

**Consensus Based Land Use Planning:  
Success and Failure of British Columbia's  
Commission on Resources and Environment's  
Shared Decision Making Model**

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## Abstract

### Consensus Based Land Use Planning: Success and Failure of British Columbia's Commission on Resources and Environment's Shared Decision Making Model

A Master's Degree Project by  
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Prepared in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the M.E.Des degree  
in the Faculty of Environmental Design, The University of Calgary  
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This project evaluates the Commission on Resources and Environment's shared decision making process as it was applied in three regions of British Columbia. The document is divided into two parts. The first section comprises discussions of theory relating to decision making, land use planning, consensus, negotiation and mediation. A brief overview of the Commission on Resources and Environment is included, as well as a short piece on each of the regions in which the process was implemented. A discussion of success, and an integration of subjective and objective measures of success complete the section.

The second part begins with a description of the framework designed to evaluate the success of the shared decision making process, drawing on the discussions from the first half of the document. Finally, the implementation of the Commission on Resources and Environment's shared decision making process is evaluated and conclusions are drawn.

#### KEY WORDS

consensus, mediation, negotiation, shared decision making, regional land use planning, round table, Commission on Resources and Environment, decision making, public involvement, public participation, success, British Columbia

I thank my committee for their assistance,  
those who provided input for their help,  
my husband for his love and encouragement,  
and my family and friends for their support.

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## Glossary of Terms

### ARBITRATION

Arbitration is usually a formal process that is imposed on disputing parties by legislation or the judicial system. A neutral third party, an arbitrator, hears submissions made by the parties at dispute, and then imposes a decision. Although the decision is usually binding, i.e., the parties must accept and implement the decision, some arbitration is non-binding. Arbitration is most often used in labour disputes.

### CONSENSUS

Consensus is a way of making decisions, where all parties accept a certain outcome. Although the parties may not agree entirely with the decision or outcome, the consensus implies that their difficulties are not so great that they must oppose the decision. The process of achieving a consensus decision includes an exploration of the needs and wants of the disputing parties. A cooperative effort is needed to achieve a consensus decision, in which tradeoffs are made concerning the wants of the parties, in order that everyone's needs are met.

### DISPUTE

A dispute is a conflict over a certain development, policy or idea leading to disagreement over what should and should not be done. Some theorists find a distinction between dispute and conflict, citing conflict as a clash on moral grounds that cannot be resolved due to irreconcilable differences in fundamental philosophies.

### FACILITATOR

A facilitator is a neutral third party who guides a group of people through a specific process, but who does not get involved in the content of the discussion.

### INTEREST

Interest refers to the underlying values and needs of an individual or group. Interest-based negotiation concentrates on satisfying the interests and recognising the values of the disputants, rather than concentrating on the positions or wants of the parties.

## MEDIATION

Mediation is a process of decision making whereby a neutral third party guides the disputants through a process to resolve the dispute. The mediator, the neutral party, is involved in the content of the discussion, as well as acting to guide the process according to a set of rules determined by the participants. All decision making is done using a consensus process. The mediation process is voluntary and has no legal authority except where stated in legislation.

## POSITION

The position of a group or individual is the stance that is taken in regard to a particular issue or dispute. The position is a list of wants, and at times can be utopian in nature.

## ROUND TABLE

Round table is used to define a group of individuals who act as representatives of larger constituencies, and who are empowered to make decisions or recommendations. The roundness of the table implies that all parties have equal power. Decisions are usually made by consensus.

## STAKEHOLDER

Traditionally, stakeholder denotes an individual who has a monetary interest in a company or issue. Today the term is generally accepted to refer to any person who is affected by a particular concern or issue, or whose interests may be affected by the resolution of an issue.



## Chapter One: Introduction

### BACKGROUND

The Commission on Resources and Environment was legislated by the government of British Columbia in 1992. In a bold step towards pluralist democracy, the British Columbia government opened the policy making process to include the public. In 1996, the Commission on Resources and Environment was disbanded. Four regional, consensus based land use planning processes had been completed, to mixed reviews from the participants and the general public. The land use plans had been recognised as higher level plans under the Forest Practices Code when the Commission closed its doors. Were the processes successful? Did the Commission on Resources and Environment successfully facilitate public involvement in policy making?

### STUDY RATIONALE

There is much theory on the process of the mediation and consensus based decision making that comes from the US and is based on US case studies. There is less Canadian literature on mediation and consensus. Although there are fewer Canadian examples of mediated processes of policy making which explains the imbalance to some extent, literature has largely ignored Canadian case studies. Even the high profile process of the Commission on Resources and Environment has spawned little more than a few academic theses. This project is an effort to advance the Canadian body of literature on the topics of mediation and consensus based decision making, and add to the burgeoning international body of mediation theory and practice.

The literature also largely ignores subjective measures of success. This could be to some

extent because much of the theory comes from the US. The fact that a mediation effort will cost less than a legal battle is not as significant in Canada as it is in the US. This project attempts to look at success subjectively, which can downplay issues such as cost and length of process. Subjective analysis of mediation processes is an important component of mediation theory which is addressed in this project.

#### INITIAL IDEA

Initially, the intent of this project was to define a set of 'criteria for success.' The idea was that the criteria could be used to guide the development of a mediation process, and if all criteria were met, the process would be successful.

A preliminary framework was developed from an extensive review of mediation theory and case studies. Most theoretical considerations of mediation include an observation of the conditions that must be met in order to facilitate the mediation process (e.g.: Abramson *et al*, 1990; Laue *et al*, 1988; Blackburn, 1990). These considerations were compiled into a set of 'criteria for success.'

These 'criteria for success' were evaluated by mediators at the Commission on Resources and Environment. The focus group discussion revealed that in practice, each situation and process will be different. One cannot impose an externally derived set of criteria on a process and expect all criteria to exist or even to influence success in a particular manner. This led to a shift in the focus of the project.

#### PURPOSE

The purpose of this project is to examine the mediation process from the participants' point of view. A new way of measuring the success of a mediation process is explored, and a framework for evaluating the process is put forward.

## RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

There are three research objectives:

1. Explore the meaning and measurement of success as it relates to consensus based decision making processes.
2. Synthesize a framework for evaluating the success of the Commission on Resources and Environment's shared decision making process.
3. Evaluate the success of the Commission on Resources and Environment's shared decision making model as it was applied in four regions of British Columbia.

## METHODOLOGY

The following overview will consider the methodology as it supports each of the research objectives.

**Objective 1: Explore the meaning and measurement of success as it relates to consensus based decision making processes.**

### *Literature Review*

A literature review was undertaken to determine the generally accepted definitions and measures of success.

### *Focus Group*

A focus group was asked to provide a definition of success. The focus group was composed of three professionals from the Commission on Resources and Environment. A definition was synthesized from the literature and the focus group discussions.

### *Key Informant Interviews*

Key informant interviews were held to get feedback on the synthesized definition of success. Interviews were held with mediators of the four CORE processes and the former Vice-Commissioner of CORE. The definition was modified to reflect the input of the key informants.

### *Questionnaire*

A mailout questionnaire was chosen as the method to get feedback from the participants. This survey technique works best when the population is targeted, not a random sample. Although the typical response rate is low, budgetary considerations ruled out a more extensive telephone survey. In addition, the CORE processes were completed over two years previous to the completion of the questionnaire. The participants would need time to think about the questions and answers, for which an on-the-spot telephone survey does not allow. The participants of the CORE processes were asked to provide feedback on a proposed definition of success, as well as evaluate the effectiveness of the shared decision making process. The questionnaire is found in appendix one.

**Objective 2: Synthesize a framework for evaluating the success of CORE's shared decision making process.**

### *Literature Review*

A literature review identified the principles or conditions that are cited as integral to a consensus based decision making process. A list of 'criteria for success' was synthesized.

### *Focus Group*

The 'criteria for success' were evaluated by a focus group. The focus group was composed of three professionals from the CORE office. The feedback on the 'criteria for success' led to a change in project focus.

### *Literature Review*

A literature review was again completed, this time to identify overall issues that should be addressed by the parties in a consensus based mediation process.

### *Key Informant Interviews*

The list of issues was used as a guide in interviews with mediators from the four CORE processes, and the former Vice-Commissioner of CORE. Their insights on the issues as

they relate to CORE's shared decision making process were used to modify the framework.

### *Questionnaire*

Participants were invited to provide definitions of success on the questionnaire. They were also asked to comment on a given definition, and indicate whether or not they agreed that the process achieved the goal.

**Objective 3: Evaluate the success of the Commission on Resources and Environment's shared decision making model as it was applied in four regions of British Columbia.**

### *Literature Review*

A literature review was conducted to examine decision making processes, democracy, and the role of public involvement in decision making. The information gathered at this step forms a response to criticism that public interest groups have no place in a democratic system of government.

A review of land use planning literature was performed, in order to determine the planning sequence. An understanding of the planning process is key to evaluating CORE's shared decision making process, as the process was intended to be the means through which land use plans would be created.

### *Information Review*

A review of the documents compiled during the implementation of CORE's shared decision making process was undertaken. This review was guided by the framework composed under the second objective. The information that was gathered at this stage explains the shared decision making process. Information was gathered with respect to timelines, budgets, milestones, and public correspondence.

### *Questionnaire*

A questionnaire was administered to the participants of CORE's shared decision making process. The design of the questionnaire was informed by the framework under objective two, the literature review, the information review completed under objective three, and the definition of success that was composed under objective one. The questionnaire was pretested by professionals in the field of dispute resolution and planning. An eleven page questionnaire was sent to the participants of the four regional round tables. 32 questionnaires were completed and returned, giving a return rate of 36%. The questionnaire was designed in such a manner as to receive comparable information from each respondent. This meant that most questions demanded closed-answer responses, *i.e.*, choose one of the following responses. Many of the respondents took the time to add comments as well. Questionnaire results are found in appendix two.

Due to changes in the project focus from the time of administering the questionnaire to the time of analysis, some of the information gathered has not been incorporated into the analysis.

### *Analysis*

An analysis of the questionnaire results was done according to qualitative statistical analysis. Due to the categorical nature of the data, descriptive statistics are the only tools used to organize the data, *i.e.*, how many respondents chose each category, and the corresponding percentages. More detailed and rigorous statistical tests were inappropriate for the type of data gathered (Horwitz and Ferleger, 1980; Leach 1979).

### RESEARCH CONSTRAINTS

The Commission on Resources and Environment facilitated four land use planning round tables in British Columbia using the model of shared decision making. The same decision making model was imposed on all four processes. It was determined to involve all four processes in this analysis since they shared the same model. The wide scope and limited resources of the project mean that the project is not a case study or even four case

studies. Rather, it is an overview of the success of the shared decision making process in these four applications, based on information provided by a sample of the total population.

Looking at the responses, there is as much diversity in opinions within a region as there is between regions. The implication is that the sample is not biased in favour of one regional process. Although the research would have been more rigorous if based on a larger sample size, resources constrained this.

CORE's shared decision making process is based on the tenets of mediation theory. The four round tables were tasked to create a land use plan through the process of shared decision making. The framework for the process was taken from interest based negotiation theory, with a land use planning system forming one step in the framework. The participants were involved in a process that was attempting to achieve a land use plan through the steps of a dispute resolution process. The nature of the participants' experience is thus twofold: land use planning and dispute resolution. The dual nature of the process creates difficulties in evaluation. This project evaluates the shared decision making process according to a framework derived from mediation theory. The evaluation framework places the emphasis on the dispute resolution system, as does the shared decision making process. The land use planning system forms one part of the framework.

The CORE process was an attempt at land use planning on a regional scale. The recommendations that were made regarding future development can be likened to policy recommendations. Throughout this report, the land use planning process is referred to as a policy making process. Decisions regarding land use that are made on a regional scale will act as guidelines for development. Regional guidelines provide direction, they do not prescribe developments. In this way regional land use planning is akin to policy making. Chapter four contains a discussion of normative planning, which occurs when goals and policies are set for use at the strategic and operational levels. I am equating the shared decision making process with normative planning and policy making to

distinguish it from on-the-ground, operational planning.

#### REPORT DESIGN

The document has two parts. The first part is composed of chapters two through six, and comprises the theoretical discussions. The discussions set the stage for the evaluation of the CORE shared decision making process in chapters seven through ten.

Chapter two describes the Commission on Resources and Environment and the shared decision making process that guided the four round tables. A brief description of the context within which the participants were operating is also provided.

Chapter three provides an overview of decision making processes and democracy. The changing role of public involvement in decision making has brought about opportunities for the public to get involved through mediation processes. The discussion touches on opportunities for involvement, levels of involvement, and defining the public interest.

Chapter four describes a land use planning approach that is based on the principles of public involvement found in an ecofeminist critique of planning. This approach is used to demonstrate the opportunities for public involvement within a traditional planning framework.

A discussion of mediation, negotiation and consensus occurs in chapter five. The framework that was synthesized from the literature and the interviews is explored.

Chapter six examines the concept of success. The discussion touches on the traditional ways of measuring success, and enters new territory by bringing subjective criteria into the evaluation framework.

Chapter seven outlines the framework that guides the evaluation of the shared decision making process. The ideas discussed and the conclusions drawn in the previous six



chapters are synthesised into an evaluation framework for mediation processes in general, and CORE's shared decision making process specifically.

Chapter eight provides an overview of the survey results, and looks at the participants' view of the successes and failures of the shared decision making process.

Chapter nine explores the participant's evaluation of the CORE process through the application of the evaluation framework described in chapter seven.

Chapter ten concludes the document with a summary of findings and lessons learned.



## Chapter Two: Commission on Resources and Environment's Shared Decision Making Process

### BACKGROUND

The Commission on Resources and Environment was created as an arm's length government agency in 1992. At the time, the NDP government was facing considerable pressure with regard to land use allocation all over the province. Incidents concerning the appropriateness of tree harvesting in Clayoquot Sound, South Moresby (now Gwaii Haanas), the Cariboo and elsewhere received world wide media coverage. The Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force, created in 1989 in hopes that a consensual process would resolve the controversy, had failed in 1990. Pressure from environmental and Aboriginal groups to protect old growth forests was escalating in the form of road blocks and peace camps. First Nations all over the province were pressuring the government to address unresolved land claims, and forestry companies were demanding an end to the confrontations so that they could log their timber leases.

The Commissioner realised that an imposed solution regarding land use would not be accepted by all stakeholders and could be very difficult to implement, and so public input was solicited in the form of round table 'shared decision making' processes. The input would address issues that were regional in scope, in order to allow room for compensation, and in an effort to address the large number of concerns that were involved. In order to preserve the integrity of the government, an arm's length agency was needed to act as a conduit between the stakeholders and the government. It was envisioned that this agency would receive recommendations regarding regional land use that were made by consensus by the stakeholders, and present the recommendations to the Cabinet. If the stakeholders could not reach consensus, the agency could take the information that was generated and create a land use plan for recommendation to

government.

In this way, the BC government ensured that if it did not receive land use plans generated by a consensus process, at the very least it would receive information regarding the interests of the stakeholders. Then, land use plans created on the basis of information on the interests of the stakeholders would be more fully informed as to the public interest.

In light of concerns relating to the creation of land use plans that would end the uncertainty and confrontation and be acceptable to all stakeholders, the government passed the *Commissioner on Resources and Environment Act* in 1992. The Act created the position of a Commissioner who was charged with the task of designing a framework for public involvement in the creation of a land use plan for the province of British Columbia.

#### COMMISSION ON RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT

The mandate of the Commissioner was to "develop for public and government consideration a British Columbia wide strategy for land use and related resource and environmental management" in a way that "the public interest [would] be best served" (BC 1992, sections 4.1 and 3.2).

The Act required "community based participatory processes" (BC 1992, section 4.2b) and attempted to encourage the participation of Aboriginal peoples by declaring that "the work of the commissioner and the participation of Aboriginal peoples under this Act shall be without prejudice to their Aboriginal rights and to treaty negotiations" (BC 1992, section 4.4).

Stephen Owen was appointed Commissioner. Owen had been Ombudsman for the province, and as a lawyer had a background in traditional dispute resolution.

The first responsibility of the Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) was

to develop a strategy for land use planning in British Columbia. The first task was to craft a shared vision for the province, which was composed of goals and policies which were to act as a framework for the subsequent land use plans. The broad components of the vision were to act as guidelines within which land use plans were to be prepared. Any land allocation was to fit with the provincial vision in order to ensure that the broad public interest was being met: "the foundation of a provincial land use strategy is a clear statement of purpose to guide all planning initiatives" (CORE 1994: 6). The vision and goals were accepted in principle by the government in 1993 as part of The Land Use Charter.

#### SHARED DECISION MAKING

The process that was used to facilitate the land allocation planning was shared decision making. The governmental philosophy behind the shared decision making process and public participation is illustrated by this quote:

Public participation includes a spectrum of activities from public consultation and reporting, to open houses and town hall meetings, to intensive multi-party public negotiations. It does not involve a formal change in government's legal authority or responsibility to make decisions. Even shared decision making processes, in which public interests and government negotiate as equals in search of decisions that most fully meet the general public interest, are advisory insofar as government, either directly through elective [sic] representatives or indirectly through legal delegation to officials, holds the statutory authority to make decisions for the public good. (CORE 1994: 47)

CORE defined the shared decision making process as follows:

on a certain set of issues for a defined period of time, those with authority to make a decision and those who will be affected by that decision are empowered jointly to seek an outcome that accommodates rather than compromises the interests of all concerned. (CORE 1993: 19)

Although entering into a process of negotiation with stakeholders, the government did not give up its power as the ultimate decision maker. The shared decision making process was used as a means of receiving public input into the decision making process. The

process involved no devolution of authority.

And public participation does not mean that all interests must always reach consensus for the process to be a success. Rather, effective and meaningful public participation provides the opportunity for the final decision to be as well informed, balanced and stable as possible through the involvement of all those who are most interested in, knowledgeable about and affected by the outcome. (CORE 1994a: 47-48)

The organisational framework for the shared decision making process was based on the principles of interest based negotiation found in Getting to Yes by Fisher and Ury (1991), and as stated by CORE (CORE 1993: 21). The framework is outlined by the steps of preparation, assessment, process design, agreement building, agreement implementation and monitoring.

#### *Preparation and Assessment*

The first stage in the shared decision making process is to convene the round table. The task of convening included identifying the various stakeholder groups, and creating coalitions between groups with similar interests in order to ensure that the number of groups at the negotiation table was manageable. As stated in the 1992-93 Annual Report, "the Commission facilitates discussions among interested parties, leading to the development 'from the bottom up' of broad but cohesive sectors of interest" (page 20).

The intent of CORE was to create a process that was "effective and inclusive." The philosophy behind 'effective and inclusive' is that "there should be a direct relationship between the inclusiveness of a shared decision making process and the breadth of acceptance and duration of its product" (CORE 1993: 19).

At the same time as identifying interested stakeholders, an assessment of the appropriateness and viability of the interest based negotiation process was carried on, both within the stakeholder groups and the larger sectors of interest that were identified. At the time at which all interested parties agreed that the shared decision making process was an appropriate means of crafting a land use plan, the table was convened.

The round table that was convened to undertake interest based negotiations was based on a sector model of representation. Each seat at the table was occupied by a spokesperson who represented a constituency made up of groups with similar interests. In many cases, the groups had never worked together prior to this process. The spokesperson was backed by a steering committee which was formed to streamline the process of communications and accountability within the sector. The following is the diagram that illustrates this model, taken from Brown, 1996.




FIGURE 1: CORE'S SECTOR BASED MODEL OF REPRESENTATION

CORE was active in identifying sectors to ensure that there was a balance of interests at the table. In the four regional processes where shared decision making was implemented, there were anywhere from 14 to 24 sectors at the table.

### *Process Design*

The first task for the participants at the table -- the sector representatives -- was to design the process that they would follow to achieve the creation of a land use plan that all sectors could live with. CORE suggests that the goal of this phase is to agree "on rules of procedure and the policy and technical information that will be required by the table in order to determine the impact and feasibility of land use options" (CORE 1993: 21).

Each of the tables produced a report outlining agreements on rules governing process and procedure. The report laid out the ground rules that guided participation in the negotiations. Agreement on what constitutes a consensus was outlined, as well as ways in which the tables would reconcile any problems they might encounter. The process itself was not modified very much from the framework provided by CORE. The agreements made by the tables were to govern their behaviour during the process.

### *Agreement Building*

After the sectors had agreed on the ground rules, they entered into substantive negotiations. The framework that guided their negotiations was based on "Regional Planning Guidelines" created by CORE. These Guidelines provide the framework for a land use planning system. Table 1 illustrates the four steps in the process (CORE 1993: 22).



	Key Tasks
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 10px auto; width: 80%;">                     1. Set the Planning Direction                 </div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review planning hierarchy</li> <li>• Clarify process objectives</li> <li>• Define products (tentative zoning system)</li> <li>• Document the 'work plan'</li> <li>• Secure necessary resources</li> </ul>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 10px auto; width: 80%;">                     2. Define Sectoral Interests                 </div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Describe underlying sectoral interests</li> <li>• Define interests geographically</li> <li>• Confirm/obtain relevant map information</li> <li>• Define evaluation criteria</li> </ul>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 10px auto; width: 80%;">                     3. Identify Land Use Compatibilities and Conflicts                 </div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop land use compatibilities matrix</li> <li>• Locate areas of conflict</li> <li>• Refine zoning system as a tool to manage conflict</li> </ul>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 10px auto; width: 80%;">                     4. Develop Regional Strategy                 </div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Iterative creation and evaluation of scenarios</li> <li>• Impact mitigation (through zoning refinement and other means)</li> <li>• Document results in report to Commissioner</li> </ul>

**TABLE 1: REGIONAL PLANNING GUIDELINES**

The process commences with the sectors defining the products that they will deliver at the end of the process, discussing and determining the geographic boundaries of the negotiations, and setting a work plan. The next phase is for each sector to define their interests. Each sector's interests are presented to the table so that all sectors will have an understanding of the interests that must be satisfied in order to have consensus. The exercise of identifying interests is useful not only to educate others, but to help the

sectors themselves move away from positional posturing, and identify underlying concerns and issues.

The third step is to examine the potential for compatible allocation and uses of land. This is done by looking at each sector's interests and any maps they may have generated, in relation to every other sector's interests and land allocation scenarios.

The last step is to finalise a land allocation scenario that all sectors find acceptable. At this time, it is expected that an impact analysis of the land allocation system will be completed to identify mitigation and monitoring priorities.

The final report of the table to CORE includes what CORE has identified as outcomes of the negotiation process (CORE 1993: 23):

1. consensus recommendations regarding:
  - land use allocations including protected, special management, integrated or intensive resource management areas;
  - transition and mitigation strategies for communities affected by land use allocations;
  - priority issues that must be addressed through community-based planning processes, or through special studies;
  - implementation and monitoring matters including such items as methods, schedules and required resources; and
  - other points that the parties wish to convey.
2. indicate where the parties disagree and, if possible, identify options as to how outstanding issues may be addressed.

#### *Agreement Implementation and Monitoring*

The final phases of the organisation framework are governmental tasks: "The *implementation* and *monitoring* phases of the process are the responsibility of the government. However, the table may in its report recommend that it be directly involved in these phases" (CORE 1993: 23).

The government did send a letter to the regional tables at the beginning of the processes stating that if there was a consensus on a land use plan, the government would attempt to legislate it.

#### APPLICATION OF SHARED DECISION MAKING PROCESS

The generic framework for shared decision making was applied to the regions identified by the government as needing resolution of land use disputes: Cariboo-Chilcotin, Vancouver Island, and Kootenay-Boundary. Each table modified the framework in response to the different needs of the participants.

#### VANCOUVER ISLAND

The Vancouver Island shared decision making process began in July, 1992 with the preparation and assessment phases. In November of 1992, the negotiation table met for the first time. The 14 sectors that made up the table are: Agriculture, Conservation, Forest Employment, Forest Industry Independents, Forest Industry Manufacturers, Fishery, General Employment, Local Government, Mining, Outdoor Recreation, Provincial Government, Social and Economic Sustainability (Community), Tourism, and Youth. Each sector was represented by one spokesperson with the exception of the Conservation sector, which had three (CORE 1994e).

There was little Aboriginal participation at the table. The region included all of Vancouver Island and islands in close proximity and accessible by ferry, excluding those governed by the Islands Trust.

After defining process procedures and agreements, the table created a statement outlining a future vision for the region. "A 2020 Vision for Vancouver Island" was concluded in May of 1993. In April of 1993, the scheduled table meeting was cancelled due to the dissatisfaction of some sectors with the Commissioner's response to the government's Clayoquot Sound land use decision (CORE, 1994).

Support was provided to the table in the form of committees. An Information Management Committee (IMC) managed and directed information requests. A technical working group (TWG) provided the table with information and analyses regarding biophysical and socio-economic matters. A Land Designation Committee (LDC) proposed land designation systems for the Island at the request of the table (CORE, 1994).

In September of 1993, the TWG presented the first scenario of land use allocation for the Island. The table decided to develop a set of land use policy subjects for the Commissioner in case they were unable to agree on a final land use plan (CORE, 1994). The table recognized that there could be no consensus on land use allocation until a transition strategy was developed to assist those who would be affected by changes in land use.

In October, land use allocation scenarios were presented to the table by different groups. The Forest Independents sector had a written proposal, the Conservation sector had a map overlay, and the Social and Economic Sustainability Sector presented an alternative on behalf of a coalition of sectors.

The table concluded without agreeing on a land use allocation scenario. In January of 1994, the negotiating table ratified its report to CORE. The report included (CORE 1994: 21):

1. 2020 Vision for Vancouver Island
2. sector interest statements
3. draft land use designation system
4. policy recommendations regarding a socio-economic transition strategy and resource management direction

CORE took the information provided by the table and prepared a land use plan that was submitted to the government and public in February of 1994. The land use plan recommends an additional 23 protected areas for an increase from “over 10%....to 13%” (CORE 1994: 111, 117). This would reduce the total harvested timber by 4.5%, and have

a minor impact on mining and energy development (CORE 1994: 120).

#### CARIBOO-CHILCOTIN

The Cariboo-Chilcotin regional shared decision making process began in August 1992 with the preparation and assessment phases. The first meeting of the table occurred in December of 1992. 26 sectors participated at the table. They are: Agriculture, All Beings, Back Country Tourism, Cariboo Tribal Council, Conservation, Fish and Wildlife, Forest Employment, Freshwater Fishing, General Employment, Government (provincial and federal), Hardrock Mining, Tourism - Hotels and Restaurants, Local Government, Major Forest Licensees, Placer Mining, Recreation, Tourism - Resorts and Campgrounds, Sustainable Communities, Sustainable Forestry, Wildcraft, and Youth. Each sector had two seats, one for the sector spokesperson and one which was occupied by anyone else from the steering committee.

The boundary of the planning area was left to the table to determine. This task posed a problem for the table, and disagreements led to sector positions becoming entrenched. The problem lay with existing protected areas on the outskirts of the Cariboo-Chilcotin region. Sectors who wanted to maximise new protected areas felt that the parks should be excluded from the land base. Other sectors that wanted to minimize the amount of new protected areas wanted to include the parks. The government had been proposing to preserve 12% of British Columbia as protected areas (Protected Areas Strategy). However, the policy was not in place, and so caused difficulties at the table in setting boundaries and targets for land allocation.

Individual sectors and coalitions of sectors presented options for land use allocations. The table did not reach consensus on a land use plan, and the table collapsed in March, 1994. After this time, individual sectors made submissions to CORE regarding land use allocation and policy recommendations. Six land use proposals were received at this time. The allocation alternatives were evaluated by CORE, then presented to a final meeting of the negotiation table in April, 1994 (CORE 1994e). After this workshop,

CORE prepared the proposed land use plan for the region.

#### KOOTENAY-BOUNDARY

The preparation phase in the Kootenay-Boundary region began in June of 1992 and the assessment phase in August. (CORE, 1993). The first meeting of the negotiation table was in January, 1993. At this time, the table decided that the process should occur at two separate tables: east and west. This division would ensure adequate consideration for the geographic and cultural differences between the regions. The combined table met three times between January and April of 1993, and designed the rules and procedures to govern the two processes.

#### WEST KOOTENAY-BOUNDARY

The western region was composed of 24 sectors, representing Agriculture, Applied Ecological Stewardship, Community Economic Development-NGO, First Nations - Ktunaxa-Kinbasket, First Nations - Okanagan Nation, Fish and Wildlife - Commercial, Fish and Wildlife - Recreation, Forest Independent - Contractors, Forest Independent - Other, Labour - Forests, Labour - Other, Local Government, Mining, North Columbia - Environment, Outdoor Recreation (non-motorised), Primary Forest Manufacturers, Provincial Government, Round Table, South Columbia - Environment, Tourism - Associations, Tourism - Heritage, Tourism - Resorts, and Watersheds.

The table met monthly until June of 1994. The outcomes of the negotiations include (CORE 1994e: 23):

- a vision statement
- sector interest statements
- sector value maps
- a land use designation system and management guidelines
- an impact analysis system
- recommendations concerning a land use policy and a socio-economic transition strategy

The mediator of the West Kootenay-Boundary process left near the end due to personal reasons, and another mediator concluded the process.

The table reached consensus on land use allocations for about 80% of the region. CORE met with several sectors after the table concluded to negotiate uses for the remaining areas (Cooley, *pers. comm.*). CORE's proposed land use plan was released in October of 1994. It recommends eight new parks, the establishment of special management areas for sensitive resource development, and initiatives to offset unemployment caused by the creation of protected areas (CORE 1994f) .

#### EAST KOOTENAY

The East Kootenay table was composed of 23 sectors: Agriculture, Community Economic Development, Ecosystems, First Nations - Ktunaxa-Kinbasket, Fish and Wildlife - Commercial, Fish and Wildlife - Recreation, Forest Independent - Contractors, Forest Independent - Other, Global-Energy, Heritage Tourism, Labour - Woodworkers, Labour - Non-Woodworkers, Local Government (RDEK), Local Government (RDGS), Mining - Coal, Mining - General, Primary Forest Manufacturers, Provincial Government, Motorised Recreation, Outdoor Recreation - Non-Motorised, Tourism - Associations, and Tourism - Resorts.

The table met between January 1993 and January 1994. The East Kootenay table created a land use plan for about 90% of the region's land base. Other outcomes include land use policy recommendations, a social and economic transition strategy, and recommendations for implementation and monitoring (CORE 1994c: 2).

CORE took the information provided by the table and crafted a land use plan for recommendation to the government. The plan recommends the creation of six new parks in addition to the table's recommendations on land use policy, transition and implementation, rehabilitation for the East Kootenay trench, and management of the Columbia River wetlands (CORE 1994c).

## CONCLUSION

All four processes were created under the same framework of shared decision making. Although each table adapted the process to meet its own needs, CORE did approach many of the issues relating to process in a similar manner in all cases. For this reason, the evaluation of CORE's shared decision making framework will be done on a global basis, looking at the four processes together. The analysis of the process in chapters eight and nine will look at differences in the way certain issues were addressed, and evaluate the different approaches.



## Chapter Three: A Discussion of Decision Making

Ultimately, real change in political processes that allows for the sharing of ideas, concerns, responsibilities and accountability for decisions among citizens and government will require a change in political consciousness and practice.

Reed 1994: 265

### DECISION MAKING: AN OVERVIEW

Methods of governmental decision making in Canada are ever-changing. The parliamentary system, although operating within the specific rules of the Constitution, allows change in response to the changing political arena and the changing global situation. The changes that have taken place over the past thirty years have come about partially as a result of the different political players, and partially as a reflection of the changing philosophies of the Canadian people. Nowhere have the changes been so noticeable as in the realm of decision making (Tester, 1992; Reed, 1994).

In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, decision making was characterised by the 'command and control' approach, especially as related to the environment. Government leaders would make a decision and expect the public to comply. Non-compliance would be punished according to specific rules laid out in the legislation. The amount of public involvement in the creation of the decision and the legislation was minimal. Any public meetings that did occur as a result of public pressure were used to provide information to justify the decision as opposed to gathering public input to factor into the decision making process.

The public's demand for increased participation in decision making over the past three decades has led to a situation where the government is making decisions based on more

extensive input from the public. Growing dissatisfaction with the government's failure to accurately reflect all interests in the decision making process has led to insistence for increased public participation (Sewell and Coppock, n.d.; Pinkerton, 1993). This is evidenced by an increase in the number of situations in which the public is called upon to provide input, and in several instances, to provide specific recommendations for legislation. A federal example that illustrates greater public involvement in decision making is the Banff Bow Valley Study. The following quote provides a brief overview of the Canadian context (FEARO 1992: 3,4):

The "announce and defend" approach to decision-making has given way in many regulatory contexts to a formal process of consultation involving public hearings or some other mechanism for soliciting public comment before the final decision is made. For example, governments often distribute draft legislation to private interest groups actively involved in that policy area before the final form is submitted to the Legislature or Parliament.... Alternatively, the governing authority may decide to engage in a process of negotiation with the interested parties. Private interests are thereby actively involved in a collaborative process to arrive at a satisfactory response to an identified need....mediation first gained a foothold and is most frequently used in the environmental context.


The quote mentions a few decision making methods, from 'decide and defend,' to public hearings, to negotiation and mediation. This list emphasizes the changes that have occurred over the last 30 years in governments' way of doing business. The level of public involvement in governmental decision making has increased to a point where the competing interest groups are asked to come to a consensus amongst themselves. This sharply contrasts with the early approach where the government itself traded off competing needs and wants of interest groups, after hearing arguments from different sides.

#### PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT

Public involvement is participation of the public in governmental decision making in addition to participation in the democratic voting system. The average Canadian is involved in decision making through the democratic system of voting, public inquiries

and elected representatives (Sewell and Coppock, n.d.). Many people argue that this level of participation is sufficient.

Sherry Arnstein's "Ladder of Citizen Participation" (1969: 217) demonstrates examples of levels of public participation. This ladder is not a definitive list: rather, it is a convenient grouping of the different levels of public input in decision making.



**FIGURE 2: ARNSTEIN'S LADDER OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION**

At the bottom of the ladder is manipulation, which occurs where the power of decision making rests securely with the government, and the public has no involvement or input.

The third rung, informing, could be likened to the aforementioned situation in Canada in the early 1970s. The public was told what the situation would be, but was allowed no input into the crafting of the decisions.

Arnstein defines the level of partnership (rung nine) as enabling the public "to negotiate and engage in tradeoffs with traditional power holders" (Arnstein 1969: 217). Most of the recent public involvement processes in Canada at this level have been formed to give recommendations to the government (e.g., Commission on Resources and Environment, Banff Bow Valley Study, Blue Ribbon Commissions, National Round Table on the Environment and Economy). The government retains the power to accept or reject the recommended decisions: there is no devolution of decision making authority.

Public involvement processes at the 'partnership' level recently have been a popular way of providing consensus recommendations to the government. It is implied that any recommendations that had the weight of consensus behind them would be accepted and adopted by the government (Sigurdson, n.d.; Bennett, 1994). In theory, this argument might appear sound, but the vagaries of the political system make it difficult for this idea to find its way into practice. Changes in government; powerful lobby groups; a shift in public opinion: all will be factored into the decision to accept or modify recommendations. In addition, the 'partnership' has been very one-sided since decision making is not shared, and there are no guarantees that recommendations will be adopted. The benefit to government of using this approach is that the conflicting interest groups can attempt to work out through their differences in an attempt to reach common ground.

To include a Canadian perspective, the following figure is adapted from Dorsey (1993), as found in Brown (1996: 9):




FIGURE 3: “CONTINUUM OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION APPROACHES”

The eight steps of participation are similar to Arnstein’s eight rungs. The most intense level of public involvement occurs at the last stage of ‘delegate.’ The CORE shared decision making process fits somewhere between ‘seek consensus’ and ‘delegate.’

DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIC DECISION MAKING

Finding a precise definition of democracy is impossible (Pops and Stephenson, 1988). Rather, the idea of democracy lies along a continuum, and varies according to the level of public participation that is allowed in the decision making process. Constitutional democracy, which forms the basis of governance in North America, is characterised by a set of institutions that make decisions on behalf of the public interest, for the public good. At the other end of the spectrum is direct democracy, in which the people participate directly in discussion and decision making. Direct democracy is likened to the Athenian model of governance, in which citizens set the agenda, debated the issues, and made the decisions (Pops and Stephenson, 1988). At some mid-point between constitutional and

direct democracy lies pluralist democracy, in which groups representing different interests are invited to debate the issues, negotiate tradeoffs, and come to decisions by consensus (Pops and Stephenson, 1988). The trend towards using consensus based processes in policy making indicates a shift towards pluralist democracy -- the idea that individuals and groups have a right to be informed and participate more fully in their own governance (Sewell and Coppock, n.d.)

There are critics who argue that opening up public policy making to interest groups represents a shift away from democracy. The present discussion of the different forms of democracy is an attempt to demonstrate that public involvement in decision making is not anti-democratic. Rather, public involvement is a shift towards a different form of democracy, away from the traditional approach taken by constitutional democracy.

There will always be the argument against pluralist democracy stating that groups will abuse the power and make decisions that satisfy their own interests to the detriment of others. However, in all examples of pluralist democracy in this country the government has retained the power of final decision making authority. This ensures that if the consensus recommendation is not in keeping with the public interest, the government is not bound in any way to accept it (Haygood, 1988; Abramson et al. 1990; Sigurdson, n.d.). The authority of decision making is not transferred to public interest groups, it is retained by elected officials who work within a system of constitutional democracy.

In addition, political decision making is subject to pressures from organised lobby groups and global corporations. It can be argued that decisions are made by those with the loudest voices and the largest donations (Ralph Nader; George Grant; Richard, 1993; Sewell and Coppock, n.d.). Pluralistic forms of public involvement give those affected groups who are not usually vocal, a chance to take part in decision making (Lucas, 1976; Sewell and Coppock, n.d.; Lilley, 1988). Inclusion of a broad range of interests can help to temper the bias toward favouring traditional lobby groups (Owen, 1983).

Elected officials may have the concern that their power is somehow being taken away if they commit to using a form of pluralist democracy, as opposed to making the decision themselves (Sewell and Coppock, n.d.). It is unfortunate that ego plays such a strong role in politics. However, perhaps the benefits of such a participatory process should be weighed against taking sole responsibility for a decision that might prove unsatisfactory to the public. One of the public benefits is that the decision making process is transparent. This transparency can actually lead to an increase in public confidence in the decision and the decision maker (Lucas, 1976).

#### PUBLIC INTEREST

It has been argued that the use of mediation or negotiation as a method of public involvement in decision making undermines the public interest. The Canadian parliamentary system is based on the principles of democracy. Members of parliament are elected on their ability to represent the concerns of the public in the government. The elected representatives act in the best interest of their constituents. The government is thus supposed to be able to make decisions that are in the public interest, themselves being a representation of the public's attitudes and interests. However, democracy claims to represent the people, not reflect the interests of the people. Arguing that increased public involvement through the use of pluralist democracy should be restricted because it does not reflect the public interests sets a standard that the parliamentary system itself does not approach.

Problems can arise when private citizens have the task of crafting recommendations that are in the 'public interest.' Critics argue that it is not possible for an individual or even a group of individuals to make a recommendation that is rooted in a concern for every citizen of Canada. The individual will make recommendations that are best for her situation and that meet her hidden agenda. Indeed, public participation in decision making is not achieved if a negotiated agreement ignores or violates the law (Sutherland and Parker, n.d.). However, even a democratically elected government does not fully reflect every aspect of the public interest. Paul Emond (in CEARC 1989: 50) has this to

say about representing the public interest in negotiation:

Finally, I find the “public interest criticism” of negotiation to be both contemptuous and presumptuous. It is contemptuous of the ability of people to solve their own problems in their own way, a way that fits well within the social fabric of the time. It is presumptuous because it assumes that there is a public interest that will, with enough effort, be gleaned by a panel of energetic and wise decision makers. I have seen very little evidence to suggest that boards and other decision making bodies are the repository of much energy or wisdom, or that their decisions conform to some superior view of the public interest.

If a participatory decision making process includes all affected parties in a transparent, public process, then it can be argued that the public interest is served. A broad representation of interests can closely approximate ‘the public interest,’ although the term defies precise definition (Jeffery in CEARC, 1989). Indeed, the argument that an elected official can represent the public interest more effectively than a group of said public is ridiculous. One person, publicly elected or not, will have a harder time putting aside personal views to make decisions in the public interest than a group of interests at dispute who must come to common ground before reaching agreement on anything. Our system of democracy that ensures powerful lobby groups hold the ear of the government means that decisions made in the public arena often reflect the interests of those groups who shout the loudest (Bregha *et al.*, 1990). The power given to individual groups ensures that the broad public interest remains represented to minimal degree. Bregha *et al.* continue by defining what is needed for effective government decision making: “A key prerequisite for successful policy making is the presence of strong, divergent, perspectives....[it is] one of the most effective measures...[to] facilitate public involvement in policy making” (1990: 20). Indeed, the problems faced by modern politicians are increasingly complex, made additionally difficult by scientific uncertainty in terms of environmental issues. “By its very nature, policy making involves tradeoffs. These judgements should not be made by government alone where the policy issues at stake are controversial, or imply significant environmental impacts” (Bregha *et al.* 1990: 29).



There is the possibility that some interest will be unrepresented at a mediation or negotiation table. The unborn and children are two examples of groups that are hard to represent, whose interests are contained in the public interest. I argue that it is the role of the mediator and perhaps the convenor to ensure that all interests are represented, and agreements take all interests into account (Emond in CEARC, 1989). The mediator, as the neutral party at the table, should be able to provide a clear view as to the balance of interests at the table. A means to ensure broad representation at the table to adequately capture the public interest is to provide the parties with the resources and information they need to be effective representatives (Emond in CEARC, 1989). Without resources, a decision making process will not be able to approximate the public interest; it will be hindered by a lack of information and a lack of willing, effective representatives.



## Chapter Four:

# Land Use Planning

### INTRODUCTION

The demand for increased levels of public participation in planning processes has grown over the past years (Smith, 1982). Not only are people speaking out about certain developments, they are also demanding to be involved in formulating the policies that guide development. The following discussion of the system of land use planning rests on the assumption that planning at a regional level takes on many of the characteristics of policy making. Regional planning is not geared toward addressing a particular issue of contention. Rather, decisions are made to guide future planning that will occur at a local level, just as policies guide future developments and actions on an issue-specific basis. In this way, regional planning will be equated with policy making.

The model of pluralist planning that is synthesized in this chapter forms part of the framework for the evaluation of CORE's shared decision making process.

### PLANNING

There are many ways to define the steps that one may follow as part of the planning exercise. Like mediation, planning is an iterative process. The steps that one follows are not discrete, as they overlap one another and sometimes must be revisited as new information becomes available (Steiner, 1991).

The planning sequence that I propose is based on two approaches: a rationalist approach (Jackson *et al.*, 1990; Leung, 1989; Steiner, 1991), and an ecofeminist approach (Sells, n.d.). The strengths of both approaches are combined to reflect both the need for a participatory environment, and the need for a process that is transparent. A conflicting theory is the incrementalist model of planning (Jackson *et al.*, 1990). Incrementalist

planning more closely resembles the approach taken toward issues that are extremely complex, and does not prescribe a logical sequence of steps that ideally should be followed, as does the rational approach. Incrementalist planning theory is based on the observation that in reality, any new issues confronting a government will usually be addressed by modifying an existing policy or program. The modifications can then be monitored and altered to increase their effectiveness (Jackson *et al.*, 1990). This is, in effect, a 'fly by the seat of your pants' approach to planning.

Incrementalist planning is only appropriate when it is used to address problems which relate to policies and programs that are already in place. Conversely, the rationalist approach can be used to address problems and issues that are not governed by existing policies. The rationalist planning approach does not rest on the assumption that policies are in place and thus can be modified to deal with the problem at hand. Rational planning is time and resource intensive, and not practical for small-scale or daily decision making (Jackson *et al.*, 1990).

One can criticise the rationalist approach for relying heavily on the planner for goal-setting. The rationalist approach tends to be elitist in that the planner determines through research of what the public interest really consists. The planner then creates the plan that the real public must follow (Collins and Barkdull, 1995). The planning sequence outlined in this chapter will take only the process framework from the rationalist approach. The framework will be combined with the participatory emphasis of the ecofeminist approach to create a planning system that will be called pluralist planning.

The ecofeminist approach to planning advocates a more participatory decision making environment (Sells, n.d.). Expertise is not limited to scientists and scholars, but is held by people who live and work in the environment that the planning process aims to shape (Sells, n.d.). The ecofeminist approach counsels that the first step in any planning exercise should be to create a vision of the future that is shared by all those involved. This visioning process is also advocated in negotiation processes as a way to provide

impetus for movement and change (Kunde and Rudd, 1988).

The system of planning that I have synthesised from the two approaches will be described as pluralist planning. Pluralist planning is an attempt to tie together public involvement in pluralist democracy with the planning process. This synthesis of different decision making techniques can create a new forum for decision making that is participatory, effective, responsive to the public interest, and democratic (Laue *et al.*, 1988).

I have synthesized these approaches because I want to provide a background for subsequent discussions regarding the planning process that was created by CORE for the facilitation of regional land use planning. CORE attempted to create a new forum for decision making and planning. The pluralist approach that I outline below provides much of the theory behind CORE's planning process.

#### PLURALIST PLANNING

The steps that will be discussed follow a logical sequence, although if new information comes to light, a previous phase is revisited. The phases that make up a rationalist planning exercise are:

1. Set Planning Framework
2. Gather Information
3. Devise Options
4. Option Selection
5. Implementation and Monitoring

These phases are outlined to give an idea of what is commonly involved in a planning process. It must be kept in mind that the participants who are involved in designing the process will decide when and how they will accomplish their tasks (Sells, n.d.; Susskind, 1989). The phases are not meant as a prescription for a planning process. Rather, the phases describe some of the issues that should be addressed in the planning process.

*Phase One: Set Planning Framework*

The first step is to plan how the planning will occur (Leung, 1989). The phases of the process must be laid out, as a sort of map that will guide the process. It is very important to spend time at this stage working out the details of the process that will be followed in the planning exercise. Having a plan that everyone is following facilitates the process and lessens confusion.

Public involvement will begin at this stage (Sells, n.d.; Susskind, 1989). A round table could be set up to facilitate public participation in the planning process. The participants will be the ones who lay out the process that they will follow. A visioning exercise is appropriate at this step, to help determine the goals of the process (Sells, n.d.).

The goals of the planning process must be identified and clearly understood. The goal that the participants may be faced with can be as broad as 'make a policy about this certain issue,' or as directional as 'make a policy regarding land use in this region.' The participants can choose to set goals for the planning process based on the vision that they have created, a survey of the public, or any other means. Most likely, a number of outcomes will have been identified by the government or department that is sponsoring the planning process (Steiner, 1991). Some of the goals of the process should reflect the outcomes that are expected by the government.

The people who are participating in the planning process will have been chosen because they represent a certain interest group, they will be affected by any outcomes, or they can speak as a representative of a certain viewpoint. The process will thus be guided by the values of those individuals, and the values that they chose to hold as a group. This conflicts with the rationalist approach, which makes decisions based on a rational assessment of science (Sells, n.d.; Steiner, 1991; Leung, 1989). The strength of a value-laden approach lies in its acceptance that all decisions are based on values. Even decisions that use objective science as a basis must make a judgement as to what science, which scientist, and whose data should be used. Clearly stating the values that underlie a

decision making process keeps the process transparent and accountable.

At this time, the framework that will be used in the selection of potential solutions to the planning problem will be devised. The framework will reflect the vision that the table created as well as the values and criteria that will be used in evaluating options to attain the vision. Having the table create the framework encourages the participants to come to a better understanding of the issues, which in turn enables them to engage in a more fully informed discussion of the options at the appropriate stage (Carpenter and Kennedy, 1988).

The framework that is devised will take into account how the different aspects of the problem relate to each other. This is where ecological values are brought in and analysed, and relationships between ecology, economy, social well-being and culture are identified. Steiner (1991: 15) points out that "the basic purpose of the detailed studies is to gain an understanding about the complex relationships between human values, environmental opportunities and constraints, and the issues being addressed." New studies are not always needed to accomplish this task. However, the decision to gather new scientific and social data should be site and problem specific.

I would argue that detailed and scientific studies may not be needed as part of the planning process. Most times, scientific evidence is available or transferable from other areas. Excess uses of scientific information may be used to obfuscate the problem that the planner is attempting to address. I argue that what is needed is a series of indicators that can be used as measures of the impacts that a proposed plan will have on the landscape and the people (Carter, *pers. comm.*). This will ensure that trends are easily identifiable, and will decrease the amount of information collected that is true but irrelevant (Carter, *pers. comm.*).

There are many issues that must be addressed at the first stage of the planning process and I cannot be comprehensive in my overview. However, the importance of this first

phase cannot be over-emphasized. The time that is spent up-front is an invaluable resource to draw upon in the later stages of the process, and will save time and money from being spent on catching up on the groundwork that should have been done initially.

### *Phase Two: Gather Information*

The information that needs to be gathered will have been mapped out in stage one as part of setting the framework. Indeed, much of the information will have already been gathered in the first phase. So why a step dedicated to gathering information?

In my view, this step is to emphasize that one must have information before one can make decisions. In the real world, decisions are sometimes made without consideration of critical information, on the basis of incorrect information, and occasionally, without any information at all (Leung, 1989). However, this does not mean that information is not an important part of a decision making process.

Without regard to the iterative nature of the process, information gaps will be identified in subsequent planning phases. The gaps that will become apparent will be easier to address if the initial information gathering ground work is done properly. Time is lost at later stages if the process must be put on hold while information is being gathered, especially if the next step relies on a certain piece of information. The time taken to anticipate and address information needs at an early stage in the process will result in a smoother process that will allow energy to be focussed on exploring creative options.

### *Phase Three: Devise Options*

The next phase in the planning process is to consider all the input gathered from the preceding phases, and creatively design options that will achieve the goal toward which the planning process is targeted (Steiner, 1991).

The input from the first phase includes an understanding of the goals, a vision that outlines a desired state, and a framework for looking at options. At this point, options are



generated which could creatively satisfy all interests at the planning table, achieve the vision, and satisfy the goals of the planning process.

The intent of this phase is to creatively explore solutions to address the problem. It is somewhat of a brainstorming exercise, in that none of the options should be rejected until all possible options are laid on the table. This step is one of option generation, not option selection.

When all creativity has been exhausted, the options can be examined more closely against the selection framework that was devised in phase one.

#### *Phase Four: Option Selection*

The options are now measured against the framework of values and goals that was devised in phase one (Leung, 1989).

At this time, the impacts of the options can be measured by way of the indicator information gathered in stages one and two. Impact analysis should not be limited to social issues, but can be measured to assess environmental, political, cultural and economic impacts as well (Leung, 1989).

There must be a model for weighting the impacts, as not all impacts are or should be considered to have equivalent significance. The values that the planning participants choose to include in the framework for analysis will direct the way in which the impacts are weighted (Steiner, 1991; Leung, 1989). The option that best addresses the goals and the interests of the table is chosen, and a recommendation is made to the government regarding the policy (Steiner, 1991).

### *Phase Five: Implementation and Monitoring*

*"Planning is only as good as its implementation"*

Leung, 1989: 24

A clear plan for implementation is needed. This is not a consideration for the final phase of the planning process, rather it will have been examined in preceding phases, perhaps most importantly when selecting an option (phase four). The implementation plan must make allowances for unforeseen occurrences (Leung, 1989) and be written in a language that is easily understandable and contains no ambiguities. The plan should state what mechanisms are available for changing the plan, if monitoring information indicates that adjustments need to be made (Steiner, 1991).

The implementation plan should indicate methods of monitoring. Monitoring is a crucial step in the planning process, as it indicates if the option that was chosen on the basis of its ability to satisfy a certain set of criteria is actually achieving what it was theoretically thought to do (Leung, 1989). If the affected public has been involved throughout the planning process, they will be more willing to be involved in monitoring the implementation of the plan (Steiner, 1991).

If indicators were set up early on in the planning process, the costs of monitoring can be lessened since some of the groundwork has already been accomplished. The monitoring plan should be an integral part of the final design, and should not be associated with unreasonably high costs. Political reality dictates that a monitoring plan will only be implemented and funded if it is simple and cheap.

#### WHEN ONE CAN PLAN

There are a number of different levels of decision making at which one can carry out the planning process. Each level of planning goes through the five stages of the planning process that are outlined above. The three levels of planning are (Smith, 1982):

1. Normative planning
2. Strategic planning
3. Operational planning

#### *Normative Planning*

Normative planning occurs at the policy planning level. Policy planning occurs when policies, values and goals are set up as guides to direct future governmental decision making (Pal, 1992). Policies provide guidance as to the goals and desired end-states of a specific political issue (Smith, 1982). For example, the Clean Air Strategic Alliance (CASA) was formed to tackle the problem of setting policies and targets surrounding air quality issues. CASA's role is to examine values and assess goals and targets in order to set guidelines for air emissions (Kelly, *pers. comm.*)

#### *Strategic Planning*

Strategic planning can only occur after policy level planning is complete. Strategic planning evaluates options and means to achieve the goals set out in the policy, in light of the stated values (Smith, 1982).

#### *Operational Planning*

Operational planning occurs at the ground level of decision making. Once the policies are in place and a desired course of action is mapped out, operational planning deals with where infrastructure will be placed according to the strategic plan. Operational planning is concerned with specific objects, such as buildings, highways, and dams (Steiner, 1991; Smith, 1982)

### PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT AND PLANNING

Traditionally, public involvement has occurred at the operational planning level (Smith, 1982). For example, after extensive internal planning at the policy and strategic levels, the government announces that a landfill site will be built in a specific community, and these five sites are being considered. Inevitably, public outcry ensues (Steiner, 1991), the process is delayed, and planners, government and the public alike become disillusioned

with both planning and public involvement processes (Smith, 1982). Government does not seem to be willing to share control of the policy and strategic planning processes with the public, although sharing could potentially make the entire process more publicly acceptable and avoid many time delays at the operational planning level.

Public participation at the strategic level can lead to a clash of values, as the value framework and policy direction have already been decided by the government. Although the government represents the public interest, if the people who are involved in the participation process do not feel that they somehow 'own' the values, they will be unwilling to align with them and could spend days debating the merits of a decision that has already been made (Carter, *pers. comm.*).

Public participation at the normative planning level is a rarity in Canada, although it may be the most efficient way of beginning the decision making process. Public input early on ensures that a broad range of opinions and values are incorporated into the policy. The timing also allows for the resolution of conflicts early in the planning process, and can encourage consensus on important policy issues (Steiner, 1991).

Public involvement at the normative stage may also lessen public outcry when it comes time to implement physical infrastructure. If the affected stakeholders have assisted in the creation of policies governing air emissions standards, then the implementation of the policy at the operations level will be greatly facilitated (Steiner, 1991; Abramson *et al.*, 1990; Smith, 1982). However, this argument hinges on having the 'right' people involved. Participation must be inclusive not exclusive so that all parties who could be potentially affected are allowed meaningful involvement. Parties who do not wish to be involved should not be forced into participating; some environmental groups, for example, have mandates which exclude them from entering into negotiations with government (Carter, *pers. comm.*). Conversely, some groups or individuals may wish to be involved, but have no desire to participate in a meaningful way, rather their intent is to stall or undermine the process. One can look at the historical behaviour of an

organisation to predict how it will behave in the planning process. If the groups will not meaningfully contribute to the process, then they should be excluded. The participation process is intended to enhance the representation of the public interest in decision making, not undermine the process in the name of one public's interest.

#### CONCLUSION

Public involvement in normative planning is important for a number of reasons. Resolving disputes, setting values and goals to guide future decision making and avoiding conflict are all positive outcomes of involving the public in the normative planning process. The discussion of this chapter forms a part of the evaluation framework that will be used to examine CORE's shared decision making process.



## Chapter Five: Consensus, Negotiation and Mediation

Rather than backing into the future focussed on solving problems and settling on whatever we get, we can shift our focus to the process that has resulted in most of the major advances in human history -- *the creative process* -- and transcend the conflict and confusion of difficult circumstances and *create* the future we want.

Elkin, n.d.:4

### INTRODUCTION

Negotiation and mediation as processes of decision making have been used extensively in family, labour, and environmental disputes. These disputes are usually characterised by a limited number of parties, a central issue, and explicit boundaries. Mediation works well in these issue specific disputes, and most of the literature looks at mediation used under these circumstances (Millard, 1987; Lilley, 1988; Talbot, 1987).

In the past 10 years, the use of mediation as a dispute resolution tool has expanded into the realm of public policy making. In the United States, regulatory negotiation has been used by a number of agencies in an attempt to create policies in a more effective and efficient manner. Regulatory negotiation involves affected parties in the creation of the policy in an effort to avoid litigation after the policy has been formulated. There have been successes in this effort, in that the parties have avoided litigation, the policies have been accepted by government, and the participants state that the policies have been more robust and inclusive than otherwise might have been (Richard, 1993; Abramson *et al.*, 1990; Haygood, 1988).

In Canada, few mediation efforts at a policy making level have been attempted. In Alberta, the Clean Air Strategic Alliance is an effort to negotiate rules surrounding air emissions. The participants are from industry, government and the general public. This

process has no statutory authority, and relies on the participants to implement in good faith any agreements that are developed (Kelly, *pers. comm.*). The Banff Bow Valley Study, completed in the summer of 1996, used a round table made up of a broad range of interests to make recommendations to the Task Force on the issues of appropriate use and ecological integrity (Page, *pers. comm.*).

The Commission on Resources and Environment in British Columbia is an example in which the public was involved in the policy making process. This process is examined in more detail in chapter two.

This chapter will examine what is meant by consensus, negotiation and mediation. The concept of mediation will be discussed in relation to its application to a policy making process.

## CONSENSUS

Making decisions by consensus involves a process of exploring the interests and needs of the other parties at the table. Consensus is reached when everyone agrees that they can live with the decision or recommendation. To achieve consensus, the parties must first explore the interests of everyone at the table. Everyone must come to an adequate understanding of the needs that must be satisfied in order to have an agreement. Once the parties understand the interests that must be satisfied, options and scenarios can usually be developed to meet everyone's needs. Consensus is a cooperative model of decision making, in contrast to litigation which is a confrontational model of decision making (Carpenter and Kennedy, 1983a).

Although the process of reaching a consensus agreement will differ in every situation, the basic ingredient remains the same. A consensus will only occur when everyone feels that the agreement meets their needs. Consensus based decision making rests on the assumption that each party will make an effort to meet its own interests (Taylor, 1992). When a consensus is reached, every party will feel that they have 'won' something. This



is why an agreement based on consensus decision making is often called a 'win-win' situation.

#### NEGOTIATION

Negotiation is a process that opposing parties enter into in order to reconcile the issue at dispute. The outcome of a negotiation process is an agreement that is arrived at through the process of consensus decision making (Taylor, 1992).

#### *Regulatory Negotiation*

Regulatory negotiation (reg neg) has been used in the United States to create new public policies (Abramson *et al.*, 1990; Ehrmann and Lesnick, 1988). At least three agencies have used this approach to date. Typically, the agency convenes a round table to negotiate a set of policy recommendations (Abramson *et al.*, 1990). As it is a negotiation, the decisions are made by consensus. The people at the table are stakeholders who will be affected by the proposed rule and as such, negotiate on the basis of their interests (Ehrmann and Lesnick, 1988). The agency usually sits at the table and negotiates as a party-at-interest (Fiorino, 1988; Haygood, 1988).

It has been found that negotiating policies works well in situations that are not amenable to the traditional approach to policy development -- situations that are politically heated and scientifically complex (Ehrmann and Lesnick, 1988). Success has been attributed to the fact that those negotiating the rule are those with an interest in the outcome who wish to create a policy that is effective. As well, those who are involved in the creation of the rule characteristically are involved in its implementation (Abramson *et al.*, 1990). Some of the successes include a more comprehensive rule, and avoidance of litigation subsequent to the publishing of the rule (Fiorino, 1988; Haygood, 1988).

The litigious nature of US interest groups no doubt contributed to the government's experimentation with regulatory negotiation. As the Canadian experience is different, negotiating public policy issues is less common. However, in both countries a frustration

with the traditional policy making framework has been emerging, due to the complicated environmental issues that face society, and the lack of a representative public voice in decision making (Ehrmann and Lesnick, 1988). It is hoped that a grass roots push for more direct democracy will provide an impetus for experimentation with mediated policy making processes in Canada.

#### MEDIATION

Mediation is based on the process of negotiation. Opposing parties negotiate with each other and make decisions based on consensus. The key difference is that a neutral third party leads the parties through the negotiation process -- a mediator. The mediator will act both as a facilitator of the process, and as a mediator of the substantive issues of discussion. A mediator is characterised by her ability to suggest options for the resolution of substantive issues without losing her neutrality and the trust of the parties.

The mediation of policy making differs in some ways from the mediation of issue specific disputes (Carpenter and Kennedy, 1988; Ehrmann and Lesnick, 1988). These will not be stated explicitly in this paper. However, the discussion of the principles will touch on some of the unique characteristics of policy making mediation processes.

Literature cites a number of principles of mediation. The following chart is a result of compiling these principles. They are presented in no specific order. A discussion regarding the role of the principles will precede an analysis of each of the principles.

1. Preliminary analysis should be done to determine if mediation is appropriate
2. Process should be participant designed and driven
3. Negotiations should be based on interests, not positions
4. Mediator should be neutral and effective
5. Issues of accountability should be resolved
6. There should be timely access to relevant information
7. There should be a communications plan
8. The goals of the process should be clearly understood
9. Decision makers should be at the table

TABLE 2: PRINCIPLES OF MEDIATION

## ROLE OF THE PRINCIPLES

The principles fit into a broad framework that one might be tempted to call a framework for success. It is not implied that each principle be present as a component in each mediation process. However, it is helpful to look at each principle to determine if it is being or should be addressed in the development of a particular mediation effort.

The framework exists as a reference, to ensure that consideration is made of the principles contained therein. There are no rigid rules guiding mediation processes, and these principles are not intended as such. The principles are intended to provide ideas to those involved or thinking about getting involved in a process of mediated decision making.

The principles are drawn out of the literature regarding mediation. Critics looked at case studies and extracted principles to be used as a sort of guideline for a process (*e.g.*, Sadler, 1993; Bingham, 1986). It is implied in the literature that the principles are guidelines for success. However, these principles are not requirements for success, nor are they criteria for success. The principles form a framework that can be looked at as a checklist of things to consider, for issues not to be overlooked, if one is setting up a process.

Keeping in mind the caveat that the principles are intended to form a generic guideline for a mediation effort, the following is an examination of the principles.

## A DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLES

### **1. Preliminary analysis should be done to determine if mediation is appropriate**

There are many 'conditions' for mediation stated in the literature (Abramson *et al.*, 1990; Meeks, 1988). One 'condition' that seems to have consensus is that the issue has to be mature enough (Sadler, 1993; Meeks, 1988; Laue *et al.*, 1988). If potential parties cannot be identified, and no one feels strongly about the issue, then it might be better to create the policy using other techniques. As well, the usefulness of consulting with the public should be considered (Haygood, 1988). The policy issue should be sufficiently important

that an increase in public involvement in the policy making process will lead to "higher levels of social satisfaction" (Sewell and Coppock, n.d.: 8).

The following list of 'conditions' for mediation is from Abramson *et al.* (1990: 111-112):

- a limited number of interests will be significantly affected and they are such that individuals can be selected to represent them
- the issues are known and ripe for decision
- no party will have to compromise a fundamental value
- the rule involves diverse issues
- the outcome is genuinely in doubt
- there is a reasonable deadline
- the parties view it as in their interest to use the process
- the agency is willing to use the process and participate in it

The convening phase can be very useful in educating the stakeholders about mediation and negotiation processes (Carpenter and Kennedy, 1988a). This opportunity can be taken to begin the learning process. In addition, the stakeholders can help define the issues (Haygood, 1988), and have a stake in the process right from the beginning (Carpenter and Kennedy, 1988a).

Another issue that could be addressed at this stage is power imbalances. One of the tasks of the mediator is to ensure that all participants are negotiating from equal positions of power. At this stage, coalitions could be formed or information could be disseminated in order to make the balance of power at the table more equal (Taylor, 1992).

A few of the questions that Laue *et al.* (1988: 8) suggest should be considered at this stage are as follows:

- What are the major issues?
- What kind of forum would be acceptable to all parties?
- What are the incentives and disincentives for the prospective parties to enter into a collaborative forum?
- How mature is the dispute -- is the timing right for resolution?
- What resources does the mediator or potential mediator bring to the dispute?

*Process should be inclusive, not exclusive*

Excluding stakeholders from the policy making process invites lawsuits and implementation troubles in the future. A sincere attempt should be made to include all those with a direct stake in the issue in the process (Reed, 1994; Laue *et al.*, 1988).

There are a number of groups that are hard to represent, and creativity should be used to address this issue. Hard to represent groups include the elderly, the disabled, the homeless, children and future generations. There is the option to have 'surrogate speakers' to represent the interests of these groups (Robinson, n.d.: 380).

The participants in the process do not have to represent a specific group or organisation. Indeed, allowing credible participants to negotiate as representatives of a particular viewpoint can be an effective way of addressing the problems associated with sector representation (Ehrmann and Lesnick, 1988). This can be called "value based representation" (BCRTEE, 1994). One of the criticisms of the sector model of representation is that it forces the table representatives to toe the party line (Wilson, 1995). Maintaining positions in an interest based negotiation process takes away from the effectiveness of the negotiation model.

If a table or a decision maker strives to have an inclusive process, based on the sector model of representation, care should be taken that the groups represented at the table are there for valid reasons. There might be a tendency to go overboard and include every group that expresses an interest. A large number of unrepresentative sectors might be detrimental to the focus and the control of the process. Allowing the participants at the table the final say regarding representation might ensure that only those who have legitimate interests will participate.

*Process should be voluntary*

People cannot be forced to participate in a mediation process (Lilley, 1988; Robinson, 1993; Sadler, 1993). One of the conditions that a convenor looks for when analysing the

suitability of a process is stakeholders that are willing to try resolving their differences through mediation. Forcing a group or person to participate will lead to bad relationships and a drawn out process that is a waste of resources. However, Laue *et al.* (1988) cite an example where the parties decided that the more productive approach was to make the process mandatory. The decision of how to participate should be left up to the participants.

## **2. Process should be participant designed and driven**

The form that the process takes should be decided by the participants (Taylor, 1992; Robinson, 1993; Sadler, 1993). Together, the parties will lay out ground rules for participation, the goals of the process, the outcomes of the process, and the steps that they will take to reach the goals. A process that is imposed from above will encounter resistance and will heighten conflict.

### *Process should be flexible*

One cannot predict how a dispute will be resolved. Mediation is a creative process, and thus allows flexibility in the way in which the dispute is resolved. The process itself must be flexible to allow for the creativity of the process. In addition, new information may change the goals of the process, which will necessitate a change in the steps to get to the goals.

The flexible nature of the process means that regular evaluations must be done to ensure that the table is still heading in a direction that it wants to be going. Realistic time lines within the process for the production of work and evaluations will add to the ability of the table to respond to changes in the process. Time lines will also add impetus for the resolution of the dispute, while avoiding foreshortening the process without providing ample opportunity for negotiations.

### **3. Negotiations should be based on interests, not positions**

An important characteristic of consensual decision making is that it focuses the negotiators to look at the needs of the parties at the table instead of looking at the positions that are put forward. People looking to enter a mediated decision making process should understand the forum in which they will be negotiating, and agree to use this style of decision making (Laue *et al.*, 1988; Sadler, 1993).

Interest based negotiation rests on the principle that there is more than one position that can satisfy a person's or a group's basic interests (Volkema, 1988; Taylor, 1992). By discussing options that satisfy the needs of the participants as opposed to the positions, creative solutions can be explored that more fully meet the interests of all involved (Fiorino, 1988; Collins and Barkdull, 1995; Robinson, 1993).

#### *Decisions should be made by consensus*

Consensus based decision making is essential in a mediation process (Reed, 1994; Sadler, 1993). The interests of all participants are important, and a consensus approach ensures that interests are not overlooked. A system of voting ensures that there are winners and losers. Consensus ensures that there are only winners.

### **4. Mediator should be neutral and effective**

The mediator should be an independent third party to ensure that there is no bias toward any side of the issue (Levinson, 1988; Robinson, 1993). The mediator serves at the request of the parties, and thus must have the authority of all sides to lead the policy making process (Sadler, 1993; Meeks, 1988).

The role of the mediator will change with every process (Laue *et al.*, 1988). The mediator must be flexible and willing to adapt to different situations in order to be effective. Some of the duties of the mediator include assisting the parties to design the process, assisting in negotiations and keeping a record of the meetings (Haygood, 1988). The mediator must also be prepared to enter into the substantive issues to encourage

agreement, while at the same time maintaining neutrality.

There are two types of mediators according to Dorsey and Riek (1989). A distinction is made between passive and active mediation. A passive mediator will act as a facilitator of the process, and ensure that the process is fair, there is a balance of power at the table, etc. An active mediator will also be concerned with the way the substantive issues are addressed: "there is not only concern with the process but also with the quality of the outcome, including results that are viewed as fair by the larger community, are reached efficiently, and endure" (Dorsey and Riek, 1989: 10). The needs of different process participants vary, so the different types of mediators may be more effective in certain circumstances, and a dual role may be needed.

#### **5. Issues of accountability should be resolved**

The department that sets up the participatory process must make a commitment that a consensus recommendation from the table will be given proper consideration by the final governmental decision makers (Bennett, 1994; Robinson, 1993; Sadler, 1993). In the US, the Environmental Protection Agency commits to publishing the negotiated rule if it is supported by consensus, and is consistent with the agency's mandate (Fiorino, 1988; Collins and Barkdull, 1995). This sort of commitment is needed, as it ensures that the participants are willing to devote their time and energy to a process that will result in sound policy (Meeks, 1988).

If the participants in the process represent sectors or groups, then there should be clear lines of accountability within each sector (Sadler, 1993). The representative needs to speak on behalf of her constituents, and the constituents need to trust that their representative is presenting their interests to the table (Blackburn, 1990).

In addition, if those who will be responsible for implementing the policy are not at the table, they should be kept informed and their interests should be worked into the policy in order to ensure effective implementation (Blackburn, 1990).



**6. There should be timely access to relevant information**

Decisions cannot be made in an information vacuum. Information pertaining to the social and scientific aspects of the issue must be available in a timely manner (Fraser and Erlandson, 1991; Fiorino, 1988). In policy negotiations, there will be an imbalance among the participants as to who has information and who does not (Carpenter and Kennedy, 1988). This power imbalance must be addressed to ensure that the participants can negotiate as equals.

The information must be timely. Policy negotiations have time lines that must be met in order to ensure that the policy is implemented in a timely manner, and to ensure that the process does not drag on forever. Baseline information should be available at the outset of the process, and data demands during the process should be met as soon as possible (Fraser and Erlandson, 1991).

**7. There should be a communications plan**

A decision will have to be made by the participants whether to hold meetings *in camera* or open to the public (Robinson, n.d.). Depending on the forum, different communications plans will be needed. A discussion on if and how the public will be kept informed regarding the occurrences in the process should take place at the beginning of the process (Sadler, 1993).

**8. The goals of the process should be clearly understood**

The participants of the process should clearly understand the goals of the process and the part that they are playing to achieve the goals. False expectations should not be set up regarding the role of the process within the broader framework of governmental decision making. On the other hand, the participants should be given some sort of commitment that their time and energy is being put to good and effective use.

Another suggestion relating to goals is that the mediation effort should have a broad mandate (Levinson, 1988). Having a broad mandate gives the participants more room to

negotiate tradeoffs and creative solutions. Volkema (1988) suggests that the act of determining the scope of the issue is one of the most important decisions to be made. Indeed, without an understanding of the scope of the issue, much energy will be spent determining boundaries for discussion, as opposed to creating options for mutual gain.

*Process should be conducted within a known policy framework*

Negotiating within a known policy framework allows the participants to understand the role of the policy that they are creating. Without the knowledge of the broader policy framework, or at least the potential framework, the policy will be unfocused. The participants must know the rules that are guiding existing governmental decision making in order to fit the new policy into the framework (Lilley, 1988).

The policy framework is in essence the point from which the government is negotiating. Legislated policies will provide a firm foundation upon which government representatives can bring their interests to the table. If the government does not have a legislated policy framework, and other components of the policy framework are being created away from the table, then any proposed framework policy that the government provides as guidance will be taken as a position, not an interest. It will be difficult for the government representatives to negotiate on interests if positions are being created for them away from the table.

**9. Decision makers should be at the table**

This principle has a number of different implications. First, the participants who are negotiating at the table on behalf of their constituents should be empowered by their constituents to make decisions (Robinson, 1993). The power to make decisions is facilitated through the use of on-going communication with constituents throughout the process. Communication ensures that the representative is making decisions that will have the support of the group at a later date.

Second, the government department with the authority to submit the policy to Cabinet

should be at the table. The department that has submitted the policy for mediation should be at the table to represent its own interests, and to keep the discussion within the realm of possibilities. The department will have an understanding of the characteristics of a policy that make it implementable and viable. These insights will be valuable in ensuring that the policy recommendations have the potential to be adopted as-is (Levinson, 1988).

*An implementation strategy should be created*

If a policy that is reached by consensus is not implementable, then it will never be implemented, despite buy-in from those who are most affected. This is one reason why decision makers should be at the table. This is also a characteristic of some planning processes: much time is spent in the creation stage, but no time is spent in the implementation stage (Reed, 1994).

The implementation strategy needs the participation of the key stakeholders (Carpenter and Kennedy, 1988a). Having the stakeholders at the table already makes the issue of addressing an implementation strategy that much easier. All the parties will know who is responsible for what, and can thus ensure that implementation takes place.

## CONCLUSION

There are conflicting theories as to the usefulness of a generic framework. It can be argued that since the process is participant designed and driven, a generic framework should not be developed as each process is necessarily different. Conversely, the principles discussed in this chapter are broad, and can be used as a sort of checklist for a process to ensure that a potential component of the process framework is not overlooked.

The implementation of the principles will be different in each mediation process. An examination of how the principles were implemented in CORE's shared decision making process is examined in chapter nine.



## Chapter Six: A Discussion of Success

### INTRODUCTION

Mediation theory has been concerned mainly with discussing the process of mediation and negotiation. Few works have dealt with success, and none in an extensive manner. This chapter will engage in a discussion of success, looking at both the literature and the results of the CORE participant survey.

### PEOPLE AND SUCCESS

Much of the literature has ignored the definition and meaning of success. Those who have addressed the definition of success base it on the output of the process (Blackburn, 1987; Haygood, 1988). For example, if the task of the table is to create an agreement, then the creation of an agreement would constitute success, and the lack of agreement would constitute failure. Others go one step further, and stipulate that the agreement must be implementable. This definition assumes that if the agreement is implementable, then it will be implemented. This more stringent definition of success is based on the implementation of the agreement, not only the creation of the agreement.

While doing the research for this project, I asked a number of people if they thought that the CORE processes had been a success. A significant number of people said that they did not know yet, as they were waiting for the land use plans from the government to be announced. After the announcement of the legislation, these people were going to evaluate the success of processes that took place nearly three years beforehand. All of the emphasis was placed on the outcomes of the processes. This emphasis on the end product distracts one from looking at the process that enabled the agreement to occur in the first

place. One might say that using the implemented agreement as the sole criterion for success discounts the process itself.

I argue that there are more components to success than just outcome (Haygood, 1988). It is people who are sitting around the table, making the process work. It is people with different aspirations, expectations, and philosophies who are involved in the process. Every one of the participants would agree that the creation of an agreement, if it was fair, equitable and implementable, would mean that the process was successful. But in addition to the agreement, relationships are created, alliances formed, and lessons learned. One cannot discount these successes just because they are not readily measurable (Sloane, n.d.).

People are behind an agreement, and people make the process work. To base the success of 18 months of time-intensive negotiations on one agreement document is disrespectful of the dedication and commitment of those who stand behind that document. It is also disrespectful of the experience of the process (Haygood, 1988). Indeed, some of the precepts of mediation and negotiation theory are aimed directly at the experience of the process, rather than the outcome. For example, Fisher and Ury (1991) write "separate the people from the problem." A negotiator does not attack her adversaries, she attacks the problem. If the other negotiators also attack the problem, a synergy is created which enhances the experience for all involved, regardless of whether or not a final agreement was attained. It could be hypothesised that a more successful experience during the process will create an atmosphere more conducive to reaching a final agreement. This could be difficult to measure as a case study; the researcher would have to be a close observer of the process to be able to evaluate this hypothesis. Nonetheless, the synergy created during interest based negotiations is an important component of the success of the process.

Another measure of success, or failure, is the overall results achieved by a programme....[t]hese negotiation processes had encouraged the community to shift its emphasis away from confrontation towards finding solutions and the means to generate employment and other benefits for the residents. (Millard 1987: 5)

The participants in the CORE processes themselves identified goals that are not outcome-oriented. For example, some of the goals of the process that were identified by the survey respondents are as follows:

- respondent 17:  
"To try a new approach to resolving land use conflicts" ✓ achieved
- respondent 22:  
"To build trust and better communication between sectors" ✓ partially achieved
- respondent 23:  
"Involve those affected and those making decisions in the process" ✓ achieved
- respondent 4:  
"Educate sectors and public" ✓ partially achieved
- respondent 8:  
"Familiarization with other sectors' interests" ✓ achieved
- respondent 9:  
"To provide a civil setting for people to listen to one another" ✓ partially achieved
- respondent 13:  
"Learn from other participants" ✓ achieved

The achievement of these goals does not hinge on a final agreement. Rather achievement lies with the dedication and enthusiasm of those people involved in the process, from the mediators through to the sector constituents.

A CONTINUUM OF SUCCESS

Perceptions of success lie along a continuum. The question underlying this whole discussion is, where do you draw the line? Previous theorists have drawn the line at the final agreement stage of the process. If a process does not result in a final agreement, it is a failure. However, why do people enter into mediation and negotiations in the first place? Not to be victorious over another party; otherwise they would have gone to court. Not with the sole goal of getting an answer to the issue; otherwise they would have gone to an arbitrator. Not solely to pressure government to makes decisions favouring their issues; they would have gone to parliament to lobby for that.

People enter into mediation because they want to end a dispute: the 'war in the woods' for example. The mediation process is not viewed as yet another battle to be fought. Rather, it is viewed as the chance to create long-lasting agreements and relationships. Lasting relationships are the key to winning the war (Susskind, 1989). Agreements are made everyday, but without relationships they will not last. Two adversaries can make a cease-fire agreement that will last mere hours, despite the fact that it was an agreement. What is lacking is the relationship. Without relationships, the best agreements, agreements that could change the world, will never be implemented. It is to create these relationships that people enter into mediation processes.

It is not just the final agreement that makes a process successful, nor is it just the relationship that is created during the process. A more appropriate way of measuring the success of a mediation process is by looking at the relationships in conjunction with the outcomes. In the long term picture, it is the relationships that will get the agreement implemented, not vice-versa.

Any method of negotiation may be fairly judged by three criteria: it should produce a wise agreement if agreement is possible. It should be efficient. And it should improve or at least not damage the relationship between the parties. (A wise agreement can be defined as one which meets the legitimate interests of each side to the extent possible, resolves conflicting interests fairly, is durable, and takes community interests into account.) (Fisher and Ury, 1991: 4)

Any conception of success that focuses solely on the outcome is discounting the process. Any conception of success that focuses solely on the process, discounts the agreement and implications beyond the process. A conception of success must reflect the complexity of the outcome, the process, the participants and the different ways in which success can be defined. When one attempts to define success according to a narrow focus, the complexity of the concept is lost. Only by integrating the different notions and concepts of success can one begin to capture its essence.



## SUBJECTIVITY

In general, the definitions found in literature focus on objective, easily measurable criteria. While most of the definitions focussed on outcomes, a number looked at the cost and length of the process relative to legal proceedings. Bingham (1986) touched upon the subjective nature of a definition of success. However, she passed over an in-depth discussion in favour of more manageable and more 'objective' measures of success.

The limitations of definitions of success lie in their inability to evaluate the quality of the participants' experiences from an external perspective. For example, it is difficult to measure how effectively an agreement satisfies each party's interests or if the agreement maximised joint gains (Bingham, 1986; Haygood, 1988).

Inherent in the concept of success is subjectivity. The Random House Dictionary (1980) defines success as "a favourable result that one has tried or hoped for." If success is defined as an accomplishment of one's own goals or aspirations, then an outsider, someone who claims to be objective, cannot interpret the situation in a meaningful way. Any external view of the situation that does not rely on the guidance provided by those involved may be inaccurate and meaningless.

Usually an objective view is the one more adept at criticising. Suggesting that the subjective view is the more accurate in this case goes against much of modern thought. However, in the process of mediation, if the participants are not comfortable with something, then it is changed. For example, the mediator must leave if she makes any of the participants uncomfortable, however experienced and competent she may be. If one of the ground rules of the table makes a participant uncomfortable, no matter how equitable it may appear, it must be changed. If any of the participants feel that they can not live with part of the proposed agreement, no matter how fair it may seem to an observer, it must be modified. In mediation, the subjective rules over the objective.

Mediation is a feel-good way of approaching the resolution of disputes. The participants

are supposed to work through the issues in an amicable manner, eventually arriving at an agreement that everyone can live with, at the same time building lasting working relationships with one-time antagonists. This warm, fuzzy view of mediation is often reflected in the literature (*e.g.*, Blackburn, 1987).

It is precisely the subjectivity of the theoretical process that inspires such oozing of warmth as witnessed in Blackburn's writing. In most other aspects of life and work, the objective view is the accepted view. All opinions must be backed up by references and studies. Mediation is one of the few arenas where one can say "that doesn't feel right to me, so I don't agree," and receive the reply "tell us what's not right and we'll work at accommodating it." The 'truth' in mediation is what is found inside, what feels acceptable; it does not lie in reference books or scientific analyses. If the process itself is based on the premise of subjectivity, then an evaluation of the process should also be based on subjective terms. Otherwise, the evaluation will convey no concept of the process.

Acceptance of the subjective nature of success means that the evaluation of the process has to come from the participants. Only those who experienced and participated in the process can accurately measure its success.

Mediation literature speaks to the process framework: setting up the process and implementing it. The process itself is subjective, and theorists are continually pointing this out. The premise behind the theory is that no certain way of doing something can be prescribed. Rather, the approach must be decided by the participants. What will work for one group may not necessarily work for another, despite similarities in issues or representation. The approach must be subjective. All of the literature states this, yet when it comes to evaluating the mediation effort, the process is forgotten in favour of the outcome. It does not make sense to advocate a subjective process and then attempt to evaluate it on objective terms. Important information will always be overlooked. There is no way that the richness and successes of the process can be captured in an evaluation

of whether or not an agreement was created.

#### MEASURING SUCCESS

Measuring success as based on the experience of the participants is more complicated than using the test of the final agreement. Indeed, a process can be a success in one person's eyes, and a failure in another's. Even a process that reaches a final agreement can be thought of as a failure by those opposed to the process, the agreement, or the people involved. So, how can one measure success?

Those who say that success hinges upon the creation of a final agreement, to be fair, use this definition because it is relatively simple to evaluate (Haygood, 1988; Bingham, 1986). Either a mediation process reaches agreement, or it does not. Either an agreement is implemented or it is not. However, success, to many people, is more nebulous a concept than the agreement definition would lead one to believe.

The results of the participant survey indicate that there are many different facets to success, some personal, some group-oriented, and some process-oriented. The only real way to determine the success of the process is to talk with the participants. The participant questionnaire administered as part of this project attempted to get feedback from the participants on certain issues that were identified from earlier research. Table 3 outlines how the survey respondents categorised the goals of the regional land use planning processes. The total number of goals identified by the participants is 97. The percentages achieved for each category relate to the number of goals identified in that category.

Number of goals identified...	Responses N=97	% achieved	% partially achieved	% not achieved
that relate to the outcome	41 %	25 %	40 %	35 %
that relate to the process of interest based negotiation	25 %	25 %	50 %	21 %*
that relate to building relationships and future certainty	23 %	5 %	45 %	45 %*
that relate to using a new decision making process	11 %	27 %	55 %	9 %*

\* One 'other' response.

TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF TYPES OF GOALS IDENTIFIED BY RESPONDENTS

It is interesting to note that 41% of the total goals identified relate to the outcome of the process, meaning that outcome was mentioned in 45 of the 97 goals. This is more than the number of respondents, leading to the conclusion that the outcome is a very important goal for the process. Only one quarter of the goals relating to outcome were achieved, according to the participants. Within each category of the different types of goals, the majority of them were only partially achieved.

These goals indicate what the participants expected to achieve by entering into the process. Most respondents indicated that the process had more than one goal. If a goal is achieved and the participants are satisfied with the way it was achieved, one can assume that the process can be considered a success according to that goal. One can not draw any overall conclusions about the success of a process based upon the achievement of one or two goals. The process, the synergy, and the participants are much more complicated than a simple causal relationship can explain.

Talking with each participant about their perceptions of the process may be difficult to do logistically. And it is usually presumed that if a final agreement is reached, the participants will necessarily consider the process to be a success. However, this may not

be the case. A group might be able to live with the agreement that is reached, yet be displeased at the actions of another group, either during or after the process. The displeasure might change their perception of the process from a success to a failure. Or, a group may be co-opted into agreeing to the outcome, and at a later date come to resent the process and the agreement. What once they viewed as a success may at a later point be viewed as a failure. Thus the assumption that a final agreement means that the process is successful may not be an entirely accurate method of determining the success of a process.

This discussion is an attempt to pull subjective criteria into a consideration of success. Rather than discount the widely accepted means of measuring success, I would like to enrich it with considerations of a more subjective nature. A new way of evaluating mediation processes will look both at the agreement and at the process that made the agreement possible through the eyes of the participants.

#### EXAMINING MEDIATION

The previous chapter listed a number of principles of mediation intended as a general guideline for the participants in the process. It was stated that the principles constitute a framework. When looking to the literature for information on how to set up a mediation effort, the implication is that one would like to set up a process to guarantee success. However, process design is not the only criterion for success. The success of a process is influenced by the mediator, the context of the process, the nature of the substantive issues, the personalities of those at the table, the availability and accuracy of information, public pressures, media coverage, and political pressures, to name just a few. The design of the process can contribute to successes, just as it can contribute to failures of the process. Letting the principles outlined in chapter five guide the design of the process does not imply success, just as it does not imply failure.

Each process will approach a consideration of the mediation principles in a different manner. Each process and table of participants will be subjective in deciding how the

principles will be used to guide the process. The way a process addresses each of the principles can be examined. Feedback from the participants as to their evaluation of how the principle was approached is one way to determine if the application of the principle influenced success. The general principle cannot be identified as contributing to success. It is the way in which consideration is made of the principle that influences success.

Thus, a judgement of success can not be applied to a mediation effort on the basis that it went through a process of considering all the principles in the framework. Rather, successes will be determined by the participants according to how satisfactorily they thought the process responded to each principle.

#### EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

The method that I propose to measure success is based not only on outcomes and achievement of goals, but is based as well on the satisfaction of the participants. The following framework will guide the evaluation of the success of the CORE shared decision making process:

1. Were participants satisfied with the ways in which the issues were addressed?
2. Did the process meet its own goals?

On a personal level, each sector will evaluate the process according to their own goals. This will not be generalised in this evaluation of the process because it is specific to individual sectors. However, achievement of personal goals is an important component of a personal evaluation of a process and to some extent influences the comments and responses of the participants. A greater emphasis will be placed on question one, due to the fact that it is rarely emphasised in the literature.

#### CONCLUSION

The discussion in the earlier part of this chapter underscores the need to take a subjective view of the process. An evaluation of a mediation process based on its conformance to a

set of principles is an attempt to objectively measure the mediation process. However, mediation is a process based on subjectivity. An evaluation of a process that is based on how each of the principles was addressed is subjective, and therefore a more appropriate means of evaluating a process. The key lies in examining the participants' reflections on *how* the principles was addressed or implemented, as opposed to *if* the principle was addressed.

The participants of the CORE shared decision making process were invited to respond to a questionnaire for this project. Briefly, this chart outlines responses to the question "was the process successful?"

	Business-Government N=16	Special Interest Groups N=16	TOTAL N=32
yes	12%	6%	9%
somewhat	44%	69%	56%
no	44%	12%	28%
other	-	12%	6%

TABLE 4: RESPONSES TO QUESTION "WAS THE PROCESS SUCCESSFUL?"

Overall, half of the respondents think CORE's shared decision making process was somewhat successful. It is doubtful if a somewhat successful experience has made them firm believers in the power of public involvement in policy making. However jaded and cynical a view that some might take of the process, it was an attempt to integrate traditionally unrepresented viewpoints into the decision making process. Although it was not an unqualified success, the participants took part in a learning process that will only serve to strengthen their understanding of their own interests, and those of others. Capturing the success of 18 months of dedication to a complex and time-intensive process in one phrase is difficult and clumsy. That half of the respondents think that the process was in some way a worthwhile experience serves to show that a simple yes or no answer cannot accurately capture the emotions and thoughts that arise when asked "was this process successful?"

A detailed examination of the success of the shared decision making process occurs in chapter nine. The various components of the process will be analysed and conclusions drawn as to the success of the components. The next chapter synthesizes a framework for the evaluation of the shared decision making process, and chapter eight provides background information on the questionnaire responses and the participants' evaluation of success.



## Chapter Seven: Evaluation Framework

### INTRODUCTION

The evaluation of CORE's shared decision making process must be carried out within a framework that encompasses the broad range of issues that the process was intended to address. A new framework must be devised since the process is unique.

The discussions in the preceding chapters provide the foundation of the evaluation. The framework is synthesised in this chapter, and applied to the process in chapter nine.

### THE CHARACTER OF CORE'S SHARED DECISION MAKING PROCESS

The chapters on land use planning, decision making, and consensus, mediation and negotiation provide the theoretical basis for an evaluation of CORE's shared decision making process. The complexity of the decision making model arises from the fact that it is a synthesis of three distinct components. The discussions in the previous chapters examined the three elements in a general manner. The components will now be explained in relationship to each other and the shared decision making process.

The overall framework of the shared decision making process is that of mediation or interest based negotiation (CORE, 1993). The framework is composed of the steps of preparation, assessment, process design, agreement building, and agreement implementation (CORE 1993: 21). These steps are explained in chapter two. The land use planning system fits into the agreement building phase (CORE, 1993). CORE developed a set of Regional Planning Guidelines to "provide a structural framework for the agreement building phase" (CORE 1993: 21). The Guidelines are described in

chapter two, and include the following steps:

1. Set the planning direction
2. Define sectoral interests
3. Identify land use compatibilities and conflicts
4. Develop a regional strategy

The agreement building phase will result in a single report from the table to the Commissioner....The Commission will then prepare a report to the cabinet and the public that includes the table's recommendations and outlines options and implications.

CORE 1993: 23

The two processes of interest based negotiation and land use planning taken together form a new forum for decision making: shared decision making. The shared decision making process presents a framework for a new way of resolving tough issues that face entire communities and regions with respect to land use. The new forum involves all stakeholders in the decision making process, ensuring that all interests are given an equal voice in creating a better future for the region.

In diagram form, CORE's shared decision making process looks like this:




FIGURE 4: AUTHOR'S CONCEPTION OF CORE'S SHARED DECISION MAKING PROCESS

## GOALS OF THE COMPONENTS

Each of the elements of the shared decision making process has distinct goals. These have been touched on in other chapters and are outlined here.

### *Interest based negotiation component*

The goal of the interest based negotiation component is to resolve disputes. The consensus based form of making decisions was chosen because the intent was to resolve long-standing conflicts in certain regions of British Columbia (CORE, 1993). The goal of this component is summarized as follows:

**Goal: To create an outcome that accommodates the interests of all stakeholders.**

### *Land use planning component*

The goal of the land use planning component is to develop a “set of recommendations regarding the allocation of the regional land base into appropriate zones” (CORE 1993: 19). The participants were asked to evaluate the definition of success involving the creation of a publicly acceptable, workable land use plan. This definition was provided by the mediator for the West Kootenay process, Bruce Fraser (*pers. comm.*). This goal is an accurate summation of what the land use planning component was intended to accomplish:

**Goal: To create a publicly acceptable, workable land use plan.**

### *New forum for decision making component*

This component is the most inclusive and the least concrete of the three elements. The background discussion contained in chapter three touches on many themes of decision making, all of which could be either goals of the process, or describe how the goals will be achieved. The following goals will be evaluated as best as possible given the

discrepancy between the questionnaire and the evaluation framework. The sources for the goals are CORE, 1993 and CORE, 1994e:

**Goal: Include a more participatory role for the public in the development of public policy.**

**Goal: Include Aboriginal interests in the planning process in a meaningful way, without prejudice.**

Thus the three elements of the process come together: a new forum for decision making is created using the framework of interest based negotiation, incorporating within it a land use planning system. The success of the process is determined by the participants, as well as a more objective look at whether the goals of each component were achieved.

#### EVALUATION OF CORE'S SHARED DECISION MAKING PROCESS

The discussion of success in chapter six underscored the need for subjective evaluation in conjunction with objective measuring. In order to ensure that both subjective and objective factors are incorporated into this particular analysis of the CORE process, each of the three elements of shared decision making will be examined by answering the following two questions.

- 1. Were the participants satisfied with the ways in which the component's issues were addressed?**
- 2. Did the component meet its own goals?**

The two questions arise from the discussion of success in chapter six. In that chapter, the subjective nature of success was determined to be important in an evaluation of a subjective process such as shared decision making. The first question relates to the subjectivity that each participant brings to an evaluation of success. The second question attempts to integrate a more objective test into the evaluation of success. The success of the component in meeting its own goals as set out by CORE provides an objective measure of the relative success of the process component.

A conclusion about the overall success of the component is made by synthesizing the conclusions drawn from the discussions elicited by the two questions. There is no formula for integrating the results of the subjective evaluation with those of the objective evaluation. The conclusion that is drawn looks at both facets of the evaluation and attempts to integrate them into comprehensive conclusions about the successes and failures of each component.

Each component will be looked at as a whole. Any issues that have been identified by the participants or key informants as significant are explored in depth, and according to the comments elicited by the questionnaire. To maintain consistency within the document, each of the mediation principles outlined in chapter five will be addressed as issues. Other issues raised by the participants are also included.

The following chart synthesizes the evaluation framework applied to CORE's shared decision making process.

**1.0 Land use planning component**

- 1.1 Were the participants satisfied with the ways in which the component's issues were addressed?
- 1.2 Did the component meet its goal of creating a publicly acceptable, workable land use plan?
- 1.3 Success of land use planning component

**2.0 Mediation component**

- 2.1 Were the participants satisfied with the ways in which the component's issues were addressed?

*Mediation Principles*

1. *Preliminary analysis should be done to determine if mediation is appropriate*
2. *Process should be participant designed and driven*
3. *Negotiations should be based on interests, not positions*
4. *Mediator should be neutral and effective*
5. *Issues of accountability should be resolved*
6. *There should be timely access to relevant information*
7. *There should be a communications plan*
8. *The goals of the process should be clearly understood*
9. *Decision makers should be at the table*

- 2.2 Did the component meet its own goal of creating an outcome that accommodates the interests of all stakeholders?
- 2.3 Success of mediation component

**3.0 New Forum for Decision Making**

- 3.1 Were the participants satisfied with the ways in which the component's issues were addressed?
- 3.2 Did the component meet its goals?
1. *Include a more participatory role for the public in the development of public policy*
  2. *Include Aboriginal interests in the planning process in a meaningful way, without prejudice*
- 3.3 Success of new forum for decision making

**FIGURE 5: EVALUATION FRAMEWORK**

## CONCLUSION

CORE's shared decision making process is comprised of three elements, each having separate goals. The first element is decision making. The process has the goal of creating a new forum for decision making. The second element is the interest based negotiation framework. The goal of this component is to bring the participants through a consensus based process to resolve contentious issues and build healthy, collaborative relationships based on creative problem solving. The third element is the land use planning system. The goal of this component is to create a regional land use plan that meets the needs of the stakeholders through a series of tradeoffs, and allows for a win-win situation.

The evaluation of the shared decision making process in chapter nine is preceded by an overview of the survey results in chapter eight.





## Chapter Eight: Questionnaire Results

### INTRODUCTION

A questionnaire was mailed to the spokespeople and alternate spokespeople of the four regional round tables where CORE’s shared decision making process was implemented. The questionnaire was 11 pages in length, and designed to solicit information on certain aspects of the shared decision making process. 94 questionnaires were mailed out, five returned to sender, and 32 completed and returned for a response rate of 36%.

This chapter will look broadly at the findings of the questionnaire and set the stage for a more focussed evaluation of the process in chapter nine.

### SUMMARY

The following chart outlines the response rate from each table.

Region	Number of questionnaires sent	Number of completed questionnaires	Response Rate
West Kootenay	25	5	20 %
East Kootenay	24	9	37.5 %
Cariboo-Chilcotin	22	11	50 %
Vancouver Island	23	7	30.4 %

TABLE 5: QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE RATE BY REGION

The amount of information provided by the questionnaires was unmanageable in raw form. To address the concern of manageability and to facilitate drawing conclusions, the respondents were grouped into two categories: special interest groups and business-

government. Since a response rate of greater than 30% was obtained, the conclusions drawn about the sample can be extrapolated to the entire population of participants (Yin, 1993). In no way should the discussion of the results be construed to refer to the regional or provincial populations.

The division was based on the assumption that small, regionally-based and community-based special interest groups share certain perspectives and philosophies as the members both live and work in the region. Business and government, of the other hand, have concerns that are not limited to the region. Most of the business-government groups have mandates that are broader and not restricted by regional boundaries. In addition, their concerns are generally more economically oriented. This assumption was upheld in the course of the response analysis. Generally, there appeared to be a cohesiveness within each group on most issues.

Looking at the information according to the two groups provides an interesting framework for the analysis. However the division of the sectors is rough, and there are interesting thoughts and responses that can get lost in the grouping. For this reason, I will also briefly explore individual and table responses to the issues.

The following chart illustrates the division of the sectors within the sample population.

<b>Business-Government groups</b>	<b>Special Interest Groups</b>
Primary Forest Manufacturers Local Government (3) Forest Independents Forestry Managers and Manufacturers Provincial Government (3) Forest Industry Forest Minor Licensees First Nations Mining Forest Employment Forest Independent Loggers Employment	Applied Ecological Stewardship (2) Sustainable Communities Tourism (2) Tourist Associations Motorised Recreation Recreation (2) Agriculture Environment (2) Communities Ranching Conservation Social and Economic Sustainability

FIGURE 6: SECTORS THAT RESPONDED AND THEIR BREAKDOWN INTO THE TWO GROUPS

The varying successes of the different tables must be kept in mind. Neither the Vancouver Island nor the Cariboo-Chilcotin tables reached agreement on land use allocations for the region. The West Kootenay-Boundary table reached agreement on land use for about 80% of the region, and the East Kootenay table reached consensus on about 90% of the land base.

**SUCCESS OF CORE**

The shared decision making process was an attempt to include traditionally unrepresented interests in the decision making process, in order to end conflicts over land use. It is interesting to look at how the different groups evaluate the success of the process. On the one hand there is the business-government group. This group includes forestry companies, mining companies, unions, provincial government, local government, and First Nations. Although local government and First Nations may have a different experience, on the whole, these groups are the traditional power holders. Industry has strong lobbying power with the government, and to some extent has influenced governmental decisions over the years. Industry may have been concerned that the

'business as usual' approach was coming to an end at the time of the CORE process, with the New Democratic Party in power in British Columbia.

The regional planning table provided an opportunity for local interests to get involved directly in the decision making process. The three regions chosen for the process had seen many land use conflicts at the local and regional level. However, the special interest groups did not declare that the process was an overwhelming success. One can conclude that sharing decision making power does not in itself make for a successful process, and nor does government bias in your favour.

In the questionnaire, the participants were asked if the process was successful. Answer choices were 'yes,' 'somewhat' and 'no.' The difficulty in evaluating success is evidenced in the preponderance of the answer 'somewhat.' Only three of the 32 respondents stated that yes, the process was successful. Two were from the business-government group. The three respondents had participated at two different tables. The breakdown is seen in table 6:

	Business-Government N=16	Special Interest Groups N=16	TOTAL N=32
yes	2	1	9 %
somewhat	7	11	56 %
no	7	2	28 %
other	-	2	6 %

TABLE 6: RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION "WAS THE PROCESS SUCCESSFUL?"

It is interesting to compare the results of the question "was the process successful" with another question asked at the end of the questionnaire. Since a generally accepted method of measuring success is to determine if an agreement was reached, the participants were asked to respond to the following: "One definition of success regarding

the regional CORE process is: the creation of a publicly acceptable, workable land use plan. Did the table achieve this goal?"

	Business-Government N=16	Special Interest Groups N=16	TOTAL N=32
yes	2	2	13 %
no	14	12	81 %
other	-	2	6 %

TABLE 7: RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION "DID THE TABLE ACHIEVE A LAND USE PLAN?"

The response options for this question were 'yes' and 'no.' This forced the respondents to take a stand on whether or not the process achieved the goal of the land use planning system that formed part of the shared decision making process.

Over 80% stated that this definition of success was not achieved. The mediators and the tables were given the task of creating regional land use allocation plans (CORE, 1993). If the measurement of success hinges on the creation of a final agreement, that is, a land use plan, then the process can be considered a failure. However, table six informs us that over 60% of the respondents think that the process was at least somewhat successful. What the two data sets taken together indicate is that it is difficult to base an evaluation of a complex process on the response to one simple question. In addition, the participants' definition of a successful process may have less to do with the creation of a final agreement than the literature makes out. The next section looks at some of the factors that affected the participants' perceptions of success.

#### SOME FACTORS INFLUENCING SUCCESS

It is impossible to weigh the factors identified as affecting the success of the process in relation to one another. Each factor will be given a different importance by different participants. Some of the issues contributing to one's weighting of the factor could be: sector goals; personal goals; personal philosophies; government influence; and point in

time with respect to the process. The issues discussed below have all been identified by the participants as having had an impact on the successes and failures of the shared decision making process.

*Lack of governmental support*

A theme that emerges from the special interest group comments is that governmental commitment to the process is very important. The lack of commitment on the part of the government to ensure that the process went smoothly and was supported by needed resources directly influenced the perception of success. Without a government that is committed not only to the process, but to implementing the final agreement, the process will be a failure.

It is interesting to note that no comments made by the business-government group reflected the need for or a lack of government commitment. Perhaps this is because as groups that traditionally hold decision making power, they know the power that they wield both at the table and away from the table. The special interest groups, on the other hand, may have a greater mistrust of government, never having been invited to become involved in decision making prior to the CORE process. The special interest groups may also be aware that away from the table, they do not have the power that industry has to influence decisions.

The comments made by the participants show that the governmental commitment to a shared decision making process is an important factor in contributing to the success of the process. Without real governmental commitment, the participants will feel that they have been used by the government, to serve ends other than those of the process.

It was stated that government commitment was negligible and resulted in changes to negotiated recommendations and manipulation by groups away from the table. Some of the participants feel that they spent a lot of time and resources on a process that was used to support the government's pre-determined decision. The government that supported the

CORE process was pro-environment, and brought in legislation that will see a representative 12% of British Columbia protected (Protected Areas Strategy, 1994). At first blush, it would seem that the environment and other special interest groups would be favoured in the shared decision making process. However, the special interest groups were disgruntled with the way in which the government handled the process.

Some of the complaints raised against the government include backroom deals, lack of information provided to the table, hidden agendas, and submitting to lobby pressures after the regional tables were concluded. One respondent cites the following to demonstrate the lack of governmental commitment: "government's preconceived 'plan;' timber industry bias; non-resident participants; bogus information availability -- no independent information allowed; too much paper wasted" (respondent 9). Some of the other comments provided by the respondents include (each region is represented):

"The Commissioner proposed a plan which accurately applied the majority opinions of the CORE table process and/or compromise solutions for those areas where no consensus or clear majority existed. The industrial interests violently rejected the Commissioner's report, and the government abandoned its commitment to legislate it. In lieu, they found a new industry dominated process which excluded the local conservation interests and 'negotiated' a land use plan (read forced it upon) the Provincial conservation associations as an ersatz "Made in the region" solution" (respondent 6)

"The goals were not met, especially the goal of "to define and recommend social and economic transition strategies within the region." The emphasis on getting a plan (at times it seemed like "the plan" already existed and our efforts were mere window dressing) in place using a flawed process meant that very important goals were ignored or reduced to insignificance" (respondent 20)

"Some success was achieved in the area of communication and comfort among the representatives. People got to know each other. This was not always meaningful at the constituency level so harmony between interests at the representative level didn't always trickle down. Most representatives viewed the exercise as a power game -- that included the government representative. The so-called interest based approach was superficial at best. Despite all that the table produced a substantial amount of agreement in their own report. The promise to implement or endorse the table's work was greatly qualified and compromised in the Commission's report which permitted ease of sabotage by those interests opposed in the first place" (respondent 16)

“The people learned to hear one another respectfully more than before, but in the end government perverted and reduced the exercise to the level of public relations ploy, to look good on the outside and allow manipulation on the inside. Some of the participants began to understand interest-based discussion, but most reverted to positions. Everyone felt ripped off and cheated by government's use of the table's work (except the timber industry)” (respondent 9)

“Hidden agendas of government ministries and some sectors; lack of commitment by some sectors” (respondent 24)

“Lack of commitment and understanding by BC government” (respondent 22)

### *Positional negotiating styles*

Another criticism cited by respondents is that some groups did not move beyond positions. Interest based negotiation is at the heart of mediation. A lack of buy-in to the consensus based style of negotiation will hinder the success of a mediation effort.

If a sector at the table does not participate in good faith, it is easy to block the table from doing any meaningful work. Since all decisions are made by consensus, a sector can drag the process to a standstill by disagreeing for the sake of disagreeing. I am not implying that a sector representative should never disagree with the table: if a sector feels that their interests are being compromised, then disagreement is warranted and encouraged.

However, blocking the table for illegitimate reasons, such as for the purpose of hindering the process, demonstrates that lack of commitment to the table and the process. When blocking occurs it is detrimental to the process and to the good faith of the other participants at the table.

The success of a process is determined in some way by the willingness of the participants to get past positions and negotiate in good faith according to interests. These considerations speak to synergy and to some extent, to trust.

The synergy that is created among people who are negotiating in good faith cannot be discounted. For many, the decision to negotiate according to interests is related to trust -- trust that interests will be taken seriously by other parties, trust that others will take the



time to understand the interests. Although in theory trust is not a prerequisite for interest based negotiations, some people find that developing trust is an essential part of the process if it is to be successful in a meaningful way. The following comments indicate that some sectors were not at the table to participate in good faith through interest based negotiation techniques.

"I feel that neither government nor the sectors involved put enough trust in each other to allow themselves to reach a workable solution. The feeling of manipulation by 'someone' could not be overcome." (respondent 28)

"Given the time frame and inexperience of many participants in land use planning and the past conflicts and distrust between many stakeholders, process was somewhat successful" (respondent 17)

"A few sectors (benefiting from the status quo) used a variety of tactics to delay and ultimately subvert the process" (respondent 27)

"Spokes people were generally poor negotiators and not knowledgeable about issues (fiction vs. fact). 95% of sectors were unable to differentiate between positional and interest based negotiation. Result: polarized camps of browns vs. greens with [my sector] trying to bridge gaps" (respondent 4)

"Process spent too much time in design and start up. Planning framework should have been better defined at the beginning. Some sectors never 'bought into' interest based negotiations and maintained 'positions' throughout" (respondent 23)

#### *Weakness of process design*

Process design was also identified as influencing the success of the negotiations. Most of the participants welcomed the opportunity to learn about the interests of other sectors. The problem with the process design seems to lie with the framework of the shared decision making process, and the emphasis on process negotiation as opposed to substantive negotiation. A respondent who was involved with one of the more successful implementations of the process in terms of outcome stated that the "major problem with CORE was a preoccupation with process at the expense of substance" (respondent 19).

The shared decision making process placed the emphasis on the framework of interest based negotiation, not the land use planning system. Many respondents feel that the

process was ill designed to accomplish the goal that had been laid out for them by the government: development of a land allocation scenario that would accommodate the interests of all the participants at the table (CORE 1993: 19).

The participants were invited to respond to the question “do you think that the shared decision making process was designed in a way that facilitated the creation of an acceptable land use plan by the table? In other words, did the means direct the table to the end?” Table 8 outlines the responses to the question.

	Business-Government N=16	Special Interest Groups N=16	TOTAL N=32
yes	6	2	25%
no	8	11	59%
other	2	3	16%

TABLE 8: RESPONSE TO QUESTION “DID THE MEANS DIRECT THE TABLE TO THE END?”

Those who indicated ‘other’ commented that the process was part of what was needed, but not all. The conclusion from these responses is that the process did not take the participants through steps leading to the creation of a land use plan. The shared decision making process was not designed to assist the regional tables in creating land use plans.

Another question aimed at soliciting information about the effectiveness of the process as a vehicle to the desired outcome was “please rate the effectiveness of the process in facilitating the creation of an acceptable land use plan.”

	Business-Government N=16	Special Interest Groups N=16	TOTAL N=32
very effective	-	1	3%
mostly effective	2	1	9%
somewhat effective	5	8	41%
a little effective	1	-	3%
not effective	8	4	38%
other	-	2	6%

TABLE 9: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROCESS AT FACILITATING A LAND USE PLAN

Table 9 provides information on how the respondents rated the effectiveness of the shared decision making process in facilitating the creation of a land use plan. Nearly 40% of respondents think that the process was ineffective.

Some of the comments provided by the respondents regarding the process include the following:

“No boundary, no goal or targets set, interference by government and CORE staff”  
(respondent 2)

“Lack of terms of reference resulted in confusion and unclear expectations of what could be included in a regional plan. Direction was vague and top-down. In the end, the plan lacked substance and the negotiation process has been extremely divisive”  
(respondent 19)

“It should have been a citizens and not a stakeholders process. Business is pure self-interest -- has no role to play in determining the public interest. Lack of time and money and unrealistic expectations” (respondent 18)

“Lack of concise direction from the beginning -- too open ended -- the group was unable to respond responsibly to the task without more guidelines, boundary definitions. Inclusion of too many 'fringe' groups that had full representation and equal say to the more major interests” (respondent 30)

“Too big an area; too much public posturing; too little guidance from mediators; return to

positions and failure to respond to others' interests; the reality of associated losses” (respondent 12)

The conclusion that can be drawn with respect to the influence of the process design on the process is that the process design was somewhat ineffective at creating regional land use plans and resolving contentious issues.

### *Dedication of participants*

A question at the end of the questionnaire asked the participants to identify any factors that contributed to successes in the process. Many of the special interest group representatives identified people as one of the contributing factors. Some comments were given, and include the following.

“Many sincere people from all walks of life” (respondent 29)

“Good will and dedication of most sectors. Mediator's ability and dedication” (respondent 22)

“The hard work of the participants that wanted the process to succeed, and local staff that helped” (respondent 11)

“Hard work. Desire for cooperation” (respondent 8)

“There were three or four sectors who presented their positions effectively and carried on with integrity in spite of the hopeless situation -- they managed to educate everyone there” (respondent 3)

Some business-government representatives also pointed to the people involved:

“Dedication of most to find solutions” (respondent 17)

“Mediators -- process would not have had the degree of success that it did without the mediator” (respondent 23)

“Owen, Sloan, CORE staff, sectors that participated in good faith, extensive discussions” (respondent 18)

“Dedicated people” (respondent 14)

Overall, the special interest groups placed more emphasis on the people involved than did the business-government group. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the special interest groups were participating for the first time in a decision making process.

It is evident that there is no over-riding factor that affected the success of the shared decision making process. Rather, the responses point to a number of issues that were inappropriately resolved, thereby contributing to the participants' dissatisfaction with the process. Briefly, the factors that had a negative effect on the process are: the weakness of process design, including a lack of direction from CORE; lack of governmental commitment; and positional bargaining styles. Positive influences were the dedication of some sector representatives and the mediators.

#### OTHER INTERESTING OBSERVATIONS

Due to the general nature of the conclusions that can be drawn when the respondents are divided into business-government and special interest groups, this section will make some qualitative observations about the tables that are otherwise lost in the analysis.

#### VANCOUVER ISLAND

As participants in the first shared decision making process to be implemented, Vancouver Island table representatives were faced with many process-related issues. Barriers facing the table included a non-existent policy framework, the lack of an economic transition strategy, and the effects of the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force report. The other three tables got the benefit of Vancouver Island's experience with first time issues.

The Vancouver Island table spent a lot of time attempting to address policy gaps. A framework for an economic transition strategy was outlined in response to the table's concern that land re-zoning would negatively affect employment levels on the island. The lack of economic mitigation measures was cited by most of the respondents as having a negative effect on the ability of the table to do its work properly. Despite these

difficulties, the process was convened in the other three regions of British Columbia before a firm policy framework, including a transition strategy, was established.

#### CARIBOO-CHILCOTIN

The most difficult obstacle to overcome for the participants at the Cariboo-Chilcotin table was the setting of the planning area boundary. Boundaries were especially important in light of the impending Protected Areas Strategy legislation (PAS). The table was informed that under PAS, a representative 12% of the land base would have to be set aside for protection. The resource extraction sectors wanted to include some existing protected areas within the boundaries of the planning area in order to minimise the amount of land that would be affected by PAS. The environmental sectors disagreed with this strategy, and wanted to exclude the existing protected areas in order to maximise the amount of new protected land.

For unknown reasons, the Commissioner did not step in early in the debate and mandate planning area boundaries. The disagreement was allowed to monopolise table discussions for months, leading to increased animosity, a delayed timetable, and violation of interest based negotiating principles. Boundaries are positions, and as such the participants were deadlocked over an issue that was not resolvable by the means at their disposal. Ultimately, CORE was forced to mandate boundaries in order to get the process moving.

#### EAST AND WEST KOOTENAY-BOUNDARY

The Kootenay table elected to divide the region in two to more closely delineate existing communities. Both tables were able to reach agreement on zoning for a large part of the land base. However, comments from both tables indicate that the polygon method of land use planning allowed the sectors to revert to positional bargaining. By going through polygon shapes defined on the land, and attempting to reach agreement on permitted land uses within each polygon, representatives were in essence being asked to state their positions not interests. However, both tables reached a substantial amount of

agreement on zoning. What can be concluded from this is that the discussions of interests and visions that preceded the polygon analyses set the stage for more informed, fair negotiations on the land base. The negotiation process is iterative, and moving back to face-to-face negotiations at the zoning stage was another iteration in the process. Evidently the participants did use the skills and information gained during the exploration of interests stage, otherwise no agreements would have been made.

#### CONCLUSION

This chapter has given a brief overview of the survey results pertaining to success. A more detailed evaluation of the results is found in the next chapter.





## Chapter Nine: An Evaluation of Shared Decision Making

### INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, CORE's shared decision making process is examined according to the evaluation framework devised in chapter seven. Each component will be discussed in light of the information gathered from the participants through the participant questionnaire. Conclusions as to the successes and failures of each component will be drawn.

### 1.0 LAND USE PLANNING

#### 1.1 WERE PARTICIPANTS SATISFIED WITH THE WAYS IN WHICH THE ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED?

A land use planning system that I have called pluralist planning is outlined in chapter four. The steps in the pluralist planning system are:

1. Set Planning Framework
2. Gather Information
3. Devise Options
4. Option Selection
5. Implementation and Monitoring

The steps in the planning component of the shared decision making process follow along the same general phases as the pluralist planning model. In theory, the land use planning component of the shared decision making model is sound. The component identifies many of the issues that the pluralist model does.

The tables of shared decision making were set up in three regions where there was much

controversy regarding land use. The various groups in the regions were firmly entrenched in their respective positions as a result of years of battling over land allocations. The shared decision making process was an attempt to bring opposing parties together to share their interests and agree on a land use plan. In theory, the planning framework as outlined by CORE could work if the parties-at-interest are interested in coming to a consensus. However, the context of the regional tables precludes this assumption. The following issues were identified by the participants:

1. Lack of emphasis on planning system
2. System design did not take context into account
3. Mismatch of governmental and participant expectations

*Lack of emphasis on planning system*

The questionnaire results indicate that the participants are split between regarding the process as somewhat effective and not effective. The respondents state that not enough emphasis was put on the planning component of the shared decision making process. Although in theory the planning component looks sound, in practice it was not effectively implemented. Comments indicate that there was not enough time to complete the land use planning exercise, because too much time was spent on the process design step in the interest based negotiation framework.

The participants were asked to respond to the question, “in hindsight, where was the emphasis placed?” The answer choices were ‘on the means -- the shared decision making

process' and 'on the end -- the land use plan.' The following chart outlines the responses.

	Business-Government N=16	Special Interest Groups N=16	TOTAL N=32
on the means -- the shared decision making process	9	8	53%
on the end -- the land use plan	2	3	16%
other	5	4	9%
no response	-	1	3%

TABLE 10: RESPONSES TO "IN HINDSIGHT, WHERE WAS THE EMPHASIS PLACED?"

Roughly half of the respondents in both groups feel that the process framework was emphasised more than the desired end-goal of the process. Combined with the responses to the question asking if the process was effective at facilitating the creation of a land use plan where 41% chose 'somewhat effective' and 38% chose 'not effective,' it is evident that the land use planning system did not receive the consideration it deserved. On this topic, some of the comments received include the following:

"Substance was often derailed by process" (respondent 27)

"The means was emphasized by facilitators, the end was emphasised by some sectors and CORE" (respondent 14)

"Might have had a better chance if CORE and table had a clear understanding of what a regional plan is, how it is administered and some attempt was made to provide and discuss factual information" (respondent 19)

"However, more time should have been spent developing scenarios rather than developing process" (respondent 24)

The conclusion drawn from the way this issue was addressed is that the process framework did not place sufficient emphasis on the land use planning system or the goal of creating a land use plan.

*System design did not take context into account*

The tables were expected to include in their reports to the Commission "consensus recommendations regarding land use allocations" (CORE 1993: 23). The land use planning component of the shared decision making process is as follows (CORE 1993: 22):

**Step 1 — Set the Planning Direction.** Participants set a logical direction for substantive negotiations by discussing and arriving at an agreement on (1) planning products, including a preliminary description of a range of land use zones to be considered, (2) planning area boundaries, (3) identification of government policies that may influence the nature of agreements reached in the process, and (4) a workplan that specifies planning process activities, including analytical methods, timing, and identification of how technical support will be provided.

**Step 2 — Define Sectoral Interests.** As the negotiations are based on interests rather than positions, it is essential that the table develop a clear understanding of the underlying and motivating interests of each sector. To this end, sectors define for the table their interests in the region, describe the types of lands and resources and general management policies needed to meet those interests, and, where possible, map the location of their land and resource priorities.

**Step 3 — Identify Land Use Compatibilities and Conflicts.** Using the descriptions provided in Step 2, the table seeks to identify the nature and extent of compatibility or incompatibility of sectoral interests. This information is incorporated into maps identifying areas of conflict and absence of conflict, and provides a means of determining which conflicts may be resolved by zoning refinements, resource management guidelines, and other methods.

**Step 4 — Develop a Regional Strategy.** In the final stage of negotiations, the table works with the products of earlier phases to establish tentative land and resource use zones, beginning with areas of low conflict and moving progressively towards the most contentious areas. As a land allocation scenario for the area is developed, it is evaluated to identify anticipated environmental, social and economic implications. Undesirable aspects are addressed through revisions to the scenario, which is subjected to re-evaluation until a scenario is produced that is mutually acceptable to participants.

Within the land use planning system, the first objective is to come to an agreement on the planning products that the table will produce, including a definition of land use zones. Putting aside for a moment the complexities of implementing a provincial land use plan

in the face of region-specific zoning, this objective is manageable with a certain amount of direction from government. The outcomes of the process that the government expected are defined as follows (CORE, 1993: 23):

1. consensus recommendations regarding:
  - land use allocations including protected, special management, integrated or intensive resource management areas;
  - transition and mitigation strategies for communities affected by land use allocations;
  - priority issues that must be addressed through community-based planning processes, or through special studies;
  - implementation and monitoring matter including such items as methods, schedules and required resources; and
  - other points that the parties wish to convey.
2. indicate where the parties disagree and, if possible, identify options as to how outstanding issues may be addressed.

The first phase in a planning process is to determine how the planning will occur. This phase could include a visioning exercise, determination of the goals of the process, and the establishment of indicators to measure the impacts of the proposed options generated in phase three. This phase is characterised by discussions centring on how the process will proceed. CORE's shared decision making process allowed for this step in the process. Step one in the agreement building phase of the process is 'set the planning direction.' More than half of the respondents indicated that they had enough involvement in the design of the planning system. However, less than 30% of respondents stated that their participation was mostly or very effective. Slightly more said that their participation was a little or not effective.

	Business-Government N=16	Special Interest Groups N=16	TOTAL N=32
very effective	2	-	6%
mostly effective	3	4	22%
somewhat effective	4	7	34%
a little effective	1	3	13%
not effective	5	2	22%
other	1	-	3%

TABLE 11: EFFECTIVENESS OF PARTICIPATION IN DESIGN OF PLANNING SYSTEM

One comment from the business-government sector sums up the problem as follows:

“Explanations occurred over several meetings, not at a ‘workshop.’ A planning system was not defined as CORE felt the table should do that by consensus, which is a mistake. Luckily the facilitators had strength and experience in planning to help define the process. Table spokespersons are not planning professionals -- don’t ask them to spend time designing a system which is already well understood” (respondent 23)

The questionnaire results indicate that the quality of involvement in setting the planning direction is questionable. One respondent commented that her sector's participation was not effective "because no system was planned" (respondent 10).

The second objective under the first step in the land use planning system is to come to an agreement regarding the boundaries of the planning area. It is at this point where the context of the tables comes in to play.

The process was set up as an interest based negotiation process. Negotiating on the basis of interests requires that the parties put aside their traditional positions under the assumption that more than one position can satisfy an interest. By the time the tables reached this stage in the process, they had already made a number of consensus decisions by interest based negotiation. For example, the tables had agreed on the process rules and

procedures that they would follow throughout the shared decision making process. At this stage, the participants were asked to revert to positional bargaining by discussing and agreeing on a planning area boundary. Lines on a map are not interests, they are positions (Long, *pers. comm.*). In the case of the Cariboo-Chilcotin table, the issue of boundaries proved to be very divisive.

Some comments provided on the questionnaire include:

“Consensus was never possible given the players, issues and history. Despite the contentions of CORE and mediators, belief that all interests could be met on the land base was naive” (respondent 18)

“Shared decision making and consensus within 22 sector proved to be a process nightmare!” (respondent 1)

“CORE boundaries were challenged at the outset: the table was never able to agree on boundaries” (respondent 27)

“Table [set the boundaries] and it was a mistake. Too much time lost arguing about the boundary. CORE should have established boundary” (respondent 4)

The third objective at this step is to identify the "policies that may influence the nature of agreements reached in the process." This was very difficult to do because the policy framework into which the tables' work was to fit was not in existence at the beginning of the processes. A strategic planning process such as this one benefits from working within an existing policy framework. Without guidance as to where the policy fits, the table will be forced to assume what potential policies will say, or will attempt to draft policies to fill the void. In the case of the Vancouver Island table, the conclusion was reached that they could not negotiate a land use plan until a socioeconomic transition strategy was in place. The impacts of the land use plan were such that without a framework in place to deal with the effects, the participants could not come to an agreement as to how much of an impact there should be on the Island population. Indeed, after the Vancouver Island table reached the conclusion that a socio-economic transition strategy is needed, CORE added this goal to the work of the other regional tables.

The participants were tasked to craft land allocation schemes that would inform subsequent decision making on the land. In essence, the tables were asked to make policy recommendations regarding land use. This task was made infinitely more difficult as the policy framework wherein the recommended policies were to fit, did not exist. The participants did not have information indicating the role of the policy they were to create. Without an existing policy framework, the tables were reduced to speculation and spent much time filling the gaps in legislation.

The participants were asked to rate how the lack of policy framework affected the table's ability to create a land use plan. An overwhelming 81% of respondents state that the effect was negative, as seen in table 12:

	Business-Government N=16	Special Interest Groups N=16	TOTAL N=32
positive	-	-	-
negative	12	14	81%
no effect	3	2	16%
other	1	-	3%

TABLE 12: EFFECT OF LACK OF POLICY FRAMEWORK ON CREATION OF LAND USE PLAN

The participants in the regional planning processes feel that their work was hindered by the absence of an existing policy framework. As respondent 11 comments, "we seemed to always be waiting for some policy or part of it. Especially in impact analysis."

The final objective in step one is to agree on a work plan for the land use planning process. One of the respondents comments that there are models of planning in existence already, and that the table should not have been forced to make up their own: "table spokespersons are not planning professionals -- don't ask them to spend time designing a system which is already well understood" (respondent 23). This is a valid point, especially given the short time frame within which the tables were forced to operate.



The first step of the planning component of the shared decision making process raised a number of issues that were addressed with varying degrees of success by all four tables. Similar concerns were not raised about the final three steps in the planning system, except perhaps to say that they were not addressed due to time constraints.

The theory behind the concept of the planning component of the shared decision making process would have been sound if the context of the tables had not been so confrontational. It is clear that key situational factors were not addressed at the time that the process was designed. As it was, the planning system was difficult to implement due to the confrontational context, the absence of an existing policy framework, and the positional negotiation that was prompted by asking the tables to set the planning area boundaries.

*Mismatch of government and participant expectations*

In the absence of receiving a consensus document outlining a land use plan for each region, the Commissioner was to craft land use recommendations using information provided by the tables. The interest statements crafted by each sector were used as key information sources in the creation of CORE's recommendations (CORE, 1994e).

A number of comments made by respondents imply that some sectors had unrealistic expectations of the process. It is clear that most respondents did consider the process as having the goal of creating a land use plan. Indeed, many of the business-government respondents indicated that since no plan was achieved, the process was a failure. They make no mention of a goal to provide information to the government so that the government or the Commissioner can create a plan.

A number of respondents indicated that there was uncertainty as to the mandate of the table. One respondent commented: "lack of terms of reference resulted in confusion and unclear expectations of what could be included in a regional plan. Direction was vague

and top-down. In the end, the plan lacked substance and the negotiation process has been extremely divisive” (respondent 19).

If no plan was devised by the table, the government would be able to create a plan that had the benefit of the table discussions and was informed by the interests of the parties. This fall back mechanism was in place from the start of the process. Although it is an effective backup plan which ensures that the best possible information will be considered in the land use plan recommendations, it changes the dynamics of the table. The participants were at the table to create a land use plan, but also to negotiate. One of the evaluations that each participating group to the process will undertake is to answer the question "what will happen if we don't participate?" In negotiation theory, this is referred to as looking at the Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). In the case of the shared decision making process, if the parties chose not to participate, then one of their alternatives would be to lobby against the agreement after the table was concluded. This is risky, because if the table reached an agreement, the government had committed itself to implementing it. Thus the government's plan to implement any agreement that had full consensus provided an incentive to negotiate.

However, the fall back mechanism might also have affected the dynamics at the table during the process. In response to the question "what if we don't reach an agreement?" a number of sectors might find that the answer is that the government will create a plan that more effectively addresses their interests or maintains the status quo. This evaluation of the alternative to a negotiated agreement might prove to be a disincentive to good faith negotiation. One of the respondents stated this explicitly: "It was a good try -- but in the end there was not agreement in full. The problems were not so much with the process -- but the context of the process, i.e., some sectors knew they could always appeal to Cabinet or already held resource tenure" (respondent 4).

The mismatch among expectations between sectors and the government may have caused some to look at the process not as a tool to resolving the issues, rather as a way of

blocking other interests to maintain the status quo. The conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion of expectations, is that clear expectations were not communicated, and alternatives to negotiation did not act as incentives to participate in good faith.

#### 1.2 DID THE LAND USE PLANNING SYSTEM ACHIEVE ITS GOAL OF CREATING A PUBLICLY ACCEPTABLE, WORKABLE LAND USE PLAN?

The shared decision making process as applied to the tables had the goal of creating a publicly acceptable, implementable land use plan. In the absence of a table recommended plan, the Commissioner was to take the information generated by the table and create a plan to recommend to Cabinet.

The shared decision making process met its goal in that the information generated by the tables was used as a basis for the Commissioner's report to Cabinet containing a recommended land use plan for each region. The tables did not meet the goal of creating land use plans by means of the shared decision making process, nor did they meet the goal of creating certainty for the future.

##### *Publicly Acceptable*

The outcome of the planning process was to be a publicly acceptable land use plan. It was supposed to be publicly acceptable so that an end could be brought to the 'war in the woods.' A broad range of interests and constituencies were represented at the table. Perhaps the assumption was that if the warring factions could agree on a plan, then the general public would agree as well. This might explain why there were few resources available to the tables for communication strategies with the general public (Cooley, *pers. comm.*). However, a plan cannot be 'publicly acceptable' if the public is not on-side. Lack of communication with the general public ensures that the public is kept ignorant of the dealings of the table. In addition, the table will not know what the public response is to the plan unless they are soliciting constant feedback. If the table works in the dark to create a plan, they cannot know if it will be acceptable to the general public.

The questionnaire respondents indicated that there was little or no information received from the public as a result of any communication strategy. This was identified as a flaw in the process by the mediators and some of the respondents. One respondent commented in response to the question "who was responsible for planning and implementing the communication strategy:" "Nobody. This was a major mistake in the process. No money to do and there were sectors with the intent to railroad CORE who spend a lot of money to misinform the public" (respondent 17). The responses to the question "please rate how satisfied your sector was with the communication strategy to inform the general public" indicate that the table participants were generally displeased with the communication strategy. If the public is not informed and given the chance to inform the process, then the level of acceptability of the final decision is low. The sectors at the table by no means spoke on behalf of the public interest, and indeed, were not asked to do so. The table representatives participated as sector spokespeople, communicating the interests and needs of the specific groups they represented. Denying the general public the information generated by the table, and the chance to participate, opens the door for criticism that the process is undemocratic. The responses to the question regarding the effectiveness of the communication strategy are presented in table 13:

	Business-Government N=16	Special Interest Groups N=16	TOTAL N=32
very satisfied	1	-	3%
satisfied	4	5	28%
not satisfied -- too much information given	1	1	6%
not satisfied -- too little information given	8	8	50%
other	1	1	6%
no response	1	1	6%

TABLE 13: LEVEL OF SECTOR SATISFACTION WITH COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

The conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion is that communication throughout the process is needed if the final decision is to be publicly acceptable.

### *Implementable*

As stated in the shared decision making framework, the table will “include consensus recommendations regarding...implementation and monitoring matters including such items as methods, schedules and required resources” (CORE, 1993: 23).

The land use plan that the tables devised was supposed to be implementable. The theory behind this is that if the tables were successful in reaching agreement on a plan, then they would be ready to implement it, barring any divisive happenings after the conclusion of the table. The participants might be less willing to implement any plans that the government created, even with the inclusion of information generated by the tables. The same buy-in is not apparent when faced with an imposed plan. There were a number of comments received indicating that the respondents had a particularly cynical view of the whole process and of government. It is a fairly safe assumption that these people will not be the first to embrace and implement the government's land use plan:

“The plan was drawn up in Victoria by the CORE staff who cherry picked the information they wanted from the CORE table discussions and ignored what didn't fit what Commissioner already had in mind” (respondent 25)

“Process is good -- what failed was the government commitment -- the process was destroyed by end runs and backroom deals” (respondent 31)

“The CORE table was adjourned without resolve and although much of the information gathered was used for the published report, I feel that neither government nor the sectors involved put enough trust in each other to allow themselves to reach a workable solution. The feeling of manipulation by 'someone' could not be overcome” (respondent 28)

### *Transition Strategies*

The Vancouver Island process reached the conclusion that the impacts of any proposed land use plan would be so great that a socioeconomic transition strategy was essential to the survival of the Island population. The provincial government subsequently legislated Forest Renewal BC, a policy that provides a framework for transition strategies.

The fact that transition strategies were not legislated to form part of the policy framework within which the tables were operating meant that many of the issues brought up in discussions did not receive answers. The participants found it difficult to do impact assessments of land use planning options without policies in place to give an indication of whether the impacts could be mitigated or ameliorated. Each of the tables addressed this issue, and made recommendations regarding transition strategies. However, the negotiation tables could have been more effective had the policies already been in place: “we understood what was likely to occur but without official approval of the new Forest Practices Code, assessment of impacts was very unsure” (respondent 20). The conclusion is that the regional tables would have been better able to concentrate on the tasks at hand, had socio-economic transition strategies been in place.

### 1.3 SUCCESS OF LAND USE PLANNING COMPONENT

The overall effectiveness of the land use planning component of the shared decision making process was affected by some major issues. The situational context within which the tables would be operating was not adequately addressed in the initial process design, leading to implementation difficulties. As well, the emphasis on the mediation component of the shared decision making model reduced the ability of the participants to participate fully in the planning component.

At the Cariboo-Chilcotin table, the challenge of agreeing on positional boundaries contributed to the ineffectiveness of the planning component (CORE files). It must be understood that the components are not independent of one another, and there were no doubt other issues that tied into the inability of the table to get past the boundary issue.

At the Vancouver Island table, the lack of a policy framework posed an impediment for the participants (CORE, 1994). The east and west Kootenay tables were more successful in addressing the challenges, perhaps because the mediators were skilled in land use planning (Fraser, *pers. comm.*).

### *Conclusions*

1. The process framework did not place sufficient emphasis on the land use planning system or the goal of creating a land use plan.
2. The quality of table involvement in setting the planning direction is questionable.
3. The participants were asked to revert to positional bargaining by discussing and agreeing on a planning area boundary.
4. The tables' work was hindered by the absence of an existing policy framework
5. Clear expectations were not communicated, and alternatives to negotiation did not act as incentives to participate in good faith.
6. Communication throughout the process was needed for the final decision to be publicly acceptable.
7. The regional tables would have been better able to concentrate on the tasks at hand, had socio-economic transition strategies been in place.

The conclusion as to the effectiveness of the planning component of the shared decision making process is that it was passably successful. The two regional tables that produced consensus reports regarding land allocation agreements managed to overcome the issues through mediator guidance and the commitment of the sectors to the negotiation process (Cooley, *pers. comm.*; CORE files).

## **2.0 MEDIATION COMPONENT**

CORE touted shared decision making as a conflict resolution process to end 'the war in the woods.' The framework for the process is from interest based negotiation theory. For this reason, the mediation component will be evaluated on the basis of the principles examined in chapter five.

The responses to the questionnaire indicate that the mediation component was only moderately successful. A number of comments point toward the failure of the process to resolve long standing disputes and create certainty for the future in land allocation. Overall, the participants were moderately satisfied with the way that the mediation component was conducted. The emphasis on the process to the detriment of the substantive issues; the lack of emphasis on the end goal of creating a land use plan; and the lack of participant control over process design and implementation provided some obstacles that were difficult to overcome. The part that synergy plays can be seen in the different tables' success in dealing with the issues. The Cariboo-Chilcotin table was deadlocked over the issue of boundaries, whereas the East Kootenay table was able to come to agreement on land allocation for almost the whole region. Although synergy was not addressed in this paper, it is a subject deserving of study in relation to round table and consensus based processes.

Many of the comments made by the respondents in relation to the mediation component were quite negative. Several of the participants made reference to a predesigned plan of the government, and indicated that the process was merely a public relations exercise (respondent 31; 28; 20). Many participants think there was too much emphasis on the dispute resolution aspect of the process, as opposed to getting down to working out a land allocation plan (respondent 24; 10; 1; 9; 15; 16).

## 2.1 WERE THE PARTICIPANTS SATISFIED WITH THE WAYS IN WHICH THE MEDIATION PRINCIPLES WERE ADDRESSED?

The evaluation of this component is guided by principles of mediation as they are applied in dispute resolution situations. The framework of the shared decision making process was based on the principles of interest based negotiation. The mediation principles are treated like issues, and are evaluated according to the responses elicited in the questionnaire.



### 2.1.1 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS SHOULD BE DONE TO DETERMINE IF MEDIATION IS APPROPRIATE

The first phase in a mediation process is to determine if the parties are amenable to mediation, if the dispute is mature enough, and if all parties can be brought to the table to participate as equals. The convening process was undertaken by mediators and CORE staff. At this stage, groups were identified to form sectors, and people were informed as to what the shared decision making process would entail. Information regarding this stage of the shared decision making process was gathered through the information review (CORE files). Meetings in each of the three regions took place with various stakeholder groups.

The convenors attempted to assist groups become sectors that were inclusive and effective (CORE, 1994). Each sector represented a stakeholder interest or group of interests. At two of the tables, a youth sector participated to represent the views of younger generations. However, other groups remained unrepresented, including future generations, the elderly, and other traditionally marginalised groups. Although these groups might not seem to be stakeholders in the traditional sense, the regional tables were dealing with public policy issues that have the potential for a great impact on all people in British Columbia. It is not clear if the participants feel that they were hindered by certain groups not having representation at the table.

The convening process was mainly concerned with identifying stakeholder groups, informing the public of the shared decision making process, and assisting groups to form sectors.

The respondents were not asked directly to comment about this stage in the shared decision making process. However, a number of the issues discussed in the land use

planning component section overlap under this issue. If appropriate analysis was done before the convening of the tables, the convenor might have determined that there were:

- large gaps in the policy framework within which the regional tables would be working;
- parts of the land use planning system that force positional instead of interest based negotiating, for example in setting regional boundaries; and
- differences between what the tables were asked to recommend and the direction that the framework pushed the discussion.

Each of these issues is discussed in detail in section 1.1. If these issues were identified at an early stage in the process, perhaps they could have been resolved in a more effective manner. The preliminary analysis might have been more politically driven than not. CORE wanted to conduct shared decision making round tables in three regions, and this might have resulted in a biased analysis. It is not clear from the information review whether any groups felt that participation was not in their best interest, but that they decided to participate for other reasons. Looking at the number of sectors that actually tried to block the process when it was underway, it seems reasonable that some sectors felt that their interests could be better met away from the table. If this was the case, and it had been known beforehand, the government could have imposed some incentives to negotiate.

Overall, preliminary analysis was completed. However, the depth of the analysis is not known, and appears superficial from an external perspective.

#### 2.1.2 PROCESS SHOULD BE PARTICIPANT DESIGNED AND DRIVEN

The participants in a mediation effort must feel that they are in control of the process. Otherwise, the table will feel manipulated, and will not have incentive to reach agreement. This principle also includes the necessity of process flexibility, in order to ensure that the process and the table can respond adequately to changes in context and information.

The questionnaire respondents indicate that the process was somewhat flexible, and somewhat participant designed and controlled. The responses do not clearly indicate that one group or another was in control of the process. What can be concluded from this is that at various points throughout the process, different groups were in charge. The term 'groups' is used to refer to a discrete entity, such as the table, CORE, or the mediators.

The comments of the respondents indicate that some people feel that CORE's shared decision making process was imposed on the tables. The fact that CORE already had a consensus based process to provide to the tables prompted this remark: "ostensibly, sectors were involved in setting some terms of reference, but CORE had designed the 'grand plan'" (respondent 12). This is a valid point. CORE had designed the shared decision making process before the tables were composed. In essence, the process was imposed on the tables. It is true that a group of sector representatives who are new to the mediation and round table approach will need to be coached to design a process. However, perhaps the tables would have created a process that more clearly directed them to the goal of creating a land use plan for the region. The problem is not only that the shared decision making process was imposed on the tables, but that the process itself was at cross purposes with the tasks at hand. Table 14 contains that responses to the question "who designed the process?"

	Business-Government N=16	Special Interest Groups N=16	TOTAL n=32
CORE	3	4	22%
table	1	2	9%
mediators	1	-	3%
CORE and table	1	2	9%
CORE and table and mediators	4	6	31%
table and mediators	-	-	-
CORE and mediators	3	1	13%
CORE and government	-	1	3%
other	3	-	9%

TABLE 14: RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION "WHO DESIGNED THE PROCESS?"

50% of the respondents indicate that the table was involved to some extent in the process design phase, whereas 78% indicate that CORE was involved.

A flaw in the shared decision making process design is the emphasis on the mediation component to the detriment of the land use planning component. Section 1.1 contains an examination of where the emphasis was placed in the shared decision making process. The emphasis might have been placed on the land allocation process if the participants were allowed more freedom in choosing the process that they wished to follow. One participant comments that the field of land use planning is developed, and redesigning a process should not have been part of the tables' tasks:

A planning system was not defined as CORE felt the table should do that by consensus, which is a mistake. Luckily the facilitators had strength and experience in planning to help define the process. Table spokespersons are not planning professionals -- don't ask them to spend time designing a system which is already well understood. (respondent 23)

If the participants had been allowed to follow a land use planning process, they might

have been more successful in achieving their goals.

The respondents indicated that there was no clear group in control of the direction of the process. The answers ideally should have indicated that the tables themselves were in control of the process. However, this is not the case. The process was evidently not under the control of the tables, where the literature indicates it should be. Only 44% of the 32 respondents indicate that the table was in some way involved in controlling the process. This is shown in table 15. Three of the ‘other’ responses are interesting in that they point to a corruption of the regional process from within, speaking of two different tables:

“Government and timber industry 'outweighed' all others and behaved as if the process would make no difference at all” (respondent 9)

“There were five sectors who wanted the process to fail. They were in control” (respondent 3)

“CORE established a few general guidelines, the mediators attempted to develop a process with the table, but from the beginning of the process a small group succeeded in discrediting CORE and the mediators, so there never was a well-defined process” (respondent 27)

	Business-Government N=16	Special Interest Groups N=16	TOTAL N=32
CORE	3	2	16%
table	2	5	22%
CORE and table and mediators	3	4	22%
CORE and mediators	3	3	19%
CORE and government	1	-	3%
other	4	2	19%

TABLE 15: RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION “WHO WAS IN CONTROL OF THE PROCESS?”

It must be made clear that the principle does not have to be followed. Rather, the participants should be satisfied with the way it is addressed. Overall, the respondents were not wholly satisfied with the design and implementation of the shared decision making process.

### 2.1.3 NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE BASED ON INTERESTS, NOT POSITIONS

The shared decision making process was guided by the principles of mediation, and the tables were expected to make consensus decisions and negotiate on the basis of interests. Some of the respondents indicated that certain sector representatives were not able to move themselves and their negotiating tactics past positional bargaining. The reluctance to let go of positions on the part of a few of the table members results in difficulty in reaching consensus. The sectors that are attempting to negotiate on the basis of interests will be frustrated by the positions put forth by other representatives.

The process was built on the foundation of interest based negotiations. The reluctance of some sectors to participate effectively at the table might be due to external factors or the perception that interests could be more fully met away from the table. There is no indication that the mediators were at fault, or that there was any lack of information and awareness provided on the subject. In the end, it comes down to the sectors and their representatives to decide if they are to participate effectively at the table. In some cases, the choice was to subvert the process. Some of the comments provided by the respondents include the following:

“Some of the participants began to understand interest-based discussion, but most reverted to positions” (respondent 9)

“The so-called interest based approach was superficial at best” (respondent 16)

“Ultimately some groups could not / would not move beyond positions” (respondent 12)

“95% of sectors were unable to differentiate between positional and interest based negotiation” (respondent 4)

Some of the respondents made comments concerning the bad faith negotiating tactics of a few of the sectors. It is impossible to determine if every sector that had difficulty getting a grasp on interest based negotiation styles had a desire to subvert the process. However, the respondents who commented on certain sectors' subversion techniques are from one table: Cariboo-Chilcotin. This table experienced many problems with the shared decision making framework. Not all of the problems had to do with process design: the mediators were discredited at the beginning and not permitted to use their skills; some sectors blocked all attempts at coming to agreements; and some sectors formed coalitions to create a power imbalance. Some comments on these issues include:

“The table (due to a few individuals) discredited both CORE and the facilitators to the point that they were not able to (or even allowed to) do their job. Their ineffectiveness was largely the table's fault. Their focus (mediation rather than planning) may have contributed” (respondent 27)

“Consensus didn't work -- some sectors would not agree to anything except when to have a coffee break” (respondent 25)

“The industrial interests banded together from the very beginning to sabotage the process” (respondent 6)

It is unfortunate that the table was allowed to proceed under the stresses it sustained. When the table fell apart, negotiations with groups of sectors provided CORE with the information needed to recommend a land use plan for the region. In hindsight, perhaps the regional table should have been cut short to allow resources for more effective methods of public involvement in the region.

The shared decision making process was based on the idea that consensus based decision making allows for decisions that are more comprehensive and inclusive of the public interest. However, one of the foundations of consensus processes is that representatives must participate in good faith negotiations. Certain sectors did not participate in good faith, and this, in conjunction with other unresolved issues, managed to thwart the shared

decision making process in the Cariboo-Chilcotin. Perhaps a more thorough mid-process evaluation could have rectified the problem.

Overall, it can be concluded that the interest based negotiation issue was addressed in the shared decision making process.

#### 2.1.4 MEDIATOR SHOULD BE NEUTRAL AND EFFECTIVE

The mediator is the keel of the process, keeping both the procedural and the substantive issues on-track and fair. Although the mediators of the regional tables were not mediators per se, they were so named by CORE. Although the loss of power did not compromise their neutrality, the mediators were not allowed to be as effective as they might have been otherwise.

Overall, the participants think that the mediators were neutral and unbiased. There is no evidence to contradict the neutrality of the mediators. However, a number of respondents think that the mediators were not as effective as the process warranted.

At the Cariboo-Chilcotin table, power over the procedural and substantive issues was taken away from the mediators early in the process. A small group of sectors removed from the mediators that which gives them power -- their neutrality (respondent 27; 28). Because of this, the mediators were not allowed to get involved in the substantive issues. The mediators at the other tables were process facilitators. Their ability to get involved in the substantive issues was curtailed (Cooley, *pers. comm.*).

Two of the mediators had a background that was connected with land use planning: Bruce Fraser and Nancy Cooley. The tables under the direction of these mediators were able to come close to full agreement on a regional plan: east and west Kootenay-Boundary. In this way, the mediators who were both perceived as neutral and had planning experience were the more effective. However, all of the respondents show respect for what the mediators accomplished.



The mediators were not doing the jobs of mediators, they were acting as process facilitators. Perhaps if they had been allowed to steer the tables through substantive issues, the tables would have reached agreement on a land use plan. Overall, the 'mediators' were neutral, but not as effective as they could have been if they had been allowed to do their jobs properly.

#### 2.1.5 ISSUES OF ACCOUNTABILITY SHOULD BE RESOLVED

Accountability in a mediation process has many different sides. The sector representatives must be accountable both to the table and their constituents; the table must be accountable to the public; the government must be accountable to the table and vice versa.

Representatives must represent their constituencies at the table, if the sector model of representation is used. Almost all of the respondents think that they were able to provide effective representation for their sector. The representatives must also participate in good faith negotiations and be accountable to the table. The questionnaire respondents indicate that there were a few sectors at each table that were not fully accountable to the process. This was manifest through a lack of full participation in interest based negotiation and attempts to maintain the status quo, as evidenced in questionnaire comments. The respondents rated their accountability to the table and their sector, and the results are provided in table 16:

Statements	Business-Government			Special Interest Groups		
	True	False	Other	True	False	Other
My sector was representing one basic interest	4	12	-	11	5	-
There were too many groups within my sector	-	14	1	-	16	-
I was able to represent my sector effectively	10	3	1	13	2	1
I was accountable to my sector	15	-	-	15	1	-
I was an effective spokesperson for my sector	11	2	-	14	1	1
I represented all interests in my sector at the table	13	1	-	16	-	-
The process was fair	4	8	-	5	10	1
Each sector was adequately empowered at the table	6	10	-	7	9	-
Mediators addressed power imbalances effectively	5	9	-	7	8	1
The process addressed power imbalances effectively	1	12	1	5	11	-

There were a few 'no responses' so the numbers do not always add up in the business-government group.

TABLE 16: HOW THE SPOKESPEOPLE RATED THEMSELVES

The tables were not directly accountable to the public since there was no comprehensive communication strategy (please see section 2.1.7). Communication with the public was not implemented by CORE, and insufficient resources prevented the tables from effectively filling the gap.

The government was not accountable to the tables as far as support for the regional tables. This lack of commitment is manifest in the lack of policy framework; a shortage of resources provided to the tables including time, information and funding; and the lack of consultation with the tables on the policies the government was scrambling to create to fill the gaps (Cooley, *pers. comm.*)

Another problem with the government's accountability was observed after the tables were adjourned. In the West Kootenay region, the government renegotiated with a handful of

interests certain parts of the land use plan recommended by the table (Cooley, *pers. comm.*). The renegotiations led to changes in the land use plan that favoured a small group of interests. The process and the table were thus discounted by the government, resulting in a lack of accountability to the table.

The tables were accountable to the government in that they provided the necessary information regarding land allocation in the four regions, including sector interest statements and policy recommendations. Where appropriate, the tables also provided consensus regarding regional land use. The government was not accountable to the table as demonstrated by biased favouring of certain sectors and interests.

#### 2.1.6 THERE SHOULD BE TIMELY ACCESS TO RELEVANT INFORMATION

The information needs of the tables were identified at the second stage of the shared decision making process. It is clear that the information needed by the tables was not provided in a timely fashion. The respondents indicated that the information they received was adequate only for the first few stages of the land use planning system. Table 17 displays how the respondents found the information provided to the table. They responded to three questions: was the information received; was the information received at the proper time; and what was the quality of the information.

stage of process	get info?		timely?		quality?		
	yes	no	yes	no	high	med	low
preparation	17	7	10	15	3	13	8
goal setting, land designation system creation	16	9	11	15	4	9	10
interests defined on the land	17	7	11	15	6	11	5
assessment of compatibility of interests	11	14	9	17	4	6	12
development of land use scenarios	12	14	8	19	5	5	13
scenario evaluation, impact assessment	9	16	4	21	2	6	11
refinement of scenarios	8	15	5	19	2	5	11
creation of implementation plan	8	16	4	20	1	6	14

'No responses' and 'other' responses account for the numbers not totalling 32 in each category.

TABLE 17: HOW THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF THE TABLES WERE MET

Perhaps the most important tool in a land use allocation process is impact analysis. Impact analysis allows one to examine the impacts of different land use scenarios. The usefulness of the impact analysis tool is limited by the quality and quantity of information that is available. Brown (1996) makes the case that planning at a strategic level is not as analytical as planning at more local levels:

Strategic land use planning is not excessively concerned with data or sophisticated modelling, nor is it concerned that plan impacts cannot be predicted with pinpoint accuracy. Although technical information and methods play a central role in the planning process, knowledge of *approximate* effects and an understanding of the *relative* pros and cons of alternative actions are seen as acceptable, given scale considerations and the significant levels of uncertainty that are a prevailing characteristic of strategic level planning. Expert perspectives, intuition, judgement and entrepreneurial attitudes are highly valued, and qualitative evaluation is accepted as legitimate.

Brown, 1996: 22

Although strategic level planning is not concerned with a fine level of landscape detail, the tools to predict impacts are still needed. The table or the decision makers need to know the order of magnitude of jobs that will be lost if a certain area is excluded from logging. One respondent wrote that it is not known how much of an economic effect the forest industry has in the region. A close approximation of a response is needed if a planning table is to deal with fundamental questions of land allocation:

“We failed to recommend a plan. We presented a vision statement, a set of land use designations with definitions, we gave the Commission and the government a clearer sense of the issues and we raised the matter of transition strategies. We achieved little or nothing in the way of a sustainable land use plan for the region. Biodiversity was not protected and local employment was not enhanced and we still do not know if our economic activities improve our welfare” (respondent 18)

The respondents indicate that the information needs of the table and the land use planning system were not adequately met.

#### 2.1.7 THERE SHOULD BE A COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

This principle is intended as a reminder that communication issues should be addressed by mediation tables. It is not necessary to have a communication plan if at issue is a private dispute between neighbours. However, the CORE tables were involved in strategic planning on a regional level. The whole region should have been kept informed and aware of the process and the progress.

Although the tables were not funded to communicate with the general public, they did manage to address this issue by holding meetings throughout the region, allowing visitors a chance to speak to the table and advertising meetings in local papers. However, the respondents indicated that little information was brought to the tables as a result of these initiatives. Table 18 summarizes the responses to the question “did the table receive additional information from the public as a result of the communication strategy?”

	Business-Government N=16	Special Interest Groups N=16	TOTAL N=32
yes	3	6	28%
no	7	6	41%
don't know	6	4	31%

TABLE 18: RESPONSE TO "DID THE TABLE RECEIVE INFORMATION FROM THE PUBLIC?"

The communication strategy was not successful at soliciting information from the general public.

Another issue identified deals with who should implement the communication plan. The respondents indicate that there are benefits to having a central agency, such as CORE, control the information that is released to the public. Ensuring that an unbiased, consistent message is communicated with the public is important to keep those not involved with the process on-side and fully informed. One respondent comments on how the lack of a communication strategy can work to the advantage of certain sectors: "This was major mistake in the process. No money to do and there were sectors with the intent to railroad CORE who spend a lot of money to misinform public" (respondent 17).

The participants were asked if they were satisfied with the amount of information given to the public. Table 10 summarizes the responses. Half of the respondents state that they were unsatisfied with the small amount of information provided to the public. CORE left the responsibility for the development of a communication strategy with each regional table. Little money was allocated specifically for communication (Cooley, *pers. comm.*).

	Business-Government N=16	Special Interest Groups N=16	TOTAL N=32
very satisfied	1	-	3%
satisfied	4	5	28%
not satisfied -- too much information given	1	1	6%
not satisfied -- too little information given	8	8	50%
other	1	1	6%
no response	1	1	6%

TABLE 19: LEVEL OF RESPONDENT SATISFACTION WITH COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

It is especially important to solicit feedback from the general public when the table is composed of groups that are thought to approximate the public interest. The tables could not and did not represent the public interest. It is important that unrepresented interests be provided ample opportunity to express their views so that their interests can be taken into account in the final decision.

It is interesting to read this respondent's comment: "the table produced a report. It was circulated to constituencies and public with no great problems. The Commission produced its report and all hell broke loose" (respondent 13). The message is that whatever steps are taken to include the public, they will never be enough to fully involve the entire population. There will always be people who wait to raise their voices at the end, after negotiations have concluded. This should not dissuade round tables from implementing a comprehensive communications plan. Rather, it should encourage accurate reporting and involvement mechanisms to be prepared for the eventuality of public criticism.

In chapter three, the idea that pluralist democracy is a form of inclusive democratic decision making is broached. Many people could view the shared decision making

process as undemocratic since it does not conform to the idea of representative democracy. Thus it is essential that the public is kept involved in the decision making process, to ensure a broad representation of the 'public interest.' Otherwise, allegations that the process is undemocratic could jeopardise the table and any decisions ultimately made on the basis of information provided by the negotiation table.

A communication strategy to inform and solicit feedback from the public was lacking.

#### 2.1.8 THE GOALS OF THE PROCESS SHOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD

Although this principle appears to be a basic requirement and is thus painfully obvious, it must be addressed by the table as a whole. A dispute resolution process in the form of a round table will be composed of people with a multitude of different backgrounds and expectations. It is important that the participants decide exactly what the table is aiming to accomplish.

A few of the respondents indicated that they perceived some other sectors as having expectations that were too high. It can be concluded that the table participants were not all working to the same end goal. One respondent comments that some sectors had "higher expectations (actually creating a consensus) than was realistic" (respondent 13). The government had the expectation that the tables would provide information regarding interests on the land (CORE, 1994e). CORE and most of the table participants had the expectation that they would create regional land use plans. This is evidenced by the number of respondents who considered the process a failure since it did not lead the tables to produce land use plans (especially in the business-government group). If some sector representatives were not working toward a land use plan, then the dynamics and abilities of the tables were changed. United commitment to a goal is needed, especially in face of the confrontational contexts within which the tables were operating.

The emphasis on the process rather than the creation of a land use plan was also a hindrance. The goal of the shared decision making process was ostensibly a land use



plan. However, the implementation of the shared decision making process favoured the creation of process over discussion of substance (CORE, 1994). This is true to a certain extent at all four tables. A number of comments indicate that it was only through the dedication of a small group of representatives that the Kootenay processes were as successful as they were in coming to an agreement (respondent 3; 29; 17; 18). Overall, the implementation of the shared decision making process led the participants in directions different from expectations.

#### 2.1.9 DECISION MAKERS SHOULD BE AT THE TABLE

Not only do the sector representatives have to be accountable to their constituents in order to ensure effective representation, they must also be able to make decisions at the table. This principle may be more applicable to instances where organisations are involved, as sector representatives will always have to take any agreements to the constituency for ratification. However, in the case of policy making, perhaps more importantly, governmental decision makers should be at the table. This is not to say that the table will not be able to function without government representatives at the table. Indeed, some tables may specifically prohibit government from participating. The pros and cons of having governmental decision makers at the table should be weighed carefully by each table.

Having final decision makers at the table may increase the probability that the final agreement will be implemented. The government representatives will also be able to provide information about departmental policies to assist the table in creating an agreement that takes into account the interests of the government and the parties who will be implementing the agreement.

The participants at the CORE regional tables gave no indication that this principle was in any way inadequately addressed.

## 2.2 DID THE PROCESS MEET ITS OWN GOALS?

The goal of a mediation process is typically to resolve a dispute. In the case of the shared decision making process, in many instances fuel was added to the fire. Even in the Kootenays, post-process decisions and actions managed to unravel many of the threads of agreement that the table had created (Cooley, *pers. comm.*). The post-process phase is one that is largely ignored. However, it is an integral part of the process, as it serves as the testing ground for any agreements reached while at the table. Indeed, I would argue that the process is only finished at the time of full implementation of any agreements. Many mediation processes end with the recognition that any changes in context may result in a renegotiation of the agreement. Although the tables in the shared decision making process did not have the option of reconvening in the future, their stake in the decision making process is not over until the land use plans are fully implemented. The roles that they play may change, but it is still the process of creating regional land use plans, creating certainty in land use for the future, and ending the ‘war in the woods.’

The constraints of this project do not allow a look at post-process occurrences. Existing literature tends to draw the line at the creation of a final agreement, leaving the post-negotiation phase of mediation unexamined. Further research needs to be done in this field to determine if the dynamics and synergy created during an interest based negotiation process are sustained after the conclusion of the negotiation phase.

### **Goal: Create an outcome that accommodates the interests of all stakeholders**

The mediation component of the shared decision making process met its goal in that the land use plans recommended by CORE to the government were informed by the interests of regional stakeholders.

### 2.3 SUCCESS OF THE MEDIATION COMPONENT

The success of the mediation component is a synthesis of subjective and objective evaluations. The conclusions drawn from the issues and goal discussions are the following:

#### *Conclusions*

1. Overall, preliminary analysis was completed. However, the depth of the analysis is not known, and appears superficial from an external perspective.
2. The respondents were not wholly satisfied with the design and implementation of the shared decision making process.
3. Negotiations were mostly conducted on the basis of interests.
4. The 'mediators' were neutral, but not as effective as they could have been if they had been allowed to do their jobs properly.
5. The accountability of the table to the general public was unresolved. The tables were accountable to the government in that they provided the necessary information regarding land allocation in the four regions, including sector interest statements and policy recommendations. The government was not accountable to the table as demonstrated by biased favouring of certain sectors and interests.
6. The respondents indicate that the information needs of the table and the land use planning system were not adequately met.
7. A communication strategy to inform and solicit feedback from the public was lacking.
8. The implementation of the shared decision making process led the participants in directions different from expectations.
9. Decision makers were at the table.

A synthesis of the conclusions leads to the determination that CORE's shared decision making process was only slightly successful. The participants were led through a process that was not designed to create a land use plan; negotiations focussed primarily on process rather than substantive issues; and the process failed to achieve a balance of power and eliminate bias. The information that was provided to CORE did assist in the creation of more informed land use plans. However, a driving force behind the shared

decision making process was to have “confrontation, with its unavoidable social and economic costs...replaced by negotiation leading to a decision acceptable to all parts of the community” (CORE 1993: 19). Confrontation still exists, and in some cases was exacerbated by the process (Cooley, *pers. comm.*; respondent 12; 16).

### **3.0 DECISION MAKING COMPONENT**

The Commission on Resources and Environment experimented with a new decision making model in the provincial arena. Shared decision making was an attempt at pluralist democracy, and the commitment by the government was that any consensus agreement would be legislated (CORE, 1994). The new forum created by the shared decision making process was an experiment with a different form of democracy. The commitment by the government to the participants in such an initiative is important to ensure integrity and good faith.

#### **3.1 WERE THE PARTICIPANTS SATISFIED WITH THE WAYS IN WHICH THE ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED?**

One sector representative from the business-government group commented:

“Within the constraints of fairly conventional planning processes we participated a great deal. However, CORE and many of the business, local government sectors stuck rigidly to the conventional and familiar, despite the fact that the conventional and familiar were responsible for many of the problems in the first place” (respondent 18)

#### *Public Interest*

The shared decision making process invited participation from a wide representation of groups and interests. The sectors at the tables can be said to have approximated the public interest. However, the fact that a large number of interests were represented does not mean that the tables represented the 'public interest.' The only true representation of the public interest is the whole public. Thus the tables were approximations of the public interest.

Having broad representation does not preclude the need to include the rest of the public in the process. It is crucial that unrepresented interests are provided with a chance to have input into the planning system. If not broadly inclusive of all interests in addition to those represented at the table, the process cannot be said to have taken all interests into account. A sincere effort must be made to ensure that as many interests as possible are considered in the creation of the final agreement.

The implementation of the shared decision making model did not allow for extensive involvement of the general public: “wider public were not considered or consulted during the process. Plan is vague” (respondent 19). The tables all accepted submissions at their meetings, both oral and written. However, no funds were provided by CORE for a more extensive education, awareness and involvement process (Cooley, *pers. comm*). The lack of public consultation could hinder the acceptability of the final agreement and policy. A public that is unaware of the process could be more resistant to the plan that the process produces.

In addition, the democracy of the process is called into question. Most people believe that the representative parliamentary system is the only form of democracy. Democracy is not always seen as encompassing pluralism and delegating decision making to interest groups. A process that bestows potential decision making power on a group of diverse interests may not be seen as democratic by the public if their involvement is not also solicited. One respondent comments: “the CORE process was never defined nor designed, it was (in my opinion) an experiment in land use planning that failed to satisfy any sector. What happened to democratic rule? We elect governments on majority” (respondent 1).

#### *Democracy and Public Involvement*

The level of public involvement that the shared decision making process promised was that of partnership. The tables were advised that if they produced a land use plan that had the support of all sectors, the plan would be adopted by government and implemented.

This level of decision making is unique; the participants were involved in a ground-breaking process. However, the conception of the process is not as it was implemented.

Aside from the process flaws that the participants point to in the evaluation of the previous two components, governmental commitment to the process and the tables fell short of expectations. Comments targeting the lack of government commitment to the process come from both the special interest group and the business-government group. The participants were not satisfied with the way the government addressed outstanding issues.

The provincial government was represented at all four tables. The table spokesperson was usually a bureaucrat from a ministry connected in some way to land use. Since there was no policy framework to guide the provincial representatives, they were placed in the role of bringing to the tables bits of policies that were being drafted within government. This gives the government table representative the task of bringing positions to the table instead of interests. Policies state positions based on an evaluation of interests. The proposed 12% target for protected areas had to be communicated with the tables, and was brought forward by the government. However, since the target was proposed, it represented the position of the government. This led to the government being viewed as negotiating in bad faith (Long, *pers. comm.*).

The shared decision making process provided a new forum for decision making. However, the mechanisms needed to support the forum, *e.g.*, information; a policy framework; a communication strategy and adequate funding, were lacking.

#### *Lack of governmental commitment*

The participants were provided with a letter stating that the government would accept and implement consensus recommendations regarding land use that came from the tables. This commitment to the outcome on the part of the government provides the participants with an incentive to negotiate. The incentive lies in knowing that the hard work of the

table will not be in vain: at the end of the day, the consensus agreement will be implemented.

However, a lack of commitment on the part of the government was seen after the negotiation phase was complete. In the absence of agreements regarding regional land use, negotiations occurred between the government and specific sectors.

#### *Level of Public Involvement in Decision Making*

The shared decision making process was conceived to be an example of what Arnstein would call partnership. The tables, which included government representation, were to make a consensus decision and recommend the land use plan to the government. Although the government committed to implementing consensus agreements, there was no transfer of power to the tables.

The partnership that was envisaged never materialized in a manner with which the participants were comfortable. Ultimately, the process turned into a consultation, although a number of participants stated that it was a manipulation exercise. On this point, the decision making process was a failure.

### 3.2 DID THE NEW FORUM FOR DECISION MAKING MEET ITS OWN GOALS?

#### **Goal: Include a more participatory role for the public in the development of public policy**

The first goal was met, in that the government created a new role for the public in its decision making process. The public, in the form of stakeholder sectors, was provided with an opportunity to shape public policy on land use. However, the effectiveness of the public's role remains in question.

#### **Goal: Include Aboriginal interests in the planning process in a meaningful way, without prejudice**

In all three regions, Aboriginal participation was minimal to non-existent. The First Nations communities were invited to participate as sectors, not as stewards of the land or

land owners. Contact was made with the communities at the same time as other stakeholders, implying that the Aboriginal interest is discrete and on the same level as, for example, motorized recreation. There was no chance for the Aboriginal communities to get involved in the development of the land use planning process as a level of government. In all, attempts to include the Aboriginal peoples in the shared decision making process were faulty and in no way proved that their participation would be without prejudice to outstanding land claims.

### 3.3 THE SUCCESS OF THE NEW FORUM FOR DECISION MAKING

The shared decision making process was an attempt to create a new forum for decision making. The process was successful in that final land use plans were created, based on information and agreements generated by the tables. However, the process was a failure in that it was not the new forum that made the decisions, it was the government. If the tables had created agreements, then the process would have been considered successful in that it met its own goal. Although the tables did reach agreements on some issues, it was the government who ultimately created the land use plans, whether through CORE or other agencies.

The respondents were not satisfied with the way in which issues concerning the decision making component were addressed. Inadequate information, funding, time and other resources were lacking. Governmental commitment to the process was lacking.



*Conclusions*

1. The tables approximated the public interest, but there was not enough communication with unrepresented interests.
2. The new forum allowed the public greater involvement in the policy making process.
3. CORE's intention to have public involvement at the partnership level failed as the shared decision making process turned into a consultation exercise.
4. The shared decision making process provided a new forum for decision making. However, the mechanisms needed to support the forum, *e.g.*, information; a policy framework; a communication strategy and adequate funding, were lacking.
5. Attempts to include the Aboriginal peoples in the shared decision making process were faulty and in no way proved that their participation would be without prejudice to outstanding land claims.

## CONCLUSION

Evaluating CORE's shared decision making process does not lead to a simple conclusion that the process was either unsuccessful or successful. The value in an analysis that relies on both subjective and objective criteria lies in the richness of the discussion, not the brevity of the conclusion. The shared decision making process was an attempt at including the public in the policy making process in order to help address the issues at the root of on-going land use controversy and conflict. Although the process was flawed in a number of respects and encountered difficulties in implementation, the faith behind the process must be complimented. The process was conceived of as a way to finally end the confrontation that had been plaguing British Columbia for years: a noble cause that must be recognized.



## Chapter Ten: Conclusion

### INTRODUCTION

The success of an interest based negotiation process can not be evaluated strictly on the basis of objective criteria. The discussion in chapter six attempted to include a subjective method of evaluation into the existing objective framework. The issues of cost and time were not included as they do not provide any information regarding the quality of the experience, or the fitness of any agreements created.

Evaluating the success of the shared decision making process means that the process must be broken down into its elements to ensure that the richness and complexity of the process are factored into the evaluation. The participants in the shared decision making process conclude that it was flawed. The questionnaire respondents indicated their dissatisfactions with the process, and identified other issues that were positive. Overall, the process was perceived by the participants as somewhat successful.

### CONCLUSIONS

#### *Land use planning component*

The process might have fared better if the shared decision making process had used a land use planning system as its framework. As it was designed, the process did not place enough emphasis on the steps needed to bring the tables to consider planning issues and resolutions. In addition, the absence of an existing policy framework and clear targets for protected areas forced the tables to debate potential policies and guidelines, taking time and resources away from the issues at hand. Overall, the land use planning component of the shared decision making framework was workable, if cumbersome. The Kootenay-Boundary tables were able to create a substantial part of the regional land use plan with the assistance of experienced mediators.

There were many factors at work at each of the tables that influenced the ability to create a land use plan, including context, mediator, sector representatives, and process design. There is no answer to the question of which process would have worked best given the circumstances and resources available. It is evident that in hindsight, comments can be made as to the effectiveness of the shared decision making process in facilitating the creation of a publicly acceptable, workable land use plan. According to the questionnaire respondents and key informants, the following conclusions are drawn about the land use planning component of CORE's process:

1. The process framework did not place sufficient emphasis on the land use planning system or the goal of creating a land use plan.
2. The quality of involvement in setting the planning direction is questionable.
3. The participants were asked to revert to positional bargaining by discussing and agreeing on a planning area boundary.
4. The tables' work was hindered by the absence of an existing policy framework
5. Clear expectations were not communicated, and alternatives to negotiation did not act as incentives to participate in good faith.
6. Communication throughout the process was needed for the final decision to be publicly acceptable.
7. The regional tables would have been better able to concentrate on the tasks at hand, had socio-economic transition strategies been in place.

#### *Interest based negotiation component*

Given the confrontational nature of the situation that prompted the creation of CORE, it is a wonder that the shared decision making process even got off the ground. Although many of the participants are not completely satisfied with the process and its outcomes, a great success lies in the fact that hundreds of people were involved in a process that took place in four separate regions of the province over a span of three years. The commitment of all involved to the process is phenomenal and in itself constitutes a success.

The participants raised a number of concerns about the design and emphasis of the process. Although it is not known how they would have responded to a more defined process, they did feel that too much time was spent on process design. Given the context within which the process was operating, it is likely that the participants would have had a difficult time agreeing with a process that was imposed on them by a government affiliate. Although the participants are unhappy, they might have been more dissatisfied with a different process. The conclusions reached in the discussion of the questionnaire responses are as follows:

1. Overall, preliminary analysis was completed. However, the depth of the analysis is not known, and appears superficial from an external perspective.
2. The respondents were not wholly satisfied with the design and implementation of the shared decision making process.
3. Negotiations were conducted on the basis of interests.
4. The 'mediators' were neutral, but not as effective as they could have been if they had been allowed to do their jobs properly.
5. The accountability of the table to the general public was unresolved. The tables were accountable to the government in that they provided the necessary information regarding land allocation in the four regions, including sector interest statements and policy recommendations. The government was not accountable to the table as demonstrated by biased favouring of certain sectors and interests.
6. The respondents indicate that the information needs of the table and the land use planning system were not adequately met.
7. A communication strategy to inform and solicit feedback from the public was lacking.
8. The implementation of the shared decision making process led the participants in directions different from expectations.
9. Decision makers were at the table.

#### *New forum for decision making component*

The shared decision making process allowed the government to try a new method of making decisions. The process was effective in that it allowed the public a different

voice in decision making. The following conclusions are drawn from the discussion:

1. The tables approximated the public interest, but there was not enough communication with unrepresented interests.
2. The new forum allowed the public greater involvement in the policy making process.
3. CORE's intention to have public involvement at the partnership level failed as the shared decision making process turned into a consultation exercise.
4. The shared decision making process provided a new forum for decision making. However, the mechanisms needed to support the forum, *e.g.*, information; a policy framework; a communication strategy and adequate funding, were lacking.
5. Attempts to include the Aboriginal peoples in the shared decision making process were faulty and in no way proved that their participation would be without prejudice to outstanding land claims.

Statistically, the conclusions drawn from the shared decision making experience cannot be transferred to future consensus based land use planning negotiations. However, having the participants evaluate the process gives some insight into the true successes and failures of the process.

The task of evaluating the success of CORE's shared decision making process raised many more questions than it answered. The questions that remain unanswered include: the impact of post-table occurrences on the success of the shared decision making process; what the role should be for First Nations in the land use planning process; how implementation will be achieved; and the role of synergy in contributing to the success of a mediation process. This project was an attempt to answer a few of the questions that surround how one evaluates the success of a multi-party dispute resolution attempt, and was unfortunately constrained from addressing many other interesting issues.

#### EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

The evaluation framework is a useful tool for using participant input to evaluate the successes and failures of the shared decision making process. The framework is based on the principle of subjectivity, which is an important component in round tables and

mediation processes. The framework also takes into account the objective measure of whether the process achieved its goals.

The framework for evaluation is a tool, and should be used as such. The framework is not a prescription for a process design. Issues should be addressed in a manner which is acceptable to all participants, and ultimately evaluated by the participants as to effectiveness of resolution. The evaluation framework can provide information about what issues might be considered, as well as laying out a sequence for assessment.

The use of the evaluation framework in this project streamlined the discussion. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, there are many interesting issues which were not addressed as part of this project. Use of the evaluation framework allowed the discussion to address those topics that were in the scope of this study. The evaluation framework can be adapted for use in other situations. As mentioned, the framework provides a list of issues for discussion: it does not prescribe a way of addressing issues.

## CONCLUSION

The evaluation of the shared decision making process reveals several major flaws in process design and implementation. The experiences that were learned by both the participants and the government of British Columbia are valuable and can be used to inform future attempts at consensus based land use planning and decision making. It is important that the first step that the government took in experimenting with a new forum of decision making is not overlooked in favour of criticisms. The shared decision making process at the regional land use planning level provides a wealth of case study information that should be used to inform future attempts at pluralist democracy in Canada. The fact that the process took place in contexts characterised by confrontation underlines the power of consensus processes in general, and the shared decision making process in particular.





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**Appendix One:  
Participant Questionnaire**

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your responses will be kept confidential. Neither your name nor the name of your sector will appear in relation to any specific answers. I will be the only person to have access to the data. The collected data will be destroyed six months after the completion of the final report.

Please respond as the spokesperson for your sector. I appreciate your thoughtful and complete answers. **Please feel free to clarify any of your answers in the margin.**

Throughout the questionnaire, "table" refers to the round table process in which you and the other sector spokespeople were involved. "Process" refers to the **regional land use planning process** initiated by CORE with which you were involved. It was characterized by **consensus decision making**. Please limit your remarks to your experiences with this regional process.

Which sector were you involved with? \_\_\_\_\_

What was your position?      spokesperson...      alternate spokesperson...

**Section 1: Success -- some first thoughts**

1. What were the goals of the regional CORE process?

- 1. \_\_\_\_\_
- 2. \_\_\_\_\_
- 3. \_\_\_\_\_
- 4. \_\_\_\_\_
- 5. \_\_\_\_\_
- 6. \_\_\_\_\_

2. Which of the goals you just identified were achieved?

- |         |                                      |  |  |
|---------|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| Goal 1: | achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> | partially achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> | not achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Goal 2: | achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> | partially achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> | not achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Goal 3: | achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> | partially achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> | not achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Goal 4: | achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> | partially achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> | not achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Goal 5: | achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> | partially achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> | not achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Goal 6: | achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> | partially achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> | not achieved... <input type="checkbox"/> |

3. In your opinion, was the process successful?      yes...      somewhat...      no...

*Please explain:*

**Section 2: Process Design**

The ultimate goal of the regional process was to create a land use plan that everyone around the table could live with. The process of shared decision making was used as the means to facilitate the creation of a land use plan. A diagram of this relationship could look like this:



1. Who designed the process? (check appropriate boxes)
  - ...CORE
  - ...table, all sectors participating
  - ...mediators
  - ...other *explain*: \_\_\_\_\_
  
2. Who was in control of the process?
  - ...CORE
  - ... table
  - ...mediators
  - ...other *explain*: \_\_\_\_\_
  
3. At what point was the process designed?
  - ...before your sector was contacted
  - ...at your first meeting with CORE
  - ...at the first meetings of the table
  - ...other *explain*:
  
4. Was the process designed to be flexible in response to the changing needs of the table?
  - yes... no...
  - Please explain*:

5. Do you think that the shared decision making process was designed in a way that facilitated the creation of an acceptable land use plan by the table? In other words, did the means direct the table to the end?  
yes... no...  
*Please explain:*

6. In hindsight, where was the emphasis placed?  
...on the means -- the shared decision making process  
...on the end -- the land use plan

7. Please rate the effectiveness of the process in facilitating the creation of an acceptable land use plan:  
...very effective  
...mostly effective  
...somewhat effective  
...a little effective  
...not effective

### **Section 3: Land Use Planning System**

The land use planning system is made up of those steps that lead to a land use plan. Steps could include creating a vision, developing different land use scenarios, impact assessment, and scenario revision.

1. How many workshops or meetings were held to explain the planning system that the table would be using to create a land use plan?  
0... 1... 2... 3... 4... over 4...
2. How would you characterize the level of participation that your sector had in the design of the land use planning system?  
...too much participation  
...enough participation  
...too little participation  
...no participation  
...don't know
3. How effective was your participation in the design of the land use planning system?  
...very effective  
...mostly effective  
...somewhat effective  
...a little effective  
...not effective

4. Please characterize your sector's understanding of the land use planning system:  
 high...      adequate...      low...      inadequate...
5. Please describe the steps of a land use planning system, as perceived by your sector during the time of the CORE process:

#### **Section 4: Sectors**

Because of the size of the area involved, many sectors consisted of groups that had to come together to form a sector. Some of these groups might never have worked together before.

1. I would like to know how effective the lines of communication were within your sector.
- how often were sector meetings held? \_\_\_\_\_
  - how did you contact your constituency? \_\_\_\_\_
  - how often did the steering committee meet? \_\_\_\_\_
  - did the steering committee share your workload?    yes...    no...
  - how many constituents went to a round table meeting? \_\_\_\_\_%
  - were you satisfied with the amount of communication that occurred within your sector?    yes...    no...
  - was funding adequate to cover communication costs?    yes...    no...
  - what would you do differently next time?
2. Please circle true (T) or false (F) to indicate how the following statements relate to you as spokesperson:
- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| a) My sector was representing one basic interest.             | T | F |
| b) There were too many groups within my sector.               | T | F |
| c) I was able to represent my sector effectively.             | T | F |
| d) I was accountable to my sector.                            | T | F |
| e) I was an effective spokesperson for my sector.             | T | F |
| f) I represented all interests within my sector at the table. | T | F |
| g) The process was fair.                                      | T | F |
| h) Each sector was equally empowered at the table.            | T | F |
| j) The mediators addressed power imbalances effectively.      | T | F |
| k) The process addressed power imbalances effectively.        | T | F |
3. Did the sector model of representation make the process fair? Did it allow the participants to negotiate on more equal footing?  
 all the time...    most of the time...      some of the time...      never...

**Section 5: Information**

There were many different sources of information used by the table during the process. Baseline information refers to existing information on the state of the region.

1. This is a three part question. In the first column, indicate if the information was received at that stage in the land use planning process (y=yes, n=no). The second category asks you to indicate if the information was timely (y=yes, n=no). The third category asks for the quality of the information (h=high, m=medium, l=low).

<i>stage of process</i>	<i>get info?</i>		<i>timely?</i>		<i>quality?</i>		
preparation	y	n	y	n	h	m	l
goal setting, land designation system creation	y	n	y	n	h	m	l
interests defined on the land	y	n	y	n	h	m	l
assessment of compatibility of interests	y	n	y	n	h	m	l
development of land use scenarios	y	n	y	n	h	m	l
scenario evaluation, impact assessment	y	n	y	n	h	m	l
refinement of scenarios	y	n	y	n	h	m	l
creation of implementation plan	y	n	y	n	h	m	l

2. Was the baseline information appropriate for your sector's needs?  
 yes...      mostly...      somewhat...      no...
3. Was the baseline information appropriate for the needs of the land use planning system?  
 yes...      mostly...      somewhat...      no...

**Section 6: Boundaries**

1. Were you comfortable with the size of the geographic area for which the table was asked to create a land use plan?      yes...      no...
2. Please characterize the size of the area in regards to the creation of an acceptable land use plan:  
 too big...      perfect size...      adequate...      too small...
3. Were the boundaries of the area mandated by CORE?  
 yes...      no...  
 If yes, when? \_\_\_\_\_ (skip to question 5)
4. If the boundaries were not set by CORE, who did set the boundaries?



5. How effective was the method of setting the boundaries?
- ...very effective
  - ...mostly effective
  - ...somewhat effective
  - ...a little effective
  - ...not effective

### **Section 7: Policy Framework and Legislation**

Policy framework refers to the place in the legislation where the land use planning process fits, and into which the land use plan will ultimately fit. In this case, the policies that make up the framework for the creation and implementation of the regional land use plans include the Protected Areas Strategy and the Forest Practices Act.

1. Which components of the framework were in place at the start of the process?
- Protected Areas Strategy:                      yes...                      no...
- Forest Practices Act (containing the Forest Practices Code):                      yes...                      no...
2. If not all policies were in place, what effect did the lack of policy framework have on the ability of the table to create a land use plan?
- positive...                      negative...                      no effect...
3. If the policies were not in place, how much of an understanding did your sector have of the probable policy framework?
- ...high understanding
  - ...adequate understanding
  - ...little understanding
  - ...no understanding

### **Section 8: Interim Policies**

Interim policies were those policies that guided development, mining and forestry practices while the round table was meeting.

1. Who developed the interim policies?    (check appropriate boxes)
- ...CORE
  - ...table, all sectors participating
  - ...mediators
  - ...other *explain*: \_\_\_\_\_
2. At what point were interim policies developed?
- ...before your sector was contacted
  - ...at your first meeting with CORE
  - ...at the first meetings of the table
  - ...other *explain*: \_\_\_\_\_
3. Please describe the interim policies that guided development, mining and forestry practices while the table was meeting:

**Section 9: Commission on Resources and Environment**

1. Please describe how your sector perceived the Commission on Resources and Environment during the process:

*the local staff:*

*the Victoria staff:*

*the Commissioner:*

2. Did your sector clearly understand the role or roles that were played by CORE?

yes... no...

**If no**, where was the confusion?

3. Did your sector believe that CORE was an impartial body?

local staff: yes... no...

Victoria staff: yes... no...

Commissioner: yes... no...

4. In your opinion, did all the other sectors see CORE as an impartial body?

yes... no...

**If no**, did perceptions of impartiality hinder the ability of the table to create a land use plan? yes... no...

5. Did you see a conflict between the role of CORE as facilitator and the role of CORE as decision maker? yes... no...

*Please explain:*

6. Please characterize CORE's shared decision making process:

...primarily a land use planning system

...primarily a conflict resolution process

...other *explain:* \_\_\_\_\_

**Section 10: Mediator / Facilitator / Chair**

1. For each mediator, please rate each statement on the following scale:

strongly agree	agree	no opinion	disagree	strongly disagree
1	2	3	4	5

*Mediator*

had appropriate skills	1	2	3	4	5
was impartial	1	2	3	4	5
kept table focussed on task	1	2	3	4	5
set interim deadlines within process	1	2	3	4	5
placed adequate emphasis on the process	1	2	3	4	5
placed adequate emphasis on the end goal	1	2	3	4	5
actively directed table discussions	1	2	3	4	5
did regular evaluations of the process	1	2	3	4	5
was effective overall	1	2	3	4	5

*Mediator*

had appropriate skills	1	2	3	4	5
was impartial	1	2	3	4	5
kept table focussed on task	1	2	3	4	5
set interim deadlines within process	1	2	3	4	5
placed adequate emphasis on the process	1	2	3	4	5
placed adequate emphasis on the end goal	1	2	3	4	5
actively directed table discussions	1	2	3	4	5
did regular evaluations of the process	1	2	3	4	5
was effective overall	1	2	3	4	5

2. Did the mediators influence the outcome of the process?      yes...    no...  
 Was the influence positive or negative?      positive...      negative...  
*Please explain:*

**Section 11: Communication Strategy**

1. Who was responsible for planning and implementing the communication strategy for informing the general public?  
...CORE  
...table  
...sub-committee of the table  
...mediators  
...other *explain:* \_\_\_\_\_
2. Please rate how satisfied your sector was with the communication strategy to inform the general public:  
...very satisfied  
...satisfied  
...not satisfied -- too much information given to the general public  
...not satisfied -- too little information given to the general public
3. Did the table receive additional information from the public as a result of the communication strategy?      yes...      no...      don't know...

**Section 12: Success – some final thoughts**

1. Please identify any factors that you feel contributed to successes in the process:

2. Please identify any factors that you feel contributed to failures in the process:

3. Was your sector satisfied with the outcomes of the process? Please list the outcomes and indicate your level of satisfaction on the following scale:

very satisfied	satisfied	no opinion	unsatisfied	very unsatisfied
1	2	3	4	5

1. _____	1	2	3	4	5
2. _____	1	2	3	4	5
3. _____	1	2	3	4	5
4. _____	1	2	3	4	5
5. _____	1	2	3	4	5
6. _____	1	2	3	4	5

4. One definition of success regarding the regional CORE process is: **the creation of a publicly acceptable, workable land use plan.** Did the table achieve this goal?

yes... no...

*Please comment:*

**Section 13: General Information**

1. Was this your first land use planning process?      yes...    no...
  
2. How many processes were you involved with *before* the CORE regional process that made decisions by consensus?  
0...      1...      2...      3...      4...      over 4...
  
3. How many processes have you been involved with *since* the CORE regional process that made decisions by consensus?  
0...      1...      2...      3...      4...      over 4...

Thank you very much for completing the questionnaire. If you would like to receive a summary of the results, please put your name and address on the back of the return envelope. Again, confidentiality is a priority, and neither your name nor your sector's name will appear in conjunction with any specific responses.

Thanks again,

Jennifer Andersen

*I realize that I have not addressed issues such as participant funding, the role of the provincial, local and First Nations governments, and sector identification. Please add any further comments you may have regarding any issue.*



Appendix Two:  
Questionnaire Results

## Questionnaire Results

### Section 1: Success -- some first thoughts

**Q1.1 What were the goals of the regional CORE process?**

**Q1.2 Which of the goals you just identified were achieved?**

achieved ✓

partially achieved /

not achieved X

### **Special Interest Groups responses**

- |    |   |     |
|----|---|-----|
| 31 | Balanced planning   | /   |
|    | Decentralisation of decision making   | /   |
|    | Broader inclusion of interests  | ✓   |
|    | Resolution of conflicts   | /   |
|    | Long term certainty   | X   |
| 9  | To provide a (one time) opportunity to exercise participatory democracy<br>(government changed the rules when it looked like<br>our table might work) | /X  |
|    | To teach those willing the basics of shared decision making   | /   |
|    | To provide a civil setting for people to listen to one another  | /   |
|    | To gather technical information and local knowledge<br>(government 'selected' which information they wanted to use)                                   | ✓/X |
|    | To identify a wide range of land values on maps   | /   |
|    | To provide false hope to citizens that government would respect<br>and implement the tables' consensus decisions                                      | ✓   |
| 28 | To formulate a workable regional plan for all residents   | X   |
|    | To bring the moderate views to the forefront  | /   |
|    | To educate people who might not be aware<br>of what happens in another sector   | /   |
| 29 | Develop land use plan (broad landscape level)   | ✓   |
|    | Multi-stakeholder group   | ✓   |
|    | Broad representation  | /   |
|    | Wide consultation   | X   |
|    | Regional/local decision making  | /   |
|    | Balance objectives and representation   | X   |
| 30 | Organise/formalise/prioritize land use planning<br>to reduce ad hoc decision making   | /   |
|    | Provide more certainty to resource users -- provide predictability in<br>land use allocations   | /   |



- |    |   |   |
|----|---|---|
| 20 | To create a land use plan for the region<br>(the current land use plan does use some<br>of the CORE process results)  | / |
|    | To define and recommend social and economic transition<br>strategies within the region  | X |
|    | To define and prioritize issues that should be addressed<br>through local or subregional processes  | / |
|    | To define the means for implementing and monitoring the regional plan   | X |
| 21 | Develop a consensus based planning system   | X |
|    | Implement the Protected Areas Strategy for the region   | / |
| 22 | To provide certainty on the land base for development and protection  | / |
|    | To provide local regional input into land use planning  | ✓ |
|    | To build trust and better communication between sectors   | / |
|    | To allow the Provincial government to make tough decisions<br>without assuming all the blame for making decisions   | X |
| 15 | Land use plan   | ✓ |
|    | Stop the valley by valley fighting  | / |
|    | Economic stability  | / |
|    | Social stability  | / |
| 16 | A less uncertain future for land use interests  | X |
|    | Land use harmony -- reduce issue by issue conflicts   | X |
|    | Integration of social, environmental and economic issues and views  | X |
|    | Deal with difficult underlying issues   | X |
|    | A land use plan reflecting community aspirations  | / |
|    | Level the playing field between the various interests   | / |
| 12 | To involve all stakeholders in land use planning  | / |
|    | To make certain all interests were represented  | / |
|    | To move beyond positions to interests   | X |
| 7  | Get a new mandate for Ministry of Tourism [set] in legislation<br>and include management of land, water and air resources   | ✓ |
|    | Get tourism resource planners hired in Ministry of Tourism<br>to act and plan as per new legislated mandate   | ✓ |
|    | Get a tourism zone under the regional land use plan   | / |
| 6  | To arrive at a consensus regional land use plan   | X |
|    | or, failing that, to give the government the local regional input<br>which would enable Stephen Owen, the CORE Commissioner,<br>to propose a land use plan to the Cabinet | ✓ |

- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| 8 | Better management for visual landscape        | / |
|   | Legislating for access to planning processes  | / |
|   | Access to back country tourism opportunities  | / |
|   | Familiarization with other sectors' interests | ✓ |

- |   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| 3 | To develop a land use plan                         | X |
|   | To protect 12% of the ecosystems based on variance | X |

**Business-Government Group responses**

- |    |   |   |
|----|---|---|
| 32 | To achieve flexibility in land use planning     | X |
|    | To have unique differences of mining recognised | X |

- |    |   |   |
|----|---|---|
| 27 | Develop rational land use plan based on long term sustainability<br>for a broad range of uses and interests | X |
|    | Reduce uncertainty and land use conflicts<br>(too early to tell, not likely)                                | - |

- |    |  |   |
|----|--|---|
| 17 | To set strategic land use and management objectives/guidelines<br>that would direct operational level planning               | / |
|    | To develop policies and describe a mechanism to fine tune the<br>strategic goals at the local level on a site specific basis | / |
|    | To try a new approach to resolving land use conflict   | ✓ |

- |    |  |   |
|----|--|---|
| 25 | Identify areas for protection                                  | / |
|    | Bring peace to the woods                                       | X |
|    | Identify special management zones                              | ✓ |
|    | Identify intensive forest management zones                     | ✓ |
|    | Create a viable on-going process to resolve and implement plan | X |
|    | Involve First Nations in the land use plan                     | X |

- |    |   |   |
|----|---|---|
| 24 | Create a land use plan for the region           | / |
|    | Develop an implementation strategy for the plan | ✓ |

- |    |  |   |
|----|--|---|
| 23 | Recommend a regional land use plan                               | / |
|    | Involve those affected and those making decisions in the process | ✓ |

- |    |   |   |
|----|---|---|
| 19 | Unclear -- there were no terms of reference | - |
|----|---|---|

- |    |   |   |
|----|---|---|
| 18 | Agreement on a broad scale land use plan for the region | / |
|----|---|---|

14	Develop a land use plan for the region	/
	...in particular recommend new protected areas	✓
	Develop a socio-economic transition (old to new)	/
	Arrive at a consensus	/
	Use shared decision making	/
13	Attempt consensus on future of region	✓
	Learn from other participants	✓
10	Develop a land use plan for the region	X
5	To draw a regional land use map by defining large geographical units such as watersheds in terms of their end-use, i.e., recreational, integrated, special management or protected	✓
	To suggest and follow-up implementation process using locally-based processes	/
4	Develop regional land use plan	/
	Attempt consensus interest based negotiation	/
	Educate sectors and public	/
2	Determine 12% parkland and locations	✓
	Protect ecosystems	/
	Ensure forestry, agriculture, tourism and mining coexist and are viable	X
	Eliminate war in the woods	X
1	Sustaining strong communities that depend on the forests	X
	Clearly defined management objectives for all forest resources	X
	A forest land base large enough to support existing AACs	X
	A secure tenure to the forest land base	X
	Continuation of a stable and secure workforce	/
	Operating rules and planning processes which provide for effective forest management	X

**Q1.3 In your opinion, was the process successful?**

options: yes, somewhat, no

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	2	1	3
somewhat	7	11	18
no	7	2	9
other	-	2	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Special Interest Groups: Comments**

*'Other' responses*

- 9 The people learned to hear one another respectfully more than before, but in the end government perverted and reduced the exercise to the level of public relations ploy, to look good on the outside and allow manipulation on the inside. Some of the participants began to understand interest-based discussion, but most reverted to positions. Everyone felt ripped off and cheated by government's use of the table's work (except the timber industry).
- 31 Process is good -- what failed was the government commitment -- the process was destroyed by end runs and backroom deals.

*Yes*

- 3 There is a plan, but we are still unsure of what it is. There were too many unanswered questions and impact analysis that were not addressed.

*Somewhat*

- 28 The CORE table was adjourned without resolve and although much of the information gathered was used for the published report, I feel that neither government nor the sectors involved put enough trust in each other to allow themselves to reach a workable solution. The feeling of manipulation by 'someone' could not be overcome.
- 30 CORE itself -no! The ensuing negotiation that produced the "Regional Land Use Plan" was successful to some degree. Implementation has not been satisfactory. In my opinion there were two separate process: a) CORE; b) the negotiated plan that evolved after CORE failed.
- 22 The biggest loss is that the government is not implementing the plan, at least in the spirit it was negotiated.
- 15 Did some good work, did not arrive at a consensus decision.
- 16 Some success was achieved in the area of communication and comfort among the representatives. People got to know each other. This was not always meaningful at

- the constituency level so harmony between interests at the representative level didn't always trickle down. Most representatives viewed the exercise as a power game -- that included the government representative. The so-called interest based approach was superficial at best. Despite all that the table produced a substantial amount of agreement in their own report. The promise to implement or endorse the table's work was greatly qualified and compromised in the Commission's report which permitted ease of sabotage by those interests opposed in the first place.
- 12 It was successful from the point of view that the participants heard first hand about other's issues and concerns; however ultimately some groups could not / would not move beyond positions.
- 6 The Commissioner proposed a plan which accurately applied the majority opinions of the CORE table process and/or compromise solutions for those areas where no consensus or clear majority existed. The industrial interests violently rejected the Commissioner's report, and the government abandoned its commitment to legislate it. In lieu, they found a new industry dominated process which excluded the local conservation interests and 'negotiated' a land use plan (read forced it upon) the Provincial conservation associations as an ersatz "Made in the region" solution.
- 8 It was a good start at dividing the pie and who gets what slice. But how do we eat it? It all boils down to ground level decisions. Such as - for visual management - how big is a cut block? How much selective logging?
- 3 The process was a failure in as much as a plan was not achieved. It was a success in as much as a lot of people were exposed to concepts and jargon that was alien to them. As well, local processes looked a lot better after experiencing the frustration of a regional process.
- No*
- 20 The goals were not met, especially the goal of "to define and recommend social and economic transition strategies within the region." The emphasis on getting a plan (at times it seemed like "the plan" already existed and our efforts were mere window dressing) in place using a flawed process meant that very important goals were ignored or reduced to insignificance.

### **Business-Government Group: Comments**

#### *Yes*

- 5 Especially in terms of the goal "to draw a regional land use map by defining large geographic units such as watersheds in terms of their end use -- i.e. recreational, integrated, special management or protected."

#### *Somewhat*

- 4 Spokes people were generally poor negotiators and not knowledgeable about issues (fiction vs. fact). 95% of sectors were unable to differentiate between positional and interest based negotiation. Result: polarized camps of browns vs. greens with [my sector] trying to bridge gaps.
- 17 Given the time frame and inexperience of many participants in land use planning and the past conflicts and distrust between many stakeholders, process was

somewhat successful. Goal of "to try a new approach to resolving land use conflicts" was successful in that many groups in the community now have first hand knowledge and respect of other groups' values and concerns.

- 18 It did not succeed in developing a land use plan. Several sectors did not participate in good faith -- it was their way or nothing -- and the perceived need for their participation forced other groups to make all the compromises. However, areas of contention were thoroughly discussed and a deeper, more widespread understanding of the issues and difficulties resulted. The government's response (land use plan) was a small step forward.
- 23 Process spent too much time in design and start up. Planning framework should have been better defined at the beginning. Some sectors never 'bought into' interest based negotiations and maintained 'positions' throughout.
- 24 Consensus was not achieved on the land use plan. However, some agreement was made as well as some innovative proposals were initially accepted. It became evident that there was hidden agendas at work as the process broke down near the end.
- 25 CORE itself failed -- community coalition made up of majority of sectors carried on negotiations with government to create a land use plan which today has not resulted in peace in the woods!

*No*

- 2 Some sectors were there to push their cause rather than find a balance. Some sectors who were encouraged to attend and participate had no tangible constituents.
- 10 The table did not reach agreement on anything. It was a complete failure.
- 19 Lack of terms of reference resulted in confusion and unclear expectations of what could be included in a regional plan. Direction was vague and top-down. In the end, the plan lacked substance and the negotiation process has been extremely divisive.
- 27 Rapidly deteriorated to trade-offs between sectors. *May* increase certainty and partially reduce conflict. Has not even begun to address sustainability.

**Section 2: Process Design****Q2.1 Who designed the process?**

options: CORE; table, all sectors participating; mediators; other

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
CORE	3	4	7
table	1	2	3
mediators	1	-	1
CORE and table	1	2	3
CORE and table and mediators	4	6	10
table and mediators	-	-	-
CORE and mediators	3	1	4
CORE and government	-	1	1
other	3	-	3
no response	-	-	-
TOTAL	16	16	32

*'Other' responses:*

- 27 CORE established a few general guidelines, the mediators attempted to develop a process with the table, but from the beginning of the process a small group succeeded in discrediting CORE and the mediators, so there never was a well-defined process.
- 26 Bureaucracy (Ministerial)
- 10 CORE encouraged table to design the process. In absence of decisions by table, CORE and mediators attempted to fill the gaps.

**Business-Government comments***CORE*

- 19 'Process Agreements' were developed by mediator and table but composition of the table and overall structure was determined by CORE

*CORE and table and mediators*

- 14 CORE set the general process, tables set the conduct of the table, mediators set the details, and the government provided some policy framework, e.g. participant assistance background, goal of 12% protected provincially, time frame.
- 17 All of the above -- portions of process were flexible, others were set, i.e. 12%

- protected area goal was set by province
- 4 CORE developed framework -- shared decision making format. Table negotiated process rules (ad nauseam). Mediator influenced table.

### **Special Interest groups Comments**

#### *CORE*

- 9 The feeling that government already had a plan persisted throughout the event and seemed confirmed by the end.
- 3 Participating sectors and mediator decided minor points.

#### *CORE and table*

- 11 CORE started or laid down ground rules. Table as we learned what we needed and wanted.
- 7 CORE stated 'no rules' which *is* a rule.

#### *CORE and table and mediators*

- 28 It was jointly done under direction of the mediators, but they steered us towards CORE's blueprint.
- 22 All of the above. Basic format -- CORE, but mediator and participants set final guidelines for table

#### *CORE and mediators*

- 16 There was never really a clear understanding of the process especially the actual land use product. A lot of time was spent on the mechanical details and very little time on the issues that really meant something to people's lives. This endeavour was touted as being a ground breaking never-before-done initiative, experimental really, and therefore subject to the usual problems with a new design. In my opinion the Commission didn't research the field very much. The table did not realise the power it possessed *if* it spoke with unanimity.



**Q2.2 Who was in control of the process?**

options: CORE; table, all sectors participating; mediators; other

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
CORE	3	2	5
table	2	5	7
mediators	-	-	-
CORE and table	-	-	-
CORE and table and mediators	3	4	7
table and mediators	-	-	-
CORE and mediators	3	3	6
CORE and government	1	-	1
other	4	2	6
no response	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

*'Other' responses***Special Interest Groups**

- 9 Government and timber industry 'outweighed' all others and behaved as if the process would make no difference at all.
- 3 There were five sectors who wanted the process to fail. They were in control.

**Business-Government**

- 26 Bureaucracy (Ministerial)
- 10 CORE intended table to control. In absence of effective control by table CORE and mediators attempted to guide table.
- 4 No-one. Which was a problem for this process. Other regional processes more controlled.
- 27 CORE established a few general guidelines, the mediators attempted to develop a process with the table, but from the beginning of the process a small group succeeded in discrediting CORE and the mediators, so there never was a well-defined process.

**Special Interest Groups Comments**

*table*

- 6 Unfortunately -- because the industrial interests banded together from the very beginning to sabotage the process.

*CORE and mediators*

- 28 CORE via mediators

*CORE and table and mediators*

- 8 All -- in and out of balance.
- 22 At different times all of above, but mainly CORE.

**Business-Government Comments**

*CORE*

- 19 Agenda content was totally under CORE.

*CORE and table and mediators*

- 17 All of above -- varied depending upon the issue and circumstances.
- 14 Including government representative.

**Q2.3 At what point was the process designed?**

options: before your sector was contacted; at your first meeting with CORE; at the first meetings of the table; other

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
before your sector was contacted	5	3	8
at your first meetings with CORE	1	-	1
at the first meetings of the table	-	4	4
all of the above	1	-	1
other	9	9	18
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

*'Other' responses***Business-Government**

- 27 CORE established a few general guidelines, the mediators attempted to develop a process with the table, but from the beginning of the process a small group succeeded in discrediting CORE and the mediators, so there never was a well-defined process.
- 17 Mediators/CORE came to table with outline of process which was modified as needed.
- 25 over 18 months of useless meetings
- 24 At the first *many* meetings of the table. Far too much time was spent on 'process.'
- 23 CORE had a concept of the shared decision making approach which was refined in both the convening stage (contacting sectors) and the early table meetings.
- 14 All of the above: partly before the sectors were contacted, plus minor changes throughout, e.g., extensions, scope of recommendations expanded
- 10 We never achieved a process that one could describe as 'designed.'
- 4 Part of old growth strategy and plus a committee that recommended CORE like approach.
- 1 Process was never fully defined and/or designed. 12-14 months were spent trying to design the process.

**Special Interest Groups**

- 9 A general explanation was prepared in advance--the whole first year was spent trying to get participants to understand how the process was supposed to work.
- 29 Before the sector was contacted, and several early table sessions and through process.
- 21 It took a number of meetings to finalise the process.

- 22 It changed as time went on.
- 15 On-going!!!
- 16 There was never really a clear understanding of the process especially the actual land use product. A lot of time was spent on the mechanical details and very little time on the issues that really meant something to people's lives. This endeavour was touted as being a ground breaking never-before-done initiative, experimental really, and therefore subject to the usual problems with a new design. In my opinion the Commission didn't research the field very much. The table did not realise the power it possessed *if* it spoke with unanimity.
- 11 We started with a plan but we changed the process to accommodate the learning process we were all going through.
- 7 Later, at the table.
- 8 All of the above -- It was dynamic all the time.

### **Business-Government Comments**

*before your sector was contacted*

- 26 The intention of the initial design was that forestry workers *would not be* represented.

*all of the above*

- 5 Mostly before the sector was contacted; also had later input.

### **Special Interest Groups Comments**

*before your sector was contacted*

- 12 Ostensibly, sectors were involved in setting some terms of reference, but CORE had designed the 'grand plan.'

*at the first meetings of the table*

- 6 many meetings were required -- the industrial interests banded together from the very beginning to sabotage the process.

**Q2.4 Was the process designed to flexible in response to the changing needs of the table?**

options: yes; no

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	7	7	14
no	6	5	11
other	3	3	6
no response	-	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

*'Other' responses*

**Business-Government**

- 27 There was too much flexibility, e.g., the first 3 months (one quarter to one fifth of the time) was wasted on trying to agree on the subject area boundaries. That could and should have been a given. Several meetings were wasted arguing over who should and shouldn't receive financial assistance.
- 17 Partially -- limited time/data/resources/funding and inflexible models resulted in poor analysis of various land use options. Also spending policies.
- 10 We never achieved a process that one could describe as 'designed.'

**Special Interest Groups**

- 9 A superficial set-up made participants think they were having some control at times, but every time something real almost happened, a stooge would waylay it.
- 28 To a point, but not enough for use to veer away from an obvious plan, i.e., amount of park, or boundary of region.
- 15 At times it was too flexible, at other times too rigid.

**Business-Government Comments**

*yes*

- 24 The table had control of the process and could make any changes it deemed appropriate.
- 14 e.g.: timing of meetings; duration of process; participant assistance; topics to address; accounts for MAA; quality of analysis in some cases
- 5 I think so.
- 4 Too flexible. Too accommodating of requests for information that was never intended to be used in negotiation. Information requests were mainly to support positional bargaining.
- 2 It took about 18 months to determine how we were going to conduct business or terms of reference for the table, but the process itself was pre-determined. Needed

100% consensus to make a deal which only allowed for blocking rather than finding a solution.

*no*

- 26 Flexibility was forced onto the process by specific sectors -- it was not designed to be flexible.
- 25 Consensus didn't work -- some sectors would not agree to anything except when to have a coffee break.
- 19 CORE was almost totally preoccupied with process/procedural meetings -- seemed unwilling to discuss even the most elementary aspects of a plan including provision of relevant practical information necessary for informed discussion (vs. positional [arguments]).
- 18 The essential consensus based process was more or less fixed. Exactly what constituted a consensus, the role of the mediators, the staging of decisions, etc, were flexible and determined by the participants.
- 1 Shared decision making and consensus within 22 sector proved to be a process nightmare!

### **Special Interest Groups Comments**

*yes*

- 21 But it took a long time to get a consensus decision for a change.
- 22 A basic design was presented at the beginning, but the table set its own rules of operation in the first few meetings. The time line was extended a few times to attempt to reach agreement.
- 11 We changed as we learned what land use planning was.
- 8 Too much so, to the detriment of efficient time usage.

*no*

- 20 Definitely not! Change was only possible if all sectors agreed, a most unlikely event! We couldn't even agree on the meaning of consensus.
- 16 In the end, the process designers became trapped in the "Chart of Accounts" spreadsheet based decision making system. Values and other unquantifiable issues were quantified anyway. Computer based requirements ended up driving the system -- the tail ended up wagging the dog.
- 12 The mediator needed the authority to "call the process to a halt and declare it invalid" when stakeholders violated 'operating rules.' There needed to be an opportunity for the table to meet privately out of the public eye.
- 6 The process was changed several times seeking a format which would work, but every format perceived by the industrial interests to be unproductive to their interests was sabotaged by them. This was done at first by passive resistance, but if that failed, then they just denied that they had ever agreed to it, and/or refused to participate in any further meetings. The mediators did not have 'the balls' to say "well then, ok, we will just proceed without you." (The only tactic that would have forced them to continue.) In lieu, the industrial interests were just allowed to dictate another process.

- 3 There was one criteria necessary for success that was never incorporated in the process and made any other flexibility irrelevant. It was never stipulated and agreed upon that the objective (12% protected, representing the bio-geoclimatic variables) was to be sincerely worked towards. As I said -- some groups were there in bad faith and consensus cannot be achieved with saboteurs.

**Q2.5 Do you think that the shared decision making process was designed in a way that facilitated the creation of an acceptable land use plan by the table? In other words, did the means direct the table to the end?**

Options: yes; no

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	6	2	8
no	8	11	19
other	2	3	5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

*'Other' responses*

**Special Interest Groups**

- 20 yes and no. The process facilitated the creation of a land use plan that was acceptable to some sectors and the government of the day and not acceptable to most participants.
- 22 yes and no. It was a good try -- but in the end there was not agreement in full. The problems were not so much with the process -- but the context of the process, i.e., some sectors knew they could always appeal to Cabinet or already held resource tenure.
- 8 It was part of what was needed. The table meeting component is not a natural way to communicate -- best movement and heart-felt understanding happen away from the table.

**Business-Government**

- 14 partly. Accountability for decisions was lacking. Mandate of representatives varied.
- 10 We had no design and we did not get anywhere.

**Special Interest Groups comments**

*no*

- 9 It should have but preconceived notions and an 'end' already formed by government and timber industry constantly perverted efforts by others at table
- 28 Because it become obvious that government had its own goal, and our region had to fit into their plan. Because sectors were encouraged not to put their 'cards' on the table so therefore we were there to negotiate, not reach consensus.
- 29 Many sectors participated primarily to maintain the status quo and I guess understandably to minimise impact on the represented interest
- 21 CORE needed to establish goals and time frames for the table to reach.
- 16 The table generated its own set of policy recommendations and concept based land use direction in spite of the insistence of the Commission and government on the



- 'Chart of Accounts' model.
- 12 All the discussions happened in public. The kind of concessions that were required of some sectors simply could not happen in public in full view of the stakeholders. There was one sector at the table that had no business being there.
- 6 The process was changed several times seeking a format which would work, but every format perceived by the industrial interests to be unproductive to their interests was sabotaged by them. This was done at first by passive resistance, but if that failed, then they just denied that they had ever agreed to it, and/or refused to participate in any further meetings. The mediators did not have 'the balls' to say "well then, ok, we will just proceed without you." (The only tactic that would have forced them to continue.) In lieu, the industrial interests were just allowed to dictate another process.
- 3 As I said -- everyone must accept, sincerely, the goal and work towards it to have success.

### **Business-Government comments**

*yes*

- 27 The design was flawed, but could have worked.
- 24 However, more time should have been spent developing scenarios rather than developing process.
- 23 The process could have worked if: better/clearer policy and planning framework from start; sectors really understood and worked with interests; 'scale' was more appropriate -- planning area was too big to allow people to relate and resolve differences effectively; spokespersons were more accountable.
- 4 Table did not take advantage of opportunity

*no*

- 32 No, there was no *real* shared decision making. The make up of the table was stacked with environmental groups in various disguises. In any case it didn't matter because the real decisions were being made elsewhere behind closed doors. This process was merely a 'red herring' to divert attention.
- 17 Shared decision making only works if *all* parties are committed to accepting results and type of process. Some sectors at the regional process were wolves in sheep skins and always planned to end run process if their *positions* were compromised.
- 26 The purpose was not to create a land use plan. It was a process designed to co-opt the interests of workers and current resource users in the interests of parks and anti-logging philosophies within the bureaucracies of the Minister of Forests and Environment and Tourism.
- 25 The plan was drawn up in Victoria by the CORE staff who cherry picked the information they wanted from the CORE table discussions and ignored what didn't fit what Commissioner already had in mind.
- 19 Application of 'negotiated' decision making process directed towards division of land base on ideological grounds has not solved and problems and has created winners and losers.
- 18 Bad faith participation by some sectors -- publicly admitted by IWA V.P. at Cariboo table. Consensus was never possible given the players, issues and history.

Despite the contentions of CORE and mediators, belief that all interests could be met on the land base was naive.

- 1 Shared decision making and consensus within 22 sector proved to be a process nightmare!

**Q2.6 In hindsight, where was the emphasis placed?**

Options: on the means -- the shared decision making process; on the end -- the land use plan

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
on the means -- the shared decision making process	9	8	17
on the end -- the land use plan	2	3	5
other	5	4	3
no response	-	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

*'Other' responses***Special Interest Groups**

- 28 In neither of these areas. Our discussion were simply 'cherry picked' to formulate the report and I believe that was the intent to start with.
- 29 On the means early in the process, on the end towards the end of the process.
- 22 it was both.
- 3 As time wore on the emphasis changed from means to end.

**Business-Government**

- 27 There was no clear consensus on this -- it fluctuated and different participants had different views. Substance was often derailed by process.
- 17 Both.
- 18 Both.
- 14 The means was emphasized by facilitators, the end was emphasised by some sectors and CORE.

**Special Interest Groups comments***on the means*

- 20 Change was only possible if all sectors agreed, a most unlikely event! We couldn't even agree on the meaning of consensus.
- 6 and how to subvert it.

**Business-Government comments***on the end*

- 26 On the pre-designated plan.

**Q2.7 Please rate the effectiveness of the process in facilitating the creation of an acceptable land use plan.**

Options: very effective; mostly effective; somewhat effective; a little effective; not effective

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
very effective	-	1	1
mostly effective	2	1	3
somewhat effective	5	8	13
a little effective	1	-	1
not effective	8	4	12
other	-	2	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

*'Other' responses*

**Special Interest groups**

11 Still waiting to see outcome.

**Business-Government comments**

*somewhat effective*

14 Wrong scale -- too large a scope.

4 Could have been more effective, more recent examples of this approach providing results, e.g., lower mainland protected areas advisory committee.

*not effective*

19 Might have had a better chance if CORE and table had a clear understanding of what a regional plan is, how it is administered and some attempt was made to provide and discuss factual information.

2 Did not come to consensus and CORE made its own plan devoid of any input but environmental.

**Special Interest groups comments**

*very effective*

31 Again, wrong question. Process was not at fault. The provincial and international politics killed CORE. IWA, MacBloe, MOF, etc. No process will work if the participants are dedicated to its failure.

*somewhat effective*

- 28 Only because there was some dialogue begun between sectors and a basic desire to create a workable plan. Which we finally did away from the CORE process -- directly with government.
- 6 It did produce a lot of very solid local knowledge of the land and local use preference which the Commissioner made good use of, but the government did not accept the Commissioner's report.

*not effective*

- 9 But mainly because of the undermining.

**Section 3: Land Use Planning System**

**Q3.1 How many workshops or meetings were held to explain the planning system that the table would be using to create a land use plan?**

Options: 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; over 4

	Business -Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
0	2	1	3
1	-	1	1
2	4	2	6
3	1	1	2
4	-	-	-
over 4	6	7	13
other	3	1	4
no response	-	3	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

*'Other' responses*

**Business-Government**

- 23 Explanations occurred over several meetings, not at a 'workshop.' A planning system was not defined as CORE felt the table should do that by consensus, which is a mistake. Luckily the facilitators had strength and experience in planning to help define the process. Table spokespersons are not planning professionals -- don't ask them to spend time designing a system which is already well understood.
- 19 Process was about land allocation -- not planning! where are we? where do we want to go? how do we get there?
- 10 One cannot have a land use planning system without defining categories of land use. We never defined categories.

**Business-Government Comments**

*over 4*

- 27 Or 0, depending on your interpretation. Many meetings attempted to design a planning system.
- 18 The table developed the planning system with *too* strong direction from CORE.
- 14 generally part of the meeting agenda and started small, general then more detail.

**Special Interest Groups comments**

*One*

6 Plus a few hours when new processes were adopted.

*Two*

8 Sectors were unprepared to start. I think that 90% of one effort should have been away from the table with mega government resources.

*over 4*

9 Almost every meeting spent a lot of time talking about the system.

21 Keep in mind the table was to design the system with help from CORE.

**Q3.2 How would you characterise the level of participation that your sector had in the design of the land use planning system?**

Options: too much participation; enough participation; too little participation; no participation; don't know

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
too much participation	1	2	3
enough participation	7	9	16
too little participation	2	3	5
no participation	3	1	4
don't know	-	1	1
other	3	-	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

*'Other' responses*

**Business-Government**

- 18 Within the constraints of fairly conventional planning processes we participated a great deal. However, CORE and many of the business, and local government sectors stuck rigidly to the conventional and familiar, despite the fact that the conventional and familiar were responsible for many of the problems in the first place.
- 2 Did not end up with a plan.

**Business-Government comments**

*too little participation*

- 14 too little in setting terms of reference.

*no participation*

- 19 Attended but CORE unwilling to discuss and address issues -- see agenda control.

**Special Interest Groups comments**

*enough participation*

- 20 Process permitted participation but ask if participation was effective.
- 21 The same as any other sector had.

*too much participation*

- 3 Any participation in such a flawed process is too much.



**Q3.3 How effective was your participation in the design of the land use planning system?**

Options: very effective; mostly effective; somewhat effective; a little effective; not effective

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
very effective	2	-	2
mostly effective	3	4	7
somewhat effective	4	7	11
a little effective	1	3	4
not effective	5	2	7
other	1	-	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Government-Business comments**

*mostly effective*

23 Government sector was key to refining the system, given their experience.

*somewhat effective*

17 Again -- lack of useful data and an inflexible computer model reduced value of impact analysis.

26 But not through the process.

18 Within the constraints of fairly conventional planning processes we participated a great deal. However, CORE and many of the business, local government sectors stuck rigidly to the conventional and familiar, despite the fact that the conventional and familiar were responsible for many of the problems in the first place.

*not effective*

10 Because no system was planned.

**Special Interest Groups comments**

*mostly effective*

6 We did eventually arrive at a system which would work *if* all the sectors had been prepared to work with it. They were not.

*somewhat effective*

20 We did have some impact but were unable to get socioeconomic studies done.

*not effective*

3 Our sector was commended for being the most proactive and helpful in the process -  
- but it failed.

**Q3.4 Please characterise your sector's understanding of the land use planning system:**

Options: high; adequate; low; inadequate

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
high	12	4	16
adequate	2	10	12
low	-	-	-
inadequate	1	1	2
other	1	1	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

*'Other' Responses*

**Special Interest Groups**

20 Low to begin, high at end.

**Special Interest Groups comments**

*adequate*

21 I was familiar with E.S. planning.

**Q3.5 Please describe the steps of a land use planning system, as perceived by your sector during the time of the CORE process:**

**Government-Business**

respondent 27

- research -- determination of inventory, carrying capacity, resilience, interactions/system dynamics etc.
- identification of interests, needs, activities
- exploration of options, development of scenarios, assessment of impacts
- resolution, plan development and ratification
- monitoring, continuing research, revision

respondent 17

1. Set the goals or vision for landscape
2. Collect and assess (understand) biophysical/cultural/other values and capabilities
3. Zone out landscape into uses based upon capability, values and social requirements / constraints
4. Assess/calculate levels of production/use/harvest/ecosystem protection etc. as a result of zoning
5. Develop guidelines to manage use / maintain productivity and ecosystem health plus meet social constraints

respondent 26

It was a farce -- a setup completely hostile to us and our interests.

respondent 25

CORE collapsed without agreeing on a land use plan. The table was deadlocked! Government ministries did not provide full data base needed to make fully informed decisions.

respondent 24

- Agree on a process
- Develop scenarios
- Assess impact of scenarios
- Revise scenarios
- Reassess

respondent 23

- vision
- sector interests / indicators
- resources / economic data / base case
- sector values (mapped)
- scenario development
- analysis
- negotiated agreement



respondent 1  
N/A.

### **Special Interest Groups**

respondent 9

1. Government creates a final plan
2. Commission touts high ideals and tries to teach people interest-based negotiation rather than 'positional' dealing
3. People are led to believe their participation will actually create a plan that will be implemented
4. Government manipulates any documents created to match their original plan, then tells public at large the table did it. Lies and cheats.

respondent 28

Basically as you described it in your opening statement, with the added emphasis on honesty and willingness by participants to actually reach a decision.

respondent 20

1. Visioning exercises
2. Developing different scenarios -- told too expensive to do different iterations; very limited feedback.
3. impact assessment -- did not happen

respondent 21

1. Identify the plan area
2. Define the objectives and goals
3. Gather the information to meet objectives and goals
4. Analyse the information
5. Present options
6. Choose the best options

respondent 22

- resource inventory and definition of terms of reference (i.e., area and policy framework from government)
- identification of sector interests -- application of interim measures where necessary
- definition of measures necessary to protect sector interests (e.g., land use designations and management guidelines)
- negotiation of application of land use designations and guidelines
- impact analysis and feedback to fine tune land use plan proposals
- final plan
- mitigation and implementation strategy -- economic transition strategy
- implementation
- monitoring
- review and revision

respondent 16

1. Exposure to interest based negotiation principles (cursory)
2. Process agreement (lengthy)
3. Information gathering (uncertain)
4. Articulating interests (abstract)
5. Various committees struck (most of the work accomplished)
6. Land use negotiation (too little too late)

respondent 12

The sector covered the entire region. Few funds were allotted to communication with the sectors so there was little understanding or interest initially.

respondent 6

1. Design the system
2. Gather the necessary data (secure specialist analysis)
3. Create GIS capability
4. Create the product

Note: 1 to 3 took so long there was no time for 4. In retrospect the system should have been designed by 'experts' and imposed. The problem to be solved should have been imposed. (The table can go nowhere if industry denies there is any problem except how to get more wood.)

respondent 8

1. Teach about process
2. Organise sectors
3. Correlate sectors
4. Find commonality/conflicts
5. Sort out 4
6. Develop guidelines

respondent 3

There should have been objectives. Second, there should have been acceptance of objectives. Third should have been method.

**Section 4: Sectors**

**Q4.1 I want to know how effective the line of communication were within your sector.**

**How often were sector meetings held?**

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups
once a week	1	2
three times a month	-	1
twice a month	4	4
once a month	7	4
as needed	2	4
other	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>

**How did you contact your constituency?**

number of sectors that used each form of communication	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups
phone	6	5
mail	4	2
fax	6	5
newsletter	-	1
E-mail	1	-
meetings	1	-
newspaper	1	-
other	4	6

**How often did the steering committee meet?**

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups
two to three times a week	1	1
weekly	3	2
every two weeks	1	-
monthly	5	4
as needed	2	1
rarely met	1	2
never met	-	2
other	1	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>15</b>

**Special Interest Groups**

28 No steering committee -- two Spokes people did the job.

6 We had no steering committee. We worked as a sector.

**Did the steering committee share your workload?**

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups
yes	9	11
no	5	4
other	-	1
no response	2	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>



**How many constituents went to a round table meeting?**

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups
0%	-	3
1 - 10%	8	7
10 - 50%	1	1
50 - 100%	3	2
other	1	-
no response	3	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>

**Business-Government comments**

18 Generally myself and the alternate spokesperson. Sometimes union members.

13 Several officials per meeting.

**Were you satisfied with the amount of communication that occurred within your sector?**

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	12	8	20
no	3	7	10
no response	1	1	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government comments**

*no*

25 Lot of people had no faith or interest in the CORE process.

**Special Interest Groups comments**

*no*

20 But the diverse constituencies and geography were difficult to deal with.

**Was funding adequate to cover communication costs?**

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	10	4	14
no	5	12	17
no response	1	-	1
TOTAL	16	16	32

**Special Interest Groups comments**

*no*

- 22 But there were other funding needs we would consider a higher priority -- e.g., research.

**I would like to know how effective the lines of communication were within your sector. What would you have done differently next time?**

**Special Interest Groups**

- 31 Spend more time lobbying
- 9 Not bother trusting government, timber industry, mining or agriculture; nor would our sector ever again use so much gas, paper, electricity or telephones!
- 28 Given the attitude of the general public I doubt if it could be done differently. Our sector had representation from individuals and organisations of varying size, but even members of those groups did not believe the process would work, so therefore were passive participants at the best. I do believe though that it is divisive to set up a table based on sector orientation. There are a number of ways to ensure that all interests are represented without putting a label on each participant. If we were there for the good of all, not to 'protect' our sector and its vision we might have concluded the task.
- 29 I would not participate.
- 20 Our sector joined the process very late and not enough time was available for getting more involvement from communities.
- 22 Try to keep the sectors better informed of realities around the context.
- 16 Circulate written coverage of the process -- obtain support from constituency in stages -- more and better communication overall.
- 11 Better lead time needed. A better understanding of what would happen if we had not participated, to get better information exchange.
- 12 If the government imposes a process, it needs to ensure adequate funds are available for travel and communication. Wealthy forest companies could and did out spend smaller sectors by 100 to one.
- 6 As a sector, nothing. What we did as a sector worked for our sector. As a 10 sector 'green' group, which we eventually had to form to resist the tactics of the 8 sector industrial group, we would have done better with a more formal structure.

- 8 Better preparation before the table got together. Work 50% of the total away from and before the table gets together with all available government resources at one's fingertips.
- 3 I would not participate -- I wasted hundreds of hours over 18 months and travelled thousands of miles -- I should have gone hiking.

### **Business-Government**

- 32 Not participate unless process made fair, effective and having real decision making power.
- 27 Because the process never got beyond process argument until the 11th hour, and then focussed on horse-trading, our sector had little to contribute substantively. There was nothing to take to our sector and once it was clear the table was not going to address sustainability, Biodiversity, etc., little opportunity for our input.
- 17 Sector communication for myself not an issue, but keeping general public informed was difficult. Table tried to do this but no resources from government to do so.
- 26 I would never continue to participate in a process that had in its design such evidence of a bias as was evidenced very early in this process. We continued with the process against our better judgement -- at great expense of time and resource. In the end, our pro-action and resistance is all that saved us from annihilation by the process.
- 25 Avoid the whole CORE process which was imposed by Victoria and run by a bureaucracy.
- 24 Given similar circumstances -- probably nothing.
- 18 I wouldn't pretend that all needs could be met. Focus on sustainability, identification of limits, current relationship to limits, transition strategies, equitable sharing of costs of change, ask participants to consider the public interest rather than their own sectoral interests, exclude the corporate sector.
- 14 Not much in terms of 'communication.'
- 10 Insist on a better process before agreeing to participate.
- 5 Work harder to familiarise myself with the process. Work harder to meet other participants away from the table.
- 4 A constant theme in the post mortem: be more draconian in choosing spokespersons. Need knowledgeable people with broad perspectives and skilled at negotiation. Government to identify sectors and representatives.
- 2 ? May not attend. At least not agree to be sector representative.
- 1 If one were to participate -- not much change would be made.

**Q4.2 Please circle true or false to indicate how the following statements relate to you as spokesperson:**

Statements	Business-Government			Special Interest Groups		
	True	False	Other	True	False	Other
My sector was representing one basic interest	4	12	-	11	5	-
There were too many groups within my sector	-	14	1	-	16	-
I was able to represent my sector effectively	10	3	1	13	2	1
I was accountable to my sector	15	-	-	15	1	-
I was an effective spokesperson for my sector	11	2	-	14	1	1
I represented all interests in my sector at the table	13	1	-	16	-	-
The process was fair	4	8	-	5	10	1
Each sector was adequately empowered at the table	6	10	-	7	9	-
Mediators addressed power imbalances effectively	5	9	-	7	8	1
The process addressed power imbalances effectively	1	12	1	5	11	-

There were a few 'no responses' so the numbers do not always add up in the business-government group.

*'Other' Responses*

**Special Interest Groups**

22 The mediators tried to address power imbalances

**Business-Government comments**

17 Each sector was not equally empower at the table because of finances.

**Special Interest Groups comments**

29 CORE was fair in balancing a terribly unbalanced table.

20 Even when a split occurred, we were honest and presented all interests within the sector at the table.

6 My sector was representing one basic interest from many different perspectives. Each sector was equally empowered at the table but some used their power more effectively. The process addressed power imbalances when the sectors worked within it.

3 I was able to represent my sector effectively within the limits of a flawed system.

**Q4.3 Did the sector model of representation make the process fair? Did it allow the participants to negotiate on more equal footing?**

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
all the time	0	1	1
most of the time	7	5	12
some of the time	5	6	11
never	3	1	4
other	0	3	3
no response	1	0	1
TOTAL	16	16	32

*'Other' Responses*

**Special Interest Groups**

- 28 I marked both 'some of the time' and 'never' because to be honest I would have to say that there were times when sector representation did seem to help. But mostly not.
- 29 Government was constantly affecting decisions which influenced the work of the table.
- 6 The sector model made the process fair all of the time. It allowed the participants to negotiate on more equal footing some of the time.

**Business-Government comments**

*most of the time*

- 27 This was a big part of the problem: Planning is not negotiation. This was largely negotiation and not at all planning.

*some of the time*

- 19 Representation model did not consider wider public.

**Special Interest Groups comments**

*most of the time*

- 22 Problem was that some sectors knew they could get what they wanted outside the process.

**Section 5: Information**

**Q5.1** This is a three part question. In the first column, indicate if the information was received at that stage in the land use planning process. The second category asks you to indicate if the information was timely. The third category asks for the quality of the information.

**Business-Government Group**

stage of process	get info?		timely?		quality?		
	yes	no	yes	no	high	med	low
1. preparation	9	3	7	5	3	6	4
2. goal setting, land designation system creation	7	5	6	6	1	6	4*
3. interests defined on the land	8	4	5	7	3	4	3`
4. assessment of compatibility of interests	6	6	4	8	3	2	5
5. development of land use scenarios	6	7	4	9	2	3	6
6. scenario evaluation, impact assessment	5	8	3	10	1	3	7*
7. refinement of scenarios	4	8	2	10	1	3	6*
8. creation of implementation plan	5	7	1	10	1	4	6*

'No responses' account for the numbers not totalling 16 in each category.

\* One 'other' response.

` Two 'other' responses.

**Comments**

26 Steps 2 and 3: N/A. Steps 6 and 8, dishonest at best.

18 (no response) Most of the information was irrelevant. The question of sustainability was new. Money and time constraints meant only readily available information was provided (except for mapping). It was the same information that lead to the problems in the first place. New information was not provided on the issues identified above -- sustainability, indicators, resource and pollution accounts, better definitions of community income, etc.

14 Step 8 was not done.

### Special Interest Groups

stage of process	get info?		timely?		quality?		
	yes	no	yes	no	high	med	low
preparation	8	4	3	10	-	7	4
goal setting, land designation system creation	9	4	5	9	3	3	6*
interests defined on the land	9	3*	6	8	3	7	2*
assessment of compatibility of interests	5	8	5	9	1	4	7*
development of land use scenarios	6	7	4	10	3	2	7*
scenario evaluation, impact assessment	4	8	1	11*	1	3	6`
refinement of scenarios	4	7	3	9	1	2	5`
creation of implementation plan	3	9	3	10	-	2	8`

'No responses' account for the numbers not totalling 16 in each category.

\* One 'other' response.

` Two 'other' responses.

### Comments

- 28 Step 1 information was medium quality, when we did get it after prep. time. We did not get to the last four stages.
- 29 All the government people working to help the table were excellent. They struggled to create an integrated information system which had previously never existed, at a scale of resolution and range of resources never before attempted in the region. They failed, but not for lack of trying. The inventory information on timber was the most developed. Mineral, range, general wildlife information was useful to a degree. Ecological information was pathetic.
- 22 It is not being implemented.
- 3 Usually the information arrived sometime after it was needed. But hard to anticipate all that would be needed in a new process.

**Q5.2 Was the baseline information appropriate for your sector's needs?**

Options: yes; mostly; somewhat; no

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	2	1	3
mostly	3	4	7
somewhat	1	7	8
no	9	3	12
other	1	-	1
no response	-	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business Government Group comments**

*no*

- 32 It was irrelevant.
- 19 Roads, river ways, communities not shown on map.

*'other'*

- 17 Somewhat and no.

*no response*

- 26 Can't answer -- the baseline information met the needs of the pre-designed plan -- it was useless to use and misleading in the extreme at best.

**Special Interest Group comments**

*yes*

- 6 But arrived too little, too late.

*somewhat*

- 22 Didn't get all we wanted.

*no*

- 9 Not at all.

*no response*

- 29 All the government people working to help the table were excellent. They struggled to create an integrated information system which had previously never existed, at a scale of resolution and range of resources never before attempted in the region. They failed, but not for lack of trying. The inventory information on timber was the



most developed. Mineral, range, general wildlife information was useful to a degree. Ecological information was pathetic.

**Q5.3 Was the baseline information appropriate for the needs of the land use planning system?**

Options: yes; mostly; somewhat; no

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	2	-	2
mostly	3	2	5
somewhat	3	10	13
no	6	3	9
other	2	-	2
no response	-	1	1
TOTAL	16	16	32

**Business-Government comments**

*mostly*

14 Some sectors wanted to go into 'too much' detail -- not enough information and time for that.

*no*

19 Forestry information and some other ministry data were very good but no grasp of overall information requirements at a regional scale.  
 18 Not for the one we wanted.

*'other'*

2 Somewhat and no.

*no response*

26 Can't answer -- the baseline information met the needs of the pre-designed plan -- it was useless to use and misleading in the extreme at best.

**Special Interest Group comments**

*somewhat*

22 Could always use more.

*mostly*

6 Some sectors demanded excessive information as a way of delaying the process.

*no*

9 Totally bogus.

28 Because it came in bits and pieces. Not as needed.

*no response*

29 All the government people working to help the table were excellent. They struggled to create an integrated information system which had previously never existed, at a scale of resolution and range of resources never before attempted in the region. They failed, but not for lack of trying. The inventory information on timber was the most developed. Mineral, range, general wildlife information was useful to a degree. Ecological information was pathetic.

**Section 6: Boundaries**

**Q6.1 Were you comfortable with the size of the geographic area for which the table was asked to create a land use plan?**

Options: yes; no

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	12	11	23
no	4	5	9
TOTAL	16	16	32

**Business-Government**

*no*

25 Left out major portion of two parks.

**Special Interest Groups**

*yes*

28 Except that we were to define our final boundary.

6 For a regional plan, but sub-regional and landscape unit plans are needed as a following process.

3 Size had to be large to be able to find the best representative areas -- but travel was too much.

**Q6.2 Please characterise the size of the area in regards to the creation of an acceptable land use plan.**

Options: too big; perfect size; adequate; too small

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
too big	2	6	8
perfect size	2	3	5
adequate	10	6	16
too small	1	-	1
other	1	1	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government**

27 Planning can be done / has to be done at all levels: provincial, regional, local.

30 It wasn't set!

**Special Interest Groups**

*perfect size*

28 Regional size unacceptable to our sector.

*'other'*

29 Perfect size -- it was defined by boundaries of regional management. Too small -- many extra boundary issues involved in evaluating ecosystems.

**Q6.3 Were the boundaries of the area mandated by CORE?**

Options: yes; no

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	9	4	13
no	6	9	15
other	-	2	2
no response	1	1	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government**

yes

5 At government direction.

**If yes, when?**

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups
before table creation	1	-
at start	1	1
soon after beginning	3	1
other	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>

**Business-Government**

32 After about 4 meetings.

27 Yes, but poorly defined.

17 Followed forestry boundaries but modified by table.

26 Who the hell knows?

**Special Interest Groups**

31 Too late.

**Q6.4 If the boundaries were not set by CORE, who did set the boundaries?**

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups
table	2	5
mediators	-	-
table and mediators	-	-
table and CORE	1	2
government	-	2
government and table	3	1
government and CORE	-	1
no one	-	1
other	2	1

**Business-Government**

- 27 CORE boundaries were challenged at the outset: the table was never able to agree on boundaries.
- 26 People who intended to maximise protected area increase by leaving existing protected area out of all boundaries -- if possible.
- 4 Table and it was a mistake. Too much time lost arguing about the boundary. CORE should have established boundary.
- 1 table sectors.

**Special Interest group**

- 31 Politics -- big government.
- 28 Boundary issue was not resolved. Region has three administration levels. There were two tentative boundaries used for discussion. CORE did cut the baby in half to write their report.
- 29 Regional boundary set by government. Sub-regional boundary set by government/CORE.
- 21 Table tried to set them.
- 22 Region defined by BC government and CORE.
- 6 The table was never able to agree on boundaries. The problem was that the industrial sectors wished to add existing parks not in the region, but adjacent to it, so as to decrease the amount of new protected areas required to produce the government's mandated 12% total allowance.

**Q6.5 How effective was the method of setting boundaries?**

Options: very effective; mostly effective; somewhat effective; a little effective; not effective

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
very effective	2	-	2
mostly effective	6	4	10
somewhat effective	1	3	4
a little effective	-	2	2
not effective	5	7	13
other	1	-	1
no response	1	-	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government**

32 CORE should have done this first and not wasted time.

*very effective*

26 We never agreed with the boundaries set arbitrarily at the outset. Since it never was changed other than to dilute our vociferous objections to the arbitrary boundary, it can be said it was effective.

*not effective*

2 Never resolved.



**Section 7: Policy Framework and Legislation****Q7.1 Was the Protected Areas Strategy in place at the start of the process?**

Options: yes; no

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	8	4	12
no	5	10	15
somewhat	1	2	3
other	1	-	1
no response	1	-	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government***other*

17 Both were evolving throughout the process and changed monthly.

**Special Interest Groups***no*

21 Part way through.

**Was the Forest Practices Act (containing the Forest Practices Code) in place at the start of the process?**

Options: yes; no

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	-	1	1
no	13	14	27
somewhat	1	1	2
other	1	-	1
no response	1	-	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government**

*no response*

27 Not fully defined.

*other*

17 Both were evolving throughout the process and changed monthly.

**Q7.2 If not all policies were in place, what effect did the lack of policy framework have on the ability of the table to create a land use plan?**

Options: positive; negative; no effect

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
positive	-	-	-
negative	12	14	26
no effect	3	2	5
other	1	-	1
no response	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government**

*negative*

- 17 No firm goal posts!
- 19 Too many parallel processes - confusing for table
- 14 Negative in that they created much more work, confusion. But...spawned policy development.

*other*

- 18 Depends. Existing policies can be constraints, which foreclose options -- as a results all options are set on table. Positive or negative - I'm not sure. Effect - yes they certainly had an effect.

**Special Interest Groups**

*negative*

- 20 Couldn't make knowledgeable scenarios when one of the basic building blocks was still being drafted.
- 11 We seemed to always be waiting for some policy or part of it. Especially in impact analysis.

*no effect*

- 3 It may have had an effect if the process had been sincere.

**Q7.3 If the policies were not in place, how much of an understanding did your sector have of the probable policy framework?**

Options: high understanding; adequate understanding; little understanding; no understanding

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
high understanding	2	2	4
adequate understanding	3	7	10
little understanding	7	6	13
no understanding	1	-	1
other	3	1	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government**

*high understanding*

4 As spokesperson I had intimate understanding and insight because I am a forest policy analyst and at the time was involved in many policy initiatives.

*'other'*

27 The land use plan was not determined by policy. I'm not sure this section is relevant.

*little understanding*

17 How can you understand something that is continually changing.

19 Plan still does not have a clearly defined administrative process.

**Special Interest Groups**

*high understanding*

9 Our participation in previous 'processes' made it clear that government already had an agenda and participation was window dressing.

*adequate understanding*

20 We understood what was likely to occur but without official approval of the new Forest Practices Code, assessment of impacts was very unsure.

**Section 8: Interim Policies****Q8.1 Who developed the interim policies?**

Options: CORE; table, all sectors participating; mediators (check appropriate boxes)

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
CORE	-	1	1
table	-	1	1
CORE + table	-	1	1
CORE + mediators	1	-	1
government	11	8	19
CORE + table + government	1	-	1
other	3	4	7
no response	-	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government***'other'*

- 27 It was business as usual: deferred areas were in place prior to the CORE process  
 25 Line ministries of government which simply stopped all activity in certain areas.

**Special Interest Groups**

- 9 All interim policies the table wanted in place during the process were denied by government.

*'other'*

- 29 With the exception of identifying only a handful of specific areas where special restriction might apply, land use policies were largely unaffected during two and a half year term of CORE.  
 6 Government had a special 'logaround' deferral in a specific area but all other requested interim policies were not offered or rejected by the table.

**Q8.2 At what point were interim policies developed?**

Options: before your sector was contacted; at your first meetings with CORE; at the first meetings of the table

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
before sectors were contacted	3	4	7
at first sector-CORE meetings	-	1	1
at first table meetings	-	1	1
later at the table	1	-	1
never ending	6	3	9
don't know	-	2	2
other	6	5	11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government**

*'other'*

- 27 They weren't.
- 26 We found policies out usually whenever we tried to do something that ran afoul of the bureaucrats plan.
- 23 Interim policies only applied to Protected Areas Strategy study areas. Balance of land base subject to regular practices.
- 19 These were evolving during table discussions adding to uncertainty/distrust.
- 18 I think some were set early and others changed during the process.
- 10 From time to time.
- 5 During our process; we were intermittently aware.
- 2 Don't know, whenever government chose to do so.

**Special Interest Groups**

*'other'*

- 29 Intense discussion around stopping development in several identified areas occurred early in the process but were never formally advanced, with the exceptions noted above.
- 20 Clayoquot decision. Protected Areas Strategy. Interim set asides. Cabinet, at its whimsy.
- 21 What was to happen with log around areas as protected areas were being considered.

22 Some deferrals under PAS study areas but generally business as usual -- NO interim measures.

*at first table meetings*

22 We walked out of the process to push BC government to implement interim measures.

**Q8.3 Please describe the interim policies that guided development, mining and forestry practices while the table was meeting.**

**Business-Government**

- 17 Limited logging in certain areas. Recreational opportunities held in abeyance.
- 26 We had large areas set aside from development ahead of time over our objections. Our interests were thus greatly compromised before the process started -- significant proposals tabled when it would injure our interests the most.
- 25 Some areas were frozen by interim measures so no mining, no forestry and no development could take place.
- 24 Business as usual.
- 19 These were not developed by the table.
- 18 There was some attempt to stop logging in a few key areas of environmental concern.
- 14 Study area designation (PAS). Achieve AAC with current management (included evolving CODE). Mining: BC was "open for business." Unwritten policy was "be sensitive to the direction table was heading."
- 13 'Logarounds' in key areas
- 4 PAS; logarounds; FPC Act; Forest Sector Strategy therefore Forest Renewal BC
- 2 Government's whim.
- 1 Other planning initiatives were 'back burner' while the table met.

**Special Interest Groups**

- 31 There were none. It was business as usual in the forest.
- 9 Business as usual.
- 28 Mostly pre-table guidelines. Idea was to discuss and change those.
- 6 Business as usual (except for one logaround).
- 3 Business as usual.



**Section 9: Commission on Resources and Environment****Q9.1 Please describe how your sector perceived the Commission on Resources and Environment during the process.***the local staff:***Business-Government**

- 32 All staff were ok.
- 27 Mediators were consultants. Naive, ill-prepared, out of their fields. None were planners, hence the exercise focussed on mediation/negotiation rather than planning.
- 26 Helpful.
- 25 One woman who was a set-up person and liaison officer worked well.
- 24 Keen.
- 23 Very supportive of sectors. Cooperative with government.
- 19 Carried out their duties effectively but strong bias to deflect discussion away from controversial/substantive issues and achieve consensus on vaguely defined principles.
- 13 Excellent.
- 5 Helpful and informative; environmentally oriented.
- 4 No local staff.
- 2 Good.
- 1 Satisfactory.

**Special Interest Groups**

- 9 Cooperative, impartial, well-meaning, efficient.
- 28 Helpful, if the table was going the way CORE wanted. Provided reasonably good paperwork. Were easy to contact, if needed.
- 29 (Ministry staff of government agencies) Excellent.
- 30 OK.
- 20 None.
- 21 Very helpful.
- 22 Very helpful.
- 15 Officious.
- 16 Committed but all knowing.
- 11 Great people to work with. Can't praise them enough.
- 7 Good.
- 6 Friendly and gained efficiency as the process progressed.
- 3 Dedicated but ineffective in recognising the fatal flaw and dealing with it.

*the Victoria staff:***Business-Government**

- 32 All staff were ok.
- 26 Hostile to our interests.
- 25 Had their own agenda.
- 24 Detached.

- 23 Shifted between staff members. Lack of continuity.
- 19 Distant/uncommunicative -- "trust us."
- 18 Helpful -- within the constraints of being low budget and quite conventionally inclined.
- 13 Excellent.
- 5 Helpful and informative; environmentally oriented.
- 4 Creating on the fly. Mediators poor.
- 2 Fair to good as far as mediators went. Other staff manipulated Commissioner's point of view.
- 1 Satisfactory.

### **Special Interest Groups**

- 9 Idealistic, well-spoken, ruthless spin doctors
- 28 Helpful, if the table was going the way CORE wanted. Provided reasonably good paperwork. Were easy to contact, if needed.
- 29 Good.
- 30 Biased.
- 20 Had a vision of their own, which became quite apparent as the process progressed.
- 21 Informed -- fair -- professional.
- 22 Uninformed and out of touch with reality in the region.
- 15 Guarded.
- 16 Some good people -- stuck with dogma -- under a lot of pressure.
- 11 Didn't know much about us. Had to do a lot of catch up.
- 7 Good.
- 6 Very high quality.
- 3 ?

### *the Commissioner:*

#### **Business-Government**

- 32 All staff were ok.
- 26 Hostile to our interests -- actively so.
- 25 Arrogant -- did not allow him to speak to table! Not worth \$148,000/year! A city slicker lawyer who was more interested in the interests of urban condo dwelling cappuccino suckers than in the interests of the regional people!
- 24 Patient.
- 23 Distant -- only came to the table a couple of times.
- 19 Theoretical/out of touch.
- 18 Independent, honest, fair minded.
- 13 Excellent.
- 5 Not sure; we discussed Mr Owen infrequently.
- 4 Sector respected Mr Owen's involvement except when he chose to announce the Clayoquot decision in Port Alberni.
- 2 A social engineer who had determined the land use plan without meaningful consideration of input.
- 1 Satisfactory.

**Special Interest Groups**

- 9 Nice guy, intelligent, powerless.
- 28 Helpful, if the table was going the way CORE wanted. Provided reasonably good paperwork. Were easy to contact, if needed.
- 29 Good.
- 30 Biased.
- 20 Unavailable, preconceived ideas given to him by his staff and exceptionally vigorous lobbyists for special interests (especially protectionist organisations, NOTE: not conservation organisations; they are ideologically quite different from each other.)
- 21 Very fair -- professional -- diplomatic.
- 22 Fair and reasonable, but uninformed on specifics.
- 15 Approachable, supportive.
- 16 talked a good line -- results did not reflect the verbalised vision.
- 11 ??
- 7 Good.
- 6 Top notch, excellent mind and ability to work with people (even very difficult ones).
- 3 Sincere but naive concerning the integrity of some participants.

*Responses not broken into groups*

**Business-Government**

- 17 Most were professional, hardworking individuals committed to making process work and did the best they could given the situation and constraints upon them
- 14 Generally ok. They stayed in background. Generally accommodating.

**Special Interest Groups**

- 31 All excellent.
- 12 Sectors did not have staff as such. Several tourism agencies joined together. This was very ad hoc.
- 8 Hard working, good jugglers. Inexperienced.

**Q9.2 Did your sector clearly understand the role or roles that were played by CORE?**

Options: yes; no

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	11	11	22
no	4	5	9
no response	1	-	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**If no, where was the confusion?**

**Business-Government**

*no*

- 32 The CORE process was not developing the regional land use plan, it was being done separately by government and special interest groups.
- 5 Concerning planning at local level.

*yes*

- 27 Unfortunately, I don't think they did.
- 26 They were the enemy, make no mistake about that.

**Special Interest Groups**

*yes*

- 9 Suspicions confirmed post-CORE.

*no*

- 28 Some things became clearer in hindsight.
- 20 We understood what the rules were about, but behind the scenes?? Who knows??
- 11 Sometimes they seemed to be leading use into decisions, overstepping their roles.
- 12 The original agency that was to handle [our sector's] representation at the process "dropped the ball."

**Q9.3 Did your sector believe that CORE was an impartial body?**

Options: yes; no

	Business-Government Group			Special Interest Groups		
	yes	no	other	yes	no	other
local staff	8	5	3	10	4	2
Victoria staff	7	7	2	5	7	4
Commissioner	7	7	2	8	7	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>7</b>

**Business-Government**

- 32 No. This became more apparent at the end.  
 27 No. Or they chose not to.  
 17 Other. In general, yes. However, personal egos and agendas occasionally got in the way.  
 26 Commissioner -- no. In spades.  
 18 Yes to all. On substance, not on process.  
 5 yes to all. Mostly.

**Special Interest Groups**

- 20 Commissioner -- no. Personally he was probably fair etc. but did not have the opportunity to show it.  
 22 Victoria staff -- mixed. Some yes, some no.  
 11 Victoria staff -- half and half.  
 6 Victoria staff -- no. many were distinctly 'green' but always acted impartially.  
 Commissioner -- yes. a very fair man as far as the table process and the report were concerned -- CORE had other mandates that required 'green' thinking.  
 3 Just a bit dumb.

**Q9.4 In your opinion, did all the other sectors see CORE as an impartial body?**

Options: yes; no

	Business-Government Group	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	2	2	4
no	13	14	27
no response	1	-	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Special Interest Group**

*yes*

11 Most of the time.

14 Generally.

**Business-Government**

*no*

32 Apparent at end.

**If no, did perceptions of impartiality hinder the ability of the table to create a land use plan?**

Options: yes; no

	Business-Government Group	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	10	13	23
no	2	1	3
other	1	-	1
no response	3	2	5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government**

*yes*

24 Possibly.

*other*

5 Maybe.

**Special Interest Groups**

*yes*

6 Very much.

3 Some sectors wanted no land protected and disagreed with the basic concept.

**Q9.5 Did you see a conflict between the role of CORE as a facilitator and the role of CORE as decision maker?**

Options: yes; no

	Business-Government Group	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	7	8	15
no	7	7	14
no response	2	1	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government**

*no*

- 17 Role was facilitator -- government made the decisions.
- 24 Facilitated regional work. CORE was to make recommendations to government, they drove the shared decision making process to develop recommendations.
- 18 The main facilitation was through a hired mediator and the government was the decision maker.
- 14 I saw facilitators as separate from CORE. Some sectors perceived facilitators as not impartial.

*yes*

- 26 The facilitators did good work process-wise. CORE's decisions were environmentally interest-based, so conflict was generated.
- 25 The land use plan was to be made by the local stakeholders. CORE denied the majority of us that role.
- 19 Facilitators clearly had an agenda to follow -- definitely was not bottom-up or table driven.
- 5 Some sectors believed that CORE was going to deliver its own report despite any table report.
- 2 We were led and manipulated to deal with only items they were interested in.
- 1 Suggest CORE had a given mandate to fulfill.

**Special Interest Groups**

*no*

- 31 CORE was not a decision maker -- Cabinet was.
- 29 Ultimately CORE only made recommendations to government. Government made the decisions and they were definitely in a conflict of interest position.
- 6 CORE was not the facilitator -- CORE was the convenor. Mediators, hired by the table, were the facilitators. CORE was only a decision maker after the table failed and was disbanded.

*yes*

- 9 Some CORE staff seemed to know it was futile but disguised it well.
- 28 Because of the way notes were kept and the fact that facilitators were paid by CORE it allowed doubt to creep in and could not be dispelled.
- 20 It's easier to bend a process to the end one has in mind when one is in control of the process.
- 21 Some other local government sectors and other sectors did not grasp the concept of CORE making recommendations to the government versus making decisions.
- 16 Because of time pressures CORE was forced to supply "product" which created an "eroding goals" scenario. They were compelled to force decisions.
- 11 CORE had a mandate and pushed very hard to achieve it, a lot of time rushing our decisions.



**Q9.6 Please characterise CORE's shared decision making process.**

Options: primarily a land use planning system; primarily a conflict resolution process

	Business-Government Group	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
primarily a land use planning system	3	3	6
primarily a conflict resolution process	5	6	12
other	7	6	12
no response	1	1	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government***other*

- 32 We didn't make a land use plan nor did we resolve any conflicts. We had our attention diverted while real decisions were being made in secret.
- 27 Should have been a land use planning process, was a conflict resolution process.
- 26 Also a farce.
- 25 A consensus process that was subject to the veto power of minority interests which would never ever work.
- 4 A nascent conflict resolution process.
- 2 A manipulative interfering body.
- 1 An experiment that failed.

*conflict resolution process*

- 14 Primary tool for consensus building.

**Special Interest Groups***land use planning*

- 11 I don't feel they helped. We had to make final decisions and couldn't compromise.

*conflict resolution*

- 3 Mostly a failure.

*other*

- 9 Conflict resolution and other: Teaching different communication skills than our social structure has normally promoted.
- 28 Social engineering -- government had a plan and we were to be facilitated into it.
- 20 Good intentions for both but ended up increasing distrust between some sectors and ended with unsatisfactory plan.

**Section 10: Mediator / Facilitator / Chair**

**Q10.1 For each mediator, please rate each statement on the following scale:**

Options: strongly agree; agree; no opinion; disagree; strongly disagree

Results are compiled by table, not mediator, to give an overall indication of the mediation team and its abilities.

Table 1

	strongly agree	agree	no opinion	disagree	strongly disagree
had appropriate skills	3	3	5	2	1
was impartial	2	6	2	2	2
kept table focussed on task	-	2	5	1	6
set interim deadlines within process	2	-	7	3	2
placed adequate emphasis on process	2	5	4	1	2
placed adequate emphasis on end goal	-	4	3	3	4
actively directed table discussions	2	2	4	4	2
did regular evaluations of the process	-	1	7	3	3
was effective overall	-	3	7*	-	2

\*One respondent did not respond to this statement.

Table 2

	strongly agree	agree	no opinion	disagree	strongly disagree
had appropriate skills	11	7	2	-	-
was impartial	5	8	1*	3	1
kept table focussed on task	4	8	4	3	1
set interim deadlines within process	3	12	4	1	-
placed adequate emphasis on process	7	7	5	1	-
placed adequate emphasis on end goal	4	8	2	3	3
actively directed table discussions	5	10	1	4	-
did regular evaluations of the process	5	6	4	5	-
was effective overall	5	5	5	5	-

\*2 'other' responses

One respondent did not complete this section.

Table 3

	strongly agree	agree	no opinion	disagree	strongly disagree
had appropriate skills	3	6	-	-	-
was impartial	4	5	-	-	-
kept table focussed on task	3	6	-	-	-
set interim deadlines within process	1	6	2	-	-
placed adequate emphasis on process	2	6	1	-	-
placed adequate emphasis on end goal	1	7	1	-	-
actively directed table discussions	3	3	2	1	-
did regular evaluations of the process	-	4	4	1	-
was effective overall	3	4	-	-	2

One respondent didn't comment on the second mediator.

Table 4

	strongly agree	agree	no opinion	disagree	strongly disagree
had appropriate skills	6	6	4	1	-
was impartial	5	9	1	1	1
kept table focussed on task	4	11	1	1	-
set interim deadlines within process	3	7	6	1	-
placed adequate emphasis on process	3	8	4	1	1
placed adequate emphasis on end goal	3	5	3	3	3
actively directed table discussions	2	7	4*	2	1
did regular evaluations of the process	2	8	6	1	-
was effective overall	4	8	2`	2	-

One respondent evaluated only one mediator.

\*And one 'no response'

`And one 'other'

**Q10.2 Did the mediators influence the outcome of the process?**

Options: yes; no

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	11	13	24
no	4	3	7
other	1	-	1
TOTAL	16	16	32

**Q10.3 Was the influence positive or negative?**

Options: positive; negative

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
positive	8	9	17
negative	4	3	7
can't say	1	-	1
other	1	2	3
no response	2	2	4
TOTAL	16	16	32

*'Other' responses*

**Government-Business**

- 27 The table (due to a few individuals) discredited both CORE and the facilitators to the point that they were not able to (or even allowed to) do their job. Their ineffectiveness was largely the table's fault. Their focus (mediation rather than planning) may have contributed.
- 14 They drove the process, not the outcome.
- 10 Process needed direction. Mediators could not have provided direction while remaining impartial and fair. mediators should not be blamed for process failure.
- 1 No opinion -- who knows?

**Special Interest Groups**

- 30 Varied according to issue.
- 16 Difficult to answer clearly. Supposedly the mediator worked for the table. The process marching orders came from CORE and the technical committee. The

mediator had a schizoid position. One mediator was particularly helpful with policy stuff. The other kyboshed an early start to land use negotiations.

### **Government-Business comments**

#### *negative*

- 32 Mediators/facilitators could have pushed us through the geographic boundaries, the vision, the decision making process etc. in about 2 meetings, versus about 8. Then we would have had some time to negotiate and conclude land use plans.
- 25 Process failed when table collapsed.
- 19 Ficus was on consensus rather than on problem-solving -- difficult issues avoided and have not been discussed.
- 4 Worst mediation I have experienced and I have been involved in many.

#### *positive*

- 24 The process was a scow without a rudder. The mediators had to provide some direction, possibly even a little propulsion!
- 17 Obvious -- kept group in task given difficult circumstances.
- 26 The outcome was pre-designated -- my sector (and other resource sectors) had the job of agreeing to what the bureaucrats and environmentalists wanted, lock stock and barrel. The mediators had no influence on this because we were not going to agree. At their urging, however, we did try for a deal. And it remained semi-civilised. That was positive -- miraculous in fact.
- 18 The tool the table about as far as it was ever going to go. Things would have come apart much sooner without [the mediator.]
- 2 Barring the fact we did not reach agreement these two did a remarkable job and the low ratings only resulted because no agreement was worked.

### **Special Interest Groups comments**

#### *negative*

- 28 Because we became distrustful of CORE and government intentions (among sectors for various reasons) we passed that difficulty on the mediators who could not reassure us. Again that seemed to be the result of the things which went into notes and what did not.
- 20 The mediators were also facilitating individual sectors, got caught up in the content of the discussions nice people but...It was unfair to expect either of the mediators to mediate, facilitate and guide a process that had no chairperson, had a long history of very negative relations between the negotiating parties, and a real-life outcome that would affect thousands of people.
- 12 Process, process, process! Never did they impose any structure on discussions or try to guide the group to consensus. They were simply there. They also made it clear that forestry, unions and environment were more important.

#### *positive*

- 3 Although the process was an overall failure the mediators worked hard to try to make it work and their influence was felt and contributed to the little success there

- was -- that people were exposed to different concepts.
- 9 In spite of futility of getting a plan government would actually use, opened new doors of communication amongst people.
  - 21 They demonstrated the difficulty of consensus based decision making process when there are such diverse backgrounds and goals, etc.
  - 22 They were very committed and worked hard to make process work -- against huge odds.
  - 11 Kept us on track. Did very good job with time frame and people with limited skills and resources.
  - 6 Although the table did not reach its goal, these mediators were inventive in trying ways to get there, and did force the table to produce a great deal of very valuable material, even against the will of many of the participants.



**Section 11: Communication Strategy****Q11.1 Who was responsible for planning and implementing the communication strategy for the table?**

Options: CORE; table; subcommittee of the table; mediators

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
CORE	2	3	5
table	3	4	7
sub-committee	1	2	3
mediators	-	-	-
all of above	-	1	1
CORE + mediators	1	-	1
CORE + table	2	2	4
CORE + table + subcommittee	1	2	3
table + subcommittee	2	-	2
CORE + subcommittee	-	2	2
nobody	1	-	1
other	3	-	3
TOTAL	16	16	32

**Business-Government**

- 25 CORE and table. The Commissioner was always making statements out of Victoria.
- 17 Nobody. This was major mistake in the process. No money to do and there were sectors with the intent to railroad CORE who spend a lot of money to misinform public.
- 19 Other. Variable, Some by CORE, other involved table's input.
- 10 Other. Table formed subcommittee to prepare releases for the public but the table never did anything to interest the public.

**Special Interest Groups**

- 20 CORE + table. Depended on topic or issue.
- 6 CORE + subcommittee. The table was not that concerned with the general public. They felt obligation only to their sectors. CORE did by default what the table and subcommittee failed to do.

**Q11.2 Please rate how satisfied your sector was with the communication strategy to inform the general public.**

Options: very satisfied; satisfied; not satisfied -- too much information given to the general public; not satisfied -- too little information given to the general public.

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
very satisfied	1	-	1
satisfied	4	5	9
not satisfied -- too much information given	1	1	2
not satisfied -- too little information given	8	8	16
other	1	1	2
no response	1	1	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government**

*other*

27 Non issue.

*satisfied*

5 Public not interested until late in process.

*too much*

25 Too much given to the general public who had little interest in CORE!

*too little*

18 Meetings open to public. No concerted effort to develop an extensive public information campaign.

**Special Interest Groups**

*satisfied*

6 Given that some sectors wanted to hide their table tactics and some of their positions from the public, and given that much of the work was too involved and technical for public consumption, the public got as much as they had any interest to know.

*too little*

29 Virtually no budget to communicate the work of the table to general population.

*other*

3 Nothing to give the public.

**Q11.3 Did the table receive additional information from the public as a result of the communication strategy?**

Options: yes; no; don't know

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	3	6	9
no	7	6	13
don't know	6	4	10
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

**Business-Government**

*yes*

26 Didn't count for shit unless it supported the environmental objectives or the bureaucrat's objectives, though.

14 A little.

*no*

25 People stayed away.

19 Public participation limited to approximately 45 minutes at the end of each two day session.

*don't know*

17 Very poor and inadequate. Large parts of public misled by mining and forest industry.

**Special Interest Groups**

*yes*

29 Minimal. Generally some attendance at table meetings and some media coverage.

16 Very little.

8 Little.

*no*

22 Or very little.

11 Should have done a lot more communicating before table started!

**Section 12: Success – some final thoughts**

**Q12.1 Please identify any factors that you feel contributed to successes in the process.**

**Special Interest Groups**

- 9 The seeds of commonality and human-ness were inadvertently sown by bringing so many former adversaries together. The 'old guard' got a taste of what's to come, even though they got their own way in the end.
- 29 many sincere people from all walks of life.
- 20 Some sectors were willing to work from their interests (not positions) to find a possible plan (multi-sector proposal included in CORE report) -- this has led to ongoing communication between individuals as of today, three years later.
- 21 Good information sessions given by various groups.
- 22 Good will and dedication of most sectors. Mediator's ability and dedication.
- 16 The commitment of a small group that wanted a successful outcome -- all non-government and all experienced self-employed types.
- 11 The hard work of the participants that wanted the process to succeed, and local staff that helped.
- 12 It was not successful from the point of view of resolving conflicts or making land use decisions. It was successful from the point of view of understanding others' positions.
- 7 Mediators did well.
- 6 Every interest was fairly represented.
- 8 Hard work. Desire for cooperation.
- 3 There were three of four sectors who presented their positions effectively and carried on with integrity in spite of the hopeless situation -- they managed to educate everyone there.

**Business-Government**

- 32 N/A.
- 27 Participation of broad range of sectors did increase understanding and possibly even respect for each other.
- 26 N/A.
- 25 None.
- 23 Maintaining focus on interests. Reaching preliminary agreement on PAS target. Better policy definition for FPC, FRBC, etc.
- 1 Do not consider the process as being successful.
- 24 Dialogue established between sectors.
- 13 Good rapport between CORE and sectors.
- 5 Regular communication from local government sector to public.
- 17 Dedication of most to find solutions.
- 23 Mediators -- process would not have had the degree of success that it did without the mediator.

- 19 Provided an opportunity for discussion by individuals and groups with different backgrounds and points of view. Created sense of involvement in land use policy development.
- 18 Owen, Sloane, CORE staff, sectors that participated in good faith, extensive discussions.
- 14 Dedicated people.

**Q12.2 Please identify and factors that you feel contributed to failures in the process.**

**Special Interest Groups**

- 31 End runs, political interference. Process was ok -- political deals were very unsatisfactory.
- 9 Government's preconceived 'plan;' timber industry bias; non-resident participants; bogus information availability -- no independent information allowed; too much paper wasted.
- 28 We did not complete our task, and CORE should not have written a final report which contained discussion not resolved, coupled with what were government plans.
- 29 Fear and unwillingness to change. Human's general condition of greed.
- 30 Lack of concise direction from the beginning -- too open ended -- the group was unable to respond responsibly to the task without more guidelines, boundary definitions. Inclusion of too many 'fringe' groups that had full representation and equal say to the more major interests.
- 20 Needed a strong chair (see further comments section). Some sectors were position based or not accountable to an identifiable constituency.
- 21 Government failed to give CORE the mandate to set goals and time frames if table could not reach consensus.
- 22 Lack of commitment and understanding by BC government.
- 15 Hidden agendas.
- 16 The bureaucratic hijack. There is extreme reluctance within the average bureaucracy to go control. Same applies to large industry -- they're reluctant to mix with the peasants, so to speak.
- 11 Too much too fast. Not enough information to everyone ahead of time.
- 12 Too big an area; too much public posturing; too little guidance from mediators; return to positions and failure to respond to others' interests; the reality of associated losses.
- 7 Local government -- future Liberal Party interest groups.
- 6 Lack of imposed defined problem to solve. Lack of imposed process (to save time and stop 'games playing.')
- Lack of imposed boundaries. Lack of commitment to the process by industrial sector group -- they felt they had lots to lose but nothing to gain so they wanted the table to fail to put the decision making back in the political arena where they felt much more confident (and, as things turned out, rightly so.)
- 9 People not being honest and negotiating falsely -- bargaining with unrealistic expectations. Why say you want 100% when you can live with 80%. Why say it's worth a dollar when it's really worth 80¢.
- 3 Industry, SHARE, and IWA wanted the process to fail so that there would be an imposed land use plan that would be easier to attack than a local plan.

**Business-Government**

- 32 I mentioned the poor process earlier. Unbalanced sector representation. The 'red herring' aspect of the process made it futile.
- 27 A few sectors (benefiting from the status quo) used a variety of tactics to delay and ultimately subvert the process.
- 26 Bias, bias, bias.
- 25 Some sectors with no significant constituency in area could veto and scuttle whole process. Some special interest groups had people from outside area come in to influence process.
- 2 No boundary, no goal or targets set, interference by government and CORE staff.
- 1 Special interest groups versus industrial resource users through a consensus decision making process is most difficult.
- 24 Hidden agendas of government ministries and some sectors; lack of commitment by some sectors.
- 13 Higher expectations (actually creating a consensus) than was realistic.
- 5 Meeting overload, explanation overload, paper overload, verbiage overload.
- 17 Lack of true commitment by status quo mining and forestry majors to give up anything.
- 19 Lack of terms of reference to define intended scope of project. No attempt to distinguish opinion from factual information during discussions. Did not involve communities/wider public.
- 18 It should have been a citizens and not a stakeholders process. Business is pure self-interest -- has no role to play in determining the public interest. Lack of time and money and unrealistic expectations.
- 14 Too big a job. Too little time. Lack of knowledge about land use planning.
- 10 Lack of process design and direction.

**Q12.3 Was your sector satisfied with the outcomes of the process? Please list the outcomes and indicate your level of satisfaction.**

- 1 very satisfied
- 2 satisfied
- 3 no opinion
- 4 unsatisfied
- 5 very unsatisfied

**Special Interest Groups**

9	Table consensus decisions implemented	5
	accurate information base	5
	timber cutting plan	5
	Biodiversity map (too bad it was shelved)	2
	tables' acceptable of our sector goals	2
	business as usual during and worse after	5
28	Because table adjourned	5
29	Open discussion of issues	2
	Fairness of process	2
	Effort of government workers	1
	Post CORE process	5
	Ultimate government decision (still in process)	4
	Local decision making in primary resource base communities	4
20	Regional land use plan	4
	Socio-economic studies	5
	Transition strategy	5
	Community stability	4
	Protection of special areas	2
	Under-protection of economic activity (including tourism, access to remote areas, forestry, mining, recreation)	5
21	Appreciation of all sectors goals	2
	Meet people of other sectors	2
	CORE produced a report	4
	Process led government to produce a report	2
22	An overall land use plan	4
	Better communication between sectors	3
	Public education around land use planning	3
	Better land use planning tools	2
15	Land use plan	4



16	Land use certainty	4
	Harmony	4
	Integration	5
	Difficult issues	4
	Community aspirations	4
	Level playing field	5
11	Still waiting to see if anything comes out of this!	
6	Caused 'greens' to get organised	1
	Caused a very sound Commissioners report	2
	Lead to the farce of ersatz "made in Cariboo" negotiations	5
	"Made in Cariboo" land use plan	4
	Interpretation and implementation of land use plan (getting worse)	5 (and
8	Land use designations	4
	Visual management guidelines	1
	Back country access	2
	Legislation input	2
3	Education of participants	2
	Consensus reached	5
	Final plan accomplishing goals	2/4
	Implementation of plan	4
<b>Business-Government</b>		
32	There were no outcomes from our process.	5
27	Land use plan	5
	Increased awareness, understanding	2
25	Land use plan	4
	% of protected areas (too much)	5
	Peace in the woods	5
	Time and cost to be at table	5
4	Land use plan	4
	Interest based negotiation	4
	Education of sectors and public	4
2	We had no result and ended up with demonstrations when Mr Owen brought down 'his' plan.	

1	Strong communities	4
	Clearly defined management objectives	4
	Forest land base to support existing AACs	4
	Secure tenure to forest land base	4
	Continuation of a stable and secure workforce	4
	Rules and planning processes that provide for effective forest management	4
24	Develop a process for negotiation	2
	Develop an implementation strategy	2
	Develop a land use plan	4
13	Attempt consensus on future and in region	1
	Learn from other participants	1
5	Land use map	2
	Follow up implementation mechanisms (somewhat)	4
17	80% agreement on use	2
	Management guidelines	2
	Policy recommendations	2
23	Partial agreement on map	4
	Policy recommendations	2
	Transition strategy - substantial agreement	2
	Implementation	2
	Better understanding of other interests	2
19	Information base	5
	Conceptual land allocation	4
	Stated rationale	5
	Implementation strategy	5
18	Vision	2
	Land use planning scheme	3
	Led to government decision -- improved situation	2
14	Protected areas	2
	Special management/integrated	4
	Objectives and strategies	4
	Transition	4
10	We wanted a publicly acceptable, workable land use plan	4

**Q12.4 One definition of success regarding the regional CORE process is the creation of a publicly acceptable, workable land use plan. Did the table achieve this goal?**

Options: yes; no

	Business-Government	Special Interest Groups	TOTAL
yes	2	2	4
no	14	12	26
other	-	2	2
TOTAL	16	16	32

**Special Interest Groups**

*no*

- 9 Almost, but government waylaid it. They sent in spin doctors and liars after the fact, they ignored table input, they censored information, they 'used' the people to mask their real intent - but, a whole bunch more people are now aware and incredulous of the failure and tenacity of the status quo, many will never try to influence government again. The seeds of anarchy are incubating.
- 32 Briefly, I believe that the process failed because all parties involved - government, public and facilitators - were there to protect their vision and not to create a new one. Of course there were some exceptions, but it seems that they were the minority. Also some sectors could not bring themselves to make an actual decision for fear it might be wrong. Not willing to make the first step necessary to walk.
- 29 Is "publicly acceptable" going to be either balanced or ecologically acceptable?
- 20 The land use plan is not accepted by the public. It satisfied no-one involved in the process. The process wore out participants with its intensity. The land use plan is not workable; by that I mean that the plan has been forced to fit an ideology, people are losing their jobs, there is no transition strategy to ameliorate the effects. Protected areas over people?
- 22 There was never consensus on a single proposal for a land use plan. The BC government was free to decide whatever it wanted, given the lack of consensus.
- 16 The table produced a report. It was circulated to constituencies and public with no great problems. The Commission produced its report and all hell broke loose. When the dust settled the bureaucracy with minimal interest group participation was given the job of coming up with an implementable land use plan. This process has been underway for a year and three months and *may* finish this fall. I think the CORE process outcomes have spooked any BC politician completely from the whole idea of a public-shared decision making process.
- 12 The Vancouver Island land use plan resulted in a public rally of 20,000 people on the lawn of the legislature protesting the decision. Personally, I liked it. That says

it all -- we remain divided.

8 It's a start.

3 Plan was imposed by government as tables failed to reach consensus.

*other*

30 To some degree, but implementation has not been satisfactory and some agreements or concessions made have not been respected. Lesson: government and their bureaucrats cannot be trusted.

11 Still waiting. Haven't seen or heard from enough people yet.

**Business-Government**

*no*

27 The CORE table was unable to reach agreement. Government negotiated with the two principle polarised groups (forestry and conservation) behind closed doors and presented "The Plan."

26 In the end there was a political solution -- done to avoid a potentially very damaging media war. That produced a workable land use plan that would work if the environmentalists would keep their word and the bureaucrats would quit bucking it. In short, neither is happening at present -- but we expected nothing else anyway.

25 After CORE collapsed various sectors got together to negotiate directly with the government to create the acceptable workable plan which is not fully implemented and is now being attacked by preservationalists like Doug Radies from Vancouver.

2 We are still attempting to comes to terms with government. We formed a coalition and negotiated a plan with government which they now refuse to legislate.

1 A publicly acceptable, workable land use plan has not been achieved to this date.

17 Table came up with 80% of a workable set of land use recommendations based upon planning polygons plus a new number of policy recommendations. Much of plan based upon recognition that further lower level decisions need to be fine tuned in similar forum.

19 Wider public were not considered or consulted during the process. Plan is vague.

18 We failed to recommend a plan. We presented a vision statement, a set of land use designations with definitions, we gave the Commission and the government a clearer sense of the issues and we raised the matter of transition strategies. We achieved little or nothing in the way of a sustainable land use plan for the region. Biodiversity was not protected and local employment was not enhanced and we still do not know if our economic activities improve our welfare.

14 Yes for PAS. Otherwise incomplete and no consensus.

*yes*

13 After the table met, government 'closed the final gap' and we have a very good land use plan.







5 Mostly.

**Further Comments****Special Interest groups**

- 9 Overall what could have been a worthy exercise in participatory democracy was undermined by unethical and corrupt government activity. Fear promotion and erosion of human dignity are still the tools of oppression.
- 32 Funding was a large problem, in my opinion. It is impossible for volunteers to receive and deal with the amount of data needed to do a regional process in their spare time. So a division is started at that point because you begin to feel unsure when discussions are carried out with people who are at the table and have staff or salary to spend the time necessary. Also it is my opinion that people who are salaried as opposed to people who are not (we received expenses), are less concerned with the amount of work accomplished at meetings. Our table had provincial and local government participation and periodically First Nations. First Nations [participation] was not adequate but that was their choice.
- 30 Boundary needs to be defined prior to process starting. Need more direction and guidance re: what is and is not at table -- too much time wasted in empty debates that were nothing more than power struggles and show boating and had little to do with land use planning. Too many narrow interest groups that could and should have been amalgamated -- 'inclusivity' at all cost is self defeating -- we proved it in spades. The most important people to have at these meetings are the least likely to be available when time is wasted. It was simply too time consuming and wasteful.
- 20 Frankly, I think one has to live through a process like this CORE thing to appreciate the intensity, responsibility, learning curve, etc. I put 31,000 km on my car from January 1993 to February 1994, travelling to CORE meetings. Yes, I am now a qualified cynic!
- It was unfair to expect each of the mediators to mediate, facilitate and guide a process that had no chairperson, had a long history of very negative relations between the negotiating parties, and a real-life outcome that would affect thousands of people. Each CORE table should have had its own commissioner as an impartial chairperson. Mr Owen could have either remained as chief commissioner to oversee all processes or he could have taken on a single table for his own, as well as overseeing the other tables. I would have recommended he take on the Vancouver Island table for two reasons: it was the first; Vancouver Island was (and continues to be) in the very hot spotlights of international attention. Under this leadership, the mediators could do their job, the negotiating parties could discuss, propose, agree and disagree with each other (their job) while guided by a strong chairperson.
- 16 I believe for a process like CORE to be successful it should be set up as almost a perpetual process. the learning required for effectiveness was not possible given the time and workload constraints. The central issue is to develop 'best' solutions as opposed to political solutions -- not easy. The interest based approach is a powerful concept -- needs to be encouraged in my opinion. However it threatens existing power structures and is disliked generally by government and large industry. The leadership from politicians required is problematic. In the end, a lot was learned of a positive nature. The courage to undertake the thing should be commended. I



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