

THE ORIGIN OF EVIL:

DIDYMUS THE BLIND'S CONTRA MANICHAEOS
AND ITS DEBT TO ORIGEN'S THEOLOGY AND EXEGESIS

by

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Evil desires and actions are at once repulsive and strangely appealing, creating an important tension within the human agent. Insofar as a religion or philosophy claims to offer a comprehensive account of the human condition, it must be able to shed light upon this tension—explaining how human evil originated, why it is appealing and what the limits of its power are.

The need to wrestle with these questions was particularly acute in the Christian communities of fourth-century Egypt. The rise of the ascetic movement had focussed attention upon the struggle against fleshly lusts and demonic powers. At the same time, Manichaean missionaries were active in Egypt, disseminating their own account of the nature and origin of human evil.

The dissertation analyzes a treatise which is arguably the most important fourth-century Egyptian Christian response to these challenges—Didymus the Blind's Contra Manichaeos—and demonstrates its indebtedness to Origen's theological and exegetical writings.

Chapter 1 provides a brief account of Didymus' life and exegetical works.

Chapter 2 describes the position defended by Didymus' opponents, providing a synopsis of Manichaean mythology (as found in the published Coptic Manichaean texts from Medinet Madi and Kellis) and analyzing references to Manichaeism in Didymus' Contra Manichaeos and exegetical

works. Didymus' exposure to and understanding of Manichaeism are seen to have been limited; a tendency to confuse the views of the Manichaeans with those of earlier individuals and groups opposed by Origen is also noted.

Chapter 3 examines the arguments advanced by Didymus in the Contra Manichaeos and demonstrates their indebtedness to Origen's theology and exegesis. Didymus' adherence to certain controversial aspects of Origen's theological anthropology (including the descent of pre-existent souls into bodies soiled by sin and death) is noted and discussed.

Chapter 4 analyzes the concept of prohairesis (purposive choice) which is central to Didymus' anthropology and grounds his anti-Manichaean arguments. By comparing Didymus' conception of prohairesis with that of Aristotle, Epictetus and Origen, it can be seen that Didymus was primarily indebted to Origen.

The appendix provides a critical edition and English translation of the Contra Manichaeos.

For, like many even in our day, heretics in particular,
Marcion had an unhealthy interest in the problem of evil
--the origin of it--and his perceptions were numbed
by the very excess of his curiosity

--Tertullian Adversus Marcionem 1.2.2

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1. **DIDYMUS' CONTRA MANICHAEOS:
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Manuscript Tradition

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Ps.-Didymus--Text

Didymus Contra Manichaeos--Text

Ps.-Didymus--Translation

Didymus Contra Manichaeos--Translation

Fragments--Translation

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ABBREVIATIONS

BHG	Bibliotheca Hagiographica Graecorum
CCSG	Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca
CCSL	Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
CPG	Clavis Patrum Graecorum
CSEL	Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum
GCS	Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller
PG	Patrologia Graeca
PL	Patrologia Latina
PO	Patrologia Orientalis
PTA	Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen
PTS	Patristische Texte und Studien
SC	Sources Chrétiennes
TU	Texte und Untersuchungen
TUNF	Texte und Untersuchungen. Neue Folge

INTRODUCTION

In every age, people have reflected upon the phenomenon of human evil and sought to understand its origin. When someone commits a particularly heinous crime, for example, we wonder what could have moved that individual to commit such an act and how he or she became the sort of person who could do such a thing. Should we view evil actions as arising simply from the rational choices of autonomous agents or are other forces at work? Can bodily desire, for example, determine the character of our actions by influencing, constraining or overriding rational choice? Furthermore, how can we explain that spontaneous attraction to evil, present even from our earliest years, which sometimes leads us to perform acts that we abhor and know to be wrong? If indeed we can be constrained or moved to action by the forces of attraction and desire, can we still be held responsible for our choices, actions or moral character?

Reflecting upon the origin of human evil is hardly a pastime peculiar to the academic theologian. As soon as one begins thinking about the issues that are involved, one notices the frequency with which they arise in different settings. The self-help section of the local bookstore, for example, contains any number of books claiming to explain how we became the people we wish we weren't and what can be done about it. In philosophy too there has been a burgeoning interest in the relationship between desire, choice, responsibility for

one's actions and the control one has over the development of one's moral character,

The need to understand the origin of human evil was particularly acute in the Christian communities of fourth-century Egypt. The rise of the ascetic movement had focused attention upon the psychology of temptation, i.e. the role played by demonic powers and the lusts of the flesh in the production of human evil. At the same time, Manichaean teachers and missionaries were active in Egypt, attracting adherents from the Egyptian Christian communities and advocating ascetic practices that depended upon an alternative account of the nature and origin of evil. These factors led several fourth-century Egyptian Christian writers to reflect upon the mystery of human evil and to try to explain and defend the theological basis for Christian asceticism.

Some of the most provocative and interesting reflections upon this subject came from the Alexandrian exegete Didymus the Blind. Despite the fact that he lived a retiring life as an ascetic, Didymus' extant works show that he was very much concerned with the broader religious scene. The refutation of Manichaean accounts of evil is an important and recurrent theme in Didymus' works, as Orphanos has noted.¹ This thesis will examine Didymus' account of the origin of human evil in his treatise Contra Manichaeos (Against the Manichaeans) and will demonstrate the indebtedness of this account to Origen's exegetical and theological insights; a critical edition and English translation of Didymus' Contra Manichaeos will also be provided in an appendix to the thesis.²

Even though François Combefis' edition of the Greek text has been available for over three centuries, Didymus' Contra Manichaeos has been curiously neglected. Four reasons may be cited for this omission. First, Didymus' prose is terse, sometimes dense and even cryptic. Not infrequently, he introduces novel or unusual words or, rummaging through his well-stocked mind, brings forth technical terms belonging to the disciplines of philosophy and rhetoric.

Second, the initial chapters of the Contra Manichaeos in Combefis' edition are separately attested in treatises bearing the names of Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus, and John the Grammarian. Since the origin and authenticity of these other treatises has itself been a matter of debate, it has been difficult to establish how the initial section of Didymus' Contra Manichaeos was related to the rest of the work and whether it was authentic. Recent research by the late Marcel Richard has made it possible to identify the material at the beginning of the received text, establishing its inauthenticity; a critical edition and detailed analysis of this ps.-Didymus material can be found in the appendix at the end of the thesis.³

Third, until recently, critical editions of many of Didymus' other extant works did not exist; this made it difficult to reconstruct Didymus' beliefs and assess his contribution to the Christian tradition. The discovery of works of Didymus among the Tura papyri has greatly expanded our knowledge of Didymus' thought and helped to form a clearer and more precise picture of his place in the history of Christian thought (especially his relationship to Origen).⁴

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Finally, until the present century, the study of Manichaeism was limited by the paucity of primary material available and the difficulties of reconstructing a religion known primarily through the writings of its opponents. The discovery and publication of Egyptian Manichaean literature during the present century has helped to illuminate the belief-system which Didymus was attempting to address.

Didymus' knowledge of Manichaeism was admittedly limited. Despite these limitations, he was familiar with some of the basic features of the Manichaean account of evil and certain examples of Manichaean exegesis. Didymus was dissatisfied with the way in which his opponents appeared to understand the role played by the flesh and demonic powers in the production of human evil. In Didymus' view, Manichaean exegesis depicted the flesh and demonic powers as evil forces which constrained and motivated the agent in such a way that the agent's capacity for choice was in danger of being subverted. Were that to occur, the basis for ascribing actions to an agent would be eroded and the agent's capacity for moral alteration would be compromised.

Didymus' response fell into two parts. First, he offered an alternative account of what evil was and how it was related to the terrestrial realm in which we presently live. Didymus contended that evil was not an original, enduring principle nor was it capable in itself of defining the character of one's bodily existence or forming one's moral identity. Didymus asserted that all beings took their origin from the good God. In making this affirmation, he rejected the

Manichaean premise that good and evil were distinct unoriginate principles that were each sovereign over a realm peculiarly their own.

Didymus likewise argued that the flesh and body were created by God and served the divine purpose. At the same time, he affirmed that as a result of a moral choice made prior to one's birth, one's fleshly body had an initial bias toward vice and could be an impediment to the pursuit of virtue.⁵ Didymus nonetheless rejected the Manichaean contention that there was something irreducibly evil in the composition of the body. The life of ascetic training and discipline commended by Didymus was therefore motivated by different considerations than those which impelled Manichaean asceticism.

The second part of Didymus' response involved the presentation of an account of moral choice which could recognize the significance of the various forces inciting one to evil action (such as bodily desire and demonic powers), yet emphasize the agent's ability to originate and control his or her actions and thus be responsible for the formation of his or her moral character. Didymus developed this position by means of two subsidiary arguments.

Didymus contended that those who accepted the challenge of the ascetic life would face intense opposition from demonic opponents, who were able to tempt one to sin without being able to compel the agent's moral choice. In the case of a human agent, Didymus argued, inclination and action did not arise simply from the impressions made upon one by external forces or from bodily desire;

it was instead rational assent (συγκατάθεσις) which produced action. Because this was so, the rational agent always retained the power of moral self-determination and was therefore responsible for his or her actions and the formation of his or her moral character.

Didymus also argued that good and evil were qualities which arose from the purposive choice (προαίρεσις) of a rational agent. Evil was therefore not something substantial and abiding (as the Manichaeans claimed), but rather something which underwent alteration as a result of choice. Since all rational beings had the capacity to reject evil and choose good, it was possible for even the most depraved persons to repent and become good. Choice thus not only shaped and formed moral character, but also relativized the latter, since even those habituated to evil retained the capacity to choose the good and change their character.

To examine how Didymus developed these arguments and to specify where he drew upon Origen's exegetical and theological insights, the thesis will be divided into four chapters. Because the arguments Didymus presents in the Contra Manichaeos are often terse and difficult, it will be useful to refer to parallel passages in Didymus' biblical commentaries to elucidate Didymus' position. The first chapter will therefore summarize what little is known about Didymus' life and provide a concise account of the published fragments of Didymus' biblical commentaries. In the case of each commentary, the principal edition will be indicated; where the authenticity of a work has been contested, the evidence for or against its authenticity will also be noted.⁶

Since the Contra Manichaeos is a treatise written against known opponents, it is important to determine what Didymus knew about the Manichaean account of evil and whether his reading of Origen helped to shape his understanding of it. The second chapter will therefore provide a brief outline of Manichaean cosmology and soteriology drawn from the Coptic Manichaean Kephalaia and Psalm Book. The positions that Didymus explicitly attributed to the Manichaeans in his writings will then be examined. I will also briefly examine a number of passages where Didymus did not identify the person or group whose views he was criticizing, but which the editors of Didymus' works have assumed to be references to Manichaean teaching. It will be seen that Didymus' knowledge of Manichaeism was limited, although he was familiar with some of the basic features of the Manichaean account of evil and certain examples of Manichaean exegesis. In some cases, I will note Didymus' tendency to view Manichaeism through the lens of Origen's polemic against earlier figures (i.e. Hermogenes and the Marcionites).

The third chapter will examine the arguments Didymus used in the Contra Manichaeos to refute his opponents and develop an alternative account of the origin of human evil; Didymus' exegetical and theological dependence upon Origen will then be noted and discussed. It will be seen that Didymus drew upon exegetical and theological arguments which previous writers (including Origen) had used to respond to Valentinian and Marcionite teaching. Furthermore, in discussing the origin and nature of human evil, Didymus committed himself to certain controversial aspects of

Origen's theological anthropology (including the soul's existence prior to the formation of the earthly body, the soul's subsequent descent into inferior conditions as a result of negligence, and the distinction between a luminous, paradisaical body and a thick, terrestrial body soiled by sin and liable to death).

Since the aim of this study is to demonstrate Didymus' exegetical and theological debt to Origen, a detailed analysis of Didymus' other sources is outside the scope of this thesis. A few of the other sources used by Didymus in the Contra Manichaeos will nonetheless be briefly indicated in the course of the discussion. Didymus' use of these other sources suggests that he had a broad knowledge of philosophy and rhetoric which allowed him to develop creative exegesis and argument within the parameters of the Origenist theological framework he accepted.⁷

The fourth chapter will analyze the concept of προαίρεσις (purposive choice), to which Didymus repeatedly appealed in his anti-Manichaean polemic. To better understand the significance of the term προαίρεσις, I will examine the works of three writers prior to Didymus (Aristotle, Epictetus and Origen) who made extensive use of the term and helped to define its sense within ancient and late antique philosophy. It will be seen that the term προαίρεσις, which Aristotle had made an important philosophical concept, was reinterpreted by Epictetus in the light of Stoic psychology; Origen took over the Stoicized term and linked it with the Platonic notion of descent into different conditions corresponding to the degree of the soul's departure from God. Didymus' use of προαίρεσις will then be

analyzed and compared to the more detailed accounts offered by Aristotle, Epictetus and Origen. It will be seen that Didymus' account resembles that of Origen, although some influence from Aristotle and Epictetus will also be noted.

The conclusion will summarize the findings of the previous chapters. A critical edition and English translation of the Contra Manichaeos will then be provided in an appendix. The analysis of the text given there will demonstrate that material from two Byzantine anti-Manichaean works has been interpolated at the beginning of the received text; this inauthentic material will also be edited and discussed in detail.

NOTES

Introduction

1. Markos Orphanos, Η ΨΥΧΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΣΩΜΑ ΤΟΥ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ ΚΑΤΑ ΔΙΔΥΜΟΝ ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΕΑ (ΤΟΝ ΤΥΦΛΟΝ) (Thessaloniki: Patriarchikon Idruma Paterikon Meleton, 1974), 166-179.

2. In referring to passages in Didymus' Contra Manichaeos, I will cite first the paragraph number and line number from my own edition and then the column, section and line number in Migne's edition (PG 39).

3. In referring to passages in ps.-Didymus, I will first cite the section number (given in Roman numerals), paragraph number and line number from my own edition and then the column, section and line number in Migne's edition (PG 39).

4. When reference is made to one of the Tura commentaries, the abbreviation T. will be added after the name of the book being commented upon; thus for example, Comm. Ps. refers to the catena fragments on the Psalms, while Comm. Ps.T. refers to the Tura commentary on the Psalms. The Tura commentaries will be cited by codex page number and line number. Since Doutreleau's edition of the Tura commentary on Zechariah also refers to the text of this commentary by book number and section number, the book number and section number will be given in parentheses after the codex page number and line number. In citing the catena fragments ascribed to Didymus, the verse which is being commented upon will be indicated (for example, Comm. Ps. 80:1); I will then give the volume, column, section and line numbers in Migne and the page and line numbers in the critical edition (where such exists).

5. This aspect of Didymus' theology has been examined by J. Leiboldt, Didymus der Blinde von Alexandria, TU 29.2b (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1905), 81-82; G. Bardy, Didyme l'Aveugle (Paris: Beauchesne, 1910), 133-138; J. Tixeront, Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne, v. 2 (Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1924), 141; Joseph Turmel, Histoire des dogmes (Paris: Éditions Rieder, 1931), 60; A. Gaudel, "Péché originel," in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, v. 12.1 (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1933), 346-347; Joannes Mehlmann, Natura filii irae. Historia interpretationis Eph. 2.3 ejusque cum doctrina de peccato originali

nexus (Rome: Pont. Inst. Biblic., 1957), 39-48; K.H. Schelkle, Paulus, Lehrer der Väter: Die altkirchliche Auslegung von Römer 1-11, 2 ed. (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1959), 166-167, 173; Julius Gross, Entstehungsgeschichte des Erbsündendogmas: Von der Bibel bis Augustinus (München: Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, 1960), 135-140; Henri Rondet, Le péché originel dans la tradition patristique et théologique (Paris: Librairie Fayard, 1967), 105; Emmanuele Testa, Il peccato di Adamo nella patristica (Gen. III) (Jerusalem: Tipografia dei PP. Francescani, 1970), 47, 52, 57; G.M. Lukken, Original Sin in the Roman Liturgy (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973), 268, 275, 325-326, 398-399; J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 351; Pier Franco Beatrice, Tradux peccati: Alle fonti della dottrina agostiniana del peccato originale (Milan: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1978), 208-213; Leo Scheffczyk, Urstand, Fall und Erbsünde von der Schrift bis Augustinus (Freiburg: Herder, 1981), 130-131; David Weaver, "The Exegesis of Romans 5:12 among the Greek Fathers and Its Implications for the Doctrine of Original Sin in the 5th-12th Centuries," St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly 29 (1985): 139-140; G.-H. Baudry, "Le péché des origines selon Didyme d'Alexandrie," Mélanges de science religieuse 53 (1996): 163-182.

6. I have elected not to discuss two other types of works which have been ascribed to Didymus. Several works dealing with Trinitarian theology have been assigned to Didymus, sometimes on quite dubious grounds; see M. Geerard, Clavis Patrum Graecorum. Volumen II. Ab Athanasio ad Chrysostomum (Turnhout: Brepols, 1974), 111, nos. 2570-2571). For an analysis of these works and the ongoing debate about their ascription to Didymus, see Alasdair I.C. Heron, "Studies in the Trinitarian Writings of Didymus the Blind: His Authorship of the Adversus Eunomium IV-V and the De Trinitate" (Diss., Eberhard-Karls-Universität, Tübingen, 1972); Franz Xaver Risch, Pseudo-Basilii Adversus Eunomium IV-V: Einleitung, Übersetzung und Kommentar (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992). Since these works are of uncertain authenticity and contain little detailed treatment of the origin of human evil, I will not attempt to study them here.

Furthermore, of the fragments ascribed to Didymus in doctrinal, ascetical and ethical florilegia, I will discuss only those which can be shown to derive from Didymus' biblical commentaries. The other florilegia fragments raise a number of problems which cannot be resolved within the scope of this thesis. Some of these fragments have not been previously described or published, while those that have been published are often not available in critical editions. Regarding the Greek florilegia, see James R. Royse (The Spurious Texts of Philo of Alexandria: A Study of Textual Transmission and Corruption with Indexes to the Major Collections of

Fragments [Leiden: J. Brill, 1991], 26-32) with the literature cited there.

7. For a detailed discussion of these other sources and their influence upon Didymus' work, see the literature cited below on page 35 n.11.

CHAPTER 1 DIDYMUS' LIFE AND WORKS

Because the Contra Manichaeos is written in a terse and difficult style, it is important to compare its arguments with parallel passages in Didymus' biblical commentaries and to understand the place of such arguments within Didymus' broader theological outlook. To gain a clearer picture of the circumstances, issues and interests that shaped Didymus' thought, what little is known about Didymus' life will be summarized. I will then offer a brief account of Didymus' biblical commentaries, describing the published fragments and indicating the principal editions; where the authenticity of a commentary has been disputed, the evidence for or against its authenticity will also be noted.

Remarkably little is known about Didymus' life, making it difficult to establish a chronology for his pedagogical and literary activities. Most of what is known is based upon the brief accounts given by Rufinus, Jerome and Palladius, who had all met Didymus during the last three decades of his life (371-398).¹ A few additional details are found in fifth-century church historians (Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret and Philip of Side) or can be deduced from an analysis of Didymus' extant works.

The approximate dates of Didymus' birth and death can be extrapolated from the testimony of Palladius and Jerome, although their accounts do not coincide exactly. After recording Didymus' death, Palladius remarked that he was able to visit Didymus four times over a

ten-year period.² Since Palladius arrived in Alexandria during the second consulate of Theodosius the Great, i.e. in 388, it is reasonable to infer that Didymus died around 398.³ Palladius also mentioned that Didymus died at the age of 85, suggesting that Didymus was born about 313.⁴ The testimony of Jerome, however, is slightly different. Writing in 392, he confirmed that Didymus was then still alive, having passed his eighty-third year.⁵ This should mean that Didymus was born about 309; if one combines this date with Palladius' information about the length of Didymus' life, one would assume that Didymus died about 394.

The ancient sources all agree that Didymus became blind in early childhood, but differ as to the precise age at which he became blind and whether he had begun his formal education prior to the loss of his sight. Palladius, who claimed to report Didymus' own testimony, asserted that Didymus became blind at the age of four.⁶ Jerome, however, contended that Didymus was five when he lost his sight.⁷ Palladius, Rufinus, and Jerome agreed that the onset of Didymus' blindness occurred before he had begun his formal education. The fifth-century church historians Socrates and Sozomen, however, asserted that Didymus became blind only after he had begun his studies.⁸ Sozomen nonetheless related that later in life, Didymus had the letters of the alphabet carved on wooden blocks so that by touching the blocks he could become familiar with the shape of the letters.⁹ This would appear to support the contention of Palladius, Rufinus and Jerome that Didymus had not yet begun his formal education when he became blind.¹⁰

Various accounts are given of the nature of Didymus' subsequent education. To facilitate comparison of these different accounts, their

contents may be displayed in the form of a table:

<u>Jerome</u> <u>De vir. ill.</u> 109	<u>Rufinus</u> <u>Hist. eccl.</u> 11.7	<u>Socrates</u> <u>Hist. eccl.</u> 4.25	<u>Sozomen</u> <u>Hist. eccl.</u> 3.15	<u>Theodoret</u> <u>Hist. eccl.</u> 4.26
dialectic geometry	dialectic geometry arithmetic astronomy	dialectic arithmetic music grammar rhetoric philosophical studies	geometry arithmetic astronomy rhetoric poetry the opinions of the philosophers	geometry arithmetic astronomy rhetoric poetry the syllogisms of Aristotle and the eloquence of Plato

An examination of Didymus' extant works confirms his acquaintance with the formal distinctions and technical terms belonging to a variety of disciplines: philosophy,¹¹ grammar,¹² natural history,¹³ music,¹⁴ astronomy,¹⁵ mathematics and geometry.¹⁶ In his works Didymus also emphasized the importance of committing philosophical and theological arguments to memory.¹⁷

Didymus devoted considerable time to the study of biblical literature. Didymus apparently did not know Hebrew.¹⁸ In commenting upon the Old Testament, he therefore used a version of the Septuagint¹⁹; where the text of the Septuagint seemed to be unclear or posed difficulties for the interpreter, Didymus was sometimes able to compare it with other ancient translations of the Old Testament into Greek.²⁰ Like his Alexandrian predecessors, Philo and Origen, Didymus made use of

allegorical exegesis to illuminate difficult passages and to draw out the spiritual teaching of the Scriptures.²¹

It is difficult to reconstruct the setting in which Didymus' biblical commentaries were dictated, since little is known about Didymus' relation to the ecclesiastical hierarchy or the religious institutions of his day. Most of Didymus' biographers have asserted that Athanasius appointed Didymus as the head of the catechetical school of Alexandria, supporting this assertion by reference to a passage in Rufinus. This passage, however, tells us little about the actual nature of Didymus' appointment or position as a teacher: "...God teaching him, he [sc. Didymus] had come to such erudition and knowledge of things divine and human, as to emerge as a doctor of the ecclesiastical school, greatly approved by Athanasius the bishop and other wise men in the Church of God."²²

During the last century there has been considerable disagreement about the nature of the catechetical school of Alexandria. It has been questioned, for example, whether the school was a formal ecclesiastical institution under the supervision of the bishop and, if so, how long it endured as such.²³ Whatever the nature of the school may have been in the third century, it has usually been assumed that it did not continue to exist as a formal ecclesiastical institution after the persecution of Maximinus at the beginning of the fourth century.

The principal evidence for the continued institutional existence of the school in the fourth century is a short fragment from a fifth-century historian, Philip of Side, which claims to report the succession of teachers appointed to preside over the school.²⁴ This fragment asserts

that after the death of Peter I of Alexandria, leadership of the school passed to Macarius ὁ πολιτικός (i.e. Macarius of Alexandria).²⁵ The leadership of the school is said to have subsequently passed to Didymus and then to a certain Rhodon, who moved the school to Side and taught Philip himself.

It is not clear, however, that Philip's testimony provides reliable historical information. As a number of writers have pointed out, Philip's list is beset by chronological problems and may be of dubious historical value. Furthermore, if the catechetical school had survived as an institution of the Alexandrian church, it is puzzling that Athanasius and his episcopal successors nowhere refer to Didymus in their extant works.²⁶ This suggests that Didymus may not have held an official ecclesiastical position but may simply have taught any interested persons in the room or cell in which he lived.²⁷

Although Didymus' relation to the ecclesiastical hierarchy is poorly understood, it is clear that Didymus' exegesis and spiritual teaching were admired by other Egyptian ascetics acquainted with Origen's writings; such persons probably constituted the principal audience for Didymus' works. Several sources mention at least one visit paid by Antony to Didymus.²⁸ Palladius also asserted that Ammonius, one of the famous Long Brothers, "had committed to memory the Old and New Testaments, and he knew by heart 6,000,000 verses of the highly reputable writings of Origen, Didymus, Pierius and Stephen."²⁹ Evagrius Ponticus likewise paid tribute to "the mighty and discerning teacher Didymus."³⁰ Van Parys, in discussing a recently discovered letter of Arsenius, has noted important similarities between the exegesis of Arsenius and that of

Didymus.³¹ Sheridan has also drawn attention to the indebtedness of Rufus of Shotep, a Coptic writer active in the second half of the sixth century, to Origen and Didymus.³²

Didymus' appeal to such figures probably rested not merely upon his vast learning and his acquaintance with Origen's writings, but also upon his own reputation as an ascetic. In his writings, Didymus commended and commented upon the ascetic life, discussing the psychology of temptation, the importance of careful training and discipline, the struggle against demonic powers, the nature of ecstasy and other relevant topics.³³ Like his ascetic contemporaries, Didymus also claimed to have had certain experiences of supernatural insight. Palladius, for example, related that Didymus had reported having a vision informing him of the death of Julian the Apostate at the very day and hour it occurred:

Now he told me this, too: "One day as I was thinking about the life of the miserable Emperor Julian, about his being a persecutor, and I was sorely troubled and had not even tasted my bread up to the time of late evening, because of my thoughts, it so happened that as I sat in my chair I fell asleep and I saw in ecstasy white horses running with soldiers and proclaiming: 'Tell Didymus, Julian died today at the seventh hour; get up and eat,' they said, 'and send word to Athanasius the bishop that he too may know.'

"And I made a note," he said, "of the hour and month and week and day, and it was found to be so."³⁴

Didymus' popularity with contemporary ascetic figures may therefore have arisen from the fact that he was committed to a similar kind of life, addressed similar problems, and could claim to have had similar experiences.

Although Didymus' reputation rested principally upon his abilities as an exegete and an exponent of the ascetic life, Didymus also commented upon the various theological controversies of his day. He was principally concerned with opposing Manichaeism and Arian and neo-Arian (Eunomian) theology.³⁵ He also made briefer but still important comments upon the Christologies of Apollinaris and Marcellus of Ancyra.³⁶ In discussing the theological issues of his own time, Didymus also referred back to the views expressed by earlier figures, including Marcion, the Valentinians, Basilides, Hermogenes, Bardaisan and the Montanists.³⁷

Having examined what little is known about the different aspects of Didymus' life, I will now summarize what is known about his biblical commentaries and briefly describe the extant fragments and the principal editions that have been published. Didymus produced a number of commentaries which were influential in the fourth to seventh centuries and made an important contribution to the Greek exegetical tradition.³⁸ These commentaries have been transmitted through a variety of means. Fragments ascribed to Didymus are extant in catenae and florilegia; in some cases, these fragments are ascribed to specific commentaries. These fragments need to be treated with caution for two reasons. First, the attribution of fragments to a given author is not uniformly accurate; some of the fragments which have been transmitted under the name of Didymus can be seen to derive from the extant works of other authors (John Chrysostom, Theodoret, etc.). Second, it is sometimes difficult to reconstruct the original form of a given fragment; some of the fragments have been paraphrased or epitomized, while others are actually a

pastiche of short excerpts from different sections of the same work, from different works of the same author, or from works of different authors. Caution is therefore necessary in using the fragments ascribed to Didymus in catenae and florilegia to reconstruct Didymus' corpus or to understand his views.

Within the present century, the discovery of Didymus' biblical commentaries among the Tura papyri has allowed us to form a more certain and considerably more detailed picture of Didymus' thought.³⁹ In places where the text of these commentaries had been damaged by insects or by the rough handling of the finders or vendors, the text has been painstakingly restored, drawing in part upon a critical analysis of the fragments transmitted in the catenae and florilegia. The editors have also supplied a number of valuable notes which analyze Didymus' exegesis and principal theological motifs.

Since it is not always possible to determine the chronological order in which Didymus' biblical commentaries were produced, my survey of Didymus' known commentaries will follow the canonical order of the books of the Septuagint and New Testament.⁴⁰ Jerome alluded to a commentary on the book of Genesis by Didymus.⁴¹ Fragments of the commentary have survived in catenae.⁴² The beginning of the commentary (dealing with interpretation of Gen. 1:1-16:16) was recently discovered in codex 4 from Tura.⁴³ A critical edition and French translation of the commentary were prepared by Nautin and Doutreleau, who referred to the catena fragments and the epitome of Procopius when filling in the lacunae in the Tura codex.⁴⁴

Fragments dealing with the interpretation of the book of Exodus are also extant. Migne (PG 39, 1113-1116) reprinted seven fragments from the catena of Nicephorus.⁴⁵ It is unclear whether these fragments come from a commentary on Exodus or derive from another work by Didymus.

In his Commentary on Zechariah, Didymus alluded to his earlier commentary on the Psalms.⁴⁶ Jerome referred to this commentary and it is also mentioned in a sixth-century papyrus which contains a list of books.⁴⁷ Mühlenberg provided a critical edition of the catena fragments on the Psalms which are ascribed to Didymus (CPG 2551).⁴⁸ Harl also published a critical edition of catena fragments on Ps. 119 ascribed to Didymus.⁴⁹

A commentary on Psalms 20-44 (LXX) (CPG 2550) found in codex 5 from Tura (6 c.) has been ascribed to Didymus because of numerous parallels in content with the catena fragments on the Psalms ascribed to him.⁵⁰ A critical edition and German translation of this commentary has been published.⁵¹ At the same time, the Tura commentary is clearly not the document from which the extant catena fragments were derived. This suggests that Didymus composed two distinct commentaries on the Psalms; given Didymus' long life and the importance of the Psalms in early Christian spirituality, this is certainly plausible.⁵²

Cassiodorus referred to a commentary of Didymus on Proverbs (CPG 2552), which was translated into Latin by Epiphanius Scholasticus.⁵³ Didymus' commentary on 2 Corinthians also appears to refer back to a commentary on Proverbs.⁵⁴ To date, no complete edition of the extant fragments of the commentary on Proverbs has been

published. A fragment attributed to Didymus' commentary on Proverbs appears in John Damascene's Sacra parallela (PG 95, 1297B5-10).⁵⁵ A fragment dealing with Prov. 20:9a is also attributed to Didymus in the Sacra parallela.⁵⁶ A number of fragments are found in Procopius of Gaza; some of these appear in Cordier's Latin translation in Migne.⁵⁷ Achelis noted at least one additional fragment in a brief comment on Prov. 30:17-31, which is cited by Anastasius Sinaita under the name of Hippolytus, but is actually composed of scholia from different writers, including Didymus.⁵⁸ A Latin translation of some of the Greek catena fragments was prepared by Peltanus.⁵⁹ Mingarelli published several additional catena fragments.⁶⁰ Mai subsequently published an edition of the catena fragments found in three Vatican manuscripts; this edition was reprinted by Migne (PG 39, 1621-1646).⁶¹ Richard recently edited several catena fragments on Prov. 30:15-16, 18-20, 24-33 which are ascribed to Didymus.⁶²

Didymus also produced a commentary on Ecclesiastes (CPG 2555), which was used by Jerome and Olympiodorus in their respective commentaries on the book.⁶³ A fragment dealing with the interpretation of Ecclesiastes appears in John Damascene's Sacra parallela (PG 96, 273B6-7). A catena fragment dealing with Eccl. 8:12-13 was published by Mingarelli (PG 39, 719B n.44). A large part of the commentary was discovered in codex 3 from Tura (6 c.), 282 of the original 378 pages being extant; a critical edition and German translation of this commentary has been published.⁶⁴ This commentary is of particular interest, since it discusses the nature of the soul in response to Manichaeism and Apollinarian teaching.⁶⁵

A fragment dealing with the interpretation of Song of Songs 1:10 (CPG 2554) is also extant. It is unclear, however, whether this fragment is from a commentary on the Songs of Songs.⁶⁶ The scholion in question was first published by Meursius.⁶⁷ A different form of the scholion is found in the epitome of Procopius, which was published by Mai and reprinted by Migne (PG 87.2, 1561B2-5).⁶⁸

Jerome referred to a commentary by Didymus on the book of Job (CPG 2553).⁶⁹ Several fragments dealing with Job are extant in John Damascene's Sacra parallela.⁷⁰ A number of catena fragments have also survived. Young published the Greek fragments found in the catena of Nicetas together with a Latin translation⁷¹; these were reprinted by Migne (PG 39, 1119-1154). A critical edition of the catena fragments on Job is presently being prepared.⁷² A large part of the commentary was discovered in codex 7 from Tura (6 c.); a critical edition and German translation of the extant fragments of the commentary has been published.⁷³ This commentary is of particular interest because it contains anti-Manichaean polemic and deals with the problem of evil and the nature of the soul.

Jerome referred to a commentary of Didymus on Isaiah 40-66 (CPG 2547) which consisted of 18 books.⁷⁴ Fragments from this commentary are extant in John Damascene's Sacra parallela (PG 95, 1093B2-4⁷⁵; 1169B14-C2; 1169C3-7⁷⁶; 1169C8-11⁷⁷; 96, 525A1-5⁷⁸).

Catena fragments dealing with Jeremiah (CPG 2548) are extant. Three fragments were published by Ghisler.⁷⁹ Faulhaber subsequently noted the existence of an additional fragment.⁸⁰ It is unclear whether the fragments are from a commentary on Jeremiah or some other work.

Two scholia dealing with Dan. 2:34 (CPG 2556) were published by Faulhaber.⁸¹ It is not clear whether these remarks were drawn from a commentary on Daniel or some other work.

Jerome also mentioned a commentary in three books on Hosea, which Didymus had addressed to Jerome.⁸² A fragment dealing with the interpretation of Hosea (CPG 2564 [2]) appears in John Damascene's Sacra parallela (PG 95, 1381B7-8=PG 96, 520A4-5).

A commentary on Zechariah (CPG 2549) is also mentioned by Jerome, who asserted that it consisted of five books and employed allegorical exegesis.⁸³ A large portion of this commentary was discovered in codex 6 from Tura.⁸⁴ Since the work had not been preserved in the catenae on the Minor Prophets, the Tura commentary was attributed to Didymus on the basis of numerous parallels with Jerome's Commentary on Zechariah, which is known to have made extensive use of Didymus' commentary.

Didymus also commented on the books of the New Testament. In his Commentary on Zechariah, Didymus referred back to his earlier commentary on Matthew's Gospel.⁸⁵ Jerome indicated that he had used Didymus' commentary on Matthew in preparing his own commentary on that book.⁸⁶ No fragments of Didymus' commentary have been preserved in catenae or florilegia.⁸⁷

There is no evidence to show that Didymus produced a commentary on Luke. Jerome, in discussing the Lucan parable of the unfaithful steward, said that he did not know whether Didymus had commented on that parable.⁸⁸ Cordier ascribed a long catena fragment on Lk. 8:5 to Didymus, but argued that the fragment derived from the

latter's Commentary on Proverbs rather than a commentary on Luke.⁸⁹ In any case, Cordier's attribution of the fragment to Didymus has generally been rejected.⁹⁰

According to Jerome, Didymus also produced a commentary on John's Gospel (CPG 2557).⁹¹ A fragment dealing with the interpretation of John's Gospel appears in John Damascene's Sacra parallela (PG 96, 484A3-7). Reuss produced a critical edition of the catena fragments on John ascribed to Didymus.⁹² A Greek fragment found among the Tura papyri and dealing with Jn. 6:3-33 has been attributed to Didymus.⁹³ Catena fragments on John are also known to be extant in the Bohairic dialect of Coptic and in Arabic.⁹⁴

A large number of catena fragments dealing with the Acts of the Apostles (CPG 2561) are also extant, suggesting that Didymus had commented upon that book.⁹⁵ These fragments were first published by Wolf⁹⁶; Wolf's edition was reprinted by Migne (PG 39, 1653D-1677B).⁹⁷ Cramer published a new edition which contained all the fragments previously published by Wolf (sometimes in a slightly different form) plus over 30 new fragments.⁹⁸ Fragments are also found in Theophylact.⁹⁹ A fragment dealing with Acts 1:1 appears in John Damascene's Sacra parallela (PG 1548D9-11).¹⁰⁰

Didymus is known to have commented on the Pauline Epistles. In the appendix, I will examine a catena fragment which deals with the interpretation of Rom. 7 (CPG 2558).¹⁰¹ Staab provided a critical edition of this fragment and argued that it was originally a part of the Contra Manichaeos.¹⁰²

According to Jerome, Didymus also produced an extensive commentary on 1 Corinthians (CPG 2559).¹⁰³ A fragment dealing with 1 Corinthians is found in John Damascene's Sacra parallela (PG 96, 521B16-C5). Staab published 38 fragments dealing with 1 Cor. 15 and 16¹⁰⁴; these fragments deal with the resurrection of the body. The authenticity of these fragments is confirmed by the fact that the citation given by Jerome from Didymus' commentary matches the Greek catena fragment dealing with 1 Cor. 15:51.¹⁰⁵

A large number of catena fragments dealing with 2 Corinthians (CPG 2560) are also extant. Staab provided a critical edition of the fragments.¹⁰⁶ These fragments are of particular interest, since they include anti-Manichaean polemic.

Writing in 386, Jerome referred to a commentary of Didymus on Galatians, which he had used in preparing his own commentary on the book.¹⁰⁷ No fragments of Didymus' commentary are known to have survived.

Jerome, writing in 386, also mentioned that Didymus and Apollinaris had produced brief commentaries on Ephesians, which he had used in producing his own commentary on the epistle.¹⁰⁸ No fragments of Didymus' commentary are known to have survived.

From the writings of Jerome and Gennadius, it appears that Didymus had interpreted 1 Thess. 5:23 as supporting a trichotomous account of the human agent.¹⁰⁹ Since Jerome did not elsewhere refer to a commentary of Didymus on 1 Thessalonians, it is likely that Didymus did not compose a separate commentary on the epistle.¹¹⁰

A fragment dealing with Heb. 1:6 (=Ps. 96 [97]:7) was published by Staab.¹¹¹ Since there is no evidence that Didymus produced a commentary on Hebrews, Leipoldt and Kramer have argued that this fragment is derived from some other work by Didymus.¹¹²

Cassiodorus mentioned a commentary of Didymus on the Catholic Epistles (CPG 2562).¹¹³ This attribution is somewhat surprising, since Cosmas Indicopleustes asserted that no ancient author had written a commentary on the Catholic Epistles.¹¹⁴ Debate over the nature and authenticity of this commentary has raged during the past two centuries; here it will be possible only to summarize the debate and to suggest some tentative conclusions.

In the passage to which we have alluded above, Cassiodorus professed to be familiar with four works dealing with the interpretation of the Catholic Epistles: a commentary of Clement of Alexandria on 1 Peter, 1 and 2 John, and James, which was translated into Latin; Augustine's exposition of the Epistle of James; Augustine's 10 sermons on 1 John; and Didymus' exposition of the seven Catholic Epistles, which was translated into Latin by Epiphanius Scholasticus.¹¹⁵ While Augustine's exposition of James appears to have been lost, the other three works mentioned by Cassiodorus are found together in the title of a Latin manuscript of the eighth or ninth century.¹¹⁶ Although the end of the manuscript has been damaged, the commentaries ascribed to Clement and Didymus have survived. It has generally been accepted that these commentaries ascribed to Clement and Didymus are identical with those mentioned by Cassiodorus.

The Latin commentary ascribed to Didymus was first published in 1531 and frequently reprinted in the early modern period.¹¹⁷ In this work, which I will refer to as the Enarratio, a relatively full and continuous commentary is given for 1 Peter and 1 John, while the comments on the other books (especially 2 Peter and James) provide only brief remarks on a few passages.¹¹⁸

Some Greek fragments ascribed to Didymus are extant in the catenae on the Catholic Epistles and can profitably be compared with the Latin Enarratio. These Greek fragments have been edited by Wolf,¹¹⁹ Matthaei,¹²⁰ and Cramer.¹²¹ Both the Latin Enarratio and Matthaei's edition of the Greek fragments were reprinted by Lücke¹²²; Lücke's work was in turn reprinted by Migne (PG 39, 1749B-1818D).

The authenticity of the Enarratio was accepted by Tillemont,¹²³ J. A. Mingarelli, Lücke,¹²⁴ and Mai¹²⁵; Ceillier, who was familiar only with the Latin Enarratio but not the Greek catena fragments, rejected the authenticity of the work.¹²⁶ Ceillier noted a number of features which appeared to indicate that the Enarratio was a work written in Latin, not a translation of a Greek original. The Enarratio contains a number of passages in which the writer treats the Greeks and Greek as a people and language alien to his own. Thus, for example, in the comments on 1 John (PG 39, 1789C), the writer feels it necessary to explain the Greek term διάβολος, while in the comments on 1 Peter (PG 39, 1758D-1759A), he contrasts the reading of the Vulgate with that found in the Greek version. Throughout the Enarratio, biblical quotations are regularly given in the Vulgate version; by contrast, in his translation of the Historia tripartitum, Epiphanius Scholasticus regularly preserved the readings of

his Greek source. Furthermore, in the passage quoted from Cassiodorus, the latter prided himself on commending orthodox works to the religious under his care; the Enarratio, however, advocates a number of unusual doctrines (including a possibly Origenist account of the fall and restoration of certain angels). Finally, in the comments on 1 John (PG 39, 1800C), the unity of the divine and human elements in the one person of Christ is discussed, as if the writer were responding to Eutychian teaching.

Klostermann, in comparing the Latin Enarratio with the Greek catena fragments on the Catholic Epistles, also doubted that the Latin Enarratio could be regarded as a work of Didymus.¹²⁷ He observed that some of the comments included in the Enarratio appeared under different names (Origen, Chrysostom, and Severus) in Cramer's edition of the Greek catena fragments on the Catholic Epistles. Furthermore, there were comments attributed to Didymus in Cramer's edition of the Greek catena fragments which did not appear in the Latin Enarratio. Klostermann therefore suggested that the Enarratio did not represent the work of a single author, but was instead a Latin translation of a Greek catena in which the first scholion attributed to an author was ascribed to Didymus.¹²⁸

These questions were examined by Zoepfl, who also produced a new edition of the Latin Enarratio and reprinted the Greek fragments previously published by Matthaei and Cramer.¹²⁹ Zoepfl argued that Didymus' comments formed the basis of the Latin Enarratio, but admitted that certain elements had later been added or reworked. Staab, building upon Zoepfl's work, provided additional information about the

readings of the Greek manuscripts and agreed that the Enarratio contained authentic material by Didymus.¹³⁰ Devreesse likewise argued that the comments of Didymus had provided the original core of material around which the catena translated by Epiphanius had been constructed.¹³¹ Because it was commonly held that a commentary of Didymus had supplied the Latin Enarratio's core material, it was sometimes assumed that one could reasonably attribute to Didymus any comments which appeared in both the Latin Enarratio and the Greek catena fragments on the Catholic Epistles (even where these fragments were not explicitly ascribed to Didymus in the manuscript tradition).

Although it is not possible here to resolve all the questions raised concerning the nature and origin of the Enarratio, a few brief remarks need to be made about the relation between the Enarratio and the Greek catena fragments. I will first examine the relationship between the Latin Enarratio and the Greek catena fragments on the Catholic Epistles which are ascribed to specific authors. The five catena fragments on the Catholic Epistles which are ascribed to Didymus will then be analyzed. Of these five fragments, Zoepfl believed that two could be paralleled in the Latin Enarratio, while the remaining three could not. By analyzing these five fragments, it will be seen that there is no reason to assume that Didymus wrote a commentary on the Catholic Epistles. The tendency of some earlier researchers automatically to ascribe to Didymus any comments appearing in both the Latin Enarratio and the Greek catena fragments on the Catholic Epistles is also seen to be unwarranted.

As Klostermann has noted, a comparison of the Latin Enarratio with the Greek catena fragments on the Catholic Epistles suggests that the former is a catena rather than the work of a single author. Of the eighty-two Greek fragments printed by Zoepfl in parallel to the Latin Enarratio, two are ascribed to Didymus, two are ascribed to Chrysostom, one is ascribed to the Monophysite patriarch Severus of Antioch (d. 538), and two or three are ascribed to Origen (Zoepfl's edition is ambiguous at one point); the rest are anonymous. This suggests that the Enarratio is the Latin translation of a Greek catena compiled no earlier than the sixth century. Since the first scholion bearing an author's name was ascribed to Didymus, it is easy to see how the translator, misunderstanding the nature of the lemma, could have placed the work under the name of Didymus.

There is little correspondence between the Latin Enarratio and the Greek catena fragments on the Catholic Epistles ascribed to Didymus. Zoepfl printed two Greek catena fragments ascribed to Didymus--both found in Cramer's edition but not in that of Matthaei--as being parallel to the Latin Enarratio. The first Greek fragment concerns the interpretation of the phrase "servant of God and the Lord Jesus Christ" in James 1:1.¹³² This fragment has been excerpted from a catena fragment of Didymus' Commentary on the Psalms.¹³³ The second Greek fragment offers a brief remark on 1 Pet. 3:15b.¹³⁴ Here the Latin text diverges so widely from the text of the Greek fragment that it is doubtful whether the former can be considered to be a translation of the latter at all. Klostermann did not see this second Greek fragment as having any

parallel in the Latin Enarratio and even Zoepfl was forced to admit that the relationship between the two was quite distant.¹³⁵

There are three catena fragments on the Catholic Epistles which are ascribed to Didymus in Cramer's edition but have no parallel in the Latin Enarratio. The first of these fragments is found after James 4:6, which quotes from Prov. 3:34.¹³⁶ It is interesting to note that the catena fragment makes use of the verb ὑψόω, which does not occur in James 4, but does occur in Prov. 3:35; this suggests that the biblical text which is being commented upon in the fragment is not James 4:6, but rather Prov. 3:34-35. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that a later commentator upon the Proverbs drew upon this first fragment in preparing his own exposition of Prov. 3:34-35.¹³⁷ This suggests that the first fragment may be derived from Didymus' Commentary on Proverbs, although it will not be possible to verify this hypothesis until a critical edition of the latter work appears. The second fragment is printed after 1 Pet. 2:7, which refers back to Ps. 117(118):22.¹³⁸ This second fragment is ascribed to Didymus by the catenae on the Psalms (PG 39, 1561C15-1564A3), but in reality belongs to Eusebius of Caesarea.¹³⁹ The third fragment is found after 1 Pet. 3:12, which quotes from Ps. 33 (34):15-16.¹⁴⁰ This fragment reproduces a catena fragment of Didymus' Commentary on the Psalms.¹⁴¹

Some of the anonymous Greek fragments which are paralleled in the Latin Enarratio can also be seen to derive from the catena fragments of Didymus' Commentary on the Psalms.¹⁴² This suggests that the catenae on the Catholic Epistles were created by extracting material from catenae on other books of the Bible; there is thus no need to assume that

Didymus commented on the Catholic Epistles. A systematic study of the anonymous Greek fragments paralleled in the Enarratio would probably lead to further identifications with catena fragments from Didymus' commentaries on the Psalms and Proverbs.¹⁴³ Until such a study is made, however, it would be rash to ascribe to Didymus fragments whose origin and authorship remain uncertain. As a result, in discussing the Contra Manichaeos, little reference will be made to the Latin Enarratio or the Greek catena fragments on the Catholic Epistles.

In his Commentary on Zechariah, Didymus referred to comments he had made upon the book of Revelation (CPG 2563).¹⁴⁴ It has been suggested that one or more fragments of this lost commentary may be preserved in the scholia on the Apocalypse discovered by Diobouniotis and subsequently ascribed to Origen by Harnack.¹⁴⁵ Wohlenberg, in his review of the work of Diobouniotis and Harnack, had noted certain parallels between the scholia and the works of Didymus, but did not actually suggest that any of the scholia should be ascribed to him.¹⁴⁶ Devresse subsequently suggested that the first scholion should be attributed to Didymus but did not explain his reason for making this attribution.¹⁴⁷ Junod likewise suggested that some of the fragments in this catena were to be attributed to Didymus.¹⁴⁸ Until a systematic study of these fragments is made, it will not be possible to establish which (if any) of these fragments actually belong to Didymus. I have therefore made little reference to these fragments in analyzing the Contra Manichaeos.

From the fragments of Didymus' biblical commentaries that have survived, it is clear that Didymus was a prolific writer who commented

upon a number of books of the Bible. As we have seen, the authenticity of some of the fragments ascribed to Didymus is dubious or uncertain. Thus, in analyzing the arguments presented in the Contra Manichaeos, I will refer principally to the commentaries found at Tura and to those catena fragments which appear in critical editions.

NOTES

Chapter One

1. The principal accounts of Didymus' life and works are Palladius Historia Lausiaca 4, Jerome De viris illustribus 109, and Rufinus Historia ecclesiastica 11.7.

2. Palladius Hist. Laus. 4 (C. Butler, The Lausiatic History of Palladius, v. 2 [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1904], 19, lines 19-21). See also Butler, v. 1 (1878), 180-181; v. 2, 187 n.12.

3. *Ibid.*, v. 2, 15, lines 5-6; cf. v. 1, 180, 293-297 and v. 2, 237-243.

4. *Ibid.*, v. 2, 19, lines 21-22.

5. Jerome De vir. ill. 109.

6. Palladius Hist. Laus. 4 (Butler, v. 2, 19, lines 22-23).

7. Jerome Chronicon ad annum Abr. 2388 (=372 A.D.) (PL 27, 695; R. Helm, Eusebius Werke. Siebenter Band. Die Chronik des Hieronymus, GCS 47 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956], 246, lines 14-17).

8. Socrates Hist. eccl. 4.25 (PG 67, 525B-528B; R. Hussey, Socratis Scholastici Ecclesiastica historia, v. 2 [Oxford: E typographeo academico, 1853], 536-538); Sozomen Hist. eccl. 3.15 (J. Bidez and G.C. Hansen, Sozomenus. Kirchengeschichte, GCS 50 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1960], 125-126).

9. Sozomen Hist. eccl. 3.15 (Bidez and Hansen, 126, lines 4-7).

10. Didymus' blindness is also alluded to in Jerome Ep. 68.2 (ad Castricianum) (Jérôme Labourt, ed., Saint Jérôme. Lettres, v. 2 [Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1951], 190). The Syriac Book of Paradise (which is based principally on Palladius' account) strangely adds, "but according to what he himself related to me, 'After forty years I perceived the faces (or, external aspects) of things'" (tr. of E. A. Wallis Budge, The Book of Paradise, v. 1 [Leipzig: W. Drugulin, 1904], 136).

11. On Didymus' acquaintance with the Greek philosophical tradition, see Dieter Hagedorn and Reinhold Merkelbach, "Ein neues

Fragment aus Porphyrios 'Gegen die Christen,'" Vigiliae Christianae 20 (1966): 86-90; Gerhard Binder and Leo Liesenborghs, "Eine Zuweisung der Sentenz οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν an Prodikos von Keos," Museum Helveticum 23 (1966): 37-43 (repr. in Carl Joachim Classen, ed., Sophistik, Wege der Forschung 187 [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976], 452-462); G. Binder, L. Koenen and L. Liesenborghs, "Ein neues Epikurfragment bei Didymos dem Blinden," Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 1 (1967): 33-44; A. Heinrichs, "Philosophy, the Handmaiden of Theology," Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 9 (1968): 437-450; G. Arrighetti, "Il nuovo frammento di Epicuro presso Didimo Cieco," in Studia Florentina A. Ronconi oblata (Rome: Ed. dell' Ateneo, 1970), 21-28; M. Gronewald, "Ein neues Protagorasfragment," Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 2 (1968): 1-2; idem, "Porphyrios' Kritik an den Gleichnissen des Evangeliums," Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 3 (1968): 96; G. Binder, "Eine Polemik des Porphyrios gegen die allegorische Auslegung des Alten Testaments durch die Christen," Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 3 (1968): 81-95; idem, "Heidnische Autoritäten im Ecclesiastes-Kommentar des Didymos von Alexandrien," Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire 57 (1979): 51-56; H.J. Horn, "Antakoluthie der Tugenden und Einheit Gottes," Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum 13 (1970): 17 n.59; J. Mejer, "The Alleged New Fragment of Protagoras," Hermes 100 (1972): 175-178 (repr. in Classen, 306-311); Marc-Antoine Costa de Beauregard, "L'eusebeia à l'époque protobyzantine. Recherches sur un mot-clé de la mentalité byzantine" (Thèse de doct. de 3e cycle, École pratique des hautes études, 1979), 239-249; C. Gnilka, "Usus iustus. Ein Grundbegriff der Kirchenväter im Umgang mit der antiken Kultur," Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 24 (1980): 34-76; Jaap Mansfeld, "Protagoras on Epistemological Obstacles and Persons," in G.B. Kerferd, ed., The Sophists and Their Legacy, Hermes Einzelschriften 44 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981), 33-53; P. Woodruff, "Didymus on Protagoras and the Protagoreans," Journal of the History of Philosophy 23 (1985): 483-497; idem, "Protagoras on the Unseen. The Evidence of Didymus," in Η ΑΡΧΑΙΑ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΗ. The Sophistic Movement. Papers Read at the 1st International Symposium on the Sophistic Movement Athens 1982 (Athens: Ekdoseis Kardamitsa, 1984), 80-87; A. Angeli, "Accessione a Idomeneo," Bolletino del Centro internazionale per lo studio dei papiri Ercolanesi 14 (1984): 147; Francesco Adorno, "Protagora nel IV secolo d. C. Da Platone a Didimo Cieco," in Protagora, Antifonte, Posidonio, Aristotele. Saggio su frammenti inediti e nuove testimonianze da papiri (Florence: Olschki, 1986), 9-60; Philip Sellew, "Achilles or Christ? Porphyry and Didymus in Debate over Allegorical Interpretation," Harvard Theological Review 82 (1989): 79-100; Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini (CPF), v. 1* (Florence: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 1989), 168, 282-287, 289-306, 313-316, 374-378, 380-381, 390-392; v. 1** (1992), 163-164, 467, 490-491; Anne Browning Nelson, "The Classroom of

Didymus the Blind" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Michigan, 1995), 83-114, 117-119, 132-139.

12. See Nelson, 139-154.

13. See Nelson, 173-178.

14. See, for example, Comm. Ps. 32:2 (PG 39, 1322D14-1324A4; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 275, lines 9-11).

15. See Nelson, 178-180.

16. See, for example, Comm. Zech.T. 4.19-5.7 (1.17-19); Comm. Gen. 1:14 (PG 39, 1112A7-11)=Comm. Gen. T. 35.15ff.; Comm. Job 1:2 (PG 39, 1120C1-9); Comm. Ps. 6:1 (PG 39, 1176A4-12; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 135, lines 13-19); 28:1 (PG 39, 1309C3-15; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 259, lines 7-14); 32:2-4 (PG 39, 1324A8-B1; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 275, lines 17-20); 36:37 (PG 39, 1341A9-B2; Mühlenberg, v.1, 305, lines 1-7); 50:1 (PG 39, 1396B7-D1; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 369, lines 12-29). See also the discussion of Nelson, 154-173, 196-198.

17. The role of memory in the acquisition of learning is emphasized by Didymus in a fragment quoted in Evagrius Ponticus' Gnostikos, which was reproduced in Socrates Hist. eccles. 4.23 (PG 67, 520C6-15; Hussey, v. 2, 529, line 41-530, line 50). See Antoine Guillaumont and Claire Guillaumont, Évagre le Pontique. Le gnostique, SC 356 (Paris: Cerf, 1989), 186-189; compare ps.-Origen (=Evagrius) Sel. Ps. 138:16 (PG 12, 1661C14-D8).

18. See Comm. Ps. 23:10 (PG 39, 1297D1-5; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 243, lines 8-11); Comm. Ps.T. 10.16-17; 87.18-19; Comm. Zech.T. 341.13 (4.254); Leipoldt, 46, 56; Bardy, 186-189; K. Holl, "Über die Gregor von Nyssa zugeschriebene Schrift Adversus Arium et Sabellium," in his Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte, v. 2 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1928; repr. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964), 302; A. Gesché, La christologie du "Commentaire sur les Psaumes" découvert à Toura, Univ. cathol. Lov. Dissert. ad grad. mag. in s. Theologia series 3 t. 7 (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1962), 398-399; Jürgen Dummer, "Angaben der Kirchenväter über das Koptische," in Peter Nagel, ed., Probleme der koptischen Literatur, Wissenschaftliche Beiträge der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle/Wittenberg (Halle: Institut für Byzantinistik, 1968), 30-31; W.A. Bienert, Allegoria und Anagoge bei Didymos dem Blinden von Alexandria, PTS 13 [Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1972], 26 n.122; Bärbel Kramer and Johannes Kramer, "Les éléments linguistiques hébreux chez Didyme l'Aveugle," in ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΙΝΑ. Hellenisme, judaïsme et christianisme à Alexandrie. Mélanges offerts au

P. Claude Mondésert (Paris: Cerf, 1987), 313-323; Nelson, 151-153, 192-195.

19. In Apol. c. Ruf. 3.34 (PL 23, 451A; P. Lardet, Saint Jérôme. Apologie contre Rufin, SC 303 [Paris: Cerf, 1983], 178) Jerome mentions that the recension of Hesychius was in use in Egypt; for the debate over the identity and nature of this recension, see F.E. Deist, Towards the Text of the Old Testament, tr. W. K. Winckler (Pretoria: N.G. Kerkboekhandel Transvaal, 1981), 172. See also Louis Doutreleau, Didyme l'Aveugle. Sur Zacharie, v. 1, SC 83 (Paris: Cerf, 1962), 45-50; Aloys Kehl, Der Psalmenkommentar von Tura. Quaternio IX (Pap. Colon. Theol. 1), Papyrologica Coloniensia I (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964), 32-38 (with the review by R. Hanhart in Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen 219 [1967]: 165-170); N. Fernández Marcos, "El texto bíblico de Dídimo en el comentario a Zacarias del papiro de Tura," Sefarad 36 (1976): 267-284. Regarding the Gospel text used by Didymus, see W.C. Linss, "The Four Gospel Text of Didymus the Blind" (Diss., Boston Univ. School of Theology, 1955); C. M. Martini, "Is There a Late Alexandrian Text of the Gospels?" New Testament Studies 24 (1978): 285-296; Bart D. Ehrman, "The Gospel Text of Didymus: A Contribution to the Study of the Alexandrian Text" (Diss., Princeton Theol. Seminary, 1985); idem, Didymus the Blind and the Text of the Gospels (Decatur, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1986); idem, "The Use of Group Profiles for the Classification of New Testament Documentary Evidence," Journal of Biblical Literature 106 (1987): 465-486.

20. See Comm. Zech.T. 341.15-21(4.254-255); Comm. Prov. 1:6 (PG 39, 1624A10-B1); and the passages collected by Bardy, 188-189 n. Jerome (Apol. c. Rufin. 2.34 [PL 23, 456A; Lardet, 196]) also alluded to Didymus' use of other Greek translations of the Old Testament.

21. See Bienert; Jo Tigcheler, Didyme l'Aveugle et l'exégèse allégorique. Étude sémantique de quelques termes exégétiques importants de son commentaire sur Zacharie, Graecitas Christianorum Primaeva 6 (Nijmegen: Dekker en van de Vegt, 1977); and M. Simonetti, "Lettera e allegoria nell'esegesi veterotestamentaria di Didimo," Vetera Christianorum 20 (1983): 341-389; Sellew; and P.F. Beatrice, "Didyme l'Aveugle et la tradition de l'allégorie," in G. Dorival and A. Le Bouleuc, Origeniana Sexta (Louvain: Peeters, 1995), 579-590.

22. Rufinus, Hist. eccl. 2.7 (PL 21, 516-517; Eduard Schwartz and Theodor Mommsen, Eusebius Werke. Zweiter Band. Die Kirchengeschichte. Zweiter Teil, GCS 92 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1908], 1012-1013); tr. of Francis X. Murphy, Rufinus of Aquileia (345-411). His Life and Works (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1945), 46. Cf. Sozomen Hist. eccl. 3.15.

23. The different views concerning the nature and function of the catechetical school at Alexandria have been discussed by H.E.F. Guerike, De schola. quae Alexandriae floruit, catechetica commentatio historica et theologica, 2 vols. (Halle: E libraria Gebaueria, 1825); G. Bardy, "Pour l'histoire de l'école d'Alexandrie," Vivre et penser 2 (1942): 80-109; Robert L. Wilken, "Alexandria: A School for Training in Virtue," in Patrick Henry, ed., Schools of Thought in the Christian Tradition (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 15-30; A. Le Boulleuc, "L'école d'Alexandrie. De quelques aventures d'un concept historiographique," in ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΙΝΑ, 403-417; Annick Martin, Athanase d'Alexandrie et l'Église d'Égypte au IVe siècle (328-373) (Rome: École française de Rome, 1996), 135 n.73.

24. The fragment in question appears in Oxford, Bodleian, Barocc. gr. 142 (14 c.), f. 216. This fragment was first edited by Henry Dodwell (Dissertationes in Irenaeum [Oxford: Ex Theatro Sheldoniano, 1689], app., 488) and later reprinted by Mingarelli, whose remarks were in turn reprinted by Migne (PG 39, 229 n. 11).

25. See Sozomen Hist. eccl. 3.14.

26. Didymus also makes surprisingly few references to Athanasius; see Comm. Zech.T. 64.28-29 (1.286) for one possible allusion.

27. Palladius (Hist. Laus. 4; Butler, v. 2, 20, lines 5-6) speaks rather vaguely of Didymus' κέλλα or κελλίον, which can mean a room or chamber as well as a monastic cell.

28. See Rufinus Hist. eccl. 2.7 (PL 21, 517); Jerome Ep. 68.2 (PL 22, 652-653; Labourt, v. 3 [1953], 190); Palladius Hist. Laus. 4 (Butler, v. 2, 20, lines 6-10); Socrates Hist. eccl. 4.25; and Sozomen Hist. eccl. 3.15. Socrates describes this encounter only as taking place "long before the reign of Valens," i.e. some time prior to 364. As Samuel Rubenson (The Letters of St. Antony: Monasticism and the Making of a Saint [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1995], 42,45) points out, the index to Athanasius' festal letters mentions a visit of Antony to Alexandria in 338; see Annik Martin and Micheline Albert, Histoire "Acéphale" et Index syriaque des Lettres festales d'Athanase d'Alexandrie, SC 317 (Paris: Cerf, 1985), 237, 286 n.32. This is possibly to be identified with the visit described in Vita Antonij 69-71; see Martin, Athanase, 486 n.131. It is interesting that Palladius has Didymus say, "The Blessed Antony entered this cell a third time (τρίτου) when visiting me..." (tr. of Robert T. Meyer, Palladius: The Lausiaca History [London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1965], 35). The index to Athanasius' festal letters asserts that Antony spent only two days in Alexandria; it is therefore unclear whether the three encounters with Didymus took place during the same visit to

Alexandria or whether Antony visited Alexandria more than once during Didymus' adult life.

29. Palladius Hist. Laus. 11 (Butler, v. 2, 34, lines 5-8; tr. of Meyer, 47). Instead of "6,000,000" (μυριάδας ἑξακοσίας), the Syriac Book of Paradise (which draws upon Palladius) reads "10,600"; see Budge, 154. See also Sozomen Hist. eccl. 6.30, which presents an abbreviated version of Palladius' account.

30. This description of Didymus appears in the fragment of Evagrius' Gnostikos reproduced in Socrates Hist. eccles. 4.23, to which I have already alluded in a previous note. Regarding Didymus' influence upon Evagrius, see M. Villier, "Aux sources de la spiritualité de Saint Maxime: les oeuvres d'Évagre le Pontique," Revue d'ascétique et de mystique 11 (1930): 156-184, 239-268.

31. M. van Parys, "La lettre de saint Arsène," Irénikon 54 (1981): 62-86.

32. J. Mark Sheridan, "The Homilies of Rufus of Shotep on the Gospels of Matthew and Luke" (Ph.D. diss., Catholic Univ. of America, 1990). Sheridan does not attempt to study this dependence in detail. Particularly remarkable is Rufus' use of the peculiar anthropology which was advocated by Origen and Didymus and will be discussed in Chapter Three below. Thus, for example, Rufus interpreted Gen. 6:1-4 in terms of the descent of spiritual beings into fleshly bodies as a result of their passion for material things (Sheridan, 285), a view discussed by Didymus in his Commentary on Genesis. Rufus also cited Job 14:4 and used the word τῶλμ (=Grk. ῥύπος) found there to designate the soiling inherited by all who are born of carnal generation and bear a fleshly body (ibid., 260); he then argued that the flesh of Christ, by virtue of its unique manner of generation, was able to be consubstantial with the flesh of other human beings yet exempt from the soiling that attached to the latter (ibid., 318). As we shall see in Chapter Three, this is precisely the position taken by Origen and Didymus.

33. Didymus' account of the ascetic life has not yet received the attention it deserves. See, however, the interesting preliminary work by E.L. Heston, "The Spiritual Life and the Role of the Holy Ghost in the Sanctification of the Soul, as Described in the Works of Didymus of Alexandria" (Diss., Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1938); T. Barosse, "The Unity of the Two Charities in Greek Patristic Exegesis," Theological Studies 15 (1954): 355-388; Everett Ferguson, "The Active and Contemplative Lives: The Patristic Interpretation of Some Musical Terms," in E. Livingstone, ed., Studia Patristica 16, pt. 2, TU 129 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1985), 15-23; James Leo Garrett, Jr., "The Priesthood

of All Christians: From Cyprian to John Chrysostom," Southwestern Journal of Theology 30 (1988): 22-33; G. Bentivegna, "L'effusion de l'Esprit Saint chez les Pères grecs," Nouvelle revue théologique 113 (1991): 690-707; S. A. Mousalimas, "'Ecstasy' in Epiphanius of Constantia (Salamis) and Didymus of Alexandria," in E. Livingstone, ed., Studia Patristica 25, TU 27 (Louvain: Peeters, 1993), 434-437.

34. Palladius Hist. Laus. 4 (Butler, v. 2, 20, line 12- 21, line 2; tr. of Meyer, 36); cf. Sozomen Hist. eccl. 6.2. This may have been part of Jerome's motivation in ascribing to Didymus the titles of "the seer", "the seeing prophet" and "a prophet and apostolic man"; see Jerome's prologues to his Comm. in Epist. ad Gal. (PL 26, 333A) and his translations of Origen's Hom. in Jer. et Ezech. (PL 25, 583D) and Didymus' De Spiritu Sancto (PG 39, 1033A; PL 23, 109A) and compare Rufinus Apol. 1.43; 2.12; 2.25. Similar supernatural announcements of Julian's death are found in Theodoret Hist. eccl. 3.19 (regarding the monk Julianus Sabas) and the Epistula Ammonis 34 (regarding the monks Theodore and Pammon, who relate the matter to Athanasius); see James E. Goehring, The Letter of Ammon and Pachomian Monasticism, PTS 27 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 156 (lines 19-27), 181, 291. The death of a prominent person being accompanied by a contemporaneous vision or supernatural announcement is found in other Egyptian monastic literature of the period; see for example, Ep. Ammonis 25 (Goehring, 148, lines 9-11) and Vita Antonii 60. For the development of legends surrounding the death of Julian, see the literature cited in Polymnia Athanassiadi-Fowden, Julian and Hellenism: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 227 n. 111.

35. For Didymus' opposition to Arianism, see Socrates Hist. eccl. 4.26; Didymus' opposition to the teachings of Eunomius is noted by Jerome De vir. ill. 120. Jerome (Chronicon ad annum Abr. 2388) and Sozomen (Hist. eccl. 6.20) suggest that Didymus had become a prominent figure in the struggle against Arianism during the reign of Valens, particularly around 373, when Lucius became the Arian bishop of Alexandria and launched a vigorous persecution of those who supported the Nicæan cause.

36. In Ep. 84.3 (ad Pammachium) (Labourt, v. 4 [1954], 127) and Apol. c. Rufin. 3.13 (PL 23, 467B; Lardet, 248), Jerome asserted that Didymus' teaching was contrary to that of Apollinaris. Didymus' response to Apollinarianism is briefly discussed in the standard works on Didymus' Christology. See Louis Béranger, "Études sur la christologie du De Trinitate attribué à Didyme l'Aveugle" (Diss., Lyons, Facultés catholiques, 1960); idem, "L'âme humaine de Jésus dans la christologie du De Trinitate attribué à Didyme l'Aveugle," Revue des sciences religieuses 36 (1962), 255-267; A. Gesché, "L'âme humaine de Jésus

dans la christologie du IV^e siècle. Le témoignage du Commentaire sur les Psaumes découvert à Toura," Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique 54 (1959): 385-425; idem, "Un document nouveau sur la christologie du IV^e siècle: le Commentaire sur les Psaumes découvert à Toura," in F.L. Cross, ed., Studia Patristica 3, pt. 1, TU 78 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961), 205-213; Alois Grillmeier, "Ho kuriakos anthropos: eine Studie zu einer christologischen Bezeichnung der Väterzeit," Traditio 33 (1977): 1-63, Theological Studies 38 (1977), 275-293; R. Lorenz, "Die Christusseele im Arianischen Streit. Nebst einigen Bemerkungen zur Quellenkritik des Arius und zur Glaubwürdigkeit des Athanasius," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 94 (1983): 1-51; Alain Le Boulluec, "Controverses au sujet de la doctrine d'Origène sur l'âme du Christ," in L. Lies, ed., Origeniana Quarta (Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1987), 223-237. See also the passages listed in Nelson, 189. A fragmentary dialogue between Didymus and a heretic (possibly an Apollinarian) is found in a sixth-century manuscript from Tura. See B. Kramer, "Protokoll eines Dialogs zwischen Didymos dem Blinden und einem Ketzler," Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 32 (1978): 201-211; idem, Kleine Texte aus dem Tura-Fund, PTA 34 (Bonn: Habelt, 1985), 107-117.

37. See Nelson (189-191) for a list of Didymus' references to heretics in the Tura papyri. See also S. Brock, "Didymus the Blind on Bardaisan," Journal of Theological Studies 22 (1971): 530-531. Didymus' references to Montanist teaching in Comm. Act. Apost. 10:10 and Comm. 2 Cor. 5:12 appear in English translation in Ronald E. Heine, The Montanist Oracles and Testimonia, North American Patristic Society Patristic Monograph Series 14 (Macon, Georgia: Mercer Univ. Press, 1989), 146-149; see also the discussion of Mousalimas.

38. Didymus also influenced the Latin exegetical and theological tradition; see T. Schermann, Die Gottheit des Heiligen Geistes nach den griechischen Vätern des 4. Jahrhunderts (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1901), 189-223; idem, "Lateinische Parallelen zu Didymus," Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und für Kirchengeschichte (1902): 232-242; E. Stolz, "Didymus, Ambrosius, Hieronymus," Theologische Quartalschrift 87 (1905), 371-401; G. Bardy, "Post apostolos ecclesiarum magister," Revue de moyen age latin 6 (1950): 313-316; Berthold Altaner, "Augustinus und Didymus der Blinde: eine quellenkritische Untersuchung," Vigiliae Christianae 5 (1951): 116-120 (reprinted in his Kleine patristische Schriften, TU 83 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1967], 297-301); P. Hadot, "Une source de l'Apologia David d'Ambroise, les commentaires de Didyme et d'Origène sur le psaume 50," Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 60 (1976): 205-225; P. Hadot and M. Cordier, Ambroise de Milan. Apologie de David, SC 239 (Paris: Cerf, 1977); P. Nautin, "Le premier échange épistolaire entre Jérôme et Damase: lettres réelles ou fictives," Freiburger Zeitschrift für

Philosophie und Theologie 30 (1983): 331-334; idem, "L'activité littéraire de Jérôme de 387 à 392," Revue de théologie et de philosophie 115 (1983): 247-259; M. Simonetti, "Sulle fonti del Commento a Isaia di Girolamo," Augustinianum 24 (1984): 451-469; Sandro Leanza, "Sulle fonti del Commentario all' Ecclesiaste di Girolamo," Annali di storia dell' esegesi 3 (1986): 173-199; R. Gryson and D. Szmatala, "Les commentaires patristiques sur Isaïe d'Origène à Jérôme," Revue des études Augustiniennes 36 (1990): 1-41; Johann Ignaz Pock, Sapientia Solomonis: Hieronymus' Exegese des Weisheits-buches im Licht der Tradition, Dissertationen der Karl-Franzens-Universität (Graz) 89 (Graz: Verlag für die Technische Universität, 1992); Leo J. Elders, "Thomas Aquinas and the Fathers of the Church," in Irena Backus, ed., The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists, v. 1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), 347, 353; Nicholas Staubach, "The Importance of the Fathers for the Devotio Moderna," in Backus, v. 2, 431.

39. See O. Guéraud, "Papyrus découverts à Toura en 1941," Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions (1946): 367-379; idem, "Note préliminaire sur les papyrus d'Origène découverts à Toura," Revue de l'histoire des religions 131 (1946): 85-108; B. Altaner, "Ein grösser Aufsehen erregender patrologischer Papyrusfund," Theologische Quartalschrift 127 (1947): 332-333; O. Cullmann, "Die neuesten Papyrusfunde von Origenestexten und gnostischen Schriften," Theologische Zeitschrift 5 (1949): 153-157; E. Klostermann, "Der Papyrusfund von Tura," Theologische Literaturzeitung 73 (1948): 47-50; J. de Ghellinck, "Récentes découvertes de littérature chrétienne antique," Nouvelle revue théologique 71 (1949): 85-86; H.C. Puech, "Écrits théologiques restitués à Didyme d'Alexandrie," Revue de l'histoire des religions 128 (1944): 184-185; idem, "Les nouveaux écrits d'Origène et de Didyme découverts à Toura," Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses 31 (1951): 293-329; Louis Doutreleau and Jean Aucagne, "Que savons-nous aujourd'hui de papyrus de Toura?" Recherches de science religieuse 43 (1955): 161-193; L. Koenen and L. Doutreleau, "Nouvelle inventaire des papyrus de Toura," Recherches de science religieuse 55 (1967): 547-564; L. Koenen and W. Müller-Wiener, "Zu den Papyri aus dem Arsenioskloster bei Tura," Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 2 (1968): 41-63; L. Moraldi, "Opere esegetiche di Didimo il Cieco nei papiri di Tura," Athenaeum 48 (1970): 401-407; idem, "Dai papiri di Tura e di Afroditopoli allo Pseudo-Filone," Athenaeum 51 (1973): 402-409; K. Treu, "Christliche Papyri II," Archiv für Papyrusforschung 20 (1970): 145-152; idem, "Papyri und Patristik," Kairos 16 (1974): 107-108; idem, "Christliche Papyri V," Archiv für Papyrusforschung 24-25 (1976): 253-261; Elie D. Moutsoulas, "La découverte de Toura en Égypte et son importance," Theologia 51 (1980): 722-733; G.H.R. Horsley, New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity: A Review of the Greek

Inscriptions and Papyri Published in 1979 (North Ryde: Macquarie Univ. Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, 1987), 196-198; Kurt Aland and Hans-Odo Rosenbaum, Repertorium der griechischen christlichen Papyri II. Kirchenväter-Papyri. Teil I. Beschreibungen, PTA 42 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995), LXXV-LXXVIII, 57-164.

40. Regarding the catena fragments ascribed to Didymus, see J. A. Fabricius and G. C. Harless, Bibliotheca graeca sive notitia scriptorum veterum graecorum, v. 8 (Hamburg: C. E. Bohn, 1802), 637-700; G. Karo and J. Lietzmann, "Catenarum graecarum catalogus," Nachrichten von der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philologisch-historische Klasse (1902): 1-66, 299-350, 559-620; Robert Devreesse, "Chaînes exégétiques grecques," in L. Pirot, ed., Dictionnaire de la Bible. Supplément, v. 1 (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1928), 1084-1233; M. Geerard, Clavis Patrum Graecorum. Volumen IV: Concilia. Catenae (Turnhout: Brepols, 1980); and Robert E. Sinkewicz, Manuscript Listings for the Authors of the Patristic and Byzantine Periods, Greek Index Project Series 4 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1992).

41. Jerome, Ep. 73.2 (ad Evangelium Presbyterum)(PL 22, 677; Labourt, v. 4 [1954], 20, lines 10-12).

42. See Robert Devreesse, "Anciens commentateurs grecs de l'Octateuque," Revue biblique 44 (1935): 181-186; idem, Les anciens commentateurs grecs de l'Octateuque et des Rois, Studi e Testi 201 (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1959), 167-172. See also the critical editions of the catena fragments in Françoise Petit, Catenae graecae in Genesim et in Exodum I. Catena Sinaitica, CCSG 2 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1977), 40, 49, 50, 56, 58, 64, 104, 125, 132, 187, 197, 252; idem, "L'édition des chaînes exégétiques grecques sur la Genèse et l'Exode," Muséon 91 (1978): 189-194; idem, La chaîne sur la Genèse. Édition intégrale I. Chapitres 1 à 3, Traditio Exegetica Graeca 1 (Louvain: Peeters, 1991), 11-12, 42-44, 53, 82-83, 89-92, 116-117, 243-244, 252-253, 256-257, 262-263, 265-267, 269, 276, 290-292, 304 (=fr. 15, 67, 68, 70, 84, 103, 112, 113, 117, 156, 158, 359, 378, 384, 397, 402, 404, 409, 423, 452, 453, 476); idem, La chaîne sur la Genèse. Édition intégrale II. Chapitres 4 à 11, Traditio Exegetica Graeca 2 (Louvain: Peeters, 1993), 4-6, 23-24, 32, 37-38, 43, 53-54, 58, 79, 86, 89-96, 99-102, 105-106, 110-112, 116, 126, 129-130, 135-136, 153-154 (=fr. 482, 483, 486, 522, 524, 540, 549, 552, 560, 578, 587, 622, 635, 641, 643, 645, 651, 654, 659, 660, 661, 662, 667, 676, 678, 680b, 685, 698, 705, 714, 746); idem, La chaîne sur la Genèse. Édition intégrale III. Chapitres 12 à 28, Traditio Exegetica Graeca (Louvain: Peeters, 1995), 5-7, 9-13, 62-65, 68, 70-71, 73-76, 78, 82, 90 (=fr. 878, 880, 881, 886, 888, 889, 890, 892, 970, 973, 978, 983, 990, 993, 997, 1005, 1020).

43. See Doutreleau and Aucagne, 165-166; Koenen and Doutreleau, 556-557.

44. Pierre Nautin and Louis Doutreleau, Didyme l'Aveugle. Sur la Genèse, 2 vols., SC 233-234 (Paris: Cerf, 1976-1978). See also J.C.M. van Winden, "Didyme l'Aveugle sur la Genèse 1,10: À propos d'une première édition," Vigiliae Christianae 32 (1978): 60-65; J.H. Crehan, "Eucharistic Epiklesis: New Evidence and a New Theory," Theological Studies 41 (1980): 698-712; Gerd I. Swensson, "God's Ikon in Man's History. A Study of Exegesis, Doctrine and Spiritual Teaching in the Commentary on Genesis by Didymus of Alexandria, I-II" (M. Phil. thesis, Heythrop College [London], 1985); Joseph Calleja, "Gen. 1,26s in Filone, nelle Omelie di Origene e nel Commentario in Genesim di Didimo il Cieco," Melita theologica 39 (1988): 91-102; Émilien Lamirande, "Le masculin et le féminin dans la tradition alexandrine. Le commentaire de Didyme l'Aveugle sur la 'Genèse,'" Science et esprit 41 (1989): 137-165; Clemens Scholten, Antike Naturphilosophie und christliche Kosmologie in der Schrift De opificio mundi des Johannes Philoponos, PTS 45 (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1996), 19, 92, 98, 186-188, 235, 278.

45. These fragments deal with Ex. 24:10; 33:11,13,19,23; 34:2,3. Devreesse (Octateuque, 172 n.3) adds a further fragment on Ex. 30:11.

46. Didymus Comm. Zech.T. 68.29-30 (1.303); compare Comm. Ps. 3:5 (PG 39, 1164B5-11; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 126, lines 1-4); 67:16 (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 68, lines 16-18).

47. Jerome De vir. ill. 109; Ep. 112.20 (ad Augustinum)(PL 22, 929; Labourt, v. 6 [1958], 40, lines 3-4). The book-list (P. Prag. I 13) has been briefly described by Karl Wessely ("Quelques pièces récemment publiées de ma collection papyrologique," Chronique d'Égypte 6 [1931]: 367-369) and recently reedited by R. Dostálová in R. Pintaudi, R. Dostálová and L. Vidman, Papyri graecae Wessely Pragenses (PPrag. I) (Florence: Gonnelli, 1988), 171-174.

48. Ekkehard Mühlenberg, Psalmenkommentare aus der Katenenüberlieferung, 3 vols. (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1975-1978). See the review by H. de Riedmatten, "Une édition des fragments exégétiques de Didyme et d'Apollinaire sur le Psautier," Aevum 52 (1978): 228-234. See also Luciana Tuccari, "Il Salterio A.γ.II della Biblioteca di Grottaferrata," Annali di storia dell'esegesi 3 (1986): 65-70.

49. M. Harl and G. Dorival, La chaîne palestinienne sur le psaume 118. Origène, Eusèbe, Didyme, Apollinaire, Athanase, Théodoret, SC 189-190 (Paris: Cerf, 1972). See also Carmelo Curti, "Tre frammenti esegetici su Ps. 124 nei mss. poziori della catena palestinese," in

Salvatore Martorana, ed., Annuario scolastico del novantennio 1897-1987 (Noto [prov. di Siracusa]: Liceo-Ginnasio Statale A. di Rudini, 1988), 71-79.

50. Some early arguments for the attribution of the work to Didymus were offered by Doutreleau and Aucagne (166) and Gesché (Christologie, 334-343). The attribution of the commentary to Didymus was supported by Penelope Photiades, "Notes sur un commentaire paléochrétien," Nuovo Didaskaleion 12 (1962): 49-53 (reprinted in Oikumene. Studi palaeochristiani in onore del Concilio Ecumenico Vaticano II [Catania: Centro di studi sull'antico cristianesimo, Univ. di Catania, 1964], 55-59) and Kehl. Kehl provided an edition of Comm. Ps.T. 129-144 and a detailed analysis of parallels in content between the Tura commentary and the catena fragments on the Psalms ascribed to Didymus; see the discussion of Kehl's work by R. Merkelbach, "Konjekturen und Erläuterungen zum Psalmenkommentar des Didymos," Vigiliae Christianae 20 (1966): 214-226 and M.J. Rondeau, "À propos d'une édition de Didyme l'Aveugle," Revue des études grecques 81 (1968): 385-400.

51. See L. Doutreleau, A. Gesché and M. Gronewald, Psalmenkommentar (Tura-Papyrus), I: Kommentar zu Psalm 20-21, PTA 7 (Bonn: Habelt, 1969); M. Gronewald, Psalmenkommentar (Tura-Papyrus), II: Kommentar zu Psalm 22-26,10, PTA 4 (Bonn: Habelt, 1968); A. Gesché and M. Gronewald, Psalmenkommentar (Tura-Papyrus), III: Kommentar zu Psalm 29-34, PTA 8 (Bonn: Habelt, 1969); M. Gronewald, Psalmenkommentar (Tura-Papyrus), IV: Kommentar zu Psalm 35-39, PTA 6 (Bonn: Habelt, 1969); idem, Psalmenkommentar (Tura-Papyrus), V: Kommentar zu Psalm 40-44,4, PTA 12 (Bonn: Habelt, 1970); idem, "Didymos der Blinde, Psalmenkommentar (Nachtrag der Seiten 248/249 des Tura-Papyrus)," Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 46 (1982): 97-111. Comments of Didymus on Ps. 28 have been edited and translated into English; see Thomas W. Mackay and C. Wilfred Griggs, "The Recently Discovered Papyrus Leaves of Didymus the Blind," Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists 20 (1983): 59-60 and Thomas W. Mackay, "Didymos the Blind on Psalm 28 (LXX): Text from Unpublished Leaves of the Tura commentary," in E. Livingstone, ed., Studia Patristica 20 (Louvain: Peeters, 1989), 40-49. See also M. Gronewald, "Εβδομήντα," Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 2 (1968): 3-4; Karen Jo Torjesen, "Interpretation of the Psalms. Study of the Exegesis of Ps. 37," Augustinianum 22 (1982): 349-355; idem, "Origen's Interpretation of the Psalms," in E. A. Livingstone, ed., Studia Patristica 17, Part 2 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), 944-958; idem, Hermeneutical Procedure and Theological Method in Origen's Exegesis, PTS 28 (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1986), 31; André Rose, "Les Psaumes et la Sainte Trinité selon la tradition," in A.M. Triacca and A. Pistoia, Trinité et liturgie:

Conférences Saint-Serge XXXe Semaine d'études liturgiques (Rome: C.L.V. Edizioni Liturgiche, 1984), 255-282; Marie-Josèphe Rondeau, Les commentaires patristiques du Psautier (IIIe-Ve siècles), Vol. I. Les travaux des Pères grecs et latins sur le Psautier. Recherches et bilan, Orientalia Christiana Analecta 219 (Rome: Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1982), 116-121; idem, Vol. II. Exégèse prosopologique et théologique, Orientalia Christiana Analecta 220 (Rome: Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1985), 223-274; Emmanuela Prinzivalli, "A scuola di esegesi: gli allievi di Didimo," Annali di storia dell'esegesi 2 (1985): 71-78; idem, "Codici interpretativi del Commento ai Salmi di Didimo," Annali di storia dell'esegesi 3 (1986): 43-56; idem, Didimo il Cieco e l'interpretazione dei Salmi, Quaderni di Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni n.s. 2 (L'Aquila-Roma: Japadre, 1988); Elisabeth Grünbeck, Christologische Schriftargumentation und Bildersprache. Zum Konflikt zwischen Metapherninterpretation und dogmatischen Schriftbeweistraditionen in der patristischen Auslegung des 44. (45.) Psalms (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 236-254. Didymus' commentaries on the Psalms are also incidentally discussed in G.C. Stead, "St. Athanasius on the Psalms," Vigiliae Christianae 39 (1985): 65-78; Mario Girardi, "Appunti per una definizione dell'esegesi allegorica di Basilio di Cesarea: le Omèlie sui Psalmi," Annali di storia dell'esegesi 10 (1993): 495-529.

52. The Tura commentary appears to present a transcript of Didymus' lectures, including a number of questions, objections and answers which are interspersed throughout the text (138.12; 140.1; 142.8,22). See Doutreleau and Aucagne, 166-167; Gesché, Christologie, 20-21; and Kehl, 25ff. The same use of questions and answers is found in the Commentary on Ecclesiastes discovered at Tura.

53. Cassiodorus Liber de institutione divinarum litterarum 5.2 (PL 70, 1116A8-11; R.A.B. Mynors, Cassiodori Senatoris Institutiones [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937], 22, lines 12-18); see P. Courcelle, Les lettres grecques en Occident: De Macrobe à Cassiodore (Paris: E. De Boccard, 1943), 319-321, 354, 373, 377, 382 n.3. The Latin translation is not extant. Didymus' commentary can be seen to have influenced the Latin exegetical tradition. Compare Didymus Comm. Prov. 30:31 (PG 39, 1644B2-13) with Fortunatianus (D. A. Wilmart, "Deux expositions d'un évêque Fortunat sur l'Évangile," Revue Bénédictine 32 [1920]: 166) and Eucherius Formulae 4 (C. Wotke, ed., Sancti Eucherii Lugdunensis, CSEL 31.1 [Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1894], 24); cf. Johannes B. Bauer, "L'exégèse patristique créatrice des symboles," in his Scholia biblica et patristica (Graz: Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt, 1972), 253 (184); idem, "Turmhahn," in Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon: Kirchlich-theologisches Handwörterbuch, 2 ed., v. 3 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962), 1522-1523.

54. Mai (PG 39, 1707-1708 n.35) suggested that Comm. 2 Cor. 5:17 (PG 39, 1705D5-7; Staab, 29, lines 16-17) refers back to Comm. Prov. 8: 22 (PG 39, 1629D2-1632B14).

55. The same fragment is ascribed to Didymus in ps.-Maximus Loci communes (PG 91, 821C5-8) and Antony Melissa (PG 136, 933D7-10); regarding the attribution of PG 95, 1297B5-10 to Didymus' commentary on Proverbs, see K. Holl, Fragmente vornicänischer Kirchenväter, TUNF 5.2 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs), 124-125 (nr. 328).

56. See Holl, 126 (nr. 334).

57. Migne (PG 87.2, 1782B8-13; 1782D1-4; 1783C10-13; 1784B6-13; 1784D5-10; 1785B2-8; 1786C11-D11; 1790C11-D4; 1791D5-13; 1793C3-1794A7; 1794C7-15; 1795A13-B1; 1795C2-13; 1795D6-10; 1796D4-5; 1797B15-C5) reprinted selections from an unpublished Latin translation of Procopius' epitome by Cordier.

58. Anastasius Sinaita, Quaestiones et responsiones 42 (PG 89, 593A-C). This commentary on Prov. 30:17-31 has been analyzed by H. Achelis, Hippolytstudien, TU 16.4 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1897], 138-157. The scholion τὰ ἔθνη-ἀγαθῶν (=N. Bonwetsch and H. Achelis, Hippolytus Werke, v. 1.2 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1897], 177, lines 18-20) is attributed to Didymus in Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1802.

59. Theodorus Peltanus, Catena graecorum patrum in Proverbia Salomonis (Antwerp: Ex typ. H. Verdussi, 1606 and 1607)(repr. Antwerp: Apud G. Bellerum, 1614). In the 1614 edition, the fragments appear on pages 6, 7, 17, 22, 28, 31, 32, 36-40, 46, 47, 48, 79, 81, 104, 111, 113, 129, 136, 155, 165, 167, 180, 228, 244, and 273.

60. Mingarelli, De Didymo commentarius (PG 39, 180B-C; 181A-B; 182C).

61. Mai, Novae patrum bibliothecae v. 7.2 (Rome: Typis Sacri Consilii Propogando Christiano Nomini, 1854), 57-71.

62. Marcel Richard, "Le commentaire du codex Marcianus gr. 23 sur Prov. XXX," in his Opera minora, v. 3 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1977), no. 84, 357-370.

63. See Jerome Comm. in Ecclesiasten (M. Adriaen, ed., S. Hieronymi presbyteri Opera 1. Opera exegetica 1, CCSL 72 [Turnhout, Brepols, 1959], 247-361). Olympiodorus' commentary can be found in Migne (PG 93,477-628).

64. See G. Binder, L. Liesenborghs, and L. Koenen, Kommentar zum Ecclesiastes. Lage 1 des Tura Papyrus (Cologne: Gouder & Hansen, 1963); L. Liesenborghs, "Kommentar zum Ecclesiastes. Lage des 22 und 23 des Tura-Papyrus" (Diss., Universität zu Köln, 1965); M. Papathomopoulos, "Didimo il Cieco. Frammento del commentario dell'Ecclesiaste-Toura VI sec. d.C.," in Papiri della Università degli Studi di Milano (P. Mil. Vogliano), v. 4 (Milan: Varese/Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1967), 7-13, Tav. 1; G. Binder and L. Liesenborghs, Kommentar zum Ecclesiastes (Tura-Papyrus). I. Kommentar zu Eccl. Kap. 1.1-2.14, PTA 25 (Bonn: Habelt, 1979); G. Binder, Kommentar zum Ecclesiastes (Tura-Papyrus). I.2: Kommentar zu Eccl. Kap. 1.1-2.14 (Erläuterungen), PTA 26 (Bonn: Habelt, 1983); M. Gronewald, Kommentar zum Ecclesiastes (Tura-Papyrus). II: Kommentar zu Eccl. Kap 3-4.12, PTA 22 (Bonn: Habelt, 1977); J. Kramer and L. Koenen, Kommentar zum Ecclesiastes (Tura-Papyrus). III: Komm. zu Eccl. Kap. 5 und 6, PTA 13 (Bonn: Habelt, 1970); J. Kramer and B. Krebber, Kommentar zum Ecclesiastes (Tura-Papyrus). IV. Kommentar zu Eccl. Kap. 7-7.18 und 7.19-8.8, PTA 16 (Bonn: Habelt, 1972); G. Binder and M. Gronewald, Kommentar zum Ecclesiastes (Tura-Papyrus). V. Kommentar zu Eccl. Kap. 9.8-10.20, PTA 24 (Bonn: Habelt, 1979); G. Binder and L. Liesenborghs, Kommentar zum Ecclesiastes (Tura-Papyrus). VI. Kommentar zu Eccl. Kap. 11 und 12, PTA 9 (Bonn: Habelt, 1969). See also J. Kramer, "Einige Bemerkungen zum dritten Band des Ekklesiastes-Kommentars des Didymos," Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 7 (1971): 188-192; Marc Hirshman, "The Greek Fathers and the Aggada on Ecclesiastes: Formats of Exegesis in Late Antiquity," in Hebrew Union College Annual 59 (1980), 137-165; Leanza, "Sulle fonti"; M. Diego Sánchez, "El 'Commentario al Ecclesiastés' de Dídimo Alejandrino," Teresianum 41 (1990): 231-242; idem, El comentario al Ecclesiastés de Dídimo Alejandrino (Rome: Teresianum, 1991); J. Ziegler, "Der Gebrauch des Artikels in der Septuaginta des Ecclesiastes," in D. Fraenkl, U. Quast, and J.W. Wevers, Studien zur Septuaginta--Robert Hanhart zu Ehren, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse 190 (1990): 83-120. The correspondence between the catena fragments and the Tura commentary is not always perfect, as has been noted by S. Leanza ("L'esegesi patristica di Qohelet: Da Melitone di Sardi alle compilazioni catenarie," in Lecture cristiane dei Libri Sapienziali: XX Incontro di studiosi dell'antichità cristiana 9-11 maggio 1991, Studi Ephemeridis "Augustinianum" [Rome: Institutum Patristicum "Augustinianum," 1992], 241-242).

65. The presence of this anti-Apollinarian polemic (Comm.Eccl T. 154; 350.8-9) has led to the suggestion that this work was composed between 377 and 381.

66. It is possible that this fragment is actually an epitome of Didymus Comm. Prov. 1:8 (PG 39, 1624D).

67. Johannes van Meurs (Meursius), Eusebii, Polychronii, Pselli in Canticum Canticorum expositiones graece (Leiden: Ex officina Elzeviriana, 1617), 19. Meursius' edition of the catena was reprinted in Giovanni Lami, ed., Joannis Meursi Operum, v. 8 (Florence: Apud Tartinium et Franchium, 1746), 129-212, where Lami also supplied a Latin translation.

68. A. Mai, Classicorum auctorum e Vaticanis codicibus editorum, v. 9 (Rome: Typis Collegii Urbani, 1837), 271.

69. Jerome De vir. ill. 109.

70. Of these fragments, the only one that is explicitly ascribed to Didymus' commentary on Job is PG 96, 141C6-7 (=PG 96, 541B4-6). The discovery of Didymus' Commentary on Job among the Tura papyri allows one to see that several other fragments ascribed to Didymus in the Sacra parallela belong to the commentary on Job: Comm. Job T. 14.24-25=PG 95, 1080C1; Comm. Job T. 49.18-22=PG 96, 361A1-3; Comm. Job T. 297.3-6=PG 96, 320D7-8; Comm. Job T. 304.34-305.2=PG 96, 141C=PG 96, 541B7-9; Comm. Job T. 375.1-33=PG 95, 1097C8-9=PG 136, 1084B1-2; see A. Heinrichs, Kommentar zu Hiob (Tura-Papyrus), I: Kommentar zu Hiob Kap. 1-4; II: Kommentar zu Kap. 5,1-6,29, PTA 1-2 (Bonn: Habelt, 1968), 15 n.12.

71. Patrick Young (Patricius Junius), Catena graecorum patrum in beatum Job (London: Ex typographio Regio, 1637), 11, 14, 17, 28, 31-34, etc.

72. One volume has already appeared: Ursula and Dieter Hagedorn, Die älteren griechischen Katenen zum Buch Hiob. Band I. Einleitung, Prologe und Epiloge, Fragmente zu Hiob 1,1-8,22, PTS 40 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994).

73. The extant portions of the commentary deal with the first half of Job: Comm. Job T. 1-192 (=Job 1:1-6:29); 209-229 (=Job 7:20-8:21); 241-396 (=Job 9:10-15:22); 401-408 (=Job 15:26-16:2). See Heinrichs, Komm. zu Hiob I; U. Hagedorn, D. Hagedorn and L. Koenen, Kommentar zu Hiob (Tura-Papyrus), III: Kap. 7:20c-11, PTA 3 (Bonn: Habelt, 1968); idem, Kommentar zu Hiob (Tura-Papyrus), IV.1: Kap. 12,1-16,8a, PTA 33.1 (Bonn: Habelt, 1985). See also R. Merkelbach, "Zum Hiobkommentar des Didymos (p. 56, 20-29)," Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 3 (1968): 191; idem, "Didymos, Hiobkommentar p.

221.32," Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 4 (1969): 134; Gerrit Wijnand, Didymus de Blinde en zijn interpretatie van het boek Job (Sneek: Doevendans, 1977); D. Hagedorn and U. Hagedorn, "Zur Katenenüberlieferung des Hiobkommentars von Didymos dem Blinden," Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists 22 (1985): 55-78; idem, Olympiodor, Diakon von Alexandria: Kommentar zu Hiob, PTS 24 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984), XVIII-XXXIII; D. Hagedorn and U. Hagedorn, "Kritisches zum Hiobkommentar Didymos' des Blinden," Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 67 (1987): 59-78; idem, "Neue Fragmente des Hiobkommentars Didymos' des Blinden?" in Mario Capasso, Gabriella Messeri Savorelli and Rosario Pintaudi, eds., Miscellanea papyrologica in occasione del bicentenario dell' edizione della Charta Borgiana, v. 1, Papyrologica Florentina 19 (Florence: Gonnelli, 1990), 245-254; Henning Graf Reventlow, "Hiob der Mann: Eine altkirchliches Ideal bei Didymus dem Blinden," in Arvid Tångberg, ed., Text and Theology: Studies in Honour of Professor dr. theol. Magne Sæbø Presented on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday (Oslo: Verbum, 1994), 213-227.

74. Jerome De vir. ill. 109; Comm. in Is., prol. (PL 24, 21; R. Gryson, P.-A. Deproost, J. Coulie and E. Crousse, eds., Commentaires de Jérôme sur le prophète Isaïe, Vetus Latina/Aus der Geschichte der lateinischen Bibel 23 [Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1993], 138, lines 90-94). This is apparently the commentary to which Didymus refers in Comm. Zech.T. 6.21-22 (1.24) (re: Is. 63:1-2); 68.30-31 (1.303) (re: Is. 40:9); 131.21-22 (2.171) (re: Is. 11:8-9!); 159.10-11 (2.285); 323.7-8 (4.179) (re: Is. 44:24); 349.21 (4.289) (re: Is. 10:10-11!); 378.20-21 (5.83) (re: Is. 11:9!); 391.10-11 (5.123). See also Simonetti, "Sulle fonti" and Gryson and Szmatala.

75. The same fragment is found in ps.-Maximus Loci communes (PG 91, 864A10-12) and also among the scholia on John Climacus in Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 410 (13 c.).

76. The same fragment is found in the florilegium of Leontius and John (PG 86.2, 2065B). There, as well in PG 95, 1169C3, it is attributed to the third section of Didymus' commentary on Isaiah.

77. This fragment (which contains a muddled reminiscence of Irenaeus Adv. haer. 3.3.4) is said to come from the sixth section of Didymus' commentary on Isaiah.

78. PG 96, 525A1-5 is said to be taken from the twelfth section (κεφάλαιον) of the work.

79. Michael Ghisler (Ghislerius), In Ieremiam prophetam commentarii (Lyons: L. Durand, 1623), v. 1, 39A (Jer. 1:4); v. 2, 704D (Jer. 31:31); 753B-C (Jer. 35:13). As Bardy (45 n.4) has noted, the fragment dealing with Jer. 31:31 does not belong to Didymus, but is a slightly abbreviated version of Asterius of Emesa Hom. 15 in Ps. 5 (PG 40, 393A10-B2).

80. M. Faulhaber, Die Prophetenkatene nach römischen Handschriften (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, 1899), 107 (cf. 100 and 123).

81. Faulhaber, 179.

82. Jerome De vir. ill. 109; Comm. in Os. proph. (PL 25, 820A3-8; M. Adriaen, ed., S. Hieronymi presbyteri Opera. Pars I. Opera exegetica 6. Commentarii in Prophetas Minores, CCSL 76 [Turnhout: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1969], 5, lines 133-137); Comm. in Zach. proph., prol. (PL 25, 1418A7-9; M. Adriaen, ed., S. Hieronymi presbyteri Opera. Pars I. Opera exegetica 6. Commentarii in Prophetas Minores, CCSL 76A [Turnhout: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1970], 748, lines 31-34); Apol. c. Ruf. 3.28 (PL 23, 500C11-12; Lardet, 292, lines 51-52). Since the book was requested by Jerome when he visited Alexandria, the commentary may have been dictated shortly afterward (386-387).

83. Jerome De vir. ill. 109; Comm. in Os. proph. (PL 25, 820A3-8; Adriaen [CCSL 76], 5, lines 133-137); Comm. in Zach. proph., prol. (PL 25, 1418A7-10; Adriaen [CCSL 76A], 748, lines 31-34).

84. L. Doutreleau, Didyme l'Aveugle. Sur Zacharie, 3 vols., SC 83-85 (Paris: Cerf, 1962); idem, "Deux pages de l'In Zachariam de Didyme l'Aveugle restitués par la lumière ultraviolette," Revue des études grecques 83 (1970): 90-93. See also L. Doutreleau, "Ce que l'on trouvera dans l'In Zachariam de Didyme l'Aveugle," in F.L. Cross, ed., Studia Patristica 3, TU 78 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961), 183-195; L. Koenen, "Ein theologischer Papyrus der Kölner Sammlung. Kommentar Didymos' des Blinden zu Zach. IX, 11 und 16," Archiv für Papyrusforschung 17 (1960): 61-105; Stephen Craig Reynolds, "Man, Incarnation and Trinity in the Commentary on Zechariah of Didymus the Blind of Alexandria" (Diss., Harvard Univ., 1966); and Fernández Marcos.

85. Comm. Zech.T. 218.10-11 (3.133) (re: Mt. 21:4); 377.19 (5.78) (re: Mt. 24:36).

86. Jerome De vir. ill. 109; Comm. Mt., prol. (PL 26, 20B15; D. Hurst and M. Adriaen, eds., S. Hieronymi presbyteri Opera. Pars I. Opera exegetica 7. Commentariorum in Mattheum libri IV, CCSL 77 [Turnhout:

Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1969], 5, lines 95-96). According to Hrabanus Maurus (Comm. in Mt. 5.18.2; PL 107, 1010A8ff.), Jerome's commentary on Mt. 18:12 (Comm. in Mt. 3; Hurst and Adriaen, 160, lines 590ff.) reproduces the interpretation of Didymus.

87. The fragments listed by Bardy (48) are in fact catena fragments on John and will be discussed below.

88. Jerome Ep. 121.6 (ad Algasiam)(PL 22, 1021; Labourt, v. 7 [1961], 32, lines 16-18).

89. The fragment appears in Latin translation in Balthasar Cordier (Corderius), Catena sexaginta quinque graecorum patrum in S. Lucam (Antwerp: Ex officina Plantiniana, 1628), 217-218. The fragment is attributed to a commentary on Proverbs by Cordier, introductory page **, verso. See J. Sickenberger, "Aus römischen Handschriften über die Lukaskatene des Niketas," Römische Quartalschrift 12 (1898): 66; idem, Die Lukaskatene des Niketas von Herakleia, TUNF 3.4 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1902).

90. The fragment is anonymous in Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Antico gr. 494 (598) (13 c.) and Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, gr. 473 (13 c.), but appears to form an integral part of a comment of Origen on Proverbs 1:6. Andreas Gallandi (Bibliotheca veterum patrum antiquorumque scriptorum ecclesiasticorum [Venice: Ex typ. J. B. Albritii Hieron fil., 1781 and 1788], v. 14, app., 25) and Delarue (reprinted in Migne, PG 13, 20-25) therefore published it under the name of Origen.

91. Jerome De vir. ill. 109.

92. J. Reuss, Johannes-Kommentare aus der griechischen Kirche, TU 89 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 177-186. See the discussion of Maurice F. Wiles, The Spiritual Gospel: The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel in the Early Church (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1960), 5, 53-54, 81, 84, 123, 139; Josep Amengual Batle, "Fe y gracia en la exégesis patristica griega de Jn 6,44-45," in Isidro M. Sans et al., Exégesis y teología, Teología Deusto 7 (Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 1975), 151-155, 202.

93. B. Krämer, Kleine Texte aus dem Tura-Fund, PTA 34 (Bonn: Habelt, 1985), 58-103.

94. Two Bohairic catena fragments, which deal with Jn. 3:25-29, are found in P. de Lagarde (=P. Bötticher), Catena in Evangelia aegyptiace quae supersunt (Göttingen: In aedibus Dieterichianis Arnoldi

Hoyer, 1886), 185, line 37-186, line 1; 186, lines 1-7. Regarding the manuscript upon which Lagarde's edition was based (Parham 102, copied in 888-889; now in the British Library, London), see George Horner, The Coptic Version of the New Testament in the Northern Dialect, v. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), XXXVII-XXXVIII, CXXX-CXL; Francisco Javier Caubet Iturbe, La cadena árabe del Evangelio de San Mateo, v. 1, Studi e Testi 254 (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1969), LI-LIV; Stephen Emmel, "Robert Curzon's Acquisition of White Monastery Manuscripts," in Marguérite Rassart-Debergh, ed., Actes du IVe Congrès Copte, Louvain-la-Neuve, 5-10 septembre 1988, v. 2 (Louvain: Peeters, 1992), 224-231.

An analysis and German translation of these two Coptic fragments can be found in A. Heinrichs, "Didymos in koptischer Übersetzung," Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 4 (1969): 219-222. Heinrichs notes that the Bohairic fragments have no parallel in the extant Greek catena fragments ascribed to Didymus, but are paralleled by Greek catena fragments ascribed to Ammonius of Alexandria (Reuss, 221 [fr. 94; 96]), who is known to have made use of Didymus' commentary (cf. J. Reuss, "Der Presbyter Ammonius von Alexandrien und sein Kommentar zum Johannes-Evangelium," Biblica 44 [1963]:163, 165).

Georg Graf (Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur. Erster Band. Die Übersetzungen, Studi e Testi 118 [Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1944; repr. 1966], 318) has noted the presence of three catena fragments ascribed to Didymus in an Arabic catena on the Gospels found in two paper mss. in the Vatican Library. The first is Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, arab. 452 (copied in 1214 at the monastery of St. John Kolobos [Kama] in the Wadi 'l-Natron); see A. Mai, Scriptorum veterum nova collectio e Vaticanis codicibus edita, v. 4 (Rome: Typis Vaticanis, 1831), 519-520; Caubet Iturbe, XXV-XVI. The second is Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, arab. 410 (13-14 c.); see Mai, Scriptorum, v. 4, 504; Graf, Geschichte, v. 1, 482; Caubet Iturbe, XXVII-XXIX. This Arabic catena is evidently a translation of a Coptic catena virtually identical to that published by Lagarde, since the numeration of the sections of the text and nearly all of the lemmata in Vat. arab. 452 correspond to what one finds in Lagarde's edition of the Coptic text.

Of these three Arabic fragments, one deals with Jn. 3:25 (Vat. arab. 452, f. 311r; 410, ff. 227v, 228r) and apparently corresponds to the Bohairic catena fragment on Jn. 3:25 mentioned above. The other two fragments deal with Jn. 1:29 and 1:32 (Vat. arab. 452, f. 302v; 410, ff. 221r,v). These have no parallel in the extant Greek catena fragments ascribed to Didymus; they also differ in content from the Coptic text published by Lagarde.

These three catena fragments are apparently found in several other Arabic paper mss. containing the Copto-Arabic catena on John discussed above:

- (a) Cairo, arab. chr. 166 (No. 1157) (= Coptic Museum, ser. 51, theol. 346) (14-15 c.), ff. 186r sq. (Jn. 1:18-34); 202r sq. (Jn. 3:22-36); see Georg Graf, Catalogue des manuscrits arabes chrétiens conservés au Caire (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1934), 71-72; Marcus Simaika Pasha and Yassa' Abd al-Masih Effendi, Catalogue of the Coptic and Arabic Manuscripts in the Coptic Museum, the Patriarchate and the Principal Churches of Cairo and Alexandria and the Monasteries of Egypt, v. 1 (Cairo: Government Press, Bulaq, 1939), 28; Caubet Iturbe, XLVII.
- (b) Cairo, arab. chr. 195 (41) (=Library of the Coptic Orthodox Patriarchate, ser. 351, theol. 26) (copied in 1735); see Graf, Catalogue, 85; Simaika Pasha, v. 2, fasc. 1, 150-151; Caubet Iturbe, XLI-XLIII.
- (c) Cairo, arab. chr. 411 (567) (=Library of the Coptic Orthodox Patriarchate, ser. 225, theol. 27) (14 c.); see Graf, Catalogue, 151; Simaika Pasha, v. 2, fasc. 1 (1942), 94; Caubet Iturbe, XXIX-XXX.
- (d) Diyarbakir, ms. 131 (copied in 1498; now in the Library of the Chaldaean Patriarchate, Baghdad); see Addai Scher, "Notice sur les manuscrits syriaques et arabes conservés à l'archevêché chaldéen de Diarbékir," Journal asiatique ser. 10, v. 10 (1907) 414; Caubet Iturbe, XLVI.
- (e) Göttingen, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, arab. 103 (orient. 125) (13-14 c.; restored and completed in 1811); see F. Wüstenfeld, "Coptisch-Arabische Handschriften der Königl. Universitäts-Bibliothek," Nachrichten von der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen 8 (1878): 294-296; Die Handschriften in Göttingen 3. Universitäts-Bibliothek. Nachlässe von gelehrte orientalische Handschriften (Berlin: Verlag von A. Bath, 1894), 359-361; Caubet Iturbe, XXX-XXXII; Stephen Emmel, "Reconstructing a Dismembered Coptic Library," in James E. Goehring et al., Gnosticism and the Early Christian World: In Honor of James M. Robinson (Sonoma, California: Polebridge Press, 1990), 149. See also the discussion of Achelis, 165-166.
- (f) Oxford, Bodleian Library, ms. Huntington 262 (16 c.); see J. Uri, Bibliothecae Bodleianae codicum manuscriptorum orientalium... catalogus. Pars prima (Oxford: E typographeo Clarendoniano, 1787), 32, no. XXVI; Graf, Geschichte, v. 1, 482; Caubet Iturbe, XXXIII-XXXVI. This is possibly the ms. described in an earlier catalogue (Catalogi librorum manuscriptorum Angliae et Hiberniae, v. 1 [Oxford: E Theatro Sheldoniano, 1697], 28, no. 5815 [69]) simply as follows: Quatuor Evangelia cum catena SS. Patrum, Arabice.
- (g) Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, arab. 55 (copied in 1619 from an exemplar dated 1288); see W. MacGuckin de Slane, Catalogue des manuscrits arabes (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1883), 12; Caubet Iturbe, XXXVIII-XLI; Gérard Troupeau, Catalogue des manuscrits arabes. Première partie. Manuscrits chrétiens. Tome I. Nos. 1-323 (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1972), 38-39.

(h) Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, arab. 93 (14 c.; copied in Egypt, probably at one of the Syrian monasteries); see Slane, 22; Troupeau, 72-73.

The three fragments transmitted in Arabic are apparently also found in two paper mss. in Karshuni, i.e. Arabic written in Syriac characters (in this case, using the serta script employed by the West Syrian Church):

(i) Birmingham, Selly Oak College, Mingana syr. 119 (copied c. 1600); see A. Mingana, Catalogue of the Mingana Collection of Manuscripts Now in the Possession of the Trustees of the Woodbroke Settlement, Selly Oak, Birmingham. Vol. I. Syriac and Garshuni Manuscripts (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 1933), 284.

(j) Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. syr. 541 (copied in 1555); see A. van Lantschoot, Inventaire des manuscrits syriaques des Fonds Vatican (490-631). Barberini Oriental et Neofiti, Studi e Testi 243 (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1965), 63; Caubet Iturbe XLIII-XLVI.

From the preliminary analysis of Caubet Iturbe (XLVIII), it appears that the following mss. are closely related: Vat. arab. 452; Vat. arab. 410; Paris, arab. 55; Vat. syr. 541. Cairo, arab. chr. 411 and Bodleian, ms. Huntington 262 also appear to be related. Finally, Göttingen, arab. 103 and Cairo, arab. chr. 195 may be related.

95. See the remarks of Johann Christoph Wolf in PG 39, 1653 n. 22.

96. J. C. Wolf, Anecdota graeca sacra et profana (Hamburg: T. C. Felginer, 1722-1724), v. 3, 92-195; v. 4, 1-113.

97. Some of these fragments are obviously inauthentic, as Bardy (50) has noted. The fragment on Acts 9:7 (PG 39, 1672A12-B14), for example, cites John Chrysostom and is therefore to be ascribed to a later writer.

98. Cramer, v. 3 (1838), 21, 25, 34, 38, 40, 46, 48, 52, 65, 66, 69, 74, 79, 90, 94, 100, 112, 116, 119, 121, 128, 132, 139, 146, 147, 152, 153, 157, 166, 167, 168, 175, 187, 189, 191, 198, 215, 216, 230, 251, 269, 291, 295, 299, 304, 307, 309, 312, 317, 320, 331, 333, 335, 337, 341, 347, 349, 367, 378, 394, 413, 431, 434, 435. The fragments previously published by Wolf can be found in Cramer, 25-175; the previously unpublished fragments can be found in Cramer, 21, 187-413. Devreesse (1207, 1209) observed that the scholion on Acts 9:7 (Cramer, 153), whose authenticity Bardy had previously questioned, is ascribed (probably correctly) to Maximus in Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Barb. gr. 582.

99. Theophylact Comm. Act. Apost. 1:25; 3:23 (PG 125, 528B; 572B [cf. Cramer, v. 3, 69, lines 22-24; PG 39, 1661C9-11]); see PG 39, 251. This commentary is also a catena, being based principally on John Chrysostom but also adding comments ascribed to Didymus, Cyril, Severus and Severianus. An anonymous edition of the Greek text and a Latin translation by Laurentius Sifanus were first published in Theophylacti Bulgariae archiepiscopi Explicationes in Acta Apostolorum (Cologne: Apud haeredes Arnoldi Birckmanni, 1567); these were reprinted in Theophylacti Bulgariae archiepiscopi Opera omnia, v. 3 (Venice: Apud J. Bertellam, 1758), from which they were reprinted by Migne (PG 125, 495ff.).

100. This fragment is also found in ps.-Maximus Loci communes (PG 91, 813C8-10) and Antony Melissa Loci communes (PG 136, 929A12-14).

101. The manuscript tradition has been analyzed in detail by Karl Staab, Die Pauluskatzen nach den handschriftlichen Quellen untersucht (Rome: Verlag des Päpstlichen Bibelinstituts, 1926), 57-83.

102. Karl Staab, Paulus-Kommentare aus der griechischen Kirche, Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen 15 (Münster i. W.: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1933), 1-6; see also Staab's analysis of the fragment on pages XIX-XX. Part of the fragment had previously been published by J.A. Cramer, Catena graecorum patrum in Novum Testamentum, v. 4 (Oxford: E Typographeo Academico, 1844), 196-197.

103. Jerome Ep. 48.3 (ad Pammachium)(PL 22, 511; Labourt, v. 2 [1951], 117); Ep. 119.5 (ad Minervium et Alexandrum monachos)(PL 22, 968-970; Labourt, v. 6 [1958], 100, line 22-103, line 27). See François Altermath, Du corps psychique au corps spirituel. Interprétation de 1 Cor. 15.35-49 par les auteurs chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1977), 152-160; J.T. Lienhard, "The Exegesis of 1 Cor. 15:24-28 from Marcellus of Ancyra to Theodoret of Cyrus," Vigiliae Christianae 37 (1983): 340-359.

104. Staab, 6-14. In his review, R. Devresse (Revue biblique 44 [1935]: 133) suggested emendations to Staab's edition. An unreliable English translation of the fragments on 1 Cor. 15 appears in A.T. Croft, "Didymus the Blind on 1 Corinthians 15" (M.A. thesis, Wilfred Laurier University, 1987).

105. See Jerome, Ep. 119.5 (ad Minervium et Alexandrum)(PL 22, 968-970; Labourt, v. 6 [1958], 100-103). This includes the citation from Didymus' exposition of 1 Cor. 15:51, which is extant in Greek (Staab, 11,

lines 1-9) and a paraphrase of his exposition of 1 Cor. 15:52-53, of which only a part is extant in Greek (Staab, 11, lines 10-20).

106. Staab, 14-44. See Erik Ten Napel, "'Third Heaven' and 'Paradise'. Some Remarks on the Exegesis of 2 Cor. 12,2-4 in Syriac," in René Lavenant, ed., V Symposium Syriacum 1988, *Orientalia Christiana Analecta* 236 (Rome: Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1990), 63.

107. Jerome Comm. in Epist. ad Gal., prol. (PL 26, 309); Ep. 112.4 (ad Augustinum) (PL 22, 918; Labourt, v. 6 [1958], 21, line 28). For the dating of Jerome's commentaries on Galatians and Ephesians to 386, see P. Nautin, "La date des commentaires de Jérôme sur les Épîtres pauliniennes," Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique 74 (1979): 1-12.

108. Jerome Apol. c. Ruf. 1.16,21; Comm. in Epist. ad Eph., prol. (PL 26. 469C11).

109. See Jerome Ep. 120.12 (ad Hedybiam)(PL 22, 1005; Labourt, v. 6 [1958], 162, lines 19-22), where the interpretation is mentioned but not ascribed to a specific author, and compare Gennadius, De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus 20 (PL 58, 985B), where the interpretation is ascribed to Didymus.

110. Reference to Didymus is conspicuously absent from Jerome's discussion of 1 Thess. 4:14-16 in Ep. 119.8 (ad Minervium et Alexandrum)(PL 22, 974; Labourt, v. 6 [1958], 109, line 21-111, line 3).

111. Staab, 44-45.

112. Leipoldt, 22; Bärbel Kramer, "Didymus von Alexandrien," in Theologische Realenzyklopädie, v. 7 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 742.

113. Cassiodorus De inst. divin. litt. 8.6 (PL 70, 1120B; Mynors, 29, line 26-30, line 2); see Courcelle, 369-371.

114. Cosmas Indicopleustes Topographia 7.68 (PG 88, 371D; Wanda Wolska-Conus, Cosmas Indicopleustès. Topographie chrétienne, v. 3, SC 197 [Paris: Cerf, 1973], 129, lines 2-4)

115. Cassiodorus, De inst. divin. litt. 8.4-7 (PL 70, 1120B; Mynors, 29, line 16-30, line 4).

116. The ms. in question is Laon (France), Bibliothèque municipale, lat. 96.

117. The Latin version was first published in Didymi Alexandrini praeceptoris divi Hieronymi in omnes epistolas canonicas brevis enarratio (Cologne: Joannes Praël, 1531).

118. The Enarratio's comments upon the Epistle of Jude have been discussed by K.H. Schelkle, "Der Judasbrief bei den Kirchenvätern," in O. Betz, M. Hengel and P. Schmidt, eds., Abraham, unser Vater. Juden und Christen im Gespräch über die Bibel. Festschrift O. Michel zum 60. Geburtstag (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1963), 405-416.

119. Wolf, Anecdota graeca, v. 4, 1-52.

120. Christian Friedrich Matthaei, S.S. Apostolorum septem epistolae catholicae...et inedita scolia graeca (Riga: Sumptibus I.F. Hartknochii, 1782), 183ff.

121. Cramer, v. 8 (1840), 2, 30, 52-53, 65 (cf. 63, 589). These fragments also appear in the Armenian catena on the Catholic Epistles recently edited by Charles Renoux (La chaîne arménienne sur les Épîtres Catholiques I. La chaîne sur l'Épître de Jacques, PO 43.1 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1985], 70, 132; II. La chaîne sur les Épîtres de Pierre, PO 44.2 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1987], 98, 122, 126).

122. Gottfried Christian Friedrich Lücke, Quaestiones ac vindiciae Didymianae (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1829-1832).

123. Louis-Sébastien Le Nain de Tillemont, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique des six premiers siècles, v. 10 (Paris: Charles Robustel, 1705), 393, 396.

124. Lücke (PG 39, 1747B-1748B) argued that in its present form, the commentary was a collection of extracts from an original larger commentary by Didymus.

125. Mai, Novae patrum bibliothecae, v. 4, 104.

126. Ceillier, 614.

127. E. Klostermann, Über der Didymus von Alexandrien in epistolas canonicas enarratio, TU 28.2 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1905).

128. See Cramer, v. 8, 2, lines 8-12.

129. Friedrich Zoepfl, Didymi Alexandrini in epistulas canonicas brevis enarratio, Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen 4.1 (Münster i. W.: Aschendorff, 1914).

130. K. Staab, "Die griechischen Katenenkommentare zu den katholischen Briefe," Biblica 5 (1924): 296-353 (esp. 314-320).

131. Devreesse, "Châines," 1226-1227.

132. Cramer, v. 8, 2, lines 8-12; Zoepfl, 1, lines 7-15; cf. Renoux, Chaine...I., 70, lines 12-15.

133. Comm. Ps. 85:2b-3 (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 155, lines 10-13); cf. Comm. Ps. T. 231.6-10.

134. Cramer, v. 8, 65, lines 10-14; Zoepfl, 31, lines 6-15; cf. Renoux, Chaine...II., 126, lines 7-12. As far as I have been able to determine, this fragment (which is ascribed to Chrysostom in Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Barb. gr. 582, f. 254v) is not attested outside the catenae on the Catholic Epistles. It is possible, however, that it has been epitomized, hindering identification of the source.

135. Zoepfl, 41.

136. Cramer, v. 8, 30, lines 16-22; cf. Renoux, Chaine...I., 132, lines 4-9.

137. Ps.-Origen Exp. Prov. 3:34 (PG 17, 169C12-13).

138. Cramer, v. 8, 52, line 28-53, line 6; in the Armenian catena published by Renoux (Chaine...II., 98, lines 11-18), this fragment has been summarized and slightly adapted. It is interesting that, in treating 1 Pet. 2:7, the Latin Enarratio translates not this present fragment, but another (anonymous) Greek fragment.

139. Robert Devreesse, Les anciens commentateurs grecs des Psaumes, Studi e Testi 264 (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1970), 132.

140. Cramer, v. 8, 63, lines 22-26; this fragment is attributed to Didymus in Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Coislin. 25, as Cramer (589 [on 63, line 22]) has noted. It is also attributed to Didymus in the Armenian catena published by Renoux (Chaine...II., 122, lines 3-6).

141. Comm. Ps. 33:15-16 (PG 39, 1529B14-C4; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 285, lines 8-14).

142. Thus, for example, Comm. 1 Jn. 3:8 (Zoepfl, 58, lines 8-10) is a slightly abbreviated version of Didymus Comm. Ps. 72:27-28 (PG 39, 1472A3-5; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 108, lines 15-16)=ps.-Origen Fr. Ps. 72:27 (J.-B. Pitra, Analecta sacra spicilegio Solesmensi parata, v. 3 [Venice: E typographeo Veneto Mechitaristarum Sancti Lazari, 1883], 97, lines 16-17).

143. There are some anonymous fragments whose style is similar to that of Didymus (Zoepfl, 7, lines 18-32; 14, line 23-15, line 4; 20, lines 18-23; 27, lines 5-23; 28, line 16-29, line 19; etc.).

144. Didymus Comm. Zech.T. 200.14-20 (3.73).

145. Constantin Diobouniotis and Adolf Harnack, Der Scholien-Kommentar des Origenes zur Apokalypse Johannis, TU 38.3 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1911). Important emendations to the text are found in the reviews of T. Schermann in Theologische Revue 11 (1912): 29; J. Armitage Robinson in Journal of Theological Studies 13 (1911-1912): 295-297; G. Wohlenberg in Theologisches Literaturblatt 33 (1912): 25-30, 49-57, 217-220; O. Stählin in Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift 32 (1912): 132-140; E. Klostermann in Theologische Literaturzeitung 37 (1912), 73-74; F. Diekamp in Theologische Revue 11 (1912): 51-55; C.H. Turner, "The text of the newly discovered scholia of Origen on the Apocalypse," Journal of Theological Studies 13 (1912): 386-397; idem, "Origen Scholia in Apocalypsin," Journal of Theological Studies 25 (1923-1924): 1-16; A. de Boysson, "Avons-nous un commentaire d'Origène sur l'Apocalypse?" Revue biblique 10 (1913): 555-567; E. Skard, "Zum Scholien-Kommentar des Origenes zur Apokalypse Johannis," Symbolae Osloenses 15-16 (1936): 204-208; P. Nautin, Origène: Sa vie et son oeuvre (Paris: Beauchesne, 1977), 449. This commentary, whose text is relatively corrupt, is a collection of citations from various authors of different periods which has been compiled in a rather artless fashion. The authors and works from which these scholia have been drawn have, for the most part, not yet been identified. Scholion 5 is derived from Clement of Alexandria Strom. 4.25.156.2-4.25.157.2 (O. Stählin and L. Früchtel, Clemens Alexandrinus. Zweiter Band. Stromata Buch I-VI, GCS 52 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1960], 317, line 27-318, line 7), while scholia 38 and 39 contain extracts from Irenaeus' Adversus haereses 5.28.2-5.29.2 and 5.30.2-3 (=fr. 22, 24, 25); see A. Rousseau, L. Doutreleau and C. Mercier, Irénée de Lyon. Contre les hérésies. Livre V, v. 1, SC 152 (Paris: Cerf, 1969), 111-117. Scholion 6 has often been thought to belong to Origen; the attribution of scholia 14 and 15 to Origen should also be seriously considered. The phrase οὐ φύσεως ἀπολλυμένης ἐστίν in scholion 17 is reminiscent of Origen's anti-Valentinian polemic in De principiis 3.1.8 and Contra Celsum 5.61, but the scholion is too brief to permit any further comparison with Origen's

writings. The text of scholion 30 is exceedingly corrupt, but if its original form could be recovered, it is possible that parallels might be found in the works of Origen or Didymus.

146. Wohlenberg, 53-56.

147. Devreesse, "Chânes," 1228. Scholion 1 (Harnack and Diobouniotis, 21, lines 7-10) and a fragment attributed to Didymus in the catenae on James 1:1 (Cramer, v. 8, 2, lines 8-12=Didymus Comm. Ps. 85:2b-3) offer a similar account of why the apostles began their epistles by referring to themselves as servants (δοῦλοι) of God and Christ. It is possible, however, that scholion 1 is simply an epitome of Comm. Ps. 85:2b-3 (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 155, lines 10-13) or Comm. Ps. T. 231.6-10.

148. E. Junod, "À propos des soi-disant scolies sur l'Apocalypse d'Origène," Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa 20 (1984): 112-121. Junod (120 n. 33) has compared three of the scholia with passages in Didymus' Commentary on Zechariah; of these, only the comparison of scholion 31 (Harnack and Diobouniotis, 37, line 13-38, line 5) with Comm. Zech. T. 200.1-13 (3.70-72) merits further inquiry.

CHAPTER 2:

DIDYMUS' KNOWLEDGE OF MANICHAISM

This chapter will examine the Manichaean account of evil and compare it with the views attributed to the Manichaeans by Didymus. The chapter will seek to answer three questions: What did Didymus claim to know about Manichaeism? Was his account of Manichaean beliefs accurate? Did Didymus' familiarity with Origen's writings shape his understanding of Manichaeism and affect the accuracy of his presentation of the Manichaean position?

The Manichaean account of evil will be examined first. Two Coptic Manichaean works which were discovered at Medinet Madi (Egypt) in 1929--the Kephalaia and the Psalm-Book--will be examined.¹ Their view of the origin and nature of evil and the means of redemption from evil will be summarized. I will then examine Didymus' presentation of the Manichaean account of evil in the Contra Manichaeos and in those passages in his biblical commentaries which refer to the Manichaeans by name. By comparing these accounts, it will be seen that Didymus had a limited understanding of some of the basic features of the Manichaean account of evil. I will then examine some additional passages in Didymus' biblical commentaries in which the opponents are not identified, but which the editors of Didymus' biblical commentaries have assumed to be Manichaeans. I will suggest that these passages

refer not to the Manichaeans but to other groups (Valentinians, Marcionites, Platonists and Epicureans).

In setting forth the Manichaean account of evil, certain limitations must be acknowledged. The origins of evil were explained by reference to a rather complicated cosmological narrative containing many interrelated dramatis personae. Although the broad lines of this myth can be found in all of the extant Manichaean texts, there is considerable variation in the details.² For these reasons, I will focus only on the principal features of the myth, as presented in the published Coptic texts. Those who wish a more detailed and thorough account of Manichaean mythology may refer to the specialized monographs produced by Cumont, Jackson, Heuser and Van Lindt.³

Manichaean mythology was based upon the opposition between two original realms, the Land of Light and the Land of Darkness.⁴ In the Land of Light dwelt the Father of Greatness, an eternal being from whom all good beings were ultimately derived by way of emanation.⁵ In the Land of Darkness dwelt the King of Darkness.⁶ The King of Darkness was formed from the substance of the Land of Darkness, i.e. Matter; Matter bore within itself an underlying inclination toward harm, evil and corruption, which the Manichaeans termed "the counsel (ἐνθύμησις) of death."⁷ The King of Darkness presided over hosts of beings who also derived their existence from Matter⁸; their way of life was characterized by envy and strife, leading them constantly to make war upon one another.⁹

During the course of one of these battles, the hosts of Darkness came to the border separating the realm of Light from that of Darkness and beheld the Light.¹⁰ Upon discovering the realm of Light, the hosts of Darkness invaded it and sought to take possession of it.¹¹ Since the realm of Light was characterized by peace and rest, it had no inhabitants suited for strife and warfare.¹² The Father of Greatness consequently evoked the Mother of Life, who in turn evoked a warrior, the Primal Man; the Primal Man was then armed with a panoply consisting of five Light-elements and sent down to do battle with the powers of Darkness (who are also called "archons" in the Manichaean texts).¹³ During the battle between the Primal Man and the forces of Darkness, the latter overwhelmed the Primal Man and consumed four of the five elements comprising his panoply; the Light-elements which had been swallowed up were thus mixed with Darkness and bound to Matter.¹⁴

When the inhabitants of the Land of Light saw the Primal Man lying on the battlefield, with most of his panoply having been consumed by the powers of Darkness, the Call was sent down into the abyss to ascertain the state of the Primal Man. The Primal Man responded with the Answer, relating how the Light-elements had been swallowed by the powers of Darkness and rejoicing that the Light-elements, though entrapped, still possessed the ability to bind and restrain the powers of Darkness.¹⁵

The Mother of Life then petitioned the Father of Greatness to rescue the Primal Man.¹⁶ The Father of Greatness consequently evoked the Living Spirit for this purpose. The Living Spirit and the

Mother of Life descended and defeated the powers of Darkness,¹⁷ rescued the Primal Man,¹⁸ and fashioned the cosmos as a place where the entrapped Light-elements could be liberated from the Darkness.¹⁹

In creating the cosmos, the Living Spirit and the Mother of Life were able to separate a portion of the Light-elements from the Matter in which they had been entrapped. The Light which was pure was fashioned into the sun and moon, while that which was less pure was used to form the other celestial bodies.²⁰ That which was least pure became the souls of earthly creatures. Being bound to Matter, these souls had forgotten the nature of their origin and become subject to the blindness, lust and madness associated with the fleshly body.²¹

To facilitate the purification of the Light trapped in earthly creatures, the Mother of Life and the Living Spirit constructed a cosmic apparatus consisting of wheels and ships.²² This apparatus was designed to operate in the following manner: The souls of the righteous would be conveyed by the wheels up to the heavens, where they would be purified by the rays of the sun.²³ Passing by way of the sun and the moon, the souls would be conveyed by ships to the Pillar of Glory and re-enter the realm of Light.²⁴

Once the Primal Man had been rescued, he joined with the Living Spirit and other emanations in petitioning the Father of Greatness to begin the process of salvation, rescuing the Light which remained trapped below in the form of soul bound to matter. The Father of Greatness therefore evoked the Third Messenger, who set the purificatory apparatus (i.e. the wheels and ships) in motion.²⁵ To

effect the separation of the remaining Light from the Darkness, the Third Messenger then displayed his image; by this means, he separated the Light from the archons (i.e. forces of Darkness), purified it and caused it to ascend, while sweeping the waste into the abyss.²⁶ When the archons saw the image of the Third Messenger, they lusted after it and sought to attain it; as a result, Sin (i.e. Matter) spurted up to the third heaven and entangled some of the Light that had been liberated.²⁷ When Matter fell down, one part fell upon the earth and was used by the archons to make Adam and Eve. By this means, the archons were able to prevent the Light from returning to its origin and, by introducing lust, were able to reign over Adam and Eve and, through them, over the rest of the world in which Light and Darkness were mingled.²⁸

A portion of the Light (known as "the Living Soul") therefore remained imprisoned in a body, subject to evil thoughts and ensnared by bodily desires, a stranger housed in the abode of Darkness.²⁹ The abject condition of the soul was also expressed in terminology borrowed from the Pauline Epistles and adapted to the Manichaeian context³⁰: In the defiled "body of death" which one wears dwells the "Old Man," who is subject to the Law established by "the God of this age"³¹; as a result, "there is none in this flesh that is free from sin."³²

Since a new initiative was needed to rescue the Light trapped in human form, the Father of Greatness evoked Jesus the Splendour.³³ Jesus the Splendour performed three functions. First,

he was sent to rouse Adam from the sleep of death; Adam was then able to recognize his true identity and understand his plight.³⁴

Second, Jesus the Splendour evoked the Light-Mind, who played a central role in the Manichaean account of salvation. The Light-Mind was responsible for sending the various apostles who had come (including Zarathustra, Buddha, Jesus and Mani).³⁵ The Light-Mind also awakened and gathered the elect in response to the apostles' preaching.³⁶ The Light-Mind was said to put on the saints like a garment, acting within them to bind the Old Man and form the New Man.³⁷ The Light-Mind also indwelt the Manichaean church and effected the sanctification of its members.³⁸ Because it fulfilled these functions, the Light-Mind appears to have been identified with the Holy Spirit.³⁹ Insofar as Jesus the Splendour was responsible for evoking and sending the Light-Mind, Jesus was fittingly given titles arising from the Light-Mind's work, being regarded as the one who saved one from error, forgave the sins of the repentant and indwelt those seeking purity.⁴⁰

Finally, Jesus the Splendour assumed the form of a body so that he could descend to the Jewish people and, through his parables, teach them the true relationship between good and evil.⁴¹ Jesus' most important and revealing parable concerned the fruit of the good and bad trees (Lk. 6:43-45; Mt. 7:17-20; 12:33).⁴² The good tree (i.e., the Father of Greatness, who is Life and Light) never produces bad fruit, only good fruit. Likewise, the bad tree (i.e., Matter, which is Darkness and Death) never produces good fruit, only bad fruit. Evil therefore cannot have come forth from good.

Consequently, good and evil must both have been present at the beginning, with each in time producing its characteristic fruits in the world of mixture.⁴³ Jesus' saying about the axe being laid to the root of the trees (Mt. 3:9-10) was likewise interpreted to mean that as a result of the Primal Man's descent, good will prevail over evil, cutting the root of sin, so that evil fruit will no longer be produced.⁴⁴

The Jews, made envious by the evil power, opposed Jesus' teaching and unjustly condemned him.⁴⁵ Since Jesus had written no books himself, the truth which he had revealed was gradually lost after his ascension.⁴⁶ Although Paul continued to teach the correct doctrine, those who came after him adulterated Jesus' teachings and departed from the correct path; the church therefore perished.⁴⁷

At this crucial juncture in time, Mani appeared and began to exercise his apostolate. Before his ascension, Jesus had promised to send "the Paraclete, the Spirit of Truth" to bring conviction of sin and spiritual instruction (Jn. 14:16-17,26; 15:26; 16:7-11,13).⁴⁸ This Paraclete revealed itself to Mani, became one with him and unveiled to him all that was hidden.⁴⁹

To those who were willing to accept his message and repent, Mani offered liberation from error and the forgiveness of sins.⁵⁰ To be his disciple, it was necessary to acknowledge the correct division between good and evil, opposing the error of the sects (i.e. non-Manichaeic religions), who asserted that evil had come forth from the good.⁵¹

Those seeking perfection in this life (the "elect," as opposed to the "catechumens" or "auditors") were expected to live in an ascetic

manner.⁵² Through faith, worship and observance of the divine commandments, they sought to vanquish the desires arising from Matter and the evil powers who ruled over it.⁵³

By living an ascetic life, the Manichaean elect played an important role in the process of liberating Light from Matter. Since the begetting of children would have resulted in the further enslavement of Light in fleshly bodies, the elect abstained from sexual relations.⁵⁴ Furthermore, through prayer and observance of the divine commandments, the elect were able to liberate the particles of Light contained in the food they ate, causing these to ascend toward their original home.⁵⁵

At death, all souls were obliged to appear before the Judge of Truth, who assessed each soul on the basis of its actions.⁵⁶ The righteous elect were sent to the realm of Life (i.e. the Land of Light), while the worst sinners were sent to the realm of Death (Gehenna). The catechumens and the remaining sinners returned to the realm in which Light and Darkness were mingled and there underwent transmigration (μεταγγισμός) into other bodies.⁵⁷ For the catechumens, this transmigration was a therapeutic punishment, providing rebuke and instruction (παίδευσις); for sinners, it apparently functioned only as a form of imprisonment, being simply the just penalty for certain past evils.⁵⁸

Since the Manichaeans refused to ascribe the origin of harm and evil to God, it was necessary for them to explain how a good being could be responsible for the evils associated with punishment. In response to criticism, Mani emphasized that God's administration

of corporeal punishment and death to wrongdoers did not make God evil.⁵⁹ The good, he argued, have nothing to fear from a just judge; wrongdoers who suffer distress have no one but themselves to blame, since it was their wrongdoing which initiated the process of punishment.⁶⁰ Furthermore, punishment is good because it limits wickedness, is an appropriate recompense for the acts committed and, in some cases, may be able to promote the reformation of offenders.⁶¹

The mingling of Light and Darkness will not be permitted to continue indefinitely. At the end of this present age, all the particles of Light which have not yet been redeemed will be gathered together and united in an image ("the Last Statue") and ascend toward the realm of Light.⁶² The souls of the wicked which remain behind, stripped of Light (i.e. deprived of Living Soul), will grieve when they see the Statue ascend.⁶³ All Matter will then be consumed by fire and dissolve.⁶⁴ The evil powers and the souls of the wicked will be eternally imprisoned, with the evil powers being separated from one another in such a way as to prevent any future rebellion.⁶⁵

When the forces of evil have been rendered impotent, there will no longer be any opposition to the Father of Greatness, who will rule over the totality.⁶⁶ The Great Builder, a being evoked by the Father of Greatness, will construct a new and indestructible aeon, which will be presided over by the Primal Man⁶⁷; there the Father of Greatness will no longer be hidden, but will reveal his image and the elect and the catechumens will find joy and rest.⁶⁸

Having examined what the Manichaeans taught about the nature and origin of evil and the means by which one was delivered from it, the references to Manichaeism in Didymus' works will now be analyzed. There are ten passages in Didymus' biblical commentaries in which the Manichaeans are mentioned by name.⁶⁹ The editors of Didymus' works have also noted a number of additional passages in which Didymus' unnamed opponents were possibly to be identified as Manichaeans.⁷⁰

The analysis of these passages will fall into four parts. First, the extent of Didymus' acquaintance with Manichaean teaching will be assessed, drawing upon the Contra Manichaeos and the explicit references to Manichaeism in Didymus' biblical commentaries. Didymus' contact with members of the Manichaean community will then be examined. In the third section, I will note Didymus' tendency to confuse the teachings and exegesis of the Manichaeans with those of certain heterodox figures opposed by Origen (namely, Hermogenes and the Marcionites). In the fourth section, I will briefly examine four positions which Didymus criticized in his biblical commentaries without explicitly identifying his opponents. Although the editors of Didymus' works have suggested that these were criticisms of Manichaeism, it is more likely that these remarks were directed against the teachings of the Valentinians, Marcionites, Platonists and Epicureans.

Didymus regarded Manichaean doctrine and exegesis as one of the most important threats to the orthodoxy of his day. In his Commentary on Ecclesiastes, for example, he remarked:

Thus, "by the things" which one "removes, one ventures into danger." You know that impious doctrines have grown up at the side--those of the Arians and Manichaeans [and] those of Eunomius--and many people remove passages from the confine of truth and of Scripture and transfer impious thoughts into other ones. And "by" these very passages which they removed do they "venture into danger."⁷¹

Since Didymus was concerned about the dissemination of Manichaean teachings and exegesis, it is therefore not surprising to find references to Manichaeism interspersed throughout Didymus' biblical commentaries.

Didymus' works show that he was aware of some of the principal features of the Manichaean account of evil. He knew that the Manichaeans rejected the Christian position that God was the creator of all beings and argued that if God had created the Devil, God himself would be the origin of evil and responsible for all the harm that ensued. Thus, in Didymus' Contra Manichaeos, his opponents asked, "Why did the good God bring into existence one who was going to be so harmful and destructive?"⁷² In his Commentary on Ecclesiastes, Didymus similarly recorded, "The Manichaeans and their followers say, 'The Devil, who was created for the ruin of all, ought not to have been created.'"⁷³ When Didymus expounded his own view of the Devil, he was therefore careful to repudiate the position which the Manichaeans attributed to the Christians--namely, that God was responsible for creating something evil which would cause harm.⁷⁴

This line of argument appears to have been a staple of Manichaean anti-Christian polemic. In the Acta Archelai, for example, Mani is represented as criticizing his Christian opponents for holding God to be "the maker and contriver of Satan and his evil deeds."⁷⁵ Augustine likewise observed, "Again they [sc. the Manichaeans] say, 'Who made the Devil?...God should not have made him if he knew that he would sin.'"⁷⁶ In John of Damascus' Contra Manichaeos, the Manichaean opponent advanced a similar argument, asking, "Since he foreknew that the Devil would be evil, why did God create him?"⁷⁷

Didymus was aware that the Manichaeans regarded good and evil as unoriginate first principles. In his Commentary on Zechariah, Didymus remarked:

Is their speech not spurious, that of those who posit two unoriginate first principles, [one] of good and [one] of evil? (These are the Manichaeans.)⁷⁸

Didymus also knew that the Manichaeans associated evil with Darkness and regarded this Darkness as the substance (*οὐσία*) of the Devil.⁷⁹

Didymus asserted that the Manichaeans used two types of arguments to defend their belief that good and evil were independent, co-existing principles. In his Contra Manichaeos, Didymus referred to his opponents' use of Jesus' teaching about the two trees (Mt. 3:10;12:33) as a proof-text.⁸⁰ As has been noted above, the parable of the two trees played an important role in Egyptian Manichaean literature, where it was understood

as supporting the Manichaeian belief that good and evil were independent, co-existing principles.⁸¹

Didymus noted that the Manichaeians also defended their belief in an independent evil substance by pointing to the existence of harmful creatures: Since we recognize that certain creatures are harmful in nature, we must regard these as evil substances and trace their origin back to an original evil substance--i.e. Matter--rather than to God.⁸² God's opponent is likewise called "the Devil" (i.e. "Accuser" or "Slanderer") and "the Evil One," indicating an evil substance.⁸³

This type of argument is not attested in the published Egyptian Manichaeian texts but can be paralleled in accounts of Manichaeian teaching found in Christian anti-Manichaeian literature. The argument that harmful creatures are derived from the evil substance (i.e. Matter) and are proof of the latter's existence is found in Ephraem Syrus, Titus of Bostra, Epiphanius and Augustine.⁸⁴ In his De moribus Manichaeorum, Augustine remarked:

For what other answer will you give to the question, What is evil? but either that it is against nature, or that it is hurtful, or that it is corruption, or something similar? But I have shown that in these replies you make shipwreck of your cause, unless, indeed, you will answer in the childish way in which you generally speak to children, that evil is fire, poison, a wild beast and so on. For one of the leaders of this heresy, whose instructions we attended with great familiarity and frequency, used to say with reference to a person who held that evil was not a substance, "I should like to put a scorpion in the man's hand, and see whether he would not withdraw his hand; and in so doing he would get a proof, not in words but in the thing itself, that

evil is a substance, for he would not deny that the animal is a substance.⁸⁵

The argument concerning the names of the Devil is more difficult to document. It is clear from the published Coptic Manichaean texts that the principal evil power was designated "the Devil" and "the Evil One" and was held to have been formed from the original evil substance, i.e. Matter.⁸⁶ It is not clear, however, whether the Manichaeans combined these two beliefs in the interest of anti-Christian polemic, treating the names of the evil power as proof of the existence of an evil substance.⁸⁷

Didymus may also have been familiar with the Manichaean belief in the primordial invasion of the realm of Light by the powers of Darkness. In the Contra Manichaeos, Didymus alluded to his opponents' belief that the Devil had risen up against God and, by assailing the Godhead, claimed a portion for himself.⁸⁸ Didymus did not clarify what he meant by "portion" but a part of the Godhead (i.e. the divine substance) seems to be intended.⁸⁹

Didymus knew that the Manichaeans believed that, as a result of this assault, souls of the same substance as God had been joined to bodies.⁹⁰ At the same time, Didymus acknowledged that he was not familiar with the details of the Manichaean account.⁹¹ Didymus did recognize, however, that if two opposing natures were present in each agent, two contrary inclinations--one toward good and one toward evil--would necessarily arise within each agent.⁹²

Didymus knew that the Manichaeans associated the inclination toward evil with one's fleshly body. He recognized that they viewed the flesh as evil in nature but the spirit (i.e. the entrapped particles of Light) as good in nature.⁹³ Didymus was also aware that the Manichaeans viewed marital intercourse as evil because it produced bodies of sinful flesh.⁹⁴

Didymus recognized that this negative view of the flesh led the Manichaeans to adopt a docetic Christology.⁹⁵ According to Didymus, they supported this position by referring to Rom. 8:3, where Paul spoke of Jesus receiving "the likeness of sinful flesh."⁹⁶ The Coptic Manichaean Psalm-Book offers a similar account, asserting that when God became man in Jesus he received the "likeness of the flesh (ϵΙΝΕ Ν̄ΤϸΑΡ̄Ξ), the σχῆμα [material shape] of [manhood]."⁹⁷ The expression ϵΙΝΕ Ν̄ΤϸΑΡ̄Ξ is reminiscent of the phrase ϵΙΝΕ Ν̄ϸΑΡ̄Ξ, which the Coptic versions of the Bible used to render ὁμοίωμα σαρκός in Rom. 8:3.

Didymus was aware that the Manichaeans rejected the Old Testament.⁹⁸ In the Contra Manichaeos, for example, he criticized the Manichaeans for appealing to the words of John the Baptist, since John was a prophet belonging to the Old Testament dispensation, whose authority the Manichaeans refused to recognize.⁹⁹ The repudiation of the Old Testament was a staple of Manichaean anti-Christian polemic. Augustine, for example, remarked, "For you well know that the Manichees move the unlearned by finding fault with the Catholic Faith, and chiefly by rending in pieces and tearing the Old Testament..."¹⁰⁰ This kind of polemic may have originated at an

early date within the Manichaean community. The short and long formulae for the abjuration of Manichaeism asserted that Mani's book of Mysteries contained a refutation of the Law and the Prophets.¹⁰¹ The Seven Chapters attributed to Zacharias of Mitylene and the long formula for the abjuration of Manichaeism also referred to a similar refutation written by Adda, the disciple whom Mani had sent to establish Manichaean communities in the Roman Empire.¹⁰²

In the Contra Manichaeos, Didymus asserted that the Manichaeans disparaged the Jewish people by pointing out that John the Baptist had referred to Abraham's descendants as "serpents" (Mt. 23:33) and the "offspring of vipers" (Mt. 3:7).¹⁰³ Augustine asserted that a similar polemical identification of the Jewish people with the serpents mentioned in Mt. 3:7 and 23:33 was found in the treatise of his Manichaean opponent Adimantus.¹⁰⁴

Didymus recognized that the Manichaeans' rejection of the Old Testament also involved a repudiation of the Law.¹⁰⁵ In the catena fragment on Romans 7, for example, Didymus' opponents noted that Paul spoke unfavourably of the Law, describing it as "the law of sin and death" (Rom. 8:2) and "the law which wars against the law of my mind" (Rom. 7:23) and asserting that the commandment provided sin with opportunities to deceive him (Rom. 7:11).¹⁰⁶ Similar exegesis was advanced by Augustine's Manichaean opponent Faustus, who distinguished three laws, of which the first was "that of the Hebrews, which the apostle calls the law of sin and death"¹⁰⁷; Rom. 7:23 was likewise advanced as

a proof-text by Fortunatus, another one of Augustine's Manichaeian opponents.¹⁰⁸

From the material that has been examined above, it is clear that Didymus was familiar with some of the basic features of the Manichaeian account of evil and that some of the proof-texts and arguments he attributed to the Manichaeians are attested in other accounts of Manichaeian polemic. At the same time, there is no evidence that Didymus knew the names of the various mythological figures who appeared in the Manichaeian account of evil and redemption. This suggests that Didymus had not read any Manichaeian literature or any anti-Manichaeian work which contained a detailed account of Manichaeian beliefs (for example, the Acta Archelai used by Epiphanius and Cyril of Jerusalem). Didymus' discussion therefore centers around a more basic question--namely, how one can account for the origin of evil in a way that recognizes the necessity and importance of ascetic practices yet maintains a satisfactory theodicy.

Although Didymus' knowledge of Manichaeism was admittedly limited, it is possible that some of it was derived from contact with members of the Manichaeian community. Didymus claimed to have conversed with a Manichaeian on at least one occasion. In his Commentary on Ecclesiastes, Didymus alluded to a discussion he had had with a Manichaeian regarding the propriety of marital intercourse and the value of the Old Testament. Although the passage has a number of lacunae and in

some places its sense is obscure, the broad lines of the argument remain clear.

In the passage in question, Didymus was commenting upon Eccl. 9:9a ("And experience life with a wife, whom you have loved") and therefore discussed the place of marital intercourse in the Old Testament and in contemporary Christian practice. Didymus recognized that the Old Testament saints had had intercourse with their wives, but emphasized that this was only for the acceptable end of procreation, not for the base end of seeking pleasure.¹⁰⁹ Didymus argued that a marriage characterized by this kind of continence was not inferior to virginity. He then alluded to a discussion he had once had with a Manichaean about this subject:

This I also once said to the Manichaeans...: "Consider how great this chastity is! For a man is not subjected to punishment if he has intercourse with his own wife at the right time [i.e. at a time when conception can take place]. No blame is attributed to him, for no transgression is ascribed to him. But since he transcended this law and devoted himself to another, angelic law, for this reason he abstained from this [i.e. marital intercourse] as an act inappropriate [for him]."

Then in a sophistical manner he [sc. the Manichaean] questioned me...premise. He said to me, "What is the will of Jesus?" He wished that I might say, e.g., "To be celibate" and he might bring forward the ancient fathers [i.e. the Old Testament patriarchs]. He said, "What is the will of Jesus?" I said, "To do the works of Abraham and to believe in Moses." Immediately was his sophism resolved....the word and said to me, "You [have brought together] the boxer and the tragedian." [I said] to him, "I have not brought together the boxer and the tragedian or the tragedian and the boxer but I have paired the tragedian with the tragedian and the

boxer with the boxer. For I am eager to be a truthful judge."¹¹⁰

Despite the obscurity of the passage, it is clear that Didymus was claiming to have conversed with a Manichaean, who was promoting abstinence from marital intercourse and questioned the value of the Old Testament, taking a negative view of the patriarchs.¹¹¹ Since these positions are attested in Manichaean literature and were elsewhere attributed to the Manichaeans by Didymus, Didymus' claim to have conversed with a Manichaean is plausible.

In the discussion above, it has been shown that Didymus was familiar with some of the basic features of the Manichaean account of evil and may even have had some contact with members of the Manichaean community. At the same time, Didymus' reports of Manichaean teaching need to be treated with caution, since their testimony is not uniformly accurate. To illustrate this point, it will be useful to translate and discuss three passages in Didymus' Old Testament commentaries in which the beliefs and exegesis attributed to the Manichaeans actually belonged to earlier figures opposed by Origen.

The first passage appears in Didymus' Commentary on Job, where an argument for the co-existence of an evil principle with God was discussed. In commenting upon Job 5:18 ("For he causes one to be in pain and restores one again; he struck and his hands healed"), Didymus observed:

Moses himself....says, "I kill and I will cause to live, I will strike and I will heal" (Dt. 32:39). For it is not, as

the Manichaeans hold, that one causes the suffering of pain but another heals. For there is one who heals, who also permitted the introduction of hurtful things, guiding the evil spirits according to the aim of providence....they introduce the things connected with affliction with a view to health...."¹¹²

Despite the lacunae in the text, the character of the argument attributed to the Manichaeans is clear: In administering justice, the God of the Old Testament causes harm by inflicting corporeal punishment and death; since only an evil being is capable of producing harmful effects, harm must be traced back to an evil principle, not to God.

The argument that Didymus here attributed to the Manichaeans is remarkable because there is no evidence that the Manichaeans used either Dt. 32:39 or Job 5:18 as proof-texts. Dt. 32:39 was used by the Marcionites, however, to demonstrate the existence of an agency which was separate from God and responsible for worldly evils. Tertullian reported that Marcion had adduced this passage in his Antitheses to establish the capricious character of the Demiurge (i.e., the being who created the world) and thus to show the need to posit a God superior to the latter.¹¹³ Origen similarly asserted that Dt. 32:39 was used by the Marcionites to demonstrate the cruel and inhumane character of the God of the Law and the Prophets.¹¹⁴ Origen also linked Dt. 32:39 with Job 5:18, the same combination of texts which appears in Didymus but is not found in other Greek writers of the first four centuries.¹¹⁵ This suggests that in writing his Commentary on Job, Didymus

reproduced exegetical material from Origen; through some confusion or lapse of memory, however, Didymus attributed the views discussed there not to the Marcionites, but to opponents of his own day who held analogous beliefs.

The argument which Didymus attributed to the Manichaeans is also remarkable because in the Coptic Manichaean Kephalaia Mani explicitly rejects the Marcionite position when it is set forth by one of his opponents.¹¹⁶ Mani instead defends a position similar to that of Didymus, arguing that God, as a just judge, rightly condemns the wicked and sees that they suffer the appropriate penalties. This further supports the thesis that Didymus was not reporting Manichaean arguments but instead drawing upon Origen's earlier discussion of the Marcionite position.

Two passages in Didymus' Commentary on Genesis appear to involve a similar confusion. The first passage deals with the interpretation of Gen. 1:2:

But one must not think, as the Manichaeans do, that the word 'was' (Gen. 1:2a) indicates the unoriginate character [of matter].¹¹⁷

The second passage concerns the interpretation of Gen. 6:12:

But one must not think, as the Manichaeans do, that the unqualified matter which has been left behind causes the "corruption of the earth" by revolving around it. For this would make people blameless, if what was unable to be set in order by God caused the spoiling.¹¹⁸

These two passages are remarkable because the information they

provide is not attested in the published Manichaean texts but can be paralleled in accounts of the views held by earlier figures.

As Nautin and Doutreleau have noted, the interpretation of Gen. 1:2a given in the first passage belongs not to Mani or the Manichaeans but to Hermogenes of Carthage, a Christian writer who flourished around 200 A.D. and was heavily indebted to Middle Platonism.¹¹⁹ Both Hippolytus and Tertullian, who are the principal sources for reconstructing Hermogenes' thought, asserted that Hermogenes had taught that matter was unoriginate and thus contemporaneous with God.¹²⁰ Tertullian also recorded that Hermogenes had interpreted the word "was" in Gen. 1.2a as "indicating that it [sc. matter] has always existed in the past, being unborn and unmade," an interpretation which appears to have been unique to Hermogenes.¹²¹

There is no evidence that Didymus had read either Hippolytus or Tertullian; Theodoret, however, reported that Origen (whose works Didymus is known to have read) had also written against Hermogenes.¹²² This suggests that in writing his Commentary on Genesis Didymus reproduced exegetical material from Origen but ascribed the opponent's position to a group of his own day who held a similar view.

The second passage from Didymus' Commentary on Genesis contains two ideas which are attested in Middle Platonic interpretation of Plato's Timaeus and also appear to have been endorsed by Hermogenes:

(1) Prior to being ordered by the Demiurge, matter was unqualified (ἄποιος);

(2) The Demiurge did not set in order all this unqualified matter.

Each of these points will be examined in turn.

The idea that matter was "unqualified" (ἄποιος) was a Stoic doctrine.¹²³ This term was subsequently adopted by the Middle Platonists, who used it to describe the character of matter prior to its reception of any form, treating ἄποιος as similar in meaning to the phrase ἄμορφον ὃν ἐκείνων ἀπασῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν found in Timaeus 50D.¹²⁴ Hermogenes also appears to have regarded matter as being unqualified before it was set in order.¹²⁵

The belief that the Demiurge set in order only a portion of the existing matter was held by some Middle Platonists.¹²⁶ Hermogenes also believed that only a part of matter had been set in order:

Seeing it [sc. matter] boiling in the manner of a heated cauldron, he [sc. the Demiurge] divided it into two parts and, taking one from the whole, he tamed it, but the other he let move in a disorderly manner. He [sc. Hermogenes] says that this one that has been tamed is the κόσμος [i.e. world or order] but the part which remains wild [and disordered] is called unordered (ἄκοσμον) matter.¹²⁷

Didymus also attributed to his opponents a further view which, for the purposes of analysis, can be divided into two parts:

(3) The motion of the matter which was not set in order caused the corruption of the earth;

(4) Matter effected this corruption by revolving around the earth.

Since Didymus' account of his opponents' position is exceedingly brief and provides no information about the opponents' reason for holding these views, any reconstruction of the opponent's position is necessarily hypothetical. Nonetheless, like points (1) and (2), points (3) and (4) can plausibly be understood against the background of the Middle Platonic interpretation of the Timaeus. It is uncertain, however, whether (3) and (4) can be attributed to Hermogenes; while Hermogenes may have endorsed a position similar to (3), there is no evidence to show that he endorsed (4). Nautin and Doutreleau's suggestion that the position discussed in the second Commentary on Genesis passage be ascribed to Hermogenes therefore cannot be decisively confirmed from the extant evidence.¹²⁸

The belief that the motion of unordered matter was responsible for the corruption and evils found in the terrestrial realm can be understood against the background of the Middle Platonic interpretation of the Timaeus. The Middle Platonists held that prior to being ordered by the Demiurge, matter was characterized by disorderly motion.¹²⁹ This belief was based upon the Middle Platonists' interpretation of Timaeus 30A:

Desiring, then, that all things should be good and, so far as might be, nothing imperfect, the god took over all that was visible--not at rest, but in discordant and unordered motion (οὐκ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως)--and brought it from disorder into order, since he judged that order was in every way the better.¹³⁰

Hermogenes similarly held that before matter was set in order, it was characterized by wild and disorderly motion (ἀεὶ...ἀγρίως καὶ ἀτάκτως φερομένην).¹³¹

Those Middle Platonists who believed that the Demiurge had not wholly ordered matter naturally held that disorderly motion persisted after the formation of the cosmos and was therefore a potential source of corruption and worldly evils. Numenius, for example, asserted that since the Demiurge was only able to form matter to a limited extent, he was unable to eliminate the disorderly motion by which matter resisted Providence and produced evils.¹³² Hermogenes may also have taken a similar position. According to Tertullian, Hermogenes had claimed that unordered matter, by its disorderly and irregular motion, aimed at formlessness¹³³; this has usually been understood to mean that Hermogenes held the unformed portion of matter and its disorderly motion responsible for corruption and worldly evils.¹³⁴

The idea that matter effected this corruption by revolving around the earth is more difficult to understand. Presumably, Didymus' opponent(s) regarded some of the celestial bodies which revolved around the earth as exercising a malignant influence upon the terrestrial realm and associated these celestial bodies with matter and its disorderly motion. A similar position is found in a passage in Calcidius' Commentary on the Timaeus, in which the Middle Platonist Numenius discussed the Stoics' treatment of astrological fatalism:

So, according to Plato, the world received its good things from the munificence of God as a father; evil clung to it through the evilness of matter, its mother. And thus we understand why the Stoics vainly put the blame on a certain 'perversity' when they say that things happen by virtue of the stars. Now the stars are bodies (*viz.*, heavenly fires), and of all bodies matter is the foster-mother, so that also the unhappy confusion caused by the movement of the stars seems to originate from matter, in which there is much instability, blind impetuosity, change and arbitrary recklessness.¹³⁵

Similar ideas appear in the Peratic system refuted by Hippolytus, which presents an idiosyncratic amalgam of Middle Platonic and astrological concepts. In the Peratic system, matter was regarded as unqualified (*ἀπλοῦς*) and the stars were held responsible for the corruption and destruction occurring in the terrestrial realm.¹³⁶ The Peratic explanation of how these two points were related is rather obscure, but it is clear that the power of corruption was likened to water in motion and was believed to move around the celestial sphere in (or among) the wandering stars.¹³⁷

In summary, although the second passage from Didymus' Commentary on Genesis poses some challenges for the interpreter, the passage appears to make use of terminology and concepts found in the Middle Platonic interpretation of Plato's Timaeus. Parallels were noted in the works of Hermogenes and Numenius and in the Peratic system discussed by Hippolytus.

Didymus' ascription of this Middle Platonic material to the Manichaeans is puzzling, but could be explained if one assumed that Didymus knew that his Manichaean contemporaries were interested in astrology and that astrological lore played a certain role in

Manichaeism mythology.¹³⁸ According to the Coptic Manichaeism Kephalaia, the five planets and the twelve signs of the zodiac were formed from and belonged to the five worlds of Darkness¹³⁹; as such, they were creatures of Matter and, being evil in nature, gave rise to worldly evils (war, hunger, lust, etc.) and spiritual error.¹⁴⁰ In forming the cosmos, the Demiurge (i.e. the Living Spirit) had imposed important constraints upon these evil agents, seizing and binding them and affixing them to the wheel of the stars, i.e. the celestial sphere.¹⁴¹ According to the account given in the Kephalaia, the zodiacal signs were suspended from the celestial sphere and rotated with it, while the planets moved upon the sphere.¹⁴² By this motion, particles of light which had been trapped in fleshly bodies were drawn up to the powers affixed to the wheel of the stars; these light-particles were then plundered and taken away by the good guardian (ἐπίτροπος) who had been set over the sphere.¹⁴³ The light which had been plundered was then apparently passed to the sun and moon for purification.¹⁴⁴ The waste resulting from the purification of the light then flowed down to earth via the wheel of the stars¹⁴⁵; this downpouring of waste gave rise to evils in the terrestrial realm.¹⁴⁶ The Manichaeism believed that over time this removal of light and return of waste had an important cumulative effect, producing a gradual decline in vitality in the terrestrial realm.¹⁴⁷ If Didymus was aware that such concepts played a role in the Manichaeism account of evil, this might explain why he attributed to the Manichaeism Middle Platonic material containing broadly similar ideas.

In conclusion, from the three passages from Didymus' biblical commentaries which have been analyzed above, it is clear that Didymus' reports of Manichaeian teaching were not uniformly accurate. In each case, views belonging to earlier figures were seen to have been erroneously ascribed to the Manichaeians. These incorrect attributions may have arisen from the fact that the views espoused by these earlier figures were in some respects comparable to those later held by the Manichaeians. In two of the three cases examined, Origen's writings could plausibly be regarded as the source of Didymus' information.

The editors of Didymus' works have suggested that some further passages, in which the opponents are not identified, are also references to Manichaeian teaching. These passages can be sorted into four groups on the basis of their content. The first group of passages addresses the question of whether human action arises from one's nature or constitution or from one's purposive choice. By analyzing the concepts and terminology found in these passages, it can be seen that Didymus was referring not to the Manichaeians but to the Valentinians, whose views were known to Didymus through the writings of Origen.

The most detailed and interesting of these passages is found in Didymus' Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles:

Since after he became an apostle of Jesus Paul says that he himself believes in the God of his forefathers and in the Law and the prophets, he makes it plain that he recognizes one God of the Old and New Testaments. For this reason, he also agrees with the Pharisees who also themselves hope for the

resurrection of all people, the just and the unjust. And since some heretics say that resurrection pertains not to the body but to the purified soul, one must inquire what they will say about the unjust persons who are resurrected, since, according to them, those who are earthly are by nature not purified. For Paul said that the unrighteous are raised; is the resurrection indicated not of bodies? Then they say about the intermediate state--which indeed they call the psychic nature--that in this case this intermediate state undergoes a change, which indeed is called "raising," as what is written above shows: "And some of the scribes, rising up, contended, 'We find nothing evil in this man'" (Acts 23:9). And again they say that the "raised" are more advanced because of their speaking perverted things (cf. Acts 20:30).¹⁴⁸

In this passage, Didymus has thrown together beliefs belonging to the Valentinians and the Marcionites in a rather careless fashion. The first two premises are to be ascribed to the Marcionites:

- (1) The God who spoke through the Law and Prophets is different than the God who revealed himself in the New Testament;¹⁴⁹
- (2) There will be a resurrection not of bodies, but of purified souls;¹⁵⁰

The remaining premises, however, are to be ascribed to the Valentinians:

- (1) The earthly (χοϊκός) nature is unable to be purified;¹⁵¹
- (2) The intermediate state (μεσότης) or psychic nature (ψυχική φύσις) is capable of undergoing change;¹⁵²
- (3) This change can be described as "raising" or "awaking" (ἐγερσις).¹⁵³

Several other passages in Didymus' biblical commentaries which have been thought to refer to the Manichaeans actually concern the Valentinians. In these passages Didymus referred to "those who introduce the natures" (οἱ τὰς φύσεις εἰσάγοντες), a stock phrase which Didymus, like Origen, used to designate the Valentinians.¹⁵⁴ In discussing this idea of "natures," Didymus attributed to these opponents beliefs which he held to be characteristic of Valentinian thought: There are certain persons who possess a spiritual nature¹⁵⁵; those who have such a nature are incapable of vice and are saved by nature.¹⁵⁶ Other persons are evil by nature as a result of their constitution¹⁵⁷; the latter are incapable of virtue and salvation.¹⁵⁸ In some cases, Didymus alluded to these views simply as a foil, contrasting the idea of being evil by nature with his own conviction that evil originated from an agent's purposive choice.¹⁵⁹ This suggests that Didymus was not combatting contemporary opponents but reproduced material from Origen about the Valentinian idea of fixed natures whenever this facilitated the introduction and development of his own views about the moral nature of human agents.

The second group of passages deals with the ascription of the Old Testament to a God other than the Father of Jesus Christ; these passages are probably to be ascribed to the Marcionites rather than the Manichaeans. Didymus summarized his opponents' beliefs as follows:

Many of the heretics divide the Godhead, saying that there is one god who made the world and another who is the Father of Christ. For this reason, having also

divided Scripture, they say that the Old Testament belongs to the one who made the world, but the New Testament belongs to the Father of Christ. In accordance with their impious opinion, they say that these two gods and their scriptures are opposed to one another, so that those who flee to the Lord for refuge are enemies of the one who created the world and are better than he, as in turn the people who belong to the one who created the world are at variance with Christ and his teaching.¹⁶⁰

The proclamations of the God of the Law and the Prophets, it was claimed, show his arbitrary and vengeful character:

When Jesus said to Paul, "Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?", he became a cause of his not seeing, though the heretics denounce the one who said, "Who made the sighted and the blind? Was it not I, the Lord God?" (Ex. 4:11b). Such passages reduce to perplexity those who say that there are different gods and denounce the one as the cause of not seeing, but favourably receive the other because he furnishes sight.¹⁶¹

The opponents also claimed that the legislation produced by this erratic and wrathful deity was a cause of death:

The heterodox also use this passage to slander the Old Testament, saying that that scripture brings death, but the New [Testament] brings life, since it belongs to the life-giving Spirit.¹⁶²

With the advent of Jesus, who revealed the good God, the proclamations and legislation of the Demiurge were to be abandoned, having been replaced by the Gospel:

And if one says that "the old things" (2 Cor. 5:17) are the books of the Law and the prophets, these passed away when the Gospels succeeded them, though these old and new books differ not in subject but in conception. For the same teaching belongs to the two testaments, at one time in a veiled manner, at another time plainly.¹⁶³

One must not pay attention to those heterodox persons who say that those who are apostles in Christ are teaching in opposition to the god who is other than the Father of the Saviour, i.e. "We utter things contrary to him."¹⁶⁴

Harnack has noted the importance of Didymus as a source for documenting Marcionite beliefs.¹⁶⁵ In the passages translated above, beliefs can be observed which were held by the Marcionites but not by the Manichaeans. In the first passage quoted, for example, the being who made the world is opposed to the good God who is the Father of Jesus. No such opposition existed in Manichaean mythology, since the Manichaeans believed that the world had been created by emanations of the good God in accordance with the divine purpose. The remark that those who flee to the good God are better than the Demiurge is also intelligible in terms of Marcionite belief; the Marcionites held that the Demiurge was not evil, strictly speaking, but only inferior in character.

The proof-texts cited in the above passages are also attested in reports of Marcionite exegesis but are not found in Manichaean texts. Origen's discussion of Ex. 4:11b, for example, strongly suggests that that verse had been used as a Marcionite proof-text.¹⁶⁶ The Marcionite Marcus in the dialogue De recta fide in Deum likewise identified the "old things" which have passed away (2 Cor. 5:17) with the books of the Law and the Prophets.¹⁶⁷ In conclusion, it appears that the second group of passages should be understood to refer to the Marcionites rather than the Manichaeans.

In Didymus' Commentary on Job, there are three passages which allude to persons advocating the doctrine of transmigration:

For it was fitting for the saint to pray for rational beings to push on toward virtue and no longer suffer a return to an inferior condition--for it is not the same [condition] [i.e. terrestrial life], as those who introduce transmigration think.¹⁶⁸

And he teaches a most noble kind of doctrine, that he who has once departed from life no longer returns to this life, as those who maintain the fantastic theory about transmigrations relate.¹⁶⁹

...then that when a man has died, he will not, as many men hold, come to spend time here again.¹⁷⁰

While it is true that the Manichaeans did believe in transmigration, there is no evidence to show that Didymus has the Manichaeans in view in the above passages. The idea of transmigration was accepted by a wide variety of groups in the ancient world, including the Pythagoreans, Platonists, and a number of figures who have often been grouped under the rather vague rubric of "Gnosticism."¹⁷¹ Furthermore, the word used by Didymus in these passages is μετενσωμάτωσης, the word used in the Platonic tradition, rather than μεταγγισμός, the word which appears in Manichaean texts and the principal anti-Manichaean sources.¹⁷² There is thus no compelling reason to interpret Didymus' remarks about transmigration as references to Manichaean teaching.

Two passages in Didymus' Commentary on the Psalms which deal with the denial of providence have also been interpreted as

references to Manichaeian teaching. In the first passage, the Devil is said to have been responsible for

decreeing a lack of providence (ἀπρονοησία). He [sc. the Devil] persuaded many people, at any rate, to lay down the doctrine that the world is without a guardian, having himself previously departed from the correct view about God's administration and judgment.¹⁷³

Didymus made a similar parenthetical remark in the second passage:

Contemplating the previously-mentioned things, men, who long ago attested to their own cleverness, [were troubled], no longer abiding by the deluded opinions which were held by the sophists, being seized with fear on account of their assent to impious doctrines of this sort. For they were learning from them that there would be no providence, since all things are moved spontaneously (ἐκ ταῦτομάτου)...¹⁷⁴

It is likely that both of these references concern the views of the Epicureans rather than the Manichaeians. The word ἀπρονοησία, which appears in the first passage, is routinely used in doxographical literature to indicate the Epicurean position.¹⁷⁵

The same is true of the phrase ἐκ ταῦτομάτου which appears in the second passage. Aristotle had attributed to the atomists the view that things were moved "spontaneously" (i.e. of themselves, not by an external agency in accordance with a conscious purpose)¹⁷⁶; from Plutarch onwards, this phrase was routinely used to describe Epicurus' atomism, an account of the world in which divine providence played no part.¹⁷⁷ In his Commentary on Ecclesiastes, Didymus himself likewise attributed to Epicurus the opinion that things were moved spontaneously rather than by divine providence.¹⁷⁸ It is therefore likely that the two passages from

Didymus' Commentary on the Psalms refer to Epicurean rather than Manichaeian teaching.

In this chapter, Didymus' knowledge of Manichaeism was analyzed. It was seen that Didymus had a limited knowledge of some of the principal features of the Manichaeian account of evil. This knowledge of Manichaeian teaching may have been derived in part from interaction with members of the Manichaeian community, since Didymus claimed to have conversed with a Manichaeian on at least one occasion. Didymus' testimony regarding Manichaeian beliefs and exegesis is nonetheless not uniformly reliable. Didymus' attribution to the Manichaeians of beliefs and exegesis actually belonging to earlier figures opposed by Origen was noted. Finally, a number of passages were examined in which Didymus criticized the views of certain unnamed opponents, whom the editors of Didymus' works had tentatively identified as Manichaeians. This identification was rejected and these passages were instead seen to refer to other groups; in some cases, Didymus' references to these groups may also reflect his dependence upon Origen.

NOTES

Chapter Two

1. An account of the discovery and conservation of the Coptic Manichaean codices, which were copied around 400 A.D. (i.e. shortly after Didymus' death), can be found in James M. Robinson, "The Fate of the Manichaean Codices of Medinet Madi: 1929-1989," in Gernot Weißner and Hans-Joachim Klimkeit, eds., Studia Manichaica: II. Internationaler Kongreß zum Manichäismus, 6.-10. August 1989 St. Augustin/Bonn (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992), 19-62; Alexander Böhlig, "Neue Initiativen zur Erschließung der koptisch-manichäischen Bibliothek von Medinet Madi," Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 80 (1989): 240-262. References to the Kephalaia (hereafter abbreviated K) will indicate the chapter number followed by the codex page number and line number, as reported in the edition of Hugo Ibscher, Manichäische Handschriften der Staatlichen Museen Berlin. Band I: Kephalaia. 1. Hälfte (Lieferung 1-10) (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1940) and A. Böhlig, Manichäische Handschriften der Staatlichen Museen Berlin. Band I: Kephalaia. Zweite Hälfte: Lieferung 11/12 (Seite 244-291) (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1966). The Psalm-Book (hereafter abbreviated P) contains several different psalm-collections. In referring to the main psalm-collection, the psalm number will be given, followed by the page number and the line number in the edition of C.R.C. Allberry, Manichaean Manuscripts in the Chester Beatty Collection. Volume II. A Manichaean Psalm-Book. Part II (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1938). In referring to the smaller psalm-collections (in which the psalms are generally unnumbered), the name of the psalm-collection will be given (Heracleides, Thomas, etc.), followed by the page number and line number in Allberry's edition. In a few instances, I have also referred to passages in the Coptic Manichaean Homilies (hereafter abbreviated H) from Medinet Madi, giving the page and line numbers in the edition of Hans Jakob Polotsky, Manichäische Handschriften der Sammlung A. Chester Beatty. Band I: Manichäische Homilien (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1934). The codex containing the Homilies has not been well preserved and the lacunae in the text of the Homilies often pose difficulties for the interpreter. For this reason, I have referred to the Homilies in only a few cases where a point of Manichaean doctrine was not well attested in the Kephalaia and Psalm-Book. I have similarly made only a few references to the fragmentary Manichaean literary texts recently discovered at Kellis in the Dakleh Oasis and edited by Iain Gardner (Kellis Literary Texts, Vol. 1, Dakleh Oasis Project Monograph No. 4 [Oxford: Oxbow Books,

1996]). In the following discussion, I have not made reference to the Cologne Mani Codex, a parchment codex from Egypt which has been tentatively dated to the fourth or early fifth century and contains a Greek-language biography of Mani. This biography provides important documentation of several subjects which are important to the study of Manichaeism *per se*--Mani's upbringing, the emergence of his awareness of his apostolate, and the early history of the Manichaean community. These, however, are matters of which Didymus had no knowledge and are therefore not relevant to the present inquiry. I have also refrained here from discussing the introduction of Manichaeism into Egypt or the practices of the fourth-century Egyptian Manichaean communities. Didymus appears to have had no knowledge of these matters and, in any case, the publication in the near future of new Egyptian Manichaean texts from the Dakleh oasis would soon render obsolete any conclusions drawn from the material presently available.

2. Like their Christian counterparts, Egyptian Manichaean communities undoubtedly had a certain amount of internal differentiation and evolved over time. These forms of diversity are at present poorly understood; as more Egyptian Manichaean texts are published, there are at least three types of variation that deserve further study. First, one would like to know how well individual Manichaeans--such as Didymus' informant(s)--understood Manichaean mythology and practices and to what extent their understanding of these was shaped by the local Egyptian environment. From P. Kell. Copt. 35, for example, one can see that in spite of certain formal prohibitions against magic (K 6;31.16-33; Cologne Mani Codex 137-140) some fourth-century Egyptian Manichaeans used and transmitted amuletic texts which contain no certain Manichaean traditions and may be of Egyptian Christian origin; see Paul Mirecki, Iain Gardner and Anthony Alcock, "Magical Spell, Manichaean Letter," in Paul Mirecki and Jason BeDuhn, eds., Emerging from the Darkness: Studies in the Recovery of Manichaean Sources (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 10-11,20.

Second, the discovery at Kellis of two Syriac-Coptic glossaries (Gardner, Kellis, 101-126) suggests that Manichaean texts were being translated directly from Syriac into Coptic (i.e. without a Greek intermediary). It would be interesting to know what Manichaean texts were actually available in Greek in fourth-century Egypt and whether this could have limited what Didymus or his Manichaean informant(s) knew about the Manichaean myth.

Finally, one would like to understand how and why Manichaean liturgical materials were revised and adapted over time and whether such alterations had any theological significance. Gardner (Kellis, 59), for example, has shown that when the Coptic Manichaean psalm

fragments discovered at Kellis are compared with the Medinet Madi Psalm-Book, the former can be seen to belong to an earlier stage in the textual history; the basic structure of the Manichaean myth, however, does not seem to have been altered. For a helpful discussion of these three points, I am indebted to Prof. Paul Mirecki.

3. Franz Cumont, La cosmogonie manichéenne, *Recherches sur le manichéisme I* (Brussels: P. Lamertin, 1908); A.V.W. Jackson, Researches in Manichaeism with Special Reference to the Turfan Fragments (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1932); M. Heuser, "Der Manichäische Mythos nach den koptischen Quellen" (Phil. Diss., Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität [Bonn], 1992); Paul Van Lindt, The Names of Manichaean Mythological Figures: A Comparative Study of Terminology in the Coptic Sources (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992). The Greek and Coptic terminology used for the Manichaean mythological figures is analyzed in Van Lindt and the Analytical Vocabulary of Manichaean Technical Terms and Concepts, *Corpus Fontium Manichaeorum Subsidia* (Turnhout: Brepols, forthcoming).

4. See the discussion of Ludwig Koenen, "How Dualistic is Mani's Dualism?" in Luigi Cirillo, ed., Codex Manichaicus Coloniensis. Atti del Secondo Simposio Internazionale (Cosenza 27-28 maggio 1988) (Cosenza: Marra Editore, 1990), 1-34. These two original principles--good/Light and evil/Darkness--were designated by various terms in Manichaean literature. In Manichaean Middle Persian, they were described as dw bwn, "the two roots" or "the two bases" (cf. bwng'h, "foundation"). Although ρίζα is occasionally found in Greek Manichaean and anti-Manichaean literature, it was more natural to use the Greek terms ἀρχή (first principle), οὐσία (essence or substance), or φύσις (nature). The terms οὐσία and φύσις were also used in the Coptic Manichaean texts (see, for example, K 15:47.28; 20:63.31; 23:67.31-32; 24:73.6; 29:81.31; H 70.9).

5. See, for example, P 251:60.30-31 and the discussion of Van Lindt, 3-16. The "Greatness" refers to the οὐσία of Light which is proper to the Father of Greatness and comprises the Land of Light.

6. Both "the King of Darkness" and "the King of those of Darkness" are found in Coptic Manichaean texts. The principal evil power is also described as "the Original One of Sin, the enemy of God" (P 220:3.26). The name "Satan" also appears in the Coptic Manichaean literature, often in contexts where the New Testament or Christian beliefs are being discussed (P 248:57.3-4; K 1;12.30-32; 2;19.2); see also Edmund Beck, Ephräms Polemik gegen Mani und die Manichäer im Rahmen der zeitgenössischen griechischen

Polemik und der des Augustinus (Louvain: Secrétariat du Corpus SCO, 1978), 45-51, who analyzes the evidence provided by Christian anti-Manichaean literature.

7. K 6;31.8-16; cf. K 4;26.11,18; 6;32.30-33.1; 24;74.15; 27;78.21-23; 73;180.15-19; P 248; 57.18. See also P. Nagel, "ζωγραφεῖν und das 'Bild' des Mani," in H. Goltz, ed., Eikon und Logos: Beiträge zur Erforschung byzantinischer Kulturtraditionen, v. 2 (Halle [Saale]: Martin-Luther Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 1981), 215-218. The evidence in Christian anti-Manichaean literature for the identification of Matter with Darkness is discussed by Beck (52-66) and André Villey, Alexandre de Lycopolis. Contre le doctrine de Mani (Paris: Cerf, 1985), 126-133. The exact sense of the word ἐνθύμησις is difficult to grasp and needs further study. The Greek word can often be translated as "consideration" or (in philosophical texts) "conception"; in Coptic Manichaean texts, the Greek word is sometimes replaced by a Coptic word meaning "consideration" or "counsel." The idea is apparently that Matter bears within it an underlying inclination or organizing principle which is responsible for the production of evil beings and which informs and guides their subsequent evil actions.

8. P 220;4.22-25; cf. P 252;61.19-21; 278;99.11. "Sin" is sometimes used in place of "Matter" and appears to be roughly equivalent to the latter (K 56;137.23-24; 56;138.6-7; cf. K 16;51.25-27; 38;92.15-17; 48;123.7-11; P 226;18.20-21; 258;70.7-8).

9. K 73;178.25-28; 73;180.15-19; P 223;9.17-22.

10. K 23;68.30-32.

11. K Intro.;4.1-2; P 223;9.22-24; cf. K 4;26.19-20; 6;30.25-33; 23;67.20-22; P 220;4.22-24.

12. P Christ;117.5-6; cf. P Sarakoton;172.11-12.

13. K 5;28.7-9; 17;55.25-27; 18;58.7-9; 26;76.29-77.3; 28;79.23-25; 39;102.23-25,35-36; P 219;1.25-28; P Sarakoton;137.14-19; P Thomas 1;204.22-28. The five Light-elements are often referred to as the five "sons" of the Primal Man and as the "clothes" which he put on; cf. K 23;69.27-32; 28;79.28; 109;262.25-26.

14. K 16;51.25-26; 51;127.15-23; 61;153.27-29.

15. P Heracleides;197.24-202.2. Because the entrapped Light-elements retained their ability to bind the evil powers, the Coptic Manichaeic texts refer to the Primal Man as a hunter and his Light-elements as a snare by which the evil powers are captured (K 4;26.21,29; 53;129.11; cf. K 17;55.25-56.2). The admixture of Light-elements is also said to improve the Darkness (P Thomas 2;205.15-26).

16. K 115;271.30-272.7; 115;272.12-16; 115;273.7-13.

17. K 18;58.22; 28;79.27-33; 32;85.26-28.

18. K 16;50.23-30; 16;51.18-20,24-25; 17;56.2-4,7-8; 26;77.8-10; 28;79.26-27; 32;85.24-25; 39;102.25-26; 115;272.20-24,27-29.

19. K 17;56.9-12; 18;58.20-21; 19;60.27-31; 29;82.12-17; 37;89.3-17; 39;102.26-28; 44;113.29-31; 53;129.12-17; P 223;10.20-29.

20. P 223;10.30-11.2; cf. K 65;163.16-20.

21. K 5;29.18-22; 65;160.27-30. Regarding the association of Matter with desire and lust, see H.H. Schaeder, "Urform und Fortbildungen des manichäischen Systems," in Fritz Saxl, ed., Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg 4. Vorträge 1924-1925 (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1927), 113-117.

22. K 1;15.8-10; 34;87.2-4; 70;171.4-7,21-25; 70;172.16-17; 90;223.27-29; 90;226.12-13; P 219;2.15-17.

23. Cf. K 65;162.24-25; 90;223.28-29; P 241;42.18-19; 246;55.11-13; 266;83.25-33.

24. The extant Manichaeic and anti-Manichaeic sources present somewhat different accounts of the souls' ascent and purification. According to Acta Archelai 8.5-6 (C.H. Beeson, Hegemonius. Acta Archelai, GCS 16 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1906], 12,line 28-13,line 19), the Greek text of which appears in Epiphanius Panarion 66.26.6 (Karl Holl, Epiphanius [Ancoratus und Panarion]. Dritter Band. Panarion haer. 65-80. De fide, GCS 37 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1933], 59,line 11-60,line 5), the souls passed first to the sun and then were sent on ships to the moon, whose disk consequently became full; the souls were then conveyed from the moon to the Pillar of Glory, causing the moon to wane. Other fourth-century anti-Manichaeic writers, however, held that the Manichaeans believed that the souls

passed from the moon to the sun at the time of the moon's waning and then returned to the Land of Light; see Alexander of Lycopolis (A. Brinkmann, Alexander Lycopolitanus: Contra Manichaei opiniones disputatio [Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner, 1895], 6, line 25-7, line 6); Ephraem Syrus Second Discourse to Hypatius (C. W. Mitchell, S. Ephraim's Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion, and Bardaisan, v. 1 [Oxford: Williams and Norgate, 1912], 15, lines 27-34 [Syriac]; xxxvi [Eng. tr.]), Titus of Bostra Contra Manichaeos 1.17 (P. de Lagarde, Titus Bostrenus syriace et graece [1859; repr. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1967], 9, lines 17ff.) and Epiphanius Panarion 66.9.8-9; 66.22.26-27 (Holl, Epiphanius, 30, lines 17-21; 50, lines 17-22). This latter account is supported by al-Shahrastani (Daniel Gimaret and Guy Monnot, Shahrastani: Livre des religions et des sectes, v. 1 [Louvain: Peeters: 1986], 660) and the Middle Persian and Turkish Manichaean texts translated by Hans-Joachim Klimkeit, Gnosis on the Silk Road (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 230, 342-343; see Manfred Hutter, Manis kosmogonische Sabuhrgan-Texte (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992), 78-80. Compare also T. Kell. Copt. 2, f. 4, lines 130-141 (Gardner, Kellis, 14) and T. Kell. Syr./Copt. 2, lines 1-33 (ibid., 118-119), which contains phrases excerpted from a Manichaean work which analyzed the souls' ascent in terms of the lunar calendar.

25. K 7;37.32-35.1; 34;87.2-7; 46;117.14-15; 115;273.29-274.8.

26. K 1;15.10-11; 5;28.15-25; 7;34.32-35.1; 7;35.7-9; 16;52.20-21; 17;56.15-18; 18;59.3-14; 26;77.11-16; 35;87.17-29; 39.102.28-32; 46;117.14-17; 48;122.24-26; 54;132.29-133.3; 55;133.12-13,16-19,23-28; 55;135.14-21; 115;273.32-274.19. The Third Messenger was also capable of displaying his image in a feminine form (the Virgin of Light). Cf. K 7;35.14-17; 28;80.25-29; 95;240.26-27; P 223;10.10-14; see also K 55;134.14-135.14 and 98;249.6-9 with the remarks of J. Ries, "L'enkrateia et ses motivations dans les Kephalaia coptes de Medinet Madi," in U. Bianchi, ed., La tradizione dell'enkrateia: Motivazioni ontologiche e protologiche (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1985), 370-371.

27. K 28;80.20-22; 34;87.8-9; 38;92.15-21; 48;122.24-30; 56;137.24-27; 56;138.6-9; 64;158.1-5; 70;171.13-15.

28. K 5;26.14-17; 38;93.2-5,29-30; 48;123.7-11; 55;133.13-15; 55;134.3-11; 55;135.21-136.17; 56;137.15-17; 56;138.2-22; 64;157.7-11,22-34; 65;158.6-11,20-23; 73;179.6-8. Because the archons fashioned Adam after the image displayed by the Third

Messenger, Adam surpassed all other earthly creatures and resembled the superior beings (K 55;135.27-136.20; 64.157.14-20).

29. P 239;40.29-30; 246;54.17-30; 247;55.19-20; 263;79.20-21; 271;89.24-27; 282;103. 29-33; P Sarakoton;135.21-24; 152.15-19; 159.31; 184.18-19; P Thomas;210.21-27; K 38;89.35-36; 38;94.17-27; 38;95.14-96.7; 38;97.26-29; 38;98.2-7,23-26; 38;99.2-17; 86;214.3-8; 86;216.15-16; 88;220.6-10; 100;253.11-12. Similar language is found in a previously unpublished Manichaean psalm edited by Gardner (Kellis, 20, 29/97:13-30/97.16, 32/97.21): "A depth of darkness is this body that thou wear...all the righteous, they have suffered...[they have] been oppressed in it. The creature of darkness is this house that is full of passion...The work of perdition is the garment of [darkness that we wear]..." See also K 53;130.13-24 and 56;138.20-144.12, where the construction of the organs of sense and memory is described.

30. Regarding the use of the Pauline Epistles in Manichaean proclamation, see Augustine Contra Faustum 12.24; T. Kell. Copt. 2, f. 4, line 36 (Gardner, Kellis, 10); and Turfan S1 (C. Salemann, "Ein Bruchstück [sic] manichäischen Schriftums im Asiatischen Museum," Mémoires de l'Académie impériale des sciences de S. Pétersbourg ser.8, vol. 6, no. 6 [1904]: 6).

31. "Body of death" (Rom. 7:24): P 248;56.29; 248;57.17; 263;79.20-21; 275;95.16; P Sarakoton;160.3. "Old Man" (Eph. 4:24; Col. 3:10): K 38;94.19; 88;221.15; cf. Augustine Contra Faustum 24.1. "God of this age"(2 Cor. 4:4): P 230;4.16-17; 248;56.31; P Sarakoton;172.26-27; Augustine Contra Faustum 21.1; Contra Felicem 2.2; cf. K 6;33.5-8; Acta Archelai 15.7 (Beeson, 24, lines 22-23). "Law": K 2;21.20-23,30-31; 4;27.13-18; 4;29.35-30.8; P 220;3.31; 251;60.18-19; 256;68.13; 281;102.10; P Heracleides; 192.20; cf. P 248;57.7-11; K 27;79.4-7.

32. P 229;25.21-22; cf. K 42;108.5-6; 88;220.6-8,15-17; 108;262.4-9. For the Manichaean view of the "flesh" (σάρξ), its authority and its effects, see K 1;12.8-9; 102;256.19-21; 38;94.25-27; 115;274.9-10; 116;281.27; P 254;64.18; P Sarakoton;149.14-15; and especially P Christ;117.19-23: "Since I was bound to the flesh I forgot my divinity...I was made to drink the cup of madness, I was made to rebel against my own self...The Powers (ἀρχή) and Authorities (ἐξουσία) came within, they armed themselves against me...." (tr. of Allberry slightly adapted).

33. K 16;49.29.

34. K 16;53.28-54.9; 38;94.3-4,8-9; 112;268.2.

35. K 7;35.21-22.

36. K 7;36.1-2; 9;40.24-33; 11;44.10-12; 28;80.33-35; 38;96.7-10; 90;225.6-7; P Sarakoton;160.6-7. The exact nature of this election is difficult to specify; see K 1;10.13-15; 1;12.5; 90;224.31-225.5; 90;225.20-21; 114;269.17-25. It is clear, in any case, that it was not thought to compromise the agent's ability to determine his or her course of action (H 3.9; P 277;97.21); agents therefore remained liable to reward or punishment for their actions (K 16;51.1-3; 89;223.1-12; 90;224.8-9; cf. ps.-Augustine [Evodius] De fide contra Manichaeos 5). The Manichaeans affirmed that because human agents bore within themselves both good and evil, they experienced inducements to both (K 65;157.25-32; 108;262.4-9) and were thus capable of moral variation (K 2;19.1-18; 88;219.6-12; 88;220.4-5,9-10,15-17; 88;221.13-17). To experience redemption, agents were expected to resist the persuasive powers of the forces of evil and instead choose the path of salvation (H 3.25); this choice, however, was not possible without the assistance of the indwelling Light-Mind (K 83;208.3-7).

37. K 86;215.1-5; 38;89.23,26-28; 38;96.13; 114;269.17-25; P 250;59.11-12; P Sarakoton;177.31-178.4; cf. K 38;89.35-90.3; 99.30-32.

38. K 20;64.8-10; 38;89.23-25; P Sarakoton;133.31-3; 177.31-32.

39. See P 229;24.23-25; K 56;143.24-32; 77;189.28-190.6; cf. P Sarakoton;161.23-24.

40. P 219;2.24-26; 239;39.19-22; 244;51.4; 245;52.16,22; 248;56.15-16; 250;59.2; 251;60.22-23; 255;65.30-32; 255;66.17; P Sarakoton;145.6; 177.31-178.4. The Light-Mind's derivation from and association with Jesus the Splendour sometimes caused the Light-Mind's functions to be transferred to Jesus. For example, in K 91;232.7 one is to beg forgiveness from the Light-Mind, while in P 239;39.20-22, one is to ask Jesus for forgiveness; petitions for salvation, redemption and assistance are similarly addressed to Jesus in the Manichaean Psalm-Book (P 247;55.17-18; 248;57.25-26; 249;58.3; 255;65.30-32; 255;66.17; 263;79.19,29; 263;80.18; 267;84.9-10; cf. P 251;60.8; 252;61.12,27-29; P Sarakoton;162.25-26; 178.3-4; 185.3-5). Where such a transfer of functions existed, it was natural for a transfer of epithets and titles also to occur. Thus, for example, in P. Kell. Gr. 91, lines 13-17 (Gardner, Kellis, 133),

Jesus the Splendour is addressed as "our holy spirit, the salt of the church," titles which, strictly speaking, should belong to the Light-Mind. Likewise, in P 239;40.11-14 the Light-Mind is designated "the physician of souls," while in P Sarakoton;145.6 a similar designation is given to Jesus; see V. Arnold-Döben, "Die Bildhaftigkeit der manichäischen Texte," in Alois van Tongerloo and Søren Giversen, eds., Manichaica Selecta: Studies Presented to Professor Julien Ries on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday (Louvain: International Association of Manichaeic Studies, 1991), 3-7.

41. For Jesus' ministry among the Jewish people, see K 1;12.26-13.5; P Heracleides;194.4-196.7; H 11.22-23; 91.29. For the docetic Christology, see K 1;12.24-26; P Heracleides;194.1-3; 196.22-26; H 11.5-6; cf. K 19;61.23-24.

42. For the importance of the parable and the interpretation of its elements, see K 2;17.5-9; 2;17.22-23.13; 255;66.26-28; P 271;91.5-7; P Sarakoton; 171.11-12; 176.24-25; 185.16-17; H 27.11-14; 75.17-18; cf. Acta Archelai 5.4-5 (Beeson, 7, lines 3-7); 15.6 (Beeson, 24, lines 17-19); 18.7 (Beeson, 29, lines 26-28); Serapion of Thmuis Adversus Manichaeos 26.10-19; Augustine Contra Faustum 32.19 and E. Waldschmidt and W. Lentz, "Die Stellung Jesu in Manichäismus," Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Phil.-hist. Klasse 4 (1926): 29ff. Compare also Apocryphon of John (NH 2.1) 21.30-36: "The root of this (tree) is bitter and its branches are death, its shadow is hate and deception is in its leaves, and its blossom is the ointment of evil, and its fruit is death and desire is its seed, and it sprouts in darkness" (tr. of Frederik Wisse in J.M. Robinson, ed., The Nag Hammadi Library in English, 3 ed. [San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988], 117).

43. K 120;286.28-30.

44. K 16;53.21-27; 18;58.16-19; P 271;91.4-7; P Sarakoton;162.31-163.1; see also Jackson's (266-268) discussion of the Arabic and Chinese sources.

45. K 1;12.29-13.4.

46. K 1;13.26-29; cf. K Intro.;5.21-33; Intro.;7.18-26; 1;16.21-22. A similar argument is used against other religious traditions which had appeared before the advent of Mani; see K Intro.;7.27-8.28.

47. K 1;13.26-14.2; compare Augustine Contra Faustum 33.3.

48. K 1;14.3-17; 1;16.19-21; P 223;9.3-5; 227;20.21-22.

49. K 1;14.32-15.24; 1;16.18-21; cf. K Intro.;5.27-28. Since the Paraclete had become one with Mani, Mani himself was also addressed as "the Paraclete"; see K 1;16.29-31; P 220;3.21; 222;8.25,30; 224;14.14-15; 227;20.19-24; cf. P 241;42.7-11. The tendency to appropriate the title "Paraclete" for Mani even resulted in the use of "the Spirit of the Paraclete" to designate the Spirit of Truth that united itself to Mani; see P 223;9.3 and H.-C. Puech, Le manichéisme, son fondateur, sa doctrine (Paris: S.A.E.P., 1949), 147 n.250. According to K 7;36.3-9, both Mani and the Paraclete which assumed him were in fact powers evoked or summoned by the Light-Mind.

50. K 101.9-12; P 241;42.7-11; cf. P Sarakoton;165.24-26.

51. The Manichaeans criticized the teachings of other religions (Copt. ΝΔΟΥΜΔ , "the sects") for failing to properly distinguish the two first principles and thus ultimately ascribing the origin of evil to God. See K 6;33,29-33; 65;161,28-29; 65;163,9-29; 65;164,5-8; 112;267,10-18; P 248;56.31-57.4; cf. K 1;12.29-32. Maintaining the correct distinction between the two principles was therefore an important part of Manichaean spirituality. See, for example, P 276;96.21-22 ("I confessed [ὁμολογεῖν] with all my heart that the Darkness came not out of the Light") and 248;56.21-30 ("I have distinguished this pair of trees of this pair of kingdoms,... the bitter fountain and the holy essence [οὐσία] of God. The Light I have distinguished from the Darkness, [life] from death, Christ and the church I have distinguished from the deceit [ἀπάτη] of the world [κόσμος]. I have known my soul and this body [σῶμα] that lies upon it, that they are enemies to each other before the creations, the...of divinity and the hostile power that are distinguished always. The body of death indeed and the soul are never in accord" (tr. Allberry). See also P 223;9.8-11; 231;28.14-15; 233;30.26-27; P Sarakoton;162.7.

52. The distinction between the spiritual attainments of the elect and those of the catechumens was sometimes blurred. In the Kephalaia, for example, it was admitted that catechumens could achieve a significant degree of purification in their present life (K 90;226.7-27); consequently, not all catechumens needed to be reborn in order to attain purification and ascend to the realm of Light (K 91;228.8-230.30).

53. P 232;30.14; 247;55,30; 248;57,17-18; 250;59.7-12; 252;61.19-21; 263;79.20-21; 273; 93.21-22; 275;95.28-30;

277;97.21; K 70;172.10-13. Cf. also the exhortations to diligent study or practice (μελέτη, μελετᾶν) and the warnings against being careless or neglectful (ἀμελεῖν) in P 241;45.31-32; 244;52.3; 245;53.15-16; 268;86.23; 280;101.28; P Trinity;116.14-15; P Sarakoton;150.20; 164.25-26; 166.4-5.

54. K 98;249.21-27; cf. P 275;96.2; P Sarakoton;151.19; 175.10-12; Augustine Contra Faustum 24.1. A similar standard was set for the catechumen who wished not to be reborn; see K 91;228.23-24; 91;229.11-12,15-20; and Ries, 372-373. For the prohibition of sexual intercourse and marriage among the elect in Manichaean sources, see also Nicholas Sims-Williams, "The Manichaean Commandments: A Survey of the Sources," in J. Asmussen, H. Bailey et al., Papers in Honour of Mary Boyce, v. 2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), 573-582 (esp. 576-577). The rejection of marriage and marital intercourse by the Manichaean elect was also noted in Egyptian anti-Manichaean literature. P. Rylands 469, which was probably written shortly before 300 A.D., reported, "Again the Manichees speak falsely against marriage saying that he does well who does not marry" (C.H. Roberts, Catalogue of the Greek and Latin Papyri in the John Rylands Library, Manchester, Volume III. Theological and Literary Texts (Nos. 457-551) [Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1938], 42, lines 12-13 [Greek text]; 43 [Eng. tr.]). The Platonist philosopher Alexander of Lycopolis, also writing in Egypt around 300 A.D., recorded, "One has to abstain from marriage and love-making and the begetting of children, lest because of the succession of the race, the power should dwell in matter for a longer time" (Brinkmann, 7, lines 21-23; Eng. tr. of P.W. Van der Horst and J. Mansfeld, An Alexandrian Platonist Against Dualism: Alexander of Lycopolis' Treatise 'Critique of the Doctrines of Manichaeus' [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974], 57). Regarding Manichaean abstention from marital intercourse and procreation, compare also the Seven Chapters ascribed to Zacharias of Mitylene and the long formula for the abjuration of Manichaeism (Samuel N. C. Lieu, "An Early Byzantine Formula for the Renunciation of Manichaeism," Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum 26 [1983]: 186, lines 205-206; 187 [1465C]; 211) as well as the eleventh anathema of the Synod of Braga (561) (A. Adam, Texte zum Manichäismus, 2 ed. [Berlin: Verlag Walter de Gruyter, 1969], 87, lines 42-43). Compare also the account given in Ibn al-Nadim's Fihrist, where Jesus the Splendour causes Adam "to fear Eve, explaining to him that she was forbidden, restraining him from [going to] her and making him afraid to approach her, so that he obeyed" (tr. of Bayard Dodge, The Fihrist of al-Nadim: A Tenth-Century Survey of Muslim Culture, v. 2 [New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970], 783).

55. K 70;172.13-17; 86;215.25-216.13; 86.216.21-24.

56. K 29;83.5-6; 120;288.17-18; cf. K 7;35.24-27; 28;80.29-32; 46;117.24-28; 93;235.4-13.

57. K 29;83.5-8; 89;223.8-12; 92;235.1-13; 94;240.11-12; 99;249.31-251.25; P Thomas 12;218.6-7; A.V.W. Jackson, "The Doctrine of Metempsychosis in Manichaeism," Journal of the American Oriental Society 45 (1925): 246-268; idem, "A Sketch of the Manichaean Doctrine Concerning the Future Life," Journal of the American Oriental Society 50 (1930): 177-178; Puech, 179 n.360.

58. K 92;236.1-4; 99;249.31-251.25.

59. K 89;221.28-223.16.

60. K 89;222.16-27; 89;223.8-10.

61. K 59;150.6-7,14; 89;222;11-12; 89;223.1-9,15-16; 115;271.9; cf. K 82;197.1-200.8; 99;250.15-27; 99;251.8-15.

62. K 5;29.1-4; 16;55.6-11,21-22; 66;165.6-11; P 223;11.8-9; cf. K 16;54.19-22; 17;56.28-29; 17;57.17-18,26; 24;71.8,16; 24;75.24-26; 32;86.12-13; 39;102.34; 39;104.4-5,11-12; 72;178.13-23.

63. K 39;104.6-12; 59;149.29-150.16.

64. K 16;52.16-17; cf. K 16;54.2; 46;118.6-7; P 223;11.6-7; 242;49.26-27. Compare also the previously unpublished Manichaean psalm edited by Gardner, Kellis, 23, 46/98:27. According to K 24;75.22-23, this conflagration will last for 1468 years.

65. K 16;52.17-19; 29;82.11-12; 40;105.10-14; 41;106.1-4,11-20; 66;165.11-15,22-23; cf. K 39;104.18-20.

66. K Intro.;5.15-18.

67. K 9;40.14-16; 11;44.2-4; 28;79.33-80.4; 29;82.8-12; 34;87.1; 46;118.8-12; P 219;1.32-2.1; 223;11.3-7,21-22; 235;32.30; P Sarakoton;137.60-66; 144.21; H 40.3-4; 41.20.

68. P 223;11.21-23; 229;25.29; 244;52.10-11; 245;54.5-6; K 7;36.25; 27;77.20-21; 28;79.34; 39;103.5-7,10-11,22-30; 105;259.21-23; H 41.11-17; cf. P 229;25.12-14; P Sarakoton;179.14.

Compare also T. Kell. Copt. 2, f. 4, lines 142-143 (Gardner, Kellis, 14).

69. Comm. Gen.T. 167.19 (=Comm. Gen. 1:2); Comm. Ps.T. 286.22-23; Comm. Eccl.T. 88.9; 274.18; 302.13; Comm. JobT. 64.13 (=Comm. Job 3:8); 134.20-21; 288.35; Comm. Zech.T. 309.22 (4.125); Comm. 2 Cor. 11:13-15 (Staab, 40, line 12). One further reference is found in the commentary on the Catholic epistles (Zoepfl, 66, line 13), a work which has been ascribed to Didymus but is actually composed of citations from various authors of different periods, as was noted in the previous chapter.

70. See Leipoldt (16) for a list of these passages.

71. Comm. Eccl.T. 302.12-16. The editors suggest that the manuscript's reading $\epsilon\rho\gamma\mu\omicron\upsilon$ (i.e. $\epsilon\rho\gamma\mu\omicron\upsilon$, "confine") in 302.14 is a mistake and propose the emendation $\epsilon\rho\mu\omicron\upsilon$ ("[logical] sequence").

72. CM 23.1-3 (PG 39, 1100D6-8).

73. Comm. Eccl.T. 88.9-10.

74. See Comm. Ps. 5:5-7 (PG 39, 1169C3-5; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 132, lines 1-2): "Since this is true, evil is not from God, as those who posit that wickedness is substantial think." Compare Comm. JobT. 2.5-16: "Therefore a rational substance became a rebel against God, 'having exalted himself before the Lord Almighty.' This is the Devil, who was not created a devil--for 'God did not make death'--but perfect and virtuous--for 'God made all things very good'--who, having fallen from an upright condition and blessedness, envies those who are turning towards this."

75. Acta Archelai 5 (Beeson, 7, lines 6-7).

76. Augustine De Genesi contra Manichaeos 2.28.42 (tr. of Roland J. Teske, Saint Augustine on Genesis: Two Books on Genesis Against the Manichees and On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991], 139).

77. John of Damascus Contra Manichaeos 34 (B. Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos IV. Liber de haeresibus. Opera polemica, PTS 22 [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981], 372, lines 1-2). Compare Zacharias of Mitylene Adversus Manichaeos με' (A. Demetrakopoulos, EΚΚΛΗΣΙΑΣΤΙΚΗ ΒΙΒΛΙΟΘΗΚΗ, v. 1 [Leipzig: O.

Bigandou, 1866; repr. Hildesheim, G.Olms, 1965), 12, lines 8-9=Paul the Persian Capita xlix contra Manichaeos, μ' (PG 88, 565D9-10).

78. Comm. Zech.T. 309.21-23 (4.125); even if the words "These are the Manichaeans" should prove to be a gloss, the identification of the opponents as Manichaeans is certainly correct. In the catena fragment on Romans 7 edited by Staab (4, lines 29-30), Didymus similarly repudiated the Manichaean position: "...the dominion of death was not without a beginning nor was it unoriginate." In Comm. Ps.T. 77.24-26, Didymus probably also had the Manichaeans in view when he remarked, "Evil, if it is not actualized, does not exist at all. On this account, many scriptural passages teach that it does not exist. From this it follows that there are not two first principles which are contrary in substance..."

79. Comm. 2 Cor. 11:13-15 (PG 39, 1724D2-9; Staab, 40, lines 9-14): "If one hears that he who transforms himself into an angel of light belongs to the darkness, let him not think that he [sc. the Devil] is such [i.e. darkness] in substance--for this Manichaean opinion is impious--for the Devil is evil and darkness by his own design, as in turn it is by his own purposive choice that he pretends to be the light for the sake of deceit, so that he might be considered to possess virtue and knowledge."

80. CM 37.4-17 (PG 39, 1108B12-C15).

81. See especially K 18;58.18-19 and P Sarakoton;162.31-163.1; compare P 248;56.21; 271;91.5-7; P Sarakoton;136.20-21; K 2;17.1-23.14; Acta Archelai 19 (Beeson, 29,line 29-30,line 10); Augustine Contra Fortunatum 14; Contra Felicem 2.2.

82. In Comm. Job 3:8 (PG 39, 1129D8-14; Hagedorn and Hagedorn, Die älteren...Hiob, v. 1, 291 [no. 30], lines 14-18)=Comm. JobT. 64.5-14, Didymus argued that when the Scriptures introduced the names of harmful creatures, they had in view not evil substances, but the various voluntary activities of the Devil: "The different names of the Devil indicate his different activities, not substances. For the Devil is called 'adversary,' 'Evil One,' 'lion,' 'serpent,' 'snake,' and 'sea-monster' on account of his conduct, since he brings about evil in different ways. This very fact refutes the Manichaean doctrine."

83. CM 20.1-3; 21.6-7,16 (PG 39, 1097D6-10; 1100B5-6, C1). The names "sinner", "enemy" and "death" were similarly discussed in Comm. Ps. 10:15 (9:36 LXX) (PG 39,1617A3-8; Mühlberg, v. 1, 160, lines 16-19); Comm. Ps.T 78.8-14; and Comm. Eccl.T. 319.3-4; 334.6-15. In these passages it is not clear from the context whether

the Manichaeans were in view; in each instance, Didymus observed that the names referred not to an evil substance, but to a quality arising from purposive choice.

84. According to Ephraem Syrus' Fourth Discourse to Hypatius, the Manichaeans pointed to "harmful creeping things" (such as serpents) as evidence for the existence of a separate evil principle (Mitchell, v. 1, 108-111 [Syriac]; lxxxiii-lxxxiv [Eng. tr.]). The same argument is given in greater detail in Titus of Bostra Contra Manichaeos 1.3 (Lagarde, 3, lines 16-19) and 2.41 (*ibid.*, 50, lines 22-29), whose remarks are reiterated in Epiphanius Panarion 66.17.4-7. See also Augustine's presentation of the argument in Contra Faustum 21.1,4,10,12-13 and De moribus Manichaeorum 11, 14, 18. Compare also P. Kell. Copt. 2, line 37 (Gardner, Kellis, 37), which is fragmentary; John the Grammarian Second Homily Against the Manichaeans 16 (M. Richard, Iohannis Caesariensis presbyteri et grammatici Opera quae supersunt, CCSG 1 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1977], 99, lines 251-252; erroneously published under the name of Paul the Persian in PG 88, 576D14-15); Zacharias of Mitylene Adversus Manichaeos μζ' (Demetrakopoulos, 13, lines 3-4)=Paul the Persian Capita xlix contra Manichaeos μβ' (PG 88, 568B8).

85. Augustine De moribus Manichaeorum 11 (tr. of Richard Stothert, Augustine. Works: A New Translation. Vol. 5: Writings in Connection with the Manichaean Heresy [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1872], 57-58).

86. "The Devil": K 63;156.33; 89;222.31; 89;223.2-3,6; 109;264.11-12; 115;272.10; P 250;59.7; "the Evil One": K 1;12.29; 80.4. For the formation of the King of Darkness (=the Devil) from the evil substance, see K 6;31.8-16.

87. Compare Augustine Contra Fortunatum 14 (R. Jolivet and M. Jourjon, Six traités anti-manichéens [Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961], 148): Hinc vere constat ex ratione rerum, quod duae sunt substantiae in hoc mundo, quae speciebus et nominibus distant... The Coptic Manichaean Psalm-Book also affirms that after the final victory of good over evil, "no name of sin shall be uttered again" (P Thomas 2;207.13-14). It is not clear, however, whether such passages indicate a broader polemical or apologetic interest in the names of the evil power.

88. CM 30.6,9-10 (PG 39, 1104B12; 1104B15-C1). Compare ps.-Athanasius Sermo contra omnes haereses 7 (PG 28, 513A5,7-9).

89. Compare Epiphanius Panarion 66.9.6 (Holl, 30, line 7-8).

90. Comm. JobT. 288.34-289.5: "[The soul] has been coupled with [the body] not in the way Mani thought, but...having followed....in other....the Creator joined it [to the body which had been made for] union with it...." The catena fragment on Romans 7 alludes to "the good God...[sending] down souls which are consubstantial with himself into our bodies" (Staab, 4, lines 35-36). It is not clear why Didymus spoke of God as being responsible for the soul's descent and union with the body. Didymus may have been assimilating Manichaean teaching to his own Platonic/Origenist framework; for the use of *καταπέμπειν* in this context, see the remarks of John Dillon (Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993], 137) and compare Albinus (Alcinous) Didaskalikos 16.2; Hermetic Corpus Exc. 24.3-4; Epictetus Diss. 3.22.59; and Tripartite Tractate (NH 1.5) 105.35-37.

91. Staab, 4, lines 37-38.

92. See the catena fragment on Romans 7 (Staab, 4, line 34-5, line 4) and Comm. Ps.T. 286.16-31. In both passages, Didymus regarded these two inclinations (the Manichaeans' *ἐνθυμήσεις*) as two opposing wills and attempted to show that this idea led to unacceptable conclusions. In the first passage, Didymus argued that if the body were evil, then it would naturally follow the evil will and perform evil actions, while the good will associated with the soul would always remain ineffective; the fact that virtuous actions do occur, however, shows that this cannot be the case. In the second passage, Didymus argued that if, as the Manichaeans asserted, every human being had two wills, then Christ (as a human being) would also have had two wills, one good and one evil; the idea that Christ had an evil will is then rejected as impious.

93. CM 10.6-7 (PG 39, 1093B4-5). Didymus asserted that the Manichaeans defended their belief that the flesh was evil by referring to the Pauline phrases "flesh of sin" (Rom. 8:3) and "body of sin" (Rom. 6:6); see CM 7.6 (PG 39, 1092C1-2).

In the catena fragment on Romans 7 edited by Staab (1, lines 4-6; 2, lines 2-3, 7-8; 4, lines 31-36; 5, lines 13-16), Didymus' opponents also advanced as proof-texts Rom. 7:17-18 and 7:23-24. François Decret (Aspects du manichéisme dans l'Afrique romaine: Les controverses de Fortunatus, Faustus et Felix avec saint Augustin [Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1970], 174; "L'utilisation des Épîtres de Paul chez les manichéens d'Afrique," in J. Ries et al., Le Epistole Paoline nei manichei, i donatisti e il primo Augustino [Rome: Istituto Patristico Augustinianum, 1989], 52) has noted the important role played by citations from Rom. 7 in the arguments of Augustine's

Manichaean opponents. See especially Augustine Confessions 5.10.18 (where Augustine is apparently satirizing the Manichaean interpretation of Rom. 7:17,20) and Contra Fortunatum 21 (where Rom. 7:23-25 is cited as a proof-text by Fortunatus); compare also Augustine's incidental remarks about the Manichaean interpretation of Rom. 7 in his De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum 1, q. 1, 16. For the use of Rom. 7:18,24 in Manichaean polemic, see also Anastasius of Sinai Hodegos 14.2.43-48 (Karl-Heinz Uthemann, Anastasioi Sinaitae Viae dux, CCSG 8 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1981], 260); Rom. 7:23,24 are cited to support the Manichaean position in Disputatio iii Photini Manichaei cum Paulo Christiano (PG 88, 548C15-D8).

Didymus' treatment of Eph. 2:3 in CM 1.1-2.2 (PG 39, 1089B) suggests that his opponents had also appealed to this as a proof-text, perhaps to show that the soul, by being bound to the flesh, came to possess an evil nature and was therefore alienated from God. A similar use of Eph. 2:3 is found in Augustine Contra Fortunatum 17 (Jolivet and Jourjon, 156-158), as has been noted by Mehlmann, 41 n.5, 173.

94. CM 14.1-2,6-7,14-21 (PG 39, 1096B9-C1,C5-6, C14-D8). In his response, Didymus treated his opponents as failing to distinguish marital intercourse from fornication (CM 14.17-20; PG 39, 1096D4-7); a similar characterization of the Manichaean position is found in Augustine Contra Felicem 1.7-8 (Jolivet and Jourjon, 660-662).

95. CM 13.10,20-21 (PG 39, 1096A8; B5).

96. CM 12.1-13.3 (PG 39, 1093D2-9). In Zoepfl's edition of the Commentary on the Catholic Epistles, which contains some material derived from Didymus' Old Testament commentaries, there is an anonymous Greek catena fragment that deals with the Manichaeans' docetic Christology: "There were certain persons who said that the Lord had come down from heaven in the appearance of a man, whose opinions the Manichaeans further asserted" (Comm. 1 Jn. 4:2-3; Zoepfl, 66, lines 10-13). Whether this fragment is to be ascribed to Didymus or some other writer will only be known when the contents of the Commentary on the Catholic Epistles have been further analyzed.

97. P Heracleides; 194.1-3. For the use of σχῆμα in the Coptic Manichaean texts from Medinet Medi to indicate the "material shape" which the historical Jesus assumed for the duration of his apostolate and then put off, see Paul Van Lindt, "Remarks on the Use of σχῆμα in the Coptic Manichaica," in Peter Bryder, ed., Manichaean Studies. Proceedings of the First International Conference on Manichaeism,

Lund Studies in African and Asian Religions 1 (Lund: Plus Ultra, 1988), 95-103; see also Gardner (Kellis, 5) and compare Acta Archelai 8.4 (Beeson, 12, lines 24-26)=Epiphanius Panarion 66.26.5 (Holl, 59, lines 5-8). In discussing P Heracleides; 194.1-3, Van Lindt ("Remarks," 100) suggests reading $\text{N}[\text{T}\text{A}\text{N}\text{T}\text{P}\text{O}\text{M}\text{E}]$ "of [manhood]" (cf. P 226;19.27-28) at the end of the passage.

98. See P 248;57.3-14 (with Allberry's note); Acta Archelai 15.9-10 (Beeson, 24, line 30-25, line 5); Serapion of Thmuis Adversus Manichaeos 25 (Casey, 41, lines 8-18); Titus of Bostra Contra Manichaeos 3.2 (Lagarde, 67, lines 18-20); 3.8.1 (P. Nagel, "Neues griechisches Material zu Titus von Bostra (Adversus Manichaeos III.7-29)," in J. Irmscher and P. Nagel, eds., Studia Byzantina. Folge II [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973], 300, line 6); Ephraem Syrus Hymnen contra haereses 51.14 (Edmund Beck, Des heiligen Ephraem des Syrers Hymnen contra omnes haereses, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium 169 [Scriptores Syri 76] [Louvain: Secrétariat du CorpusSCO, 1957], 198, lines 18-23); Secundinus Epistola 3 (Jolivet and Jourjon, 516); Augustine De haeresibus 46; Ep. 236.2; Contra Adimantum 13.4 (Jolivet and Jourjon, 286); Contra Faustum 4.1; 6.2; 15.1; 18.2; and the passages cited in A. Anthony Moon, The De natura boni of Saint Augustine: A Translation with an Introduction and Commentary (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1955), 175. See also Villey (194) and Wolfgang Wassilios Klein, Die Argumentation in den griechisch-christlichen Antimanichaica (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1991), 176-189.

99. CM 31.10-13 (PG 39, 1104D9-1105A2); see Lk. 16:16 and compare Mt. 11:13.

100. Augustine De utilitate credendi 4 (tr. of Whitney J. Oates, Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, v. 1 [New York: Random House, 1948], 401).

101. Lieu, 179, 215; compare the testimony of Peter Siculus in C. Astruc et al., "Les sources grecques pour l'histoire des Pauliciens d'Asie Mineure," in Travaux et mémoires 4 (Paris: Éditions E. de Boccard, 1970), 25, lines 3-4; 133, lines 5-6.

102. Lieu, 178, lines 46-48; 179 [1466D]. According to these texts, the book in question was written by "Adda and Adeimantos." It is unclear whether these were two names of the same person or whether the book is to be identified with the treatise refuted by Augustine in his Contra Adimantum. Nonetheless, Augustine appears to have identified this Adimantus with Addas, the disciple of Mani;

see Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum 2.12.42.1321-1322 (Klaus-D. Daur, Sancti Aurelii Augustini Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum, CCSL 49 [Turnhout: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1985], 131); Retractationes 1.22.1.2 (Almut Mutzenbecher, Sancti Aurelii Augustini Retractationum libri II, CCSL 57 [Turnhout: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1984], 63).

103. CM 34.1-4,18 (PG 39, 1105B5-8, C11).

104. Augustine Contra Adimantum 5.1 (Jolivet and Jourjon, 236); compare Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum 2.5.17. Cf. also Augustine Ep. 236.2: "They [sc. the Manichaeans] speak evil of the patriarchs and the prophets" (tr. in Jes P. Asmussen, Manichaean Literature: Representative Texts Chiefly from Middle Persian and Parthian Writings [Delmar, New York: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1975], 15). Abraham's character was also called into question by the Manichaeans Faustus (Contra Faustum 22.5; 32.4) and Secundinus (Epistola 3; Jolivet and Jourjon, 516); compare Acta Archelai 45.6 (Beeson, 66, lines 17-18), the Seven Chapters attributed to Zacharias of Mitylene and the long formula for the abjuration of Manichaeism (Lieu 180, lines 90-91; 181). In his Tathbit dala'il al-nubuwwa, the tenth-century Mu'tazilite theologian 'Abd al-Jabbar also alluded to the Manichaeans' criticism of Abraham and their association of him with the evil power; see Guy Monnot, "Quelques textes de 'Abd al-Jabbar sur le manichéisme," Revue de l'histoire des religions 183 (1973): 4.

105. See P 251;60.18-19; 256;68.13; 281;102.10; P Heracleides; 192.20; H 2.27; 11.4,10; compare Acta Archelai 44.6 (Beeson, 65, lines 3-6); Augustine Contra Faustum 15.1; 18.2. In Comm. Ps. 118:51 (PG 39, 1569C11-14; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 282), Didymus may have had the Manichaeans in view when he remarked: "When the heterodox made false claims against the Law by slandering it, I vehemently held fast to the observance of it, not allowing my assent to it to waver to any extent."

106. Staab, 2, lines 2-3; 3, lines 31-34; 4, lines 13-16; see Alexander Böhlig ("Die Bibel bei den Manichäern," [Diss., Evangelisch-theologischen Fakultät der Westfälischen Landesuniversität zu Münster i. W., 1947], 17), who discusses the relation of this exegesis of Rom. 8:2 to the Manichaean reinterpretation of Paul's concept of the "Old Man." Paul's strident denunciation of the Law is also alluded to in the Coptic Manichaean Psalm-Book: "The axe of the Law (νόμος) is Paul the Apostle" (P Heracleides; 192.20).

107. Augustine Contra Faustum 19.2 (tr. of Stothert, 327). Compare Acta Archelai 45.1 (Beeson, 65, line 30).

108. Augustine Contra Fortunatum 21 (Jolivet and Jourjon, 174).

109. Compare Origen Hom. Gen. 3.6; 5.4 (L. Doutreleau, Origène. Homélie sur la Genèse, SC 7 bis [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1976], 134, lines 8-9; 172, line 34-174, line 44; 174, lines 51-54); Comm. Rom. 2.13 (PG 14, 909C5-9; Theresia Heither, Origenes. Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos. Liber primus, liber secundus, Fontes Christiani 2.1 [Freiburg: Herder, 1990], 286, lines 10-13); Hom. Lk. 6.1 (M. Rauer, Origenes Werke. Neunter Band. Die Homilien zu Lukas in der Übersetzung des Hieronymus und die griechischen Reste der Homilien und des Lukas-Kommentars, 2 ed., GCS 49 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1959], 32, lines 14-20; H. Crouzel, F. Fournier and P. Périchon, Origène. Homélie sur S. Luc. SC 87 [Paris: Cerf, 1962], 142); Comm. 1 Cor. 7:8-12 (C. Jenkins, "Origen on 1 Corinthians. III," Journal of Theological Studies 9 [1908]: 505, line 48). For the previous use of this distinction in Stoic diatribe and the early Christian apologists, see H. Crouzel, Virginité et mariage selon Origène [Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1963], 79-80 n.9.

110. Comm. Eccl.T. 274.18-275.2. Compare Comm. Ps.T. 210.22-25; Comm. Gen.T. 235.2-7=Comm. Gen. 16:2-3 (Petit, La chaîne sur la Genèse. Edition intégrale III, 74; cf. F. Petit, La chaîne sur la Genèse. Edition intégrale IV. Chapitres 29 à 50 [Louvain: Peeters, 1996], 27 [fr. 1560, lines 1-2]). See also Comm. Eccl.T. 75.3-10 and 278.22-279.1, where Didymus further developed these ideas.

111. Presumably the Manichaean argument is to be reconstructed as follows: We commend those who take up the ascetic life in obedience to the commands of Jesus and practice celibacy; what then are we to make of the Old Testament patriarchs who married and had sexual relations with their wives? Compare Titus of Bostra Contra Manichaeos 3.7.12 (Nagel, "Neues," 298, line 12), where the fecundity (πολυγονία) of the Old Testament saints is sufficient to show them worthy of blame.

The argument advanced by Didymus' Manichaean opponent was clearly intended to leave Didymus in an awkward position, compelling him either to embrace the ascetic ideal and abandon the Old Testament or embrace the Old Testament and abandon the ascetic ideal. An argument of similar design appears in CM 38.1-39.12 (PG 39, 1108D1-1109A10), where promise and punishment are opposed to one another in such a way that the Christian will be obliged to give up one of his or her beliefs to save the other.

112. Comm. JobT. 134.17-31.

113. Tertullian Adversus Marcionem 1.16.4; 2.14.1; 3.24.1; 4.1.10; 5.11.4 (Ernest Evans, Tertullian: Adversus Marcionem [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972], 42, 124, 246; 260, 578; René Braun, Tertullien: Contre Marcion, v. 1, SC 365 [Paris: Cerf, 1990], 176, line 28; v. 2, SC 368 [1991], 92, line 2; v. 3, SC 399 [1994], 202, line 7). See also E.P. Meijering, Tertullian Contra Marcion: Gotteslehre in der Polemik Adversus Marcionem I-II (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977), 51-52, 124. Dt. 32:39 also appears in the Marcionite antitheses which are put in the mouth of Simon Magus in pseudo-Clementine Homily 17.4.2 (Bernhard Rehm and Johannes Irmscher, Die Pseudoklementinen I: Homilien, GCS 42 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1953], 230, lines 19-22); compare also pseudo-Clementine Recognition 2.43.1-2 (Bernhard Rehm and Franz Paschke, Die Pseudoklementinen II. Rekognitionen in Rufins Übersetzung, GCS 51 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1965], 77, lines 15-21).

114. Origen Contra Celsum 2.24 (Marcel Borret, Origène: Contre Celse, v. 1, SC 132 [Paris: Cerf, 1967], 350, lines 24-26, 30-31, 36-38); Hom. Jer. 1.16 (Pierre Husson and Pierre Nautin, Origène. Homélie sur Jérémie, v. 1, SC 232 [Paris: Cerf, 1976], 232, line 18-234, line 21; 234, lines 30-31); Hom. Lk. 16.4-5 (Crouzel, Fournier and Périchon, 240-242); Comm. Mt. 15.11 (E. Klostermann, Origenes Werke. Origenes Matthäuserklärung I, GCS 40 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1935], 378, line 14-379, line 12); Comm. Rom. 6.6 (PG 14, 1068B10-13; cf. A. Ramsbotham, "The Commentary of Origen on the Epistle to the Romans. II," Journal of Theological Studies 13 [1912]: 368 [fr. 34, lines 7-10]). See Adolf von Harnack, Der kirchengeschichtliche Ertrag der exegetischen Arbeiten des Origenes. II. Teil: Die beiden Testamente mit Ausschluss des Hexateuchs und des Richterbuchs, TU 42.4 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1919), 66.

115. Origen Contra Celsum 2.24; Hom. Jer. 1.16; 16.6; Comm. Mt. 15.11; Comm. Rom. 6.5 (PG 14, 1065B8-12). Only one other occurrence of this combination of Dt. 32:39 and Job 5:18 is listed in the first five volumes of the Biblia Patristica (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1975-1991): Basil of Caesarea Hom. in Ps. 39 (PG 29, 313C14-D4). Since Basil appears to have been reproducing material from Origen (Hom. Jer. 1.16; 16.6) and Didymus is not known to have read Basil's works, this exception can be set aside as irrelevant to the present inquiry.

116. K 89;221.18-223.16 (especially K 87;22.14-15) and compare K 82;199.24-26; 99;250.20-30.

117. Comm. Gen. 1:2 (Petit, La chaîne sur la Genèse. Édition intégrale I, 11-12). Since the section of the Tura papyrus containing this passage (Comm. Gen.T. 3A.4-5) had been badly damaged and Petit's edition of the catena fragment had not yet been published, Nautin and Doutreleau were obliged to restore the text of the Tura commentary by reference to Procopius' epitome (PG 87, 41C4-7), which reads, "But the enemy of God Mani says that the word 'was' (Gen.1.2a) indicates the unoriginate character of matter."

118. Comm. Gen.T. 167.18-23.

119. Nautin and Doutreleau, v. 1, 25-26, 39 n.

120. Hippolytus Refutatio 8.17.1-2 (M. Marcovich, Hippolytus. Refutatio omnium haeresium, PTS 25 [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986], 336-337); Tertullian Adversus Hermogenem 1.4; 4.1; Theodoret Haer. 1.19 (PG 83, 369B). The idea that matter was contemporaneous with God (σύγχρονος τῷ θεῷ) was regarded by the doxographers as a Platonic doctrine; see Hippolytus Refutatio 1.19.4 (Marcovich, 76, lines 12-13) and compare Adamantius De recta fide in Deum 4.4 (W.H. van de Sande Bakhuyzen, Der Dialog des Adamantius [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1901], 144, line 6; Vincenz Buchheit, Tyrannii Rufini librorum Adamantii Origenis adversus haereticos interpretatio [Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1966], 62, line 9). Unformed matter was also described as "unoriginate" by the Middle Platonist Atticus (in Proclus Comm. in Tim. 1.276.30-1.277.7; 1.283.27-29; cf. Eusebius Praep. evang. 15.6.3-4); compare Plutarch (De animae procreatione in Timaeo 5 [1014B]) and Calcidius (Comm. in Tim. 293), who say simply that matter was always available to the Demiurge.

121. Tertullian Adversus Hermogenem 23.1 (tr. of J.H. Waszink, Tertullian: The Treatise against Hermogenes [Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1956], 57); compare 27.1 and Gerhard May, Schöpfung aus dem Nichts: Die Entstehung der Lehre von der creatio ex nihilo (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1978), 147 (ET Creatio ex nihilo: The Doctrine of 'Creation Out of Nothing' in Early Christian Thought, tr. by A.S. Worall [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994], 144). It is likely that all the known instances of this interpretation in Greek writers can be traced back to Hermogenes, whose views were known through the critical accounts given by Hippolytus and Origen. See Origen's commentary on Gen. 1:2 in Eusebius Praep. evang. 7.20.1-9 (Guy Schroeder and Édouard des Places, Eusèbe de

Césarée. La préparation évangélique. Livre VII, SC 215 [Paris: Cerf, 1975], 270-276); Adamantius De recta fide in Deum 4.4 (Sande Bakhuyzen, 144, lines 6-9; Buchheit, 62, lines 9-14); and Ambrose Hexameron 1.7.25 (C. Schenkl, Sancti Ambrosii episcopi mediolanensis Opera 1. Exameron [Milan: Biblioteca Ambrosiana, 1979], 54). Hermogenes' interpretation of ἦν ("was") in Gen. 1:2a may have a Platonic background. Compare Plotinus Enneads 3.7.6.50-57, where the word ἦν ("was") in Timaeus 29E1 was similarly discussed; see Matthias Baltes, Die Weltenstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten, v. 1 (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1976), 133-134.

122. Theodoret Haer. 1.19 (PG 83, 369C5).

123. See Diogenes Laertius 7.134.

124. See Plutarch De animae procreatione in Timaeo 6 (1014F-1015A); Albinus (Alcinous) Didaskalikos 8.2-3; 11.1; Hippolytus Refutatio 1.19.3; and Calcidius Comm. in Tim. 310, 319, 331. Compare Methodius De autexousio (A. Vaillant, Méthode d'Olympe. Le De autexousio, PO 22.5 [Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1930], 743, line 5; 755, lines 1-2; 757, line 14).

125. Tertullian's discussion of this point is admittedly rather vague. It is clear from Adversus Hermogenem 23.1 that Hermogenes interpreted the words "invisible and unfinished" in Gen. 1:2a as meaning that matter was "shapeless." Tertullian understood this to mean that matter lacked form (Adversus Hermogenem 25.1; 26.1; 28.1; 30.2) and thus presumably also quality. By analyzing the Middle Platonic background of Adversus Hermogenem 35-37, Waszink (Treatise, 5-6) concluded: "As to the condition of matter, it may be regarded as certain that he [sc. Hermogenes] asserted it to be without any quality."

126. See Calcidius Comm. in Tim. 298 (reporting the views of Numenius) and Plutarch De Iside et Osiride 49 (371A-B).

127. Hippolytus Refutatio 8.17.2 (Marcovich, 336, lines 6-10); compare also 8.17.1 and Tertullian Adversus Hermogenem 38.2-4. The likening of turbulent, unformed matter to boiling water may have a Platonic background; the comparison of unformed matter to fluid in motion is also found in Numenius (in Calcidius Comm. in Tim. 296 and Eusebius Praep. evang. 15.17.2).

128. Nautin and Doutreleau, v. 1, 26.

129. Plutarch Quaestiones conviviales 8.2 (719E); Platonicae quaestiones 4 (1003A); De animae procreatione in Timaeo 5 (1014B); Albinus (Alcinous) Didaskalikos 12.2; 13.3; Calcidius Comm. in Tim. 300-301.

130. Plato Timaeus 30A (tr. of F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato [London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1937], 33. I have altered Cornford's "is visible" to "was visible" to more accurately render Plato's ἦν. See also Timaeus 34A; 43B; 52C-53B (especially 52E) and 69B. For a brief summary of Plato's account of disorderly motion, see Eduard Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 5 ed. (Leipzig: O.R. Reisland, 1922), 719-744.

131. Hippolytus Refutatio 8.17.2. Compare Tertullian Adversus Hermogenem 41.1; cf. 43.1.

132. See Calcidius Comm. in Tim. 298-299 (=Numenius, fr. 52 Des Places); R. Beutler, "Numenius," in A.F. von Pauly, G. Wissowa, W. Kroll and K. Mittelhaus, Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Supplement 7 (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1940), 674; and J.C.M. van Winden, Calcidius on Matter: His Doctrine and Sources. A Chapter in the History of Platonism, 2 ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965), 118.

133. Tertullian Adversus Hermogenem 42.1. For matter's resistance to the formative power of the Demiurge and his providential designs, see Porphyry De antro nympharum 5 and 9 with the remarks of Jean Pépin, "Porphyre, exégète d'Homère," in H. Dörrie et al., Porphyre: Huit exposés suivis de discussions, Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique 12 (Geneva: Vandoeuvres, 1965), 244-245 (especially 245 n.1).

134. See Augustus Neander, Antignostikus; or The Spirit of Tertullian, tr. J.E. Ryland (London: H.G. Bohn, 1851), 451, 453; G. Uhlhorn, "Hermogenes," in J.J. Herzog and A. Hauck, Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, 3 ed. (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1899), 757; J.H. Waszink, "Observations on Tertullian's Treatise against Hermogenes," Vigiliae Christianae 9 (1955), 134. Compare Plato Politicus 273B-D and Methodius De autexousio (Vaillant, 753, lines 7-8).

135. Calcidius Comm in Tim. 298=Numenius, fr. 52 (Des Places) (tr. of van Winden, 114-115). On the translation and interpretation of this difficult passage, see also J. Den Boeft, Calcidius on Fate: His Doctrines and Sources (Leiden: E.J. Brill,

1970), 76. This passage in Calcidius appears in the middle of a section which reports Numenius' "Pythagorean" responses to Stoic teaching; see Comm. in Tim. 295-297 and 299, where Numenius is mentioned by name. In Comm. in Tim. 298, immediately after the section quoted, Pythagoras is invoked as an authority when the interpretation of the Timaeus is being discussed. This suggests that 298 may also report the views of Numenius and his reflections upon Stoic teaching, as van Winden (115) holds.

136. Hippolytus Refutatio 5.14.5 (Marcovich, 179, lines 27-28); 5.16.6 (Marcovich, 183, lines 30-31); 5.17.2 (Marcovich, 185, line 11).

137. Hippolytus Refutatio 5.16.2-3 (Marcovich, 182, lines 7-13); compare 5.14.1-14.

138. See V. Stegemann, "Zu Kapitel 69 der Kephalaia des Mani," Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 37 (1938): 214-223; R. Beck, "The Anabibazontes in the Manichaean Kephalaia," Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 69 (1987): 193-196; S.N.C. Lieu, Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China, 2 ed. (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1992), 177-179. Cf. also the canons ascribed to Maruta of Maipherqat: "They [sc. the Manichaeans] proclaim the seven and twelve (planets). They say that there are thrums and lots and the signs of the zodiac. They persevere in the chaldaean art" (tr. of Arthur Vööbus, The Canons Ascribed to Maruta of Maipherqat and Related Sources, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium 440 [Scriptores Syri 192] [Louvain: Peeters, 1982], 19, lines 14-16).

139. K 69;167.23-30; 69;168.1-7; 69;169.9-13. Presumably the two lunar nodes (K 69;168.7,13; 69;169.14), whose character and activities resembled those of the planets and zodiacal signs, had the same origin.

140. K 4;27.14-20; 15;48.34-35; 47;120.12-18; 69;167;32-33; 69;168.12-16; cf. K 4;26.11-13,17-18; 46;117.34-118.8; 64;157.23-32. Compare also Alexander of Lycopolis' summary of Manichaean mythology, where the stars are said to be "moderately evil" (Brinkmann, 6, line 12).

141. K 47;119.2-17; 69;167.3-9; 69;168.16-26; 69;169.9-11; 70;173,24-30.

142. K 47;119.3,10-12,17; 69;167.11-13.

143. K 47;119.17-20; 48;121.22-24; 48;121.35-122;5; 69;167.20-22; 69.168.26-168.8; cf. K 47.119.24-120.20. Compare also P. Kell. Copt. 1, lines 6-8 (Gardner, Kellis, 56).

144. K 69;169.17-22; cf. 48;121.3-5,11-12,22-24; 48;121.35-122.4; 48;122.10-11; 48;123.12-15; 48;124.25-31. Due to the obscurity of these passages, my reconstruction of this point is conjectural.

145. K 47;119.20-23; 48;121.6-11,25-30.

146. K 48;121.25-32; cf. K 69;168.26-169.8; 86;215.15-29; 86;216.14-21. It is not clear precisely how this downpouring of waste was supposed to produce these evils; the answer appears to lie in part in the fact that the planets and zodiacal signs had corresponding agencies which dwelt in the human body and produced bodily corruption (K 70;175.6-24; cf. K 70;172.30-32). The connection between the "rulers" or "leaders" on the celestial sphere (i.e. the planets and the signs of the zodiac) and those in the body is nonetheless not clearly explained; see K 4;27.10-12; 48;121.18-20; 48;122.6-8; 64;157.23-32; 86;215.5-11.

147. Cf. K 57;144.22-146.22; 57;147.1-17.

148. Comm. Act. Apost. 24:15 (Cramer, v. 3, 378, lines 4-18).

149. Irenaeus Adversus haereses 1.27.2; Tertullian Adversus Marcionem 1.19.4-5; 4.34.15; ps.-Tertullian Contra omnes haereses 6.1-2; Epiphanius Panarion 42.4.1-2; A. von Harnack, Marcion. Das Evangelium vom fremden Gott, 2 ed., TU 45 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1924), 106-117. According to Irenaeus Adversus haereses 1.7.3, Valentinus offered a different analysis, asserting that the contents of the Old Testament were derived from three different sources; a threefold division is also found in Ptolemaeus Epistula ad Florum (in Epiphanius Panarion 33.4.1-2; 33.5.1-7; 33.6.1-5). Didymus' confusion may have arisen from acquaintance with a heresiological work which attributed the Marcionite position to Valentinus; see, for example, Hippolytus Refutatio 6.35.1.

150. Irenaeus Adversus haereses 1.27.3; Tertullian Adversus Marcionem 1.24.3; Hippolytus Refutatio 10.19.3; Adamantius De recta fide in Deum 5.20 (Sande Bakhuyzen, 214, lines 3-10); Epiphanius Panarion 42.3.5; Harnack, Marcion, 136-137.

151. Irenaeus Adversus haereses 1.6.1-2; 1.7.5.

152. See Irenaeus Adversus haereses 1.6.1; 1.6.4; 1.7.1; 1.7.5; Clement of Alexandria Strom. 4.13.91.2; Ptolemaeus Epistula ad Floram (in Epiphanius Panarion 33.7.4-5).

153. In early Christian literature ἐγερσις ("raising" or "awaking") was used as a synonym for ἀνάστασις (νεκρῶν) ("resurrection [of the dead]"), a usage which appears already in the New Testament itself (Mt. 27:53). The persons to whom Didymus referred appear to have believed in a spiritual resurrection occurring in this present life, through which one received knowledge and became enlightened. See Excerpta ex Theodoto 3.1-2; 7.5; and the Nag Hammadi Treatise on the Resurrection (NH 1.4) 49.15-26 with the parallel passages cited in Michel Malinine et al., De resurrectione (Zurich: Rascher Verlag, 1963), 42 (on 49.15-16); Malcolm Lee Peel, The Epistle to Rheginos: A Valentinian Letter on the Resurrection (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969), 96; Jacques E. Ménard, Le traité de la résurrection (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université de Laval, 1983), 79-81; H.W. Attridge, ed., Nag Hammadi Codex I (The Jung Codex) (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), 205-206.

154. Didymus Comm. Gen.T. 143.14-15; Comm. Act. Apost. 10:10 (PG 39, 1676B-D; Cramer, v. 3, 175-176); Comm. Act. Apost. 16:16 (Cramer, v. 3, 269-270); Comm. Act. Apost. 18:9-11 (Cramer, v. 3, 304); Comm. Zech.T. 133.1 (2.175). Compare Origen Contra Celsum 5.61 (= Philocalia 16.3); Expositio in Proverbia (PG 17, 189D7-8); Comm. Mt. 10.11; Comm. Jn. 20.8.54; 20.17.135; 28.21.179; 28.21.183; Comm. Eph. fr. 9, line 220 (J.A.F. Gregg, "The Commentary of Origen upon the Epistle to the Ephesians: Part II," Journal of Theological Studies 3 [1902], 404). Origen's description of the Valentinian account of salvation history in terms of fixed natures is discussed by W.A. Löhr, "Gnostic Determinism Reconsidered," Vigiliae Christianae 46 (1992): 381-390.

155. Didymus Comm. Gen.T. 144.2,4; Comm. Act. Apost. 18:9-11 (Cramer, v. 3, 304).

156. Didymus Comm. Gen.T. 144.1-2; Comm. Zech.T. 133.2-3 (2.175); Comm. Act. Apost. 9:15 (PG 39, 1672C-1673A; Cramer, v. 3, 157-158). Cf. Irenaeus Adversus haereses 1.6.2; 1.7.5; Clement of Alexandria Strom. 4.13.89.4; Excerpta ex Theodoto 56.3; Tripartite Tractate (NH 1.5) 119.16-18; François Sagnard, La gnose valentinienne et le témoignage de Saint Irénée (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1947), 137; Luise Schotroff, "Animae naturaliter salvandae: zum Problem der himmlischen Herkunft des Gnostikers," in Walther Eltester, Christentum und Gnosis (Berlin:

Verlag Alfred Töpelmann, 1969), 82-96. Compare also Second Apocalypse of James (NH 5.4) 59.9-10.

157. Didymus Comm. Act. Apost. 8:22 (PG 39, 1668D-1669A; Cramer, v. 3, 139-140); Comm. Act. Apost. 13:10 (Cramer, v. 3, 215-216); Comm. Act. Apost. 13:10-11 (Cramer, v. 3, 216). Compare Comm. Ps.T. 250.13.

158. Comm. Gen.T. 143.15-144.1; 144.3-4; Comm. Zech.T. 133.2 (2.175); Comm. Act. Apost. 10:10 (PG 39, 1676B-D; Cramer, v. 3, 175-176). Compare Irenaeus Adversus haereses 1.6.1-2; 1.7.5; Excerpta ex Theodoto 56.3; Tripartite Tractate (NH 1.5) 106.6; 109.18-19; Origen Comm. Jn. 32.19.246; Corpus Hermeticum 9.5.

159. Didymus Comm. Ps. 2:8 (PG 39, 1160B; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 124, lines 7-30); Comm. Ps. 22:3a (PG 39, 1289C; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 236); 52:4 (PG 39, 1401D; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 6).

160. Comm. Act. Apost. 4:24-25 (PG 39, 1664A3-14; Cramer, v. 3, 79, lines 22-31).

161. Comm. Act. Apost. 9:6 (PG 39, 1669D1-1672A1; Cramer, v. 3, 152, line 33-152, line 5), reading κατηγοροῦντας with Wolf at PG 39, 1669D6 (=Cramer, v. 3, 153, line 3). Cf. Comm. Act. Apost. 13:10-11 (Cramer, v. 3, 216, lines 25-26): "This passage also refutes the view of those who say that making one sighted and blind does not belong to the good God."

162. Comm. 2 Cor. 3:4-6 (PG 39, 1693C10-13; Staab, 22, lines 1-4).

163. Comm. 2 Cor. 5:17-19 (PG 1708A2-7; Staab, 29, line 20-24). Cf. Comm. 2 Cor. 3:17 (PG 39, 1697B2-7; Staab, 23, lines 28-32): "By these words is refuted the fable of those who cut God's scripture in two. For there is one [scripture] which at one time is veiled in types and shadow, but at another time appears without any veiling, seeing that we receive the revelation of it from the Lord's spirit, believing that 'the Spirit of the Lord' is 'freedom.'"

164. Comm. 2 Cor. 2:17 (PG 39, 1692C4-7; Staab, 20, lines 25-27).

165. See the remarks of Harnack (Marcion, 96* n., 352; Neue Studien zu Marcion [Leipzig, J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1923], 30, 34) on Didymus Comm. 2 Cor. 2:17 (Staab, 20, line 25-26, line 9).

166. Origen Hom. Num. 17.3. For the identification of Ex. 4:11b as a Marcionite proof-text, see André Méhat, Origène. Homélie sur les Nombres, SC 29 (Paris: Cerf, 1951), 345 n.1; Éric Junod, Origène. Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre arbitre, SC 226 (Paris: Cerf, 1976), 165 n.1. Origen elsewhere suggested several different ways of resolving the difficulties posed by this verse. See Comm. Gen. 3 (=Philocalia 23.11; Eusebius Praep. evang. 6.11.51); Comm. Mt. 13.6; Hom. Lk. 16.8; and compare W. Schubart, "Christliche Predigten aus Ägypten," Mitteilungen des deutschen Instituts für ägyptische Altertumskunde in Kairo 1 (1930): 97, lines 35-48.

167. Adamantius De recta fide in Deum 2.16 (Sande Bakhuyzen, 90, lines 34-35).

168. Comm. JobT. 59.23-29.

169. Comm. Job 10:21 (PG 39, 1145D5-8).

170. Hagedorn and Hagedorn, Die älteren...Hiob, v. 1, 423 (no. 146), lines 7-8.

171. For a critical discussion of the meanings that have been assigned to the word "Gnosticism," see Michael A. Williams, Rethinking "Gnosticism": An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1996). I owe this reference to Prof. Paul Mirecki.

172. See P 218.6-7; Epiphanius Panarion 66.55.1; the Seven Chapters attributed to Zacharias of Mitylene (Lieu, 184, lines 169-170); the long formula for the abjuration of Manichaeism (Lieu, 185 [1465B]); compare the use of μεταγγίζεσθαι in Acta Archelai 10 (Beeson, 15, line 6). According to Seneca (Ep. 108.19), the use of μεταγγισμός (literally, "pouring from one vessel into another") to indicate transmigration was a Pythagorean innovation.

173. Comm. Ps. 9:25-27 (PG 39, 1201C12-D1; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 157, lines 29-31).

174. Comm. Ps. 63:8 (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 49, lines 4-8).

175. See, for example, Alexander of Aphrodisias De fato 31 (203.11 [Bruns]=R.W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate [London: Duckworth, 1983], 205) and Socrates Scholasticus Historia ecclesiastica 3.16.11 (PG 67, 420C4; Bright, v. 1, 428 [192.5-6]). For

Didymus' own account of providence, see Comm. Ps. 21:9 (PG 39, 1277C; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 225).

176. Aristotle Physics 2.4 (196a25-26).

177. Plutarch De defectu oraculorum 19 (420B); De sera numinis vindicta 3 (549D).

178. Didymus Comm. Eccl. 209.26ff. (cf. 24.7).

CHAPTER THREE:

DIDYMUS' DEPENDENCE UPON ORIGEN'S THEOLOGY AND EXEGESIS

In the Contra Manichaeos, Didymus made use of a number of exegetical and theological arguments previously advanced by Origen. This chapter will examine three of the principal arguments used by Didymus in the Contra Manichaeos and demonstrate their indebtedness to Origen's work.

"Sons", "Offspring", and Fixed Natures (CM 1.1-7.6; 31.11-37.17; PG 39, 1089B2-1092C1;1105-1108)

The semitisms of the Greek New Testament have always posed a challenge for the interpreter. One of the most interesting semitisms in the Gospels is the use of the phrase "son/child/offspring of X" to describe the character of an agent. When, for example, one reads that a certain person is a "son of light", a "son of destruction," a "child of wisdom" or "the offspring of serpents and vipers," what precisely is being asserted? What kind of claims are being made about the person so described? Because these expressions are somewhat strange, they are sufficiently ambiguous in meaning as to invite explanation from the interpreter. The interpreter's attempt to elucidate these remarkable expressions can reveal something important about the interpreter's deeper theological commitments, particularly his or her view of the nature and capacities of human agents.

In this section, I will note Didymus' opponents' appeal to the "son of X" formula in anti-Judaic polemic and will examine Didymus' response. Didymus' interpretation of his opponents' remarks will be seen to have followed the general pattern of Origen's response to Valentinian teaching, leading Didymus to attack the idea of fixed moral natures. Didymus' interpretation of the "son of X" formula will be seen to have depended upon exegetical material drawn from Origen's writings, particularly the twentieth book of Origen's Commentary on John, where the Valentinian commentator Heracleon's interpretation of the "son of X" formula was discussed.

As was noted in the previous chapter, Didymus' opponents defended the position that good and evil were such by nature. Because Didymus' response to Manichaeism followed the general lines of Origen's response to Valentinianism, Didymus sometimes incorrectly assumed that his opponents were asserting that certain persons were good by nature, while others were evil by nature, with each group acting in accordance with the nature they possessed.¹

This was clearly how Didymus understood his opponents' repudiation of the Jewish people. As was noted in the previous chapter, the Manichaeans pointed out that John the Baptist had referred to those descended from Abraham and his followers as "serpents" (Mt. 23:33) and the "offspring of vipers" (Mt. 3:7; 23:33; Lk. 3:7).² Didymus' opponents appear to have argued as follows: If Abraham and the others were vipers and their descendants had the same character, then they ought to be repudiated.³ Didymus assumed that his opponents were not simply repudiating the Jewish people but asserting the existence of a class of

persons who had fixed moral natures (the position attributed to the Valentinians by Irenaeus and Origen).

Didymus disputed the claim that the words "sons" and "offspring" signified physical descent and thus a fixed filiation (i.e. moral nature). Even where agents were said to be "by nature" (φύσει) children of some state of affairs, this did not preclude a change in the agent's character and subsequent filiation. Paul, for example, said, "We were by nature children of wrath" (Eph. 2:3), showing that a person who was once evil and "a child of wrath" could change and become holy and "a child of truth and virtue."⁴ Since moral alteration was always possible, wherever the phrase "by nature" was used in reference to an agent's moral character, it was merely descriptive (indicating what was the case at some particular time or was often seen to be the case), not prescriptive (indicating what was in accordance with nature and therefore an ineradicable part of the agent's existence).⁵

To defend his position, Didymus examined a second way in which the Scriptural phrase "son/offspring of X" could be understood. Didymus examined the passages advanced by his opponents and concluded that the phrase "offspring of vipers" applied not to those who were physically descended from Abraham and his followers, but to those persons who had submitted themselves to wicked teachers and acted in the same way as the one they followed (whose "son" or "child" they were said to be).⁶ Such persons had changed in the same way as the one they followed and had acquired the same quality as the latter.⁷ In the same way, if stones could be raised up as children for Abraham (Mt. 23:33), Abraham's "children" were obviously not his physical descendants, but

those who were his children in regard to virtue (i.e. those who resolved to act in the same manner as Abraham by repenting, fleeing from idols and having faith in God).⁸

Didymus then examined a third way in which the phrase "sons/offspring of X" could be applied, discussing a number of Scriptural passages in which persons were called the "sons", "children" and "offspring" not of a person but of some state of affairs.⁹ Didymus argued that in this third way of attributing sonship, "Holy Scripture calls people the 'sons' and 'offspring' of the actions and pursuits to which they devote themselves."¹⁰ One who acted in a certain way derived his or her being (i.e., identity or individual character) from the quality or state associated with those actions.¹¹ Thus, for example, Judas, by accepting silver to betray Jesus to his enemies, performed an action which brought about destruction; he consequently became a "son of destruction."¹² In Lk. 16:8, those who had been enlightened by knowledge of the truth and performed virtuous deeds were called "sons of light"¹³; the expression "sons of peace" in Lk. 10:6 was to be understood in a similar manner.¹⁴ Finally, in Lk. 7:35, those who had become wise were called children of Wisdom.¹⁵ The phrase "offspring of vipers" (Mt. 3:7-10; 23:33; Lk. 3:7-9) could also be understood on the analogy of the previous examples. In that case, the phrase would refer not to physical descent but to the change effected in those who had departed from virtue and acquired the opposite quality (i.e., vice), performing the actions associated with the latter state (ἐξίς).¹⁶

Didymus' explanation of the phrase "son of X" was dependent upon explanations of the phrase set forth in Origen's Commentary on John.¹⁷

In this latter work, Origen discussed and critically evaluated the Valentinian commentator Heracleon's exposition of Jn. 8:44.¹⁸ There Origen noted that Heracleon had reflected upon why those rebuked by John were unable to hear or acknowledge the words of Jesus.¹⁹ Heracleon understood Jn. 8:44 (Ὑμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστέ) to mean, "You are of the οὐσία of the Devil."²⁰ Since the sense of οὐσία was ambiguous, Heracleon sought to define its meaning by investigating the concept of filiation, distinguishing three ways in which one could be said to have been derived from another as a "son."²¹ First, one could be a son by nature (φύσει), i.e. by physical descent. Second, one could become a son by resolve (γνώμη), i.e. by deciding to act upon the will or desires of another (being called a "son" of the person whose will or desires one resolved to act upon). Third, one could become a son by merit (ἀξία) of some state of affairs--a "child of Gehenna" or "of darkness" or "of lawlessness" or the "offspring of serpents and vipers"--by having performed the deeds which were associated with these states of affairs and consequently being delivered over to these states. Thus, concluded Heracleon, when persons were said to be "children of the Devil" and "of the οὐσία of the Devil", this was not because they were physically begotten by the Devil (the first way of attributing sonship); instead they had become like the Devil by resolving to perform the deeds he favoured (the second way of understanding paternity and filiation).²²

Origen endorsed and drew upon Heracleon's account of the three ways in which sonship was attributed. Elsewhere in the Commentary on John, Origen adopted Heracleon's account of the second way of attributing sonship. Thus, for example, Origen remarked:

Thus, every son of someone wants to accomplish the desires of his own father and every son of someone does the works of his father. For in this way the Saviour also wants to accomplish the desires of his own father and does the works of his own father. Even "the man of sin, the son of destruction" wants to accomplish the desires of his own father and does the works of his own father. Among us men also, the works are assuredly either of God or of the Devil and what we want to accomplish is either a desire of our good heavenly Father or of his enemy, the Devil. And if we do the works of God and want to accomplish his desires, we are sons of God. But if we do what is of the Devil, wanting to accomplish the things the latter desires, we are "of our father, the Devil."²³

Origen's interpretation of Mt. 23:33 in his Commentary on Matthew proceeded along similar lines, preparing the way for Didymus' interpretation: "If from stones children are given to Abraham, it is not in respect of the state of the flesh that he is a father, but in respect of the state of virtue that God's people are said to have Abraham as a father."²⁴ Like Didymus, Origen regarded Abraham as an ethical model for believers, defining "the works of Abraham" (Jn. 8:39) in terms of faith in God (Rom. 4:3) and flight from idols.²⁵

Origen also made use of Heracleon's third way of ascribing sonship, calling one a "son" of some quality or state of affairs because one's actions were associated with that quality or state.²⁶ Thus, for example, one who sought to bring about Jesus' destruction thereby became a "son of destruction."²⁷ In one important passage, Origen developed this line of argument with reference to three of the same biblical texts discussed by Didymus (Lk. 16:8; 10:6; 7:35):

...in many passages [of Scripture], [the holy person] is called a "son" because of his good actions: "[son] of light" because his "works shine before men," "[son] of peace"

because he possesses the "peace of God which surpasses all understanding", "child of Wisdom" because of the profit one derives from wisdom "for", it says, "Wisdom has been justified by her children."²⁸

Origen's interpretation of the phrase "offspring of vipers" (Mt. 3:7; 23:33; Lk. 3:7) proceeded along similar lines, preparing the way for Didymus' interpretation: "The phrase 'offspring of vipers' indicates" not physical descent but "the state (ἔξις) of vice," which is capable of alteration.²⁹

In conclusion, Didymus' treatment of the "son of X" formula was dependent upon the earlier exegetical work of Origen. Origen in turn was seen to have drawn upon certain ideas previously introduced by the Valentinian commentator Heracleon.

Paul's Use of "Flesh/Body of Sin" (CM 7.6-15.8; PG 39. 1092C1-1097A3)

It is usually agreed that bodily desires play an important role in the production of moral evil. There has been considerable debate, however, about how these desires are related to the body and how they influence the production of evil action. Are the desires which lead to evil action a natural and ineradicable feature of one's bodily existence? If they are, does this mean that the body itself is evil? Do we enter this life burdened with certain moral liabilities, having a propensity for evil even from our earliest years? If so, how and why has this come about?

In this section, the Manichaean criticism of the body will be noted and Didymus' response will be analyzed. Didymus' response may be divided into three parts. Didymus argued that in itself the body was morally indifferent, although it could be put to good or evil uses. He also affirmed that even a body that had been used in an evil manner and become corrupted was capable of being purified and sanctified as one

made moral progress. Finally, Didymus acknowledged that a certain taint of sin attached to the fleshly body from birth; he also offered an explanation for how and why this had come about. These three lines of argument will be seen to reflect Didymus' dependence upon earlier responses to Valentinian teaching, including that of Origen; Didymus' adherence to certain controversial features of Origen's theological anthropology will then be noted.

Didymus' opponents argued that, in speaking of the "body of sin" and the "flesh of sin", the Apostle was showing that the fleshly body belonged to sin and was intrinsically opposed to the spirit.³⁰ This, they argued, is why Paul said, "God, having sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh for sin, condemned sin in the flesh."³¹ Since the flesh belonged to sin, it followed that marriage and sexual union, being responsible for the production of flesh, were also evil and ought to be considered sinful.³² This was why the Apostle said that Jesus, being born of a virgin, assumed only "the *likeness* of sinful flesh."³³

In responding to his opponents' negative view of the fleshly body, Didymus made use of three lines of argument. First, Didymus vindicated the body and marriage by drawing upon Stoic teaching. Like the Stoics, Didymus asserted that the flesh and body were not evil by nature but were in themselves morally indifferent, since the possession of such things could not of itself make one either virtuous or vicious.³⁴ Drawing upon Stoic ideas, he argued that things which are indifferent acquire moral value from the moral purpose (*προαίρεσις*) of the agent using them.³⁵ Thus, although the flesh and body are only instruments used by the soul, they can nonetheless be made evil when one uses them in a

sinful manner.³⁶ In this way, one can have a "body of sin" and "flesh of sin" insofar as one has devoted one's body and flesh to sinful activities and become a slave to sin.³⁷

Didymus also appealed to the Stoic account of indifferent things to vindicate marriage. Marriage and marital intercourse were indifferent matters, being used sinfully before the Saviour's advent and honourably after it.³⁸ It was therefore possible to have an honourable marriage and an undefiled marriage-bed (Heb. 13:4).³⁹ If marriage compared unfavourably with virginity, this was not because marriage was a sin, but because marriage was an indifferent matter, while virginity reflected a moral choice for purity and therefore belonged among the virtues.⁴⁰

In using the Stoic teaching about indifferent things to vindicate the body, Didymus took a position similar to that previously adopted by Origen. In Contra Celsum 3.42 and 4.66, Origen had rejected the view that matter and the body were in themselves evil, thereby distancing himself from contemporary Platonic and Valentinian teaching.⁴¹ In Contra Celsum 4.45, Origen had also endorsed the Stoic account of indifferent things:

The Greeks have investigated the nature of the good, bad and indifferent. And those among them who are successful hold that the good and bad lie in the moral purpose (προαιρέσει) alone, but they say that all the things which are examined apart from a moral purpose are, properly speaking, indifferent; the moral purpose which uses these things as one ought is praiseworthy, but the one which does not is blameworthy.

Thus, Origen and Didymus agreed that all things external to one's moral purpose (including the body) were in themselves indifferent, though they

were capable of being used in either a good or an evil manner, depending for their value upon the character of the agent's moral purpose.

Didymus' second line of argument established that the body was capable of being sanctified, proving that the body could not be evil by nature. To establish that the flesh and body were capable of being sanctified, Didymus introduced several biblical citations which had previously been used by Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen to refute the Valentinian and Marcionite denial of a fleshly resurrection body. Didymus began by quoting 1 Cor. 3:16-17 and 6:19-20, where the body is said to be a temple in which God is to be glorified; if God could be glorified in the body, Didymus argued, then the body could not be evil by nature.⁴² Didymus then quoted 1 Thess. 5:23 ("May the God of peace completely sanctify you and may your whole spirit, soul and body be kept blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ") to show that the spirit and the body formed a fundamental unity and that like the spirit, the body was capable of receiving good.⁴³

Didymus' third line of argument offered an alternative interpretation of the phrase "sinful flesh" (σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας) (Rom. 8:3). There Didymus acknowledged that although one's fleshly body was not evil in nature, it did possess a certain soiling, inherited by way of descent from Adam, which made it subject to corruption, the passions and demonic incitements to sin. This interpretation allowed Didymus to defend the propriety of marriage and sexual union, while nonetheless accounting for the human body's weakness and attraction to evil and the consequent need for the Saviour to be born in a unique manner. Didymus' explanation of the phrase "the likeness of sinful flesh" in Rom. 8:3 will be

described and compared with that of Origen. Didymus' belief that in some biblical passages the word "sin" (ἁμαρτία) designated an inherited soiling will then be discussed. In each case, Didymus will be seen to have drawn upon arguments and ideas developed by Origen in response to Valentinian teaching.

In Rom. 8:3, Didymus argued, Paul did not say that the Saviour had only "the likeness of flesh," but rather that he had "the likeness of *sinful* flesh."⁴⁴ Paul therefore did not deny the Saviour's assumption of flesh; consequently, one ought not to imagine that the Saviour's appearance was an illusion or that he took on a wholly unique type of body.⁴⁵ In speaking of "the likeness of sinful flesh", the Apostle alluded to the fact that the Saviour's body came into existence apart from sexual intercourse.⁴⁶ The flesh he received from the Virgin therefore resembled the flesh produced through intercourse, being of the same kind (i.e. human) without being of identical origin.⁴⁷ The unique manner of the Saviour's conception allowed him to be born of human descent without being liable to the sin (i.e. soiling) which has accrued to all of Adam's descendants.⁴⁸

Didymus' interpretation of the phrase "the likeness of sinful flesh" was similar to that used by Tertullian and Origen to refute the Valentinian idea that the Saviour did not derive his body from Mary but bore a spiritual, heavenly flesh. Writing in response to the Valentinian Alexander, Tertullian remarked:

For in another place also he [sc. Paul] says that Christ was in the likeness of the flesh of sin: not that he took upon him the likeness of flesh, as it were a phantasm of a body and not its reality: but the apostle will have us understand by 'the likeness of sinful flesh' that the flesh

of Christ, itself not sinful, was the like of that to which sin did belong, and is to be equated with Adam in species but not in defect. From this text we also prove that in Christ there was that flesh whose nature is in man sinful, and that it is by virtue of this that sin has been brought to nought, while in Christ that same flesh exists without sin which in man did not exist without sin.⁴⁹

Thus, Tertullian, like Didymus, refused to allow the phrase "the likeness of sinful flesh" to be reduced to "the likeness of flesh" (thereby supporting a docetic Christology). Like Didymus, Tertullian understood the phrase to assert that Christ's flesh was of the same kind as the flesh possessed by Adam and his descendants, but lacked the depraving influence (i.e. orientation toward sin) which belonged to the latter.

Origen advanced a similar interpretation in his Romans commentary, although the exact text of this passage is difficult to reconstruct. In a catena fragment on Rom. 8:3-4, we find the remark: "On this account, the flesh of the Son of God was not sin but a 'likeness' [of sinful flesh], seeing that it did not derive from the seed of a man and a woman who had slept together."⁵⁰ Rufinus' translation of Origen's Commentary on Romans contains a passage which is similar but not identical:

Because he said "in the likeness of sinful flesh", he showed that we indeed have sinful flesh; the Son of God, however, had the likeness of sinful flesh, not sinful flesh. For all we human beings who have been conceived from the seed of a man who had intercourse with a woman necessarily employ that saying which David utters: "in iniquity did my mother conceive me." But he [sc. the Son] who, from no touch of a man but by the Holy Spirit alone coming upon the Virgin and by the power of the Most High overshadowing her, came to her unstained body, he indeed possessed the nature of our body; nevertheless, he in no way possessed the defilement of sin which is transmitted to those conceived by the moving of desire.

Therefore, for that reason the Son of God is said to have come "in the likeness of sinful flesh."⁵¹

Thus, Origen, like Didymus, apparently interpreted "the likeness of sinful flesh" (Rom. 8:3) to mean that Christ's flesh was exempt from the stain attaching to other human flesh since Christ's flesh was not produced by carnal generation.

Didymus' belief that in some biblical passages the word "sin" (ἁμαρτία) designated an inherited soiling which attaches to the fleshly body also drew upon Origen. Didymus' account will be examined first; his indebtedness to Origen will then be analyzed. Didymus' discussion of the origin and nature of this inherited soiling is quite difficult to follow. A measure of clarity is introduced, however, if one views Didymus' discussion as being composed of two accounts--one historical (dealing with the sequence of events in this terrestrial realm we presently inhabit) and one "trans-epochal" (connecting the history of this present world with events in some prior realm).⁵² The historical account asserted that all those physically descended from Adam had inherited the soiling resulting from Adam's sin⁵³; this inherited soiling was nonetheless distinguished from voluntary acts of sin.⁵⁴ Didymus held that although Adam was incorrupt before his transgression, he became corrupt when he transgressed; since his union with Eve took place after the transgression, his descendants were likewise corrupt in character.⁵⁵ This taint of sin could not be removed until the advent of the Saviour.⁵⁶ From the catena fragment on Romans 7, it appears that this inherited corruption consisted in being deprived of the indwelling presence of God and condemned to have an indwelling power of sin and death which,

through ignorance and deceit, provided opportunities for sinful choices and actions to arise.⁵⁷ This power (elsewhere identified with the Devil) could make one prone to sin but could not compel the agent's choice or override the agent's moral purpose.⁵⁸

Because the corruption inherited from Adam was external to one's moral purpose, Didymus distinguished between the sin (i.e. soiling) inherited from Adam, which was in need of purification (κάθαρσις) through baptism, and voluntary acts of sin, which merited corrective punishment (κόλασις).⁵⁹ Those who were not yet able to exercise reason (for example, small children) were soiled by inherited sin and consequently committed "sins of ignorance"; nonetheless, since they were not yet capable of voluntary acts of sin, they were not appropriate objects of punishment.⁶⁰

In addition to this historical account based upon physical descent, Didymus also provided a second, trans-epochal account of sin and soiling. This trans-epochal account was necessary to resolve two types of problems raised by the historical account; the first dealt with theodicy (i.e. the defense of God's goodness in view of the existence of evil), the second with human responsibility. In regard to theodicy, there was a need to explain (in response to Valentinian or Manichaean criticism) how one could continue to maintain the priority of the good when one experienced various evils as soon as one entered this world; the fact that some individuals began this life with greater liabilities than others also required explanation.⁶¹ It was therefore necessary to show how the existence and distribution of evils in this present world could be reconciled with God's goodness and impartial justice.

The historical account's treatment of inherited soiling also raised questions regarding human responsibility. The historical account asserted that all of Adam's descendants, no matter how distant, would receive a liability that made them subject to the Devil's power and prone to sin. It remained unclear, however, why those descended from Adam should be subjected to penalties arising from his sin, since they were not the authors or originators of the sin in question. Furthermore, since these penalties were not imposed upon Adam's descendants as a result of wrongs they had committed in this present life, a sense of desert seemed to be lacking. The penalties which were imposed also seemed actually to promote transgression, since they made one prone to actions which led to divine punishment.

The trans-epochal theory responded to these problems by asserting the original unity and equality of all rational creatures and affirming that the soul's entry into a corrupt body corresponded to corrupt acts performed in a previous (i.e. pre-incarnate) existence; the liabilities experienced by the incarnate soul therefore corresponded in character to its previous acts. A sense of desert was therefore maintained and the evils experienced by the soul could be traced back to the soul's prior actions, allowing God's perfect justice to be upheld. At the same time, one could maintain that the soul's original existence in the pre-incarnate realm was good, with evil being a secondary quality that was added to it when it performed culpable acts and was bound to a body soiled by sin.

Because the trans-epochal model accounted for worldly evils in a manner consistent with God's justice and the agent's responsibility, Didymus quite reasonably followed Origen in endorsing it. Didymus (like

Origen) held that all rational creatures had originally existed in unity and equality, having the same rational substance.⁶² He also affirmed that prior to the creation of the body, the soul had existed in an immortal and incorrupt state.⁶³ The birth in a body soiled by Adam's sin, he argued, was generally a consequence of faults committed in a realm prior to this present world.⁶⁴ The soul was therefore compelled to enter a "body of death" (Rom. 7:24) and "of humiliation" (Phil. 3:21).⁶⁵ The time spent by the soul in this body could be viewed as an imprisonment whose term corresponded to the weight of the soul's previous transgressions.⁶⁶

In developing the trans-epochal account, Didymus did allow for one important exception to these general principles. Didymus held that some souls had been obliged to descend not because of their own vice but because of their usefulness to others.⁶⁷ The souls of certain Old Testament saints, for example, had entered into bodies soiled by inherited sin so that they might help others and provide them with an example of virtue.⁶⁸ In this case, the descent into an inferior body and the suffering of physical evils in this present life was not a corrective punishment for past sins but a test imposed upon the righteous to promote the display of virtue and courage.⁶⁹

The relationship between the historical and trans-epochal accounts is difficult to determine. It appears that Didymus linked the two accounts by assigning the transgressions committed by Adam and his descendants to the pre-incarnate realm and positing a distinction between two different kinds of bodies borne by the soul. Didymus argued that a human being (ἄνθρωπος) was "the living compound made up of a soul and a body, especially the soul".⁷⁰ The soul or "inner man" was an

incorporeal and intelligible substance, since it was made in the image of God (Gen. 1:26).⁷¹ When Adam was said to have been fashioned from dust (Gen. 2:7), this was understood to refer to the existence of a corporeal substance which was inseparable from the soul and appropriate to the soul's existence in paradise.⁷² With the fall, however, an additional thick or dense body (παχὺ σῶμα) was assumed (corresponding to the "coats of skins" mentioned in Gen. 3:21).⁷³ This thick, fleshly body was of an entirely different character than the soul, since it bore the corruption arising from Adam's transgression and was subject to death and the passions.⁷⁴ Since Adam and his descendants possessed thick bodies bearing this corruption, it was natural that when they procreated, they likewise produced bodies of the same kind.⁷⁵ In its purified, resurrected state, however, the soul would once again bear only the spiritual body it had originally borne in paradise (i.e. in its pre-incarnate existence).⁷⁶

In developing the theory of sin and soiling outlined above, Didymus was indebted to Origen. Origen clearly endorsed the trans-epochal account and also certain elements of the historical account which could be harmonized with the trans-epochal account. Like Didymus, Origen joined these two accounts together by positing the existence of two distinct bodies, created at different times and reflecting the soul's condition at those different times.

Origen endorsed the trans-epochal account, asserting that all rational creatures had originally existed in unity and equality.⁷⁷ Origen also affirmed that souls had existed prior to the body in an immortal and incorrupt state but subsequently descended and were bound to fleshly

bodies, generally as a consequence of their negligence and longing for material things.⁷⁸ The soul was thus condemned to enter a body of sin (Rom. 6:6), death (Rom. 7:24) and humiliation (Phil. 3:21).⁷⁹

Like Didymus, Origen allowed for one important exception to these general principles. Origen asserted that some souls had descended not as a punishment for past sins, but so that they might exercise and display virtue.⁸⁰ To illustrate this principle, Origen referred to certain Old Testament saints, citing precisely the same examples as Didymus.⁸¹

This trans-epochal account was then tied in with an element of the historical account, namely descent from Adam. Since Adam and Eve did not beget until after they had sinned, the bodies of their physical descendants were like their own, i.e. innately soiled "bodies of sin" which needed to be purified through baptism.⁸² A lengthy discussion of this point is found in Rufinus' translation of Origen's Romans commentary :

If, however, the Apostle is instead understood to have said that this body of ours is a body of sin, it is certainly to be understood in accordance with that sense in which David also says concerning himself, "In iniquity was I conceived, and in sin did my mother conceive me." But the Apostle himself also says elsewhere, "Who will free me from this body of death?" and again names our body a "body of humiliation".....Accordingly then, Paul, through the ineffable wisdom of God which was given to him, contemplating some secret and hidden matter, calls our body a "body of sin," a "body of death," and a "body of humiliation." David also, who from the same Spirit was familiar with heavenly secrets, said concerning the body, "And down into the dust of death have you led me" and again, "Our soul was humbled in the dust." Jeremiah also, conscious of a similar mystery through the Spirit of God, says in his Lamentations that all people are bound to the earth, i.e. on account of the body: "so that he might humble under his feet all who are bound to earth, because they have deprived a man of justice in the sight of the Most High and have condemned a man in

judgement." Therefore our body is a body of sin, since it is written that Adam did not know his wife Eve and beget Cain until after his sin. Finally, in the Law also, for the child who had been born it is commanded that a sacrifice be offered--a pair of turtle-doves or two young pigeons; of these, one was for sin and the other was a whole burnt-offering. For what sin is this one pigeon offered? Was a new-born child able to sin already? Nevertheless it also has a sin for which a sacrifice is commanded to be offered, from which it is denied that one is pure, even if one lived for one day. Concerning this, therefore, David also must be believed to have uttered that saying which we mentioned above, "in sin did my mother conceive me." According to the narrative, of course, no sin is declared to belong to his mother. For this [sin], the Church also has received a tradition from the Apostles to administer baptism even to children. For those to whom the secrets of divine mysteries were entrusted knew that in everyone there were innate soilings of sin which ought to be cleansed by water and the Spirit. It is indeed on account of these that the body itself is called a "body of sin," not (as some of those who introduce a transmigration of souls into various bodies think) for those things which a soul did wrong when it was situated in another body, but for this very thing which was brought about in a "body of sin" and a "body of death" and "humiliation." And it is just as he [sc. David] said: "You have humbled our soul in the dust." Now for a time these things have been able to occur in us on account of the body of sin. ⁸³

Origen's Homilies on Leviticus and Homilies on Luke also asserted that bodies produced by carnal generation had a soiling (ρύπος, citing Job 14:4) that was distinct from voluntary sin and needed to be purified by baptism; since the earthly body assumed by Jesus was not produced in this manner, it was free of such soiling.⁸⁴

Origen described the consequences of this soiling in much the same way as Didymus. The soiling which attached to the fleshly, terrestrial bodies of all of Adam's descendants brought with it a liability to death; this afflicted all who bore such a body, even the just.⁸⁵ With this soiling came also the influence of the passions and demonic

temptation; as a result, desire had its seat in the flesh and warred against reason.⁸⁶

Origen, like Didymus, asserted that the corruption inherited from Adam was external to one's moral purpose. In Origen, as in Didymus, this had three important consequences. First, the agent could only be tempted but not compelled by carnal or demonic forces.⁸⁷ Second, inherited soiling could attach even to small children not yet capable of voluntary sin.⁸⁸ Finally, neither the soiling nor the sins of ignorance that arose from it were blameworthy or appropriate objects of punishment.⁸⁹

Like Didymus, Origen held together the historical and trans-epochal accounts by consigning Adam's fall to a realm prior to this present world and postulating the existence of two different bodies received by the soul at different times.⁹⁰ Like Didymus, Origen affirmed that the soul was an incorporeal and intelligible substance made in the image of God.⁹¹ Origen, like Didymus, affirmed that the soul was initially clothed with a luminous spiritual body appropriate for its original, paradisaical existence.⁹² After its fall, however, it assumed a thick, terrestrial body (identified with the "coats of skin" in Gen. 3:21).⁹³ It appears that for Origen (as for Didymus), one was divested of the fleshly body at death but received a refined, aetherial body at the resurrection.⁹⁴ Origen and Didymus were thus substantially in agreement regarding the fall of human agents into sin and the implications of this fall for one's subsequent existence.

To What Do Names Refer? (CM 20.1-30.20; PG 39, 1097D9-1104C12)

Didymus' opponents argued that an evil name (such as "Devil" or "Evil One") was indicative of an evil substance (οὐσία).⁹⁵ The Devil was thus evil in substance and possessed a kind of existence which was analogous to God's own.⁹⁶ Didymus referred to a similar line of argument in the catena fragment on Romans 7. There the opponents contended that the name "sin" indicated "an underlying substance," so that not only the Devil but others as well could be called "sin" in a general way⁹⁷; the Devil was thus sinful by nature (φύσει) and in substance.⁹⁸

The relation of names to οὐσίαι was discussed in a comparable manner in Plato's Cratylus.⁹⁹ There Cratylus argued that "the one who knows the names knows also the things named."¹⁰⁰ According to Cratylus, this knowledge was made possible by the special relationship which existed between the name and the thing named. The name imitated the thing named, embodying in letters and syllables the essential nature (οὐσία) of thing named.¹⁰¹ Because the name was formed in this manner, it correctly showed the nature (φύσις) of the thing named, just as a picture does.¹⁰² Since this mimetic relationship between the name and the nature of the thing named always obtained,¹⁰³ it followed that the proper way of learning about the natures of things was through the study of their names.¹⁰⁴ Cratylus' view that "a name is an instrument which teaches about and distinguishes the essence (οὐσία)" of the thing named continued to be discussed by later Platonic writers, from whom Didymus' opponents may have derived their knowledge of this idea.¹⁰⁵

Didymus responded to his opponents by denying that the Devil was evil by nature and in substance and therefore incapable of receiving

good (ἀνεπίδεκτον ἀγαθοῦ).¹⁰⁶ Names (such as "Devil") did not indicate the substance or essence.¹⁰⁷ A name was instead "a summary designation indicative of the peculiar quality of the thing named"; the name thus indicated a quality predicated of a substance and not (as his opponents claimed) the underlying substance (i.e. material substrate) itself.¹⁰⁸ More specifically, the name signified a peculiar quality which distinguished an individual and attached to that individual in virtue of action which was deliberately chosen (πράξις προαιρετική).¹⁰⁹ Analyzing the name "Satan," for example, Didymus observed that this Hebrew word was equivalent to the Greek word for "adversary" (ἀντικείμενος), indicating action which was deliberately chosen.¹¹⁰

Didymus explained his position at greater length in his Old Testament commentaries. There he argued that names were predicated in different ways of sensible and intelligible things. In the case of sensible (or corporeal) things, the species was denoted by a single name and could not be denoted by any other.¹¹¹ By contrast, the nature of intelligible things (such as rational souls) could not be indicated by a single name but had to be grasped through several different conceptions (ἐπίνοιαί). An intelligible thing could thus bear the names of several unlike things belonging to the sensible realm; these indicated the different relationships (σχέσεις) in which the intelligible thing stood as a result of its various activities.¹¹² Where an agent was capable of bearing different names, the name which was used indicated which of the agent's activities was presently under discussion.¹¹³

To illustrate this principle, Didymus discussed several examples. The same agent, he noted, bore the names "God", "Lord" and "King"; the

name "God" more manifestly presented his character as Creator, while "Lord" manifested the mark of a ruler or king, whose function it was to issue laws and commandments and to administer reward and punishment.¹¹⁴ The Son was likewise called not only "Light", but also "Wisdom", "Word", "Life", "Truth", "Righteousness", "Sanctification", and "Redemption"; this did not mean that he was multiple in substance but rather that different names were predicated of one subject (*ὑποκείμενον*) in accordance with different activities (*ἐνέργειαι*).¹¹⁵ The names applied to transcendent powers ("Principalities", "Powers", "Thrones", "Dominions", and "Cherubim") were also not asserted absolutely (i.e. as proper names), but indicated those beings' administrative actions (governing, ruling, exercising authority) or a quality that inhered in them as agents.¹¹⁶

The name "Devil", Didymus concluded, could be understood in the same manner as the other examples given above. The Devil did not bear just one name (indicating the substance), but many names (indicating different conceptions arising from his various activities).¹¹⁷ Thus, he was called "not only 'Satan,' 'Adversary,' 'Accuser,' 'snake,' 'lion,' and 'Beliar,' but also 'flesh,' 'law,' 'sin,' and 'death.'" ¹¹⁸

The idea that an agent could bear various names and be understood in accordance with varying conceptions allowed Didymus to develop a second, related argument against the Manichaean position. If, as the Manichaeans asserted, a name was indicative of a substance, names could not undergo alteration, since the substance (to which they referred) persisted and was unchanging. This account, however, did not cohere with the biblical narratives, where the names ascribed to agents did undergo alteration as the narrative progressed. If, however, the

names of agents indicated not a substance but qualities associated with the agents' actions, then it would be natural that as agents made moral progress, the names they bore would likewise undergo alteration; this we in fact find to be the case.

Didymus defended his position by means of the following arguments: Many of the names applied to rational beings refer not to their physical constitution, but to their pursuits (ἐπιτηδεύματα), i.e. the particular kinds of actions they are accustomed to performing.¹¹⁹ One's pursuits both form and indicate one's character but are liable to change.¹²⁰ The names of rational agents will therefore undergo change as their way of life (and thus, the state of virtue which attaches to them) undergoes change; this is the reason why "Abram" becomes "Abraham", "Sara" becomes "Sarrah" and "Jacob" becomes "Israel".¹²¹

To further illustrate this point, Didymus appealed to the example of Judas.¹²² Jesus initially called Judas his "sheep" (Mt. 10:16) because of the virtue which attached to Judas at that time and on account of which he was chosen (with the others) to be an apostle.¹²³ Judas later became a "devil" (διάβολος, i.e. an accuser) when he chose to act as an accuser, effecting the betrayal of Jesus (Jn. 6:70-71).¹²⁴ The mutability of the names ascribed to agents thus demonstrated that the names referred to something mutable (i.e. qualities that varied with the agents' actions) rather than something immutable (the agents' substance).

Didymus' response to his opponents drew upon arguments previously advanced by Origen. Responding to the Valentinian commentator Heracleon, Origen had denied that the Devil was evil by nature or had a different substance that was incapable of receiving good

(ἀνεπίδεκτον τῶν κρηττόνων).¹²⁵ Origen also rejected the idea that names indicated or represented the substance or essence.¹²⁶ A name was instead "a summary designation indicative of the peculiar quality of the thing named," the same definition later offered by Didymus but not otherwise attested.¹²⁷ For Origen, as for Didymus, the name of an agent indicated the peculiar quality which attached to the agent in virtue of the agent's action.¹²⁸ Origen illustrated this point with the same example later used by Didymus: The Hebrew word "Satan" was equivalent to the Greek word for "adversary" (ἀντικείμενος), indicating action which was deliberately chosen.¹²⁹

Origen also endorsed the Platonic division between sensible and intelligible things and noted that a term was predicated in a different way of sensible and intelligible objects.¹³⁰ Origen's discussion of this topic was less systematic than that of Didymus but nonetheless contained the fundamental elements from which Didymus' account was subsequently developed. Origen recognized that intelligible realities could not be directly expressed or represented through words; God's essential attributes, for example, could not be reduced to a word or expression.¹³¹ The character of an intelligible thing could nonetheless be indirectly indicated by various terms normally applied to sensible (or corporeal) things that were distinct from one another.¹³² One could therefore form various conceptions (ἐπίνοιαι) of an intelligible thing which indicated the various relations (σχέσεις) in which the thing stood.¹³³

To illustrate this principle, Origen introduced the same examples which would later appear in Didymus' account. The Son could be called "Wisdom", "Power", "Righteousness", "Sanctification", and "Redemption";

this did not mean that he was multiple in substance but rather that many different names were predicated of one subject (ὑποκείμενον), with the different conceptions (ἐπίνοιαι) corresponding to the different powers or activities of the agent.¹³⁴ The names applied to transcendent powers (such as "Principalities", "Powers", "Thrones", "Dominions", and "Cherubim") were also not asserted absolutely (i.e. as proper names), but instead indicated those beings' administrative actions (governing, ruling, exercising authority) or a quality that inhered in them as agents.¹³⁵ The Devil likewise bore a variety of designations ("sin," "death," and so on) which referred not to his substance, but to his various powers or activities.¹³⁶

Like Didymus, Origen observed that the names of biblical characters changed as the moral character of the agents changed. Origen noted the change of "Abram" to "Abraham", "Sara" to "Sarrah" and "Jacob" to "Israel" and connected this change of names with a change of quality.¹³⁷

Origen's discussion of Judas appears to have been similar in character, preparing the way for Didymus' later treatment of Judas. Since Origen's commentaries upon the verses cited by Didymus (Mt. 10:16 and Jn. 6:70-71) have not survived, Origen's view of Judas must be reconstructed from various remarks which appear in his Commentary on John.¹³⁸ Origen rejected the Valentinian view that Judas was depraved by nature and incapable of salvation.¹³⁹ Origen emphasized that a certain virtue had originally attached to Judas, so that Judas' disposition was initially as noble and holy as that of the other apostles; it was for this reason that Jesus had chosen Judas as an apostle.¹⁴⁰ Those

who are esteemed for obedience and everything noble (as Judas originally was) are called "sheep" (Mt. 10:16).¹⁴¹ Judas was later rejected when he acquired a wicked disposition and departed from Jesus to become an accuser (διάβολος).¹⁴² Despite the limitations of the extant evidence, it appears that Origen's treatment of Judas was similar to that later offered by Didymus.

In conclusion, it has been shown that the arguments which Didymus developed in the Contra Manichaeos were indebted to arguments previously advanced by Origen. Didymus can be seen to have drawn upon Origen's exegesis (how to interpret the phrase "son of X"), hermeneutics (how to understand the various names ascribed to a single agent) and theological anthropology (defending God's goodness and the moral responsibility of rational agents by positing a pre-incarnate existence for the soul and offering trans-epochal and historical accounts of sin).

NOTES

Chapter Three

1. CM 32.1-3,5-6 (PG 39, 1105A3-4,7-8). Didymus' tendency to assimilate Manichaeism to Valentinianism sometimes led to a distorted or erroneous understanding of the Manichaean position. The Manichaeans held that the present world was a mixture of Light and Darkness and that the souls of all earthly creatures contained at least a small portion of Light (i.e. Living Soul) which was capable of redemption. Although the Manichaeans did believe in some sort of election (considering the assistance of the Light-Mind to be necessary for salvation), this did not lead to a denigration of the agent's moral choice or a denial of the agent's moral responsibility for the actions chosen.

2. CM 34.1-4 (PG 39, 1105B5-8).

3. CM 34.5-7,18-19; 35.2-3; 36.15-16; 37.10-11 (PG 39, 1105B10-11; C10-11; D2-3; 1108B3,7-8).

4. CM 1.3-2.3 (PG 39, 1089B4-C8); cf. Staab, 2, lines 18-19. Didymus may have derived this argument from the anti-Valentinian polemic in Origen's Commentary on Ephesians; compare Origen Comm. Eph., fr. 9 (Gregg, 404, lines 219-221), which was reproduced by Jerome Comm. Eph. 1.2 (PL 26, 497C7-12).

5. CM 1.11-12 (PG 39, 1089C3-4). As Mehlmann (47 n.1; 223; 242) has noted, this passage was reproduced in ps.-Gregory of Nazianzus Significatio in Ezechielem (PG 36,668B) and echoed by Cyril of Alexandria Apologia XII capitulorum contra orientales (Anathematismus III; PG 76,332B; E. Schwartz, ed., Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum, t. 1, v. 1, pars 7 [Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1929], 40, lines 20-25). Epictetus (Diss. 1.11.5-7) made a similar distinction between the descriptive and the normative or prescriptive: The fact that things often come about in a certain way does not show that their occurrence is in accordance with nature. Thus, for example, the mere fact that tumours often occur does not show that their appearance is in accordance with nature.

6. CM 34.20-21 (PG 39, 1105C13-14); cf. CM 33.4-5; 34.9-10; 36.10-15 (PG 39, 1105B1-2; C2-3; 1108A12-B2).

7. CM 34.11-13,16-17,19; cf. 33.5-7 (PG 39, 1105C3-5,9-10,12;D1-4; cf. 1105B2-4). The quality which was acquired took the form of a good or base disposition (ἐξῆς)(CM 36.7; 37.7 [PG 39, 1108A8; C4]).

8. CM 36.9-17 (PG 39, 1108A10-B5).

9. CM 1.1-7.6 (PG 39, 1089B2-1092C1).

10. CM 1.1-2 (PG 39, 1089B2-3).

11. Didymus' exposition of this point in CM 2.7-9 (PG 39, 1089C12-15) is difficult to follow but the sense of his argument is made clear by his subsequent discussion of biblical examples; compare also the similar line of argument in Comm. Eccl.T. 159.1-7.

12. CM 5.1-3 (PG 39, 1092A11-15).

13. CM 3.8-10 (PG 39, 1089D8-11).

14. CM 3.2-6 (PG 39, 1089D2-6).

15. CM 2.3-3.2 (PG 39, 1089C9-D1). In Comm. Eccl.T. 159.1-7, Didymus offered a similar discussion in regard to the interpretation of Lk. 7:35. There he argued that when Scripture spoke of the son, child or offspring of a particular quality ("children of Wisdom," "son of destruction," "son of vipers," "son of death," "son of light," or "son of peace"), this referred to the moral state which was produced in the agent when the agent performed the actions associated with that particular quality.

16. CM 34.19-21; 36.2,7 (PG 39, 1105C12-D4; 1108A3,8).

17. Heracleon's exegesis of Jn. 8:44 was discussed in the twentieth book of Origen's Commentary on John; citations refer to the edition of Cécile Blanc, Origène: Commentaire sur Saint Jean. Tome IV (Livres XIX et XX), SC 290 (Paris: Cerf, 1982).

18. Origen Comm. Jn. 20.20.168-170; 20.24.211-218; 20.28.252-253.

19. Origen Comm. Jn. 20.20.168.

20. Origen Comm. Jn. 20.20.168-20.21.175; 20.23.198; 20.24.211. In his eagerness to assimilate Heracleon's exegesis to what he knew about the Valentinian conception of fixed or immutable natures, Origen assumed that οὐσία meant "substance"; those who are "of the οὐσία of the Devil" would therefore be those who belonged to the choic or terrestrial class (οἱ χοϊκοί) (Comm. Jn. 20.20.170; 20.23.198-200). It later becomes evident, however, that for Heracleon those who are "of the οὐσία

of the Devil" are not the choic class (who are sons of the Devil by nature), but the psychic class (who become sons of the Devil by adoption, i.e. by resolving to do the deeds of the Devil) (Comm. Jn. 20.24.213-218).

21. Comm. Jn. 20.24.215-216.

22. Comm. Jn. 20.24.218.

23. Origen Comm. Jn. 20.23.191-193; cf. Comm. Jn. 20.10.77-79; 20.13.105-107; Hom. Ezek. 6.3 (Marcel Borret, Origène. Homélie sur Ézéchiël, SC 352 [Paris: Cerf, 1989], 216-220). A similar passage is also found in Rufinus' translation of Origen's Romans commentary (Comm. Rom. 4.2; PG 14, 969A14-B3; B6-9; Theresia Heither, Origenes. Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos. Liber tertius, liber quartus, Fontes Christiani 2.2 [Freiburg: Herder, 1992], 188): Vis autem et ex veteri Scriptura perdoceri, quod filius quis dicitur non tantum eius de cuius carnali semine descendit, sed et eius, cuius actus imitatur et opera?...Vides eum, qui carnaliter de genere Iuda descenderat, negari filium esse Iuda, sed Chanaan, eius scilicet cuius actus et opera sequebatur.

24. Comm. Mt. fr. 45 (E. Klostermann, Origenes Werke. Zwölfter Band. Origenes Matthäuserklärung III. Fragmente und Indices. Erste Hälfte, GCS 41 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs Verlag, 1941], 34); compare Comm. Lk., fr. 237 (Rauer, 328) and Hom. Lk. 22.9 (Crouzel, Fournier and Périchon, 308).

25. For the identification of "the works of Abraham" with faith, see Didymus CM 34.11; 36.7,10-11 (PG 39, 1105C3; 1108A8-9,12-13) and Origen Comm. Jn. 20.10.66; compare also Origen Comm. Rom. 6.6 (Jean Scherer, Le commentaire d'Origène sur Rom. III.5-V.7 [Cairo: Imprimerie de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale, 1957], 213, lines 7-9). Like Didymus (CM 36.10-11; PG 39, 1108A12-13), Origen exhorted Christians to emulate Abraham by fleeing from idolatry: Just as Abraham was told to leave his homeland, believers too must leave behind the superstitious practices of their native land; see Origen Comm. Jn. 20.10.67-68 and Comm. Mt. 10.23 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung I, 32, lines 21-22).

26. In addition to the passages cited below, see also Jerome Comm. Eph. 1.2 (PG 26, 498A4-11), which may be dependent upon Origen's Commentary on Ephesians.

27. Origen Comm. Mt. fr. 252 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung III, 117, lines 2-5): "...when someone departs from Jesus, he takes counsel to destroy Jesus...Anyone who destroys the latter is called a 'son of destruction.'" Compare also Comm. Jn. 20.21.174: "...citing the

phrase, 'You have become destruction and will be no more' [Ezek. 28:19]-which is found in Ezekiel concerning a certain person who, on account of his vice, had changed to the point that he became 'destruction'--in the same manner you also will support what is said about a certain person's being falsehood not in substance (*ὑποστάσει*), as a result of his constitution, but having become such as a result of a change and his own purposive choice, and thus 'to have been endowed with a nature' (to employ a neologism)."

28. Comm. Jn. 2.1.5 (Cécile Blanc, Origène. Commentaire sur Saint Jean. Tome I (Livres I-V), SC 120 [Paris: Cerf, 1966], 210). Compare De principiis 1.8.4 (H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti, Origène. Traité des principes. Tome I (Livres I-II), SC 252 [Paris: Cerf, 1978], 230, lines 149-151), where Origen referred to "those who, forsaking the darkness, have loved the light and been made 'sons of the light'; or those who, after winning every fight and being changed into 'men of peace' become 'sons of peace'..." (tr. of G.W. Butterworth, Origen. On First Principles [New York: Harper and Row, 1966], 72).

29. Origen Comm. Mt. fr. 44 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung III, 33); compare Comm. Mt., fr. 137.2 (*ibid.*, 69, lines 6-8); Dial. Heracl. 14 (Scherer, 150, line 17-152, line 6); and Comm. Lk., fr. 89 (Rauer, 263). See also Hom. Lk. 8.3; 22.5-6 (Crouzel, Fournier and Périchon, 166-168, 304); Comm. Lk. fr. 88 (Rauer, 262); Hom. Ezek. 3.8 (Borret, 142-144); Comm. Cant. 3 (W. Baehrens, Origenes Werke. Achter Band. Homilien zu Samuel I, zum Hohelied und zu den Propheten. Kommentar zum Hohelied in Rufins und Hieronymus' Übersetzungen, GCS 33 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1925], 211, lines 2-5); Origen (?) Comm. Ps. 57:5 (PG 12, 1476A12-14); and U. Treu, "'Otternggezücht': Ein patristischer Beitrag zur Quellenkunde des Physiologus," Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 50 (1959): 113-114, 116-117. Marguérite Harl (Origène et la fonction révélatrice du Verbe incarné [Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1958], 246) has aptly observed: "Pour Origène, ces termes [sc. the names of different spiritual conditions] désignent, lorsqu'il les utilise, des états passagers, non pas des natures."

30. CM 7.6-7; 10.6-7; 11.3; 12.1-2 (PG 39, 1092C1-2; 1093B4-5; C13; D3-4). For Didymus' interpretation of "spirit" as a reference to the agent's soul, see CM 10.20-21,25 (PG 39, 1093C5,10); Comm. Ps.T. 139.7-9; and Comm. Ps. 30:6 (Mühlenberg, v. 1, 265, line 20=ps.-Origen Comm. Ps. 30:6 [PG 12, 1300B9-10]).

31. CM 13.1-3 (PG 39, 1093D7-9).

32. CM 14.1-2,21; 15.4 (PG 39, 1096B9-C1; D7-8,12-13); compare Comm. Eccl.T. 274.17-23.

33. CM 13.10-11,19-21; 14.1-2 (PG 39, 1096A8-9; B4-5; B9-C1).

34. CM 8.4 (PG 39, 1092D2). Following the Stoics, Didymus argued that only that which makes one good is good; see Comm. Eccl.T. 150.10-11 and compare the accounts of Stoic teaching found in Simplicius Comm. in Arist. Phys. 8.1 (H. Diels, Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum libros quattuor posteriores commentaria, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 10 [Berlin: G. Reimer, 1895], 1167, lines 26-27; H. von Arnim Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, v. 3 [Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner, 1964], 20, lines 7-8) and Seneca Ep. 87.12 (von Arnim, v. 3, 36, lines 15-16). Like the Stoics, Didymus also held that a thing which could be put to either good or bad use was neither good nor bad, but morally indifferent; see Comm. Eccl.T. 167.11-14 and compare Plutarch De Stoicorum repugnantis 31 (1048C; von Arnim, v. 3, 29, lines 41-44); Diogenes Laertius 7.103 (von Arnim, v. 3, 28, lines 14-16); and Sextus Empiricus Adv. math. 11.59,61 (von Arnim, v. 3, 29, lines 16-17,28-29). On the role of indifferent things in Stoic ethics, see A. Dyroff, Die Ethik der alten Stoa (Berlin: Calvary, 1897), 90, 100-126; M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung, v. 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1948), 120-123; Maximilian Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), 116-118, 165-170; Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 145, 171, 183, 197-200, 208-210.

35. Didymus may be blending Stoic and Platonic ideas here. The Stoics asserted that indifferent things could be put to good or bad use as a result of the agent's good or bad moral purpose (cf. Epictetus Diss. 2.5.7; 2.10.25; 3.10.18). The idea that the things which are used, though originally indifferent, can come to share in the good or bad quality of the agent's moral purpose may reflect Platonic influence; compare Plato Meno 88A,D-E and Euthydemus 280E, 281D-E, where the use one makes of a thing determines its value, so that a thing is good when rightly used and harmful when wrongly used.

36. CM 8.4-5 (PG 39, 1092D2-3). Cf. Comm. Ps.T. 36.27-28: "For if it becomes the 'body of death' when the one using it sins..."; 38.3-5: "The soul, when it transgresses, leads the body to comply with sinful impressions, as it [sc. the body] is [only] an instrument. Surely now, we do not say that the sword which kills is a murderer, not the one using the sword?"; 263.22-25: "We understand it to be a 'body of death' not absolutely, but rather a body of such a quality. When someone uses this body so that he performs sins leading to death, from then on he is clad in a body of death. But it is possible to make it not a 'body of death,' for

when I take away from it the things which make it a 'body of death', it is no longer a 'body of death.'" As Orphanos (195 n. 2) has noted, the idea of the body as an instrument used by the soul is found in Aristotle (De anima 1.3 [407b25-27]; Eudemian Ethics 7.9 [1241b17-19]) and was subsequently used by later writers in the Platonic tradition. See also Ilsetraut Hadot, Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1978), 158-160.

37. CM 7.7-10 (PG 39, 1092C3-6); cf. the analogous treatment of "body of death" (Rom. 7:24) in Comm Ps.T. 263.22-264.5.

38. CM 14.3-6,12-20 (PG 39, 1096C2-5; C12-D7). That marriage and the begetting and rearing of children were held by the Stoics to be indifferent matters is attested by Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 2.23.138.5; von Arnim, v. 3, 39, lines 1-2) and Theodoret (Graec. affect. cur. 12.75; von Arnim, v. 3, 39, lines 3-5).

39. CM 14.15-19 (PG 39, 1096D1-5); cf. Comm. Eccl.T. 274.19-20; 275.2-4. Compare also P. Rylands 469, where Heb. 13:4 is similarly cited in response to the Manichaean denigration of marriage.

40. CM 14.20-15.3 (PG 39, 1096D7-11).

41. Origen also discussed the notion of indifferent things in Comm. Ps. 4 (= Philocalia 26). Contrast the view of matter and the body espoused by Celsus in Origen Contra Celsum 4.66 and 8.53 and by the Valentinians in Irenaeus Adversus haereses 2.10.3; see the discussion of H. Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus (Berlin: W. de Gruyter and Co., 1932), 101-102.

42. CM 8.2-10 (PG 39, 1092C13-D9). A similar argument, appealing to 1 Cor. 3:16-17 and 6:20, is found in Tertullian De res. carn. 10, although the focus is there upon the nature of the resurrection body. See also Serapion of Thmuis Adversus Manichaeos 5.5-6.3 (Robert Pierce Casey, ed., Serapion of Thmuis Against the Manichees [Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1931], 31).

43. CM 9.1-10 (PG 39, 1092D10-1093A11). 1 Thess. 5:23 was a commonplace in anti-Valentinian and anti-Marcionite polemic, being used to demonstrate that the various components of the human agent formed a unity and were all objects of salvation in Christ. See Irenaeus Adversus haereses 5.6.1; 5.9.1; Tertullian Adversus Marcionem 5.15.7; De res. carn. 47, 57; Origen Hom. Lk. fr. 205 (Rauer, 316); Dial. Heracl. 6.22-7.5 (J. Scherer, Entretien d'Origène avec Héraclide [Cairo: Imprimerie de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale, 1949], 136,

lines 5-16). Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 4.26.164.3) similarly rejected the idea that the soul was good by nature and the body bad by nature.

44. CM 13.10 (PG 39, 1096A7-9).

45. CM 13.12,18-21 (PG 39, 1096A10; B4-5).

46. CM 13.7-8,13-14 (PG 39, 1096A5-6,11-12).

47. CM 13.15-21 (PG 39, 1096A13-B5).

48. CM 13.14-15,21-24 (PG 39, 1096A12-13; B6-9).

49. Tertullian De carne Christi 16.14-22 (tr. of Ernest Evans, Tertullian's Treatise on the Incarnation [London: SPCK, 1956], 57).

50. Comm. Rom. fr. 45 (A. Ramsbotham, "The Commentary of Origen on the Epistle to the Romans. III," Journal of Theological Studies 14 [1913]: 17, lines 7-9). I suspect that the text of this fragment is corrupt, since the phrase γυναικὸς ὑπὶ σὺνελθούσης in line 9 seems awkward; one would have expected γυναικὶ σὺνελθόντος. Perhaps αὐτῷ ought to be read instead of ὑπὶ σὺν.

51. Comm. Rom. 6.12 (PG 14, 1094C8-1095A9). A similar exposition is given in Comm. Rom. 5.9 (PG 14, 1046C1-9): "But also concerning the Saviour he says in a certain place that he came 'in the likeness of sinful flesh' so that 'on account of sin' he might condemn 'sin in the flesh.' In it he showed that our flesh is indeed sinful flesh, but the flesh of Christ is like sinful flesh. For it was not conceived from the seed of a man, but the Holy Spirit came upon Mary and the power of the Most High overshadowed her, so that what was born of her was called 'Son of the Most High.'"

52. I owe the word "trans-epochal" to B.D. Jackson, "Sources of Origen's Doctrine of Freedom," Church History 35 (1966): 13-23.

53. On the subjection of all of Adam's descendants to the power of sin, see Comm. 2 Cor. 2:17 (Staab, 21, lines 1-2) and compare Comm. Ps. 48:7-8 (PG 39, 1384C-D; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 358, lines 1-2); 88:49 (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 179, lines 2-7); 129:4 (PG 39, 1585D-1588A; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 312, line 1); Comm. Ps.T. 220.18-20; Comm. JobT. 282.22; Comm. Eccl.T. 220.7,18-20; 221.2-3.

54. The defect inherited from Adam can be described as a "soiling" (ῥύπος ; Comm. Job.T. 260.10,30; 283.19 [=PG 39, 1145B9]; 365.27,30), following Job 14:4 , or a "defilement" (μολυσμός ; Comm. JobT. 282.29).

following 2 Cor. 7:1. It is interesting that Didymus cited Job 14:4 in the form quoted by Origen, which was slightly different than the traditional Septuagint text; see G. Teichtweier, Die Sündenlehre des Origenes (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1958), 93 n. 4; Hagedorn, Hagedorn and Koenen, Kommentar zu Hiob III, 246 n. 69.

55. CM 14.7-11 (PG 39, 1096C6-10).

56. CM 14.3-4,12-14 (PG 39, 1096C2-3,12-14); cf. Comm. JobT. 365.14-15; Comm. Ps. 110:9 (PG 39, 1544B10-11; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 260, lines 24-25).

57. Staab, 4, line 24; cf. Staab, 2, lines 23-25; 3, lines 12-14.

58. Staab, 1, line 8; 5, line 27-6, line 3.

59. Comm. JobT. 283.19-25 (=PG 39, 1145B9-12); see also Staab, 2, lines 21-24; Comm. JobT. 210.5-6; 365.2-366.7; Comm. 1 Cor. 15:29 (Staab, 8, lines 19-20). Inherited soiling (ῥύπος) is similarly distinguished from voluntary acts of sin (ἀμαρτήμα, ἀμαρτία) in Comm. JobT. 260.30-31; 365.30-31. Sin acquired by descent (κατὰ διαδοχήν) is distinguished from sin arising by purposive choice (κατὰ προαίρεσιν) in Comm. JobT. 282.24-25; 283.15-23.

60. See Comm. JobT. 260.33-261.2 and compare Comm. JobT. 283.1-10; 365.25-366.13; Comm. Eccl.T. 220.9-13. Since Jesus alone was exempt from this inherited corruption, he alone chose good before evil (cf. Is. 7:16) and was free of sins of ignorance (Comm. Ps. 21:10-11 [Mühlenberg, v. 1, 226, lines 13-16]; Comm. Ps.T. 30.3-8; 222.11; 258.6-7; Comm. Eccl. 221.4-10; Comm. Zech. 178.20-26 [2.361]; cf. ps.-Origen (=Didymus?) Sel. Ps. 21:10 [PG 12, 1256A3-7; A15-B1]).

61. See Didymus Comm. Eccl.T. 173.7-18 and compare Origen De principiis 2.9.6 (cf. 1.6.2-3; 2.3.1). See also the passage attributed to Origen in Leontius of Byzantium (?) De sectis 10.5 (PG 86.1, 1264-1265): "For if this were not so [i.e. if fallen souls were not imprisoned in bodies corresponding to the degree of their departure from God] and souls had no pre-existence, why do we find some new-born babes to be blind, when they have committed no sin, while others are born with no defect at all?" (tr. of Butterworth, Origen, 67). With this latter passage, which is probably a later summary of Origenist teaching, compare Origen De principiis 2.9.3 and Jerome Comm. Eph. 1.5 (PL 26, 479A).

62. Comm. Ps.T. 197.21-24; 232.21; cf. Comm. Gen.T. 21.18-20.

63. See Comm. Ps.T. 36.21-23, 277.15-17 and Orphanos (75-93), who analyzes the relevant texts in some detail and provides a useful survey of the secondary literature on Didymus' belief in the pre-existence of souls.

64. Concerning the soul's descent and union with an inferior body, see Comm. Eccl.T. 85.23-24; 176.1-2; 193.25-194.1; Comm. Zech.T. 270.2-5 (3.312).

65. Comm. Ps.T. 36.21-23: "The body in which we are clad is called a 'body of death'; it is also called 'dust of death.' It is 'dust of death' not in substance, but since those who have been constrained come to this from the life outside the body it is called a 'body of death.'" Cf. Comm. Ps.T. 323.15-17: "Literally, this [the place of humiliation] is the earthly place where the souls burdened with 'the body of humiliation' are humbled." Didymus similarly presented the earthly body in a negative light in Comm. Gen. 103.15-17 (= Comm. Gen. 3:19 [PG 39, 1112B9-11; Petit, La chaîne sur la Genèse. Édition intégrale I, 276]): "For what thing consequent upon the body is not painful, since both pleasures and cares are produced from it?"

66. In Adversus Rufinum 3.28 (PL 23, 478D; Pierre Lardet, Saint Jérôme. Apologie contre Rufin [Paris: Cerf, 1983], 292, lines 47-49), Jerome mentioned a book of Didymus addressed to Rufinus (written in or before 386), in which the death of newborn infants was explained by their not having committed many sins; it was therefore sufficient for them merely to have touched the prison of a body. The significance of this passage is discussed by Pierre Lardet, L'Apologie de Jérôme contre Rufin: Un commentaire (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993), 344-345; see also J. Daniélou, "Le traité 'Sur les enfants morts prématurément' de Grégoire de Nysse," Vigiliae Christianae 20 (1966): 159-182 (esp. 169-170, 177, 182); Endre von Ivánka, "Eine Frage zu De infantibus qui praemature abripiuntur (PG 46, 161-192)," in H. Dörrie et al., Gregor von Nyssa und die Philosophie: Zweites Internationales Kolloquium über Gregor von Nyssa (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 79-82; and Yves-Marie Duval, "Traces de lecture du Peri archôn d'Origène avant le départ de Rome de Jérôme en 385: L'Ep. 39, la mort des enfants et la préexistence des âmes," in Yves-Marie Duval, Jérôme entre l'Occident et l'Orient (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1988), 139-151 (esp. 147-148). In Didymus Comm. Eccl.T. 173.7-22, the length of a fetus' or infant's life is similarly correlated with the different judgements which God renders in regard to individual souls; see also Comm. Eccl. 170.5-12; 175.5-9; Leipoldt, 11, 16; L. Doutreleau, "La vie et survie de Didyme l'Aveugle du IV e siècle à nos jours," Les mardis de Dar-el-Salam (1956-1957 [publ. 1959]), 73; Orphanos, 86-87.

67. Comm. JobT. 56.20-29; 261.18-20.

68. Comm. JobT. 57.14-58.16 (Jacob, Jeremiah and John the Baptist); see also Comm. JobT. 73.8-19 (Job); 260.27-31 (saints); 261.20-21 (John the Baptist and Jeremiah); 350.24-32 (Job); Comm. Ps.T. 30.8-11 (John the Baptist and other saints); 55.23-27 (Jacob and John the Baptist); Comm. Eccl.T. 220.7-9 (Jeremiah and John the Baptist); and Gesché, Christologie, 358-360. For the general principle, see Comm. JobT. 327.32-328.18; 403.34-38.

69. Comm. JobT. 93.25-31; 95.12-19; 209.8-9; 212.9-10; 274.33-275.5; 287.5-6; 353.19-21; 360.10-11,17-19; 362.9-10; 363.9-10; 372.23-28; 380.30-31; 384.30-385.2. Compare also Didymus apud John of Damascus Sacra parallela (PG 96, 324D7-9): "Not all who are sick have sin as a cause of illness. For there are those who are subjected to afflictions in order that they might be shown to be of proven worth or for other profitable purposes." Job's comforters were therefore wrong to think that hardships were sent wholly on account of sins (Comm. JobT. 209.28-32).

70. Comm. Gen.T. 54.23-24; cf. Comm. Gen.T. 56.12. See also Comm. JobT. 346.27: "A human being is composed of a soul and a body." Orphanos (35 n.3) compares Aristotle Metaphysics 8.6 (1045b12).

71. Comm. Gen.T. 56.11-12; 57.6-7; Comm. JobT. 273.24-27. Considered in itself, the soul was immaterial (ἀύλον) (Comm. Gen.T. 107.5; Comm. Ps.T. 21.24); nevertheless, it was always conjoined with a body endowed with a form (Comm. Gen.T. 57.7-8; Comm. Ps.T. 263.26). The body allowed the soul to move from one place to another (Comm. Gen.T. 107.11-14) and functioned as an instrument used by the soul (Comm. Gen.T. 107.6-7).

72. Comm. Gen.T. 118.14-16.

73. Comm. Gen.T. 106.11-12; 107.7-11; 108.5-15; Comm. JobT. 277.28-31; Comm. Ps.T. 263.25-26; cf. Comm. Ps.T. 193.10-12; Comm. JobT. 359.30-31. Didymus' exegesis of Gen. 3:21 is discussed by Hagedorn, Hagedorn and Koenen, Komm. zu Hiob III, 257-260. n. 101; M. Simonetti ("Didymiana," Vetera Christianorum 21 [1984]: 129-155) has shown that Didymus' interpretation of the "coats of skin" in Gen. 3:21 was essentially identical to that of Origen. After the soul's fall, the original, paradisaical body functioned as an intermediary which united the intellectual substance of the soul to the thick body acquired with the fall (Comm. Gen.T. 107.13-14).

74. Comm. Ps.T. 193.11-12.

75. Cf. CM 14.6-11 (PG 39, 1096C5-10); compare also Comm. Eccl.T. 175.28-176.2, where marriage is said to be the cause of the body, just as descent is the cause of the soul. See L. Koenen, "Augustine and Manichaeism in the Light of the Cologne Mani Codex," Illinois Classical Studies 3 (1978): 160.

76. Comm.Zech.T. 231.17-20 (3.183); Comm. 2 Cor. 5:1 (PG 39, 1704A-B; Staab, 27, lines 7-22); cf. Comm. Gen.T. 104.18-21; 108.14-15. Compare also Ps. Comm.T. 129.4-6: "There is also a resurrection of the body; for not the fashioning, but the corruption after the fashioning, was its fall." In Comm. 1 Cor. 15:41 (Staab, 9, lines 26-29), Didymus asserted that all who are raised will have incorruptible, spiritual bodies but that only the bodies of the just will be luminous.

77. De principiis 2.1.1; 2.9.6.

78. Comm. Mt. 11.17 (Klosterman, Matthäuserklärung I, 64, lines 20-22); De principiis 1.4.1; 1.8.4; 2.8.3; 2.9.2,6-7; 3.1.22; 3.3.5; 4.4.9; Contra Celsum 5.30; Comm. Jn. 13.43.292; see M. Harl, "Recherches sur l'origénisme d'Origène: la satiété (κόπος) de la contemplation comme motif de la chute des âmes," in F.L. Cross, ed., Studia Patristica 8 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 373-405; "La préexistence des âmes dans l'oeuvre d'Origène," in Lothar Lies, ed., Origeniana Quarta (Innsbruck-Wien: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1987), 238-258. The principal passages in which Origen argued that the conditions of one's present life are consequences of one's prior moral choice are collected in D. Huet Origeniana 2.2.6.7 (PG 17, 902); M. Lang, "Über die Leiblichkeit der Vernunftwesen bei Origenes" (Diss., Leipzig 1892), 8; and R. Cadiou, La jeunesse d'Origène (Paris: G. Beauchesne et Fils, 1935), 226.

79. Origen Contra Celsum 7.50.

80. Origen De principiis 2.9.7; 3.5.4; Comm. Jn. 13.43.293; cf. Hom. Gen. 16.3; Comm. Jn. 2.23,28; 20.4.19.

81. Jacob: De principiis 1.7.4; 2.9.5,7; 3.1.22; 3.4.2; De oratione 5.4; Comm. Jn. 2.31.188-192. John the Baptist: De principiis 1.7.4; 3.3.5; 3.4.2; Comm. Jn. 2.30.180-187. Jeremiah: De principiis 1.7.4; 3.3.5; 3.4.2. This idea may have a Platonic background. Compare Iamblichus De anima apud Stobaeus Ecl. 1.49.39-40 (C. Wachsmuth, Ioannis Stobaei Anthologii libri duo priores, v. 1 [Berlin: Weidmann, 1884], 379, lines 7-10; 380, lines 6-19) and see the remarks of A. Festugière, La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste III. Les doctrines de l'âme (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1953), 219-220, 222); O. Geudtner, Die Seelenlehre der chaldäischen Orakel (Meisenheim an Glan: Verlag Anton

Hain, 1971), 8-9; and John Dillon, "The Descent of the Soul in Middle Platonic and Gnostic Theory," in B. Layton, ed., The Rediscovery of Gnosticism, v. 1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980), 357-364.

82. The role of physical descent from Adam in transmitting the soiling of sin is briefly discussed in Comm. Rom. 5.1 (PG 14, 1009B13-15; C6). In Comm. Mt. fr. 11 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung III, 19, lines 14-18) Origen contrasted γένεσις, which he defined as ἡ ἐκ θεοῦ πρώτη πλάσις and described as ἀφθαρτον and ἀναμάρτητον, with γέννησις, which he defined as ἡ ἐκ καταδίκης τοῦ θανάτου διὰ τὴν παράβασιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων διαδοχὴ and described as παθητὸν καὶ ἀμαρτητικόν; Didymus alluded to this distinction in Comm. Job 277.13-18. It is difficult to know how to interpret Origen's declarations that all humanity was in Adam's loins and consequently shared in his expulsion from Paradise (Comm. Rom. 5.1 [1009C10-1010B1]; 5.4, [PG 14, 1029D4-9]; cf. Contra Celsum 7.28). In such passages, Adam is probably symbolic of all those who have fallen and been born in mortal, terrestrial bodies; see Contra Celsum 4.40 and Teichtweier, 96-99.

83. Comm. Rom. 5.9 (PG 14, 1046B8-C1; 1046C9-1047C5); cf. Comm. Rom. 7.4 (PG 14, 1110; Theresia Heither, Origenes. Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos. Liber septimus, liber octavus, Fontes Christiani 2.4 [Freiburg: Herder, 1994], 50-52). For a discussion of Origen's treatment of the phrase "body of sin," see S.T. Bettencourt, Doctrina ascetica Origenis seu quid docuerit de ratione animae humanae cum daemonibus (Vatican City: Libreria Vaticana, 1945), 108-109. The doctrine of transmigration (μετενσωμάτωση) which is criticized here is attributed to Basilides in Comm. Rom. 5.1 (PG 14, 1015A12-B6); Origen's view of the doctrine is discussed by W. Theiler (Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1966], 18-20) and U. Bianchi, "Origen's Treatment of the Soul and the Debate over Metensomatosis" in Lies, 270-281.

84. Hom. Lev. 8.3; 12.4,6; Hom. Lk. 14.3-5; Contra Celsum 7.50; Comm. Mt. 15.23; cf. Hom. Jer. 2.2; Comm. Rom. 5.2 (PG 14, 1024C3-14); 6.12 (PG 14, 1094C11-A7). Compare also ps.-Basil Comm. Is. 4:4 (4.137; PG 30, 341A6-7, 12-16; B8-10, 13-15). The nature of this soiling is discussed by Giulia Sfameni Gasparro, "Le sordes (/rhupos), Il rapporto genesis-phthora dell'enkrateia in Origene," in Richard Hanson and Henri Crouzel, eds., Origeniana Tertia (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1985), 167-183, which appears in expanded form in G.F. Gasparro, Origene: Studi di antropologia e di storia della tradizione (Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1984), 193-252. See also Huet Origeniana 2.2.7.24 (PG 17, 964-969); Tixeront, v. 1, 313; Turmel, 44-47; Teichtweier, 99-101; Gross, 99-109; Crouzel, Virginité, 51-52; Schelkle, 274; J.A. Alcain, Cautiverio y rendención del

hombre en Origenes (Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 1973), 165-166; Scheffczyk, 71-84.

85. Comm. Rom. 5.1 (PG 14,1011B1-8; 1012B14-1013A6; 1017B12-C2; 1019A13-14); for the association of sin and death in Origen, see Teichtweier, 140-143.

86. Comm. Rom. 5.7 (PG 14,1035C1-D5).

87. Comm. Rom. 1.18 (PG 14, 866C5-D3; Heither, Origenes...Liber primus, 150).

88. Comm. Rom. 5.1 (1014C1-1015A1).

89. Comm. Rom. 5.1 (PG 14,1014B-C).

90. Origen's interpretation of Gen. 2:7 and 3:21 and his understanding of the relationship of the soul to the two bodies is discussed by M. Harl ("Préexistence") and C.P. Bammel, "Adam in Origen" in R. Williams, ed., The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), 62-93. See also G. F. Gasparro, "Doppia creazione e peccato di Adamo nel Peri archon di Origene: Fondamenti biblici e presupposti platonici dell'esegesi origeniana," in U. Bianchi, ed., La "doppia creazione" dell'uomo negli Alessandrini, nei Cappadoci e nella gnosi (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo e Bizzarri, 1978), 43-82.

91. Hom. Gen. 1.13; Sel. Gen. 1:26-27 (PG 12, 93A8-B9; Petit, Catena graecae in Genesim et in Exodum II. Collectio Coisliniana in Genesim, 74); Dial. Heracl. 15 (Scherer, 154, lines 9-15); De principiis 1.1.7; Comm. Rom. 7.4 (PG 14, 1110B1-5; Heither, Origenes...liber septimus..., 52-53); for the Philonic background, see De opificio mundi 69. See also the discussion of H. Crouzel, Théologie de l'image de Dieu chez Origène (Paris: Aubier, 1956), 148-157.

92. Contra Celsum 2.60; Comm. Mt. 17.30 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung I, 671, lines 20-21); De principiis 2.10.8; cf. also De principiis 2.2.2; 2.8.3; Comm. ser. Mt. 50 (E. Klostermann and U. Treu, Origenes Werke XI. Origenes Matthäuserklärung II. Die lateinische Übersetzung der Commentariorum series, 2 ed. [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1976], 107-110). In De principiis 2.2.2, the soul was said to be only notionally separable from the material substance of this original (paradisical) body; this suggests that the soul continued to make use of a body throughout its existence (cf. De principiis 1.6.4; 4.2.7; 4.3.15; Contra Celsum 7.38). See the discussions of Henry Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus and the Resurrection of the Body," Harvard Theological Review 41

(1948): 99-100; H. Crouzel, "Le thème platonicien du véhicule de l'âme chez Origène," Didaskalia 7 (1977): 225-238; and Lawrence R. Hennessey, "A Philosophical Issue in Origen's Eschatology: The Three Senses of Incorporeality," in Robert J. Daly, ed., Origeniana Quinta (Louvain: Peeters, 1992), 373-380.

93. De principiis 1.pref.8; 2.2.2; 3.5.4; Contra Celsum 4.40; 5.5; 7.5; Sel.Gen. 3:21 (PG 12,101A; Petit, Catena graeca in Genesim et in Exodum II. Collectio Coisliniana in Genesim, 124-125); cf. Methodius De resurrectione 1.4.2 (G. Bonwetsch, Methodius, GCS 27 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1917], 223, line 28-224, line 5); 1.29.1 (Bonwetsch, 258, lines 5-6); Epiphanius Panarion 64.63.5; 64.64.4; 64.65.11; Ancoratus 62.1-3; Jerome (=Epiphanius) Ep. 51.5.2. For the association of thickness and density with the terrestrial realm, see Origen Exh. mart. 45 and Contra Celsum 3.41-42 and 7.5 with the remarks of Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus and the Resurrection Body," 101. For the background to this interpretation, see Pier Franco Beatrice, "Le tuniche di pelle. Antiche letture di Gen. 3:21," in Bianchi, Tradizione, 433-484.

94. De principiis 1.6.4; cf. Methodius De resurrectione 3.16 (Bonwetsch, 413, line 6); Jerome Ep. ad Avitum 4. The interpretation of the surviving evidence is nonetheless a difficult matter and this may reflect Origen's own indecision regarding this issue; see G. Dorival, "Origène et la résurrection de la chair," in Lies, 312-315.

95. CM (PG 39, 1097D6-9; 1100B5-C6); cf. Comm. Eccl.T. 334.6-8.

96. CM 29.2-4 (PG 39, 1104B2-4).

97. Staab, 3, line 5.

98. Staab, 3, lines 37-38.

99. See E. Heitsch, "Platons Sprachphilosophie im 'Kratylos,'" Hermes 113 (1985): 44-62 and Timothy M.S. Baxter, The Cratylus: Plato's Critique of Naming (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992); for the Sophistic background to the debate, see E. Dupréel, Les sophistes (Neufchâtel: Griffon, 1948), 265-279; D. Fehling, "Zwei Untersuchungen zur griechischen Sprachphilosophie," Rheinisches Museum 108 (1965): 212-229; and G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), 68-77. Socrates agreed that, as far as is possible, names should reflect essences (435c2-3), but he was doubtful how far our actual practices of naming can be said to live up to this ideal (391d7-e2; cf. 397b7-c2; 400d6-401a5). Socrates therefore rejected Cratylus' approach, asserting that the nature of existing things (τὰ ὄντα) is to be

discovered through a dialectical examination of the things themselves rather than through the study of their names (439b; 440c; cf. Politicus 261e5-7). For the history of the discussion, see Paolo Rotta, La filosofia del linguaggio nella patristica e nella scolastica (Torino: Bocca, 1909); J. Daniélou, "Eunome l'Arien et l'exégèse néo-platonicienne du Cratyle," Revue des études grecques 69 (1956): 412-432; Arno Borst, Der Turmbau von Babel. Geschichte der Meinungen über Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und Völker. Erster Bande: Fundamente und Aufbau (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1957); Rolf Gögler, Zur Theologie des biblischen Wortes bei Origenes (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1963), 39-59; and Battista Mondin, Il problema del linguaggio teologico dalle origini ad oggi (Brescia: Queriniana, 1971).

100. Plato Cratylus 435d4-6; cf. 386d9-c4.

101. Cratylus 390e3-5; 423b9-11, e7-9; 430a11-b1; cf. 422e2-423b2.

102. Cratylus 422d1-3; 423e7-9; 428e1-2; 429c3-4; 430e9-10; 436e3-437a1.

103. Cratylus 429d4-6; 438c1-4; cf. 390e1-2; 429c3-4; 430a1-5.

104. Cratylus 435d4-6; cf. 438a8-b3.

105. Cratylus 388b13-c1 (ὄνομα... διδασκαλικόν τί ἐστίν ὄργανον καὶ διακριτικόν τῆς οὐσίας) is cited by Albinus (Alcinous) Didaskalikon 6.10 and Proclus (Comm. in Cratylum 48, 51) in their summaries of the arguments advanced in the dialogue. See John Dillon (Alcinous, 12-13, 85-86) and Francesco Romano (Proclo: Lezioni sul Cratilo di Platone [Catania: Università di Catania, 1989], xxv-xxvii, 16-20, 138-141).

106. CM 22.1-3; 9.6-10 (PG 39, 1100C7-9; 1093A7-11); Staab, 3, lines 37-38. Didymus offered a similar criticism of the Manichaean position in Comm. 2 Cor. 11:13-15 (Staab, 40, line 12), where he affirmed that the Devil was evil (κακός) and darkness (σκότος) not in substance (κατ' οὐσίαν) but by his own resolve (ἰδίᾳ προθέσει) and purposive choice (ἰδίᾳ προαιρέσει).

107. CM 20.1-3,5 (PG 39, 1097D6-9; 1100A1).

108. Cf. Comm. Ps.T. 60.7-14: "For he made rational beings so that they might partake of his name. I do not mean names composed of syllables, but names deriving from a quality which distinguishes the thing named. For a definition of 'name' has been given as follows: 'A name is a summary designation indicative of the peculiar quality of the

thing named.' And this holds especially for a derivative name. From wisdom one is called 'wise' and does not have a mere designation, [i.e.] not the one composed of syllables, but the one indicating the quality which wisdom has supplied to the soul. Therefore the name in the proper sense, which is indicative of the the thing named, is a summary designation." The same definition of name is given in Comm. Ps.T. 264.13: "A name is a summary designation indicative of the quality of the thing named."

109. CM 20.3-17 (PG 39, 1097D9-1100A15).

110. CM 21.6-13 (PG 39, 1100B5-12); Comm. Zech.T. 44.12-13 (1.191); Comm. Ps.T. 78.10; Comm. Ps. (PG 39,1617A); Comm. JobT. 64.5-14.

111. Comm. Ps.T. 60.13-17; 143.6-8.

112. Comm. Ps.T. 34.8-18; 67.29-68.1; 143.6-8; 195.13-15; 239.13-14; Comm. Gen.T. 86.22-25; 160.9-17.

113. Comm. Eccl.T. 10.31. Cf. Comm. Ps.T. 40.25; 239.7; 143.9-13.

114. See Comm. Gen.T. 31.15-24; 91.13-18, which was dependent upon Philo De plant. 85-87. Philo had posited a distinction between $\acute{\omicron}\ \acute{\omega}\nu$ (the One who is, i.e. the cause of all things) and two divine powers ($\delta\upsilon\nu\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\iota\varsigma$)--a creative ($\pi\omicron\iota\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$) one, which was designated "God" ($\theta\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$) and established and ordered the world, and a ruling ($\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$) one, which was designated "Lord" ($\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\rho\iota\omicron\varsigma$) and governed with justice, bestowing benefits and administering recompense for evil; see De somniis 1.163; De Abrahamo 121; De vita Moysis 2.99; De sobrietate 55; and De Deo (Folker Siegert, Philon von Alexandrien: Über die Gottesbezeichnung "wohlthätig verzehrendes Feuer" [De Deo] [Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1988], 26, lines 61-62). Later in the commentary on Genesis, Didymus admitted his indebtedness to Philo: "If someone wishes to interpret these anagogically, taking the starting-point for anagogy from the interpretation of the names, let him do this without talking nonsense. There is also a discussion by Philo in regard to these; let the scholar who has examined them derive the proper profit" (Comm. Gen.T. 139.10-14, referring to Philo De poster. 66-75; cf. the similar remarks in Comm. Gen.T. 119.2-3, alluding to Philo's De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini). Didymus' debt to Philo has been discussed by David T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1993), 197-204; idem, Philo and the Church Fathers: A Collection of Papers (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 233.

115. Comm. Gen.T. 221.14-18. Cf. Comm. Zech.T. 410.12-20 (5.196-197).

116. Comm. Gen.T. 113.9-18.

117. CM 21.15-22.3 (PG 39, 1100B15-C9); Comm. JobT. 64.5-14.

118. Staab, 1, lines 10-13.

119. In CM 1.1-3; 7.1-2 (1089B2-4; 1092B12-13), the names ascribed to persons reflect the pursuits and actions to which they devote themselves.

120. Cf. Comm. Eccl.T. 94.12-16: "He [sc. Solomon] can here call the pursuits an 'action' but the man who pursues a 'product.' For the grammarians also call the accidents 'actions.' Therefore they say that the noun indicates a body and an action. One calls a 'body,' for example, a stone, a man (a body of flesh); one calls an 'action' education, justice. The latter [i.e. the grammarians] call the substance a 'body,' the accident an 'action,' inasmuch as they have not systematically treated logical matters." A similar definition is found in Dionysius Thrax Ars grammatica 12 (περί ὀνόματος) (Gustavus Uhlig, ed. Dionysii Thracis Ars grammatica, Grammatici Graeci 1.1 [Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1883], 24, lines 3-4): "Ὄνομά ἐστι μέρος λόγου πτωτικόν, σῶμα ἢ πρᾶγμα σημαῖνον, σῶμα μὲν οἷον λίθος, πρᾶγμα δὲ οἷον παιδεία. A scholion on this latter text brings together "body" and "substance" and also "action" and "accident," just as Didymus does: Πόσα σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα; Δύο, σῶμα καὶ πρᾶγμα, σῶμα μὲν, οἷον οὐσία, πρᾶγμα δέ, οἷον συμβεβηκός (A. Hilgard, Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem grammaticam, Grammatici graeci 1.3 [Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1901], 360, lines 5-6).

121. Comm. Gen.T. 113.18-114.17. Elsewhere, in discussing Lk. 10:20, where the disciples' names are said to be written in heaven, Didymus says, "He means not those names which are composed of syllables, but the peculiar qualities which mark their soul and mind" (Comm. Ps.T. 264.11-12).

122. CM 20.4-17 (PG 39, 1097D10-1100A15).

123. CM 20.11-13; 6.2-5 (PG 39, 1100A8-10; 1092B5-9).

124. CM 20.4-11,13-14 (PG 39, 1097D10-1100A8, 10-12); compare ps.(?)-Didymus Comm. Jude (Zoepfl, 92, lines 20-26).

125. Comm. Jn. 20.24(20).202-219; 20.28(22).254. Cf. Jerome Adv. Rufin. 2.19 (Lardet [SC 303], 154, lines 16-22), which discusses a

lost dialogue, in which Origen debated the matter with the Valentinian teacher Candidus: "Candidus affirms that the Devil is of a most wicked nature which can never be saved. To this Origen rightly responds that he is not of a substance destined to perish, but has fallen by his own will and can be saved. This Candidus turns into a calumny, as if Origen had said that the nature of the Devil was destined for salvation. Candidus' false objection Origen refutes." See Henri Crouzel, "A Letter from Origen to Friends in Alexandria," in David Neiman and Margaret Schatkin, The Heritage of the Early Church: Essays in honor of...George Vasilievich Florovsky (Rome: Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1973), 135-150.

126. Cf. Contra Celsum 5.39: "For one must not think that because of the feminine name wisdom and righteousness are feminine in essence" (οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸ θηλυκὸν ὄνομα καὶ τῆ οὐσία θήλειαν νομιστέον εἶναι τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην). Compare Philo De fuga 51 and the scholion (ascribed to Stephanus) on Dionysius Thrax Ars grammatica 12 (Hilgard, Scholia, 218, lines 12-16).

127. Origen De oratione 24.2, reproduced in Didymus Comm. Ps.T. 60.9-14; 264.13. Although the definition is not otherwise attested, the expression τὸ κεφαλαιῶδες (the general character of a thing which is summed up in its name or definition) is found in Simplicius' testimony regarding the Stoic treatment of names (Comm. in Categ. 4; C. Kalbfleisch, ed., Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 8 [Berlin: G. Reimer, 1907], 66, line 8; von Arnim, v. 2, 75, 225). This expression was condemned as a technical term by Epictetus (Diss. 2.12.9); its sense is made clear by Alexander of Aphrodisias (Comm. in Top. 1.5; M. Wallies, ed., Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Topicorum libros octo commentaria, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 2.2 [Berlin: G. Reimer, 1891], 42, line 27-43, line 2; von Arnim, v. 2, 75, lines 34-37), who was discussing a definition offered by the Stoic writer Antipater (cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.60; von Arnim, v. 2, 75, lines 20-22). See also the account offered by the Stoic writer Diogenes of Babylon (von Arnim, v. 3, 213, lines 27-31) and E. Klostermann, "Überkommene Definitionen im Werke des Origenes," Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 37 (1938): 54-61. Stoic definitions of οὐσία are discussed by Origen later in the De oratione (27.8) and may have been derived from the same doxographical source.

128. Sel. Gen. 17:5 (PG 12,116A14-B3; Petit, La chaîne sur la Genèse. Édition intégrale III, 91 [cf. 86]): "...names are indicative of states (ἔξεων), conditions (καταστάσεων) and qualities (ποιοτήτων), from which it is possible to see the aptitude (ἐπιτηδειότητα) of the one named"; cf. Origen (?) Sel. Ps. 9:6 (PG 12,1188D10-1189A3). A similar passage is found in

Schol. Apoc. fr. 14 (lines 7-11), which may belong to Origen: "Into the spiritual stone, then,...in accordance with the New Covenant, a new name is inscribed, which indicates the quality of the one who receives and understands it. For when, in accordance with all progress, someone possesses a designation suited to the quality arising from the progress (since the earlier names are always passing away)...." (Diobouniotis and Harnack, 27).

129. Contra Celsum 6.44: "The word Satan in Hebrew, which some spell in a more Hellenic fashion as *Satanas*, means adversary when translated into Greek. Every man who has chosen evil and to live an evil life so that he does everything contrary to virtue is a Satan, that is, an adversary to the Son of God who is righteousness, truth, and wisdom. But speaking more strictly, the Adversary is the first of all beings that were in peace and lived in blessedness who lost his wings and fell from the blessed state" (tr. of H. Chadwick, Origen. Contra Celsum, rev. ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965], 361). The same interpretation of the Hebrew word appears in Origen Comm. Mt. 12.21 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung I, 117, lines 9-11) and in Jerome's Liber interpretationis hebraicorum nominum (Adriaen [CCSL 72], 154 [75.29]; 158 [78.26]), which contains explanations collected from the works of Origen. The actions characteristic of spiritual adversaries were discussed by Origen in De principiis 3.2.

130. Comm. Jn. 19.22.143-146; 13.9.51; Contra Celsum 3.47; cf. Comm. Jn. 10.9.40; 13.7.40-42; 13.9.56. Thus, Origen can refer to the "intelligible light of knowledge" (Contra Celsum 5.10) or to "intelligible bread" (De oratione 27.9).

131. Contra Celsum 6.3; 6.65; 7.42,44; Comm. Jn. 2.28.172.

132. Contra Celsum 6.70; Comm. Jn. 10.5.18; 13.40.261; De principiis 2.8.5; cf. Comm. Jn. 1.26(24).167.

133. Cf. Comm. Jn., fr. 1 (E. Preuschen, Origenes Werke. Vierter Band. Der Johanneskommentar [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1903], 485, lines 12-13). Among the many works on Origen's conception of ἐπίνοιαι, see especially Koch, 65-68; A. Orbe, La epinoia: Algunos preliminares históricos de la distinción κατ' ἐπίνοιαν (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1955), 16-32; H. Crouzel, Origène et la "connaissance mystique" (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961), 390-391 (cf. 248-272); idem, "Le contenu spirituel des dénominations du Christ selon le Livre I du Commentaire sur Jean d'Origène," in H. Crouzel and A. Quacquarelli, eds., Origeniana Secunda (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1980), 131-150. Origen's account developed an idea found already in Philo De specialibus legibus 2.29.

134. Hom. Jer. 8.2; cf. Hom. Jer. 15.6; Comm. Jn. 1.9(11).59-1.10(11).60; Comm. Cant., prologue (Baehrens, 69, lines 27-28); Comm. Rom. 5.6 (PG 14, 1034C1-2): ...Christus unum quidem est per substantiam multa autem virtutibus et operationibus designatur; Hom. Jer. (L.) 1(3).4: Iuxta diversos intellectus terrenus locus multipliciter nominatur et, quomodo differenti inter se notione Salvator plura habet vocabula, cum unus in subiacenti sit, varius autem in virtutibus, sic et propter malitiam generis humani terrena negotia, cum unum sint in subiacenti, intellectus diversitate sunt plurima. See Harl, Origène, 236-237. Origen was here developing an idea which had appeared already in Philo Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 23: ...εί και τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἓν και ταῦτόν ἐστιν, ἐπινοίαις αἱ κλήσεις διαφέρουσι.

135. Origen stated the general principle in Hom. Josh. 23.4: "...and as it is certain that all--either of angels or of human beings--also obtain the names which they bear from these functions and acts..." (W.A. Baehrens, Origenes Werke. Siebenter Band. Homilien zum Hexateuch in Rufins Übersetzung, GCS 30 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1921], 446, lines 1-3). Compare Comm. Cant., prologue (Baehrens, Origenes...Achter Band, 78, line 29-79, line 1). Like Didymus (Comm. Gen.T. 113.9-13), Origen (De principiis 1.5.3; 1.6.2; Comm. Jn. 2.23[17].146) asserted that the names "Principalities", "Powers", "Thrones" and "Dominions" indicated the administrative actions of the beings in question. Origen further developed this idea by noting that the significations of the archangels' names corresponded to their allotted functions (De principiis 1.8.1; Contra Celsum 1.25; 5.4; Comm. Jn. 2.23[17].145; Hom. Num. 14.2; Hom. Josh. 23.4; cf. Enoch 40:9). This connection between names and functions may have been suggested to Origen by Philo De mutatione nominum 65, where proper names were said to be the characteristic marks of powers or functions (χαρακτῆρες δυνάμεων). For Origen and Didymus, names could also indicate the possession of knowledge, which was closely linked to an agent's action or function. Didymus (Comm. Gen.T. 113.15-17) explained "Cherubim" to mean "a multitude of knowledge" (πλήθος γνώσεως), the same explanation which appeared in Origen Hom. Num. 5.3 (multitudo scientiae); 10.3 (multitudinem, id est perfectionem, scientiae). Origen's source, in turn, may have been Philo (De vita Mosis 2[3].98) who asserted, "'Cherubim' is 'full knowledge' and 'much knowledge'" (χερουβίμ, ὡς δ' ἂν Ἕλληνες εἶποιν, ἐπίγνωσις καὶ ἐπιστήμη πολλή); see Lester L. Grabbe, Etymology in Early Jewish Interpretation: The Hebrew Names in Philo (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 219.

136. Comm. Rom. 5.6 (PG 14, 1034C).

137. Comm. Mt. 13.2 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung I, 177, lines 23-25); Hom. Jer. 19.11 (P. Husson and P. Nautin, Origène. Homélie sur Jérémie, v. 2, SC 238 [Paris: Cerf, 1977], 218, lines 21-22); Sel. Ps. 9:6 (PG 12, 1188C9-14); Hom. Num. 25.3 (Baehrens, Hexateuch, 235, lines 29-30); Hom. Josh. 23.4 (ibid., 445, line 19-446, line 1). The change of Abram's name to Abraham was associated with a change of quality in De oratione 24.2; Sel. Gen. 17:5 (PG 12, 116A11-B3; Petit, La chaîne sur la Genèse. Édition intégrale III, 91 [cf. 86]); and perhaps also Comm. Rom. 6.2 (Scherer, 192, line 12-194, line 4), which is fragmentary. Origen was developing ideas previously introduced by Philo, who ascribed the change of the names of Abram and Sarah to a change in their intellectual character and way of life (De cherubim 4-5,7; De gigantibus 62; De mutatione nominum 60-61; 65-71; 76-78; 130; De Abrahamo 81-84; Qu. Gen. 3.43).

138. See Comm. Jn. 10.46.322; 32.2.19,23-24; 32.6.68; 32.9.109-110; 32.13.145-32.14.168; 32.18.230-32.19.249; 32.20.280-317; 32.30.381-382; see S. Laeuchli, "Origen's Interpretation of Judas Iscariot," Church History (1953): 253-265.

139. Comm. Jn. 32.19.246-249; Comm. ser. Mt. 117 (Klostermann and Treu, 243-248); Comm. Rom 9.41 (PG 14, 1244C).

140. Comm. Jn. 32.14.157-159,162; 32.18.232,235; 32.19.241,247-249.

141. Comm. Mt. fr. 201 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung III, 97).

142. Comm. Jn. 32.6.68; 32.24.301,316; 32.30.382.

CHAPTER FOUR:
PROHAIRESIS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ARISTOTLE,
EPICTETUS, ORIGEN AND DIDYMUS

The concept of *προαίρεσις* played a central role in Didymus' criticism of Manichaeism and his attempt to offer an alternative account of the ascetic life. Given the importance of *προαίρεσις* in Didymus' theology, it is remarkable that he nowhere attempted to define the term or discuss it in a systematic manner. This suggests that Didymus was taking over a particular account of *προαίρεσις* which had been expounded by another writer or represented the views generally held by a certain philosophical school. In this chapter, I will examine three influential accounts of *προαίρεσις* which had appeared prior to Didymus' time, those of Aristotle, Epictetus and Origen. I will then examine Didymus' own view of *προαίρεσις*, showing that Didymus was primarily indebted to Origen.

Although the concept of *προαίρεσις* was understood in different ways at different periods, it continued to perform one important function. An account of *προαίρεσις* explained how an agent was able to originate and rationally control his or her actions and thus be morally responsible for the latter. The agent's choice of actions also formed and shaped his or her character, imposing certain limitations upon the scope and nature of his or her future commitments to act.

I. Translating the Term: Some Differences Between Ancient and Modern Accounts of the Impulse to Act

The term προαίρεσις has been variously translated. Since the term was often used in situations where an agent's impulse to act was being discussed, translators have sometimes rendered it by "will," "volition" or even "free will." Such translations, while readily intelligible to the modern reader, are potentially misleading, since the notion of "will" carries a certain amount of philosophical baggage, including concepts which were alien to both the ancient Greek philosophers and Greek Christian writers of the first four centuries. I will briefly indicate some of the points at which the ancient and modern accounts of human action diverge and then suggest alternative translations for the term προαίρεσις.

In the modern period, a distinction has often been made between the reason and the will. The task of reason, it is argued, is to judge what is best; the function of the will is to initiate action. Since the will is an independent faculty, the agent can will to pursue any object or end, regardless of whether the agent's reason judges that object or end to be good. Thus, for example, I may will to smoke a cigarette and actually do so, even though I know that smoking causes cancer and my reason therefore judges smoking to be bad.

According to the modern account, there is nothing particularly surprising or mystifying about such behaviour. Because the reason and will are independent faculties, I can be as rational as I wish to be. If I wish to act in accordance with my reason's judgement about

what is good, I can will to pursue the latter; if I do not wish to act thus, I can will to pursue another course of action. In either case, I am simply doing what I wish to do, regardless of how my reason (or anyone else's reason) may evaluate that course of action.

Modern accounts of the will also emphasize the relative autonomy of the will from the agent's desires, although they disagree about precisely how this autonomy should be understood. According to one account, willing is the agent's selection of one of his or her standing desires for conversion into action, a selection which is independent of the relative force of the desires in question.¹ Thus, for example, I might be strongly motivated by hunger to raid the refrigerator and only slightly motivated to keep typing on the computer so that I can finish the article on which I am working. The superior strength of my desire to raid the refrigerator does not guarantee that it will become my will. Should I will to keep typing on the computer, I will keep doing so, in spite of forceful contrary desires.

According to another account of volition, I can will to perform a particular action even if I have no standing desires to perform that action.² For example, I might be moved purely by a sense of duty to perform some official function which I loathed, undertaking the action even though it was at variance with my own desires about how I should like to act.

The modern concept of the will differs in some important respects from the discussions of the impulse to act which appeared in Greek philosophical writings prior to 400 A.D. In the latter, there

was no faculty independent of reason and desire which initiated action. Action instead arose from reason, desire or some confluence of the two. Furthermore, the reasoning or desire which moved the agent to act was understood to reflect a belief that the object or end of the action was good. The agent therefore did not pursue just any object or end, but only that which he or she regarded as good under some particular description. According to this account, I do not smoke my cigarette simply because I wish to, but rather because I believe smoking to be pleasant or think it to be a cure for asthma and therefore beneficial.

When the origination of action was viewed in this way, an important problem arose in regard to evil acts. If the agent could only elect to pursue the good, could the bad and harmful actions performed by the agent still be regarded as voluntary (i.e. as actions originated and controlled by the agent)? This problem was addressed in different ways, depending upon how the psychology of human action was understood. One approach was to argue that the human soul consisted of two parts, one rational and one irrational, either of which could ultimately inform the agent's action. Evil action arose when the agent pursued what the irrational part imagined to be good (i.e. pleasant or gratifying) rather than what reason judged to be good (i.e. best). Another approach was to argue that the soul was wholly rational in character but was capable of making either accurate or erroneous judgements about what was good. Evil action arose when the agent, being ignorant of what was truly good, pursued what merely appeared to be good.

Because ancient and modern accounts of the impulse to act depend upon different assumptions about the psychology of human action, there was no ancient analogue for the modern concept of the will. To avoid misunderstanding, it therefore seems best to render προαίρεσις by terms other than "will," "volition" or "free will." Because deliberation played a central role in Aristotle's account of the production of the impulse to act, scholarly translations of Aristotle's writings have often rendered προαίρεσις as "deliberate choice," a practice which I have followed in my summary of Aristotle's account.

Since the kind of deliberation which is central to Aristotle's account did not play a significant role in the Stoic analysis of moral choice, a different translation will need to be adopted when Epictetus' reinterpretation of προαίρεσις in terms of Stoic psychology is examined. Epictetus used the term to signify either (1) the assent which initiated the agent's impulse to act or (2) the agent's fundamental orientation or tendency toward some morally-assessable goal. I have rendered the first use of the term by "purposive choice" and the second by "moral purpose." These two ways of rendering the term appropriately emphasize that the choice in question is not random or whimsical, but oriented toward a definite object or end which the agent believes to be good; as such, the choice always indicates an underlying commitment on the agent's part. Furthermore, the translations "purposive choice" and "moral purpose" are able to indicate the close relationship which exists between the terms προαίρεσις and πρόθεσις ("purpose") in Epictetus and other Stoic texts of the Roman period.³ Because Origen and Didymus

followed Epictetus in understanding προαίρεσις in terms of Stoic psychology, the translations "purposive choice" and "moral purpose" will also be used when the accounts of Origen and Didymus are examined.

II. Aristotle's Account of Deliberate Choice

Aristotle's account of προαίρεσις fell into two parts--a discussion of voluntary action and a description of deliberate choice. Aristotle's discussion of voluntary action laid the groundwork for his subsequent description of deliberate choice, outlining the causal and psychological concepts which were presupposed in the latter account. Because Aristotle regarded prohairetic action (i.e. action arising from and reflecting deliberate choice) as a species of voluntary action, all the features that defined voluntary action also necessarily characterized prohairetic action.⁴

I will begin by examining the concepts of "in X's power," "through X's own agency" and "knowledge" which Aristotle used to define voluntary action. The discussion will focus on the Eudemian Ethics (hereafter EE), since EE 2.6-9 contains Aristotle's most detailed account of voluntary action; supporting evidence from other works of Aristotle, particularly the Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter NE) and the Magna moralia (hereafter MM), will also be briefly indicated.⁵ Aristotle's account of deliberate choice in NE 3.1-5 will then be examined; supporting evidence from other works will also be noted.

1. Voluntary Action (EE 2.6-9)

1.1 "In the Agent's Power"

An action could only be voluntary, Aristotle argued, when the action was "in the agent's power" (ἐφ' αὐτῷ), i.e. the action was able to come about or not to come about and the agent was able to control its' coming about or not coming about.⁶ This excluded all actions that occurred "of necessity or by luck or in the course of nature."⁷

1.2. The Internal Impulse Criterion

Aristotle then discussed a second, closely related criterion for voluntary action: The agent must act through his or her own agency (EE 2.9, 1225b9: δι' αὐτόν), i.e. in accordance with an internal impulse (EE 2.8, 1224a22: τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὀρμήν). To define the concept of "internal impulse," Aristotle analyzed the different types of motion which characterized (1) natural (i.e. inanimate) objects; (2) animals and children; and (3) adult human agents.⁸ Aristotle argued that (2) and (3) had an internal starting-point for action (i.e. inclination) which was able to set the body in motion, making self-movement possible. Adult human agents also had a second internal starting-point from which action could arise, i.e. reason; the possession of reason was important because it made the agent capable of producing variable outcomes.

Aristotle began by analyzing the motion of natural objects. A natural object non-incidentally possessed the capacity for a particular kind of change.⁹ When the right conditions obtained--i.e. the object was affected by a thing in which that capacity was actualized and any obstacles to actualization were removed--the

object actualized that potential for change.¹⁰ Because the natural object possessed a capacity for one specific type of change, it consistently tended toward a single goal; fire, for example, had a consistent tendency to move upward and, if not prevented, invariably moved in that direction.¹¹

Natural objects thus had their natural places and, in accordance with their nature and essential impulse, moved toward these places unless something prevented them from doing so.¹² Because a natural object was a continuous and homogeneous body, it was not differentiated in such a way that it could act upon itself and move itself¹³; thus, for example, it could not stop itself or reverse its direction.¹⁴

Animals and children were capable of being moved by an internal impulse arising from inclination (*ὄρεξις*).¹⁵ They were thus able to be self-movers, since the differentiation between inclination and body allowed the animal or child both to act upon itself and to be affected by itself.¹⁶

Like animals and children, adult human agents were self-movers; unlike animals and children, adult human agents possessed both inclination and reason. Two internal starting-points could therefore be distinguished in each adult human agent.¹⁷ Consequently, the internal impulse which moved the agent to act could reflect either a goal arising from reason or a goal arising from inclination.¹⁸ Because either reason or inclination could function as a starting-point (establishing the goal to be pursued), an adult human

agent's action could be voluntary even when the agent's reason and inclination were opposed and the one overpowered the other.¹⁹

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle argued that the introduction of reason as a starting-point allowed the actions produced by human agents to vary in a way that the actions produced by natural objects and animals could not. Aristotle distinguished between rational and non-rational powers. Non-rational powers (such as heat and cold) produced only one kind of change; heat, for example, caused heating but not cooling. Rational powers, by contrast, were able to give rise to contrary outcomes. Where an agent was capable of rational knowledge, the agent's action could be informed either by rational knowledge or its privation, allowing for the production of contrary results.²⁰ The medical art, for example, could be a cause of either health or sickness. Medical knowledge was a cause of health; the privation of such knowledge was a cause of sickness. Medical knowledge was thus essentially a cause of health, but accidentally (through its privation) a cause of sickness. Which of the two outcomes was actually produced depended upon whether the agent inclined to actualize the rational power in question.²¹

Aristotle's requirement that the agent be moved by an internal impulse was intended to prevent actions arising from compulsion from being included in the class of voluntary actions. If something moved the agent against his or her internal impulse, then the agent contributed nothing to the action and the action was involuntary.²² Thus, for example, if A took B's hand and hit B with it, the action

would be involuntary because it it was not produced by an impulse that arose from B's reason or inclination.²³

1.3. Knowledge

Aristotle recognized that an action could not be regarded as voluntary when the agent was not cognizant of what he or she was doing. Thus, Aristotle's third requirement for voluntary action was that the agent act with non-incidental knowledge of the subject, means, and actual result of the action.²⁴ Thus, for example, if X killed Y without knowing that Y was X's father, X could not be said to have killed his father voluntarily; "X killed his father voluntarily" would be true only when X knew Y under Y's proper description (i.e. qua father).²⁵ The same was also true in the case of the means and the actual result. If, for example, one administered a drink thinking it was wine and would function as an aphrodisiac but it was really aconite and caused death, then one caused death involuntarily through ignorance of the means and the actual result.²⁶

In EE 2.9, 1225b11-16, Aristotle added some further stipulations to the knowledge requirement, allowing a distinction to be made between culpable and non-culpable ignorance.²⁷ Aristotle distinguished between having knowledge and using knowledge.²⁸ If the agent had failed to acquire knowledge when it was easy or essential to acquire and this failure resulted from negligence, the agent was responsible for blameworthy acts arising from such ignorance.²⁹ The agent was also responsible when he or she had knowledge but failed to use it as a result of negligence.³⁰ Since blame

was only assigned to actions that were voluntary, culpable actions arising from past or present negligence were to be regarded as voluntary.

2. The Capacity for Deliberate Choice (NE 3.1-5)

Aristotle recognized that an adult human agent was able to bear ascriptions of moral responsibility in a way that an animal or small child could not because the former had certain rational capacities which the latter lacked. The adult human agent, Aristotle asserted, was able to grasp abstract concepts, formulate universal judgements and make use of inference.³¹ These capacities allowed the adult human agent to conceive of and pursue the goal under a general description indicating the goal's value ("Things of such-and-such a kind are good") and then deliberate about the best way to attain the goal.³² This allowed the agent to plan his or her future course of action in a way that reflected his or her reasoned preferences.

2.1. Deliberate Choice

Aristotle argued that moral responsibility (i.e. praise and blame) was assigned only in cases where (1) the action was voluntary and (2) the agent had the capacity for deliberate choice.³³ Deliberate choice was a species of voluntary action which involved a "deliberative inclination for that which is in our power."³⁴ Deliberate choice thus involved two elements.

The first element was an inclination--in this case, a wish (βούλησις)--for some end. A wish was a rational inclination, i.e. an inclination toward an end which the agent opined to be good. The end was "that for whose sake" one acted (wealth, pleasure, etc.)³⁵; Aristotle regarded the end as the cause and goal of the action that followed from it.³⁶ The end arose naturally from the agent's character, which established what things the agent regarded as good and wished for.³⁷

The second element was a process of practical reasoning.³⁸ Preliminary deliberation identified things that were related to the end and led toward it.³⁹ A doctor, for example, deliberated not about the end itself ("Should I heal or not heal?"), but about what things needed be set in relation to the end if the appropriate action was to occur ("What conditions must obtain for healing to take place?").⁴⁰

This process of practical reasoning resulted in deliberate choice only when the thing wished for could be reached by actions the agent believed were possible (i.e. capable of either being or not being) and in his or her power to do or not to do.⁴¹ This excluded cases where the thing wished for was impossible (i.e. wanting fire to cool rather than heat) or came to be naturally, by luck or on account of other causes unrelated to the agent.⁴²

2.2. Character, Choice and Voluntariness

Having defined the concept of deliberate choice and analyzed its components, Aristotle attempted to clarify the relationship between deliberate choice, character and moral responsibility. On

the one hand, character appeared to be a necessary precondition of deliberate choice, since one's perception of the goal arose naturally from one's character. At the same time, the fact that character established which goals the agent was inclined to pursue appeared to imperil the voluntariness of choice. Was character something that controlled the agent rather being something that lay within the agent's control? Did character restrict the scope of deliberate choice in such a way that the agent became unable to avail himself or herself of courses of action for which he had the capacity (*δύναμις*) and which were in his or her power?

Aristotle argued that because deliberate choice led to habituation, one was able to control (and thus be responsible for) not only one's immediate actions but also one's future proclivities for action. Aristotle therefore defined character (*ἦθος*) as a state (*ἕξις*) produced in the agent by habituation.⁴³ A state was a kind of quality which took time to acquire and, once acquired, was lasting and stable; if not permanent, it was at least hard to change.⁴⁴ "State" thus differed from "nature" in that the state was acquired and could sometimes be altered.⁴⁵

Aristotle regarded character as a state of "that part of the soul that is non-rational, but capable of following reason, in accordance with a prescriptive principle."⁴⁶ Those who possessed this part of the soul (i.e. animals and humans) had a capacity for passions, i.e. conditions of the soul (such as anger, desire, fear, and shame) which gave rise to pleasure and pain.⁴⁷ When agents acted in accordance with the passions, they acquired the corresponding states (being

irascible, lustful, etc.).⁴⁸ The state one had caused one either to experience the passions in a certain way or to be immune to them.⁴⁹ The state of an adult human agent was therefore of crucial importance because it determined whether the agent's passions would occur in accordance with reason, leading to virtuous actions (e.g., actions exhibiting bravery and temperance), or in opposition to reason, leading to vicious actions (e.g., actions exhibiting cowardice and intemperance).⁵⁰

In maintaining the agent's responsibility for the formation of his or her character, Aristotle assumed that it would be obvious to everyone that choosing to perform actions of a certain type caused one to possess a state of the same type: "[Only] a totally insensible person would not know that each type of activity is the source of the corresponding state."⁵¹ Where the connection between actions and states of the same type was both necessary and predictable, agents could be expected to have this knowledge; they could therefore be held responsible for the states which were the foreseeable consequences of their actions.⁵²

Once one's character had been established, it was very difficult to alter, since one's character established which goals one was inclined to pursue. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle compared the vicious agent to a man who had thrown away his chance for health by living an intemperate life; although it was once in his power not to be ill, it was now no longer possible for him not to be so.⁵³ Since the intemperate man decided to pursue excesses precisely because they were excesses and had no regrets about it, he was

incurable.⁵⁴ In the Categories, Aristotle nonetheless allowed that a change of character might still be possible for some agents.⁵⁵

In conclusion, Aristotle's account of deliberate choice was important because it showed how the rational and irrational parts of the soul were united in the production of morally-assessable action. In deliberating with a view to action, knowledge of the end and the means was joined with an inclination toward the end. Since this inclination arose from one's character and the distinctive features of one's character were determined by one's past choice of actions, it was also within one's power to discipline the irrational part of the soul and thus determine whether one's future inclinations would occur in accordance with right reason.

III. Epictetus' Account of Purposive Choice

The Stoic philosopher Epictetus contended that all human agents were confronted with a fundamental dilemma.⁵⁶ One lacked control over the changes that took place in one's body and one's environment. Thus, for example, one could neither avoid death nor prevent others from dying; in the same way, it was not always possible to protect one's possessions from loss, destruction, or decay. When one desired something that could not be achieved (for example, preserving one's possessions from loss or decay) or wished to avoid something that could not be avoided (for example, death), unhappiness would inevitably result.⁵⁷ Such unhappiness disturbed the soul and threw it into confusion; under the influence of the

passions, the soul was distracted, drawn in various directions and led to act contrary to nature.⁵⁸

If one wished to attain a life that was in accordance with nature (and therefore free, happy, calm and serene), one needed to determine what was within one's power to achieve or avoid and direct one's desire or aversion only toward such things.⁵⁹ Thus, when one's mind received impressions (φαντασίαι) of external objects, one had to assess whether it was in one's power to attain or effect a change in the objects in question.⁶⁰ If it was in one's power to do so, one also needed to determine whether attaining that object or effecting that change would be in accordance with nature (and therefore good) or contrary to nature (and therefore bad). Having made this judgement, one then responded to the impression of the object with either desire and choice or aversion and refusal.⁶¹ Where it was not within one's power to attain or effect a change in the object, the object was to be regarded as neither good nor bad but indifferent; the impression of the object was therefore not an appropriate object of choice and desire or refusal and aversion.⁶²

Epictetus emphasized that although it was not always within the agent's power to attain or effect a change in external objects, it was always within the agent's power to determine what use he or she would make of the impressions of these objects. Every rational soul, he argued, possessed a governing principle (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), i.e. a rational power (ἡ δύναμις ἡ λογική) which was capable of contemplating both itself and everything else⁶³; its function was to judge how and

when all other things were to be used, allowing the agent to rationally establish his or her plan for living.⁶⁴

Epictetus reinterpreted the concept of προαίρεσις in terms of the Stoic psychology of action, identifying προαίρεσις with the functions of the agent's governing principle.⁶⁵ Epictetus thus associated the term προαίρεσις not with Aristotle's notion of deliberation, but with the Stoic concept of the assent (συγκατάθεσις) which initiated the impulse (ὁρμή) to act.⁶⁶ Because Epictetus denied that there was an irrational part of the soul and equated προαίρεσις with the assent which produced the impulse to act, prohairesis action became synonymous with voluntary action, rather than being a special subset of voluntary action as in Aristotle.

To indicate that προαίρεσις was understood in terms of Stoic rather than Aristotelian psychology of action, the term will be rendered by "purposive choice" rather than "deliberate choice" in the discussion which follows. The identification of προαίρεσις with the agent's governing principle also allowed Epictetus to use the term προαίρεσις in a second sense which transcended the individual act of choice, indicating a rational agent's fundamental orientation or inclination toward a morally-assessable goal (i.e. the agent's "moral purpose").⁶⁷

Since the agent's governing principle could not be compelled by anything external to itself, the capacity to assent or refuse to assent to impressions always remained under the agent's immediate authority (αὐτεξούσιον)⁶⁸; the agent's moral purpose was therefore by nature free (ἐλευθέρα), i.e. autonomous (αὐτόνομον) and unhindered

(ἀκώλυτον).⁶⁹ Epictetus was willing to allow that an impression could sometimes have such force that it created an initial, involuntary disturbance (προπάθεια) in the agent's soul. He asserted, however, that even in such cases the moral purpose was able to refuse to assent to the impression and thus return the soul to its original, undisturbed condition.⁷⁰

Epictetus defined the optimal human state in terms of having a moral purpose whose freedom allowed one to attain the good one desired⁷¹: "he is free for whom all things happen according to his moral purpose, and whom none can restrain."⁷² Where one had a proper moral purpose, one would make proper use of external impressions and therefore be free to attain what was good.⁷³ In the same way, an improper exercise of the moral purpose would lead to an improper use of external impressions and thus to evil consequences, including the soul's subjection to the passions and the consequent distraction and debilitation of one's moral purpose.⁷⁴ The soul, Epictetus contended, could never be compelled or brought to harm by external objects; only one's own judgements could compel or harm it.⁷⁵

To explain the origin of moral error, Epictetus analyzed the process by which the agent came purposely to choose (i.e. assent to) some course of action. He distinguished three elements which preceded rational assent: impressions of external objects, innate preconceptions (προλήψεις) and acquired principles which applied the preconceptions to individual cases. The impression of an external object stimulated the soul to consider pursuing a certain course of

action. Preconceptions provided human agents with a natural knowledge, present from birth, of what was good and evil, honourable and base, appropriate and inappropriate, and conducive to happiness or unhappiness.⁷⁶ Preconceptions thus provided standards which could be used in evaluating the object or course of action under consideration.⁷⁷ Certain additional principles were also required to determine how these standards were to be systematically applied to individual cases.⁷⁸ Erroneous judgements and actions could arise when the agent failed to grasp these principles.⁷⁹ In such a case, one would misconstrue the situation⁸⁰; laying down a wrong premise, one would be led to a wrong conclusion and thus to wrong action.⁸¹ Epictetus thus endorsed the Socratic belief that right and wrong choice derived respectively from right judgement (based on knowledge) and wrong judgement (based on ignorance).⁸²

Epictetus also held that when one believed something to be good and profitable, one had to desire and assent to it.⁸³ The converse was also true; agents could not desire or assent to anything they believed to be false, bad, unprofitable or harmful.⁸⁴ Agents thus desired and assented to the wrong things only where ignorance made them unable to properly distinguish between good and evil in a particular situation.⁸⁵

Like Aristotle, Epictetus believed that it was possible for the agent to change his or her moral character. Because Epictetus denied that there was an irrational part of the soul which could give rise to action and held that one must desire and assent to what one believed to be good, it followed that one's moral character would

change automatically once one perceived the error of one's reasonings.⁸⁶ The amendment of one's moral character should therefore have been a relatively easy, straightforward matter.⁸⁷ In actual fact, however, those who had grown accustomed to error lost the power to reason correctly and, being subject to the passions, were often unwilling to admit that they held erroneous opinions. When agents were in such a state, Epictetus concluded, it was impossible to get them to listen to reason or change their opinions about what was good and what was evil.⁸⁸

In conclusion, Epictetus held that because one was able to establish one's goals through assent to external impressions and in independence of all external conditions, one was responsible for the proper formation of one's moral purpose and for the habits one acquired.⁸⁹ If negligence and error were allowed to corrupt one's moral purpose, corrupt habits would be acquired, leading to unhappiness, subjection to the passions and action contrary to nature.⁹⁰ Reformation of one's moral character was in theory easily attainable through the reformation of one's judgements; sadly, persons who had allowed themselves to become corrupted had often put this antidote beyond their own reach.

IV. Origen's Account of Purposive Choice

Origen's discussion of purposive choice arose from his desire to defend the ecclesiastical proclamation in response to Valentinian teaching. By "ecclesiastical proclamation" (τὸ κήρυγμα τὸ

ἐκκλησιαστικόν), Origen meant what was publicly proclaimed in the churches of his day and (as far as he knew) had been proclaimed in the churches since apostolic times. Although it did not have a fixed form like a creed, this proclamation could be articulated in the form of various articles (δόγματα).⁹¹ For Origen, the ecclesiastical proclamation was only notionally distinguishable from Scripture and was never separable from the latter since, in cases of dispute, it could be confirmed by reference to Scripture.

Although the ecclesiastical proclamation stated that certain things were the case, it did not explain how or why they were so. Origen held that those who possessed intelligence, devotion and moral purity could legitimately seek to explain how and why such things were so, drawing upon the inspired writings and the logical development of the principles involved. Such speculative explanations of the ecclesiastical proclamation, however, were to be communicated (if it all) only to persons of similar mental and spiritual character; unlike the ecclesiastical proclamation itself, these speculative accounts were not to be publicly disseminated.

Origen regarded the righteous judgement of God as a part of the ecclesiastical proclamation.⁹² The righteousness of God's judgment could not be maintained if God punished those who had always been incapable of complying with the divine demands and rewarded those who had never had any choice but to comply. Since human agents were required to live a good life and avoid sin, one had to assume that deeds worthy of praise or blame lay within the power

of such agents.⁹³ Rewards and punishments could not justly be administered for actions caused by another agent or by fate.⁹⁴

Origen also argued that if the righteous judgement of God was a part of the ecclesiastical proclamation and both praiseworthy and blameworthy actions had to be in the agents' power if the righteousness of God's judgement was to be maintained, then praiseworthy and blameworthy actions' being in the agent's power must also be inferred to be a part of the ecclesiastical proclamation and confirmable by reference to Scripture.⁹⁵

Origen examined a number of biblical passages which appeared to contradict the idea that both praiseworthy and blameworthy actions were in the agent's power. Origen considered passages dealing with the hardening of Pharaoh's heart (Ex. 4:21; 7:23), God's removal of the heart of stone (Ezek. 11: 19f.) and Jesus' use of parables to prevent some of the hearers from understanding and being saved (Mt. 13:10; Mk. 4:12).⁹⁶ Origen noted that certain heterodox persons (probably Valentinians) explained the hardening of Pharaoh's heart by reference to Rom. 9:20: "He has mercy on whom he wishes and hardens whom he wishes."⁹⁷ By distinguishing between "earthly" (χοϊκοὺς) persons who had lost natures and were incapable of salvation and "spiritual" (πνευματικῶν) persons who had natures of the opposite kind, these opponents appeared to deny that human agents' choice of actions was under their immediate authority.

Origen rejected the ideas (which he attributed to the Valentinians) that some agents had fixed moral natures and that good

and evil arose from the agent's constitution (κατασκευή) or nature (φύσις).⁹⁸ He also refused to accept the Marcionite assertion that the Creator was vindictive and the author of worldly evils. These explanations, he argued, conflicted with the ecclesiastical proclamation and failed to provide convincing interpretations of the Scriptures. If, for example, Pharaoh had had a lost nature, why would there have been any need for God to harden Pharaoh's heart? Similarly, if Pharaoh had had a lost nature and was wholly disobedient to God, how could he have been troubled by the signs and wonders which God performed through Moses?

Origen sought a new explanation which better agreed with the ecclesiastical proclamation. Such an explanation had to meet three criteria. First, it had to leave morally appraisable acts within the power of human agents. Second, it needed to show that when God withheld things from an agent and allowed the agent to suffer various evils, God did so with the agent's benefit in mind. Finally, it had to be able to account for the dynamics of conversion and moral alteration which one repeatedly found in the biblical narratives.

As Jackson has noted, the explanation Origen offered can be divided into two parts.⁹⁹ First, Origen drew upon Stoic teaching to argue that rational agents had the power to evaluate impressions and decide how to respond to them. Alternative, morally appraisable acts of choice thus remained within the power of human agents even when their external circumstances were determined. Second, Origen drew upon Platonic teaching to explain how acts of choice could positively or negatively determine an agent's subsequent identity

without impugning God's goodness or undermining the agent's immediate authority over his or her acts of choice.

Following Stoic teaching, Origen asserted that animals and humans were capable of producing an impulse (ὁρμή) to act in response to an impression (φαντασία) of an external thing.¹⁰⁰ Unlike animals, human beings also possessed reason, which allowed the various impressions to be judged and consequently admitted or rejected.¹⁰¹ Thus, although it was not within the agent's power to determine whether an external thing would produce an impression upon the soul, it was always within the agent's power to decide how that impression would be used.¹⁰² Reason thus provided the means to contemplate both the noble and the base and to decide which impressions one would act upon, producing an impulse toward what was noble and proper (τὸ καθήκον) or toward the opposite.¹⁰³ Origen linked this capacity to give rise to opposite outcomes with the Platonic and Aristotelian idea that knowledge was necessarily of contraries; like Aristotle, he illustrated this concept by noting that medical knowledge could give rise either to health or, by its privation, sickness.¹⁰⁴ Since the good could only be acquired voluntarily, God wished the soul to acquire knowledge and choose the good.¹⁰⁵

Like the Stoics, Origen held that control over external things was often not within one's power and therefore not within the realm of choice; the possession or absence of such things was neither good nor bad but indifferent.¹⁰⁶ Origen accepted the Stoic premise that only that which made one good (i.e. virtue) was good, while only that

which made one bad (i.e. vice) was bad.¹⁰⁷ Good and evil therefore lay in the moral purpose alone, the alteration of which always remained within one's power.¹⁰⁸ Origen illustrated this lack of connection between external conditions and the character of one's moral purpose by pointing to 2 Cor. 4:8, where Paul showed that external afflictions need not lead to inward distress.¹⁰⁹

Like Epictetus, Origen held that the soul was a rational substance and associated προαίρεσις with the functions of the agent's governing principle (ἡγεμονικόν), which he identified with the biblical notion of the heart (καρδία).¹¹⁰ Like Epictetus, Origen associated προαίρεσις with the soul's power of assent (συγκαταθέσθαι) and refusal (ἀνανεῦσαι), rather than with deliberation (as in Aristotle's account).¹¹¹ By denying that action could arise from an irrational part of the soul and identifying προαίρεσις with assent, Origen regarded prohairesis action (i.e. action arising from and reflecting προαίρεσις) as being synonymous with voluntary action (as in Epictetus), rather than being a special subset of the latter (as in Aristotle).¹¹² Origen's account of προαίρεσις nonetheless differed from that of Epictetus in that Origen made little use of the Stoic idea of preconceptions (προλήψεις), which had played a central role in Epictetus' account.¹¹³

Because Origen identified προαίρεσις with the governing principle and its functions, Origen could use the term to indicate not only the assent which initiated the agent's impulse to act (i.e. the agent's "purposive choice"), but also the agent's fundamental orientation or tendency toward a morally assessable goal (i.e. his or her "moral purpose"). Thus, for example, Origen could speak of an

agent acting ἀπὸ τῆς μισητικῆς προαιρέσεως, i.e. from a disposition to hate.¹¹⁴ Origen was likewise able to accuse the Marcionites of having the Creator act with an ἀμυντική καὶ ἀνταποδοτική τῶν χειρόνων προαίρεσις, i.e. a disposition to retaliate and inflict retribution upon those who were inferior in character.¹¹⁵ Origen compared God to a father who had a φιλική προαίρεσις for his son (i.e. was affectionately disposed toward the latter).¹¹⁶ Likewise, while the person alienated from God had a κακοποιητική προαίρεσις (i.e. was disposed to do evil), the person ready to do the will of God was distinguished by the rectitude of his or her moral purpose (τὸ δεξιὸν τῆς προαιρέσεως).¹¹⁷ The acts chosen by the agent were therefore not isolated from, but rather reflected, the character of the agent's moral purpose.¹¹⁸

Although one's προαίρεσις could not be compelled by anything external to itself, it could be altered in response to persuasion.¹¹⁹ Impressions and reasonings could initially seem very appealing and therefore have considerable persuasive power.¹²⁰ In the same way, when the soul received an impression of something unsettling or threatening, an initial, involuntary disturbance (προπάθεια) could be produced in the soul.¹²¹ Moral error arose when the agent hastily assented to an impression because of its persuasive or unsettling features, without taking the time to rationally examine and assess his or her course of action.¹²²

Origen affirmed that the Devil and demonic forces were able to use impressions of external objects for their own ends.¹²³ When an agent assented to the impressions and evil reasonings introduced into his or her mind by demonic powers, choosing to perform vicious acts,

the demonic forces were able to enter into the agent's soul and enslave it.¹²⁴ Origen compared the way in which the soul received and reflected and acted upon demonic suggestions to the way in which a woman's womb conceived, nurtured and brought forth a child.¹²⁵

In spite of the persuasive force which an impression might have, it was always within the agent's power to give or withhold assent (*συγκατάθεσις*) to the impression and thus determine the inclination of his or her governing principle.¹²⁶ Because rational agents possessed immediate authority (*αὐτεξούσιος*) over their impulse to act, they were able to incline toward either virtue or vice.¹²⁷ Making use of this ability, rational agents constantly underwent moral alteration, changing at one time for the better, at another for the worse¹²⁸; since agents were capable of altering their moral purpose, they therefore remained the cause of their own salvation or perdition.¹²⁹ Origen cited Judas as a case in point; having been chosen to be an apostle on account of his right moral purpose, he afterward allowed Satan to enter into his heart and became a betrayer.¹³⁰

Because of the force which impressions could bring to bear upon the soul, Origen emphasized that the agent must hold fast to his or her judgements, not allowing his or her assent to waver or be shaken.¹³¹ Careful training was therefore necessary if one was to repel incitements to evil action and steadfastly adhere to virtuous judgements.¹³² Those who did not remain steadfast became distracted and fell into discordant judgements on account of vice¹³³;

debilitated by ignorance, vacillation and erroneous judgements, the agent's moral purpose was unable to pursue virtue.¹³⁴

In the second part of his explanation, Origen made use of Platonic concepts to refute Marcion's contention that the Creator was vindictive and the author of worldly evils. Origen argued that all rational creatures were formed from the same substance and originally enjoyed the same status by participating in the same activity (contemplating and adhering to the good).¹³⁵ Rational creatures nonetheless differed from God in that they possessed goodness accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) rather than substantially (οὐσιωδῶς).¹³⁶ Rational creatures' goodness was thus contingent; they could only continue to participate in the good by choosing to do so.¹³⁷

As a result, although God had created a single material substrate, rational creatures had introduced diversity into the created realm by forming different moral purposes and thus giving rise to different qualities in the substrate.¹³⁸ By choosing to pursue different goals and acquiring different moral qualities, rational creatures came to merit different degrees of praise and blame.¹³⁹

Since the character of one's moral purpose was correlated with one's state (ἔξις), rational creatures came to have different kinds of existences.¹⁴⁰ Those who became negligent and turned away from God were obliged to enter into inferior bodily conditions which corresponded to the degree of their departure from the good.¹⁴¹ In these inferior conditions, they acted in accordance with the passions and thus resembled the irrational animals in their mores; thus, for

example, Origen likened the lustful man to "a horse in heat" (Jer. 5:8).¹⁴²

Because rational agents were created to be immortal, they continued to exist through a succession of lifetimes. The status God granted to one in one's present lifetime was determined by the moral choices one had made prior to entering one's present life. Thus, God could justly love Jacob and hate Esau before either had been born because of "older causes," i.e. choices made by each before their entry into that particular life.¹⁴³ Origen likewise regarded the Old Testament prophecies about different nations (i.e. Egyptians, Babylonians, Tyrians and Sidonians) as referring to the various positions occupied by rational agents in the present age as a result of their various degrees of declension from the good.¹⁴⁴

Because one could not attain purity of heart by προαίρεσις alone, one was obliged to repent, turn to God and seek divine assistance.¹⁴⁵ God then enlightened the soul and made it suitable for reception of further divine benefits.¹⁴⁶ God's assistance made it possible for the agent to bring about things that would not have been possible for the agent alone to achieve; the soul's right action should therefore be referred to God.¹⁴⁷ Through the appropriation of God's grace and proper training, the soul was able to overcome negligence and attain a superior state of existence, becoming fundamentally oriented toward heavenly things and conformed to the image of the Son of God.¹⁴⁸ Reestablished in a good moral purpose, rational creatures were once again able to be united in love and truth.¹⁴⁹

V. Didymus' Account of Purposive Choice

For Didymus, as for Origen, reflection upon προαίρεσις arose in response to heretical teaching and rested upon an appeal to God's giving of commandments in the Old and New Testaments. Such legislation, Didymus argued, presupposed that human agents were capable of obedience, being able to turn away from wrongdoing and toward what was commended.¹⁵⁰ Since evil was not an ineradicable part of the agent's existence, it did not arise from the agent's constitution (κατασκευή) or nature (φύσις), as the Valentinians asserted.¹⁵¹ Neither was evil to be connected with an underlying substance (a view which Didymus attributed to the Valentinians and Manichaeans).¹⁵² Evil was instead a quality which characterized the agent's moral purpose when he or she purposely chose to do wrong.¹⁵³

In setting up his discussion of προαίρεσις, Didymus drew upon Aristotle's distinction between potentiality and actuality. Every human agent, he affirmed was a "rational creature...created with a capacity for virtue or vice."¹⁵⁴ Each would therefore have a natural "aptitude for the acquisition of the good."¹⁵⁵ This potential for change remained even where it was not actualized.¹⁵⁶ Having a capacity for change was nonetheless neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy; one was praised and blamed only for actions or achievements--i.e. the actualization of capacities--and not for having the capacities themselves.¹⁵⁷

Like Plato and Aristotle, Didymus affirmed that for rational creatures, knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) was necessarily of contraries; thus,

for example, knowledge of what was good necessarily involved knowledge of what was evil and knowledge of what was true implied knowledge of what was false.¹⁵⁸ Because rational creatures admitted of contraries in this way, they were capable of producing contrary outcomes, since what was produced could arise either from knowledge or its privation. Didymus developed this idea by referring to an illustration which had been used by Aristotle and subsequently borrowed by Origen. The medical art could be either a cause of health or accidentally, by its privation, a cause of sickness.¹⁵⁹ Because either knowledge or its privation could inform the rational agent's choice of actions, the agent was capable of producing both praiseworthy and blameworthy actions; the agent was therefore capable of possessing contrary moral qualities.¹⁶⁰ Since a rational creature could only become good voluntarily, God wished the agent to acquire and make use of the knowledge relevant to the moral life, translating the capacity for virtue into action while abstaining from actualizing the capacity for vice.¹⁶¹

Didymus followed Epictetus and Origen in defining *προαίρεσις* in terms of Stoic psychology. The soul was a rational substance, being guided by a leading part (*ἡγεμονικόν*), which Didymus, like Origen, identified with the biblical concept of the heart (*καρδία*).¹⁶² The impulse (*ὄρμη*) to act arose only from the soul's assent (*συγκατάθεσις*) to an impression (*φαντασία*), i.e. an imprint (*τύπος*) left in the soul by an external object.¹⁶³ Purposive choice was identified with assent and thus could be found only in agents capable of rational assent.¹⁶⁴ Although Didymus allowed that reasoning or reflection often

preceded the agent's assent, deliberation of the Aristotelian type was not an important part of Didymus' account of purposive choice.¹⁶⁵ By denying that there was an irrational part of the soul which could give rise to action and centering his account of choice around assent rather than deliberation, Didymus showed that, like Epictetus and Origen, he understood προαίρεσις in terms of Stoic rather than Aristotelian psychology. Thus, for Didymus, as for Epictetus and Origen, prohairetic action was identified with voluntary action and was not, as Aristotle held, a special subset of voluntary action.¹⁶⁶

Like Epictetus and Origen, Didymus held that although impressions could not compel assent, they nonetheless could have considerable persuasive power. Thus, for example, an impression of something beautiful might initially seem very appealing and desirable to the soul.¹⁶⁷ In the same way, if the soul received an impression of something dangerous and threatening, the anticipation of suffering might produce an initial disturbance in the soul (προπάθεια).¹⁶⁸

Like Origen, Didymus affirmed that the Devil was able to use these impressions of external objects for his own ends. Since he was unable to compel rational agents to embrace evil, the Devil opted for a more subtle method. By introducing into the agent's mind impressions of attractive and desirable material objects and various evil reasonings, the Devil hoped to make the negligent, pleasure-loving soul abandon any resolutions to pursue virtue and instead pursue vice.¹⁶⁹ When the soul assented to these evil reasonings and collaborated with the Devil, the soul brought forth sinful thoughts and actions¹⁷⁰; like Origen, Didymus compared this process to the

way that a woman's womb conceived, nurtured and brought forth a child.¹⁷¹ Once the soul had chosen to perform a sinful action, the Devil was able to enter the soul and enslave it.¹⁷²

Because impulse could arise only from assent, the agent possessed immediate authority over his or her choice of actions and the consequent formation of his or her moral character.¹⁷³ Like Epictetus, Didymus defined this immediate authority (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον) in terms of having a moral purpose (προαίρεσις) that was free (ἐλευθέρᾳ), i.e. autonomous (αὐτόνομον) and unhindered (ἀκώλυτον).¹⁷⁴ Following Origen, Didymus illustrated the lack of connection between external conditions and the character of one's moral purpose by pointing to 2 Cor. 4:8, where Paul showed that external afflictions need not lead to inward distress.¹⁷⁵ Because the soul had an autonomous moral purpose, it always remained able to pass from virtue to vice and from vice to virtue.¹⁷⁶

Like Epictetus and Origen, Didymus argued that if the soul was to keep itself in a correct state, it needed to use rightly its powers of memory, assent (συγκαταθετική) and refusal (ἀνανευτική).¹⁷⁷ In exercising these powers, one needed to distinguish carefully between external circumstances (which were ultimately beyond one's power to control) and one's moral purpose (which was always within one's power to alter and was the true focus of the moral life).¹⁷⁸ It was therefore necessary to rationally examine all things and assent only to those which were within one's power and approved by reason.¹⁷⁹ In discussing the agent's rational assent, Didymus (like Origen) did

not make use of the Stoic theory of preconceptions, which had played an important role in Epictetus' account.

Once the soul had assented to what was consonant with reason, it had to refuse to allow itself to be disturbed or influenced by external circumstances or evil agents, so that its assent did not waver.¹⁸⁰ By remaining steadfast in his or her judgements, the agent was able to check any disturbances in the soul and return the latter to its former, undisturbed condition.¹⁸¹ As long as the soul remained resolute in its assent to the appropriate things, it was able to preserve its correct tension (εὐτονία) and thus its health and correct functioning.¹⁸²

The agent who failed to make correct judgements would undermine his or her soul's health, leaving the soul distressed and weakened. If one did not devote one's attention to maintaining a correct moral purpose and instead imagined that wealth, fame and other external things were good and useful, one spoiled the tension of one's soul and became unable to bear life's inevitable misfortunes.¹⁸³ The agent's moral purpose was therefore distracted and drawn in different directions and thus debilitated.¹⁸⁴ The agent's incorrect judgements and the consequent weakness and perversion of the agent's moral resolve prevented the agent from being rightly guided toward virtue.¹⁸⁵

Like Epictetus and Origen, Didymus used the word προαίρεσις to indicate not only the assent which initiated impulse (i.e. "purposive choice"), but also the agent's fundamental tendency (i.e. his or her "moral purpose"). Thus, for example, Didymus was able to define

generosity (ἐλευθεριότης) as ἡ κοινωνικὴ προαίρεσις, i.e. the disposition to share what one has.¹⁸⁶ Didymus also remarked that when a penurious man presided over the games and sought to reduce the expenses associated with the latter, he was motivated to do this ἀπὸ μικρᾶς προαιρέσεως, i.e. by small-mindedness.¹⁸⁷ In the same way, Didymus could also speak of an agent as having a προαίρεσις which was humble or passionate or which rejoiced at another's misfortune.¹⁸⁸

Like Origen, Didymus linked προαίρεσις with the soul's descent into various conditions which corresponded to the degree of the soul's departure from the good. Didymus affirmed that God, as Creator, was not responsible for the diverse conditions in which rational creatures presently existed. All human beings had a single common substance (i.e. primary substrate) which was receptive of different contingent or accidental qualities.¹⁸⁹ These qualities (including evil) did not subsist in the way that the substance did; instead, they came into being through an agent's moral purpose and ceased to exist when the agent ceased to have that moral purpose.¹⁹⁰

When rational agents turned away from God and inclined toward various forms of evil, it was no longer possible for them to be united in the same judgement, pursuing the same goal and having the same moral purpose.¹⁹¹ Since the quality of one's moral purpose was linked to the state (ἔξις) or condition (διάθεσις/κατάστασις) of one's soul, when one chose to cultivate and pursue an inferior life, one's soul entered into an inferior condition.¹⁹² In this inferior condition, the soul became accustomed to its erroneous judgements and,

refusing to attend to divine matters, became entrapped in ignorance.¹⁹³ Because of its fundamental attachment to material things (its ὑλικὴ προαίρεσις), the soul became thick and dense and gave itself over to the passions of the flesh.¹⁹⁴ Like Origen, Didymus described the soul's descent in terms of a passage from a superior condition, in which one was conformed to the divine image, to an inferior condition, in which one bore the likeness of the irrational animals, acting in accordance with the passions; thus for example, the lustful man bore and conducted himself in the image of "a horse in heat" (Jer. 5:8).¹⁹⁵

To prevent the soul from becoming confirmed in its erroneous judgements and unrepentant, materially-oriented moral purpose, God administered corrective punishment.¹⁹⁶ Recognizing that because of its mutable character it was unable to resist evil and attain a perfect state by its own efforts, the soul repented, humbled itself, and approached God to ask for his mercy and gracious assistance.¹⁹⁷ Once the agent had repented and been converted, the agent's moral purpose cooperated with God, who helped to bring the agent's good resolutions to term; the agent's subsequent perfect state and right action (κατόρθωμα) were therefore to be attributed to God, since these could not have come about without divine grace.¹⁹⁸

God's grace was manifested in a way that did not compromise or abolish the agent's authority over himself or herself.¹⁹⁹ Since sin arose from ignorance, grace involved an illumination of the mind by the Spirit of Christ, making one sensible of divine things and able to form correct judgements about spiritual matters.²⁰⁰ When the soul

responded to this illumination by forming a good moral purpose, the soul was able to participate in holiness and became suited for communion with God and the receipt of further benefits from God.²⁰¹ Thus, having walked "in the image of the earthly" (being bound to material things and behaving in a bestial manner), souls progressed to walk "in the image of the heavenly" (being oriented toward divine things and conformed to the image of the Son of God).²⁰² Once again united by a harmonious moral purpose and eager for divine truth, they performed the spiritual functions of priestly worship in the heavenly temple.²⁰³

From the analysis given above, it can be seen that Didymus' use of the term προαίρεσις drew upon the accounts of previous writers, most notably that of Origen. In setting up his discussion of προαίρεσις, Didymus drew upon Aristotle's account of potentiality and his belief that the rational agent was capable of producing opposite outcomes through the possession or privation of knowledge. While these ideas were not unknown to Origen, Didymus made much greater use of Aristotelian concepts than Origen and other earlier ecclesiastical writers.²⁰⁴

At the same time, Didymus, like Epictetus and Origen, understood the term προαίρεσις in terms of Stoic, rather than Aristotelian psychology. Didymus affirmed that there was only one starting-point for action in the soul. The impulse to act could therefore arise only from the assent of the soul's governing principle; prohairetic action was therefore identified with voluntary action

rather than being a special subset of the latter. Furthermore, deliberation did not play an important role in Didymus' account.

Although Didymus' treatment of προαίρεσις was in some respects comparable to that of Epictetus, there are also some important differences. It is remarkable, for example, that Didymus, like Origen, did not make significant use of the Stoic notion of preconceptions (προλήψεις) when discussing the nature of assent and the origin of moral error.

Didymus' account of προαίρεσις most nearly resembles that of Origen. Certain ideas not found in Aristotle or Epictetus were shared by Origen and Didymus. In both writers, for example, προαίρεσις was intimately linked with the state or condition of the agent; the agent's moral character was therefore associated with a corresponding type of bodily existence. Purposive choice consequently came to have a cosmic, trans-historical importance which it did not have for Aristotle or Epictetus. Thus, although purposive choice always defined and expressed the character of an autonomous agent, it also situated that agent within a broader cosmic drama, spanning lifetimes, in which divine and demonic powers contended for the rational creature's allegiance. The rational agent was not able to play his or her appropriate part in this drama without the gracious assistance of God, to whom all the agent's excellences must ultimately be referred.

NOTES

Chapter Four

1. See, for example, Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5-20. Frankfurt distinguishes between a first-order desire (i.e. wanting something), a second-order desire (i.e. wanting to want something) and a second-order volition (i.e. wanting one of my wants to be the one that moves me to action). The relative force of one's desires and the selection of a desire to be one's will are therefore treated as separate issues.

2. Here I have in mind contemporary discussions of volition which are indebted to Kant; see, for example, R.F. Dearden, "Autonomy and Education," in R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst and R.S. Peters, eds., Education and the Development of Reason (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), 448-465.

3. See, for example, Epictetus Diss. 2.23.37, where πρόθεσις appears in place of προαίρεσις; compare also Encheiridion 51.1. The term πρόθεσις could also be used in a more restricted sense to designate one of the components of the act of choice, i.e. future-directed intention. Cf. Diss. 1.21.2; 2.8.29; 2.13.7; 4.6.26, where πρόθεσις is numbered together with design (ἐπιβολή), assent (συγκατάθεσις) and impulse (ὄρμη); see also the analysis of Inwood, 231-232. Since Epictetus held that προαίρεσις was identifiable with each of the components of the act of choice, the identification of προαίρεσις and πρόθεσις persisted even when the latter term was used in its restricted sense.

4. Nicomachean Ethics 3.2, 1111b7-10, 1112a14-17; 5.8, 1135b8-10; Eudemian Ethics 2.10, 1226b30-36; Magna moralia 1.17, 1189a33-36.

5. The authenticity of the MM is contested. The majority of scholars regard the MM not as a genuine work of Aristotle, but as a later epitome which drew primarily on the EE. In the following discussion, reference will be made to the MM only in a few cases where the MM helps to clarify ambiguities in the EE's treatment of voluntary action. For our purposes, it will not be necessary to establish the authenticity of the MM or specify its exact relation to other works in the Aristotelian corpus. For a discussion of these

latter questions, see Franz Dirlmeier, Aristoteles. Magna Moralia (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958), 93-147.

6. EE 2.6, 1223a5-7.

7. EE 2.6, 1223a10-12.

8. For the discussion that follows, see EE 2.8, 1224a16-30 and compare De caelo 4.3, 310b33-311a1.

9. Physics 8.4, 255a25-30.

10. Physics 8.1, 251b1-4; 8.4, 255a34-b1; 255b5-13; 255b20-256a3.

11. Physics 8.1, 252a17-20.

12. EE 2.8, 1224a16-19; cf. Physics 8.3, 253b33-35 and De caelo 4.3. See Felix Grayeff, Aristotle and His School: An Inquiry into the History of the Peripatos with a Commentary on Metaphysics Z, H, A, and Θ (London, 1974), 183-186.

13. Physics 8.4, 255a13-20.

14. Physics 8.1, 251a29-30; 8.4, 255a6-12.

15. EE 2.8, 1224a24-30.

16. Cf. Physics 8.2, 252b20-23; 8.4, 254b15-19,29-32; De motu animalium 1, 698a7-8. See David J. Furley, "Self-Movers," in Amélie Oskenberg Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1980), 55-67 and Mary Louise Gill and James G. Lennox, eds., Self-Motion: From Aristotle to Newton (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994) (which also reprints Furley's article on pages 3-14).

17. EE 2.8, 1224a23-25,27-28; cf. De anima 3.9, 433a6-9. In EE 2.8, 1224b29-35, Aristotle argued that both reason and inclination were natural starting-points--desire because it was present in the agent from birth, reason because it arose naturally from growth.

18. Aristotle emphasized that only human beings were capable of "actions" (πράξεις), i.e. changes which realized goals arising from reasoning. See EE 2.6, 1222b19-20. Cf. EE 1.7, 1217a35-37; 2.1,

1219b40-1220a2; 2.3, 1220b27; 2.6, 1223a4; 2.8, 1224a29; NE 6.2, 1139a19-21.

19. EE 2.8, 1224a30-b29.

20. See Metaphysics 9.2, 1046b4-28; 9.5;1048a2-14; compare also Physics 8.1, 252a17-20, where a rational or intelligible principle (λόγος) is associated with the production of variable outcomes.

21. Metaphysics 9.5, 1048a11-15. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle asserted that the moral state or disposition produced in the agent by habituation could limit and determine the way in which the agent's rational powers were exercised; see NE 5.1, 1129a7-15 and note Aristotle's rejection of the commonly-held view discussed in NE 5.9, 1137a17-26.

22. EE 2.8, 1224a20-23; 1224b7-8; cf. NE 3.1, 1110a1-b17.

23. EE 2.8, 1224b11-14.

24. EE 2.6, 1225b2,6. See the discussion of Robert Heinaman ("The Eudemian Ethics on Knowledge and Voluntary Action," Phronesis 31 [1986]: 128-147), who is responding in part to criticisms of Aristotle's account made by J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle on Action," Mind 87 (1978): 595-601 (reprinted in Rorty, 93-101). In NE 5.8, 1135a23-25, the same conditions are given. In NE 3.1, 1111a3, three possible additional conditions are examined and rejected.

25. NE 5.8, 1135a28-30. The distinction between incidental and non-incidental knowledge was discussed by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics 1.2, 71a9-10,b28-29; 1.4, 73b16-19; 1.5, 74a27-32; 1.6, 74b21-26; 1.9, 76a4-6,26-28; NE 6.3, 1139b31-35. Of these, Posterior Analytics 1.9, 76a4-6 provides the most concise definition: "We understand something non-incidentally when we recognize it in respect of the subject in virtue of which it is an attribute, and from the principles proper to that subject as such" (tr. of Hugh Tredennick, Posterior Analytics [London: William Heinemann, 1960], 67).

26. EE 2.9, 1225b4-5.

27. See the remarks of Heinaman (132n.4, 135n.8) on the significance of προσδιοριστέον in EE 2.9, 1225b16.

28. EE 2.9, 1225b11-12; NE 1.8, 1098b32-1099a2; 7.3, 1146b31-34; cf. MM 2.10, 1208a31-b1. An agent can be said to have knowledge of X when the agent knows a thing is X and, upon perceiving the thing, can attend to it as X. When the agent perceives the thing and attends to it as X, the agent is using his or her knowledge of X. For the distinction between potential knowledge (i.e. having knowledge) and actual knowledge (i.e. using knowledge), see also De anima 2.1, 412a9-11,22-26; 2.5, 417a21-417b1; Physics 8.4, 255b2-4; and Metaphysics 9.6, 1048a32-35; 9.8, 1050a34-36.

29. EE 2.9, 1225b14-16; NE 3.5, 1113b32-1114a3. See also NE 3.1, 1111a3.

30. EE 2.5, 1225b12-14; NE 1.8, 1098b32-1099a2. Those who act in ignorance when drunk or angry will fall into this category. In such cases, the starting-point of the action is in the agent and the agent controls whether he or she will get drunk and is therefore responsible for his or her ignorance (NE 3.1, 1110b24-27; 3.5, 1113b21-32).

31. NE 7.3, 1147b3-5; De anima 3.11, 434a9-12; cf. De anima 3.3, 428a19-23.

32. In EE 2.10, 1226b23, Aristotle asserts one of the reasons why adult human agents can have προαίρεσις, while animals do not, is that the former possess a "notion of the 'Why?'" (ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τί), i.e. an account of the goal of the action which explains why the action is being performed. See also NE 6.2, 1139a23-26,30-34.

33. EE 2.6, 1223a9-20; see the discussion of Robert Heinaman, "Compulsion and Voluntary Action in the Eudemian Ethics," Nous 22 (1988): 253-281.

34. For the definition of deliberate choice as a "deliberative inclination for that which is in our power," see EE 2.10, 1226b16-17. A "deliberative inclination" was an inclination whose starting-point and cause was deliberation and thus resulted from deliberation (NE 3.3, 1113a10-12; EE 2.10, 1226b19-20; 1227a3-5). Because animals were incapable of deliberation, they were therefore incapable of deliberate choice (EE 2.10, 1225b26-27).

35. EE 2.10, 1227a13-15.

36. EE 2.10, 1227a25-30; Physics 2.3, 194b33-35. Discernment of the end was necessary for deliberation to occur; those who had no goal (σκοπός) before them were not in a position to

deliberate (EE 2.10, 1226b29-30; cf. 1227a5-7). The end was thus a starting-point and a hypothesis, resembling the hypotheses used in the theoretical sciences (EE 2.11, 1227b28-32; cf. EE 2.10, 1226b9-10; NE 7, 1151a15-18; Posterior Analytics 1.3, 72b19-20).

37. NE 3.5, 1114a11-14; cf. NE 7.8, 1150a19-22. Wish (βούλησις) and opinion (δόξα) were thus necessary components of deliberate choice even though they did not themselves require deliberation (EE 2.10, 1226b3-5,25; 1227a3-5), since they could be done "in a flash" (ἐξαίφνης) (EE 2.8, 1224a3-4; 2.10, 1226b3-4). Wish and opinion were related to one another in that one wished for what one opined to be good (EE 2.7, 1223b32-33; 2.10, 1226a13-15; 1227a18, 22, 28; NE 3.4, 1113a15-16,22-24; 5.9, 1136b7; Rhetoric 1.10, 1369a3-4; cf. Metaphysics 12.7, 1072a29-30).

38. Deliberate choice is not reducible to deliberation or practical reasoning simpliciter, since "thought (διάνοια) itself moves nothing" (NE 6.2, 1139a35). Deliberation can lead to impulse (ὁρμή) and movement only when it is joined with inclination.

39. EE 2.10, 1226b2-17. In deliberation, A is chosen for the sake of B and A is in some sense a component of B, so there is not a strict division between the means and the end (NE 3.3, 1113a11-12; 6.2, 1139a23-26). See William W. Fortenbaugh, "Τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος and Syllogistic Vocabulary in Aristotle's Ethics," Phronesis 10 (1965): 191-201. To borrow an example from Ackrill, if mending a fence is the way I pay off a debt to my neighbour, fence-mending will not only be the means by which I pay off the debt, but will actually constitute paying off the debt.

40. NE 3.2, 1111b26-28; 3.3, 1112b11-15,34; EE 2.10, 1226a7-10; Metaphysics 7.9, 1032b6-9. But could the agent be faced with two or more ends which were regarded as equally good (i.e. appropriate) in a given situation? See William J. Fulco, "A Note on Free Will in Aristotle," Modern Schoolman 40 (1963): 393.

41. NE 3.2, 1111b19-26; 3.3, 1112a18-31; EE 2.10, 1225b32-36; 1226a4-6; 1226b13-17.

42. NE 3.3, 1112a18-31; EE 8.2.

43. Rhetoric 1.10, 1369b6-7 (ἔθει δέ, ὅσα διὰ τὸ πολλάκις πεποιηκέναι ποιούσιν). Aristotle posited a link between the words ἦθος (character) and ἔθος (habit) to support his argument (NE 2.1, 1103a16-17; EE 2.2, 1220a39-b1).

44. Categories 8, 8b26-9a9.

45. Aristotle held that the nature could not undergo alteration because it represented a thing's original constitution and innate tendency to produce or undergo a certain kind of change; see Metaphysics 4.4, 1014b16-1015a19. A stone, for example, could not be habituated to rise upward, no matter how many times it was thrown in that direction; the stone's nature mandated that it would always move downward unless prevented from doing so by something external (NE 2.1, 1103a20-24; EE 2.2, 1220b3-5).

46. EE 2.2, 1220b5-7; cf. NE 1.13, 1102b13-1103a1. This was the part of the soul in which inclination arose (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν) (NE 1.13, 1102b30; EE 2.1, 1219b23; De anima 2.3, 414a31).

47. EE 2.2, 1220b8; cf. Rhetoric 2.2, 1378a19-23.

48. EE 2.2, 1220b1-2,16-18,38; NE 2.1, 1103a26-b1,25-31; 2.2, 1103b31; 1104a19-b3.

49. EE 2.2, 1220b9-10; NE 2.2, 1104a34-b3,26-27.

50. EE 2.2, 1220b18-20; cf. MM 2.7, 1206b28-29.

51. NE 3.5, 1114a9-11 (tr. Irwin). Aristotle treated this knowledge as axiomatic; presumably, he expected it to be a predictable inference from analogous human processes (such as athletic training) with which one could be expected to be familiar (cf. NE 3.5, 1114a8-9).

52. See William Bondeson, "Aristotle on Responsibility for One's Character and the Possibility of Character Change," Phronesis 19 (1974): 59-65. Alexander of Aphrodisias suggested that Aristotle's argument also depended upon a second assumption: Agents must have been capable of acquiring knowledge of what was good and what was evil (R.W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias. Ethical Problems [Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990], 35 [129.3-11]). Presumably Aristotle expected one to acquire this knowledge by observing the rewards and punishments arising from good legislation. Furthermore, just as there was a morally excellent person (ὁ σπουδαῖος) who judged each sort of thing correctly and served as the standard by which the truly good could be known, there was also a person who was equitable (ἐπιεικής), administering justice even in cases where the letter of the law would lead to injustice (cf. NE 5.10). Persons of this latter sort would also exemplify the good and the just for their fellow citizens.

53. NE 3.5, 1114a15-22.

54. NE 7.8, 1150a21-22, b29-30; cf. NE 3.5, 1114a11-14.

55. Categories 10, 13a23-31.

56. Epictetus' writings will be cited in the translation of W.A. Oldfather, Epictetus: The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and the Fragments, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press 1925-1928). In the subsequent notes, the Discourses will be designated by the letter D, the Enchiridion by the letter E.

57. D 1.4.1-2; 1.4.19; 1.27.10; 3.11.2; E 5. Epictetus regarded desires of this sort as a kind of madness (D 1.12.10; 1.12.12; 1.28.33), in which one forgot one's proper character (D 1.2.14; 2.24.19).

58. D 3.2.3.

59. D 1.1.14; 1.1.21-22; 1.1.31; 1.4.1; 1.4.3; 1.4.11; 1.6.29; 1.12.15; 1.12.19; 2.23.42; 3.2.1; 3.22.13.

60. The older Stoics defined φαντασία as the impressing of a form (τύπωσις) upon the soul. See Sextus Empiricus Adv. math. 7.230,236 (von Arnim, v. 1, 17, lines 23-26); 7.228,372 and 8.400 (von Arnim, v. 1, 108, lines 20-27; cf. v. 2, 22, lines 31-34; 3, lines 4-5, 12-13); Pyrrh. hypotyp. 2.70 (von Arnim, v. 1, 108, lines 28-31); and especially Plutarch De comm. not. 47 (1084f.) (von Arnim, v. 2, 229, lines 35-36): φαντασία γάρ τις ἢ ἐννοιά ἐστι, φαντασία δὲ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ. Regarding the Stoic concept of φαντασία, see also von Arnim, v. 2, 227-229 (nos. 835-837 and 839-847).

61. Cf. D 1.20.6; 2.10.6. Epictetus summarized this principle in D 1.1.17 by saying, "We must make the best of what is under our control." Virtue consisted in progress towards this ideal (D 1.4.7; cf. D 1.4.4; 1.19.25).

62. D 1.4.27; 1.19.16; 1.25.1; 1.29.24; 1.29.47; 1.30.3; 3.10.18; E 1.5; 2.2. In E 8, Epictetus summarized his position by saying, "Do not seek to have everything that happens happen as you wish, but wish for everything to happen as it actually does happen, and your life will be serene."

63. D 1.1.4; 1.17.1-3; 2.23.12-13.

64. D 1.1.5-6; cf. D 1.3.4; 1.7.5-6; 2.23.6-7; 2.23.35.

65. Cf. D 1.15.4-5; A.-J. Voelke, L'idée de volonté dans le Stoïcisme, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1973), 154; Inwood, 240. The nature and function of προαίρεσις in Epictetus' writings has been discussed by Myrto Dragona-Monachou ("Η Προαίρεσις στον Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ στον Ἐπίκτητο," Philosophia [Athens] 8-9 [1978-1979]: 265-310) and Robert Dobbin ("Προαίρεσις in Epictetus," Ancient Philosophy 11 [1991]: 111-135), who provide a complete survey of the relevant secondary literature and also compare Epictetus' usage of the term with that of Aristotle.

66. D 1.21.2; 4.6.18; 4.6.26; 4.11.6.

67. D 2.22.19; cf. D 3.2.12; E 33.1. The felicitious phrase "moral purpose" was suggested by Oldfather and is used throughout his translation of Epictetus' writings.

68. D 1.19.7; 2.2.3; cf. 1.17.22,24,26; 1.29.12. The term αὐτεξούσιος is difficult to render into English. Prior to Epictetus, who promoted its use as a philosophical term, it was primarily used to indicate that a person was able to act at his or her own discretion, i.e. without being dependent upon some external authority.

69. D 1.4.18; 1.12.10; 2.15.1; 4.1.62.100; cf. D 1.6.28. What Epictetus boldly asserted of himself was true of every rational agent: "...my moral purpose not even Zeus himself has power to overcome" (D 1.1.23-24; cf. 1.6.40). Elsewhere Epictetus explained, "For if God had so constructed that part of His own being which He has taken from Himself and bestowed upon us, that it could be subjected to hindrance or constraint either from Himself or from some other, He were no longer God, nor would He be caring for us as He ought" (D 1.17.27).

70. In fr. 9 (=Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticae 19.1.14-21), Epictetus admitted that the sudden and forceful advent of impressions could produce an involuntary disturbance in the agent which momentarily forestalled the use of reason. The initial, disorienting ferocity of impressions is also emphasized in D 3.24.108, where Epictetus spoke of the impression "biting" (δάκνη) the agent. This in no way precluded a rational examination and response on the part of the agent: "...the first and greatest and task of the philosopher is to test the impressions and discriminate between them, and to apply none that has not been tested" (D 1.20.7). For Epictetus, "everywhere judgement is strong, judgement is invincible" (D 3.16.9).

71. D 1.8.16; 4.1.56. The agent whose way of life was in accordance with nature (and thus appropriate for the agent) would be self-sufficient (αὐτῷ ἀρκούμενον), independent (αὐτεξούσιον) and autonomous (αὐτόνομον) (D 1.9.9; 4.1.56).

72. D 1.12.9; cf. D 1.17.21-23; 1.18.21.

73. D 1.30.4; 2.23.25; 3.8.4; 4.8.3.

74. D 2.1.6; 4.8.3.

75. D 1.11.30-40; 1.19.8.

76. D 2.11.3; 2.11.6; 3.11.2.

77. D 1.28.28; 2.11.13; 2.20.21.

78. D 2.11.4; 2.17.7; 2.20.21.

79. D 1.4.14; 1.4.18; 4.1.42.

80. D 1.7.33.

81. D 4.1.61. According to Epictetus, it was philosophy's task to identify where error had been introduced into the inferential process that applied general principles to particular cases (E 52.1-2).

82. D 2.26.1.

83. D 1.18.1-2; 1.28.6-7; 2.26.3; 3.3.2-4; 3.7.15; 4.5.30.

84. D 1.18.1-2; 1.26.1-3; 1.28.1-2; 1.28.4; 2.22.1; 2.22.3; 2.22.36; 2.26.3; 3.3.2; 3.7.15; 4.5.30; E 31.3.

85. D 1.18.3-6; 2.3.5. Where the agent was ignorant of the proper distinctions between good and evil things, he or she would act on the basis of mere opinion. Because opinion was unstable, the agent would vacillate under the influence of different external impressions, regarding a thing first as good, then as evil (D 2.3.5; 2.15.20; 2.22.6; 2.22.25).

86. D 1.18.3-4; 1.28.8; 2.26.1-5; 2.26.7; 3.3.3-4.

87. Cf. D 4.9.16: "You have but to will a thing and it has happened, the reform has been made." When one's judgements had been amended, the agent's governing principle regained its original

authority (D 2.18.11) and the evil habit was weakened and then utterly destroyed (2.18.13).

88. D 1.5.5; 2.15.20; 2.21.4-5; 2.24.19; 3.2.3; 3.13.1; 4.6.5. In D 1.5.3, Epictetus spoke of a petrification (ἀπολίθωσις) of the agent's intellect and his or her sense of shame.

89. D 1.9.31-32; 1.19.2; 1.25.4.

90. D 1.17.22; 1.18.17; 1.28.23; 4.12.8-9; E 24.1.

91. Thus, for example, in Contra Celsum 1.7 the ecclesiastical proclamation is said to include "...Jesus' birth from a virgin,...his crucifixion,...his resurrection..., and ...the proclamation of the judgement which punishes sinners according to their deserts and pronounces the righteous worthy of reward." A similar list is found in Hom. Jer. 5.13 (Husson and Nautin, v. 1, 310-312 [lines 25-29]), which included beliefs concerning the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, resurrection, punishment, eternal repose, the Law and the prophets. A longer, more detailed summary was given in De principiis 1.pref.4-10, which again asserted that rational agents were held responsible for their actions and praiseworthy and blameworthy acts were to be met with corresponding rewards and punishments (De principiis 1.pref.5).

92. De principiis 3.1.1. In De principiis 3.1.6, this was supported by reference to various passages in the Old and New Testaments (Micah 6:8; Deut. 30:15,19; Is. 1:19-20; Ps. 81:13-14; Mt. 5:39; etc.) which asserted that God required and rewarded obedience, while punishing disobedience. Compare Philo Quod Deus sit immutabilis 50, who also referred to Dt. 30:15,19 in a similar context.

93. De principiis 3.1.6; cf. Comm. Mt. 11.12 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung I, 53, lines 8-11).

94. Origen rejected the idea that action could arise through the prior determination of events by fate, necessity, or the movement of the stars; see Comm. Gen. III (Philoc. 23.6,16); Comm. Rom. (Philoc. 25.4); Comm. Rom. fr. 1 (Ramsbotham, 213, lines 109-112)=Comm. Rom. (e cod. Vindob. gr. 166) fr. 3 (K. Staab, "Neue Fragmente aus dem Kommentar des Origenes zum Römerbrief," Biblische Zeitschrift 18 [1928]: 76); David Amand, Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque (Louvain: Bibliothèque de l'Université, 1945), 275-325; H.S. Benjamins, Eingeordnete Freiheit: Freiheit und Vorsehung bei Origenes (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994).

95. De principiis 3.1.6. Cf. Comm. Tit. (PG 14, 1305A-B)=Pamphilus Apologia pro Origene (PG 17, 555B-C), where those who denied that praiseworthy actions were within the agent's power were condemned as heretics.

96. De principiis 3.1.7.

97. De principiis 3.1.8. On Origen's treatment of the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, see W.J.P. Boyd ("Origen on Pharaoh's Hardened Heart: A Study of Justification and Election in St. Paul and Origen," in F.L. Cross, ed., Studia Patristica 7, TU 92 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966], 434-442) and M. Harl, "La mort salutaire du Pharaon selon Origène," in Studi in onore di Alberto Pincherle, Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni 38, (Rome, 1967), v. 1, 260-268; Lorenzo Perrone, ed., Il cuore indurito del Faraone: Origene e il problema del libero arbitrio (Bologna: Marietti, 1992).

98. De principiis 3.1.18; Comm Jn. 13.10.64; fr. 42; Comm. Rom. (Philoc. 25.4); Comm. Rom. fr. 1 (Ramsbotham, 213, lines 109-112)=Comm. Rom. (e cod. Vindob. gr. 166) fr. 3 (Staab, "Neue Fragmente," 76). Compare also Sel. Lev. 11:46 (PG 12, 401B11-14).

99. Jackson, "Sources".

100. Cf. Philo De legibus 1.30 (von Arnim, v. 2, 229 [no. 844]); Quod Deus sit immutabilis 41-44 (ibid., 150 [no. 458]); Plutarch Adversus Colotem 1122C-D; Clem. Alex. Strom. 2.20.110.4-111.2 (Stählin and Früchtel, v. 2, 173, lines 17-22; von Arnim, v. 2, 205 [no. 714]); 6.12.96.2 (Stählin and Früchtel, v. 2, 480, line 13).

101. Origen De oratione 6.2.

102. De principiis 3.1.3. Cf. Plutarch Adversus Colotem 19 (1118B); Clem. Alex. Strom. 2.20.111.2 (Stählin and Früchtel, v. 2, 173).

103. De principiis 3.1.3. The idea of the agent's proper function (τὸ καθήκον) was of central importance in Stoic ethics.

104. Comm. Rom. (Scherer, 126, lines 15-18).

105. Contra Celsum 4.3; cf. De oratione 39.15; De principiis 3.1.6.

106. Contra Celsum 2.23; Comm. Ps. 4 (Philoc. 26.1); Hom. Lk. 11 (Rauer, 66, lines 5-9).

107. See Comm. Rom. 4.9; Comm. Cant. prol.; compare Epictetus D 2.9.15.

108. Contra Celsum 4.45; Comm. Ps. 4 (Philoc. 26.1).

109. De oratione 30.1. See also Origen (?) Sel. Ps. 4:2 (PG 12, 1136D8-10; 1137C4-6).

110. A. Lieske, Die Theologie der Logosmystik bei Origenes (Münster im Westfalen: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1938), 103-105.

111. Comm. Jn. 13.10.64; 20.24.205-206. See also Origen (?) Sel. Ps. 115:1 (PG 12, 1576C7-8); 129:4-5 (PG 12, 1648D4-5).

112. Comm. Mt. 10.11,24.

113. Origen alluded in passing to the notion of preconceptions in Contra Celsum 1.4 and Comm. Jn. 32.6.65.

114. Contra Celsum 4.47.

115. De principiis 3.1.16.

116. Hom. Jer. 20.3.

117. Comm. Mt. 10.11; De oratione 11.4.

118. Sel. Exod. 12:48 (PG 12, 288A15-B2); Hom. Jer. 10.1; cf. Contra Celsum 8.53; Comm. Lam. (Klostermann, Origenes' Jeremiahomilien, 279); Comm. Mt. 15.21 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung I, 410, lines 2-8); 15.36 (ibid., 458, lines 1-3); Comm. 1 Cor. fr. 23 (Jenkins, 363, lines 17-20); Comm. Rom. (Scherer, 134, lines 12-15).

119. Contra Celsum 6.57; Exh. mart. 26.

120. To illustrate this point, Origen (De principiis 3.1.4) borrowed an example from Epictetus (D 2.18.15-26), to whom he elsewhere referred by name (Contra Celsum 3.54; 6.2).

121. Sel. Ps. 4:5 (PG 12,1141D5-1144B2); Comm. Eph. fr. 19 (Gregg, 420, lines 68-75).

122. Contra Celsum 3.37; De principiis 3.1.4; Comm. Eph. fr. 33 (Gregg, 570-571, lines 15-16). Compare also Sel. Gen. 3:21 (Petit, Catena graecae in Genesim et in Exodum II. Collectio Coisliniana, 125, lines 7-9); Comm. Jn. 13.3.16.
123. Comm. Gen. III (Philoc. 27.1); Comm. Eph. fr. 20 (Gregg, 554, lines 1-10).
124. Hom. Ezek. (Baehrens, Homilien zu Samuel I, 390, lines 2-5, 16-21); Comm. Eph. fr. 20 (Gregg, 554, lines 1-10).
125. Hom. Josh. 20.2.
126. On the persuasive force of impressions, see the reports of Chrysippus' teaching in Diogenes Laertius 7.89 (von Arnim, v. 3, 53, lines 8-10) and Galen De Hipp. et Plat. decr. 5.5 (165) (ibid., 55, lines 7-11).
127. Comm. Jn. fr. 43.
128. De principiis 3.1.23-24; Comm. Ps. 4 (Philoc. 26.7); Comm. Mt. 10.11; cf. Comm. Mt. 11.17 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung I, 62, lines 16-19); fr. 141 (ibid., Matthäuserklärung III, 72, lines 1-2= PG 17, 292C); Comm. Jn. 32.19.255.
129. De principiis 3.1.6; De oratione 29.13; cf. Comm. Jn. 32.19.255; Contra Celsum 3.69.
130. Comm. Lk. fr. 200 (Rauer, 313, lines 24-28); Comm. Mt. 16.8; cf. Comm. Jn. 32.19.258.
131. Contra Celsum pref.,3; cf. Exp. Prov. 18:71 (PG 17, 204B10-11); Comm. Lk. fr. 42 (Rauer, 244).
132. De principiis 1.4.1; 1.6.2-3; cf. Contra Celsum 3.69; 4.3; Sel. Ps. 114:3 (PG 12, 1573C3-5); Hom. Jer. 5.13; Comm. Lk. fr. 68 (Rauer, 157).
133. Contra Celsum 1.61; 2.1.
134. Hom. Jer. fr. 63; Comm. Lam. fr. 80; cf. Comm. Mt. 15.18 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung I, 401, lines 11-13); Sel. Ps. 138:11 (PG 12, 1661B6-11); Comm. Prov. 24:46(31) (PG 17, 232B); Comm. Jn. 20.21.174; 32.13.246; Contra Celsum 3.69.

135. Contra Celsum 3.69; cf. De principiis 2.9.5-6; 2.11.7.
136. Contra Celsum 6.44; cf. De principiis 1.2.4; 2.9.2.
137. De principiis 2.9.2.
138. De principiis 3.1.10,24; Comm. Mt. 10.12; Comm. Eph. fr. 11 (Gregg, 406, lines 15-18); Comm. Jn. 20.24.205-206.
139. De principiis 1.5.1; 1.6.3.
140. Comm. Mt. 15.11 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung I, 377, lines 28-30).
141. De principiis 2.9.6; Comm. Mt. 11.17 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung I, 64, lines 23-25); cf. De principiis 2.8.3; De oratione 29.13; Hom. Jer. 8.2.
142. Comm. Jn. 20.36.332; cf. Comm. Jn. 10.32.204; Hom. Josh. 15.3. See also Origen (?) Ennar. Job 35:11 (PG 12, 96D7-97A3)=Sel. Job 35:11 (PG 12, 1044D10-1045A2).
143. De principiis 3.1.22; cf. 2.9.5-7; 4.4.9.
144. De principiis 4.3.9-13; cf. 1.5.1.
145. Contra Celsum 7.33; De principiis 3.1.19; Comm. Ps. 4 (Philoc. 26.7); Sel. Ps. 50:14 (PG 12, 1456D3-5); Comm. Mt. 10.23; Comm. Jn. fr. 11; cf. Contra Celsum 8.53,64; Sel. Ps. 36:7 (PG 12, 1316C14-D1).
146. Comm. Jn. 6.33.135; Hom. Lk. 11 (Rauer, 67, line 19); cf. Contra Celsum 5.10.
147. De principiis 3.1.18-19,24; Comm. Lk. fr. 38b (243, lines 3-5); fr. 42 (Rauer, 244); Comm. Ps. 4 (Philoc. 26.7); Comm. 1 Cor. fr. 20 (Jenkins, 360, lines 8-11); cf. Comm. Jn. 7.16.
148. De principiis 1.6.3; Comm. Mt. 11.17 (Klostermann, Matthäuserklärung I, 64, lines 23-25); De oratione 26.5; De engastrimytho 8, lines 10-12 (Baehrens, Homilien zu Samuel I, 292, lines 5-9); Exp. Prov. 30:27 (PG 13, 33D1-2).
149. Hom. Jer. fr. 28.

150. Comm. Ps.T. 77.28-78.4; 199.9-17; CM 25.4-9 (PG 39, 1101A14-B5); cf. Comm. Eccl.T. 35.14-15. See also Comm. Zech.T. 132.28-135.15 (2.175-185), where this argument is developed at length.

151. CM 1.11; 6.1,5-7; 8.4; 9.6-7; 11.3; 32.2-3; 37.16 (PG 39, 1089C3; 1092B4,8,10; D2; 1093A7-8; C13; 1105A4; 1108C14); Comm. Ps.T. 232.16-21; 311.21-23; Comm. Ps. 35:4 (PG 1333C; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 294, lines 16-18); 138:11-14a (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 327, line 28; Comm. Zech.T. 132.28-135.15 (2.175-185)).

152. Staab, 3, line 5; CM 20.2; 22.1-9; 32.5-6 (PG 39, 1097D7-9; 1100C7-D5; 1105A7); Comm. Ps. 2:8 (PG 39, 1160B-C; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 124, lines 7-8); Comm. Ps.T. 54.18; 232.21; 276.16; Comm. JobT. 115.11-13; Comm. Eccl.T. 226.16.

153. Comm JobT. 115.10-15; cf. CM 18.12-13; 19.12-20.7; 22.1-3; 34.19-21; (PG 39, 1097B15-C1, 1097D3-1100A3; 1100C7-9; 1105C12-14); Comm. Ps.T. 22.4-5; 54.18-20; 154.25; Comm. Ps. 21:21a (PG 39, 1284A-B; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 230, lines 17-18); 53:5 (PG 39, PG 39, 1404C-D; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 8, lines 4-7); 138:11-14a (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 327, lines 26-29); Comm. Eccl.T. 88.12-13; 212.19-20; 226.15-16; Comm. Zech.T. 9.18 (1.39); 315.22-23 (4.150); 413.8-9 (5.209); Comm. 2 Cor. 11:13-15 (Staab, 40, lines 12-13). See also CM 24.2-3 (PG 39, 1101A3-4).

154. CM 25.4-5 (PG 39, 1101A14-15).

155. CM 25.2-3 (PG 39, 101A11-13). Compare Alexander of Aphrodisias (Quaestiones 81.9-10; Problemata 29 [161.15-21], De fato 27 [198.3ff.]), who was developing ideas found in Aristotle De anima 417b5ff. and NE 2.1, 1103a23ff.; 2.5, 1106a6ff.

156. CM 25.5,7,14-17; 26.6-9; 30.17-18 (PG 39, 1101A15, B2,10-13; C6-9; 1104C9); Comm. Ps. 57:4 (PG 39, 1416C; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 24, lines 9-15); Compare Aristotle Physics 8.1, 251b32-252a1.

157. CM 25.10-11; 26.3-4; 30.18-20 (PG 39, 1101B5-6, C3-4; 1104C10-12); cf. CM 24.2-3 (PG 39, 1101A3-4). Compare Aristotle NE 1.12, 1101b10-15.

158. Comm. Gen.T. 140.6-10; Comm. Eccl.T. 24.3-6; 46.18-24; Comm. Zech.T. 179.5-6 (2.362); cf. CM 25.3-4 (PG 39, 1101A13-14). For the Platonic background of this idea, see Plato Phaedo 97D;

Theaetetus 186A; Epist. 7, 344B (cited in Binder, Koenen and Liesenborghs, "Ein neues Epikurfragment," 36).

159. CM 27.3-8 (PG 39, 1101D4-8). Compare Aristotle Topics 6.5, 143a2-5 and Met. 9.2, 1046b7-24; cf. NE 1.2, 1094a8. With CM 27.8 (PG 39, 1101D8-1104A1), where Didymus denied that the medical art could be held responsible for the production of adverse effects, compare Plato Republic 342A-B.

160. CM 25.3-4 (PG 39, 1101A13-14).

161. CM 25.4-7; 26.6-9 (PG 39, 1101A14-B2, C6-9); cf. CM 25.11-14 (PG 39, 1101B7-10); Comm. Ps. 23:4b (PG 39, 1296C; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 241, lines 1-3, 9-10); 118:29 (PG 39, 1569A; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 281, lines 3-4); Comm. Ps.T. 6.25-26; 7.2; Comm. JobT. 5.4-7; Comm. Eccl.T. 46.18-19. Compare also CM 25.7-9 (PG 39, 1101B3-5), where God's provision of the Law was similarly explained. For the idea that rational creatures could only become good voluntarily, see CM 24.3-25.2 (PG 39, 1101A4-11) and Comm. Ps.T. 199.17 (which echoes Origen Contra Celsum 4.3 [Borret, v. 2, 194, lines 48-49]).

162. Comm. Ps. 54:16b-c (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 13, lines 13-14); Comm. Ps.T. 213.5; 217.2-3; Comm. JobT. 43.28-29; 158.14; Comm. Eccl.T. 15.18,20; 206.24; Comm. Zech.T. 136.21 (2.189). See Reynolds, 12-15 (with the literature cited in the notes) and Orphanos, 15, 53, 138, 143, 152-156, 188, 190-191, 252, 254.

163. Comm. Zech.T. 324.18 (4.184); Comm. Gen.T. 165.19-21; 217.19-20; Staab, 6, line 2. Compare Philo De opificio mundi 166 (von Arnim, v. 2, 23, lines 30-34; Diogenes Laertius 7.50 (ibid., 22, lines 23-26); Sextus Empiricus Adv. math. 7.227 (ibid., 22, lines 31-32; Alexander of Aphrodisias De anima 72.5 (ibid., 23, line 35-24, line 4). Elsewhere Didymus distinguished between lower animals (who lacked clear and distinct impressions) (Comm. Zech.T. 269.16 [3.310]), higher animals (who possessed impressions and impulse but lacked reason and were therefore incapable of rational assent) (Comm. Gen.T. 48.26-27), and rational agents (who initiated impulse by assent to impressions) (Comm. Gen.T. 82.27-28; 218.5; Comm. Ps. 35:2 [Mühlenberg, v. 1, 294, lines 2-3]).

164. Purposive choice was therefore not to be found in irrational animals (Comm. Gen.T. 157.29; Comm. Eccl.T. 47.17-21). Children were likewise unable to exercise their capacity for purposive choice until their indwelling reason (ἐνδιάθετος λόγος) attained maturity (Comm. Ps. 57:4 [Mühlenberg, v. 2, 24, lines 9-15]);

70:6a-b [Mühlenberg, v. 2, 90, lines 13-21]; Comm. Ps.T. 91.14-17; 93.23-26); compare the reports of Stoic teaching cited in von Arnim, v. 2, 43, lines 11-22.

165. Προαίρεσις is connected with deliberation (βουλή) in Staab, 5, lines 10-11; Comm. Prov. 2:11 (PG 39, 1625A14-B4); Comm. Eccl.T. 47.17-21; see also Comm. JobT. 1.35-2.1. By "deliberation of the Aristotelian type," I mean a process of practical reasoning about the means to attain an end which one believed was possible and in one's power to achieve.

166. Comm. Ps.T. 199.16-17; 264.28-30; Comm. Ps. 7:12-14 (Mühlenberg, v. 1, 142, lines 15-16); Comm. Eccl.T. 296.10-11; Comm. Zech.T. 175.1-2 (2.347). Like Aristotle, Didymus admitted that an action might seem involuntary when an agent pursued things that were not good (though the agent imagined them to be such) (Comm. Eccl.T. 296.10-11,19-23). The only truly involuntary acts, however, were those found in children who had not yet attained the age of reason, i.e. the "sins of ignorance" which they committed as a result of the stain inherited by descent from Adam (Comm. JobT. 282.25; 283.15-25=Comm. Job 10:15 [PG 39, 1145B5-12]).

167. Comm. Jn. 3:35-35 (Reuss, 178 [fr. 2, line 12]).

168. Comm. Ps.T. 221.33-34; 222.8-14; 293.4; Comm. Gen.T. 165.23; Comm. Eccl.T. 206.23; Kramer and Krebber, Komm. zu Eccl. IV, 33 nn.1-2; 157-158.

169. .Staab, 5, lines 28-31; 6, lines 2-3; cf. 3, line 30; Comm. Eccl.T. 293.7-8.

170. Staab, 5, line 30-31; cf. 3, lines 12-15.

171. Staab, 5, lines 30-33.

172. Staab, 5, lines 18,21,27-28.

173. Cf. Comm. Gen.T. 20.8; 127.3; 130.26; Comm. Ps. 2:8 (PG 39, 1160B; Mühlenberg, v.1, 124, lines 7-8); Comm. Eccl.T. 94.17-19; Comm. Zech.T. 215.21 (3.124); CM 24.3-5; 28.4-6 (PG 39, 1101A4-7; 1104A6-7). Like Origen (Comm. Gen. III [=Philocalia 23.6,16]), Didymus rejected the idea that a rational agent's actions occurred by necessity, in accordance with fate or because of the movement of the stars (Comm. Gen.T. 75.15-17; Comm. Ps. 72:6b-9 [PG 39, 1468C; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 105, lines 8-9]; Comm. Eccl.T. 226.16-17; Comm. Zech.T. 135.23-24 [2.186]).

174. Compare Comm. Zech.T. 133.7-8,17 (2.176-177); 134.18-19 (2.182); 176.2-3 (2.351) with Epictetus D 1.4.18; 1.12.10; 2.15.1; 4.1.62; 4.1.100; cf. Comm. Ps. 118:101 (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 290, lines 5-9); Comm. Ps.T. 232.20; Comm. Eccl.T. 296.26-27; and Epictetus D 4.1.27; 4.1.56.

175. Comm. 2 Cor. 4:8-9 (Staab, 25, lines 15-27); Comm. Ps.T. 87.18-20. Compare Origen De oratione 30.1.

176. Comm. Eccl.T. 46.18-24; 47.19-21; Comm. Zech.T. 147.3-5 (2.233); cf. CM 6.6-8; 11.4-6; 34.19-21 (PG 39, 1092B10-11; 1093D1-3; 1105C12-14); Comm. Ps.T. 54.19-20; Comm. Ps. 17:43 (Mühlenberg, v. 1, 206, lines 12-13); Comm. JobT. 1.25-29; Comm. Eccl.T. 94.17-19; 285.8-9; 322.11-12; Comm. Zech.T. 342.13-14 (4.259); 413.13-16 (5.210).

177. Comm. Ps. 32:2 (PG 39, 1321D; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 275, lines 6-8). Compare Epictetus D 1.14.7 (τοῖς μὲν συγκαταθετικῶς, τοῖς δὲ ἀνανευτικῶς) and Origen Comm. Jn. 20.24.205 (συγκαταθέσθαι... ἀνανεῦσαι).

178. Comm. Ps.T. 87.18-88.8; Comm. Eccl.T. 335.20; Comm. 2 Cor. 4:8-9 (Staab, 25, lines 23-27).

179. Comm. Gen.T. 112.14-15; cf. Comm. 2 Cor. 2:10-11 (Staab, 19, lines 12-20). For Didymus, as for the Stoics, only things which were truly good (i.e. made one good) were worthy of being chosen (αἰρετά). See Comm. JobT. 65.32-66.4; Comm. Eccl.T. 24.6; 335.23-25; and compare the reports of Stoic teaching cited in von Arnim, v. 3, 22. See also Koenen, "Ein theologischer Papyrus," 78.

180. Comm. Ps. 118:51 (PG 39, 1569C; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 282, lines 11-13); cf. Comm. Ps. 21:21a (PG 39, 1284A-B; Mühlenberg, v.1, 230, lines 9-16); 139:5-6 (PG 39, 1600D-1601A; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 331, lines 11-20).

181. Comm. Ps.T. 54.19-20. For the necessity of steadfastness in one's judgements, see CM 16.4-5 (PG 39, 1097A7-8); for the Stoic background, see Plutarch De comm. not. 8 (1061E; von Arnim, v. 3, 145, line 1); De virtute morali 3 (441C; von Arnim, v. 1, 50, lines 3-4; v. 3, 111, lines 16-17); Cicero Acad. post. 1.42 (ibid., v. 3, 16, line 30; 18, line 38). Like the Stoics, Didymus emphasized that this kind of steadfastness could only be secured by proper training. See CM 16.5-7 (PG 39, 1097A8-10); Musonius Περὶ ἀσκήσεως apud Stobaeus

Floril. 3.29.78; ps.-Plutarch De placit. phil. 1.proem. (Diels, 273, lines 11-14); Seneca Ep. 90.46; Diogenes Laertius 7.123.

182. Comm. Ps.T. 202.34-203.2. For the Stoic idea that the soul, as a material substance, had a certain tension (τόνος), see Comm. JobT. 13.8; 44.21; Comm. Eccl.T. 204.19 and compare Galen De Hippoc. et Plat. decr. 4.6; 5.2 (von Arnim, v. 3, 123, lines 3-7, 16-19; 120, line 32).

183. Comm. JobT. 183.10-12; Comm. Eccl.T. 166.22-26; 204.19.

184. Comm. Eccl.T. 166.21-22, 25-26; 293.2; cf. Comm. Ps.T. 227.21.

185. Staab, 5, lines 6-7; Comm. Ps. 139:12a (PG 39, 1601B; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 333, lines 1-4).

186. Comm. Zech.T. 333.3-4 (4.219).

187. Comm. Ps.T. 16.25.

188. Comm. Job.T. 331.3-5; Comm. Ps. 101 (PG 39, 1516B; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 222, lines 9-10); Comm. Zech.T. 13.10-11 (1.57); compare also Comm. Ps.T. 64.8 and Comm. Prov. 31:8 (PG 39, 1644C12-13). The agent's moral purpose therefore indicated the agent's character more clearly than the agent's actions themselves did; cf. Comm. Ps.T. 232.11-32; Comm. Eccl.T. 220.24-25; Comm. Zech.T. 178.25 (2.361).

189. Comm. Ps.T. 197.23-24; cf. CM 9.7-10; 11.1-6 (PG 39, 1093A8-11, C11-D3). In making this point, Didymus drew upon Aristotle (Metaphysics 1.3.3 [986b16]; 4.10.1-3 [1018a23-32]; 7.7.3.1 [1028b36-1029a2]; De generatione et corruptione 319b21-31; 320a2-5; Categories 5 [4a10-21]).

190. Comm. JobT. 114.31-115.6; 115.10-15; Comm. Ps.T. 77.24-25; Comm. Eccl.T. 334.12-15. See also Comm. Zech.T. 80.17-21 (1.355).

191. Cf. Comm. Ps. 53:5 (PG 39, 1404C-D; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 8, lines 4-7). Like Origen, Didymus asserted that only the soul of Jesus had never chosen or undertaken any sinful action and supported this by referring to Is. 7:16 and 2 Cor. 5:21. See Comm. Eccl.T. 221.6, 18-19; Comm. Ps.T. 282.16-17; Comm. Zech.T. 178.22-26 (2.361) and compare Origen Hom. Ex. 4.8; De principiis 4.4.4. Compare also

Origen Sel. Ps. 21:10 (PG 12, 1256A3-B4) with Didymus Comm. Ps. 21:10 (Mühlenberg, v. 1, 226, lines 10-16).

192. Cf. Comm. Gen.T. 63.4-9. For the association of the quality of one's moral purpose with the state or condition of the soul, see Comm. Ps.T. 87.20-24; 267.27-28; Comm. Prov. 14:10-11 (PG 39, 1636C7-8); Comm. JobT. 147.29-30; Comm. Eccl.T. 149.4-5. In Didymus' view, the wicked already receive punishment by being just what they are (i.e. alienated from God); for the Platonic background to this idea, see Plato Laws 728B-C and compare Epictetus D 1.12.21-22.

193. Comm. Eccl.T. 287.7-11; 341.3-7; cf. Comm. Zech.T. 130.19-24 (2.167); 131.4-5 (2.168); 131.25-132.2 (2.172).

194. Comm. Ps. 17:43 (Mühlenberg, v. 1, 205, lines 11-12; 206, lines 11-13); 62:10b-11 (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 46, lines 7,14-18); 74:4-5a (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 112-113); 139:12a (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 333, lines 1-2); Comm. Ps.T. 251.14-25; Comm. Zech.T. 21.14 (1.94); 361.14-15 (5.18); cf. Comm. Eccl.T. 149.4-5; Comm. Zech.T. 331.13,21-22 (4.213).

195. Comm. Ps.T. 276.13-18. See also Comm. Ps. 38:7 (PG 1349C4-7; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 314, lines 6-8=ps.-Origen Sel. Ps. 38:6 [PG 12, 1389A8-12]); Comm. Ps.T. 87.29-88.3; Comm. Eccl.T. 101.19-25; Comm. Gen.T. 53.9-26; Comm. Acts 10:10 (Cramer, v. 3, 175, lines 19-23; 176, lines 2-7).

196. Comm. Ps. 54:24b-d (Mühlenberg, v. 1, 17, lines 8-11); cf. Comm. Ps. 6:2 (Mühlenberg, v. 1, 136, lines 23-27); 17:39a (ibid., v. 1, 204, lines 9-12); 77:17-25a (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 128, lines 10-11); 111:10 (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 263, line 20-264, line 6). Regarding the nature and purposes of divine punishment, see also CM 39.2-5 (PG 39, 1108D12-1109A3); Comm. Ps. 27:5 (Mühlenberg, v. 1, 257, lines 10-17); Comm. JobT. 368.33-369.5; Comm. Eccl.T. 68.14-20; Comm. Zech.T. 80.5-7 (1.353); 342.12-19 (4.259).

197. Comm. Ps. 101 (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 222, lines 1-10); cf. Comm. Ps. 88:47-48a (PG 39, 1497A; Mühlenberg, v. 2, 178, lines 10-13); 118:29 (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 281, lines 1-6); Comm. Ps.T. 264.28-30.

198. Comm. Gen.T. 54.3-7; Comm. Ps.T. 84.13-14; 202.34-203.2; Comm. Ps. 58:10-11 (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 30, lines 9-11); 118:29 (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 281, lines 1-6); Comm. Eccl.T. 33.28-30;

Comm. 1 Cor. 15:10-11 (Staab, 7, lines 3-6). For allusions to the Stoic notion of right action (κατόρθωμα), see also Comm. JobT. 7.7; 8.7.

199. Cf. Comm. Ps.T. 198.22-23.

200. CM 10.16-19 (PG 39, 1093B15-C3); Comm. Ps. 15:5a (Mühlenberg, v. 1, 177, lines 21-23); 33:6 (Mühlenberg, v. 1, 282, 16-283, line 2); Comm. Ps.T. 261.6-9; Comm. Zech.T. 136.21-23 (2.189).

201. Comm. Gen.T. 162.2-6; 211.18-22; Comm. Ps.T. 77.22-24; 133.16-20; Comm. Ps. 2:8 (PG 39, 1160B-C; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 124, lines 8-9); 17:43 (Mühlenberg, v. 1, 206, lines 8-9, 12-13); Comm. Eccl.T. 12.1; Comm. Zech.T. 15.12 (1.65); 236.24 (3.205).

202. Comm. Ps.T. 276.14-16; Comm. Ps. 38:7 (PG 1349C-D; Mühlenberg, v. 1, 314, lines 5-8); Comm. Gen.T. 53.5-9.

203. Comm. Ps.T. 121:2-4 (Mühlenberg, v. 2, 299, lines 10-21); Comm. Zech.T. 411.18-19 (5.202). For the notion of different agents being united in moral purpose, see also Comm. 1 Cor. 16:17-18 (Staab, 13, lines 15-19); Comm. Ps.T. 49.13-14; 53.6-7.

204. See David T. Runia, "Festugière Revisited: Aristotle in the Greek Patres," Vigiliae Christianae 43 (1989): 10, 14-15. Runia (15) rightly concludes, "It is evident that Didymus, who must have had a formidable memory, really knew Aristotle's logical writings very well."

CONCLUSION

In response to Manichaeian teaching, Didymus offered an account of the origin of human evil which allowed him to maintain the importance of ascetic practices while providing a different theological rationale for the latter. Like his Manichaeian opponents, Didymus wanted to find an account which could explain the individual's struggle with the passions and his or her attraction to evil things, but which in no way implied that God was responsible for the production of evil. To Didymus, the Manichaeian belief that there was a certain permanent and irreducible datum of evil associated with the body seemed to imply that the agent would ultimately be compelled to undertake evil action; were this to be the case, the agent would be unable to bear moral responsibility for his or her actions and would be incapable of moral alteration.

In contrast to the Manichaeians (of whose views he had only a limited understanding), Didymus emphasized that there was nothing irreducibly evil in the composition of the body. Insofar as the body was simply a material substrate, it was in itself neither good nor evil, but rather indifferent. It was nonetheless capable of acquiring differing qualities. Since good and evil were accidental qualities whose existence was contingent upon something in the rational agent's power (i.e. purposive choice), rational agents were able to become either good or evil. There was thus nothing static or fixed

about one's moral character; as the biblical narratives showed, individuals constantly underwent moral alteration, sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse. Since purposive choice and the qualities it engendered determined one's state (i.e. the character of one's mental and physical existence), the moral life needed to be treated with the utmost seriousness, requiring constant vigilance and careful reflection about one's choice of actions.

In outlining and defending this position, Didymus drew upon Origen's account of purposive choice and his speculative treatment of the nature and origin of the soul and the earthly body. Didymus followed Origen in understanding purposive choice in terms of the Stoic account of human action (holding that the soul was rational in character and that the impulse to act could arise only from the assent of the agent's governing principle) without committing himself to the Stoic analysis of assent in terms of innate preconceptions (*προλήψεις*) and acquired principles. Like Origen, Didymus could therefore recognize the significance of the various external forces which incited the agent to evil action, yet emphasize that the capacity for moral self-determination always remained within the agent's power. Because the agent always retained the ability to originate and control his or her actions through purposive choice, the agent remained morally responsible for the production of those actions and the consequent formation of his or her moral character. Because character was understood in terms of the agent's adherence to judgements, purposive choice not only shaped and formed one's character but also relativized the power of the latter; once one

returned to the correct judgements, moral reform occurred automatically. Thus, even those who had become habituated to the worst sort of evil faced no obstacles if they wished to repent and pursue good.

Like Origen, Didymus linked purposive choice with the agent's state (ἔξις), combining Epictetus' reinterpretation of προαίρεσις in terms of Stoic psychology with the Platonic idea that souls were obliged to enter into different kinds of existences as a result of the choices they had previously made. In setting forth this idea, Didymus committed himself to certain controversial features of Origen's theological anthropology, including the soul's existence prior to the formation of the earthly body, its original possession of a spiritual body, and its subsequent descent into inferior conditions as a result of negligence. Like Origen, Didymus held that in descending to the terrestrial realm, souls assumed a second kind of body which made them subject to the passions and liable to sin and death. Thus, even from the agent's earliest years, the agent was attracted to material things and constrained by ignorance. In this condition, demonic forces were able to introduce into the agent's mind impressions of appealing things and various evil reasonings, tempting (but not able to compel) the agent to pursue evil. By repenting, receiving divine assistance, and adopting a life of vigilance and constant training, souls were able to be purified and return to their original state, once again harmoniously united in the pursuit of divine truth.

Although the position developed by Origen and adopted by Didymus was not received in its entirety by most later Christian

writers, it did offer an interesting and, in some respects, compelling account of the origin of human evil. This account was able to emphasize human responsibility without failing to acknowledge the necessity of divine grace. Furthermore, it boldly asserted God's goodness while recognizing the seriousness of humanity's struggle with moral and physical evil in the present world. As the Christian community continues to wrestle with the problem of evil, there is something to be learned from Didymus' emphasis upon God's goodness and his clear understanding of the awesome responsibility associated with our God-given freedom.

APPENDIX

DIDYMUS' CONTRA MANICHAEOS: A CRITICAL EDITION AND TRANSLATION

1. Manuscript Tradition

L Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, plut. IX,23, membr., s. IX-X, f. 203 (198 script.+ 5 vac.), 340 x 242 mm.: Didymi Contra Manichaeos (ff. 171^r-179^v)¹

This is the principal manuscript for the text of Didymus' Contra Manichaeos, from which all others are likely to be derived. The codex containing this work (which I have examined on microfilm) consists of two different blocks of material, each in a different hand; it is likely that these were originally separate codices which were rebound together after each had lost a considerable number of folios. The first section is written in an attractive minuscule hand, which Richard and Wahl have dated to the twelfth century, while Perria assigns it to the eleventh century.² Regular use is made of majuscule Γ, Η and Κ ; majuscule Δ also appears infrequently. Titles of individual works are given in a combination of minuscule and majuscule letters. Use of abbreviations is generally confined to the most common nomina sacra and Φ^ϛ [=φησι]. Abbreviations are used occasionally for word endings at the end of lines, so as to preserve the regularity of the margin. Breathing marks and accents are consistently supplied. This first section consists of the following works:

(f. 1^v Table of contents in Latin, bearing the manuscript's number within the present collection)

ff. 2^r-3^v Table of contents in Greek in the hand of the scribe responsible for the first section. A consultation of this table of contents demonstrates that this first section was once part of a much larger codex. The first 22 works of the original codex have disappeared. Of these, the titles of 19-22 are preserved on f. 2^r. The title of 19 has not been preserved; from the incipit, the work can be identified as BHG 1060 (Miraculum in eadem obsidione seu de ἀκαθίστω [a Metaphrasta in menologium insertum]; PG 92, 1353-1372).³ No. 20 bore the title Περὶ τοῦ μεγάλου Κωνσταντίνου καὶ τῶν γενέ[σεων] τῆς πόλεως and is described as a Διήγησις περὶ τῶν πατρίων ἐθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐγκωμίων τῆς πόλεως ὅπως τὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐγένετο. καὶ παρὰ τίνος ἐκτίσθη καὶ τίνος χάριν κατ'ἐνιαυτὸν περίοδον ἐπιτελε[] ἐκκλησία τὸ γενέθλιον αὐτῆς. No incipit or desinit is given; the work cannot presently be identified.⁴ No. 21 bore the title Ὑπομνήματα τοῦ ἀγίου [καὶ] μεγάλου μάρτυρος Ἄρτεμιου and is described as being collected from Philostorgius' Ecclesiastical History; from the incipit given, this work can be identified as BHG 170 (Passio [Artemii] a Ioanne mon. Rhodio [an Damasceno]; PG 96, 1252-1316; CPG 8082).⁵ No. 22 bore the title Τοῦ Χρυσοστόμου ἐκ τῶν ἀνδριάντων περὶ ὄρκου and can be identified as John Chrysostom's Homilia 14 ad populum Antiochenum (PG 49, 143-154; CPG 4330).

On f. 2^v, the marginal numbers κγ' - κη' have been written over with the numbers α' - ζ' (the numbers γ' and δ' having both been assigned to the text previously numbered κε'). This new numeration

corresponds to the order of the works presently extant in the first section of the codex. The new numeration is continued on f. 3^r (η' - ιβ') and f. 3^v (ιγ' - ιζ'), the previous numerals having been erased. The table of contents must have continued on a subsequent folio (now no longer extant), leaving the incipit of the last work listed on f. 3^v incomplete. At the bottom of f. 3^v, the hand responsible for the new numeration has added the titles of works found in the second section of the present codex, numbering them ιη' - λ'.⁶

ff. 4^r-84^r Seventeen short works attributed to John Chrysostom. These are actually compilations of ethical teaching drawn from Scripture and the works of John Chrysostom (especially his commentaries on the Pauline Epistles), as well as from other sacred and profane authors. The incipits and desinits do not match any of those listed in the standard reference works.⁷ According to Richard, each of these works begins with extracts from the interpolated recension of ps.-Maximus Locī communes.⁸ The nature of these treatises will become clearer once Michel Aubineau's study of the Chrysostomica in the Florentine and Venetian libraries is published in a future volume of the Codices Chrysostomici graeci.

ff. 84^r-87^r Πρᾶξις Γρηγορίου τοῦ ἀγιωτάτου καὶ ἀποστολικοῦ πάπα τῆς πρεσβυτέρας Ῥώμης (BHG⁴ 721db).⁹

ff. 87^r-100^r Περί ἐπισκόπων χρηστῶν, φυλασσόντων τὰς ἐντολάς τοῦ θεοῦ.
Inc. Εἶπεν ὁ κύριος τῷ Πέτρῳ· ποιμαίνε τὰ πρόβατά μου, ποιμαίνε τὰ ἀρνία μου.
Des. ἐκ μακρᾶς συνηθείας μελετηθέντες μόνοι, ἀλυπότερον προσπίπτουσι τοῖς ἐγγεγυμνασμένοις. This work is a compilation of sayings from Scripture and early Christian writers on the ethical qualities required in a

bishop; various other matters (including topics relating to the management of a household) are also discussed. According to Wahl, this is an extract from the Loci communes of Antony Melissa (PG 136, 765-1244).¹⁰

ff. 100^r-103^r Θαῦμα μέγιστον τὸ γεγονὸς ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει εἰς μνησικακίαν διακόνου καὶ πρεσβυτέρου (BHG 1322d).¹¹

ff. 103^r-104^v Βίος καὶ πολιτεία τοῦ ὁσίου πατρὸς ἡμῶν Εὐφροσύνου τοῦ μαγείρου (BHG 628).¹²

ff. 105^r-167^v Epitome of Leo Choirosphaktes on the Octateuch and the four books of Kings.¹³ This commentary is compiled primarily from Theodoret of Cyrus' Quaestiones in Octateuchum (CPG 6200; PG 80, 75-528).¹⁴ The commentary on the four books of Kings, which was originally found at the end of the work, has been damaged. Several folios are missing and five blank folios have been inserted to indicate the loss.¹⁵ The folios containing the comments on the second, third and fourth books of Kings had evidently become detached and were carelessly reinserted (ff. 113^r-126^v) near the end of the commentary on Genesis (ff. 105^r-112^v, 128^r-129^v). The ending of the commentary on the fourth book of Kings was apparently in poor condition, since the last folio of that work (f. 127^{r-v}) has been supplied by a more recent hand.¹⁶

The second block of material within the codex is written on parchment of the highest quality in a rather stiff pure minuscule hand belonging to the end of the ninth century or the first half of the tenth century.¹⁷ The writing covers an area on the page measuring 286 x 181 mm., containing 30 lines per page; the letters (which are

about 3 mm. high) are written above the line.¹⁸ Titles to individual works are given in majuscule letters. Abbreviations are confined to the most common nomina sacra and ζ (=καὶ); final ν is sometimes represented by a horizontal superstroke at the end of the line. Breathing marks and accents are occasionally omitted (especially in the case of the word ἦ); iota-subscript is always missing. The parchment has experienced some damp-staining in the upper and lower margins of some pages, although the text remains perfectly legible. It was evidently the scribe's practice to supply the author and title both at the beginning and at the end of each work; this has facilitated identification of the surviving treatises in spite of the loss of a certain number of folios. The second section contains the following works:

ff. 168^r-170^v Anonymous verses (στίχοι).¹⁹ Inc. (mutil.)

Ἐπεκπροχεύων παντὶ σώματος μέρει/ἀπὸ κρατός, καὶ μέχρι ταρσῶν εὐλόγως.

Des. τῆς παντανάσσης καὶ πανάγνου παρθένου/καὶ τῶν ἀπάντων ἁγίων αἰωνίως.

The first 60 verses are lost; only verses 61-231 are extant.²⁰ A

comment in the upper margin (which has been partly cut away)

appears to read [εἰς τὸν] βασιλεῖον βασιλέα, "on Basil the emperor."²¹

The Latin table of contents on f. 1^v describes these verses as Versus senarii in Regem David sine principio. This work cannot presently be identified. The fact that the author and title of the work are not given under the ornamented border at the conclusion of the work (as the scribe does elsewhere) may suggest that these are dedicatory verses from the beginning of a presentation volume.²²

ff. 171^r-179^v Διδύμου κατὰ Μανιχαίων. The title in the upper margin of f. 171^r has been supplied in red majuscule letters by a somewhat later hand, reproducing the title given at the end of the work by the original scribe.²³ The first letter of the text on f. 171^r has also been embellished; the decoration added beneath the letter is found in manuscripts of the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries (being especially common in the second half of the fifteenth century and the sixteenth century).²⁴ The lack of a title in the hand of the original scribe is surprising and may indicate that one or more folios have disappeared between f. 170 and f. 171.²⁵

As we shall see below, in discussing other extant fragments of the text, material from other anti-Manichaeian works appears to have been added at the beginning of the Didymus treatise. It is therefore most likely that the words Ἡ θεία γὰρ γραφή (1.1; PG 39, 1089B2) mark the true beginning of the Didymus treatise (or of all that is extant of it). This interpolation of material from other anti-Manichaeian works at the beginning of the Didymus treatise must have taken place before **L** was copied, not at the time when folios were lost from **L**. The end of the syllogisms and the words Ἡ θεία γὰρ Γραφή do not coincide with the end of one folio and the beginning of another; instead, this break occurs in line 4 of f. 172^r. It therefore seems that the interpolated material was found at the beginning of the Didymus treatise in the exemplar from which **L** was copied. Due to the paucity of manuscript evidence, it is not possible to say how this extraneous matter was originally added to the beginning of the Didymus treatise. One may surmise that it resulted from a loss or

displacement of folios at the beginning of the Didymus treatise and/or the copying of marginalia or fly-leaf notes at the beginning of the received text.

ff. 180^r-193^v Ἀλεξάνδρου Λυκοπολίτου ἐπιστρέψαντος ἐξ ἔθνων πρὸς τὰς Μαιχάϊου δόξας.²⁶

ff. 194^r-198^v Μεθοδίου περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου.²⁷ The text of the De autexousio is divided into two parts. The first part (ff. 194^r-197^v) bears the title Μεθοδίου περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου, while the second part (ff. 197^v-198^v) has the title περὶ θεοῦ καὶ ὕλης.

Didymus' Contra Manichaeos is also extant in eight copies on paper from the early modern period (sixteenth to seventeenth centuries). Seven of these manuscripts were examined on microfilm. As I will show below, it is likely that all are ultimately derived from **L**.

A Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Barb. gr. 362 (III,81), chart., s. XVII (in manu Lucae Holsteni [ob.1661]), 181 ff.: Didymi Contra Manichaeos (ff. 22^r-33^r)²⁸

B Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Barb. gr. 496 (IV,78), chart., s. XVI-XVII, 138 ff.: Didymi Contra Manichaeos (ff. 31^r-50^r)²⁹

A consists of texts copied from codices in the Biblioteca Laurenziana in Florence (including **L**).³⁰ Five of these texts are reproduced in **B**. Three of the texts found in **A** and **B** are also found in another manuscript, **V**, which will be discussed below. Collation of the variant readings shows that **A**, **B** and **V** share a significant number of readings not found in other manuscripts:

ps.-Did. II 9.2 εἰ: ἦ ABV

10.3 τὸ ABOVW: τὸ τὸ CLP

- Didymus** 1.6 οὔτοι: οὐ τι AV
 2.3 γούν: οὖν ABV
 4.10 καλῶς ποιῆσαι: κακοποιῆσαι ABV
 5.1 περί: om. ABV
 9.9 post ἀνεπίδεκτον: add. τοῦ ABV
 10.4 καὶ²: om. BV (A illegible)
 10.19 τοῦ ἐναντίου: ἐναντίων B τῶν ἐναντίων V
 13.1 υἰόν: Ἰησοῦν ABV
 13.23 ἐκ τοῦ: ἐκ AV ἐξ B
 14.10 τὸ ABV: τὸν LW (ν erased: C)
 15.1 δὲ LW (C mg.): om. ABCOV
 15.2 χρήμα: πράγμα ABV
 20.9 post περί: add. τοῦ ABPV
 22.8 τὰ: τὸ ABV
 23.4-5 ἀντιπίπτουσιν...τιθέμενοι om. ABV
 26.7 τῆς: τὴν ABV
 29.2 μαχόμενα: μαχοόμενα ABV
 29.3 αὐτῷ: om. BPV
 31.6-7 δύναται... Ἀβραάμ om. ABV
 32.7 χρήσηται: χρήσεται ABV
 34.19 ἔσχον τοῦτο: τοῦτο ἔσχον ABOV
 36.14 ὥστε: ὡς ABV
 38.4 ἀλλὰ: ἀλλ' ὁ ABV

The exact relationship between **A**, **B**, and **V** is difficult to determine because of the large number of readings shared by all three manuscripts.³¹ Since (as was noted above) **A** is an apograph of **L**, one

must assume that the other manuscripts which share **A**'s distinctive readings are derived from **A**. **B** contains certain omissions and additions which are not found in **A** or **V**.

Didymus 33.6 ὅτι ἐπίστευσεν: om. B

35.9 post μετανοῶν: φεύγη τὴν ἐσομένην add. B

37.5-7 δένδρα...δένδρα: om. B

Since **V** does not share these omissions and additions, **V** must have been copied from **A** rather than **B**; this is supported by the fact that at Didymus 1.6 and 13.23, **A** and **V** contain readings which differ from those of **B**.

B in turn appears to have been copied from **V**. **V** and **B** reproduce the same three works in the same order: Didymus' Contra Manichaeos, Alexander of Lycopolis' Contra Manichaei opinionones disputatio and ps.-Josephus' Contra gentes. Furthermore, at Didymus 10.19 and 29.3, **V** and **B** share readings not found in **A**. If (as has been argued above), **V** is a copy of **A**, then the peculiar features shared by **V** and **B** must be explained by assuming that **B** was copied from **V**. Since all three manuscripts are ultimately derived from **L**, they cannot provide an independent witness to the text and will therefore be ignored in the subsequent discussion.

C Rome, Biblioteca Casanatense, gr. 329 (olim G.V. 14), chart.,s. XVI (prima pars; in manu Camilli Veneti? [ob. post 1587]), ff. 370, 221 x 149: Didymi Contra Manichaeos (ff. 1r-13v)³²

The codex contains a variety of works copied between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, mostly by scholars for their personal use. The first two fascicles, containing Didymus' Contra

Manichaeos (ff. 1-13) and a catena on Luke (ff. 17-162), were copied by the same professional scribe and bear the same ornamental border above their titles; the second fascicle also bears the subscription ἐκ Φλορεντία.³³ An analysis of the characteristic features of this scribal hand suggests that the manuscript is to be ascribed to Camillo Zanetti, who was probably also responsible for copying **O** and **W**.³⁴ Some caution is nonetheless necessary, since the manuscripts signed by Camillo Zanetti show minor variations in the ductus; this minor variation is also evident when one compares **C**, **O** and **W**. Such variation suggests either that there was a certain fluidity or development in Zanetti's style of writing or that he supervised various scribes working for the Zanetti family who had a similar style of writing.

Collation of the variant readings shows that **C** and another manuscript, **P**, share a number of peculiar readings not found in other manuscripts:

Ps.-Did. II	10.3	τὸ: τὸ τὸ	CLP
Didymus	1.6	οὔτοι: οὐ τι	AV om. CP
	2.8	προσγενομένης: προγενομένης	CP
	8.3	post δέ: add. ὁ	CP
	8.7	οὔ: οὐκ	CP (ὄν C mg.)
	10.6	εἰ: ἦ (mg. εἰ)	CP
	35.1	ὁ: om.	CP
	38.8	ἐπιφέρει ² : om.	CP

It is interesting that **C** and **P** reproduce a dittography in **L** (ps.-Didymus II.10.3) which is not reproduced in other manuscripts. One

could account for the reproduction of the dittography in both **C** and **P** by assuming either that both are apographs of **L** or that one is an apograph of **L** and the other was copied from that apograph. The large number of readings shared by **C** and **P** (but no other manuscript) suggests that the latter is most likely the case.

P contains a number of careless errors, omissions and reduplications which do not appear in **C**:

ps.-Did. I 1.1 τῶ: τὸ P
 1.14 εἶ τι: ἔτι P
 II 6.2 οὐδέ: οὐ P
 9.2-3 θεὸς...ὀρέγεται: om. P
 Didymus 2.1 τέκνον: τέκνα P
 16.1 προσερχόμενοι: bis P
 20.7 τοὺς: bis P

Since these readings are found in neither **L** nor **C**, it is reasonable to assume that it is **C** which is the apograph of **L** and that **P** is a careless copy of **C**. Since **C** and **P** are both derived from **L**, they cannot provide an independent witness to the text and will therefore be ignored in the subsequent discussion.

○ Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ottob. gr. 194, chart., s. XVI (in manu Camilli Veneti? [ob. post 1587]), ff. 275, 250 x 170: Didymi Contra Manichaeos (ff. 1r-13v)³⁵

The peculiar characteristics of this scribal hand suggest that the manuscript is to be attributed to Camillo Zanetti, who was possibly also responsible for copying **C** and **W**. The first letter of the text is ornamented in a manner similar to that found in **L**, **C** and **W**.

The first three works contained in this codex are the anti-Manichaean treatises of Didymus (f. 1^r) and Alexander (f. 13^v) and Methodius' De autexousio (f. 34^v), reproducing the order found in **L**. Like the Methodius treatise in **L**, the Methodius treatise in **O** is divided into two parts titled respectively Μεθοδίου περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου (f. 34^v) and περὶ θεοῦ καὶ ὕλης (f. 38^v); it also has the same desinit as the Methodius treatise in **L**. For these reasons, Bonwetsch concluded that **O** was an apograph of **L**.³⁶

This conclusion was supported by a collation of the variant readings, which shows that nearly all the variant readings found in **O** are not attested in other manuscripts and can be explained as orthographic errors made when transcribing **L**:

ps.-Did. II	1.1	ἄλλως τε: ἄλλ' ὥστε	OW
Didymus	2.8	αὐτοῖς: αὐτῆς	O
	3.9	τοῖς: τῆς	O
	4.10	καλῶς ποιῆσαι: κακῶς	O
	6.4	τοὺς πρακτικούς: τοῦ πρακτικοῦ	O
	7.1	οὐ τῶν: αὐτῶν	O οὐ αὐτῶν W
	7.2	post πραττομένων: οἱ	add. O
	9.6	εἰ: εἰς	O
	13.5	οὐ: ὄν	O
	14.17	ἦ: οἱ	O
	15.3	post ὑπάρχει: καὶ ὡς ἐν ἀρεταῖς ὑπάρχει	add. O
	19.13	πάντας: πάντα	O

Since **O** appears to be an apograph of **L**, it does not present an independent witness to the text and may therefore be ignored in the subsequent discussion.

P Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ottob. gr. 378, chart., s. XVI (in manu Emmanuel Provatari), ff. 104, 230 x 155: Didymi Contra Manichaeos (ff. 5^r-17^r)³⁷

The codex contains various works in different hands which were originally parts of different codices. As Canart has shown, this copy of Didymus' Contra Manichaeos was made by the Cretan scribe Emmanuel Provataris before he became scriptor graecus of the Vatican library in 1556. As noted above, **P** is a careless copy of **C** (which in turn is an apograph of **L**); since **P** does not present an independent witness to the text, it will be ignored in the subsequent discussion.

R Rome, Biblioteca Vallicelliana, gr. 147 (ms. Allaci XXXIV): Didymi Contra Manichaeos (fasc. 17)³⁸

The brevity of the catalogue entry prevents one from reaching any definite conclusion about the origin of this manuscript (of which I have not been able to obtain a microfilm). It is possible, however, that this manuscript is dependent upon either **A** or **O**, since the latter (like **R**) each contain Didymus' Contra Manichaeos, Alexander of Lycopolis' Contra Manichaei opiniones disputatio, Methodius' De autexousio, and the Philosophoumena once ascribed to Origen and now assigned to Hippolytus of Rome.

V Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1942, chart., s. XVII (in manu Laurentii Portii), ff. IV.112, 255 x 185: Didymi Contra Manichaeos (ff. 65^r-77^v)³⁹

The manuscript catalogue suggests that the text given here of Didymus' Contra Manichaeos, Alexander of Lycopolis' Contra Manichaei opiniones disputatio (ff. 81^r-100^v) and ps.-Josephus' Contra Gentes (ff. 102^r-105^r) is an apograph of **A**.⁴⁰ As was noted above (in discussing **A**), this conclusion was supported by collation of the variant readings. Since **V** does not provide an independent witness to the text, it will be ignored in the subsequent discussion.

W Vienna, Nationalbibliothek, Theol. gr. 44, chart., s. XVI (secunda pars) (in manu Camilli Veneti [ob. post 1587]), ff. I.10 (I.10=vac.), 312/315 x 218: Didymi Contra Manichaeos (ff. 1^r-9^v)⁴¹

Collation of the variant readings shows that most of the variant readings found in **W** are not attested in other manuscripts and can be explained as orthographic errors made when transcribing **L**:

- | | | |
|------------|-------|-------------------------------|
| ps.-Did, I | 4.2 | ῆ: ἡ BV (A illegible) ῆ W |
| II | 1.1 | ἄλλως τε: ἄλλ' ὥστε OW |
| | 8.1 | ἐναντιουμένων: ἐναντιομένων W |
| Didymus | 7.1 | οὐ τῶν: αὐτῶν O οὐ αὐτῶν W |
| | 15.1 | δὲ LW (O mg.): om. ABCOV |
| | 21.13 | τὸ: τὰ W |

It is particularly interesting to note that in Didymus 15.1 **W** reproduces a reading of **L** which is not found in the text of other manuscripts. This further supports the assertion that **W** is an apograph of **L**.

This manuscript, in the hand of Camillo Zanetti, contains an entry of Johannes Sambucus on f. 9^v, which reads as follows: "Erat in v.c. [=vetere codice] Cesennat[ensil], ut librari[us] Creten[isis]"

affirmabat, et Arnoldus Arlenius."42 Since **W** is an apograph of **L**, this presumably means that **W** was copied from **L** while the latter was in Cesenna. In any case, the present manuscript was purchased by Johannes Sambucus in 1563 during a trip to the Apulia region of southeastern Italy, in which he visited Taranto, Brindisi and Otranto.⁴³ Sambucus' marginal notes in Latin and Greek show that he had intended to publish an edition of the text; a note on f. 1^r reads as follows: "Edatur: si nil contra orthodox[iam] habeat: uti spero".⁴⁴ The fact that the marginal notes were later crossed out may indicate that Sambucus subsequently abandoned the idea of producing an edition of the work; his reasons for abandoning the project are unknown. After the death of Sambucus in 1584, the manuscript passed into the hands of Sebastian Tegnagel (d. 1636) and then into the present collection.

Zanetti also produced copies of Leo Choïrosphaktes' Epitome, Methodius' De autexousio and Alexander of Lycopolis' Contra Manichaei opinionones disputatio; these also were acquired by Sambucus and later became part of the Nationalbibliothek collection (Theol. gr. 28, 50 and 52 respectively).⁴⁵ It is likely that these were all copied by Zanetti from **L**. As was noted above (in discussing the contents of **L**), Theol. gr. 28 was evidently copied from **L**, since it reproduces an important lacuna found in the latter. Bonwetsch likewise noted that Theol. gr. 50 is a copy of the Methodius treatise in **L**, having the same desinit.⁴⁶ As Hunger and Kresten have noted, the same watermark (a siren, for which no counterpart exists in the collections of Briquet and Zonghi) is found in the blank folios at the

end of Theol. gr. 28 (ff. 64-65) and in Theol. gr. 44, 50, and 52. It is therefore possible that Theol. gr. 28, 44, 50 and 52 were all copied by Zanetti from **L** on the same occasion. In any case, since **V** is an apograph of **L**, it does not represent an independent witness to the text and does not merit further discussion.

2. Editions

A Latin translation by Franciscus Turrianus appeared in 1603 in Antonio Possevino's Apparatus sacer.⁴⁷ This translation was reprinted in the following year by Canisius⁴⁸ and later by La Bigne.⁴⁹ The initial section of the Greek text found in **L** (ps.-Didymus I.1.1-3.7) was published in 1657 by Pierre Poussines in a note on Nilus Ancyranus' Epistles.⁵⁰ The complete Greek text was published by François Combefis in 1672 on the basis of an apograph of **L** which Émery Bigot had brought back from Italy.⁵¹ In 1725, Jacques Basnage reproduced the Greek text of Combefis together with Turrianus' Latin translation, adding footnotes to the latter in which he suggested various improvements (drawing in part on Combefis' translation).⁵² Andreas Gallandi reproduced the Greek and Latin texts of Combefis, judging Combefis' edition to be superior to that of Basnage.⁵³ As an aid to the reader, Gallandi also introduced chapter numbers together with Latin summary headings for each chapter. These chapter divisions do not always correspond with the sequence of thought in the text; in the case of chapters 6, 8, and 11, the chapter divisions are arbitrarily introduced into the middle of arguments. (Since Gallandi's chapter divisions are potentially misleading, I have not included them in the present edition.) Gallandi's edition was subsequently reproduced by Schram,⁵⁴ Caillau,⁵⁵ and Migne.⁵⁶

3. Fragments

(a) A saying from Didymus' Contra Manichaeos appears in John Damascene's Sacra parallela (PG 95, 1532A1-2). Since this fragment does not appear in **L**, it has been suggested that it came from a part of the treatise which has not been preserved due to a loss of folios at the beginning of the work.⁵⁷ The fragment is important because it provides the only known attestation external to **L** that Didymus produced a treatise bearing the title *κατὰ Μανιχαίων*.

(b) Selections from Didymus' Contra Manichaeos (1.5-6, 11-12, 13-14; 2.4-5; 3.6-9; 5.1-2, 4-5; PG 39, 1089B7; C3-4, 5-6, 10-11; D7-11; 1092A11-12, 14-15) are reproduced in ps.-Gregory of Nazianzus' Significatio in Ezechielem (CPG 3060; PG 36, 668B5-15).⁵⁸ Despite the title (*Σημασία εἰς τὸν Ἰεζεκιήλ*), the work does not deal only with Ezekiel, but is composed of brief extracts from different authors commenting upon a variety of biblical texts. As Sinko has noted, the first section of the work consists of extracts from Origen's comments on Ezekiel 1:5ff. The second section consists of excerpts from Didymus' Contra Manichaeos, while the source (or sources?) of the third section has not yet been identified. These extracts are joined together in an artless manner, suggesting that they were originally compiled as a set of reading notes, not as a treatise intended for public dissemination. A comparison of the text of these extracts with that of **L** shows that the compiler of this collection sometimes paraphrases Didymus' words in simpler

language; caution is therefore necessary in using the ps.-Gregory of Nazianzus extracts as a witness to the text of the Contra Manichaeos.

(c) The syllogisms which appear at the beginning of the Didymus treatise in the printed editions (I.1.1-II.10.4; PG 39, 1085C1-1089B1) pose a textual problem which must be resolved. Although the syllogisms and the text which follows it are not separated by a border or a title heading, a number of important differences will be obvious to the reader. At 1.1 (PG 39, 1089B2), there is a noticeable change in genre. Syllogisms based almost exclusively on philosophical premises give way to an extended exposition of biblical passages whose interpretation has been contested.

The syllogisms given in I.1.1-II.10.4 (PG 39, 1085C1-1089B1) also focus on a very limited set of themes which are not discussed in the text that begins at 1.1 (PG 39, 1089B2). The syllogisms, for example, rely heavily upon Aristotle's account of contrariety. To be contraries (rather than merely incommensurable), two things must have common attributes; because these common attributes are prior to the differentiae which distinguish the contraries, contraries (such as good and evil) cannot be unoriginate. This account of contrariety does not appear in the text which begins at 1.1 (PG 39, 1089B2). The syllogisms also repeatedly emphasize that evil is subject to corruption and therefore mutable; not being immutable and incorruptible, evil cannot be unoriginate. The text which begins at 1.1 (PG 39, 1089B2) is not concerned with addressing the issue of whether evil is subject to corruption.

These clearly observable differences in form and content suggest that the words Ἡ θεία γὰρ γραφή (I.1; PG 39, 1089B2) mark the true beginning of the Didymus treatise; this thesis is further supported by evidence external to L. The syllogisms given in I.1.1-II.10.4 (PG 39, 1085C1-1089B1) may be subdivided into two groups on the basis of their literary form: I.1-4 (PG 39, 1085C-1088B) and II.1-10 (PG 39, 1088C-1089B1). Each of these blocks of text is separately attested in other anti-Manichaean works. It therefore appears that material from other anti-Manichaean works was added at the beginning of the Didymus treatise; this may have been due to a scribal error, the loss of folios at the beginning of the Didymus treatise, and/or the entry of marginalia or fly-leaf notes into the beginning of the received text.

The first block of arguments (I.1-4; PG 39, 1085C-1088B) reproduces §§ 15-16 of John the Grammarian's First Homily Against the Manichaeans.⁵⁹ The second block of arguments (II.1-10; PG 39, 1088C-1089B1) reproduces an anonymous anti-Manichaean work which exists in two recensions. A discussion of these two recensions of the anonymous work will help to illuminate the origin of I.1.1-II.10.4 (PG 39, 1085C-1089B1) and determine the precise relation of this section to the Didymus treatise which follows it.

The first recension of the anonymous work, which bears the title Syllogisms of the Holy Fathers (hereafter SHF), is extant in three manuscripts.⁶⁰ In each manuscript, the SHF appears in a similar series of short anti-Manichaean texts, suggesting that the three manuscripts are descended from a common ancestor. It is interesting

that John the Grammarian's First Homily Against the Manichaeans appears before the SHF in this collection of anti-Manichaean texts; this ordering is the same as the sequence of the fragments in **L**, where John's homily is followed by the *second* recension of the anonymous work. It is therefore possible that the introductory material in **L** was copied from a later version of this same collection of anti-Manichaean texts, in which the compiler of the second recension of the anonymous work replaced the first recension with his own version.

The anonymous work also appears in a second recension, which is found in two different literary settings.⁶¹ As already noted, it appears in the introductory material prefixed to the treatise of Didymus in **L** (II.1-10; PG 39, 1088 C1-1089 B1); it also appears as a separate treatise ascribed to Gregory of Nyssa (PG 46, 541).⁶² The second recension retains eight of the eleven syllogisms which appear in the first recension (#1-4, 6-9) and adds two new syllogisms (#12-13), which may either have belonged to the lost ending of the first recension or been added by the compiler of the second recension. These ten syllogisms appear in the following order: 1-2, 6-7, 4, 12, 3, 13, 8-9.

The organizing principle of this second recension is not immediately evident. The first six syllogisms of the second recension are quite short, while the last four syllogisms are somewhat longer. It is therefore possible that length is one of the organizing principles.

It is interesting that in the second recension the sequence of three pairs of syllogisms is maintained (1-2, 6-7, 8-9). In the case of

syllogisms 1-2, it seems natural for the sequence to be maintained. The first syllogism leads one to the conclusion that evil is not incorruptible; the second syllogism carries this argument forward by showing that if evil is corruptible, it cannot be unoriginate. Syllogisms 8-9 are linked in an analogous manner. The eighth syllogism leads one first to admit that evil is corruptible, then to conclude that since evil is corruptible, it cannot be unoriginate. The ninth syllogism confirms this conclusion through a reductio ad absurdum of the contrary premise: If evil *were* unoriginate, then evil would be a natural attribute; since evil would be acting in accordance with nature, it would neither sin nor incur blameworthiness. Since this is absurd by definition, evil (and more particularly, Satan) cannot be unoriginate. The conclusion of the previous syllogism is thus vindicated. Syllogisms 6-7, however, do not seem to be linked together in the way the previous two pairs of syllogisms were; the reason for the retention of their sequence remains unclear.

The reasons for the omission of syllogisms 5, 10, and 11 in the second recension also remain uncertain. Syllogism 10 reproduces material from the end of Didymus' Contra Manichaeos (38.1-39.8; PG 39, 1108D1-1109A6); since the Didymus treatise follows the syllogisms in **L**, the tenth syllogism would therefore have been redundant and may have been omitted for that reason. Richard suggested that syllogisms 5 and 11 were originally drawn from the beginning of the Didymus treatise (now lost) and were likewise omitted to prevent redundancy. While this is possible, simpler

reasons are available to explain the omission of the fifth and eleventh syllogisms. Syllogism 5 may have been omitted because its premises overlap the premises of syllogisms 1, 3 and 4. Syllogism 11 may have been omitted because it was manifestly incomplete and the missing minor premise and conclusion could not be supplied.

The first recension is likely to be the original form of the syllogisms. Since the point of the syllogisms is to show that evil is not unoriginate but is instead mutable and corruptible, the first recension must present the original form of syllogism 4: Οὐδὲν ἀγένητον τρεπτόν· τρέπεται δὲ τὸ κακὸν κρατηθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· τὸ ἄρα κακὸν οὐκ ἀγένητον. In the second recension, the terms κακὸν and ἀγαθόν are reversed, leading to the unexpected conclusion that good is not unoriginate. The first recension also reports the original form of syllogism 7: Πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ φθαρτικά· τὰ δὲ ἀγένητα ἄφθαρτα· τὰ ἄρα ἐναντία οὐκ ἀγένητα. The second recension, however, misreports the conclusion of that syllogism (τὰ ἄρα ἐναντία οὐκ ἄφθαρτα).⁶³

The situation is more complicated in the case of syllogism 8, where the first recension reads Πᾶς ὁ εὐλόγως ὀρεγόμενός τινος ἐπιτετευγμένην ἔχει τὴν ὄρεξιν, ἧς εὐλόγως ὀρέγεται. This could be the original reading, if one supposes that τινος and ἧς refer back to a feminine antecedent, such as πράξις or ἀκολουθία. The mss. of the second recension read either ἦ or εἰ in place of ἧς, which are both intelligible but redundant.⁶⁴

Despite these deficiencies, Richard suggested that the second recension might contain a better text of the third syllogism than is preserved in the first recension. An examination of the syllogism

could not confirm this hypothesis. The second recension adds οὐ τοὺς ἄλλους κακοὺς μόνον [ps.-Greg.Nyss.: μόνον κακοὺς] ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτόν before the words τὸν διάβολον, replaces the word φασιν (favoured by the compiler of the first recension) with λέγουσιν, and adds τό before κολάσει. Until the source for this syllogism can be identified, there is no way of knowing whether these additions bring the syllogism nearer to the original form found in the source.⁶⁵

The sources from which the majority of these thirteen syllogisms have been drawn cannot presently be identified. Because syllogism 10 reproduces material from Didymus Contra Manichaeos (38.1-39.8; PG 39, 1108D1-1109A6), Richard suggested that syllogisms 1,3,5,6 and 9 might also reproduce material from that treatise. Richard notes that syllogisms 1,3,5 and 9 all rely upon the generally accepted belief that evil is blameworthy and subject to punishment, using this premise to demonstrate that moral qualities are mutable and dependent upon choice. He observed that the punishment of the wicked was also discussed in Didymus' Contra Manichaeos (20.3-30.19; 37.1-39.12; PG 39, 1097D9-1104C12; 1108B9-1109A10). He therefore suggested that syllogisms 1,3, 5, and 9 might be derived from those sections of the Didymus treatise. A close reading of the Didymus treatise did not bear out this hypothesis, since no demonstrable parallels could be identified.⁶⁶

Richard had also suggested that syllogism 6, which asserts that evil is not a substance but a quality, was derived from Didymus' Contra Manichaeos. He noted that the phrase κατ' οὐσίαν κακόν occurs several times in Didymus' treatise (10.7; 29.2; 32.5,8; PG 39,

1093B4; 1104B2; 1105A7,10); the idea that evil is a quality is also discussed (see especially 2.7-9; PG 39, 1089C12-15). A close reading of the Didymus treatise did not find any demonstrable connection between these passages and syllogism 6.⁶⁷

In view of what has been said above, the following conclusions would seem to be justified: (1) The first recension of the anonymous work presents the original form of the syllogisms, from which the second recension found in **L** is derived; (2) Syllogism 10, which is included only in the first recension, provides a second witness to the text of the concluding section of Didymus' Contra Manichaeos (38.1-39.8; PG 39, 1108D1-1109A6); (3) Significant and demonstrable parallels were not found in comparing the syllogisms with the sections of Didymus' Contra Manichaeos indicated by Richard.

(d) As was noted in the first chapter, a discussion of Romans 7 (especially vv. 11-18) by Didymus has been preserved in the catenae on the Pauline Epistles. In his Commentary on Zechariah, Didymus referred to certain ὑπομνήματα (dissertations or commentaries) on Romans and Revelation, which contained extended discussions of the mystical value of the numbers mentioned in the Old and New Testaments.⁶⁸ Patristic and Byzantine writers, however, make no mention of a commentary on Romans by Didymus and no other catena fragments on Romans by Didymus are extant. Thus, with the possible exception of the present fragment, there is no evidence to show that these ὑπομνήματα on Romans and Revelation survived Didymus' death or were ever disseminated.

The nature of the catena fragment itself raises questions about whether it ought to be ascribed to the ὑπομνήματα mentioned by Didymus. The catena fragment displays no interest in the mystical value of numbers. It also does not supply a verse-by-verse exposition and therefore lacks the sense of progression which is normally found in a commentary on a specific book of the Bible. The fragment instead seeks to resolve a particular discussion question (ἀπορία) by defending the thesis οὐ φαύλη κατὰ φύσιν ἡ σὰρξ.⁶⁹

Like the Contra Manichaeos text extant in L, the catena fragment contains a much longer and more systematic refutation of Manichaean exegesis than is found in Didymus' other works. The catena fragment and the Contra Manichaeos text extant in L also attribute similar arguments and proof-texts to the Manichaean opponents. Both texts devote considerable space to refuting the premise that the flesh is evil by nature.⁷⁰ In both, Didymus is obliged to deal with the nature of original sin, which resulted from Adam's transgression and was subsequently transmitted to his descendants⁷¹; in each case, Christ's relation to original sin has to be explained with reference to Rom. 8:3 ("God, having sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh,...condemned sin in the flesh"). In both texts, Didymus discusses the variety of names ascribed to the Devil in Scripture, including not only personal designations such as "Devil" (i.e. "Accuser") and "Adversary", but also impersonal designations such as "Evil" (Contra Manichaeos) and "Sin" (Romans fragment)⁷²; in each case, Didymus then goes on to show that these impersonal designations do not indicate that the Devil is evil in substance or by

nature.⁷³ In both texts, the positive value of the Law must be defended in response to criticism.⁷⁴

Because of such similarities, Karl Staab suggested that the catena fragment had originally belonged to the Contra Manichaeos.⁷⁵ Staab's attribution of the text to Didymus' Contra Manichaeos was favourably received by the majority of those who reviewed Staab's work; the only reviewers to express reservations about this attribution were C. Martin and R. Devreese.⁷⁶

Martin agreed that the catena fragment had come from one of Didymus' doctrinal works rather than a biblical commentary. Martin nonetheless asserted that the Contra Manichaeos lacked the kind of extended exposition of biblical texts which is found in the Romans fragment; he also contended that the Contra Manichaeos contained polemical allusions that were not found in the Romans fragment. The first of these objections is not borne out by an examination of the Contra Manichaeos text in L. In the latter, the length of the exegesis of a particular passage varies significantly; the length and detail of the exegesis appears to have been determined by the nature of the claims advanced by Didymus' opponents and by the demands of the broader argument. Didymus' exegesis of Mt. 3:7-10 (Lk. 3:7-9), for example, is quite long.⁷⁷ In response to Martin's second objection, it should be noted that the Romans fragment does contain polemical references to Didymus' opponents.⁷⁸ Martin's objections therefore do not appear to be well grounded.

Devreese accepted that the Romans fragment was directed by Didymus against the Manichaeans, but argued that the whole

fragment was really an exposition of a single biblical text (Rom. 7:11). This is a rather surprising claim, since Rom. 7:11 is introduced quite late in the discussion (p.3, lines 2-5 in Staab's edition). Furthermore, Didymus introduced his treatment of Rom. 7:11 with the words, "At this point, I shall try to briefly summarize what was said in another persona about these matters." "These matters" refers to the relationship between the flesh, law/commandment, sin and death, which had been the subject of discussion in p. 1, line 20-p. 2, line 11 and p. 2, lines 27-38. It is this latter relationship (and not Rom. 7:11) which is the true subject of the Romans fragment. Devreese also hesitated to attribute the Romans fragment to Didymus' Contra Manichaeos because he thought (erroneously) that the latter work was no longer extant ("une oeuvre contre les Manichéens aujourd'hui perdue"). Although Devreese's analysis of the Romans fragment cannot be accepted, he did suggest several useful emendations to the text of Staab's edition, which I have adopted in the translation.⁷⁹

Since convincing reasons for rejecting Staab's attribution of the catena fragment to the Contra Manichaeos have not appeared in the literature, I have included a translation of the catena fragment within the present edition. Since both the Contra Manichaeos text in **L** and the catena fragment attribute similar arguments to the Manichaean opponents and pursue similar lines of refutation, it is useful to treat both texts together. At the same time, although Staab's ascription of the catena fragment to the Contra Manichaeos is a plausible hypothesis, there may not be sufficient evidence extant to decisively confirm it.⁸⁰

NOTES

Appendix

1. The contents of this codex have been described by A.M. Bandini (Catalogus codicum mss. Bibliothecae Mediceae Laurentianae, varia continens opera graecorum patrum, v. 1 [Florence: Typis Caesareis, 1764; repr. Leipzig: Zentral-Antiquariat der DDR, 1961], 427-430) and Brinkmann, IV-V.
2. M. Richard, "Florilèges spirituels grecs," in Dictionnaire de spiritualité, ascétique et mystique, v. 5 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1964), 490, 492; O. Wahl, "Zum Sapientia-Text der Sacra Parallela," Salesianum 42 (1980): 560; Lidia Perria, "Una minuscola libreria del secolo IX," Rivista di studi bizantini e neoellenici n.s. 26 (1989): 117-137. Perria (125) provides the following analysis of the first section, "Questa sezione, del tutto indipendente, presenta infatti caratteri grafici e codicologici piuttosto banali: rigatura eseguita col sistema 1, tipo 43D1, con 33 linee di scrittura; segnatura dei fascicoli di mano più tarda, al centro del margine inferiore del f.1r; ornamentazione modesta, in inchiostro color carminio."
3. François Halkin, Bibliotheca Hagiographica Graeca, 3 ed., v. 3 (Brussels: Societé des Bollandistes, 1957), 134. An epitome of this work also exists (BHG 1062) which has the same incipit.
4. It is possible that the reference is to one of the patriographic works edited by Theodor Preger, Scriptores originum Constantinopolitanarum (Leipzig: Teubner, 1901 [repr. 1989]). For a brief discussion of the character and date of these works, see Averil Cameron and Judith Herrin, Constantinople in the Early Eighth Century: The Parastaseis Syntomoi Chronikoi (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1984).
5. Halkin, v. 1, 64. Regarding this work, see Joseph Bidez, Philostorgius Kirchengeschichte, 3 rev. ed. by Friedhelm Winkelmann (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1981), XLIV-LVIII.
6. This numeration does not include reference to the comments of Leo Choiosphaktes on Leviticus-Kings (ff. 138v -167v in the present codex); either these folios could not be located at the time the table of contents was drawn up or else they were still intercalated with the folios of Leo's comments on Genesis and had thus escaped the numerator's attention. The numerator also counts

22 folios of Methodius' De autexousio, whereas the present codex contains only 5 folios (ff. 194-198).

7. Codices Chrysostomici graeci, 6 vols. (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1968-); J.A. Aldama, Repertorium Pseudochrysostomicum (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1965); Douglas Clyde Burger, Bibliotheca Chrysostomica. Bibliographia analytica corporis Chrysostomici. Vol. I: Index initiorum graecorum operum Chrysostomo adscriptum (Portland, Maine: Bibliotheca Chrysostomica, 1982); Chrysostomus Bauer, Initia patrum graecorum, 2 vols. (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1955); M. Geerard and F. Glorie, Clavis Patrum Graecorum, v. 5 (Turnhout: Brepols 1987), 161-203.

8. Richard, "Florilèges," 490.

9. F. Halkin, "Les manuscrits grecs de la Bibliothèque Laurentienne à Florence. Inventaire hagiographique." Analecta Bollandiana 96 (1978): 22.

10. Wahl, 560.

11. Halkin, Bibliotheca, v. 2, 179.

12. *Ibid.*, v. 1, 191-192.

13. The codex describes this Epitome as being the work of Λέοντος μαγίστρου ἀνθυπάτου πατρικίου τοῦ μυστικοῦ. For the identification of this author with Leo Choiosphaktes (c. 824-c. 920) and a brief description of this work, see Hans-Georg Beck, Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 12.2.1 = Byzantisches Handbuch 2.1 (Munich: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1959), 594-595. It would be interesting to know whether the scribe responsible for the first half of **L** copied this text from Patmos, Μονή τοῦ Ἁγίου Ἰωάννου τοῦ θεολόγου, ms. POZ' (10 c.) or ms. POH' (10 or 11 c.), which contain the oldest extant copies of Leo's Epitome and from which several of the other manuscripts of this work appear to be derived. See J. Sakkalion, ΠΑΤΜΙΑΚΗ ΒΙΒΛΙΟΘΗΚΗ (Athens: Alexandrou Papageorgiou, 1890), 96-98.

14. The dependence of this work upon Theodoret is detailed by Herbert Hunger and Otto Kresten, Katalog der griechischen Handschriften der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek. Teil 3/1 (Codices Theologici 1-100) (Vienna: Verlag Brüder Hollinek, 1976), 48. The manuscript which they are discussing (Vienna, Nationalbibliothek, Theol. gr. 28) is a copy on paper of **L**, dating

from the second half of the sixteenth century. The dependence of Theol. gr. 28 on L is evident from the fact that Theol. gr. 28 (f. 42r) reproduces an important lacuna in L (ff. 159v-160r).

15. One blank folio has been inserted between ff. 127 and 128; four blank folios have been inserted between ff. 167 and 168. At least one folio is also missing between ff. 159 and 160, although no blank folios have been inserted to indicate the omission.

16. The handwriting is similar to that of Aristoboulos Apostoles (=Arsenius of Monembasia), who is known to have worked in Florence in 1492 and 1519-1521. The latter's scribal activity is discussed by Gamillscheg and Harlfinger, Repertorium. I.A., 41; compare especially Henri Omont, Fac-similés de manuscrits grecs des XVe et XVIe siècles (Paris: Alphonse Richard, 1887), pl. 6 (under the episcopal name of Arsenius of Monembasia, which he assumed in 1506).

17. The second section of the codex is analyzed in detail by Perria (117-125). Perria (125ff.) also discusses another manuscript (Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, gr. B II 15) produced by the same scribe, who remains anonymous.

18. These figures are derived from Brinkmann's analysis of the codex. Perria's (119-120) analysis of the codex varies slightly from that of Brinkmann: "I fogli misurano mm 328 x 218, con una superficie scritta di 280 x 165 circa (misure rilevate sul f. 198 [i.e. f. 193 in Bandini's numeration or f. 194 in my numeration]). La rigatura è del tipo Leroy C 20C1, incisa secondo il sistema 9, con 30 linee-guida per la scrittura, separate da un' interlinea di mm 9....La scrittura è una minuscola pura alquanto angolosa, posata sul rigo, di aspetto arcaico e di modulo piuttosto grande: il nucleo delle lettere misura 2/3 mm in altezza e i tratti superiori e inferiori si prolungano di 3/4 mm. La si può considerare affine al 'tipo Anastasio' per il contrasto di modulo e di tratteggio fra lettere larghe e lettere strette, fra lettere angolose e lettere più fluide e rotondeggianti..."

19. Regarding this work, see N. Piccolos, Supplément à l'Anthologie grecque (Paris: C. Reinwald, 1853), XI; Brinkmann, XXIV-XXV; K. Ohly, Stichometrische Untersuchungen (Leipzig: O. Harrasowitz, 1928), 82-83, 122; G. Moravcsik, "Ἀνώυμou ἀφιερωτικὸν ποίημα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος Βασιλείου Α΄," in ΕΙΣ ΜΝΗΜΗΝ Κ. ΑΜΑΝΤΟΥ (Athens: Myrtides, 1960), 1-10; A. Vogt, Basile Ier empereur de Byzance (867-886) et la civilization byzantine à la fin du IXe siècle (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1973), XXIII; and A. Acconcia Longo, "Un nuovo codice con poesie salentine (Laur. 58,25) e l'assedio di

Gallipoli del 1268-69," Rivista di studi bizantini e neoellenici n.s. 20-21 (1983-1984): 123 n.4.

20. The extant verses are transcribed in Brinkmann, XVI-XXII. The disposition of these verses in the manuscript is as follows: 61-90 (f. 168r), 91-120 (f.168v), 121-150 (f.169r), 151-180 (f.169v), 181-210 (f.170r), and 211-231 (f.170v). Since this collection of verses is one folio longer than Bandini allows, the numbering of the folios from here to the end of the codex will differ from Bandini's numeration.

21. This note has elicited a great deal of speculation about the origin of the codex. As Perria (121), has noted, the verses refer to Basil's conflicts with the barbarians and Manichaeans (i.e. Paulicians), which may suggest that these verses were composed early in the reign of Basil I (i.e. 867-870). It is unclear, however, whether the composition of these verses was contemporaneous with the production of the present codex. As Perria (121 n.13) has noted, some scholars have held that that the verses contain echoes of Photius' Homilies 10 and 18 and suggested that the verses were composed by the exiled patriarch to promote reconciliation with the Emperor. Even if these 'echoes' are not simply reproductions of standard encomiastic formulae, their existence need not point to Photian authorship, only to authorship by someone who had access to Photius' homilies. In any case, it would be surprising if such indifferent verses had been penned by an author as learned and cultured as Photius; Piccolos exaggerates only slightly in his assessment of the verses: "Il n'en reste encore que trop...pour dégoûter le lecteur le plus froid et le plus patient."

22. Ornamental borders appear at the conclusion of each text, separating the last line of the text from the blank space left at the bottom of the page. These borders are of two kinds, which might be termed type 1 (ff. 170v, 179v, and 193v) and type 2 (ff. 179v and 197v), with type 2 being a smaller, much simplified version of type 1. The embellishment in the left margin of f. 179v and the vertical embellishment in 193v may be later additions. As Perria (120) notes, the scribe has drawn small, simple crosses in the margins of ff. 168v, 169v, and 170r; larger crosses with two crossbars appear on both sides of the titles on ff. 194r and 197v. A drawing of three crosses is found under the ornamental border on f. 170v (see Perria, pl. 2). The crosses on the left and right sides each have a single crossbar and 4 fine lines bisecting the four angles of the cross. The middle cross, which is slightly larger, has two crossbars and is framed by the words $\overline{\text{I}\Sigma\ \overline{\text{X}\Sigma}}$ (= Ἰησοῦς Χριστός) NIKΑ, which fill the spaces above and below the lower crossbar. Above and below the crosses is a liturgical reminiscence written in two different hands (both distinct from that

of the scribe): Τῶν σταυρῶν σου προσκυνούμεν. The words Τὸν σταῦρον σου προσκυνούμεν Δέσποτα are sung during the feast of the Exaltation of the Cross (Sept. 14); see Georgios G. Gegle, ed., MHNAION TOY ΣΕΠΤΕΜΒΡΙΟΥ (Athens: M. Saliberos, 1926), 130-131, 143-144, 146). (I owe this reference to Prof. R. Sinkewicz.)

23. The use of red ink in this later title is noteworthy, since red ink is not used elsewhere in the second section of the codex, as Brinkmann (IV) has noted.

24. A slightly simplified version of this same decoration appears in the three copies of **L** made by Camillo Zanetti in the sixteenth century (**C**, **O** and **W**). It is possible that Zanetti (or one of the scribes working for him) added the embellishment to **L**.

25. Brinkmann (IV n.2) has suggested that if one or more folios were lost at the beginning of the work, this might explain why the name of the opponents does not appear in the present form of the treatise. This argument is not conclusive, however, since Didymus rarely identifies his opponents by name. To determine whether one or more folios have been lost between f. 170 and f. 171 would require a careful analysis of the gatherings; this analysis Brinkmann and Perria have not provided.

26. PG 18, 412-448; CPG 2510. Brinkmann provided a critical edition of the Greek text. An English translation and commentary were produced by van der Horst and Mansfeld. A French translation and commentary were provided by Villey.

27. PG 18, 240-265; CPG 1811. A critical edition of the complete text in Palaeoslavonic and of the extant Greek fragments together with a French translation has been provided by Vaillant.

28. Seymour de Ricci, "Liste sommaire des mss. grecs de la Bibliotheca Barberina," Revue des bibliothèques 17 (1907): 109; Brinkmann, VI-VII. See Adolf Harnack, Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius, 2 ed., v. 1.2 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs Verlag, 1958), 622, 625.

29. Ricci, 117; Brinkmann, VII. Regarding the codex, see also H. Diels, Doxographi graeci (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter et Socios, 1965 [repr. of 1879 ed.]), 155, 551; A. Elter, Gnomica II: Epicteti et Moschionis quae feruntur sententiae (Leipzig: Teubner, 1892), 11; P. Franchi de' Cavalieri, Catalogus codicum hagiographicorum graecorum Bibliothecae Vaticanae (Brussels: Societé des Bollandistes, 1899), 265; Paul Wendland, Hippolytus Werke III:

Refutatio omnium haeresium (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1916), XI; Harnack, 622, 625; Fulvia Casella, "Hippolyti Refutationes I,14," Maia n.s. 9 (1957): 323n.3, 324; M. Markovich, "Textual Criticism on Hippolytus' Refutatio," Journal of Theological Studies n.s. 19 (1968): 83. Diels and Wendland suggested a fifteenth- or sixteenth-century date for the codex, while Brinkmann assigned it to the seventeenth century.

30. Ricci, 109.

31. Brinkmann (VII n.1), in his edition of Alexander of Lycopolis, suggested that **B** was copied from **A**. Wendland, however, in his edition of Hippolytus, asserted that **A** was copied from **B**.

32. F. Bancalari, "Index codicum graecorum Bibliothecae Casanatensis," Studi italiani di filologia classica 2 (1894): 174-176. This entry is reproduced in Christa Samberger, ed., Catalogi codicum graecorum qui in minoribus bibliothecis Italicis asservantur, v. 2 (Leipzig: Zentral-Antiquariat der DDR, 1968), 174-176. See also Isabella Ceccopieri ("Il fondo manoscritti della Biblioteca Casanatense," Accademie e biblioteche d'Italia 56 [4] [1988]: 25-26) and Marina Panetta, "Manoscritti greci del fondo Casanatense," Nuovi annali della Scuola Speciale per Archivisti e Bibliotecari 3 (1989): 94-95.

33. Regarding the catena on Luke (copied from Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, plut. VI,33), see Karo-Lietzmann, 574; Burger, 134 (entry 96-200); M. Geerard, Clavis Patrum Graecorum. Volumen II: Ab Athanasio ad Chrysostomum (Turnhout: Brepols, 1974), 532 (CPG 4449); Geerard, Clavis Patrum Graecorum. Volumen IV, 238 (C 131); J. Sickenberger, Titus von Bostra, TU 21.1 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1901), 56-59; Rauer, XXXVIII-XXXIX; Joseph Reuss, Lukas-Kommentare aus der griechischen Kirche, TU 130 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1984), XI.

34. On Camillo Zanetti, see Gamillscheg and Harlfinger, Repertorium... I.A., 119-121 (no. 212); Herbert Hunger, Repertorium der griechischen Kopisten 800-1600. 1 Teil. Handschriften aus Bibliotheken Grossbritanniens. B. Paläographische Charakteristica (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1981), 91-92; Ernst Gamillscheg and Dieter Harlfinger, Repertorium der griechischen Kopisten 800-1600. 2 Teil. Handschriften aus Bibliotheken Frankreichs und Nachträge zu den Bibliotheken Grossbritanniens. A. Verzeichnis der Kopisten (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1989), 119 (no. 299); Giovanna Derenzini, "Camillo Zanetti copista: tra vivere e

scrivere," Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Università di Siena 9 (1988): 19-43. It is interesting that **C** ornaments the first letter of the text in a manner similar to that found in **L**, **O** and **W**.

35. E. Feron and F. Battaglini, Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae codices manuscripti recensiti iubente Leone XIII Pont. Max. Codices manuscripti graeci Ottoboniani Bibliothecae Vaticanae descripti, Praeside Alphonso Cardinali Capecelatro Archiepiscopo Capuano, S.R.E. Bibliothecario (Rome: Ex typ. Vaticano, 1893), 114; Brinkmann, VI. Regarding the codex, see also Diels, 155, 551; Bibliotheca Hagiographica Graeca (Brussels: Societ  des Bollandistes, 1895), 82; Karl Krumbacher, Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur von Justinian bis zum Ende des Ostr mischen Reiches (527-1453), 2 rev. ed. by A. Ehrhard und H. Gelzer (Munich: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1897), 176n.10; Wendland, XI; Bonwetsch, Methodius, XXXII; Harnack, 625; Silvio Giuseppe Mercati, "Epigramma in Esametri di Dionisio Studita," Revue des  tudes byzantines 11 (1953): 226; Casella, 323 n.3, 324; and Markovich, 83. Diels originally assigned the codex to the sixteenth century. Based upon second-hand reports, Brinkmann suggested dating the works contained in this codex to the fifteenth or sixteenth century. Feron and Battaglini suggested a seventeenth century date. Albert Ehrhard ( berlieferung und Bestand der Hagiographischen und Homiletischen Literatur der griechischen Kirche von den Anfngen bis zum Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts, Erster Teil, III. Band, 2. Hlfte [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1952], 897n.3) has noted that later in the codex there is a separate section (ff. 176-217), not noted by Feron and Battaglini, which must be assigned to the sixteenth rather than the seventeenth century. As Ehrhard has noted, the majority of that section (ff. 176r-200v) appears to be an apograph of a twelfth-century manuscript in the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana (gr. LXX, 27).

36. Bonwetsch, Methodius, XXXII.

37. Feron and Battaglini, 192. See also Paul Canart, "Les manuscrits copi s par Emmanuel Provataris (1546-1570 environ): Essai d' tude codicologique," in Melanges Eug ne Tisserant, v. 6 (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana 1964), 229n.141, 243. This codex was once part of the library of Cardinal Sirleto; see E. Miller, Catalogue des manuscrits grecs de la Biblioth que de l'Escorial (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1966 [repr. of Paris, 1848 ed.]), 313 (nr. 134). Regarding the codex and its contents, see also I. B. Pitra, Iuris ecclesiastici graecorum historia et monumenta, v. 2 (Rome: Congreg. de propoganda fide, 1868), 297; S. Petrid s, "Trait s liturgiques de Saint Maxime et de Saint Germain traduits par

Anastase le bibliothécaire," Revue de l'Orient chrétien (1e série) 10 (1905): 292; Karl Mras, "Eine neuentdeckte Sibyllen-Theosophie," Wiener Studien 28 (1906): 43, 53; Silvio Ferri, "Oracula Sibyllina I 324 Sgg.," Studi italiani di filologia classica n.s. 1 (1920): 313; A. von Premerstein, "Neues zu den apokryphen Heilsprophezeiungen heidnischer Philosophen im Literatur und Kirchenkunst," Byzantinische-neugriechische Jahrbücher 9 (1933): 340 n.1; Hartmut Erbse, Fragmenta griechischer Theosophien, Hamburger Arbeiten zur Altertumswissenschaft 4 (Hamburg: Hansischer Gildenverlag, 1941), 28-30.

38. E. Martini, Catalogo di manoscritti greci esistenti nelle biblioteche italiane, v. 2 (Milan: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1902), 205-206.

39. Paulus Canart, Codices Vaticani graeci. Codices 1745-1962, v. 1 (Vatican City: Bibliotheca Vaticana, 1970), 718-720; Brinkmann, VII. For the identification of the scribe, originally from Chios, who was made vicarius (1625) and then scriptor graecus (1654-1676) of the Vatican library, see Marie Vogel and Victor Gardthausen, Die griechischen Schreiber des Mittelalters und der Renaissance (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung 1966 [repr. of 1909 edition]), 451 (who wrongly assign him to the sixteenth century); H. Rabe in Berliner philologische Wochenschrift 30 (1910): 115; Canart, Codices, v. 1, 581, 586; v. 2 (1973), XX.

40. Canart does not explain his reasons for adopting this position. Brinkmann had previously suggested that **B** and **V** might be apographs of **A**.

41. Hunger and Kresten, 85.

42. Ibid. See also H. Gerstinger, "Johannes Sambucus als Handschriften-Sammler," in Festschrift der Nationalbibliothek in Wien (Vienna, 1926), 255, 328-330, 351. The copyist or bookseller Cretensis cannot be identified with certainty, although Gerstinger (329 n.3) suggests one possible identification. The Flemish scholar Arnoldus Arlenius (Arnould de Lens) of Brabant is discussed by Gerstinger (333).

43. Gerstinger, 328.

44. Gerstinger, 330; Hunger and Kresten, 85.

45. Brinkmann, VI; Hunger and Kresten, 95-96.

46. G. Bonwetsch, Methodius von Olympus (Erlangen-Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1891), XV; Methodius, XXXI-XXXII. Bonwetsch erroneously refers to Theol. gr. 50 as Theol. gr. 49, a mistake which is explained by the fact that Theol. gr. 49, 50, 51 and 52 are bound together.

47. Antonio Possevino, Apparatus sacer ad scriptores Veteris & Novi Testamenti. eorum interpretes. synodos, & patres latinos, ac graecos..., v. 1 (Venice: Apud Societatem Venetam, 1603), 421-427; a brief account of Didymus' works appears on pages 397-398. In the Cologne edition of 1608, the Latin translation appears on pages 488-494. Turrianus' translation was published posthumously from a manuscript in Possevino's possession (cf. Possevino, 398). This manuscript is possibly to be identified with Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 6221, which contains Turrianus' Latin translation of Didymus' Contra Manichaeos and Titus of Bostra's Contra Manichaeos; see Paul Oskar Kristeller, Iter Italicum: A Finding List of Uncatalogued or Incompletely Catalogued Humanistic Manuscripts of the Renaissance in Italian and Other Libraries. Vol. II. Italy. Orvieto to Volterra. Vatican City (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), 339.

48. Henricus Canisius, Antiquae lectiones [seul antiqua monumenta ad historiam mediae aetatis illustrandam nunquam edita], v. 5 (Ingolstadt: Apud Andream Angermarium 1604), 15-29.

49. M. de La Bigne, Magna bibliotheca, v. 4 (Cologne: Sumptibus A. Hierati, 1618), 265-268; idem, Maxima bibliotheca, v. 4 (Lyons: Apud Anissonios, 1677), 338-341.

50. Pierre Poussines, Ἐπιστολαί. Epistolae in quibus controversiam hodie flagrantium luculenta extant praeiudicia (Paris: Typographia Regia, 1657), 342-343.

51. François Combefis, Bibliothecae graecorum patrum auctarium novissimum...pars II (Paris: A. Hotot, 1672), 21-32. On Combefis' role in editing and publishing patristic texts, see Raymond Darricau, "A Hellenist of the Grand siècle: The Dominican François Combefis (1605-1679)," Res publica litterarum 1 (1978): 21-41. Combefis' labours can be seen as part of a broader intellectual movement, namely the emergence of a new interest in patristic and Byzantine texts among French Jesuits and Dominicans after 1610; see Henri-Jean Martin, Livres, pouvoirs et société à Paris au XVIIe siècle (1588-1701), v. 1 (Geneva: Droz 1969), 198-199; Dominique Bertrand, "The Society of Jesus and the Church Fathers in the Sixteenth Century," in Backus, v. 2, 889-950 (esp. 935). On Bigot's trip to Italy in 1659-1661 to copy and collect manuscripts, see

Leonard E. Doucette, Émery Bigot: Seventeenth-Century French Humanist (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1970), 18-25. Some of the marginal emendations in **C** correspond to the emendations silently adopted by Combefis in his text. A more detailed analysis of **C** might therefore be able to determine whether **C** was the manuscript brought by Bigot from Italy and used by Combefis in preparing his edition of the text.

52. Jacques Basnage, Thesaurus monumentorum ecclesiasticorum et historicum, sive Henricii Canisii Lectiones antiquae..., v. 1 (Amsterdam: Apud Rudolphum & Gerhardum Wetstenios, 1725), 204-216.

53. Andreas Gallandi, Bibliotheca veterum patrum antiquorumque scriptorum ecclesiasticorum, v. 6 (Venice: Ex typ. Albritii Hieron fil., 1770), 309-318.

54. Dominicus Schram, Analysis operum s.s. patrum et scriptorum ecclesiasticorum, v. 13 (Augsburg: Mattheus Rieger, 1790), 578-707. (Only the Latin translation is given.)

55. A.B. Caillau, Collectio selecta s.s. ecclesiae patrum, v. 53 (Paris: Mecquignon-Havard, 1836), 385-402. (Only the Latin translation is given.)

56. J.P. Migne, Patrologia Graeca, v. 39 (Paris: J. P. Migne, 1858), 1085-1110.

57. Michel Lequien, ...S. Joannis Damasceni...Opera omnia quae exstant, v. 2 (Paris: Apud Joannem-Baptistam Delespine, 1712), 763; Gallandi, v. 5 (1769), 348-350; J.G.T. Grässe, Lehrbuch einer allgemeinen Literargeschichte, v. 1 (Leipzig: Arnoldische Buchhandlung, 1837), 985.

58. Regarding the ps.-Gregory of Nazianzus Significatio in Ezechielem (PG 36, 665-669), see T. Sinko, De traditione orationum Gregorii Nazianzeni. Pars I, Meletemata Patristica 2 (Cracow: C. Gebethner, 1917), 149-151, 160-167. An Armenian version of this work is extant under the name of Evagrius Ponticus. The Armenian text has been edited by Barsel V. Sargisean, Srboy horn Ewagri Pontac'woy Vark' ew Matenagrut'iwnk (Venice, 1907), 9-12. For a discussion of the Armenian version, see Willy Lüdtkke ("Zur Überlieferung der Reden Gregors von Nazianz," Oriens Christianus n.s. 3 [1913]: 269-270) and J. Muyldermans, "Miscellanea Armeniaca," Muséon 47 (1934): 295-296.

59. The full text of this work is extant only in Athos, Μονή βατοπεδίου, ms. 236, (11-14 c.; ff. 140-143) (=B). As Marcel Richard (Iohannis Caesariensis presbyteri et grammatici Opera quae supersunt, CCSG 1 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1977], XLII) has noted, a brief excerpt is extant in Sinai, Μονή τῆς Ἁγίας Αἰκατερίνης, gr. 513 (383) (10 c.; f. 143) (=S) and Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1838 (13 c.; f. 266v) (=V). This excerpt, entitled Περὶ σκοτούς (PG 88, 577D), reproduces two sentences of §7. Richard (Iohannis, XLIII-XLIV) also noted that two more excerpts have been attached to the beginning of Didymus' Contra Manichaeos in L. The first passage (I.1.1-I.2.3; PG 39, 1085C-1088A8) reproduces §§15-16 of John's homily. The second passage, Εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν...καὶ κακόν (I.4.1-4; PG 39, 1088B10-13) reproduces the end of §16 in the homily. A critical edition of the homily appears in Richard (Iohannis, 84-92). His edition reports the text of B, noting the parallels in L (for §§15-16) in footnotes.

Richard noted that L contains some additional material which cannot be paralleled in B (I.2.3-I.3.8; I.4.4-5; PG 39, 1088A8-B9; B13-14). He suggested that this material does not belong to John's homily but may have come from the Syllogisms of the Holy Fathers (which will be discussed below). An examination of the material in question suggests a simpler explanation. I.2.3-6 (PG 39, 1088A8-10) represents the entry of a marginal note into the text. In this marginal note, a reader, evidently struggling with the terse form of the argument in I.2.1-3 (PG 39, 1088A5-8), has tried to reproduce the argument in his own words. Τίθενται δὲ αὐτὰς ἀγενήτους εἶναι (I.2.1; PG 39, 1088A5-6) is paraphrased by αὐταὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀγένητοι αἱ ἐναντία (I.2.3-4; PG 39, 1088A8-9). The difficult sentence πρὸ τούτων δὲ τί ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ὃ εἶπον κοινῶς αὐταῖς ὑπάρχειν (I.2.2-3; PG 39, 1088A6-7) is summarized in the simpler words τὸ δὲ κοινῶς αὐταῖς ὑπάρχον πρὸ αὐτῶν (I.2.4-5; PG 39, 1088A9). The phrase οὐκ ἄρα ἀγένητοι αἱ ἀρχαί (I.2.3; PG 39, 1088A7-8) is repeated at I.2.5 (PG 39, 1088A9-10). The minor premise οὐδὲν δὲ πρὸ ἀγενήτου (I.2.1-2; PG 39, 1088A6) is reproduced only at the end of the argument, where it helps to explain how the conclusion was reached (I.2.5-6; PG 39, 1088A10: οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸ ἀγενήτου).

The situation is different with I.3.1-8 and I.4.4-5 (PG 39, 1088B1-9, 13-14), which present the original form of the text found in §16 of John's homily, but were unfortunately not included in Richard's edition. I.3.1-8 (PG 39, 1088B1-9) and I.4.1-5 (PG 39, 1088B10-14) present the two horns of a dilemma: either being unoriginate is common to good and evil or it is not. (The consequences which follow from each thesis are then analyzed, showing that neither thesis is compatible with the Manichaean position.) Since both I.3.1-8 (PG 39, 1088B1-9) and I.4.1-5 (PG 39, 1088B10-14) begin with the words Εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, μή..., it was easy for

I.3.1-8 (PG 39, 1088B1-9) to be omitted in **B** through haplography, destroying the parallelism of the argument.

I.4.4-5 (PG 39, 1088B13-14) must belong to the original form of the text for two reasons. First, this sentence is necessary if I.4.1-4 (PG 39, 1088B10-13) is to be brought to its proper conclusion, showing that the Manichaean position is incompatible with the thesis set forth in I.4.1 (PG 39, 1088B10). Furthermore, I.4.4-5 (PG 39, 1088B13-14) is parallel to I.3.7-8 (PG 39, 1088B7-9), allowing both horns of the dilemma to end with the conclusion that the good alone is unoriginate.

60. The SHF appear in the mss. designated by Richard as **B** (ff. 151v-152r), **S** (ff. 143r-143v), and **V** (ff. 266v-267v). The SHF were edited from **V** by A. Mai (Nova patrum bibliotheca, v. 4. 2 [Rome: Typis Sacro Consilii Propogando Christiano Nomini, 1847], 103-104). Their existence was noted by Migne (PG 88, 577D), who declined to reproduce them. They were subsequently edited from **S** by V. Benesevic, Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum graecorum qui in monasterio sanctae Catharinae in Monte Sina asservantur. Tomus I: Codices manuscripti notabiliores bibliothecae monasterii Sinaitici ejusque metochii Cahirensis, ab archimandrita Porphyrio (Uspenski) descripti (St. Petersburg, 1911; repr. Hildesheim: G. Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1965), 349-350. A critical edition of the SHF appears in Richard (Iohannis, 130-133). As Richard notes, the eleventh syllogism is incomplete, containing only a major premise and part of an explanation of the major premise; it is therefore uncertain whether the SHF originally contained more than eleven syllogisms.

61. The following analysis of the second recension is indebted to Richard (Iohannis, LV-LVIII).

62. The treatise, ps.-Gregory of Nyssa Contra Manichaeos, is extant in 13 manuscripts, of which I have examined six on microfilm and collated their variant readings. The oldest known ms. is Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Coislin. 253, ff. 266v-267v (9-10 c.), which was used by Richard in preparing his edition of the SHF. (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 697, f. 48v [13-14 c.] is an apograph of Coislin 253, ff. 266v-267v since Vat. gr. 697, ff. 13r-48v reproduces Coislin 253, ff. 230r-267r. Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ottob. gr. 362, ff. 157r-v [15-16 c.], in turn, has been copied from Vat. gr. 697, f. 48v since Ottob. gr. 362, ff. 157r-168r, reproduces material from Vat. gr. 697, ff. 48v-134v.) Two manuscripts of the eleventh century are also of special importance for establishing the original form of the text: Vienna, Nationalbibliothek, Hist. gr. 56, ff. 207v-208r and Vatican City,

Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pius II gr. 4, ff. 304v-305r. (Milan, Ambrosianus gr. Q 14 sup.(668), ff. 465-465v [15 c.] is an apograph of Pius II gr. 4, ff. 304v-305r, since Ambrosianus gr. Q 14 sup., ff. 164r-477r reproduces Pius II gr. 4, ff. 1r-316r.)

Several of the later manuscripts also appear to be related to one another. Vat. gr. 1907, f. 50r (12-13 c.) is probably related to Athos, Μονή Μεγίστης Λαύρας, ms. B 116 (236), ff. 183v-184r (14 c.), since Vat. gr. 1907, ff. 35v-50r and Lavra gr. B 116 (236), ff. 149-184 reproduce the same works in the same order. It is unclear whether the latter is an apograph of the former or the two are copies of the same original manuscript. It is possible that Lavra gr. B 116 (236), ff. 183v-184r is derived from Hist. gr. 56, ff. 207v-208r since both give the title in the same form. Four later mss. appear to be closely related and may be derived from Athos, Lavra gr. B 116 (236), ff. 183v-184r: Leiden, Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit, Gronov. 12, ff. 174-175 (16 c.); Montpellier, Bibliothèque de l'Université, Section Médecine, gr. 122, ff. 167-169 (16 c.); Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, gr. 47, ff. 212-214 (16 c.); and Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Urb. gr. 9, ff. 126v-127r (17 c.). Athos, Μονή βατοπεδίου, ms. 132, ff. 238v-239r (14 c.) is not obviously related to any of the manuscripts previously discussed.

The text of ps.-Gregory of Nyssa was edited and translated into Latin by Fronton Le Duc, D. Gregorii Nysseni Opuscula nonnulla (Ingolstadt: D. Sartorius, 1596), 96-100. From Le Duc's note, it is not clear which manuscript he used for his edition. It was clearly not Coislin. 253, since the transcription he gives of the last syllogism (syllogism 9) shows that his manuscript contained readings which differ significantly from those of Coislin. 253. Neither was it Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, gr. 47, from which Le Duc cites an alternative reading of syllogism 9. It is possible that Le Duc based his edition on Vat. Urb. gr. 9, which presents readings essentially identical to those of Le Duc's edition. A new critical edition of the ps.-Gregory treatise, based upon all the known mss., is much to be desired but cannot be supplied within the present dissertation, since, as we shall see, the second recension (attested by ps.-Gregory of Nyssa) has no demonstrable connection with the treatise of Didymus which follows it in L.

Le Duc's Latin translation was reproduced in Beati Gregorii Nysseni episcopi...Opera omnia quae exstant (Paris: Apud Michaellem Sonnum, 1605), 105B-106B. Le Duc's Greek text and Latin translation were reprinted by Claude Morel, Sancti Patri nostri Gregorii...Opera, v. 3 (Paris: Sumptibus Aegidii Morelli, 1638), 180; a brief note by Le Duc is found on page 59 of the Annotationes at the end of the same volume. H. Omont (Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques des Départements, v. 1 [Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1849], 328) suggested that Montpellier, Med.

gr. 122 was used by Morel as a reference copy in the preparation of his printed edition. The Greek text and Latin translation were reprinted from Morel's edition by Migne (PG 46, 541-542).

The ps.-Gregory of Nyssa treatise was translated into Spanish by C. Parpal (in L. Segalá et al., Obras escogidas de patrología griega, v. 1 [Barcelona: Imprenta Editorial Barcelonesa, 1916], 205-209) from the Greek text reproduced in Migne. Parpal followed Migne in assuming the treatise to have been derived from Didymus' Contra Manichaeos. The volume in which this translation is contained was reviewed by A. Puech (Revue des études grecques 31 [1918]: 118), who also recognized the similarity of this text to the material appearing at the beginning of printed editions of Didymus' treatise.

63. The second recension also omits ἐστί before φαρτικά, perhaps to bring the text into conformity with the preceding major premises (in which ἐστί is omitted).

64. Various minor errors in the transmission of the text also appear in the second recension. In the minor premise of the first syllogism, κολαστέον (the reading attested by the SHF and L) is replaced by the reading κολαζόμενον. Similarly, in the third syllogism, κολάσει (the reading attested by the SHF and L) is replaced by ταῖς κολάσεσι. In syllogism 8, the minor premise θεὸς δὲ τοῦ φθεῖραι τὴν κακίαν ὀρέγεται (attested by the SHF and L) is omitted. In syllogism 9, the defective reading τῷ κακόν found in all the mss. of the first recension has been variously emended in the mss. of the second recension. It is also noteworthy that throughout the text the reading ἀγέννητον (found in the SHF and L) has often been replaced by ἀγέννητον in the mss. of the second recension.

The text has been transmitted more faithfully in L, although a few errors do appear. In the first syllogism, δέ is omitted in the minor premise and after the conclusion a gloss that is tautological and unnecessary has been added. In syllogism 8, δέ has been moved from the second to the third position in the sentence. In syllogism 9, the defective reading of the first recension τῷ κακόν is correctly emended to τὸ κακόν; an instance of dittography (τὸ τό) appears before the words μὴ ἀμαρτάνον.

65. The words οὐ...αὐτόν, for example, might simply reflect the entry of a supralinear gloss or marginal note into the text. Furthermore, even if the emended form of syllogism 3 were closer to the original form found in the source, this would not necessarily mean that the compiler of the second recension had access to a superior text of the whole collection of syllogisms. It might mean only that the compiler recognized the source of the third syllogism and was able to supply a more complete text from a manuscript copy

of the source.

66. Only one possible point of contact with the syllogisms was observed. The major premise of syllogism 3 and the comment εἰ γε καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν αὐτὸ εἶναι κολαστέον at the end of syllogism 5 could conceivably have been inspired by the discussion of Didymus in 28.6-29.6 (PG 39, 1104A8-B6). Nonetheless, there are no obvious verbal parallels to suggest direct literary dependence. Furthermore, the verb παραδίδοσθαι, which is used in syllogism 3, does not appear in the Didymus passage. The argument advanced by Didymus in 29.1-6 (PG 39, 1104B1-6) also differs from that advanced in syllogism 3. Didymus is interested in whether the Devil has power equal to God's own; syllogism 3 is interested in whether the Devil is subject to change.

67. Richard also suggested that syllogisms 7, 12 and 13 are derived from the two homilies of John the Grammarian, which precede the SHF in **B**. It is not impossible that Homily I 14 (line 237) inspired the major premise of syllogism 12, where it is asserted that God, being good, does not cause the corruption of existing things. It is also not impossible that the explanation following the major premise in syllogism 13 (ὥστε πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τῷ θατέρῳ ὑπάρχον τῷ λοιπῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν) is dependent upon Homily I 16 (lines 263-264; cf. I.4.2; PG 39, 1088B11): εἰ (**L**: ἦ) θατέρῳ ὑπάρχει, τῷ λοιπῷ οὐχ ὑπάρχει. It should be noted, however, that this phraseology is common in the Aristotelian tradition and that the argument proceeds differently in syllogism 13 than in the Homily; the text of syllogism 13 has also been badly corrupted, further hindering comparison. Richard also suggested that Homily II 6 (lines 86-87: Ἄλλως τε τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλων ἐστὶν ἀναιρετικά...) might have been the inspiration for the major premise of syllogism 7 (Πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλων [ἐστὶ] φθαρτικά). This seems improbable; it is more likely that the inspiration for the latter was Aristotle Physics 192a21 (φθαρτικά ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐναντία).

68. Comm. Zech.T. 200.14-20 (3.73). In Comm. Zech. 199.15-19 (3.68), Didymus offered one example of such interpretation, discussing the "seven thousand who have not bowed the knee to Baal" in Rom. 11:4.

69. Cf. Werner Keuck, "Sünder und Gerechter: Rm 7,14-25 in der Auslegung der griechischen Väter" (Diss., Eberhard-Karls Universität zu Tübingen, 1955), 98.

70. See CM 7.6-14.12 (PG 39, 1092C1-1096C12) and compare Staab, 1, lines 4-23; 2, lines 7-25, 31-33; 5, lines 4-7, 13-20.

71. Compare CM 13.1-14.12 (PG 39, 1093D7-1096C12) with Staab, 2, lines 23-25.

72. Compare CM 21.1-20 (PG 39, 1100A15-C6) with Staab, 1, lines 8-13; 3, lines 11-20.

73. Compare CM 22.1-9 (PG 39, 1100C7-D5) with Staab, 3, lines 37-38.

74. Compare CM 25.5-9; 26.10-14; 28.1-10; 30.10-12; 39.10-12 (PG 39, 1101B1-5,C10-15; 1104A2-14, C1-3; 1109A8-10) with Staab, 1, line 20-2, line 11; 2, line 27-3, line 3; 3, lines 21-36; 4, lines 13-21.

75. Staab, XX.

76. See the reviews of Staab's edition by C. Martin in Nouvelle revue théologique 60 (1933): 817-818 and R. Devreese in Revue biblique 43 (1934): 133. Kramer ("Didymus," 742) accepted Staab's argument that the Romans fragment was not from a commentary.

77. CM 31.1-36.20 (PG 39, 1104C13-1108B8).

78. See, for example, Staab, 2, line 8: "those who malign the flesh with which we are clothed"; 4, lines 13-16: "If they should say, 'How could the commandment be good and just? How can the commandment and the Law be holy when it was through the opportunity which these provided that sin became exceedingly sinful?"; 4, lines 35-36: "...then in vain has the good God sent down souls which are consubstantial with himself into our bodies"; 4, lines 38-39: "If this is actually the case, then I shall say in the manner of the ungodly..."

79. In translating the catena fragment on Rom. 7, I have followed Devreese in making the following emendations to Staab's edition of the text: In p. 4, line 24, add <του> after στερηθεις. In p. 4, lines 40-42, read ἐνήργησεν. Εἶγε....πράσσω,.... I have not followed Devreese in emending αὐτὸν to αὐτήν in p. 5, line 30.

80. It would be interesting to review the corpus of fragments ascribed to Didymus to see if all or part of the Romans fragment is elsewhere attested and if it is there ascribed to the Contra Manichaeos. An examination of the fragments ascribed to Didymus in ps.-Maximus Loci communes (PG 91), John Damascene's Sacra parallela (PG 96) and Antony Melissa's Loci communes (PG 136) did not find any additional attestations of the Romans fragment. An

examination of the unpublished florilegia containing extracts from Didymus is unfortunately beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Ps.-Didymus

f. 171 (1085C) I

1. Οὐδεμία ἀντίθεσις ἐναντίων ἐξ ὅλων ἀντίκειται, τῷ καὶ κοινά τινα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις. οἷον τὸ λευκόν, ἐναντίον ὄν τῷ μέλανι, κατὰ μόνας τὰς διαφορὰς ἔχει τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ὄντων αὐτοῖς κοινῶν χρώματος καὶ

5 ποιότητος. οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν τοιούτων τὴν περι αὐτὰ ἐναντιότητα προτέραν ἔχει, πάντα γὰρ μετὰ τὰ κοινά· ἐν δὲ τοῖς κοινοῖς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντιότης. δεῖ γὰρ κοινὸν χρῶμα καὶ ποιότητα εἶναι, ἵνα οὕτω τὸ λευκόν καὶ τὸ μέλαν ἢ, ὡσαύτως μετὰ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ διάθεσιν ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ
10 ἢ κακία. εἰ τοίνυν ἀγένητοι δύο ἀρχαὶ καὶ αὐταὶ ἐναντία, ἢ ἐξ ὅλων εἰσὶν τὴν ἐναντιότητα ἔχουσαι ἢ ὑπάρχει τινα αὐταῖς κοινά· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἐξ ὅλων δέχεται ἐναντιότητα· ἔχουσιν ἄρα καὶ αὐταὶ κοινά, τὸ εἶναι, τὸ οὐσίαι εἶναι, καὶ
(1088A) εἰ τι ἕτερον εὐρίσκεται περὶ αὐτὰς κοινόν. ἐναντίας δὲ
15 ποιεῖ αὐτάς, τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ κακόν καὶ τὴν μὲν φῶς, τὴν δὲ σκότος εἶναι· προεπινοεῖται δὲ τὸ εἶναι αὐτάς οὐσίας ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ κακόν ὑπάρχειν· ἢ ἐναντιότης ἄρα οὐ κατὰ τὰ κοινά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ιδιότητα.

2. Τίθενται δὲ αὐτάς ἀγενήτους εἶναι· οὐδὲν δὲ πρὸ ἀγενήτου· πρὸ τούτων δὲ τί ἐστίν, αὐτὸ ὃ εἶπον κοινῶς αὐταῖς ὑπάρχειν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀγένητοι αἱ ἀρχαί. Αὗται μὲν γὰρ ἀγένητοι αἱ ἐναντία· τὸ δὲ κοινῶς αὐταῖς ὑπάρχον
5 πρὸ αὐτῶν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀγένητοι αἱ ἀρχαί, οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸ ἀγενήτου.

(1088B)

3. Εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν μὴ κατὰ τὸ ἀγένητον ἔχειν αὐτάς τὴν ἐναντιότητα, καὶ τοῦτο κοινὸν αὐτῶν εὐρεθήσεται· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀγενήτως τὸ κακὸν κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, κοινὸν εὐρεθήσεται τὸ ἀγένητον κακὸν ἀμφοτέρων
5 καὶ τὸ ἀγένητον ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοτέρων, εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγενήτου οὐ δύναται, κοινὸν δὲ τὸ

I 1.4 καὶ addidi cum Comb. 10 ἐναντία:ἐναντίοι Comb.

2.3 μὲν om. Comb. 4 ὑπάρχον:ὑπάρχειν Comb. 3.5 το²

om. Comb. 6 post δύναται:εὐρεθῆναι add. Migne

I.1.1-I.2.3 (PG 39, 1085C-1088A8)=John the Grammarian
First Homily Against the Manichaeans §§15-16 (242-262)

I.3.1-8 (PG 39, 1088B1-9)=ibid. §16 (addi post 262)

ἀγένητον· κοινὸν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπόμενον τῷ ἀγενήτῳ, τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν τὸ ἀγαθόν.

4. Εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν μὴ κοινὸν αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγένητον εἶναι, ἢ θατέρῳ ὑπάρχει, τῷ λοιπῷ οὐχ ὑπάρχει· ἔσται τοίνυν ἀγένητον ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακόν, οὐ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν· εἰ οὖν εὐρεθείη τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀγένητον, τὸ κακὸν γενητόν.

(1088C) Π

1. Ἄλλως τε πᾶν κακὸν κολαστέον· οὐδὲν κολαστέον ἄφθαρτον· οὐδὲν ἄρα κακὸν ἄφθαρτον, τῷ μὴ ἀφθάρτως ὑπάρχειν φθαρτόν.

2. Οὐδὲν φθαρτὸν ἀγένητον· ἔστιν δὲ τὸ κακὸν φθαρτόν· τὸ ἄρα κακὸν οὐκ ἀγένητον.

3. Οὐδὲν κατ' οὐσίαν κακόν, τῷ τὸ κακὸν ποιὸν εἶναι· οὐδὲν δὲ ποιὸν οὐσία· τὸ ἄρα κακὸν οὐκ οὐσία.

4. Πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλων φθαρτικά· τὰ δὲ ἀγένητα ἄφθαρτα· τὰ ἄρα ἐναντία οὐκ ἄφθαρτα.

(1088D)

5. Οὐδὲν ἀγένητον τρεπτόν· τρέπεται δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν κρατηθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ· τὸ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἀγένητον.

6. Το ἀγένητον οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρεκτικὸν φθορᾶς τινος, οὐδέ γε φθαρτικόν· τὸ δὲ γε κακὸν ὀρεκτικὸν φθορᾶς· τὸ ἄρα κακὸν οὐκ ἀγένητον.

7. Αἰ θεῖαι γραφαὶ κολάσει παραδίδοσθαι οὐ τοὺς ἄλλους κακοὺς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν διάβολον λέγουσιν· πᾶν δὲ τὸ κολάσει παραδιδόμενον τρεπτόν· οὐδὲν δὲ τρεπτόν ἀγένητον· οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν κακῶν ἀγένητον.

5

Π 1.1 Ἄλλως τε om.SHF,ps.-Greg. post οὐδὲν:δέ add.SHF, ps.-Greg. κολαστέον:κολαζόμενον ps.-Greg. 2-3 τῷ...ὑπάρχειν cog.cum Comb.:τὸ...ὑπάρχον L τῷ-φθαρτόν om.SHF,ps.-Greg. 2.1 ἔστιν:ἔστι SHF,ps.-Greg. 4.1 post ἀλλήλων:ἔστι add.SHF 2 τὰ-ἄφθαρτα: οὐκ ἄρα ἐναντία· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία οὐκ ἄφθαρτα Comb. ἄφθαρτα²:ἀγένητα SHF 5.1 ἀγαθόν:κακόν SHF 2 κακοῦ...ἀγαθόν:ἀγαθοῦ...κακόν SHF 7.1 κολάσει:ταῖς κολάσεσι ps.-Greg. 1-2 οὐ-αὐτόν om.SHF 2 ἄλλους:ἀνθρώπους Comb. κακοὺς μόνον:μόνον κακοὺς ps.-Greg. 3 λέγουσιν:φασιν SHF τὸ om.SHF

I.4.1-4 (PG 39, 1088B10-13)=John the Grammarian First Homily Against the Manichaeans §16 (263-266)

I.4.4-5 (PG 39, 1088B13-14)=*ibid.*, addi post κακόν (266)

II.1-10 (PG 39, 1088C1-1089B1)=ps.-Gregory of Nyssa Contra Manichaeos (PG 46.541)

8. Τῶν δὲ ὄλων ἐναντιουμένων οὐδὲν καινόν, ὥστε

πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὸ θατέρῳ ὑπάρχον τῷ λοιπῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· ὑπάρχει δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸ εἶναι ἀγένητον· τῷ ἄρα κακῷ

οὐδέτερον τούτων ὑπάρχει· μὴ ὄν ἄρα τὸ κακόν.

9. Πᾶς ὁ εὐλόγως ὀρεγόμενος τινος ἐπιτετευγμένην

ἔχει τὴν ὀρεξίν, εἰ εὐλόγως ὀρεγεται· θεός δὲ τοῦ φθίρειν τὴν κακίαν ὀρεγεται· τῶν φθαρτῶν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ κακία· τῶν δὲ φθαρτῶν οὐσα, ἀφανισθήσεται· ἀφανισθῆναι δὲ οὐκ

ἐστὶν ἀγένητος.

5

10. Εἰ ἀγένητον τὸ κακόν, κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει

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τὸ κακόν εἶναι· οὐδεὶς δὲ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργῶν

ἀμάρτανει· τὸ ἄρα κακόν οὐχ ἀμάρτανει· τὸ μὴ ἀμάρτανον οὐχ ὑπάλτιον· ὑπάλτιος δὲ ὁ σατανᾶς· οὐκ ἄρα ἀγένητος.

(1089B)

9.2 εἰ ἦς SHF τοῦ om.SHF 2-3 θεός-ὀρεγεται om.ps.-Greg.
4 δὲ φθαρτῶν corr.cum Comb.:φθαρτῶν δὲ L 10.2 τὸ² om.ps.-
Greg. 3 τὸ² corr.:τὸ τὸ L τὸ δὲ Comb.

Didymus Contra Manichaeos

1. Ἡ θεία γραφή τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων
ᾧν ποιούσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγει αὐτοὺς εἶναι υἱοὺς καὶ
γεννήματα. τοὺς γοῦν ὀργίλους καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀμαρτίαν
ἔχοντας, ὡς διὰ τοῦτο ὑποκεῖσθαι τῇ κατὰ κόλασιν ὀργῇ,
5 τέκνα ὀργῆς ὀνομάζει, ἣ φησιν ὁ Παῦλος· *καὶ ἡμεν φύσει*
τέκνα ὀργῆς, ὡς καὶ οἱ λοιποί. οὗτοι μεταβάλλειν
δύνανται ὡς μηκέτι εἶναι τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς. Παῦλος
γοῦν περὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν παραπλησίως ἀγίων
(1089C) *γεγεννημένων λέγει ὅτι ἡμεν φύσει τέκνα ὀργῆς, ὡς καὶ οἱ*
10 *λοιποὶ ἄνθρωποι, οἱ εἰσέτι δεῦρο ἐν τῷ ἀμαρτάνειν ὄντες.*
προσκέειμενον δὲ τὸ φύσει οὐ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν σημαίνει,
ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀληθεία, τὸ γὰρ ἡμεν φύσει τέκνα ὀργῆς λέγει
δηλῶν ὅτι ἀληθεία ὑπεύθυνοι ὀργῆς τυγχάνουσιν οἱ
ἀμαρτάνοντες.

2. Ὡσπερ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τέκνον ὀργῆς γίνεται τῷ
συνεῖναι αὐτῷ κακίαν, οὕτω μεταβαλὼν ἀληθείας γίνεται
τέκνον καὶ ἀρετῆς. εἴρηται γοῦν περὶ τινων ὑπὸ τοῦ
σωτῆρος τοιαῦτα· *ἐδικαιώθη ἡ σοφία ἀπὸ τῶν τέκνων*
5 *αὐτῆς, τέκνα σοφίας τοὺς σοφοὺς λέγων.* ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ
τέκνα τινὸς ὄντες ἐκ τοῦ τεκόντος ἔχουσιν τὸ εἶναι.
ἔχουσιν δὲ καὶ οἱ ποιοὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐκ τῆς ποιότητος τῆς
προσγενομένης αὐτοῖς· εἰκότως οἱ ποιοὶ τέκνα καὶ υἱοὶ
τῆς ποιότητος ὀνομάζονται.

(1089D) 3. Ὡς γὰρ εἴρηται ὑπὸ τοῦ σωτῆρός τινές, οὗτοι δέ
εἰσιν οἱ σοφοὶ σοφίας τέκνα, οὕτω καὶ ἄλλους υἱοὺς
εἰρήνης προσηγόρευσεν, φάσκων τοῖς μαθηταῖς· *ἐὰν*
εἰσέλθητε εἰς πόλιν ἢ εἰς οἰκίαν καὶ ἢ ἐκεῖ υἱὸς εἰρήνης, ἢ
5 *εἰρήνη ὑμῶν, ἢ διδομένη τῇ πόλει ἢ τῇ οἰκίᾳ,*
ἔπαναπαύσεται ἐπὶ τὸν ὄντα ἐν αὐτῇ υἱὸν εἰρήνης. πάλιν ὁ
αὐτὸς σωτῆρ φησιν· *φρονιμώτεροί εἰσιν οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος*
τούτου ὑπὲρ τοὺς υἱοὺς τοῦ φωτὸς ἐν τῇ γενεᾷ τῇ ἑαυτῶν,
υἱοὺς φωτὸς λέγων τοὺς πεφωτισμένους τῇ γνώσει τῆς
10 ἀληθείας καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις τῆς ἀρετῆς.

(1092A) 4. Πρὸς οὓς καὶ φῶς γεγεννημένους διὰ τὸ τυγχάνειν

1.1 post θεία:γὰρ add.Comb. 7 δύνανται:δύναντος Comb.
δυνατὸν Migne 13 ὀργῆς L,ps.-Greg.Naz.:ὀργῇ Comb.

3.1 εἴρηται:εἴρηται Comb.(cf. 2.3-4) τινές:τοιαῦτα Comb.

φωτὸς υἱοὺς λέγει· ἡμεῖς ἔστε τὸ φῶς τοῦ κόσμου τοὺς δὲ ἀγαπήσαντας τὸ παρὸν ζῆν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ πάντα ἅ ποιούσιν ἀναφέροντας, υἱοὺς αἰῶνος τούτου ὠνόμασεν.

5 ἄλλ' εἰ καὶ εἶπεν τούτους φρονιμωτέρους ὑπὲρ τοὺς υἱοὺς τοῦ φωτὸς, οὐ καθάπαξ αὐτοὺς εἶπεν φρονιμωτέρους, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν γενεᾷ· τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν τοῖς οἰκειωθείσιν τούτῳ τῷ αἰῶνι φρονιμώτεροι τῶν τοῦ φωτὸς υἱῶν τυγχάνουσιν. σοφοὶ γὰρ εἰσιν τοῦ κακοποιῆσαι· τὸ
10 δὲ καλῶς ποιῆσαι οὐ συνήκαν.

(1092B) 5 **5.** Καὶ περὶ τοῦ Ἰούδα δὲ γέγραπται ὡς εἶη υἱὸς ἀπωλείας, ὁ γὰρ κύριος περὶ αὐτοῦ εἶπεν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀπώλετο ἐκ τῶν μαθητῶν μου, εἰ μὴ ὁ υἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας. ἀπωλείας δὲ υἱὸν αὐτὸν εἶπεν τῷ τὰ τῆς ἀπωλείας πεπραχέναι. οὐ γὰρ ὅτε εἷς ἦν τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ διηκόνει ἅμα ἐκείνοις τῷ σωτήρι ἦν τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὅτε προδότης γέγονεν τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ διδασκάλου, ἀγαπήσας τὰ τῆς ἀπωλείας ἀργύρια.

6. Καὶ ὅτι οὐ κατὰ φύσιν ἦν κακός, ἅμα πᾶσιν τοῖς μαθηταῖς ὧν ἤκουσεν· ἰδοὺ ἀποστέλλω ὑμᾶς ὡς πρόβατα ἐν μέσῳ λύκων. εἰ δὲ λύκους τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας λέγει, πρόβατα δὲ τοὺς πρακτικοὺς τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἶπερ ὁ Ἰούδας φύσει κακός ἦν, οὐκ ἦν πρόβατον Χριστοῦ, ἐπεὶ μὴ πρακτικὸς τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ κατὰ φύσιν κακός. ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτὸς ὁ διάβολος κατὰ φύσιν κακός, ἀλλ' ἐκ τροπῆς τοῦ ἰδίου αὐτεξουσίου.

7. Ὡσπερ οὖν οὐ τῶν φαύλων μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν σπουδαίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πραττομένων υἱοὶ καλοῦνται καὶ τέκνα οἱ ἐπιτελοῦντες τῷ προειρημένῳ τρόπῳ, καθ' ὃν ἐλέγετο γεννήματα ποιότητων εἶναι τοὺς λαμβάνοντας ἀπ' αὐτῶν τὸ εἶναι ὅπερ ἔχουσιν ἐκ τῆς ποιότητος· εἰκότως σὰρξ ἀμαρτίας καὶ σῶμα ἀμαρτίας οὐ καθάπαξ λέγεται τις ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπηρετεῖν τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ σαρκὶ εἰς λαγνεῖαν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τοιαύτας ἐνεργείας καταχρῶμενος ποιεῖ τὸ σῶμα

- 10 αὐτοῦ ἁμαρτίας σῶμα καὶ τὴν σάρκα σάρκα ἁμαρτίας·
ὥσπερ ὁ σπουδαῖος διὰ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἐπομένης
ἀρετῆς τὸ σῶμα ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγιάζει. ἡ
παρθένος γοῦν ἀγία γίνεται σώματι καὶ πνεύματι, ὃ ἐστὶν
ψυχὴ, ὡς γράφει Παῦλος λέγων ὅτι τὴν παρθένον δεῖ
15 ἀπερίσπαστον εἶναι τῶν βιωτικῶν πραγμάτων ἵνα ἡ ἀγία
σώματι καὶ πνεύματι.
- 8.** Ἄλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ τῇ Κορινθίων γράφει·
δοξάσατε τὸν θεὸν ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑμῶν. Εἰ δὲ δοξάζεται ὁ
(1092D) θεὸς ἐν τῷ σώματι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐ δοξάζεται δὲ θεὸς ἐν
κακῷ, οὐ κακὸν τὸ σῶμα τῇ φύσει, κἂν κακὸν αὐτὸ ποιεῖ ὁ
5 ἁμαρτωλὸς ἁμαρτητικῶς αὐτῷ χρώμενος. καὶ μετ' ὀλίγα
πάλιν τοῖς αὐτοῖς προσφωνεῖ· ἡ οὐκ οἶδατε ὅτι τὰ σώματα
ὑμῶν ναὸς τοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν ἁγίου πνεύματός ἐστιν, οὗ ἔχετε
ἀπὸ θεοῦ; εἴ τις τὸν ναὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φθειρεῖ, φθερεῖ τοῦτον
ὁ θεός· ὁ γὰρ ναὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ἅγιός ἐστιν, οἵτινές ἐστε
10 ὑμεῖς.
- 9.** Ἄλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Θεσσαλονικέας ὁ αὐτὸς
(1093A) ἀπόστολος γράφει· ὁ θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης ἀγιάσαι ὑμᾶς
ὀλοτελεῖς καὶ ὀλόκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ
σῶμα ἀμέμπτως διατηρηθεῖη. πῶς γὰρ ὀλοτελῶς ἀγιασθῆναι
5 καὶ ὀλόκληρον ἔχειν τις τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ δύναται, εἰ τὸ
σῶμα μὴ πέφυκεν κακὸν ὄν ἀγιάζεσθαι; εἰ γὰρ κακὸν τῇ
φύσει τοῦτο, οὐ δεκτικὸν ἀγιασμοῦ· εἰ δὲ δέχεται τὸ
ἀγαθόν, δηλονότι οὐ φύσει κακόν, δεκτικὸν ὄν ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ
γὰρ τῇ φύσει κακὸν ἀνεπίδεκτον ἀγαθοῦ, ὥσπερ τὸ
10 ἀγαθὸν ἀνεπίδεκτον κακοῦ.
- 10.** Γράφει ἐν ἑτέρᾳ ἐπιστολῇ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀπόστολος
πρὸς τινὰς· καθαρῖσωμεν ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ παντὸς μολυσμοῦ
σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος, ἐπιτελοῦντες ἀγιωσύνην ἐν φόβῳ
173V (1093B) θεοῦ· δεικνύς καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς λέξεως ὡς πέφυκεν καὶ ἡ
5 σὰρξ καθαίρεσθαι τῶν προσαπτομένων αὐτῇ ἐξ ἁμαρτίας
μολυσμῶν· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ. εἰ δὲ ἡ σὰρξ
κατ' οὐσίαν ἦν κακὸν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα κατ' οὐσίαν ἀγαθόν,

8.5 ὀλίγα:ὀλίγον Comb. **9.4** post ἀμέμπτως:ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ
Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ add.Comb. 5 τὸ² om.Comb.
10 post τὸ: φύσει add.Comb.

- οὐδ' ἂν τὸ πνεῦμα μολυσμὸν εἶχεν, οὔτε μὴν ἡ σὰρξ ἀπὸ
 10 μολυσμοῦ ἐκαθαίρετο. προστάττει δὲ ἐκάτερα καθάραι ἀπὸ
 μολυσμοῦ, λέγων καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς καθάρσεως·
ἐπιτελοῦντες γὰρ φησιν ἀγιωσύνην ἐν φόβῳ θεοῦ. εὖ δὲ
καὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν· ἐν φόβῳ θεοῦ, δεικνὺς τὸ ὑπήκοον ἔχειν ἐξ
αὐτῶν καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. εἰ δὲ ἐπιτελοῦντες ἀγιωσύνην
 15 *ἐν φόβῳ θεοῦ, καθαίρομεν τὴν ἑαυτῶν σάρκα ἀπὸ μολυσμοῦ*
 (1093C) *καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα, δηλονότι ἐγγινομένης ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς*
ἀγιωσύνης τοῦτο γίνεται. ὥσπερ γὰρ καθαίρεται ἀγνοίας
ψυχὴ καὶ ἀδικημάτων παρουσίᾳ ἐπιστήμης καὶ
δικαιοσύνης, ἡ γὰρ ἀποφυγὴ τῆς κακίας ἀρετῆς εἴσοδον
ἐργάζεται ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οὕτως παρουσίᾳ ἀγιασμοῦ
 20 *καθαίρεται ἡ σὰρξ μολυσμοῦ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα. πνεῦμα δὲ ἐν*
τούτοις τὴν ψυχὴν λέγει, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς Πράξεσιν τῶν
ἀποστόλων Στέφανος ὁ ἀπόστολος καταλευόμενος καὶ
μέλλων ἀποθνήσκειν εἶπεν εὐχόμενος· κύριε Ἰησοῦ,
δέξαι τὸ πνεῦμα μου. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἐν τούτοις ἔλεγεν
 25 *τὸ πνεῦμα ἑαυτοῦ ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν.*
- 11.** Εἰ οὖν διὰ πλειόνων ἡ σὰρξ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὅτε μὲν
 ἀμαρτίας, ὅτε δὲ ἀγιασμοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὸ δοξάζειν τὸν θεὸν
 3 ἔχοντα λέγεται, οὐδὲν τούτων φύσει κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν
 (1093D) ἐστίν, ἀλλ' αὐτεξουσίως ἐκατέρων δεκτικὸν καὶ παρὰ τὴν
 5 χρῆσιν τοῦ ἔχοντος ἀνά μέρος δέχεται, ὅτε μὲν ἀμαρτίας
 εἶναι, ὅτε δὲ ἀγιασμοῦ.
- 12.** Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ ῥητὸν ἀγνοοῦντες ἀφ' οὗ
 προφέρουσιν ἀμαρτίας εἶναι τὴν σάρκα, τοῦτο νομίζουσιν·
 ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ὅλον αὐτὸ θέμενοι, τὴν διάνοιαν φανεράν
 ποιήσομεν. Ἔχει δὲ οὕτως.
- 13.** Ὁ θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ πέμψας ἐν ὁμοιώματι
 1 *σαρκὸς ἀμαρτίας περι ἀμαρτίας κατέκρινεν τὴν ἀμαρτίαν*
 (1096A) *ἐν τῇ σαρκί. ὃ λέγει τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ἡ πάντων ἀνθρώπων*
 5 *σὰρξ ἐκ συνδυασμοῦ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, δίχα τοῦ*
πρωτοπλάστου καὶ οὐ ανέλαβεν ὁ σωτὴρ. οὐκ ἂν γὰρ
ἄλλως σῶμα ἀνθρώπου γένοιτο μὴ ἐπιπλακέντος τῷ

11.1 σῶμα:πνεῦμα Migne 4 καί:ἡ Comb.
 13.6 ἄλλως corr.cum Comb.:ἄλλο L

θήλει τοῦ ἄρρενος. ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ σωτὴρ ἐκ μόνης τῆς
 παρθένου ἔλαβεν σῶμα τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχον ἐκ συνουσίας,
 10 ὁμοίωμα τὴν σὰρκα τὴν κυριακὴν εἶπεν τῆς σαρκὸς τῆς ἐκ
 συνουσίας. οὐ γὰρ καθάπαξ εἶπεν ὁμοίωμα σαρκὸς αὐτὸν
 ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίωμα σαρκὸς ἀμαρτίας. τὸ δὲ ὁμοίωμα τῆς
 σαρκὸς τῆς ἀμαρτίας σὰρξ ἐστὶν μόνω τούτῳ λειπομένη
 τῶν ἄλλων σαρκῶν, τὸ ἄνευ ἀνδρὸς ἐσχηκέναι τὴν ὑπαρξίν·
 15 ἔδει γὰρ τὸν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐρχόμενον μὴ ἐκ
 (1096B) συνδυασμοῦ σῶμα λαβεῖν. μηδ' αὐτὸ ἔξωθεν τῆς τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων διαδοχῆς ὥσπερ ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἵνα μὴ
 ἑτερογενὲς αὐτοῦ νομισθῆ τὸ σῶμα. εἰ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκ
 τῆς γῆς ἐπέπλαστο ὡς ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ γένους τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων, ὑπόνοιαν ἐλάμβανον οἱ διὰ φαντασίας τὴν
 20 δόκησιν εἰσάγοντες, μήπη ἄρα οὐ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἔφερεν
 ἀνθρώπου σῶμα. πάλιν εἰ ἐκ συνδυασμοῦ ἀνελήφει σῶμα,
 οὐκ ἔχων τὸ παρηλλαγμένον, ἐνομίσθη ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς
 ὑπεύθυνος εἶναι ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ ἥπερ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ
 Ἀδὰμ πάντες κατὰ διαδοχὴν ὑπήρχον.

(1096C) **14.** Εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν· εἰ σὰρξ ἀμαρτίας ἐστὶν ἢ ἐκ
 συνουσίας ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς τεχθεῖσα, κακὸς ὁ γάμος·
 ἀκουέτωσαν ὅτι πρὸ τῆς τοῦ σωτῆρος ἐπιδημίας τοῦ
 ἄραντος τὴν ἀμαρτίαν τοῦ κόσμου, ἅπαντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι,
 5 ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα μετὰ κακίας ἐπραττον, οὕτω καὶ τὸν γάμον
 ἀμαρτητικῶς εἶχον. Διὸ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ γάμου γεννώμενα
 σώματα νοήτεον· καὶ οὕτως, ἐπεὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀμαρτίαν ἡ
 σύνοδος γέγονεν τοῦ Ἀδὰμ καὶ τῆς Εὕας, διὰ τοῦτο σὰρξ
 ἀμαρτίας εἶρηται. ἄφθαρτος γὰρ ὢν πρὸ τῆς παραβάσεως,
 10 φθαρτὸς γεγένηται παραβὰς καὶ οὕτως ἡ διαδοχὴ τὸ
 φθαρτὸν ἔχει. ὁμοίωμα οὖν τῆς σαρκὸς ταύτης εἶχεν ὁ
 σωτὴρ, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἶδεν ἡ σὰρξ αὐτοῦ διαφθοράν. ἀλλ'
 ἐπιδημήσαντος τοῦ σωτῆρος, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πραγμάτων
 ἀφαίρεσις ἀμαρτίας γέγονεν, οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ γάμου. νῦν
 (1096D) 15 γοῦν οἱ κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον βιοῦντες ἔχειν δύνανται
 τίμιον γάμον καὶ κοίτην ἀμίαντον, ὡς γράφει Παῦλος τοῖς

13.12 τῆς om. Comb. 14 τὸν corr. cum Comb.: τὸ L
 18 ὁ om. Comb. 20 μήπη; μήτε Migne ἔφερεν corr. cum
 Comb.: ἔφερον L 14.4 ἅπαντες corr. cum Migne: εἰ πάντες
 L, Comb. 10 τὸ corr. cum Comb.: τὸν L

πιστοῖς· τίμιος ὁ γάμος καὶ ἡ κοίτη ἀμίαντος, πόρνους δὲ
καὶ μοιχοὺς κρινεῖ ὁ θεός. διαστέλλων γὰρ τὸν τίμιον
γάμον καὶ τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτῷ ἀπὸ πόρνων καὶ μοιχῶν,
20 οὐ πορνείαν, οὐ μοιχείαν τοῦτον βούλεται εἶναι·
ὄθεν οὐδὲ ἀμαρτία ὁ γάμος.

15. Καὶ ἐτέρως δὲ φυσικώτερον λεχθήσεται. ἡ
παρθενία θεῖόν τι χρῆμα τυγχάνει καὶ ὡς ἐν ἀρεταῖς
ὑπάρχει. εἴ τις οὖν συγκρίνων ταύτη τὸν γάμον, λέγοι
αὐτὸν ἀμαρτίαν εἶναι, οὐκ ἀπολελυμένως ἀμαρτία ἐστίν·
(1097A) 5 τὸ γὰρ κακὸν οὐ συγκρίσει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κακὸν ἐστὶ καθ’
ἑαυτὸ ὄν τοιοῦτο. εἴ ποτε γοῦν ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν λέγοιτό τι
κακόν, καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶη ὑποδεέστερον τοῦ
προκρινομένου αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

16. Οἱ τοίνυν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ προσερχόμενοι,
προηγουμένως προσέρχονται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τῷ θεοσεβεῖν καὶ
κατὰ θεὸν γενέσθαι σοφοί. οὗτοι ἐπομένως ἔχουσι τὸ
πολεμεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τινων· καὶ γὰρ δεῖ τούτους βεβαίως
5 ἀναλαβεῖν τὸν χριστιανισμόν· προσγίγνεται δὲ ἡ
βεβαιότης ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τοὺς πειρασμοὺς γυμνασίας· ὄθεν
ἀνάγκη ἀγῶνας αὐτοὺς ὑπομένειν.

17. Καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγωνοθετοῦντες, εἰ τοῦ εὐλόγου
φροντίζοιεν, οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν τόνδε μετὰ τοῦδε
συμβάλλουσιν ἀθλητὴν, ἀλλὰ σὺν ἀκριβείᾳ πολλῇ εἰς τὴν
ἀναλογίαν τῆς ἐκάστου δυνάμεως σκοποῦντες· οὕτως καὶ
ὁ ἡμέτερος ἀθλοθέτης Χριστὸς οὐ πάντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς
ἐ.175 5 ἀνταγωνισταῖς συζεύγνυσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ
(1097B) τὴν δύναμιν ἐκάστου τὸν ἀντίπαλον δίδωσιν.

18. Κορινθίοις γοῦν νηπίοις οὖσιν ἐτι τῶν παθημάτων
τῆς σαρκὸς περιέχεσθαι Παῦλος γράφει· πειρασμός ὑμᾶς
οὐκ εἴληφεν, εἰ μὴ ἀνθρώπινος· οἱ γὰρ πειρασμοὶ τούτων
καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες πρὸς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα τὴν ἀναφορὰν
5 ἔχουσιν. περὶ ἑαυτοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων ἰσορρόπων
τε καὶ ἰσοσθενῶν γράφων φησὶν· οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ πάλη
πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς

14.20 οὐ²:οὐδὲ Comb. **16.5** προσγίγνεται:προσγίνετα Comb.

ἐξουσίας και τους κοσμοκράτορας του αιώνας
τούτων μόνον ουχι τούτο λέγων· ητιν τοις

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(1097C)

ὑπερναββηκόσιν ουκέτι πρὸς αἴμα και σάρκα, τούτ
ἐστιν ἀνθρώπινα, η πάλη, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ ὑπερναββηκότα

τάγματα τῶν ἀντιπάλων· εἰσιν δὲ ταῦτα εἰδη λογικῶν

19. Μηδέις δὲ ὑπολάβη ὅτι εἰδη λογικῶν πονηρῶν

εἰρηκότες οὐσίαν πονηρῶν λέγομεν, ἐστὶν γὰρ εἰδη και

γένη και τῶν προαιπετικῶν ὑπαρχόντων· λέγομεν γοῦν

εἰδη σπουδαίου εἶναι δικαίον, σῶφρον, φρόνιμον,

ἀνδρείον· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ γένος εἰδη μερίζομεν,

εἰς δικαιοσύνην, σωφροσύνην και τὰ λοιπὰ, ἀνάγκη τὸν

τοῦ γένους μετέχοντα, σπουδαίου ὄντα, ὡσαυτεὶ γένος

εἶναι τῶν μετέχόντων τῶν κατ' εἶδος ἀρετῶν· ὡσαύτως και

τῆς ἐπιστημῆς γένος οὐσίας, γραμματικῆς, μουσικῆς και

τῶν λοιπῶν, τὸν παρονομαζόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους

ἐπιστημονα, γένος εἶναι τῶν παρονομαζόμενων ἀπὸ τῶν

τῆς ἐπιστημῆς εἰδῶν φαιεῖν· κἀν τοῖσιν πονηρῶν λογικῶν

εἰδη λέγομεν, προαιπετικῶς πάντας τοὺς ὑπὸ τὰ εἰδη

ταῦτα λέγομεν εἶναι τοιοῦτους·

20. Αἰελεὶ γοῦν τὰ ὄνματα τὰ προεπιημένα

πονηρὰ οὐκ οὐσίαν ἀλλὰ προαιπετικῶν ἐστὶν ἐπιφαιετικὰ·

τὸ γὰρ διὰ βόλος ὄνματα οὐκ οὐσίαν ἀλλὰ προαιπεσιν δηλοῖ·

αὐτικά γοῦν και τὸν ἰούδα ἀνθρώπων ὄντα, διὰ βόλον ὃ

κύριος οὐ διὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν προαιπεσιν

ὠνόμασεν, λέγων πρὸς πάντας αἴμα τοὺς παθητάς,

συναριθμῶν και τὸν ἰούδα ἐν αὐτοῖς· ουχι τοὺς διὰ κεκα

υμῶς ἐξελεξάμενην και εἰς ἐξ ὑμῶν διὰ βόλος ἐστὶν· ὃ

ἐπιφέρει ὃ συγγραφεὺς· τούτο δὲ εἶπεν περὶ ἰούδα τοῦ

μεγάλουτος προδιδόναι αὐτὸν· εἰ γὰρ διὰ τὴν μελλουσαν

προδοσίαν διὰ βόλος εἰρηται, οὐ τότε διὰ βόλος ἦν ὄτε αἴμα

πᾶσιν ἐκαλογῆς ἐτυχεν· ἐκακετὸς ἦεν γὰρ αἴμα πᾶσιν

γέγονεν διὰ τὴν προσοῦσαν αὐτῷ τότε ἀρετῆν· διὰ βόλος

δὲ τότε ἐχρημάτισεν ὄτε τὰ τῆς προδοσίας εἰργάσατο· εἰ

τοῖσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἰούδα τὸ διὰ βόλος ὄνματα πρᾶξῶς

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(1100A)

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(1097C)

προαιρετικῆς δηλωτικόν ἐστίν, οὕτως κἀν ἐπ' ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ φωνῆ λέγοιτο, προαιρετικόν τι σημαίνει.

- (1100B) 5 10 15 20
21. Οἶδεν δὲ καὶ ἡ συνήθεια τὴν χρῆσιν τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου. διαβόλους γοῦν καλοῦμεν τοὺς κατηγοροῦντας τούσδε τοῖσδε κάκεινους τούτοις. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ διάβολος θεὸν ἀνθρώποις διαβάλλει καὶ ἀνθρώπους θεῷ καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀλλήλοις, ταύτης ἔτυχεν τῆς ὀνομασίας. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ σατανᾶς ὄνομα κατηγοροῖτο αὐτοῦ τοῦ διαβόλου, ἴστωσαν ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο προαιρετικοῦ τινὸς ἐστίν δηλωτικόν· ἐβραϊκὴ γὰρ οὔσα ἢ φωνῆ οὐχ ἕτερόν τι σημαίνει καθ' ἑλλάδα φωνὴν ἢ τὸ ἀντικείμενον· τὸ δὲ ἀντικείμενον ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου λαμβανόμενον ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ ἐχθρὸς, βλαβερός. ὥς οὖν ὁ ἐχθρὸς προαιρέσει ἐστίν τοιοῦτος, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἀντικείμενος ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐναντία· τὸ γὰρ φίλος καὶ εὐνοῶν καὶ ὁμονοῶν καὶ ὁμοφρονῶν ὀνόματα προαιρέσεών ἐστίν δηλωτικά. λέγεται γὰρ αὐτὸς οὗτος ὥσπερ διάβολος καὶ σατανᾶς καὶ πονηρός, ὡς ἐν εὐαγγελίῳ ὁ σωτὴρ πρὸς ἑτέροις καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν διδάσκει ἐν τῇ εὐχῇ τοὺς μαθητάς· *καὶ μὴ εἰσενέγκης ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν ἀλλὰ ῥύσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ*, καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ ὄνομα προαιρέσεώς ἐστὶ δηλωτικόν.

- £.176 (1100C) 5 10 15 20
22. Εἰ τοίνυν διὰ πάντων ὧν σημαίνεται ὁ ἀρχέκακος καὶ πρῶτος ἀποστάτης τῆς ἀρετῆς προαιρετικῶς ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος, οὐ δύναται κατ' οὐσίαν εἶναι κακός. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν τοῦτο, ὅτι τῇ οὐσίᾳ κακὸς ὧν ἔσχεν καὶ τὰ προαιρετικὰ δι' ἃ οὕτως ὠνόμασται, ἴστωσαν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς οὐσιώδεσιν οὐ παραλαμβάνεται προαίρεσις. οὐδεὶς γὰρ λέγει προαιρετικῶς ζῶον εἶναι ἢ λίθον, ταῦτα γὰρ οὐσιώδη· ὅθεν οὐδὲ προαιρετικόν τι, ἐν ἐκείνοις γὰρ τὰ προαιρετικὰ ἐν οἷς καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις.

- (1100D) 5
23. Ἄλλ' ἴσως ἐροῦσιν· διὰ τί τὸν οὕτω μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι βλαβερόν ἢ λυμεῶνα εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἠγαγεν ὁ ἀγαθὸς θεός; Ἰστωσαν δὲ τοῦτο λέγοντες ὅτι οὐχ ἡμῖν μόνοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς τιθεμένοις πρόνοιαν ἀντιπίπτουσιν.

21.3 κατηγοροῦντας corr. cum Comb. (cf. 21.6): κατηγοροῦντας L 15 post οὗτος: φίλος καὶ εὐνοῶν add. Comb. 22.4 ὧν ἔσχεν: ἀν ἔτυχεν Comb.

- 5 πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοι τιθέμενοι πρόνοιαν ἐκ θεοῦ λέγουσιν
 εἶναι πάντα τὰ λογικὰ ζῶα, ἐν οἷς φύεται καὶ ἡ κακία. εἰ
 (1101A) οὖν περὶ τοῦ διαβόλου ταῦτα λέγουσιν, καὶ περὶ πάντων
 τῶν λογικῶν ἀναγκάζονται εἰπεῖν τοῦτο.
24. Ὅμως δὲ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐκείνους μιμούμενοι,
 φαμέν· οὐ κακίας αἴτιος ὁ ποιήσας τὸ δυνάμενον ἐξ ἰδίας
 ῥοπῆς εἰς κακίαν ἐλθεῖν, λογικὸν γὰρ κατεσκεύασεν ζῶον,
 ὃ ἐβούλετο εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ προαιρέσεως ἀγαθόν,
 5 ἔχον εἰς ἐκάτερα ῥέπειν τὸ αὐτεξούσιον. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ
 αὐτὸν ἐβούλετο εἶναι, ἐκουσίως αἰρούμενον τὸ ἀγαθόν·
 οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν γεινητῶν ἄκων ἀγαθὸς εἶναι δύναται, ἀλλὰ
 πάντες οἱ ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ ἐκουσίως εἰσὶν τοιοῦτοι.
25. Ἐδει τοίνυν τὸν προαιρέσει τῆ ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸν
 ἐσόμενον δύναμιν ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν τῆ ἐπιτηδειότητι πρὸς
 ἀνάληψιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· εἶπετο δὲ τὸ δεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
 καὶ κακοῦ δεκτικὸν εἶναι. οὕτω κατεσκευασμένῃ τῷ
 (1101B) 5 λογικῷ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἐντολὴ
 ε.176^v δέδοται, ὅπως τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν, τὴν δὲ
 κακίαν κατ' ἐπιτηδειότητα μόνην ἔχει. ὁ γὰρ τοῦ
 δημιουργήσαντος νόμος προτρέπει καὶ ἀλείφει καὶ
 συνεργεῖ πρὸς ἀρετὴν, ἀποτρέπων τὴν φύσιν τῆς κακίας.
 10 κἂν τοίνυν ἐνυπάρχη δύναμις κακίας ἐν τῷ λογικῷ, οὐ διὰ
 τὴν δύναμιν φαῦλον τοῦτο. ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ
 κακίας λέγω αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ αἱ αἰρέσεις. αἰρούμεθα γὰρ
 ἀρετῆς ἔχειν δύναμιν ἵνα καὶ ἀναλαβεῖν κατ' ἐνέργειαν
 δυνώμεθα· αἰρούμεθα καὶ κακίας ἔχειν δύναμιν· τότε γὰρ
 15 αὐτὴν ἔχομεν ὅταν ἐνεργείᾳ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχωμεν. καὶ οὐχ
 ἡμῶν μόνων ἡ δόξα αὕτη, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς περὶ τῶν
 λογικῶν ζῶων φιλοσοφησάντων.
- (1101C) 26. Κἂν τοίνυν τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν καλουμένην
 διάβολον ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν, οὐχὶ διάβολον αὐτὴν
 ἐδημιούργησεν, ἀλλὰ δεκτικὴν ἀρετῆς ἵνα ταύτην ἔχη καὶ
 δεκτικὴν κακίας ἵνα ταύτης ἀπέχηται. ἐπεὶ γὰρ
 5 ἀσυνύπαρκτος ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆ κακία, φίλη δὲ τῷ θεῷ ἡ ἀρετὴ,

24.7 τῶν om. Comb. 25.12 αἱ αἰρέσεις corr.: αἱ ἀρεταὶ L
 προαιρέσεις Comb. 15 post ὅταν: ἐν add. Comb. 26.5
 ἀσυνύπαρκτος corr. cum Comb. marg.: ἀσυνάρακτος L, Comb.

- ἀμφοτέρων τὰς δυνάμεις ἐνείεις τῷ λογικῷ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνήκεν αὐτὰς ἵνα τὴν μὲν εἰς ἐνέργειαν μεταλάβωμεν, τῆς δὲ ἑτέρας δυνάμεως τοῦ τέλους, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἀπεχώμεθα. ὥστε γέγονεν πᾶν λογικὸν ἐπὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ
- 10 εἶναι καὶ μὴ φαῦλον. εἴ τινα οὖν τῶν λογικῶν τὴν ἐναντίαν δεδράμηκεν τῷ πεποιηκότι καὶ προνοουμένῳ, οὐ τοῦ ποιήσαντος καὶ νομοθετήσαντος ἢ αἰτία, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀντιτεινάντων πρὸς τοὺς δοθέντας καὶ πρὸς τοὺς προνοουμένους νόμους.
- (1101D) **27.** Ὁρῶμεν γοῦν καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ ταῦτα γινόμενα ἃ παιδεύομεν τὰ τέκνα, κατ' ἐπιστήμην αὐτὰ ἀνάγειν βουλόμενοι ἵνα καὶ ταύτην ἐνεργῶσιν. οὐ πάντως δὲ οὕτως ἐνεργοῦσιν ὡς ἐδιδάχθησαν· ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ὅτε
- 5 ἐναντίως πολλοὶ υἱοί, παρὰ πατέρων ἰατροὶ ἀνατραφέντες, οὐ δεόντως χρῶνται τῇ ἰατρικῇ, τὰ νοσοποιὰ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑγεινῶν τοῖς κακουμένοις προσάγοντες· καὶ οὐ δήπου ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἢ ὁ ταύτην παιδεύσας αἴτιος. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἐδίδαξεν ἴν' οὕτως ποιῇ· πράττει γὰρ οὐχ ὡς ἔμαθεν
- £.177 (1104A) 10 ποιεῖν.
- 28.** Πάλιν νόμους παιδεύομέν τινας ἵνα συνιστῶνται τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν παραιτῶνται, ἀλλὰ κακοήθως ἐνιοὶ αὐτῶν τοῖς νόμοις προσιόντων τὸ ἀνάπαλιν ποιοῦσιν. καὶ οὔτε τὸν νόμον οὔτε τὸν
- 5 νομοθέτην αἰτιώμεθα· εἰ γὰρ αὐτοὶ τῆς ἀδικίας αἴτιοι ἦσαν, οὐκ ἂν ἐκόλαζον τοὺς ἀδίκους. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ βουλήματος αὐτῶν ὑπάρχει· τὸ κολαστέον τὸν ἄδικον εἶναι. καὶ ὁ θεὸς κολάζει τὸν σατανᾶν καὶ τοὺς παραβάντας τοὺς ἀπὸ θεοῦ τεθέντας νόμους. τισὶν γὰρ
- 10 φαύλοις λέγει· *ὑπάγετε εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ αἰώνιον τὸ ἠτοιμασμένον τῷ διαβόλῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀγγέλοις αὐτοῦ.*
- (1104B) **29.** Ἰστωσαν τοίνυν οἱ τούτοις ἀντιλέγοντες μαχόμενα ἑαυτοῖς λέγοντες. εἰ γὰρ κατ' οὐσίαν κακὸς ᾔην ὁ διάβολος καὶ ἀλλότριος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θεοῦ, δυνάμενος αὐτῷ ἰσοσθενὴς εἶναι, οὐδὲ κόλασιν ἠτοίμαζεν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ

26.6 διὰ τοῦτο corr.cum Comb.:διὰ τούτου L 7 τῆς corr. cum Comb.:τὴν L 13 post δοθέντας:καὶ addidi cum Comb.
 27.9 ποιῇ corr.cum Migne:ποιεῖ L,Comb. 28.5 αἰτιώμεθα corr.cum Comb.:αἰτούμεθα L

5 βάλλειν αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν κόλασιν ἠδύνατο· λέγει δὲ ἠτοιμάσθαι πῦρ τῷ διαβόλῳ.

30. Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ῥητέον· εἰ ἄτρεπτος ὁ ἀγαθὸς θεὸς ἐστίν, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἐστίν, καὶ αἰεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὡς μὴ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἰσχύειν καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως· ἐμελλεν δὲ μετὰ πολλὴν βλάβην καὶ ἀπώλειαν πολλὴν πυρὶ

5 αἰωνίῳ παραδιδόναι τὸν σατανᾶν· διὰ τί μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦτο ἐποίει ὅτε ἐπανῆλθεν αὐτῷ καὶ μέρος ἔλαβεν αὐτοῦ; δικαιοτέρον γὰρ τότε μᾶλλον τιμωρίαν ὄριζεν κατ' αὐτοῦ, ὡς κατὰ μείζονος πλημμεληθέντος. νῦν μὲν γὰρ

(1104C) ἀνθρώπους βλάπτει· τότε δὲ κατ' αὐτοὺς αὐτὴν ἐβλαψεν

10 τὴν θεότητα, ὥσπερ καὶ φρονοῦσιν. νόμος δὲ καὶ ἀγανάκτησις δικαία ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ τῶν κατὰ βασιλέως τολμώντων ἢ τινων τῶν ὑπηκόων. εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα οὕτως φρονητέα, ἢ ἄγνοιαν προσάψουσιν τῷ θεῷ τότε τοῦ πῶς τιμωρήσονται καὶ ἐμποδίσῃ τὸ κακὸν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν, ἀλλ'

f.177^v

15 οὐδέτερον τούτων περὶ τὸν ἀγαθὸν θεόν. οὐκ ἄρα ἀγενήτως ἐχθρὸς ἂν θεοῦ ἐπανεβῆ κατ' αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ γενόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ εἶναι ἀγαθός, τὴν μὲν δύναμιν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀτελῆ ἐφύλαξεν, τὴν δὲ τῆς κακίας ἐπιτηδειότητα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἤγαγεν· διὸ καὶ κολαστέος καὶ εἰκότως μετὰ πολὺ τιμωρία ὑπεβλήθη.

(1104D) **31.** Εἰ δὲ κάκεῖνο προφέρουντο τὸ λεχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ βαπτιστοῦ Ἰωαννοῦ τοῖς μεθ' ὑποκρίσεως εἰς τὸ βάπτισμα ἐλθοῦσιν, οὕτως ἔχον· ὄφεις, γεννήματα ἐχιδνῶν, τίς ὑπέδειξεν ὑμῖν φυγεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς μελλούσης ὀργῆς;

5 ποιήσατε οὖν καρπὸν ἀξίον τῆς μετανοίας καὶ μὴ δόξητε λέγειν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὅτι πατέρα ἔχομεν τὸν Ἀβραάμ, δύναται γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἐκ τῶν λίθων τούτων ἐγεῖραι τέκνα τῷ Ἀβραάμ. ἤδη δὲ ἡ ἀξίνη πρὸς τὴν ρίζαν τῶν δένδρων κεῖται· πᾶν οὖν δένδρον μὴ ποιοῦν καρπὸν καλὸν

(1105A) 10 ἐκκόπτεται καὶ εἰς πῦρ βάλλεται· ἀκουέτωσαν ὅτι οὐ δύνανται προφέρειν ἀφ' ὧν μὴ παραδέχονται· οὐ γὰρ δέχονται τὸν βαπτιστὴν Ἰωάννην, τυγχάνοντα ἕνα τῆς

30.9 δὲ om. Comb. 11 ἢ corr. cum Comb.: ἢ L
14 τιμωρήσονται: τιμωρήσεται Comb. 15 τούτων corr. cum
Comb.: τοῦτον L 16 ἂν corr. cum Comb.: ὧν L
31.11 παραδέχονται corr. cum Comb.: παραδέχονται L

παλαιᾶς γραφῆς.

32. Ὅμως δὲ καὶ οὕτως ῥητέον πρὸς αὐτούς· διὰ πάσης τῆς συμφράσεως ἀναιρεῖ τὸ φύσει ἀγαθούς ἢ φύσει εἶναι κακούς. λέγει γὰρ πρὸς αὐτούς· ποιήσατε οὖν καρπὸν ἄξιον τῆς μετανοίας· μετάνοια δὲ καὶ καρπὸς αὐτῆς οὐ πίπτει οὔτε πρὸς τὸν κατ' οὐσίαν κακὸν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν φύσει ἀγαθὸν ὄντα. πῶς γὰρ ὁ αἰεὶ ἀγαθὸς χρήζει μετανοίας; ἢ πῶς ὁ φύσει κακὸς χρησιμεύει τῷ ἀγαθῷ τῆς μετανοίας; ὁ γὰρ κατ' οὐσίαν ὢν κακὸς ἐκτραπήναι τῆς ἀμαρτίας οὐ δύναται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ μετάνοια γίνεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

£.178
(1105B)
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33. Ἐπι μὴν καὶ ἐκ τῶν λίθων τῶν δεικνυμένων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λέγει τέκνα ἐγερθήσεσθαι τῷ Ἀβραάμ, λίθους λέγων τοὺς ἠλιθίους καὶ ἔτι ἐμμένοντας τῇ κακίᾳ ἀνθρώπου. εἰ γὰρ μετανοήσαιεν οὗτοι καὶ πιστεύσαιεν τῷ θεῷ, τέκνα τοῦ Ἀβραάμ ἔσονται, ὅς διὰ τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος θεοῦ ἐχρημάτισεν, ὅτι ἐπίστευσεν εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν ὡς τὴν πίστιν αὐτοῦ εἰς δικαιοσύνην λογισθῆναι.

(1105C)
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10
15
34. Ἐπειδὴ κάκεινο ἠκούσαμεν λεγόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ Ἀβραάμ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγίων ἀνδρῶν γεγενημένους, τὸ ὄφεις, γεννήματα ἐχιδνῶν λεγόμενον ἐχίδνας τοὺς ἀμφὶ τὸν Ἀβραάμ δηλοῖ, ἴστωσαν μαχόμενα τῇ ἀκολουθίᾳ τοῦ κεφαλαίου λέγοντες. ἐλέγχει γὰρ αὐτούς ὡς μὴ τοῦ Ἀβραάμ ὄντας ἀλλ' ἐχιδνῶν γεννήματα, προσποιουμένους καὶ μάτην αὐχοῦντας εἶναι τοῦ Ἀβραάμ. λέγει γὰρ ἐν ἐτέρῳ κεφαλαίῳ ὁ σωτὴρ πρὸς αὐτούς· τοῦτο Ἀβραάμ οὐκ ἐποίησεν ὃν λέγετε πατέρα ὑμῶν εἶναι ψευδόμενοι. εἰ γὰρ τέκνα ἦτε τοῦ Ἀβραάμ, ἐποιεῖτε ἄν τοῦ Ἀβραάμ τὰ ἔργα. ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν ἐστε τοῦ διαβόλου καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν θέλετε ποιεῖν. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἐστὶν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐχ ἔστηκεν. εἶ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν· οὐχ ἔστηκεν, δεικνὺς αὐτὸν πρότερον ἱστάμενον ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. πατέρα δὲ αὐτῶν λέγει τὸν διάβολον διὰ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν τῆς τροπῆς καὶ τῆς ποιότητος.

32.2 ἢ corr.:εἰ Comb.καὶ Migne **33.2** post λίθους:δὲ add.Comb.
34.1 ἐπειδὴ:ἐπεὶ δὲ Comb.

ὥστε οὐ τὸν Ἀβραάμ καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ ἁγίους ἐχίδνας
 εἶπεν. ἐκ μεταβολῆς γὰρ ἔσχον τοῦτο τὸ υἱοὶ ἐχιδνῶν
 20 εἶναι διὰ τὸ αὐτοὺς πονηροῖς κεχρησθαι διδασκάλοις, ὡς
 εἶρηται, κατὰ ἰδίαν προαίρεσιν.

(1105D) **35.** Λέγει τοίνυν ὁ Ἰωάννης αὐτοῖς· ἐπεὶ κατὰ
 μεταβολὴν τὴν ἐξ ἀρετῆς ὄφεις ἠθελήσατε γενέσθαι, οὐδὲ
 γὰρ κατ' οὐσίαν ἦσαν τοιοῦτοι, παύσασθε τοῦ εἶναι
 ἐχιδνῶν γεννήματα ὧν ἠθελήσατε τὴν ποιότητα ἔχειν.

5 πονηροὶ γὰρ ἐκ πονηρῶν καὶ ἄδικοι ἐξ ἀδίκων
 εἰ.178^v ἐσπουδάσατε εἶναι. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ βάπτισμα
 ἔρχεσθαι, μετανοίας λέγετε σημεῖον φέρειν, προσποητῶς
 δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖτε, λέγω ὑμῖν· τίς ὑπέδειξεν ὑμῖν φυγεῖν
 ἀπὸ τῆς μελλούσης ὀργῆς; ὁ γὰρ μετανοῶν διὰ τοῦτο

(1108A) 10 μετανοεῖ ἵνα μηκέτι ἀμαρτάνων φεύγη τὴν ἐσομένην κατὰ
 τῶν ἀμαρτανόντων ὀργήν.

36. Πυθάνεται δὲ τὸ τίς ὑμῖν ὑπέδειξεν; ἵνα εἴπη
 ὁ γνησίως ὑποδεικνύς κακίας ἀναχωρεῖν οὐ προσποιήσῃ
 τοῦτο γίνεσθαι. ὑμεῖς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖτε μεθ' ὑποκρίσεως,
 ἐπὶ τὸ βαπτίζεσθαι ἐρχόμενοι· οὐκ ἄρα καθαρθήσεσθε. ὁ

5 γὰρ ἀληθῶς καθαρθῆναι βουλόμενος ἀφίσταται
 ἀμαρτημάτων καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης μετανοίας καρπὸν φέρει,
 τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας τῇ ἀμαρτία ἔξεως ἔργα ποιῶν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο
 μὲν ὑμεῖς οὐ πεποιήκατε ἑαυτοὺς κατακρίναντες,
 φάσκοντες πατέρα τὸν Ἀβραάμ ἔχειν. ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦθ' ὑμᾶς

10 ὠφελήσῃ τὸ οἶεσθαι τέκνα τοῦ Ἀβραάμ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ
 εἶναι αὐτοῦ τέκνα καὶ τῇ πίστει καὶ τῇ ἀπὸ εἰδώλων φυγῇ.
 κἂν τοίνυν ποτὲ τέκνα τοῦ Ἀβραάμ γεγόνατε, οὐ τοῦτο
 ὑμᾶς σώσει. καὶ γὰρ τοὺς νῦν μὴ ὄντας αὐτοῦ τέκνα

(1108B) δύναται ὁ θεὸς τέκνα αὐτοῦ ποιῆσαι· ὥστε σώζεται ὁ ὢν

15 τοῦ Ἀβραάμ τέκνον κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, οὐχ ὁ γενόμενος
 αὐτοῦ τέκνον κατὰ σάρκα μόνον. κἂν δὲ γένηται, μὴ μέγα
 φρονεῖτω· μετάπτωτον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο. ἀμέλει γοῦν καὶ
 οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες αὐτὸ κτήσασθαι αὐτὸ δυνησονται. καὶ γὰρ ὁ
 Παῦλος οὖς τῇ σαρκὶ οὐ γεγέννηκεν λέγει· ἐν γὰρ

35.6 τὸ *cott.cum Comb.*: τοῦτο L 9 τοῦτο *cott.cum Comb.*: τοῦτου L 10 ἵνα *cott.cum Comb.*: εἰ L **36.17** Ἀμέλει *cott.cum Comb.*: Ἀμέλι L

20 Χριστῷ διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐγέννησα.

(1108C) **37.** Ἄλλὰ ταῦτ' ἀκούοντες μὴ καταφρονεῖτε ὡς
 βραδυνούσης τῆς κατὰ τῶν ἀμαρτανόντων ὀργῆς. ἤδη γὰρ
 δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν ὁ φαῦλος παροῦσαν ἔχει τὴν
 (1108C) κόλασιν, κολαστέος ὑπάρχων. διὸ ἴστε τὴν ἀξίνην ἤδη ταῖς
 5 ῥιζαῖς ἐγγίζουσιν τῶν δένδρων. δένδρα δὲ οὐκ αἰσθητὰ
 λέγει, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπους κατὰ κακίαν πεπονημένους. ῥίζα δὲ
 τῶν δένδρων τούτων ἡ χειρίστη ἔξις, ἀφ' ἧς καρπὸς οὐκ
 ἐδώδιμος ἀλλὰ δηλητήριος γίνεται· αὐτὸν οὖν οὐ καλὸν
 καρπὸν εἶπεν. κἂν τοίνυν ἡ ἀξίνη τὴν κόλασιν σημαίνει, τὸ
 10 δὲ κακὸν δένδρον τὸν ἀμαρτάνοντα ἄνθρωπον, οὐ
 μαχόμεναι φύσεις αὐταί· ἀπειλεῖται γὰρ ἡ κόλασις ἐπὶ τῷ
 μεταβαλεῖν τὰ δένδρα. ὁ γὰρ ἀπειλῶν τοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσιν
 δι' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀπειλῆς μεταποιῆσαι βούλεται. εἰ τοίνυν διὰ
 τῆς ἀπειλῆς τῆς ἀξίνης τῆς μελλούσης ἐκκόπτειν τὰ
 15 σαπρὰ δένδρα πείθει αὐτοὺς παύσασθαι τοῦ μὴ κακὸν
 καρπὸν φέρειν ἀλλὰ καλόν, οὐ φύσει κακὸν τὸ δένδρον,
 οὐδὲ φύσει κακὴ ἡ κόλασις.

(1108D) **38.** Ἄλλ' ἴσως ἐροῦσιν· εἰ μεταποιεῖ τοὺς φαύλους
 ἡ κόλασις ἀγαθὸν αὐτὴν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἡ κόλασις ἀγαθόν,
 ἐναντία δὲ ταύτῃ ἡ ἐπαγγελία, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία οὐ δύνανται
 ἅμα ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· ἡ ἄρα ἐπαγγελία κακόν. ἀλλὰ θεὸς
 5 ὑπισχνεῖται ταύτην· οὐκ ἄρα κακόν. μὴ κακοῦ δὲ τῆς
 ἐπαγγελίας ἀλλ' ἀγαθοῦ οὐσης, ἡ κόλασις ἐστὶ κακόν· εἰ
 δὲ κακὸν ἡ κόλασις, οὐχ ὁ θεός, ἀλλ' ὁ σατανᾶς αὐτὴν
 ἐπιφέρει· ἐπιφέρει δὲ ὁ σατανᾶς τὴν κόλασιν οὐ τοῖς
 ἑαυτοῦ, εἰσὶν γὰρ ὡς αὐτὸς ποιηροί, καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ
 10 αὐτὸν ὑποπίπτειν τῇ κολάσει· τῷ ἄρα ἀγαθῷ ἐποίσει
 αὐτήν.

39. Ἄλλ' ἀδύνατον τοῦτο· οὐκ ἄρα ὁ ποιηρὸς αὐτὴν
 ἐπιφέρει ἀλλὰ θεός· πᾶν δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἐπιφερόμενον

37.9 σημαίνει:σημαίνει Comb. **38.1** Ἄλλ'...ἐροῦσιν:φασί τινες SHF
 τοὺς om.Comb. 2 ἀγαθόν...ἀγαθόν:ἀγαθὴν...ἀγαθή SHF
 3 post ἐπαγγελία:τῶν ἀγαθῶν add.SHF δύνανται:δύναται SHF
 4-5 ἀλλὰ...κακόν om.SHF,Comb. 7 post κόλασις:ἀρα add.SHF
 8 ὁ σατανᾶς om.SHF 9 post αὐτὸν:ὄντα ποιηρὸν add.SHF
39.2 ἀλλὰ:ἀλλ' ὁ SHF post θεός:πρὸς οὓς ῥητέον· add.SHF
 δὲ om.SHF

Χρησιμώς επιφέρεται, τυγχάνον η άγαθών η άγαθού ποιητικών η κωλυτικών κακόν· ο άρα θεός κωλυειν τό κακόν βουλόμενος επιφέρει τότο· ουκ άν δ' επιφέρει κωλυειν τό κακόν, ει μη δύνατον ην κωλυέσθαι τό κακόν· κωλυόμενον δε τότο ου δύναται είναι φύσει και αγένητον· εσδάλησαν δε και εν τούτω οι άμαθεύς, νομισαντες εναντιαν είναι την κόλασιν τη έπαγγελία εκάτερα γαρ άνταπόδοσις εστιν, η μείν τοις άγαθοίς μισθόν φέρουσα, η δε τιμωριαν κατά των έκουστίωσ παραββηκότων τους θελους νόμουσ.

39.3 η 1 om.SHF η άγαθόν om.Comb. 4 άρα:γάρ SHF 5 δ':δε SHF επιφέρει cori.cum Comb.SHF: επιφέρει L 9 εναντιαν(cf.38.2-3):έναντιον Comb.

Ps.-Didymus

I. 1. No absolute opposition exists between contraries, since the contraries have certain common attributes. White, for example, which is contrary to black, is opposed to the latter in respect of differentiae alone, while colour and quality are common to them. But nothing of this sort [i.e. like white and black] has its opposition in this respect at a prior [i.e. more general] level; for they are all logically posterior to the common attributes and among the common attributes there is no opposition. There must be colour and quality in common if white and black are to exist; in the same way, virtue and vice are logically posterior to quality and disposition. Thus, if there are two unoriginate first principles [i.e. good and evil] and these are contraries, then either their opposition is absolute or they have some common attributes. Nothing, however, is regarded as a contrary in an absolute sense; therefore they have common features, such as existence and being substances and whatever else is found to be common to them. The fact that one is good while the other is evil and that one is light while the other is darkness makes them contraries. The fact that they are substances is conceived of as prior to their being good and evil. Their opposition therefore lies not in what they have in common, but rather in what is peculiar to each.

2. They [i.e. the Manichaeans] posit that the first principles are unoriginate. But nothing is prior to what is unoriginate. What is prior to them is the very thing which I said was an attribute common to them. Therefore the first principles are not unoriginate. (For the

contraries themselves are unoriginate. Their common attributes are prior to them. The first principles [i.e. the contraries, good and evil] are therefore not unoriginate, for nothing is prior to what is unoriginate.)

3. But if they should say that it is not in respect of being unoriginate that these things are contrary, then being unoriginate shall be found to be common to them. But since evil is unoriginately evil and good is unoriginately good, unoriginate evil shall be found to be common to both and unoriginate good shall be found to be common to both. For if no good can be found save that which is unoriginate and being unoriginate is a common attribute, then what necessarily accompanies the unoriginate is also a common quality, namely the good.

4. But if one should say that being unoriginate is not common to them, then insofar as it is an attribute of one, it is not an attribute of the other. The unoriginate shall therefore be either good or evil; it cannot be both good and evil. Thus, if the good should be found to be unoriginate, then evil is originate.

II. 1. In any case, everything evil is to be punished. Nothing which is to be punished is incorruptible. Therefore nothing evil is incorruptible (since what is subject to corruption does not exist in an incorruptible manner).

2. Nothing subject to corruption is unoriginate. But evil is subject to corruption. Therefore evil is not unoriginate.

3. Nothing is evil in substance, since evil is a quality. But no quality is a substance. Therefore evil is not a substance.

4. Every contrary causes the destruction of its opposite. But unoriginate things are incorruptible. Therefore contraries are not incorruptible [sic!].

5. Nothing unoriginate is subject to change. But good undergoes change when it has been dominated by evil. Therefore good is not unoriginate [sic!].

6. The unoriginate does not desire any corruption, nor does it produce corruption. But evil desires corruption. Therefore evil is not unoriginate.

7. The Holy Scriptures say that not only the other evil ones, but even the Devil himself, are consigned to punishment. But everything which is consigned to punishment is subject to change and nothing subject to change is unoriginate. Therefore nothing evil is unoriginate.

8. Between things that are wholly opposed, nothing is common. It is therefore strictly necessary that what is an attribute of one is not an attribute of the other. But being unoriginate is an attribute of the good. Therefore neither of these [i.e. the unoriginate or the good] is an attribute of evil. Therefore evil is not being.¹

9. Everyone who desires something reasonably has his desire satisfied, if he desires it reasonably. But God desires that evil be abolished. Therefore evil is one of the things subject to corruption. Being one of the things subject to corruption, it shall be destroyed. Being destroyed, it is not unoriginate.

10. If evil is unoriginate, then being evil is a natural attribute. But no one who acts in accordance with nature sins. Therefore evil

does not sin. What does not sin is not blameworthy. But Satan is blameworthy. Therefore he is not unoriginate.

NOTES

Ps.-Didymus--Translation

1. The argument as it stands does not seem to require the conclusion that "evil is not being". To make sense of the argument, one might emend the text in one of two ways. One could omit ἀγένητον from the phrase ὑπάρχει δε τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸ εἶναι ἀγένητον and translate, "Being is an attribute of the good." Alternately, one could understand ὄν as being equivalent to the phrase τὸ εἶναι ἀγένητον. One would thus translate the conclusion "Evil is therefore not unoriginate."

Didymus Contra Manichaeos

1. Holy Scripture calls people the "sons" and "offspring" of the actions and pursuits to which they devote themselves. At least, since those who are prone to anger or to any other sin are subjected to wrath by way of punishment, Scripture calls them "children of wrath," as when Paul says, "We were by nature children of wrath, as was the rest [of humanity]." ¹ The persons of whom Paul speaks are able to change, so that they are no longer by nature "children of wrath." Paul, at least, says of himself and of those who had become holy in a similar manner, "We were by nature children of wrath, as was the rest of humanity," who at that time were still in sin. The phrase "by nature," which is added here, refers not to what is in accordance with nature, but rather to what is truly the case. For when he says, "We were children of wrath," he makes it clear that those who sin are truly subject to wrath.

2. Just as one becomes a child of wrath according to nature in consequence of evil's being joined with one, so in changing one becomes a child of truth and virtue. This, at least, is what the Saviour said of some persons: "Wisdom has been justified by her children," ² calling the wise "children of wisdom." For if indeed they are someone's children, they derive their being from the one who engendered them. But also persons of a certain kind derive their being from the quality which attaches to them; such persons are fittingly called "children" and "sons" of that quality.

3. For just as the Saviour called certain persons by a name and these wise persons are "children of wisdom," in the same way, he called others "sons of peace," as when he said to the disciples, "If you enter a city or a home and find a son of peace there, your peace," which is given to the city or the home, "shall rest upon the son of peace who is in it."³ Again, the same Saviour says, "The sons of this age are shrewder than the sons of light in their generation."⁴ He calls "sons of light" those who have been enlightened by knowledge of the truth and virtuous deeds.

4. To those who also have become a light since they are "sons of light," he says, "You are the light of the world."⁵ But those who love the present life and act always in reference to it, he called "sons of [this] age." But although he said that the latter are shrewder than the sons of light, he called them "shrewder," not in an unqualified sense, but "in their generation." In other words, they happen to be shrewder than the sons of light in those matters which have been accommodated to this age. "For they are skilled at doing evil; they have not understood how to do good."⁶

5. Concerning Judas also it is written that he would be a "son of destruction." For the Lord said of him, "Not one of my disciples has been destroyed, save the son of destruction."⁷ He called him a "son of destruction," because he had done the things which brought about destruction. For he was not such when he was one of the apostles and together with them served the Saviour. Instead, he became "the son of destruction" when he became the betrayer of the Son of God and

Teacher, having cherished the silver-pieces which brought about destruction.

6. Yet, because he was not evil according to nature, while he was together with all the disciples, he heard Jesus say, "Behold I send you out as sheep among the wolves."⁸ If Jesus calls sinners "wolves" and those who act virtuously "sheep", then if Judas were evil by nature, he would not have been Christ's sheep, since the person who is evil according to nature cannot act virtuously. But not even the Devil himself is evil according to nature; instead, he became so as a result of a change effected of his own free will.

7. Therefore, those who act in the previously-mentioned way are called sons and offspring, not only of bad practices and actions but also of good ones, and accordingly it was said that those who derive from the qualities the being which they have as a result of the quality are offspring of the qualities. In all likelihood then, someone is said to be "flesh of sin"⁹ and "body of sin"¹⁰ not in an absolute sense, but because he is a slave to sin. For the man who applies his body and flesh to lust and other such activities makes his body to be a body of sin and his flesh to be flesh of sin. Likewise, one who is good sanctifies his own body and soul through chastity and the attendant virtue. The virgin, at least, comes to be holy in body and spirit, which is the same as soul, as Paul writes, when he says that the virgin ought not to be distracted by worldly affairs "so that she may be holy in body and spirit."¹¹

8. And also in the Epistle to the Corinthians, he writes, "Glorify God in your body."¹² If God is glorified in the human body, but God is

not glorified in what is evil, then the body is not evil by nature, even if the sinner makes it evil by using it in a sinful manner. A little farther on, he again addresses them, "Do you not know that your bodies are a temple of the Holy Spirit who is in you, whom you have received from God? If anyone destroys God's temple, God will destroy him. For God's temple is holy and that is what you are."¹³

9. And also in the Epistle to the Thessalonians, the same apostle writes, "May the God of peace completely sanctify you and may your whole spirit, soul and body be kept blameless."¹⁴ For how can it have been completely sanctified and how can one keep one's whole body sanctified, if the body, being evil, by nature cannot be sanctified? For if the latter is evil by nature, it is incapable of receiving sanctification. But if it receives the good, this shows that it is not evil by nature, since it is capable of receiving good. For what is evil by nature is incapable of receiving good; likewise, what is good [by nature] is incapable of receiving evil.

10. The same apostle writes in another epistle to certain persons: "Let us purify ourselves from every defilement of the flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness through fear of God."¹⁵ He shows from this passage also that it is natural for the flesh to be purified from the defilements which attach to it as a result of sin; the same is true of the spirit and the soul.¹⁶ If the flesh were evil in substance and the spirit were good in substance, then the spirit could have no defilement, nor could the flesh be purified from defilement. He commands them to purify each from defilement; he also speaks of the manner of purification, saying, "perfecting holiness through fear of

God." Well indeed does he say, "through fear of God," showing that the obedience comes from them and not from necessity. If in "perfecting holiness through fear of God", we are purifying our flesh as well as our spirit from defilement, it is clear that this takes place when sanctification occurs in us. For just as the soul is purified from ignorance and from the wrongs which it has done by the advent of knowledge and righteousness (for the flight from evil effects the entrance of virtue by way of opposition), so also the flesh and the spirit are purified from defilement by the advent of sanctification. By "spirit" in these passages he means the soul, just as in the Acts of the Apostles, when the Apostle Stephen was being stoned to death and was about to die, he prayed, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit."¹⁷ For what he there called his "spirit" was nothing other than his soul.

11. Thus, if in many passages the flesh and the body are said at one time to be associated with sin and at another time to be associated with sanctification and oriented toward the glorification of God, then flesh and body are by nature neither evil nor good; they are instead capable of receiving each quality through the exercise of free will and in consequence of the possessor's usage it receives each in turn, being associated at one time with sin and at another time with sanctification.

12. But even if they think this out of ignorance of the passage on the basis of which they propose that flesh belongs to sin, we on the contrary will set the passage out in its entirety and we will make its sense clear. It is as follows.

13. "God, having sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh for sin, condemned sin in the flesh."¹⁸ What he says is as follows. The flesh of every human being derives its existence from sexual union, except for [the flesh which] belonged to the first man and that which the Saviour assumed. For the human body could not come into existence in any way other than through the intercourse of man and woman. Since the Saviour received a body from the Virgin alone, one that had not originated from intercourse, Paul said that the Lord's flesh was the likeness of the flesh which is produced by intercourse. For he did not say without qualification that he had the likeness of flesh, but rather that he had the likeness of sinful flesh. The likeness of sinful flesh is flesh which differs from other types of flesh in one respect, namely that it came into existence without a man. For it was necessary that he who came to save humanity should not derive his body from sexual union. At the same time, the Redeemer could not be born outside the line of human descent, as the first man was, lest his body be considered to be of a different kind. For if he also had been fashioned from the earth, as was the founder of the human race, then those who claim that his appearance was an illusion would have supposed that he therefore did not truly bear a human body. Furthermore, if he had assumed a body produced by sexual union, then, since he did not possess the extraordinary feature, he also would have been considered to be liable for that sin which has accrued to all who are descended from Adam.

14. If they should say, "If sinful flesh is flesh that has been produced by the intercourse of man and woman, then marriage is

evil," let them hear this: Before the advent of the Saviour who took away the sin of the world, all of humanity treated marriage sinfully just as they did other things wickedly. Therefore, one ought to understand that what is begotten by marriage are bodies. Because the sexual union of Adam and Eve took place after their sin, it is therefore called "sinful flesh." For being incorrupt before his transgression, he became corrupt when he transgressed; his lineage is thus corrupt. The Saviour therefore possessed the likeness of this flesh, even though his flesh did not know corruption.¹⁹ When the Saviour dwelt among us, he effected the removal of sin from marriage, as from other matters. Now, at least, those who live according to the Gospel are able to have an honourable marriage and an undefiled marriage-bed, as Paul writes to the faithful: "Marriage is honourable and the marriage-bed undefiled, but God will judge fornicators and adulterers."²⁰ For in distinguishing the honourable marriage and those who undertake it from fornicators and adulterers, he wishes marriage to be neither fornication nor adultery; from this it follows that marriage is not a sin.

15. The matter can also be stated otherwise, in a more physical way. Virginity is a divine matter and, as such, belongs among the virtues. If therefore in comparing marriage to virginity, one should say that marriage is sin, then marriage is not a sin in the absolute sense [i.e. in itself]. For what is evil is evil not by comparison to what is good, but because it is evil in and of itself. Now if ever something were said to be evil in comparison to what is good, it might also be good but inferior to the good which is preferred to it.

16. Furthermore, those who turn to the Gospel do so primarily to show reverence for God and to become wise with respect to God. They subsequently find that they are attacked by certain [temptations]. For it is also necessary that they take up the Christian faith in a steadfast manner. Steadfastness accrues from training against temptations; hence, it is necessary that they endure struggles.

17. Those who preside over the games, if they should think of what is reasonable, do not throw together two athletes in a random fashion; instead, with careful judgement, they consider the amount of strength possessed by each contestant. In this manner, Christ, who presides over our contest, also does not pair everyone with the same adversaries, but instead assigns the opponent according to the age and strength of each contestant.

18. To the Corinthians at least (who, being still mere infants, were clinging to the passions of the flesh²¹), Paul writes, "No temptation has seized you, save that which is human."²² For their "temptations" and "struggles" refer to human affairs. But concerning himself and those like him who are similarly matched and of equal strength, he writes, "Our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, powers, and the cosmic forces who rule over the darkness of this age."²³ Here he is all but saying: "For us who have become superior, our struggle is no longer against flesh and blood--that is, human affairs--but against superior orders of adversaries." These are species of rational beings which have become evil through purposive choice.

19. Let no one suppose that when we speak of species of rational beings that are evil, we are speaking of an evil substance, for there are species and genera of beings having purposive choice. We say, at least, that the species of the morally excellent man are the just, the temperate, the prudent, [and] the courageous. For since virtue is a genus which is divided into species (justice, temperance, etc.), it is necessary that he who participates in the genus, being morally excellent, should be, as it were, the genus of those who participate in the specific virtues. In like manner, as knowledge is a genus that includes grammar [i.e. grammatical knowledge], music [i.e. musical knowledge], etc., we can say that the knower named for [his grasp of] the genus is the genus of those named for [their grasp of] the species of knowledge.²⁴ So, if we say that there are species of rational evil beings, we say too that all members of these species are so as a result of purposive choice.

20. Indeed, the previously-discussed evil names are indicative not of substances, but rather of purposive choices. For the name "devil" [i.e. accuser or slanderer] indicates not a substance but a purposive choice. Judas, for example, was a man, yet the Lord called him a devil, not on account of his substance but on account of his purposive choice. To all the disciples who were with him, Judas being numbered among them, the Lord said, "Have I not chosen you twelve, yet one of you is a devil?"²⁵ To this the Evangelist adds, "This he said of Judas, who was about to betray him."²⁶ For if Judas is called a devil [i.e. an accuser] because he was about to betray the Lord, he was not a devil when he was chosen along with the whole group. For

he was chosen with the whole group because of the virtue which attached to him at that time. But he was called a "devil" [i.e. an accuser] when he effected the Lord's betrayal. If therefore, in Judas' case, the name "devil" is indicative of a purposive action, then, similarly, if the word should be used of someone else, it signifies something purposely chosen.

21. This is the known and customary usage of this name. We call "devils," at any rate, those who accuse some persons to one audience and other persons to another audience. Since the Devil accuses God before humanity, humanity before God, and humans before one another, he has been given this name. If the name "Satan" should be predicated of the Devil himself, let them know that this name also indicates a purposive choice. For the word, which is Hebrew, signifies nothing different from the Greek word "adversary." "Adversary", when applied to a person, is equivalent to "enemy", "harmful person." Just as an enemy is such through purposive choice, the same is true of the adversary. The same is also true of the contraries of these terms, for the names "friend," "well-wisher," "like-minded," and "similarly-minded" are indicative of purposive choices. He is called this [i.e. "Adversary"], just as he is called "Devil", "Satan" and "Evil" since, in the Gospel, the Saviour among other things teaches the disciples to say this in prayer, "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from Evil,"²⁷ for the name "Evil" is also indicative of purposive choice.

22. If then, in respect of all the terms by which he is designated, the author of evil and the first one to depart from virtue

is like that by purposive choice, he cannot be evil in his substance. But if they were to say, "Since he was evil in substance, he also possessed the attributes associated with purposive choice, on account of which he was given the corresponding names," let them know that with the attributes belonging to the substance, purposive choice is not employed. For no one says that one is an animal or a stone by purposive choice, for these are attributes belonging to the substance; hence, no purposive choice is involved. For it is in those beings in which purposive choice is found that the attributes associated with purposive choice are found.

23. But perhaps they [i.e. our opponents] will say: "Why did the good God bring into existence one who was going to be so harmful and destructive?" Let them know that in saying this, they are contending not only against ourselves, but against all who posit the existence of providence. For many others who posit the existence of providence say that all rational creatures, in whom evil also grows, have come from God. So if our opponents say these things about the Devil, they are compelled to say the same of all rational beings.

24. Nevertheless, instead of imitating such persons, we say: "He who created the capacity to undertake evil by one's own inclination is not the cause of evil, for God made one to be a rational creature whom he wished to be good of its own purposive choice, having the power to incline toward either good or evil. God wished the latter to be good, choosing the good voluntarily, for no created thing can be good involuntarily; instead, all who are good are so voluntarily."

25. It was necessary then that whoever would be good by their own purposive choice should possess an ability which is the same as an aptitude for the acquisition of the good. And it followed that what is capable of good is also capable of evil. A commandment has therefore been given to the rational creature who was created with the capacity for virtue or vice, so that it might possess virtue in actuality and vice only in aptitude [i.e. potentiality]. For the Law of the Creator exhorts, anoints, and helps one toward virtue, while turning one's nature away from vice. Thus, even if the capacity for evil inheres in a rational being, the latter is not bad because it possesses this capacity. For both---i.e., virtue and vice--involve capacities and choices. We choose to possess the capacity for virtue, so that we may be able actually to acquire it; we also choose to exercise the capacity for vice. We possess the capacity for vice whenever we actively exercise virtue. This opinion is not ours alone, but that of all who have philosophized correctly about rational creatures.

26. Thus, even if God created the substance which is called "Devil", he did not make it a devil but made it capable of virtue, so that it might possess virtue, and capable of vice, so that it might abstain from vice. Since virtue does not co-exist with evil and virtue is dear to God, for this reason, having implanted in the rational being the capacities for both, he did so in order that we may translate the capacity for virtue into action, but abstain from the end of the other capacity, which is its actualization. Every rational being has therefore been created to be good, not bad. If therefore some rational beings

have done what is contrary to the one who created and provided for them, the blame does not lie with the Creator and Lawgiver, but rather with those who strenuously oppose the laws which have been given to us and provided for us.

27. We see, at least, in our own case the things which are always happening when we instruct our children, wishing to bring them up in knowledge, so that they too may practise it. Children do not invariably act in the same way as they have been taught. But often, contrariwise, many sons who are brought up by their fathers to be physicians do not use the healing art as they ought, for they administer to the afflicted things which cause sickness instead of things which restore health. The cause is neither the healing art, I presume, nor the instructor. For the instructor did not teach them to act in this way; the son instead acts in a way different from that which he learned.

28. Furthermore, we teach people laws so that they may adhere to what is just and refrain from what is unjust, yet some of those who maliciously attack the laws do what is contrary to them. In such a case, we blame neither the law nor the law-giver, for if the latter were the cause of injustice, they would not punish the unjust. Instead this is their verdict: One who is unjust is to be punished. God punishes both Satan and those who transgressed the laws which had been established by God. For to certain wicked persons, he says, "Depart into the eternal fire which has been prepared for the Devil and his angels."²⁸

29. Therefore let those who contradict these arguments know that they are contradicting themselves. For if the Devil were evil in substance and opposed to the good God, having a power equivalent to God's own, then God could neither prepare a punishment for the Devil, nor could he consign the Devil to that punishment. Scripture, however, says that a fire has been prepared for the Devil.

30. One also ought to say the following: If the good God is immutable, as indeed he is, and always has the same power, since he does not possess one degree of strength at one time and another degree of strength at another time, and yet planned to consign Satan to eternal fire [only] after Satan had caused much harm and destruction, why did God not do this at the beginning, when Satan rose up against him and took his portion? For at that time God established for Satan a far more just punishment, since he had offended against one who was greater. For now the Devil harms humanity, but formerly, according to them, he harmed the Godhead itself, so they think. The Law, however, is an affliction which is more justly applied to those who defy the King than to those who are his subjects. For if one has to think of things thus, then they shall ascribe to God at that time either ignorance of how to punish and prevent evil or inability to do so, but neither of these is appropriate in the case of the good God. God's enemy therefore could not have risen up against him unoriginately. Instead, having been created to be good, on the one hand he retained the capacity for virtue without bringing it to fruition, but on the other hand he brought the aptitude

for vice into actuality. For this reason, he ought to be punished and fittingly, after a long time, he was subjected to punishment.

31. But if the objection should be brought forward that John the Baptist said to those who came to baptism in a hypocritical manner, "You serpents, you offspring of vipers, who warned you to flee from the coming wrath? Bear fruit in keeping with repentance and do not think to say to yourselves, 'We have Abraham as our father', for God can raise up children for Abraham from these stones. The axe is already laid to the root of the trees; therefore every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire,"²⁹ let them hear that they cannot bring forward objections based on the words of those they do not recognize. For they do not recognize John the Baptist, who was a personage belonging to the Old Testament.³⁰

32. In any case, one ought reply to them in the following manner: Throughout the entire speech, John refutes the idea that good or evil people are such by nature. For he says to them, "Therefore bear fruit in keeping with repentance." But repentance and its fruit are not applicable either to one who is evil in substance or to one who is good by nature. For how does one who has always been good stand in need of repentance? And how could one who is evil by nature make use of the good of repentance? For one who is evil in substance cannot turn away from sin, while repentance is of no use to the good.

33. Furthermore, John says that children will be raised up for Abraham even from the stones to which he pointed. By stones (λίθους), he means people who are foolish (ἡλιθίους) and continue to abide in

wickedness. If these should repent and have faith in God, they shall be children of Abraham, who was given the title "man of God"³⁰ because he had faith in God, so that his faith was credited to him as righteousness.³¹

34. Since we heard also what they said about the descendants of Abraham and other holy men, viz. the saying "You snakes, you offspring of vipers" indicates that Abraham's followers are vipers, let them know that what they are saying violates the consistency of the passage. He rebukes them not for being descended from Abraham, but for being the offspring of vipers, i.e. for being pretenders who vainly boast that they are Abraham's descendants. For in another passage the Saviour says to them, "This, Abraham," whom you falsely claim to be your father, "did not do. For if you were Abraham's children, you would have done Abraham's deeds. You, however, are children of your father the Devil and seek to accomplish the desires of your father. For he is a murderer from the beginning and has not stood fast in the truth."³² Well was it said, "He has not stood fast"; this shows that he formerly stood fast in the truth. He calls the Devil their father because they have changed in the same way and been imbued with the same quality. Thus, he did not call Abraham and those holy men who followed him "vipers". They became "sons of vipers" by undergoing a change, since those who have submitted themselves to wicked teachers, as it is said, have done so by their own purposive choice.

35. Thus, John says to them, "Since by departing from virtue, you have sought to become serpents," for they were not such in

substance," cease from being the offspring of vipers, whose quality you have sought to acquire. You have been eager to be wicked children of wicked parents and unjust children of unjust parents. Yet since you have come to baptism you claim to bear a sign of repentance, but this you do by way of pretence. Thus I say to you: 'Who warned you to flee from the coming wrath?' For one who repents, repents for this reason--that in sinning no more, one may flee the wrath which is to come upon sinners."

36. He makes the inquiry, "Who warned you?", so as to say: "He who genuinely indicates that he is withdrawing from wickedness will make no pretense of this being the case." But you act hypocritically in coming to baptism; therefore you shall not be cleansed. For one who truly desires to be cleansed abstains from sins and bears the fruit of such repentance, doing the deeds which arise from a disposition opposed to sin. But you have not done this by condemning yourselves; rather you say that you have Abraham as your father. But it will not help you to think that you are Abraham's children; instead, you must be his children both in faith and in flight from idols. Even if you were once Abraham's children, this fact will not save you. For God can make those who are presently not his children to be his children. Thus, he who is Abraham's child in regard to virtue shall be saved, not he who is born his child in respect of flesh alone. Even if he were so begotten, let him not be conceited, for whoever is a child of the latter kind is liable to change. Indeed, even those who do not have such a nature will be able to acquire it, for Paul tells those

whom he did not beget by fleshly means, "In Christ I have begotten you through the Gospel."³³

37. But when you hear these things do not contemptuously suppose that wrath is slow to descend upon sinners. For already, through the sinning itself, the wicked immediately receive punishment, being worthy of punishment. For this reason, know that the axe has already drawn near to the roots of the trees.³⁴ The "trees" of which he speaks are not the ones perceived by the senses, but rather people who have chosen to conform to vice. The "root" of these trees is the basest disposition, from which fruit is produced that is not edible, but poisonous. He therefore said that it was not good fruit. If then the axe signifies punishment, while the worthless tree signifies the person who sins, these things are not of opposing natures. Punishment is threatened so that the trees might alter their character. For he who threatens sinners wishes to alter them by means of the threat itself. If then, by the threat of the axe, which is about to cut down the rotten trees, he persuades them to cease from bearing bad fruit and instead to yield good fruit, then the tree is not evil by nature; neither then is punishment evil by nature.

38. But perhaps they shall say, "If punishment effects a change in the bad, then it is a good. But if punishment is a good, and the promise is contrary to this, and things which are contrary to the good cannot co-exist with goods, therefore the promise is an evil. But God makes this promise; therefore it is not an evil. But since the promise is not an evil but a good, punishment is an evil. But if punishment is an evil, not God but Satan imposes it." But Satan does not impose

punishment upon his own, for they are wicked just as he is and he would also have to subject himself to punishment. Therefore he administered it to the good.

39. But this is impossible. Therefore it is not the Evil One who imposes punishment, but God. But everything which is imposed by God is imposed for a beneficial end, being either good, productive of good or preventive of evil. Therefore God, wishing to prevent evil, imposes this. But he would not have attempted to prevent evil if it were not possible for evil to be prevented. Being prevented, this cannot be natural and unoriginate. The ignorant have erred in this matter, believing that punishment is contrary to the promise. For each is a recompense, the one bearing a reward to the good, while the other brings down punishment upon those who have willingly transgressed the divine laws.

NOTES

Didymus Contra Manichaeos--Translation

1. Eph. 2:3
2. Lk. 7:35
3. Lk. 10:5-6
4. Lk. 16:8
5. Mt. 5:14
6. Jer. 4:22 (LXX)
7. Jn. 17:12
8. Mt. 10:16
9. Rom. 8:3
10. Rom. 6:6
11. 1 Cor. 7:34
12. 1 Cor. 6:20
13. 1 Cor. 6:19; 3:17
14. 1 Thess. 5:23
15. 2 Cor. 7:1

16. The phrase *ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ* is admittedly somewhat awkward. By repunctuating the Greek text, it would also be possible to translate, "Now as far as the spirit and the soul are concerned--if the flesh..."

17. Acts 7:59
18. Rom. 8:3

19. Cf. Ps. 16:10 (LXX); Acts 2:27,31; 13:34-37
20. Heb. 13:4
21. 1 Cor. 3:1-3
22. 1 Cor. 10:13
23. Eph. 6:12
24. Compare Porphyry Comm. in Categ. 140.1-24 (cf. 76.18-24).
25. Jn. 6:70
26. Jn. 6:71
27. Mt. 6:13
28. Mt. 25:41
29. Mt. 23:33; 3:7-9
30. See Lk. 16:16 and compare Mt. 11:13. Cf. also Origen Comm. Cant. 3 (Baehrens, Origenes. Achter Band, 213, lines 19-20): Quae "vox Domini," nisi illa, quae in lege et prophetis habetur et pervenit usque ad Iohannem...
31. Cf. James 2:3
32. Gen. 15:6 (LXX); Rom. 4:3
33. Jn. 8:40,39,44
34. 1 Cor. 4:15
35. Mt. 3:10; Lk. 3:9

Fragments

(a) An otherwise unattested fragment of Didymus' Against the Manichaeans (from John Damascene's Sacra parallela (PG 95, 1531A1-2)

Φιλοῦσι τὰ ἀμαρτήματα ἐκ πλήθους ὄχλων καὶ εὐθηνίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων τίκτεσθαι.

They love the sins which are born of the unruly crowds and an abundance of costly things.

(b) Fragments extant in ps.-Gregory Nazianzus' Significatio in Ezechielem

ps.-Gregory (PG 36,668B5-15)

Ἐδικαιώθη ἡ σοφία ἀπὸ τῶν τέκνων αὐτῆς, τοὺς σοφοὺς τὰ τέκνα λέγων.

Καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸς αὐτοῖς ὁ σωτὴρ φησιν ἐν τῷ· σοφώτεροί εἰσιν οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου ὑπὲρ τοὺς υἱοὺς τοῦ φωτός ἐν τῇ γενεᾷ αὐτῶν, υἱοὺς φωτός λέγων τοὺς πεφωτισμένους τῇ γνώσει.

Καὶ ἡμεν φύσει τέκνα ὀργῆς οὐ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν λέγων ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν ἀληθείᾳ.

ὑπεύθευνοι ὀργῆς τυγχάνουσιν οἱ ἀμαρτάνοντες.

Καὶ περὶ τοῦ Ἰούδα γέγραπται ὅτι υἱὸς ἀπωλείας·

ἀπωλείας δὲ υἱὸν αὐτὸν εἶπε τῷ τὰ τῆς ἀπωλείας πεπραχέναι.

Didymus Contra Manichaeos (L) 2.4-5 (=1089C10-11):

Ἐδικαιώθη ἡ σοφία ἀπὸ τῶν τέκνων αὐτῆς, τέκνα σοφίας τοὺς σοφοὺς λέγων.

3.6-9 (=1089D7-11):

Πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς σωτὴρ φησιν· φρονιμώτεροί εἰσιν οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου ὑπὲρ τοὺς υἱοὺς τοῦ φωτός ἐν τῇ γενεᾷ τῇ ἑαυτῶν, υἱοὺς φωτός λέγων τοὺς πεφωτισμένους τῇ γνώσει τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις τῆς ἀρετῆς.

1.5-6,11-12,13-14 (=1089B7; C3-4,5-6):

Καὶ ἡμεν φύσει τέκνα ὀργῆς... προσκείμενον δὲ τὸ φύσει οὐ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀληθείᾳ, τὸ γὰρ ἡμεν φύσει τέκνα ὀργῆς λέγει δηλῶν ὅτι ἀληθείᾳ ὑπεύθευνοι ὀργῆς τυγχάνουσιν οἱ ἀμαρτάνοντες.

5.1-2 (=1092A11-12)

Καὶ περὶ τοῦ Ἰούδα δὲ γέγραπται ὡς εἶη υἱὸς ἀπωλείας.

5.4-5 (=1092A14-15)

ἀπωλείας δὲ υἱὸν αὐτὸν εἶπεν τῷ τὰ τῆς ἀπωλείας πεπραχέναι.

(c) Syllogisms of the Holy Fathers (The readings of B,S,V as reported by M. Richard, Iohannis Caesariensis presbyteri et grammatici Opera quae supersunt, CCSG 1 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1977], 131-133)

B=cod. Athous. Vatopedinus 236 [olim 620] (s. XII), f. 151^v-152^r.

S=cod. Sinaiticus 383 (s. X), f. 143^{r-v}.

V=cod. Vaticanus gr. 1838 (s. XIII), f. 266^v.

Mai=A. Mai, Nova patrum bibliotheca, t. IV. 2 (Romae: Typis Sacro Consilii Propogando Christiano Nomini, 1847), 103-104: editio princeps e cod. V.

Usp.=V. Benesevic, Catalogus codicum manuscritorum graecorum qui in monasterio sanctae Catharinae in monte Sina asservantur.

Tomus I: Codices manuscripti notabiliores bibliothecae monasterii Sinaitici eiusque metochii Cahirensis, ab archimandrita Porphyrio (Uspenski) descripti (Petropoli:1911; denuo impressus, Hildesheim: G. Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1965), 349-350: editio altera e cod. S.

ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΙ ΑΓΙΩΝ ΠΑΤΕΡΩΝ

1. Πάν κακόν κολαστέον· οὐδέν δὲ κολαστέον ἄφθαρτον· οὐδέν ἄρα κακόν ἄφθαρτον.
- 5 2. Οὐδέν φθαρτὸν ἀγένητον· ἔστι δὲ τὸ κακόν φθαρτὸν· τὸ ἄρα κακόν οὐκ ἀγένητον.
3. Αἱ θεῖαι γραφαὶ κολάσει παραδίδοσθαι τὸν διάβολόν φασιν· πᾶν δὲ κολάσει παραδιδόμενον τρεπτόν· οὐδέν δὲ τρεπτὸν ἀγένητον· οὐδέν ἄρα τῶν κακῶν ἀγένητον.
- 10 4. Οὐδέν ἀγένητον τρεπτόν· τρέπεται δὲ τὸ κακόν κρατηθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· τὸ ἄρα κακόν οὐκ ἀγένητον.
5. Τὸ μερικὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν τρέπεται, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀγένητα· τὸ δὲ οὐσιῶδες ἀγαθὸν ἄτρεπτον· τὸ δὲ κακόν, ὃ φασιν οἱ Μανιχαῖοι οὐσιῶδες εἶναι, τρεπτὸν ἔστιν, εἴ γε καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν αὐτὸ εἶναι κολαστέον.
- 15 6. Οὐδέν κατ' οὐσίαν κακόν, τῷ τὸ κακόν ποιὸν εἶναι· οὐδέν δὲ ποιὸν οὐσία· τὸ ἄρα κακόν οὐκ οὐσία.
7. Πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλων ἔστι φθαρτικά· τὰ δὲ ἀγένητα ἄφθαρτα· τὰ ἄρα ἐναντία οὐκ ἀγένητα.
- 20 8. Πᾶς ὁ εὐλόγως ὀρεγόμενός τινος ἐπιτετευγμένην ἔχει τὴν ὄρεξιν, ἧς εὐλόγως ὀρέγεται· θεὸς δὲ φθειραὶ τὴν κακίαν ὀρέγεται· τῶν φθαρτῶν ἄρα ἔστιν ἡ κακία· τῶν δὲ φθαρτῶν οὐσα ἀφανισθήσεται· ἀφανιζομένη δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγένητος.

9. Εἰ ἀγένητον τὸ κακόν, κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ κακόν εἶναι· οὐδεὶς δὲ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργῶν ἀμαρτάνει· τὸ ἄρα κακόν οὐχ ἀμαρτάνει. τὸ μὴ ἀμαρτάνει οὐχ ὑπαίτιον· ὑπαίτιος δὲ ὁ σατανᾶς· οὐκ ἄρα ἀγένητος.

25 10. Φασὶ τινες· εἰ μεταποιεῖ τοὺς φαύλους ἢ κόλασις, ἀγαθὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἢ κόλασις ἀγαθὴ, ἐναντία δὲ ταύτῃ ἢ ἐπαγγελία τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία οὐ δύναται ἅμα ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· ἢ ἄρα ἐπαγγελία κακόν. μὴ κακοῦ δὲ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας ἀλλ' ἀγαθοῦ οὐσης ἢ κόλασις ἐστὶ κακόν. εἰ δὲ κακόν ἢ

30 κόλασις, ἄρα οὐχ ὁ θεός, ἀλλ' ὁ σατανᾶς αὐτὴν ἐπιφέρει· ἐπιφέρει δὲ τὴν κόλασιν οὐ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰσὶ γὰρ ὡς αὐτὸς πονηροὶ καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὸν ὄντα πονηρὸν ὑποπίπτειν τῇ κολάσει· τῷ ἄρα ἀγαθῷ ἐποίσει αὐτὴν. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον τοῦτο· οὐκ ἄρα ὁ πονηρὸς αὐτὴν ἐπιφέρει, ἀλλ' ὁ θεός.

35 Πρὸς οὓς ῥητέον· πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἐπιφερόμενον χρησίμως ἐπιφέρεται, τυγχάνον ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὸν ἢ κωλυτικὸν κακοῦ. Ὁ γὰρ θεὸς κωλύειν τὸ κακόν βουλόμενος ἐπιφέρει τοῦτο· οὐκ ἂν δὲ ἐπεχειρεῖ κωλύειν τὸ κακόν, εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν ἦν κωλύεσθαι τὸ κακόν· κωλύομενον δὲ τοῦτο οὐ δύναται εἶναι φύσει καὶ ἀγένητον.

11. Τὸ κακόν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εὐρίσκεται· κακόν γάρ ἐστὶ τὸ μεταχειρίζεσθαι τοὺς λογικοὺς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν οὐ δέοντας...

4 τὸ¹ supra lin.S post κακόν¹: καὶ add.B 6 παραδίδοσθαι:παραδέδοσθαι Usp. φασιν:φασιν Mai 9 τρέπεται:τρεπτόν V τρεπτέον Mai 11 τὸ² om.B 12 post οὐσιῶδες¹:καὶ add.V Mai 13 τρεπτόν:τρεπτέον Mai ἐστιν om.Mai αὐτό:αὐτόν Mai,om.B 14 τῷ τὸ κακόν om.B 16 τὰ - ἄφθαρτα om.B ἄρα om.B 18 τὴν om.Usp. 20 ἀφαιζομένης S 22 τὸ κακόν² Usp.:τὸ κακῷ B S V Mai 23 τὸ¹ om.Mai post τὸ³: δὲ add.Mai 25 αὐτὴν om.Mai 27 ἅμα:ὡς Mai ἢ:εἰ S Usp. κακοῦ:κακῆς Mai 28 ἀγαθοῦ:ἀγαθῆς Mai 28-29 κακόν ἢ κόλασις transp. Mai 29 ἄρα: ἀλλ' V Mai 30 πονηροὶ ὡς αὐτός transp.B 31 ἀλλ':ἀλλὰ B V Mai 32 ἀλλ':ἀλλὰ B V 35 δὲ om.Mai 38 Syll.11 in V Mai sequitur sine distinctione Syll.10 τὸ² om.Mai 39 λόγικους:λόγους Mai οὐ δέοντας:οὐ δέοντα V οὐδὲ ὄντα Mai Syll.iste aperte des.imperfectus (emend.οὐ δέοντως?)

1. Everything evil is to be punished. But nothing which is to be punished is incorruptible. Therefore nothing evil is incorruptible.

2. Nothing subject to corruption is unoriginate. But evil is subject to corruption. Therefore evil is not unoriginate.

3. The Holy Scriptures say that the Devil is consigned to punishment. But everything consigned to punishment is subject to change and nothing subject to change is unoriginate. Therefore nothing evil is unoriginate.

4. Nothing unoriginate is subject to change. But evil undergoes change when it has been dominated by the good. Therefore evil is not unoriginate.

5. Partial good and evil are subject to change, for they are not unoriginate. But substantial good is not subject to change. But evil, which the Manichaeans say is substantial, is subject to change, if indeed they too agree that it is to be punished.

6. Nothing is evil in substance, since evil is a quality. But no quality is a substance. Therefore evil is not a substance.

7. Every contrary causes the destruction of its opposite. But unoriginate things are incorruptible. Therefore contraries are not unoriginate.

8. Everyone who desires something reasonably has the desire for what he reasonably desires satisfied. But God desires that evil be abolished. Therefore evil is one of the things subject to corruption. But being one of the things subject to corruption, it shall be destroyed. Being destroyed, it is not unoriginate.

9. If evil is unoriginate, then being evil is a natural attribute. But no one who acts in accordance with nature sins. Therefore evil does not sin. What does not sin is not blameworthy. But Satan is blameworthy. Therefore he is not unoriginate.

10. Some say, "If punishment effects a change in the bad, then it is good. But if punishment is good, and the promise of good things is contrary to it, and things which are contrary to the good cannot co-exist with goods, therefore the promise is an evil. But since the promise is not an evil but a good, punishment is an evil. But if punishment is an evil, therefore not God but Satan imposes it." But he does not impose punishment upon his own, for they are wicked just as he is and, being evil, he would also have to subject himself to punishment. Therefore he administered it to the good. But this is impossible. Therefore it is not the Evil One who imposes punishment, but God.

To them one must say: "Everything which is imposed by God is imposed for a beneficial end, being either good, productive of good, or preventive of evil. For God, wishing to prevent evil, imposes this. But he would not have attempted to prevent evil if it were not possible for evil to be prevented. Being prevented, this cannot be natural and unoriginate."

11. Evil is to be found in activities, for it is evil for rational beings to deal improperly with things that are in accordance with nature...

Ps.-Gregory of Nyssa Contra Manichaeos (PG 46, 541)

A=cod. Vat. gr. 697 (s. XIII-XIV), f. 48^v.

B=cod. Vat. gr. 1907 (s. XII-XIII), f. 50

C=cod. Paris. Coislinianus 253 (s. IX-X), f. 266^v-267^r (iuxta Richard, Iohannis Caesariensis, 131-133)

M=cod. Monac. gr. 47 (s. XVI), f. 212-214 (lectio syll.10 iuxta Le Duc)

O=cod. Vat. Ott. gr. 362 (s. XVI), f. 157

P=cod. Vat. Pius II gr. 4 (s. XI), f. 304^v.

U=cod. Vat. Urb. 9 (s. XVI-XVII), f. 126^v.

V=cod. Vindob. Hist. gr. 56 (circa 1000), f. 207^v-208^r.

Le Duc=Fronton Le Duc, D. Gregorii Nysseni Opuscula nonnulla (Inglstadii: D. Sartorius 1596), 96-100

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ [Γρηγορίου Νύσσης] κατὰ μανιχαίων

1. Πᾶν κακὸν κολαστέον· οὐδὲν δὲ κολαζόμενον ἄφθαρτον· οὐδὲν ἄρα κακὸν ἄφθαρτον.
2. Οὐδὲν φθαρτὸν ἀγένητον· ἔστι δὲ τὸ κακὸν φθαρτὸν· τὸ ἄρα κακὸν οὐκ ἀγένητον.
5
3. Οὐδὲν κατ' οὐσίαν κακόν, τῷ τὸ κακὸν ποιὸν εἶναι· οὐδὲν δὲ ποιὸν οὐσία· τὸ ἄρα κακὸν οὐκ οὐσία.
4. Πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλων φθαρτικά· τὰ δὲ ἀγένητα ἄφθαρτα· τὰ ἄρα ἐναντία οὐκ ἄφθαρτα.
- 10 5. Οὐδὲν ἀγένητον τρεπτόν· τρέπεται δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν κρατηθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ· τὸ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἀγένητον.
6. Τὸ ἀγένητον οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρεκτικὸν φθορᾶς τινος, οὐδέ γε φθαρτικόν· τὸ δὲ γε κακὸν ὀρεκτικὸν φθορᾶς· τὸ ἄρα κακὸν οὐκ ἀγένητον.
- 15 7. Αἱ θεῖαι γραφαὶ ταῖς κολάσεσι παραδίδοσθαι οὐ τοὺς ἄλλους μόνον κακοῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν διάβολον λέγουσιν· πᾶν δὲ τὸ κολάσει παραδιδόμενον τρεπτόν· οὐδὲν δὲ τρεπτὸν ἀγένητον· οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν κακῶν ἀγένητον.
- 20 8. Τῶν δι' ὄλων ἐναντιουμένων οὐδὲν κοινόν, ὥστε πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὸ θατέρω ὑπάρχον τῷ λοιπῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· ὑπάρχει δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸ εἶναι ἀγένητον· τῷ ἄρα κακῷ οὐδέτερον τούτων ὑπάρχει· μὴ ὄν ἄρα τὸ κακόν.
9. Πᾶς ὁ εὐλόγως ὀρεγόμενός τινος ἐπιτετευγμένην ἔχει τὴν ὄρεξιν, εἰ εὐλόγως ὀρέγεται· τῶν φθαρτῶν ἄρα ἔστιν ἡ κακία· τῶν δὲ φθαρτῶν οὐσα ἀφανισθήσεται· ἀφανιζομένη δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγένητος.
10. Εἰ ἀγένητον τὸ κακόν, κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ κακὸν εἶναι·

25 οὐδεὶς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργῶν ἀμαρτάνει· τὸ ἄρα κακὸν οὐχ ἀμαρτάνει. τὸ μὴ ἀμαρτάνον οὐχ ὑπαίτιον· ὑπαίτιος δὲ ὁ σατανᾶς· οὐκ ἄρα ἀγέννητος.

1 Τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ μαιχαίων ACP (μαιχέων [sic] A) τρόποι συλλογιστικοὶ ἰβ' add.C τρόποι συλλογικοὶ ἰβ' add.A

Γρηγορίου Νύσσης κατὰ μαιχαίων τρόποι συλλογιστικοὶ δώδεκα O

Κατὰ μαιχαίων διὰ δέκα συλλογισμῶν, ὅτι τὸ κακὸν φθαρτὸν, καὶ γενητὸν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον· καὶ ὁ τούτου δὲ πατὴρ διάβολος οὐκ ἀγέννητος B

Γρηγορίου Νύσσης Τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ μαιχαίων λόγος, δώδεκα συλλογισμῶν, ὅτι τὸ κακὸν φθαρτὸν καὶ γενητὸν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον καὶ ὁ τούτου δὲ πατὴρ διάβολος οὐκ ἀγέννητος U Le Duc

Πρὸς μαιχαίους Γρηγορίου Νύσσης [sic] V
sine titulo L

2 Πᾶν : ἄλλως τε πᾶν L Εἴ τι ἂν B U Le Duc τι ἂν V δὲ om. L V

κολαζόμενον: κολαστέον L (cf. SHF) οὐδέν: οὐ δὲ A O

3 post ἀφθαρτον: τὸ μὴ ἀφθάρτως ὑπάρχον φθαρτὸν add.L 4 ἔστι: ἔστιν L

4-5 ἀγέννητον: ἀγέννητον A C O U Le Duc 6 κακὸν¹: κακῶν A

τῷ τὸ κακὸν ποιὸν: τὸ τῷ κακοποιῶν A O 7 οὐκ om. A O

8 φθαρτικᾶ: φθαρτά U Le Duc ἀγέννητα: ἀγέννητα A C O U Le Duc ἀφθαρτα: ὄντα οὐ φθαρτά U

Le Duc 10 ἀγέννητον: ἀγέννητον A C O U Le Duc ὑπὸ: τὸ U Le Duc

11 ἀγέννητον: ἀγέννητον A C O P U Le Duc 12 ἀγέννητον: ἀγέννητον A C O P U Le Duc

γε: om. V 13 ἀγέννητον: ἀγέννητον A C O P U Le Duc 14 post Αἰ: δὲ add. P V

ταῖς κολάσσει: κολάσει L (cf. SHF) οὐ τοὺς: αὐτοὺς P μόνον: μόνους U Le Duc

14-15 μόνον κακοὺς: κακοὺς μόνον L 15 λέγουσιν: λέγουσι B O U Le Duc

16 τρεπτὸν²: τερπτὸν [sic] A ἀγέννητον: ἀγέννητον A C O P U Le Duc

16-17 τῶν κακῶν: κακὸν V 17 ἀγέννητον: ἀγέννητον A C O P U Le Duc

18 δι' ὄλων: δ' ἄλλων P δι' ὄλου B U Le Duc τὸ: τῷ A C O P

19-20 θάτερω-τούτων om. U Le Duc Migne ([ἀγαθὸν] add. Migne) 19 ὑπάρχον: ὑπάρχων A O

τῷ ἀγαθῷ: τὸ ἀγαθὸν A O 20 ἀγέννητον: ἀγέννητον A C O P U Le Duc τῷ...κακῷ: τὸ...κακὸν A

O P ὄν: ὄν A ἄρα τὸ: transp. C 21 ἐπιτετευγμένη: ἐπιτίθεται, ἡγμένην A O εἰ: ἦ V ἦ

C U Le Duc 22 post ὀρέγεται: θεὸς δὲ τοῦ φθεῖραι τὴν κακίαν ὀρέγεται add. L (cf. SHF)

δὲ φθαρτῶν: φθαρτῶν δὲ L δὲ om. U Le Duc οὐσα: οὐσία A O 23 ἀγέννητος: ἀγέννητος A C O P

U Le Duc 24 Εἰ om. U Le Duc ἀγέννητον: ἀγέννητον A C O P U Le Duc

κατὰ φύσιν-τὸ κακὸν supra lin. U τὸ κακὸν εἶναι: τῷ κακῷ εἶναι A C τῷ κακὸν εἶναι O τὸ εἶναι

κακῷ V 25 post δέ: τὸ add. L (cf. SHF) τὸ...ἀμαρτάνει: om. V κακὸν: ἀγέννητον U Le

Duc 26 ἀμαρτάνον: ἀμαρτάνων(?) U ἀμαρτάνειν M ἀγέννητος: ἀγέννητος A C O P

ἀγέννητον U Le Duc

1. Everything evil is to be punished. But nothing which undergoes punishment is incorruptible. Therefore nothing evil is incorruptible.

2. Nothing subject to corruption is unoriginate. But evil is subject to corruption. Therefore evil is not unoriginate.

3. Nothing is evil in substance, since evil is a quality. But no quality is a substance. Therefore evil is not a substance.

4. Every contrary causes the destruction of its opposite. But unoriginate things are incorruptible. Therefore contraries are not incorruptible [sic!].

5. Nothing unoriginate is subject to change. But good undergoes change when it has been dominated by evil. Therefore good is not unoriginate [sic!].
6. The unoriginate does not desire any corruption, nor does it produce corruption. But evil desires corruption. Therefore evil is not unoriginate.
7. The Holy Scriptures say that not only the other evil ones, but even the Devil himself are consigned to punishments. But everything which is consigned to punishment is subject to change and nothing subject to change is unoriginate. Therefore nothing evil is unoriginate.
8. Between things that are wholly opposed, nothing is common. It is therefore strictly necessary that what is an attribute of one is not an attribute of the other. But being unoriginate is an attribute of the good. Therefore neither of these [i.e. the unoriginate and the good] is an attribute of evil. Therefore evil is not being.
9. Everyone who desires something reasonably has the desire satisfied, if he desires it reasonably. Therefore evil is one of the things subject to corruption. Being one of the things subject to corruption, it shall be destroyed. Being destroyed, it is not unoriginate.
10. If evil is unoriginate, then evil is a natural attribute. But no one who acts in accordance with nature sins. Therefore evil does not sin. What does not sin is not blameworthy. But Satan is blameworthy. Therefore he is not unoriginate.

d) Didymus' Catena Fragment on Rom. 7 (Karl Staab, Pauluskommentare aus der Griechischen Kirche. Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen XV [Münster: Aschendorff, 1933], 1-6)

By doing good, the holy Apostle became a spotless image for those whom he instructed. For this reason, he cried out, "Be imitators of me, just as I am of Christ."¹ Therefore what he said of himself is not to be taken literally: "I know that the good does not dwell in my flesh"² or "Wretched man that I am, who will set me free from this body of death?"³ Instead, these and all passages that are of the same kind he utters, delivering a speech in an assumed persona, so that he may convict those who are prone to sin. Just as Holy Scripture is able to call people "carnal," "material-minded," "spiritual"⁴ and by countless other names in consequence of their actions, it is also able to call the Devil not only "Satan,"⁵ "Adversary,"⁶ "Accuser,"⁷ "snake,"⁸ "lion,"⁹ and "Beliar,"¹⁰ but also "flesh," "law," "sin," and "death." For through our disobedience, we have become subject to these things and not to Christ. For this reason, he says, "When we were in the flesh,"¹¹ showing that now they were no longer "in the flesh," although they existed in a fleshly body; therefore he is denouncing not the flesh with which we are clothed, but rather that which is *called* "flesh," having the same name but a different nature. It is the latter from which we were set free, since we have died in Christ by being buried with him through baptism.¹² We have truly been freed from this "flesh", for he goes on to say: "But now we have been released from the law of sin, having died to that by which we

were held fast, so that we might serve in newness of spirit and not in the obsolescence of the letter."¹³ He perhaps began again to assume another persona for the sake of the argument, starting at the phrase, "What shall we say then? That the Law is sin? God forbid!"¹⁴ and continuing up until the passage, "O wretched man that I am, who will set me free from this body of death?"¹⁵ Having laid an unshakeable foundation in the introduction, he then defends his own position, saying "What then? Is the Law sin? God forbid!The law is holy and the commandment is holy, just, and good."¹⁶ The "law" which he speaks of there is not "the law which wars against the law of" our mind,¹⁷ but rather the Law which warns us beforehand and punishes those who sin. For this reason, it was reckoned to be holy, just and good. Perhaps he began again to explain [the matter] in accordance with those things which he had previously discussed, offering a word of thanksgiving by way of a preface: "I give thanks to God through Jesus Christ our Lord."¹⁸ Then to condemn those who use such passages as a pretext¹⁹ and malign the flesh with which we are clothed, he asks rhetorically: "So then, do I myself obey the Law of God with my mind, while with my flesh I obey the law of sin?"²⁰ Am I Paul thus divided, with one part of me obeying the Law of God, while the other part serves the law of sin? Do I therefore have within myself both Christ and Beliar, both at the same time and in the same respect? Do I, who say falsely, 'I live, yet it is no longer I, but Christ who lives in me'²¹ have sin living within me? I who proclaimed to others, 'Do you not know that your bodies are a temple of the Holy Spirit who is within you? Therefore glorify God in your members'²² ,

do I myself have nothing good in my body?" But he is not like that; he is not ! ("God forbid !") For he who was formerly "a child of wrath"²³ and a "vessel of wrath"²⁴ became an honourable "elect vessel"²⁵ by altering his way of life, not his nature. Thus the things spoken in another persona befit neither the divinely-inspired Paul nor anyone who has been buried with Christ through baptism,²⁶ since they have been set free from what is called "flesh". For such persons shall no longer be condemned because of Adam's disobedience; sin no longer reigns over them, nor does the death which came about through sin.²⁷ For they have been buried together in the life of Christ (who, by his obedience, has obliterated disobedience²⁸) and in his voluntary death (which has repulsed the death which befell us as a result of disobedience²⁹). For he willingly came under the law which pertained to disobedience, so that he might redeem us who are under the law which pertains to condemnation.³⁰ For this reason everyone who has been redeemed has said, "Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord."³¹ For what the Law was powerless to do (since it was weak because of the flesh), God did by sending his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh; by this means, he condemned sin in the flesh."³² That this is the correct view of the matter, the holy Apostle goes on to say: "There is thus no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus. For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me free from the law of sin and death,"³³ etc.

At this point, I shall try to treat briefly and cursorily what was said in a different persona about these matters, beginning at the

passage, "Sin, seizing the opportunity afforded by the commandment, deceived me and, through it, put me to death."³⁴

The term "sin" does not indicate an underlying substance, but rather certain conduct and way of life in which one has failed to achieve a state of affairs which is rational and correct. Since "sin" is the most general term, it is predicated of many different states of affairs. No sinful act occurs because of reason or a prescriptive law. For if it came about in accordance with law and right reason, it would no longer be a sinful act, having a definite and ordered reason for its occurrence. Since the holy Apostle does not mention simply "sins", but rather "sin" in the most general sense as having a way of thinking and having a law, while being able to deceive and provide occasions for the production of evil, he does not call anyone else "sin" in a general way, but rather the Devil himself, who is the first cause and father of sins. For this reason, the apostle declared that the Devil also reigns over sinful actions: "Let not sin reign in your mortal body"³⁵ . For just as we call people after the trade they practice, Paul calls the Devil himself "sin", since he was the inventor of sin in the first place.

Accordingly, since it was through the commandment given to Adam that he deceived humanity (even Adam himself), he was provided with opportunities by the commandment.³⁶ This is the commandment: "Why then", he says, "did God say, 'You shall not eat the fruit of any tree in paradise'?"³⁷ ...On the day you eat the fruit from it, your eyes shall be opened and you shall be like gods, recognizing good and evil."³⁸ He cleverly hid from them his

deception by means of a greater promise; he promised more so that he might overthrow the guardians of the commandment themselves through a similar collapse of the foundations of virtue. For having goaded humanity on to wish to become equal with God,³⁹ he was provided with an opportunity for instruction of a deceitful character as a result of the commandment which had been given. For this reason, Paul said, "Sin, seizing the opportunity provided by the commandment, deceived me".⁴⁰ So that certain persons might not accuse either the commandment or the God who gave the commandment, he used an expression of a similar kind and a kindred nature, speaking as follows: "We know that the law is holy and the commandment is holy, just, and good."⁴¹

Since not even "sin" itself (i.e. the Devil) is sin by nature or in substance, he goes on to say, "so that through the commandment, sin might become exceedingly sinful."⁴² For what something is in substance will not admit of more or less, for it is precisely what it is, always being this very thing in virtue of its substance. In the case of a person who comes to be and subsequently becomes something (whether a little bit or excessively), he is different in substance from the accidents which supervene in him. For quantity is not substance but is a feature of substance, not being substance. Thus, what is called "sin" by the Apostle admits of becoming more sinful, "so that sin might become exceedingly sinful." Therefore sin qua sin took its origin from being sin, not being in the beginning excessively sinful through having sinned. He therefore shows that the increase to become exceedingly sinful was to happen at a later time, when he

says,"so that *through the commandment*, sin might become exceedingly sinful." If they should say, "How could the commandment be good and just? How can the commandment and the law be holy when it was through the opportunity which these provided that sin became exceedingly sinful?" In response to these questions, let them hear that if something should prove injurious, that which provides occasion for injury is not thereby bad and harmful. Although those who gaze at the sun in an undisciplined and immoderate fashion injure their sight, we do not therefore say that the sun is harmful. Although the Devil has become exceedingly sinful by having attacked the Son of God, we do not therefore say that the Son of God is bad and harmful.

"I know that the good does not dwell in me, i.e. in my flesh."⁴³ Now he expounds [the matter] in the person of Adam. Because he has been deprived of having God within him, he exchanged death for what is truly life. For it was not only the ordinary death that ruled over his members, but also the death which entered into his soul as a result of disobedience. For the death which reigned prior to Christ's sojourn among us held a greater sway, holding disobedience over everyone as law and sceptre of his kingdom. Yet the dominion of death was not without a beginning nor was it unoriginate. For being dead presupposes the existence of living beings, while to have become disobedient presupposes the obedience of the obedient.

"Wishing for what is right is open to me, but bringing it about is not. For I do not do the good I wish to do; instead I do what I hate."⁴⁴ If wishing alone is within our power, but bringing about the desired

right action is not within our power, then in vain has the good God sent down souls which are consubstantial with himself into bodies. For they do not do what is dear to God and to their souls, nor do they put it into action, but only wish. Perhaps this is not the case, for the matter remains unclear. If this is actually the case, I shall say in the manner of the ungodly: "Therefore what is right was not to be found in life, nor shall it be, nor has anyone ever brought it about." If indeed they understand [the passage] 'I do not do the good I wish to do; instead I do what I hate' in accordance with the denial of the noble and good to every human being, how can it be then that the names of the virtues have been found in human life? If there are persons who do what is right (even if there should be few who do it), then not all shall say, "We know that the good does not dwell in us"⁴⁵, for they do the good which they desired.

If those who do good do this while they are in a fleshly body and those who do not do good but rather evil are also in a fleshly body, then one must attribute the cause of the good's non-occurrence not to the flesh but rather to such persons' weakness of character. For if evil continues to dwell in those who wish to do what is right, and what is right is not likewise present in those who wish to do evil, and it is by having previously reflected and willed that they proceed to such a degree of activity, then our bodies are not bad either in nature or in substance. For deliberation and volition precede our actions; these things belong to a soul which has the power of self-determination, being able to incline toward the actions it desires.

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"Now it is no longer I who bring it about, but rather the sin dwelling within me."⁴⁶ By this declaration, he defended his position that the flesh is really not bad by nature. For the flesh with which we are clothed does not dwell within us; instead, it is the Devil who dwells in wrongdoers. For in regard to him [i.e. the Devil], I say: Christ dwells in every just person who does what is good; I believe that the Devil dwells in every wrongdoer in the same fashion. We are therefore not wicked insofar as we have a fleshly body. Instead it is the sin dwelling within us that is evil; this is something distinct from the human flesh and soul. For it is especially in the soul that the Devil is said to take up his abode. Thus it is said: "Satan entered into Judas' heart"⁴⁷ and "Ananias, why has Satan filled your heart?"⁴⁸ Well was it said, "It is no longer I who bring it about, but rather the sin dwelling within me."⁴⁹ For there is a great difference between a product and [its] production, since production precedes the product, as is obvious in the case of a house or a ship. Production is the prior preparation of the raw material. The sin dwelling in sinners (i.e. Satan, as we agreed in our earlier arguments) causes the formation of the idea of future evil; when the soul has admitted him [i.e. Satan], it cooperates with him in the production of evil, just as in the case of those who beget, the woman's womb brings to maturity what was begotten. Since "evil reasonings proceed from the heart",⁵⁰ [i.e.] from the conception which is produced by the Devil, the divine oracle cries, "We demolish arguments and every pretension that sets itself up against the knowledge of God."⁵¹

So then, just as the Holy Spirit is said to work together with souls that love virtue ([for Paul says.] "I worked harder than all of them--yet not I, but the grace of God that was with me"⁵²), so also whenever the indolent soul has been won over by the Devil's exhortations, it has an accomplice in evil--the Devil himself--for the Devil previously prepared in him the representation of future sin. For this reason, it was said, "It is no longer I who bring it about, but the sin dwelling within me."⁵³

NOTES

Didymus--Catena Fragment on Rom. 7--Translation

1. 1 Cor. 11:1
2. Rom. 7:18
3. Rom. 7:24
4. Rom. 7:14; 1 Cor. 2:13f.; 3:1,3; Jude 19
5. 3 Kings 11:14,23 (LXX); Mt. 4:10; 12:26; Rom. 16:20
6. 2 Thess. 2:4
7. Job 1:6ff.; Mt. 4:1
8. Gen. 3:1; Rev. 12:9,14,15; 20:2
9. 1 Pet. 5:8
10. 2 Cor. 6:15
11. Rom. 7:5
12. Rom. 6:3-4; Col. 2:12
13. Rom. 7:6
14. Rom. 7:7
15. Rom. 7:24
16. Rom. 7:7,12
17. Rom. 7:23
18. Rom. 7:25
19. Or "find such beliefs unsuitable", if ἀφορμάζω is a late form of ἀφαρμόζω.

20. Rom. 7:25
21. Gal. 2:20
22. 1 Cor. 6:19-20
23. Eph. 2:3
24. Rom. 9:20
25. Acts 9:15
26. Rom. 6:3-4; Col. 2:12
27. Rom. 5:12
28. Rom. 5:19
29. Cf. Rom. 6:8-11
30. Cf. Gal. 4:4-5
31. Rom. 7:25
32. Rom. 8:3
33. Rom. 8:1-2
34. Rom. 7:11
35. Rom. 6:12
36. Cf. Rom. 7:11
37. Gen. 3:1 (LXX)
38. Gen. 3:5 (LXX)
39. Cf. Phil. 2:6
40. Rom. 7:11
41. Rom. 7:12
42. Rom. 7:13

43. Rom. 7:18
44. Rom. 7:18
45. Rom. 7:18
46. Rom. 7:20
47. Lk. 22:3
48. Acts 5:3
49. Rom. 7:20
50. Mt. 15:19; Mk. 7:21
51. 2 Cor. 10:4-5
52. 1 Cor. 15:10
53. Rom. 7:20

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





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