

**THE CHINESE TECHNOCRATIC LEADERSHIP:
A CASE STUDY OF THE MUNICIPAL LEADERSHIP OF SHANGHAI
IN THE REFORM ERA**

By

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**The Chinese Technocratic Leadership:
A Case Study of the Municipal Leadership of Shanghai in the Reform Era**

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Abstract

This dissertation is a case study of the changing composition and characteristics of the Chinese leadership in Shanghai since the mid-1980s. Currently dominated by party technocrats with little revolutionary experience, Shanghai leadership reflects the shift to a market-oriented reform and opening-up and a more pluralistic form of socioeconomic development. The case study suggests that the new political technocratic leadership significantly differs from its Mao-era revolutionary predecessors, and is capable of conducting China's long-awaited reform and modernization.

This study addresses two fundamental, interlocking questions: Who are these party technocrats? And what are the distinguishing features of the Chinese technocratic leadership? The existing scholarly literature on the Chinese political elite has established that the new political elite can be clearly distinguished from their revolutionary predecessors in terms of socio-political traits,

particularly revolutionary experience and educational attainment. But studies have yet to define the functional characteristics of the new leadership. The importance of this lacuna becomes clear from the recent debate over whether the new Chinese leadership is a technocracy or a political technocracy. This study attempts to investigate the functional as well as socio-political characteristics of the new leadership. It also touches upon a series of important issues such as the legitimacy, authority, and political implications of the Chinese technocratic leadership.

Based on primary and secondary sources, this dissertation examines the three main aspects of the political and administrative leadership of Shanghai in the reform era: personnel, institution, and collective conduct. The research focus is on the top echelon of the municipal leadership. The Mao-era leadership is surveyed so as to provide historical background and a basis for comparison. Post-1980 leadership transformations are then probed. The bulk of the dissertation focuses on the characteristics of the new elite, including an inquiry into their general socio-political traits and profiling of the six senior municipal leaders since 1985. In addition, two case studies of municipal leadership performance in the challenging and critical areas - urban planning and reconstruction and housing policy-making - aim to shed further light on the new leadership's functional characteristics.

The dissertation concludes that in a changing communist state, the communist-technocratic leaders, modern, cosmopolitan, and nationalist, are a driving force for institutionalization and rationalization, the principal agents of science and technology, promoting pragmatism, market-oriented reform, and modernization. The new leadership this dissertation argues is better characterized as a political technocracy rather than a technocracy.

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CHAPTER ONE

TECHNOCRACY, CHINESE TECHNOCRATS AND THE TECHNOCRATIC LEADERSHIP OF SHANGHAI: AN INTRODUCTION

The Chinese political elite and leadership have always been a major subject of scholarly inquiry and public concern. In China where authoritarianism is deep-rooted and institutionalization and law are less developed than Western countries, political elites have played a crucial role in political, social and economic developments. The passing of China's paramount leader Mao Zedong two decades ago, or Deng Xiaoping's passing recently, marked the formal end of leader-centered era. However, while the Maoist revolution did not survive his death, Deng's death marks more the end of the rule of rehabilitated revolutionary veterans rather than the end of Deng's reform program. His market-oriented reform and open-door policies are expected to continue and develop under a new political leadership.

An overwhelming majority of the current Chinese leaders at the national and provincial levels are members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and technicians or managers in origin. Who are these party technocrats? What are their family and personal backgrounds, including their age, native place, education and career? What is their collective mentality, outlook and leadership style? Are Chinese technocrats a cohesive socio-political group? What are the distinguishing features of the technocratic leadership in policy making and policy implementation in comparison with the revolutionary leadership in Mao's China? What has been the political impact of the rise of China's technocrats? Did the leadership transformation from revolutionary to technocratic leaders pave the way for "elitism" and "immobilism"? What are the linkages between technocracy and China's authoritarian tradition, and between technocracy and democratization? What effects will the technocratic leadership have on the legitimacy of the CCP and the existing mono-organizational system?

These are some of the important questions that students of Chinese politics and elite studies have attempted to answer. This introductory chapter first surveys the technocratic literature in

general and studies of Chinese technocrats in particular. Then it presents the justification for this case study of the technocratic leadership of Shanghai, my hypotheses, research scope and methods, and finally my sources of material and the structure of this dissertation.

1. TECHNOCRACY, STUDIES OF TECHNOCRACY AND CHINA'S TECHNOCRATS: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The theory of technocracy originated and developed in the context of modern scientific and technological progress and revolution, though the notions of technocracy can be found as early as the seventeenth century.¹ Intrigued by the world-wide spread and prevalence of modern science and technology, many believed in and even longed for a corresponding fundamental change in economic development, in political systems and in social life. The term "technocracy," initiated by William Henry Smyth between two world wars, became the name for a technocratic movement led by Howard Scott in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s. Although the movement failed to draw popular support from the intelligentsia as well as the public, the scientific and technological breakthroughs and impact in the past half century have sparked new rounds of enthusiasm for technocracy (criticism as well) among Western intellectuals. The term "technocracy" has been emerged in variant catch-phrases such as Jacques Ellul's "technological society," James Burnham's "managerial revolution," Zbigniew Brzezinski's "technetronic era," and John K. Galbraith's "Technostructure."

Typically, the advocates of technocracy claimed that as societies are more and more penetrated and transformed by modern science and technology and as social, political and economic problems have become increasingly specific and complicated, a new type of administration run by technocrats with both scientific-technical credentials and managerial abilities is required to accommodate socioeconomic transformation and to deal with specific and complex problems. However, there have been theoretical changes and varied approaches,

¹ According to a contemporary scholar, Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis*, was "the first modern vision of a technocratic society". Langdon Winner, *Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as A Theme in Political Thought*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987, p. 135.

emphases, and interpretations.² For some principal advocates of technocracy, the technological age means an end to ideology and to industrial capitalism;³ For others such as Don K. Price and John Galbraith, the new age means the technocratic elite's sharing of power and responsibility with other social groups based on specialized knowledge.⁴ In contrast, some contemporary advocates of technological development suggest that there will be some changes but existing ideologies and systems will continue.⁵ Moreover, where the earlier advocates viewed technocracy as basically elite-oriented, some contemporary theorists of technocracy such as Langdon Winner, have tried to reconcile technocracy with liberal democracy, highlighting the necessary of direct, public participation yet not denying the crucial role of technocrats. While the classical theory of technocracy emphasizes the imperative and advantages of scientific, technological progress, contemporary works tend to find out how to prevent humanity from being submissive to technology, yet with a stress on the *natural* bond between human being and technology.⁶

² For a survey of the evolution and tenets of the theory, see Chapter 4 "Technocracy", *ibid.*, Victor C. Ferkiss, *Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality* (New York: The New York Times Company, 1969), Robert D. Putnam, "Elite Transformation in Advanced Industrial Societies: An Empirical Assessment of the Theory of Technocracy" (*Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3, October 1977, pp. 383-412), and Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizers to Managers" (*Asian Survey*, vol. 28, 4, April 1988, pp. 388-390).

³ The former was claimed by Daniel Bell in his *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), and by Brzezinski in his *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York: Viking, 1970). The latter was the central theme of the classic theory of technocracy.

⁴ Price's proposed a new political system of checks-and-balances and cooperation, which is composed of four groups or estates in his own terms: political, administrative, professional, and scientific. *The Scientific Estates*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Not as comprehensive as Price's research, Galbraith's on industrial organizations suggests that decision-making power no longer be in the hands of managers only, but in the hands of members of the organizations based on knowledge, talent and experience. Hence he called these organizations the "technostructure." *The New Industrial State*, New York: New American Library, 1968. For a critique of both works, see Winner, *Autonomous Technology*, pp. 151-172.

⁵ Envisioning "a pluralism of competing interests, a neofeudalism in which all seek their private economic or bureaucratic ends, with no over-all direction," Ferkiss asserted that "legal and political considerations ensure that the technical elite remains secondary to the business elite," and that "Contemporary man is essentially bourgeois man with new tools and toys." *Technological Man*, pp. 126, 120.

⁶ For example, Ferkiss believed that "man is a technological animal." Ferkiss, *Technological Man*, p. 35. And in the view of Winner, "the technologies of concern are actually *forms of life* [his own emphasis] – patterns of human consciousness and behaviour adapted to a rational, productive design." Winner, *Autonomous Technology*, p. 331.

These theoretical changes are, in a large part, a response to the criticism and cynicism regarding technocracy. In the eyes of the critics, technocracy is anti-democratic and de-humanizing. It is anti-democratic not only because it is elite-oriented, but also because of the nature of technology and the natural ways of using it.⁷ It is not human because, as one of the harshest critics has stated, modern technology has forcefully penetrated every aspect of human life, the environment, and society, so making the human being into a captive of an autonomous technology.⁸ In addition, the public as well as many intellectuals, including the majority of technical elite themselves,⁹ have appeared to be cynical about the viability of technocracy, for politics and administration are extremely complex and beyond the abilities of the technical elites who lack political and administrative knowledge, experience and skills are certainly unable to handle. Thus, despite the fact that studies of technocracy originated and are well developed in the technologically advanced West, particularly the United States, the notion of technocracy seems to have not been appealing to either academics or the public. In contrast, although both the scientific and technological development and the study of technocracy are far less sophisticated elsewhere, the notion has been quite attractive in a large number of countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe. This facilitated the emergence of the variant technocratic leaderships.

Studies of Chinese Communist technocracy have emerged only recently, yet China's technocrats have increasingly attracted academic attention and interests, thanks to leadership changes and the study of it since the early 1980s. Among earlier works, Hong Yung Lee's

⁷ Winner said, "Science and technics, in their own workings and in their utility for polity, are not democratic, dealing as they do with truth on the one hand and optimal technical solutions on the other." Ibid., p. 146. In an introduction to the influential book by renowned Jacques Ellul, Robert K Merton made it more clear that because the use of technique has been and will be "massive" and "unprincipled," technocracy is compatible with dictatorship, not to democracy. Ellul, *The Technological Society*, translated By John Wilkinson. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964. p. vii. Indeed, Ellul concluded, the "only one means" to the solutions to a series of problems is "a world-wide totalitarian dictatorship which will allow technique its full scope" Ibid., pp. 433-434.

⁸ See Ellul, *ibid.*, pp. 325-335. He believed, pessimistically, that in the "monolithic technical world" created by himself, "man finds that there is 'no exit' ... All men are constrained by means external to them to ends equally external. The further the technical mechanism develops which allows us to escape natural necessity, the more we are subjected to artificial technical necessities." Ibid., pp. 428-429.

⁹ A good example is that they did not support of the Technocratic Movement in the 1930s and 1940s. Winner, *Autonomous Technology*, p. 150.

"China's 12th Central Committee: Rehabilitated Cadres and Technocrats"¹⁰ and William deB. Mills' "Generational Change in China" noted the beginning of a gradual replacement of the revolutionary elite by a younger generation of technocrat at the 12th Party Congress in September 1982, predicting that this kind of generational change, coupled with organizational and constitutional changes, would "fundamentally alter the likely future course of Chinese politics."¹¹ Another essay by Mills, "Leadership Change in China's provinces" took account of a sweeping change in provincial leadership in early 1983, shortly after the 12th Party Congress.¹² Mills' appraisal of the change provoked disagreement from Keith Forster who regarded the leadership change as of little significance.¹³

Although much research points to a leadership transition in Deng's China, no consensus as to the significance and nature of this transition has been reached. If the earlier studies tend to depict the personnel change in leadership as merely a generational change,¹⁴ most recent studies have come to the conclusion that there have been not only a generational change but also a substantial change in the characteristics of political leadership. Although there was still no consensus on whether a technocratic elite dominates the Chinese leadership,¹⁵ Ting Wang, Hong Yung Lee, Cheng Li and his collaborators Lynn White and David Bachman, all suggest the replacement of those revolutionary mobilizers and ideologues have been supplanted by a technocratic-managerial elite in the context of China's market-oriented reform and modernization.

First, Ting Wang describes a two-stage transfer of power. Closely related to the reforms of the Chinese Communist administration and cadre system, the first stage between 1985-1987 "is the transition period for the transfer of power between the first, second, and third generations [of the Chinese Communist leadership]", and the second stage of 1987-1988 "is the period when the third

¹⁰ *Asian Survey*, vol. 23, 6 (June 1983): 673-691.

¹¹ *Problems of Communism*, v. 32 (November-December, 1983), p. 19.

¹² *Ibid.*, (May-June, 1985), p. 24-40.

¹³ See his letter to the editors, *ibid.*, p. 85-87.

¹⁴ Even Mills who did appreciate the very significance of the 1983 leadership change did not think that the substance of the leadership of revolutionary veterans had been changed yet.

¹⁵ Xiaowei Zang's two earlier essays, "Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China" (*Asian Survey*, vol. 31, no. 6, June 1991, pp. 512-525) and "Elite Formation and the Bureaucratic-Technocracy in Post-Mao China" (*Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. 24, no. 1, March 1991, pp. 114-123), also present useful data on the rise of the managerial-technocratic elite in the reform era at the national and provincial levels. Nevertheless, he did not believe the predominance of the technocratic elite in the Chinese leadership. We will discuss his view later.

generation cadres will take over the overall power and authority".¹⁶ According to him, the third-generation cadres are "new economic policy interest group" or technocrats.¹⁷ Their replacement of "administrative type officials" "will perhaps give great impetus to the modernization plan"; at the same time, given lack of "a real rule of law or a democratic political system" and weakness in the institutionalised process of cadre recruitment in the People's Republic of China (PRC), the transfer of power will give rise to nepotism.¹⁸

Ting Wang's periodization of the power transfer and his definition of the third-generation officials are open to question. The large-scale elite transformation at the national and provincial levels, as the research of Mills and Lee shows, started in 1982-83. The second wave of the power transfer came in 1985, resulting in the dominance of technocrats in some provincial units such as Shanghai. And the power transfer was not really between the "new economic policy interest group" and "administrative type officials," because many new leaders are administrators themselves, even though they have received training in the fields of science and technology and are supportive of economic reform.¹⁹ Yet Ting Wang's proposition of a stage-by-stage power transfer, and his prediction of the new elite's contribution to modernization and, to a lesser degree, of the rise of nepotism, deserve credit and attention. Apparently, he viewed the power transfer as profound, though his essay appears to be not as bold and systematic as the work of Hong Yung Lee and that of Cheng Li and his collaborators.

Impressed by the significance of the technocrat-oriented leadership transformation, Hong Yung Lee's book *From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats* is by far the most comprehensive account of this historical phenomenon.²⁰ By examining the evolution of the Chinese communist cadre system and policies since the 1920s, the book puts the ongoing elite transformation in a full historical perspective. One of its strengths is its systematic examination of the evolution of the CCP's cadre policy. An impressive amount of data is presented to show the

¹⁶ Ting Wang, "An Analysis of the P.R.C's Future Elite: The Third Echelon". *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, vol. 4, 2 (Summer 1985): 33.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 34.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

¹⁹ According to Cheng Li and David Bachman's systematic research on mayors of Chinese cities in the mid-1980s, "the majority have worked in administrative fields for a long time," and experience as administrative director was a leading positive factor in both the highest rank and fastest runner categories. Li and Bachman, "Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism: Elite formation and social Changes in Post-Mao China," *World Politics*, v. 1 (October 1989), pp. 75, 81, 82.

importance of this nation-wide transformation. This scholarly piece also puts forth several stimulating speculative propositions about the characteristics of party technocrats and about the implications of the technocratic leadership for China's politics and modernization. Notwithstanding its strengths, it does not address always adequately the basic questions of who are the party technocrats. Nor does it offer an extensive theoretical discussion of technocracy, though admittedly this was not its intent.

In this regard, the works by Cheng Li and his advisors and collaborators Lynn White and David Bachman are particularly noteworthy.²¹ They made a number of theoretical and empirical contributions to studies of Chinese technocracy and technocratic elites, based on a comparative focus, on a systematic collection and analysis of newly available general biographic data on top Chinese elites, on case studies, and on general observation of China's political and economic development. Their research reinforces the observation of Mills and Lee about the leadership transformation from revolutionaries to technocrats. Their research squarely addresses the salient yet thorny questions of who the Chinese technocratic elite is, how it emerged, and what the implications of Chinese technocracy are.

Their definition of "Technocrat" is not based on the elite's outlook but three traits -- technical education, professional occupation, and leadership position. To some scholars such as Jese Veloso Abueva and R. S. Milne, technocrats are those "who share an ideology of modernization, an aversion to politics, a belief in the free enterprise system and yet a need for government planning, an elitist view of society, and a commitment to development."²² To Li and White, however, this definition is too broad and loose in application. A technocrat is a person "who simultaneously is specialized by training, holds a professional occupation, and

²⁰ Berkeley, Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1991.

²¹ Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizers to Managers," *Asian Survey*, v. 28, 4 (April 1988): 371-399; "Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy," *The China Quarterly*, 121 (March 1990): 1-35, and "China's Technocratic Movement and the World Economic Herald," *Modern China*, vol. 17, 3 (1991): 342-388; Li and Bachman, "Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism", *World Politics*, v. 1 (October 1989), pp. 64-94; Cheng Li, *The Rise of Technocracy: Elite Transformation and Ideological Change in Post Mao China*, Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1992.

²² R. S. Milne, "Technocrats and Politics in ASEAN Countries," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 55, 3 (Fall, 1982), p. 409.

has a leadership position."²³ Li and White were inclined to put those trained in the fields of law, economics, political science and other social sciences and those technicians, engineers and natural scientists into one category. But this category rigidly excludes those with less than college-level special training.²⁴ Those who only have a technical outlook are "technocrat patrons," those who received technical education but have no political or administrative positions are "technical intellectuals", and those officials trained in the fields of humanities are bureaucrats. Li and White believed that "The technocrat does not rely for legitimacy on a purely political or military background, but at least partly on experience in research or management," in contrast to revolutionary mobilizers and agitators or political ideologues and generalists.²⁵

In defining the Chinese technocratic elite, Li and his collaborators explored the theory of technocracy and its application to China. Echoing the point of the elites theorist Robert Putnam that "the technocracy thesis should apply to all modern societies, regardless of political regime or ideology"²⁶, they demonstrated that both mainland China and Taiwan, though different politically and ideologically, had been undergoing an identical elite transformation leading to the dominance of technocrats in leadership, correlating with socioeconomic transformations.²⁷ It is noted that before 1989, they tended to view the Chinese technocrats as a cohesive sociopolitical group with common values: meritocratic and technocratic views, pragmatic outlook and economic determinism, and cosmopolitan vision and nationalist identity.²⁸ After the 1989 pro-democracy movement, what their research

²³ Li's Ph.D. dissertation, p. 51.

²⁴ Li's dissertation reads that "those appointed leaders who have not received a college education ... should be treated as bureaucrats instead of technocrats." Ibid., p. 52. On another occasion, the technocrat is defined as "a person in power who is professional and has a university degree." Li and White, "The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," *Asian Survey*, vol. 28, 4 (April 1988): 390.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 390-391.

²⁶ Robert Putnam, *Comparative Studies of Political Elites*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976, p. 205.

²⁷ See Li and White, "Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan," *China Quarterly*, no. 121, pp. 1-35.

²⁸ Li & White, "The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," *Asian Survey*, v. 28, 4 (April 1988): 392-398.

accentuated was not the cohesiveness of Chinese technocrats but their generation divisions, ideological conflicts, and factional struggles.²⁹

The above definition and research of Li and White represent marked contributions to the study of Chinese technocracy. Important as it is, their definition of technocrats, to some extent, neglects the behavioral characteristics of the new elite, particularly its outlook and political orientation. The application of the three criteria -- technical training, professional occupation, and leadership position -- invites further discussion and clarification. For example, by technical training, they referred to college and university education only. It may be argued that those trained in vocational and technical schools, and even those self-made technicians should not be excluded from the category. Whether political scientists, economists, and even lawyers should be put into the same category with natural and applied scientists is a matter of discussion. There are other ambiguities in the application of their criteria, which are to be discussed later. Notwithstanding, their awareness and analysis of some characteristic differences between the Western and Chinese technocrats, and of the Chinese technocrats' common characteristics and their strife are extremely important and should be well received.

How did this new political elite rise to power? Li and White addressed this question by looking into Chinese history and the recent pro-technocracy movement. They ascribed the favourable historical conditions for China's technocratic orientation to its traditional political culture and system, which cherished meritocracy and education.³⁰ Their research also mentions the introduction of the term technocracy in China in the early 1930s. However, in their view, most of this century witnessed obstacles to the development of technocracy. The major ones included "ceaseless civil conflicts between warlords, and between the CCP and the KMT [The Nationalists]",³¹ and the CCP's revolutionary legacy characterized by the political dominance of cadres with soldiers, peasants and other working classes in origin, the Party's "considerable hostility toward technical authority," and "its consequent reliance solely on the politics of mobilization".³²

²⁹ Li & White, "China's Technocratic Movement and the World Economic Herald." *Modern China*, vol. 17, 3 (1991): 373-380.

³⁰ Li and White, "Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan," *China Quarterly*, no. 121, pp. 1-35.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

³² Li & White, "The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," *Asian Survey*, v. 28, 4 (April 1988): 391-392.

The recent technocracy-oriented movement is the locus of the research of Li and White. Their study of the identical elite transformations in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan highlights the political nature of the pro-technocracy transformations. The most comprehensive account of the transformation in China is Li's Ph.D. dissertation *The Rise of Technocracy: Elite Transformation and Ideological Change in Post-Mao China*.³³ While Lee's book is mainly concerned with the evolution of the CCP's cadre policy and system against a broader historical background, Li's dissertation is focused on China's socio-political development in the Deng era. It treats technocracy as a socio-political movement rather than an elite formation or a type of government. Through the case studies of the cradle of the Chinese technocrats Qinghua University (Beijing), and of China's most influential organ of technocracy *The World Economic Herald* (Shanghai), the dissertation demonstrates the crucial institutional and ideological origins of the emergence of the Chinese technocrats. Criticizing the "end of ideology" thesis, Li regarded technocracy as a modern ideology that has the basic functions of *interpretation, mobilization, and legitimation*. The dissemination of technocratic values, including "scientism, the technological imperative, functionalism and scientific social engineering," is nothing but the technocratic elite's "first step" in promoting their group interest and seeking social and political domination.³⁴ A critique of the conventional view that the rise of technocracy is due to the societal, economic and administrative need in the technological era, Li's dissertation concludes that the technocratic elite's political and ideological ambition, objectives and efforts, in the context of socioeconomic crisis and political instability, can better explain the emergence of the technocratic elite in China as well as in other countries.

Li's two case studies of how the new technocratic elite rose to power are solid and insightful, and his conclusion is generally logical and persuasive. Yet one question arises from Li's viewpoint about ideology. Li certainly has a point in emphasizing technocracy as an ideology in terms of its group nature of thought and its functions of interpretation, mobilization and legitimation. However, are all the ideologies same in terms of political, social and economic implications and of sophistication and application? Technocracy has developed throughout the world, in communist and capitalist countries, and developed and developing countries alike.

³³ Op. cit..

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 103-104.

Perhaps we should consider a typology of ideologies to accommodate the significant differences of ideologies. In addition to the question of ideology, the relationship between the veteran revolutionary leaders and the technocrats might be a subject of further probe.

What are the implications of the rise of technocracy in China? Whereas Lee's book portrays the phenomenon as historically progressive, the basic tone of the works of Li and his collaborators is rather critical. The critical and negative assessment of the rise of the Chinese technocrats is evident in the essay of Li and Bachman entitled "Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism: Elite formation and social Changes in Post-Mao China", and in Li's dissertation. Although its empirical part is about the composition, not the behavior or conduct, of the new leadership, the essay correlates the rise of Chinese technocrats with that of localism, elitism and immobilism, in comparison with what occurred under the Mao-era leadership. The rise of localism, particularly economic localism, resulted from economic reform and decentralization, and from change in the composition of leadership - the majority is no longer non-native "outsiders" but natives or those born in neighbouring provinces. The rise of elitism correlated with the disappearing of the basis of the revolutionary leaders' legitimacy - charisma, revolutionary role, and "representatives of the former exploited class".³⁵ Li and Bachman implied that the new, educated elite does not understand the problems of workers and peasants as well as the Mao-era leaders most of whom came from peasant, worker, and soldier backgrounds. They envisioned the "elitist, technocratic values are likely to provoke growing social conflict as ordinary citizens become progressively dissatisfied with elitist rule."³⁶ Related to localism and elitism is immobilism which is meant by the authors that the state, especially the central leadership, lose the ability to mobilize resources and elicit compliance. The rise of immobilism is also due to the transformation of politics and leadership. As the communist regime has passed the "mobilization phase" characterized by political mobilization, revolutionary campaigns, and ideological indoctrination, but has yet to arrive the "institutionalization phase", "new elites have not yet developed the ability to guide and control society through new means."³⁷ In short, the essay calls attention to the close correlation between the technocracy-oriented elite transformation and the dangerous rise of localism, elitism, and immobilism in the Chinese political system.

³⁵ Li and Bachman, "Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism", *World Politics*, v. 1 (October 1989), p. 89.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

Li's dissertation, though concerning the biographical characteristics and career patterns of the Chinese technocrats and their ways to power, *not in office*, further concludes "the incompatibility between technocracy and democracy" in China.³⁸ Like Western critiques of technocracy, Li viewed technocracy as *inherently* anti-democratic because it is based on expertise that the majority lack.³⁹ Technocracy "is characterized by elite decision-making procedures, hierarchical power structure, intolerance of public participation, and sets of regulations which are of a nondebatable character," while democracy "emphasizes the values of responsiveness, representativeness, egalitarianism and legal authority."⁴⁰ In China, the advocates of technocracy are not only communist leaders but also dissident intellectuals and college students, who, even though having participated the pro-democracy movement of 1989, "believe in technocracy -- a political system that emphasizes their own role in Chinese political development and that gives no real place for the masses or other social groups."⁴¹ Under the profound impact of the traditional or Confucian political culture, both elites and the ordinary people prefer elitism to real democracy.⁴² Overall, Li and his collaborators have painted a quite gloomy picture about the Chinese technocratic leadership and its social and political impacts.

Nevertheless, Li was optimistic that democracy would prevail over technocracy in the future. He was right in acknowledging that "democracy is directional and evolutionary",⁴³ that parallel development of democracy and technocracy in many countries, and that several East Asian polities such as South Korea and Taiwan had undergone democratization under the leadership of technocrats. His optimism is mainly premised on the view that the "consolidation of legal institutions and pluralist forces such as rural industrialists and urban entrepreneurs," social and intellectual criticism of technocratic elitism, political infighting among technocratic elites that

³⁷ Ibid., p. 91.

³⁸ Li's dissertation, p. 304.

³⁹ Li & White, "China's Technocratic Movement and the World Economic Herald," p. 381.

⁴⁰ Li's dissertation, pp. 307, 333. These absolutely clear-cut generalizations of technocracy and democracy may be overstated, or only valuable from a theoretic point of view. In reality, as the United States of America, the leader of democracies, reveals, democracy may not necessarily emphasize egalitarianism, yet may tolerate elite decision-making procedures and hierarchical power structure. By the same token, as our two case studies of the technocratic leadership of Shanghai are going to suggest, the technocratic elite may also emphasize responsiveness and legalization, while not necessarily excluding public participation and debate in policy making.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 329.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 304-318.

erodes technocratic legitimacy, and fundamental change in the attitudes and behaviours of technocrats, dissidents and ordinary people.⁴⁴ Obviously, these are Li's assumptions. Although containing some truth, such an assumed basis for the prevalence of democracy in China is weak, given his accentuation of the entrenched Confucian political culture, the virtual consensus of the Chinese political elite, intellectuals, and ordinary people on the ongoing technocratic and elitist orientation, and an anti-democratic political system. Li's optimism regarding democracy is not the logical conclusion of his dissertation, as it attempts to demonstrate that the leadership transformation has been anti-democratic in orientation, that Chinese technocrats are inherently anti-democratic, and that "technocracy poses a threat to democracy".⁴⁵

The major points of Li and his collaborators about the implications of technocracy in China are not as cogent as their analysis of who the Chinese technocrats are and how they rose to power. Although the empirical findings of Li and Bachman (a drastic decline in the percentage of outsiders in leadership composition) may buttress their claim that localism is on the rise in China, they provide no evidence for the assertion about the close correlation between the Chinese technocrats and elitism. Commonsense observation tells us a person's family background and social status may not necessarily accord with his or her political belief and behaviour. A social elite may be an advocate of egalitarianism or utopianism, whereas a political activist from a lower social stratum could be a guardian of conservative elitism. Moreover, Chinese history demonstrates the coexistence of egalitarian and elitist value systems and conducts as far as both the rulership or leadership and society are concerned. Rulership or leadership is of the elite. Even in modern democracy in terms of socio-political movement or government, the "law of oligarchy" presented cogently by Robert Michels has not disappeared.⁴⁶ It is necessary to say, at the same time, that rulerships or leaderships are varied in nature, contingent on their various policies and impact rather than rhetoric. How egalitarianism and elitism have mingled in China, what the nature of a rulership or leadership is, and whether the recent technocratic leadership is more likely than its Mao-era counterpart to provoke social conflict and the ordinary citizens' "progressive" discontent, require empirical studies of the conduct of a form of leadership rather than its socio-political traits.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 315.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 334, 333, 331, 319, 329.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 322.

Li's conclusion about technocracy versus democracy in China is also arguable. As socio-political movements or even types of government, technocracy and democracy are mingled somewhat like egalitarianism and elitism. Quite often than not, a person's ideological orientation is not clear-cut but mixed; within a society, a community, a social group or even a political party, the mixture of value systems exists. For instance, the renowned dissident scientist Fang Lizhi has promoted both technocracy and democracy. So did tens of thousands college students as the pro-democracy movement of 1989 showed. Li and his collaborators were right in noting that Chinese intellectual dissidents, college students and ordinary people have shared technocratic and elitist value with the new power elite, but overlooked differences between the technocratic leadership and the led in their perceptions and cognition of democracy. Even the current leadership's perceptions and understanding of democracy and the rule of law are not the same as those of the Mao-era leadership. Although there are no fundamental changes yet, significant progress in the direction of democracy and the rule of law, including pluralistic socioeconomic transformation, village-level democratic election, and strengthening of the legal system, has been made under the technocratic leadership. While acknowledging that "democracy is directional and evolutionary" and the democratic experiences of South Korea and Taiwan, Li appeared to have neglected China's less substantial yet still noteworthy changes.

In conclusion, the research of Li, White and Bachman on the Chinese technocrats is probably by far the most comprehensive and in-depth, theoretically and empirically. The strength of their research lies in addressing the key problems of who the Chinese technocrats are and how they became dominant in leadership. However, their examination of the family, educational, career and political backgrounds of Chinese technocrats is, though essential and useful, insufficient in understanding the functional characteristics of Chinese technocrats. Their research is relatively weak when it comes to the implications of technocracy in China. Although it has raised some key questions such as localism, elitism, immobilism, and the prospect of democracy, their works seem to have overlooked some equally important issues such as the relationships of the Chinese technocratic leadership with China's market-oriented reforms and modernization. And their suggestion about the generally ominous implications in China requires further evidence, as their

⁴⁶ Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. New York: Dover, 1959 (First published in German in 1911).

works are basically about what the socio-political traits of the Chinese technocrats are and how they emerged, not about their behaviour in office. Their major hypothesis that technocracy is, and will for a fairly long time dominate China, also requires further analysis.

The "technocracy" paradigm was challenged by Xiaowei Zang, particularly in a study entitled "The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?"⁴⁷ In his view, what is underway is not technocracy but political technocracy. Zang directed his challenge mainly at Li and his collaborators on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, his viewpoint derives from Richard Lowenthal, George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi's observation and conceptions of Communist states, particularly the former Soviet Union and Eastern European states. He applied the concept of political technocracy presented by Konrad and Szelenyi to the case of China, claiming that like its counterparts in East Europe, it recently witnessed the formation of an political alliance between the career bureaucrats who "monopolize detailed knowledge of the bureaucracy" and the technocrats who "control expertise."⁴⁸ More critical than Li about the current Chinese leadership, Zang believed that there was more continuity than change in methods of rule between the political-technocratic alliance and the Mao-era leadership. Both relied primarily on coercive means. Empirically, he claimed "a serious mismatch" between their argument for the rise of technocrats and their data, noting that only 20 percent of the Thirteenth Central Committee of the CCP they studied were specialists.⁴⁹ His own empirical study of the Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP tries to demonstrate that the Committee was evenly divided between technocrats and career bureaucrats, each numbering for over 40 percent.⁵⁰

While Li and White paid due attention to the distinctive tradition and reality of China in applying the notion of technocracy, Zang directly applied the paradigm of political technocracy derived from some experts' studies of the former Soviet Union and its Eastern European partners to the case of China. Obviously, there were and significant differences between them, especially China's market-oriented reform and opening-up which have had profound impact on its political as well as social and economic development.

⁴⁷ *Asian Survey*, vol. 33, 8 (August 1993): 787-803.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp., 791, 801.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 791, 790.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 799.

Zang's empirical generalizations require more discussion. While his challenge does reveal some ambiguity in the research of Li and his collaborators, particularly their criteria for defining a technocrat, there are some problems with his generalizations. The study of the Thirteenth Central Committee of the CCP by Li and White indicates that 20 percent of its membership were specialists, and 73.3 percent were college educated, almost eight-fold and three-fold increases respectively over the Eleventh Central Committee in 1977.⁵¹ Unfortunately, the authors did not make a distinction among those college educated, nor clarify whether only those specialists were technocrats, which led Zang to infer that only 20 percent were technocrats and so to challenge their argument for a technocratic leadership in China. The ambiguous treatment of those trained in the social sciences by Li and White also is problematic. All their works above-mentioned, with the exception of Li's dissertation, do not make clear whether those trained in the fields of economics, political science, sociology and law should be put into the same category with scientists and engineers. However, like a majority of scholars, they seemed to be inclined to do so, a pattern most evident in Li's dissertation.⁵² But in Zang's article, those with backgrounds in the social sciences are excluded from the category of technocrats and the exclusion is claimed to be in accordance with the criteria of Li and White. Moreover, Zang misapplied their criteria by attempting to differentiate the members of the Central Committee majoring natural and applied sciences from those trained in engineering, management, and finance.⁵³ As for the career patterns of the elite, the criteria of Li and White require that a technocrat should have *some* experience in research or management.⁵⁴ Yet, disregarding the elite whose main careers were in government, education, law, medical work, and research (not to mention others), Zang only regarded 34.38 percent of committee members whose main careers were in engineering, finance, and industrial administration as technocrats (at most 46.55 percent if military sciences included).⁵⁵ If the disregarded aforementioned are

⁵¹ Li & White, "The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," op. cit., pp. 380, 379.

⁵² Op. cit., p. 14.

⁵³ Actually, applying the criteria of Li and White to the data Zang collected on the academic majors of members of the Fourteenth Central Committee, one can find that those with specialities should account for 58.22 percent of the total membership, not 29.11 percent Zang originally believed, as specialities include not only engineering, finance and management but also natural and applied sciences, political science, political economy, law, and military science). Thus only 5.07 percent known members of the Central Committee were trained in humanities and should be put into another category. See Zang, "The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP", *Asian Survey*, vol. 33, 8 (August 1992): 796-797.

⁵⁴ Li & White, "The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," op. cit., pp. 390-391.

⁵⁵ Zang, "The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP", *Asian Survey*, vol. 33, 8 (August 1993): 799-800.

included as should be by the criteria of Li and White, the percentage of technocrats should be 58.19 at least. And one may note that Table 7 "Main Career Patterns" in Zang's article can not reveal whether the rest committee members had no experience *at all* beyond the career patterns Zang classified – foreign relations, mass organizations, office, Party or political work, police, mass media, and sports. It is highly likely that many of them had *some* experience in research or management. If so, the percentage of technocrats should be considerably higher than 58.19. In short, if really guided by the criteria of Li and White as Zang reiteratively claimed to do, the investigation of the academic majors and career patterns of the members of the Fourteenth Central Committee should point to the dominance of the Chinese technocrats over bureaucrats. The disparity in the results of the investigations of Zang and ours based on same data on the same group of political elite is mainly due to different interpretations and applications of the somewhat ambiguous criteria of Li and White.

Nevertheless, Zang's article puts forth essential questions: Are the current Chinese leaders technocrats or political technocrats? Is the Chinese leadership a technocracy or a political technocracy? But interestingly, while Li and White actually indicated, though not stressed, the political nature of the Chinese technocrats by noting that they were Communists and rose to power through socio-political movements, Zang did not distinguish the Chinese technocrats from their Western counterparts whom are generally believed apolitical, especially in comparison with politicians. By political technocracy, Zang meant a political alliance between technocrats and career bureaucrats, or rather, the career bureaucrats' dominance over the technocrats in leadership.⁵⁶ Moreover, like Li, White and Bachman, Zang did not provide a piece of work on the conduct of the new Chinese leadership for his political technocracy paradigm and his generalization that the political-technocratic leadership has been basically the same as the previous leadership of bureaucrats.

In my view, the Chinese technocrats *themselves* are political technocrats, they do dominate political leadership and their leadership is a hybrid of one-party rule and technocracy. Hence the Chinese leadership is better characterized as a political technocracy. I will discuss my views later. It is my belief that a better answer to the above crucial question lies in an inquiry into not only the

socio-political traits of the new elite but also its functional characteristics. The leadership performance of the Chinese technocrats, in the aggregate, reflects their outlook, leadership style, technique and ability. And case studies can provide opportunity to examine the leadership conduct of Chinese technocrats in an empirical and in-depth way. As far as I know, there has been no such case study in the newly emerged field of studies of Chinese technocrats. It might also be noted that no research seems yet to point out explicitly that the political power of technocrats is much more substantial at the provincial and local levels than at the national level, and that China's urban and coastal areas are likely to be more advanced in the leadership transformation than China's countryside, hinterlands, and border provinces.

Nevertheless, the heretofore published researches on China's leadership transition and Chinese technocrats, particularly those of Ting, Lee, Li, White, Bachman, and Zang, have laid an admirable empirical and theoretical ground for further studies. Ting's theme of two-stage elite transition, Lee's account of the system and policy contexts of the transition, and especially the probes of Li, White, Bachman and Zang into the characteristics of Chinese technocrats and the meaning of technocracy, stimulate and enable us to have a further look at the behavioural characteristics of the formative Chinese technocratic leadership. By doing so, we can better understand the implications of Chinese technocracy or political technocracy.

2. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST TECHNOCRATS, THE CHINESE TECHNOCRATIC LEADERSHIP, AND THE CASE OF SHANGHAI

Technocrats and the Chinese Communist Technocrats

Although the definition of technocrats in general and Chinese technocrats in particular, the rise of Chinese technocrats, and the implications of the technocratic leadership, are not the loci of my investigation, it may be helpful to express my thoughts briefly on these issues of primary importance. Generally, a technocrat is an official who, *with technical and scientific training and professional background, tends to promote rationalization and*

⁵⁶ In Zang's words, "the post-Mao Chinese bureaucrats need expertise to develop China's economy and thus promote technocrats who are loyal to the regime and the official ideology. Many technocrats have

institutionalization and maximize the role of expertise, science and technology in politics and governance and in socioeconomic development. This definition of technocrats incorporates the three criteria of Li and White -- education, profession and leadership position, because otherwise it would be too wide and technically difficult in application. I also agree with Li that social scientists should be included in the group of engineers and natural scientists. On the other hand, my definition differs from that of Li and White on two points. First, the criteria of education or special training is applied more broadly here, not only to college graduates but also to graduates of technical-vocational schools and self-made technicians. More importantly, we believe that the behavioral characteristics of technocrats, especially their outlook and political orientation, are too important to be left out. From a behavioral and practical perspective, they are even more crucial than the criteria of education, profession and leadership position.

Generally, technocrats are viewed as a new elite versus bureaucrats; our definition of technocrats as well as that of Li and White excludes officials without technical and scientific training and careers, and humanists and the technicians and natural scientists without holding official positions. However, it must be noted that in reality, the lines between bureaucrats and technocrats are not clear-cut, as the two groups overlap, and share each other's views and mentality from time to time. As well, non-technocratic intellectuals might be as enthusiastic as technocrats in advocating technocracy, while technocrats may share humanists' concerns about the shortcomings or weaknesses of technocracy. Finally, as Professor Milne's essay on technocrats and politics in South East Asian states shows, the "academic" definitions appear to be narrower than the actual use of "technocrats".⁵⁷

The original and conventional concept of "technocrats" accentuates the non-political nature of the new elite. As Jose Veloso Abueva stated and R. S. Milne agreed, technocrats share "an aversion to politics."⁵⁸ We acknowledge the existence of perceptual and behavioral differences in politics between technocrats and traditional bureaucrats, but our definition does not indicate that technocrats are essentially non-political. We rather believe that what

come to power because they are clients of party leaders." *Ibid.*, p. 802.

⁵⁷ Milne, "Technocrats and Politics in ASEAN Countries," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 55, 3 (Fall, 1982), pp. 403-429.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 409.

technocrats generally prefer and how they behave leads to a different form of politics, or a convergence of technocracy and conventional politics. We agree with the conclusion of Li and White that "technocracy does not end politics,"⁵⁹ in spite of our reservation about their implication that technocracy is exactly as political as democracy and Marxism.

With the new political nature of technocrats as a whole in mind, one may find, from a more specific and comparative perspective, that technocrats can be further divided into two categories in terms of the degree of political involvement. Generally speaking, technocrats in Western countries are less political than those in former and existing communist countries and in many developing countries. Yet usually, the higher the offices for Western technocrats, the more political they are. In many non-Western countries such as Southeast Asian countries, there are "non-political" and "political" technocrats.⁶⁰

In the case of the PRC, however, technocrats are all value-laden in contrast to their Western counterparts who are required to be politically neutral. The history of the Chinese Communist rule was filled with the revolutionary mobilization of society, the politicization of bureaucracy, and the radicalization of politics. China was distinguished in the world by its extraordinary scope and degree of politicization. Having lived and worked in such a politically intense environment from which virtually no one could escape, all the technocrats are political veterans. Despite their technical training and professional careers, almost all of them are members of the CCP. Regardless of their capacities as director of a teaching, research or health institute, manager of an enterprise, head of a government department, or party secretary of a working unit, they all are basic- or intermediate-level cadres, bearing political responsibilities and working for the party. In this regard, there is no fundamental difference between the Chinese communist technocrats and bureaucrats. On the other hand, those Chinese technocrats, by and large, appear to have shared with their counterparts in the West and with Southeast Asian countries and many other developing countries, "an ideology of modernization ... , a belief in the free enterprise system and yet a need for government planning, an elitist view of society, and a commitment to development." Therefore, the

⁵⁹ Li and White, "Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan," *China Quarterly*, no. 121, p. 35.

⁶⁰ Milne, "Technocrats and Politics in ASEAN Countries," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 55, 3 (Fall, 1982), pp. 403-429.

Chinese technocrats are political technocrats; what they advocate and conduct is a political technocracy. Hereafter, the terms of "Chinese technocrats", "Shanghai technocrats," "technocratic leaders" and "political technocrats" will be used interchangeably in this thesis.

The rise of Chinese technocrats has its historical and contemporary causes. Li and White have contributed to our understanding of the causes by tracing the historical roots of the emergence of Chinese technocrats to a deep-rooted meritocratic society, and more remarkably, by probing their recent institutional base and their *own* sociopolitical movement. Here, we may add two points. First, the one hundred years prior to the Communist takeover of China was a crucial historical period in which science and technology gained unprecedented influence and status in Chinese society and value system. Imperial China's humiliated defeat by Western powers prompted the Chinese ruling elite and intellectuals to learn advanced technologies and political practices from the advanced West. The Chinese people's enthusiasm about science and technology, for the sake of a strong, independent and prosperous China, started to climax in the May Fourth Movement of 1919; "Mr. Democracy" and "Mr. Science", the catchwords of the movement, had since been the catchwords of the Chinese nation. Thus knowledge and legitimacy of science and technology were disseminated, scientist and technologist were among the most respected and attractive professions, even though technocrats had yet to play a major role in politics and administration.

Our second point is about the role of revolutionary technocrats and technocratic patrons in the emergence of the new generation of Chinese technocrats. Doubtless, a large number of Chinese Communist leaders were not well-educated but peasant-soldiers, and the Maoist rulership was anti-technocratic in essence. But it is worthwhile to note the existence of revolutionary technocrats such as former Shanghai mayor Wang Daohan, and revolutionary technocratic advocates or patrons such as Deng Xiaoping, and the persistence of technocratic values and policies in Mao's China.⁶¹ Those revolutionary technocrats and

⁶¹ For instance, Professor Lowell Dittmer, an authority on Chinese political elite and leadership, wrote that the life of Liu Shaoqi, former President of the People's Republic of China, "may be viewed as an attempt to combine order with revolution and equality with economic efficiency and technocratic values." *Liu Shao-chi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Mass Criticism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: The University of California Press, 1974), p. 3.

Nevertheless, we do not want to go so far as to agree the view that the political conflict among the top Chinese communist leaders leading the Cultural Revolution was between the Mao-led "humanists"

technocratic patrons and advocates were severely purged during the Cultural Revolution, but reassumed power after the downfall of the "Gang of Four" in 1976, especially after the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee in 1978. It is them who vigorously promoted the new generation of technocrats to accommodate the implementation of Deng's economic reform and open-door policy. Without them, the pro-technocracy sociopolitical movement that Li and White showed would hardly have prevailed so quickly, and the new technocratic elite would not have risen to power at such a massive scale and in such short period of time.

The emergence and gradual rise to dominance of Chinese communist technocrats in political and administrative leadership have profound implications for China's economic, social, cultural and political development. Their commitment to economic reform, development and modernization, their emphasis on expertise and administrative, managerial and planning skills, and their system- and task-oriented leadership style, appear to be instrumental to the Chinese course of market-oriented reform and modernization. Compared with its Maoist counterparts, the new leadership's "elitist" view of society and liberal social policies in a relative sense, give rise to further social stratification. Meanwhile, the ongoing socioeconomic reform and policies are helpful for pluralistic social development. The technocratic elite's far less centralized authority and grip on society, in the context of market-oriented reform and pluralistic social development, are paving the way for a remarkable decline in the four-decade social dominance of the communist officialdom. The role of modern science and technology, that of intellectuals and specialists, and the traditional value of meritocracy, are being and likely to be greatly enhanced or disseminated in the realm of culture as well as in socioeconomic realms.

The political implications of the new Chinese technocratic leadership seem less certain than its social and economic implications, partly because of the legacy of Deng's reform which had primarily been concentrated on economic reform rather than political reform, partly because of the unavailability of the current leadership's scheme for political reform, and partly because of the high complexity and variability of political situations in China. If compared with the revolutionary leadership in the Mao era, nevertheless, the technocratic leadership is

and "technocrats" represented by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, primarily because Mao was not a humanist, and Liu and Deng were not technocrats. See Kurt Y. Kuriyama, *Humanists and Technocrats*:

less powerful but it may have more progressive impact on the Chinese political development. The disastrous impact of the Cultural Revolution on the image and authority of the party and state, its lack of the strong charisma and legitimacy the revolutionary veterans enjoyed, and its rejection of conventional large-scale class struggle and political purges, certainly have negative impact on the authority of the Chinese technocratic elite. At the same time, these factors may propel it to be more responsible and efficient in office, in order to win the people's political support, and to accelerate the ongoing process of institutionalization and strengthening the legal system for the sake of effective leadership and sociopolitical stability. The considerable decline in political authority, particularly the authority of the centre in the course of decentralization, correlates the rise of regionalism. On the other hand, it may stimulates the central and regional authorities to create a framework of power distribution fair to both parties. The problems of bureaucratism and official corruption are intensifying. To deal with the problems, the new elite is likely to introduce more public accountability and legal controls. There is no doubt that the Chinese technocrats try to maintain one-party rule and a maximum ideological grip on the society. Yet the process of policy-making is likely to be more open and transparent, especially in the policy areas concerning the ordinary people's living and working. It is predicted that more effective participation in the policy process by experts, from the public, and from the People's Congress, the People's Political Consultative Conference, and other traditional and new institutions. If the technocratic elite succeeds in leading China's modernization and socioeconomic development, the communist rule may be prolonged for some time.

It is not our intention at all to promote a positive and determinist view. We acknowledge a variety of scenarios as far as the prospect of China's social, economic and political development is concerned.⁶² We believe that history is shaped by various factors and dynamic forces rather than political elite and leadership, though political elite and leadership are often crucial. Here we merely suggest, from a leadership perspective, some likely trends in China's development.

Political Conflict in Contemporary China, Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, 1979.

⁶² For instance, see Richard Baum, "China After Deng: Ten Scenarios in Search of Reality", *China Quarterly*, 145 (March 1996): 153-175.

The Chinese Technocratic Leadership

We have chosen the Chinese technocratic leadership rather than Chinese technocrats as our focus of research. There are two considerations behind our decision. First, probably no leadership is absolutely composed by one single elite group. Chinese technocrats have been virtually dominant in provincial leadership, and to a large extent, in central leadership as well, but they worked and interacted with revolutionary veterans and bureaucrats without technical training, the majority of whom is believed supporters of China's reform and modernization, the prevalence of science and technology, and a political technocracy. Thus, the term “technocratic leadership” seems better than the term “technocrats” in a reflection of this complex reality.

More importantly, we want to extend the traditional type of elite studies which tend to overemphasize personal traits. Important as traits are, they are not sufficient as far as leadership quality and capability or the characteristics of an elite group are concerned. History is often a record of human ironies, paradoxes, contradictions or complexity. A person's better formal education does not necessarily guarantee he or she is going to perform better than a less **formally** educated person in a modern political and administrative environment; and a person who received technical training does not necessarily mean he or she is inherently less capable in politics. Leadership means not only leaders but also institution and conduct. Utilizing the conception of technocratic leadership may provide room for us to explore technocrats in a more systematic, more empirical and more meaningful way.

China is such a diversified country that visitors are struck by its regional variations and disparities, which have deepened since the launch of Deng's market-oriented economic reform and open-door policy in 1978. As well, there was a markedly increase in the provincial role in national politics in the Deng era, and probably even more so in the post-Deng era. Furthermore, I believe that the provincial-level leaderships, except Beijing where the seat of the national leadership has been, are more technocratic in nature than the national leadership, because the influence of the revolutionary veterans has remained far stronger at the centre than at the provincial

level.⁶³ Hence, for a comprehensive understanding of China's political, social and economic development in general and the current technocratic leadership in particular, one needs to extend his/her horizon beyond the national level to the provincial level.

On the other hand, China is a highly centralized party-state ruled by one omnipresent, powerful party and guided by its centrally planned blueprints, programs and strategies. While social, economic, even cultural conditions and development vary considerably province by province, the characteristics of the provincial political and administrative leaders are fairly uniform throughout the country, because of the fact that the central authority has always exerted far tighter control over leading personnel than socioeconomic developments at the provincial level, and each and every provincial leader has been carefully selected, appointed, and screened by the centre according to its generally uniformed criteria.⁶⁴ In this sense, the case study of provincial leadership can shed light on the characteristics of Chinese political elite and leadership as a whole. I have chosen Shanghai as a case study.

The Shanghai Case

The municipality of Shanghai is a provincial-level polity, located in the middle of China's North-South coastline and at the mouth of the Yangtze River. A county about one millennium ago, it became one of the first treaty-port cities in 1843 after the Sino-British Opium war, and then developed dramatically into perhaps the most populous, cosmopolitan and booming business centre in East Asia in the first half of this century.⁶⁵ Under the Communist rule, the

⁶³ Dittmer also pointed out that "the attempt to rejuvenate the ruling apparatus has been more successful at lower levels than at the top. The incumbents of lower-level advisory committees ... do not appear to be intruding into the decision-making process in the way that they do at the top. This is essentially because there is not as much power available at lower levers." Dittmer, "Patterns of Leadership in Reform China," in Arthur Lewis Rosenbawn ed., *State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 37.

⁶⁴ There have only been some variations in cadre policies towards China's autonomous regions and localities.

⁶⁵ There are many excellent scholarly accounts on Shanghai during this period. For a general account, one should read the classic one, Rhoads Murphey's *Shanghai: Key to Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953). For Shanghai's relationship with the rest of China, particularly its role in the national development, see an outstanding essay by Marie-Claire Bergere, "The Other China': Shanghai From 1919 to 1949" (In Christopher Howe ed. *Shanghai: Revolution and Development in an Asian Metropolis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 1-34). And for recent accounts of Shanghai

metropolis became a city-region in 1958, with a 30 percent increase in population and a two-fold increase in area.⁶⁶ By the end of 1994, the municipality in total has a population of thirteen million and an area of 6340 square kilometers.

I believe that Shanghai can make a good case for four reasons. The first reason lies in its general political, social and economic importance in China. Although one of the smallest provincial-level units in the country, the metropolis is more than a single provincial unit in terms of its importance in Chinese politics, economy and culture. Its political importance has been only second to the capital of China, for most of this century. Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping treated Shanghai as the alternative political base to Beijing, from which both launched their radical, historic attacks (though different in motivation, objective, method and consequence) on the conservative forces entrenched in Beijing during the mid-1960s and the early 1990s respectively. Shanghai also has been the largest economic centre of China over a century. It has been a major contributor to the national revenue and economic performance. In 1994, the city with one percent of China's population, and 0.07 percent of its territory, accounted for one-eighth of the country's financial revenue, and one-seventh of its total value of exports and imports.⁶⁷ Finally, Shanghai has been a cultural centre. The quantity and quality of its media, publications, arts, education, and the professionals have won it a leading position in the country that probably only Beijing can match. If Beijing represented traditional Chinese culture, Shanghai was the cradle of modern Chinese culture which absorbed modern, western elements.

Secondly, Shanghai has reached a higher level of industrialization, modernization, and scientific and technological development, and has been facing more complicated problems. The notion of technocracy is associated with high levels of industrialization, modernization, and scientific and technological development, which created more complicated problems and required more specialization and leadership ability. In this sense, the characteristics and capability of the technocrats and the technocratic leadership can be best tested in a highly industrialized, modernized,

politics, see Henriot, Christian. *Shanghai, 1927-1937: Municipal Power, Locality, and Modernization* (translated by Noel Castelino. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1993).

⁶⁶ For details, see Ka-iu Fung, "The Spatial Development of Shanghai" ((In Howe ed. *Shanghai*, pp. 269-300).

⁶⁷ The Bureau of Statistics of the Shanghai Municipal Government, *Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai, 1995*. Beijing: Press of China's Statistics, 1995, p. 333.

and, probably, urbanized setting. This kind of setting can be found in Shanghai. It has a long proven record of being the principal representative of China's industrialization, and modernization. There has been a high concentration of scientists, technicians and other specialists. In the meantime, this mega-city has encountered more complex problems than most parts of China, the kind of problems they would be facing in the future. Now party technocrats are predominant in leadership throughout China, and there should be a spectrum of their characteristics and capability. It is not my intention to equalize absolutely Shanghai technocrats to those in other provinces. But the technocratic leadership of Shanghai may represent the high end of the leadership spectrum.

Thirdly, the Shanghai leadership has been more technocratic in nature, and served as a major source for national leadership posts. For the past decade, no other province or municipality has provided so many technocrats to fill various key national leadership posts - to name a few, Rui Xingwen as a member of the CCP Secretariat, Jiang Zemin as the general secretary of the CCPCC and head of the State, Zhu Rongji as the number-two figure in the State Council, Zeng Qinghong as the extremely powerful director of the CCPCC General Office, and Wu Bangguo as the vice-premier in charge of industry.⁶⁸ Hence, the case of Shanghai perhaps better than any other case study, can throw light on the national leadership.

The final reason is the relative availability and reliability of information. The inadequacy of reliable sources of material has long been a major problem for students of Chinese politics, especially of political elite. The problem is due to political, administrative and technical factors. Deng's reform and open-door policies has led to a marked improvement in the situation. As a major information centre and the largest Chinese cosmopolis, Shanghai has been a leading information collector and provider in the country. In talking about information and statistics in China, the renowned China expert Rhoads Murphey observed that "Shanghai has always offered better and more reliable statistical information than most of the rest of China."⁶⁹ It is this reason, along with

⁶⁸ There have been many more Shanghai technocrats elevated to varied kinds of key national positions at the ministerial level, while a few became top leaders of some other provinces such as Ruan Chongwu in Hainan and Wan Xueyuan in Zhejiang. This phenomenon caused a wide circulation of the term "Shanghai clique" (Shanghai Bang) among China observers. Personally, I do not think the term accurate nor as meaningful as many observers think, as its application to all Chinese leaders with some connections to Shanghai leads to obscuring real leadership issues and factions.

⁶⁹ Rhoads Murphey, "Shanghai," in Mattei Dogan & John D. Kasarda eds. *The Metropolis Era*. vol. 2, *Mega-Cities* (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1988), p. 181, note 1.

the other three, that propel me to regard Shanghai as the most suitable locality for a test for theoretical assertions and hypotheses with respect to political technocracy.

3. HYPOTHESES, RESEARCH METHODS AND SCOPE

The main research question of this inquiry concerns the basic characteristics of the leadership of Chinese communist technocrats in Shanghai in the transformation of Chinese economy, society and politics towards modernization and market-oriented economy. My hypothesis contains three propositions. First, recent Chinese leaders, as political or party technocrats, advocated and practised neither the Western version of technocracy nor orthodox or conventional Communism, but a novel, complex hybrid of politics and technocracy and of a communist political system and a market economy. Second, they were better equipped by both training and experience, less ideologically burdened, and more open-minded than their revolutionary predecessors as a whole in leading China's market-oriented reform and modernization. Third, the Chinese technocratic leadership may not necessarily be more "elitist" and less effective than its predecessor, largely thanks to their lack of the revolution-based legitimacy which appears to have propelled the new elite to work harder, more responsively and efficiently to win the support of the led. While the revolutionary leadership demonstrated its strong capability of political mobilization, the technocratic leadership tended to rely upon systems for leadership conduct.

This study of the leadership of technocrats in Shanghai is intended to utilize and yet go beyond the conventional methodology of studies of elite groups.⁷⁰ Traditionally, political elite studies in general and studies of Chinese political elite in particular focus on two sets or sorts of the traits of an elite group. One may be called as socioeconomic traits or personal traits, including birthplace, age, sex, family background, education, skills, socioeconomic status, religion, career and experience. Another set is political or public traits, pertaining to political affiliation, political

⁷⁰ It seems, in contrast, that studies of individual political leaders tend to examine both the traits and behavior of the research object. For example, Lowell Dittmer's *Liu Shao-chi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Mass Criticism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: The University of California Press, 1974), and David Shambaugh's *The Making of a Premier: Zhao Ziyang's Provincial Career* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984).

seniority, tenure, patronage, career mobility, system (Xitong) background,⁷¹ and outlook. No doubt, these two sets are very important to our understanding of Chinese political leaders and Chinese politics. Yet if the action of an elite reflects the effect of their socio-political traits and reveals more about the nature of the elite, one might argue that the above variables require to be linked with the conduct of the elite, with the performance of the leadership, and even with policy outcomes. This thesis attempts to emphasize the linkage, and to find out not only the aforementioned two sorts of traits but also the **functional** characteristics of the Chinese technocratic leaders by looking at their leadership performance.

This study is basically empirical. As stated above, it will investigate the three main integral components of a political leadership: personnel, institution, and collective performance. Leadership personnel is my major concern. Their socioeconomic and political traits and background still attract much of our attention. Their personality, leadership and life style, patronage and power base, and interrelationship are also the objects of my inquiry. Leadership structure and institutions are less weighty, but they are thought to be important for comprehension of the institutional setting of the rise and conduct of the leadership of technocrats. Leadership conduct is another major area of my research. In this area, leadership vision, policy-making process, and policy implementation, which reflect the leaders' collective characteristics, will be probed. In addition, this dissertation pays special attention to the technocrats' collective functional characteristics through a survey of their distinctive leadership conduct. For a better understanding of the characteristics of the Chinese technocratic leadership, the revolutionary leadership in the Mao era becomes the main object of comparison and contrast. I also put the performance of the technocratic leadership of Shanghai Municipality into an international context.

The municipal leadership of Shanghai in this study refers primarily the top echelon of the political and administrative leadership of Shanghai in the reform era, particularly from 1985 to 1995 when technocrats were predominant in municipal leadership. My main research objects are municipal Party secretary, mayor and their deputies, not the heads of the municipal bureaus, offices, and committees, mainly because there is far less information on the latter or the second echelon.

⁷¹ This indicator is of importance to studies of Chinese politics and elite. It refers to the functional systems such as party and political work, finance and economy, and security and intelligence. It also refers to an communist elite's military background prior to 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party took over power, such as the New Fourth Army, and later the Number-three Field Army.

Notwithstanding, the second echelon is within my research horizon. As a matter of fact, almost all the top municipal leaders since 1985, especially in the 1990s, have been promoted from the second echelon. Another category of municipal leaders which is not my major research object is the standing members of the Municipal Party Committee. Powerful policy makers as they are, the handful of the standing members have mostly been either party secretaries or mayor and vice mayors at the same time. For technical convenience, this category, not the individuals, are sidelined in my research. So is the category of legislative and consultative leaders. They include the chairs and vice-chairs of the Shanghai People's Congress (SPC) and the Shanghai People's Political Consultative Conference (SPPCC). They are political, economic, social, and cultural elites with prestige and influence, but they are far less powerful than the above three groups or categories of municipal leaders, even though the SPC and the SPPCC have gained more respect and power over the past decade. Since my primary concern is about the leadership of technocrats with real or key decision-making power, and these legislative and consultative elites are largely not technocrats, nor have that kind of power, they are left out of my research focus.

This dissertation inevitably touches on the leadership transformation from revolutionary to technocratic. Although this topic merits more study, it is not the focus of this research. Nor is the topic of leadership performance. A selective survey and a couple of case studies of leadership performance are intended yet only for further bringing to light the characteristics of the technocratic leadership. The case studies of leadership performance do not cover political propaganda and ideology. This does not mean at all that I did not pay attention to this aspect of high political importance in Communist countries. On the contrary, it is an integral part of my research. I have found that over the past two decades, there has been an inconsistency in both the contents of political ideology and propaganda and the related implementation strategies.⁷² I have also found something novel and interesting such as the official promotion of local pride and conscience in the 1990s, and the utilization of state-of-the-art media by municipal authorities to

⁷² For example, the Strategy of Cultural Development of Shanghai ironed out in 1986 actually encouraged a freer cultural and ideological environment, the 1989 ban of China's most influential liberal newspaper the *World Economic Herald* signified the beginning of more strict political control over ideology and propaganda, and the editorials of the *Liberation Daily* (Jiefang Ribao, the organ of the Municipal Party Committee), written by the writing group of the municipal party committee in the early 1990s under the pen name of "Huang Puping," called for the emancipation of thoughts, and triggered a fierce battle on the front of ideology and propaganda in China.

reach out to the ordinary citizens, especially to respond to their concerns. Nevertheless, as most municipal leaderships in the world do not bear the responsibility of propagandizing official ideology, and their performance are evaluated on the ground of propaganda and ideology, my dissertation does not include a case study concerned, though the outstanding events in this regard, and the ideological characteristics and value orientation of the Shanghai technocratic leaders are subject to discussion.

Another hot issue that my dissertation does not tackle is bureaucratic corruption. I do see, and share the concern of many China observers about, the magnitude of the deteriorating problem and its profound, negative impact on the legitimacy and authority of the current Chinese leadership. Nevertheless, it seems seldom to find out an political elite group that is inherently corrupt. This research, mainly concerning the characteristics of an elite group, does not include corruption as a major topic. Moreover, although a few municipal leaders at the bureau level were trailed or rumoured to have been disciplined for charges of corruption, there have been no such scandal involving our main research objects - the political and administrative leaders of Shanghai, especially the full Party secretaries and mayors in the 1980s and 1990s. Many China observers as well as Chinese people blame the reformist leadership and Deng's market-oriented reforms and open-door policies for rampant corruption, while they tend to praise the leaderships and policies of the Mao era in this respect. I rather view the corruption as more complicated a phenomenon. It is true that current corruption is much more serious in both scope and volume than that in the Mao era, and China's transformation from a highly centralized planning economy to a market economy and its opening-up to foreign capitals, visitors, and lifestyles may bring about unpleasant by-products. Specifically, the transformation and opening-up may have stimulated officials' materialistic appetite and left more loopholes for corruption. It is also apparent that the existing system and institutions are inadequate in checking the worsening corruption. However, the current rampant corruption actually originated at least in the late 1960s and early 1970s, ironically the heyday of Mao's continuous revolution and of the Maoist fanatical condemnation of materialism. And the relevant existing system and institutions are inherited, with little change, from the Mao era. Last but not least is the psychological origin. The Mao era witnessed a constant, extraordinary, puritanical suppression of the people's normal demands for materials and higher living standards, and continuous political purges and campaigns which caused numerous people, including officials and

their children (many became officials themselves in the reform era), to suffer or at least, to waste their best time in life. Thus the stage was set for an explosion of the officials' desire for extravagant materials and life-style to compensate what they lost or missed, once the suppression and the politics of purges discontinued and more opportunities and stimuli for the enjoyment of life became available. In short, the problem of bureaucratic corruption has long existed and is very complex.

4. SOURCES OF MATERIALS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Sources of Information

There are three major sources for this study. The first major source is primary materials. They include local and national newspapers, official journals, statistics and documents, municipal leaders' speeches, autobiographies, memoirs and other publications, official and non-official biographical dictionaries and reference books, as well as periodicals of English translation of Chinese materials. The second one is secondary materials in Chinese and English, including academic works and the biographies of top municipal leaders written by China observers. A bibliography about these two sources of materials is attached. The third major source is a field study and interviews. I spent four months conducting field study in Shanghai in 1995. While collecting relevant materials, I observed Shanghai leaders' conduct, and interviewed local cadres and residents from various sectors or occupations, social strata, and age groups. Aside from this field study, I also conducted interviews with some people who have acquaintance with Shanghai leaders.

In order to obtain balanced sources of information for objective generalization, I have consulted materials from the PRC, Hong Kong, the West, and Taiwan. I have also tried to use the most reliable information by carefully processing varied sources or kinds of material. For example, I found that there is considerable discrepancy in Shanghai leaders' biographical data (i.e. age, education, political seniority, etc.) among varying reference books.⁷³ I regard the biographical data

⁷³ They include Wolfgang Bartke's *Who's Who in the People's Republic of China* (Armonk, N. Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1981, 1991), David Goodman's *China's Provincial Leaders, 1949-1985* (vol.1, Atlantic Highlands,

compiled by Chinese Communist authorities as the most authoritative. When it comes to more detailed biographical accounts, however, I am rather inclined to consult all kinds of sources, and paid special attention to those accounts by credible scholars, observers and interviewees, since official accounts tend to portrait political leaders in line with their political and ideological needs. I also treated official statistics with caution because I did find some printing and calculative errors.

The Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation consists of eight chapters (including this introduction), and a conclusion. Chapters Two and Three cover respectively the two closely related yet distinctive periods of the Mao era, 1949-66 and 1966-76, providing the historical background for comparison as well as comprehension of the development of Chinese politics and leadership. Chapter Four deals with leadership transformation from revolutionary to technocratic with emphasis on the latter. It touches upon the leadership of rehabilitated revolutionary veterans, the mixed leadership of revolutionary veterans and technocrats, the personnel and organizational changes that were crucial for the rise of technocrats, and especially, the general traits of top technocrats in comparison with those of their predecessors. Chapter Five furthers our search for the characteristics of Shanghai technocratic leaders by examining the profiles of all six top municipal party and administrative leaders between 1985 and 1995. In contrast to Chapter Four which is a macro study with many statistics, this chapter is a micro one with a display of human faces.

From Chapter Six on, our research focus is on the performance of Shanghai technocratic leaders, in the hope that the investigation will in turn bring to light more dynamic characteristics of the political elite and leadership, since we believe that there is a close, inherent linkage between a political elite's characteristics and its conduct. Chapters Six and Seven present two case studies of the technocratic leadership in perhaps the most challenging and testing areas for any municipal leadership in the world - urban planning and redevelopment, and housing reform. The case studies may shed further light on the technocratic leaders' vision and conduct in socioeconomic policy areas. Chapter Eight attempts to survey their general value orientation and conduct, and to sum up

the results of the case studies. The examination of the Shanghai technocratic leaders' traits and conduct may enable us to answer, with more confidence, the questions of who Chinese Communist technocrats are and what the Chinese technocratic leadership is about, at least as far as the leading Chinese technocrats in an advanced region are concerned.

CHAPTER TWO

THE LEADERSHIP OF REVOLUTIONARY VETERANS, 1949-66

To understand the current technocratic leadership of Shanghai, we shall first examine the leadership during the Mao era of 1949-76, from which, in theory, the present leaders officially inherited authority, party, apparatus, ideology and leadership techniques (though to what extent it really inherited them is a topic of discussion in the following chapters). The Shanghai leadership in the Mao era falls into two distinctive categories: the leadership of veteran revolutionaries in 1949-66 and that of Maoist radicals in 1966-76. This chapter deals with the former.

The period 1949-66 witnessed a transition in the municipal leadership from gradualism to radicalism, from pragmatism to idealism, from limited class struggle to total class struggle. This transition, which set the stage for the rise of the Maoist radicals in the Cultural Revolution, is due to the change of top leaders from Chen Yi and Pan Hannian to Ke Qingshi as well as the national political development. Nevertheless, the composition of the municipal leadership as a whole had not changed substantially, and there were many common distinctions in leadership techniques and problems of performance during this whole period, in comparison with the periods of the Cultural Revolution and the reform era. This chapter does not attempt to rebuild a detailed chronology of the leadership changes, but to focus upon three aspects of the veteran leadership, that is, its composition and characteristics, its personnel and organizational changes in the light of intra-relationships, and its performance.

1. THE COMPOSITION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP

The Chinese Communist leadership of Shanghai was formally established upon the liberation of this vital, heavily guarded power base of the Nationalist regime. The liberation campaign merely took a couple of weeks, with few casualties and without any serious damage to

this modern and prosperous city.⁷⁴ This campaign was political rather than military; its success was attributed to the activities of underground Communists and their allies as well as the presence of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).⁷⁵ In preparation for a smooth liberation, underground Party members and their allies organized the People's Security Corps and the People's Propaganda teams numbering 100,000 workers and students.⁷⁶ They provided the PLA with much needed intelligence and information based on a comprehensive, unit-by-unit investigation,⁷⁷ such as the offices, residences and telephone numbers of political, administrative, military, security and intelligence officials, even a secret, most detailed map of the city obtained from the acting Nationalist mayor Zhao Zukang. Most impressive were their extremely fruitful efforts to incite defection from the Nationalist camp.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ For the figures and the details of the campaign, see the head of the Shanghai Military Control Commission Chen Yi's report on August 3, 1949 (in the Shanghai Archives compiled, *Shanghai Jiefang* [the Liberation of Shanghai]. Beijing: the Publishing House of Archives, 1989, pp. 146-147). According to Ba Zongtan, a participant of the campaign as an commander, the total number of the Nationalist forces was lower, about 210,000, of which over 50,000 men fled to Taiwan, more than 90,000 men were captives, 40,000 more surrendered, and 15,000 more were casualties. The casualties on the communist side were over 30,000. The *Shanghai Jiefang Sishi Nian Jinian Wenji* Editorial Board ed., *Shanghai Jiefang Sishi Nian Jinian Wenji* (The Collected Works for Commemorating the Fortieth Anniversary of the Liberation of Shanghai), Shanghai: Xueling Press, p. 29.

⁷⁵ Shanghai was the birth place and headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) until 1933, though the bloody Nationalist suppression of 1927 incurred a heavy blow on Chinese Communists, marking a turning point in the history of underground Communist activity. 1937 was another turning point when the Party made a major effort to rebuild its underground organization in Shanghai. The third turning point was 1946 when a large-scale recruitment of party membership, coupled with a rapid organizational expansion and regrouping, took place until March 1949. On the eve of the liberation, there were about 9,000 Party members from all the occupations (including the police) in the city, of which three-fourths were new recruits since 1946, and near two-thirds were clerks and workers. See Sha Wenhan, "Jiefangqian Shanghai Dixiadang de Ruogan Qingkuang" (Certain state of affairs of the underground party in Shanghai before liberation), *Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji* (Selected Historical Accounts of the Past), no.3, 1980, pp. 36-37. And in his "Jiefang Zhanzheng Shiqi Shanghai de Renmin Geming Yundong" (The People's Revolutionary Movement in Shanghai during China's War of Liberation) (Ibid., no. 2, 1979, p. 30), Zhang Chengzong, an underground municipal party leader and a vice mayor of Shanghai, said the total number of party membership was over 9,000. An official announcement of rehabilitating the underground party members in Shanghai indicates the number was over 8,000. *Renmin Ribao* (The People's Daily), April 27, 1979.

⁷⁶ Wang Yaoshan et al, "Jinian Shanghai Jiefang Sishi Zhounian" (Commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the liberation of Shanghai), in the *Shanghai Jiefang Sishi Nian Jinian Wenji* Editorial Board ed., *The Collective Works for Commemorating the Fortieth Anniversary of the Liberation of Shanghai*, pp. 18-19.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 216. Zhang Chengzong, "Jiefang Zhanzheng Shiqi Shanghai de Renmin Geming Yundong". *Selected Historical Accounts of the Past*, no. 2, 1979, pp. 31-32.

⁷⁸ Among the defectors were Director of the general office of the Nationalist Navy Jin Sheng, Commander of Shanghai Railway and Deputy Commander of Shanghai Ports Duan Zhongyu, Chief of the Operation Section of the Shanghai Garrison Headquarters Liu Quanxi, Deputy Commander of the Shanghai Garrison

On May 27 and 28, the Communist institutions took shape, consisting of the Municipal Party Committee, the Municipal Military Control Commission (MMCC) and the Municipal People's Government. In 1955, the MMCC no longer existed and the municipal administrative authority was the Municipal People's Council (MPC) instead of the Municipal People's Government until the Cultural Revolution. The post-1949 top municipal party and administrative leaders under examination were full and deputy secretaries of the municipal party committee and full and deputy MPC chairmen or mayors. They were thirty-six in total -- thirty-one communists and five non-communists. They were different from the pre-1949 Nationalist leaders who were mostly well-educated urbanites, probably technocrats trained in the West.⁷⁹ It may be unnecessary to make further comparison and contrast of the two groups. However, for our later discussion of communist technocrats, we will look at the socio-political characteristics of the post-1949 elite - native place, urban experience, education qualification and speciality, age at the time of appointment, revolutionary seniority, career, task assignments and system background.

The new elite was a subject of great interest to many China scholars. Their research helps students of contemporary China to grasp some basic traits of the new elite and provides instrumental statistical methods and analytical frameworks for research.⁸⁰ However, there is still room for discussing definitions about the traits such as the definition of "native", and relevant questions such as whether an overwhelming majority of the new elite were ruralites and outsiders.

Headquarters and Commander of the Fiftieth Army Liu Changyi (who took the place of Tang Enbo as the chief military commander in the defence of Shanghai after Tang fled to Taiwan in the middle of the campaign), the Acting Chief of the Bureau of Municipal Police Lu Dagong, the Secretary General of the Municipal Government Mao Yisheng, and Acting Mayor of Shanghai Zhao Zukang. This incomplete list of defection should have explained itself the degree of the success of underground Party activities. All these underground Party activities help explain in part why the PLA won the Shanghai campaign with such surprising ease.

⁷⁹ The best account on the pre-1949 leadership of Shanghai is Christian Henriot, *Shanghai, 1927-1937: Municipal Power, Locality and Modernization* (Translated by Noel Castelino. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1993).

⁸⁰ Among those scholarly publications are Heath Chamberlain's "Transition and Consolidation in Urban China: A Study of Leaders and Organizations in Three Cities" (in Robert Scalapino, ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972, pp. 245-301), Lynn White's "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955-69" (ibid., pp. 302-377), Ying-Mao Kau's "The Urban Bureaucratic Elite in Communist China: A Case Study of Wuhan" (in A Doak Barnett, ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969, pp. 216-267), and John Gardner's "The Wu-fan Campaign in Shanghai: A Study in the Consolidation of Urban Control" (ibid., pp. 477-539).

Furthermore, the availability of more reliable biographic information on the revolutionary elite both necessitates and facilitates re-examination of their characteristics.⁸¹

Defining "native" and "non-native" is not easy.⁸² Customarily, Chinese people regard someone's father's place of origin rather than his or her own birthplace as his or her native place. As a consequence, it is common that in most Chinese "Who's who", a figure's "Jaguar" (native place) does not indicate his or her own birthplace, so that finding out it is very hard, if not impossible. This traditional way to identify "native" has been complicated with the Western way of identification by birthplace. In his excellent study of the post-1949 bureaucratic elite in Wuhan, Ying-mao Kau set a more strict criterion -- only those whose "parents or ancestors had established permanent residence there before their birth" are regarded as the "native".⁸³ The definition by birth place may be too narrow and problematic in reality. For instance, Premier Li Peng was born in Shanghai but barely has residential experience there. In contrast, Zhang Chengzong, a vice mayor of Shanghai, came to the city at early childhood from his birthplace Zhenghai, Zhejiang province, and has stayed there for more than half a century. In terms of social relations and lifestyle, of familiarity with local dialect, custom and community, and of other people's perception, Zhang is a real native of Shanghai, probably more "native" than Li.

This difficulty in definition is especially complicated when scholars try to define who is a native or non-native of Shanghai, a city of immigrants and refugees. In his pioneering work on the Communist leadership in Shanghai, Lynn White suggested that the one who either was born in the

⁸¹ We have found many errors in the biographical works largely published in Hong Kong, Taiwan and the West, including some scholarly works such as Donald Klein and Anne Clark's *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971) and Wolfgang Bartke's *Who's Who in the People's Republic of China* (Armonk, NY.: M. E. Sharpe, 1991). Most of the errors involve the subject's age, education, family background or place of origin. For example, Fang Yi's date of birth is 1916, but in the Institute of International Relations' *Chinese Communist Who's Who* (Zhonggong Renming Lu), vol. 1-2, (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1970), it is 1902, a difference of fourteen years. In addition, thanks to the CCP's deliberate concealment, some "democratic" elites were communists. Sha Qianli or Sha Ch'ien-li, for example, a "White" or non-Communist leader of Shanghai in all biographical publications as well as Chamberlain's "Transition and Consolidation in Urban China", actually was a "Red" or communist since 1938. Such misinformation in the aggregate could have a considerable effect on statistical analysis of the post-1949 elite.

⁸² For a useful discussion of the definition of "native" and "outsider," see Michel Oksenberg, "Local Leaders in Rural China, 1962-65," in Barnett ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, p. 177.

⁸³ Ying-mao Kau, "The Urban Bureaucratic Elite in Communist China," *ibid.*, p. 229.

Table 1: Sociological Attributes of the Revolutionary Elite

	Party Elite (N = 31)		Non-Party Elite (N = 5)		Total (N = 36)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Native Place						
Native	3	9.7	5	100	8	22.2
Non-native:	25	80.6			25	69.4
(a) East China	15	48.4			15	41.6
(b) The Rest	10	32.2			10	27.8
Unknown	3	9.7			3	8.3
Urban Experience *						
(a) General						
10 Years or +	24	77.4	5	100	29	80.5
5 - 9 Years	6	19.4			6	16.7
1 - 4 Years	1	3.2			1	2.8
(b) Having Experience in Shanghai						
Having Experience in Shanghai	28	90.3	5	100	33	91.7
Unknown	2	6.5			2	5.5
None	1	3.2			1	2.8
Level of Education **						
Graduate School	1	3.2	1	20	2	5.5
Post-secondary ***	12	38.7	3	60	15	41.7
Secondary****	3	9.7			3	8.3
Primary or Less	3	9.7	1	20	4	11.1
Unknown	12	38.7			12	33.3
Age at the Appointment						
61 years or More			2	40	2	5.5
51 - 60 years	6	19.4	1	20	7	19.4
41 - 50 years	18	58	2	40	20	55.6
31 - 40 years	3	9.7			3	8.3
Unknown	4	12.9			4	11.1
Average Age	46.5		55.4			

* Before assuming their responsibilities as a municipal party secretary or a mayor or his deputy.

** Including those who had not graduated.

*** Including political and military academies such as the Leninist Institute in Moscow and Kangri Junzheng Daxue (The Resisting Japanese Political and Military Academy) in Yanan.

**** Including special or technical secondary schools.

Wu-dialect region or spent most of his or her life in Shanghai is a native of the metropolis⁸⁴. Less strictly, Heath Chamberlain's remarkable study of the post-1949 political elite in Shanghai and two other cities regards those who either were born or have resided ten years or more in the city as its "native" or "local".⁸⁵ Based on the above definitions and considerations, we set our own criteria for a Shanghainese: (1) one who was born in Shanghai; (2) one who was born in Jiangsu or Zhejiang Province and spent a considerable period of time in Shanghai⁸⁶; and (3) one who was born in another part of China but spent most of his or her life in this metropolis. Thus the term "non-native" or "outsider" refers to people who are from all over the country beyond Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces. In the following table, we divide the category of "outsider" into two parts: (1) the people from the region of East China except for Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, including Fujian, Anhui, Jiangxi and Shandong provinces, to which Shanghai has close regional ties; and (2) the people from all other provinces.

By our criteria, the biographic information collected thus far indicates that all the non-communist and three communist leaders were Shanghainese. Among the known outsiders (all communists), fifteen came from the East China region, ten from the rest of China. Even if Jiangxi province is regarded as a province of Central China as some earlier studies did,⁸⁷ only one would be put into a different category of "outsiders." Of the ten non-East China leaders, eight or nearly one-fourth of the total top leaders were the natives of Sichuan, Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi. This picture is different from the conventional one that shows a high proportion of the elite from these four provinces in the post-1949 provincial leadership of China.

⁸⁴ Lynn White, "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955-69," in Scalapino ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, p. 368.

⁸⁵ H. Chamberlain, "Transition and Consolidation in Urban China," *ibid.*, footnote 25, p. 256.

⁸⁶ Here included are "Subeiren" (the people who came from the northern part of Jiangsu, a non-Wu dialect area) as well as the people from the Wu-dialect region, which covers the most area of the two provinces. Many Shanghainese do not regard "Subeiren" as the native of Shanghai, even though his/her situation is similar to those from the Wu-dialect other than Shanghai. That is a century-old prejudice. For details, see Emily Honig, *Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, 1850-1980*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992.

⁸⁷ In Chamberlain's paper, East China included the provinces of Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian (presumably plus Shanghai already) (Scalapino, *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, Table 29, p. 261), while in Franz Shurmann's classic study of the rule of the CCP, it included Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong and the municipality of Shanghai (*Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, p. 136).

Another conventional portrait of the leadership in urban China is that it was mainly composed of the peasants from remote and isolated hinterlands with none or little urban experience. This portrait has been revisited, but to what extent that the communist leadership was composed of the elite with considerable urban experience is still at issue.⁸⁸ To reveal degrees of these leaders' familiarity with Chinese urban setting in general and with Shanghai in particular, which are of extreme importance to their job performance after liberation,⁸⁹ we set the variable of lengths of urban experience. As Table 1 shows, all the municipal leaders, communist and non-communist alike, had been exposed to urban settings before assuming their positions. 80 per cent of the entire leadership and 77.4 per cent of the Communist leaders had been so for more than ten years. And a majority of the leadership had urban contact by their late teens or early twenties. It is noticeable that almost all the leaders had been exposed to a variety of Chinese cities in terms of size and feature, and some of them had been to North America, Japan, Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Of course, most important is their exposure to Shanghai. While all the non-communist leaders had such exposure, so had 90.3 per cent of the Communist leaders, of whom about two-thirds had stayed in Shanghai for three years or more. The only known exception was Su Yu, a well-known military commander and vice-chairman of the Military Control Commission of Shanghai from May to October, 1949. The findings lead to our conclusion that the degree of the Party elite' familiarity with urban settings was higher than previous studies generalized, which may

⁸⁸ Although John Gardner noted that there were "a number of men" with urban backgrounds in the leadership (Barnett ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, p. 479), his "The Wu-fan Campaign in Shanghai: A Study in the Consolidation of Urban Control" highlights the urban setting alien to the communist leaders. The study of the leaderships of Wuhan by Ying-mao Kau points to a high degree of urbanism in the composition of the post-1949 leadership ("The Urban Bureaucratic Elite in Communist China: A Case Study of Wuhan, 1949-65", *ibid.*). Though agreeing with this observation of the leadership as a whole, nonetheless, Heath Chamberlain thought that among the two types of leaders, "liberators and second wave," who were dominant in the communist elite in terms of both number and substance, "a substantial number" had not experienced any urban contact before liberation ("Transition and Consolidation in Urban China," in Scalapino ed., *Elites in The People's Republic of China*, footnote 28, p. 264)

⁸⁹ H. Chamberlain has clarified elites as "urbanites" or "urban-ruralites" or "ruralites" in terms of where they were either born or raised ("Transition and Consolidation in Urban China," in Scalapino ed., *Elites of the People's Republic of China*, p. 264. Although these definitions are important, we believe that an individual's contact with city life beyond his or her adolescence, especially in twenties, is also very important in the shaping of his or her understanding of the urban setting and problems. Thus we choose to clarify the leaders under examination by lengths of the time in city. They may have longer contact with the city than we have identified, owing to lack of detailed records of their activities.

help explain why the communists' striking, speedy success in consolidating their power in urban China, improving economic situation, and transforming cities from capitalism to socialism.

Like the variable of "native" and "non-native," educational qualification is also elusive. In Table 1, for technical or practical reasons, we use "level of education" to indicate the **formal** education an elite attained. The Table indicates that although the non-party elite's formal education backgrounds were stronger than those of the Communist elite, 42.9 per cent of the latter group reached the level of post-secondary education and beyond. In addition, among the two groups, the only recipient of a graduate degree (Ph.D. from Columbia University) was Wei Que, once secretary of Sun Yat-sen and a secret communist. What the Table does not show is special fields of study of all those recipients of post-secondary education. Over 90 per cent of the Communist elite and 50 per cent of the non-party elite majored in the humanities and social sciences.

It is necessary to add that we do not think a person's "level of formal education" really equates with his or her qualification of education. Discrepancies between the two are a serious problem in study of Chinese elite, especially of veteran Communists. A large number of them who came from a poor peasant family, receiving little or no education, had learned how to write and read or even advanced knowledge in various informal or unusual ways. Fang Yi, a vice-mayor in the early 1950s, is a good example. As a child cowherd, he did not have chance to enter any regular school. However, after years of self-study and almost five years of imprisonment when he studied with help from inmates with an intellectual background, he was believed to have attained the education qualification equivalent to that of university level. He understood English, German, Japanese and later Russian, and used to be an editor of the Commercial Press in Shanghai, probably the most famous press in Republican China. It is not unreasonable to assume that all the revolutionary leaders at this high level who had not received any formal education as Table 1 indicates, actually had the least education qualification equivalent to the level of primary education.

Finally, Table 1 tells us that the Communist leaders in question were quite young if their long revolutionary experience is taken into consideration. Most of them were in their forties at the time of the appointment, and none exceeded the age of sixty years old, regardless of their being appointed in the early 1950s or mid-1960s. Although there are four unknown cases, it is reasonable to guess that their ages would be within the limit because their positions were junior. In contrast, the non-party elite were nine years older in average.

Let us shift from their social traits to political ones. Our attention is concentrated upon the revolutionary seniority, system backgrounds and careers of the thirty-one Communist elite, who were predominant in leadership. They are divided into three categories in terms of major revolutionary assignments or tasks before 1949, that is, the military (almost exclusively the New Fourth Army in the Anti-Japanese War and the Third Field Army in the War of Liberation), the Red Areas (including the base areas at the earlier revolutionary stage and the “Old” or “liberated” areas at the later stage), and the “White” areas (under the control of the enemies of the Communists).⁹⁰ It is necessary to mention that these divisions are not clear-cut in the sense that almost all of the leaders had been involved in two categories, and two-thirds in three categories, including Mayors Chen Yi, Ke Qingshi and Cao Diqu, and Chen’s chief deputy Pan Hannian. The divisions are made upon their main revolutionary career, especially during 1946 to 1949. According to our criteria, seventeen individuals fall into the category of Red Areas, ten into that of Military, and four into that of White Areas.

It is important whether they were generalists or specialists, what functional areas were of their leadership strength, which would affect their leadership style and performance after 1949. As revealed in Table 2, the Military group of cadres had more military experience, while the group from the Red Areas were distinctive in administrative experiences; in contrast, the group from the White Areas did not have any distinctive strength. Despite these differences, in each group, the most common one of six functions was in charge of the Party and political works. Of the thirty-one Communist leaders, two-thirds had taken two or more functions in their pre-1949 revolutionary career. In most cases, an individual had been a regional Party secretary or political commissar in army and a general administrator, and sometimes, even a director of propaganda. Based on our limited information on the leaders’ revolutionary profiles, Table 2 indicates only seven individuals had served as military commanders and soldiers. It is reasonable to make an assumption, however, that a great number of the Communists had had some sort of military experience during the first half of the twentieth century, which was full of armed

⁹⁰ We chose not to use the category of Nanxia Ganbu (South-bound cadres), even though it has often appeared in both mainland and western publications. The main reason is that in the case of Shanghai, this term is a serious mix-up. It includes the cadres with the backgrounds of the New Fourth Army or the Eight Route Army, those from the Communist-controlled areas in both North China and East China, and more than 2,000 cadres who had been involved in underground activities in Shanghai until late 1948 or early 1949.

Table 2: The Revolutionary Career of the Communist Leaders

Names by Task Area	Major Revolutionary Functions					
	Military	Security & Intelligence	Party & Polit- ical Works*	Propaganda & Education	Gen. Ad- ministration	Economic Affairs
Military***						
Chen Yi	x		x	x	x	
Rao Sushi			x			
Su Yu	x		x			
Chen Pixian			x			
Liang Guobin		x	x			
Liu Suzhou			x	x		
Song Jiwen						x
Wang Yiping			x			
Yang Xiguang			x	x		
Wang Shaoyong	x	x				
Red Areas						
Wei Que				x	x	
Zeng Shan	x	x	x	x	x	x
Fang Yi			x	x	x	x
Gu Mu			x		x	
Ke Qingshi			x		x	x
Xu Jianguo	x	x				
Song Richang					x	x
Ma Tianshui			x			
Wei Wenbo			x	x	x	
Cao Diqu	x		x	x	x	
Liu Jiping			x	x	x	
Niu Shucui			x			
Shi Ying						x
Shi Ximin				x		
Li Gancheng			x		x	
Li Guangren			x			
Zhang Chunqiao				x		
White Areas						
Pan Hannian		x	x	x		
Liu Xiao			x			
Liu Changsheng	x		x			
Zhang Chengzong			x			x

* This category mainly involves the CCP secretaries, political commissars, directors of organization and personnel affairs, and mass mobilizers.

** This includes functions of finance, trade, food, industrial production, and material supply, etc. within an army, a Communist government, or a regional party organization.

*** This refers to individuals working in various positions within the military, while the other "Military" only refers to the military commander and soldier serving in regular troops.

conflicts and wars. Obviously, a majority of the elite were generalists mainly in political, administrative, propaganda, and, in a sense, military fields.

As presented in Table 2, one-third of the elite carried out one function consistently so that these leaders might be called "specialists". What fields did they specialize in? Seven were Party secretaries or political commissars or both and two in charge of Communist propaganda apparatus. Only two had worked in economic fields. Thus, regardless of being generalists or specialists, the Communist cadres by and large had their strongest functionary strength in the area of Party organization and political mobilization, whereas their weakness lay in economic fields. In addition, it might be worthwhile to note that among the elite, only the Party leader of underground Shanghai Liu Changsheng can be seen as a representative of the workers since he himself was a worker and was involved in the movements of trade union. A majority of the leaders were the first generation of the Chinese Communist cadre corps, namely the Long March cadres. They joined in the revolution at very young ages - most in their teens, even in early teens. This is the reason why after two decades of revolution, they were still relatively young when assuming top municipal offices. Revolutionary seniority was a key element in an individual cadre's appointment and mobility in Communist China, particularly in the period of 1949-66. The chief positions in the municipal Party committee and government were usually held by those elite who joined the Chinese Communist revolution in the 1920s. The next table will disclose the Communist elite's revolutionary seniority. Since the most significant manifestation of revolutionary seniority is the date of one's joining the CCP, this table utilizes this indication. It is also interesting to compare the three groups in revolutionary seniority.

As Table 3 shows, 42 per cent of the elite joined the CCP before 1927, another 32 per cent from 1928 to 1937. What our finding differs from some earlier studies is not the picture of the elite as a whole but that of specific groups.⁹¹ Our finding suggests that the most senior group in terms of percentage was not the "liberators" or the elite of the PLA but the elite working in underground Shanghai. The picture might change somewhat but not fundamentally if the second echelon of the municipal leaders had been included. Given the pivotal role of Shanghai in the early Communist

⁹¹ According to Chamberlain's generalization, the liberators were more senior than the second-wave cadres and local Reds in revolutionary experience (the three types of leaders are included respectively in our categories of the Military, the Red Areas and the White Areas) (See his "Transition and Consolidation in Urban China," in Scalapino ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, pp. 259, 268.

revolution, this should not be surprising. Actually a number of liberators were recommended by local Reds to join the Party. For instance, Yang Fan, a liberator and deputy Chief of the municipal bureau of public security, was recruited into the Party on the recommendation of Tang Yulan, a long-time underground Party activist and the director of the municipal bureau of education after liberation. Our fragmentary information on the profile of the junior elite leads us to propose that the revolutionary seniority of local Reds be similar to that of the liberators, if not more.

Compared with the Communist elite, the non-party elite's appointment to top municipal offices seemed to have been determined first and foremost by their absolute compliance with the Communist leadership or their non-conditional subordination to their Communist colleagues. This does not necessarily mean an individual should have a long and outstanding record of political opposition to the Nationalists and collaboration with the CCP. Although Jin Zhonghua was a long-time friend and collaborator of communists, and Sheng Peihua and Hu Juewen were leading figures in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek's authoritarian rule in the 1940s, Zhao Zukang collaborated with the communists only on the eve of liberation, and Rong Yiren, now Vice President of the People's Republic of China, started his co-operation and compliance even after liberation. Besides the political factor, there was another feature in common--all of them had remarkable achievements in

**Table 3: Distribution of the Communist Elite by
Revolutionary Seniority and Task Areas before 1949**

	Military (N=10)		Red Area (N=17)		White Area (N=4)		Total (N=31)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Period of Joining CCP								
1921-27	3	30	7	41	3	75	13	42
1928-37	5	50	4	23.5	1	25	10	32
1938-44	1	10	2	11.8			3	10
Unknown	1	10	4	23.6			5	16

their own specific fields or business. Jin was a renowned journalist, Zhao was a chief engineer in urban planning and construction, while Sheng, Hu and Rong were financial or industrial tycoons in town. Their much needed experiences and expertise, coupled with their influential social status, seemed to be beneficial to the consolidation of the new-born Communist rule and to the economic development of Shanghai in the early 1950s.

In conclusion, the post-1949 top leaders of Shanghai were largely middle-aged and fairly educated, with high levels of familiarity with urban situations and of revolutionary seniority. The leadership was a fairly balanced combination of natives and outsiders, and of specialists and generalists. Most of them were veteran Communists who had sophisticated political, propaganda and organizational skills other than military and coercive strength. Their relative weakness lay in economic spheres. The strength and weakness of the leadership were reflected in its performance, which will be discussed later.

2. STRIFE AND CHANGE WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP OF SHANGHAI

It is commonly held that the Chinese Communist leadership during the period of 1949 to 1957, in comparison with the post-1958 period, was generally united and stable.⁹² It might also be said that Communist leadership cleavages were on the ebb, or rather, the period was the formative stage of a new round of Party infighting. This general pattern, however, did not apply to the case of Shanghai. The fact that a much higher percentage of individual cadres entering into and exiting from the municipal leadership by 1957 than after 1958 was a sign of leadership strife and instability as well as a reflection of the initial stage of national state-building in general and leadership formation in particular.⁹³ Leadership cleavages often resulted in personnel, and sometimes

⁹² A representative of this view is Frederick Teiwes. He also explained succinctly a variety of sources of leadership unity. See Chapter 1, "The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, 1949-1957," Roderick MacFarquhar ed., *The Politics of China, 1949-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 8-9).

⁹³ Of the thirty-six municipal leaders, 58 per cent were appointed between 1949 and 1955 – nine individuals in 1949-50, six in 1952, and another six in 1954-55. The rest occupied their offices from 1957 to 1965 – five in 1957-58, four in 1962, and six in 1965-66.

institutional changes. This section will focus upon leadership strife, and personnel and institutional changes in 1949-66.

The Shanghai leadership was not united from the beginning. Actually there had been two centres of leadership or two lines of authorities headed by Rao Shushi and Chen Yi,⁹⁴ who had similar backgrounds, experiences and careers. Both were born into non-proletarian families (a bankrupt landlord family for Chen and a middle school teacher family for Rao) in the beginning of this century. Both received post-secondary education, went abroad (including western Europe), and joined the CCP in the first half of the 1920s. Before working together in the New Fourth Army as of 1942, both had been involved in mainly Party and political works, even though Chen was active in armies, whereas Rao in Party organizations and trade unions. Both were members of the Central Committee of the CCP (CCPCC) as the representatives of the New Fourth Army and had close ties with central leaders, though different leaders.⁹⁵ There is no evidence proving this difference had caused a strife between them, nor were there fundamental policy issues making them apart. Difference in personality – an forth-right, big-hearted Chen vis-à-vis a sly, anxious Rao – appeared to be the primary source of their strife.⁹⁶

Tensions between these two powerful Communist elite started in 1942 when they became colleagues in the New Fourth Army, and exploded one year later as Chen was expelled from the

⁹⁴ After the Communists' capture of Shanghai on May 1949, the first secretary of the East China Bureau of the CCP Rao Shushi was additionally appointed as full secretary of the Municipal Party Committee, while Chen was the second secretary of the East China Bureau, a deputy Party secretary, mayor of the Municipal Government and Chairman of the Military Control Commission of Shanghai which was primarily in charge of the take-over of this city. In January 1950, the East China Military and Administrative Committee (ECMAC) was set up under the Chairmanship of Rao. Although not taking any leading position in ECMAC, Chen replaced Rao as the Party boss of Shanghai with all other titles remained. This change did not end the dual leadership. The Municipal Party Committee and administration headed by Chen were supposedly subordinate to the authorities of the East China Bureau and ECMAC, which was also located in Shanghai. Besides their Party and administrative positions, Chen and Rao were Commander and Political Commissar of the Third Field Army, and of the Military District of East China whose headquarters were in the city of Nanjing.

⁹⁵ According to Frederick Teiwes, Rao had close relationship with Liu Shaoqi, while Chen with Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Deng Xiaopi and Tan Zhenglin (See his *Politics at Mao's Court: Gao Gang and Party Factionalism in the Early 1950s*, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990, Table 1, p. 22). Our sources of information, confirm Rao's tie to Liu and add Kang Sheng to the list. However, Chen's major close ties were to Zhou Enlai and Zhu De rather than Mao and Liu.

⁹⁶ Teiwes also noted that Rao had "abnormally suspicious nature", was "a particularly prickly individual who generated an excessive degree of conflict" with Chen Yi and others (*Politics at Mao's Court*, pp. 44, 148). For

headquarters of the New Fourth Army in Jiangsu province to Yanan, the headquarters of the CCP, to participate in the rectification of Yanan.⁹⁷ After being criticized and making self-criticism, Chen reassumed the position of commander of the New Fourth Army, but the strife continued. After 1949, there were signs of another explosion of tension in their relations. For quite a while, Chen was pushed out of the municipality he was entitled to lead, and stayed in the headquarters of the Military District of East China in Nanjing. The Shanghai leadership was under the control of Rao, though he held no municipal office at all. Only after Rao went to Beijing for a rest and recuperation in early 1952 did Chen come back to Shanghai.⁹⁸ Given the fact that for a considerable period they had been chief Communist leaders in East China as well as commanders of the New Fourth Army, from where and which almost all the cadres in Shanghai, especially those at the municipal level, came from, their strife must have complicated lines of authority, institutional relations as well as relationships among the leaders.⁹⁹

At the same time, there was another kind of leadership tension and power struggle, which were not based on different personalities but on different backgrounds or experiences which sometimes contributed to different policies and tactics. As mentioned before, the Shanghai leadership, like other provincial leaderships, comprised cadres from the military, the “Red Area” and the “White Area.” Apparently, these three groups were distinctive in revolutionary experience, in educational qualification, and in familiarity with Shanghai. Moreover, the “White Area” group

Chen's personality, there are numerous records of his speeches, reminiscent articles and books of his colleagues and friends, as well as leaflets of the Red Guards.

⁹⁷ Rao's victory reflected the communist principle and tradition that "the Party takes command of the military," which means that in a unit, the Party secretary is more powerful than the military commander in terms of power struggle. It also was an indication that Chen's relationship with the centre headed by Mao was not as good as Rao's.

⁹⁸ See Chen Pixian's reminiscence about Chen Yi, the *People's Daily*, August 25, 1991.

⁹⁹ Among Communist elites existed, there were both Chen's followers or faction and Rao's. In addition, there were some cadres who had an ambiguous or shifting relationship with Chen and Rao. Pan Hannian, one of the most prominent underground communists, was an example. In the 1943 infighting between Chen and Rao, Pan expressed his disagreement with the treatment of Chen, so he was expelled to Yanan, too. However, his relations with them became ambiguous after liberation. As the actual chief executive of the Shanghai leadership between 1949 and 1955, he assisted both Chen and Rao. It seems that in their post-1949 infighting, he did not take sides as before. The later accusation that linked Pan with Rao's anti-Party activities and conservatism in policy implementation might be an exaggeration of their relationship, but it may reflect a close work relationship between them, which turned out to cost Pan dearly.

had the strongest power base in the city.¹⁰⁰ Since this group had worked in underground Shanghai as members of the middle class or upper class in disguise for more than a dozen years, their life style and work style were very different from those of other two groups who had long lived in jungles, villages or towns, and had engaged in numerous battles.¹⁰¹ These differences were reflected more or less on policy issues.¹⁰² All the above distinctions seemed to be sources of tensions and infighting within the municipal leadership, even though strife and power struggle were not always along the lines of the groups.¹⁰³

Though the smallest among the three, the "White Area" group occupied executive party and administrative positions in the municipal leadership in the early period of the communist rule. As chief deputy mayor and secretary-general for both the MMCC and the municipal government. Pan Hannian was the executive of the Shanghai administration, since Rao Sushi and Chen Yi were involved in lots of regional (East China) and national affairs. In the Municipal Party Committee, the

¹⁰⁰ It may include nearly 9,000 local communists, 2,000 take-over cadres who just retreated from Shanghai to the "Red Area" in 1948, and a portion of south-bound cadres who had been under the three elite's leadership for a considerable period by 1949.

¹⁰¹ For example, Pan Hannian was criticized by the Marshal Peng Dehuai for eating deer meat after some figures in the classic Chinese novel *Hongloumeng* (Dream in the Red Mansion) (Tang Yu ed., *Lingluo Chengni Xiangruguo* or "Fallen and muddled but Fragrant as before", Beijing and Hong Kong: The Press of living, Reading and New Knowledge, 1984, pp. 167-168).

Friction between local cadres and non-local cadres (mainly the "south-bound" cadres) was not limited to Shanghai. It occurred in Guangdong as Ezra Vogel revealed in his classic study of local politics *Canton under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1969). So did in Nanjing as Song Renqiong, then number-two man in the early city leadership, recalled ("Before and after the takeover of Nanjing," in the Research Group of the CCPCC, ed., *Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao* [Materials on the history of the Chinese Communist Party]. Beijing: the Publishing House of the CCP's History, 1991, vol. 38, pp. 70-71).

¹⁰² When Pan Hannian and his associates, who were familiar with the extreme political, social and economic complexity of this cosmopolis, made decisions, implemented policies, especially dealt with the remaining Nationalists, gangsters and the bourgeoisie, in a pragmatist, particular but effective fashion, their leadership were often criticized as "Right opportunism or conservatism" by some of their peers whose understanding of the problems and situations of Shanghai was shallow and who tended to carry out policies in a simplistic and radical way. The Shanghai leadership (Chen Yi was absent) was criticized by the center at the early stage of the "Five-Anti" campaign in early 1952 as being too conservative. After his arrest in 1955, Pan was even accused of shielding counter-revolutionaries.

¹⁰³ For instance, Pan Hannian and Chen Yi had a fairly good relationship. And after the groups of the Military and the "Red Area" became much more powerful, Peng Baishan, the director of the Propaganda Department of the Municipal Party Committee with the background of the New Fourth Army and later the Third Field Army, was labeled as a key figure of the Hu Feng's "anti-Party" group and purged in 1956. Furthermore, one can easily find that power struggle occurred everywhere, within every social or political group.

executives second to Rao and Chen were Liu Xiao and Liu Changsheng, who had been in charge of the party organization and activities in underground Shanghai since 1937. In addition, there were an impressive number of former underground communists holding important positions in the East China Bureau and the ECMAC. For example, Wu Kejian was secretary-general of the ECMAC, a position of great influence to the Shanghai leadership. In the second echelon of the municipal leadership, Wang Yaoshan was secretary-general of the Municipal Party Committee, Xu Dixin, later an key figure in China's economic policy making, used to be secretary-general of the Municipal Government, and Sha Qianli, used to be a deputy secretary-general of the government.

The group's powerful status declined dramatically as of 1952, as the other two groups were on the rise.¹⁰⁴ Chen Pixian, a veteran political commissar in the New Fourth Army and party secretary who had not resided in Shanghai until one month before assuming office, was promoted from southern Jiangsu province to Shanghai as the fourth Party secretary but the acting first secretary and actual Party executive. And more key positions of municipal party and administrative apparatus began to be occupied by cadres with "Red areas" and military backgrounds.¹⁰⁵ In the meantime, Liu Changsheng and Liu Xiao left Shanghai for Beijing in 1953 and 1954 respectively. Pan Hannian's authority was significantly restricted.¹⁰⁶ Finally, in May 1955, he was secretly arrested for being an counter-revolutionary since the early 1940s and for collaborating with Rao Sushu who was purged earlier in the case of the Gao-Rao's anti-Party group.¹⁰⁷ Although like the case of Rao, Pan's fall was decided by Mao Zedong, it is believed that both Ke Qingshi and Chen

¹⁰⁴ This was certainly not an isolated phenomenon. In Guangdong province, Tao Zhu and Zhao Ziyang assumed the top authority at the expense of Fang Fang and other elites who were locally born and active, and were pragmatic and influential. See Vogel, *Canton under Communism*.

¹⁰⁵ Gu Mu, a national leader since 1975, whose main revolutionary activities were in Shandong province and northern China, and a couple of cadres of the "Red Area" also took up the posts of vice Party secretary and of standing member respectively. Xu Jianguo, a bodyguard of the central party leadership and a senior security cadre who was the only leader without any connection with the New Fourth Army and the Third Field Army and without being active in East China, not to mention Shanghai, was appointed as a deputy mayor. So was another cadre from the "Red Area," Liu Jiping. Moreover, in 1954 when Chen Yi assumed his vice premiership, Ke Qingshi became the first Party secretary. In the same year, Ma Tianshui entered into the rank of vice Party secretary, and Song Richang the rank of deputy mayor. All the three were the "Red Area" cadres.

¹⁰⁶ He even had a premonition of being transferred to Beijing (Tang Yu ed., *Lingluo Chengni Xiangrugu*, pp. 141-142).

¹⁰⁷ For the most comprehensive study of the Gao-Rao case, see Teiwes, *Politics at Mao's Court*.

Pixian had contributed somehow to it prior to Mao's decision.¹⁰⁸ Thus, the aforementioned two kinds of elite infighting within the Shanghai leadership joined and generated such an ironic result -- Pan and Rao, the two individuals who disliked each other, were tied together and purged to death.¹⁰⁹

The astonishing fall of Rao and Pan was a turning point in the transition of the post-1949 municipal leadership. Firstly, it marked a leadership predominance of non-Shanghai-based elite groups, especially the group of "Red Area." The once powerful, Shanghai-based elite group no longer had its representative at the top level of the municipal leadership until 1962 when Zhang Chengzong was appointed as a deputy mayor. Meanwhile, in 1955, two more cadres with the "Red Area" background, Cao Diqu and Wei Wenbo, and one cadre from the military joined the Party and administrative leadership. Under the leadership of Ke Qingshi and Chen Pixian, the purge of Pan involved his close associates¹¹⁰ so that the former underground revolutionaries' decline in power occurred not only at the top level but at the lower level of the municipal leadership. Secondly, the 1954-55 purge ended a conflicting dual leadership of Rao Sushi and Chen Yi and started a three-year transitional period, during which power was gradually but steadily concentrated into the hands of Ke Qingshi. Although still having the title of mayor, the vice premier Chen Yi was involved in national affairs. Meanwhile, it appeared that the first Party secretary Ke was expanding his power quite successfully. Three of the six Communist cadres appointed to the top Party and administrative positions during 1955-58 (Liu Suzhou, Shi Ximin and Song Jiwen), used to be Ke's associates when Ke was the mayor of Nanjing. In the second echelon, there appeared Zhang Chunqiao, Ke's earlier subordinate when Ke was the mayor of Shijiazhuang, North China. In 1958, Ke was promoted to a full member of the Politburo and chief of both the Party committee and government of Shanghai, marking the end of the transitional period.

¹⁰⁸ A veteran revolutionary, Tang Yu publicly mentioned the responsibility of Ke Qingshi (Tang, *Lingluo Chengni Xiangrugu*, p. 159.). And in his "Transition and Consolidation in Urban China," Chamberlain noted "Chen took an active part in the attacks on Jao Shu-shih [Rao Shushi] and P'an Han-nien [Pan Hannian] in 1954" (Scalapino ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, pp. 275-276).

¹⁰⁹ Pan's name was cleared in 1982, five years after his death in a labor camp in Hunan province. Rao died of an illness in 1975.

¹¹⁰ For example, Wang Yaoshan, secretary-general of the Municipal Party Committee, stepped down. His wife Zhao Xian, a leader of the Women's Federation of Shanghai, was also punished. Both of them were leaders of the underground Party committee of Shanghai.

Between 1958 and 1963, there were several personnel changes in the top leadership and Ke's power further expanded. However, the leadership transition from two centres of power or two lines of authority to one centre or line did not eliminate serious elite discords. What distinguished it from the earlier period was that the major source of elite friction within the Ke's leadership during the period 1958 to 1965 seemed not a conflicting personal relationship, nor a kind of group schism, but rather policy and institutional contention.

Policy disputes within the municipal leadership were largely over cultural, ideological or theoretical orientation and issues. Since the mid-1950s, Shanghai had been a forefront of Mao's radicalism versus a nation-wide bureaucratic conservatism. An ardent supporter of Mao's radical initiatives, Ke had constantly encouraged and promoted many radical ideologues and cultural critics such as Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, in spite of strong resistance and sharp criticism from within the leadership. With Ke's powerful backing, Zhang and Yao succeeded in breaking through and having both the director and deputy director of the Propaganda Department of the Municipal Party Committee removed.¹¹¹ In 1965, Zhang became a Party secretary, responsible for propaganda and cultural affairs. The rise of Zhang and Yao and their collaboration with Mao's wife Jiang Qing paved the way for their notorious role in the Cultural Revolution.

Institutional friction was another prominent feature of political conflict in the leadership. Institutional and functional changes, which affected leadership personnel and intra-relations, occurred at the top level as well as lower levels of the leadership in Shanghai.¹¹² At the municipal level, in 1955, the Party Committee headed by Ke started to expand its authority drastically into the spheres of administration and management by setting up not only general departments such as the departments of organization and propaganda but also a set of specifically functionary departments such as the industrial work department and the State Industry department.¹¹³ Especially after the

¹¹¹ For a detailed description of elite schism in the ideological and cultural arena and of the corresponding personnel changes in leadership, see Lynn White, "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955-69" (Scalapino ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, pp. 332-365).

¹¹² For institutional and functional changes in 1964-65 – the set-up of political departments or divisions or instructorship in every unit of administration, business, production, education or residence, bureaucratic unit and related elite tensions between generalists and specialists at the level of municipal bureau and the basic level of bureaucracy, see Lynn White, "Leadership in Shanghai," *ibid.*, pp. 342-344.

¹¹³ The Department of Local Staff-size Management of the Ministry of Personnel (China) ed., *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Sheng Zizhiqu Zhixiashi Dang Zheng Qun Jiguan Zuzhi Jigou Gaiyao* (Essentials of the Party, Administrative and Mass Organizations of the Provinces, Autonomous Regions, and Centrally-

national Party conference of Chengdu of March 1958 which put stress on the Party's overall leadership and the principle of "integration of the works of the Party and government," the all-out intrusion of the Party Committee on administrative and managerial affairs was greatly strengthened. In September 1958, this municipal Party leader issued a notice on the future work of the government, requiring from then on whatever the government's meetings on the municipal affairs be held by the Party Committee, and restricting the functions of the government to contacting non-party elite, hosting various visitors and dealing with residents' complaints and concerns. This kind of intrusion was bound to complicate lines of authority and responsibilities, to bring about more bureaucratism, and to fuel the institutional and functional friction between the Party and government.

Several leaders of the municipal government (the Municipal People's Council as of 1955), including deputy mayors Cao Diqu and Shi Ying, tried to resist the Party's intrusion. The MPC meetings were held regularly and some administrative policies or guidelines were proclaimed in the name of the MPC. And with the support of Communist deputy mayors, non-party deputy mayors were still able to assume administrative leadership in some domains such as city construction and culture. In 1962 when conservative national leaders regained much of the grounds in leadership and policy making that were lost during the Great Leap period, Cao led a local attack at the radical phenomenon of "Yi Dang Dai Zheng" (the displacement of the government by the Party) in the name of "Strengthening the Party's leadership and giving play to the government". As a result, the MPC's administrative leadership severely impeded by the Party Committee in the past three years, was largely restored.¹¹⁴

Clearly, the political leadership of Shanghai in the seventeen years prior to the Cultural Revolution was not a unitary one. It had experienced a transition from two centres of authority to one centre with institutional and functional conflicts between the Party Committee and the

directed Municipalities in the People's Republic of China). Beijing: The Chinese Personnel Press, 1989, p. 404.

¹¹⁴ See the municipal bureau-level leader Fan Zhengfu's reminiscent article "Zhongsheng Wei Renmin Fuwu de Shiganjia – Jinian Shiyong Tongzhi Shishi Ershi Zhounian" (A man of action, serving the people all his life - commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the death of Shi Ying), in the Shanghai People's Political Consultative Conference and the United Front Department of the Party Committee of Shanghai eds., *Shanghai Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji; Tongzhan Gongzuo Shiliao Zuanji* (Selected Historical Accounts of the Past Events in Shanghai; Historical Materials about Works of the United Front), Shanghai: the Shanghai People's Press, 1986, v. 6, pp. 179-181.

government. The four major kinds of elite strife - personal, group, policy, and functional - had contributed to waves of personnel and institutional changes in the municipal leadership. Those leadership conflicts and relating changes, especially the turnover of chief Party and administrative officials correlated the performance of the Shanghai leadership in the same period.

3. LEADERSHIP PERFORMANCE, METHODS, AND PROBLEMS

In this section, a general enquiry will be made into the leadership performance during the periods of 1949-55 and 1955-65, and then into the leadership's methods, visions, and problems of performance. Since leadership is a relationship between leader and the led, and since political leadership performance is conditioned by and should be assessed relative to the level of social, political and economic development, our enquiry also takes the circumstances of the leadership into consideration.

In the existing literature of the CCP, associated with the conventional view that there was a high degree of ruralism in the Communist leadership of urban China, is the assertion that in the early years after liberation, Chinese Communists found themselves not only in an alien circumstance but also in a weak position vis-à-vis a strong bourgeoisie, especially in Shanghai.¹¹⁵ The bourgeoisie possessed wealth, high social status and business talents while the CCP lacked them on top of urban experience and sufficient manpower. This view needs to be revisited.

It is true that an apparent shortage of revolutionary cadres and Party members, though not as acute as previous researches suggested, was a major problem confronting the new leadership of Shanghai. Nevertheless, since realizing the unification of China after a century of foreign aggressions and civil wars and bringing the corrupted and incompetent Nationalist regime to an end, the Party immensely boosted the people's deep-rooted national sentiment and individuals' hopes for a bright future, and won an unprecedented popularity from urban as well as rural residents, including many businessmen and numerous talented urbanites who regarded the

¹¹⁵ A representative of this conventional view is John Gardner. In his "The Wu-fan Campaign in Shanghai: A Study in the Consolidation of Urban Control," he stated that "The position of the bourgeoisie, in contrast to that of the Chinese Communist Party, was relatively strong, not only in Shanghai but throughout urban China." (Scalapino ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, pp. 485-486).

Communist regime as legitimate were also willing to serve it. As far as the Communist leadership is concerned, not only did most top municipal leaders have urban experience and a majority of them were well-acquainted with Shanghai, but also a considerable portion of bureau- and district-level officials were local residents. Among them, one could find a lot of talent and expertise, such as urban generalist Pan Hannian, economist Xu Dixin, long-experienced bank staff Zhang Chengzong, cultural specialist Xia Yan, and external affairs expert Huang Hua. In addition, soon after liberation, the Communists confiscated all the properties and facilities belonging to the Nationalist regime and elite, and built up the State sector, which surpassed the private sector. In contrast to the bourgeoisie's lack of political skills as well as its own political force, the CCP had its unmatched strength in ideology and effective propaganda, in its organization and capability of organizing and mobilizing the Chinese society, and in its gradualist programs and strategies.¹¹⁶

The long-term ambition of the Chinese Communist leadership was to transform China from a poor, backward, fragmented, and weak "semi-colonial" and "semi-feudal" country to a wealthy, modern, integrated, and strong socialist giant. Its immediate goals after takeover, however, were to revive a collapsing economy, to improve people's living standard, to establish social and political order, to build an effective governing machinery, and in short, to consolidate the Communist rule. To serve these national goals, the leadership in Shanghai started propaganda on a large scale, condemning imperialism, feudalism and the Nationalist Party, while glorifying the CCP, the PLA, the revolutionary tradition of the Shanghai people, and the new regime called the "People's Democratic Dictatorship." The propaganda helped legitimize the Communist rule, build a good public image of the military and civilian "liberators," and reinforce the patriotism and anti-KMT sentiments of almost all the social groups, including the bourgeoisie. Thus, based on the platform of building a wealthy, strong, independent new China, the municipal leadership was able to enlist an unprecedented degree of enthusiasm and support from the society so that a favourable milieu of governance was created.

¹¹⁶ For fine researches on these aspects of strength in general, see Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, John Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1963), John Lindbeck, ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), and Harry Harding, *Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949-1976* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981); for those on China's provincial leadership and politics other than Shanghai, see Vogel, *Canton under Communism*, and Victor Falkenheim, "Provincial Leadership in Fukien, 1949-66" (in Scalapino, ed., *Elites of the People's Republic of China*, pp. 199-244).

The successful propaganda was carried out through organizing the society as well as through existing channels such as the media, bookstores and schools. Organizing the entire society was a priority of the municipal leadership. Relying on previous underground revolutionary activists and organizations such as trade unions and the associations of teachers, and on "democratic" or pro-Communist bourgeois elite, the leadership set up a series of occupational organizations from the Municipal Trade Union to the Association of Industry and Commerce. Non-working residents were organized into residential committees.¹¹⁷ Besides these two kinds of organizations, there were such organizations as the Municipal Federation of Women which cut across occupation and residence. These three kinds of mass organizations constituted a societal network, setting the stage for a totalization of social control, mobilization, and politicization.

Gradualism and pragmatism in program and strategy characterized and resulted in the victory of the CCP over the once giant KMT; so did they during the early years of the Communist rule. As China was in the transitional stage between a bourgeois-democratic revolution and a socialist revolution and construction¹¹⁸, and as the new regime had yet to be consolidated,¹¹⁹ the CCP's general approach to economic, social and political problems was open, prudent, practical and gradualistic, if compared with that after the mid-1950s. This was reflected in the CCP's blueprint "the Common Program,"¹²⁰ and in its guideline and plan on how to take over Shanghai.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ The residential committee was initiated by the leadership of Shanghai in 1951 as a basic-level urban organization of mass character. However, like other so-called mass organizations, this one has been controlled by the Communist authorities and it has contributed enormously to the expansion and consolidation of the Communist rule and control over the entire society. For its sociopolitical goals, functions and impacts, see Janet Salaff, "Urban Residential Committees in the Wake of the Cultural Revolution," in John Lewis, ed., *The City in Communist China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 289-303.

¹¹⁸ This strategic assessment or judgment was the official Communist viewpoint. The reasons were that one crucial task of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, namely land reform, remained to be fulfilled, and that the economic or material basis and preparation for the socialist revolution and construction had yet to complete.

¹¹⁹ In the case of Shanghai, there were continual direct military attacks (air raid) from the Nationalist side. The most damaging one occurred on February 6, 1950. At the same time, there existed a considerable number of the KMT's secret agents, trying to sabotage the Communist efforts to consolidate power.

¹²⁰ The Common Program was approved by the new authorities in September 1949. Reflecting the CCP Chairman Mao's gradualistic strategy for the Chinese revolution outlined almost a decade ago in his treatise "On New Democracy," this general guideline was basically for the transitional stage between a "semi-colonial" and "semi-feudal" China and a socialist China. The mission of transition was to be carried out by a revolutionary alliance of four classes – the industrial proletariat, the poor peasants, the middle classes, and the national capitalists. This program attempted "to take both private and public interests into consideration and benefit both labor and capital, to encourage mutual aid between the cities and countryside and exchanges between China and foreign countries, and to develop production and bring prosperity to the economy."

Specifically, the Shanghai leadership took three steps -- take-over, management and reconstruction -- to accomplish the mission of take-over.¹²² There were examples of pragmatism. Although the essence of the Marriage Law of 1950 was the emancipation of Chinese women, the status of concubines was tolerated by the authorities. While anti-imperialism had been a major theme of the Communist propaganda, the properties of foreigners were not confiscated.¹²³ In its efforts to eliminate notorious gangsters in Shanghai, the leadership decided to open the door of the trade union to gangsters, and even not to punish Huang Jinxing, the once number-one gangster, provided they obeyed the Communist rule and were no longer involved in crimes. Probably the most striking and important evidence of the Communist approach and capability was the treatment of the seemingly powerful Shanghai bourgeoisie. The municipal administration, and its executive Pan Hannian in particular, realized that economic restoration and socio-political consolidation could not and should not rely on the Party, the government and the working class only; and the leadership ought not to ignore business elite who had credits for patriotic and anti-authoritarian activities as well as needed capital, managerial skill and business experience.¹²⁴ Accordingly, the leadership actively carried out the national guideline "Gong Si Jiangu, Lao Zi Liangli" (Consider

(Article 11). Also see Teiwes, "The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, 1949-1957" as Chapter 1 of MacFarquhar ed., *The Politics of China*, pp. 27-28.

¹²¹ For the detailed, comprehensive guideline and plan, see the CCP Bureau of East China's "On Policies on the Takeover of Shanghai and Some Problems" passed on by Wang Yaoshan to the takeover team on May 11, 1949 (in the Archives of Shanghai ed., *The Liberation of Shanghai*, pp. 70-82). According to it, the takeover, as a "guerilla war, not a war of annihilation," must be realized step by step. It concerns literally almost everything conceivable about the takeover, from principles and strategies to policies and tactics.

¹²² For details, see Mayor Chen Yi's report made on August 3, 1949, on the behalf of the Municipal Committee of Military Control and the People's Government (*ibid.*, pp. 146-157).

¹²³ In 1949-1950, foreigners, particularly British and Americans, still controlled major public utilities from electricity and water supply to telephone and modern vehicles, which were essential to urban life. The realization of the Communist leadership that an immediate, forceful deprivation of the foreign control over these public utilities and some other properties in Shanghai would be harmful rather instrumental to economic restoration and social stability explains in part why the Communists did not take radical actions against foreigners after takeover. But they had never abandoned their goal of eliminating foreign control, which was accomplished in the mid-1950s. The Korean war was a turning point in the relationship between the Communist authorities and the foreigners from the West. For the rationales behind the Communist benign treatment of foreigners in the city, see "Wang Yaoshan's Speech on the Policies of Takeover and Other Works after Entering Shanghai," in the Archives of Shanghai ed., *The Liberation of Shanghai*, pp. 70-82. For the foreigners' illusion and later disillusion about the Communist rule, see Noel Barber, *The Fall of Shanghai: The Communist Takeover in 1949* (London: MacMillan, 1979).

¹²⁴ See "Wang Yaoshan's Speech on the Policies of takeover and Other Works after Entering Shanghai" (*The Liberation of Shanghai*, pp. 70-82); and Tang, *Lingluo Chengni Xiangnugu*, pp. 64-75.

both public and private interests, benefit both labour and capital). Private business establishments and activities were allowed as usual, except for the suppression of speculative enterprises and activities such as stock exchanges. Moreover, those private enterprises in dismal economic situations were helped out by the government in loan, supply of raw materials, and order of production. Workers were discouraged from striking against the management, and disputes between the two sides were often resolved with governmental arbitration. Organized into the Association of Industry and Commerce, industrialists, bankers, merchants and people influential in the business circle had their representation at all three levels of authority in the city (municipal, district and sub-district), and were invited to attend governmental meetings and express their opinions regularly.¹²⁵ Even in the Five Antis campaign of 1952-53 (against bribery, theft of state property, theft of state secrets, cheating on contracts, and tax evasion), whose target was the bourgeoisie, an overwhelming majority of the bourgeoisie, especially 303 business elite, were "educated" and criticised but not penalized for their tax evasion.¹²⁶

The prudent, gradualist and pragmatic approach to enormous urban problems were attributed in part to the municipal leaders, particularly Chen Yi and Pan Hannian (and probably Rao Shushi). One of the most well-known "rightists" in the CCP, Chen had a long record of disliking "left" deviation in strategy and policy, whose key feature was an overemphasis of class struggle. The successful survival and expansion of the New Fourth Army and base areas in East China, the backyard of the enemy-occupied area, demonstrated his very willingness and skills in maximizing allies, including anti-Communist forces. So was Pan, proved in his outstanding activities in Shanghai and other "White areas," making friends with an extraordinary diversity of figures and taking advantage of all kinds of social connections. Although Chen was and Pan had different personalities, both were prone to gradualism and pragmatism, and prone to a united-front strategy, making direct contact with non-communist elite.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ For an insightful account on how the municipal leadership dealt with the bourgeoisie, see then director of the municipal bureau of industry and commerce Xu Dixin's reminiscence "Yanyang Zhao Dadi" (The bright sun shines the earth), in Xue Muqiao, ed., *Ao Shuang Ji* (the Collection of Being Strong and Unyielding), Beijing: the China Lookout Press, 1989, pp. 30-53.

¹²⁶ John Gardner's "The Wu-fan Campaign in Shanghai" details the campaign (in Barnett ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, pp. 477-539).

¹²⁷ Not afraid of being accused of losing the proletarian stand, both of them even took the lead in accepting invitations for dinner from the business circle. For the personalities and leadership styles of Chen and Pan,

Despite the Communist leaders' gradualist and pragmatist approach and their propaganda and organizational strength, a series of campaigns was launched by the Communist leadership, especially after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, so as to ensure its ultimate total control over the society. After the land reform, there occurred the Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries in 1951-52, the thought reform of intellectuals and campaigns of criticising the film "the life of Wu Xun" and the "bourgeois" philosopher Hu Shi in 1951-53, the "Three Anti" (anti-corruption, anti-waste, and anti-bureaucratism) and "Five Antis" campaigns in 1952, the purges of "the Hu Feng counter-revolutionary group," of the intellectuals involved in the "Yu Pingbo affair" or the "Dream of the Red Chamber affair", and of the "Gao Gang-Rao Shushi anti-Party alliance" in 1954-55, and the Elimination of Counter-revolutionaries in 1955, in which Pan himself was arrested and jailed. In Shanghai, these campaigns by and large appeared more severe than in other provincial unites, bringing on tens of thousand cases of demotion, loss of job and privilege, imprisonment, and execution,¹²⁸ generating enormous psychological pressures on the society in general and on the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia in particular, in the course of establishing a total Communist control and new social value and structure.

A combination of political education, institutional building, gradual programs, pragmatic leadership styles, and massive campaigns enabled the municipal leadership to overcome mammoth urban problems within a relatively short period of time. Three years after takeover, rampant inflation which contributed to the collapse of the Nationalist regime was under control, industrial productivity and commercial activity were restored and developed somewhat. An unprecedented political control by the CCP over the society, particularly over the bourgeoisie, and a new political order were built. New social values, customs, order and relations emerged. By 1955, the urban economy, especially industry, had developed rapidly under the First Five Year Plan (1953-57) in emulation of the Soviet model. The Communist authorities and political penetration into the society had been reinforced. Social stability had coincided with a revolutionary social

see Hu Shiyan, et al, *Chen Yi Zhuan* (The biography of Chen Yi) (Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 1991), and Tang, *Lingluo Chengni Huarugu*.

¹²⁸ There is no accurate combined figure of the direct victims of these campaigns. However, one can make an estimation upon fragmentary information. In the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Campaign alone, it was said that "altogether 3,000 accusation meetings disposed of 40,000 cases" (Craig Dietrich, *People's China: A Brief History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 72). It must be noted that our estimation of victims does not include their implicated friends and relatives.

transformation. The Communist leadership not only had achieved its initial goals of socio-economic restoration and political consolidation, but had started preparations for the establishment of a socialist economic basis for China's socialist revolution and reconstruction.

During the period of 1955-65, Shanghai, like other parts of Communist China, had undergone radical economic, social and political developments. The period 1955-58 witnessed an all-out socialist offensive and transformation -- a "high tide" of agricultural collectivization, a socialist transformation of industry, commerce and handicraft industry, a massive "Anti-Rightists" campaign. As a consequence, the bourgeoisie and rich peasants lost their ownership of means of production, and in this sense they were extinguished as classes. The intelligentsia lost academic freedom as well as traditional self-confidence or self-esteem. The Communist State virtually owned everything in the name of public ownership, and gained a total control over the society. There were a total politicization and a radicalization of politics and developmental strategies. In 1957, it was officially claimed that the socialist basis had been laid and a Chinese socialist revolution and reconstruction began. Between 1958 and 1965, with an escalation of political campaigns, purges and education (the purge of the Peng Dehui anti-Party group, the campaigns of "Learning from Lei Feng" and "learning from the PLA," and "the Socialist Education Movement), the cyclic radicalization of Chinese politics and developmental strategies continued,¹²⁹ despite the failure of the Great Leap and waves of mounting political and economic counteractions from the bureaucracy.¹³⁰

At the same time, what made Shanghai distinctive from other provincial units was its outstanding radicalism in the implementation of Mao's radical policies and in China's political development. After 1955, the Shanghai leadership rushed the "socialist transformation of industry and commerce" and the transformation of the city from a multifunctional metropolis to an industrial base with sharply shrunk consumption and services. In response to Mao's call for giving aids to the border regions and countryside, and for political education or thought reform, by 1966 the

¹²⁹ During this period, the communist principle that "politics takes command" and class struggle were emphasized as the key factor and the primary driving force respectively in China social and economic development. Meanwhile, the Communist leadership called for "Learning from Dazhai" (a model brigade in Shanxi province, Northern China). A revolution in the domain of culture started under the direction of Mao's wife Jiang Qing.

leadership had already sent a total of four million cadres, managers, professionals, skilled workers, educated youths and other urban residents down to remote areas. As of 1958 when Mao initiated one of the largest decentralizations with an expeditious organizational and functional expansion of the role of the Party,¹³¹ Shanghai was extremely active in augmenting the authority of the Party, particularly of the head of the Party committees, at the expense of government (we mentioned earlier). Most remarkably, Shanghai played a leading role in the ideological and cultural sphere by propagating the Maoist ideas of permanent revolution,¹³² and by becoming the national base for the Maoist revolutionization of Chinese culture and arts.¹³³ In short, by 1966, Shanghai had been built into the most important national base for the Maoist radical policies.

The distinctive radicalism of Shanghai was mainly attributed to the Party secretary and Mayor Ke Qingshi, a "Red Area" cadre though having spent years in underground activities and in political work in the military. Perhaps because the complex Party history and his own up-and-down political career made him come to realize the utmost importance of following Mao's instructions and to buttress Mao absolutely,¹³⁴ Ke made extraordinary efforts to fathom Mao's speeches and writings and to implement Mao's radical thinking¹³⁵. Ke's radical leadership, manifested in the

¹³⁰ Maurice Meisner's *Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic* (New York: The Free Press, 1977, Parts 3 & 4) provides a fine description and analysis of the zigzag course of the development of Chinese politics and economic strategy and policies during this period.

¹³¹ See Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, pp. 188-219.

¹³² Two most notorious and far-reaching radical articles in the history of the People's Republic of China are worth noting here. The first one "Breaking Away from the Idea of Bourgeois Rights," which theoretically attacked the bureaucracy, social hierarchy, inequality and the principle of material interests, was written in 1958 by Zhang Chunqiao, then editor-in-chief of *Liberation Daily*, the mouthpiece of the Municipal Party Committee (See Harding, *Organizing China*, pp. 191-193). The second one is Yao Wenyuan's conspiratorial criticism in 1965 of the prominent official-historian Wu Han's play in 1961 entitled "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office." This criticism, to many observers, was the prelude to the Cultural Revolution. See Jacques Guillermaz, *The Chinese Communist Party in Power, 1949-76* (Translated by Anne Destenay. Kent: Dawson, 1976), pp. 360-363.

¹³³ Teiwes, "The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime," in Macfarquhar, ed., *The Politics of China, 1949-1989*, pp. 134-135.

¹³⁴ A graduate from a normal school, he joined the Party as early as 1922 in Shanghai. Although he was secretary-general of the CCPCC in the early 1930s and deputy and once acting director of the United Front Department of the CCPCC in the first half of the 1940s, although he used to work underground with Liu Shaoqi, a ranking Communist leaders in the forties, and was rumored to have been in the same study group with Chairman Mao during the rectification of Yanan, Ke was not a member of the Mao-dominated Seventh CCPCC in 1945, and was a vice mayor of Nanjing in 1949.

¹³⁵ For instance, after a careful study of Mao's speech of April 25, 1956 "On Ten Great Relationships," Ke took note of Mao's idea of taking advantage of the relatively peaceful external situations and gearing up industries in the coastal areas. He translated this idea into the principal theme and guideline of his key report

socialist transformation of industry and commerce, the campaign of "Anti-Rightists", the Great Leap Forward, and a massive industrial development, were paid off. With merely four years (1954-58) in Shanghai, his official title of first Party secretary was added with the mayorship, membership of the Eighth CCPCC and then the Politburo, and was even considered by Mao as the substitute of Zhou Enlai for premiership. These rewards, in return, seemed to have strengthened his determination to follow Mao without reservation. Being among the few most ardent supporters of Mao in intra-Party struggles such as the Peng Dehui affair,¹³⁶ Ke strove to make Shanghai a key base for Mao's radical forces and a best field for the Maoist revolutionary experiments, including Jiang Qing's "revolution of drama," though his endeavour was circumscribed by bureaucratic constraints as a miniature of the national political scene.

In leading Shanghai toward a radical, revolutionary role, Ke demonstrated his different personality and leadership style.¹³⁷ One recent source portrays him as a serious and somewhat impatient man, critical of almost all his subordinates.¹³⁸ He lacked the charisma of Chen Yi, and the intelligence that Pan Hannian demonstrated, but he seemed distinguished with his strong willingness and determination to conduct class struggle in building socialism and to be Mao's surrogate in intra-Party struggles. His motto was "unshakeable revolutionary will, indomitable fighting spirit, fervent class feeling, and strict scientific attitude."¹³⁹ In conducting leadership, if Chen and Pan inclined to the necessity of bureaucratic systems, of techniques of "united front," and of administrators, Ke tended to stress the importance of mass movement, of class struggle, and of ideologues and propagandists.

The differences between the chief municipal leaders during the periods of 1949-55 and 1955-65, however, were less striking than those between them and the leaders in the Cultural

at the first municipal Party Congress in July 1956, with a blunt criticism of the previous municipal leadership for its cautious approach to industrial development [Actually the pre-1956 industrialization in Shanghai was not slow at all] (See Ye Yonglie, *Zhang Chunqiao Fuchen Shi* [A history of Zhang Chunqiao's Rise and Fall]. Changchun: The Shidai Wenyi Press, 1988, pp. 96-97).

¹³⁶ Apart from those from the central leadership such as Lin Biao and Luo Ruiqing, another fervent provincial leader was Li Jingquan of Sichuan province. For Li's political activities and policy preference, see David Goodman, *Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China: Sichuan and Guizhou, 1955-1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

¹³⁷ Edgar Snow had interviewed him. For his depiction of Ke, see Snow, *The Other Side of the River: Red China Today*. New York: Random House, 1963, p. 543-549.

¹³⁸ Ye Yonglie, *A History of Zhang Chunqiao's Rise and Fall*, p. 96.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

Revolution or in the reform era. Chen, Pan, Ke and other pre-1966 Communist leaders in Shanghai were all revolutionary veterans and political mobilizers; many of them were experienced administrators. Like other provincial leaders,¹⁴⁰ they all had committed and contributed to the national programme of transforming China from a loose Party-State with a diversified "semi-colonial" and "semi-feudal" society and a market economy to a monolithic Party-State with a uniformed socialist society and a highly centralized planning economy. They were preoccupied with the national goals and demands rather than local interests. In this sense, they were local agents of the national authorities rather than local leaders.

The application of the national programme to Shanghai was achieved by virtue of an amalgamation of persuasive, coercive and normative methods. There had been a spiralling intensification of political indoctrination, of campaigns and purges, of organizing and structuring the bureaucracy and society, and of regular political and administrative intervention into economy. As a major organizational reflection on the Communist leadership's emphasis and preferred techniques, the Municipal Party Committee, the primary and foremost body of the municipal leadership, consisted of only three major functionary departments - propaganda, organization and united front. In addition, the size of the public security bureau in the municipal administrative apparatus had been overwhelming.¹⁴¹

The post-1949 leadership doctrine, agenda, strategies and techniques tended to be influenced more by the Chinese Communists' own "Yanan" legacy than by the Soviet model,

¹⁴⁰ For studies of the revolutionary leaders at the provincial level, particularly in Guangdong, Fujian, Sichuan and Guizhou, see Vogel's *Canton under Communism*, Victor Falkenheim's Ph.D. dissertation "Provincial Administration in Fukien, 1949-1966" (Columbia University, 1972), and Goodman's *Center and Province in the People's Republic of China* respectively.

¹⁴¹ In 1952, the municipal government had twenty-five bureau-level units and a total of 35,294 staff; the bureau of public security alone, had 19,654 personnel, 55.7 percent of the total. In the end of 1957 when there were fifty-one bureau-level units, the personnel of the bureau decreased slightly to 18,501, counting for 58.1 percent of the total staff of 31,820. By the end of 1965 when the bureau-level units increased to sixty-three but the total personnel was cut more than one half to 14,810, the personnel of public security also dropped to 7,206, but still counted for 48.7 percent of the total. See The Department of Local Staff-size Management of the Ministry of Personnel (China) ed., *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Sheng Zizhiqu Zhixiashi Dang Zheng Qun Jiguan Zuzhi Jigou Gaiyao* (Essentials of the Party, Administrative and Mass Organizations of the Provinces, Autonomous Regions, and Centrally-directed Municipalities in the People's Republic of China), Beijing: The Chinese Personnel Press, 1989.

though there were fluctuations of the influence of the legacy.¹⁴² During the period 1936-47, especially in the 1940s, in its headquarters in Yanan, the Communist leadership utilized two fundamental strategies, namely the "mass line" and, to a lesser degree, an elite-oriented strategy called the "United front," for political, economic and military purposes. The leadership emphasized a close relationship between leaders and led by the campaigns for "simple administration," the campaigns of "Xiafang" (sending down to the basic level of the society, especially the countryside), rectification, and mass movements. The Yanan model was a model of "politics taking command" of economy, and of economic self-reliance and self-sufficiency. The Yanan legacy underlined the limitless potential of men and the advantage of intensive labour over modern science and technology, the role of the generalists over that of the expert, political and spiritual inspirations rather than material incentives on men, and constant struggle rather than rationality. To mould a revolutionary person and create a new society, voluntarism, selflessness and self-sacrifice, and ascetic and egalitarian values were advocated through extensive and intensive political indoctrination and thought reform (the most common methods to do so were small-group discussions, uniformed propaganda, creation of models, public criticism and self-criticism). Finally, in the Yanan period, there was a decentralization of administrative and managerial power coupled with an expansion and consolidation of the Party's authority and control. All these recurred in Shanghai and other parts of the country in the period of 1949-65, especially after 1955.

These revolutionary leadership doctrines, strategies and methods helped the post-1949 leadership accomplish a great deal in political, social and economic development, but at an immense expense of the led. The Communist leadership achieved political order and stability partly in virtue of "the development of political institutions and the mobilization of new social forces into politics."¹⁴³ Meanwhile, the led were deprived of many basic freedoms, including freedom of speech, investment, and migration, let alone a great many individuals were purged, imprisoned and even executed for political purposes. The leadership succeeded in the socialist transformation of society in the sense that it had deprived the bourgeoisie of ownership of productive means, created

¹⁴² For details of the legacy of Yanan, see Mark Selden, *The Yanan Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China*, pp. 47-51, and "Yenan Communism and Chinese People's Republic" (in James Crowley, ed., *Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970), pp. 265-296.

¹⁴³ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Society* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. vii.

a uniformed political community, reshaped social relations along class lines, and introduced an ascetic life style and a set of new social norms and values. Yet what accompanied this success were a widespread discrimination against the bourgeoisie, the victims of Communist politics and their families, an undermining of Chinese traditional social relations and values, and a uniformity of life style.

The municipal leadership also achieved the goal of both restructuring the economy into socialist planned one emphasizing production, heavy industry and, rapid growth.¹⁴⁴ On the other hand, the economic planning system was rigid, the economic structure was unbalanced, and the economic developmental strategy and practice neglected balanced development in the realm of consumption, of housing and infrastructure construction, finance, commerce, service, light industries and agriculture. This neglect counteracted the leadership's attempts to improve the people's living and working conditions, though one study suggests that there was a slow, cyclical increase in the living standards of industrial workers in Shanghai.¹⁴⁵ In addition to the production-oriented developmental strategy and practice, during the period of 1958-65, Shanghai remitted 83.7 percent of its total local revenue to Beijing, and so there was not much capital left for local housing and infrastructure projects.¹⁴⁶ Perhaps the most formidable obstacle to improving the people's living standard as well as maintaining political and social stability was the excessive growth in population -- a 64 percent increase in sixteen years,¹⁴⁷ a result of the Maoist developmental strategy and strategic considerations, which underscored the factor of manpower.

¹⁴⁴ However, how to evaluate the annual rate of the growth and so how accurate the statistics were is subject to debate. See T. C. Liu and K. C. Yeh, *The Economy of the Chinese Mainland: National Income and Economic Development, 1933-1959* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965) and Alexander Eckstein, *China's Economic Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

¹⁴⁵ Bruce Reynolds, "Changes in the Standard of Living of Shanghai Industrial Workers, 1930-1973," in Christopher Howe, ed., *Shanghai: Revolution and Development in an Asian Metropolis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, *Shanghai*, pp. 222-391).

¹⁴⁶ This level of remittance, the highest among China's provincial units, had remained until 1985. Gang Tian, *Shanghai's Role in the Economic Development of China: Reform of Foreign Trade and Investment*, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996, Table 3.1, p. 42. Also see Lin Zhimin, "Reform and Shanghai: Changing Central-Local Fiscal Relations" (in Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin eds., *Changing Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity*, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 239-259), and Lynn White III, *Shanghai Shanghaied?: Uneven Taxes in Reform China* (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1991).

¹⁴⁷ This is an estimation of the population of "putative" new Shanghai for as of 1958 the boundary of Shanghai expanded substantially. If based on the actual population of Shanghai in 1949, the population of

More fundamentally, the retardation of the sectors directly concerning the Shanghai people's living and working conditions was due to the centre's over-centralized control over Shanghai and other provincial units, under the slogan and principle of "Quan Guo Yi Pan Qi" ("All parts of the country are like one single chess board". This metaphor underlines the priority of national interests and needs over local ones, referring to co-ordinating all the activities of the nation like a whole, and more importantly, the compliance of every locality with national strategies and directives). Meanwhile, the responsibility of the municipal leadership should not be ignored. Ke Qishi was one of the centre's most radical and active agents in provincial units rather than a senior provincial-level representative.¹⁴⁸ Under his leadership, Shanghai authorities took the lead in implementing the Maoist policies and developmental strategy, while being less enthusiastic towards the directives of the so-called conservative national leaders which generally were more concerned with improvement in the people's living and working conditions.

During the period of 1949-66, the revolutionary leadership in Shanghai had constantly confronted several problems of leadership. A general problem was revolution versus modernization. The Communist leadership was committed to both the Mao-led "Proletarian revolution" and to modernization. However, the municipal leadership was caught between Mao's call for the continuation of Chinese revolutionary doctrines and spirits and the needs of institutionalization, bureaucratization, regularization and rationalization. As a collective scholarship reveals, the economic, political, social developments in the modern Chinese city "continued to defy Mao's revolutionary doctrine."¹⁴⁹ Specifically, there were problems concerning leadership approaches, criteria of recruitment, policy making and implementation.

The first one was egalitarianism versus social stratification and inequality. The Communist leadership committed itself to a gradual elimination of distinctions between town and country, industry and agriculture, physical and mental labour, and adopted an egalitarian strategy of development if compared with the Nationalist administration or with the Soviet Union. This

1965 had doubled from five millions to roughly eleven millions. See Robert Ash, "The Quest for Food Self-sufficiency," *ibid.*, pp. 218-221.

¹⁴⁸ Another well-known radical heavyweight was Li Jingquan of Sichuan province. For Li's attitudes and conduct, see David Goodman, *Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China: Sichuan and Guizhou, 1955-1965*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

¹⁴⁹ Lewis, "Introduction: Order and Modernization in the Chinese City, in his *The City in Communist China*, p. 1.

commitment and strategy did lead to a considerable progress. Nonetheless, after seventeen years of political, economic and social reconstruction and development, the three distinctions were far from elimination, regional disparities were observable, social stratification and inequalities (not to mention political inequality) still existed in terms of income, housing, social status, supply of food and commodities, and access to education, health and other social services. It is noticeable that one distinctiveness of the phenomena is a heavy play of politics. While the majority of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia lost its elite status, and while a great number of victims of various campaigns, rectification and purges were subject to deliberate discriminations from the state, the Communist elite and their relatives enjoyed special treatments from housing to health service,¹⁵⁰ and the rank of cadre became the standard for determining each person's wage scale, social status and treatment.

The second problem was "red" versus "expert," a highly sensitive political problem since it concerns cadre recruitment and leadership composition.¹⁵¹ Although the Communist leadership desired a cadre or a leadership to be both "red" and expert, or both politically loyal and able to do good job, these two aspects had never been combined equally, and even had contradicted and excluded each other. The unequal combination, contradiction and exclusion tended to favour "red" over expert, though there were fluctuations coinciding the ups and downs of Party infighting. As a sign, party cadres, a kind of representative of "red" expanded their power at the expense of non-party cadres, a representative of "expert." Within the party, it seemed that the fastest promoted were ideologues and propagandists such as Zhang Chunqiao rather than administrators, managers and scientists needed for modernization.

The third problem was the roles of leaders, masses and experts in policy making. Mao and the communist leadership had stressed that leadership should be "from the masses, to the masses," and that the masses should participate in policy making. Meanwhile, they had underlined the vanguard nature of the Party, the importance of educating and guiding the masses, and the principle of centralization of authority. In addition, policy process was complicated and compartmented; bureaucrats tended to put their interests and opinions ahead of the ordinary people's; the cadre system made leading and ordinary cadres responsive to their superiors rather than to the ordinary

¹⁵⁰ *CPC Cadres' High Living: A Translated Collection of Excerpts from Chinese Mainland Publications* (compiled by Chen Ke-wei. Hong Kong: Altai Publishing House, 1978) provides some information on the privileged life of Communist elites.

people; and there was no adequate institutional and legal mechanisms to ensure the responsiveness of leadership to the masses' concerns. Therefore, mass participation in policy making rather became a hollow slogan. As well, the role of specialists in policy making, crucial in modernization, was generally insignificant, given the tendency of the leadership's treatment of the "red-expert" contradiction.

The fourth problem was mobilization campaigns versus institutional building. During 1949 to 1965, although there were periods of the communist leadership's utilizing both campaigns and institutions to fulfil its missions, there were periods of giving priority to either one, and even exploring mass campaign against bureaucratic establishments. Rooted in the Yanan model, these phenomena reflected on the social and bureaucratic developments, more importantly, on Mao's and other Communist leaders' preferences and the status of their infighting. While many Communist elite inclined to institutional building, Mao and his supporters including Ke and Zhang Chunqiao preferred mobilization campaign as a key leadership technique to help implement policy, transform the society, counter bureaucratism, and ensure the Communist rule.¹⁵² Although Mao had been the paramount leader of China and Ke was that of Shanghai, the degree of their influence did change, and so were the emphasis of leadership technique. But Mao's unchallenged power enabled him and his supporters to intervene the progress of bureaucratic institutionalization and specialization from time to time.

Notwithstanding, the leadership of veteran revolutionaries in Shanghai was quite competent, not only in governing but also in conducting political, social and economic development and transformation while maintaining stability, though at horrible expenses. However, it seems less open-minded and less competent than our primary object of research, the technocratic leadership, as far as modernization is concerned. The revolutionary leadership's inclination to revolution rather than modernization, its politicization of the entire society and radicalization of politics, and its high authoritarianism and intensification of class struggle, overshadowed its efforts for economic development. Its strength and weakness were owing partly to the Yanan legacy,

¹⁵¹ For the meaning, origins and evolution of the "red-expert" contradiction, see Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, pp. 163-172.

¹⁵² The sociologist Charles P. Cell conducted a comprehensive study of the Chinese campaigns. He divided them into three types – economic, struggle and ideological. In his view, their utilities were different, though the overall utility was remarkable. See his *Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China*, New York, San Francisco, London: Academic Press, 1977.

partly to the national leadership, and partly to those municipal leaders' own educational qualification, urban experience, and above all, political skill. Meanwhile, the leadership was not unified, infighting over personal, institutional and policy issues endured. With the above problems unsolved, political infighting intensified, and finally exploded in 1966.

CHAPTER THREE

THE LEADERSHIP OF MAOIST RADICALS AND REBELS, 1966-1976

The period of 1966-76 is called by many as the period of the Cultural Revolution. But to some Western scholars, the Cultural Revolution took place only between 1965/66 and 1969/71, as there were significant changes in leadership afterwards.¹⁵³ Certainly, there were some leadership changes, yet they are regarded here as indicators of different stages in the course of the Cultural Revolution, as the essence of the Maoist-radical leadership in terms of personnel, institution, ideology and socioeconomic development strategy remained little changed over the ten years.

The Cultural Revolution period was an extraordinary period in the history of Chinese politics in general and political leadership in particular. This period was distinguished from both that of 1949-65 and that of 1977-95 by the hallmark of Maoist radicalism. On the other hand, this period did not separate itself completely from the other two periods. The Cultural Revolution involved a drastic movement of the revolutionary politics and leadership of China towards the extreme of revolutionary leftism. Then its devastating experience prompted a bigger swing in Chinese politics and leadership, from a leftist extreme towards the opposite end of the spectrum, a rightist or capitalist end in the views of both pre-1966 revolutionaries and Maoist radicals. It is the historical impact of the Cultural Revolution on the later transformation of Chinese politics and society that necessitates an examination of Chinese politics and leadership of 1966-76.

¹⁵³ The title and contents of Parris Chang's "Shanghai and Chinese Politics: Before and After the Cultural Revolution" (In Christopher Howe ed. *Shanghai: Revolution and Development in an Asian Metropolis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 66-90) imply that the Cultural Revolution ended due to the comeback of conservative bureaucrats after 1969. Christopher Howe's "Industrialization under Conditions of Long-run Population Stability: Shanghai's Achievement and Prospect" regards the period of 1965-70 as that of Cultural Revolution, and the period of 1970-77 as that of post-Cultural Revolution (Ibid., pp. 159). Also see Frederick Teiwes, *Provincial Leadership in China: The Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath*, New York: Cornell University, 1974.

Shanghai at the time was the origin of the Cultural Revolution and the January Revolution (the seizure of power by rebel radicals), and was the power base for the “Gang of Four.” This chapter will examine the Cultural Revolution-era leadership in Shanghai as a microcosm of Maoist radicalism. The focus of our examination will be on the personnel aspect of municipal leadership in the context of the Cultural Revolution. Institutional change in leadership and leadership performance will also be examined.

1. THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE MAOIST RADICALS’ SEIZURE OF POWER

Although the origins and evolution of the Cultural Revolution are not the center of our concern, they have to be dealt with to some degree because it was against the background of the Cultural Revolution that Maoist radicals rose to power. In this section, we will sketch in the making of the Cultural Revolution as well as the seizure of power from revolutionary veterans by Maoist radicals.

The Making of the Cultural Revolution and the Rise of Maoist Radicals in Shanghai

Aimed at destroying the bulk of the existing political system and leadership in China, the so-called Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, unparalleled in Chinese and world history, was launched by the paramount leader Mao Zedong himself and reflected his theoretical beliefs and political purposes. The launch originated in Shanghai with the assistance of the municipal leadership. The preparation for and launch of the Cultural Revolution paved the way for the rise of Maoist radicals.

The launch of the Cultural Revolution had much to do with the Chairman of the CCP Mao Zedong’s theory of revolution and political infighting within the Communist leadership. There are three central points in Mao’s theory. First, social contradictions and struggles were, are and will be endless in all societies and in every stage of societal development; before the realization of Communism, there are class contradictions and struggles which prompt an endless series of social revolution and super-structural revolution. Second, class struggle,

social revolution, and super-structural revolution (not scientific and technological revolution), are the most effective driving force, lever or locomotive for economic production and development. Third, the key to success is indoctrinating and mobilizing the masses for class struggle and revolution on a continuous basis.¹⁵⁴ These central points were embodied in the continuation of total “class struggle” and Communist indoctrination throughout the Mao era, in Maoist strategy and practice for the social and economic development of China which was typified by the “Great Leap Forward, and in his frequent harsh criticism of the established bureaucratic system and conduct.

Mao’s theory of continuous revolution and developmental strategy, however, was not carried out as effectively as he expected, especially after the failure of the Great Leap Forward. Although his almost god-like status seemed unchallenged, he found that an increasing number of senior officials inclined to another theory of socialist revolution and construction, which was represented by Head of the State Liu Shaoqi and some other Chinese leaders such as Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping. They believed that the major contradiction in the socialist society was not between classes but between advanced productive relations and backward productive forces, so class struggle should be restrained in scale and frequency, and enhancing productive forces should be the major mission of the party and the state. They also believed in a more balanced developmental strategy, in combinations of spiritual incentives with material incentive and of human strength with scientific and technological power, and in the necessity of strengthening the legal-rational basis of political authority and improving the bureaucratic system. Thus political tension between Maoist leaders and those conservative leaders mounted.¹⁵⁵ To counter the conservative forces in leadership and bureaucracy, Mao had stepped up struggles within the Chinese leadership and political system as well as in the whole country. But the political struggles, including internal purges and nationwide political

¹⁵⁴ For a more detailed, masterly generalization of Mao’s theory, the origin and evolution of the theory of permanent revolution, and the similarities and differences between Mao’s concept and Marx’s and Trotsky’s, see Meisner, *Mao’s China*, pp. 204-216. Here we need to mention that the reason for our labeling Mao’s theory of revolution as that of “continuous revolution” rather than “permanent revolution” is that Mao himself liked the catchword “continuous revolution under the Proletarian dictatorship” during the Cultural Revolution.

¹⁵⁵ Two points need to be raised here. First, in reality, the line between Maoist leaders and those conservatives was not as clear-cut as generalized. Second, we agree with the viewpoint of the expert of

campaigns such as the Socialist Education Movement in 1964, were not successful by Mao's judgment. Hence, Mao resorted to the Cultural Revolution, a drastic escalation of the previous political purges and campaigns.

The early stirring of the Cultural Revolution was started in the early 1960s by Maoist radicals in Shanghai. Mao's wife Jiang Qing initiated her collaboration with Maoist radicals in Shanghai - the chief municipal leader Ke Qingshi, the municipal propaganda head Zhang Chunqiao, and the propagandist Yao Wenyuan,¹⁵⁶ after receiving no support of her proposition of Maoist radicalism from central and local propaganda and arts authorities in Beijing.¹⁵⁷ The most notorious and profound result of their collaboration was Yao Wenyuan's "On the New Historical Play 'Hai Rui Dismissed from Office' of November 10, 1965,"¹⁵⁸ which marked the prelude to the Cultural Revolution. In the meantime, the collaboration between Maoist radicals at the center and in Shanghai enhanced their relationship, and the political status of Zhang and his protege Yao at the national and municipal levels, even though Zhang's patron Ke Qingshi died in April, 1965. Six months after the publication of Yao's article, the CCPCC proclaimed the launch of the Cultural Revolution on May 16, 1966. In the same month, the Five-people Central Group for Cultural Revolution headed by conservative Beijing Mayor Peng Zhen was dismissed;¹⁵⁹ Instead, the Central Leading Group for the Cultural Revolution was established. Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao became vice group

Chinese elite studies Frederick Teiwes that Mao's political power was overwhelming, and his status in Chinese leadership was well above that of the rest. See his *Politics at Mao's Court*.

¹⁵⁶ The reasons why Shanghai became China's primary base for Maoist radicals were explained in Chang's "Shanghai and Chinese Politics" (in Howe, *Shanghai*), pp. 67-71.

¹⁵⁷ Jiang Qing's propositions were mainly aimed to change the status quo in the fields of arts and culture and to attack conservative leaders and bureaucrats. They were at Mao's implied consent or at least along Mao's thinking. One of the propositions, made in July 1962, was to criticize the renown historian Wu Han's "New Historical Play 'Hai Rui Dismissed from Office' (Xinbian Lishi Ju 'Hai Rui Ba Guan').

¹⁵⁸ Other results include so-called revolutionary model dramas, which dominated China's arts and performance during 1966-1975, and several heavy-laden articles as a bunch of spearheads against the conservative officials, particularly in charge of propaganda and arts offices. For details of the collaboration among the radicals and its fruits, see Ye Yonglie, *Yao Wenyuan Zhuan* (A Biography of Yao Wenyuan), Changchun: Shidai Wenyi Press, 1993, pp. 206-233, and *Zhang Chunqiao Zhuan* (A Biography of Zhang Chunqiao), *ibid*, pp. 112-133.

¹⁵⁹ This Five-People group was set up in the spring of 1964 in midst of the bitterest ideological debate between China and the Soviet Union. Its original mission differed from that of the other group, though their names were similar.

heads and Yao Wenyuan a member. By the early 1968, this most powerful executive body at the center had fallen in the hands of the three.

The “January Revolution” - Maoist Radicals’ Seizure of Power

Like any historic event, the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76 proceeded in stages. The first stage was between November 1965 or May 1966 and January 1967, in which Maoist rebels mushroomed yet pre-1966 revolutionary leaders were still in control. The second stage of 1967-71 was characterized by Maoist Radicals taking power and intense factionalism which ended up with China’s number-two leader Lin Biao and his powerful military-based faction being wiped out. The period 1971-74 may be seen as the third stage in which the Gang of Four enjoyed their heyday in politics. The final stage of 1974 to 1976 witnessed that the Gang of Four and conservative leaders were locked in a seesaw struggle, and the latter won after Mao died. These four stages in national politics did not coincide absolutely with the situations in the primary power base of the Gang of Four, especially the last stage, but Shanghai certainly was a pacesetter in the early development of the Cultural Revolution in China, particularly in Maoist rebels’ seizure of power.

After the aforementioned CCPCC’s seminal decision of May, 1966, the features of the Cultural Revolution - Maoist rebels, including red guards, their attacks on party, administrative or managerial leaders called the “Capitalist Roaders”, and their massive, vicious, destructive actions against traditional Chinese culture, custom, and value system, came into existence in Shanghai. Yet for half a year or so, there had been no really influential rebel organizations in this largest industrial city of China, and those attacks had constituted no immediate threat to municipal authorities. In fact, many of the phenomena of the Cultural Revolution were allowed by the Shanghai municipal leadership headed by Party secretary Chen Pixian and Mayor Cao Diqu.

The situation started to change dramatically as of November, 1966. In that month, the General Headquarters of Revolutionary Rebel Workers of Shanghai came into existence, but their demand for recognition was rejected by municipal authorities. Then more than three thousand rebel workers tried to go to Beijing by taking three trains. The Shanghai authorities

tried to have them stopped and returned to their working units. One train was stopped at Anting, a small town in the suburb of Shanghai. In response, rebel workers blocked the railway between Shanghai and other parts of China north of Shanghai, which was called the Anting Incident. Zhang Chunqiao of the Central Leading Group for the Cultural Revolution rushed to Anting, persuaded rebel workers to go back to Shanghai by recognizing this rebel organization, by blaming the Shanghai leadership for the incident, and by promising no reprisals against the rebel workers. The Anting incident was the most severe blow to the existing municipal authorities, and set the stage for a close collaboration between Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen and his rebel workers.

The Anting Incident was followed by the *Liberation Daily* Incident of November 30, and the Kangping Road Incident, which tilted the balance of power between the authorities and rebel forces in Shanghai in favor of the latter.¹⁶⁰ In November and December, more rebel organizations emerged. One of them was a city-wide red guards organization named as the General Headquarters of Shanghai Revolutionary Rebel Red Guards (Shanghai's major red guards organization prior to November was somewhat under the control of the then municipal authorities). More influential was the establishment of the Shanghai Revolutionary Rebels Liaison Station of Municipal Party Organizations (Shanghai Shiwei Jiguan Geming Zaofan Lianlo Zhan). Since all its members were staff of the municipal party committee, particularly key officials of the party propaganda machine, it struck municipal authorities from within and paved the way for the Shanghai January Revolution - Maoist rebels' seizure of power.

The January Revolution of Shanghai was not a spontaneous action of Shanghai rebel forces, nor their response to the municipal authorities' attempts to "divert a mounting political

¹⁶⁰ In the *Liberation Daily* Incident, a rebel organization of red guards raided the Shanghai post office building and the newspaper's office, and received rebel workers' support. The incident of nine days ended with the municipal authorities' public self-criticism and concession to the rebel forces' demands. The Kangping Road incident of the end of December was a decisive engagement between rebel workers and the workers called "Scarlet Guards" who were anti-Zhang Chunqiao and virtually supportive of municipal authorities. 30,000 scarlet guards were surrounded by about 100,000 rebel workers around Kangping Road, the main residential area for municipal leaders and their families. Finally, those scarlet guards surrendered. Another army of scarlet guards tried to march to Beijing to protest the action of rebel workers, but were caught up by rebel workers in Kunshan of Jiangsu province, a town adjacent to Shanghai. And in Shanghai, the Worker's General Headquarters also arrested over two hundred organizers of scarlet guards at municipal and district levels. The strongest pro-authority organization was totally defeated.

revolution into struggles for individual material gain” and to “paralyze the city”,¹⁶¹ but a maneuver of the Maoist leadership at the center. The green light for power seizure came from Mao, then was hinted in the New Year Editorial of *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*.¹⁶² And Zhang Chunqiao was the man pulling the strings. The opening shot of seizure of municipal power was the takeover of *Wenhui Daily* and *Liberation Daily* by Maoist rebels on January 4 and 5 respectively. The takeovers were highly praised by Mao. On January 8, the Shanghai Fighting Line Command for “Grasping Revolution and Promoting Production” emerged to take over the economic management function of the municipal government. Then rebel forces convened huge rallies condemning the municipal leadership. Chen Pixian and Cao Diqu were “arrested,” publicly humiliated and even tortured, so that the municipal authorities were totally paralyzed. Thanks to factional conflicts among rebel forces, Shanghai rebels’ own form of government appeared, which was called “the Shanghai People’s Commune” on February 5, and “the Revolutionary Committee of Shanghai” eighteen days later.¹⁶³

2. THE LEADERSHIP OF MAOIST RADICALS

¹⁶¹ Victor Nee, “Revolution and Bureaucracy: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution.” In Victor Nee and James Peck ed., *China's Uninterrupted Revolution: From 1840 to the Present*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1975, pp. 331-332.

¹⁶² According to Guan Feng, a member of the Leading Group for Cultural Revolution who participated in preparation of the editorial, when members of the Leading Group wished Mao a long, long life at his private birthday party, Mao surprised every one by saying “I wish a total civil war to be launched throughout the country.” Thus, the editorial called for “launching an overall offensive” against “capitalist roaders.” Ye Yonglie, *Wang Hongwen Zhuan* (A Biography of Wang Hongwen), Changchun city: Shidai Wenyi Press, 1993, pp. 154-155.

¹⁶³ For details and different views and interpretations, see Evelyn Anderson, “Shanghai: The Masses Unleashed” (*Problems of Communism*, XXVII, no.1, January-February, 1968, pp. 12-21); Neale Hunter, *Shanghai Journal: An Eyewitness Account of the Cultural Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1969); Parris Chang, “Shanghai and Chinese Politics: Before and After the Cultural Revolution”; White, “Leadership in Shanghai, 1955-69” (In Scalapino, ed., *Elite in the People's Republic of China*, pp. 302-377); Nee, “Revolution and Bureaucracy” (In Nee and Peck ed., *China's Uninterrupted Revolution*, pp. 322-414); and Gerald Tannebaum, “The 1967 Shanghai January Revolution Recounted” (*Eastern Horizon*, VII, no.3, May-June, 1968, 7 ff). Above all, Ye’s *A Biography of Zhang Chunqiao* (pp. 141-183) and *A Biography of Wang Hongwen* (pp. 154-226) seem to be the most factually reliable and revealing account of the January Revolution to date, though they are less academic.

The new municipal leadership was distinguished from the previous one, and more so from the leadership in the reform era, in its sociopolitical traits, institutions, and conduct. Although there had been several shuffles in leadership, the majority of municipal leaders, including chief ones - Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen - remained unchanged. This section is about the personnel dimension of the leadership. We will look at first how the new leadership was composed and then what were the social and political traits of Maoist leaders.

Evolution and Composition of the Leadership of Maoist Radicals

The new leadership had some connection with the leadership of revolutionaries in the sense that quite a few were members of the former leadership and that the seeds of the Cultural Revolution were nurtured by Ke Qingshi, the propaganda boss Zhang Chunqiao and his protege Yao Wenyuan. However, depriving from a Mao-initiated rebellion against and destruction of the former leadership,¹⁶⁴ the new one was clearly distinguished in leadership personnel. It was a leadership of Maoist radicals and rebels.

Table 4 illustrates the evolution of the Maoist leadership and its composition by leaders' background. There were four major leadership shuffles and three groups of leaders as indicated. In the first one and a half years, the biggest group within the leadership was revolutionary leaders, which included the Maoist radicals and Shanghai rebels' sponsors Zhang and Yao, former full and alternate party secretaries Ma Tianshui and Wang Shaoyong who jumped on the bandwagon of Maoist rebellion. The group of rebels consisted of rebel workers such as Wang Hongwen and rebel cadres, or rather, rebel propagandists such as Xu Jingxian. The military group was composed of representatives from the Shanghai Garrison and the Air and naval forces in Shanghai. The group's relatively stronger presentation in this

¹⁶⁴ Maoist rebels' destruction of the leadership of revolutionaries was substantial. 83.7 per cent or 853 of total 1,019 cadres at the municipal bureau level and higher were investigated, so were 95.2 per cent of total 6161 cadres at the departmental level. 3617 of them were labeled as "absolutely unrepentant capitalist roaders." Most municipal party secretaries, party standing members, mayor and vice-mayors were purged. Several municipal leaders were purged to death. The Research Office of the Municipal Party Committee of Shanghai ed. *Zhongguo Gongchandang Zai Shanghai, 1921-1991*. Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1991, p. 556.

Table 4: The Background of Shanghai Municipal Leaders, 1967-76*

	Jan.1967 -Jun.68	Jun.1968 -Jan.70	Jan.1970 -Nov.72	Nov.1972 -Oct.76
No. of Leaders	17	15	15**	20***
Revolutionary Cadre****	8	4	4	8
Rebel	4	6	7	8
Military	5	3	4	4
Unknown		2		

* Here municipal leaders pertain to the chairman and vice chairmen of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee, some of whom concurrently held all the positions of secretary and deputy secretaries of the municipal Party Committee.

** The number includes one soldier co-opted in December, 1970, and another soldier who exited in September, 1971.

*** Among them, one rebel leader and two soldiers exited in December, 1972, 1974 and 1975 respectively. And two former municipal Party secretaries were rehabilitated in 1975.

**** This category refers to the new leaders who were middle or high ranking officials before 1966, regardless of being Maoist radicals or co-opted to the Maoist leadership.

Sources: *Shanghai Quanshu* (the Encyclopaedia of Shanghai), Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1991; the Organization Department of the Municipal Party Committee of Shanghai, et al, ed., *Shanghaishi Zhengquan Xitong, Difang Junshi Xitong, Tongyi Zhanxian Xitong, Qunzhong Tuanti Xitong Zuzhishi Ziliao, 1949.5-1987.10* (Materials on the Organizational History of Government System, Local Military System, United Front System, and Mass Organization System of Shanghai Municipality), and *Zhongguo GongchanDang Shanghaishi Zuzhishi Ziliao, 1920.8-1987.10* (Materials on the Organizational History of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai Municipality), Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1991.

period reflected the fact that Zhang and Yao had more reliance upon the military as they had to cope with serious challenges from some powerful red guards and worker's rebel organizations.¹⁶⁵

The leadership shuffle of June 1968 resulted in a significant increase in the number of rebel leaders and a decrease in that of the other two groups. The rebel group replaced the group of revolutionary cadres as the biggest group within the municipal leadership. The shuffle of January 1970 did preserve the status quo. It was changed in the period of November, 1972, to October, 1976. As part of a national scheme for co-opting former officials, particularly in 1975, the number of revolutionary cadres within the leadership jumped from four to eight. Yet we should point out that the late number included former alternate municipal party secretary Yang Xiguang who entered this leadership as late as November, 1975, and Chen Pixian who stayed in office only for three months in late 1975.

Throughout the whole period of 1967-76, the nucleus of the municipal revolutionary committee consisted of its chief leaders Zhang and Yao, their rebel associates Wang Hongwen and Xu Jingxian (and Wang Xiuzhen as of June 1968), and co-opted Ma Tianshui and Wang Shaoyong. Moreover, beyond the top municipal leaders listed in Table , an investigation of the standing members of the revolutionary committee reveals a higher percentage of rebels in the municipal leadership. Among them were Wang Hongwen's close rebel associates Chen Ada and Ye Changming, and Xu Jingxian's associate Zhu Yongjia. They had substantial administrative power. It seems that the percentage of rebels in the membership of the revolutionary committee was even higher.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, it was doubtless that the new leadership was controlled by Maoist radicals and rebels.

¹⁶⁵ Zhang Chunqiao's authority were challenged in January, 1967, and April, 1968, which were called the January 28 Incident and the April 12 Incident. With support from the military and Wang Hongwen-led worker's rebel forces, Zhang survived politically, and suppressed those red guards and rebel cadres and workers who actively participated in the challenges. For details, see Chang, "Shanghai and Chinese Politics" (in Howe, *Shanghai*), pp. 84-85; Ye, *A Biography of Zhang Chunqiao*, pp. 172-183, 203-225, and *A Biography of Wang Hongwen*, pp. 197-199.

¹⁶⁶ For a full list of the members and standing members of the municipal revolutionary committee, see the Organization Department of the Municipal Party Committee of Shanghai, et al., ed., *Materials on the Organizational History of Government System, Local Military System, United Front System, and Mass Organization System of Shanghai Municipality*, pp. 148-149.

Social and Political Traits of Maoist Leaders

In this section, we are going to further our examination of the leadership of Maoist radicals and rebels by having a rough look at their social and political traits. Social variables include family background, native place, age, education level and specialty. Political ones include political status, intra-leadership relations, and tenures in office.

Available biographical information indicates that most municipal leaders came from a worker's or peasant's family background. But the number one leader Zhang was born into a family of a military doctor and Nationalist official. Another two top leaders Yao and Xu Jingxian were from families of political intellectuals (their fathers used to be Communists). For many leaders from the group of revolutionary cadre such as Zhang and Ma, Shanghai was not their birthplace, but they had resided and worked in the city for more than a decade prior to January, 1967. Most rebel leaders were natives (exceptions include Wang Hongwen yet he had been in the city for ten years by 1966). Military leaders were generally outsiders. As for age, the group of rebels were youngest, in their thirties. Most leaders from other two groups were in their forties or fifties. Their average age is believed to be similar to that of former leadership in the early 1950s.

The educational level of Maoist leaders seems to be lower than that of revolutionary leaders, as most leaders from the rebel and military groups received no college education.¹⁶⁷ So did leaders with the background of revolutionary cadre, including the ideologues Zhang and Yao. The educational level of members and standing members of the municipal revolutionary committee was similar, if not worse. Furthermore, most of the top municipal leaders had a specialization in propaganda, military and basic industrial working. Only few leaders such as Ma Tianshui had experience in industrial and other economic administration. We need to mention that a majority of them had military experience as several rebel leaders (including members of the municipal revolutionary committee) used to be servicemen.

Unlike the pre-1966 and post-1978 leaders, all the top leaders in question were party members. The sociopolitical status of the cadre and military groups was quite high, as those

¹⁶⁷ As far as we know, there were two exceptions: Chen Ganfeng was a student rebel leader of Tongji University, and the Shanghai Garrison commander Liao Zhengguo graduated from a military academy.

leaders were revolutionary veterans and were holding positions at the municipal bureau level or higher. The exception was Yao who joined the party in 1948 and was a member of the editorial committee of *Liberation Daily* before 1966. In contrast, the sociopolitical status of rebel leaders was low. Among them, the highest was Xu Jingxian, head of the writing group of the municipal party committee. Most of the rest were industrial workers or foremen.

Since the Maoist leadership occurred in a most turbulent and unpredictable period, and since it was composed of different groups, factionalism was a feature of the leadership. There were conflicts between Maoists and co-opted cadres,¹⁶⁸ between Maoist radicals and the military,¹⁶⁹ between the group of rebel workers and that of rebel cadres,¹⁷⁰ and between individual rebel leaders.¹⁷¹ Intense factionalism, nevertheless, does not necessarily mean that leaders had high mobility. Interestingly, the average tenure of municipal leaders during the Cultural Revolution was quite long. About one third of the leaders had been in office for eight

¹⁶⁸ The conflict was common and constant. Nee's "Revolution and Bureaucracy" suggests that protecting the workers' interest or the state's interest caused the common division and conflict between veteran cadres and the workers' representatives within the revolutionary committees at the basic level (pp. 391-392). At the municipal level, it seems that difference in leadership style, revolutionary seniority and working experience, and desire for power may also be the sources of conflict. The conflict appeared to have occurred right from the beginning. As Table 4 shows, the first reshuffle of the municipal revolutionary committee cut the number of revolutionary cadres by half - four were either demoted or purged. After 1971, a large number of purged revolutionary cadres at the department level or higher gradually returned to administrative positions. This may contribute the intensification of the relations between the cadres and Maoist radicals and rebels. Later, in 1975 when conservative bureaucrats regained an upper hand at the centre under the leadership of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, and when Chen Pixian and Yang Xiguang, two primary targets of the Shanghai rebellion, were rehabilitated, the relationship deteriorated.

¹⁶⁹ The relationship of Zhang Chunqiao and his associates with the military was complicated. They had a close relationship with some military leaders such as the deputy political commissar of the Shanghai Garrison Xu Haitao, while their relationships with the Lin Biao faction in Shanghai and with some other military leaders were either subtle or poor.

¹⁷⁰ According to the author of biographies of the Gang of Four, friction between the two groups was frequent. Ye, *A Biography of Wang Hongwen*, p. 275.

¹⁷¹ There were two noticeable series of conflict centered on Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen respectively. One of the challenges to Zhang involved several leading figures of the revolutionary committee, including the propagandist Zhu Xiqi. The challenge was followed by a purge. (See White, "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955-69," pp. 364-365). Wang Hongwen had his rivals within Shanghai workers' rebel forces. The commander of the "Second Corps" Geng Jinzhang and the vice-commander of the Shanghai Rebel Workers' Headquarters Pang Guoping (both were members of the municipal revolutionary committee) were Wang's principal rivals before and after the January Revolution. In addition, there was infighting among individual leaders, for example, between the two rebel propagandists Xu Jingxian and Zhu Xiqi (See Ye, *A Biography of Wang Hongwen*, p. 275).

to ten years. Another one third had four to six years of tenure. Only the last one third had less than two years of tenure. Six key figures of the municipal leadership - Zhang, Yao, Wang Hongwen, Xu Jingxian, Ma Tianshui and Wang Shaoyong (Wang Xiuzhen joined them later) had enjoyed their rule throughout the entire period, which helped stabilize the Maoist leadership, despite factionalism.

Compared with the pre-1966 and post-1978 leaderships, the Maoist leadership in Shanghai as well as in other parts of China, was distinguished in its composition of a high percentage of rebels and military leaders. Under the conduct of the Maoist radicals Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, these government outsiders, in collaboration with Ma and other veteran officials who joined Maoist radicals and rebels, had made their own marks on the change of leadership system, and on Chinese politics, economics, society, and culture.

3. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN THE PARTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS

After its inauguration, the new leadership started to make swift and radical changes to the municipal party and administrative apparatus. The changes concerned bureaucratic structure, personnel, and rules and regulations. They were largely accomplished in the first year or so of Maoist rebels' rule, and they existed into the late 1970s. In this section, the structural, personnel and institutional changes, along with the principles underlying the changes will be examined.

Structural Changes

Changes in administrative structure were guided by three notions - "Smashing old political machines," building "thinner, better troops and simpler administration" (Jingbing Jianzheng), and making a "united party and administrative leadership" (Dang Zheng Yiyuanhua Lingdao). After February, 1967, the revolutionary committee replaced previous party and government apparatus and became the only governing body at all administrative

levels and working units. Although the Party committees were restored as of 1971, there was one general office executive for both the revolutionary committee and Party committee.

To make administration smaller and simpler, the new leadership decided to exclude those functional bureaus from the revolutionary committee. Under the committee, the functional organizations were called group, office or command. During the rule of Maoist rebels, the number of the groups and offices (including those under the municipal Party committee as of 1971) ranged from fifteen to twenty-eight in each year.¹⁷² At first view, this seems a significant drop in the number of municipal administrative organizations from over sixty of the 1960s. In fact, those groups, offices and commands were equivalent to the previous tier of committees and offices (a major difference was that the former played a leadership role while the role of the latter was coordinating and directive), those functional bureaus which were subordinate to the groups, offices and commands and which accounted for the bulk of the number of pre-1966 municipal administrative organizations were simply not taken into account.

A striking feature of the Maoist administration was a high degree of emphasis on its functions of conducting class and "line" struggles and mobilization. In late 1967, the municipal revolutionary committee comprised twenty-eight groups, offices and commands, of which at least thirteen were for political struggle and mobilization, excluding the general office.¹⁷³ After 1969, this kind of organizations still accounted for approximately one third of the total.

Change in Bureaucracy

During the Cultural Revolution, noticeable changes occurred in Shanghai cadre corps. Since Chinese bureaucracy was a major target of Mao's constant, and harsh criticism, the Maoist leadership paid special attention to remolding cadre corps. There were three features

¹⁷² The Office of Shanghai Staff-Size Control Committee ed., *Shanghai Dangzheng Jiguo Yangce. 1949-1986* (The Evolution of the Party and Government Organizations of Shanghai), Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1988, pp. 131-133.

¹⁷³ They were the Organization Group, the Political and Propaganda Group, the Political Group, the Materials Group, the Group for Mass Movement, the Investigation Group, the Liaison Group, the Defence Group, the Writing Group on Special Topics, the Writing Group for Great Criticism, the

in the remolding of cadres: first, a considerable reduction in staff size; second, a massive input of the working class elements into Shanghai cadre corps; and third, a combination of compulsory labor work and intensive indoctrination.

Under the notion of building “thinner, better troops and simpler administration,” the size of regular staff of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee was substantially smaller than before.¹⁷⁴ We do not know exactly what caused this phenomenon, whether was due to large-scale layoffs or transfers or due to a calculated trick that did not count the regular staff of municipal bureaus as they were not included in the revolutionary committee. But we do know that staff counting for that period was a problem because there were a large number of workers who did not belong to administrative organizations but worked regularly there.

This phenomenon is related to another feature of bureaucratic remolding in the Cultural Revolution. To implement Mao’s call that “the working class must lead all,” especially must supervise the superstructure and his related instructions, new municipal authorities took two major measures. The first was recruiting workers, mainly industrial workers, into bureaucratic apparatus on a massive scale. Those recruits were called “the workers substituting cadres” (Yi Gong Dai Gan), who were still on the payroll of their factories but worked as a cadre. The second was dispatching numerous “workers’ propaganda teams” to the superstructure, including administrative organizations. Their role was not only to propagate Mao Zedong thought but to participate in and supervise decision-making. In addition to workers’ propaganda teams, there were a number of the “Liberation Army’s propaganda teams”.

While a large number of industrial workers entered the bureaucratic system, administrative cadres and other State workers were required to go down to the first line of production on a regular basis, in the name of administrative streamlining, integration of cadres with the masses, and cadre reeducation. In March, 1968, the new leadership divided all staffs working at the level of administrative corporation and above into two groups. The big group comprising 90 per cent of staffs was ordered to leave administrative works, and then go to the

Political and legal Command, the “Civil Offense, Armed Defense” Command, and the Group for Searching and Confiscating Goods and Materials. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

so-called May-Seventh Cadre Schools.¹⁷⁵ Later, the places to which cadres went included factories, the People's communes, and remote rural areas. As a rule, cadres, old and young, had to do labor work, study Maoist ideology, and make political criticism and self-criticism at those places. According to a scholar, municipal leaders were required to "perform several months of physical labor" each year, and members of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee spent two hours for political study every morning.¹⁷⁶ But it is doubtful that municipal leaders had ever met the requirement. Moreover, the downward transfer (Xia Fang) of cadres became a vehicle for the Maoist leadership to rectify the ruling apparatus and punish cadres whom it did not like on a massive scale.

These institutional changes in the bureaucratic system were striking if compared to both the pre-1966 and the post-1978 periods. The Maoist leadership had attempted to realize Mao's ideal of create a novel ruling system which would be free of bureaucratism and elitism, and far more efficient than any bureaucratic system in the world. Nonetheless, in reality, those attempts failed by and large.¹⁷⁷ As mentioned before, the number of administrative organizations and the size of administrative staff were not cut as much as the Maoist leadership announced. In addition, the measure of regularly sending cadres down to the first line of production, including the May-Seventh schools, was not applied fairly to all the cadres, so that those who were sent down for longer periods of time regarded the measure as a punishment (in most cases, this was true) rather than a way to prevent or cure

¹⁷⁴ It is unfortunate that the official account *The Evolution of the Party and Government Organizations of Shanghai* does not list data on actual staff size during the Cultural Revolution but only mentions that the size was not big. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

¹⁷⁵ For an introduction to the May Seventh Cadre School, see James C.F. Wang, "The May Seventh Cadre School for Eastern Peking," *The China Quarterly*, no. 63, September 1975, pp. 522-527. In Shanghai, a total of forty-nine May Seventh Cadre Schools were set up, with an enrollment of up to near 20,000. The Organization Department of the Municipal Party Committee of Shanghai, et al, ed. *Materials on the Organizational History of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai Municipality*, p. 521.

¹⁷⁶ Nee, "Revolution and Bureaucracy," p. 399.

¹⁷⁷ Some China observers may not agree with our conclusion. Victor Nee, for instance, believed that the Maoist did succeed in "sustain[ing] the forward momentum of socialist revolution and prevent[ing] it from ossifying in the morass of bureaucratism and statism" (*Ibid.*, p. 407). Presumably, one reason for this positive assessment is because of his lack of information other than official one, as his description of administrative streamlining and other administrative reforms shows. See *ibid.*, pp. 378-380, 402-403.

bureaucratism.¹⁷⁸ Given a large-scale input of worker's representatives who lacked special training, given a high degree of mobility of cadres, and given a high amount of their time for political activities rather than administrative works, it is hard to imagine how efficient the municipal administration would actually be.

4. THE PERFORMANCE AND HISTORICAL IMPACT OF THE LEADERSHIP OF MAOIST RADICALS AND REBELS

After looking at the personnel and structural dimensions of the Maoist leadership, one may ask the question: did those personnel and structural changes in leadership matter? In this section, we shall make a survey of the collective behavior of Maoist leaders, and its economic and political impact. We believe that the survey can answer the question, and in turn, their performance can serve as a footnote for our depiction of the personnel and structural dimensions of the Maoist leadership.

Let us begin with the leadership's performance in the realm of economy. As China's largest industrial city, Shanghai had achieved a respectable growth of gross value of industrial and agricultural output - up from 30.064 billion *yuan* in 1966 to 45.82 billion *yuan* in 1971 based on the fixed price of 1952, and then up from 35.123 billion *yuan* in 1971 to 46.536 billion *yuan* in 1976 based on the fixed price of 1970.¹⁷⁹ Most of the targets of major industrial products set in the state plans were accomplished.¹⁸⁰ Shanghai's gross value of industrial output grew an average of seven per cent annually during 1967-76.¹⁸¹ The success

¹⁷⁸ For many cadres, the School was a labor camp where Political, mental and physical abuse of cadres by red guards and members of worker's propaganda team was quite common. See the Research Office of the Municipal Party Committee of Shanghai ed. *The Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai, 1921-1991*, p. 563, and the renown writer Yang Jiang's *Six Chapters of Life in A Cadre School: Memoirs from China's Cultural Revolution*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.

¹⁷⁹ Sun Huairen, *Shanghai Shehuizhuyi Jingji Jianshe Fazhan Jianshi, 1949-1985 (A Short History of the Development of Socialist Economic Construction in Shanghai)*, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1990, p. 867.

¹⁸⁰ Three-fourths of the targets of twenty major industrial products set in the third Five-Year Plan (1966-70) were surpassed, so were thirty of a total of thirty-three major industrial targets set in the fourth Five-Year Plan. *Ibid.*, pp. 476-477, 487-488.

¹⁸¹ See Table 6.1 in Howe's "Industrialization under Conditions of Long-run Population Stability" (in Howe ed., *Shanghai*, p. 158). But for the year 1967, we use the figure -9.7 per cent provided by Sun

in industrial production was due to a strong industrial basis and a massive skilled working force that Shanghai had enjoyed,¹⁸² and to the center and other relevant provinces as Shanghai was a part of a highly centralized planning economy. It also had something to do with the municipal leadership, particularly Ma Tianshui who had expertise in industrial administration and management.

However, it is worthwhile to mention that as the principal power base of the Gang of Four and a model of Maoist leadership and developmental strategies and policies, Shanghai's annual rate of growth of gross value of industrial output was behind the national rate for the periods of 1965-70 and 1970-77.¹⁸³ Moreover, there were signs of weakness in industrial production. After reaching its peak of fifteen per cent for in 1969 and 1970, the index of annual growth of gross value of industrial output had declined steadily in the ensuing six years and was down to as low as one per cent for the year 1976.¹⁸⁴ And while the gross value of industrial output increased, the economic efficiency of industrial production declined. Tax revenue and profit out of per 10,000 *yuan* industrial output value was down 20.6 per cent, from 3,601 *yuan* in 1965 to 2,859 in 1976.¹⁸⁵ The Maoist leadership was responsible for the decline. Had it placed the priority of their work on economic production rather than on class struggle and "line struggle," had it not purged or ignored managers and administrators at various levels, had it paid attention to scientists and technologists, and to education and science, and had it not shut the door to advanced industrial countries in the West, economic efficiency could have been improved, and industrial output could have been even more successful.

To get a full picture of economic performance, one needs to look at more areas or sectors, particularly those concerning people's living. One important area to probe is urban infrastructure and housing. The Maoist leadership's radical implementation of the principle of

ed. *A Short History of the Development of Socialist Economic Construction in Shanghai* (p. 474), because Howe did not have an exact figure.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 153-187.

¹⁸³ The Shanghai rates were 10.03 per cent and 6.73 per cent for the two periods, while the national rates were 11.7 and 8.77 respectively. Howe, "Industrialization under Conditions of Long-run Population Stability," p. 159.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

¹⁸⁵ Sun ed. *A Short History of the Development of Socialist Economic Construction in Shanghai*, p. 508.

“Production first, consumption or people’s living second” resulted in the deterioration of infrastructure and housing in Shanghai.¹⁸⁶ Another area is employment. We do not have a reliable, comprehensive data of employment and unemployment, but one of the real rationales behind the decision to send 926,000 educated youth down to rural areas was to alleviate amounting employment pressure.¹⁸⁷ Last but not least, our concern turns to consumption. During the Cultural Revolution, people’s desire for consumption was discouraged as numerous people who had better clothes or food were humiliated and even tortured as bourgeois elements. Consumer power was limited as wages had largely been stagnant for the decade. Commercial and catering networks were also hit hard, shrinking from 48,400 in 1965 to over 20,000 in 1976.¹⁸⁸ And the quality of service declined noticeably after clerks were required to have viewpoints of class and class struggle.

The Cultural Revolution was the climax of Maoist politics. The leadership of Maoist radicals and rebels had made endeavors to implement Mao’s political thoughts - “Politics taking command,” class struggle, continuous revolution, mass line, and so on. Politics became absolutely dominant over every thing. Maoist revolution and class struggle were extremely intensified. A series of political campaigns and purges were conducted: “Purify the class ranks” (Qingli Jieji Duiwu), “Strike counterrevolutionary sabotage, and fight against graft and embezzlement, against speculation and profiteering, and against extravagance and waste” (“Yi Da San Fan” is the Chinese abbreviation), “Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius” (The Chinese abbreviation “Pi Lin Pi Kong”), and “Counterattack a Right-deviationist tendency to reverse verdicts” (Fanji Youqing Fan-an Feng), to name a few.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶ An average annual investment on non-productive construction in the period 1967-76 accounted for only 13.3 per cent out of total investment, while the rest was investment in productive construction. Therefore, few infrastructure projects had been completed, and per capita living space of Shanghai urbanites had increased merely by 0.4 square meters, from 3.9 in 1966 to 4.3 in 1976, after an absolute decrease in the population from 10.9583 million to 10.813 million during the same period. *Ibid.*, pp. 570-571, 890, 869.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 559-560.

¹⁸⁸ The shrinking was due to merger or restriction by government, as those department stores were accused of “serving the bourgeoisie,” and those numerous smoke shops and peddlers were regarded as “tails of the capitalism.” *Ibid.*, pp. 543-545.

¹⁸⁹ Almost everyone, even pupils, was propelled to be involved in some or all political campaigns and purges. As for the number of victims of purges in Shanghai during the entire Cultural Revolution, an authoritative investigation reveals that there was a total of more than 348,700 charged cases, involving about one million victims, including the relatives and friends of the accused. And the abnormal death

One of the features of the Cultural Revolution was “Mass dictatorship” fostered by the Maoist leadership. The existing legal system was totally ruined. “Red terror” was everywhere. Especially in the early years, red guards frequently broke into residences to make searches or arrests, and they humiliated or assaulted “class enemies” by almost every evil means one can possibly imagine.¹⁹⁰ People’s daily life were under a tightest scrutiny of so-called revolutionary masses. The repression and brutality of the mass dictatorship were unparalleled in modern history, even eclipsing Stalin’s “Great Terror.”

Under the Maoist leadership, society and culture were turned upside down, inside out. Traditional social norms and values such as harmony, honest, courtesy, self-esteem and respect for others, especially the elder, some of which had already been under attack since 1949, were totally taken place with the opposite. Social relations among groups, families, and individuals had never been so intensified. Even family members were encouraged or pressured to fight against each other for the sake of the Maoist revolution. Social orders broke down; “backdoor” and gang activities, crimes and mischief became rampant.

In heavy-handed “anti-feudalist” and “anti-bourgeois culture and life style” campaigns, traditional culture fell into ruin, from symbols of ancestors to valueless antiques to street and personal names; so did modern culture, or rather, Western culture, which had taken root in this largest cosmopolis in the Far East long before Chinese communists took power.¹⁹¹ Education was also in a state of disgrace and decay. Since the intelligentsia were one of the two primary social targets of the Cultural Revolution (Another was bureaucracy), and since schools and colleges became a major front-line for revolution and class struggle, education was interrupted.¹⁹² Later it deviated from the normal way in the name of educational

toll was over 13,200, including Mayor Cao Diqu and vice-mayor Jin Zhonghua. The Organization Department of the Municipal Party Committee of Shanghai, et al, ed., *Materials on the Organizational History of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai Municipality*, p. 521.

¹⁹⁰ Nien Cheng’s *Life and Death in Shanghai* (London: Grafton Books, 1989) vividly illustrates the “red terror.”

¹⁹¹ When Maoist leaders conducted anti-feudalist and anti-bourgeois culture and life style, and required ordinary people to live a life style like puritans, they themselves promoted personal cult, and lived in luxury. Ye. *A Biography of Wang Hongwen*. pp. 370-375, 377, 394-395.

¹⁹² Education at all levels had been out of order for at least three years, because of the Cultural Revolution. And all technical schools were closed for the entire period. Sun ed., *A Short History of the Development of Socialist Economic Construction in Shanghai*, p. 583.

revolution. The Cultural Revolution had created a huge gap in education, and so in qualified human resources.¹⁹³

The performance of the Maoist leadership as a ruling body was generally poor. In the realm of economy, despite some success in industrial production, it failed to build an economy efficient, sustainable, and above all, beneficial to the people. In the political realm, although its grip of power was firmer than that of its counterparts in other provinces and municipalities, it was caught between maintaining the Maoist radical and rebellious spirit and momentum, which formed the basis of its legitimacy, and searching for a new system, order and stability for the sake of rulership. In social, cultural and educational realm, it did succeed in having inflicted heavy damages on the bulk of Chinese civilization and some modern culture, yet again, it was unable to ensure a better society, culture, and educational system. In short, the leadership of Maoist radicals and rebels had undermined the established systems, but it had not been successful in creating new ones. It was responsible for an unparalleled vacuum and chaos in Chinese politics, economy, society, and culture, which would take generations to solve, if it is solvable.

The bulk of the Maoist leadership's conduct was not novel. Constant, large-scale class struggle (political campaigns and purges), the principle of "Mass-line" politics, an intensive indoctrination, the guidance of "Politics takes command," the advocacy of "Nonprofessionals lead professionals," the fundamental of "Self-reliance," the strategy of "Production first, consumption second," and anti-feudalism and anti-bourgeois culture, all existed already under the leadership of revolutionary veterans. What distinguished the Maoist leadership from its predecessor in this regard was that the above principles, strategies or conduct were carried out to the extreme.

The conduct of the Maoist leadership had enormous impact on the development of the Chinese economy and politics. Its poor economic performance to content people's needs with restrains of consumption and material incentives, was certainly harmful to Maoist economic policies, paving the way for more radical changes in economic system and strategy with an accentuation on consumption and material incentives. Its unprecedentedly repressive political

¹⁹³ For example, the merges of Shanghai universities and colleges resulted in less graduates by a margin of more than 100,000. The percentage of engineers and technicians in the total number of Shanghai

conduct in the name of “continuation of Proletarian revolution” and “Mass dictatorship” warned the Chinese, including many rehabilitated revolutionary veterans, that China had a very long way to go towards a genuine democracy and rule of law, but it was urgent to embark on the long march now, with the establishment of a political system with law and order. A crucial prerequisite for all the necessary economic and political changes was leadership transformation.

On the other hand, the Cultural Revolution had transformed China into a polity more difficult to lead or rule than ever before. Many traditionally valued sociopolitical traits of the Chinese people such as respect for authority, integrity, fairness, the “State-first” attitude and collectivism had diminished. The Chinese communist ideology - Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, along with the powerful Communist propaganda machine, had lost its appeal for the people, including many officials. At the same time, on the rise were political sophistication and opportunism (ig. how to discern political winds, pay lip service to the superiors, and grab opportunities for one’s own interest), cynicism, disobedience, individualism, nepotism, departmentalism, abuse of power, and materialism.

In conclusion, ultimately it was the Maoist leadership’s extreme, unsuccessful performance that had triggered the biggest, and perhaps most challenging, political and economic swing in the history of the People’s Republic of China, a swing from the extreme conduct of Maoism to the opposite extreme. The chapter of the leadership of Maoist radicals and rebels ended. The leadership of rehabilitated veterans took its place and thus began a difficult transformation.

CHAPTER FOUR

LEADERSHIP TRANSFORMATION: FROM VETERAN REVOLUTIONARIES TO POLITICAL TECHNOCRATS, 1977-1993

The emergence of the Chinese technocratic leadership was an historical development in Chinese communist cadre policies.¹⁹⁴ According to a recent fine study, the phenomenon was also the fruit of a Chinese technocratic movement and had its institutional bases, particularly Qinghua University.¹⁹⁵ It was certainly not a desired product of Mao's continued revolution, but of Chinese modernization under Deng's reform and open-door policies. Our main concern here, however, is about leadership itself rather than the sociopolitical context of the rise of Chinese technocrats. Like the former Soviet Union and East European countries, the leadership transformation from revolutionary to technocratic took place within the Leninist systems, and with the initiatives and protégé of old revolutionary guards.

During the period of 1977-93, there were seven major leadership reshuffles in Shanghai. The first two occurred among rehabilitated revolutionary veterans between 1977 and 1980, yet resulted in the transition of leadership from restoration to reform. Under the promotion of reform-minded revolutionary leaders, political technocrats rose to the key bodies of municipal power in significant numbers in 1983, and the technocratic leadership headed by two technocrats, Jiang Zemin and Rui Xingwen came into play in 1985. The rest reshuffles served to consolidate the technocratic leadership. This chapter deals with the leadership transformation. It proceeds with an examination of two types of the rehabilitated revolutionaries' leadership, especially the trio of the early 1980s which played a crucial role in the rise of technocrats, with institutional, personnel and organizational changes in favor of the emergence of a technocratic leadership, and with a statistical and analytical illustration of the personnel dimension of the leadership transformation in 1977-93.

¹⁹⁴ For the general historical background of Chinese Communist leadership transition from revolutionary to managerial-technocratic, see Lee, *From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China*.

1. THE LEADERSHIP OF REHABILITATED REVOLUTIONARIES, 1977-1985

The rehabilitation of Chinese revolutionary veterans began in the early 1970s when the “Gang of Four,” of which three were then leaders of Shanghai, were still in power. After their arrest in October, 1976, the rehabilitation significantly accelerated, and power was regained by revolutionary veterans. Therefore, the leadership of Shanghai as well as other provinces may be called the leadership of rehabilitated revolutionaries. However, this leadership was not same throughout the period of 1977 to 1985 in terms of leadership mission and composition. Before 1980, the municipal leadership was mainly composed of rehabilitated veterans, whose primary mission was to restore what had been destroyed by Maoist radicals. In contrast, the primary mission of the leadership of 1980-85 was to realize Deng Xiaoping’s reform schemes, political, administrative as well as economic. The leadership composition was more complex – the 1983 leadership reshuffle made technocrats a majority of municipal leaders, though the top three were still revolutionary veterans. Hence, the leadership of revolutionary veterans in the two periods may be characterized as the leadership of restoration and that of reform. This section deals with these two types of leadership, with its focus upon the leadership of reform-minded revolutionaries for they were critical in a generally smooth leadership transformation from revolutionary veterans to political technocrats.

The Leadership of Restoration, 1977-80

The municipal leadership before 1980 was mostly under the trio of Su Zhenghua, Ni Zhifu and Peng Chong. Between October 1976 and March 1977, aiming to destroy the power base of the notorious three and to return power to purged veterans, the Hua Guofeng regime made the first reorganization. Only two of the existing seven party secretaries stayed, one general and another civilian veteran. The leading positions were taken by Su Zhenghua, (political commissar of the Navy), Ni Zhifu, (a pre-1966 national model worker and party secretary of a factory who showed his political loyalty to veterans during the Cultural Revolution), and Peng Chong, a long-time mayor of Nanjing, the capital of Jiangsu Province.

¹⁹⁵ Li, *The Rise of Technocracy*, Ph.D. dissertation, 1992.

The remaining three positions, along with one new position, were occupied by another three veterans and one new-comer, Chen Jinghua. As to the Revolutionary Committee, only four out of the seventeen chair- and vice-chairpersons survived (Yang Fuzhen, a pre-1966 model worker, General Zhou Chunlin, and two rehabilitated veterans Wang Yiping and Yang Xiguang). Six veterans now entered this body of power; another nine so-called "old cadres" joined them from the period December 1977 to September 1978. All the departed leaders were purged; some were tried and imprisoned. All the survivors of this purge-type reorganization departed before the end of 1978, except Zhong Min, who stepped down from the position of Party Secretary in November 1981.

After Deng Xiaoping's return to power and the layout of his reform and open-door policy for China's modernization at the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in December 1978, the second leadership change was implemented. In 1979-80, Revolutionary Committees -- a product of the Cultural Revolution -- were abolished; the pre-1966 government system came back throughout the country for the purpose of regularization and institutionalization. In Shanghai, the positions of Party secretaries left by both survivors and appointees in the first reorganization were filled by six individuals who were veterans, and at least half of these, namely, Wang Daohan, Zhao Xingzhi and Xia Zhengnong, received higher education. Personnel changes in the municipal administration were radical in appearance rather than in substance. Almost all the chair- and vice-chairpersons attained the titles of mayor or vice-mayor of Shanghai.

Although Deng Xiaoping's bold and ambitious reform scheme was adopted in 1978 at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of CCP as the primary guidance for and objective of the Party's and government's work, it was not effectively carried out nationwide until the early 1980s. Within the political leadership as well as the society, there were widespread confusion over and resistance to Deng's reform and open-door plan. The Maoist legacy of the Cultural Revolution, in terms of ideology, personnel, institution and policy, was still influential. This was particularly evident in Shanghai, the power base of the "Gang of Four". The leadership of rehabilitated revolutionaries was not as resolute as expected in implementing Deng's reform scheme. In the historic debate and discussion of "Practice is the only criterion of truth" (Shijian Shi Jianyan Zhenli de Weiyi Biao zhun)

advocated by Dengist reformers in 1978-79, Shanghai lagged behind the national pace, so it was required to make up this virtual political education of Deng's reform and open-door schemes. Apparently, at that time, the promotion of technocrats was not on this leadership's agenda. Even with respect to the restoration of the pre-1966 situation and practice, the performance of the post-1976 leadership was not really satisfactory, though the offices of Maoist radicals at all levels were being occupied by revolutionary veterans. All these changed after the municipal leadership was reshuffled around 1980.

The Leadership of Reform-minded Chen, Hu, and Wang, 1980-85

1980 marked the end of the leadership of restoration and the beginning of the leadership of reform led by Chen Guodong, Hu Lijiao¹⁹⁶ and Wang Daohan. This leadership existed from 1980 to 1985, a critical period in the development and transformation of Shanghai, particularly its leadership transformation from revolutionary veterans to technocrats. There were two phases in the leadership transition during the period of 1980-85. In 1980-83, the leadership was mainly composed of rehabilitated revolutionaries who were reform-minded and in favor of the rise of political technocrats. As part of a national effort that took place within the six weeks between March and April 1983,¹⁹⁷ the Shanghai leadership underwent a sweeping change. All the existing secretaries departed except the top three (Chen, Hu and Wang). Two younger cadres, Yang Di and Ran Congwu, were promoted to the position of party secretary. And all the thirteen vice-mayors lost their positions, while six younger political technocrats were recruited to that rank. Thus, the second of 1983-85, the leadership consisted of many technocrats yet still led by the three revolutionary veterans. This section is focused on the trio's profiles. It will mention the personnel aspect of top-level leadership change but leave a detailed study as well as institutional and lower-level personnel changes for the following sections.

As the first secretary of the Municipal Party Committee, Chen Guodong was the number-one leader of Shanghai. He was appointed first as the second Party secretary in January 1980, and then succeeded the first secretary Peng Chong two months later at age 69.

¹⁹⁶ Hu came to Shanghai as Second Party Secretary in 1981.

Chen was a native of Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi Province. We do not know what level of his education attainment but his working at the Shanghai International radio station at age 19 indicates that he might have attained more than elementary education plus some technical training. He joined the Communist Youth League in 1932 and the CCP next year. Before 1949, he first was responsible for underground activities of the CYL in Jiangsu Province and Shanghai, and then assisted Chen Pixian and Cao Diqui successively in charging financial, economic, and administrative affairs in the base areas (under the control of the CCP with the New Fourth Army) mainly in Jiangsu. After 1949, his financial and economic responsibility expanded to the East China Region. From the mid-1950s to 1980, he was promoted to the posts of deputy minister of Finance and Economics, minister of Food, director of Supply and Marketing Cooperative, and head of the Group of Finance and Economics in the State Council. Given these posts, it is not surprising that he was said a protégé of Chen Yun, China's most respected and powerful advocate of centralized planning economy who was commonly regarded by China hands as the leader of Chinese conservatives versus Deng Xiaoping.

From the available information on this revolutionary veteran, three points may be drawn. First, Chen was an administrator with little military experience but a certain degree of expertise in finance and economics; Second, he was supposedly familiar with the city he was going to rule as he had been there at least ten years (1930-37 and 1949-52); Third, he was detached from complex local politics though he might be sympathetic to the fate of his former colleagues such as Chen Pixian and Cao Diqui under Ke Qingshi's and later Zhang Chunqiao's radical leadership. On the other hand, his considerable revolutionary experiences in Jiangsu and Shanghai working with underground Communist activists and with the New Fourth Army, conceivably, earned him many important local acquaintances while his three-decade performance at the center helped build his power base and his reputation as a centralist.

Among municipal leaders, second to Chen was Hu Lijiao, another native of Jianhxi. He was transferred from the position of Second Party Secretary and Chairman of the People's

¹⁹⁷ For the 1983 sweeping changes in China's provincial leaderships, see Mills, "Leadership Change in China's Provinces."

Congress of Henan Province to that of Second Party Secretary of Shanghai in January 1981. Born in 1914, three years younger than Chen, Hu joined the CCP in 1930, three years earlier, and participated in the Long March. His involvement in the Communist revolution at such young age may indicate that he did not receive as much education as Chen did. He had held various key positions in the military, party apparatus, and administration, at both the local and national levels. His pre-1949 career included a detachment head of the Third Red Army Group; director of the Second Bureau of the Central Military Committee; deputy director of the Political Department of the Rear-base of the New Fourth Army; chief of the Investigation Section, deputy director of the Department of Society (Shehui Bu), and director of the United Front Department of the Central China Bureau of the CCPCC; and director of the Organization Department of the Political Department of the East China Military Region. After 1949, he continued working in East China, particularly in Shanghai, responsible for reorganizing the Municipal Party Committee, and for affairs of personnel, organization and supervision for the entire East China region. Between 1954 and 1981, he was consecutively vice minister of Finance, first Party secretary of Songjiang District of Heilongjiang province, vice president of the People's Bank, and a leader of Henan province.

Unlike Chen, Hu had built his successful career largely through military, secret and organization services, especially during the pre-1949 period. He also had at least nine years of provincial and local Party and administrative experiences prior to January 1981 when he was transferred to Shanghai. But like Chen, Hu presumably had a considerable political network in East China Region, and to a lesser degree, had an acquaintance with Shanghai, through his activities there.

Under Chen and Hu was Wang Daohan, a Party secretary and mayor of the city.¹⁹⁸ One year younger than Hu, Wang studied in Jiao Tong University of Shanghai, a prestigious

¹⁹⁸ Mayor Wang was officially junior mainly because the People's Republic of China was a Leninist party-state where the Party controls the administration. In her fine study of Chinese political institutions and policy-making at the center, Susan Shirk defines the Party as the "principal" and the government as the "agent," and their relationship as the "delegation relationship." *The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China*, Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993, p. 55. This definition is appropriate for the era of Deng Xiaoping's reform, even though for most time in the history of the People's Republic of China, the roles of the Party and government and their relations were not so clearly cut ("Dang Zheng Bufen" or the mix-up of the Party's role with the government's),

technological institution with undeniable political influence in China. In 1938, he became a Party member, and worked in the base areas in East China. A native of Jiashan county of Anhui province, he was appointed as head of the county, and a district head in southern Anhui. Later he served as vice director of the departments of Finance and Construction, as director of the Department of War Industry of the Central China Military District and the Shandong Military District, and as head of the Finance and Commerce Office of Anhui. After 1949, he was director of the Industry Department of the East China Military and Administrative Committee. In 1952 he left East China for Beijing to assume the position of vice-minister of the First Machinery Industry of China. Before coming back to Shanghai in 1980, he was vice-chairman of the State Commission For Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, and then of the State Commission for Foreign Investment Control.

Wang may be regarded as a typical revolutionary technocrat, in other words, a technocrat with long revolutionary experiences. He received formal technical training at the college level. This may indicate that he came from an above-average family background. Unlike most Communist officials, Wang's character and appearance are gentle and cultivated, perhaps due to his family and formal education. At the same time, he joined the CCP at age 23, so had revolutionary seniority which was a major criterion for an official's position and mobility in the Chinese bureaucratic system. His revolutionary experiences, however, were almost exclusively involved in administrative and economical affairs, while Chen spent several years conducting works of Party propaganda and organization, not to mention Hu.

Nevertheless, these three leaders had something in common. They were revolutionary veterans. East China was their birthplace and the primary region of their revolutionary activities. They had more or less first-hand experience in Shanghai, though they were not Shanghainese. They had close ties with the New Fourth Army as well as other Communist cadres in East China including Shanghai, so the basis of their leadership already existed. They were transferred from East China to Beijing in the early 1950s, and had born responsibilities for individual central ministries for substantial periods of time, so that their loyalty to the center appeared evident. Although their pre-1949 revolutionary responsibilities differed, their

and the Party often was both "principal" and "agent" in the pre-1966 period ("Yi Dang Dai Zheng" or Replacing the government with the Party).

ministerial roles were all in economic spheres. Their assignments to Shanghai may reflect the center's practicalism with its determination to ensure the economic development of Shanghai, or rather, its high contribution, to the Chinese economy.

Their relationships may not be very cohesive,¹⁹⁹ but the trio of leaders cooperated fairly well in main policy areas. Under the leadership of reform-minded revolutionary veterans and technocrats, particularly Mayor Wang Daohan,²⁰⁰ the revival of pre-1949 Shanghai's metropolitan status or another reconstruction of Shanghai (from industrial base to multifunctional cosmopolis, from "Production first" to "raising people's living standard first," and from highly centralized planned economy to market-oriented economy) got underway. Influential Maoist legacy was receding, and Deng's reform and open-door policies were taking roots. More and more experts were invited to participate in policy-making, especially in socioeconomic spheres. For the first time in the history of Communist rule, the overall city

¹⁹⁹ there were rumors about tensions between Chen and Hu, particularly after Hu's son Hu Xiaoyang was arrested for his raping and gang activities at the end of 1984 which eventually led to a death penalty. Not long after the arrest of Hu's son, Yu Tiemin, Chen's long-time assistant and deputy head of the General Office of the Municipal Party Committee, was accused for corruption and given a life sentence in July 1986 (less than five months after the sentencing of Hu's son). It is held that a major political figure behind this unusual accusation was Hu Lijiao. (A non-academic, unbalanced, yet somewhat revealing book by a former Shanghai editor provides some information on these two cases. See Hu Zhiwei, *Jiang Zemin Chuanchi* [The Legend of Jiang Zemin], Taipei: The Publishing House of Biographical literature, 1990, pp. 171-176).

Another revealing case is the publication of a former official and then researcher's article "Shige Diyi He Wuge Daoshu Diyi Shaoming Le Sheme?" (Ten Number-ones and Five Last Ones Show What) on October 3, 1980, by the organ of the Municipal Party Committee *the Liberation Daily*. The article and ensuing forum attended by many heads of municipal bureaus, virtually called for a prompt, substantial change in the direction and strategy of municipal socioeconomic development, and in the central-municipal relations (though not as explicitly as the former). In the meantime, a reliable source said that Chen Guodong was not happy about this kind of discussion, worrying it may fuel public and bureaucratic discontent at the center and the planned economy. He attempted to stop this discussion and to take disciplinary action against Mr. Shen, though at this point we do not know whether his action was due to the pressure from the center. He succeeded in the former but not in the latter because some top leaders, at least mayor Wang, apparently disagreed with him. Later on, Mr. Shen became one of a handful advisors to Wang, and his article was awarded as one of the best published in *the Liberation Daily* in 1986, six years after its publication, when the relationship between the center and Shanghai entered a different stage. We will discuss this case further in Chapter seven.

²⁰⁰ This is not only based on the assumption that the center's determination and efforts to separate the works of the government from those of the Party would lead to an augmentation in the administrator's power, but also based on the observation that Wang played a key role in the above-mentioned undertakings, in the existence of what Cheng Li regarded the organ of China's technocratic movement

plan of Shanghai was drafted and submitted to Beijing for approval, and the Strategy of Shanghai Economic Development was made with central approval. Three small special development zones within the city were initiated locally and then approved by the centre. In 1984, Shanghai was selected as one of the fourteen coastal open cities, a sign of catching up the forerunners of China's economic reform. In the first half of the 1980s, there were many more remarkable undertakings in the transformation of Shanghai. From the perspective of leadership, the most primary and profound undertaking was in the institutional and personnel aspects of leadership transformation.

2. PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT

Personnel and organizational changes in the party and government of Shanghai were crucial to the accommodation of Deng's economic reform and opening-up schemes, and to the rise and consolidation of Chinese technocratic leadership in the power base of Maoist radicals. This focus of this section is on changes concerning the rise of technocrats. It will deal with institutional changes, and then change in cadre corps.

Personnel Change in the Party and Administration of Shanghai

During the first half of the 1980s, the municipal leadership experienced drastic, historical shuffles under the unified national schemes to consolidate the power of rehabilitated revolutionary veterans and then to rejuvenate the aging revolutionary leadership. Consolidating the leadership of old guards meant its continuation of getting rid of those Maoist radicals. It also meant a continuous rehabilitation of purged veteran revolutionaries who often tended to favor better educated communists to be their successors. And rejuvenating the leadership provided technocrats a golden, legitimate and historical opportunity to enter the center of political power. Within such short period of time, the

– the *World Economic Herald*, and in recommending technocrats such as Jiang Zemin for top municipal positions.

municipal leadership under the trio of Chen, Hu and Wang had accomplished three interlocked missions: political housecleaning, the retirement of revolutionary veterans, and the massive promotion of younger, better educated cadres.

Although a political house cleaning commenced after the fall of the “Gang of Four” in late 1976, it did not have, in legal terms, a legitimate basis, and its progress in this power base of the “Gang of Four” was not satisfactory to Deng Xiaoping and his revolutionary associates. The public trial of the “Gang of Four” in 1980 set a legitimate basis for a swift purge of their associates and followers in Shanghai; meanwhile, the newly appointed trio of municipal leaders was determined to carry out such a purge. Following the national trial, a trial of the local leading supporters of the “Gang of Four” was held in 1980-81. Ma Tianshui, Wang Xiuzhen, Xu Jingxian, and a dozen of other former municipal leaders were convicted and sentenced heavily. Then, under the guidance of the center, the Shanghai leadership launched a full-scale purge of “three kinds of people” (those incumbents as Maoist rebels, factionists, or smash-and-grabbers) at every level of authority.²⁰¹ It is believed that a large number of officials were affected. Furthermore, in the March of 1983, one of the most significant leadership reshuffles in the reform era led to loss of the standing membership of the Municipal Party Committee for Yang Fuzheng and Wang Mingzhang, the only survivors of the post-1976 purges who rose to and remained in power after the breakout of the Cultural Revolution, even though they were not old. The stronghold of Maoist radicals had been largely destroyed thus far.

When the political housecleaning was done, unfortunately, a large number of rehabilitated veterans were aging and their experience, knowledge, skills and perhaps way of thinking were somewhat outdated in conducting economic reform and open-door policies. But the problem was that Chinese revolutionary cadres, especially high-ranking cadres, had long enjoyed an actual life-tenure system, regardless of their age, health and competence. Thanks to the maneuver of Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues at the center, the nationwide

²⁰¹ On December 30, 1982, the CCPCC issued “the Notice on Eliminating ‘Three Kinds of Persons’ From Leading Groups.” The undertaking was re-emphasized as one of the key ones in the Party rectification as of 1983. The task was carried on throughout the country after the Party rectification and until the end of 1989. Song Defu, et al., *Dangdai Zhongguo de Renshi Guanli* (Personnel Management in Contemporary China), Beijing: The Press of Contemporary China, 1994, vol. 1, p. 401.

abolishment of the life-tenure system was promulgated in 1981. With propaganda, norm-building, negotiations, and particularistic treatment, a series of carefully formulated policies and regulations had been translated into a system of retirement for leading cadres.²⁰² According to the system, with few exceptions, the universal age caps for the retirement of chief party and administrative leaders at the provincial and municipal level are sixty-five, for their deputies as well as both chief and deputy leaders at the provincial bureau level are sixty.²⁰³ In Shanghai, the leadership shuffle of 1983 set a good example, having all the revolutionary veterans holding top municipal party and administrative positions but the top three and Wang Jian (a standing member of the municipal party committee) retired or semi-retired. The retirement system worked better over time. Lower-level cadres' retirement also became regular.

Also at the 1981 Plenary Session of the CCPCC, change in the selection criteria for leading cadres was also formally announced, which laid the legislative ground for the rise of technocrats. In Communist China, the conventional criteria for cadre selection had overemphasized *red* at the expense of *expert* or *professionalism*, since the socialist and proletarian revolution took the central stage. Now, as the Chinese leadership was concentrating on the "socialist reconstruction" and modernization of China, "revolutionary, younger, better-educated, and specialized" became the new criteria. In applying the new criteria, the Chinese leadership widened the channel and source of cadre recruitment. Over years, leading cadres had been recruited almost exclusively from the bureaucracy, a pool of reds rather than experts in the era of politics taking command. By the new criteria, this conventional pool was no longer satisfactory. The reform-minded leaders began to pay attention to factories, enterprises, colleges and research institutes in which there were plenty of younger managers, directors, teachers, and researchers who had managerial skills or useful knowledge, and had a leadership potential. Complementary to party and governmental apparatus, these new channels became indispensable to the recruitment of cadres in the

²⁰² For an excellent description and analysis of the making and functioning of this retirement system, see Melanie Manion, *Retirement of Revolutionaries in China: Public Policies, Social Norms, Private Interests*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993.

²⁰³ For the retirement age cap and benefits for leading cadres, see Song Defu et al. ed., *Personnel Management in Contemporary China*, vol. 1, pp. 507-511.

1980s.²⁰⁴ These channels are pivotal to enhancing the educational and specialty composition of the leadership in transition, and to promoting Chinese technocratic leadership.

In Shanghai, most top municipal leaders after 1983 were recruited from the new channels. And an incomplete survey of the municipal leaders at the second echelon during the first half of the 1980s shows a large number of new appointees were managers and technocrats, including most of the top municipal leaders in the following decade. To name a few, municipal party secretary Wu Bangguo was deputy party secretary of the Shanghai Telecommunications Industrial Bureau, 1982-83; mayor and party secretary Huang Ju was deputy director of the of Shanghai Electric Machinery Number-one Bureau, 1982-83; Zeng Qinghong, deputy municipal party secretary and now secretary general of the General Office of the CCPCC, used to be deputy director and director of the Organization Department; deputy municipal party secretaries Chen Zhili, Wang Liping and Chen Liangyu were deputy party secretary of the Science and Technology Work Committee, deputy party secretary of the Education and Health Work Committee, and deputy director of the Old Cadres Bureau respectively; deputy mayors Gong Xueping and Gong Xinhan were deputy directors of the Propaganda Department; deputy mayors Zhao Qizheng and Jiang Yiren were deputy party secretaries of the Industrial Work Committee; deputy mayor Qian Xuezhong was vice chairman of the Construction Committee, deputy secretary general and secretary general of the municipal government successively; and deputy mayor Xia Keqiang was also the deputy secretary general.

Did nepotism play a key role in the selection of the new generation of municipal leaders? The recruitment and exit of top municipal leaders have shown that political nepotism was not as serious as many people would believe on this level of leadership in Shanghai. Of 81 per cent of a total of 21 post-1982 leadership recruits, only 19 per cent could be subject to the suspicion that their family background may help their appointments and promotions to any significant extent.²⁰⁵ The pattern of municipal leaders' regularly leaving Party and

²⁰⁴ In the 1983 change, nearly two thirds of the new appointees in the provincial and municipal leaderships came from party and governmental apparatus, and one third from these new sources. *Ibid.*, p. 289.

²⁰⁵ They were high-ranking revolutionary veteran Zeng Shan's son Zeng Qinghong, Shanghai's former second party secretary Ni Zhifu's brother Ni Hongfu, and Ruan Congwu and Jiang Zemin whose father or uncle was revolutionary martyr.

administrative positions shows that a universal standard of retirement by age appeared to have been applied to all the revolutionary veterans over the past fifteen years, no matter what type of revolutionary cadres they were or which faction, if any, they were affiliated with.

According to the Nomenklatura system of the CCP, the authority to select or dismiss municipal and provincial leaders was at the hands of central leaders in Beijing.²⁰⁶ It is worthwhile, however, to take notice of complexity of the selection process in which senior local revolutionary leaders were also involved usually by nominating or recommending candidates. In this sense, those retired as well as incumbent municipal leaders all made contributions to the emergence of technocrats at the municipal level. Their contributions to promoting younger technocrats to the second echelon of municipal authorities are greater than those concerning the first echelon, especially since the decentralization of the cadre management system in 1984 which allows leading cadres at the provincial and municipal bureau level to be managed by provincial and municipal authorities in stead of central authorities.²⁰⁷

Why did those rehabilitated revolutionary veterans promote technocrats on such a large scale? Of course, as subordinates to central leaders, they were obliged to implement central policies. Perhaps there were other factors. Generally, over the past one hundred years or so, especially since the May Fourth Movement, the imperative of “Mr. Science” in China’s development and modernization had won wide recognition from Chinese society, including many revolutionaries. China’s current march towards modernization seemed to have reinforced the recognition and so favored technocrats. Specifically, a majority of the rehabilitated old guards had received considerable education and had charged affairs of finance, economics, science and technology for long time, and some of them such as Wang Daohan were technocrats themselves. Hence they probably understood the importance of science and technology in China’s development and modernization better than other cadres; and cadres they acquired most likely were managers and technocrats. When they were inescapably approaching retirement and facing the problem of choosing successors, there was

²⁰⁶ For the Party’s control of leadership selection, see John P. Burns ed., *The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System: A Documentary Study of Party Control of Leadership Selection, 1979-1984*, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1989.

a high likelihood that they would prefer technocrats. In addition, most rehabilitated veterans were the victims of Leftism or Maoist radicalism which overemphasized Red while discrediting expert or professionalism. Their personal suffering and their observation of the country being driven into a political, social and economic catastrophe led to their determination to eliminate Leftism, and to balance the relationship of *Red* and *Expert* by emphasizing the importance of the latter. This may also explain why they dealt with Maoist radicalism and its supporters differently from technocrats.²⁰⁸

If the role of the reform-minded municipal leaders in the establishment of cadre retirement system is limited as cadres at that level were under central control, their contributions to the application of the new criteria and the consolidation of the new selection

²⁰⁷ For the relevant documents, particularly the CCPCC's "Notice on the Revision of the Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Central Committee," see *ibid.*, pp. 119-141.

²⁰⁸ The case of Zhou Ke, a revolutionary technocrat, may help illustrate the point. A student of civil engineering at Tianjin Industrial and Commercial College and then Fudan University in Shanghai, he joined the CCP in 1937 at the age of 20, and engaged himself in underground activities. In the 1950s, he was the secretary of the Communist Youth League of Shanghai and then a deputy director of the Department of Industry under the municipal party committee. Because he criticized mayor and party secretary Ke Qingshi's undemocratic leadership style and advocated independent thinking, he was charged as an anti-party rightist. Accordingly, he lost his party membership and position, and he and his family underwent a twenty-one year ordeal of being punished physically, economically, psychologically and, of course, politically in the names of conducting a socialist and proletarian revolution, countering "bourgeois liberalism," and politics taking command. He was rehabilitated in December 1978. Prompted by the ordeal and impressed by Albert Einstein's view of the development of individuality, and of thinking and making judgments on one's own, he devoted himself to emancipating thoughts and victims from the shackles of leftism, to advocating leadership science and soft science, and to purging Maoist radicals and promoting younger technocrats. In the capacity of deputy director of the Municipal Science and Technology Committee, he collaborated several young scientists and social scientists in organizing a study group for leaders of science and technology, which constituted the basis for the establishment of the Shanghai Research Institute of Sciences. From 1980 to the end of 1984, at the request of his old superior Chen Guodong to take a more challenging and crucial job in the struggle against leftism, Mr. Zhou became a deputy secretary general of the municipal party committee, the executive deputy director and director of the Municipal Organization Department successively. He also was heads of the Municipal Office for Party Rectification, of the Group for Implementing Intellectual Policies, and of the Leading Group for Cadre Education, and deputy heads of the Leading Group for Cadre Inspection, and of the Investigation Group of Party Conduct, all under the municipal party committee. As of 1986, he held a standing membership of the Advisory Committee of Shanghai. It is reasonable to assume that Mr. Zhou played a significant role in the purges of Maoist radicals and the transformation of leadership from revolutionary to technocratic. He may help the appointment of Liu Jie, a graduate from Qinghua University and a close friend of Zhou's, and currently deputy Dean of the Academy of Social Sciences of China, to the deputy directorship of the Municipal Propaganda Department. See his autobiography *Lishi Zheyang Guaosu Wo* (History Tells Me So). Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1993.

system can not be understated as tens of thousands of younger and better-educated cadres were promoted by them or at their recommendations. At the same time, the municipal leadership tried to change the composition and structure of the party and government in Shanghai.

Organizational Change in the Party and Government

Like those personnel changes, organizational changes were part of the nation-wide process directed and controlled by central authorities, but the Shanghai leadership should be accredited with implementing central directives. The organizational changes we are going to delineate include changes in the functions and staff size of governing bodies, and in the number and membership composition of party organizations. In addition, a new institution essential to the prevalence of technocracy in Shanghai and in China, will be mentioned.

Changes in the municipal party and governmental apparatus started before 1980. The title of the administrative body was changed from "revolutionary committee" to "government," the municipal people's congress and political consultative conference were re-established, and the functionary units of the municipal party and administration were restructured.²⁰⁹ But those changes as a whole were a restoration of the pre-1966 governing structure. After 1980, in order to accommodate economic reforms, municipal authorities made earnest efforts in this regard, particularly in restructuring the party and governmental apparatus and in dealing with the size of the governing body.

A strong push for restructuring party and governmental apparatus came from the top national leadership.²¹⁰ In October 1982, the municipal group for organizational reform in

²⁰⁹ After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of December 1978, some functionary units were set up or upgraded in attempts to strengthen the municipal leadership in economic reforms and opening-up. They included the Municipal Bureau of Urban Planning and Construction Management, the Department of Science and Technology Cadres under the municipal revolutionary committee, the Municipal Bureau of Environmental Protection, the Municipal Bureau of Drugs Management, the Municipal Office for Collective Enterprises, and the Municipal Office for Import and Export Affairs.

²¹⁰ Deng's speech "Restructure Party and State's Leadership" (Dang he Guojia Lingdao Tizhi de Guige) at the enlarged meeting of the Politburo in August 1980 has been regarded by Chinese communists as a major guiding document for China's political and administrative reform. In 1981, the concept of "structural reform," instead of the conventional one of "structural simplification," first

Shanghai was formed. Wang Daohan was its head, and thirty-two junior municipal leaders were its members. This authoritative group proposed that this reform should be aimed at separating government from enterprises, reducing administrative layers and the staff size of the municipal government, and improving the age and cultural structure of cadres. The municipal government (not party apparatus), particularly those apparatus of economic management, would be the primary object of the reform.²¹¹

But an ensuing months-long investigation conducted by the group showed the magnitude and complexity of bureaucratic and structural problems, so the municipal authority reconsidered its reform plan, and decided, with the center's approval on the ground of the peculiarity of Shanghai, to concentrate its efforts on the improvement of leadership rather than the bureaucratic structure. Thus there was dramatic leadership change but changes in governmental organizations in 1980-85 were less impressive. In 1985, the number of governmental organizations, after jumping sharply from 15 in 1977 to 76 in 1980, remained at the level of 1980.²¹² The municipal leadership's main restructuring efforts were the setup of a new command layer within the hierarchy of municipal authority -- the party committee of

became the official phrase in this regard, which pertains to a broader range of organizational change including transforming governmental functions, rearranging central-local, intra-institutional, government-enterprise, and party-administrative relations, adjusting bureaucratic set-ups, and reducing, rejuvenating, and redesignating staff in line with functional changes (See Song Defu et al, ed., *Personnel Management in Contemporary China*, vol. 2, pp. 424-428). In 1982, as structural problems were more acute, Deng and premier Zhao Ziyang emphasized restructuring, especially streamlining, party and governmental apparatus as a revolution. Both the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CCPCC put the structural reform on the top of their agenda. They further pointed out that the ongoing economic reform required that this organizational reform be streamlining economic management apparatus while strengthening the apparatus of economic cooperation, statistical surveillance, and law making and enforcement. As of 1982, the party and government organizations at the center began their restructuring, and provincial units were allowed to formulate their *own* restructuring schemes and conduct their organizational reform in the light of the central scheme and experiments and of their special situations.

²¹¹ The Office of the Shanghai Staff-size Control Committee ed., *The Evolution of the Party and Government Organizations of Shanghai, 1949-1986*, p. 198.

²¹² These organizations were permanent functional ones only. Besides them, there were a number of so-called temporary organizations. As a matter of fact, many of them were more than task forces. They constituted a part of the formidable bureaucratic problem. The municipal leadership tried to solve it, but failed too. The number of municipal temporary organizations reduced from thirty to seventeen in 1979, but rebounded to even fifty-three in 1983; then it was cut by over one half, but recovered to fifty in 1987. The Organization Department of the Municipal Party Committee of Shanghai, et al, eds. *Materials on the Organizational History of Government System, Local Military System, United Front System, and Mass Organization System of Shanghai Municipality, 1949.5-1987.10*, p. 194.


functional system between the municipal and bureau party committees.²¹³ The layer was designed to separate party work from governmental work, but ironically, it upheld the interlocking of party and government, or rather, the substitution of party for administration. Furthermore, it contradicted the goal of structural simplification.

Another organizational problem that the municipal authorities tried to solve was the oversize of municipal bureaucracy. In March 1980, the number of the staff of the party, government and mass organizations at all levels in Shanghai was over 63,000, soaring 71% from 36,739 in 1965 or 32% from 47,827 in 1978.²¹⁴ The task to reduce the overgrown staff size of the bureaucratic organizations correlates with the task of organizational simplification. As the municipal authorities failed to streamline those bureaucratic organizations, the task of staff reduction was out of the question. As Figure 1 shows, from 1981 to 1986, the overall staff size was not reduced but increased by one third, from 63,483 to 84,976. despite the fact that the staff in the juridical and law enforcement system had not been included since 1983. In 1981, the State Council approved the staff size to be 57,000, but the municipally authorized size was 60,136, and the actual size was 63,483. As chart one shows, the actual size exceeded the authorized size every year. The biggest annual margin was 11,592 or 19% of the authorized size in 1982.

The municipal authorities' failures to cut the number and staff size of bureaucratic organizations were partly due to the restoration and creation of functional organizations to facilitate economic reforms and the functions of planning, management and control of the city. During the period 1980-85, a few of the bureau-level government institutions abolished or merged in the Cultural Revolutionary period continued to be restored. They included the Bureau of Justice, the Bureau of Environment and Health Management, and the Municipal Office of Transportation. To strengthen Shanghai's economic ties with other provinces and cities, the Municipal Office for Cooperation appeared. So did the Committee of Workers and Peasants' Education, the Committee of Birth Planning, and the Bureau of Audit. The Bureau of State Security was set up in 1984. In the same year, the municipal authorities decided to

²¹³ As of 1983, the party committee was set up in each of the eight systems -- industry, transportation, construction, finance and commerce, external economics and trade, rural work, science and technology, and education and health.

Figure 1: The Staff Size of the Party, Government, and Mass Organizations of Shanghai, 1978-1986




* Information on the distributed size for 1978, 1979, and 1986 is not available.

Source: The Office of the Municipal Committee of Size Control of Shanghai Cadres ed., *Shanghai Dangzheng Jiguo Yangde, 1949-1986* (The Evolution of the Party and Government Organizations of Shanghai). Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1988, p. 237.

create a new functional system -- city construction planning, and accordingly a municipal committee responsible for both urban and rural planning, constructions, and environmental protection, and for coordinating institutions and functional systems concerned. Moreover, the municipal leadership started to pay attention to the importance of think tanks. Established under the municipal government were the Research Office and three advisory and research centers for economics, international relations, and economic laws and regulations respectively.

²¹⁴ The Office of the Shanghai Staff-size Control Committee ed., *The Evolution of the Party and Government Organizations of Shanghai*, pp. 157, 237.

Figure 2 : Basic-level Party Organizations in Shanghai, 1949-87




* The statistics of 1976 and 1987 do not include those basic-level party organizations in rural Shanghai.

Source: The Organization Department of the Municipal Party Committee of Shanghai, et al, eds. *Materials on the Organizational History of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai Municipality, 1920.8-1987.10*, p. 687.

In addition to changes in the function and size of the governing organizations, there was a remarkable expansion of the party and its massive recruitment of younger and better educated people, which constituted the political base of the technocratic leadership. The CCP as the ruling party and principal political force has been expanded remarkably in Shanghai in the 1980s and the first half of 1990s. Figure 2 shows that the scale of the expansion at the basic level. During the period 1976-87, the numbers of the party committees, party general branches, and party branches, had increased by 1,029 or 88 percent, 1,373 or 89 percent, and 18,520 or 59 percent respectively. This has been the biggest expansion since 1949 in terms of numbers.

The party membership of Shanghai and its ratio to population rose as well. In 1978, the party membership totaled 668,704. In 1987, it reached a total of 972,998, increasing 304,294 or one third. By 1995, it had been added by another 137,000 to 1.11 million. While the population of the city soared almost six million from almost seven million in 1959 to thirteen million in 1995, the growth of party membership even outran that of the city population,. The ratio of party membership to the city population was approximately three percent in 1959.²¹⁵ 6 percent in 1978, 7.8 percent in 1987, and 8.5 percent in 1995.



²¹⁵ Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, p. 137.

A closer look at the growth of party membership reveals an unprecedented surge of better educated party members in general and those with technical training in particular (See Figure 3). In the history of the CCP, intellectuals constituted a tiny fraction of its membership. In the period 1949-1965, there was a nearly seventeen-fold increase in party membership, yet the bulk of new recruitment was from workers, not intellectuals, as the percentage of those attaining less than middle-school education in party membership did not decline but increased slightly, from 78.5 percent to 79 percent.²¹⁶ During the Cultural Revolution period, the totals of party membership climbed as rapidly as in the period of 1978-1987, and it is believed that more workers, peasants and soldiers were recruited than in the previous period.²¹⁷

In contrast, the period of 1978-1987 witnessed a sharp decline in recruitment of the less educated people -- 66,306 in total, representing merely 28 percent of the new blood of 304,294, and an 12 percent increase from the figure of 1978. Meanwhile, among new party members, there were 105,688 college graduates and 132,300 high school or technical school graduates. These two groups constituted 32.6 percent and 43.5 of new recruits, and made the numbers of 1987 three times and 2.5 times as many as those of 1978, respectively. As a result, the percentage of the least educated in party membership declined by eighteen points, from 79.3 in 1978 to 61.3 in 1987, whereas that of college graduates escalated from 7.3 to 15.9, and that of the middle group from 13.3 to 22.8. As in the early 1980s, the municipal party committee still strove to break rigid obstacles to recruiting intellectuals, it is reasonable to assume that a majority of the two groups were recruited in the mid-1980s. A recent official statistics shows a continuation of the trends. In 1994, the party members with high-school education or above were 533,100, more than double the 1984 figure of 225,600; and the better educated constituted 48 percent of the total membership, surging from 28 percent ten years ago.²¹⁸

²¹⁶ The total party membership of Shanghai was 20,646 in 1949, and 345,456 in 1965. Of 324,810 new recruits, 273,221 had below middle school education. The Organization Department of the Municipal Party Committee of Shanghai, et al, eds., *Materials on the Organizational History of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai Municipality, 1920.8-1987.10*, p. 689.

²¹⁷ The exact number of new recruitment in 1966-1976 is not available at this point, yet official statistics show that party membership in Shanghai had almost doubled between 1965 and 1978, from 345,456 to 668,704. Those whose education attainment was below the level of middle school still represented 79.3 percent of the total party membership. Ibid.

²¹⁸ *The Liberation Daily*, June 11, 1995.

Besides the significant expansion of the party in favor of the better educated, the cadre corps evolved in the same direction. Between 1978 and 1987, the number of cadres in Shanghai surged 346,469 or 48.5 percent from 713,216 to 1,059,685, the biggest in one decade since 1949. Of the surge, administrative cadres outran non-administrative ones in terms of percentage, though the former accounted for nearly 10 percent of the total number. If the cadre corps is broken down into the above-mentioned three groups, we can see a trend similar to what took place in the party's expansion. In 1949, the least educated group comprised 91 percent of a total of 26,111 cadres. Such extremely high percentage dropped to 40.2 percent of 713,216 cadres in 1978, but the absolute number of those cadres was 12 times the number in 1949. In 1978-1987, the growth of this group of cadres was not only stopped but reversed. While the total number of cadres was up substantially, the number of the group in question decreased from 287,591 in 1978 to 226,330 in 1987, and the its percentage in the total of cadres fell further from 40.2 to 21.4. Meanwhile, the group of cadres with college education was more than doubled, from 177,573 to 399,270; its percentage in the total number of cadres rose from 24.9 to 37.8. The group of cadres with education from high school or technical school also had grown from 248,052 to 434,085 in number, and from 34.8 to 41 in percentage.

The rapid expansion of both the party and the cadre corps, especially the large-scale recruitment of the better-educated which led to substantial change in the composition of the party and cadre corps, was not accomplished by the leadership of reform-minded revolutionary veterans. The above data of 1978-87 implies the efforts of the full technocratic leadership as of 1985. It also reasonable to say that even before 1985, technocrats at the sub-municipal levels as well as the municipal played an important role in the rapid expansion. It was in their interest after all.

Another institutional contribution of the municipal leadership of 1980-85 was the emergence of the semi-official newspaper *Shijie Jingji Daobao* (The World Economic Herald). This newspaper was found with the Research Institute of World Economy, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences in 1980, under the auspices of Mayor Wang and Qian Junrui, a veteran revolutionary, eminent economist, and director of the Research Institute of World Economy, China's Academy of Social Sciences. From its debut to its ban by the

municipal authorities led by Jiang Zemin in 1989, this newspaper was increasingly popular, especially among intellectuals and many cadres nationwide, thanks to its thoughtful editorial works, its stimulating articles, and its presentation of insightful interviews with high-ranking officials.²¹⁹ As one of the most influential Chinese newspaper in the reform era, it had contributed tremendously to the dissemination of technocracy, or in the words of an expert of Chinese technocracy, to China's "technocratic movement and ideological formation."²²⁰

The personnel and organizational changes conducted by the leadership of revolutionaries and technocrats paved the way for the coming of a full technocratic leadership. The leadership transformation from revolutionary to technocratic was gradual and smooth, mainly thanks to those reform-minded revolutionary veterans who realized the importance of technocrats in China's reform and modernization. By using the word *transformation* instead of *transition*, we try to accentuate differences between the two groups of leaders. Although they were all communists and had same or similar views over the party-state and many other fundamental issues, there were several significant changes in leadership, not just a continuation of the Chinese communist leadership. The following section is going to demonstrate this.

3. SHANGHAI LEADERSHIP TRANSFORMATION IN PERSPECTIVE

Based on available information on the Shanghai leadership and individual leaders of 1977-92, we conducted a conventional elite study. Eight tables were produced. And the focus of our study was placed on the four aspects of leadership changes: the size of municipal party and administrative leadership; the leaders' tenures and patterns of mobility; their age, revolutionary seniority and educational attainment; and native-outsider ratio.

The Streamlining of the Shanghai Leadership

²¹⁹ Cheng Li and Lynn White, "China's Technocratic Movement and the World Economic Herald." *Modern China*, vol. 17, 3 (1991): 342-388.

²²⁰ Cheng Li, *The Rise of Technocracy*, Ph.D. thesis, p. 241.

Although Deng's China had no apparent success in detaching administration from the Party and streamlining the bureaucracy as a whole,²²¹ the reduction of the size of provincial Party and administrative leaderships was quite successful. Table 5 shows that the number of

Table 5: Changes in the Party and Administrative Leadership, 1976-93

Year	Party Secretary	Administrative leader*	Total
1976	7	17	24
1977	7	16	23
1978	7	15	22
1979	11	16	27
1980	11	12	23
1981	11	12	23
1982	12	14	26
1983	5	7	12
1984	5	7	12
1985	5	7	12
1986	5	7	12
1987	6	8	14
1988	6	8	14
1989	6	9	15
1990	6	8	14
1991	6	8	14
1992	5	7	12
1993	5	9	14

* This category includes Chairpersons and Vice-Chairmen of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee as well as mayors and vice-mayors of the municipal government.

²²¹ See Hong Yung Lee, "China's New Bureaucracy?" in Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum ed., *State and Society in China: the Consequences of Reform*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, p. 60.

Party secretaries and mayors and their deputies shrunk by more than half.²²² The course of the changes can be divided into three phases: 1976-1978; 1979-1982; 1983-1991. In the first phase, the total number of the Municipal leaders was high, ranging from twenty-four to twenty-two. Few changes occurred immediately after the collapse of the Gang of Four. Before October 1976, there were seven Party Secretaries and seventeen Chairpersons and Vice-Chairpersons of the Revolutionary Committee. By the end of 1978, the count of the former had remained the same while the count of the latter had decreased by two.

The situation changed in 1979-80 when the Revolutionary Committee was replaced with the government system. Owing to a substantial increase in the number of Party Secretaries -- from seven to eleven in 1978-81 and twelve in 1982, the total number of the Party and government leaders reached its zenith for the period 1976-91 -- twenty-seven in 1979 and twenty-six in 1982. Nevertheless, there was no significant change in the total number of the Party and administrative leaders, nor in the number of the administrative leaders. 1983 witnessed a dramatic change: the numbers of Party secretaries and mayors and the combined number of both groups decreased from the figures of 1982 by 58 percent, 50 percent and 54 percent respectively. These figures remained unchanged from 1983 to 1986, and then increased slightly in the following seven years except 1992. It is apparent that 1983 is a watershed in the period 1976-93.

Tenures and Patterns of Mobility

A comparison of top municipal Party and administrative officials in 1976-82 and 1983-93 may be of help in depicting the leadership change. All the municipal leaders in the past fifteen years were appointed after October 1976, except for four who survived no later than March 1983. We have collected information on the tenure of these post-1976 appointees, except one, by position, not by individual, from the date of appointment to the present time. In Table 6, we compare the tenure in office of municipal Party and administrative leaders appointed between October 1976 and the end of 1982 (over six years) with those appointed in

²²² The reduction of the size of the first echelon of the municipal leadership does not equal the streamlining of the whole bureaucracy.

**Table 6: Tenure of the Municipal Party and
Administrative Leaders, 1976-1993**

	The Leaders Appointed in			
	Oct.1976-1982		1983-93	
	No. of Men in Position	Average Months of Service	No. of Men in Position	Average Months of Service
All Party & Admin- istrative Leaders	41	39	30	48
Party Secretaries	18	42	14	42
Chief*	3	35	4	23
Deputy**	15	44	10	50
Administrative Leaders	23	37	15	52
Chief ***	3	35	3	31
Deputy Chair- persons/Mayors	20	37	12	57

* This refers to the first Party Secretary existing before June 1985 and full Secretary afterwards.

** This category includes the second, third, full and deputy secretaries before June 1985 and deputy secretaries afterward.

*** It refers to Chairperson of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee before 1980 and Mayor of the Municipal Government since 1980.

Main sources: *China Directory* (1986-92), Tokyo: Radiopress, 1985-1991; *Yearbook on Chinese Communism, 1976-1990*, Taipei: Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, 1976-1990; Wolfgang Brake, *Who's Who in the People's Republic of China*, 1st and 3rd editions, Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1981, 1991, and 2nd edition, Munchen, N. Y.: K. G. Saur, 1987; David Goodman, *China's Provincial Leaders, 1949-1985*, vol.1, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1986; *Shanghai Quanshu* (the Encyclopaedia of Shanghai), Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1991; the Organization Department of the Municipal Party Committee of Shanghai, et al, ed. *Shanghaishi Zhengquan Xitong, Difang Junshi Xitong, Tongyi Zhanxian Xitong, Qunzhong Tuanti Xitong Zuzhishi Ziliao, 1949.5-1987.10* (Materials on the Organizational History of Government System, Local Military System, United Front System, and Mass Organization System of Shanghai Municipality, 1949.5-1987.10. Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1991; the Organization Department of the Municipal Party Committee of Shanghai, et al, ed. *Zhongguo Gongchandang Shanghaishi Zuzhishi Ziliao, 1920.8-1987.10* (Materials on the Organizational History of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai Municipality, 1920.8-1987.10. Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1991.

the period of March 1983 to February 1993 (almost ten years). We find the overall average tenure of the appointees of the second period was 48 months, nine months longer than that of the appointees of the first period. This difference is mainly due to the average length of service of administrative leaders of the second period (52 months), or rather, due to the duration in office of the post-1983 appointees to the position of deputy mayor (57 months), which is about 20 months longer than that of the pre-1983 appointees. Generally speaking, the Shanghai political leadership personnel in the second period was more stable than in the first period.

While the tenure of the post-1983 deputy Party and administrative leaders was longer than that of the pre-1983 deputies, nonetheless, the average time of service in both chief Party and administrative positions in 1976-82 was longer than that in 1983-93 -- approximately twelve and five months respectively. Two points need to be addressed here. First, the tenure of current Party Secretary and mayor as well as many post-1983 appointees has yet to end; as recently "re-elected" Party Secretary and Mayor, Wu Bangguo and Huang Ju are expected to continue their tenure for some time, so consequently the average tenure of the chief leaders in the second period will increase. Second and more important, the high turnover of chief Party and administrative leaders in the second period is mainly because all the post-1983 appointees, other than current top leaders, were promoted into the nucleus of the national leadership.

A trend of upward mobility of the post-1983 appointees on the whole, in comparison with a downward mobility of the pre-1983 appointees, is another feature of the Shanghai leadership transition. We divided the period 1979-91 into four sub-periods according to the official terms of office.²²³ As indicated in Table 7, of the leaders in the first term, 60 percent retired to the "second line" (a semi-retirement); in addition, one (five percent) was demoted, though slightly, from vice-mayor to head of the Municipal political and legal leading group, and another vice-mayor (five percent) disappeared from the senior official list (most likely retired). Only fifteen percent remained in office or transferred to an equivalent position, while another fifteen percent (Peng Chong, Wang Daohan and Chen Jinhua) advanced to higher

²²³ See *The Encyclopedia of Shanghai*, p. 30-31.

Table 7: Mobility of the Party and Administrative Leaders, 1979-1991 *

The Mobility of The Leaders Appointed in								
Classification of Mobility	Dec.1979- Mar. 1983**		Mar. 1983- July 1985		July 1985- April 1988		April 1988- April 1991	
	N=20	%	N=10	%	N=15	%	N=13	%
Promotion:								
From chief posts to leading posts at centre ***	1	5			1	6.7	2	15.4
From deputies to (1) chief municipal posts	1	5			2	13.3	2	15.4
(2) ministers or the equivalent	1	5			1	6.7	1	7.7
Lateral transfer	1	5			1	6.7	1	7.7
Remain in posts	2	10	7	70	7	46.6	7	53.8
Semi-retirement****	12	60	3	30	1	6.7		
Demotion	1	5						
Unknown	1	5			2	13.3		

* The leaders are counted as individuals, not by their positions. The mobility of every leading individual is reckoned by the end of each of the four counting periods. If one received promotion twice during a single period, the higher one will be recorded here. Quite a few held municipal party and administrative posts concurrently. If one of his or her positions changed while another remained, it will be taken into account.

** For party secretaries, the term started in March 1980.

*** For the application of "chief posts," see Table 6. The "leading posts at the centre" refers to members of the State Council, of the Secretariat or the Politburo of the CCPCC.

**** Officially called "Tuiju Erxian" (retired to the second line), it here refers to the municipal leaders who were transferred to Party and governmental advisory positions or the standing committees of the NPC and CPPCC at either municipal or national level.

positions.²²⁴ The pattern started to change in the second term. No promotion nor demotion did occur. The percentage of the semi-retirees dropped from 60 to 30. More than two-thirds of the leading figures stayed in office.

The ensuing terms saw a continuation and strengthening of the change. The percentage of semi-retirement declined sharply to seven in the third term and to zero in the fourth. While the majority of the appointees since 1985 retained their positions or were transferred laterally, the percentage of advancement rose from fifteen in Term One to 27 in 1985-88 and to 39 in 1988-91. And the top positions at the national level they advanced to, were not ceremonial but rather powerful, such as member of the Party Secretariat (Rui Xingwen), Deputy Director of the General Office of the CCPCC (Zeng Qinghong), Party General Secretary (Jiang Zemin), and Vice-Premier (Zhu Rongji).

The exit of those Party and administrative leaders during the period 1977 to 1992 may be worth mentioning here. As we have seen, the majority of the leaders leaving office were old revolutionary cadres who retired to the "second-line" due to this generational ascendancy. Some like Han Zheyi, joined the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, or like Wang Yiping and Xia Zhengnong, the Advisory Committee of the CCPCC. Most of the "retirees" became heads of the Municipal Party Advisory Committee (Chen Guodong, Zhao Xingzhi), of the Municipal People's Congress (Yen Youmin, Hu Lijiao, Ye Gongqi, Zhong Min, Chen Yi and Zhao Zukang, etc.), and of the Municipal People's Political Consultation Council (such as Yang Shifa), and advisors to the municipal government (Wang Daohan, Yang Kai, Pei Xianbai, Xin Yuanxi, etc.). It is believed that after their exit from the leading Party and administrative positions, these revolutionary veterans, particularly Chen, Hu and Wang, the top three in the first half of the 1980s, still played an important role in municipal politics by promoting the relations between the centre and Shanghai, by advising current Party and administrative leaders, by monitoring policy implementation and municipal politics, by

²²⁴ In China, "promotion" often requires a close look. What seems to be a promotion may be an actual demotion ("Ming Sheng An Jiang"). It usually pertains to the case where an official was given a higher but ceremonial position in exchange for his current powerful position. Peng Chong, then number one leader of Shanghai, was transferred to the post of vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. However, as a China expert noted, this meant Peng, as a regional leader, lost his power base. Thus his advancement to the centre turned out to be an unfavorable turn. See

recommending leadership candidates, and by passing by-laws, policy options or leader nominations. However, their role in municipal politics appears to be not as crucial as the role of the retirees from the central leadership in national politics.

According to information available to us, only one individual (Wang Jian) was relatively demoted. After being a vice-chairman of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee and then vice-mayor between January 1978 and April 1983, Wang Jian was relieved to the position of deputy head of the Municipal Leading Group for Political and Legal Affairs while retaining his membership of the Municipal Party Standing Committee. Later on, he was appointed as a vice-chairman of the Municipal People's Congress. There are three former vice-mayors (Chen Zonglie, Qian Xiezhong and Li Zaoji) who left and have not re-appeared on the lists of the Municipal Party Standing Committee, of Party and government advisors, of heads of municipal departments, commissions, offices and bureaus, and of chairmen and vice-chairmen of the MPC or MPPCC. Whether they were transferred to certain leading positions outside Shanghai or were severely demoted is a matter for future investigation. As well, since the reasons underlying the mobility of individual municipal leaders have not been made public, we are unable to explain with accuracy what causes individual promotion or demotion at the present time.

Change in the Leaders' Age, Revolutionary Seniority and Educational Qualifications

Let us shift our attention to a profile of the leaders. Data on the distribution of those leaders in 1979-1991 by age and revolutionary seniority deserve notice. According to Table 8, none of the appointees of 1979-1980, who consisted of almost 90 percent of the appointees of 1979-1982 and who were representative for the appointees of 1976-1978, were under 50 years of age. Almost two-thirds of them were in their 60s and 70s. Their average age was 63.3 years. The age structure of the Shanghai Party and government leaders changed substantially in 1983 and afterwards. The average age of the 1983 appointees was 51 years, a decline of 12.3 years of age from the level of 1979-80. That of the 1985 appointees rose by 0.4 years,

Table 8: Distribution of Municipal Leaders by Age and Revolutionary Seniority, 1979-91 *

	The leaders appointed in					
	May 1979- Jun. 1980 (N=16)	May 1979- Jun. 1980 (N=7)	Mar-April 1983 (N=5)	May-June 1985 (N=5)	Nov. 1987- Mar.1988 (N=4)	April- Jun. 1991
Age Group						
40 - 49			3	3		
50 - 59	4		3	2	4	4
60 - 69	9		1		1	
70 - 79	2					
Unknown**	1					
Date of Join- ing the Party						
Pre-1950	13		3	2	2	
pre-1937	6					
1938-45	6		2	1		
1946-49	1		1	1	2	
Post-1950			4	2	3	4
Unknown***	2					

* If a functionary got promotion twice or held both top municipal party and government posts in each of the five periods, he/she will be counted only one time. His or her age at the earlier appointment will be taken into account.

** Although his exact age is not known at this moment, he is thought to be in his late fifties or early sixties if we reckon his pre-1966 leading position.

*** The unknown are thought to have joined the CCP before 1949 because their pre-1966 official ranking were already quite high.

but all the appointees were still only in their 40s and 50s. Although that of the appointees of 1987-88 increased 5.4 years from the level of 1985, 80 percent of them were also only in their 50s. This kind of demography continued after 1988. The average age of the appointees of 1989 to March 1991 was 54.3 years and that of the appointees of 1992 to 1993 was 50.2 years, even lower than the level of 1983. As almost all the pre-1983 appointees left their leading positions in the municipality by June 1983 (Only three remained until 1985), as more and more younger individuals occupied those positions, the average age of Municipal

Table 9: Distribution of the Municipal Party and Administrative Leaders by Types of Revolutionary Cadres, 1979-1992

Revolutionary Labels of Cadre	Leaders appointed in				
	May 1979- Jun.1980 N = 12*	Mar.-April 1983 N = 7	May- Jun.1985 N = 4**	Nov.1987- Mar.1988 N = 5	April- Jun.1991 N = 4
(1) New Democratic Revolution (pre-1949)	12	3	2	2	
a. Cadre of Agrarian Revolutionary War	6				
b. Cadre of Anti-Japanese War	3	1			
c. Cadre of Liberation War			2	2	
Unknown ***	3	2			
(2) Socialist Revolution (post-1949)		4	2	3	4

* The total number of the Party and government leaders appointed in this period was sixteen. Of them, one was not a communist but rather an acting mayor of Shanghai under the nationalist regime; another three were revolutionary cadres, but the date of their joining the revolution is not known. These four officials are not included in this table.

** The total number of the appointees in this period was five. This table does not take one non-communist official into account.

*** All the three officials in this category were revolutionary cadres before 1949. However, when they became the cadre is unknown.

Party and administrative leaders serving during the period from 1983 to the present seems to be younger than before.

On the other hand, the revolutionary seniority of the appointees was on the decrease(See Table 9). Of these appointees, only two were non-communist (Zhao Zukang and Xie Lijuan who were appointed in 1979 and 1985 respectively), so they were not included in this table. As demonstrated in the table, all the known individuals appointed in 1979-80 were pre-1949 cadres. Half of them became revolutionary cadres before 1938 and another three joined the Party in 1938-39. The revolutionary seniority of the 1983 appointees dropped remarkably. Not one of the seven appointees was a pre-1938 revolutionary cadre, whereas more than half of them were post-1949 cadres. The decline in the leading cadres' revolutionary seniority continued between 1985 and 1991. In the two reshuffles of the Municipal Party and administrative leadership over the past two years, all the known appointees were post-1949 Party members; two of them joined the Party as late as the early 1980s.

Contrast to the decline of the leaders' revolutionary seniority, their level of education had been on the ascent. Although information about the exact educational attainment of one quarter of the leaders is not available to us, we have collected enough data to make conclusions. The known cases in Table 10 indicate that the educational attainment, if any, of nearly half of the appointees of 1979-80 was below college level. It is noted that we are unable to determine whether two of them had received primary education or even no education at all, due to lack of information. By comparison, all the leaders appointed during 1983-1991 received higher education, except Yang Di, an appointee of 1983, who attained high school education only.

These appointees' major fields of education also display a sharp contrast. While merely one of the sixteen appointees in 1979-80 is known to have attained formal scientific and technical training, all the post-1983 appointees with advanced educational qualifications took their specialities in the fields of science and technology, except for one graduate of business administration and as well for one unknown case. It is interesting that most of them were technical experts rather than theorists of science, and that electrical engineering is the most common field. All the municipal Party chiefs and mayors in the period 1985-93 were political technocrats (The following chapter will profile them).

Table 10: The Shanghai Leaders' Educational Attainments and Major Fields

	The leaders appointed in				
	May 1979- Jun. 1980 N = 16	Mar.-April 1983 N = 7	May- Jun. 1985 N = 5	Nov. 1987- Mar. 1988 N = 5	April- Jun. 1991 N = 4
Level of Education:					
High	5	6	5	3	4
Secondary	2	1			
Primary or less	2				
Unknown	7*			2	
Major Field **: 					
Architecture		1			1
Chemical Eng.				1	
Civil Eng.	1				
Electrical Eng.		1	3	1	2
Medical Science			1		
Mechanical Eng.		1		1	
Metallurgy		2			
Physics					1
Business Admin.			1		
Economics	1				
Literature	1				
Unknown	2	1			

* At least half of them are not likely to have received high education due to their revolutionary experiences.

** It only applies to those leaders who attained high education.

**Table 11: Comparison of the Backgrounds of the Municipal Party
and Administrative Leaders By System Before and After 1983 ***

System	Municipal Leaders in Position in			
	Jan.1977-April 1983		May 1983-April 1991	
	No.	%	No.	%
Top functional posts in				
Party & administration**	7	24.1	2	9
Organization-personnel	2	7	1	4
Political and legal work	1	3.5		
Military	3	10.3		
Finance and trade	3	10.3	2	9
Industry & communication	5	17	12	52
Agriculture & rural work	1	3.5	1	4
Culture-education-public health, science-technology	3	10.3	3	13
Party-mass organization	1	3.5		
External Affairs	2	7	2	9
Unknown	1	3.5		
Total	29	100	23	100

* The background of system pertains to the most recent functional posts these leading cadres occupied before they became the municipal Party or administrative leaders during the period October 1976 to April 1991.

** They include heads of Party committees, government and revolutionary committees, and secretaries-general of these bodies.

The contrast between the appointees before and after 1983 is more impressive under an examination of their backgrounds of system. Table 11 shows that the municipal leaders

serving in the period of October 1976 to February 1983 came from all the major systems in China. The relatively dominant system is top functional positions in Party committees and government -- approximately one-quarter of the leaders were from this system. It is noticeable that fourteen percent of the leaders came from the military and party-mass organizations, the two distinguished systems in composition of China's provincial authorities during the Cultural Revolution.²²⁵ The composition of the top municipal officials in the period of

Table 12: Comparison of the Municipal Party and Administrative Leaders Before and After 1983 By Previous Occupation*

Occupation	The leading individuals in position in			
	Jan.1977-April 1983		May 1983-April 1991	
	No.	%	No.	%
Cadre:				
High-intermediate-level**	20	69	3	13
Basic-level ***	1	3.5	8	35
Military & police personnel	5	17	1	4
Worker	1	3.5		
Engineer	1	3.5	3	13
Teacher, researcher and doctor			5	22
Unknown	1	3.5	3	13
Total	29	100	23	100

* Before or during the Cultural Revolution.

** This category pertains leading cadres at national, regional, provincial and municipal levels, and those at the levels of bureau, department, county and district.

*** This category here comprises mainly industrial managers, directors of research institutes, and staff (Yiban Ganbu) at various levels.

²²⁵ See Teives, *Provincial Leadership in China*, p. 95.

March 1983- April 1991 was different. More than half of them were from the system of industry and communication. Only nine percent of them came from top positions in the Party committees and government. There was none from the military and party-mass organizations nor from the political and legal systems.

If we further probe the municipal leaders' previous occupations, the profiles of the appointees of 1983 to 1991 will become more clear. As Table 12 reveals, of the top Party and administrative officials in office before 1983, two-thirds were already cadres at high and intermediate levels, twenty percent were previously servicepeople, police officers and industrial workers. There were only one worker-engineer (Ni Zhifu) and one industrial manager (Chen Jinhua). No one was promoted who had been a teacher, a researcher or a medical professional. In sharp contrast, 35 percent of the top Party and administrative officials since 1983 were professionals before becoming cadres. Another 35 percent used to be basic-level cadres, mainly industrial managers and directors of research institutes. No one was previously a military personnel or a worker. Only Yang Di, who was originally appointed before 1983 but re-appointed afterwards, had been a police officer.

Native-Outsider Ratio in the Shanghai Leadership

The native-outsider ratio is a key variable in the study of the Chinese provincial leadership. In order to ensure both central control over provinces and efficient implementation of central policies by provincial authorities under various local conditions, China's leaders have always tried to keep a certain native-outsider ratio in the provincial leadership by directly appointing provincial leaders. However, the ratio has changed from period to period, reflecting shifts in the balance of power between the centre and the provinces, or the centre's attempts to tighten or loosen its relationship with the provinces.

As shown in Table 13, there was a trend towards a numerical dominance by natives in the Municipal leadership during the period 1977-91. In the wake of the formal end of the Cultural Revolution in October 1976, of eight party secretaries, only twelve percent were native. This percentage went up to 20 percent in 1983 and then dramatically to 83 percent in

1991, while the percentage of non-native secretaries fell correspondingly. The native-outsider ratio of the administrative leaders shifted from 1:3 in 1977 to 7:1 in 1991.

It is worthwhile to point out that the shift was due to changes in the original places of those deputy secretaries, vice-chairpersons and vice-mayors. There was no significant change as far as the places of origin of top Party and administrative leaders are concerned. All

Table 13: The Native/Non-native Ratio of the Shanghai Leaders, 1977-1991*

	November 1977		April 1983		July 1991	
	Party Secretary (N=8)	Chair of Revolutionary Committee (N=10)	Party Secretary (N=5)	Mayor (N=7)	Party Secretary (N=6)	Mayor (N=8)
Native	1	3	1	5	5	7
Non-native	7	6	4	2	1	1
From:						
the East China Region	4	4	2		1	
the rest of China	3	3	2	2		1

* The leaders include party secretaries (first, second, full, deputy), Chairpersons and vice-Chairpersons of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee, and mayors and vice-mayors of the municipal government.

the Municipal Party chiefs, chairpersons of the Revolutionary Committee and mayors in 1977-91, except Jiang Ziming, were outsiders. It was consistent with the centre's traditional strategy (except for the Cultural Revolutionary period) -- appointing outsiders to the top and most powerful positions in provincial leaderships to prevent localism, while selecting loyal natives to the positions of deputy in order to apply central initiatives to local conditions more effectively. Nonetheless, this practice has changed since 1991 when Huang Ju became the

mayor. The current mayor Xu Guangdi is also a Shanghainese by our definition stated in Chapter two.

The examination of changes in the size, mobility patterns, seniority and education level, and native-outsider ratio of the municipal leadership in 1977-93 shed light on the scale and substance of Chinese leadership changes in the reform era in which 1983 was a watershed. How substantial and significant China's provincial/municipal leadership changes were? In his examination of China's provincial leadership changes in 1983 in general and the cases of Shanxi and Hunan in particular, William deB. Mills claimed an "astonishing" speed and scope for the 1983 reform but believed it was not successful in paving the way for "the transfer of power to a new elite composed of technocrats" but to "younger leaders with traditional backgrounds."²²⁶ By using the case of Zhejiang Province, Keith Forster argued that the provincial leadership personnel changes in 1983 were "much more limited than Mills indicates."²²⁷ Now the acquisition of data on the streamlining, turnover, mobility and personal profile of municipal Party and administrative leaders during the period of 1976-92, albeit incomplete, allow us to make a better assessment of the full significance of the leadership change in general and the 1983 change in particular. As our findings indicate, it was more significant than Mills acknowledged, not to mention Forster's conclusion. Its significance lies in the beginning of a large-scale leadership streamlining at the provincial level, of the stability and an upward mobility of the leadership personnel, of the transfer of power from rehabilitated revolutionary veterans to a younger generation of cadres. More important, 1983 marks the dawn of a domination of technocrats in provincial-level authorities.

²²⁶ Mills, "Leadership Change in China's Provinces," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1985, p. 29.

²²⁷ Keith Forster, "Leaders of Chinese Provinces" (to the editors), *ibid.*, p. 85.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE TECHNOCRATIC LEADERS OF SHANGHAI, 1985-1995

One of the most important questions about the Chinese technocratic leadership is who the Chinese communist technocratic leaders are. After probing how technocrats as a political elite group rose to the top of municipal leadership for the first time, the previous chapter illustrates the question by a series of comparisons and contrasts of Chinese technocratic leaders and revolutionary leaders based on statistical and biographical data. Though scientific and systematic in appearance, the illustration does not provide human faces for the picture of Chinese communist technocrats. This chapter is primarily designed to complement it.

The technocratic ruling period of 1985-1995 in Shanghai can be divided into five sub-periods by shuffles of its top leaders, namely, party secretaries and mayors: Rui Xingwen and Jiang Zemin, 1985-87; Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, 1987-89; Zhu Rongji, 1989-91; Wu Bangguo and Huang Ju, 1991-94; and Huang Ju and Xu Kuangdi, 1994-95. There were six individuals in total. In the Chinese political system, top party and administrative leaders at the provincial and municipal level are the key political figures and most powerful policy makers, far more important than their deputies, in provincial or municipal politics and administration. These six municipal leaders may be seen as the representatives of the Chinese technocratic leaders (As a matter of fact, now two of them are China's number one and number three leaders, another two are members of the Politburo). This chapter is to examine their profiles one by one in a chronological order. The examination is followed by some notes of observation on their relations, and by a typology of Chinese technocrats based on the profiles of these technocratic representatives.

1. THE PROFILES OF SIX TOP TECHNOCRATS IN SHANGHAI, 1985-1995

Rui Xingwen: A Revolutionary Technocrat from the Base-area

Rui Xingwen was born in Lianshui county, Jiangsu province, 1926. His family background is not clear; and information on his revolutionary experiences is sketchy.²²⁸ He was head of a Children's Corps in an anti-Japanese aggression base area. His formal participation in the Chinese Communist revolution is dated from 1942. After being head of the Propaganda Department of the Middle School Students' National Salvation Society, Binhai County of Jiangsu, in 1942-44, he joined the party in 1945. He was reported to have studied at the Northern Jiangsu Public School, the Central China Construction University and Shangdong University for one year or so. Then he was transferred to Northeastern China, serving as an assistant of the Organization Department, the North East Bureau of CPC Central Committee, in 1947-48, and as a section chief of Jinxi Oil Refinery in 1948-49. The above information suggests that with secondary education, Rui had little experience, if any, in battle fields, but certain experience in propaganda, personnel and industrial management.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China, his industrial management knowledge and skills developed along with his promotions. In 1950, he was sent to the Chinese People's University in Beijing to study special courses in business management. Equipped with advanced managerial knowledge, though probably the Soviet style, Rui was assigned as the first deputy manager of Dalian Engineering Company, the Ministry of Heavy Industry, in 1952-56, as manager of Jilin No.8 Mechanical Installation Company in 1956-57, as the first deputy manager of Lanzhou Chemical Industrial Company, and as manager of No.7 Chemical Industrial Construction Company, the Ministry of Chemical Industry, in 1957-66.

Information on his activities during the Cultural Revolution period is not available; yet it is most likely that he was purged as most industrial managers. Afterwards, he served as deputy director of the First Office of the National Defence Industry in 1977-78. In 1978-83, he was escalated to the position of vice minister of the Seventh Ministry of Machine-Building

²²⁸ Bibliographical information on Rui Xingwen is from Liao Gailong, et al eds., *Zhongguo Renming Da Cidian. Xiandai Dang Zheng Jun Lingdao Renwu Juan* (Who's Who in China: Current Party, Administrative and Military Leaders) (Shanghai: the Shanghai Press of Dictionaries and Books; and Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1989), and Li Guoqiang, *Zhongguo Dangdai Mingren Lu* (A Short Biography of Eminent Chinese in Contemporary China), Hong Kong: Wide Angle Press, vol. 9, pp. 30-32.

and of the Ministry of Aerospace Industry in 1978-83. Then he left industrial sectors and became a vice-chair of the State Planning Commission in 1983-84, and minister of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental Protection in 1984-85, prior to his new job in Shanghai. It is conceivable that Rui's long experience in industrial management, coupled with his leadership experience in planning, urban construction, and environmental protection made him a strong candidate for top offices of Shanghai leadership. But it is unclear why he was appointed as the full party secretary of Shanghai and who was or were his patron/s.

However, later events indicate that his appointment may have something to do with then party general secretary Hu Yaobang. After his appointment, Rui, together with other technocratic leaders, furthered the reform, opening-up and modernization of Shanghai. His most noted contribution during his tenure is to his leadership in holding the conferences on Chinese cultural and then making the Strategy of Shanghai Cultural Development, which called and laid a groundwork for further reform, the reform of traditional Chinese culture. This was in accordance with Hu Yaobang's radical reform scheme, and was first of its kind in the country, showing Shanghai's vanguard status again after almost a decade of being in a backwater. Probably because of his political, ideological inclination to radical reform which was manifested in this undertaking, Rui was promoted to the Secretariat of CCPCC in 1987 in charge of China's ideology and propaganda. In the Incident of 1989, he appeared to be ally of then Party general-secretary Zhao Ziyang who was a resolute reformist leader and was sympathetic to the pro-democracy movement. As a result, Rui lost his membership of the powerful Secretariat.

Jiang Zemin: A Technocrat with Revolutionary Background

Information on Jiang Zemin, both official and unofficial, is much richer,²²⁹ due to his current official status as the number-one Chinese leader. Jiang is one year older than Rui, but

²²⁹ Liao Gailong, et al eds., *Who's Who in China: Current Party, Administrative and Military Leaders*; Li, *A Short Biography of Eminent Chinese in Contemporary China*; Li Guoqiang et al., *Jiang Zemin Pouxu* (An Analysis of Jiang Zemin), Hong Kong: Wide Angle Press, 1989; Hu Zhiwei, *Jiang Zemin Chuanchi* (The Legend of Jiang Zemin), Taipei: The Publishing House of Biographical literature, 1990.

one year junior as a party member. He came from an intellectual family in the cultural city of Yangzhou, Jiangsu province. Yet he was adopted by one of his uncles named Jiang Shangqing, who was a student of literature at Shanghai Arts University, and later became a Communist cadre mainly conducting underground revolutionary activities in the Northeast of Anhui province. In 1939, he was ambushed by a puppet Chinese army, so he was regarded by Chinese communists as a revolutionary martyr. We are not sure in what degree Jiang Zemin was directly influenced by his foster-father, though one source says that Jiang had lived for three and a half years with his foster-father, whose influence was profound.²³⁰ Neither does it seem true that Jiang Zemin's successful political career was owing to his foster-father, as he was not a prominent communist leader, and died so early. We believe that Jiang was basically a self-made man, and his political success was situational.

Jiang was a bright student. Besides his specialty of electric motor engineering, he likes Chinese classic literature, Peking opera, and music. He began devoting himself to the Communist-led revolution in the period of the Nationalist-Communist Civil War, when he was an active university student in Shanghai. In 1946, the 21-year-old student activist became a communist. Before the liberation of Shanghai, his main revolutionary activities included underground party works and public protests against the Nationalist regime, while he was an employee of an American company in charge of its power section.

From 1949 to 1966, Jiang was mostly an industrial manager or a research director on the basic level. He served as deputy manager of Shanghai No.1 Yimin Foodstuff Factory and Shanghai Soap Factory in 1949-52; chief of the Electric Appliances Section of Shanghai No.2 Designing Sub-bureau, the First Ministry of Machinery Industry, in 1953-54; manager of the

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 27. But Hu's conclusion is subject to investigation. Jiang Zemin was born in 1926, when his foster-father was fifteen years old. According to Hu himself, Jiang Shangqing was a university student and anti-imperialist activist in the early 1930s; and then he was imprisoned for a total of more than two years and released in 1937; and in the same year, he went to Northern Anhui and had conducted revolutionary activities there until his death in 1939 at age 28 (pp. 29-34). It is apparent that before Jiang Zemin reached the age of five, Jiang Shangqing had already left Yangzhou city to study in Shanghai. It was unlikely that Jiang Shangqing, either as an extremely busy student in Shanghai, or as a prisoner, or as an underground communist who was facing constant uncertainty and danger in a poverty-stricken area, would chose to carry a child with him, rather than leaving the child with Jiang Shangqing's brother -- the child's natural father -- in a relatively comfortable city. If Jiang Zemin had

Power Plant of No.1 Motor Vehicle Plant in 1956-62; deputy director of Shanghai Electric Appliance Institute and director of Wuhan Thermos-engineering Machinery Institute, the First Ministry of Machinery Industry, in 1962-66. During the Cultural Revolution, he first suffered in 1967-70, then led a group of Chinese experts to work in Romania. In 1974-79, he served as deputy director and director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the First Ministry of Machinery Industry. In the first half of the 1980s, Jiang was successively vice-chair and secretary-general of the State Import and Export Administrative Committee, and first vice-minister and minister of the Electronics Industry. In June 1985, he became mayor of Shanghai and deputy secretary of CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee.

Both Jiang and Rui were born and raised in North Jiangsu, became communists at their early ages, and had technical training and rich managerial and bureaucratic experience. Yet Jiang is distinguished in three aspects. First, he had received a solid, formal education. Based on his sound elementary and secondary education, which partly due to his intellectual family background and partly due to the cultural and educational milieu of Yangzhou city, Jiang spent four years studying in and graduated in 1947 from the Faculty of Electric Motors, Shanghai Jiaotong University, one of the best Chinese universities. In 1955, he went as a trainee to Moscow Stalin Automobile Plant, the Soviet Union. On top of a sound training in classical Chinese literary and culture, he is reported to have learned English, Russian, German, French, and Romanian.²³¹

Second, Jiang had been exposed to the outside world and to modern management, planning and technology demonstrated by the foreigners. Other than working with the American-run Haining Company before 1949, being trained in the Soviet Union in 1955-56, and working in Romania in the capacity of a leading expert in the early 1970s, Jiang had visited Hong Kong in 1965, 1980, and 1983. In early 1981, under the coordination of the United Nations' trade and development organizations, he led China's first study group on special economic zones to visit about a dozen export-oriented trade and industrial processing zones in Asia, Europe, and Latin America. He also visited Japan as minister of Electronics

lived with Jiang Shangqing for three years or so as a baby or a small child, how could he understand his foster-father's revolutionary and patriotic views and activities?

Industry. Moreover, as being responsible for the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the First Ministry of Machinery Industry, and later for the State Import and Export Administrative Committee, Jiang not only had many opportunities to contact foreigners, but must have done a lot of homework on foreign countries and international relations.

Third, Jiang was already well acquainted with Shanghai prior to his appointment of 1985. According to incomplete information, he had resided in the city for a total of sixteen years at least. In 1943, he entered Shanghai Jiaotong University and lived there until 1955. In the 1960s, he had worked there again for a period of time. After the fall of the “Gang of Four” in October 1976, Jiang returned to the city as a member of the center’s working group. His family had always dwelled in Shanghai even though he worked in other places. Therefore, unlike Rui, Jiang is not a newcomer to this metropolis. His general experiences in Shanghai over both the pre- and post-1949 periods helped him well aware of the achievements and defects of local culture and society, the strength and weakness of Shanghai people, and dynamics and problems in the city’s development and modernization. Particularly, he understood the living and working conditions and concerns of ordinary people through his managerial and directorial work and his dwelling in one of the worker’s residential areas. He could be seen as an insider to local politics at both basic level and higher level, as having been a basic-level leader for years and as being a member of the powerful political working team in the city as of October 1976. His acquaintance with Shanghai was instrumental to his mayorship of the city.

His appointment as the mayor appears to have something to do with his job performance that impressed his superiors rather than mere personal relationship, including his kin relationship with a communist martyr. It is widely said that his predecessor Wang Daohan played a key role in Jiang’s appointment by recommending him. Available sources suggest like most high-ranking officials, Jiang had a few patrons on his way from a basic-level official to middle-level to high-level. It was the minister of No.1 Machinery Industry Duan Junyi, another revolutionary technocrat, who appreciated Jiang’s knowledge and capability and assigned him the responsibility for the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the ministry where Jiang did

²³¹ Ibid., p. 101. However, what language proficiency he obtained is not very clear. It appears that his English is the best of what he has learned. He also can speak some Russian and Romanian.

a competent job.²³² Gu Mu, a vice premier in charge of foreign trade and Special Economic Zones, may be another patron. As vice-chair and secretary-general of the State Import and Export Administrative Committee, Jiang was Gu Mu's associate. Jiang assisted Gu in successfully establishing China's Special Economic Zones, one of the greatest achievements of Deng's economic reform. Li Peng may have also played some role in Jiang's appointment. When Li was vice premier and head of the State Electronics Leading Group in 1984, Jiang was minister of Electronics Industry and deputy head of the leading group. Their working relationship seemed fairly smooth probably because Jiang did an impressive job and had better interpersonal skills than usual. It is also suspected that Chen Yun, China's second paramount leader, was favorable towards Jiang's appointment.²³³ So were the Minister of Organization of the CCPCC Qiao Shi, and probably the Politburo member Wu Xueqian, who both were college educated revolutionaries and were leaders of the Shanghai Student Committee enter the Municipal Party Committee before 1949, to which Jiang belonged.

Above all, the role of Wang Daohan in Jiang's political career, was of most importance. A senior university mate of Jiang, Wang was probably acquainted with him in the capacity of vice-minister of No.1 Machinery Industry in the 1950s and 1960s when Jiang was a industrial manager or research director with the ministry. It is said that Wang highly admired Jiang's leadership ability and knowledge, and so in 1980, in his position of standing vice-minister of Import and Export Administrative Commission, Wang had Jiang first transferred from the Ministry of No.1 Machinery Industry to the administrative commission, and then promoted from a state-bureau-level cadre to a vice-minister of this commission when Wang left for Shanghai. Finally, when Wang was about to retire from the mayorship of Shanghai, he recommended Jiang to be his successor.

Probably due to his long stay in Shanghai and his considerable contacts with various foreigners, Jiang looked like a western-style gentleman who was extremely care about his neat appearance, particularly his hair. He understood the imperative of China's reform and adoption of advanced science, technology and managerial system from abroad for the sake of her modernization. He was also open-minded towards foreign customs and classic cultures. At

²³² Ibid, pp. 101-102.

²³³ Li Guoqiang, et al., *An Analysis of Jiang Zemin*, p. 35.

the same time, he was inclined to believe the essentiality of traditional Chinese culture and value system for contemporary Chinese society. As a top municipal leader, he was project-oriented. Jiang cared about his political image as much as his personal appearance, so he liked various publicity and was keen to build a good relationship with the ordinary people. He also seems to have tried to maintain amiable working relations with subordinate bureaucrats.²³⁴ In this regard, his leadership style was in contrast to Zhu Rongji's.

Zhu Rongji: A Tough, "Rightist" Technocrat²³⁵

Unlike other top Shanghai technocratic leaders who were originally from the provinces adjacent to Shanghai in East China, Zhu was a native of Changsha city, the capital of Hunan province in central China. He was born in 1928 into a decayed, unfortunate family, like many Chinese revolutionary leaders. His grandfather used to be a district head in the Qing dynasty but his career came to an end after the founding of the Republic of China. Zhu's father strove to study science and technology, but died of pneumonia even before Zhu's birth. When he was ten years old, his single-mother passed away, and he was since under the care of his eldest uncle who was a junior agronomist with a meager wage to support a family of seven. Zhu's living conditions had been so poor that he got no single toy. His childhood was filled with sadness, poverty, and disrespect.

His poor, unfortunate, and intellectual-like family background and his childhood experience helped forge his strong personality, his early maturation, and his determination to study for excellence and to struggle for a fair and justified society. As an outstanding student,

²³⁴ But this does not mean that he tended to compromise his principles. A good example of his uncompromising side is the *World Economic Herald* Incident of 1989 (a part of the prologue to the 1989 nationwide pro-democracy movement), in which Qin Benli, the liberal ex-editor of this most influential semi-official Chinese newspaper, was punished, and the newspaper was ordered to cease its publication, even though it was under the patronage of several powerful political and academic figures, including Jiang's principal patron Wang Daohan.

²³⁵ Information on Zhu is mainly from Liao Gailong, et al eds., *Who's Who in China: Current Party, Administrative and Military Leaders*; Gao Xin and He Pin, *Zhu Rongji Zhuan: Cong Fandang Youpai Dao Deng Xiaoping Jichengren* (A Biography of Zhu Rongji: From an Anti-Party Rightist to Deng Xiaoping's Successor), Taipei, Taiwan: New News Culture Ltd., 1993; and Zheng Yi (Hu Zhiwei's

Zhu received bursaries and scholarships that enabled him to study through the elementary and secondary levels of education in that cultural city and to enroll in the department of Electronic Engineering of Qinghua University, one of the best in the country, in 1947. Soon he became a pro-Communist student activist, a member of the New Democratic Youth League, and eventually in October 1949, a communist. After four years of full-time study, he graduated and was assigned to the planning division of the Industrial Department under the government of North-east China. With a proficiency in classical Chinese, literature, science, and English, and with a solid training in electronic engineering, Zhu started his uneasy bureaucratic career in 1951 at the age of 23.

His competence and reliability as a bureaucrat were soon recognized, so when the chairman of the North-east government Gao Gang assumed the chair of the State Commission of Planning in 1952, Zhu was transferred to work with the commission. And after Gao Gang fell and Li Fucheng succeeded his chair from the post of vice-chairman of the North-east government in 1954, Zhu continued working there, and in 1958 became deputy-division-chief of Li's Chairman Office. But as the anti-rightist campaign intensified, he soon was transferred to another division, then labeled as an anti-party rightist and stripped his party membership, and forced to do labor work on a farm. According to Zhu, the reason that he was picked on was because he had expressed somewhat different opinions against unrealistic state plans. It was also rumored that he said something that was regarded as sympathetic towards ousted Gao Gang.²³⁶

From then to 1978 when he regained his party membership, Zhu had experienced a lot of hardships. After a period of labor work in the late 1950s, he was assigned to be a teacher at a sparetime school affiliated with the State Planning Commission. As of 1962, his "rightist" label was lifted (but he still carried an invisible "rightist" label, like all the other label-lifted "rightists" in China), and soon he returned to the commission to work not as an administrative cadre but a vocational or technical cadre. During the Cultural Revolution, he became a political target again. In 1970-1975, he was at the "May-Seventh Cadre School" of the

pen name), *Zhu Rongji Pingzhuan* (A Critical Biography of Zhu Rongji), Hong Kong: Mingchuang (Bright Window) Press, 1992.

²³⁶ Gao Xin and He Pin, *A Biography of Zhu Rongji*, p. 50.

Commission in the countryside, working as a swineherd, a shepherd, a washroom cleaner, as well as a peasant. In 1975-1978, he was assigned to the Electric Power Communications Company of the Pipe Bureau under the Ministry of Petrochemical Industry, serving first as an office functionary and later as a head of an operational team in the capacity of deputy chief engineer.

1978 marked a turning point in Zhu's political career. After his pre-1958 political status was restored, he was appointed to various important positions as follows: director of the Institute of Industrial Economics, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1978-79; division chief, senior engineer, deputy and full bureau director, and deputy chairman of the State Economic Commission, and member and deputy-secretary of the party group of the Commission, 1979-1987; dean and professor of the Faculty of Business Management, Qinghua University, 1984; deputy party secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee, and alternative member of the 13th CPC Central Committee, 1987; and Shanghai mayor, 1988. Within a decade, Zhu was elevated from a basic cadre scale to the second highest scale in the Chinese bureaucracy.

Zhu was a beneficiary of Deng's leadership and reforms. In a new, more tolerant political ecology promoted by those reform-minded revolutionary leaders, Chinese talents were unleashed at a massive scale. Specifically, Zhu's dazzling upward mobility was mainly attributed to the two senior revolutionary technocrats, Ma Hong and Zhang Jingfu. Zhu's relationship with Ma can be traced back the early 1950s. At that time, the communist economist Ma Hong was an associate of Gao Gang, serving first in North East of China and then in Beijing as a member and secretary-general of the State Planning Commission. As Zhu's superior, Ma was acquainted with Zhu and impressed by his capability. Ma was sidelined politically after the fall of Gao Gang until the end of the Cultural Revolution. First he was director of the institute of Industrial Economy, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; in that position, he recruited Zhu. Then Ma advanced to be deputy president and president of the Academy, and Zhu succeeded in Ma's directorship. Later Ma became vice-secretary-general of the State Council. It would not be surprising that he would continue to promote Zhu. Unlike Ma, Zhang Jingfu was not a long-time acquaintance of Zhu. Nevertheless, it appears that this high-ranking revolutionary veteran with an educator background and various

leadership experiences, is the kind of leader who can appreciate talents and like to promote them accordingly. It was Zhang who as chairman of the State Economic Commission, promoted Zhu from deputy-bureau-director to bureau director and commission member and to vice-chairman of the commission. Beside Ma and Zhang, it is also rumored that Zhan Jingfu's predecessor Yuan Baohua and his successor Lu Dong played some role directly or indirectly in Zhu's promotion.²³⁷

The personality and leadership style of Zhu Rongji are distinctive among top municipal leaders. He was cheerless, upright, unequivocal and resolute in appearance. He was bold but sober in decision-making. He was eloquent but realistic. Perhaps most distinctive is that Zhu was cold, impatient, and stern in interpersonal relationship, especially toward bureaucrats. Once he found out bureaucratic problems, he would usually reprimand the responsible bureaucrat/s openly, without consideration for their face, which in Chinese culture would be extremely important for a leader to render. In one case, a vice mayor was about twenty minutes late at a working meeting of the municipal government because he attended an opening ceremony and ensuing banquet. As chair of the meeting, the new mayor said to him in front of all the attendants of the meeting, "I would like to see you go to fewer banquets; so many people are waiting for you!"²³⁸ At municipal government meetings, it was not unusual that some municipal bureau-directors were offering cigarettes of foreign brand names to each other. When Zhu saw the exchange, he asked them, "Where did you get those cigarettes? Does your salary afford you to buy this kind of cigarettes?"²³⁹

Sometimes he scolded bureaucrats even if responsibilities were too complex to be borne by one or few individuals. For instance, in the 1980s, the textile industry - one of the pillars of this biggest industrial city -- did not progress as expected but even declined in some aspects, particularly in profitability, due to varied factors including a sharp rise in raw materials and an intensification of competition from textile producers in other provinces. Zhu was unhappy about the situation, so at the large meetings attended by all bureau-level cadres, he blamed the bureau director for the decline of the textile industry, warning him that if the

²³⁷ Ibid., pp. 66, 68.

²³⁸ Ibid., p. 121.

²³⁹ Ibid., p. 128.

situation did not turn around in a not long period of time, he would be dismissed. Eventually, the status of the industry and of the director remained because some situational problems were beyond the control of bureaucrats in this industry. However, Zhu's open reprimand was such a tremendous embarrassment and humiliation for the director of a major municipal bureau and he has since resented Zhu. Although this instance and others may spur municipal bureaucrats to be more accountable, they did cast shadows on the relationships between Zhu and bureaucrats.

Their relationships were impacted by Zhu's anti-bureaucratism and anti-corruption efforts as well as his personality and leadership style. As soon as Zhu entered the mayor office, he put anti-bureaucratism and anti-corruption on his list of priorities. While he was tough on bureaucrats, he was popular among ordinary people. He liked to hear various views and public opinions. In 1991, Zhu directed the decision-making process of the most substantial and profound housing reform in Shanghai, in which Shanghai residents participated to an unprecedented degree (For details, see Chapter 8). He also demonstrated his strong, effective and shrewd leadership in handling the 1989 pro-democracy movement in Shanghai.²⁴⁰ Afterwards, when asked about how to judge the tragic 1989 Incident, he was reported to have said: "The whole truth will come out eventually."

He believed that "Weiguan Yiren, Zaofu Yifang," (being a leader for one term, should bring fortune to the region he serves within the term. He often mentioned those "Qing Guan" (honest and upright officials) in ancient Chinese history as paradigmatic officials. Shortly after he was assigned to Shanghai, Zhu presented senior municipal officials and the leaders of districts and counties with an ancient admonition and explained it word by word, "Li bu wei wo yan, er wei wo lian; Min bu fu wo neng, er fu wo gong; Gong ze ming, lian ze wei." (Bureaucrats would be in awe of me not for my strictness but for my honesty; people would be docile not because of my capability but my impartiality. Impartiality would translate into perceptibility, and honesty would translate into authority).

²⁴⁰ In the spring of 1989, Zhu and the municipal leadership tried not to provoke massive participators of the movement by accusing them of being anti-Communist rule, anti-government and anti-socialist system, but to persuade them to cease their demonstrations and sabotage mainly on the ground of social and economic stability and necessary continuation of production. And in the late stage, municipal authorities resorted to minimum non-military coercive methods.

It was observed that Zhu's wife Lao An, his high school and university mate and currently a senior engineer, had never been present with Zhu at officially arranged recreational activities during large, public ceremonies or festivals. Their two children do not appear to be as spoiled with power and privileges as many would perceive of children of high-ranking communist officials.²⁴¹

Wu Bangguo: From Technician to Municipal Party Chief²⁴²

Wu Bangguo was promoted from the position of deputy secretary to that of full secretary of the municipal party committee in April 1991. At the age of forty-nine, Wu has been the youngest municipal party secretary since 1949. Unlike Rui, Jiang, and Zhu, Wu and other two top Shanghai leaders we are going to sketch, were junior both in age and in revolutionary seniority, and were not cadres from Beijing but those from within the municipality.

Wu Bangguo was born in July 1941. It is said that he is a native of Feidong, Anhui province, but whether that is his birthplace is unknown. As well, information on his family background and his early life is yet to obtain. It seems that he received formal elementary and secondary education and was a bright student so that he entered one of the best and most competitive universities in China. In 1964, he joined the party as a university student. In 1967, he graduated from the Faculty of Radio and Electronics of Qinghua University, and was assigned to work in Shanghai. He had been a Shanghai resident since. He was no different from other Shanghai residents in appearance, dialect fluency, and ways of living, working, and thinking.

Within the twenty-four years of 1967-91, Wu went straight from an ordinary worker to the municipal party secretary. However, by 1978 he had only been a basic-level cadre. In 1967-76, he had been a labor, technician, deputy-head and head of the Technology Section at

²⁴¹ Gao Xin and He Pin, *A Biography of Zhu Rongji*, p. 131.

²⁴² His bibliographic information is mainly from Liao Gailong, et al eds., *Who's Who in China: Current Party, Administrative and Military Leaders*; the *People's Daily*, September 29, 1994, and Li, *A Short Biography of Eminent Chinese in Contemporary China*, vol. 20, pp. 34-42.

Shanghai No.3 Electronic Factory. In 1976-78, he became the deputy party secretary, vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee, vice-manager and manager of that factory. From 1978 on, his political career took off. In 1978-81, he was still a middle-level cadre, serving as deputy manager of Shanghai Electronic Industrial Company, and Shanghai Vacuum Apparatus Industrial Company successively. In 1981-83, he advanced to the bureau-level of the Chinese bureaucratic hierarchy as deputy secretary of the CPC Shanghai Telecommunications Industrial Bureau Committee. Afterwards, he became a municipal leader as secretary of the Scientific and Technical Committee and member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Shanghai Committee in 1983-85, and as deputy municipal party secretary in 1985-1991. He was also an alternative member of the CPC 12th and 13th Central Committee.

Generally speaking, a relatively young technocrat who has long engaged in one of the pillar and most promising industries of China's biggest industrial city, may have good chances of promotion. (may add note to show there have been more selections from this sector than others) Yet we do not know why Wu was selected and promoted so quickly in the extremely competitive process of leadership selection in Shanghai. He does not appear to have a politically established family background. Perhaps his managerial skills and leadership potential, especially in the industrial sector, were impressive to his superiors. Certainly he had demonstrated persuasively his political commitments to the current leadership and ongoing reforms. It is also apparent that his post-1976 promotions were basically due not to the central leadership but to the municipal one, particularly under the trio of Chen, Hu and Wang.

Compared with Jiang and Zhu, Wu was a municipal leader in low-profile. Thus, information on him and his family is very limited. However, it is reported that he understood economic and social problems facing Shanghai people very well, since he had his own experience and liked to hear from ordinary people. Like a majority of urban Shanghainese, he had been living in a crowded slum without gas pipe and flush toilet for years. Even when he became a standing member of the municipal party committee, he and his four family members lived in one half of a flat in an inconvenient traditional urban house. Their living space was only eleven square meters. In summer nights, they had to sleep along the street till 1 am or 2 am when the temperature in their rooms could be tolerated. Thanks to his long experience of

working and living among ordinary Shanghai people, Wu seemed no difficulty in making friends with various kinds of people.

As a top Shanghai leader, Wu promised to take big actions and measures so as to achieve great undertakings that are worthy of the status of Shanghai. Based on the blueprints of the reconstruction and development of Shanghai which were ironed out by his predecessors, Wu had a pragmatist vision, that is, by the end of this century, “[we] shall give the people a prosperous, civilized new Shanghai where there will be no more wooden closestools and briquette stoves, no more slums and shanty houses, and no more urban pollution.”²⁴³ He was confident that the well-educated, highly competent Shanghai people would achieve the goals, though he admitted the weakness of the Shanghai bureaucrats in pioneering courage, market consciousness, and competition spirit, which he thought was not inherent but situational, or rather, due to the long existence of a centralized planning economy.

Perhaps the most remarkable political incident took place within Wu’s tenure was the publication of a series of commentaries of the *Liberation Daily* in 1991-92. They were written by Huang Pu Ping, the pen name of the Propaganda department under the municipal committee. This was a highly sensitive issue and incident in Chinese politics in the early 1990s. In an unusual fashion, the commentaries fired against conservatism within the Chinese leadership and called for a continuation of Deng’s market-oriented reforms. It was rumored that Deng’s daughter Deng Nan played an important role behind the scene by being a liaison between Deng and the Shanghai authority. As the chief party leader of Shanghai, Wu bore an inescapable responsibility. His political career was at stake. If Deng’s reform camp won, he could be highly appreciated or vice versa. We do not know what really happened in preparation of those commentaries. An insightful source says that although Wu was the municipal party boss, it was Zhu Rongji who ordered the preparation and publication when Wu went to ask Zhu for decision.²⁴⁴ Still it appeared that Wu made contributions to the remarkable call for further reform. To a large extent, Wu’ experiences and leadership style are

²⁴³ Ibid., vol. 20, pp. 40-42.

²⁴⁴ Gao and He, *A Biography of Zhu Rongji*, pp. 226-227.

similar to those of Huang Ju, his administrative partner and successor when Wu was appointed to the vice-premiership in 1995.

Huang Ju: Another Technician-Manager-Bureaucrat ²⁴⁵

When Wu Bangguo succeeded Zhu's post as the municipal party secretary in April 1991, Huang Ju became a successor of Zhu's another post as Shanghai mayor at the age of 52, the youngest in the history of the People's Republic of China. Four years later, Huang left his mayor office and succeeded Wu. Huang was also a Politburo member. Born in September 1938, he is a native of Jiashan, Zhejiang province. But given the fact that that is a county adjacent to Shanghai and belongs to the region of Wu dialect, and the fact that Huang had resided and worked in Shanghai for at least two decades prior to this appointment, Huang may be seen as a Shanghainese by our criteria.

Majoring in electric motors, Huang graduated in 1963 from the same university that Zhu and Wu did, after seven years of study. He became a Party member in March 1966, two years later than Wu. Like Wu, he worked from the bottom of the society to the top administrative position in Shanghai. He had worked at the basic level for seventeen years or so, as a technician and secretary for manager at Shanghai Artificial Board-making Machinery Plant in 1963-67, and as technician, engineer, deputy secretary of a workshop party branch, deputy chairman of the revolutionary committee, and deputy manager of Zhonghua Metallurgical Plant in 1967-80. In the early 1980s, he went to Japan to study business management.

From 1980 on, his pace of promotion accelerated dramatically. He became deputy manager of Shanghai General Petrochemical Machinery Manufacturing Corporation in 1980-

²⁴⁵ Information on Huang Ju is collected from my indirect interviews, and from the following materials: Li Zhai, "Huang Ju: Shanghai's New Mayor," *Beijing Review*, June 17-23, 1991, p. 18; Liao Gailong, et al eds., *Who's Who in China: Current Party, Administrative and Military Leaders*; the *People's Daily*, September 29, 1994, Yu Yuanming and Li Wenqi, "An Interview with Mayor Huang Ju" (the *Liberation Daily*, April 30, 1991), and Zhou Miaokung, "Dongfang Da Dushi de Xingzheng Zhushuai Huang Ju" (The Administrative Executive of An Oriental Metropolis Huang Ju), in Wang Xiaopeng ed., *Zhongguo "Jingguan" he "Fengjiang Dali"* (Top Ministerial and Provincial Bureaucrats of China) (Beijing: The Press of Chinese Communist Party History, pp. 261-267).

82, deputy director of the No.1 Municipal Bureau of Electric Machinery in 1982-83; member of the Standing Committee, secretary of the Industrial Committee, and secretary-general of the Shanghai Party Committee in 1983-85; deputy municipal Party secretary and vice-mayor as of 1985 and 1986 respectively. From 1986 to 1991, Huang was a chief associate of mayors Jiang and Zhu, in charge of daily administration of Shanghai. He was also an alternate member of the 13th CCPCC and full member of the 14th CCPCC.

Like Wu, Huang's upward mobility in the bureaucratic hierarchy was a result of Deng Xiaoping's reform policies, particularly the new cadre policy to recruit cadres who were younger, better educated, politically reliable, and reform-minded. Since Huang also had always served in Shanghai, his mobility can be ascribed primarily to local leaders at different levels, even though the record of his graduation from Qinghua University might be favored by central authorities at certain stage of the selection process. There had been no reports on any astonishing achievements that were under Huang's leadership at the basic- and mid-levels, though one of his colleagues praised his style of "always getting [it] right on the job."²⁴⁶ Since he was promoted to vice-mayorship in 1986, Huang had taken in charge of daily administrative affairs of the municipality and had involved in the formulation and implementation of reform, reconstruction and development strategies and policies that have transformed this industrial city. Presumably, his job performance was satisfactory to his superiors, even though not as impressive as Zhu's. As far as his promotions are concerned, Huang's less publicized performance might be compensated by his strength in interpersonal relationship and in coordination. Although we do not know who played a major role in his mobility from the basic-level to the municipal level, it seems that Zhu, perhaps Jiang too, were key superiors behind Huang's promotion to mayorship.

Huang's personality and leadership style are in sharp contrast to Zhu's. Huang has a cheerful, warm, plain and easy-going personality. Like Wu Bangguo, he has kept a low profile, and appeared to be easy to get along with ordinary people as well as bureaucrats. As a new mayor of Shanghai, Huang considered the following three relationships as most crucial.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁶ Li Zhai, "Huang Ju," p. 18.

²⁴⁷ Yu Yuanming & Li Wenqi, "An Interview with Mayor Huang Ju," the *Liberation Daily*, April 30, 1991.

The first was the past-present relationship. He thought that he was only a member of a relay team of Shanghai mayors. His mayor work must be of continuity, stability, and creativity. The second was the party-government relationship. Huang announced that major decisions would be made by the municipal party committee, and he would be working under its leadership. The third was the relationship between collective leadership and individual responsibility. Huang accented the insufficiency of his capability and intelligence and the importance of collective leadership. These considerations appeared to have guided and underlined Huang's leadership activities throughout his tenure. Contrast to Zhu's authoritative style, the manifestation of the new mayor reflects his modest style. At the same time, it indicates in what his leadership strength lay.

It is noticeable that during almost four decades of his career, he had always played a supporting role -- deputy party secretary, deputy chairman, deputy manager, deputy mayor, etc. -- at varied levels of leadership, except for the years of 1983-1985. This may explain, other than his personality, his less authoritative leadership style. As the top administrative leader and second party boss of Shanghai, Huang seemed to have established smooth working relationships with most of his colleagues at the municipal party and administrative apparatus. Moreover, he paid attention to giving the people's deputies more opportunity to discuss and supervise government works. He believed that the people's deputies' supervision power should be exercised not only at the annual sessions of the people's congress but also on a routine basis. Soon after assuming the mayor office, he invited municipal and district people's deputies, for the first time in the history of Shanghai under the communist rule, to attend the government's on-the-spot work meeting.

He was steady, prudent and pragmatist, especially at work. His motto is to "tell the truth, do solid work, and seek practical results."²⁴⁸ During his tenure, there seemed no such political upheavals as the 1986 "anti-bourgeois liberalization" and the 1989 pro-democracy movement which could test the capability of a leadership, but there were astonishing economic and social developments, especially after 1992, which substantially changed the face of Shanghai and the minds of Shanghainese. Those changes were accomplished through boldly and carefully designed strategies and plans, and through radical and steady progress in

implementation. These changes will be presented in the last section of the chapter. As mayor of Shanghai, Huang Ju had made an important contribution to the development of Shanghai. In February 1995 when Wu Bangguo left Shanghai for Beijing to take a vice-premiership, Huang Ju succeeded his position of municipal party secretary, leaving the mayorship to Xu Kuangdi.

Xu Kuangdi: A Versatile Intellectual-Technocrat²⁴⁹

In 1937 when the Japanese army continued its all-out aggression, Xu was born into an engineer's family in Chongde, Zhejiang province, on a refugee route from Hangzhou city to hinterland. He was first named "Kangdi" (resisting the enemy), then renamed as "Kuangdi" which implies justice, safety, well-being, and luck. Xu spent his childhood in the "safe haven" of Yunnan province, Southwest China, and returned to the native place Hangzhou after the end of the anti-Japanese war in 1945. Even during the wartime, he received a sound elementary education from teachers who graduated from the Southwest United University, the best Chinese university.

Xu's many family members and relatives are intellectuals. His wife Xu luoping is his university mate, and is a professor at Shanghai University. She did not join Xu in his public affairs for the reason that she is independent and does not like to take part in official activities in the name of the wife of mayor. They have two daughters, both currently in the United States. One is a professor of biomedical engineering, and another majors in electric engineering. One of his sisters was a Tongji University professor, another was a secondary school teacher. And his brothers-in-law were university professors, too.

Like Wu and Huang, Xu received university education in Beijing, majoring in a field of applied sciences, and then worked in Shanghai. Yet his career path is quite different from the aforementioned four municipal leaders. After graduation from the Beijing Institute of Iron and

²⁴⁸ Li Zhai, "Huang Ju," p. 18.

²⁴⁹ Information on Xu's profile is from one of his acquaintances, Zeng Hua, "Zoujin Xu Guangdi" (Approaching Xu Kuangdi), *Economy of Shanghai and Hong Kong*, 1995, pp. 8-10, *Wenhui Daily*,

Steel in 1959, he did not enter the government nor factories but the institution of higher education. He spent thirty-one years at university, teaching students and doing research, and was promoted from assistant teacher to lecturer to full professor and doctoral supervisor (Even after becoming mayor of Shanghai, he still continued supervising Ph.D. students). In the 1980s, he joined the party and became increasingly involved in administrative affairs at university, first as vice chairman and chairman of a department, and in 1986, as vice-president of the Shanghai Polytechnic University. At one point, he went abroad as deputy chief engineer and technical manager of a Sweden company. Only until the beginning of the 1990s did he moved into municipal authorities, serving as deputy director of the Municipal Office of Education and Health, director of the Bureau of Higher Education. In 1991, he left the realm of education and became director of the Municipal Planning Commission and secretary of its party group. In 1992, he was appointed a standing member of the municipal party committee and vice-mayor. Two years later, he became a deputy party secretary of Shanghai. Compared with the others, Xu had different and broader working experiences (a university teacher and researcher, educational and academic administrator, technical manager, and city planner), but he lacked experience in industrial management, and his bureaucratic career started very late and was short.

Like Wu and Huang, Xu has always served in Shanghai, so most likely his promotions were mainly to do with local bureaucrats, including former municipal leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji. Since Xu entered the municipal authorities a decade later than Wu and Huang, one may curious about what is ascribed to his rapid promotions? It did not appear to be his family background because it is not revolutionary nor proletarian. Neither did it appear to be his intellectual career, for usually an outsider of bureaucracy is less likely than a bureaucrat to have had patron-client ties and built strong power base within the bureaucratic system. It is said that Zhu Rongji's strong recommendation contributed greatly, if not mainly, to Xu's speedy promotion. And the basis of Zhu's recommendation seemed to be Xu's traits and impressive leadership potentials, including his leadership vision, administrative ability, and interpersonal skills.

Xu is a versatile and distinguished intellectual. At middle school and university, he was an amateur runner and swimmer, and a member of the orchestra and of the chorus of the university. He was an excellent student and vice president of the student association, the Beijing Institute of Iron and Steel. Over the ensuing three decades, he had been teaching and had published four books and several dozens of articles in the field, particularly on special steel products and electric metallurgy, so he came into recognition as a renowned professor and expert of metallurgy. Xu has a good command of English and Japanese, and can read materials in Russian and German. He has first-hand knowledge about western countries such as Sweden, Canada and the United States. Xu's versatility, broad knowledge and recognized intelligence won him a breadth of respect, especially from intellectuals.

Xu is easy to get along with not only intellectuals but also bureaucrats and working people, thanks to his specialty, living experience, personality and leadership style. As a student of metallurgy having done fieldwork at steel factories as required, Xu recalled that he learned from steel works two merits -- not being afraid of any hardship, and the spirit of team work. As a university teacher, Xu and his family had lived among ordinary residents for years. Like Wu, and probably Huang, Xu's living standard was very low. The living space of his family was so limited that in the evenings, he, his wife and two daughters shared their only square table equally to study. His ordinary, hard living experience made him easy to understand the magnitude of urban problems, the concerns of ordinary residents, and the urgency to address their concerns and solve the problems.

Though reform-minded and capable as the other top municipal leaders, Xu has a distinctive leadership style and personality. Like Zhu Rongji, he is bold, resolute, and eloquent. Meanwhile, he is warm, cheerful, and plain, like Huang Ju. He is commonly praised for his versatility and ability of coordination. He has a team-work style, being responsible but willing to listen to other cadres' opinions with respect and to change his own opinion if others' are more reasonable. According to a Hong Kong reporter, Xu set a norm for his family members, that is, "to be an open and aboveboard person, with good intentions toward others."²⁵⁰ Clearly this is a reflection of traditional Confucian value rather than Maoist

²⁵⁰ Zeng Hua, "Approaching Xu Kuangdi," p. 10.

philosophy of struggle. But this basic norm of attitude and behavior seemed to be helpful in his relationship with others, bureaucrats and ordinary people alike.

Although his bureaucratic career was short, he had already demonstrated leadership vision and capability. As director of the municipal planning commission, he had a new vision, that is, to change the main role and functions of the commission from passive planning and issuing directives and quota in the context of a highly centralized planning economy to researching and providing strategies and policy options for the municipal government, and actively engaging in big projects, macro-economic balancing and market building. Within one year, the change was already successfully started and in progress. Later on, as standing vice mayor, Xu assisted the mayor in governing and transforming the city. His capability of coordination and command was also impressive. For example, he helped the leaders and staff in the financial sector to find more ways to improve municipal financial performance. Thus, although Xu was approaching the retiring age limit for vice-governors/mayors and there were younger competent candidates, he was chosen, through an extremely competitive selection process, as the new mayor.

At his first appearance as the mayor, Xu echoed Zhu Rongji's saying, "being a local leader for a term, I shall make that locality prosperous." Like Huang Ju, Xu also likened the succession of mayor to a relay race in which he had received a relay baton and would continue what his predecessors had endeavored. As he promised, for the past year, Shanghai has moved further along the course of development and modernization whose ultimate goal is to transform this city into an international economic center in the twentieth century.

2. SENIOR SHANGHAI TECHNOCRATS, THEIR RELATIONS, AND A TYPOLOGY

Some Generalizations about the Top Technocratic leaders of Shanghai

In addition to Chapter four, the preceding sections of this chapter sheds further light on the fundamental questions of who are Chinese communist technocrats as well as how they rose to power. One can find out that there are both differences and similarities in the profiles

of the six senior party technocrats. In terms of experience rather than age, these senior technocrats may be seen as two generations of technocrats. The first three, Rui, Zhang and Zhu all had some pre-1949 revolutionary experience, and joined the CCP by or in 1949, the most general official line in determining the revolutionary seniority of cadres and so cataloging them in China. They all had experiences in central ministries, which became their springboard to the top municipal offices. Rui and Zhu were definitely outsiders, and were not acquainted with Shanghai before their assignments. Accordingly, they were perceived, probably they indeed behaved, differently from the younger group of three,²⁵¹ though the difference did not appear to be a decisive factor in local people's appraisal of their leadership performance.²⁵²

In contrast, the three younger technocrats Wu, Huang, and Xu did not have pre-1949 revolutionary experiences, and joined the Party much later, even as late as 1983. Neither did they have worked in central ministries. But they had resided and worked in Shanghai for two decades or more before entering the top municipal leadership (Wu and Huang in 1983, Xu in the early 1990s), so that they were not apart from ordinary Shanghai residents if judged by their ways of speaking, working and living. Because of their living among ordinary Shanghainese and working through local political system as well as industry or education system, they knew the city's communities and systems, its problems and potentials, and its residents and workers' concerns and expectations. They were promoted as local technocrats yet with roughly five-year experience in Beijing, a positive indicator of their potential compliance with central directives and policies. Finally, the recent three senior technocrats appeared to be less authoritarian and more approachable.

Despite these differences, the six municipal political and administrative leaders had much in common. All of them except Rui were of engineer origin. Zhu was an expert in industrial management, the others had industrial managerial experience at the basic and higher levels. All of them were pro-reform, pragmatic and quite open-minded. Neither of them was

²⁵¹ A reporter who had many opportunities of contacting or observing municipal leaders told me that there was an apparent difference in the two groups or generations of Shanghai leaders. The three under question looked and behaved like high-ranking officials designated by the centre as the leaders of this city. They appeared more authoritative and less approachable.

²⁵² For example, by the end of his tenure, Zhu Rongji's popularity appeared higher than many locally promoted leaders.

from a family of incumbent or retired mandarin; their later promotions were ascribed to both the veteran revolutionaries and new policies which inclined to modernization, reform and some form of technocracy. The common features of these leaders are representative as far as all the municipal leaders of 1985-95 are concerned.²⁵³

Tensions within the Collective Leadership of Shanghai Technocrats

In the introduction to this dissertation, we stress that our research is on the collective technocratic leadership of Shanghai rather than individual technocrats. This does not mean that we have overlooked differences, tensions or even power struggles within this new political elite. On the contrary, we believe that these are part of human nature, inevitable within any social groups, no matter how cohesive it would be. Here we are going to look at the relationships between these six senior technocrats, again in a chronological order.

The relationships between the first three technocrats were different. Although both Rui Xingwen and Jiang Zemin came from North Jiangsu, and were a younger generation of Chinese technocrats, their relations seemed to be not as smooth as many would expected. During the Rui-Jiang period, there were rumors on their tense relationship.²⁵⁴ At this point, we do not have evidence to prove to what degree that their relationship was not smooth, and what were the exact causes. Nevertheless, the incident of 1989, which tested their political, ideological and personal inclinations and which led to the fall of Rui and the rise of Jiang at the center of power, may indicate more or less the status of their working relationship in Shanghai and its sources. As for the relationship between Jiang and Zhu Rongji, one source said that it was not smooth, partly because Jiang was afraid of Zhu's popularity.²⁵⁵ We have

²⁵³ However, there is a noticeable distinction between these top leaders and their deputies or associates, that is, the native ratio in the latter group was much higher.

²⁵⁴ Because relationships between Chinese political leaders have always been an extremely sensitive political issue in mainland China, all information concerned is subject to official censorship except for periods of extraordinary power struggles and political campaigns such as the Cultural Revolution. On the other hand, the past three decades witnessed that street political rumors were often revealing, especially after the Cultural Revolution which led to a considerable degree of laxness in discipline among party members and leaders alike so that information on disputes and rifts within the party or government leaked to the public from time to time.

²⁵⁵ Gao Xin and He Pin, *A Biography of Zhu Rongji*, pp. 296-300.

some reservation to this conclusion. Given the fact that there was no sign of serious strife but a considerable level of collaboration between the two, one can at least say that their relations were better, more cooperative than those of Jiang and Rui.

The relationships between the younger municipal leaders appeared to be a problem as well, though they may be as widely rumored as the relationship between Jiang and Rui. One reliable source said that Wu Bangguo and Huang Ju were locked in a power struggle. It was not overt, yet involved other senior municipal officials and touched upon the sphere of personnel. Tension also emerged as far as the relationship between Huang and Xu Kuangdi is concerned. We do not know whether they were involved in such kind of power struggle as the one between Wu and Huang. It appears that Huang and Xu were at odds over Shanghai's developmental strategies, particularly over whether the first priority of Shanghai's economic development should be given to the industrial sector or the financial one.

Tension and political infighting among these senior technocrats were caused by a variety of factors. Differences in personality, leadership style, popularity, or political alliance, and disagreements over personnel or policy issues, came into play. The primary source of the political infighting was institutional. In the People's Republic of China, every provincial unit has been led by a full party secretary and a governor or mayor. In theory, the party secretary is superior, responsible for the overall communist rule, while the governor/mayor is, primarily in charge of administration. In reality, there has been no clear-cut division in the functions of the party and administrative leaders. As the number one policy maker, the party secretary has been involved in virtually all the policy areas from personnel and socioeconomic development to political and ideological affairs. Conventionally, as the number two policy maker and deputy party secretary, the governor/mayor has legitimately played an important role in political as well as administrative decision-making. During the reform era, separation of party work from government work has become a major reform objective. Unfortunately, the higher level of ruling apparatus the reform went, the less successful it was. The serious overlap of the functions of the chief party secretary and chief administrator is likely to result in intra-elite friction, unless they have deep trust in each other, or one individual concurrently occupies the two offices as Ke Qingshi did before 1966, Zhang Chungqiao during the Cultural Revolution, and Zhu Rongji in 1989-91.

Moreover, the political and administrative reform in the 1980s, coupled with the fundamental shift of the Chinese leadership's central mission from class struggle to economic construction, tends to help enhance the role of mayor, and so the conventional superior-subordinate relationship between the chief party secretary and chief administrator became even more subtle and complicated. It seems that the more equal the two in terms of seniority and power, the more likely leadership friction is to occur. The tense relationships between Rui and Jiang, between Wu and Huang, and between Huang and Xu are such cases. In contrast, as Jiang was politically more senior and powerful than Zhu, and Zhu appeared to stick to the conventional superior-subordinate relationship between the two positions, their relationship, in our view, was more cooperative.

If compared with the revolutionary leadership in the Mao era, however, the intra-elite tension and friction mentioned above are less serious in scope and substance. Partly thanks to the far less tense and punitive environment of elite politics in Deng's China, policy differences and power struggle among the new political elite appeared to have been dealt with restraint. The continuity and progression of Shanghai's socioeconomic policies and political stability in the context of radical market-oriented reform and opening-up is a significant reflection. The new political elite of Shanghai has demonstrated its collective and effective leadership by a dazzling revitalization of this declined cosmopolis despite intra-elite friction, which is inevitable within any polities and leaderships. We will explore the collective and effective performance by Shanghai technocrats later.

Types of Chinese Technocrats

This collective technocratic leadership of Shanghai consisted of various types of political technocrats. We believe that the profiles of the six political technocrats can provide a reasonable basis for our typology of the Chinese technocrats. While there has been a traditionally perceived dichotomy between bureaucrats and politicians in Western democracies, these Chinese technocrats are both bureaucrats and politicians with special training in a different polity. Yet given the fact that all the bureaucrats are more or less

political in reality, that senior bureaucrats are far more political than traditionally conceived,²⁵⁶ and that the Chinese Communist leaders were not made through general elections but selected, these Chinese technocrats seem to resemble senior bureaucrats rather than politicians in the West. Thus, we may based our generalization of the types of Chinese technocrats on some fine and inspiring theories about bureaucrats provided by Western experts. Particularly, Anthony Downs' *Inside Bureaucracy* and Arnold J. Meltsner's *Policy Analysts in the Bureaucracy* are a major source of academic stimulation.

Downs' book is basically a theoretical account of American bureaucrats as a whole, whereas Meltsner's is both theoretical and empirical, focusing on one group of American bureaucrats -- policy analysts, who are less senior and powerful than policy makers. Nevertheless, both have offered admirable frameworks for understanding the behavior of various bureaucrats. Based on the motivation of bureaucrats and degrees of their self-interest, Downs divided bureaucrats into five types: purely self-interested "Climbers" and "Conservers", and mixed-motive "Zealots", "Advocates" and "Statesmen".²⁵⁷ Meltsner categorized American policy analysts as "Technicians", "Politicians", "Entrepreneurs", and "Pretenders", based on difference in their political and analytical strengths. The first two are high in analytical or political skill, while the latter two are either strong or weak respectively in both analytical and political skills.²⁵⁸ Meltsner's typology of bureaucrats is especially instrumental to ours.

In the mean time, we take it into account that our objects of research are not policy analysts but policy makers, nor just general bureaucrats, but both bureaucrats and politicians in one of the most political countries on earth. In our opinion, all the six Shanghai leaders are "entrepreneurs" (in Meltsner's terms) with strong analytical and political skills, and pragmatism and expertise. Yet relatively, differences in their leadership strengths and styles

²⁵⁶ The traditional conception that the bureaucrats are non-political is challenged by more solid and systematic research over the past two decades or so. For an excellent account of the Western bureaucrats, see Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, eds., *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981.

²⁵⁷ For details of these five types of bureaucrats and their general motives, see Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967, pp. 84-111.

are still discernible. We use bureaucratic and policy-making strengths or skills as variables to identify the differences. By "bureaucratic strength", we mean that a leader is sophisticated in dealing with bureaucrats and bureaucratic politics, though he or she understands general politics well. "Policy-making strength" refers to one's expertise and ability to take and adopt optimal policy advice or options under certain circumstances and in the best of public interest, not bureaucratic interest.

Then based on the profiles of the six senior political technocrats, we create four categories: "Practitioners", "Coordinators", "Commanders", and "Caretakers". "Practitioners" are high in policy-making strength but low in bureaucratic strength. They resemble "Statesmen" in Downs' typology in the sense that they are "loyal to society" so that they are somewhat alienated from bureaucracy.²⁵⁹ In addition, the category also refers expertise or professional quality. Zhu Rongji might be a good example of this category. Its opposite is "Coordinator" whose relative strength lies in dealing with bureaucrats and bureaucratic institutions rather than the public. Wu Bangguo may be put into this category because of his low-profile and less frequent public appearances, especially because of his impressive capability of coordinating and mobilizing bureaucrats and bureaucratic institutions. "Commanders" refer to those who are quite strong in both variables. Jiang Zemin, and

Figure 4: Types of the Chinese Communist Technocrats

		Bureaucratic Strength	
		High	Low
Policy-making Strength	High	Commander	Coordinator
	Low	Practitioner	Caretaker

²⁵⁸ Meltser's main interest is in the three competent types of policy analysts, excluding the "pretenders". See Meltser, *Policy Analysts in the Bureaucracy*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1976, pp. 15-49.

²⁵⁹ Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, pp. 88, 110-111.

Xu Kuangdi may be seen as two examples. The opposite of "Commanders" is the category of "Caretakers". They are similar to "Pretenders" in Meltsner's typology in the terms of being low in job skills, and to "Conservers" in Downs' typology in the sense that they are rigid rule-followers, lacking creativity yet being determined to preserve bureaucratic interest as well as self-interest. None of the six political technocrats is typical of this category. Like any other typologies, ours is an oversimplification of Chinese technocrats. However, it does have some theoretical and empirical grounds we mentioned before. Our examples are all in the relative sense, and the six Shanghai leaders are representative of not all Chinese technocrats but a high spectrum of the new elite. But we believe that our typology can apply to Chinese technocrats. While a considerable number of them may be strong in either or both policy-making skill and bureaucratic skill, perhaps a good number of them are typical of "Caretaker".

After probing differences in Chinese technocrats, we need to return to our main concern of the collective behavioral characteristics of Chinese technocrats. It is because that after all, what really counts is the aggregate effects of the Chinese technocratic elite rather than individual technocrats' records. Whether those Chinese technocrats' sociopolitical traits we have examined thus far contribute to their functional characteristics? What are their functional characteristics as a new political elite? We can find out through the Shanghai technocratic leadership's conduct.

CHAPTER SIX

CITY PLANNING AND URBAN RECONSTRUCTION IN SHANGHAI

A fundamental function of any municipal leadership is to conduct urban planning and reconstruction. It is a very challenging mission for the leadership, especially in a mega-city like Shanghai. It has become one of the key areas that test the vision, capability, strategies, and ways of conduct of a municipal leadership. It can reveal the characteristics of a leadership, and indicate whether it is responsible, fair, and efficient. Therefore, we select this area as a case for our examination of Chinese technocratic leadership in Shanghai.

As an empirical case study, this chapter attempts to answer the following questions: Who made plans and conducted reconstruction? What were goals, strategies and principles of urban planning and reconstruction? What criteria or values guided decision-makers to make plans? What were the contents and implications of city plans? And how were they implemented? We deal with, first, the evolution of urban planning and reconstruction in Shanghai in 1949-1980 as both the historical and comparative background for the conduct of political-technocratic leaders; then who were major plan-makers and the process of plan-making, the objectives, principles and strategies of city plans after 1980, the implementation of city plans; and finally, the performance of leadership.

1. CITY PLANNING AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1949-1980

When Chinese communists seized Shanghai in 1949, the city was left with both legacies and burdens. As the biggest cosmopolis in the Far East between two World Wars, Shanghai had advanced infrastructure, utility facilities, and an army of well-trained and experienced planning and construction staff. Dynamic and prosperous, it was China's financial, commercial, industrial (mainly light industry), service, and information centre. Meanwhile, as a substantially colonized Chinese city, it was mainly composed of the Chinese territory, the French Concession, and the British-American Concession so that there were

three types of infrastructure, utility facilities, and institutions of planning and construction. Moreover, as a “paradise of adventures,” the city was notorious for its social polarization, including housing polarization.²⁶⁰

Under the Communist rule, fundamental change in planning and reconstruction had taken place. There were at least three principal factors behind the change.²⁶¹ The first factor was the socialist revolution and reconstruction of the city and the Communist ideology and campaign of anti-capitalism and anti-bourgeois influence. Shanghai was China’s biggest concentration of capitalism and bourgeois establishments, so it was the first and foremost target. The second factor was the tensions and even conflicts between Communist China and the outside world, particularly the United States and its allies in most of the time and the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Preparation for war had occupied the mind of Chinese policy-makers, more or less, from the very beginning to the early 1970s. The last factor is the Soviet model of development. After 1949, China learned from the Soviet Union the developmental strategies of “Production first, consumption second” and of “heavy industry ahead of light industry and agriculture, as well as a highly centralized planning economy. Although the Sino-Soviet relations turned from an alliance to adversaries, and some modifications had been made at Mao’s request since the late 1950s, the developmental strategies and the planning economy continued.

Affected by these factors, Chinese policy-makers adopted an urban strategy. Its main components were restricting overall development of coastal cities, including Shanghai,²⁶² emphasizing the “productive” function of cities and minimal development of “non-productive” urban services, and giving priority to the development of heavy industry. It is not difficult to

²⁶⁰ The best and most comprehensive Chinese account of the development and modernization of Shanghai, including city planning and construction, is Zhang Zhongli (Chang chung-li) et al ed., *Jindai Shanghai Chengshi Yanjiu* (An Urban Study of Modern Shanghai), Shanghai: The Shanghai People’s Press, 1990. An classic English account is Murphey’s *Shanghai*.

²⁶¹ Many China experts assert that the anti-urbanism of Mao and communist officials who had peasant background did play a role in the post-1949 change of the city’s functions. This might be true. Yet we leave it for the time being until we have more solid evidence.

²⁶² One of the causes for this was the strategy of “Third lines,” a part of China’s preparedness for war. The “Third lines” referred to hinterlands. Numerous industrial plants were removed from Shanghai and other coastal cities to mountainous hinterlands. Wang Yukun et al, *Zhongguo: Shiji Zhijiao de Chengshi Fazhan* (China: Urban Development at the Turn of the 21st Century). Shengyang: Liaoning People’s Press, 1992, p. 13.

discern that the first component was contradictory to the other two, especially the third. Actually, China in general and Shanghai in particular was facing a dilemma. For the sake of anti-capitalist impact, avoidance of possible consequences of war, and ultimate elimination of disparities between regions and between cities and countryside, the development of large cities needs to be curbed. On the other hand, China's modernization, development and preparedness largely relied upon industrialization, particularly upon Shanghai and other economically and industrially advanced cities on the coastal line. The dilemma caused oscillation in urban planning and reconstruction in Shanghai as well as other cities.²⁶³

The above urban strategy was embodied in the Party boss Ke Qingshi's seminal speech at the first municipal Party congress of 1956. He announced that in the coming years, the function of Shanghai industry must be the focal point of socialist construction in Shanghai. At the third municipal Party congress of 1963, the party secretary Chen Pixian's working report called for building Shanghai into China's advanced industrial, scientific and technological basis. As for specific city plans, relevant functional agencies did draft three: the *Sketch Map of the Direction of Shanghai City Development*, the *Draft of Overall City Plan of Shanghai*, and the *Draft of Regional Planning of Shanghai*. However, city planning was so low on the policy agenda that no working conference on city planning had ever been held by the municipal leadership.²⁶⁴

During this period, inherited urban problems such as the matchlessness of infrastructure was resolved. In 1958, the city expanded drastically and later became a city region with the original city, ten incorporated counties, newly-built satellite towns and industrial districts. The most remarkable output of the Communist urban strategy was the transformation of this multifunctional metropolis into a "producer" city, or rather, an industrial base with a large proportion of heavy industry. The share of the labour force employed in finance, trade, transportation, food, retailing, public utility and other services declined severely.²⁶⁵ The ratio of capital construction investment in non-productive sectors to that in

²⁶³ For some policy oscillations and the spatial expansion of Shanghai Municipality during the period of 1949-60, see Ka-iu Fung, "The Spatial Development of Shanghai." In Howe ed., *Shanghai*, pp. 269-300.

²⁶⁴ *The Liberation Daily*, November 6, 1986.

²⁶⁵ Martin K. Whyte and William L. Parish, *Urban Life in Contemporary China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 34-35.

productive sectors dropped from 3:2 in 1952 to 1:13 in 1975.²⁶⁶ With its residential population doubling in thirty years, Shanghai's population density was 43,000 people per square kilometre at its centre and 170,000 people per square kilometre in the downtown in the 1980s.²⁶⁷

The transformation of Shanghai into an industrial centre and the disproportionate capital and labour input in service and infrastructure sectors to the population growth by a moderate standard had caused a series of new urban problems, particularly housing shortages (See chapter seven), traffic congestion and pollution. Shanghai's road area per capita was two square metres - half the national average for cities, and so streets were jammed with pedestrians, bicycles, and automobiles.²⁶⁸ Suffering from excessive industrial and human waste and from the long-term negligence by municipal authorities, Shanghai's environment had been deteriorating to an appalling extent.²⁶⁹ In addition, networks of goods and services and entertainment were sharply reduced. Shanghai had lost its status as China's financial, commercial, information and service centre, and as the most dynamic, prosperous cosmopolis in the Far East. The revolutionary planning and reconstruction of the city into merely an industrial base dragged the enhancement of Shanghai people's living conditions, and had more negative than positive impact on the city's balanced and sustainable development and its international competitiveness and attraction.

Although there were some variations, Chinese city planning and reconstruction during the period of 1949-1980, had some common features. First, the principal factors or criteria for city planning and reconstruction were political and ideological as above mentioned. Second, municipal policy-makers tended to define the problems of city planning and reconstruction as a political problem or a major issue which would be inevitable to distinguish the promising communist leadership, socialism, and proletarian influence on the one side, and decayed imperialism, capitalism, and the bourgeois influence on the other. Third, city planning

²⁶⁶ The ratio is based on data offered by Sun Huairan, *A Short History of the Development of Socialist Economic Construction in Shanghai*, p. 881.

²⁶⁷ Louise do Rosario, "The Urban Dilemma: China's Largest City is Bursting at Its Seams," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 12, 1985, p. 28.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

and construction were not a priority. Fourth, despite a large pool of specialists in Shanghai, the process of city planning had very limited experts' input, systematic scientific research, probability test, let alone public participation. Fifth, city plans tended to be sketchy. Sixth, plan implementation was conducted almost exclusively by political and administrative means. Finally, plan implementation was usually less efficient than that under the political-technocratic leadership.

2. POLICY-MAKING IN CITY PLANNING UNDER THE TECHNOCRATIC LEADERSHIP

This section deals with the policy-making of city plans by political technocrats in the 1980s and 1990s. It attempts to address the following questions: Who were the major policy-makers or primary city planners in Shanghai? How did they deal with the central leadership, which has held decisive authority on the city planning of Shanghai? And what was the general process and features of city planning under Chinese technocrats?

Major Policy-Makers in City Planning

City planning is a macro-political arena,²⁷⁰ touching upon virtually every resident, sector, community, institution, social group, and administrative level within the city. Thus, city planning ultimately involves a wide scope of participation in various ways and to a varied extent, even in a non-pluralist polity like Shanghai. Nevertheless, we believe that only a small portion of the participants of city planning in Shanghai can be called major policy-makers.

²⁶⁹ Every Western visitor to Shanghai can instantly sense the severity of air pollution. The Suzhou Creek, the major river floating through the city, used to be clean in the 1940s, but was all black and murky as early as in the 1960s.

²⁷⁰ Based on Emmette Redford's research, an expert of public policy-making points out three levels of policy-making. Both micro-level and subsystem-level policy-making involves particular individuals or groups, and particular functional policy areas respectively, and so the scope of participation is limited. In contrast, macro-level policy-making involves a wide range of participants. James E. Anderson, *Public Policy-Making*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. pp. 48-52.

They are official policy-makers who “possess legal authority to engage in the formation of public policy.”²⁷¹

These official policy-makers can be categorized into five groups. The first group is the central party and administrative authorities who set overall directions and guidelines for municipal city planning and possesses the power of approval or disapproval of any grand plans. The second is top municipal party and government leaders whose role is a little more complicated. As centrally-appointed senior officials, they are supposed to ensure the application of the central leadership’s guidelines and decisions to Shanghai. As the political and administrative leaders of the municipality, they are responsible for translating central guidelines and strategies into policy agenda and priority, general principles and strategies suitable to Shanghai, for delegating administrative agencies to make plans accordingly, and for approving or disapproving plans at the municipal level. As the official representatives of municipal interests and Shanghai people’s concerns, they play a crucial role in influencing the central leadership’s decisions concerned through information supply, formal or informal discussions, and other means.

Other than the political leaderships, there are legislative, consultative, and functional groups. The SPC is the municipal legislature in official terms, but it has been commonly called a rubber-stamp. It is fair to say, nevertheless that, its rubber-stamp role has been changing somewhat over the past decade. Deputies of the SPC have started to bring concerns of individuals, groups, or institutions to city planners’ attention and put forward constructive ideas. The consultative group includes private citizens and officials or institutions assigned by municipal authorities to participate in the policy process for the sake of political or public support, or technical support. The SCCPP was the major official organization and its role was seemingly political or public rather than technical. Perhaps more important were specialists and specialist groups or organizations, which generally participate in most stages of the process of city planning. Since the process is both political and technical, their contribution to city planning is significant.

Finally, the functional group is the most important in city planning and reconstruction, in the sense of providing particular leadership in the policy process from policy formulation to

²⁷¹ Ibid., p. 37.

policy implementation. The group includes particular municipal administrative leaders and agencies who have specific responsibilities for assisting top municipal leadership in identifying public problems, setting policy agendas and priorities, and making decisions on policy proposals, the bulk of which was drafted by themselves, and for implementing plans. They are the focus of our examination.

The mayor of Shanghai usually was the chief yet titular leader of city planning. Wang Daohan and Jiang Zemin used to hold concurrently the directorship of the Municipal Urban and Rural Planning and Environmental Protection Committee. The vice-mayor responsible for city planning and reconstruction (And management) was the executive leader. From 1983 to 1992, the leader was Ni Tianzeng, a graduate from the Department of Architecture at Qinghua University and a senior engineer and administrator with twenty-year experience in the field prior to his appointment. He grew up in Zhejiang province, had worked in Shanghai since 1962, so he can be regarded as a Shanghainese. He and family lived in one of the most crowded residential areas, even after four years of being a vice mayor. The combination of his expertise with personal working and living experience contributed to his very competent leadership.²⁷² He worked extremely hard, so hard that he passed away on duty at the age of fifty-four.²⁷³ His successor was his chief assistant and vice secretary-general of the municipal government Xia Keqiang, another specialist and native of Shanghai.

Under the leadership of Ni and Xia, the Construction Committee of the Municipal Government functioned as the government's agency in charge of the city planning, construction and management of the whole city.²⁷⁴ Clustered under the committee or the

²⁷² His leadership was both administrative and technical. As a leading expert in architecture, Ni was involved in both macro planning and micro designing and decision-making. For instance, in the overall plan of Shanghai city planning, the design of two axes of construction, or south-bound and north-bound corridors of development across the city, was his innovation. In making final decision on the design of the spectacular Nanpu bridge (over the Huangpu river), many specialists and construction agencies preferred a colored bridge, Ni decided to build a one with natural color for the benefit of efficiency and quality in the long-run. The Editorial Committee for *Renmin Gongpu Ni Tianzeng* ed., *Renmin Gongpu Ni Tianzeng* (The People's Public Servant Ni Tianzeng), Shanghai: Baijia Press, 1992, pp. 261, 110.

²⁷³ For his profile and performance, see *ibid*.

²⁷⁴ There had been some titular and substantial changes in the administration. In December, 1984, municipal authorities decided to separate city planning from construction, so the Municipal Committee of Urban and Rural Construction and Planning derived from the Municipal Capital Construction Committee. In the spring of 1986, the Capital Construction Committee was renamed as the

system of construction, were twenty-eight institutions, including ten municipal bureaus for the management of architectural engineering, municipal works, public utilities, real estate, building materials industry, environmental sanitation, city planning and construction, parks, land, and environmental protection.²⁷⁵

Apart from the Construction Committee and its affiliated institutions, there were several relevant ad hoc agencies, including the Municipal Management Committee, the Leading Group of Shanghai "94 Special" Municipal Works, and the Office of Shanghai Major Construction Projects. Usually the leaders of the Municipal Construction Committee concurrently participated in the leadership of those agencies, and sometimes were the chief executive, such as of the latter two agencies.

Finally, we must not neglect the role, though secondary, of the Municipal Planning Committee, and to a lesser degree, that of the Municipal Economic Committee, in city planning and construction. We also must mention the Working Committee of Construction under the municipal party committee. It was set up in 1983 so as to reinforce the party leadership in the system of construction. Though essentially political and ideological, its role

Construction Committee city planning of Shanghai. And the Urban and Rural Planning Committee was somewhat upgraded to the Committee of Urban and Rural Planning and Environmental Protection. Headed by the Shanghai mayor, the Committee of Urban and Rural Planning and Environmental Protection consisted of senior representatives from the Shanghai government, the State Planning Commission, the State Economic Commission, the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Planning, the Planning Office for Shanghai Economic Zone, the military forces in Shanghai, and the Municipal Construction Committee, and some other related municipal agencies. In March, 1988, the office of the new committee and its directed municipal bureaus of city planning and construction, land management, and environmental protection were remerged into the Construction Committee. Thus, the committee of Urban and Rural Planning and Environmental Protection existed in name, not in function. See the Office of Shanghai Staff-Size Control Committee ed., *The Evolution of the Party and Government Organizations of Shanghai*, pp. 169, 178; The Organization Department of the Municipal Party Committee, et al, ed. *Materials on the Organizational History of Government System, Local Military System, United Front System, and Mass Organization System of Shanghai Municipality*, pp. 205-206; Li Chuntao, et al, ed. *Shanghai Jianshe, 1986-1990 (Construction in Shanghai)*, Shanghai: Shanghai Popular Science Press, 1991, pp. 701-707.

²⁷⁵ In addition, there were ten research, designing, educational and consulting institutions under the Committee. The rest included the Shanghai General Corporation of Housing Construction, the Shanghai General Corporation of Public Transportation, the Shanghai City Construction and Comprehensive Development Office, the Centre for Comprehensive Development of Shanghai Residential Areas, three corporations for the development of Hongqiao and Minghuang, and one newspaper.

in the administration and management of city planning and construction was not clearly designated, so that it had created problems.²⁷⁶

Shanghai and the Center in City Planning and Development

In the PRC where the center has controlled the provincial leaders' political career and major policy-making,²⁷⁷ maintaining a good relationship between Shanghai and center has been essential to Shanghai leaders for their personal interest and for the sake of municipal policy-making. In most of the time in the period of 1949-76, top Shanghai leader had a close relationship with central authority. Yet the relationship was more beneficial to their own career than to the ordinary people, as they seldom took the socioeconomic policy initiatives in the public interest. For municipal technocratic leaders who endeavored to do something for Shanghai people as well as for themselves, how to make central authority to approve their initiatives which would benefit the public interest and themselves, while stabilizing and improving Shanghai-central relationship, has been extremely challenging. It required a high level of political sophistication and leadership skills. How the municipal leadership coped with the center in the making of city plans is the focus of this section.

Before we get into the discussion of the distinctive techniques of technocratic leaders, brief consideration will be given to a remarkable change in Shanghai-central relationship and a key problem in the city planning of Shanghai. As aforementioned, one of the most notable changes in central-provincial relations in contemporary China was the fact that provincial leaders have been far more willing than before to take initiatives in pursuit of the interests of their provinces. Shanghai was a good example. In the 1980s and 1990s, municipal leadership initiated a number of plans, projects or strategies that were of fundamental importance to the development and revival of the metropolis. They included the overall city plan, the economic development strategy of Shanghai, the Pudong project, and the establishment of Shanghai's

²⁷⁶ This is the conclusion of an official investigation team. the Office of Shanghai Staff-Size Control Committee ed., *The Evolution of the Party and Government Organizations of Shanghai*, pp. 202-203.

²⁷⁷ For a picture of the central-provincial relationship, see Frederick Teiwes' outstanding essay "Provincial Politics in China: Themes and Variations" (In Lindbeck ed., *China: Management of Revolutionary Society*, pp. 116-189), David Goodman's *Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China*, and Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin eds., *Changing Central-Local Relations in China*.

three Special Economic and Technological Development Zones (Hongqiao, Minhang and Caohejing. All of them were set up first, and the center sanctioned two years later).

Nevertheless, a key problem for Shanghai and other provincial/municipal authorities was to get the central approval of their initiatives, as central authorities often had their own interest and priorities.²⁷⁸ In order to influence central decision-making, therefore, it is not unusual that the Shanghai leadership had to utilize several ways, channels or tactics. They were evident in city planning as well as other policy areas such as the economic development strategy.

One of the channels for municipal influence was information supply. Generally, socio-economic data and reports from municipal authorities constituted an integral part of the basis for central decision-making. Thus, what kind of data were collected or how reports were written may attract or distract central attention. In addition, many reports and ideas were presented orally by municipal leaders to central leaders in formal or informal discussions. Sometimes, emotional presentation also occurred. At the end of 1987, at a meeting attended by vice premier Yao Yilin and some other central leaders and some municipal leaders, Ni Tianzeng tearfully reported to Yao on the acute problems of city construction and Shanghai people's living and working. His heartfelt message moved the central leaders, according to mayor Huang Ju.²⁷⁹

Apart from its direct contact with the top central authority, municipal leadership promoted municipal interests and its schemes through influential specialists and senior central policy-makers (including ministerial leaders) advisors. The making of the Shanghai city plan showed that consultation with them was a regular part of the policy process. Inviting them to participate in the discussion and appraisal of Shanghai's grand development schemes or strategies facilitated a mutual understanding of municipal and central (ministerial) concerns

²⁷⁸ The instance of the making of overall city plan of Shanghai may point to the problem. Although the draft plan seemed to have been well prepared for four years, with substantial consultation with experts and relevant central ministries, before reaching China's top authorities, it still took another two years to get just a specific, formal discussion, and later to be passed. Why had central authorities held the draft for so long? It may be because the draft plan needed more time to ponder, or because they wanted to see Shanghai's economic plans first, which they received in December, 1984 and gave it the green light in February, 1985. Yet it seems most likely that since the draft plan meant a sharp increase in the city's budgetary expenditure, the center worried about its impact on Shanghai's high contribution to the State revenue.

and so made Shanghai's policy proposals more sensible and acceptable, particularly to central ministries. More importantly, the participation of those experts and officials provided opportunities for Shanghai leaders to project the city's needs for fundamental change in its role and the corresponding relaxation of central over-control, and to promote its redevelopment proposals and strategies. For example, in 1984, municipal authorities invited many ministerial leaders and central policy-advisors, apparently on a selective basis, to discuss problems of Shanghai's socio-economic revival. Those guests, including the distinguished central policy-formulators or advisors Xue Muqiao, Xu Dixin, Yu Guangyuan, Tong Dalin and Jiang Yiwei, expressed some views such as giving the city favourable treatment that Shanghai leaders seemed to have desired yet hard to voice, at least not in such blunt way. This conference on Shanghai's development appeared to help spark the centre's major policy change towards Shanghai.

Media was also useful for Shanghai leaders to have municipal interest projected or disseminated. In October, 1980, the *Liberation Daily* published the native cadre and economic researcher Shen Junpo's article "Ten Firsts and Five Lasts Explain What? (Shige diyi he wuge daoshu diyi shuoming le sheme)?" calling for a fundamental change in the status quo of Shanghai.²⁸⁰ Followed this article was a months-long forum in the newspaper and *Shehui Kexue* (The journal of Social Sciences), which was attended favorably by many heads of municipal bureaus or the equivalent as well as experts.²⁸¹ Although having the support of many municipal leaders, the article and the public discussion were under fire from the party boss for they could be interpreted as building pressure on central authorities. But it may indicate itself the fact that some pressure or influence had already been put on central policy-makers. Upon the end of the high-profile conference of 1984 on Shanghai's development direction and strategy, an editorial of the *Liberation Daily* reads: "Someone said, Shanghai is

²⁷⁹ *The People's Public Servant Ni Tianzeng*, p.76.

²⁸⁰ In an unusually critical way, he pointed out five worst aspects of living conditions in Shanghai, compared with other parts of China, while listing its greatest contributions to the country; he ascribed the five worst to an unbalanced socioeconomic development strategy which put priority on industrial production at the expense of human consumption in the context of China's central planning economy over three decades.

²⁸¹ For the general context and contents of the public discussion, see Lam Tao-chiu, "Local Interest Articulation in Shanghai, 1979-1985: A Case Study," Master of Philosophy Thesis. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1988.

a dragon, yet now is tied up and immovable by a monstrous rope; once it gets rid of the rope, it would skyrocket and fly vigorously.”²⁸² Though based on the expression of many honourable guests, the editorial served to accentuate the conference theme as well as reinforce public opinion in Shanghai which in turn, may draw more attention from the centre.

Apparently, political-technocratic leaders in Shanghai were quite good at seizing opportunities to promote the municipal interest. For example, the aforesaid conference on Shanghai’s development strategy was convened just before the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Congress of the CCP in October, 1984, probably because municipal leadership had already gained the information that the theme of the plenum was a strategic shift of the focus of China’s reform from on countryside to on the cities. Merely two months after the shift was formally announced at the plenum, municipal leadership ironed out the *Report Outline of Shanghai’s Economic Development Strategy*, which appeared to be closely related to its proposed overall city plan and to central decision-making on the plan. The decision of municipal leadership on revising the first overall city plan was thus made after political and economic conditions became more favourable to Shanghai’s development and revival. The decision and ensuing revision helped consolidate Shanghai’s leading role in China’s reform and modernization and promote the municipal interest further.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Shanghai leaders always tried to ensure the centre the loyalty of Shanghai and themselves. Certainly, political loyalty can not automatically guarantee a favourable treatment of the centre towards Shanghai and other provincial units. However, a strong loyalty showed by municipal/provincial leadership to central leadership can prevent the latter from suspicion or fear of regionalism or localism, especially when a provincial unit was striving to gain more decision power and retain more resources for its own. The Shanghai leadership has iterated that Shanghai has been and would always be China’s Shanghai. It seems that the more the metropolis developed, the more its leadership stressed the above statement. And in 1988, Deng Xiaoping himself came to ask Shanghai leaders to “lend” a huge amount of money to central authority for alleviating its “temporary” financial strain. Although there had existed an Shanghai-central agreement in which the centre set a five-year fixed revenue quota for Shanghai and given it power to spend

²⁸² The *Liberation Daily*, September 28, 1984.

the rest of its municipal revenue, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji still agreed to Deng's request. The financial loss seemed later to have benefited both the municipal leaders and the city. In addition, Shanghai's leading role in supporting Deng's push for market-oriented reform and open-door policy in the early 1990s led to the strengthening of its favourable status in central-provincial relations and to a more dramatic development and reconstruction of the city.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Shanghai's ways or tactics of dealing with the centre were generally persuasive and incremental in nature.²⁸³ Municipal leaders seem to have fully understood that any confrontation with central authority would be disastrous to the interests of Shanghai and of their own, and negotiation, persuasion, and incrementalism were better ways and tactics in pursuit of the interests. Their ways or tactics were very effective, as the takeoff of the city for a leading cosmopolis in the world and the dazzling change of its physical appearance have proven. We will present the records of the development and change later.

The Process of City Planning

Let us turn our attention to the process of making city plans. As a policy-making process, city planning in Shanghai was a series of purposive actions by a number of participants in dealing with relevant public problems or issues. This section is designed to deal with first what were problems in city planning, and how they became public problems and then a priority on the policy agenda of the political-technocratic leadership. Then it briefly presents two sorts of instances - macro and micro - for a generalization of the process of city planning from plan formulation to adoption.

The major problems of city planning in Shanghai during the 1980s and 1990s were the shrinking of the city's functions from multiple to single, the obsolescence and decay of urban infrastructure, the increasing inconvenience of urbanites' living and working, and the lack of advanced, comprehensive and specific city planning. As mentioned before, these problems,

²⁸³ For an insightful account of local interest articulation outside the political and administrative leadership, particularly through seminars and conferences, local journals and newspapers, and the SPC and the SPPCC, see Lam Tao-chiu, "Local Interest Articulation in the 1980s." Chapter 5 of *Shanghai: Transformation and Modernization under China's Open Policy*, edited by Y. M. Yeung & Sung Yun-wing. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996.

particularly the first three, were largely caused by the production-oriented developmental strategy of the leaderships of revolutionary veterans and Maoist radicals and rebels.

Though commonly perceived, the problems did not become a public problem until the publication of the aforementioned Mr. Shen's article and a month-long, profound forum on it in the *Liberation Daily*. Shen was so concerned about the problems and their deterioration that he decided to take a political risk in publicizing his concerns.²⁸⁴ His article aroused numerous officials as well as ordinary people; who echoed his concerns and called for actions to reverse the trend. Thus, the problems became a public problem that municipal authorities felt compelled to give more attention to it, though some top leaders were uneasy about this phenomenon.

City planning and reconstruction were dealt with more seriously after the phenomenon.²⁸⁵ In March, 1981, municipal authorities held a working conference on city planning for the first time in more than three decades. A powerful figure behind this was the revolutionary, technocratic mayor Wang Daohan. Under his leadership, *An Outline of the Overall City Plan of Shanghai* was finally approved. Based on the outline, municipal authorities began to make an overall city plan. Since 1985, under the technocratic leadership, the city planning and reconstruction of Shanghai have received even more official attention. In 1991, city planning and construction were put by the municipal administration as a top priority.

What contributed to the change? Obviously, a major precondition was the national leadership's strategic decisions to place the focus of leadership works on economic reform and modernization and to change the three-decade production-oriented developmental strategy and economic structure. The decisions seemed easier to be understood by party technocrats than political workers and ideologues. It was also highly likely that political-technocratic leaders were considering the need to achieve something to win public support for their political career. What is certain was that the personal living and working experience of those technocratic leaders - Jiang Zemin, Wu Bangguo, Hu Ju, Xu Guangdi, Ni Tianzeng, and

²⁸⁴ In an interview during the summer of 1995, Mr. Shen said that he made this decision on his own.

²⁸⁵ Shanghai city planning agencies started to make long-time and regional plans in 1979, and came up with *An Outline of the Overall City Plan of Shanghai*. It was approved by the municipal party committee in principle in September, 1980. *The Liberation Daily*, November 6, 1986.

so on so forth - helped them better understand the magnitude of the problems, Shanghai people's concerns and expectations, and the urgency to find solutions.

Their efforts to find solutions resulted in *The Overall City Plan of Shanghai*, the first overall plan of Shanghai city planning after 1949. The process of making this plan was long, complex, and widely participated. Its initiation was reported as of 1980.²⁸⁶ After the final approval of *An Outline of the Overall City Plan of Shanghai* in 1982, concerned municipal committees, offices, bureaus, and every district and county, drafted their own specific or regional designs. Based on those designs, municipal planning agencies started made the overall plan of Shanghai. At this stage, a number of professional associations were invited to discuss drafts of the plan through the Shanghai Association of Science.²⁸⁷

In December, 1982, an appraisal conference on the plan was attended by sixty senior officials and experts from central administrative agencies,²⁸⁸ research institutes and universities in Beijing, Tianjing as well as Shanghai. In the meantime, the plan was displayed, attracting about sixty thousand visitors, including all deputies attending a plenum of the SPC. During the display, over thirty symposia were held. Taking various comments and suggestions into consideration, municipal planning agencies made amendments to the plan. In September, 1983, after hearing the opinions from the ministry of construction and environmental protection and other concerned ministries, the drafters revised the plan again.

Then, this grand plan reached top municipal authorities from special planning agencies. On October 17, 1983, an enlarged Mayor's Working Meeting approved to put the plan forward to the Standing Committee of the SPC. After the SPC and the SPPCC sponsored concerned deputies and experts to have field survey and research, and discussion, the Standing Committee of the SPC sanctioned the plan in principle.

On February 9, 1984, the plan was submitted to central authorities. In May, concerning the sponsorship of the ministry of construction and environmental protection, a

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ They were the associations of civil engineering, architecture, water conservation, navigation, survey and cartography, environmental protection, geography, ecology, science studies, futurology, horticulture, railroad, transportation, engineering, agriculture, and forestry.

²⁸⁸ They were the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental Protection, the Ministry of Hydropower, the Ministry of Railroad, the Ministry of Transportation, and the General Bureau of Civil Aviation of China.

few leading economists, sociologists, and experts on culture, sciences as well as city planning made an on-the-spot investigation and appraisal. Two years later, the Secretariat of the CCP held a special meeting on the plan, and made instructions. Shanghai authorities amended it accordingly, and submitted it to the top central leadership on July 20, 1986. On October 13, the State Council approved it. Since it was sanctioned by the municipal legislature, officially it became a legal piece with binding power.

After several years of the implementation of the overall plan, the situation under which it was made had changed significantly. The rapid development of market-oriented economic reform and open-door policy gave rise to new problems, demands and ideas; meanwhile, the elevation of Shanghai's status in China's political and economic development, signified by the promotion of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji to the nucleus of national power and by the central decision to make Shanghai's Pudong area the focal point of China's reform and development in the 1990s, provided new opportunities to rebuild Shanghai as one of the largest, and most modern, dynamic and prosperous cosmopolises in the world in the next century.²⁸⁹ It was in this context that in mid-1993, municipal leadership promulgated its decision to revise the existing overall city plan.

The planning process in the 1990s was similar to the previous one. First, the Municipal Construction Committee, the Municipal Planning Committee, and other relevant municipal agencies, made specific plans of their own; and every county and district also drafted its own county/district plans. Based on these plans, the city planning bureau proposed the framework of a new overall city plan. Chinese specialists first and internationally renowned experts and officials in the field of city planning, management and construction later, were invited to appraise the framework. The appraisal led to a preliminary plan. A city-wide display of the draft plan was held for obtaining inputs from the public. Then a modified version of the plan was submitted first to the municipal government and then to the SPC for approval. Finally, a

²⁸⁹ In his keynote speech of June 29, 1993, at the third working conference on Shanghai planning, mayor Huang Ju said that the overall city plan of the 1980s "did not and could not project imagination of planning onto a higher level, based on the requirements of 'One dragon head, three centers [Economic, financial, and commercial]' and from the heights of the world-class metropolis." He pointed out that as Shanghai's strategic status changed enormously, Shanghai plan-makers ought to project their imagination into the 21st century. *Shanghai Chengshi Guihua* (The Journal of City Planning in Shanghai), no. 2, 1993, p. 2.

municipally sanctioned plan arrived at the center for final approval. Modification of the plan was made throughout the process until the central approval.

The making of the overall city plan in the 1980s and its revision in the early 1990s help illustrate the process of city planning in contemporary Shanghai. But the illustration has limitations. It does not reveal what major decision criteria or value the planners held. We will tackle these problems later. Another set of limitations is that the above instances are macro planning, not micro planning, and that how a preferred plan or drafts were selected is drawn from competing alternatives. These limitations can be made up for by presenting an example of micro planning, the planning of a part of the Central Business District (CBD) of Shanghai for the next century.

This part has been called the Lujiazui Financial and Commercial District of twenty-eight square kilometers, located in Pudong and in the opposite side of the Bund. After the center's strategic decision to open and develop Pudong in April, 1990, the major problem facing Shanghai city planners was how to transform basically rural Pudong in general and industrial Lujiazui in particular into world-class socioeconomic areas in a most efficient way. In September, the official corporation for the development of the Lujiazui Financial and Commercial District came into play. In December, 1990, at a government-sponsored Pudong planning symposium, mayor Zhu Rongji and some experts proposed that the planning of Lujiazui be made, in the best interests of Shanghai and Pudong, by way of international competitive bidding (ICB). The proposal was agreed by other attendants.

In April, 1992, Zhu Rongji visited France and signed a Sino-French agreement that led to the establishment of the consortium of French support for the development of Shanghai and Pudong. Later, the both sides invited four internationally reputable designing firms (Fuksas of Italy, Rogers of Britain, Ito of Japan, and Perrault of France) and one Chinese designing group (comprising Tongji University and three best planning and designing institutes) for the designing competition. In November, a three-day conference of the international advisory committee on the designing of Lujiazui was held in Shanghai, at which the five bidders displayed their designing models and attendants made appraisals. Finally, the advisory committee submitted to the conference its planning proposal.

Later, almost every top leaders of the municipal party committee, government, SPC, SCCPP visited the five designing models. The vice mayor and chief executive of the Pudong project Zhao Qizheng took great pains to study and compare the models, and twice organized local experts to examine them. In January, 1993, under his leadership, the leading group of the Further Planning of Lujiazui, together with the affiliated specialists group and working group, were set up for an optimum plan.

The second round of competition began. In February, the working group came up with three mixed plans for further comparison. The first one was the Rogers plan combined with some advantages of the Shanghai plan. The second was a modified version of the Shanghai plan. The third was based on the advisory committee's proposal and integrated with the advantages of the four foreign plans. After thorough comparison with each other, the specialists group reached a concerted opinion that led to the leading group's decision to select the third plan as the principal part of the overall plan, and the second one as a supplement. The ICB stage ended.

Afterwards, the preferred policy alternative was being finalized. Another special international conference convened in March. The attendants' comments and suggestions were absorbed into a new draft completed in early May. Then the Lujiazui planners brought the new draft with them to Britain, France, Singapore, and Hong Kong for the final round of consultations with renowned specialists and field study. In August, an optimum plan proposal was finally formulated.

The adoption of the proposal was less complicated and time-consuming than its formulation, largely because of top policy-makers' concerns were well taken into consideration in plan formulation. The final draft was reported to the standing committees of the SPC and the SCCPP, and was submitted to the standing committee of the municipal party committee, the most powerful policy-making body, for a decisive discussion. After passing this discussion, it was formally sanctioned by the municipal government in December, 1993.

The above two levels of city planning - macro and micro -involved two sorts of planning process: the technical and systemic or institutional processes. The technical process of city planning may be generalized as five stages: definition of the policy problem, goals setting, formulation of plan alternatives, appraisal of and selection from plan alternatives, and

plan drafting, modification and adoption. The systemic process was varied. The case of micro city planning showed a less complicated process, as it involved policy-making at the municipal and local levels. The process of macro city planning was complicated and more time-consuming. Generally, there were the following stages or major steps in macro city planning: planning initiation (by municipal, sometimes central authority), specific plan drafting at the bureau/district/county level, synthesization of the specific plan drafts and formulation of a plan framework by the municipal agencies of city planning, discussion and appraisal of the framework by policy-makers and advisors from Shanghai, other provincial units, and ministries, plan drafting and modification by the municipal special agencies, the discussion and approval of plan by municipal administrative, party, and legislative authorities, and plan discussion and approval by the top central leadership.

The three representative cases also illustrated some characteristics of the process. The first one was a broad range of participation - bureaucratic, institutional, public, and sometimes even private and foreign - in city planning. The second was the crucial role of advanced city planning knowledge and practice and their carrier, particularly experts. It was partly because of the attitude of leadership changed as technocrats themselves were professionals, unlike their predecessors; partly because the nature of this policy area, which, unlike the field of propaganda, inevitably involve a substantial degree of science and technology; and partly because the current leadership's criteria for urban planning also changed so that political and ideological factors in urban planning became less weighty than before. The third characteristic was the policy-making style of consensus-building and optimization, which was particularly illustrated in the case of Lujiazui planning. The fourth was a conventional one, that is, the grip of party and administrative leadership on city planning.

3. LEADERSHIP VISION AND CITY PLANS

Started in 1980, overall city planning has received more and more attention from municipal authorities, and has become more and more sophisticated. There were two high tides in city planning, with an interval of roughly seven years of implementation, modification, and reviewing; as a result, two overall city plans, along with socioeconomic developmental

strategies of the city, were produced in the mid of 1980s and the mid of 1990s respectively, guiding Shanghai's reconstruction and development at a dazzling speed and scale. The contents and underlying principles of city plans are as important as the process of plan making. They are embodied with the vision, sensibility, knowledge, priority, ideological orientation, and developmental strategy of a political leadership. This section is designed to deal with the two overall city plans themselves. We are going to take a look at their objectives, contents, and distinctiveness, and the qualities of the technocratic leadership, particularly their vision, value orientation, and developmental strategy revealed in the plans.

The first overall city plan under the Communist rule, drafted in 1982 and approved by the central leadership in 1986, consists of five parts.²⁹⁰ The first part concerns the general objectives of the city plan, the integral or close relationship with the Strategies of Shanghai Economic Development and the Strategies of Shanghai Cultural Development, which also came into existence in the mid-1980s, and the principles for urban and rural planning and construction. The second one deals with the nature, scale and development direction of the city. The third is about the projected layout of the city, including the overall layout and the layout of the central city, of satellite cities, and of suburban towns and market towns. The fourth is the bulk of the plan, touching upon industry, transportation, communication, energy, commerce and finance, housing, science and technology, education and health, culture and sports, tourism, water supply and flood prevention, environmental protection, heritage protection, agriculture and food-supply bases. The final part is about the guidelines for plan implementation.

As mentioned before, by 1993, this city plan had been somewhat outdated, according to the current municipal leadership, and so its revision began from then on. It seems that a revised city plan has yet to promulgate, but its major points have already been included, identically, in mayor Xu Kuangdi's report of the Shanghai Ninth Five-Year Plan and the Outlines of 2010 Long-term Objectives at the Fourth Plenum of the Tenth SPC in February, 1996,²⁹¹ and in other official publications.²⁹² Here we like to use the mayor's report, the most

²⁹⁰ *The Liberation Daily*, November 9 & 10, 1986.

²⁹¹ *Wen Hui Daily*, February 11, 1996.

²⁹² Party Secretary Huang Ju, Mayor Xu Kuangdi et al eds, *Mai Xiang 21 Shiji de Shanghai* (Shanghai Striding toward the 21th Century), Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1995; and Cai Laixing (former

authoritative document among the available sources, to make a comparison and contrast of the objectives, principles, strategies and concepts of overall city planning in the 1980s and 1990s (See Figure 5).

Figure 5: A Comparison and Contrast of Two City Plans

	The City Plan of the 1980s (Projected for the Year 2000)	The City Plan of the 1990s (Projected for the Year 2010)
General Objectives of Development of Shanghai	An open, multifunctional, modernized socialist city with appropriate industrial structure, advanced science and technology, and high civilization; China's important basis and pioneer; and one of the biggest economic and financial centers on the west coast of the Pacific Ocean.	"One dragon head, three centres (economic, financial and commercial centres), that is, the leading economic city in the Yangtze River, and even in China, and a central city of international economy or a global city. Pudong to be a world-class, open, multifunctional and modernized new area.
Function of the City	Industrial, transportation, economic, scientific, trading, financial, information, and cultural.	Distribution, production, management, service, and innovation.
Layout of the City	Four layers: One central city, seven satellite cities, numerous suburban towns and market towns. The central city consists of its restructured old area and nine new areas of special functions. Pudong is to be developed, but the main directions of spatial development are northbound and southbound.	A "corporate" layout with "multiple centers and layers": One chief city – two associated cities – five secondary cities – several central towns. The chief city has four ring-like, specialized areas: a central business district, surrounded by a central commercial area, then a central urban area, and finally the outer-ring area.
Strategy of Development and Implementation	The plan must be interwoven with the strategies of economic and cultural developments, governed by the objective law of socialist planned commodity economy, and implemented under one united leadership, and management of different levels, and in order of importance and urgency.	"Relying science and education to raise the city", sustainable development, and market economic system. The plan must be implemented under one united leadership, and management of different levels, and in order of importance and urgency.

deputy secretary-general of the municipal government) et al eds., *Shanghai: Chuangjian Xinde Guoji Jingji Zhongxin Chengshi* (Shanghai: Creating A New Central City of International Economy), Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1995.

The two plans have many things in common. Unlike development plans made over the past three decades, both have minimum ideological flavor and commitment, without revolutionary terms such as “politics takes command”, “revolutionization”, or “the proletarian dictatorship”, but only one moderate term “socialist modernization.” Both plans are ambitious in terms of massive urban reconstruction and transformation along the line of modernization rather than proletarian revolution. Both highlight the city’s open and cosmopolitan nature, and project Shanghai as an part of global socioeconomic and scientific and technological developments. Both underline the very importance of the city’s functions themselves, paying long overdue attention to its living function rather than its production function, and to its multiple socioeconomic functions rather than its industrial function. Both give priorities to the long neglected fundamentals of urban construction for the sake of the people’s life -- environment, housing, services, infrastructure, transportation and communication. Above all, both plans were regarded by plan makers as projects of system engineering rather than political campaign or movement, and were required to exploit market mechanisms more or less.

Although a significant departure from previous socioeconomic plans, the two plans differ substantially, as Figure 1 illustrates. There is no doubt that the plan of the 1980s set the stage for radical theoretical and practical changes in the reconstruction of Shanghai in the 1980s and the early 1990s, in other words, the recent plan is a continuation of the former one. Nevertheless, a reader of the plans can notice that the recent plan is full of changes, and is far more ambitious, more sophisticated and advanced, and more pro-market. In the plan, the general objective is to build Shanghai not only a national and regional center in the world, but also a global city at the ranks of Paris, Hong Kong, Singapore, Toronto, and even Tokyo. Shanghai’s functions are modified and expanded; its financial role and its functions of distribution, management, service, and innovation are highlighted. The direction of the city’s spatial development changed from north- and southbound to eastbound. the development of Pudong area is put on the top of the development agenda. As to City layout, the projected city system is modified and upgraded in scale.

If the style of the first city plan is not really distinguished from the conventional economic development plans, the recent one certainly is. It is equipped with historical and

comparative knowledge and insights, up-to-date information and conception, and state-of-the-art techniques. The projected high status for Shanghai by 2,010 is based on systematic studies of the city's potential and present strengths and weaknesses, and of the historical conditions and general laws of those global cities. The city planners of the 1990s are much more conscious and overt in exploiting Shanghai's pre-1949 international reputation. In addition, many key modern concepts in urban and development planning, such as ecological city, urban ecological system, green city, sustainable growth, information superhighway, which are absent in the former plan, are used now. As well, the recent plan includes a series of well-researched subordinate or sectoral plans.

Furthermore, the new plan has new strategies. The strategy of "Relying on science and education to raise the city", a hallmark of the political-technocratic leadership, is a key strategy for urban reconstruction and development. The city plan also promotes the so-called socialist market system; at the same time, all its objectives are to be accomplished within the emerging market system, with the help of market mechanisms. Although the other plan does reflect and promote changes in the long existing planning system in the form of socialist planned commodity economy, it does not embrace market mechanisms as a main framework for plan implementation. The new one overtly introduce market mechanism as the main framework, indicating a marked progress in China's transformation from planned economic system to market economic system.

It is worth noting the changes in city plans were made in different circumstances. In the early 1980s, Shanghai's leading role in China's socioeconomic development was facing serious challenges, as it had been overburdened over the past three decades and as the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the South were getting preferential treatment and so were catching up. The main concern of Shanghai leaders at the time was to rejuvenate the city and so to ensure its leading status in the reform era. Moreover, Deng's market-oriented reform was in the initial stage, so were Shanghai's reform and reconstruction. The city's contacts and cooperation with the advanced countries were limited. The transformation of the municipal leadership from revolutionary to technocratic was just under way. All these changed in the early 1990s. After several years of endeavor, the city had firmly regained its leading role in China's economic reform and development, and the municipal leadership started to envision it

as an international economic centre. This envisage was preconditioned by the national development priority was shifted from the South to Shanghai with the Pudong project, by an amazing progress of Shanghai's market-oriented socioeconomic reform and reconstruction, by its extensive international contacts and cooperation. Perhaps most important was the rise and dominance of a different group of plan makers who were better educated and informed, more pragmatic and open-minded, and more supportive of Deng's-market-oriented reform and scheme of modernization. The evolution of the city plans manifested the political, social and economic progression.

As well, the city plans, particularly the recent one, reflect the recent Shanghai leadership's different vision, guiding principles and strategies from those of its predecessors. In the vision of the current leadership, the city is primarily not a key centre of revolution and anti-Western movement, but the forefront of modernization and international contacts, cooperation and competition, and not a productive base, particularly an industrial base, but a concentration of the people and their diversified needs and activities. The guiding principles underlines the city plans include enhancing the city's basic functions themselves (its infrastructure, utility and food supply, housing and services, etc.), transforming the industrial base into a multi-functional cosmopolis, and the harmonious interplay of economic development, social progression, and ecological improvement. In city construction and development, the leadership of the reform era was to rely on science and education rather than political campaigns and movements, and on some sort of market mechanism rather than the conventional planning system. More distinctive features of the technocratic leadership are revealed in its plan implementation.

4. MUNICIPAL LEADERSHIP AND PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

Urban reconstruction or redevelopment is one of the most difficult but unavoidable tasks for any municipal government, particularly in an overburdened, declined mega-city like

Shanghai. How to conduct the task successfully is a primary test for municipal leadership.²⁹³ The realization of the aforementioned extraordinarily ambitious city plans inevitably required immense resources, including financial and technological ones the city lacked most; it required co-operation and compliance from various sectors, social strata, and interest groups whose interests may be affected, especially a majority of urban residents and working units in the process of massive relocation; it required co-ordination among different players across levels of administration, public and private sectors; and it required an overall framework or milieu to facilitate the input of resources, the co-operation and compliance, and the co-ordination. These requirements were a serious challenge to the technocratic leadership of Shanghai. However, it is very impressive that the leadership has accomplished a great deal in the regard by applying a market-oriented strategy with elements of authoritarianism. Within the following limited space, we look at both major players, administrative and non-administrative, public and private alike, and the characteristics of the implementation of the reconstruction or redevelopment plans. The focus of our examination is on municipal leadership.

Major Players and Their Relationships in Urban Reconstruction

City construction is basically the next phase of city planning, or called the phase of plan implementation. Hence, the chief official responsible for city construction was also Ni Tianzeng. Under his leadership was the Municipal Leading Group of City Construction and Comprehensive Development whose role was to co-ordinate participatory agencies, solve major problems, and make administrative policies and decisions. The principal functionary agency in charge of city construction was still the Construction Committee. As city construction or plan implementation involved policy-making, most of the major municipal policy-makers in city planning such as municipal party, legislative and consultative bodies, have also been major players in this phase.

The role of the municipal authorities was multiple. First, they were regulators, making rules and regulations for city construction and redevelopment. Second, the municipal

²⁹³ The distinguished political scientist Robert Dahl utilized the case of urban development in his classic case study of the municipal leadership in the plural society of New Haven. See *Who Governs:*

government exerted administrative power, dealing with bidding and contracts, and matters of relocation and reconstruction. Third, municipal authorities were the primary mobilizer in the process of city redevelopment and reconstruction, helping mobilize residents and working units, particularly factories, for relocation on the one hand, and resources for reconstruction on the other. Fourth, the Shanghai leadership performed as an investment and business facilitator, soliciting a huge amount of investment and technology from other parts of China, and especially, from abroad. Fifth, it played a co-ordinate role in plan implementation. Sixth, they were arbitrators, mainly resolving disputes between developers and residents. Finally, these functional agencies of the municipal administration were directly involved in construction projects of strategic significance such as two gigantic bridges over the Huangpu river and intra-city highways. However, it was evident that the scope of such direct involvement has significantly reduced, and the ways of municipal authorities dealing with city reconstruction have changed, as China's market-oriented reform progressed, steadily but substantially taking the place of the traditional planning economy. It is worth noting that some of the above roles such as business facilitator are novel, and that others such as administrator, co-ordinator and mobilizer seem old but have functionally changed in a new socio-economic context.

Another major group of players in urban construction and redevelopment was developers. They (other than those under direct governmental control) were encouraged by central and Shanghai authorities to emerge and play a significant role in urban reconstruction, which is a drastic departure from the Chinese Communist leadership's conventional conduct, and which also made less direct involvement of municipal government possible. By the end of 1994, there were approximately two thousand domestic developers, and 391 foreign or joint developers.²⁹⁴ Most domestic developers had somewhat affiliation with administrative agencies or state-run enterprises, but there was an increasing number of private developers. Few of the domestic developers were large in capital asset, so their projects were relatively small, most of which dealt with residential buildings. In contrast, foreign and joint developers, many of which were from Hong Kong, were generally large, and their projects ambitious.

Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1961.

²⁹⁴ *The Liberation Daily*, July 13, 1995.

They began to enter the Shanghai market in the late 1980s; after the formal launch of the Pudong project in 1990, the number and scope of their projects were increased significantly. What is particularly significant in terms of the reconstruction of Shanghai as well as their projects and investment was that in the past few years, Shanghai authorities encouraged developers to purchase existing industrial sites and then build department stores or high-rise buildings for commercial use. Many of the transformation projects, especially the large ones, were invested and conducted by foreign developers.

All the developers had to operate within the regulatory and technical limits set by municipal and district authorities. There have been a series of bylaws, rules and regulations concerning urban reconstruction and relocation. The important and relevant bylaws included the *Regulations of City Construction, Planning and Management of Shanghai Municipality* (1989) and the revised 1987 version of the *Management Measures of Housing Demolition and Residential Relocation of Shanghai Municipality* (Shanghai Shi Chaqian Fangwu Guanli Banfa).²⁹⁵ The bylaws, rules and regulations systematically introduced into urban reconstruction the concepts of competition and differential rent which are essential and prevailing in market economies. While highlighting the necessity of city reconstruction and the corresponding obligation of urban residents and work units, the bylaw on relocation required their interests and rights to be treated fairly i.e. with satisfactory compensation, otherwise they can go to court for settlement. Because relocated residents remained in temporary shelters far beyond the date promised by developers to move into new residence, largely owing to incompleteness of projects, municipal authorities made new regulations in 1995, requiring developers to live up to their promises or to compensate the victims based on an attached schedule of mandatory compensation. Apart from the operational rules and regulations, developers' projects and their operation must meet technical standards made by concerned municipal agencies with reference to international standards.

At the same time, authorities in Shanghai were a collaborator to developers. Because the reconstruction of Shanghai needed developers, especially those from abroad with ample funding and advanced skills, municipal and district authorities have made great efforts to attract them. Those who won contracts were promoted by the authorities so as to facilitate the

²⁹⁵ Li Chuntao, et al, ed. *Construction in Shanghai*, p. 679.

operation of their projects. In the cases of the relocation of residents, developers usually received help from local administration, such as persuading residents to move out within the time limits set by developers. Since quite a few reconstruction projects were postponed far beyond original schedules due to few residents who stuck to their demands for compensation for relocation, Shanghai authorities, in the 1990s, moved to tighten up the regulations and exert more administrative power in coping with those residents or so-called “snag households” (Dingzi hu).

Other than the two major groups of players - municipal authorities and developers, there were about six hundred consulting, property management and real estate broker companies, and numerous construction companies, material suppliers, and technological institutes. Their roles were rather technical. It is worth noting that a number of existing state- or collectively-own working units also played an active role in the unprecedented reconstruction of Shanghai. Their role we refer to is not in terms of forming one sort of the above-mentioned companies (many working units did), nor their involvement in bargains with developers for a better compensation for relocation like hundreds of thousands of urban residents (we will discuss it later), but their direct participation in the revival of real estate market by making best use of the land in which they located. For instance, the factory of Shanghai Furniture utilized its often idle sawmill of 15,000 square meters to build shelters for residents in the interim of relocation over five years; and in return, it earned five million yuan from Yingdu Developer of Zhabei district, and created jobs for itself.²⁹⁶ The deal between the factory and the developer also contributed to the redevelopment of Shanghai.

Market-oriented Framework and The Reconstruction of Shanghai

The most distinctive feature of the implementation of city plans or the reconstruction of Shanghai in the reform era, especially in the 1990s, is the creation of a market-oriented system. Most of the aforesaid players and their market-oriented functions were encouraged by the leadership of political technocrats. Moreover, by exerting its political and administrative power which is far more embracing than that of its counterparts in the West, it endeavoured to

²⁹⁶ *Shanghai Tan* (Shanghai Strand), no.1, 1993, pp. 6-7.

institutionalize and legalize market-oriented, Western-style practice. In this section, our exploration is concentrated on the municipal authorities' efforts as a chief regulator and administrative practitioner.

As the chief regulator, the current municipal party, administrative and legislative authorities have apparently made greater efforts than their predecessors in providing a legal and regulatory framework for massive relocation and redevelopment. During the period of 1986-1990, they made or revised a total of eight bylaws, forty-two administrative rules and regulations, and over one thousand regulatory documents concerning city planning, construction, and management.²⁹⁷ The principle of the development and construction of new areas was "Unified planning, comprehensive exploitation, and complete construction" (Tongyi Guihua, Zonghe Kaifa, Peitao Jianshe); and the guideline for redeveloping old areas was to disperse industry, transportation, and the population there. To build a modern, comprehensive, stable and effective legal system on city planning, construction and management, the municipal construction committee worked out a mid- and long-term plan of legislation, which included a list of 294 legislative and regulatory proposals on city planning, construction and management. The normative trend in city reconstruction continued in the first half of the 1990s.

Yet the series of bylaws, rules and regulations demonstrated what fundamentally distinguished the leadership of technocrats from that of revolutionaries before 1966 is not its greater commitment to institutionalization and legalization, but its willingness and efforts to bring a market system into city reconstruction as well as other socio-economic realms. Realizing that the market system is fundamentally instrumental and imperative to the reconstruction and revival of the once prosperous metropolis, the technocratic leadership of Shanghai vigorously, maximally and creatively implemented national policies concerning market development. It had established the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the conversion centre of foreign currency, the markets of technology, human resource, metals and minerals, and real estate, and so on. The municipal leadership took a full advantage of shifts in China's

²⁹⁷ Of the eight bylaws, three mainly concerned environmental protection, another three were about housing and residents' relocation, one about city planning and construction, and the last about the management of beaches. For a detailed list of bylaws and administrative rules and regulations, see Li Chuntao, et al, ed. *Construction in Shanghai, 1986-1990*, pp. 683-685.

development strategy and priority as well as political situation as of 1989 which enable Shanghai to attain a leading status in the country.

Under its leadership, Shanghai began to play a leading role in China's transformation from a planning system to the so-called socialist market economy. Cadres and ordinary citizens were required to make thorough change in ways of thinking and behaviour to accommodate the market-oriented transformation. The Pudong project, the official recognition of Shanghai as the "dragon head" of the Yangtze Delta and actually China, the city's international reputation as the most favoured investment, trade and transportation port in China, and its advanced level of science, technology, education, and human resources, were actively promoted through official propaganda, and especially through municipal leaders' salesman-like activities within and without China. The "Card of China" (Zhonghua Pai) was projected to encourage domestic business investors. Mutually reinforced, and perhaps more important, was the "International card" aiming at foreign investors. The preferential investment policy towards foreign investors and joint-ventures ("San Jian Liang Mian" or "To be exempt from the income tax in their first two years, a 50 percent tax reduction for the ensuing three years"), was implemented in earnest. Administrative services for the introduction of capital, technology and managerial skills from abroad were apparently improved. Perhaps most impressive were those political-technocratic leaders' knowledge, open-mindedness, and entrepreneur-like and pro-market ways of thinking and activities. Thus, Shanghai provided foreign investors and other businessmen as well as domestic ones with a favourable "hard" and "soft" infrastructure. All of these market-oriented changes were of great help to solving the problems of capital and technology, two crucial ones in urban reconstruction and modernization.

Since real estate market is primary in urban redevelopment, it merits further exploration, including the development, institutionalization, and functioning with special reference to land lease, a phenomena in the reconstruction of Shanghai. The market of real estate, a pillar of the economy and construction of pre-1949 Shanghai, was literally suffocated in the Mao era. Deng's reform paved the way for its revival, however, its substantial revival took place only after the year 1986 when municipal authorities decided to redevelop the market, and made regulations on housing commercialization and the eligibility of real estate

agencies. A milestone in the evolution of real estate market was the promulgation of the *Shanghai Municipality's Methods of Non-gratuitous Transfer of the Right of Land Use* in November 29, 1987. Over the past four decades, non-gratuitous transfer of the right of land use was illegal in China, not to mention the involvement of private investors from abroad. This regulation was a major legal breakthrough of the conventional practice and its underlying principle that land was not a commodity. Based on this regulation, in 1988, for the first time in the history of the People's Republic of China, a lot of 1.29 hectares in western Shanghai was leased to a Japanese investor for fifty years at the price of US\$ 2.8 million or US\$ 2,174 per square meter. In the same year, a batch of relevant regulations came into play in Shanghai,²⁹⁸ further constituting an institutional and legal ground for the development of real estate market. By September 30, 1992, while the number of real estate developers jumped to nearly 400 from less than 100 in the end of 1991, 145 lots of land had been leased, 85% of which were in less developed Pudong, earning the municipality two billion US dollars.²⁹⁹

1992 marked another turning point, in terms of not only the surge of real estate market in scale but also a shift in the focus of its development. As the reconstruction of old residential areas, the restructuring of industry, and the development of tertiary sector were given higher priorities, land lease has been expanded from mainly underdeveloped areas to downtown and populous areas. To revive Shanghai's pre-1949 status as a commercial and financial centre in Asia, the municipal government even moved out of its administrative building located on the Bund or Shanghai's Wall Street, and let its former foreign owner to resume it (at a dear price) as a financial building. In return, the municipal government spent the money the foreign owner paid to build a modern, better-equipped administrative building. Encouraged by this example of reciprocal benefits, one occupant of former financial building after another followed the guideline of urban reconstruction to move out of the Bund. The growth of real estate market also greatly facilitated a massive reconstruction of populous old residential areas and industrial

²⁹⁸ There were the *Methods of Housing Auction* (July 29), the *Detailed Operational Rules of the Non-gratuitous Transfer of the Right of Land Use* (October 12), the *Detailed Operational Rules of the Non-gratuitous Transfer of the Right of Land Use and Real Estate Management* (October 12), the *Detailed Operational Rules of the Non-gratuitous Transfer of the Right of Land Use and Real Estate Registration* (October 12), the *Certain Rules of the Agency of Lawyers by Agreement on the Non-gratuitous Transfer of the Right of Land Use* (October 12), and the *Operational Methods of Taxation on Land Use in the City and Towns* (March 28).

areas, which was conducted in a pattern of reciprocity similar to the above example. Hundreds of thousands of families moved from shanty towns or ill-maintained houses to new, less narrow and better-equipped apartments which were generally invested by developers. And large amounts of much needed capitals from developers, especially foreign ones, enabled tens of thousands of working units, particularly factories, to relocate outside precious downtown and adjacent areas, to upgrade their equipment, and to restructure their staff and provide acceptable packages for layoff workers.³⁰⁰ For those factories which were in deep trouble, on the brink of bankruptcy or literally bankrupted, and could not see any future for their products, the capitals as the costs of land lease helped them reverse their enterprises from industry to tertiary sector or simply pay debts. On the other hand, developers obtained the right of land use for half a century or longer. Numerous financial, commercial and high-rise residential buildings mushroomed on the leased land, being those developers' sources or potential sources of profit.

It is worthwhile to note that the ways of making deals with developers, residents or working units were different from those during the Mao era. For example, land lease has proceeded gradually in accordance with international practice.³⁰¹ The land of the city fell into three categories. "Uncultivated" land (Shengdi, the land without roads, power lines, communication cables, water and gas pipes), "cultivated land" (Shudi, the opposite to Shengdi), and semi-developed (Maodi) land referring particularly to the overcrowd, shanty areas. Accordingly, land rent was differentiated by ten scales. Another criterion of land lease was the object of a development project. Land rent would be highest for the projects of financial, commercial, hotel and comprehensive development, moderate for those of industrial, transportation, recreational, and residential development, and lowest for those of the

²⁹⁹ *Shanghai Strand*, no.1, 1993, pp. 5, 12.

³⁰⁰ For instance, eighty-nine-year-old Wuzhou Pharmaceutical factory leased out its production site on Huihai Street West to a Hong Kong based developer for the development of luxurious condominiums and office buildings, then used the lease fee to build a new production base in a suburban area, with a maximum six-fold increase in production capacity. *The People's Daily*, overseas edition, August 2, 1996.

³⁰¹ For details of the following description of land lease and bidding, for a chart of municipal administration in real estate, and for lists of relevant administrative regulations, and developers and builders, see Association for Shanghai Investment (Shanghai Touzi Xuehui) ed. *Shanghai Fang Di Chan Touzi Shouce* (Handbook of Shanghai Real Estate Investment). [Hong Kong ?]: Economic Herald, [1994 ?].

development of education, science, and health. In addition, the period of land lease varied, ranging from forty years for commercial, tourist, and recreational development, to fifty years for industrial, educational and comprehensive development, to seventy residential development. This seemingly non-market regulation and practice have actually facilitated, given the peculiar circumstances, the gradual development of Chinese-style real estate market, and the reconstruction of the city in social as well as economic terms.

Land leases were proceeded by tender, negotiation or auction. The process of tender was conducted by the government, particularly by the Municipal Bureau of Land Management. The administration decided which lot to be tendered, how to solicit tenderers, the contents and procedure of tender, and how and which tenderer would be finally selected. Tenderers were solicited openly, usually through media. A major principle of tender is that who offers the highest bid would be selected, though in practice the authorities often took other contents of a tender, such as the purpose, layout and predicted effects of a project, into consideration as well. The other major way of land leasing was negotiation; usually it was conducted between the perspective land leaseholder and the current land user or representative (mainly state-run institutions rather than the administrative agencies in charge of land lease). Both parties negotiated terms, especially land rent with reference to market prices. the perspective leaseholder often got a deal at a better price than the market price. Apart from the two major ways, some land leases were done through auction. The auction of land was hosted by the representative of land owner, namely the government, yet with little administrative intervention. In both principle and practice, who bid the highest would get the deal. All the three ways of land leasing pointed to the significant role of market. The development of real estate market in the 1990s became a major lever for the removal of industrial factories from the downtown and areas.

Authoritarianism in Plan Implementation

At the same time, the role of the state is crucial to the successful reconstruction of Shanghai. It is probably safe to say that without the active role of the state, a market system and pro-market practices, as the case of the development and operation of the real estate

market revealed, would not have come into play. What we are going to discuss now is not the state's role in promoting market system and in pro-market practice, but its role in the implementation of city plans, particularly in the process of urban redevelopment. Our focus is not on those municipal or state projects of reconstruction which accounted for most of the major construction projects, nor on state-owned and/or state-run enterprises, particularly construction companies, which constituted a backbone of the labour forces undertaking the projects, but on the municipal party and administrative authorities as chief representatives of the state, particularly on how they dealt with work units and individual inhabitants in the city in their relocation, an imperative, extremely complicated and thorny task in urban reconstruction.

Usually relocation is hard, particularly for inhabitants of the inner city of Shanghai. Their traditional reluctance to leave their inner-city residence was due to their being accustomed to ample commercial, administrative, health, educational and recreational facilities or services, to convenient transportation, communication and other infrastructures, and to their life styles and neighbourhoods or communities. In addition, now these inner-city inhabitants are concerned about safety and security issues in newly built residential areas on the fringes of the inner city. Many down-town residents, particularly those in the former French and International Concessions or the so-called "Upper corner," were also burdened with a social and cultural prejudice against the "Lower corner," the less developed inner-city areas, let alone the fringes of the city. On the other hand, one must note that inhabitants in shanty towns tend to have a strong desire, if not a desperation, to have living conditions changed.

The party and government authorities of Shanghai have been geared to the needs of urban relocation and reconstruction. Persuasive and coercive methods as well as normative means and incentives were applied to facilitate the relocation of work units and residents. The municipal authorities, particularly the Municipal Construction Committee and its subordinate bureau of Land and of Housing Property, were designated as the decision makers, registrars and ultimate managers of land distribution and leases for use within the jurisdiction of Shanghai. Once a piece of land is decided for leasing or for new construction projects, those work units and residents on the land must relocate, in accordance with official regulations.

They would be offered compensation packages by either the government or developers in forms of money and/or better housing (yet usually further away from downtown areas than their previous addresses).³⁰² Other relevant policies included "tax reductions and rebates, value-added and appreciation taxes, housing loans for disadvantaged groups"³⁰³ Those who were unsatisfied could appeal to administrative authorities, and even to the court.

Besides regulations and materialistic incentives, propaganda machines run at a full scale. Under the tight control of party and government authorities, all the media (newspapers, radio broadcasting, television) as well as advertisement boards, study sessions, public forums, various meetings, official documents, and ad hoc propaganda teams, conveyed the same message: the revival of Shanghai depends on the implementation of urban reconstruction plans; plan implementation depends on everyone's co-operation and compliance. Especially since Deng Xiaoping's call for "Shanghai making changes each year, making big changes in three years" (Yi Nian Yi Ge Yang, San Nian Da Bian Yang) in early 1992, the propaganda had been geared up to the degree that the message and the call got across to every resident, including pupils. Apparently, this all-out, continuous, and intensified propaganda campaign has overwhelmed dissenting voices.

In the process of relocation, party and government authorities exerted full political and administrative pressures as well as other means to have targeted work units and residents relocated as scheduled. Certainly, the methods of current authorities as a whole were not as same as those of their predecessors. Now economic or materialistic incentives, reinforced with administrative and legal arbitrary systems, were one of the key means; and political and administrative pressures were not the major means, and were not as harsh as before. However, the pressures were there, coming from authorities at all levels. In cases of individual residents, usually sub-district authorities and leaders of their work units played a major role. The pressures could be in forms of administrative order or individual "persuasive" work. After 1992, political and administrative pressures increased, due to the fact that in many cases, the propaganda, materialistic incentives and arbitrary mechanisms did not work out as effectively

³⁰² The targeted residents would be allocated, according to their original one, more living space in new buildings in peripheral areas than in the same or near site. See Roger C. K. Chan, "Urban Development and Redevelopment," Chapter 12 of Yeung & Sung eds., *Shanghai*, Table 12.1, p. 314.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

as expected,³⁰⁴ and, perhaps more importantly, due to the political need to meet Deng's abovementioned requirement. If someone did not yield to the pressure, his or her residence would be removed forcefully. Obviously, the involvement of municipal party and government authorities in the processes of plan implementation in general and of relocation in particular may be seen as authoritarian in nature, even though the authoritarianism was lesser in degree than before, and was, paradoxically, complementary to market mechanisms.

The authorities' treatment of work units and individual urban residents did have a legitimate ground, that is, the state owns all lands. Accordingly, as land users, all the working units, public or private alike, and all individual residents, are obliged to comply with the state's decisions, though the state authorities are supposed to take the interests of the land users into consideration. It is this legal cornerstone that allowed municipal authorities to discuss and debate relevant issues and options among decision-makers and among experts, and to make and implement plans in the interests of the city and Shanghai people as a whole rather than in the interests of special groups. From the democrat's point of view, the practice of the municipal authorities was certainly short of democracy. It is worthwhile to point out that for a number of work units and especially ordinary residents, this type of state authoritarianism may be too rush, too inconvenient, and sometimes, too rough.³⁰⁵ On the other hand, one must admit that the authoritarian conduct avoided many usually complicated procedures and lengthy debates which are often under the influence of special interests groups, so they may result in non-action or non-optimal decisions.

The conduct of the municipal technocratic leadership in the reconstruction of Shanghai demonstrates a remarkable amalgam of a modified or moderate Communist authoritarianism

³⁰⁴ A report in *the Liberation Daily* of February 23, 1991, reveals the problems of relocation and reconstruction. One of the problems was to satisfy the materialistic demands of work units and, especially, residents. Although officially set housing or building compensation fee (per square meter) went up from 110 Yuan in 1982 to 313 Yuan in 1987 and to 501 Yuan in 1990, and the residents' transition fee (per household) soared from 288 Yuan to 968 Yuan and to 1480 Yuan in the same years, a few targeted residents and work units were still not contented, and the cases had to be solved through time-consuming legal process. As a result, from the beginning to the end, the general time span to solve each case was half a year at least. Both the skyrocketing compensation and other expenses and lengthy arbitrary process were two major factors in the postponement of completion or the abortion of a number of reconstruction projects.

³⁰⁵ If a researcher lived in the city for a considerable period of time and had many local acquaintances, he or she probably would take notice of such complaints which may not be publicized in official media.

and a market mechanism. This combination and the leadership conduct are substantially different from that of the revolutionary or Maoist leaderships. It also manifests transforming China's distinctiveness from Western democracies, and from former communist-ruled but radically changed Russia and East European countries. While its pro-market policies and practice helped solve two fundamental problems – capital and technology, the technocratic leadership's totalist approach authoritarian conduct helped work out plans optimal to the revival of the dynamics, prosperity and cosmopolitan status of Shanghai, and helped mobilize and manage human and material resources. It is this distinctive combination that made a massive, swift, and modern transformation of Shanghai's physical appearance possible, and perhaps even made Shanghai a remarkable example in urban redevelopment or reconstruction in the world, particularly among aged mega-cities, possible.

5. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SHANGHAI IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

After our examination of the process of city planning in Shanghai, the contents of recent overall city plans, and the implementation of these plans, one question naturally rises: What are the final results? In other words, did the changes in plan making, in leadership vision, the principle, objective and strategy of city plans, and in ways of plan implementation make result in something significantly different from those in the Mao era? How well has the technocratic leadership of Shanghai performed in urban redevelopment, if put it into a broader urban context? This section is to tackle these questions by comparing the results of urban reconstruction under the current leadership with those under the pre-1980 leadership and under varied kinds of municipal leadership. An overview is followed by investigations into what had happened to housing, economic restructuring, environmental protection, and inner-city spatial disparity.

The Astonishing Redevelopment of Shanghai

In Mao's China, two major changes - functional and spatial - indeed occurred in Shanghai. Guided by the Maoist developmental principles of "production first" and "self-reliance" respectively, the multifunctional metropolis was transformed into an industrial base or a place primarily for production, and into a much bigger city-region, with an amalgamation of a vast, mainly rural area. In terms of urban redevelopment, nevertheless, there had been no significant change at all. Notwithstanding the revolutionary leadership's efforts to improve the urbanites' living standards, urban Shanghai's physical appearance, infrastructure, and inner-city disparities³⁰⁶ were almost unchanged.

In the reform era, Shanghai changed dramatically. Investment in urban infrastructure averaged 0.841 billion Yuan per year in the five-year period of 1980-84, 3.075 billion Yuan in that of 1985-89, and 12.073 billion Yuan in that of 1990-94.³⁰⁷ Two turning points were 1985 and 1993. According to a Taiwan journalist who recently interviewed the director of the Municipal Commission of Construction Zhang Huimin, the investment in urban infrastructure from 1991 to 1995 was almost equivalent to the total over the preceding four decades.³⁰⁸ The sharply increased investment had translated into numerous construction undertakings. The 24-floor high Park Hotel had stood as the highest building in the city for half a century; in contrast, within only seven years as of 1989, 460 20-floor or above modern high-rise buildings have appeared, the highest is a 460-metre high T.V. tower called "the Pearl of the East" (Dongfang Mingzhu). Meanwhile, completed were two world-class bridges (at least seven kilometres long each) over the Huangpu River, a subway, a new railway station, an inner circular highway, a north-south highway and numerous smaller construction projects. As a result of the unprecedented investment in and construction of urban utilities, recent transportation, communication and utilities were a great improvement on those before 1980,

³⁰⁶ Before 1949, most of the French Concession and much of the International Concession were in sharp contrast to the rest of the city which was mainly under the Chinese jurisdiction in terms of services and conditions of residing, working, transportation and consumption. After 1949, supposedly egalitarianism-oriented communist officials took the place of Westerners and Chinese bourgeois elite, but the sharp disparity continued. Since the mid-1960s, the two kinds of areas were colloquially called the "upper corner" and the "lower corner" respectively.

³⁰⁷ The Bureau of Statistics of the Shanghai Municipal Government, *Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai*. Beijing: Press of China's Statistics, 1995, p. 238. Regrettably, the official data do not give inflation index concerned, even though the deflection does not affect the general picture significantly.

³⁰⁸ Xu Caiyun, "Sinian Zuo Sishi Nian de Shi" (What had been done in four decades was achieved in four years). *Yuanjian* (Global Views Monthly), November issue, 1996, p. 144.

Table 14: The Development of Public Utilities in Shanghai, 1980-1994

Category	Unit	1980	1990	1994
Length of Paved Roads in Downtown Areas	km	907	1663	2799
Areas of Paved Roads in Downtown areas	10,000 sq.m	894	1787	3037
Length of Public Transit Routes	km	5231	18593	27046
Length of Water Supply Pipeline	km	2318	3483	4442
Volume of Household Tap Water Consumption	1 million tn.	342	611	778
Length of Gas Pipeline	km	1414	2700	3938
Household Gas Consumption	1 million cu.m	326	573	1091
Election Consumption	10,000 kwh	3834	6414	9713
Public Phones	Per 10,000 Population	7.3	11.2	20.5
Length of Drainage-pipe	km	1370	1892	2132

Sources: The *Shanghai Economic Yearbook* Editorial Board of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. *Shanghai Economic Yearbook, 1995*. Shanghai: Branch of Joint Publishing Company, 1995; The Bureau of Statistics of the Shanghai Municipal Government, *Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai, 1995*. Beijing: Press of China's Statistics, 1995.

as Table 14 indicates.

The history of urban planning and development around the world suggests that urban redevelopment is more challenging for urban leadership than spatial expansion so that world cities, including New York City, London, Paris, Mexico City, Sao Paulo, and to a lesser degree, Tokyo, tended to expand rather than be redeveloped.³⁰⁹ So was Shanghai in the Mao

³⁰⁹ I am indebted to Professor William Michelson at the University of Toronto, an authority on world cities, for his insightful knowledge about the urban redevelopment of world cities, particularly in the West, and for his guidance to some principal reading materials concerned. It is his observation that no massive redevelopment have taken place in major Western cities over the past five decades except for Toronto and many German cities (due to war destruction), that led to my preliminary thought that the recent urban redevelopment of Shanghai in terms of scale and time span may be the most distinguished among mega-cities in the world. And this thought has been reinforced after going through several monographs, particularly the ones he recommended.

era, though the underlying principle was distinguished. During the reform era, urban Shanghai continued its expansion in all directions (within the boundary of the city-region set up in the late 1950s), especially north-eastward, south-westward, and eastward, namely Pudong. Yet more remarkable was its redevelopment. Within one decade or so, over one million households or almost one in every five urbanites had moved into their more spacious, better equipped new homes,³¹⁰ and a large number of industrial factories had relocated outside the downtown areas. The scale and speed of the redevelopment seem to have set a record in the world history of urban redevelopment. The substance and quality of the redevelopment also merit attention. Let us examine Shanghai's urban redevelopment with respect to social, economic and environmental changes.

Housing Development

Our examination is first focused on housing, a key indicator of urban development and redevelopment. Table 15 indicates that during 1980-94, especially as of 1985, municipal investment in residential housing production and the results overwhelmed those in the period of 1949-76. The completed floorspace of residence per year since 1982 even eclipses that in Moscow during its peak of housing production (a total of 37 million square metres of floorspace in 1971-81) which made the Soviet Union "the world's most prolific housebuilder."³¹¹ And most new dwellings completed in Shanghai in the past fifteen years or so had own toilets and kitchens. In contrast, in Tokyo, in 1968 or more than twenty years after the beginning of its post-war urban redevelopment, "45 per cent of all families were in tenements that typically had shared toilets and kitchens."³¹² For the remarkable achievements of Shanghai, the United Nations granted the city the Human Settlements Award in 1995 and the Best Practices Initiative Honour in 1996.³¹³

³¹⁰ Xu Caiyun, "What had been done in four decades was achieved in four years," *Global Views Monthly*, November issue, 1996, pp. 146, 147.

³¹¹ Peter Hall, *The World Cities*, 3rd edition. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984, p. 123.

³¹² *Ibid.*, pp.186-7; quoted from Roman Cybriwsky, *Tokyo: The Changing Profile of an Urban Giant*. London: Belhaven Press, 1991, p. 95.

³¹³ *Shanghai Star*, June 17, 1997.

Table 15: Housing Situations in Shanghai, 1949-94

Year	Investment (1,000,000 Yuan)	Floorspace of re- sidence completed (10000 sq.m)	Living space per capita (sq.m)
1952	28	25.77	3.4
1957	46	84.05	3.1
1962	14	31.32	3.8
1965	39	65.08	3.9
1970	11	21.65	4.4
1975	106	105.67	4.2
1978	227	199.61	4.5
1980	434	304.32	4.4
1981	561	297.57	4.5
1982	621	394.60	4.7
1983	643	405.89	4.9
1984	820	438.24	5.0
1985	1295	488.55	5.4
1986	1756	490.95	6.0
1987	2246	486.24	6.2
1988	2703	474.88	6.3
1989	1894	371.01	6.4
1990	2626	421.94	6.6
1991	3567	477.69	6.7
1992	4471	543.48	6.9
1993	6670	616.50	7.0
1994	28906	873.59	7.5

Sources: The Bureau of Statistics of the Shanghai Municipal Government, *Xin Shanghai Sishi Nian* (New Shanghai in Forty Years). Beijing: China's Statistics Press, 1989, p. 448. The Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. *Shanghai Economic Yearbook, 1990-1995*.

Restructuring Economy and Internationalization

Like many mega-cities such as Tokyo and Taipei, Shanghai has been undergoing economic restructuring and internationalization in the midst of its urban redevelopment so as

to become a world city or one of the global economic, financial and commercial centres. Economic restructuring in Shanghai is referred to changes in three key aspects of economic structure. The first aspect of change was the ratios of three tertiary sectors or industries in the city's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Before the socialist economic restructuring and construction as of the mid 1950s, the ratios were generally proportionate by international standards. But under the Maoist strategy and policies, the percentage of the first, second and third tertiary industries in GDP changed respectively from 3.8, 53.4 and 42.6 in 1952 to 4.0, 77.4 and 18.6 in 1978.³¹⁴ Since then, especially under the technocratic leadership, it has changed, by and large, in reverse direction. The percentage of the three sectors was counted 4.0, 68.5 and 27.5 in 1986, and 2.5, 58.0 and 39.5 in 1994.³¹⁵ Apparently, the second and third tertiary industries had absorbed most changes over the past four decades. As a result, the layout of the city, especially the downtown areas, has changed.

The second sort of change was in the ratios of different kinds of enterprises in terms of ownership. Generally, there have been three kinds of enterprises by ownership - state, collective, and private. A parallel to changes in the ratios of the three tertiary sectors, the evolution of the enterprises involved two opposite trends. In the early 1950s, there were 170,000 or so private enterprises and individual business households in Shanghai. However, by 1958, the majority had been transformed into collective or virtually state enterprises, only about 20,000 individual business households left; and by the end of 1978, the number of survivors further reduced to 8327. It was Deng's economic reform led to a rapid recovery of private business. By the end of 1988, the number of individual business household totalled 110,000.³¹⁶ In the end of 1994, there were 146,500 individual business households and 17,214 private enterprises.³¹⁷ Since most of them involved in services and small retail business, not in industry, their rise is an indication that the appearance and character of Shanghai are changing.

³¹⁴ The Bureau of Statistics of the Shanghai Municipal Government, *New Shanghai in Forty Years*, p. 413.

³¹⁵ The Bureau of Statistics of the Shanghai Municipal Government, *Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai, 1995*, p. 347.

³¹⁶ The Bureau of Statistics of the Shanghai Municipal Government, *New Shanghai in Forty Years*, p. 71.

³¹⁷ The *Shanghai Economic Yearbook* Editorial Board of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, *Shanghai Economic Yearbook, 1995*, Shanghai: Branch of Joint Publishing Company, 1995, p. 582.

Finally, change has occurred to the city's pillar industries. In the past, textile and food processing industries played a key role in the economy of Shanghai. Now both have declined rapidly. Determined to bring the city into the era of post-industrial or information economy as well as the advanced stage of industrial development, the municipal leadership has instead identified six industries as Shanghai's pillar industries or new points of economic growth. They are those of automobiles, telecommunication, power station equipment, petrochemicals, steel and iron, and home electric appliances. While those heavy industries have been concentrated in the suburbs and satellite towns, the rise of high-tech industries and the decline of textile industry in downtown areas have a marked impact on the spatial and environmental aspects of the city as well as its socioeconomic development.

A distinctiveness of the economic restructuring and urban reconstruction is foreign, or rather, Western participation, which is an integral part of the internationalization of Shanghai. As a prerequisite for and a major indicator of the world city,³¹⁸ the internationalization of a city here means a continuous projection of its image and influence abroad, and the increasing presence of foreign elements through various kinds of exchanges including cultural and economic ones.³¹⁹ As far as the reconstruction of Shanghai is concerned, foreign tourists and investment appeared to be a peculiar stimulus. As tourists from foreign countries, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan flowed into Shanghai,³²⁰ the role of tourism has been elevated, and more and more hotels, stores and tourist facilities have been built in the downtown area.

More important than tourism is direct foreign investment. Direct capital investment from abroad, including Hong Kong and Taiwan, skyrocketed in the past decade. Between 1980 and 1983, there was a total of 17 contracted enterprises with varied degrees of foreign

³¹⁸ According to the generalization of Professor John Friedmann, the principal proponent of the world city hypothesis, one of the five characteristics of the world city is its articulation of international economy as well as larger regional and national economies. See his "Where We Stand: A Decade of World City Research," Chapter two of Paul L. Knox & Peter J. Taylor eds., *World Cities in A World System*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 22.

³¹⁹ In Japan, the term "Internationalization" refers to "(1) the increasing influence Japan has achieved among the nations of the world; (2) the increased facility many Japanese have today with foreign ways and language; and (3) the growing presence on Japanese soil of foreigners and foreign companies." Cybriwsky, *Tokyo*, pp. 112-113.

³²⁰ The number climbed from 311,800 in 1980 to 893,000 in 1990 and to 1,321,800 in 1994. The Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. *Shanghai Economic Yearbook*, 1995, p. 580.

investment and management, worth 0.11 billion US\$.³²¹ By the end of 1988, the number of the enterprises jumped to 510 worth 2.1 billion US\$, comprising three sole-foreign investment enterprises, 99 co-operative, and 488 joint ventures.³²² By the end of 1994, the total number soared to 10,714, worth 23.17 billion US\$, including 1,534 sole-foreign, 2041 co-operative, and 7,139 joint ventures.³²³ Among the foreign enterprises, 41 foreign banks started their operation within the past five years, in contrast to the situation in Taipei where a total of 40 foreign banks took the past thirty-one years to become operational.³²⁴ And half of the one hundred largest transnational corporations have opened their branches in Shanghai³²⁵, an indicator of a considerable degree of internationalization.

The economic structuring and internationalization correlated with the spatial development and redevelopment of Shanghai. The former propelled and helped the latter in the direction of being an international financial, economic and commercial centre; the latter accommodated those fundamental changes to catch up the post-industrial world trend. Moreover, the economic structuring and internationalization was beneficial to improvements in the city's environment.

Environmental Undertakings and Changes

The environment in Shanghai had deteriorated drastically in the Mao era, mainly thanks to a rapid industrialization. In the reform era, particularly after 1985, municipal leadership was determined to cope with appalling environmental problems. A series of regulations and bylaws concerning pollution control and reduction have been made, and billions of dollars have been poured into environmental undertakings. For example, excessive noise from trucks' horns were prohibited in downtown areas, especially during the night. Giant projects of the diversion of rivers for water supply have being undertaken. The city's

³²¹ The Shanghai Bureau of Statistics, *New Shanghai in Forty Years*, p. 290.

³²² *Ibid.*, p. 439.

³²³ There seem some errors in the original figures of the total enterprises and investment. Our figures are the results of summing up the numbers and investments of the three specific categories. See the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. *Shanghai Economic Yearbook, 1995*, p. 580.

³²⁴ Xu Caiyun, "What had been done in four decades was achieved in four years," *Global Views Monthly*, November issue, 1996, p. 130.

capacity of daily sewage treatment was augmented from 15.3 tonnes in 1980 to 40.5 tonnes in 1990 and to 49.3 tonnes in 1994.³²⁶ During the same period, urban public green areas was also enlarged from 0.44 square meter per capita to 1.02 square meters and to 1.4 square meters.³²⁷

In addition, municipal authorities utilized economic restructuring and urban redevelopment for environmental improvement. The aforementioned large-scale replacement of industrial factories in the downtown areas with third tertiary enterprises resulted in the elimination of more than one thousand industrial chimneys over the past decade, so that in the downtown areas, waste gas and dust declined by 1.08 cubic meters and 14 tonnes per day respectively.³²⁸ So did other sorts of industrial wastes. The economic restructuring propelled industrial factories to upgrade their production lines, to change their products, or to shrink in size, even to close up, which is generally believed helpful to the environment. In the meantime, as hundreds of thousands of relocated families left their coal-burning stoves for much more convenient and environmentally clean gas or even electricity stoves, the reduction of carbon dioxide was apparent.

Notwithstanding, serious environmental problems still exist in this fast changing city.³²⁹ It is partly because of the magnitude of the historical burden or environmental debt, and partly because of the ongoing socioeconomic development, economic restructuring, and urban redevelopment that have turned Shanghai into a gigantic construction site and booming metropolis. With the municipal leadership's strong commitment to environmental protection and its tested, sophisticated planning and leadership capability, the continuation of environmental improvement is expected.

Proliferation of Better Commercial and Residential Areas Throughout the City

Another serious problem in urban planning, development and redevelopment is the failure of municipal authorities in solving or even reinforcing the spatial segregation of the

³²⁵ Ibid., 140.

³²⁶ The Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. *Shanghai Economic Yearbook, 1995*, p. 584.

³²⁷ Ibid., p. 583.

³²⁸ *The People's Daily*, overseas edition, August 2, 1996.

³²⁹ For details, see Lam Kin-che & Tao Shu, "Environmental Quality and Population Control," Chapter 18 of Yeung & Sung eds., *Shanghai*, pp. 469-491.

poor and the rich. From London and New York, the leading cities of the developed world, to San Paulo and Mexico City, “the archetype of the third world metropolis,”³³⁰ the problem is not uncommon. In some cases such as London, the problem is mainly of historical burden, in other cases such as San Paulo and Mexico City, it is rather a result of “the rapid, chaotic, illegal, and highly segregated process of urban expansion” over the past decades or so,³³¹ or “the creation of inequality through earthquake reconstruction.”³³²

In Shanghai, high-quality residences and commercial and recreational services were concentrated in the French and International Concessions before 1949. There had been no significant change throughout the Mao era and afterwards until the predominance of technocrats in municipal leadership in 1985, especially after 1992. High-quality residential areas with fine commercial and recreational centres have been established in previous shantytowns, underdeveloped areas or suburbs such as Pudong and Hongqiao. During the period of 1985-1995, the total squatter area in urban Shanghai was reduced from four to one million square meters.³³³ The demolition of shantytowns such as “San Wan Liang Qiao” (Three Bays and Two Bridges) and proliferation of commercial and recreational centres and fine residential areas (some are even better than the residential area for the elites before and after 1949) throughout the city led to the dwindling of the enduring district disparities, especially between the aforementioned former foreign concessions and the rest of the city.

A look at distributions of housing-type and housing-related services by district may illustrate this change. Xuhui District, the main area of the former French Concession, has been the principal residential area in the city for elites, the foreign and Chinese bourgeois elite before 1949 and the ranking communist leaders afterwards. In 1985, this district ranked the second last among ten districts in the floor area of shanties and conversions, but the first in high-quality housing, in the hospital floor area (1,000 persons per square meter, and hereafter for both the hospital and school space), and in the school area which was almost four times Nanshi District, the main area of the original Shanghai city under the Chinese administration

³³⁰ A leading expert’s word. Peter Hall, *The World Cities*, p. 217.

³³¹ Dogan & Kasarda, eds. *Mega-Cities*, p. 301.

³³² Peter Ward, *Mexico City: The Production and Reproduction of an Urban Environment*. London: Belhaven Press, 1990, p. 194.

³³³ Roger C. K. Chan, “Urban Development and Redevelopment,” Chapter 12 of Yeung & Sung eds., *Shanghai*, p. 313.

before 1949. However, the 1993 statistics show that other districts had been catching up Xuhui district. In the category of hospital areas, Xuhui dropped to the number three. While its school area had a 32 percent increase, the school space of Yangpu district and Luwan district jumped 53 percent and 50 percent respectively, and that of Changning district climbed by 37 percent. And between 1985 and 1993, the floor area of shanties and conversions (Unit: 1,000 square meter) declined from 153 to 80 in Xuhui, yet from 768 to 40 in Zhabei, from 666 to 330 in Nanshi, and from 535 to 290 in Huangpu.³³⁴ These trends are continuing, even though the former French and International Concessions are still the primary areas for business, recreation, and high-quality residence. At the same time, however, new shanties have appeared on the periphery of the city since hundreds of thousands of workers and opportunity seekers flushed into Shanghai from other parts of China in recent years. This new problem seems to be with municipal authorities as long as the massive immigration continues.

For every municipal leadership, urban redevelopment, especially large-scale one, has been an extremely challenging but often unavoidable mission to accomplish. Many mega-cities have failed to do so. Among world cities, Tokyo and Mexico City were distinctive in their experience of reconstruction, yet under unusual conditions - large-scale war destruction and earthquake respectively. In other words, the residents and businesses were in absolutely desperate situations so that they were much easier to be mobilized than under usual circumstances. It is within this broader urban context that one can fully gauge the extent of the Shanghai leadership's accomplishments in urban redevelopment, not in the wake of disasters, but during the normal period.

The history of urban planning and redevelopment shows that one major negative factor has been the complication of authority lines, as what happened to London, Mexico City and New York City.³³⁵ It also shows that the co-operation between the government and private

³³⁴ The data and the above calculations are based on Tables 14.5, 14.7, 14.8 and 14.10 in Rebecca L. H. Chiu, "Housing," Chapter 14 of Yeung & Sung eds., *Shanghai*. For details of change in the uneven housing distribution in urban Shanghai, see *ibid.*, pp. 346-361.

³³⁵ In London, the Greater London Council's planning authority was complicated by each borough's own planning authority. (Dogan, Mattei, & Kasarda, John D. eds. *The Metropolis Era. Vol. 2, Mega-Cities*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1988, p. 117). In Mexico City which has been composed of the Federal District and the State of Mexico, the decisions and conduct of the authority of the Federal District and those of municipal and central authorities in the State of Mexico were often incompatible. (*Ibid.*, p. 284-285). And in New York City, the basic problem was too many

sector, particularly the business circle, is a key to the success in massive urban redevelopment.³³⁶ In these senses, the successful urban planning and redevelopment of Shanghai may be a proof of the efficiency of the government system there and of the authority and co-ordinate capability of municipal leadership.

governments - 1,467 in the New York Metropolitan Region - each with great financial power so that it was too hard to co-ordinate them for the sake of the entire city (Hall, *The World Cities*, pp. 160-161).

³³⁶ Tokyo is an example. See Cybriwsky, *Tokyo*.

CHAPTER SEVEN

MUNICIPAL LEADERSHIP AND INTEREST-ORIENTED MASS PARTICIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE HOUSING REFORM PLAN OF 1991³³⁷

Housing has been a formidable problem in China, especially in its largest city Shanghai. The problem of housing reflects as well as generates economic, social and, to some extent, political problems. After a decade of unsuccessful efforts to solve this problem, the leadership of Shanghai launched an unprecedented housing reform as of May 1991, aiming at housing commercialization. This initiative was significant not only because it was the first of its kind in China, but also because the process of the plan-making demonstrated a new style of municipal leadership, of which the most noticeable was the search for a popular consensus on a critical public policy issue, allowing the citizens to voice their private interests rather than suppressing them.

In the Chinese communist history, the mass line has been a fundamental principle for the Communist leadership, and mass movements have constituted one of the essential characteristics of the Chinese communist revolution and reconstruction.³³⁸ Yet in Communist China, mass participation (here except for the illicit) had been manipulated.³³⁹ More importantly, the masses had little influence of their own on the policy-making. It is the masses' influence that makes this public discussion substantially different from the previous ones. But in the reform era, with social and economic pluralism growing, the situation began to change.

The change is perhaps best revealed in the making of the housing reform plan under

³³⁷ This research is conducted through a careful reading of *Wen Hui Daily*, one of the two major local daily newspapers, as well as available primary and secondary sources in Chinese and English.

³³⁸ For a thorough examination of the Chinese Communists' conceptions and practices of participation, see James R. Townsend's *Political Participation in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), and Lowell Dittmer's "Public and Private Interests and the Participatory Ethic in China," in Victor Falkenheim ed., *Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1987), pp. 17-44.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

the political-technocratic leadership. This chapter is an attempt to explore the context and dynamic of the decision making process which led to this housing reform. It consists of three sections: an analytic description of the origins and conditions of the housing reform, a delineation of the process of the decision-making, and an appraisal of the political changes as well as the reform plan itself.

1. HOUSING PROBLEMS AND THE ORIGINS OF HOUSING REFORM

Housing problems in Shanghai as well as other Chinese cities existed before the Communist takeover of power in 1949. In the Republican era, magnificent residential areas co-existed with vast slums, symbolizing a social polarization in this financial, commercial, industrial and communicational centre of China. Chinese Communist rulers had made efforts to improve housing conditions, but the problem of housing remained.

Under the Communist rule, there have been three basic housing problems: shortages in supply, poor quality and inequality in distribution. 14% of the total households in Shanghai were classified as "Kunnan Hu" (households with insufficient floor space) with per capita residential floor space under 4 square metres. 42,000 households were "Te Kun Hu" (households with particularly insufficient floor space) with per capita space under 2.5 square metres³⁴⁰. In addition, shacktowns still existed in large number. Garrets and attics were still the only choice for many urban residents. Most houses were time-worn and poorly maintained. Prior to the 1991 housing reform, half of the urban residents had to share kitchens, bathrooms or toilets with up to a dozen other households. Many residences lacked facilities for gas supply.

These problems did not affect all the residents of Shanghai equally. According to the Municipal Housing Reform Office, 29.6% of the total households had per capita living space of more than 8.1 square metres, and 26,000 households or 1.7% of the total had over 20

³⁴⁰ *Outlook*, no. 5, Feb. 4, 1991, p. 4. Sometimes the administration also applies the label "Kunnan Hu" to the households whose housing quality is poor. In that case, the 1982 census of population and housing showed there were 998,629 "Kunnan Hu" or 62.4% of the total Shanghai households. For the criteria and statistics, see Cai Derong, *Zhongguo Chengshi Zhuzhai Tizhi Gaige Yanjiu* (Research on the reform of China's urban housing system) (Beijing: the Press of China's Finance and Economy, 1987), p. 189.

square metres.³⁴¹ It is believed that almost all these households were high and middle ranking officials and other elites of the society. For the majority of the urban residents, the effects of the housing problem varied. Ordinary government employees, by and large, occupied better housing in term of space, location, structure and utilities. Employees at large public institutions such as universities had better housing than those at small institutions such as elementary and secondary schools. Workers in large state-owned enterprises were better off than those in small ones. And people working in public sectors and state-owned enterprises had an advantage in housing over those in collective-owned enterprises. In terms of age groups, young people (under thirty-five years of age), particularly young couples, were the most disadvantaged.³⁴² Since housing in Communist China has been a major in-kind compensation by either government or work units to their employees who paid no more than 10% of their wages as rent, the unequal housing distribution means an inequality of income as well as housing.

The problems of shortage, quality and unequal distribution have generated social and economic problems, and sometimes even political and morale problems. Housing shortages led to unhealthy contests among individuals and work units for limited housing or financial or land resources, which were commonly associated with bribery, corruption, influence peddling and power-struggles. Sharing kitchen and washroom often caused quarrels among individuals, households and even within a family, harmful to social relations. The poor conditions of living had negative impact on the morale of workers, especially young workers; and low morale was detrimental to their work performance. The inequality in distribution contradicted the Chinese Communist propaganda that has underlined the basic principle of equality, and induced the disadvantaged to be increasingly discontented with the state and the entire system, which were responsible for the inequality. Housing problems resulted in a series of consequences disruptive to social harmony, economic productivity and political stability.

Since 1978 when the Chinese leadership began to shift its central interest from class struggle to economic development, China has made a series of noticeable changes in housing

³⁴¹ Gu Liping, "Lishun Shanghai Zhufang Fengpei Tizhi De Gouxiang" (Clarifying the conception of the housing delivery system in Shanghai), *Shehui Kexue* (The Journal of Social Sciences), no. 5, 1991, p. 28.

³⁴² Newly-weds constituted 69% of the households with deficient living space in Shanghai. Yok-shiu

policies. One significant change was that the government shifted priority from industrial production to the people's living conditions and consumption. As a consequence, housing investment in Shanghai as a proportion of Gross Fixed Asset Formation increased fourfold between 1975 and 1987, from 3.6% to 14.5%,³⁴³ though still far behind the national figure of 24.7%.

As part of the national effort to tackle housing problems, several limited reform measures had been implemented by the Municipal administration. In 1981, the system of investment for housing construction was changed from the sole responsibility of the national and municipal government to a joint responsibility of both the government and work units. And individual employees were encouraged to participate in residential house building. The Municipal government also took cautious steps toward housing commercialization, laying out regulations for housing market, encouraging the residents' spontaneous housing exchanges and allowing certain privileged individuals, including overseas Chinese, to purchase houses.

The low-rent policy, a pillar of the existing housing system, was also modified, though extremely cautiously. In April 1987, the administration began to raise the rent for non-residential buildings and spend the differential mainly to subsidize the maintenance expenses for residential buildings. At the same time, it put the solution of "Te Kun Hu" on the top of its agenda. By the end of 1988, 15,000 households with per capita living space under 2 square metres measured in 1986 had moved into larger apartments. In the 1980s, a limited number of high-rise buildings (by local standards) were built specially for newly-weds.

Though helpful, these efforts had their limits in solving long-accumulated housing problems. Both the government and work units were no longer able to sustain the pace of massive housing construction. The most alarming sign appeared in 1989 when investment in housing building and completed housing floor area declined 30% and 28% respectively from the level of 1988.³⁴⁴ The reform of the system of housing investment reinforced housing inequalities based on work-unit differences. The steps towards housing commercialization were trivial. The rental adjustment did not touch the residential rent, the major substance of the low-rent policy. There was too wide a gap between supply and demand, a result of the

Lee, "The Urban Housing Problem in China," *The China Quarterly*, no. 115 (September 1988): 390.

³⁴³ The Shanghai Statistics Bureau ed., *New Shanghai in the Forty Years*, p. 448.

developmental strategy that overemphasized industrial production at the expense of the people's consumption and living conditions and of rapid population growth over the past four decades. The leadership of Shanghai came to the realization that only a systematic housing reform can solve the housing problems.

For this kind of reform, there already were many favourable conditions in both national and local contexts. Nationally, a decade of market-oriented reform and opening-up had brought about many fundamental changes in the central-planning economic system, of which the housing system was a part. An increasing number of different kinds of markets had emerged, eroding the planning economic system. An unprecedented decentralization of decision-making power had taken place. Particularly, Beijing had encouraged individual cities to initiate novel schemes and worked out the first national plan of housing reform in March 1988, aiming at implementing housing reform in most cities and towns by the end of 1990. The centre's decision to treat Shanghai as virtually the "Dragon head" of China's economic reform and development implied a special policy-making status for the municipal leadership. Moreover, theoretical groundwork had been laid for the kind of innovative housing reform. After 1984, a majority of economic theorists viewed the nature of urban housing as a commodity, not a kind of welfare nor a combination of the both.³⁴⁵ Meanwhile, in the 1980s, particularly in the second half, the State experimented with a number of limited housing reforms in Yantai, Bengbu and some other cities in the direction of housing commercialization.³⁴⁶

The Shanghai administration itself, apart from the limited reforms described before, had assigned several task-forces to look into the problem of housing reform, and to collect public opinions. The censuses of 1982 and 1987, the ad hoc investigations and annual socio-economic statistics collected by the government presented indispensable, comprehensive data for policy-makers. The most recent and extensive investigation was carried out in 1988, collecting data on the size, income, living space and rent of all the urban households. Through these efforts, the Municipal leadership had a good sense of not only housing situations but the

³⁴⁴ *Wen Hui Daily*, December 10, 1990, p. 3.

³⁴⁵ For details, see Cai, *Research on the reform of China's urban housing system*.

³⁴⁶ Zhu Jianhong and Wang Guozheng, *Zhufang, Zhufang* (Housing, Housing) (Shenyang: the Liaoning People's Press, 1988), pp. 76-91.

driving forces for and obstacles to a structural housing reform.

On the one hand, the pressure for housing reform had been mounting in the city. Although their views differed on the substance and strategy of reform, most ordinary residents, especially those "Te Kun Hu" and "Kunnnan Hu," urged substantial change in the existing housing system, particularly in the system of unequal housing distribution. The pressure also came from middle-sized and small work units, which usually had serious difficulties in supplying their own employees with decent housing. On the other hand, the beneficiaries from the existing housing system, including the powerful corps of officials, were inclined to preserve the system. A great many of residents who were close to obtaining a long-awaited benefit might join the opposition to a structural reform. In addition, there was the obstacle of concept. A number of people, particularly those over the middle age, still felt uncomfortable with the concept of housing commercialization. For the Municipal leaders, nevertheless, the sharp drop in house construction in 1989 indicated that a structural housing reform was inevitable.

2. THE PROCESS OF THE HOUSING REFORM PLAN OF 1991

In the beginning of 1990, the Shanghai leaders decided to reform the existing housing

Figure 6: The Process of the Housing Reform Plan, 1990-91

Date	Stage of the Process
March-September, 1990	Preparation for the housing reform draft for public discussion
October 1- December 7, 1990	Initial public discussion at seventeen selected work units; the draft revised
December 8, 1990- January 3, 1991	Formal public discussion of the new draft involving over 80% of the Shanghai residents
January 4- February 28, 1991	Nine major amendments to the draft based on the city-wide discussion; another sixteen amendments made to the revised draft plan following discussions among members of SPPCC and especially of the Standing Committee of the SPC; the completion of the housing reform plan with the approvals of the SPC on Feb. 8 and of China's State Council on Feb. 28

system. The direct preparation for the reform plan started in March. It took almost one year to have the plan laid out and approved through an unconventional process with effective participation of experts and, especially, of the masses. The whole process can be divided into four phases: the preparatory phase, the initial discussion, the formal discussion, and the finalization of the plan (See Figure 6).

The Leadership and the Draft of Housing Reform for Discussion

Let us first look at the Municipal leadership in charge of this process. The Mayor was Zhu Rongji, an experienced industrial and urban planner, and a "resolute, bold and un[re]strained" man.³⁴⁷ Realizing not only the immensity of housing problems but also its potential impact on the political leadership, he said, "We must solve the problem of housing; otherwise, the masses won't allow us to stay in our positions."³⁴⁸ Zhu's executive associate was vice-mayor Ni Tianzeng, a fifty-three year old expert in architecture. After graduating from the same university as Zhu, he spent twenty-one years working in his field of expertise, rising from factory technician to researcher in an academy to assistant director of the Municipal Planning Bureau. Ni's own long experience of unpleasant housing conditions led to a better understanding of the magnitude of housing problems in Shanghai.

The body responsible for municipal housing reform was the Municipal Leading Group of Housing Reform, headed by Ni and composed of all the relevant bureaus, departments and commissions at the municipal level. Under this leading group, there was an executive office for housing reform, in charge of specific matters on a daily basis as well as some decision-making tasks such as offering policy options and drafting plans. At the level of district and county, there were similar organizations.

In March 1990, the preparatory phase began. The Municipal Leading Group and its office hosted a series of forums on housing reform attended by people from various social groups. Based on the forums, proposals were summed up and then were discussed among varied organizations and institutions, from the Standing Committees of the SPC and the

³⁴⁷ The appraisal was made by Weng Shilie of Shanghai Jiaotong University. *Beijing Review*, June 17-23, 1991, p. 18.

SPPCC to the Municipal Women's Federation and the Municipal Trade Union to selected factories, schools, stores and food markets. The opinions and proposals were collected by the Office for Housing Reform as part of the references to the drafting. On a daily basis, members of the Office collected and analyzed information and proposals, and revised drafts of the plan accordingly.

Another part of the mandate of the municipal leadership was to canvass useful domestic and foreign experiments. It sent high-level investigative delegations to Yantai, Tangshan and Shenyang, the national experimental cities for housing reform. In June, Zhu Rongji himself led a Shanghai economic delegation to visit Hong Kong and Singapore, making an on-the-spot investigation of housing systems and policies, and consulting with the officials and experts there on how to solve housing problems.

After half a year of intensive work, the final draft of the housing reform was disseminated for open discussion in September. This 4,500-word draft embodied five principles: raising funds from the State, collectives and individuals; commercializing the housing system gradually; improving housing planning and preventing unfairness and malpractice in housing distribution; "Zi shi qi li" (Live on one's own income); and "Duo zhufang, duo jiaozu" (More residential space, more rent). Five main policies were set forth: (1) a collective fund-raising system requiring both the work-units and the employees to contribute 5% of their monthly payrolls or wages to it; (2) a double rent increase with subsidies to the rent payers; (3) a compulsory investment in housing by the new tenants by buying five-year repayable residential construction bonds, with an annual interest of 3.6 % paid by their work units; (4) residential housing sales at approximate one-third of the construction cost. (5) the establishment of housing committee at the municipal, district and basic levels.³⁴⁸ The bulk of this draft was basically a blending of selected domestic and foreign experiences.³⁴⁹ Only the last policy was Shanghai's own initiative, probably a sensitive response to a flood of complaints about unfairness and malpractice in housing distribution, expressed during those forums and consultative discussions.

³⁴⁸ *Outlook*, no. 5, Feb. 4, 1991, p. 4.

³⁴⁹ *China News Analysis*, no. 1432 (1991), pp. 5-6.

³⁵⁰ The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *China: Implementation Options for Urban Housing Reform*, Washington D.C.: the World Bank, 1992, pp. xiv-xv.

The Initial Phase of the Open Discussion

Probably decided by the Municipal Party Committee and government, the motion proposing a city-wide discussion of the draft so as to involve all Shanghai citizens in the policy-making of their own matters, was passed at the 21st meeting of the SPC Standing Committee on September 27, 1990. On October 1, the Municipal government announced that the discussion was to be carried out first at seventeen selected work units. Among them were a Municipal bureau, a research institute, a university, a large hospital, a food market, an elementary school, a department store and enterprises. The work units varied in sector, size, ownership (state/collectively owned) and financial situation. We do not know the criteria of the selection, but the selected appeared to be representative of the work units in Shanghai.

According to official reports, a majority of the employees in those work units supported the housing reform. However, what we are more curious about is whether this discussion was conducted in a really open manner, what the main public concerns and issues were, and how the Municipal administration responded to them.

It seems that the discussion was quite frank, as many sensitive questions, criticisms and suggestions were raised. The provisions respecting the rent increase with subsidies were a focal point for criticisms and suggestions. Many discussants criticized the provision granting the household with an excessive living space not to pay proper rent as a violation to the principle of "more space, more rent." Some further suggested the adoption of progressive rent. A few people suggested that subsidies after the rent increase should be distributed on a per capita, not per employee basis. Those tenants and owners of private housing were discontent with the provision not allowing them to be subsidized, and demanded the same treatment as tenants in public housing.

There appeared other concerns in the discussion. One major concern was over the possibility of official misuse of the collective fund and housing bonds for other purposes. Many people wanted the policy-makers to better define the functions of the housing committee. A great number of discussants paid special attention to the necessity of the reform of housing delivery system. Some prospective housing buyers worried about unaffordable maintenance costs in the future, given the probability of disproportionate fee increase and

inflation. Some young employees were worried that a commercially oriented housing reform would be too costly for them to bear. Some heads of the work units with marginal or no profits were nervous that the reform would make their financial burden heavier. And the masses disliked the way that the date of implementing the housing reform was pre-set.

In consideration of the public opinions and criticisms, the Municipal authorities had the draft amended.³⁵¹ Particularly, the collective fund and housing bonds were now permitted in principle to be used by the work unit which set up them for the purpose of house construction only. The provision exempting the household's excessive rent for its excessive living space no longer existed. The employees with extraordinary financial difficulty were to be allowed to purchase housing bonds by instalments. The nature, function and structure of the housing committee were clarified. The provision about the date of the implementation now read "as of the plan of housing reform is sanctioned." In spite of the amendments, the new version did not address some aforementioned concerns, which would recur in the next round of the public discussion.

The initial discussion was wrapped up at the end of November, 1990, and followed by a preparation for a city-wide discussion. During the first week of December, the municipal authorities convened mobilization meetings, requiring every work unit to treat this discussion in earnest. In addition, 1,700 senior municipal and district bureaucrats attended a training session for conducting the public discussion of the draft of housing reform.

The Formal Phase of the Public Discussion

On December 8, 1990, the phase of formal discussion began with the publication of Zhu Rongji's speech at the city's mobilization meeting, which emphasized the importance of both the housing reform and the masses' participation in the discussion. The revised reform draft and an outline of propaganda were also made known. All three documents highlighted the immensity of the housing problems, the limits of the government's efforts and means, the advantages of a structural housing reform, and the key points of this tentative reform plan. Addressing the aforementioned public concerns, the municipal leadership put forward seven

³⁵¹ For details, see *Wen Hui Daily*, December 11, 1990, p. 2.

concrete points in the propaganda outline, including the appeal for public understanding of the disproportionately low rent the political and social elites had enjoyed. The tone of the documents was sincere and practical; their statistics-based contents looked solid.

Along the guidelines set in Zhu's speech and the outline of propaganda, the official propaganda machine was put into high gear during the period of discussion. Once the authorities even sent several propaganda teams totalling one thousand people into the streets to propagate the discussion of housing reform. Everyday there was some form of the propaganda in this regard -- radio talks, television shows, or special columns in newspapers.

For the contents of the intensive propaganda, let us take *Wen Hui Daily*, a major official daily in Shanghai, as an example. Much of the reporting was about an enthusiastic public support for the proposed housing reform, and about supportive analyses or views of the plan, including those of some social elites. A considerable proportion of news coverage was devoted to the seventeen units' successful experiences of conducting the discussion. The positive coverage reflected the Municipal leadership's attempt to influence the public opinion and keep the discussion on the desired course.

Meanwhile, *Wen Hui Daily* publicized critical letters and revealing reports. For instance, a summary of hundreds of letters mentioned that some people suggested the government to adopt progressive rent on the living space exceeding the local standard (6.4 square metres per capita).³⁵² A report on one of the seventeen experiences did not leave out the private residents' demand for subsidies.³⁵³ The summary and the report either went beyond or differed from the key points of the propaganda outline, revealing a certain degree of leadership flexibility and tolerance.

Despite the intensive propaganda, the configuration of the people's basic attitudes towards the intended housing reform and main issues appeared in the initial discussion remained little changed. The people's basic attitudes were generally divided into two -- for and against.³⁵⁴ In the pro-reform view, the old, welfare-like housing system resulted in housing shortages and inequality; although housing reform would be difficult, preserving the old system would make the current housing situation worse. As to the opposition, some held an

³⁵² *Ibid.*, December 21, 1990, p. 1.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, December 14, 1990, p. 1.

ideological view, insisting that the old housing system was superior in its planned distribution and low rent, reflecting the superiority of socialism. A fundamental reform meant to them a jettisoning of its superiority along with the socialist system. From a practical standpoint, other opponents criticized the proposed reform as nothing but the government's new scheme to take money from the pockets of individuals and work units, and worried that as low wage earners, they could not afford housing commercialization.

The two opposite views were represented, in general, by the disadvantaged and the beneficiaries under the old housing system respectively. Those "Kunnan Hu" who currently had no immediate chance to obtain a decent residence but had an above-average income were among the enthusiastic supporters. On the other side, among those strong opponents were the households whose income had been stagnant for years but residential space exceeded the local standard so that they would have to either yield some space or pay more rent (even if not at progressive rates), should the system be reformed as proposed.

Other than these two groups, the picture was quite complicated. The two opposite general attitudes cut across social strata, sectors, occupations and work units. Some ordinary residents blamed their bad fate - with no power nor money, there seemed no way out. The opponents included some private residents and the unemployed who were strongly discontent with their ineligibility for housing subsidies, some newly-weds who would be under a heavy financial restraint, and some "Kunnan Hu" who were entitled to have new housing soon under the old system.³⁵⁵ On the other hand, a few beneficiaries of the old system appeared to support or accept the reform proposal, maybe because they understood the very problems of the old system and could afford the proposed changes.

Reflecting the different attitudes, those main issues in the initial discussion recurred throughout this city-wide discussion, in spite of the government's amendment and explanation. Should private housing residents have the same right as public housing residents in housing subsidies? Is it fair that progressive rents be imposed on residential spaces exceeding the local standard? How should revolutionary veterans be treated with respect to rent increases?

³⁵⁴ *Outlook*, no. 5, Feb. 4, 1991, pp. 6-7; *Wen Hui Daily*, December 10, 1990, p. 3.

³⁵⁵ See an official summary of the housing reform in Shanghai, in the State Commission of Economic Restructuring ed., *Zhongguo Jingji Tizhi Gaige Nianjian, 1992* (China's Economic Restructuring Yearbook)(Beijing: the Press of Reform, 1992), p. 506.

Should the enterprises in financial difficulties be treated differently from the others? How can housing be allocated fairly? And how can the appropriate and efficient use of the collective fund and housing bonds be ensured?

The issues of fair housing distribution and progressive rents were those that most concerned the public and most embarrassing or troublesome to the authorities.³⁵⁶ In discussions and in their letters to newspaper editors, ordinary citizens viewed the issue of housing distribution as the most critical in a structural housing reform and the decisive one in making up their minds.³⁵⁷ They strongly thought the existing system of housing delivery was deeply flawed and unfair so that they were strong about establishing a new, fair and effective one. They criticized the amended draft because it still did not pay as much attention to the delivery system as to the systems of housing investment and construction. Furthermore, discontented with the provision that the housing committee would consist of veteran revolutionaries, current leading cadres and social elites, they demanded the seats for the ordinary people's own representatives.³⁵⁸

Related to and more outstanding than the issue of fair housing delivery was that of progressive rent. The targets of the progressive rents were the privileged households whose housing was over the local standard as a consequence of the old system of housing delivery. Those special residents consisted of five groups - social elites, retired revolutionaries, officials, "Shou chang de ren" ("the long-armed persons" who do not have formal power or status but informal social connections that enable them to have access to inordinate housing privileges), and those who use illegal means.³⁵⁹ Ordinary discussants demanded tough measures to deal with the excessive residential space, in consideration of many people's desperate need for decent housing.³⁶⁰ Progressive rent was commonly regarded as an effective and fair measure to target those beneficiaries, especially the last three groups, and to set a precedent for the future.

³⁵⁶ According to the Municipal Office of Housing Reform, 31% of the letters from the public were with respect to the demand for progressive rent. *Wen Hui Daily*, December 21, 1990, p. 1.

³⁵⁷ They said bluntly, "If the housing reform eradicates unfair housing distribution, we will support it; if not, forget it." *Outlook*, no. 5, Feb. 4, 1991, p. 7.

³⁵⁸ *Wen Hui Daily*, December 21, 1990, p. 1.

³⁵⁹ *Outlook*, no. 5, Feb. 4, 1991, p. 7.

³⁶⁰ For example, in the initial discussion, a few staff at Shanghai Jiaotong University suggested to put a

The suggestion of progressive rent put the authorities in a dilemma. In the light of severe housing shortage and the principle of "more living space, more rent," the measure was reasonable. Nevertheless, it seemed that the municipal leaders did not want to see the interests of both retired and incumbent officials affected as suggested. Other than their own self-interest, probably they were concerned about the possibility of those powerful officials withdrawing their support for the housing reform, which was critical to the reform. On the other hand, the leaders must have been worried about negative effects on the popular support for a structural housing reform and on the troubled relationship between the cadres and the masses, had this suggestion been rejected.

On January 3, 1991, another publicized speech by Zhu Rongji marked the formal end of the city-wide discussion. The speech was basically a response to some of the outstanding issues. As to many people's suggestion that housing bonds should be applied to the old tenant as well, Zhu said that the reform plan would be added where they might purchase housing bonds voluntarily. With reference to a strong suggestion of not placing a ceiling on the special residents' rent nor granting them extra subsidies, he only mentioned that it was reasonable to give revolutionary veterans extra subsidies; however, they would depend on individual work units rather than the Municipal government. The mayor also indicated that the government would help out those financially burdened work units by loans, and outlined a preferential plan to solve the problem of "Kunnan Hu." His speech did not touch upon other main issues. Nonetheless, it showed a certain flexibility on the part of the government and its attempt to continue to exert its influence while the finalization of the reform plan was under way.

The Final Phase of the Decision-Making

In the final phase, the government continued to gain more public support for the housing reform. *Wen Hui Daily* published several commentaries and articles respecting the issues of fair housing distribution and progressive rent. Against the latter, one signed article argued that a two-fold increase in rent already reflected the principle of "more space, more

ceiling on the residential space per capita. *Wen Hui Daily*, December 27, 1990, p. 1.

rent."³⁶¹ Other writings tried to demonstrate the leadership's determination to eradicate unfair housing distribution and to promote the advantages of the housing reform. On January 9, the administration announced its decision to fire a deputy corporation manager for breaking the regulation of freezing housing purchase until the housing reform.³⁶²

Meanwhile, the draft plan of the housing reform was revised again with nine amendments based on the city-wide discussion. On January 25, the new version reached the SPPCC for discussion. On February 6, it was tabled by Ni Tianzeng at the Standing Committee of the SPC for examination and approval. As reported, some outstanding issues reappeared. A few members of the Committee backed up the private residents' request for housing subsidies. Some members stood by the popular demand for progressive rent, arguing that it would compel those special households to give back some exorbitant residential space and help check unfair housing allocation in the future. They recommended that the government should set housing standards for progressive rent. Some expressed concern about the reconstruction of slums and the composition of the housing committee.

On February 8, Ni reported to the Standing Committee that following its suggestions, the administration had made sixteen amendments to the draft plan.³⁶³ Among them, the priorities of reconstructing shacktowns and solving the problem of the most needy were highlighted. Retired revolutionary cadres or their surviving spouses would be allowed to join those recognized low-income households and solitary seniors to receive special housing subsidies. The housing committee would be responsible for research on housing policy, not the policy-making. It would be set up at the municipal level and the level of bureau and district, excluding the basic level as originally proposed.³⁶⁴ However, the suggestion of progressive rent, though reasonable, was not added into the new version, pending the establishment of the housing committee and the formulation of a series of residential standards. Ni also gave an explanation as to why there were no subsidies but instead, loans to private residents.

The SPC Standing Committee and China's State Council approved the plan in principle

³⁶¹ Ibid., January 8, 1991, p. 2.

³⁶² Ibid., January 9, 1991, p. 1.

³⁶³ Ibid., March 17, 1991, p. 1.

³⁶⁴ For the final version of the reform plan, see *ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

on February 8 and 28 respectively. On March 6, the Municipal Office for Housing Reform declared that the housing committee at the lower level would have no less than one third of the total seats for the mass representatives, and that this national approval marked the beginning of the implementation of the housing reform.³⁶⁵

3. THE HOUSING REFORM PLAN, MASS PARTICIPATION AND THE MUNICIPAL LEADERSHIP: AN APPRAISAL

Both the reform plan and its formulation process were unusual in Communist China and significant in terms of the transformation of Chinese politics and leadership. This section will proceed with an appraisal of the reform plan and then of the decision-making process. The interest-oriented public participation in the process is a focal point of our examination. Furthermore, we will use this case to examine the similarities and departures of the current Municipal leadership in comparison with the old.

The Shanghai plan was so far the most comprehensive housing reform plan in China, attempting to replace the old housing system, which was essentially a type of welfare, with a market-oriented one. Deriving from a combination of relevant domestic and foreign experiences, this plan touched upon most aspects of the housing system - investment, commercialization, rent, distribution and management. As far as its specific measures are concerned, however, the plan was quite cautious. The scale of rent increases was lower than those in Yantai and Bengbu. The proposed housing sale prices (for employees) were only about one-fourth to one-seventh of the current cost of housing construction in urban Shanghai.³⁶⁶ It failed to weaken the dependence of employees on their work units for housing, a main feature of the old system and a structural cause for housing inequality. It did not deal with the problems of housing construction except for funding; nor did it address some key issues closely related to housing such as the use of land.

The limits of this plan are mainly owing to the limits of Deng's market-oriented reform, and to the limits of the economic and social development of Shanghai. For instance, the

³⁶⁵ Ibid., March 6, 1991, p. 1.

³⁶⁶ The State Commission of Economic Restructuring, *China's Economic Restructuring Yearbook*,

majority of employees could not afford to purchase houses, even at prices far below construction costs. In view of the broader limits, we might say that this plan was pushed quite far in the designed direction. The significance of the plan lies in its starting of a relatively comprehensive transformation of the old housing system, in its impact on related social and economic policies, and, especially, in its unconventional policy-making process.

The one-year process to formulate the plan appeared to have four features. The first feature is the decision making relies on a series of scientific and systematic investigations and careful calculation for optimal solutions.³⁶⁷ The second one is learning from foreign experiences to form a critical reform plan. The third one is consulting expertise, one of the characteristics of policy-making in Deng's China. The Municipal policy makers consulted not only economists and urban planning experts but also sociologists and psychologists.³⁶⁸ The last feature is an interest-oriented public participation. All these kinds of efforts are useful in making rational, optimal, popular and successful policies.

Perhaps the most distinguished aspect of this policy making process is the interest-oriented, city-wide discussion. Over 80% of the residents participated in this organized discussion.³⁶⁹ Nearly 100,000 letters, phone calls and visitors flooded into the newspapers editors' offices, radio stations and the reception rooms of the authorities.³⁷⁰ According to an official sampling survey, of about 50,000 discussants from 98 work units or one-fifth of the total employees in Shanghai, 84.6% supported or accepted the proposed housing reform, 9.7% opposed it, and 5.7% were indifferent to it.³⁷¹ The scale of this mass participation is impressive.

1992, p. 506.

³⁶⁷ For example, the scales of rent increases and subsidies (the counter measure) were based upon an investigation and calculation arranged by the Municipal Office for Housing Reform. The calculation showed that if rent increases and subsidies were made as such, 49.43% of the total households would have surplus, of which those with surplus under three yuans, three to ten yuans, ten to fifteen yuans would count 35%, 13% and 1.22% respectively, and over 50% would have certain surplus on rent alone (before any subsidies). *Wen Hui Daily*, December 26, 1990, p. 1.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, October 21, 1990, p. 1.

³⁶⁹ See Ni Tianzeng's report of February 6, 1991, at the Standing Committee of the SPC, *Wen Hui Daily*, February 7, 1991, p. 1. Although he did give specific definition of the discussants, it is believed that they were adult permanent residents, including employees, the unemployed and retired.

³⁷⁰ *Outlook*, no. 5, Feb. 4, 1991, p. 5.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, and Ni's report of February 6. The survey seems reliable, though the figures might change slightly if the adult residents outside the work force had been surveyed.

It is worth noting that this mass participation differs from conventional, large-scale mass participation in Communist China in the masses' own influence on the policy-making. Right from the beginning, the Municipal leadership had asked all the citizens to voice their opinions openly and frankly. Our detailed description of the policy-making process shows that on most key issues of the public discussion, the authorities responded to the ordinary people's criticisms and suggestions sensitively, with amendments to the reform drafts. On the topic of a rent increase with subsidies, the authorities cancelled the article granting extra subsidies to cover extra rent for excessive living space, at the public suggestion in the initial discussion; and they finally agreed to let the incoming housing committee set residential standards for the implementation of progressive rent, an issue raised repeatedly throughout the discussion. On the topic of the establishment of a "justice and authoritative" housing committee, in response to the popular demands, the Municipal decision-makers added new provisions concerning the committee to the draft plan; and shortly after the plan was approved in principle, they announced that the masses' representatives would have one-third of the seats of the housing committee at the level of bureau and district. As to strong requests for housing subsidies from private residents and financially burdened work units, the government did not make a corresponding change but conceded them the right to apply for loans from the collective fund.

While students of interest politics in the West have tended to concentrate their studies on the roles of individuals and interest groups in participation and on their spontaneity, some China experts brought our attention to the significance of "interest-oriented participation by broad social, occupational, or generational aggregates" and that of "organized" participation.³⁷² The case of the Shanghai citizens' participation with intended-influence demonstrates such "social aggregates" and such an organized participation. The public discussion was a social bargaining between the government and urban residents and work units in Shanghai. Both sides were generally inclined to a fundamental reform of the old housing system, but needed to settle what specific changes should be made. Through the discussion, the authorities maintained the five policies of the original reform plan and achieved their goal to have the society support or accept the reform package. The other side also

³⁷² See Falkenheim ed., *Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China*, p. 3, and Lynn White III, Chapter 7 of the book, "Leadership and Participation: The Case of Shanghai's Managers," p. 190.

gained some ground from the government. This is not to suggest that the two sides of this social bargaining were equal. The government apparently had an upper hand. Notwithstanding this, the Shanghai residents and work units did leave their mark on the reform package.

Mass persuasion and mass participation are two sides of the same coin. Mass persuasion has been cherished by the Chinese Communists for more than half a century, especially by the Maoists. In the past, mass persuasion was carried out mainly through the communist propaganda and indoctrination. But this case is a significant departure from the tradition. In this mass persuasion, there was no such ideological propaganda nor indoctrination as previously. Although the official propaganda for the housing reform was intensive, its substance and tone were concrete and pragmatic, and it revealed more insights of the process of a mass persuasion than ever before. It is observed that this time the relevant coverage of *Wen Hui Daily*, including Zhu's speeches and Ni's reports, was filled with expressions of naked private interests of individuals, groups and work units rather than revolutionary ideals or altruism. Although sometimes "public interests" or "the interests of the whole" were mentioned, they were overwhelmed by the explicit expression of private interests. This is a remarkable change in the Communists' mass persuasion.³⁷³

Intensive as it was, the propaganda for housing reform was not as effective as expected.³⁷⁴ Aside from political education, what vehicle benefited the Municipal authorities in seeking a consensus of opinion of the housing reform? It seems to have been the discussion characterized by self-interest. Shanghai citizens attended the formal city-wide discussion of the reform draft organized by individual work units and neighbourhood committees. Under the circumstances, moreover, they most likely had informal discussions among friends, neighbours and relatives. Both formal and informal discussions provided opportunities for the citizens to clarify and unify their interests and opinions along the lines of housing conditions -- poor, moderate and privileged. The discussions were a process of grouping interests. In the meantime, the formal discussion seemed to have been a platform for the articulation,

³⁷³ As Lowell Dittmer noted, in Communist China, the expression of private interests had been so far in "euphemistic, public-spirited form." Dittmer, "Public and Private Interests and the Participatory Ethic in China," in Falkenheim ed., *Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China*, p. 43.

³⁷⁴ In spite of the official explanations with respect to the issues of progressive rent, of the private residents' subsidies, and of the special treatment of the financially burdened work units, these issues persisted throughout the public discussion.

confrontation, mutual understanding and somewhat reconciliation of varied group interests and related opinions. Since a majority of Shanghai citizens strove for a fundamental change in housing situations, and since the authorities took a cautious and gradual approach to housing reform and balanced different group interests by yielding something to each group of residents, the course of confrontation and reconciliation of varied private interests developed in the direction the government wanted.

This case may also point to the beginning of the transition of the SPC from "a rubber stamp" to a truly representative body of the people with real legislative power. In this policy-making, there were signs that the Standing Committee of the SPC played more or less the role of interest broker between the ordinary people, work units and the government. While assisting the Party and government in promoting the reform package as a whole, a good many members of that body supported several public requests and their representation was unprecedentedly effective.

This case has revealed political limits as well as changes. The Municipal authorities still used some old techniques such as organized propaganda to persuade the citizens. They were reluctant to let the representatives of the ordinary people have a seat at the Municipal housing committee. They tried to protect the interests of the households with above-standard living space, of which a majority were revolutionary cadres, though ordinary residents urged the full application of the principle of "more space, more rent." Above all, the authoritarian nature of the leadership remained.

However, it is worth asking what type of authoritarianism the current leadership represents or how far it has been transformed from the Maoist authoritarianism (an absolute authoritarianism with a very high degree of manipulation). If there are two stages in the transformation or two other types of authoritarianism as an expert labelled,³⁷⁵ this interest-oriented public participation in the making of a crucial public policy may signify that the current Shanghai leadership is on the threshold of participatory authoritarianism (the lesser form) rather than consultative authoritarianism.

In exploring the development of political participation in a variety of Communist

³⁷⁵ Richard Lowenthal, "On 'Established' Communist Party Regimes," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, no. 4 (Winter 1974), pp. 335-358.

systems, Donald Schulz generalized:

... at least three substantive changes are occurring in the quality of participation that is commonly found in developing Socialist societies. (1) Socioeconomic modernization has generated growing pressure for more autonomous and effective participation. (2) Much of this activity is antisystemic or elite-challenging in nature. (3) Moreover, both autonomous and mobilized participation seem to be performing increased policy input functions.³⁷⁶

The case of Shanghai might be viewed as a development of this trend. Furthermore, if the revolutionary veterans' legitimate authority depends on their revolutionary seniority and experience, whereas that of the political technocrats derives from their work performance and their relationship to the populace as Zhu Rongji was aware of, the retreat of the revolutionary veteran from the political stage and the dominance of the technocrat may lead to more dramatic political changes in the context of the development of a market-oriented economy -- more appeals of the leadership to ordinary people in search of political support, more effective mass participation in policy making, more conscious, explicit expression of private interests. Thus a continuation of the ongoing transformation of the nature of the leadership can be expected, even though the transformation may be uneven.

³⁷⁶ Donald Schulz, Chapter 2 "On the Nature and Function of Participation in Communist Systems: A Developmental Analysis," in he and Jan Adams eds., *Political Participation in Communist Systems* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 67.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF THE POLITICAL-TECHNOCRATIC LEADERSHIP IN SHANGHAI

A major imperfection in conventional elite studies is the separation of the elite's personal traits from their behavior. We believe that an elite, especially a political elite, can not be fully understood unless their behavior is investigated. Chapters Four and Five tackled the basic question of who the Shanghai technocratic leaders were through statistical and biographical studies respectively. Chapters Six and Seven explored case studies of their operational styles. This chapter attempts to explore the characteristics of collective leadership conduct. In other words, the leadership is dealt with as a whole. To avoid going astray, the investigation concentrates on their common characteristics and related typical behavior or performance rather than on details of their leadership activities. We also continue probing the characteristics of this technocratic leadership in comparison with and contrast to the revolutionary leadership from which it derived. Specifically, this chapter is to examine several key aspects of leadership: what were its commitment, outlook, orientation, and strategies, whether it was accountable and efficient, and how it dealt with its relationship with the led. It concludes with an examination of the challenges that face this elite as the end of the century approaches.

1. NEW COMMUNISTS: MODERN, COSMOPOLITAN AND NATIONALIST

China's technocratic leaders are a new political elite, distinguished from both the technocrats in the West and their revolutionary predecessors. These Chinese technocrats are Communists (except vice-mayor Xie Lijuan, a "rightist" doctor) and nationalists; yet they are modern, and cosmopolitan. Unlike Western technocrats who are relatively political neutral,

but like technocrats in former Communist Eastern European countries and Soviet Union, in many developing countries, and in Taiwan, these Chinese technocrats are value-laden. This means that they were politically active, and in theory at least, are guided by an ideology other than technocracy. They are political or party technocrats. Moreover, since politicization in Communist China was more thorough than not only Western democracies but other authoritarian countries, the Chinese Communist technocrats are more political than their counterparts there. They have worked and lived in a total political environment in which everyone were constantly under political education and surveillance, no matter on streets, in shops, and at school, office or home. Through their career, even as an ordinary worker, technician or teacher, they have participated in numerous political studies and meetings, and in one political campaign after another. In such political environment and through political activities, they have learned political wisdom and tricks actively or passively, directly or indirectly. In general, a four-decade political education and “class” struggles have trained them as well as most Chinese of their generation on how to protect themselves, how to deal with their superiors, peers and juniors politically, and as party officials and managers, how to indoctrinate and mobilize the masses, though their political experiences and capabilities varied. It is apparent that the general political milieu that these political technocrats lived in was the same one that their predecessors were in since 1949.

Also similar to their revolutionary predecessors, the new generation of municipal leaders has very strong nationalist sentiments. At the early stages of their life, they all painfully, unforgettably experienced the Japanese aggression and Chinese resistance -- the most humiliated and devastating war that had ever occurred to China, and they were implanted with patriotism.³⁷⁷ These early experience and indoctrination were reinforced by Communist China’s uniformed nationalistic and patriotic education and exercises. Thus their nationalistic sentiments are as strong as those anti-Japanese revolutionary warriors. Like their revolutionary predecessors who had raised the banner of nationalism in their path to and hold

³⁷⁷ For example, Jiang Zemin’s foster-father was ambushed by a puppet troop of the Japanese aggressor. As for patriotic education, Xu Kuangdi recalled vividly after half a century, “I will never forget one primary school teacher. At one class, he drew a map of China on the blackboard, saying that China was just like a mulberry leaf, and Japan a silkworm, nibbling our Northeast and North China bit by bit.” Zeng Hua, “Approaching Xu Kuangdi,” p. 8.

of power, this political-technocratic leadership has been advocating nationalism as a primary state ideology for the sake of leadership consolidation as well as China's development. Nevertheless, while in the ideological structure of Chinese revolutionary veterans, Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought was predominant, in that of the technocratic leadership, nationalism has occupied a central place in the wake of the drastic decline of the conventional Communist ideology. In practice, while revolutionary nationalism was confrontational, and to some scholars, romantic in essence (with the West, with the Soviet Union and former East Europeans, and with several neighboring countries), the nationalism that the technocratic leadership has promoted is more rational and cooperative, which has been demonstrated in China's relationship with the above countries.

While they were Party members and were politically oriented, these Chinese technocrats were not as same as those post-1949 revolutionary leaders in many aspects. Most of the technocrats joined the party after 1950, that is to say, not in a life-threatening wartime nor a so-called White Terror period but in a peaceful period when the party was in power. They advanced into high ranking positions not through war or war-related experiences but through managerial and technocratic experiences. More importantly, there were differences between the two groups of leaders in understanding Communist ideology, the road towards the ultimate destination, and political strategy, largely thanks to the zigzag of China's socialist revolution and construction. Unlike their revolutionary predecessors, these technocrats seem to have no longer believed that there was no middle ground between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the East and the West, and between socialism and capitalism, and that the struggles between them were not necessarily life-and-death or zero-sum. Neither do the new generation of leaders continue to hold, in a simplistic and unrealistic fashion, that the collapse of capitalism and the realization of Communism would come true in a not too distant future. Nor do they consider and utilize frequent large-scale class struggles and political campaigns as necessary and principal means to achieve the destiny of a modern, strong, prosperous China. Even the importance of administrative methods for municipal authorities declined, while economic and legal means drew more attentions instead. We will elaborate these points later in this chapter.

With the different understanding of communist ideology and of China's principal means or strategies to achieve the goal, the new group of leaders demonstrated their pro-modern and pro-cosmopolitan characteristics. Realizing that China's reform and development required modern science and technology, modern administrative and managerial knowledge, and massive investments mainly available in Western countries, they were strong supporter of Deng's reform and open-door policies for the sake of China's development and modernization. This is evident especially in the wake of the 1989 Incident when China's reform and open-door process virtually paused, if not fell back. Two good indicators are the "Huang Puding" Incident and a drastic acceleration of the reform and opening-up in Shanghai.

Like modern political and administrative leaders in developed and many developing countries, current Shanghai leaders took notice of and adopted avant-garde ideas and concepts such as "sustainable development", "green" projects, "community policing," and the "information superhighway". They were well aware of the trends, experiences and strategies of social, political and economic developments in the modern time. Under their leadership, a series of markets prohibited in the Mao era, were restored or opened; and export-oriented and free-trade economic zones were set up. They realized the importance of modern means of governance, and took advantage of them. One of the modern means they used frequently was television; another was interactive communication and dialogue through radio stations. We will delineate this later. Finally, these political and administrative leaders often acted like salespersons, business brokers or promoters. They have been increasingly active in economic affairs, promoting local companies and products, and attracting investors and expertise from the outside, foreign and domestic alike. All these point to a clear departure of the current leadership from the pre-1966 one.

Perhaps greater distance between the two groups of leaders existed in their different views and approaches towards foreigners and the outside world, especially the West. In the period of 1949-1966 when the People's Republic of China first leaned toward the Soviet Union against Western imperialism and then adopted anti-Soviet bloc and anti-West policies so that it was almost in complete international isolation, Shanghai leaders had only a few external contacts. In striking contrast, Deng's pragmatism and its embodied reform and open-door policies marked a new page in the history of Communist China in general and that of the

Shanghai leadership in particular. Current municipal leaders appeared quite the same as their counterparts from the West -- with shining and well-combed hair and in fine western-style suits. Many of them had learned foreign languages and at least understood English, facilitating their contacts with foreigners. They had visited many foreign countries, especially Western countries. Zhu Rongji, Wu Bangguo, Huang Ju, and Xu Kuangdi all had been to the United States of America. Chen Zhili, currently the only female deputy party secretary who has been in charge of party propaganda and ideology, had lived and studied for two years for her Master of Science degree from the University of Philadelphia. In Shanghai, they had contacted numerous and various foreign people, particularly foreign businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats, experts and reporters.

Their frequent contacts with the outside world and foreigners helped change their perceptions and conceptions concerned. They put national interests above ideology. Western countries are no longer treated as being hostile and dangerous only, nor are the Soviet Union (Russia after 1991) and its former East European partners. Foreigners from these two former camps are no longer perceived as CIA or KGB agents. International organizations such as the World Bank are no longer the tools of Western imperialism, particularly American imperialism. In their view, the major trends in the world are not military conflicts and other kinds of confrontations but peaceful coexistence and development. China's relationships with other countries should be of complexity -- not only coexistence, non-aggression and non-interference, but cooperation, competition, bargain. They have an acquaintance with the concept of "global village" and with its individual member's duties and responsibilities such as environmental protection. The new Shanghai leadership has been calling for "Yu Guoji Jiegui" (its straight translation is "to join China's rails with the international," a metaphor of joining the market economic system of the world.) a sign of further development of Deng's open-door policies.

Perhaps more revealing than their official activities as to their different perception and conception from their revolutionary predecessors is the fact that a great number of Shanghai leaders at the first and second echelons alike, have allowed or encouraged their children to study, work, or even reside permanently in the West. Take the aforementioned six top municipal leaders for example. With the exception of Rui Xingwen and Wu Bangguo whose

children are yet to know, the rest all have children in North America. Jiang Zemin' children (sons) had studied in the United States for years. Xu Kuangdi's two children all have studied and worked there after receiving graduate degrees. Huang Ju's daughter has lived and worked there, too. Zhu Rongji's son studied in the United States and his daughter and her own family are permanent residents of Canada.

These technocrats are not conventional Communists, nationalists, and technocrats. They are definitely political technocrats, having strong nationalistic sentiment. In the meantime, they are modern and cosmopolitan, eagerly and successfully promoting political, economic, social, governmental, cultural and intellectual exchanges with the outside world, including the West. This is a new political elite in modern Chinese history, distinguished from veteran Chinese revolutionaries and from Western technocrats. This section only concentrates on some perceptible and conceptual aspects rather than the behavioral and practical aspects of their characteristics. In the following sections, our focus of inquiry will be shifted to the latter.

2. A LEADERSHIP OF MODERNIZATION, PRAGMATISM, AND MARKET-ORIENTED REFORM

Modernization, pragmatism, and market-oriented reform are the hallmarks of the technocratic leadership of Shanghai as well as Deng's China. Modernization has been a primary goal of Communist Chinese leaders since the mid-1950s. But how to realize this goal was at issue. Mao's revolutionary ways failed miserably. Shanghai technocrats experienced Maoist ways and witnessed their failure; and their collective emergence on the political stage was a major product of China's march towards modernization under Deng's leadership. Inherently, Shanghai technocrats were supportive of and committed to Deng's modernization scheme, which is substantially different from Mao's revolutionary scheme. Before 1985, they assisted rehabilitated revolutionaries in carrying out projects of modernization. Afterwards, as top municipal leaders, they accelerated the speed and depth of modernization. Anyone who has visited the city twice at least before 1985 and recently would be amazed at the

modernization of Shanghai, from the city's physical appearance and economic structure to its residents' appearance and ways of thinking and doing things.³⁷⁸

The drastic transformation of Shanghai is ascribed to pragmatism, a principal philosophy that Deng cherished and the Shanghai technocratic leaders championed. At the core of the pragmatism of the Shanghai leadership was to enhance productive forces, improve the people's living standard, rejuvenate Shanghai and modernize China. This pragmatism has been underlining all major actions of the leadership. From its call for emancipation of the people's ways of thinking and doing to a radical introduction of market economy, foreign investment, and modern life-style, which would be inconceivable in Mao's China, one can see the dwindling of communist ideology and the predominance of pragmatism in municipal leadership.

The foremost indicator of the pragmatism is reform. Some China analysts regard the leaders of Shanghai as middle-roaders with an inclination to conservatism rather than market-oriented reforms, since they always tried to please both the reformist leader Deng Xiaoping and the conservative leader Chen Yun who was a native of Shanghai and had more influence there than Deng.³⁷⁹ Certainly personnel appointments to the top municipal offices required the paramount leaders' approval, and Shanghai leaders needed to keep a balance between the two.³⁸⁰ But this does not mean that Deng and Chen absolutely disagreed with each other at all

³⁷⁸ A recent concerted research demonstrates Shanghai's impressive transformation and modernization in depth. See Y. M. Yeung & Sung Yun-wing eds. *Shanghai: Transformation and Modernization under China's Open Policy*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996.

³⁷⁹ Gao Xin, He Pin, and Ruan Ming, a former advisor to the ousted party general-secretary Hu Yaobang, held this view. Gao and Xin also assert that from 1979 on, central authorities, particularly premier Zhao Ziyang, called Shanghai for a radical reform of its planning economic system, but the local authorities turned a deaf ear to the call. (see Gao Xin and He Pin, pp. 86-90). As a matter of fact, it was the center which cautiously decided not to choose China's largest economic center but peripheral areas down the South to be experimental fields for radical reforms, a major decision that Deng regretted later. And it was the authority of Shanghai in the first half of the 1980s, though maybe not as radical as in the 1990s given the circumstances, made its ways subtly and gradually to persuade and, to some extent, push Beijing to decentralize some of its power to Shanghai. One example, described in Chapter five, is the making of local special economic zones.

³⁸⁰ It is also remarkable that the leaders of Shanghai skillfully kept a balance between Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, and seized opportunities to further reforms in local interests. A good example is how they deal with what Deng and Chen said at the beginning of the 1990s. At that time, the chief Chinese reformer Deng Xiaoping had made up his mind to put Shanghai onto the fore of China's reforms, so he urged the leaders and people of Shanghai to be more emancipated in thinking, and to be bolder and

major issues so that there would be no room for local leaders' maneuvers in local interests. Nor does this mean that local leaders, particularly Shanghai leaders, were merely central agents or central tools, and did not have or could not deliver and materialize other concerns and their own thinking.

There is plenty of evidence showing that the political-technocratic leadership was supportive of reforms, not the status quo of Shanghai as a model of planning economy and an overburdened industrial center. In 1985-86, the municipal leadership led by Rui Xingwen supported the reform leaders in Beijing, particularly the general party secretary Hu Yaobang, and organized a series of conferences and discussions on Chinese culture, aiming at digging out the cultural roots of conservatism and facilitating reforms. When the campaign of anti-bourgeois liberalization of 1986 clouded urban reforms, municipal authorities continued their reform efforts. After the 1989 incident when China was clouded with political and economic conservatism, the Shanghai leadership succeeded in obtaining the central approval of the Pudong project in 1990 so that the city came to the fore of reform and development. At the work meeting of the CCPCC of September 1991, mayor Huang Ju put forward a reform proposal of "Three guarantees and two selves" on the behalf of the Shanghai authority, that is, Shanghai needs central permission to undertake reforms decided and sponsored by itself while the municipal authority guarantees no change in the socialist direction, guarantees no less financial contribution to the center, and guarantees compliance with macro-economic

faster in carrying out reforms. Meanwhile, at a meeting with Wu Bangguo and Huang Ju in the early 1990, Chen Yun cautioned the younger generation of leaders "not to listen to the superior only, nor to follow what documents instruct only, but to proceed from actual conditions" (Bu Wei Shang, Bu Wei Shu, Zhi Wei Shi). The municipal leaders showed same respect for both paramount leaders' words, and interpreted these words not as conflicting but as complementary. The municipal leadership required Shanghai cadres and ordinary people to change their ways of thinking and behaving -- not saying what the superior has not instructed, not thinking what has been absent in read-headed documents (referring to the party and government documents which usually have their headings printed red), and not trying what other people have not tried. Instead, anyone who does not want to see the decline of Shanghai ought to break the shackle of an ideological debate as to whether reforms belong to socialism or capitalism, nurture the consciousness of reform, commercialization, marketization and cosmopolitan, and strive for whatever good for the development and modernization of Shanghai (The Research Office of Party History under the municipal party committee of Shanghai ed., *Shanghai Gaige Kaifang Fengyun Lu* or *Records of changes of Shanghai during its reform and opening* [Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1994, pp. 7-8). In virtue of combining the words of both Deng and Chen to make a strong call for further reform, the municipal leadership laid a legitimate cornerstone for Shanghai's forging ahead in the direction of reform and opening-up.

adjustment and control and completion of central tasks. At another turning point, in 1992, Shanghai played a leading role among provincial units in supporting Deng's urgent and resolute call made during his south-bound inspection trip for further emancipation of the people's minds and further reform. From then on, reforms in Shanghai have been greatly accelerated, and this municipality has become China's reform model besides its traditional role as a major contributor to the economy and revenue of the country.

One of the remarkable reforms occurred in the relationship between the center and Shanghai, a crucial factor to the transformation and revival of this declined international business metropolis. Under the leadership of revolutionary veterans in the period of 1949-1966 and in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Shanghai had been a model of local compliance with the center, particularly in the fiscal area, a key aspect of central-local relations. Over almost four decades, Shanghai had turned over to Beijing a net 70 percent in average of its GDP annually, leaving a minimum budget for its own development and reconstruction. Most of the new municipal leaders themselves have experienced the negative impact of insufficient funding on local people's daily life and work. And they realized their career would hang more on their job performance as local leaders than their predecessors, and so they were determined to take care of local interests. Thus they attempted to bring change to the existing central-municipal relations that were over-dominated by the center. As far as the fiscal relations between the center and Shanghai are concerned, this technocratic leadership adopted non-confrontational strategies in the bargaining process with Beijing. By virtue of maneuver, central-municipal fiscal relationship was changed and Shanghai gained more power, though that was not a zero-sum result and Beijing also was assured a huge share of revenue contribution from this long-time biggest contributor among Chinese provinces and municipalities.³⁸¹ In 1990 when the center tried to roll back some of the decentralized power from provincial unites, the Shanghai municipality and Guangdong province took a lead in the provinces' resistance to the central attempt. They succeeded and the reformed central-provincial relations continued.

³⁸¹ For details of the Shanghai leadership's strategies and changes in Shanghai-central fiscal relations, see Lin Zhimin, "Reform and Shanghai: Changing Central-Local Fiscal Relations," in Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin eds., *Changing Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity*, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 239-259.

3. A DRIVING FORCE FOR INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND RATIONALIZATION

During the 1980s and 1990s, institutionalization and rationalization took place in Shanghai and the rest of China. Aimed at strengthening the party-state and improving governmental efficiency and accountability, the reforms of ruling institutions, policy-making process, and the vertical relationships between various levels of authority, were schemed and initiated by the Deng-led reformist leadership of rehabilitated revolutionaries, including revolutionary technocrats. Nevertheless, these reforms, especially after the mid-1980s, were largely implemented by Chinese technocrats, a driving force for institutionalization and rationalization. This section mainly deals with institutional reforms.

Institutional reforms were an integral part of Deng's reform, though its core was economic reform. The dynamics of the reforms of political, legal and administrative institutions were partly derived from the bitter lessons of the Cultural Revolution and the previous experiences of Chinese revolution and reconstruction,³⁸² and partly from problems and requirements generated from Deng's market-oriented reform. Yet it is worth noting that institutionalization fits into the nature of Chinese technocrats, for they were a product of the early stage of Deng's institutional reforms, and for the technocrats around the world seem to be inherently in favor of institutionalization and rationalization.

If institutionalization and rationalization in the post-1976 period were a restoration of the pre-1966 institutions destroyed by the Cultural Revolution, and in the first half of the 1980s were the consolidation of these achievements with some new developments, in the past decade it was a marked advance in political, legal and administrative aspects, under the slogan of "Strengthening socialist democracy and legal systems," particularly after the thirteenth Congress of the CCP of October 1987, which put political and administrative reform on the

³⁸² For most of the Chinese leaders and people in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, a critical lesson drawn from the Chinese practice of socialist revolution and reconstruction in 1949-1976 was the imperative of political and legal institutionalization, which, neglected and even opposed by the Mao-led leadership, could provide political stability for China and prevent it from political disasters and tragedies such as the Cultural Revolution.

agenda of the party and state. In Shanghai, the most impressive institutional reform other than change in cadre policies aforementioned, was not separation of Party functions from government functions, nor the streamlining of party and government apparatus, but a remarkable change in the ways that the party and government apparatus work, in the functions of government, in municipal-district relations, at much lesser degree, in the roles of the SPC and the SPPCC, and in the rationalization of policy process.

Administrative Regularization

Aimed at enhancing administrative accountability and efficiency, regularization and standardization of party and government works were a major objective of institutional reform. Under the technocratic leadership, considerable progress had been made, particularly in the appraisal of administrative staff, information flow, the standardization of administrative work, and the construction of legal infrastructure.

In the past, administrative staff appraisal was not regular, systematic, and measurable in essence, and tended to be too political and ideological. In the second half of the 1980s, China was propelled to start administrative reforms, one of whose objectives was to establish a Chinese-style system of civil servants. In Shanghai, there were experiments in administrative reforms, including the reform of the conventional methods of administrative appraisal. Based on these experiments, the personnel bureau of Shanghai came up with an administrative appraisal system, which was approved by central authorities as a viable scheme for the whole country in 1989.

This appraisal system has at least three features. First, it rules out ideological criteria and plays down political criteria, while stressing professional competence, especially job performance. There are two categories of criteria -- integrity and ability, and job performance. Administrative staff are divided into two groups (the administrative and technical ones) and three levels (those of department chief, section chief, and general staff) for appraisal. For examinees at the level of department chief, integrity and ability count 40 percent and job performance 60 percent, and for the others, they count 30 percent and 70 percent

respectively. Second, the criteria are quite comprehensive, particular and easy to appraise. For each of six categories of examinees, there are seven to eleven appraisal criteria and distribution of 100 percent on criteria vary, in accordance with the nature of the service. The application of the criteria is referred to a detailed, general standard. Third, the appraisal system is open and procedural with ad hoc committees. The appraisal process includes eight steps, from the first step of mobilization and preparation to the eighth step of appeal. The ad hoc committees consist of the chief administrator, personnel officials and staff representatives of the working unit with whom examinees work. Although the role of chief administrators is principal, the staff representatives, who are elected by ordinary administrative staff, are supposed to be no less than one-third of the total components of the committee.

Facilitating information flow was another institutional endeavor of municipal authorities. The municipal Party and administrative offices started to issue the following bulletins or briefings on a regular basis. *Meiri Dongtai* (Daily Developments) contains daily information on industrial and urban production, city construction, financial and commercial development, social security, market prices, emergencies, cultural, educational and health affairs, major events and activities of the municipal government and its municipal commissions and offices, and public opinions. *Gongwen Xingxi* (Information on Official Documents) is a collection of excerpts from piles of internal news briefings, central documents, newspaper and periodicals, telephone notes, and municipal investigations and reports. *Meizhou Yaowen* (Important News Weekly) deals with Shanghai-related feedback, complains, concerns, suggestions and instrumental experiments from both domestic and abroad, and with important events and developments both in China and around the world. And *Shifu Lingdao Pishi Huibian* (The Corpus of the Comments and Instructions of Municipal Government Leaders) contains the thoughts, comments and directives of municipal leaders. While the last one was mainly designed for sub-municipal leaders, the others served first and foremost for top municipal leaders. These routine, internal and official publications became a convenient, important channel for leaders at various levels to obtain up-to-date, useful information.

New standards were set up in handling day-to-day administrative works for the sake of efficiency. For example, the municipal secretariat has speeded up its processing of documents; processing urgent ones required to be completed within the same day. The Municipal

Commission of External Economic and Commercial Relations simplified the administrative procedures of applications for going abroad by changing more complicated, time-consuming documentation into standardized forms, which was praised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and applied nation-wide. As of mid 1988, a one-stop administrative service emerged with the establishment of the Municipal Work Commission for Foreign Investment. With the mission of only “one institution, one window, and one stamp” for permission of foreign investment, the commission was operated on a non-stop and highly efficient basis, offering far better service than before.³⁸³

The early 1980s witnessed an inception of government by law, based on a consensus among both Chinese communist officials and people that constructing and strengthening legal system and institutions were one of the most fundamental and urgent missions facing China. However, a massive and rapid construction of legal infrastructure for administration was undertaken after the mid-1980s. In Shanghai, the Department for Legal Affairs under the Office of the Municipal Government was upgraded into the Municipal Office for Legal Affairs in 1987. After 1990, similar institutions emerged at the district and basic levels. The progress in making administrative laws and regulations was more impressive. During the 1980s, over fifty by-laws were drafted by the municipal government and passed by the SPC, and another four hundred or so administrative rules and regulations were promulgated, of which two thirds were made after 1986. After taking stock of more than 1,600 legal documents, the municipal authorities published *A Compilation of Shanghai By-laws and Administrative Rules* for both administrators and the public. A high point in the legal progress was 1990 when the Administrative Law of 1990 came into existence. As a result, by 1991, 86 percent of about three thousand administrative lawsuits involving nearly eighty administrative institutions had

³⁸³ The decision to set up this institution was prompted by widely ranged, mounting complaints from Chinese and foreigners, and people without and within bureaucratic institutions alike, on bureaucratism, particularly with respect to foreign investment. There was a notorious practice that the approval of an application for a joint adventure had to involve four municipal offices and commissions and nineteen bureaus to receive forty-one official stamps, in some cases even 126 stamps, over quite a long period of time, even as much as a year. This new commission was aimed to break through bureaucracy, simplify bureaucratic rules and procedures, and set a model for all administrative services.

had their legal basis to be laid.³⁸⁴ From 1990 to 1995, over 1,800 lawsuits were filed by citizens against administrative organizations. Of over 1,700 settled lawsuits, approximately 30 percent were lost by the accused, though one-third were withdrawn by the prosecutors either due to pressures from the accused administrative institutions or due to settlements outside the court.³⁸⁵ In addition, the constituent act for all the provincial and local People's Congresses and governments and the constitution were passed in 1979 and 1982 respectively, granting local legislative bodies the power to make bylaws provided they are not contradictory to the national laws. However, we must point out that in Shanghai as well as the other parts of China, law compliance and enforcement have been one of the formidable problems yet to solve.

Changing Government Functions

Changing government functions (Zhuanbian Zhengfu Zhineng), particularly functions of economic management, were another mission of the administrative reform. The beginning of the functional change in Shanghai can be traced to the early 1980s, though the focus of administrative reform in China before 1988 was on streamlining. Changes in government functions may be generalized as three-fold -- from political-ideological-centered to socioeconomic-centered, from industrial-base-inclined to multifunctional-center-inclined, and from planning-economy to market-oriented economy in nature.

These changes, which are yet to be completed, were in response to profound changes in China's political and economic development, and in its strategy and urban policies. Governmental functions changed in the context of China's transformation from Maoist radicalism to Dengist pragmatism. After three decades of revolution and class struggle, the Chinese leadership decided to shift the focus of governmental works from large-scale class

³⁸⁴ Chen Pengsheng et al, ed., *Shanghai Fazhi Fazhan Zhanlue Yanjiu* (Research on the Strategy of the Development of Legal Systems in Shanghai). Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1993, pp. 110-111.

struggle to economic construction; modernization took the place of revolution as the Chinese paradigm. This shift led to a diminution in the functions of mobilizing or manipulating masses and conducting political campaigns and purges, and to an enhancement in the economic function of government. Moreover, in the Mao era, guided by the principle of “Production first, and consumption second,” the Chinese cities were regarded as industrial bases rather than multifunctional economic centers. Accordingly, distribution of government functions as well as governmental structure there was seriously tilted towards industrial production, particularly the production of heavy industry, at the expense of the urbanites’ living standard and the economic sectors other than industry such as finance, city construction, and environmental protection. As a result, the once biggest multifunctional metropolis in East Asia declined drastically, and its urbanites’ living and working conditions lagged far behind industrial development.

Shanghai urbanites’ dissatisfaction and the lessons of China’s socioeconomic development before 1980 propelled the Chinese leadership to jettison the old principle of “production first,” and to put improving people’s living standards on the top of its agenda. The functions and powers of the city government were proclaimed in the 1984 *Decision of the Central Committee of The Chinese Communist Party on the Reform of Economic System*: The city government must

“concentrate its efforts and resources on city planning, construction and management, reinforce the construction of the infrastructure of public utilities, cope with the environment comprehensively, direct and encourage the rational circulation of goods and materials, promote the construction of spiritual civilization and create a sound social mode, take care of the business of culture and education, health, social welfare and various services and safeguard security of society. In the meantime, the city government should also make middle- and long-range socioeconomic development plans in accordance with the general requirements of national economic development and local conditions.”³⁸⁶

³⁸⁵ “Baixing Gao Guan Nan Bu Nan?” (Is it difficult or not for ordinary people to suit the officialdom?), an excerpt from *Shanghai Fazhi Bao* (The newspaper on Shanghai legal system) [no indication of the date]. *Minzhu yu Fazhi* (Democracy and Legal System), 23 (1995): 37.

³⁸⁶ Zheng Yushuo (Joseph Y.S. Cheung) & Xie Qingkui ed., *Dangdai Zhongguo Zhengfu* (The government of contemporary China) Hong Kong: Cosmos Books Ltd, 1992, p. 349.

Accordingly, the main responsibility of the Chinese mayors included city planning, construction and management.³⁸⁷ The Shanghai city administration shifted its functional focus from production to the balanced development of both production and consumption, from building an industrial base in China to building an economic, financial, commercial, and cultural metropolis in East Asia. Government functions on city construction and tertiary sectors were greatly strengthened.

Yet the official term “Changing functions” as part of China’s administrative reform basically refers to the government functions of economic management. This sort of functional change commenced as from 1988, which was driven by the growth of market economy and the decline of planning economy as China’s market-oriented economic reform accelerated. At the 14th Party Congress of 1993, which called for building a “system of socialist market economy” for the first time, the government functions of social and economic management were defined as “overall planning, policy assurance, information guidance, coordination, providing service, and inspection and surveillance.” (Tongchou Guihua, Zhangwu Zhengce, Xingxi Yindao, Zuzhi Xietiao, Tigong Fuwu he Jiancha Jiandu).³⁸⁸

³⁸⁷ See a report on the speech of vice-premier Gu Mu at a national work conference on city planning. *The People’s Daily*, October, 1980.

³⁸⁸ According to an authoritative interpretation of this definition, the new economic system includes four major interlocked components: the enterprises, the market, the government, and the system of distribution and social security. The government needs to accommodate to changes in the other components, especially in the enterprises and market. Specifically, the government must change its economic functions in four aspects. The first change is from its micro management of economic activities (setting production targets for enterprises, and distributing investment and goods and materials) to macro adjustment and control, including research on strategies of socioeconomic development, prediction of economic trends, balancing the volume of goods and materials, and distribution of industry. The second change is from the principal managerial task of state-owned enterprises to providing overall guidance and services for all the enterprises, as the state-owned enterprises declined sharply in their share of the total number of enterprises and of the total volume and profits of products, while the collectively-owned, private, foreigner-owned enterprises and joint ventures mushroomed. The third one is of its methods of economic management from direct to indirect. That is to say that the government would mainly rely on the market, using economic methods and policy guidance rather than administrative and planning methods. The fourth one is from a branch-type, vertical management to a trade/sector based management, no matter which branch an enterprise is belonged to and what kind of ownership it is. All the above changes point to strengthening macro economic management. See the Office of the Central Committee for Authorized Institutional Size ed. *Zhongguo Xingzheng Gaige Daqushi: Xingzheng Guanli Tizhi he Jigou Gaige* (The General Trend of China’s Administrative Reform: The Reform of the System of Administration and Management). Beijing?: Economic Science Press, 1993, pp. 120-121.

This underscored the functional reform of the Shanghai administration in recent years. The administrative organizations were re-conceptualized and grouped into four systems (Xitong) of economic management by function. The system of economic management included two principal functional institutions of economic management - the commissions of planning and of economy. The system of economic surveillance comprised the institutions of audit, industrial and commercial management, statistics, and economic laws enforcement. The system of economic adjustment consisted of those institutions dealing with finance and loans, taxation, prices, wages. And the system of research and consultations was mainly composed of the information center of statistical institutions, economic research centers, technological service agencies and consulting companies.

Most of the above institutions were not new, but their functions changed. As we mentioned in the previous chapter, the role of the planning commission gradually shifted from a direct involvement in distribution of goods and materials and in micro-management of enterprises to macro economic adjustment, planning, offering guidance, and coordination. Economic surveillance became a major area that drew the government's reform efforts, and the agencies of economic surveillance appeared to be reinforced, though this government function was far from satisfactory. The institutions of economic adjustment mostly existed before, with the exception of the stock exchange. Yet all of them were in the progress of functional change, which was aimed to become an economic lever, maximizing the law of value. Particularly, banks began to be transformed from government agencies to banks in a real sense. But how to make fine tunes of a quasi-market economy is still a serious problem, partly due to lack of accurate, timely economic statistics. Unlike the above three, the research and consulting system was weak in terms of institutional establishment. Many research and consulting organizations were newly established in the government's efforts to build city-wide networks of information, research, consulting and other services, providing useful surveys, forecasts, statistics and advice for the authorities and for the effectiveness of the other three systems.

Perhaps the most exemplary, comprehensive functional reform of administration was the Pudong experiment, which was also the foremost project of China's economic reform and

development in the 1990s.³⁸⁹ The administration of Pudong was the Management Committee of the Pudong New Area. As a brand-new administration, it was not burdened with conventional institutions and overgrown bureaucracy, but built in line with the idea of “small government and big society,” the official paradigm of the Chinese government vis-à-vis Chinese society.³⁹⁰ The Pudong experiment illustrates the following features of changed governmental functions: first, underscoring the function of economic management; the function of managing a multifunction city rather than an industrial base; second, augmenting the managerial function vis-à-vis the administrative function, and furthermore, the service function vis-à-vis the managerial function; third, strengthening the function of macro adjustment and control instead of that of micro-management; indirect management instead of direct management.³⁹¹

Designed to facilitate the historic transformation from a planning economy to a market economy, the functional changes in the government of Shanghai encountered tremendous

³⁸⁹ According to a vice-secretary-general of the Shanghai party committee and vice-chief administrator of the Pudong New Area, upon the establishment of the Management Committee of Pudong New Area in 1991, the party and administrative leadership of Shanghai announced its expectation that the Pudong New Area should take the lead in building the system of socialist market economy, in connecting the Chinese economy with the global economy, in realizing the management paradigm of “small government and big society” (Xiao Zhengfu, Da Shehui), and in taking shape of the operational mechanism of economy. Huang Qifan, *Tan Pudong Kaifa de Zhanlue, Zhengce Jiqi Guanli* (Notes and comments on the strategy, policy and management of the opening-up of Pudong), Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 1995, p. 249.

³⁹⁰ This concept refers to a substantial reduction in the number of administrative institutions, in the size of bureaucracy, and in the scope of administration. It also implies the enhancement of the quality of administrative personnel and in government efficiency and accountability, and changes in administrative functions. While the government shrinks, the society is encouraged to expand. Particularly, the “big” society mainly pertains to the expansion of societal or non-governmental organizations such as those offering professional and community services and dealing with charities, and to the establishment of the system of social security participated by the government, the public and individuals. A key concept for China’s political and administrative reform in accommodation with the development of market-oriented economic reform, it was put into practice in the late 1980s when the Chinese political and administrative reform was at its height. A major experimental field then was the newly established Hainan province. This kind of experiment appeared to be slow down in 1989-1990 and regain the momentum afterwards. For the Hainan experiment, see the Office of the Central Committee for Authorized Institutional Size ed. *The General Trend of China’s Administrative Reform*, pp. 323-326.

³⁹¹ For a more detailed description of the administrative structure of Pudong New Area and its features and limitations, see King K. Tsao, “Institutional and Administrative Reform,” Chapter 4 of Yeung & Sung eds. *Shanghai*, pp. 100-103.

difficulties. One reason was the complexity of the task and China's political and economic development. From time to time the specific targets, priorities, pace, means and procedure of functional change were not clear-cut or undetermined. Another main reason was the resistance from conventional institutions and established bureaucracy as the changes inevitably affected their interests.

Decentralization of Administrative Power

The decentralization of municipal administrative power took place in Shanghai over the past decade, as some central decision-making power were transferred to provincial and municipal authorities. For years, enterprises and districts/counties had been over-controlled by the municipal government, which contributed to lack of initiatives from enterprises and districts/counties, and to the administrative inefficiency of the latter. The systemic problem of municipal over-concentration of power became more acute as China's market-oriented reforms advanced, posing more complicated but urgent problems onto the existing lines of authority. In the context of China's administrative reforms in general and its decentralization in particular, the authorities of Shanghai launched two sorts of decentralization - to enterprises and to districts/counties.

The decentralization of decision-making power to enterprises commenced in the early 1980s, aimed at reducing superfluous administrative levels and institutions and enhancing administrative efficiency, and at stimulating the initiatives of enterprises and increasing their productivity. There were nearly fifty thousand industrial and commercial enterprises in Shanghai, which were under the jurisdiction of over twenty municipal bureaus except for a handful of enterprises owned and run by central authorities. Yet the enterprises were controlled strictly and vertically by four levels of administration and management: the municipal government, municipal commissions or offices, municipal bureaus, and administrative companies. The major achievements of the early reform included the abolition of administrative companies while business companies began to emerge, and transferring decision-making power to the business companies and, in a much lesser degree, to the

enterprises. The second wave of decentralization came in 1988-89. Those state-run enterprises formed more than eighty specialized companies or joint companies on the principle that the restructuring must be beneficial to special cooperation among enterprises. For collectively owned street enterprises and town and township enterprises, most of which were small or medium in size but massive in number, the municipal government encouraged them to organize trade guilds through which decision-making power were gradually decentralized to the member enterprises. Later, the reform was concentrated on separation of the ownership of state enterprises from management.

Another sort of decentralization involved the municipal-district/county relationship. The administrative structure of Shanghai municipality had long been composed of three levels of government: municipal - district/county - sub-district/town and township (the People's Communes from 1958 to 1984). The municipal government had vertical control over the district/county and the basic level of government.³⁹² The old administrative system was not favorable for the district/county government to take initiatives, while the over-concentration of administrative power at the municipal level of government had overburdened municipal authorities. Radical socioeconomic changes and challenges as well as its ambitious developmental goals in the reform era, had propelled the municipal government to undertake a structural reform of the old system of power distribution. Since the late 1980s, the district/county government has been given substantial autonomous power in a wide range of areas, including planning, construction and management, industry and commerce, labor and personnel, commodity prices, and foreign trade and investment, within its jurisdiction.

³⁹² It may be worthwhile to mention that there were some differences between sub-municipal governments in the city and rural areas. Although both were subject to a tight control of municipal administration, the district government was even less autonomous than the county government (for example, the district tax bureau and public security bureau were branches of and directly subordinate to the municipal bureaus), since the former was primarily created as being of assistance to the municipal government in urban administration and management. On the other hand, determined by the nature of the city as a concentration of people and related facilities and as a political, social, economic and cultural center, the district government has more or heavier administrative and managerial responsibilities than its counterpart in rural areas, responsibilities for utility, transportation, environmental protection, infrastructure, city planning and construction, social and health services, and commercial, financial, educational, cultural and recreational facilities and activities. For a relatively detailed description of the district and county governments and their functions, see Zheng & Xie ed., *The Government of Contemporary China*, pp. 333-336, 359-362.

Enormously beneficial to the districts and counties was their autonomy as of 1988 of approving projects of foreign investment worth up to five million U.S. dollars. Perhaps the essential autonomy the district/county government has obtained is in budget-making.

Institutional Pluralism: Augmentation of the Roles of the SPC and SPPCC

In the context of an economic and social pluralization in the reform era, change occurred to the roles of the People's Congress and the People's Political Consultative Conference, which were powerful in theory but the CCP's "rubber stamps" in reality. Changes in the SPC were reflected in the scope and frequency of its involvement in the political, legal, economic, social and cultural development of Shanghai. From 1980 to February 1994, it had made a total of seventy-five local laws and regulations, and passed eleven modified ones; political system building and financial and economic legislation were on the top of the legislative agenda.³⁹³ Almost in the same period (1980-1993), deputies of the congress put forward 414 motions and 12,769 written proposals on almost every aspect of the government and society in Shanghai. Most of the laws, regulations, motions and proposals are believed to be put forth during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Beyond the legislature, deputies attended on-the-spot administrative meetings with administrators to solve problems at the invitation of the administration. Moreover, the people's congress increasingly exerted the role of legislative surveillance of implementation of laws, regulations and policies. These exercises of the congress were more frequent than ever, and many have become a routine matter.

There has also been meaningful change in the way and effectiveness of the functioning of the people's congress. In the past, the voting in the legislature was a mere formality or a legislative show, as deputies usually voted unanimously on what had already been approved by the party.. This political phenomenon had come to change in the late 1980s when political

³⁹³ Of the seventy-five laws and regulations, twenty-one concern the government and legislature itself, nineteen are about finance and economy, seventeen about social life, nine each about city construction, management and environment protection, and about education, culture and health. The Research Office of Party History of Shanghai ed., *Records of Changes of Shanghai during Its Reform and Opening*, p. 741.

reform was put on the agenda of the Chinese leadership. Over the past decade, the voting of deputies was no longer unanimous, no matter on appointments of administrators or government policies, and so this legislative process began to be effective. In the 1988 election of mayor and vice mayors, the deputies' voting brought an end to incumbent Li Zhaoji's vice mayorship. It would not be unusual that, as the eighth chapter (On the policy-making process of housing reform) illustrates, the government modified its original drafts of policy in the light of suggestions or criticism from deputies of the People's Congress. As the party and government authorities rendered some political room to the SPC and it thus had more authority and publicity, its deputies became more active and more willing to bring the opinions of their constituents (used not in the classic sense but for convenience) to the legislature and to the party and administrative authorities. The more meaningful the contacts between the deputies and those they are supposed to represent, the more effective the legislature would be. This might be seen as a positive circle of change in the Chinese political system.

In the meantime, the role of the SPPCC had also been enhanced. The party and administrative leadership came to realize the importance of this institution as a comprehensive reservoir of brains and as a useful channel for expression of public opinions and exertion of public surveillance, and so it granted the SPPCC certain power in policy formulation and implementation. Like the SPC, the SPPCC became more active than ever. Its functions were no longer confined to being the principal show-case of the well-being of the CCP's united front and a vehicle of the party's control of the society, especially non-communist elites, even though the functions were still primary. Thus members of the SPPCC were increasingly active in addressing ordinary citizens' concerns, in investigating outstanding issues and inspecting administrative works, and in providing the government with advice, proposals or constructive criticisms. These activities, in and outside the SPPCC sessions alike, were conducted on a regular basis. There were signs that administrative authorities did pay attention to what the SPPCC members expressed, and they were obliged to respond to their individual formal proposals.³⁹⁴

³⁹⁴ Most of the proposals addressed what citizens and communities were most concerned about, including issues of environment, housing, transportation, construction, public security, education, and health care. According reliable sources, there were regulations requiring administrative authorities concerned to reply to the proposals in writing within certain periods of time. The formal replies,

Certainly, the changes of the roles of the SPC and SPPCC are not fundamental. They occurred only on the premise that any change will not lead to any Western political systems and pose any challenge to the CCP's absolute rule over the country but strengthen the party-state. Nevertheless, these changes may be viewed as a Chinese form of institutional pluralism.³⁹⁵

The Rationalization of Policy Process

Another feature of the technocratic leadership is the rationalization of policy formulation and implementation. In 1949-1966, decisions and policies by and large were not made on a consistent, universally acknowledged, systematic rational basis. In other words, the revolutionary leadership did not pay as much attention to the rationalization of decision-making as the current technocratic leadership has done. This can be seen through at least three aspects: the role of think tanks, surveys and statistics, and feasibility studies.

Think tanks have flourished in the reform era as the Chinese leadership lent higher valuation to expertise than to sensation, observation and experience. There were various kinds of expertise working for the government. The government at the municipal, bureau, district levels all had their own think tanks in the form of affiliated research office, center or group. The municipal government, for instance, has three bureau-level research centers for studies of economic laws and regulations, international studies and economic studies, other than the municipal research office. Moreover, some key functional institutions such as the Planning

bearing the signatures of heads of individual administrative institutions, must state what the institutions plan to do, when the problems concerned can be solved; or, if not, they must give out satisfactory explanations.

³⁹⁵ "Institutional pluralism," the concept originally applied by the distinguished Soviet Union expert Jerry F. Hough to the post-Stalin system, now according to Suisheng Zhao, "is characterized by conflict among political leaders and bureaucrats who must be reckoned with mainly according to the institutional resources provided by their offices ..., and is based on the functional division of authority among officeholders" (Carol Hamrin & Suisheng Zhao eds. *Decision-making in Deng's China: Perspectives From Insiders*. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, p. 245, footnote 28, and p. 241. However, we borrow the term to refer to the pluralistic tendency of distribution of authority and power among institutions per se rather than officeholders.

Commission and the Personnel Bureau increasingly played an advisory role as part of functional reform.

Beyond the municipal administrative apparatus, the major sources of advice that the government has tapped on a regular basis were the SPPCC, the academic and specialized institutions, and the professional associations such as the association of science and technology. Many experts from universities and research institutes were appointed as policy-making advisors for the municipal government, among whom 116 were “senior advisers” for municipal investment policy making. The municipal authorities also invited specialists from other parts of China (particularly Beijing) and from abroad (mainly Western countries) to offer suggestions and comments for policy formulation. For instance, the making of the strategies of Shanghai cultural, social and economic development had involved many Chinese specialists. Since 1988, the Conference of the Shanghai Mayor Consulting International Entrepreneurs has been regularly held once a year, at which top municipal party and administrative leaders discussed with those foreign consultants who were exclusively most prominent businessmen, retired bureaucrats and experts about ways of rejuvenating Shanghai into one of the most prosperous, attractive multifunctional metropolis in the world.

As a rule, statistics and surveys are the prerequisites to making rational policies, especially in modern market economy. Realizing this importance, the technocratic leadership paid attention to comprehensive, sophisticated surveys and statistics, and utilized the information in policy process. Institutionally, as aforementioned, the administrative function of information collection was strengthened. Besides administrative channels, party apparatus, the SPC, the SPPCC, the mass organizations such as the Youth League and the Trade Union, and academic institutions and professional associations, all played a certain role in the systematic collection of information for the sake of rational decisions. Never before had census and other socioeconomic indices attracted such administrative priority from the communist leadership. And even an advanced comprehensive computer data-bank on underground pipelines was set up to facilitate urban planning and reconstruction.³⁹⁶ In spite of the technocratic leadership’s

³⁹⁶ Xia Dongyuan ed., *Chronicle of the 20th Century of Shanghai* (Ershi Shiji Shanghai Da bolan). Shanghai: Wenhui Press, 1995, p. 1148.

earnest efforts to collect accurate, timely and useful information, there appeared to be a considerable gap between ideals and reality.

Like systematic information collection, feasibility study or test plays a key role in modern decision making. In Mao's China, however, feasibility study based on sophisticated scientific and technological methods was not a requisite for decision making, though less sophisticated and systematic preliminary studies or experiments were not uncommon. Under the technocratic leadership, feasibility study became an integral phase in plan making. Projects and plans, from the projection of an institution (e.g. the Shanghai Stock Exchange) or a functional district (the Lu Jiazui Central Financial District) to infrastructure projects such as the subway, new Shanghai railway station, the circular road, and three bridges over Huang Pu river, all needed to pass the phase of feasibility study and test before approved. Feasibility study has helped minimize human errors or shortcomings in decision making, and usually preconditioned completion of projects or plans within the budget and time span.

4. AUTHORITARIANISM AND LEADERSHIP-MASS RELATIONS

Political leadership is commonly viewed as a relationship between political leaders and the led. In this section, we are going to look at the evolution and status of this relationship, the technocratic leaders' predisposition of leadership, and especially, their endeavors to improve the much troubled leadership-mass relationship and to maintain their rulership on a legitimate basis.

The CCP, by posting itself as the leader of the Chinese nation in resisting foreign imperialism, in countering bureaucratism, corruption and bureaucratic-capitalist autocracy, and in building a new, strong, independent and prosperous, people-ruled China, used to be very popular among the masses after it took power from the Nationalist Party in 1949. During three decades of the Mao era, where some prominent China scholars saw as changes in the

basis of the CCP's legitimate rule of mainland China,³⁹⁷ there was a substantial erosion of the legitimacy of the Communist rule, after constant punitive political infighting and campaigns, and miserable failures in the Maoist strategy for China's socialist construction and continuous proletarian revolution. The most devastating failure of the Maoist strategy was the Cultural Revolution. As tens of thousands of senior party and government officials, many of whom were heroic or even legendary revolutionaries, were publicly humiliated and tortured by Maoist Red Guards or members of other mass organizations, the almost unchallenged authority of the party and government was dashed to the point that it would probably be never totally recovered in the mind of the masses.

Deng and his rehabilitated revolutionary veterans took great pains to restore this authority by building a political leadership and system apart from the cult of Mao and towards legal-rational modes of legitimation, and by embarking on economic reform and programs of modernization. Deng's market-oriented reform and modernization scheme brought out remarkable progress in the people's living standards and freedom as well as China's modernization, and so generated a majority of people's hopes, appreciation, and support. At the same time, there were widespread disappointment, discontent, and disillusionment at the reformist leadership and policies, as many economic and social problems became serious or even seemingly intolerable - widening disparities among regions, sectors, institutions and individuals, amounting unemployment, high inflation, and especially corruption and abuse of power by party and government officials, to name a few. After a limited recovery from damages by the Cultural Revolution, the authority of the party and government and the leader-

³⁹⁷ Chalmers Johnson identified the long-standing Chinese national revolution, the CCP's ideology of socialist construction, and the cult of Mao Zedong as three different legitimate bases for the communist rule consecutively for the three periods of 1949-55, 1956-62, and 1965-1969. (See his "The Changing Nature and Locus of Authority in Communist China," in A. Doak Barnett ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969, pp. 34-76). Frederick C. Teiwes also generalized a marked changing pattern in the shift of Mao's authority. According to him, the basis of the Chinese communist leader's legitimacy went through four stages, from a charismatic, traditional and legal-rational combination in 1949-58 to "legal-traditional ambivalence" in 1959-65 to solely charisma in 1966-71, and finally to a "traditional resistance" to Mao's charisma in 1972-76. (See his *Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China: From A Charismatic Mao to the Politics of Succession*, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1984, pp. 62-76).

mass relationship, were in of trouble.³⁹⁸ Perhaps the historical mission of totally restoring the Communist authority was too difficult to achieve.³⁹⁹

The political-technocratic leaders of Shanghai municipality did realize the magnitude of the problems of authority. Without much revolutionary capital, they had to work harder and perform better to maintain, and to strengthen, the inherently weak authority and relations with the led. Their authority lay on a legal-rational basis, so that the continuation of Deng's efforts to build legal-rational modes of legitimation was essential. They were also very clear that their position and power ultimately hung on whether they could improve people's living standards and revitalize this declined metropolis through market-oriented reforms and opening-up policies. As Zhu Rongji said bluntly, if a leader fails to deliver social and economic progress, he will be ousted.

It is crucial to stress that the leadership has been determined to improve its authority and its relationship with the led mainly by virtue of economic and social undertakings, not political campaigns. From their point of view, the decades-long planning economy ought to be changed into a market-oriented economy, massive class struggle and excessive political campaigns must not be continued, economic construction should be the center of the

³⁹⁸ Although there are no comprehensive data, one can come to this conclusion by sensitive observation and by an exploration of some surveys and statistics. According to an official survey, when asked about joining the Party, only 16.68 per cent workers and staff had both strong desire and were working hard for that qualify; as to the impact of economic reform on the worker-cadre relationship, 37.77 per cent thought it became worse, 31.47 per cent said unchanged, the rest believed better; even in a political model factory (Shanghai No. 3 Bicycle Firm), 43.8 per cent questioned workers and staff felt the relationship had deteriorated. (Zhonghua Quanguo Zong Gonghui [All-China General Trade Unions] ed., *Zhongguo Zhigong Duiwu Zhuangkuang Diaocha* [An Investigation of the Situation of China's Workers and Staff] 1986. Beijing: The Workers' Press, 1987, pp.69-70, 146). Given the Party's control over work units and individuals which may cause some workers to pay lip service to the Party, there may be more people have negative view of the Party and its members and cadres than the statistics show. In his essay, "The Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Society: Popular Attitudes Toward Party Membership and the Party Image," Stanley Rosen shows that 61.88 per cent of respondents had negative image of the Party. (*The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, 24 (July 1990): 81. The original source of the data is *Paisheng* [Common People], Hong Kong, no. 188, 16 March 1989, p. 9).

³⁹⁹ F. C. Teiwes believes that Deng's failure to build a genuinely legal-rational system was due to "the constraints of Chinese culture, his own political needs, and the fundamental nature of socialist systems." (His *Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China*, p. 86). But as for the authority of the party and government, it is really doubtful that the probability of its restoration after the Cultural

leadership's concern and work. Yet the existing political system, especially the CCP's absolute rule shall never be undermined but reinforced, because radical social and economic changes require a stable political environment and a strong political leadership as the guarantee for the success of social and economic reform. Clearly, the technocratic leadership was determined to persist the Deng-set "four fundamental principles" ("the socialist road, the proletarian dictatorship, the leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong thought" as the basic premises of the realization of modernization in China), of which the most crucial is the Party leadership. On the other hand, like Deng and his revolutionary associates, these technocratic leaders wanted to improve the communist rule and the political and administrative systems, and to be authoritative yet responsible officials who are able to bring prosperity to the people, somewhat like "Qing Guan" (upright official) in ancient China.⁴⁰⁰

Their reformist but authoritarian (or socioeconomically progressive yet politically conservative) predisposition appears to have much to do with Chinese history, contemporary events and their personal experience and consideration. Like many revolutionary predecessors, they grew up in a deep-rooted, influential political culture which glorifies those authoritative, competent and upright officials, and in one of the most unstable and tragic periods in modern Chinese history when the war-torn country lacked a strong political leadership. They were encompassed by and involved in the communist heavy-handed political education that stresses that the system of one-party-rule is superior than Western democratic systems in terms of both efficiency and democracy, and that the CCP is the only political party capable of leading China to surpass Western countries. The turbulent Cultural Revolution was a serious lesson to them to consolidate the existing political system on a legal-rational basis and prevent so-called "Grand democracy." And the Russian path of reform (pro-democracy reform first) and its bitter social and economic reality further warned them to be extremely cautious as to political reform.

Revolution. With the generation of charismatic revolutionaries passing away, the restoration, even to the level of 1965, appears to be more unlikely.

⁴⁰⁰ The popular saying among the officialdom, "Dang Guan Yi Ren, Zao Fu Yi Fang" (Being an official for one term, one should bring prosperity to the region he serves," is a reflection.

Moreover, it seems that they felt somewhat vulnerable and stability is their main concern, given the inherently weak authority and leader-mass relationship, and given their lack of revolutionary capital, the capital had constituted a major source of their revolutionary predecessors' remarkable legitimacy and power. This vulnerability has been revealed by some political incidents, especially the incident of 1989. That incident, though well managed in Shanghai, may send a striking warning signal to the leaders on how vulnerable were their basis of authority and their relationship with the led, and how the situation could change so rapidly and so hard to put under control as amounting social, economic and bureaucratic problems and concerns translated the potentiality of a massive challenge to their authority into a reality. The leadership has appeared to come to the conclusion, especially after 1989, that it is urgent to strengthen its basis of authority and its relationship with the led on the lines of the reformist-revolutionary leadership.

The political-technocratic leadership has been striving for authority building and for improvement in its relations with the governed. Besides speeding up institutionalization as above mentioned, it has made several socioeconomic and political efforts. First, it was furthered market-oriented reform and open-door policies. The Pudong project and many other ambitious undertakings had not only positioned Shanghai on the fore of China's modernization, but generated more social and economic dynamics, spheres, and opportunities for Shanghai people. A materialistic atmosphere, with prevalence of a "money-rush" mentality, emerged and expanded, though to a point that exceeded over the expectation of policy-makers. But what they would be delighted to see was that a overwhelming majority of people's main attention and activities, including those of politically sensitive and active university students, were diverted from politics to economic matters. The acceleration of economic reform helped transform people's mentality and behavior, and reduced chances of political challenge to the leadership.

Second, the leadership attempted to address the basic concerns of the citizens, and to win their support by bringing them tangible reform benefits. Municipal authorities concentrated their efforts on a substantial improvement in people's living conditions, particularly in food, shelter, and transportation. Given limited municipal resources and the urgent needs of Shanghai residents as well as foreign investors, Jiang Zemin initiated, in the

capacity of mayor, that the municipal government ought to undertake several tangible projects (“Shishi”) each year. This has since been a practice of every municipal administration. Among the accomplished were new Shanghai train station, a subway line, two long bridges over the Huangpu, huge pipelines and facilities for water confluence and purification, and the projects of food supplies which succeeded in solving one of the most formidable problems confronting Chinese urbanites. Consecutive, massive housing construction resulted in a significant augmentation in living space per capita from 4.3 square meters in 1979 to 7.3 in 1993. As a matter of fact, Shanghai has become a gigantic site of construction, a construction of political support as well as infrastructure and housing.

Third, municipal authorities tried to provide better services for the public, while getting tough with bureaucratic maladies, especially corruption, one of the most hated bureaucratic maladies. The technocratic leadership started to adopt a new doctrine -- “administration is management, and management is service.” In the mean time, it continued its predecessor’s efforts of crackdown on economic crimes, including corruption.⁴⁰¹ Since corruption became an outstanding social and political problem, the Surveillance Bureau of municipal administration and the Anti-Corruption Bureau of the Municipal Procuratorate were set up. And a number of relevant rules and regulations have been made.⁴⁰² Despite the determination and endeavor of municipal authorities, the problems of bureaucratism and corruption did not diminish but deteriorate, partly due to the inherent deficiencies of the bureaucratic system, and particularly the problem of enforcement of laws and rules.

Fourth, municipal leadership attempted to keep its political and ideological grip on the society. Municipal leadership believed that the Communist grip was the cornerstone of

⁴⁰¹ The campaign of “crackdown on economic crimes” (the Chinese abbreviation “Jing Da”) began in 1982, and ended in 1987-88 when the executive body Municipal Office for Crackdown on Economic Crimes was dismissed. However, the office’s functions have been carried out by the procuratorate and the bureau of public security. In this sense, the campaign actually continued yet on a more institutionalized and legal basis. Another change was that anti-corruption has become the focus of the campaign in substance. For a brief description of this campaign and its achievements, see the Research Office of the Municipal Party Committee of Shanghai ed., *The Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai, 1921-1991*, pp. 633-634.

⁴⁰² For example, based on the number seven and eight central documents of 1995, the municipal authorities issued two official regulations on June 21, 1995, stipulating leading cadres at the level of

leadership authority, political stability, and socioeconomic development. In its absence, the essence of the leadership-mass relationship, a predominance of leadership over the masses, can not be preserved. In order to prevent the grip from further erosion, the leadership intensified its efforts. By the same token, it was very cautious towards political reform. Actually, in recent years, its concentration has been on administrative reform rather than political reform.

A couple of points need to be made here. First, during the period 1985-95, political and ideological control was not always tight. It was less tight before 1989 than afterwards. Second, the Communist grip after 1989 on the society, particularly the intelligentsia, was a far cry from that in the Mao era in both substance and methods. It was conducted when the focus of leadership already shifted from class struggle and sociopolitical revolution to economic reform and modernization programs, and when seventeen years of market-oriented reforms already brought about a considerable degree of social and economic pluralism, and of debility of the once powerful and mighty political machine.⁴⁰³ And the intensifying political and ideological control was conducted not by means of Maoist mass politics, including constant, intensified and punitive campaigns, but on an institutional, legal, and selective basis.

Fifth, municipal authorities, at the same time, allowed more yet limited public participation and surveillance to improve policy making and implementation, and opened up more channels for leader-mass communication and linkage. More public input in the process of public policies, particularly those concerning necessities of people's life, was evident, especially in the 1990s (For an example, see Chapter Seven). Public and media surveillance was also invited, particularly in dealing with social and economic problems of most concern to ordinary citizens, including the problems of corruption, crime, commodity quality and prices, transportation, and services. Public participation and surveillance were conducted through working unit meetings, hot lines, letters to authorities, members of SPC and SPPCC,

county or department to declare their incomes, and all party and state workers to register the gifts they received during their working contacts within the country. *The Liberation Daily*, June 28, 1995.

⁴⁰³ For the burgeoning social and economic pluralism, see Robert A. Scalapino. "China in the Late Leninist Era." *China Quarterly*. 136 (December 1993): 949-971. For the debility of the political authority, see Li and Bachman. "Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism," *World Politics*, v. 42, 1 (October 1989): 64-94.

intermediary organizations (professional associations, official mass organizations, etc.), personal networks, and even protests.

There were varied channels or forms of communication between leaders and the public. Perhaps the most novel, efficient, and powerful means was telecommunication, particularly radio and television. A good example was a radio talk show called *Citizens and Society*. It was held at Shanghai People's Broadcasting Station five times a week, each time lasting fifty minutes. From its debut in October, 1992 to April, 1994, this talking show had a total of 388 sessions and more than three hundred topics, of which one third were raised by the audience themselves. The topics touched upon almost all the problems of ordinary people's life, particularly the problems of city infrastructure and reforms. Eight mayor, vice mayors and one standing member of the municipal party committee had attended the talking show as guests for twelve times. As well, chief leaders at the municipal bureau level and the district/county level had been the guests for sixty-three and twenty-five times respectively. (The majority of guests for this show was social and economic elite, including professors, journalists, industrial managers, school principals, legislative members, and judicial professionals). In a straight and responsive manner, these officials listened to the callers' concerns, comments or complaints, explained problems, situations and policies to the audience, and answered or discussed questions with them.⁴⁰⁴

This talk show was not the only one of its kind. The East (Dongfang) Broadcasting Station held the program "Today's New Topics" (Jinri Xinhua); the Eastern Television Station (Dongfang Dianshi Tai) had a program called "the Eastern Broadcasting Studio" (Dongfang Zhibo Shi); and Shanghai Television Station provided "Eight O'clock Tonight" (Jinwan Badianzhong). Municipal party and government leaders often attended these programs, directly communicating with ordinary people. These participatory programs had come to be one of the most efficient channels for municipal leaders to get in touch with the masses, to find out their concerns and mood, and to sell plans and policies. For the masses, these programs became good opportunities to voice their concerns over a wide range of

⁴⁰⁴ For a comprehensive description of the talk show, including all the topics and names of guests during 1992-94, see Chen Wenbing and Chen Jiezhong, *Minzhu Zhisheng: Zhibo Shili de Guan Min*

policy issues, and from time to time, to have their concrete problems solved within the shortest period of time. These programs helped bridge the gap between the two sides.

Finally, like the revolutionary leadership, the technocratic leadership exploited means of propaganda for its political purposes. There was a continuation of conventional Communist propaganda, which highlighted Mao's mass line as the basis for the relationship between Communist leadership and the masses, highlighted identicalness of social and economic goals of both leadership and ordinary people, highlighted the Communist leadership as the best representative of nationalism and patriotism, and highlighted the leadership's unchallengeable authority and incomparable capability. There were also some new features of current Communist propaganda. The necessity of political stability, particularly of the legitimate existence and stability of the current leadership were reiterated intensively. Meanwhile, the conduct of image building through individual projects and tangible accomplishments was observable. Those projects concerning people's living and working conditions were officially labeled as projects of "People's heart" (Minxin Gongcheng) or "Cohesion" (Ningjuli Gongcheng). The labels themselves clearly reflected the official attempt to seek social cohesion and to win people's heartfelt support.

Notwithstanding the above endeavors by the technocratic leadership, its authority and relationship with the masses seemed not in as good a shape as it expected. There were historical factors, especially the devastating impact of the Cultural Revolution. Constant, massive, comprehensive coercion and indoctrination, two most effective techniques of maintaining an authoritarian leadership-mass relationship during the Mao era, had been either jettisoned by technocrats or by the led. Deng's market-oriented reforms and open-door policies diversified a highly centralized planning economy and relatively uniform society, and so further debilitated the highly centralized system of political authority. Insufficiency in charisma and revolutionary capital, incompleteness of legal-rational systems, mounting crime, corruption, inflation, social mobility and instability, some negative policy effects, and transitional pains, all added to the problems of leadership authority and leadership-mass relations.

The nature of the authority of technocrats and their relationship with the led may be defined as authoritarian, as they were not elected by citizens but selected by central authorities, and there were no political choices for the led, and as the leadership dominated the relationship and the influence of the led was limited. However, this authoritarianism is not the same as the one in the Mao era. The Maoist techniques of massive, continuous coercion and inescapable indoctrination, did not continue. The masses were allowed to have a significant degree of social and economic freedom and have some room for a direct articulation of their interests and concerns on public policy issues such as housing and redevelopment. A limited election of leaders occurred at the low levels. Although no political parties (by the generally accepted definition) other than the CCP existed, there were various intermediary institutions as channels for the led to influence leadership as well as vice versa. These institutions included long existed interest groups such as the Trade Union, the Federation of Women, the League of Youth, the eight “democratic parties,” and many academic and research associations. They also included new institutions such as the Association of Individual Entrepreneurs, and personal networks such as patron-client networks. One may conclude that the nature of leadership authority and leadership-mass relationship over the past half a century has progressed from an absolute authoritarianism to a limited or soft authoritarianism.

5. AGENTS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

If the above reforms are yet to make the technocratic leadership as distinctive from the pre-1966 revolutionary leadership as one may expect, promoting science and technology is the hallmark of this new leadership. This does not mean that revolutionary leaders have totally neglected the role of science and technology in the reconstruction and development of China. In the late 1950s, a sincere call by the central leadership for a national “Marching Towards Science” (Xiang Kexue Jingjun) did incite enthusiasm among Chinese people. In Shanghai, a movement called “Technological Revolution” used to be popular, especially in the industrial sector. The call and the movement did reflect some leaders’ genuine belief in science and technology, however, the Chinese leadership in the Mao era did not trust science and

technology as a primary driving force for China's development. Participants in the "March" at that time were a fraction of the populace. The social impacts of the call and the movement had been counteracted by Maoist anti-intellectual sentiments and campaigns.

In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, the climax of anti-science and technology in the Mao era, Deng raised the importance of science and technology by claiming that they were "the number one productive force." In reality, however, this recognition of science and technology had yet to materialize, even though it was still short of assigning an overall importance to science and technology in China's development. Resources and leadership attention to education and research were insufficient, partly because of financial strain and partly because of many officials' conventional view of the roles of the intelligentsia and science and technology.

Since the mid-1980s, science and technology had gradually been given a top priority on the agenda of leadership. The technocratic leadership viewed the crucial role of science and technology from perspectives of global competition, economic and social development, and political and administrative rationality. In its view, global competition over the last couple of decades and the next century has been and will be more fierce than ever, largely due to the dazzling development of science and technology or the "information revolution." Hence the most decisive resource for any country to survive and be strong in this kind of global competition is its scientific and technological resources rather than natural resources or man power in quantity. China's future will hang on the level of its scientific and technological development.

Science and technology are also of primary importance to the development and modernization of Chinese economy and society. For a late-comer of modernization and developing country like China, to catch up to those industrial and developed countries requires leaps over certain phases of the conventional economic development. Only advanced science and technology can make the leaps viable. Moreover, the scientific and technological development has always been affecting societies and individuals in a profound fashion. Especially, the ongoing "scientific" or "information" revolution is and will be delivering unprecedented changes to social relations, groups and organizations, and values and norms, and to ways of people's thinking, living, learning, and working. According to an influential

former Shanghai technocrat and current national technocrat, this new wave of scientific revolution “belongs to socialism and communism” as it will pave the way for some of Marx’ predictions for a communist society - the complete, free development of individuals, the collaboration of work by free men, the emergence of mental workers as the main working force, and the elimination of the distinction between mental and manual labor.⁴⁰⁵ The Chinese technocrats’ highest pitch of promoting science and education was the recent developmental strategy “Kejiao Xingguo” (Rejuvenating the Country by Science and Education). In Shanghai, there was the strategy of “Kejiao Xingshi” (Rejuvenating the City by Science and Education).

Finally, science and technology are requisite for modern political and administrative leadership. This is the tenet of the current Chinese technocratic leadership manifested by then mayor Jiang Zemin on October 4, 1986 in his speech for the innovation of a series of lectures on the science of leadership. After repeating Mao Zedong’s understanding of leadership science as laws or regular patterns derived from leadership works, Jiang made four important points. First, leadership science at the modern time is “a highly comprehensive science,” which is bound to solve comprehensive and complicated problems in the process of modernization. Administration and management are likened to systems engineering. Modern leadership works require the scientificization of decisions and a comprehensive utilization of the interdisciplinary knowledge of political science, economics, philosophy, science and technology, and sociology, etc. Therefore, modern leaders must learn modern leadership science. Second, modern leadership needs the extension of intelligence, and therefore think tanks so that they could offer policy options for decision-making. Third, Chinese leaders should utilize exemplary leadership cases, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign temporary, for reference.⁴⁰⁶ In 1995, Jiang’s speech was republished in the journal *Modern Leadership* (Xiandai Lingdao) as a primary guidance to municipal leaders.

In the same issue, Chen Zhili, deputy municipal party secretary responsible for ideology and propaganda, pointed out that leadership science was

⁴⁰⁵ Liu Ji, “‘Kexue Jishu Shi Diyi Shengchan Li’ De Shehui Yiyi” (The Social Significance of “Science and Technology is Number One Productive Force”). *Wenhui Daily*, December 24, 1994.

⁴⁰⁶ *Modern Leadership*, 1 (1995): 4.

a product of the rapid development of science and technology and the scientific management of modern society. Its main tasks were to study the tasks and functions of leadership activities, to search the principles and methods of leadership activities, and so to achieve the scientificization, rationalization and high efficiency of leadership work; Its basic theory touched upon the leaders' training and quality, leadership system, the structure of leading groups, leadership fundamentals, and leadership tenets, etc. ... To be a qualified and competent leader, one must learn more knowledge of social sciences and natural sciences ... These were prerequisite conditions and qualities for modern leaders.⁴⁰⁷

In China, leadership science as a discipline was a novelty. Promoting leadership science and setting corresponding requisites for leaders were a reflection of the sensitivity and attention of the current leadership to an interlock of the relationship between scientific and technological development and modern leadership. More importantly, in promoting leadership science, the current leadership actually propagated the legitimacy of Chinese technocratic leadership and reinforced the principles of cadre recruitment which are in favor of the younger and better educated, especially more scientifically knowledgeable.

Shanghai technocrats' unprecedented stress on the overall significance of science and technology reflects their sensitivity to and acquaintance with up-to-date information around the world. As well, it seems to have been driven by the needs of breaking through an impasse in economic reform and development, especially in industrial as well as agricultural production.⁴⁰⁸ This impasse provided a legitimate and logical ground for the technocratic leadership to promote science and technology. Above all, the technocrats' high appreciation of science and technology mirrors their inherent nature as specialists in science and technology. In this sense, their enthusiastic promotion of science and technology might be seen as a manifestation of their collective mindset.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁴⁰⁸ The success of Chinese economic reform in the 1980s was basically by virtue of policy changes, not of change in the existing productive forces. By the early 1990s, the previous productive potentialities unleashed by reform policies and translated into so-called Chinese economic miracle had being exhausted, while the problem of lack of high quality labor force and obsolete means of production became a major obstacle to further economic reform and growth.

6. PARTY TECHNOCRATS AND CHINA IN PERSPECTIVE

The Chinese technocrats exemplified by the new Shanghai leaders are not technocrats in the Western definition, but political technocrats in the sense that almost all of them have been members of the CCP, gone through various kinds of political campaigns, movements and purges, accumulated considerable political experiences and skills. Neither is what they advocate technocracy in its original notion, but political technocracy. I disagree both with Li Cheng who asserts that the ideology of Chinese technocrats is technocracy, and with Zang Xiaowei who defines political technocracy as the ominous alliance between political bureaucrats and technocrats, and who accents the continuity of the coercive Maoist leadership in this political technocracy. By political technocracy, I basically refer to a complex Chinese hybrid of the established, penetrating political and administrative system, Communist ideology and nationalism with various technocracy-oriented or related components, including modernization, institutionalization, rationalization, cosmopolitanism, and scientism.

It is worthwhile to further notice that the political system established and then ruined in the Mao era has been undergoing functional changes, though seemingly intact. For example, to facilitate the fundamental change in the locus of party work from large-scale class struggle to economic construction, the functional parts of the system were redesigned, especially the economic function of the system was strengthened. The so-called "rubber-stamp" legislature, along with the Political Consultative Conference, is gaining ground in distribution of power within the system. The ongoing market-oriented socioeconomic reforms and opening-up have had undesirable impacts on the regular political functioning of organizations at the basic, even intermediate levels. Democratization has been underway on a limited basis - the village-level direct election. A pillar of the Communist political system - *Nonmenklatura* - is facing mounting challenges. An increasing number of civil servants, even intermediate-level officials, have been selected on a merit basis through open competition - similar to the examination system in imperial China. Chapters Six and Seven show an augmented participation of the public, especially the experts, in the process of public policy making. Certainly the changes in the political system are not substantial enough to change its authoritarian nature totally, but they seem to have softened it.

A look at the actual impacts of the transformation of political leadership and the functional changes in the political system on Chinese politics, society and economy may indicate how much difference has been made thus far. Now once omnipresent and omnipotent Communist politics is on the wane. People have more civil freedom, and to a lesser extent, political freedom. The middle class is emerging. As Chapter Six demonstrates, the people's living standards have generally been enhanced, and Shanghai is, at full speed, on its way to revive its glorious past as one of the most dynamic and prosperous metropolises in the world. These results provide footnotes for our observation that there has been more change than continuity in current Chinese politics in general and political leadership in particular. In the context of socioeconomic pluralism and China's transformation towards modernization and market-oriented economy, what the Chinese communist technocrats have conducted is neither the Western version of technocracy, nor Mao's socialist revolution, but a complex political technocracy. In my view, this political technocracy is political progress, even though there are serious problems concerning the political-technocratic leadership.

Many China observers believe that China is at a historical crossroads, and there are at least three outstanding problems - legitimacy, elitism, and immobilism - associated with the new leadership as compared with their revolutionary predecessors. It is common to view that the new generation of leadership has the problem of legitimacy since the political technocrats do not have a strong pre-1949 revolutionary background, if any. This view has considerable truth in it. The Chinese communists' legitimacy basically lies in their victories over the Japanese aggressors and later over the Nationalist forces. While the revolutionary veterans brought about the victories, few technocrats made contributions. Their leadership positions were recommended and approved by the revolutionary veterans.

It does not mean, however, that the current leadership has no legitimacy at all. Although the revolutionary veterans have gradually passed their leadership to the technocrats, their real legitimacy is supposed to lie on their leadership in China's marching towards modernization. Legitimacy is situational. The Cultural Revolution dealt a fatal blow to the legitimacy and authority of the Maoist leadership, and stimulated the Chinese people's longing for social, economic and even political developments. Modernization and improvement in the people's living standards had replaced the Maoist continuous revolution as the major source of legitimacy. In the information or knowledge era, modernization and improvement in the people's living standard depend more than

ever on the development of science and technology, and on rational management and institutionalization. This situation is favourable to the Chinese technocrats who are generally conceived as the agents of science and technology and of management and institutionalization. As the case of Shanghai suggests, after contributing to the success of Deng's market-oriented reform and open-door policies, and so to China's modernization and improvement in the people's living standard, the party technocrats have gained more legitimacy and authority than the revolutionary veterans passed on to.

As mentioned before, the political technocracy that the Chinese technocratic leadership advocates include communist ideology, socialism, nationalism on the one hand and technocracy, market-economy, and cosmopolitanism on the other. After orthodox communist ideology and socialism lost much of its appeal to the Chinese people, including many officials, this complex hybrid is targeting varied groups of people and officials. It is apparent that the components of the political technocracy are far from being really integrated, if they ever can be. But the Chinese technocratic leadership's endeavour in tapping one of the most enduring and crucial sources of legitimacy - nationalism - seems to be beneficial to its legitimacy and authority in both the short-run and long-run.

While there are many achievements and potentials as to the legitimacy of the Chinese technocratic leadership, the problem of legitimacy exists and the possibility of deterioration can not be ruled out. Perhaps the most negative factor is rampant corruption. Although it is a complex problem as we point out in Chapter One, the ordinary people tend to ascribe it to the political-technocratic leadership. Unless significant improvement is made, the problem of corruption will continue to take a heavy toll on the legitimacy of the technocratic leadership. So are the problems of high crime rate, unemployment rate, "spiritual crisis," social polarization, and regional disparity. The political-technocratic leadership is aware of the problem of legitimacy and these negative factors, and is determined to solve the problems. How successful its efforts are is to be watched.

The problem of "elitism" or "anti-democracy" of the technocratic leadership seems not as commonly conceived as its problem of legitimacy. The criticism that technocracy is elitist and anti-democratic originated in the West, and is reflected in recent scholarly works about the current Chinese leadership. In the conclusion of his dissertation, Li Cheng equated Chinese technocracy to anti-democracy. He and David Bachman also suggested that unlike the vast majority of the

pre-1966 political elite who came from peasant, worker and soldier backgrounds, the educated elite does not understand the problem of workers and peasants. The new elite's rule is elitist, and their rise and rule are "likely to provoke growing social conflicts."⁴⁰⁹ Surely an elite-mass gap, the social distinctiveness of the technocratic elite and the widening of socioeconomic gaps should not be ignored. But we like to utilize a historical perspective, and draw our conclusions not on the existing theories of technocracy, but on reality, especially a comparison of the revolutionary and technocratic leaders.

It is evident that although many of the pre-1966 municipal leaders had worker-peasant backgrounds, they had enjoyed a privileged urban life-style after 1949. Moreover, an irony is that these leaders with peasant or worker backgrounds had failed to provide solutions to the social, economic and cultural problems workers and peasants have been facing. By contrast, Chinese technocrats have more contact with ordinary working people, and their lack of the revolution-based legitimacy may have propelled them to work harder, more responsively and efficiently to win the support of the led. As the six chief municipal party and administrative leaders of Shanghai in 1985-95 exemplify in Chapter Five, most technocrats had been basic-level cadres, particularly factory managers, for a number of years, contacting workers on a daily basis. Because their rank then in China's bureaucratic hierarchy was not high enough to win socioeconomic privileges -- housing, daily consumption, transportation, and so on and so forth. They lived lives among ordinary residents.⁴¹⁰ Thus, the technocratic leaders of the 1980s and 1990s, with their personal experiences and regular contacts with working people, have a better understanding of the severe problems of ordinary people in areas of housing, shopping, communication, transportation, working conditions, etc. More important, their managerial experience and scientific-technical knowledge have enabled them to find better solutions to those problems than those solutions attempted by previous leaderships. Their better

⁴⁰⁹ Li and Bachman, "Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism," *World Politics*, no. 1 (October 1989), pp. 90, 88-89. It may be worthwhile to note that the term "elitism" they used may need better definition. To my understanding, the Chinese term "Bai zhuan lu Xian" (the white-expert line) pertains to the value-orientation that "knowledge is all" rather than "the negative Chinese language of version of elitism."

⁴¹⁰ The basic-level cadres generally lived with ordinary people. For instance, Jiang Zemin's family had resided for a long period of time in Cao Yang Xin Cun (the new village "Cao Yang") of Putuo district, a residential area mainly for industrial workers and managers.

understanding and solutions are reflected in urban planning and implementation examined in the final two chapters.

As to democracy, I believe that the historical perspective is instrumental in passing judgment. From a historical and empirical point of view, the rise of the Chinese technocratic leadership may not be seen as an anti-democratic development. The case study of urban planning and redevelopment points to a complexity of the issue. The regular input of experts in the policy making process might be interpreted as a sign of elitism. I rather see it as a significant, instrumental expansion of policy-making power to an important group of the society. The case of the making of housing reform plan also points to remarkable progress in terms of the pluralization and democratization of policy-making. The trends are likely to continue rather than to discontinue.

The problem of immobilism is also a complicated issue. While there has been considerable erosion in the authority of the Chinese leadership, it is worthwhile to ask whether immobilism is more due to the characteristics of technocratic leadership than due to the situation or status of sociopolitical development. We believe that immobilism is situational, though leadership is accountable. After the Cultural Revolution delivered a deadly and profound blow to all sorts of authorities and fundamentals of Chinese society, an increase in the extent of immobilism, regardless of the leadership of veteran revolutionaries or that of technocrats, is not a surprise.

While the critiques of the Chinese technocratic leadership assert that the revolutionary leadership was more capable, we rather think each has demonstrated its own distinctive capabilities. While the latter had strong capability of revolutionary mobilization, the former is capable of utilizing systems for impressive leadership conduct, as shown particularly in the last two chapters. People tend to give high appreciation to the charismatic leaders in extraordinary times such as war and revolution while neglecting the capability of the leaders of legal-rational type. And the critiques the Chinese technocratic leaders seem to have overlooked the facts that these technocrats are not value-free, politically innocent and inexperienced, but mostly are communist party members, having lived in an extremely politically intensified milieu, and moved upward, through fierce competition, from the basic-level cadre to the first echelon of the municipal leadership. They have both political as well as technical skills.

The Shanghai case is believed to reveal the fundamental characteristics of the Chinese technocratic leadership. Nevertheless, there are some limits. For example, the high degree of sophistication and effectiveness of the municipal leadership may not be seen in the most parts of China. The high rate of upward mobility of Shanghai leaders is perhaps unique among all the provincial units. The leadership of Shanghai in question represents the high end of the spectrum of the Chinese technocratic leadership, and its basic trends. A legitimate and successful leading role of Chinese technocrats may contribute to prolonging the communist rule (in terms of rulership rather than ideology), and to the gradual emergence of a pluralist political regime with political-technocratic authority.

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