the previous chapter that Austin's criticisms of the argument from conflicting appearances are somewhat superficial: Austin neither explains why so many philosophers make this supposition nor, really, what is wrong with the supposition. Putting it another way, Austin does not penetrate to the fundamental assumption that generates P1* and so

generates the argument from conflicting appearances—and therefore does not show what is wrong with the fundamental assumption. Just as Price takes the truth of P1* as obvious, Austin takes its falsity as obvious. But the truth or falsity of P1* is not a primary in this way. There are more fundamental philosophical assumptions which give rise to the issue and explain why so many think that the truth of P1* is obvious (and why, if you do not share those assumptions, you will not think that P1* is true let alone obviously true). To see what is wrong with the argument from conflicting appearances and to give a different explanation of the existence of conflicting appearances (compatible with directly perceiving external objects), it is these more fundamental assumptions that must be explicitly identified and challenged.

Although Snowdon does not identify what the fundamental assumption is which generates P1* and so the argument from conflicting appearances—as I said, that will be one of my main tasks in the dissertation—I think he grasps that contrary to Price and Austin the issue is not obvious. But as far as I can discern, his explanation of this in the paper is that the general principle "if X appears F, there is something directly perceived which is F", is a generalization from more specific principles, which themselves are relatively obvious.

> A standard criticism of the argument [from conflicting appearances] is that its proponents simply assume the truth of some such principle as—'if *x* appears *F*, then something is *F*'—but that we have no reason to accept it. It seems to me that to say this is to fail to capture the psychological source of the appeal of the argument. For most people, the general principle, if accepted, is itself an implication of, or a generalization from, a more fundamental conviction that, for a particular value of an apparent *F* (say, apparent colour, or shape) [i.e., some sensory quality], it is just obvious to inspection that there is something which is *F*. The more fundamental conviction is that to which a critic must speak.[23]

Elsewhere Snowdon claims that another perspective from which to look at this issue is the following: the move from "X appears F" to "there is something being directly perceived that is F" can be presented as acceptable because it is involved in the traditional and dominant view of perceptual awareness and appearances; Snowdon in effect challenges someone (like Austin) who rejects this principle to explain why a proper theory of perceptual awareness should not include this principle.[24]

In the paper Snowdon leaves the matter at that: it is beyond the scope and purpose of his paper to explain why the traditional theory of perceptual awareness contains the principle that in direct perception if X appears F, then one directly perceives something that is F. To understand fully the appeal of the argument from conflicting appearances, however, this is the issue that we must understand. Note further that Price's and Snowdon's claim that, at first glance at least, it is "introspectively obvious" that a sensory quality of a particular shape, say, is an intrinsic quality of something, either of an external object (a possibility which the argument from conflicting appearances is meant to discredit) or of some other kind of object also needs explanation. Why are these the only two alternatives for the status of sensory qualities? Why must sensory qualities be <u>intrinsic</u> properties of anything?

It is Snowdon's challenge that I take up in the dissertation. I will try to show (i) that the argument from conflicting appearances rests on a mistaken conceptualization of the causal facts involved in perceptual awareness and appearances, and (ii) that a proper view of perceptual awareness does not hold that sensory qualities are intrinsic properties of anything. Let us begin by identifying the fundamental assumption about perceptual

awareness that generates the crucial premise of the argument from conflicting appearances, namely P2*, and see why this fundamental assumption should be rejected.

## NOTES

[1]Fragments #1, #2, #3, and #7 of Democritus quoted and translated in The Presocratics (ed. Wheelwright), pp. 182-183.

[2]Owens, A History of Ancient Western Philosophy, p. 147.

[3]Burnyeat, "Conflicting Appearances" in *Proceedings of the British Academy 65*, p. 69.

[4]Bayle, *Dictionaire historique et critique*, quoted in Popkin's "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism" in The Skeptical Tradition (ed. Burnyeat), pp. 380-381.

[5]Popkin, "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism", in The Skeptical Tradition (ed. Burnyeat), p. 381.

[6]Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, p. 16.

[7]In an interesting article, Popkin argues that Berkeley was heavily influenced by Pyrrhonism, especially as presented in the writings of Bayle, but that "Berkeley follows the sage advice of our day, 'If you can't beat them, join them.' After joining forces with the Pyrrhonists, Berkeley is able to show that their attack is innocuous if *esse est percipi*." (Popkin, "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism" in The Skeptical Tradition (ed. Burnyeat), pp. 377-396; the quote is from p. 386.) I think Popkin's analysis is correct, for Berkeley himself remarks at the end of the Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous that "My endeavours tend to unite, and place in a clearer light, that truth which was before shared by the vulgar and the philosophers: the former being of the opinion, that *those things they immediately perceive are the real things;* and the latter, that *the things immediately perceived, are ideas which exist only in the mind.* Which two notions put together, do in effect constitute the substance of what I advance." (Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, p. 94.)

[8]Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, pp. 11-12. Of course it is by no means clear that things look the way that Russell says they look. True, when one tries to represent what we see in three dimensions by using a two-dimensional canvas, one will not draw a rectangular-looking object by means of a two-dimensional rectangle. Further, the two-dimensional image projected on the retina also is not rectangular. And although one can learn how a three-dimensional object must be represented in two dimensions, this does not mean that the three-dimensional object's shape "really" looks like the shape of how it would be represented in two dimensions.

[9]Snowdon, "How To Interpret 'Direct Perception'", in The Contents of Experience:

Essays on Perception (ed. Crane), pp. 67-75.

[10]Ibid., pp. 48 & 51.

[11]Ibid., p. 56.

[12]Ibid., p. 58.

[13]Snowdon further develops and refines the notion in the paper.

[14]As Snowdon points out, it might also be the case that someone holds that we do not directly perceive anything (although I think such a viewpoint is rare); see Snowdon, "How To Interpret 'Direct Perception'", in The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception (ed. Crane), p. 61.

[15]Quoted in Snowdon, "How To Interpret 'Direct Perception'", in The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception (ed. Crane), p. 69; "Hume 1777" refers to Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (ed. Selby Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1902). Hume thinks the argument from conflicting appearances provides the only satisfactory grounding for the fundamental tenet of modern philosophy, namely, that objects and their sensory qualities exist only in the mind (notice the similarity to Berkeley's view). "The fundamental of that philosophy [i.e., modern philosophy] is the opinion concerning colours, sounds, tastes, smells, hot and cold; which it asserts to be nothing but impressions in the mind, deriv'd from the operation of external objects, and without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects. Upon examination, I find only one of the reasons commonly produced for this opinion to be satisfactory, *viz.* that deriv'd from the variations of those impressions, even while the external object, to all appearance, remains the same. These variations depend upon several circumstances. Upon the different situations of our health: A man in a malady feels a disagreeable taste in meats, which before pleas'd him the most. Upon the different complexions and constitutions of men: That seems bitter to one, which is sweet to another. Upon the difference in their external situation and position: Colours reflected from the clouds change according to the distance of the clouds, and according to the angle they make with the eye and luminous body.... Instances of this kind are very numerous and frequent."

"The conclusion drawn from them, is likewise as satisfactory as can possibly be imagin'd. 'Tis certain, that when different impressions of the same sense arise from any object, everyone of these impressions has not a resembling quality existent in the object. For as the same object cannot, at the same time, be endowed with different qualities of the same sense, and as the same quality cannot resemble impressions entirely different; it evidently follows, that many of our impressions have no external model or archetype. Now from like effects we presume like causes. Many of the impressions of colour, sound, &c. are confest to be nothing but internal existences, and to arise from causes, which no way resemble them. These impressions are in appearance nothing different from the other impressions of colour, sound, &c. We conclude, therefore, that they are, all of them, deriv'd from a like origin." (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (ed. Selby-Bigge), Bk I, Pt IV, Sec IV, pp. 226-227.)

As we see from the passage that Snowdon quotes, Hume thinks that the argument shows that all sensory qualities and objects are perceptions "in" the mind.

[16]Note that the phrase "the corresponding external object" is meant to capture the idea that the real table is the only external object which the "seen table" would be if it were an external object (and not, say, a perception in the mind). Cf. Snowdon, "How To Interpret 'Direct Perception'", in The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception (ed. Crane), p. 70.

[17]This is somewhat different from Snowdon's formulation of the argument; see Snowdon, "How To Interpret 'Direct Perception'", in The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception (ed. Crane), pp. 70-71.

[18]Despite this fact, I think it is nevertheless fruitful to point out that our reasons for holding that P2* is true must be compatible with our reasons for holding that P1* is true and, especially, must be compatible with the truth of C1*. That is, if we know that P2* is true only on the assumption that we do directly perceive external objects like the real table (which goes against the truth of C2), then we have a problem that applies equally well to the non-epistemological version of the argument. The non-epistemological version of the argument, in other words, does not take place in a cognitive vacuum, and these compatibilities must obtain; otherwise one will have a puzzling situation but will not yet know which premises and conclusions should in the end be accepted and rejected.

[19]Quoted in Snowdon, "How To Interpret 'Direct Perception'", in The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception (ed. Crane), p. 73; "Price 1932" refers to Price's Perception, London: Methuen.

[20]Broad, Scientific Thought, p. 239.

[21]Ibid., pp. 239-240.

[22]Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, p. 29.

[23]Snowdon, "How To Interpret 'Direct Perception'", in The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception (ed. Crane), pp. 73-74.

[24]Ibid., p. 73.

# CHAPTER THREE

## *THE ASSUMPTION GENERATING THE ARGUMENT FROM CONFLICTING APPEARANCES*

### (1) The Revelatory Standard of Direct Perception

We have seen that the crucial move in the argument from conflicting appearances is going from the claim that in direct perception something appears F to the claim that there is something being directly perceived that is F, that is, something being directly perceived to which the sensory quality of F is attached as an intrinsic property. Although the move is considered obviously illegitimate by some (e.g., by Austin), it is much more often the case that it is considered obviously legitimate (e.g., by Price and by Broad). Snowdon, as we have seen, maintains that such a move is part of the traditional theory of perceptual awareness and appearances, and this means that it is part of the traditional theory of perceptual awareness that sensory qualities are intrinsic properties of something, usually of external objects or of some kind of mental items (or perhaps sometimes the former, sometimes the latter).

Our task in this chapter is to identify why it is thought by so many philosophers that the move of going from "something appears F" to "there is something being directly perceived that is F" is a legitimate move. When we have identified the reason, we will be in a position to understand what is wrong with the reason and so to reject the move. As we will see, just making explicit the assumption behind the move, and so behind the crucial premise of the argument from conflicting appearances, will go a long way toward showing why the assumption should be rejected. Once we have done this, the way will substantially be cleared for proposing a different view of the nature of perceptual appearances and the status of sensory qualities in perceptual awareness from that of the

traditional model of perceptual awareness.

My contention, then, is that there is a fundamental assumption about perceptual awareness, expressed in various models of perceptual awareness throughout the history of philosophy and part of the "traditional" view of perceptual awareness, that generates and sanctions the crucial move in the argument from conflicting appearances. In the attempt to identify and describe this fundamental assumption, I want to begin with Burnyeat's article "Conflicting Appearances."[1] For there Burnyeat is concerned with trying to identify what makes the argument from conflicting appearances seem plausible to so many and there he describes one specific model of perceptual awareness which I think contains the fundamental assumption, a model that he calls the "window model" of perceptual awareness.

Burnyeat begins his article by giving a few examples of the argument from conflicting appearances and then observes that the examples of the argument are not very convincing as they are normally stated. It is not entirely clear, however, why he thinks they are not very convincing. As we have seen in the previous chapter, without too much effort the argument from conflicting appearances can be formulated so that it is valid. Burnyeat thus must think that one of the premises of the argument, namely (P1*), the premise that contains the move from "something appears F" to "there is something being directly perceived that is F," is fairly obviously false. But then why do so many philosophers find the argument sound? Burnyeat suggests that a hidden influence must be at work. What influence? "I am going to propose that the hidden influence is a certain undeclared picture or model of what perception is or ought to be like. It is an inappropriate picture...and for that reason it is not something a philosopher will readily acknowledge, even to himself."[2] What is the model that Burnyeat has in mind?

He calls it the "window model" of perceptual awareness. "If one thinks of visual perception as a matter of looking out through the eyes as through a window, then coloured eyes [such as a white eye] will be like the tinted spectacles favoured by modern

philosophers of perception, only further in...."[3] If the window through which we look is not clear, is not transparent, then one will see a tinted world, the world as it appears but not as it "really is." In discussing the example of perceiving a white stone Burnyeat writes "In terms of the window model, Socrates' point [in the *Theaetetus*] is that if the white were in the eye of the perceiving subject, then he would be looking out, as it were, through a white-tinted pane and so should see everything white."[4] On the other hand, if the window is not tinted but transparent, then one will see the world as it "really is."

> If the white were out there in the stone...and one looks through the eye as through a window, then one's view of the white must be unobstructed. The windowpane should be transparent, without spot or blemish. Or better, since classical Greek windows were unglazed, the eye should be an open aperture with no pane at all. There is as it were nothing between the perceiver and the thing he perceives. In that case the stone should appear white to every perceiver.[5]

Only if something like the window model is implicitly at work, Burnyeat suggests, can one explain why the argument from conflicting appearances seems plausible to so many philosophers. To these philosophers the existence of conflicting appearances shows that our perceptual awareness is not like a transparent window on the world, that something distorts or obscures our perceptual awareness. Why does the existence of conflicting appearances show this? Because if our perceptual awareness were like a transparent window on the world, then the external stone, say, would appear white only when it actually was white, when whiteness attached to it as an intrinsic property. But this turns out not to be the case: the external stone can appear white when it is not white. Because the window model is implicitly at work, however, it is held that our perceptual awareness of (external) objects must be like a transparent window on the world. Hence the existence of conflicting appearances is considered deeply problematic, requiring a radical rethinking of what kind of objects we are directly aware of in perceptual awareness.[6]

The "window model" of perception that Burnyeat describes is I think but one instance of a group of similar models of perceptual awareness. Here are some other instances of the same kind of model. Some philosophers in ancient Greece, for example, held that in perception (and cognition) the mind becomes like or identical to the object. One interpretation of Aristotle, for instance, says that according to Aristotle the mind is a bare, empty potentiality which takes on the various forms of objects without their matter. Very similarly, in the Renaissance and seventeenth and eighteenth centuries philosophers spoke of (direct) perception as the mind copying or reproducing the perceived object in the form of an image, idea, or representation (in the mind) which resembles, that is, which is like, the object. In the twentieth century, philosophers spoke of "acquaintance," which is supposed to be an unmediated awareness of objects: the object simply coming before the mind, with nothing between the two; as Dancy describes the view: "we tend to think of a...perceived object as standing nakedly [emphasis mine] open to inspection".[7]

The common fundamental idea in these different models is that in direct perception the subject does not causally affect the nature of his perceptual awareness of objects. Only the object, in other words, determines the nature of the subject's resulting perceptual awareness of the object. If the subject did causally affect the nature of his resulting perceptual awareness, then he would not be perceiving reality—that is, he would not be perceiving reality as it "really is." He would be in some way distorting his awareness. His perceptual awareness would be invalid.

Consider, for instance, the window model. Clearly, the idea of a transparent window on the world is the idea of the world being presented "as it is," with no distortions imposed by a non-transparent window. In valid perceptual awareness—that is, when the window is transparent—if the sensory quality of whiteness is attached to the object, then the object will appear white. In other words, only the object determines the nature of the subject's resulting perceptual awareness. If the subject did affect the nature of the perceptual awareness, if the window were tinted green, for instance, this would mean that

the object would not appear white and so the subject would not perceive the external object as it "really is." His perceptual awareness would be invalid.

Or consider the idea of the mind taking on the form of the object without its matter. Here too, the claim is that in valid perceptual awareness only the object determines the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness—by imposing its form on the subject's mind. If the subject did affect the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness, if he did in some way contribute to the form implanted on his mind, then by that very fact he would distort his perceptual awareness—i.e., alter the form from the object's form to some other kind of form—and thus his perceptual awareness would be invalid.

Or consider the idea that in perception the mind in some way copies or reproduces the object. Again, the claim is that in valid perception only the object determines the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness; to the extent that the subject causally affects the nature of the idea (image, copy, or representation) in his mind, the idea (image, copy, or representation) would not faithfully reproduce the object. The image would be distorted and hence the subject's perceptual awareness would be invalid.

My claim, then, is that at work in the various instances of the argument from conflicting appearances that have been advanced throughout the history of philosophy is a fundamental assumption about the nature of perceptual awareness. The fundamental assumption is that in valid direct perception the subject cannot causally affect the nature of his resulting perceptual awareness; if he does, he invalidates that perceptual awareness. What we have, therefore, is an implicit standard of validity for direct perception, what I will call the "revelatory standard of direct perception." In order for perceptual awareness to be valid, the subject cannot affect the nature of his perceptual awareness, only the object can.[8] And this means that to be valid, the subject's perceptual awareness of the object should vary only when the object itself varies (and vice-versa). If the object appears F and then non-F to the subject, this must be because the object has gone from being F to being non-F. (There is also the implication that if an object of direct perception

is in fact F, then it will appear F in (valid) direct perception. For if it is only the object which determines the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness, then the object, which, ex hypothesi, is F, will appear F. Consider an example: on the model of the mind taking on the object's form without its matter in direct perception, if an object is such that it has form D, then the form that the mind will take on in (valid) direct perception, and so the resulting perceptual awareness of the object, will be D.) To both summarize and name this assumption, I will often write that in order for perceptual awareness to be valid, the object must be revealed to the subject.

Note that revelation here is I think a good analogy, for if one thinks of the idea of divine revelation, the idea seems to be that the subject of a revelation knows the truth without having done any cognitive work, without having engaged in any cognitive processing. He has, for instance, discovered no evidence or facts justifying his new belief, he has not logically derived the belief from other knowledge or integrated the belief with the rest of what he knows; the "truth" has simply implanted itself in his mind. The subject has not causally affected his awareness in any way. So similarly, at the perceptual level the idea is that in direct perception the subject does not causally affect the nature of his resulting perceptual awareness; the object, as it were, simply comes before or implants itself in his mind.[9]

It is in the following way, then, that I think the revelatory standard of direct perception underlies the argument from conflicting appearances. It legitimates the move from "something appears F" in direct perception to "there is something you are directly perceiving that is F." So long as perceptual awareness is held to be valid (that is, so long as the open question is not whether our direct perception is valid but rather what types of objects we directly perceiving), it legitimates the move because according to it only the object affects the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness. This means that when something appears F it is because there is in fact an object being directly perceived that is F, an object being directly perceived to which F attaches as an intrinsic property.[10] On the

window model, for instance, when looking through a transparent window, if something appears white it is because there is something intrinsically white in front of the window. On the model of the mind taking on the object's form without its matter, to take another example, if something appears to have a rectangular form it is because the object does in fact have that form, which the mind has taken on. On the reproduction model, if the idea or copy in the mind is brown, it is because the object which has been reproduced is intrinsically brown. Thus given the revelatory standard of direct perception, the move from "something appears F" in direct perception to "something is being directly perceived which is in fact F" would be, as Price for instance claimed, obviously legitimate.

And given the revelatory standard of direct perception, we can see why sensory qualities are viewed as intrinsic qualities of something or other. Since only the object (whatever it turns out to be, be it an external object or, say, a perception in the mind) determines the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness (including the resulting sensory qualities), the sensory qualities are thought to belong on the side of the object, attached to it as its intrinsic properties.

We have now identified the source of the crucial premise in the argument from conflicting appearances: the revelatory standard of direct perception. Thus the fundamental issue upon which the soundness of the argument from conflicting appearances rests is how to conceptualize the causality involved in perceptual awareness. According to the revelatory standard of direct perception, the causality involved in perception must be such that only the object affects the nature of the subject's resulting perceptual awareness.

It is not hard to understand the initial appeal of the revelatory standard of direct perception. The appeal I think comes from a sort of introspective reflection upon one's own perceptual awareness, and thus it is not surprising that Price and Snowdon appeal to introspection when claiming that the move from "something appears F" to "there is something I am directly perceiving that is F" seems legitimate. When you consider your own perceptual awareness, it seems that all there is to it is the object "before" you. You

simply are aware of the object. You do not experience any of the causal processing producing the perceptual awareness, such as the firings of sensory receptors, nor do you experience any distinct or isolable contribution from your senses to the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness.

If this is an accurate rendition of our introspective evidence, then from this perspective it is not difficult to understand Price's claim that when "I say 'this table appears brown to me' it is quite plain that I am acquainted with an actual instance of brownness...This cannot indeed be proved, but it is absolutely evident and indubitable (Price 1932, p.62),"[11] nor Snowdon's remark that we have a "fundamental conviction that, for a particular value of an apparent *F* (say, apparent colour, or shape), it is just obvious to inspection that there is something which is *F*."[12] For when we introspectively reflect upon our own perceptual awareness, what else is there but the object? If there is not in fact an intrinsically brown, rectangular shaped table-like object before you when a table appears brown to you, then what is going on? It certainly seems that in direct perception all there is is the object "before" you. From this perspective, therefore, it seems that nothing else can affect your perceptual awareness but the object <u>because that is all there is</u>. And so, in effect and by default it is held that in direct perception the object is and should be revealed.

And if the revelatory standard of direct perception is an implicit assumption, then a conflict is created between the direct perception of external objects and the existence of conflicting appearances because the existence of conflicting appearances shows that external objects do not meet the revelatory standard of direct perception. When the warm water in a bucket feels cold to a hot hand and hot to a cold hand, for example, the subject's perceptual awareness of the object varies when the object itself does not. The condition of the subject's means of perception, in other words, can causally affect the nature of his resulting perceptual awareness of the water. But according to the revelatory standard of direct perception, this means that the subject is not directly perceiving the

water (he is not perceiving the water as it "really is"). Thus if my contention is true that the revelatory standard of direct perception has been an implicit standard for direct perception and part of the traditional view of perceptual awareness, it is not surprising that the existence of conflicting appearances has been thought to be so deeply problematical and to cast doubt on our ability to directly perceive external objects.

So long as the revelatory standard is an implicit assumption, one's main alternatives seem to be to hold that (i) perceptual awareness is valid, we do directly perceive external objects and (contrary to what the existence of conflicting appearances and the like seem to show) the subject does not causally affect the nature of his resulting perceptual awareness; (ii) perceptual awareness is invalid since external objects do not meet the revelatory standard of direct perception (few wish to embrace such a radically skeptical view); or (iii) perceptual awareness is valid but since external objects do not meet the revelatory standard of direct perception, other objects must be sought out that do (this has been the dominant view).

Aristotle is often interpreted as maintaining (i). Consider, for instance, the way in which the commentator John Herman Randall explains Aristotle's model of the mind, which makes the mind a bare potentiality simply taking on the form of the external object without its matter (i.e., the mind is a thing with no nature and which therefore cannot affect the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness). (Note that Randall's emphasis is on all awareness rather than on perceptual awareness as such.)

> ....*nous*, since its function is to think all things, all forms and universals, can have no form of its own, no inherent structure of its own, to keep it rigid and inflexible, and incapable of becoming any form whatsoever that may happen to be the object of its thinking....Its only "nature" is to be a pure capacity, a pure power, a *dynaton*—that is, an indeterminate power, much less limited and determinate than a *dynamis*....
>
> If *nous* were something—if it had a definite and determinate structure of its own—then men could not transparently "see" and know what is, without distortion. They could not really "know" things as they are, but only things mixed with the structure of *nous*. Such a *nous* would have turned Kantian: it would have become "constitutive" and creative, it

> would have ceased to be the Greek *nous* that is intuitive and "sees" directly...[15]

So according to Randall, Aristotle holds that the subject plays no causal role in the nature of his resulting awareness. If the subject did affect the nature of his resulting awareness, he would by this very fact distort and thereby invalidate that awareness. (We will see below why Randall says that such a mind would have turned Kantian.)

As I said above, however, the much more prevalent view has been to say that since external objects do not satisfy the revelatory standard of direct perception, other objects must be sought out that do (alternative (iii)). These other objects are usually held to be some kind of mental items, created by the interaction of external object with the subject's means of perception and themselves directly perceived. Because these "internal" objects meet the revelatory standard of direct perception, sensory qualities are still being viewed as intrinsic properties, but now as intrinsic properties of internal objects rather than external objects. Berkeley, for example, thinks the existence of conflicting appearances shows that we cannot directly perceive external objects. So other objects must be posited that are directly perceived: namely, ideas in the mind. Since there is nothing that can intervene to distort or obstruct our direct perception of our own ideas—we do not causally affect our awareness of them—every idea is as it is perceived to be. When an idea in the mind appears square to a subject, for example, this is because the subject is directly perceiving something that is square. In other words, there is an idea in the mind that is being directly perceived to which the sensory quality of visual squareness attaches as an intrinsic property. So Berkeley preserves the validity of perception (against the skeptic's charges) by making the direct objects of perception ideas or images in the mind; our perceptual awareness of them, unlike external objects, meets the revelatory standard of direct perception. (Preserving the validity of direct perception while doing justice to the skeptical arguments of philosophers, as we saw in the previous chapter, is precisely what Berkeley sees himself as accomplishing.)

Similarly in the case of Protagoras, his radical "solution" to the problem of the existence of conflicting appearances does not challenge but rather preserves the revelatory standard of direct perception by preserving the window model of perception. Protagoras, Burnyeat explains, "does not challenge the assumptions of the window model but confirms them. [Protagoras' view] embodies a thesis that perceptual experience is transparent and saves it from the objection raised against transparency [viz., the existence of conflicting appearances] by making the white private to the eye which sees it [rather than an intrinsic property of an external object].... Protagorean windows provide a flawless close-up view of the contents of a private world."[14] To say that "Protagorean windows provide a flawless close-up view of the contents of a private world" means, more literally and fundamentally, that Protagoras' private world and the objects in it meet the revelatory standard of direct perception. The private white object that is directly perceived by the subject is as it appears to be; in other words, only the direct object determines the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness. The subject's means of perception bring this private white object into existence, but this is the end of their role. They do not affect the nature of the perceptual awareness of this private object; nothing does except the object itself.

So what is happening is that the direct object of perception is being pushed "into" the mind, after all causal processing has taken place. Philosophers asked themselves: Can external objects meet the revelatory standard of direct perception? It seems not, since not just the object affects the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness; the external conditions and the perceiver's own perceptual systems seem to also affect it. Since the revelatory standard remains an implicit and unquestioned assumption—and so long as a philosopher is not ready to embrace the skeptical idea that in fact nothing is directly perceived—it seems that the only alternative is to hold that something other than external, physical objects are directly perceived. These other things, whatever their precise description, must be such that they meet the revelatory standard. And so it was said that we directly perceive images, ideas, perceptions, sense-data, appearances, etc. Now such

things, which must exist after all causal processing has taken place (or else they too would be subject to conflicting appearances) could be conceived of as existing only internally, only "in" the mind. Such "internal" objects can be directly perceived—i.e., can be revealed, because there is no causal processing that can get in the way of or distort the direct awareness of these objects, whatever one calls them. Protagoras's private objects (rather than external objects), for instance, are the direct objects of perception precisely because external objects are subject to conflicting appearances and to the perceiver influencing the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness whereas the private objects are not. The same holds for Berkeley's ideas in the mind. (The reason Berkeley and others label this direct awareness "immediate" awareness is precisely to suggest that such awareness is not mediated by any causal processes or activity on the part of the perceiver and his perceptual systems—to suggest, in other words, that the subject does not causally affect the nature of the resulting awareness.)

One should not make the mistake, however, of concluding that preserving the revelatory standard of direct perception by pushing things further and further "into" the mind is restricted to such "extreme" figures as Protagoras and Berkeley. The same is true, for instance, of the sense-datum theorists in the twentieth century. In order to preserve the revelatory standard of direct perception and so the idea that only the object determines the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness, they put forth the notion of acquaintance and held that we are aware of sense-data by acquaintance. Acquaintance, they maintained, is precisely the kind of awareness that is revelatory, unmediated by any causal processing. As Burnyeat remarks in a discussion of Russell (and other sense-data theorists):

> Perception, it is felt, ought not to be mediated by a causal process. But alas, that cannot be.... But instead of coming to terms with reality, our [sense-data] theorists find a place for the window model within perception. Let causality do its worst: at the core of the perceptual experience there will still be an unmediated knowing [for Russell, acquaintance]...and when a suitable story has been told about the objects of this knowing, the problem of conflicting appearances is solved.[15]

This same notion of acquaintance, of immediate or causeless perceptual awareness, is also held by more recent philosophers of perception, including even those who reject sense-data and the like. Consider, for instance, the case of Comman. In explaining a core component of his theory of perceptual awareness, which he calls "compatible common-sense realism", he describes the nature of the awareness in perception—a form of awareness, he explains, that is completely causeless.

> Any relation of immediately experiencing that a person has to an object does not consist even partly in a causal relationship, such as being caused to have an experience of the object by stimulus from the object....immediately experiencing something, whether it be an object or a property of something, is a simple, unanalyzable relationship.[16]

It was Kant, however, not Protagoras or Berkeley or Hume or the twentieth-century sense-data theorists, who first stated explicitly and succinctly, in its most general form, the larger worry and more fundamental assumption behind the argument from conflicting appearances, namely, that if the subject affects the nature of his perceptual awareness of an object, then it is not the object as it "really is" that he is directly perceiving, but only the object as it appears to him, the object as shaped and constituted by his means of perception. Kant argued that since the subject's means of awareness, like everything else, must have some definite nature or other, they must interact with objects in some definite ways and not others when they are engaged in perception. They must, therefore, affect the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness and thus they must create and constitute the object of awareness. We cannot perceive any external, independent object, any object as it "really is"; we can only perceive objects as molded by our particular perceptual faculty, only objects as they appear to us, only, in Kant's words, appearances. One would need a divine mind, Kant maintains, in order to perceive external objects, objects as they "really are," because only such a mind would not be limited by a

definite nature and definite means of awareness; such a mind would not have to engage in any specific kind of causal processing, and so would not mold the object of awareness in any specific way, such as creating spatial and temporal properties. In other words, Kant first grasped and explicitly argued that, in effect, only a mind without a specific nature would meet the revelatory standard of direct perception: only such a mind could reveal the external object. (It should be obvious now why Randall contrasts his interpretation of Aristotle's view to Kant's view.)

So even if there were no conflicting appearances among human beings, the fact that we have a definite and specific sensory apparatus, nervous system, and brain means, according to Kant, that the objects of awareness will be constituted in specific and definite ways for us, ways determined by our human means of perception. So what the example of the existence of conflicting appearances simply helps illustrate is the broader fact that because perceptual awareness involves a causal interaction between object and subject, the subject must affect the nature of his resulting perceptual awareness. As Kant explains the essence of his view:

> To avoid all misapprehension, it is necessary to explain, as clearly as possible, what our view is regarding the fundamental constitution of sensible knowledge in general. What we have meant to say is that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things which we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being, nor their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us, and that if the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish. As appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility, remains completely unknown to us. We know nothing but our mode of perceiving them—a mode which is peculiar to us, and not necessarily shared in by every being, though, certainly, by every human being....Even if we could bring our intuition to the highest degree of clearness, we should not thereby come any nearer to the constitution of objects in themselves. We should still know only our mode of intuition, that is, our sensibility. We should indeed know it completely, but always only under the conditions of space and time—conditions which are originally inherent in the subject. What the objects may be in themselves would never become

> known to us even through the most enlightened knowledge of that which is alone given us, namely, their appearance.[17]

In other words, our perceptual awareness is not revelatory because our senses and mind have a definite nature and can interact with external objects in certain ways and no others. We therefore cannot directly perceive external objects and their inherent properties. We can only directly perceive "appearances." Notice that Kant thinks that we can be aware of and know the nature of these appearances, of what elsewhere he calls phenomena; it is just objects "as they are in themselves", noumena, that we are not aware of and cannot know. And our awareness of appearances, it seems, does not occur by any specific means, such as a second set of sense organs; our awareness of them is revelatory. So like Protagoras's private world and Berkeley's ideas in the mind, Kant's appearances meet the revelatory standard of direct perception.

Thus the argument from conflicting appearances and the facts to which it appeals suggest the broader point that there is a tension between the causal aspects of perception and the direct perception of external objects.[18] Since at least the time of the ancient Greeks, it has generally been accepted that in order to perceive an external object there must be a causal interaction between subject and object, a subject's sense-organs must be affected by stimuli transmitted from the object (or, much more rarely, vice-versa). In the twentieth century we have a much more detailed knowledge of the nature of this causal interaction. We know that in vision, for example, light waves travel from the object to the retina of the eye, producing chemical changes in it; the chemical changes in the retina then cause signals to travel along the optic nerve to the brain, where they are further processed. What the example of the existence of conflicting appearances simply helps illustrate is the broader fact that when there are changes in the causal aspects of perception, the subject's perceptual awareness of the object can vary even when the object itself remains unchanged. In such altered conditions of perception it is concluded, because of the revelatory standard of direct perception, that the object is not revealed, it is not directly

perceived. Further reflection on this fact shows that even in the initial conditions of perception, there must be some type of causal interaction and processing going on. The altered conditions do not introduce causal interaction and processing in perception, they merely change the exact nature of the causal interaction and processing that is going on when perceiving an object. And so it is concluded that we in fact never directly perceive the external object because the external object is never revealed.[19] In terms of the window model, for instance, the fact that there is always causal processing involved in perceiving an (external) object means that the window is never transparent; the sensory apparatus has a nature of its own, which will necessarily affect the way the external object appears; hence we do not perceive the (external) object as it "really is," but only as it "appears," distorted by the non-transparent window. According to the implicit assumption at work, therefore, causal interaction with and processing of external objects in perception precludes direct perceptual awareness of such objects.

### (2) Rejecting the Revelatory Standard of Direct Perception

I said before that simply making fully explicit the assumption that is the revelatory standard of direct perception would go much of the way in showing what is wrong with it. We can now see why this is true. Perceptual awareness, like any other phenomenon, in order not to be mysterious or magical, must occur by some means or other, must involve some kind of causal interaction between perceived object and perceiving subject, must involve some kind of processing on the part of the subject. You cannot find an object, no matter how far "in" you look, that you are directly aware of by no means—that is, without causal interaction or processing. The quest for "immediate" awareness or direct "acquaintance," the quest, that is, for a type of awareness that is causeless and processless, and so the quest for a subject who does not affect the nature of his resulting perceptual awareness, is hopeless.

Perceptual awareness, human or otherwise, necessarily involves a causal interaction between object and subject, between what is perceived and the means of perceiving it—that is, the perceiver's sense-organs, nervous system, brain. A subject cannot be aware of something unless that something affects him in some way, unless he processes that something in some way and thereby becomes aware of it. And this means that the causal factors at work, the nature of the subject's means of perception and the nature of the medium in which the perceptual awareness occurs, will play a role, will affect, the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness. The only reason that people have gone to such great lengths to deny these inescapable facts is that they have been pushed into the denial by implicitly or explicitly holding the revelatory standard of direct perception.

Direct perception, it is implicitly or explicitly thought, must reveal the object; if the object is to be directly perceived only the object can affect the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness. If the subject's means of perception affect the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness of the object, then the subject does not actually perceive the object (as it "really is"), he perceives an object that is constituted and created by his specific means of perception. Given their implicit desire to uphold the revelatory standard of direct perception, philosophers' reflection on the existence of conflicting appearances and, wider, the causal aspects of perception, coupled with their strong desire to defend the validity of direct perception—"we do directly perceive <u>something</u>" most want to maintain—leads them to affirm a type of perceptual awareness that is free from causality. And if perceptual awareness is free from causality, it cannot be the direct perception of external objects.

But where does the revelatory standard of direct perception itself come from? Why must direct perceptual awareness of an object meet the standard?

As we have seen, one source of the appeal of the revelatory standard of direct perception comes from introspective reflection on one's own perceptual awareness. How

can you not be directly perceiving some object (even if in the final analysis it turns out to be an internal object) that is brown and bent, to which the sensory qualities of brownness and bentness attach as intrinsic properties—wonder Price and others—when you see a stick partially immersed in water? From this introspective standpoint on perceptual awareness we are not aware of our means of perception: of light waves striking the retina and being processed by the retina and the visual cortex, of sound waves striking the inner ear and being processed by it, etc. It seems that the object is just present to the mind, revealed by it. Introspectively, the mind in perception seems revelatory because we cannot introspect the causal processing involved in producing that perceptual awareness.

But of course our observations of the world, as against introspection, lead to another conclusion. From this standpoint, the existence of causal processing is seen as necessary and inescapable in order for perceptual awareness to occur. Among the facts that we grasp are that there are means of perception, which must interact with the external world in order for the subject to perceive; that the mind does engage in processing in perceiving the world; that the subject's perceptual awareness of the object is affected by the medium and means of perception; that, in other words, the mind does not simply reveal the object, that both the object and the subject determine the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness; that perceptual awareness is a product of the interaction between subject and object and so the nature of each will affect the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness. (This, after all, is what the existence of conflicting appearances shows.) From this standpoint, therefore, there is no reason to hold that perceptual awareness could or should be revelatory.

The revelatory standard of direct perception could be legitimately adopted as a standard for the validity of direct perception, therefore, only on a partial grasp of the facts. Once one realizes that perceptual awareness of any kind must occur by some means and through some causal interaction of perceiving subject and direct object of perception, the revelatory standard of direct perception should be discarded. (Of course part of the

problem has been, especially before Kant's time, that the revelatory standard of direct perception was never made explicit; it was only an implicit assumption, making it difficult to discard.) The proper procedure is not to deny the causal facts about perceptual awareness and try to escape the inescapable by positing some kind of causeless perceptual awareness. The proper procedure rather is to reject the revelatory standard of direct perception and see what might rise in its place when we embrace all the facts. It is worthwhile to quote Burnyeat's remark again about the sense-datum theorists: "Perception, it is felt, ought not to be mediated by a causal process. But alas, that cannot be. The truth is that the window model is utterly inappropriate to the real facts of perception. But instead of coming to terms with reality, our theorists find a place for the window model within perception."[20]

In order to come to terms with reality, what must be done is to find a way to conceptualize, in general terms, the causality involved in perceptual awareness. Notice that so long as one accepts the fact that perceptual awareness must occur by some means and as a result of some causal interaction between direct object of perception and the perceiving subject, one may as well hold that the direct object of perception is the external object. For a senseless regress results if one holds that the causal interaction between external object and perceiving subject produces a new object, which itself is the direct object of perceptual awareness. Why? Because the new object, in order for the subject to directly perceive it, must interact with a second perceptual system of the subject, which in its turn will produce a new object of awareness, and so on and so on.

The problem has been, however, that admitting causality into perceptual awareness is taken, implicitly or explicitly, to mean that the subject partially creates and constitutes the object of his direct perceptual awareness, thereby threatening the validity of perceptual awareness. This is the significance of Randall's remark about Aristotle's theory. If revelation is what is required to grasp independent objects and their intrinsic properties, and if the existence of causal processing in perceptual awareness is taken to mean that the

object of awareness is created or constituted by our perceptual systems and so not revealed, then so much the worse for causal processing and so much the better for revelation.

In other words, if the only alternative envisioned to the view that perceptual awareness is revelatory is the idea that if the causal aspects of perception affect the nature of the perceptual appearance of the object then by that very fact they create a new object, this helps explain the long-lasting appeal of the view of perceptual awareness as revelatory. Philosophers have thought that in order to resist the idea that in direct perception the mind is creative, in some way constituting its own objects, they must embrace the idea, however unpalatable, that in perception the mind is revelatory, simply revealing external objects. If the choice is only between direct perception as revelatory, on the one hand, and direct perception as constitutive and creative, on the other hand, then most choose the first option.

However, if we look at the same issue at a deeper level, we will see that the choice of perception as revelatory versus perception as constitutive and creative exists only because the revelatory standard of direct perception has already been implicitly assumed. For the facts that the nature of the surrounding conditions of perception and the nature of the perceiver affect the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness, or more generally, that the causal aspects of perception affect the nature of the subject's resulting perceptual awareness, will be problematic only if one takes these facts to imply that the perceiver creates or constitutes the object of awareness. And one will take them to imply this only if one has already assumed something like the window model—that in order to directly perceive an object the revelatory standard of direct perception must be met. Thus the very idea of the revelatory standard of direct perception (held implicitly) gives rise to the choice of perception as revelatory versus perception as constitutive and creative—a choice which, in its turn, makes the idea of revelation seem attractive, since most people do not wish to hold that direct perception is constitutive and creative (and thus a vicious circle is

created).

So in order to properly conceptualize, in the most general terms, the causality involved in perceptual awareness we must find a way to conceptualize and understand the facts that external objects are what are directly perceived (not some new object created by the causal processing) but that, at the same time, the subject causally affects the nature of his perceptual awareness of them.[21] In rejecting the revelatory standard of direct perception, we are rejecting the move generated and sanctioned by the acceptance of the revelatory standard, namely, the move of going from the claim that a subject S directly perceives something that appears F to the claim that S directly perceives something that is F. This means that the argument from conflicting appearances will lose its persuasiveness, because as we have seen the move is crucial to the argument. Rejecting the revelatory standard of direct perception also means that sensory qualities need no longer be considered as intrinsic properties of some object (external or internal). We are free to give a different account of their status.

What remains to be accomplished, then, is to develop a general view of the causality involved in perceptual awareness that is free of the revelatory standard of direct perception and then to see how the existence of conflicting appearances can be rendered unproblematic.

## NOTES

[1]Burnyeat, "Conflicting Appearances" in *Proceedings of the British Academy 65*, pp. 69-111.

[2]Ibid., p. 75. Note that the example of the argument from conflicting appearances that Burnyeat uses to first illustrate the hidden influence of the undeclared model is the Protagorean argument about perception presented in Plato's *Theaetetus* 151e-152c. Here is how Socrates states the argument: "it's what Protagoras used to maintain.... For he says, you know, that 'Man is the measure of all things: of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not.'... [H]e puts it something like this, that as each thing appears to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so it is for you—you and I each being a man.... Now doesn't it happen that when the same wind is blowing, one of us feels cold and the other not? Or that one of us feels rather cold and the other very cold?... [S]hall we listen to Protagoras, and say it is cold for the one who feels cold,

and for the other, not cold?... So it results, apparently, that things are for the individual such as he perceives them." Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato, p. 272.

[3]Burnyeat, "Conflicting Appearances" in *Proceedings of the British Academy 65*, p. 81.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid., p. 85.

[6]Of course Burnyeat realizes that one example is far too little to detect a hidden model of perception at work in the history of philosophy. So Burnyeat gives examples from the Cyrenaic school in Ancient Greece to Sextus and the Skeptics to Descartes to Berkeley to Bertrand Russell and Roderick Chisholm, of philosophers who cite similar cases, such as, for instance, the example of a man with jaundice to whom things look yellow because his eyes are tinged with yellow. Now this is in fact false: it is a myth that things take on a yellow tinge for those who have jaundice. Why then have so many philosophers (and so many others as well, it may be added) uncritically accepted this myth—when to dispel it all that is required is to ask a person with jaundice how (white) things look to him? Burnyeat answers: because of the window model. "[T]he manner in which philosophers through the centuries have repeated this type of example, in defiance of ascertainable fact, is evidence that at some level people are powerfully drawn to the thought that we look through our eyes as through a window." Ibid., p. 83.

[7]Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, p. 146.

[8]Note that the revelatory standard of direct perception is a standard for direct perception in the sense that if an object does not meet the standard, if the object is not revealed in S's perception, then S cannot be directly perceiving the object. This does not mean that S cannot be perceiving the object, so long as "perceiving the object" means something different from "directly perceiving the object." (A sense datum theorist, for instance, may claim that a table, say, is the indirect object of perception, which a subject S is perceiving in virtue of directly perceiving another object, a sense datum.)

[9]John Baker has pointed out to me that that the now famous [Kantian] denial by Davidson that we "confront reality" is the obverse of the revelatory standard: to confront reality, Davidson holds, reality would have to be revealed to us, but it is not revealed to us because of the distortions, etc., caused by the filters (i) of the concepts through which we perceive the world, (ii) the diversity of views of the world that different people with different sensory apparatuses have, etc.

[10]It is perhaps worthwhile to observe here that the phrase "O appears F" when used in the dissertation does not mean that a subject S is disposed or inclined to classify O with other similar objects that are F, to subsume O under the concept of F as one of its instances, or to believe that O is F. "O appears F" is not meant to designate a conceptual or propositional state, a state of belief or knowledge. It is meant to capture nonpropositional perception, the purely factual component of perceiving: the fact that when S perceives O, O (perceptually) appears in some definite way to S. (The idea that nonpropositional perception captures the purely factual aspect of perception is advanced by Comman in

Perception, Common Sense, and Science, pp. 368-374.) And therefore, a fortiori, to say that O appears F to S is not to make a claim about the infallibility of S identifying O as an instance of F. Moreover, the phrase "O is F" here is not a statement about the concept F correctly applying to the object O (that is a related but different issue) but a statement about O's inherent nature—that is, its inherent characteristics, those that exist even when it is not being perceived or conceptualized by any subject.

[11]Quoted in Snowdon, "How To Interpret 'Direct Perception'", in The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception, p. 73; "Price 1932" refers to Price's Perception, London: Methuen.

[12]Snowdon, "How To Interpret 'Direct Perception'", in The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception, pp. 73-74.

[13]Randall, Aristotle, p. 91. This interpretation of Aristotle is of course open to debate, but nevertheless it is one plausible interpretation.

[14]Burnyeat, "Conflicting Appearances" in *Proceedings of the British Academy 65*, p. 87.

[15]Ibid., pp. 94-95. Rand also notices this desire for "unmediated knowing"; and Rand and Searle both think that to bring in causality we must distinguish between what we are aware of and how we are aware of it (Rand is much more explicit and consistent on this point), which is the basic insight, as we will see, that I try to apply in my model of perceptual awareness and my explanation of the existence of conflicting appearances. (I discuss Searle's views concerning this distinction in detail in Chapter Ten.) See Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, pp. 75-82, 279-282; Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pp. 37-52; Searle, "Response: Perception and the Satisfactions of Intentionality" in John Searle and His Critics, pp. 181-192.

[16]James W. Comman, Perception, Common Sense, and Science, p. 221. Here Comman also accurately points out that sensum theorists (his term for those who posit ideas, images, representations, copies, sense data, etc., in the mind as the direct objects of perception) hold that sensa are immediately experienced in this sense—i.e., our direct awareness of them is non-causal.

[17]Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (tr. Kemp Smith), pp. 82-83 (A41-43, B59-60). Elsewhere Kant remarks that a non-finite creature (who would have no specific means of awareness) would be capable not of sensible intuition but of intellectual intuition and therefore of grasping the object as it is in itself. See for example Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (tr. Kemp Smith), p. 90 (B71-B72) & 269-270 (B308). As it has been pointed out to me by John Baker, it is interesting to note that commentators on Kant, trying to find a metaphor to catch his ideas here suggested the metaphor of coloured spectacles through which we view the world—if these spectacles had blue lenses then the world would look blue to us.

[18]In this context see Price's initial characterization of what he calls the Causal Argument against (naïve) realism, which, in his words, appeals to the facts that "sense-data [appearances] vary with variations in the medium between the observer and the object,

with variations in the observer's sense-organs, and with variations in his nervous system"; Price, Perception, p. 30. Such facts are indeed problematic for realism if it includes the revelatory standard of direct perception and so the claim that in direct perception the awareness of the object is determined solely by the nature of the object.

[19]As Ayer states the problem: "the way things appear to us is never just a consequence of their own nature. It is causally dependent also on their environment, on such factors as the state of the light, and on our own mental and physical condition." (A.J. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy, p. 74.) As Chisholm puts it, "the ways in which the things that we perceive *appear* to us when we perceive them depend in part upon our own psychological and physiological condition. This fact has led to some of the most puzzling questions of the theory of knowledge." (Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, p. 91.)

[20]Burnyeat, "Conflicting Appearances" in *Proceedings of the British Academy 65*, pp. 94-95.

[21]One might think that what is required is simply to factor in or out the contributions made by the subject's means of perception to the resulting perceptual awareness. In one sense, as we shall see later in the dissertation, I think this is right. In forming judgments and building his conceptual knowledge, a subject must take into account the ways in which his perceptual awareness of objects can vary because of changes in the means or context of his perception of external objects. But this does not mean that the subject can separate his perceptual awareness into those aspects that are revelatory and those that are not. One cannot say, for instance, that when visually perceiving the table the brownness is produced by one's visual system and should be factored out, but that the visual squareness is produced by the object and is part of reality as it "really is." All aspects of the subject's awareness are a product of external object and perceiving subject, of the processing on the part of the subject; so their natures are determined by both the external object and the perceiving subject. What we must come to terms with is the idea that no aspect of the subject's perceptual awareness is revelatory.

# CHAPTER FOUR

## *SOME RECENT REALIST EXPLANATIONS OF CONFLICTING APPEARANCES*

To make convincing my rejection of the argument from conflicting appearances and its claim that we do not directly perceive external objects and states of affairs, I must develop a general view of the causality involved in perceptual awareness (a view free from the revelatory standard of direct perception) that allows that we directly perceive external objects and yet is capable of explaining the existence of conflicting appearances. Before going on to do this, however, we should note that there have been in the past thirty or so years a few different kinds of attempts to explain the existence of conflicting appearances along direct realist lines and so, at least indirectly, to address the argument from conflicting appearances. Interestingly, these attempts try to resist representationalism and idealism (or phenomenalism), and in this way, at least implicitly, try to discard the revelatory standard of direct perception. In other words, these attempts resist pushing the direct object of awareness "into" the mind (calling it a copy, image, idea, appearance, sense datum, etc.) so that it satisfies the revelatory standard of direct perception. I want to indicate why I find some of these kinds of direct realist attempts to explain the existence of conflicting appearances unsatisfactory.

### (1) Armstrong's Explanation of Conflicting Appearances

Armstrong's book Perception and the Physical World is one of the more recent and most well known full-length treatments of the argument from conflicting appearances

(though Armstrong like Snowdon calls it the Argument from Illusion). Armstrong rejects both representationalist and idealist theories of perception (theories that make sensory qualities subjective, intrinsic properties of the mind) and seeks to defend instead a direct realist theory of perception. How does Armstrong answer the argument from conflicting appearances and explain the existence of conflicting appearances and illusions?

Armstrong denies that we have the ability to focus on and pick out objects in our perceptual field, which is an ability more basic than, and which underlies our capacity for, demonstrative and other types of judgment. He does not, in other words, recognize a characterization of direct perception like Snowdon's. As a result, Armstrong answers the argument from conflicting appearances and the conclusion that we do not directly perceive external objects like tables and chairs, not by challenging the premise P1* (and so the move from "something appears F" to "there must be something being directly perceived that is F") and the fundamental assumption giving rise to it, but rather by challenging the idea that direct perception is something different from acquiring beliefs or being inclined to acquire beliefs. As Armstrong states his view of the nature of perception, "perception is *nothing but* the acquiring of knowledge of, or, on occasions, the acquiring of an inclination to believe in, particular facts about the physical world, by means of our senses."[1]

Briefly stated, Armstrong's account of the existence of conflicting appearances, such as the case of a straight stick seen on the ground versus seen partially immersed in water, is as follows. The difference in a subject's perceptual awareness of a straight stick seen lying on the ground and the subject's perceptual awareness of a straight stick seen partially immersed in water, Armstrong claims, is solely a difference in judgments and beliefs—not a difference in the look, the perceptual appearance, of the stick in the two

different situations. Thus the illusion of the stick looking bent when seen partially immersed in water, this conflict of "appearances," does not lead us to conclude that in at least one instance our perceptual awareness is not awareness of external objects and their intrinsic properties—because there is in reality no such distinct thing as perceptual awareness or a perceptual appearance. What the "conflict" should lead us to conclude, Armstrong holds, is that in at least one case (in fact, when the stick is seen partially immersed in water) we acquire, or are inclined to acquire, a false belief (viz., that the stick is bent). This difference in belief, Armstrong holds, is actually all that is different about the two instances of perception. As Armstrong summarizes his account of perceptual illusions, "to suffer sensory illusion is to acquire a false belief or inclination to a false belief in particular propositions about the physical world, by means of our senses."[2] And so as a result cases of conflicting appearances, such as that of the stick seen partially immersed in water versus seen lying on the ground, do not force us to posit ideas, copies, images, or sense data in the mind, as the direct objects of perceptual awareness. The beliefs we acquire or are inclined to acquire by means of our senses refer to physical objects and so these are the direct objects of perception.

We can see therefore that, implicitly, Armstrong is trying to uphold a direct realist theory of perception free from the revelatory standard of direct perception (i.e., free from the idea that only the object should determine the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness) when explaining the existence of conflicting appearances, since he is abandoning the very idea that perception involves a form of awareness (i.e., perceptual awareness) distinct from the conceptual, distinct from acquiring concepts and judgments and beliefs.

We can see here also an example of just how far someone who (properly) takes the argument from conflicting appearances seriously will go in order to avoid its conclusion that we do not directly perceive external objects like tables and chairs (in order to avoid, that is, representationalism or idealism of some kind). For I agree with those who hold that Armstrong's account of perception is implausible: perceptual awareness certainly seems to be something distinct from conceptual awareness, from the acquisition of beliefs, not reducible to it.[3] I do think it is plausible to maintain that to explain the error, or at least the tendency to error, in cases of conflicting appearances like that of the straight stick seen partially immersed in water versus seen lying on the ground, it is necessary to make reference to the concepts and judgments of the subject (as we shall see, this is exactly what my view maintains). But to accept this claim is quite different from accepting the claim that perceptual awareness is nothing but the acquisition of beliefs.

Consider again, for instance, the case of the straight stick. Why is it that when the straight stick is seen on the ground, out of water, the person acquires the belief, or at least the inclination to believe, that the stick is straight? And why is it that when the straight stick is seen partially immersed in water the person acquires the belief, or at least the inclination to believe, that the stick is bent? Surely because of the way the stick appears or looks to him perceptually in the one case versus in the other. The obvious answer, in other words, is that the person has or is inclined to have these different beliefs because the nature of his direct perceptual awareness is different in the two cases. Armstrong's account, however, reverses this explanation. The stick appears or looks different in the two cases, according to Armstrong, because in the first case the person acquires or is inclined to acquire the belief that the stick is straight while in the second case the person acquires or is inclined to acquire the belief that the stick is bent. Such an explanation, I

think, is extremely implausible. Why does the person have these different inclinations in the different situations? For Armstrong, these different inclinations seem simply to be brute facts.

In any event, I have no wish to deny the existence of perceptual awareness as something distinct from conceptual awareness. Moreover, I think an account of perceptual awareness can be developed that preserves this distinction yet does not make sensory qualities subjective (i.e., intrinsic qualities of some kind of internal item) and so does not become, as Armstrong fears, representationalist or idealist. My account will be compatible with direct perceptual realism while at the same time capable of explaining the existence of conflicting appearances.

## (2) Charlesworth's Explanation of Conflicting Appearances

Let us now turn to a second kind of recent account of perceptual awareness which seeks to provide a direct realist explanation of the existence of conflicting appearances. In "Sense-Impressions: A New Model" Maurice Charlesworth proposes a model of sense-impressions that, like Armstrong's account, attempts to avoid the pitfalls of both representationalism and phenomenalism.[4] He claims that admitting the existence of sense-impressions or perceptual appearances or perceptual awareness is now often considered tantamount to accepting some version of representationalism or phenomenalism (as Armstrong for instance thinks). But these two theories face serious problems. For representationalism, the problem is one of "'breaking out beyond our sense-impressions to physical reality'." For phenomenalism, the problems are the "traditional and equally intractable problems ensuing upon a reduction of physical reality to sense-impressions."

To avoid these problems, therefore, it is now often thought that the existence of sense-impressions or perceptual appearances must be denied outright (as Armstrong for instance does).[5] But Charlesworth argues that it is not sense-impressions or perceptual appearances per se that lead to problems but only the traditional model of them. Thus we can already see that the kind of explanation of conflicting appearances that Charlesworth is going to offer will be quite different from the kind Armstrong offered.

The traditional model of perceptual awareness, according to Charlesworth, is one which views perceptual appearances as analogous to "the pattern of electronic impulses on a television screen during a live programme", a pattern which we do not see as a pattern of electronic impulses but rather as "a picture of what it represents." To this model Charlesworth proposes an alternative. "I suggest that a much better although, as we shall see, by no means exact model of the sense-impressions...is provided by a piece of tinted glass....The glass is something through which the object is seen and not something seen instead and as a representative of the object." Why is this a superior model? Because there is a "highly significant difference between this model and the previous ones. Although they [sense-impressions] do in a sense come between us and the physical world, sense-impressions whose role in perception is the same as that of the piece of transparent glass do not obscure that world."[6]

Of course in one way this account sounds suspiciously like Burnyeat's window model of perception—and I think in the final analysis it ends up advocating the revelatory standard of direct perception—but in another way I think Charlesworth's account is trying to maintain something quite different. The difference between the traditional account and Charlesworth's alternative one is that according to the traditional account we literally directly see the perceptual appearances (as representations, images, copies, sense data,

etc., in the mind) whereas according to his alternative account perceptual appearances (as glass that we look through to the world) are not literally what is directly seen—the external world is.[7] In this way Charlesworth seems to be treating perceptual awareness as something real and as something with a definite nature of its own, distinct from that of the external object—perception is not revelation—for Charlesworth says that although perceptual appearances and their sensory qualities "come between" us and the external world they do not obscure the world. In other words, Charlesworth seems to be trying to develop an account—as I will try later on in the dissertation—that maintains both that (1) the subject (not just the object) affects the nature of his resulting perceptual appearance and (2) it nevertheless is the external object and its intrinsic properties that are being directly perceived, not some new object created by the interaction of the external object with the subject's means of perception. It seems Charlesworth is trying to maintain—as I will try—that sensory qualities are neither intrinsic qualities of the external object (since their existence is dependent upon the subject's means of perception) nor intrinsic qualities of some kind of internal object (such as an idea or sense datum in the mind); he is trying to maintain that sensory qualities are not intrinsic qualities of anything but rather the means or the way in which we are perceptually aware of the external object and its intrinsic properties, which is what I will claim.

However, when Charlesworth turns to explaining the existence of conflicting appearances, I think unfortunately he fails to uphold this view of sensory qualities and instead slips back into the view that sensory qualities are intrinsic properties of external objects. For it seems a reason why Charlesworth speaks of tinted and transparent glass rather than just glass is that this allows him to "talk of the glass [i.e., our perceptual awareness or, more specifically, our sensory qualities] as falsifying or distorting our view

of what we see" without making reference to mental representations and the like. "Imagine that the glass is tinted green. Then it will be true to say that when we look through it at a white object, the green colour that we see that object to have will not belong to the object at all [emphasis mine] but will be due to the glass."[8]

Thus in the end Charlesworth seems to be thinking of the external object as having intrinsic sensory qualities attached to it, which may or may not be revealed in our perceptual awareness of the object. In the above example of illusory colour, for instance, the point seems to be that the sensory quality of white is in some way attached to the object but is not revealed by our perceptual awareness of the object, since we see the object as green. Now this choice of example I think is just meant to suggest the general distinction of primary versus secondary qualities that Charlesworth takes to be part of the scientific view of the world. Science shows, he thinks, that many of the qualities we perceive are in fact not part of the intrinsic properties of external objects, a thesis which he labels the secondary-quality thesis.[9] His likening of perception to looking through glass, along with the difference between looking through clear and transparent glass, he thinks can explain the scientific facts. When the glass is transparent, we see the sensory quality that is attached to the object; when the glass is tinted, we see sensory qualities that seem to be attached to the object (such as colours) but which in fact are not; in this way perception can falsify or distort.

Therefore in the end and despite Charlesworth's attempts to the contrary, I think Charlesworth's model is best seen as a modern version of the model of perceptual awareness that Burnyeat named the window model. As such, it (implicitly) endorses the revelatory standard of direct perception. For direct perception to be valid, our perceptual awareness must reveal the object; the subject must not affect the nature of the resulting

perceptual awareness. Although it seems that Charlesworth begins by wanting to accord perceptual awareness a nature of its own, in the end he holds that that nature must be "transparent"—in other words, a nature that is no nature.

It is I think worth noting that another way of looking at what is wrong with Charlesworth's model—and the window model of perceptual awareness in general—is that it tries to model perceptual awareness on what is already an instance of perceptual awareness: looking through a pane of glass to the world behind it. Charlesworth himself recognizes and tries to deal with the objection that his model is unhelpful precisely because it appeals to an instance of perceptual awareness in order to model perceptual awareness in general. As he himself states the objection: "To use this [Charlesworth's] model in explaining perception would therefore be like trying to explain the phenomenon of colour in terms of items which are themselves coloured." To which he replies:

> I do not think that the new model does presuppose perception anymore than does the traditional one. There is no need on either model to consider the awareness of sense-impressions, in terms of which perception is partly explained, to be itself a case of perception. All that is needed for the glass model to be appropriate and useful is that the sensory medium should be able to function in perception in the same way as the glass functions in the perception of objects through it. It is not necessary that the medium be perceived in the way that the glass is, or can be.[10]

Charlesworth's reply may well be plausible as far as it goes, but it does not I think address the real worry behind the objection.

The real worry behind the objection is that in modeling perceptual awareness on an instance of perceptual awareness—looking through transparent glass—one has thereby already granted objects intrinsic sensory qualities. The way objects look through transparent glass is taken to be (implicitly and by default at least) their intrinsic sensory

qualities, the ones that are really attached to the objects. One has elevated, in other words, an instance of perceptual awareness to one that reveals the way the object "really is." And thus one will think that any instance of perceptual awareness that deviates from this paradigmatic instance distorts or falsifies the intrinsic sensory qualities of the object. This after all is what Charlesworth is doing in his example of an object that is seen as white in normal conditions of perception but which in different conditions of perception is seen as green; he takes the appearance of white to be the paradigmatic instance and takes the appearance of green to be some kind of distortion. But why pick that instance instead of the appearance of green as the one that reveals the way the object really is? No answer is given by Charlesworth.

To put the point another way, in modeling perception on an instance of perceptual awareness one in effect duplicates perceptual appearances. A perceptual appearance arises from the interaction between the external object and a subject's means of perception (sensory receptors, nervous system, brain, etc.). If one thinks of this in terms of looking through transparent glass (or in terms of some other instance of perceptual awareness), the object will then be thought to already possess a perceptual appearance, which becomes intrinsic to it. But the actual act of perceptual awareness, which is being modeled on looking through transparent glass, will also itself give rise to another perceptual appearance. It will then be held that this second perceptual appearance may or may not correspond to the object's intrinsic appearance. But what is left unexplained by Charlesworth is why it is legitimate to so duplicate perceptual appearances of objects. It is this worry that Charlesworth's reply does not assuage.

Thus I do not think that Charlesworth's realist model of perceptual awareness and his explanation of the existence of conflicting appearances is satisfactory.

## (3) Searle's Explanation of Conflicting Appearances

In his book Intentionality John Searle defends a direct realist account of perceptual awareness, rejecting both representationalist and idealist approaches.[11] I think that of the three kinds of realist explanations of the existence of conflicting appearances being examined in this chapter, Searle's is the most plausible; as we shall see later in the dissertation, Searle's account is in some ways similar to mine; nevertheless, the two remain significantly different.

According to Searle's account, to directly perceive the external world we must have a perceptual experience whose intentional content is satisfied. Perceptual awareness, then, involves not two things—a perceiving subject aware of the external object of perception—but three things: "visual perception involves at least three elements: the perceiver, the visual experience, and the object (more strictly: the state of affairs) perceived."[12] In this way Searle is according perceptual awareness a nature of its own; it is not just the object that determines the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness; the subject does as well, it seems, by affecting the nature of his perceptual experience. In this way it seems Searle is implicitly rejecting the revelatory standard of direct perception.

The reason that Searle says that strictly speaking it is a state of affairs that is directly perceived is that he does not think that perceptual awareness is awareness of single, discrete qualities or objects (as was often held, for instance, by classical empiricists and sense data theorists). Perception is of a world of entities—of objects, their properties and their relations; it is not awareness of an isolated patch of brownness or of a

rectangular shape. On this point I think most philosophers of perception today would agree (as I do). Searle writes:

> The content of the visual experience...is always equivalent to a whole proposition. Visual experience is never simply *of* an object.... Whenever, for example, my visual experience is of a station wagon it must also be an experience, part of whose content is, for example, that there is a yellow station wagon in front of me. When I say that the content of the visual experience is equivalent to a whole proposition I do not mean that it is linguistic [in form] but rather that the content requires the existence of a whole state of affairs if it is to be satisfied. It does not just make reference to an object.[13]

To state the intentional content of the perceptual experience that Searle would have in this example of him seeing the yellow station wagon in front of him, we should say, according to Searle, that Searle has a visual experience "that there is a yellow station wagon there and that there is a yellow station wagon there is causing this visual experience".[14] If the world is as Searle's perceptual experience presents it as being, if the intentional content of his perceptual experience is satisfied (including the causal component), then according to Searle he is not just having a perceptual experience with a certain intentional content: rather, he is directly perceiving the state of affairs in the world.

If this is the essence of Searle's account of direct perception then why, some will no doubt wonder, is it not a version of representationalism? For it seems very close to an account that says we have a representation with a certain content, and we (indirectly) perceive a state of affairs in the world when the content of the representation accurately represents that state of affairs. The crucial difference is that on Searle's account <u>having</u> a perceptual experience with a certain intentional content is not to be directly aware of the perceptual experience.

> ...the representative theory and phenomenalism....both treat the visual experience as itself the object of visual perception and thus they strip it of its Intentionality. According to them what is seen is always, strictly speaking, a visual experience (in various terminologies the visual experience has been called a "sensum" or a "sense datum", or an "impression"). They are thus confronted with a question that does not arise for the naïve [direct] realist: What is the relationship between the sense data which we do see and the material object which apparently we do not [directly] see? This question does not arise for the naïve [direct] realist because on his account we do not see sense data at all. We see material objects and other objects and states of affairs in the world...though we do indeed *have* visual experiences.... [For the representationalist and phenomenalist] the vehicle of the Intentional *content* of our visual perception, the visual experience, becomes itself the *object* of perception.[15]

But if we are not directly aware of perceptual experiences, then why maintain that they exist? Searle gives a negative reason for maintaining they exist: the reason philosophers of perception today deny the existence of perceptual experiences, of a third element in perceptual awareness, is that they think that upholding their existence commits one to representationalism or phenomenalism, but it does not.[16] However, this is not a very persuasive reason for maintaining that perceptual experiences exist. For the reason philosophers thought that perceptual experiences exist in the first place is that they thought (because of the existence of conflicting appearances and the like) that external objects could not be directly perceived, so they had to postulate the existence of perceptual experiences—ideas, images, impressions, sense data, etc., in the mind—as the direct objects of perceptual awareness. But if one thinks (once again) that external objects can be and are directly perceived, then why not abandon the postulate? What we need is some positive reason for maintaining that a third element of perceptual awareness, namely perceptual experiences, exist.

Searle, however, says it is hard to make a positive argument for the existence of perceptual experiences: "It is a bit difficult to know how one would argue for the existence of perceptual experiences to someone who denied their existence. It would be a bit like arguing for the existence of pains: if their existence is not obvious already, no philosophical argument could convince one."[17] But denying the existence of a third element in perceptual awareness is not like denying the existence of pains. The better analogy would be that denying the existence of perceptual experiences is like denying one analysis of pain, such as, for example, an analysis that held that pain is an awareness of the state of one's own body. In denying perceptual experiences, one is not denying the existence of perceptual awareness as such, one is denying an analysis of perceptual awareness into three components: the perceiving subject, the external objects that are perceived, and the "having" of a perceptual experience. So I think Searle is too quick in dismissing his detractor.

Despite what Searle says about the difficulty of offering a positive argument for the existence of perceptual experiences, however, one can find one other positive reason in Searle's book for advocating the existence of perceptual experiences: the existence of hallucinations. Searle thinks that a proper explanation of the existence of hallucinations will maintain that when we suffer from a hallucination we have an experience whose intentional content is not satisfied and so we are not perceiving anything though we "*have* the visual experience and the visual experience may be indistinguishable from the visual experience I would have had if I had actually seen a car."[18] Searle does not develop this reason into a full-fledged argument, although others have used the existence of hallucinations to argue for the existence of something like perceptual experiences. I do not think the existence of hallucinations requires postulating the existence of perceptual

experiences or sheds much light on the nature of perceptual awareness, but my explanation of why this is so is somewhat lengthy, so rather than getting completely side-tracked, I will reserve the explanation until the next chapter.

The important point in our present context is that one main reason I find Searle's realist explanation of conflicting appearances unsatisfactory is that his account of perceptual awareness involves a third element beyond the perceiving subject and the external object of perceptual awareness: a perceptual experience. As we shall see, I think an account of perceptual awareness can be given without this third element. With these points in mind, let us now see just what Searle's explanation of the existence of conflicting appearances is.

Searle discusses the conflicting appearances of the moon when seen on the horizon versus when seen directly overhead. "A good example is the appearance of the moon on the horizon. When one sees the moon on the horizon it looks a great deal bigger than it does when seen directly overhead."[19] What is Searle's explanation of the existence of these "conflicting" appearances? He maintains that the intentional content of the two perceptual experiences is that the moon is of a certain size (when seen on the horizon) and that the moon is of a smaller size (when seen directly overhead), so that the intentional contents of the two perceptual experiences include that the moon has changed in size. We believe, nevertheless, that the moon has not changed in size, and it "is only because we believe independently that the moon remains constant in size that we allow the Intentionality of belief to override the Intentionality of our visual experience."[20]

Thus according to Searle in the case of these two conflicting appearances it is the subject's very perceptual awareness that is defective. The two perceptual experiences are not satisfied. It is "part of their respective Intentional contents that the moon is smaller

overhead than it is on the horizon"—which is in fact not the case.[21] But since the intentional content of the two perceptual experiences is not satisfied, it seems that the subject is in fact not (directly) perceiving the moon in the two cases. Now that is a startling conclusion for a direct realist! Notice further that since most if not all of the objects that we perceive are subject to such variations (houses and cars and bridges and lakes look smaller when seen from an airplane, for instance, than when seen from the ground), on Searle's account it seems that we rarely in fact directly perceive these objects. This is not a conclusion that most perceptual realists would find acceptable.

Another perspective from which to look at this point is that of the ancient skeptics. There seems little basis, the skeptics correctly pointed out, to pick one instance of perceptual awareness as the instance where the object looks the way it "really is," to pick one instance of perceptual awareness as the instance where the moon, say, looks the size it "really is" (for example, when it is seen on the horizon or when it is seen directly overhead) and then to label the other instances "non-veridical." If one holds that in one case we do not directly perceive the moon, then it seems that we must hold that in the other cases as well we do not directly perceive the moon. If, on the other hand, we hold that in one case we do directly perceive the moon, then it seems we must hold that in the other cases as well we directly perceive the moon.

Thus another significant reason why I find Searle's explanation of the existence of conflicting appearances unsatisfactory is that he seems to maintain that in cases of conflicting appearances (and there are many such if one allows the example of seeing an object from different distances) the perceptual awareness itself is defective, which leads to the unwanted conclusion that in numerous instances we are "having" a perceptual experience that is not satisfied—and so are not actually perceiving anything.

But why does Searle think that in the cases of seeing the moon on the horizon and seeing it directly overhead the intentional contents of the two perceptual experiences include that the moon has changed in size and so conflict? Because "if we imagine that the visual experiences remained as they are now, but...that we simply had no relevant beliefs, then we really would be inclined to believe that the moon had changed in size."[22] As we shall see later in the dissertation, however, I think one can give an account of this inclination while still maintaining that each instance of perceptual awareness is valid and that the two do not in fact conflict.

Of course the deeper question for Searle's account of perceptual awareness is: What specifies the intentional content of a perceptual experience? According to Searle, it is the phenomenological properties (i.e., the sensory qualities) of the perceptual experience that specify the perceptual experience's intentional content.[23] Searle does not say very much about how this actually works, but he does drop some hints throughout the rest of the chapter. Searle's is not the simple-minded view that sensory qualities attach to external objects; on Searle's account sensory qualities are not intrinsic properties of external objects. When we conceptually judge that the station wagon is yellow or that it is rectangular, we are not ascribing sensory qualities to the station wagon. The concept yellow or rectangular, when applied in our judgments about external objects (as against our judgments about perceptual experiences), does not refer to the sensory qualities of various shades of yellow or of various rectangular shapes. As Searle puts it,

> ...concepts that mark off real features of the world are causal concepts. Red, for example, is that feature of the world that causes things to look (and otherwise pass the tests for being), systematically and under the appropriate conditions, red [here of course "red" does designate the sensory quality of red]. Square things are those which are capable of

> causing certain sorts of effects on our senses and on our measuring apparatus.[24]

So Searle's view seems to be that the sensory quality of yellow, say, specifies that the intentional content of the perceptual experience is that the external object(s) is yellow. The sensory quality of a visually straight shape, to take another example, specifies that the intentional content of the perceptual experience is that the external object(s) is straight.

Crucially, Searle seems to hold that a sensory quality always specifies the same intentional content no matter what changes there might be in the conditions of perception or in the perceiver's means of perception. So, for example, in the case of the conflicting appearances when a spear is seen lying on the ground versus when it is seen partially immersed in water, Searle would hold that when the spear seen partially immersed in water looks bent, the intentional content of the subject's perceptual experience includes that the spear is bent (which means that the intentional content is not satisfied and that the subject in fact is not perceiving the spear). Similarly, when an object occupies a certain space in the subject's visual field, Searle seems to think that this always specifies that the perceptual experience's intentional content includes that the object is of a certain absolute size, say size S6. So when the same object occupies less space in the subject's visual field (because it is seen from a greater distance), this means that the perceptual experience's intentional content includes that the object is of a different absolute size, say size S2. And so according to Searle the intentional content of the two instances of being perceptually aware of the moon, for instance, conflict and are incompatible.

Searle, however, gives no reason why this should be so. He does not explain, in other words, why the same sensory quality must always specify the same intentional content. When the sensory quality of what we might call a visually straight shape is

caused by a straight spear, it specifies that the spear is straight. When, in different conditions of perception, the sensory quality of what we might call a visually bent shape is caused by a straight spear (as it is when a straight spear is seen partially immersed in water), why should it specify that the spear is bent? Why does it not resemble the above case and so specify that the spear is straight? If it did, then the intentional content of the perceptual experience would be satisfied and the subject would be directly perceiving the spear (though he might mistakenly judge—to the extent that people make such judgments—that his perceptual experience was not satisfied).

If Searle adopted such an account rather than the account he does adopt, then, as we shall see when I propose my explanation of conflicting appearances later in the dissertation, his explanation of the existence of conflicting appearances would be much closer to mine than it in fact is. However, the two views would still be significantly different in that my account will not include a third element in the analysis of perceptual awareness, perceptual experiences. Notice further that if Searle abandoned the view that in cases, say, of perceiving objects at different distances our perceptual awareness is defective and that we actually are not perceiving anything, he would have little need for perceptual experiences with an intentional content of their own, since perceptual experiences are needed primarily to explain cases where the intentional content of perceptual awareness is (allegedly) not satisfied. In other words, to account for the "fact" that there is an intentional content but that this intentional content cannot be identified with external objects and states of affairs perceptual experiences are needed. But if cases of conflicting appearances are not cases where the intentional content of perceptual awareness is not satisfied—if the intentional content of the perceptual awareness were in fact satisfied—then one could hold that the intentional content is to be identified with

external objects and states of affairs (and then Searle's theory would indeed be a version of common sense realism).[25]

In any case, one can understand now why I find Searle's actual explanation of conflicting appearances unsatisfactory: it advocates the existence of perceptual experiences with a distinct intentional content of their own and, as far as I understand his account, it invalidates far too many instances of perceptual awareness.

## NOTES

[1]Armstrong, Perception and the Physical World, p. 105.

[2]Ibid., p. 106.

[3]See, for example, Goldman, Empirical Knowledge, pp. 92ff; Dretske, Seeing and Knowing, pp. 5ff; Comman, Perception, Common Sense, and Science, pp. 348ff.

[4]Charlesworth, "Sense-Impressions: A New Model", pp. 24-44.

[5]Ibid., pp. 24-26.

[6]Ibid., pp. 28-29.

[7]Ibid., pp. 29-32.

[8]Ibid., p. 30.

[9]Ibid., p. 26. Charlesworth begins his article by remarking that he accepts the picture of the world painted by physics. Presumably what he has in mind is that he accepts the view that colours, etc., are not intrinsic properties of external objects. This is certainly suggested by the fact that, as I remarked, he labels the picture of the world painted by physics "the secondary-quality thesis" and holds that a proper model of perceptual awareness must be true to this scientific picture of the world.

[10]Ibid., p. 44.

[11]Searle, Intentionality, pp. 57-59. Searle writes "The account of visual perception that I have been arguing for...is, I guess, a version of 'naïve' (direct, common sense) realism". (p.57) Though Searle refers to his theory as a version of naïve realism in the rest of the book, I actually think the account is best viewed simply as a version of direct realism, and this is how I will refer to it. Note that in Searle's discussion his focus is primarily on

vision.

[12]Ibid., p. 57.

[13]Ibid., p. 40. For the sake of brevity, however, I like Searle will often simply speak of directly perceiving external objects rather than states of affairs.

[14]Ibid., p. 48.

[15]Ibid., p. 58. Unfortunately, Searle does not explicate further what it means to "have" a perceptual experience. On the issue of distinguishing his theory from representationalism, note that Searle also writes: "If, for example, I see a yellow station wagon in front of me, the experience I have is directly of the object. It doesn't just "represent" the object, it provides direct access to it.... It seems therefore unnatural to describe visual experiences as representations, indeed if we talk that way it is bound to lead to the representative theory of perception". (pp. 45-46)

[16]Ibid., p. 44.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid., p. 38.

[19]Ibid., p. 55.

[20]Ibid., p. 56.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid., pp. 61-62. Searle writes there: "We are now in a position to return to our original question: what are the truth conditions of a sentence of the form...X sees that there is a yellow station wagon in front of X. The truth conditions are: 1. X has a visual experience which has a. certain conditions of satisfaction b. certain phenomenal properties. 2. The conditions of satisfaction are: that there is a yellow station wagon in front of X and the fact that there is a yellow station wagon in front of X is causing the visual experience. 3. The phenomenological properties are such as to determine that the conditions of satisfaction are as described in 2. That is, those conditions of satisfaction are determined by the experience. 4. The form of the causal relation in the conditions of satisfaction is continuous and regular Intentional causation....5. The conditions of satisfaction are in fact satisfied. That is, there actually is a [yellow] station wagon causing (in the manner described in 4) the visual experience (described in 3) which has the Intentional content (described in 2)."

[24]Ibid., p. 75.

[25]Of course there remains the question of whether the existence of hallucinations forces us to posit perceptual experiences.

# CHAPTER FIVE

## *HALLUCINATIONS AND PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES*

I said in the previous chapter that one positive reason Searle suggests for introducing a third element into the analysis of perceptual awareness (other than the perceiving subject and the external objects of perception)—a vehicle to bear the intentional content of perceptual awareness, namely, perceptual experiences—is the existence of hallucinations. But as I also said there, Searle does not develop this suggestion into an argument. Other philosophers, however, like Jackson and Harman, argue for the existence of something like perceptual experiences by appealing to the existence of hallucinations. The phenomenological similarity of perceptual awareness to hallucinating shows, they contend, that the intentional object of perceptual awareness is like that of hallucinating: it is a mental object or, at the very least, an intentional object that is not to be identified with any external object or state of affairs. (Indeed, this seems to be the main reason they offer for splitting the intentional object of perceptual awareness from external objects and states of affairs and positing something like perceptual experiences to bear the intentional content of perception.) Although I will not write volumes on the issue—this is, after all, a dissertation on conflicting appearances and perceptual awareness, not a dissertation on hallucination and perception—I think that something nevertheless needs to be said in order to explain fully why I find Searle's positing of perceptual experiences, and so Searle's direct realist explanation of the existence of conflicting appearances, unsatisfactory.

## (1) The Appeal to Hallucinations

It is widely recognized that perceptual awareness is an intentional phenomenon—it is of or about objects. But despite this recognition, it is still rarely accepted that perceptual awareness is a real relation between the subject and a world of objects and events external to him. It is rarely accepted, that is, that some external object or state of affairs is an actual component of a subject's perceptual awareness—that when Susan, for instance, is looking at the tree in front of her apartment, the external tree (or the state of affairs of the tree existing outside Susan's window) is an actual component of her perceptual awareness. Granted, it is usually held that if Susan is perceiving the tree then the tree must be appropriately causing her awareness, but nevertheless the tree is not held to make up the intentional object of her awareness. Susan could have the same perceptual awareness with the same intentional object, it is held, even if the tree were not causing her perception or did not even exist. In other words, remove the tree and you do not thereby remove the intentional object of Susan's perceptual awareness. And this means that her perceptual awareness is not a real relation between her and the external tree, since if it were, removing one of the relata would eliminate the relation—i.e., would eliminate Susan's perceptual awareness, including its intentional object.[1]

This I think is why so many philosophical discussions of perception speak not of perceptual awareness but rather of perceptual states and experiences. For the latter terms, unlike the former, suggest that perception does not reach out beyond the perceiver to include as its intentional object or content some aspect(s) of the external world.

Of course this philosophical analysis is contrary to our common-sense (and some would say naive) viewpoint. Common-sensically, we think that if, when Susan is perceiving

the tree, the tree were removed then her awareness would cease, not just in the sense that the cause of her awareness would have been removed, but also in the sense that the object of her awareness would have been removed: there would be no intentional object left. Common sense, in other words, identifies the intentional object of perceptual awareness with some aspect(s) of the external world.

Probably the principal way of maintaining that perception is not a real relation between the subject and some aspect(s) of the external world, and that its intentional object therefore cannot be identified with some aspect(s) of the external world, is to maintain that perception is instead a relation between the subject and a mental object, such as an idea, a sense-impression, a sense-datum, a sensum, an appearance.[2]

A well-known modern theory along these lines is Frank Jackson's (which is presented in his book, Perception). Jackson begins by conceding that perception in a sense is a relation between subject and object: "The sense-datum theorist admits that looking red and looking square are relations between persons and objects, as does everybody."[3] But it becomes clear that by this Jackson does not mean that in perception the mind is essentially relational, reaching out beyond itself to include as its object something other than the mental, some aspect(s) of the external world. As a result, he speaks of perceptual states rather than of perceptual awareness. In other words, for Jackson the external object is not the intentional object of a perceptual state: it is only a cause of that state.

"A necessary condition of the truth of 'The orange looks red to me'", he writes, "is that there be a causal connection between the orange and me; this causal link is essential to its being *the orange* and not something else which looks red to me." Satisfying this condition alone, however, is not sufficient for perceiving the orange.

> A second necessary condition is that the orange not only causally act on me, but that it act on me to produce a certain kind of *state*. And this state might have existed in the absence of the orange or any other material object looking red to me [emphasis mine]. For I can be in exactly the state I am in when the orange looks red to me without there being any appropriate material object looking red to me.[4]

In other words, the external orange is not literally the intentional object of the instance of perceptual awareness.

Why does Jackson maintain that the intentional object of perceptual awareness can exist in the absence of the external object or state of affairs? The answer is: because of the existence of hallucinations. "I might," Jackson writes in defense of his claim that he might be in exactly the same state he is in when the orange looks red without there being any appropriate material object looking red to him, "be suffering from a total hallucination indistinguishable from the orange looking red."[5] The idea here of course is that a hallucination is an intentional phenomenon phenomenologically very similar (if not identical) to an instance of perceptual awareness, except that no external object or state of affairs is causing the hallucinatory state by stimulating the senses. And the absence of such an external object or state of affairs, it seems, is taken to imply that the hallucination's intentional object—the object that is directly before the mind—cannot be identified with some aspect(s) of the external world (on Jackson's view, it is to be identified with a mental object). A similar analysis is then given to the intentional object of perceptual awareness.

Perceptual awareness, therefore—and this is the crucial point—is not a real relation between the mind and objects and states of affairs external to it. As Jackson formulates the point: "*X* looking *F* to *S* is a matter of *X* causing...a [perceptual] state in *S* which is itself not a relation between *S* and *X*."[6]

Of course (as Jackson himself admits) the positing of mental objects is widely out of favour today. But rejection of mental objects does not mean embracement of the view that the intentional object of perceptual awareness is some aspect(s) of the external world. A prevalent view among philosophers discussing perception is to distinguish between the intentional object of perceptual awareness and the external object or state of affairs, while at the same time refusing to analyze intentional objects in terms of mental objects. Thus the external object or state of affairs is still viewed only as a (possible) cause of the perceptual experience and its intentional object (and as that which must satisfy the intentional content of the perceptual experience).

Consider for instance Harman's recent remarks about perception and intentionality, which bear a close similarity to Searle's account but which focus more on the issue at hand.

> I begin by remarking on what is sometimes called the intentionality of experience. Our experience of the world has content—that is, it represents things as being in a certain way. In particular, perceptual experience represents a perceiver as in a particular environment, for example, as facing a tree with brown bark and green leaves fluttering in a slight breeze.
>
> One thing that philosophers mean when they refer to this as the intentional content of experience is that the content of the experience may not reflect what is really there [emphasis mine].[7]

Harman makes it clear a bit later on that in saying that the intentional content of the (perceptual) experience may not reflect what is really there, he means that no external object or state of affairs need exist to which the intentional object corresponds; the intentional content of the perceptual experience may not be satisfied. And this means that some aspect(s) of the external world cannot be identified with the intentional object of the perceptual experience. Perceptual awareness is not a real relation between subject and external world.

Harman admits that he has no worked-out theory of intentional objects; but, he says, no such theory will be satisfactory that identifies intentional objects with mental objects (nor, of course, with external objects). He presents Jackson's view only to reject it.

> You agree that there is a sense in which Eloise sees something green and brown when there is nothing green and brown before her in the external world [she is hallucinating]. You are able to deny that this brown and green thing is mental by taking it to be a nonexistent and merely intentional object. But it is surely more reasonable to suppose that one is in this case aware of something mental than to suppose that one is aware of something that does not exist. How can there be anything that does not exist? The very suggestion is a contradiction in terms, since "be" simply means "exist," so that you are really saying that there exists something that does not exist (Quine 1948). There are no such things as nonexistent objects![8]

To which Harman replies:

> ...let me concede immediately that I do not have a well worked out theory of intentional objects....Indeed, I am quite willing to believe that there are not really any nonexistent objects and that apparent talk of such objects should be analyzed away somehow....However this issue is resolved, the theory that results had better end up agreeing that Ponce de Leon was looking for something when he was looking for the Fountain of Youth, even though there is no Fountain of Youth, and the theory had better *not* have the consequence that Ponce de Leon was looking for something mental. If a logical theory can account for searches for things that do not, as it happens, exist, it can presumably also allow for a sense of "see" in which Macbeth can see something that does not really exist.[9]

Why does Harman maintain that the intentional object of perceptual awareness can exist in the absence of the external object or state of affairs and therefore cannot literally be identified with the external object or state of affairs? As in Jackson's case, the answer is: because of the existence of hallucinations. "Although it looks to me as if I am seeing a tree", Harman writes, "...it may be a hallucination produced by a drug in my coffee."[10] Again, the

idea is that a hallucination is an intentional phenomenon phenomenologically very similar (if not identical) to an instance of perceptual awareness, except that no external object or state of affairs is causing the hallucination by stimulating the senses. And the absence of such an external object or state of affairs, it seems, is taken to imply that the hallucination's intentional object cannot be identified with some aspect(s) of the external world (on Harman's view, as I have discussed, it is to be identified with an intentional object). A similar analysis is then given to the intentional object of perceptual awareness.

## (2) Some Flaws in the Appeal to Hallucinations

Let us examine more carefully the reasoning involved in these appeals to hallucinations in order to justify splitting the intentional object of perceptual awareness from external objects and states of affairs. As we can see from the above discussion, Jackson and Harman seem to think that the reasoning involved in deriving the conclusion that the intentional object of perception cannot be identified with an external object or state of affairs is relatively straightforward, for neither devotes much space to explaining the reasoning (recall that Searle did not spend any time explaining the reasoning). But is the reasoning really so straightforward and unproblematic? To answer this, let us begin by attempting to make more explicit what the actual argument is.

I think the following argument captures the sort of reasoning that Jackson, Harman and Searle are appealing to.

(P1) Perception is sufficiently similar (if not identical) phenomenologically to hallucination so that the same account that is given of the intentional object of the one should be given of the intentional object of the other.

(P2) The intentional object of hallucination cannot be identified with an external object (or state of affairs).

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(C1) The intentional object of perception cannot be identified with an external object (or state of affairs).

Rarely is any significant attempt made to establish the truth of premises P1 and P2. Jackson, Harman, and Searle, for instance, seem to treat P1 and P2 as obvious. Jackson, as I said, in defending his claim that he might be in exactly the same state he is in when the orange looks red without there being any appropriate material object looking red to him, simply states that there might be nothing before him, he might "be suffering from a total hallucination indistinguishable from the orange looking red." In other words, according to Jackson it is obvious that the intentional object of hallucination cannot be identified with an external object (i.e., P2 is obviously true) and that hallucination and perception are the same kind of state having the same kind of intentional object (i.e., P1 is obviously true). Similarly, in explaining why the intentional object of perception should not be identified with an external object, Harman simply remarks that he might be suffering from a hallucination produced by a drug in his coffee. In other words, perception is the same kind of experience as hallucination and will have the same kind of intentional object (i.e., P1 is obviously true) and the intentional object of hallucination is obviously not an external object (i.e., P2 is obviously true). And like Harman, Searle also simply remarks that we might be hallucinating in such a way that we are "having" a perceptual experience without perceiving anything.

Let us, however, be more careful and actually consider what can be said for the truth of P1 and P2. Let us begin with P1.

P1 is difficult for the ordinary person to substantiate since he has probably never suffered from a hallucination, like that of "seeing pink rats." It is therefore difficult for him to say whether perception and hallucination are phenomenologically very similar or not.

However, normally—if one forces a proponent of P1 to actually try to justify P1—the evidence adduced for the phenomenological similarity of perception and hallucination is that a subject suffering from a hallucination confuses what he perceives and what he hallucinates, and will describe his hallucination in perceptual terms, like "seeing pink rats." The question is: Is this sufficient evidence to establish their phenomenological similarity?

With respect to the evidence of how a hallucination is described, I do not think that it is very compelling. It is normal to describe the unusual and previously unknown in terms that are familiar to one, and perception is certainly more familiar to a person than hallucination. Moreover, the fact that we use similar terms to describe two things does not mean that they are in reality identical nor even that they are fundamentally similar. We may describe a piece of wax fruit in terms similar to those we use in describing a piece of real fruit, but this does not show that the two are in reality identical or even fundamentally similar nor that we cannot distinguish between the two. We may describe our perceptual memories (say the remembered look of someone's face) largely in perceptual terms, but this does not show that perception and this kind of memory are identical or even fundamentally similar mental processes nor that we cannot distinguish between the two.

With respect to the evidence of hallucinating being confused with perceiving, one must remember that there are at least two reasons why a subject S might be unable to distinguish between two things, Y and Z. First, it may be because Y and Z are indistinguishable within S's (present) context. For example, S might be unable to distinguish a piece of fruit, Y, from a wax replica, Z, when situated across the room from Y and Z. Second, it may be because S's ability to distinguish things like Y from things like Z within S's (present) context has been hampered. For instance, if S is drunk he may have not have the ability to distinguish wax fruit from real fruit, even if the normal person can. Now there is reason to think that it is the second

and not the first that is going on when a subject confuses hallucination with perception. That is, there is reason to think that a subject confuses hallucination with perception not because they are that (phenomenologically) similar, but because his judgment has been impaired.

Most drugs which produce hallucinations, such as LSD, also significantly impair a subject's judgment and general cognitive functioning. It is I think reasonable to hold that among the impairments is a decreased ability to distinguish one phenomenon from another, such as distinguishing hallucination from perception. Moreover, when hallucination is produced by a drug, such as mescaline, that does not significantly impair a subject's judgment and general cognitive functioning, psychologists report that the subject is able to distinguish his hallucinations from his perception.[11] This counts against the two being very similar phenomenologically.[12]

Furthermore, even if one admits for the sake of argument that hallucination and perception are in fact very similar phenomenologically, it is not clear why this fact alone would imply that the account given to the intentionality of the one should also be given to the intentionality of the other. As I have said, two things can be indistinguishable or virtually indistinguishable from a certain context to a given subject and yet not be of the same kind nor even very similar. Looking across a room at a bowl of fruit, for instance, a subject may be unable to distinguish the real fruit from the wax replicas. This does not imply that the wax replicas are identical to or even very similar to the real fruit. And such examples could be multiplied almost endlessly.

Notice, moreover, that a supporter of P1, like Jackson or Harman, would admit that hallucination and perception differ in a major way: perception involves stimulation of the sensory receptors and complex processing of the resulting signals by the nervous system and brain, while hallucination does not, being produced by drugs and the like. Why then think that

the same account of their intentionality must be given for both? If they differ so radically in the causal processing involved, why assume or maintain that they must have the same kind of intentional object?[13]

Therefore in assessing the argument involved in the standard appeal to hallucination, I do not think that there is good reason to hold that P1 is true and there is reason to think that it is false. Let us now consider briefly P2.

The truth of P2 may not be suspect—though I am not certain about this—but its use in the argument certainly is. For what is at issue, in a sense, is how to understand the intentionality of hallucination and perception. If one can take it as obvious that the intentional object of hallucination is not an external object (because no external object is stimulating the senses), why cannot one take it as obvious that the intentional object of perception is an external object (because an external object is stimulating the senses)? And if this last point is taken as obvious, then, since according to P1 the same analysis should be given to the intentional object of hallucination as to the intentionality of perception, the intentional object of hallucination is also an external object.[14] This also suggests that it is most likely a serious mistake to think that the same account of intentionality should be given to hallucination and perception simply because the two are (allegedly) phenomenologically similar.

Thus I think the reasoning involved in the appeal to hallucinations in order to justify splitting the intentional content of perception from external objects and states of affairs is flawed—and much too casually endorsed.

## (3) Some Alternative Accounts of Hallucinations

Even after disposing of the appeal to hallucinations, I suspect that some people will be wondering what account of hallucinations can be given other than the standard one. The standard account, as we have discussed, is to treat an instance of hallucinating and an instance of perceiving as two instances of the same type of mental state or experience, with the same type of object—a mental or intentional object that is not to be identified with any external object. The two states or experiences differ only in their causal origins: perception is produced by stimulation of the sensory receptors while hallucination is produced by drugs and the like. After the causal processing has occurred—the standard account in effect holds—the mental or intentional object just comes "before" the mind, revealed by it. What other accounts of hallucination are there than the standard one?

There are many plausible alternative accounts of hallucinations which do not treat perception and hallucination as the same kind of mental state or experience and do not require their objects to be revealed. Here are sketches of some alternatives (no doubt there are more), listed in no particular order of plausibility. Of course much more would need to be said than what I say in order to establish one alternative account as a full let alone correct account of hallucinations, but that it is not my aim here since this is not a dissertation on hallucinations.

One alternative account of hallucinations is that a drug like LSD triggers very vivid sensory memories and imagery, which the subject recalls somewhat involuntarily and randomly. Because a hallucinatory drug usually also impairs the subject's ability to judge and discriminate between phenomena, including mental phenomena, he is most often unable to tell what he is perceiving and what vivid sensory memories he is recalling; as a result, he often confuses what he perceives with what he hallucinates and vice-versa. Such an account makes perception and

hallucination different mental processes, while nevertheless explaining the similarity between the two: the two processes are similar in that hallucination is recall of stored past perceptual awareness and sensory imagery. Moreover, this account can allow that the intentional object of perception is an external object or state of affairs while holding that the intentionality of hallucination should not be explained along the same lines as that of the process of perception—which accords with the fact of their radically different causal natures—but rather along the lines of the intentionality of the process of memory.

Another alternative account of hallucinations, similar to the previous one, is that a drug like LSD induces not vivid sensory memories and imagery, but rather a dream-like process in the subject while he remains awake. Because a hallucinatory drug often impairs the subject's judgment, and because dreams can be mistaken for perception, the subject is often unable to tell the difference and confuses what he hallucinates with what he perceives and vice-versa. Such an account also makes hallucination and perception different mental processes while still explaining how a hallucination can be mistaken for perception. And such an account can allow that the intentional object of perception is an external object or state of affairs while holding that the intentionality of hallucination should not be explained along the lines of the intentionality of the process of perception—which again accords with their radically different causal natures—but rather along the lines of the intentionality of the process of dreaming.

A third alternative account of hallucinations is that they are a type of perception, a perception of the effects the drug (or what not) has on the subject's body and nervous system. Hallucination, in other words, might be a form of interoception. Just as we can be sensorially aware of the position of our legs and arms, and, as many accounts of pain maintain, of various forms of physical damage to our bodies, so we can be sensorially aware of the effects that various drugs have on our body and nervous system. Hallucination then would be much more

similar to perception than the previous accounts allow, since it would be a form of perceiving events and/or states of affairs in the external world.

Finally, a fourth alternative account of hallucinations is that they are a distinct type of mental process, as perceiving is distinct from remembering and remembering is distinct from dreaming. Hallucinations would involve the external world in the same way that dreams, for instance, do—that is, the intentional content of the process of hallucination would ultimately be derived from what the subject has perceived and/or conceptualized—but there would be no intentional object which comes "before" the mind (to use Jackson's phrase again) and which is revealed to the subject. For in the case of dreams or hallucinations, there is not a complex and intricate causal connection between sensory receptors and objects impinging on the sensory receptors; there is nothing that could serve as an object; there is, in other words, a much looser connection between the mental process of dreaming or hallucinating and objects and events external to the mind. Hallucination then, like dreaming (let us say for the sake of argument), might be a distinct mental process having intentional content but no intentional objects. And therefore the account of the intentionality of hallucinations will not be the same as that of perception, which does have intentional objects.

So we see that there are many alternative explanations of hallucinations apart from the standard one. Whether or not one finds any of these alternative explanations plausible, it remains the case, however, that the much more important point of the chapter is that the appeal to hallucinations in order to justify splitting the intentional object of perceptual awareness from external objects and states of affairs, and so to introduce a third element into the analysis of perceptual awareness, something bearing the intentional content of perception, namely, perceptual experiences, is flawed.

## NOTES

[1]Of course on Searle's account, if you eliminate the external object, you eliminate perception, since he defines perception not just as the having of a perceptual experience but as the having of a perceptual experience whose intentional content is satisfied. So verbally Searle seems to hold that perception is a real relation between subject and external object. But importantly and nevertheless, on Searle's account eliminating the external object does not eliminate the perceptual experience, the having of the perceptual experience, or the intentional content of the perceptual experience. So a perceptual experience itself is not a real relation between subject and external object.

[2]Locke, for instance, speaks of ideas, appearances, and perceptions in the mind, which may or may not resemble qualities inherent in the corresponding external object. Berkeley says that the things we immediately perceive are ideas which exist only in the mind. Hume writes that the direct objects of awareness are impressions in the mind which are (probably) derived from external objects but which bear no resemblance to the qualities inherent in those objects. Kant holds that in sense-perception we are aware only of appearances, never of the object as it is in itself. Mill, describing the popular opinion of his day, says that what we are directly aware of is only sensations in the mind which are caused by the object. Russell, Price, and Broad speak of the given in perception as not, say, the external table but only its appearance, which they label "sense-datum" or "sensum." See, for example, Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding: II, viii, p. 15; Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, pp. 21-22; Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (Bk I, part iv, sec. iv) pp. 226-227; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (tr. Kemp Smith), (A41-43, B59-60) pp. 82-83; J.S. Mill, An Examination of William Hamilton's Philosophy, pp. 5-6; Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, pp. 11-12; Price, Perception, p. 28; and Broad, Scientific Thought, pp. 234-240.

[3]Jackson, Perception, p. 91.

[4]Ibid., p. 98.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Harman, "The Intrinsic Quality of Experience", p. 34. Note that like Harman I use the terms "intentional object" and "intentional content" as roughly interchangeable. But one could argue that "intentional object" is a stronger notion than "intentional content." Imagination and dreams, for instance, are intentional phenomenon, but few would go so far as saying that in a dream, say, one is perceiving objects, intentional or otherwise. Rather, the typical account of dreams is that they are a reexperiencing of past perception and conception, often in a rearranged form. In this sense they can bear a relation to the external world and have intentional content, without the need of positing any new type of objects for these processes.

[8]Jackson, Perception, quoted in Harman, "The Intrinsic Quality of Experience", p. 37.

[9]Harman, "The Intrinsic Quality of Experience", pp. 37-38.

[10]Ibid., p. 34.

[11]See Hirst, The Problems of Perception, pp. 43-44.

[12]Consider the parallel with dreaming. Sometimes while dreaming a subject will think that he is in fact awake and perceiving. Does this show that dreaming is phenomenologically identical to or even very similar to perception? Not necessarily. The "mistake" may occur because the subject's ability to make such judgments as "I am perceiving" or "I am dreaming" is hampered or even lost completely. Those capable of directed dreaming, for instance, who seem to retain a capacity for judgment while dreaming, report that they can distinguish between their dreams and perception.

[13]I suspect that the reason Jackson and Harman in effect maintain this is that they implicitly hold that the awareness in perception occurs after all causal processing has taken place and so is unaffected by causal factors; perception and hallucination thus both bring an object, mental or intentional, "before" the mind, though by different causal means. Thus they are the same kind of mental state or experience even though they differ in causal origin. I have of course already rejected this idea of the awareness in perception occurring after all causal processing has taken place and in this sense being non-causal. Absent this idea, there is little temptation to treat perception and hallucination as the same kind of "experience" when they differ so greatly in their causal origins and processing.

[14]Kelley, The Evidence of the Senses, p. 135

# CHAPTER SIX

## *THE MAIN ISSUES AN ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS ADDRESSES*

### (1) The Issues

Our task now is to develop a general positive account of perceptual awareness and appearances in realist terms. The account must be compatible with the idea that external objects are directly perceived (and make up the intentional content of perception) while at the same time capable of explaining the existence of conflicting appearances. The account must also be free from the revelatory standard of direct perception. If we can provide such an account then it will no longer be plausible to claim that the existence of conflicting appearances by itself casts doubt on the idea that we directly perceive the external world.

To provide such an account it will be helpful to begin by considering the main issues that an account of perceptual awareness and appearances must address. It is vital to remember that we are here concerned with perception from a non-epistemological standpoint. We are interested in how the existence of perceptual awareness is, in general terms, best understood and conceptualized.[1] I think an excellent way of seeing what main issues a non-epistemological account of perceptual awareness should address is by seeing what main issues the traditional accounts of perceptual awareness and appearances, namely naïve realism, representationalism, and idealism/phenomenalism, have addressed. Along with these three traditional theories I will consider a fourth, Searle's version of perceptual realism—which he says is a version of naïve realism but which, as I have said before, I think is best viewed simply as a version of direct realism—in order also to

compare and contrast my version of direct realism with a modern version of direct realism. In doing this it is important to keep in mind that the labels "naïve realism," "representationalism," and "idealism/phenomenalism" have been applied to various theories of perception, both non-epistemological and epistemological. I will give what I take is a fairly standard account (very close to Searle's account) of the views that each of these general accounts advance about how the existence of perceptual awareness is to be understood and conceptualized. But one will of course be able to find in the literature many self-proclaimed representationalists, for instance, who do not advance every claim that I list. Nevertheless, I hope a list of issues along with each account's general view of the issue will allow us to see what kinds of issues an account of perceptual awareness and appearances should address.

The main issue each account addresses is: In general terms how should the causality involved in perception be understood and conceptualized? The concern is not to investigate in precise detail the causal processes involved in vision or touch, for example, but to properly classify and conceptualize the general causality involved in perceptual awareness. This is neither a priori reasoning nor detailed empirical investigation.

According to naïve realism the senses simply bring the external object "before" or make it "present" to the mind, contributing nothing to the nature of our perceptual awareness of objects, to the perceptual appearance of the object to the subject (this last I think is the naïveté in naïve realism). Perceptual awareness is not produced by a causal interaction between object and subject with each member of the interaction affecting the resulting awareness. Thus in a way naïve realism really has no suggestion of how to understand and conceptualize the causality involved in perceptual awareness, because

whatever causality it admits there is, this causality does not affect the subject's perceptual awareness of the object.

According to representationalism, on the other hand, the external object does interact with the subject in perceptual awareness, and this interaction produces a copy or representation of the external object. It is this copy or representation that we directly perceive or are directly aware of, but our awareness of the copy or representation is non-causal in the sense that no second set of sense organs is posited to interact with the copy or representation and produce our awareness of it. So representationalism shares with naïve realism the view that the direct object comes "before" or is "present" to the mind, but, in recognizing and stressing the causal factors that are involved in perception, representationalism holds that the direct object cannot be the external object but must rather be something produced by the causal interaction of external object and the subject's sense organs.

Perceptual idealism/phenomenalism shares with representationalism the view that the direct object of perception is not the external object. But unlike representationalism, idealism/phenomenalism wants to do away with the external world. For this reason, however, it seems that it really has no coherent account of how to understand and conceptualize the causality involved in perception (and this has long been a powerful criticism of idealism/phenomenalism). According to idealism/phenomenalism, we are directly aware of sense-data. But it is not clear from where these sense-data derive, since to posit things-in-themselves acting on the senses and producing sense-data is to posit things that do not exist (or at least cannot be known) according to the theory.

Turning now to Searlean direct realism, according to it the causality involved in perception should be conceptualized as follows. External objects interact with a

perceptual system in definite conditions to produce a perceptual experience with phenomenological properties, and these phenomenological properties determine the experience's intentional content. The intentional content of the perceptual experience is that the external objects in question exist and that they cause one to have this very perceptual experience. When the intentional content of the perceptual experience is satisfied, we are directly perceiving the external objects.

Now according to the version of perceptual realism that I am going to advance, external objects interact with a specific perceptual system of a specific subject in specific conditions, making the subject aware in a specific way of the external objects. Unlike naïve realism, the version of perceptual realism I will advance recognizes and accepts the causal factors involved in perception and holds that the external object and subject interact in perception, with each member of the interaction affecting the resulting perceptual awareness. But the interaction does not produce the direct object of awareness (as representationalism maintains) nor does it produce a perceptual experience distinct from and capable of existing independently from the external object (as Searlean realism maintains); the interaction simply produces the perceptual awareness of the object. The external objects affect the nature of this awareness in the sense that they are what the subject is directly aware of; the subject's sense organs affect the nature of this awareness in the sense that they determine the specific way in which the subject is directly aware of the external objects.

To further characterize the way each account conceptualizes the causality involved in perceptual awareness, consider a sub-issue each account addresses: What do we directly perceive? In other words, what can we demonstratively pick out in perception? According to naïve realism, we directly perceive external objects. According to

representationalism, we directly perceive copies or representations of external objects. (Representationalism like naïve realism maintains that there is an external world, which, according to representationalism, our representations may or may not correctly depict; as such representationalism is a version of indirect realism.) According to idealism/phenomenalism, on the other hand, we directly perceive sense-data, which are not copies or representations of the external world ("external" objects are actually complex conglomerations of actual and possible sense-data). According to Searlean direct realism, we directly perceive external objects and states of affairs.

Now according to the version of direct perceptual realism I will advance, we also directly perceive external objects and states of affairs. In denying that the existence of conflicting appearances (or hallucinations) forces one to divorce the direct object of perception from external objects and states of affairs, I am claiming that the direct object of perception is external. However, in the dissertation I have not and will not make a positive argument for this position. Rather, the dissertation is focused on arguing that a traditional reason for doubting or denying that we directly perceive external objects, an appeal to the existence of conflicting appearances, is a bad reason for doubting or denying this. As I have said, I will try to show in the following chapters that one can explain the existence of conflicting appearances while at the same time holding that external objects are directly perceived and make up the intentional content of perception. But for those who maintain on other grounds that external objects are not directly perceived and/or do not make up the intentional content of perception, one would expect that they will retain their view at the end of the dissertation.

Very closely related to the above issue is a second sub-issue each account addresses: How do we perceive the direct object? What is our awareness of it like?

According to naïve realism, as I have said above, the external object simply comes "before" or is "present" to the mind, with the senses contributing nothing. Our awareness of the external object, then, is revelatory in the sense spelled out earlier in the dissertation. Only the object determines the way it looks, feels, tastes, etc.; the subject contributes nothing to the perceptual awareness. There is no distinction to be made between the external object's intrinsic properties and its sensory qualities; external objects do not appear, they just come "before" or are "present" to the subject.

According to representationalism, the copy or representation also simply comes before the mind; our awareness of the copy or representation is revelatory in the sense spelled out earlier in the dissertation. As we have seen, according to representationalism the senses do play a role in perception, they do contribute something. Their role is to help produce the copy or representation and its nature. But only the copy or representation determines the way it "looks," "feels," "tastes," etc.; the subject contributes nothing to the awareness of the representation. In this respect, there is no distinction to be made between the intrinsic properties of the copy or representation and its sensory qualities; copies or representations do not appear, they just come "before" or are "present" to the subject.

According to idealism/phenomenalism, a sense datum, the direct object of perception, is also revealed. There is no distinction to be made between the intrinsic properties of the sense datum and its sensory qualities; sense-data do not appear, they just come "before" or are "present" to the subject.

According to Searlean direct realism, we have a perceptual experience whose intentional content is satisfied; we do not, however, perceive the perceptual experience, we directly perceive the external objects. So the specific perceptual experience that we

have when we directly perceive external objects, it would seem, is the specific nature of our perceptual awareness of the external objects (certainly, Searle says it is the perceptual experience which we have that "bears" the specific phenomenological properties of the instance of perceptual awareness).

Now according to the version of direct perceptual realism that I will advance, there is no perceptual experience over and above the external objects and the subject's direct perception of them. There is only the perceptual awareness of the external objects. But this awareness has a specific nature; it is not revelatory. The external objects, as I have said, affect the nature of this awareness in the sense that they are what the subject is aware of; the subject's sense organs affect the nature of this awareness in the sense that they determine the specific way in which the subject is aware of the external objects. This last idea is conceptualized by the term "appearance." The subject's sense organs determine the nature of how the external objects appear in perception; they determine the sensory qualities in which the object is perceived. The appearance is not an object, much less an object of awareness (it is not a copy or representation of the external object). It is the specific form in which a subject's awareness of the object manifests itself. The subject perceives the object but always in some specific way or other. It is this general view of perception, as I have said before, that is crucial to my realist explanation of conflicting appearances.

A fourth issue each account addresses, derivative from the above issues, is: What is the status of sensory qualities? According to naïve realism, because perceptual awareness is revelatory, sensory qualities are intrinsic properties of the object and exist independently of our perception of them. According to representationalism, because our awareness of copies or representations is revelatory, sensory qualities are intrinsic

properties of the (mental) copy or representation and exist independently of our perception of them (to the extent that such a copy or representation can exist independently of perception). And these sensory qualities can in some instances accurately copy intrinsic properties of the external object. According to idealism/phenomenalism, sensory qualities are intrinsic properties of sense data and exist independently of our perception of them (to the extent that sense data can exist independently of perception). According to Searlean direct realism, sensory qualities are (I think) the way in which the intentional content of a perceptual experience is realized or manifests itself.

Now according to the version of direct perceptual realism I will advance, sensory qualities are relational properties, they are intrinsic properties of the external object as perceived by the subject (just as weight should be thought of as follows: weight is an object's mass (an intrinsic property) as attracted by another mass, such as the Earth).

A fifth issue each addresses is: What is the intentional content of perception? Does the external object literally make up the content? According to naïve realism, the intentional content is the external object. According to representationalism, the intentional content is the copy or representation, and the external object is not literally part of the intentional content of perception. According to idealism/phenomenalism, the intentional content is a sense datum. According to Searlean direct realism, the intentional content of perception is the intentional content of the perceptual experience, and the external object, although it is directly perceived, is not literally part of the intentional content of perception.

Now according to the version of direct perceptual realism I will advance, the intentional content is the external objects that are directly perceived. Unlike a perceptual

experience, the external object appearing to the subject is not some third component of perception, something distinct from the subject's direct perceptual awareness of the object, something which could have a content of its own.

Lastly, a sixth issue each addresses, really more of an implication of each account, is: How do we form judgments (justified or not) about the external world? How do we identify objects in the external world? According to naïve realism, since we directly perceive external objects, to form judgments about the external world we must classify and identify what we are directly observing. (Some might think that naïve realism involves the claim that the objects we are directly perceiving are self-identifying in the sense that we cannot be mistaken when identifying them; that is, if the apple is round then it "announces" to the perceiving subject that it is round. If this is indeed part of naïve realism, then I think this is another source of the naïveté of naïve realism.)

According to representationalism, we do not directly perceive external objects. To form judgments about them, we must first classify and identify the copies or representations that we are directly aware of (and here again the claim might be that they are self-identifying and so we cannot be mistaken in such classification and identification) and then, once we have determined what these copies or representations copy or represent, infer that the external world is as our copies or representations depict it as being.

According to idealism, there really is no external world; "external" objects are conglomerations of actual and possible sense data, so to form judgments about such objects we must form judgments about the sense data that we are or might be aware of.

According to Searlean direct realism, we directly perceive the external world, so to form judgments about it we must classify and identify what we are directly observing. It

might be thought that there is an inference involved here, to the effect that the intentional content of one's perceptual experience is in fact satisfied, but Searle himself denies that such an inference is required.[2]

Now according to the version of direct perceptual realism that I will advance, we again directly perceive the external world, so to form judgments about it we must classify and identify what we are directly perceiving. We do not make an inference from the appearance of the object to the object's nature because the two do not stand in the relation of representation to that which is represented. For a subject to directly perceive an object is for that object to appear to him. But we should take into account our knowledge (when we have acquired it) of the various ways in which the perceptual appearance of objects can vary when making judgments about the nature of the external world.

These are the main issues that a non-epistemological account of perceptual awareness addresses. My focus will be especially on how we perceive the direct object of perception, that is, on describing an alternative to the revelatory standard of direct perception. This will allow for a plausible realist explanation of the existence of conflicting appearances.

## NOTES

[1]Searle, Intentionality, p. 37.

[2]To quote Searle again: "I no more infer that the car is the cause of my visual experience than I infer that it is yellow....The knowledge that the car caused my visual experience derives from the knowledge that I see the car, and not conversely. Since I do not infer that there is a car there but rather simply see it, and since I do not infer that the car caused my visual experience, but rather it is part of the content of the experience that it is caused by the car, it is not correct to say that the visual experience is the 'basis' in the sense of evidence or ground for knowing that there is a car there. The 'basis' rather is that I see the car, and my seeing the car has no prior basis in that sense. I just do it." (Ibid., p. 73.)

# CHAPTER SEVEN

## *PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS WITHOUT THE REVELATORY STANDARD OF DIRECT PERCEPTION*

### (1) Perceptual Awareness as a Joint Product of Object and Subject

The main question before us, then, in giving a non-epistemological, direct realist account of perceptual awareness is how to conceptualize the causality involved in perception. Naïve realism, as we have seen, maintains, at least implicitly, that perception is not a causal interaction between subject and object. The subject's means of perception, his sense organs, do not affect the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness; only the external object does. The way to conceptualize this, the naïve realist holds, is by saying that the external object comes "before" the mind or is "present" to the mind. For these terms, he holds, suggest that only the external object and its intrinsic sensory qualities determine the way the object looks, tastes, feels, etc., to the subject. What the subject directly perceives, therefore, according to the naïve realist, are external objects in the external world. But there is no specific way in which these are perceived; the subject's perceptual awareness of the object has no distinct nature of its own; it is revelatory (in the sense already defined). And this means that the existence of conflicting appearances, if one is going to be a consistent naïve realist, demonstrates the existence of contradictions in nature. If one person perceives the wine as sour and another person as sweet, then, since only the external object determines the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness, this must be because the wine is both sour and sweet.[1]

Representationalists consider naïve realists misguided. The existence of conflicting appearances, like wine tasting sweet to one person, sour to another, does not demonstrate the existence of contradictions in nature. That is much too radical a conclusion. Instead, what must be rethought is the assumption that the subject's means of perception do not affect his perceptual awareness. This assumption, representationalism holds, is at best naïve; in actual fact, it defies the discoveries made about the causality involved in perception. Since there is a causal interaction between subject and object in perception, and since the subject's sense organs themselves have a definite nature, they must affect the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness. The way to conceptualize this fact, according to representationalism, is to say that the causal interaction produces a copy or representation of the external object in the subject's mind. Thus we can explain how the subject's means of perception affect his resulting perceptual awareness: they determine what the subject is directly aware of, namely, the copy or representation, and they determine the nature, the sensory qualities, of this copy or representation.

So our awareness of external objects is indirect; it occurs by means of our direct awareness of copies or representations. But how are we directly aware of the copy or representation itself? Here, as we have seen, the representationalist holds, as does the naïve realist for external objects, that the copy or representation "is just what it seems to be." In other words, only the copy or representation determines how it "looks," "feels," "tastes," etc., to the subject; the awareness of it has no specific nature of its own; it does not occur by means of a causal interaction between the copy or representation and the subject's means of awareness; the awareness of it is revelatory.

So the representationalist agrees with the naïve realist that in direct perception our awareness is revelatory; but he disagrees with him that what is revealed to the subject in

direct perception is an object in the external world. To properly conceptualize the causal facts about perception, one must maintain that the subject's means of perception in some way constitute or create the nature of the object of his direct awareness. The existence of conflicting appearances, therefore, shows not that there are contradictions in nature but that, at least in certain instances, the copies or representations that we are directly aware of in perception fail to accurately copy or represent the external world. (From an epistemological perspective, there are of course the difficult questions of how we know that there is an external world and how we know that our representations or copies do or do not accurately represent or copy it.)

The idealist or phenomenalist then starts from the representationalist position. He agrees with the representationalist that we do not directly perceive external objects. However, he thinks there is a significant objection to the representationalist's conceptualization of the causal facts about perception. There is no reason to think that there is an external world, which the objects we are directly aware of copy or represent. For we never perceive such an external world and can never step outside of our own representations in order to compare them to the external world in order to judge whether they accurately represent it or not. So the idealist dispenses with talk of representations; in order properly to conceptualize the causal facts about perception, he labels the objects that we are immediately aware of "sense data." These objects are constituted or created by the subject's means of awareness, without any participation from the external world. Indeed, "external objects" are just conglomerations of our actual and possible sense data. What we are aware of, then, are sense data. And sense data, the idealists tells us, "are just what they seem to be." The nature of our awareness of sense data, then, is determined

solely by the sense data themselves; the subject contributes nothing; his awareness of them is revelatory.

So, historically, once the fact has been accepted that the subject's means of perception affect the nature of his resulting perceptual awareness, this fact has been conceptualized by maintaining that the subject constitutes or creates the object that he is directly aware of in perception. This, however, is I think a strange conceptualization of the facts. For what one is trying to come to terms with is the fact that the subject affects the nature of his resulting (direct) awareness, but what is actually upheld is that he does not affect the nature of his resulting direct awareness. His awareness of a copy or sense datum, according to representationalism and idealism, is said to be revelatory, and for good reason. For if it did involve some kind of causal interaction between the direct object of awareness (the copy or sense datum) and the subject's means of awareness, then, according to the conceptualization of the causal facts about awareness that is being advanced by representationalism and idealism, a second direct object of awareness would be created by the subject's means of awareness. And then this second direct object of awareness, if our direct awareness of it involved a causal interaction, would give rise to a third direct object of awareness, and so on and so on. To avoid such an infinite regress, the representationalist and idealist both hold that our awareness of copies or sense data is revelatory and, in effect, causeless.

If a direct realist wants to uphold perceptual realism and still do justice to the causal facts about perception, as the naïve realist cannot do, then he must conceptualize them in a different way from that of the representationalist and idealist. A realist must recognize what is undeniable: the subject's means of perception affect the nature of his resulting perceptual awareness. But he must refrain from immediately jumping to the

conclusion, as almost everyone does, that this fact implies that the subject constitutes or creates the nature of the object that he is directly aware of in perception. To conceptualize properly the causal facts about perception in realist terms, a new insight is needed: what comes into existence when external object and perceiving subject interact is the specific nature of the subject's perceptual awareness of the object, not the nature of the object itself. To say that the subject's means of perception affect the nature of his resulting perceptual awareness should mean that they constitute or create the nature of his awareness of the (external) object, not the nature of the object of his awareness. This point is crucial, so let me stress it again: the subject's means of perception affect not the object but the nature of his awareness of the object. In perception what a subject is aware of is: external objects existing in the world. There are no objects lurking in mental or intentional "space." But how he is aware of external objects, the nature of that awareness, is determined by his specific means of perception operating in definite conditions of perception.[2]

Thus as a (non-naïve) direct perceptual realist one should speak neither of external objects coming "before" or being "present" to the mind nor of perceptual awareness "representing" the external world (and of course still less of a direct awareness of sense data). For to conceptualize the issue by saying that external objects come "before" the mind or are "present" to it is taken to designate the idea that the nature of our perceptual awareness, including not only what we are aware of but also how we are aware of it, is determined solely by the object. And, on the other hand, to say that our perceptual awareness "represents" the external world implies that we are directly aware of a stand-in for the external world, not the external world itself. Instead, the perceptual realist should I think use the terminology of appearing: he should conceptualize the issue by saying that

external objects appear to the subject in perception. This allows the direct realist to maintain most easily that what the subject directly perceives is the external world but that how he perceives it is determined by his specific means of perception. For one would describe the situation as follows: it is external objects that appear to the subject, but the nature, the identity, the form of their appearance to the subject is determined by the operation of the subject's specific means of perception.

The terminology of appearing therefore allows one to conceptualize and capture the following ideas: (1) that the subject does in some way or other affect his resulting perceptual awareness (against what naïve realism maintains), (2) that the subject does not affect the nature of the object of his awareness (against what representationalism and idealism maintain), since it is external objects and their intrinsic qualities that appear, but (3) that the subject does affect the nature of his awareness of the external object, since his means of perception determine the specific way in which external objects and their intrinsic qualities appear to him.[3]

## (2) The Nature of Appearing

It was of course Chisholm who popularized the terminology of appearing when conceptualizing the causal facts about perception. And in part he introduced the terminology in order to deal with a problem very similar to our own: how does one properly conceptualize the fact that the subject's means of perception affect the nature of his resulting perceptual awareness? As Chisholm himself states the problem (which he attempts to solve in a chapter entitled "The Status of Appearances"): "the ways in which the things that we perceive *appear* to us when we perceive them depend in part upon our

own psychological and physiological condition. This fact has led to some of the most puzzling questions of the theory of knowledge."[4]

Chisholm observes (something that we have already seen) that this problem has led to some radical theories being proposed to account for the fact that the nature of a subject's perceptual awareness depends on the subject's means of perception. Chisholm thinks, for example, that Democritus was led by this fact to hold that "no one ever *perceives* any external thing to be white, black, yellow, red, sweet, or bitter" and that "no unperceived external thing *is*, in fact, white, black, yellow, red, sweet, or bitter." And Chisholm explains that the American New Realists, as we have seen, who maintained that things are just what they seem to be, were led by this principle and the existence of conflicting appearances to hold that there are contradictions in nature: wine, for instance, is both sweet and not sweet, sour and not sour.[5]

Chisholm wants to resist such radical theories, as I want to, and he wants to resist them by arguing that perception is best understood by the terminology of appearing. A perceptual appearance itself has a nature but the appearance of the object to the subject is not what the subject perceives, it is the way in which he perceives. This sounds very similar to the view I am advancing. Nevertheless, as we shall see at the end of our discussion of the nature of appearing, Chisholm's view is quite different from mine.

Let us begin with my view of the nature of appearing. Perceptual awareness is a relational phenomenon between subject and external world: the subject is perceptually aware of external objects. This relational phenomenon, the subject's perceptual awareness of objects, itself has a nature. The subject is not aware of external objects by revelation; the objects do not just come "before" his mind, as though God has placed them there. The terminology of appearing applied to perception is meant to capture and conceptualize the

nature, the identity, the specific form of the subject's perceptual awareness of external objects (produced and determined by the subject's means of perception). The specific appearance of the object to the subject—for instance, if he is perceiving the object in the sensory qualities of round, red, and sweet—is the nature, the identity, the form of his awareness of the external object.

Thus it is completely mistaken to suggest that we perceive appearances. As Chisholm correctly observes in this regard:

> We perceive a thing when the thing as stimulus object has acted upon our sense organs, thereby causing us to be appeared to. The appearances of things, however, are not stimulus objects that affect our sense organs and therefore are not themselves anything that we perceive. We do not see, hear, or feel the appearances of things.[6]

The term "appearance," in other words, designates the fact that there are various forms of awareness of an object when one is aware of it perceptually, such as various visual, auditory, and tactile forms. It designates the fact that the perceptual awareness of objects itself has a nature. It does not designate some object of perceptual or direct awareness.

Remember, moreover, the senseless regress that results from the idea that the interaction of external object and perceiving subject produces an appearance, which itself is the object perceived. For then this appearance in its turn must somehow causally interact with a second perceptual system of the subject in order for it to be perceived by him, an interaction which will itself simply be the production of what is perceived, namely, a second appearance, i.e., the appearance of the first appearance, which in its turn must causally interact with a third perceptual system of the subject in order to be perceived by him, etc. However strange this idea may seem, it is what, in another guise, the argument from conflicting appearances relies upon. If a subject's means of awareness affect the

nature of his perceptual awareness of the external object, the argument contends, the subject cannot really be (directly) perceiving the external object. He must be perceiving only a copy, a representation, a sense datum, etc., created by the interaction.

So from a negative perspective, the point is that the appearance of the external object to the subject is not an object, much less an object that the subject is directly aware of. Looking at it from a positive perspective, on the other hand, the point is that the interaction of external object and perceiving subject in the appropriate conditions of perception is the process of perceiving the external object—not the creation or production of what is perceived. The term "appearance" as a noun does not designate an object; it is an abstraction that designates the specific nature of a relational phenomenon: the specific identity or form of the subject's perceptual awareness of the object, whether, for instance, the subject is perceiving the object as round, red and sweet or as rectangular, green and sour. The external object appearing to the subject in a specific way is not what the subject is directly perceiving or aware of; it is the subject's perceptual awareness of the object.

Thus external objects and their intrinsic properties are what is perceived by the subject. But his perception of them is not revelatory; it has a nature. He must be directly aware of them somehow. The sensory qualities, the tactile feel of roundness, the visual look of redness, the gustatory taste of sweetness, of an apple, for example, are how the subject is aware of the apple, how the apple's intrinsic properties are appearing to him. These sensory qualities are the nature, the identity, the form of his perceptual awareness of the apple and its intrinsic properties.

The best way to understand this idea, to understand how the terminology of appearing properly conceptualizes and captures the nature of direct perception in realist terms, is I think by considering the so-called common sensibles.[7]

The term "common sensibles," of course, refers to properties and characteristics of objects which can be perceived in more than one sense modality. In the case of human beings, common sensibles include such things as the size, shape, motion, and surface texture of objects. The size of a floppy disk, for example, can be detected by sight and by touch; the shape of a floppy disk can be detected by sight and by touch. The surface texture of a wooden desk can be detected by sight and by touch. The motion of a bumblebee can be detected by sight, by touch and even by hearing in some instances.

Observe that in such cases we perceive the same object and the same property of the object, but something nevertheless differs. For instance, I can touch and feel the same floppy disk that I can look at and visually inspect, and in both instances I can perceive the length of the disk's sides. Nevertheless, the two instances of perceptual awareness differ radically. But the difference does not rest on the side of the external object and its intrinsic properties, on the side of the floppy disk and its intrinsic property of length. In both cases, what we are aware of is the floppy disk's intrinsic physical property of extension in one dimension. This, after all, is what makes the common sensibles common sensibles—the same object and physical property is perceived in more than one sense modality. But if the difference does not rest in the object, then where does the difference rest? What is the proper way to conceptualize the difference in realist terms?

I am suggesting that the proper way to conceptualize the difference is to say that in visual and tactile perception of the disk's length what we perceive, the object that we are directly perceiving, is the disk and its intrinsic property of extension in one dimension, but

that the nature of our perceptual awareness of this external object, how the external object is appearing to us, differs in the two cases. The nature, the identity, the form in which the object and its physical property are perceived differs in the two cases. In the case of perceiving the length of the floppy disk's sides by sight, the floppy disk's extension in one dimension appears in the form of what we might call the sensory quality of "visual length." In the case of perceiving the length of the floppy disk's sides by touch, the floppy disk's extension in one dimension appears in the form of what we might call the sensory quality of "tactile length." The same object as well as the same property is being perceived, but the way in which it appears differs because the subject's means of perceiving it differ. [8]

Consider another example. I can perceive the shape of the mug on my desk by vision and by touch. I can look at it and see its circular opening and cylindrical shape, with a circle for a handle. I can also feel its circular opening and cylindrical shape, and run my fingers through its circular handle. Again, the two instances of perception differ radically. And again, the difference does not lie on the side of the object: what I am aware of, the mug and its physical shape, is the same in the two instances of perception. What differs between the two instances of perception is the nature of our perceptual awareness of the object and its intrinsic property. The way in which the mug's physical shape appears in vision is radically unlike the way in which its physical shape appears to touch. What we are perceiving is the mug's intrinsic physical shape but the nature, the identity, the form of our perception of it differs in the two instances. In the case of perceiving the physical shape of the mug by vision, its shape appears in the form of what we might call the sensory quality of "visual shape." In the case of perceiving the mug's shape by touch, its shape appears in the form of what we might call the sensory quality of "tactile shape."

Again, the same object as well as the same property is perceived, but the way in which it appears differs because the subject's means of perceiving it differ.

Consider now an example of a common sensible in a different sense modality than that of sight and touch. We can perceive by sight a bumblebee's motion as it flies across the room, from the interior wall to the window, but we can also perceive the bumblebee's motion by the sense of hearing. Again, what is perceived is the same. But the nature of our perceptual awareness of it differs. In the case of perceiving the bumblebee's motion by sight, the bumblebee's motion appears in the form of what we might call "visual motion." In the case of perceiving the bumblebee's motion by hearing, the bumblebee's motion appears in the form of what we might call "auditory motion." Again, two different ways of perceiving the same thing.

What the common sensibles are so helpful in demonstrating is that perceptual awareness itself has a nature. Our perceptual awareness of external objects is not revelatory. The external object has no intrinsic sensory qualities (no intrinsic perceptual appearance) that simply come "before" the mind in perception. It is our perceptual systems, our sense organs, that determine the nature of, the form of, the specific sensory qualities involved in, our perceptual awareness of external objects. Naive realism, therefore, is radically mistaken. But this does not mean that representationalism or idealism is therefore the correct view. Our perceptual systems do not create the object of awareness and its intrinsic nature, they create the nature of our awareness of external objects and their intrinsic natures. When we perceive the floppy disk's extension in one dimension by sight, our visual system does not create the object of our awareness, i.e., the floppy disk and its intrinsic length; rather, it creates the nature of our awareness of the floppy disk and its intrinsic length. Our visual perceptual system determines the fact that

we perceive the floppy disk's extension in one dimension in the form of what we have called the sensory quality of visual length, that, in other words, the nature of the object's appearance to the subject is in the form of visual length. Similarly, when we perceive the floppy disk's extension in one dimension by touch, our tactile system does not create the object of our awareness, i.e., the floppy disk and its intrinsic length; rather, it creates the nature of our awareness of the floppy disk and its intrinsic length. Our tactile perceptual system determines the fact that we perceive the floppy disk's extension in one dimension in the form of what we have called the sensory quality of tactile length, that, in other words, the nature of the object's appearance to the subject is in the form of tactile length.[9]

The common sensibles, therefore, help us grasp a general truth about perception. In order for a subject to perceive an object, he must perceive it somehow. His perceptual awareness must have a specific nature, an identity. The object must appear to the subject in some specific form or other. Perception is an inseparable package of something being perceived somehow. It is an inseparable package of external object appearing in some specific form or other. In perception, one can neither subtract the appearance and its specific nature from the external object and its intrinsic properties nor subtract the external object and its intrinsic properties from the specific forms in which they are appearing.

For instance, one cannot separate the sensory quality of visual shape of the floppy disk's extension in one dimension from the floppy disk and its extension in one dimension, because the sensory quality of visual shape <u>is</u> the floppy disk's extension in one dimension as the subject in question is perceptually aware of it. And one cannot separate the floppy disk's extension in one dimension from the sensory quality of visual shape because one is aware of the floppy disk's extension in one dimension only in the form of the sensory quality of visual shape. In other words, eliminate the floppy disk and its extension in one

dimension and you eliminate the perceptual awareness of the floppy disk since the object of awareness is eliminated; eliminate the specific nature of the awareness of the floppy disk's extension in one dimension and you eliminate the perceptual awareness of the floppy disk since the awareness of the object is eliminated. The specific appearance of the object to the subject is not a new object over and above the external object nor even something added to the external object which could be stripped off of it in perception in order to get to the external object "as it really is". When an object appears in different forms, such as when perceived by sight versus when perceived by touch, the intrinsic object is not acquiring different or new properties; what is being affected is not the object but the perceptual awareness of the object. We are, in other words, always perceiving the external object "as it really is", but always in some specific form or other.

So Protagoras in the *Theaetetus* is correct when he says that perception is a marriage between object and perceiving subject and that sensory qualities are products of this marriage. Sensory qualities exist only because of and during the interaction of subject and object and so are not intrinsic properties of the external object. But contrary to (the usual interpretation of Plato's) Protagoras, the marriage produces no offspring. It does not bring into existence any new object, which itself becomes the direct object of perceptual awareness. What comes into existence through the marriage is not a new object of awareness but the actual perceptual awareness of the external object (and its intrinsic nature). Both the external world and the perceiving subject contribute to the nature of the marriage, of the resulting perceptual awareness: the external world is what the subject is perceiving, and his means of perception operating in definite conditions of perception determine how the subject is perceiving it, the nature or form in which the external world appears to him. If you remove either the external world or the subject and

his means of perception, you destroy the perceptual awareness. Perceptual awareness is a veritable marriage between object and subject.[10]

The appearance of the external object and the external object itself, therefore, are not separable in perception. The appearance is the appearance of the external object to the subject. One cannot look at an instance of perceptual awareness and say that this part of the appearance is the external object and the rest is "mere" appearance. To be aware of any aspect of the external object, that aspect must appear in some form or other. And if something is appearing, then something is appearing. There is no "mere" appearing in the sense of appearing without an external object that is appearing. So in one sense everything is appearance; in another sense, everything is the external object. This is because it is the external object that is appearing. It is one inseparable package.

When scientists attempt to determine precisely what factors cause our perceptual awareness to vary, such as changes in the external objects, changes in the medium of perception, or changes in the subject's sense organs, the scientists are not separating external object from appearance in perception. These two remain inseparable in perception. What the scientists are doing I think is determining which factors produce which kinds of changes in the nature of our perceptual awareness of external objects. The nature of a subject's perceptual awareness is a product of various factors external to the subject's perceptual awareness: the nature of the external object, the nature of the subject's sense organs, and the nature of the conditions in which those sense organs are operating. What the scientist investigates is how these various factors affect the subject's perceptual awareness. He is not separating that awareness into external object and "mere" appearance. When scientists discover, for instance, how our visual awareness of an object varies according to the laws of perspective as we step further and further away

from an object, he is not separating our awareness into external object and "mere" appearance, for it is still, as always, the external object that is appearing. He is discovering how the appearance of the object to us varies when certain factors that help produce that awareness vary.

The only way to "separate" external object from its appearance to the subject is I think in thought, that is, at the conceptual level of awareness. We can abstract the external object from its various perceptual appearances and conceptually identify its intrinsic properties apart from the nature in which we perceive those intrinsic properties. This, after all, is just what we do in the case of common sensibles. The concept "length," for instance, abstracts away from the various forms (such as visual and tactile) in which we can perceive an external object's physical length, its extension in one dimension, and designates only the external object's physical length: its extension in one dimension. We can perform such an abstraction when we discover that we are aware of the same external object and properties in different forms, for then we can distinguish the two in thought: we can say that visual length is one form in which we can perceive the same intrinsic property of extension in one dimension, and tactile length is another form. It remains the case, however, that perception is an inseparable package of external object appearing in a specific way to the subject. You cannot strip off the appearance to get at the object as it "really is," nor do you need to, since you are perceiving the external object and its intrinsic properties, that is, you are perceiving the object as it "really is." And you cannot remove the external object to leave just the appearance since the appearance is an appearance (not a representation) of the external object.

Since on my account of the nature of appearing and of sensory qualities, sensory qualities are the external objects and its intrinsic properties as perceived by the subject, the

intentional content of perception is not the intentional content of a perceptual experience, an experience that can exist in the absence of external objects. The intentional contents of perception are the objects existing in the external world. They are, literally, components of the subject's perceptual awareness or perceptual "experience." Eliminate the external objects and you eliminate the perceptual awareness, not just the conditions which satisfy it. But to specify the intentional content of perception is not to specify everything about the subject's perceptual awareness because, as I have said, perception is an inseparable package of external object appearing in a certain form. The subject perceives something in the external world somehow. The intentional object does not exhaust the perceptual awareness. So if the subject is perceiving the extension in one dimension of the floppy disk's side, the floppy disk's extension in one dimension is the intentional object of his perceptual awareness, but this does not exhaust his perceptual awareness. For what must still be specified is the nature of his perceptual awareness of the floppy disk's extension in one dimension, whether, that is, he is aware of it in the form of visual length, or tactile length, or in yet some other form.

Let me now summarize how I think the terminology of appearing allows one to conceptualize the causality involved in perception in (non-naïve) direct realist terms. In perception, the external object and the subject's means of perception causally interact, and this interaction produces the subject's perceptual awareness of the external object. Contrary to naïve realism, the subject's means of perception do affect his perceptual awareness. Contrary to representationalism and idealism, they do not constitute or create the nature of the object of his awareness. They create the nature of his awareness of the external object. The subject is aware of external objects in the world. To capture the specific nature of the subject's awareness of external objects in the world, we use the term

"appearance." How an external object appears to the subject, such as in the form of the sensory qualities of tactile roundness, visual redness, and gustatory sweetness, is the specific nature of the subject's awareness of the external object. The same object and intrinsic property can appear in different forms, and the form in which it appears can vary when any of the factors producing it vary. Perception is an inseparable package of external object appearing to the subject in a definite form.

Although I have argued that the terminology of appearing can be fruitfully used to conceptualize the causal facts about perception in direct realist terms, it is important to note that my specific account of the nature of the external object appearing to the subject is very different from Chisholm's account of appearing.

According to Chisholm, sensory quality terms like "white" can refer to those intrinsic properties or dispositions "in virtue of which the things appear in the ways in which they do appear"—in which case they have a dispositional use. Or they can "refer to ways of appearing, to ways in which things may appear"—in which case they have a sensible use. The statement "without sight, there is no black or white, without taste, no savour" is true if white and the other sensory quality terms are used in their sensible use, when referring to the very perceptual appearances of things, but false if used in their dispositional use, when referring to external objects and their intrinsic physical properties which give rise to the perceptual appearances.[11]

Chisholm's idea seems to be that although what is appearing, or at least that in virtue of which the thing appears in the ways in which it does appear, is intrinsic to the external world and has a reality when unperceived, the actual appearing (the appearance) of what is appearing is a relational phenomenon, caused by the interaction between the external object and the subject's means of perception. As such, it has no existence apart

from such an interaction; it is not intrinsic to or "in" the object. To this idea Chisholm then adds the idea that depending on the context sensory quality terms like "white" or "hot" or (visually) "straight" are used to refer either (a) to that in virtue of which the thing appears in the ways in which it does appear or (b) to the very perceptual appearance, to the sensory qualities, of that which is appearing.

Chisholm draws two implications from this position of viewing appearances as relational phenomena caused by the interaction of an object with a subject's means of perception.[12] First, from the fact that an object's appearing white depends on the perceiver's means of perception one cannot legitimately conclude that the object's being white depends on the perceiver's means of perception. The appearance is a relational phenomenon dependent upon the specific nature of the perceiver's means of perception. But the intrinsic quality of an object is, obviously, not a relational phenomenon and so does not depend on the perceiver's means of perception. So long as one allows that "white" can sometimes refer to an intrinsic characteristic of an object, then when used in this sense an object's being white does not depend on the existence of the perceiver even though its appearing white, that is, the sensory quality of white, does. Second, as we have already seen, to say that in perception the object appears in a specific and determinate way to the perceiver does not mean that what the perceiver is (directly) aware of is the perceptual appearance. We do not perceive appearances.

So far, then, Chisholm's account seems very similar to mine. For I too maintain that from the fact that a perceptual appearance of, say, length is relative to the subject's means of perception, it does not follow that the object and its intrinsic property, its physical length (its extension in one dimension), are relative to the subject's means of

perception. And I too, for reasons similar to Chisholm's, reject the idea that the perceptual appearance is the direct object of perception.

But despite these similarities, Chisholm's account of appearing is fundamentally different from mine. The initial warning sign is Chisholm's employment of the terms "dispositional" and "sensible" in his account of sensory qualities. As his terminology suggests, Chisholm's view is much closer to the view that has been traditionally ascribed to Locke than to my view. The view traditionally ascribed to Locke is as follows. Ideas are perceptions in the mind caused by modifications of matter in external objects, or, putting it another way, the qualities of external objects have the power to produce various ideas in the mind. Many of these ideas are not images or resemblances of something inherent in the object, and it is a major confusion to take an idea to be a quality—to think, for instance, that the ideas of whiteness or roundness are in the snowball. Primary qualities are inseparable from objects in whatever state they may be, while secondary qualities are nothing but powers of objects to produce ideas in us by the primary qualities of the insensible parts. Ideas of primary qualities, further, resemble something inherent in objects (i.e., resemble their primary qualities) while ideas of secondary qualities do not.[13] Chisholm's view is similar to this in that he is treating all sensory qualities as similar to Locke's secondary qualities: they are "ideas" in us produced by the powers of external objects. Sensory quality terms can refer either to these "ideas" in us (how we are appeared to) or to the powers of objects in virtue of which we are appeared to in the ways that we are appeared to.

Crucially, this means that the external object is actually not a component of the subject's perceptual awareness; it is not what is appearing. It is not the external object that is appearing to the subject; the subject is simply said to be "appeared to." "We have

noted," Chisholm writes, "...that a man may be presented with a 'white appearance' when no object is appearing....Hence if we are to speak more strictly... [the term] 'white' in its sensible use...refers, rather, to the way in which one is *appeared to*—whether or not an object appears."[14] Why does Chisholm reject the idea that in perceptual awareness an external object is literally a component of the awareness, that a perceptual appearance requires an object that is appearing? He rejects it for the standard reason, namely, the existence of hallucinations (and of products of the imagination, etc.), a reason we have already discarded as unconvincing.

Since Chisholm also rejects the idea that the object of perceptual awareness can be a mental object, as, for instance, in Frank Jackson's theory, all that is left to Chisholm is object-less states of sensing or experiencing. "[I]f we introduce an active verb such as 'sensing' or 'experiencing' as a synonym for the passive 'is appeared to,' we could say that 'white,' in its sensible use, refers to the way in which a man may sense or experience."[15]

This means that in the end Chisholm is not able to uphold a relational view of perceptual appearances, since a perceptual appearance does not (necessarily) involve a subject perceptually aware of an external object. According to Chisholm, there can be appearances in the absence of any external object that is appearing.

Chisholm's theory, in other words, is an experiential or state theory of perception. The external object is just a (possible) cause of the particular way in which a man is sensing or experiencing.[16] Thus, like the model traditionally ascribed to Locke, Chisholm's model holds that the object simply creates an effect on the perceiver's mind; it is not a literal component of the perceptual awareness. But unlike Locke's model, Chisholm's does not treat the resulting effect as something (an idea) which a subject is

directly aware of but rather as a process or state which can be modified in many different ways.

Perceptual appearances or sensory qualities on Chisholm's model, then, are not the external object and its intrinsic characteristics as perceived in a specific nature or form by the subject of the perceptual awareness. Visual straightness or tactile bentness, for instance, are not forms in which an external object's physical shape are appearing to, or are perceived by, the subject. "We are saying, rather," writes Chisholm, "that there is a certain state or process—that of being appeared to, or sensing, or experiencing—and we are using the adjective 'white,' or the adverb 'whitely,' to describe more specifically the way in which that process occurs."[17] And in this sense, therefore, for Chisholm (as for Locke) appearances or sensory qualities are strictly mental phenomena, since they are characteristics which more fully characterize the object-less, purely mental process of sensing or experiencing.

Chisholm's adverbial theory of perceptual appearances (or sensory qualities)—as it has come to be called—is difficult to understand and accept. This is not to deny that we can make sense of the notion of characteristics which further characterize the mental process of perceptual awareness. We can, for instance, make sense of the difference in degrees of clarity of perceptual awareness, as when one sees something straight ahead versus at the periphery of one's visual awareness. We can make sense of differences in the level of one's perceptual awareness of and attention to an object. For example, the level of one's perceptual awareness and attention toward a piece of music differs greatly when it is playing in the background as one types on the computer versus when one is listening to that same piece in the concert hall. The effort required to maintain one's perceptual awareness and attention can also vary greatly, as for instance when one is listening to a

piece by Chopin in the recital hall versus when one is attempting to listen to the same piece on the radio while the incessant dripping of a faucet distracts one. These are all characteristics which further characterize the process of perceptual awareness. All such further characterizations of perceptual awareness, however, presuppose that there is something which is being perceived, that there is an object which is also a component of the perceptual awareness.

What is extremely difficult to understand and accept about Chisholm's adverbial theory is the notion that our sensory qualities terms are actually adverbs which characterize an object-less process of being appeared to, that perceptual appearances are in no way tied to an object of perceptual awareness, to something that is appearing. What does it mean to say that the process of perception is occurring "whitely" (in the absence of an object)? So what this objection amounts to is that it is extremely difficult, at least for me, to understand Chisholm's idea that there is no object of perceptual awareness but just a process. And as I have argued before, appealing to the existence of hallucinations does not help here: the existence of hallucinations does not provide us with a reason to think that perceptual awareness is an object-less state of experiencing (whatever that really means).

Chisholm admits that it is a problem for his view that it seems to separate to an illegitimate extent the appearance from the external object, but he has no reply to ease this worry so long as he admits appearances without objects that are appearing.[18] In this respect my model, which preserves the common-sense idea that the external object is a literal component of perceptual awareness, fares better. The external object, I have argued, is a literal component of the perceptual awareness, but the external object must appear in some definite form or other (such as visual length or tactile length), a form

determined not by the object but by the specific perceptual system in use, operating in specific conditions of perception. My model, therefore, does not separate external object and perceptual appearance in any way comparable to Chisholm's.

Thus although Chisholm and I both think the terminology of appearing is useful in conceptualizing the causal facts about perception, our accounts of the nature of appearing are radically different.

## (3) Sensory Qualities as Relational Qualities

On my account of the nature of appearing, then, like Chisholm's, sensory qualities characterize or specify the nature of our perceptual awareness. On my view, however, they do not characterize or specify the nature of an object-less state of "sensing" or "experiencing." They characterize or specify the nature of our perceptual awareness of external objects. The various sensory qualities are the nature, the identity, the form in which we are aware of external objects and their intrinsic properties, in which external objects appear to us. Each sensory quality is the external object (and one or more of its intrinsic properties) as it is being perceived by a particular subject in definite conditions of perception. Or: each sensory quality is the external object (and one or more of its intrinsic properties) as it is appearing to a particular subject in definite conditions of perception. For example, the sensory quality of visual length, in certain conditions of perception, is the nature, the identity, the form in which we perceive a floppy disk's extension in one dimension. The sensory quality of tactile length, in certain (different) conditions of perception, to take another example, is the nature, the identity, the form in which the floppy disk's extension in one dimension appears to us.

Sensory qualities, as I have said, are the product of a marriage of external object interacting with perceiving subject. Apart from this complex interaction and relation, and apart from the specifics of the interaction and relation, therefore, one cannot legitimately speak of the sensory qualities of the object (of course, one can still legitimately speak of its intrinsic properties). One must always ask (and be able to answer) about the perceptual appearance and sensory qualities of an object: Perceptual appearance and sensory qualities, yes, but to which particular subject and in what particular conditions of perception? Apart from how an object appears to a definite subject in definite conditions of perception, the object has no intrinsic perceptual appearance or sensory qualities. Since perceptual appearances and sensory qualities are relational phenomena between external object and perceiving subject, they cannot exist in the absence of either one of the relata.

Sensory qualities, to be sure, are qualities. But they are not intrinsic qualities of objects, they are relational qualities, which do not exist in the absence of either one of the relata. They are the intrinsic qualities of objects as perceived by, or as they appear to, the subject. Think here of another relational quality, such as weight. A rock, for instance, has no intrinsic weight. Apart from its weight in certain particular circumstances—the weight of the rock on earth or the weight of the rock on the moon or the weight of the rock on Mars—the rock has no intrinsic weight. And it would be an error to speak as if it did. Weight, therefore, is a relational quality. As such, weight, like any specific sensory quality, exists only in the context of the interaction between two objects. Apart from this context, it has no existence. Remove either one of the relata, in other words, and the weight is eliminated. Remove the rock, and there is no weight. Remove the earth, and there also is no weight. Just as weight is an object's mass as (mutually) attracted by another mass, so a sensory quality is a property (or properties) of the external object as

perceived by the subject. Furthermore, since sensory qualities are relational qualities, they cannot exist in the object, as its intrinsic qualities, or in the mind, as its intrinsic qualities. Just as the weight of a stone on Earth does not exist in the stone or in the Earth, so the sensory form of visual length in which a subject perceives a floppy disk's extension in one dimension does not exist in the floppy disk or in the subject's mind.[19]

It is crucial to note that what is being maintained here is not that the concepts "long," "square, " "white", "hot", etc., cannot be truly predicated of an object when it is unperceived. So long as such concepts designate intrinsic properties or features of external objects, then such concepts can be truly predicated of an external object when it is unperceived. What is being maintained here, rather, is that sensory qualities themselves are not "attached" to the object when it is unperceived. It is not a point about conception but about perception. The point is that it is wrong to think of the object when unperceived as being visually "painted" with the colour red, as having the visual look of being about three feet long, as having the tactile feel of squareness, as having the gustatory taste of sweetness, as having the olfactory smell of roses, etc. It is wrong, in other words, to think of the object when unperceived as having any sort of intrinsic sensory qualities—and then to think of the task of the mind in perception as striving to be like a clear window on the world, transparently revealing the object's intrinsic sensory qualities, revealing the object "as it really is," a task at which the mind may or may not succeed.

To this idea that sensory qualities do not exist in the object, however, many proponents of the revelatory standard of direct perception, I am sure, will vigorously object. For many of them think that it is obvious that a sensory quality attaches to some object or other as its intrinsic property. Many of them think, in other words, that it is obvious that if something appears as round, red, and sweet then there is something that is

round, red, and sweet, that is, that either the external object or some mental object has these sensory qualities as its intrinsic properties. Remember Price's statement?

> When I say 'This table appears brown to me' it is quite plain that I am acquainted with an actual instance of brownness (or equally plainly with a pair of instances when I see double). This cannot indeed be proved, but it is absolutely evident and indubitable....Thus the natural way of restating the sentence 'This table appears brown to me' is 'I am acquainted with something which *actually* is brown (viz. a sense-datum) and I believe that there is a table to which this something is intimately related (viz. belongs to).'[20]

But it really is not so obvious. Everyone will agree that there is the sensory quality of brown in the above example, but what is at issue is how the sensory quality is to be understood and conceptualized. Is it an intrinsic property of an object (be it an external object or a sense datum)? Is it a way of being appeared to, an adverbial characteristic of an object-less state of sensing? Is it a relational quality, a form in which we are perceiving the external object and its intrinsic properties? None of these accounts is obviously true or false, something revealed merely by a moment's introspection.

A more recent advocate of a sense datum theory appreciates this fact that the existence of sense data (or mental objects), to which sensory qualities attach as intrinsic properties, is not so easily established.

> Sense-data are not to be discovered by introspection....Attention to the phenomenology of visual perception...leads to *truths*; truths we all acknowledge concerning bent shapes, double images, mirages, converging railway lines, and so on; but the question of the existence of sense-data turns not just on what is true, but also on how we should understand these truths—that is, on their ontic commitments.[21]

In the context of the issue under discussion, all that reflection on our perceptual awareness shows, I think, is what Harman has said it does: sensory qualities are experienced as being on the side of the object.

> When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her experience. And this is true of you too....Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience. I predict you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree....[22]

The only question for my account, then, is: Does the fact that sensory qualities are experienced as being on the side of the object conflict with the claim that sensory qualities are relational qualities?

I do not think so. As I have said, sensory qualities are relational in that they are the nature, the identity, the form in which a subject perceives the external object and its intrinsic properties. A sensory quality is the external object and its intrinsic property as perceived by a subject. It is not a problem, then, that Eloise's sensory qualities (like visual shape) are experienced as features of the tree she perceives, for they are intrinsic properties of the tree as perceived by her. Moreover, sensory qualities are not produced by the subject's awareness of them. They are produced by factors external to his perceptual awareness, that is, by factors in the external world. They are produced by his physical sense organs interacting with external objects in definite (physical) conditions of perception. It is not a problem, then, if sensory qualities are experienced as being in the external world, on the side of the object. For it is factors external to the subject's awareness that produce them.

We are now I hope in a position to see what my account says about the main issue a non-epistemological account of perceptual awareness must address: how to conceptualize the causality involved in perception. My account accepts the fact that the subject's means of perception affect his resulting perceptual awareness, but unlike most theories I hold that this means the subject affects the nature of his perceptual awareness of the object, not the nature of the object of his perceptual awareness. This means we must distinguish between what is perceived and how it is perceived. What we directly perceive is the external world and the objects in it. How we perceive it is in the form of various sensory qualities. Sensory qualities are relational qualities; they are the objects intrinsic properties as perceived by the subject. They are not intrinsic properties of anything, located either in the external object or in the mind of the subject.

In the next chapter I will differentiate my view from one which may seem very similar to it, Tye's account of perceptual awareness. I will then proceed to show in detail how my account of perceptual awareness can give a plausible explanation of the existence of conflicting appearances in direct realist terms.

## NOTES

[1]"[S]ome of the American New Realists [who were naïve realists]," Chisholm explains, "in defense of the view that 'things *are* just what they *seem*' drew [the following]...conclusion: 'The wine that tastes sweet to me tastes sour to you; therefore, one must say (absolutely and not relativistically) that there are contradictions in nature; one must say of the wine not only that it is both sweet and not sweet, but also that it is both sour and not sour.'" Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, p. 92.

[2]As I remarked in Chapter Three, my view is based on Rand's and Searle's. See Chapter Ten as well as Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pp. 37-52.

[3]I am of course aware that some representationalists and idealists use the terminology of appearing to describe their views, instead of speaking of copies, representations, images, ideas, or sense data, but I take this to be a poor choice of terms on their part. For this reason, however, my usage of the terminology of appearing is somewhat stipulative.

[4]Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, p. 91.

[5]Ibid., pp. 91-92. On my view, of course, the American New Realists held as a basic principle that things are just what they seem to be because they accepted the revelatory standard of direct perception. The existence of conflicting appearances, as a result, pushed them into the unpalatable view of admitting the existence of contradictions in nature.

[6]Ibid., p. 94.

[7]See Kelley, The Evidence of the Senses, p. 94; Kelley too is advancing a theory of perception based on Rand's views.

[8]The claim of course is not that touch is just another form of perceiving everything that can be perceived by vision, that, in other words, the only difference between touch and vision is with respect to the form of the appearance of the object. Touch allows us to be aware of properties of objects that vision does not, and vice-versa. The claim is only that there is some overlap in the properties of the object which each sense modality lets us perceive.

[9]Compare this to Dretske's suggestion: "The sense modality (seeing, hearing, etc.) is determined, not by *what information* is encoded, but by the particular *way* it is encoded. I can *see* that it is 12:00 p.m. (by looking at the clock), but I can also get this information by auditory means (hearing the noon whistle). What makes one an instance of seeing and the other an instance of hearing is not the information carried by the two sensory representations (in this case the information is the same), but the differences in the vehicle by means of which this information is delivered--a difference in the representations (in contrast to what is represented)." Fred Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, p. 154. However, this is all Dretske says about the matter, so it is not possible to determine the extent to which he would agree with my model, whether he would except the distinction between what we perceive and how we perceive it, etc.

[10]Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 46.

[11]Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, p. 93.

[12]Ibid., pp. 93-95.

[13]"The *ideas of primary qualities* of bodies are *resemblances* of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the *ideas produced* in us *by* these *secondary qualities have no resemblance* of them at all. There is nothing like our *ideas* [of secondary qualities], existing in the bodies themselves." Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding: II, viii, p. 15.

[14]Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, p. 96.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Chisholm expands on some of these ideas in Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, but their essence remains the same.

[17]Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, p. 96.

[18]Ibid., pp. 96ff.

[19]Kelley, The Evidence of the Senses, p. 89; Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pp. 46-47.

[20]Price, Perception, p. 63.

[21]Jackson, Perception, pp. 106-107.

[22]Harman, "The Intrinsic Quality of Experience", p. 39.

# CHAPTER EIGHT

## *CONTRASTING MY ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS TO TYE"S*

### (1) Similarities and Differences Between My Account and Tye's

I suspect that my account of the nature of appearing and sensory qualities will strike some as being very close to Tye's account of perceptual awareness and sensory qualities, for he speaks of the specific format of the subject's perceptual awareness of the object and the specific mode of presentation of the object to the subject. These distinctions sound very similar to my distinction between the external object, which is what is perceived, and the nature, the identity, the form in which the subject perceives it. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there are significant differences between my model of perception and of sensory qualities and Tye's.

Tye spells out his model in a recent article "Visual Qualia and Visual Content" (I am assuming, along with Tye, that his model can be extended to other sense-modalities as well).[1] In the article Tye combats the idea that perceptual awareness involves intrinsic, introspectively accessible mental properties (or objects)—to which he gives the label "qualia." Putting it in my terminology, Tye is combating the idea that sensory qualities are intrinsic properties of an object "in" the mind or of the mind itself, which we are directly aware of in perception (as Price, for instance, thinks).

> Many philosophers take it to be evident that visual experiences have, over and above their representational contents, intrinsic, introspectively accessible properties in virtue of which they have those contents. Such properties, which are held to ground the subjective character or

> phenomenal 'feel' of the experiences, I shall call 'visual qualia'....I now believe that there are no visual qualia.[2]

So in rejecting "qualia" Tye is rejecting an idea that I too reject.

Nevertheless, right from the start we can see that Tye's approach is different from mine. He is viewing perception as in some sense representational. At the beginning of his article Tye distinguishes the content of a representation from the properties by which it does the representing—as when, for instance, one distinguishes the content of a painting as that of a tiger from the properties of the paint by which the tiger is painted (and hence represented). So unlike in my model, in Tye's external objects are not a literal component of a subject's perceptual awareness; they do not make up the intentional content of his perceptual awareness. And thus Tye speaks in the article not of perceptual awareness but of perceptual experience; the idea Tye is combating is that in having a perceptual experience we are aware of some inner, mental "paint" by which external objects are represented. "It would obviously be absurd to suppose that parts of my brain are orange and black striped when I see a tiger and it is surely no less absurd to suppose that parts of my soul [mind] are."[3] What the friend of qualia must maintain and what the enemies of qualia must deny, Tye says, is that "visual experiences are like pictures to the extent that they have intrinsic, non-intentional features which are accessible to introspection and by virtue of which these experiences represent what they do."[4]

Refreshingly, Tye does not take the rejection of qualia to entail a rejection of the view that there is "something it is like" for the actual subject of perceptual awareness. Tye holds, however, that this "subjective character" of perceptual awareness is determined strictly by the intentional content of the awareness. And thus he thinks that any two

perceptual experiences which are alike in intentional content will be alike in subjective character. Notice here both the similarity to and difference from my model.

I too reject qualia in Tye's sense but do not reject the idea that there is something it is like for a subject of perceptual awareness. But I would not identify this so-called subjective character[5] of perceptual awareness with the intentional content of the perceptual awareness. On my model, perception is external objects appearing to the subject in certain forms. The "subjective character" of the perceptual awareness is the entire affair, the inseparable package or integrated phenomenon of external objects appearing in certain forms. Since, as we have seen for instance in the case of common sensibles, the specific form in which an external object appears can vary while the external object itself—which is the intentional object of the perceptual awareness—does not, the subjective character of the perceptual awareness can change even if the intentional object of the awareness does not. In other words, what it is like to be the subject of an instance of perceptual awareness is determined by what the subject is perceiving as well as by how the subject is perceiving it. But this "how," the specific sensory qualities in which the external object is appearing, is not the same thing as qualia in Tye's sense. On my view sensory qualities like visual length or color are not intrinsic features of a mental object or of the mind (i.e., some kind of mental paint) but rather relational qualities: visual length, for instance (assuming normal conditions of perception), is the external object's extension in one dimension as perceived by the subject.

Thus in the end Tye (like almost all writers on the subject) can envision only one possibility for the status of sensory qualities: sensory qualities are intrinsic properties of something. The naïve realist says that they are intrinsic properties of external objects, attaching to them even when no one perceives them. The (historical) representationalist

views this as naïve, for he thinks that the subject must affect the nature of the resulting sensory qualities in his perceptual awareness, and so maintains that sensory qualities are intrinsic properties of mental copies or representations. A modern "representationalist" like Tye, wishing to avoid the historical problems afflicting representationalism, says that sensory qualities are not intrinsic properties of mental copies or representations (they are not mental "paint") but rather are intrinsic properties of the intentional objects or content of the subject's perceptual experience. No one seems to countenance the possibility that sensory qualities might not be intrinsic features of anything, but rather relational qualities. No one seems to countenance the possibility, in other words, that a sensory quality like visual length might be the external object's extension in one dimension as it is being perceived by the subject, the nature or form in which he is perceiving the external object and its intrinsic property. But despite the fact that Tye does not even countenance a model like mine, I think—and will try to show—that Tye's developed model is in fact closer to mine than one would imagine given his initial comments.

Tye remarks in the article that to rebut his rejection of qualia it is sufficient to specify one clear counter-example to the generalization that two instances of perceptual awareness alike in intentional content are alike in subjective character. (But of course to rebut Tye's rejection of qualia is not to show that there are qualia, since I argue, for example, that there are no qualia but that, nevertheless, two instances of perceptual awareness can be alike in intentional content but different in subjective character.) The rest of Tye's article then takes up such alleged counter-examples. In considering Tye's discussions of the alleged counter-examples, I will focus on those discussions which shed additional light on Tye's own model and thereby show that his model is actually closer to mine than at first it seems.

One alleged counter-example Tye considers is whether introspection reveals the existence of qualia. Suppose, for instance, that Tye is staring, transfixed, at the intense blue of the Pacific Ocean. Is he not then delighting in the phenomenal aspects of his perceptual awareness? And are these not qualia? To this consideration Tye replies that he is not taking delight in some inner, intrinsic object or property, but in the content of his awareness. Following Harman, Tye remarks that sensory qualities are experienced on the side of the object, not on the side of the mind; they are properties of the (intentional) object or content of the subject's perceptual awareness. "I experienced blue as a property of the ocean not as a property of my experience. My experience itself certainly wasn't blue....What I was delighting in, then, were specific aspects of the content of my experience."[6]

In such a case, by contrast, I maintain that it is not simply the content of his awareness that Tye is taking pleasure in, but the external objects of his awareness perceived in the forms in which he does perceive them. What a person takes delight in, in other words, is the inseparable package of external objects appearing in specific ways. One can see this most clearly I think again in the case of common sensibles. Suppose you have just bought a plank of pine wood while in the process of finishing your basement. You picked the piece that was as close to level as the store had, and when you look at it you can see that it is flat and level. But this perceptual awareness of its surface produces no pleasure. However, when you run your hand over the plank, feeling its flatness, this instance of perceptual awareness produces sensory pleasure.

What will an account like Tye's say about this situation? The content of the two instances of perceptual awareness is the same, so if the person is taking delight only in the content of his awareness, why does he experience sensory pleasure in one instance but not

in the other? Since my account maintains that the person's awareness is the external object appearing in a specific form, it can maintain that when the very same object and property appear in one form (in this case a visual form) they produce no sensory pleasure but when they appear in another form (in this case a tactile form) they do produce sensory pleasure. We shall see (in our discussion of the next alleged counter-example) that Tye tries to maintain something like my position, but it is very difficult for him to do so because he also wants to maintain, as we have already seen, that two instances of perceptual awareness alike in content are exactly alike. And he wants to maintain this last point because he thinks sensory qualities must be intrinsic features of something.

Very closely related to the above alleged counter-example is another alleged counter-example that Tye considers later on in his article: Is liking and disliking certain experiences the result of the qualia of those experiences? Shoemaker, for instance, has said that he likes the taste of Cabernet Sauvignon wine but that he may very well not like what he is aware of when he tastes the wine, which he takes to be some chemical properties of the wine (i.e., some combination of esters, acids, and oils), if he were aware of it by visual rather than gustatory means. Therefore what he likes about the wine, Shoemaker argues, cannot be equated with the perceptual object (or content) of the experience, since he can have an experience with the same object (or content) and nevertheless not like it. What he likes about the taste of Cabernet Sauvignon wine, Shoemaker concludes, is what it is like to have the experience, that is, the qualia of the experience.[7] (Notice again that the only possibility envisioned is that sensory qualities are intrinsic properties of some object or other. Shoemaker thinks that in tasting the wine the sensory qualities involved cannot be strictly identified with some intrinsic property of the object of his perceptual awareness, and therefore they must be identified with some

intrinsic properties of his mind. The possibility that they can be identified neither with intrinsic properties of the object nor with intrinsic properties of the mind is not even entertained.)

To Shoemaker's alleged counter-example Tye replies that what Shoemaker probably likes in tasting the wine is not just the content of his perceptual awareness—though this is in part what he likes—but also the content's mode of presentation.

> ...it seems to me reasonable to claim that what Shoemaker likes about the experiences [of drinking Cabernet Sauvignon wine] is that they are gustatory experiences having a certain content. It is this package of content plus species which he finds so appealing—the presentation of a certain content in a certain mode of experience.[8]

The implication of course is that were Shoemaker aware of the same chemical properties of the Cabernet Sauvignon wine by visual means, he would be aware of the same content but presented in a different mode and thus the total package would be different. And if the total package is different, Shoemaker may very well not like it, even though he is perceptually aware of the same object, the same chemical properties of the same wine.

Now Tye's distinction here sounds very much like my distinction between what we perceive and how we perceive it, between the external object and the nature or form of its appearance to the subject. And I think there is at least a surface similarity. For as I have indicated, what my account would say about a case like this is that what Shoemaker takes pleasure in is the integrated phenomenon of the wine and its chemical properties perceptually appearing in a certain specific form. As I have said, in perception this integrated phenomenon is an inseparable unity. You cannot perceive an external object unless it is appearing in some specific form or other to you, and you cannot have a specific form of appearance unless some external object or other is appearing to you. It is this

integrated phenomenon or package, as Tye puts it, that is causally efficacious in Shoemaker's mental life in the sense that his pleasure-pain mechanism is so "wired" that when he perceives the object and properties appearing in this form, he has a sensation of pleasure. The awareness of the same object and properties in a different form (in a visual instead of gustatory form, so with visual instead of gustatory sensory qualities) need not be wired in the same way, and so the perceiver may be indifferent to (or even dislike) his perceptual awareness of the same object in the altered circumstances. If Shoemaker were to perceive the wine and its chemical properties in a visual form with visual sensory qualities, he might very well be indifferent to the "taste" of Cabernet Sauvignon wine—i.e., to visually perceiving the wine's chemical properties. But this does not mean that what Shoemaker delights in when he tastes the wine is some set of intrinsic mental properties, some set of qualia. What he delights in, according to my account, is the integrated phenomenon of the wine perceptually appearing in a certain specific form, which is definitely not a mental object or property.

Tye I think is maintaining something similar to this explanation of Shoemaker's alleged counter-example. Nevertheless, Tye's explanation cannot be identical to mine. Tye has said that a central tenet of his view of perceptual awareness is that the content of the awareness exhausts the awareness (insofar as the subject of that awareness is concerned). Tye's notion of the "mode of presentation" of the content, therefore, contrary to what one might at first glance think, cannot designate some aspect of the subject's perceptual awareness of the object. A perceiving subject can tell from his perceptual awareness whether he is aware of something visually with visual sensory qualities or gustatorily with gustatory sensory qualities. So this is not and cannot be what Tye means by his notion of a mode of presentation. It cannot be something internal to the

subject's perceptual awareness in this way. If Tye is to preserve the claim that two instances of perceptual awareness alike in object or content are therefore alike in "subjective character," he must maintain that the "mode of presentation" is external to the subject's perceptual awareness of the object and its subjective character. And this in fact is just what we do find Tye maintaining.

Right after the passage quoted above about the package of a certain content presented in a certain mode of experience, Tye says that he is "assuming that a sufficient condition for an experience's being gustatory is that it have an appropriate functional role." And this means that the mode of presentation is not an aspect of the actual perceptual awareness of the object but rather an aspect of the causal connections in which that perceptual awareness enters. This of course is radically different from my view of perception and appearing, since the specific nature of the appearance of the object to the subject certainly is part of the subject's perceptual awareness and its "subjective character." Tye's notion of a "mode of presentation," therefore, is not identical nor even very similar to my notion of a "form of appearance."

And in this respect I think my account is superior to Tye's because mine explains why there is a difference in subjective character when tasting the wine's chemical properties versus when seeing them—because there is a difference in the very nature of the perceptual awareness—whereas Tye has to say that tasting and seeing the wine's chemical property are alike in subjective character (since they have the same object or content) and differ only in the causal connections in which they enter. According to Tye the difference between the two experiences is solely in the way they are wired: tasting the wine's chemical properties produces pleasure while seeing the wine's chemical properties

does not. If both produced pleasure, it seems Tye would be forced to say that the two instances of perceptual awareness do not differ at all.

Therefore to Tye's account I think Shoemaker should reply that the two instances of perceptual awareness differ in subjective character not because one produces pleasure and one produces pain. The one can be wired to produce pleasure while the other can fail to be so wired because they are different: that is, because they differ in their subjective character. Moreover, I think Shoemaker should say that even if both tasting the wine's chemical properties and seeing those properties produced pleasure (and had their other causal connections in common), the two instances of perceptual awareness would nevertheless differ in subjective character. Just as seeing the length of the sides of a floppy disk is subjectively different from feeling them, irrespective of functional roles, so seeing the wine's chemical properties would be subjectively different from tasting them, irrespective of functional roles. Note that whereas Tye's account cannot explain these points, my account can, since I hold that there is something different in the actual perceptual awareness in the two instances, but it is a difference of the form in which the object appears, not a difference in object or content (nor in qualia).

Since Tye does not take the step of treating the mode of presentation as an actual aspect of the subject's perceptual awareness of the object, in the end he must still be viewing sensory qualities not as forms in which the subject is aware of external objects but rather as intrinsic properties of intentional objects. In the end, in other words, Tye views, for instance, a particular colour such as blue as an intrinsic property of the (intentional) object, not a form in which we are aware of, say, the reflective properties of the surfaces of objects. He views a particular taste, to take another example, such as the taste of Cabernet Sauvignon to Shoemaker, as an intrinsic quality of an intentional object, not a

form in which Shoemaker is aware of the wine and its intrinsic chemical properties. That this is Tye's final, considered position about the status of sensory qualities, no matter the difficulties to which it leads, becomes clearer when one considers Tye's reply to Shoemaker's rejoinder to Tye's initial reply (discussed above) to Shoemaker's alleged counter example (that is a mouthful!).[9]

Shoemaker's rejoinder to Tye's initial reply that what Shoemaker really likes about Cabernet Sauvignon wine is the package of the object or content (i.e., certain chemical properties of the wine) presented in a certain mode of experience (i.e., gustatorily) is that the perceptual awareness of the wine can remain gustatory while still varying. And, Shoemaker claims, it may vary in such a way that (once Shoemaker is accustomed to the change) the new gustatory experience can have the same object or content as before but, as a result of the change, Shoemaker no longer finds the wine pleasurable; he actually finds it unpleasant. And this, Shoemaker claims, may happen without him having ceased to like how the wine tasted to him before. So Shoemaker's rejoinder is that the general mode of presentation (i.e., a gustatory mode) is not sufficient to account for subjective character and for what a person likes or dislikes in his perceptual awareness of the world.

To this Tye does not reply as I would, namely, by saying that gustatory or visual forms are actually a large class of different forms of awareness (modes of presentation)—e.g., visual forms include visual length, the various colours, visual shape, etc.—and so one's awareness can remain gustatory or visual while still having changed in form (mode of presentation). Shoemaker's imagined case would then be another case in which the same object and property is perceived in different forms, and so with different sensory qualities, but this time within the same sense-modality. And so the same kind of reply can be given to this case as was given to the case of the wine's chemical properties being

perceived by taste versus by sight. Tye does not make such a reply because for him the mode of presentation is not an aspect of the actual perceptual awareness of the object, but only an aspect of the causal connections in which the experience enters. And it is not clear to him that these will have changed if the perceptual experience remains gustatory in character.

So Tye finds himself forced to reply that in Shoemaker's new imagined case there will be a difference in object or content. "If the way Cabernet Sauvignon tastes to me changes, the gustatory experiences it produces in me will, I claim, represent it as having a *different* taste from the one it had earlier. So, contra Shoemaker, there *will* be a change in the intentional content of my gustatory experiences."[10] To give such a reply implies that Tye still considers particular, specific sensory qualities, like a specific shade of blue or a specific taste, not as relational qualities, as forms in which the subject perceives the external object, but as intrinsic properties of an (intentional) object. For Tye, Shoemaker's specific taste is not a form in which Shoemaker is perceiving certain chemical properties of the wine, but is rather itself an intrinsic property of Shoemaker's (intentional) object. That this is in fact what Tye is maintaining about the status of sensory qualities becomes completely clear when one considers what he has to say about an inverted spectrum.

The example of an inverted spectrum that Tye considers is the (imagined) case of Tom, who, when he looks at red objects, is such that what it is like for him is the same as what it is like for other people when they look at green objects, and vice versa. Neither Tom nor the other people are cognizant of the difference, and Tom's linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour is standard when compared to that of the other people. Given this imagined example of an inverted spectrum, the alleged counter-example to Tye's

generalization that two perceptual experiences alike in intentional object or content must be alike in subjective character goes as follows.

> ...when Tom views a tomato, say, in good light his experience is phenomenally, subjectively different from the experiences you and I undergo. But his experience has the same representational content as ours....The only way that Tom's experience can be subjectively different from yours and mine, then, is if it has a different visual quale.[11]

To which Tye replies: no, the two experiences are <u>not</u> identical in content.

> The answer, I maintain, is as follows: Introspection leads Tom astray. He forms a false belief about the content of his experience [when he is looking at red blood, say]. This content is certainly something *of* which he is introspectively aware but it is a content which he misclassifies. He takes it to be the content *red* and so he believes, on the basis of introspection, that he is undergoing an experience that represents red. In reality, his experience represents green. *This* representational difference is what is responsible for the subjective difference....[12]

Thus I think it is clear that according to Tye sensory qualities like red and green are intrinsic properties of the (intentional) object or content. In order to reject qualia, Tye thinks, he must make every difference in perceptual awareness a difference in object or content, no matter how implausible the suggestion.

And Tye's reply is implausible. Tom can perform by visual means all the sorting and classifying functions that normal people can based on their visual awareness—he can, for instance, sort green apples from red ones. And when he uses the term "red" to designate some object, its surface has the same reflective properties as when we use the term "red" to designate objects. Further, when those reflective properties are changed, he too will report that the object has changed colour, just as we would. Yet somehow,

according to Tye, the object or content of Tom's awareness is different from ours. Why would anyone think this, unless he were already wedded to a theory?[13]

Notice that my position can give a plausible account of the imagined example of an inverted spectrum. My account is that in the above example Tom's awareness has the same object and content as other people's, but that he grasps the world in a different way. In other words, what Tom is perceptually aware of is the same as what other people are perceptually aware of, but how Tom is perceptually aware of it—the nature or form in which he perceives it—is different from how others are perceptually aware of it. In insisting upon the distinction between what we are aware of and how we are aware of it, and in insisting that sensory qualities are relational phenomena, my model can account for a difference in the subject's perceptual awareness without reducing that difference to one of intrinsic properties, either of properties of the object or of the mind. My model agrees with Shoemaker's that there is no difference in perceptual content when looking at, say, a strawberry before the spectrum inversion and after. One is equally well aware of the external strawberry before and after the spectrum inversion. And whatever intrinsic property (or properties) of the strawberry was perceived in the form of the sensory quality of red colour before the spectrum inversion is still perceived after the spectrum inversion, but now in a different form—now in the form of the sensory quality of green colour.

Thus there is a psychological difference, but it is a difference not of "mental paint" nor of some intrinsic property of the object but of the specific form in which the object and its intrinsic property appear. Just as the visual appearances of the length of an object by sight and by touch do not differ in content nor in "mental paint," but do differ in the specific form in which the object's intrinsic property of extension in one dimension is appearing, so the visual appearances of the strawberry before and after the spectrum

inversion do not differ in content nor in "mental paint," but do differ in the specific form in which the strawberry and its intrinsic properties are appearing. In the case of an imagined inverted spectrum, the perceptual appearance, as a relational phenomenon resulting from the interaction of the external object and the subject's means of perception, varies because the means of perception vary (Harman, for instance, envisions the spectrum inversion to come about as the result of some brain operation in which the subject's nerves are re-wired). But this does not mean that what is perceived changes; it means that how the same object is perceived changes.

So I can maintain that the object and content are the same yet there nevertheless is something else that differs, which explains the difference in subjective character, because I have envisioned a third possibility for sensory qualities: they are neither intrinsic properties of an object nor intrinsic properties of a mind, but are rather relational qualities. A sensory quality is the external object and its intrinsic property as perceived or as it appears to the subject. Thus I think my model is able to do justice to the intuition that something changes in a subject's perceptual awareness due to a spectrum inversion (as Shoemaker maintains), but that the difference is not one of object or content.

In any case, I think it is clear that despite some similarities, my account of perception and of sensory qualities is quite different from Tye's and that a relational account like mine of the status of sensory qualities adds an interesting alternative to contemporary debates about the status of sensory qualities when considered in the context of the alternatives entertained by Tye, Shoemaker, Harman and others.

## (2) Implications for the Intentional Content of Perception

We have now seen, in the previous chapter, what my view says about some of the main issues that a non-epistemological account of perceptual awareness addresses and, in this chapter, how my view contrasts to a close alternative. As I have said, the central issue that a non-epistemological account of perceptual awareness must address is how to conceptualize the causality involved in perception. And in this regard I have a new view to propose, one quite different from the traditional theories. My account accepts the fact that the subject's means of perception affect his resulting perceptual awareness, but unlike most theories I hold that this means the subject affects the nature of his perceptual awareness of the object, not the nature of the object of his perceptual awareness. This means we must distinguish between what is perceived and how it is perceived. What we directly perceive is the external world and the objects in it. How we perceive it is in the form of various sensory qualities. Sensory qualities are relational qualities; they are the object's intrinsic properties as perceived by the subject. They are not intrinsic properties of anything, located either in the external object or in the mind of the subject. On my view, then, the intentional content of perception is not separable from the external objects that are directly perceived. There is no perceptual experience which has an intentional content of its own and which could exist in the absence of the external object. There is only the subject's perceptual awareness, and the intentional content of this awareness is the external objects being perceived.

Some might worry, however, that on my view we will never be able to determine what the intentional content is of our perceptual awareness since the same object can appear in different forms. If the sensory quality of green can be a form in which we

perceive a green, unripe strawberry and a form in which we perceive a red, ripe strawberry (recall the imagined case of Tom, discussed above), how can we determine what the intentional content is of our perceptual awareness?

It is important to note, however, that most theories will face such an "objection." A representationalist like Tye, for instance, has to determine whether in the imagined case of Tom (for whom the sensory qualities of red and green are switched) a perceptual representation with the sensory quality of green has as its intentional, representational content, that the external object is green or, rather, that the external object is red. The instance of perceptual awareness, of course, does not announce what its intentional content is. The subject must identify and determine this for himself, and presumably he does this by means of the concepts and knowledge and theories that he has acquired. For instance, as we have seen, Tye holds that the intentional content of the representation is that the object is green and that Tom is mistaken (after the spectrum inversion) if he judges that the intentional content of his perceptual experience when there is a red, ripe strawberry in front of him is that the object is red. Presumably, it is other knowledge and a theory like Tye's that would lead the subject to think that he has made a mistake and misclassified the intentional content of his perceptual experience, and then lead him to reclassify the content.

Similarly in the case of Searle's theory, Searle holds that the phenomenological properties (i.e., sensory qualities) of the perceptual experience determine its intentional content (which may or may not be satisfied).[14] For instance, when we look at a red station wagon, the sensory quality of red determines the fact that part of the intentional content of the perceptual experience is that the station wagon is red. (When we say that the station wagon is red, "red" here designates not the sensory quality but an intrinsic property of an

object: "Red, for example, is that feature of the world that causes things to look (and otherwise pass the tests for being), systematically and under the appropriate conditions, red."[15] ) So Searle too faces the problem of determining which sensory qualities specify what intentional content in a given situation. For instance, in the imagined case of Tom, does the sensory quality of green specify that the object is green, or does it specify that the object is red? Again, the perceptual experience does not announce what its intentional content is, so one will have to determine this by bringing all one's knowledge and theories to bear on the situation. Searle seems to hold that a sensory quality always specifies the same intentional content (see his account of conflicting appearances), which means that, like Tye, he thinks that the intentional content of Tom's perceptual experience when there is a red, ripe strawberry in front of Tom is that the object is green, but Searle gives no argument that this is true.[16] And it is by no means obvious that it is true, that, in other words, given different conditions of perception the same sensory quality must specify the same intentional content.[17]

And similar things could be said for my theory. We will have to bring in all our knowledge and theories to determine whether the intentional content of Tom's perceptual awareness is that the object is green or that it is red. The fact that the intentional content of the awareness does not announce or identify itself does not mean that we cannot determine what the intentional content of the awareness is, any more than it means this for Tye's or Searle's theory.[18] There will always be a judgment to be made about what the intentional content of the instance of perceptual awareness is; since I equate the intentional content of perception with external objects, to judge what the intentional content is, we must judge what it is that we are directly perceiving.

And this, of course, is the last issue that I said an account of perceptual awareness should address: its implications for how we form judgments about the external world based on perception. Insofar as I am able to take it up in the dissertation (a whole dissertation, of course, would be required to do justice to this issue but I can only devote a few pages to it), this issue will be taken up in the next chapter, where I present my detailed explanation of the existence of conflicting appearances.

## NOTES

[1]Tye puts forth the same model in his recent book Ten Problems of Consciousness. See especially Chapter Four.

[2]Tye, "Visual Qualia and Visual Content", p. 158. Tye adds a footnote to this where he says that he thinks his arguments can be extended *mutatis mutandis* to the other senses (and that he does not reject all qualia, such as, e.g., pain qualia; he only rejects sensory qualia).

[3]Ibid., p. 159.

[4]Ibid. To deny qualia, Tye observes, is not to deny that the contents of perceptual experiences are available to introspection nor to deny that the experiences have intrinsic, non-intentional features (Tye thinks that perceptual experiences are probably neural items and so will have physical-chemical properties which are non-intentional); it is just to deny that there are any such intrinsic, non-intentional features available to introspection.

[5]I am suspicious of the phrase "subjective character" because I think the term "subjective" implicitly suggests the idea of intrinsic mental properties, bearing no relation to the external world. One must remember that the phrase refers only to what it is like to be a perceiver, and that this need not be analyzed in terms of intrinsic mental properties.

[6]Tye, "Visual Qualia and Visual Content", p. 160.

[7]Ibid., p. 163.

[8]Ibid., p. 165.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid., p. 167.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Other philosophers with a view of sensory qualities similar to Tye's, such as Harman, take a different route. Harman holds, for example, that Shoemaker's imagined spectrum inversion does not produce a difference in perceptual object or content (nor, ex hypothesi, a difference in functional roles). Therefore, Harman concludes, there would be no difference at all to the perceiving subject after the spectrum inversion. But Shoemaker "thinks it is evident that there may be a psychologically relevant difference between these experiences [looking at a red object like a strawberry before and after the spectrum inversion] even though there is no functional difference and no difference in the content of the experiences." Harman suggests, however, that this "will seem evident only to someone who *begins* with the prior assumption that people have an immediate and direct awareness of intrinsic features of their experience, including those intrinsic features that function to represent color." (Harman, "The Intrinsic Quality of Experience", pp. 48-49; the article Harman is discussing is Shoemaker's "The Inverted Spectrum.") Harman says this because he too, like Tye and so many others, thinks that sensory qualities must be intrinsic qualities of something or other; the possibility that they may be relational qualities is never entertained. Given this (implicit) assumption on Harman's part, the only way he can see of accounting for the psychological difference would be to hold that sensory qualities are "mental paint": intrinsic qualities of the subject's experience rather than intrinsic qualities of the subject's intentional object. And Harman rejects this view of sensory qualities as "mental paint." But of course we now know that the account of sensory qualities as "mental paint" is not the only account of sensory qualities that can account for psychological differences without making them differences of content.

[14]Searle, Intentionality, p. 61.

[15]Ibid., p. 75.

[16]Ibid., pp. 55-56.

[17]As I remarked in an earlier chapter, if Searle maintained (1) that the same sensory quality, in different contexts and different conditions of perception, could specify a different intentional content, (2) that different sensory qualities, in different contexts and conditions of perception, could specify the same intentional content (even within the same sense modality), and (3) that in cases of conflicting appearances what is occurring is that we have two perceptual experiences (within the same sense modality) with different sensory qualities that nevertheless specify the same intentional content, then, as we shall see, his view of conflicting appearances would be close to mine. However, there would still of course be the significant difference that Searle's view maintains that there are perceptual experiences distinct from the external objects that are perceived, whereas my

view does not.

[18]This of course means that Cartesian assumptions about the transparency of the mind are wrong-headed. That is, the assumptions that no effort is required to make identifications about the nature of one's perceptual experience and objects of awareness and that no error in such identifications is possible are wrong-headed. But I think most theories of perceptual awareness today, like Tye's and Searle's, reject such Cartesian assumptions. Almost everyone today agrees that one can make errors in judgment about the workings of one's mind, even in such a comparatively simple judgment as whether the shirt looks blue or black, just as one can make errors in judgment about the workings of the external world. Indeed, I would think most people have far more knowledge about the external world than they do about mental processes, both their own and those of others.

# CHAPTER NINE

## *EXPLAINING THE EXISTENCE OF CONFLICTING APPEARANCES*

Our task in this chapter is to give an explanation of the existence of conflicting appearances that is compatible with the direct realist account of perceptual awareness offered in the previous two chapters. Providing such an explanation will I hope once and for all defuse any temptation to argue that the existence of conflicting appearances by itself shows that we do not directly perceive the external world (external objects, events, and/or states of affairs).

### (1) Conflicting Appearances: Where Is the Conflict?

The first question we must ask ourselves in trying to explain the existence of conflicting appearances is: Exactly what type of conflict is it? Is it a conflict among two instances of perceptual awareness themselves, or is it a conflict among judgments we make (or are inclined to make) based on our perceptual awareness?

I have no doubt that to some these will seem strange questions. Is it not obvious where the conflict lies? We have two different perceptual appearances of the same object and at most one can match the object's intrinsic sensory qualities; at most one appearance, in other words, can be "veridical." Many philosophers treat this idea as obvious and uncontroversial. Consider one example (examples could be multiplied almost endlessly).

In Knowledge and Justification Pollock writes:

> In seeing a red object, I might be presented with an apparent object which looks purple because there are blue lights shining on the object. Thus the presented object need not, at least, look *exactly* like the perceived object. This might suggest that the appearance of the presented object must be only approximately the same as that of the real object. But even this is not correct. If the circumstances are sufficiently unusual, there may be no feature of the appearance of the presented object which is at all like that of the real object. For example, if we are viewing a tree through a tinted and malformed lens, this may change its apparent color, size, shape, and location, all at once. Hence the appearance of the presented tree will be totally unlike that of the real tree....[1]

It is clear I think that Pollock is here thinking of the sensory quality of red as attached to the external object, as an intrinsic property of the external object. The question is then whether or not the subject's current perceptual awareness of the object matches the intrinsic sensory quality of the external object. If it does, if we perceive, say, the apple as red and the sensory quality of red also attaches to the apple as an intrinsic property, then we have an instance of veridical perception. If it does not, if we perceive the apple as orange when the sensory quality of red is actually attached to it, then we have an instance of defective or non-veridical perception, what Pollock calls "perceptual error."

Like Pollock, many philosophers consider it obvious that one can compare a subject's perceptual awareness of an external object to the external object itself (when unperceived) to determine whether or not the two match. Those who find such a viewpoint obvious will think that the reason conflicting appearances are conflicting is also obvious. For they will think that in the case of, say, a spear appearing one way when seen lying on the ground and another way when seen partially immersed in water, the two instances of perceptual awareness not only are different but also conflict because the first instance of perceptual awareness of the spear matches the spear's intrinsic sensory quality

whereas the second does not. They will think, in other words, that the first instance of perceptual awareness is veridical whereas the second is not.

But according to my view this account of where the conflict lies is unacceptable. I have argued that sensory qualities are not intrinsic qualities of anything. They are relational qualities. As I have argued, the external object appearing in a specific form to the subject is a particular instance of perceptual awareness of the object by the subject. In order for a subject to perceive an external object, the object must interact with his sense organs and the object must appear in the form of some specific sensory qualities or other, a form determined by the conditions of perception, the medium of perception, and the subject's means of perception. Apart from this complex interaction and relation, and apart from the specifics of the interaction and relation, one cannot legitimately speak of the sensory qualities of the object.

An implication of this fact is that sensory qualities do not attach to external objects; when it is not being perceived, an external object has no sensory qualities. Consequently, on my theory it is completely misguided to try to compare the sensory qualities in which we perceive external objects to the external objects themselves, to determine whether or not they "match." So on my theory the distinction cannot be used to account for the conflict in conflicting appearances. To be completely clear on this, let us consider the point in somewhat more detail.

It has often been remarked that representationalism is futile because according to it one must step "outside" of one's awareness, of one's representations, to discover whether or not one's awareness accurately represents the external object. But this same futility is present in any attempt to compare one's perceptual awareness of an external object to the object when unperceived in order to discover whether they "match." To know what the

object is like, one must know what the object is like—that is, one must be (perceptually or conceptually) aware of the object. One cannot step "outside" of one's means of awareness, of one's means of knowledge, all the while demanding knowledge of the object. But many, apparently, do not see that this is a problem not with perception or knowledge but with the demand. Just as it is incoherent to try to compare the object as you are conceptually aware of it, the object as you know it, with the object as you are not conceptually aware of it, the object as you don't know it, so it is just as incoherent to try to compare the object as you are perceptually aware of it with the object as you are not perceptually aware of it.

This means that the attempt to compare, say, visual length to the object's physical extension in one dimension, to determine whether they "look" the same, is completely misguided. The visual length of the object is the way its physical extension in one dimension looks (to us and in certain definite conditions of perception). If one recognizes the fact that sensory qualities are relational qualities, there will be no temptation to posit an intrinsic sensory quality of an object nor to think that one can compare an actual sensory quality of the object in some definite conditions of perception with the object's "intrinsic" sensory quality.[2] All that can be said is that such and such an object, in such and such conditions, appears in perceptual awareness in the form of such and such sensory qualities to such and such a perceiver.

For instance, when a spear appears one way when seen lying on the ground and another way when seen partially immersed in water, there is no reason to say that the first is the spear's intrinsic visual sensory quality while the second is not. All that the facts show is that in certain conditions of perception, the spear appears visually in one way to the subject, and that in other conditions of perception it appears visually in another way.

There is no reason to demand that despite changes in the conditions of perception, objects should or ought to continue to appear as they did before; for this is to demand that causal laws should work otherwise than the ways in which they do work, since perceptual appearances result from the causal interaction of a definite object with a definite subject in definite conditions of perception. If ought implies can, then there is no reason to say that when seen partially immersed in water a straight spear ought to appear differently to us than how it does appear, since given the causal conditions and causal laws involved, it cannot appear differently from how it does appear.

I maintain, therefore, that our visual system is not defective when we perceive a spear as "bent" when seen partially immersed in water. By the nature of a properly functioning human visual system and the specific conditions of perception at hand, this is how a physically straight spear must visually appear. Interestingly, Augustine (and the Epicureans) was close to recognizing this point.

> There remains to ask if, when the senses report, they report what is true. Now, then, if an Epicurean says: 'I have no complaint to make about the senses. It is unjust to demand from them more than that of which they are capable. When the eyes see anything, they see what is true': is, then, what the eyes see of an oar in water, true? Certainly, it is true. A cause has intervened so that it should present itself so. If when an oar was dipped under water it presented itself as straight, then in that case I would convict my eyes of giving me a report that was not true. For they would not see what, given the circumstances, should have been seen....The same thing can be said of...countless other cases.[3]

Just as such sensory qualities as visual length and visual shape, and tactile length and tactile shape, do not attach to the external object as intrinsic properties, since they are forms in which we perceive the external object's intrinsic physical length and shape, so the same holds for all sensory qualities. The ancient skeptics were correct when they claimed

that there is no basis to pick out one sensory quality in which we perceive an object as in some way superior to all the other sensory qualities in which we perceive it, and then to label it the object's "intrinsic" or "real" sensory quality. But contrary to the skeptics, this is not a problem since it is not the task of the mind in perceptual awareness to somehow reveal the object's intrinsic sensory qualities, since it has none. The revelatory standard of direct perception should be discarded and so should the idea that objects have intrinsic sensory qualities.

If an external object has no sensory qualities attached to it when unperceived, then one cannot simply claim that the conflict in cases of conflicting appearances is that one instance of perceptual awareness is "veridical" while the other is not. For the usual grounds for saying that one is veridical and the other is non-veridical have been removed. The "straight look" of the spear when seen lying on the ground is one form in which we are aware of the spear; the "bent look" of the spear when seen partially immersed in water is another form in which we are aware of the spear. The two forms are different, to be sure, just as visual length is different from tactile length, but this does not mean that they conflict or are incompatible. As Austin observed, the senses are dumb. They do not announce "The spear is bent" or "The water is hot" or "The wall is white", etc. These, rather, are conclusions we may or may not draw as a result of our perceptual awareness. There is no basis, therefore, for thinking that one appearance of the object is superior to another—that one is "the way the object really is." As Austin asked rhetorically with respect to the visual perception of size, from what distance does an object look the size that it really is?[4]

The only reason, then, immediately to think that the two instances of perceptual awareness conflict is that they are different when the object itself remains the same. To all those who subscribe to the revelatory standard of direct perception, this will be a deep

problem since they hold that the perceptual awareness of the object should not change unless the object itself does. To "solve" the problem, they immediately conclude that (at least) one perceptual appearance is defective and non-veridical.

But, absent the revelatory standard of direct perception, when one recognizes that perceptual awareness itself has a nature—that we perceive external objects somehow, that sensory qualities are relational qualities, that they are the external object's properties as perceived by the subject—there is no temptation immediately to label one of the instances of perceptual awareness "defective" or "non-veridical." For one realizes that the nature of the perceptual awareness can change even if the object itself does not. One realizes that there is more than one form in which one can perceive the external object and its intrinsic properties, as the existence of common sensibles, for instance, clearly shows. One realizes, as Augustine observed, that the truth is really the opposite: one's perceptual awareness would be defective or non-veridical if the spear, for example, continued to look the same even when seen partially immersed in water.

But one need not look so far back in the history of philosophy to find expression of the idea that all perceptual appearances are equally "veridical." Daniel Dennett, for instance, has recently expressed a similar view.

In the chapter "Qualia Disqualified" of Consciousness Explained Dennett discusses the status of sensory qualities (are sensory qualities intrinsic properties of the object, of the mind, etc.?). The question with which the chapter begins is: Where are colour and the other sensory qualities located?[5]

Dennett's own position identifies colour (and other sensory qualities) with intrinsic properties of external objects and speaks of the subject's brain going into certain discriminative

states with respect to the external world during colour vision.[6] This position I think is similar to mine but probably not quite the same.

In a certain sense, as we have seen in the previous chapter, my position identifies the sensory quality of visual length, say, with an intrinsic quality of the external object, its physical extension in one dimension, but it is the quality of the external object as it is perceived or as it appears to the subject. Perception is the integrated phenomenon of an external object and its intrinsic properties appearing to a definite subject in a specific form. I agree with Dennett that in perceptual awareness we are not aware of any inner, intrinsic objects or properties and that we are rather aware of or discriminate only objects and properties in the external world. But I do not take this as equivalent to saying that there is just the external object and that the means of perception contribute nothing to the perceptual awareness or discrimination of the object. On my view, as we have seen, the means of perception play a crucial role: they determine the form in which the external object is perceived or appears. For instance, the fact that we are perceiving the object and its extension in one dimension by means of vision determines that we perceive it in one form, in the form of visual length; the fact that we are perceiving the object and its extension in one dimension by means of touch determines that we perceive it in another form, in the form of tactile length. Dennett's brief discussion of discriminative states in the book leaves it unclear (to me at least) whether he would accept this idea of the form in which the external object is perceived, though I certainly think he holds that the subject affects the nature of the resulting discriminative state.

But despite this potential difference, the important similarity between the two accounts in the present context is that Dennett observes that no system of colour vision is more true than another, which suggests that he grasps fully the idea that an external object has no intrinsic sensory qualities. "Many human beings are red-green colorblind. Suppose we all were....Were

folks like us to come along, insisting that rubies and emeralds are different colors, there would be no way to declare one of these color-vision systems "truer" than the other."[7] Of course I agree with this and my account gives a fuller explanation of why this is so. The case of red-green colour blindness is a case of perceiving external objects in a different (and less precise) form of appearance from the form in which we normally perceive them (just as some animal's grey scale perception is a different form of perceiving external objects), not a case of misperceiving the object or of a defective perceptual appearance. Thus Dennett I think would also maintain that in the case of conflicting appearances, the instances of perceptual awareness are merely different; in each we perceive the external world and its intrinsic features; each, in other words, is equally "veridical."

If, then, in the case of conflicting appearances the perceptual appearances themselves do not conflict but are merely different, why does the sense of conflict arise? Why are we inclined to think that conflicting appearances are conflicting? These are the questions we must answer in order to explain the existence of conflicting appearances in direct realist terms.

(2) The Sense of Conflict Requires Judgments but Can We Form Judgments?

On my view the sense of conflict in conflicting appearances lies not in one instance of perceptual awareness (or both) failing to "match" the object's intrinsic sensory qualities (there are none such) but in the judgments we make (or are inclined to make) based on our perceptual awareness of external objects. In a certain respect, therefore, I agree with Armstrong: one must appeal to judgments in order to explain the existence of conflicting

appearances. However, I think that the story one must tell is different from, and more complex than, that which Armstrong presents.

Basically, Armstrong explains conflicting appearances by saying that in the case of seeing a spear on the ground versus seeing it partially immersed in water we have a disposition to judge, in the first instance, that the spear is straight while in the second instance we have a disposition to judge that it is bent, and the first judgment will be true whereas the second will be false. Thus we have conflicting judgments, which accounts for the sense of conflict. As we have seen, Armstrong identifies the difference in the two instances of perceptual awareness with the difference in the judgments the subject is disposed to make. He does not think there are any separable perceptual appearances which differ in the two instances and which are the basis for the subject being disposed to make the differing judgments. (This dismissal of perceptual awareness, that is, this equating of perceptual awareness with conceptual cognition and judgment is, as we have seen, implausible. Armstrong proposes it simply in order to escape representationalism and idealism, but there are other, more palatable ways to escape these two theories.)

I hold, on the other hand, that there is a difference in perceptual awareness which is not to be identified with a difference in judgments. But the fact that the subject has two different perceptual appearances of the same object, I hold, does not by itself show that his perceptual awareness (at least in one case) is not veridical (think, for instance, of the common sensibles). Though different, each instance of perceptual awareness is equally valid. However, I hold that the differences in his perceptual awareness are the basis for the subject making or being inclined to make conflicting judgments about, say, a straight spear when he is seeing it lying on the ground versus when he is seeing it partially

immersed in water. This is what I will now try to explain. But before doing so, I must deal with an objection which threatens my whole approach.

Some people have objected that on my view it is not clear how we can even form judgments about or identify objects in the external world. Note that the objection is not questioning whether judgments and identifications that we do make about the external world are valid or justified; the objection is questioning what, according to my view, could these judgments and identifications even be. How could we make them on my view?

To answer this objection, consider first what some other theories maintain, in a general way, on this issue. Representationalism, for example, maintains that we must first judge and identify the representation or copy that we are directly aware of, and then, to make a judgment about the external world, we must infer that the representation or copy does (or does not) accurately represent or copy the external world. In other words, we must first identify the nature of the representation, then judge what the representation is a representation of, and then, finally, infer whether the external world is as we represent it to be. That is how we make judgments about the external world according to representationalism.

Notice that the representationalist faces a doubly difficult task. According to his theory, we must first identify and classify the representations or copies we are directly aware of. That is, we must identify that the representation is yellow or red and then determine that it is a representation, say, of a yellow station wagon resting in the driveway or of a red, ripe apple resting on top of an orange in the fruit bowl. And secondly, to make a judgment about the external world instead of just our representations of it, we must infer that the external world is or is not as our representation represents it to be.[8]

For the direct realist, on the other hand, be it a naïve realist, a Searlean realist, or myself, since the direct object of perception is not a representation but rather an external object itself, the only task is the first task. And so far as I can see, it is a similar task for all three versions of realism: of classifying and identifying what we perceive based on the similarities and differences we observe.

One might think, however, that even though Searle is a direct realist, a story roughly like the representationalist's must be given by Searle as well. One might think that according to Searle's account we must first judge and identify what is the intentional content of the perceptual experience we are having, and then, to make a judgment about the external world, we must infer that the intentional content is satisfied and that that which satisfies it is causing our perceptual experience. But Searle (as I remarked before) denies that such an inference takes place or is necessary. To quote Searle again:

> I no more infer that the car is the cause of my visual experience than I infer that it is yellow....The knowledge that the car caused my visual experience derives from the knowledge that I see the car, and not conversely. Since I do not infer that there is a car there but rather simply see it, and since I do not infer that the car caused my visual experience, but rather it is part of the content of the experience that it is caused by the car, it is not correct to say that the visual experience is the 'basis' in the sense of evidence or ground for knowing that there is a car there. The 'basis' rather is that I see the car, and my seeing the car has no prior basis in that sense. I just do it.[9]

The perceptual experience is not a representation, from which we must infer that the world is as it is represented to be.[10] We go straight from having the experience to perceiving the object; we go straight from having the perceptual experience of a yellow station wagon in front of one to seeing the yellow station wagon in front of one, resting on the driveway.

But how, according to Searle's theory, do we make judgments about the external world, about that which we are perceiving?[11] Presumably, we must form concepts from our perceptual awareness and then by means of our concepts identify and judge what it is we are perceiving when we are perceiving the external world. And, presumably, we form concepts and make judgments from our perceptual experiences on the basis of perceived similarities and differences. We form the concepts "station wagon" or "yellow" or "square," that is, on the basis of the similarities and differences we perceive. We group together similar objects, for example, and retain the group by the concept "station wagon." Such concepts designate real objects and real features in the external world (since that is what we are perceiving, according to Searle's theory). About such concepts Searle writes:

> [C]oncepts that mark off real features of the world are causal concepts. Red, for example, is that feature of the world that causes things to look (and otherwise pass the tests for being), systematically and under the appropriate conditions, red. Similarly for the so-called primary qualities [I think Searle should have written here: Similarly for the concepts of the so-called primary qualities]. Square things are those which are capable of causing certain sorts of effects on our senses and on our measuring apparatus. And this causal feature is also characteristic of those properties of the world that are not immediately accessible to the senses such as ultraviolet light and infrared, for unless they were capable of having some effects—e.g., on our measuring apparatus or on other things which in turn affected our measuring apparatus which in turn affected our senses—we could have no knowledge of their existence.[12]

So when we judge that what we are perceiving is, say, a yellow station wagon in the driveway, we are making a judgment about the external world and its intrinsic nature. In making this judgment, we are not ascribing any sensory qualities to an external object. The concept yellow, for instance, is not attributing the sensory quality of yellow to the

external object that is the station wagon. It is attributing an intrinsic property to the station wagon, an intrinsic property that we perceive, in the appropriate conditions, by means of a perceptual experience with the sensory qualities (Searle calls these phenomenological properties) of various shades of yellow. And we form the concept square, for instance, by grouping together various objects that are perceived as similar (that have similar square shapes); the concept itself designates the similar intrinsic property of the objects that we perceive in similar visually square shapes.

Now why think that my direct realist position cannot give a similar account about how we make judgments and identify objects in the external world? Based on perceived similarities and differences, we form concepts which in turn enable us to make judgments and identify what we perceive. When we judge that what we are perceiving is, say, a yellow station wagon in the driveway, we are making a judgment about the external world and its intrinsic properties. The concept yellow does not attribute a sensory quality to the external objects but an intrinsic property, which we, in normal conditions of perception, perceive in the form of a sensory quality of a particular shade of yellow. Thus it seems to me that there is no more reason to think that my view cannot account for how we make judgments about the external world than there is to think this about Searle's view (or any other direct realist view).

However, the real worry behind the objection might be that my view allows that we can have two instances of perceptual awareness that are subjectively indistinguishable yet in which we are directly perceiving objects with different intrinsic properties. For example, in the cases of the imagined spectrum inversions that we considered in the previous chapter, I said that the sensory quality of red might be the form in which a subject perceives a strawberry's reflectance properties before the spectrum inversion, and

that the sensory quality of green might be the form in which the subject's perceives the same strawberry's reflectance properties after the spectrum inversion. So, since before the spectrum inversion the sensory quality of a particular shade of green was a form in which the subject perceived other objects with other reflectance properties (such as an unripe strawberry), the subject can have subjectively indistinguishable instances of perceptual awareness and yet the external objects of those experiences can be different. (Similarly, I am going to claim below that in the case of illusions like that of a straight spear seen partially immersed in water, we are perceiving the spear and its physical straightness but in a form that resembles the visual form in which we perceive bent spears when they are seen lying on the ground.) So, the worry is, how can the subject ever judge and identify what in fact the external object he is directly perceiving is if the same perceptual appearance can be the appearance of more than one object?

But if this is the worry behind the objection, it is not clear that the objection is in fact directed at <u>how</u> we can form judgments about the external world. The subject's judgments would be judgments about the external world, but after the imagined spectrum inversion, say, he may make erroneous judgments until he has come to grasp and adjust to his new circumstances. That is, immediately after the spectrum inversion the subject may judge that the strawberry he is perceiving is green and unripe when in fact it is red and ripe, and he would do so because his judgment is based on perceived similarities and differences, but he would still be making judgments about the external world based on his perceptual awareness of it.

Notice further that one could make a similar objection to Searle's theory. Consider what Searle might say about the imagined inverted spectrum. After the spectrum inversion, is the intentional content of the subject's perceptual experience of the

strawberry (a perceptual experience that among others has the sensory quality of green) still that he sees a red strawberry? If it is, then Searle faces exactly the same "objection", since he would be maintaining that a subject's perceptual awareness can be subjectively indistinguishable and yet can have different intentional content that is satisfied by different external objects with different intrinsic properties.

If, on the other hand, the intentional content of the perceptual experience is now that I see a green strawberry, then Searle would face a related worry. If this is the experience's intentional content, then the content is not satisfied since the strawberry is in fact red. And this means that the subject is not perceiving the strawberry and its reflectance properties. If he judges, based on his perceptual experience, that the strawberry is green, he would be mistaken. Yet before the spectrum inversion, when the subject perceives an unripe strawberry, a green strawberry, he would have a perceptual experience with the sensory quality of green; the intentional content of the experience would be that I see a green strawberry. So the subject could have subjectively indistinguishable perceptual experiences and yet in one there is an external object which he perceives and in the other there is not (as against my position, which says he is perceiving different external objects.)[13] So how can the subject even make judgments about the external world, when he might not even be perceiving an external object?

Searle I think would reply to the objection by reminding us that when we make judgments about external objects, we are not ascribing sensory qualities to them. When we judge that the object we are perceiving is a red strawberry based on the perceptual similarity of the object we are currently perceiving to previously perceived objects, which we classified together as strawberries, "red" does not designate a sensory quality but rather an intrinsic property of the object, of the strawberry. So if we judge that the

strawberry is green when it is red, the judgment is still about an object in the external world; it just ascribes the wrong intrinsic property to the object. And we can discover by other means, including other instances of perception, that we have misidentified and misclassified the object. Additional knowledge, in other words, can correct the judgment or even prevent the subject from making it (suppose, for example, that he knows that he has undergone a spectrum inversion). We can discover, for example, that we are subject to an illusion. We can discover, in other words, that the intentional content of a particular perceptual experience is not satisfied.

And my theory would say similar things. When we judge that the object we are perceiving is a red strawberry based on perceived similarities and differences, we are not ascribing sensory qualities to the object but rather intrinsic properties. If we perceive a red strawberry in the form of the sensory quality of green, therefore, we may initially judge that the strawberry is green because of the perceived similarity to things that are green. This judgment is about an external object, but it misidentifies or misclassifies it. And we can discover our error, we can discover that the strawberry is red rather than green (and that we are actually now perceiving the red strawberry in the form of the sensory quality of green), by other means, including other instances of perception. (We might, for example, use a machine that measures the light absorbed and reflected by objects, and note that the strawberry still absorbs and reflects the same wavelengths of light.)

So I do not think that the fact that we can have subjectively indistinguishable instances of perceptual awareness having different objects suggests that we really cannot form judgments about external objects based on our perception of them. It would only suggest this if one thought that in forming a judgment from one's perceptual awareness, the only piece of evidence one could use was the experience itself. But I don't think this is

the case. All our judgments are subject to revision based on all our other evidence, including both our other instances of perception and the other judgments we have formed. Even when we initially mistakenly judge that the strawberry is green, we are already bringing in other instances of perception as well as other knowledge, since the concepts of strawberry and green must have been formed from previous instances of perception in which we classified objects based on perceived similarities and differences. This judgment that the strawberry is green is then revisable in the light of any further information and knowledge we may acquire.

### (3) Explaining the Conflict via Differing Appearances and Judgments

So on the direct realist account of perceptual awareness offered here, there is no special reason to think that we cannot form judgments about the external world. As I have indicated, my explanation of conflicting appearances will maintain that the two instances of perceptual awareness themselves do not conflict. As we shall see, however, for understandable reasons the two different perceptual appearances may lead us, initially at least, to make conflicting judgments about the intrinsic properties of the external object. This I hold is the source of conflict in "conflicting" appearances.

We have seen that the perception of common sensibles, like the perception of length by sight and by touch, are cases in which the object of perception itself does not change but the nature of the perceptual awareness does. The perception of common sensibles, which occurs across two different sense modalities, is a case in which the nature or form of the appearance of the external object to the subject is different because of a difference in the means of perception—the subject is employing different sense-organs. What is perceived is still the

external object and its intrinsic properties—because they have not changed—but how they are perceived—the form in which they appear—is different. And contrary to a significant portion of the history of philosophy, this fact should be considered neither surprising nor problematic. The appearance of the same object to the same subject, being a relational phenomenon, can change when either of the relata change. The nature of the perceptual appearance of the length of the sides of a floppy disk can change, for instance, because the length of the sides of the floppy disk changes—a change in the object—or because the subject employs a different means of perceiving the floppy disk's length (touch instead of sight)—a change in the subject's means of perception.

Cases of conflicting appearances, such as a spear looking straight when lying on the ground and looking bent when partially immersed in water, or a bucket of warm water appearing cool to a hot hand and hot to a cold hand, I hold, are similar to the perception of common sensibles in two different sense-modalities except that they occur within the same sense-modality. The fact that they occur within the same sense modality rather than across different sense modalities, I will show, helps explain the conflict in judgment that may result from the two different appearances. (By contrast no conflict in judgment results in the case of perceiving common sensibles like length in two different sense modalities.) My claim, to spell it out more fully, will be that in cases of conflicting appearances we remain aware of the same object with the same physical property (or properties), but the nature of the way in which it is appearing, the form of its appearance, varies because of a variation in the subject's means of perceiving it and/or a variation in the conditions of perception. It is not what we perceive that varies, but how we perceive it. Only this variation in how we perceive it does not take place across sense-modalities but within the same sense-modality, and this fact may lead us to make conflicting judgments about the object.[14]

Please note again that, as I remarked in a previous chapter, philosophers have been lackadaisical in grouping together various disparate phenomena under the heading of conflicting appearances or illusions (when they refer to the argument from conflicting appearances as the argument from illusion), such as: paradigmatic cases of illusion (like a spear appearing bent when partially immersed in water), hallucinations (which I have argued are probably quite different from instances of perception), ambiguous figures, delusions, etc. I will not attempt to sort through and properly categorize all these disparate phenomena here. I will simply restrict my attention to paradigmatic cases of conflicting appearances like that of seeing a spear partially immersed in water or that of feeling the temperature of a bucket of water by a cold and by a hot hand.

Consider, for instance, the case of the spear. When one sees a spear lying on the ground, one perceives its physical shape in a certain form. It is often said, however, that when one sees the spear partially immersed in water one is misperceiving its shape because its physical shape no longer appears as it did in the previous conditions of perception, namely, when the spear was seen lying on the ground. But as we have seen this notion of "misperception" rests on thinking of one appearance of physical shape as in some way attached to the spear, as its true or real appearance—in contradiction to the fact that when one perceives the spear's physical straightness by touch, the appearance is nothing like the visual appearance of the spear's physical straightness when seen lying on the ground—in contradiction to the fact, that is, that physical objects have no intrinsic appearances. In the absence of a specific subject in specific conditions of perception, as we have seen, there is no way in which the object <u>should</u> or <u>must</u> appear. The spear's straight shape should and must appear only as the causal facts dictate: facts which include the new conditions of perception, namely that light must now travel through air and water. So the proper view, I maintain, is that the new appearance of the spear

when seen partially immersed in water is but one instance of perceiving the spear's physical straightness in a new and different form. The way in which the spear's physically straight shape appears to the subject varies from how it appeared before because of the change in the subject's conditions of perception.

But why do I say that when the spear appears "bent" when seen partially immersed in water—that is, when it appears similar to how bent spears appear when seen lying on the ground—we nevertheless are perceiving the spear's physical straightness? The reason is that, just as in the case of spears seen lying on the ground, we can still perceptually differentiate straight spears from bent spears when they are seen partially immersed in water. It is just that both straight and bent spears appear visually different from the way in which they visually appear when seen lying on the ground. To grasp that this is true, perform a simple experiment. Take a drinking straw which is straight and partially immerse it in water. It looks slightly bent. Now bend a second straw and immerse it in water at the bend. The straw looks even more bent than the first one does. In other words, one is aware of and can perceptually differentiate between the straight straw and the bent straw, but they both look (i.e., appear) different from how they look when not immersed in water. The slightly "bent" visual look of a straight spear partially immersed in water is how the human visual system perceives the spear and its physical straightness in the given conditions of perception. The even more significant "bent" visual look of a bent spear partially immersed in water is how the human visual system perceives the spear and its slight physical bend in the given conditions of perception. In other words, when seen partially immersed in water, just as when seen lying on the ground, physically straight things are still perceived as similar to one another and as different from physically bent things. This is the reason for maintaining that when we see a straight spear partially immersed in water we are still

perceiving the spear and its physical straightness, but simply in a different form with different sensory qualities.

So what I am maintaining is that in these conditions of perception, how we perceive the shape of spears and the like, the form in which they appear, is different from how we perceive the shape of spears and the like in different conditions of perception (or with different sense organs), but why think this is a problem—unless one is assuming that only the object and not the subject's means of perception (operating in definite conditions of perception) should affect the nature of the resulting perceptual appearance—that is, unless one is assuming that the revelatory standard of direct perception is correct? But as I have argued, there is no a priori reason to assume that the nature or form of the appearance of a certain object and intrinsic property (across different or within the same sense-modalities) must always remain the same despite variations in the means or conditions of perception (the existence of common sensibles is good evidence against this global assumption).

It might be objected to the idea that we are perceiving the spear's physical straightness when it is seen partially immersed in water that we have much more difficulty differentiating between straight and bent spears when seen partially immersed in water than when seen lying on the ground. It is probably true that we have more difficulty doing so, but the difficulty stems from unfamiliarity with the new conditions of perception: we do not regularly perceive and deal with objects partially immersed in water. If for some reason we had to deal repeatedly with objects partially immersed in water, and also had to be able to differentiate between straight and bent ones while doing so, we would adapt to the changes in the form in which we perceive their shapes.

A similar analysis to the above applies to the other cases of "conflicting" appearances, such as, for example, when one feels the temperature of a body of water with a cold hand and

with a hot one. Here too it is often said that we must be misperceiving the temperature of the water since it does not appear as it does in the previous conditions of perception, namely, when the temperature of the water is felt with a warm hand (i.e., a hand at room temperature). But again I hold that the difference in the perceptual appearances lies on the side of how we are aware of the world, not on the side of what we are aware of. It is only how we perceive the warm water's temperature that differs when we feel it with a cold or hot hand rather than with a warm hand. Why?

Because again we can distinguish differences in the temperature of water with a cold and with a hot hand. If you place hot water in one bucket and warm water in another, the hot water appears warmer to the cold hand than does the warm water—it is just that both appear warmer than they do to a hand at room temperature. If you do the same thing with a hot hand, the hot water again appears warmer than does the warm water—it is just that now both appear colder than they do to a hand at room temperature. So in each case, that of a hand at room temperature, that of a cold hand, and that of a hot hand, we can discriminate similarities and differences in the temperature of the water and hence perceive the temperature of the water. But because of differences in the subject's means of perception—in the temperature of his hands—the way in which the same temperature of water appears to him, the form of its appearance, varies. And once again, this should not be viewed as problematic unless one has assumed the revelatory standard of direct perception. In other words, when felt with a hot hand, just as when felt with a cold hand or a hand at room temperature, warm water is still perceived as similar to other buckets of warm water and different from buckets of cold or hot water. This is the reason for maintaining that we still are perceiving the water and its physical temperature, but simply in a different form with different sensory qualities.

In this case too it is probably true that we have more difficulty perceptually differentiating differences in the temperature of water with a cold or hot hand than with a warm hand, but again I do not think this is a strong objection because the difficulty I think stems from unfamiliarity with the different conditions of perception: we do not regularly perceive water and other liquids with cold or hot hands. If for some reason we were repeatedly in such circumstances and had to be able to differentiate between various temperatures of liquids, we would adapt to the changes in the form in which we perceive their temperatures.

So the appearances in cases of conflicting appearances do not themselves conflict. Neither appearance of the external object is "non-veridical." In both cases we are perceiving the object and its intrinsic property. How then does a conflict arise? If the perceptual awareness itself is not defective in either of the two conflicting perceptual appearances, then the sense of conflict must arise from the judgments we make or are inclined to make based on our perceptual awareness.

Now the issue of how we acquire and form concepts and judgments from perception is complex and of course beyond the scope of the dissertation. I shall simply assume that an acceptable theory will hold, as indicated above, that we form concepts and judgments from our perceptual awareness based on the similarities and differences that we perceive. So when we form the concept of "strawberry" or "red," we do so by classifying together objects that we perceive as similar. We group different strawberries together and retain the group by the concept "strawberry," treating each strawberry as an interchangeable member of a kind, because we perceive them to be similar. We group different shades of red together and retain the group by the concept "red," treating each shade of red as an interchangeable member of a kind, because we perceive them to be similar. The concepts "strawberry" and "red" designate objects and their intrinsic properties in the external world. When we judge "This is a red

strawberry" about an object that we are perceiving, we are concluding that the object that we are perceiving is a certain type of external object with certain intrinsic properties, an object that is of the same kind as previous objects we have grouped together under the concepts "strawberry" and "red." We make such a judgment because the object we are perceiving is perceived to be similar to the previous objects which we have grouped together under the concepts "strawberry" and "red."

If this general story of how we form concepts and judgments is on the right track, then, initially at least and in the absence of other relevant knowledge, we will make erroneous judgments when we first experience conflicting appearances. Why? Because when we first see a straight spear partially immersed in water, perceptually it looks similar to how bent spears look when seen lying on the ground. Now, crucially, the normal context in which we perceive objects and from which we have formed the concepts of straight and bent is that of seeing objects not partially immersed in water. So the first time we see a straight spear partially immersed in water, we will judge that it is bent because it is perceived to be similar to spears we have previously identified and classified as bent and different from spears we have previously identified and classified as straight. We will judge that the spear is bent, that the spear is a member of the group of bent objects, even though we are perceiving the spear and its physical straightness (in a new form); we will make this judgment because according to the knowledge we have acquired so far, that is the correct judgment. We do not yet have the explicit knowledge that different objects can appear in similar forms and similar objects can appear in different forms. So we take any perceived similarity to indicate a similarity among the objects we are perceiving.

The same thing would happen when we first feel warm water with a cold hand. Perceptually, it feels similar to how hot water feels to a hand at room temperature. Since one's

hand being at room temperature is the normal context in which we form the concepts of hot, warm, and cold, from this perceptual similarity we will likely judge that the water is hot, that the water is a member of the group of hot objects. Even though we are perceiving the water and its warmth, we do not make this identification, we do not judge that it is warm, because we do not yet have the knowledge required to do so. Again, at first we take any perceived similarity to indicate a similarity among the objects we are perceiving.

How then do we discover that we are making an error in judgment?

Notice that we must have some other grounds for concluding that despite the nature of our perceptual awareness in the cases at hand, the spear nevertheless is straight and the water nevertheless is warm. After all, we have grounds for initially judging that the spear is bent and that the water is hot, namely, that they are perceived to be similar to other objects that we have classified as bent spears and as hot water. Some factor or factors, therefore, must overturn these initial grounds, leading us to conclude that our initial judgments are mistaken. That is to say, other knowledge must be operating to steer us away from judging, for example, that the spear is bent and toward judging that the spear is straight. And this knowledge must be such that it excludes two interrelated possibilities.

The first and most obvious possibility that must be excluded is that the object is in fact F, that the water is hot since it is perceived to be similar to other hot liquids and that the spear is bent since it is perceived to be similar to bent spears. For instance, suppose that Albert is handling ice with one hand and room-temperature bottles with his other hand. After he finishes and begins to wash his hands in a bucket of warm water, he finds that the water feels hot to the hand that was handling the ice but only feels warm to his other hand. What might lead him to conclude that though the water feels hot it nevertheless really is not hot? Well, he might splash some water on other parts of his body and find that if they are at room temperature, the water

feels warm to them too. And if he asks other people who have not been handling the ice to judge whether the water is warm or hot, they judge that the water is warm. Further, when his hand is no longer cold, he finds that to it too the water now feels warm. Finally, if he places a thermometer in the bucket, it does not indicate that the water is hot. So he concludes that though it felt hot, the water was in fact not hot.

Or, to take the other example, suppose that Susan is spear fishing and she notices that when she plunges the spear into the river, it seems to bend at the point where it enters the water. What might lead her to conclude that though the spear looks bent it nevertheless is in fact not bent? Well, she might notice that when she puts her arm in the water, she experiences no force that would be anywhere near sufficient to bend her spear (versus, say, banging her arm against a rock, where she does experience sufficient force to bend or break her spear). And when she pulls the spear completely out of the water, it again looks straight. Moreover, where the bend in the spear occurs varies with the depth to which it is immersed in the water, and when it is completely immersed, it looks straight again. Finally, when she touches the spear partially immersed in water, the spear feels to the touch to be straight. From these considerations she concludes that although the spear looks bent it is in fact not bent.

But this is not enough. The possibility that the object is changing from F to non-F must also be excluded. Albert must exclude the possibility that the water is at one moment in time hot, at another moment in time not hot. He might simply do this by putting both hands in the bucket at once and stirring them about. Everywhere the water feels warm to one hand and hot to the other. Further, if he places a thermometer in the bucket, the temperature it indicates does not fluctuate. So he reasonably concludes that the water itself is not changing. Only then can he reasonably conclude that although the water feels hot, it is in fact not hot nor changing from hot to warm, but rather simply is warm.

Similarly, Susan must exclude the possibility that the spear is bending as it penetrates the water, and is straightening out as it is withdrawn from the water or completely immersed in it. She might do this by noticing, as mentioned before, that little force seems to be being exerted against the spear as it is immersed and withdrawn from the water, and that it continues to feel straight to the touch no matter whether it is out of, partially immersed, or completely immersed in the water. Only then can she conclude that although the spear looks bent it is in fact not bent nor changing from bent to straight, but rather is simply straight.

From such situations and experiences, one can begin to conclude that water can feel hot but nevertheless still be warm or that a spear can look bent but still be straight. What we are discovering is that the way an object feels, looks, tastes, etc.—our perceptual awareness of it, the way it appears—depends on and varies with conditions external to the object itself, on something other than the object's nature, such as the condition and state of the perceiver's body and sense organs or the medium of perception. We still perceive the water and its temperature or the spear and its straightness, but in a different form from that in which we are used to perceiving it. Furthermore, this new form can be very similar to the form in which we normally perceive an object at a different intrinsic temperature or an object with a different intrinsic shape. And this means that a perceived similarity of the object to other objects can depend on something other than the object's intrinsic nature (but still on factors in the external world, such as the condition of the subject's sense organs or the medium of perception).

When Albert's hand is at room-temperature, for example, and he places it in two separate buckets of hot water, he perceives the temperature of the water in the two buckets to be similar, and he takes it that these instances of perceptual awareness detect a similarity between the water in the two buckets, a similarity that is due to the objects' intrinsic natures. However, when his hand is cold, say because he has been handling some ice, and he then places

his hand in a bucket of warm water, he perceives the temperature of the water in the bucket to be similar to that of a bucket with hot water (when he places a hand at normal room temperature in it). But other, background considerations and knowledge lead him to think that this perceived similarity between the felt temperature of the water in the bucket with warm water and that of other buckets with hot water is due not to the intrinsic natures of the waters but to some other factor: in this case, the state of his body.

Or, to take the other example, when Susan sees two bent spears lying on the ground, she perceives the two spears to be similar and she takes it that this instance of perceptual awareness detects a similarity between the two spears, a similarity that is due to the objects' intrinsic natures. However, when she notices that her own spear looks bent when partially immersed in water, she perceives her spear to be similar to the two bent spears lying on the ground. But other, background considerations and knowledge lead her to think that this perceived similarity between her spear and the two bent spears is due not to the intrinsic nature of her spear but to some other factor: in this case, the medium in which she sees her spear.

So to distinguish in judgment "X seems F" from "X is F" we require background knowledge in order to discover that although the spear, say, looks bent it is in fact straight. And what this discovery in essence amounts to is that a perceived similarity between two objects may be due not to the intrinsic nature of the objects themselves but to some other factor(s), such as the state of the perceiver's body or the medium of perception.[15] In the absence of this discovery, we will say that the spear partially immersed in water is bent. Though this error is natural, it nevertheless is an error—and we can and do discover its source. The way we conceptualize our discovery is by saying that although the spear partially immersed in water seems or looks bent, it is in fact straight. To add the qualification X "seems" F rather than saying X "is" F is to say that although the perceptual appearance of X is

similar to how we normally perceive Xs that we have grouped together under the concept F, this does not mean that X is in fact F: the perceptual similarity is due not to the intrinsic physical properties of X but rather to conditions external to X.

So the source of conflict in cases of conflicting appearances lies in the judgments we make. When we perceive the straight spear lying on the ground, we judge (or are inclined to judge) that it is straight. The first time we see it partially immersed in water, we judge (or are inclined to judge) that it is bent. So we have conflicting judgments about one and the same object. The potential source of error arises from mistaking in judgment a similarity in two instances of perceptual awareness, A1 and A2, that is due to conditions in the external world but external to the objects for a similarity that is due to the objects themselves.

Compare and contrast this to cases of the common sensibles. I have argued that in the case of perceiving a common-sensible such as length, there is a difference in perceiving it visually from tactilely but that the difference is not a difference in the object itself but in the forms in which the object appears to the subject. The difference between our visual perception of the length of a floppy disk and our tactile perception of the length of a floppy disk is due not to a difference in the intrinsic physical property—extension in one dimension—of the floppy disk, for that remains the same, but to a difference in the subject's means of perceiving the property. In a similar manner, in cases of conflicting appearances such as that of feeling the water in the bucket with a cold hand and a hand at room temperature, there is a difference in the two instances of perceptual awareness but the difference is not a difference in the object of awareness, viz., the water in the bucket, but in the forms in which it is perceived. With either hand one is aware of the water and can discriminate between different temperature waters, but the form in which water at a particular temperature appears when felt with a cold hand is

different from the form in which water at that particular temperature appears when felt with a warm hand.

Furthermore, in the case of perceiving the floppy disk's length visually and tactilely, the difference in the forms in which it appears is due to something external to the object itself, namely to the difference in the sense organs used to perceive the object. Similarly, in the case of the water in the bucket, the difference in the forms in which the water appears is explained by the difference in the subject's sensory apparatus; in the case of the spear, the difference in the forms in which it appears is explained by the difference in the medium of perception. So for both the perception of common sensibles and the perception of conflicting appearances, the difference is due to something external to the objects themselves but not external to the relation between object and subject, since the whole relation is that of a definite subject with definite means of perception in definite conditions of perception perceiving the object.

So far, then, cases of perceiving conflicting appearances are similar to cases of perceiving common sensibles. What then explains why the former lead (initially at least) to conflicting judgments while the later do not?

The source of conflict and the potential source of error in the case of perceiving a spear partially immersed in water, as we have seen, arises from the fact that the form in which the straight spear appears in these particular (and non-normal) conditions of perception is not only different from the form in which a straight spear appears when seen lying on the ground but also <u>similar</u> to the form in which a <u>bent</u> spear appears when seen lying on the ground, not immersed in any water. An error occurs when one judges that the spear partially immersed in water is bent because it visually appears similar to how a bent spear visually appears when it is lying on the ground, out of water. The error, in other words, occurs from the implicit assumption that the similarity between perceiving the straight spear partially immersed in water

and perceiving the bent spear lying on the ground is a similarity in the external objects of awareness, a similarity due to their intrinsic properties, not a similarity in the forms in which they are perceived, a similarity due to conditions external to the objects.

Likewise, in the case of a body of water in a bucket, the source of conflict and the potential source of error arise from the fact that the form in which the lukewarm water in the bucket appears when felt by the cold hand is not only different from the form in which the lukewarm water appears when felt by a warm hand but also similar to the form in which hot water appears when felt by a hand at room temperature. An error occurs when one judges that the water in the bucket is hot because it appears similar to how hot water appears when felt by a hand at room temperature. The error, in other words, occurs from the implicit assumption that the similarity between perceiving the lukewarm water with a cold hand and perceiving hot water with a hand at room temperature is a similarity in the external objects of awareness, a similarity due to their intrinsic properties, not a similarity in the forms in which the objects are perceived, a similarity due to conditions external to the objects.

As I have indicated, such an assumption, of course, is natural. In the absence of specific knowledge of how changes in conditions external to the object (changes in the medium of perception and changes in the subject's means of perception) affect the nature of the resulting perceptual appearance, it is natural to assume that any similarity in the perceptual appearances of objects is due to the objects themselves—and hence the objects themselves must be similar. Our conceptual vocabulary I think attests to the naturalness of this assumption. Concepts like "straight," "bent," "hot," and "cold" are taken to designate intrinsic properties of an object. When a person says "The spear is straight" he takes himself to be referring to an intrinsic physical property of the spear, not to how the spear is perceptually appearing to him. When a person says that this spear and that spear are both straight, he takes

himself to be referring to a similarity between the two objects themselves, not to a similarity in how each is perceptually appearing to him (even though that too is similar).

Thus the source of conflict in cases of conflicting appearances arises from the fact that (i) the same object and physical property are appearing in different forms (e.g., the spear's physical straightness as appearing when seen lying on the ground versus as appearing when seen partially immersed in water); and that (ii) one of the forms of appearance is similar to the form in which we perceive (in the same sense-modality) a different physical property (e.g., the form in which the spear's physical straightness is visually appearing when seen partially immersed in water is similar to the form in which a spear's physical bent shape is visually appearing when seen lying on the ground). The potential error arises not from misperception, since given the sense-organs in use and the specific conditions of perception, the subject perceives as he must perceive and the object appears as it must appear. The error occurs if and when one judges that the fact that one of the forms of appearance is similar to how we perceive a different physical property means that we are not perceiving the same physical property in different forms but are rather "perceiving" two conflicting physical properties.

There is not the same source of conflict and potential source of error in the perception of common sensibles like length, on the other hand, because condition (ii) is not met. Though we perceive length in different forms (visual length and tactile length), neither form is similar to some other form of perception, a form in which some other property appears. When we perceive the spear's physical straightness when it is partially immersed in water, the form is different from the form in which we normally (in other conditions of perception—i.e., when seen lying on the ground) perceive the spear's physical straightness and similar to the form in which we normally perceive the bent shape of a spear. In the case of a common sensible like length, the tactile form in which we perceive a floppy disk's length is different from the visual

form in which we perceive its length, but the different tactile form is not itself similar to some other tactile (or visual) form in which we perceive an object that is not physically similar in length to the floppy disk. And so there is not the same potential source for making a mistaken judgment.

When we learn that the medium of perception and the subject's means of perception affect the nature of the resulting perceptual appearance, the assumption that a perceived similarity is always a similarity among the objects perceived is no longer warranted. If we have knowledge that the conditions of perception and/or our means of perception are different from the conditions we are normally in and from which we have formed our concepts, and that the difference is such that it affects and alters the nature of the resulting perceptual appearance, it is no longer warranted to assume that perceived similarities entail that the objects perceived are in fact similar. It is no longer warranted, for example, to assume that if a straight spear partially immersed in water visually appears similar to how a bent spear lying on the ground visually appears, the two spears must be similar in physical shape. For we know that the conditions of perception have changed from our normal ones (we do not normally perceive objects partially immersed in water) and that this change in the conditions of perception affects the visual appearance of objects. The perceived similarity, therefore, might be a product of a difference in the conditions of perception, in conditions in the external world but external to the object (which include the medium of perception and the nature and state of the subject's sense organs), such that though the two spears, a straight one partially immersed in water and a bent one lying on the ground, look similar, they are in fact different. We then judge, for instance, that the spear looks bent but is straight or that the water feels hot but is warm.

We now have an analysis of conflicting appearances and therefore an answer to the argument from conflicting appearances. In terms of general principles the argument from

conflicting appearances rests on confusing or failing to distinguish the what and the how of perceptual awareness. In the history of philosophy it has normally been assumed that any variation in the perceptual awareness of an object must be the result of a change in the object itself. Cases of conflicting appearances were therefore considered deeply problematic since the perceptual awareness of the object changes when the external object itself does not change. Hence the radical conclusion was often drawn that we do not in fact directly perceive external objects. But we have seen that by the very nature of perceptual awareness, an object interacting with a subject having definite means of perception operating in definite conditions of perception, both the external object and the perceiving subject must play a role in the resulting nature of the perceptual awareness of the object to the subject. Perception is a relationship of awareness between an object and a subject, and both members of the relation can affect the relation. We have seen that the way to conceptualize their respective roles is to say that the external object is what is perceived and the subject's means of perception operating in definite conditions of perception determine how the object is perceived, the form of its appearance to the subject. Perceptual appearances, like concepts, are forms of awareness of reality. They are not intrinsic properties or qualities of objects, in some way attached to them. They are not what we are aware of (any more than concepts are)—reality is. They are how we are aware of reality, one way in which we grasp the external world. So we can remain perceptually aware of the same object and properties but nevertheless the perceptual appearance of these to us can change, as it does in fact change in the case of common sensibles—and in the cases of paradigmatic conflicting appearances.

In terms of a more specific analysis, we have seen that we can account for the existence of (paradigmatic) cases of conflicting appearances by this distinction between what we perceive and how we perceive it. My account preserves the sense of conflict and explains the potential

source of error and illusion in cases of conflicting appearances while still showing that there is in fact no conflict. The sense of conflict comes from the fact that we not only perceive the same thing in a perceptual appearance of a different form, but the different form is also similar to the form in which we perceive some other property. Furthermore, my account does not have difficulty explaining, as Armstrong's, for instance, does, why there remains a sense of conflict in seeing a spear partially immersed in water even though we know that it is physically straight. If perception is just a disposition to believe, why do we still have the disposition to believe the spear is bent when we in fact know that it is straight? On my account, however, the sense of conflict remains to some extent since even though we are in fact perceiving the spear's physical straightness when it is partially immersed in water, it still visually appears similar to how a bent spear appears when lying on the ground. And so there remains some temptation to think that it is bent. The more familiar we become with seeing objects partially immersed in water and making judgments about them, the more "normal" such conditions of perception become, the weaker the temptation to judge that it is bent.

## (4) A Final Reply to the Argument from Conflicting Appearances

By way of concluding the chapter, let us return to a consideration of the basic structure of the argument from conflicting appearances as formulated at the beginning of the dissertation. Recall that the structure of the argument (using the example of seeing a spear partially immersed in water versus lying on the ground) is as follows:

(P1*) *That* ('the spear we see', the directly presented perceptual item, whatever it is) is (and seems to be) bent during period p.
(P2*) The corresponding external object, the spear, is not bent during period p.

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(C1*) *That* is not identical with the corresponding external object, the spear.

(P3*) *That* is identical either with the corresponding external object, the spear, or with a perception in the mind.

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(C2) *That* is identical with a perception in the mind.

The crucial premise, as we have seen, is P1*, and P1* is generated by the move of going from "the spear (that which we see) seems bent" to "the spear (that which we see) is bent." Those who uphold P1* claim, as we have seen, that the move is obviously acceptable and those who deny P1* claim that the move is obviously unacceptable. The move, however, is neither obviously acceptable nor unacceptable. We discovered, however, the fundamental reason why most find the move obviously acceptable: at some level they think direct perception should be revelatory, that only the object should determine how it perceptually appears to the subject. The only way that the spear can seem "visually bent," they think, is if it is in fact bent. In a previous chapter I argued that those who accept the revelatory standard of direct perception have, in the final analysis, a causeless view of direct awareness. For this reason, I said, the move should be resisted.

I have argued that one must accept the fact that both the object and the subject play a role in the resulting perceptual awareness, and that the way to conceptualize and understand this fact is by the distinction between the what and the how of awareness. This is the fundamental reason why the move should be resisted. Sensory qualities are not intrinsic qualities or properties of objects; they are not attached to the object in the way that P1* implies. The sensory quality of "visual bentness" is no more intrinsic or attached to the spear

than is the sensory quality of "visual straightness." Both are forms of perceptual awareness of objects. Something may appear in the form of "visual bentness" in direct perception yet not in fact be physically bent. The reason is that perceptual appearances can vary when the object itself does not. When the spear appears visually bent when seen partially immersed in water, the way the spear's straight shape appears to the subject is different from how it normally appears because the conditions of perception are different from our normal ones: we do not normally perceive objects partially immersed in water. To say that the spear seems bent, as we have seen, is to say that the way its straight shape is appearing is similar to the way a spear's bent shape appears in other, more normal (to us) conditions of perception—namely, when a spear is seen lying on the ground. What is happening is that we are perceiving a straight spear in an unusual form because the conditions of perception are unusual. It is completely misguided to say that we are perceiving the appearance of a bent spear.

Remember that Snowdon suggested that it is the standard account of perceptual appearances which legitimates the move generating P1*. This, as I have shown, is true. It is the view that sees perceptual appearances as intrinsic to external objects, in some way attached to them that makes it seem obvious that if something seems F then there is in fact something which is F, something to which the sensory quality of F attaches as an intrinsic quality or property. Unfortunately, this still is a dominant view of perceptual appearances. But I have now argued at length that this approach to perceptual appearances should be discarded. Taking seriously the fact that direct awareness is a joint product of external object and perceiving subject—the subject is perceptually aware of the object—means taking seriously the idea that perceptual appearances and sensory qualities are not intrinsic qualities of objects (just as concepts are not) but forms of being aware of reality (just as concepts are). Such a

perspective on perceptual appearances makes the move generating P1* seem obviously unacceptable—as Austin correctly viewed it (but without adequate explanation).

The argument from conflicting appearances, therefore, should no longer be seen as persuasive or convincing because the move generating P1* is not. Thus the argument should be rejected once and for all.

## NOTES

[1]Pollock, Knowledge and Justification, p. 120.

[2]Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pp. 47-48.

[3]Augustine, Against the Academics, pp. 127-128. W.E. Kennick comments on this passage: "The oar's looking bent in water is not an illusion, something that appears to be the case but isn't; but this does not mean that the oar does not look bent." ("Appearance and Reality", p. 136)

[4]Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, p. 11. Although Austin does not discuss a relational view of appearances or sensory qualities in Sense and Sensibilia—his focus is more negative and linguistic—he makes a remark that bears some resemblance to my views. The remark occurs in Austin's discussion of an argument of Ayer's claiming that as one approaches an object from a distance one may begin by having a series of perceptions which are delusive (non-veridical) in the sense that the object appears to be smaller than it really is, culminating (Ayer allows for the sake of argument) in a veridical perception. Austin remarks: "But what, we may ask, does this assumption amount to? From what distance *does* an object, a cricket-ball say, 'look the size that it really is'? Six feet? Twenty feet?" (pp. 45-46.) Austin seems to be hinting at the idea that an external object has no intrinsic perceptual appearance or sensory qualities, which may or may not be revealed in our perceptual awareness of the object. When seen from a distance, a cricket ball does look the size that it "really" is—when it is seen from that distance.

[5]Dennett, Consciousness Explained, pp. 370-371. As Dennett states the question: "Modern science—so goes the standard story—has removed the color from the physical world, replacing it with colorless electromagnetic radiation of various wavelengths, bouncing off surfaces that variably reflect and absorb the radiation. It may look as if the color is out *there*, but it isn't. It's *in here*—in the "eye and brain of the beholder." (If the authors of the passage [that Dennett previously quoted in the chapter about colour existing in the eye and brain of the beholder] were not such good materialists, they would probably have said that it was in the *mind* of the observer, saving themselves from the silly reading we just dismissed [that the eye and brain have the colours when we look at them], but creating even worse problems for themselves.) But now, if there is no inner *figment* that could be colored in some special,

subjective, in-the-mind, phenomenal sense, colors seem to disappear altogether! *Something* has to be the colors we know and love, the colors we mix and match. Where oh where can they be? This is the ancient philosophical conundrum we must now face." Later on p. 371 Dennett makes it clear that he is using colour as but one example of a sensory quality and that his discussion is meant to apply to all sensory qualities. We should note, however, that in the chapter Dennett is also concerned with issues with which I am not concerned in the dissertation. Most importantly, Dennett wishes to provide a materialist account of sensory qualities while I have left the materialism versus anti-materialism debates to one side. My claim is only that the phenomenon of consciousness called "sensory qualities" is a relational phenomenon—that is, part of a real relation between subject and external object. Sensory qualities are relational qualities, not intrinsic qualities of the object or of the subject (of his mind). The dissertation does not address the question of whether sensory qualities can or cannot be completely reduced (whatever that means exactly) to material properties and relations.

[6]Ibid., pp. 372-373. Dennett writes: "...colors supposedly are: reflective properties of the surface of objects, or of transparent volumes (the pink ice cube, the shaft of limelight). And that is just what they are in fact—though saying just *which* reflective properties they are is tricky...." (p. 373) This account of course, like all accounts of colour, is controversial.

[7]Ibid., p. 379.

[8]The representationalist does not have to perform the first task only if he maintains that the representations we are directly aware of are self-identifying. That is, if they announce themselves as being representations of a yellow station wagon in the driveway or of a red, ripe apple in the fruit bowl. But I take it that such a view is implausible.

[9]Searle, Intentionality, p. 73.

[10]Searle thinks that if we must infer the existence of the external object from the having of a perceptual experience, skepticism cannot be avoided. "What I believe is entirely correct about the skeptical objection is that once we treat the experience as evidence on the basis of which we infer the existence of the object, then skepticism becomes unavoidable. The inference would lack any justification. And it is at this point that the metaphor of the inner and the outer sets a trap for us, for it inclines us to think we are dealing with two separate phenomena, an 'inner' experience about which we can have a kind of Cartesian certainty, and an 'outer' thing for which the inner must provide the basis, evidence, or ground. What I have been proposing in this chapter is a noninferential, that is, a naïve realist, version of the causal theory of perception, according to which we are not dealing with two things one of which is the evidence for the other, but rather we perceive only one thing and in so doing have a perceptual experience." Searle, Intentionality, p. 74. As I have remarked before, Searle's view is better seen simply as a version of realism or of direct realism rather than a version of naïve realism.

[11]Although Searle gives some hints about what he would say on this issue, he himself does not address the issue in Intentionality.

[12]Searle, Intentionality, p. 75.

[13]This I think would be Searle's position on the imagined spectrum inversion. Searle says it is the sensory qualities of the perceptual experience that determine its intentional content. But it seems that he maintains that no matter the circumstances, a particular sensory quality always specifies the same intentional content (he does not present any arguments for this view). So in the case of illusions, such as when the moon on the horizon looks a great deal bigger than it does when directly overhead, he thinks that the intentional content of the perceptual experience in the first case includes that the moon is of size S and the intentional content of the perceptual experience in the second case includes that the moon is of a size smaller than S, which means that our belief that the moon has not changed sizes contradicts the content of our perceptual awareness. And this means that the intentional content of at least one of the perceptual experiences is not satisfied; we are not perceiving a moon of size S or of a size smaller than S.

[14]As I have said before, my explanation of conflicting appearances is an application of Rand's views; see Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pp. 39ff. Kelley also applies Rand's views to illusions in a way similar to mine; see Kelley, The Evidence of the Senses, pp. 93-94 & 234.

[15]It is worth noticing in passing that although, initially at least, we may be inclined to judge that the spear, say, is bent when we see it partially immersed in water, and later, when we have acquired the necessary knowledge, inclined to judge that though the spear looks bent it is in fact straight, it seems entirely inappropriate to analyze our perceptual awareness in terms of these judgments (as Armstrong's view, for example, does). Suppose, for instance, that when Susan first sees her spear partially immersed in water, she judges (or is inclined to judge) that her spear is bent. One wants to say here that what accounts for her forming this judgment (or being inclined to form it) is the way the spear looks to her; one does not want to say that the way the spear looks to her is the forming or the inclination to form the judgment. For then what explains her inclination to judge that her spear is bent when it is in fact straight? Furthermore, suppose that after she has acquired the necessary background knowledge, when she sees her spear partially immersed in water she judges (or is inclined to judge) that the spear looks bent but is straight. One wants to say here that what accounts for her forming this judgment (or being inclined to form it) is her background knowledge and the way the spear looks to her; one does not want to say that the way the spear looks to her is the judgment or the inclination to form it. For then why does she judge that the spear seems bent but is straight instead of just judging that it is straight? Finally, notice that the way the spear looks does not change after Susan has acquired the necessary background knowledge, yet according to a view like Armstrong's, the way the spear looks does change because the judgment she is inclined to form changes.

# CHAPTER TEN

## *OBJECTION: CAN I DISTINGUISH MY VIEW OF PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS FROM PUTNAM'S INTERNAL REALISM?*

### (1) The Objection

In this final chapter I want to address a significant objection to my view. The objection is, to state it baldly, that I am a failed "Putnam wannabe." In other words, the objection is that since my view like Putnam's maintains that we affect the nature of our perceptual awareness of reality, my view should reject the very metaphysical realism that Putnam's view (which he has labelled internal realism) rejects. For it may seem to many that on my view we cannot know what the external world is "really" like except that we can be pretty sure it is not in itself "like" what we perceive it to be. So the objection is that there is a deep incoherence in my view: if one wants to maintain that we affect the nature of our perceptual awareness of reality, one must abandon metaphysical realism.

In many ways this objection, addressing as it does not just our perceptual but also our conceptual awareness of reality, brings in issues beyond the scope of the dissertation, and to that extent I will not be able to give a reply that will satisfy those sympathetic to the objection. However, I think that any non-naïve version of direct perceptual awareness will have this sort of objection raised against it, so it is necessary to say something about it. The same kind of objection, for instance, has also been raised against Searle's version of direct perception. Moreover, I think that given what has gone before, I can indicate the essence of my reply to the objection.

To better understand the objection, I want to consider a similar objection that has been raised against Searle's version of direct perceptual realism and then, in the next section, consider Searle's reply to the objection. Although more will have to be said about what the argument behind the objection is than what Searle says about it, and although we will need a fuller reply than that which Searle gives, the reply that Searle gives is nevertheless along the same lines as the reply that I will offer, so it is fruitful to begin by considering Searle's reply.

In an article in John Searle and His Critics Eddy Zemach contends that two theses which Searle advances are, in fact, inconsistent.[1] The two theses are:

> (T1) Metaphysical Realism. There exists a reality whose existence and whose features are independent of our representations [awareness] of it.
>
> (T2) Conceptual Relativity. Our conception [awareness] of reality, our conception [awareness] of how it is, is always made relative to our constitution.[2]

Note that these are Searle's own statements of the two theses. Zemach labels the second thesis "causal relativity," a label which Searle finds misleading and so resists. But Searle's own substitution of "conceptual relativity" leaves something to be desired as well. Since the topic under discussion is perceptual awareness and direct perceptual realism, it is peculiar to label the second thesis "conceptual relativity" and to speak about our conception of reality rather than our direct perception of reality. Moreover, the use of "representations" in T1 is also peculiar given that Searle rejects a representationalist view of perception.[3] Despite all this, we nevertheless can see that Zemach's objection to Searle's direct perceptual realism is very similar to the objection that is being raised against my version of direct perceptual realism. Not surprisingly, therefore, Searle's reply to the objection will help us see what is wrong with the objection.

## (2) Replying to the Objection

In his reply Searle observes correctly that Zemach has not actually argued for the incompatibility of T1 and T2; he has merely asserted it. But that T1 and T2 are incompatible is by no means obvious. An argument is needed. Searle remarks that he knows of only one recent argument whose conclusion is that T1 is incompatible with T2, an argument advanced by Putnam in Reason, Truth and History. And so in his reply to Zemach's objection Searle focuses on presenting and replying to Putnam's argument.[4]

Putnam's argument, Searle writes, "uses conceptual relativism to argue against metaphysical realism and to substitute for metaphysical realism a view he calls 'internal realism.'"[5] The essence of Putnam's argument, Searle says, is this:

> Putnam thinks that because we can only *state* the fact that iron oxidizes relative to a vocabulary and conceptual system, that therefore the fact only *exists* relative to a vocabulary and conceptual system. So, on his view if conceptual relativism is true, metaphysical realism is false.[6]

That is, if we can only state or, better, be conceptually aware of the fact that iron oxidizes by means of a specific system of concepts and language, then what we are aware of when we are aware of the fact that iron oxidizes is not a fact of an independent reality but a "fact" of a "reality" constituted or created by our specific system of concepts. Beings with a different system of concepts and language will be conceptually aware of different "facts" of a different "reality"—a "reality" constituted or created by their specific system of concepts.

Stating the argument in more general terms, if our means of conception—our constitution, as Searle puts it in T2—affect the nature of our conceptual awareness of reality,

then we are not conceptually aware of facts of an independent reality but only of "facts" of a "reality" in some way constituted or created by us, by our means of conception (our particular language and conceptual system).

Now of course Searle's characterization of Putnam's argument, brief as it is, leaves something to be desired. Moreover, Searle places the focus on concepts and conception, both in stating the argument and, as we shall see, in giving his reply, when the focus should be on perception. After all, Zemach's original objection is to Searle's version of direct perceptual realism. And, as we shall also see when I give a fuller characterization of Putnam's argument, perhaps the main evidence that Putnam adduces for his view of internal realism is the existence of conflicting appearances.

Keeping in mind that Searle has not done full justice to Putnam's argument and that Searle's reply incorrectly focuses on conceptual rather than perceptual awareness, consider now Searle's actual reply to (his characterization of) Putnam's argument for internal realism.[7]

> The premise of his argument does not entail the conclusion. It is, indeed, trivially true that all statements are made within a conceptual apparatus for making statements. Without a language we cannot talk. It does, indeed, follow from this that given alternative conceptual apparatuses there will be alternative descriptions of reality. For example, not every language will even have a vocabulary for stating that iron oxidizes. But it simply does not follow that *the fact* that iron oxidizes is in any way language-dependent or relative to a system of concepts or anything of the sort.[8]

Now this of course is a brief reply to Putnam's argument. But I think a plausible way of interpreting what Searle is suggesting here is that we grasp the fact that iron oxidizes in the form of certain concepts and judgments, but this is how we grasp the fact not what we grasp. What we grasp is in no way relative to our means of conception. How we grasp the fact, which is dependent on our means of conception, does not affect the nature of what we grasp.

What we grasp is: the fact that iron oxidizes. How we grasp this fact is by means of the English language and the concepts "iron" and "oxidation." We are not aware of "facts" of a "reality" created by our specific language and conceptual system; we are aware of facts of reality by means of our specific language and conceptual system. Concepts are a form of grasping reality. They are a "how" of awareness, not a "what."

As Searle remarks, given a different specific language and conceptual system, there may be different descriptions of reality—that is, different means of conceptualizing reality, of being conceptually aware of the facts of reality. But this is a difference in how a fact is grasped, not in the fact itself that is grasped. For instance, to take a relatively simple example, John might grasp the fact that the car is in the street by means of the conceptual judgment "The car is in the street" while Jean might grasp this same fact by means of the conceptual judgment "L'automobile est dans la rue." This is a difference in the form of being aware of the fact, not in the fact itself; a difference in how that which is conceptually grasped is conceptually grasped, not in that which is conceptually grasped. Similarly, as Searle remarks, a language and system of concepts might not even have the means of allowing a knower to grasp a certain fact. The language and conceptual system of the Ancient Greeks, for instance, may be such that it does not even allow an Ancient Greek to grasp the fact that iron oxidizes. But this does not mean that that fact is relative to those languages and conceptual systems that do allow a knower to grasp this fact.

Thus we have Searle's general framework for understanding conceptual relativity: that which varies between languages and conceptual systems is not what one is conceptually aware of—everyone is conceptually aware of the same one reality—but how one is conceptually aware of it (assuming one has the resources to be aware of it). Concepts are therefore not intrinsic properties, qualities, or features of what one is conceptually aware of. To view them

as such is to place them in the wrong category. Concepts lie on the side of the "how" of awareness or knowledge: they are forms of awareness of reality, forms of grasping facts. The concepts of iron and oxidation are not qualities, properties, or features of the fact of reality that iron oxidizes. They are forms in which we grasp this fact. There is thus no reason to think that T1 and T2 are incompatible, since the former deals with <u>what</u> one is conceptually aware of, the latter with <u>how</u> one is conceptually aware of it.

What Searle has understood, at least in some form, about conceptual awareness is, I have argued in the dissertation, true of perceptual awareness as well. As I have put it, one must distinguish between what we are perceptually aware of and how we are perceptually aware of it. Our means of perception do affect the nature of our resulting perceptual awareness, but they do not create the objects of our perceptual awareness, they create the forms in which we are perceptually aware of the objects that we are perceptually aware of. According to the argument in the dissertation, therefore, T1 and T2 (which I would state as T1* and T2* below) are compatible.

> (T1*) Metaphysical Realism. There exists a reality whose existence and whose features are independent of our perceptual awareness of it [and which is the object of our perceptual just as of our conceptual awareness].
>
> (T2*) Perceptual Relativity. Our perception of reality, the form in which we are aware of it, is always relative to our constitution, to our specific means of perception.

There is no reason to think, therefore, that I am a failed "Putnam wannabe." In advancing the view that the subject affects the nature of his perceptual awareness of reality, I have no desire nor do I see a need to abandon metaphysical realism. But to fully appreciate the fact that I am not a failed "Putnam wannabe," I think we must see in more detail what exactly Putnam's actual argument is for his view of internal realism. For when we understand why

Putnam accepts T2 and thinks that T2 is incompatible with T1, we will also understand why I do not think that T1 and T2 are incompatible.

## (3) Understanding the Structure and Flaws of Putnam's Argument

Putnam's presents his argument for internal realism in Reason, Truth and History. Although the major argument, especially as it concerns perception, is in Chapter Three of the book, it will be necessary to look at some of his views in earlier chapters because they set the context for what is said in Chapter Three.

In the Preface to the book, Putnam makes it clear that he is going to challenge the "copy" theory of truth and propose an alternative view, which in spirit goes back to the ideas of Kant. However, right from the beginning we can see Putnam running together and almost equating two disparate views, "copy" theories and correspondence theories. He describes the copy theory of truth as follows: "Many, perhaps most, philosophers hold some version of the 'copy' theory of truth today, the conception according to which a statement is true just in case it 'corresponds to the (mind independent) facts'".[9] Now to speak of copies and representations, whether perceptual or conceptual, is to put forth a representationalist view of the mind. To speak of a correspondence between the mind and the world, however, is not necessarily to put forth a representationalist view of the mind, to advocate that the mind deals with copies or representations that may or may not correctly copy or represent the world external to the mind. Aristotle, for instance, held that "a falsity is a statement of that which is that it is not, or of that which is not that it is; and a truth is a statement of that which is that it is, or of that which is not that it is not."[10] This of course is the classical statement of the correspondence theory of truth. It is by no means obvious, to put it mildly, that such a theory

entails a representationalist view of the mind. To be sure, to say that the mind corresponds or fails to correspond to the world entails that there is a distinction to be made between the mind and its knowledge and awareness of the world, on the one hand, and an independently existing world, on the other hand. But this does not mean that the two can or do stand in the relation of copy to original or of representation to that which is represented. "Correspondence" might be cashed out in completely non-representationalist terms, but Putnam does not seem to recognize this.

As a result of running together representationalism and a correspondence theory of truth, Putnam thinks that when he has provided reasons for rejecting representationalism, he has provided reasons for rejecting the correspondence theory of truth along with the conception of an independently existing reality to which our awareness "corresponds" (i.e., an independently existing reality which our awareness is awareness of). But since a correspondence theory of truth does not entail representationalism, the overall structure of Putnam's argument is invalid.

Looking at the same point from another perspective, Putnam can countenance only two alternatives: a representationalist view of the mind and his own view of internal realism. At one point in the book, for instance, this is how he states the main issue he is addressing:

> if we assume that we have no 'sixth sense' which enables us to directly perceive extra-mental entities, or to do something analogous to perceiving them...then grasping an...extra-mental entity, must be mediated by representations in some way. (This also seems clear introspectively, to me at least.) But the whole problem we are investigating is how representations can enable us to refer to what is outside the mind. To assume the notion of 'grasping' an X which is external to the mind would be to beg the whole question.[11]

So Putnam thinks that to maintain that we can perceptually or conceptually grasp the world without representations would be to beg the whole question. But in actuality, it would be to beg the whole question only if it has already been shown that one must uphold some form of representationalism in order to uphold metaphysical realism, which Putnam has not shown (and which, as I have indicated, I do not think he could show). According to my version or Searle's version of direct perceptual realism, for instance, we do perceptually grasp the world without representations; this does not beg any questions, because both versions reject representationalist analyses of perception.

To be fair, Putnam does briefly consider theories that maintain that we are perceptually or conceptually aware of the world without representations, but he dismisses such theories as mysterious and magical.

> thoughts (and hence the mind) are of an essentially different nature than physical objects. Thoughts have the characteristic of intentionality—they can refer to something else; nothing physical has 'intentionality', save as that intentionality is derivative from some employment of that physical thing by a mind. Or so it is claimed. This is too quick; just postulating mysterious powers of mind solves nothing.[12]

But his dismissal of such theories is itself I think strange and too quick. No mysterious power of mind is being postulated. Both Putnam and his opponent agree that the mind has the power of intentionality or reference. Putnam thinks this power must be explained by a more basic power of the mind, the mind's power to make mental representations, whereas his opponent does not think that the mind works by means of representations nor that the notion of a representation, borrowed from the physical world, sheds any light on mental phenomena. (Any more than saying that the sea is stormy because it is angry, i.e., explaining a physical phenomenon by a notion borrowed from the mental realm, sheds any light on why the sea is

stormy.) Further, his opponent does not think that there is some other kind of mental power necessary to explain intentionality or reference; the ability to be aware of extra-mental things is a basic power of the mind (this does not imply that this power cannot be described at length nor does it imply that physical processes do not give rise to the mind and its powers).

So the overall structure of Putnam's argument against metaphysical realism is I think deeply flawed. He is going to argue that the correspondence theory of truth and the mind should be rejected, along with its belief in an independently existing world, because representationalism cannot establish that mental copies copy an independently existing world. But representationalism is not the only other plausible view of the mind; there are other ways to uphold metaphysical realism than just representationalism.

With all this in mind, let us consider Putnam's actual argument against metaphysical realism and for internal realism.

He begins by distinguishing the perspectives of metaphysical realism and what he calls internal realism. According to the perspective of metaphysical realism,

> the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'. Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things.... [I]ts favourite point of view is a God's Eye point of view.[13]

According to the internalist perspective, on the other hand,

> *what objects does the world consist of*? is a question it only makes sense to ask *within* a theory or description.... 'Truth', in an internalist view, is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability—some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our experiences *as those experiences are themselves represented in our belief system*—not correspondence with mind-independent or discourse-independent 'states of affairs'. There is no God's Eye point of

> view that we can know or usefully imagine, there are only the various points of view of actual persons....[14]

Notice that Putnam's characterization of metaphysical realism is somewhat non-standard. The essential idea behind metaphysical realism, as T1 and even more so T1* bring out, is that the world (and its features) exists independently of our awareness of it. Since our awareness is of this independently existing world, knowledge and truth will involve a correspondence between mind and external world. But a metaphysical realist need not maintain that there is a fixed totality of mind-independent objects. Consider for instance a book of a hundred pages. Is it one object or one hundred? A metaphysical realist need not maintain that reality dictates that only one answer is correct here. It can be one book or a hundred pages; truth would still be a correspondence between mind and world since to judge that there were two books or a hundred and one pages would be false because it fails to correspond to the nature of the world.

Observe also Putnam's reference to the God's Eye point of view in describing metaphysical realism. What does this mean? Although Putnam never defines the notion, I think what he has in mind by the notion is the idea of stepping out from behind one's representations to "perceive" the world "as it really is" and then to decide whether one's representations do or do not accurately copy the world "as it really is". Stepping out from behind one's representations—one's means of awareness—is adopting the God's Eye point of view. (The God's Eye point of view, then, is just the revelatory standard of direct perception applied to all awareness; it is awareness without a specific means of awareness producing the awareness.) So here again one can see how Putnam is equating advocacy of metaphysical realism with advocacy of representationalism. If a metaphysical realist maintains that we are directly aware of or directly grasp the external world, then we do not have to step outside of

our awareness in order to "perceive" the world "as it really is"; we already are perceiving the world "as it really is".

The essential idea behind internal realism, by contrast, is that the mind does not correspond to a mind-independent world. The objects of awareness or knowledge, their features and identity, are (in part) created by the subject's means of awareness; as Putnam states the point, "I maintain, [that] 'objects' themselves are as much made as discovered...."[15] This of course is the Kantianism in Putnam's view. Kant's Copernican revolution held that the subject no longer has to conform to the object, to bring his mind and judgments in line with the nature of the independently-existing world (thus discarding the correspondence theory of truth). Rather, the object must conform to the subject; the subject's mind and judgments bring the object in line with them by creating its fundamental features and identity.[16] Similarly, Putnam holds that the object conforms to the subject; the subject's theories and descriptions bring the object in line with them.

In claiming that there is no God's Eye point of view internal realism is maintaining that the idea of stepping out from behind one's representations in order to be aware of reality "as it really is" makes no sense because the only way one could be aware of something is by representing it. One cannot therefore be aware of reality "as it really is"; one can only be aware of reality as it is created or constituted by one's means of awareness, as it conforms to one's means of awareness. There is no God's Eye point of view; there are, as Putnam puts it, only the various points of view of actual persons.

Given his descriptions of metaphysical realism and internal realism, what, in essence, is Putnam's argument against the former and in favour of the latter?

Putnam contends that prior to Kant perhaps every philosopher held the correspondence theory of truth. The dominant model of the mind was the similitude theory, which holds that

awareness works by means of mental representations and that "the relation between the representations in our minds and the external objects that they refer to is literally a *similarity*."[17] In the seventeenth century the similitude theory was refined, much as it had been by ancient philosophers who advocated a primary versus secondary quality distinction. "Locke and Descartes held that in the case of a 'secondary' quality, such as a colour or a texture, it would be absurd to suppose that the property of the mental image is *literally* the same as the property of the physical thing."[18] However, in the case of "primary" qualities, such a length, it was not thought absurd to suppose this, and in fact it was thought that the two literally were the same (or similar). Berkeley then pointed out an unwelcome consequence of the similitude theory: it implies that nothing exists except mental entities.

> Berkeley's argument is very simple. The usual philosophical argument against the similitude theory in the case of secondary qualities is correct (the argument from the relativity of perception), but it goes just as well in the case of primary qualities. The length, shape, motion of an object are all perceived differently by different perceivers and by the same perceiver on different occasions. To ask whether a *table* is the same as *my* image of it or the same length as *your* image of it is to ask an absurd question.... Mental images do not have *physical* length. They cannot be compared to the standard measuring rod in Paris. Physical length and subjective length must be as different as physical redness and subjective redness.
>
> To state Berkeley's conclusion another way, *Nothing can be similar to a sensation or image expect another sensation or image*. Given this, and given the (still unquestioned) assumption that the mechanism of reference is similitude between our 'ideas'...and what they represent, it at once follows that no 'idea' (mental image) can represent or refer to anything but another image or sensation. Only phenomenal objects can be thought of, conceived, referred to. And if you can't think of something, you can't think it exists. Unless we treat talk of material objects as highly derived talk about regularities in our sensations, it is completely unintelligible.
>
> ...the fact that one could derive such an unacceptable conclusion from the similitude theory produced a crisis in philosophy.[19]

Putnam's reason for rejecting metaphysical realism (and the correspondence theory of truth), then, hinges on Berkeley's argument against representationalism. We can never establish that our representations represent a world beyond them; indeed, it is absurd even to think that our representations might resemble anything other than some of our other representations. The argument from conflicting appearances (which Putnam calls the argument from the relativity of perception) shows that our means of awareness affects, in each and every case, the nature of the object of our awareness (for Putnam, the representations in our mind). There is thus no basis, then, to think that our mental representation will in any way correspond to an independently existing world, to a world beyond our representations. Only if we were privy to a God's Eye point of view, an awareness of the world, that is, that is unaffected by a means of awareness, an awareness of the world that is revelatory, could we be aware of an independently existing world. Since, however, in actual fact we have a definite means of awareness, which affects the nature of our resulting awareness in definite ways, we can only be aware of the world as it is "for us", aware of the phenomenal world, aware of the world as constituted and created by our means of awareness; in other words, we can only be aware of our representations.[20] And since, according to Putnam, the only way to uphold metaphysical realism is by way of representationalism, metaphysical realism must be rejected.

What then is to replace it? Internal realism, as Kant suggested. "Kant is best read as proposing for the first time what I have called the...'internal realist' view of truth." Putnam of course realizes that he is "attributing a view to Kant that Kant does not express in these words" but, Putnam writes, "what Kant *did* say has precisely the effect of giving up the similitude theory".[21] The best first approximation of Kant's view, Putnam thinks, is to say that all properties are secondary.[22] Everything we are aware of is constituted, created, and shaped by our means of awareness. We have no access to mind-independent things, to the intrinsic

properties of objects, to a reality whose nature, identity and features have not been shaped and created by us. "*[E]verything* we say about an object is of the form: it is such as to affect *us* in such-and-such a way. *Nothing at all* we say about any object describes the object as it is 'in itself', independently of its effects on *us*, on beings with our rational natures and our biological constitutions.... Our ideas of objects are not *copies* of mind-independent things."[23] Kant himself thinks we need a conception of a noumenal world, of things-in-themselves (as against things-for-us), and he thinks that such a noumenal world exists (but that we cannot know its nature and can only postulate its existence). About this idea Putnam remarks that philosophers today hold that the noumenal world is an unnecessary metaphysical element in Kant's thought, although Putnam himself says that "perhaps Kant is right: perhaps we can't help thinking that there is *somehow* a mind-independent 'ground' for our experience even if all attempts to talk about it lead at once to nonsense."[24]

But whether or not psychologically we need a conception of a mind-independent "ground" for our experience, epistemologically such a thing plays no role in determining our standards of objectivity and truth. Since the subject's means of awareness constitute the world (for him), objectivity can no longer designate a judgment unaffected by emotions and other "subjective" factors. No one can escape the influence that his means of awareness and subjective constitution have on his resulting object of awareness: "Our conceptions of coherence and acceptability are...deeply interwoven with our psychology. They depend on our biology and our culture; they are by no means 'value free'.... They define a kind of objectivity, *objectivity for us*, even if it is not the metaphysical objectivity of the God's Eye view."[25] And truth, of course, cannot designate correspondence between our judgments and the world. Rather, it must be something internal to our "representations": according to Putnam, it is their coherence and fit, their idealized rational acceptability.[26]

So the essence of Putnam's argument for internal realism, as he himself realizes, is borrowed from Kant. The subject's means of awareness affect the nature of his awareness. This is taken to mean that they affect the nature of the object that he is aware of. And this means that he is not aware of a mind-independent world, but only of a world constituted by his means of awareness. We are not aware of reality "in itself" but of a reality "for us"; there is no objectivity or rationality "in itself" but only objectivity and rationality "for us." "Objectivity and rationality humanly speaking are what we have; they are better than nothing."[27]

Now we can clearly see, I think, why I am not a failed "Putnam wannabe." Although I too hold that the subject affects the nature of his resulting awareness, I do not hold that he affects the object of his awareness; rather, he affects the nature of his awareness of the object. There are two things: (i) the object and (ii) the awareness of the object, and both have a nature. The subject does not determine the nature of the object, he determines the nature of his awareness of the object. In thinking about perception and conception, we must always distinguish between the nature of the object, what the subject is aware of, and the nature of his awareness of the object, how he is aware of it. Putnam conflates the two, so there is no reason to think I am trying to advance a view like Putnam's, but fail to do so. Moreover, Putnam cannot (or at least does not want to) envision a model of the mind and its awareness other than a representationalist one, so here too his view is radically different from mine.

The kernel of truth in Putnam's view is that we cannot "step outside of our awareness" to compare it to reality. Such a notion is, in the end, unintelligible. For what is being asked for is that we step outside of our means of knowledge and yet, somehow, still have knowledge of reality, since we are being asked to compare our awareness and knowledge to reality. This cannot be done. One cannot step outside of one's means of knowledge, one's consciousness, and still have knowledge, still be conscious, of reality. (The only way one can "step outside"

one's consciousness is to fall asleep; and then there is only blackness.) The God's Eye point of view is a myth—because the whole idea of revelation is a myth. But abandoning the God's Eye point of view creates a problem for our knowledge of a mind-independent reality only if one has already assumed a representational view of the mind, only if one has already assumed that the subject's means of awareness constitutes and creates the direct object of his awareness. For then the only way to be aware of reality "as it really is" (versus as it is constituted and created by you) is by revelation. To abandon the idea of revelation would be to abandon knowledge of reality "as it really is."

But I have argued in the dissertation (in the case of perceptual awareness at least) that the fact that the subject affects the nature of his resulting awareness does not imply that he affects the nature of the object of his awareness. Without relying on this implication, Putnam's argument cannot go through. For as we have seen, the essence of his argument (at least insofar as it concerns perceptual awareness) rests on the existence of conflicting appearances. He thinks the existence of conflicting appearances shows that the subject creates the object of his awareness. I have argued that it shows no such thing: just as in the case of common sensibles, the subject does not affect the nature of the object of his awareness but rather the nature of his awareness of the object.

Thus just as Searle thinks T1 and T2 are not incompatible in the case of conceptual awareness, so I think T1* and T2* are not incompatible in the case of perceptual awareness. Many philosophers are relatively comfortable with the distinction between language and conceptual systems, on the one hand, and reality on the other hand, between how we are conceptually aware of reality and what we are conceptually aware of. Many thus I think would accept Searle's view that T1 and T2 are compatible. What needs to be understood is that similar things are true for perceptual awareness as well.

T1* and T2* are compatible because perceptual appearances and sensory qualities have a similar status to concepts: they are how we are aware of reality, not what we are aware of. They are specific forms in which we are aware of reality. The distinction between the what and the how of awareness applies to all levels of awareness. Just as facts are what are conceptually grasped and a specific language and system of concepts is how they are conceptually grasped, so external objects, events, and states of affairs are what are perceived and specific perceptual appearances are how they are perceived.

The two points that Searle made about conceptual awareness, namely, (i) that one can have different conceptual grasps of the same fact and (ii) that some conceptual systems might not have the resources to grasp a fact but this does not show that the fact is relative to those systems that do have the resources to grasp it, apply to perceptual awareness as well. To paraphrase Searle: "Without a means of perceptual awareness we cannot perceive. It does, indeed, follow from this that given alternative perceptual apparatuses there will be alternative (perceptual) appearances of reality. For example, not every means of perception will even be able to detect whether an object is relatively impenetrable or not (the sense of touch can, the sense of smell cannot). But it simply does not follow that the fact of impenetrability is in any way mind-dependent or relative to the means of perception or anything of the sort."

In other words, the following is true of perception: (i) one can have different perceptual awarenesses of the same object, event, or state of affairs and (ii) some perceptual systems might not have the resources to be aware of an object, event, or state of affairs, but this does not show that the object, event, or state of affairs is relative to those systems that do have the resources to be perceptually aware of it. Our visual perception of a mosquito, for instance, and a bat's perception of the mosquito by echo-localization are most likely radically different, but this does not mean that we perceive one object—the mosquito-as-it-appears-to-us—and the

bat perceives another object—the mosquito-as-it-appears-to-the-bat. Rather, we both perceive the mosquito but by different means and in different forms. Just as how (the form in which) John is conceptually aware of the fact that the car is in the street is different from how (the form in which) Jean is aware of the same fact ("The car is in the street" versus "L'automobile est dans la rue"), so how (the form in which) we are perceptually aware of the mosquito is different from how (the form in which) the bat is perceptually aware of the very same mosquito.

Turning now to an example of point (ii), a dog's auditory system can perceive sounds that a human's auditory system just does not have the resources to detect, but this in no way shows that what the dog is hearing is relative to its auditory perceptual system.

The compatibility between T1* and T2*—that, in other words, the distinction between what we are aware of and how we are aware of it applies to perceptual awareness—is not as widely recognized as the compatibility between Searle's T1 and T2, which apply to conceptual awareness, because perceptual appearances and sensory qualities are often still reified into the direct object of perceptual awareness or, at least, as we have seen, they are projected as being intrinsic to external objects, in some sense attached to them.

Hardly anyone any longer thinks of concepts as objects of conceptual awareness or as intrinsic properties of reality, in some sense attached to external objects, which must be intuitively revealed by some conceptual equivalent of perceptual awareness—as Plato and Augustine (and perhaps even Aristotle), for instance, thought. Nor do most philosophers think that concepts are "inner" objects or properties of "inner" objects created by the operations of our means of conceptual awareness. The concepts "iron" and "oxidizes," for instance, are not properties or qualities or attributes of iron nor properties of some kind of "inner" object; they are forms of awareness of reality. They are conceptual forms—there may well be others—in

which we are aware of the fact that iron oxidizes. In other words, few today reify concepts into intrinsic features of reality. This would be to commit a category mistake, to view a concept not as an instance of how we are aware of reality but as an instance of what we are aware of.

When I say "Michael Jordan is tall" it is not quite plain (contra Plato) that I am acquainted with an actual instance of (the Form) Tallness. For to say this is to reify the concept of tall into what one is aware of rather than (an aspect of) how one is aware of the fact that someone is tall. Further, it robs the conceptual awareness of any nature or identity. As with Plato, conceptual awareness becomes just the intuitive revelation of concepts existing in external reality. There is then only a "what" of conceptual awareness, no "how." But if awareness is the result of a certain means of awareness producing an awareness of an independent reality, then there must be a what and a how of awareness.

Unfortunately, the same is not true for perceptual appearances and sensory qualities. These are still often thought of as objects or properties of external reality. The object's visual length and shape, its visual size, its visual colour, for instance, are all projected as qualities or properties of the object (external or internal). We saw examples of this projection in previous chapters. But as I have argued, sensory qualities are relational qualities like weight; they are not intrinsic qualities of anything.

The key, then, to escaping from such an improper viewpoint applied to perception is to recognize the proper status of sensory qualities, like the sensory quality of visual shape or colour: they are not the object or content of perceptual awareness, but the form in which we are perceptually aware of external reality. They are not the what but the how of perceptual awareness. They are the specific nature or identity of an instance of perceptual awareness. Just as the concepts "iron" and "oxidization" make up the specific form in which we

conceptualize the fact that iron oxidizes and are not the object of our conceptual awareness, so visual shape makes up a specific form in which we perceive the physical shape of a table and is not the object of our perceptual awareness. What we conceptually grasp are facts of an independent reality. But how we grasp these facts, the specific nature of this conceptual grasp of facts, is determined by our specific conceptual apparatus. Our specific conceptual system is the nature, the identity, of how we grasp facts. The same is true of perception. Sensory qualities have the same ontological status as concepts: they are forms of awareness. To make any of them, be it visual size or shape or colour or tactile size or shape, into the object of awareness is to rob perceptual awareness of any nature or identity. It is to eliminate the how of perceptual awareness. To make all sensory qualities, or just the so-called primary qualities (like visual shape), into properties or qualities of external reality is to say that these sensory qualities are "revealed" by the mind—the subject's means of awareness plays no role in the resulting perceptual awareness. But this is to contradict a fact. What is undeniable at the conceptual level of awareness, as Searle has claimed, is, I hold, also undeniable at the perceptual level of awareness.

But what then of the worry with which this chapter began, namely, that according to my view we cannot know what the real world is "really like" except that we can be pretty sure it is not in itself "like" what we perceive it to be—that is, the worry that there is a deep incoherence in my view? The answer, which in parts has been given before, should now be evident. I reject the implicit representationalism behind this worry, the attempt to compare our perceptual awareness of reality with reality when it is unperceived. In perception, the object of awareness is not something internal (as in Putnam's view) but some aspect of the external world. The world, then, is exactly like what we perceive it to be. For instance, if one asks whether this straight spear seen lying on the ground looks "like what it is really like," the

answer must be: Yes, given the subject's visual system and the specific conditions of perception, the spear looks exactly as it should, exactly as what it is like. What then when the spear is seen partially immersed in water? Again, as we have seen, the answer is that the spear looks exactly as it should, exactly as what it is like. The existence of "conflicting appearances" like these does not show that we are not aware of what reality is "really like"; it shows that what reality is like is such that the same object can be perceived in different ways, the same object looks different when seen in different circumstances.

The only "sense" in which we cannot know what the world is "really like" is that we cannot step outside of our means of knowledge, perceptual and conceptual, and still somehow know the nature of reality. Knowledge presupposes a means of knowledge and so a form in which that knowledge is acquired. For us, it is in perceptual and conceptual forms. But all this means is that we know reality by means of specific percepts and concepts, which have a specific nature of their own. It does not mean that we know only our percepts and concepts, and can never know what reality is "really like." True, you cannot know what reality is like apart from your means of knowledge. But this does not mean that you know only reality as known by your means of knowledge, not reality as it is "in itself." As someone pointed out to me, that would be like arguing that you cannot reach Boston apart from a means of transportation to Boston; therefore, you can only reach "Boston-as-reached-by-train" (or as-reached-by-airline), you can never reach "Boston-as-it-is-in-itself," apart from how it is reached by train or by airline.

Thus on my view the distinction between reality as we are perceptually aware of it and reality as it is "really like" is an invalid distinction. Reality as we are perceptually aware of it is reality as it is "really like." And thus I reject Putnam's whole approach to awareness, both perceptual and conceptual. At most my view bears a superficial similarity

to Putnam's. In terms of fundamentals, the two views are radically different. And they are radically different because Putnam thinks that the fact that the subject affects his resulting perceptual awareness implies that the subject affects the nature of the object he is aware of whereas I think that the fact implies that the subject affects the nature of his awareness of the (external) object. I am thus not a "Putnam wannabe", much less a failed "Putnam wannabe."

## NOTES

[1]Zemach, "Perceptual Realism, Naive and Otherwise".

[2]Searle, "Response: Perception and the Satisfactions of Intentionality", p. 190.

[3]Searle, Intentionality, pp. 46 & 58-61.

[4]Putnam recognizes that to a significant extent his argument goes back to Kant and in this sense has a long history. See Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, pp. x & 56-64.

[5]Searle, "Response: Perception and the Satisfactions of Intentionality", p. 191.

[6]Ibid.

[7] Keep in mind also that Searle's characterization of Putnam's argument is similar to the larger worry which I have shown to be at the root of the argument from conflicting appearances: the fact that our means of perception affect the nature of the resulting perceptual awareness, the resulting perceptual appearance of the object to the subject. In other words, if our means of perception affect the nature of our perceptual awareness of an independent reality, the worry is, then we cannot really be perceptually aware of this independent reality but only of a "reality" in some way constituted or created by our means of perception. Just as Putnam finds it impossible to deny (rightly so) that our means of awareness affect the nature of our resulting awareness and therefore feels forced to maintain that we are aware not of independent facts but only of "facts relative to our means of awareness," so those who advance the argument from conflicting appearances find it impossible to deny (rightly so) that our means of perception affect our resulting perceptual awareness and therefore feel forced to maintain that we are aware not of independent objects (and events and states of affairs) but of "objects relative to our means of perception"—a world of images, sense data, etc., not the world as "it really is."

[8]Searle, "Response: Perception and the Satisfactions of Intentionality", p. 191.

[9]Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, pp. ix-x.

[10]Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1011b25-28 (tr. Apostle).

[11]Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. 27. And again later, on p. 51: "the problem is this: there are these objects out there. Here is the mind/brain, carrying on its thinking/computing. How do the thinker's symbols [i.e., representations]... get into a unique correspondence with objects and sets of objects out there?"

[12]Ibid., p. 2.

[13]Ibid., p. 49.

[14]Ibid., pp. 49-50.

[15]Ibid., p. 54.

[16]As Kant himself states it: "Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them *a priori*, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success...if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.... We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus' primary hypothesis.... If intuition [i.e., perception and knowledge] must conform to the constitution of the objects [i.e., their intrinsic features and identity], I do not see how we could know anything of the latter *a priori*; but if the object (as objects of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition [i.e., to the nature of our means of awareness], I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility." Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B xvi-xvii (tr. Kemp Smith).

[17]Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. 57.

[18]Ibid., pp. 57-58.

[19]Ibid., p. 59.

[20]Notice again the fundamental similarity to Kant's view. In the Critique Kant hints that God's knowledge would be that of intellectual intuition, an intuition without limitations: awareness without a definite, limited means of awareness. The implication is that God's awareness would not affect the nature of the object of awareness and so God could be aware of objects "as they are in themselves" (i.e., the noumenal world). Human beings, however, are limited to awareness of representations and appearances, objects as constituted and created by our definite and limited means of awareness. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B71-72 and B59-60 (tr. Kemp Smith).

[21]Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. 60.

[22]Ibid., p. 63. Putnam thinks it is only a first approximation because Kant also holds that there is no one-to-one correspondence between things-for-us and thing-in-themselves, between phenomenal objects and the noumenal world.

[23]Ibid., p. 61.

[24]Ibid., pp. 61-62.

[25]Ibid., p. 55.

[26]Ibid., pp. 54-56. I place "representations" in quotes since on Putnam's view there is nothing that is being represented.

[27]Ibid., p. 55.

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# IMAGE EVALUATION
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

















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