

Awakening of Spirits

Eurasianism and Geopolitics in the Foreign Policy of Russia

By

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with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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Abstract

Students of international politics tend to convert their personal or collective experience and/or historical information into geographical images of the world, and to attach to them some kind of political significance. This tendency, the conversion of historical information into geographical images, in this dissertation is referred as geomentality. Coming from this, the dissertation argues that since the emergence of the new Russian state in the 1990s, Eurasianism and *geopolitika* have become theoretical or doctrinal manifestations of the geomentality of Russia's foreign and security policy establishment. This manifested itself in two important foreign policy challenges in the 1990s, the start of NATO enlargement, and the NATO-Yugoslavia war of 1999.

The dissertation emphasises that the tendencies of envisioning the political world in terms of Eurasianist and geopolitical models is most natural for Russian foreign and security policy makers. Political thinking about the importance of geographical space has strong intellectual and academic roots in Russia, and exploration and expansion-oriented geomentalities have been centrepieces of Russian state-making for generations.

The dissertation analyses the doctrines of Eurasianism and *geopolitika*. The accent is placed on the birth of Eurasianism in the 1920s, and its re-emergence in Russian political thinking in the 1990s. The dissertation explains how Eurasianism informs Russia's political identity and its foreign and security policies.

The first government of post-Soviet Russia was dominated by the Liberals, politicians who advocated Russia's pro-Western orientation. However, Russia's pro-Western foreign policies slowly collapsed under Eurasianist pressure. The first foreign policy issue that helped Eurasians to gather popular support was the question of the Russian diaspora in the former Soviet states. The decision on NATO enlargement helped Eurasianist ideas to emerge as the dominant doctrine in Russia's foreign and security policy. The NATO enlargement issue united Russia's political class in their opposition to this policy. However, Russian public opinion did not share the same sentiment until the Kosovo war. The 1999 NATO-Yugoslavia war convinced the majority of Russians that Eurasians had always been right in their criticism of the West, NATO, and the Russian Liberals.

To Elizabeth

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Transliteration of Names

The transliteration of Russian and other names in this thesis follows the versions offered by various sources cited in this dissertation. Different publishers have used different versions of the spelling of such names as Trubetskoi (Trubetzkoy), Gumilëv (Gumilyov), etc. The first name of Gumilëv also has alternate versions: Lev and Leo. The reader should be aware that the above noted names belong to the same individuals.

Chapter One

Introduction: *Ex Fontibus*

Sociological sciences are still far from having acquired the same degree of accuracy as physics or chemistry. Even in the study of climate and weather (in Meteorology), we are not yet able to predict a month or even a week beforehand what weather we are going to have; consequently, it would be foolish to pretend that with the aid of such a young science as Sociology is, dealing moreover with infinitely more complicated things than wind and rain, we could scientifically predict events. We must not forget either that scientific men are but ordinary men, and that the majority of them belong to the leisured class, and consequently share the prejudices of this class; most of them are even in the pay of the State.

Prince Kropotkin¹

In February-April 2001, approximately 100 students enrolled in first and second year Political Studies courses in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada, and approximately 100 first and second year students from the Tbilisi State University (TSU), Tbilisi, Georgia, were asked to respond to a survey composed of four questions: "A) Please name three countries in Asia, B) Please name three countries in Eastern Europe, C) Please name three cities in the West, D) Please list three cities that have approximately equal distance from each other." The survey questions in English and Georgian were formulated as to maintain the closest meaning possible in translation. The words "Asia," "Eastern Europe," and "the West" were not capitalised in Georgian, since there are no capital letters in this language. The

1. Peter Kropotkin, *Modern Science and Anarchism*, London: Freedom Press, 1912, p. 1.

written instruction given to students was the following: "Please answer the following questions to the best of your knowledge." No additional written or oral instructions were offered. Students were not given a prior warning about the survey, and no visual or other aid, such as maps, etc., was used when responding the survey questions. Most students answered the questions in about 5 minutes, and vast majority was able to provide answers for each question. As a result of this survey, 104 responses were collected in Kingston. All of the responses contained the answers to the questions A, B, and C, but only 96 contained answers for the question D. In Tbilisi, 105 responses were collected. Only question A was answered in every response, while questions B, C, and D had 104, 103, and 101 answers respectively.

This exercise was based on the following assumptions: 1) most people have mental images of the world they live in, 2) these images are different in geographically distant parts of the world, 3) these images are influenced by local political, cultural and other experiences. It was not an aim of this survey to establish certain trends or to develop a new theory or to 'measure' certain concepts. This survey had no pretensions of being 'scientific,' at least in the sense this term is understood by most scholars emphasising 'research methods in political science.' Question A intended to see what was the predominant vision of Asia among Queen's and TSU students. The 104 respondents in Kingston named 30

geographical entities as countries of Asia, out of which 27 were legitimate.² Out of these 27 entries, 17 countries (around 63%) are located at the Pacific Rim.³ The 105 respondents in Tbilisi named 36 geographical entities as Asian countries, out of which 33 were legitimate entries.⁴ Out of the 33 Asian countries, 23 (around 70%) are not located at the Pacific Rim.⁵ In both cities the respondents named 16 countries most frequently (three times or more). Out of the Queen's first 16 countries, 11 are at the Pacific, while only 6 belong to this region from the most frequently named 16 countries named at the TSU. Students at Queen's identified Taiwan (12 times), Hong Kong (4 times), and Tibet (once) as separate countries, while students at the TSU did not name any of these even once. Iran was the fourth most frequently named Asian country among the TSU respondents (named 24 times), Iraq was seventh (7 times), and Turkey was named 4 times. None of these countries was named even once as an Asian country by the Queen's respondents. It seems that Queen's students thought of Asia in terms of the countries 'facing' Canada across

2. The three "illegitimate" Queen's Asian entries were: Shanghai, Tokyo, and Canada.

3. These countries are: China, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Laos, Hong Kong, Philippines, Burma/Myanmar, Russia, Malaysia, Brunei, Cambodia, Palau. The ten 'non-Pacific' countries are: India, Mongolia, Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Tibet, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan.

4. The three "illegitimate" TSU Asian entries were: Alma-Ata, Beijing, Budapest.

5. These countries are: India, Iran, Mongolia, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, Nepal, Kuwait, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Bhutan, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Qatar, Syria, The United Arab Emirates. The ten 'Pacific' countries are: China, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Russia, Brunei, Laos, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia.

the Pacific Ocean, while TSU students identified “Asia” with countries to which Georgia has long-standing historical and cultural links. In short, for students in Georgia, Asia was mostly composed of ‘non-Pacific’ countries, while for students in Canada it was the opposite. One major similarity that the surveys in both countries had was that China dominated the lists, named 88 times in Georgia, and 86 in Canada.

“Asia,” first of all, signifies a continent, and as such it is not a politically defined concept. Eastern Europe, on the other hand, has been politically defined as a region for the most part of the 20th century. Question B of the survey was concerned with Eastern Europe. One hundred and four responses were given to this question in both Tbilisi and Kingston. Forty-six geographical entities were named in both cities as Eastern European countries. However, only 20 countries named by Queen’s students, and 19 countries named by TSU students are normally associated with Eastern Europe.⁶ In other words, more than one half of all entries were incorrectly associated with the region by students of both universities.⁷ Germany, for example, received 11 votes in the TSU and 9 votes in Queen’s as an Eastern European country. Turkey was named in this category 12 times by Queen’s students, and Greece was named 13 times by TSU students. These countries also

6. This is so if Georgia and Azerbaijan are allowed to stand as Eastern European countries, and the USSR and Czechoslovakia are not.

7. Among the most exotic entries in this category were, in Kingston: Iran and Iraq (both named 4 times), Taiwan (named twice), Bolivia, Mongolia, “Kerblockistan.” In Tbilisi: Italy (named 9 times), Spain (named 6 times), India (twice), Dublin, Kyrgyzstan.

ended up among the top ten most frequently named Eastern European countries in their respective lists. On the other hand, the lists of the countries correctly identified as Eastern European were similar in both universities. The only difference was the popularity of certain countries: with 50 votes Poland dominated responses received at Queen's, while it shared the first spot with Bulgaria with 31 votes, and was a little ahead of Romania (30 votes) in the responses collected at TSU. Bulgaria and Romania did not even make the top ten in the Queen's survey (8 or more votes). The share of incorrect entries, 56-57 per cent, when responding to the question B in both Canada and Georgia suggests that political affiliation with a space is more problematic for most people than a geographical one. The rate of mistakes on question A was much lower, at 8-10 per cent.

The term "the West" (*dasavleti*, in Georgian) was not given any additional interpretation, and it was left up to the respondents to decide what this term stood for. It was capitalised in English meaning that the West, a political entity not a geographical one, was under investigation. It was more difficult to make the decision for Georgian respondents, since there is no spelling difference between the two concepts. Despite this, out of 104 responses collected in Canada and 103 collected in Georgia, the rate of divergence between the two meanings of the concept "West" was remarkably similar. In both cases 11 western Canadian, and 11 western Georgian cities and towns were named, most of them taking all three choices of respondents. Overall, 65 geographical entities were identified by Queen's students as Western cities, and 69 were identified by TSU students. The latter also

had more mistakes (10) than the former (4). It was expected that respondents would name most entries in this category. It is interesting that in the popularity contest North American cities dominated the choices of the Queen's respondents, and European cities dominated choices of the TSU respondents. Among the top ten most frequently named cities by Queen's students, for example, 8 are in North America, and among these 3 are in western Canada. Out of the top ten Western cities most frequently named by TSU students 8 are in Europe, among them 3 are in western Georgia.⁸ In other words, although most respondents in both countries identified "the West" with its political meaning, they 'stayed' with cities of their continents or cities they were most familiar with. The Queen's respondents named 15 cities out of 61 legitimate entries outside America, while the TSU respondents named only 10 cities out of 59 legitimate entries outside of Europe.

Question D was the most difficult one, because it required respondents to visualise geographical locations, to make mental images of maps. The Queen's respondents had the most difficulty with this question, and 8 people were not able to provide any response (96 entries collected). Four respondents from the TSU were not able to respond either (101 entries collected). Most people were not able to name three cities with roughly equal distances from each other, and to achieve this was not really necessary. Most respondents made sufficient efforts, and some even

8. These cities are: Queen's: London (43 votes), New York (40), Toronto (37), Paris (28), Vancouver (21), Los Angeles (14), Washington (11), Calgary (10), Edmonton and Chicago (7-7). The TSU: Paris (47 votes), London (42), Rome (22), Berlin and Madrid (16-16), Washington (15), New York (13), Poti (12), Kutaisi (10), and Batumi (9). The last three cities are in western Georgia.

provided distances in hours or drew triangles to demonstrate their point. The more interesting thing was that most Queen's students again focused on Canada and North America. Out of 96 entries, 57 were all Canadian, and 75 were North American. Out of 100 TSU entries, 53 were all Caucasian, including 49 all Georgian. Overall, in the TSU responses 88 entries were all European (the Caucasus plus Europe), 5 covered global distances, and only 7 entries listed all North American cities. No TSU entries focused on other regions of the world, and the number of Queen's entries listing cities from other than North American and European continents was very small.

At least three main conclusions could be drawn from this survey. First, when people visualise geographical maps or try to answer geographical questions, they are more likely to focus on the areas and places they know best. This is an expected conclusion, and perhaps, it is a common sense one, too. Second, politically defined regions are more difficult to place within boundaries than geographically defined ones. There was a great confusion among students of both universities as to the boundaries of Eastern Europe. Also, the West was interpreted as both a politically defined entity of 'western civilisation,' and western regions of their respective countries. Third, it is very likely that people will name and define geographical entities, even in distant places, based on some other information they may have about these entities. This is a more speculative conclusion, since there is no direct proof for it. Certain facts, however, indicate that this may indeed be the case. Students in Georgia, for example, named minor European cities like Blackpool,

Freiburg, Bordeaux, Nantes, Dortmund, and Stuttgart. The main reason these cities appeared under the heading of “cities in the West” could be that they have well known soccer clubs whose European exploits are constantly featured by the Georgian media. The real reason these cities appeared in the survey may be something else, but again one person selected Lazio for this entry. Lazio is not a city, but a well-known Italian soccer club, SS Lazio, based in Rome. The National Hockey League’s Western Conference could be the reason why cities like Chicago, Dallas, Denver, St. Louis, and Phoenix were named by Queen’s respondents as “cities in the West.” Around 10 per cent of respondents from both Georgia and Canada decided that Germany was an Eastern European country. There is a chance that now extinct East Germany (the German Democratic Republic) may be responsible for this.

Whatever the real reasons behind the answers given by students in Canada and Georgia may be, it is clear that they used their personal or collective experience or information to choose certain regions or to give preference to some but not to other geographical entities. The aim of this dissertation is not, however, to establish why certain people from certain places give preference to certain geographical locales. It is not intended here to determine ontological boundaries of such a phenomenon either. For the purposes of this dissertation it will suffice to establish that such a phenomenon does exist. This shall serve as an empirical starting point for this research, as something that does occur objectively, i.e., regardless of our knowing about it or not. It is important to establish the empirical validity of this

proposition, so that the research would not be supported by only theoretical reasoning and historical overview. This dissertation is concerned with such matters as general tendencies of envisioning world politics, the significance of geographical dimensions in international politics, doctrines of Eurasianism and geopolitics, and Russian foreign policy in the 1990s.

This dissertation has two closely inter-linked theses. One is more general and theoretical, while the other is more specific and case related. The general thesis is the following: students of international politics tend to convert their personal or collective experience and/or historical information into geographical images of the world, and to attach them some kind of political significance. This tendency, the conversion of historical information into geographical images, in this dissertation is referred as *geomentality* (this term is explained below). The other, more specific, thesis states that since the emergence of the new Russian state in the 1990s, Eurasianism and *geopolitika* have become theoretical or doctrinal manifestations of the *geomentality* of Russia's foreign and security policy establishment. This manifested itself in two important foreign policy challenges in the 1990s, the start of NATO enlargement, and the NATO-Yugoslavia war of 1999.

Geomentality was first introduced into geography by a New Zealand scholar of Korean descent, Hong-key Yoon. He elaborated this concept in a book, *Maori Mind, Maori Land*, and two articles, "On Geomentality" and "Maori Identity and

Maori Geomentality.”⁹ Professor Yoon defines geomentalities as “an established and lasting frame (state) of mind regarding the environment.” According to him, geomentalities are “necessarily translated into a geographical behavioural pattern and is reflected in a pattern of cultural landscape.”¹⁰ In simple terms, “geomentalities are a people’s mind-set regarding the geographical environment.” Professor Yoon argues that “determining geomentalities is the ultimate key to explaining in a profound way patterns of cultural landscapes.”¹¹ He applies geomentalities to his analysis of Maori identity, and explains in what ways Maori understanding of the environment is different from everybody else’s. Professor Yoon views the study of geomentalities “as an attempt to identify the types of mind and images that are responsible for the patterns of cultural landscape.”¹²

In this dissertation the understanding of the concept of geomentalities is similar to that of Professor Yoon, but there are two important differences. One is more technical than theoretical. Since this dissertation is concerned with international politics, geomentalities are used for the analysis of phenomena that are political-geographical in nature. In a broader sense, however, international politics

9. Hong-key Yoon, *Maori Mind, Maori Land*, Berne: Peter Lang, 1986; Hong-key Yoon, “On Geomentalities,” *GeoJournal*, Vol. 25, No. 4, December 1991, pp. 387-392; and Hong-key Yoon, “Maori Identity and Maori Geomentalities,” in ed. David Hooson, *Geography and National Identity*, Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1994, pp. 293-310.

10. Hong-key Yoon, “On Geomentalities,” p. 387.

11. Hong-key Yoon, “Maori Identity and Maori Geomentalities,” p. 297.

12. Hong-key Yoon, “On Geomentalities,” p. 388.

is a cultural phenomenon and can be viewed as part of the “cultural landscape” Hong-key Yoon refers to.¹³ The other difference is more fundamental and philosophical. According to Professor Yoon, geomentality is a real phenomenon in the sense that it is part of the human mentality. Religious beliefs, particular physical environmental conditions, local customs, etc., are listed as “some of the more important factors in the formation of geomentalities resulting in different types of geographical behaviour and cultural landscapes.”¹⁴ In other words, the principal starting point in Hong-key Yoon’s analysis is ontological. He posits geomentality as a real, objective occurrence, and tries to analyse it in order to explain cultural, subjective phenomena. The approach taken in this dissertation is diametrically opposite, since it is based on epistemological primacy. It is not asserted or assumed that geomentality exists as a real part of the human mentality. (It may, indeed, exist as such, but I have no means of determining this here.) Instead, geomentality is taken as an analytical concept that is applied to a human tendency to present, illustrate or convert human experience and history in geographical images that are pregnant with some political significance. In this role geomentality serves two purposes. First, it helps us to analyse comparatively such images created in different times by different people in different parts of the world; and second, it helps us to bridge the gap that exists between our own images of the world and

13. Professor Yoon is mostly concerned with such things as gardens, urban settings, etc., and uses the term “cultural landscape” to denote primarily this kind of cultural creations.

14. Hong-key Yoon, “On Geomentality,” p. 391.

those we analyse. The second task, in principle, can be accomplished without the help of geomentality, but the concept and the analytical mode it represents will be helpful, since it is ideologically and politically neutral.

Chapter Two outlines the methodology used in this dissertation. The main thesis of this chapter is that the historical method is the primary method for studying international relations, and that method, in general, is more important for research in this discipline than theory. Since method is the main subject of discussion in this chapter, international relations as a discipline is used as the broader setting for the arguments. The chapter consists of three sections: teleology, epistemology, and ontology. The arguments are developed in the broadest possible frameworks in order to allow for a more general analysis of method in IR. Teleology is concerned with the main purposes of international relations. It is stated that the main goal of IR is humanitarian; i.e., to help people. For this purpose theory does not seem to be the most efficient instrument, since it tends to constrict or limit free analysis. This section argues that theories used in international relations are not theories in the strict sense of the concept, but rather analytical modes (models). Analytical modes are different from theories, because besides being right or wrong modes can be relevant or irrelevant. The argument developed in this section does not assert that theories are useless in international relations, because they do have some obvious merits. Instead, it is asserted here that theory is secondary to method in IR in terms of its teleological importance.

The section on epistemology contains the analysis of main arguments of

Chapter Two. It discusses why the historical method is primary in international relations as opposed to empirical or the formal methods. Method here is understood as the most basic and natural means humans possess to study the universe scientifically. The real or empirical method is the main method in the natural sciences to study phenomena in real time by means of observation, test, and/or experiment. The formal method is the main method in the mathematical and formal sciences. The historical method denotes the method of studying events and processes that have taken place sometime in the past. This method is the primary method in the humanitarian and/or social sciences. The use of the real and the formal method in these sciences is not rejected, but it is stated that these two methods are secondary and auxiliary when it comes to social phenomena. This section also posits the principal starting point of this dissertation. It is epistemological analysis, not ontological, that has priority here. In analysis that gives privilege to epistemology, knowledge, information, images, etc., precede facts, not vice versa, as is the case in research that gives privilege to ontology. It is also explained how the use of the historical method in IR is different from the use of the same method in historical sciences.

The section on ontology argues that although history and IR (and other political science disciplines) use the same primary method of research, the ontology of the phenomena they study is different. In this sense history could be understood as dead politics. In IR the study of events that belong to the past is not a goal, but a means to find out their influence on the present and their possible implications for

the future. Various theories, analytical modes or other means are used to bridge the gap that exists between the world-view of the investigator (and his audience) and those of his sources. The ontology section also debates the question whether the international system (environment) is a deterministic system or a deterministic system behaving stochastically or a stochastic system. Finally, it is argued that the perception of time in IR is also different from those in the natural or historical sciences.

Chapter Three is devoted to a historical-theoretical discussion of geomentality in Europe and Russia in the XVIII-XX centuries. The main idea of this chapter is that the tendency to envision the political world denoted as geomentality are most natural for Russian foreign and security policy makers because (a) political thinking about the importance of geographical space has strong intellectual and academic roots in Russia, and (b) exploration and expansion oriented geomentality have been centre-pieces of Russian state-making for generations. Professor Nicholas von Winsheim, a Russian geographer of German descent, was the first known person in Europe, and possibly in the world, who conceptually combined political and geographical thinking in one. In 1745 he produced a volume titled *A Brief Political Geography*, the first known book to carry such a title. This volume was written shortly after Vitus Bering's discovery of the north-eastern passage, a narrow strait between Russia and Alaska. Bering's discovery was the last major discovery in the long series of geographic discoveries of the XV-XVIII centuries. These discoveries slowly changed and shaped the vision of the world

held by European students of geography and world politics. All populated continents of the world acquired their now familiar shapes on the maps produced in Europe. Bering's discovery filled the last missing gap, and answered the question whether there was a land bridge between Asia and America. The spirit of geographical explorations, and the need to scholarly evaluate the political significance of the new geographical age was captured in writings of such notable 18th century European thinkers as Jonathan Swift, Baron de Montesquieu, and Christian Wolff.

By the end of the 19th century, the age dominated by global dichotomies of explored vs. unexplored, old vs. new, was replaced by the new age of imperialism. In the context relevant to this dissertation, the total territorial re-division of the world among the major world powers that occurred at the end of the 19th century is emphasised among other features of imperialism. The world became increasingly visualised through the dichotomy *Us vs. Them*. A new discipline, geopolitics, emerged in Europe in response to the need to better understand and interpret the new, globalised world. Such thinkers of the time as Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, Halford Mackinder, Alfred Mahan, and Vladimir Lenin captured well the spirit of the new age. Besides the changing perceptions of the world, these thinkers were also influenced by the dominant ways of making science of XIX century Europe. Auguste Comte, Georg Hegel, Karl Marx, and Charles Darwin were the most influential scholars of that era who shaped the preference for deterministic, rational, systematic, ontology dominated, and universal scientific theories. Russia, which in

the XVIII-XIX centuries went through a steady period of territorial expansion and population growth, was not free of political thinkers who took notice of the changing world either. However, in the beginning of the 20th century, the main interests of Lenin, Kropotkin, Plekhanov and other revolutionaries lay elsewhere, as they wanted to change the world for the good of all humanity. It was not until the 1920s, when thinkers like Veniamin Petrovich Semënov-Tyan-Shanskiy, Ivan Solonevich, and especially Pëtr Savitskii started developing globalistic doctrines in the tradition of Ratzel, Mackinder, and Mahan. The most productive and influential among these scholars was Savitskii, an emigrant, the first Russian geopolitician and one of the founders of the Eurasianist movement.

Chapter Four analyses the doctrines of Eurasianism and Russian *geopolitika*. The main subject of this chapter is the birth of Eurasianism in the 1920s, and its re-emergence in Russian political thinking in the 1990s. The main argument of the chapter is that Eurasianism, first of all, is a theoretical expression of the Russian geomentality. Chapter Four has two parts. Part One is a review and analysis of major works by original Eurasians of the 1920s and 1930s. The main argument of the original Eurasians was that Russia was neither [extension of, or part of] Europe or Asia, but it was a unique cultural-geographical construct, Eurasia. Part One argues that the reasons why Eurasianism is so attractive for modern day Russian political class are already evident in the first Eurasianist volumes of the 1920s. Seven such reasons are identified in this thesis: geographical, economic, political, historical, cultural, national-ethnic, and ideological. The geographical aspect of

Eurasianism outlined the geographical foundations and unity of this part of the world. The economic aspect argued that peoples of Eurasia were geographically bound for similar economic development. The political aspect emphasised that the political coexistence of many different cultures in this geographical realm was its very essence. The historical aspect was developed in order to give Russians and other young nations of Eurasia their own significance and role in history as opposed to the more dominant role played by major European nations. The cultural aspect of Eurasianism recognised the contributions of other peoples and cultures of Eurasia in "the process of culturo-geographical and culturo-ethnographic evolution" of Russia. The national-ethnic aspect of Eurasianism implied that Russia was not only ethnic Russians, but all peoples and ethnic groups that lived in Eurasia. The ideological aspect emphasised the 'natural,' 'organic' character of Eurasia, and argued for its unity and against any form of self-determination of smaller Eurasian nations.

Part Two of Chapter Four is a review and analysis of modern Russian literature that can be loosely termed New Eurasianism. Eurasianism came back to Russia in the 1990s and acquired a different meaning for different people. However, its essence, Russia's unique geographical identity remained unchanged. *Geopolitika*, Russian style geopolitics, was also born as *the* theory of international relations partly thanks to Eurasian conceptions of history and politics. Eurasianism of the 1990s is even more eclectic than its original predecessor. People who embraced this doctrine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union came from different academic and

social backgrounds, and most of them contributed their previous knowledge and experience in developing new Eurasian theories. Various works of New Eurasians, both prominent and not, are analysed in this part of the dissertation. It is pointed out that although New Eurasianism in general follows doctrinal aspects outlined by the original Eurasians, there are significant ideological differences between the two. First, certain prominent volumes of New Eurasianism are replete with occult reasoning and qualities. Second, New Eurasians are more belligerent and xenophobic than their predecessors. Third, the influence of Marxist scholarship is evident in works of New Eurasians. The final difference is not ideological: New Eurasian writings contain a large number of logical and historical inaccuracies. *Geopolitika* carries more academic connotation and weight, but it also suffers from similar weaknesses as the Eurasianism and European geopolitics of the first half of the 20th century.

Chapter Five is a case study analysing Russian foreign and security policies in the 1990s. The chapter is concerned with two major issues in Russian security and foreign policy since the end of the Cold War: NATO enlargement and the NATO-Yugoslavia war of 1999. It is argued that although the end of the Cold War brought major security changes in Europe, the old geomentality carried by Russia and NATO has survived, and it has been manifested by these two events. Both sides maintain an *Us vs. Them* vision of the world, but each of them justifies this vision differently. Russia favours its newly found Eurasianism and *geopolitika*, while NATO is promoting liberal values of human rights and democracy. The first section

of this chapter provides historical evidence that besides the Eurasians and geopoliticians, the Soviet [Russian] statesmen and military leaders also heavily relied on geographical thinking in foreign and security policy, and generally viewed the world through the *Us vs. Them* prism. Most of them were Bolsheviks, who used the concept of class struggle as a dividing line between *Us* and *Them*, but there were non-Bolsheviks as well who saw the world in a similar way. Spatial, geographical considerations were taken into account at the creation of the Soviet state, and at various stages of the evolution of Soviet power inside or outside the borders of the USSR. The official image of the world in Moscow changed with the emergence of Gorbachëv's New Political Thinking at the end of the 1980s, when the old dichotomy was replaced with a new vision of common European security and world peace. This new way of perceiving the world lasted in Russia until the mid-1990s, when the issue of NATO enlargement helped Eurasianists to gain dominance in Moscow. Their dominance in Russian foreign and security policy was fortified in 1999, when NATO launched a military campaign against Yugoslavia. The collective Soviet experience of Russian people, and the multicultural nature of the Russian state have helped Eurasianists to better promote and defend their arguments. NATO leaders in the 1990s, on the other hand, have engaged in an attempt to reinvent European security and find a new role for NATO by championing democratic values and human rights. This approach, however, has proved to be unacceptable for Russia, mainly because it excludes this important actor of the European theatre from the security scheme endorsed by NATO.

Chapter Six is the conclusion. This chapter is not extensive, since each chapter of the dissertation contains a section with summaries of the presented arguments. The conclusion outlines the methodological progress of the thesis and its results.

Chapter Two

As Long As They Get Somewhere: On Theory and Method in IR

'Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?'

'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,' said the Cat.

'I don't much care where -- ' said Alice.

'Then it doesn't matter which way you go,' said the Cat.
' -- as long as I get *somewhere*, -- ' Alice added...

Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*¹

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify some methodological issues relevant to this thesis. The main idea of this chapter is that historical method is the primary method for international relations, and that method is more important for research in this scientific discipline than theory.² Since the dissertation is situated within the discipline of international relations, I consider it necessary to explain my view of the methodology used within the discipline. This chapter also discusses some of the main concepts of the dissertation: geomentality, geopolitics, and Eurasianism. The discussion of methodology is structured in three parts: teleology, epistemology, and

1. Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, in ed. R. L. Green, *The Works of Lewis Carroll*, Feltham: Spring Books, 1968, p. 65.

2. "International relations" and "international politics" are used as synonymous concepts in this chapter.

ontology. Teleology discusses the broader aims of the discipline, epistemology focuses on the method of inquiry itself, and ontology comments on the nature of the phenomena the discipline investigates.

The purpose of the discussion of theory and method in this chapter is not normative. I do not intend to produce a technique of investigation in IR or a new methodology. I do not wish to elaborate a system of rules or guidelines to describe or explain or direct the methodological procedures of international relations. It is not my aim to investigate the theoretical foundation of concepts used in this dissertation either. Neither is my concern profoundly philosophical, but rather ordinary and pragmatic. What I am trying here is to present a view on what makes investigation in IR different from that done in other sciences. It is not a discussion of what we ought to do, but what we do. Some of the ways investigators approach their objects of study in IR are above their wanting and doing, since these things derive from the nature of human existence and/or the nature of the objects themselves.

International relations is a scientific, scholarly discipline. As such, it cannot define within itself the purpose of scholarly investigation. This purpose should be decided on some other grounds. However, when the goal is clear, the choice of methodology, and the best way to achieve the decided goal should come easier. In this case, I use philosophical theories of teleology, epistemology, and ontology as guidelines. This chapter discusses such things as a broader reason of the discipline of IR, the methodology of the current research, and some other theoretical aspects

that may be important in the course of the investigation.

Teleology

Teleology addresses ultimate aims of things and/or processes. Scientific disciplines should have a purpose for their existence. They all serve some kind of goal and are used to achieve something. The nature of international relations as an academic discipline is humanitarian. Its main purpose is to help people.³ In the quest to help people and improve the quality of their lives it would be best to have a free and open mind. Theories that dominate academic discussions in IR limit this freedom and restrict the scope of academic research. Theory, by definition, is an abstract formulation of ideas, concepts, methods or principles used to explain a wide set of observed facts. The relationship between theory and facts is a complex one. In performing its function of explaining a set of observed facts, any theory has two possible outcomes for itself: it may be proved right or wrong. Theory as such only exists in people's minds and it has no other form of existence. A theory is considered to be good if it satisfies two basic requirements: it must accurately describe a large set of observations on the basis of a framework that contains only a few arbitrary elements, and it must make definite and clear predictions about the results of future observations.⁴ The most common way to test the validity of a

3. The idea that the purpose of science is humanitarian is advanced by Paul Feyerabend in his *Against Method*, London, New York: Verso, 1993.

4. Stephen W. Hawking, *A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes*, New York:

theory and decide whether it is right or wrong is experiment or observation. In natural sciences there are a very few cases where theory can be applied without major adjustments, but mostly they must deal with certain approximation and auxiliary assumptions.⁵ These approximations and adjustments appear to be necessary to keep theory relevant to the observed phenomena and to make a choice on its validity. In international relations there are plenty of theoretical constructs that make the assumption that they are explanations of observed facts. Even if we accept the idea that these theories do indeed explain observable facts, there is still no theory in international relations that allows only a very few arbitrary elements within its framework. Instead, most theories have even more arbitrary elements than non-arbitrary ones. The fact is that such frameworks themselves are designed arbitrarily, assuming that some 'variables' are more important than others. It is no secret that there are so many elements or variables in any given issue concerning international relations that it is much easier to ignore most of them altogether than to account for them in any reasonable way. Further, no IR theory makes clear and definite predictions about the results of future observations. All events in international relations take place in time, and all of them concern actors with some kind of spatial dimensions. Even if the nature "of future observations" is ignored, IR theories still cannot deliver any definite predictions of where and when certain

Bantam Books, 1988, p. 9.

5. Paul Feyerabend, *Science in A Free Society*, London: NLB, 1978, p. 111.

outcomes of 'observed' events will take place.

The existing state of affairs would suggest that international relations theories are not theories as such, but rather analytical modes. When applied to facts, analytical modes may have other outcomes than just right or wrong. They may be right but irrelevant or relevant but wrong, or even worse, both wrong and irrelevant. The good thing is that in spite of the problem of the relevance of theoretical constructs to facts in IR, outcomes of international research can be very appropriate and useful. Such outcomes may help the reader to understand certain international issues better, to learn things or even to make certain policy decisions based on them. The bad thing is that a similar exercise can also produce useless or misleading results. Theoretical debates in international relations, therefore, serve very little practical purpose. They do not help much to carry out the humanitarian aim of the discipline. The grand debate between realists and institutionalists, for instance, is more like an ancient debate between the Dominicans and the Franciscans on the subject of whether Jesus owned a purse or not. The debate did not matter for the Christian faith, but it did have implications for the participating sides in terms of resource allocation and distribution.

It should be noted that theoretical exercises in international relations do have some merits. For one thing, the constant reproduction or revision of the most common theories and the emergence of newer ones prevent any one theory from dominating the discipline. As historical experience suggests, the dominance of any one theory eventually leads to its transformation into an ideology, and may even

lead to the stagnation and degradation of the society dominated by this ideology. Since international relations is a very complex field dealing with the ever changing world, the proliferation of ideas and views, even if these ideas are presented as 'theories,' is a good thing that could help to better understand various changes and developments. Further, it can happen that theoretical constructs developed by IR scholars may be used by decision-makers as guidelines for their further actions. This may be an important thing, since most people try to be rational when trying to make sense out of things, and not all policy makers pretend to be just efficient managers, but some subscribe to certain views and ideologies. It is a different matter altogether that such decisions may have disastrous results, but at least they can provide some consistency in decision making for political administrations, and certain feelings of predictability for their friends or foes. Finally, theoretical speculations in international relations represent a good intellectual challenge for IR scholars, and some of their works do make interesting reading, at least for the people who are interested in history of ideas.

Epistemology

Epistemology addresses questions related to the nature of knowledge. There are three main methods used by scientists in every discipline to conduct research and gain knowledge. These three methods are: real or empirical, formal or mathematical, and historical. Real or empirical method is the primary method used in natural sciences such as physics and chemistry. Scholars in natural sciences do

research and acquire knowledge by observing, experimenting, measuring, and testing phenomena in real space and time. Researchers conduct experiments, observations, tests, and based on these they come up with some relevant data. Normally, these data are quantifiable, universal, and measurable. Because of this, it is possible to establish general laws in natural sciences and to make them generally acceptable. These laws describe and predict certain behaviour of natural phenomena. They are 'universal' in the sense that they are true within the designed parameters and conditions. The systems and phenomena that natural sciences study are mostly deterministic; i.e., the same causes always produce the same effects under the same conditions and within the same parameters. This means that laws of physics, for example, depend on the physical conditions and parameters they are specified for, and if such are observed, they will produce the same results anywhere in the world. The laws of physics do not change from country to country or from one administration to another. There is no Canadian perspective on quantum physics or Chinese or American organic chemistry. Besides, the phenomena natural sciences study and investigate do not possess free will, and they cannot willingly alter or change the procedures and/or results of the observations, tests or experiments conducted on them. These phenomena are also insensitive to cultural, political, ideological or other differences.

The scientific results achieved by the real or empirical method may be checked or verified or falsified by the same method. The scientists who may be interested in checking theories or hypotheses developed by their colleagues will be

using the same general means of testing; i.e., they will be experimenting, observing or testing. However, the view that scientific theories can be proved once and for all may be misleading. Physical theories are always provisional, in the sense that epistemologically they exist as hypotheses. No matter how many times the results of experiments agree with some theory, one never be sure that the next time the result will not contradict the theory. Scientific theories can never be proven once and for all. However, disproving a theory is much easier: it would be enough to find a single observation that disagrees with the predictions of theory.⁶ In short, even in natural sciences it is impossible for a theory to prove something once and for all, even though most theories account for most, if not all, relevant variables and aspects, and any number of experiments or observations will corroborate the conclusions and predictions offered by the theory.

The formal method is the primary method in mathematical disciplines and formal logic (with alternative geometries and formal logics included). When using this method, scholars do not need to observe or experiment with physical phenomena. They may do science by using formal reasoning and operating within the formal rules established for their fields. The results of their research are quantifiable and universal; however, they may not always have anything to do with reality. In principle, mathematics does not have to be concerned what goes on in the real, physical world. A mathematician may do the necessary operations in his head

6. Stephen W. Hawking, *A Brief History of Time*, p. 10.

without using any other object, but normally would at least use a pen and paper. True mathematical equations are universal, and they do not change their validity from era to era or place to place; i.e., the nature of formal knowledge is not sensitive to time and space. The results of mathematical calculations may change, but only if the axiomatic principles they operate within change first. The results achieved by the formal method can be checked or verified by using the same method, and within the same parameters. Mathematics is believed to be the most effective and trustworthy method that humans know of understanding and explaining the physical world around them. Mathematics arises from questions about the physical world, and it owes its enduring existence to the fact that it sometimes provides answers about this world.⁷ However, any mathematical idea can be treated on its own, as if it were devoid of any references to the physical world.

The historical method is a somewhat awkward term, but it simply signifies the method of study of events, processes, and phenomena that took place sometime in the past. The events that happened several millennia or a day ago all belong to the past. The significance of this fact is that the phenomena that belong to the past cannot be directly observed, tested or experienced. The historical method is the primary method for the so-called social sciences and humanitarian disciplines. Even some disciplines in natural science (e.g. the theory of evolution) employ the historical method as the primary approach to research. Research in international

7. Ian Stewart, *Does God Play Dice? The Mathematics of Chaos*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1989, p. 7.

relations, as well as in other political science disciplines, is based on the historical method. This is due to the fact that none of the phenomena in international relations can be directly observed, measured or tested. Researchers learn about the events in international relations only after they have taken place or after they have started taking place, and only after more or less coherent stories emerge about them. Investigators may be present right then and there in the epicentre of the events they may be studying, but nothing in real time may readily present itself to them as a subject of their study, unless the investigators know in advance what they are looking for. Students of international relations have to actively research, ask questions, find and analyse relevant written, spoken, filmed or otherwise communicated evidence or simply use the stories of the investigators who have already done this.

It is impossible to use the experimental and formal methods as primary research methods in IR. Large scale events and processes simply do not lend themselves to observation. Their particular outcomes may be possible to observe, but the fact that we know that certain phenomena are outcomes of the processes we investigate indicates that we had already known about those processes from other sources. In other words, our knowledge about facts precedes our 'observation' about them. It may also be possible to experiment in some areas of international relations, but such a thing is undesirable and even unethical. Humans are themselves actors in international relations, and they represent the end, not the means, of achieving scientific results. Besides, investigators involved in observation

or experimenting in IR may be influenced in their judgement by their own preferences and ethical norms, or they themselves may influence the events and processes they intend to be objective and impartial observers of. Relying chiefly on the formal method in international relations research is not a good strategy either. Conducting formal speculations about IR or any other discipline without taking into account the actual world is certainly possible, but the results of these speculations will be utterly irrelevant or they will be relevant only by coincidence.

The real or empirical method in natural science tries to account for all the variables involved in the question under investigation. Natural sciences deal mostly with deterministic systems or with deterministic systems that do not behave as such. Deterministic behaviour is governed by exact and unbreakable laws. To come up with such laws, every relevant variable should be accounted for. Otherwise the laws will not work. In international relations there are so many variables involved in any particular event that it is impossible to account for all of them. If certain variables are 'isolated' for the purpose of conducting research, this would mean that prior to any observation or testing the investigator himself is 'creating' a system by deciding what is relevant and what is not. The outcomes of the research done on this kind of system may make sense or may not, but there is a good chance that they will be irrelevant. Any law or law-like generalisation derived from such an exercise will be irrelevant or at best highly debatable. The difficulties concerning law-like generalisations are compounded by the fact that humans possess free will, a phenomenon that is not observable, measurable and quantifiable by any stretch of

imagination. The presence of free will in the equation may alter events at any time and any place, rendering the best defined law-like generalisations a failure. IR investigators in the field also should take into account the fact that people in certain areas of the world may be more sensitive to some ideas or information than in others. This sensitivity may stem from different political, ethnic, social, religious and other backgrounds, and may well impede the work of IR students who may or may not be aware of such things.

The idea of the dominance of certain methods in certain scientific fields does not mean that other methods should be excluded. It is well known, for instance, that formal reasoning is part of every meaningful scientific investigation. Without certain norms and rules of communication it will be impossible to exchange ideas. The formal method is widely used in natural sciences in terms of quantifying and organising collected data and knowledge. Mathematical, especially statistical, analysis is utilised in political science as well. Historical research may help a physicist or a mathematician to better grasp the nature of the problem and its evolution. Observing natural occurrences may help a scholar to better formulate or re-formulate a mathematical problem. All three methods may be used in any scientific discipline with various degrees of intensity. However, non-dominant methods may not be used for determining the validity of scientific claims. No observation of natural things may help to prove or disprove mathematical equations. A physicist will not help his/her case with formal speculations or historical evidence if experiments or tests contradict his/her findings. All claims of

objectivity in observation or statistical correlation will come to nothing, if history brings the events or processes related to those claims to different or unexpected results or outcomes.

The concept of geomentality in this thesis is an analytical concept, an instrument that is supposed to help to learn about other things. The current research starts by assuming the truth of the idea that people in different parts of the world have different images of the world. The differences may or may not be significant, and they may or may not be influenced by education, personal or collective experience. It is not a goal of this research to classify or explain the differences among different images of the world, or to debate how constant or enduring these images are. These tasks may be possible and desirable to accomplish, but for the purposes of this research it should be sufficient to establish the analytical value of geomentality, and the existence of the phenomenon it signifies. The concepts of geopolitics and Eurasianism could also be viewed as analytical concepts, but they carry so much ideological weight that their usefulness in this role is very dubious. Besides, traditionally their arguments have been developed from an approach that treated the empirical method as the main method for demonstrating scientific findings. This has led both geopolitics and Eurasianism toward highly debatable and controversial deterministic claims.

There is a long tradition in the social sciences of rationalism, causality, and determinism. The nature of social sciences has also traditionally been defined by the ontological essence of the phenomena they investigate. The concept “social science”

itself is a prime example of this: the nature of a scientific discipline is defined by its object of study. This tradition has been inherited from philosophy, where for centuries one of the main problems has been an ontological one: what is the principle of being? If privilege is given to ontology when outlining the philosophical foundations of a discipline, rationalism, causality and determinism normally follow from this principle, and their separation from one another is rarely possible. Ontological primacy suggests that things are the way they are without, and prior to, our knowing about them, and that these things are the subject of observation for our senses. If this is so we should be able to discover cause-effect relations among these things to make sense of them. Again, it is assumed that such relations exist objectively, that such things are observable, and that we can observe them in a manner that will not influence the outcomes of cause-effect relations. Consequently, a rational explanation of everything becomes possible, and even necessary, because if such an explanation is not produced, it is argued that sufficient data were not gathered or necessary links among phenomena were not found. Thus, rationality becomes not only possible but also necessary, and this necessity eventually leads to determinism. Determinism has a bad name in social sciences, and most scholars who subscribe to causality try at the same time to distance themselves from determinism. However, they never manage to discard it completely. Indeed, thanks to determinism there is this expectation that scientists should make accurate predictions about the outcomes of the processes they study. Such predictions, however, are only possible about processes taking place in

deterministic systems. Nevertheless, in a system that is deterministic, but is dominated by random behaviour, there is a good chance that predictions about the outcomes will not come true. Good examples of such systems are the ones that come to us as weather. Weather systems, although deterministic in nature, behave as stochastic systems, and this makes weather-forecasting, especially long-range ones, very unreliable.

Social sciences, and among them international relations, have fallen into this predicament due to a faulty assumption that social sciences are epistemologically not much different from natural sciences. In other words, similar methods of investigation have been accepted for social sciences as there has been for natural sciences. Great breakthroughs made by natural sciences over the centuries have been instrumental in convincing scholars of the usefulness of empirical or real methods. There is no serious ontological objection why social phenomena should not be treated the same way as natural. Indeed, ontologically they are both as real, and sometimes even as empirical, as they could get. The simple fact that these two realms cannot be "accessed" the same way has somehow escaped the discussions on theory and method. In international relations, for example, most scholars who have had a significant influence on the development of the field have implicitly or explicitly subscribed to the ontological principle of theory making. When doing research, however, all of them have demonstrated that it is impossible to do any meaningful work without the historical method. Hence the big discrepancy between theory and research in the discipline.

The historical method is used in international relations differently from the historical sciences. A historian focuses on historical facts and processes and tries to reveal everything possible about the subject. An IR scholar uses the same method from the other end, with the purpose to conceal certain historical facts or processes. It becomes necessary to conceal, to de-emphasise or omit certain things in order to disclose other phenomena that may affect the present and/or future. It is necessary because it is simply impossible to account for all historical details that may be related to the subject, and make sense out of them. In other words, by disclosing and explaining something an IR investigator first conceals other, unnecessary, historical information. It is like watching cable television: by selecting one channel, the others that are broadcasting at the same time are automatically isolated, concealed. This allows a viewer to follow a story and comprehend it. Selecting a certain channel for viewing does not mean that other channels are not broadcasting or that their coverage is not relevant for the story in question. However, it is much easier to make decisions about selecting cable television channels. In international relations it may not be immediately clear what ought to be concealed and what not. The relevance of analyses and analytical modes in the discipline mostly depends on the choices the investigators make about concealing and disclosing historical material. Disclosure of information of little importance, and concealment of significant material normally results in misleading analysis and/or in an irrelevant analytical mode.

In the current work, too, certain historical events, ideas, and personae are

disclosed and others are de-emphasised. This is done not because the revealed things directly caused something that was inevitable, but rather to emphasise how these events, ideas, or personae underlined some of the major themes discussed in the thesis. It is quite possible that some very important ideas and events remain omitted in the process, due to the lack of information about them or to simple oversight. Some important ideas and events will not be discussed, because they are less relevant to the main themes of the dissertation. They will, however, be acknowledged. Questions such as why someone had certain ideas at certain times and places, or why something happened and something else did not, are not of much concern for this research. In international relations the nature of things is judged from the position of knowledge or information about them. Facts in international relations come after knowledge about them, but this does not mean that the nature of things cannot affect the process of investigation.

Ontology

Ontology deals with the question *what is (or what is not)*? We need to discuss the ontological design of things in this chapter in order to address the question of ontological primacy between the disciplines of politics and history. If history and international relations use the same historical method for their research, does this mean that they are basically the same discipline? What is the difference between the two, and do IR and other political disciplines belong with history? Ontological investigation of the international relations' objects of study may also answer

questions addressing their distinctiveness from the phenomena investigated by natural sciences. What is the nature of things IR investigates and how can it affect a theoretical explanation of facts? An ontological investigation can be very complex and lengthy, and full of supporting ideas from various pre-eminent thinkers. In this chapter I will limit the ontological discussion to a general outline of the questions posed above. This should be enough for the purposes of this thesis, as it may answer some methodological questions the reader may have.

Above I noted that social and humanitarian sciences, and disciplines like the theory of evolution, use the historical method as their primary means of approaching their objects of study. By this I do not mean that all of these disciplines are historical ones or that institutionally they should belong to history departments. The ontological status of the objects these disciplines study should help to clarify that they are different disciplines. The case of the theory of evolution is safer from such suspicions than that of international relations. The subjects of investigation of the theory of evolution studies are biological, and this discipline is concerned with how biological life-forms evolved on earth. History and international relations (and other political science disciplines) seemingly have the same object of study: human and institutional actors, historical processes and events. However, ontologically IR and politics are more privileged than history. If politics and history have something in common, it is that history is dead politics. Politics and international relations exist first and then they become history. In this sense history is the politics that belongs only to the past.

When historians do their investigation they approach historical texts and other evidence only historically; i.e., they view them as products of certain social, cultural, and political conditions. They may not be necessarily concerned about what if any relation their objects of investigation have with the present or the future. Most investigators of political and international subjects, on the other hand, are primarily interested in what relations events and processes of the past have with the present and how they may affect the future. The biggest challenge in IR is to understand these relations and their possible implications. The *sola scriptura* approach may be enough for historical disciplines, but it is not so for political and international problems. To better understand his sources, a good investigator of politics tries to view the image of the world presented to him not through his own lenses or the lenses of the author whose texts he examines. It becomes necessary to somehow merge these two, and this is done through various means. The most common is the application of analytical modes, or theories as they are more commonly known. These theories allow for generalisations, and comparisons of similarities and differences. They are not, however, theories that allow clear and definite predictions, because they are often developed or adapted on an *ad hoc* basis, and most importantly, they always deal with phenomena of the past.

Geomentality is such an analytical mode. It is not a theory that is widely used in foreign and security policy studies, neither does it have any pretensions of being universal. It is, however, useful in analysing Russian foreign and security policies of the present, by investigating past examples and the visions of the world

surrounding them. Geomentality does not exist independently from theoretical analysis, at least in an ontological sense. It is only relevant when appropriate questions of investigation are posed. In this dissertation such questions are: what is the general vision of the world held by Russian foreign and security policy makers, and how was this vision formed? Geomentality may or may not have a different form of existence, such as emotional, or it may indeed be a form of mentality. However, these questions are beyond the scope and design of this thesis and investigation. The main purpose of “geomentality” in this work is to signify the phenomenon, which is presented to us as a mental conversion of historical experience into geographical images. Such geographical images attach certain political significance to particular spaces or places, and the investigation of the value of the latter is the ontological goal of this thesis.

The other two major concepts this dissertation discusses are geopolitics and Eurasianism. As concepts they are different from each other and from geomentality. They do exist as scholarly or quasi-scholarly doctrines, and their followers even have pretensions of presenting them as independent and very important scientific disciplines. This thesis does not discuss the scientific validity of the claims geopolitics and Eurasianism make as doctrines. Rather, the concept of geomentality is applied to images of the world these two doctrines present, in order to uncover their significance for foreign and security policy making, especially in post-Soviet Russia. Nor does the author attempt an authoritative definition of geopolitics and Eurasianism. More important for the current analysis is the fact that both of these

doctrines exist in some form, and both of them have their followers and critics. Both geopolitics and Eurasianism are very eclectic, and it is impossible to identify a single theoretical grounding for either of them. Despite this, geopolitics and Eurasianism in this dissertation are treated as analytical modes, designed to justify or explain certain political phenomena.

It should be also noted that geopolitics and Eurasianism claim strong ontological grounds for themselves. These doctrines underlie the significance of geographical space for their analyses, and as such they claim empirical and scientific foundations. These foundations are normally decorated with historical 'facts' that are also awarded some ontological value. The implication in both doctrines is that willingly or not humans are destined to behave in certain ways and/or know certain things, because they are ontologically, i.e. historically, and especially geographically, fated to do so. The current dissertation argues the opposite: people create geographical images and award them political significance, because of their individual and/or collective experiences, and their knowledge or perceptions about these experiences. In other words, the philosophical starting point for geopolitics and Eurasianism is ontology, while this dissertation with its concept of geomentality is based on the primacy of epistemology.

Geopolitics, Eurasianism, as well as more accepted theories such as realism and institutionalism, make an assumption that the object of their investigation is, in principle, deterministic systems. While there are very few claims made that such systems can be subjected completely to a systematic, rational investigation, it is

assumed that this is possible, at least in principle, or that such an investigation is possible for some parts of the system, with other 'variables' being 'isolated.' Such assumptions allow for cause-effect analyses, and claims that conclusions can be derived from observation. Again, this type of reasoning is borrowed from natural sciences. However, even in natural sciences uniform conclusions cannot always be derived from observations. Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy is an excellent example that not all the physical world is a subject of cause-effect analysis derived from observation. There is a problem of deterministic systems behaving stochastically. The science of meteorology deals with this type of systems on a daily basis. These systems are also products of the natural world, but to understand them systematically, perhaps a different kind of mathematical apparatus is required.⁸ IR scholars almost never ask the question whether the phenomenon they investigate is a deterministic system, a deterministic system behaving stochastically, or a stochastic system. If it is the first, then relevant theories should exist about it, with definite and clear predictive powers, and perhaps substantiated with adequate mathematical equations. We already know that this is not the case. If it is the second, then the same type of analysis may be theoretically possible, but a relevant mathematical apparatus should be developed first. When this happens, most people will know about it because weather-forecasting as well will become very accurate. If

8. A direction in mathematics informally known as chaos theory is supposed to provide answers for deterministic systems that behave stochastically.

it is the third, then no kind of cause-effect or observation type of analysis makes any sense, because this type of analysis only works for deterministic systems. In short, it may not be very productive to base IR methodology on the primacy of the ontological principle, since the ontological characteristics of the phenomena IR investigates are not fully investigated and understood themselves.

Finally, time or the perception of it in international relations is also something that distinguishes this discipline from history or natural sciences. In natural sciences investigators deal with linear time: x happens before y and y happens before z . Linear time is good for cause-effect observations and analysis. The perception of time follows the same linear logic: under the same conditions of experiment z always follows y , and y always follows x . Therefore, x is the cause of y , and y is the cause of z . This kind of perception of time makes clear distinctions between the past, the present, and the future. In natural sciences time is treated spatially, and this allows for quantification and measurement. Time can be dissected and presented as a set of geometrical units designed to measure certain processes. History also treats time as if it were a linear phenomenon, with historical processes having a beginning and an end. Although historians are normally far from treating time as mathematical units, they nevertheless benefit from linear time, since it allows for a clear chronology and assessment of historical changes or developments in time.

In political science in general, and in international relations in particular, time is normally perceived differently. If an IR investigator focuses on the present

state of affairs, and its possible impact on future events, time will no longer be perceived in a quantifiable or 'before and after' sense. Time will have an appearance of a stream or flow, with no apparent beginning or end. Since politics essentially is sums of experiences, both individual and collective, experience cannot be represented as a line. A non-linear perception of time also allows for alternative scenarios of change and development based on alternative experiences. An IR investigator normally perceives past, present, and future at once: based on the past experiences or events the present state of things is assumed and future scenarios of development are anticipated. It is a similar approach to watching a film: relevant events of the plot are kept in mind to understand the current actions of characters, and future outcomes of such actions are expected and anticipated. A film viewing experience, however is much more structured than an investigation of international events, for the simple reason that most films are well organised in terms of the plot, characters, and other 'variables.' The international environment, on the other hand, appears as anarchic as Lewis Carroll's Wonderland.

Summary of Chapter Two

When Alice, lost in Wonderland, asks for directions she wants to leave the place, which is very unpleasant for her, and to go to a place that is more agreeable. She does not know where such a place is, but her desire to leave is not lessened because of this, and she just wants to go. The Cat, on the other hand, is a rational being who wants to know where this place is in order to advise Alice how to get

there. In sciences that use empirical or formal methods investigators should first decide where they want to go in their research, and then hopefully their scientific methods would tell them how to get there. The problem for sciences that rely primarily on historical method is that it is not known where they want to go. Most political scientists do not know where history is going, and just like Alice they have to walk without any directions. This is a significant problem; however, it should not deter the scholars, of course, as long as they get somewhere.

In this chapter, certain important methodological points of this dissertation have been discussed. This chapter has been focused on more general problems of methodology in international relations, because it has been assumed that, first, epistemology is more important than ontology in defining the nature of a discipline, and second, in international relations method plays a bigger part than theory in conducting research and utilising its outcomes. The purpose of the discipline of international relations is humanitarian. Theories may not always serve this purpose well, since they tend to impose frameworks and forms of judgement, thus impeding free thought and imagination. Theories in international relations also are better characterised as analytical modes. Analytical modes are different from theories, because besides being right or wrong, they also can be irrelevant. Despite this, theories still have certain values in the discipline. They serve as vehicles for debates, and the spread of ideas, and may even provide a good basis for ideologies.

People normally do science in three general ways: they conduct empirical research in real time, they guide their investigation with formal reasoning, and they

do historical research to investigate phenomena of the past. The empirical or real method dominates natural sciences, the formal method is the main tool for mathematical sciences and formal logic, and the historical method cannot be avoided in social and humanitarian sciences. For international relations the dominant method is historical. There is no phenomenon in IR that can be observed in real time and identified as a relevant factor without prior knowledge about it. Traditionally, however, the empirical method has been judged to be the main method for IR, as well as other political science disciplines. This assumption was borrowed from the natural sciences, since it has been believed that the phenomena natural and social sciences study are essentially identical; i.e., they or their effects exist in real time and space. This is so, but it has not been accepted that epistemologically natural and social phenomena are not identically accessible. Natural phenomena can be observed, experimented, and tested in real time, while we receive information about social phenomena normally only after they have taken place; they are not observable as such, and their measurement mathematically is almost impossible or useless. Besides, the empirical method only works well in deterministic systems, where clear and definite predictions about future outcomes of observations are possible. No such consistent prediction about future events has ever taken place in social sciences. Time is also perceived differently. In natural sciences it is treated as a linear, spatial phenomenon, which can be presented as a set of geometrical units well suited for measurement. Time does not appear to be linear in politics, where it is shaped by various experiences, and seems to be a flow

rather than a line. Nevertheless, it has been assumed that social phenomena also can be analysed causally as if they were obeying deterministic laws. Experience and analysis have shown that international phenomena cannot be investigated deterministically. The international system could be a deterministic one, but it behaves stochastically. Weather systems behave in such a way and are investigated by the science of meteorology. Forecasting in these systems, however, is unreliable, and an adequate mathematical apparatus does not yet exist to fully describe stochastic behaviour in deterministic systems. If the international system is a stochastic one, then no form of cause-effect, deterministic analysis will make any sense, and forecasting of future events will remain in the realm of probability.

Politics and history use the same epistemological method, but this does not mean that they are ontologically identical. History is secondary to politics; it is dead politics. A history is investigated as an event that belongs to its historically defined social-cultural era and environment, while a political phenomenon is studied in terms of its relations to the present, and its possible implications for future events. A historian tries to clear his subject of investigation from obscurity as much as possible, and to produce as much evidence about it as possible. A political scientist, on the other hand, starts by de-emphasising, omitting historical evidence irrelevant to him/her, and thus revealing relevant or important events or processes. A historian also perceives time in a linear manner, which serves well for his/her chronological purposes. It is more difficult to see time in this manner in political studies, where the distinction between past, present, and future is blurred, and

where events and processes do not have definite beginnings and ends. A historian may also be well satisfied with investigating historical texts and other sources, and producing a study describing events and processes as they have taken place in the past. This is not enough for political science, since investigation is conducted with the aim of benefiting current affairs, and not simply of explaining the past. A bridge should be made between the investigator and his/her subject or sources of investigation so as to merge two world-views in one. Analytical modes or theories normally serve as such bridges, but their usefulness is often defined on an *ad hoc* basis, and even then they may not always be relevant to the subject of research.

The concept of geomentality is used as such an analytical mode in this dissertation. This concept is introduced in order to analyse images of the world presented by the doctrines of geopolitics and Eurasianism. These two doctrines, traditionally, have taken ontology as their starting point. Geomentality, on the other hand, is an epistemological concept. It is concerned with geographical images of the world derived from historical experiences, and with the political significance of these images for certain peoples and cultures. Geopolitical and Eurasianist doctrines have mostly taken an ontological starting point; i.e., they have been treated just like other natural sciences investigating deterministic systems.

In international relations facts are often defined by knowledge or information about them. Therefore, epistemology should be privileged over ontology and method over theory. This is the theoretical starting point of this research, while the phenomenon signified by “geomentality” and explained in the

previous chapter is an empirical starting point of this dissertation.

Chapter Three

Envisioning the World: The Roots of Political Geography and Geopolitics

A man sees a great many things when he looks at the world for himself, and he sees them from many sides; but this method of learning is not nearly so short or so quick as the method which employs abstract ideas and makes hasty generalisations about everything. Experience, therefore, will be a long time in correcting preconceived ideas, or perhaps never bring its task to an end; for, wherever a man finds that the aspects of things seem to contradict the general ideas he has formed, he will begin by rejecting the evidence it offers as partial and one-sided; nay, he will shut his eyes to it altogether and deny that it stands in any contradiction at all with his preconceived notions, in order that he may thus preserve them uninjured.

Arthur Schopenhauer, "On Education"¹

The proponents and followers of the modern Russian *geopolitika* may not be quite scholarly or even consistent in their arguments; however, there is at least one thing they have got right: geography, and especially political geography, has long been the ontological foundation for Russian foreign and security policy thinking. Geographic considerations should not be alien to foreign policy-makers of any nation, but Russia stands out as a singular case; its academic, cultural, and political traditions have real or imaginary links with political geography, and as such they contribute to the geomentality of Russia's political class. The main idea of this chapter is that geomentality as a mode of analysis provides the most natural way of

1. Arthur Schopenhauer, *Essays*, New York: A. L. Burt Company, Publishers, 1900, pp. 429-430.

analysing Russian foreign and security policy, because, first, political thinking about geographical space has strong academic and intellectual roots and influence in Russia; and second, explorative and expansionist geomentality has been the centre-piece of Russian state-making vision for generations. Academics working in Russia, historically, have been among the pioneers of the discipline of political geography. It was a Russian geographer of German descent, Christian Nicholas von Winsheim, professor at the gymnasium (college) of the St. Petersburg Imperial Academy of Sciences of Russia, who in 1745 first used *political geography* as an academic concept in his book.² Since the beginning of the 18th century, the time of Peter the Great, geography has been one of the most respected and enduring academic disciplines in Russia. The accumulation and advancement of geographic knowledge was of particular interest in Russia, since this vast country was mainly unexplored and unmapped. The discipline followed the desires of the Russian emperors to consolidate and strengthen their domain. Russian statesmen had to think of geography first when they discussed new frontiers of their country and considered security issues related to these frontiers. Geography was, probably, the only academic discipline that served the practical interests of the Russian statesmen

2. Christian Nicholas von Winsheim was born in Anklam, Pomerania, on April 16, 1694. He was an astronomer by education. On May 1, 1731, he was appointed adjunct professor of the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. On January 1, 1735 he became professor extraordinaire of the same academic establishment. He served as conference-secretary in 1742-1746 and again in 1749-1751. Winsheim died in St. Petersburg on March 4, 1751. (This endnote was written on March 4, 2001, 250 years after his death). *The Russian Academy of Sciences*, Kazan <<http://www.ras.knc.ru/ras/WIN/05/0559.HTM>>.

of those days. This tradition of considering geographic factors first has been largely kept by Russian foreign and security policy-makers.

The Age of Exploring Geomentality

Winsheim's book, *A Brief Political Geography*, describes important countries and lands of the era, and discusses in greater detail some of the major states. Even earlier, in 1738-1739 the Imperial Academy published another volume, first in German and then in Russian, titled *A Brief Reference for Mathematical and Natural Geography*. This book was written by another ethnic German scholar, H. W. Kraft, who had been teaching a course in "mathematical and natural geography" at the Academy since 1725. Professor Kraft, a well-respected scholar in 18th century Russia, was one of the first geographers who brought historical and political dimensions into study of geographical phenomena. Winsheim's 1745 book was probably the first volume to be titled *Political Geography*. By this term both Kraft and Winsheim meant a comprehensive description of states, countries, and lands in terms of their borders, size, natural characteristics, administrative arrangements, population, main industries, religious affiliations, and military strength.³

Winsheim, who had lived in Russia since 1718, wrote his book to interpret

3. Kraft's book was titled *Kratkoe rukovodstvo k matematicheskoy y naturalnoy geografii*. N. B. Kaledin, "Otechestvennye politicheskaya geografiya i geopolitika: realnost' i vozmozhnost'," in ed. S. B. Lavrov, *Geopoliticheskie i geoekonomicheskie problemy Rossii*, St. Petersburg: Russian Geographic Society, 1995, pp. 83-84.

and explain the world atlas published in St. Petersburg in 1737, and used by students in the college at the Academy of Sciences. The full title of the book is *A Brief Political Geography for the Interpretation of A Minor Atlas Published in the Russian Language, Composed for Utilisation in the Gymnasium at the Imperial Academy of Sciences*.⁴ The book consists of 20 chapters, of which 12 are dedicated to Europe (223 pages), 6 to Asia (65 pages), 1 to Africa (18 pages), and 1 to America (25 pages). Above all, Winsheim discusses state borders and main cities of the major countries of the mentioned continents. The main features of physical geography of various countries, such as lakes, rivers, islands, are described along the way. Of individual countries Germany, the homeland of Professor Winsheim (who was from Prussia), is given the most detailed description (50 pages out of total 350).⁵

Winsheim's book was by no means perfect. It was criticised by contemporaries for dedicating so little attention to Russia itself. The author himself acknowledged this weakness.⁶ It is possible that his lack of knowledge of Russian political geography was due to the relatively unexplored and un-researched nature

4. The book was published simultaneously in Russian and German. In Russian it was titled *Kratkaya politicheskaya geografiya k iziasneniiu izdannogo na Rossiiskom iazike nebolshogo atlasa, sochinennaia dlia upotrebleniia gimnazii pri imperatorskoi akademii nauk*". In German: *Kurtzgefasste Politische Geographie zur Erläuterung eines kleinen, in Russischer Sprache publicitren Atlantis enworten, bey der Kayserl. Academie der Wissenschaften, St. Petersburg*. On the Russian title page the words *politicheskaya geografiya k iziasneniu... atlasa* (political geography for interpretation of a... atlas) stand out, since they are printed in larger letters.

5. V. I. Grekov, *Ocherki iz istorii Russkikh geograficheskikh issledovaniy v 1725 -1765 gg.*, Moscow: The USSR Academy of Sciences, 1960, p. 330.

6. Ibid., p. 279.

of Russia. The 18th century was the era of major geographical explorations in Russia, especially in its northern and Far Eastern regions. This was probably the main reason why Russia attracted so many German geographers. One of the most distinguished among them, H. Müller, criticised the author of *A Brief Political Geography* for not being very systematic in his description of various locations.⁷ It seems that as a geographer Winsheim was not as influential and famous in his time as his other colleagues working in Russia, such as Kraft, Müller, Lomonosov, and Krashennikov. Despite this, Winsheim has to be credited for inventing the term “political geography,” and giving the first conceptual base for the discipline. The Imperial Academy attempted to perfect Winsheim’s idea and work, and in 1749 it was decided to publish the second edition of *A Brief Political Geography*. To correct the shortcomings of the first edition, besides the author, Lomonosov, Müller, and I. Fischer were also asked to contribute.⁸ However, this project was never completed, as Winsheim died in 1751. His *Brief Political Geography* remained the most comprehensive Russian study of foreign lands until 1772, when the four-volume Political Geography project was finished.⁹

In the beginning of his book, Winsheim explains the purpose of his project.

7. Ibid., p. 330.

8. *Svodniy katalog Russkoi knigi grazhdanskoi pechaty XVII veka. tom I (Summary Catalogue of the 18th Century Russian Books of the Civic Press, Volume I)*, Moscow: AN SSSR, 1962.

9. This project was started in 1758 and finished in 1772. The first of the four volumes was a Russian adaptation of earlier published German works, and the remaining volumes were written by a Russian scholar, S. F. Nakovalnin. V. I. Grekov, p. 330.

He notes that “with the first examination of a globe, our eyes are met with two distinct parts [of the globe], that is land and water.”¹⁰ Winsheim further writes that land, in general, is divided into four parts. “The main parts of the world” are Europe, which is in the north; Asia, which is in the east; Africa, which is in the south; and America, which is in the West.¹¹ After this, Winsheim proceeds with a classification of forms of government in the world. He writes that “in discussing different sorts of government, it is possible to divide different lands of the world” among different types of domains.¹² He distinguishes six different sorts of political organisation, and it seems that one of the criteria for this classification is the *size* of political entities. Winsheim names empires first. He identifies three empires: Roman-Germanic, Russian, and Turkish; and he notes that travellers, who explore Asia, Africa, and America, also identify great states of those continents as such. Kingdoms are named second. According to Winsheim, there are two kinds of this form of government: kingdoms that are composed of “provinces,” and kingdoms that are composed of “other kingdoms.” The Spanish and Prussian kingdoms are mentioned as representatives of the former, and the Swedish and Polish kingdoms as representatives of the latter. *Kurfürstentum* are named third, with a clarification

10. Christian Nicholas von Winsheim, *Kratkaya politicheskaya geografiya k iziasneniiu izdannogo na Rossiiskom iazike nebolshogo atlasa, sochinennaia dlia upotrebleniia gimnazii pri imperatorskoi akademii nauk*, St. Petersburg: Rossiiskaia Imperskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1745, p. 3.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

that “they demand as much respect as kingdoms do.”¹³ Dukedoms, and entities of the similar calibre (“*markgrafstoa, landgrafstoa*”), come fourth in this classification. To such sort of government belong such political entities as Austria, Mecklenburg, and Hesse (Hessen). Earldoms are named fifth. Tirol is mentioned as one of earldoms of Europe. Republics end the list of classification, with the Netherlands, the Swiss cantons, and Venice as examples of such a political organisation.¹⁴ Winsheim ends the classification of different forms of government in the world with the following remark: “this general understanding of different forms government and states of the world should be enough here, since the true distinction in power, excellency, and other advantages among governing persons does not belong to geography, but has to be considered from political rules.”¹⁵

This conception of political geography, i.e. conceptually dividing the land among different types of government, and the classification given to characterise these different types, is the ‘theoretical foundation’ of Winsheim’s book. Six pages out of the volume’s 350 are dedicated to ‘theory;’ however, these six pages are enough to see that the author had an understanding and method for discussing various states of the globe. It is remarkable that he starts a book with observing the unity of the globe, and then dividing the four continents among the four sides of the

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., p. 5.

15. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

world. As we will see below, this kind of vision of the world, which is based on unifying and dividing it at the same time, is more characteristic of geopoliticians of the 20th century, than of political geographers of the 18th and 19th centuries. It is quite possible that Professor Winsheim was the first scholar who offered such an image and vision of the world.

The fact that the first book titled *Political Geography* was published in Russia remains little known in the West. The scholar normally credited with the invention of this discipline is the German professor of geography Anton Friedrich Büsching. In 1754 he published a voluminous work, titled *Neue Erdbeschreibung* (*New Description of the Earth*), dedicated to the description of countries of the world. In general, Büsching saw the mission of geography as "to give a complete account of the nature and political state of the known territory of the earth."¹⁶ The completed version of *New Description of the Earth* contained 11 volumes, and was translated in all major European languages.¹⁷ Two years earlier, in 1752, Büsching had published a trial book on political geography: *Kurzgefasste Staats-Beschreibung der Herzogthümer Holstein und Schleswig* (*Brief Political Description of the Duchies of Holstein and*

16. Büsching argued that "the known territory of the earth must be studied with regard to its physical and also its political shape." Further, according to him, "when looking at the political division of the earth, one notes numerous and various states; it will not be sufficient merely to contemplate their condition to gain an impression of their size, power, infrastructure, government, and inhabitants; it will be necessary to deal with their specific constitutions and their religions, their cities, fortifications, castles, settlements and noteworthy towns, and institutions" (*New Description of the Earth*, vol. 1, 1785, 19-21). Quoted in Manfred Büttner and Reinhard Jäkel, "Anton Friedrich Büsching 1724-1793," in ed. T. W. Freeman, *Geographers: Biobibliographical Studies*, Vol. 6, London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1982, pp. 9-10.

17. Ibid., p. 14.

Schleswig). For many years Büsching's books were the main sources for students of political geography in Germany, Russia, and probably elsewhere. Büsching's scholarship was so influential that according to German researchers, Kant's lectures on geography contained certain passages of Büsching almost verbatim. Until the end of the 19th century most geographical publications in Europe were based, to some degree, on Büsching's writings, sometimes even taking whole passages, and often not acknowledging him by name.¹⁸

Although Büsching's work dominated political geography for almost 150 years, he was not the first scholar to outline political geography as a discipline. His *New Description of the Earth* appeared nine years after Winsheim's *A Brief Political Geography* was published in St. Petersburg. His 1757 work, *Kurzgefassten Staats-Beschreibung...*, which can be understood as *A Brief State Description* rather than *A Political Description*, was translated in Russian in 1763, but it did not contain a reference to political geography.¹⁹ Moreover, it is known that Büsching visited Russia a couple of times, and he started developing his political geography only after his first visit to St. Petersburg in February 1750.²⁰ At that time Büsching was only twenty-six years old, while Winsheim's *A Brief Political Geography* had been

18. Ibid., p. 12.

19. Kaledin, p. 84.

20. According to Kaledin, Büsching first visited St. Petersburg in 1748, but this does not seem consistent with his biography. Büsching's German biographers note that the young German scholar first visited Russia's capital city in February 1750, as a private tutor for the Danish ambassador's son. Büttner and Jäkel, p. 8.

published for about five years. Winsheim himself had been around geographic circles since at least 1718, when he first arrived in Russia. In 1745, the year Winsheim's volume was published, Büsching was only twenty-one and was attending the University of Halle as a theology student.²¹ Büsching's biographers explain that his "geographical awakening came only during his first travel to St. Petersburg," and that the visit had an important influence on Büsching's later work, for he became aware of the inadequacy of the geographical works he had known before.²²

It seems that the achievements of Russia-based scholars in developing political geography as an academic discipline remain unknown or unacknowledged, especially in English-language literature. Even Büsching is hardly ever acknowledged by historians of geography. He is characterised as a geographer, "who compared the natural features of the earth with those created by civilisation," and who advanced statistical-geographical method in describing various nations.²³ Büsching is also given credit for solving some "important questions."²⁴ Russian political geographers are not even mentioned by Western

21. Ibid., p. 7.

22. In their article Büttner and Jäkel point out twice that Büsching's evolution as the most prominent geographer of his era started only after his first journey to St. Petersburg. Ibid., p. 8 and p. 9.

23. Hermann Wagner, "The History of the Methodology of Geography as a Science," in ed. Gary S. Dunbar, *The History of Geography: Translations of Some French and German Essays*, Malibu, CA: Undena Publications, 1983, p. 53.

24. Hanno Beck, "Geography and Travel in the 19th Century: Prolegomena to A General History of Travel," in Ibid., p. 74.

students of history of geography. Most of them regard Friedrich Ratzel and Carl Ritter as fathers of political geography, although Ratzel himself thought very highly of Büsching, whom he regarded as the most important political geographer of the period until the end of the 19th century.²⁵ Historians of geography also point out that in the consideration of the relationship between man and nature there is a striking similarity between the work of Büsching and Carl Ritter. In fact, Büsching's works were the basis of the young Ritter's geographical education.²⁶ The contributions of lesser known scholars, such as Johan Michael Franz, to the discipline of political geography also remain undervalued.²⁷

Jean Gottmann, a distinguished political geographer of the 20th century, credits a Frenchman, A. R. J. Turgot, with inventing political geography (*géographie politique*). Upon his graduation from the Sorbonne in 1750, Turgot delivered two addresses on the progress of mankind, and began to develop a political geography.²⁸ Turgot, a brilliant statesman and scholar of his time, could have been

25. Kaledin, p. 83.

26. Büttner and Jäkel, p. 13.

27. Johann Michael Franz (1700-1761) was one of the most remarkable geographers of his time, but was not appreciated in his era. He developed his ideas of political description of geographic space roughly at the same time as Büsching. In 1753 Franz published his *Der Deutsche Staatsgeographus* (*The German Political [or National or State] Geographer*). In it he argued that "any country and any place can be described with regard to their natural structure and with regard to the political structure of the state; thus, one can render a natural [physical] and also a political geography, whereby the latter description in view of the secular and the ecclesiastical constitution divides into two different ones." Quoted in Reinhard Jäkel, "Johann Michael Franz 1700-1761," in ed. T. W. Freeman, *Geographers: Biobibliographical Studies*, Vol. 5, London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1981, p. 43.

28. Jean Gottmann, *The Significance of Territory*, Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia.

influenced by then well-known French geographer L de L'Isle, who after spending many years in Russia, returned to France in 1747.²⁹ In Russia de L'Isle was a professor at the Imperial Academy of Sciences. He co-operated closely with Winsheim, Kraft and others in researching Russia's north, Siberia, and the Far East.³⁰ Although his main specialisation was astronomy, de L'Isle was very much interested in geography, and especially in cartography. After his departure for France, Winsheim succeeded him as the Academy's main astronomer.³¹ De L'Isle sent to France hundreds of Russian maps, both originals and copies, and other notes. Russian historians of geography argue that he was employed by the French Ministry of the Sea, and that he was asked by the Ministry, and his brother, H. de L'Isle, to collect as much material as he could about Russia (see Map 3-1). L de L'Isle himself indicated in his memoirs that he was collecting geographical information on Russia.³² As a result, there are


1973, p. 71.

29. Kaledin, p. 85.

30. Grekov, pp. 57-62.

31. Kaledin, p. 85.

32. Grekov, p. 256.



Map 3-1. A map commissioned by the French Ministry of the Sea depicting Russia's Far East. The map was created by Jacques Nicolas Bellin (1703-1772) sometime after 1737. The maps created at the end of the 17th century and in the first part of the 18th century normally depicted more or less accurately all parts of the world except Russia's Far East, Alaska and Australia.

Source: L'hydrographie française: recueil des cartes générales et particulières.... *Meeting of Frontiers*, "America, Russia, and Meeting of Frontiers," "Exploration," "Digital Collection," "Collections from the Library of Congress: Maps" <<http://frontiers.loc.gov/>>

hundreds of old Russian maps and notes in Paris museums.³³ Since L. de L'Isle was so keen to share with his countrymen information he collected in Russia, it is very likely that he also noted the emergence of a new sub-discipline, political geography, in the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences. It is quite possible that young Turgot was inspired by certain ideas in political and historical geography that de L'Isle imported from Russia. In 1750 Turgot was twenty-three, and when Winsheim's *Brief Political Geography* was first published in St. Petersburg he was only eighteen years old.

Publications discussing and describing peoples and cultures of foreign lands had been published in English language long before the times of Winsheim, Büsching, and Turgot. Gerald of Wales wrote *Itinerarium Cambriae* and *Description of Wales* in the end of the 12th and the beginning of the 13 century.³⁴ In 1599, George Abbot produced his geographical treatise *Briefe Description of the Whole Worlde*. This remarkable little book contains some very insightful observations and comments.³⁵ In 1621 Peter Heylyn published his *Microcosmus: Or a Little Description of the Great World*. Later, in 1652, he produced an enlarged version of *Microcosmus* in four

33. Ibid., p. 379.

34. Edmund W. Gilbert, *British Pioneers in Geography*, Plymouth: David & Charles, 1972, p. 31.

35. Abbot's book was subsequently constantly reprinted, especially in the 17th century. One of the more recent reprints is *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum Ltd*, Amsterdam and New York: De Capo Press, 1970.

volumes, and called it *Cosmographie*.³⁶ Before Winsheim “cosmography” was, indeed, the common title for the books aspiring to describe the political world. Abbot’s and Heylyn’s books were similar in character. Heylyn, however, dedicated more time to definition both of his book and geography. *Microcosmus* he described as “a treatise, historical, geographical, political and theological.” He agreed with Ptolemy’s definition of geography as “an imitation of the picture of the whole Earth,” but produced his own definition of the subject as well: “a description of the earth, by her parts and their limits, situations, inhabitants, cities, rivers, fertilities and observable matters, with all other things annexed thereunto.”³⁷ Heylyn came very close to defining political geography as a discipline in his attempt to link closely geography and history.³⁸ In spite of these efforts by British scholars, the description of politics and culture of foreign lands remained known as cosmography both in Britain and the continental Europe until Winsheim, Büsching, and Turgot produced their books in the mid 18th century.

Contemporary political geographers offer various definitions for their discipline: “the study of political regions or features of the earth’s surface” (Alexander), “the geographical nature, the policy, and the power of the state”

36. Gilbert, p. 46.

37. Ibid.

38. Heylyn argued that “*Geography* without *History* hath life and motion, but very unstable and random; *History* without *Geography*, like a dead carcase, hath neither life, not motion at all.” Ibid., p. 48.

(Pounds), "the study of political phenomena in their areal context" (Jackson), "the study of the variation of political phenomena from place to place in interconnection with variations in other features of the earth as the home of man" (Harstborne), "a subdivision of human geography... concerned with a particular aspect of earth-man relationships and with a special kind of emphasis... the relationship between geographical factors and political entities" (Weigert), "the study of the interaction of geographical area and political process" (Ad Hoc Committee on Geography, Association of American Geographers).³⁹ By any of these definitions, Winsheim's *A Brief Political Geography*, would clearly belong to this discipline, by virtue not only of its title, but of the substance as well. It is true, however, that Winsheim's work is mostly descriptive rather than analytical, and the author does not employ any known theoretical-methodological model. Winsheim's volume was not very systematic either, as was well noted by his contemporary colleagues. Nevertheless, since Winsheim was the first person who both used the term *political geography*, and arranged or tried to arrange the contents of his volume under this title, the

39. These definitions are collected by Martin Ira Glassner in his *Political Geography*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993, p. 3. Other definitions of political geography Glassner provides in his book are: "the study of the spatial and areal structures and interactions between political process and systems, or simply, the spatial analysis of political phenomena" (Kasperson and Minghi), "political geography is concerned with the spatial attributes of political process" (Cohen and Rosenthal), "political geographers are concerned with the geographical consequences of political decisions and actions, the geographical factors which were considered during the making of any decisions, and the role of any geographical factors which influenced the outcome of political actions" (Pacione), "humanistic political geography is concerned with uncovering the dynamic social processes whereby the spatial dimensions of the natural and social world are organised and reorganised into geographically delimited and symbolically meaningful provinces by national and transnational groups" (Brunn and Yanarella).

theoretical omissions should be forgiven, and he should be given due credit as the first political geographer.

The fact that political geography started to emerge in the 18th century, and that it was pioneered in Russia, was not accidental. Three important developments in world history that took place from the end of the 15th century to the mid 1700's contributed significantly to the emergence of the discipline of political geography. The first, and probably the most important, development was the change in Europeans' perceptions of the world. The world took a more or less definite shape by the mid-18th century, and this shape was finite. The world could be visualised as a whole picture of more or less well defined segments of earth and water. The world was not visualised any more as a dichotomy of 'known' and 'unknown.' Before for Europeans the world could be visualised as something existing between the known horizons. Beyond these horizons there were dragons, evil spirits, the mouth of Hell, chaos, and danger, or so was it perceived. This image of the world was replaced by the image of the world as a whole by the mid-1700s, and the great explorers of the 15th-18th centuries contributed to this change most significantly.⁴⁰ Bartolomeo Diaz travelled around Africa in 1487-1488, and this continent took a better shape in the maps made in Europe, despite the fact that those maps were still

40. These two images of the world are based on John Agnew's distinction between the image of the world as "the world-as-a-picture," and "the world pictured beyond horizon." John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. 11-12.

following Ptolemy.⁴¹ In 1497-1498 Vasco da Gama sailed around Africa, and then went to India across the Indian Ocean. Christopher Columbus discovered America in 1492, although he thought he had gone to Asia circumnavigating the world. Magellan did circumnavigate the world in 1522. He did not make it back himself, but most of his crew did, and the world maps drawn on basis of his discoveries soon became available in Europe. Sir Francis Drake repeated this accomplishment in 1577-1580. In 1514, a Portuguese mission reached China, and in 1542 Europeans made the first contact with Japan.⁴² As a result of Abel Tasman's journey of 1642-1643, much of Australia and New Zealand appeared on European-made maps.⁴³ In 1728-1741, Vitus Bering, a Russian explorer of Danish decent, sailed around the Dezhnev Miss (cape), 'opened' the north-east passage, and eventually reached Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. Bering's voyages around Northern Siberia, Kamchatka, and the Far East were the last in the series of voyages around the populated continents of the world. By reaching North America from Asia, Bering's expeditions provided final data about the missing north-east passage. In 1741, Bering's discovery became widely known and its implications were well utilised by geographers. The borders of all continents had become known. The image of the world changed significantly: all populated continents of the world on the newer

41. Ibid., p. 15.

42. Stuart Hall, *The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power*, Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996, p. 192.

43. Agnew, p. 15.

maps acquired better defined geographical shapes. It had been proven that Asian and American continents were separated by a narrow strait.

The second major development in European politics, which helped to form the idea of political geography, was the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The European-style state-centred world was born, and cartographers started to draw maps accordingly. It became possible to make more precise spatial-political distinctions among different countries. Since different countries had different governments, with different political structures and/or institutions, it made sense to describe, compare or analyse them. World atlases became very popular in Europe, and especially in Russia. A number of atlases, both national and international, were published in St. Petersburg in the first half of the 18th century. Winsheim's *A Brief Political Geography* was, as noted, inspired by one of the world atlases.

After the age of discovery Europeans started to develop a new geomentality: a world with its centre in Europe. This was given its canonical expression in the work of Mercator, whose new projection was first used in a map in 1568. The cornerstone of this geomentality was the image of Europe in the middle of the world with other continents and islands naturally grouping around it. New projections and atlases led Europeans to assume that they belonged to the centrepiece of the world, and that this arrangement was the natural order of things.⁴⁴

44. J. M. Roberts, *The Triumph of the West*, London: BBC, 1985, p. 202.

The third development in the European and world history of the 16th-18th centuries was the emergence and spread of colonialism, and the competition among the European colonial powers. Now centralised major European states managed the political division of new lands as well. The initial Spanish-Portuguese rivalry was settled by the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, which divided the new 'unknown world' between the two countries. This agreement was revised many times afterwards, and other countries, like England, disregarded it completely and grabbed as much of new lands as they could.⁴⁵ Colonisation of new lands and expansion beyond Europe helped states like Portugal, Spain, England, the Netherlands, and France to emerge as large trading powers. By the eighteenth century all major European colonial-commercial states were in place. They took on the serious business of bringing the discovered lands and their people under European control. The newly discovered lands served as sources of income for Europeans, but they also got something in return: imprints of European politics and culture. Political rivalries among European states now transcended the old continent, and were fought out in the new distant lands.⁴⁶

Russia also sought to explore new lands beyond its geographic frontiers. Peter the Great was the ruler who contributed most to this effort. In 1695 he started the Russian navy, and soon afterwards Peter won Azov for Russia from the Turks.

45. Hall, p. 194.

46. Ibid., p. 195.

In 1700-1721 Russia and Sweden fought the Great Northern War, which Russia won and thus acquired Narva, Livonia, Estonia, Karelia, and Ingria from Sweden. In 1697 Russia conquered Kamchatka. Even before Peter I, Russian expeditions had reached China, and the first border agreement between Russia and China was signed at Nerchinsk in 1689. After Peter, as a result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1735-1739, the Russian state expanded toward the Black Sea (but could not yet reach it). In general, in the beginning of the 18th century, the Russian geographic explorations of the Urals, Siberia, the Caspian Basin, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Far East were given an organised and systematic character and this prompted the rise of geographical science in the country.⁴⁷ The imperial government funded various geographical projects, and recruited both scientists and seamen in Russia as well as abroad to carry out these projects. In 1758, the Imperial Academy of Sciences started to publish a new book on political geography (titled *Politicheskaya geografiya* or *Political Geography*); the project was completed in 1772 when the fourth and the last volume of the project was produced. It was the most extensive and comprehensive geographical work completed in Russia in the 18th century. It provided for the definitions of many important concepts, and described in detail many countries. For example, 272 pages were dedicated to France alone.⁴⁸

47. D. M. Lebedev, *Ocherki po istorii geografii v Rosii XVII v. (1725-1800 gg.)* (*Essays on History of Geography in Russia in the 18th Century (1725-1800)*), Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR (The Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences), 1957, p. 7.

48. Ibid. p. 19.

The birth of political geography historically followed the age of exploration and colonialism. Intellectually, great minds of the era, such as Montesquieu, Jonathan Swift, and Christian Wolff, prepared fertile methodological soil for its emergence. Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* was published in London in 1726. The book, which found an immediate success, is a great introduction to understanding international politics. Using a satirical form of writing, Swift describes different countries co-existing in the same geographic space, but despising one another. Each country has its own culture and political institutions, and inhabitants of each country believe that their culture and political traditions are the best and highest of all. The states of Lilliput and Blefuscu, for example, are very similar, but they insist that they are very different from each other, and see the other side as the mortal enemy. Among other things, Swift made very insightful and sharp comments on forms of government, international relations, and other matters political. Laputa's flying capital city, much like any elitist or non-democratic regime, is detached from its people and above it. The country of giants, Brobdingnag, much like a superpower has no real enemies; however, it sees an insignificant alien entity, Gulliver, as a threat to its peace. To this day *Gulliver's Travels*, with its Lilliputians, giants, Yahoos and others, remains a great classic, at least in many European countries. Swift, using satire, was probably the first European author to offer a critical analysis of the already established Westphalian model of international politics.

Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, anonymously published

Lettres persanes in Paris, in 1721. Like Swift's book, it met with enormous success. Montesquieu uses a different literary technique to present its point. It is the correspondence of a Persian nobleman visiting France with his friends and wives back home that illustrates the differences between two distinct cultures with very different political and legal systems. The book also highlights the variety of the Europeans themselves. The author stresses the differences among cultures and political systems, but there are similarities that these cultures share, derived from human nature, and from some aspects of political organisation.⁴⁹ Montesquieu had much more to say about politics and law, however. His *De l'esprit des lois* (*The Spirit of Laws*) was published in 1748, debating universal principles of laws. Montesquieu rejected the dominant theological understanding of philosophy, and argued that the main purpose of philosophy was to research cause-effect relationships of the physical world guided by the laws of mechanics. The French philosopher also rejected the theological interpretation of historical process dominant in those days, and stated that geographical features had more to say about the character of a nation, and the spirit of its development than divine intervention. The main message communicated by Montesquieu in his books was not to take as given the dogmatic theological view of society and politics, but to pursue socio-political research using the natural, empirical criteria. Geographical features (climate,

49. Jean Gottmann, *The Significance of Territory*, pp. 69-70.

terrain, demography, etc.) were among those criteria.⁵⁰

Christian Wolff (1679-1754) is known less today than the above mentioned two intellectuals. Wolff did not directly contribute to geographical knowledge, but he was *the* most prominent German philosopher of the 18th century before Kant, and as such had enormous influence over European formal education. Wolff, like Montesquieu in France, fell out of favour with religious authorities, and had to defend his philosophy from those who favoured medieval scholastic compendiums. Wolff taught at the universities of Halle and Marburg. In Halle among his students was Johann Franz, subsequently an important German geographer, who was among the first political geographers of Europe. At Marburg Wolff's students included Mikhail Lomonosov, a multitalented Russian, who afterwards did so much in his country for the development of various sciences including geography. Wolff's books on philosophical sciences and methods eventually replaced old scholastic writings, and it is quite likely that the young Büsching, too, in the 1740s was educated by Wolff's books. In his classification of sciences, Wolff used the following scheme. All philosophical knowledge could be divided among "rational-theoretical sciences" (ontology, cosmology, rational psychology, natural theology),

50. Montesquieu presents his famous theory of the influence of climate on human behavior in Book XIV. The main idea is that if minds and characters vary from climate to climate, laws too should vary to accommodate those differences. In Book XVII Montesquieu turns to the condition of the soil and its influence on the form of government likely to develop in any given area. In this book, among other things, he also discusses the reasons why islands are conducive to liberty, and suggests a correlation between liberty and a nomadic existence. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws*, Together With an English Translation of An Essay "On Causes Affecting Minds and Characters" (1736-1743), Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977, p. 242 and p. 280.

“rational-practical sciences” (ethics, politics, economics), “empirical-theoretical sciences” (empirical psychology, teleology, dogmatic physics, and “empirical-practical sciences” (technology, experimental physics). It was very important that Wolff found a place for empirical sciences in his classification, for geography could be ‘legitimised’ this way. Medieval theological-philosophical traditions had not allowed much room for empirical reasoning and science.⁵¹

By the mid-18th century European countries had finalised their break from the Old World. Physical and mental barriers that had impeded the spread of knowledge about the world were overcome. In 1780, the term “international” was invented by Jeremy Bentham.⁵² The world no longer was depicted as a wheel, superimposed on the body of Christ.⁵³ The old concepts of the world that did not encourage travel and exploration were abandoned. From the age of exploration Europeans pictured themselves differently in the world. Their geographical identity changed. Europeans developed a new geomentality.

The Age of Imperialist Geomentality

By the end of the 19th century both the European intellectual map and the

51. Wolff followed his own methodology and wrote such books as: *Cosmologia Generalis*, *Psychologia Empirica*, *Psychologia Rationalis*, *Theologiae Naturalis*, *Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica*, *Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia*, *Philosophia Moralis sive Ethica*, *Oeconomica*, *Jus Gentium*, *Jus Naturae*, etc.

52. Fred Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations*, London: Macmillan, 1994, p. 6.

53. Hall, p. 197.

political map of the world had changed again considerably. In the 1890s and 1910s the new disciplines of international relations and geopolitics were born. Swedish scholar and politician Rudolf Kjellén coined the term “geopolitics” in 1899.⁵⁴ A British geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder, soon popularised the term with his conception of heartland-rimland rivalry, and his all-encompassing globalising vision of history. The 1900 publication of *World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century* by Reinsch is regarded as the first glimmerings of international relations as a discipline.⁵⁵ Formally the discipline was institutionalised in British universities after the First World War.⁵⁶ The emergence of these disciplines had its precursors in the intellectual and political developments of the 19th century. Auguste Comte, Georg Hegel, and Karl Marx shaped social science in such a way that their vision of it is still dominant today. In terms of political changes, the most significant feature of world politics by the end of the 19th century was the almost total division of the world among the colonial powers. This new division produced a different, more totalitarian vision of the world as a single unit composed of various segments dominated by the major powers. The new understanding of the world required new disciplines for world politics. The intellectual merger of these two changes helped

54. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Thinking Critically About Geopolitics,” in eds. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge, *The Geopolitics Reader*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 1.

55. William C. Olson and A. J. R. Groom, *International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation*, Cambridge: HarperCollins, 1991, p. 47.

56. Halliday, p. 8.

to produce geopolitics and international relations.

Auguste Comte (1798-1857), an important French social scientist and thinker, wanted to develop a methodology for the scientific understanding of society and history. He is the inventor of positivism, which he understood as the middle line of reasoning between empiricism and mysticism. Comte became famous after the publication of his *Cours de philosophie positive* (*Course in Positive Philosophy*, published in six volumes in 1830-1842). Intellectually he followed his mentor, Saint-Simon,⁵⁷ developing a grand theory of the evolution of humanity, which defined the development of society, and individuals as well. According to Comte, there are three stages of the evolution of humanity: theological, metaphysical, and positivist or scientific. During the first stage all phenomena are explained on the basis of religious beliefs and perceptions. The second stage replaces supernatural principles with critical thinking and seeks to unravel cause-effect regularities. The second stage prepares society for the third and final stage, which is defined by scientific, positivist, rational understanding of things. The aim of this stage, and the whole progress of society, is to establish scientifically organised society. Comte argued that *the* social science would evolve during the third stage of development, and this would enable a scientific organisation of society. According to him, positivist science and philosophy should not be concerned with the causes of things, but with how things are happening. In other words, science and philosophy, and social

57. Claude Henri de Rouvroy Saint-Simon (1760-1825) was a French philosopher and social scientist. Comte served as his secretary in 1817-1822.

science among them, should concentrate on the question *how* not *why*. Thus for Comte, social science was as real or as positive as physics or chemistry, although not as empirical.⁵⁸ Later in his life, in 1851-1854, Comte published *Système de politique positive* (*System of Positive Polity*) in four enormous volumes. By this work he wanted to institute a new religion of Humanity. Comte believed that it was possible to scientifically study society and politics, and improve social reality. "The positive spirit always consists in acquiring a sufficient knowledge of reality to improve it as much as possible," Comte explained.⁵⁹ However, if evaluated against his own scheme, this work seems to be closer to the mystical mode of reasoning than to the positivist one.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was a 19th century philosopher who, to this day, has had a larger influence on social science and politics than anybody else. Karl Marx, whose ideas are so pervasive even today, was Hegel's most diligent pupil. Georg Hegel developed the most systematic and all-encompassing theory of history ever. With his philosophy of mind Hegel sought to describe the development of history, the human civilisation. He built his philosophy on two foundations: Christian theology, namely *The New Testament*, and classical

58. See "Tableau synoptique du cours de philosophie positive d'Auguste Comte," in Auguste Comte, *Cours de philosophie positive*, Paris: Librairie Garnier Freres, 1949.

59. Auguste Comte, "To His Majesty the Czar Nicholas, St. Petersburg" (December 20, 1852), in his *System of Positive Polity*, Third Volume, London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1876, p. xxxvi.

philosophy, in particular Aristotle's metaphysics.⁶⁰ In principle, Hegel's philosophy is a brilliant conceptual revision and philosophical speculation of St. John's Gospel's first few passages:

"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made. In him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not."⁶¹

For Hegel "in the beginning" was Absolute Mind, being, which alienated itself from itself in itself, and thus, created the world of the senses and perceptions in the place of non-being. Creative Absolute Mind 'travels' through history of this world, learning about itself via the human mind. Absolute Mind's final 'destination' is itself, which it 'approaches' and 'rejoins' enriched with all the experience of history, just as in the Bible, the creative principle, which is one and undivided, goes a full circle of history and finally rejoins itself. According to the Bible, human history starts from the day when Adam and Eve were released from Eden, the place of eternal life. Humans should go through history, and find salvation through the Messiah, who will take them back to the place of eternal life. Both the Bible and Hegel's stories are teleological – they assume the existence of the final destination,

60. These were main influences on Hegel's philosophy, besides, of course, from Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854) and Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843), his roommates at the theological college in Tübingen.

61. Quoted from *The Holy Bible*, London: Cambridge University Press, (dedicated to Prince James), n.d., p. 862.

toward which the process is progressing. However, the story of the Bible is told through images and lyrics that may not be suitable for science. Since Hegel believed that he was doing science with his philosophy, he changed the images and lyrics with concepts and categories. His highly abstract concepts also needed a formal scheme that would make them dynamic, not static.

Hegel found this scheme in Aristotle's metaphysics, which he knew very well. Aristotle operates with four principles of being: *causa formalis*, *causa materialis*, *causa movens*, and *causa finalis*. The first principle gives being its 'meaning;' the second is the material substance of it; the third is the cause of being's movement; and the fourth is a 'goal,' toward which it is moving. Aristotle, one of the greatest minds in history, devised a teleological philosophy, but unlike his successors, he did not create a system out of it (or if he did, it did not survive). In Hegel's scheme *causa formalis* is Absolute Mind in the beginning of its 'journey,' *causa materialis* is the world it creates, *causa movens* is the logic according to which it is becoming known, and *causa finalis* is Absolute Mind at the end of its process.

The logic of Hegel's system is based on the thesis-antithesis-synthesis (affirmation, negation, negation of negation) triad. This is the basis of dialectical thinking, which allows Hegel's theory of history to evolve, to progress, and finally, to come full circle. The German philosopher created a rational theory of history, which he believed was the true scientific understanding of the subject. Hegel's system was deterministic, teleological, and it assumed that history progressed irreversibly. It was a unifying theory of human civilisation, a theory of everything.

Hegel's system was powerful, revolutionary, and it had a deep impact on European intellectuals. Nevertheless, it remained a very abstract philosophical system. There were followers of Hegel who saw this abstractness to be the biggest weakness of Hegel's system, and of philosophy in general. The most innovative among them was Karl Marx (1818-1883), who believed that philosophy should serve progress, but in more worldly ways.

Although he was captivated by Hegel's dialectical method, young Marx did not like philosophical, political, and social theories being so detached from the practical world. He decided that philosophical theories of history and progress should get closer to the world, and the best vehicle for this was the most popular mass media of those days – newspapers.⁶² Marx viewed philosophy to be as useful scientifically in politics as any other science in its own sphere. "In the political sphere," he wrote, "philosophy has done nothing that physics, mathematics, medicine, and every science, have not done in their spheres."⁶³ It should be noted that by "philosophy" young Marx understood any kind of rational, thoughtful criticism. He applied philosophical analysis to non-traditional philosophical questions that were political and economic in nature.⁶⁴ Marx sought to put

62. Karl Marx, "Leading Article in No. 179 of *Kritische Zeitung*" (first published as a supplement in *Reinische Zeitung*, No. 195, July 14, 1842), in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Volume 1, New York: International Publishers, 1975, pp. 195-197.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

64. In a letter published in the *Franco-German Yearbook*, Marx wrote:

philosophy in the service of the proletariat in its class struggle. According to him, philosophy had to become 'real,' and liberate mankind.⁶⁵ For this purpose he re-worked the contents of Hegelian system, keeping its form intact.

Marx also based his theory of history on the dialectical mode of reasoning: thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Like the Bible and Hegel, he saw history as a complete system consisting of three phases. However, for him human history started from non-class society, evolved in and progressed through class society, and enriched by all kinds of experience eventually reached a new non-class mode, which was socialism (communism). Marx also kept Hegel's Aristotelian scheme of principles: for him *causa materialis* was the economic base of society, *causa formalis* was its superstructure, *causa movens* became the class struggle, and *causa finalis* a classless,

We are therefore in a position to sum up the credo of our journal in *single word*: the self-clarification (critical philosophy) of the struggle and wishes of the age. This is a task for the world and for us. It can succeed only as a product of united efforts. What is needed above all is *a confession*, and nothing more than that. To obtain forgiveness for its sins mankind needs to declare them for what they are [emphases in the original].

Karl Marx, "Letters from the Franco-German Yearbook," in Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, New York: Vintage Books, 1975, p. 209.

65. In "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" Marx argued that

Just as philosophy finds its *material* weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its *intellectual* weapon in philosophy... *The emancipation of the German* is the *emancipation* of man. The *head* of this emancipation is *philosophy*, its *heart* the *proletariat*. Philosophy cannot realise itself without the transcendence [rejection, *Aufhebung*] of the proletariat, and the proletariat cannot transcend itself without the realisation [*Vervirklichung*] of philosophy [emphases in the original].

Karl Marx, "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction," in Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, p. 257.

communist society. For Hegel, as well as for Aristotle, the main principle of being was *causa formalis*, Logos, the ideal beginning and the end of all. Marx rejected the idea that anything had an ideal beginning, and chose *causa materialis* as his main principle – the economic base of society exists in any socio-economic formation, and it determines the nature of a formation. *Causa formalis*, superstructure, merely derives from the base, and thus it is secondary. History moves toward the non-antagonistic, non-class mode of existence, and this is its *causa finalis*, its teleological principle of progress. History is moved toward this goal by its progressive forces, proletariat, etc. through class struggle (*causa movens*).

Thus, rejecting Hegel's "absolute science" Marx ended up developing one. He developed a theoretical system, which was as teleological, deterministic, rational, and all encompassing as Hegel's. In his system Marx replaced metaphysics with political economy, and came up with a new theory of everything, in which the whole human experience was unified under the tutelage of economic evolution. Like Comte and Hegel, Marx believed that he was doing the true science. According to him, a scientific theory of society had to be as exact and precise as natural science. In fact, Marx expected the realisation of a grand scientific project, and argued that natural science and human (social) science would become one.⁶⁶ The idea that

66. According to Marx,

Hence natural science will lose its abstractly material, or rather idealist, orientation and become the basis of a *human science*.... The idea of *one* basis for life and another for *science* is from the very outset a lie. Nature as

humanity would evolve from capitalism to a higher stage of development was not a supposition, but the irrefutable logic of the development of society.

Marx, Hegel, and Comte had an enormous influence on social science. By the end of the 19th century, it was widely believed that social science had to be as systematic, exact, and universal as the natural sciences. The titans of 19th century social thought convinced their followers that analysis of social phenomena was conducted by the same method as in natural science, real (positive, observation/experimental) method, although they made a good use of historical method themselves. It was argued that society was developing, progressing, and that history was teleological. Everything in historical development was a subject of rational analysis and explanation, and the explanations, normally, concurred with the tenets of the dominant social theories (positivism and Marxism, in particular). It was also believed that society operated according to universal laws or law-like generalisations that were very similar to those operating in physics and other sciences, and it was up to the students of society and history to discover them.

One more very important 19th century development in scientific and intellectual history was the Darwinian revolution. In 1859 the first edition of

it comes into being in human history –in the act of creation of human society – is the *true* nature of man.... Only when science starts out from nature – is it *real* science.... History itself is a *real* part of *natural history* and of nature's becoming man. Natural science will in time subsume the science of man, just as the science of man will subsume natural science: there will be *one* science [emphases in the original].

Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844)," in Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, p. 355.

Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* was published.⁶⁷ The book became immensely popular, and to the amazement of the author, even attracted the attention of the general public.⁶⁸ In Darwin's lifetime alone the book appeared in six editions with 35 printings. In the same period it was translated into eleven languages.⁶⁹ The subject of Darwin's book is well known. With this work he provided an answer for the question: what are the origins of the world's living organisms? Darwin's argument was that all living organisms were bound by a natural law, and that all types of organisms have descended, gradually being modified through many generations. He identified the mechanism behind this process, something he called "natural selection." Darwin presented a picture of the world's organisms living and evolving together, having the same humble origins, and thus being interrelated. Again, the basis of his argument was identification of natural processes behind this picture, and exclusion of supernatural forces. In this way Darwin created a theory that could explain the origins and lives of every living organism in the world. It was very a powerful and attractive scientific theory using such metaphors as "struggle," "selection," "adaptation," "survival." To these the

67. The full title of the volume was *On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, of the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*. From the sixth edition of 1872 "On" was dropped from the title.

68. David L. Hull, *Darwin and His Critics: The Reception of Darwin's Theory of Evolution by the Scientific Community*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973, vii.

69. "Introduction to Volume Fifteen," in eds. Paul H. Barrett & R. B. Freeman, *The Works of Charles Darwin*, Vol. 15, *On the Origin of Species*, London: William Pickering, 1988, p. 5.

term “survival of the fittest” was added later on.⁷⁰ It was also a theory of everything of sorts, since it encompassed everything within the borders of the discipline of biology. One more important aspect of Darwin’s theory was that man himself had its own niche within it. In 1870-1871 Darwin published a two-volume work, *The Descent of Man*.⁷¹ The origin of man was also to be explained by the same natural processes, and mankind became a part of the larger biological system.

Darwin was not the first scholar to present such a theory. However, he was the first scholar to present the most logical and systemic “theory of evolution.”⁷² There were certain things that made his theory so attractive, yet so criticised. Darwin based his theory on some *obvious* phenomena and processes. For instance, he assumed the fact that there were a variety of species was obvious. The fact that there was variation under domestication was also taken as obvious, and first and foremost, attention in the book was drawn to the results of the processes of breeding and artificial selection practised by humans.⁷³ Evidence provided by

70. This was Herbert Spencer’s term. Ibid., p. 6.

71. *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex*. This two-volume work was compressed into one for the second edition, and included an essay by T. H. Huxley. See “Introduction to Volumes Twenty-One and Twenty-Two,” in eds. Paul H. Barrett & R. B. Freeman, *The Works of Charles Darwin*, Vol. 21, London: William Pickering, 1988, p. 5.

72. Darwin, in fact, did not use the term “evolution” even once in his *Origin of Species*, although the very last word of the book is “evolved.” A very careful scholar and writer, Darwin called his theory “the theory of descent with modification.”

73. Darwin starts the first chapter, “Variation Under Domestication,” of *Origin of Species* with the following passage: “When we look to the individuals of the same variety or sub-variety of our older cultivated plants and animals, one of the first points which strikes us is, that they generally differ more from each other, than do the individuals of any one species or variety in a state of nature.” The

practices of artificial selection known to man for centuries was, in fact, the only scientific evidence Darwin had to support his theory of descent with modification. This evidence was acquired by using inductive method, the most favoured scientific method by such contemporaries as John Stuart Mill and John Herschel. However, Darwin's main method was hypothetico-deductional, which allowed him to extrapolate his theory to the descent of all species.⁷⁴ The practice of breeding was an acknowledged fact, and the scientific community and the general readers could relate to it. The idea that similar processes of natural selection were happening in nature was not an obvious fact, and there was very little or no evidence to support it. However, if humans could do something this remarkable in a short period of time, why could not nature or God, much more powerful than humans, do the same over a much longer period of time? The argument was never posed from such an angle by Darwin, but it was, indeed, a hidden logic of his deduction. *Origin of Species* uses inductive reasoning to present a scientific proof, artificial selection, but it switches to deductive reasoning when presenting a scientific discovery, natural selection. The use of this type of logic was not immediately accepted by the scientific community, but it was widely embraced by the general public. Darwin,

second chapter, "Variation Under Nature," discusses whether organic beings "are subject to any variation" in a state of nature." Darwin, *On the Origin of Species*, p. 6 and p. 33.

74. Many critics of Darwin's theory complained in his day that the theory was not inductive, i.e. it was "not based on a series of acknowledged facts pointing to a *general conclusion*." David L. Hull, *Darwin and His Critics: The Reception of Darwin's Theory of Evolution by the Scientific Community*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974, p. 17.

alongside other great minds of the 19th century, created a breakthrough in his discipline, which touched the subject of the explanation of human society, its origin, and its fate.

At the end of the 19th century the image of the world held mostly by Europeans and Americans changed once more. It was the era when the division of the world among the major imperial powers was virtually complete. The world was freed of political *terrae incognitae*. By 1900 most of the great indigenous states of Africa that resisted the encroachments made by Europeans finally succumbed to their attacks. The 1890s was “clearly the decade of conquest” of Africa, the movement of European conquest reaching a crescendo in 1896.⁷⁵ Now the political maps of the world would depict all populated territories as belonging to one or another nation. At the end of the 19th and the early years of the 20th century, Kjellén and other “imperialist thinkers understood geopolitics as that part of Western imperial knowledge that dealt with the relationship with the physical earth and politics.”⁷⁶ There was virtually no populated territory left in the world where the imperial states could expand further. Expansionist geomentality had reached its peak – if the imperial powers wanted to expand territorially they had to do it at each other’s expense. Vladimir Ulianov-Lenin and others were quick to point out that history had reached the final phase of the capitalist development, imperialism.

75. Robin Hallett, *Africa Since 1875: A Modern History*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1974, p. 49 and p. 50.

76. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Thinking Critically About Geopolitics,” in Gearóid Ó Tuathail et al., p. 1.

According to Lenin, a revolutionary follower of Marx's teaching, because of the achieved territorial stalemate in the world, major powers were bound to fight imperial wars that would eventually lead toward socialist revolutions. Hegel and Marx had been the masters of devising global, universal theories guided mainly by temporal dimensions of the existence of humanity. Now the time had come when the world's spatial dimensions had to be taken into account as well.

These changes in European geomentality prepared a fertile ground for the birth of such disciplines as geopolitics and international relations. The mental image of the world changed; therefore, there was a niche and a need for new disciplines to engage in a discourse operating with global concepts. Geopolitics seems to be a natural result of this need. Many political geographers consider geopolitics to be a sub-discipline or a branch of political geography. There is a dominant argument among political geographers that states that geopolitics is very similar to political geography, but with a very important distinction: geopolitics is based on global thinking, and mostly concerned with global rivalries and other global issues.⁷⁷ Geopolitics should not be confused with political geography, because it is only one subject studied by political geographers, and it is concerned with "the study of States in the context of global spatial phenomena."⁷⁸ Geopolitics, especially of the

77. Peter J. Taylor, *Political Geography: World Economy, Nation-State, and Locality*, Essex: Longman, 1993, p. 50.

78. Glassner, p. 223. The author distinguishes between "State" and "state:" according to him, two different phenomena that should not be confused with each other or with the concept of "nation." (pp. 35-40).

traditional kind, involved “speculation on the grandest possible of scales.” However, it was never more than “a component of political geography.”⁷⁹ The term “geopolitics” is normally understood as a discipline dealing with global politics, and its meaning changes “as historical periods and structures of world order change.”⁸⁰ In short, whatever the most acceptable definitions of political geography and geopolitics may be, most political geographers seem to agree on one thing: that geopolitics is different from political geography in taking the whole world as the main subject of its research or analysis or speculation.⁸¹ Political geography tells stories about discrete units of the globe while geopolitics, at least of the traditional character, seeks to light the whole globe, and tell epic stories.

In the epoch of grand theories and imperialism, geopolitics too was born as a grand imperialist theory. Its relevance to imperialism is evident from an analysis of the ideas of its founders, Ratzel, Kjellén, Mahan, Mackinder, and Haushofer. The relationship of geopolitical theories to the dominant mode of thinking of those days is not noted as frequently, however. The traditional geopolitical theories were deterministic speculations on the largest scale possible, involving continents, nations, and millions of people. The founders of the discipline reasoned just like the

79. Richard Muir, *Political Geography: A New Introduction*, London: Macmillan Press, 1997, p. 214.

80. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Thinking Critically About Geopolitics,” in Gearóid Ó Tuathail et al., p. 1.

81. I provide definitions given by political geographers, because political scientists who analyse and talk geopolitics do not compare it to political geography, or do not try to situate geopolitics within political geography.

19th century titans of universal theories: they stated their ideas categorically, insisted that they were doing science just as natural scientists did, and believed that their conclusions were objective and without any kind of bias. In most cases they neglected consistency in using a research method.

Friedrich Ratzel never stated that he was inventing a new discipline called geopolitics. However, he is regarded by many as one of the founders of geopolitics, because of the all-encompassing nature of his theoretical analysis. The most important among Ratzel's works is *Anthropogeographie* or human geography, which is the application of the principles of the Darwinian theory to the study of human society. Ratzel was very productive and insightful scholar, but he was not original in his intellectual approach to the subject. If Marx used political economy to give life to abstract philosophical speculations about history, Ratzel chose geography to explain human history and society. Ratzel was very far from being a follower of Marx, and did not use any of Marx's concepts and analogies. But he did follow the intellectual fashion of his time: when scientific thinking was replacing philosophical reasoning as the dominant mode of scholarship it seems that creation of grand theories was the most respectable way of explaining human history.

Unlike Marx, who was a philosopher by education, Ratzel came from a background of biological and other sciences. When he was attending Heidelberg University in the 1860s, Darwin's *Origin of Species* was gaining support and influence in the scholarly circles of Europe. In Germany, E. Haeckel and others were developing all-encompassing *Weltanschauung* — a new scientific mentality, through

which the world could be understood and explained exclusively in terms of the natural laws of selection and struggle for survival proclaimed by Darwin.⁸² Haeckel was, in fact, developing theory that later became known as Social Darwinism. Although Ratzel was influenced by this new *Weltanschauung*, later he rejected it and distanced himself from leading Social Darwinists like Haeckel.⁸³ Among other Darwinian scholars who influenced Ratzel was Moritz Wagner, who in his works perfected Darwin's theory of evolution of the species by adding to it a spatial dimension. Wagner, with whom Ratzel became close friends, developed the theory of *Migrationsgesetz* (the Law of Migration), which focused on factors of movement, migration of organisms, and the living space they occupied. Wagner's theories had a profound impact on the young Ratzel, who observed that *Migrationsgesetz* used in the context of human society was the most fundamental law of world history. Following the logic of the Darwin-Wagner theories, Ratzel developed his famous bio-geographical concept of *Lebensraum* (living space), which was the foremost analytical concept for his analyses.⁸⁴

While young, Ratzel travelled a lot around the world as a foreign columnist for *Kölnische Zeitung*. A keen and careful observer, Ratzel noted such processes as

82. Mark Bassin, "Friedrich Ratzel 1844-1904," in ed. T. W. Freeman, *Geographers: Biobibliographical Studies*; vol. 11, London and New York: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1987, p. 123.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

large-scale human migration and dispersal of settlements, physical expansion of states, influence exerted by the environment on individuals and on the different forms of social life. During these travels Ratzel became interested in geography, and he used his personal experience later when theorising the new discipline of anthropogeography. He wrote that the new science had three principal tasks: first, to describe the distribution of humans in a region; second, to study human migratory processes of all types and their dependency on the land; and third, to analyse the effect of the natural environment on humans, both on individuals and on different social groups.⁸⁵ The last principle gave Ratzel's thinking a deterministic tendency. The three principles taken together allowed him to apply his theory to any region and social group in the world, including whole states, nations, and ethnic groups. Indeed, Ratzel concentrated his intellectual efforts on ethnography and history, and in 1885-1888 published his voluminous *Völkerkunde* or *The History of Mankind*. In the introduction to this work, Ratzel emphasizes that it is necessary to study "not only... what man is, but... the means by which he has become what he is, so far as the process has left any traces of its manifold inner workings." In this study "the geographical conception of their [various races] surroundings, and the historical consideration of their development, will thus go hand in hand." It was only from the combination of these two, geography and history, that a just

85. Ibid.

reasoning on the subject could be derived.⁸⁶

Thus, using the Darwinian ideas of evolution of species as analogies and an analytical base, Ratzel developed a unifying theory of geography and history in his attempt to describe and explain human civilisation. His theory of anthropogeography had deterministic tendencies, which was inevitable since it was a product of the application of natural-scientific principles to human society. Ratzel also ended up with his own 'theory of everything,' which had geography as its base. The scholar who brought in social sciences' infamous term *Lebensraum* was also an imperialist.⁸⁷ From the 1870s until his later years he was affiliated with groups of individuals who argued that a united Germany could not survive in the middle of Europe as a competitive world power without acquiring overseas colonies as well. The Munich Association for the Defence of German Interests Abroad was founded in the late 1870s under his leadership. In 1882 Ratzel became a founding member of what became the principal lobby group for colonies, the Colonial Society. When in 1884 Germany finally acquired colonial territories in Africa, Ratzel sharply criticised those who opposed such policies.⁸⁸

At the end of the 19th century Ratzel joined a group of prominent German

86. Friedrich Ratzel, *The History of Mankind*, Volume 1, London and New York: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1896, p. 3.

87. It should be noted that Ratzel himself did not use this term to promote or condone racial discrimination, genocide, and other things *Lebensraum* became subsequently associated with under the Nazis.

88. Bassin, p. 125.

academics that supported the all-out development of a German navy to defend and enhance its competitive position in the world. This group, known as “fleet professors,” included such notables as Max Weber.⁸⁹ At that time Ratzel wrote a book on the sea as the source of national greatness titled *Das Meer als Quelle der Völkergröße; Eine politisch-geographische Studie*. The book, which bore a strong likeness to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, was published in 1900.⁹⁰ Mahan, whose book had been published ten years earlier, is often mentioned as one of the founders of geopolitics. It is true that he influenced geopoliticians like Mackinder, Haushofer, and the political geographer who prepared very fertile soil for geopolitics, Friedrich Ratzel, but in terms of scholarly thinking, scope, and research method Mahan was hardly a geopolitician. Mahan did not try to develop a grand theory of history, nor were his works teleological and deterministic. Mahan’s writings give no indication of developing a quasi-philosophical system unifying geography and history. However, he did live and work in the era of imperialism, and as a senior naval officer with the US Navy, thought about and judged the world accordingly. Only his global thinking, and analyses of certain geographical factors that influenced world history, place Mahan in one camp with geopoliticians. His writings also show some Darwinian influence. In *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812*, Mahan

89. Ibid.

90. Harriet Grace Wanklyn, *Friedrich Ratzel: A Biographical Memoir and Bibliography*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1961, p. 15.

compared naval and commercial activities to a living organism, which could live and grow. These activities, he noted, could be "seen to be a complex organism, endowed with a life of its own, receiving and imparting countless impulses, moving in a thousand currents which twine in and around one another in infinite flexibility."⁹¹

According to Jon Sumida, the world's foremost expert on Mahan's writings, the American admiral did not argue that geography determined the course of history. Sumida summarises Mahan's views on geographical position in the following way:

First, an insular state was more likely to concentrate its resources on maritime development and overseas territorial extension than a continental one. Second, geographical factors could either 'promote a concentration, or... necessitate a dispersion, of naval forces' with large effects on a country's naval strategic circumstances. Third, geographical position vis-à-vis other powers could confer 'the future strategic advantage of a central position and a good base for hostile operations against probable enemies' in terms not only of attack on territory but also on important trade routes. And fourth, Mahan noted that control of certain bodies of water was particularly important for economic and military reasons.⁹²

Mahan was a very prolific writer. If one can judge his research method from his *Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*, and various reviews of his other

91. Jon Sumida, "Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 22, Numbers 2/3 (June/September 1999). Special Issue on *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy*, eds. Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, p. 54.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

works by Sumida,⁹³ the Sprouts,⁹⁴ and Glassner,⁹⁵ one could argue that Mahan was a political scientist rather than geopolitician. He used the comparative historical method of analysis in order to understand certain aspects of great power politics, and draw conclusions for his own country, the United States. Mahan did extensive historical research not for the sake of learning history, but for understanding how experiences of great powers of the past could be related to his contemporary United States. Mahan did make some unwarranted generalisations, and engaged in inaccurate prognostication of the future, but these were intended as policy recommendations, not as teleological arguments.

Unlike Mahan and like Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, a Swedish political scientist, was a university professor; later he became a member of the Swedish parliament. Kjellén was the one who coined the term geopolitics (*geopolitik* in Swedish and German). In 1899–1900 he used this term when he was teaching Swedish geography at Göteborg University, using methods and ideas borrowed from Friedrich Ratzel. Kjellén was a great admirer of the German scholar and Germany, and he also used Ratzel's analogy of the state as an organism. Unlike Ratzel, however, he approved of Darwin's theory of natural selection, took it literally, and insisted that states were

93. Despite the title of his article, Sumida thinks that "Mahan was an historian and essentially a humanist." Ibid., p. 59.

94. For the Sprouts, Mahan was a geopolitician. Margaret Sprout and Harold Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics*, Princeton, NJ: D. van Nostrand, 1962.

95. Glassner classifies Mahan as geostrategist. Glassner, p. 225.

just like living organisms. In his most important work, *The State as a Life-form* (*Staten som livsform*, in Swedish), Kjellén defined *geopolitik* as the study of the state as a geographical organism manifesting itself in space.⁹⁶ This organism that materialises in space was a multifaceted phenomenon, and it could be studied as a sum of its five main manifestations: the state as a commonwealth (*Reich*), the state as a nation (*Volk*), the state as a household (*Haushalt*), the state as a society (*Gessellschaft*), and the state as a government (*Regiment*). *Geopolitik* was the study of the state as a commonwealth. *Demopolitik* was to study the state as a nation, *Soziopolitik* as a society, *Wirtschaftspolitik* as a household, and *Herrschaftspolitik* as a government.⁹⁷

Kjellén constructed a rigid positivist system to study the state, which he believed was a real phenomenon as living organism. He was very much influenced by Darwinian ideas of natural selection, and extrapolated this theory of the English biologist to human societies. Kjellén saw the states as living organisms in possession of forces of life and instincts, and existing in the condition of constant struggle for survival.⁹⁸ In the tradition of the right-wing Hegelians, Kjellén gave priority to government, rule, and order. He argued that one of the main manifestations of the state was its existence as a form of government, rule, and order. As such the state

96. The author defines geopolitics in the following way: "Die Geopolitik ist die Lehre über den Staat als geographischem Organismus oder Erscheinung im Raum." Rudolf Kjellén, *Der Staat als Lebensform*; Leipzig: S. Hirzel Verlag, 1917; p. 46.

97. Ibid., p. 94, p. 156, p. 171, and p. 185.

98. Ibid., p. 37.

was a goal itself, not an institution that serves its citizens. In terms of political preferences, Kjellén devoted much of his attention to Germany and its central position in Europe. As an imperialist thinker, he saw Germany's expansion in Europe as a natural way for it to assume the dominant position on the continent, and thus, become an empire-state just like the United States, and Russia.⁹⁹ According to Kjellén, states should expand in space in order to survive, and if smaller states would meet their demise in the way, it was only the natural way of things.¹⁰⁰

Halford John Mackinder, an English scholar and politician, was like Ratzel and Kjellén influenced by Darwinian theories. Like Ratzel he was educated as a scientist, mostly in biological disciplines. Mackinder borrowed some of his ideas from Mahan.¹⁰¹ However, he tried to create a philosophical system of sciences in order to explain and interpret human history. He believed in causal relations and rationalism, and in the beginning of his career sought to develop an exact science of politics based on geography and history. He warned against deterministic assumptions and reasoning in geographical disciplines, but came out with the most famous geopolitical dictum ever. Like Ratzel, Kjellén and Mahan, Mackinder was an imperialist thinker, defending and promoting the interests of the British Empire.

99. Kjellén envisions Germany as the centre-piece of *Mittleuropa*. Kjellén, pp. 82-83.

100. Ibid., pp. 59-60.

101. Sumida, p. 58.

In *The Geographical Pivot of History*, published in 1904, Mackinder wrote that “my aim will... be... to exhibit human history as part of the life of the world organism.”¹⁰² Mackinder tried to develop a geographical method for better explaining society, as well as the animal kingdom; he believed that “the geographical distribution of animals was one of the principal foundations of the Darwinian theory.”¹⁰³ Mackinder considered geographical space to be an important requirement for the development of the social organism. According to Darwinian theories, species compete for survival, the fittest survive, and the existence of human society is to be understood along similar lines. However, unlike Kjellén, Mackinder argued for “the natural regions” of geographical environment, meaning that the available space in the world was already filled up.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, despite relying on Darwin’s dynamic theories of evolution, Mackinder seemed to favour the international status quo, and was not calling for drastic changes of international borders. In fact, during the First World War he pointed out that borders were fixed by a process of political bargaining, and argued against crushing enemies: “you are

102. Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” in ed. Gearóid Ó Tuathail et.al., p. 28.

103. Gerry Kearns, “Halford John Mackinder, 1861-1947,” in ed. T. W. Freeman, *Geographers: Biobibliographical Studies*, Vol. 9, London and New York: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1985, p. 77. In fact, as was discussed above, Moritz Wagner, a German follower of Darwin and a friend of Ratzel, noted that the spatial dimension was lacking in Darwin’s theory, and came up with his own “Law of Migration.”

104. Geoffrey Sloan, “Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 22, Numbers 2/3 (June/September 1999). Special issue on *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy*; eds. Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, p. 23.

not going to crush out the German nationality. That is impossible; nor would it be desirable, if it were possible."¹⁰⁵

Mackinder's writings were replete with Social Darwinist and racist assertions. In analysing society and history he concentrated on biological and largely neglected social aspects of humanity. Mackinder derived from Social Darwinism his pseudo-rational reasoning about the "Anglo-Saxon race," and "the English blood." He worried for the survival of the British empire and saw the solution in the special nurturing of the pure British race: "you must so increase your white man-power, both in number and efficiency, and so attract your dark man-power, that your friendship may be worthy of allies and that foes may shrink from your strength."¹⁰⁶ Mackinder had races as the basic units of analysis, rather than classes or nation-states. However, unlike Kjellén he did not see the world engaged strictly in a Darwinian struggle for survival, but ascribed to his races "inherited characteristics" learned from their environment. Mackinder saw blood as a means of passing down the lessons learned from geographic habitat:

"the genetic influences are the momentum from the past, and the genetic influences acting on this generation may be resolved into the dynamic and genetic of the last. If this process be repeated through many generations, it is clear that the sum total of geographical influence is always accumulating."¹⁰⁷

105. Ibid., p. 24.

106. Kearns, p. 75.

107. Ibid., p. 79.

However, after the bloody First World War, Mackinder rethought the dominance of biological aspects of human civilisation. "Last century, under the spell of the Darwinian theory," he wrote, "men came to think that those forms of organisation should survive which adapted themselves best to their natural environment. To-day we realise, as we emerge from our fiery trial, that human victory consists in our rising superior to such mere fatalism."¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, Mackinder never gave up "the blood" as an analytical concept. In an article published in 1931 he wrote:

Within this natural region [the English plain] we have the English blood, one fluid, the same down through the centuries, on loan for the moment in the forty million bodies of the present generation. John Bull in his insularity is the exemplar of the myriad separate bloods and saps, each the fluid essence of a local variety of species of animal or plant.¹⁰⁹

As an imperialist thinker Mackinder tried to justify the supremacy of the British Empire with the claims that as the most racially developed nation, England had a duty to fulfil in spreading "responsible government" and "our methods of business" throughout the world. In 1911, he expressed concern that the British Empire might not hold its due place in the world "according to the universal law of survival through efficiency and effort," if the citizens of the empire were not

108. Sir Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1942, p. 2.


109. As quoted by Kearns, p. 79.

geographically educated from "the British standpoint."¹¹⁰ In the 1920s, Mackinder still maintained that the guiding forces of world development were to be found in biological-genetic characteristics of certain nations. He identified these 'genetic forces' with historical forces of development. They included race-character and race-tradition. In 1925 Mackinder argued that "the English race, the English blood" was carrying a certain character that was "something physical, and not wholly transferable except with the blood." This was "the English tradition embodied in our Common Law, our Parliamentary system, our methods of business."¹¹¹ Since "the English race" was a unique phenomenon, it had the duty of maintaining itself in the dominant position in the world so that it could impart "responsible government" to the rest of the world.

In the tradition of Hegel and Marx, who championed the use of the dialectical law of the unity and struggle of the opposites, Mackinder in his geopolitical theories divided the world into two opposing camps: land-power and sea-power, the landsman's world and the seaman's world. In Mackinder's understanding these two worlds naturally oppose each other, but they still are the two cardinal parts of the same world organism (see Map 3-2). Mackinder's initial and very ambitious goal was to develop his own philosophical-political theory, centred on the unified theory of geography and history. He began his paper on *The*

110. Ibid., p. 78.

111. Ibid.



Map 3-2. Mackinder's geopolitical vision of the world. The natural seats of power: the geography of the distribution of power in the world.

Source: The Geopolitics Reader, edited by G. Ó. Tuathail, S. Dalby, and P. Routledge. London and New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 31.

Geographical Pivot of History by noting that since the age of geographical exploration was nearly over, "geography must be diverted to the purpose of intensive survey and philosophical synthesis."¹¹² Mackinder saw the basis of this synthesis in the unity of geography and history, with the dominant position given to geography, and historical processes excluded from consideration. He argued that "geographer uses History in order to interpret the present."¹¹³ Mackinder wanted to use history only for consideration of its "results." Just as the artefacts set in place in earlier periods become part of the environment of the present, "thus the results of history are embodied in geographical facts in a manner quite analogous to the determination of the physical geography of a country by its geology."¹¹⁴

In his 1904 *Geographical Pivot*, Mackinder was cautious about deterministic trends in geography: "the actual balance of political power at any given time is, of course, the product, on the one hand, of geographical conditions, both economic and strategic, and, on the other hand, of the relative number, virility, equipment, and organisation of the competing peoples."¹¹⁵ In spite of this, he argued for "the natural seats of power," and came up with the most famous geopolitical dictum, which was deterministic in nature:

112. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot...", p. 27.

113. Kearns, p. 79.

114. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

115. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot...", p. 31.

*Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.*¹¹⁶

The Heartland for Mackinder was the geographical space roughly equivalent to the territory of the Soviet Union. In the beginning of the 20th century, when first developing his Heartland-Rimland rivalry theory, Mackinder expected that in the new century the Heartland would assert itself as a more dominant force. One of the factors he gave an emphasis was the development of railroads. Mackinder forecast this form of transportation to be crucial in the 20th century, so that it would change trade patterns and development of remote regions.

In 1904 Mackinder believed that at least “geographical quantities in the calculation” were measurable, and “more nearly constant than the human;”¹¹⁷ in measurability and constancy he saw the scientific nature of geography. He later changed his mind and was willing to concede that geography was not a strict science, since the operation of societies might not be predictable.¹¹⁸ However, he did not give up the idea that the investigation of causal relations, not historicism, was the main approach to the study of society. In 1904 Mackinder wanted to “seek a formula which shall express certain aspects, at any rate, of geographical causation

116. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals...*, p. 150.

117. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot...,” p. 31.

118. Kearns, p. 78.

in universal history.”¹¹⁹ In 1931 he still maintained that “geography should, as I see it, be a physiological and anatomical study rather than a study in development. As its name implies, it should be a description, with causal relations in a dynamic rather than genetic sense.”¹²⁰

Thus, the birth of a new European geomentality was more or less outlined and formalised by the creators of geopolitics. Students of international politics started to discuss the world as one entity or even an organism. This newly found unity of the world created a new environment of dependency and sensitivity. Mackinder spoke for all when in 1904 he declared the Columbian age to be over:

From the present time forth, in the post-Columbian age, we shall again have to deal with a closed political system, and none the less that it will be one of world wide scope. Every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence.¹²¹

The world was no longer divided between the known and the unknown: “the known does not fade any longer through the half-known into the unknown; there is no longer elasticity of political expansion in lands beyond the pale.”¹²² The

119. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot...,” p. 27.

120. As quoted by Kearns, p. 80.

121. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot...,” p. 27.

122. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals*..., p. 29.

geographical knowledge of Europeans was now complete, at least in outline.¹²³ For the first time in history, European scholars were “in a position to attempt, with some degree of completeness, a correlation between the larger geographical and the larger historical generalisations.”¹²⁴

Imperialist Geomentality: Russia’s Place in the World

The period from the mid-18th century to the beginning of the 20th century in Russian history is marked with a steady territorial expansion and consolidation of the Russian Empire. In 1772-1773 the first partition of Poland took place and Russia annexed Belarus, part of Lithuania, and other lands.¹²⁵ Poland was partitioned twice more in the 18th century, in 1792-93 and 1795. After the second partition Russia acquired almost all lands populated by Ukrainians and Belarussians. The population of these lands totalled 3 million.¹²⁶ Russia participated in the third partition of Poland as well, and as a result the empire incorporated more lands around the Baltic Sea, thus entrenching itself in very important strategic and trading points of north-eastern Europe.¹²⁷ The same was achieved in the south, around the


123. Ibid.

124. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot...,” p. 27.

125. The population of the lands acquired by Russia was about 1.8 million. Michael Florinsky, *Russia: A History and An Interpretation*, Vol. 1, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964, p. 524.

126. Lebedev, p. 25.

127. Florinsky, pp. 537-540.



Source: "Russian Expansion in Europe and Asia 1462 to 1815," in *The Times Atlas of World Geography*, edited by Geoffrey Barraclough, London: Times Books Limited, 1984, p. 163.

Black and Azov Seas. After defeating Turkey in the war of 1768-1774, Russia firmly established its presence on the Black Sea and gained unrestricted access to the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits.¹²⁸ In 1775 the autonomy of the Zaporozhian Cossacks was liquidated and their lands were incorporated into the empire. In 1781-1786 Russia fully occupied the Ukraine. In 1783 Russia's presence in the south was strengthened by the incorporation of the Crimea into the empire.¹²⁹ After the 1787-1791 Russo-Turkish war, Russia gained more lands between the rivers of South Bug and Dnestr (see Map 3-3).¹³⁰ In 1784 Gregory Shelekov established the first colony in Alaska, and in 1799 the Russo-American Trading Company was formed, thus opening the doors for the exploration and settlement of Alaska.¹³¹ During the same year, Aleksandr Suvorov conducted a successful military campaign in northern Italy and Switzerland. The aim of this campaign was not to incorporate these countries into Russia, but it effectively demonstrated that Russia could project its forces far beyond its borders and maintain their fighting capabilities.

The population of the Russian Empire was growing with the acquisition of

128. Paul Dukes, *A History of Russia: Medieval, Modern Contemporary*, London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 118-119.

129. Catherine the Great and Prince Potemkin had a "Greek Project" envisioning nothing less than the revival of the Byzantine Empire, the roots of Russia's Christian heritage. Dukes, p. 118.

130. Lebedev, p. 25.

new territories. Russian historians estimate that if in 1762 the population of Russia was around 19 million, by the end of the 18th century, in 1796, it reached 36 million, of which 7 million lived on newly gained territories.¹³² In less than 40 years the population of the empire grew by more than 50 per cent.

In the 19th century Russia continued to gain new lands. In 1801 Russia annexed eastern Georgia, and eventually occupied the whole country.¹³³ In 1806 Russia conquered Daghestan and much of today's Azerbaijan. In 1809 Russia annexed Finland. In 1812-14 Russia again demonstrated that it could conduct effective military campaigns abroad by defeating Napoleon I in Russia and chasing him to Paris. After the 1828-1829 Russo-Turkish war, Russia acquired more lands at the mouth of the Danube.¹³⁴ Since the end of the 16th century Russia was expanding steadily in Asia. It soon reached the Pacific Ocean and established a numerous strategically located ports along the way (see Map 3-4). In 1858-1860 Russia acquired from China the Amur and Maritime lands, and in 1860 Vladivostok (the word literally means "own the East") was founded. In 1859 Russia made important

131. Alaska was sold to the United States in 1867.

132. Lebedev provides data by two Russian historians, p. 26. The figure Dukes provides is even higher – 37.5 million by 1795. Dukes, p. 144.

133. Emperor Pavel of Russia "was preparing a grandiose campaign for the conquest of India," but was assassinated in the same year of 1801. Ibid., p. 119.

134. Russia was later forced to withdraw from the mouth of the Danube after signing the Treaty of Paris in 1856, which was a result of the defeat in the Crimean War of 1854-1856. Ibid., pp. 142-143.



Map 3-4. Russian expansion in Asia. Rivers facilitated exploration, soon reinforced by strategic forts. The foundation dates show the dramatic speed of the expansion of Russia into the territories that had been dominated by the Mongols, Tatars, Chinese and others.

Source: "Russian Expansion in Europe and Asia 1462 to 1815," in *The Times Atlas of World Geography*, edited by Geoffrey Barraclough, London: Times Books Limited, 1984, p. 162.

headway in the conquest of the North Caucasus by capturing Imam Shamil.¹³⁵ The population of Russia grew considerably. By 1838 it was around 37.5 millions, and by 1851 it reached 69 million.¹³⁶ Meanwhile, Russia was slowly industrialising and developing rail links in its old and newer territories. In 1851 the first Russia railway linking Moscow and St. Petersburg was opened. In 1860-1873 Russia experienced a railway boom, but it was concentrated mostly in the western parts of the country. Industrial and economic developments in the East were very slow, and there were no railways there until 1891 when the Trans-Siberian railway was started. In 1864-1885 Russia conquered much of Central Asia. In 1898 Russian forces occupied the Chinese cities of Port Arthur and Dalny (the latter means "remote" in Russian). In 1900 Russia participated in crushing the Boxer Rebellion and occupied Manchuria.

Thus, by the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian empire reached its peak: until the end of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, Russia occupied the largest landmass in its history, and was one of the most populous states in the world. The first all-Russia census of 1897 counted almost 126 million people. By

135. The resistance offered by north Caucasians to the Russian invader did not cease until the early 1860s. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

136. *Ibid.*, p. 144.

1913 they had grown to almost 166 million.¹³⁷

Russia approached the culmination of expansionism from a similar experience with the major Western European states, but it walked its own path. If the Western European colonial powers colonised and exploited lands across the oceans, Russia expanded its empire by incorporating and conquering lands bordering its frontiers. As a result, Russia ended up as the largest contiguous empire in history. This period of unprecedented land-based expansion was also significant in Russia due to the coming of age of its revolutionary thinkers. Russia had never suffered from the absence of revolutionaries and rebels of all sorts, but the beginning of the 20th century was significant in terms of revolutionary movements reaching their maturity. They saw the world divided among a very few large European nations, with Russia among them, which were oppressing both colonised people and their own working class. The ruling regime in Russia was among the most oppressive in the world, trying to maintain the unity of the vast country by brute police and military force. Members of Russian revolutionary organisations came from different nationalities. Besides Russians, prominent members of revolutionary groups included Ukrainians, Jews, Poles, Georgians, Armenians, and others. The existing international political and economic environment, in conjunction with the intellectual heritage of the 19th century, helped Russia revolutionaries to reach maturity.

137. Ibid., p. 199.

In his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Vladimir Lenin presented a dramatic picture of the world divided among the predatory forces of capitalism. Lenin's main concern was to argue for a socialist revolutionary movement, but in the process, he supplied Marxism with a powerful revisionist doctrine. An important element of this doctrine was its international dimension.¹³⁸ In the 5th and 6th chapters of this book, Lenin depicted the world divided among the great competing powers and international financial and industrial consortia. Lenin wrote that "for the first time the world is completely divided up, so that in the future *only* re-division is possible, i.e., territories can only pass from one "owner" to another, instead of passing as ownerless territory to an "owner.""¹³⁹ These powers and consortia controlled different geographical chunks of the world. The geographically divided world, however, was united by all-penetrating forces of international capitalism. Thus, Lenin perceived the world to be completely divided among territorial states, but, at the same time, united by economic forces. Lenin used economic and other data to prove his arguments. In the "Preface to the French and German Editions," he spoke of the uneven development of different parts of the world, best indicated by the uneven development of railways.¹⁴⁰ In terms of

138. Robert Tucker, "Foreword" to "Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism," in ed. Robert C. Tucker, *The Lenin Anthology*, New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1975, p. 204.

139. Lenin, *Imperialism. The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, no date, p. 129.

140. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

development, Lenin saw the international system as a system of the unity and struggle of "advanced," "civilised" states, and the "dependent countries."¹⁴¹ The latter were oppressed and exploited by the former, due to, among other things, their attractive geographical characteristics, such as raw materials, and agricultural potential.¹⁴²

Lenin thought himself as a true Marxist, and he had a Marxian vision of history as a process of human development going through various stages of economic progress, and ending with its highest stage, a classless society. He was no geopolitician and had no desire to focus on territorial and geographical aspects and history. However, the emergence of imperialism by the beginning of the 20th century gave Lenin an opportunity to envision spatial aspects of the universal historical process of class struggle. Lenin depicted a dramatic picture of the world territorially divided and controlled by the dark forces of capitalism. The oppressed masses had no salvation except revolutionary struggle for liberation. According to Lenin, humanity reached a new, imperialist stage of development. Now capitalism had nowhere else to go, but to be destroyed and buried by the hands of the proletariat. The struggle between the oppressive and the oppressed forces of humanity was supposed to reach its culmination in imperialism, resulting in a socialist revolution. The socialist revolution was to abolish the main instrument of

141. Ibid., p. 11.

142. Ibid., pp. 139-141.

the oppressive forces, the state, with its territorial characteristics. The oppressive, reactionary forces were represented by capitalists, bourgeoisie, and land owners. Lenin identified himself and his comrades with the oppressed, progressive forces of history represented by the working class. In this global dichotomy there was no other significant force, just 'us' and 'them.'

Lenin wrote *Imperialism* in 1916, and published it in 1917. After the Bolsheviks took power at the end of 1917, and found themselves engaged in the deadliest civil war in history, Lenin came up with his infamous dictum "who is not with us is against us." For him 'us' were the Bolsheviks, and 'them' was everybody else. According to this logic, whoever did not support the Bolshevik cause was against the revolution. One could not be neutral in this struggle. The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty of February 1918, and especially the foreign intervention in Russia during the Russian Civil War of 1918-1921, demonstrated that the territorial state was not dead at all, and a world wide socialist revolution was nowhere in sight. The global and universal dichotomy between the progressive and the reactionary forces of history articulated chiefly in economic terms, now acquired its territorial dimension. The *Us vs. Them* dictum became a signifier of the struggle between the progressive Soviet state, and the reactionary world capitalism still controlling much of the planet. If the new Soviet regime wanted to defend itself from the opposing camp, it had to fight territorial wars. It was ironic that, as a result of their victory in the Civil War, and successful defence against the outside forces, the Bolsheviks not only preserved the Russian Empire, but consolidated and gave it a new, more

modern form of existence. Anti-imperialists before the 1917 October revolution, by the end of 1922 the Bolsheviks were in charge of one of the major imperialist players in the world, the USSR.

Geographical thinking was not foreign to other major figures of Russian revolutionary thought either. Prince Peter Kropotkin, a major theoretician of anarchism, was a noted and accomplished geographer as well,¹⁴³ although most of his work in the discipline was done in physical geography. Kropotkin did not think much about the territorial aspects of international relations, mainly because he believed that the territorial state was an instrument of oppression, and as such had no future. Kropotkin hated the institutions of the state as such, and the Russian state institutions in particular. Georgy Plekhanov, 'the father' of Russian Social-Democracy, was influenced by major geographical works of the day. It has been noted that he used extensively Ratzel's ideas on political geography. Plekhanov borrowed heavily from Ratzel when he was explaining the human condition from a materialist standpoint, and thought Ratzel's work to be *de facto* historical

143. For Kropotkin's geographical contributions, see Olga Alexandrovskaya, "Pyotr Alexeivich Kropotkin 1842-1921," and S. R. Potter, "Peter Alexeivich Kropotkin 1842-1921," in ed. T. W. Freeman, *Geographers: Biobibliographical Studies*, Vol. 7, London & New York: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1983, pp. 57-62 and pp. 63-69 respectively.

materialism.¹⁴⁴

External and internal shocks experienced by the Russian state in the beginning of the 20th century, such as the defeat and loss of lands in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, the revolution and the general strike of 1905, the Stolypin land reforms of 1906-1911, the First World War, two revolutions of 1917, the loss of more possessions, the Civil War, War Communism, and foreign intervention accentuated the geomentality of Russian scholars and politicians. Besides the already popular themes of the global distribution of power, etc., Russians also emphasised more traditional Russian themes of the identity, fate, and destiny of Russia and its peoples. After the violent first quarter of the 20th century, not only Russia's singular geographical characteristics, but its own way of historical change as well became the main subjects of debates among Russian intellectuals of geopolitical inclination.

Apart from the now official Marxist-Leninist doctrine of imperialism, the most prominent independent geopolitician in the Soviet Union of the 1920s and 1930s was Veniamin Petrovich Semënov-Tyan-Shanskiy. A professor of country studies and geography at Leningrad University, V. P. Semënov-Tyan-Shanskiy developed a globalistic theory of the relationships among cultural, and above all political, phenomena with their historical antecedents and natural environment, in the process of the interaction of humans with their geographical space.

144. Bassin, pp. 128-129.

Professor V. P. Semēnov-Tyan-Shanskiy sought to develop a synthetic discipline of all geographical knowledge called anthropogeography (*antropogeografiya*). This discipline, “country studies of territorial domination,” was said to study “territorial and spiritual domains of human communities.”¹⁴⁵ The approach blended some anthropological considerations with more traditional geographical determinism in order to give more attention to certain aspects of human activity, especially those in the economic sphere, helping to form territorial domains on the basis of given geographical factors. V. P. Semēnov-Tyan-Shanskiy saw historical processes in conjunction with natural, cultural, and economic factors as the unified developing force of territories, with the resulting “power-territorial domains.”¹⁴⁶ According to him, geography could express itself in scientific statements that possessed the quality of “laws of spatial relationships of life on Earth in the broadest meaning of those words, that is, beginning with the life of rocks and ending with the life of humans.”¹⁴⁷ Russia was given its fair share of attention in this doctrine as a country with a “trans-continental” system of territorial-political dominance. Russia also served as a case study in analysing the importance of “colonial bases” as the foundations for a territorial-political power. V.

145. Iu. V. Tikhonravov, *Geopolitika*, Moscow: INFRA-M, 2000; p. 231.

146. In 1915 V. P. Semēnov-Tyan-Shanskiy produced *Tipy mestnostey Evropeyskoy Rossii y Kavkaza* (“Location Types in European Russia and the Caucasus”) significantly subtitled *A Study in Physical Geography and Its Links With Anthropogeography*. See P. M. Polyan and Colin Thomas, “V. P. Semēnov-Tyan-Shanskiy 1870-1942,” in ed. G. J. Martin, *Geographers: Biobibliographical Studies*, Vol. 13, London & New York: Mansell, 1991, p. 74.

P. Semēnov-Tyan-Shanskiy provided his own version of the regional division of Russia, outlining "holistic geographical-political places."¹⁴⁸

The emphasis given to the territorial aspects of the Russian state by V. P. Semēnov-Tyan-Shanskiy was due not only to the fact that he was a geographer by training, but also to the fact that the Soviet Union, a new political and geographical entity on the world map, occupied almost 1/6 of the world's landmass. The Russian professor, unlike his Western colleagues, did not give a determining role to any one particular aspect of his theory, be it geographical, biological, historical, or racial. Rather, he insisted that all these and other factors should be considered and analysed together in order to explain political power in a given geographical space.¹⁴⁹ V. P. Semēnov-Tyan-Shanskiy's ideas were not officially endorsed by the Soviet government. However, later the Soviet regime adopted policies almost according to his prescriptions, especially when it came to the development of areas like Soviet Central Asia, the Urals, the Altai, and the Baikal regions.¹⁵⁰ V. P. Semēnov-Tyan-Shanskiy was one of the few scholars researching territorial-political problems who remained in the Soviet Union after the Bolsheviks consolidated their

147. Ibid., p. 75.

148. Tikhonravov, p. 231.

149. Ibid., pp. 231-232.

150. To the subject of development of remote regions of the country was dedicated his book *Rayon y strana (Region and Country)* published in 1928. Polyan and Thomas note that V. P. Tyan-Shanskiy's works also influenced understanding of urban settlements and their hierarchy in the USSR. Polyan and Thomas, p. 75.

hold on the country. Of the many who emigrated, one of the most vocal was Ivan Lukianovich Solonevich (1891-1953), a historian and a monarchist. Solonevich was a strict geographical determinist, even explaining the limitation of individual liberties in Russia by Russian geography. "American liberty and American wealth," he wrote, "is defined by the American geography; our liberty and our wealth is limited by the Russian geography."¹⁵¹ Solonevich argued that Russians would never be as free as Americans or English, since the latter are protected by seas and oceans, while Russia's freedom could only be guaranteed by military service. That is why military service, i.e. long-term, widespread conscription, and militarisation of the country, had traditionally been the biggest freedom restricting institution in Russia. "The history of Russia is a history of overcoming the Russian geography," argued Solonevich.¹⁵²

Neither V. P. Semēnov-Tyan-Shanskiy nor Solonevich ever explicitly noted that they were developing geopolitical doctrines. The first and probably the only Russian geopolitician until the collapse of the Soviet Union was Pētr Nikolaevich Savitskii (1895-1968). Savitskii, an economist by training, was one of the founders in 1921 and the main promoter of a group of Russian émigré intellectuals known as the Eurasians. Despite their ideological disagreements with the Soviet regime, the Eurasians were quite sympathetic toward the Soviet Union. This was a movement

151. As quoted by Tikhonravov, p. 232.

152. Ibid.

largely influenced by the Slavophile thinkers of the 19th century. The post-Revolution Russian Eurasians borrowed from, among others, a revolutionary Slavophile Konstantin Nikolaevich Leontiev (1831-1879). His main arguments focused on the identity of the "Great Russians," which was not derivable from either their religious or ethnic identity. The most notable of Leontiev's theses was "there are Slavs, there is no Slavism;" in other words, although all Slavic peoples shared similar ethnic and linguistic similarities, these were not sufficient to argue for Slavs' cultural and political unity.¹⁵³ The Eurasians, who also drew ideas from such notable 19th century Russian thinkers as Fyodor Dostoevsky and Alexander Herzen, developed original and controversial views on Russia's political identity. The Eurasian movement is the main subject of Chapter Four, and here only geopolitical ideas of Pëtr Savitskii will be discussed.

The main principle on which Savitskii based his works was the idea that Russia represented a special civilisational phenomenon, defined through its "middleness," i.e. its middle location. Savitskii saw Russia as the middle of the Eurasian continent. In his 1933 article "Geographical and Geopolitical Foundations of Eurasianism (Geograficheskie i geopoliticheskie osnovy evraziystva)," Savitskii argued that Russia deserved more than China to be called the "Middle Kingdom."¹⁵⁴ The middle location of Germany was limited by the context of the

153. Ibid., p. 233.

154. P. Savitskii, "Geograficheskie i geopoliticheskie osnovy Evraziistva," in a collection of his works *Kontinent Evraziia*. Moskva: AGRAF, 1997, p. 295.

European only, which Savitskii perceived to be the “western cape” of the Eurasian continent. For Savitskii, the “middleness” of Russia was the basis of its *historical identity*; it was neither a European country nor an Asian extension. He understood Russia as a distinct world, as a unique spiritual-historical and geopolitical entity called “Eurasia.” *Eurasia sensu stricto*, clarified the author.¹⁵⁵ This concept for Savitskii is not only the name of a continent, but also an *idea*, reflected in Russian space and Russian culture, a some kind historical paradigm, a distinct civilisation.

Savitskii understood Russia not as a nation-state, but as a certain type of civilisation. This civilisation was a synthetic whole composed of a number of historical-cultural units: Slavic-Aryan culture, Turkic nomadic lifestyle, and Orthodox Christian tradition. Together these created a unique “middle” geopolitical phenomenon, some kind of synthesis of world history. Savitskii identified Great Russians, or ethnic Russians, with an imperial-ethnic phenomenon, which combines in itself Slavic and Turkic roots. At this point he brought into the picture the theme of Turan, a positive characterisation which was scandalous for many Eurasianists, and for Russians in general. Savitskii argued that thanks to the Golden Horde, which dominated Russians for more than 200 years, Russia acquired its geopolitical independence and preserved its spiritual sovereignty from the Roman-Germanic world.¹⁵⁶ (It is a general view in Russia today, as it was in Savitskii’s time, that the

155. Ibid., p. 297 and p. 299.

156. The Mongol domination lasted from around 1240 to 1480.

'Mongol-Tatar Yoke' impeded development and progress of Russia. This view, however, is changing thanks to the popularity of Eurasianist writings). Savitskii needed a revisionist interpretation of Slavic-Turkic relations in the 13th -15th centuries in order to substantiate Russia's unique ethnicity, and separate Russia-Eurasia from Europe and its fate.¹⁵⁷

Savitskii continued this theme in another article, "Steppe and Settledness (Step i osedlost')," which had a similar thesis: "without Tatars there would not be Russia."¹⁵⁸ In this article Russia was pictured as heiress of the Great Khans, as owner of Chingiz Khan's and Temur Lang's heritage, and as the force that had unified Asia. Savitskii argued that historical forces of the "steppe," i.e., the nomadic life, and the "settledness," i.e., the settled way of life, were combined in Russia. Savitskii also brought into this equation a dichotomy characteristic of the Russian landscape, its division mainly between forests and steppes. According to him, Russia's geopolitical essence was in its synthesis of European forests and Asian steppes. This synthesis was not a simple, mechanical overlapping of the two geographical realities, but an original and organic whole, which possessed its own values and measures.¹⁵⁹ In terms of global politics, Savitskii offered a different

157. Tikhonravov, pp. 234-235.

158. In the Russian original "Tatarshchina" is used instead of "Tatars," which refers to the domination of Russia by Tatars and other Turkic groups: "Bez tatarschiny ne bylo by Rossii." P. Savitskii, "Step i osedlost'," in a collection of his works *Kontinent Evraziia*, Moskva: AGRAF, 1997, p 332.

159. Ibid.

dichotomy:

Let us say it straight: on the world-historical dimension, only the Mongol¹⁶⁰ awareness of continent contests as an equal, but a diametrically opposed one, with the European awareness of sea; among other things, in Russian explorers, in the magnitude of Russian conquests and explorations, the same spirit, the same sense of continent is present.¹⁶¹

One of the main factors of historical process, according to Savitskii, is a close link between the lives of peoples with their geographical habitat. This is the essence of his concept "place-development" (*mestorazvitie*). In his "Geographical Review of Russia-Eurasia (Geograficheskiy obzor Rossii-Evrazii)," Savitskii again proposed a holistic understanding of politics. According to him, a union between a socio-political environment and its corresponding geographical space constituted a geographical individual or landscape. Savitskii borrowed "landscape" from Ratzel, and used it as a synonym for his own "place-development." He saw this concept as a philosophical synthesis of subjective and objective roots of human existence. He wrote of Russia-Eurasia being a "place-development," a "geographical individual." At the same time it was a geographical, historical, ethnic, economic, etc., "landscape." Russia-Eurasia was such a unique "place-development" that it played

160. For Savitskii, Mongols and Tatars are the same people. This is the popular belief in Russia even today, which probably started from the very first contact with the Mongols. It was a dogma in the Soviet historiography to talk about Mongols and Tatars as one people. The Mongols, in fact, had many Tatar and other ethnic Turkic soldiers, and this is probably why they became all the same for Russians. See Donald Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influence on the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Charles J. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.

161. Savitskii, "Step i osedlost," p. 334.

an integral part in the forming of other smaller "place-developments."¹⁶² Another important term introduced by Savitskii for geopolitical analysis is *Oekumenon* (*Oekumena*), a term that is widely used by modern New Eurasians.¹⁶³ He derived this word from the Greek equivalent meaning "universe." The meaning Savitskii gave to this new term was similar to that of the Latin *orbis terrarum*. Savitskii noted that this term was necessary, because there was nothing like it available in Russian. He gave Europe, Eurasia, and Asia as an example of an *Oekumenon*. These three, according to him, constitute "one part of the world," one *Oekumenon*, better known as "the Old World."¹⁶⁴

One more concept that was developed by Eurasians, and that is important for an understanding of Savitskii's geopolitical vision, is "ideocracy" (*ideokratiya* or *ideopravstvo*). Savitskii and other Eurasians believed that the Eurasian state should be built from its roots up, starting from a spiritual impulse. The whole structure of this state had to be construed in concurrence with the *a priori* Idea, and this structure should be headed by a distinct class of "spiritual chiefs."¹⁶⁵ Savitskii was against any form of Western liberalism and democracy. Nikolai Sergeevich

162. P. Savitskii, "Geograficheskii obzor Rossii-Evrazii," in a collection of his works *Kontinent Evraziia*, Moskva: AGRAF, 1997, pp. 283-284.

163. Savitskii uses "Oekumena" in singular sense. Modern Russian analysts, who utilize this term, use "Oekumeni" for the plural.

164. Savitskii, "Geograficheskii obzor Rossii-Evrazii," p. 281.

165. "Chief" here is the Russian "vozhd'," the meaning of which is very similar to German "der Führer." In the Soviet Union, such leaders of the Communist Party and the state as Lenin, Stalin,

Trubetskoi (Trubetzkoy), a famous linguist and an important Eurasian, came up with ideocracy, which he never defined in detail, as an ideological competitor for democracy.¹⁶⁶ What Savitskii and other Eurasians did not like in Western liberalism was its pragmatism and materialism. Ideocracy for Savitskii included all non-democratic and non-liberal forms of government founded on non-utilitarian and non-materialistic motivations. According to him, a dignified “geographical individual” was able to lift itself above the material necessities, and focus on spiritual-creative aspects of the global historical process. The *a priori* Idea, thus, could be reincarnated either in a theocratic rule or in a popular monarchy or a national dictatorship or a Soviet-type party- state.¹⁶⁷

Savitskii’s works were never published in the Soviet Union, despite his and other Eurasians’ being sympathetic toward the regime. Moreover, like many other emigres, he was officially regarded as a traitor. Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union were Savitskii’s writings introduced to the general public. His ideas of

Brezhnev were called “vozhd’.” Tikhonravov, p. 236.

166. Savitskii comments on the idea of ideocracy in his “V borbe za Evraziistvo,” p. 199, and “Poddanstvo idei,” pp. 127-128, and p. 133, both in a collection of his works *Kontinent Evraziia*, Moskva: AGRAF, 1997. Nikolai Trubetskoi himself discusses ideocracy in “Ob idee-pravitel’nitse ideokraticheskogo gosudarstva” (“On the Idea Governing the Ideocratic State”), in a collection of his works, N. S. Trubetzkoy, *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity*, Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1991, pp. 269-275.

167. Savitskii, as it was noted above, was sympathetic toward the Soviet state. However, neither he nor other Eurasians considered the USSR to be close to their ideal of an ideocratic state. The Eurasians thought of fascist Germany and Italy to be even further removed from the true ideocracy. N. Trubetskoi was especially vocal in his criticism of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Trubetzkoy, “On the Idea Governing the Ideocratic State,” p. 274.

Russia's unique geographical individualism, its centrality and "middleness," its historical-cultural synthesis of European and Asian identities were met by many with great enthusiasm. Similarly, his re-evaluation of the Mongol role in Russian history and his anti-democratic and anti-liberal views of the state found supporters as well. Savitskii's emphasis on non-utilitarianism and spiritualism was also met with appreciation. However, what has been valued the most by new Russian geopoliticians was Savitskii's image of the world as divided between the competing European and Russian-Eurasian civilisations.¹⁶⁸

Geopolitical images of Russian authors also carried signs of influence by the great minds of the 19th century. Most of the geopoliticians discussed above saw the world as a scene of unity and struggle between two opposed forces or civilisations, as would be expected if the world was organised according to Marx's scenario or to history according to Hegel. Comte's idea of social and political sciences being as real as natural ones was accepted by all geopoliticians. Causality reigned supreme in the dominant geopolitical scenarios, and chance had no place in them. Darwin's theories had a tremendous influence not only on geopoliticians, but on other areas of scholarship as well. Just as Darwin related all living organisms of Earth with each other, geopoliticians tried to relate all human races or geographical areas populated by humans with each other. Like Comte, Hegel, and Marx, they

168. The influence of Savitskii's ideas on the modern Russian *geopolitika* will be discussed in more detail in following chapters.

generalised freely and without much regard to details. Although the images of the world as depicted by most geopoliticians were not teleological, they were definitely deterministic. Finally, most geopolitical doctrines were presented as attempts to unify different sciences, most importantly geography and history, in their quest to rationally explain the whole of human history. In this sense they were theories of everything of sorts.

The Russian geopoliticians of the beginning of the 20th century, much like their Western counterparts, thought and reasoned in terms of global geographical space and universal historical processes. Both in Russia and the West geopoliticians thought of the world as a whole, but divided between two opposed realms: *Us* and *Them*. Each of them visualised this opposition differently: for Ratzel the world was divided between civilised and uncivilised peoples;¹⁶⁹ Mahan divided the world between sea-powers and land-powers, and Mackinder's vision of Heartland-Rimland opposition was very similar; for Kjellén it was Germanic peoples that were

169. Ratzel did not want to appear prejudiced against uncivilised races, and he used the term "natural" when describing them. He wrote of them:

They are those races who live more in bondage to, or in dependence on, nature than those whom we call "cultured" or "civilised." What the name expresses is a distinction in mode of life, of mental talent, of historical position; it assumes nothing and prejudices nothing in those directions, and is therefore doubly suitable for our purpose.... The distinction between natural and cultured races is not to be sought in the degree, but in the kind of their association with Nature.

Ratzel envisioned the world divided between these two "races." However, he declares in *The History of Mankind* his main objective to be not just "contrasting natural and civilised races," but "to propound the question: What is the position which the natural races hold among mankind?" Ratzel, *The History of Mankind*, p. 14.

constricted by the world; Lenin visualised the world divided between imperialists and oppressed; V. P. Semënov-Tyan-Shanskiy saw the source of strength for imperial states in their efficient exploitation of their colonial bases; for Solonevich it was two kinds of freedom that divided the world; and Savitskii's image of the world was composed of the opposing European awareness of sea and Mongol awareness of continent. All of these authors were imperialist thinkers, defending or promoting interests of great powers or international regions of their choice. On the *Us vs. Them* divide for Ratzel *Us* was, first of all Germany, and then other Western nations, as opposed to peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. For Kjellén *Us* was Germany in alliance with other Germanic and Nordic nations, and opposed to *Them* – large empires like the United Kingdom, and Russia. Mahan mainly implied that Russia and China were *Them*, and the United States and the United Kingdom were *Us*. For Mackinder *Them* was Russia, and *Us* was England and its allies. Although they had left Russia, Savitskii and Solonevich still saw Russia-Eurasia as *Us*, which was opposed to the European and American world. For Lenin *Us* was Russia, and peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and *Them* were imperialist nations of Western Europe and North America. V. P. Semënov-Tyan-Shanskiy's *Us* was Russia, but he never clearly identified who were *Them*. In short, geopoliticians of the beginning of the 20th century carried very similar geomentality as it was related to the conversion of time into space on the global scale.

Summary of Chapter Three

In this chapter different phases of converting time into space were discussed, as these phases changed in the Europe-centred world from the mid-18th century onward. The purpose of this exercise was to demonstrate changes that occurred in the geomentality of different generations of the same geographic area. It was argued that the Europe-centred world went through three phases of geomentality. Before the age of great explorations Europeans saw the world divided between known and unknown lands and seas. The age of exploration, formally completed by the Bering voyages of the mid-18th century, brought an end to such a vision of the world. This period coincided with the emergence of political geography as a scientific discipline. After an examination of English and Russian-language literature it was found that the first political geographer was a Russian scholar, or rather a Russia based scholar of German descent, H. N. Winsheim. Eighteenth-century Russia was a hotbed of geographic explorations, and sciences, since the imperial government supported and funded such activities. Jonathan Swift, Montesquieu, and Christian Wolff were discussed as great thinkers of the 18th century Europe who highlighted new ways of seeing the political world, and new ways of studying it. The old divide between the known and unknown was to be replaced with a new one, between civilised and uncivilised. The final grand summary of such a view of the world was given by Friedrich Ratzel, the 19th century German political geographer, whose works also signalled the start of a new geomentality.

By the end of the 19th century the world was completely divided among the great colonial powers. This era, dubbed by some as the era of imperialism, gave birth to yet another way of visualising the world; now the globe was divided between *Us* and *Them*. The birth of imperialism and the new geomentality called for new ways for conceptualising the world. Hence, geopolitics. Ideas of Comte, Hegel, Marx, and Darwin were discussed as the most influential 19th century thinkers who prepared the ground for the new way of seeing and explaining the world. Among the first European geopoliticians, the ideas of Ratzel, Kjellén, Mackinder, and Mahan were discussed. Special emphasis was placed on their understanding of a new science, which was to envision and explain the world as a whole, divided among the competing forces. The same period was significant for Russia, which by the beginning of the 20th century reached the peak of its territorial expansion. This peak was followed by wars and revolutions that influenced world history, and changed the way Russian students of global politics viewed the world, and Russia's place in it.

Chapter Four

Eurasianism: In Search of Russia's Political Identity

Most of them, and especially those who deal in the Astronomical Part, have great Faith in judicial Astrology, although they are ashamed to own it publickly. But, what I chiefly admired, and thought altogether unaccountable, was the strong Disposition I observed in them towards News and Politicks; perpetually enquiring into publick Affairs, giving their Judgments in Matters of State; and passionately disputing every Inch of a Party Opinion. I have indeed observed the same Disposition among most of the Mathematicians I have known in Europe; although I could never discover the least Analogy between the two Sciences; unless those People suppose, that because the smallest Circle hath as many Degrees as the largest, therefore the Regulation and Management of the World require no more Abilities than the handling and turning of a Globe. But, I rather take this Quality to spring from a very common Infirmary of human Nature, inclining us to be more curious and conceited in Matters where we have least Concern, and for which we are least adapted either by Study or Nature.

Jonathan Swift, "A Voyage to Laputa, Etc."¹

The main subject of this chapter is the birth and re-emergence of Eurasianism in Russian political thinking. Since the end of the Cold War, Eurasianism has slowly become the most dominant school in Russian foreign and security policy debates. It has also become the most popular mode of thinking among Russian political scholars, pundits, analysts, commentators, and journalists. In this chapter I argue that Eurasianism, as a mode of thinking in foreign and security policy making, is first of all an expression of Russian geomentality. Eurasianism is often understood as many different things together: as theory, ideology, world-view, school of thought, political movement, policy orientation. Since it is a loose union of

1. Jonathan Swift, *Gulliver's Travels*; New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1961, p. 137.

sometimes very different ideas, Eurasianism can be interpreted to be all of the above. The original Eurasianism of the 1920s and 1930s was created by economists, geographers, art critics, philosophers, theologians, anthropologists, political scientists, historians, linguists, ethnographers and others. These people of very different professions and inclinations made their unique contribution toward developing Eurasianism often by writing and analysing issues in their respective areas. The New Eurasianism of the 1990s is even more broad and diverse. As well, New Eurasians have often used Eurasian ideas and research as a launching pad for *geopolitika*, Russian-style geopolitics, normally interpreted by its authors as the science of international relations and foreign policy. However, despite this eclecticism and heterogeneity, Eurasianism does possess central unifying aspects and trends. Part One of this chapter identifies these aspects, laid down by the founders of the Eurasian school. In Part Two, I analyse the works of the major New Eurasians, and point out where and why they differ from the original proponents of the school. The old and new Eurasianisms differ in some important ways, but their commitment to a single form of geomentality does not change: Russia is a unique political entity, defined by its geographical and historical characteristics; Russia is neither Europe nor Asia, but a single cultural-geographical construct, *Eurasia*.

Part One: The Birth of Eurasianism

It seems axiomatic that in the 20th century every great power needed some

sort of theory to sustain its foreign and security policy. In the 1930–40s, Germany had its *geopolitik*; the Soviets under Stalin adapted certain Marxist ideas to serve their foreign policy; and Americans have used European diplomatic experience as a basis for their brand of international theory and called it realism. Most, if not all, of these theories have been ideologically motivated. By the 1990s, Russians lost their interest in the ‘not so distant communist future,’ and consigned Marxism-Leninism to the dustbin of history. Russia needed another theoretical grounding for its foreign policy. The newly adopted victorious ideology, liberalism, did not work well. Among other things, it could not tell adequate stories about Russia’s political identity. By the mid 1990s, Eurasianism, a long forgotten theory cultivated by Russian immigrants prior to the Second World War, slowly started to assert its dominance in Russia’s foreign and security policy. An obscure theory, the existence of which until the 1990s was only known to some historians and enthusiasts, very quickly gained popularity in Russia. The last classical Eurasian, Lev Gumilëv, has been regarded by many Russians as one of the most brilliant thinkers of the 20th century. It seems a matter of common sense that Russia as a great power needs some kind of theory to articulate its foreign policy, but why Eurasianism? What are historical, philosophical, and political roots of this theory?

It originated 80 years ago, in Sofia, Bulgaria. In July 1921, four Russian émigré scholars published a book titled *Iskhod k vostoku: Predchuvostoiia i sversheniia: Utoerzhdenye Evraziistev* (*Exodus to the East: Forebodings and Events: An Affirmation of*

the Eurasians). The four were Prince Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetskoi (1890-1938), a famous linguist and philosopher, Pëtr Nikolaevich Savitskii (1895-1968), a gifted economic-geographer and geopolitician, Father Georgii Vasil'evich Florovskii (1893-1979), a theologian and historian, and Pëtr Petrovich Suvchinskii (1892-1985), a talented musicologist and art critic. All of them were recent emigrés from Bolshevik Russia. As the title suggested, the book heralded the creation of a new group of intellectuals who called themselves "Eurasians." The main ideologue of this movement, Savitskii, contributed three articles: "A Turn to the East" ("*Povorot k Vostoku*"), "The Migration of Culture" ("*Migratsiia kul'tury*"), and "Continent-Ocean, Russia and the World Market" ("*Kontinent-ocean. Rossiia i mirovoi rynok*"). Prince Trubetskoi was represented by his two political articles "On True and False Nationalism" ("*Ob istinnom i lozhnom natsionalizme*"), and "The Upper and Lower Stories of Russian Culture, The Ethnic Basis of Russian Culture" ("*Verkhi i nizy russkoi kul'tury. Etnicheskaia osnova russkoi kul'tury*"). Suvchinskii contributed two philosophical articles "The Strength of the Weak" ("*Sila slabykh*"), and "The Age of Faith" ("*Epokha very*"). Florovskii wrote three pieces dealing with theological, philosophical and political issues: "Breaks and Connections" ("*Razryvy i sviazi*"), "The Cunning of Reason" ("*Khitrost' razuma*"), and "About Non-Historical Peoples (The Land of the Fathers and the Land of the Children)" ("*O narodakh ne-istoricheskikh (Strana ottsov i strana detei)*").

This first volume by the Eurasians did not gain overwhelming support in

Russian émigré circles. It was partly intended as a political manifesto, and although in the 1920s and 1930s Eurasianism received much attention among Russian exiles in Europe, it never became a unifying theoretical base for them. Two of the four original Eurasians, Suvchinskii and Florovskii, soon distanced themselves from what was to become an émigré political movement. Florovskii left after 1923, and Suvchinskii gradually became less involved. In the 1930s, Prince Trubetskoi also broke with the movement for a while, but he maintained his Eurasian views until his death in 1938. Only Savitskii pursued the idea of Eurasianism diligently and consistently. Savitskii, who subsequently settled in Prague, and other Eurasians published a number of books, journals, monthlies, weeklies and other periodicals in such European cities as Paris, Berlin, Prague, Tallinn, London, Brussels. They also conducted regular seminars, public lectures, formal debates, and private disputations.² Besides the authors mentioned above, the Eurasians, at one point or another, could claim support of such notable figures as Roman Jakobson (Jakobson), a famous linguist; G. V. Vernadskii (Vernadsky), a well known U.S.-based historian; N. N. Alekseev, a noted Russian political scientist; and K. A. Chkheidze, a former member of two governments – Russia's Provisional Government under Kerensky in 1917, and Georgia's Social-Democratic Government of 1917-1921.³ In the 1920s and

2. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "Afterword: The Emergence of Eurasianism," in Savitskii, Petr, et al. *Exodus to the East: Forebodings and Events: An Affirmation of the Eurasians*, Idyllwild, California: Charles Schlacks, Jr., Publisher, 1996, pp. 115-117.

3. Ilya Vinkovetsky, "Eurasianism in Its Time: A Bibliography," in *Exodus to the East*, pp. 157-158, and pp. 166-167.

1930s, the Eurasians published research in politics, economics, geography, geopolitics, history, ethnic relations, philosophy, theology, linguistics, anthropology, and political theory. However, after the end of the Second World War, Eurasianism came almost to a halt. Only very few writers, among them most notably Professor Vernadsky in the United States, continued write on Eurasianism in the post-war period.⁴

The analysis of the original Eurasianism in this chapter is based on four original volumes by Eurasians, collected works by two very important members of their movement, and a number of commentaries by students of Eurasianism. This may not provide a full picture of the Eurasian movement, if such a thing is possible, but it will help the reader to identify the main aspects of this mode of thinking. It will also provide some clues as to why this theory has become the most suitable basis for modern Russian foreign policy making. From the original Eurasians, contributions by Trubetskoi, and especially by Savitskii, are analysed in more detail, since these two have had the biggest impact on the New Eurasianism of the 1990s. Of the original volumes, most attention is devoted to the first one, *Exodus to the East*, since it fully outlines Eurasianism as a mode of thinking and political movement. "The essays that make up the present volume were put together in an atmosphere of a consciousness of catastrophe," states an untitled introduction to *Exodus to the East*.⁵ In 1921, the Eurasians saw their Motherland, Russia, destroyed

4. Riasanovsky, p. 117.

5. An untitled and unsigned introduction, in *Exodus to the East*, p. 1. It is believed that Savitskii

and savaged in, arguably, the most violent civil war in history. People in Russia were dying from violence and starvation, and large numbers of intelligentsia had been forced to leave the country with no prospects of ever returning home safely. People in Russia were committing horrible crimes. "There are frightening times, terrifying epochs, like apocalyptic visions, times of great realisations of the Mystery, times of frightening and blessed," wrote Suvchinskii.⁶ The Russian civil war was in part a result of the murderous First World War, conducted in the name of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people."⁷ This war was the beginning of "a grandiose tragedy, a tragedy of death."⁸ European policy-makers intended "with the price of thousands of murders and thousands of deaths to buy and secure other thousands of lives." This did not happen; the war did not re-forged swords into ploughshares. Instead, "chaos began to move," and, as a poet had once predicted, Russia vanished.⁹

After experiencing this tragedy, frightening times, and chaos, the four emigré Russian scholars initiated a re-assessment of Russia's identity, both as a nation and great power. The result was the idea of Eurasianism, novel for Russian political thinking in some very important respects. The basis of it was the

authored this introduction.

6. Pëtr P. Suvchinskii, "The Age of Faith", in *Exodus*, p. 17.

7. Georgii V. Florovskii, "Breaks and Connections," in *Exodus*, p. 13.

8. Suvchinskii, "The Age of Faith," p. 27.

9. Florovskii, "Breaks and Connections," p. 13.

identification of Russia, first of all, with the geographical phenomenon of Eurasia. Since Peter the Great, Russians had regarded themselves as Europeans. Since the beginning of the 18th century, there had been no significant author or argument in Russian socio-political literature claiming that Russia was not a European, but an Asian culture. Eurasians did not claim this either. Instead, they made a synthesis: "Russians and those who belong to the peoples of "the Russian world" are neither European nor Asians. Merging with the native element of culture and life which surrounds us, we are not ashamed to declare ourselves *Eurasians*" [emphasis in the original].¹⁰ This was a synthesis between the two poles of an old Russian debate between 'Slavophiles' and 'Westernisers.' The Eurasians rejected the ideas of the Westernisers on the grounds that Russia did not belong to the "Romano-Germanic world," Western European culture. There was no reason for Russia to emulate the West, as some kind of "cultural province" of Europe, tardily repeating its past moves."¹¹ The Eurasians mostly built their vision on Slavophile ideas, but they re-worked the Slavophile idea of "Slavdom."¹² This idea, they argued, had not justified itself before "the court of reality."¹³ The Eurasians recognised the existence of Slavs, but rejected the existence of Slavdom as unrealistic, and supported this claim with cultural arguments. They were nationalists, however, and directed "their

10. "Introduction," in *Exodus*, p. 4.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

12. The original Eurasians were also influenced by Pan-Slavic ideas of Nikolai Danilevskii and Vladimir Lamanskii.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

mood of nationalism” “toward a whole circle of peoples of the ‘Eurasian’ world, among whom the Russian people” had the central position.¹⁴ The basis of the Eurasian nationalism was, therefore, not an ethnic or racial element, but a *geographical* one. Eurasia included East European and Asian peoples “into the mental sphere of the culture of the Russian world,” because it was impossible to comprehend Russian culture without the cultures of these people and vice versa.¹⁵ This line of argument made Eurasianism appealing not only for Russian émigré scholars of the first half of the 20th century, but for Russian foreign policy makers of the beginning of the 21st century as well. There are several aspects of this vision or theory that make it so successful with modern day Russians, most of which were established by the original Eurasians.

The first important aspect of Eurasianism, already identified above, is a geographical one: Russia is neither Europe nor Asia, but a unique entity called Eurasia. Iakobson pointed out in 1931 that “Russian scholarship of the last decades has demonstrated the presence of a special geographical world, which was baptised as “Eurasia,” for it had to be distinguished from the neighbouring geographical worlds – Europe and Asia.”¹⁶ Russia’s political identity, thus, was defined by its geography. The geographical aspect affected all factors of Russian life: cultural,

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. R. O. Iakobson, “Doklad: O fonologicheskikh iazikovikh soiuzakh,” in Roman O. Iakobson and Pëtr N. Savitskii, *Evrasiia v svete iazikoznaniia*, Praha: Izdanie Evraziitsev, 1931, p. 8.

political, and economic. The tragedy of the world war and the Russian revolution acted as catalysts in revealing Russia's true identity. Before the war of 1914-1918, and the October revolution, Russia was wearing a mask of "Europeanness," but after these two major cataclysms this mask fell, and "we saw a two-faced Russia.... With one face she is turned to Europe.... But with the other face, she has turned away from Europe."¹⁷ Russia was, as a revolutionary nation, fighting for "the new world," and was doing it with the most despotic means possible. Savitskii was in some sense a visionary when he was analysing the revolutionary changes in Russia in 1921. He based his analysis on Russia's unique geographical qualities ("a continent in itself"),¹⁸ and its multicultural character ("Russia is truly an Orthodox-Moslem, Orthodox-Buddhist country").¹⁹ Comparing the Russian revolution with the French revolution of 1793, he concluded that "the Russian revolution is not an episode of European history only." After the Bolshevik revolution "Russia, in a certain sense, becomes an ideological centre-point of the world."²⁰ Prince Trubetskoi argued that Russian national culture was closely associated with the East "in a whole set of issues, so that at times the boundary between East and West passes exactly between the Russians and other Slavs."²¹

17. Pētr N. Savitskii, "A Turn to the East," in *Exodus*, p. 5.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

20. *Ibid.* p. 6.

21. Prince Nikolai S. Trubetskoi, "The Upper and Lower Stories of Russian Culture (The Ethnic Basis of Russian Culture)," in *Exodus*, p. 89.

The *economic* aspect of Eurasianism is also closely tied with its geographical one. This has its explanation in the fact that both aspects were mostly developed by Savitskii, who was an economic-geographer by education and profession. In the article "Continent-Ocean," Savitskii analysed international trade in the context of the continent-ocean dichotomy developed by A. T. Mahan and Halford Mackinder. He noted that "the continentality of those territories that we... call regions of 'the Russian world,'" restricted their economic development. Savitskii believed closeness to the ocean shore to be the main geographical requirement for economic progress. He argued that "for those countries that are distinguished among the areas of the world by their 'continentality,' the prospect of being 'the backwoods of world economy' becomes a basic reality in the case of intensive involvement in world's oceanic trade.... In the case of isolation from the world, their lot is primitiveness associated with the system of 'natural economy.'"²² After analysing the geographical characteristics of Russia-Eurasia, Savitskii favoured the economic principle of self-sufficiency as the most suitable direction for Russia's economic development.²³ However, he was against isolating Russia from the outside world. Savitskii understood economic self-sufficiency as an ideal, which was impossible to achieve. He was for an adaptive autarky, a flexible protectionist system of sorts.²⁴

22. Savitskii, "Continent-Ocean (Russia and the World Market)," in *Exodus*, p. 100 and p. 103.

23. P. N. Savitskii, "Glavi iz 'Ocherka geografii Rossii'," in ed. N. N. Alekseev et.al., *Tridtsatye gody*, Praha: Izdanie Evraziitsev, 1930, p. 101.

24. Savitskii, "V borbe za evraziistvo," in eds. N. N. Alekseev et.al., *Tridtsatye gody*, Praha: Izdanie Evraziitsev, 1931, pp. 48-49.

According to Savitskii, the continentality of Russia was not enviable, because "of all the great units of the world economy, it is Russia which is the most 'deprived' in respect to opportunities for oceanic trade."²⁵ He wanted to see Russia as an economic crossroads linking Europe, Asia, and America. According to him, this was in concordance with Russia's 'the middle world' nature.²⁶ Savitskii urged Russia to face its "geographic reality." However, he was not pessimistic about Russia's future, and predicted the following in 1921:

We can be certain that in the intensive utilisation of the principle of continental proximities the geographical world of Russia-Eurasia will, indeed, manifest a certain "self-sufficiency," not literal, of course, but in the sense of the fundamental materialisation of reciprocal equalisation and reciprocal balancing within the bounds of the world. In the environment of the politico-economic units of the world, Russia-Eurasia will appear as a unit primarily of self-sufficiency, and at that, as a combination of regions that is determined not by whims of political fate, as we see in the examples of current "colonial oceanic" empires, but as long as technology stays the same, as a pressing, unavoidable, reciprocal attraction of lands, drawn to one another by the force of their "oceanic deprivation."²⁷

It should be noted here that this and some other predictions made by Savitskii did come true, at least in part. The Soviet Union came as close to self-sufficiency as any great power had ever come. Moscow also used geographical

25. Savitskii, "Continent-Ocean," p. 111.

26. Savitskii, "Glavi iz 'Ocherka geografii Rossii'," p. 101.

27. Savitskii, "Continent-Ocean," p. 111. This passage ("in the sense of the fundamental materialisation of reciprocal equalisation and reciprocal balancing within the bounds of the world") is very vaguely translated in *Exodus*. Therefore, I translated the passage from the original: Pëtr Savitskii, "Kontinent-ocean," in a collection of his works *Kontinent Evraziia*, Moskva: AGRAF, 1997, p. 416.

characteristics of the country's regions, as well as some of its neighbouring states, to advance its economic and political interests. Savitskii also made a controversial claim in this article – “it is useful [for Russia] to obtain an outlet to the Persian Gulf” (a favourite theme of some Russian great-power chauvinists) – but declared that this issue was “secondary in principle.”²⁸ Avoiding deterministic reasoning and analysis of causality in international politics, Savitskii wanted to emphasise that, first of all, Russia's geographical identity was found in its “continental nature:” “the economic future of Russia lies not in the aping of the ‘oceanic’ policy of others, a policy that is in many ways inapplicable to Russia, but in the comprehension of its own ‘continental nature,’ and in an adaptation to this nature.”²⁹

In conjunction with developing Russia's new geographical identity, Eurasians started to develop the discipline of geopolitics, as “one of the scholarly themes of Eurasianism,”³⁰ in order to study state formations in their relations with their “place-development:”

Geopolitics has to do with exclusively specific material. It is occupied with the questions of development – with the questions that link the life of the state formations with their earthly, natural conditions of their locations. In other words, geopolitics is study of the life of the state formations in relations with their place-development.³¹

The concept of “place-development” (*mestorazvitie*) was defined as “a people

28. Savitskii, *Continent-Ocean*, p. 112.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

30. K. A. Chkheidze, “Iz oblasti Russkoi geopolitiki,” in *Tridtsatye gody*, p. 114.

and the place, on which it develops.”³² This was one of the central concepts of the old Eurasians, signifying their desire to emphasise, first of all, the geographical qualities of both their identity and research efforts. Geopolitics was adapted to study and further develop the concept of place-development of states. K. A. Chkheidze defined the two main elements of the geopolitical approach: to study a given place-development, and to study this place-development as a subject of history.³³ He stressed that the geopolitical approach was better to study the state, because it underscored “earthly, natural properties and wealth of territories,” and these qualities were better expressed by the term place-development.³⁴ Vernadskii’s priority was to develop a new approach for the study of Russia’s history. He argued it was novel and more productive to investigate Russian history within a frame of Eurasian history, and “to study Russia as a geopolitical entity,” in other words “to study history of Russian people not only in time, but *in space* as well.”³⁵

The significance of *political* coexistence of many different cultures in one geographical space constitutes another important aspect of Eurasianism. Trubetskoi provided the alliance-building by Emelian Pugachëv, an 18th century Russian rebel, as an example of political force rejecting “pagan Latins and Lutherans” and uniting

31. Ibid., p. 105.

32. P. N. Savitskii, “V borbe za evraziistvo,” in *Tridsatye gody*, p. 49.

33. Chkheidze, “Iz oblasti Russkoi geopolitiki,” p. 109.

34. Ibid. p. 112.

35. Quoted by Savitskii, “V borbe za evraziistvo,” p. 49.

in his fight with “the Bashkirs and other adherents of not only non-Orthodox Eastern Christianity, but of the non-Christian faiths of the East.”³⁶ Trubetskoi rejected “Russia’s historical mission to unite our Slavic ‘brothers’” as unfounded, and argued that Russian culture should be linked to the unique psychological and ethnographical characteristics of Russian national life. He noted that “our ‘brothers’ (if not in language or faith, then in blood, character, and culture) are not only the Slavs, but the Turanians,” and that “Russia has already consolidated a large part of the Turanian East under the aegis of its state system.”³⁷ The Eurasians did not seek the causes of Russia’s troubles in its multiculturalism, as some Russian historians do now by blaming Jews, Georgians and other non-Russians for everything bad that happened to Russia in the 20th century. Instead, the Eurasians tried to identify the roots for Russia’s woes in false nationalism (Trubetskoi) or inadequate national consciousness (Suvchinskii). Savitskii explained Russia’s underdevelopment among the industrialised nations by its geographical characteristics. However, despite the huge problems their fatherland was facing, the Eurasians were convinced that Russia was still a great power. “Russia, although blind, is blessed by the glory of her Great Power essence,” wrote Suvchinskii.³⁸

The Eurasians aspired to encourage Eurasian peoples to endorse a new historical self-consciousness, which would help to establish one historical actor out

36. Trubetskoi, “The Upper and Lower Stories of Russian Culture,” p. 93.

37. Ibid.

38. Suvchinskii, “The Strength of the Weak,” in *Exodus*, p. 9.

of them, "the symphonic persona."³⁹ This persona had to be formed in "the common Eurasian house," the idea of which was understood as "an expression of aspirations and interests of Eurasian peoples," as a realisation of "common Eurasian nationalism."⁴⁰ In terms of institutional arrangements of the Eurasian state, the Eurasians favoured federalism and *étatisme*. They were criticised for their belief in federalism by right wing critics, who compared their institutional sympathies to those of the Bolsheviks and charged the Eurasians with promoting the destruction of the Russian state. However, the Eurasians were firm in defence of the principle of federalism, arguing for the "independence of its parts."⁴¹ Eurasians understood *étatisme* as a strong state model in terms of its economic organisation, and rejected totalitarian control of the state over other areas such as religion and freedom of expression. The *étatist* economic model for Eurasians was developed by N. N. Alekseev. He strongly favoured a state dominated economy, but also allowed for private and co-operative property.⁴² For this they were also criticised and accused of endorsing socialism. Savitskii noted that the European notion of "socialism" did not express well "the social substance of Eurasianism," and that it was necessary to go beyond that. He declared that "we [Eurasians] r e j e c t socialism, and we... are s

39. Untitled introduction to *Tridtsatye gody*, p.ii.

40. Savitskii, "V borbe za evraziistvo," p. 20.

41. Ibid., p. 48.

42. Ibid., pp. 46-47.

u p e r - s o c i a l i s t s" [emphasis in the original].⁴³ Within this framework, Eurasians also expressed the idea of the unity of society and the state: "[a]ccording to general Eurasianist concepts, the gap between "the state" and "society" is removed, thanks to the organic aggregation of the state forms with society."⁴⁴ This principle of the unity between society and the state was believed to better the social organisation of the state with its various social programmes.

The *historical* aspect of Eurasianism was counter-opposed to the "Romano-Germanic" ethnocentricity or, as Trubetskoi put it, "the attitude of the Romano-Germans [Western Europeans]... which can be called egocentric."⁴⁵ This "egocentricity" stemmed from Western Europeans dominating world politics, and from the tendency of Western European intellectuals to identify their continent with "humanity," and to describe themselves as representatives of the "universal human culture."⁴⁶ Florovski placed the dominance of Western Europeans in the global context and presented a dichotomy between "historical" and "non-historical peoples." "Historical peoples" were those who played the dominant role in world history, and "non-historicals" were nations who were largely overlooked or remained inactive in world historical process or were new to it. Florovski analysed this dichotomy using as a guide the 19th century Herzen-Turgenev debate about

43. Ibid., p. 8.

44. N. A. Klepinin, "Materialy k sotsialnoi programme evraziistva," in eds. N. N. Alekseev et al., *Evraziiskii sbornik: Kniga VI*, Praha: Politika, 1929, p. 52.

45. Prince Nikolai S. Trubetskoi, "On True and False Nationalism," in *Exodus*, p. 69.

Russia's place in the world, and concluded, that since the only law of life was "the young incessantly [displacing] the old [emphasis in the original]," "the land of the fathers,' the land of tradition and succession, will be replaced by 'the land of the children, undiscovered, in the faraway sea.'" ⁴⁷ Florovski predicted that "the land of the children" or the land of non-historical peoples, which would succeed "the land of the fathers" or Western Europe, would be found in "the Far West" of America, and Russia. The latter was characterised as "an historical formation complicated to the highest degree," despite its "non-historicity."⁴⁸ Trubetskoi joined in by condemning "false nationalism" practised in Western Europe, and in smaller countries that aspired to be like Western Europe "or real Europeans:"

Europeanisation – that is, the effort to reproduce general Romano-Germanic [Western European] patterns in every area of life – results ultimately in complete loss of every trace of national uniqueness; soon the infamous "native language" is the only unique thing remaining in a nation led by such nationalists."⁴⁹

Trubetskoi rejected such "fraudulent terms" as "universal human civilisation," "cosmopolitanism," and "internationalism." He also criticised "militant chauvinism" and "cultural conservatism" as the other extreme forms of nationalism. Trubetskoi defined "true nationalism" as self-aware and self-sufficient

46. Ibid.

47. G. V. Florovski, "About Non-Historical Peoples (The Land of the Fathers and the Land of the Children)," in *Exodus*, p. 59 and p. 62.

48. Ibid., pp. 65-66.

49. Trubetskoi, "On True and False Nationalism," p. 76.

nationalism "within a particular anthropo-geographical area," and complained that such nationalism was nowhere to be found in post-Petrine Russia: "the majority of educated Russians have not wanted to 'be themselves;' they have dreamed of becoming 'real Europeans.'" In Russia there had always been a tendency to construct nationalism according to the Romano-Germanic model.⁵⁰ For Trubetskoi this was indicative of Russia's problems, and he concluded that although true nationalism had never existed as a socio-historical tendency, "it must be created in the future."⁵¹ Savitskii, like Florovskii, also saw the world in transition, and in opposition between the old and the new. In "The Migration of Culture" he predicted that cultural concentrations of the world, the bearer of which throughout many centuries had been Western Europe, "will move to Russia-Eurasia and to North America." Australia was also mentioned as a possible bright spot of the future. According to Savitskii, "the birth of a mighty cultural life in North America is in some ways a 'revolutionary' fact of culturo-geographical evolution," and "just as new a culturo-geographical fact is the emergence on the broad culturo-historical arena of the regions of northeastern Europe and northern Asia integrated into Russian culture."⁵²

Eurasians accused Western Europeans of creating mental dichotomies between themselves and other peoples. In his "Europe and Mankind" (*Evropa i*

50. Ibid., p. 78 and p. 79.

51. Ibid., p. 79.

52. Savitskii, "The Migration of Culture," in *Exodus*, pp. 46-47 and p. 50.

chelovechestvo") Trubetskoi debated in detail how Europeans regarded themselves as ethnically or racially superior, and regarded many non-Europeans as "barbarians" or "savages."⁵³ On the other hand, the Eurasians saw Russia to be performing a different role in Asia. Even scholars in Russia who were neither officially or personally affiliated with Eurasians, seem to express well the Eurasian vision of Russia as a historical relative and leader of Asia. In 1922, soon after the debut by the Eurasians, a new journal titled *Novii Vostok* (*The New East*) was started in Moscow. The editor of the journal, M. Pavlovich, wrote in a leader:

The entire contemporary Asia is *terra incognita* for us... Meanwhile, since a short-while ago Russia is called Eurasia (Europe-Asia), and in fact, no other country of the European continent is even in the slightest degree linked as deeply with Asia and with the entire East as Russia, in terms of economic, political, and spiritual relations.... The contemporary Russia-Eurasia is, first of all, a teacher and a leader [of Asia], which is moaning in spiritual and economic slavery, but is also fighting for the brighter future for the East.⁵⁴

The Eurasians also recognised the contributions of non-Russians and non-Slavs in the development of Russian culture. The *cultural* aspect of Eurasianism was developed as an inclusive one. "The name 'Eurasia,'" wrote Savitskii, "expresses for us, for one thing, the link of the Russian element with some ethnically non-Russian elements of its surrounding milieu."⁵⁵ Savitskii established and explained the

53. Trubetzkoy, "Europe and Mankind" in a collection of his works *Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity*, Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1991, pp. 19-21.

54. Quoted by Savitskii in "V borbe za evraziistvo," p. 10.

55. Savitskii, "The Migration of Culture," p. 48.

cultural unity of Eurasian peoples with “the process of culturo-geographical and culturo-ethnographic evolution.” He argued that historical changes occurred through “the stages of geographical and ethnographic shifts,” and “according to this conception, images of geography and ethnography of culture are, at the same time, essential bearers of culture: of religion and philosophy, poetry and art, statehood and the economy, technology and the way of life.”⁵⁶ Based on geographical data and characteristics of climate, Savitskii developed a universalistic theory of emergence and succession of dominant cultures. He argued that the future would be dominated by North American and Russian-Eurasian cultures, and that they would exceed in centrality the Western European one.

Prince Trubetskoi took a different approach. In his fascinating article, “The Upper and Lower Stories of Russian Culture,” he demonstrated why Russians should be regarded as a unique culture, even among other Slavic peoples. According to Trubetskoi, “in the period since the era of common Slavic unity, the Slavs have separated into three groups – the West, South, and East Slavs.”⁵⁷ These three groups of Slavs took different “orientations” even when they were part of the common mass of Indo-Europeans and spoke a dialect of the Proto-Indo-European language; Slavdom as such never really existed. He further argued that “the culture... of the Russian people is an absolutely singular entity that cannot be

56. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

57. Trubetskoi, “The Upper and Lower Stories of Russian Culture,” p. 85.

accurately identified with any broader cultural zone or grouping of cultures.”⁵⁸

This culture comprises its own special zone and includes, besides Russians, the Ugro-Finnic peoples, and the Turkic peoples of the Volga Basin. In the east it merges with the Turko-Mongolian culture of the steppes, and in the west it meets with the culture of the West Slavs. This view contradicted the widely held view of the day that the unique characteristics of Russian culture were of Slavic origins only. Trubetskoi was a linguist and an ethnographer by training, and he used his professional research and observations to substantiate his claim. He comparatively analysed the styles of Russian folk songs, dances, fairy tales, and other aspects of folk arts, and found that, in many respects, Russian folk art was much more similar to the folk art of Asian peoples than it was to the folk art of other Slavs or Europeans. In the context of Russia’s being at the crossroads of the West and the East, Savitskii also was a strong supporter of the argument for the unity of culture in the Eurasian world: “if Russia is to be interpreted broadly, if the participation in the matter of Russian culture by Tatars and the Sarts, the Georgians and the Armenians, the Persians and the Turks, is understood and given proper weight, then it can be asserted that the Russian element, in its spiritual essence, is at the crossroads of the West European tradition and the traditions of the old “pre-European” East.”⁵⁹

An especially important contribution in establishing the cultural unity of

58. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

59. Savitskii, “The Migration of Culture,” p. 51.

Russians and other Eurasian nations within the Eurasianist context was made by Roman Jakobson. He was a famous and respected linguist, a close friend of Prince Trubetskoi. In 1931, the Eurasian publishing house in Prague published a tiny volume announcing a discovery made by Jakobson. He was a specialist in phonology, the predecessor of structuralism in linguistics. Jakobson discovered that almost all Eurasian languages, including Russian, had very similar phonemes, the most basic elements of language. Phonemes are sounds in language that allow for the verbal distinction of the meaning of words. According to Jakobson, the Eurasian languages were "characterised with the combination of two phonological qualities: 1) monotony, i.e. the absence of polytonality, 2) consonants distinguished by their timbre."⁶⁰ Jakobson's linguistic research was embraced by the Eurasians as the best cultural evidence for Eurasianism. It was noted that there was an "Eurasian union of languages," and that Russia-Eurasia was a "special linguistic world." The fact that the "Eurasian union of languages" were present on territory almost equal to the geographical boundaries of the Eurasian world, and that such phonological similarities did not exist in any other languages of Europe and Asia, was also stressed.⁶¹ To be more precise, from the "Eurasian union of languages" only the Armenian language and the Kartvelian (Georgian) group of languages did not fall within Jakobson's phonological classification, and among other European and Asian languages only the Irish language was determined to have the same

60. Jakobson, p. 10.

61. Savitskii, in Jakobson and Savitskii, pp. 1-2.

phonemic qualities.⁶²

In terms of *national-ethnic* identity, Eurasians asserted that Russia was not only 'Russians,' i.e. the Russians with Slavic ethnic origins, but with them other nations and ethnic groups as well. "Are there many people in Rus' through whose blood vessels does not flow Khazar or Cuman, Tatar or Bashkir, Mordovian or Chuvash blood? Are there many Russians who are completely alien to the imprint of Eastern spirit: its mysticism, its love of introspection, indeed, its introspective laziness?" exclaimed Savitskii.⁶³ Florovskii compared this ethnic symbiosis in Russia with that in Western Europe, where nobility and "purity of blood" was emphasised: "the right to participate in historical drama is granted, thus, by descent, by nobility, so to say, by purity of blood – those of humble origin, and those who do not remember their origin, are, by that alone, excluded from participation."⁶⁴ This characterisation of Western European traditions by Florovskii can be understood in both the context of internal European politics, and the broader international context; i.e., in terms of the treatment of aliens by Western Europeans. This inclusion of the non-Russian peoples in the formation of the Russian nation, and acknowledgement of their positive role by the Eurasians, was new, but it was rooted in reality. First of all, there has been, indeed, plenty of historical evidence of individuals of non-Russian origins playing very important roles in Russian history,

62. Iakobson, pp. 9-11.

63. Savitskii, "A Turn to the East," p. 5.

64. Florovskii, "About Non-Historical Peoples," p. 53.

individuals of Western European origins. Second, the four Eurasians themselves were not 'Russians' either. Savitskii, Florovskii, and Suvchinskii came from the Ukraine, while Trubetskoi belonged to a princely family derived from Grand Prince Gedymis of Lithuania.⁶⁵ Among the people who later joined the ranks with the Eurasians were individuals of Jewish, Georgian, Ukrainian, Kalmyk, Russian and other nationalities.

The Eurasians strongly defended their idea of the embrace of the East. Eurasianism was criticised for recognising the East as a cultural and historical influence in Russian life. The critics rejected 'the other Russians' (i.e. those of non-Orthodox and non-Slavic heritage) and even considered the recognition of the East as a factor in Russian history as a form of national humiliation.⁶⁶ Dr. Erenzhon Khara-Davan defended the Eastern factor in Eurasianism by pointing out that, in fact, Russians had deceived themselves by denying Eastern influences on Russian culture and history and instead endorsing "false conceptions and superstitions of Europeanism."⁶⁷ Chkheidze compared Russia-Eurasia to a huge "pot of assimilation" created by nature itself. However, according to him, the Eurasian pot was different from a similar American melting pot in that in Russia there were two opposed processes at work. "On one hand, there is a process of Russification directed from the centre to the peripheries," wrote Chkheidze, "[o]n the other hand,

65. Riasanovsky, "Afterword," p. 139. Savitskii also is a family name quite common in Belarus.

66. Savitskii, "V borbe za evraziistvo," p. 12.

67. Quoted by Savitskii in "V borbe za evraziistvo," p. 11.

there is a process of "okrainisation" directed from the peripheries to the centre...." *Okraina* in Russian has a similar meaning to "periphery." (There is an opinion that the name of Ukraine is derived from the word *okraina* – periphery). The re-emergence of national cultures, such as Tatar, Uzbek, Armenian, etc., was understood under the term *okrainisation*, as well as "the incorporation of individual peripheral [cultural] elements into the unified all-Russian Eurasian culture."⁶⁸

Ia. A. Bromberg, a leading Jewish Eurasian, recognised the positive role Jews had played in Russian history and culture. However, he also noted that Jews traditionally had been passive in Russian culture, forming a sort of "peripheral intelligentsia." Bromberg called on Jews to play a more active role in "the great contest between eastern and western principles." He argued that "eastern principles" were more beneficial for Jewish people, and emphasised the importance of the Eurasianist idea of place-development, in which he saw the true way for each nation to strive. He called the concept of place-development "a fundamental geospherical construct of the Eurasianist cultural-historical conception."⁶⁹ Pro-European emigré Jews objected to the idea that Eurasia was the only true way for Jews, and instead advocated a Europe-only principle. Eurasians responded by defending their point with a softer stance, but with a "clearer claim:" "'Europe' is not the 'only' way for the Russian Jews. And zapadnichestvo is not the only [venue]

68. Chkheidze, "Iz oblasti Russkoi geopolitiki," p. 113.

69. Ia. A. Bromberg, "O neobkhodimom peresmotre evreiskogo voprosa," in *Evrasiiskii sbornik*, p. 43 and p. 46.

available to them. It is possible and necessary to create and promote a Jewish *v o s t o c h n i c h e s t v o*. With this [pro-Eastern Jewry] Eurasianism must be in co-operation and union" [emphasis in the original].⁷⁰

Eurasianism *ideologically* justifies the domination of Russia in "the Eurasian world." The logic of this view suggested that since the cultural-political unity of the peoples of this world was something very natural and organic, and since the Eurasian nations only benefited from the interaction with each other, separatism and self-determination made no sense anymore. Trubetskoi rejected the forms of nationalism operating with the terms such as "national self-determination." He believed that this policy led the smaller nations using it "only to confusion."⁷¹ He was the most vocal among the original Eurasians in opposing self-determination of smaller nations. Trubetskoi condemned the movements for national independence on ideological grounds: "national liberation movements often incorporate socialism, which always contains elements of cosmopolitanism and internationalism."⁷² The Eurasians and many other Russian emigrants did not require much scholarly argumentation why "socialism," "cosmopolitanism," and "internationalism" were bad ideas. They had their personal experience to convince them of the malignity of

70. Savitskii, "V borbe za evraziistvo," p. 4 and p. 5. *Zapadnichestvo* means being pro-Western, and is derived from *Zapadniki*, the pro-Western school in the *Zapadniki* vs. Slavophile debate in Russia. "*Vostochnichestvo*" means being pro-Eastern, and is used and emphasised by Savitskii in order to draw the reader's attention to it. There was no significant formal or informal "*vostochnichestvo*" political movement in Russia or the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s outside Eurasianism.

71. Trubetskoi, "On True and False Nationalism," p. 76.

72. *Ibid.*

these ideologies. It was, therefore, natural that they disapproved of any political movement that included traces of socialism and internationalism. In terms of the existing movements for self-determination, the Eurasians were concerned with the Ukrainian, and to a lesser extent the Belarussian movement for independence.⁷³ Later in the 1920s, Trubetskoi devoted special attention to the question of Ukrainian independence. He strongly criticised the idea, and on a couple of occasions, sketched his image of an independent Ukraine in rather unpleasant colours.⁷⁴ Trubetskoi argued that Russian and Ukrainian cultures had influenced each other a great deal throughout their cultural and political co-existence, and their separation would result in the "degeneration and death" of a culturally "extremely valuable part of the Ukrainian people."⁷⁵ Even before Trubetskoi published his articles against the independent Ukraine, and before the argument ideologically justifying the existence of smaller nations within a common Eurasian state, Eurasianism was criticised for its nationalistic and imperialistic inclinations. Such criticism started in Poland in 1922, and remained part of its Eurasianologist tradition. Ukrainian emigrants voiced their criticism of Eurasianism in the 1920s as well. They saw Eurasianism as threatening Russification and poised to assimilate their cultural

73. Riasanovsky, "Afterword," p. 139.

74. See, for instance, his "The Ukrainian Problem" (1927), in Trubetzkoy, N. S. *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays On Russia's Identity*. Also Anatoly Liberman, "Postscript: N. S. Trubetzkoy and His Works on History and Politics," *Ibid*.

75. Trubetzkoy, "The Ukrainian Problem," p. 257.

heritage.⁷⁶

The primary goal for the original Eurasians was to develop and substantiate Russia's new national identity. They supported their vision by findings and observations from different disciplines: ethnography, economic geography, linguistics, and history. This gave Eurasianism a much needed scholarly aspect, a necessary tool for debating the educated public. The authors of *Exodus to the East* made a number of predictions on matters of international relations on the same 'scientific' basis. Some of these predictions later came true. The Russian-dominated Soviet Union became a superpower and the main rival of the West. The Soviet Union developed as a major ideological fortress of the 20th century. The dominance of Western Europe in the world declined; it lost most of its colonies, and at some point, it even became dependent on the United States for security and development. The United States emerged to become the richest and most powerful state in history. Australia developed to be one of the advanced states of the world. The Russian revolution became an event of global significance. Bolshevism was eventually defeated in Russia as the dominant political force. However, in the 1920s not many people endorsed this type of bold predictions made by Eurasians in spring of 1921. It seemed that there were no real bases for this kind of prognostication: Russia lay in ruins, and its population was starving; the USA was very much an isolationist country; Australia was hardly regarded seriously; and nothing seemed to threaten the dominance of major Western European powers. For

76. Savitskii, "V borbe za evraziistvo," p. 9.

most Russian émigrés these predictions probably sounded on the verge of lunacy. No wonder the Eurasians found a relatively small following among them.

There are several misperceptions and assumptions about the original Eurasians that should be clarified. First, Eurasianism was not developed as a new religion or some sort of occult group. This was out of question for the original Eurasians, since they had firm religious beliefs rooted in Orthodox Christianity. Second, although one can identify some unifying aspects in the writings of Eurasians, supported by empirical and historical findings, Eurasianism was not developed as a coherent science or field of research either. Third, Eurasians did not argue that Russia was an Asian phenomenon, but rather they developed an argument about the uniqueness of Russia's place in the world, based on its geographical or empirical, and historical characteristics. Fourth, the original Eurasians were not an anti-Western political movement. Instead, they criticised some aspects of *Western European* political heritage, namely, its ethnocentricity, rationalism, and adherence to progress.⁷⁷ The writings included in *Exodus to the East* demonstrate that their authors were influenced by such Western European thinkers as Nietzsche, Kant, Fichte, and especially Hegel. Therefore, Eurasians did not stand for the rejection or condemnation of Western European cultural heritage as such. The authors of *Exodus* criticised Western European cultural imperialism, refused to view Russia as a cultural province of Europe, and criticised the Russian

77. Florovskii's "The Cunning of Reason" was, in fact, a philosophical criticism of some of the dominant aspects of Western European political and philosophical thought of the day.

intelligentsia for its “timidity and subservience” to European culture. Fifth, the original Eurasians did not view Russia to be ‘the centre of the world,’ but instead, saw this ‘centre’ elsewhere, namely in Western Europe. They saw Russia and the United States as challengers of this ‘centre,’ and possible future successors of it. Finally, Eurasians also had a specific attitude toward the Bolshevik revolution: they were anti-Bolshevik and condemned their violent ways, but they did recognize the historical significance of the revolution, and tried to ‘constructively’ assess its historical effects and influence.

The four original Eurasians collaborated on two or three more volumes. Then their personal interests took different turns. Florovskii left the movement after 1923, and Suvchinskii did so at the end of the 1920s. Savitskii, the most dedicated and persistent of all Eurasians, settled in Prague, which became the centre of Eurasianist activities. In 1922, Trubetskoi got a professorship at Vienna University where he taught Slavic philology and Slavic antiquities. He remained active in Eurasian circles, and was a frequent visitor to Prague and Brno until his death in 1938. Trubetskoi’s strong interest in Eurasianism is sometimes explained by the fact that his linguistic research, especially that conducted in Russia, was mainly based on a geographical method: “[a] geographical (that is, an essentially spatial) approach – behind which one can glimpse a spatial-temporal approach close in the final analysis to that of the exact sciences – initially played an essential role in the formation of Trubetzkoy’s Eurasian views, as it did in the views of his allies in the

Eurasian movement.”⁷⁸ Savitskii lived in Prague until the end of the Second World War, when he was arrested by the Soviet occupation forces. In 1946 Savitskii was sent to a labour camp in Mordvinia (Mordva or Mordovia, around 500 km south-east of Moscow), apparently for his anti-Soviet activities during the Russian civil war.⁷⁹ In 1956 he was released and was allowed to return to Prague. In 1961 Savitskii was arrested again, this time by the Czech authorities. Although he was not detained for long, apparently due to a shake-up in the Ministry of the Interior, the second arrest finally broke Savitskii’s health, and he died in 1968.⁸⁰ He did not leave this world without passing the torch of Eurasianism to the new generation, though. Lev Nikolaevich Gumilëv (1912-1992), the son of legendary Russian poets Nikolai Gumilëv and Anna Akhmatova, has been regarded as “the last of the [original] Eurasians.”⁸¹ This very talented and controversial Russian political scientist, who identified himself as an ethnologist, was directly influenced by Savitskii.⁸² There are two versions of how these two met. The popular version had it

78. Viacheslav V. Ivanov, “Preface,” in Trubetzkoy, *Legacy of Genghis Khan*, p. xvi and p. xvii.

79. According to one source, Savitskii in 1920 served as a secretary of P. B. Struve who was in charge of foreign affairs at the staff of General Wrangel, a prominent White general during the Russian civil war, operating in southern Russia. Iu. V. Tikhonravov, *Geopolitika*, Moscow: INFRA-M, 2000, p. 233.

80. Liberman, p. 349. Dugin provides another explanation for Savitskii’s early release: an appeal made by Bertrand Russell, a prominent British philosopher. Aleksandr Dugin, *Posleslovie: Evraziiskii triumf*,” in Pëtr Savitskii, *Kontinent Evraziia*, p. 439.

81. Vinkovetsky, p. 153.

82. Gumilëv was a multitasking person. He had doctoral degrees in both history and geography. He has also been referred as a philosopher, and an ethnographer. Tikhonravov, p. 238. Russians do not normally identify him as a political scientist, but his writings do suggest that Gumilëv, above all else,

that they met in a Mordvinian labour camp – Gumilëv, too, was sentenced to labour camps, both before and after the Second World War.⁸³ According to the other version, offered by Gumilëv himself, he travelled to Prague in the 1960s, and met Savitskii. By that time he had read some, but not many Eurasian works.⁸⁴ Subsequently, in Gumilëv's writings Eurasianism took a different spin. Initially he was interested in the histories of the Mongols, the Tatars, the Huns, the Khazars, and other peoples of the Great Steppe, and produced a number of interesting works in the area.⁸⁵ Later in his career, Gumilëv developed the theory of ethnogenesis, a universalistic theory of history, explaining change and progress in history through the rise and fall of different ethnoi (plural for ethnos). According to Gumilëv, the clue of understanding history lies in the analysis of the interrelationship between the biosphere and ethnogenesis; i.e., why and how nature and human nature overlap and influence each other.⁸⁶ This controversial theory has its roots in Savitskii's "Migration of Culture," in which the author tried to establish a

was interested in matters political.

83. Tikhonravov, p. 233.

84. Vinkovetsky, p. 153.

85. Some of Gumilëv's earlier works in history and ethnography were translated into French and English. See, for instance, "Les Fluctuations du niveau de la mer Caspienne," *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, Vol. VI, No. 3, Paris, 1965; "Les Mongols du XIIe siècle et le Slovo o polku Igoreve," *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, Vol. VII, No. 1, Paris, 1966; "New Data on the History of the Khazars," *Acta Archeologica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 19, Budapest, 1967; *Searches for an Imaginary Kingdom: The Legend of the Kingdom of Prester John*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

86. See Leo Gumilëv, *Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1990.

correlation between major historical shifts and changes in geographical and meteorological data.

The Eurasians of the 1920s and 1930s believed that Bolshevism in Russia was only a passing moment in history. They believed that Eurasianism was more organic and natural for Russia-Eurasia than Bolshevism. They wanted to replace the Bolsheviks in the Kremlin.⁸⁷ This did happen in the 1990s, at least to some extent. Russian political thought, especially in the areas of security and foreign policy, is currently dominated by New Eurasian ideas. The Russian theory of international politics, *geopolitika*, is rooted in Eurasianism, as well as in classical geopolitical theories. The Russian political class has embraced Eurasian ideas since it seems to provide logical arguments for a cohesive Russian state. Eurasianism also informs Moscow's desire to dominate its 'traditional spheres of influence,' most notably, the countries of the former Soviet Union. Eurasianism, or rather its modern form, may serve as an ideological base for Russia's security and foreign policy. The proponents of New Eurasianism can substantiate their choice of ideology by pointing out insightful prognostications made by the original Eurasians. In short, Eurasianism speaks to some very important levels of Russian political mentality.

Ilya Vinkovetsky, one of the translators and editors of *Exodus to the East*, rejects New Eurasianism and its proponents, arguing that they "have very little to do with Eurasianism in the classic sense."⁸⁸ The opponents of Eurasianism and

87. Riasanovsky, p. 123.

88. Vinkovetsky, p. 154.

geopolitika in Russia and elsewhere accuse the New Eurasians of imperialism and of promoting outdated ideas.⁸⁹ Harsh criticism of the modern Eurasianism is understandable, since it does divert from the classical Eurasianism in some important aspects. Unlike the original Eurasianism, its newer version is explicitly anti-Western, xenophobic, chauvinistic, militant, and simply represents propaganda of great Russian ethnic nationalism. The most noted among the New Eurasians are: its main theoretician Aleksandr Dugin, a self-proclaimed 'conspirologist' (conspiracy theorist) and geopolitician, Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, an eccentric populist right-wing politician. Besides these figures there are hundreds of Russian scholars, analysts, commentators, politicians, and journalists who also subscribe to ideas of Eurasianism. Not all of them, though, go to the extremes of Dugin or Zhirinovsky, and some of them do make legitimate arguments. Overall, the resurgence of Eurasianism has its own historical logic: much as in the 1920s, Russia once again finds itself at historical crossroads, in a world dominated by the West. However, have Eurasians in fact replaced the Bolsheviks in the Kremlin? It does not seem that way. It would be more accurate to argue that so far Bolsheviks have merely adopted and adapted long-forgotten Eurasian ideas.

89. Charles Clover of *Financial Times* is a notable critic of Eurasianism, especially of the version championed by Aleksandr Dugin.

Part Two: The Re-emergence of Eurasianism and the Birth of *Geopolitika*

After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Eurasianism re-emerged in Russia, apparently out of nowhere. The modern brand of Eurasianism slowly became very popular both among the masses and the political class. The attention of New Eurasians has been directed toward several tasks: publication, study, and analysis of works by original Eurasians, a search for a new identity for the post-Soviet Russia, and the creation of theories on Russian security and foreign policy. The latter came to be known as *geopolitika*, the Russian-style imperialist geopolitics, which in Russia signifies a theory of international politics and foreign policy. This body of thought grew out of Eurasianist concepts on the one hand, and classical geopolitical writings on the other. Different Russian authors pursue different methodologies, and approach the discipline from different perspectives. However, they all share the same geomentality: their vision of the geographical identity of Russia is remarkably similar. They see Russia in a dichotomous opposition to the West, and identify the geographical characteristics of the Russian Federation or the former Soviet Union as the most fundamental defining factors for Russia's international identity, national security, and foreign policy. From this vision arise images of historical destinies of Russia, world domination by the West, the multi-polar or uni-polar international system, and different scenarios for Russian foreign and security policy in the new century. *Geopolitika* also displays tendencies of becoming a replacement for Soviet-era

Marxist theory in international relations, the criterion of truth for the Soviet (and Russian) scholars for many years. The proponents of *geopolitika* follow similar principles of theory making, and tend to have a god's eye vision of the world, and other niceties that go well with universalistic social theories. Thus, *geopolitika* is one part of New Eurasian thinking focusing mostly on international affairs. New Eurasianism itself is broader and includes both analysis of original Eurasian works, and research and study in other areas such as history, philosophy, literary studies, linguistics, geography, theology, economics, ethnography, and politics.

Many different authors promote *geopolitika* in Russia, and they construct sometimes similar and at times original theoretical structures for the discipline. Most of them start by asking an obvious question: what is geopolitics? Since most of the authors imply that *geopolitika* is a positive science, it needs some kind of definition. As a positive science it also needs concepts, categories, and a field of study. Aleksandr Dugin is the author of one of the better known and thicker books on Russian geopolitics *Osnovy geopolitiki (Foundations of Geopolitics)*. Published in 1996, it has been very successful in Russia, having been reprinted in 1997 and again in 1999. *Foundations of Geopolitics* made the name of its author very well known in Russia. Dugin is a publisher and the editor of an Eurasianist journal titled *Elementy*. He was even given his own TV show on one of Russia's main networks. In April 2001, he was one of the organisers of the founding congress of Eurasians in Russia.⁹⁰ In the beginning of the book, Dugin provides a number of definitions for

geopolitics. The most important among them is “geopolitics – [is a] science to govern.” Geopolitics also serves as a “short directory for the prince.”⁹¹ It is, according to Dugin, a “discipline for political elites,” the main thesis of which is “dependency of humans on space.”⁹² Geopolitics also is a form of “mentality (*Weltanschauung*), and as such it should be better compared not with [individual] sciences, but [with] a system of sciences.” At the same time, geopolitics is an ideology, much as Marxism and liberalism are. However, geopolitics as an ideology is different from these “economic ideologies,” because “it is based on the thesis: ‘geographic landscape as a destiny’,” while Marxism and liberalism start with the principle “economics as a destiny.”⁹³ In short, *geopolitika* is a science, a form of mentality, and an ideology. As a science it has no claim to scientific rigour, but “geopolitics decides herself what is valuable for her and what is not. Humanitarian and natural sciences are called upon only when they do not contradict the principles of geopolitical method.”⁹⁴ As an ideology *geopolitika* has geography and space as its main principles. Dugin argues that these principles perform the same function in geopolitical ideology as relations of production and money in Marxism and liberalism. These are the main principles of the mentioned ideologies, because

90. “Dugin Creates Eurasian Movement,” *RFE/RL Newswire*, Vol. 5, No. 78, Part I, April 23 2001.

91. Aleksandr Dugin, *Osnovy geopolitiki*, Moscow: ARKTOGELA-tsentr, 1999, p. 14.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 12.


94. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

within these ideologies every important aspect of social and economic life is derived.⁹⁵ Dugin does not elaborate on the claim that *geopolitika* is a form of mentality. His main goal is to depict the current world, and world history in general, as a continuous struggle between continental and sea powers. Dugin argues this dichotomy between sea and land powers has its origins in the very foundation of nature: dry land never coexists well with the sea; in “the dualism of the elements” that takes place, the land is against the sea.⁹⁶ The fundamental dualism between “tellurocracy” (land power) and “thalassocracy” (sea power) is “the main law of geopolitics,” which is “reflected in the geographical constitution of the planet, and historical typology of civilisations.” In other words this dichotomy could be expressed as the one between “ideocracy” and “democracy,” the two forms of government that are inherent for these two types of civilisation.⁹⁷ Dugin provides a map, which depicts the division of the world between the two “types of civilisation” (see Map 4-1). According to his schema, Russia, Eastern Europe, China, the bigger part of the Middle East and India, and surrounding regions belong to the Heartland-Eurasia, i.e., the group of “tellurocratic” powers, which is geographically and historically opposed to the Rimland-World Island or the group of thalassocratic states. This Heartland is surrounded by Rimland, the inner crescent of powers, which encompasses Western Europe, the rest of the Middle East and Indochina, and

95. Ibid., p. 12.

96. Ibid., p. 19.

97. Ibid., p. 15.



Map 4-1. The geopolitical division of the world according to Dugin. The globe is divided between Heartland-Eurasia and World Island-Inner Crescent. Between them is sandwiched Rimland-Inner Crescent.

Source: Aleksandr Dugin, *Osnovy Geopolitiki*, p. 17.

a little bit of Africa. The rest of the world is the World Island -the outer crescent, which includes everything else.

Although Dugin outlines well the schematics of his vision of the world, his definition of *geopolitika* is very broad and imprecise. He does not even pin down exactly what *geopolitika* is: a science, an ideology or a form of mentality. It could be said that Dugin develops *contradictio in adjecto* – a contradiction in definition: one and the same thing cannot be a science and an ideology or a form of mentality at the same time. Other authors take different approaches to the subject of definition. For Zyuganov *geopolitika* is an approach to study historical processes. This approach incorporates geographic factors that “always have influenced politics” – characteristics of landscape, the perimeter of state borders, natural resources, etc.⁹⁸ Zyuganov does not go into more specific discussion what *geopolitika* is, but rather he quotes Marx and Spykman to support his claim on the importance of geopolitics, and poses four generic questions “in order to involve in an organic and constructive way the whole scientific potential and experience of world geopolitics in the business of rebuilding Great Russia.”⁹⁹ These four questions or the main titles for groups of questions are: first, “what are the ‘geopolitical interests’ of a state?” Second, “what are the objectively defined, ‘natural’ geopolitical interests of Russia?” Third, “what are the most optimal forms of control by Russia of those key

98. Gennady Zyuganov, *Geografiia pobedy*, Moskva: no publisher, 1998, p. 11.

99. Ibid., p. 12.

geopolitical regions [at her border]...?" And fourth, "what does a strategic prognosis of the geopolitical image of the world look like in the 21st century, and what is Russia's place in it depending on different scenarios of world development?"¹⁰⁰ In this way Zyuganov avoids problems related to the definition and scientific justification of geopolitics, and goes directly into an exploration of "geopolitical problems."

A theory developed by such an approach is fine, perhaps, for a politician who tries to push his own ideological agenda, but it does not help in demonstrating the scientific nature of this theory. However, Zyuganov's main interest is not to establish the theory and method of geopolitics, but to demonstrate the superiority of Russia, and its civilisational importance. He quotes I. A. Il'in, one of the old Eurasians, and emphasises his ideas as the keys for understanding Russia's place in the world. The Russian state grew as an "organic unit," Il'in wrote, "this unity was, first of all, geographically prescribed and forced on us by the earth." Russia has been "an organism forced to defend itself eternally."¹⁰¹ Zyuganov himself introduces the idea of ethics in this picture of the eternally fighting Russia. It was religion and spirituality that played a unique role in Russian history. "Practical Russian geopolitics," argues Zyuganov, "was born in the 16th century with the unified and centralised Russian state." It was also the period when the first Russian geopolitical doctrine was born: "Moscow [is] the third Rome." Here is the

100. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

101. Ibid., p. 46.

difference between Russia and Europe. The basis for European geopolitical conceptions has been the attempt to formulate the best possible methods for achieving power and wealth. The ideological basis for Russian geopolitics was completely different. Russians have used geopolitics to secure their control over territories in order to achieve their “main objective – to bring the light of Truth to the people, and to defend God’s Truth from any foreign encroachment.” Although Zyuganov further continues with his geopolitical classification of historical eras, he believes that the ethical basis of the Russian geopolitics is the reason for “the absence of geodeterminism” in it.¹⁰² Thus, as strange it may sound, the leader of the second largest communist party in the world believes that an ethical stance, namely the word of God, is what makes Russia geopolitically unique in this world. It should be noted that Zyuganov is not as militaristic and radical in his judgement as Dugin and some others, but he does argue for Russia’s singularity and original destiny.

According to S. B. Lavrov, the “term ‘*geopolitika*’ hardly demands an explanation;” i.e., the subject of this discipline is so clear that it even does not need a definition.¹⁰³ It seems that for this author *geopolitika* is a collection of *ideae innatae* – some inborn ideas or senses that do not need any additional reference. K. Sorokin points out that geopolitics normally is understood as a science “of global politics

102. Ibid., pp. 51-52.

103. S. B. Lavrov, “*Geopolitika i regionalistika: vzgliad uchenykh*,” in ed. S. B. Lavrov, *Geopoliticheskie i geoekonomicheskie problemi Rossii*, St. Petersburg: Russian Geographic Society, 1995, p. 3.

("geos" in Greek means Earth, the globe), i.e. [the science that studies] mainly contemporary strategic directions in the development of international *political relations*" [emphasis in the original].¹⁰⁴ Further, Sorokin notes that the Academy of Natural Sciences of the Russian Federation calls geopolitics military or military-political studies. Therefore, according to Sorokin, there is no real geopolitics in Russia, and it is possible that it would never come about, if "foreign geopolitical findings, methodological research, etc. are blindly copied" by Russians. The "traditional Western geopolitics" is currently in crisis, according to Sorokin, because it could not adapt itself to the realities, such as a significant increase in those fundamental factors that define the strategic behaviour of the states." Sorokin proposes that *geopolitika* transcend the "narrow framework of political geography," and become a systematic science in order to serve as a "systemic database" for Russia's foreign and domestic political strategies. This author also proposes that *geopolitika* become a "rationally limiting" factor for the new nationalistic ideology that is to replace the old Communist one, and prevent it from falling into extremism.¹⁰⁵

Sorokin finds it difficult to define *geopolitika* for Russia's needs, and argues that such a definition should emerge with the development of this discipline within

104. K. Sorokin, "Osobennosti geopoliticheskogo polozheniya Rossii v sovremennom mire," in ed. S. B. Lavrov, *Geopoliticheskie*, p. 11. It should be noted that *geos* in classic Greek means not the Earth or globe, but land. Whether Earth was a globe or not was a highly debatable question among ancient scholars.

105. Ibid.

Russian realities. Thus, Sorokin, like Zyuganov, avoids the task of defining or outlining the discipline, and tries to substantiate his claim that geopolitics is very important by using an old trick of *argumentum ad ignorantiam*: his claims that there are substantial “foreign geopolitical findings,” and there is a “traditional Western geopolitics,” which currently experiences a crisis, presupposes the ignorance of his audience. In terms of outlining his vision of Russia in the world after the dissolution of the USSR, Sorokin identifies two main peculiarities of “the existing geopolitical situation:” the “invasion” of “the near abroad” by Western states, and the shift of the geopolitical pole from the West to the East, i.e. the Pacific Rim. The 1990s is understood as the period of “*the third re-division of the world in this century among the leading countries and country groupings of the world*” [emphasis in the original].¹⁰⁶ This re-division, however, is conducted not with military, but economic means. Sorokin concludes that “the geopolitical position of Russia” in this period is weakened due to “*a significant reduction of Russia’s geopolitical space*” [emphasis in the original].¹⁰⁷

N. V. Kaledin follows a more complicated and highly theoretical path, and tries to develop *geopolitika* from “practical-theoretical concepts of political geography as a science [that studies] the process of self-organising political activities of society in the multifaceted conditions of geo-space, and the results of

106. Ibid., pp. 13-14 and p. 12.

107. Ibid., p. 16.

this process.”¹⁰⁸ Further, Kaledin develops even more complicated concepts such as “geopolitical optimum,” “geopolitical administration,” “geopolitical effectiveness,” and defines “geopolitical security” as a concept that “describes the status of geopolitical optimum in dynamic or static geopolitical situations, processes, and systems.”¹⁰⁹ Kaledin’s attempt to define geopolitics as a scientific discipline and outline its methodology is, of course, more developed and challenging, but he runs into another logical mistake of defining an unknown concept through other unknowns (*ignotum per ignotum*). Definition of geopolitics by using such a concept as “geo-space” helps very little, since it stays unexplained what “geo-space” is, and how it is different from “space.” A similar problem exists with the definition of “geopolitical security” through such terms as “geopolitical optimum” or “geopolitical situation.” Kaledin does define what “geopolitical optimum” is: “an optimal variation of combinations, inter-relations, and inter-links between political activities of [human] subjects, and the geo-space that surrounds them.”¹¹⁰ However, again, it remains unexplained what “geo-space” is, and how political activities can be combined with the respective geo-space.

According to some versions of *geopolitika*, there are “hidden from view” agencies in international politics that have significant powers – they direct and

108. N. V. Kaledin, “Otechestvennye politicheskaya geografia i geopolitika: realnost i vozmozhnosti,” in ed. S. B. Lavrov, *Geopoliticheskie*, p. 79.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

110. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

guide the lives of nations and states. The nature of these agencies is not entirely clear, but they are said to influence peoples' lives a great deal. In 1993 Aleksandr Dugin published a volume titled *Konspirologiia* (Conspirology). Besides debating traditional geopolitical dichotomies between sea powers and land powers and their influence on history, Dugin also argues that there has been a constant chain of conspiracies by "Atlantists," the carriers of the sea power mentality – the USA and England, on one side, and "Eurasianists," the carriers of the land power mentality – Russia and Germany, on the other. These conspiracies have been directed against each other by sea and land powers, and they have served as invisible governing strings throughout the permanent struggle between the West and Eurasia.¹¹¹ Dugin depicted the original four Eurasians, the authors of *Exodus to the East* – Frolovskii, Savitskii, Suvchinskii, and Trubetskoi, not as creators of Eurasianism, but as members of the secret Eurasian order acting, along with Haushofer, as its "disclosers."¹¹² Kuznetsov and Nikolskii introduce terms like "biorobots" ("biological robots") and *zakulisie* in their thick volume titled *Introduction to Theory of National Security* (1999). The latter concept, *zakulisie*, literally means "[the place] behind the scenes," but with the implication of its being a rational actor itself. The actor, which is represented as the world-wide behind-the-scenes player, the international elite of sorts, is a kind of "invisible hand" poised to struggle with

111. Iu. Kuznetsov and V. Nikolskii, *Vvedenie v teoriu natsionalnoi bezopastnosti*, Moskva: Vernyi, 1999, p. 222.

112. Vinkovetsky, p. 154.

national behind-the-scenes actors in its attempts to control the world.¹¹³ “Biorobots” are humans who can be easily manipulated by the élite, especially by the international behind-the-scenes élite. These “biorobots” are also good “biological conductors” of governing instructions given them by the elite.¹¹⁴ Through “biorobots” the international elite achieves its goals world-wide by manipulating the masses. According to the authors, most of these “biorobots,” as well as the main conspirators behind the international scenes, are people of Jewish heritage or ancestry; they stop short of accusing the entire Jewish nation.

This kind of discussion of events of world history, supported by ideas and notions from Darwinism, mythology, cosmology, philosophy, theatrical studies, etc. seems to be not very serious and bizarre. However, the chapters chiefly dedicated to “biorobots” and their masters in the book adjoin with the chapters debating more conventional ideas and concepts from geopolitics and international affairs, and events of world history. Kuznetsov and Nikolskii’s vision of the world, on which they built Russia’s new identity, is based on two assumptions: “1. the world is a whole, 2. the processes that take place in it are inter-linked and inter-sewn with each other.”¹¹⁵ In terms of its natural evolution, their world is divided among civilisations: Western-Christian, Russian-Orthodox, Muslim (Islamic world), Hindu,

113. Kuznetsov and Nikolskii, pp. 17-19.

114. Ibid., p. 42.

115. Ibid., p. 13.

Buddhist-Pacific, and the Black.¹¹⁶ Russia itself is “a Great Nation,” around which a civilisation has developed.¹¹⁷ The world is also divided in terms of “geostrategic regions,” and there are three such regions: “the Eurasian continental world, the sea world, and the intermediate [world].”¹¹⁸ Kuznetsov and Nikolskii also speak of “the Russian civilisation.” “Russian people” these authors understand to be the Russians plus the Ukrainians and Belorussians.¹¹⁹ After creating such an image of the world, Kuznetsov and Nikolskii find it necessary to have a science that would study it. According to them, geopolitics is this crucial science in analysing world processes and the principles of the development of the nations of the world. They define geopolitics as “a science, [which] studies processes of the spatial-temporal organisation of the development of the nations of the world.” The world according to Kuznetsov and Nikolskii is a world of the permanent struggle between the continental and sea nations or “the struggle of the continents.” The analysis and research of this struggle is identified as the main problem of geopolitics. State borders play a huge role in this struggle, since geopolitics deals with “the spatial relations among nations and their states.”¹²⁰ After developing this kind of image of the world and a method to study it, Kuznetsov and Nikolskii offer their formulation

116. *Ibid.*, pp. 104-109.

117. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

118. *Ibid.*, p. 258.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

120. *Ibid.* p. 273.

of “the main idea of the National Doctrine of the Russian People,”¹²¹ and various levels of the analysis of national security. They also develop several scenarios of the possible future changes in Russia’s ‘living-space’ (*Lebensraum*), and in its defence capabilities.¹²²

Even works by such a gifted scholar as Gumilëv are not free from occultist ideas. The main occult elements in Gumilëv’s ethnogenesis theory are his idea of *passionarity* (*passionarnost’*), and its source – cosmic radiation. He develops his theory of ethnogenesis in the volume titled *Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere*. *Passionarity* is something like Bergson’s *élan vital*, but according to Gumilëv, his *passionarity* has not philosophical but strictly scientific significance. According to him, “passionarity is not the energy itself but its observable effect.”¹²³ He rejects philosophy in favour of “clear and exact” natural sciences. Gumilëv is obsessed with the idea of “cause-effect relations” and “cause-effect chains.” For him it is absolutely clear and beyond doubt that everything has its own cause, and this cause is of natural source, and that one and the same cause creates the same effects in the same circumstances.¹²⁴ At the same time, *passionarity* is understood as some kind of observable effect of a vital energy or the biosphere, which drives ethnoi to accomplish historically significant deeds. “Ethnos” is understood as a large group

121. Ibid., pp. 332-335.

122. Ibid., p. 443 and p. 707 respectively.

123. “Lev Gumilyov on Interethnic Relations,” *Soviet Literature*, Vol. 4, No. 505, 1990, p. 95.

124. Tikhonravov, p. 241.

of people with a similar mode of behaviour. Although the biosphere, biochemical energy, is the source of passionarity, the biosphere itself is also influenced by a cosmic radiation of sorts. The only evidence Gumilëv has to support this hypothesis is that “explosions in ethnogenesis” occurred roughly at the same time in different parts of the world.¹²⁵ To make his analysis clearer, he proposes a diagram of “the change in the passionary tension of the ethnic system,”¹²⁶ tables of “the ethnic hierarchy,” and “the phases of ethnogenesis.”¹²⁷ It should be noted that Gumilëv always avoided using the terms “Eurasianism” and “geopolitics.” This was one of the reasons he managed to publish under the Soviet government. However, the scale of his analysis and theoretical speculation is global and all encompassing. Gumilëv constructs an image of the world that is a whole, and inter-related and inter-linked with the chains of causality. All living matter of the planet is bound by the biosphere, which is a sort of biochemical energy. This energy influences and directs history and civilisations in a deterministic manner. This influence is, in principle, quantifiable and even predictable, provided sufficient data and “correct statistics” are collected and input into a computer.¹²⁸

Not all scholars and analysts who discuss different aspects of *geopolitika* use occult thinking or highly speculative reasoning. However, almost all of them ‘draw’

125. Ibid., pp. 241-242.

126. “Lev Gumilyov on Interethnic Relations,” p. 98.

127. Leo Gumilëv, *Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere*, p. 139 and p. 379.

128. “Lev Gumilyov on Interethnic Relations,” p. 98.

schematics of the world, and emphasise Russia's place and priorities in it. For Professor B. S. Khorev the main question about Russia is its survivability within its current, post-Soviet state borders. He points out that "historical roots" keep the ideas of "united superethnic community very recently referred as the Soviet people" and "Eurasian power" very much alive. According to Khorev, "this is our historical fate, our geopolitical destiny." He sees the Russian nation as the centrepiece of this superethnic entity, and he is against creating official borders among the larger states of the former Soviet Union: "*there must not be any kind of new de facto state borders at least with Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus. This has to become an axiom for the modern Russian policies*" [emphasis in the original].¹²⁹ In other words, in Khorev's image of the political world the absence of well-delineated, fortified, and guarded state borders means the absence of conflicting agendas among such states. D. V. Zhitin compares the "geopolitical situations" of the 16th and 17th century Russia with the modern day Russian state, and concludes that the two have at least three major similarities: first, the absence of "secured ports" at the Baltic and Black Seas; second, the presence of a significant number of Russian, Orthodox people outside Russia's state borders and in the neighbouring countries; and third, the "amorphousness" and "reality" of Russia's state borders in the south and south-east. He points out that everything has changed from the 17th century to the modern times – Russia has a different political system, different neighbours, etc.

129. B. S. Khorev, "Iavliaetsia li "Novaia Rossiia" zhiznesposobnym gosudarstvom v sovremennykh granitsakh?" in ed. S. B. Lavrov, *Geopoliticheskie*, p. 20.

Only geography remains the same. On this basis Zhitin concludes that “*geopolitika* of Russia” is more of an expression of “objective reality” than of “imperialist policy.”¹³⁰ V. K. Kolosov argues that “the geopolitical structure of the world has become more complicated” since the changes started in “the world-wide geopolitical order” in 1989-1991. He sees a “a post bi-polar” “new European geopolitical space” formed, which would isolate Russia by developing a new zone of hostile or non-friendly Balto-Pontic states.¹³¹ Gusakov and Zotova make a reference to Russian president Boris Yeltsin’s address to the Federal Council in 1997, and state that Russia is “a singular world with its own interests and its own logic of development.” It occupies “a unique geographical location in Eurasia” and this underlines its geopolitical importance as a stabilising actor on the global level.¹³² These scholars in their volume mainly discuss Russia’s foreign economic relations and its economic security; however, they, among many things, first of all identify the country’s geographical characteristics as the basis for its uniqueness and singularity.

New Eurasians use various methodological approaches to present their findings in a more respectable or acceptable academic manner. The main source for the methodological choice is the author’s previous expertise and training. Since

130. D. V. Zhitin, “Geopolitika Rossii: 400 let nazad i segodnia. Obyektivnaia realnost’ ili “imperskaia politika”?” in ed. S. B. Lavrov, *Geopoliticheskie*, p. 48 and pp. 53-54.

131. V. K. Kolosov, “Geopoliticheskie stsenarii dlia Vostochnoi i Tsentralnoi Evropei v postbipoliarnom mire,” in ed. S. B. Lavrov, *Geopoliticheskie*, p. 55 and p. 61.

132. H. P. Gusakov, N. A. Zotova, *Natsionalnye interesy i vneshneekonomicheskaya bezopastnost’*

political science and international relations did not exist in the Soviet Union as such, and positive discussion of geopolitics was not heard of at all, the current Russian geopoliticians have come from other disciplines. Most of them have brought their old academic baggage to the new discipline as well. A brief analysis of Russian geopolitical writings shows that almost every author tries to pull the discipline toward his old academic domain. Besides, since almost all of them are Soviet-educated scholars or politicians, many of them retain the official Soviet academic line of methodological thinking in social sciences, with relevant theoretical concepts.

For Alexandr Dugin it is philosophical training that serves as a starting point for his geopolitical theories. As a student at a Soviet institution of higher learning, he was obligated to learn official Marxist-Leninist doctrines of philosophy, political economy, political philosophy, and history. Dugin also educated himself: he learned foreign languages, and read works by classical geopoliticians. In Soviet times he was probably regarded as a dissident. He read literature officially banned by the Soviet authorities. People who entertained anti-Soviet ideas had a feeling in those days that the authorities had good reasons to ban certain literature. The banned literature and doctrines were dangerous for the Soviet system, because they propagated theoretically sound arguments that undermined the official doctrines propagated by the government. Otherwise, why would have they banned or restricted Freud, Nietzsche, Mackinder, and Haushofer among others? Ideological

or moral differences with the Soviet ideological norms were not good enough reasons for this. The authorities did not ban works by Oscar Wilde, Knut Hamsun or Max Stirner for example. It was, therefore, assumed that banned literature contained seeds of truth the government did not want its people to know. Those dissidents who managed to lay their hands on banned or restricted literature probably read it like a Bible, and quite possibly accepted it as truth. Geopolitics and its authors were among those banned. Until the very end, the official Soviet academia maintained a very negative view of geopolitics. It was described as a “concept, which justifies various forms of imperialist expansion through manipulating data from economic and political geography.” “From a theoretical point of view” geopolitics was characterised as a variation of “contemporary bourgeois *fetishism*” [emphasis in the original].¹³³ It was also perceived to be “the ideological foundation of the aggressive foreign policy of imperialism.”¹³⁴ The Soviet authorities described geopolitics as “fascist” and “bourgeois pseudo-science.” The existence of geopolitics as an academic discipline, sub-discipline or any other legitimate field of study was categorically rejected. However, in the 1990s the attitude toward geopolitics changed diametrically. After the fall of the Soviet Union, “geopolitics” became “one of the most popular” terms in Russian

133. “Geopolitika” in *Filosofskii slovar*, Moskva: Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literaturi, 1991, p. 86. “Fetishism” subsequently is defined as a form of “social relations (economic, ideological, etc.), and a thinking relevant to it, which ascribes specific social characteristics to things themselves, and accepts qualities created by culture as something naturally inherent.” Ibid., p. 483.

134. N. S. Mironenko, “Teoriia “kharlenda,” tselostnost’ Rossii i demokratiia (geograficheskii aspekt),” in ed. S. B. Lavrov, *Geopoliticheskie*, p. 23.

political lexicon.¹³⁵

According to some Russian geopolitical pundits, not everyone is able to comprehend the complexities of geopolitical theories and issues. One of the definitions Dugin gives to geopolitics is this: "*geopolitika* – [is a] discipline of political elite." The closer an individual is to the top of this elite, the better he understands "the meaning, and the usefulness" of geopolitics. This is, according to Dugin, the initiated caste capable of understanding the mysteries of geopolitics, presumably apart from the scholars who study geopolitics. Common people removed from this caste due to their social standing, can only comprehend geopolitics as some kind of abstraction.¹³⁶ Major-General Vladimir Zolotarëv comes into geopolitics from the discipline of military history. He sees regularity, consistency, and "historical-genetic logic" in military conflicts: "wars of our Fatherland, [both] external and internal, [and historic] periods preceding and following them – represent conformity to natural laws of genetic development of Russia."¹³⁷ Zolotarëv sees Russia as occupying "the unique geopolitical and very important geostrategic place in the very middle of Eurasia, which is the key region of the globe from the point of view of the access to land-based communication arteries, seas and oceans, as well as to practically all kinds of raw materials and

135. K. S. Gajiev, *Vvedenie v geopolitiku*, Moskva: Logos, 2000, p. 3.

136. Dugin, p. 13.

137. Zolotarev, p. 11.

resources.”¹³⁸ He defines Russia as a “multi-environmental, multi-ethnic, multi-religious territory.”¹³⁹ Zolotarëv does not develop a case for the natural superiority and unique destiny of Russia. As a military historian, he bases his analysis on generalising Russia’s historical experience, and combining it with geopolitics. Zolotarëv notes that Russia’s statehood is underlined by its “historical experience” and “geopolitical situation.”¹⁴⁰ His analysis of Russia’s national security is heavily influenced by geographical thinking:

While developing a modern conception of [Russia’s] national security, it is necessary to [develop] a deep comprehension of *peculiarities of [our] national mentality*, which has emerged under the real influences of geographical, historical, socio-psychological, and other conditions [emphasis in the original].¹⁴¹

Further, Zolotarëv lists several of these conditions, among which the top priorities are given to “Asian-European geographical location of Russia,” and “the spacious (from the point of view of the planetary [scale]) territory of the state.”¹⁴² He supports his assertions not only with geographical speculations, but some historical evidence as well. For example, among some important events of the 19th and the 20th century Russian Empire and the USSR, Zolotarëv discusses in detail the obsession with the state borders of the Soviet leadership in its negotiations with

138. Ibid., p. 33.

139. Ibid., p. 12.

140. Ibid., p. 44.

141. Ibid., p. 48.

142. Ibid.

London and Washington during and after the Second World War.¹⁴³

Gennady Zyuganov, the Chairman of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, is, first of all, an ideologue. He enters geopolitics having been trained in such disciplines as scientific communism, history of the CPSU, and (Soviet-style) Marxist political economy. Zyuganov's main geopolitical work, *Geografia pobedi* (*The Geography of Victory*), is styled and written in a way any self-respected representative of these disciplines would do. He cites Marx and Lenin in this book, arguing that when it came to international politics, these titans of communist thought reasoned and analysed just like geopoliticians. Zyuganov argues that the emergence of geopolitics in the beginning of the 20th century was a way to re-think the "changed social reality," i.e., the total division of the inhabited landmass of the globe among major powers. Lenin's *Imperialism* was in part a reaction to this new reality; it was an attempt "to uncover the contents of the new stage in social development."¹⁴⁴ Zyuganov also quotes Marx's work on the diplomatic history of the 18th century in order to show that even this classical author of communist theory was concerned with geopolitics.¹⁴⁵ To be sure, Marx wrote on the significance of geographical aspects and considerations in history, and Zyuganov is not alone in noting this. There have been attempts in both in the East and the West to analyse the geographical thought of Marx, who "himself in no way may be

143. Ibid., pp. 128-139.

144. Zyuganov, p. 24.

145. Ibid., p. 11.

considered... as a practising geographer, [but] his works have subsequently informed and inspired a legion of others who have been."¹⁴⁶

Zyuganov is more egalitarian than Dugin when it comes to the question of whom *geopolitika* is for, and what is to be done to better understand it. Zyuganov argues that *geopolitika* should be treated just like any other scientific discipline.¹⁴⁷ If this is the case, then anybody who is interested in the subject and works hard enough should be able to understand it. Zyuganov himself provides a theoretical foundation for geopolitical analysis. According to him, geopolitics, "as a branch of knowledge," has three principal theoretical sources: "civilisational concepts of historical process, military-strategic studies, and various theories of geographical determinism."¹⁴⁸ It should be noted that this is a very important step Zyuganov takes, if not in better explaining geopolitics, at least in imitating the classical Soviet Marxism-Leninism. The latter school of thought claimed that Marxism, as the highest form of human knowledge of history and society, had three principal sources: classical English political economy (Adam Smith, David Ricardo), mostly French schools of utopian socialism (Charles Fourier, Saint-Simon, Robert Owen), and German classical philosophy (Hegel, Feuerbach). If, according to Soviet ideology, these schools of thought helped to develop scientific Marxism-Leninism,

146. Brian J. Shaw, "Karl Marx, 1818-1883," in eds. Patrick H. Armstrong and Geoffrey J. Martin *Geographers: Biobibliographical Studies*, Vol. 19, London and New York: Mansell, 2000, p. 75.

147. Zyuganov, p. 3.

148. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

and thus their role in history ended, the “three sources of geopolitics,” according to Zyuganov, are constantly feeding geopolitics with ideas and concepts.¹⁴⁹ These ideas and concepts are developed by such authors as: N. I. Danilevsky, K. N. Leontiev, Oswald Spengler, P. N. Savitsky, L. N. Gumilëv, Arnold Toynbee, Samuel Huntington (“civilizational concepts of historical process”), Phillip Colomb, Alfred Mahan (“military-strategic studies”), Jean Bodin, Montesquieu, Johan Herder, Karl Ritter (“theories of geographical determinism”).¹⁵⁰

In order to demonstrate deep philosophical roots for his theory, Dugin develops a new approach to old ontological questions. Much in the spirit of Heidegger, he writes a new “philosophy of space.” We should think differently, according to him, we should pose questions from a new unexamined angle, we should “think space” first.¹⁵¹ Dugin takes a pre-Einstein and pre-Heideggerian understanding of time in European philosophy and science, and presents it as if the same were true today. He criticises historical interpretations based on the “paradigm of time,” and proposes instead the “paradigm of space.” According to Dugin, space is the “antithesis to time.” The past, present and future possess “equal ontological values” in the paradigm of space, and “the real topos of the West gives birth to an abstract impression of time without qualitative characteristics, which on

149. Ibid., p. 14.

150. Ibid., pp. 14-23.

151. Dugin, pp. 583-584.

its part poses the concept of a fictitious “topos,” which does not exist.”¹⁵² Like Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, which is devoted to philosophical aspects of time, Dugin’s philosophy of space is very complicated and difficult to follow and understand. However, unlike *Being and Time*, Dugin’s work makes neither philosophical nor scientific sense.

N. V. Kaledin, a geographer from St. Petersburg State University, notes that although *geopolitika* and its terminology has perpetrated all walks of life in Russia, a well established and accepted set of categories of this discipline is absent. He proposes to form “a theory of *geopolitika*” from the “position of dialectical-materialist methodology.” This methodology, according to Kaledin, should be used on already well established theoretical concepts of political geography.¹⁵³ Political geography has had a respectful history in Russian academia for a long time, and moreover, some of the pioneers of this discipline in the 18th century lived and worked in Russia. Kaledin also argues that *geopolitika* and political geography are close disciplines, and very often their concepts are used interchangeably. However, he does not elaborate why *geopolitika* as a scientific discipline should be guided by dialectical-materialist methodology.

Lev Gumilëv started from dialectical materialism, and developed a universalistic theory of history based on his ideas of *ethnos* and *passionarity*. This theory of ethnogenesis focuses on analysis of the most basic and stable units of

152. Ibid., pp. 585-586 and p. 590 and p. 591.

153. Kaledin, pp. 78-79.

human society, *ethnoi*. From the ontological point of view such a theory is opposed to Marxist historical materialism, which starts from the assumption that being (existence) determined or defined thinking (consciousness). However, in the introduction to the very book in which the theory of ethnogenesis is developed, Gumilëv identifies dialectical materialism with *the* philosophy of science: “since I start from the point that an *ethnos* is a natural phenomenon in its forming, the basis for studying it can only be the philosophy of science, i.e. dialectical materialism.”¹⁵⁴ Historical materialism, on the other hand, studies the history of people and not the history of nature, which is inside of man. Gumilëv further quotes Marx, who wrote that “history itself is a *real* part of *natural history* and of nature’s becoming man. Natural science will in time subsume the science of man just as the science of man will subsume natural science: there will be *one* science.”¹⁵⁵ With his theory of ethnogenesis Gumilëv intends to accomplish exactly what Marx predicted, namely, to synthesise “outside” and “inside” histories of man in one science. The idea of *ethnos* was conceived as that of a biophysical phenomenon, which at the same time was understood as a social-cultural phenomenon:

So the concept of ‘*ethnos*’ is introduced into the problem of the relation of man, as the bearer of civilisation, with the natural environment in the sense of a stable collective of individuals that opposes itself to all other similar collectives, that has an inner structure, in each case peculiar, and a dynamic stereotype of behaviour. It is through ethnic collectives that mankind’s link with the natural environment is realised, since

154. Gumilëv, *Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere*, p. 9.

155. *Ibid.*

the ethnos itself is a phenomenon of nature.¹⁵⁶

Among those who use Gumilëv's concepts and ideas in their analysis are economists, geographers, sociologists, historians, and political scientists. Economist Olgerd Volkov calls Russia "a huge Eurasian continent" in a volume dedicated to economic changes in the post-Soviet Russia.¹⁵⁷ He uses an expression by Chairman Mao as the title for one of his chapters, "winds from the East overcome winds from the West," noting that the author of these words was probably reflecting not only on the present and the future, but on the thousands years of history of civilisation as well.¹⁵⁸ Sociologists P. P. Skorospelov and V. A. Veselov, debating a new strategy of the US and the security of Russia, in their analysis accentuate "powerful" phenomena that are known as "civilisations" in the West (a reference to S. Huntington's 'clash of civilisations'), and are called "superethnoi" by Gumilëv, such as "Islamic world" or "Great China."¹⁵⁹ According to geographers V. Iu. Ermolaev and M. A. Ermolaeva, Russian communism and Eurasianism look very much compatible in historical perspective, especially if considered within "*the ethnic history*" of Eurasia [emphasis in the original].¹⁶⁰ They propose to revise the history

156. Ibid., p. 31.

157. Olgerd I. Volkov, *Kontinent Rossiia: XX century*, Moskva: Russkoe Slovo, 1998, p. 5. O. I. Volkov is a senior Russian economist who has been involved in policy making, educational, and industrial activities since the 1960s.

158. Ibid., p. 188.

159. P. P. Skorospelov, V. A. Veselov, "Novaya strategiya S.Sh.A. i bezopastnost Rossii," in ed. S. B. Lavrov, *Geopoliticheskie*, p. 76.

of the Russian Communist Party within the framework of Gumilëv's theory, i.e. as a structure of 'ethnic' relations.

The demise of Marxism or Marxism-Leninism left a huge vacuum in Russian social and humanitarian sciences. In Soviet times Marxism was used as a theory of everything, and it served as a theoretical foundation and a criterion of truth in *every* social science and philosophical work done in the Soviet Union. It served this purpose even in the disciplines that have no relevance to economics or politics, such as biology, physics, formal logic, and other disciplines. Marxism or its Soviet variations was *the* theory for Soviet social scientists and philosophers, it was *the* methodology, it was *the* criterion of truth. Marxism also insisted on strict cause-effect relations in history, and tried to offer a rational explanation for every event in history. Soviet scholars, therefore, were brought up and trained with this academic approach firmly impressed in their minds: that one theory can be so perfect that it can explain every change and development in history. After Soviet Marxism ended its domination in Russia, Russian scholars were left with three choices: to critically re-examine their own claims and methodology, to abandon the doctrine of a theory of everything, or to look for a new such theory. Russian scholars, indeed, made such choices, and very interesting and useful works have been produced in all three directions. As a result, *geopolitika* and *politologia* (politology, or political science) have emerged as mostly belonging to the third choice: most authors have sought to

160. V. Iu. Ermolaev, M. A. Ermolaeva, "Russkii kommunizm i Evraziia: alternativa ili edinstvo?" in ed. S. B. Lavrov, *Geopoliticheskie*, p. 70.

develop these disciplines as systemic and deterministic theories of everything – the former dominating international relations, and the latter acting as a unifying theory for political science disciplines.

Soviet-style Marxism, and Marxism in general, as a social theory has been very systemic. Soviet Marxism offered a very rationalistic and deterministic way of explaining human history. In explaining social-historical phenomena it was perceived to be as exact as physics or chemistry was in explaining physical or chemical matters. The empirical, real method of analysis was judged to be the main method of analysis for social sciences. The Soviet scholars who subsequently distanced themselves from Marxism and became advocates of geopolitics, Eurasianism or politology, did so not because they had lost interest in universalistic grand theories, but because they saw that Marxism failed in practice – the Soviet social experiment was not as successful as theory claimed it would be. These scholars and intellectuals started to look for other universalistic theories that would explain human history and society in methodological ways similar to Marxism. In international relations geopolitics seemed to satisfy all main requirements: it has been a rationalistic, deterministic, grand theory explaining everything. Just like Marxism it has its own “classics:” Ratzel, Kjellén, Mahan, Mackinder, Haushofer. The relative success of the countries these classical authors of geopolitics were from, seemed to prove that their geopolitical theories have been more correct in practice than Marxism, to which the official Russian scholarship was devoted for the most part of the 20th century.

There are certain themes that resonate from one writer to another in almost all *geopolitika* volumes and articles: space, fate, geographical determinism, historical development, struggle, global dichotomies. Many other themes are adapted or borrowed from Russian or Soviet experience. There are certain authors and names that are mentioned or quoted in many writings: Mackinder, Haushofer, Mahan, Kjellén, Huntington, Brzezinski. Most Russian authors share the view that certain Russian political geographers of the 19th and the 20th centuries were geopoliticians as well. These are the themes and subjects one can find in most writings on *geopolitika*, but even they are differently interpreted and understood in these writings. Moreover, since different authors come into *geopolitika* from many different backgrounds, they bring along new interpretations, concepts, and ideas. This mix of newly adapted and/or interpreted material from various academic disciplines and eras enormously expands the borders of the discipline, if, of course, *geopolitika* is understood as a single discipline. It has been a well-known fact that geopolitics has never been represented as a single, coherent theory. Its Russian spin-off goes even further – *geopolitika* does not even seem to be a single discipline. Needless to say, its broader base, Eurasianism or New Eurasianism, is even more eclectic and less refined. However, the arbitrary, unnecessary, and very often uncritical introduction of concepts and dimensions from biology, mathematics, geology, physics, chemistry and other scientific disciplines is not the worst practice of scholarly analysis common among the authors of New Eurasianism and

geopolitika. It is occult ideas and hypotheses that make such writings naive, complicated and/or bizarre. Gumilëv's emphasis on the energy of "passionarity" and cosmism, Dugin's arguments of world-wide conspiracies and hidden meanings of things, Kuznetsov and Nikolskii's ideas of "biorobots" and "behind-the-scene actors" belong more to science fiction than to scholarly analysis.

Despite its occult qualities, *geopolitika* and New Eurasianism need some kind of criteria to establish the legitimacy of their claims. Just as the Soviet scholarly tradition suggests, they find three such criteria: classical authors, practice, and rationality. It was mandatory in the Soviet social sciences to quote the classical authors of communism, Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The intellectual constructs built upon ideas of these classics were deemed to be *the theory and method* of research. Any kind of scholarly debate would end if one of the sides provided quotes from classics of Marxism that would directly disprove the ideas of the opponent. There was no higher authority of truth than Marx and Lenin, and to a lesser extent, Engels. They could not be wrong. New Eurasians maintain this tradition, and they in fact, have a bigger pool of the classical authorities to draw from. These are, first of all, the original Eurasians: Savitskii, Trubetskoi, Alekseev, Gumilëv, and others; and second, classical geopoliticians like Ratzel, Kjellén, Mackinder, Mahan, and Haushofer. Some authors also draw from "the old authorities" such as Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The second criterion of truth used by New Eurasians is social practice, much as it was understood by Soviet Marxists. On the hypothetical

question, “where is the proof that geopolitics is a superior mode of thinking in politics?” New Eurasians point to the West: the success of Western countries is treated as the evidence of geopolitics being very successful. Russian scholars do not understand this matter uniformly, but their argument goes like this: geopolitics has been a major mode of thinking for Western scholarship, Western governments have applied geopolitical theories in their policies, and have achieved economic and political success; Russia, on the other hand, lacked institutional support for such theories, and it is in dire straits now. As evidence of geopolitics being so dominant in the West, New Eurasians provide a host of names of Western scholars. Besides those already mentioned, *geopolitika* names the works and ideas of the following people, who, it is believed, have contributed to the development of geopolitics in the West: Albrecht Haushofer, Andrew Gyorgy, Nicholas Spykman, A. K. Wienberg, W. Kirk, Saul Cohen, Carl Schmitt, A. Grabovsky, Paul Vidal de la Blanche, P. Célérier, Jean Gottman, Jacques Ancel, Raymond Aron, Arnold Toynbee, K. D. Kristof, R. Pittin, W. Davis, Henry Kissinger, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Jean Thiriart, Jordis von Lohausen, Jean Pervulesco, Jean Attali, Carlo Maria Santoro, Pierre Gallois, Yves Lacoste, P. Giraud, M. Fouchet, R. Steukers, G. E. Graf, R. Hinder, Ferdinand Fried, Heinz Guderian, Zbigniew Brzezinski, R. Strausz-Hupé, Colin Gray, A. P. Seversky, Daniel Deudney, William E. Griffith, Ray Cline, J. Parker, I. Wallerstein, Kenneth Thompson, Joseph Black, Francis Fukuyama, Paul Wolfowitz, Samuel Huntington, and many others. Some of these

authors probably have never characterised themselves as geopoliticians; however, New Eurasians have apparently found geopolitical ideas and reasoning in their writings. "Besides, it is necessary to remember that geopolitics in this century has been developed by Western scholars and has served Western interests," claims Sorokin.¹⁶¹

Behind the claim that geopolitics, as an academic discipline, has been successful in the West, lie two Soviet assumptions. First, according to an old Marxist-Leninist claim, there was no science free of ideological bias. Scientists, scholars were class-oriented people, just like everybody else in society, and in most cases their works reflected their class sympathies. In short, the scholars being employed by the state or the dominant class, delivered according to their social contracts. Second, in the Soviet Union it was widely believed that the state was governed according to theory. The Soviet state, for example, was governed according to Marxist theory. In other words, the ultimate purpose of the dominant theory was believed to be its application in policies. Thus, if geopolitics was the dominant international theory in the West, Western governments should have construed their foreign and security policies according to this theory.

The final criterion of truth used by New Eurasians, and not only by them, is their unconditional belief in rationalism: there has to be a rational, causal explanation for everything. Needless to say, if one assumes a political discipline to be based on empirical, real method, such a belief is absolutely necessary. However,

161. Sorokin, p. 11.

this sort of strict commitment to rationalism may lead to curious conclusions, since not everything in politics can be analysed in this manner. Tikhonravov, a very serious analyst of geopolitical writings, wonders how so many predictions and policy recommendations by Savitskii and other Eurasians, and by Nicholas Ustrialov, an émigré National-Bolshevik, could come true in Soviet policy-making. He concedes that there is no evidence that Savitskii's ideas had any influence on the Soviet government, but he believes that Ustrialov, who returned to the USSR in 1935, held a professorship in Moscow, and was executed in 1937 alongside other National-Bolsheviks, had some influence on Stalin and his comrades.¹⁶² With regard to Savitskii's influence on policy-making, Tikhonravov proposes two hypotheses: either there was a secret, unknown organisation in the Soviet regime that analysed Savitskii's ideas and adapted them for Soviet policies, or the "objective location of heartland forced the USSR to take steps by inertia, which were supposed to be made by a geopolitically aware continental state – Eurasia."¹⁶³ Dugin, a very influential but less academic New Eurasian, proposes a version according to which the GRU (the Main [military] Intelligence Agency [of the Soviet Union]) had a secret department that analysed and synthesised Eurasianist ideas, and helped to transform them into Soviet foreign and security policy.¹⁶⁴ The idea that there could have been a simple coincidence or that the Soviet leaders could

162. Tikhonravov, p. 243, and p. 245.

163. Ibid., p. 246.

164. Ibid., p. 247.


have simply made pragmatic policy decisions disregarding ideological dogmas, escapes both authors.

As often happens, in discussing geopolitics most authors use maps to demonstrate their point, but in the process they lose geography. The same is true for Russian New Eurasians. Although they claim to be discussing and demonstrating geographical facts, their understanding of geography is so abstract that it does not resemble the geography of this world at all. Dugin complements his *Foundations of Geopolitics* with a number of maps of his own creation. These maps drawn according to the Mercatorian tradition, are replete with all sorts of arrows and other apparently significant lines. For instance, the map titled “Russia as the Eurasian Empire” depicts an arbitrarily drawn sector of the globe, which besides Russia and the former Soviet states, includes Finland, Mongolia, northern China, and northern Afghanistan (Map 4-2). Another set of maps depicts sectorized divisions of Eurasia, one in “civilisational zones,” and the other in geopolitical regions. The “civilisational” map of Eurasia includes, among other regions, northern Africa and the British islands (see Map 4-3a). The “geopolitical” zones of Eurasia are depicted as two sectors of a giant landmass, the northern and the southern. “Northern Eurasia” encompasses the entire European continent and much of Asia, including the Russian Far East. “Southern Eurasia” includes the rest of Asia, south of the Caspian Sea, including Indonesia and northern Africa (Map 4-3b). Dugin’s one map attempts to combine in one image both the West vs. Russia-Eurasia and the wealthy



Map 4-2. Dugin's Russia – Eurasian Empire.

Source: Aleksandr Dugin, *Osnovy Geopolitiki*, p. 415.



Map 4-3a (top). Dugin's "six civilisational zones of Eurasia:" 1. Western Europe, 2. Middle Europe, 3. Russia-Eurasia, 4. Arabic Asia (including the Maghreb countries), 5. Middle Asia, 6. Far East. Dugin argues that "the parallelism between northern and southern zones is very much evident."

Map 4-3b (bottom). Eurasian North and Eurasian South. According to Dugin, [this is] "the geopolitical division of Eurasia along a meridian line. The mountainous range from the Pirenees to Altai and Manchuria is the most important natural border between the two worlds."

Source: Aleksandr Dugin, *Osnovy Geopolitiki*, p. 420.



Map 4-4. The Wealthy West, Russia-Eurasia, and the Poor South-Third World. Dugin argues that “the geopolitical revolution against the global domination of the West is based on the union between the Poor South and Russia-Eurasia.”

Source: Aleksandr Dugin. *Osnovy Geopolitiki*, p. 217.



Map 4-5. The Anaconda Strategy. The dark colours on the map represent “the countries of the Eurasian continent that are under the strategic control of atlantism.” According to Dugin, the main goal of American foreign policy is “to create links [among individual units] of this coastal zone and widen its borders.” He calls this “the Linkage Doctrine.” The arrows on the map show the directions of “atlantism’s geopolitical pressure.”

Source: Aleksandr Dugin, *Osnovy Geopolitiki*, p. 55.

North vs. the poor South dichotomies. However, some countries, like Japan, South Korea, Finland, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, clearly do not fit in such a tripartite dissection of the world, and are left outside the sectors (Map 4-4). Still other maps feature “vectors of geopolitical pressure” signifying a Western strategy to apply geopolitical pressure on Russia-Eurasia (Map 4-5). Dugin’s map-making exercise is not entirely out of line: it shows the influence of at least two geopolitical authorities, Mackinder and Haushofer. Mackinder later in his life revised his Heartland theory, and depicted the world-island as something including Africa, besides Eurasia.¹⁶⁵ Haushofer and other German geopoliticians of the Nazi era championed the use of maps with all kinds of lines and other images to make their point more dramatic and graphic.¹⁶⁶ At the end of his book, *The Geography of Victory*, Zyuganov also makes space for several maps borrowed from a French edition of *Atlas strategique*.¹⁶⁷ Zyuganov regards such maps to be very important for studying geopolitics, and regrets that similar atlases or volumes do not exist in Russian.¹⁶⁸ Gumilëv, the last of the original Eurasians and the most influential bridging figure between the old and the new Eurasians, also used historical maps of his creation and made parallels among them by drawing lines that connect places characterised

165. Geoffrey Sloan, “Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 22, Numbers 2/3 (June/September 1999), Special issue on *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy*, eds. Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, pp. 32-34.

166. Martin Isa Glassner, *Political Geography*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993, pp. 228-229.

167. Zyuganov, appendix.

168. *Ibid.*, p. 279.

by explosions in ethnogenesis. He also claimed that such lines resemble geodesic lines, implying that they have natural sources. However, it has been noted that drawing lines on historical maps is a very arbitrary exercise.¹⁶⁹

Summary of Chapter Four

Jonathan Swift explains the desire of “mathematicians” to meddle in political affairs as a common human weakness. “I rather take this Quality to spring from a very common Infirmary of human Nature, inclining us to be more curious and conceited in Matters where we have least Concern, and for which we are least adapted either by Study or Nature,” remarks Gulliver.¹⁷⁰ New Eurasians, too, seem to be subject to this “infirmary of human nature.” Most of them do not seem to appreciate the complexities and nuances of the matters they discuss, and simply approach them from their own academic and personal backgrounds. Part one of this chapter discussed the main aspects and authors of the original Eurasian movement of the 1920s and 1930s, and Part Two analysed works by some of the most prominent modern Russian writers who are commonly identified as New Eurasians. The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate some commonalities between the two, especially in their envisioning the world and Russia’s place in it. The forms of the image of the world the old and new Eurasians possess are identical, but the contents are significantly different. In terms of the form, they both

169. Tikhonravov, p. 241.

170. Swift, p. 137.

dichotomise the world between Russia-Eurasian and the West (Western Europe for the original Eurasians, and the US dominated West for New Eurasians). Both old and new Eurasians see Russia as a unique geographical entity, not belonging to either Europe or Asia. They either identify Russia with Eurasia or see Russia as the heart of Eurasia. Both old and new Eurasians try to emphasise the geographical identity of the Russian state. The contents that fill these forms are, however, different. The original Eurasians from the very beginning rejected “the possibility of “last words” and final syntheses.”¹⁷¹ The most distinguished New Eurasians claim exactly “last words” and “final syntheses” (Dugin, Zyuganov, Gumilëv, Kuznetsov and Nikolskii). The old Eurasians were very cautious about endorsing deterministic causality and rationalism, and making unwarranted generalisations.¹⁷² New Eurasians, especially those close to Gumilëv, claim to possess the clues that would explain the cause-effect relations in politics, and general laws of development in historical processes. Although original Eurasians wrote on philosophical and theological issues, they never presented such writings as exact science, and nor did they endorse occult reasoning. Quite a few notable New Eurasians have distinguished themselves in part by endorsing occult thinking, and introducing mysterious concepts in their works (Gumilëv, Zyuganov, Dugin, Kuznetsov and Nikolskii). The original Eurasians used Russia’s unique geography in order to establish its ethnically diverse identity, while New Eurasians emphasise Russia’s

171. “Introduction” in *Exodus*, p. 1.

172. Suvchinski, “The Age of Faith,” p. 20. Savitskii, “Continent-Ocean,” p. 111.

geographical characteristics in order to stress its 'naturally superior' destiny as opposed to that of the West. The original Eurasians were far from ethnic chauvinism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. New Eurasians have left the door wide open for all three (Dugin, Gumilëv, Zyuganov, Kuznetsov and Nikolskii). The original Eurasians used very correct and academic language, and demonstrated professionalism in their writings. Some New Eurasians use angry and hostile language toward their opponents, and demonstrate ignorance and incompetence in some areas they comment on. In terms of theoretical and methodological outlook, the old Eurasians displayed the strong influence of Hegel. The New Eurasians, although some of them are anti-Marxist, display strong influence by the Soviet-style Marxist-Leninist theory, method, and ideology. The original Eurasians developed their world-view and theory in order to better rationalise and understand Russia's political identity. Most of the New Eurasians have used Eurasian ideas as a springboard for *geopolitika*, their own brand of imperialist geopolitics. Finally, some commentators accuse New Eurasians of obfuscation; however, obfuscation and obscurantism could merely be a result of that "very common infirmity of human nature" Gulliver talked about.

Chapter Five

New Old Geomentality: Russia-NATO Security Issues in the Post-Cold War Europe and their Historical Precursors

On the East side of Sweden beginneth the dominion of the Emperor of Russia, although Russia, or Muscovia it self, doe lie somewhat more into the East: which is a great and mightie Monarchie: extending itself even from Lapland, & Finmark, many 1000 miles in length vnto the Caspian Sea: so that it containeth in it a great part of Europ, and much of Asia also.

George Abbot, "De Russia, sive Muscovia"¹

In this chapter I try to demonstrate that territorial thinking in foreign and security policy making is still the dominant mode of analysis in Russia. Visualising history through geographical spaces and giving them particular political significance is most prevalent in Russian foreign and security policy. Eurasianism, which emerged in the 1920s and almost completely disappeared in the 1940s, now serves as the main theoretical base in Russian debates of international issues. I argue that the modes of envisioning the world of NATO and Russia in the Cold War proved to be very resilient to the changes that occurred after the end of it. The resilient nature of the old confrontational geomentality can be seen in political disagreements that exist between NATO and Russia. These differences manifested themselves especially during the NATO enlargement debate, and during the

1. George Abbot, *A Briefe Description of the Whole Worlde*, London: T. Iudson, 1599.

NATO-Yugoslavia war of 1999.

From the very beginning Moscow has rooted its opposition to NATO enlargement in the idea of “geopolitics.” On the other hand, the Atlantic alliance accompanies its eastern policies with idealistic notions of “democracy” and “human rights.” Although the two sides hold similar geomentality based on an *Us vs. Them* vision of the world, they speak completely different languages when addressing each other’s security needs, and thus, very often misunderstand or misinterpret each other. If the actors involved in an important security issue misinterpret their opponents’ intentions for an extended period of time, the future of their relations may well become uncertain and disturbed. I emphasise this strained trend of communications between Russia and NATO, because the disagreement between them is theoretically fundamental, and cannot be reconciled unless one or both of them modify their security vision. The modification of theoretical outlooks is possible and even desirable, even though the geomentality standing behind them may be very difficult to change. Further, I argue that the “geopolitical” and “civilisational” arguments that dominate security and foreign policy discussion in and about Russia have their roots in the dominant 20th century mode of converting time into space, the *Us vs. Them* geomentality. However absurd some Russian arguments may sound in their opposition to NATO enlargement or otherwise, they do have some political legitimacy derived from the historical and cultural experiences of the new Russian state. The same can be said about the dominant arguments voiced in the West, but their main underlying theme is the assertion of

civilisational superiority rather than unique cultural-historical experience.

Territorial Dimensions in Russia's National Security

To date, opposition to NATO enlargement (or expansion, as Moscow prefers to call it) has been the single most important issue in Russian foreign policy, upon which almost all of the country's political class is in agreement. Until recently, Russian public opinion was relatively indifferent to the alliance or its expansion, but that indifference ended with the commencement of the air campaign against Yugoslavia in March of 1999. At that time the majority of Russians joined with their political leaders in expressing anti-NATO and anti-American sentiments.² The war against Yugoslavia helped to fuel the agenda of those in Russia who have long claimed that NATO is, in fact, an aggressive military alliance directed primarily against Russia and its allies. Since the years of *Perestroika* discredited Soviet-style Marxism as theoretically bankrupt, critics of NATO in Russia have sought to find a theoretical base in geopolitics. The understanding of this concept among Russian authors has been almost as diverse as its use. However, what these authors all emphasise is geographical data embedded in historical precedents of Russia's relations with its Western neighbours.

Geopolitika has been the dominant school of international relations in Moscow

2. CBC Radio estimated on June 11 1999 that 98 per cent of the public opposed NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia. *The Economist* provided corroborative data, reporting that some 55 per cent of Russians thought a world war was "quite likely" in the next decade, with 20 per cent regarding it as "very likely." *The Economist*, 24, 3 April 1999, p. 50.

since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Below I provide some examples of how most Soviet and Russian politicians and opinion-shapers of the past and the present have viewed international security issues through the prisms of geographical imperatives. There must be an explanation for the popularity of geopolitics among the country's political class. To unearth that explanation will, in turn, require us to examine some salient aspects of Russia's geography, history, and culture, as well as the politically relevant claims Russian politicians and pundits make on the basis of these aspects.

In October of 1996, the then foreign minister, Yevgeniy Primakov, published some thoughts on world politics. Among other topics, he commented on NATO enlargement, an idea to which he objected: "we are firmly proceeding from the position that the approach of NATO's military infrastructure to Russian territory will undoubtedly complicate both our purely military and our geopolitical position."³ In his objection Primakov emphasized NATO's territorial, spatial approach to the Russian borders. Charles Clover of the *Financial Times* noted that although Primakov never publicly stated his position on geopolitics, his policies dove-tailed with Eurasianist geopolitical doctrine.⁴

Primakov would later become Prime Minister. However, even he has not been the highest ranking Russian official to stress the country's "geopolitical

3. Quoted by Derek Averre, "NATO Expansion and Russian National Interests," *European Security*, 7, Spring 1998, p. 16.

4. Charles Clover, "Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The Reemergence of Geopolitics," *Foreign Policy* Vol. 78, No. 2, March/April 1999, p.10.

position.” Former president Boris Yeltsin also liked to talk about geopolitics. Addressing Russian diplomats on May 12, 1998, Yeltsin pointed out that Russia’s “negative attitude toward NATO expansion has never changed.” However, he added that Moscow was willing to work on a “constructive relationship with the alliance,” while at the same time establishing its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. “We have started to prove in practice that Russia’s geopolitical situation as a Eurasian power is indeed unique,” he said.⁵ Other senior Russian officials frequently refer to the country’s geopolitics. Vladimir Ryzhkov, head of the Our Home Is Russia faction in the Duma, noted in April 1999 that “in eight years of its existence new Russia... has lost its status of geopolitical superpower.” However, he added that Russia still retained a “unique geopolitical and geographical position,” but this was now a “totally different geopolitical position.”⁶

Geopolitika is a favourite subject for many leaders of the Russian opposition, the most exotic among them being Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the populist leader of the ultra right-wing Liberal Democratic Party. Zhirinovsky has declared his intentions to initiate a re-division of the world, whereby Russia would claim new territory, especially in the regions with a warmer climate.⁷ The chairman of the Communist

5. Boris Yeltsin, “Address to Russian Diplomats, Speech in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia on 12 May 1998,” *International Affairs* (Moscow) Vol. 44, No. 3, 1998, pp. 3-4.

6. “Realities of the Fourth Russian Republic and War in the Balkans, Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs Boris Piadyshev Interviews Vladimir Ryzhkov,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), Vol. 45, No. 2, 1999, p. 12.

7. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, *My Struggle*, New York: Barricade Books, 1996, p. 54, p. 62. Among many other things Zhirinovsky writes that “the Indian Ocean that now washes India’s shores will one day

Party of the Russian Federation, Gennady Zyuganov, a somewhat less flaky exponent of matters geopolitical, is also a very influential politician in Russia. The academic and ideological qualities of his two geopolitical volumes, *Beyond the Horizon* (*Za gorizontom*), and *The Geography of Victory* (*Geografiya pobedy*), have already been discussed in Chapter Four.

The emergence of Eurasianist geopolitical doctrines in post-Soviet Russian foreign and security policy has not been an accident. There is a plenty of evidence that the imperialist geomentality was at the heart of Soviet state-making and foreign policy from the very early days of the union. The Bolshevik leadership took geographical and spatial considerations into account routinely when making important foreign and security policy decisions. It is no secret that in the 1920s and 1930s Moscow viewed major world powers as mortal enemies of the Soviet state. Therefore, the set-up of the country resembled that of a military camp, using existing geographical characteristics to its own advantage.

From the very beginning, Soviet decision-makers adopted Lenin's vision of the world as the place of struggle of two opposed forces: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This dichotomy, a global extrapolation of Lenin's "who is not with us, is against us" thesis, was accepted as the key feature of world politics. By the beginning of the 1920s, the idea of the world revolution had been abandoned by

lap at Russia's southernmost extremity" (p. 64). According to him, "for Russia, the proposed territory changes in the South do not constitute an acquisition but, rather, are the normal outcomes of geopolitical factors" (pp. 62-63).

Lenin, Stalin, Frunze, and their associates in the Bolshevik leadership, but they did maintain the *Us vs. Them* dictum. This was mainly due to the failure of revolutionary movements in Germany and Finland in 1918 (suppressed by German troops), and in Hungary in 1919 (crushed with the help of the Entente), as well as in Poland in 1918–1919. Lenin concluded that Europe was not yet ready for a proletarian revolution. Now the main goal of the Bolsheviks was the defence of the socialist motherland. Other leaders of the Russian revolution, such as Trotsky, Bukharin and their associates did not like the idea of “socialism in one country,” but could not pursue their goal of world revolution, in part because most Red Army generals did not care much about it.

Quite a number of the Red Army’s chief commanding officers were former members of the Czarist imperial army. Many of these well trained and distinguished officers joined the Red Army not because of their beliefs in socialism and Bolshevism, but because of their patriotic feelings. The most prominent among them was General Alexis Brusilov, the architect of the May 1916 Brusilov Breakthrough (offensive), which brought the Austro-Hungarian forces to their knees. After the World War I, Brusilov emerged as the most famous and trusted general in the Russian armed forces. A religious and conservative person, Brusilov joined the Red Army and called on his fellow officers to do the same only because he saw his motherland in a mortal danger of division and annexation by foreign

forces, and the Red Army as the only force capable resisting them.⁸ Many former generals and senior officers of the imperial army saw the alternative, the White Army, as being totally dependent on major foreign powers and subservient to their interests. For them the defence of the unity and integrity of Russia was a natural strategy, and this helped the Bolshevik faction of Lenin and Stalin to consolidate power. Since Bolshevik Russia, which in 1922 became the Soviet Union, was the only socialist country in the world and claimed to represent the interests of the world proletariat, Lenin's thesis of the world-wide struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat became the struggle between Bolshevik Russia and the rest of the world. The idea of the defence of the socialist motherland was endorsed as well by those few professional revolutionaries who distinguished

8. In 1920 Alexis Brusilov was in charge of a Red Army division that was resisting the Polish invasion. He used his authority and influence among the officer corps of the former imperial army, and helped to mobilise them to fight foreign forces invading Russia. Brusilov appealed to former officers:

At this critical historic point in the life of our nation, we, your senior comrades in arms, appeal to your love of country and loyalty to it, we call to you and ask you to forget all your injuries regardless of who inflicted them on you and where they were inflicted and enlist in the Red Army voluntarily, eagerly, and with dedication at the front or in the rear. And wherever the government of Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Russia might send you, serve not out of fear, but out of conscience, to defend our dear Russia, and with your honest service and not begrudging your life, do not allow Russia to be plundered since it might vanish forever. Then our descendants will rightfully curse us for not using our combat expertise and knowledge, for forgetting our dear Russian people, and ruining our Mother Russia out of selfish feelings of class struggle.

General Brusilov, "Appeal To All Former Officers Wherever They Are" (*Vozzvaniye. Ko vsem byvshim ofitseram, gde by oni ni nakhodilis*), *Voennoe delo*, No. 13, July 7 1920, p. 1. Quoted in Andrei A. Kokoshin, *Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-1991*; Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997, pp. 68-69.

themselves as prominent military leaders during the Russian civil war of 1918-1922. Mikhail Frunze, the most prominent among them, was one of the most important military strategists of the Red Army. In his 1921 article "Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army," Frunze presented a dramatic picture of the "proletarian island" surrounded by the "bourgeois capitalist ocean:"

At the first convenient moment, the waves of the bourgeois capitalist ocean surrounding our proletarian island will rush in to attempt to sweep away all the achievements of the proletarian revolution. At the same time the flames of revolutionary fires are erupting more and more frequently in various countries of the bourgeois world, and the formidable tramp of proletarian columns preparing for the attack reveals in part the plans of the other side. This contradiction can be eliminated only by force in a bloody battle between class enemies. There is and can be no other way out.⁹

Frunze's vision was echoed by another distinguished Red commander and a revolutionary, a former lieutenant of the imperial army, Mikhail Tukhachevsky. In 1921 a collection of his articles was published titled *War of the Classes (Voina klassov)*. Tukhachevsky was a very talented and dedicated revolutionary commander of the Red Army. In the 1920s and 1930s he made a significant contribution to the evolution of the Red Army as a modern military force, and many historians and military specialists in today's Russia believe that Tukhachevsky was the most outstanding military strategist of the pre-World War II Soviet Red Army.¹⁰ In 1921 he argued that:

9. Ibid., pp. 65-66.

10. Tukhachevsky was executed by a firing squad in 1937 for his alleged anti-Soviet activities.

It is absolutely impossible to imagine that the world, shaken to its very foundation by the world war, could be quietly divided into two parts – socialist and capitalist – capable of living in peace and perfect harmony. It is absolutely clear that such a time will never come and the socialist war will not end until the victory of one or the other side.¹¹

Tukhachevsky was no exception among the professional military in viewing the new world as a battle-ground between the two opposed forces. Nikolai Kakurin, a Red Army commander and a former colonel in the imperial army, was neither a political worker nor a member of the Bolshevik apparatus. Kakurin, who was one of the commanders of the army that defeated Polish invasion, wrote in 1922:

The struggle between Russia and *panskaya* Poland is the first international clash between a proletarian state's policy and that of a capitalist state.... The Polish-Soviet War is not a struggle between two nations, it is a struggle of the proletariat that has already shed its shackles for the freedom of the proletariat that has not yet succeeded in throwing off the yoke of its enslavers.¹²

Hard-core Soviet communists kept this line of reasoning long after the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchëv endorsed the idea of “peaceful coexistence” with capitalism in the 1950s. In comments made in mid 1970s, Vyacheslav Molotov argued: “properly speaking, what was Hitler’s aggression [against the USSR]?

11. Ibid., p. 66.

12. N. Kakurin, “The Struggle of the Soviet Russia With *Panskaya* Poland” (*Borba Sovetskoi Rossii s panskoi Poleshei*), *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 7, 1922, p. 3, in Kokoshin, p. 69. *Panskaya* refers to the Polish word *pan*, meaning lord or master. By using this word Kakurin meant that the Soviet government was resisting not an invasion by the Polish people as such, but an invasion of the Polish land-owners and capitalists. “Soviet” in the quoted passage refers to the government structures of Russia organised around Soviets (Councils) of workers, peasants, and soldiers. The Soviet Union (USSR) did not yet exist at the time of Russo-Polish war of 1920.

Wasn't it class struggle? It was. And the fact that atomic war may break out, isn't that class struggle? There is no alternative to class struggle."¹³

On the founding of the USSR on December 30, 1922, the original four union republics were set up in such a way that all of them had land borders with foreign states.¹⁴ Moreover, autonomous republics were set up inside some union republics (constituent units of the USSR) in order to use them as a counterweight against the locally dominant authorities. Buffer states were created in the Far East: Tuva, the Far Eastern Republic, and Mongolia (see Map 5-1, p. 224). The first two were later incorporated into the Russian Federation (RSFSR),¹⁵ and the third has continued to exist as an independent country.¹⁶ At the end of the 1930s, after the accord signed

13. Felix Chuev, *Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics*, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993, p. 20.

14. The original four members of the USSR were: the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Transcaucasia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia). In 1925, the Turkmen and Uzbek republics, and in 1929 the Tajik republic joined the union. The three members of the Transcaucasia also joined as independent republics. Paul Dukes, *A History of Russia: Medieval, Modern, Contemporary*, London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 247.

15. The Far Eastern Republic was proclaimed on April 6, 1920, and it was annexed by Soviet forces on November 19, 1922. The Republic of Tuva declared independence in 1921, and in 1944 it joined the USSR in the form of an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation. Both countries were pro-Soviet in their orientation when independent.

16. The Soviet Union maintained Mongolian independence and refused to give it to China even when the USSR and China became friendly nations. Vyacheslav Molotov remembered:


Khrushchëv told me that when he left China, at the farewell Mao Tse-tung held up one finger: one question remained unsolved-- Mongolia. Mao considered it Chinese territory. A large proportion of the Mongols live in China. In its time this territory was called Outer Mongolia-- the part that became an independent state. It separated itself from the Chinese area. So it had been considered [by the Chinese] Outer Mongolia and not simply Mongolia.... We couldn't take Manchuria. It was impossible. It contradicted our policy. We took a lot. But that's another matter.

by the Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Molotov and his German counterpart Ribbentrop on August 23 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany divided among themselves the smaller countries of Eastern Europe.¹⁷

During the winter of 1939-40, the Soviet Union fought a costly war against Finland for an insignificant amount of land, in order to gain a better strategic position for Leningrad. After World War II, the Soviet leadership created a formidable buffer zone out of the countries of Eastern Europe. At the same time, the borders of Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Czechoslovakia were redrawn in such a way that all of them shared land boundaries with the Soviet Union. The borders of Poland were moved westward, and lands of eastern Prussia were given to it, in the hope that a larger Slavonic state would serve as a good defence in case of future aggression from the West. The enclave of Kaliningrad, formerly Königsberg, was created between Poland and the Soviet Lithuania. Thanks to this enclave the Russian Federation still shares a land border with Poland, owns a strategically well situated Baltic sea-port, and keeps a significant military contingent between the now independent Baltic states and Poland, currently a member of NATO.

Chuev, pp. 71-72.

17. Molotov explained the division of Poland in his conversations with Chuev: "we negotiated with the British and French [about security for Poland] before talking to the Germans. If the West had permitted our troops in Czechoslovakia and Poland, then of course we would have fared better [opposing Germans]. They refused, thus we had to take at least partial measures; we had to keep German troops at a distance. If we hadn't moved toward the Germans in 1939, they would have invaded all of Poland right up to our border." Ibid., p. 9.



Map 5-1. The socialist states of the east. "The east has been definitely drawn into the revolutionary movement," argued Lenin in 1923. The east played a major part in the cultural-political constructs of the Eurasians of the 1920s, who re-defined Russia's identity by articulating its eastern roots.

Source: "The Russian Revolution 1917-1925," in *The Times Atlas of World Geography*, edited by Geoffrey Barraclough, London: Times Books Limited, 1984, p. 258.

The borders of all states in East and Central Europe geographically adjacent to the Soviet Union were thus redrawn and reshaped to allow maximum strategic advantage to the latter. The Soviet leadership acquired a renewed enthusiasm for defending their 'socialist island' from the 'capitalist ocean.' The Soviet Union was bigger and much stronger than before the war. Andrei Zhdanov, a leading post-war Soviet ideologue, in his 1947 *International Situation* summarised the changes World War II brought in the global alignment of forces. The official Soviet view of the world was that "the military defeat of the bloc of fascist states... and the decisive role played by the Soviet Union... sharply altered the alignment of forces between the two systems – the socialist and the capitalist – in favour of socialism."¹⁸ Moscow expected socialism to fully dominate the world and defeat capitalism sometime in not so distant future, and this vision of international affairs did not inspire mutual trust and co-operation between Moscow and its allies on the one side, and Washington and its allies on the other. The developments surrounding the atomic bomb, Eastern Europe, Berlin, etc., further fuelled these sentiments. Milovan Djilas, one of the founders of the post-war socialist Yugoslavia, remembered in his *Conversations with Stalin*:

18. Andrei Zhdanov, "The International Situation," in eds. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge, *The Geopolitics Reader*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 66. Despite keeping the usual *Us vs. Them* view of the world, in this article, Zhdanov also derived positive lessons from the war-time co-operation between the Soviet Union and its Western allies, the United Kingdom and the United States. A new line of post-war Soviet foreign policy was that now the Soviet leadership accepted the idea that "co-operation between the USSR and countries with other systems is possible, provided that the principle of reciprocity is observed and that obligations once assumed are honoured." *Ibid.*, p. 67.

Stalin then invited us to supper, but in the hallway we stopped before a map of the world on which the Soviet Union was coloured in red, which made it conspicuous and bigger than it would otherwise seem. Stalin waved his hand over the Soviet Union and, referring to what he had been saying just previously against the British and the Americans, he exclaimed, "They will never accept the idea that so great a space should be red, never, never!"¹⁹

Other accounts also point out that Stalin liked to look at maps and contemplate international affairs.²⁰ In 1975, long after he was retired by Khrushchëv, Molotov remarked: "it's good that the Russian tsars took so much land for us in war. This makes our struggle with capitalism easier."²¹

After World War II, Moscow also attempted unsuccessfully to set up a buffer state in northern Iran. Before, during, and after the war, large movements of people occurred within the Soviet Union: whole nations were removed from their ancestral lands by the government and resettled in remote parts of the country. These nations included Meskhs from southern Georgia, Chechens and Ingushs from North Caucasus, and Crimean Tatars. This was done either to prevent co-operation of these people with possible invaders, or to punish them for co-operating with, or for not resisting enough, invaders.²² As a result, the question of return and resettlement

19. Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1962, p. 74.

20. Chuev, p. 8.

21. Ibid., p. 8.

22. The Meskhs from southern Georgia, sometimes called Turk Meskhs, were seen as possible sympathisers with Turkey, an ally of the Axis powers. This perception was created by the fact that unlike most other Georgians, a substantial number of Meskhs were Muslim. The question of the return of the Meskhs to their original place of settlement is still unresolved. The Chechens and

of some of these nations to their ancestral lands is still unresolved.²³

Settlement of ethnic Russians in the new Soviet lands was encouraged by the Moscow leadership, especially during the consolidation of Soviet power. The USSR was especially successful under Stalin in creating a buffer of allied states or 'breathing space' in its geographic proximity. Vyacheslav Molotov, who was in charge of Soviet foreign affairs from 1939 to 1956, saw as his main task "to extend the frontier of the Fatherland to the maximum." He was a proponent of "Red Army Socialism," the establishment and support of pro-Soviet regimes in countries around the Soviet geographical perimeter.²⁴

It could be said that in the 1960s, and especially in the 1970s, Moscow saw its own geographical habitat fortified enough thanks to previously made geostrategic decisions and large arsenals of both conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, the USSR remained very sensitive to developments at its borders, and violently opposed any changes within its 'traditional spheres of influence.' Good examples of this are the events in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Afghanistan in 1979-1989. The Brezhnev doctrine was the explicitly written document of such a commitment. In August of 1968, the

Ingush were removed and resettled in northern Kazakhstan for their perceived co-operation with the German occupational forces.

23. These include the question of the return of the Meskhs to Georgia, and various issues surrounding the resettlement of the Tatars in Crimea, now Ukraine. The unsettled question of Prigorodniy Raion of Vladikavkaz, which remains the main point of tension between the Ingush and North Ossetian republics of the Russian Federation, also has its roots in the 1944 forced removal of the Ingush.

24. Albert Resis, "Introduction," in Chuev, *Molotov Remembers*, p. xix.

Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies sent armed forces to Czechoslovakia in order to bring it back under firm Soviet control. Leonid Brezhnev, then Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the *de facto* leader of the country, published an article in the leading party newspaper *Pravda* titled "Sovereignty and the Internationalist Obligation of Socialist Countries." According to Brezhnev, socialist countries, and especially the USSR, had a right to intervene in Czechoslovakia because they were defending "the social gains of the Czechoslovak people," and thus "strengthening the socialist commonwealth, which is the main achievement of the international working class."²⁵ In other words, Brezhnev and his associates still pictured the world divided between two camps, the socialist and the capitalist. The Soviet Union claimed the right to preserve the integrity of the socialist camp. Since all the countries of this 'camp' were geographically adjacent to the USSR, Moscow was reserving the right to defend and preserve its geographical 'breathing space,' in this case, Eastern Europe:

Czechoslovakia's separation from the socialist commonwealth, would run counter to Czechoslovakia's fundamental interests and would harm the other socialist countries. Such "self-determination," as a result of which NATO troops might approach Soviet borders and the commonwealth of European socialist countries would be dismembered, in fact infringes on the vital interests of these countries' peoples, and fundamentally contradicts the right of these peoples to socialist self-determination.²⁶

25. Kovalev (L. Brezhnev), "Sovereignty and the Internationalist Obligation of Socialist Countries," in eds. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge, *The Geopolitics Reader*, p. 74. Kovalev was Brezhnev's pen name for this article (the root of this common Russian family name is *kovat*, which means "to forge").

26. Ibid., p. 75.

It was not until Mikhail Gorbachëv that the Soviet leadership abandoned the dividing geomentality, and thus walked away from the Cold War. Instead, Gorbachëv and his allies proposed a new mentality, “the new political thinking” as Gorbachëv himself called it, which was not dividing, but inclusive. Gorbachëv’s Kremlin argued for a “common European house,” and “mutual security arrangements.” Gorbachëv called for the abandonment of “views on foreign policy” that were “influenced by an imperial standpoint.” He stressed that the main issue for the world was “the growing tendency towards interdependence of states of the world community.”²⁷ Gorbachëv and his allies argued for a new vision of the world without the old dividing line. According to Gorbachëv, security was indivisible; it was either equal security for all or none at all.²⁸ Shevardnadze called for a process of building a new Europe, of developing new CSCE (currently OSCE) institutions with real authority to deal with political and security issues.²⁹ On December 3, 1989, Gorbachëv told US President George Bush that the Soviet Union was ready not to regard the United States as its enemy. President Bush did not expect this kind of statement, and did not respond until April 1990, when he told the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze: “the enemy is not the other side,

27. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, London: Collins, p. 138 and p. 127.

28. Ibid., p. 142.

29. Pavel Palazchenko, *My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter*, University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, p. 160.

but instability and unpredictability.”³⁰

Mikhail Gorbachëv first outlined the major elements of his New Political Thinking at the 27th Party Congress in February 1986. This initiative marked the beginning of new Soviet foreign policies that eventually brought an end to the Cold War. Paul Marantz identifies five major elements of the foreign policies based on Gorbachëv’s New Political Thinking. First, the dogma of unchanging truths of Marxism-Leninism was abandoned; past foreign policy practices were questioned and a search for innovative and constructive approaches was launched. Second, Gorbachëv’s new policies gave priority to the interests of humanity over the interests of ‘the socialist camp.’ Gorbachëv stated that world civilisation was imperilled, and for this reason all people should co-operate in a common search for a solution to the threat of possible nuclear war. Third, Gorbachëv stressed the importance of increased international interdependence; he argued that various global problems threatened the very foundations of the existence of civilisation. Fourth, Gorbachëv put forth a new Soviet conception of international security. He criticised attempts to attain security unilaterally by means of a military build-up, and advocated multilateral co-operation and reliance upon the political process. Fifth, new verbal formulations like ‘reasonable sufficiency’ and ‘non-offensive defence’ to characterise new Soviet military doctrine were developed.³¹

30. Ibid. pp., 156-157.

31. Paul Marantz, ‘Gorbachëv’s ‘New Thinking’ About East-West Relations: Causes and Consequences,’ in ed. Carl G. Jacobson, *Soviet Foreign Policy: New Dynamics, New Themes*,

When Gorbachëv started to propagandise his new military doctrine based on the New Political Thinking, the initial attitude of the West was “your intentions could change.”³² Jerry Hough pointed out that Americans had great difficulty in believing Gorbachëv, despite the fact that Gorbachëv told *Time Magazine* in September 1985 that he had “‘grandiose’ plans of domestic reform” and emphasised his view that foreign policy was a continuation of domestic policy.³³ Robert Miller compared *Perestroika* reforms to Khrushchëv’s foreign policy initiatives. The withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Austria in 1955 and the return of the Porkkala military base to Finland in September of the same year were seen mainly as public relations moves. Miller stressed that “both those moves were clearly designed to improve the Soviets’ image in the West.”³⁴ According to Miller, only in his fifth year in office did Gorbachëv succeed in convincing Reagan and Bush “of the *bona fides* of his commitment to change in Soviet foreign policy and to reliance on peaceful means for its implementation.”³⁵ Thus, even the most revolutionary changes in Soviet foreign policies were not well understood in the West. The vision of Gorbachëv and his supporters was not enough to alter the established

Ottawa: Macmillan, 1989. pp. 19-21.

32. Sergei Oznobishchev, “Russia And NATO: The Coming of A Previously Announced Crisis,” *Prism*, Vol. III, 1 February 1997, <www.jamestown.org>

33. Jerry F. Hough, “The Domestic Politics of Foreign Policy,” in ed. Carl G. Jacobsen, *Soviet Foreign Policy: New Dynamics, New Themes*, p. 3.

34. Robert F. Miller, *Soviet Foreign Policy Today*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1991, p. 33.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

geomentality in the West.

This new vision of the world was retained by the post-Soviet Russian leadership until about 1994-1995, when the old geomentality, now armed with a variety of Eurasianist and geopolitical doctrines, once again assumed its dominant position in Russian foreign and security policy debates. Gorbachëv's attempt to re-interpret the world, which was supported by Yeltsin for a while, is now much hated in Russia and known as the "*mondialist* theory of convergence."³⁶ However, opposition to Gorbachëv's new policy arose while he was still in office. In 1989 one political analyst close to Eurasianism, Aleksandr Prokhanov, wrote in *Literaturnaya Rossiia* that the new political thinking had "led to the collapse of the entire geopolitical architecture of post-war Europe," which was the basis of the Soviet Union's security. Prokhanov argued that the millions of Soviet people who died in Eastern Europe in the Second World War and the generations that fought so hard to achieve military parity with the West after the war had been betrayed.³⁷ However, people who supported this kind of argument were in minority in 1989, and during the years that saw the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and a failed coup d'état in Moscow.

Today, the people who hold similar views to Prokhanov are in huge majority in Russia, and Prokhanov and other old critics of the new political thinking have emerged as prophets and visionaries of Russian security; they can now claim that

36. Iu. V. Tikhonravov, *Geopolitika*, Moscow: INFRA-M, 2000, p. 247.

they have been right all this time, but were not listened to. The now condemned New Political Thinking is seen as the doctrine that undermined Russia's security and geopolitical strength. Gorbachëv is now seen as a follower of the *mondialist* theory of convergence – the theory that argued for the ideological convergence of two systems, socialism and capitalism, and for the dominance of universal liberal values.³⁸

There are a lot of politicians, opinion-shapers, and others in today's Russia who are busy reviving the old imperialist geomentality, and employ and develop Eurasianist geopolitical arguments about the country's national security and foreign policy. I have presented the historical examples above to show how particular geographical territories and dimensions are viewed through historical context, and how they are assigned political significance. The significance of territory has been emphasised in Russia by people of different political ideologies. Since the mid-1990s, arguments underlying the importance of territory and geographical identity have been rooted in the doctrines of Eurasianism and geopolitics. It was discussed in Chapter Four that Russian scholars do not define and understand "geopolitics" in

37. Quoted in Palazchenko, p 165.

38. Vocal critics of the *mondialist* theory in Russia especially blame two individuals: Jacques Attali, a French scholar and politician, and D. M. Gvishiani, a senior Soviet scholar and advisor. To what extent *mondialism* was guilty of the charges of undermining Russia's security is difficult to say. Russian geopoliticians may be using the good old Russian method of blaming foreigners for everything bad that happens to their country. Attali is a Frenchman, and Gvishiani, like the last Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, who allegedly carried out a *mondialist* foreign policy, is an ethnic Georgian, i.e., then a Soviet citizen, but not Russian. Tikhonravov, p. 247.

any way that may be considered cohesive. New Eurasianism is also less consistent and more eclectic than its original predecessor. Russian foreign and security policy analysts differ considerably when it comes to interpreting this conceptual marriage between politics and geography. However, most of them have revived the old geomentality based on the *Us vs. Them* confrontational mode of envisioning the world.

Russia's Geographical Identity

The re-emergence of geopolitical ideas in Russian politics in the 1990s suggests that most of the country's political class prefers to emphasise the geographic identity of the state over its national or ethnic one. In this respect, Eurasianism, especially of sorts propagated by P. N. Savitskii and his group in the first half of the 20th century, becomes a much more coherent basis for arguing the unity of the Russian Federation than does Russian nationalism. Eurasianist geopolitical arguments provide for the respect of each nation's and ethnic group's identity within the federation, while still preserving the integrity of the latter. If a Russian patriot wants to be taken seriously by all citizens of the federation, it is mandatory to stress the geographic roots of political identity. For a Russian patriot to argue in terms of nationalist or other cultural values is to risk alienating those nations and ethnic groups of the Russian Federation that may not share those values (Chechen, Tatar, Ingush, and many others). An emphasis upon nationalist or culturally derived values may be more acceptable in provincial politics, but not in

national foreign and security policy, where political actors need to represent the whole country.

The Russian geomentality, which is expressed in Eurasianist geopolitical doctrines and is accentuated in Russian foreign and security policy-making, is reinforced by the old, Soviet-style, understanding of the nature of the state. The Soviet totalitarian state, which controlled and regulated almost everything within its borders, was understood as such – the institution with a well-defined territorial presence that entailed and enabled almost everything within its territory. The original Bolshevik vision had been of the state as a vehicle for building a better society of workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. That is one of the reasons why there could not be an officially sanctioned discussion about state-society relations.³⁹ To better argue the unity of the party, the state, and the people, communist propaganda had to treat the Soviet state and society as the same. It is a well-known fact that the Soviet state was dominated by élite groups of the Communist party, which represented the country as a monolithic unit with no internal antagonistic processes. Officially the state (*gosudarstvo*) was defined as the “main institution of the political system of the class society, which governs society.”⁴⁰

39. Scientific disciplines that study state-society relations, in their complex manifestations, did not have an easy ride within Soviet academia. The Soviet regime in the 1950s and 1960s viewed with great hostility such disciplines as sociology and political science. As had occurred with some other disciplines (e.g. genetics, and cybernetics), they were treated as “bourgeois sciences,” not able to correctly represent the realities of Soviet society. Although sociology would later gain acceptance as a legitimate science, the same could not be said for political science until the very last days of the Soviet regime.

40. I. T. Frolov, ed., *Filosofskiy slovar* (*Philosophical Dictionary*), Moscow: Izdatelstvo politicheskoi

Nevertheless, formally or not, the state in the Soviet Union was widely identified, first of all, with the geographical territory occupied by the existing regime. Soviet propagandists also tried to stimulate the idea of the "Soviet nation," but with very little success. This category had to signify the emergence of a new type of nation, which apart from sharing the geographic space presided over by the Soviet Union, and the political identity derived therefrom, lacked genuine substance. The Soviet regime encouraged the use of such appellations as *sovetskoe otechestvo* (Soviet fatherland), *rodina-mat'* (motherland), *sovetskiy patriot* (Soviet patriot), *sotsialisticheskaya rodina* (the Socialist homeland). These were labels with which everyone could identify, irrespective of nationality (ethnic origin). These terms were also pregnant with geographic significance, in the sense that for many years the Soviet Union was the world's only socialist country; i.e., the characteristics of the "Socialist motherland" or "Soviet fatherland" were contained within the USSR's borders. Even after other "socialist states" were held to have emerged, the Soviet Union still remained the "cradle of socialism" and "the pillar of the world socialism." This embedded the USSR with unique status: the quality being embodied in its geography. Soviet leaders were proud to point out the territorial greatness of their country, and its rich natural resources. Molotov was quoted as saying: "we have such a vast territory that you can't cover it all. You can't research everything, the distances are too great. We are quite fortunate people in that sense.

literaturi, 1991, p. 97.

We found just the country for socialism. Everything is here, you just have to look for it! And you can find whatever you want.”⁴¹ There were patriotic songs written that emphasised the territorial vastness of the Soviet country. One of the most popular of such songs started with the words: “My Motherland is vast” (*Shiroka strana moya rodnaya...*). The frontiers of this vast country were viewed as “the pulse of the country.”⁴² The Bering Strait served as a metaphorical divide between the progressive socialist system (USSR) and the decaying capitalism (USA).⁴³

Today’s Russia, just like the Soviet Union, is a multinational state. This is one more important reason why Russians tend to emphasise their country’s geographical identity. Not every citizen of the Russian Federation is Russian. Tatars, Chechens, Bashkirs, Chuvash, Ingush, Udmurts, Ossetians, and others normally do not identify themselves as “Russians.” Most of the members of the minor nations of the Russian Federation are loyal citizens of their country, but in terms of national identity their own ethnic, linguistic, and cultural background are the things that count. In Russian they have two related, but not identical, words when they refer to Russians. One is *Russkiy* or “Russian,” and the other is *Rossianen* or “of Russia.” In Russia they normally would not call a person *Russkiy* if the

41. Chuev, p. 71.

42. John J. Stephan, *The Russian Far East: A History*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, p. 277.

43. Ibid., p. 284. Stephan ends the chapter of his book titled “Frontier Ethos” with an old Soviet joke: a young soldier, who just arrived in Chukotka Peninsula (which faces Alaska from the west), asked his more experienced comrade why Tuesday in Chukotka was Monday in Alaska. The older soldier gave an ideologically correct explanation: because America is a yesterday country.

person's ethnic background is not Russian, even though this person may be a very dedicated patriot of Russia. For instance, in February 2001, the members of the interim, pro-Moscow, government of the Chechen Republic were chosen. One of the deputy prime ministers appointed was Colonel Yuri Em, who had distinguished himself as a brave commander in the Chechen war, and had been awarded the highest military honour in Russia – Hero of Russia.⁴⁴ However, one of the reasons he was chosen for the job was that he is not *Russkiy*, but an ethnic Korean. It is unknown whether Colonel Em speaks Korean or not, but he definitely looks Korean.⁴⁵ The logic behind his appointment, besides his military qualifications, was that an ethnic minority officer of the Russian army was seen as more appropriate candidate to establish trust and a working relationship with Chechens. There is no question that Colonel Em is a Russian patriot, but he is not Russian (*Russkiy*). Another example of how non-Russian nations of the Russian Federation define their national identities is the case with the introduction of the new, post-Soviet passports. The new passport originally did not include the line with the holder's nationality. Representatives of most non-Russian nations strongly objected to this, and demanded that the format of the new passport be altered, so it would mention the holder's nationality, e.g., Tatar, Bashkir, Udmurt, etc.⁴⁶ They were against the

44. "First Chechen Government Appointments Approved," *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 5, No. 29, Part I, 12 February 2001.

45. Most members of national minorities in Russia speak their mother languages. In certain national republics of Russia, the knowledge of the local language may be a requirement for high public office.

46. In fall of 1997 Tatarstan suspended the issuing of passports of the Russian Federation on its

new format because it was seen as an act of Russification of the non-Russian nations of the Federation, one which diminished their national identity. Moscow finally agreed to alter the format of the new Russian passport, and reportedly, the document now includes an insert where the holder's nationality is identified.⁴⁷

It is not very advantageous, therefore, for a Russian politician to frequently emphasise the nationalism of Russians, because such a thing would sound politically incorrect, diminishing the value of the non-Russian nations of Russia. In part influenced by Soviet times, the political meaning of the concept of "Russian nationalist" (*Russkiy natsionalist*) in Russian is very close to advocating the supremacy of ethnic Russians (*Russkiykh*). It is much more convenient and non-offensive to non-Russian nations, if one uses concepts like "the Russian state" (*Rossiiskoe gosudarstvo*) or "Russian patriot," which as was noted above, are pregnant with territorial, geographical meanings. The Russian Federation is a common state of many different nations, and Russians themselves are the dominant nation.

territory. The Tatar government demanded that the new passports issued in Tatarstan should have a special title page in the Tatar language, containing Tatarstan's state symbols, and including the bearer's "nationality" and "republican citizenship." Bashkortostan made similar demands. *RFE/RL Newslines*, 21 October and 14 November 1997. In February 1999, Tatarstan State Council Chairman Farid Mukhametshin demanded that the new Russian passports issued in Tatarstan should have the republic's symbols, and include "the bearer's nationality." *RFE/RL Newslines*, Russia section, 17 February 1999. Fandas Safiullin, a Russian state Duma deputy from Tatarstan, once again demanded that new Russian passports not be issued until the demands put forward by national minorities of Russia were met. *RFE/RL Newslines*, *Tatar-Bashkir Weekly Review*, 23 November 2000 <www.rferl.org/newsline>

47. "Bashkortostan, Moscow Resolve Passport Issue," *RFE/RL Newslines*, *Tatar-Bashkir Service*, *Tatar-Bashkir Daily Report*, 23 March 2001.

However, if this common state is to be seen as a coherent unit by representatives of different nations of Russia, it is only because they together occupy the same geographical space. Thus, the concept of the state, in Russian, and for peoples of Russia is primarily geographical in its political understanding.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, new terms emerged in the Russian language that also implied geographical reasoning. The fourteen former union republics, for example, were termed as “the near abroad.” Politicians, analysts, and the mass media would frequently speak of “the near abroad,” and use no adverb indicating distance when speaking about the rest of the world. This vision divided the world outside of Russia in two: “the near abroad” and the rest. According to this logic, Tajikistan, which has no common border with Russia, nor borders a country that shares a land border with Russia, became a “near abroad” country. Finland, on the other hand, which shares its longest border with Russia and is only a few hundred kilometres away from St. Petersburg, was not included in this category. The term “near abroad” is, probably, the best example in Russia’s case how historical experience can be converted into a geographical image of the world, and how this can be summarised in one concept. What this term implied was that Russia still saw its former co-habitants of the Soviet state as its own, as states belonging to its sphere of influence. “Near abroad” was not readily and broadly accepted as a legitimate phrase in English, since many students of Russian affairs quickly realised the implicit meaning of it.

Some other terms invented in Russia have been widely used in English,

despite the fact that they diminish the peoples and countries they refer to. One such term is "Transcaucasus." This term refers to the region of South Caucasus, and its three states, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Russia is a newcomer to the Caucasus region. It has been there only since the beginning of the 19th century, while the nations living on the other side of the Caucasus mountain range, mainly Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Georgians, as well as their neighbours in the North Caucasus, have lived there for at least 35 centuries. For those who live in the South Caucasus, Russia would be "Transcaucasus." Another term, which often implies Russo-centrism, and is widely used by English language academia is "Kievan Rus'."⁴⁸ Even superficial examination of a map reveals that Kiev, or rather Kyiv, is located in the country called Ukraine, and it is Ukraine's capital city. In the 9th century it became the centre of a relatively strong and developed Slavonic, not Russian, state. Kyiv was the seat of Vladimir, grand prince, who baptised his subjects in 988. Vladimir and his subjects were Slavs, but that does not mean that they were Russians only. Most probably, for Ukrainians and Russians, and maybe for other eastern Slav nations, they were common ancestors. However, there is no evidence of the ancient Kyivans being Russians *per se*.⁴⁹ They became "Russians" in

48. Historian Charles Halperin starts his chapter titled "Kievan *Rus'* and the Steppe" with the following passage: "Historians usually consider the Kievan period of Russian history, from the migration of the East Slavs into the modern-day Ukraine in the sixth through eighth centuries...." Charles J. Halperin, *Russia and The Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987, p. 10.

49. Historian Florinsky in a chapter titled "The Early Kievan Princes" wrote on "the conditions prevailing in Russia in the ninth and tenth centuries," and "the character of the trade relations between the Russians and Byzantium," etc. He is quite explicit in claiming the "Kievan" history is

the imperial Russian and then Soviet historiography, the version that was readily accepted by Western scholars. Most historians of Russia refer to “Kievan Rus” in the context of Russian history only; however, they fail to acknowledge that this term, first of all, signifies shared history of Eastern Slavs.

Totalitarianism and excessive interference in almost all aspects of social life may no longer be the case with the current Russian state, but old ways of thinking, especially in politics, never go away easily or completely. Whatever the normative extrapolations of geopolitics may be in Russia, there can be no denying the dominance of geographical-spatial considerations among the country’s foreign policy élite. The emphasis most Russian political actors still place on the geographical and spatial integrity and coherence of the Russian state logically derives from the country’s recent political and cultural experience. This phenomenon is not new at all in Russian foreign policy and security calculations. It has its roots in geographical facts and historical experiences related to the emergence of the current Russian state.

There are some things in international politics that may require very little theoretical grounding, because they are more or less obvious as they are. Such phenomena, for instance, relate to geography – or political geography, to be more precise. This is not to say that political geography determines the behaviour of the state; however, political geography embedded in historical experience may well

that of Russia only. Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia: A History and An Interpretation*, Vol. 1. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964, p. 18 and p. 19.

influence foreign policy decision-makers' mentality and their understanding of security related issues. Russia, given its singular political geography, provides an excellent case for this demonstration.

The Russian Federation is the only state in the world with a geographic presence both in Europe and on Asia's Pacific shores: it shares borders both with Poland and North Korea. At the same time, only the narrow Bering Strait separates Russia from North America. Further, Russia remains the largest country in the world, with the longest land borders. In the Soviet era, a frontier mythology was spawned, according to which the defenders of the Soviet motherland were glorified, and the state borders were deemed sacrosanct. Atrocious actions by Soviet military were justified by the slogans like "Motherland Frontiers Are Sacred."⁵⁰ The Soviet regime expended substantial resources defending and monitoring those borders. The Soviet "frontier connoted a fortified perimeter insulating 'us' from 'them.'"⁵¹ It would not be unfair to argue that the frontier-oriented mentality

50. This was a headline in *Tikhookeanskaya Zvezda* (*Pacific Ocean Star*), a Khabarovsk newspaper, after a Sukhoi interceptor shot down a Korean Airlines' Boeing 747 over the Sea of Japan on September 1 1983. All 269 people on the board perished. For reasons unknown, KAL flight 007 veered off course en route from Anchorage to Seoul and flew over Kamchatka and Sakhalin. Authorities ordered the plane destroyed, and pilot Gennady Osipovich obeyed without hesitation. He was, and still is, convinced that he did the right thing: "I knew that the plane had intruded across a frontier that should be under lock and key," he was quoted as saying. John J. Stephan, *The Russian Far East: A History*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, p. 277. After the incident Soviet propaganda claimed that they had information proving that KAL flight 007 was on a spy mission to photograph the Kamchatka and Sakhalin lands that were closed to foreign planes. No such proof was ever presented to substantiate this claim.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

remains in the new Russia, especially among its political class.⁵² At the same time, the new Russia finds itself living with a number of new international boundaries. Its borders with Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states are completely or relatively undefended. Russia is not the only state in the world that is concerned with issues of its national frontiers and borders, but it is the only one that has elevated these issues to such a high importance. The foundation for this was laid in the early days of the Soviet state. The most prominent Red Army scholar of strategic studies of the 1920s and 1930s taught his students:

Today, however, peace itself is primarily the result of violence and is maintained by violence. Every state border is the result of a war, the outlines of states on the map make us familiar with the strategic and political thinking of the victories, and political geography and peace treaties constitute a lesson in strategy. In every corner of Central Europe there are

52. A symbolic reminder that this is, indeed, the case in today's Russia is the fact the person who ordered the attack on KAL 007 in 1983 was promoted in the 1990s and became the chief of Russian air force in January of 1998. Colonel-General Anatoliy Kornukov told Russian television after his appointment that he would "always be sure" that his orders to shoot down the Korean civilian aircraft were correct. He added that "if something like that would happen now, I would act the same way." Paul Goble, "Without Remorse," *RFE/RL Newsline*, 27 January 1998, <www.rferl.org/newsline>. In February 2001, General Kornukov claimed that Russian radars detected and tracked approximately 250,000 airborne targets near Russia's borders in the Far East and the Kola Peninsula (bordering Finland and Norway) during 2000. He added that half of these were foreign planes, including 1,500 combat aircraft, and nearly 600 spy planes. Paul Goble, "Moscow Tracks Spy Planes Near Russian Borders," *RFE/RL Newsline*, Vol. 5, No. 41, Part I, February 28 2001.

Another unrelated example of this kind of mentality would be the headline given by a Russian electronic daily, *lenta.ru*, to the February 2001 Treaty of Nice: "The European Union is Approaching Borders of Russia" (*Evropeiskiy Soiuz priblizhaetsia k granitsam Rossii*). Although there is no widespread concern in Russia regarding EU's decision to accept more members, the editors of *lenta.ru* highlighted precisely the decision made in Nice by foreign ministers of EU countries to accept new members starting 2003, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, and Cyprus. For this article, the editors of *lenta.ru* used information from *cnn.com*, whose piece on the issue with almost the same content was titled "EU Ministers Sign Treaty of Nice," <www.lenta.ru> 27. 02. 2001, and <www.cnn.com> February 26, 2001.

irredentas, that is, conquered territories which have not been returned to their rightful owners and contradict the desires of nations for self-determination.⁵³

Not only is Russian political geography, for reasons cited above, singular, it has also been in a constant state of flux during the twentieth century. It should be come as no surprise to discover that the territory presided over by the Russian state has been shrinking ever since the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. The biggest territorial losses, however, occurred subsequent to the October 1917 revolution, in the first instance, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in the second. It is true that Russia gained some territory in the early 1920s, following its civil war and with the expansion of the Bolshevik regime, as well as in 1939-1940 with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and again after the Second World War. However, as the 21st century begins, Russia is smaller than at any time since the end of the eighteenth century.⁵⁴

Nor it is certain that the shrinking of the country has stopped. The separatist forces in Chechnya-Ichkeria have not abandoned their hopes for independence and their struggle to achieve it is not over yet. At the end of the 1990s, Russia and China

53. Aleksandr A. Svechin, *Strategy*, Minneapolis, Minn.: East View Publications, 1992, p. 83. Svechin's book *Strategiia*, originally published in the Soviet Union in 1927, has been called the most important Russian language contribution to strategic studies in the 20th century. Hundreds of generals and senior Red Army officers of the World War II were educated by Svechin and/or his writings. Former General of the imperial army, Svechin was purged and executed in 1938 for his alleged anti-Soviet activities.

54. There is a story of a Georgian Bolshevik, Philippe Makharadze, who bragged after the 11th army of the Soviet Russia conquered Georgia in February of 1921: "Today the Soviet power covers 1/6 of the land surface of the globe. But the day will come and it will cover 1/16, 1/26, 1/36, and so on, of the globe." Makharadze meant that the Soviet regime would extend and eventually cover bigger

demarcated their common border, and signed a treaty on this for the first time in history. As a result, Russia has transferred some disputed lands to China.⁵⁵ However, the number of legal and illegal Chinese immigrants is increasing in the Russian Far East, and this generates certain fears in Russia that the region eventually may be lost to China.⁵⁶ The question of the so-called “northern territories,” islands Moscow and Tokyo both claim, has yet to be resolved.⁵⁷ There are irredentist claims voiced in Finland and Estonia regarding some Russian lands at their common borders.⁵⁸ As NATO expands and Russia continues to struggle with significant economic, political, and demographic problems, the future of the Kalinigrad district (Königsberg) is getting more uncertain. Of late, geopolitically inclined Russian commentators have been juxtaposing this “shrinking” trend with a

chunks of the globe, but it seems that he was right in his prediction after all.

55. Genrikh Kireiev, “Demarcation of the Border with China,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), Vol. 45, No. 2, 1999, p. 100, p. 102, and p. 109.

56. Ibid. Also, Eric Hyer, “Dreams and Nightmares: Chinese Trade and Immigration in the Russian Far East,” *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. X, No. 2, Summer/Fall 1996, p. 290.

57. “Northern territories” is an irredentist name of the islands that now belong to Russia, but are claimed by various actors in Japan as their own: 1) the government (the Liberal Democratic Party) claims Kunashir, Itupur, Shikotan, and the Habomai group of islands, 2) some oppositional parties claim the whole Kurile archipelago, and 3) the Kurile archipelago and southern Sakhalin is claimed by right-wing groups. Stephan, p. 278.

58. Estonia and Russia negotiators reached a technical border agreement in December 1996, but it has not been yet ratified. “Estonia,” *The World Factbook 2000*, Central Intelligence Agency (USA), <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/en.html>>. In Finland, demands like “Take Karelia Back!” are rather faint, and do not represent the view of the mainstream; however, such claims are still voiced. “Occupied Finnish Territories: A Sacrifice for the United Europe,” *Karelian Question*, Patriotic National Alliance (Finland), <<http://www.kauhajoki.fi/~ikl/ulkoomat/index.html>>.

NATO that has been constantly getting bigger and stronger since its creation in 1949. NATO expanded in 1952 (Greece and Turkey), 1955 (the Federal Republic of Germany), 1982 (Spain), 1990 (incorporation of the German Democratic Republic into the FRG), and 1999 (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). The alliance appears poised to remain on the enlargement track; its leaders profess to want to take more members, and to expand activities outside the alliance's borders.

Russia first emerged as a strong and centralised state under Ivan the Terrible.⁵⁹ Since then it expanded to form a large Eurasian empire, and as was discussed in Chapter Three, therein lies the main difference between Russia and other great European powers. Such states as Great Britain, Spain, and France colonised lands in the distant Americas or in Asia and Africa. Russia expanded eastward, incorporating into the empire such distinct nations as the Tatars, Bashkirs, Udmurts, Evenks, Yakuts, Buriats and many others. Russia's expansion looked more "natural" in terms of geographical and historical logic than did the colonisation efforts of its European rivals. That is probably why when the empires of great European powers collapsed, Russia managed to remain more or less intact.

Russia did, as mentioned above, lose a significant amount of land by the end of the twentieth century. It still remains, however, the largest country in the world, and even were Russia to lose more territory, like the disputed Kuril islands or

59. Ivan IV "the Terrible" (1530-1584) was Grand Prince Over the All Rus' from 1533 and the first Russian Czar (Tsar, Emperor) from 1547. Under his leadership the dominance of Moscow in Russia was strengthened. Also, in 1547, Russia conquered the Kazan khanate, and in 1556, the Astrakhan khanate. In 1581, Yermak started the conquest of Siberia.

Chechnya, there is no immediate danger of its getting as small as today's Great Britain or Spain. Its geographical dimensions remain as impressive as they have been for many centuries. Its geographic characteristics have helped Russia to ward off series of invaders, and to prove itself as the one of the most resilient nations in history. No other country in the world lost so many lives or endured so much fighting on its soil during the bloody twentieth century.

The most catastrophic of these conflicts for Russia and other members of the Soviet Union was World War II, when more than twenty million Soviet citizens lost their lives, most of them civilians. The memory of this war remains fresh, and its influence is great upon Russian culture. "This will not be repeated!" was the pledge of those who survived, and from 1945 until the end of the 1980s, Moscow expended inordinate amounts of money and effort defending the country against possible invaders. For many years, the Soviet Union was organised like a very large military camp, with fenced and mined borders, and military installations at every imaginable strategic point. The countries of Eastern Europe served as a buffer zone for the Soviet state; no longer was their elimination seen to be either necessary or beneficial, given the bad experience subsequent to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939. The absence of a buffer zone or breathing space, as Soviet leaders would call it, allowed the militarily superior Germany to launch unexpectedly Operation *Barbarossa* on June 22, 1941, destroying within days many Soviet strategic targets and important cities.

These events are known well by students of European politics and history. They are so well known that very often they are overlooked. However, they must always be kept in mind when one discusses the Russians' view of current international realities. These historical events have helped to shape their collective experience, and have significantly influenced the mentality of Russia's political class.

From Liberalism to Eurasianism: Bombs are Stronger than Promises

Countless writers have presented accounts of how and why Russian and NATO representatives debated issues related to the alliance's enlargement. Mostly, they have focussed on whether enlargement (expansion) has been a good idea, and they have sought to determine whether the emerging new defence structure in Europe would enhance security on the continent. Relatively little attention, on the other hand, has been paid to the fact that the two sides in the debate – the Westerners and the Russians – cannot really hear each other. Russians maintain their traditional, geography-centred perspective on security issues, and cannot share in the idealistic assessments offered to them by the NATO allies. NATO leaders, for their part, in the 1990s have embraced new ideals and objectives of promoting democracy via enlargement, and cannot understand why Moscow does not abandon its "outdated" mentality, and join with them in celebrating the new security arrangements in Europe.

In international politics, clear and effective communication is not easily

achieved. Since every country communicates with others based upon its own experience and interests, ideas do not automatically “translate” into another party’s language. This happens not for reasons related to language itself, but because of differences in the international security experiences and realities confronting the different countries. These differences are the very fabric of international politics. That international “realities” sometimes may be more apparent than real may not matter much, since perceptions are often more important than realities. Experience is what every state has, and relies upon, as the basis of its future actions. In international politics actors do not observe, but experience events. Decision-makers either live through these experiences or read about them, and then take decisions and form opinions based on *their* experiences. Based upon the different experiences, actors in international politics have different interests, and these interests get negotiated constantly, so that conflicting ones sometimes can be resolved peacefully, yet sometimes cannot. If the two opposed sides share the same mode of geomentality, especially the imperialist one, this may not help but instead may aggravate problems further. Since each side views the opposite as *Them*, without transcending such a dichotomy, most security arrangements undertaken by *Us* will be directed against *Them*, and vice versa. If security arrangements are made according to the imperialist mode of geomentality, the world will be composed of *Us* and *Them*, and there will be no one else.

When two such different sides as Russia and NATO negotiate, they do so based upon their own “realities,” and with their experiences and interests

uppermost. Russia finds itself economically and militarily weak, in a historic phase when the state is shrinking and deteriorating, and facing constant social and political crises. Their country's international experience tells the Russian political class that, first of all, it emerged as a world power thanks to its geographic expansion, and its embrace of the strong state model over many centuries. It also reminds them that Russia has always had huge problems whenever a single dominant military power faced them from the West. Such a dominant military power has always sought to undermine or divide Russia, by attacking Russia itself or its allies, all the while claiming to have noble and even progressive motives.

International political experience further teaches them that, in most cases, it was more advantageous for a stronger military power in Western Europe not to have a "breathing space" (buffer zone) with Russia, than it was for Russia itself.⁶⁰ Therefore, it follows that Russia's interests do not allow the emergence of such a new power in Europe, no matter what the declared objectives of the latter may be. If such a power emerges despite Russian efforts, then it is imperative for Moscow to

60. Boris Shaposhnikov, a former colonel in the Czarist army, and subsequently one of the most distinguished Soviet military leaders and strategists, argued in the 1930s that major European states might use smaller states, such neighbours of the USSR as Poland, Finland, and Romania, in order to attack the Soviet country. In his view,

These small states, politically and economically dependent on larger European states, are immediate neighbours of the Soviet Union, and above all fear the 'red menace' and thus are most interested not only in preserving their borders but in expanding them to the East.

According to this logic, it was of vital interest for the USSR to have as friendly regimes in charge of these smaller European states as possible. Quoted in Kokoshin, p. 85.

keep as much “breathing space” as possible between it and Russia.

NATO, on the other hand, finds itself in a world where it is the strongest military amalgamation, one whose ranks could be augmented by as many as a dozen new members, yet an entity whose old members face no direct or indirect military threat. Almost all NATO members are liberal democracies, with most of them having much better human rights records and democratic systems than most other countries in the world. Their international experience tells NATO leaders that the alliance has been a very robust institution, which is worth preserving. Further, this alliance was very instrumental in winning the Cold War, and defeating Soviet-style socialism. NATO has also been very useful since, especially in implementing the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, this logic suggests that it is in NATO's interests to further project its power, influence, and values. So it does this, by admitting new members, and by engaging in peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations outside its borders.

Thus, Russia and NATO approach the post-Cold War security challenges in Europe from two very different positions. Their geomentality is the same, but the arguments they advance to communicate it are the polar opposites. Russia, which is in a weaker position, stresses geopolitical and geographical arguments, supporting them with its international security experience. NATO, on the other hand, promotes liberal and institutional values, and based on these hopes to reach some kind of understanding with Moscow. But because the two sides still view each other in a divided and confrontational world, and communicate security issues with very

different sets of values, there is very little chance that they will be able to understand each other without modifying their interest hierarchies.

Moscow has two options when interpreting NATO aspirations and claims. It can take them at face value, as accurately reflecting Western intentions. Or it can regard them as some kind of propaganda ploy, designed to mask the West's true geomentality. If NATO arguments are taken as ideological smokescreens, Russians must suspect the alliance has ulterior motives, perhaps similar to those of Russia's erstwhile European foes. But even if NATO leaders are being honest, and are not seeking to mask other intentions behind liberal propaganda, the security dispensation they propose would not be acceptable to Russia, anyway. The emphasis on liberal and institutional values will put Russia in a position of permanent outsider, a second-rate actor at best in Europe.

Why? Because it is no secret that Russia has a poorer human rights and democracy record than most of the European countries, including former members of the Eastern bloc. Russia may agree to play second fiddle to the United States, Germany, France, or even the United Kingdom, but it is very unlikely that it would ever be content to be ranked below Slovenia or Estonia. Besides, NATO enlargement logically leaves Russia excluded, since it will be impossible to incorporate such a large country institutionally into the alliance without altering its nature and design. Further, if the meaning of the NATO-Yugoslavia war of 1999 is that countries such as Yugoslavia, which also have poor human rights and democracy records, can expect to be punished for their dereliction, then NATO's

allure can hardly be enhanced, at least from the Russian perspective.

From the beginning, independent Russia's new foreign policy expressed an aspiration to "join" the West. The new Russian Westernisers or Liberals had the upper hand in the first post-Soviet Russian government. The Soviet Union had not been completely dissolved when Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev declared that Russia was unconditionally accepting such basic liberal democratic values as the market economy and the priority of the individual over the state. Kozyrev understood liberal democratic values as the essential conditions for Russia to join the First World. President Yeltsin, in his first speech to the United Nations General Assembly in January 1992, proclaimed that the new democratic Russia would be built on the principles of democracy and human rights.⁶¹ Russian leaders hoped that the pro-Western policies would promote the political and economic transformation of Russia and eventually would be helpful in integrating Russia into the world economy. The West was perceived as both the guiding star in foreign policies and as a tool for the ideological justification of domestic reforms. The Liberals tried to sell Moscow's pro-Western orientation to the public as the only reasonable approach to foreign policy. The formula presented to the public and strongly supported by the electronic media was very simple: if you want to live like a western society, you have to behave like one.

The Russian government hoped that if they would embrace Western values

61. *Itar-tass*, 31 January 1992.

and follow the West, mainly the United States, in its foreign policies, it would help them to obtain aid and assistance in reforming the Russian economy. Foreign Minister Kozyrev proposed a 'Marshall Plan' for Russia, implying that this sort of plan would definitely cut the new Russia from its totalitarian past.⁶² The new Russian government saw the West's task as promoting Russia's transition from the Soviet administrative economic regime to a market economy. Since foreign policies are normally closely linked with domestic policies in general, it was clear that the success of the foreign policies of the new Russian government would be judged according to the success of domestic economic reforms.

With regard to national security issues, the architects of the pro-Western policies in Russia expected that Western methods of conflict resolution and collective security would be extended eastward to include the whole Eurasian continent. The Liberals envisioned the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) and the United Nations as the main vehicles in promoting new security frameworks and ensuring Russia's security concerns. At the same time, Moscow saw NATO as a Cold War relic, an outdated institution, which was counting its days. Moscow was encouraged by the West's approval in creating and promoting the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The CSCE (OSCE) accepted the states of the CIS as members at the Prague Conference of January 1992. At the same time the

62. *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, 3 July 1992.

United Nations was perceived as an organisation capable of more active involvement in the existing and potential conflicts in the former Soviet Union through extended peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations.⁶³ During the first post-Soviet years Russian foreign and security policies toward the West were removed from their traditional territorial-spatial dimensions.

Modern Eurasians criticised Kozyrev's pro-Western foreign policy from the very first days of the existence of the new Russian state. Pro-Western foreign policies were seen to be humiliating for a country that had until recently been accorded equal status with the United States. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation was a stronghold of pro-Eurasian views, and soon conflicts started to develop between this body and the Foreign Ministry. The call to defend the rights of ethnic Russians in 'the near abroad' was actively taken up by the opposition.⁶⁴ In 1992 Kozyrev was accused of destroying Russia's traditional alliance with the Serbs when Russia voted for sanctions against Serbia in the United Nations Security Council. Among the most outspoken critics of Kozyrev's foreign policy were Yevgeni Ambartsumov, the Head of the Supreme Soviet's Committee on International Affairs, and Oleg Rumiantsev, the Head of the Constitutional Committee. In 1992 Kozyrev was also accused of intending to return disputed Kuril

63. *Izvestiia*, 24 February 1992.

64. Alexander Yusupovsky, "Latvia: Discrimination, International Organisations, and Stabilisation," in eds. Alexei Arbatov, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler, and Lara Olson, *Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives*, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 245.

Islands to Japan. He was then criticised for upholding an American position and not selling cryogenic rocket engines to India. However, the most critical issue for the new Russian Foreign Ministry was the question of the Russians living in the former Soviet Republics. The question of the Russians in the so-called 'near abroad,' alongside with the issue of NATO expansion, was the issue that marked Kozyrev's turning away from pro-Western foreign policies. In the beginning of 1994 Kozyrev declared that the vital strategic issue for Russian diplomacy was the defence of Russian minority rights in the former Soviet Republics.⁶⁵ In May of the same year the Russian Foreign Minister visited Tallinn, met with representatives of the Russian diaspora in Estonia, and told them that the withdrawal of Russian forces from Estonia would free Russia's hands and would enable it to defend the Russians of Estonia by any means available to it.⁶⁶ Kozyrev had come under heavy pressure from the opposition and public opinion. Soon after the break-up of the Soviet Union, various political forces in Russia, among them the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), and the Congress of Russian Communities called for Russians to regard themselves as a "divided people," implying a refusal to recognise the break-up of the USSR, and portraying the new borders as temporary and unnatural. The issue of the Russians

65. Andrei Kozyrev, "Za voennoe prisutstvie v sosednikh gosudarstvakh," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 19 January 1994.

66. Ibid.

in other post-Soviet states became a central issue in Russian public opinion.⁶⁷

Among the most prominent politicians who championed Eurasianist ideas in Russia in the beginning of the 1990s were Sergei Baburin, a well-known deputy of the Supreme Soviet from Siberia, Eduard Limonov, a former émigré writer and the founder and leader of the National Bolshevik Party in 1993, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the founder and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), Viktor Aksiushechkin, the leader of the Christian Democratic movement, and later a leader of the Congress of Civic and Patriotic Forces, and Aleksandr Rutskoi, Vice-President of Russia. They were informed by such intellectuals as Lev Gumilëv, Aleksandr Dugin, Aleksandr Prokhanov, a writer and the editor of weekly newspaper *Den'*, Nikita Mikhalkov, a filmmaker (a 1995 Oscar winner for *Burnt By the Sun*), and Aleksandr Nevzorov, an extreme right-wing broadcaster from St. Petersburg.⁶⁸ Baburin was one of the leaders and initiators of the United Opposition in the Supreme Soviet against the Liberal controlled Russian government. Formed on March 10, 1992, the United Opposition declared "social justice and state protection for all Russians, including those outside the boundaries of the Russian Federation"

67. Yusupovskiy, "Latvia," p. 249.

68. Aleksandr Prokhanov was one of the most distinguished critics of liberalism, reforms, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He united Dugin, Limonov and others around his newspaper. Prokhanov later broke with Dugin, apparently because of disagreements about the question concerning Jews. He became an adviser of Zyuganov during the 1996 presidential elections. In August 2000, Prokhanov invited David Duke, a former KKK leader to Russia, and organised his public speeches and meetings. Duke's visit to Russia came only two weeks after President Putin granted a meeting to Prokhanov. Currently Prokhanov is editor-in-chief of the ultra-nationalist weekly newspaper *Zavtra* (tomorrow), which he started publishing after *Den'* (Day) was ordered to shut down.

to be one of its major goals.⁶⁹ The opposition soon formed a parliamentary bloc, Russian Unity, to which five parliamentary factions adhered. It was the largest bloc in the Russian Supreme Soviet. Baburin's vision of Russia was a typical Eurasianist one. He saw Russia as "a special kind of civilisation between West and East," and that Russians were a "superethnos" (Gumilëv's term) composed of many different ethnic groups.

In the beginning of the 1990s, Eduard Limonov was closely associated with Dugin and Prokhanov. Limonov, who in the 1970s was exiled to Paris for his anti-Soviet activities, is an extreme right-wing promoter of Russian nationalism. He returned to Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and accepted the post of KGB chief in Zhirinovsky's shadow cabinet (he later resigned his post because of Zhirinovsky's alleged Jewish origins). Limonov fought in the Pridnestrovie region of Moldova supporting ethnic Russian separatists, and in the Yugoslav civil wars. In December 1993, he was elected to the new Russian parliament, the Duma. Limonov has made himself notorious in Russian politics with his extreme anti-Western and anti-Semitic views. According to Limonov, Russia should seek allies in Asia and among Islamic states, not in the West. The only remedy for Russia is to rebuild a powerful Russian state within 'its natural boundaries.' A national-socialist revolution is necessary to unite all Russian lands, because "only by means of a

69. Judith Devlin, *Slavophiles and Commissars: Enemies of Democracy in Modern Russia*, New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999, p. 133.

NATIONAL REVOLUTION can the Russian people preserve its territorial, economic, national and cultural unity" [emphasis in the original].⁷⁰ Later in the 1990s, Limonov and Dugin disassociated themselves from each other, and in spring of 2001 Limonov was imprisoned by Russian authorities on charges of calling for the overthrow of the government, and keeping an arms cache.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky gained popularity and a wide support in the beginning of the 1990s. He declared the defence of Russians living in 'the near abroad' to be one of his major goals in the December 1993 Duma elections. "I WILL DEFEND THE RUSSIANS!" [emphasis in the original] proclaimed one of Zhirinovsky's newspapers.⁷¹ Zhirinovsky has advocated the restoration of a Great Russian state, but not in the form of the USSR or the CIS. Russians needed help, according to Zhirinovsky, because "millions of Russians and Russian-speaking inhabitants of Russia are now beyond its borders.... They have become pariahs, second-class people deprived of their blood, their means of existence, and turned into refugees, bums, and beggars."⁷² Zhirinovsky received 6.2 million votes (8 per cent) and finished third in the 1991 presidential elections, behind Yeltsin (59.7 per cent), and a former Soviet Prime Minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov (17.6 per cent).⁷³ However, his true success came in 1993, when the LDPR became the largest political

70. Ibid., p. 52.

71. Vladimir Kartsev, *!Zhirinovsky!*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 91.

72. Ibid., p. 95.

73. Devlin, *Slavophiles and Commissars*, p. 153.

party represented in the new state Duma.

By Spring 1992, Viktor Aksiushits was one of the leaders of the anti-Liberal opposition. His Christian Democrats joined forces with communists and neo-Stalinists. The 1992 programme of his party emphasised such things as *sobornost'* (conciliarism, an Eurasianist term underlying the Russian communal tradition) of the Russian state, the restoration of a single Russia state by uniting the Slavic states of the USSR, and the areas in other post-Soviet states mainly inhabited by Russians, and other territories that felt themselves 'drawn' to Russia.⁷⁴ According to this programme, the defence of the Russian diaspora in 'the near abroad' should become one of the key elements of Russian foreign policy.⁷⁵ Eventually Aksiushits became an active opponent of Russia's Liberals. He was one of the most devoted supporters of Vice-President Rutskoi and other leaders of the Autumn 1993 rebellion, and stayed in the White House (then the main building of the Russian parliament) during its October 1993 siege.

Aleksandr Rutskoi, a close associate and ally of President Yeltsin during the August 1991 coup d'état, slowly developed anti-liberal, nationalist ideas, and eventually he joined the anti-Liberal opposition. He was drawn to Eurasianism under the influence of the political thought of one of the old Eurasians, Ivan Il'in.

74. The term *sobornost'* was first introduced by Slavophiles in the 19th century. Alexis Khomiakov was the most prominent pre-Eurasian Slavophile who pioneered this term in Russian political discourse.

75. Devlin p. 74.

Filmmaker Nikita Mikhalkov, one of his closest friends, apparently introduced him Il'in's ideas.⁷⁶ Mikhalkov insisted that "we had and have and – as I think – will have our own Way, the Eurasian Way.... Russia, which is not a national but a state formation, has become the East-West (Eurasia)."⁷⁷ By the beginning of 1992, Rutskoi had denounced the Liberals for undermining the Russian-Eurasian state. He argued that Russians should "keep in view the problem of preserving Russian [*rossiiskaia*] statehood, and... restoring a single democratic space on the territory of a wider Eurasian space."⁷⁸ During his brief tenure as Russia's first and last Vice-President, Rutskoi intervened in the domestic affairs of Moldova (Pridnestrovie), Ukraine (the Crimea), and Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia).⁷⁹ His aim was to support pro-Russian forces in these regions, and weaken the respective central governments of these countries, which he saw as anti-Russian. According to Georgian officials, once Rutskoi even threatened to bomb Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, if his demands on Abkhazia were not met. In Autumn 1993, Rutskoi led an unsuccessful anti-government rebellion of the Supreme Soviet, for which he was fired, stripped his military honours, and briefly imprisoned.⁸⁰

76. Ibid., p. 142.

77. Ibid., p. 18.

78. Ibid., p. 141.

79. Ibid., p. 142.

80. Rutskoi and other leaders of the 1993 rebellion were amnestied by the new Duma. After his release from prison, Rutskoi founded the *Derzhava* (Great Power) political movement and ran for president in the 1996 elections, but later withdrew in favour of Ziuganov. In 1996 Rutskoi was

The shift in the official Russian position toward Eurasianist views with a greater concern for Russians living in the post-Soviet states was christened by Vitautas Landsbergis, the ex-president of Lithuania, as "the Kozyrev-Zhirinovky doctrine."⁸¹ Kozyrev's turning toward the Eurasians did not, however, save him. His name was already associated in Moscow with very unpopular foreign policy decisions. The Supreme Soviet first demanded Kozyrev's resignation in April 1992. In November - December 1992 Kozyrev was saved by President Yeltsin when the reform cabinet of Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar resigned. During 1993 the policies of Yeltsin and Kozyrev came under heavy fire from the Supreme Soviet, which was eventually disbanded by force in October 1993. After the December 1993 elections Kozyrev's position became even shakier. According to some Russian newspapers, from the very first days the new Duma was very hostile toward the policies Kozyrev represented, and a strong anti-Kozyrev lobby in the Duma cut across the party lines.⁸² The largest political party in Duma was Zhirinovsky's LDPR; they won 22.9 per cent of the party list vote, and 5 single seats. Zyuganov's Communists won 12.4 per cent of the vote, and 10 single seats. The pro-Communist Agrarian Party won 7.99 per cent and 16 single seats. Many notorious anti-Liberals,

elected governor of Kursk oblast', his home province. He was banned from running again in 2000, when the regional court took his name off the gubernatorial ballot.

81. Yusupovsky, "Latvia," p. 248.

82. *Izvestiia*, 26 January 1994.

like Eduard Limonov, Aleksandr Nevzorov and others also were elected.⁸³ The West's decision to expand NATO effectively doomed pro-Western tendencies in Russian foreign policy. Kozyrev invested too much in the hope that the CSCE (OSCE) would emerge as a vehicle of European security, and that NATO would slowly wither away. Most politicians, analysts and commentators in Moscow viewed the Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign policy regarding NATO as a total failure. Andrei Kortunov suggests that this issue has been a crucial litmus test foreshadowing the future of relations between Russia and the West:

The opposition to Boris Yeltsin's leadership in Moscow, nationalists and liberals alike, tends to interpret the "expansion" of the Atlantic alliance, with Russia being left on the outside, as one of the most serious defeats, if not the most serious defeat, of the Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign policy during the past four years. It is the ultimate proof that Russian policy since 1991 has been based on profoundly incorrect assumptions, which have led the country down a blind alley.⁸⁴

In August 1993, President Yeltsin stated in Warsaw that Russia would have no objections if Poland joined NATO. The Russian President agreed that a decision by Poland to accede to NATO "aiming at all-European integration is not contrary to the interests of other states including also Russia."⁸⁵ Yeltsin's remarks were soon

83. Devlin, *Slavophiles and Commissars*, pp. 147-148. Also, "Main Forces in the State Duma and dynamics of Change 1993-95," NUPI Centre for Russian Studies, <www.nupi.no/russland/elections/Forces_State_Duma_93_95.html>.

84. Andrei Kortunov, "NATO Enlargement and Russia: In Search of an Adequate Response," in ed. David Haglund, *Will NATO Go East?* Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, 1996, p. 71.

85. John Borawski, "Partnership for Peace and Beyond," *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 71, No. 2, April 1995, p. 235.

retracted, and Russian 'power ministries' formed a consensus against NATO enlargement. In November of the same year Yevgeni Primakov, Head of Russian Intelligence Service, publicly declared Russia's concern about the question of NATO expansion. At a news conference at the Foreign Ministry Press Centre he declared that he had consulted the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces General Staff and was expressing a view that had their approval. Primakov pointed out that the enlargement of NATO would create a 'siege mentality' in Russia.⁸⁶ For Russia's security establishment the alliance's expansion suggested shifting Cold War borders eastward, and creating an image of Russia's isolation. In spite of this objection, by mid-1994 it became clear that the alliance would expand eastward. In June 1994 US President Bill Clinton declared that the question was no longer whether NATO would expand, but how and when.

Initially, Moscow had been presented with a more moderate Western plan – the Partnership for Peace initiative. This American initiative was first introduced at the meeting of NATO defence ministers in Travemunde, Germany, on 20-21 October 1993. The programme was officially proposed by President Clinton at the NATO summit January 1994. The Partnership for Peace programme offered six areas of co-operation to all "able and willing" CSCE participating states, but did not mention possible NATO enlargement.⁸⁷ At this stage leading Western politicians

86. *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 26 November 1993.

87. Borawski, p. 233.

publicly refused to accept any new members into the alliance. From the very beginning Russia was critical of the PfP initiative, and it was very reluctant to sign any agreement under this new framework. However, after 24 nations joined the partnership programme, Foreign Minister Kozyrev signed the PfP documents on Russia's behalf in May 1995. By that time talks about NATO's possible enlargement had become common, and Russian officials remained very critical of these ideas. The Liberals in the Russian government still tried to affect the future image of European security. Some in Moscow developed ideas on NATO's transformation into a pan-European security institution, and Kozyrev even proposed certain transitional stages.⁸⁸ Kozyrev wrote that "we do not exclude the possibility that at some point Russia itself may become a member of the Alliance."⁸⁹ This call for Russia's membership in NATO was repeated by Russian Security Council Secretary Ivan Rybkin in November 1996. Russian Defence Council Secretary Yuri Baturin supported Rybkin's call.⁹⁰ On 11 February 1997, former Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar asserted at a news conference in Moscow that NATO "poses no military threat to Russia" and advised that NATO would be wise to offer membership to Moscow.⁹¹ On the other hand, the most radical opponents of NATO

88. Andrei Kozyrev, "Partnership or Cold Peace?" *Foreign Policy*, No. 99, Summer 1995, pp. 13-14.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

90. "More Talk For NATO Membership for Moscow," *Monitor*, Vol. II, No. 215, 15 November 1996, <www.jamestown.org>

91. "Lone Voices in Moscow Urge Conciliation on NATO Enlargement," *Monitor*, Vol. III, No. 31, 13 February 1997.

urged the Russian leadership to undertake drastic measures in order to counteract NATO expansion. In October 1995, Lieutenant-General Leonid Ivashov, then Secretary of the CIS Defence Ministers Council, argued that “the states of the Commonwealth [CIS] today can consider NATO as a military threat” and supported the idea of creating a military-political bloc of the CIS states.⁹² The Institute of Defence Studies of Russia (INOBS) prepared a study about Russia’s security concerns that identified five external threats to the national security of Russia. One of these five ‘threats’ read: “the West tries to isolate Russia and push it out of Europe by enlargement of NATO.”⁹³ Among other things the authors of this study recommended to the Russian leadership to use force, if necessary, to prevent the Baltic republics’ acceptance into NATO.

However, the American position on the issue of European security has been different from that of Russia. Washington by 1994 saw the new European environment as a good opportunity to strengthen its status in Europe that had somewhat weakened after the end of the Cold War. Warren Christopher, the US Secretary of State, declared that “American leadership requires that we back persistent diplomacy with the credible threat of force and that we act alone when necessary to defend our interests.”⁹⁴ Christopher argued that America should lead

92. Leonid Ivashov, “*Silnoe SNG - silnaia Rossiia*,” *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 20 October 1995, p. 2.

93. “*Sotrudniki spetsinstituta predlogaiut Rossii protivostoiat’ NATO i S.S.H.A.*” *Segodnia*, 20 October 1995, p. 3.

94. Warren Christopher, “America’s Leadership, America’s Opportunity,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 98, Spring 1995, pp. 7-8.

the world, and he saw NATO as a vehicle for this leadership.⁹⁵ Senator Bob Dole who was a presidential candidate at that time, agreed with Christopher that “the United States, as the only global power, must lead.”⁹⁶ The same politicians also shared a mistrust toward Russia, and their ideas probably represented best the common perceptions of the Washington political class: “we do not know what kind of state Russia will be in the twenty-first century” (Christopher);⁹⁷ and “acquiescence in Russian activities in Georgia and other border states, for example, may be too high a price for Russian acceptance of US positions” (Dole).⁹⁸

The Study On NATO Enlargement, published by NATO in September 1995, devotes a special paragraph to NATO-Russia relations. This leaves an impression that NATO will never even consider Russia’s application for membership. The paragraph emphasises that “NATO decisions, however, cannot be subject to any *droit de regard* by a non-member state.”⁹⁹ Although the *Study* does not name the Russian Federation, it is clear from the context that this “non-member state” is Russia.

After Yevgeny Primakov replaced Andrei Kozyrev as Foreign Minister in

95. Ibid., p. 9.

96. Bob Dole, “Shaping America’s Global Future,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 98, Spring 1995, p. 35.

97. Christopher, p. 10.

98. Dole, p. 37.

99. *Study On NATO Enlargement*, Brussels: NATO Bureau of Information and Publications, 1995, p. 12.

January 1996, Russia's foreign policy toward the West became more structured and self-centred. In November 1996, Russian Defence Minister Yegor Rodionov signed several military co-operation agreements with his Italian counterpart. It was the first high-level bilateral military accords between Russia and a NATO member. Rodionov said that Russia's partnership with NATO might best be developed on a bilateral basis.¹⁰⁰ In January 1997, Yeltsin met Chancellor Kohl at Zavidono, near Moscow. Kohl was the first Western leader to see Yeltsin after his heart surgery. The meeting was described as friendly and "exceptionally cordial," but it was also admitted that considerable differences remained regarding NATO enlargement.¹⁰¹ In the same month formal talks started in Moscow between Russia and NATO. The meeting between NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov was described as "useful" and "in no way a failure."¹⁰² These "useful" talks ended five months later, on 27 May 1997, with the signing in Paris of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which addressed Russian concerns regarding future NATO enlargement, but did not fully satisfy Russian demands. The Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council was created, which would have only consulting functions and allow Russia to express its opinion regarding NATO decisions, but Russia would not be able to veto any of those decisions.

100. "Rodionov Signs Military Agreements In Italy," *Monitor*, Vol. II, No. 215, 15 November 1996.

101. "Yeltsin-Kohl Meeting Friendly, But Tensions Over NATO Persist," *Monitor*, Vol. III, No. 3, 6 January 1997.

102. "NATO and Russia Launch Talks," *Fortnight in Review*, Vol. II, No. 2, 24 January 1997, <www.jamestown.org>

The Principles of the Founding Act were as follows:

- **Development, on the basis of transparency, of a strong, enduring and equal partnership and co-operation to strengthen security and stability in Euro-Atlantic area;**
- **Acknowledgement of the vital role that democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liberties and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security;**
- **Refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act;**
- **Respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples' right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents;**
- **Mutual transparency in creating and implementing defence policy and military doctrines;**
- **Prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles;**
- **Support, on a case-by-case basis, of peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.¹⁰³**

The section of the NATO-Russia Founding Act document regarding the mechanisms for consultation and co-operation within the framework of the Russia-

103. The full text of the document was available on the American Embassy in Spain's web-site at <<http://www.embusa.es/nato/founding.html>>

NATO Permanent Joint Council read:

The Permanent Joint Council will provide a mechanism for consultations, co-ordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint actions with respect to security issues of common concern. The consultations will not extend to internal matters of either Russia, NATO, or NATO member states.¹⁰⁴

The Russia-NATO Founding Act provided for establishment of the necessary administrative structure to support the work of the Permanent Joint Council.¹⁰⁵ The Act did not give any substantial powers to Russia on NATO enlargement decisions; however, it did call for consultations with respect to “security issues of common concern.” The Act also declared that the signatories would not use “threat or force” against each other “as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence.” These provisions were violated by NATO in March 1999 when it attacked Yugoslavia. The action rendered the Russia-NATO Founding Act a dead letter, and made Moscow even more suspicious of NATO.

After the negotiations were completed Secretary-General Solana described Foreign Minister Primakov as a “tough negotiator” and “true patriot” of his country.¹⁰⁶ After the 8-9 July 1997 Madrid summit, when NATO formally invited three Eastern European states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, to join the Alliance, Russian leaders continued to call for other forms of pan-European

104. Ibid., <<http://www.embusa.es/nato/foundin2.html#B>>

105. Ibid.

106. *CBC News Service*, May 1997.

security. In October 1997, President Yeltsin proposed at the Strasbourg summit the construction of a "great Europe without dividing lines." He repeated his earlier calls for stronger ties between Russia and Europe, presumably by both reducing the US presence on the continent and de-emphasising the security role played by NATO.¹⁰⁷ Following talks with President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl at the same summit, Yeltsin also announced that he would henceforth hold regular meetings with these leaders: "we need to hold these summits to build a new Europe, a Europe that includes Russia and stretches to the Pacific."¹⁰⁸ These remarks resemble Gorbachëv's late 1980's idea to build a new 'European condominium,' from the Atlantic to the Urals. Before going to Strasbourg, Yeltsin said that at a Council of Europe meeting he would call for a reduced US presence in Europe. He complained that Washington played too great a role in European affairs, and emphasised Moscow's opposition to NATO enlargement. Yeltsin was quoted saying that "Europeans must themselves take care of their security."¹⁰⁹

The Jamestown Foundation's analysts noted that Russia sought to exploit differences between the US and its NATO allies "while simultaneously moving forward with Washington on strategic arms control."¹¹⁰ Andrei Kortunov

107. "Repeated Calls For "Greater Europe," *Monitor*, Vol. III, No. 190, 13 October 1997.

108. Ibid.

109. "Yeltsin and Lebed Address Russian Foreign Policy Issues," *Monitor*, Vol. III, No. 174, 19 September 1997.

110. "Russian Diplomacy: Playing Europe Against Washington," *Prism*, Vol. III, No. 16, Part 1, 10 October 1997.

suggested that the “new division of Europe” was a possibility within the mood of political debates in Moscow regarding NATO expansion.¹¹¹ On the other hand, the official position of NATO concerning its relations with Russia was diametrically opposed to this kind of assessment. Javier Solana, then Secretary-General of NATO, published an article in *Izvestiia* on September 24, 1997. He argued that “NATO and Russia have common interests” and they “are destined to co-operate.”¹¹² Solana wrote that the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council would not be a council just for consultations, but its working would have practical and useful results for both parties. He pointed out several spheres where joint NATO-Russia action would be possible: peacekeeping operations, training of retiring military officers, environmental and scientific problems that are relevant to defence, training and preparation of civil forces for cases of emergency, co-operation in cases of natural disaster, nuclear security. Solana argued that the agenda of the NATO-Russia Joint Council might include questions concerning Bosnia, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, military strategy, defence policies and military doctrines of NATO and Russia, control and monitoring of conventional arms, and exchange of opinions regarding peace and security.¹¹³

Solana, however, failed to mention why NATO and Russia suddenly

111. Kortunov, p. 79.

112. Javier Solana, “U NATO i Rossii obshchie interesy,” *Izvestiia*, 24 September 1997, p. 1.

113. Ibid., p. 3.

developed common interests in 1997 and where those interests had been before. Since it was clear that the NATO-Russia Joint Council was created specifically to address Russia's concerns regarding NATO enlargement, one could argue that this Council and the so suddenly developed "common interests" had been results of NATO's enlargement initiative, and Moscow's turning its back on Liberal foreign and security policies. The day after the publication of Solana's article by *Izvestiia*, Vladimir Mikheev, once a very influential Soviet commentator on international politics, published an article in the same newspaper, where he termed new Russian foreign policies as policies of "new thinking." Mikheev did not elaborate on the changes in Russian foreign policy, but as a true Soviet analyst he stayed loyal to the first man and attributed all new initiative to him. Mikheev argued that those "new thinking" policies had been produced by "the team of Boris Yeltsin."¹¹⁴

The NATO eastward enlargement plan was the first foreign policy issue in the post-Soviet Russia upon which all major Russian politicians developed a common stand. The crisis created by the NATO enlargement policies in Moscow almost erased the demarcation line between the Liberals and the Eurasians in Russian foreign policy debates. Despite many security assurances from the West, every more or less known politician and political party in Russia has been opposed to the idea of NATO moving eastward. It has been noted in Russia that the NATO enlargement issue had done the impossible in Moscow – "it has united everyone,

114. Vladimir Mikheev, "Rossiia svoe ne otdast," *Izvestiia*, 25 September 1997, p. 3.

from the extreme left to the extreme right, in opposition to the expansion process.”¹¹⁵ Russian analyst Sergei Oznobishchev reported that the speeches made at a conference sponsored by the Institute of Strategic Assessments, held in January 1996 in Moscow, were prime examples of how unanimous was the opposition to NATO enlargement in Russia.¹¹⁶ Alexei Pushkov argued that NATO enlargement would create new dividing lines in Europe, and Russia will be forced to adjust to the challenges to its security created by this process.¹¹⁷ President Yeltsin warned several times that the policies of NATO enlargement could lead toward a Cold Peace.¹¹⁸ The former Russian Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Primakov has been very critical of NATO enlargement, and so had been his predecessor in the Foreign Ministry, Andrei Kozyrev. These are only few examples of the Russian negative reaction to NATO eastward enlargement. The negative comments have been coming out almost daily since the publication of *The Study on NATO Enlargement* in September 1995. On the other hand, NATO has been trying to convince Russia that “enlargement of NATO will be a next step toward the main goal of the union - to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region within the broader European structure of security on the basis of true

115. Sergei Oznobishchev, “Russia and NATO: The Coming of Previously-Announced Crisis,” *Prism*, Vol. III, 1 February 1997.

116. Ibid.

117. Alexei K. Pushkov, “Don’t Isolate Us: A Russian View of NATO Expansion,” *The National Interest*, No. 47, Spring 1997, p. 58.

118. Law and MacFarlane, p. 48.

partnership.”¹¹⁹ According to various NATO documents, enlargement of the alliance does not threaten Russia and is not directed against any country.¹²⁰ Moreover, the enlargement process itself is in “Russia’s interest.”¹²¹ Why has this idea been so negatively accepted by the Russian establishment and the population in general, if there have been no explicit hostility displayed toward Russia by the West, by action or word?

Whatever people know about international politics is based on history. Historical events constitute the empirical evidence of this area of knowledge. There is no other measurement than historical experience to evaluate any international political action. Politicians, diplomats and other decision-makers always keep in mind historic legacies and experiences of their and other countries when they make this or that international political decision. In the case of Russia, various geographical aspects are added to historical experiences of the state in order to measure international developments and their implications for the country’s national security.

International politics of Russia toward the West in this century was shaped by three major wars. Out of these three two started in strategic situations where the ‘buffer zone’ was absent between Russia and its main Western adversary -

119. *Kratko o NATO*, Brussels: NATO Bureau of Information and Publications, 1996, p. 96.

120. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

121. *Ibid.*

Germany. During both these wars the United States was an ally of Russia/Soviet Union. The third, the Cold War, was a global ideological competition between two rival superpowers, and Central Europe was the heart of this struggle. The Soviet Union sought to secure its western borders by creating buffer states between itself and the rival bloc. The rationale behind this was, first, to prevent these states from joining the rival, and second, to prevent the past strategic situations that led to major wars recurring. NATO was a successful creation of the Cold War. It proved viable, mostly because it managed to survive its time. Russians do not fail to note that NATO has been expanding since the beginning of the Cold War, and has not stopped expansion even after its end. The military capabilities of this organisation have remained steady since the end of the global rivalry, and its technological capabilities have been further developed. The political and military bond among its members has not diminished either. The Soviet Union, on the contrary, first lost its political and military allies, and then started shrinking itself. These processes in Russia have been accompanied by dramatic economic decline, which significantly affected the Russian military. In 1996 Russian armed forces' budget was less than one-sixth of what it was in 1990, before the USSR's disintegration.¹²² In the same year the average sum spent on a Russian soldier was US \$5,711, while in NATO the corresponding sum was US \$90,000.¹²³ According to some sources, in 1996 there

122. Andrei Koliev, "The Army's Patience is Running Out," *Prism*, Vol. II, 1 November 1996.

123. *Ibid.*

were more than 125,000 military families without housing.¹²⁴ Now the Russian Federation has reached probably its lowest point since the 1920s in terms of military might relative to its neighbours. In short, the conventional arms of NATO are currently much stronger than those of Russia.

Hitler and Mussolini in the 1930s eagerly depicted Germany and Italy as bulwarks of peace menaced by warmonger nations.¹²⁵ Germany signed a peace pact with the Soviet Union in 1939, only to attack it in 1941. E. H. Carr emphasises that very often when politicians talk peace, what they actually mean is war. In his book, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, he quotes Halevy's observation that "propaganda against war is itself a form of war propaganda."¹²⁶ The peace posture adopted by the leaders of NATO nations has worked well for the Western mass media and the public. The Russian political class is not so easily convinced. The track record of Western leaders in keeping their word is not helping their cause either. It has been widely publicised in Russia that the top officials of the Western states, Mitterrand, Major, and Baker in conversations with Gorbachëv in 1990-91 said: "NATO will not expand one inch to the east." On the eve of German unification Chancellor Kohl of West Germany reassured President Gorbachëv that NATO's military infrastructure would not move eastward into the territory of German Democratic Republic. This

124. Ibid.

125. E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1956, p. 84.

126. Ibid., pp. 84-85.

fact was confirmed by the former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock.¹²⁷ Later, after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, Moscow was assured by the leaders of the former Pact countries that these states would not seek membership in NATO.¹²⁸ In the same manner was violated the 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act by NATO's attack on Yugoslavia. This record of stepping back from previously made agreements and promises helps the New Eurasians in promoting their argument that the West should not be trusted.

According to Sergei Oznobishchev, "the western politicians who undertook the process of expanding NATO displayed a remarkable, simply phenomenal ineptitude. Although they certainly cannot be accused of intending to do so, if someone was deliberately trying to spoil relations between Russia and the West - it would be hard to think of a better idea than an expansion of the alliance."¹²⁹ Pushkov wrote that "new tensions caused by enlargement would spoil the post-Cold War political climate in Europe, destroy mutual trust, revive old fears, and throw the relationship between Russia and the West back into the past."¹³⁰ The Russian Duma Committee Chairmen wrote an open letter to President Clinton in October 1997, arguing that "the plans to advance the North Atlantic Alliance eastward are laying the foundation for unfriendly and even confrontational

127. Pushkov, p. 60.

128. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

129. *Prism*, Vol. III, 1 February 1997.

130. Pushkov, p. 58.

relations between Russia and NATO states in future.”¹³¹ Oznobishchev expressed frustration with these developments, asserting that “the process of NATO expansion created a “handmade crisis” when there was absolutely no reason for it.”¹³²

Hence, there is a strong and unanimous opposition to NATO enlargement from the Moscow political elite, and their voice is supported by some similarly concerned opinions from the West. However, before the 1999 NATO-Yugoslavia war, there was very little concern among the Russian public about the NATO enlargement issue. The New Eurasians and their arguments did not enjoy wide support among the public. In December 1996, the Russian Public Opinion Foundation conducted a nation-wide poll, in which the respondents were asked the question: “What policy should Russia pursue with regard to NATO?” The answers were somewhat unexpected: only 31 per cent of the respondents said that Russia should obstruct NATO enlargement; 22 per cent declared that Russia should itself become a member of NATO; 10 per cent supported the idea that Russia should agree to NATO enlargement in exchange for a good treaty on co-operation with the NATO countries; 2 per cent was convinced that Russia should not obstruct NATO enlargement; and 35 per cent simply did not know what to answer.¹³³ Exactly a year

131. *Sovetskaiia Rossiia*, October 16, 1997. Posted on the Internet: <http://www.robust-east.net/Net/russia/statement2.html>. Among the signatories of the letter were L. Rokhlin, A. Lukyanov, V. Varennikov, P. Bunich, G. Tikhonov, V. Gusev.

132. *Prism*, Vol. III, 1 February 1997.

133. Tatiana Parkhalina, “Of Myths and Illusions: Russian Perceptions of NATO Enlargement,”

earlier, in December 1995, in a public opinion survey conducted by the All-Russia Centre for Public Opinion Research (VtsIOM), only 0.7 per cent of respondents expressed concern over NATO enlargement.¹³⁴ Kortunov explained this indifference of Russians: "the overwhelming majority of Russians do not care much about NATO... the country is clearly inward-oriented and the average Russian in the streets will definitely not put the enlargement issue on top of his or her priorities' list."¹³⁵ Things changed drastically after NATO started bombing Yugoslavia, and as noted above, anti-NATO and anti-West sentiments in Russia grew dramatically. The New Eurasians have since managed to gain wider popular support. Before the 1999 war, only a very few Russian Liberals seemed to agree with the public opinion regarding the NATO enlargement issue. Duma deputies Sergei Kovalev and Konstantin Borovoi argued in February 1997 that NATO enlargement was actually in Russia's best interest. Their opinion was supported by Arkady Murashev, Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Conservative Policy.¹³⁶ This kind of attitude among Russian politicians was very rare, and even some of those who argued that NATO expansion represented no threat for Russia, supported the Kremlin's call for

NATO Review, Vol. 45, No. 3, May/June 1997, p. 12.

134. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

135. Kortunov, p. 69.

136. "Lone Voices in Moscow Urge Conciliation on NATO Enlargement," *Monitor*, Vol. III, No. 31, 13 February 1997.

NATO not to station troops or deploy nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe.¹³⁷ It is remarkable that those few Russian Liberals who were not radically opposed to NATO enlargement did not belong to the circle of the Russian decision-makers. After the 1999 war, even those rare voices went silent.

Moscow, of course, does not and will never accept that NATO's bombardment of Yugoslavia was occasioned primarily by humanitarian concerns. The Russian political class is familiar with at least two very recent wars in which NATO members failed even to condemn ethnic cleansing and humanitarian disaster. In 1993 Armenia defeated Azerbaijan in the war for Nagorny Karabakh, occupied at least 20 per cent of Azerbaijan's territory, and deported around a million Azeris at gunpoint.¹³⁸ In the course of the Armenia-Azerbaijan war for Karabakh, in February of 1991, several hundred Azerbaijani civilians were massacred by Armenian forces in the Karabakh vilage of Khojali.¹³⁹ To be sure, Moscow itself, along with Tehran, was instrumental in Armenia's victory, given that it has been arming and supporting the latter heavily. That does not change the fact that the US has given more aid per capita to Armenia than to any other former

137. Ibid.

138. Glenn E. Curtis, ed., *US Army Country Studies: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia*, Lanham, MD: Bernan, May 1995, p.28.

139. Azerbaijanis argue that Armenian forces committed the Khojali massacre with help from Russian troops. In February 2001, Azerbaijan's President Heidar Aliev criticised the international community for its failure to condemn the killings. Armenians claim that the Khojali civilians were murdered by armed detachments of the Azerbaijan Popular Front, and they accuse the Azeri leadership of not acting promptly to evacuate civilians from Khojali, which in February of 1992 was under Armenian offensive. Liz Fuller, "Azerbaijani, Karabakh Officials Issue Statements on

Soviet country, or that, in general, Armenia has become the largest per capita recipient of American aid with the exception of Israel.¹⁴⁰ Azerbaijan, on the other hand, was declared the aggressor in this war by the US Congress, under Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, and various economic and humanitarian sanctions were imposed against this country.¹⁴¹

The second recent case of ethnic cleansing in Europe is of Croatia's reconquest of Srpska Krajina in August of 1995. On April 26 1999, the Croatian Helsinki Committee published a study stating that Croatian troops burned, destroyed, or mined some 22,000 homes in the Krajina region in 1995.¹⁴² Since this war various Serb sources have claimed that their country has sheltered as many as 500,000 refugees from Croatia and Bosnia. NATO leaders and the so-called international community failed in both instances not only to condemn, but even to mention that these killings and deportations took place. Moreover, in Srpska Krajina's case Croatia's armed forces were trained and assisted by experts from

Massacre Anniversary," *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 5, No. 4, Part I, 27 February 2001.

140. According to Ambassador John J. Maresca, the first American mediator for the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, between 1992 and 1998 the US gave Armenia more than US \$1 billion. John J. Maresca, "US Ban on Aid to Azerbaijan (Section 907): How It Started and Why It Should Be Lifted," speech delivered on October 2 1998 to a conference on US-Azerbaijan relations in Washington, DC, *Azerbaijan International* 6, Winter 1998, <<http://www.azer.com>>. The population of Armenia is around 3.5 million.

141. "Karabakh Conflict, Section 907," *Ibid*.

142. "Croatian NGO: Hundreds of Serb Civilians Killed Since 1995," *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 3, No. 81, 27 April 1999. Also, Ivana Nizich, "Croatia: Impunity for Abuses Committed During "Operation Storm" and the Denial of the Right of Refugees to return to the Krajina," *Human Rights Watch*, 1996.

NATO countries.

The watershed event that most influenced Russians' perceptions of NATO was the alliance's 1999 campaign against Yugoslavia. Ten years after the end of the Cold War, NATO bombed a European capital for the latter's failure to follow its dictate. The official version offered by NATO leaders in March of 1999, at the onset of the campaign against Yugoslavia, was that the Yugoslav leadership refused to sign the "Rambouillet Agreement" in order to settle ethnic conflict in Kosovo. In fact, at Rambouillet, NATO made a proposal to Belgrade it could not accept. NATO was proposing an occupational force for the entire country of Yugoslavia, not a peacekeeping force for its province Kosovo. The KFOR peacekeeping mission composed of NATO troops only was supposed to have "free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], including associated airspace and territorial waters."¹⁴³ The NATO troops in Yugoslavia were also to be given a free hand to do whatever they wanted in the entire country: "NATO personnel, under all circumstances and at all times, shall be immune from the Parties' jurisdiction in respect of any civil, administrative, criminal, or disciplinary offences which may be committed by them in the FRY."¹⁴⁴ The NATO force in Yugoslavia would also be granted the cost-free use of all streets,

143. Paragraph 8, Appendix B "Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force," *The Rambouillet Accords*. The document was first published on the Internet by *The Kosovo Crisis Centre* <<http://www.alb-net.com/kcc/interim.htm>> It is now also available at *Common Dreams* <www.commondreams.org/kosovo/rambouillet.htm>

144. Paragraph 6, Appendix B, *Ibid*.

airports and ports in this country.¹⁴⁵ In short, the Rambouillet document sounded more like a surrender treaty.

Before the Rambouillet proposal, the Yugoslav delegation had endorsed the ten principles established by the Contact Group of Five, which besides leading NATO countries included Russia, to settle the conflict in Kosovo: "by accepting the ten principles established by the Contact Group, it [Yugoslavia] demonstrates its firm determination to achieve a political agreement [on Kosovo]."¹⁴⁶ The Yugoslav delegation insisted that all sides of Rambouillet negotiations sign these ten principles. This was very important for them, because the principles preserved the territorial integrity of their country. *The Salt Lake City Tribune* noted on February 9, 1999 that the Yugoslavs insisted on signing these principles, because they were "very important for the Serbs, because these principles contain a guarantee that Yugoslavia's borders won't change. That would mean the ethnic Albanians [of the province of Kosovo] would have to give up their demand for independence."¹⁴⁷ The NATO leaders at Rambouillet refused to sign anything except their own proposal, which did not include the guarantees for the territorial integrity for Yugoslavia. Instead, NATO leaders stated that "the Rambouillet Accords are a 3-year agreement..." and "three years after entry into force of the Accords, an international

145. Paragraph 10, Appendix B, Ibid.

146. "Statement From the Federal Government's Meeting," Belgrade 19.03.1999. Published on the Internet by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
<<http://www.gov.yu/institutions/government/statemankontic.html>>

147. *The Salt Lake City Tribune*, February 9, 1999.

meeting will be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people [of Kosovo]..."¹⁴⁸ The final version of Rambouillet Accords offered to Belgrade was not an agreement per se since it was written by NATO, excluding the Russians. It was not publicised and published by NATO governments during the NATO-Yugoslavia war. However, it was made available on the web-site created by ethnic Albanians during this crisis, and later by others.

In June 1999, after three months of bombing of industrial, communications, and military facilities in Yugoslavia, a deal between NATO and Yugoslavia was negotiated by Russian and Finnish envoys, and NATO settled on the terms Belgrade had been ready to accept before the bombing started: the agreement honoured the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, the peacekeepers were to be deployed based on a UN resolution, and they would include Russians, and troops from other non-NATO countries. The Russians, along with the Chinese and others, were outraged by NATO's actions against Yugoslavia, because they took the situation the way it looked to them: an act of punishment inflicted on a country by a superior power. In June of 1999, Aleksandr Solzhenitsin, Nobel Prize-winning Russian author and quondam darling of the West, compared NATO to Hitler's Germany because of its bombing of Yugoslavia: "I see no difference in the behaviour of NATO and Hitler. It is the same." He also accused NATO of trying to

148. The United States Department of State, "Understanding the Rambouillet Accords," Washington, DC, March 1 1999, <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990301_rambouillet.html>

dominate the world: "NATO wants to establish its order in the world, and it needs Yugoslavia as a pretext – let's punish Yugoslavia and the whole planet will tremble."¹⁴⁹ At the same time, President Yeltsin also accused NATO and the US of wanting to dominate the world. In the beginning of June he was quoted as saying that aggression against Yugoslavia led to "the serious aggravation of international relations," and that the world faced new attempts of establishing a unipolar system against existing tendencies of multipolarity.¹⁵⁰ There were thousands of comments like these made in Russia during and after the NATO-Yugoslavia war, and as mentioned above, the attitudes of Russians toward the West changed significantly during the same period. The quotes of Solzhenitsin and Yeltsin are more telling, because of the high position of power the latter holds, and the age-old honoured Russian tradition of treating celebrated writers and poets as prophets, in the case of the former.

The fact that NATO was so superior in conventional warfare to any other country in the world was most alarming for the Russian political class. In Yugoslavia NATO inflicted heavy damage on the opposition and could have produced even more, while not losing a single soldier in the combat. What was seen in Moscow, Beijing, and other concerned capitals around the world was that, in

149. "Solzhenitsin Says NATO 'Like Hitler' in Yugoslavia," *Reuters*, June 2 1999, <www.reuters.com>.

150. "Yeltsin: NATO Aggression Breaks Balance of International Relations," *Tanjug*, June 8 1999, <www.tanjug.co.yu>.

theory, NATO could bomb any country in the world without fearing any meaningful retaliation. Yugoslavia was punished because, among other things, it was seen as different, as one of *Them*. Belgrade under Milosevic was the only Central or Eastern European country not aspiring to NATO membership or supporting its policies. Nor did it admire the European Union with its liberal economic policies; instead, it promoted a protectionist economic system domestically. Celebrated economist and statesman Dr. Dragoslav Avramovic succeeded in taming the country's runaway hyperinflation in the mid-1990s by implementing mainly socialist fiscal and economic policies. Despite international economic sanctions, Yugoslavia was surviving as a viable state with a strong military, and although it was not a picture of democracy and human rights, it was still better off than other explicitly pro-Western and pro-liberal countries of the Balkans, like Bulgaria, Albania, or Macedonia.

Organising the Peace: A New Security Model for Europe

From the 1990s, NATO leaders have employed an *als ob* (as if) approach in their decision-making, while envisioning the world according to the old scheme, *Us & Them*. Immanuel Kant introduced *als ob* thinking in his third book of "critiques." According to Kant, we could reason the world as if the desired system of values had been already realised in practice.¹⁵¹ This may be sage advice when considering

151. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam Jun., 1991, p. 197, and p. 354. In English translation *als ob* simply denotes "as if." Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgment*,

teleology of ethics or aesthetics, but its merits should be questioned in international politics, especially in important security-related issues, for two simple reasons. First, different states and cultures come from different experiences and employ different systems of values, which to them may seem worth defending with military force. Second, no matter how hard politicians in Western liberal democracies may reason about the practicability of their systems of values in places with limited or no experience with these values, the prospects for democratic rule in the latter places remain highly doubtful. A case in point is Turkey, a member of the "alliance of nineteen democracies," which nevertheless refuses to recognise the rights of its Kurdish minority, with the result that for years it has been engaged in a civil war with nearly 20 per cent of its population.¹⁵² Human rights issues and the treatment of minorities have plagued the Czech Republic, one of the three celebrated new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe that were admitted to NATO during its war against Yugoslavia. The human rights of the Roma minority, in particular, have

translated by J. C. Meredith, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964, p. 139, and p. 33 of "Analytic of Teleological Judgement."

152. In the first half of the 1990s, the Turkish armed forces destroyed more than 3,000 Kurdish villages in southeastern Turkey, and pushed almost two million people out of their ancestral lands. It was argued that "the vast majority of these shameful human rights abuses have been carried out with US weapons (85% of Turkey's arms imports come from the US)." Jennifer Washburn, "US Has to Meet Responsibility to Kurds," *Newsday: The Long Island Newspaper*, October 2 1996. Amnesty International has published a number of reports describing the human rights abuses by the Turkish security forces during their campaign against Kurds. See, for example, *Amnesty International*, "Birds or Earthworms: The Gökçekonak Massacre, Its Alleged Cover-up, and the Prosecution of Independent Investigators," Report -- EUR 44/24/98, <<http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/EUR440241998>>.

not been respected and recognised by the Czech majority.¹⁵³

According to Javier Solana, the Secretary General of NATO in 1995-1999, concepts like 'dividing lines,' 'buffer zones' and 'spheres of influence' were consigned "to the dustbin of history" after the Cold War. In 1997 he rejected old and traditional *Realpolitik* or geopolitical concepts in international politics, and argued that NATO's enlargement truly created a Europe without dividing lines. Therefore, this process "should not be considered outside the context of an evolving security architecture."¹⁵⁴ Solana believed that the concepts like "spheres of influence" depend on one's mentality, and if one chooses to abandon them they no longer will be relevant. Solana further argued that "Russia still has considerable problems in understanding the new NATO and its opening to new members;"¹⁵⁵ i.e., according to him, NATO enlargement was a matter of understanding, not of geopolitics and

153. In November 1997, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada quoted Mr. Karel Holomek, a Romani leader based in Brno, Slovakia: "racism [against the Roma] is worse in the Czech Republic than it is in Slovakia." Research Directorate, "Roma in the Czech Republic: Identity and Culture," the Immigration and Refugee Board, Ottawa, Canada, November 1997, <<http://www.cisr.gc.ca/research/publications/cze02%5fe.stm>>. Canada's *News in Review* noted in December of the same year that "with democracy [in the Czech Republic] came the increased expression of racial prejudice. Thirty-five Roma have been killed since 1989 in what the Roma claim are racially motivated deaths." The same source also describes how using the Soviet-type residency requirement laws authorities denied between 10,000 and 25,000 Roma their Czech citizenship after the division of Czechoslovakia. *News in Review*, "Gypsies in Canada: The Promised Land?" *CBC*, December 1997, <<http://www.tv.cbc.ca/newsinreview/dec97/gypsies/roma.html>>. In June 1999, the Usti nad Labem city council in the Czech Republic approved their previous decision to build a wall in one of the city's districts in order to segregate the local Roma from their Czech neighbours. "Czech Town Council Backs Fencing off Roma," *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 3, No. 119, Part II, 18 June 1999.

154. Javier Solana, "Only Winners in New Security Structure," *The World Today*, April 1997, Vol. 53, No. 4, p. 104.

155. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

Realpolitik.

The promoters and supporters of NATO enlargement have offered many such arguments. They have talked and written about “the new world order,” “the new Europe,”¹⁵⁶ “organising the peace,”¹⁵⁷ promoting democracy and “alliance values” through NATO,¹⁵⁸ fostering democracy in Eastern Europe,¹⁵⁹ launching “a manifesto for modernising Europe.”¹⁶⁰ They justify the policy by claiming that NATO enlargement will enhance all-European security,¹⁶¹ secure democracy in Eastern Europe,¹⁶² help to solve existing problems among Eastern European

156. Ibid. Also Alexander Kwasniewski, ‘*Polsha gotowa pomoch Rossii vstupit’ v NATO*’ (“Poland is Ready to Help Russia to Join NATO”), President of Poland interviewed by *Izvestiia*, No. 43, 12 March 1999.

157. Madeleine K. Albright, “The Testing of American Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 6, November/December 1998. One of the sections of this article is titled “Organizing the Peace,” p. 51. According to the *New York Times*, Secretary of State Albright was a major driving force behind the decision to bomb Yugoslavia. Elaine Sciolino and Ethan Bronner, “How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War,” *The New York Times*, April 18, 1999, pp. 12-13. Reuters quoted former Vice President Dan Quayle as saying Mrs Albright was too easy in making empty threats: “She really needs to be a little bit more careful. She goes into these meetings and comes out and makes these rather harsh statements that are not backed up.” “US Secretary of State Survives ‘Albright’s War,’” *Reuters*, Washington, June 11 1999.

158. US Representative Porter Goss and Danish MP Annette Just, quoted in Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate 1990-1997: Blessing of Liberty*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998, p. 126.

159. Quoted and discussed by Alvin Z. Rubinstein in his “NATO Enlargement vs. American Interests,” *Orbis*, Vol. 42, No. 1, Winter 1998, p. 40.

160. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder promote together Blair’s “New labour” ideas and call to battle “for structural reform and flexibility in Europe” by discarding old-fashioned leftist dogmas, embracing a new agenda based on flexible markets, and so on. *Reuters*, June 8 1999.

161. Solana, “*U NATO i Rossii*.”

162. Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, “Polish Security Policy,” *Perspectives*, No. 5, Prague, 1995. Mr. Bartoszewski was Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.

states,¹⁶³ prevent a 'security vacuum.'¹⁶⁴ NATO has been depicted as "an alliance of values: democracy, transparency in government, human rights, and respect for minorities,"¹⁶⁵ "a defensive community of countries that are democratic and adhere to basic civilisation values of the Euro-Atlantic or Euro-American world,"¹⁶⁶ etc. The *Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Co-operation* signed by leaders of the NATO countries declares that "we are moving towards the realisation of our vision of a just and lasting order of peace for Europe as a whole, based on human rights, freedom and democracy."¹⁶⁷

The idea that NATO enlargement was not motivated by *Realpolitik*, was probably best expressed and summed up by Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien in July of 1997, when his comments on US government's push for NATO enlargement intended for private consumption were accidentally overheard by media: "it's not for reasons of security; it's all done for short-term political reasons, to win elections."¹⁶⁸ Professor Alvin Rubinstein pointed out that the push for NATO enlargement in the United States was not motivated by *Realpolitik*. He argued that

163. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan For Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1, January/February 1995.

164. Philip Zelikov, "The Masque of Institutions," *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 1, Spring 1996.

165. *NATO Summit: Background Information* (a brochure published by the Government of Canada for the Washington Summit, April 24-25, 1999), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, p. 8.

166. Vaclav Havel interviewed by Peter Adler, *National Post*, May 1, 1999, p. A13.

167. Excerpts in Solomon, p. 143.

168. Chretien's comments were widely broadcast in North America, and quoted in newspapers,

"the decision to accelerate the timetable for NATO's expansion was based neither on strategic logic nor military threat, but was domestically driven." According to him, in making this decision the US administration neglected or did not pay much attention to such issues as the costs, the effect on US-Russian relations, "the strategic, political, and financial interests of the United States itself; the uncomfortable German factor; and the asymmetry between US interests and those of Western Europe."¹⁶⁹ Quoting President Clinton's claim that by enlarging the alliance would strengthen itself, Rubinstein noted that

historically, no alliance has strengthened itself by embracing weak, dependent, resource-poor, geographically vulnerable new members, none of whom is in immediate or foreseeable danger of attack by any power. In its present geographical and military positions, the United States does not need the territory, know-how, or capability offered by the CEEC [Central and East European countries]. Nor is the security of any other NATO country significantly enhanced by the three invitees whose defence only adds unnecessarily to every NATO country's burden. Rather, an enlarged NATO would benefit only the "Brussels-crats" - the generals and diplomats, staffers and office personnel, and mushrooming committees and conferences based at the headquarters.¹⁷⁰

So far, some predictions and warnings offered by various critics of NATO enlargement have been borne out by events.¹⁷¹ Presentiments expressed during the period 1995 to 1998 appear even more convincing after the alliance's war with

including *The Boston Globe*, on July 11, 1997.

169. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

170. *Ibid.*, p. 40. Rubinstein focuses mainly on the United States, because, according to him, the US has been the major driving force behind NATO enlargement.

171. For good summaries of opposing views see Rubinstein, "NATO Enlargement vs. American Interests," and Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate*.

Yugoslavia. As a result of that war, it has become even more unlikely that Russia could ever accept with equanimity further NATO enlargement in Europe. Although, for most Central and Eastern European countries, joining the alliance is their best bet to enhance security, it seems very unlikely that further NATO enlargement without including Russia in the process would ever produce positive feedback in Moscow. European security in general is not going to benefit if the two sides will perceive each other as a potential threat. Russia remains, and is very likely to remain, a very important player in European security arrangements. If NATO enlargement is to proceed further, it will be very important for the alliance to overcome the mistrust it has generated with its enlargement policies and the war in Yugoslavia, and find a common language with Moscow.

Summary of Chapter Five

Russia has strongly objected to and opposed NATO activities in Europe since the mid-1990s. The relationship between these two important security players in Europe was particularly strained during the NATO-Yugoslavia war of 1999. In advancing their security arguments, NATO and Russia use different sets of theoretical grounding for them. NATO justifies its policies with universal humanitarian and democratic values, while Moscow emphasises territorial, geographical aspects of national security. Both sides, however, envision the security world through a very similar lens. In particular, the world for them is divided between two opposed sides, *US & Them*. This has been a traditional security vision

for Russia/USSR and other dominant powers throughout the 20th century. Soviet experience, and cultural-historical values inherited from it, strengthened Russia's imperial geomentality that emerged throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. Russia's geographical identity, and its preferences for territorial thinking is, among other things, embedded in Russian language. This tradition has not been continuous, however. Most recently and noticeably it was interrupted by Gorbachëv's New Political Thinking doctrine, which more or less dominated Moscow's security thinking until the mid 1990s. The first government of post-Soviet Russia was dominated by the Liberals, politicians who advocated Russia's pro-Western orientation. They were opposed by pro-Eurasian forces, who dominated Russia's Supreme Soviet. The confrontation between these two turned violent in October 1993, when the Russian government disbanded the Supreme Soviet by force. Despite this, pro-Eurasian forces emerged victorious in the December 1993 State Duma elections, and they have dominated the Russian parliament since. Eurasianist views also became popular with other branches of the Russian government as well. Now this doctrine forms the theoretical basis for Russia's foreign and security policies.

Russia's pro-Western foreign policies slowly collapsed under Eurasianist pressure. The first foreign policy issue that helped Eurasians to gather popular support was the question of the Russian diaspora in the former Soviet states. The decision on NATO enlargement helped Eurasianist ideas to emerge as the dominant doctrine in Russia's foreign and security policy. The NATO enlargement issue

united Russia's political class in their opposition to this policy. However, Russian public opinion did not share the same sentiment until the Kosovo war. The 1999 NATO-Yugoslavia war convinced the majority of Russians that Eurasians had been right in their criticism of the West, NATO, and the Russian Liberals. Since the war, NATO has been depicted by Russian opinion-makers as an aggressive alliance that represents the main threat to Russia's security. New Eurasians have helped to strengthen this opinion with their theoretical speculations on the diametrically opposed geographical identities and destinies of Russia and NATO.

Conclusion

It is true, indeed, that in Europe until now there has been no particular necessity to get to know us in any detail. But still it seems certain that a European of any nationality can always learn another European language and enter into the soul of any other European nationality more easily than he can learn Russian and comprehend our Russian essence. Even Europeans who have made a point of studying us for some particular purpose (and there have been such), and who applied great effort to their study, left us having surely learned a great deal, perhaps, but still not fully understanding certain facts; one may even say that it will be a long time – a generation or two at least – before they do understand. All this suggests that we may still suffer a long and unhappy alienation from the European family of nations; that the Europeans will make a long series of errors in their assessment of Russia; that they will evidently be inclined always to think the worst of us. And perhaps it also explains that constant, general hostility of Europe toward us, a hostility founded on some very powerful and immediate sense of loathing; it is a loathing of us as if we were something repulsive; it is partly even a superstitious fear of us; and it is the eternal, familiar, ancient judgement pronounced on us: that we are not Europeans at all.... We, of course, take offence at this and try with all our might to prove that we are Europeans....

Fyodor Dostoevsky, "Apropos of the Exhibition."¹

Lars Skalnes noted that the process of NATO enlargement represents a puzzle for international relations theory. He argued that the two leading schools in international relations theory, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, fail to adequately explain this phenomenon. To better explain NATO enlargement,

1. Fyodor Dostoevsky, "Apropos of the Exhibition," in a collection of his works, *A Writer's Diary*, Volume One, 1873-1876, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1993, p. 207.

Skalnes proposed a new framework, called institutional stability theory. According to him, this "theory argues that policy makers regard international institutions as instruments for altering domestic political and institutional constraints and providing for domestic stability, and a stability which, in turn, provides foreign policy stability."² Skalnes made a good point by proposing a new theory, which was supposed to explain the events the existing theories could not. In fact, however, he proposed a new model, not a new theory, the relevance of which is a subject of a separate discussion. Realist schools could not explain well NATO enlargement, because that process had not been motivated by international realist considerations in the first place. International relations theories, as it was argued in Chapter Two, are in fact not theories as such, but models devised to explain regularities in the behaviour of the states or other international actors. These models are also used to reasonably describe and predict behaviour of international actors. This means that if certain steps are taken in international politics by actors who ignore frameworks of realism or any other IR school, it should not come as a surprise if realism cannot explain the logic of these steps. However, international realism still may be helpful in explaining the actions of interested international actors who may counteract the actions of 'non-realist' actors, if the latter are perceived to be threatening their security. International realism may as well explain the follow-up actions of the same 'non-realists,' when they are called upon to respond to the counter-actions of the

2. Lars S. Skalnes, 'From the Outside In, From the Inside Out: NATO Expansion and International Relations Theory,' *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 4, Summer 1998, pp. 44-87.

opponent. In short, there is very little evidence that NATO enlargement was motivated by realist conceptions of security, and there is not much international realism can do to explain the phenomenon.

When in December of 1989 Gorbachëv told President Bush that the Soviet Union did not regard the United States as its enemy anymore, he did not receive a similar response from the US president. Gorbachëv then asked Bush straightforwardly: did the United States leadership understand the consequences that such a policy would have within the Soviet Union, and its global implications?³ Although five months later Bush made a similar remark to Shevardnadze, it did not seem that the US or a leadership of any other major Western power understood the implications of Gorbachëv's new policy. Maybe they could not follow Gorbachëv, a visionary idealist who sought to change the world overnight. Mentality is a very tough thing to change, especially when it is institutionally strengthened and ideologically supported. The NATO leaders continued to see the world according the old *Us* and *Them* scheme. Instead of the old dogma of ideological incompatibility between capitalism and socialism, a new civilisational difference assumed the place of the watershed between the two poles of the scheme. The NATO leaders saw their world distinct in its achievements in democratic and human rights values. There is a little doubt that respect for such values is, indeed, a great achievement for any society, and it is an indicator of a better quality of life in

3. Palazchenko, p. 157.

such societies. However, it is doubtful that international security arrangements can be based on this kind of humanitarian principle, for such arrangements themselves would permanently seek *Them*, i.e. those who do not fit it. Except, perhaps, for the very distant future, there will always be states that are less democratic than others, less respectful of human rights issues than others, less developed than others. Security arrangements based on these kind of comparative and relative concepts are thus contradictory in themselves, since they argue for universal values while strengthening a divided world.

Many opponents of NATO enlargement in Moscow accuse the alliance of following Cold War thinking. It would be more accurate to say that it was Russia that openly resurrected its imperialist geomentality in the mid 1990's, and started to employ Eurasianist geopolitical arguments as the theoretical base for the country's foreign policy and security analysis. If NATO is to be blamed for anything, it is the alliance's inability to find better ways of dealing with Russia, and its above described *als ob* stand on security issues. This kind of treatment of security problems departs from the Cold War era pragmatic role NATO used to play. After the end of the Cold War the alliance walked away from its pragmatic-realist stance, and now sees itself as an organisation promoting civil society, democracy, and human rights.

Such a new vision has given NATO a new mandate that should keep it busy and relevant for a long time. If nothing else can be said to ensure the alliance's future, it will be the Balkans that does so. Since it is the sad rule in the Balkans that if you shoot once there is a good chance that your descendants will be shooting for

the next hundred years, NATO is likely to remain committed for decades to conflict-management tasks in the region. Such a long-term and one-dimensional commitment may well compromise the alliance's original objective, namely to serve as a collective defence organisation for its members.

On the other hand, Russian peacekeepers will almost certainly stay for a long time in the Balkans as well. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, peacekeeping has emerged as a very peculiar foreign policy exercise for Russia: Moscow's main objective seems to be to keep one piece of land here, another there, and if it becomes possible, to get one more piece elsewhere. Since the Russian style of geopolitics gives a good theoretical impetus to this trend of Russian 'piecekeeping,' Moscow will try to retain these pieces as long as it can, and try to acquire new ones. It remains highly improbable that Russia would engage the West in a Cold War style confrontation, no matter how nationalistic and anti-Western its leaders may become. However, such 'piecekeeping' ways should not be comforting for Russia's smaller neighbours, especially for those who are likely to remain outside of NATO's protective shield.

Two Theses

The general thesis of this dissertation has argued that the conversion of historical information and/or experience into geographical images of the world is characteristic of the study of international relations. The term "geomentality" has been proposed to denote this process, and used as an analytical mode. As such,

geomentality has been applied to concepts and images from different eras and places: 18th century Russia and Europe, Russian and Western students of international politics at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, 20th century Russian political writers of various ideological persuasions. Different periods of converting time into space were examined, as these periods changed in the Europe-centred world from the mid-18th century onward. The rationale of this exercise was to explain changes that took place in the geomentality of different generations of the same geographical area.

An application of this analytical mode in this research allows us to say that, for example, people like Kjellén, Lenin, and Mackinder had very similar geomentalities despite being very removed from each other in terms of national, ideological, political, and other affiliations. The same could be said about the geomentalities of such individuals as Savitskii, Solonevich, Tukhachevskii, and Stalin, who, despite being on not very friendly terms with each others' philosophies and ideologies, came up with strikingly similar images of the world and ideas on Russia's place in it. One cannot say, for example, that Savitskii and Stalin had similar views because they subscribed to the same doctrine or theory. This would be inaccurate for the simple reason that Savitskii was an anti-Bolshevik and a geopolitician, while Stalin was a leader of the Bolsheviks and regarded geopolitics as a vermin science. However, it would be justified to claim that Savitskii and Bolshevik leaders had similar ideas about world politics, and even on some policy decisions, because their geomentalities were similar; i.e., they envisioned the world

similarly. This vision was based on the dichotomy of *Us vs. Them*, and on the assumption that there was a permanent struggle between the two camps. For Savitskii the basis of the division between the two camps lay in geography and economy, while for the Bolsheviks it lay in class struggle. No matter what the ideological or political content of these visions, they produced similar assessments on Russia's place in the world.

Geomentality may have its corresponding phenomenon in the human mentality, and it may also have its causes or basis in the physical and/or cultural world. The investigation of these was not the goal of this dissertation. However, there were certain historical parallels discussed in the thesis that may support the idea that geomentality is shaped by the geographical and/or cultural environment. International political and geographical phenomena were first combined after the geographical shape and boundaries of the political (populated) world became known. Geopolitics emerged as a discipline at the dawn of imperialism, when major world powers finished the territorial re-division of the political (populated) world. In both cases one can argue that political geography and geopolitics were theoretical or doctrinal responses to the changes in the perception of the political world. Before the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks were very critical of empires and the state as such. However, after winning the Russian civil war and defeating the foreign intervention, their attitude toward these things changed drastically. The Soviet Union became one of the strongest states in the world, and internationally it sometimes behaved like an empire. Again, an argument can be developed that the

Bolshevik leaders in the 1920s had no other choice due to the international geographical and political environment they found their state in.

The specific thesis of this dissertation has dealt with theoretical and doctrinal manifestations of geomentality in Russian foreign and security policy making. For this purpose the main aspects and authors of the original Eurasian movement of the 1920s and 1930s, and works by some of the most distinguished modern Russian writers who are commonly identified as New Eurasians have been analysed. The reason for this analysis has been to explain some important commonalities between the two, especially in their envisioning the world and Russia's place in it. The forms of the image of the world the old and new Eurasians possess are identical, but the contents are considerably different. In terms of the form, they both dichotomise the world between Russia-Eurasia and the West. The original Eurasians saw Russia in opposition to Western Europe, while for New Eurasians the West is mostly the United States. Both old and new Eurasians see Russia as a unique cultural-geographical entity, not belonging to either Europe or Asia. Eurasians either identify Russia with Eurasia or see Russia as the heart of Eurasia. Both old and new Eurasians place their main emphasis on the geographical identity of the Russian state.

The re-emergence of Eurasianism and the birth of *geopolitika* in Russia in the 1990s are manifestations of the country's search for its new identity. By embracing Eurasianism, Russia's political class aims to establish a new identity based on the geographical factor, which is the most acceptable to all sectors of Russian society.

Territory, geographical space, is taken as the defining concept for Russia's unity and cohesiveness. Certain aspects developed by the original Eurasians in the 1920s speak well to Russia's current needs and requirements. This dissertation has pointed out what these aspects are (Chapter Four), and why they inform today's Russian politics (Chapter Five). The geography-based identity is as neutral and stable as anything can be in politics. Geographical territory is also easier to visualise, and geographical images are prone to all kinds of ideological or propagandistic manipulations. Any populated geographical territory has a history, and Russia is no exception. The history of this vast country is not very long, only 1200 years or so, but it is very complicated, because it incorporates the histories of hundreds of nations occupying its territory. Again, the common denominator these hundreds of histories may have is that they share a common geographical space. This many nations could not have evolved for many centuries in a common geographical space without culturally influencing each other. It is believed that the Russian nation has been the most influential in this regard, but the influence of smaller Eurasian nations over Russians is acknowledged as well. Political co-existence and survival of many different nations in a common geographical space for almost 800 years is also taken as a remarkable fact. Although Eurasia was first dominated by the Mongols and their allies, and from XVII century by the Russians, most other smaller nations have survived their rule, and they have even maintained their ethnic-national identities. Russia-Eurasia is, therefore, home to not only the Russians, but as well other small and proud nations with their national identities.

Since there are many national identities in Russia, but only one for the state, the state identity or the Russian statehood is equated with the geographical space it occupies. This common cultural, historical, national, and political co-existence of different nations in a common geographical territory is regarded by the Eurasians as a unique and distinct phenomenon in world history. This unique way of existence in history is also combined with constant economic backwardness, which is, again, associated with the geographical characteristics of Eurasia: it is remote, far from the oceans and the seas; it has very harsh climates and difficult terrain; it is vast and devoid of well-developed means of communication and transportation. The economic backwardness of Eurasia adds an additional argument for Eurasians' ideological opposition to the self-determination of smaller Eurasian nations: it is easier to survive together by combining whatever economic resources are available. The unity of Eurasia is also argued from the position of its uniqueness, its geographical fate, and historical destiny. The Eurasians have found a doctrinal way to argue for the unity and uniqueness of their motherland, traits that were emphasised long before them: the Russians "were founding kingdom and *consciously unifying it*" [emphasis in the original], so that "after a thousand years, there emerged there a kingdom and a political entity without parallel in the world."⁴

Geopolitika, Russian-style geopolitics, has been explained as a derivative of

4. Dostoevsky, "April," in *A Writer's Diary*, p. 437.

the Eurasianist doctrine. Geopolitics, in general, from the very beginning adopted a god's eye stand on world politics, debating global issues in a global context, and developing all encompassing and deterministic theories. It was born in the dawn of global confrontations in the beginning of the 20th century. Its birth in Western Europe (Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom) was no accident. The globe had been divided and controlled by the major world powers, and most of which were Western European. The process of territorial expansion and domination was seen as a pre-condition for economic well-being and prosperity. However, the division of the globe was complete, and from now on the major states had to engage in a deadly struggle for survival if they wanted to prosper further. The globe was seen as the arena of this struggle and geopolitics was understood as the science of conducting and winning it.

Serving as the main theory of international politics and foreign policy in Russia, *geopolitika* maintains the tradition of offering grand designs from its predecessor. In Russia *geopolitika* emerged at the end of the Cold War and filled in the gap left behind by the demise of Soviet-style Marxist interpretations of international politics. Most well-known and original geopoliticians of the beginning of the 20th century were influenced by the scientific methodology that dominated 19th century Europe. Similarly, the Russian geopoliticians are greatly influenced by the deterministic Marxist methodology dominant in the Soviet Union. In Russia *geopolitika* is seen much the same light as the original geopolitics had been seen in almost a century ago. It is understood to be a science of states' struggle for survival.

Geopolitical analysis is also perceived to be as the main theoretical base for states' foreign policy making and international behaviour. Presently, there is no commonly accepted interpretation of geopolitical theory and method in Russia, but there is a common argument that Russia's international success in many ways depends on this newly discovered discipline of international relations, geopolitics.

Contribution to Scholarship

It has been argued in this dissertation that the historical method is the primary method for the study of international politics. This thesis followed this primacy, and the research here was also guided by other methodological principles outlined in Chapter Two. The main goal of this dissertation has been to better explain some moments from Russia's history and politics. This thesis also has emphasised that in order to understand the policies or behaviour of an international actor it is necessary to gain knowledge about this actor's vision of the political world and its place in it. It is very likely that this actor will see international events or facts differently from somebody else. In other words, its understanding of facts will be derived from its understanding of history and political experience, not vice versa. To study this actor's policies and behaviour by running them through various international theories may not be enough for understanding their true nature. Understanding foreign actors in international politics is not a problem of understanding Russia only. Russians always complain that Westerners never understand Russia, but it is also true that Russians also frequently fail to

understand the West as well. One of the main goals of this dissertation was to address some new developments in Russia that may not be understood well yet.

This dissertation made following contributions to scholarship:

- It introduced geomentality as an analytical concept in international politics,
- It investigated and classified the most important aspects of the original Eurasianism and their significance for Russia's political identity,
- It analysed the old and new Eurasianism both comparatively and in terms of Eurasianism informing foreign and security policies of the Russian Federation,
- It explained the main tenets of Russian *geopolitika*, and its relationship with Eurasianism,
- It outlined the evolution of pro-Eurasian Russian foreign policies in the 1990s,
- It explained the main reasons behind Russia's strong opposition to NATO enlargement.

Based on the above, one could outline ways for further research. Eurasianism and *geopolitika* require further research and analysis, since they are the dominant schools of political thought in Russia. Within this context, one could look both inside and outside of Russia. Eurasianism, both as a school of thought and a political movement will be of interest of Russia's ethnic minorities. It may also

generate interest in some of its neighbours, such as Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Mongolia, and North Korea. Russia's continuing debate with NATO, and their involvement in the Balkans is definitely worth of further attention. Finally, it will be interesting to see whether geomentality could be used as an analytical concept in other cases and areas of the world.

Afterword: Eurasien Über Alles!

Russia remains concerned with geographical and territorial aspects of its security. It is very unlikely that Russia would ever accept further enlargement of NATO. In a lengthy interview published on July 16, 2001 in the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera*, President Putin said that he was not concerned by the United States' National Missile Defence plans. According to him, this plan poses no security threat to Russia. In the same interview, however, Putin strongly opposed NATO enlargement and said that it should be disbanded rather than enlarged unless it is to include all of Europe and Russia.⁵ With these comments Russia's president emphasised once more his country's concerns with security developments at its geographical frontiers. If Russia's foreign and security policies remain informed by Eurasianism, Moscow will remain very sensitive about such developments at the country's borders.

It is unlikely that Russia would resort to any form of the Cold War-style confrontation with the West. More militant New Eurasians do argue that due to its geographical fate Russia is engaged in a global confrontation with sea powers, but this theoretical dictum is unlikely to find many supporters among Russia's more pragmatic decision makers. Post-Soviet Russia has very limited capabilities and no desire to engage other major powers in a confrontation. However, Moscow will try to outmanoeuvre these powers on any issue that it may see as a security concern for

5. "Putin Says He's Unconcerned by U.S. NMD Plans..." and "... But Says NATO Should Include

Russia. Instability in the Balkans is one such issue. Russia will try to gain as much ground from the developments in Kosovo and Macedonia as possible. If, as is likely, NATO fails to achieve positive results in the Balkans, it will help Russia's argument that the alliance is a useless institution for the post-Cold War Europe. If NATO decides to go ahead with further enlargement, it will be in Russia's interest to keep Kosovo-style conflicts go on as long as possible in Europe, because they preoccupy NATO's attention and resources.

Eurasia Above All! is the title of the Eurasian Manifesto published in Russian, German, Italian, and English at the beginning of 2001.⁶ Eurasianism as a political movement is gaining momentum in Russia. It was formally registered with the Ministry of Justice as "an all-Russian socio-political movement" on May 31, 2001.⁷ The movement held its founding congress in April 2001. Russian mass media at the time noted among the delegates attending the congress "an unprecedented number of veterans of the special services and [Russian] power structures."⁸ Aleksandr Dugin, its main ideologue, is one of those who has been actively developing the doctrine, and has become influential in applying it to issues of national security

Russia or Be Disbanded..." in *RFE/RL Newswire*, Vol. 5, No. 133, Part I, 17 July 2001.

6. The official site of the Eurasian movement is *Obshchestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie Evraziia* at <<http://eurasia.com.ru/>>. The movement also has sites in other languages. The English-language site can be found at <<http://eurasia.com.ru/eng/>>.

7. "V ministerstve iustitsii zaregistrovano obshcherossiiskoe politicheskoe obshchestvennoe dvizhenie 'Evraziia,'" *strana.ru*, 04.06.01, <www.strana.ru>.

8. *smi.ru*, 28 June 2001 <www.smi.ru>

since Vladimir Putin has come to power. Russian newspapers call him “Putin’s secret advisor,” and “Putin’s ideologue,” and the Eurasian movement – “an intellectual party of power.”⁹ Eurasianism itself has virtually become official state doctrine.¹⁰ The newly established Eurasian movement enjoys “runaway popularity” in Russia.¹¹ Besides Dugin, the leadership of the movement includes such people as Pëtr Suslov (Dugin’s chief deputy, former intelligence colonel), Dmitrii Riurikov (former foreign affairs adviser to Yeltsin, now Russia’s ambassador to Uzbekistan), General Klokotov (former head of the Faculty of Strategy at the Military Academy of the General Staff), Talgat Tadzhuddin (chief mufti of Russia), and Rabbi Avrom Shmulevich. Support for the Eurasia movement has been expressed by Abbot Ioann (rector of the St. John Russian Orthodox University), Father Vsevolod Chaplin, and Rabbi Berl Lazar (chief rabbi of Russia).¹² Russia’s Buddhist community is

9. “Pressa o dvuxdnevnom vizite A. G. Dugina i P. E. Suslova v Krasnoiiarskii Krai,” *Obshchestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie Evraziia*, <<http://eurasia.com.ru/>>. The concept “party of power” has a specific meaning in Russian. In the Soviet Union the Communist Party was such a party until the end of August 1991. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian analysts and commentators have been in search for such a party in a new multi-party environment. Neither President Yeltsin nor President Putin had any official party affiliations. In Yeltsin’s case first Gaidar’s Democratic Choice and then Chernomyrdin’s Our Home is Russia were briefly seen as “the party of power,” but neither of them lived up to the expectations. Under Putin’s presidency the Eurasian movement is the first political force to be regarded as a party of power despite the fact that its members have not even run for office under the party banner.

10. Marina Latysheva, “The Eurasia Movement: Mystics, Priests, and Secret Service Agents,” *Versiya*, No. 19, May 29-June 4, 2001.

11. Ilan Berman, “Increasingly, Russia Seeks to Regain Ground in Eurasia,” *Orlando Sentinel*, June 15, 2001.

12. Latisheva, “The Eurasia Movement.” The clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church cannot join political organisations.

represented in the Eurasian movement as well.¹³ In Eurasianist discussions and round tables have participated many senior Russian academics and politicians. Among them have been V. N. Likhachëv (Vice-President of Tatarstan Republic), I. R. Tagirov (Chief Executive Officer of the World Tatar Congress), R. F. Mukhametdinov (Deputy Chief of the Assembly of the Turkic People of the Commonwealth of Independent States), V. N. Ivanov (Vice-President of Russian Academy of Social Sciences), M. L. Titarenko (Director of the Far East Institute).¹⁴ According to some Western analysts, Eurasianist ideas have a strong influence on President Putin.¹⁵ Among Russia's neighbours Eurasianism has been popular in Belarus and Kazakhstan. Presidents of these countries, Aleksandr Lukashenko and Nursultan Nazarbaev have personally expressed their interests in the idea.¹⁶ There are rumours in Moscow that the Eurasian movement may even take on some functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁷ In May 2001, the CIS Customs Union

13. Berman, "Increasingly, Russia Seeks to Regain Ground in Eurasia."

14. V. N. Likhachëv, "Evraziiskii proekt: balans interesov gosudarstv i regionov," in eds. G. A. Chemeiko et.al., *Evrasiiskii proekt: realnosti, problemy, kontseptsii*, Moskva: klub "realisty," 1996, pp. 5-11.

15. "Russia's president Vladimir Putin... has a travel itinerary that looks like some of the maps in Dugin's book," Charles Clover, "Will the Russia Bear Roar Again?" *The Financial Times*, 2 December 2000. "Putin clearly takes them [Dugin's dreams of Eurasian empire] seriously enough to try to put them into practice." Berman, "Increasingly, Russia Seeks to Regain Ground in Eurasia."

16. Aleksandr Lukashenko, "Evraziiskii soiuz," in eds. G. V. Osipov et.al., *Evrasiiskii soiuz: novye rubezhi. problemy i perspektivy*, Moskva: RITs ISPI RAN, 1996, pp. 6-10.

17. Latisheva, "The Eurasian Movement."

was re-named and re-organised as the Eurasian Economic Community.¹⁸ On May 29, 2001, Aleksandr Dugin published an article in *Krasnaia Zvezda*, the main national newspaper of the Russian military. He argued that President Putin's creation of a Eurasian Economic Community shows that Eurasianism is becoming the common ideology of the entire political leadership of Russia. He also emphasised that Russia is a unique and self-contained civilisation, Eurasia. Dugin also stressed Eurasia's irreconcilable opposition to the Atlanticist, Western, world.¹⁹

Geographical and spatial considerations have a long tradition in Russian foreign and security policy. New Eurasianism and *geopolitika* of the 1990s have been doctrinal expressions of this tradition in post-Soviet Russia. Eurasianism informs well modern Russia's identity and security needs, and *geopolitika* provides an academic support for them. It will be interesting to see what will happen to Eurasianism in Russia. It seems that Eurasianism, both as a doctrine and movement, are in Russia to stay. It has been a rule that whatever doctrine or idea may gain popularity in Russia, it tends to stick around for a long time. Ideas themselves do not harm anyone, but the problem is, most of the time people are possessed by ideas in Russia, not vice versa.

18. *RFE/RL Newslines*, 18 May 2001.

19. "Eurasianism Explained to Military," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 22, June 4, 2001.

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