

Université de Montréal

Ethnic Political Participation in Montreal:  
The Role of Community Leaders

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The Role of Community Leaders

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### Summary

This thesis examines the relationship between electoral mobilization by community leaders and voter turnout in five Montreal ethnic communities during three recent elections: the 1993 federal, the 1994 provincial and the 1994 Montreal municipal elections. Using a combination of interview data, socio-economic statistics derived from the 1991 census and official polling results, the sources and effects of mobilization are identified.

The thesis examines the problem of voter turnout from a rational choice perspective. It reviews the leading rational choice solutions to the "paradox of voting" and finds one model, which incorporates the role of intermediary social groups and leaders, to be most promising. From this model, six research hypotheses are derived. The first three identify the conditions under which mobilization is expected to take place. The next two specify the kinds of arguments leaders are expected to use when mobilizing turnout. The final hypothesis predicts that mobilization by group leaders increases voter turnout within the group. The overall results are weak, leading to the conclusion that the model is not supported and that the paradox of voting remains.

The findings indicate that leaders are more likely to mobilize turnout when they perceive that group-specific benefits will accrue from the election of a particular candidate or party. Contrary to the model's predictions, however, leaders do not take into account the probability that their actions will affect the outcome of the election. Leaders who perceive the race to be close are not more

likely to mobilize than those who perceive it to be one-sided. The only indication that leaders are aware of probabilistic considerations comes from the finding that leaders do not mobilize on behalf of candidates who have no chance of winning.

When mobilizing group members to vote, leaders are slightly more likely to make use of consumption than instrumental benefits. Consumption benefits are derived from the act of voting itself, while instrumental benefits are derived from the outcome of the election. This finding is weakly supportive of the model. Contrary to the model's predictions, leaders do not make greater use of relational than non-relational benefits when mobilizing turnout. Relational benefits derive from a particular relationship existing among a specific sub-set of individuals and can only be enjoyed if shared with other members of the group; non-relational benefits can be enjoyed either alone or by an arbitrary number of people. The findings indicate that leaders make greater use of non-relational benefits when convincing group members to vote. The most important argument used is that of civic duty.

Finally, the data show that mobilization by group leaders does not result in increased turnout by group members. In fact, there is little or no relationship between variations in mobilization and variations in the rate of turnout across communities or elections. The final observation -- that the most important reason for voting is a sense of civic duty -- supports neither the particular model used in this study nor rational choice theory in general.

## Résumé

Cette thèse examine l'effet de la mobilisation électorale sur le taux de participation dans cinq communautés ethniques de Montréal pendant trois élections récentes: l'élection fédérale de 1993, l'élection provinciale de 1994 et l'élection municipale de 1994. La thèse cherche à identifier les causes et les effets de la mobilisation par les leaders des communautés chinoise, grecque, italienne, juive et portugaise.

La thèse se fonde sur la théorie des choix rationnels. Selon cette approche, ou plutôt cette famille d'approches, chaque électeur décide de participer ou non selon sa propre évaluation des coûts et des bénéfices de l'action et de la probabilité que son propre effort sera décisif. En tout temps, l'individu cherche à maximiser sa propre utilité. Si les bénéfices anticipés sont plus grands que les coûts, l'individu décide de participer; si le contraire est vrai, l'individu décide de s'abstenir. En expliquant la décision de voter en termes simples et clairs, la théorie est parcimonieuse. Malheureusement, les prédictions qu'elle produit ne s'accordent pas avec les observations de la réalité. Le problème se trouve dans l'aspect probabiliste du calcul individuel. Puisque la probabilité qu'un seul vote soit décisif est très minime -- presque nulle -- dans la plupart des élections, la théorie prédit que la grande majorité des gens ne votera pas. Manifestement cette prédiction n'est pas confirmée par les faits; dans la plupart des

pays démocratiques la très grande majorité vote. Même aux États-Unis, où le taux de participation aux élections présidentielles se situe autour de cinquante pour-cent, le niveau de participation dépasse les prévisions de la théorie.

Plusieurs solutions au "paradoxe du vote" ont été proposées. La solution la plus connue postule que les gens votent afin d'obtenir des bénéfices de consommation, c'est-à-dire des bénéfices qui découlent de l'acte de voter plutôt que du résultat de l'élection. Voter pour remplir son devoir de citoyen ou pour affirmer sa croyance en la démocratie sont des exemples de bénéfices de consommation. Cette solution a été critiquée comme étant tautologique et apolitique. En augmentant de façon arbitraire le nombre potentiel de bénéfices, toute action devient rationnelle et la théorie n'est plus falsifiable.

Une solution qui s'annonce prometteuse explique la participation électorale en postulant un rôle mobilisateur pour les leaders de groupes sociaux. Selon ce modèle, le processus de mobilisation électorale s'effectue en deux étapes. Dans un premier temps, les leaders de groupes sociaux négocient avec les candidats au sujet des politiques importantes pour le groupe. En échange des promesses politiques du candidat, c'est-à-dire des bénéfices instrumentaux, le leader promet d'accroître le taux de participation des membres de son groupe. Dans un deuxième temps, les leaders cherchent à mobiliser les membres du groupes en faisant

appel à des bénéfices de consommation de type "relationnel". Ce sont des bénéfices qui dérivent de l'acte de vote et dont la jouissance dépend d'une relation sociale spécifique. Voter pour affirmer son allégeance au groupe constitue un exemple d'un tel bénéfice. Dans ce modèle, les bénéfices offerts aux individus sont des bénéfices de consommation, mais ils dépendent de l'existence a priori de bénéfices instrumentaux. Puisqu'ils varient d'une élection à l'autre, ces bénéfices évitent d'être tautologiques et apolitiques.

La thèse cherche à vérifier six hypothèses dérivées de ce modèle. Les trois premières hypothèses stipulent les conditions sous lesquelles se produit la mobilisation. Selon la première hypothèse, la mobilisation dépend de la perception par les leaders de groupe qu'un des candidats ou partis détient une position plus bénéfique pour le groupe que n'importe quel autre candidat ou parti. D'après la deuxième hypothèse, la mobilisation est plus importante quand les leaders de groupe s'attendent à un résultat serré plutôt qu'à un résultat non-serré. La troisième hypothèse prédit que si l'élection n'est pas perçue comme étant serrée, la mobilisation est plus importante quand le candidat préférée est perçu comme étant en avance. Les hypothèses quatre et cinq décrivent la nature des bénéfices qu'utilisent les leaders afin de mobiliser les membres du groupe. Selon la quatrième hypothèse, les leaders utilisent des bénéfices de consommation plutôt que des bénéfices instrumentaux, tandis que la cinquième hypothèse prédit que les



leaders utilisent des bénéfiques relationnels plutôt que des bénéfiques non-relationnels. La dernière hypothèse prédit que la mobilisation par les leaders augmente le taux de participation par les membres du groupe.

Pour vérifier ces hypothèses, les données provenant de trois sources sont utilisées. Les informations sur les perceptions et les activités électorales des leaders sont tirées d'entrevues semi-dirigées avec les leaders des communautés ethniques. Ces informations permettent de ranger les cinq communautés selon les attentes des leaders et selon la quantité de mobilisation. Sur la base de ces rangements, les trois premières hypothèses sont vérifiées. Les entrevues fournissent également les informations sur la nature qualitative de la mobilisation, ce qui permet la vérification des hypothèses quatre et cinq. Enfin, pour vérifier l'effet de la mobilisation sur le taux de participation dans les communautés, les informations provenant des entrevues sont mises en relation avec les résultats électoraux officielles au niveau des stations de vote et les données socio-économiques du recensement de 1991, mesurées au niveau du secteur de dénombrement. La thèse utilise ainsi l'analyse écologique pour mesurer la participation par les communautés ethniques.

Les résultats indiquent que trois des hypothèses sont confirmées et trois sont infirmées. La première hypothèse est confirmée. On trouve ainsi que la mobilisation est plus importante

quand les leaders s'attendent à recevoir des bénéfiques d'un candidat ou d'un parti. Par contre, l'hypothèse deux n'est pas confirmée; les leaders ne sont pas plus portés à mobiliser quand la course est perçue comme étant serrée. Ceci indique que les leaders ne tiennent pas compte de la probabilité d'avoir une influence sur le résultat final. Le fait que la troisième hypothèse est confirmée indique que les leaders ne sont pas totalement inconscients des probabilités; ils ne mobilisent pas quand leurs candidats préférés n'ont aucune chance de gagner.

L'hypothèse quatre est confirmée. Les leaders ont plus tendance à utiliser des bénéfiques de consommation quand ils essaient de convaincre les gens de voter. Par contre, l'hypothèse cinq n'est pas confirmée. On constate que les leaders n'utilisent pas des bénéfiques relationnels plus souvent que des bénéfiques non-relationnels. En fait, l'argument le plus utilisé par les leaders est le devoir civique. Il s'agit d'un argument non-relationnel parce qu'il fait référence à la société en générale et non pas au groupe particulier. Enfin, la dernière hypothèse, qui prédit que la mobilisation par les leaders génère une croissance dans le niveau de participation par les membres du groupe, est infirmée. On ne trouve aucune relation entre la variation dans le niveau de mobilisation et la variation dans le taux de participation.

A la lumière de ces résultats, la thèse conclut que le modèle de départ n'est pas validé. On trouve, premièrement, que les

leaders mobilisent souvent pour des raisons autre que celles prévues par le modèle. Deuxièmement, on constate que les leaders utilisent des arguments qui ne se conforment pas aux prévisions du modèle. Troisièmement, on observe que la mobilisation n'a pas l'effet prévue sur le taux de participation. Les résultats indiquent que pour la plupart des gens, la motivation la plus importante de voter est le devoir civique. Cette motivation se situe en dehors du modèle et de la théorie des choix rationnels en général. La thèse conclut que le modèle a de sérieux problèmes au niveau empirique et que le paradoxe du vote n'est pas résolu.

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## Chapter One

### Electoral Participation: Theoretical Approaches

Electoral turnout is widely recognized as being the most common and important voluntary act citizens can perform in a democracy, as well as being the most studied political behaviour (Aldrich 1993; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Nie and Verba 1975). Despite its importance, turnout remains poorly understood from a theoretical point of view. While the participation literature is vast and rich in empirical findings, "we still have no widely accepted theory regarding voters' decisions to participate in elections or to stay away from them" (Dennis 1991a: 24). Much of the literature tends to focus on socio-economic and demographic correlates of participation without seeking to explain why these variables have the influence they do. Indeed, studies of electoral participation can be said to suffer from "hyperfactualism" when one compares them with other areas of political science research (Dennis 1991a: 24). As a result, we can point to a number of variables that increase or decrease the likelihood of voting; what we cannot point to is a single, systematic explanation of the underlying causal process.

While the participation literature tends, on the whole, to be overly empirical, it would be inaccurate to suggest that it has been completely devoid of theorizing. There have been attempts to link empirical findings to more generalized theories of causal

processes, but so far such efforts have not met with much success. Indeed, such theory as exists in these studies tends to be implicit and fragmentary. This is due to the fact that, in most cases, "... the development of theory has been an adjunct -- often a mere addendum -- to the collection and statistical analysis of survey interview data" (Abrams 1973: 6). The result is that "... all theoretical accountings of turnout are problematic. Extant theories are strong in finding variables that increase or decrease the likelihood of turning out. They do not, in a fundamental sense, however, tell us about the absolute level of turnout, that is, why some people vote and others do not" (Aldrich 1993: 247).

Of the theoretical approaches currently in use in the participation literature, one which cannot be accused of "hyperfactualism" is rational choice theory. On the contrary, the rational choice perspective can fairly be said to suffer from too much theorizing and not enough empirical research (Dennis 1991a: 60; Green and Shapiro 1994: 5). Indeed, the relative absence of empirical applications has become a major source of criticism for rational choice models of turnout. Green and Shapiro note that "despite its enormous and growing prestige in the discipline, rational choice theory has yet to deliver on its promise to advance the empirical study of politics" (1994: 7). With respect to voter turnout in particular, they criticize rational choice theorists for spending more time devising post hoc explanations than constructing and applying systematic tests of their models. Dennis suggests that

if rational choice theorists have failed to achieve full legitimacy among most students of voting behaviour, it is in part because they "... have not become a significant part of the evidential basis of the subdiscipline" (1991b: 79).

The present study seeks to address this empirical deficiency by putting some of that rational choice theory to the test. Before discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the rational choice perspective, however, it is useful to examine the most important alternative approaches to turnout and to understand why, from a theoretical standpoint, they are considered to be less than satisfactory. I have identified three such alternatives: the psychological, the sociological, and the demographic approach. I have also identified two integrated approaches that combine elements of each of these alternatives. In the following sections, I review each of these, indicating their strengths and weaknesses and showing how they relate to rational choice.

### 1.1. The Psychological Approach

It is fair to say that the psychological approach constitutes the leading rival to rational choice theory in the participation literature. Early studies of electoral participation which make heavy use of psychological explanations include Campbell, Gurin, and Miller's The Voter Decides (1954); Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes' The American Voter (1960); and Lane's Political Life

(1959). Also known as the Michigan Model, because of its close association with the National Election Studies (NES) carried out by the University of Michigan, the psychological approach views participation or abstention as a function of the individual's underlying attitudes, beliefs and values (Conway 1991a; Dennis 1991b; Abramson 1983; Milbrath and Goel 1977). According to this view, the more an individual is psychologically involved in politics the more she can be expected to participate. Indicators of psychological involvement include "a perceived obligation to participate (civic duty), interest in politics, interest in a current or impending political campaign, sense of personal political effectiveness (political efficacy) and identification with a political party" (Conway 1991a: 42).

Psychological involvement in politics is a learned characteristic which is "related to prior political experience or to learning about electorally related aspects of politics and government" (Dennis 1991a: 27). Political education begins early in life in the family, where children learn the attitudes, beliefs and values of their parents and relatives, and continues through the education system, the media, as well as through friends and acquaintances (Conway 1991a). Engaging in political activity is in itself an important source of adult learning, as individuals come to interpret "how well major actors, processes, programs, and institutions meet their demands over the long term" (Dennis 1991a: 28). In other words, political learning is a lifelong process which

results in the development of an underlying sense of integration into, or alienation from the political system. What is important to note about this approach is that it places most of the emphasis for explaining behaviour on the past history of the individual, in contrast to the rational choice perspective, which focuses attention on expected future payoffs.

The psychological approach is useful as far as it goes. Tied closely to empirical observations, it has produced a body of "... generally useful, valid, and reliable voter survey evidence..." (Dennis 1991b: 76). Indeed, two psychological variables -- weakening partisan identification and declining beliefs in the responsiveness of government (external efficacy) -- have been linked to the steady decline of voter participation in the United States since the 1960s (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Conway 1991a). The main problem with the psychological approach is that it appears trivial. Its central hypothesis, that people who are more interested in politics participate more, is certainly plausible, but it does not provide us with much interesting information. It only moves us back one link in the causal chain so that the important question becomes: why are some people more interested in politics than others?

On the whole, the approach suffers from being far too fragmentary. When it comes to turnout, it seems to be telling only part of the story. In contrast to the rational choice alternative,

the psychological approach cannot be said to contain an explicit, or well-developed theory of political motivation (Dennis 1991a: 26, 60). Rather, it provides "... a subtle, diffuse, and rather indirect theoretical approach. It is very much inductive rather than deductive; and it begins not with a grand normative question -- such as the desirability or workability of democracy -- or with a set of axioms about the nature of human motivation as applied to elections, but rather with the practical aim of giving the best empirical account possible of what causes people to decide as they do in voting" (Dennis 1991b: 74). It can thus be said that the psychological approach's greatest asset -- its strong empirical tradition -- is also its greatest weakness. Like most of the participation literature in general, the psychological approach suffers from too much empiricism and not enough theorizing.

It has been suggested that the explanations provided by the psychological approach can be expanded upon by the rational choice perspective. Consider the following observation by Dennis (1991b): "Given the Michigan Model's mostly inexplicit theory (in that its *raison d'être* has been more factual than theoretical), it might be better characterized not as a 'model' at all, but rather as a hertofore partially revealed general analytical framework into which a variety of more specific models of voting can be fitted" (p. 79). Dennis includes rational choice on his list of "more specific models of voting". Jackman (1993) goes even further when he claims that it is possible and desirable to recast psychological



elements such as political learning into a rational choice perspective because in doing so, one places them in a richer and more general context, one that incorporates "a host of other political factors [such as] ... the impact of strategic politicians on turnout" (pp. 284-285). Without trying to discredit or diminish the contributions of the psychological approach, I agree that the rational choice perspective has the potential to offer a more promising route to understanding and explaining electoral participation. One reason is that, in contrast to the emphasis on long-term personal predispositions contained in the psychological approach, rational choice takes variable, election-specific factors into account, and thus seems better situated to explain short-term variations in turnout.

### 1.2. The Sociological Approach

A second set of explanations that has received considerable attention in the literature concerns the role of group identification and consciousness in fostering and encouraging political involvement. The sociological approach, also known as the "Columbia School", is most clearly identified with the early work of Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1968) and Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954). While the main focus of these works is on voter choice rather than on turnout, the authors make it clear that both outcomes are determined primarily by social processes. According to this view, "... a person thinks,

politically, as he is, socially. Social characteristics determine political preference" (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1968: 27). Moreover, "... voting is essentially a group experience. People who work or live or play together are likely to vote for the same candidates" (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1968: 137). The assumption underlying these studies is that social connections both bring people to the polls and determine how they will vote once they are there. It is important to note that "this basic relationship was conceived as a direct one -- that is, as describing an inescapable consequence of being Protestant or Catholic, white-collar or blue-collar, urban or rural, and so on. In a society that has consisted of strong religious, class, regional, and racial, or other ethnic groupings, it seemed natural, at least to sociologists, to assume that such memberships had relatively fixed, direct, strong effects on the vote" (Dennis 1991b: 58).

This view contrasts with both the psychological model, which tends to treat social group memberships as peripheral, important only insofar as they have an impact on long- and short-term individual attitudinal traits, and with rational choice, which treats voters as self-interested individuals, "... free of undue social pressure to conform to group wants and aspirations" (Dennis 1991b: 62). For the Columbia School, voting behaviour was neither an individual decision, nor a "rational" one. Instead, it was best conceived as "analogous to cultural tastes ... Both have their

origin in ethnic, sectional, class, and family traditions... Both are characterized more by faith than by conviction and by wishful expectation rather than by careful prediction of consequences" (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954: 311).

The most important contribution of the sociological approach to our understanding of political behaviour lies in the recognition that "... much of what is contested in American politics [and presumably in politics in general] has been defined in group, ethnic, regional, and social-strata, or socioeconomic terms" (Dennis 1991b: 63). Such social cleavages are important not only for the formation of political attitudes, but also for the recognition of interests. As Dennis points out, "Social reality rewards some groups and social formations relative to others and thus sets in motion conflict along the lines of predominant social divisions, or cleavages within society. The voter simply mirrors such bases of cleavage in his or her behavior" (Dennis 1991b: 64). But, as Dennis also points out, the sociological approach has been criticized on a number of grounds. The first of these is that in making voter choices analogous to cultural tastes, it tends toward a kind of social determinism which threatens to take politics out of electoral behaviour; people vote for reasons that have little or nothing to do with politics. Another objection concerns the relatively static nature of social attributes in relation to voting patterns and election outcomes, which vary considerably. The result is that when one seeks to predict electoral outcomes using social

characteristics alone, the results are very poor (see also Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954: 85).

Following its initial impact in the 1950s and early 1960s, the sociological approach has been largely neglected by the mainstream political participation literature. Dennis (1991a) reports that there have been a few efforts to utilize concepts such as group consciousness and social communication in explaining political participation, but that these efforts have been "for the most part without the statement of any well-formulated theory standing behind them" (p. 62). In other words, while we can point to studies which show that having a sense of group consciousness and identifying with a group do increase participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981),<sup>1</sup> we do not as yet have a coherent theory linking these observations to causal influences.

Here again, as was the case with the psychological perspective, it is possible to argue for an integrated approach that combines elements from both the sociological and the rational choice schools of thought. Such an approach seems likely to improve upon both types of model by recognizing the individual's freedom of choice, and the fact that such choices are made within a social context. The model that informs this study hinges upon the

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<sup>1</sup> See also Conover (1984) for evidence of the relationship between group identifications and political perceptions.

incorporation of group identification within a rational choice framework. With its emphasis on strategic group leaders and politicians, the rational choice model proposed for this study offers a link between social identity and political participation. In so doing, it offers a more realistic portrait of the voter that may help to fill in the theoretical gap left by existing studies.

### 1.3. The Demographic Approach

The third approach to voter turnout is best described as descriptive. Dennis (1991a: 30) identifies it as "the demographic approach" because of its prominent use of demographic variables such as age, gender, race, and education. One could also include such socio-economic variables as income and occupation in this list. Dennis observes that "the studies that focus most of their attention on these sociodemographic differences in voter behavior either typically do not have a theory of what causal processes are at work to produce such differences, or else they need to seek their causal explanations in forces that lie behind such observed differences" (1991a: 30). Others have remarked that the "interpretations given for why people participate in politics vary considerably more than how the determinants are operationalized" (Uhlener, Cain and Kiewiet 1989: 202).

To take just one example, education is a socioeconomic variable that has been found, at least in cross-sectional studies,

to be consistently related to turnout. On the one hand, education is seen to reflect a person's status in society, level of political socialization, sense of moral obligation to participate, and overall interest in politics. In other words, it appears to be related to socio-psychological explanations of turnout. On the other hand, it can also be seen to indicate greater cognitive and bureaucratic skills which in turn reduce the informational and other costs of participating. According to this reading, it is consistent with a rational choice approach. The relationship between education and turnout is thus consistent with a number of theoretical interpretations.<sup>2</sup> The meaning of education as a determinant of turnout is problematic for another reason as well. As Abramson and Aldrich (1982) have pointed out, education levels have continued to increase over the past three decades, while turnout levels have declined (at least in the United States). Thus while the relation between education and turnout is positive in cross-sectional studies, it would appear to be negative when examined from a longitudinal perspective. On the whole, the multiplicity of interpretations contained in these variables means that we must look beyond them if we are to understand why it is that people decide to vote or abstain.

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<sup>2</sup> For various explanations of the impact of education (and other socio-demographic variables) on turnout see: Verba and Nie (1972); Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980); Uhlaner, Cain and Kiewiet (1989); Dennis (1991b); and Conway (1992).

#### 1.4. Integrated Approaches: Resources and Mobilization

The most interesting alternatives to rational choice, from a theoretical point of view, are those which seek to integrate the approaches outlined above. I have identified two such models: the resource model and the mobilization model. I outline each below and indicate why I consider the rational choice approach to be more satisfactory, from a theoretical point of view.

The first of the integrated approaches is made by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995).<sup>3</sup> In their "Civic Voluntarism Model" they combine three factors -- resources, psychological engagement and recruitment -- to explain political participation.<sup>4</sup> While all three components are said to be important, they place greater emphasis on resources than on engagement or recruitment (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995: 270). They stress three resources in particular -- money, time and civic skills -- showing how they are related to various socio-economic and demographic variables as well as to various types of participation. In other words, they posit resources as the crucial missing link between socio-economic status and participation (p. 282). In this way, they embed socio-economic and demographic variables in a model which seeks to explain why these variables impact participation the way they do.

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<sup>3</sup> See also Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie (1993); Schlozman, Verba and Brady (1995); and Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995).

<sup>4</sup> To some extent, they can be seen to be combining the three approaches I have identified here: the psychological (engagement), the sociological (recruitment), and the demographic (resources).

This approach -- or combination of approaches -- is certainly an improvement over the demographic approach taken on its own. But it appears to be more useful in explaining modes of participation other than voting. With respect to resources, the centre-piece of the model, it would appear that only time is theoretically relevant when it comes to voting; money certainly is not, and even civic skills would appear to be largely unimportant.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, the authors remind us that "voting is unique among political acts ... What matters most for going to the polls is not the resources at voters' disposal but, rather, their civic orientations, especially their interest in politics" (p. 361). It would appear then, that with respect to voting at least, the Civic Voluntarism Model simply brings us back to psychological involvement.<sup>6</sup>

The other attempt to integrate the approaches outlined above is made by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). Their mobilization model combines "individual" and "political" factors to explain political behaviour. Specifically, they acknowledge the importance of

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<sup>5</sup> Except, perhaps, in the United States, where some level of skill may be required to get oneself registered on the voter list.

<sup>6</sup> The model does explain why education is related to voting. The authors show that education affects voting by increasing political interest. This contrasts with the relationship between education and other forms of participation, which appears to take place via the creation of civic skills. In other words, for voting and other forms of participation alike, education is an indirect determinant; while its impact on other forms of participation is mediated through civic skills (ie., resources), its impact on voting is mediated through psychological variables (see Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995: 283; and Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995: 359).



individual-level costs and benefits, but argue that these are not enough to explain participation; in an argument that borrows heavily from rational choice theory, they point to the paradoxes of participation and rational ignorance to show that "... the question of when people involve themselves in politics cannot be addressed solely within the context of individual motives and behaviors. ...Instead, the explanation of participation, to make any sense, must move beyond the worlds of individuals to include family, friends, neighbours, and co-workers, plus politicians, parties, activists, and interest groups" (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 23).

This approach comes very close to the one adopted for this study, with one important difference. While the mobilization model used by Rosenstone and Hansen identifies the key problem of turnout -- the paradox of voting -- from a rational choice perspective, it is not particularly concerned with resolving the problem from within that perspective. Their solution to the problem is to go beyond the individual to look at social networks. I would argue that their explanation of how social networks address the paradox of voting is incomplete: it comes down essentially to a matter of reducing the costs and increasing the selective benefits of participation (p. 24). They do not seek to explain how or why social networks operate to make such benefits available. As a result, the underlying process remains a mystery.

Although Rosenstone and Hansen use rational choice theory to

identify the main problem with voter turnout, the purpose of their study is not to solve the paradox of voting. As a result, they are not guided by rational choice theory when they propose their solution. This means that their use of mobilization as a factor to augment individual resources and motivations, while part of the explanation of turnout, does not go far enough. What is needed is a model that not only includes social groups, but that also predicts when and how social group leaders mobilize, and, most importantly, explains why they do so. The model proposed for this study fulfils all of these requirements.

#### 1.5. The Rational Choice Approach

This study attempts to account for variations in voter turnout within a rational choice model of participation. This model, which in its most basic form posits rational, self-interested actors seeking to maximize their expected utilities, is most often associated with the work of Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968; 1973). According to the original version of the model, the rewards for voting ( $R$ ) can be expressed as:  $R = BP - C$ , where  $B$  is the difference in utility (or benefits) received by having one's preferred candidate win over the other;  $P$  is the probability that the individual will, by voting, bring about the victory of the preferred candidate; and  $C$  is the cost to the individual of the act of voting (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). If  $R$  is positive, the

rational individual will vote. If it is negative -- that is, if the benefits of having one's preferred candidate win multiplied by the probability of having a decisive impact on the outcome are less than the cost of going to the polls -- then the individual will abstain. In most cases, because the probability term is usually quite small, the model predicts abstention. The problem with this model is that it fails to account for the fact that, every year, millions of people in democratic countries do in fact vote in elections. Even a relatively low participation rate of 50%, such as has marked the most recent American presidential elections, exceeds the predictions of this theory. Indeed, as Barry notes "(e)ven low turnouts of, say, 25% are, on this analysis, clearly inconsistent with rationality" (Barry 1970: 15).

Students of rational choice theory are well aware of its on-going inability to give a satisfactory account for even a minimum of electoral participation among rational, self-interested actors. This problem has been identified as the "paradox of [not] voting" and constitutes one of the most important problems in voting research today (see Mueller 1989: chap. 18; Dennis 1991a; Green and Shapiro 1994: chap. 4).<sup>7</sup> Voting is seen to be problematic because the individual has very little chance of affecting the outcome, meaning that the instrumental benefits to the individual that come from voting (seeing one candidate or party elected over another)

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<sup>7</sup> But see also Grofman (1993; 1996) for the view that the "paradox" is not the serious problem that many have claimed.

can be enjoyed whether or not he or she participates. Thus voting, as a form of collective action, becomes subject to the "free-rider" problem identified by Olson (1965).

Various attempts to resolve this paradox and to explain voter turnout from a rational choice perspective have been suggested. The earliest and best known solution involves the provision of additional consumption benefits to individuals in return for participation (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Such a solution would add an additional term to the original "calculus of voting" so that it becomes:

$$R = BP - C + D ,$$

where  $D$  represents the consumption benefits to be derived from the act of voting itself. These benefits are similar to Olson's "selective incentives" which are seen to be necessary to overcome the "logic" of collective action. Voting becomes possible according to this type of argument because, although the expected instrumental benefits of voting ( $BP$ ) are still very small, the consumption benefits ( $D$ ) will often outweigh the costs ( $C$ ) and make the net reward positive. Examples of such benefits include fulfilling a desire to see democracy preserved, satisfying a taste for voting, and fulfilling a sense of citizen duty (for other benefits, see Riker and Ordeshook 1968: 28).<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> I realize that the desire to preserve democracy, being a long-term goal, may be considered by some to be an instrumental benefit. I consider it a consumption benefit because the satisfaction that comes from feeling that one has helped contribute to that goal is obtained immediately upon casting one's vote. It is

Such solutions are said to be problematic for at least three reasons. The first is that they allow economic theories to become tautological in that they "come to 'explain' everything by merely redescribing it" (Barry 1970: 33; see also Green and Shapiro 1994: 51). From this perspective, every action becomes rational and the theory, which can no longer be falsified, loses its predictive power. Secondly, such solutions tend to explain participation by divorcing it from politics. People are predicted to act for reasons that have little or nothing to do with politics. Denardo (1985) has stated the problem in its most colourful terms: "If taken seriously, the revised theory implies that socialists will gladly participate in fascist demonstrations, and vice versa, if the organizers simply provide coffee and doughnuts to the marchers" (p. 56). Finally, such solutions seem to explain rational behaviour by appealing to non-rational motivations. Having a sense of citizen duty, or desiring to do one's share in maintaining a stable democracy (Downs 1957: 270) cannot be considered rational motivations in the usual sense of the term. As Barry observes, "(t)his may be good ethics, but it is not consistent with the assumptions of the model" (1970: 20; see also Dennis 1991a: 35). Furthermore, if voting can be accounted for entirely by consumption benefits, the usefulness of an instrumental rational choice model becomes subject to question.

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not contingent on the outcome of the election (unless the election happens to be contested by a party dedicated to the destruction of democracy; I am assuming this is not the case), but on the act of voting itself.

This is not to suggest that people do not vote on the basis of civic duty, or out of a taste for voting. On the contrary, it is quite likely that they do.<sup>9</sup> But finding that they do cannot be construed as support for the rational choice approach to turnout, at least not as it has been modeled thus far. While I agree with Tollison and Willet's (1973: 61) observation that "logical or economic models of voting can productively include non-economic arguments in the citizen's decision calculus", I would suggest that great care must be taken in how such arguments are incorporated. It is not enough to simply add a new term to the calculus. If the resulting model is avoid falling into tautology, it must be explained how these non-economic arguments relate to the economic ones.

Another proposed solution to the paradox of voting rejects the notion that people make probability assessments about expected utility and suggests instead that individuals use a minimax-regret decision strategy (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974; 1975). Under such a decision rule, voters calculate the possible regret or loss, rather than the expected payoff, from choosing a particular strategy. They then choose the action which minimizes that regret. In other words, voters deal in possibilities rather than probabilities, and seek to minimize the greatest possible regret (no matter how slight the

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<sup>9</sup> There is increasing empirical evidence to support such a claim. See Tollison and Willett (1973); Ashenfelter and Kelley (1975); Knack (1994); Blais, Young and Lapp (1997); and Blais (1997).

possibility of such a regret might be). If the possibility of a tie or of seeing one's preferred candidate lose by a single vote as a result of one's non-participation produces a greater regret in the individual than the possibility of voting unnecessarily, that individual is predicted to vote. The beauty of minimax regret is that it predicts greater amounts of participation than the standard utility maximization model. But it is also subject to a number of criticisms.

Perhaps the most obvious critique of minimax regret relates to the assumption that voters do not or cannot estimate probabilities (see Strom 1975; Stephens 1975; Mayer and Good 1975; Beck 1975; and Aldrich 1993). Such an assumption has an intuitively implausible ring to it. While it may be true that voters have difficulty estimating the precise probability of their vote affecting the outcome, they are surely capable of figuring out that the chances of their favorite candidate winning or losing by a single vote are extremely unlikely. Thus the basic assumption that voters are incapable of calculating probabilities seems unrealistic.

The minimax regret model has also been criticized for being extremely conservative and for leading "to rather bizarre behaviour when applied to other decisions or even when extended within the voting context" (Mueller 1989: 353).<sup>10</sup> While individuals are

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<sup>10</sup> For similar critiques of the minimax-regret solution, see Strom (1975); Mayer and Good (1975); Beck (1975); and Tullock (1975).

expected to be extremely risk-averse when deciding whether or not to vote, there is little empirical evidence to support the notion that they routinely employ such strategies in every day life. Mueller (1989), for example, cites evidence which shows that most people do not protect their homes against floods and similar disasters even when insurance is sold at rates below actuarial value (p. 353). And yet it seems safe to assume that the loss of one's home and possessions would produce at least as great a regret as seeing one's preferred candidate lose an election by a single vote. As Mueller puts it, "Is it reasonable to assume that the same person is a risk taker with respect to home and personal possessions but becomes a minimax-regret conservative when deciding whether or not to vote?" (p. 353). Another example, more closely related to voting, is given by Stephens (1975). He points out that it is at least as possible to be involved in a serious car accident driving to and from the polls as it is to cast the decisive vote in an election. In other words, it would appear that people are not equally risk-averse in all situations. Indeed, Ferejohn and Fiorina themselves acknowledge "the messy possibility that individuals act as if they vary their decision rules in response to the decision context" (1975: 921). While intended to save the model, the problem with such a caveat is that it makes behaviour prediction impossible without a theory that can say which decision strategies are chosen in which situations (Mueller 1989: 353; see also Dennis 1991a: 35-36).



A further argument against minimax regret arises from the model's refusal to allow for a "wasted voting logic", that is that an individual may rationally choose to vote for a second-ranked party or candidate instead of a first preference in order to avoid "wasting" his or her vote on someone who has no chance of winning (Aldrich 1993: 259). According to Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974: 534), "(v)oting for one's second choice is never minimax regret optimal". Wasted -- or sophisticated -- voting, while predicted by other rational choice models, is not consistent with the minimax-regret approach because it requires that individuals make probability calculations. The fact that wasted voting does appear in multi-party systems as well as in U.S. presidential primaries (see Black 1978; Cain 1978; Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, and Rohde 1992; Blais and Nadeau 1996) shows that people do take account of  $P$  in multi-candidate races. We must conclude, therefore, that on theoretical grounds, the minimax regret model does not provide a satisfactory solution to the paradox of voting.<sup>11</sup>

A third solution focuses on the cost element of the calculus

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<sup>11</sup> Ferejohn and Fiorina recognize that the model may have "weaknesses as a prescriptive theory of decision making", but argue that rather than reject it, we should judge the model on its descriptive merits (1975: 925). A direct test of the model is provided by Blais, Young, Fleury and Lapp (1995). Using data collected among students at two universities during the 1993 Canadian federal election campaign, they find that the minimax regret hypothesis is supported at the bivariate level only; when it is included in a multivariate model along with other elements of the calculus of voting, the minimax regret measure fails to achieve statistical significance. Instead, it "...appears to be a mere reflection of a generalized sense of duty" (p. 833).

of voting. Niemi (1976) argues that it may be that the cost of voting is, practically speaking, nil. He points out that "If voting is an extremely low cost activity, then benefits from voting (or benefits times a probability of altering the outcome) can also be very small and still be larger than the cost" (p. 116). Not only that, but there may actually be costs associated with **not** voting: "This is the psychological cost of saying "no" when asked whether or not you voted" (p. 117).

Niemi is probably right in pointing out that the costs of voting are extremely small. But unless they are absolutely zero (and empirical evidence suggests they are not), it is unlikely that they are smaller than the infinitesimal probability that one vote will alter the outcome of an election. In other words, even if it takes only fifteen minutes to cast one's vote, such a cost is still likely to outweigh the suitably discounted expected benefits of voting. Thus the claim that the cost of voting is very small cannot, on its own, salvage the rational choice account of turnout. Voting may be a low-cost activity in most cases, but it is not costless.

As for the contention that there may be costs associated with not voting, notably the guilt one may feel when admitting this fact to others, this amounts to bringing  $D$  back into the equation, albeit in a reversed format. Niemi's claims notwithstanding, it is difficult to see the difference between voting to obtain

satisfaction from having done one's duty, and voting to avoid the embarrassment from non-voting. Both are selective incentives which lie outside the original calculus, both are psychological (or perhaps sociological) in origin, and both are apolitical. Most importantly, both would render the model tautological by appealing to non-rational motivations to explain the decision to vote.

Thus far, we have witnessed attempts to resolve the paradox of voting which have focused on every one of the original elements (*B*, *P*, and *C*) as well as on an additional component, *D*. Still another solution to the paradox attempts to relax or expand the rationality assumption of rational choice theory. Mueller (1989) posits non-rational, egoistic actors in an attempt to explain electoral participation as selfish/ethical behaviour. Borrowing from behavioural psychology, Mueller states that human beings learn "to avoid doing that which brings about pain, and to do that which produces pleasure" (p. 363). According to this view, ethical behaviour (like voting) "... is inherently no more or less selfish than what we call selfish behavior. It is a conditioned response to certain stimuli governed by past reinforcement experience" (p. 363). If people vote, they must do so because voting is a form of ethical behaviour and they have been taught that ethical behaviour produces benefits.

The problem with this approach is that it appears to explain behaviour as a consequence of past conditioning rather than in

terms of future rewards. As Mueller himself admits, "Modeling individual behavior as conditioned by past learning shifts one's attention from the future payoffs from different actions to the past history of the individual" (p. 364). While such a solution may eliminate the paradox of voting, it does so by effectively taking us out of rational choice theory altogether. By focusing on past learning and psychological conditioning, this solution seems to belong more to the psychological or "alienationist" school of thought than to the rationalist camp (see Dennis 1991a).

Perhaps the most interesting solution (certainly the most provocative) argues that "It may well be that both the costs and the (suitably discounted) benefits of voting are so low that it is simply not worth being 'rational' about it" (Barry 1978: 23). A similar argument is made by Aldrich (1993), who calls voting a "low-cost, low-benefit decision-making problem" (p. 264). But whereas Barry interprets this to mean that rational choice does not apply to voting (p. 23),<sup>12</sup> Aldrich suggests that it may mean rational choice performs less well for voting than for other forms of participation. The reason for this is that "(t)here are more 'errors' made by decision makers in low versus high cost-benefit contexts; measurement error will be more consequential; and a large range of variables that contribute small amounts of costs or of benefits and that are generally impossible to measure completely will have a greater impact on decisions" (Aldrich 1993: 265). The

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<sup>12</sup> See also Hardin 1982: 11.

fact that the theory performs less well for voting means that turnout may not be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action, as so many have suggested.

Aldrich suggests that the low-benefit, low-cost nature of voting means that it is a marginal decision, in which even "small changes in costs and benefits can make a significant difference" (p. 264) in the individual's propensity to vote. The marginality of voting "...provides an opportunity for political leaders and groups to affect turnout through their strategic actions" (p. 274). By raising the benefits or lowering the costs even slightly, political leaders can have an important impact on the level of turnout in any given election. Another consequence of the low-cost, low-benefit nature of turnout is that "most of the action is, in fact, in the intrinsic values of voting per se (i.e., in *C* and *D* terms)" (p. 266). The problem thus becomes one of reconciling expressive or consumptive voting on the part of individuals with the political and strategic nature of election campaigns. The solution, according to Aldrich, lies with mobilization.

The type of mobilization Aldrich suggests arises from the strategic calculations made by politicians and other elites, to mobilize turnout when and where it can be most useful in achieving instrumental, political outcomes. Thus while individuals may vote for consumption benefits, they are mobilized by politicians and elites who are themselves motivated by instrumental, strategic

calculations. Aldrich's solution would, therefore, have us reexamine the relationship between  $D$  and the other terms in the calculus of voting. Specifically, he suggests that  $D$  may be modelled to include "highly political, even election-specific, values" (p. 273). In this way,  $D$  takes on some of the characteristics of  $B$ . Aldrich argues against what he considers the overly narrow interpretation of consumption benefits by critics like Barry (1970). What Barry and others dismissed as a "mere matter of taste" can be, according to Aldrich, integrated "into a richer, highly political, and strategic account of campaigns and elections" (p. 274), if one considers the role played by intermediary elites.

Aldrich argues for a class of models in which the  $D$  term of the calculus remains the primary motivation behind the individual's decision to vote, but without becoming divorced from the political stakes of the election. In other words, a model in which  $D$  is made to be dependent upon  $B$ . The mechanism which links consumption and instrumental benefits is mobilization. It is just such a model that I am proposing for this study.

#### 1.6. A Group-based Model of Turnout

Based on this overview of the various proposals for resolving the paradox of voting, it is apparent that a number of criteria must be met if a satisfactory solution to the problem is to be

found. We must maintain both the rationality and the self-interest assumptions of the original theory. If the model is to avoid being apolitical, or worse yet, tautological, selective incentives cannot be imported wholesale, but must be restricted to benefits that are related to the political stakes of the action. One solution which seems to fulfil these requirements has been offered by Carole Uhlaner (1986; 1989a; 1989b; 1993).

Uhlaner's model can be seen to use a logic similar to that of the "closeness" literature which seeks to explain the relationship between close elections and higher turnout (Denver and Hands 1974; Patterson and Caldiera 1983; Cox and Munger 1989; Berch 1993; Jackson 1996), as well as the literature which examines the effects of macroeconomic conditions on voting choices (Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Jacobson 1989). In both cases, it is argued that the observed relationship between macro-level influences and micro-level electoral behaviour can best be explained by incorporating the activities of intermediary strategic actors who, motivated by their own self-interest, "invest" resources in get-out-the-vote campaigns, thereby stimulating turnout and/or altering vote choices. The importance of strategic actors can best be illustrated by examining some of this literature in greater detail.

Studies have shown that the closeness of an election is at

least modestly related to the level of turnout.<sup>13</sup> The standard rational choice theory would hypothesize that this relationship is due to the fact that the closer the race, the greater the value of  $P$ , or the probability that the individual vote can have an impact on the outcome. According to this view, closeness has a direct effect on turnout. Alternatively, an indirect effect has been hypothesized wherein intermediary elites, for their own reasons of self-interest, are more likely to invest scarce resources in close elections, thereby increasing turnout by decreasing information and other costs of voting.<sup>14</sup>

According to the first explanation, citizens behave instrumentally by evaluating the closeness of the election, and their own chances of having an effect. According to the second, citizens need not even be aware of the actual closeness of the race. Simply by responding to the activities of local elites (politicians, community leaders, campaign organizers), they produce results which, on an aggregate level at least, make it look as if they are responding directly to the closeness of the race. This is similar to what occurs when strategic politicians translate

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<sup>13</sup> In addition to the studies listed above, see Barzel and Silberberg (1973); Silberman and Durden (1975); Settle and Abrams (1976); Crain, Leavens, and Abbot (1987); Mueller (1989: chap. 18); and Blais (1997: chap. 3).

<sup>14</sup> While most studies so far have used campaign expenditures to measure elite activity, Berch (1993) has shown that such a measure is insufficient, and argues that alternate forms of elite activity must also be examined. In a similar vein, Jackson (1996) shows that campaign expenditures exert both direct and indirect effects on turnout in congressional elections.



national-level economic conditions into local-level electoral conditions (see Aldrich 1993: 266-270). Thus, while voters appear to be behaving instrumentally by responding to either the increased probability of affecting the outcome or the increased utility of electing one candidate over another (the *P* and *B* terms of the original calculus), in reality they may simply be responding to the decreased costs and/or to increased consumption benefits (the *C* and *D* terms) brought about locally by strategic elites. This seems to explain why, in the case of both macroeconomic conditions and closeness of the race, aggregate-level data show them to be strongly related to turnout, while individual-level survey data show only a weak relationship (see Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Berch 1993; Jackson 1996).<sup>15</sup>

Uhlaner's model for explaining voter turnout operates in a similar manner. Uhlaner hypothesizes that for those voters who identify with some group, the decision to vote may be strongly influenced by group leaders who intervene between members of the group and local candidates. In this model candidates and group leaders make bargains in which candidate issue positions are traded for leaders' promises of increased support from the group. The collective policy benefits derived from these bargains are in turn used by group leaders to increase turnout by members, either by reducing the costs or increasing the consumption benefits of

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<sup>15</sup> But see also Matsusaka and Palda (1993) for an alternate explanation.

voting.<sup>16</sup>

The relationship between candidates' promises and increased turnout is thus an indirect one. In fact, "(g)roup members need not be aware of the differences between a candidate's original and group-influenced positions, nor need they be aware of policy, nor need they recognize the source of the [consumption benefits], in order for this model to work" (Uhlener 1989a: 492). Individual group members need only respond to the mobilization efforts of their own group leaders in order to produce what appears, in the aggregate, to be a group-wide response to candidate policy-shifts.

It may be argued that such a model amounts to saying that people vote on the basis of consumption benefits. It is important to note, however, that there are significant differences between the use of consumption benefits in Uhlener's model and their use in earlier versions of the calculus of voting. Recall that the consumption benefits envisaged by Downs, Riker and Ordeshook consisted of long-standing values and predispositions such as the desire to preserve democracy or the need to fulfill some generalized sense of civic duty. These presumably did not change from one election to the next and thus were not related to the politics of the particular election at hand. As Uhlener (1989a)

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<sup>16</sup> Frolich, Oppenheimer and Young (1971) would identify such group leaders as political entrepreneurs: "Any individual who acts to supply a collective good without providing all of the resources himself we will call a political leader or political entrepreneur" (p. 6).

points out, "a sense of civic obligation and other early-inculcated attitudes that engender consumption benefits from voting ... lead to a baseline level of benefits and a corresponding baseline propensity to vote" (p. 419).

In contrast, the consumption benefits employed by Uhlaner are variable, changing from one election to the next. Such benefits can vary in their scope and nature. As Uhlaner points out, "These benefits may be economic (e.g., dollar bills in envelopes handed to known party supporters at the polls), but they are more likely to have a normative basis, such as enhancement of a sense of group loyalty. ... Thus excludable benefits include, but are not limited to, standard economic private incentives" (1989a: 395). These benefits are made possible by the particular political trades and promises that take place between group leaders and candidates, and which result in increased instrumental benefits for the group. What distinguishes this model from earlier ones, then, is that the existence of the consumption benefit is very much dependent upon the existence of some kind of instrumental benefit. In other words,  $D$  is dependent on  $B$  in this model. Because they are derived from election-specific political exchanges, and not simply the reflection of early socialization, these consumption benefits are not invariable, nor do they suffer from the defect of being divorced from politics. This makes their incorporation into a rational voting model theoretically justifiable.

One problem that remains with this model is that of actually translating the collective benefit received from the candidate into private advantages for the group members (1989a: 414). The solution proposed by Uhlaner involves the incorporation of "relational goods" into the model. These are defined as goods that "...can only be enjoyed if shared with some others. ... [They] cannot be acquired by an isolated individual ... [but] arise as a function of a relationship with others" (1989b: 254). In other words, it is the jointness of consumption, or the fact that they must be shared with some others in order to be enjoyed, which gives them their unique character. Because of this, money cannot be considered a relational good, "since payment of five dollars retains the same monetary value no matter who provides it" (1989b: 254). The examples of relational goods suggested by Uhlaner include maintaining one's sense of identity, solidarity, friendship, and the desire to be recognized and accepted by others. By thus incorporating relational goods into the model, Uhlaner restricts the kinds of consumption benefits that can be offered by group leaders. More specifically, she excludes such economic incentives as "dollar bills in envelopes", insisting instead upon more normative benefits such as feelings of belonging and enhanced identity.

While this narrowing of the model does not, in itself, detract from its clarity and parsimony, there is another aspect of the incorporation of relational goods which does. That aspect involves the distinction between instrumental and consumption benefits.

As was pointed out earlier, the class of models to which Uhlaner's can be said to belong explains turnout in terms of an interplay between instrumental and consumption benefits. Instrumental benefits motivate strategic politicians and elites, while individual voters are said to be motivated by consumption benefits. Ambiguity is introduced with the incorporation of relational goods because, according to Uhlaner, these goods can be of either the instrumental or the consumption type. Thus we find that, on the one hand, the model predicts that consumption benefits alone will be used by leaders to motivate their members to vote, while on the other hand, the model predicts that either instrumental or consumption benefits can be used as long as they are relational. Such a variety of possible benefits does not, in my view, contribute to the model's clarity. For this reason, I propose to limit the benefits offered by leaders to the consumption kind. Examples of relational consumption benefits include receiving approval from others for participating, or simply feeling more like a member of the group as a result of having voted. Such goods can be provided less expensively to a larger number of individuals than can non-relational goods. It is difficult to imagine a leader providing jobs or money to every member of the group in exchange for their votes. It is much easier to envisage a leader using group resources to enhance members' sense of group identity.

In order to overcome the problem of translating instrumental, collective group benefits into selective incentives for those

individual group members who participate, group leaders must be able to make their members feel "that they are a politically salient group with interests to defend" (Uhlener 1989b: 278). Relational goods can work only if the individual members of the group feel that the group has important interests to defend, and that it is important to belong to the group. What motivates the individual to act is the desire to be like others in the group. Thus instead of wanting to free-ride on the efforts of others, the individual wants to be more like them. This means that "a leader could mobilize participation to the extent he or she conveys the message that 'everyone' is acting" (Uhlener 1989b: 272). This conception of individual motivation sets Uhlener's model apart from other rational choice models, which tend to portray voters as atomistic individuals, acting in isolation from others. In this respect, it presents a more realistic portrait of voters than do these other models.

This approach recognizes that while individuals make their own choices, they do so within a social structure. In this respect, it is similar to the mobilization model elaborated by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993).<sup>17</sup> For Rosenstone and Hansen, as for Uhlener, social networks act to reduce the costs of voting (primarily by making information more readily available) and increase the consumption benefits (by rewarding those who comply and sanctioning those who

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<sup>17</sup> In fact, Rosenstone and Hansen refer to Uhlener at several points in their chapter on "The Political Logic of Political Participation". See pages 23, 25, and 29.

do not) (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 23). Both models also recognize the key role played by political leaders in mobilizing turnout. The crucial difference between the model proposed by Rosenstone and Hansen and that put forward by Uhlaner is that only the latter seeks to explain the mechanism inside the black box of mobilization. This is made evident in the way in which the two models incorporate selective incentives or consumption benefits (the *D* term). Because the model used by Rosenstone and Hansen is not, at base, concerned with resolving the paradox at the heart of rational choice theory, it is also not concerned with the problem of relating *D* to *B* in a theoretically satisfying way. In fact, it tends to conflate the two kinds of benefits. Uhlaner's model, on the other hand, does purport to explain turnout from within a rational choice framework, and so must contend with this problem. This is why Uhlaner's model is explicit about the exchanges which take place between political candidates and intermediary group leaders. It is these exchanges which make mobilization not only possible, but probable. They explain why mobilization (and thus turnout) is variable from one election to another.

While Uhlaner's approach has received theoretical support in the literature (see Aldrich 1993; and Morton 1991),<sup>18</sup> and appears

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<sup>18</sup> Schwartz (1987) offers a somewhat different, but congenial approach. While Schwartz sees party organizations as key, Uhlaner allows for mobilization by other kinds of intermediary social groups. And while Schwartz insists on instrumental benefits as rewards for voting, Uhlaner puts the emphasis on consumption benefits which are in turn dependent on instrumental benefits.

to be consistent with certain "casual observations of the political world" (Uhlener 1989a: 415),<sup>19</sup> it has yet to be submitted to systematic empirical testing. While Uhlener herself admits that "... direct evidence for the model is difficult to establish, since individuals may well not know what motivates their vote..." (1989a: 415), she indicates that "... consideration of leaders' appeals in conjunction with aggregate fluctuations in participation can lend support to this argument" (1989b: 279). This study seeks to fill the empirical gap by testing the model's ability to provide satisfactory predictions of mobilization and turnout in real electoral contexts.

The layout of the study is as follows. Chapter Two reviews the empirical literature pertaining to the two main subfields of this study: ethnic electoral participation and political mobilization. In Chapter Three, I outline the precise methodology, hypotheses and indicators to be used. Chapter Four provides background information on the particular elections and groups selected for this study. Chapters Five, Six and Seven present my findings. In these chapters I show when and why mobilization by group leaders takes place, what kinds of benefits are used by leaders to mobilize turnout, and finally, the impact such mobilization has on aggregate turnout levels. In each chapter, I begin with general findings, before

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<sup>19</sup> See also Uhlener (1989b: 276-279). As mentioned earlier, the literature on closeness and turnout is consistent with the model's expectation that intermediary strategic actors influence turnout. Empirical support for the model is examined in greater detail in Chapter Two of this study.



turning to tests of my research hypotheses. In the final chapter, I present my conclusions as to the utility of Uhlaner's model and make suggestions for future research.

## Chapter Two

### Empirical Review of the Literature

Uhlener's model explains electoral turnout by embedding the individual voter in a social context. Specifically, it posits social group memberships as a potential source of electoral mobilization. The model could apply to a number of social groups, including labour unions, religious, professional and ethnic groups (Uhlener 1993: 73).<sup>1</sup> The focus of this study is on ethnic groups. As a result, this study touches on two distinct empirical subfields. The first is political mobilization and the second is ethnic electoral participation. In this chapter, I examine each of these subfields in turn, indicating how much is known and how the present study can contribute to the advancement of knowledge in these areas.

#### 2.1. Political Mobilization

Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) define political mobilization as "the process by which candidates, parties, activists and groups induce other people to participate" (25). The model developed by Uhlener relies on two sources of political mobilization: political parties (candidates) and social groups. In this section, I examine

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<sup>1</sup> I disagree with Green and Shapiro's (1994: 53) critique that Uhlener does not specify which social or political groups and leaders she has in mind. While the list she provides may not be exhaustive, it does include enough suggestions to allow for empirical testing.

the empirical evidence relating to these sources. In doing so, I keep two questions in mind. First, does political mobilization by parties and groups increase turnout? Secondly, if mobilization does increase turnout, does it do so in ways that are consistent with rational choice explanations of turnout and in particular, with the model proposed by Uhlaner?

### 2.1.1. Mobilization by Parties and Candidates

It has already been noted that campaign spending -- an indirect measure of political mobilization -- increases turnout.<sup>2</sup> But what about the direct measures? Does direct contact with party activists and/or candidates have an impact on voter turnout? An examination of the evidence in this area suggests that it does, but that such impact is conditional. Table 2.1 provides a summary of studies which have examined the impact of party canvassing on turnout over the past 70 years. A cursory glance over this table indicates that while the vast majority of studies do find a significant relationship, this relationship varies with the context. Closer examination of some of these studies will indicate why this is the case.

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<sup>2</sup> See Denver and Hands (1974); Copeland (1983); Patterson and Caldeira (1983); Caldeira, Patterson and Markko (1985); Cox and Munger (1989); Berch (1993); Jackson (1993); Matsusaka and Palda (1993).

Table 2.1. Political Mobilization and Turnout: Review of Studies

Study	Level of Analysis	Measure of Mobilization	Impact on Turnout
Gosnell (1927)	aggregate	non-partisan mailed contact	Yes (variable with context)
Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee (1954)	individual	personal contact	Yes
Eldersveld & Dodge (1954)	individual	1) personal contact 2) mailed contact	Yes No
Eldersveld (1956)	individual	1) personal contact 2) mailed contact	Yes Yes (weak)
Kramer (1970-71)	individual	personal contact	Yes
Bochel & Denver (1971)	individual	personal contact	Yes
Blyndenburgh (1971)	aggregate	personal contact	No
Lupfer & Price (1972)	aggregate	1) personal contact 2) telephone contact 3) literature	Yes (variable) No No
Price & Lupfer (1973)	aggregate	personal contact	Yes (variable)
Black (1984)	individual	1) personal contact 2) impersonal contact	conditional conditional
Krassa (1988)	individual	personal contact	Yes (variable)
Caldeira, Clausen & Patterson (1990)	individual	1) personal contact 2) impersonal contact	Yes Yes
Rosenstone & Hansen (1993)	individual	personal contact	Yes
Matsusaka & Palda (1993)	individual	1) personal contact 2) mailed contact 3) phone contact	Yes (variable) Yes (variable) No
Wielhouwer & Lockerbie (1994)	individual	personal contact	Yes (variable)
Huckfeldt & Sprague (1995)	individual aggregate	personal contact personal contact	No Yes (indirect)

One of the earliest studies of political mobilization, carried out by Gosnell in the mid 1920s, involved neither parties nor groups. Instead, it focused on the impact of non-partisan mobilization. I examine it here because it is useful for what it shows about how the impact of mobilization varies, and because its findings have served as a reference point for numerous subsequent studies. Gosnell (1927) took advantage of two elections -- the 1924 presidential and the 1925 aldermanic campaigns in Chicago -- to conduct a series of experiments on the impact of non-partisan mailed contact on voter turnout. Using official polling results to compare turnout levels across precincts, he found that while there was little effect on turnout in the presidential election (an average increase of only 1%), contacting did produce an important effect for the local election: an average increase in turnout of 9% between the experimental and control groups (Gosnell 1927: 41). He also found that contacting produced a significant increase in voter registration in both elections. The greatest effects on turnout were found among those who had never voted before and in areas where the local party organizations were weak (p. 80). This latter finding, along with the differential impact between the presidential and local elections, suggests that mobilization is most effective when the overall level of political information is low and when the stakes are perceived to be low as well -- in other words, when the costs of becoming informed are high and the perceived benefits of voting are low. Such findings are consistent with rational choice explanations of turnout. Less consistent with

such explanations is Gosnell's additional finding that "some persons can be persuaded to go to the polls and vote even though their action cannot have the remotest effect upon the selection of the official personnel of the government. In cases like this voting is clearly a ratifying gesture. Our study has clearly shown that the number of ratifying gestures can be increased by the device of notification" (Gosnell 1927: 108). Gosnell's findings could be taken to suggest that for some people, mobilization works by stimulating their sense of civic duty.

Early examinations of partisan mobilization are provided by Eldersveld and Dodge (1954) and by Eldersveld (1956). These two studies compare the impact of personal and impersonal partisan contact in two local elections held in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in 1953 and 1954. Like Gosnell, they use experimental techniques to test the impact of contacting on turnout. Unlike Gosnell, they use data drawn from personal interviews, rather than aggregate polling results, to measure the impact of mobilization. In the first study, Eldersveld and Dodge divided their sample into three groups: two experimental and one control. One of the experimental groups was contacted by mail, while the other was exposed to personal contact -- carried out by university students. Both types of contact were explicitly partisan in tone.<sup>3</sup> The results indicate that both personal and impersonal contacting are related to greater levels of

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<sup>3</sup> The election was for municipal offices, and included a proposal on the revision of the city's charter. It was to this proposal that the authors' propaganda was directed.

turnout, with the greatest increases coming from personal contact (p. 537). However, the limited scope of the study (n=63), and the fact that adequate controls for alternate sources of mobilization were not included, mean that their results should be taken with caution.

In a follow-up to the 1953 study, Eldersveld conducted a second experiment during the 1954 local election. Using a somewhat larger sample (n=390), and controlling for alternate campaign stimuli and demographic variables, Eldersveld found that only personal contacting (carried out this time by both students and party workers) had a significant impact on increasing turnout among chronic local<sup>4</sup> non-voters (Eldersveld 1956: 160). But while personal contacting did stimulate turnout among voters "in the demographic groups which traditionally are less predisposed to vote" (p. 163), it did not do so to an extent greater than among those who were already predisposed to vote. In apparent contrast to Gosnell, Eldersveld concludes that "those in the potential electorate who are in the lower socio-economic classes, who have not developed real roots in the community, and who are pessimistic about the worthwhileness of political action are the most difficult to activate..." (p. 165). In other words, those for whom the costs of voting are highest and the perceived benefits are lowest are the most difficult to mobilize.

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<sup>4</sup> The sample was composed of persons "who had voted regularly in the state and national elections of 1948, 1950, and 1952 but who had never voted in local elections" (Eldersveld 1956: 157).

A more comprehensive and rigorous test of the impact of party mobilization is provided by Kramer's (1970-71) individual-level study of party canvassing in the 1952, 1956, 1960 and 1964 U.S. presidential elections.<sup>5</sup> Using data gathered by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Centre, and controlling for differences in socio-economic background, Kramer finds that "the primary effect of door-to-door canvassing during a presidential campaign is to increase turnout; there is little effect on voter preferences for national or local offices" (p. 572). He also finds that "repeated contacts have little additional effect, compared to the effect of the initial contact" (p. 572). These findings lead Kramer to conclude that parties should concentrate their efforts on mobilizing known supporters and avoiding known opposition voters, that repeated contacts are not worth while, "and that, *ceteris paribus*, canvassing will be relatively more effective in low-turnout neighborhoods" (p. 572). These findings suggest that while parties cannot alter voters' preferences, they may be able to lower the costs of voting among those who are already favorably predisposed, thereby increasing turnout overall. It is not clear what impact they can have on people who have no partisan preferences.

Yet another experimental study of party canvassing effects is

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<sup>5</sup> He uses data collected by the Survey Research Centre of the University of Michigan. The surveys asked respondents whether they had been contacted by a party worker during the campaign as well as whether they had voted (Kramer 1970-71: 564).



provided by Bochel and Denver (1971). Using a British municipal election for their setting, they compare self-reported turnout rates in two demographically similar apartment blocks, one of which was canvassed during the election, the other of which was not. The authors find that "the canvassed block had a 10 per cent higher turnout than the control (not canvassed) block" (Bochel and Denver (1971: 263). Unlike Kramer, they find that repeated contacts do result in increased levels of turnout (p. 266). The relative homogeneity of their two groups precludes them from making observations on the relationship between canvassing and socio-economic status.

Contrary findings are provided by Blydenburgh (1971). Using a "controlled experiment designed to measure the effects of door-to-door canvassing and telephone solicitation at the precinct level" (Blydenburgh 1971: 365) during a 1967 New York county legislative election, Blydenburgh finds that while campaigning did have some effect on the partisan distribution of the vote, it did not affect overall turnout (pp. 376-378). The author cautions us, however, about the general applicability of his findings, especially since they run completely contrary to those produced by previous studies. He suggests that the particularities of the election under study, and the fact that it was "virtually ignored by the mass media" (p. 380) may mean that the findings are not applicable to other types of elections in which media coverage is extensive.

Two more studies reinforce the earlier findings that personal party contact increases voter turnout, while impersonal contact -- be it either by telephone or by mail -- does not. Lupfer and Price (1972) and Price and Lupfer (1973) use aggregate-level data collected during the 1970 senatorial race in Tennessee to show that face-to-face contacting by party workers increases turnout, but that the impact varies with contextual variables. Specifically, they argue that "canvassing seems most likely to increase voter turnout in areas where (1) a large majority of residents are sympathetic to the canvasser's position, but (2) turnout tends to be low" (Price and Lupfer 1973: 434). These findings reinforce the earlier conclusions of Gosnell and Kramer that mobilization works by reducing the costs of voting.

Black's (1984a) examination of party activity during a Canadian federal election is one of the few studies to cast serious doubt on the importance of canvassing effects. Using data gathered for the 1974 Canadian National Election Study (CNES), Black finds that the method of contact, be it personal or impersonal in nature, does not matter (Black 1984: 360-361). Moreover, controlling for both the degree of competitiveness in the constituency and the individual's past turnout behaviour, Black finds a "lack of systematic turnout effects" (p. 362). While some of the regression coefficients produced are quite large and significant, they are not always in the expected direction. This is most notable for previous non-voters in competitive constituencies, where Black finds that

"while canvassing by the several competitive parties has no effect whatsoever, canvassing by only one of them actually increases nonvoting and rather substantially so (-.32)" (p. 364). It is a finding for which he has no explanation. He concludes by suggesting that "canvassing effects are not yet fully understood and appear to be fairly complex in nature. What is particularly striking is how canvassing-voting relationships are conditioned, but varyingly so, by past voting behaviour and different facets of competition" (p. 373). On the basis of these findings, it would appear that it is not possible to generalize about the impact of party canvassing on turnout. Black concludes that further research is necessary in order to better understand this phenomenon.

Further evidence that both personal and contextual variables are important when considering the impact of party contacting on turnout is provided by Krassa (1988). Using pooled NES survey data (1952-1982), Krassa finds that party contacting does increase turnout, particularly among those with low levels of education, who live in low-status neighborhoods, and who do not regularly talk about politics with their friends and neighbours (Krassa 1988: 243). In other words, among those people with few personal and/or contextual sources of political information, party contacting has significant effects. These are the people for whom the costs of voting are likely to be quite high. As these personal and contextual sources of information increase, the costs of voting decrease and so too does the impact of party contacting on turnout.

Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) provide additional evidence that party contact increases turnout. Like Krassa, they use pooled NES survey data (1952-1988) to examine the impact of parties' efforts on a variety of electoral activities, including turnout. Controlling for a multitude of individual and contextual variables, they find that people who are contacted by a party during the campaign are 7.8% more likely to vote than those who are not contacted (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 130, 171). They go on to examine possible explanations for why party contacting increases turnout. Their findings suggest that it is not because people are led to evaluate the parties more positively, to care more about the outcome, to see the race as being closer, or to feel a greater sense of personal efficacy: "all told, barely a tenth of the total impact that party mobilization has on electoral participation stems from its effect on people's perceptions about the candidates, parties, and elections" (p. 175). This suggests that perceptions of *B* -- the investment benefits of voting -- are not affected in a significant way. Nor does it suggest that perceptions of *P* -- the probability of affecting the outcome -- are enhanced. Rather, they hypothesize that mobilization by parties increases turnout because it "underwrites the costs of political participation" (p. 175) and because it "occasions the creation of selective social incentives for political involvement. It taps networks of family, friends, neighbors, co-workers, and associates and exploits the complex relationships of social identity, expectation, and obligation. People participate not because parties ask them, but because people

they know and respect ask them" (p. 176). Unfortunately, Rosenstone and Hansen do not test these two hypotheses. Instead, they provide anecdotal evidence to show that party contacting works both by decreasing costs and by creating selective incentives via social interactions (pp. 175-177). While such evidence may be suggestive of the kinds of mechanisms at work, it remains to be seen whether their explanations are borne out by systematic testing.

Another study to use pooled NES data (from the years 1952 to 1990) is that of Wielhouwer and Lockerbie (1994). Here again, the authors find that, all things being equal, party contacting has a substantial impact on voter turnout: "in all but four years, party contacting is statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)" (Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994: 220). Moreover, they find that "the effects of party contacts on voter turnout have clearly increased since the beginning of the National Election Studies" (p. 226). They hypothesize (but do not show) that this increase in effects is due to the fact that parties have become either more convincing in their appeals, or more effective at targeting their own supporters. Finally, they find that party contacting serves to stimulate greater involvement in the campaign on the part of those contacted (p. 223). They draw two main conclusions from these findings: first, that "the parties' activities reduce the cost component of individuals' participation calculus, relative to the discounted benefits components"; and second, that "political parties play an important role in

mobilizing the electorate not only to vote but to get involved in the process of politics" (p. 226). Thus here once again we find indications that political mobilization by parties operates on two levels: directly, by decreasing the voter's costs of voting, and indirectly, by stimulating some members of the electorate to become more active in the campaign.

The final study to be examined here supports the view that the impact of party contacting on turnout varies with context and personal characteristics. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995)<sup>6</sup> combine survey and aggregate data from South Bend, Indiana, in their innovative study of the 1984 presidential election. They find only weak mobilization effects at the individual level, with individual and contextual educational levels much more important in accounting for turnout (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995: 247). Contrary to most earlier studies (but consistent with those of Blydenburgh and Black), they find that "partisan contact is less important as a vehicle to get out the vote than as a means of swaying the preferences of voters who are already likely to vote" (p. 249). But they also suggest that "partisan mobilization is best understood at two levels of analysis and meaning -- the individual and the aggregate" (p. 255). They point out that as long as studies focus primarily on direct individual consequences, party contacting will appear to have little effect on voting behaviour. They conclude that "party contacts are most important as a means of mobilizing

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<sup>6</sup> See also Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992).

potential activists" (p. 256) who go on to mobilize the rest of the public, or at least that part of the public with whom they live and interact. This portrait of the "catalytic function of party activity" (p. 256) is compatible with the model proposed by Uhlaner in that it suggests an important role for community leaders who can act as links between parties and community members.

On the basis these studies,<sup>7</sup> it seems clear that political mobilization in the form of party contacting does have a significant, though variable, impact on voter turnout. But it remains to be shown in a systematic way why it has such an impact. Most of the studies examined provide evidence which allows us to infer that mobilization by parties serves to reduce the costs of voting: the impact seems to be greatest where the costs of voting are highest. When costs are already low, because of high media coverage or personal information resources, contacting by parties does not appear to have much of an impact.

These studies also suggest, but do not demonstrate in a systematic way, that contacting by parties works by taking advantage of social relationships. Both Wielhouwer and Lockerbie (1994) and Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) show that contacting by

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<sup>7</sup> I have not discussed in detail the studies by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954), nor by Caldeira, Clausen and Patterson (1990) because, although both produce results to support the claim that party mobilization increases turnout, they do not address the questions which are of interest to me here, namely when direct mobilization is most effective and why this is the case.

parties increases campaign activity among some members of the electorate. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) suggest that such individuals make use of "selective social incentives" to mobilize members of their social networks to vote. They refer to this as "indirect mobilization" and suggest that it may be even more useful than direct mobilization in stimulating people to vote (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 27-30). It is more useful because it enables party leaders and candidates to contact more people using fewer resources than would be possible through direct mobilization alone. As they point out, "by working through social networks, political leaders need not provide selective incentives themselves, need not coax, cajole, and persuade people to take part. Social networks do it for them" (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 29). This comes very close to Uhlaner's explanation of turnout. It remains to be seen, however, whether mobilization actually works in this way. This brings us to the role of social groups in electoral mobilization. Do groups act to increase turnout? If so, do they do so in a way that is consistent with the rational choice model elaborated by Uhlaner?

### 2.1.2. Mobilization by Groups

The interest in groups as a source of mobilization for political participation is far from new. Early studies played particular attention to the role of groups and particularly of individuals' identifications with groups in explaining various



forms of participation and political attitudes.<sup>8</sup> There are, however, surprisingly few studies which examine the impact of group mobilization on voter turnout. The two most direct and systematic examinations are provided by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995). I will examine each of these studies below, indicating what they tell us about the ways in which group-based mobilization affects turnout and the reasons they suggest for why it does so.

While the study by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) constitutes one of the most direct examinations of the impact of group-based mobilization on voter turnout, it should be recognized that the measure of group activity they use is both aggregate and indirect. They relate the number of civil rights activities carried out in a respondent's area over the previous eight years to the respondent's self-reported turnout (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 193, 263). Using this measure, and controlling for other individual and contextual factors, they find that "the greater the number of civil rights activities, the higher the voter turnout... Even relatively small numbers of activities significantly increased participation. Citizens who experienced an average of five civil rights activities in the seven years before the election were 3 percent more likely to vote, and citizens who experienced ten activities a year were 5 percent more likely to vote" (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 193).

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<sup>8</sup> See for example, Berelson Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954: 52-75); Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960: 316-322); and Lane (1959: 188-89).

They go on to report that "the civil rights movement also increased party mobilization, boosting voter turnout indirectly. Citizens living in the South at the height of the movement were about 4.3 percent more likely to be contacted by a political party than they otherwise would have been" (p. 193). It would thus appear, on the basis of these findings, that not only can parties induce groups to mobilize, but the reverse can be true as well.

While these findings are suggestive, the measures on which they are based are less than satisfying. Both the definition of group and the measure of the activities undertaken are vague and poorly defined. As the authors themselves admit, "the term *civil rights movement* describes a broad coalition of political, social, and religious organizations that engaged in a wide range of activities with the general aim of securing political, economic, and social equality for black Americans" (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 189). In other words, the "group" whose activities they measure is not a group at all, but a broad-based coalition of groups, some of which are social in nature, some political. The activities engaged in by these groups are not defined, but presumably include a mix of electoral and non-electoral actions. As a result, it is impossible to get more than a partial impression from these findings. They do not allow us to generalize about what kinds of groups or activities increase turnout, nor about the mechanisms underlying mobilization. Although the authors conclude that political mobilization by the civil rights movement worked "by

assuming some of the costs of political participation ... and by augmenting some of the benefits ..." (p. 196), this cannot be proven on the basis of the evidence they present. Clearly, further study is necessary if we are to understand how group-based mobilization increases turnout.

Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) use a more direct measure of mobilization. Their "institutional recruitment" measure is based on "the number of times [during the previous five years] an individual was asked either to vote or to take some other political action on the job, in church, or in a non-political organization" (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995: 388, 558). This measure is not only more direct, it is also more clearly defined: the types of groups involved are all non-political in orientation, while the activities measured are explicitly political. They find this measure to be statistically significant in predicting turnout, even when controlling for such competing factors as civic skills, personal resources and level of political interest and information (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995: 446). While the coefficient for recruitment is not as strong or significant as that of some of the other variables included in the equation (the most important factor predicting turnout is political interest), the fact that it has any impact is remarkable, given that it deals with strictly non-political organizations. These findings are also important for what they say about how recruitment affects turnout. It is clear that it is not simply a reflection of increased resources or personal interest: recruitment works independently of these other factors.

Why does recruitment by non-political organizations help to increase turnout? Unfortunately for our purposes, the authors of Voice and Equality do not try to answer this question. The causal model they put forward makes participation a function of three main factors: resources, engagement and recruitment. Of these three, recruitment is seen to be the least important (p. 270). On the basis of this study, the most that we can say about why recruitment impacts on participation is that it "seems to act as a catalyst for participation among those with the wherewithal and desire to become active" (p. 16).

What are we to conclude from this examination of the group-mobilization literature? We have seen that mobilization -- or recruitment -- by a variety of different social groups increases turnout among those who are contacted. These studies are inconclusive, however, when it comes to explaining why mobilization works. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) provide suggestions but no proof that group-based mobilization works by engendering selective social incentives. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) do not even provide suggestions.

In Uhlaner's model, groups play an intermediary role between political leaders and members of the electorate. This model relies on what Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) have called "indirect mobilization". Indirect mobilization models operate in a way that is similar to the idea of the "two-step flow" of communication:

political information flows to opinion leaders first, who then pass it on to the less-informed general population (see Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Katz 1957; and Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1968). What we need, then, is evidence which shows that mobilization takes place in two steps. In the first, political parties and candidates contact group leaders and seek their support; in the second step, group leaders contact their members and mobilize them to vote. In our review of the mobilization literature, we have found evidence for each of these steps taken separately. Thus we have seen that while parties do mobilize voters directly, there are compelling reasons to believe that they make use of indirect mobilization as well. We have also found evidence to support the second step of the process. But Uhlaner's model, being based on rational choice theory, also generates specific expectations with respect to the kinds of messages that are transmitted in each of these steps of the process. Specifically, we should find that the first step involves messages relating primarily to the instrumental benefits of voting, while the second step makes use of messages relating to (group-specific) consumption benefits. The studies examined so far provide very little evidence with respect to this aspect of the model.

## 2.2. Ethnicity and Participation

Considerable effort has been given to the study of ethnic political participation. In this section, I examine this literature

from two angles. In the first place, I want to know if ethnicity is related to voter turnout. Do some ethnic groups participate more than others? I examine evidence from both the United States and Canada. Secondly, I want to know why ethnicity might have an impact on turnout. In other words, why is ethnicity a salient factor in predicting political participation? To answer this question, I look beyond ethnicity and turnout to examine the larger body of literature pertaining to ethnic political participation in general.

#### 2.2.1. Ethnicity and Voter Turnout

Are there significant and systematic differences in turnout across various ethnic groups? To answer this question, I begin with the American literature, which is by far the most extensive in this area. I then turn to the Canadian literature, which, although less sizable, is more directly related to my own focus of study.

Beginning with the literature on the electoral participation of African-Americans, it seems safe to say that there has yet to be a consensus formed on this question. While some studies indicate that African-Americans vote less than whites (Shingles 1981; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), others suggest that racial differences in turnout disappear once socioeconomic and regional variables are controlled (Greeley 1974; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989; Uhlaner 1991; Verba, Schlozman and Brady

1995). Still others indicate that blacks participate at levels greater than those of whites of a similar socio-economic background (Olsen 1970; Verba and Nie 1972; Antunes and Gaitz 1975; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Leighley and Nagler 1992). The picture is far from clear. Moreover, it would seem that caution is in order with all of these studies, as all rely on self-reported turnout to measure the dependent variable, turnout. As Abramson and Claggett have shown repeatedly, self-reported turnout is invariably inflated, with many nonvoters claiming to have voted (Abramson and Claggett 1984; 1986; 1989; 1991). They also show that the problem is greater among blacks than whites, which means that "relying upon reported turnout can lead to misleading conclusions about racial differences in electoral participation" (Abramson and Claggett 1991: 187). These authors show that "when reported participation is used to measure turnout the conventional wisdom that low black turnout results from their low socioeconomic status and their tendency to live in the South is supported. When turnout is measured by actual checks of voting and registration records, racial differences remain even after controls are introduced" (Abramson and Claggett 1991: 194)<sup>9</sup>. As a result of these conflicting findings, it would seem that no definite conclusions can be drawn at this point as to whether racial differences are significantly related to differences in voter turnout.

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<sup>9</sup> But another study finds that racial differences in over-reporting are slight (Silver, Anderson and Abramson 1986).

Considerably fewer studies have been devoted to the participation rates of other minority groups in the United States. Of these studies, most have looked at participation among people of Hispanic or Latino origins. Here again there is considerable disagreement, with some studies finding lower levels of turnout among members of this group (Greeley 1974; Antunes and Gaitz 1975; Welch 1977; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), while others conclude that there is little or no difference once socioeconomic factors are controlled (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Uhlaner, Cain and Kiewiet 1989; Uhlaner 1991; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Unfortunately, no studies of validated turnout have been carried out for this group, so it is difficult to say if reported levels of turnout are inflated or not. Our expectation is that they are, and that actual turnout rates among Latinos are probably somewhat lower than those of blacks and whites.<sup>10</sup>

With respect to other minority groups in the United States, the evidence is more scarce. One early study of individuals of Polish, Italian, German and Irish origins found that "(d)espite the fact that [these] ethnic groups rank lower in terms of socioeconomic status than the non-ethnics in [the] sample, the participation rates of the former tend to be higher. This is

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<sup>10</sup> This view is supported by Jackson (1996), who uses aggregate data to show that the proportion of both African-Americans and Hispanics in a congressional district has a significant negative effect on district turnout. Moreover, the coefficient for the Hispanic variable is more than twice the size of the coefficient for the African-American variable.



particularly the case with regard to voting" (Kellstedt 1974: 413). Another study found that some groups -- including Irish, Italian, Polish and German Catholics -- voted more than the Anglo-Saxon Protestant reference group, while others -- including Jews and Latin Americans -- voted less, controlling for region and social class (Greeley 1974: 184). Finally, it has been found that Asian-Americans participate considerably less than other groups, even when controls for socioeconomic variables are added. In fact, it appears that Asian-Americans vote less despite their relatively high rankings on such socioeconomic variables as education and home-ownership (Uhlener, Cain and Kiewiet 1989).

Clearly, the literature on minority participation in the United States does not speak with one voice. Different conclusions have been drawn for different groups. One important problem relates to the fact that most of these studies rely on self-reported turnout to determine rates of participation. Some do not control adequately for other, possibly confounding variables. The vast majority do not examine the possibility that mobilization by ethnic or political elites might have an influence. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that further study in this area is warranted, and that such study needs to take into account the problems noted above.

Turning to the Canadian literature on ethnic voter participation, we find two notable characteristics. First, it is

much smaller in size than the American literature and second, it tends to be much narrower in scope. Indeed, as two authors have observed, this narrow approach "is evident in voting studies where 'ethnicity' usually refers to French-English differences and is often counter-poised to 'class'" (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1990: 582; see also Laponce 1994: 192-195). Of those studies which do look beyond the French-English dichotomy, most have tended to focus on voter choice as the dependent variable, rather than on voter turnout (see Anderson 1966; Laponce 1969; 1988; Taylor and Wiseman 1977; and Wiseman and Taylor 1974; 1979; and 1982). Only a handful have examined the question of whether ethnicity affects participation rates (Black 1982; 1987; 1991). Here again, very little interest has been accorded to ethnic community elites and the strategic role they may play in mobilizing voter turnout.<sup>11</sup>

Those studies which have ventured outside the traditional British/French dichotomy to examine the participation levels of other minority ethnic groups in Canada have found that, "generally speaking, minorities do not systematically participate less than the British [majority group], but where there are participation

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<sup>11</sup> The three studies on ethno-cultural groups and visible minorities produced for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing go a long way towards addressing one part of the problem identified here -- that is, the lack of research on groups other than the English and French. They do not, however, examine that aspect of participation -- voter turnout -- which is of greatest interest to my own study. Rather, they are concerned primarily with questions of representation, both within the political parties and within parliament, as well as with attitudes towards the Canadian political system in general (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1991; Pelletier 1991; and Simard 1991).

deficits, they occur overwhelmingly in connection with the foreign born" (Black 1991: 129; see also Black 1982). This particular conclusion was based on a survey study which compared "five general ethnic categories, grouped by geographic origin: British, south European, north European, east European and British West Indian" (Black 1991: 131). Such a study certainly constitutes a much-needed beginning to the examination of non-charter ethnic group participation in Canada. In particular, it points to the importance of distinguishing between immigrant and non-immigrant populations within ethnic groups. But it also leaves many questions unanswered. First, as the author himself acknowledges, the study is confined to only one city, and replication is necessary in order "to determine the extent to which the Toronto area results are typical of most urban centres ... [and] whether the findings can be generalized to minorities not explicitly examined here" (Black 1991: 131). Indeed, one of the most interesting findings of this study pertains to the West Indian pattern of participation. Black's findings indicate that Canadians of West Indian origin have much lower turnout rates than other groups, including those coming from countries with single-party systems (east-Europeans). This pattern is all the more surprising in light of the fact that West Indians "do not seem to be reluctant to engage in other forms of political activities that require far more effort than voting" (Black 1991: 148). That such an exceptional pattern of activity should emerge with the only visible minority group in the sample suggests that further study is necessary among such groups.

Black raises a second important point, and suggests another avenue for further research when he remarks that "some of the participation equality observed between the majority and minority may come about precisely because of ethnically-motivated politics... [and that]... *elite mobilization*, perceived discrimination, and response to certain issues are some of the mechanisms by which sentiments of ethnic attachment might be translated into a sort of political consciousness" (Black 1991: 149; emphasis added). It seems clear that more research is needed in the area of ethnic participation in general, and most especially in the area of intermediary elites, if we are to understand why it is that "race/ethnicity can be alternately divisive and mobilizing, conservatizing and radicalizing" (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1990: 582). An examination of the particular mechanisms by which group identification is translated into activity therefore seems warranted.

### 2.2.2. Explaining Ethnic Political Participation

We have examined the evidence relating to the question of whether differences in ethnicity correspond to differences in turnout, and the answer appears to be a qualified yes. It is time now to address ourselves to the second question, that is, why should ethnicity have such an effect on participation? My examination of the literature on ethnic political participation reveals four major explanations. These are not necessarily mutually

exclusive, although they are usually presented as such by their proponents. In this section, I present each of these explanations in turn. I then indicate how they relate to the model proposed by Uhlaner.

*i) Socio-economic Status*

In an early examination of the political behaviour of ethnic groups, Dahl (1961) presented what has come to be called the assimilation theory of ethnic politics. According to this theory, ethnic political behaviour is a transitional phenomenon, one which gradually disappears as the ethnic group becomes increasingly divided along socioeconomic cleavages (Dahl 1961: 34-36). Underlying such a view is the notion that ethnicity is little more than a surrogate for social status (defined variously in terms of occupation, income and/or education level) and that once ethnic communities become more economically and socially diverse, they will cease to behave in politically distinct ways. In other words, "...the ultimate source of political cohesiveness is the individual well-being of group members" (Huckfeldt 1983: 93).

Wolfinger (1965; 1974) presents an important critique of Dahl's view, but does not challenge the underlying premise. Wolfinger's most important contribution to the debate is in suggesting that in order for ethnic identification to be salient, mobilization by political leaders must take place. This, he argues, is only likely to occur after the community ceases to be primarily

working-class in composition, and comes to include a sizeable middle-class. Thus while he suggests that ethnic politics develops more slowly, and persists for a much longer period of time than Dahl would have us believe, Wolfinger nonetheless is in agreement with Dahl in pointing to socio-economic status, and in particular, to social mobility, as the key to understanding ethnic politics. He is also in agreement with Dahl in suggesting that social mobility will weaken the political importance of ethnicity over time because it produces "...economic interests inconsistent with ethnic voting..." and because "...the mobile individuals will come into contact with a broader, socially heterogeneous environment that will dilute ethnic salience..." (Wolfinger 1965: 906-907).

Parenti (1967) critiques both Dahl and Wolfinger, and puts in question the underlying premise that social mobility weakens the salience of ethnicity, when he proposes that a distinction be made between assimilation and acculturation. He argues that "while it is established that ethnics have accommodated themselves to American styles and customs (acculturation) by the second generation, and while perhaps they may enjoy increased occupational and geographic mobility, it is not at all clear that they are incorporating themselves into the structural-identificational-group relations of the dominant society (assimilation)" (Parenti 1967: 718). In other words, ethnicity can remain a significant force even after socio-economic diversification takes place. Parenti suggests that three factors are particularly important for understanding ethnic

politics. The first is what he calls "the vast pluralistic parallel systems of ethnic social and institutional life" (p. 724). The second comprises the "psychological feelings of minority group identity, both of the positive-enjoyment and negative-defensive varieties" (p. 724). The third is the political system itself, or the fact that "the political system, i.e., party, precinct workers, candidates, elections, patronage, etc., continues to rely upon ethnic strategies such as those extended to accommodate the claims of newly-arrived ethnic middle-class leadership; as a mediator and mobilizer of minority symbols and interests, the political system must be taken into account" (p. 717). In other words, Parenti suggests that the sociological, psychological and mobilizational aspects of ethnicity be considered when trying to explain the persistence of ethnic politics.

*ii) Ethnic Self-identification*

This explanation sees ethnicity as a psychological phenomenon, important primarily for the kinds of attitudes it engenders among ethnic group members. Those using this approach tend, like Nelson (1979; 1982), to relate ethnic group membership to various political attitudes, which are in turn related to varying levels of political participation. Nelson shows how different ethnic groups measure on his "participant culture" scale, that is on an index composed of five political attitudes: interest in politics, efficacy, cynicism, knowledge, and civic awareness (Nelson 1979: 1027-29). In a separate operation, he relates participant culture

to various forms of political participation. He does not seek to relate ethnicity to participation directly. The underlying assumption is that ethnicity is important only insofar as it produces attitudes which are conducive to participation.

Shingles (1981) also presents a psychological explanation for ethnic politics. He posits a combination of attitudes -- high political efficacy and high mistrust -- as an explanation for higher rates of political participation among ethnically conscious blacks (Shingles 1981: 77). He notes that this explanation explains not only why blacks over-participate in certain high-initiative activities (such as campaigning or working to solve community problems) but also why they continue to be under-represented at the polls: the combination of attitudes produced by black consciousness is precisely the opposite of what has been found to encourage high voter turnout, namely high trust and low efficacy (p. 88).

Bobo and Gilliam (1990) provide further evidence that ethnicity affects political behaviour primarily by creating certain psychological attitudes. They present evidence which shows that while in most cases, blacks and whites participate at comparable rates, in areas where there are blacks in positions of power (for example, as mayor), black voters have a greater sense of psychological empowerment, which contributes to greater feelings of trust, efficacy and increased political knowledge. These attitudes lead to greater participation (Bobo and Gilliam 1990: 387). It is



significant to note that these authors explicitly reject the alternative interpretation that higher participation is brought about simply by registration and turnout drives, ie., by mobilization.

*iii) Ethnic Community Consciousness*

According to this view, ethnicity is a sociological force. It has an impact on political behaviour because of the existence of certain group norms, which are transmitted to group members through social pressure and/or encouragement. One of the earliest proponents of this explanation is Olsen (1970), who proposes an "ethnic community thesis" according to which "members of ethnic minorities -- whether based on race, religion, or nationality -- may become active in social and political affairs because of social pressures exerted upon them within their ethnic community to conform to the norms of that community" (p. 684). Common experiences, usually of discrimination, create a cohesive bond among community members and enable the community to serve as a salient political reference group.

Miller, Gurin, Gurin and Malanchuk (1981) follow in this line of thinking when they make the distinction between group identification and group consciousness. Whereas "group *identification* connotes a perceived self-location within a particular social stratum, along with a psychological feeling of belonging to that particular stratum ... group *consciousness* ... involves identification with a group *and* a political awareness or

ideology regarding the group's relative position in society along with a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group's interests" (p. 495; italics in the original). They find that simple identification with a group is not enough to significantly increase turnout among members of either subordinate or dominant social groups (pp. 498-499). Rather, it is "politicized group consciousness [that] acts to promote electoral participation among highly identified members of subordinate groups at rates higher than expected on the basis of socioeconomic characteristics alone" (p. 503). They also note that "the strongest evidence of a mobilization theory based on group consciousness is found for blacks, but [that] it is also evident for women and the poor" (p. 507). This suggests that group consciousness is most effective as a means of mobilization among groups which are socio-economically subordinate and for whom the costs of participating may be high.

Such findings are consistent with those of Verba and Nie (1972), and Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978), which describe group consciousness as a strong "countervailing force" against the socioeconomic factors which act to depress turnout among black Americans and other groups which rank similarly low on the scale of individual socio-economic resources. Likewise, Uhlaner and her colleagues have found that having a strong sense of group identity, as indicated either by feeling that one's group has specific problems, or that one's group has been discriminated against, is positively related to political participation (although the

relationship with electoral participation is less consistent; see Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989; and Uhlaner 1991).

Huckfeldt (1983) examines three explanations for the persistence of ethnic politics: social status, neighborhood social context and geographic independence. The first of these corresponds to the first explanation we outlined above. The second "emphasizes the importance of shared residential location which structures the social interaction patterns of individual ethnics" (Huckfeldt 1983: 97). The third suggests that while "the ties of the ethnic group are social and cultural, ... they are also mobile. ... (E)thnic politics persist because patterns of social interaction are able to endure" (p. 97). In both the second and third explanations then, it is social networks which explain the impact of ethnicity on political behaviour. Huckfeldt's findings are interesting, because they show that no single explanation is sufficient for all ethnic groups. Thus, "the geographical independence explanation is supported by our analysis of Italian ethnics, but not by our analysis of Polish ethnics. ...The neighborhood and social status explanations do a better job of accounting for the persistence of Polish ethnicity" (p. 111). These findings confirm Huckfeldt's initial suggestion that "these three explanations are not necessarily competing; all three might add to our understanding of ethnic politics and its persistence" (p. 96).<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> For other examples of the sociological explanation, see Schneider, Berman and Schultz (1974); Welch (1977); Jackson (1987); and Tate (1991).

*iv) Mobilization*

This explanation comes the closest to the model proposed by Uhlaner, in that it makes ethnic political behaviour the result of conscious efforts, on the part of political and ethnic leaders, to mobilize people to vote. While the mobilization explanation is not new -- Wolfinger (1965) was one of the first to recognize its importance -- it does appear to be less frequently invoked than the others.

In his critique of Dahl's assimilation theory, Wolfinger (1965) argued that "no matter how salient an individual's ethnic identification may be, it will not influence his voting behavior unless he sees a connection between this identity and the choice he makes on election day" (p. 903). This was accomplished when "each nationality group in a city had leaders who bargained with politicians, trading their followers' votes for money, favors, and jobs" (p. 898). Wolfinger also recognized the utility of symbolic rewards: "when one Italian was appointed to a public position his success was enjoyed vicariously by other Italians; it was 'recognition' of the worth of Italians. Ethnic solidarity let politicians economize on the indulgences they bestowed" (p. 898). Thus we find a striking similarity between Wolfinger's early description of ethnic politics in a New England city and Uhlaner's explanation of voter turnout.

While stressing the psychological and sociological aspects of

ethnicity, Parenti (1967) is in agreement with Wolfinger's claim that mobilization by political leaders is an important factor in explaining the persistence of ethnic politics. He points out that "the political organization attempting to mobilize support faces the problem of having to construct definitions of its constituency which will reduce the undifferentiated whole into more accessible, manageable, and hopefully more responsive components" (p. 725). Mobilization along ethnic lines is useful to the political organizer because "ethnic social life provides him with ready-made avenues to constituent audiences..." (p. 725).

Borowiec (1974) is one of the few to attempt to evaluate the empirical validity of the mobilization explanation. He does so by examining the attitudes of ethnic political leaders (both elected and appointed) to see whether they consider candidate ethnicity to be an important mobilizing force among ethnic voters. His findings suggest that they do. He also finds that younger, more highly educated leaders are most likely to consider ethnicity an important factor in mobilizing support. This suggests that mobilization is not just a first or second generation phenomenon, that it is a conscious strategy which persists even as (or especially as) the community becomes economically and socially mobile.<sup>13</sup>

We can see from this examination of the ethnic participation

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<sup>13</sup> Further support for the mobilization model is provided by Antunes and Gaitz (1975); Hood (1989); and Tate (1991).

literature that Uhlaner's approach is not entirely new. The mobilization model has been around for many years, although it has not been extensively tested. What contribution, then, is made by Uhlaner's model? The difference lies in the underlying causal forces assumed to be at work. Uhlaner bases her model squarely on rational choice theory. All the actors involved are presumed to be rational and are thus constrained by the limits of rationality.

It might be argued that Uhlaner's model is no more than old-fashioned clientelism and machine politics dressed up in rationalist garb. Indeed, the image that springs to mind is one of the self-interested group leader "buying" ethnic votes with promises of jobs and personal favours. Uhlaner's model does not exclude such tactics, but says that they are likely to be rare. In most cases, it would simply be too expensive to buy a sufficient number of votes to make a difference. Instead, Uhlaner suggests that group leaders make use of "relational" benefits, that is, benefits which are dependent upon some kind of social relationship and which can only be enjoyed within that context. This means that we are more likely to find group leaders making appeals to a sense of group identity or group solidarity than to promises of "dollar bills in envelopes".

Uhlaner's model differs from early portrayals of clientelism in another way: by assigning leaders a qualitatively different set of motivations. Rather than being motivated by individual favours,

the leaders in Uhlaner's model are very much interested in political outcomes. The bargaining which is hypothesized to take place between politicians and group leaders concerns policy positions which will affect the group as a whole, not just the leader. Uhlaner's leaders are politically -- not personally -- motivated.

### 2.3. Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to review the empirical literature from two subfields -- political mobilization and ethnic electoral participation -- and to indicate how the present study can contribute to the advancement of knowledge in these areas. With respect to political mobilization, we have seen that while an extensive literature exists with respect to direct mobilization by political parties and candidates, relatively little is known about indirect mobilization, and in particular, about the role played by social groups. While existing evidence suggests that indirect mobilization may be an important aspect of election campaigns, it does not provide clear and systematic proof of such mobilization. Nor does it explain how or why indirect mobilization occurs. The present study can add to our knowledge by examining the process of indirect mobilization and by testing hypotheses which state how and why it occurs.

The other area of interest to this study is ethnic electoral

participation. My review of the literature indicates that much remains to be done in this subfield. Specifically, it is still not clear whether turnout varies significantly across ethnic groups. In the Canadian context, studies of ethnic political participation have, with few exceptions, focused primarily on the original English-French dichotomy. Systematic examinations of electoral participation among other ethnic groups are almost non-existent. Here, then, is an empirical deficiency which the present study can address. Another question which has yet to be examined in depth is that of the role played by ethnic elites in mobilizing turnout. In this study I examine mobilization by ethnic community leaders both as dependent and independent variable. In other words, I seek to explain when and why ethnic community leaders become involved in election campaigns, as well as the impact of such involvement on turnout within their respective communities.



## Chapter Three

### Research Design

The model developed by Uhlaner posits three kinds of actors involved in two separate but closely related exchanges. In the first step, candidates and community leaders trade issue positions -- either explicitly or implicitly -- for promises of increased turnout. It is expected that without such trade-offs, community leaders will have neither the motivation nor the resources necessary to mobilize their members. These candidate-leader exchanges, which contribute to the instrumental benefits component of the original calculus of voting, are then used by the leaders to provide variable advantages to community members in exchange for turnout. In order to prevent free-riding, leaders will couch their appeals in consumption terms; in order to keep their own costs low while at the same time providing benefits to as many group members as possible, leaders will make these consumption benefits relational in nature. An example of a relational consumption benefit would be to make group members feel that by voting in this particular election they are affirming their status as members of the group. In the final step, individual group members, in responding to leaders' offers of consumption benefits, may produce what appears to be, in the aggregate, a group-wide response to candidate issue positions.

A full test of such a model would require examining the behaviour and beliefs of both mass publics and elites. Lacking the resources necessary to carry out a survey of sufficient size at the mass level, I make use of aggregate measures of turnout. I also examine the activities and opinions of intermediary elites -- as both dependent and independent variables. While such an approach may not provide a complete set of measures, I believe, following Uhlaner, that "consideration of leaders' appeals in conjunction with aggregate fluctuations in participation can lend some support to this argument" (Uhlaner 1989b: 279).

### 3.1. Hypotheses

With these considerations in mind, I have derived the following general hypotheses from the model:

- H<sub>A</sub> Mobilization by group leaders takes place only when leaders can expect some group benefits in return for the support they supply to candidates.
- H<sub>B</sub> Aggregate voter turnout is greater in those groups that have been mobilized by their leaders.

Each of these general hypotheses refers to one part of the two-step relationship taking place between candidates, leaders and voters. Confirmation of each is necessary in order for the model to be supported.

Beginning with General Hypothesis A, there are two basic

expectations which need to be considered; the first relates to benefits and the second to probabilities. First, the benefits supplied by candidates in step one of the process must be instrumental in nature, that is they must be contingent on who wins the election. They must also be group-specific. Aside from these basic requirements, they can be quite variable, ranging from promises of support on particular issues important to the group, to much more tangible promises of providing actual goods (for example, funding for a community centre) to the group. Seeing a candidate of the group's ethnicity elected can, in itself, also be considered to be a benefit for the group, because of the expectation of future group benefits resulting from such an outcome.

Secondly, it is assumed that candidates and leaders are rational, and that as such they pay attention to probabilities. We therefore expect that community leaders will not mobilize support for a candidate who has no chance of winning the election, regardless of how much the candidate promises in the way of benefits to the group, since such candidates will have no way of delivering on their promises. Similarly, mobilization will be less intensive when candidates are perceived to be likely to win by a landslide. There are two reasons for this: first, candidates are less likely to make costly promises to group leaders if they do not believe this is necessary in order to win support; secondly, group leaders are less likely to spend scarce resources on mobilization if they perceive that their preferred candidate will most likely be

elected with or without their support. While it is possible in such cases that leaders will want to at least appear to have supported the candidate in order to be able to lay claim to their group's share of the future benefits, the level of mobilization produced in such cases should be lower than that produced by a close election. We can, therefore, formulate more specific hypotheses concerning the relationship between the perceived probability of the candidate's chances of winning and the level of mobilization produced by group leaders.

Turning to General Hypothesis B, there are two important components to be considered: the nature of the mobilization carried out by leaders, and the effects of mobilization on turnout. With respect to the first, it is expected that mobilization by leaders will be based on consumption rather than on instrumental benefits. This means that leaders will mobilize their members with promises of the immediate benefits of voting rather than of benefits derived from the eventual victory of the candidate. It is also expected that such benefits will be relational, that is dependent upon the existence of a relationship between the individuals receiving them. This means that benefits are more likely to be based on normative appeals than on economic incentives. It also means that the referent for these normative appeals will be the specific subgroup, rather than society as a whole.<sup>1</sup> With respect to the second

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<sup>1</sup> I therefore agree with Knack's (1992) distinction between "civic" and "special interest" norms.

component, the expectation is that turnout will be greater in those groups that have been mobilized by their leaders.

With these considerations in mind, it is possible to break each of the general hypotheses down into several more specific working hypotheses. I have grouped these together as "mobilization", "benefits" and "turnout" hypotheses:

Mobilization Hypotheses:

- H<sub>A.1</sub> Mobilization occurs only when group leaders perceive one of the candidates or parties to be holding a position more beneficial to their group than that of any other candidate or party.
- H<sub>A.2</sub> Mobilization is greater when group leaders perceive the election to be close than when they perceive it to be one-sided.
- H<sub>A.3</sub> If the election is not perceived to be close, mobilization is greater when the preferred candidate is seen to be winning than when the preferred candidate is seen to be losing.

Benefits Hypotheses:

- H<sub>B.1</sub> Group leaders use the promise of consumption benefits rather than of instrumental benefits when mobilizing their members to vote.
- H<sub>B.2</sub> Group leaders use the promise of relational benefits rather than non-relational benefits when mobilizing their members to vote.

Turnout Hypothesis:

H<sub>B.3</sub> Mobilization by a group leader on behalf of a particular candidate or party increases turnout within the group.

When determining the impact of mobilization on turnout, it is necessary to control for other factors arising from the group itself. Among the standard socio-economic variables found to have had an impact in the participation literature, age, level of education and income are considered to be most the important (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Blais 1997). It is hypothesized that each of these three variables is positively related to turnout. Variables which are more specific to the ethnic group context are the proportion of recent immigrants in the group, and the degree of mobility of the group's population. Drawing from Black's (1991) study, we can hypothesize that groups with large proportions of recent immigrants will show lower levels of turnout than other groups. Following Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980: 52), we can also expect that turnout will be lower in groups having very mobile populations, that is, whose members are frequently moving in and out of the community. Such groups will presumably have a weaker sense of identity upon which to base mobilization appeals. A more detailed discussion of the control variables and of how they are operationalized is provided in Chapter Seven.

### 3.2. Methodology

The research design involves comparing both across groups and across elections. To this end, data have been gathered for three elections and five ethnic communities located on the Island of Montreal. The groups were chosen for their size (based on 1991 Census data, using ethnic origin as the criteria for selection). They are the Jewish, Italian, Greek, Portuguese and Chinese communities. In addition to being the most populous, these groups represent a mix of older and more recently-arrived communities, and include one visible minority community.

The three elections under study are the October 1993 Canadian federal election, the September 1994 Quebec provincial election and the November 1994 Montreal municipal election. The inclusion of three different elections serves to broaden the comparative aspect of the study. Because the issues at stake, and therefore the instrumental benefits to be offered, can be expected to differ across these three contests, it can be expected that mobilization will vary as well. Examining three elections also enables me to control for certain community-specific variables that could not be controlled otherwise. For example, it could be argued that what affects a community's participation rate is not leader mobilization, but other characteristics, such as the community's overall level of political integration, or its degree of institutional completeness (Breton 1964). By making comparisons

across elections within the same community, I can control for these factors, as it is unlikely that they will have changed from one election to the next, particularly since two of the elections (the provincial and the municipal) occurred within two months of each other.

In order to test hypotheses  $H_{A.1}$ ,  $H_{A.2}$  and  $H_{A.3}$ , I require data measuring leaders' expectations and the frequency with which they mobilized their communities. Hypotheses  $H_{B.1}$  and  $H_{B.2}$  require data measuring the kinds of benefits that leaders offered to their communities. In both cases, the data source is the same: it consists of two sets of interviews, conducted in the fall of 1994, with leaders from each of the five communities under study. The first set of interviews, conducted at the time of the 1994 Quebec provincial campaign, covered both the provincial election and the 1993 federal election. The second set, conducted approximately one month later, focused exclusively on the 1994 Montreal municipal election. For each election under study, leaders were asked about their involvement during the nomination period as well as during the campaign itself. They were also asked about the involvement of their respective organizations. Full question wording is found in Appendix A.

An initial selection of leaders was carried out in the early part of the summer of 1994, using directories of ethnic group associations for the greater Montreal area. Groups of a



professional or business nature, or social groups which appeared to cater to a broad section of the community were chosen and contacted in order to determine the name of the president or director of each. Following that, a letter of introduction explaining the nature and purpose of the research was sent to each leader. Approximately two weeks after the mailing of the letter, I began calling leaders to set up appointments. Of the twenty-six letters that were sent out, nine resulted in an interview, producing a 35% response rate. All other contacts were the result of references -- either from the initial nine interviewees, or from other researchers working in this field -- bringing the total of first wave interviews to 35. All of the leaders interviewed during the first wave were recontacted for a second interview. Twenty-three accepted to be reinterviewed, for a re-interview response rate of 66% (in addition, two leaders who had not been interviewed in the first wave were interviewed in the second, bringing the total number of second wave interviews to 25). Thus the average number of leaders interviewed per group was seven for the first wave and five for the second.

In order to test hypothesis  $H_{3.3}$ , data have been drawn from three different sources. Information on the independent variable, mobilization, is taken from the interviews with leaders. Information on the dependent variable is based on an ecological analysis of turnout, in which the unit of analysis is the census enumeration area, the smallest geographical unit employed by

Statistics Canada.<sup>2</sup> Turnout data were obtained from official polling station results for each of the three elections. In order to collate turnout data with socio-demographic information, I used official electoral and census maps to match each polling station to an enumeration area (EA). If a polling station belonged to more than one EA, it was divided between them in a way that reflected the amount of residential surface area of the polling station which was contained within each EA. In sum, my sample consists of all enumeration areas located on the Island of Montreal in which the population exceeds 250 inhabitants and includes at least 10% of any one of the five chosen ethnic groups. A total of 1049 enumeration areas, with an average population of 730, were retained for this study.<sup>3</sup>

We can see, then, that in the case of hypothesis  $H_{B,3}$  the dependent variable, voter turnout, is based on an aggregate rather than an individual-level measure. This ecological approach to studying turnout and other forms of electoral behaviour is not without precedent. Such a technique was used by Wiseman and Taylor

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<sup>2</sup> The enumeration area is used, rather than the census tract, in order to maximize variation in ethnic proportions across the units. While census tracts can vary in size from 2500 to 8000 inhabitants, the enumeration area contains approximately 200 to 400 inhabitants.

<sup>3</sup> A full sample of 1214 cases was obtained for the Island of Montreal. Those cases having fewer than 250 inhabitants had to be dropped from the sample because Statistics Canada does not report economic data for such areas (for privacy reasons). This left a total sample of 1049 for the whole Island. For comparisons across all three elections, only those units found within the City of Montreal are used (n=610).

in their studies of ethnic and class voting in Winnipeg from the Depression to the Cold War period (see Wiseman and Taylor 1974; 1979 and 1982; and Taylor and Wiseman 1977). Eagles (1991) makes use of ecological analysis at the constituency level to explain variations in voter turnout in the 1980, 1984 and 1988 Canadian federal elections.<sup>4</sup> The use of ecological analysis -- as opposed to the survey method -- to study voter turnout involves both shortcomings and advantages. I examine each of these in turn.

One disadvantage that comes from using aggregate-level data is that it imposes limits on the kinds of variables that can be included in the analyses. In this particular study, I can examine a wide variety of socio-demographic characteristics for the populations living within the census enumeration areas; I cannot look at psychological factors, which are, by definition, individual in nature. The impact of group members' attitudes and opinions, whether they be about particular issues and events or about politics in general, cannot be assessed. Neither can their levels of political interest and knowledge, or their feelings of efficacy or trust.

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<sup>4</sup> For other examples of the use of ecological analysis to study voting behaviour see Gosnell (1927); Laponce (1969); Blydenburgh (1971); Lupfer and Price (1972); Price and Lupfer (1973); Denver and Hands (1974); Blake (1978); Featherman (1983); Patterson and Caldeira (1983); Cox and Munger (1989); Eagles and Erfle (1989); Berch (1993); and Merrifield (1993). Studies which combine survey and ecological data include Huckfeldt (1979; 1983; 1986); Giles and Dantico (1982); Jackson (1987); and Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992; 1995).

But the most important problem for researchers working with aggregate-level data is commonly referred to as the "ecological fallacy" (see Robinson 1950; Goodman 1953; 1959; Blalock 1964; Shively 1969; 1974; 1985; Hanushek, Jackson and Kain 1974; Langbein and Lichtman 1976; Kramer 1983; Clagget and Van Wingen 1993; Achen and Shively 1995). When the problem was first made known by Robinson (1950),<sup>5</sup> the conclusion was that ecological data should never be used to draw inferences about individuals (Robinson 1950: 357). While subsequent treatments have been less pessimistic, they have advised caution when attempting cross-level inference. In what is the most comprehensive overview of the problem, Achen and Shively (1995: 22) argue against the idea of a single solution. Instead, they suggest a variety of methods by which the biases inherent in the aggregation process might be attenuated. I address this problem in greater detail in chapter seven, where I present the evidence relating to my final hypothesis on the relationship between mobilization and group turnout.

We can see, then, that there are difficulties associated with the use of aggregate data. But as was pointed out earlier, there are also certain advantages to using aggregate rather than survey

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<sup>5</sup> As Achen and Shively (1995: 5-8) point out, the problem had been exposed much earlier (as early as 1916), but it was not until Robinson's 1950 article that it was taken seriously by the wider social scientific community. They suggest that one reason for this delay is that it was not until after the second world war that an alternative to ecological analysis -- survey research -- became viable and widely-used. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995: 28) make a similar observation.

data to measure voter participation. Eagles (1991) suggests three major advantages to using aggregate data. The first is that they enable far greater geographic coverage than do surveys. As Eagles points out, "virtually all surveys employ some clustering to reduce interviewing costs, and this has the effect of selecting individuals from a limited subset of constituencies" (1991: 4). For the purposes of my own study, the problem with survey data is not one of maximizing geographic coverage, but of maximizing the coverage of particular sub-populations. The fact remains that aggregate analysis continues to be the most accessible method for the study of political participation among minority ethnic groups in Canada. Because large-scale surveys generally seek to be representative of the entire population, they simply do not include large enough samples of most minority groups to allow for reliable analysis. Smaller-scale surveys which deliberately over-sample minority ethnic groups are practically non-existent.<sup>6</sup> As a result, ecological analysis is often the only option available to those interested in the political behaviour of minority ethnic groups.

A second advantage to using aggregate rather than survey data is that the former do not have to rely on self-reported turnout which, as we have seen, is invariably inflated and may produce

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<sup>6</sup> Two notable exceptions are Wood's 1978-79 survey of East Indians in Vancouver (Wood 1981) and Black's 1983 survey among various ethnic groups in Toronto (Black 1991; Black and Leithner 1987). For an overview of the primary and secondary data sources available for the study of ethnic voting behaviour in Canada, see Laponce (1994).

systematically biased results for certain groups (see Abramson and Claggett 1991). As Eagles (1991: 5) notes, "the turnout figures utilized in aggregate analyses are based on actual (as opposed to reported) behaviour and are as reliable as the electoral system can provide". Thus it can reasonably be argued that aggregate data allow for a more accurate measure of voter participation than do survey data.

Finally, Eagles raises the important point that individual political behaviour is a function of both individual and environmental factors. This observation has been made by others as well, most notably by Huckfeldt (1979; 1983; 1986) and Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995). Eagles' list of environmental (or contextual) variables includes the legal framework of the electoral process, riding-level electoral marginality and the intensity of party competitiveness, community cohesiveness, group memberships and interests, interpersonal environments, and third-party activity. He argues that "since constituency-level aggregate data necessarily pertain to at least some of these environmental characteristics, ecological analyses based on them are especially well suited to assess the impact of these extra-individual correlates of political participation" (1991: 5). In other words, when the factors we are interested in are by definition contextual, aggregate data may be more appropriate than individual-level survey data.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> We should note, however, that the opposite view has also been taken, namely that "aggregate data are virtually useless for studying contextual effects" (Achen and Shively 1995: 223).

### 3.3. Summary

This study provides both quantitative and qualitative information on mobilization and turnout within ethnic communities. Quantitatively, I compare both levels of mobilization and aggregate turnout rates across groups and elections, seeking to determine whether an independent causal relationship exists between community turnout rates and mobilization activities engaged in by leaders. The qualitative side of the study involves a comparison of different kinds of mobilization activities, as well as an analysis of leaders' perceptions of the issues at stake and of the best methods for bringing out the vote. In the next chapter, I provide background information on the three elections and five groups under study. In the three chapters which follow, I present the results of my research, beginning in each case with the general findings, which are presented in descriptive detail, followed by empirical tests for my six working hypotheses.

## Chapter Four

### The Elections and the Groups

Before we can begin to assess the empirical validity of the six working hypotheses presented in the previous chapter, it is necessary to describe the context in which this study has been carried out. I have selected three elections and five ethnic communities as test cases for my hypotheses. In this chapter, I describe these elections and communities in some detail. With respect to the elections, I focus on two aspects: the major issues at stake and the overall results. With respect to the communities, I examine the historical, geographical and socio-economic characteristics of each, within the context of the greater Montreal region.

#### 4.1. The Elections

The purpose of this section is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the three elections in question.<sup>1</sup> The goal is rather to provide an overview of the main issues at stake in each campaign, as well as to summarize the results. This will provide a backdrop against which I will be able to analyze the perceptions

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<sup>1</sup> The 1993 federal election has been the focus of several analyses (see especially Cairns 1993; Frizzell, Pammett and Westell 1994; Monière and Guay 1994; and Nevitte, Johnston, Blais, Brady and Gidengil 1996). In contrast, the 1994 Quebec provincial election has received relatively little attention in the scholarly literature (see Monière and Guay 1995). To date, the 1994 Montreal municipal election has not been analyzed in depth.



and activities of ethnic community leaders.

#### 4.1.1. The 1993 Federal Election

##### *i) Issues*

It is generally agreed that, in the country as a whole, the main issues of the 1993 federal election campaign were economic in nature. The 47-day campaign, which officially began on September 8 and culminated in the election on October 25, was dominated by two economic issues in particular, namely unemployment and the deficit (Frizzell, Pammett and Westell 1994: 2-4; Clarke, Jenson, Leduc and Pammet 1996: 31). The Liberal party quickly took the initiative in adopting job creation as its main priority, with leader Jean Chrétien promising that under a Liberal government, "It will be like the good old days. Canadians will be working" (Greenspon 1993a). In contrast, Kim Campbell, the newly-elected leader of the incumbent Progressive Conservatives, focused primarily on the need to eliminate the federal deficit. Thus in terms of issue priorities, there was a clear contrast between the two main parties.

At first glance, it would appear that either stand had the potential to capture significant public support, as concern about these issues tended to vary in importance across the regions. Unemployment was seen as being particularly important in the Atlantic provinces, as well as in Quebec and Ontario, while the

problem of the deficit, and its attendant problem of high taxes, was more salient in the West, particularly in Alberta and British Columbia (Greenspon and Howard 1993; Gingras, Gauthier and Graves 1995; Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc and Pammett 1996: 42). As the campaign unfolded, however, it soon became apparent that, of the two main parties, the Liberals were doing the best job of capturing the attention and mobilizing the support of the electorate. There were several reasons for this.

Perhaps the most important factor aiding the Liberals in their attempt to make job creation the number one issue in the campaign was the Conservative leader herself. Kim Campbell got off to a bad start when she suggested, quite candidly, that people should not expect unemployment to diminish significantly before the end of the century. Such a remark, regardless of its accuracy, was bound to be seized upon by political opponents and media commentators as proof of Campbell's lack of concern for the plight of the unemployed (Campbell and Delacourt 1993; Wills 1993). Still, the effects of such a slip-up would likely have passed in a relatively short period of time, had it been an isolated incident. Unfortunately for Campbell and the Conservative party, it was not. Slips of the tongue and off-hand remarks seemed to become the hallmark of the Conservative leader, as when she suggested that an election campaign was the worst possible time to discuss social policy reform (Sallot and Winsor 1993), or when, following the French language television debate, she angrily attacked Lucien Bouchard

saying "Il n'y a que les Québécois pour avaler ses chiffres..." (Hébert 1993b). Needless-to-say, remarks such as these did nothing to reassure those who feared the Conservatives would sacrifice social programs in order to bring down the deficit. Nor did they succeed in shoring up the party's sagging popularity in Quebec.

A second factor aiding the Liberals in making job creation the key issue of the campaign was the fact that the Conservatives appeared unable to say how they would address the issue they had adopted as their own, namely deficit reduction. While intended to demonstrate the party's desire to "do politics differently",<sup>2</sup> by not making lengthy lists of expensive election promises, the primary effect of such an approach was to give the impression of a lack of preparation on the part of the party leader (York, Winsor and Howard 1993; Woolstencroft 1994: 18). Even worse, it fuelled fears that the Conservative program amounted to nothing more or less than a massive attack on social programs (Lortie 1993).

The contrast between the two parties' campaign strategies became all the more striking when the Liberals surprised Conservative organizers and media observers alike by releasing their entire platform early in the campaign, in the form of the now famous Red Book. Entitled *Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan*

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<sup>2</sup> Both the focus on "leadership" as a campaign issue and the slogan, "doing politics differently", were part of a strategy to put distance between the party and its former leader, Brian Mulroney, who was extremely unpopular at the time (Woolstencroft 1994).

for Canada, the 112-page document described in varying degrees of detail how the Liberals would create 65,000 jobs a year, reduce the deficit to 3% of the GDP while still protecting national standards for social programs, replace the GST with a more equitable tax, and so on (Greenspon 1993b). Its release on September 15 forced the Conservatives to alter their strategy and produce a campaign program of their own. The Conservatives' answer to the Red Book was the Blue Book. This 36-page document, released on September 28 and entitled *Making Government Work for Canada: A Taxpayers Agenda*, was an attempt to respond to the growing perception that the Conservative leader was all talk and no substance, and to allay growing fears that the Conservative program for eliminating the deficit would result in drastic cuts to social programs (Campbell, Delacourt and Greenspon 1993; Young 1993). There is little evidence that it succeeded in doing either (Picher 1993; Hébert 1993a; Dubuc 1993b; Wills 1993b).

Still another reason why the Liberals were able to profit from making job creation their main priority was the presence of the Reform party as a serious contender for votes in western Canada. As mentioned earlier, the issue of unemployment was less important than the issue of the federal deficit in the West. Traditionally, the West has been one of the Conservative party's main bases of support. With the arrival of the Reform party, this support was severely challenged. Not only did Reform appear to have a much clearer plan for dealing with the issue of deficit reduction, but

on the theme of "doing politics differently", the populist party led by Preston Manning could not be out-done (Cairns 1994: 222). This meant that in the one region of the country where the Conservatives' message of deficit reduction might be expected to have been well-received, they were faced with competition from a party even more committed to reducing government spending than they were. The Liberals, on the other hand, encountered little serious competition in their quest to present themselves as the champions of job creation. While it is true that the NDP made unemployment one of its key election issues, it was never able to present the kind of serious challenge to the Liberals that Reform was able to mount against the Conservatives. Nor did the Bloc Québécois -- at least not on the issue of job creation.

This raises the question of what effect, if any, the Bloc had on the shaping of issues during the 1993 election campaign. Judging from media coverage and from the results of some opinion surveys, it appears at first glance that the issue of Quebec sovereignty was not particularly salient during that election, at least outside Quebec (Globe and Mail 1993a; 1993b).<sup>3</sup> Quite telling was the Globe

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<sup>3</sup> Using survey data, Gingras, Gauthier and Graves (1995: 62) show that when voters were asked to say what they felt was the most important issue in the election, most chose either unemployment or the deficit. In Canada outside Quebec, 47% opted for the first, and 29% for the latter; only 1% chose national unity or the constitution. In Quebec, 53% chose unemployment, while 29% chose the deficit. The authors do not indicate the precise proportion who chose national unity (or sovereignty), although it can be presumed to be less than 18% (the proportion of responses in the residual category).

and Mail's "A voters' guide to the issues", which appeared just prior to the leader debates, and which purported to summarize the nine "key" issues of the campaign, and show how each party leader stood on them (Globe and Mail 1993c). Ranked at the top of the list were job creation and deficit reduction. These were followed by trade, social programs, crime and justice, defence policy, health care, parliamentary reform, and immigration. Nowhere was the issue of Quebec sovereignty, or even national unity mentioned.<sup>4</sup> Given the Bloc's presence in the campaign and that its raison d'être was to work for the achievement of Quebec sovereignty, the relative absence of this issue in the media and in the pronouncements of the party leaders themselves is somewhat astonishing.<sup>5</sup>

Not surprisingly, the issue of sovereignty was accorded somewhat greater attention in Quebec, although even there it seemed to figure as more of a background factor. This is apparent in both media coverage and in the discourse of the party leaders. Early in the campaign, the federalist Gazette printed an editorial telling readers "What's at stake on Oct. 25" (Gazette 1993a). While national unity manages to make the list this time, it comes after

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<sup>4</sup> It is also telling that the Globe's first front-page article about the Bloc did not appear until September 21 (Freeman 1993).

<sup>5</sup> Of course, we need to remember that, given the rather spectacular failure of the two most recent attempts to resolve the problem of Quebec's place in Canada, namely the Meech Lake and the Charlottetown accords, it was not in the interest of any of the three major parties (all of whom had endorsed these accords) to bring up constitutional issues during the election campaign. See Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc and Pammett (1996: 47).

"change", unemployment, and government spending in order of mention and presumably in order of importance. At the end of the campaign, the Gazette produced another list of important election issues, along with the party leaders' positions on each. As can be expected, jobs and the deficit occupy the top two positions, followed in turn by medicare, trade, social programs, crime, defence, reform of parliament, immigration, and finally, national unity (Gazette 1993c). Ironically, the apparent reluctance on the part of party leaders and the media to talk about the issue of sovereignty managed to provoke some commentary by media observers (Sinisac 1993; Dubuc 1993a; Gruda 1993).

This is not to say that the issue of Quebec sovereignty or national unity was completely absent from the federal campaign. Despite the national parties' leaders' best efforts to "keep the constitutional issue out of the election" (Cairns 1994:228), there were times when they could not help but be faced with it. The presence not only of the Bloc, but also of Reform (with its position that Quebec should not be accorded "special status") occasionally forced the two main party leaders to address the unity issue head on. This was particularly evident during the French language leaders' debate, in which the federalist leaders attacked Lucien Bouchard as "a separatist" (Delacourt, Freeman and Séguin 1993), and towards the end of the campaign, when it became increasingly clear that Reform was making significant gains -- at the expense of the Tories -- in the West (Sallot 1993).

What is perhaps most interesting about the status of the sovereignty issue is the fact that even Lucien Bouchard refrained from making it his main priority during the federal campaign. While not denying that his ultimate goal, and that of his party, was to bring about Quebec's eventual independence, Bouchard made it clear that what was at stake in this particular election was the need to give Quebec a stronger voice in Ottawa (Scott 1993a; 1993b; 1993c; Sinisac 1993; Ha 1993). Indeed, one of the more memorable episodes of the campaign in Quebec occurred when Jacques Parizeau, leader of the Parti Québécois (the Bloc's forerunner at the provincial level) attempted to make the link between voting for the Bloc and voting for independence more explicit. Bouchard's cool reaction made it clear that he did not appreciate Parizeau's intervention (Fontaine 1993; Gazette 1993b).

It would be wrong, however, to conclude from this that the issue of Quebec sovereignty was of no importance during the 1993 federal election. Despite its relatively low profile in terms of explicit media coverage and leader focus, there is clear evidence that the issue of sovereignty, or the status of Quebec more generally, was a major factor determining voters' choices, both in Quebec and in the rest of Canada. In their analysis of the determinants of voting behaviour in the 1993 election, Johnston, Blais, Brady, Gidengil and Neviitte (1996: 9) find that "orientation to French Canada" was a significant factor determining voters' choices in 1993, one which polarized the Reform Party against the



Liberals and the Conservatives. According to these authors, Reform succeeded in undermining Conservative support in part "... by a generalized anti-minority appeal ... and by playing the anti-French card" (1996: 10). Inside Quebec, these same authors find that the single most important issue affecting vote choice is sovereignty, with support for sovereignty positively associated with support for the Bloc, and negatively related to support for the Liberals and Conservatives (1996: 10).<sup>6</sup>

Another study which shows the importance of the sovereignty issue, at least in Quebec, is that of Nadeau, Guérin and Martin (1995). They seek to explain the collapse of the Conservative party in terms of two "super issues": the role of the state in the economy, and the status of Quebec. They show that while the economic issue was significant in explaining the Conservative decline in the rest of Canada (controlling for evaluations of the parties and the leaders as well as for the respondent's region), support for sovereignty was the most significant issue inside Quebec (Nadeau, Guérin and Martin 1995: 140-142).

In conclusion, then, we can say that while economic issues,

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<sup>6</sup> In another article, these same authors show that the Bloc's main base of support lay with sovereigntists, but that the party received considerable support from non-sovereigntist francophones who were either: fed up with the traditional parties, nationalist in orientation (without necessarily wanting outright sovereignty), or frustrated by the economic situation. It is the support of these non-sovereigntist francophones that raised the party's overall standing from 40% to 50% of the vote in Quebec (Blais, Neviite, Gidengil, Brady and Johnston 1995).

especially unemployment and deficit reduction, dominated the campaign as a whole, the issue of Quebec sovereignty played a significant, if often unacknowledged role in the 1993 federal election. This issue was particularly salient in Quebec itself, where the Bloc Québécois received its greatest support from francophone sovereigntists while at the same time mobilizing a significant proportion of francophone non-sovereigntists. Outside Quebec, the issue was less important than economic concerns, but was nonetheless a salient one, particularly in the West where the Reform Party appealed to anti-Quebec sentiments in order to undermine support for the Progressive Conservatives. Finally, it is important to note that issues of specific salience to ethnic minorities do not appear to have played a major role in the 1993 federal election.<sup>7</sup>

#### *ii) Results*

The 1993 election results are presented in Tables 4.1 to 4.5. In the first three of these tables, we can see how each of the major parties fared, in terms of popular support and the number of seats won, in the country as a whole (Table 4.1), in the province of Quebec (Table 4.2), and in the twenty ridings which make up the

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<sup>7</sup> In a profile of "ethnic voters", the Gazette suggests that the most important issues were sovereignty, with these voters indicating a marked preference for the Liberals as the party best able to counter the Bloc, and unemployment. Other issues were mentioned -- notably the Conservative government's decisions to downgrade the department of multiculturalism and to combine immigration and public security into a single department -- but appear to have been less important (Norris 1993).

island of Montreal (Table 4.3). In the country as a whole, we find the Liberals taking the vast majority (60%) of the seats in the House of Commons with just over 41% of the popular vote -- a result which demonstrates rather clearly the inequities of Canada's first-past-the-post electoral system.<sup>8</sup> The second most popular party in terms of voter support is the Reform party, with nearly 19% of the votes cast; this is translated into 52 seats for the party, or 18% of the seats in the House. The Progressive Conservative party, with 16% of the vote, ranks third in terms of popular support, but with only 2 seats in the House (0.7%), ranks last among the parties in parliament. The Bloc Québécois obtains 13.5% of the popular vote, but because this support is concentrated in a single province, manages to translate a fourth-place showing in votes into a second-place ranking in seats: with 54 seats or 18% of the total. Finally, the New Democratic Party comes away with 7% of the votes and 9 seats (3%) in parliament.

Turning to Table 4.2, we find the results of the 1993 federal election for the province of Quebec. Here we find that it is the Bloc Québécois that comes in first place, both in terms of popular support -- 49% of the votes cast in Quebec were for the B.Q. -- and in the number of seats won -- 54, or 72% of the total number of seats available from Quebec. The Liberals come in second, with 33% of the popular vote and 19 seats (25%), while the Progressive

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<sup>8</sup> For analyses of the merits and weaknesses of different electoral systems see Blais (1988), and Blais and Carty (1987; 1990).

Table 4.1. 1993 Federal Election Results (Canada as a whole)

Party	Votes (%)	Seats (N)
Liberal	41.3	177
Reform	18.7	52
Progressive Conservative	16.0	2
Bloc Québécois	13.5	54
New Democratic	6.9	9
Other	3.5	1

Source: Elections Canada: Ottawa, 1993.

Table 4.2. 1993 Federal Election Results (Quebec)

Party	Votes (%)	Seats (N)
Bloc Québécois	49.3	54
Liberal	33.0	19
Progressive Conservative	13.5	1
New Democratic	1.5	0
Other	2.6	1

Source: Elections Canada: Ottawa, 1993.

Table 4.3. 1993 Federal Election Results (Island of Montreal)

Party	Votes (%)	Seats (N)
Liberal	50.3	13
Bloc Québécois	36.1	7
Progressive Conservative	8.0	0
New Democratic	2.1	0
Other	3.5	0

Source: Elections Canada: Ottawa, 1993.

Conservatives occupy the third place position, with 13.5% of the votes and a single seat. This result, while weak, is nevertheless better than that of the New Democrats, who only manage to get 1.5% of the votes in Quebec. This is not enough to win them any seats in that province.

The 1993 results for the island of Montreal are found in Table 4.3. Here we can see how this particular region differs, in terms of support for the parties, from Quebec as a whole. Unlike the rest of the province, but like the rest of Canada, the island of Montreal voted strongly in favour of the Liberal party, giving it 50% of the popular vote and 13 of its 20 seats. The Bloc Québécois makes a strong second-place showing, with 36% of the votes and the other 7 seats available. The Progressive Conservatives and the New Democrats prove unable to win any seats, with 8% and 2% of the votes respectively.

Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show how the different areas fare in terms of voter turnout in the 1993 federal election. Table 4.4 allows us to compare the rate of turnout in the country as a whole, in the province of Quebec and on the island of Montreal. We see that turnout was highest on the island of Montreal, where nearly 79% of those eligible to vote did so, and lowest in Canada as a whole, where just under 70% turned out. The 77% participation rate in Quebec is one of the highest on record for a federal election in that province (Guay 1994: 128; Drouilly 1994: 67).

Table 4.4. 1993 Federal Election Turnout (%)

Canada as a whole	69.6
Canada outside Quebec	67.1
Quebec	77.1
Island of Montreal	78.6

Source: Elections Canada: Ottawa, 1993.

Table 4.5. 1993 Federal Election Turnout in 20 Montreal Ridings

Riding	Turnout (%)
Ahuntsic	81.9
Anjou-Rivière-des-Prairies	78.9
Bourassa	77.5
Hochelaga-Maisonneuve	74.2
Lachine-Lac-Saint-Louis	84.0
Lasalle-Émard	81.9
Laurier-Sainte-Marie	71.3
Mercier	78.8
Mont-Royal	80.1
Notre-Dame-de-Grâce	79.8
Outremont	78.2
Papineau-Saint-Michel	75.4
Pierrefonds-Dollard	81.0
Rosemont	75.4
Saint-Denis	79.1
Saint-Henri-Westmount	74.6
Saint-Laurent-Cartierville	79.8
Saint-Léonard	79.8
Vaudreuil	82.0
Verdun-Saint-Paul	75.5

Source: Elections Canada: Ottawa, 1993.

Turning to Table 4.5, we can see how turnout varied across each of the twenty federal ridings located on the island of Montreal. Here again we find considerable variation, with turnout rates ranging from a high of 84% in the suburban west-island riding of Lachine-Lac-St-Louis to a low of 71% in downtown riding of Laurier-Sainte-Marie (see Appendix B for a map of federal ridings).

While it is not the purpose of this chapter to try to explain these variations in participation, it is useful to make suggestions as to which factors are likely to be affecting rates turnout. In his analysis of turnout variations across the 75 ridings in Quebec, Jean H. Guay identifies age, income, occupation and marital status as significant factors (Guay 1994: 131). He finds, for example that the participation rate in the wealthiest ridings (where the median family income is greater than \$37,053 a year) is over 5% higher than it is in the poorest ridings (where the median family income is less than \$30,979). Likewise, ridings containing higher percentages of older, married, professionals show greater rates of participation than ridings with high proportions of young, single, non-professionals. In a separate analysis of the 1993 election, Pierre Drouilly indicates that language may be a significant factor in explaining variations in turnout, with ridings containing large numbers of anglophone and allophone populations showing a higher rates of turnout than ridings in which the population is mostly francophone (Drouilly 1994: 68). These findings are suggestive of the kinds of variables that need to be taken into consideration

when analyzing variations in voter turnout across geographical units.

#### 4.1.2. The 1994 Provincial Election

##### *i) Issues*

If the issue of Quebec sovereignty served as a background factor in the 1993 federal election, it was without a doubt the most important issue of the 1994 Quebec provincial election (Lesage 1994). This was made clear from the beginning of the 51-day campaign (one of the longest in memory), when Daniel Johnson, the newly chosen leader of the Liberal party and Premier, announced that a Parti Québécois victory would plunge Quebec into "turmoil" by leading immediately to preparations for accession to sovereignty (Authier 1994a; Lessard 1994a).

The Liberal leader did not focus exclusively on the issue of sovereignty; indeed, the Liberal strategy involved establishing a dichotomy of issues -- sovereignty versus job creation -- and convincing the electorate that the Parti Québécois was concerned exclusively with the former, while the Liberal party would devote itself to the latter (Monière 1995a: 19). The party's campaign slogan, "L'emploi, la véritable option", sought to underline this dichotomy. After more than eight years in power -- years which were marked by two major failures on the constitutional front and by a stubborn economic recession (the unemployment rate in Quebec at the



time was 11.5%) -- and facing an electorate visibly desirous of change (Kappler 1994a), such a strategy was thought to be crucial if the Liberals were to have any chance of winning a third mandate (Thompson 1994; Monière 1995a: 15).

For its part, the Parti Québécois sought to downplay the importance of the sovereignty issue in the campaign, emphasizing instead the issues of change and good government. This was evidenced by the party's campaign slogan: "L'autre façon de gouverner" (Lessard 1994b; Bousquet and Monière 1995: 26). Recognizing that, for most Quebeckers, the issue of greatest concern was job creation (Kappler 1994a; Monière 1995b: 40), and knowing that the sovereignty option did not enjoy the support of a majority of the electorate (Falardeau 1994a), the party took great pains to stress the fact that this election was about choosing a new team and a new approach to government, and that the vote on sovereignty would come later. Thus a vote for the PQ was not necessarily a vote for sovereignty.

This being said, the PQ's leader, Jacques Parizeau, could not resist seizing every opportunity to stress the viability of sovereignty, and indeed, its necessity for bringing about Quebec's full economic and social development (Authier 1994c; 1994d). As a result, the PQ succeeded in sending rather conflicting messages to the electorate; on the one hand, the main issue in the election was the need for change and good government; on the other hand, the

election was widely recognized, both within the PQ and outside it, to be a crucial first step on the path to Quebec sovereignty (Monière 1995b: 66). Hence the need to win, not just a majority of seats (which is all a government requires in order to govern in a parliamentary system), but a majority of votes as well -- in order to create the necessary momentum to carry it on to victory in the ultimate contest: the referendum on sovereignty (Bousquet and Monière 1995: 38).

We thus find the leaders of the two main parties each engaged in an effort to win the electorate by distracting it from certain issues. For the outgoing Liberals, it was important to downplay the past. In this respect, they found themselves in a situation similar to that of the Progressive Conservatives in the 1993 federal campaign: saddled with a long, but less than illustrious record of governing, and trying to win re-election at a time of high unemployment and general dissatisfaction with government. Whereas the federal Conservatives tried to overcome this problem by stressing the newness of their leader and avoiding concrete issues as much as possible, the Quebec Liberals were limited in the amount of emphasis they could place on their new leader. Like Kim Campbell, Daniel Johnson carried with him a record of involvement in an unpopular outgoing government: as President of the Treasury Board, he had been intimately involved in some of the Bourassa government's least popular initiatives (Monière 1995a: 15). Unlike the Conservative leader, Johnson was obviously lacking in charisma.

So while Campbell had to contend with accusations that she was all image and no substance, Johnson had to overcome the problem of having no image whatsoever. That the Liberals were concerned about this problem was made clear in their television advertisements, which featured Johnson telling voters, with great sincerity, "I'm not a machine ... I care about the people around me ..." (Boisvert 1994). This attempt to pull at the heart-strings of Quebeckers was combined with a darker message, one of warning about the PQ's plans for "enclenchisme" (immediately engaging in the process of achieving sovereignty) and the permanent damage to Quebec's economy that would result from such plans.

If the Liberals had to distract voters from focusing too much on the past, the Parti Québécois needed to keep them from thinking too much about the future. In other words, they had to convince the electorate that the current campaign was not about sovereignty, but about choosing a government capable of dealing with Quebec's most serious problem -- unemployment. Their task was to focus as much attention as possible on the Liberals' record in office, while reassuring voters that any decision about sovereignty would come later. In doing so, the PQ could not place too much emphasis on its party leader, primarily because he was less popular than the party itself (Falardeau 1994a). Whereas the Liberals had to contend with a leader who lacked charisma, the Péquistes had the even less enviable task of trying to win under a leader whom people visibly disliked and distrusted (Masson 1994). Hence the need to stress the

PQ's "team" of candidates, and the utility of having the highly popular and undeniably charismatic Lucien Bouchard campaigning on its behalf.<sup>9</sup>

It is clear, then, that the issue of sovereignty was foremost in the minds of voters and politicians during the 1994 provincial election. This appears to be true for members of Montreal's ethnic communities as well (Bauch 1994a). It was concern about sovereignty that prompted anglophone and allophone voters to return to the Liberal fold en masse in 1994, after turning their backs on the party in 1989 over the issue of language rights (Riga 1994a; Kalbfleisch 1994). The English-language Gazette, in an editorial just days before the September 12 vote, openly endorsed the Liberal party, telling readers that it had the best platform overall, and the best stand on Canada. Even more interesting, it stressed the necessity for all federalists to turn out to vote on election day. The argument given was that if the Péquistes won a large majority in the current election, they would use it as a source of moral and psychological support in their preparations for the upcoming

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<sup>9</sup> Although this too carried risks, as was evidenced by the much commented-upon "disagreement" between the two leaders over the precise meaning of a PQ victory in the overall sovereigntist timetable. Whereas Parizeau's oft-repeated promise that a PQ government would act quickly to introduce a "solemn declaration" stating Quebec's will to achieve full sovereignty was taken by many to mean that he would move unilaterally on this question, Bouchard's assurances that the question of sovereignty could only be decided by a referendum were indicative of a more gradual approach. Opponents of the sovereigntist option seized upon this difference in emphasis to suggest that there was a serious rift between the two leaders (Bauch 1994b; Authier 1994b; Adam 1994).

referendum on sovereignty. Although they could not prevent a PQ victory, federalists, by voting in large numbers, could help diminish the size of that victory, and thereby contribute to the expected future contest over sovereignty (Gazette 1994a).

Support for sovereignty was undoubtedly the key factor explaining why many francophones supported the Parti Québécois in 1994. But it was not the only factor. As opinion polls showed throughout the campaign, support for the PQ consistently exceeded support for sovereignty (Kappler 1994a; 1994b; Falardeau 1994a; 1994b). Thus while many of those who supported the Parti Québécois on September 12 did so because of its position on sovereignty, a sizeable portion of the PQ vote came from non-sovereigntist francophones who were dissatisfied with the Liberals and wanted a change of government (Dubuc 1994). That the PQ was able to maintain the support of its sovereigntist base while at the same time capturing many of the votes of francophone non-sovereigntists suggests that it was able to strike a balance between the two issues -- sovereignty and good government -- to carry it to victory on election day. It is to the results of that election that I now turn.

#### *ii) Results*

Table 4.6 presents the results of the 1994 Quebec election in the province as a whole. We can see that the difference between the two leading parties in terms of popular support is very small.

In fact, less than half of a percentage point separates the Parti Québécois from the Quebec Liberal party. In terms of seats, however, the difference is much more striking. Here we find the PQ winning 77 of the 125 seats in the Quebec National Assembly, or 62% of the total, while the Liberals come away with only 47 seats (38%). The fledgling Action Démocratique party succeeds in winning one seat -- that of its leader, Mario Dumont -- with 6.5% of the popular vote.

Turning to Table 4.7, we find once again that, on the island of Montreal, the order of support for the parties is reversed. Here the Liberal party gets the greatest share of the popular vote (59%) as well as the most seats (21 out of 30, or 70%), while the Parti Québécois gets 40% of the vote and only 9 seats (30%). The Action Démocratique party picks up 4% of the vote, but does not manage to win any seats.

Table 4.8 shows the rates of voter turnout for the 1994 Quebec provincial election, both in the province as a whole and on the island of Montreal. We can see that approximately 82% of eligible voters participated in this election, a rate that is somewhat higher than that observed in the 1993 federal election (see Table 4.4), and higher than that of the two previous provincial elections (Guay 1995: 203; Drouilly 1995: 138). Turning to Table 4.9, we can compare the rates of turnout across the 30 provincial ridings located on the island of Montreal. Here again, we find considerable

Table 4.6. 1994 Provincial Election Results (whole province)

Party	Votes (%)	Seats (N)
Parti Québécois	44.8	77
Liberal Party	44.4	47
Action Démocratique	6.5	1
Other	4.3	0

Source: Le directeur général des élections du Québec: Québec 1994.

Table 4.7. 1994 Provincial Election Results (Island of Montreal)

Party	Votes (%)	Seats (N)
Liberal	58.8	21
Parti Québécois	31.9	9
Action Démocratique	3.9	0
Other	5.3	0

Source: Le directeur général des élections du Québec: Québec 1994.

Table 4.8. 1994 Provincial Election Turnout (%)

Quebec as a whole	81.6
Island of Montreal	82.5

Source: Le directeur général des élections du Québec: Québec 1994.

variation across the ridings, with 88% of eligible voters participating in the west-island riding of Jacques Cartier, and 75% participating in the downtown riding of Sainte-Marie-Saint-Jacques. It is interesting to note that these two provincial ridings correspond approximately to the federal ridings of Lachine-Lac-Saint-Louis and Laurier-Sainte-Marie, which were found to be the highest and lowest participators in that election (see Appendix B).

In analyzing variations in participation across the different ridings in Quebec, Jean H. Guay points to linguistic differences as the most significant factors in the 1994 election (Guay 1995: 206). This finding stands in contrast to those of the 1993 federal election and the 1989 provincial election, in which the more standard socio-economic factors appear to have been of greatest significance (Guay 1994:130; 1995:207).<sup>10</sup> It is similar, however, to the findings for the 1992 referendum on the Charlottetown accord. Guay suggests that these differences in the significance of language for explaining turnout may be due to variations in the predominance of the nationalist question across these different contests. Specifically, he suggests that when the constitutional status quo is at stake, either because of the strong presence of a sovereigntist party (as in the 1994 election), or because the question to be decided is explicitly constitutional in nature (as

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<sup>10</sup> But see Drouilly (1995: 139), where it is suggested that the relationship between participation and the ethnic composition of a riding is weaker than that between participation and other socio-economic factors.



Table 4.9. 1994 Provincial Election Turnout in 30 Montreal Ridings

Riding	Turnout (%)
Acadie	84.3
Anjou	85.5
Bourassa	83.3
Bourget	84.4
Crémazie	86.0
D'Arcy-McGee	84.5
Gouin	80.0
Hochelaga-Maisonneuve	75.5
Jacques-Cartier	88.1
Jeanne-Mance	81.5
Lafontaine	82.9
Laurier-Dorion	81.7
Marguerite-Bourgeoys	86.1
Marquette	83.6
Mercier	80.3
Mont-Royal	80.1
Nelligan	86.2
Notre-Dame-de-Grâce	83.2
Outremont	82.1
Pointe-aux-Trembles	82.5
Robert-Baldwin	85.2
Rosemont	83.7
St-Henri-Sainte-Anne	81.2
Saint-Laurent	81.8
Sainte-Marie-Saint-Jacques	75.1
Sauvé	80.3
Verdun	81.9
Viau	79.7
Viger	84.1
Westmount-Saint-Louis	77.9

Source: Le directeur général des élections du Québec: Québec 1994.

in the 1992 referendum), the anglophone and allophone communities are mobilized in greater proportions than the francophone community. Here once again then, we have evidence which suggests the need for socio-economic and demographic controls when trying to explain variations in voter turnout across geographical units.

#### 4.1.3. The 1994 Municipal Election

##### *i) Issues*

The 1994 Montreal municipal election campaign began officially on September 9, while the Quebec provincial campaign was still going on.<sup>11</sup> Despite this overlap, the two campaigns focused, for the most part, on very different issues. Whereas economic questions took a back seat to the issue of Quebec sovereignty in the provincial campaign, the situation was reversed in the municipal campaign. Here, economic issues occupied the central position, while the sovereignty issue was seen by most observers and participants to be irrelevant (Lalonde 1994c; Gazette 1994b).<sup>12</sup>

Of all the issues debated in the course of the municipal campaign, the question of taxes was by far the most important (Léger 1994a; Laberge 1994). One tax in particular, the municipal

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<sup>11</sup> While the official campaign began on September 9, an unofficial campaign had been under way for several months. See Lalonde (1994a); Bisson (1994).

<sup>12</sup> But see Lalonde (1994b; 1994d) for indications that some candidates tried to make sovereignty an issue at the municipal level.

surtax on non-residential property, was the focus of considerable attention during the campaign. First utilized in the city's 1993 budget, the surtax had been imposed in response to the provincial government's Bill 145 -- adopted in June 1991 and known as the "Ryan Reform" because of its sponsorship by municipal affairs minister Claude Ryan -- which effectively downloaded millions of dollars worth of responsibilities to the municipalities (Bernard 1992: 39; Andrew 1992: 132-133; Johnston 1994). For the city of Montreal, the most important provision of Bill 145 was its virtual elimination of provincial grants to public transit corporations, a measure which was estimated to cost the city \$120 million in 1993 alone (Quesnel 1994: 94).

To compensate for the cuts it imposed, and to enable municipalities to pay for their additional responsibilities,<sup>13</sup> Bill 145 gave them the right to charge a surtax on non-residential properties. This surtax would replace the existing municipal business tax. Whereas the business tax had been charged directly to business owners, most of whom were tenants in the buildings they occupied, the new surtax would be charged to the landlords, who would then have to try to recoup their money by billing tenants (Thompson and Buckie 1993). While owners of vacant commercial spaces were entitled to a rebate, they would receive it only at the end of the year, without interest (Thompson 1993b).

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<sup>13</sup> For smaller municipalities, the new burdens included paying for provincial police services on their territory, and for local road maintenance (Andrew 1992: 132).

The city's decision to impose the surtax, taken in December 1992, led to a series of heated protests by groups of business owners in the spring of 1993, as well as to a court challenge by Jérôme Choquette, a lawyer, former Quebec justice minister and former mayor of Outremont (Thompson and Buckie 1993; Buckie 1993; Thompson 1993a; 1993c). While the protests moved the administration to soften some aspects of the surtax (Thompson 1993b), Mayor Jean Doré refused to accede to calls for its abolition, arguing that the city had no alternate means for making up the lost revenue (Thompson 1993a). Then, in September 1993, a Quebec Superior Court judge ruled that the surtax was unconstitutional, on the grounds that it was an indirect tax and that under the Canadian constitution, only the federal government has the power to levy indirect taxes (Thompson and Clark 1993; Quesnel 1994: 95). The city's response was to join the Quebec government in launching an appeal to the ruling, while at the same time scaling back (but not eliminating) the surtax and reinstating the business tax in its 1994 budget (Thompson 1994d; 1994e). Montreal business owners responded to the ruling by calling for the complete and immediate abolition of the surtax and by launching a series of lawsuits against the city aimed at reclaiming the millions of dollars that had been paid during the previous year (Baker 1993). These various legal actions were still working their way through the courts in the fall of 1994, when the municipal election campaign was taking place.

Due in large part to the on-going pressure of various groups of commercial property owners, the issue of the surtax was of primary importance during the 1994 municipal campaign. Two of the four main contenders for the post of mayor campaigned on a promise to abolish the surtax. The most categorical of these was made by Jérôme Choquette, who, buoyed by the success of his recent court challenge, had decided to run at the head of the newly-formed Montrealers' Party. Choquette proposed the immediate abolition of the surtax, in addition to reducing all other municipal taxes by 15 per cent over four years (with a five per cent reduction in the first year alone) (Gazette 1994b; Picher 1994). Also promising to abolish the surtax was Pierre Bourque, leader of the Vision Montreal party and a former city administrator. Bourque promised to eliminate the surtax over two years and to negotiate a new fiscal relationship with the Quebec government that would eventually allow for the reduction of all property taxes in Montreal (Gazette 1994b; Picher 1994). In contrast to these two candidates, incumbent mayor Jean Doré argued that promises to abolish the surtax in the short term were unrealistic, and that such a move could not take place until a new fiscal deal with the Quebec government was reached, one that would allow the city to make use of revenue sources other than property taxes, such as, for example, a share of provincial sales or gasoline taxes (Gazette 1994b; Lapointe 1994; Picher 1994). The fourth major candidate, Yolande Cohen of the Democratic Coalition-Ecology Montreal party, also promised to expand and diversify the city's tax base, but did not promise to abolish the surtax (Gazette

1994b).

While the surtax was undoubtedly the single most important issue in the municipal campaign, it did not dominate that election the way the employment and sovereignty issues dominated the federal and provincial campaigns. There were other issues of considerable importance in the 1994 municipal election, including questions of administrative reform, economic development, and environmental issues. Both Jérôme Choquette and Pierre Bourque called for a reduction in the size of the city's administrative apparatus in order to render the decision-making process more effective and to reduce spending. Choquette was particularly interested in reducing the city's payroll, by freezing or reducing salaries and eliminating positions (Pépin 1994a). All four mayoral candidates offered proposals for stimulating the city's economic development, ranging from the creation of development funds in cooperation with the other levels of government, to offering free parking in the downtown core in order to stimulate commerce (Gazette 1994b).

The importance of ecological issues in the campaign was due in large part to the presence of Pierre Bourque, who, in the course of his 30-year career with the city, had formerly been responsible for the Botanical Gardens and the Biodome. Bourque began the campaign promising to make the city a garden (Lalonde 1994a), and although he gradually toned down his use of botanical metaphors, he continued to give considerable attention to a number of

environmental issues. These included the expansion of the curbside recycling program, the promotion of neighbourhood beautification projects (based on the work of volunteers in each neighbourhood), and the conversion of the Miron quarry -- a much-contested landfill site located in one of the city's north-end districts -- into a park and a centre for "environmental excellence" (Pépin 1994b; Gazette 1994b). The promotion of environmental issues was also a priority for Yolande Cohen, leader of the only avowedly ecological party in the race.

It is clear, then, that a number of issues were important in the 1994 Montreal municipal election. In this respect, the municipal campaign differed from the federal and provincial campaigns, both of which were dominated by only one or two major issues. The municipal election also differed in the degree to which members of ethnic communities became involved. While the issues of greatest importance to ethnic communities appear to have been the same as for the majority population -- namely taxes and economic development -- the issue of access, both to municipal services and to representation in municipal government, was also raised (Derfel 1994; Yakabuski 1994). The presence of a large number of ethnic candidates in the municipal race (Berger 1994) suggests that it was perceived to be both salient and accessible to members of Montreal's ethnic communities.

*ii) Results*

The results of the 1994 Montreal municipal election are presented in Tables 4.10 and 4.11. Beginning with the mayoral race, we can see in Table 4.10 that Pierre Bourque received nearly 47% of the votes cast, while just under one-third went to outgoing mayor Jean Doré. Anti-surtax crusader Jérôme Choquette managed to get 13% of the popular vote, while Yolande Cohen picked up 4.5%. This order of support for the four mayoral candidates is replicated exactly in the pattern of support received by the parties themselves, as we can see by looking at Table 4.11. Here we find that Bourque's party, Vision Montreal, receives 45% of the votes cast, which enables it to take 39 of the 51 seats on city council (76%). The Montreal Citizens' Movement of Jean Doré receives just under 29% of the popular vote, which translates into 6 seats (12%). The Montrealers' Party gets 13.5% of the votes, or just slightly more than its mayoral candidate received, and 2 seats (4%) in council. Finally, the Democratic Coalition-Ecology Montreal party comes away with exactly the same number of seats as the Montrealers' Party, but with a considerably smaller proportion of the popular vote (6%).

Table 4.12 presents the rates of voter turnout in each of the 51 electoral districts in the City of Montreal, as well as the average turnout for the city as a whole. In the case of the city as a whole, the rate of turnout in the 1994 municipal election was 47.5%. While obviously much lower than the rates of turnout



Table 4.10. 1994 Montreal Municipal Election Results (mayoral)

Candidate	Party	Votes (%) <sup>1</sup>
Pierre Bourque	Vision Montreal	47.6
Jean Doré	Montreal Citizens' Movement	32.3
Jérôme Choquette	Montrealers' Party	13.0
Yolande Cohen	Democratic Coalition - Ecology Montreal	4.5
Other	various/independent	2.6

<sup>1</sup> Percent of valid votes.

Source: Bureau des élections de la Ville de Montréal: Montréal 1995.

Table 4.11. 1994 Montreal Municipal Election Results (councillors)

Party	Votes (%) <sup>1</sup>	Seats (N)
Vision Montreal	45.4	39
Montreal Citizens' Movement	28.7	6
Montrealers' Party	13.5	2
Democratic Coalition - Ecology Montreal	6.0	2
Other	6.5	2

<sup>1</sup> Percent of valid votes.

Source: Bureau des élections de la Ville de Montréal: Montréal 1995.

observed in either the federal or provincial elections, this is a higher rate than that observed for the 1990 municipal election, in which only 36% of eligible voters took part (Léger 1994b).<sup>14</sup>

Comparing across electoral districts, we can see that the highest rate of participation, 58%, is found in District 18 (Marie-Victorin), while the lowest rate, just over 37%, is found in District 26 (Peter McGill). It is interesting to note that these two districts do not correspond to the highest and lowest participating ridings at the federal and provincial levels (see Appendix B). In those two elections, the highest rates of participation were found in suburban west-island ridings, that is, outside the City of Montreal itself, while the lowest rates were found in the ridings located just east and south of downtown, ridings which encompass parts of the area around St. Lawrence boulevard, the southern portion of the Plateau Mont-Royal, as well as the areas known as Chinatown and Old Montreal. In the municipal election, the district showing the highest rate of participation is found in the east end of the city, in an area situated on the southern edge of the town of St-Léonard and which includes, among other things, the Botanical Gardens. The district showing the lowest rate of participation is found in the downtown area, bordering the towns of Westmount and Outremont, and includes the

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<sup>14</sup> It is slightly lower than the 50% participation rate observed in the 1986 municipal election, the year when Jean Doré's Montreal Citizens' Movement swept to power, replacing the long-lived Civic Party of former mayor Jean Drapeau.

Table 4.12. 1994 Municipal Election Turnout in 51 Montreal Districts (mayoral race)

District	Turnout (%) <sup>1</sup>
1) Cartierville	53.4
2) Acadie	53.0
3) Ahuntsic	57.1
4) Saint-Sulpice	54.6
5) Fleury	56.5
6) Sault-au-Récollet	53.9
7) Saint-Michel	51.5
8) Jean-Rivard	40.8
9) François-Perrault	47.0
10) Villeray	49.0
11) Octave-Crémazie	49.9
12) Jarry	47.4
13) Parc-Extension	56.6
14) Saint-Édouard	42.9
15) Père-Marquette	46.7
16) Louis-Hébert	49.1
17) Étienne-Desmarteau	48.8
18) Marie-Victorin	58.3
19) Bourbonnière	48.8
20) Rosemont	48.8
21) Lorimier	42.2
22) Plateau-Mont-Royal	48.6
23) Laurier	44.3
24) Mile End	44.3
25) Jeanne-Mance	39.4
26) Peter-McGill	37.3

continued...

Table 4.12. (continued)

27) Côte-des-Neiges	42.8
28) Darlington	42.4
29) Victoria	47.1
30) Snowdon	44.1
31) Notre-Dame-de-Grâce	45.4
32) Loyala	43.7
33) Décarie	39.9
34) Émard	51.8
35) Saint-Paul	47.9
36) Saint-Henri	40.6
37) Pointe-Saint-Charles	44.1
38) Saint-Jacques	43.9
39) Sainte-Marie	41.4
40) Hochelaga	38.5
41) Maisonneuve	40.1
42) Pierre-de-Coubertin	45.0
43) Louis-Riel	52.4
44) Longue-Pointe	49.0
45) Honoré-Beaugrand	51.8
46) Tétreaultville	48.5
47) Marc-Aurèle-Fortin	45.7
48) Rivière-des-Prairies	50.0
49) Pointe-aux-Trembles	48.2
50) La Rousselière	48.5
51) Bout-de-l'Île	51.2
<b>City as a whole</b>	<b>47.5</b>

<sup>1</sup> Percent of total vote.

Source: Bureau des élections de la Ville de Montréal: Montréal 1995.

main business district, as well as McGill University and Mount Royal park. We can see, then, that the areas of highest and lowest participation, while similar in the federal and provincial elections, are different in the municipal. This difference in patterns of turnout raises the question of whether different sources of electoral mobilization were at work in the municipal election. Unfortunately, no cross-district analyses have been performed for the 1994 municipal election, so we cannot at this point suggest which factors are at work here. It does seem likely that socio-economic variables are at least partly responsible for these variations. The relative absence of the sovereignty question suggests that linguistic factors may be less relevant in this election than they were in the provincial (or even in the federal). I examine the impact of these and other factors on turnout in greater detail in chapter seven.

#### 4.2. The Groups

Having examined each election to see which issues were of greatest importance, as well as to see how turnout varied, both across elections and across ridings, we can now turn our attention to the five ethnic groups of interest to this study. In the remainder of this chapter, I examine each group in turn, focusing on their history in Montreal, their geographical distribution across the island, and their most important socio-economic characteristics.

#### 4.2.1. The Jewish Community

##### *i) History<sup>15</sup>*

I begin with the Jewish community because it is the oldest of the ethnic communities examined in this study. According to Rosenberg and Jedwab (1992: 274),

Montreal's Jewish community is the oldest of the ethnocultural communities in Montreal, dating back to the early years of the 19th century, although large scale immigration did not begin until the early years of the 20th century.

The Jewish community was also the largest in Montreal (after the French and British-origin communities) until the 1960s, when it was overtaken by the Italian community (Szacka 1984: 110).

Jews began settling in Quebec in 1760, following the British conquest of the colony. Prior to that time, the French government had forbidden their settlement in New France. While these early Jewish immigrants were from Britain and of British culture, they did not form part of the British conquering elite, nor did they enjoy the benefits or privileges of that elite. Indeed, some historians have termed them a "third society, or intergroup" between the French and the English (Langlais and Rome 1991: 5). Having previously been excluded (by both the French and the British) from owning land or from military service, the early Jews in Quebec were involved primarily in business and finance.

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<sup>15</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, this section based on Langlais and Rome (1991).

Soon after the first Jewish settlers arrived in Quebec, elements of a Jewish community began to form. The first Jewish congregation, Shearith Israel (Remnants of Israel), was established in Montreal in 1768. According to Langlais and Rome,

... the original Jewish community was made up of immigrants arriving from England and the British colonies, whose forebears were German Ashkenazim (Ashkenazi means German in Hebrew) but who had adopted the Sephardic rite (from the medieval Hebrew word Sefarad, meaning Spain). Naturally, they affiliated their Montreal congregation with the Sephardic congregation in London, an affiliation still honoured at their synagogue on Lemieux Street (1991: 9).

The first synagogue in Montreal (and in Canada) was built in 1777, at the corner of Notre-Dame and St. Jacques streets, in Old Montreal. A cemetery (or "house of life") was established in 1781.

The early Jewish community in Quebec was quite small in size: by 1825, it numbered only 90 people. This began to change in the 1840s, as immigrants from Germany and Eastern Europe began arriving. Growth was slow at first: by 1871, the Jewish population in Quebec numbered just over 450 (Szacka 1984: 97). These new arrivals differed from the earlier Jewish settlers in that they were Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazim. An early indicator of the increasing diversity within the Jewish community in Montreal was the founding of a German Ashkenazic congregation in 1846.

While relatively small numbers of Eastern-European Jews were arriving by the mid-1800s, the most important influx of Jewish immigrants, to Canada as a whole, as well as to Montreal, occurred between 1880 and 1930, a time of severe anti-semitic repression in

Eastern Europe.<sup>16</sup> The arrival of this new wave of immigrants had a dramatic impact on the Jewish community in Montreal, transforming it from a small, primarily English-speaking, and economically well-established community to a relatively large, overwhelmingly Yiddish-speaking, and economically impoverished one. The dramatic growth of the community during this period is documented by Szacka (1984: 97), who shows that between 1881 and 1931, the Jewish population in Quebec increased from 989 individuals to just over 60,000.<sup>17</sup>

A more restrictive immigration policy following the First World War, compounded by the onset of the Great Depression, all but eliminated Jewish immigration to Canada during the 1920s and 1930s. Restrictions were kept in place even as fascism and anti-semitism in Europe were becoming increasingly evident. As Langlais and Rome (1991: 85) note,

Of the 800,000 Jews who fled the Third Reich from 1933 to 1939, Canada admitted only 4,000. This gave it the worst record of all countries that accepted Jews, placing it far

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<sup>16</sup> While anti-semitic laws and practices had been well established for centuries, it would appear that the late 1800s were a time of increased repression. This was especially the case in Russia where, following the assassination of the Tsar in 1881, "anti-semitism became an important political instrument for reactionary forces struggling to maintain a dying medieval order. Hundreds of existing anti-Jewish regulations were suddenly and brutally enforced, leading, for example, to the overnight expulsion of over 10,000 Jews previously allowed to settle in Moscow" (Vigod 1984: 5).

<sup>17</sup> As is the case with the other ethnic communities examined here, the Jewish community of Quebec is concentrated in Montreal. Szacka (1984: 109) notes that in 1901, 93% of Quebec Jews lived in Montreal, while in 1971, this proportion had risen to 98.5%



behind the others at the bottom of the list such as Brazil (20,000), China (15,000) and Australia (10,000).

Following World War II, a new wave of Jewish immigration brought survivors of the Holocaust to Canada. These were followed, in the 1950s and 1960s, by Sephardic Jews, primarily from North Africa and the Middle East. As a result of this new wave of immigration, "Quebec Jewry today differs from all other North American Jewish communities in its large proportion of North African or francophone Jews, estimated at between 15,000-20,000" (Weinfeld 1993a: 176).<sup>18</sup>

Jewish immigration to Quebec has been in decline since the 1960s. Indeed, out-migration has been a more marked trend in the community over the past three decades, with the result that the overall Jewish population has declined in size, from a high of over 115 thousand in 1971 to just over 102 thousand in 1981 (Szacka 1984: 97).<sup>19</sup> The latest census (1991) shows that this decline has continued, with the Quebec Jewish population (based on single ethnic origin) numbering just over 77 thousand.

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<sup>18</sup> Weinfeld goes on to note that "not all francophone Jews are Sephardim; many from France or Belgium are Ashkenazi. Moreover, not all Sephardim are North African or francophone; some are Syrian, Egyptian, or Iraqi Jews. Yet the vast majority of Sephardim in Montreal are both North African (essentially, Moroccan) and francophone" (1993a: 176).

<sup>19</sup> We should note that the 1971 figure is based on ethnic origin, while the 1981 figure is based on religion. Vigod (1984:14) puts the 1981 Jewish population based on single ethnic origin at 90,355.

The Jewish community in Montreal has changed considerably over the years, in terms of its size, demographic make-up, and institutional development. As we can see by Table 4.13, it is currently the fourth largest community in Montreal. Demographically, the community is diverse, comprising two major subgroups, the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim, each having its own distinctive religious rites, customs, practices, languages and history. There is also a sizeable Hassidic community (from Hassidim, meaning "pious ones"), which is distinct from the rest of the Jewish community.<sup>20</sup>

This diversity is reflected in a wide variety of community organizations, some catering to small segments of the population, while others encompass the entire community. Indeed, the Jewish community today is said to be the most institutionally complete of the minority communities in Montreal. Many of these institutions, such as the Jewish General Hospital (opened in 1934), or the system of Jewish Day schools (the first of which was established in 1896), were developed to fill in the gaps in services provided to the Jewish population in Montreal (Rosenberg and Jedwab 1992: 274). Others, such as the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services were developed to respond to specific needs. The community is also distinct in having a number of central organizations which act either as spokesbodies

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<sup>20</sup> Langlais and Rome write that "most Hassidim minimize contact with other Jews, even the devout. They have their own synagogues, schools and community centres. Their communities are strictly self-contained, except in the case of the Liubavitch Hasidim, who work outside the group to convert other Jews" (1991: 131).

Table 4.13. Size of Ethnic Populations in Quebec and Montreal, 1991

Group	Quebec (whole) <sup>1</sup>	Montreal (region) <sup>1</sup>	Montreal (island) <sup>2</sup>	Montreal (city) <sup>2</sup>
French	5,077,830	1,824,300	816,140	522,275
British	286,075	166,815	108,380	40,425
Italian	174,530	165,735	136,870	71,495
Jewish	77,600	76,780	70,220	22,495
Greek	49,890	48,575	32,860	21,430
Portuguese	37,165	32,325	23,130	19,110
Chinese	36,815	34,355	26,255	15,075

Notes: Group classification is based on single ethnic origin. Montreal region refers to the Census Metropolitan Area as defined by Statistics Canada, which includes, in addition to the island of Montreal, Ile Jésus (Laval), and parts of the North and South shores.

Sources:

<sup>1</sup> Statistics Canada. 1991 Census (profile 2B). CD-ROM.

<sup>2</sup> Statistics Canada. 1991 Census (profile 2B). Electronic data file.

or coordinating bodies for smaller, constituent organizations. The Canadian Jewish Congress, Quebec Region, "is the elected official spokesperson for the Quebec Jewish community on all issues of public policy" (Canadian Jewish Congress 1994: x). The CJC was founded in 1919 and since then, has tried to respond to a wide variety of problems faced by the community, be they related to "education, internal organization, civic activities or international aid to Jews. It also continues to promote religion, culture, archival research and government relations on various levels" (Langlais and Rome 1991: 143). Another central body is the Federation CJA (Combined Jewish Appeal), formerly known as Allied Jewish Community Services, which coordinates and finances major initiatives in the community. Comprising 18 affiliated agencies, "Federation CJA supports health and social-service institutions, Jewish day schools, cultural events and recreation for the Greater Montreal Jewish community" (Canadian Jewish Congress 1994: xi). Another important organization is the Communauté Sépharade du Québec, to which are affiliated ten constituent organizations, including six regional congregations, a community centre, the Maimonides day-school and the French Hillel centre.

The Quebec Jewish community has had a long history of involvement in politics, at all three levels government. Indeed, the first Jew to be elected to public office in the British Commonwealth was Ezekiel Hart, who was chosen in 1807 by the voters of Trois-Rivières to represent them in the Legislative Assembly of

Lower Canada. Hart was not allowed to take his seat in the Assembly because of a law which forbade non-Christians to swear the oath of allegiance on the Bible (Canadian Jewish Congress 1994: iii). In 1832, under the political leadership of Louis-Joseph Papineau, the Legislative Assembly passed a law granting full political rights and privileges to Jews. This law was the first of its kind in the British Commonwealth, coming twenty-seven years before England adopted similar legislation (Langlais and Rome 1991: 14-15).

While the Quebec Jewish electorate appears to have had a long-standing preference for the Liberal party, both at the provincial and the federal levels (Jedwab 1986; Laponce 1988), there has been significant Jewish involvement in other parties, particularly those of the left, such as the NDP (previously the CCF). Indeed, the leader of the federal NDP from 1971 to 1975, David Lewis, immigrated from Poland to Montreal with his family in the early 1920s. More recently, Jews have been represented in all three major political parties at the federal level, as well as in both major parties at the provincial level. The 1994 municipal election saw Jewish candidates in all four major parties, as well as a Jewish mayoral candidate.

*ii) Geography*


As the Jewish community in Montreal grew and diversified, it began moving, slowly, from one part of the city to another. Langlais and Rome (1991: 30) observe:

As elsewhere in North America, the immigrants were naturally drawn to certain parts of the city. Until 1914, the Montreal community adopted the older Crémazie neighbourhood south of Ontario Street on either side of what is now St. Lawrence Boulevard. Decade after decade they moved northward along this commercial artery, the backbone of the city, spilling out between Park Avenue on the west and Saint-Denis Street on the east. By 1921 they had reached St. Louis Square and in 1931 Mount Royal, forging ahead of the next wave of immigrants who would arrive from Greece and Portugal.

The desire to be close to vital institutions and services -- synagogues, schools, kosher food shops -- was the primary reason for forming such neighbourhoods. And like other immigrant groups, there was the natural desire to be near people of similar background, both for support and for the sharing of experiences.

As Figure 4.1 shows, the Jewish community today tends to be spread across a number of areas of the city and the surrounding region (see Figure 4.6, at the end of this chapter, for the corresponding names of communities and municipalities). While a small number continue to live in the old neighbourhoods of Mile End and the eastern portion of Outremont, many are located in the western end of the city, in the Côte-des-Neiges, Snowdon and Notre-Dame-de-Grace districts, as well as in the municipalities of Cote-Saint-Luc and Hampstead. Suburban communities can be found in the Town of Mount Royal, Ville Saint-Laurent, and Dollard-des-Ormeaux, as well as in Chomedey (Laval).

Figure 4.1. Geographic Distribution of Jewish Community



Source: Pierre Drouilly, L'Espace Social de Montréal, 1951-1991 (Sillery, Québec: Les Editions du Septentrion, 1996). Used with permission of the author and publisher.

*iii) Socio-economic characteristics*

Table 4.14 shows the main socio-economic correlates of each of the five ethnic groups under study.<sup>21</sup> With respect to the Jewish community, we can see that the strongest correlations are for home language and age. The Jewish community is a predominantly English-speaking community, with a large proportion of members over the age of 65. The aging of the community has been noted by other observers as well. According to the Canadian Jewish Congress (1994: ix), 24% of the population is over the age of 65. Because of significant out-migration of young people over the past two decades, the remaining population has become progressively older, a situation that will have important consequences for the provision of services by community organizations.

Turning to socio-economic status, the Jewish community of Montreal tends, on the whole, to be well-educated and economically well-off, as we can see by the strong positive correlations for high education and median income. This assessment is supported by other sources as well. The Canadian Jewish Congress (1994: ix) estimates that approximately 45% of the Jewish adult population has obtained a university degree. And according to a 1978 survey of Jewish households in Montreal, more than 13 percent reported family incomes of greater than \$50,000 (Weinfeld 1993b: 222). However, that same survey showed that more than a quarter of households

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<sup>21</sup> The table is based on 1991 Census data, observed at the level of the enumeration area.



reported a family income of less than \$10,000. In other words, a tendency to focus on over-all levels of wealth may lead us to overlook considerable amounts of poverty within the community. The Canadian Jewish Congress estimates that "in 1991, approximately 18% of the Montreal Jewish population lived below the poverty line..." (1994:ix).

Turning to immigration variables, the Jewish community has a significant proportion of immigrants, with most having arrived prior to 1971 (early immigration).

Table 4.14. Socio-economic Correlates of Montreal Ethnic Groups

A. Citizenship and Immigration

Ethnic Origin	Citizens	Immigrants	Early	Middle	Late
Jewish	.02	.23**	.30**	.09**	.01
Italian	.27**	-.12**	.34**	-.20**	-.36**
Greek	-.23**	.39**	.19**	.27**	.25**
Chinese	-.29**	.20**	-.18**	.23**	.33**
Portuguese	-.11**	.04	-.15**	.22**	.06

B. Education and Income

Ethnic Origin	Low Education	High Education	Median Income
Jewish	-.31**	.36**	.34**
Italian	.40**	-.48**	-.04
Greek	.13**	-.06	-.12**
Chinese	-.13**	.15**	-.06*
Portuguese	.12**	-.03	-.16**

C. Age

Ethnic Origin	18-24	Over 65
Jewish	-.30**	.51**
Italian	.11**	-.22**
Greek	.12**	-.10**
Chinese	.20**	-.16**
Portuguese	.18**	-.17**

D. Home Language

Ethnic Origin	French	English	Other
Jewish	-.49**	.63**	-.23**
Italian	.18**	-.28**	.16**
Greek	-.30**	-.05	.52**
Chinese	-.18**	.04	.21**
Portuguese	.09**	-.20**	.18**

\* significant at .05 level (two-tailed test)

\*\* significant at .01 level (two-tailed test)

Notes: With the exception of median income (which is measured in dollars), all variables are measured in percentages, with the enumeration area as unit of analysis (n=1049). For a description of variables, see Appendix C.

#### 4.2.2. The Italian Community

##### *i) History<sup>22</sup>*

The Italian community of Montreal is currently the largest of the city's ethnic communities, ranking third in size after the French and British communities. It is also one of the oldest. While the bulk of the community's growth has occurred in this century -- particularly since the end of World War II -- a significant number of Italian immigrants were arriving in Montreal in the late 19th century. In 1871 and 1881, the Italians in Montreal numbered 539 and 745 respectively. By 1901, this number had grown to 1400 and by 1911, to 7000.

The period running from the final decade of the 19th century to just before the First World War was marked by large-scale migration of Italian workers to Canada. These people, mostly men, were drawn to this country by the promise of work. As Ramirez (1984: 25) notes,

the construction of the transcontinental railroad and the rapid development of the primary resource extraction industry created an unprecedented demand for labourers willing to submit themselves to this type of work (my translation).

Consequently, the Italians arriving in Canada during this early period were, to a large extent, migrants rather than immigrants. Most came with the goal of returning to Italy, either at the end of the work season, or after a few years of working and saving in

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<sup>22</sup> This section is based primarily on Boissevain (1971), Ramirez (1984) and Painchaud and Poulin (1988).

Canada.

This aspect of the early Italian immigration had significant effects on the development of the community in Montreal (which constituted the most important concentration of Italians in Canada). Early Italian settlement in the city was concentrated in two neighbourhoods: the first was located in the area around Bonaventure Station; the second was in the Mont-Carmel district, situated in the blocks between St. Lawrence boulevard and St. Denis street, below Ste. Catherine and above St. Antoine. The latter would become, in 1905, the site of the first Italian parish, Notre Dame du Mont-Carmel. These areas were close to the primary source of employment for the community, namely the Canadian Pacific Railway Company. As the community expanded, it tended to migrate to areas of the city which had links either to the railway -- the most notable being the Mile End district -- or to other sources of employment, such as the construction of the Lachine Canal in the St. Henri district. Thus the primary sector of employment for the early Italian community -- unskilled manual labour -- determined its pattern of settlement within the city.

An important aspect of early Italian immigration was what has been called the *padrone* system. While the practice of padronism dated from the early 19th century in Italy, in Montreal it grew out of the wave of mass immigration which occurred at the end of the 19th century. Prior to the arrival of these migrant labourers,

there was a small group of Italians living in Montreal, who had been established for several generations. This group was well-integrated into the socio-economic fabric of the city, and when the new waves of poor, unskilled labourers began arriving, they became the elite of the nascent Italian community. Out of this elite, a few individuals set themselves up as *padrones*, or labour agents. Their job was to recruit large numbers of labourers in Italy to come and work in the various construction projects across Canada. Each step of the process, from the trans-atlantic voyage, to the sojourn in Montreal, to the actual procurement of a job, involved paying a sizeable commission to the agent, so that quite often, a migrant labourer would find himself heavily indebted to his *padrone*, a situation which only strengthened and prolonged the *padrone's* control over his workers.

In Montreal, the most notorious of these *padrones* was Antonio Cordasco, who took advantage of his position as a foreman at the CPR to become exclusive supplier of immigrant labour to that company, and in the process, Montreal's largest labour agent. Not content to simply take their money, in 1904 Cordasco had his workers organize a parade in his honour. About 2000 Italian labourers took part in this event, which culminated in Cordasco's being crowned "King of the workers" (the crown was a replica of that of the King of Italy). Cordasco's abuses came to a climax in the spring of 1904 when, as a result of advertisements distributed throughout Italy in which he claimed he would need over 10,000

labourers for the upcoming work season, Montreal was glutted with thousands of desperate Italian migrants. Most of these were unable to find employment -- the promise of 10,000 jobs having been a gross exaggeration -- and were subsequently forced to turn to public charity in order to survive. The highly visible misery in which these people lived, and the fears of unrest that it provoked within the larger population led to the creation, that same year, of the *Royal Commission into the Immigration of Italian Labourers to Montreal and the alleged Fraudulent Practices of Employment Agencies*. As a result of the negative publicity created by the commission, as well as the increasing frustration and anger of the labourers themselves, the padrones were eventually driven out of business. This episode had enduring effects in the community, not only for the thousands of impoverished workers who had been exploited by the labour agents, but for the elite of the community as well, whose struggle over who could claim to represent the community as a whole was made quite visible.

The decade prior to World War I was one of transition for the Italians of Montreal, from sojourning to settlement within the city. This was a period of rapid expansion of the city, and as such it provided ample employment opportunities in the construction industry. Both the establishment of an urban infrastructure -- roads, tramways, sewers and canals -- and the construction of residential and non-residential buildings provided opportunities for Italian labourers to find work within the city. It was during

this period that men began bringing their families over in large numbers, and consequently migrating out of the old, run-down quarters in the south of the city to the newer neighbourhoods of Mile End (named for the CPR station located at the corner of St. Lawrence boulevard and Bellechasse street), Montcalm (located at the intersection of Jean-Talon and Papineau streets), and Ville-Émard, in the south-west corner of the city. In addition to being relatively close to the main sources of employment, these areas consisted primarily of undeveloped, and relatively inexpensive land, an aspect which facilitated the building of homes and the cultivation of small vegetable gardens.

From 1901 to 1921, the Italian community in Montreal grew from less than 1,500 to nearly 14,000 individuals. By 1931 it numbered 21,000. From migrant labourers, the Italians gradually became immigrants, settling down and creating their own neighbourhoods and institutions. The first and most important of these was the church. As mentioned previously, the first Italian parish, Notre Dame du Mont-Carmel, was established in 1905, in the initial area of Italian settlement. In 1911, the Italian neighbourhood of Mile End consecrated its own church and school, called Notre Dame de la Defense. This quickly became the most important Italian parish in the city and in 1919, a new building had to be constructed because the original had become too small to accommodate the growing Italian population in the area. It was around this church that Montreal's "Little Italy" developed -- which in 1935 included over 60 shops and businesses.

This was also the period in which the community's first organizations were created. They were primarily regional associations at first -- representing the various regions in Italy from which the immigrants had originated -- but in 1920, a larger organization was formed, with the goal of uniting the smaller groups and promoting a more general vision of Italian culture. The Order of the Sons of Italy, first founded in the United States in 1905, was nationalist in nature. With the rise of Mussolini and fascism in Italy during the 1920s, the Order became increasingly fascist in orientation. By 1926, a schism had formed within it, and an anti-fascist group broke away to form, in 1927, the Order of Italo-Canadians. It appears, however, that prior to the Second World War, it was the fascist organization which was most influential within the community.

In 1934, with the help of the Italian Consul General, fascist leaders in Montreal formed a new organization, the Fronte Unico Italiano di Montreal, the goal of which "was to provide material and moral support for the Italian government and to augment the prestige of Italians in general, and Fascists in particular" (Boissevain 1971: 6). The Fronte Unico united a large number of community associations and institutions, including the various chapters of the Order of the Sons of Italy, as well as the two Italian parishes, the Italian schools, and the Chamber of Commerce. Only the Order of Italo-Canadians and two Italian protestant churches stood opposed to it. The nerve centre of the Italian



fascist movement in Montreal was the Casa d'Italia, located at the corner of Jean-Talon and Lajeunesse, on land donated by the city of Montreal through the good offices of mayor Camillien Houde. Funding for the building was provided by the Italian government as well as by the many small donations originating within the community itself.

The period of fascist leadership in the community came to an abrupt end in 1940, with Italy's declaration of war against France and Great Britain. With fascism illegal in Canada, the leadership of the community was effectively wiped out when the RCMP sent over 600 of its leaders to internment camps. The Casa d'Italia was seized (to be returned after the war), along with material and documents. All immigration from Italy was effectively halted during the war, and those Italians already in Montreal went to great pains to either hide or play down their Italian origins.

With the end of the war, and the lifting of the embargo on Italian immigration in 1947, the second wave of Italian immigration to Canada began. Painchaud and Poulin point out that, since the beginning of the 20th century, approximately 650,000 Italians have immigrated to Canada. Nearly 70% of this immigration took place after the Second World War (1988: 81). In Montreal, this wave of immigration produced a rapid growth in the size of the Italian community, from 30,000 in 1951, to over 160,000 in 1981. This second group of immigrants, while largely unskilled and possessing

minimal levels of education, differed greatly from their forebears by being, for the most part, sponsored immigrants. This pattern of sponsored, or dependent immigration tended to encourage the reproduction of familial and regional groupings in Canada.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the rapidly expanding Italian community of Montreal underwent further migration, under the guidance of certain key entrepreneurs and real estate developers. The best example of this occurred in the town of St. Leonard, which, until 1950 had been a semi-rural francophone village located in the eastern end of the island of Montreal. By the mid-1960s, it was a burgeoning suburb of more than 35,000 inhabitants, nearly 20% of whom were Italian. Similar patterns occurred in Montreal North and the St-Michel district. These new Italian neighbourhoods, with their large houses and gardens, were a reflection of the increasing prosperity that the community experienced as a result of the post-war economic boom.

The post-war period was also one of rapid institutional growth. Various studies of the community have placed the number of organizations at between 64 and 185 (Painchaud and Poulin 1988: 118). These organizations tended to be very diverse in nature and objectives. Painchaud and Poulin group them into four major categories: 1) assistance organizations; 2) cultural groups; 3) recreational groups; and 4) regional associations. The latter were most important, numerically, in the community. These regional

associations brought together families and individuals from the same village, town or region in Italy. Their principal activities were cultural and recreational in nature, centering around the organization of banquets, religious feasts and sporting events.

If the community is marked by a strong sense of regionalism, there have been attempts to regroup the many individual associations under the leadership of a single, over-arching organization. In 1974, the Quebec Region of the Congresso Nazionale degli Italo-Canadesi (CNIC) was created for just this purpose. Under the guidance of a group of leading Italian businessmen, the CNIC sought to unite the community under a single social and political banner, and claimed to be the sole official mouthpiece for the community. The extent to which it has succeeded in its task is illustrated by the number of community associations that have not affiliated themselves with the CNIC. According to Painchaud and Poulin (1988: 120-123), while two-thirds of the regional associations are affiliated with the Congresso, the vast majority of the recreational, cultural, and assistance organizations are not. It would thus appear that, while an important institution within the community, the Congresso's ability to speak on behalf of the entire community is still subject to question. This is not surprising, given the diversity of opinions and interests that one is likely to find within any large community.

Politically, the Italian community underwent an important

transformation, as a result of the war and the influx of new immigrants in the post-war period. Community involvement in local and provincial politics increased, and while the fascination with fascism would not be repeated, there was a strong current of support for the conservative policies of Premier Maurice Duplessis. There were strong ties between Duplessis and a number of influential Italian businessmen. One of these, Alfredo Gagliardi, became, in 1950, the first Italian to be elected to municipal council (he was reelected in 1954, 1957 and 1960, and even organized a party to oppose the "reformist party" of Jean Drapeau). Gagliardi was, at the same time, an electoral agent, organizer and orator for the Union Nationale (Painchaud and Poulin 1988: 197). Other indicators of the close ties between Duplessis and certain leaders of the Italian community are the granting of \$500,000 in 1952 for the construction of an Italian orphanage and, in 1956, the provision of \$ 1,000,000 to the Sisters of Santa Cabrini for the construction of an Italian hospital.

With the onset of the Quiet Revolution in the early 1960s, the Italian community became increasingly involved with the Liberal party, at both the provincial and federal levels. With the rise of Quebec nationalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the community's involvement with the Liberal party increased, owing primarily to that party's unequivocal stand on federalism (although there was a brief breakdown in the relationship, in 1976, when the Italians, angered by Robert Bourassa's language policy, voted

massively for the Union Nationale). In 1979, Carlo Rossi, a Liberal, was elected federal M.P. for the riding of Bourassa.<sup>23</sup> In 1981, three Italians were elected to the Quebec National Assembly under the Liberal party banner: John Ciaccia, Cosmo Maciocia and William Cusano. With the arrival of Brian Mulroney in the 1980s, there was significant Italian involvement with the Conservative party. In the 1984 federal election, three Italians were elected to the House of Commons from Montreal-area ridings; two were Liberals and one was a Progressive Conservative.<sup>24</sup> In 1988, two Italians -- one Liberal and one Conservative -- were returned to parliament from the Montreal area. In the 1993 federal election, Italians ran with all the three major parties (Liberal, PC and Bloc Québécois) on the island of Montreal, and two of these -- Liberals Alfonso Gagliano and Nick Discepola -- were elected. The 1994 provincial election saw eight Italian candidates from the two main parties, four of whom were elected. The 1994 municipal election was the occasion for numerous Italian candidacies, with five councillors of Italian origin elected.

*ii) Geography*

As was mentioned previously, the Italian community has grown considerably from its early days of settlement in the south of the city. After migrating north to the Mile End and Montcalm districts,

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<sup>23</sup> He was re-elected in 1980 and 1984.


<sup>24</sup> They were: Carlo Rossi, Alfonso Gagliano, and Vincent Della Noce.

and south-east to Ville Émard, the community began moving to the suburbs. While St. Michel, St. Leonard, and Montreal North were the primary recipients of this migration, significant numbers also settled in N.D.G., Lasalle, and Lachine, as can be seen in Figure 4.2. The most recent migrations have been towards the eastern end of the island, to Rivière-des-Prairies, as well as off the island, to Laval.

*iii) Socio-economic characteristics*

Table 4.14 (p. 144) indicates that the most significant socio-economic traits for the Italian community are its relatively low level of education and its high proportions of early (pre-1971) immigrants. Because of the large numbers of second- and third-generation Italians in Montreal, the community as a whole correlates negatively with the immigration variable and positively with the citizenship variable. There are no other striking characteristics to be drawn from these figures, other than, perhaps, the community's greater tendency to speak French than English in the home. Such a tendency, which may come as a surprise to those who would portray the Italian community as one drawn overwhelmingly to the anglophone language group, is likely the result of more than twenty years of provincial legislation designed to encourage the integration of immigrant school-children into the francophone school system.

Figure 4.2. Geographic Distribution of Italian Community



Source: Pierre Drouilly, L'Espace Social de Montréal, 1951-1991 (Sillery, Québec: Les Editions du Septentrion, 1996). Used with permission of the author and publisher.

### 4.2.3. The Greek Community

#### *i) History<sup>25</sup>*

The first wave of Greek immigration to Quebec, which was part of a larger wave of immigration to the United States, began in the late 19th century and progressed modestly until the economic depression of the 1930s. Thus while census figures indicate that there were seven Greeks living in Quebec in 1871, this figure had risen to 66 by 1901 (with some sources suggesting that the number was really as high as 300). By 1906, it is reported that there were 1000 Greeks living in Montreal. The early community settled in the area around Dorchester (now René Lévesque) and St. Lawrence boulevards.

The first Greek immigrants were, for the most part, poorly educated and lacking in occupational skills. Most had been rural-dwelling farmers before emigrating, and as a result found adapting to their new urban lives in Montreal difficult. Knowing neither French nor English, they tended to find work in the most marginalized sectors of the economy, as street vendors, for example, or working for employers of the same ethnic origin, in bakeries, restaurants, and small grocery stores.

It was at this time that the first Greek community organizations were founded in Montreal. In 1906, the 1000 Greeks

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<sup>25</sup> This section is based on the following sources: Gavaki (1983); Ioannou (1983); and Constantinides (1983).



living in the city obtained a Charter from the Quebec government and constituted themselves into the Greek Orthodox Community of Montreal, better known by its Greek name, Koinotita. The main purpose of the Koinotita was the preservation of Hellenic culture, the Greek Orthodox religion and the Greek language. In 1909, a building located at 735 St. Lawrence Boulevard was purchased by the community. After carrying out the necessary renovations, the consecration of Montreal's first Greek Orthodox church took place on December 15, 1910.<sup>26</sup> In the same year, the first Greek school was established in Montreal. Fully supported and sponsored by the church, it provided instruction in Greek, English and French to 25 students during its first year of operation. In the words of one observer, "in its early life, the community was dominated by the church in the decision-making process, selection of programs, administration, and the Greek curriculum" (Gavaki 1983: 134).

During this time, community members continued to follow events in their homeland very closely. Consequently, the community underwent a split in the 1920s, mirroring the political division in Greece between royalists and republicans (known as Venizelists, after their leader, Venizelos). This split, which resulted in the creation of a second Koinotita, complete with its own church and school, was to last until 1931. It was partly as a result of the efforts of the Archdiocese, and partly as a result of economic

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<sup>26</sup> Gavaki (1983: 133) reports that this was the first Greek Orthodox church in Canada.

difficulties produced by the onset of the Depression, that the two communities were finally reunited, under the name of the Holy Trinity Greek Orthodox Congregation of Montreal, with a single church and school. By this time, the Greek community in Montreal numbered approximately 2000 people.

Following the devastation of World War II and the civil war in Greece (1946-1949), the second major wave of Greek immigration to Canada began in 1950. These Greeks arrived not only from Greece, but from Turkey, Egypt, Cyprus and other parts of the Balkans. Most of these new immigrants tended to have only minimal education and few occupational skills. By 1951, there were over 3000 persons of Greek origin living in Montreal. This number increased rapidly over the next two decades, so that by 1961 the Greek population in Montreal numbered more than 19,000; by 1971, it had risen to nearly 43,000.<sup>27</sup> By 1981, the Greek population for the census metropolitan area of Montreal (which includes Laval and the South Shore) was estimated to be at just under 50,000 individuals (Brédimas-Assimopoulos 1983: 106; Lefebvre and Oryschuk 1985: 120). As Table 4.13 (p. 137) shows, in 1991 there are 49,890 Greeks living in Quebec, 48,575 of whom live in the census metropolitan area of Montreal.

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<sup>27</sup> These figures, based on Statistics Canada data for the entire province of Quebec, are taken from Lefebvre and Oryschuk (1985: 119). We need to remember that approximately 98% of Greeks in Quebec live in the Montreal metropolitan area (Ioannou 1983: 37).

In 1956, the Community petitioned the government of Quebec and changed its name to the Hellenic-Canadian Community of the Island of Montreal. In the same year, it purchased property at the corner of Côte-Sainte-Catherine road and Wilderton avenue, with the purpose of building a new church, school and community centre to fulfill the needs of the growing Greek population in Montreal. St. George's Cathedral was completed in 1961 and St. George's school, a new branch of the Socrates school, was established in 1962 (Gavaki 1983: 135).

The community underwent a second major split in the late 1960s and early 1970s, once again as a result of political events in Greece. The 1967 military coup in that country created considerable friction within the Montreal community, with the clergy and many of the Hellenic Community leaders siding with the military junta, while the majority of recent immigrants opposed it. The conflict lasted until 1974, when the Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus not only brought down the military government in Greece, but served to unite Greeks everywhere (Gavaki 1983: 135).

This was a period of increasing activity within the Greek community in Montreal, with the formation of new organizations, such as the Hellenic Federation of Parents and Guardians of Greater Montreal (1969), and the Hellenic-Canadian Labour Association of Metropolitan Montreal (1971). It was also a period of organizational restructuring for the Koinotita, resulting from

increasing pressure from lay members of the community for greater control over their organization. As a result of this pressure, in 1980 the organization's name was changed to the Hellenic Community of Montreal, and its constitution was modified (by an act of the Quebec National Assembly) to give it ownership and control over the community's four churches, thereby restricting the authority of the clergy to religious matters only (as well as a consultative role in the area of education). As a result of this internal reorganization, and the bringing in of outside (government) funds, the Hellenic Community of Montreal succeeded in becoming the predominant (although not uncontested) organization within the Greek community.

The period of the 1970s saw the beginning of Greek community involvement in Canadian and Quebec politics. Until that time, the community had been relatively inactive politically (Brédimas-Assimopoulos 1975; 1983). In the 1976 provincial election, Christos Sirros ran as a candidate for the Democratic Alliance, while George Savoidakis was a candidate for the Union Nationale. In 1981, Sirros ran again, this time for the Quebec Liberal party, and won, while Nadia Assimopoulos ran unsuccessfully for the Parti Québécois. Greeks were becoming involved at the municipal level as well, with two councillors of Greek origin elected in 1978 and three in 1982. At the federal level, Greek candidacies were restricted to the minor parties until 1993, when the Liberals nominated a Greek candidate in two Montreal-area ridings. One of these candidates, Eleni Bakopanos, was successful in the riding of St-Denis.


*ii) Geography*

Like the Jewish and Italian communities before it, the Greek community has migrated within the city of Montreal. From the early location around the corner of St. Lawrence and Dorchester Boulevards, it has moved northward, concentrating along Park Avenue, first in the Mile End district, and then in the area known as Park Extension. As the community grew, both in size and in wealth, it began moving out of the old neighbourhoods, migrating to suburbs in Laval, the West Island and the South Shore. Figure 4.3 shows the most recent geographical distribution of the community.

*iii) Socio-economic characteristics*

Turning to Table 4.14 (p. 144), we find that the most important characteristics of the Greek community are related to immigration. The community contains a relatively high proportion of immigrants, most of whom arrived during the middle (1971-1981) or late (post-1981) periods. Related to this is the community's relatively strong tendency to use a language other than English or French in the home. In terms of economic status, the community does not show many distinguishing features: there is a slight tendency towards low educational levels, and a corresponding tendency towards a low median income.

Figure 4.3. Geographic Distribution of Greek Community



Source: Pierre Drouilly, L'Espace Social de Montréal, 1951-1991 (Sillery, Québec: Les Editions du Septentrion, 1996). Used with permission of the author and publisher.

#### 4.2.4. The Chinese Community

##### *i) History<sup>28</sup>*

Montreal's sixth largest ethnic community is at the same time one of its oldest and newest. While there has been a Chinese community in the city since the late nineteenth century, large-scale immigration has occurred primarily since the Second World War, with significant numbers of ethnic Chinese immigrants arriving as recently as the 1970s and 1980s (primarily from Southeast Asia and Hong Kong). This has meant that the Chinese community has undergone important changes over the many years that it has been present in Montreal.

The first Chinese to settle in Montreal appear to have migrated from western Canada, following the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway in the 1880s. In 1881, there were only seven individuals of Chinese origin in Montreal; by 1891, there were 36, and by 1901, there were over 800. These early settlers were almost all men, as Canada's restrictive immigration policies towards the Chinese, combined with the harsh conditions under which they lived in this country, discouraged most men from bringing their wives and families with them. In fact, with the completion of the CPR (and the corresponding decline in demand for cheap, unskilled labour), Canadian immigration authorities began imposing

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<sup>28</sup> This section is based on Helly (1987), Tan and Roy (1988), and Wickberg (1982).

restrictive measures on the immigration of Chinese nationals. In 1886, the federal government imposed a \$50 head tax on all Chinese entering Canada. This amount was raised to \$100 in 1900 and then again to \$500 in 1904. This latter amount all but eliminated Chinese immigration to Canada until 1908, "when an expanding economy, rising wages, and limitations on Japanese immigration made it worthwhile for labour contractors in Canada to advance head tax money to Chinese immigrants" (Tan and Roy 1985: 8). Finally, "in 1923, in response to pressure from across Canada, the federal government replaced the head tax with a new Chinese Immigration Act which effectively prohibited Chinese immigration until its repeal in 1947" (Tan and Roy 1985: 8).

The prohibitive cost of bringing family members over from China, combined with a reluctance to expose them to the racism and humiliation that the men themselves had experienced, meant that most Chinese communities in Canada were characterized by a serious gender imbalance. Thus while there were over 800 men in Montreal in 1901, there were only four women; by 1911, there were over 1,000 men but only 33 women. Indeed, as Helly (1982: 122) shows, this imbalance continued to characterize the community in the 1950s, when there was approximately one woman to every four men.<sup>29</sup> In

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<sup>29</sup> An important reason for this is that, although the Chinese Immigration Act was repealed in 1947, the Canadian government continued to place restrictions on the reunification of Chinese families that were not applied to any other ethnic group at the time (except the Japanese); namely, that in order to bring his wife or children (under the age of 18) to Canada, a Chinese immigrant must already be a Canadian citizen. For a number of reasons (not



general, it was the wealthiest individuals in the community who were able to bring their wives and families to Canada; the poorer members of the community remained alone; some eventually returned to China, while others remained in Canada until their deaths, without ever seeing their families again.

The early Chinese immigrants in Montreal tended to concentrate in a few economic activities, namely the hand laundry, restaurant and small retail businesses. The desire to be self-employed was rooted in the discrimination most Chinese immigrants had experienced at the hands of white employers. There was also a desire to avoid sectors of employment in which they would have to compete with white workers. The hand laundries were a particularly attractive to these early Chinese entrepreneurs, because of their relatively low start-up and operation costs. This meant that it was feasible for one or two individuals, with the aid of a loan from other members of the community, to start up such an enterprise, employing several of their compatriots in the process. The hand laundry was also a business which required little or no knowledge of either French or English. Finally, the hand laundries of Chinatown were ideally situated to attract clientele, close as they were to the financial district of St. James (St-Jacques) Street, the civic administration in Old Montreal, and the downtown shopping district. For all these reasons, the hand laundries constituted an

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the least of which was the racism), most Chinese immigrants had not become Canadian citizens prior to the 1950s.

important part of the early economy of the community. In 1911, there were more than 200 Chinese hand laundries in operation, employing approximately 1,100 of the 1,336 Chinese residents of Montreal (Helly 1987: 77).

Despite the restrictions placed on immigration and family reunification, the Chinese community of Montreal continued to grow, albeit slowly. By 1921, it numbered approximately 1,900 individuals; this number grew to over 2,100 by 1931. By 1941, it had shrunk to just over 1,800 and by 1951, there were just over 1,400 individuals of Chinese origin living in the region of Montreal (Helly 1987: 218). This decline appears to have been the result of returns to China, out-migration, primarily to Toronto, as well as the progressive aging of the community. Beginning in the 1950s, however, the community began to grow more quickly -- to over 4,700 individuals in that decade alone. By 1971, the Chinese population of Quebec numbered just under 12,000 individuals, and by 1981, it had grown to just over 19,000 (Tan and Roy 1985: 17). As we can see by Table 4.13 (p. 137), the Chinese community in the greater Montreal region today stands at over 34,000 individuals, which makes it slightly larger than the Portuguese community (although there are somewhat fewer Chinese than Portuguese in the province as a whole).

The first Chinese organizations to be formed were clan associations. These groups were based on family relationships, with

men of the same surname joining together to provide mutual aid and support to one another. Between 1900 and 1914, six clan associations had formed in Montreal, with the Lee, Wong and Hum clans being the most important of these. Clan associations were important sources of financial aid for individuals wishing to start up a business. There appears to have been little rivalry between the clans, as it was possible for a man to go to clans other than his own in order to obtain a loan, if this proved to be necessary. Nor did any single clan dominate the economic sectors of the community. Other early organizations were clubs, of an economic or political nature. The economic clubs, such as the Canton Club (in existence from 1905 to 1919) or the Chinese Merchants Club (1920-1933), were formed by business owners sharing similar economic interests. The purpose of such clubs appears to have been both economic and recreational. Most were of short duration, which suggests that they were formed primarily to deal with specific problems (dealing with a particular municipal tax or regulation, for example), or that they may also have had "hidden vocations" such as gambling, which would have augmented the revenues of their members (Helly 1987: 232).

In addition to the more particularistic clubs and clan associations, there were also organizations and institutions which sought to serve the community as a whole. In 1914, the Chinese Association of Montreal (the equivalent of the Chinese Benevolent Association in other parts of the country), was formed in order to

respond to the agitation of an association of white owners of mechanized (steam) laundries against Chinese hand laundries. It was also an organization of social assistance, providing financial aid to needy members of the community, taking care of the elderly, and overseeing the operation of the Chinese hospital. The CAM was organized and financed by a number of smaller groups, such as political and clan associations, as well as individual business owners.

The Chinese Hospital was founded in 1918, by the Sisters of the Immaculate Conception, in response to an influenza epidemic which had struck the community particularly hard. When the epidemic had passed, and the Sisters were called to other duties, the Chinese Association of Montreal took over the running of the hospital, and were able to obtain financial aid from both the municipality and the archdiocese. The founding of the hospital is indicative of the presence of the Catholic church in the community, which worked primarily among the poorest members, providing social assistance, and seeking converts. Also active in the community was the Presbyterian church, which appears to have appealed more to the wealthier members of the community, those who had families. Because of the differences in their respective clienteles, the Presbyterians played a greater role in education, while the Catholics concentrated on medical and social assistance.

Early political associations were organized in response to

political events in China. These consisted of local chapters of the various political parties being formed in China, such as the Empire Reform Association (which advocated a constitutional monarchy), or the republican Guomindang (which governed China from 1928 to 1949). The main activity of these associations was to raise money to support the struggles being waged by their counterparts in China. While these local associations differed over their visions of the best form of government for China (differences which occasionally led to physical violence), they came together to oppose the Japanese occupation of their homeland, which began in 1931. Chinese communities across Canada mobilized to raise funds for the purchase of aircraft, ambulances and medical supplies, and succeeded in raising some five million dollars between 1931 and 1944 (Helly 1987: 252). In Montreal, a group was formed in 1937, led by the Lee and Wong clans, which was able to raise \$18,000 in war relief in one year alone. The following year, a delegate from the central committee of the Guomindang arrived in the city, and reorganized the group into the Chinese Patriotic League. This organization succeeded in raising \$400,000 between 1938 and 1944. This unity of cause lasted only as long as the war, and with the fall of Japan, the different political factions in Montreal were once again rivals -- at least until the victory of the Communists in 1949. Following this, the majority of community members united behind the anti-communist Guomindang.

Today the community comprises a large number of organizations

and institutions. In the economic sector these include the Chinatown Chamber of Commerce, the Association of Chinese Professionals and Businessmen, the Chinese Restaurant Association, as well as the Caisse populaire du quartier chinois. There are also service associations, such as the Chinese Neighbourhood Society of Montreal (located in the Mile End district), the Chinese Family Service of Greater Montreal, and the Chinese Catholic Community of Montreal. Finally, the Chinese United Centre attempts to act as a central coordinating body for various smaller organizations and groups.

As far as involvement in Canadian politics is concerned, it has only been in recent times that the Chinese community of Montreal has begun taking an active role, and even this has been at a very limited level, compared with the other ethnic communities of Montreal. There has not yet been a candidate of Chinese origin at either the federal or provincial level in Quebec. Candidacies at the municipal level have occurred only since the mid-1980s, and none of these have been successful (although one Chinese candidate in the 1994 municipal campaign, David Ly, came within 36 votes of winning in the multi-ethnic district of Victoria). The reasons for this lack of involvement appear to be primarily those of geographical dispersion and a relatively low rate of citizenship among the Chinese population.

*ii) Geography*

The early community was concentrated primarily in the district around La Gauchetière Street, between Chenneville and Saint-Charles-Borromée (Clark), a district which soon came to be known as Chinatown.<sup>30</sup> It gradually grew in size, extending east and west along La Gauchetière, as well as north and south, primarily along St. Lawrence Boulevard, Clark and St. Urbain streets. The Chinatown of today is bounded by René-Lévesque Boulevard to the north, Viger St. to the South, Bleury St. in the west and Sanguinet in the east. It is no longer, however, the area of greatest geographical concentration of the Chinese community, but appears, rather, to be a sub-community of elderly Chinese. According to one study conducted in the mid-1980s, "there are altogether 441 residents in Chinatown, 271 of whom are Chinese by ethnic origin. Among the 271 Chinese, about 60 percent (162) are 60 years of age or older" (Chan 1986: 68). This was at a time when the Chinese population of greater Montreal was estimated to be close to 19,000 people.

Of the five communities examined in this study, the Chinese is the most geographically dispersed. As Figure 4.4 shows, the most important concentrations are found in the suburban cities of Ville-St-Laurent and Brossard (on the south shore), and to a lesser extent, in Lasalle and Ville Émard. Within the city of Montreal itself, there are small concentrations in the Cote-des-Neiges and

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<sup>30</sup> Helly notes that the term "quartier chinois" first appeared in La Presse in 1902.


Mile End districts. The reasons for this geographic dispersion lay in part with the tendency, seen in all the ethnic communities examined here, for residents to move to the more up-scale suburbs as economic success is achieved. It also appears to be a result of urban renewal and forced relocation. According to one analysis, the construction in the early 1980s of a federal office building (Complexe Guy-Favreau), a provincial convention centre (Palais des Congrès), and a twenty-million-dollar condominium-office building (Place du Quartier), served to restrict and delimit Chinatown, driving out a large number of businesses and services and making it difficult for low-income tenants to find affordable accommodations. Added to this was a 1985 municipal zoning law which prohibited further commercial development on La Gauchetière street east of St. Lawrence boulevard, thereby removing the only remaining possibility for expansion. As a result,

While about 200 Chinese elderly women and men now live as retirees in rooming houses above the Chinese restaurants and stores, it was estimated that Montreal's Chinatown once supported a Chinese population of 3,000 before expropriation and demolition by the various governments (Chan 1986: 72).

Chinatown appears to be becoming increasingly a commercial and tourist district, catering more to the needs of consumers than to those of its residents or of the community as a whole.



Figure 4.4. Geographic Distribution of Chinese Community



Source: Pierre Drouilly, L'Espace Social de Montréal, 1951-1991 (Sillery, Québec: Les Editions du Septentrion, 1996). Used with permission of the author and publisher.

*iii) Socio-economic characteristics*

As we can see in Table 4.14 (p. 144), the Chinese community contains high proportions of recent immigrants. It is also the community with the greatest proportion of non-citizens. This, as we have seen, may help to explain the relative lack of involvement in Canadian politics by members of the Chinese community. It is a relatively young community, and shows a greater propensity for higher education than any of the other communities, except the Jewish. It is also a community where one is more likely to find a language other than English or French spoken in the home.

4.2.5. The Portuguese Community*i) History<sup>31</sup>*

Although Portugal has been a significant emigrating nation for centuries, Portuguese immigration to Canada is a relatively recent phenomenon, occurring primarily in the three decades following the Second World War. According to one study, "in 1926-1927, only 14 Portuguese entered Canada; in 1955, 1965 and 1974, the figures were respectively 1,427, 5,734 and 16,333" (Alpalhao and Da Rosa 1980: 61). The influx of Portuguese immigrants to Canada during this time was due to a number of factors, including changes to Brazil's immigration policy, which had the effect of diverting large numbers of Portuguese emigrants to other countries. While France was the

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<sup>31</sup> This section is based on Alpalhao and Da Rosa (1980), Anderson and Higgs (1976), and Higgs (1982).

preferred destination for most, Canada was also an important destination (after the United States and Venezuela). Anderson and Higgs (1976: 23) report that "some migrants came to Canada after a period of work in France, and these individuals generally preferred to settle in French-speaking areas of the country." However, most of the initial Portuguese immigrants to Canada came either as part of a Canadian government-sponsored recruitment of farm labour in the late 1950s, or followed later as dependents of the same. These people tended to have little formal education (until 1960, compulsory schooling in Portugal was limited to three years; this was raised to four years in 1960 and then to six years in 1967) and to know neither English nor French upon arriving in Canada. This made settlement and adjustment difficult for the new immigrants.

The predominant pattern of Portuguese immigration to Canada was set by 1961, that is,

... the reconstitution of extended families. ... Family contacts appear more important as an explanation of Portuguese immigration than either individual enquiries made to Canadian immigration officers or the desire to escape the political situation in Portugal during the period 1950 to 1974 (Anderson and Higgs 1976: 28).<sup>32</sup>

This pattern of chain migration explains, in part, the large

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<sup>32</sup> From 1926 to 1974, Portugal was ruled by an authoritarian government, backed by the military, known as the *Estado Novo* (New State). Until 1968, this government was headed by a former economics professor, Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. He was succeeded in 1968 by a law professor, Dr. Marcelo Caetano. On April 25, 1974, the Portuguese armed forces carried out a *coup d'état*, thereby ushering in the Second Republic, and a period of rapid decolonization and sweeping social and economic reforms in Portugal (Anderson and Higgs 1976: 169).

concentrations of Portuguese in certain areas of the country, including Toronto and Montreal.

The Portuguese community of Montreal quickly became the second largest in Canada, after that of Toronto. By 1971, there were approximately 17,000 people of Portuguese origins living in Montreal (Anderson and Higgs 1976: 57). By 1981, there were over 23,000 (Lefebvre and Oryschuk 1985: 161). As we can see in Table 4.13 (p. 137), by 1991 the Portuguese population in the region of Montreal numbered over 32,000, making it the fifth largest minority ethnic group in the region.

The growth of the community in Montreal was linked to employment opportunities. According to Alpalhao and Da Rosa (1980: 75), "the Portuguese of Montreal work in different sectors, and more particularly, in the hotel trade, service industries, workshops, building construction, manufacturing industries and commerce." Anderson and Higgs (1976: 63) report that "by the 1970s, there was an inflow of professional people, including teachers in the French-language school system." Despite this, and the fact that many of the immigrants to Montreal had spent prior time in France, and were thus familiar with the French language, it appears that prior to 1976 at least, the majority of Portuguese parents (like parents in most other minority ethnic groups) opted to have their children educated in the English-language schools. The reason for this was that English was seen as providing greater opportunities

for employment and economic advancement in North America (Anderson and Higgs 1976: 65).

The first Portuguese community organization in Montreal was the Associação Portuguesa do Canadá (Portuguese Association of Canada). Founded in 1956, "its aims were to provide a social centre for Portuguese immigrants, to advise on integration into Canadian society, and to preserve Portuguese culture in the new land" (Anderson and Higgs 1976: 155). It still exists today, and is considered one of the most important organizations in the community. Another important organization is the Clube Português de Montreal (Portugal Club of Montreal). It was founded in 1965, and "its main activities are in the areas of recreation and sports and involve in particular the holding of parties and dances" (Alpalhao and Da Rosa 1980: 243). Other organizations active in the community are the Portuguese Centre of Information and Social Advancement, the Portuguese Businessmen's Association of Quebec, the Alliance des professionnels et entreprises portugaises (APEP), the Maison des Açores (House of the Azores) and the Portuguese Association of Lasalle, as well as a number of smaller cultural and sporting groups. Community institutions include the Santa Cruz church located on Rachel street, the Caisse d'économie des portugais de Montréal, and the Portuguese Chamber of Commerce. It is useful to note that there is no organization which attempts to speak for or coordinate the entire community, as is the case in the Jewish, Italian and Greek communities.

Prior to 1974, most political activity in the Portuguese community, in Montreal and in Canada as a whole, tended to focus on events in Portugal. The military dictatorship, the anti-colonial movements in Portugal's overseas territories and the issue of compulsory military conscription that resulted from this were all vigorously debated within the Portuguese communities in Canada. According to Anderson and Higgs (1976: 170),

In general, ... the leaders of the Portuguese community, including the most economically successful individuals, either favoured or were not openly hostile to the Lisbon government. ... By contrast, in Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal, there were others who actively disapproved of the *Estado Novo*. These men and women often perceived their life in Canada as a political exile as much as voluntary emigration.

The most important political groupings at this time were the Portuguese-Canadian democratic movements in Montreal and Toronto, membership in which "... included the whole spectrum of opposition to the Lisbon government" (Anderson and Higgs 1976: 171). It should be noted, however, that only a minority of Portuguese-Canadians became involved in the political opposition to the Lisbon government, either out of fear of reprisals against relatives still living in Portugal, "... or because pride in their origin made support of a campaign against the government of the motherland repugnant to them" (Anderson and Higgs 1976: 171).

Portuguese involvement in Canadian politics was rare prior to the late 1970s. This was manifested by low rates of registration and voter turnout in areas with high densities of Portuguese residents, as well as by the scarcity of Portuguese candidates, at

all levels of government. According to Anderson and Higgs (1976: 173),

In general, the Portuguese have not developed a strong political representation at any level of Canadian government - - municipal, provincial, or federal -- by the mid-1970s. This had consequences in the lack of a clear articulation of the problems confronting their community in Canada and in a weakly organized response to them.

It might be expected that political involvement has increased in the two decades that have passed since these words were written. Looking just at the community in Montreal, we know that since the 1980s, there have been Portuguese candidacies at both the municipal and provincial levels, but these have been rare, and have not tended to attract much support within the community.

*ii) Geography*


The first Portuguese to settle in Montreal did so in the area bounded by Sherbrooke Street, St-Joseph Boulevard, St-Denis Street and Park Avenue. The heart of this area, the St-Louis district, has been the home to successive waves of immigrants over the decades, and even today, it retains a highly multicultural character. As was the case with the earlier groups, the Portuguese have gradually begun moving out of this district, as their economic situations have permitted them. As Figure 4.5 shows, most of the movement has been northwards, to the Mile End, Villeray and Rosemont districts. There has also been some migration to the suburb of Lasalle, as well as to Laval and parts of the south shore.

*iii) Socio-economic characteristics*

Turning to Table 4.14 (p. 144), we find that the Portuguese community in Montreal consists of immigrants who arrived primarily during the middle period, that is during the decade of the 1970s. The community tends towards low levels of education and income; indeed, the negative correlation with median income is the strongest among the five communities examined here. It is also a relatively young community, showing one of the strongest correlations with the 18-24 year-old age group. Finally, it is a community in which the language spoken in the home tends to be neither English nor French.



Figure 4.5. Geographic Distribution of Portuguese Community




Source: Pierre Drouilly, L'Espace Social de Montréal, 1951-1991 (Sillery, Québec: Les Editions du Septentrion, 1996). Used with permission of the author and publisher.

### 4.3. Summary

In this chapter, I have reviewed the three elections and the five ethnic communities which constitute the cases for my study. I have indicated the most important issues and the results for the 1993 federal, the 1994 provincial and the 1994 Montreal municipal campaigns. I then described the history, geographical distribution and socio-economic characteristics of the Jewish, Italian, Greek, Chinese, and Portuguese communities in Montreal. I can now proceed to use these cases to test the empirical validity of the hypotheses derived from Uhlaner's model.

Figure 4.6. Communities and Municipalities on the Island of Montreal and in the Surrounding Region



Source: Pierre Drouilly, L'Espace Social de Montréal, 1951-1991 (Sillery, Québec: Les Editions du Septentrion, 1996). Used with permission of the author and publisher.

## Chapter Five

### When and Why does Mobilization Take Place?

#### 5.1. General Findings

This first section summarizes leaders' responses to a number of questions relating to two key areas: leaders' reasons or motivations for mobilizing voter turnout in their communities, and leaders' actual involvement -- either at a personal or an organizational level -- in the three campaigns under study. These responses provide background information that will be used in the final section of this chapter to test specific hypotheses on the context and motivation of group mobilization in election campaigns.

##### 5.1.1. Reasons for Mobilization

Leaders were asked a series of questions that dealt with their perceptions of the elections under study. These perceptions pertain both to the *benefits* accruing from the election of a particular party or candidate, and to the *probability* of having an effect on the outcome of the race and thereby affecting the provision of perceived benefits. Precise question wording is found in Appendix A.

Five indicators of group leaders' perceptions of benefits were identified. They are: 1) the perception of issues that are important and specific to the community; 2) the perception of group-specific *benefits* or 3) *losses* resulting from the election of a party or a particular candidate; 4) the perception of campaign *promises* to the community; and 5) the perception that a *candidate* of the same ethnic origin as the community was running in the election.<sup>1</sup>

Two indicators were used to measure the perceived probability of affecting the outcome of the election: 1) the perceived *importance* of the community's support for either a party or a candidate; and 2) the expected *closeness* of the race, either overall or in a particular riding.

#### 5.1.1.1. The 1993 Federal Election

i) *Issues*. In all five communities, the first issues leaders mentioned were of a general nature: an overall disenchantment with the outgoing Progressive Conservatives (due primarily to the imposition of the GST), the state of the economy in general and

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<sup>1</sup> It may seem strange to treat this indicator as a perception, since such information can be obtained objectively, without relying on leaders' responses. I have done it this way because my primary interest is with leaders' perceptions, and because it is possible for an ethnic candidacy to go largely unnoticed by the leaders of the community (this happens in the municipal election). In such cases, the candidate's presence cannot be considered as a reason for mobilization within the community.

unemployment in particular, and to a somewhat lesser degree, the national unity issue. In this respect, leaders' perceptions are a good reflection of the amount of attention focused on these particular issues by both the media and the party leaders during that election campaign. Issues of group-specific importance were cited by leaders in four of the five communities. Chinese leaders mentioned the issue of redress for the head-tax imposed by the Canadian government on Chinese immigrants during the first half of this century. Leaders in the Portuguese community also cited an immigration-related issue: the Progressive Conservative government's imposition of a visa on visitors coming from Portugal. Greek leaders spoke of foreign policy issues relating to Greece, specifically, the issue of Macedonia,<sup>2</sup> and the status of Cyprus. Jewish leaders cited Jewish immigration and Canadian foreign policy with respect to Israel. Only in the Italian community were leaders unable to name an issue of particular importance to their community. Thus four of the five communities had issues of specific importance to them that leaders could have used to mobilize turnout in 1993.

*ii) Benefits.* Leaders in all five communities were able to cite group-specific benefits they thought would result from the election of a Liberal government. In the Chinese community, leaders expected more favorable treatment on a variety of issues, including

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<sup>2</sup> This refers to a region of the former Yugoslavia which was seeking to call itself by that name, in opposition to the wishes of the government of Greece and to the members of the Greek diaspora.

the head-tax redress and immigration. There was also the perception that the Chinese community, like most immigrant communities, was more familiar with, or closer to the Liberals. Among the Greek leaders, most expected the Liberals to be more favorable on issues affecting Greece. Some also pointed to the fact that the Liberal party had more Greeks in its ranks, and that the community had always associated with the Liberals, suggesting that the community would enjoy more advantages if the Liberals were in power. Others thought the fact that the Liberal party was running Greek candidates for the first time was in itself a benefit. Leaders in the Italian community made a similar point: they felt that Italians were more integrated into the party, were better represented within it, and had more influence in the Liberal party. The expectation was that the community would therefore benefit by having the Liberals in power (although no leaders could point to specific benefits that would accrue to the community). While most Jewish leaders did not foresee specific benefits resulting for their community from a Liberal victory, some mentioned that having Jewish members of parliament could be considered a benefit. They suggested that it would be easier to deal with these members on issues of importance to the community. It should be pointed out that there were Jewish candidates running in both major parties, which leads to the expectation of Jewish leader involvement on both sides in the 1993 election. Finally, leaders in the Portuguese community believed the Liberals would be more favorable to their community on immigration issues, and in particular, on the lifting of the visa

requirement for Portuguese visitors to Canada. In addition, two leaders said that the Liberal party had always been close to their community in the past, and that they expected that relationship to continue. Summing up then, we can consider the perception of community-specific benefits resulting from a Liberal election victory to have provided a potential reason for mobilization in all five communities.

*iii) Losses.* Leaders in most communities did not expect particular losses to result from the election of any one party. The only exception was the Chinese community, where leaders thought that a Conservative victory would result in a set-back on the head-tax issue. In the words of one Chinese leader, "As far as the redress campaign was concerned, we had dealt with the Conservatives for 8 years, and were getting nowhere, so we felt we were pretty much at a dead end with these guys."

*iv) Promises.* A similar pattern is observed for the fourth indicator, group-specific promises. Here again, leaders in four of the five communities were unable to cite a single political promise of particular importance to them. Within the Chinese community, two leaders mentioned that a few individual candidates had given their support to the redress issue, but these leaders were quick to point out that without the support of the whole party, and in particular of the party leaders, these individuals would be unlikely to be able to deliver on their promises. None of the leaders in the



Italian, Jewish or Portuguese communities could think of any particular promises that had been made. Only in the Greek community did leaders name a group-specific promise, relating to Greek concerns in the former Yugoslavia, that they considered credible. Four Greek leaders indicated that promises had been made to respect the Greek position on Macedonia. While one leader indicated such promises had been made by candidates in both major parties (Liberal and Conservative), the others indicated that it was primarily Liberal candidates who had made such promises. Thus on this fourth indicator, we find only one community which can be said to have had a reason to mobilize. In the other communities, the lack of concrete promises on the part of the parties or candidates was very evident. Greek and Italian leaders offered some theories as to why this was the case. According to one Greek leader, the candidates must avoid being seen as too favorable to the ethnic communities. Speaking of the two Greek candidates in particular, this leader said that they must not appear to be "too Greek", lest they risk alienating voters from outside the community. An Italian leader said the same thing about Italian candidates, but offered another explanation as well. He said that the Liberals do not need to make promises to the community because of the perception within the community that individual Italians are very influential within the party, especially in the area of party-financing. In his words, Italians are seen (by Italians) to "control" the party. Thus while the party does not make explicit promises to the community, a Liberal party victory is still expected to bring community

benefits.

v) *Candidates*. On the fifth indicator, the perception of ethnic candidates, members of the Greek, Jewish and Italian communities were able to see themselves reflected through the presence of candidates of their own ethnic origins. Remarks from both Greek and Jewish leaders regarding the importance of having their own candidates at the federal level indicate that this is a significant motivating factor for some. One Greek leader put it this way,

... they [the community] gave their support to someone who came from their community, following the reasoning that it's good to have someone from the community to represent us, especially in a party that has a very good chance of forming the government.

Similar comments were made by leaders in the Jewish community. But it is important to note that the ethnicity of the candidate is not the only factor of importance. As one Jewish leader put it,

...the ideas matter. The Jewishness of this person is irrelevant because the ideas predominate. Would there be a greater degree of complicity or sympathy for a Jewish candidate, or better connectedness, all things being even? Probably. ... This person will probably know the community better, they'll probably have more identification. ... But that's all things being even.

In other words, it is not enough for a candidate to be of the same ethnicity as the community. He or she must also be in the right party. This was particularly evident with respect to the few ethnic candidates running with the pro-sovereignty Bloc québécois (or with the Parti québécois at the provincial level). Community leaders were quite emphatic in stating that such candidates could not

expect much support from their communities. Thus ethnicity can be seen as an important factor in candidate support, but by no means the only factor. When ethnicity and party (or ideology) clash, it would appear that it is the latter which prevails.

*vi) Importance.* For the most part, leaders were not optimistic about their communities' chances of affecting the outcome of the race at the federal level. Only in the Greek and Jewish communities did leaders think that community support could be important to the outcome of the election. This was true only for certain ridings. For the Greek community, this meant the riding of St. Denis, where a candidate of Greek origin, Eleni Bakopanos, was running. In the Jewish community, leaders mentioned Mount Royal, Outremont, Saint-Henri-Westmount, and Saint-Laurent-Cartierville as being ridings in which the support of the Jewish community could be important to the outcome of the race.

*vii) Closeness.* On the closeness indicator, no leaders expected the race to be close in 1993. All expected the Liberals to win overall, and most expected landslide Liberal wins in the ridings affecting their communities. The only exceptions to this pattern were found in the Chinese and Portuguese communities. Because these two communities are concentrated primarily in an area of the city that is split between two ridings (Saint-Henri-Westmount in the west and Laurier-Sainte-Marie in the east), Chinese and Portuguese leaders expected a Liberal win in one riding

and a Bloc Québécois win in the other. In both cases, the win was expected to be quite large. Thus on the perception of which party would win in one-sided races, three communities expected only Liberal victories in ridings affecting them, while two expected both Liberal and Bloc victories.

#### 5.1.1.2. The 1994 Provincial Election

i) *Issues.* As we saw in chapter four, the 1994 Quebec provincial election was dominated by two issues: sovereignty and the economy. This is reflected in the responses given by leaders from all five ethnic communities. Beginning with the Chinese community, over half the leaders interviewed cited the economy as the most important issue at the time, with nearly as many citing sovereignty or separation. Most made a link between the two. While three of the leaders mentioned issues relating to integration and tolerance, none could think of anything relating specifically to the Chinese community itself. This situation is similar to the one found among Greek, Italian and Portuguese leaders, all of whom cited the economy and sovereignty as the main areas of concern to their communities. The only leaders to mention group-specific issues ahead of other issues were found in the Jewish community. The distinction here was quite noticeable, with every one of the Jewish leaders mentioning community-specific issues as being at least as important as the overall economic or political situation. These issues were: the retention of the community's youth,

providing services to the elderly, and maintaining Jewish education. Thus it appears that only in the Jewish community did leaders have a perception that their's was a community with issues to defend.

*ii) Benefits.* Most leaders could foresee no group-specific benefits resulting from the election of the Liberal party, outside the obvious (and non group-specific) benefit of having a federalist party in power. The only example of a group-specific benefit was provided by two leaders in the Portuguese community, who expected that funding for their organization (both were involved in the same organization) would be more likely to continue under the Liberals than under the PQ. The overriding sentiment among leaders from all the communities was that there was nothing specific to be gained from a Liberal win. On the contrary, there was a strong feeling of "support by default" for the Liberals, with many leaders saying that they thought the Liberal party took their community for granted. In fact, leaders in both the Greek and the Portuguese communities said (somewhat ironically) that they expected more favorable treatment from the Parti québécois in power, both because the PQ had been generous to them in the past and because the PQ would most likely be in search of supporters for its promised referendum on sovereignty. It should be pointed out, however, that for most of these leaders, this was not seen as a reason to support

the Parti Québécois.<sup>3</sup> Thus, on this second indicator, we find that only within the Portuguese community did leaders expect group-specific benefits to result from the election of their preferred party.

*iii) Losses.* If very few leaders could cite specific benefits resulting from a Liberal win, even fewer could think of specific losses to be incurred from a Parti québécois victory. The only loss to be mentioned relates back to the dominant issue of the election: sovereignty. Leaders in both the Chinese and Portuguese communities thought that a PQ win would contribute to greater political and economic instability overall. But most did not think that a PQ victory would affect their communities in any particular way. The one exception to this was found in the Portuguese community, where the same leaders mentioned above said they expected funding for their organization would probably be jeopardized if the Parti québécois came to power. On this third indicator then, we find only one example of group-specific losses that could be seen to be a possible motivation for leader mobilization.

*iv) Promises.* Leaders of all communities were quite emphatic when responding to questions about campaign promises. Most said that no parties or candidates had made any specific promises to their communities, and that this was quite normal. In three of the

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<sup>3</sup> And for those few who were actual Parti Québécois supporters, this was not their primary motivation.

five communities, however, some leaders were able to point to group-specific promises that they considered credible. One leader in the Chinese community spoke of a Liberal promise to increase provincial trade with the Asian and Pacific-rim countries, and of utilizing the resources of the province's Chinese and Asian communities in doing so. Turning to the Greek community, some leaders cited promises by the Parti québécois to either maintain or to reinstate provincial funding for community schools and organizations. At least two of these leaders were admitted PQ supporters, and it is conceivable that for them, this was a reason to mobilize support in the community. In the Italian community, one leader recalled a Liberal promise to increase the number of beds in the "Italian" hospital. Only in the Jewish and Portuguese communities does it appear that promises were not a source of mobilization in the 1994 provincial election. While leaders in the Jewish community cited the Liberal government's long-standing commitment to granting associate status to Jewish day schools as a sort of promise, they expected it to be kept no matter which party came to power. Leaders in the Portuguese community could think of no promises at all. On this fourth indicator then, we find reasons for mobilization in three of the five communities.

v) *Ethnic candidates.* The 1994 Quebec provincial election saw candidate involvement from three of the five ethnic communities under study. They were the Greek, Italian and Jewish communities. In all three cases, there were candidates running for at least one

of the two major parties (and in the case of the Italian and Jewish communities, for both). Equally important, at least one candidate from each community was running in a winnable riding, so the community could be assured of at least one representative in the provincial legislature. Leaders in all three communities were aware and made mention of these points. On this particular indicator, then, we find a reason for mobilization in three of the five communities.

vi) *Importance*. It is very difficult for a leader to admit that his or her community is not important to a political party. This would appear to explain why most leaders said they thought their community was very important to the parties, even though they admitted upon further questioning that the parties could win without their community's support. Only the Greek, Italian, and Jewish leaders could point to specific ridings on the island of Montreal in which the support of their respective communities could make a difference to the outcome of the election.

vii) *Closeness*. On this particular indicator, only leaders in the Jewish community could be said to have a strong reason to mobilize, with about half expecting a very close race between the Liberal and Equality Party candidates in a riding with a considerable Jewish population. In all the other communities, leaders expected strong Liberal majorities in the ridings affecting their communities, but a PQ victory overall. With respect to the



Chinese and Portuguese communities, here once again we find that the geographic centre of each community is split between two provincial ridings (Westmount-Saint-Louis and Sainte-Marie-Saint-Jacques). Leaders in these two communities expected a strong Liberal win in the first riding and an equally strong PQ win in the second.

#### 5.1.1.3. The 1994 Municipal Election

*i) Issues.* Leaders in all five communities were in agreement that the issue of taxes was of uppermost importance during the 1994 Montreal municipal campaign. Here again, we find the ethnic communities reflecting the concerns of the general population. With the exception of some Chinese and Jewish leaders, most were unable to name an issue of particular importance to their own communities. Leaders in the Chinese community stressed two issues of specific importance to them: the effects of zoning by-laws and municipal services on the development of Chinatown, and the need to better integrate the Chinese community into civic life in Montreal. Leaders in the Jewish community also brought up the issue of zoning regulations and mentioned that these had had an effect on the construction of a synagogue.

*ii) Benefits.* Leaders had a difficult time thinking of any ways in which their communities could benefit by having a particular party or candidate elected. Most cited general benefits,

such as an expected lowering of taxes under a Pierre Bourque administration. Leaders in the Jewish and Portuguese communities indicated that certain local candidates had been helpful to them in the past, but did not mention any particular benefits that they expected for their communities in the future. Leaders in the Chinese community, while also pointing to certain local candidates who had been helpful to the community, went on to indicate that one mayoral candidate, Pierre Bourque, was expected to bring certain (unnamed) benefits to the community. The reasoning behind this perception appears to be the following: having worked closely with members of the community on such projects as the Chinese garden and the renovation of Chinatown, Bourque was perceived to have close ties to the community and its leadership, and could therefore be expected to work to improve the community's situation in the future. Such reasoning is similar to that expressed by some leaders in the Italian and Greek communities with respect to the federal Liberal party. Turning to these latter two communities, no Italian or Greek leaders were able to cite group specific benefits that they expected to result from the victory of a particular candidate or party at the municipal level.

*iii) Losses.* Aside from the general disappointment that would be felt if Jean Doré were to be re-elected, leaders did not expect any particular losses to result from the election of one party or candidate over another.

iv) *Promises*. All leaders said that at the level of the mayor, no specific promises had been made to their communities. One Chinese leader remembered hearing a promise from somewhere within the Vision Montreal party to double the size of Chinatown, but said that no one had taken it very seriously. Leaders from the Greek community mentioned promises from all the candidates in a particular district to revitalize certain areas and to increase the sports facilities in the district. But these were promises made to the district as a whole, rather than to the Greek community. The same thing can be said of the promise by Pierre Bourque to close the Miron dump, located within a district having a sizeable Italian population. While it was a promise that would certainly affect a large number of Italians, it cannot be seen as a promise made specifically to the Italian community. Only in the Portuguese community was a promise made that applied specifically to the community. In this case, independent candidate Michel Prescott had promised to change the name of a local park from *Parc du Portugal* to *Parc des Açores*, in order to better reflect the regional origins of the Portuguese population living in that area. While not all the leaders who mentioned this promise thought it was particularly important, the fact that all were aware of it and that it applied specifically to the Portuguese community make it the only example of a community-specific promise in this election.

v) *Ethnic candidates*. The 1994 municipal campaign saw the participation of candidates from all five communities. The Greek,

Italian and Jewish communities were well-represented, with several candidates running from each. In fact, leaders from both the Greek and Italian communities could point to at least one district in which every candidate running was Greek or Italian, respectively. Chinese leaders were also able to point to a candidate from their own community: David Ly, who ran in the ethnically-diverse district of Victoria. Finally, there was one candidate from the Portuguese community running in 1994, although his case differed significantly from that of the others. Herman Alves was not running in a district with a significant Portuguese population. Nor was he well-known by the community. In fact, most Portuguese leaders were unaware of his candidacy, with the majority reporting that there were no Portuguese candidates at all in this election, and the few who mentioned him saying that they did not think he was well-known in the community. For these reasons, I have not considered his candidacy to be a mobilization factor for Portuguese community leaders.

vi) *Importance*. Leaders in all five communities were able to answer yes to this question, at least with respect to certain districts. In this sense, the municipal election appears to represent a significant change from the other two elections under study, in that more communities felt they could make a difference at this level.

vii) *Closeness*. Leaders in all five communities expected the race to be close in at least one district affecting their communities. While most of the leaders in the Chinese community did say that they did not expect there to be a close race, this was not the prediction made by the only Chinese candidate running, who in fact ran a very close race in the district of Victoria, eventually losing to the Jewish incumbent by only 36 votes. This difference of opinions among leaders in the Chinese community can be traced to the fact that the majority were following the local race in the district of St-Jacques, where Chinatown is located and where the incumbent candidate was expected to win easily, rather than the race in the district of Victoria, where David Ly was running. For this reason, I consider that leaders in all communities expected close races, and therefore had reasons to mobilize voter turnout in the 1994 municipal election.

#### 5.1.1.4. Reasons for Mobilization: Summary

Table 5.1 summarizes each community's score on the seven indicators for the 1993 federal election. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the results for the provincial and municipal elections. The first and most striking message to be drawn from these tables is that in no community is there a particularly strong reason to expect mobilization to take place. Out of a possible total score of 7, the highest ranking obtained is 5. The average score obtained in the federal election is 3.2; in the provincial election it is 2.6; and

in the municipal election it is 3.6. These results would lead us to expect moderate amounts of mobilization at best. The very low scores obtained by the majority of communities in all three elections would lead us to expect very low levels of mobilization overall.

I will return to these scores, and the rankings that result from them, in the final section of this chapter. At this point it is sufficient to say that, for all five communities in all three elections, the motivations for mobilization are, on the whole, rather weak. Leaders were not particularly enthusiastic about any of the elections under study, nor did they expect any candidates or parties to be especially beneficial to their communities. Indeed, many leaders said they felt the parties took their communities for granted. The kinds of issues and benefits that leaders were most likely to mention were not of a group-specific nature, but were general, pertaining to society as a whole. This would seem to provide preliminary evidence that the portrait of community mobilization presented in the Uhlaner model is not reproduced to any significant degree in the ethnic communities studied here. Further analysis is necessary, however, before we can make a complete assessment.

Table 5.1. Leaders' Perceptions in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election Campaign

<u>Indicators</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
Issues	X	X		X	X
Benefits	X	X	X	X	X
Losses	X				
Promises		X			
Candidate		X	X	X	
Importance		X		X	
Closeness					
<u>Total (/7)</u>	3	5	2	4	2

Average score: 3.2/7

Table 5.2. Leaders' Perceptions in the 1994 Quebec Provincial Election Campaign

<u>Indicators</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
Issues				X	
Benefits					X
Losses					X
Promises	X	X	X		
Candidate		X	X	X	
Importance		X	X	X	
Closeness				X	
<u>Total (/7)</u>	1	3	3	4	2

Average score: 2.6/7



Table 5.3. Leaders' Perceptions in the 1994 Montreal Municipal Election Campaign

<u>Indicators</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
Issues	X			X	
Benefits	X				
Losses					
Promises					X
Candidate	X	X	X	X	
Importance	X	X	X	X	X
Closeness	X	X	X	X	X
<u>Total (/7)</u>	5	3	3	4	3

Average score: 3.6/7

### 5.1.2. Quantity of mobilization

Data for this section are drawn from a series of questions which dealt with the electoral activities of leaders and their organizations. The wording of the questions can be found in Appendix A. Two dimensions are explored: *campaign period* and *level of leadership involvement*. With respect to the first dimension, the questions focused on two distinct stages in each election period: *candidate nominations* and the *campaigns* themselves.<sup>4</sup> With respect to the second dimension, the questions focused on *organizational involvement* as well as on the leader's *personal involvement*. I examine each of these dimensions for the three elections in turn.

#### 5.1.2.1. The 1993 Federal Election

##### i) Nominations

a) *Organizational involvement*. Most of the organizations examined were not involved in the nomination process leading up to the 1993 federal campaign. There were two minor exceptions to this. In both the Greek and the Jewish communities, leaders mentioned that their organizations did support the nomination of Greek and

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<sup>4</sup> While Uhlaner's model refers only to campaign activities, the inclusion of nominations is justifiable in that the nomination can be seen as a sort of pre-campaign, the place where mobilization begins (see Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1991). Even if nominations do not involve a great many community members, they can be occasions for letting people know who the leaders support. In some cases, where a riding is considered to be a "safe seat" for one particular party, the nomination race may even be seen to be the most important moment in the campaign.

Jewish candidates in an official, but very limited way. In the Greek case, the organization made it known to the Liberal party that it felt it would be appropriate that a Greek candidate replace the out-going incumbent (who had been nominated to the Senate) in a riding containing a sizeable Greek population. It did not, however, specify who that candidate should be. In the Jewish case, the leader said simply that the organization encouraged Jewish candidacies, but was not actively involved in their nominations. While admittedly modest, these two examples show a greater level of organizational involvement than was found in any of the other communities.

b) *Personal involvement.* Leaders were somewhat more involved in candidate nominations on a personal level. In three communities, the Chinese, Greek and Italian, leaders participated in an indirect way in nominations, by simply attending a meeting (without actually voting or mobilizing support for a candidate). While at first glance this may not seem like much involvement, some leaders pointed out that simply being seen is sometimes enough to convey one's support for a particular candidate. It is for this reason that I consider this type of involvement to be at least moderately significant. Active and direct support for a party nominee was found only among leaders of the Jewish community. In fact, two of the leaders interviewed said they openly supported a candidate's nomination in 1993. No participation was found among leaders of the Portuguese community. On this indicator of

mobilization then, three communities show a moderate level of involvement, while one shows a relatively high level.

ii) Campaign

a) *Organizational involvement.* The 1993 campaign found some organizational activity in each of the five communities examined. Within the Chinese community, such involvement ranged from playing a simple informational role -- informing parties or candidates of issues important to the community -- to encouraging turnout in a non-partisan fashion -- either by placing advertisements in community newspapers or by contacting organization members directly and reminding them to vote. It is important to note, however, that in some cases, although the organization itself did not take a partisan stand, many of its active members did, and that because of this, the organization may have been identified by its own members, as well as by some in the community, as supporting a particular party. Such unofficial partisan involvement on the part of organizations was found to take place not only in the Chinese community, but in the Greek, Italian and Portuguese communities as well.

Taking the Greek community, two organizations claimed involvement primarily in an informational capacity, informing candidates of issues and organizing meetings within the community. One of these organizations also encouraged participation in a non-partisan way. All of this was done in an official capacity.

Unofficially, many of the members in this second organization let it be known that one party in particular was best suited to the community's needs, thereby creating the impression that the organization itself was to some extent supportive of that party. The same phenomenon occurred in the only Italian organization which admitted to being actively involved in the 1993 campaign. At an official level, the organization encouraged turnout in a non-partisan way, and attended campaign-related functions if invited to them. Unofficially, most of its members were highly active in a partisan way with the Liberal party. Here once again, the leader interviewed said this may have created the impression that the organization itself was supporting that party. In the case of the Portuguese community, two organizations invited or allowed candidates from different parties to use their facilities in order to speak to members of the community. One of these also encouraged turnout in a non-partisan way. However, active involvement by key organization members gave the impression of unofficial organizational support for the Liberal party.

Turning, finally, to the Jewish community, I found only modest organizational involvement in the 1993 campaign, with two organizations playing an informational role by meeting candidates and informing them of the community's concerns. No mobilization of voters was reported to have taken place.

Summing up this indicator of mobilization, it appears that

four of the five communities saw moderate levels of official organizational involvement, while one, the Jewish, saw only low levels of organizational involvement. If we consider the unofficial partisan involvement of organizations, the Chinese, Greek, Italian and Portuguese communities turn out to be most active, with each one having at least one organization unofficially involved in partisan mobilization.

b) *Personal involvement.* Leaders were personally involved in all five communities in 1993. While some limited their involvement to providing non-partisan information, or working behind the scenes for candidates, others were openly campaigning on behalf of particular candidates. For example, when asked what types of activities he was engaged in, one Chinese leader responded this way:

Typical stuff. Doing the polling, calling people up, asking them to come out to vote, making sure they vote on that day. Actually, the list of all the Chinese voters we divided among us, and we called people up. We had about 15 to 20 volunteers helping out, just taking care of the Chinese community.

Another reiterated the importance of the ethnic connection, saying,

Well, they would always give us the Chinese community, because, not so much that we know them, but the language factor. You need volunteers who can speak to people in the Chinese, and that's very important. If a political party phones you up and says to you in Chinese, "Go and vote", you think "Oh wow, someone from this party speaks Chinese." You'll identify a little bit more with it.

One Greek leader described her involvement as one of showing up at public meetings in support of her favorite candidate. She said that she would also talk about the candidate to others, but only to

people she knew personally. Other Greek leaders, while not personally involved in the campaign, were able to point to a number of prominent individuals within the community who were. According to one of these leaders,

Yes, quite a few [were involved]. First in the way of financing, as well as in meetings with leaders, especially the ones who are considered to be the most important economic leaders in the community ... people like that. Meetings to meet the candidates, things like that. There were many, many activities going on.

Leaders in the Italian community pointed to a variety of campaign activities in which they, or other leaders were involved. Some went door-to-door, others helped organize the campaign of a particular candidate. Said one leader about such involvement, "Obviously, my role would be to contact the Italian community, which I know very well, I know everybody in NDG." Jewish leaders were also involved in a variety of ways. While some played an informational role only, others took an open stand in favour of a particular candidate. One leader described his activities in the following way:

Door to door, and helping out on election day. I was taking food to people at the polling stations. A little bit of everything. I did phoning as well during the campaign.

The same kinds of activities were engaged in by a number of leaders in the Portuguese community. Said one leader, who was active in the Paul Martin campaign, "I was doing surveys, door-to-door, updating computer information." Another leader, who was active in the same campaign, described how it worked:

We take the electoral list, and if there are a lot of ethnic voters, we'll send in the people [of the same ethnicity] to get out their own vote. It's easier that way, since they speak the language. ... So me, I spoke to the Portuguese voters in Montreal.

We can see, then, that leaders in all five communities were in direct contact with voters in their communities. On this indicator, all five communities appear to have been highly mobilized in the 1993 federal election.

#### 5.1.2.2. The 1994 Provincial Election

##### i) Nominations

a) *Organizational involvement.* None of the organizations whose leaders I met were involved in candidate nominations for the 1994 provincial election.

b) *Personal involvement.* If community organizations were not involved in nominations in an official way, there was some evidence that leaders within these organizations were involved. The level of involvement, in most cases, seems to have been limited. Among the Chinese leaders interviewed, two said they had attended nomination meetings, and although they did not actually vote (neither one was a party member), they did think that their attendance provided symbolic support for a preferred candidate. Among the Greek leaders interviewed, only one reported having attended nomination meetings. This particular individual said that she had been present at several nominations, primarily because they were "political happenings", and that as a member of the party, it was important to be there. This person also made an effort to mobilize support for one candidate involved in a tightly contested



race for the PQ nomination in Mercier riding. Turning to the Italian community, here again most leaders interviewed were not involved in party nominations. Aside from the one who ran as a candidate (and whose candidacy was not contested at the nomination meeting), only one leader mentioned having been involved at this stage of the election. This individual worked for a candidate in his own riding, and in particular, tried to mobilize support among Italian voters there. There was some nomination activity among Jewish leaders as well, with two of the five leaders interviewed saying that they had either run for a nomination, or had begun to run and had dropped out early in the race. A third said that he had given behind-the-scenes support to candidates, but that he had not actually attended meetings. Finally, within the Portuguese community, one leader admitted to being involved in a party nomination. This person publicly supported a PQ candidate in the race for the Mercier nomination. Overall then, we can say that there was personal leadership involvement in all five communities, with the level of involvement being greatest among the Greek, Italian, Jewish and Portuguese leaders, and least among Chinese leaders.

## ii) Campaign

a) *Organizational involvement.* The majority of organizations contacted in all five communities were not involved in any campaign activities in the 1994 provincial election. However, there were some organizations in each community that were.

Beginning with the Chinese community, one leader said that his organization's involvement was limited to attending meetings or banquets if invited to them. Two others said that their organizations tried to encourage turnout in a non-partisan way, the one by placing advertisements in community newspapers reminding people to vote, the other by contacting its own members. This second organization also pushed to have Chinese enumerators employed in areas with significant numbers of Chinese voters.

Within the Greek community, two of the leaders interviewed said that their organizations had been involved in organizing debates and meetings during the campaign. While neither one took an official stand in favor of any party, and no official effort was made to mobilize voters to turn out, here again, as was the case in the federal election, there is evidence of unofficial organizational support for a particular party. A similar story is told in the Italian community, where only one leader said that his organization had been involved during the campaign. Officially, this organization remained neutral, getting involved only in order to inform the parties of its views. Unofficially, many of the organization's most important members were visibly involved with one party, creating the impression both within the parties and within the community that the organization itself supported one particular party.

Organizational involvement within the Jewish community

consisted primarily of playing an information role. One organization provided parties and candidates with information kits, telling them of the community's concerns and needs. It also met with candidates from all major parties, again in order to provide information and to exchange points of view. That organization did not, however, try to inform the community itself in any direct way, nor did it try to mobilize turnout. A second organization did play an information role vis-à-vis the community, by allowing candidates to use its facilities in order to hold meetings. This was done, the leader told me, in a strictly non-partisan fashion. While none of the leaders interviewed said that their own organizations had been involved in mobilizing voter turnout in the 1994 election, they were able to point to other, smaller, community organizations that were so involved. On the basis of this information, I consider the Jewish community to have been at least moderately active at the organizational level.

Turning, finally, to the Portuguese community, I found that only one organization was involved in the campaign. Here again, there was some ambiguity surrounding its involvement. On an official level, the organization saw itself as being non-partisan. It invited candidates to speak and encouraged its members to vote, but did not openly urge support for any one party. Upon further questioning, it was revealed that the organization invited only one party to speak (although the others would have been allowed to come if they had asked), and made a habit of informing its members

every time the party provided them with funding. In this way, the organization sent a clear message to its members that one party was preferred, without actually coming out and saying so.

Summing up then, I found moderate amounts of organizational involvement in the Chinese and Jewish communities, and high levels of involvement in the Greek, Italian, and Portuguese communities.

b) *Personal involvement.* I found evidence of personal leadership involvement in all the communities except one. None of the Chinese leaders interviewed claimed to have been involved in any significant way in the 1994 provincial election. Among the Greek leaders interviewed, only one said that she had been personally involved in the campaign. This individual was, however, very active. She campaigned openly for one party, supporting its candidates and arranging meetings in ridings that had significant numbers of Greek voters. She also translated party campaign literature into Greek and wrote articles for a community newspaper. Turning to the Italian community, I found a similarly high level of involvement among four of the leaders interviewed. One was a candidate himself, while three others actively campaigned for various candidates. Their activities included going door-to-door with or on behalf of candidates, as well as telephoning voters. One mentioned that he was active primarily as a contact with the Italian voters in his riding. Within the Jewish community, leaders were also quite active in the campaign. One campaigned openly for

a candidate, going door-to-door in his riding, telephoning voters, and even accompanying the candidate to a synagogue in order to meet members of the community. Two other leaders said they were involved in the campaign, but that their involvement was limited to working behind the scenes, helping candidates prepare for debates and meetings. They did not actually meet voters or try to convince any one to support their candidates. Turning, finally, to the Portuguese community, I found that half of the leaders I interviewed were personally involved in the campaign. All were involved in a partisan way, supporting a particular candidate or party. Their activities included going door-to-door, telephoning Portuguese voters, accompanying candidates to meet the community at various events, as well as working behind the scenes. All in all, I found high levels of personal involvement among leaders in four of the five communities examined. Only in the Chinese community was there no evidence of leaders' personal involvement.

#### 5.1.2.3. The 1994 Municipal Election

##### i) Nominations

a) *Organizational involvement.* Once again, as was the case in the previous two elections, official organizational involvement in candidate nominations was practically non-existent in the Montreal municipal campaign. Once again, however, there were ambiguous cases in which organizations did not participate officially, but where the presence of a significant number of their

members may have created the impression that the organization was at least unofficially supporting a particular candidate or candidates. This occurred in both the Chinese and the Greek communities. Otherwise, there was no organizational involvement at this level.

b) *Personal involvement.* There was very little personal involvement in nominations at the municipal level. Only one Portuguese community leader said he had attended a candidate's nomination, and even that case involved, at best, indirect support for the candidate. No other leaders interviewed said they were involved in the nominations at the municipal level.

ii) Campaign

a) *Organizational involvement.* Much more organizational activity took place during the campaign itself. Within the Chinese community, leaders of four organizations reported some kind of campaign activity, with two involved in low-intensity, informational roles, and two actively and openly supporting a particular candidate. In the one case, the organization held a fund-raising banquet for one mayoral candidate, to which the whole community was invited. This organization also encouraged voter turnout in the municipal election. In the other case, the organization supported the only Chinese candidate running, by endorsing him in the Chinese media and by providing volunteers to work on his campaign. Turning to the Greek community, one

organization was involved in an informational capacity, by helping to organize a debate between the four major mayoral candidates. Another encouraged turnout in a non-partisan way. A third appears to have been involved in supporting the candidacy of one of its own leaders. While the leader/candidate in question declined to be interviewed, this information was confirmed by two other leaders in the community. In the Italian community, I found, once again, evidence of unofficial partisan involvement in the campaign, particularly on the part of the regional organizations. With respect to the Jewish and Portuguese communities, lower levels of organizational involvement were detected, with leaders reporting information-type activities only.

b) *Personal involvement.* High levels of personal involvement were found among leaders in four of the five communities examined. Only in the Jewish community was no personal leadership activity reported. In the others, at least one leader was found in each community who actively campaigned on behalf of particular candidates. Some of the leaders interviewed were candidates themselves. Thus at this level of activity, four of the five communities can be considered to have been highly mobilized.

#### 5.1.2.4. Quantity of Mobilization: Summary

It is possible at this point to create a second rank-ordering of the communities, based on leaders' reports of personal and organizational involvement in the campaigns. Tables 5.4 to 5.6 summarize the communities' scores for the federal, provincial and municipal elections respectively. We can see by looking at these tables that the scores range from a low of 1 to a high of 8 (out of a possible total of 10), with most of the scores situated in the middle range, between 5 and 7. Perhaps the most surprising result is the relative scarcity of very low scores. If we look back to the first three tables, which summarize the communities' scores on leaders' perceptions of benefits and probabilities, we find that 10 of the 15 scores are 3 or less, that is, less than half the total score possible.

Turning to Tables 5.4 to 5.6, we find that only 2 of the 15 scores are below 5, or less than half the total score possible. While the two scoring schemes are different, it is nonetheless surprising to find so few low scores in this second set of tables. The average score for the federal election is 7; for the provincial election it is 6.8; and for the municipal election it is 5.6. Thus while the general tendency appears to have been for moderate levels of mobilization, this does surpass the expectation, based on the first set of observations, of very low levels of mobilization overall.



Table 5.4. Mobilization in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election Campaign

<u>Type of Involvement</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
Nominations:					
Organizational	0	1	0	1	0
Personal	1	1	1	2	0
Campaign:					
Organizational	3	3	3	1	3
Personal	3	3	3	3	3
-----					
<u>Total (/10)</u>	7	8	7	7	6

Average score: 7/10

Note: Points are attributed according to the following criteria: for nominations, 1 point if the organization or leader attended a nomination meeting but did not directly support a candidate; 2 points if the organization or leader attended and supported the candidate either by voting or by urging others to vote. For campaign activities: 1 point if the organization or leader played an information role only; 2 points if turnout was encouraged in a non-partisan way; 3 points if partisan mobilization occurred.

Table 5.5. Mobilization in the 1994 Quebec Provincial Election Campaign

<u>Type of Involvement</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
Nominations:					
Organizational	0	0	0	0	0
Personal	1	2	2	2	2
Campaign:					
Organizational	2	3	3	2	3
Personal	0	3	3	3	3
-----					
<u>Total (/10)</u>	3	8	8	7	8

Average score: 6.8/10

Note: See table 5.4 for an explanation of point attribution.

Table 5.6. Mobilization in the 1994 Montreal Municipal Election Campaign

<u>Type of Involvement</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
Nominations:					
Organizational	2	2	0	0	0
Personal	0	0	0	0	1
Campaign:					
Organizational	3	3	3	1	1
Personal	3	3	3	0	3
-----					
<u>Total (/10)</u>	8	8	6	1	5

Average score: 5.6/10

Note: See table 5.4 for an explanation of point attribution.

These first two sections have provided a description of the reasons leaders may have had for becoming involved in the elections, and of the types of activities they or their organizations were involved in. The scores presented so far should not be taken too literally. They are intended to provide a summary of the leaders' reasons for mobilizing and of the levels of mobilization in each community. On the basis of these scores, it will be possible to rank-order the communities across the three elections, as well as to rank-order the elections across the five communities. By comparing the rank-orderings for leaders' perceptions with the rank-orderings for leader mobilization, I can proceed to test my first three hypotheses. It is to this testing that I now turn.

## 5.2. Hypothesis Testing

The first three hypotheses which were laid out in chapter three pertain to the reasons for mobilization and to the amount of mobilization expected to take place. In order to test these hypotheses, I will be making use of the scores presented in Tables 5.1 to 5.6. In fact, the first three tables (5.1 to 5.3) enable me to make predictions about how much mobilization should take place across communities and elections, while the last three tables (5.4 to 5.6) can be used to test these predictions.

### 5.2.1. Hypothesis A.1: Perceived Benefits and Mobilization

According to Hypothesis A.1,

Mobilization occurs only when group leaders perceive one of the candidates or parties to be holding a position more beneficial to their group than that of any other candidate or party.

In other words, leaders must perceive some group-specific benefits to result from the election of a particular party or candidate. Communities in which perceived benefits are high should be more mobilized than communities in which they are low. Likewise, elections in which perceived benefits are high should see more mobilization than elections in which they are low.

By combining the first five indicators laid out in Tables 5.1 to 5.3, I can build a five-point benefits scale. Table 5.7 presents the summary of this scale for each community and election. Here we see that in the Chinese community, for example, the perceived benefits score for the federal election is greater than that for the provincial, but equal to that of the municipal election. In the Greek community, the score for the federal election is greater than both the provincial and municipal scores, and the provincial score is in turn greater than the municipal score. I can thus rank-order the federal, provincial, and municipal elections for each community. These rankings are presented in Table 5.8.

It is also possible, on the basis of Table 5.7, to hold each election constant and compare across communities. Taking the

federal election, we can see that perceptions of benefits were greatest in the Greek community, followed by the Chinese and Jewish communities in second place, and by the Italian and Portuguese communities in third place. The rank ordering of communities within each election is presented in Table 5.9.

On the basis of these two rank orderings -- across elections and across communities -- I can make predictions about how much mobilization should take place. Turning to Table 5.8, I can predict that in the Chinese community, mobilization will be greater in the federal election than in the provincial election, and that mobilization will be greater in the municipal election than in the provincial election. Similar predictions can be made for each community. A total of 11 predictions are possible, based on the rankings presented in Table 5.8.

Turning to Table 5.9, I can make predictions within each election. Taking the federal election, for example, I can predict that mobilization will be greater in the Greek community than in any of the other communities, and that it will be greater in the Chinese and Jewish communities than in the Italian and Portuguese communities. In the provincial election, mobilization is predicted to be greater in the Greek community than in the Chinese, greater in the Italian community than in the Chinese, and so on. A total of 19 predictions are possible, based on the rankings presented in Table 5.9.

Table 5.7. Community Scores on Perceived Benefits: Summary

<u>Election</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
Federal	3	4	2	3	2
Provincial	1	2	2	2	2
Municipal	3	1	1	2	1

Note: Scores are measured on a scale of 5, as based on the first five indicators listed in tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.

Table 5.8. Ranking of Elections According to Leaders' Perceptions of Benefits

<u>Election Order</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
1st	F, M	F	F, P	F	F, P
2nd	P	P	M	P, M	M
3rd		M			

F= Federal, P=Provincial, M=Municipal

Note: Elections are listed in order, from greatest expectations of benefits to the least, within each community.

Table 5.9. Ranking of Communities According to Leaders' Perceptions of Benefits

<u>Community Order</u>	<u>Election</u>		
	Federal	Provincial	Municipal
1st	G	G, I, J, P	C
2nd	C, J	C	J
3rd	I, P		G, I, P
4th			
5th			

C=Chinese, G=Greek, I=Italian, J=Jewish, P=Portuguese

Note: Communities are listed in order, from greatest expectations of benefits to the least, within each election.

In order to test these predictions, I must be able to say how much mobilization actually took place in each community and election. This requires a second set of rankings, showing how the communities and elections compare in terms of leader mobilization. Table 5.10 presents a summary of community mobilization scores, based on the scores presented in Tables 5.4 to 5.6. We can see that in the Chinese community, mobilization is greatest in the municipal election, somewhat less in the federal and least in the provincial. On the basis of this table, I can establish my second set of rankings. These are presented in Tables 5.11 and 5.12. In the first of these tables, each community is held constant and the elections are rank-ordered within them. In the second, it is the election that is held constant and the communities that are rank-ordered.

By comparing the predictions set out in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 to the actual mobilization rankings set out in Tables 5.11 and 5.12, I can proceed to test the validity of Hypothesis A.1. The first test is laid out in Table 5.13, and the second in Table 5.14. We can see that the hypothesis performs moderately well in both tests. Of the 11 predictions presented in Table 5.13, 7 are confirmed, for a confirmation rate of 64%. Of the 19 predictions set out in Table 5.14, 13 are confirmed, for a confirmation rate of 68%. It would thus appear, on the basis of these two tests, that Hypothesis A.1. is supported. More mobilization takes place in communities and elections where benefits are perceived to be high than where they are perceived to be low.

Table 5.10. Community Scores on Mobilization: Summary

<u>Election</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
Federal	7	8	7	7	6
Provincial	3	8	8	7	8
Municipal	8	8	6	1	5

Note: Scores are measured on a scale of 10, based on the scores listed in tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8.

Table 5.11. Ranking of Elections According to Leader Mobilization

<u>Election Order</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
1st	M	F, P, M	P	F, P	P
2nd	F		F	M	F
3rd	P		M		M

F= Federal, P=Provincial, M=Municipal

Note: Elections are listed in order, from greatest mobilization to the least, within each community.

Table 5.12. Ranking of Communities According to Leader Mobilization

<u>Community Order</u>	<u>Election</u>		
	Federal	Provincial	Municipal
1st	G	G, I, P	C, G
2nd	C, I, J	J	I
3rd	P	C	P
4th			J
5th			

C=Chinese, G=Greek, I=Italian, J=Jewish, P=Portuguese

Note: Communities are listed in order, from greatest mobilization to the least, within each election.



Table 5.13. Testing Predictions of Community Mobilization Rankings Across Elections (based on perceived benefits)

<u>Predicted</u>	<u>Observed</u>	<u>Verdict</u>
Chinese:		
F > P	F > P	Confirmed
M > P	M > P	Confirmed
Greek:		
F > P	F = P	Neither
F > M	F = M	Neither
P > M	P = M	Neither
Italian:		
F > M	F > M	Confirmed
P > M	P > M	Confirmed
Jewish:		
F > P	F = P	Neither
F > M	F = M	Confirmed
Portuguese:		
F > M	F > M	Confirmed
P > M	P > M	Confirmed

Total number of predictions = 11

Total confirmed = 7

Confirmation rate = 64%

Note: Predicted rankings are for relative community mobilization levels in each election (F=Federal, P=Provincial, M=Municipal), based on leaders' perceptions of benefits. Predictions are based on the rankings set out in Table 5.8. Observed rankings are based on Table 5.11.

Table 5.14. Testing Predictions of Election Mobilization Rankings  
Across Communities (based on perceived benefits)

<u>Predicted</u>	<u>Observed</u>	<u>Verdict</u>
Federal:		
G > C	G > C	Confirmed
G > J	G > J	Confirmed
G > I	G > I	Confirmed
G > P	G > P	Confirmed
C > I	C = I	Neither
C > P	C > P	Confirmed
J > I	J = I	Neither
J > P	J > P	Confirmed
Provincial:		
G > C	G > C	Confirmed
I > C	I > C	Confirmed
J > C	J > C	Confirmed
P > C	P > C	Confirmed
Municipal:		
C > J	C > J	Confirmed
C > G	C = G	Neither
C > I	C > I	Confirmed
C > P	C > P	Confirmed
J > G	G > J	Disconfirmed
J > I	I > J	Disconfirmed
J > P	P > J	Disconfirmed

Total number of predictions = 19

Total confirmed = 13

Confirmation rate = 68%

Note: Predicted rankings are for relative electoral mobilization levels across each community (C=Chinese, G=Greek, I=Italian, J=Jewish, P=Portuguese), based on leaders' perceptions of benefits. Predictions are based on the rankings set out in Table 5.9. Observed rankings are based on Table 5.12.

### 5.2.2. Hypothesis A.2: Perceived Probability and Mobilization

The second hypothesis states that,

Mobilization is greater when group leaders perceive the election to be close than when they perceive it to be one-sided.

This hypothesis relates to the probability element in the calculus of voting. Leaders are expected to mobilize only when they perceive that such mobilization will be worth their while. To test this hypothesis, I have created two indicators of probability: importance and closeness. Recall that leaders were asked whether they thought their community's support was important for a party or candidate in any particular riding. They were also asked whether they expected the race to be close in any particular riding. Each community's score on these two indicators can be found in Tables 5.1 to 5.3. A summary of these probability scores is presented in Table 5.15.

Based on the scores presented in Table 5.15, I can, once again, arrange both the communities and the elections in order, from greatest perceived probability of affecting the outcome to least. In Table 5.16, the community is held constant and the elections are ranked within it. Looking at the Chinese community, we see that the perceived probability of affecting the outcome is greater in the municipal election than in either the federal or the provincial. This pattern holds for all of the other communities except one: in the Jewish community, the perceived probability of

Table 5.15. Community Scores on Perceived Probability of Affecting Outcome

<u>Election</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
Federal	0	1	0	1	0
Provincial	0	1	1	2	0
Municipal	2	2	2	2	2

Note: Scores are measured on a scale of 0 to 2, based on the last two indicators listed in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.

Table 5.16. Ranking of Elections According to Perceived Probability of Affecting Outcome

<u>Election Order</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
1st	M	M	M	M,P	M
2nd	F,P	F,P	F,P	F	F,P
3rd					

F= Federal, P=Provincial, M=Municipal

Note: Elections are listed in order, from greatest probability to the least, within each community.

Table 5.17. Ranking of Communities According to Perceived Probability of Affecting Outcome

<u>Community Order</u>	<u>Election</u>		
	Federal	Provincial	Municipal
1st	G,J	J	C,G,I,J,P
2nd	C,I,P	G,I	
3rd		C,P	

C=Chinese, G=Greek, I=Italian, J=Jewish, P=Portuguese

Note: Communities are listed in order, from greatest probability to the least, within each election.

affecting the outcome is greater in the municipal election than in the federal, and greater in the provincial election than in the federal.

In Table 5.17, the election is held constant and the communities are rank-ordered within it. Thus for the federal election, we see that perceived probability of affecting the outcome is greater in the Greek and Jewish communities than in the Chinese, Italian or Portuguese. Note that because the ranking is based on a 0 to 2 scale, the maximum number of positions possible is three.

I can now proceed to test Hypothesis A.2, using the two rank orderings set out in Tables 5.16 and 5.17. Once again, I use these rankings to make predictions about the amount of mobilization that should take place within each community and election. I use the mobilization rankings presented in Tables 5.11 and 5.12 to test these predictions. Both the predicted and observed mobilization rankings are presented in Tables 5.18 and 5.19.

As can be seen, Hypothesis A.2 receives much less support than did Hypothesis A.1. In fact, based on the results in Tables 5.18 and 5.19, I am forced to conclude that Hypothesis A.2 is not supported. In the first test (Table 5.18), only 20% of the predictions are confirmed. In the second (Table 5.19), only 50% are confirmed. In other words, the results are never better than what

Table 5.18. Testing Predictions of Community Mobilization Rankings Across Elections (based on perceived probability)

<u>Predicted</u>	<u>Observed</u>	<u>Verdict</u>
Chinese:		
M > F	M > F	Confirmed
M > P	M > P	Confirmed
Greek:		
M > F	M = F	Neither
M > P	M = P	Neither
Italian:		
M > F	F > M	Disconfirmed
M > P	P > M	Disconfirmed
Jewish:		
M > F	F > M	Disconfirmed
P > F	P > M	Disconfirmed
Portuguese:		
M > F	F > M	Disconfirmed
M > P	P > M	Disconfirmed

Total number of predictions = 10

Total confirmed = 2

Confirmation rate = 20%

Note: Predicted rankings are for relative community mobilization levels in each election (F=Federal, P=Provincial, M=Municipal), based on leaders' perceived probability of affecting the election's outcome. Predictions are based on the rankings set out in Table 5.16. Observed rankings are based on Table 5.11.

Table 5.19. Testing Predictions of Election Mobilization Rankings Across Communities (based on perceived probability)

<u>Predicted</u>	<u>Observed</u>	<u>Verdict</u>
Federal:		
G > C	G > C	Confirmed
G > I	G > I	Confirmed
G > P	G > P	Confirmed
J > C	J = C	Neither
J > I	J = I	Neither
J > P	J > P	Confirmed
Provincial:		
J > G	G > J	Disconfirmed
J > I	I > J	Disconfirmed
J > C	J > C	Confirmed
J > P	P > J	Disconfirmed
G > C	G > C	Confirmed
G > P	G = P	Neither
I > C	I > C	Confirmed
I > P	I = P	Neither

Total number of predictions = 14

Total confirmed = 7

Confirmation rate = 50%

Note: Predicted rankings are for relative electoral mobilization levels across each community (C=Chinese, G=Greek, I=Italian, J=Jewish, P=Portuguese), based on leaders' perceived probability of affecting the election's outcome. Predictions are based on the rankings set out in Table 5.17. Observed rankings are based on Table 5.12.

one could expect on the basis of chance alone. It thus appears that the model performs better when perceived benefits are used to predict mobilization than when perceived probability is used.

### 5.2.3. Combining Benefits and Probability: Expectations

It could be argued that a better test of Hypotheses A.1 and A.2 could be made by combining the two -- just as the B and P terms are combined in the original calculus of voting. In other words, I need to combine leaders' perceptions of benefits with perceptions of the probability of affecting the outcome of the election. We can call this leaders' *expectations* of benefits (because the receipt of benefits is an expected one, based on the probability that the leader will, by mobilizing his or her community to vote, affect the outcome of the election). I will not try to make a multiplicative term out of the indicators presented here. Instead, I will combine the five benefits indicators with the two probability indicators to form a seven-point "expected benefits" scale. A summary of the communities' scores on this scale is presented in Table 5.20.

I proceed as I did in the previous two tests, rank-ordering the elections within each community, and rank-ordering the communities within each election. The two sets of rankings are presented in Tables 5.21 and 5.22. On the basis of these rank-orderings, I can test the hypothesis that the expectation of benefits increases mobilization by community leaders.



Table 5.20. Community Scores on Expected Benefits

<u>Election</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
Federal	3	5	2	4	2
Provincial	1	3	3	4	2
Municipal	5	3	3	4	3

Note: Scores are measured on a scale of 7, based on the seven indicators listed in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.

Table 5.21. Ranking of Elections According to Expected Benefits

<u>Election Order</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
1st	M	F	P,M	F,P,M	M
2nd	F	P,M	F		F,P
3rd	P				

F= Federal, P=Provincial, M=Municipal

Note: Elections are listed in order, from greatest probability to the least, within each community.

Table 5.22. Ranking of Communities According to Expected Benefits

<u>Community Order</u>	<u>Election</u>		
	Federal	Provincial	Municipal
1st	G	J	C
2nd	J	G,I	J
3rd	C	P	G,I,P
4th	I,P	C	
5th			

C=Chinese, G=Greek, I=Italian, J=Jewish, P=Portuguese

Note: Communities are listed in order, from greatest probability to the least, within each election.

The first test, comparing across elections within each community, is presented in Table 5.23. Here we find a total of 9 predictions, only 4 of which are confirmed. This gives a confirmation rate of 44%. Table 5.24 provides the second test, comparing across communities within each election. Here, out of a total of 25 predictions, we find 13 confirmed, for a confirmation rate of 52%. We can see, then, that in combining benefits and probabilities we obtain results that are somewhat better than those obtained for probabilities alone, but much weaker than those obtained for benefits alone. On the basis of this combined test, I must conclude that the first two hypotheses are not confirmed.

One further test can be conducted on the basis of these last results. Spearman's rho ( $r_s$ ) is a measure of association for ordinal variables that is based on the difference between ranks. I have calculated it for the rank order between the two variables, expected benefits and mobilization, for each of the three elections (the first rank-ordering is based on Table 5.22, the second on Table 5.12). The value of  $r_s$  ranges from +1.0 for a perfect match of ranks, to -1.0 if the ranks are exactly opposite. A  $r_s$  of 0 indicates no systematic ordering or rank pattern between the two variables. The results of this test, for the federal, provincial and municipal elections, are presented in Tables 5.25, 5.26, and 5.27 respectively. Here we find that the  $r_s$  for the federal election is +.80, indicating a fairly strong match between the two sets of orderings. This is not the case for the other two

elections: the  $r_s$  for the provincial election is +.23, while the  $r_s$  for the municipal election is +.06. These results indicate that little or no pattern exists between the two variables for these particular elections. Thus I find that only in one election out of three is there some support for the hypothesis that expected benefits are related to increased mobilization by community leaders.

Table 5.23. Testing Predictions of Community Mobilization Rankings Across Elections (based on expected benefits)

<u>Predicted</u>	<u>Observed</u>	<u>Verdict</u>
Chinese:		
M > F	M > F	Confirmed
M > P	M > P	Confirmed
F > P	F > P	Confirmed
Portuguese:		
M > F	F > M	Disconfirmed
M > P	P > M	Disconfirmed
Greek:		
F > P	F = P	Neither
F > M	F = M	Neither
Italian:		
P > F	P > F	Confirmed
M > F	F > M	Disconfirmed

Total number of predictions = 9

Total confirmed = 4

Confirmation rate = 44%

Note: Predicted rankings are for relative community mobilization levels in each election (F=Federal, P=Provincial, M=Municipal), based on leaders' expectations of benefits. Predictions are based on the rankings set out in Table 5.21. Observed rankings are based on Table 5.11.

Table 5.24. Testing Predictions of Election Mobilization Rankings Across Communities (based on expected benefits)

<u>Predicted</u>	<u>Observed</u>	<u>Verdict</u>
Federal:		
G > J	G > J	Confirmed
G > C	G > C	Confirmed
G > I	G > I	Confirmed
G > P	G > P	Confirmed
J > C	J = C	Neither
J > I	J = I	Neither
J > P	J > P	Confirmed
C > P	C > P	Confirmed
C > I	C = I	Neither
Provincial:		
J > G	G > J	Disconfirmed
J > I	I > J	Disconfirmed
J > P	P > J	Disconfirmed
J > C	J > C	Confirmed
G > P	G = P	Neither
G > C	G > C	Confirmed
I > P	I = P	Neither
I > C	I > C	Confirmed
P > C	P > C	Confirmed
Municipal:		
C > J	C > J	Confirmed
C > G	C = G	Neither
C > I	C > I	Confirmed
C > P	C > P	Confirmed
J > G	G > J	Disconfirmed
J > I	I > J	Disconfirmed
J > P	P > J	Disconfirmed

Total number of predictions = 25

Total confirmed = 13

Confirmation rate = 52%

Note: Predicted rankings are for relative electoral mobilization levels in each community (C=Chinese, G=Greek, I=Italian, J=Jewish, P=Portuguese), based on leaders' expectations of benefits. Predictions are based on the rankings set out in Table 5.22. Observed rankings are based on Table 5.12.

Table 5.25. Ranking of Communities on Leaders' Expectations and Mobilization in the 1993 Federal Election

Community	Rank on Expectations	Rank on Mobilization	Difference between ranks	
			D	D <sup>2</sup>
Portuguese	1.5	1	0.5	0.25
Italian	1.5	3	-1.5	2.25
Chinese	3	3	0	0
Jewish	4	3	1	1
Greek	5	5	0	0
			-----	-----
			$\Sigma D = 0$	$\Sigma D^2 = 3.5$

Spearman's  $r_s = +.80$

Table 5.26. Ranking of Communities on Leaders' Expectations and Mobilization in the 1994 Provincial Election

Community	Rank on Expectations	Rank on Mobilization	Difference between ranks	
			D	D <sup>2</sup>
Chinese	1	1	0	0
Portuguese	2	4	-2	4
Italian	3.5	4	-0.5	0.25
Greek	3.5	4	-0.5	0.25
Jewish	5	2	3	9
			-----	-----
			$\Sigma D = 0$	$\Sigma D^2 = 13.5$

Spearman's  $r_s = +.23$

Table 5.27. Ranking of Communities on Leaders' Expectations and Mobilization in the 1994 Municipal Election

Community	Rank on Expectations	Rank on Mobilization	Difference between ranks	
			D	D <sup>2</sup>
Portuguese	2	2	0	0
Italian	2	3	-1	1
Greek	2	4.5	-2.5	6.25
Jewish	4	1	3	9
Chinese	5	4.5	0.5	0.25
			-----	-----
			$\Sigma D = 0$	$\Sigma D^2 = 16.5$

Spearman's  $r_s = +.06$

#### 5.2.4. Hypothesis A.3: Winning Candidate and Mobilization

The final hypothesis to be tested in this chapter is Hypothesis A.3, which states that,

If the election is not perceived to be close, mobilization is greater when the preferred candidate is seen to be winning than when the preferred candidate is seen to be losing.

In other words, in one-sided races, mobilization should be greater when the preferred candidate is winning than when the opposing candidate is winning. Recall that leaders are presumed to be rational; they will not waste time and other resources mobilizing support for a candidate who has no chance of winning. But what about a candidate who has every chance of winning? Why would rational leaders support such a candidate instead of free-riding? The reason is that leaders need to be able to lay claim to their group's share of future benefits. In order to do so, they must at least *appear* to have supported the candidate during the election. While mobilization in such instances should be less than what we would find in a close race (hypothesis A.2), it should nevertheless be greater than what we would find in a one-sided race that is expected to be won by the opposing team.

The data needed to test this hypothesis are drawn from leaders' responses to questions about perceived closeness. Recall that when leaders were asked about the perceived closeness of the race in ridings affecting their communities, they were also asked whom they expected would win. In both the provincial and federal

elections, the majority of leaders (with the exception of Jewish leaders in the provincial campaign) expected very one-sided races in all the ridings affecting their communities. In the majority of these cases, the candidate expected to win was also the candidate preferred by most of the community's leaders. Two interesting exceptions to this pattern were found in the Chinese and Portuguese communities. It is on the basis of these two exceptions that I am able to test Hypothesis A.3.

The leaders of the Chinese and Portuguese communities found themselves in similar situations. While there are significant Chinese and Portuguese populations found in the suburbs surrounding Montreal (see Figures 4.4 and 4.5 in the previous chapter), the historical and institutional cores of the two communities are found in adjoining, downtown areas of the city. These areas, which straddle St. Lawrence boulevard, are split between two ridings at both the federal and provincial levels. At the federal level, these ridings are Saint-Henri-Westmount and Laurier-Sainte-Marie (and to a lesser extent, Outremont and Rosemont). At the provincial level, the ridings are Westmount-Saint-Louis and Sainte-Marie-Saint-Jacques (and to a lesser extent, Outremont and Mercier). At both levels, the riding to the west of St. Lawrence boulevard was expected to vote strongly for the Liberal party, while the riding to the east was expected to vote strongly for either the Bloc (federally) or the PQ (provincially) (see Appendix B for location of ridings).



Because of this peculiar situation, leaders in both the Chinese and Portuguese communities expected a strong Bloc or PQ win in at least one of the ridings affecting them, while a strong Liberal win was expected in the others. Because most of the leaders in these two communities had indicated a preference for the Liberals at both the federal and the provincial levels, we can predict greater mobilization by Chinese and Portuguese leaders in the ridings where the Liberal candidate was expected to win than in the ridings where the Bloc or PQ candidate was expected to win. This prediction applies to the federal and provincial elections only; we cannot make predictions for the municipal election, as the majority of leaders in all five communities expected close races in all the districts affecting their communities.

Beginning with the Chinese community, I have examined leaders' responses to the questions regarding their own and their organizations' involvement in the 1993 federal and 1994 provincial elections in order to determine precisely where such involvement took place. With respect to the federal election, one leader indicated that he had been active in two ridings, Outremont and Saint-Denis. In both ridings, he had worked for the Liberal candidate. While there are relatively few Chinese voters living in either of these ridings, this leader pointed out that the organization to which he belonged was located in the Outremont riding. His support for the Liberal candidate in Saint-Denis appears to have been based on his admiration for her qualities as

an individual, and on her efforts to make contact with his organization. This leader also indicated that other members of his organization had been involved in the campaigns of various candidates, including Eleni Bakopanos (Liberal, Saint-Denis), Shirley Maheu (Liberal, Saint-Laurent-Cartierville), Martin Cauchon (Liberal, Outremont), Jean-Pierre Hogue (PC, Outremont) and David Berger (Liberal, Saint-Henri-Westmount). Another Chinese leader indicated that he had been personally involved with the Progressive Conservative party in 1993, but that he had not been involved in any one riding in particular. This long-time party member did not become involved to as great an extent as he had in previous years because he expected the Conservatives to lose the election. While his decision to be less involved was based in part on a sense of personal disillusionment with the party, it also appears to have been based on a kind of strategic calculation, as the following excerpt indicates:

...halfway through the campaign we [members of the community organization] decided it's time to switch. So even though I'm a Conservative, for the sake of the community I say to people when I see them, the Liberals are going to win it, so we should at least provide some support to the Liberal candidate in the riding. In the past ... whoever was the MP of the time, whoever assisted us, we would try to help them on an individual basis as much as we can, to help them get elected. But halfway through the election, when I saw that we weren't going to win it, I suggested that people help out with the Liberal candidate. ... So we provide some kind of support and maintain a good working basis. ... As long as the MP is helping us, I think it's only fair that we help that person.

This leader, then, encouraged other members of his community organization to help the challenging Liberal candidate in the organization's riding, based on the expectation that the Liberals

would win there and overall.

Turning to the 1994 provincial election, none of the Chinese leaders indicated personal involvement in the campaign (see Table 5.5). Two leaders said that they had been minimally involved at the nomination stage, but by the time of the election had decided to refrain from participating. While the one indicated that he had simply lacked the time to become more involved in the campaign, the other appears to have been influenced by strategic considerations. This leader had, at the time of the nomination, given symbolic support to Martin Oré, the Liberal candidate in the riding of Sainte-Marie-Saint-Jacques. This riding, as I have already pointed out, is a known Parti Québécois stronghold. Following the nomination, this leader's level of commitment to Oré appears to have cooled considerably. The following passage is quite revealing:

He [Oré] told me he'd like to meet all the people down here, to find out what we want. ... So he wants to go door to door, but the fact is, the riding doesn't belong to him. Most of the Chinese residential housing belongs to Jacques Chagnon. So I guess it wouldn't help him to go and meet them because he would be wasting his time. So I told him, you better not, but after the election if you want to meet these people, I'll introduce you.

While it is true that most of the Chinese residential housing is located in the neighbouring riding of Westmount-Saint-Louis, the riding of Jacques Chagnon, there is still a part of Chinatown that is found within Oré's riding. This leader's withdrawal from the campaign appears to have been influenced by the fact that his preferred candidate could not win in his own riding. There is also an indication that this leader had been unable to establish a

relationship with the one Liberal candidate in the area who could win, as the following passage makes clear:

We were supposed to get involved with Martin, but I figured after I went to the nomination that they were not inside Chinatown area, so I said no. It's kind of a waste of time to help Martin when you have Jacques who is supposed to come down and ask us to help him. . . . If Jacques would have asked us to do something we probably would have helped him.

We find, then, that in the Chinese community, there is some indication that leaders took strategic considerations into mind when deciding where to become involved. While leaders became involved in a number of ridings, some of which contained very few Chinese voters, none became involved in ridings that were expected to be won by either the Bloc or the Parti Québécois. The one leader who began the election by supporting the nomination of a Liberal candidate in a known PQ riding did not continue his involvement once the campaign began.

Turning to the Portuguese community, we can recall that while most leaders were not involved in either the federal or the provincial elections, a small number were very active in both (see Tables 5.4 and 5.5). Where did this activity occur? Beginning with the federal election, I found that the active leaders were involved primarily in the riding of Lasalle-Émard, on behalf of the Liberal incumbent, Paul Martin. The reason for this choice of location was quite simple: this was the riding in which these leaders lived, and in which their organization was located. Of those leaders whose organizations were located in the downtown core, only one was involved in the federal election. That leader, a longtime supporter

of Quebec sovereignty and member of the PQ at the provincial level, worked for the Bloc Québécois. He did not, however, work in any one riding in particular; rather, his participation was limited to taking part in the party's committee on ethno-cultural communities.

Turning to the provincial election, we find somewhat greater involvement in the campaign by leaders of the Portuguese community. Two of these were involved, once again, in their home riding of Marguerite-Bourgeoys (the provincial equivalent of Lasalle-Émard), on behalf of Liberal candidate Liza Frulla. One of these two indicated that he had also helped the Liberal candidates in the ridings of Westmount-Saint-Louis and Outremont. His said that his role was to contact the Portuguese families in these ridings. Another Portuguese leader who was involved with the Liberal party worked closely with John Ciaccia, the incumbent member for the riding of Mount-Royal. This individual did not confine his activities to a single riding, but followed Ciaccia to his various appearances around the province. He also played an intervening role when Ciaccia visited ridings in which the Portuguese community was numerous.

Another leader who indicated active participation in the provincial election, at least at the nomination stage, was involved with the Parti Québécois in the riding of Mercier. This riding, which is situated just north of Sainte-Marie-Saint-Jacques on the east side of St. Lawrence boulevard and contains a sizeable

Portuguese population, was expected to be the site of a strong Parti Québécois victory in 1994. Formerly held by Gérald Godin, who was recognized and admired by members of all the ethnic communities contacted in this study, the riding of Mercier had been the object of a bitter nomination battle between Giuseppe Sciortino and Robert Perrault. Sciortino, an Italian immigrant and member of the party executive, had initially won the nomination but saw his victory overturned in a rematch with Perrault, the former chairman of the Montreal Urban Community Transit Corporation, after riding association members had complained of voting irregularities in the first contest (Bauch 1994c; Macpherson 1994; Riga 1994b). Sciortino's loss came as a blow to the party leadership, which had openly endorsed his candidacy (in clear contravention of party practice). It was also a bitter disappointment to his supporters inside the riding, many of whom were members of ethnic communities. One such supporter was the Portuguese leader interviewed for this study. He had supported Sciortino for both personal and practical reasons; Sciortino was a long-time friend but more importantly, he represented an opportunity for the party to shed its exclusionary image and reach out to the ethnic communities. After the acrimonious nomination battle and Sciortino's narrow loss to Perrault, this leader decided to abstain from further campaign activity at the riding level. He restricted his activities to helping the party formulate policy positions and compose campaign literature aimed at ethnic communities. This decision to withdraw from active campaigning was only partly self-imposed; this leader

indicated that it would have been "difficult" to participate in the campaign on Perrault's behalf, hinting that there were too many bad feelings between the opposing camps to allow for a quick reconciliation.

There is evidence, then, that leaders in the Portuguese community, took strategic considerations into account when deciding where to mobilize. While some leaders simply chose to participate in their home ridings, ridings which also happened to be Liberal strongholds, others made a choice to participate in other parts of the city where the Portuguese community was present. The ridings they participated in were ridings that the Liberal candidate was expected to win. But the most interesting case is that of the leader who actively participated in a riding where a PQ victory was expected. Because he was an avowed PQ supporter, this leader's participation should not be seen as irrational. On the contrary: he was supporting his preferred party in a riding where it was certain to win. Had his preferred candidate won the nomination, this leader would have been well-situated to extract benefits for his community from a PQ victory in that riding. But because his preferred candidate lost the nomination, he was left without access to the bargaining process. It can fairly be argued that he had no rational reason to pursue the campaign after that. Of course, there may have been other factors which influenced his decision to withdraw from the campaign, not the least of which was the fact that the campaign conflicted with his summer vacation; still, the fact that he found

the time to help out at the party level suggests that this leader might have been more active if he had been able to support the candidate of his choice.

Summing up, then, we have seen that in the both the Chinese and the Portuguese communities there is some evidence that leaders took strategic calculations into consideration. With respect to the Chinese community, most of the leaders who were active in the campaign itself participated on behalf of Liberal candidates in safe Liberal ridings. The two exceptions to this pattern -- the Conservative supporter and the supporter of the Liberal candidate in a PQ riding -- either toned down their participation when it became clear that their party could not win, or dropped out of the campaign altogether. With respect to the Portuguese community, we have seen that those leaders who participated in the campaign did so in ridings where their preferred candidate or party was sure to win. Thus at no time did we find leaders participating on behalf of candidates who were sure to lose. In this sense, then, it is possible to say that hypothesis A.3 is supported. However, the fact that it is based on so few observations -- only two communities -- means that such support can be considered modest at best. We simply do not have enough evidence at this time to provide a more robust confirmation.



### 5.2.5. Hypothesis testing: Summary

In this section, I have tested three hypotheses in which the dependent variable is electoral mobilization by community leaders. Hypothesis A.1 made mobilization a function of leaders' perceptions of benefits. In testing this hypothesis, I made use of five indicators of perceived benefits: issues, benefits, losses, promises, and ethnic candidates. Hypothesis A.2 made mobilization dependent upon leaders' perceptions of probability -- specifically, the perceptions that the community's support was important for a candidate or party and/or that the race was expected to be close. I tested each of these hypotheses separately and in combination. Finally, I tested Hypothesis A.3, which predicted that in one-sided races, mobilization would be greater when the winning candidate was the one most favored by the community.

In the case of Hypothesis A.1, the results provide modest support, suggesting that the perception of benefits is positively related to mobilization. As for Hypothesis A.2, we find no support for the model. Leaders do not appear to be affected by considerations of closeness. When the perception of benefits is combined with the perception of probabilities, as it is in the calculus of voting, the results are less than favorable. In fact, the tests result in confirmed predictions only about half of the time, which is what we would expect on the basis of chance alone. In other words, while I have found moderate support for B, the

benefits portion of the calculus, I have found no support for P, the probability element.

As for Hypothesis A.3, these findings provide some support, suggesting that to the extent that they do not become involved in ridings where their preferred candidate or party is sure to lose, leaders do make strategic calculations about where to mobilize. This hypothesis is a rather blunt measure of strategic thinking, however. The fact that its confirmation is based on relatively few observations, combined with the lack of support for Hypothesis A.2, suggests that more evidence is necessary before leaders can be said to be motivated by probabilities.

In general, I find more mobilization taking place than can be predicted on the basis of leaders' expectations of group benefits alone. It appears that leaders mobilize even when group-specific benefits are not at stake. This suggests that factors other than expected group benefits are having an impact on leaders' decisions to mobilize voters during these three election campaigns. To this extent, we must conclude that the model is not supported by these findings.

If leaders are motivated by factors other than group-specific benefits and probabilities, what are they? We can recall that in each of the five communities, for each election, the majority of leaders referred to general, society-wide factors as being of

greatest importance to their communities. In the federal election, these included the general backlash against the Progressive Conservative party and the GST, as well as concern about the state of the economy and in particular, the high rate of unemployment. In the provincial election, it was the sovereignty issue which dominated, followed by economic concerns. In the municipal election, the question of taxes -- and in particular, the much despised surtax on non-residential properties -- was foremost in leaders' minds. While community-specific issues were not lacking, it was clear from leaders' responses that in most cases, they were secondary to these generalized, society-wide concerns. Now such issues, because they affect the whole population and not just the communities examined here, must be seen as pure public goods, subject to the free-rider problem. Such goods cannot be used to explain mobilization by rational group leaders because they are obtainable whether or not the leader mobilizes. They do not, therefore, fit the specifications of this model.

Leaders also made mention of factors which were of a purely personal nature. Some spoke of having a personal relationship with a particular candidate (antipathy as well as friendship), or of a sense of personal party loyalty. These sources of mobilization also lie outside the model because they are based on psychological characteristics (loyalty, altruism, revenge), rather than on the rational calculation of benefits and probabilities. These factors do not result from election-specific political exchanges between

leaders and candidates, but are long-standing, and therefore cannot be said to lie within the parameters of this particular model. It is also unclear how such personal factors could be translated into group-level consumption benefits.

The results of the tests presented in this chapter suggest that these other considerations -- the society-wide and the personal -- are more important in inducing group leaders to mobilize their communities than the kind of calculus imputed by Uhlaner's model. Group leaders become active when they feel strongly about a society-wide issue or when they have personal loyalties toward particular candidates. To this extent, we must conclude that the model proposed by Uhlaner is not supported.

Of course, we have tested only three of our six hypotheses, relating to only one aspect of the model -- the relationship between leaders' expectations and the amount of mobilization which takes place. It could be that our other three hypotheses -- which relate to the kinds of benefits leaders offer in order to mobilize their communities, and to the impact of mobilization on turnout -- produce more positive results. Still, even if this proves to be the case, we are forced to admit that one important part of the model does not work as expected. If the model is to be retained, we will have to explain why it is that supposedly rational, self-interested group leaders undertake a costly and time-consuming activity like electoral mobilization when it is clear that neither they nor their

communities can directly benefit from doing so. However, before we can even begin to address such a question, it remains to be seen whether the model performs better with respect to our other three hypotheses. It is to this question that I now wish to turn.

## Chapter Six

### What Kinds of Benefits Do Group Leaders Offer?

#### 6.1. General Findings

In the previous chapter, I examined the quantity of mobilization taking place in each community, and the reasons for that mobilization. In this chapter, I look at the qualitative aspect, that is, the kinds of arguments and incentives leaders use to urge community members to turn out. In this first section, I describe leaders' responses to three "quality of mobilization" questions. I begin with the question of whether it is difficult or easy to convince people in the community to vote. I then proceed to the question of how leaders convince people to vote. Finally, I examine whether they encounter the argument that a single vote cannot make a difference to the outcome of the election, and if so, how they respond to such an argument. Precise question wording is found in Appendix A.

##### 6.1.1. Is it difficult to convince people in your community to vote?

###### *i) The Chinese Community*

Beginning with the Chinese community, leaders felt it was difficult to convince people to vote in all three elections under study. With respect to the 1993 federal election, most leaders

responded that it was very difficult to convince people to turn out, primarily because of a general lack of interest in politics in that community. In the words of one leader, "Usually it's not easy. there's always a certain difficulty." Another leader blamed the difficulty on the weakness of the community's communications:

Our internal news network is so poor that none of us can use any network to influence others. So me, or somebody like me, might have, say, some moral influence, but our tools are so limited.

One pointed out that many people, caught up in running their own business and raising a family, find it difficult to find the time to vote. Two others indicated that they found it personally difficult to try to motivate others to vote in the 1993 federal election because they felt no desire to vote themselves. This was due to the fact that they expected their preferred party, the Progressive Conservatives, to lose.

Turning to the provincial election, here again most leaders in the community thought it was very difficult to convince people to vote. Lack of interest among community members and a preoccupation with other affairs appear to be the primary reasons for this. According to one leader,

... many Chinese people are just not interested to even come out and vote. They'd rather go home and take two more hours to sleep, or do their own thing in the house or something like that.

Another explained it in terms of a lack of "education" among community members, by which he meant a lack of understanding of politics. He felt that as the community became more educated, they

would eventually learn to participate more in elections. This view was shared by another leader, who responded that getting people to turnout was "very hard", but felt that because of the recent influx of better educated Chinese immigrants, turnout would likely increase in years to come. Two leaders pointed to the difficulty of getting people on the voters' list. This was especially the case for older members of the community. In the words of one leader,

In Chinatown there are a couple of buildings of elderly people, and the elderly don't open their doors to anybody. Unless you speak the language; that helps a bit.

He suggested that employing Chinese enumerators would help increase the number of registered voters in that community.

Turning to the municipal election, leaders were unanimous in declaring that it was very difficult to convince community members to participate. In the words of one leader,

Municipally, it's hard to get them to vote. The lower the level, the more important it is to vote, but the more difficult it is to get them to turn out.

He pointed out that people in the community often failed to recognize that the issues of greatest importance to them, like zoning, parking, and various services, fall within the municipal jurisdiction. This view was shared by another leader, who also brought up the fact that most of the residential population of Chinatown is elderly and therefore little inclined to vote. Two others pointed to factors specific to this particular election. One suggested that the issue of the surtax, which was the most important issue in the election, affected only commercial property



owners, not residential owners or tenants, and was therefore not useful in mobilizing large-scale turnout. The other pointed to the particularly bad weather experienced on election day as an important impediment to getting out the vote.

In sum, then, we can say that in the Chinese community, regardless of the election, leaders felt it was difficult to mobilize people to vote. The main reasons appear to be a general lack of interest in politics and a perceived high opportunity cost of voting. These reasons were compounded by a number of other factors, some election-specific, others arising from the demographic characteristics of certain geographic concentrations.

*ii) The Greek Community*

To the same degree that Chinese leaders found their community difficult to mobilize, leaders in the Greek community found it easy to convince members of their community to vote. In fact, most said it was not even necessary to try, because, in the words of one leader,

They are very political animals, the Greeks. They love elections, debates, because their whole life revolves around elections and political activity, starting from the Greek community itself. It's a very politically aware community.

This perception was expressed, in various ways, by all the leaders interviewed, with respect to all the elections examined here.

In explaining the ease of getting people to vote and the expected high rate of turnout in his community, one leader spoke of

a strong degree of politicization among Greeks:

It's because they've been sensitized to elections, to the right of voting. ... In the Greek community people vote because they believe in elections. And even if they vote for a minor party, they'll still vote. They really participate; they want to express themselves.

Many pointed to the fact that voting is compulsory in Greece, and that this has left people of Greek origins with both a strong sense of duty and a long tradition of voting. Such views were expressed by several leaders:

You see, in Greece, it's compulsory. If you don't vote, you're penalized. Because the State, they believe it's a duty. So I would say that we are inclined to vote, number one, because of what happens in Greece, and number two, because as I said before, we are political animals and we like politics.

In Greece it's obligatory. And I think we have this culture, that it's important to go vote. I think it's a habit. We don't believe that it's useless.

Traditionally, Greeks like politics. They talk politics alot. So everybody is a little prime minister. Everybody has an opinion, they're quite active in politics. And traditionally, they vote.

There's a big tradition in cultural communities, just like there's a big tradition in Europe, where your vote counts. They're stubborn. ...Canadians, I find, are very indifferent, compared to Europeans. I think it's a tradition; you vote, and even the little old lady across the street votes...

Only one leader expressed a variation on the themes of tradition, duty and taste for politics. Speaking with respect to the federal and provincial elections she explained Greek participation this way:

[It's] because of the stakes. At the provincial level it's that. But there's also the element of exercising your rights of citizenship, which is something very entrenched in Europeans. In Greece, at least, it's mandatory. ...It's a way of participating. They don't have a lot of means of showing

their orientation. Often it's not easy for them to get involved at the national level, so the only way of showing their orientation is by voting.

Similar arguments came up with respect to the municipal election. The ideas of tradition and duty, and the belief that Greeks like to vote, were voiced by all the leaders. One, however, pointed to an additional motivation for turnout: the high number of Greek candidates running in the election. Recall that in one district, Parc Extension, all six candidates were of Greek origin. One leader, noting that the rate of turnout at the municipal level is usually about 40%, expected a rate of more than 50% in this district, because of the large number of Greek candidacies. Well-known Greek candidates were also running in the districts of Mile End and Jeanne-Mance.

On the whole, then, leaders in the Greek community expected high turnout from community members in all three elections, and consequently felt that it was unnecessary to convince people to vote. The primary reasons given for this were a strong sense of duty, tradition, and a taste for voting. The presence of a large number of Greek candidates at the municipal level was also seen as source of motivation to turn out.

### *iii) The Italian Community*

A similar story was told by leaders in the Italian community. Here again most leaders expected higher than average levels of

turnout from community members, and this in all three elections. Several leaders explained this tendency in terms of habit and duty:

The Italian community always votes in great numbers. At least 85%.

We're used to an obligatory vote in Italy. So everyone goes to vote.

They just take it as a given. It's a principle for them to vote. Call it an obligation or duty, but they vote. ... They're people, if there's any kind of election or vote, they'll go vote. I've seen that at the municipal, the provincial, and the federal levels.

Others referred to the particular issue of national unity, which was seen to have been salient in both the federal and provincial elections. According to this view, voting was a way of demonstrating one's position on this larger issue of importance to community members:

I think it's a way of feeling like a citizen. When you hear all the time that there are Québécois and "the others", it's as if the vote reminds us that we have rights and we exist. It's also a way of making it known that they're against separatism: to vote, and to make it clear that where there are large concentrations of Italians, the Liberal vote is stronger. It doesn't necessarily mean that they'll make the difference, but it's a way of showing that they don't accept the other option. If they didn't vote, no one would know how they feel.

Because the 1994 election was a kind of referendum. The Italian community showed it wanted to stay federalist. The flavour of the referendum made people want to show their colours. ... There's also a strong feeling of the right to vote in the Italian community.

They go out, no problem. ...It's more difficult at the municipal level. ... Maybe they don't take seriously the municipal election. ... At the federal and provincial level, you're really dealing with your own life, what is going to happen to you and your future [because of the separation issue].

With respect to the municipal election, most leaders referred to the same arguments as above, that is, a sense of duty, an affirmation of citizenship, and a desire to express themselves. One leader put it in the following terms:

They vote essentially for three reasons. One, because it's a way of feeling like they're part of society. The idea of "I want to have my say". Two, there's the ideological question at the provincial and federal levels, and their opinion is set. Three, if one of their own is running, there's a sense of solidarity. People vote to be able to express their opinion. It's not important to make a difference. For example, in the school board elections, they'll vote regardless of whether or not they know the issues or the people running. They vote because it's their duty to vote.

Like their counterparts in the Greek community, Italian leaders also pointed to the unusually high number of Italian candidates running in the municipal election. One leader was quite specific in explaining how this translated into higher turnout:

The organizations of these candidates courted the Italian voters. They target the Italian electorate. They solicit the Italian voters themselves, then they also solicit Italians who have connections in the neighbourhood. Whether it's an organization or an individual, it's their network of connections that counts.

Only two leaders at the municipal level thought it would be hard to get people to turn out. These leaders differed from the others in that both were involved in the Italian community located in the western part of the city, specifically, the districts of Notre-Dame-de-Grace and Loyola, rather than the north-eastern districts of St-Michel, François-Perrault, Villeray, and Rivière-des-Prairies. Both of these leaders expected low turnout among members of their community because they felt that there was little

difference between the candidates or parties. In the words of one of these disillusioned leaders, "It doesn't really matter who wins, taxes go up anyway." The other thought that turnout among Italians in the N-D-G area would have been higher if the local candidates had made a greater effort to get the vote out:

...I blame the candidates for not taking the people out. Because when you're running an election you need committees, you need a car-pool committee, you need a door-to-door committee and so on.

When asked if he had been involved in this particular election this leader replied in the negative, explaining:

...I was very tired, and I preferred to stay out. I was, in a real sense, disgusted by this incredible farce that was going on in the municipal level, I thought it was ridiculous. I think all the population feels like this. We are tired of politicians. And I am particularly tired of politicians, who are a bunch of crooks. They get in power, supposedly for the benefit of the population, but they really go there just to fill up their pockets. And I think we've had it. At least I have.

It is interesting to note that this same leader had, in the past, been very active in campaigning at all three levels of government.

We can see, then, that most leaders in the Italian community expected high rates of turnout in all three elections. The reasons for this were similar to those expressed in the Greek community, that is, duty, tradition, and a taste for voting. Italian leaders put particular emphasis on the expressive function of voting, both in terms of citizenship and on particular issues of importance to community members, like national unity. Only in the municipal election was there some disagreement among Italian leaders, with two leaders from a particular area of the city expressing a less

optimistic view of mobilization and turnout in their community, due primarily to a sense of dissatisfaction with the candidates and parties.

*iv) The Jewish Community*

Leaders in the Jewish community were unanimous in declaring mobilization to be an easy task at both the federal and provincial levels, and in expecting above-average rates of turnout in these two elections. Rather than put it down to duty or habit, however, Jewish leaders were more likely to stress the importance of issues, in particular, the issue of national unity or Quebec sovereignty. One leader, predicting a high rate of turnout in the 1994 provincial election, put it this way:

It varies. Over the past few elections it's been extremely high. In fact in Charlottetown, the turnout in D'Arcy McGee riding, which has the highest concentration of members of the Jewish community, was 92%. So one can expect that if the community feels the issues are critical, that the turnout will be high.

This same leader, when asked if it was difficult to mobilize people to vote replied,

No. [Not] when the issues are critical. I think it's the nature of the issues. If they understand the issue is important, I think they're going to turn out in significant numbers. They're fairly well politicized. ...The level of political consciousness is fairly high.

Another leader, speaking of the 1993 federal election, also expected higher than average turnout from his community, saying: "I think [that it was] a little higher than usual. Because the issue was important, because of the Bloc Québécois." When asked whether it was difficult to mobilize people in his community, this

same leader said no, explaining that "... they are interested. They have a sense for politics. ...I think they understood that this election was important."

The importance of issues in both the federal and provincial elections was also brought out by another leader:

It's not so difficult to convince them. You just have to show them the issues, because in general, people think "Nothing will change, things will continue as usual, so why should I vote?" ...But you can't just stay at home and not vote. That's the message that we have to get out. So that people will understand that there is a whole range of things that can affect their lives. And people will vote.

One variation was added to this explanation by another leader, who said that "in general, in the Jewish community, there's usually a high turnout." When asked why this was so, this leader made reference to political socialization and, specifically, to family pressure:

Because I think we imbue in our children, through our schools, our social network, the importance of participating in the political process, the importance of voting, what a vote means, that it's part of our responsibility of citizens, and so forth. ... For me, it was almost automatic. I could never, in my family, it was a given that you had to vote. There was no question. Not voting is considered an aberration.

It is important to note, however, that with respect to turnout in the particular election at hand, this same leader also had this to say: "[It's] fear of separation. Period. Point blank."

Turning to the municipal election, Jewish leaders were not as expectant of a high rate of turnout as they had been in the



previous two cases. Only one leader continued to expect a fairly high rate of turnout from the Jewish community in the municipal election, and thought that mobilization would not be difficult, because "people feel that the right to vote is a privilege". Other leaders felt that mobilization would be more difficult at this level, and that turnout would not be higher than the average. Here again, issues appear to be the most important factor explaining leaders' perceptions:

Yes, it is difficult getting people out to vote. They don't understand the stakes. They don't think it will change the world tomorrow, so they don't bother to vote.

Another leader felt that turnout might be higher than average, but that it would not be easy to mobilize people. He too pointed to the necessity of raising important issues:

There must be some kind of carrot at the end of it. You have to explain to them why they should vote, how it would benefit the community.

In sum, leaders in the Jewish community felt that it was not difficult to mobilize people to vote in the federal and provincial elections, due primarily to the importance of the stakes and to the level of political socialization in the community. At the municipal level, leaders were less optimistic about the ease of mobilizing community members, with only one leader declaring it to be an easy task. The others felt it would be at least somewhat difficult, in large part because the issues were not deemed to be important by most people.

v) *The Portuguese Community*

Leaders in the Portuguese community were not of one mind when it came to the question of whether it was easy or difficult to mobilize people to vote. With respect to the federal election, about half the leaders thought that it was relatively easy to mobilize people to vote, and that turnout among the Portuguese had been relatively high. The only reason given for this was a sense of civic duty:

Oh no, it's not difficult ...People vote.

I think they vote in large numbers ... Those who had the right to vote, they voted all right...

People have to vote, and they have to express what they feel about it. ... the Portuguese community is very grateful to this country. And this is one of the ways that we have to express our gratitude.

They believe it's their civic duty and they go out and they comply with it. ... From my personal involvement, I've had no negative feedback. They say they will vote and they do vote. ... I think they take pride in voting. ...they feel that it's a right, that they can express, and they should express. It's a freedom of choice for them.

For the other half of the leaders interviewed, mobilization was seen to be more difficult. These leaders thought that turnout among community members was probably lower than the average. Those who were able to cite a reason for this pointed to a feeling of ineffectiveness and cynicism among voters in the Portuguese community:

I think the Portuguese vote a little bit less than the average. Unfortunately, immigrants often don't vote.

I think the rate of turnout was weak. ... Because people were saying that it's always the same ones [who get in] and that even if they do change, things stay the same.

My impression is that it didn't really create a great deal of interest. ...in the case of the Portuguese, at the federal level they found themselves split between two ridings. Because people know what's around them, which way it's going to go, and there were two parties and they knew that it would be the Bloc in two ridings, here in Sainte-Marie and to the north, in Rosemont, people knew that there was a strong chance that the Bloc would win. There are people who think that it will change nothing, that we're not strong enough, not numerous enough, to make it worthwhile to do anything.

Turning to the provincial election, leaders in the Portuguese community were, once again, split between those who thought that mobilization would be difficult and turnout low, and those who expected mobilization to be relatively easy and turnout to be high. Thus one leader expected turnout in his community to be about 60%, saying: "From my knowledge of the Portuguese, I know that there'll be a lot who won't vote." While this leader did not think it would be hard to mobilize them, he admitted that he had never tried. He thought that whether or not they voted depended in large part upon the amount of free time they had. Other leaders who thought it would be difficult to mobilize people to vote referred either to a sense of cynicism towards politics, or to the cost of voting:

More and more, yes. People can see that, and sure, it ends up as a kind of cynicism towards politics. People say that it's always the same thing, whether it's one [party] or the other, it makes no difference.

Sometimes it is difficult. People have a tendency, not to forget, but sometimes they're just tired, they get home from work and they're dead tired...

Other leaders in the Portuguese community took the opposite view, expecting turnout in the provincial election to be higher than usual:

I can tell you, in the Portuguese community, this time, everyone who has the right to vote will vote. It's going to be very high.

When asked why he felt this way, this leader explained turnout in terms of a desire to elect the party that would give people a sense of security:

... they'll vote because, in their minds, if we don't vote, maybe the party we don't like will win, and they'll treat us badly; we have to vote to help bring in the people we want, so that we can feel secure.

He also evoked a sense of citizen duty, along with past experience in the country of origin. Unlike Greek and Italian leaders, however, this leader did not refer to the obligatory vote. Rather, he referred to the lack of democracy in Portugal as a factor pushing people to exercise their franchise in Canada:

...for the Portuguese people, the issue of the right to vote, which we didn't have for over 50 years in Portugal, it's a right that they have acquired here, it's a democratic right, and it's a right that they will exercise. They will vote. The Portuguese community always votes.

The other leaders who thought mobilization would be easy in their community made reference either to the importance of the issue at stake in the provincial election or to a sense of duty:

It's not so difficult. It always depends on the issue. When they feel they have to, they'll vote.

It's important. And I believe, as we grow older, we're more conscious of the time, of the situation. Because people being over here longer, they start to understand more of the politics of the country we live in, and this is a special time. I believe most people will vote. ...because of the threat of separation.

They believe in doing their duty when it comes to voting. They believe it's important that you have to get out there and vote. Either which way, but at least you have to vote.

With respect to the municipal election, some leaders thought that mobilization was not difficult, some thought that it was, and some were unsure. Those who felt that mobilization was easy referred to the surtax issue as an important factor pushing people to vote this time:

I think that this time, the level of participation will be pretty high, because people aren't happy with Doré. They're tired of taxes, and parking meters and so on.

I think it will be hot this time.... People have the [anti-surtax] demonstrations fresh in their minds. I think there'll be a larger turnout than usual.

For those who thought that it would be difficult to mobilize turnout in the municipal election, a lack of understanding of the issues, a sense of cynicism towards politics, and a lack of experience at the municipal level were given as reasons:

... it's the issues that count, and people don't understand. It's the level closest to them, but they vote the least for it. Before 1974, they never had municipal elections in Portugal. Those who came before that period, people don't have a habit of voting in municipal or school board elections.

It was difficult to convince them to go and vote. People are cynical. They don't think it can make a difference. All the candidates are alike.

Finally, there were some leaders who were either unsure about it, or who felt that mobilization was becoming somewhat easier than it had been in the past:

It used to be more difficult, before the convention between Prescott and Gardiner [two local candidates]. After that, people got the taste for voting. People are more likely to vote now, especially the younger ones. The older ones, they're still influenced by their experience of Salazar in Portugal.

I don't really know how many showed up to vote. Often people say they will vote, but then they don't. Maybe 50% voted. Everyone was against Doré. I found most people easy to approach, but I don't know if they actually voted.

In sum, leaders in the Portuguese community were somewhat divided in their assessments of whether it was easy or difficult to mobilize people to vote. This was the case for all three elections under study. It is interesting to note that some of the same factors were cited by leaders in both camps. Thus the perceived importance of the issues, and previous experience in Portugal were cited both by those who felt that mobilization was easy and by those who thought it was difficult. Sense of duty was cited only by those who thought mobilization was easy, and the costs involved in voting were mentioned only by those who found mobilization difficult.

#### *vi) Summary*

We have seen that there is considerable variation across the communities in terms of leaders' assessments of the ease or difficulty of convincing community members to vote. Leaders in the Chinese community were unanimous in finding it a difficult task in all three elections. A lack of interest in politics and a perceived high opportunity cost of voting were the main reasons given for this. In stark contrast, leaders in the Greek community were

unanimous in finding it easy to mobilize people to vote -- so easy, in fact, as to be all but unnecessary. The primary reasons given for this were a strong sense of duty, tradition, and a taste for voting. The obligatory vote in Greece was cited by many leaders as the main source of these attitudes. Leaders in the Italian community agreed that it was easy to mobilize turnout in the federal and provincial elections, but some found it difficult in the municipal. Like their counterparts in the Greek community, Italian leaders cited duty, tradition, and a taste for voting as the main reasons for the ease of mobilization. It is interesting to note, however, that Italian leaders were less likely to raise the obligatory vote in Italy as a reason for voting in Canada -- in contrast to leaders in the Greek community. Italian leaders put particular emphasis on the expressive function of voting. However, for those who found mobilization difficult at the municipal level, a sense of dissatisfaction with the candidates and parties was the primary reason cited, which suggests that considerations of instrumental benefits were also important. Leaders in the Jewish community showed a similar pattern to that of the Italian leaders, that is, a unanimous assessment of the ease of mobilization at the federal and provincial levels, with greater difficulty perceived at the municipal level. The importance of the issues and the level of political socialization in the community were the main reasons cited for the ease of mobilization. The less optimistic view of the municipal level was largely due to the fact that the issues were not deemed to be important by most people. Turning, finally, to the

Portuguese community, leaders were divided in their assessments of mobilization, and this was the case for all three elections. Surprisingly, the same factors were cited by both those who found mobilization easy and those who found it difficult, namely, the perceived importance of the issues, and the lack of democracy in Portugal. The two views split over sense of duty, which was cited only by those who found mobilization easy, and the costs of voting, which were mentioned only by those who found it difficult.

We have seen that a strong sense of civic duty among community members is the most widely cited reason for the ease of mobilization. This factor was cited by leaders in three of the five communities. A related factor -- social pressure -- was cited by leaders in the Jewish community. Only in the Chinese community was duty not mentioned; it is interesting to note that this is the only community where leaders were unanimous in finding mobilization to be a difficult task. This finding appears to support the view of voting as an expressive or consumption act. We should also note, however, the frequency with which the instrumental side of voting is mentioned; leaders in three communities made specific reference to particular issues when explaining the ease or difficulty of mobilization. This suggests that some people believe their vote can make a difference.



### 6.1.2. How do you convince people to vote?

In this section, I examine leaders' responses to the question of how they convince people to vote. Here again, the question was put to leaders in all three elections (see Appendix A for wording). Within each community, I examine each election in turn, providing examples of the responses leaders gave.

#### *i) The Chinese Community*

Beginning with the 1993 federal election, most leaders in the Chinese community said that they did not try to convince people to vote. Two of these said it was because they knew their preferred party was going to lose, and so they did not even bother to vote themselves. Of those who did try, one used a mild form of the duty argument:

In friendly meetings, I say, you know this election is very crucial, I think you should go to vote. Vote for the one you like; this party's policy is this, the other one is this. If they ask me, I give them my opinion. If they don't ask me, they vote by themselves.

Another leader disagreed with this type of approach. He thought that it was important to make people feel that by voting, they can make a difference in how the country is run. In other words, voting should be portrayed as an act with political consequences:

You're not going to get very far with duty. ... Well, it depends on what you mean by that. There's a positive sense and a negative sense. The negative sense is that if you don't vote it's all your fault... The positive sense is that you can do something. You know, you can bring something positive to this. If by duty you mean you can effect change, OK. But if you say duty in a punitive sense, that you're not being a good citizen ... I don't think that works. ... You have to make them feel

they can make a difference.

When asked how he would convince them in a riding where it is known in advance who will win he replied:

Well, if the candidate is a really good candidate, then people will come out, because they ... know the person, ... and this is the importance of getting to know the community. Because if you've talked to people, then they'll say, "Yeah, I know this person, I'm going to vote for them." You know, "I helped put him where he is." It's a certain self-worth, heightened identification. ... It's like a sports team.

Turning to the provincial election, here again, many leaders did not even try to convince people to vote. In the words of one of these leaders,

I'm not convincing them to go if they're not going. If they go, I encourage them to go. If they don't want to, I don't push them.

Of those who did make an effort, most appear to have made reference to some variant of the duty argument.

Normally I don't say anything, but if it's a close friend I'll say, "It's your duty. We live in a society that's the free-est in the world, I think that if we're given the opportunity to do that, then let's go exercise that right." But it's up to the individual if he goes to vote.

It is our duty. ... We tell first from family to family. I tell my family members you should go out to vote. And I tell my friends' families. We do it this way.

I'd scare them ... civic responsibility is not something they easily accept, and I think ultimately, they have to be convinced that living in a democratic society, you have to pay the price, and that is, to come to vote.

Another leader said he would stress the specific issue of sovereignty:

Usually when the Chinese community comes out to vote it's because of an issue that affects them. They don't see that in different elections, because whether it's Liberal or

Conservative, or Liberal or PQ, it's the same thing. But this time, they say that if you vote for the PQ, Quebec will separate, it affects them directly and therefore they will come out to vote.

Yet another said he would try to address three common arguments against voting:

The first thing is, old habits are hard to change. The second thing is, people have to feel involved. They have to feel that they can make a difference. Third is the whole aspect of priorities. You have to take care of the kids, make sure the business is running, do you have time to vote. And that's it, those are the three main things.

Turning, finally, to the municipal election, only two declared that they were not involved in trying to convince people to vote. Of these, one had several ideas about how he would approach the problem:

You have to simplify the procedure: explain to people how to vote. ... But you must point out to people that every vote counts. It's our duty to vote. In a democratic society, it's our right. That's how we make society function. We all have the right. If you don't vote, you have no right to complain afterwards.

By stressing several arguments, this leader resembled the others who did try to convince people to vote. In most cases, duty was the most important argument cited:

You can convince them by telling them they can make a difference. Issues come and go, but it's your duty to vote. If you don't vote, you can't complain about the taxes afterwards.

I didn't try to push them too hard. I tell them we live in a democratic society, it's a component of the democratic system to vote. Otherwise, they are disgraced. Even if I succeed in convincing them, they don't care.

I told them it was their civic duty as a Canadian, you have to vote. You have no right to complain afterwards if you don't vote. You vote to choose the right officers. Your vote is your voice.

I tell them that they should vote. That if everyone thinks like that, no one would vote. I tell them that in other countries people don't have the right to vote, so they should take advantage of it. It's a privilege, it's a right. If you don't vote, the one you don't like might stay in power all the time.

On the whole, while the majority of leaders were not involved in trying to convince people to vote at either the federal or provincial levels, the opposite was true at the municipal level. In all three elections, the most frequently cited argument was one of civic duty, while voting to maintain the right to complain afterwards was also a popular argument.

*ii) The Greek Community*

As was mentioned earlier, most leaders in the Greek community were in agreement that it was not even necessary to convince people to vote, as it was felt that most would do so on their own initiative. This was the case in all three elections. In the words of one leader, "... we don't have that problem because the Greeks, they vote." According to another,

People go out to vote on their own. It's never been a problem. ... We take for granted that people will vote. We don't have to persuade them to get out.

The few who did make an effort to mobilize turnout indicated that they made reference to having one's say in how things are run:

This is a democratic right that everybody has, and it's the one time that every citizen has a say. Because afterwards, it's too late.

When I was president, I would go all the time on the radio and I would say, "Don't forget to vote, because [otherwise] you can't complain."

Overall, then, leaders in the Greek community found it unnecessary to convince people to vote, whether it be the federal, the provincial, or the municipal election. All pointed to a strongly-entrenched tradition of voting in the community. The minority who did make an effort in this direction used expressive arguments, telling people that voting was a way of having one's say.

*iii) The Italian Community*

While leaders in the Italian community agreed, for the most part, that mobilizing people to vote was an easy task, they were less likely to say that it was unnecessary. Responses were similar for all three elections. The most frequently cited arguments for voting were duty and retaining the right to criticize:

I tell them that September 12 is election day, and that they should go and vote. There are those who tell me, and this is in every race, that they don't trust politicians, that they're all alike. I tell them that even if they don't like the politicians, they should go, even if they spoil their ballot, because no one can vote for you. I tell everyone, it's your duty to vote.

We're citizens, we have the rights, and responsibilities, to elect people who represent us and who defend our interests the best.

I would tell people that they must exercise their right to vote. I would not tell them who to vote for. ...There's a strong feeling of the right to vote in the Italian community. By not voting, you give the responsibility to others. You give them the right to decide for you. Then you have no right to criticize after. The right to exercise [the vote] is the most important argument I would use.

I tell them they have no right to complain afterwards if they don't vote.

When one leader said that he expected most people in his community

would vote, I asked him if it was therefore not necessary to convince them. His reply:

No, it's necessary to go talk to them because everything changes. Politics isn't static. It's not a portrait that stays the same. Everything depends on the programme, the goals, and that changes. And there's a new generation coming. The first generation, they're one way, but they're being replaced by the children who see more, who expect more.

Another leader indicated how he went about mobilizing large numbers of voters:

Well, you have to talk really to the father of the family, to the head of the family. Italians have large families, so if you talk to, let's say, 100 or 200 people, automatically you have 800 votes. ... it's on a friendly basis. As I say, I know them all. Most of the time, they go to the parties, the events and associations. Where you talk to people, you know them personally, so they trust your opinion. And it's not very difficult at all, for me it's not difficult.

On the whole, leaders in the Italian community did not find it difficult to mobilize turnout. In the case of all three elections, they indicated that references to duty, and the right to criticize government were the most frequent arguments used, while the importance of deciding for oneself and the importance of specific issues (e.g. sovereignty) were also cited.

#### *iv) The Jewish Community*

Jewish leaders were likely to indicate that mobilization of turnout was not necessary, owing to the fact that turnout is usually quite high in that community. Only at the municipal level did some think that it was necessary to convince people to vote. Most, however, indicated that they themselves were not involved in

this way. One leader who did try to get people to turn out described his efforts in the following way:

When I meet people, especially young people, I tell them that it's important, that they have to vote, one way or another, but they should vote. ... People tell me that they don't know if they'll vote or not, and I tell them, "You have to vote, it's important." That's something I always do.

Another leader, who worked in a partisan capacity for an individual candidate, described his activity in these terms:

Well, you ask them a few questions, if they're on the list, if they know there's an election, and we hope they'll support our candidate, and sometimes they say yes they will, and sometimes they say no, and you talk to them a little bit, but if they're fairly, if they've made up their mind not to vote for my person, I'm not going to waste too much time arguing with them. You try to show them the benefits of voting for these people.

With respect to the municipal election, more leaders indicated that it was necessary to mobilize turnout. One leader described his own efforts this way:

I would tell them that it's an important election, that there are ramifications beyond Montreal itself. That the services offered by Montreal are affected, and what those services are. I will try to urge them to vote.

Another leader indicated that encouraging people to vote is usually done through the synagogues. He also said that his own organization would put out a flyer, telling people that "we live in a democratic country, we must vote".

Thus most of the Jewish leaders interviewed did not think it was necessary to motivate people to turn out. Of those who did, some would make reference to the particular issues or benefits to be derived from the election outcome, while others would stress a

sense of duty.

*v) The Portuguese Community*

Leaders in the Portuguese community generally felt that some mobilization was necessary, but not all were involved in this capacity. Of those who were, some used the argument that every vote can make a difference. As one leader put it,

Of course, when we talk about this, and somebody says, I won't go, I won't vote, I don't care, then we of course, this is one vote lost, for the other side, so it makes a difference. ... Of course we try to encourage, why sure, you should exercise your right to vote, because in your place it could make a difference, where you live. This is more likely on a personal basis, talking one to one, we don't, you know, publicly, in our assemblies, we don't try to influence people on that.

Others made use of the duty argument:

The argument is in the sense that, "It's a little too easy to say that it's the other guy's fault, if we do nothing, if we don't get involved... And it's the little bit of participation that we have ... In Portugal, to have elections, and be able to choose... here we've got the chance, a democratic country, and all that, and well, it's just a shame [if we don't vote]..." That's the argument I would use.

The only thing we do is tell people it's a duty to vote, that it's something we have to do. But we don't tell them to vote for one party or another. ... Yes, we tell people that it's a duty to vote. Because often, if things happen that we don't like, well, it's your fault too because you didn't go vote. If you don't vote, you have no right to criticize.

I tell them not to forget to vote on election day. But I don't think it has any effect. But the more we talk about it, the more it stays in people's memories.

I told them it's important to be involved, to take an interest. I said that they can't just complain about things, they have to do something too.

One leader disagreed with the suggestion that arguments are



even necessary. According to him, it was more a matter of making voting easy for people:

There aren't arguments, there's just organization. Identify people in the Portuguese community. The day of the vote, have people who speak their language phone them, send a car to pick them up. If you don't go after them, they won't come out. Because in their heads, they think, if I vote or not, it doesn't make a difference. That's very bad.

Finally, one leader, rather than try to convince people of the necessity of voting in the provincial election, saw his role as one of reassuring them in the face of an imminent Parti québécois victory:

Personally, I don't try to convince anyone. What I do is, when people come to talk to me about one party or another, if I see that they aren't informed about some details, I try to explain it to them and make them see the positive side of things... Because ... I don't want people to start panicking. I tell them, OK, if the Parti Québécois wins, it's not a problem, your deposits are insured.

On the whole, leaders in the Portuguese community tended to see some kind of mobilization as necessary in all three elections. Not all were convinced that it would be effective. The most frequently cited arguments involved making voters believe that their vote can make a difference, or appealing to a sense of civic duty.

#### *vi) Summary*

We have seen that leaders in all the communities felt that some mobilization was necessary in order to get people to vote. The degree to which this belief was held varied considerably across the

communities. In the Chinese community, leaders thought mobilization was necessary in all three elections. While only a few became involved at the federal or provincial levels, most made an effort to mobilize turnout in the municipal election. The argument most frequently cited was civic duty. The idea that voting gives one the right to complain was also used. In contrast, leaders in the Greek community found it unnecessary to convince people to vote, regardless of the election. All pointed to a strongly-entrenched tradition of voting in the community as the main reason for this. The few who did make an effort to mobilize used expressive arguments, saying that voting was a way of having one's say. Leaders in the Italian community did not find it difficult to mobilize turnout, although they did not go so far as to say that it was unnecessary. Civic duty and the right to criticize government were the most frequent arguments used, while the importance of deciding for oneself and the importance of specific issues were also cited. Most Jewish leaders did not think it was necessary to motivate people to turn out. Of those who did, some made reference to the importance of particular issues or benefits; others stressed a sense of duty. Leaders in the Portuguese community thought mobilization was necessary in all three elections. Making voters believe that their vote can make a difference and appeals to civic duty were the most frequent arguments used to mobilize turnout.

When leaders are asked directly to say how they would mobilize people to vote, the most frequent response is civic duty. This

argument is cited by leaders in four of the five communities; only in the Greek community is it not used to mobilize turnout. Here, it would seem that a deeply-entrenched tradition of voting renders such an argument unnecessary. The second most frequent type of argument is expressive in nature: in three of the five communities, leaders made reference to the importance of having one's say, or voting to maintain the right to criticize. These findings reinforce the idea that voting is an act of consumption. Finally, some leaders, in the Jewish and Portuguese communities, made reference to the instrumental side of voting, by appealing to particular issues or by arguing that a single vote can make a difference.

#### 6.1.3. How do you respond to the "one vote can't make a difference" argument?

The final question probing the qualitative nature of leaders' mobilization efforts was put to them only once, during the provincial election interview.<sup>1</sup> It asked leaders how they responded to people who thought that their one vote wouldn't make a difference to the outcome of the election (see Appendix A for question wording). The argument that a single vote cannot make a difference to the outcome of the election goes to the heart of the paradox of voting by addressing the problem of *P*. Leaders' responses to this argument reveal whether or not they see *P* as a problem and

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<sup>1</sup> The two leaders who were not interviewed during the first wave were asked this question during the municipal wave.

if they do, how they deal with it.

*i) The Chinese Community*

Most leaders in the Chinese community acknowledged that they had often heard this argument from community members. Only one said he would counter it by appealing to a sense of civic duty:

Normally, I don't say anything, but if it's a close friend, I'll say, "It's your duty".

The others said they would point out the importance of every vote, and would suggest that a single vote can often make the difference:

I'd keep telling them, "This is a pivotal riding, your vote might just make the difference."

Well, eventually they will change their minds. Some of them are new arrivals, and they don't know the importance, each vote is important, some people vote for a very small majority, so... .. It's education. Eventually they will realize that.

Quite often that's the case. But when it's an issue like this, ... every vote counts.

I'm not sure how many people follow the campaign per se, but I think it would be difficult, even if you don't follow the campaign on a day to day basis, to ignore all the polls that have come out, that basically say that the PQ is going to win. To go out of your way, close your business, and go out and vote, despite this, wait in line, and whatever else, the person has to have a heck of a lot of sense of civic duty.

Finally, one leader thought that it was necessary that the candidates themselves make a greater effort to stimulate turnout, presumably by pointing out how they could benefit the community:

The people who say that are people who don't understand elections. That's why each candidate has to explain to all the communities -- as soon as they understand, they'll follow him. ... I think it's a lack of work on the part of the candidates.

In the Chinese community, then, most leaders would counter the

"one vote cannot make a difference" argument by stating the exact opposite -- that is, that a single vote can be decisive.

*ii) The Greek Community*

The vast majority of leaders in the Greek community stated that they had never heard this argument from their members. The following responses are indicative of this:

Lot's of people say that. But in the Greek community it's very rare.

Not really, from the Greeks I didn't really have that feedback.

No, not from the Greeks. For them, voting is very important. The idea of not voting is like letting someone else decide for you. There's a very strong belief in the importance of voting.

Some leaders, while indicating that they had not heard the argument, were nonetheless able to offer some possible responses to it:

I don't recall hearing that. They may say so, I would say they are wrong. ... I believe that every citizen has an obligation to vote. It's a duty. If you want democracy's protection, you have to give a little bit. I cannot let you decide for me. In a democracy you have only one chance, every four or five years, to decide your future. So it's evident that everybody has to vote.

Not among Greeks. Personally, I haven't heard it. The young people, yes. My son, for example, says that. ... I tell him it's important. Otherwise, you let others decide for you.

Only one leader admitted having heard such an argument from members of the Greek community. In his words, "Yes, they say that and they still go out and vote." When asked if this was because of

a sense of duty, he replied, "I would say it's more of a tradition than anything else."

Thus among Greek leaders, the most frequent response to this question was to say that they had never heard such an argument from members of their community. For those willing to offer a hypothetical response, appeals to duty are less important than the argument of not letting others make your decisions for you.

*iii) The Italian Community*

Most leaders in the Italian community said that they had heard this argument from community members at one time or another, but most also indicated that people vote nonetheless. In the words of one such leader,

Some people do say this, but they vote just the same. ...There's a strong feeling of the right to vote in the Italian community...

For those who tried to counter this belief, the most frequently used arguments appear to be a sense of duty, or civic responsibility:

This bothers me a lot, but it's not happening in the Italian community. It's happening in the other communities. ...It's like some kind of defeat: I'm not going to vote, I don't care. Sometimes it's very widespread among the young people. There's some kind of disillusionment. ...I try to contrast their opinion. I say, "Listen, this is nondemocratic, you're not exercising your right to express your opinion." But I don't know if I'm successful in convincing them.

I say that every vote is important. Not so much in terms of the difference it can make, because when you're talking about Italians you know everyone is going to vote one way, but it's important that every individual exercise his or her democratic right. Because it's a right, it's inherited, it's earned, and

we are privileged. You know, you look around, and see what's happening all over the world today...

At least one leader said he would try to convince them that a single vote can be decisive:

I tell them that one vote is important. There are some who tell me that one vote can't make a difference, and I explain to them that there are ridings where it's been won by a single vote.

This leader went on to elaborate an argument which is a reversal of the usual assessment of the "first-past-the-post" electoral system:

... And when I try to explain to them how it works here, for example, the PQ is ahead by 7%, which doesn't seem like a lot, but they could have 80 seats versus 41, with just 7%. And if I win by one vote, that means I took .001% of the votes more, but I get the seat. So I explain to them that you could have 10 deputies who win by one vote, and that doesn't make much of a difference in terms of percentages, but you get 10 seats versus 0.

In the Italian community, then, it appears that although the argument that a single vote cannot make a difference is often heard, people tend to vote anyway. The most frequent counter-argument cited by leaders is that of civic duty.

#### *iv) The Jewish Community*

Leaders in the Jewish community tended not to have heard such an argument from their own members. They were willing, however, to offer some hypothetical responses to it:

I haven't hear that, but I know that there are a lot of people who think it. ... I would tell them that if they don't vote, they're just helping the majority tendency. And no matter what, it's important to express yourself. "He who says nothing consents." There's a proverb that says that. So if you abstain, you're just helping out the other side. It's important to get involved. Personally, I would tend to preach

the importance of involvement. Don't let others organize everything. Take your destiny into your own hands.

Others indicated that they would point out that sometimes, a single vote has made a difference:

I disagree with it. I say to them that it's been shown many times, like in the last federal election, some ridings have been won by a margin of one or two votes.

When it was pointed out to this leader that his own riding, Mount Royal, was likely to be the site of a landslide victory for the Liberal candidate, he replied,

If they say it here in Mount Royal, I'm not going to argue too much with them. But the other thing I'm going to say is, "Maybe you're right, in this kind of election, in Mount Royal, it's not that important. But when you're in a referendum, every vote is vitally important, and you have to get out and vote." I think one vote makes more of a difference in a referendum.

Another leader made similar comments, but took the latter argument a step further. For him, even if the election at hand was not a referendum, it was still a possibility to send an important message to political leaders:

Not too much in the Jewish community. I've heard that argument from other people. ... I'd point out some statistics. That David Payne lost the last election by 83 votes. ... so every vote counts. ... The other possibility is that sometimes, in this coming election, for example, [when] you know for sure that a candidate is going to win, we want to send a message, we have to make sure that a candidate has the largest majority possible. So every plus one vote counts towards that.

This leader made it clear, in the course of the interview, that the message that needed to be sent was that the population does not support the sovereignty option favoured by the Parti Québécois.

Jewish community leaders thus made reference to a variety of



arguments: the importance of having one's say, the possibility of casting the decisive vote, and the possibility of sending a message, even if the vote itself is not decisive. They also indicated, however, that such arguments were not really necessary in their community, as the initial objection to voting -- that it could not make a difference to the outcome -- was not one that they had heard from community members.

v) *The Portuguese Community*

All but one of the leaders in the Portuguese community acknowledged having heard the argument that a single vote cannot make a difference. Of these, only one said that he would try to counter it by appealing to a sense of civic duty:

Yes, there are many who say that, that one vote is just a drop in the ocean. But if you talk to them, tell them the reality, that you must vote, that it's a duty to vote, in these cases, people can change their mind. It's easy to make them understand.

Others would argue that a vote does count, either alone or taken together with other votes:

[I tell them] "Well, your vote counts, of course you do."

That's something we hear all the time, in every election. If I vote or don't vote, it's just one vote, it doesn't do anything. But if you put all the votes together, they count. ... For people who talk like that, what's missing is politicians who will come and show them [how it counts].

There are some who talk like that and I tell them no, you should vote. ... Because one vote can make a change. You know, we saw it last week with Monique Simard. ... Sometimes it is important. I think it's important to vote.

When asked if this argument could work in a riding such as his, where it was known in advance that the Liberal candidate would win

by a large margin, this leader hesitated somewhat, but then found another justification for his belief that every vote counts:

That's where sometimes we have to rack our brains to push people. Because they know in advance that it's Liberal here. They'll say, "Ah, it's not important, they have enough support already." But sometime you might be wrong, because there still is an opposition after all.

It would appear that even the tiniest possibility of a PQ victory would be reason enough, in the eyes of this leader, to vote.

Other leaders said they would put the emphasis on the expressive aspect of voting, stressing that it is the individual's only source of power:

... if we do nothing, if we don't get involved ... it's the only power we have ...

... You have to valorize the importance of voting to the immigrant. Inculcate in them that through their vote, they have power. The problem is that immigrants in general believe that they don't have any power, and that politicians don't do anything for them. So you have to tell them the only real power, is the one you give them, by voting.

When asked if appealing to a sense of duty would also work, this leader was quite adamant in his response:

No, that's only good in countries where voting is obligatory. But here, the only way to convince the immigrants is to tell them that it's the only power they have. ... It's the only way you can make yourself heard. Because the political parties know how the ethnic groups vote. But if all the Portuguese on the list in one riding had turned out to vote against the candidate, that would have been power. A group has to have force. Personally, if tomorrow I had to run in a riding, I would talk to them the way I'm talking to you now.

For Portuguese leaders, then, it would appear that the argument is one they have heard frequently in their community. A

variety of counter-arguments were offered, ranging from civic duty, to the notion that a single vote can make a difference, to the idea that the vote is a source of power or influence.

*vi) Summary*

Leaders gave a variety of responses to the argument that a single vote cannot make a difference. Perhaps the most surprising, from a rational choice perspective, is the response given by leaders in both the Greek and Jewish communities that they had never heard such an argument from their own members. Leaders in the Italian community gave a similarly surprising response when they said that although they had often heard the argument, the people making it tended to vote anyway. Both reactions indicate that in some communities, the problem of *P* is not that important to community members or leaders. In contrast, leaders of the Chinese and Portuguese communities indicated that they often heard this argument from their members. Leaders in all five communities indicated that appeals to civic duty and to the importance of expressing one's opinion were the best way to counter such an argument. Many also refused to accept the premise of the argument, countering with the belief that a single vote can sometimes be decisive.

## 6.2. Hypothesis Testing

I now turn to the two hypotheses which deal with the qualitative side of the model, that is, the nature of the arguments leaders are expected to use to convince people to vote. The data used to test these hypotheses are drawn from two questions. The first asked leaders how they convinced people in their community to vote; the second asked them how they responded to the "one vote cannot make a difference" argument. In the preceding sections I have provided a detailed description of leaders' responses to these questions. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 summarize these responses and classify them as either consumption or instrumental, while Tables 6.3 and 6.4 classify them as relational or non-relational. Table 6.5 provides a four-fold classification of mobilization arguments offered by leaders. It is on the basis of these results that I will test my hypotheses.

### 6.2.1. Hypothesis B.1: Consumption Benefits

According to Hypothesis B.1,

Group leaders use the promise of consumption benefits rather than of instrumental benefits when mobilizing their members to vote.

In other words, the benefits leaders offer must be attainable from the act of voting itself, rather than from the outcome of the election. According to the model, consumption benefits are necessary in order to avoid the free-rider problem. Thus while

leaders are, themselves, motivated by instrumental benefits, the arguments they use to mobilize turnout among group members must be of the consumption type.

Turning to Table 6.1, we find that, across the communities, the most frequently invoked argument is that of duty. Leaders in four of the five communities made explicit reference to the duty argument, while leaders in the Greek community made reference to what may be considered a variant of duty, that is, the obligation to exercise one's democratic right. We find here strong evidence of the use of a consumption-type logic.

Another frequently invoked argument is that of preserving one's right to criticize government. This argument was invoked by leaders in three of the five communities. I have classified this as a consumption benefit because the "right" that it confers is obtainable regardless of whether one's preferred candidate or party wins the election. Indeed, one imagines that it may be enjoyed most fully when the preferred candidate does not win.

Another type of consumption argument that was offered by leaders in three communities is that of having a say, or sending a message about a particular subject or issue. These may be considered consumption benefits as long as it is clear that one does not require one's candidate to win in order for the message to be conveyed. The leaders who invoked this particular argument were

Table 6.1. Classification of Arguments Used to Convince People to Vote: Consumption Versus Instrumental

<b>Community</b>	<b>Consumption</b>	<b>Instrumental</b>
Chinese	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> <li>- self-worth/team</li> <li>- preserve democracy</li> <li>- right to criticize</li> <li>- send a message</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- effect change</li> <li>- importance of issue</li> <li>- every vote counts</li> <li>- community's candidate</li> </ul>
Greek	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- tradition/habit</li> <li>- democratic right</li> <li>- have a say</li> <li>- right to criticize</li> </ul>	
Italian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> <li>- right to criticize</li> <li>- have a say</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- importance of issue</li> </ul>
Jewish	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- importance of issue</li> <li>- community's candidate</li> </ul>
Portuguese	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- every vote counts</li> </ul>

Table 6.2. Classification of Responses to "One Vote Cannot Make a Difference": Consumption Versus Instrumental

<b>Community</b>	<b>Consumption</b>	<b>Instrumental</b>
Chinese	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- single vote can decide</li> <li>- importance of issue</li> </ul>
Greek	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> <li>- preserve democracy</li> <li>- it's important</li> </ul>	
Italian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- single vote can decide</li> </ul>
Jewish	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- send a message</li> <li>- self-fulfilment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- single vote can decide</li> </ul>
Portuguese	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> <li>- power/expression</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- single vote can decide</li> <li>- all votes together</li> <li>- possibility of opponent winning</li> </ul>

referring to the issue of Quebec sovereignty, and the notion that even if one cannot ensure the victory of one's preferred (non-sovereigntist) candidate, one can at least increase the vote share received by the Liberal party, and thereby send the message that federalism is supported by a large proportion of the population.

The other responses to this first question must be considered to be instrumental arguments: the desire to effect change in government, the importance of a particular issue, and the desire to elect the "community's candidate" -- either a candidate from the community, or one who has been supportive of the community in the past. I have also classed the "every vote counts" argument as an instrumental incentive, because, although it refers to probabilities rather than to benefits, it does make use of an instrumental logic: that the individual's vote will produce a desired result.

Turning to Table 6.2, which classifies leaders' responses to the question of how to counter the "one vote cannot make a difference" argument, here again we find that one of the most frequently invoked benefits is that of fulfilling one's civic duty, that is, a consumption benefit. Leaders in four of the five communities said they would make use of such an argument. Other consumption benefits invoked in response to this question were: the desire to help preserve democracy, the belief that it is important to vote, the desire to send a message (independent of the outcome

of the election), the idea that voting can be a fulfilling act, and the notion that voting provides community members with a way of expressing themselves collectively, and can therefore confer on them a kind of power.

The other response to this question, which appears to have been just as important as duty, is the belief that a single vote can make a difference to the outcome of the election. This argument, which is clearly instrumental in nature, was invoked by leaders in four of the five communities. A similar idea, expressed by a leader in the Portuguese community, is that all votes together can make a difference. Other instrumental benefits referred to by leaders were the importance of particular issues, and the suggestion that, however remote it might be, there is always the possibility that one's opponent might win.<sup>2</sup> In each of these arguments, there is the logic that one can convince people to vote by making them believe that they might affect the outcome of the election.

We can see, on the basis of these two tables, that although leaders do make use of consumption benefits when convincing people to vote, or when countering the "one vote cannot make a difference" argument, they also make considerable use of instrumental benefits. Thus while leaders in all communities rely on civic duty as an

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<sup>2</sup> Such an argument is, in fact, similar to the minimax-regret model outlined in chapter one.



incentive for voting, there are frequent appeals to the belief that every vote counts, as well as to the importance of supporting particular issues or candidates. With respect to the second question in particular, the argument that a single vote can make a difference is just as important as a sense of civic duty. On the whole, we must conclude that there is only a slight tendency among leaders to make greater use of consumption benefits than instrumental when mobilizing their members to vote. These findings therefore provide only mitigated support for Hypothesis B.1. The frequent use of instrumental appeals precludes us from considering this hypothesis fully supported.

#### 6.2.2. Hypothesis B.2: Relational Benefits

According to Hypothesis B.2,

Group leaders use the promise of relational benefits when mobilizing their members to vote.

This means that leaders must make use of group-specific, or group-centred arguments when mobilizing turnout. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that leaders, motivated by group-specific instrumental benefits, must be able to translate such benefits into excludable incentives for individual group members. Non-relational benefits (dollar-bills in envelopes) are too costly to provide on a large scale. Appeals to a generalized sense of civic duty are too broad; leaders cannot maintain a control over who feels like a good citizen. Thus examples of relational benefits include friendship, solidarity and a heightened sense of belonging to a particular

group.

Tables 6.3 and 6.4 present a second classification of leaders' responses, according to whether they are relational or non-relational in nature. Beginning with Table 6.3, we find that the overwhelming tendency is for responses to be non-relational in nature. Appeals to civic duty, the desire to preserve one's right to criticize the government, the desire to send a message or have a say -- these are all non-relational benefits, which can be enjoyed independently of one's membership in a particular group. In fact, relational benefits are relatively rare among leaders' arguments: they can be found in only three of the five communities, and within those communities, they are invoked less frequently than non-relational benefits.

Turning to Table 6.4, which classifies leaders' responses to the second question, we find even fewer references to relational benefits. In fact, among all the responses from all the communities, only one leader in the Portuguese community was able to provide a relational benefit in response to this question. This was the idea that the vote provides members of the community with a way of expressing themselves collectively, and thus with a source of power. By focusing on the particular community's need to feel powerful, this benefit can be considered relational in nature. The other responses to this question must be considered non-relational, as they make no reference to the particular ethnic group.

Table 6.3. Classification of Arguments Used to Convince People to Vote: Relational Versus Non-relational

Community	Relational	Non-relational
Chinese	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- self-worth/team</li> <li>- community's candidate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> <li>- preserve democracy</li> <li>- right to criticize</li> <li>- send a message</li> <li>- effect change</li> <li>- importance of issue</li> <li>- every vote counts</li> </ul>
Greek	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- tradition/habit</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- democratic right</li> <li>- have a say</li> <li>- right to criticize</li> </ul>
Italian		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> <li>- right to complain</li> <li>- have a say</li> <li>- importance of issue</li> </ul>
Jewish	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- community's candidate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> <li>- importance of issue</li> </ul>
Portuguese		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> <li>- every vote counts</li> </ul>

Table 6.4. Classification of Responses to "One Vote Cannot Make a Difference": Relational Versus Non-relational

Community	Relational	Non-relational
Chinese		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> <li>- single vote can decide</li> <li>- importance of issue</li> </ul>
Greek		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> <li>- preserve democracy</li> <li>- it's important</li> </ul>
Italian		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> <li>- single vote can decide</li> </ul>
Jewish		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- send a message</li> <li>- self-fulfilment</li> <li>- single vote can decide</li> </ul>
Portuguese	- power/expression	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> <li>- single vote can decide</li> <li>- all vote together</li> <li>- possibility of opponent winning</li> </ul>

On the basis of these results, I must conclude that Hypothesis B.2 is not supported. Leaders do not make greater use of relational benefits when mobilizing turnout; in fact, they make very little use of relational appeals. The vast majority of the arguments leaders provided were purely non-relational in nature.

### 6.2.3. Hypothesis testing: summary

It is arguable that the best test of the qualitative side of the model is to combine our two hypotheses -- in other words, to predict that leaders mobilize turnout using benefits which are both consumption and relational in nature. To this end, I have produced a fourfold classification of the arguments leaders provided. This classification is presented in Table 6.5. In the upper left corner, we find our preferred cell, which contains those arguments or benefits which can be considered to be both consumption and relational. We can see that this cell is far from being the most popular. In fact, our two non-relational cells contain the greatest number of entries, indicating that non-relational appeals were most frequent. If we recall the description provided in the first half of this chapter, we know that two arguments were particularly important: the duty argument and the notion that a single vote can make a difference. While one is a consumption benefit and the other instrumental, both fall into the non-relational half of the table. It would thus appear that the relational-consumption combination, while not the least popular, is far from being the most important

Table 6.5. Four-fold Classification of Mobilization Arguments

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Relational-Consumption</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- self-worth/team</li> <li>- tradition/habit</li> <li>- power/expression</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Non-relational-Consumption</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty</li> <li>- democratic right</li> <li>- preserve democracy</li> <li>- right to criticize</li> <li>- send a message</li> <li>- have a say</li> <li>- it's important</li> <li>- self-fulfilment</li> </ul>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Relational-Instrumental</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- community's candidate</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Non-relational-Instrumental</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- effect change</li> <li>- importance of issue</li> <li>- every vote counts</li> <li>- single vote can decide</li> <li>- all votes together</li> <li>- possibility of opponent winning</li> </ul>

motivation for voting in these communities.

This examination of the qualitative side of the model has revealed that the kinds of arguments leaders use to mobilize turnout are *slightly* more likely to be of the consumption type than of the instrumental, but *considerably* more likely to non-relational than relational. Thus while Hypothesis B.1 is supported by these findings, it is only weakly supported. Still, it fares better than Hypothesis B.2, which receives no support at all. The results of this chapter appear to be consistent with those of the previous one, in finding little or no support for the model.

The results of this chapter also appear to confirm the finding from the previous chapter that most leaders pay little or no attention to  $P$ . We have seen that in three of the five communities, leaders either had not heard the argument that a single vote cannot make a difference, or reported that people voted in spite of it. For those who had heard it, one of the most frequent responses to it was to say that a single vote can be decisive, that is, to reject the very premise of the argument. In these cases, we find clear evidence of an overestimation of the value of  $P$ .

Not all leaders overestimate the probability of affecting the outcome, however. While they may not pay much attention to the problem, leaders show that they are at least implicitly aware of it when they mobilize voters by appealing to such things as civic

duty, self-expression, and the importance of preserving democracy. By appealing to consumption benefits, leaders show an awareness of the free-rider problem. It may not be overt; but it is nevertheless real. This suggests that *P* may be a factor, but a less important one than *B*, *C* or *D*.



## Chapter Seven

### Does Mobilization Matter?

In this chapter, I present my findings for the final step of the model, that is the relationship between mobilization by community leaders and electoral participation by community members. To do this, I make use of data from the 1991 Census (at the level of the enumeration area) and from official election results (at the level of the polling station). I begin by presenting my general findings with respect to the dependent variable as well as each ethnic and control variable included in my analysis. I then show how the ethnic and control variables relate to turnout in each election. Finally, I examine the last hypothesis derived from the Uhlaner model, which predicts that leader mobilization increases voter turnout.

#### 7.1. General Findings

In this section, I present a description of the variables, beginning with the univariate distributions of the dependent, independent and control variables. I then use multivariate regression analysis to show how ethnicity relates to turnout. In doing so, I re-examine the ecological inference problem, showing why I do not believe it is a serious cause for concern in this study.

### 7.1.1. Distribution of Variables

It is appropriate to begin with our dependent variable, voter turnout. Because we are interested in three elections, we have, in effect, three dependent variables. Table 7.1 presents the distribution of each of these dependent variables, observed first at the level of the Island of Montreal and then at the level of the City of Montreal. Taking the Island of Montreal, we find that the mean turnout across the 1048 enumeration areas selected for this study is just over 75 percent in the 1993 federal election, and 78 percent in the 1994 provincial election. This is consistent with the general pattern of turnout in Quebec, where participation in provincial elections tends to be higher than in federal elections. We can see that in the federal election, the rate of turnout ranges from a low of 47 percent (for an EA located in the riding of Laurier-Sainte-Marie) to a high of 89 percent (for an EA located in the riding of Lachine-Lac-Saint-Louis). In the provincial election, the minimum rate of turnout is 49 percent (in the riding of Laurier-Dorion), while the maximum is nearly 89 percent (in the riding of D'Arcy-McGee).

Turning to the 610 enumeration areas contained within the City of Montreal, we find that both federal and provincial turnout decline slightly -- to 74.5 percent and 77 percent respectively. These rates are considerably higher than the mean turnout for the 1994 Montreal municipal election, which is just over 45 percent.

Table 7.1. Voter Turnout in Three Elections (%)A. Island of Montreal (n = 1048)

<u>Election</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Maximum</u>
1993 Federal	75.45	5.20	47.24	89.36
1994 Provincial	78.15	4.77	48.99	88.68

B. City of Montreal (n = 610)

<u>Election</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Maximum</u>
1993 Federal	74.51	5.47	47.24	88.99
1994 Provincial	77.18	5.07	48.99	88.37
1994 Municipal	45.33	7.92	23.66	74.02

As for the variation in turnout across enumeration areas, we should note that for both the federal and provincial elections, the EA with the lowest turnout at the level of the city is the same as at the level of the island. As a result, the minimum scores are the same at both levels of observation. The maximum scores for the city differ slightly from those observed at the level of the island, as they are found in different enumeration areas. For the federal election, the EA with the maximum turnout (89%) is found in the riding of Mount-Royal. The provincial maximum (88%) is found in the riding of Crémazie. Turning to the municipal election, the minimum turnout rate (24%) is found in the district of Snowdon, while the maximum (74%) is found in the district of Victoria.<sup>1</sup>

Table 7.2 presents the descriptive statistics for each of the ethnic and control variables in this study. Beginning with the five ethnic communities, we find that the Italian community is largest, with a population mean of nearly 15 percent across enumeration areas on the Island of Montreal. The Jewish community follows with a population mean of 11 percent. The Greek community is considerably smaller, with a mean of 4 percent. It is followed by the Chinese and Portuguese communities, each of which shows a population mean of approximately 3 percent for the Island of Montreal.

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<sup>1</sup> The higher standard deviation observed for the municipal election appears to be the result of differences in the range of scores observed across the three elections. While the range for the federal and provincial elections is approximately 42% and 40% respectively, the range for the municipal election is 50%.

Table 7.2. Ethnic and Socio-economic VariablesA. Island of Montreal (n = 1048)

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Maximum</u>
Italian	14.71	16.57	0	87.86
Jewish	10.79	20.27	0	100.00
Greek	4.03	8.95	0	64.04
Portuguese	2.74	6.93	0	58.44
Chinese	2.71	5.26	0	36.36
Noncitizens	11.86	9.99	0	82.14
Early Immigration	15.26	7.98	0	53.85
Young	10.86	3.04	0	25.45
Old	13.73	9.51	0	92.31
English at Home	32.05	24.67	0	96.61
French at Home	43.50	23.78	0	98.43
Mobility	15.94	9.03	0	80.00
Homeowners	28.46	21.96	0	92.98
High education	25.21	16.24	0	86.96
Low education	35.14	15.09	0	74.60
Median Income	37,600	20,300	6,000	226,730

B. City of Montreal (n = 610)

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Maximum</u>
Italian	13.15	15.71	0	87.86
Jewish	7.34	13.86	0	77.05
Greek	5.07	10.81	0	64.04
Portuguese	4.61	8.68	0	58.44
Chinese	2.82	5.37	0	36.36
Noncitizens	14.36	11.08	0	82.14
Early Immigration	14.48	7.91	0	50.91
Young	11.21	3.14	0	25.45
Old	14.00	8.08	1.39	92.31
English at Home	25.53	20.63	0	85.29
French at Home	46.08	24.08	0	98.43
Mobility	18.28	9.52	0	80.00
Homeowners	21.64	17.15	0	91.30
High Education	25.07	15.82	0	72.34
Low Education	36.90	15.28	0	74.60
Median Income	30,670	13,480	6,000	119,210

Note: All variables are measured in percentages, except Median Income, which is measured in dollars. For a full description of variables, see Appendix C.

Taking the City of Montreal, it is interesting to note that the population means decline for both the Italian and the Jewish communities, although these remain the two largest communities overall. The other three communities show slightly higher proportions at the city level than at the level of the island as a whole. This indicates that the Greek, Portuguese and Chinese communities are somewhat more concentrated within the City of Montreal, while the Italian and Jewish communities are more concentrated in the surrounding suburbs.

Differences between the city and the island are also evident when it comes to the socio-economic variables included in this study. Thus we find that the average household income is nearly \$38,000 for the island, while it is just under \$31,000 in the city. The proportion of the population having a high level of education (holding a college or university degree) is the same in both jurisdictions, but the proportion having a low level of education (less than a high school diploma) is higher in the city. There do not appear to be important differences with respect to age categories, with the proportions of young adults (aged 18 to 24) and old people (over 65 years of age) approximately the same in the city as across the island. The proportion of residents who are not Canadian citizens is somewhat higher in the city, while the proportion of early immigrants (those who arrived prior to 1971) is only slightly higher at the island level. The level of mobility -- this measure includes intra-provincial, inter-provincial, as well

as external migrants -- is greater in the city than across the island, while the proportion of homeowners is, not surprisingly, greater at the level of the island than in the city itself. Turning, finally, to linguistic measures, we find that the proportion claiming English as their home language is greater across the island as a whole than in the city, while the reverse is true for French.

The portrait is thus similar for both the island and the city of Montreal. While the population of the city itself tends to be somewhat poorer, less well-educated, more mobile, more likely to include non-citizens and more likely to use French than English as a home language, the differences between the two jurisdictions are not enormous.

#### 7.1.2. Relating Ethnicity to Turnout

How does ethnicity relate to turnout? To answer this question, I have regressed the percentage of voter turnout in each election on the five ethnic variables. The method used is Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis. Taking the federal election as an example, the basic relationship is modelled as follows:

$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + e,$$

where  $Y$  = turnout in the 1993 federal election,  $a$  = the intercept,  $X_1$  = percent of the area's population that is Chinese,  $X_2$  = percent of the area's population that is Greek,  $X_3$  = percent of the area's

population that is Italian,  $X_4$  = percent of the area's population that is Jewish,  $X_5$  = percent of the area's population that is Portuguese, and  $e$  represents the error term. Table 7.3 presents the results for the 1993 federal and the 1994 provincial elections at the level of the Island of Montreal, while Table 7.4 presents the results for all three elections at the level of the City of Montreal. Taking these two tables together, we find that for most of the communities, the relationship is similar in both jurisdictions. For the Chinese community, the regression coefficient is negative and significant in all three elections, indicating that as the proportion of an area's Chinese residents increases, the level of voter turnout declines. The relationship holds whether we take the 1048 enumeration areas found across the island, or restrict ourselves to the 610 enumeration areas found within the City of Montreal. A similar story can be told for the Greek and Italian communities, where the relationship to voter turnout is positive in all three elections; for the Portuguese community, it is negative, but significant in only one case.

The interesting exception to this pattern is found in the Jewish community. Here we find that when we take the turnout results for the island as a whole, the relationship between the proportion of the population that is Jewish and the level of turnout in the federal and provincial elections is positive, and in the case of the provincial election, significantly so. When we move to the jurisdiction of the city of Montreal, we find that the



Table 7.3. Ethnicity and Turnout in Two Elections (Island of Montreal)

	<u>Election</u>	
	<u>1993 Federal</u>	<u>1994 Provincial</u>
Chinese	-.205 (.030)***	-.116 (.028)***
Greek	.074 (.018)***	.024 (.016)
Italian	.069 (.011)***	.092 (.010)***
Jewish	.003 (.009)	.017 (.008)*
Portuguese	-.044 (.023)	-.049 (.021)*
Constant	74.77 (.35)***	76.97 (.32)***
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.17	.13
N	1048	1048

\*\*\* significant at the .001 level, two-tailed.

\*\* significant at the .01 level, two-tailed.

\* significant at the .05 level, two-tailed.

Note: Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors indicated in parentheses. Dependent variables are percentage turnout in each election. Independent variables are measured as percentages.

Table 7.4. Ethnicity and Turnout in Three Elections (City of Montreal)

	<u>Election</u>		
	<u>1993 Federal</u>	<u>1994 Provincial</u>	<u>1994 Municipal</u>
Chinese	-.312 (.039)***	-.228 (.036)***	-.269 (.057)***
Greek	.080 (.020)***	.034 (.019)	.212 (.029)***
Italian	.064 (.016)***	.093 (.014)***	.085 (.023)***
Jewish	-.006 (.017)	-.013 (.016)	-.040 (.025)
Portuguese	-.022 (.025)	-.036 (.023)	-.057 (.036)
Constant	74.28 (.48)***	76.67 (.44)***	44.42 (.69)***
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.17	.18	.16
N	610	610	610

\*\*\* significant at the .001 level, two-tailed.

\*\* significant at the .01 level, two-tailed.

\* significant at the .05 level, two-tailed.

Note: Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors indicated in parentheses. Dependent variables are percentage turnout in each election. Independent variables are measured as percentages.

relationship is negative in all three elections, although none of the coefficients achieves statistical significance. These results are intriguing, and they suggest that the Jewish population in the city of Montreal behaves differently, in terms of electoral participation, than the Jewish population found across the island of Montreal. Such findings point to the necessity of controlling for other socio-economic variables.

In controlling for additional socio-economic variables, our regression equation takes the form of:

$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + b_kX_k + e,$$

where, in addition to our five ethnic variables, we include a matrix of control variables,  $X_k$ . These variables include measures of socio-economic status, demographic measures, as well as measures relating to the immigrant background of ethno-cultural communities. I have tried a variety of controls, settling upon those presented in Tables 7.5 and 7.6.

Beginning with Table 7.5, which presents the results for the federal and provincial elections at the level of the island as a whole, we find, with respect to the ethnic variables, that most of the relationships between ethnicity and turnout remain the same as in Table 7.3. Thus the relationship between turnout and the proportion of Chinese residents in an area is negative, even controlling for such variables as non-citizenship and mobility. The relationship does cease to be significant in the provincial

Table 7.5. Determinants of Voter Turnout in Two Elections (Island of Montreal)

	<u>Election</u>	
	<u>1993 Federal</u>	<u>1994 Provincial</u>
Chinese	-.149 (.029)***	-.041 (.027)
Greek	.067 (.020)***	.039 (.018)*
Italian	.009 (.014)	.048 (.013)***
Jewish	-.053 (.012)***	-.037 (.011)***
Portuguese	.003 (.021)	-.003 (.019)
Income	-.007 (.011)	-.008 (.010)
Young	-.171 (.056)**	-.238 (.051)***
Old	.030 (.024)	.008 (.022)
Noncitizens	-.079 (.017)***	-.067 (.015)***
Early Immigration	.071 (.028)*	.025 (.026)
English at Home	.009 (.009)	.020 (.007)*
Mobility	-.038 (.020)	-.049 (.018)**
Homeowners	.074 (.011)***	.064 (.009)***
Homogeneity Index	-.013 (.013)	.026 (.012)*
Constant	76.25 (1.17)***	78.27 (1.06)***
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.31	.32
N	1048	1048

\*\*\* significant at the .001 level, two-tailed.  
 \*\* significant at the .01 level, two-tailed.  
 \* significant at the .05 level, two-tailed.

Note: Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors indicated in parentheses. Dependent variables are percentage turnout in each election. Income is the median income (in thousands of dollars) for each unit of analysis. All other independent variables are measured as percentages. For a full description of variables, see Appendix C.

election. For the Greek community, the relationship remains positive and significant, even when controlling for such potentially confounding variables as income, age, and period of immigration. For the Italian community, the relationship remains positive, although it ceases to be significant in the federal election. For the Portuguese, a non-significant positive relationship becomes a non-significant negative one in the federal election, while a significantly negative relationship ceases to be significant in the provincial election. Once again, the most important change is observed in the Jewish community, where we find that when other variables are held constant, a positive relationship becomes significantly negative in both elections.

Table 7.6 presents the multivariate regression results for the 610 enumeration areas found within the City of Montreal. Comparing the multivariate results in Table 7.6 with the results presented in Table 7.4, we find some similar patterns occurring, as well as some interesting changes. For the Chinese community, the relationships remain significantly negative for all but the municipal election. Here, the relationship remains negative, but ceases to be statistically significant. For the Greek community, the relationships remain positive in all three elections, and significant in the federal and municipal. With respect to the Italian community, we find important changes occurring once other variables are held constant. Relationships that were significantly positive in Table 7.4 have become insignificant and negative (in two

Table 7.6. Determinants of Voter Turnout in Three Elections (City of Montreal)

	<u>Election</u>		
	<u>1993 Federal</u>	<u>1994 Provincial</u>	<u>1994 Municipal</u>
Chinese	-.167 (.040)***	-.084 (.037)*	-.028 (.053)
Greek	.069 (.025)**	.035 (.023)	.219 (.032)***
Italian	-.009 (.021)	.026 (.019)	-.022 (.028)
Jewish	-.091 (.021)***	-.073 (.019)***	-.041 (.028)
Portuguese	.012 (.024)	-.005 (.022)	-.002 (.032)
Income	.038 (.020)	.049 (.019)**	-.084 (.027)**
Young	-.195 (.073)**	-.225 (.067)***	-.259 (.096)**
Old	.133 (.035)***	.052 (.032)	.297 (.046)***
Noncitizens	-.046 (.021)*	-.046 (.019)*	-.003 (.027)
Early Immigration	.114 (.039)**	.073 (.036)*	.066 (.052)
English at Home	-.013 (.013)	-.001 (.011)	-.134 (.016)***
Mobility	-.041 (.026)	-.055 (.024)*	-.087 (.034)*
Homeowners	.042 (.019)*	.038 (.017)*	.189 (.024)***
Homogeneity Index	-.004 (.019)	.029 (.017)	.031 (.025)
Constant	73.90 (1.65)***	76.44 (1.50)***	44.93 (2.15)***
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.31	.33	.44
N	610	610	610

\*\*\* significant at the .001 level, two-tailed.

\*\* significant at the .01 level, two-tailed.

\* significant at the .05 level, two-tailed.

Note: Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors indicated in parentheses. Dependent variables are percentage turnout in each election. Income is the median income (in thousands of dollars) for each unit of analysis. All other independent variables are measured as percentages. For a full description of variables, see Appendix C.

of three elections) in Table 7.6. For the Jewish community, the results are similar in both tables: negative relationships remain negative, becoming significantly so in the federal and provincial elections once other variables are held constant. Turning, finally, to the Portuguese community, the only change occurs with respect to the sign of the federal coefficient when other variables are held constant. Otherwise, the relationships remain negative and non-significant in both tables.

Summing up our findings with respect to the ethnic variables, we find that the Greek community participates at levels that are consistently and significantly higher than that of the population in general,<sup>2</sup> that the Chinese and Jewish communities participate at levels that are consistently lower than the rest of the population, while the Italian and Portuguese communities show turnout rates that are sometimes higher and sometimes lower, but rarely are they significantly different than that of the general population.

What are we to make of these results? Perhaps some light can be shed on them by examining the relationships between the control variables and turnout. Beginning with income, we find that while it is not significant in the regressions run for the island as a whole, it is significant in two of the three equations run at the

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<sup>2</sup> Our reference group consists of the general population, minus the five groups under study.

level of the city. The problem is that the coefficient is positive in one of these equations (1994 provincial) and negative in the other (1994 municipal). These are certainly unexpected results. In most studies of voting, the impact of income on voting may not always be significant (depending on what other variables are included), but it is generally positive (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980: 20-26; Eagles 1991: 16-21).<sup>3</sup> It might be argued that such inconsistent results are due to the fact that income is not a very reliable indicator of socio-economic status, and that a better indicator would be educational attainment (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980: 25). I did include two measures of education in earlier regression models, but found that they did not achieve statistical significance. Like income, high education and low education produced both positive and negative coefficients -- contrary to expectations that high education would be consistently positive and low education consistently negative. When the income and education measures were included in the same equation, none were statistically significant (except in the 1994 municipal election, where income was significantly negative). In all equations, the sign for the income coefficient remained the same as it is in the equations presented in Tables 7.5 and 7.6. Because of this, I have dropped the education variables from the final equations.

Turning to the other socio-economic control variables, the

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<sup>3</sup> But see Jackson (1996:430) for evidence that the effect of income is not always positive.



results are in keeping with expectations based on previous research. With respect to age, for example, we find that an increase in the proportion of 18-to-24-year-olds in an area is negatively related to turnout, while an increase in the proportion of the population that is over 65 is positively related to turnout (although the latter achieves statistical significance only in the federal and municipal elections, measured at the city-level). These results are consistent with earlier findings that young people tend to vote less, and that participation increases with age (declining only among the very elderly) (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980: 47). It is important to note that the age variables achieve significance even in the presence of controls for mobility and homeownership, which are included as indicators of stability and integration into the community. It is often argued that one reason the young vote less is that they are more mobile. The findings presented here indicate that both factors exert a significant, negative influence on the likelihood of voting. Homeownership, on the other hand, has a positive impact on turnout.

With respect to immigration-related variables, we find that the proportion of non-citizens in an area is negatively related to turnout, and that the relationship is significant in all but the municipal election. We find a positive relationship between early immigration and turnout, indicating that the longer immigrants have lived in Canada, the more likely they are to vote. Both of these findings are consistent with expectations based on previous

research.

The only other anomalous finding concerns the use of English as a home language -- included here as an indicator of integration into the host society. While the effect is positive in the regressions run for the whole island, and in one case, significant as well, it becomes negative in the regressions run at the city-level, achieving statistical significance in the municipal election. This finding suggests that the use of English in the home is not necessarily a good indicator of integration into the political culture of Montreal.<sup>4</sup>

### 7.1.3. The Ecological Inference Problem

Before discussing the final control measure, the homogeneity index, it is necessary to address a problem which was first raised in Chapter Three, that is the problem of the ecological fallacy. This problem, which arises when aggregate-level data are used to make inferences about individual-level relationships, is well-known in the social science literature, and to date, has not produced a

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<sup>4</sup> I ran the same regressions using French as a home language, both alone and in combination with English. I found that it achieved statistical significance only once -- when used alone in the equation for the 1994 municipal election -- in which case it was positive. However, when English as a home language was added to the model, the French coefficient became negative and non-significant, while the English coefficient remained negative and significant. For the sake of parsimony, I have included only one measure of home language, English, which produces more significant coefficients than French.

single, comprehensive solution.<sup>5</sup> In the case of ecological regression (which is the method I have been using here), the source of the problem lies in the assumption that the value of  $b$  is not correlated with the value of  $X$ , that is, "... the crucial assumption that the transition rates are constant across constituencies..." (Achen and Shively 1995: 32). This means that the proportion of Italians who vote ( $b$ ) should not increase with the proportion of Italians in each unit ( $X$ ). In other words, I am assuming that the relationship between the "Italian-ness" of a unit and the percentage of voter turnout is a linear one.

In order to control for the possibility of non-linearity, I have taken two steps. In the first place, I have included in each of my regression equations a control variable which measures the amount of ethnic homogeneity in each unit. The measure used is a "Herfindahl index". It is often used by economists as a measure of concentration within an industry. The Herfindahl index is defined as:

$$H = \sum_{i=1}^n (S_i)^2 ,$$

where  $S_i$  is firm  $i$ 's market share and where there are  $n$  firms in the industry. The value of the Herfindahl index ranges from  $1/n$

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<sup>5</sup> Although a new solution proposed by King (1997), which combines the application of deterministic bounds at the level of observation (e.g. the precinct) with a statistical model applied at the aggregate level (e.g. the electoral district), may go some way towards unifying "the two primary competing parts of the ecological inference literature" (p. 27).

(all firms are of equal size) to 1 (one firm dominates). By substituting data on ethnic group size for the size of firms in the formula above, Herfindahl index scores of ethnic homogeneity can be computed for each unit of analysis.<sup>6</sup> Inclusion of this index in the equation controls for the possibility that it is the homogeneity of the unit that increases turnout, rather than the presence of any one ethnic group per se. Examining the results for this measure we find that it is significant in only one of the five equations: that of the 1994 provincial election, taken at the level of the island as a whole (Table 7.5).

As a second precaution, I have also re-run the full multivariate model as a quadratic equation, in order to test for non-linearity among the independent variables. The results of this test (conducted for each of the three equations presented in Table 7.6) indicate that this is not a serious problem here. With respect to the five ethnic variables, I found that of the fifteen relationships examined, only one shows signs of non-linearity. In this case, the effect is not in the expected direction: the coefficient for the squared variable (%Italian) is negative, indicating that in this particular election (the 1994 provincial), an increase in a unit's Italian population actually decreases the propensity to vote. There are no good theoretical or empirical reasons for this finding, nor for the fact that it occurs in only

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<sup>6</sup> See Eagles and Erfle (1989) for further description of the Herfindahl index and its application in a study of voter participation.

one of the three elections. I conclude that non-linearity is not a significant problem with these data.

While the problem of the ecological fallacy is an important one, it would be a mistake to conclude that ecological analysis should never be used. As I have indicated earlier, there are advantages to using aggregate data over individual data. This is particularly the case when the effects one is interested in can be considered contextual in nature (Eagles 1991: 5; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995: 28-33). In the current study, the impact of leader mobilization on turnout can be considered in this light, as such mobilization is expected to make use of communications networks and relationships within the ethnic community. It is therefore appropriate to use aggregate measures in this case. It is necessary, however, to use caution when using aggregate data. I believe that the steps taken here are sufficient to demonstrate that the ecological fallacy is not a serious cause for concern in this study.

#### 7.1.4. Summary

In this section, I have presented the general findings with respect to turnout in the five communities and three elections under study. I began by describing how the variables are distributed. With respect to the dependent variable, turnout, we have seen that it was somewhat higher in the provincial election

than the federal, and considerably higher in both of these elections than in the municipal. This is in keeping with the general pattern of turnout in Quebec, where participation in provincial elections tends to exceed that of federal elections (with municipal participation coming in a distant third). Turning to the independent variables, we have seen that there is considerable variation in the size and concentration of the five communities examined here. We have also seen that the Italian and Jewish communities are slightly more concentrated outside the city itself, while the Greek, Portuguese, and Chinese communities are slightly more concentrated inside the city. With respect to the control variables, we have seen that although there are differences between the island as a whole and the city of Montreal, with the population of the city tending to rank somewhat lower on the socio-economic scale, these differences are relatively minor.

I then related ethnicity to turnout. I began by taking the five ethnic variables only, and found that in four of the five communities, the relationship was the same at both the level of the island as a whole and the level of the city. The only exception was the Jewish community, which showed a positive relationship to turnout at the level of the island, but a negative one at the level of the city. This pointed to the necessity of controlling for other, possibly confounding, variables. The multivariate analyses presented in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 tended to confirm the previous observations. Thus it appears that both the Chinese and the Jewish

communities participate at rates that are significantly lower than that of the general population; this observation holds at both the level of the island as a whole and inside the city (suggesting that the previously-observed positive relationship for Jewish participation at the island-level was spurious). The Greek community, on the other hand, participates at a rate that is consistently higher than that of the population in general; this too holds for both levels of observation. The Italian and Portuguese communities produce mixed results. In both communities we find both positive and negative coefficients. In only one instance, however, do we find a significant coefficient (Italian turnout in the provincial election at the level of the island). This lack of significant coefficients suggests that members of these two communities do not differ from the general population in terms of electoral participation.

An examination of the control variables reveals few surprises. One of these is the income variable, which produces two negative (but non-significant) coefficients at the level of the island as a whole, and one significantly negative coefficient at the level of the city. The other anomaly is posed by English as a home language. Positive (and barely significant) at the level of the island, this variable is consistently negative (and in one case, significantly so) at the level of the city. This suggests that English-speakers inside the city vote less than those living in the outlying suburbs. As for the remaining control variables, these tend to

perform as expected, although not always to a degree that is statistically significant.

Finally, I addressed the problem of the ecological fallacy and introduced two techniques for dealing with it. In the first instance, I included as a control variable a Herfindahl index which takes into account the ethnic homogeneity of each unit. This controls for possible non-linearity in the relationships between ethnicity and turnout. As a further precaution, I re-ran the multivariate model as a quadratic equation. The results indicate that non-linearity is not a significant problem with these data.

## 7.2. Hypothesis Testing

On the basis of the findings presented above, I can now proceed to test the final hypothesis of this study, which makes turnout a function of mobilization by community leaders.

### 7.2.1. Hypothesis B.3: Mobilization and Turnout

According to hypothesis B.3,

Mobilization by a group leader on behalf of a particular candidate or party increases turnout within the group.

This means that we should find greater levels of turnout in those communities and for those elections in which leaders have been involved in mobilization. In Chapter Five I established rank-orderings between the communities on the basis of leader



mobilization. Those orderings, first presented in Tables 5.11 and 5.12, are reproduced in Table 7.7. They allow me to make predictions concerning the level of turnout across communities and elections. These predictions can then be tested using the regression results presented in this chapter. Because I wish to compare the communities across all three elections, I will be using the regression results presented in Table 7.6, that is, the results obtained for the 610 enumeration areas found within the City of Montreal.

Table 7.8 lays out the predictions for each election, based on the mobilization rankings reported in Table 7.7A. We can see, for example, that in the federal election, turnout is predicted to be higher in the Greek community than in the Chinese, Italian, Jewish or Portuguese communities; higher in the Chinese community than in the Portuguese; higher in the Italian community than in the Portuguese, and so on. A total of 23 predictions are made. These predictions are tested by comparing the turnout coefficients taken from Table 7.6 for each pair of communities within a given election. A positive difference is indicative of a correct prediction. Initially, I find that 17 of the 23 differences are positive, giving us a confirmation rate of 74%. When I test the significance of these differences I find that only 13 of the 23 are significant at the .05 level or better (one-tailed test),<sup>7</sup> for a

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<sup>7</sup> To test whether differences are statistically significant, I use a T-test, calculated by the formula:  $\beta'/S_{\beta}$ . (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1981, 121-22). One-tailed tests are used because the

confirmation rate of 57%. On the whole, it would appear from this initial test that the model performs moderately well. In keeping with the hypothesis, mobilization does appear to have a positive impact on turnout.

The preceding test involved comparing across communities within each election. An alternate way of testing these results is to make comparisons across elections within each community. This second method provides a more stringent test of the model because by holding the community constant, I can control for other community-specific factors, such as level of integration or internal organization, that may be influencing the results. It thus provides a more rigorous indication of the independent effect of group leader mobilization on turnout.

This second test involves a somewhat different procedure than that used in the first. This time, the data are pooled, and dummy variables and interaction terms are used to test whether there is evidence of systematic differences in turnout across the three elections.<sup>8</sup> The results shown in Table 7.9 indicate the effect of

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alternate hypotheses are stated in the form of strict inequalities. In the two cases where the predictions are *not* confirmed but are nevertheless significant (*Federal Chinese > Portuguese* and *Federal Jewish > Portuguese*), it is more appropriate to use the more stringent two-tailed test. Both of these cases are significant at the .001 level for a two-tailed test. For the sake of clarity, I have presented one-tailed significance levels only.

<sup>8</sup> In effect, the size of the sample was tripled (n=1830), and the dependent variable was set to correspond to turnout in the municipal election for the first 610 cases, turnout in the federal

each community variable, of the two election variables (the municipal election is the missing category, and so becomes the constant) and of the ten community-election interaction variables (for the sake of space, the control variables and their interactions are not shown). Our interest is in the ethnic interaction variables, as they indicate the differential effect a community has across elections. Taking the first such variable, *Federal\*Chinese*, we see that the Chinese community's impact is less in the federal election than in the municipal, as indicated by the negative coefficient, and that this difference is statistically significant. If we take the second interaction variable, *Federal\*Greek*, we can see that the coefficient is negative as well, indicating that the Greek community's impact is weaker in the federal election than in the municipal. Here again, the difference is statistically significant. The third interaction variable, *Federal\*Italian*, is positive, indicating that the Italian community's impact is stronger in the federal than in the municipal election. This time, however, the difference is not statistically significant. In fact, only three of the ten interaction variables shown in Table 7.9 are significant at the .05 level for a one-

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election for the next 610 cases, and turnout in the provincial election in the last 610 cases. Added to the original equation were two dummy variables, which took the value of 1 for the federal and provincial elections, respectively, and interactive terms for each dummy and individual variable (eg: *dummyfed\*chinese*, *dummyprov\*chinese*, etc...). The coefficients associated with each of the interactive terms indicate whether the variable's impact differs across the three elections. For an example of this procedure, see Krosnick and Kinder (1990). A similar procedure is used by Bartels (1996).

Table 7.7. Ranking of Elections and Communities by Leader MobilizationA. Ranking of communities

<u>Community Order</u>	<u>Election</u>		
	Federal	Provincial	Municipal
1st	G	G, I, P	C, G
2nd	C, I, J	J	I
3rd	P	C	P
4th			J
5th			

C=Chinese, G=Greek, I=Italian, J=Jewish, P=Portuguese

B. Ranking of elections

<u>Election Order</u>	<u>Community</u>				
	Chinese	Greek	Italian	Jewish	Portuguese
1st	M	F, P, M	P	F, P	P
2nd	F		F	M	F
3rd	P		M		M

F= Federal, P=Provincial, M=Municipal

Note: Communities and elections are ranked in order, from greatest mobilization to least.

Table 7.8. Testing Predictions of Election Turnout Levels Across Communities

<u>Prediction</u>	<u>Difference between coefficients</u>	<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>T-statistic</u>
<b>Federal:</b>			
Greek > Chinese	+.24	Yes	5.54**
Greek > Italian	+.08	Yes	3.79**
Greek > Jewish	+.16	Yes	6.06**
Greek > Portuguese	+.06	Yes	1.99*
Chinese > Portuguese	-.16	No	8.12**
Italian > Portuguese	-.02	No	0.81
Jewish > Portuguese	-.10	No	3.51**
<b>Provincial:</b>			
Greek > Jewish	+.11	Yes	4.48**
Greek > Chinese	+.12	Yes	3.06**
Italian > Jewish	+.10	Yes	4.93**
Italian > Chinese	+.11	Yes	2.89**
Portuguese > Jewish	+.07	Yes	2.54**
Portuguese > Chinese	+.08	Yes	1.98*
Jewish > Chinese	+.01	Yes	0.28
<b>Municipal:</b>			
Chinese > Italian	-.01	No	0.12
Chinese > Portuguese	-.03	No	0.46
Chinese > Jewish	+.01	Yes	0.22
Greek > Italian	+.24	Yes	8.93**
Greek > Portuguese	+.22	Yes	5.89**
Greek > Jewish	+.26	Yes	7.58**
Italian > Portuguese	-.02	No	0.57
Italian > Jewish	+.02	Yes	0.66
Portuguese > Jewish	+.04	Yes	1.02

Total confirmed: 17/23 (74%)

Total confirmed and statistically significant: 13/23 (57%)

\*\* significant at the .01 level, one-tailed.

\* significant at the .05 level, one-tailed.

Note: Predictions are for relative turnout levels in each community, based on mobilization scores reported in Table 7.7 (panel A). The difference between coefficients column is based on regression coefficients for community variables listed in Table 7.6. A positive difference indicates an accurate prediction.

Table 7.9. Determinants of Turnout: Pooled Data

<u>Group variables</u>		
Chinese	-.028	(.044)
Greek	.220	(.027)***
Italian	-.022	(.023)
Jewish	-.041	(.023)*
Portuguese	-.002	(.026)
<u>Election variables</u>		
Federal dummy	28.970	(2.531)***
Provincial dummy	31.512	(2.531)***
<u>Interaction variables</u>		
Federal*Chinese	-.139	(.062)*
Federal*Greek	-.151	(.038)***
Federal*Italian	.012	(.033)
Federal*Jewish	-.050	(.032)
Federal*Portuguese	.014	(.037)
Provincial*Chinese	-.056	(.062)
Provincial*Greek	-.185	(.038)***
Provincial*Italian	.048	(.033)
Provincial*Jewish	-.032	(.032)
Provincial*Portuguese	-.003	(.037)
Intercept (municipal turnout)	44.931	(1.790)***
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.90	
N	1830	

\*\*\* significant at the .001 level, one-tailed

\* significant at the .05 level, one-tailed

Note: Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors indicated in parentheses. The dependent variable is turnout. Control variables are the same as in Table 7.6, as well as interaction terms for each (results not shown).

tailed test.

How do these results compare with the predictions of turnout based on community mobilization scores? Table 7.10 lists the predictions for each community, based on the mobilization scores listed in Table 7.7B, and on the interactive terms listed in Table 7.9.<sup>9</sup> For each prediction, it indicates a confirmation verdict and a test of significance. Taking the Chinese community, for example, I expect municipal turnout to be greater than federal turnout (based on mobilization scores), which would translate into a negative *Federal\*Chinese* interaction coefficient in Table 7.9. I find that the coefficient is indeed negative, meaning that my prediction is confirmed. This is also the case for the second prediction concerning the Chinese community. Here, the prediction is that municipal turnout will be greater than provincial turnout, which would require a negative *Provincial\*Chinese* interaction coefficient in Table 7.9. This time the coefficient is negative, but it is not significant. The third prediction for the Chinese community is that turnout in the federal election will be greater than in the provincial election. Comparing the two interaction terms in Table 7.9, I find that this prediction is not confirmed.

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<sup>9</sup> The results shown in Table 7.9 indicate how the community variables compare across the federal and municipal elections, and across the provincial and municipal elections. To compare across the federal and provincial elections, I must subtract one interaction coefficient from the other (for example: *Federal\*Jewish* - *Provincial\*Jewish*). To test whether the difference is statistically significant, I use a T-test. None of the resulting Ts is significant at the .05 level (one-tailed).

Table 7.10. Testing Predictions of Community Turnout Levels Across Elections

<u>Theoretical Prediction</u>	<u>Empirical Prediction</u>	<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>T-statistic</u>
Chinese:			
Municipal > Federal	Federal*Chinese < 0	Yes	2.24*
Municipal > Provincial	Provincial*Chinese < 0	Yes	0.90
Federal > Provincial	Fed*Chin > Prov*Chin	No	1.34
Italian:			
Provincial > Federal	Prov*Ital > Fed*Ital	Yes	1.08
Provincial > Municipal	Provincial*Italian > 0	Yes	1.45
Federal > Municipal	Federal*Italian > 0	Yes	0.37
Jewish:			
Federal > Municipal	Federal*Jewish > 0	No	1.54
Provincial > Municipal	Provincial*Jewish > 0	No	0.98
Portuguese:			
Provincial > Federal	Prov*Port > Fed*Port	No	0.45
Provincial > Municipal	Provincial*Portuguese > 0	No	0.09
Federal > Municipal	Federal*Portuguese > 0	Yes	0.37

Total confirmed: 6/11 (55%)

Total confirmed and statistically significant: 1/11 (9%)

\* significant at the .05 level, one-tailed

Note: Theoretical predictions are for relative community turnout levels in each election, based on mobilization scores reported in Table 7.7 (panel B). Empirical predictions, confirmations, and t-statistics are for interaction terms listed in Table 7.9.



Of the eleven predictions listed in Table 7.10, six are confirmed, but only one of these is significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test). In other words, I find one case out of eleven in which the model is confirmed at a statistically significant level (for a confirmation rate of 9%). Obviously, these results are much weaker than those of the first test, and do not appear to support the model. Contrary to expectations, the results of this second test would seem to indicate that mobilization by community leaders does not produce a significant increase in voter turnout.

#### 7.2.2. Hypothesis Testing: Summary

In this chapter I have examined the last of the research hypotheses derived from Uhlaner's rational choice model of turnout. The results do not confirm the hypothesis, and therefore are not supportive of the model. Instead of finding significant increases in turnout among groups that have been mobilized by their leaders, I find little or no relationship between mobilization and turnout. While the results of the first test seem to offer modest support for the model, those of the second, more stringent, test are completely unresponsive. On the basis of these results, I would have to conclude that mobilization by community leaders does not have a significant effect on voter turnout in those communities.

These results are consistent with those of the previous chapters, where support for the model was found to be modest at

best. Thus in addition to finding that leaders often mobilize when they have no rational reason to do so, that the arguments they use to mobilize are frequently instrumental and almost always non-relational in nature, we now find that such mobilization is not related to the variations in voter turnout observed for these groups and elections. It would seem that we must look elsewhere, outside the model, if we are to understand not only the variations observed here, but why it is that people decide to vote or abstain.

## Chapter Eight

### Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research

#### 8.1. Recapitulation of Findings

This thesis has taken a particular rational choice model of electoral participation and tested it by examining the political attitudes and activities of group leaders and the aggregate turnout rates in five Montreal ethnic communities during three separate elections. The model, first developed by Carole Uhlaner, identifies two distinct stages in the electoral mobilization process. In the first stage, leaders are said to make bargains with political candidates, in which candidate issue positions are exchanged for promises of increased group turnout. In the second stage, leaders are expected to mobilize turnout within their communities using promises of relational (group-specific) consumption benefits.

I have tested the model using two sources of data. Information on leaders' campaign activities and perceptions of benefits is drawn from two sets of in-depth interviews conducted in the fall of 1994. Information on community turnout is drawn from an ecological analysis of official polling station results combined with Census Canada data at the level of the enumeration area. The methodology thus provides both qualitative and quantitative data with which to test the model.

I have derived six working hypotheses from the model. These relate to the amount of mobilization expected to take place, the type of argument leaders use to mobilize, and the effects of mobilization on turnout. In chapters Five, Six and Seven, I present tests of these hypotheses.

In Chapter Five, I address the questions of when mobilization takes place and why. The first hypothesis states that mobilization occurs only when leaders perceive one candidate or party to be more beneficial to their group than any other candidate or party. In other words, leaders must expect some instrumental benefits to accrue from the election of a particular candidate or party before they will mobilize turnout. On the basis of the tests presented in tables 5.13 and 5.14, I find that this first hypothesis is confirmed -- albeit modestly. On the whole it would appear that more mobilization takes place in communities and elections where instrumental benefits are perceived to be high than where they are perceived to be low.

The second hypothesis states that mobilization is greater when leaders perceive the election to be close. This hypothesis relates to the probability term of the model: leaders are expected to mobilize more when they perceive that such mobilization has a greater chance of having an effect on the outcome of the election. On the basis of the tests presented in tables 5.18 and 5.19, I find that this hypothesis is not confirmed. It would appear that

perceived probability of affecting the outcome of the race is not a good predictor of mobilization by group leaders.

I then proceed to combine benefits and probabilities, in much the same way as the original calculus of voting combines the *B* and *P* terms (although the measure I use is additive rather than multiplicative). In this way, perceived benefits are discounted by the perceived probability of affecting the outcome of the race. Tables 5.23 and 5.24 present the results of the two tests in which such "expectations" are used to predict mobilization. These results are not supportive of the model. It thus appears that the best support for the model is obtained when benefits alone are used to predict mobilization. The use of probability, either alone or in combination with benefits, does not produce results that are supportive of the model.

The third hypothesis tested in Chapter Five states that when an election is perceived to be one-sided, mobilization will be greater when the preferred candidate is seen to be winning rather than losing. It is expected that leaders, who are presumed to be rational, will not waste their time and scarce resources mobilizing turnout in an election that their preferred candidate has no chance of winning. They will also be less likely to mobilize when the preferred candidate appears to be able to win without their support; in this case, the free-rider logic should apply. However, some mobilization can be expected under the latter scenario because

leaders may want to appear to have supported the winning candidate in order to be able to lay claim to possible future benefits. The results indicate that this hypothesis receives modest support. When faced with one-sided races, leaders do appear to mobilize only where such races are expected to be won by the preferred candidate. As I pointed out in Chapter Five, such results provide only limited proof of leaders' rationality. The most that can be said is that leaders do not waste their time mobilizing on behalf of candidates who have no chance of winning. This does not mean that leaders spend much time calculating probabilities. Thus the positive results for hypothesis A.3 do not contradict the negative results for hypothesis A.2. Instead, they nuance them; while leaders may take the most obvious probabilities into account, there is no evidence to suggest that they go much further than that.

Of the three hypotheses tested in Chapter Five, two receive modest support, while the other is not supported at all. When perceived benefits and probabilities are combined in a single hypothesis, the results are not supportive. On the whole, it is found that perceived benefits are useful for predicting mobilization, while perceived probabilities are not.

The results presented in Chapter Five indicate that more mobilization takes place than can be predicted on the basis of leaders' expectations of group benefits alone. Other benefits which appear to have an impact on leaders' decisions to mobilize are of

two types: general, society-wide issues and benefits, and benefits of a purely personal nature. Both types of benefit lie outside the model. To the extent that they have an influence on leaders' decisions to mobilize, we must conclude that the model is not supported.

In Chapter Six, I examine the kinds of benefits leaders use to mobilize turnout. I base this examination on leaders' responses to three questions: do leaders find it easy or difficult to mobilize people to vote? how do they convince people to vote? how do they respond to the argument that a single vote cannot make a difference?

Beginning with the first question, I found that in the Chinese community, leaders were of the view that mobilization was a difficult task. This assessment was consistent across all three elections. In the Greek community, the opposite was true: leaders found it very easy to mobilize people to vote. In fact, most leaders in the Greek community felt that it was unnecessary to mobilize turnout, as most people in the community were expected to vote on their own initiative. Leaders in the Italian community felt that it was easy to mobilize turnout in the federal and provincial elections, but difficult in the municipal. The same assessment was provided by leaders in the Jewish community. Turning to the Portuguese community, leaders were divided in their experiences. There is thus considerable variation across the five communities,

with some leaders finding mobilization easy in all three elections, some finding it easy in certain elections but difficult in others, and some finding it difficult in all three elections.

The second question asked leaders how they convinced people in their communities to vote. I found that in response to this question, most leaders chose civic duty as the main argument in favour of voting. Only in the Greek community was this not the case. Other important arguments were: maintaining the right to complain, having a say or deciding for oneself, and voting to have an impact on a particular issue.

The final question probing the qualitative side of mobilization asked leaders how they responded to people who thought that a single vote would not make a difference to the outcome of the election. I found that the responses leaders offered to this third question were qualitatively different from those offered to the second. While references to civic duty were still very common, just as important were the appeals to the possibility that a single vote might make a difference in this particular election. In other words, leaders showed a strong tendency to reject the premise of the original argument. This suggests that many leaders overestimated the probability that a single vote could make a difference.

In Chapter Six I tested two hypotheses relating to the



qualitative nature of mobilization. The first hypothesis states that leaders use consumption rather than instrumental benefits when mobilizing their members to vote. Recall that consumption benefits are those that can be obtained only through the act of voting. They are not outcome-dependent. The use of consumption benefits is necessary if the model is to avoid the free-rider problem at the level of the individual voter. On the basis of the findings presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, I find only limited support for this hypothesis. Although leaders do make strong use of consumption benefits when convincing people to vote, or when countering the "one vote cannot make a difference" argument, they also make considerable use of instrumental benefits. Thus while leaders in all communities rely on civic duty as a primary incentive for voting, they also make frequent appeals to the belief that every vote counts, as well as to the importance of voting in order to support a particular issue, party or candidate. In some communities, the argument that a single vote can make a difference to the outcome proved to be just as important as the civic duty argument. Thus I find only a slight tendency among leaders to make greater use of consumption benefits when mobilizing community members to vote. The frequent use of instrumental benefits prevents me from considering the hypothesis fully supported.

The second hypothesis tested in Chapter Six states that group leaders make use of relational benefits when mobilizing voter turnout. Relational benefits are group-specific or group-centred in

nature -- they can be enjoyed only in the presence of, or along with, other members of a clearly-defined group. Appeals to the individual's sense of civic duty, as a citizen of Canada, cannot be taken as relational benefits because the reference group is too broad. Appeals to the individual's sense of belonging to a particular ethnic group are considered to be relational in nature. That benefits be relational is necessitated by leaders' need to translate collective instrumental benefits into variable private benefits for individual group members. Leaders must make use of benefits over which they have some control. Thus while membership in the specific ethnic group constitutes such a relational benefit, membership in the country as a whole (civic duty) does not.

The results presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show that this second hypothesis is not supported: the overwhelming tendency is for responses to be non-relational. Civic duty, the preservation of one's right to criticize, the desire to send a message or have a say in society -- these are all non-relational benefits because they can be enjoyed whether or not the individual belongs to a particular ethnic group. They are available to anyone who has the right to vote in Canada. On the whole, I find relational benefits to be quite rare among leaders' responses. I must therefore conclude that my second hypothesis is not supported. The overwhelming tendency is for leaders to make use of non-relational benefits when mobilizing community members to vote.

In Chapter Seven I test my final hypothesis, which states that mobilization by community leaders increases turnout within the community. I relate mobilization rates, based on data drawn from the interviews with community leaders, to observed turnout rates for each of the communities. In each case, I am comparing the relative rankings of the communities; thus if the Greek community ranks higher than the Chinese in terms of mobilization, I expect that it will also rank higher in terms of turnout. It is on the basis of these expectations, or predictions, that I am able to test my final hypothesis.

I perform two types of comparison. In the first instance, I hold the election constant and compare across communities. This allows for 23 predictions. Table 7.8 shows that 13 predictions are confirmed, indicating that the model performs moderately well. I then perform my second set of comparisons, holding the community constant and comparing across elections. As I explained in Chapter 7, this provides a more rigorous test of the model, because by holding the community constant we are controlling for community-specific factors that are not accounted for by the variables included in the regression equation. Comparing in this manner allows for 11 predictions. The results in Table 7.10 show that only 1 is confirmed at a statistically significant level. Thus, while the results of the first test seemed to offer modest confirmation of the hypothesis, those of the second test disconfirm it. On the basis of these results, I conclude that the model is not supported:

mobilization by community leaders does not produce a significant increase in voter turnout in those communities.

Table 8.1 presents a summary of the hypotheses and their verdicts. We can see that of the six hypotheses tested in this study, two are moderately supported, one is weakly supported, and three are not supported at all. Of the three confirmed hypotheses, I find that  $H_{A1}$  receives the most support. This finding indicates that the perception of increased instrumental benefits produces increased mobilization by community leaders. Hypothesis  $H_{A3}$  is also confirmed to a moderate degree, but the support it provides for the model is not as strong as that of the other hypotheses. It suggests, at most, that leaders are not completely unaware of probabilities. The other confirmed hypothesis,  $H_{B1}$ , receives only weak support. It shows that leaders are slightly more likely to use consumption benefits when mobilizing turnout among community members.

The remaining three hypotheses --  $H_{A2}$ ,  $H_{B2}$ , and  $H_{B3}$  -- are not confirmed. This means that the perception of a close race does not lead to increased mobilization by community leaders; that leaders do not use relational benefits to mobilize voter turnout; and finally, that increased mobilization by leaders does not result in increased turnout within that community.

Table 8.1. Summary of Hypotheses and Verdicts

<b>Hypothesis</b>		<b>Verdict</b>
H <sub>A.1</sub>	Mobilization occurs only when group leaders perceive one of the candidates or parties to be holding a position that is more beneficial to their group than that of any other candidate or party.	Confirmed
H <sub>A.2</sub>	Mobilization is greater when group leaders perceive the election to be close than when they perceive it to be one-sided.	Disconfirmed
H <sub>A.3</sub>	If the election is not perceived to be close, mobilization is greater when the preferred candidate is seen to be winning than when the preferred candidate is seen to be losing.	Confirmed
H <sub>B.1</sub>	Group leaders use the promise of consumption benefits rather than of instrumental benefits when mobilizing their members to vote.	Weakly Confirmed
H <sub>B.2</sub>	Group leaders use the promise of relational benefits more often than non-relational when mobilizing their members to vote.	Disconfirmed
H <sub>B.3</sub>	Mobilization by a group leader on behalf of a particular candidate or party increases turnout within the group.	Disconfirmed

What are we to make of such results? The most appropriate reaction would seem to be that of rejecting the model. Only half of the hypotheses are confirmed and of these, only one receives confirmation that is better than weak. Surely such results are indicative of a model that does not work. It may be premature, however, to declare the model dead on the basis of these results alone. Half of the hypotheses *do* receive some support. What these results suggest is that a high degree of scepticism is in order. The model, which makes sense at a theoretical level, and which has received considerable theoretical support in the literature, encounters serious problems when applied empirically. This requires us to return to the theoretical level, in order to determine what implications can be drawn from the findings presented here.

## 8.2. Theoretical Implications

The rational choice model developed by Uhlaner casts turnout as a two-step process. In the first step, political candidates make bargains with group leaders, in which candidate positions on issues of importance to the group are traded for leaders' promises to increase turnout by group members. This stage of the process can be seen to comprise the *B* and *P* terms of the original calculus of voting. The *B* term is captured by the instrumental benefits that are promised in exchange for group support. The *P* term enters into the calculations of both candidates and group leaders. Candidates will not make exchanges with leaders who cannot be counted on to

deliver the votes, and leaders will not enter into promises with candidates who have no chance of winning. Thus leaders must expect that their mobilization efforts will bring about the provision of the instrumental benefits. This means that leaders must believe there is a positive probability that their mobilization efforts will affect the outcome of the election.

The results of this study provide support for the  $B$  term, but not for  $P$ . While they do abstain from supporting sure losers (and can thus be considered minimally rational), leaders do not appear to pay much attention to the probability aspect of mobilization. When they do take probability into consideration, it would appear that they tend to overestimate it. This is made evident by leaders' responses to questions probing the qualitative aspects of mobilization. When asked to respond to the argument that a single vote cannot make a difference to the outcome of the election -- the argument which lies at the heart of the paradox of voting -- most leaders refuse to accept the underlying premise. They insist on the possibility -- however slight -- of a single decisive vote. It is this over-estimation of  $P$ , combined with instrumental benefits (society-wide and personal) that lie outside the model which, I believe, explains the greater propensity to mobilize than can be predicted on the basis of expected group benefits alone.

The second step of the model incorporates the  $D$  term, integrating it with the original elements of the calculus so that

the promise of consumption benefits is made dependent upon the expectation of instrumental benefits. Leaders are expected to use consumption benefits to mobilize group members to vote. In doing so, they are effectively resolving the free-rider problem, because consumption benefits can only be obtained through participation. But leaders are expected to do so only when they have good reason to believe that the group will benefit instrumentally from the election of a particular candidate or party, and when they have good reason to believe that their mobilization efforts will be useful in bringing about the election of that candidate or party. Thus in this model,  $D$  is made possible only by the prior existence of  $B$  and a non-negative  $P$ .

The model also makes it clear that the consumption benefits used by leaders will be of a particular type. They will be relational in nature, that is, arising from a particular relationship existing among a specific sub-set of people. Relational benefits can be enjoyed only if shared with members of that particular group; they cannot be enjoyed alone, or by an arbitrary number of people. As Uhlaner states, "The identity of the 'other' in the relationship matters" (1989b: 254).

The findings of this study run contrary to the model in three ways. First, in showing that leaders mobilize even in the absence of expectations of group-specific instrumental benefits, I find that the  $D$  term is not dependent upon  $B$  and  $P$ . Leaders appear to be



acting not on the basis of a rational calculation of expected group benefits, but from a variety of motivations, most of which lie outside the parameters of rational choice theory. Second, in showing that leaders make use of both instrumental and consumption benefits when mobilizing group members to vote, I find that the free-rider problem is not resolved. Instrumental benefits do not require action on the part of the individual in order to be enjoyed. Finally, in showing that leaders make greater use of non-relational than relational benefits, I find that the particularity of Uhlaner's model -- that of incorporating sociability into a rational choice framework -- is no longer maintained. Leaders make appeals which are based not on group-specific relationships, but on society-wide relationships, as well as on purely individualistic concerns. In this way, they offer benefits over which they, as group leaders, have no control and presumably little credibility.

The fact that leaders do make extensive use of the civic duty argument when mobilizing group members to vote may help explain the lack of relationship between mobilization and turnout. Civic duty is not a relational argument, at least not in the sense implied by this model. Civic duty refers the individual to the society as a whole, rather than to the particular sub-group to which he or she belongs. It is beyond the authority of the local group leader, and is therefore something over which he or she has very little control. Having mobilized group members once on the basis of civic duty, it would be difficult for the leader to argue next time

around that the obligation to vote no longer exists. The fact that civic duty is used repeatedly in election after election, so that the effect becomes cumulative, suggests that the feeling must be very strong among members of some communities. As one group leader put it, "The more we talk about it, the more it stays in people's memories." What this leader may not realize is that once civic duty becomes ensconced in people's memories, these people are likely to vote whether the leader wants them to or not. Having let the genie of civic duty out of the bottle, the leader no longer retains control over it. The relationship between mobilization and turnout is thus compromised.

How does the finding that most people vote on the basis of civic duty square with Uhlaner's model and with rational choice theory in general? While Uhlaner does not deny the existence of civic duty or its importance in mobilizing voter turnout, she does make it clear that duty cannot be the whole story. In her words, "while individuals may well have a sense of civic obligation and other early-inculcated attitudes that engender consumption benefits from voting, these lead to a baseline level of benefits and a corresponding baseline propensity to vote" (Uhlaner 1989a: 419). Her model is meant to explain variations in turnout above and beyond what can be explained by this baseline.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In this respect it is congenial with the argument put forward by Grofman (1993; 1996) that rational choice theory should be judged by its ability to explain *changes* in turnout, rather than absolute levels of turnout.

The problem for this model, and for rational choice theory in general, is that for a large number of people, civic duty is the whole story. Once civic duty enters the picture it leaves very little room for other motivations to have any influence on the decision to vote. To this extent, the findings of this study are consistent with those of other empirical evaluations of the rational choice approach, which show that duty is, by far, the most important explanation of turnout and that calculations of probabilities, costs and instrumental benefits play only a marginal role (Blais 1997; Blais, Young and Lapp 1997). This suggests that rational choice provides, at best, a limited contribution to our understanding of voter turnout.

### 8.3. Suggestions for Future Research

Given these limitations, it is reasonable to suggest that we look beyond rational choice theory when conducting future investigations of electoral mobilization and voter turnout. While I do not think that rational choice should be discarded entirely, I do agree with Green and Shapiro (1994: 69) that "a synthesis of different theoretical perspectives" is the best way to proceed. In this final section, I offer some suggestions as to the kinds of questions that future studies might try to answer.

To begin with, I believe that further investigation of the phenomenon of civic duty is in order. We have seen that duty plays

a paramount role in motivating people to vote. How does it relate to other types of participation? We also need more information on the sources and the limitations of duty. When is civic duty reinforced and when is it constrained? In seeking to answer such questions, I would be particularly interested in seeing how duty relates to other values and beliefs, especially religious ones.

Another area which requires further research is that of electoral mobilization. I believe that future research should examine both direct and indirect mobilization. We have seen from the review of the literature that there is considerable quantitative data on electoral mobilization by political parties and candidates. What are lacking are qualitative studies which show how such mobilization works. A participant-observer study into the kinds of arguments candidates and parties use to mobilize voters would shed some much-needed light on this subject. Some questions we might seek to answer are: Do candidates try to convince people to vote? Do they know who will or will not vote? What are the main reasons, according to candidates, that people do not vote? What arguments do candidates use to convince people to vote? Do these arguments work?

I would also like to see more research on the subject of indirect, or group mobilization. As my review of the literature revealed, there is much less information on this subject than on direct mobilization. And while the present study has provided some

evidence in this area, I believe further investigation is warranted in order to better evaluate both the quantitative and qualitative importance of indirect mobilization. We could begin by trying to evaluate how important indirect mobilization is in terms of mobilizing turnout. Is mobilization by non-political groups and organizations a significant factor in elections? Evidence could be provided by survey studies which ask respondents about the kinds of groups they belong to and whether these groups try to convince them to vote. We could then move to more qualitative questions such as: How do groups convince their members to vote? Do different kinds of groups use different kinds of arguments? Which arguments are most effective? Which groups are most successful? Here again, a participant-observer design would be particularly useful in providing answers to these questions.

By seeking answers to these kinds of questions, we will be in a better position to say why it is that people decide to vote or abstain. In so doing, we will not only expand our substantive knowledge of electoral mobilization and voter turnout, we will also be in a better position to evaluate the utility of the rational choice approach and make suggestions for possible improvements. In the meantime, we are forced to conclude that most people vote for reasons that are largely irrational. From the standpoint of rational choice theory, then, the paradox of voting remains.

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## Appendix A

### Question Wording

The questions presented here were used for the portion of the interview dealing with the 1994 Quebec provincial election. With few exceptions, all the questions were repeated with respect to the 1993 federal and 1994 municipal elections, with appropriate changes made where necessary (e.g., names of ridings, or candidates). Questions of a general nature, which were not election-specific, were put to respondents only once.

#### Introduction - Background

Respondent's name: \_\_\_\_\_

1. I'd like to begin just by verifying some points of information.  
You are the [president/director/...] of [name of organization], is that correct?
2. How long have you been [president...] of this organization?
3. Can you tell me what your organization does, that is, what are its main activities?
4. How many members does your organization have?
5. Is your organization affiliated with other groups in or outside Montreal?

#### I. Motivations for Mobilization

6. What would you say are the most important issues facing the [italian/...] community in Montreal today?
7. Taking the [italian/...] community as a whole, do you think it matters which party wins the upcoming provincial election?
8. Why?
9. How will the [italian/...] community benefit if the [party] wins?
10. Suppose the [other party] wins instead, does the [italian/...] community have anything to lose if that happens?

11. Has your organization been in contact with the Liberal party? Have you personally been in contact with them?
  12. And the Parti Québécois, has your organization been in contact with them? Have you personally been in contact with them?
  13. Have either of these two parties made any specific promises either to you, to your organization or to your community as a whole? What are they?
  14. Do you think the support of your community is important to the [party]? That is, can the [party] win this election without your community support?
  15. Would the election of the Liberal Party or the Parti Québécois have any kind of effect on you personally?
  16. Are you personally a member of a provincial political party? Which one?
  17. What is the name of your own riding?
  18. Are there specific ridings in Montreal where it particularly matters to the [italian/ ...] community which candidate wins? Which ridings are those?  
List: \_\_\_\_\_
- 

[REPEAT THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FOR EACH RIDING NAMED ABOVE]

19. Do you think the [italian/ ...] community as a whole will benefit in any particular way if [candidate] is elected in [riding]?
20. In what way(s)?
21. And if [other candidate] wins, do you think the [italian/...] community has anything to lose?
22. Has your organization been in contact with [candidate]?
23. Have you been in contact with him/her personally?
24. Has this candidate made any specific promises to you, to your organization or to your community as a whole?
25. Will it affect you personally, which candidate wins in [riding]?



26. Does [candidate] need your community's support in [riding] in order to win? Can he/she win without your community's support?
27. How close do you think the race will be in [riding]? Very close? Somewhat close? Not very close? Not at all close?
28. Are there any ridings where there is a candidate from the [italian/...] community?
29. Is it important to your organization that the candidate be [italian/...]? Why? What difference does it make?
30. And to you personally, does it matter whether or not the candidate comes from the [italian/...] community? Why?
31. Is it important to people in the community? Do you think they're more willing to support a candidate who is [italian/...]? Is it easier to get them to vote when the candidate is someone from the community?
32. Does your organization try to get candidates from the [italian/...] community to run?

## II. Nominations

I'd like to talk about nomination for just a moment.

[REPEAT THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FOR EACH RIDING NAMED ABOVE]  
 [NOTE WHETHER CANDIDATE WON OR LOST, AND WHETHER DEALS MADE]

33. Was your organization involved in the nomination of the LIBERAL candidate in [riding]? How was it involved?
34. Was there a particular candidate that your organization preferred for the nomination? Who was that?
35. Why did your organization prefer that candidate?
36. Did your organization actively support that candidate?
37. Were you yourself present at that nomination meeting?
38. Did you support [candidate] at that time?
39. Were you personally active in helping him/her get the nomination? What did you do?

40. Did [candidate] make any specific promises to you, to your organization or to your community in return for your organization's support during the nomination process?
41. Was it a very close race?
42. How about the nomination for the PARTI QUEBECOIS candidate in [riding]? Was your organization involved in that? How?
43. Was there a particular PQ candidate that your organization preferred? Who was that?
44. Why did your organization prefer that candidate?
45. Did your organization support that candidate in any way?
46. Were you yourself present at that nomination meeting?
47. Did you support [candidate] in any way?
48. Were you personally active in helping him/her get the nomination? What did you do?
49. Did [candidate] make any specific promises to you, to your organization or to your community in return for your support?
50. Was it a very close race?

### III. Campaign Activities

51. Getting back to the election at hand now, is your organization active in the current provincial election campaign? (If not now, does it plan to be?)
52. How is your organization active? What kinds of activities?
53. Thinking about specific ridings, are there any in which your organization is more active? List: \_\_\_\_\_

- 
54. How is it active in these ridings?

[PROBE IF NECESSARY]

- tried to convince people to vote for the candidate? ...
- canvassed door-to-door? ...
- called people on the telephone? ...
- distributed flyers or other campaign information? ...

- distributed lawn signs or posters?...
- organized a meeting or rally for the candidate? ...
- appeared at a meeting or rally? ...

55. Are you yourself active in the current election campaign?

56. How are you active?

57. Are there specific ridings where you personally are more active?

List: \_\_\_\_\_

58. How are you active in these ridings?

[PROBE IF NECESSARY]

- made a campaign contribution? (Are you planning to ....?)
- tried to convince people to vote for the candidate? ...
- canvassed door-to-door? ...
- called people on the telephone? ...
- distributed flyers or other campaign information? ...
- distributed lawn signs or posters? ...
- organized a meeting or rally for the candidate? ...
- appeared at a meeting or rally? ...

59. Is there an organized Liberal campaign committee within the [italian/ ...] community in these ridings?

60. Is there an organized Parti Québécois campaign committee within the [italian/ ...] community in these ridings?

61. What proportion of people in your community will turn out to vote do you think?

62. Is it difficult to convince people to get out and vote?

63. How do you convince them to vote?

64. How many people in your community believe that their one vote won't make any difference to the outcome of the election?

65. What do you say to these people?

#### IV. Expected Effects of Mobilization


66. Do you think most of the people who've been contacted by you or your organization will vote?

[REPEAT THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FOR EACH RIDING NAMED ABOVE]

67. Do you think most of the people you've contacted in [riding] will support [candidate]?
68. Why do you think they will support that him/her?
69. Do you think [candidate] will [keep his/her promises] [pay attention] to your community if he/she gets elected?

#### V. Perceptions of Other Leaders

70. Can you think of any other people in leadership positions in the [italian/ ...] community?
71. Who are they? (Name of individual and organization):
72. Do you know which candidate(s) they support?
73. Are they active in the campaign?
74. What kind of effect do you think they'll have on people?
75. Will this affect the outcome of the campaign, do you think?

Appendix BElectoral Ridings and DistrictsFigure B.1. Montreal-area Ridings in the 1993 Federal Election


Source: Thirty-fifth General Election 1993: Official Voting Results. Elections Canada: Ottawa, 1993.

Figure B.2 Montreal-area Ridings in the 1994 Provincial Election



Source: Nouvelles délimitations des circonscriptions électorales provinciales. Le directeur général des élections du Québec: Québec 1994.

Figure B.3 Montreal-area Ridings in the 1994 Municipal Election



Source: Bureau des élections de la Ville de Montréal: Montréal 1995.

Appendix CVariables used in Correlations and Regression EquationsDependent variables

1993 federal turnout = (number voted/number registered)\*100

1994 provincial turnout = (number voted/number registered)\*100

1994 municipal turnout = (number voted/number registered)\*100

Independent variables

Jewish = percent of residents with Jewish ethnic origins

Italian = percent of residents with Italian ethnic origins

Chinese = percent of residents with Chinese ethnic origins

Greek = percent of residents with Greek ethnic origins

Portuguese = percent of residents with Portuguese ethnic origins

Control Variables

Income = median household income (in thousands of dollars)

Young = percent of residents between 18 and 24

Old = percent of residents over 65

Low education = percent of residents aged 15 and over who haven't finished high school

High education = percent of residents aged 15 and over with college or university degree







Citizens = percent of residents who are Canadian citizens

Noncitizens = percent of residents who are not Canadian citizens



Immigrants	= percent of residents who are immigrants (includes naturalized citizens)
Early immigration	= percent of immigrants who arrived before 1971
Middle immigration	=percent of immigrants who arrived between 1971 and 1981
Late immigration	= percent of immigrants who arrived after 1981
Home language:	
- English	= percent of residents using English in the home
- French	= percent of residents using French in the home
- Other	= percent of residents using a language other than English or French in the home
Mobility	= percent of residents who moved to the area during the previous year (intra-provincial, inter-provincial and external migrants combined)
Homeowners	= owner-occupied one-family households as a percentage of total private households
Homogeneity Index	= Herfindahl index of ethnic homogeneity of each unit

# IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



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