

**Rascals, Resistance, and Ethnographic Reticence
in Papua New Guinea**

by

Jodi Leigh Harper

Department of Anthropology

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Faculty of Graduate Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario
September 1998

© Jodi L. Harper 1998



National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file *Votre référence*

Our file *Notre référence*

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-30795-6

Canada

ABSTRACT

Drawing upon a detailed examination of urban criminal groups in Papua New Guinea, this thesis explores the problems that arise when anthropologists research and then write about highly sensitive subjects. I focus particularly on the problem of self-censorship whereby researchers omit or suppress from their accounts unpleasant or 'sensitive' details thereby lending a romanticised air to the accounts. I explore the academic and political bases underlying these editorial decisions and identify two main sources behind what I and others describe as a failure of nerve. The first concerns the problem of anthropological essentialism and the tendency to portray the societies we study as though they were exotic and self-contained. The second problem can be traced to the so-called crisis of representation and the attendant ethnographic reticence which has come to preoccupy the anthropological imagination and has impaired our ability to understand and report on research populations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In acknowledgement of the advice and support I have received, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to: Kevin Simpson, soul mate and source of strength, for the love, patience, and boundless encouragement he provided throughout the years; Linda Rossi-Harper, mother and spiritual healer, for her undying love, faith, and comfort that got me through those difficult times; Rheo Harper, for the love and pride he has for his children; Todd, Tracey, and Jasen, for always believing in me; Cindy Thoroski, for her friendship, wisdom, and inspirational writing; Frank Ridsdale, Susan Hagopian, Paul Hong and Dufferin Murray, for their valued friendship and endless support ; Kim Clark, internal examiner, for her assistance and receptivity, and for easing my fears before the oral examination; Gloria Leckie, external examiner, for making my oral defense a pleasurable experience; Jean-Marc Philibert, friend and academic 'father', for his boundless encouragement, sense of humor, and tremendous generosity; and to Dan Jorgensen, thesis supervisor, for his support, helpful advice, and inspirational pep-talks.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
LIST OF APPENDICES	vii
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION	1
The Problem: A Failure of Nerve	3
Polemics: The Lipset / Kulick Exchange	4
A Breakthrough in the Case	6
Plan of the Thesis	8
CHAPTER 2 – RASCALS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA	10
The Rise of Rascalism	10
Rascal Gangs in the 1990s	17
Bill Skate and the Mujo Sefa Tapes	18
Rascals as Public Culture	20
Assessing the Impact	21
Response and Reaction	28
Conclusion	30
CHAPTER 3 – INTERPRETING RASCALISM	32
The Social Inequality Model	33
Rascals and the State	39
Big Men and Rascals	40
The Phenomenon of Mass Surrender	44
Delinquent Avengers or Big Men of Crime?	46
Critique	49
Rascals and Resistance	55
Sanitizing the Violence	60
Summary and Conclusion	63
CHAPTER 4 – DILEMMAS OF RASCAL RESEARCH	65
Digging Below the Surface	65
Professional Myopia and the Essentialisation of PNG	68
Ethnography and the Representation of Cultures	73
Rascalism, Rape and the White Women's Protection Ordinance	76
Summary and Conclusion	82

CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION	85
On Anthropology’s Essentialising Tendencies	86
On Representational Delicacy and a Failure of Nerve	88
ENDNOTES	91
APPENDIX A	96
APPENDIX B	97
REFERENCES CITED	98
VITA	109

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix		Page
Appendix A	Map of Papua New Guinea	96
Appendix B	Informal E-mail Survey	97

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

When I started this project, I was initially interested in exploring the social significance of urban life in Papua New Guinea with the intent to investigate the linkages that connect rural areas with their urban counterparts. Such an examination of urban PNG, I thought, would have much to contribute to current efforts to broaden the foci of analysis so as to address the interconnectedness and interdependence between local systems and larger networks of relations (Marcus 1995). In addition, I also imagined that such research would provide a welcome addition to the relatively small body of work devoted to the study of urban life and processes in PNG. For instance, it is well acknowledged that anthropologists working in PNG have tended to privilege research in small rural villages over research in the urban centres – despite the fact that between 20% and 25% of the population now live in towns (Ryan 1989; Carrier 1992). To the extent that anthropologists have made urbanism a focus of study, the predominant theme has been the study of the urban ethnic enclave and how village life-ways are reproduced within the towns.¹ So, while these studies have been informative in terms of understanding how ethnic identities are maintained and strengthened in the ethnically diverse cities of PNG, for the most part they reveal very little about new urban relations and identities that arise exclusively in the towns. Therefore, I wanted my study to reflect a new shift in emphasis in which the town itself is a privileged site of analysis and where the focus of attention is given to better understanding 'new' social and cultural forms as

opposed to the examination of the trials and tribulations of specific ethnic groups. Armed with the intent to make urban New Guinea the centre of my study, I conducted a library survey in order to assess the possibilities for such work.

While my library search opened up an array of encouraging possibilities regarding potential topics of research, I became increasingly drawn to a fascinating feature of PNG's urban centres – criminal gangs. Criminal gangs, otherwise known in popular parlance as *rascals* (also spelled *raskol* and *raskal*), struck me as a promising subject of study for a variety of reasons. Most notable is that rascals constitute a relatively new and distinct social group/institution whose beginnings are directly linked to the towns. Rascals thereby provide an excellent opportunity through which to explore the development of new urban social relations and identities that the cities cultivate. Furthermore, since rascals are predominately an urban phenomenon, such research allows one the chance to move away from the over- emphasis on ethnic or tribal affiliation since PNG's urban gangs actually constitute one of the few viable inter-ethnic forms of organisation – a factor which is relatively unique in a country that is continuously threatened by ethnic separation and regionalism (Harris 1988; Nibbrig 1992; Connell & Lea 1994).

In more general terms, however, criminal gangs struck me as a promising subject given that they are also one of the greatest national concerns facing the country at present. Besides creating acute levels of personal insecurity among the populace, the activities of rascal gangs – which range from highway hold-ups to sophisticated armed robberies, pack rapes and homicides – also constitute a

serious threat to the effectiveness and image of the state and so impressed me as an important area for anthropological research. For these reasons, I decided to explore the topic more thoroughly with the hope that I might be able to uncover an interesting angle for analysis.

The Problem: A Failure of Nerve

The course of my research changed, however, when upon reviewing the literature and turning to PNG's national newspapers, I was taken aback by several glaring problems.² For instance, while there were plenty of written materials on the topic of "law and order" (mainly in the form of government reports and studies), there was very little written about urban gangs as a topic in their own right. Given the fact that rascalism exudes a powerful presence throughout PNG, one would imagine that it would raise serious questions for social scientists such as: What kind of identities are young men fashioning in the towns? How is the country dealing with some of these urban social problems that rascalism exemplifies? Yet, we do not find that to be the case here. Over thirty years of escalating gang activity, only a handful of researchers have been interested. Secondly, most of the analytic frameworks used to explain urban gang criminality rely in varying degrees upon a romanticised resistance model. This model is questionable because urban gangs are presented as though they were proletarian avengers fighting social and economic inequalities -- despite evidence that blatantly contradicts such an interpretation. Lastly, to the extent that researchers have directed their attention to the rascal phenomenon, there also appeared to be a serious problem tackling the more 'unpleasant' and/or

'sensitive' dimensions of gang behaviour. For instance, a consistent pattern one finds throughout the literature on rascals is that greater emphasis is conferred to acquisitive crime over crimes of violence – particularly sexual violence. Overall, what my search of the literature revealed to me is that there is a serious reluctance, not only to tackle the contemporary urban issues PNG is facing, but also a serious reluctance to deal with the darker side of gang life.

Polemics: The Lipset / Kulick Exchange

Having observed this, I was initially unsure about the sources underlying this reluctance. Why, I wondered, was there so little anthropological attention given to the subject of rascals? Why was the literature so incomplete? And so watered down? Then I came across a series of letters published in *Anthropology Today* which offered some important clues.

The series of exchanges began with Don Kulick (1991), who wrote a letter to the editor in an effort to share a horrifying experience with other anthropologists working in PNG. In his letter, Kulick recounted how a group of armed rascals stormed his village in the middle of the night, attacked and robbed him and killed one of his closest friends who had tried to intervene. Following this account, Kulick sought to forewarn researchers planning to do fieldwork that, while there were local variations, "the country had become extremely dangerous" (1991: 21) and that the time had probably come to start to seriously rethink doing research in PNG. Furthermore, Kulick also recommended that future graduate students needed to be properly informed of the possible risks and dangers. He urged anthropologists:

[t]o do anything they can to influence not only the PNG government, but, perhaps more realistically, grant funding institutions to accept that researchers going to PNG need things like short-wave radios and outboard motors or whatever, to be able to contact someone in case of emergencies (ibid: 21).

The following year, Marc Schiltz (1992) submitted a response to Kulick in which he concurred with most of Kulick's experiences and observations. For instance, Schiltz stated that during the late 1970s and 1980s, while he was teaching at the University of PNG in Port Moresby, the level of violent crime and constant threat of rascal strikes "became quite intolerable" for his colleagues and his students (1992: 26). However, in his view, suspending future research in PNG would not only raise serious questions about "our credibility as researchers", it would also fail to acknowledge that the "rascal phenomenon is an integral aspect of much of the violence that has come to besiege people's lives in that country" (ibid:26).

However, in sharp contrast to Schiltz's reply, David Lipset bitterly denounced Kulick's remarks and recommendations, stating that Kulick's remarks "did no small dishonour to Lower Sepik peoples, and to PNG in general" (1993:18). In his chastising response, Lipset argued that Kulick's assessment of the current law and order situation was overblown and did not match his own experience during a brief visit to that province the previous year. Indeed, he even suggested that he had noticed no significant change in the law and order situation between 1982 and his latest visit in 1993, stating that:

[I]n October 1993, neither village nor urban mortality seemed to have changed from 1982 when I first visited the region. I had felt more vulnerable walking in broad daylight in Manhattan the month before

than I did in Wewak or any Murik village. No random, unmotivated violence was going on in this part of the country, either in town or in the Lower Sepik villages, and no violence involved whites at all ... From my perspective, if not all Papua New Guineans, at least the people of the Lower Sepik, deserve an apology, I believe the quality of their state has been badly misrepresented (p. 18).

A Breakthrough in the Case

After reading the reactions to Kulick's letter to the editor, I became acutely aware that something much larger was at stake than the mere accuracy and fairness of Kulick's report. Although I was not completely surprised by Schiltz's response to Kulick's letter, Lipset's reply left me somewhat perplexed since I could not quite figure out the subtext of his attack. Certainly there was a chance that Lipset was just plainly unaware of the rascal situation – a possibility that would be hard to believe in the best of circumstances. However, I was nonetheless convinced that something else was brewing below the surface. Beyond the obvious problem of Lipset's apparent naivete about current affairs in PNG -- where rascals comprise a significant item of news reports -- I believe the exchange also revealed that rascals and the way one talked about them were potentially contentious issues. Yet, I remained uncertain as to exactly why Kulick's report raised such harsh objections.

To be sure, I had my own intuitions of what I thought this was all about. However, my intuitions presented an epistemological/methodological problem, since there was very little literature available about the issues I was confronting. How, I wondered, could I possibly address with confidence issues that for the most part remained off stage? Researching and writing about a problem that few

were readily discussing or were willing to acknowledge left me with few options other than to ask those who were in a better position to offer some insights about some of the problems I was encountering.

My objective to make sense of some serious deficiencies in a specific body of literature became the driving force behind my own research. By peeling back the layers I discovered that I was witnessing a clear example of some of the problems that may arise when anthropologists research and write about potentially controversial subjects. It became clear that there was apprehension on the part of those who made rascals a subject of study – that many of these researchers were either suppressing or omitting from their accounts details/evidence deemed to be politically sensitive. This was particularly striking in the omission by several scholars working on rascalism to address the issue of rascal violence.

Besides locating the problem, I also sought to investigate the academic and political motivations underlying what I viewed as editorial omissions. I now believe that this reluctance most likely stems from two distinct sources. The first of these concerns the widely discussed problem of anthropological essentialism (Carrier 1992:13-14). Such essentializing tendencies, I am convinced, account for the way rascals remain poorly represented in the anthropological writings about PNG (I see this as an example of professional myopia). The second source of reluctance, I believe, stems from the so-called crisis of representation and the accompanying uncertainty that has come to besiege the discipline. Fears of misrepresenting the people we study, of offending our hosts, and of being

viewed as exploitative, produce a debilitating sense of one's ability to understand and report on one's research populations. In this case, these fears and concerns are manifested in a denial or suppression of gang violence and the internal contradictions and politics of rascal gangs. This, in turn, explains why the analyses are impoverished and often strongly romanticised.

My diagnosis of the problems I encountered in the rascal literature raise some important questions for anthropologists who presently work in PNG. For instance, if ethnographic reticence is a problem, what are the wider implications for anthropology in Melanesia as well as elsewhere? Is this a failure of nerve and is it a part of a larger problem with Melanesian ethnography in general? What do we stand to lose or gain by communicating openly our research findings (even if they are disagreeable and unsavoury)? What does it say about how 'we' perceive ourselves, as anthropologists? These are the issues that this thesis attempts to explore more fully in the pages that follow.

Plan of the Thesis

The discussion will reflect my own process of discovery and will unfold in the manner that I encountered the material. For instance, in Chapter Two, I will trace the emergence and evolution of urban gangs and outline the changes in gang membership, organisation and activities over a thirty year period. The aim of this chapter is to explore and demonstrate the social significance of PNG's urban gangs, while also highlighting their impact at both the state and civic levels. I point out, for example, that rascal gangs are taken

very seriously by state officials and the wider public who consider them to be a serious issue and problem.

In Chapter Three I provide a survey of the literature devoted to rascals. I outline two contrasting perspectives about the rascal phenomenon: The first explains rascalism in the context of growing socio-economic inequalities, while the second presents rascals as part of a continuity linking traditional and modern institutions. Following the review, I provide a critique of the literature in which I attempt to delineate the problem of ethnographic reticence.

In Chapter Four, I offer a more thorough analysis of the problem of ethnographic reticence. Here, I explore and identify the underlying sources of this reticence and how this prevents us from gaining an accurate portrait of the rascal phenomenon.

In Chapter Five, I conclude with a brief summary in which I attempt to bring all of these chapters into a productive dialogue with each other. In this chapter, I examine some of the consequences that this ethnographic reticence has for research in Papua New Guinea as well as for the discipline as a whole. I then conclude with some final thoughts and suggestions so that we can move beyond the impasse that has characterised research on PNG's urban gang phenomenon.

Chapter Two

Rascals in Papua New Guinea

The principal aim of this chapter is to provide a descriptive backdrop against which past and present discussions of rascals occur. In this chapter, the history of urban gangs in PNG is presented with particular emphasis placed upon documenting some of the changes surrounding gang membership, social organisation and activities since the 1960s. The impact of criminal gangs at both the state and societal levels is explored through chronicling the evolution of urban gangs to their contemporary form. Finally, an investigation into some of the reactions and responses of the state is provided. Throughout the chapter, special emphasis is placed on accentuating the magnitude of the rascal situation, particularly in the way it has come to penetrate deep into the public psyche of Papua New Guineans. The chapter focuses specifically on urban criminal groups and, in particular, on those operating in the capital city of Port Moresby where the majority of research has been carried out.³ Rascals and rascalism are the Melanesian Pidgin terms used to refer to gang members and gang crime and, although the terms are occasionally used to refer to relatively petty street criminals, this thesis concerns the more serious career minded rascals who operate in highly organised groups.

The Rise of Rascalism

Rascalism has had a relatively short and tumultuous history in PNG. The earliest documented gangs first emerged in the capital city of Port Moresby around the mid-1960s. It was during this period in Port Moresby that the actual

term 'rascal' was first introduced, although it remains uncertain when it became enshrined in the everyday lexicon of Papuans. What is certain, however, is that it was initially used to describe young troublemakers in the area, and only gained currency later upon being appropriated by the gangs themselves (Harris 1988:3). It should also be said at the outset that urban gangs in PNG have always been predominately a male preserve. To the extent that women have consensual association with rascals, they have always appeared to be supportive rather than active; otherwise, women figure prominently as victims of gang crime, notably rape.

Most accounts locate the rise of rascalism in the context of rapid urbanisation and in parallel with the eradication of colonial controls over the movement of indigenous populations. Unlike many other areas in the developing world, there were no indigenous pre-colonial urban settlements in New Guinea. Even during the colonial period, indigenous presence and participation in the towns continued to be negligible at best. This was mainly due to the fact that throughout most of the colonial period, a series of administrative and legal provisions served to preserve the towns as European enclaves by restricting the mobility of indigenous people (Oram 1976; Levine & Levine 1979). Although these discriminatory measures were eventually dismantled in the decade preceding Independence in 1975, urbanisation as a social process came relatively late to PNG.

Thus the early gangs of Port Moresby were initially the by-product of a rapid, albeit recent, urbanisation process in which substantial numbers of Papua

New Guineans were moving into their urban centres.⁴ Members of these early gangs comprised a rather loose and sporadic assemblage of young migrating men who banded together in the emerging settlement communities that were forming in and around the town. The term 'settlements' was originally used to describe the areas where rural-to-urban migrants resided. Typically these settlements were on land rented from traditional landowners or the state and, sometimes, land that was occupied without permission (e.g. squatter settlements). More recently, however, the term 'settlements' has become a generic term for socially deprived urban communities where rascalism is viewed as the most dramatic manifestation of that deprivation.⁵

According to Bruce Harris, these early Port Moresby gangs functioned as a support mechanism for young migrating men who were confronted with an alien and disorientating urban environment (Harris 1988:4). Throughout this formative period, criminal activities centred in and around the settlement communities, and were mainly confined to relatively harmless criminal pursuits, such as petty thievery, vandalism, and intimidation (ibid:4). Gang-related violence was relatively low key and seemed to be motivated by emotion (often fuelled by the consumption of alcohol) rather than by the pursuit of profit alone.

Between 1968 and 1975 as the early gangs gave way to complexly organised criminal groups, we witnessed the rise of the true rascal gang. During this period, criminal activity expanded both in volume and scope as illicit enterprises spread beyond the settlement areas into more affluent neighbourhoods. For instance, in an interview with Bruce Harris, a former Texas

Gang member⁶ said that during the first several years (1966 to 1968), the gang mainly restricted its illegal offences to the settlement areas. But by the 1970s, they had expanded into more affluent neighbourhoods that yielded profitable rewards (Harris 1988:11). Although the statistical data on crime are notoriously unreliable in PNG, the sharp escalation in both acquisitive and non-acquisitive⁷ offences – as represented in the urban arrest figures between the mid-1960s and 1970s -- provides additional support that gang crime was on the rise during this period (Clifford, Morauta, and Stuart 1984:18-25).

Besides the increase and spread of gang activity, gang membership also increased dramatically during this period. As criminal pursuits spread into more affluent neighbourhoods, new recruits to the gangs also reflected this shift towards 'middle-class' areas. Gangs were no longer solely comprised of uneducated, out-of-work migrants. They now included educated young people from well-to-do families. In addition, whereas early gangs were often ethnically based, during this period it became increasingly evident that rascal gangs were also becoming much more ethnically heterogeneous as young men from diverse backgrounds became involved with the gangs (Connell and Lea 1994:272; Harris 1988:47). Consequently, these significant changes in the profile of rascal members signalled a dramatic shift in the structure and criminal pursuits of gangs, setting the stage for an entirely new phase in the evolution of rascalism.

According to several observers, the dramatic change in the profile of gang membership brought about new opportunities. These new middle-class gang members brought with them the benefits of having a greater familiarity with the

residential areas into which they helped expand gang activity (Harris 1988; Nibbrig 1992; Dinnen 1989). For instance, they were in a better position to observe those who possessed items worth stealing as well as having the added advantage of 'casing' a house or area without arousing much suspicion (Harris 1988:13). Moreover, they had the ability to make connections with wealthy and respectable Papua New Guineans, and consequently, were in a better position to exchange stolen goods for cash (a practice known as 'fencing'). Interestingly, it was this trend that would become the first step in what was to become a continuous "process of vertical integration of gangs into larger criminal networks", as gangs began establishing formal and efficient fencing operations with the more respectable and prosperous Papua New Guineans in the region (Harris 1988:13).

This dramatic expansion into more profitable areas coupled with the acquisition of recruits from more prosperous backgrounds prompted important changes in the scope and scale of criminal pursuits. For instance, there was a noticeable increase in the level of sophistication in carrying out criminal escapades. During this period, criminal activities became more complex, requiring greater planning, mobility, and attention to details. For instance, criminal heists would often take several days of planning and organising in which a team would be assembled and assigned specific roles and tactical duties. Rascal gangs also began to develop and implement effective tactical units to carry out their crimes -- an indication that the gangs were developing a

formalised leadership structure with one or two veteran criminals organising gang heists (Dorney 1990:304; Schiltz 1985:144-145).

In order to avoid confusion, however, it is important to note that although there was a definite trend towards more sophisticated and organised criminal ventures, these did not supplant other common types of crimes committed by rascals. In fact, offences such as vandalism, and intimidation as well as the more violent offences such as assault (physical and sexual) continued to be staple crimes for the gangs and often occurred in conjunction with these more sophisticated heists, commonly as crimes of opportunity.

By the 1970s, it became quite clear that gangs no longer served solely as a means of psychological support for their members, but rather functioned as extremely efficient vehicles for material advancement that promised profitable dividends. With the expansion of gang activity into more lucrative hunting grounds, coupled with the rise in recruits (with "connections"), opportunities arose for greater material returns than had previously been the case. In addition, there was also a sharp increase in the level of prestige associated with being a rascal. For example, Harris states that during the 1970s, the myth of the rascal-as-hero first began to gain currency, as many young children started to aspire to become rascals (Harris 1988:14).⁸

In addition to the changes that occurred between the 1960s and 1970s, there was also a marked increase in the actual number of gangs operating in and around Port Moresby. While, there were approximately six active gangs in Port Moresby in the early 1960s, by the mid-1970s the number of gangs operating in

the capital grew to around twenty. This was largely due to the development and expansion of new settlement areas and the process of "gang fission" whereby principal gangs splintered into several different gangs (Harris 1988:36-40). This period of gang expansion eventually gave way to a process of consolidation in the mid-1980s, as the larger more powerful groups struggled to assert their dominance in particular areas or turfs. By the late 1980s, the number of gangs declined once again to approximately twelve as a result of a series of violent take-overs and amalgamations between competing gangs (Harris 1988:40-41). This period of bloody inter-gang conflict marked the beginning of a substantially more violent phase in the evolution of rascal gangs. During this period, early gangs who had fought their way to the top displayed a higher level of brutality and shrewdness than had been the case in the 1960s and 1970s. Whereas in the past gang violence (and the occasional killing) was usually committed for emotional reasons, the 1980s saw a marked a transition towards gang violence and murder that were now motivated by the cold and calculated effort to consolidate gang territory in order to access greater illicit profit (Harris 1988: ibid).

This period witnessed violent and often deadly internecine conflict, as gang related homicide gave way to a vicious cycle of 'payback killings', rapes, and other violent assaults. There was also a noticeable increase in the level of violence directed against innocent people during this period as well. As such, it was not uncommon to read reports of individuals severely beaten and/or killed in the dead of night by a group of armed rascals carrying out a burglary.

During this time, it was becoming increasingly evident that gangs were much bolder, open to confrontation, and more prone to use violence when carrying out their crimes. This turn toward more ruthless offences was especially evident in the case of women who frequently became the targets of violent sexual attacks, most commonly in the form of gang or 'pack' rape (Harris 1988:40-41; Schiltz 1985:149-153).

Rascal Gangs in the 1990s

After thirty years of dramatic changes in the growth and complexity of urban gangs, rascals have become powerful criminal organisations that operate with little fear of being caught. Although there are certainly continuities that link contemporary rascals with their predecessors, three factors can be used to distinguish an entirely new phase in the evolution of rascalism in PNG. These factors include: the new and intensified commerce of drugs (mainly high grade marijuana) and weapons (both factory and home-made); the dramatic escalation in violent and acquisitive crime; and the emergence of alliances between rascals and powerful politicians and businessmen (Kulick 1993:12; Dinnen1996:3).

Although the first two factors can be regarded as predictable outcomes given the kinds of changes that were already underway, the last factor deserves further comment. For instance, it is worth noting that when Harris conducted his study in the late 1980s, this was one of the predictions he made about the future of criminal groups in PNG. In his study, Harris outlines what he calls the "Political Co-optation Scenario" as one possibility when he speculates that:

[T]he political and economic leadership of the country will recognise both the threat posed by the rascal gangs as well as

their potential for both their own selfish ends and for social and political control...It will appear far easier to such people to simply co-opt the rascal gangs and make them 'partners' in the corrupt system which they might otherwise threaten (1988:48).

Although there were rumours which indicated that this was already well underway during Harris's study, his comments represent an impressive forecast of things to come.

There is now plenty of evidence that alliances have been forged between several gangs and certain political and business leaders. For example, it is well known that many public figures rely on and employ rascals to carry out various 'contracts' against enemies and/or rivals and otherwise ensure each other's survival in return for mutual payoffs (Kulick 1993:12). It is also well known that rascals are hired by politicians in order to intimidate and cause trouble for rival candidates and their supporters during elections (Standish 1996; Strathern 1993). The connection between rascals and these elements of the elite is perhaps most poignantly demonstrated in the case of Bruce Samban – former premier of East Sepik Province – who was sentenced in 1992 to five years' imprisonment for paying rascal gang members to burn down the provincial government offices while he was under investigation for corruption (Kulick 1993:12-13). What is even more interesting and alarming is that speculations regarding dealings between rascal gangs and certain political and economic leaders have even been traced to PNG's highest office.

Bill Skate and the Mujo Sefa Tapes

In November 1997, damning videotapes of PNG's Prime Minister, Bill Skate, were televised locally and internationally by the Australian Broadcasting

Corporation. The tapes were secretly recorded by Bill Skate's one-time aide Mujo Sefa and show the Prime Minister apparently authorising bribes to fellow politicians and journalists. Most significant, however, is that the tapes show the Prime Minister boasting that he is the 'godfather' of Port Moresby's rascal gangs as well as having ordered the killing of a Highlands man who attacked him. In the tapes, Bill Skate is heard saying:

"I can be ruthless....I don't need money...but if I tell my gang members to kill, they kill. There is no godfather I'm the godfather."

"He fired a shot...he missed...I go down....I told my boys, 'hold him'. They hold him...put him in the car. We took him to bloody Vanapa (outside Port Moresby along the Hiritano Highway)...and we cut him into pieces."

-- The Post-Courier, 1 December 1997

While Skate and those implicated in the tapes continue to deny that any wrong-doing took place, charges of corruption and accusations of Skate's illicit dealings with rascal gangs in Port Moresby continue to haunt Papua New Guinea's highest office.⁹ In February of this year, new allegations surfaced that Bill Skate is using the National Capital District Commission (NCDC) as his personal bank amidst allegations that between K25 and K30 million in public money were squandered in corrupt deals with youth groups who were, in fact, rascals.¹⁰ Further accusations allege that around eighty percent of all crime in Port Moresby could be related back to the NCDC staff because such a high proportion were actually gang members.¹¹

Although in PNG allegations of corruption in government or reports of convictions for corruption are frequent, the recent Skate/Sefa/NCDC controversy

suggests a dismal situation for the future of the country.¹² At the bare minimum, it would certainly prove Harris' "vertical integration" thesis – albeit on a much grander scale than he ever would have thought possible.

Rascals as Public Culture

The extent to which rascalism has penetrated the consciousness of many Papua New Guineans is evident in the fact that rascals have become one of the most talked about topics in the country (Kulick 1993). For example, one anthropologist recently was struck by how frequently the theme of rascals and escalating crime cropped up in the media and in the course of everyday conversational exchanges (Battaglia 1995). Another was impressed by how often villagers engaged in 'rascal talk' despite the fact that they were far removed from the cities, and consequently far away from most kinds of rascal crime (Kulick 1993). Rascalism is not only a topic that dominates exchanges among Papua New Guineans, it is also the stuff of popular songs as well. For instance, in one popular song entitled "Raskal King", John Wong of the band Barike sings:

Ol polis i bin holim em, ol i tok em i stil man
He was in police custody, they said he was a thief

Sanap pret long bikepela kol, kisim taim antap long Keravat
Standing reticently during the cold spell, doing time up at Keravat

Do em bin ranawe long kalabus, hait nabaut long bikbus
The day he escaped from jail, went into hiding in the dense bush

I no moa kisim gutpela kaikai, no moa kisim gutpela slip
He no longer ate well, no longer slept peacefully

Em i amamas long ranawe
He was happy to escape

Emi no moa tingting
He didn't care anymore

I no harim toktok bilong papa na mana bilong en
He hadn't listened to his parents' instructions

Wanpela sande moning polis i sutim em long sotgan
One Sunday morning the police shot him with a shotgun

Ol i tok I king bilong ol rasko, ol il no sore liklik bilong em
They said he was the gang leader, they didn't show any sign of pity for him

Nem bilong em yu mas save, sampela i bin kolim em Paksi
Surely you've heard his name, some used to call him Paksi.

Raskel nabaut i bin save, taim ol i bin kilim king bilong Ret Lait
Local rascals knew, when they killed the Red Light King

(quoted in Webb 1993:137-138).

The degree to which rascalism has invaded conversation and popular music certainly lends credence to the idea that rascalism has become very much a part of people's lived experience, so we should not be surprised to learn that rascals and rascalism are also common features in PNG's newspapers and letters-to-the-editor (Cooper 1994). In short, rascalism, as they say, is virtually on everyone's lips.

Assessing the Impact

As we have seen, the relatively short history of Port Moresby's urban gangs has witnessed the evolution of rascals into extremely powerful criminal groups. This process of maturation has, in turn, accompanied rising levels of personal insecurity on the part of the wider urban population as well. People are becoming angry and frustrated, not only with the fear that has started to stalk their lives on a regular basis, but also simply with the sheer restrictions being

placed on their movements and on their freedoms. Many people now avoid taking public transportation as well as travelling the streets after dark – whether by foot or by vehicle – out of fear of falling victim to rascal attacks. Nowhere is this concern more clearly expressed than in the continuous stream of editorials and letters-to-the-editor that Papua New Guinea citizens write which supplement the endless barrage of reports of the latest heist, assault, and robbery. In the following, I have provided some excerpts in order to provide a clear sense of how these anxieties and fears are articulated.

"It is a time when once again the nation's leaders will focus their attention on the problems of Papua New Guinea. Today, we remind our leaders that the most serious crisis still affecting the lives of all Papua New Guineans is crime. Every day in this country is a day of fear. No one is safe in Papua New Guinea. The capital city of Port Moresby is the worst place to live in. Crime in this city has reached the point where criminals seem to be in control of the lives of all citizens, dictating how people should live their lives. This is unacceptable. What is the Government doing about this serious problem? If the Government is slow in coming up with positive measures to minimise crime, then Parliament should take the lead because crime is fast destroying this country. Innocent people are being killed, stabbed, shot, raped, robbed, terrorised daily in the streets of Port Moresby by criminals who have shown total contempt for the laws of this land..."

-The Post-Courier, 10 November 1997.

"Every day in Port Moresby residents talk about one subject more than any other. The subject is crime. Fear has gripped every law abiding person in this city in a way that is beyond joke. Today, we report the attack on a family returning home and a security guard who was going about doing his normal duty. In Gerehu, as in many other spots in the city, people losing vehicles to armed gangsters has become almost daily routine. In various parts of the city, frightened residents hide behind the locked doors of their home and listen to criminals practice shooting with their newly acquired weapons automatic firearms. Police resources are stretched to the limit trying to keep up with the criminals, who seem very well in

control of some parts of Port Moresby....States of emergency and curfews have been imposed in Port Moresby in the past. None of them led to noticeable declines in the serious crime rate. We ask the Prime Minister: Please do something and save your people."

-- The Post-Courier, 22 April 1998.

Growing frustrations and escalating fears are especially evident for large numbers of Papua New Guinean women and girls who experience intense levels of anxiety and insecurity on a daily basis. This is largely due to the grim reality that women comprise the largest group of victims in the country, particularly of physical and sexual violence (most notably in the form of gang rape). Laura Zimmer-Tamakoshi notes that:

Fear of rape and sexual harassment keeps many women and girls from attending school (in rural and urban areas), from asserting themselves in gatherings where men are also present, and from experimenting with new lifestyles (1993:81-82).

While the factors underlying abusive sexual behaviour in PNG are complex and under-researched, what is certain is that the quality of life for virtually half of the population is and continues to be seriously compromised by well-grounded fears based on acts and threats of rascal attacks upon PNG women and girls.¹³ For instance, last November, increasing frustrations, fears, and escalating crime against women culminated in the inauguration of a national campaign to end violence against women in which hundreds of people marched on Parliament demanding that their concerns be heard (Robie 1997).¹⁴ Moreover, the expressed fears and frustrations are now commonplace in the many letters-to-the-editor that poignantly articulate the level of anxiety that continuously stalks the lives of women in PNG. For example one individual writes:

That half the population (females) cannot safely work in their gardens, catch a PMV or, for that matter, be alone in their own homes is a total disgrace to PNG....These cowardly mongrels deserve to do hard time, and plenty! Especially the pack animals who feast on young women like wolves, without even the courage to act alone....There is no excuse for rape. It can never be by accident. No women ever 'deserves' it no matter how she is dressed, no matter where she is or what her lifestyle is like.

-- The Post-Courier, 5 August 1998.

Following a news story about the brutal pack rape of 18 school girls by rascals, another individual writes:

The crime of rape must attract the maximum penalty possible and that means death for those convicted. Papua New Guinea leaders must take a stand to protect the women of this country against this serious crime that shows no sign of easing. Rapists who rob women of their dignity and reduce them to shame for the rest of their lives do not deserve to be treated as human beings. Women have every right to live their lives without fear....Yet, in PNG today, women live in fear every day of being raped, murdered, robbed or harassed by criminals....The nation cannot wait for another 18 school girls to be gang raped before leaders start seriously talking about renewing the criminal code....We call on all elected Members of Parliament to stand up and be counted on this issue'.

-- The Post-Courier, 11 August 1998.

Given the growing levels of personal insecurity experienced by both women and men, public perception that rascalism has become out of control has resulted in many citizens searching for their own crime-control solutions. For instance, many people (mostly expatriates and members of the indigenous elite) now barricade themselves behind walls and razor-wire fences, keep guard dogs, install security systems and hire security guards in order that they may be better protected against rascal strikes (Connell and Lea 1994:275; Dinnen 1997:248).¹⁵

However, despite the 'fortress city' mentality that has been sweeping the urban centres of PNG, the state and law enforcement agencies have largely been ineffectual in combatting crime and appeasing public concern. According to several observers, the factors behind the growing levels of fear and insecurity and the challenges facing law enforcement agencies are complex and multifarious. For instance, burgeoning levels of crime, the widespread availability of firearms,¹⁶ a rapidly growing population which has not been matched by a corresponding increase in the size of PNG's police force,¹⁷ and a persistent shortage of resources which seriously limits the coverage afforded by state controls, are factors frequently mentioned behind the challenges facing law enforcement agencies (Domey 1990; Dinnen 1997; Clifford, Morauta, and Stuart 1984).

In addition to the rising pessimism directed towards a thinly spread criminal justice system, public concern about the 'rascal problem' has also resulted in the public lashing out against the state for failing to get a handle on the law and order situation.¹⁸ Rascals have shown that their activities can be very effective not only in disrupting the justice system but also the image of the state as a whole. This is mainly due to the boldly expressed belligerence that drives home the painful realisation that rascals constitute a powerful force to be reckoned with. Thus, in a statement made to government politicians, one gang leader fearlessly proclaimed that:

We determine Papua New Guinea's image abroad; we control the country's economy; we are the carpet that you walk on; and we are your time bombs (quoted in Schiltz 1985:142).

As rascals and the crimes they commit continue to escalate, forcing government to expend scarce resources on strengthening law enforcement operations, and as long as Papua New Guineans continue to live in fear, the confidence in and legitimacy of the state will continue to be threatened.

Interestingly, at the same time the state has had to grapple with what appears to be a crisis of legitimacy, rumours about the rascal situation continue to spill outside PNG's borders, leaving the government to deal with what seems at times to be a public relations disaster. Yet, one does not have to be an economist to realise that the perception of an out-of-control crime problem is not a favourable attribute to attract foreign investment. In the case of Papua New Guinea, fears concerning the impact of increasing lawlessness upon the country's economy and economic development by foreign investments are well founded, and it appears there is plenty to be concerned about. For instance, copper trader Mitsui & Co. Limited announced early in December that they will be closing their offices due to the current law and order situation,¹⁹ and the tourism industry continues to fight an up-hill battle in order to curb tourist concerns.²⁰ A report issued by the US State Department warned prospective travellers that:

Crime and personal security are serious concerns in Papua New Guinea. Car hijackings, armed robberies, and stoning vehicles are problems in Port Moresby....Persons travelling alone are at greater risk for robbery or gang rape than those who are part of an organised tour or under escort. Visitors to Papua New Guinea should avoid using taxis or buses, known as public motor vehicles, and should rely instead on their sponsor or a rented car for transportation. Travel outside of Port Moresby and other major towns at night can be hazardous, as criminals set up roadblocks (US State Department 1998).

Interestingly, a private firm also echoes the same warnings.

Urban crime in Papua New Guinea is a fact. Armed robberies and assaults on women, in particular, have become a serious problem in Port Moresby and other urban centres.... Travel outside of Port Moresby after dark, even by car, is dangerous. Criminal gangs sometimes set up roadblocks to trap unwary travellers. In fact, it is best to minimise night time travel in both urban and rural areas.... Organised "raskol" (rascal) gangs are largely responsible for urban crime.... Sexual assaults is a danger for both resident and expatriate women in crime situations, but the threat can be minimised. Women should not walk alone anywhere in Papua New Guinea, whether it is daylight or night (Vantage Systems 1998).

While it is often difficult to assess the economic impact of rascalism and the deteriorating law and order situation in PNG, the recent controversy surrounding the fly-in fly-out (FIFO) operations in Porgera provides one revealing example. At Porgera Mine, FIFO operations, or the practice of hiring employees (mostly from Australia) on a fly-in fly-out basis have seen the transfer of personal consumption and disposable income (transfer of wage income) overseas, totalling approximately K100 million in seven years as a result of increasing lawlessness in the country.²¹ Porgera Joint Venture justifies their position by pointing to crime figures and to the difficulties they have had hiring people who will live at the site. This confirms perceptions that lawlessness is pandemic in and around mining towns where criminal profits are likely to be high.²²

Certainly, plenty more can be said concerning the impact that rascalism has had upon the economy, state and citizenry of PNG. For instance, there is an enormous diversion of public funds which go to battling rascalism and other forms of crime. In addition, the undetermined loss of business and foreign investment that accompanies rising concerns over issues of security and

escalating crime has a national impact. Besides the loss of confidence in the state's ability to effectively curb lawlessness, one also cannot overlook the costs of rascalism in terms of the sheer loss of lives and personal freedom.

Response and Reaction

Over the past thirty years, the response of PNG's law enforcement agencies to the increasing tide of lawlessness in general, and rascalism in particular, has been varied and for the most part ill-conceived. This is largely due to the inherent weaknesses of PNG's criminal justice system that have led to the augmentation of 'normal' policing processes with extraordinary and, at times, draconian measures. These include state of emergency-imposed curfews and special policing operations in rural and urban areas in order to apprehend suspects and retrieve stolen goods. While the aim of such measures is to restore the law and order situation by placing restrictions on movement, the use of police raids and the overall display of militaristic might have been mainly directed at settlement communities. Indeed, upon a closer investigation of the state's reaction to escalating lawlessness, it is clear that the majority of these strategies reveals an underlying perception that rascals are predominantly uneducated, unemployed, and largely the by-product of squatter settlements.

Yet, while the settlements have been the target of much bad press in PNG as allegedly criminogenic, this bias against settlement areas is largely undeserving and reveals a blatant refusal on the part of the state (and public) to accept the fact – already recognised by several competent observers – that the 'career-criminals' and gang leaders tend not to reside in the settlements but

rather come from the more affluent areas of Port Moresby (Clifford, Morauta, and Stuart 1984; Morauta 1986; Harris 1988).

Here it is perhaps best to provide some background on some of the operations and policies that have been directed towards PNG's settlement areas over the years. For instance, one of the most common and long favoured policing tactics is to raid or 'sweep' settlement communities in search of stolen goods and those responsible for stealing them. Such raids usually take place in the early morning hours and are frequently administered in a heavy-handed manner. According to Dinnen, settlement raids often end up operating like "indiscriminate fishing expeditions" in which items of value that cannot be accounted for with a written receipt are confiscated (1997:249). Most alarming is the number of residents' allegations (often later substantiated), of harassment, brutality, and property destruction on the part of the police (Ibid.). Unfortunately, settlement raids and well-documented incidences of 'inappropriate' behaviour on the part of the police breed mutual distrust between the police and local communities. For the most part, this kind of policing creates an escalating cycle of tension and mistrust on both ends. While police often cite a lack of local co-operation as a justification for using this kind of force, such use of force is often the source of local antagonism against police. In effect, police raids upon the settlements have been counter-productive, and such measures have only exacerbated the continued alienation of the one group who may very well constitute the greatest source of help in combating rascalism, namely, the law abiding residents of those settlements.

Besides the law enforcement strategy of 'sweeping' settlement communities, there have also been several coercive administrative policies directed against 'problem' communities believed to be implicated in urban crime. Once again, these policies continue to be directed at the settlements. These policies have included not only the implementation of curfews and vagrancy laws, but also the repatriation of offending migrants, and the wholesale destruction of illegal settlements (McGrath 1990; Dinnen 1993; Morauta 1986).

It is worth noting that during perceived outbreaks of localised violence, the state tends to respond with special police/defence force operations or by imposing blanket restrictions on movement. Yet, during such operations, criminal groups either lie low or escape to rural areas or other towns. Consequently, such strategies have had the counter-productive effect of dispersing criminals throughout the country and of contributing to the geographic expansion of rascal gangs (Harris 1988:34; Strathern 1993:52; Dinnen 1997:250).

Conclusion

In Papua New Guinea, rascal gangs have emerged out of the urban scene as a menacing force that terrorises and profoundly disturbs all sections of the population. Although rascalism as a social phenomenon has had a relatively short history in PNG, spanning little more than a thirty-year period, rascals have developed into highly organised and effective criminal groups. However, as we have seen, the evolution and maturation of rascal gangs has also occurred in parallel with escalating crime and the growing victimisation of the populace. Concerns and the implementation of (largely misdirected) special policing

programs and administrative measures by the state indicate that rascalism is an urgent national issue that is taken very seriously. Correspondingly, fears and anxieties on the part of the wider population also suggest that PNG's urban gang phenomenon is well recognised to be a serious social problem. That rascals and rascalism are salient topics of discussion on the part of politicians and ordinary citizens is thus revealing of the way in which rascalism has penetrated deep into the public psyche and consciousness of Papua New Guineans. In short, rascals have become one of the most prominent features of the urban landscape and one of the most significant issues facing the country at present.

Chapter Three

Interpreting Rascalism

This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first section, I present a survey of the literature on PNG's urban gangs. Here, the object is to explore the various approaches social scientists use to interpret the rascal phenomenon. Specifically, I focus attention on the dominant paradigm for explicating the rascal situation, which I refer to as the social inequality model. Following this examination, I also trace more recent developments in the study of rascals by examining the work of Michael Goddard and other contemporaries who have forwarded alternative interpretations. In the second section, I turn a critical eye towards these frameworks in order to assess their adequacy in accounting for rascalism in PNG. Here, I point out that the literature suffers from a serious failure of nerve in dealing with the darker side of gang behaviour. In this section, I show that the literature demonstrates an inability and/or failure to address the issue of violence (especially violence perpetrated against women), as well as to explore the internal contradictions and politics of these groups. Such deficiencies, I argue not only produce overly romanticised and one-dimensional portraits of gang life but also severely impoverished analyses.

While it is relatively easy to suggest that rascal gangs have left an indelible impression upon PNG's urban landscape, determining the factors that motivate rascalism is more difficult. This is largely due to the fact that studies about rascals are relatively limited, even though rascalism is a significant issue of

concern in PNG. However, in spite of the paucity of research, popular perspectives of rascalism remain firmly rooted in the belief that rascals are predominantly uneducated, unemployed, and the by-product of squatter settlements (Goddard 1995: 55). In academic circles, theorisations about the rascal phenomenon also tend to echo these popular views by associating rascalism with broader social and economic processes currently underway in the country.

The Social Inequality Model

Speculations in academia about the rise of rascalism in PNG have largely been dominated by the view that social inequalities and/or rising moral discontent are the direct cause behind the formation of urban gangs (Reay 1982; Nibbrig 1992; Dinnen 1986, 1993; Harris 1988). In this approach, the rascal phenomenon in PNG is seen to comprise a deeply embittered reaction to perceived inequalities in the country. Here, inequalities – brought about by the increasing disparities of wealth and power – are viewed as the prime mover by which the poor are effectively blocked from legitimate means of acquiring wealth, and therefore forced to create opportunities through criminal means.

Proponents of this view frequently point to the early work of Bruce Harris – whose study of the evolution of rascals remains the most comprehensive – in order to bolster this position (Nibbrig 1992; Dinnen 1993). For instance, in his investigation of rascals, Bruce Harris (1988) points to the difficulties and disillusionment that young men experienced in the urban centres as a motivational factor behind the formation of urban gangs. In his account of the rise

of rascalism, Harris identifies four major forces that were instrumental in the development of urban gangs. These forces include: the dramatic and continuous increase in the level of immigration from outlying areas; the difficulties that faced individual migrants once they arrived in the city; the deprohibition of alcohol in the early 1960s; and the emergence of a new urban elite and a western legal system.

Without giving way to long-standing discussions on the dynamics of and motivations for urban migration (see Levine and Levine 1979 and May 1977), the important point here is that migrants perceived the city as the place to find work and earn money. Yet most often this is not what occurred. According to Harris, most migrants had little to no educational training and no required skills to find employment and earn money. Subsequently, this inability to earn a living, much less to contribute to family or wantoks,²³ was often a great source of frustration and shame for young male migrants. According to Harris, many young men who were marginalised and frustrated in the city found a source of refuge and commonality within their peer groups (Harris 1988:5-6).

Harris also suggests that the deprohibition of alcohol in 1962 further fuelled the development and rise of gangs (Harris 1988:8-9). Previously, discriminatory legislation prevented Papua New Guineans from purchasing or drinking alcohol in their own country. However, following deprohibition, alcohol soon became a symbol of one's success and social status in the new urban environment (ibid:8-9). For example, in an excellent study of the effects of alcohol use after deprohibition, Mac Marshall suggests that drinking alcohol

eventually became a "rite of passage for young men who wish[ed] to show they [were] officially modernised" (1982:5). As such, the social drinking of beer and spirits not only came to symbolise "urbanism, sophistication and modern ways" (ibid: 8), it also proved to be an important factor for young men striving to establish a place for themselves in the towns. In addition, it also proved to be a contributing factor in the rise of thefts that occurred shortly after deprohibition went into effect, as young men stole goods to fund the purchase of intoxicating beverages (Harris 1988:9).

According to Harris, for many young men who found it difficult to establish a legitimate place for themselves in the urban scene, the city often appeared to be deeply contrastive to village life (1988:6-7). In the early period of gang formation, young men not only witnessed a gap in the level of wealth and status between themselves and urban elites, they also saw financially prosperous individuals with little or no obligation to share their wealth with others in the community. Consequently, this refusal to engage in relations of mutual obligation and reciprocity that were commonplace in the villages was not only deeply frustrating but also far removed from their own experience. According to Harris,

The idea that one could suffer in the midst of plenty contradicted the individuals most basic beliefs and values. In the village, no one went hungry as long as someone had food. Certain members of the village group might accumulate more goods and prestige than others but it was in the context of an intricate system of rights and obligations (1988: 6).

Moreover, Papua New Guinea also had a new western legal system that seemed to buttress the actions of the urban elite. For example, Harris points out that the new legal system:

[N]ot only validated their right to acquire as much wealth as they were able, without regard for sharing it with others, it also made it a crime for others to try to force them to share (1988:ibid).

Therefore, when interpreted through the veil of traditional system(s) and values, what is defined as 'theft' in the Western legal sense became simply a way of redressing the imbalance: a way of 'making things right'. Consequently, Harris speculates that the urban experience for many young males was frequently a disappointing one, in which they discovered that the rules they were taught in the village simply did not work. According to Harris, the impact of this culture clash in the city, coupled with acute feelings of worthlessness and frustration, made their rebellion more extreme and their retreat to the comfort and security of the gangs extremely appealing. Gangs and gang life, suggests Harris, provided young men with the opportunity to recreate themselves by transforming their negative identities into a powerful and potentially threatening force (1988:5-7). In other words, the early gangs allowed young and disaffected men to transform their marginality into esteem and their inferiority into outright defiance.

The explanations offered by Harris resonate well with others who have also forwarded interpretations of the rascal situation in Papua New Guinea. For instance, in his recent study of rascal gangs, Nibbrig like Harris, also suggests that "blocked mobility and relative deprivation" (1992:117) fuel the indignation felt by young men who have been adversely affected by the modern capitalist economy. For many young men who found city life particularly hard and frustrating, Nibbrig states that:

[b]efore long, however, these young men realise that places like Port Moresby are alien to them and this new world, one dominated

by a money economy, is not what they had anticipated. They run headlong into existing social, economic, and political structures and the values that underpin them....Some learn quickly that the existing economic structures are 'oppressive' and that they are either ill equipped educationally to enter the urban workforce or that there are no jobs regardless of how well equipped they are (1992:123).

While Nibbrig's interpretation bears striking similarities to Harris, he also goes on to suggest that the discontent and sense of injustice are not solely a consequence of the contemporary urban experience, but rather stem out of PNG's colonial past and continues into the post-Independence period. According to Nibbrig, this sense of indignation – of being denied the benefits of the new urban society – can be traced to the colonial era when indigenous Papua New Guineans were largely restrained from access to the cash economy (1992:125). In his view, the legacy of this colonial restriction continues to be felt to this day, so that:

A visitor today would be struck by the reliance of much of Australian colonialism in present-day Port Moresby. Just as in the past, the modern cash economy appears to be the playground of the European expatriate community, high government officialdom, and, since independence in 1975, the new indigenous bureaucratic and entrepreneurial elite. In sharp contrast to these groups are the majority of people, who walk without shoes and remain at modernity's doorstep (ibid:125).

In light of the Nibbrig's explanation, modern-day rascalism constitutes a political expression against a system that rejects them. The sense of moral indignation that emerges out of the violation of the personal expectations regarding urban life results in the adaptive and criminally inspired reaction against the offending system, as rascals seek redress by redistributing opportunities, that were initially denied to them, through criminal activities.

Sinclair Dinnen, a leading criminologist and expert on rascalism, also emphasizes processes of socio-economic change as factors explaining the urban gang phenomenon. Like Nibbrig and Harris, Dinnen (1986, 1989, 1993, 1997) also draws similar connections between crime and social inequality. For instance, Dinnen sees rising unemployment, a poorly run education system, and urbanisation as leading towards greater disillusionment and escalating crime – as those most adversely affected by the modern cash economy find themselves forced to counteract the inequities through illegitimate means. According to Dinnen, criminal opportunities and activities available to the urban poor are particularly enhanced by the conspicuous concentrations of wealth in the cities and the marked contrast in lifestyles and wealth (particularly in the settlement communities). Urban gang criminality, suggests Dinnen, is largely the end-result of growing socio-economic inequalities whereby the poor are effectively blocked from lawful opportunities to acquire wealth (1993:19-22,25).

As I have noted, the idea that rascalism is largely the result of socio-economic inequities is particularly pervasive among the vast majority of Papua New Guineans and academics alike. The currency of this view is especially evident in government-funded reports (Clifford, Morauta, and Stuart 1984; O'Collins 1986) and letters to the editor in the national newspapers (Cooper 1994; Paiaru 1997; Concerned Pikinini 1998). All of these reinforce the argument that rascal gangs constitute a criminally inspired reaction to socio-economic inequalities that are now prominent and endemic features of PNG's

urban environment. Most compelling, however, is the additional support that comes from the criminals themselves (Goddard 1995:57) and from reports that suggest that gangs rob the rich to give to the poor (Reay 1982). For example, Don Kulick recently reported that in spite of the relative isolation from rascalism, "folk" tales about rascals are commonly shared among rural villagers, in which rascals are seen to be "fighting a kind of protracted guerrilla war against corrupt politicians, greedy businessmen and obstructionist missionaries" (1993:9).

Rascals and the State

While it has become increasingly common to associate rascalism with the economic environment in PNG and the socio-economic inequities found therein, the relationship between rascals and the state is another dimension that is frequently discussed. For instance, Marc Schiltz (1985) sees rascalism as reflecting structural changes in the power bases of society and the relationship both to tradition and modernity. In his study, rascals are viewed by the state as individuals who habitually break the law and who are identified with the urban poor. However, in stark contrast, gangs view the state – represented by high income earners, members of the elite, the police and other law enforcement agencies – as an opponent who is unwilling to engage in exchange relations with them which would allow them to compete on an equal footing in the nation's social processes (1985:149, 153). Others, like Sinclair Dinnen (1986), see the state-rascal relationship somewhat differently. For example, Dinnen sees rascals and the state as locked in a tight embrace in which law and order policies serve the rulers at the expense of the ruled

and divert public attention from the less visible types of crime such as white collar crime and political corruption (1986, 1989, 1993).

Big Men and Rascals

In contrast to the social inequality model that emphasises the causal connections between rascalism and rising disparities in wealth and power, some scholars have also focused on the linkages and continuities between rascals and tradition (Schiltz 1985; Dinnen 1995; Goddard 1992, 1995). For instance, in sharp contrast to previous interpretations that emphasise the breakdown of traditional institutions and value systems (culture clash) as important pre-conditions for urban gang activity, it is instead suggested that what really is going on here is the evolution and manifestation of an exchange economy fed by crime (Goddard 1992, 1995).

In a 1984 report on the law and order situation in Papua New Guinea, Clifford et al. observed that:

Youth gangs in Papua New Guinea have a culture all their own – not traditional, not western but with elements of each. This needs further study (Clifford et. al.: 1984 Vol. II:176).

As we can see by the above quote, elucidating the connections between the pre-colonial past and present-day rascal gangs is not entirely unprecedented. Over the past twenty years of rascal study, several observers have commented on the continuities between rascalism and pre-colonial institutions and processes. For example, Harris suggests that rascal leaders frequently exhibit "attributes of both a modern crime leader and a traditional big man in Melanesian society" (1988:26).²⁴ Nibbrig also suggests that the role of gang leaders "is reminiscent of

the traditional role of the big man" and, in many ways, is a "modern restatement of a traditional system of authority" (1992:117). However, for the most part, these connections have amounted to little more than passing observations. The main exception, of course, is the early work of Marc Schiltz, and the more recent work of Michael Goddard who investigated more fully the potential links between rascal leaders and the model of traditional big men.

Goddard's work presents a very different interpretation from previous analyses that pointed to poverty and moral indignation as determining factors behind the emergence of rascal gangs. While Goddard does not deny that social inequalities do exist or that indignation plays a factor in the rascal phenomenon, he does suggest that such accounts have largely "misapprehended [the] popular rhetoric of disadvantage" (1995:56). According to Goddard, this is due in large part to the fact that other commentators have failed to take into account ideational factors that are central to Papua New Guinea social relations and interaction (1995:64). While it is true that several observers have pointed to the similarities between rascal leaders and the pre-colonial Melanesian big man, Goddard argues that they miss the mark, in that there is little contextualization, and subsequently, little discussion about what these similarities may mean beyond the rascal/big man juxtaposition. In other words, what is missing is any in-depth investigation and analysis into Papua New Guinean conceptions of how relationships ought to operate between individuals with desirable resources and those with whom they interact through kinship and exchange ties.

Accordingly, Goddard's answer to this theoretical oversight is to place

greater emphasis upon the continuities that connect modern and traditional institutions in PNG. In his analysis, Goddard argues that, besides the similarities between the role of the gang leader and that of the traditional big man, the distribution of wealth also follows a similar pattern to that of Melanesian societies in general. In other words, Goddard argues that gang behaviour represents an integration of pre-capitalist behaviour into a cash economy environment. For example, he demonstrates that like traditional Big-men, rascal leaders are entrepreneurs who gain prestige and support through escalating success in crime and the redistribution of stolen goods as gestures of generosity to family members and lesser criminals (1995:64). Thus, in Goddard's view, the leaders of rascal gangs are in many ways big men, who operate in a "crime-fed economy that involves social relations typical of precapitalist Melanesian societies" (ibid:64).

Goddard argues that pre-colonial and pre-capitalist societies in PNG practised a communal mode of production in which a system of reciprocity was central. Although he points out that success in this system relied, in varying degrees, upon the accumulation of material wealth, wealth was viewed not as an end in itself but rather was valued for its use in establishing more fundamental social objectives, such as the pursuit of prestige (1992, 1995). Goddard maintains that this complex of relations is still evident today in urban settings.²⁵ For instance, he points out that wantok networks in many ways replicate the pre-capitalist relationships in which the tangle of prestige, obligation, and reciprocity are visibly apparent. Such observations are not novel, however, for in his

discussion of wantokism in PNG, Monsell-Davis states that:

Reputation, including moral and ethical superiority, is commonly based on access to, and command over, resources and their distribution. The expectation of reciprocity, and the idea of prestige associated with giving (along with the concomitant fear of being perceived as repudiating proper social relationships if one rejects a request for help) are important elements of continuity in modern Melanesia (1993:51).

Therefore, strategies that centre on the manipulation of resources and social relations demonstrate important continuities that link social behaviour in both modern and traditional contexts.²⁸

In his work, Goddard argues that rascals are like traditional big men; they are brazen and highly competent individuals who are extremely reliable in orchestrating large scale (criminal) endeavours that promise profitable returns. In addition, rascal leaders are also highly efficient in mobilising and gaining the support and trust of others in order to carry out crimes. For instance, Goddard suggests that like the big man of the past, rascal leaders also build up chains of obligations and counter-obligations with their families and with lesser criminals (1992:27-29). For example, in return for support rendered in carrying out crimes, and for the secrecy that insures they are not apprehended by the police, rascal leaders are also bound to certain obligations as well; the basic one being that their following has the right to share in the bounty even if they did not actually participate in the heists. So like big men who became powerful figures and made names for themselves by giving away pigs or shells, gang leaders also gain prestige through generously dispersing the spoils of crime to wantoks and fellow rascals (ibid:27-29). For instance, Goddard states that:

The focal entities in the Papua New Guinea gang phenomenon are in fact not the 'gangs', but the so-called 'gang leaders', criminal entrepreneurs who have gained prestige by their successful manipulation of relationships of reciprocity, using theft as a means of obtaining gifts (mostly in the form of money) to develop and maintain the relationships (1992:30).

As such, Goddard argues that like traditional big men, rascals are also well aware of these age-old political strategies of giving generously to establish enduring social relations and prestige. The objective of redistribution – upon which the gang leader develops his power base – is not only the desire for material wealth that most rascal leader are after, it is also the pursuit of prestige and the reputation for being a skilled and accomplished criminal.

The Phenomenon of Mass Surrender

According to Sinclair Dinnen (1995, 1997), the perennial pursuit of prestige and relationships of obligation are not only evident in the social behaviour of those within the gangs, they are equally evident in the behaviour of those who have chosen to leave the gangs. For instance, in recent years, a frequent occurrence in PNG is the mass surrender of criminals to the legal authorities (Goddard 1995:72; Dinnen 1995; Giddings 1986). According to Dinnen, the surrender of self-proclaimed criminal groups in PNG dates back to the early 1980s and has, over the years, become a regular phenomenon throughout the country (1995:103). Lynn Giddings documented the first case in which a large number of young people from Goroka marched through the towns carrying placards asking for amnesty before giving themselves up at the police station (1986:133).

According to the observations of both Goddard and Dinnen, criminal surrenders are typically formal and highly publicised affairs that frequently followed intensive preliminary negotiations among the legal authorities, a neutral "brokering party", and the rascals themselves (Dinnen 1995:104; Goddard 1995:72). These surrenders usually involve a public conversion to Christianity, a ceremonial handing over of guns and other implements of crime, a public apology for past crimes, and often the suspension of any prosecutory action (Ibid.). Most importantly, however, such occasions usually guarantee a great deal of media coverage, as well as a considerable degree of prestige, with some 'ex-criminals' occasionally participating in "testimonial tours" around the country, and others receiving private and government funding in order to start legitimate businesses (Giddings 1986:133).

However, Dinnen -- who investigated one such surrender in Port Moresby in 1992 -- says that neither regrets for past crimes nor religious conversion, nor the desire to become law-abiding citizens appeared to play a significant factor in the decision to surrender (1995:111). According to him, most of the youths who decided to surrender were primarily on the "margins of crime" and were not the numerically small and hard core career rascals. From their perspective, mass surrenders were primarily seen as a "strategy for accessing resources" such as the procurement of jobs, contracts and financial assistance (ibid:111).

While this interpretation broadly accords with previous accounts that placed emphasis upon the desire for material resources and a corresponding

lack of legitimate opportunities available to young people, Dinnen also goes on to suggest that:

such a view, however, seriously over-simplifies the social dynamics of both raskolism and raskol surrender by privileging one motivational aspect over others (ibid:111).

According to him, there are more pervasive factors underlying the social behaviours of rascals and those who choose to surrender, the most obvious of which is the issue of prestige. So that as in the case of rascals, who engage in criminal activities as a strategy of acquiring prestige and enduring social relations, and of course, material resources, surrender also constitutes a strategy for obtaining virtually the same things. Subsequently, Dinnen notes that in many ways the desire for material resources and for prestige are equally evident among rascals who opt to surrender. According to Dinnen, surrender merely constitutes "another avenue for pursuing essentially the same social objectives" (1995:114). For those on the margins of criminal organisations and whose status is often negligible, surrender offers an extremely appealing way of not only gaining access to material resources in the form of jobs, government contracts and funding, it also often provides an excellent way of gaining the prestige denied to them in the gangs.

Delinquent Avengers or Big Men of Crime?

As we have seen, interpretations of the rascal phenomenon follow two distinct paths. The first and widely travelled path is the social inequality model and is expressed in the work of Reay (1982), Harris (1988), Dinnen 1986, 1989, 1993), and Nibbrig (1992). In this model, rascalism is often associated with

unemployment, relative poverty, and marginalised and/or disaffected youth because it is assumed that social inequalities and rising moral discontent are the direct causes of Papua New Guinea's urban gang phenomenon. Rascals are thereby typically identified with the urban poor, who are forced into a life of crime because they are effectively cut off from legitimate means of acquiring wealth, or alternatively, with urban warriors who turn to a life of crime due to anger and frustration with oppressive social, economic and political structures. Many of these analyses contain elements of both of these interpretations.

Whereas proponents of the social inequality model focus on the present day social and economic processes currently underway in the country, the second path, identified with the work of Goddard and Dinnen, emphasizes the connections between rascalism and tradition. By drawing out the continuities that exist between rascalism and pre-colonial institutions and processes, Goddard and Dinnen emphasize the ideational factors that remain central to Papua New Guinea social relations and interactions. Where Goddard chooses to make his case by elucidating the connections between the traditional big men of the past and the contemporary gang leaders, Dinnen chooses to outline how the pre-colonial tangle of prestige, obligation, and reciprocity are still evident in the case of gang members who choose to surrender.

Although the social inequality and the big man model emphasize acquisitive crime committed by rascals in order to make their case, they nonetheless reveal dramatic differences in the way they have chosen to interpret the evidence and view the rascal phenomenon. Where one model looks to the

present, the other model looks to the past; where one model sees discontinuity and a breaking away from past institutions, the other models sees continuity between traditional systems and the present. Yet, while these models constitute mirror images of one another, these differences speak to a larger set of issues that fall well beyond rascalism, namely, dominant (mis)perceptions of social change in colonial and postcolonial circumstances. For example, the social inequality model generally can be seen to fall under the auspices of the dependency theory of crime. Dependency theory criminologists tend to locate the causes of crime in the structures of society, particularly in those structures that produce inequality. As such, they tend to focus on rule making over rule breaking, since rule breaking or crime is the symptom rather than the cause of criminal behaviour. In this framework, criminal law is affected by the relations of production and operates as an instrument in which the dominant classes maintain and strengthen their position while also securing the country for foreign investment and further exploitation. Consequently, dependency criminologists such as Sinclair Dinnen, frequently place emphasis upon poverty and social inequalities in order to show how third world countries and traditional economies fall victim to capitalist exploitation.

Conversely, the big men of crime model can be seen as a reaction to this view in which the underlying argument is that despite the penetration of capitalism or the unprecedented process of social, economic and political change, Papua New Guinea's traditional institutions have not been destroyed but in many ways have actually effloresced (Gregory 1982:115). As such, the big

man model constitutes an alternative to the view of third world societies as mere pawns of international capitalism and the tendency to ignore the integrity of local systems and cultural traditions.

Critique

It is undeniable that unemployment, increasing inequalities in wealth and power, urbanisation, and rising discontent have long been favoured as the main explanatory variables for understanding rascalism in Papua New Guinea. There are two reasons that explain the use of the social inequality model by social scientists. The most obvious reason is that the social inequality model seems to coincide with the widely held views of the general public, and most significantly, with the experiences and testimonies of gang members (current and former). This in turn makes it difficult to imagine other factors that might lie behind gang behaviour.

However, despite the fact that the social inequality model appears, on the surface, to be the most sensible and obvious interpretation, it also blinds us to other factors that are less conspicuous. For instance, upon closer study of the evidence, the linkage that has been drawn between rascals and settlement communities becomes increasingly tenuous. Although there is little debate that settlements were crucial in the early years of gang formation, there is growing evidence to suggest that career criminals (particularly gang leaders) now come from more affluent neighbourhoods (Harris 1988). In addition, there is increasing awareness that the majority of young people who currently run with the gangs are not rural-to-urban migrants, but rather are born and raised in the cities

(Connell & Lea 1994; Goddard 1992). Most important, however, is the evidence that suggests that settlement communities in urban Papua New Guinea are more likely the result of a serious housing shortage rather than an unemployment problem as was previously argued (Connell & Lea 1994:274; Goddard 1995; McGrath 1992). It is not at all clear that unemployment, urban migration, and poverty lie behind present-day rascal organisations.

Most significant, however, is the mounting criticism directed at the portrayal of rascals as the poor and downtrodden who are forced into a life of crime because legitimate opportunities are unavailable. Although it is likely that some people are driven to crime by extreme poverty, there is no hard evidence to show that individuals in these kinds of circumstances make up the majority of rascal gangs as has been suggested by proponents of this argument. For instance, Louise Morauta has commented that the connection between relative poverty and crime is not as straightforward as it seems (1986:10). In her investigations, she observes that:

[m]ost urban teenagers who left school at grade 6 and have been unable to find jobs do not become criminals or join gangs. A large number may be dissatisfied or underemployed, but do not turn to crime....At best, poverty could be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for crime (ibid:10).

In addition, the kinds of crime that rascals commit also challenge this view. For instance, evidence suggests that in terms of theft, the profits of criminal ventures are in fact expended (in one way or another) very quickly instead of being used to redress material deprivation. In other words, putting food on the table does not appear to be a primary goal (Goddard 1995).

How does one account for the testimonies offered by rascals themselves?

According to Morauta, "criminals have learned that academics, bureaucrats, politicians find poverty partly acceptable excuses for crime" (1986:11).

Subsequently, when one investigates more closely the connections between unemployment and crime, it becomes abundantly clear that the popular stereotyping of rascals as unemployed school dropouts is much too simplistic to be granted much explanatory value. Furthermore, rascal testimonials that place blame on the lack of legitimate opportunities also cannot be accepted at face value. For example, Dinnen argues that there is plenty of evidence that suggests that those involved in rascal activities have at one time or another occupied waged positions (1995:113). Indeed, one observer even goes so far as to suggest that while most gang members are 'unemployed' when apprehended, this in fact may be by preference:

[t]o assume that their unemployment leads to criminal activity may not only be incorrect, but may in many cases present the progression the wrong way round (Goddard 1992:21).

In addition, it is well recognised that in urban situations being employed may often be a mixed blessing, given that employment frequently creates financial difficulties rather than financial stability (Stevensen 1986; Monsell-Davis 1993; Goddard 1992; Dinnen 1995). This 'mixed blessing' of being employed is often attributed to the 'wantok system' and its encompassing kinship obligation complex. Although the wantok system constitutes an invaluable source of support for individuals and households facing tough economic hardships, the wantok system can also be seen to engender intense and persistent demands

on those who are employed. Requests for help from wantoks – which vary in scale from requests of tobacco, to school fees, and marriage payments – frequently create a situation in which it becomes next to impossible to maintain those obligations. Consequently, because crime affords a level of material rewards that far outweighs what can be realised by wage labour, criminal activities, may very well provide a financially promising way to supplement the demands made by kin.

In Goddard and Dinnen's attempt to reorient thinking about rascalism in an anthropological purview of prestige and continuity with the traditional past, both scholars provide a corrective over frameworks that draw solely upon social-psychological factors and other adaptive deficiencies that are often derived from studies of gangs in the West. Too often social scientists who study urban gangs in the developing world work from assumptions that are gleaned from studies in the West, thereby neglecting the specific historical and social processes that are unique to Papua New Guinea. According to Goddard, most proponents of the social inequality model frequently and in eclectic fashion employ a number of these assumptions to account for rascalism (1992:20).²⁷ The big man model at least moves (in varying degrees) away from the common reliance on a Western archetype to understand delinquency and crime.

However, in spite of these strengths, the big man of crime model also suffers from its own unique set of problems. For instance, both Goddard and Dinnen rely on a seriously over generalised and reified portrait of big men and traditional exchange economy dynamics in their work. By opting for a largely

essentialist view, Goddard and Dinnen tend to overlook the tremendous regional, ethnic, and historical variation in leadership styles and economic relations in PNG. Moreover, it also allows them to ignore an enormous body of work that disputes and further complicates the notion of the Melanesian big man.²⁸ For example, D.K. Feil (1987) notes that like other features of social life, leadership in the New Guinea highlands does not follow a uniform pattern and therefore cannot be treated as homogenous. According to Feil, many anthropological depictions of big men systems date from the post-colonial period when political and economic conditions were very much changed from those that prevailed prior to colonialism (1987:95). He suggests that prior to European settlement and pacification, systems of ascribed (as opposed to achieved) leadership were more in evidence in the western highlands than has been portrayed by anthropologists (ibid:95).²⁹ Feil also notes that leadership styles varied from the east to west, whereby in the eastern highlands leaders were frequently warriors, men skilled in fighting, rather than the economic entrepreneurs that one finds in the western highlands (ibid:65). In short, Feil argues that colonialism altered previous political and leadership systems, so that what became almost diagnostic of highland politics -- the big man -- is actually either relatively recent and/or geographically specific (ibid:95). Traditional highlands leaders vary greatly and have not been static, unchanging or immune to external influences. As such, Feil argues that any attempt to present "a pan-highlands leadership type is likely to be methodologically unsound and empirically ill-fated" (ibid:92).

Certainly placing due attention upon the ways in which many social groups actively mingle tradition and modern elements is important.³⁰ However, both scholars, and particularly Goddard, make the mistake of relying on an archetypal image of the Melanesian big man amassed from post-pacification reports. By drawing upon an overly simplified understanding of Melanesian bigmanship and exchange economies, Goddard and Dinnen overlook important facts that contradict the big man - rascal comparison. Both authors fail to attend to the ways in which: (1) rascals do not necessarily mediate wider political relations/networks; or (2) establish partnerships and rivalries between gang leaders; or (3) engage in competitive exchanges with other leaders, as we find in the literature on traditional political and exchange systems in Papua New Guinea (Strathern 1966; Schiltz 1985:149). For his part, Marc Schiltz chooses to downplay the similarities between rascals and traditional Melanesian big men, stating that:

In searching for cultural continuities, I would compare the generosity displayed by rascals with that of village men interacting with their own supporting factions, but not with their competitors. Generosity is a public relations act through which rascals try to validate and/or improve their presence within a neighbourhood (Schiltz 1985:147).

Ironically, had Goddard and Dinnen examined closely early pre-pacification descriptions (instead of accepting a highly generalised portrait), they would have been introduced to a barrage of accounts about infamous leaders better suited to the rascal/big man juxtaposition that they sought to establish. For example, there are several reports of leaders who existed throughout pre-colonial New Guinea who were more often than not aggressive

warriors and killers rather than manipulators and transactors of wealth (Salisbury 1964; Strathern 1966; Watson 1971). Despotic leaders such as the infamous Matoto (Watson 1971) and Kavage (Young 1983) are well known to this day for their outrageous improprieties, as well as the capacity to use brutal violence (physical and sexual) against enemies and allies alike. In this sense, the portrait Goddard constructs of rascals as big men misses what is perhaps the strongest resemblance between the two, namely, a propensity to use violence.

Rascalism and Resistance

In her early investigation of rascalism in the New Guinea Highlands, Marie Reay proposed that rascal gangs purposefully "aim to close the gap between the rich and poor", suggesting that:

Gang members recycle the spoils of their robberies among those who think they are in need. The gang leader himself provides a model of this Robin Hoodism. When he sleeps in somebody's house for the night he gives K60 or K70 in tariff. To anyone he meets on the road who seems thirsty or hungry he gives food and drink or money (1982:625-626).

Interestingly, ten years later Nibbrig can be seen to echo those same observations.

Framing the discussion in this way further illuminates the adaptive capacity of Rascal organisations and the indignation driving that process. Indignation – the internalisation of historic wrongs, a heightened sense of injustice – is the emotion that provides the bridge from the social psychological state of relative deprivation to its political expression (1992:117).

As I attempted to demonstrate earlier, academic and popular commentary regarding the nature of rascalism tends to suggest that rascals are fighting and/or

resisting *something*. Whether it be poverty, inequalities in wealth and power, the state, or larger processes like capitalism, the position that rascalism amounts to a kind of culture of resistance, or that rascals are actually "organic heroes fighting social and political injustice" (Reay 1982), appears to be widely held throughout PNG.

Within academic circles, the connection between rascalism and resistance is a pervasive theme that runs through the literature. This is not surprising, however, when one realises that *resistance* (and its derivatives) has become a predominant theme in the social sciences. Yet, despite "our current love affair with resistance," as one observer describes it (Brown 1998:729), several scholars are now beginning to point out problems with the resistance concept and the manner in which it is applied.

For example, in her 1995 review of resistance studies, Sherry Ortner argues that most studies of resistance are seriously weakened by a problem she identifies as "ethnographic refusal" (ibid:173). According to her, "ethnographic refusal" primarily involves a failure of ethnographic holism and depth in the accounts, which may take various forms. For instance, Ortner notes that many studies are "thin" in their treatment of the internal political complexities of dominated groups, which not only gives these accounts an "air of romanticism" but also leads to one-dimensional portrayals and faulty analyses (ibid: 176-180, 190). In addition, she points out that most resistance studies are guilty of "thinning culture" and of "dissolving subjects" (ibid:180-187), by presenting subordinate groups/culture and subject positionings only as reactions to

domination. According to Ortner, the creation of "ethnographically thin" accounts is largely the result of a "failure of nerve" by academics which inhibits the ability to explore the politically sensitive issue of the internal politics and contradictions of dominated groups (ibid: 190). While Ortner sees various reasons that might account for what she identifies as a "bizarre refusal to know and speak and write of the lived worlds inhabited by those who resist" (ibid: 187-188), she sees the "crisis of representation" as the driving force behind this "failure of nerve" (1995:188). Thus, Ortner states that:

When Edward Said says in effect that the discourse of Orientalism renders it virtually impossible to know anything real about the Orient (1979); when Gayatri Spivak tells us that "the subaltern cannot speak" (1988); when James Clifford informs us that all ethnographies are "fictions" (1986:7); and when of course in some cases all of these things are true —then the effect is a powerful inhibition on the practice of ethnography broadly defined: the effortful practice, despite all that, of seeking to understand other peoples in other times and places, especially those people who are not in dominant positions (ibid:188).

In another critique of resistance studies, Michael Brown examines "anthropology's fascination with resistance" (1998:730) and explores the manner in which attributions of resistance become important rhetorical devices for anthropologists and other social scientists. Brown argues that the concept serves as a vehicle to express the anthropologist's moral fervour and he criticises the way in which this kind of moral sensibility frequently "spills into contexts of questionable relevance" (1998:733). By exploring the seemingly "excessive" focus on resistance, Brown -- like Ortner -- points out how an "unchecked application of the concept of resistance" impoverishes one's ability to gain a complex understanding of the people s/he studies. In other words, Brown

suggests that the need not to be viewed as either politically or morally insensitive can lead anthropologists to overuse the concept of resistance so we end up seeing resistance virtually everywhere. This undermines the concept's analytical utility as well as the project of anthropology. In his concluding remarks, Brown states that:

The task of cultural anthropology remains, as it always has been, to illuminate how human beings use their emotional, intellectual, aesthetic, and material resources to thrive in a range of social settings. Domination and subordination are, of course, key elements of this process. But so are reciprocity, altruism, and the creative power of the imagination, forces that serve to remind us that society cannot be relegated to the conceptual status of a penal colony without impoverishing anthropological theory and worse still, violating the complex and creative understandings of those for whom we presume to speak (1998:734).

Keeping in mind the insights provided by both Ortner and Brown, one can see that the 'Robin Hood' imagery and rhetoric of disadvantage adopted by rascals and promulgated in the literature falls apart with the discovery that most victims of crime are the poor themselves (Morauta 1986; Goddard 1992, 1995). While it is certainly true that some victims of crime comprise wealthy individuals and neighbourhoods, there is no hard evidence to suggest that they are any more victimised by rascals than their poorer counterparts, as would be expected in some of the earlier interpretations (Reay 1982; Dinnen 1986; Nibbrig 1992). The communities from which rascals steal, in fact, comprise their own compatriots (parents, aunties, uncles, wantoks, etc.). Louise Morauta is very clear on this point when she states that:

[T]he poor are in several ways more exposed to crime than the affluent. It is they who have to walk home after dark if they cannot find public transport, live in flimsy homes without security bars, and

cannot afford private security services or telephones. They bear the brunt of violent crime in public places, and are not spared murder, rape or injury (Morauta 1986:10).

In addition, the fact that rascals are increasingly becoming the henchmen of PNG's political and/or economic elites also tends to contradict the Robin Hood imagery found in both the popular and academic commentary on rascalism. Moreover, as Marc Schiltz points out, the dramatic increase in rape by rascals also demonstrates that this form of crime can no longer be accounted for by the pursuit of wealth alone. By focusing attention on the patterns of crime and its victims, it becomes increasingly apparent that the poor are victims of rascals. The realisation that rascals do not necessarily discriminate on the basis of economic status -- as they would have us believe -- makes it difficult to accept the argument that material poverty and/or moral indignation are predominant motivational factors underlying rascal behaviour.

While it may be tempting to present rascalism as resistance, Ortnor's argument suggests a need to dig deeper in order to examine the internal contradictions of these groups as well. For example, we need to find ways to better account for the fact that the victims of rascalism are often no more economically advantaged than rascals themselves. Most importantly, these studies need to explore in greater detail the internal politics of rascal gangs; not just between rascal gangs and PNG's *bourgeois* society as Nibbrig and Reay would have it, but within all arenas of friction and potential conflict e.g. between parents and children, seniors and juniors, and men and women. A good place to start might be to investigate the connection between rascals and the

communities in which they live. Two opposing views of rascals are that they are parasites who frighten their hosts and neighbours, make constant trouble and give the communities a bad name, or that they are Robin Hoods who steal from the rich in order to give to the poor (Reay 1982). While these contrasting stereotypes may not be mutually exclusive, but rather reflect in simple form the highs and lows of the relationship between rascals and the communities in which they live, the relationship nonetheless demands further study. Finally, it seems clear that rascals are adept at using the social inequality to evade the moral consequences of their acts, suggesting that such rhetoric has the ideological function of hiding, rather than illuminating, social reality.

Sanitising the Violence

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the literature on PNG's rascal gangs is that it fails to acknowledge, never mind explore, the darker side of rascalism. This is not entirely surprising, however, when we – following Sherry Ortner -- realise how frequently resistance studies tend to gloss over and sanitise the internal contradictions and unsavoury aspects of those who resist (or do not resist, whatever the case may be) (1995:177-179). Throughout the literature on rascals, some of the serious forms of exploitation and violence (both physical and sexual) committed by rascal gangs are either entirely excluded from view, or are treated as superfluous to other types of crime, notably theft. Indeed, in most of the accounts,³¹ readers are led to assume that the only *real* kinds of crime that rascals commit are acquisitive in nature. This fact is particularly alarming considering that violent crime far supersedes that of property crime, especially in

the case of rascals. This oversight is largely made possible by the failure to recognise that the distinction between crimes against property and crimes against persons makes little sense when most acts of rascalism exhibits elements of both.³² Moreover, by presenting rascalism in primarily economic terms, the accounts also fail to acknowledge the alarming increase in violent offences over the past decade and its repercussions on the country at large. For example, recent police figures between 1980 and 1990 not only demonstrate that violent crimes in PNG have escalated at a phenomenal rate, but also reinforce the fact that crimes against property are the least of concerns.

*Reported Number of Violent Crimes in PNG*³³

<i><u>Violent Crime</u></i>	<i><u>1980</u></i>	<i><u>1990</u></i>
<i>Homicide</i>	<i>127</i>	<i>1777</i>
<i>Rape</i>	<i>285</i>	<i>1896</i>
<i>Assault</i>	<i>2622</i>	<i>3149</i>
<i>Armed Robbery</i>	<i>530</i>	<i>1944</i>

(Dinnen 1993:28)

Besides over-emphasising the material dimensions of crime, the literature also exhibits a serious reluctance to adequately explore or explain why rascal gangs engage in certain types of offences. This appears to be a case of failure of nerve and is no where more evident than in the silence surrounding the phenomenon of rape committed by individuals and groups.

Throughout the literature, the topic of sexual violence committed by rascals has been consistently neglected. For example, while Reay (1982) and Goddard (1992, 1995) largely ignore the topic, and Nibbrig (1992) side-steps the issue by relegating it to a footnote, Sinclair Dinnen chooses to balance the mention of pack

rape with a hypothesis that views sexual violence against women as epiphenomenal to broader structural inequalities (1993:28-29). Throughout the literature, rascals are presented as simply a nuisance and not the pandemic social problem that creates intense fear amongst the populace. Security fears on the part of the public at large are often translated into security fears on the part of the expatriate community, thereby creating the false impression that the only people victimised by and concerned about rascals are the elite. In fact, upon reading the accounts, one is often led to wonder if rascals victimise anybody at all. In the literature, the reader is left with two possible alternative explanations: either rascals are seen as victims of social, economic and/or political injustices or they are seen as righteous warriors of tradition or of the oppressed. This refusal and inability to explore the issue of sexual violence as a phenomenon in its own right is particularly distressing considering that the sexual victimisation of women in PNG is widespread. Both national and international crime statistics demonstrate that the sexual victimisation of women is extensive. For example, in PNG's Annual Police Report, there were 3079 counts of rape reported to the police in 1993 (Dinnen 1998), and in one international survey conducted by the United Nations, PNG was rated the second highest in the developing world in terms of the sexual victimisation of women (Patrignani and Alvazzi del Frate 1998). While one would not necessarily expect a full account of the nature of gender-based violence committed against women in PNG, at the very least one would expect the literature to mention that rascal gangs victimise women more than any other group in PNG. Although great strides have been made to better understand gender-based

conflict, precious little has been done to explore this form of violence,³⁴ which is surprising given that pack rape has become such a prominent part of gang activity.³⁵ Clearly, much more research needs to be done to understand the underlying dynamics that motivate rascal gangs to brutalise women physically and sexually.

Overall, what these examples and problems reveal is that there appears to be a virtual taboo on putting the pieces together in a manner that would offer a more complex analysis and portrait of the rascal situation. Throughout the literature on rascals, scholars continuously exhibit trepidation or blatant refusal to address the more unpalatable aspects of the phenomenon, choosing instead to smooth over or ignore altogether the evidence that informs them. This failure of nerve leads not only to a sanitisation of the accounts but also to an impoverishment of our analyses.

Summary and Conclusion

In the first section of this chapter, I attempted to show that contemporary thinking about the rise and extension of urban gangs in Papua New Guinea has tended to be dominated by the social inequality model. According to this model, the rascal phenomenon is seen to comprise an embittered reaction to rising disparities in wealth and power thus leading to the view that rascalism is a culture of resistance. In recent years, an alternative model has been advanced which attempts to elucidate the connections between rascalism and tradition. According to his model, rascalism represents not a response to material deprivation or moral discontent, but rather a strategy for the pursuit of prestige and creation of

obligations: the age-old economic and political strategies of traditional Melanesian big men.

In the second section, I provided a critique of the explanatory frameworks used to account for rascalism. Here, I tried to show that in spite of the relative successes of each interpretation of the rascal phenomenon, both models fall short of the mark. Besides ignoring or glossing over the conflicting evidence in favour of over simplified explanations, I showed that both frameworks exhibit a troubling reluctance to deal with the disturbing dimensions of gang behaviour – the violence. I argued that the propensity for rascal gangs to use brutal physical and sexual violence is systematically excluded from the reader's view, suggesting that the only criminal activity worth commenting on is theft, lending a remarkably economistic flavour to these accounts.

Most importantly, however, I showed that this apprehension is manifested in other ways, beyond what appears to be a purposeful turning away from the unpalatable aspects of rascalism. It is seen in the view that rascals are primarily proletarian avengers fighting against an oppressive and unjust system. The notion that rascals are reacting against broader socio-economic inequalities is widely accepted in both academic and popular circles. However, I also noted that an indiscriminate application of the concept of resistance – such as we find in this case – frequently skews the ethnographic reality, creating an overly romanticised portrait of rascalism as well as faulty analyses.

Chapter Four

Dilemmas of Rascal Research

In chapter three I provided a survey and critical evaluation of the literature dealing with urban gangs in PNG. In that chapter, I highlighted what appeared to be a serious 'failure of nerve' dealing straightforwardly with the darker side of rascalism. In this chapter, I intend to examine this problem in more detail, exploring the possible sources that may lie behind the current practice of *editing-out the bad parts*. While I do not wish to suggest that the problem springs from just one source, I intend to argue that the sanitisation stems in large part from a real and/or perceived fear of (mis)representing our anthropological Others. In more specific terms, I intend to argue that despite the development of a healthy self-consciousness, the so-called crisis of representation may have also created a form of professional myopia in which we are turning a blind eye to important processes. I argue that despite the best of intentions, scholars researching uncomfortable issues such as rascalism risk doing a disservice to research in PNG and to the discipline as a whole, *if their sense of representational delicacy* is allowed to dim their view of the social processes surrounding what is, after all, a source of suffering and fear in the communities we investigate.

Digging Below the Surface

How can we best account for what appears to be a systematic failure to provide a more complete, complex and realistic portrait of rascalism? How can we best explain the reluctance and inability to explore and to discuss the more disturbing aspects of gang behaviour? Where, for example, does the issue of

rascal violence fit into the literature? And why are so few anthropologists willing to talk about it?

As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, I eventually came to the realisation that rascalism and the way it is talked about it is a potentially contentious issue: a fact which became abundantly clear in the series of exchanges that occurred in *Anthropology Today* (Kulick 1991; Schiltz 1992; Lipset 1993). More importantly, I also knew that finding the answers to the above questions would not be a straightforward matter, since they concerned gaps and exclusions, or what was missing the accounts. While I had some ideas regarding possible factors behind this problem of ethnographic reticence, I knew that finding answers would require an innovative solution on my part since the issues I was confronting were largely implicit in nature. Consequently, I did the only thing I could reasonably do under the circumstances: I asked researchers who were active in the field.

Specifically, I sent out an informal query to several social scientists³⁶ who presently work in Papua New Guinea, and whom I thought would be in a good position to shed light on some of these pressing questions:³⁷

- Is the topic of rascalism controversial?
- Is there a general reluctance to 'talk' about rascalism in print?
- And if so, why might this be the case?

I based my choices about who to contact upon those who have either written about rascalism or crime in PNG, or who have written about a particular subject matter that could be regarded as politically sensitive.³⁸ The rationale for this decision rested on the belief that they would be in a good position to offer

important insights and to be reflexive about their own research experience. Of course, my choice was also further determined by the feasibility contacting these individuals, which proved at times to be a long and trying process. The ensuing exchanges occurred over a period of a few months and were made possible through the use of electronic mail and some postal correspondence. Altogether my queries involved twelve researchers,³⁹ ten of whom responded.⁴⁰

In the informal survey (see appendix b) I asked individuals if they thought there was a reluctance to talk about rascalism in print and if they thought the topic was controversial.⁴¹ As it turned out, the responses to my query varied across the board; from individuals who provided a two-sentence reply to individuals who provided lengthy reflections about the rascal situation. Several were excited by my work and eager to engage in a correspondence with me, while at least one of my respondents was indifferent to my questions and my concerns. With a few of my respondents, exchanges were brief and short-lived, while others were lengthy and extended over a period of several weeks. All in all, my correspondence provided me with a wealth of knowledge concerning issues that relate to anthropological research in PNG on the one hand, and research that deals with politically sensitive issues on the other.⁴²

Although it would be an exaggeration to propose that I was able to identify the underlying sources behind what I perceived to be a reluctance and sanitisation problem, I believe that it is possible to make some observations regarding the general themes that emerged from this informal survey. For

instance, it is interesting to note that despite the open-endedness of my questions – a tactic to elicit a full range of responses and possibilities from my informants – there was plenty of overlap, particularly in terms of where each respondent chose to place emphasis. While I do not intend to treat each ‘factor’ independently from one another, I have broken down what I call the dilemmas of rascal research into two main categories which relate to (1) a form of anthropology that continues to be practised in Papua New Guinea, and (2) the politics of our representational practices.⁴³

Professional Myopia and the Essentialisation of PNG

One of the most intriguing aspects of rascalism – both as a phenomenon and as a topic of discussion – is that it has been relatively absent from the anthropological writings about Papua New Guinea. Despite the fact that the topic of rascalism has long been a prominent feature of government funded reports, mass media debates, and everyday conversational exchanges, rascalism as a subject of research has not generated much enthusiasm from anthropologists working in PNG. As we saw in the previous chapter, there has been only a handful of scholars who have explored the topic, and so it is probably safe to say that anthropological attention to violent criminal groups in PNG has been muted. As Don Kulick observes, “if one read only anthropological works about PNG, one could easily miss the fact that rascalism is one of the most salient and talked about topics in the country” (1993:9). Given that the urban gang phenomenon is among the most serious national issues facing PNG at present, I find this paucity of research especially puzzling.

While there are a number of possible reasons behind the general reluctance by anthropologists to research and write about rascalism, I think one observer identified one of the main ones when he suggested that "there was a topical bias at work, [given that] information on rascalism doesn't 'fit in' with much of the writing on PNG that most anthropologists produce" (Richard Scaglione, personal communication, 12 December 1997). For example, Sinclair Dinnen states that, among anthropologists, rascals have been conceived as essentially urban and 'modern' and, hence, of significantly less interest than the rural and more 'traditional' phenomena (1996). Interestingly, Dinnen's observation tends to buttress the perceptions of others who also work in Papua New Guinea. For example, Laura Zimmer-Tamakoshi notes that in her experience working and teaching in PNG, she found that there was "a bias towards working on out of the way topics" (personal communication, 16 December 1997). Scaglione also supports this assessment, suggesting, among other things, that:

[t]here is a bias in favour of rural in fact, really rural research, to work with people who are 'least' acculturated (where rascalism is less of a problem). PNG disproportionately draws anthropologists interested in less acculturated peoples (personal communication, 12 December 1997).

While it remains difficult to quantify or validate these remarks – since one 'hears' much more about rascalism than one 'reads' – such views nonetheless resonate well with recent critiques of conventional Melanesian anthropology.

For instance, in his edited volume *History and Tradition in Melanesian Anthropology* (1992), Carrier takes issue with the frequency with which anthropologists tend to portray Melanesian societies as though they existed in a

timeless, traditional present. Carrier notes that many anthropologists commonly ignore the social and historical contingencies they confront in the field, thereby failing to see that the people being studied are involved in the same world as the anthropologist (1992: 8-9,13). He argues that such oversights and omissions frequently lead anthropologists to essentialise the people they study, or to present social behaviour and processes as exotic, unchanging, and cut off from the rest of the world (1992: 11-16). According to Carrier, anthropology's essentialising tendencies may take various forms. Most often, however, they take the form of refusing or denying altogether aspects of culture which are recent innovations and which may exhibit western or modern influences, under the tacit assumption that *because they are 'new' they must be 'illegitimate', 'inauthentic', and thus, an obstruction to 'true' anthropological research* (1992:14).

Anthropological essentialism also takes the form of researchers seeking to find and present signs of the traditional past so as to reclaim the stable pre-colonial order (ibid). At other times, such anthropological essentialism can be seen in the hierarchisation of topics that are evaluated in terms of their 'anthropologicalness', as, for example, ceremonial exchange over indigenous country and western bands (1992:9, 12-13). In Carrier's view, the timeless-traditionalism approach that we find throughout the literature in Melanesia has not only encouraged the tendency to suppress, omit, or interpret the data in order to make them fit our preconceptions of what Melanesian societies should be like, it has also encouraged a systematic neglect of issues and processes that are important to the people being studied. For example, John Barker (1992) argues that many

anthropologists working in Melanesia have tended to overlook Christianity and the extent of Christian influences, opting instead to "write them out of ethnographies, to reduce them to silence or inconsequence" (1992:144-145). Most importantly, however, Carrier argues that the desire to provide a study of alien and exotic societies that are relatively "untouched" by western forces and influences can lead to a seriously distorted, if not highly patronising, view of the ethnographic reality and communities anthropologists study.

Although there is much evidence to support the view that there is an intensive selection process at work in PNG that tends to present Papua New Guinea as intrinsically traditional and exotic, anthropologists who work in PNG have long been alert to issues of 'social change'.⁴⁴ For example, a good number of monographs and articles have explored aspects of change in the context of colonialism, particularly areas that deal with the transformation of local economies, political structures, and religious systems.⁴⁵ Unfortunately, however, for the most part these studies tend to be marginal to the main anthropological construction of Papua New Guinea, which, according to Carrier, is largely dominated by the view of societies as isolated, exotic, and authentic (1992:7). It should be noted, however, that such constructions are not solely created by scholars working and writing about Papua New Guinea; they are also perpetuated by important academic presses and journals that wish to continue portraying the country as timeless and essentially traditional (Carrier 1992:12-13). In other words, things that are unfamiliar or 'different' are often defined as suitable research projects, whereas phenomena and processes that are already

in some way familiar are viewed to be less worthy of study. Consequently, this desire for the culturally exotic and authentic not only leads us to skew the ethnographic reality by filtering out exogenous elements; it also guides us in our choice of fieldwork sites and problems, thereby shaping our knowledge and image of the societies we study.

Nowhere is this better demonstrated than in the current paucity of anthropological research devoted to the study of urban life and processes in Papua New Guinea. For example, in an informal survey I conducted of the literature and individuals studying towns and town life, I was struck by the marked difference in emphasis between rural and urban research. Reviewing the urban literature back to about 1985, it was particularly surprising to find that there were only about twenty anthropologists who have made PNG's urban scene a focus of study. This discovery certainly lends credence to Richard Scaglion's assertion that anthropological research in rural locations is disproportionately represented in the literature on Papua New Guinea. Given this assessment, perhaps Keesing and Jolly are correct in suggesting that:

[t]he anthropology of Melanesia is in crisis, then, not because anthropology is everywhere conservative in questing for the vanishing primitive and residual traditionalism, but because New Guinea and nearby islands are imagined as places where peoples practising their ancestral cultures can still be found (1992:226).

The point that can be drawn from all of this is that research on rascalism is poorly represented in the literature on Papua New Guinea in part because research on urban and/or contemporary phenomena is also poorly represented. As I have noted, this 'topical bias' can be traced to anthropology's essentialising

tendencies – tendencies that have the unintended effect of obscuring the social and ethnographic reality while also presenting/preserving Papua New Guinea as inherently exotic and traditional.

Ethnography and the Representation of Cultures

Although the ongoing essentialisation of PNG by many researchers has much to do with the current neglect of the issue of rascalism, it is my belief that the reluctance to study certain topics has much to do with the highly polarised debate about representation, and the much problematised relationship between anthropologists and natives. While anthropologists have studied virtually everything under the sun, they nonetheless display trepidation when tackling tough issues like rascals, or issues that may lead to negative judgements and/or interpretations of the people they study. In my queries to those who have made PNG the principal site of their research, a recurring theme in our discussions about the reticence to talk about the darker side of rascalism concerned the real or perceived fear of (mis)representing our anthropological others. In fact, out of all those consulted, eight out of ten respondents mentioned the issue of representation and/or the precarious relationship between anthropologists and the people they study. In other words, explanations regarding sanitisation or ethnographic reticence tended to centre on the politics of our representational practices and issues relating to PNG's 'image' abroad.

Since the early 1970s there have been widespread challenges to scientific colonialism abroad and a thorough interrogation of anthropology as an integral component of colonialism (and vice versa).⁴⁶ In addition, much has

been written about the idea that anthropological texts misconstrue or exclude the voices and perspectives of those being written about and how this has led to a crisis of representation.⁴⁷ Not surprisingly, such charges against the project of anthropology in general, and the writing of ethnographies in particular, have led to a serious questioning of the anthropologist's ability to understand and accurately represent the experiential worlds of those they study. Yet, while there have been many promising developments in recent years, I nonetheless believe that the implications of these critiques are often exaggerated in ways that seem to me to be as dangerous as the self-assurance they have sought to break down. For example, there is a real potential of fostering either a reluctance or refusal to present one's findings, out of the fear that what we say may be disagreeable to some people. Such apprehension – brought about by a deliberate effort to distance oneself from the stigma that emanates from those who view anthropology as inherently exploitative (Trinh 1989; Torgovnick 1990) – creates, at times, a debilitating fear of offending one's hosts and being viewed as a mere extension of academic colonialism. While I certainly do not want to present the discipline as inherently paranoid, I do want to suggest that fears of being viewed in this negative manner are deep-seated.

In other words, I believe that there exists a real fear of pathologising the people we study. For instance, in answer to questions regarding reticence in the rascal literature, Michael Goddard suggests that:

The main difficulties are ethics – the responsibilities of the researcher to the people he or she is working with and the sense of

protecting them from the negative fall out of one's work (personal communication, 19 January 1998).

According to Laura Zimmer-Tamakoshi, there is a reluctance to talk about the darker side of rascalism which revolves around anxieties about presenting our research communities negatively (personal communication, 16 December 1997). Not surprisingly, this presents a challenge in the case of rascalism when one's research subjects are criminals, e.g. violent thieves, murderers, and rapists. While a desire not to blame or pathologise those we study attests to our general disciplinary predisposition to not cause harm, I think far more is at stake than most are willing to admit. To be sure, I believe the current anxieties have much to do with what Michael Brown (1998) has said about the postmodern uncertainty that has left social scientists with few choices other than to make their case through a kind of rhetoric that projects moral fervour in order to persuade others of the correctness of their position (1998:730). These concerns are most evident in a general tendency on the part of anthropologists to write sympathetically about the people they study as well as in a tendency to edit out details deemed to be contradictory and unsavoury. Sympathetic writing conveys by extension that the anthropologist is also a sympathetic figure, which suggests that this is in part about protecting the anthropologists' own self-images as much as it is about protecting the image of those they study. So in our effort to convince others (as well as ourselves) of our moral propriety, what we are really saying is that we anthropologists do not want them (the natives), and consequently, *ourselves* to look bad. I think, therefore, that the general reluctance of anthropologists and other academics to discuss nasty issues in print – even where people have some

direct experience of them -- has much to do with the current politically charged climate in which most anthropologists now work, as well as our own personal fears of being labelled as academic imperialists or worse.

Rascalism, Rape and the White Women's Protection Ordinance

In the previous chapter, I showed that most of the explanations of rascalism tended to either downplay or ignore altogether the issue of sexual violence. For instance, despite the fact that rascal gangs have, in recent years, become synonymous with rape (especially pack rape), the literature tended to downplay or ignore the fact that rape comprises a prominent part of gang activity. Most importantly, I argued that security concerns about rascal attacks are frequently translated into security paranoia on the part of the numerically small expatriate and indigenous elite community and the issue (and victims) of gang related rape are seen to exemplify a kind of class struggle.

This refusal to adequately address the issue of rape in the analyses of rascalism makes sense, however, when we examine PNG's colonial legacy and an important piece of legislation that served to keep indigenous Papuans in their place. The legislation I am referring to is the notorious White Women's Protection Ordinance which was passed by the colonial authorities in 1926.⁴⁸ The passage of the ordinance made the crime of rape or attempted rape upon a European woman or girl it a capital offence for any person convicted, a capital offence (Inglis 1974:vi).

In her influential work, *The White Women's Protection Ordinance: Sexual Anxiety and Politics in Papua* (1974), Amirah Inglis investigates the underlying motivations and factors surrounding the passage of this particularly discriminatory legislation. In her study, Inglis explores the racial and sexual fears of the colonial elites that fuelled the imposition of severe restrictions and penalties upon the male indigenous population. She takes issue with explanations that blame women and their behaviour for the enactment of the ordinance, suggesting instead that with the increasing arrival of European women in the mid-1920s, the threat (real or imagined) of sexual attack became an increasing obsession for the white men of Port Moresby and other towns (1974: 23-24). The White Women's Protection Ordinance is thus examined against the background of the sexual and racial politics that prevailed in the colonial context. According to Inglis, the implementation of the ordinance:

[w]as the most significant expression of one aspect of the relations between black and white in the colony, the fear of sexual attack by black men on white women and girls: the Black Peril (1974: v).

Interestingly, while Inglis's study was published in 1974 – one year before PNG became an independent nation – the ordinance and Inglis's work continue to play an important role in pointing out the discriminatory views and measures in place during the colonial era.

In light of Inglis's work and the discriminatory attitudes, values and institutions that figured prominently throughout PNG's colonial history, one can see why there exists a reluctance to address the issue of rape in the accounts of rascalism. Certainly, no one wishes to return to the sexual and racial hysteria that

brought about the oppressive policies of the past and which coloured the relations between whites and blacks. Thus, I believe that there exists a very real fear or concern on the part of social analysts of perpetuating these racist views – especially when to a certain extent they still remain intact today.

It would be difficult to draw a connection between the relative invisibility of rape in the explanations of rascals and fears of preserving racist stereotypes and attitudes if the ordinance or Inglis's book were not cited in literature on rascals. However, we have examples that come readily to mind: both Nibbrig (1992) and Dinnen (1989) cite Inglis and/or the ordinance in the context of expatriate paranoia and the continuation of fears of black sexual attack. As Nibbrig states:

Port Moresby in its early days was a white Australian town with a preponderance of men. When European women began arriving in appreciable numbers in the 1920s, a white male hysteria developed surrounding their safety. Laws to protect white women subjected indigenous Papuans, largely males, to increasing regulation... Historical parallels with race relations in the American South and contemporary South Africa are striking and help us recognise a source of the indignation that colours underclass perceptions of their conditions (1992:126-127).

Sinclair Dinnen also appears to be concerned about reinforcing racist stereotypes in discussions of rascalism. For example, in response to the exchange that occurred between Don Kulick and David Lipset (see introductory chapter), Dinnen goes on to state:

When I first read Kulick's remarks back in 1991 I experienced disquiet about his specific prescriptions and warnings to would-be fieldworkers. This was in part because of the way these appeared to reinforce lingering stereotypes about the innate violence of the 'natives' (Amirah Inglis's historical work on race and crime in colonial Port Moresby is enlightening on the origins and early context of these views). Many expatriates in PNG continue to be obsessed with issues of security that sometimes reflect the

insularity of the expatriate community more than anything else (Sinclair Dinnen, personal communication).

While there may be a real connection between expatriate-bred paranoia about the rascal problem and lingering racism in PNG, I believe that this perception has also blinded Dinnen and Nibbrig from the very real fact that rascals do not appear to discriminate when it comes to rape. While in some rascal circles sexual violence against women may reflect class struggles, it would be erroneous to suggest – as Nibbrig and Dinnen seem to do – that it characterises all violent sexual offences committed by rascals. This apprehension of being seen to perpetuate racist stereotypes thereby allows both of these scholars to evade the issue of race and to overlook the fact that the propensity of rascals to commit sexual violence against women is a gender issue, not a class issue.

While it is obvious that one should always be wary of the potential fall-out of one's work (since anthropology does not operate in a social and political vacuum), Papua New Guinea's exceptional record of tackling unremittingly tough issues such as domestic violence, alcohol use, and political corruption suggests that many of the present fears are overblown. For example, Andrew Strathern notes that despite the fact that "like any painful contemporary issue it can lead to disagreements of interpretation and different ideas on policy", the issue of rascalism "is one that concerns the PNG authorities as well as anthropologists and is well recognised to be a problem" (Strathern, personal communication, 16 December 1997). Certainly, it is undoubtedly true that some of PNG's political elites do not like the negative press such works attract. For example, Bill

Standish states that for the past 20 years, as a political scientist working in and writing about PNG, he has "received slings and arrows for mentioning the problems of disorder and the weak state, being labelled a congenital pessimist and worse" (personal communication, 19 December 1997). And in my correspondence with him, Lawrence Hammar – who in 1988 considered conducting his doctoral research on rascal gangs – states that he "was told by all and sundry that anyone doing research on this...would surely get brutalised or worse, if not by *ol raskol* (*rascal*), then by *ol politisen nogut* (*corrupt politicians*), *ya*" (personal communication, 12 February 1998). Yet, at the same time that some political elites have discouraged this kind of research being done in PNG, there are also ample criticisms levelled by other government officials that much anthropological research is 'impractical' or not 'useful' for the people of PNG (Scaglione, personal communication, 12 December 1997).

In fact, I think we may find that one of the greatest sources of anthropological anxiety concerns the fear of losing access to research sites. In other words, I believe that besides being concerned about researching and writing about sensitive issues – that may or may not offend our hosts – many are also worried that by disseminating unpopular research findings, they may inadvertently preclude future research on the subject or area. As such, Laura Zimmer-Tamakoshi recalls how the newspapers once suggested that she "called PNG a rape culture", when one of her working papers was used to educate women police officers in Port Moresby. Reflecting on the experience, Zimmer-

Tamakoshi notes that while the experience was "scary", especially "when (she) wants to return to PNG many times in the future", that

[s]ome anthropologists, some in high places, and I won't name names over the internet, are more afraid of not getting their annual research permits than doing good, telling the truth (personal communication, 14 December 1997).

While there is much evidence that the fears of losing access to research areas and topics are well founded, if one cares to conduct a quick survey of former areas now restricted to anthropologists, I also believe that this assessment of what is happening in PNG is overblown. At least, these fears do not seem to be consistent with PNG's past and current treatment of anthropologists.

In fact, what appears to comprise a significant – albeit largely unexpressed – source of unease relates to fears that anthropologists who have spent most of their lives researching and writing about PNG will lose future graduate students and funding if the country is presented as dangerous. For example, Don Kulick notes that following the controversy surrounding his writing the letter to the editor of *Anthropology Today*, that

one senior academic told me basically that I shouldn't have published things about my experience because it might scare off grad students from wanting to work in PNG (personal communication, 18 February 1998).

Bill Standish also provides an excellent example of how such fears can be particularly acute in some circles.⁴⁹ According to Standish,

at ANU [Australian National University] we don't want the university to stop sending people to do fieldwork. In 1995 I wrote lengthy warnings to the [Australian] Overseas Service Bureau, a body which used to send 60 or so Australian volunteers abroad to PNG

each year, suggesting better preparatory training and in-country support. OSB wants the Australian governments money for their volunteers, and don't wish to frighten them off, so were very angry at my submission, and rejected it. A month later two English volunteers were raped on the Madang Highway, and the following year OSB volunteers to PNG declined in numbers (personal communication, 20 December 1997).

Bill Standish's chilling account and Don Kulick's experience following the publication of his encounter with rascals in *Anthropology Today* raises a whole set of issues. Most importantly, it raises the issue of 'gatekeeping', and the possibility that there may be a concerted effort to conceal some of PNG's more troubling social realities. In addition, masking the realities of what is "really going on" may in fact create a potentially more dangerous situation in for future researchers if they remain poorly equipped and poorly informed about the possible risks of working in that country. Therefore, at the very least, this raises the issue of what our responsibilities are, not only to the people of PNG but also to our own colleagues.⁵⁰

Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, I sought to uncover the factors explaining a reluctance to address unsavoury issues and sanitisation problem in addressing rascalism. I also made an effort to understand why the topic of rascalism remains relatively absent from the anthropological writings about PNG. For instance, I argue that research on rascal gangs is poorly represented in the anthropological literature about PNG mainly because research on urban and contemporary issues like gangs are also poorly represented. Rascalism as a subject of research has been unable to muster much interest because of a topical bias that favours research in

rural areas over research in PNG's modern urban centres. This systematic oversight, I argue, can be traced to anthropology's predilection to study and portray Melanesian peoples as though they exist in a timeless traditional present. This tendency to view Melanesian societies in largely essentialist terms – as exotic, alien and self-contained – produces a form of professional myopia that not only distorts the ethnographic reality but also fails to recognise that the people we study are in fact fully engaged in the twentieth century.

Most importantly, however, I also demonstrated that alongside the general deficiencies in the explanations of rascalism, the reticence to discuss the darker side of gang life reflects fears of misrepresenting and/or pathologising rascals. I argue that the critique of ethnographic representation -- which has seriously challenged anthropology's authority and ability to adequately represent the social life and experience of the people we study -- has also encouraged a reluctance and refusal to present the evidence in a way that would provide a complex and more realistic portrait of rascal gangs.

However, I also argued that fears of offending our hosts and of the consequences that may arise from discussing politically sensitive issues (e.g. precluding future research) may be over-exaggerated, especially in the case of Papua New Guinea, which has demonstrated an exemplary record of tackling uncomfortable issues like urban gangs. I argue that concerns about protecting PNG's image may in fact reflect a concern with anthropology's own self-image. Unfortunately, however, the preoccupation that some anthropologists have with their own disciplines' image often times produces the unintended effect of

misconstruing the ethnographic and social reality they confront in the field. Instead of presenting rascalism in all its complexities and contradictions, several of those researching and writing about urban gangs opt for simplistic and highly romanticised portraits in which details, that are deemed to be too politically sensitive, are conveniently removed from the reader's view. I interpret the difficulty of reconciling accurate interpretations of the ethnographic reality with that of providing conscientious representations as the prime reason behind the current reluctance and sanitising problem that we find in the literature on rascal gangs.

Chapter Five

CONCLUSION

One of my goals in this thesis has been to identify and critically examine some of the deficiencies that I uncovered in the literature on Papua New Guinea's rascal gang phenomenon. When I initially encountered the material on rascals, I was struck by three glaring problems. First, I was troubled to discover that despite the fact that rascals and rascalism are an important topic of concern throughout PNG, only a few scholars seem to be even remotely interested in it. Secondly, I found that the explanatory frameworks used to account for urban gang criminality depended upon a highly romanticised resistance model in which rascals were presented in one-dimensional terms. Finally, I was taken aback by what appeared to be a serious failure of nerve to tackle the darker side of gang behaviour, particularly when it concerned the topic of violence committed by gang members. This I sum up as a clear case of ethnographic reticence.

In addition to outlining the flaws and weaknesses that I encountered in the literature, I sought to explore both the academic and political reasons underlying these problems and editorial omissions. I tried to show that the reluctance to study unsavoury aspects of PNG life and sanitisation in the literature could be traced to two larger sets of issues: the first concerns the problem of anthropological essentialism, while the second relates to what is commonly referred to as the crisis of representation and what I identify as the attendant fears of (mis)representing our anthropological others. In what follows, I examine – for the last time – some of the consequences of these two sets of problems,

while I also put forward suggestions for moving beyond the impasse in a manner that will promote better, more comprehensive interpretations and analytic models.

On Anthropology's Essentialising Tendencies

I have suggested that many of the underlying reasons for the paucity of research on the subject of rascals could be traced to an intensive selection process that aims to preserve the image of PNG as inherently traditional, exotic, and separate from the rest of the world. Taking my cue from the work of Carrier (1992), I argued that there is a strong tendency on the part of many anthropologists – particularly in the Melanesian context – to essentialise the people they study by *presenting social behaviour and processes as exotic, timeless, and self-contained*. Anthropology's essentialising tendencies are manifested in a variety of ways such as ignoring or denying altogether aspects of culture that are new or recent innovations, under the implicit presumption that they are inauthentic and therefore an obstruction to true anthropological research. I also noted that the (largely unexamined) desire to present Melanesian societies in essentialist terms has not only nourished a tendency to suppress or interpret the evidence in order to make these societies fit our preconceived ideas of what they should be like, it has also encouraged a systematic neglect of issues and processes that are important to the people we study. This systematic oversight is particularly evident in the way anthropology in Melanesia has tended to privilege research in small and relatively isolated villages over research on urban centres and urban processes.

Unfortunately, however, anthropology's tendency to essentialise the people they study has – as we saw in the material on rascals – served to skew the social and ethnographic reality, while also eliding issues that are of great interest to our research communities. Because urban gangs blatantly challenge the notion of PNG as a place where traditional and relatively isolated cultures can be found, the study of PNG's gang phenomenon does not carry the status or analytic importance that other kinds of research carry. As a result, we deny ourselves the opportunity to explore what may very well be one of the most important social phenomena in post-colonial Papua New Guinea.

However, what I identify as turning a blind eye to important processes like urban criminal groups does, in my view, no small disservice to the discipline or to PNG in general as it ignores some of the important contemporary realities of PNG. Our attention should be broadly directed to all major aspects of human life. In other words, we need to move towards research that is relevant to contemporary PNG's problems. PNG's urban gang phenomenon should be just as much a part of our research agendas as ceremonial exchange and initiation rituals. Thus, I believe that Marc Schiltz is correct when he declares that:

If ever there was a theoretical and practical, relevant topic for an anthropologist in PNG, it seemed to me that it was the rascal phenomenon. Therefore, to look upon rascalism simply as a nuisance or an obstacle to 'true' anthropological work in a safe little village seems to miss the point of what people's lived experience in PNG is about at present (1992:26).

Exploring the problems and contemporary realities that researchers confront in the field instead of denying them under the implicit assumption that they are not anthropologically salient would be a move in the right direction. Moreover, this

might allow us to move away from the more insular image of PNG and toward one that recognises and reaffirms that the people we study are firmly rooted in the twentieth century. At the very least, such a move would greatly improve the state of anthropological interest and commitment to issues that matter to the discipline, and most importantly to the people of PNG. Achieving this goal, however, would require us to remove the blinders that have long afflicted anthropological research in PNG and that have prevented us from gaining a more complete and accurate portrait of some of the issues that PNG is presently facing.

On Representational Delicacy and a Failure of Nerve

In this thesis I have argued that many of the underlying reasons for the reticence and sanitisation we find in the rascal scholarship stem from the so-called crisis of representation and the accompanying uncertainty that has come to beset the discipline. In more specific terms, I have suggested that despite the best of intentions on the part of academics researching and writing about uncomfortable issues like rascalism, uncertainties over anthropology's ability to understand and report about another society may have also nourished a kind of professional myopia in which we are neglecting important social processes. I maintain that there exists a real fear of misrepresenting the people we study, of offending our hosts, and of being viewed as exploitative, and that this has the unintended effect of distorting the social and ethnographic reality that the researcher confronts in the field.

As I have pointed out, apprehensions and anxieties about presenting our

research communities in a negative manner are manifested in a variety of ways. For instance, they are evident in analytic models and interpretations that rely on an overly romanticised and one-dimensional portrait of rascals as proletarian avengers or as big men of crime. These anxieties are also evident in the refusal to explore the internal politics and contradictions of the rascal phenomenon that would permit more complete and realistic understanding of rascalism. Most often, however, these fears are manifested in the suppression or omission of the unpleasant and disturbing details which might lead to negative judgements and interpretations about the communities anthropologists' study. For example, I demonstrated that throughout the accounts the propensity for rascals to use brutal violence is systematically excluded from the reader's view which suggests that the literature systematically sanitises the material on rascals.

It is my conviction that in order to move beyond the failure of nerve that has characterised research on PNG's urban gangs we need to work to find ways of reconciling our intellectual responsibility to publish and discuss the results of our research, with the current uncertainty and self-doubt that have come to besiege much of the discipline. This reconciliation requires above all a fuller examination of the consequences of our editorial decisions (leading to the sanitisation of our accounts) by critically asking ourselves: what good is derived from editing out "the bad stuff"? Moreover, we should continuously ask ourselves whose interests are really being served by ignoring certain topics. For example, I have suggested that many of the present anxieties about presenting our research communities negatively may have more to do with protecting the anthropologist's

own self-image than it does with protecting the people he/she investigates. In short, we should ask ourselves what we stand to lose (and to gain) by researching and writing about sensitive issues like rascalism.

In my view, while researching and writing about rascalism will never be a simple endeavour, I believe that anthropologists working in PNG do have a special responsibility to address such an individually and nationally important topic as crime and violence. But what is the nature of our responsibility? Must we continuously research grim topics? As I see it, we have three choices: 1) we can sanitise and dilute our published works as has been done in the majority of the accounts on rascal gangs; 2) we can decide not to write about or ignore altogether topics that may offend our hosts, as we have also seen in the paucity of research devoted to the study of rascals; or 3) we can choose to research and publish our findings and deal with the consequences, if and when they come. Nonetheless, I remain convinced that the study of rascalism is imperative for addressing issues and processes that matter. Rascal gangs are a serious problem, they are disruptive, create fear and panic, and they victimise innocent people. Therefore, we need to develop new and better models: models that neither romanticise rascals as urban crusaders fighting socio-economic injustice, nor sanitise their activities as assaults against an oppressive system. Most importantly, we should always be conscious of the potential result of giving into fears of being seen as politically or morally insensitive: namely, of losing much of our engagement with the real world and with the urgent issues that our research communities face.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ See for example the influential work of Battaglia (1986) and Ryan (1989) on Trobriander and Toaripi in Port Moresby, and Marilyn Strathern's early work on Hageners in Port Moresby (1975).
- ² The newspapers I relied on were the National and the Post-Courier. Both newspapers were accessed via the Internet. The National <<http://www.wr.com.au/national/home/htm>>. The Post-Courier <<http://www.postcourier.com.pg>>.
- ³ For a complete list of written work see: Schiltz (1985); Harris (1988); Dinnen (1986, 1989, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997); Goddard (1992, 1995); Nibbrig (1992). In this chapter, I have chosen to limit my frame of reference mostly to the Port Moresby area in order to avoid the pitfalls of generalising too much. Rascal gangs are not a unitary phenomenon and do display differences throughout Papua New Guinea.
- ⁴ For an excellent treatment of the topic of urbanisation in Papua New Guinea see Levine & Levine (1979); M. Strathern (1974); Rew ((1974); Willis (1974); Zimmer (1985).
- ⁵ For a history of early urban settlements in Port Moresby, see Oram, 1976.
- ⁶ Texas gang was one of the earliest rascal gangs to operate out of Port Moresby. For an interesting background to specific Port Moresby gangs, see Harris (1988).
- ⁷ I use the term acquisitive crime to refer to theft. Non-acquisitive crime refers to all other types of crime – mainly crimes involving violence.
- ⁸ For a contemporary examination of the rascal as hero myth within a rural village, see Kulick (1993).
- ⁹ For more information concerning the Bill Skate/Mujo Sefa controversy see: "Skate denies bribes claims," *The Post-Courier* 28 November 1997; "Godfather' tape adds to scandal surrounding PM," *The Post-Courier* 1 December 1997.
- ¹⁰ K= Kina. In PNG Kina exchange rates (August 1998): K1 \$0.60 (Canadian Dollar).
- ¹¹ It is alleged that corruption or misappropriation of public funds concerned employment of youth groups for various contracts such as street cleaning, lawn cutting and building footpaths. For instance, it is suggested that NCDC employees routinely cashed fraudulent cheques between \$300 and \$30,000, often for work that was never done. For further information see: "PM denies fraud and gang claims," *The Post-Courier* 3 February 1998; "NCDC is Skate's bank, Noonan alleges on TV," *The Post-Courier* 9 February 1998.
- ¹² For an excellent examination of the extent of corruption in PNG, see "Conflicting Interests" (Sean Dorney 1990).
- ¹³ See for example: "City staff patrolling beaches to warn of dangers", *The Post-Courier*, 19 December 1997; "Attacks on women mar the new year", *The Post-Courier*, 2 January 1998; "Women told to take care"; *The Post-Courier*, 15 January 1998; "Women

warned", *The Post-Courier*, 9 February 1998; "18 girls raped in school hold-up", *The Post-Courier*, 11 August 1998.

¹⁴ For an illustration of the various ways PNG women have expressed their fear and frustration with the increasing levels of violence (sexual and physical) directed against women, see "Black day for Papua New Guinea," *The National*, 24 October 1997; and "Deafening silence on crime," *The National* 22 December 1997.

¹⁵ Unfortunately, however, the vast majority of the population cannot afford such security measures and are often easy targets of rascal attacks.

¹⁶ Shoot-outs between rascals and police have become commonplace in many urban centres throughout PNG, where the latter are often outgunned. See for example: "Morauta police post burned after violent weekend", *The Post-Courier*, 28 January 1998.

¹⁷ It is interesting to note that of the current population of 4 million, approximately 43 percent are under the age of 15. According to Dinnen (1996), this youthful profile is especially marked in the cities where criminal groups flourish and where many young people are recruited. Dinnen also states that in 1990, approximately 50 percent of the total population of the National Capital District (Port Moresby and surroundings) which falls around the 200 000 mark, are under 20 years of age and over 62 percent are under 25 years of age.

In addition, it is also worth noting that in 1975, when the national population was just under 2 million, PNG's police numbered 4100; indicating a police/population of 1:476. By 1996, however, with lawlessness a major concern the population had doubled while the number of police personnel remained at 5000: a police/population ratio of 1:800 (*ibid.*).

¹⁸ See for example: "Let's get serious", *The Post-Courier*, 6 January 1998; "A leaderless society in PNG", *The Post-Courier*, 8 January 1998; "Enemies in Society", *The Post-Courier*, 27 January 1998; "Vagrancy law needed now", *The Post-Courier*, 16 February 1998.

¹⁹ Mitsui & Co. Limited is one of the major copper buyers in Papua New Guinea and has been operating in the country for the past 25 years. For more information concerning their announcement to close their offices as a result of escalating crime see: Ngaffkin and Kewa (1997).

²⁰ For example see: "Tour operators fear for future", *The Post-Courier* 28 January 1998; "Japanese tourists scared off by PNG's 'social' problems," *The Post-Courier*, 3 February 1998.

²¹ It should also be noted that the practice of FIFO is not exclusive to Porgera mine, but can also be found in other industries. For example, Air Niugini (PNG's airline) employs many pilots and engineers who live in Australia and commute.

²² For more information concerning the FIFO controversy, see "Fly-in fly-out hits economy hard," *The Post-Courier* 29 September 1997.

²³ The Tok Pisin term wantok (one-talk) originally referred to shared language (in a country in which more than 700 different languages are spoken in PNG), but has

become an elastic term denoting anything from shared kin-group membership to shared provincial or regional origins, depending on the circumstances.

²⁴ The big man (system) is a mode of leadership characteristic of Melanesia in which the leader or big man commands a following via the manipulation of wealth, women's labour, and male supporters. The big man's power depends on his personal skill at organising large-scale exchange ceremonies and regional exchange networks. For more information regarding big men leadership systems, see Strathern (1971).

²⁵ For an enlightening discussion of the origins and modern extension of wantokism in urban settings see Monsell-Davis (1993).

²⁶ In addition, such observations also tend to echo recent work which argues against the exaggeration and reification of the difference between gift and commodity economies in anthropological writing (Appadurai 1986:11; Gregory 1982; Thomas 1991). In other words, what the observations of Monsell-Davis and Goddard reveal are the ways that Papua New Guinea's gift economy is articulated with a capitalist economy in complex ways and without necessarily throwing everything into disarray.

²⁷ In his article, Goddard refers to social disintegration/dislocation, anomie, alienation as Western-derived theories used to explain delinquency and which are often implicitly drawn upon in the accounts of rascalism.

²⁸ See for example: Sahlins (1963); Strathern (1971); Berndt and Lawrence (1971); Goderier (1986); Feil (1987).

²⁹ Achieved leadership: Leadership based on a person's demonstrated personal abilities apart from his/her social status ascribed at birth, e.g. big man systems.

Ascribed leadership: Leadership and status that one is born into which includes, birth order, lineage, gender, and connection with elite ancestors, e.g. chiefdoms.

³⁰ This is especially the case in Papua New Guinea, where capitalism engages a mixed mode of production whose social relations remain well rooted in the pre-capitalist one.

³¹ Of course there are some exceptions. For instance, Andrew Strathern (1985) and Marc Schiltz (1985) do not overlook the harsh realities of rascal behaviour in their writings, particularly when it comes to the issue of sexual violence committed by rascal gangs.

³² When one considers the main places in which rascal crimes are committed, e.g. schools, highways, roadways, homes and hospitals, crimes of violence usually accompany property crimes.

³³ It should be noted that the quality of official crime statistics in Papua New Guinea is poor and should be interpreted with caution. For example, crime figures only include crimes reported to the police.

³⁴ There is an extensive literature on the enormously complex issue of gender relations/conflict in Papua New Guinea that falls beyond the scope of this thesis. Interested readers should consult Toft (1985); Zimmer-Tamakoshi (1997).

³⁵ Interestingly, while Papua New Guinea has produced what is perhaps the most comprehensive study on domestic violence (Toft 1985), the issue of gender-based violence is largely examined in the context of the household (marriage/familial relations). Sexual violence is often seen as a domestic issue rather than an issue of public safety.

³⁶ Those who were consulted on-line include: Anou Borrey <aborrey@ozemail.com.au> Christine Bradley <cbradely@saltspring.com>; Dorothy Counts <dcounts@mail.escapees.com>; Sinclair Dinnen <dinnen@coombs.anu.edu.au>; Colin Filer <cfiler@global.net.pg>; Michael Goddard <mgoddard@mail.newcastle.edu.au>; Lawrence Hammar <darudubu@teleport.com>; Don Kulick <kulick@mail.datakom.su.se>; Richard Scaglione <scaglione+pitt.edu>; Bill Standish <standish@coombs.anu.edu.au>; Andrew Strathern <strathern@unixs3.cis.pitt.edu>; Laura Zimmer-Tamakoshi <lzt@academic.truman.edu>.

³⁷ My effort to reach out via email was successful. Most often people contacted were very willing to share their thoughts with me and many were extremely candid in doing so. I owe many thanks to those who kindly responded to my questions, especially those who went to great lengths during the busiest time of year to correspond with me and who were willing to help in so many ways. I would particularly like to thank Lawrence Hammar, Laura Zimmer-Tamakoshi, Bill Standish, Andrew Strathern, and Sinclair Dinnen for the extra measures they took in assisting me with my work.

³⁸ For example, Anou Borrey, Sinclair Dinnen, Michael Goddard, Don Kulick, Richard Scaglione, and Andrew Strathern have all at one time or another discussed rascalism and crime in Papua New Guinea. Christine Bradley, Dorothy Counts and Laura Zimmer-Tamakoshi have all worked on the politically sensitive subject of domestic violence and Lawrence Hammar has studied the sex industry on Daru Island. Colin Filer was chosen because of his reputation as a particularly candid individual and because of his position with the National Research Institute. I also felt he would be able to offer some important insights because he is a resident of Papua New Guinea.

³⁹ They included: 1 political scientist (Bill Standish), 1 criminologist (Sinclair Dinnen), and 10 anthropologists.

⁴⁰ The two individuals who did not respond to my informal survey were Anou Borrey and Dorothy Counts.

⁴¹ The survey consisted of two separate queries: one directed to those who had at one time or another made rascals a focus of study and the other to those who had not (see appendix a). The underlying rationale for my decision to write two separate queries was two-fold. The first reason was that I did not wish to begin my correspondence in a way that might make my respondents defensive. Subsequently, I took care in phrasing my observations of the literature in a manner that was tactful. For example, I refrained from using the term sanitisation in the queries I sent to those who studied rascals, opting instead for a much less contentious statement about my assessment of the literature. The second reason behind the difference was that in my query to those who had written about rascals, I included a reference to the Don Kulick/David Lipset exchange presuming that they would be familiar with that and that they might be able to offer some insightful comments.

⁴² While some may wish to relegate the information obtained in this informal survey as little more than a form of professional gossip, I would like to point out the insights of Paul Rabinow on the phenomenon of "corridor talk" for an alternative view (1986:253). According to Rabinow, corridor talk refers to the informal discourse that occurs among anthropologists but which for the most part, remains in the corridors or 'off duty' periods at professional meetings, and thus, outside the realm of public knowledge (1986:253). However, Rabinow also notes that "what cannot be publicly discussed cannot be analyzed or rebutted" (ibid.). Therefore, informal discourses that cannot be fully examined or refuted but which are central to the production of anthropological knowledge cannot be viewed as innocuous. For as Rabinow points out, "one of the most common tactics of an elite group is to refuse to discuss – to label as vulgar or uninteresting – issues that are uncomfortable for them" (ibid.).

⁴³ In the following, I have chosen to include some passages from my correspondences (where I have obtained permission). Where I have left passages as anonymous, I did so because the respondent did not wish to have his/her comments attributed or because I did not wish to cause any embarrassment.

⁴⁴ Personal communication: Laura Tamakoshi-Zimmer (16 December 1997) and Richard Scaglione (12 December 1997).

⁴⁵ For an excellent example of studies that concentrate on 'social change' see the New Guinea Research Bulletin series (from 1963-1975) and its successor, the Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research Monograph series (IASER). See also the early and highly influential cargo cult studies (Kenelm Burridge 1969; Peter Lawrence 1964; and Peter Worsley 1968).

⁴⁶ See: Asad (1973); Said (1978); Fabian (1983).

⁴⁷ See for example: Clifford & Marcus (1986); and Marcus & Fischer (1986).

⁴⁸ This legislation was eventually repealed in 1958.

⁴⁹ Although the example provided here concerns volunteers as opposed to anthropologists or other social scientists, I still believe that this provides an excellent case in point of the lengths to which some individuals and institutions will go in making sure that PNG is portrayed in a particular light.

⁵⁰ For an excellent report on health and safety in anthropological fieldwork, see Howell (1990).

APPENDIX B

Greetings,

My name is Jodi Harper. I am a graduate student who is currently doing library research on rascal gangs in Papua New Guinea. Dan Jorgensen (my thesis supervisor) recently advised me to get in contact with you with the hope that you may be of some assistance to my work.

Examining the literature on the rascal phenomenon published over the past twenty years, it became evident that writing about rascals can be quite controversial. My sense is that there is a degree of reticence in writing about the 'darker side' of rascalism and that treatment of the topic is somewhat sanitized.

Do you feel that there is a reluctance to talk about rascalism in print? If so, do you have any ideas why this might be the case?

Your comments and any advice will be greatly appreciated. I thank you in advance.

Greetings,

My name is Jodi Harper. I am a graduate student who is currently doing library research on rascal gangs in Papua New Guinea. Dan Jorgensen (my thesis supervisor) recently advised me to get in contact with you with the hope that you may be of some assistance to my work.

Examining the literature on the rascal phenomenon published over the past twenty years, it became evident that writing about rascals can be quite controversial. This was plainly demonstrated in the Don Kulick/David Lipset exchange back in 1991 (see Anthropology Today). My sense is that, besides those such as yourself who have actually explored the topic, rascalism is a difficult topic to write about or at least to digest. Subsequently, the question I would like to propose is if you feel that the topic is 'hot' in the sense that it is controversial? And if so, do you have any ideas why this might be the case?

Your comments and any advice will be greatly appreciated. I thank you in advance.

References Cited

Appadurai, Arjun, ed.

1986 *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Asad, Talal, ed.

1973 *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*. New York: Humanities Press.

Barker, John

1992 "Christianity in Western Melanesian Ethnography". *History and Tradition in Melanesian Anthropology*, James G. Carrier (ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 174-192.

Battaglia, Debora

1986 *Bringing Home to Moresby: Urban Gardening and Ethnic Pride Among Trobriand Islanders in the National Capital*. IASER Special Publication 11. Boroko: Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research.

1995 "On Practical Nostalgia: Self-prospecting among urban Trobrianders." *Rhetorics of Self-Making*, D. Battaglia, ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 1-36.

Berndt, R. and P. Lawrence, eds.

1971 *Politics in New Guinea*. Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press.

Burridge, Kenelm

1969 *New Heaven, New Earth: A Study of Millenarian Activities*. New York: Schocken Books.

Brown, Michael F

1998 "On Resisting Resistance." *American Anthropologist*, 98 (4): 729-734.

Carrier, James, ed.

1992 *History and Tradition in Melanesian Anthropology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

1992 "Introduction." *History and Tradition in Melanesian Anthropology*. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 1-37.

Clifford, James, and George Marcus, eds.

1986 *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Clifford, W., L. Morauta, and B. Stuart
 1984 *Law and Order in Papua New Guinea*. Port Moresby: Institute of National Affairs.

Concerned Piginini

1998 "Make plans for school leavers." *The National Online*.
 <<http://www.wr.com.au/national/home/htm>>, 7 January 1998. [Archived:
 January 8, 1998].

Connell, John and John Lea

1994 "Cities apart or cities of parts? Changing places in modern Melanesia".
The Contemporary Pacific 6(2): 267-309.

Cooper, David

1994 *Reading a Public Culture: Letters to the Editor in a Pidgin Language Newspaper*. M.A. thesis, University of Western Ontario.

Dinnen, Sinclair

1986 "Perspectives on law and order." In *Law and Order in a Changing Society*,
 L. Morauta (ed.). Canberra: Australian National University, pp. 76-89.

1989 "Crime, Law and Order in Papua New Guinea." *Melanesian Law Journal*. 17:10-25.

1993 "Big Men, Small Men and Invisible Women – Urban Crime and Inequality
 in Papua New Guinea." *The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 25 (1):19-34.

1995 "Praise the Lord and Pass the Ammunition – Criminal Group Surrender in
 Papua New Guinea." *Oceania* 66(12):103-118.

1997 "Restorative Justice in Papua New Guinea." *International Journal of Sociology of Law*. 25: 245-262.

1998 "Papua New Guinea." In *World Factbook of Criminal Justice Systems*. <<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bis/pub/ascii/wfocjpnq.text>>.
 [Archived: August 8 1998].

Domey, Sean

1989 *Papua New Guinea – People, Politics and History Since 1975*. Sydney:
 Random House.

Fabian, Johannes

1983 *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object*. New York:
 Columbia University Press.

Feil, D, K

1990 *The Evolution of Highland Papua New Guinea Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Giddings, Lynn

1986 "Community response to law and order problems". In *Youth and Society: Perspectives from Papua New Guinea*, M. O'Collins (ed.). Canberra: Australian National University, pp. 131-153.

Goddard, Michael

1992 "Big-man, thief: the social organization of gangs in Port Moresby". *Canberra Anthropology* 15(1): 20-34.

1995 "The Rascal Road: Crime, Prestige, and Development in Papua New Guinea". *The Contemporary Pacific* 7: 55-80.

Godelier, Maurice

1986 *The Making of Great Men: Male Domination and Power among the New Guinea Baruya*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gregory, CA

1982 *Gifts and Commodities*. London: Academic Press.

Gupta, Akhil and James Ferguson eds.

1996 "Introduction." *Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a Science*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Harris, Bruce M.

1988 *The Rise of Rascalism: action and reaction in the evolution of rascal gangs*. Port Moresby Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research No. 24.

Howell, Nancy

1990 "Surviving Fieldwork: A report of the advisory panel on health and safety in fieldwork." *A special publication of the American Anthropological Association*. Number 26.

Keesing, Roger and Margaret Jolly

1992 "Epilogue." In *History and Tradition In Melanesian Anthropology*, James Carrier (ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 224-247.

Kulick, Don

1991 "Law and Order in Papua New Guinea." *Anthropology Today*, 7(5): 21-22.

1993 "Heroes from hell: representations of 'rascals' in a Papua New Guinea village." *Anthropology Today* 9(3): 9-14.

Kuper, Adam

1994 "Culture, Identity and the Project of a Cosmopolitan Anthropology." *Man* (N.S.), 29: 537-554.

Lawrence, Peter

1964 *Road Belong Cargo: A Study of the Cargo Movement in the Southern Madang District, New Guinea*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Levine, Hal and Marlene W. Levine

1979 *Urbanization in Papua New Guinea: A Study of Ambivalent Townsmen*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lipset, David

1993 "Law and Order in Papua New Guinea." *Anthropology Today*, 9(6):18.

Marshall, Mac (ed.)

1982 *Through a Glass Darkly: Beer and Modernization in Papua New Guinea*. IASER Monograph 18. Boroko, Papua New Guinea: Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research.

Marcus, George E

1995 "Ethnography in/of the World System." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24: 95-117.

Marcus, George E., and Michael M.J. Fischer

1986 *Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

May, R.J.

1977 *Change and Movement: Readings on Internal Migration in Papua New Guinea*. Port Moresby: Papua New Guinea Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research.

McGrath, Brendan

1992 "Port Moresby." *Cities* 9(4): 243-248.

Monsell-Davis, Michael

1993 "Urban Exchange: Safety-net or Disincentive? Wantoks and Relatives in the Urban Pacific." *Canberra Anthropology* 16(2): 45-66.

Morauta, Louise (ed.)

1986 *Law and Order in a Changing Society*. Political and Social Change Monograph 4, Research School of Pacific Studies, Canberra: Australian National University Press.

The National Online

1997a "Black day for Papua New Guinea."

<<http://www.wr.com.au/national/home/htm>> 24 October 1997. [Archived: October 25 1997].

1997b "Deafening silence on crime".

<<http://www.wr.com.au/national/home/htm>> 22 December 1997. [Archived: December 23 1997].

Ngaffkin, Cletus and Christina Kewa

1997 "Mitsui shuts PNG office." *The National Online*.

<<http://www.wr.com.au/national/home/htm>> 11 December 1997. [Archived: December 12 1997].

Nibbrig, Hart Nand E

1992 "Rascals in Paradise: Action and Reaction in the Evolution of Rascal Gangs". In *Pacific Studies* 15(3): 115-134.

O'Collins, Maev (ed.)

1986 *Youth and Society: Perspectives from Papua New Guinea*. Canberra: Australian National University.

Oram, N

1976 *Colonial Town to Melanesian City – Port Moresby 1884-1974*. Australian National University, Canberra.

Ortner, Sherry B

1996 "Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37: 173-193.

Paiaru, Lovera

1997 "Tougher laws for a better society." *Papua New Guinea Post-Courier*.

<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/a7743b1dd6f681004a256499000adb8e/27a7981819a79afc4a25656d00836c8d?OpenDocument>> 15 December 1997. [Archived: December 16 1997].

Patrignani, Angela and Anna Alvazzi del Frate

1998 "Women's Victimisation in Developing Countries." In *Issues and Reports – no. 5*. <<http://www.unicri.it/unicri/publicat/issues/5e.htm>> 1998. [Archived: August 8 1998].

The Post-Courier Online

1997a "Fly-in fly-out hits economy hard."

<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/7cf615cf461185f04a2564950068945f/77142a9d827514d94a25652100089ab8?OpenDocument>> 29 September 1997. [Archived: September 30 1997].

- 1997b "Crime remains the big worry."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/a7743b1dd6f681004a256499000adb8e/45612e06beb80f2f4a25654a0080fc75?OpenDocument>> 10
November 1997. [Archived: August 12 1998].
- 1997c "Skate denies bribe claims."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/7cf615cf461185f04a2564950068945f/67e67dfd8232ea684a25655c00820967?OpenDocument>> 28
November 1997. [Archived: December 2 1997].
- 1997d "Godfather' tapes add to scandal surrounding PM."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/7cf615cf461185f04a2564950068945f/3d47a4841b55f8a74a25655f007ecc8d?OpenDocument>> 1
December 1997. [Archived: December 2 1997].
- 1997e "City staff patrolling beaches to warn of dangers."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/7cf615cf461185f04a2564950068945f/0d85f555f9362cb64a256571008360ad?OpenDocument>> 19
December 1997. [Archived: August 12 1998].
- 1998a "Attacks on women mar the new year."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/df143365e6194d154a256499000ae3b4/a8cb2a7171aa59df4a25657f0081fe51?OpenDocument>> 2
January 1998. [Archived: August 12 1998].
- 1998b "Let's get serious."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/a7743b1dd6f681004a256499000adb8e/b00bf97e7991ebd74a2565830081480b?OpenDocument>> 6
January 1998. [Archived: January 7 1998].
- 1998c "A leaderless Society."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/a7743b1dd6f681004a256499000adb8e/0e9a5480d52385b14a2565850081dc63?OpenDocument>> 8
January 1998. [Archived: January 9 1998].
- 1998d "Women told to take care."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/df143365e6194d154a256499000ae3b4/b3aa30351896ba5f4a25658c00821773?OpenDocument>> 15
January 1998. [Archived: August 12 1998].
- 1998e "Enemies in society".
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/a7743b1dd6f681004a256499000adb8e/fd86dec701a774714a2565980080c904?OpenDocument>> 27
January 1998. [Archived: January 28 1998].

- 1998f "Tour operators fear for future."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/df143365e6194d154a256499000ae3b4/2407cd122c6cfe844a25659a00006920?OpenDocument>> 28
January 1998. [Archived: January 29 1998].
- 1998g "Morauta police post burned after violent weekend."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/df143365e6194d154a256499000ae3b4/5d6059ebfaa6be974a25659a00007ae5?OpenDocument>> 28
January 1998. [Archived: January 29 1998].
- 1998h "PM denies fraud and gang claims."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/7cf615cf461185f04a2564950068945f/30749bc22b4e937b4a2565a000002215?OpenDocument>> 3
February 1998. [Archived: 4 February 1998].
- 1998i "Japanese tourists scared off by PNG's 'social' problems".
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/7cf615cf461185f04a2564950068945f/8c5cdcbf53ada0704a2565a000004d9b?OpenDocument>> 3
February 1998. [Archived: 4 February 1998].
- 1998j "NDC is Skate's Bank, Noonan alleges on TV."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/7cf615cf461185f04a2564950068945f/4725c268b1ff5bd14a2565a500836cd4?OpenDocument>> 9
February 1998. [Archived: February 10 1998].
- 1998k "Women warned."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/df143365e6194d154a256499000ae3b4/fed39e7a764588414a2565a600011ccb?OpenDocument>> 9
February 1998. [Archived: February 10 1998].
- 1998l "Vagrancy law needed now."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/a7743b1dd6f681004a256499000adb8e/36afd7d5ca4f68334a2565ac0082d83b?OpenDocument>> 16
February 1998. [Archived: August 12 1998].
- 1998m "Crime grips capital city."
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/a7743b1dd6f681004a256499000adb8e/b41c697a41d3bded4a2565ee00014afd?OpenDocument>> 22
April 1998. [Archived: August 12 1998].
- 1998n "Pokies, rape: both need strong, moral action now".
<<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/a7743b1dd6f681004a256499000adb8e/68e3dccec8c4d30d4a25665600804e4e?OpenDocument>> 5
August 1998. [Archived: August 12 1998].

- 1998o "Rape requires death sentence."
 <<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/a7743b1dd6f681004a256499000adb8e/6b6c3f73a74fb1a94a25665c00800c61?OpenDocument>> 11
 August 1998. [Archived: August 12 1998].
- 1998p "18 school girls raped in school hold-up."
 <<http://202.1.56.50/postcour/POSTARC.NSF/7cf615cf461185f04a2564950068945f/608810ae2ddd17e44a25665c007fbd44?OpenDocument>> 11
 August 1998. [Archived: August 12 1998].
- Rabinow, Paul
 1986 "Representations Are Social Facts: Modernity and Post-Modernity in Anthropology." In *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*, James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds.). Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 234-261.
- Rannells, Jackson
 1995 *PNG: A fact book on modern Papua New Guinea*. Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press.
- Reay, Marie
 1982 "Lawlessness in the Papua New Guinea Highlands". *Melanesia: Beyond Diversity* (Vol. 2). R.J. May and Hank Nelson (eds.). Canberra: Australian National University, pp. 623-637.
- Rew, Alan
 1974 *Social Images and Process in Urban New Guinea: A Study of Port Moresby*. New York: West Publishing Co.
- Robie, David
 1997 *Crime: PNG Women Declare War on Gang Rape*. Café Pacific: Asia-Pacific Network,
 (<http://acij.uts.edu.au/cafepacific/resources/aspac/rape.html>). [Archived: December 2 1998].
- Roscoe, Jim
 1992 [Untitled] *Anthropology Today* 8(1): 26.
- Ryan, Dawn
 1989 "Home Ties in Town: Toaripi in Port Moresby". *Canberra Anthropology*, 12(1&2): 19-27.
- Said, Edward
 1973 *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon.

Sahlins, M.D.

1963 "Poor man, rich man, big man, chief: political types in Melanesia and Polynesia." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5: 285-303.

Salisbury, R. F.

1964 "Despots and Administration in the New Guinea Highlands." *American Anthropologist* 66(4): 225-239.

Schiltz, Marc

1985 "Rascalism, Tradition and the State in Papua New Guinea." Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea Monograph no. 3. Susan Toft ed., *Domestic Violence in Papua New Guinea*. Port Moresby, pp. 141-160.

1963 "Living Dangerously In Papua New Guinea." *Anthropology Today*. Vol. 8(1): 25-26.

Standish, Bill

1996 "Elections in Simbu: towards gunpoint diplomacy?" *The 1992 PNG Elections – Change and Continuity in Electoral Politics*. Y. Saffu ed. Australia National University: Canberra, pp. 277-322. Political and Social Change Monograph 23.

Stevensen, Michael

1986 *Wokmani: Work, Money and Discontent in Melanesia*. Sydney: University of Sydney Press.

Strathern, Andrew

1966 "Despots and Directors in the New Guinea Highlands." *Man* (N.S.) 1:335-367.

1971 *The Rope of Moka*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1984 "Rape in Hagen". *Domestic Violence in Papua New Guinea*, Port Moresby: Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, Monograph 3, Susan Toft (ed.), pp.134-140.

1993 "Violence and Political Change in Papua New Guinea." *Pacific Studies* 16(4): 41-60.

Strathern, Marilyn

1974 *No Money on Our Skins: Hagen Migrants in Port Moresby*. New Guinea Research Unit Bulletin No. 61. Canberra and Port Moresby: New Guinea Research Unit.

Thomas, Nicholas

1991 *Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture and Colonialism in the Pacific*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Toft, Susan, ed.

1985 *Domestic Violence in Papua New Guinea*. Port Moresby: Law Reform Commission.

Torgovnick, M

1990 *Gone Primitive: Savage Intellect, Modern Lives*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Trinh, T. Minh-Ha

1989 *Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

US State Department.

1998 "Papua New Guinea – Consular Information Sheet. In *Travel Warnings and Consular Information Sheets*.
<http://travel.state.gov/papua_newguinea.htm> 26 June 1998. [Archived: August 20 1998].

Vantage Systems Inc.

1998 "Papua New Guinea". <<http://www.vantage-security.com/aspapuan.htm>> 1998. [Archived: August 20 1998].

Watson, James B

1971 "Tairora: The Politics of Despotism in a Small Society." *Politics in New Guinea*, Ronald M. Berndt and Peter Lawrence eds. Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, pp. 225-275.

Webb, Michael

1990 *Lokal Musik Lingua Franca: Song and Identity in Papua New Guinea*. Boroko, Papua New Guinea: National Research Institute.

Willis, Ian

1975 *Lae: Village and City*. Australia: Melbourne University Press.

Worsley, Peter

1969 *The Trumpet Shall Sound*. New York: Schocken Books.

Young, Michael W







1983 *Magicians of Manumanua: Living Myths in Kalauna*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Zimmer, Laura

1985 *The Losing Game – Exchange, Migration, and Inequality Among the Gende People of Papua New Guinea*. Ph.D. Thesis, Bryn Mawr College

1993 "Nationalism and Sexuality in Papua New Guinea." *Pacific Studies* 16(4):61-98.

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



APPLIED IMAGE, Inc
1653 East Main Street
Rochester, NY 14609 USA
Phone: 716/482-0300
Fax: 716/288-5989

© 1993, Applied Image, Inc., All Rights Reserved