ICONOLOGY AND HYPOSTATICS IN DOSTOEVSKY'S *THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV* AND IN THE WORKS OF AUGUSTINE

by

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Abstract

This study deals with the status of personhood in Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov* and the works of Augustine. Two categories are central for the mapping out of a person: icon and hypostasis. The semiotic category of icon generates a foundational iconostasis (e.g., freedom-faith-love-hope or power-mystery-worship-authority) circumscribing a person, while the religious category of hypostasis denotes the co-inherent or common substance that underlies icons and persons. The study of icon (iconology) and the study of hypostasis (hypostatics) are undertaken in order to foreground person-bound ethical and soteriological praxis in Augustine and Dostoevsky. In studying personhood, two complementary methodological strategies are implemented: close textual analysis and the expansion of the theoretical apparatus and framework. Grounded in the interpreted text and theory, modeling strategies are designed for capturing person-versions and world-versions. The main part of this study develops an interpretation of iconology and hypostatics in Dostoevsky's novel *The Brothers Karamazov* through the close textual interpretation of the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor. The second focus of the study proposes an iconologic and dialogic interface between the most prominent Dostoevskian and Augustinian icons in order to illuminate their internal similar typological substance, an enterprise designed ultimately to foster a better understanding of the iconology and hypostatics in *The Brothers Karamazov*.

Contents

Note on Transliteration and Translation

For the most part I have used the currently standard practice of transliterating Russian texts based on the Library of Congress system. The well-known proper names are given in their commonly used forms in the text – thus Dostoevsky instead of Dostoevskii. I have also preserved the transliterating practice chosen by the translators. All transliterated citations from Dostoevsky are taken from the Soviet Academy edition, F. M. Dostoevskii, *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii v Tridtsati Tomakh* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1972-88). All references to the 30 volume edition specify the volume and page as follows: (25:9). Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from Russian are my own. Unless otherwise indicated, all Latin citations from Augustine are taken from *Opera Omnia*, At: www. Augustinus. it/latino/index.htm.

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INTRODUCTION

'Dostoevsky and Religion' constitutes a topic inescapable for Dostoevskian scholarship, and most recent evidence of intensified scrutiny of doctrinal, liturgical, and devotional themes and motifs in Dostoevsky's work testifies to the actuality of the topic.[1] Historically, the most celebrated studies of Dostoevsky's religious ideas, relevant for my study, are represented, for instance, by such religious philosophers as Berdiaev and Rozanov.[2] However, what individuates the majority of works on Dostoevskian religious themes is that they base their mostly useful and imaginative rhetoric and substance on the surveys of general theological ideas to the detriment of fictionality in Dostoevsky's texts. I shall try to redirect the priorities in religious interpretive strategies and anchor them in the Dostoevskian text.

In the main part of this study, I develop an interpretation of iconology and hypostatics in Dostoevsky's novel *The Brothers Karamazov* through the close textual interpretation of the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor. The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor is a novelistic, fictional construct governed by constraints of literary production of fictional worlds and their meanings. It is, therefore, the fictional texture of the novel that imposes priorities on the strategy of interpretation, as well as on the selection of the theoretical apparatus necessary for the fixation of the results of the interpretation. In the

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[1] See, for instance, Pattisson, George and Thompson, Diane, (ed.), 2001, *Dostoevsky and the Christian Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See, also, Jones, Malcolm V., 2002, "Dostoevsky and Religion.' In Leatherbarrow 2002:148-174.

[2] Berdiaev, Nikolai, 1957, *Dostoevsky*. New York: Meridian Books; and Rozanov, Vasily, 1972, *Dostoevky and the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor*. Ithaca: Cornell Univeristy Press. Translated and with an 'Afterword' by Spencer E. Roberts.

second focus of the study, I develop an iconologic and dialogic interface between the most prominent Dostoevskian and Augustinian icons in order to illuminate their internal similar typological substance, an enterprise designed ultimately to foster a better understanding of the iconology and hypostatics in *The Brothers Karamazov*.

The main claim of this study is that the semiotic[3] and religious[4] categories of icon and hypostasis constitute useful devices for interpretation and meaning production in both Dostoevsky and Augustine, being inherently present in the fictional mechanisms of *The Brothers Karamazov*, as well as in the religious mechanisms in Augustine. Dostoevsky and Augustine's iconologic and hypostatic sets intersect, and whatever does not intersect, can be placed in the most productive dialogic exchange due to the common religious semiosphere that the two authors inhabit.[5]

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[3] Linguists describe hypostasis as a devise for foregrounding and making salient conceptual figures, a tendency inherent in language, being effected through lexical and grammatical metaphors, demotivation, nominalization, and allegory, all devices of iconization. In connection with this kind of linguistic hypostasis-icon, Ivan Fonagy says:

> "Due to [...] vestiges of mythical thinking, language shows a trend towards *hypostasis* [emphasis added], allowing for the fixation of qualities, events, transient and highly complex relations, or the embodiment of the lack or absence of objects and properties: *disappearance*, *lack*, *absence* [these three hypostases are an excellent example of linguistic hypostatization]" (Fonagy, "Why iconicity" in Nänny and Fischer 1999:28).

[4] The Trinitarian and thus hypostatic concerns are directly associated with *The Brothers Karamazov*. See, for instance, Cunningham, David S, 2001, "*The Brothers Karamazov* as Trinitarian Theology." In Pattison and Thompson 2001:134-155.

[5] The concept of semiosphere is advanced by Lotman (see 1992a, "O Semiosfere"), being defined as a universe containing a semiotic continuum constituted of hierarchical and heterotypological semiotic systems undergoing a perpetual semiosis of evolution, prioritization, dialogue, or reversal between its semiotic components. Its structure contains a nucleus of dominant systems with a perpetually active communicative exchange with heterosemiotic or nonsemiotic systems at its periphery. 'Dialogue' is defined by Lotman as being a bipolar reciprocal semiosic exchange (not a transfer)

The connection of the category of 'icon' to *The Brothers Karamazov* is made by Dostoevskian literary critics primarily from the legitimate perspective of religious and moral constraints that govern *The Brothers Karamazov*. In this context, the most profound interpreter of Dostoevskian iconology is Jackson:[6]

> Both the crime and punishment of Fyodor [Karamazov], in the poetics of Dostoevsky, belong to the realm of *bezobrazie* (the morally and aesthetically "monstrous" or "shapeless") and involve the disfiguration of man made in the image and likeness of God.
>
> The centrality of the concepts of *obraz* (image, form, icon) and *bezobrazie* as antithetical moral and aesthetic categories in Dostoevsky's thought cannot be overstressed. *Obraz*, for Dostoevsky, is the axis of beauty in the Russian language. It is aesthetic form, and it is also the iconographic image, or icon, the visible symbol of the beauty of God. Aesthetically, *bezobrazie* is the deformation of ideal form. The humanization of man is the creation of form, the restoration of the image. All violence against man is a dehumanization, which is a deformation, in Dostoevsky's view, of the divine image. (Jackson 1981:304)

Jackson's focus on the interplay of *obraz/bezobrazie* (which I would equate with *icon/deiconization*, which in turn could take a strictly verbal form of *obrazit'/bezobrazit'* and become iconize/deiconize) thematizes the radical centrality of iconologic

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between two heterogeneous (for instance word-to-icon intercommunication) systems: "The presence of two similar and simultaneously different partners of communication – is the most important, although not the exclusive condition for the emergence of a dialogic system" (Lotamn 1992a:15). It is precisely this quality of simultaneous similarity and dissimilarity that warrants the dialogic comparison between Augustine and Dostoevsky's iconologies.

For a similar approach that compares Bakhtin and semiosphere, see Mandelker, Amy, 1995a, "Logosphere and Semiosphere: Bakhtin, Russsian Organicism and the Semiotics of Culture." In Mandelker 1995:177-190.

[6] See Jackson, Robert Louis, 1981, *The Art of Dostoevsky: Deliriums and Nocturnes*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. An excellent commentary on Jackson's iconologic apparatus is offered by Caryl Emerson, 1995, "Word and Image in Dostoevsky's Worlds: Robert Louis Jackson on Readings that Bakhtin Could Not Do." In Allen and Morson 1995:245-266.

mechanisms to which a person is subjected in *The Brothers Karamazov*. The concepts of iconization and deiconization of persons are central to my study.[7]

> A different approach, for instance, is advanced by Harriet Murav:[8]
>
> > *The Brothers Karamazov* will be examined as a *narrative icon* [italics added], in which the stories of the brothers and the structures of the novel mirror each other. The icon consists of three parts: katabasis, or descent into hell; trial; and resurrection, or ascent. This tripartite structure corresponds to the traditional structure of the icon, in which the uppermost part represents heaven, the middle section, earth, and the lowermost, hell. In the novel, as we will see, hell takes up the largest space. The possibility of ascent is suggested only at the novel's end by the holy-foolish Alyosha. (Murav 1992:135)

The partitioning of the novel that Murav performs according to the icon is less useful for our study (although its overstressing of the hell part of the novel is consonant with constraints of deiconization that govern the novel), but Murav's analysis of the function of the holy foolish person[9] in the novel is a felicitous exhibition of a person's integral

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[7] Literature and iconicity are intrinsically connected, and iconology (the study of iconicity and icon) is central to literary studies. Lotman, for instance, engages literature within various semiotic and extrasemiotic constraints, but two semiotic categories are directly linked with the principle of iconology in his study of literature: modeling and icon. Lotman says:

> It is the nature of the artistic texts to be transformed into codes, into modeling systems; this entails that certain features that are specific for the text as such be carried over into the sphere of coding systems in the process of artistic communication [...] Verbal art begins with an attempt to overcome the fundamental property of a word as a linguistic sign – the arbitrariness of the connection between the planes of expression and content; it constructs a verbal artistic model according to the *iconic principle* [my underscoring], as in the fine arts. This is not accidental but organically linked to the use of signs in human culture (Lotman 1977:55)

[8] See Murav, Harriet, 1992, *Holy Foolishness. Dostoevsky's Novels & the Poetics of Cultural Critique*. Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press.

[9] "The essential feature of holy foolishness, as a category of the church, can be stated [...] as the assumption of madness or folly as an ascetic feat of self-humiliation" (Murav 1992:2).

iconicity that anticipates our use of the concept of person-version that proselytizes a world-version (say, Zosima). The two examples of iconology in the *The Brothers Karamazov* are the most useful for my study.

The second central category in my study, that of hypostasis, is mentioned in Dostoevskian criticism in different contexts. In the context of Russian cultural and religious typology, the connection between hypostasis and Dostoevsky is made through Soloviev:[10]

> While the rhythm of the patterns in *The Brothers Karamazov* is basically one of thesis-antithesis – that is, binary – there are also a number of instances of what William W. Rowe calls 'triplicity.' The metaphysical-religious idea of triunity was important in Soloviov's discourses on Godmanhood. And it may well be that Dostoevsky consciously created the three Karamazov brothers to correspond to Soloviov's three *hypostases* [italics added] of being: spirit, intellect, and soul. (Terras 1981:106-107)[11]

If the three Karamazov brothers are hypostases, then the internal and external concatenations of their iconologic substance will also be hypostatic, imposing, as a consequence, a hypostatic functioning on the entire economy of the novel. Mihailovic[12] also correlates Bakhtin and Dostoevsky with the religious culture where hypostatic thinking is one of the ruling principles:

> The relations among consciousnesses is [...] framed in terms of interpretive aesthetics, and one inevitably thinks not just of the patristic *perichoresis* [coinherence], but also of the category of 'multiple-hypostaticness'

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[10] Kostalevsky, Marina, 1997, *Dostoevsky and Soloviev: The Art of Integral Vision*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

[11] Terras, Victor, 1981, *A Karamazov Companion: Commentary on the Genesis, Language, and Style of Dostoevsky's Novel*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

[12] Mihailovic, Alexandar. 1997. *Corporeal Words: Mikhail Bakhtin's Theology of Discourse*. Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press.

> (*mnogoipostasnost'*)[13] that was so important for Russian philosophers such as Solovyov, Lossky, and Zenkovsky in their descriptions of what intersubjectivity should be. As Bakhtin asserts [...], Dostoevsky was hostile to 'those world-views which see the final goal in merging [*v sliianii*], in a dissolution of consciousnesses in one consciousness, in the removal of individuation. No nirvana is possible for a *single* consciousness. A single consciousness is *contradictio* in *adjecto*. Consciousness is in essence multiple [*mnozhestvenno*]. *Pluralia tantum*.' (Mihailovic 1997:222)

Still another modality of hypostatics, this time the explicitly internal interpersonal hypostatics, is noted by Tarras in the relations between Ivan and Smerdiakov: "'On the bench in the gateway the lackey Smerdiakov was sitting [...] and at the first glance Ivan Fiodorovitch realized that the lackey Smerdiakov was sitting in his soul too.' Dostoevsky likes to hypostatize mental states" (Terras 1981:240n340). The hypostatic capacity of a person to be present in another person, through iconologic mediation, is one of the central tenets of this study.

In speaking about the structure of Dostoevsky's novels, Pomerants,[14] an astute semiotician, assesses the Dostoevskian novelistic modeling principle as being hypostatic. He compares Dostoevsky's hypostatic construction with Einstein's relativistic construction (also Bakhtin's favored comparison of Dostoevsky is with Einstein[15]):

> [Einstein said:] 'Dostoevsky gave me a great deal, extraordinarily much, far more than Gauss.' The fact that Dostoevsky gave a great deal to Einstein as a man, is not surprising in itself; the strange thing is the mentioning of Gauss. If what is referred to is the esthetic, philosophical, moral, and religious influence, then Gauss is beside the point. The works of Gauss helped Einstein work out the mathematical apparatus of the theory of relativity. It follows that Dostoevsky

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[13] It is primarily the Russian term *mnogoipostasnost'* and its cognate *ipostasnost'*, ('hypostaticity') that in this study justifies the introduction of the term 'hypostatics,' as the theory of hypostasis.

[14] Pomerants, G., 1990, *Otkrytost' Bezdne: Vstrechi s Dostoevskim*. Moskva: Sovetskii Pisatel'.

[15] See Morson and Emerson 1990:240.

> greatly helped Einstein with something precisely in the creation of the theory of relativity – and more than Gauss. But with what? I think that with the 'relativistic' structure of his novels. I place 'relativistic' in quotation marks. Properly speaking, Dostoevsky's novels are not relativistic, but hypostatic [*ipostasnyi*]. But any hypostatic construction, starting with the Christian Trinity, can be interpreted as a relativistic model. (Pomerants 1990:85)

It should be noted here that the Christian Trinity is an iconologic and personologic[16] model that exercises modeling power over Dostoevsky's fiction. And this study is concerned exclusively with the modeling power of semiotic systems and does not advance any religious commitments.[17] The modeling categories of this study derived from the nucleus of nature-person-icon are bound to be mostly trinitarian (semiotically and religiously).[18] The category of hypostasis is religiously equatable with person,

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[16] Throughout this study, I will use three main macrostructural concepts: ontologic (the 'logos' of the ontic and of human nature), iconologic (the 'logos' of iconicity and icon), and personologic (the logos-study of the person). The foundational structure of nature, person, and icon is derived from the Trinitarian model, which the Christian typology of culture and Christian semiosphere places in the nucleus of its semiosic processes.

[17] We can find an interesting biographical remark about Dostoevsky's relations to Catholicism in Frank: "Dostoevsky's paternal great-grandfather was a Uniat archpriest in the Ukrainian town of Bratslava; his grandfather was a priest of the same persuasion; and this is where his father was born. The Uniat denomination was a compromise worked out by the Jesuits as a means of proselytizing among the predominantly Orthodox peasantry of the region: Uniats continued to celebrate the Orthodox rites, but accepted the supreme authority of the Pope. Dostoevsky's horrified fascination with the Jesuits, whom he believed capable of any villainy to win power over man's souls, may perhaps first have been stimulated by some remark about the creed of his forebears" (Frank 1976:8). Certainly, the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor is not interpreted by us or by other critics in a confessional way, but only as a typological world-version. Dostoevsky himself created the Legend as a possible model of the world.

[18] See also an article mindful of Dostoevsky's fiction being positioned within a semiosphere: Pyman, Avril, 2001, "Dostoevsky in the Prism of Orthodox Semiosphere." In Pattison and Thomson 2001:103-115.

therefore the generative and modeling structure of nature-person-icon is equivalent with nature-hypostasis-icon.[19]

The maximal development of the model nature-person-hypostasis-icon we find in the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, hence our focus on it. The Legend, in terms of poetics and narrative, is powered by the Three Temptations. It is the strategy of interpretation of the Three Temptations in the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor that exhibits almost a total failure in Dostoevskian criticism. The best of insights about the Legend I have found in the following remarks by Malcolm Jones:[20]

> It is tempting to try to equate each of the Three Temptations with one of the three forces which the Grand Inquisitor lists: miracle, mystery, and authority, and perhaps the three torments:[21] people's need for someone to worship, for someone to entrust their consciences to and for the universal state of the ant-heap. But although all are related to the Grand Inquisitor's reading of the temptations and human history, there is no exact symmetry and no direct equation. The idea of miracle, together with the yearning for someone to worship, seems to be related in

[19] The sacramental coinherence of matter with the semiotic and personologic dimensions of existence is profoundly investigated by Charles Lock within the Bakhtinian framework and that of Eastern Christianity. See his "Carnival and Incarnation: Bakhtin and Orthodox Theology." *Literature and Theology* 5, no. 1:68-82, 1991.

[20] Jones, Malcolm V., 1990, *Dostoevsky after Bakhtin. Readings in Dostoevsky's Fantastic Realism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[21] It appears that here Jones presents some of the interpretive assignments and distributions of categories across the Three Temptations, found in Sandoz's book (2000): true virtues (hope, faith, love), human typology, (rebellious, weak, unhappy) symbols (Tower of Babel, Crystal Palace, Ant Heap), desires (to worship, for harmony, to get rid of consciousness), forces of the human soul (will, heart, spirit), powers (bread, conscience, sward), and Trinitarian periodization (Father, Son, Spirit). Although the selection of the items to be assigned to every temptation is most revealing for the meaning of the Legend, the nature of the items-categories and their distribution, it seems to us, is incorrect. It is not the temptations that have the priority in the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, but the persons who perform the temptation, and the icons-categories, whatever they are (and they are not Sandoz's), that the persons generate through the temptations. However, Sandoz's attempt to generate and distribute the main meanings of the Legend starting from a model (here the three Temptations) is very important, being the only attempt of this kind that I am aware of. See Sandoz, *Political Apocalypse: A study of Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor*, 2000:128-149.

> his mind to both the first two temptations (turning stones into bread and throwing oneself off the Temple). In the Gospel the yearning for someone to worship is linked with the third temptation through Jesus' reply. The idea of authority is linked in the Legend with the third temptation, that of earthly dominion, and with the third torment, the yearning for the universal antheap. But mystery, together with someone to whom to entrust one's conscience, seems more loosely related to all three. (Jones 1990:173)

What is evident in the above remarks is that Jones makes a trinitarian assignment of the Grand Inquisitor's mystery to all three temptations. This is correct, although only a partial strategy, and I am not aware of further development in this direction. What is lacking, first of all, in the interpretation of the Legend is a different strategy of partitioning of the text. Lotman has a profound observation in this regard:

> The structure of an artistic text has a practically infinite number of boundaries which divide this text into segments that are equivalent in certain respects [i.e. iconically], and consequently may be regarded as alternatives. [...] The relation between writer and reader creates additional alternative possibilities. In the transition from writer to reader, the measure of indeterminacy grows (although certain purely personal alternatives are irretrievably lost) and accordingly the information contained in the text increases. (Lotman 1977:297)

It appears that the partitioning of the text of the Grand Inquisitor has to be performed in accordance with the principle of the dominant. The concept of the dominant could be the starting point for any determination of what is a 'mandatory component' (Jakobson 1987a:42)[22] in a sequence of a text, the text being considered as an intensional

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[22] Jakobson, Roman, 1987a, "The Dominant." In Jakobson 1987:41-46. Thus Jakobson: "[T]he definition of an artistic work as compared to other sets of cultural values substantially changes as soon as the concept of the dominant becomes our departure point; [...] a poetic work is defined as a verbal message whose aesthetic function is its dominant" (1987a:43).

Bakhtin also uses the concept of the dominant at critical junctures of his analysis of Dostoevsky: "The idea helps self-consciousness [*samosoznaniiu*] assert [*utverdit'*] its sovereignty in Dostoevsky's artistic world, and helps it triumph over all fixed [*tverdym* vs. *utverdit'* above, as assertion, consolidation of dominance-sovereignty of self-consciousness], stable [*ustoichivym*], neutral images [*neitral'nym obrazom*; in our terminology: non-icons]. But on the other hand, the idea itself can preserve its power to

continuum, where the case might be that synonymic linguistic and semantic units refer to a single extensional object, a 'referent,' in a fictional world (see, for instance, Doležel 1979).[23]

The 'dominant' alerts us to what is the ruling principle, or the ruling modality,[24] that governs the compossibility and the functioning of entities in both the intensional (text describing a fictional world) and extensional (fictional world) dimensions of the text. In Dostoevsky's fictional personology the dominant is person-bound and founded on self-consciousness. Any change from one person and consciousness to another person and consciousness triggers the introduction of a new dominant, that is of new hypostasis and new icon. Therefore, the interpretation of the Legend discovers that the person of the Great Spirit (Satan) is completely ignored by the interpreters when the iconologic structure of the Legend is individuated, even worse, Christ's person, simply because he is silent, is barely assigned a dominant significance in his domain of discourse. In order to generate a systematic interpretation of the Legend, all three persons and their self-consciousnesses must become equal hypostatic dominants in charge of their discourses

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mean [its iconized force], its full integrity as an idea, only when self-consciousness [and thus, metonymically, the personhood, the self for whom the idea becomes its icon] is the dominant [*kak dominanty*] in the artistic representation [*izobrazheniia*, where the word *obraz*-image is central] of the hero" (1984:79). In Dostoevsky's fictional world an idea becomes an icon (an iconologic entity) only when self-consciousness is the dominant and thus fuses its iconic imprint with an idea. The category of the 'dominant' shouldn't be assessed strictly formalistically or structuralistically, since, as we can easily see, self-consciousness is the dominant, and the analytic truth of self-consciousness is to be both dialogic (in terms of voice-ideas or voice-words) and polyphonic (in terms of person-consciousnesses).

[23] Doležel, Lubomir, 1979, "Extensional and Intensional Narrative Worlds." *Poetics*, 8:193-212.

[24] Doležel, Lubomir, 1976a, "Narrative Modalities." *Journal of Literary Semantics*, 5.1:5-1

and their appropriately partitioned dialogic and polyphonic domains.[25] I shall implement this very strategy in my interpretation of the *The Brothers Karamazov*. Above I have presented a full review of the current status of the iconologic and hypostatic interpretation of *The Brothers Karamazov* that has pertinent impact on this study.

Starting from the minimal, but extremely insightful contribution of Dostoevskian scholarship on iconology and hypostatics, in this study I shall offer a sustained interpretation of relevant texts of *The Brothers Karamazov*, in order to generate a foundational, though not comprehensive, iconology of persons. In the chapter on the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor I shall develop a necessary and sufficient iconostasis that integrates each person of the Monologue of the Grand Inquisitor into a series of coherent icons. In the second chapter, I expand on the iconologic terminology that was inconvenient to discuss in more detail during the interpretation of the Legend. In chapter three I describe the main world-versions advanced by Ivan Karamazov and Zosima.

Augustine and Dostoevsky's ontology, personology and iconology are only tentatively and partially addressed by literary scholars in the context of Slavic studies. I am not aware of any systematic comparison between Augustine and Dostoevsky. Several profound remarks about the pertinence of interpreting Dostoevsky through Augustine are made by Jackson:

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[25] The concepts of 'polyphonic' and 'dialogic' are unproblematic for us. 'Polyphonic' simply refers to fictional equality between the author and his characters (similarly to God and his creatures endowed with full autonomy and freedom). The model then transfers to any constellation of equal persons, and I equate it with the personologic domain. 'Dialogic' refers to any semiotic entity inhabited by voices of persons in the process of equal communication. I equate it with the iconologic, since a person's voice and countenance are iconically present in a gesture, word or in an idea. On an extensive discussion of dialogism and polyphony see Morson and Emerson (1990).

> Placed in the framework of the Augustinian and Pelagian theological controversy, it may be noted, Ivan's position would seem to gravitate toward radical Augustinian doctrine, or Jansenism, according to which post-Fall man lacks the power to abstain from sin and can be saved only by virtue of God's grace. Zosima's thought, with its emphasis on man's freedom of conscience and its faith in man, would seem to gravitate in the direction of Pelagian doctrine, which placed less emphasis on original sin and affirmed man's perfect freedom to do right and wrong and, in the end, to discover his path of salvation. [...] The range of Dostoevsky's thought would appear to be expressed in the polarities of Augustinian and Pelagian doctrine, but as an artist-thinker, he decisively leaned in the direction of Pelagian doctrine, with its great trust in man. (Jackson 1993:298)

It should be noted here that Jackson's identification of Ivan Karamazov with Augustine and of Dostoevsky with Pelagisus is quite significant, since it points to an immense gap in the interpretation and correlation of Augustine and Dostoevsky.[26] I will address the category of freedom, mentioned by Jackson, in the context of ontologic, iconologic, and personologic correlation of Augustine and Dostoevsky.[27] In interpreting Augustine, my

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[26]A similar reference to Augustine through Dostoevsky is even more specific, since it relates to the Augustinian work on the freedom of the will (*De Libero Arbitrio*), which I scrutinize in the chapter on Augustine: "Ivan, like several other of Dostoevsky's protagonists, faces anew the dilemma discussed by St. Augustine. Dostoevsky's views on freedom of choice and man's responsibility for his acts basically correspond to the teachings of St. Augustine. While discussing free will with Enodius, St. Augustine emphasized the responsibility which free will implies, since the cause of man's evil deeds is his free will (*De Libero Arbitrio*, Book I, 1.35) St. Augustine said that no one compels man to sin, he can choose freely: Man 'is bound to resist an evil will as the enemy of his most precious good,' (I, 13:27; II, 1.1, 2 ,3; and III, 36-46). To do right, man has to free himself from his own evil thoughts and frequently also explained that man's mind becomes the slave of his passions through its own choice, and man's wisdom consists in the control of the human mind (I, 7.16-10.22). Ivan's superior mind is enslaved by his own controversial theory." (Natov 1987:25)

[27] Dostoevsky's thematization and iconization of sin within Orthodoxy is paralleled by Pelikan, a historian of Christianity, to that of Augustine within Catholicism: "Although the detailed etiology of sin, original and actual, was a phenomenon of Western theology, associated chiefly with the theology of Augustine and with the religious experience of Luther, perhaps its two most profound interpreters, Dostoevsky's sensitive grasp of the psychology of sin gave the doctrine concrete expression. [...] Through a reading of *The Brothers Karamazov* [...] it was possible to begin and inquire into the distinctive meaning of Eastern Christianity within the overall history of Christian thought. [...]

main source of theoretical guidance, especially concerning the literary theory and the theory of reading and interpretation, is Brian Stock's book on Augustine.[28] Stock's theory of reading[29] and interpretation in Augustine is strongly focused on the narrativized and iconologic self,[30] which coincides with this study's thematization of the iconized person: "Augustine was convinced that words and images play a fundamental role in mediating perception of reality" (Stock 1996:1). The theory of reading "deals with, among other things, mental representations, memory, emotion, cognition, and the ethics of

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Combined as it was with a doctrine of sin that matched Luther's for religious power, this interpretation of Orthodoxy [in the novel] gives the lie to the conventional wisdom of Protestant theologians and historians that Eastern Christianity, both Greek and Slavic, has been too optimistic about human capacity and vague in its doctrine of grace. Therefore when the Cappadocians received fresh attention, Dostoevsky had prepared the way for an appreciation of their insights" (Pelikan 1988:59-60). It appears, however, that Dostoevsky rather maximizes human capacity and freedom to sin only in order to maximize God's 'capacity' for love-grace.

[28] Brian Stock, 1997, *Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and Ethics of Interpretation*. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press.

[29] On the question of reading and veneration of texts (in this study's terminology: their iconization) in Dostoevsky, see the article by Eric Ziolkovski, 2001, "Reading and Incarnation in Dostoevsky.' In Pattison and Thomson 2001:156-170. Ziolkovski has a section that compares Zosima's relation to texts to that of Augustine: "Augustine, Zosima and the Question of Reading."

[30] In both Dostoevsky and Augustine a person can be governed by strongly iconized semiotic dominant-icons, to which man relates with veneration (the image of Christ in Dostoevsky, for instance). Augustine depicts an iconized self when he reduces the entire iconologic realm to only three iconized components, faith, hope, and charity: "Thus a man supported by faith, hope, and charity, with an unshaken hold upon them, does not need Scriptures except for the instruction of others. And many live by these three things in solitude without books. Whence in these persons I think the saying is already exemplified, 'whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongs shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed' [1 Cor. 13:8]. In them, as if by instruments of faith, hope, and charity, such an erudition has been erected that, holding fast to that which is perfect, they do not seek that which is partially so [1 Cor. 13:10] – perfect that is, in so far as perfection is possible in this life" (*On Christian Doctrine* 1.39.43). This is an excellent example of an iconized structure, or an iconostasis, that is 'running' a person, which is indispensable for the understanding of iconization in this study.

interpretation. [...] [Augustine] contrasts the inner certainty of the self's existence, with the uncertainty of information acquired through such accounts [rereading of narratives]. If our presentations of self are in this respect like such rereadings, we cannot hope for objective knowledge of ourselves any more than we can be certain that an interpretation of a given text is correct" (Stock 1996:1). The main import from Stock's analysis of Augustine's mind for the strategies of interpretations of the person in this study consists in the fact that a person, a self, functions under the predicament of iconologic mutation and erasure, or, conversely, under iconologic and interpretive commitments to a spiritual and textual community.[31] Any iconologic content can be removed from or devalued in a person, potentially leaving a person with a naked ontological power and an emptied personologic magnitude. I address the ontology of the person in Augustine and Dostoevsky in section one in the chapter "Icon and Hypostasis in Augustine and Dostoevsky." The iconology of the person is addressed in section two, and the personology of freedom in section three in the chapter on Augustine and Dostoevsky.

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[31] "Love operates vertically, descending from the text to the reader, and horizontally, as readers relate to audiences. Christianity emerges as a textual community built around shared principles of interpretation." (Stock 1996:196)

ONE: THE LEGEND OF THE GRAND INQUISITOR

In this chapter, I propose an interpretation of the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor in *The Brothers Karamazov*. The chunk of the text called 'The Grand Inquisitor' functions as one of the semantic and polyphonic hubs in the novel (if not the very nucleus of its semiosphere), and the monologue of the Grand Inquisitor, being its integral part, is our primary interpretive target. The monologue is constructed on the basis of the three temptations of Christ by the devil. The interpretation shall be developed by following the narrative sequence of the three temptations (sections 3, 5, and 6). In addition, two sections will deal with the concept of hypostasis, developing a theoretical basis for the concept (section 2), as well as a practical, text-based modeling of the concept (section 4). Section (1) focuses on the general conditions that invite a new interpretation of the Legend, as well as on a new artistic thinking that postulates a new model of the world in the Legend.

1) The Legend as Model of the World and Artistic Thinking

The Chapter "Grand Inquisitor" is contained in book five entitled "Pro and Contra." The word "Legend," as Belknap (1990:111)[1] remarks, epitomizes the centrality of the text describing the Grand Inquisitor and its creator, Ivan. The Grand Inquisitor's "Legend" involves, first, literary genealogical remoteness (primarily its genre sources and models),

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[1] Belknap, Robert L. 1990. *The Genesis of The Brothers Karamazov. The Aesthetics, Ideology, and Psychology of Making a Text.* Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

and, second, interpersonal narrative remoteness (Dostoevsky –Ivan –the Grand Inquisitor –the Devil):

> The word "Legend" emerges not from Dostoevsky's text but from the critical tradition. Ivan Karamazov calls his creation a *poema* or even a *poemka,* but neither of these words is common in the critical treatments of the chapter. Such critical unanimity deserves attention, for there is something Darwinian in our vocabularies; the fittest names for things survive. *Legend* is a word that attracts less attention than *myth* in our century, but it was a favorite of Maupassant, Flaubert, Hugo, Hoffmann, and many other nineteenth-century authors whom Dostoevsky admired and used. The derivation is obvious-that which is to be read-but a definition might draw attention to certain elements or qualities in the text that could otherwise elude us. We can define a legend as a relatively brief and simple narrative, remote in origin, rich in implication, and constituting part of the common heritage of a certain sect or place.
>
> The local color, sectarian associations, and enormous implications of Ivan's tale speak for themselves, but its remoteness is more interesting. Ivan sets his account in the sixteenth century and compares it to accounts from cultures very different from his own, such as medieval France and pre-Petrine Russia. It is also set in Spain, the part of Europe most remote from Russia, culturally and geographically. Narratively, the remoteness is more complex. Dostoevsky tells the legend through Ivan, who speaks largely through the Grand Inquisitor, who in turn devotes much of his speech to points made by the Devil. (Belknap 1990:111-112)

Belknap's book, and many others (primarily Sandoz's[2]) engages, as its title shows, ideological and aesthetic intertextuality (inter alia), being a precious and in-depth correlation of Dostoevsky and Dostoevsky's text with other authors, cultural models, patterns, and texts. The book advances its cause mostly intertextually, as opposed to his previous book[3], which is relatively marked by intratextuality, in Belknap's words (1967:1) by structuralistic *dispositio,* not *inventio* (discovery). Both approaches (in essence, intrinsic and extrinsic strategies of reading and interpretation) are employed

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[2] Sandoz, Ellis. 2000. *Political Apocalypse. A Study in Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor.* Wilmington: ISI Books.

[3] Belknap, Robert L. 1967. *The Structure of The Brothers Karamazov.* Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

variously or in original combinations or segregations by different researchers and interpreters.

The current study places the value of primacy on the concept of fictional world and fictional person, that is on intrinsic intratextuality. But the borders of a fictional world are mobile and their perpetual redrawing is contingent upon cultural frames, maxims, and programs.[4] My study of the Legend, as a consequence, does not discount the value and import of other approaches to Dostoevskian fiction: I believe that even an "erroneous" (only putatively so, but basically exhibiting immunity or disdain to ideological criminalization) interpretive approach may in propitious and benevolent contexts trigger the development of a seminal problematic.

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[4] See, for instance, Pavel, Thomas G. 1986. *Fictional Worlds.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. In pursuing fictional saliency, incompleteness, indeterminacy, referential density, segregation of worlds, ontological landscapes, and cultural maxims (among many other similar things), Pavel's book is quite serviceable for understanding sometimes segregationist interpretive and research positions adopted by Dostoevsky's critics (and Dostoevsky's hermeneutics is mostly sociologizing and biography-centered, instead of intratextual and fictionality-bound), a situation, as we saw in the text above, intimated by Belknap. I would choose Pavel's concept of ontological fusion (alternated with ontological fission) to visualize operations performable over fictional and nonfictional worlds. Fusion and fission projected over persons and their 'text-words' only facilitate the adoption of Bakhtinian dialogism. No rigid ideological positioning is desirable in interpretation (say, what is permissible and what is not in strategies of interpretation): the principle of interpretive coherence, and not necessarily interworld correspondence (in its guise of dogmatic referentiality, or else semantic or modal fundamentalism) could be the starting point. Fiction's ontological landscapes prepare us for a genuine openended openmindedness. Thus Pavel: 'Instead of defining fiction in historical terms only, as a result of decayed myth [or, for that matter, in terms of biographic or sociologic restrictiveness], we should perhaps characterize it in terms of ontological landscaping and planning. [...] Indeed, fictional space can accommodate almost any ontological construction" (1986:143). It is important to think of any world, fictional or not, as having an ontological base that supports every furniture-entity and denizen-person within its framework of possibility. Any comparison between worlds, say Dostoevsky and Augustine's, is bound to start with the ontic, if it wants to be relatively coherent.

Dostoevsky's fiction, and especially the text of the Legend, engenders a drastically new *artistic* sphere and, therefore, requires new rules of orientation "in that incomparably more complex *artistic model of the world* which he created" (Bakhtin 1984:272).

To account for the structure of that *artistic model of the world* (or, in Dostoevsky's case, model of the universe, where worlds encapsulate worlds) is to account for the ontological status of the entities that populate or furnish that world. In this perspective, a radical ontological shift qualifies Dostoevsky's literary work: the privileging of the fictional personhood over the fictional world in its totality, over other fictional entities present in that world, and over the literary text itself. Dostoevsky's heroes are foregrounded not merely as characters, but as persons[5], displaying uncanny autonomy with regard to the fictional world they live in, to the plot and narrative. The

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[5] In my approach to the status of personhood in "The Grand Inquisitor," I will make distinctions among several categories that designate a human being, namely: character, self, individual, and person. A detailed discussion of these categories is given in Amelie O. Rorty's paper, "A Literary Postscript: Characters, Persons, Selves, Individuals" (1979b:301-323). I adopted Rorty's and the philosophy of the mind's stance that person is the umbrella concept covering all other concepts referring to a human being. As a rule, in Dostoevsky, as we shall see, the character part of a person refuses to substantiate: a person remains stubbornly openended, uncrystallizable ontological and social entity. Freedom and readiness for negative action and responsibility shatter any fixity in a person. In Dostoevsky, the best example of such a fictional construct is emplotted in the type of the Underground Man. As to the specific distinctions between character and personhood, relevant for their differentiation is the Christian and Roman historical background: "Characters can be arranged along a continuum of powers and gifts, but personhood is an all-or-none attribution. One is either legally empowered or one isn't; one is either liable or not. Degrees of excusability can be granted only after liability is accepted. The Christian theological conception of judgment is obviously rooted in a legal context, one that, in its Roman origins, did not treat every human being as a person... In fusing the legal and dramatic concepts of person, Christianity made every human being with a will qualify as a person, in order to make them all equally qualified to receive divine judgment. With this introduction of a conception of unitary and equal persons,

targeting of the elusive category of personhood in Dostoevsky's fictional world is seriously hampered by the lack of development of some extensional and intensional analytical and critical terminology. Bakhtin offered an original basis for developing an operative set of categories of person and, on that basis, of a more or less systematic reception and interpretation of Dostoevsky's fiction.

Several categories from the Bakhtinian critical reservoir have been appropriated by literary criticism to account for the poetics of Dostoevsky's literary works.

The most used canonical paradigm includes such global and metaphorical terms as polyphony, dialogism, carnival, unfinalizability, self, terms potentially covering all spheres of culture.[6] In this study of the Legend I will concentrate my attention exclusively on the literary category of fictional polyphonic person. And Dostoyevsky's literary work postulates the existence of radically different persons in a radically specific fictional world (to anticipate: projecting a person onto a differently framed ontological landscape, a person could discontinue being polyphonic: an apocalyptic Christ is not a polyphonic, Dostoevskian Christ). Consequently, the categories of dialogism and polyphony should find their legitimate and full applicability in the fictional world of specifically identifiable persons that are offered solely by the verbal fictional narratives.

Christianity at one stroke changed both the rule of law and the idea of persons." (Rorty 1976b:310)

[6] Bakhtin's legacy is scrutinized and debated within a spectrum of entertaining cacophony and instructive polyphony (here 'polyphony' means the programmatic absence and avoidance of a finalizing, authoritarian supremacy of an opinion on Bakhtin). Two books, whose learned and creative contribution to the field of Bakhtinology is inestimable, offer marathon-like surveys of Bakhtin's theories and receptions. The first one: Morson, G. S. and Emerson, C. 1990. *Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. The second one: Emerson, C. 1997. *The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton

The subsequent extraliterary theoretical application of these global categories (and especially that of person) to other sphere of culture (as Bakhtin does) would draw a direct benefit from pertinent literary experience. But Bakhtin, in his study on Dostoevsky, focuses primarily on the mechanisms of literary poetics in general (as preeminently theory-bound polyphonic poetics) and does not interpretively exhaust the category of person in any of Dostoevsky's texts or works. (I will define Bakhtin's foundational categories of dialogism and polyphony in due course. The treatment of voice and dialogism can be found in the section on the model of hypostatic artistic thinking: in my theoretical framework, dialogism preeminently relates to the semiotic realm of iconology, since its very possibility is secured by what Bakhtin calls 'image,' 'idea' and 'word.' Polyphony is treated in the chapter on hypostatic person: polyphony relates to the personologic realm. I reiterate that the central analytical dichotomy semiotic/personologic pervades and underlies this study).

Several illustrations of the discrepancy between Bakhtin's theory on Dostoevsky's fictional work and its application to specific Dostoevskian texts is necessary.

In the celebrated cultural nexus established between Bakhtin's polyphonic and dialogic theory and Dostoevsky's literary work, it is relevant for our interpretative project to detect symptomatic frustration shown by some critics vis-à-vis the underprivileged textual interpretation and, as a correlate, underapplied polyphonic theory in Bakhtin's book on Dostoevsky. Wayne C. Booth states this precariousness in Bakhtin's practice with some poignancy:

University Press. The two books reinforce not only the creative approach to Bakhtin, but, most crucially, the critical freedom from Bakhtin.

> He often seems to lapse into the hortatory mode that has little to do with the critical work in hand. Most seriously, his failure to settle into sustained study of any one of Dostoyevsky's works and his persistently high level of generality often make me impatient for more of the sort of analysis he is capable of. Whenever an author dwells at great length on general theories about huge lumps of literature called 'the novel' or even about smaller piles called 'Dostoyevsky's works,' without settling into detailed efforts at exemplification, I grow restless. The temptation to resist becomes especially great when the generalizations are vague, as they often are in Bakhtin." (Booth 1984, p. xxxvi)

This kind of criticism does not discount the merits of Bakhtin's theory per se. On the contrary, it stresses its esoteric originality that requires quasi-initiation: "What is vague from a hostile point of view is wonderfully 'suggestive' when we consider it from inside the enterprise. If he is repetitive, why should he not be, when what he is saying will surely not be understood the first, or third, or tenth time?" (Booth 1984, p. xxvii). One can subscribe to the above remarks at least for two reasons. First, Bakhtin's theory is highly "suggestive," and I will appropriate its suggestion for the purposes of textual analysis. Second, there is sufficient ground to believe that the theory could be expanded and "understood" differently or better once "verified" on a text. In this perspective I claim that Bakhtin's theory becomes more relevant when it is rearticulated through the concrete medium of a text, and therefore, presents the benefits of a case study.

On the other hand, and in a larger perspective, Bakhtin's polyphonic poetics offers a useful guidance in the approach to Dostoievsky's texts in their macrostructural, closure-bound integrality (in their cultural, person-dependent "construction" or in Bakhtin's terminology, "architectonics"[7]). Todorov, for instance, understands Bakhtin's

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[7] Morson and Emerson position architectonics in an illuminating correlation with the Bakhtinian dialogic word: "If we compare the idea of architectonic act with the later (and more familiar) 'dialogic word,' two differences immediately come into view. First, what is remarkable about the act is its high degree of closure. [...] In marked contrast to the novelistic *word*, which Bakhtin will come to define as open, unfinalized, inhabited by

theoretical and practical priorities as being linked to 'transtextuality,' as something that belongs to the history of culture and to the links woven between literature and culture:

> Rather than 'construction' or 'architectonics,' the literary work is above all a heterology, a plurality of voices, an echo and anticipation of discourses past and to come; it is both a crossroads and a meeting place, and thereby loses its privileged position. Unfaithful to his own earlier program, Bakhtin never studies entire works, nor does he close himself off inside one single work. (1997:85)

From Todorov's assessment of Bakhtin's polyphonic theory we should retain the fact that culture is to be taken as the frame for understanding heterology and therefore, Dostoevsky's fiction. As will become obvious, in my textual analysis I will scrutinize the heterologic concatenations of voices from the explicit perspective of cultural discourses constituting or framing the fictional work (for instance, Christian mythology and tradition, or Menippean satire). But the feature most startling in the quote above is Todorov's imputation that targets Bakhtin's default in textual analysis, that is, in palpable practice. This is significantly ominous, since usually Bakhtin is celebrated as one who is an enemy of theorizing and theoretism.[8] To be coherent about theorizing, however, one must develop a metatheory, or else one is relegated to impressionistic statements. It

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many voices and therefore shot through with sideward glances or loopholes, the *act* is valuable as a concrete closed event around which I can wrap my responsibility" (1990:70). Here again, *word* (semiotics) displays junctive (disjunctive or conjunctive) capacity with the responsible *act* (personology). Only in passing I want to mention in this context that the well known "speech acts" could be construed as a conjunctive case of word/person interpaly. Not much analogizing effort is needed in order to construct situations where *iconic speech acts* are instantiated (the commandment to be like God readily comes to mind).

[8] See, for instance, Morson and Emerson on Bakhtin's objections to mere theoretical 'transcriptions': "For Bakhtin, whatever serves to 'fuse' serves to impoverish because it destroys outsidness and otherness; it replaces interactive processes with consumated products, and thus sacrifices the eventness of events to mere theoretical 'transcription'" (1990:183). Ironically, Bakhtin performed mostly theoretical transcriptions upon and from Dostoevskian texts.

appears that reductionistic attacks against theory (quite rampant in Russian criticism[9]) are simply self-defeating: no legitimate branch of human activity should be subjected to expatriation.

In this context of an extremely imperious need for cultural frames and theoretical assumptions in approaches to Dostoevsky's fiction, one can find an additional symptomatic comment on the locus of textual practice:

> Bakhtin provides no sustained readings of whole novels, and so one must guess at how he would analyze the role of extra-plot connections in a specific work. His analysis suggests that the truly central moments of *The Brothers Karamazov* are in great dialogic encounters, which although enabled by the plot seem to arise out of it. They seem to be somehow 'excessive' in terms of the whole novel's action. Most likely, Bakhtin would focus on the Grand Inquisitor's legend, which seems to have a life of its own. (Morson and Emerson 1990:247)

From all the above quotations pertaining to Bakhtin's critics, one can detect, first, the state of affairs resulting from Bakhtin's 'avoidance' of full interpretation of Dostoevsky's fictional texts, and, second, the declaration of the centrality of "The Grand Inquisitor" for the application of Bakhtinian theory. Bakhtin, however, is a cultural and literary theorist, and his "excessive" theorizing is evidence that the genre of theory as a metalanguage of culture and literature, as a medium of dialogical coherence, is an organic and semiotic necessity in a culture. *Pace* all the Bakhtinian critics, it should be axiomatic that he chose

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[9] An excellent study of various implications of the term "theory" for the Russian society and literature, relevant also for the Dostoevskian creative process and ambiance, is given in Moser, Charles A. 1989. *Esthetics of Nightmare. Russian Literary Theory, 1855-1870.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Thus Moser: "The word 'theory' in a literary context was associated with bloodless abstractions, preconceived, procrustean doctrines which deliberately distort the artistic depiction of reality" (103). Dobroliubov, for instance, accused Dostoevsky of being a "theoretician [...] and in many cases [...] poorly acquainted with reality" (quoted in Moser 1989:235). This statement alone should make us aware of the risks involved in playing the misguided game of false dichotomies like theory/reality.

to pursue a terminology and a field, which could be the most productive for his profile as a critic. In such a theory-centered context it is revealing to quote the full 'extent' to which Bakhtin himself comments on the text of "The Grand Inquisitor":

> For all its external proportionality, the 'Legend' is nevertheless full of interruptions; both the very form of its construction as the Grand Inquisitor's dialogue with Christ and at the same time with himself, and, finally, the very unexpectedness and duality of its finale, indicate an internally dialogic disintegration at its very ideological core. A thematic analysis of the 'Legend' would reveal the deep essential relevance of its dialogic form. (1984:287)

As is evident from Bakhtin's terminology, the categories of "dialogue," "duality," and "interruptions" are indispensable (though lamentably general, applicable to any of Dostoevsky's texts) for sequencing of the 'Legend'. But as such, these extremely general categories are not sufficiently transparent for our purposes of textual analysis.

The answer to this "predicament" lies not in the incorrectness of the polyphonic conceptual framework, but in its unavoidable incompleteness. Thus the basic Bakhtinian intuitions about plot, text, ideas, hero, person, polyphony, dialogism are decisive in any productive interpretation of Dostoevsky's literary work. Since for our purposes two categories will be central in the textual analyses of the "Legend," - the categories of polyphony and dialogue, - I will use them as forms and general frames that underlie personal-hypostatic coexistence of characters in the "Legend." By themselves, these categories are extremely "suggestive," although their methodological efficacy has to be qualified. In this perspective, doubts about the nature and efficacy of the category of "polyphony" are voiced by Bakhtin himself:

> It must be noted that the comparison we draw between Dostoevsky's novel and polyphony is meant as a graphic analogy, nothing more. The image of polyphony and counterpoint only points out those new problems which arise when a novel is constructed beyond the boundaries of ordinary monologic unity, just as in music new problems arose when the boundaries of a single voice were exceeded. But the

> material of music and of the novel are too dissimilar for there to be anything more between them than a graphic analogy, a simple metaphor. We are transforming this metaphor into the term 'polyphonic novel, since we have not found a more appropriate label. It should not be forgotten, however, that the term has its origin in metaphor. (1984:22)

It is strategically relevant to relate the term "polyphonic" to liminal and conventional generality. Being only and merely a metaphor this central term of Dostoevsky's poetics inspires limited interpretive confidence when applied to a specific text and betrays the need to reevaluate the status of other Bakhtinian categories, especially that, of "dialogue" and "person."

Therefore, a significant shift in value and efficacy of those terms could be detected only when applied to a specific text. Moreover, the need for a new terminology and a new interpretive strategy will be dictated and legitimized by the text itself. It is the nature of the specific text to demand its own theory and to be open to a multitude of complementary interpretations.[10]

Consequently, a dual task emerges: to extend theory and to extend interpretation. Since my prime target is to define the status of the fictional person in "The Grand Inquisitor," close textual analysis will follow the strategy of "discovering" and defining the textual subsistence of fictional persons in the monologue of "The Grand Inquisitor" (hereafter also: the Monologue).

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[10] Generally, I adopt the position that a text is endowed with the capacity to suggest or contain its own theory or is able to model itself upon a reader. In my study I will rely on that assumption. Todorov, for instance, relating to the strategy of understanding built in the text itself, says: "The text itself always contains an indication of the way it is to be read" (1990:46). It is also important to stress that the reading of a text is performed by a reader who activates his own frames of understanding, frames based on his knowledge-encyclopedia. Eco, within a framework of infinite semiosis, underscores the role of the reader/text mutual modeling: "Many texts make evident their Model Reader by implicitly

To model the interpersonal structure of the monologue of the Grand Inquisitor, a new category will be introduced, the category of "hypostasis." The main feature of this category is that it automatically postulates at least two persons in their most intimate and immanent relationships of identity and difference. I will determine that the category of person in Dostoevsky is instantiated through the so-called hypostatic modality, tentatively defined as "integral interpersonal identity." The person itself will be the hypostasis of the other person or of several persons.

Once interpersonal relationships have been defined as hypostatic, the clusters of persons and images attached to those persons will exhibit hypostatic interdependency through their dialogical and polyphonic functions. The three persons of the Legend, The Grand Inquisitor, Christ, and the Great Spirit (Satan), develop a ternary structure of persons and interpersonality that resembles and impostorially supplants the Christian Trinity. The three persons of the Legend generate a semiotic medium of image-icons, the foundational one being the trinity of Love, Freedom, and Faith.[11] To correlate the structures of persons with that of images-icons, I will develop a modeling approach through the Bakhtinian category of the voice. All three categories developed via textual analysis (i.e., hypostasis, icon, and voice) will be understood as dynamic entities

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presupposing a specific encyclopedic competence. [...] But at the same time text *creates* the competence of its Model Reader." (1979:7)

[11] The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor invites if not compels a religious intertextual iconology. The icons of Love, Freedom, and Faith, ruling over interpersonal modalities in the Legend, interface unpredictably with the foundational Evangelical and Augustinian icons of Faith, Hope, and Love. Dostoevsky's text and world-version privilege the icon of Freedom over that of Hope. Freedom is more important than hope for personal identity in Dostoevsky, or else Hell and history would be impossible. A section ("Freedom, Hope, and Happiness") comparing Dostoevsky's iconological trinity with the classical one is prevalently based on Augustine's *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love.*

generated by the hypostatic-iconological artistic thinking foregrounded by "The Grand Inquisitor."

A special emphasis will be given to the notion of "artistic thinking" (identifiable mainly with that of "poetics"). The central notion of polyphonic artistic thinking is explicitly advanced by Bakhtin:

> We consider the creation of the polyphonic novel a huge step forward not only in the development of novelistic prose, that is, of all genres developing within the orbit of the novel, but also in the development of the *artistic thinking* of humankind. It seems to us that one could speak directly of a special *polyphonic artistic thinking* extending beyond the bounds of the novel as a genre. This mode of thinking makes available those sides of a human being, and above all the *thinking human consciousness and the dialogic sphere of its existence*, which are not subject to *artistic* assimilation from *monologic positions*. (1984:270)

In the concrete, textual definition of the Legend's poetics, polyphonic artistic thinking will be instantiated and identified as hypostatic-iconological artistic thinking. Due to the novelty of the term "hypostasis" in my approach to Dostoevsky's fiction, a full section will be devoted to this category, as well as a full section to the mechanisms permitting the modeling of the other two categories: that of icon-image and voice. The hypostatic (interpersonal) mode of thinking (fictional visualizing) and co-being (Bakhtin's *so-bytie*) developed in the Legend rests on the personologic (polyphonic) and iconologic (semiotic) interplay staged by the categories of *hypostasis, icon,* and *voice*. But in the Dostoevskian fictional world-version, as we shall see, the ontic dichotomy person/sign is overcome (by definition an icon is personal hypostatic presence): the theological oppositions nature/person and logos/flesh will provide the mechanisms of mutual convertibility between the two ontic domains.

2) The Category of Hypostatic Person

To identify and to interpret the functioning of the poetic mechanism (or of the mode of artistic thinking) in "The Grand Inquisitor" is to radically center our descriptive attention on the status of persons in the monologue. In the Dostoevskian context of "profound personalism" (Bakhtin 1984:31), it is not sufficient, though necessary, to view personal identity as the self/other mechanism, but also as a truth-person mechanism:

> For Dostoevsky there are no ideas, no thoughts, no positions which belong to no one, which exist 'in themselves.' Even 'truth in itself' he presents in the spirit of Christian ideology, as incarnated in Christ; that is, he presents it as a personality entering into relationship with other personalities. (Bakhtin 1984:32)

From the self-evident Bakhtinian ontological hierarchy we can postulate the absolute priority of the category of person in Dostoevsky, so that the truth itself is irrelevant without personal and interpersonal projections. The truth-person coexistence, however, is presented in Christian terms, where whatever constitutes the substance of a person (truth, ideas, thoughts, positions) functions as an incarnated component of that person. That means that any person-generating element that is incarnated by a person abandons any hope of neutrality, scientific truth, and becomes identity, icon. Moreover, in terms of action (say, Aristotelian ethical praxis) the personal substance undergoes an experiential (paschal) edification. In Dostoevsky, the paschal (suffering-driven) experience of self-identity, of freedom (in its various forms of hubris or kenosis), of faith (and thus of nihilism towards a semiotic doctrine), or of God (and thus of belligerent atheism), represent only a few central items that confront a person in terms of its substance. The shorthand, umbrella denomination for the incarnated substance into a person would be

'semiotic substance,' where any semiotic 'logos' appears as a personologic, not doctrinal, faith, love, or worship. The hypostatic coexistence of a person's mind with its incarnated substance requires visualization by a special fictional world, a world created (as Bakhtin seems to claim) by Dostoevsky. And, therefore, to elaborate a theory of person would mean to account for the most intimate nature of Dostoevskian poetics (or polyphonic artistic thinking), a poetics that makes possible the construction of a polyphonic fictional world.

Starting on this ground, Holquist, for instance, develops a scrupulous survey of the Bakhtinian theory of dialogism that is based on the priority of a personal center and all that is not that center:

> In dialogism, the very capacity to have consciousness is based on *otherness*. This otherness is not merely a dialectical alienation on its way to a sublation that will endow it with a unifying identity in higher consciousness. On the contrary: in dialogism consciousness *is* otherness. (1990:18)

Self and other acquire the status of simultaneous interdetermination through the medium of consciousness. Thus "self" itself is dialogic, a relation. Moreover, "I" and the "other" form a unity as interpersonal beings, as an event, or a co-being (*sobytie*: an event) of persons. But the interpersonal existence realizes itself not only through co-eventness of distinct personal presences. The medium of the dialogic word, in fact, the human dimension which is subject to the test of truth, or the truth itself, fully participate in the economy of personal coexistence and personal identity: "Existence is not only an event, it is an utterance" (Holquist 1990:27).

After establishing the modes of existence of the self ("event, " and "utterance"), Holquist formalizes the "ratios" of "otherness" that pertain to that self in terms of Bakhtinian science of relations: "The self, then, may be conceived as a multiple

phenomenon of essentially three elements (it is -at least -a triad, not a duality): a center, a non-center, and the relation between them" (Holquist 1990:29).

In my approach to the monologue, the two formal centers of the triad will be personal centers. Moreover, the relation between them will be identified as being the third center - as the third personal center. So, the mediation between two persons in the monologue becomes possible only through the third hypostatic person, in our case Satan (the other two being Christ and the Inquisitor). The image of the third person is essential in Bakhtin's view of interpersonal poetics:

> The person who understands inevitably becomes a *third* party in the dialogue... Any utterance always has an addressee. [...] This is the second party. [...] But in addition to this addressee (the second party), the author of the utterance, with a grater or lesser awareness, presupposes a higher *superaddressee* (third), whose absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed, either in some metaphysical distance or in distant historical time (the loophole addressee). (Bakhtin 1986:126)

The third person's role could be flexible, no doubt, but the main point made by Bakhtin is that even the two persons of a dialogue (the addresser and the addressee), who are by definition non-solitary, would have to be aware, in addition to the responsibility of the dialogue, that their interaction is witnessed and judged by a third person, a superaddressee (God, Christ, a judge, etc.). This only means that the dialogic praxis between two has consequences for a third. After having defined dialogic relations among three persons, Bakhtin also offers a tentative model underlying the nature of relations between two distinct persons that are being defined as an integral non-solitary interpersonal self-awareness:

> Does the cognizer coincide with the cognized? In other words, does man remain only with himself, that is, remain solitary? Such is indeed the case. Something absolutely new appears here: the supraperson, the *supra-I*, that is, the witness and the judge *of the whole* human being, of the whole I, and consequently someone who is no longer the person, no longer the I, but the *other*. The reflection of the

> self in the empirical other through whom one must pass in order to reach *I-for-myself* (can this *I-for-myself* be solitary?). The absolute freedom of this I. (Bakhtin 1986:137)

Bakhtin's categories of superaddressee (the third person) and supraperson (the second person) originally, though partially, thematize the concept of interpersonality and are helpful for our adoption of the category of hypostasis from theology. As it may be derived from Bakhtin's formulations, three essential features are to be defining for the hypostatic person: I is the other, the other is the judge of the *whole* I, and I is, in spite of the total impact of the other, absolutely free.

The category of "hypostasis" - I adopted from theology, where this term is linked to the definition of the nature of interpersonal identity of Christ. From the extensive literature on the Trinity where the category of hypostasis is defined not only in relation to the divine but explicitly to the human nature (Christ as two natures in one hypostasis-person, where hypostasis is the ontological and soteriological capacity to integrate radically different natures into one person),[1] I will adopt the typologically circumscribed definition from the point of view of the Orthodoxy:

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[1] Trinitarian thinking is central to Russian theology. Pavel Florensky (1989. *Stolp i Utverzhdenie Istiny. Opyt Pravoslavnoi Teoditsei v Dvenatsati Pis'makh.* [*The Pillar and the Foundation of Truth. An Essay in Orthodox Theology in Twelve Letters.*] Paris: YMCA Press), for instance, in his analysis of the Trinity (pp. 51-70) relentlessly insists on the radical difference between the East and the West's understanding of the Trinity. The quest for the Trinity is qualified by Florensky as the model of spiritual soteriology: "Beyond searching for the Trinity, and dying in folly – *tertium non datur*!" (p. 66). Florensky is relevant for the understanding of Bakhtin's closeness to Russian theology: "Florensky was admired by Bakhtin and others around him. [...] The parallels between the thought of Bakhtin and Florensky are significant. [...] Both men were unusually cultured, particularly in classical and modern European philosophy. Both Bakhtin and Florensky were enemies of clericalism. Florensky invoked a more personal and immediate sense of God's presence by emphasizing Christ's saying, 'When two or more are gathered in my name, there shall I be.' In all these views, particularly in their emphasis on communality, anticlericalism, and I/thou distinction, both men were typical

> Trinitarian theology thus opens to us a new aspect of the human reality; that of personhood. ...Every attribute is repetitive, it belongs to nature and is found again among other individuals. Even a cluster of qualities can be found elsewhere. Personal uniqueness is what remains when one takes away all cosmic context, social and individual -all, indeed, that may be conceptualized. Eluding concepts, personhood cannot be defined. It is the incomparable, the wholly-other. (Lossky 1978:42)

Thus, Lossky provides the radical distinction between the identity of an individual, which is cosmic, social, and individual nature and the personal identity (as opposed to the natural individual identity). But the question is how to find a way to define the person. The answer, as we saw above, was suggested by Bakhtin's poetics of persons: through another person. Lossky, theologically, takes the same position according to which to know a person is to relate integrally to another person:

> For that which remains irreducible to every nature cannot be defined, but only designated. It is only to be seized through a personal relationship, in a reciprocity analogous to that of the Trinity, in an unfolding which goes beyond the opaque banality of the world of individuals. (Lossky 1978:127)

And, as for the Trinity itself, it is well known that it is defined by one nature (or essence) in three hypostases, where every hypostasis assumes in its fullness the whole of divine nature. It is doubtful that one could straightforwardly and expeditiously define divine nature and, consequently, a divine person. That is beyond our purpose here. Nevertheless, the structure of the Trinity is a human construct containing the fruits of human imagination about the possible ideal status among persons. It is a cultural model, with inherent cultural capacity of modeling human creative self-understanding. In my projection the category of hypostasis will be redefined in accordance to the reading

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of the unorthodox Orthodoxy in the 1920s. [...] While Florensky dreamed of an end of time, of a stasis that would come when we get beyond the flux of this world and history ends, Bakhtin believed that there should be no end to becoming, and he was an enemy of all that is finished [*zavershen*]." (Clark and Holquist 1984. *Mikhail Bakhtin*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pp. 135-136)

strategy proposed by the text itself, and the category of 'trinity' will also serve as a useful cultural and intertextual frame.

In using the model of interpersonality offered by the Trinity, Lossky transfers the definition applied to the Trinity unto human beings as well: "So then, men possess a single common nature in many human persons. ...However, the idea of the person implies the idea of freedom in relation to nature" (Ibid. 126).

But every hypostasis contains nature in its fullness, meaning with all its powers. Nature does not offer inter-human or inter-divine hypostatic distinctions, god equals god and man equals man by nature. Ultimately, a hypostasis is to be defined only in relation to another hypostasis, another free and self-determining person. In this context a hypostasis by definition is many hypostases-persons (in this case three).

At this juncture, as a consequence, the major task is to distinguish between 'I' and 'Other,' or between hypostases: "We have said that personal uniqueness eludes every definition, that personhood can only be evoked in its relation with another. The only way to distinguish the hypostases will therefore be by making precise their relationship [...]" (Lossky 1978:43).

In the Bakhtinian paradigm of interpersonal relationship we find two categories that are used by Bakhtin in defining the I/Other relationship, categories that guarantee the "surplus of vision" and "extralocality" in interpersonal relations: the category of the word (discourse, utterance, truth, thought, idea, consciousness), and the category of the voice. The word decides (alters, or upgrades) the status of the person: "Dostoevsky and his characters are all equally compounded of language. They are words, combinations of

their own and others' words, all selves constructed out of other selves" (Clark and Holquist 1984:246).

The above quote sounds quite hypostatically: we can remember from it that words are carriers of selves, to that extent that words are selves (roughly speaking: to unite hypostatically different natures is to effect hypostatic union, similar to Christ's hypostatic union of human and divine natures). To designate this identity of person and word, we will equate the word with the image-icon of the person. But this icon-word will be understood as personified icon.[2]

We find countless variations on the term "image" in Bakhtin's book on Dostoevsky, where we should take into consideration the semantic commonality of the term "*obraz*" ("image") with that of "icon." In one instance, Bakhtin relates to the term "image" as to the interconnecting medium between ideas and persons: "We must remember first of all that the image of an idea is inseparable from the image of a person, the carrier of that idea" (1984:85).

But Bakhtin shifts the stress from the mirror-image (which is not abrogated) to the discourse-image: "Dostoevsky's hero is not an objectified image but an autonomous discourse, *pure voice*; we do not see him, we hear him" (1984:55).

Therefore, a person is identified both with an *image* and with a *voice*. Ultimately, polyphony is conjoined with poly-iconicity, or else with an *iconostasis*. The structuring

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[2] Bakhtin is fascinated by junctive capacity between heterogeneous natures: "My image [icon] of myself. The nature of one's idea of oneself, of one's I as a whole. How is it principally distinguished from my idea of the *other*. The image of I, a concept or an experience, a sensation, and so forth. The nature of this image's existence. The composition of this image. [...] The heterogeneous composition of my image. [...] To what degree is it possible to combine *I* and the *other* in one neutral image of a person." (1986:146-147)

of persons, images, and voices will provide us with the theoretical framework necessary to grasp the functioning of the Dostoevskian textual mechanism. The unit of the voice will represent the minimal component in any understanding of the image-word, which must have a minimum of two voices: "A single voice ends nothing and resolves nothing. Two voices is the minimum for life, the minimum for existence" (1984:252). Bakhtin designated the unit of the word as being the carrier of voices, when voices determine the sounding and the dialogic status of the word: "Everywhere a specific sum total of ideas, thoughts, and words is passed through several unmerged voices, sounding differently in each" (1984:265) .

Now, to understand the functioning of the hypostatic structural unit, it is imperative to determine the modality of presence of a person in an image or in a voice. Bakhtin envisages this presence as a total presence:

> A person is wholly present in his every gesture. And the orientation of one person to another person's discourse and consciousness is, in essence, the basic theme of all of Dostoevsky's works. The hero's attitude towards himself is inseparably bound up with his attitude toward another, and with the attitude of another towards him. His consciousness of self is constantly perceived against the background of the other's consciousness of him – 'I for myself' against the background of 'I for another.' Thus the hero's words about himself are structured under the continuous influence of someone else's words about him. (1984:207)

The expression "A person is *wholly* present in his every gesture" entails that a person also be wholly present in his every word. A person's actions and discourses are integral versions of that person in Dostoevsky's fictional world.

This status of a person is even more obvious from the perspective of the genre: "The menippea strives to provide, as it were, the ultimate and decisive words and acts of

a person, each of which contains the whole man, the whole of his life in its entirety" (Bakhtin 1984:115).

In Bakhtin's Dostoevsky we encounter a radical Christian form of personified ontology, where every manifestation of a person contains the whole person. This state of affairs reminds us of the category of hypostasis by which personal existence incorporates the entire nature. More importantly, a person's manifestation in another person will amount to the effective presence of that person in another person, establishing thus the hypostatic equality between persons.

A final quote from Bakhtin will reinforce the hypostatic perspective on person and its 'nature' (word, thought, idea, truth, and discourse) in Dostoevsky:

> Dostoevsky's ideology knows neither the separate thought nor systemic unity [...]. For him the ultimate indivisible unit is not the separate referentially bounded thought, not the proposition, not the assertion, but rather the integral point of view, the integral position of personality. For him, referential meaning is indissolubly fused with the position of a personality. In every thought the personality is given, as it were, in its totality. And thus the linking-up of thoughts is the linking-up of integral positions, the linking-up of personalities. [...] In Dostoevsky, two thoughts are already two people, for there are no thoughts belonging to no one and every thought represents an entire *person*. (1984:93)

As it has become obvious from our presentation of the conception of personhood in Dostoevsky, as seen by Bakhtin, the centrality of person has ontological priority. But the assertion that a thought would represent an *entire person* thematizes and enacts a converse operation from the usual one in Christianity: here not logos becomes flesh, but flesh becomes logos (and for the skeptic it is sufficient to look at a speaking person to perceive the mutation of flesh into words). This unusual anthropological move does not abrogate or obviate the usual theological primacy of logos. The otherness comes at us not

only as flesh, but primarily in its distinctive features of a word-person. To postulate a person in Dostoevsky means to postulate ipso facto another person.[3]

It follows from all this that to grasp the nature of persons (not the nature of nature) we have to postulate their relationship in two additional categories, that of *image-icon* and that of *voice*. To identify persons, personified images, and personified voices, and their reciprocal distribution and structuring, represents the main project of our interpretation of the Monologue. Since the typological-religious Christ is present in the Monologue, the principle of cultural typology invites a transcultural transfer of pertinent determinations of the religious Christ to the person defined as fictional 'Christ,' who obviously carries with him a self-describing paradigm generated by that cultural context. Persons and images accompanying them are transmitted through the mechanisms of intertextuality. Bakhtin himself stressed the typological importance of culture: "The link

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[3] The visualization of external copresence and compossibility of persons has its counterpart in the internal segmentation of a person, derived from the voices and contradictions of a person, an artistic modality that is equivalent with hypostatization: "The fundamental category in Dostoevsky's mode of artistic visualizing was not evolution, but *coexistence* and *interaction*. He saw and conceived his world primarily in terms of space, not time. Hence his deep affinity for the dramatic form. Dostoevsky strives to organize all available meaningful material, all material of reality, in one time-frame, in the form of dramatic juxtaposition, and he strives to develop it extensively. [...] For him, to get one's bearings on the world meant to conceive all its contents as simultaneous, and *to guess at their interrelationships in the cross-section of a single moment*. This stubborn urge to see everything as coexisting, to perceive and show all things side by side and simultaneous, as if they existed in space and not in time, leads Dostoevsky to dramatize, in space, even internal contradictions and internal stages in the development of a single person – forcing a character to converse with his own double, with the devil, with his alter ego, with his own caricature (Ivan and the Devil, Ivan and Smerdiakov, Raskolnikov and Svidrigailov, and so forth). This characteristic explains the frequent occurrence of paired characters in Dostoevsky's work. One could say, in fact, that out of every contradiction within a single person Dostoevsky tries to create two persons, in order to dramatize the contradiction and develop it extensively" (Bakhtin 1984:28). Augustine's dialogues are in principle similar to the Dostoevskian dialogic confrontations, especially his *Soliloquies*, where he stages a dialogue about iconology with a hypostatized reason (see the section on inanity in Augustine).

between literary scholarship and history of culture (culture not as a sum of phenomena, but as a totality). [...] Literature is an inseparable part of the totality of culture and cannot be studied outside the total cultural context" (Bakhtin 1986:140).

It is our basic premise to take Bakhtin as a normative source for our approach to Dostoevsky: both authors pertain to the same cultural context. It is typologically indicative to trace personal filiation and the power of diachronic modeling among persons, as Clark and Holquist do in relation to Bakhtin: "His various redactions of Dostoevsky books, covering a period of over forty tumultuous years, make clear that Bakhtin learned well the polyphonic lessons of the figure he chose as his authority: Dostoevsky occupies for Bakhtin the same position that Bakhtin ascribes to Christ in relation to Dostoevsky" (1964:247).

In defining the basic or effectively foundational categories of person, image, and voice, one can proceed with the concrete manifestations of those categories in the Monologue. The interpretation of the monologue will significantly expand the semantic range of the adopted categories from Bakhtin, and, more importantly, will circumscribe the dynamic understanding of the category of hypostasis, which defines the relations among the categories of *person*, *image*, and *voice*. The hypostatic interplay among persons, images and voices is generated in the Monologue within the framing of the Three Temptations.

3) The First Temptation

To define hypostatic artistic thinking in the Legend is to define its mechanism in terms of poetics. The monologue of the Grand Inquisitor in this perspective has its distinct narrative engine: the structure of the myth of the three temptations in the wilderness. In the myth of the temptations, every temptation is a binary structure rendered by pairing of a question-temptation followed by the answer-refutation.

Questions are attributes ascribed to the person named Great Spirit (Satan), whereas the answers constitute a paradigm attached to the second person of the drama in the wilderness, to Christ. The discourse mechanism is guaranteed by the passage from one question to another, and thus, from one temptation to another.

Since in the myth the temptations were refuted, the person identifiable as Christ defeated the person identifiable as Satan. In Dostoevsky's poetics of persons - narrative, plot and discourse are only poetic means for actualizing or targeting the integral person. 'Truth' is used by a person with the specific purpose of reinforcing, testing, defeating, substituting, or annihilating another person. In this perspective, nothing prevails over a person but another person. 'Truth' as the paradox of hypostatic union between personal nature and semiotic nature prevails and reigns only as person.

To illustrate the ontological prevalence of personhood, Dostoevsky chooses the myth of temptations as the battleground for establishing the soteriological shift in history through and only through the soteriological mission of a person. Soteriology as the theory of salvation is a process accomplished by a person vis-à-vis other persons, or the whole of humanity (e.g.: two soteriological systems are well known as two extremes and constructs in the soteriological continuum: Christianity and Communism). For our purposes it is imperative to keep in mind that the conflict among persons over the definition and the identity of human person defines the structuring of the Monologue. In

the myth of the Temptations we have the collision of two superpersons, Christ and Satan, over the nature of the human being.

In the Monologue the temptations are replayed and newly solved by a human being, The Grand Inquisitor, whose personal nature (not ontic nature underlying the person) was defined in the wilderness by an alien self-sacrificial person, Christ, whose mission is now redefined by a new soteriology, projected and proclaimed through the rejection of Christ[4].

Let us now follow, systematically, the development of the new temptations as presented in the Monologue. The temptations, it must be stressed, are designed by a spiritual negative personal power (Satan, Great Spirit, Spirit of Nonbeing, the devil, etc.), which is extensively thematized in The Brothers Karamazov:

> "'The dread [*strashnyi*;] and intelligent spirit [*umnyi dukh*], the spirit of self-destruction and non-being [*dukh samounichtozheniia i nebytiia*],[5]' the old man

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[4] The Dostoevskian text follows the succession of temptations from the Gospel of Mathew (4:1-11): "[1] Then Jesus was led up by the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted [Russ.: *dlia iskusheniia* Gr.: *peirasthenai*] by the devil [Russ.: *ot diavola*; Gr.: *diabolou*]. [2] When he had fasted forty days and forty nights, he was hungry afterward. [3] The tempter [Russ.: *iskusitel'*; Gr.: *peirazon*] came and said to him, 'If you are the Son of God, command that these stones become bread [Russ.: *khlebami*].' [4] But he answered, "It is written, 'Man shall not live by bread alone [Russ.: *ne khlebom odnim*], but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of God.'" [5] Then the devil [Russ.: *diavol*; Gr. *diabolos*] took him into the holy city, and set him on the pinnacle of the temple, [6] and said to him, "If you are the Son of God, throw yourself down, for it is written, 'He will give his angels charge of you,' and, 'On their hands they will bear you up, lest you strike your foot against a stone.'" [7] Jesus said to him, "Again, it is written, 'You shall not tempt [*ne iskushai*] the Lord, your God.'" [8] Again, the devil took him to a very high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them. [9] And he said to him, "All these I will give you, if you will fall down [Russ.: *padshy*] and worship [Russ.: *poklonish'sia*; Gr.: *proskineses*] me." [10] Then Jesus said to him, "Begone Satan! For it is written, 'You shall worship [Russ.: *pokloniaisia*; Gr.: *proskineseis*; Lat.: *adorabis*] the Lord your God, and him only shall you serve [Russ.: *sluzhy*; Gr.: *latreiseis*; Lat.: *servies*].'" [11] Then the devil left him, and behold, angels came and ministered to him."

[5] In what follows, the quotes will be given from Fyodor Dostoevsky. *The Brothers Karamazov.* 1990 [1880]. Translated and Annotated by Richard Pevear and Larissa

> goes, 'the great spirit [*velikii dukh*] spoke with you in the wilderness, and it has been passed on to us in books that he supposedly 'tempted' [*iskushal*] you! Did he really? And was it possible to say anything more true than what he proclaimed [*vozvestil*] to you in his three questions, which you rejected, and which the books refer to as 'temptations' [*iskusheniiami*]? And at the same time, if ever a real thundering miracle [*chudo*] was performed on earth, it was on that day, the day of those three temptations [*trekh iskusheniiakh*]. The miracle lay precisely in the appearance of those three questions [*voprosov*]. If it were possible to imagine [*pomyslit'*: to conceive in thought; *mysl'*: thought], just as a trial [*dlia proby*] and an example [*dlia primera*], that those three questions of the dread spirit had been lost from the books without a trace, and it was necessary that they be restored, thought up and invented anew, to be put back into the books, and to that end all the wise men on earth-rulers, high priests, scholars, philosophers, poets-were brought together and given this task: to think up, to invent three questions such as would not only correspond to the scale of the event, but, moreover, would express in three words, in three human phrases only, the entire future history of the world and mankind-do you think that all the combined wisdom of the earth could think up anything faintly resembling in force [*po sile*] and depth [*po glubine*] those three questions that were actually presented to you then by the powerful [*moguchim*: mighty] and intelligent spirit in the wilderness?" (252)

The Monologue is built as a reiteration in strict chronological manner of the Gospel temptations, but this time between a human being (the Grand Inquisitor) and Christ. The analysis of the Monologue will generate a polyphonic perspective on the status of the persons involved in the Monologue, as well as the distribution of what defines their identity and their difference, i.e. the icon-images and their voices.

The significance of the myth of the temptations is defined by The Grand Inquisitor as an absolute superhuman event (the entire number of human minds, even if it

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Volokhonsky. New York: Vintage Books. I will also use in a very limited fashion and only for stylistic purposes the classic Garnett translation. The Garnett translation renders the Russian sentence about Satan's spirit this way: "The wise and dread spirit, the spirit of self-destruction and nonexistence" (232). In Victor Terras (1998. *Reading Dostoevsky.* Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press) - in the chapter "Appendix: How Much Does Dostoevsky Lose in English Translation?" – we find the following comment: "Pevear's translation serves the scholarly reader better, as it brings him or her closer to Dostoevsky's craftsmanship. Garnett's somewhat old-fashion English has great charm and is close to the ethos of Dostoevsky's Victorian narrator. It is not quite Dostoevsky, falling short of the prodigious energy of his dialogue, but the general reader may find it preferable to Pevear's." (162)

were possible to bring them together into one Mind, would be incapable of creating something similar):

> By the questions alone, simply by the miracle of their appearance, one can see that one is dealing with a mind not human and transient but eternal and absolute. For in these three questions all of subsequent human history is as if brought together into a single whole [*v odno tseloe*] and foretold; three images [*tri obraza*: three icons][6] are revealed [*iavleny*] that will take in all the insoluble historical contradictions [*protivorechiia*] of human nature [*chelovecheskoi prirody*] over all the earth. This could not have been seen so well at the time, for the future was unknown, but now that fifteen centuries have gone by, we can see that in these three questions everything was so precisely divined [*ugadano*] and foretold [*predskazano*], and has proved so completely true [*i do togo opravdalos'*: has been so truly fulfilled], that to add [*pribavit'*] to them or subtract [*ubavit'*] anything from them is impossible.[7] (252; 14:230)

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[6] This moment in the Monologue is an iconologic shifter. Its iconologic force is derived from the foregrounding to the status of global, macrostructural dominant of the three 'images-icons' which take charge of the mechanism of the Monologue and govern its production of meaning.

[7] With these iconized words, we enter the hypostatic status of the three images, which consists of a complete nature that powers them. Here also we must commit to memory still another principle that governs the Monologue: that nothing can be added to or subtracted from the images' completeness (this assertion is exclusively the Grand Inquisitor's). But to add and subtract is the main business of the polyphonic novel. To add and to subtract will form a powerful paradigm with other two functions: to unite (associate) or separate (dissociate). The concepts of completeness/incompleteness, association/dissociation, subtraction/addition (and, as we shall see later symbolic/diabolic) form a paradigm of devises that govern the procedures of partitioning of the text's world into domains (see Pavel 1986:45) and dominants. Domain and dominants are not formalistic limiting concepts, but world-forming procedures governed by a modality that individuates a world (see, for instance, Doležel 1976a and 1989). The Grand Inquisitor here individuates his world as being governed and thus axiologically modalized by an absolutely good iconology of the three images (Doležel – 1976a:7 - identifies four main modalities whose constraining principles could govern a world: alethic, deontic, axiological, and epistemic). What is good for man and what is bad for man is governed by axiological macrostructural modal operators (expressed by the concepts of goodness, badness, and indifference). The main target of the Three Temptations is to identify the axiological world (it should be stressed that in a world all modalities operate jointly) in which man exercises his freedom of action. In Dostoevsky, however, any possible modality of a world must be refracted through a person's self-consciousness (Bakhtin – 1984:76 - stresses the fact that self-consciousness of a person is the dominant in Dostoevsky's fiction).

Now, in the interpretation of the Monologue one should not make the mistake and ignore the warning of the Grand Inquisitor that one is dealing here with the absolute terms of understanding of the myth and, from the perspective of the hypostatic thinking, with the "absolute" terms of interpretation of the Monologue (here one can recall the interpretive strategy adopted for this study, namely that the text suggests its own model of interpretation, as is claimed by Eco and Todorov).

Indeed, the three temptations[8] are the basis of the hypostatic artistic thinking developed in the Monologue, and to discover the rules of concatenation between the questions and answers of each temptation will amount to the discovering of the rules of hypostatics.

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[8] The word 'temptation' (*iskushenie*) is pivotal for The Brothers Karamazov, since the tempter (*iskusitel'*) is called also diavol, which in Greek is diabolos. The term 'dia-bolic' (dividing) will be used by us in iconic opposition with 'sym-bolic' (uniting). Another conceptual distinction that will guide us is that between 'worship' (*poklonenie*, or *preklonenie*), applied to God alone (as nature-person) and 'veneration' (usually *pochitanie* as in *ikonopochitanie* or *ikonochestvovanie*) of God's semiotic counterpart, the icon (as person-image). *Ikonopoklonenie* would be icon-worship (iconolatry), but worship should be directed exclusively towards God, not towards a semiotic or non-personal entity (be it sacred word or sacred image or sacred object). The Orthodox tradition knows the dogma of veneration, not of worshiping, of the icon. In Ouspensky (1992, 1:138) we have the claim, unrelated to Mathew and the temptations, that *proskinesis* (used in Mathew 4:9), term translated as 'veneration', is to be applied to the icon, and that *latreia* (used in Mathew 4:10) translated as 'worship' or 'adoration' (Lat.: *adoratio*), is a term to be applied to God alone (it is no wonder then that iconolatry is justly perceived as idolatry). This application of the term *proskinesis* as 'veneration' and not 'worship' seems to deviate from Mathew's text of temptations, where *proskinesis* is clearly 'worship' (Lat.: *adoratio*) as is *latreia*. There is no need to clarify the problem of translation or use of the Greek terms here (which could follow different terminology tradition). For us it is quite clear, from both the Russian and the English terminology, that worship-*poklonenie* should not be confused with veneration-*pochitanie*. It appears though (to capitalize on the distinction here and now) that the Grand Inquisitor worships not only the 'Great Spirit', but also the text that iconizes the three temptations. From our focus on the distinction person/image, one may see, in a preliminary fashion, that the integral, religious mereology (the study of parts-components) of person (of man or god or spirit) rests on the foundational triad of nature-person-and-image. The category of worship prepares us for and anticipates the Second Temptation.

Let us attempt a demarcation of the key concepts related to the Temptations. The Temptations are *three questions*, which contain in them the *whole* of human history.

Moreover, the three questions represent *three images-icons* constructed out of *contradictions* of human nature. Consequently, our task is to establish the rules which govern the "whole," and the rules which govern the coexistence if not the compossibility (whether they are a whole by nature or by fiat, or both) of the images-icons.

Therefore, the first interpretive and hermeneutic endeavor is to identify the images, which are engendered by the superhuman absolute event of the temptations. For this we have to postulate that the Monologue is an iconic reiteration and reenacting of the temptations themselves, only that the Grand Inquisitor is performing now the temptations. The Grand Inquisitor replays the role of Satan, and by tempting Christ anew, he reactualizes and reenacts the foundational power of the myth itself:

> Decide [*reshi*][9] yourself who was right [*prav*: ethically]: you or he who questioned you then? Recall the first question; its meaning, though not literally, was this: 'You want to go into the world, and you are going empty-handed, with some promise [*obetom*] of freedom, which they in their simplicity [*prostote*] and innate lawlessness [*beschinstve*][10] cannot [*ne mogut*] even comprehend

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[9] Decision-making is an ethical deliberative and choosing (proairetic) enterprise, whose systematic investigation started with Aristotle (see, for instance, Broady 1991, or A. Rorty 1984). One deliberates among competing options of action (praxis) for achieving an end, and to the best of one's knowledge and capacity, one chooses the best available option at that time. This moment is very important theologically and ethically. Theologically, Christ does not have to deliberate over options in order to choose one: Christ, on account of both his power and knowledge, does not experience dilemmas and aporias over alternative courses of action. The theological reasoning defending this position rests on the ousianic (*ousia*: nature) understanding of Christ's will, which is called 'thelemic' (see, for instance, Meyendorff 1987:147). That is, Christ's nature contains divine, automatic, and omnipotent capabilities for action: he simply acts by nature, not by the free will (called gnomic will, not thelemic) of a limited, deliberating, and choosing person. It is obvious that the Grand Inquisitor positions deliberation/choice and temptation in an uncanny semantic interplay: it is solely the Grand Inquisitor who needs deliberation and choice, which he iconizes to hide his intent of temptation.

> [*osmyslit'*][11], which they dread [*strashatsia*][12] and fear [*boiatsia*] - for nothing has ever been more insufferable [*nevynosimee*][13] for man and for human society than freedom! But do you see these stones in this bare, scorching desert? Turn them into bread [exercise your power] and mankind will run after you like sheep, grateful and obedient, though eternally trembling lest you withdraw your hand [and thus your power] and your loaves cease for them.' But you did not want to deprive man of freedom and rejected the offer, for what sort of freedom is it, you reasoned, if obedience [*poslushanie*][14] is bought with loaves of bread? You

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[10] Lawlessness proper is *bezzakonie* (also, along with *nepravednost'* an equivalent for unrighteousness, anomie), where *zakon* is 'law'. *Bes-* (without) prefixes the noun *chinstvo*, which is connected to *chinit'* (to cause, to perform, to make, to put in the way), as in *chinit' sud i raspravu* (see Dal' 1882, 4:604): 'administer (*chinit'*) justice and *inflict* (*chinit'*) punishment,' with an accent on deliberative action. *Beschinstvo* for the Grand Inquisitor is an iconic term for the unseemliness, outrageousness of behavior and action, or incapacity for good purposeful action, which could also cover *bezzakonie* as absence of law or infringement on law. As we can see, the Grand Inquisitor visualizes man's image, right from the beginning of the Monologue, with both legalistic emergency (Christ comes only with a dubious 'promise') and iconologic palpability.

[11] The awareness of the innate (ontic) powerlessness of man's nature is systematically thematized and iconized by the Grand Inquisitor throughout his monologue. Incapacity (*ne mogut*), powerlessness (*bessilie*) is ascribed to man's nature, not person, in distinct opposition to Christ's natural, god-like, powers. Even if man were capable to comprehend (*osmyslit'*: make any sense of; *smysl* is 'meaning,' 'sense') freedom, he wouldn't be able, have the powers, to practice it. Here we could dialogically factor in the old Socratic ethical opinion, that knowledge of virtue (in our case of freedom) would be sufficient to make us choose it and practice it. That certainly leaves at sea the concept of akrasia (weakness of personal will; see, for instance, Charlton 1988), or, in our case, natural powerlessness and weakness. The Monologue, therefore, is quite aware that even 'knowledge' (*'osmyslit'*) has to be thought in terms of power(*ne mogut'*), only that cognitive powers initially appear to be naturally endowed powers, before displaying any epistemic or ethical capacity.

[12] Fear is another feature of both ethical ignorance and natural incapacity. The Grand Inquisitor uses the term *strashatsia*, which iconically resonates with *Strashnyi Dukh*, the Terrifying Spirit from the beginning of the Monologue.

[13] The Garnett translation renders *nevynosimee* by 'insupportable,' which seems to be closer to the original, which should be rendered as 'unbearable.' 'Unbearable', like the original Russian implies (*nesti*: to carry, to bear) burden, weight, a concept to be used later in the Monologue in the expression 'burden of choice,' and 'burden of freedom.' Equally, the Russian term implies the notion of powerlessness (*bessilie*), of incapacity to bear a burden, here the burden of freedom.

[14] The Grand Inquisitor uses two antinomic words, freedom and obedience, with reversed, or cross-fertilizing, meaning, displaying a form of religious, hypostatic

> objected that man does not live by bread alone, but do you know that in the name of this very earthly bread, the spirit of the earth will rise against you and fight with you and defeat you, and everyone will follow him exclaiming: 'Who can compare to this beast, for he has given us fire from heaven!' Do you know that centuries will pass and mankind will proclaim with the mouth of its wisdom and science that there is no crime, and therefore no sin [*net i grekha*], but only hungry men [*golodnyie*]? 'Feed [*nakormi*] them first, then ask virtue [*dobro*deteli][15] of them!'-that is what they will write on the banner they raise against you, and by which your temple will be destroyed." (252-253; 14:230-231)

And, indeed, the first question is restated in detail and a new process of solving it begins. The first question tempts Christ to turn the stones of the desert into bread. But, interpreting the answer-refutation given by Christ, the Grand Inquisitor blames Christ:

> You promised them heavenly bread [*khleb nebesnyi*], but, I repeat again, can it compare with earthly bread in the eyes of the weak [*slabogo*], eternally depraved [*vechno porochnogo*][16], and eternally ignoble [*neblagorodnogo*: of low birth] human race [*plemeni*: tribe]? And if in the name of heavenly bread thousands and tens of thousands will follow you, what will become of the millions and tens of thousands of millions of creatures who will not be strong [*ne v silakh budut*; *sila*: power] enough to forgo earthly bread for the sake of the heavenly? Is it that only the tens of thousands of the great and strong [*sil'nykh*; from *sila*: power] are dear

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thinking: one term becomes a hypostasis of the other. True freedom, he says, consists in genuine obedience to Christ, which for us, as it does for Ivan, might sound doctrinaire. Dostoevskian Christ, however, might not think in terms of obedience (even one sanitized) at all, but exclusively in terms of freedom as love. The Russian term *poslushanie*, however, calls to mind the word *poslushnik* ('novice' in a monastery, a word applicable to Alyosha), and thus would carry a prevalently positive meaning of edifying 'obedience.' Political or legal obedience would be *povinovenie*.

[15] 'Bread first and only afterwards virtue' summarizes the underlying dichotomy or bipolarity of man's person: power and virtue. One cannot practice freedom, or any virtue for that matter, unless one has the power first, a power hypostatized and iconized as 'bread.' In a doctrinal vein, one can state that 'nature,' and whatever sustains it (any kind of 'bread' or 'grace'), takes precedence over person and its 'freedom.' If the nature is weak, or corrupted, or fallen, then only a God can help it. But as we shall see, the Grand Inquisitor claims that Christ did not help it either.

[16] *Porochnyi* comes from *porok* (vice, defect). Eternally vice-ridden (ethically), of ignoble birth (ontically), human race ('tribe') is weak (*slaboe*) in terms of power on both counts, ethical and ontic. The focus on the ethical connects bread with virtue (the only virtue would be the one that feeds on bread and thus dependent on bread), as we saw above, and vice with an inherent, insurmountable natural condition of weakness.

> to you, and the remaining millions, numerous as the sands of the sea, weak but loving you, should serve only as material for the great and the strong? No, the weak, too, are dear to us. They are depraved and rebels, but in the end it is they who will become obedient. They will marvel at us, and look upon us as gods, because we, standing at their head, have agreed to suffer [*vynosit'*][17] freedom and to rule over them-so terrible will it become for them in the end to be free! But we shall say that we are obedient to you and rule in your name. We shall deceive them again, for this time we shall not allow you to come to us. This deceit will constitute our suffering, for we shall have to lie. This is what that first question in the wilderness meant, and this is what you rejected in the name of freedom, which you placed above everything. (253; 14:231)

Our main interpretive effort of the Monologue is to reduce the redundancy of series of synonymic images to a basic oppositions of binary and ternary images. This effort amounts to a rewriting of the Monologue itself, securing thereby an intelligible interpretive order.

Once we detected the image of the *Earthly Bread* as pertaining to the question part of the First Temptation, it is vital to detect the image of the answer, part of the first temptation, which is the *Heavenly Bread.* Here the unexpected takes place and Christ rejects the temptation in the name of freedom: the text explicitly equates Heavenly Bread with Freedom. *Earthly Bread* will be the image of Satan, whereas the *Heavenly Bread* (i.e. freedom) will be the image-icon of Christ.

But the first temptation is not merely restated; more than that: it is interpreted by the Inquisitor:

> They will seek us out again, underground, in catacombs, hiding (for again we shall be persecuted and tortured), they will find us and cry out: 'Feed us, for those who promised us fire from heaven did not give it.' And then we shall finish building their tower, for only he who feeds them will finish it, and only we shall feed them, in your name, for we shall lie that it is in your name. Oh, never, never will they feed themselves without us! No science will give them bread as long as they remain free, but in the end they will lay their freedom at our feet and say to us: "Better that you enslave us, but feed us." They will finally understand that freedom and earthly bread in plenty for everyone are inconceivable together, for

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[17] Again, *vynosit'* is in direct conceptual correlation with *nevynosimyi*, a term discussed in note 10. *Vynosit' svobodu* is the capacity, the power to carry, to bear the burden of freedom. It is essential not to miss this dependency of freedom on 'capacity' and 'power.'

> never, never will they be able to share among themselves. They will also be convinced that they are forever incapable [*ne mogut*] of being free, because they are feeble [*malosil'ny*], depraved, nonentities and rebels. (253; 14:231)

The expression *inconceivable together* describes only the interpretive position of the Grand Inquisitor, because, for Christ, the *Heavenly Bread* (freedom) and the *earthly bread*, to the contrary, are *conceivable together*: 'But you would not deprive man of freedom and rejected the offer, thinking, what is that freedom worth, if obedience is bought with bread? You replied that man lives not by bread alone.'

The expression "You replied that man lives *not by bread alone*" --reflects the pure voice of Christ, as it appears in the myth, without the Grand Inquisitor's interpretation, who claims that Christ will be defeated in the name of the earthly bread.

The crucial fact is that Christ refuses to separate the Earthly from the Heavenly bread (and by his integral position of not demonizing earthly bread and not splitting dia-bolically[18] existence itself – Christ refutes the first temptation), but does not refute, supplant or deny the Earthly bread as such.

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[18] The usually ignored opposition between sym-bolic and dia-bolic (in its etymological rhetorical force of uniting and separating) is introduced here to underscore Christ's soteriological mission: salvation is reconciliation between bread and freedom. Diabolic slandering of existence operates by disuniting ontological entities. Dostoevsky's Christ, through his kissing of the Grand Inquisitor, would not separate even the Grand Inquisitor (the Antichrist) from himself. However, the Orthodox understanding of the etymological symbolic and the ontological iconic, of the icon as 'symbol', is not overlooked by Orthodox theologians:

"In the icon, the iconographer sets out the personal mode of existence which is love, communion, and relationship, the only mode which forms existential distinctiveness and freedom into a fact of life and a hypostasis of life.[...] The technique of the icon –the restriction to two dimensions, the rejection of dimensional 'depth' and of temporal sequence in events depicted, the use of colors, attitudes, figures and background –leads Greek 'abstraction' to a remarkable level of expressiveness, in which the concrete reality operates as a *symbol* of the universal dimension of life. It is *symbol* in the sense that it *puts together* (*sym-bollei*) or coordinates and reconnects the particular experiences of personal participation in the one, universal mode of existence which is the distinctiveness of the person as dynamically fulfilled in the framework of communion and relationship" (Yannaras, Christos. 1984. *The Freedom of Morality*. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's

The Grand Inquisitor's interpretation of the first temptation distributes the images-icons generated by the question and by the answer on the axis of the two persons: *bread* is the icon of Satan, *freedom* is the icon of Christ. The icons are differently assimilated by the two persons: Satan proposes separating them, Christ refutes the disjoining perspective, and decides to keep them in unity.

The Grand Inquisitor's interpretation is defined on both levels, on the level of the two persons and that of the two icons attributed to the persons. But the Grand Inquisitor's interpretation must decide what is the nature of the icon attributable to him:

> And yet this question contains the great mystery [*taina*] of this world. Had you accepted the 'loaves,' you would have answered the universal and everlasting anguish of man as an individual being, and of the whole of mankind together, namely: 'before whom shall I bow down [*pred kem preklonit'sia*: whom to worship]?' There is no more ceaseless or tormenting care for man, as long as he remains free, than to find someone to bow down to as soon as possible. But man seeks to bow down before that which is indisputable, so indisputable that all men at once would agree to the universal worship of it. For the care of these pitiful creatures is not just to find something before which I or some other man can bow down, but to find something that everyone else will also believe in and bow down to, for it must needs be all together. And this need for communality of worship is the chief torment of each man individually, and of mankind as a whole, from the beginning of the ages. In the cause of universal worship, they have destroyed each other with the sword. They have made gods and called upon each other: 'Abandon your gods and come and worship ours, otherwise death to you and your gods!' And so it will be until the end of the world, even when all gods have disappeared from the earth: they will still fall down before idols. You knew, you could not but know, this essential mystery [*osnovnuiu tainu*] of human nature [*prirody chelovecheskoi*], but you rejected the only absolute banner, which was offered to you to make all men bow down to you indisputably-the banner of earthly bread; and you rejected it in the name of freedom and heavenly bread. (254; 14:231-232).

So, as is obvious, the Grand Inquisitor detects in the *First Question* the great, foundational *mystery* (*osnovnaia taina*) of this world, the mystery of losing human freedom: 'To find someone to worship.' This mystery performs the operation of

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Seminary Press. Pp. 256-257). The symbolic power and meaning of the icon makes the world of persons and things hang together: the icon is anti-diabolic.

identifying the Heavenly Bread with Freedom and the Earthly Bread with the deliverance from the burden of freedom. But we know already that Christ refuses to accept the rule of this mystery – that is to separate the two 'breads.'

On the contrary, the Grand Inquisitor separates them by rejecting the icon of freedom (the Heavenly Bread), realizing by that the great mystery of human existence itself: to whom to bow. The interpretation, therefore, radically resemantisizes the meaning of the earthly bread by dividing the total "sphere" of bread into two antinomical parts, and, moreover, depriving Christ of his double identity (which generates a new Christ in Dostoevsky): as unity of both spheres of "bread." The unity of the two icons of bread, as defined by the nature of the hypostatic unity, is represented by their polar inseparability. But from the perspective of the hypostatic artistic thinking, in any process of hypostatic relations, persons are to be endowed with absolute priority.

Since *mystery* introduced by the Grand Inquisitor antinomically separates the icons of Christ, the process of attribution of icons is carried out solely by the person uttering the Monologue, that is the Grand Inquisitor. And the icon he attributes to himself on the level of the First Temptation is the icon of *mystery*. His voice, furthermore, sequesters the earthly bread and identifies it with his own icon of mystery. But, before being redirected, on the level of the first question the earthly bread is the icon-hypostasis of Satan.

Therefore, three levels of the Monologue could be identified, each dominated by one of the persons: the level of the question dominated by Satan, the level of the answer dominated by Christ, and, ultimately, the level of the interpretation, dominated by The Grand Inquisitor. Each level having its own person-hypostasis, symmetrically

appropriates its own icon-hypostasis. On this level of the interpretation it is relatively straightforward that the three persons and the three icons represent a unity of parts, each hypostatically entailing the other. On the basis of the continuum question-answer-interpretation we can envisage a diagram of hypostatic relations between persons and their icons:

(1) Question: Satan = Earthly Bread

(2) Answer: Christ = Heavenly Bread (freedom)

(3) Interpretation: Grand Inquisitor = Mystery (antifreedom)

In other words, in the substance of the first temptation (and the first temptation is alongside with the remaining two temptations an effective creation of a new 'nature' for persons and history to be assimilated hypostatically by Christ) Christ-hypostasis is identified with freedom--hypostasis (they are inseparable and interchangeable).

The same rule applies to the rest of the persons and their respective icons. But the decisive moment is given by the fact that this distribution of identity of the hypostases as persons and hypostases as icons is given solely by the voice of the Grand Inquisitor on the ground that this is *his* and only his monologue. Legitimate attempts were made (see, for instance, Jones 1986) to compromise the Grand Inquisitor by saying that he misrepresents Christ or the Gospels. Although the monologue is exclusively the Grand Inquisitor's, the dialogic and hypostatic nature of the polyphonic truth cannot be ignored or suppressed by him. It is the tragedy of the Grand Inquisitor to have to present the new Gospel of freedom to Christ himself from the perspective of Christ. Christ's truth is not

unknown and it is not unknowable: human nature is so designed as to assimilate the nature of the new burden of freedom.

A new problem arises at this juncture: the question is how to identify the voices of the rest of the persons in the Monologue. For this purpose we have to design a model of hypostatic artistic thinking as it is conceived in the Monologue.

4) The Model of Hypostatic Artistic Thinking

To design a model of hypostatic thinking, as it is present in the Monologue, it is not sufficient to determine the status of persons and the status of the images-icons generated by persons and attached to them. A rigorous approach (as is obvious from the polyphonic nature of the co-present dialogic voices in a "double-voiced" word, so many times stressed by Bakhtin in his book on Dostoevsky) has to account for the status of the voices in their strict relations to the persons and to the icon-words of those persons. Therefore, the modelling power of the term 'hypostasis' will be evident only through the accounting for the constituent parts of the hypostatic thinking itself: *persons*, their *icons*, and their *voices*. To define the nature of the *hypostatic-iconological artistic thinking* in the Monologue is to define the nature of the identity established between the persons and their voices through their corresponding icons.

So, let us postulate that the minimal unit of a hypostasis is the "voice." The voice is that personological quantity which is integrally inserted by a person as a hypostasis into an icon as a hypostasis. But a voice, as the minimal constitutive part of a person, will

integrally contain that person (see Bakhtin's position in our chapter on hypostatic person). That is so only in the perspective of the Monologue, where a voice is the voice of the person that utters it in a word-icon, in which the integral person is embodied (e.g., the *voice* of the "earthly bread" equals the *person* of Satan, i.e., voice = person).

As a rule, the voice provides the understanding of the icon-hypostasis (e.g., mystery) in its relation with the person-hypostasis (e.g., The Grand Inquisitor). But the voice of an icon-hypostasis (i.e., its person) is not, as we saw, isolated - it is in an absolute manner (i.e., without exceptions) related to the voice of another icon-hypostasis, which is embedded in that first icon (e.g., the voice of Christ is equally present in both icons-breads, but the icon of the earthly bread contains also the voice of Satan, who claims it exclusively for himself).

It becomes evident that the second voice (Christ's voice), which is identifying itself with the earthly bread, will play the distinguishing role between the two icon-hypostases represented by the double image of bread. Thus a *double-voiced icon* is generated, which is analogous to the double-voiced word in Bakhtin.[19]

At this point we can proceed with the modeling of the voices. In the polyphonic (that is personologically egalitarian) and dialogic (that is in plurivoiced semiotic units,

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[19] In Bakhtin's book on Dostoevsky, the centrality of the double-voiced "word" (*dvugolosoe slovo*) - rendered in Emerson's translation as "double-voiced discourse" – couldn't be overemphasized: "The chief subject of our investigation, one could even say its chief hero, will be *double-voiced discourse*, which inevitably arises under conditions of dialogic interaction, that is, under conditions making possible an authentic life for the word" (Bakhtin 1984:185). For Bakhtin not merely life, but the authentic life of a word comes to the fore and is enacted. The word is not merely semiotically or stylistically personified. Bakhtin's logos theology is incarnational: the word is empowered with its own authentic flesh and life.

icon-words) articulations of the icon-hypostases, the Earthly Bread can be visualized in its own identity only through its accounting for the voices embraced by it. In designating a voice as having the status of presence in an icon, we will mark the presence by |+|. "Presence" means the positive affirming presence of a person in an icon. The converse possibility is "the absence" (marked by |-|), i.e. the negating presence of a person in an icon. So, a double intentionality of the voices is detectable in the form of negating presence and affirming presence.

Now let us present the diagram of the distribution of the voices as it is revealed by the hypostatic relations established between persons, their icons, through the distinctive power of their voices. A minimal syntagmatic sequence of identities would be stated in this form:

[1.1]

|+| Satan {Earthly bread |+|

The above statement shows the presence of the voice "|+|" (that is, of Satan) in the icon, which is his chosen image: earthly bread. But icon-images are hypostatical, that means they are minimum two. Thus a person is a structured semantic field or a paradigm of icons and voices.

First, let us approach the person of Christ, who explicitly claims two icons:

[1.2]

+	Christ	Heavenly Bread	+
		Earthly Bread	+

In interpreting the diagram, it is obvious that Christ distributes his voice into both icons, being present integrally in both. Textually and mythically (i.e., intertextually) this hypostatic self-distribution is expressed in the sentence: "You replied that man lives not by bread alone," what is being reinforced and hypostatically redefined in the new first temptation staged in the Monologue.

The model of the distribution of the voices predicated by the Inquisitor about the person of Satan is intrinsically related to the same icon-hypostases that define the hypostatic life (i.e. the substance: a personal hypostasis has the "same" substance as another personal hypostasis) of the person Christ:

[1.3]

Satan	Heavenly Bread	-
		-
	Earthly Bread	-
		+

A person is the capacity to be transposed into a negative or positive voice presence (double-voiced presence).

This sequence in its syntactic order of voices demonstrates (on the discoursive and narrative level of the Monologue) that Satan perceives himself as an affirming presence in the icon of the Earthly Bread but as a negating presence in the icon of the Heavenly Bread. It is decisive for Satan to place his negating voice into Christ's

representative identity, the Heavenly Bread (=Freedom). From the perspective of Satan's hypostatical logic Christ is envisaged as follows:

[1.4.]

|+| Satan: |-| Christ {Heavenly bread |-|

Satan's above sentence is hypostatically (i.e. integrally and reciprocally) opposing the person of Christ, his icon and his voice. Nevertheless, this kind of hypostatic sentences in the text do not exist in separation; consequently they generate constellations of polyphonic voices, which are a product of hypostatic inter-determinations among ternary structure of persons, icons and voices. The fact that Christ rejected the temptation of adopting exclusively the earthly bread has consequences on the distribution of his voices (negative and positive):

[1.5.],

|+|Christ: |-| Satan {earthly bread |-|, or:

|+| Satan: |-| Christ {earthly bread |-|

Therefore, in a different structuring of the diagrams, this model of the dialogue between the voices appears more sharply articulated:

[1.6]

+	Christ: Earthly Bread	-
		+

But this sentence cannot entail that Christ denies the earthly bread. It only means that the voice representing Satan in the icon is negated by Christ's voice. At this point, we have to design a model to reflect unambiguously this state of affairs. By merging the models of previous distributions of Christ voices we are given the next more complete a model:

[1.7]

+	Christ	Heavenly Bread	+
			+
		Earthly Bread	-
			+

In this model a new situation appears: the icon of Heavenly Bread has two voices. To account for this we have to postulate that each icon has its voice being doubled by its hypostatic pair: in the case of Christ the voice of the Heavenly bread incorporates into itself the voice of the earthly bread, and vice versa. Simply because they are hypostatically co-dependent and thus reflect their hypostatic unity. The situation appears differently in the case of Satan:

[1.8]

+	Satan	Heavenly Bread	-
			-
		Earthly Bread	-
			+

From the exclusive perspective of Satan, only the negating presence of his voice appears in Christ's icon of freedom, or the negative overlapping over positive presence of Christ's

voice, which consequently cannot be seen or heard, or is perceived as a negative presence. From the same point of view, the icon of heaven has a negating impact (by its autonomous hypostatic voice) on the exclusive rights of the Bread-icon of Earth: it comes to question its solitary soteriological status as professed by Satan.

We have seen that in the model of Christ's icons, the icons themselves develop the rule of hypostatical identification, but a contrary type of behaviour marks the same icons in the case of Satan: they are hypostatically (i.e., reciprocally and integrally) opposed to each other, thus sanctioning the rule of hypostatic opposition. The hypostatical activity of the voices on the level of the icons as well as on the level of the persons will have a double orientation: that of identifying the units among them, or that of opposing the units among them.

Up to this point we have determined the status of only two persons in their hypostatic identifications or oppositions with their own icons as well as with the negating voices embedded into icons.

But for a fuller perspective on the nature of hypostatics in the Monologue, it is interpretively necessary and useful to define the hypostatical positioning of the actual (not the mythical one only) tempter of Christ, the person-hypostasis of the Grand Inquisitor. This person-hypostasis possesses his own icon- hypostasis (mystery) and, most importantly, his own voice-hypostases as carriers of his identity and of his exclusive dialogical position. As we have seen already, *mystery* is an identifying icon of the Grand Inquisitor and it is a direct result of his interpretation of the two other icons of the first temptation (question-bread and answer-freedom), predicated about two other persons, Christ and Satan. The three persons of the Monologue, Inquisitor-Christ-Satan, form a

system of interdependent centers, capable of deciding each other's integral fate. A temptation is targeting the integral person, with the explicit purpose of annihilating its existence or its soteriological mission.

Conversely, the ontological status of the tempting person depends entirely on the results of the temptation. But, in the Monologue, we have a discoursive presence of the Grand Inquisitor, i.e. he is the speaker and, consequently, he alone decides the final distribution of the voices, being the distinctive power among the voices (the Monologue, ultimately, is the prevailing or dominant-like voice of the Inquisitor). He determines the structuring of the opposing or identifying voices, and he decides to oppose the two icons of bread and not to identify them as the positive affirming hypostasis of the other.

But the Inquisitor reflects correctly the status of all the voices in the Monologue, securing by that a perspective of autonomy in the functioning of the voices. By choosing to identify himself with the Earthly bread exclusively, he, therefore, identifies himself with Satan's voice embedded in that icon-bread, and, ultimately, with the role played by Satan as a person, being Satan's hypostasis. The secret knowledge of what is ontologically primordial for man's salvation (i.e. earthly bread) is iconically represented as *mystery*. This mystery, being the product of hypostatic relations on the level of bread-icons, also necessarily entails hypostatic economy on the level of persons, i.e., secret identification with Satan and secret denial of Christ: "And we alone shall feed them in Your name, and declare falsely that it is in your name" (253).

It is extremely important to establish that any relation of a person to an icon of another person entails an identical relation to that person: by denying freedom (heavenly

bread) the Inquisitor denies Christ. Let us represent this relation of the Inquisitor as a person to the icons of the first temptation in a diagram:

[1.9]

+	GRAND INQUISITOR:	Mystery	+
			+
		Earthly Bread	+
			-
		Freedom	-
			-

This paradigm of voices is constructed exclusively from the perspective of The Grand Inquisitor, being a product of his distribution of his accepting or rejecting voices. His distribution does not violate Christ's legitimate position of his voices. In the paradigm, which is itself a diagrammatic icon,[20] we have, for example, mystery with two affirming voices |+|. Since mystery is the hypostatic reflection of the Earthly bread - it necessarily contains its voice, being double-voiced. But earthly bread comprises the voice of Satan, and solely that voice penetrates the mystery where the Inquisitor voice inhabits its natural slot.

Conversely, the Inquisitor's voice embedded in the icon of mystery, through its identification with the voice of Satan, travels into earthly bread. Neither the positive voice of Satan, nor the positive voice of the Inquisitor are present in the icon of freedom, identical with Christ. It is the negating voice of the Inquisitor and of the earthly bread which are present in the icon of freedom, and thus constituted, the hypostatic substance of

freedom is incorporated as a negating component in the paradigm of the person of the Inquisitor. But the icon of freedom, besides two negating voices, necessarily comprises the affirming voice of Christ. To represent the complete disposition of voices of the icon-freedom as it is present in the persons identified as Inquisitor, Christ and Satan, a new diagram is needed:

[1.10]

+ - -	Freedom's voices	Christ	+
		Satan	-
		The Grand Inquisitor	-

In paradigm [1.10] we identify all the persons through their relation to freedom, because this icon-freedom is really constructed by the voices of the persons represented in the Monologue. Freedom is interpersonal. Moreover, this triad of voices that constitutes the icon of freedom is integrated by every person in the Monologue, guaranteeing by that the common substance of their hypostases.

Since a person-hypostasis is a relation to all the persons and their voices, the two remaining icon-hypostases will have their own dialogic identity:

[1.11]

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[20] On the distinction between diagrammatic and imagic icons, see chapter (2) 'Faces of Iconicity.'

+ + +	Earthly Bread's voices	Christ	+
		Satan	+
		The Grand Inquisitor	+

This paradigm of voices describes the status of voices as presented by the Monologue, i.e., all the persons agree that earthly bread is decisive in the soteriological endeavor directed towards the human being. The icon of Earthly Bread converts into a positively-voiced iconologic identity, being a *three-voiced icon.*

The position of the Inquisitor is embodied in the icon of mystery. But this icon is voiced, as a distinguishing icon between the two remaining icons of the first temptation, in front of a silent and receptive Christ. Christ, therefore, integrates the icon of mystery into his own structure of opposing or dialogical voices.

The following diagram will illustrate the complete structure of voices displayed by the icon-mystery:

[1.12]

- + +	Mystery's voices	Christ	-
		Satan	+
		The Grand Inquisitor	+

Therefore, the voices of the ternary structure bread-freedom-mystery will be simultaneously present in the hypostases (substance-identity) of every person. Each icon (as semiotic translation of hypostatic identity) thus appears to be a carrier of three voices,

each voice corresponding with one person. The synoptic perspective on *three-voiced icons* can be represented paradigmatically and diagrammatically in an iconostasis[21] as follows:

[1.13]

ICONS	CHRIST	SATAN	GRAND INQUISITOR
Freedom	+	-	-
Bread	+	+	+
Mystery	-	+	+

And a person is hypostatic if and only if it contains the substance of the other persons, represented by the icons of every person. The difference among the persons is given by the fact that each person has to contain its opposite person, establishing therefore, the perspective from within (intratopy) and from the outside (exotopy). So, we will represent a person as being a structure of icon-voices. Let us see now how Christ, as a person-hypostasis, would shape his own identity by his reception of the voices pertaining to the icons uttered by the Inquisitor and by Satan:

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[21] The concept of iconostasis is decisive for the understanding of imagic and diagrammatic coherence that a set of icons represents. A person's identity and substance (hypostasis) must be translated or converted into a copresence of indelibly foregrounded iconologic moment-icons and version-icons (a person being an identity in flux in Dostoevsky) that can be captured only by an open-ended iconostasis. A Dostoevskian person is an iconostasis, that is, a fully embodied conversion of himself into icons whose hypostatic meaning targets another person (a hypostatic person is by definition not neutral, uniconized) in a context of soteriologic or ethical praxis. On additional

[1.14]

PERSON		ICONS	VOICES		
+	Christ	Freedom	+	-	-
+	Christ	Bread	+	+	+
-	Christ	Mystery	-	+	+

This diagram is the summation of all the voices present in Christ as person on the level of the first Temptation and thus reflecting his hypostatic perspective. Christ incorporates all the voices of all the icons, but displays them in his proper personal hierarchy. As is obvious, Christ has his negative or positive voice displayed in accordance with his attitude towards the icons. It must be noted that Christ as a person-voice distributes his personal negative or positive voice into the corresponding negative or positive icon.

But, on the contrary, the Inquisitor does not oppose Satan. Moreover, with Satan as his positive person-hypostasis, he claims identity of relations towards the icons. Therefore, their diagrams will show identical person-voices and identical distribution of their voices into the icons:

[1.15]

PERSON		ICONS	VOICES		
+	Satan	Freedom	-	-	-
+	Satan	Bread	+	+	+
-	Satan	Mystery	+	+	-

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significance of icon and iconostasis for the interpretation of the novel, see the chapter "Faces of Iconicity.'

Since the above paradigm is identical with that of the Grand Inquisitor, we can conclude that the same iconic substance is present in both persons, the Inquisitor being the hypostasis identifying itself with the person-hypostasis of Satan (by definition something is a hypostasis of something else just in case both share the same 'substance'). But the Grand Inquisitor is complete in his identity only by including a second person into its own, that of Christ. This inclusion is antinomic. Therefore, the Inquisitor will define his hypostatic identity as being a triad comprising a hypostatic identification (Inquisitor = Satan) and a hypostatic opposition (Inquisitor versus Christ), the latter being an antinomic hypostatic relation. The same hypostatic rule applies to the triad of icons. Each of them is a hypostasis of the other. In Christ's perspective, heavenly bread (=freedom) is hypostatically (i.e., integrally and reciprocally) identifying itself with the earthly bread, and both hypostatically oppose the icon of mystery.

Conversely, in the case of the Inquisitor, the icon of mystery is being hypostatically identified with the earthly bread, and, as a consequence, both icons hypostatically oppose the heavenly bread.

An identical mode of appropriation of the icons is displayed by the person-hypostasis called Satan.

All this effort to construct hypostatic economy is dictated by the soteriological, in the case of Christ, and, in the case of the Inquisitor, by both soteriological and ideological necessity. Already on the level of the first question the Inquisitor explicitly states the purpose of his effort:

> "They will marvel at us and look upon us as gods, because we are ready to endure the freedom which they have found so dreadful and to rule over them -so awful will it seem to them to be free. But we will tell them that we are Your servants

> and rule them in your name. We will deceive them again, for we will not let You come to us again. That deception will be our suffering, for we will be forced to lie. That is the significance of the first question in the wilderness." (254; 14:231)

A new and decisive hypostatic rule crowns the economy of hypostatics: that of usurpation and imposture. Since the aim of soteriology is the salvation of the human being, then the ideology of deceit must falsely present itself as being identical with that of Christ. The Inquisitor is the hypostatic impostor, who secretly allies himself with the hypostasis of Satan, but must market his identity as a hypostasis allied with the hypostasis of Christ.

This is the meaning of his identity as a person and of his secret icon cherished as mystery. Instituting a new hypostatic unity of persons, the Inquisitor generates a new ontology of persons. The Inquisitor, then, being a person integrally and reciprocally defined by the other two persons, engenders an inseparable coexistence of persons which could be designated as a new Trinity. The persons of the Trinity contain within themselves an identical soteriological substance (freedom-bread-mystery), which renders them reciprocally transparent in knowledge, codependency, and common mission. Only that this new Trinity aims at subverting and impostorially substituting the classical Trinity. This imposture implies, in the words of Alyosha, the Inquisitor's atheism: "Perhaps nothing but atheism, that's all their secret. Your Inquisitor does not believe in God, that's his secret" (260)

By this move we have concluded charting the necessary and sufficient hypostatical units and their rules of hypostatic concatenations on the level of the first temptation only. We insisted upon the rules of hypostatic artistic thinking starting with the first temptation, because the rules will be identical in the two consequent temptations.

The next stage of our project consists of defining the extent and the nature of the identity of the persons of the Monologue by identifying the icons on the levels of the Second and the Third Temptation.

5) The Second Temptation

The second temptation proposes that Christ cast himself down from the pinnacle of the temple[22] to prove by that his divine nature, i.e. that God would prevent him from being dashed into pieces. According to the text of the Monologue, Christ, by rejecting the temptation, refuses to perform a miracle:

> When the dread [*starshnyi*] and wise spirit [*premudryi dukh*] set you on a pinnacle of the Temple and said to you: 'If you would know whether or not you are the Son of God, cast yourself down; for it is written of him, that the angels will bear him up, and he will not fall or be hurt, and then you will know whether you are the Son of God, and will prove what faith you have in your Father.' But you heard and rejected the offer and did not yield and did not throw yourself down. Oh, of course, in this you acted proudly and magnificently, like God, but mankind, that weak, rebellious tribe-are they gods? Oh, you knew then that if you made just one step, just one movement towards throwing yourself down, you would immediately have tempted [*iskusil*] the Lord and would have lost all faith in him and been dashed against the earth you came to save, and the intelligent [*umnyi*] spirit who was tempting you would rejoice. But, I repeat, are there many like you? And, indeed, could you possibly have assumed, even for a moment, that mankind, too, would be strong enough [*budet pod silu*: it would be within their power] for such a temptation? Is that how human nature was created-to reject the miracle, and in those terrible [*strashnyie*] moments of

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[22] [5] Then the devil took him into the holy city, and set him on the pinnacle of the temple, [6] and said to him, "If you are the Son of God, throw yourself down, for it is written, 'He will give his angels charge of you,' and, 'On their hands they will bear you up, lest you strike your foot against a stone.'" [7] Jesus said to him, "Again, it is written, 'You shall not tempt [*ne iskushai*] the Lord, your God.'" (Mathew 4:5-7)

> life, the moments of the most terrible, essential, and tormenting questions of the soul, to remain only with the free decision of the heart [i.e. freedom of choice]? (255; 14:232-233)

The framework of the Second Temptation effects an iconic copresence of such defining concepts of man's identity, as power (*sila*), faith and freedom of choice ('decision of the heart'). Foundationally, it is the category of ontic (innate, nature-given) power that identifies the distinctive feature that differentiates man and Christ-God: man by nature stands in need of miracle. The need for miracle, therefore, makes sense only when the concept of power (not political power, but ontic power) is factored into the definition of faith. It is surprising that Satan would tempt Christ in the full knowledge that Christ's nature is in possession of divine power (capable of withstanding temptations), one which is secure in its faith, and standing in no need of miracle. However, the concept of temptation is employed even in relation to God the Father, and it constitutes a form of personal freedom: to tempt is to exercise freedom interpersonally, even if, paradoxically, it is exercised against God as person. But man's nature appears to be double. The interplay of *faith* and *miracle* is oriented now towards man's second nature, his "free verdict of the heart", i.e., his conscience, much like freedom and 'the earthly bread' were targeting man's 'first nature' (represented by his body) on the level of the First Temptation:

> Instead of taking over men's freedom, you increased it still more for them! Did you forget that peace and even death are dearer to man than free choice in the knowledge of good and evil? There is nothing more seductive for man than the freedom of his conscience, but there is nothing more tormenting either. And so, instead of a firm foundation for appeasing human conscience once and for all, you chose everything that was unusual, enigmatic, and indefinite, you chose everything that was beyond men's strength, and thereby acted as if you did not love them at all. (254; 14:232)

In the above texts of the Monologue, we encounter the three icons (miracle, faith, conscience) in their relations to the three persons. Satan tempts Christ's *faith* in God, by appealing to his *freedom to choose* (in the text's words: "freedom of conscience") between the goodness of faith and the badness of miracle. Therefore, "the knowledge of good and evil," i.e., the freedom of conscience and of choice, is Satan's icon on the level of the second temptation. But, by relying on both the freedom and *the power* to choose good (=faith) or evil (miracle), Christ chooses faith and does not choose *miracle*, he rejects the option of arresting the mutability of conscience by miracle (conscience's content could thus be provided either by faith or by miracle). The Inquisitor, instead, chooses miracle, not free faith. As a result of direct activity of identification and rejection of the icons we will have the following diagram:

[2.1]

Question: Satan = knowledge of good and evil
(freedom of conscience, burden of free choice)
Answer: Christ = faith

Interpretation: Inquisitor = miracle

The ambivalence of the freedom of conscience is interpreted by the Grand Inquisitor as exclusively evil, as he interpreted the icon of bread of the first temptation as exclusively good. This kind of dehypostatization and deiconization of 'the earthly bread' and of conscience is realized by a diabolic (dia-bolic, i.e. not sym-bolic)) operation of disuniting and isolating. Christ hypostatically disambiguates, and reiconizes the earthly bread, i. e. bread is fully good (there is also an inherent, ontic goodness of bread's nature) only in its connection with freedom: 'the earthly bread' becomes (by an iconologic fiat) the icon of 'the heavenly bread' (freedom). The same rule is displayed in the Second Temptation: the

good and evil of conscience entails freedom of choice, primarily the freedom to choose the nature of faith (call it 'the freedom of faith'): "Instead of taking over men's freedom, you increased it and forever burdened the kingdom of the human soul with its torments. You desired the free love of man, that he should follow you freely, seduced and captivated by you" (251).

It is obvious that freedom is freedom to choose in whom to believe. Therefore, faith requires freedom, it increases it. Ultimately, faith is freedom; even more: faith is 'free love.' One can notice here that in Dostoevsky, Christ's Christianity recasts faith in its hypostatic (that is identical, homousic, *nature*-based) codependency with freedom: faith is genuine only if it appears to resemble freedom iconically and only if it works and functions like freedom.

As we have just seen, the concept of freedom (since it is a guiding personologic power) is fully iconized on the level of the Second Temptation. Faith and freedom, in being of the same substance, have the same powers. In Dostoevsky one can with identical success choose, pursue, and achieve a goal whether one acts out of faith or out of freedom; or: only because faith chooses to be an icon of freedom, freedom itself, paradoxically, resembles and works like faith. Although freedom and faith could be interpreted as purely iconologic pairs (by looking at faith one can discern in it the articulations of freedom, and one therefore postulates that one needs, semiotically, faith to understand freedom), they carry also personologic dimensions and similitudes, that is the two icons cannot be separated from Christ:

> Behold what else you did. And all again in the name of freedom! I tell you that man is tormented by no grater anxiety than to find someone to whom he can hand over quickly that gift of freedom with which the unhappy creature is born. But

> only he who can appease their conscience can take over their freedom. In bread there was offered to you an indisputable banner; give bread, and man will worship You, for nothing is more indisputable than bread. But if someone gains possession of his conscience - oh! Then he will cast away your bread and follow after him who has ensnared his conscience. In that you were right. For the mystery of man's being is not only to live but to have something to live for. (254; 14:232).

The relevancy of this fragment is decisive for several reasons. First, for the repeated grounding of person in freedom, the icon of Christ in the first temptation ("And all again in the name of freedom"). This fact reiterates that the understanding of the second temptation is based on the first.

Second, it links the icon of bread to its correlate on the level of the second temptation: the icon of conscience.

Third, the text reintroduces the term mystery (*taina*) as being a component both of the first and of the second temptation: man's mystery is double: to live (=bread) and to have something to live for (=faith), which are hypostatically inseparable. The repeating of *freedom*, *bread*, and *mystery* is done in strict correlation with the icons of the second temptation: faith, the good and evil of conscience, and miracle.

The second temptation, therefore, foregrounds man's freedom "to decide for himself with free heart what is good and what is evil, having only your [Christ's] image before him as his guide."

The image-icon of Christ is given by his rejections of the temptations to reduce man to the earthly bread and by his refusal to remove "the burden of free choice." Freedom and faith are the icons simultaneously related to the image of Christ, constituting the substance of his personal identity. Sure enough, Satan's icons are earthly bread and the burden of conscience, while the icons rendering the image of the

Inquisitor are mystery and miracle.

The following diagram depicts the structuring and the hypostatic interdependency among persons and among icons:

[2.2]

	SATAN	CHRIST	GRAND INQUISITOR
TEMPTATIONS	QUESTION	ANSWER	INTERPRETATION
FIRST TEMPTATION	Bread	Freedom	Mystery
SECOND TEMPTATION	Good-evil of conscience	Faith	Miracle

In this diagram we encounter the hypostatic artistic thinking developing additional clarity. As we have seen from the quotes related to the Second Temptation, *freedom* and *faith* cannot be thought separately. Similarly, faith has no meaning without its hypostatic relation with the burden of conscience (=knowledge of good and evil). All the icons are related to each other in a hypostatic circle: to understand one of them means to understand all of them. Moreover, the hypostasis-persons acquire a profile marked by two homogeneous icons. To illustrate this new situation, let us take the person-hypostasis of Christ and distribute the voices on his homogeneous icons:

[2.3]:

+	Christ	Freedom	+
			+
		Faith	+
			+

As we can see, Christ's dialogic diagram distributes his positive voice into both icons. Moreover, each icon identifies itself with the other by reciprocally receiving each other's voices. The Grand Inquisitor and Satan develop the same activity at the level of their respective voices. There is no need to illustrate the distribution of the voices across their respective icons because they are hypostatically identical with the first temptation.

It must be noted, though, that all forms of hypostatics are simultaneous global structures, and that they are possible only through the mediation of the voices of the persons. Only by accounting for the voices and their iconic carriers can the nature of polyphony be closely interpreted and understood.

6) The Third Temptation

To interpret the third temptation in its immanent articulations one should recall and keep in mind our strategic assumption that the rule that is governing the mechanism of the Monologue is hypostatic in nature. Consequently, the third temptation will rely entirely on the previous two temptations, displaying synchronic and diachronic (genealogical)

hypostatic dependency. The co-presence of all three constituents-powers of the Inquisitor's hypostatic person – mystery (*taina*), miracle (*chudo*), and authority (*avtoritet*) - was manifest in its entirety already on the level of the Second Temptation, and its implicit presence was also powering the mechanism of the First Temptation.

Following also the rule of simultaneous inter-iconic force of the 'three powers' (*tri sily*: mystery, miracle and authority) as our iconostatic guide, let us now turn to the question-answer-interpretation on the level of the third temptation.

The Third Temptation in the myth as well as in the Monologue (according to the Monologue) develops the idea and the icon of *authority* (*avtoritet*). It should be noticed that the icon of authority is the result of the hypostatic interpretation of both the question and the answer of the third temptation now reiterated intertextually by the Grand Inquisitor (intertextually, the text of the Gospels is an integral part of the Monologue). For this purpose, the Grand Inquisitor has to reiterate at least metonymically the very mechanism of the third temptation. The Grand Inquisitor does not have to spell out or repeat the third temptation in its entirety, or even the third question, since Christ is, quite obviously, cognitively superior to the Grand Inquisitor himself, which fact is, not surprisingly, taken for granted by the Grand Inquisitor. And by doing so the Grand Inquisitor is analogically tempting Christ again, but this time not leaving the decision up to him: now the Grand Inquisitor imposes his own choice upon the entire humanity and on Christ. The Grand Inquisitor knows that Christ invested him with the freedom of choice, which now cannot be repealed: whatever the Grand Inquisitor chooses, and whatever is within his power, lies outside Christ's jurisdiction, although most certainly would not lie outside Christ's power. In the Third Temptation Satan demands of Christ to

"fall down and worship him" (according to the myth of the Gospels)[23], and, as a consequence, Christ would receive "the kingdoms of the earth," i.e., "the world and Caesar's purple" (according to the text of the Monologue):

> And what can I hide from you? Do I not know with whom I am speaking? What I have to tell you is all known to you already, I can read it in your eyes. And is it for me to hide our secret [*tainu*: also 'mystery'] from you? Perhaps you precisely want to hear it from my lips. Listen, then: we are not with you [*my ne s toboi*], but with *him* [*my s nim*], that is our secret [*vot nasha taina*]! For a long time now- eight centuries already - we have not been with you, but with him. Exactly eight centuries ago we took from him what you so indignantly rejected, that last gift [*poslednii dar*] he offered you when he showed you all the kingdoms of the earth: we took Rome and the sword of Caesar from him, and proclaimed [*ob'iavili*] ourselves sole rulers [*tsariami*: also 'tsars'] of the earth, the only rulers, though we have not yet succeeded in bringing our cause [*nashe delo*] to its full conclusion. But whose fault is that? Oh, this work is still in its very beginnings, but it has begun. There is still long to wait before its completion, and the earth still has much to suffer, but we shall accomplish it and we shall be Caesars, and then we shall think about the universal happiness [*vsemirnom schastii*] of mankind. (257; 14:234)

It is decisive to understand the intertextual interplay that the words of the myth and the Monologue develop. On the level of the third temptation the word "worship" (*preklonenie*) synthesizes the icon of Satan contained in its fullness exclusively in the third question of the Gospel's myth, but in the text of the Monologue the word-icon of worship appears on the level of all three temptations. This is an eloquent proof of the icon's hypostatic distribution performed by the text of the Monologue: Dostoevsky's text

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[23] The third temptation, according to the Gospel of Mathew, whose sequence of temptations Dostoevsky follows, develops this way: "[8] Again, the devil took him to a very high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them. [9] And he said to him, "All these I will give you, if you will fall down [*padshy*] and worship me [*poklonish'sia mne*]." [10] Then Jesus said to him, "Begone Satan! For it is written, 'You shall worship [*pokloniaisia*] the Lord your God, and him only shall you

'knows' that to succumb to any of the three temptations means to 'worship' Satan. Although in the Gospels only the third temptation rests on the demand towards Christ to worship Satan, in the Monologue it is already with the first temptation that the Grand Inquisitor iconizes through his interpretation the religious category of 'worship' with an unusual force. This only proves that the first question-temptation itself is fully intelligible only through the hypostatic import of the third temptation:

> Had you accepted the "loaves," you would have answered the universal and everlasting anguish of man as an individual being, and of the whole of mankind together, namely: "before whom shall I bow down? [*pred kem preklonit'sia*? – whom one should worship?]" There is no more ceaseless or tormenting care for man, as long as he remains free, than to find someone to bow down to [*preklonit'sia*: to find someone to worship] as soon as possible. But man seeks to bow down before that which is indisputable, so indisputable that all men at once would agree to the universal worship [*vseobshchee preklonenie*] of it. For the care of these pitiful creatures is not just to find something before which I or some other man can bow down, but to find something that everyone else will also believe in and bow down to, for it must needs be *all together*. And this need for *communality* of worship is the chief torment of each man individually, and of mankind as a whole, from the beginning of the ages. In the cause of universal worship, they have destroyed each other with the sword. They have made gods and called upon each other: "Abandon your gods and come and worship ours, otherwise death to you and your gods!" And so it will be until the end of the world, even when all gods have disappeared from the earth: they will still fall down [worship] before idols. You knew, you could not but know, this essential mystery of human nature, but you rejected the only absolute banner, which was offered to you to make all men bow down to you indisputably-the banner of earthly bread; and you rejected it in the name of freedom [*svobody*] and heavenly bread [*khleba nebesnogo*]. [...] With bread you were given an indisputable banner: give man bread and he will worship you [*dash' khleb i chelovek preklonitsia*], for there is nothing more indisputable than bread. (254; 14:231-232)

It is memorable that 'bread' and 'freedom' should be hypostatically associated with 'worship'. Certainly, 'bread' stands for man's nature; 'freedom' represents the personal

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serve [*sluzhy*].'" [11] Then the devil left him, and behold, angels came and ministered to him" (Mathew 4:8-11).

dimension of man, while 'worship' introduces the supernatural agency, or a different nature (heteronature) that underlies a new level of interpersonality. The first temptation hypostatically absorbs the third temptation, and one can imagine a positivisation of 'worship': one can worship the 'bread of heaven', that is freedom, as a distinct otherness of nature and person. Effectively that is what the third rejection of worship of Satan spells out in the Gospels: 'You shall worship [Gr.: *proskineseis*; Russ: *pokloniaisia*] the Lord your God, and him only shall you serve [Gr.: *latreiseis*; Russ: *sluzhy*]' (Mathew 4:10).

In the second temptation, where miracle targets conscience and its substance, free faith, the Grand Inquisitor also focuses on the ruling icon of the third temptation, worship:

> Oh, you knew that your deed [*podvig*] would be preserved in books, would reach the depths of the ages and the utmost limits of the earth, and you hoped that, following you [*sleduia tebe*], man, too, would remain with God, having no need of miracles [*ne nuzhdaias' v chude*]. But you did not know that as soon as man rejects miracles [*otvergnet chudo*], he will at once reject God [*otvergnet i boga*] as well, for man seeks not so much God as miracles. And since man cannot bear to be left [*ostavat'sia ne v silakh*: it is not within man's power to remain][24] without miracles, he will go, and create new miracles for himself, his own miracles this time, and will bow down to [*poklonitsia*: he will *worship*] the miracles of quacks, or women's magic, though he be rebellious, heretical, and godless a hundred times over. You did not come down from the cross when they shouted to you, mocking and reviling you: 'Come down from the cross and we will believe

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[24] The personological category of 'power' (*sila*), be it under the version of the 'power of the will' (*sila voli*), the 'power of the emotions' or the 'power of reason' is iconized in this study in correlation with the concepts of the 'political power' (*vlast'*) and 'authority' (*avtoritet*). Power (*sila*) and powerlessness (*bessilie*) primarily relate to a person's autonomy of the mind to engage in a praxis that lies or does not lie within his/her powers. In this quote, the Grand Inquisitor qualifies a person as being powerless to live without miracles. This powerlessness should be understood iconically: man's mind would not be able, capable of having an identity, of effectively and properly functioning, if it were not similar to the 'miraculous' and dependent on the miraculous. Man is simply visualized as mind plus miracle, as two ontic sets encased into one another. More on the subject of 'power' in its connection to the faculty of the will see the chapter 'Iconicity and Hypostatics in Augustine and Dostoevsky.'

> that it is you.' You did not come down because, again, you did not want [*ty ne zakhotel*] to enslave man [*porabotit' cheloveka*] by a miracle [*chudom*] and thirsted [*zhazhdal*] for faith that is free [*svobodnoi very*], not miraculous [*ne chudesnoi*]. You thirsted for love that is free [*svobodnoi liubvi*], and not for the servile raptures of a slave [*nevol'nika*: of a man in captivity] before a power [*pered mogushchestvom*][25] that has left him forever terrified. (255-256; 14:233)

We must repeat that all the icons appear in all three temptations in a hypostatic dependency (i.e., they can be understood only reciprocally): faith is the hypostasis of freedom, and, analogously, worship (= enslavement) is the hypostasis of the miracle. However, on the level of the third temptation the word 'worship,' appropriated by Satan's personal iconostasis, is ambivalent. Christ does not reject the icon of worship as he did not reject the earthly bread or the good and evil of conscience (that is, the freedom and the burden of choice) in the previous temptations. The myth clearly ascribes to man the capacity and the natural need for worship, only that man should worship God alone: "You shall worship the Lord your God and him only shall you serve" (Matthew 4:10). Therefore, the rejection of the third temptation is not the rejection of the icon of 'worship' but solely the rejection of the imposture represented by Satan, who claims for himself and his iconostasis the icon that pertains exclusively to God.

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[25] Here we encounter a new term for the concept of power: mogushchestvo (powerfulness, mightiness), as different from *sila* or *vlast'*. *Mogushchestwo* carries the semantic distinctive feature of majesty and supreme power; thus Satan is called '*moguchii dukh'*, a 'mighty spirit', a spirit within whose powers lies the capability to perform acts beyond normal powers: "Had you accepted that third council of the mighty spirit [*moguchego dukha*], you would have furnished [*vospolnil*: would have completed by filling a gap, by meeting a lack in the furniture of the world] all that man seeks on earth" (257; 14:234). The palpable, iconic, correlation of might and extraordinary, almost creational, achievement in this world is possible solely through the counsel of the mighty spirit.

However, on the basis of the mystery of the earthly bread of the first temptation and that of the miraculous enslavement of conscience of the second temptation, the Grand Inquisitor's iconostasis appropriates the icon-gift of worship also. He restricts the semantic range of the icon of worship to himself, while humankind falsely believes that it worships Christ, and, most importantly, while humankind unwittingly worships Satan. Two direct consequences follow from this: 1) God is interpretively suppressed, and 2) God is hypostatically supplanted. The Grand Inquisitor tells Christ what Christ's 'salvation' means (that it is a failure): he chides and ultimately banishes him with a pseudo-fatherly (imposture-driven) superiority. Furthermore, by taking charge of salvation, the Grand Inquisitor not only takes the place of the Father, but that of the Son also. It is thus iconically palpable that the Grand Inquisitor cannot perform a personologic hypostatic move without also performing a personologic Trinitarian move. The Grand Inquisitor is meaningful solely on account of his secret identification with Satan as well as on account of his impostorially paraded identification with Christ. The Grand Inquisitor (acting as God) plus Christ and plus Satan (by being called the 'dread spirit' by the Grand Inquisitor, Satan usurps the Holy Spirit) form a new hypostatic Trinity that supplants the Christian Trinity. This last hypostatic maneuver brings closure to the hypostatic circular dynamics:

> And yet you could have taken the sword of Caesar even then. Why did you reject that last gift [*poslednii dar*]? Had you accepted that third counsel of the mighty spirit, you would have furnished [*vospolnil*] all that man seeks on earth, that is: someone to bow down to [*pred kem preklonit'sia*: whom to worship], someone to take over his conscience [*komu vruchit' sovest'*: to whom to hand over one's conscience], and a means for uniting [*kakim obrazom soedinit'sia*][26] everyone at

[26] Here we see an interesting case within the iconicity of 'obraz' (image, icon, face). The third temptation rests on the iconology of power, ultimately the power to unite everyone under one power: *kakim obrazom* (*obraz*: image-icon) *soedinit'sia. Kakim obrazom*

> last into a common, concordant, and incontestable anthill - for the need for universal union is the third and last torment [*muchenie*] of men. Mankind in its entirety has always yearned to arrange things so that they must be universal. There have been many great nations with great histories, but the higher these nations stood, the unhappier they were, for they were more strongly aware than others of the need for a universal union of mankind. Great conquerors, Tamerlanes and Genghis Khans, swept over the earth like a whirlwind, yearning to conquer the cosmos, but they, too, expressed, albeit unconsciously, the same great need of mankind for universal and general union. Had you accepted the world and Caesar's purple, you would have founded a universal kingdom and granted universal peace. For who shall possess mankind if not those who possess their conscience and give them their bread? And so we took Caesar's sword, and in taking it, of course, we rejected you and followed *him* [the Great Spirit of Nonbeing]. (257-258; 14:234-235)

From the immanence and the explicit manner of the above quote itself we discover that all is contained in the last temptation: by accepting the third gift of authority, Christ would have accepted all three gifts of the three temptations simultaneously. The same rule applies to all three temptations: accepting one means accepting all three at once. Thus, the hypostatic artistic thinking in the Monologue is fully actualized in the third temptation because the third temptation is "the third and the last." No new temptation could participate in the hypostatic unity of the three temptations, each and all allied in the soteriological goal of man's salvation. Let us reiterate the basic premise of the hypostatical economy: the Inquisitor identifies himself with Satan and opposes himself to Christ, solving thereby the temptations by his personal soteriological arbitration.

('How? In what way? By which modality? In what manner? By what means?' Literally: 'through which image-icon?') comes at us with the force of its semantic field: *obraz deistvii*: mode/line of action, policy; *obraz zhizni*: way/mode of life/living; and, most visibly/invisibly, *obraz myslei*: way/shape of thinking. The main thrust of the term *obraz* in the syntagmas just presented resides in their power to convey form, shape, order, and visibility: thought, and action and life overall are iconically structured, displaying their visible order in an outward fashion. No doubt the society erected by the Grand Inquisitor, we might say, would have a totalitarian *obraz* (appearance, face), being thus achievable in a totalitarian fashion (*totalitarnym obrazom*).

Let us now turn to the apocalyptic reasons that underlie the Grand Inquisitor's choice of the strategy of salvation offered as a gift by the three temptations. Now the Grand Inquisitor introduces a new zone, that of apocalyptic intertextuality, in order to make his points:

> And so, turmoil [*nespokoistvo*], confusion [*smiatenie*], and unhappiness [*neschastie*] - these are the present lot of mankind, after you suffered so much for their freedom [*za ikh svobodu*]! Your great prophet tells in a vision and an allegory that he saw all those who took part in the first resurrection and that they were twelve thousand from each tribe. But even if there were so many, they, too, were not like men, as it were, but gods [*bogi*]. They endured your cross, they endured scores of years of hungry and naked wilderness, eating locusts and roots; and of course you can point with pride [*s gordost'iu*] to these children of freedom [*detei svobody*], of free love [*svobodnoi liubvi*], of free and magnificent sacrifice [*zhertvy*] in your name. But remember that there were only several thousand of them, and they were gods [*da i to bogov*]. What of the rest? Is it the fault of the rest of feeble [*slabyie*] mankind that they could not endure what the mighty [*moguchie*] endured? Is it the fault of the weak soul [*slabaia dusha*] that it is unable [*chto ne v silakh*] to contain such terrible gifts [*strashnykh darov*]? Can it be that you indeed came only to the chosen ones and for the chosen ones? But if so, there is a mystery [*taina*] here, and we cannot understand it. And if it is a mystery, then we, too, had the right to preach mystery and to teach them that it is not the free choice [*svobodnoie reshenie*: the free decision] of the heart that matters, and not love [*ne liubov*], but the mystery [*a taina*], which they must blindly obey [*povinovat'sia*], even setting aside [*mimo*: in spite of] their own conscience [*sovesti*]. And so we did. We corrected your deed [*podvig*] and based it on *miracle* [*na chude*], *mystery* [*taine*], and *authority* [*i avtoritete*]. And mankind rejoiced that they were once more led like sheep, and that at last such a terrible gift [*strashnyi dar*], which had brought them so much suffering, had been taken [*sniat*: *lifted* like a burden] from their hearts. (256-257; 14:234)

The above text concentrates on the most decisive moments of the Grand Inquisitor's argument against Christ's soteriological mission. Here we find the concepts of ontic (that is constitutive, because it is creational or naturally endowed) weakness (*slabyie dushi*: weak souls, since weak by their constitution), unable to contain or handle the terrible gift of freedom (and thus not guilty, or blameworthy), as well as the concept of ontic power of those who are mighty (*moguchie*) and therefore outright gods, capable of imitating both Christ and freedom.

The Grand Inquisitor's argument from human weakness rests on a sincere and genuine indignation and imputation (much like Ivan's nonacceptance of any future paradisal theodicy rationalizing this world's evil and cruelty): the text of the Apocalypse restricts electivity, first, into freedom and, second, into salvation to only very few. To the Grand Inquisitor this sounds, since it is preached to that effect, like mystery (*taina*): from Christ's mystery, he derives the right to preach his own mystery, according to which not love and freedom but blind submission, even against one's conscience, to miracle, mystery and authority is the law of salvation. (It appears that the legitimate question of 'false' Christianity or of whether Christianity as such is a false worship of a false Messiah arises precisely within the tensions and the semantic field of miracle-mystery-and-authority). This new mystery inaugurates and institutes, as the Grand Inquisitor claims, a radical soteriological correction ('*my ispravili*)' of Christ's deed (*podvig*),[27] a deed that rejected the temptations and started Christ's misguided, as the Grand Inquisitor claims, economy of salvation through freedom and free faith. Not because freedom and free faith would constitute or represent false ideals, but because they are powerless icons and ideals: man has no available power (*sila*), no capability (*mogushchestvo*) that would

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[27] The entire coming of Christ could be denominated as *podvig*: one cam think of the history of salvation as the history of divine *podvig*. Incarnation, Temptations, and Passions are the elements of this *podvig*. The word *podvig* in the Russian New Testament renders, for instance, the Greek *athlesin*: 'fight' (Heb 10:32), or *agona*: 'combat' (2Thim 4:7), rendered, in turn, in Latin as *certamen* or, possibly, *agon*. One of Augustine's works carries the title *De Agone Christiana*. *Podvig* deserves an extended treatment in Dostoevsky, with all its semantic implications and generative paradigms. *Podvig* represents a genuine exploit in the realm of spiritual praxis, or *podvizhnicheskoe delanie* (see, for instance, Isaak Sirin's *Podvizhnicheskie Slova*, usually translated as *Ascetic Words*, in 'Bibliography', a book decisive for Dostoevsky and twice mentioned in *The Brothers Karamazov*). *Podvig* is an exploit, a deed, an ascetic creation, or a religious and spiritual effort that gives priority to the freely creative cultural, theological and personal

enable him to exercise and implement the praxis of freedom and free faith. It is within this very semantic and personologic context that we should understand the three salvific powers (*tri sily*) advanced by Satan through the Grand Inquisitor: they are the only operative and implementable powers available for this world.

The three powers do not remain in their naked status of mere and sheer powers (as potentiality, Aristotelian *dynamis*, if we want), on the contrary, as we have seen throughout the previous two temptations, they are iconized by a person, and thus actualized into an iconostasis and enunciated in one breadth: miracle-mystery-authority.

If in the realm of the third temptation the Grand Inquisitor actively fuses the power (*sila*) of authority with an authoritarian icon of authority, then he does so with the awareness that a power stands in need of an icon. Once hypostatically fused (hypostatically, since the fusion covers two heterogeneous natures: personologic and semiotic), this icon-power will be able to compensate for the ontic powerlessness of man in this world. In its iconologic dimension, the power of authority functions exclusively through the semiotic marketing of an iconostasis (call it 'doctrine'): one needs an icon to convey a power interpersonally (call it 'iconized power').

It is quite evident by now, that the identifying of persons is possible only through the identifying of their icons. This shows us that the third temptation generates the icon of worship, which defines Satan, and the icon of authority, which defines the Inquisitor. Therefore, the icon of authority is the hypostasis of the icon of worship.[28]

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act. The word *podvig* confers its modality upon both the teaching and the biography of Father Zosima.

The next step in our analysis requires the identification of the icon of Christ in the framework of the third temptation. In his passage from the second to the third temptation, the Grand Inquisitor explains why he chose to correct Christ's work and deed:

> But here, too, you overestimated mankind, for, of course, they are slaves, though they were created rebels. Behold and judge, now that fifteen centuries have passed, take a look at them: whom have you raised up to yourself? I swear, man is created weaker and baser than you thought him! How, how can he ever accomplish the same things as you? Respecting him so much, you behaved as if you had ceased to be compassionate, because you demanded [*potreboval*] too much of him-and who did this? He who loved [*vozliubil*] him more than himself! Respecting him less, you would have demanded less of him, and that would be closer to love, for his burden [*nosha*: personal burden; *bremia svobody*: the burden of freedom] would be lighter. He is weak and mean. (256; 14:233)

This quote connects the Christ of the second temptation, where the burden of conscience can be solved only through "free love" (i.e., faith), with the Christ of the third temptation, where the demand for worshipping the authority of political power is opposed by the personal love of Christ towards man. But the Grand Inquisitor now rejects and corrects Christ's work of love by opposing it to his own love towards man:

> We corrected [*my ispravili*] your deed [*podvig tvoi*] and based it [*i osnovali ego*: and founded it; it is a foundational correction] on *miracle*, *mystery*, and *authority*. And mankind rejoiced that they were once more led like a flock, and that at last such a terrible gift [*strashnyi dar* of freedom; but not from a *strashnyi dukh*, the Satan's terrible spirit, but Christ], which had brought them so much suffering, had been taken from their hearts [as a burden: *nosha* and *bremia*]. Tell me, were we right in teaching [*ucha*: as an iconologic doctrine] and doing [*delaia*: as praxis of power-*sila*] so? Have we not, indeed, loved [*liubili*: iconology-praxis implemented] mankind, in so humbly [*smirenno*; *smirenie*: humbleness; here: pseudo-Christian humility, lowering itself to mankind's powerlessness]

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[28] One should note, however, that the icons of the Grand Inquisitor – miracle, mystery, and authority – are iconizing Christ even in their antinomic positioning to Christ (see section (4) in "Faces of Iconicity"). Christ can positivize these icons by appropriating them into his own personologic economy, instituting therefore an open-ended struggle over the content of a person's iconostasis. It is within Christ's nature and power to be able to carry the mission of enhypostatizing into himself any heterogeneous nature that is in ontic need of 'salvation,' as the three icons of the Grand Inquisitor are.

> recognizing [*soznav*: becoming conscious of] their impotence [*bessilie*: powerlessness], in so lovingly [*s liuboviiu*; a Church Slavonic form] alleviating their burden [*noshu*] and allowing [*razreshyv*] their feeble [*slabosil'noi*: of weak power] nature even to sin; with our permission [*razresheniia*]? Why have you come to interfere [*meshat'*] with us now? And why are you looking at me so silently and understandingly with your meek [*krotkimi*] eyes? Be angry [*rasserdis'*]! I do not want your love [*liubvi*], for I do not love [*ne liubliu*] you. (257; 14:234)

The words 'allowing,' 'our permission,' 'interference' – are the words of political authority, and they are uttered in their connection with love. Authority, therefore, is interpreted in terms of love: authority claims to be the hypostasis of the Inquisitor's love (a pseudo-love, an impostorial love, allowing the powerless the deranking and degrading freedom to sin, but not the right to practice the 'burden of freedom'). Moreover, the Inquisitor opposes his hypostatics of love-authority to Christ's hypostatics of love-freedom[29]: "Why have you come to interfere with us now? And why are you looking at me so silently and understandingly with your meek eyes? Be angry! I do not want your love, for I do not love you."

This revelation of the Inquisitor's authority ("Be angry") that rejects love -is the essence of the Third Temptation's interpretation. By the operation of the

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[29] The Orthodox theologian Zizioulas, in presenting the theological model of divine being, brings together the main concepts permitting the coping with the figure of self-hypostatizing person, those of substance (nature), communion, love, and freedom:

> It becomes evident that the only exercise of *freedom* [emphasis added] in an ontological manner is *love*. The expression 'God is love' (1 John 4:16) signifies that God 'subsists' as Trinity, that is, as person and not as substance. Love is not an emanation or 'property' of the substance of God – this detail is significant in the light of what I have said so far – but is *constitutive* of His substance, i.e. it is that which makes God what he is, the one God. Thus love ceases to be a qualifying – i.e. secondary – property of being and becomes the *supreme ontological predicate*. Love as God's mode of existence 'hypostatizes' God, constitutes His being. Therefore, as a result of love, the ontology of God is not subject to the necessity of the substance. *Love is identified with ontological*

hypostatic identification of an icon with a person we discovered the icon-love as being identical with Christ on the level of the third temptation.

To summarize: on the level of the third temptation Satan's icon is 'worship,' the Grand Inquisitor's icon is 'authority,' and, finally, Christ's icon is 'love':

[3.1]

Question: Satan = worship
Answer: Christ = love
Interpretation: Inquisitor = authority

Love, however, is hypostatically present on the level of the other two temptations. One cannot make much iconic or hypostatic sense without reciprocal intermirroring between temptations, and without an effective labor of every icon on the level of each temptation.

The first temptation factors in love towards mankind by using the expression 'to be dear,' both words edifying the semantic field of interpersonal soteriology. The words 'dear' and 'love' (the ruling icon of the third temptation) are conjoined on the level of the first temptation in order to make more intelligible the icons of 'earthly bread' and that of 'heavenly bread' (freedom):

> And if in the name of heavenly bread thousands and tens of thousands will follow you, what will become of the millions and tens of thousands of millions of creatures who will not be strong enough to forgo earthly bread for the sake of the heavenly? Is it that only the tens of thousands of the great and strong are dear

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freedom [emphasis added]." (1997:46)

> [*dorogi*] to you, and the remaining millions, numerous as the sands of the sea, weak but loving you [*liubiashchikh tebia*], should serve only as material for the great and the strong? No, the weak, too, are dear [*dorogi*] to us. (253; 14:231)

The foundational iconicity of love is connected to still another moment of Christ's 'deed', *the crucifixion*. The Grand Inquisitor brings the argument of the cross within the framework of the second temptation in order to conjoin icons in an impressive iconostasis, where Christ rejects the miracle of faithlessness in favor of both free love and free faith:

> You did not come down from the cross when they shouted to you, mocking and reviling you: 'Come down from the cross and we will believe that it is you.' You did not come down because, again, you did not want to enslave man by a miracle and thirsted for faith that is free [*svobodnoi very*], not miraculous. You thirsted for love that is free [*svobodnoi liubvi*], and not for the servile raptures of a slave before a power [*mogushchestvom*] that has left him permanently terrified. (256; 14:233)

On the level of the second temptation proper, the icon of *love* hypostatically integrates the icon of the first temptation, freedom, within the iconic frame of free faith and free love. As we can see, none of the foundational icons of a person can be understood in isolation, that is non-hypostatically. Christ's freedom, faith, and love are interchangeable homogeneous magnitudes, that adopt the 'face' of different hypostases:

> Instead of taking over [*ovladet'*; *vlast'*: political power] men's freedom, you increased it still more for them! Did you forget that peace and even death are dearer to man than free choice [*svobodnogo vybora*; *svoboda vybora*: perfect equivalent of the Augustinian *liberum arbitrium* and the Aristotelian *proairesis*] in the knowledge of good and evil? There is nothing more seductive [*obol'stitel'nee*][30] for man than the freedom of his conscience [*svoboda ego*

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[30] Here we have the term *obol'shchenie* (seduction) that could be better understood once it is iconized within a semantic field together with such ruling terms within the novel like *iskushenie* (temptation) and *soblazn* (lure). *Obol'shchenie* appears to be a temptation by a positive option (say, freedom), while *soblazn* describes a temptation by something dubious or negative (for instance, Alyosha's faith being subjected to a lure, that is undermined, by Father Zosima's decaying 'saintly' body, which is expected to evade decay due to sainthood). Both *soblazn* and *obol'shchenie* appear to be prevalently

> *sovesti*], but there is nothing more tormenting either. And so, instead of a firm foundation for appeasing human conscience once and for all [by performing the miracle of the second temptation], you chose everything that was unusual, enigmatic, and indefinite, you chose everything that was beyond men's strength, and thereby acted as if you did not love [*ne liubia*] them at all-and who did this? He who came to give his life for them! Instead of taking over men's freedom, you increased it and forever burdened the kingdom of the human soul with its torments. You desired the free love [*svobodnoi liubvi*] of man, that he should follow you freely, seduced [*prel'shchennyi*; variation on the above *obol'shchenie*] and captivated [*plenennyi*: as the result of seduction] by you. Instead of the firm ancient law, man had henceforth to decide for himself, with a free heart [*svobodnym serdtsem*: as the seat of free love], what is good and what is evil, having only your image [*obraz*: icon] before him as a guide - but did it not occur to you that he would eventually reject [*otvergnet*: temptations are also 'rejected' by Christ] and dispute [*osporit*: call into question] even your image and your truth [*pravdu*: also righteousness; *istina* is the impersonal truth of 'science'] if he was oppressed [*ugnetut*: under a regime of freedom] by so terrible a burden as freedom of choice [*svoboda vybora*]? (254-255; 14:232)

The Grand Inquisitor resemantasizes and subjects to inversion the main concepts of the Christian 'doctrine.' Thus he uses the words 'oppression' in conjunction with 'freedom': man is oppressed with freedom, that is with the duty of deliberation and decision making, with the 'terrible burden' of 'freedom of choice.'

As we can see, the rule of hypostatics of love on the level of the Second Temptation is as inescapable as on the level of the Third Temptation: we have there not only freedom of choice, but equally 'free faith' and 'free love'. 'To oppress' is 'to not love' and, most evidently, it is not 'to love.' Still, the Grand Inquisitor claims that in his reductionistic oppression, that is in his subtracting of freedom from man and thus in his impoverishing of man, he practices love. It follows from this, that the Grand Inquisitor practices not only an impostorial, usurping iconicity and hypostatics (he effectively tells Christ: 'Your image-icon will be challenged not only by me, but also by the majority of them, and they will choose me over you'), but also verbal imposture: language itself, an

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impersonal, while temptation (*iskushenie*) is mostly intentionally mounted by a person

entity supremely amenable to both freedom and authority, is subverted and misdirected. It is inside this picture that Christ's silence becomes eloquent: Christ says nothing on a double injunction, one comes from the Grand Inquisitor who orders him to remain silent, the other comes from the text of the Gospels, whose message (kerygma) is complete and final, as the Grand Inquisitor claims, allowing no addition or alteration.[31]

Thus, after having decoded the identity of the main trinitarian icons, let us now represent in a diagram the final distribution of the icon-hypostases into the iconostasis-paradigms of person-hypostases:

[3.1]

	SATAN	CHRIST	GRAND INQUISITOR
TEMPTATIONS	QUESTION	ANSWER	INTERPRETATION
FIRST TEMPTATION	Bread	Freedom	Mystery
SECOND TEMPTATION	Good-evil of conscience	Faith	Miracle
THIRD TEMPTATION	Worship	Love	Authority

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against another person.

[31] One should note, however, that the mere appearance of Christ upsets the apocalyptic punctuality and scriptural chronemics: Christ's unscheduled coming appears to be not 'in time' but 'in freedom,' not according 'to the Gospels,' texturally, but according to 'the person,' as a creational fiat. Dostoevsky's Christ is more than Scripture-restricted paleo-kerygmatic reappearance. Christ's appearance, silence, meekness, and kiss are to be categorized as neo-evangelical, as inaugurating and proclaiming a new kerygma and a new Gospel.

This diagram presents the advantage of displaying synoptic co-presence (a basic feature of the religious pictorial icon) of all the icons predicated about each of the three persons. The significance of any of the icons cannot be grasped but in simultaneous interplay of all the others. For instance, Christ as hypostatic person is defined by his three homogeneous icon-hypostases: we cannot understand Christ but as a hypostatic (i.e., simultaneous and integral) interplay of freedom-faith-love. But Christ's person is by definition hypostatic: Christ has no ontological standing outside the soteriological implications of persons defining him (e.g., as it is claimed by the nature of the Trinity). In the case of the Monologue, Christ must be represented as a non-solitary triadic co-presence: Christ-Satan-Inquisitor. Once two other persons are implicated in the hypostatic definition of Christ -their icons are reciprocally brought into the semantic field of each person, entering thereby the iconological polyphonic intermirroring and co-dependency among the icons themselves. Christ represents the modal domain, which must overcode and overdetermine any personal semantic field. The same modal rule applies to any person, i.e., the modality of the personal voice is superimposed on other voices generating the irreducible personal perspectives and autonomies.

To account for the distribution of the voices across the three temptations we will design the following diagram:

[3.2]

	ICONS		
	Bread Conscience Worship	Freedom Faith Love	Mystery Miracle Authority
PERSONS	VOICES		
Satan	+	-	+
Christ	+	+	-
Inquisitor	+	-	+

In this diagram we identify the necessary and the sufficient elements of the iconological-hypostatical structures of the Monologue. The main fictional entity that is indispensable for the correct understanding of the Monologue is the person of Satan.[32] Only three persons --the Inquisitor, Christ, and Satan --can serve the interpretation of the poetical mechanism engendered by the Three Temptations. On this basis it has been possible to capture the identity of the discourses intersecting themselves in the Monologue and, therefore, via icons and voices identified as pertaining to persons, to specify the dialogic-polyphonic and iconologic-hypostatic artistic thinking of the Monologue.

[32] Fictional Satan is an equal originator of the personologic trinitarian substance (not of the individual nature of the other two persons) in the 'The Grand Inquisitor.' To the extent that Satan is logically and temporally first to initiate the substance through his temptations and questions, in the Antichrist trinity he positions himself analogously to God of the Orthodox Trinity. To the extent that Satan is the analogue and the counterpart of the Trinitarian Holy Spirit, and together with Christ generates the person of the Grand Inquisitor, he will not only redirect the meaning of Filioque (of Christ's generative personology, not individual nature) towards the Grand Inquisitor, but will institute a new and radical interhypostatic equality through the new doctrine of Satanoque. Logically, in relation to the Christian Trinity, one can easily imagine a heresy or a doctrine where the Holy Spirit, on an exclusively personologic and interhypostatic level, together with the hypostasis of the Son, 'exercises' a 'generative' personologic power on the person (not nature) of the Father, instituting therefore the doctrine of Spirituque. If the nature (ousia) of the Holy Trinity and its intratrinitarian homoousic identity is taken for granted, then Filioque would account only for interpersonal 'generation,' together with the Father, of the Holy Spirit. Then Filioque (now equally directed towards the Father) and Spirituque (as, say, equal loving of the person of the Father together with the Son) would function exclusively on the interhypostatic level.

TWO: FACES OF ICONICITY

In this chapter we discuss some of the most important conceptual and semantic aspects that are guiding our iconologic and hypostatic interpretation of the fictional world in *The Brothers Karamazov*. Our secondary purpose here is to correlate some of the concepts of this study with a larger field of inquiry to which we appeal in order to individuate more forcefully some of the interpretive devices we have employed in the analysis of the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor. Section (1) presents a short and necessary survey of the field of iconology in its most current version. Section (2) makes an appeal to a strictly defined cultural perspective (Orthodoxy) in order to position Dostoevsky within an appropriate typological framework (primarily in terms of iconostasis). Section (3) elaborates some of the religious and semiotic aspects that further delineate our cardinal categories of nature (ontology), person (personology), and icon (iconology), a segment also serving as partial preparation for our interpretation of Dostoevsky in light of Augustine in chapter Four. Section (4) attempts to present a short review of Pierce's main thoughts on iconic similarity and dissimilarity and their supporting value for our interpretive strategies.

1) Synoptic Iconicity

The category of the iconic enjoys acceptance on account of Peirce's (1955:98-119) tripartite classification of signs into iconic, indexical, and symbolic, who also developed,

among other things, the modern foundation of speaking about signs in terms of arbitrariness and motivation.

The question of arbitrariness (convention, culture) vs. motivation (nature) pervades the philosophical discussions since Plato (see Nöth 1995:240-241)[1], and we elaborate on this aspect in section (3). Iconicity, as we shall see below, offers an imaginative combination of semantic and pragmatic aspects of the sign. It is remarkable that lately almost exclusively linguists, and not literary theorists, have been the ones who have endeavored to systematically challenge and complement the prevalent doctrine of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign and continue to elaborate the concept of iconicity and thus motivation (as opposed to arbitrariness).

One cannot but feel gratitude for what has been already done in the field of iconologic studies.[2] In my interpretive strategies I was also guided (besides the theological understanding of an icon) by the scheme we find in Nänny and Fisher's "Introduction: Iconicity as a Creative Force in Language Use" (Nänny and Fisher 1999: xxii):

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[1] Noth, Winfried. 1990. *Handbook of Semiotics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

[2] See, for instance: Simone, Rafaele (ed.). 1994. *Iconicity in Language*. Amsterdam: Benjamins;

Landberg, Marge E. (ed.). 1995. *Syntactic Iconicity and Linguistic Freezes: Human Dimension*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter;

Nänny, Max and Fisher, Olga (ed.). 1999. *Form Miming Meaning: Iconicity in Language and Literature*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins;

Johansson, D. T., Skov, M., and Brogart B. (ed.). 1999. *Iconicity. A Fundamental Problem in Semiotics*. Katrinebjergvej: NSU Press.

Nänny, Max and Fisher, Olga (ed.). (ed.). 2001. *The Motivated Sign: Iconicity in Language and Literature 2*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

| imagic | - oral/aural
| | - tactile
| | - visual
| | -centrality vs. peripherality
Iconicity| | -distance/proximity
| |structural | - isomorphism - | -sequential ordering
| | | - iconicity of | -markedness
| | | motivation | -repetition
|diagramatic |
| |
| |semantic | -metaphor (cognitive)
| -metaphor (grammatical) | - analogy
| - grammaticalization

In this study the term 'icon' itself will be subjected to semantic grammaticalization (note this very term's generation through the iconicity devices and algorithms) and yield such option as 'iconization' or 'de-iconization,' besides the already existing term of 'iconicity' (and this represents just another example of iconicity's generative mechanisms). This scheme also is preeminently a diagram of devices, as the scheme we present below from Mitchell is of iconologic domains.

Let me take for the purposes of illustration of diagrammatic iconicity the double iconicity of Caesar's *veni*, *vidi*, *vici* (here I simply borrow from Nänny and Fischer's argumentation and examples from the 'Introduction' mentioned above, and then I expand on them). In Caesar's dictum, Nänny and Fischer argue, we encounter the temporal sequencing of action translated into diagrammatic iconic succession of three verbs. But, they also argue, there is a second iconicity at play here too: all three verbs start with the same consonant and end with the same vowel, suggesting their forming of similarity and ultimately semantic equivalence. One feels that for Caesar to win or conquer is as

effortless as to see or to come. This introduces besides diagrammatic iconicity also the semantic iconicity, making it a powerful and straightforward example of person-icon mutual motivation. In our personologic dimension, one should notice here the voluntaristic/creative aspect of this iconicity: it applies to and individuates only Caesar (*veni-vidi-vici* is an icon of Caesar). Similarly, when a person practices freedom, one should expect that freedom (say Christ's) would stand in iconic relation to that person (freedom's imagery and diagrammatics constitute an icon of Christ). Thus once we postulate Christ, ipso facto we postulate love and freedom. But if we want to exercise some degree of iconic imagination or intericonicity (only to upstage or, more kenotically, mimic intertextuality in iconology) and correlate even Caesar to Christ, we could transfer Caesar's diagrammatic and programmatic swiftness of action unto Christ's soteriology.

Thus Christ might say about himself in imitating Caesar's iconologic thinking: "*I was incarnated-I died-I resurrected*', or, Christ might say, again in imitating Caesar: '*I believed-I loved-I liberated*', to reemploy in a different logical and temporal modality the Grand Inquisitor's hypostatic paradigm of 'freedom-faith-love' (this can also efficiently serve as an illustration of the workings of iconic conceptual mechanisms).

Finally, any map or rule of prosody (rhyme, rhythm, etc.) pertains to diagrammatic iconicity. As an extra example of semantic iconicity, relevant for natural metaphor, and not voluntaristic, person-dependent one, the expression 'foot of a mountain' is generated on natural similarity not between foot-foot identity, but between the lower part of a man and lower part of a mountain. One can imagine metaphors of the sort: "The man was big like a mountain" (a mountain of a man).

Metaphor (as cognitive iconicity) is a straightforward affair as is the diagramatic

isomorphism (say, maps). Even less problematic is imagic iconicity, since the majority of cognitive subjects restrict themselves to this alone, raising objections to the projection of iconicity beyond its naturalistic similarity (mimetism). Iconicity therefore is a creative and the most potent extension of semiotic domains.

A similar scheme of iconicity, although more explicit in capturing general literary concerns and items, one can find in Mitchell's book on iconology (1986:10).[3] The concept of iconology is felicitously employed to cover heterogeneous phenomena relating to the study of images as icons. I will reproduce the scheme without extensive comments, the scheme being straightforward and simple. The only difference from the previous scheme resides in that Mitchell uses the term 'image' instead of the more technical term 'iconicity,' focusing the diagram on iconologic domains, rather then devices, as we have mentioned above:



The two schemes are projected as diagramatic icons of the field of iconicity, and this example itself should help the process of grasping the macrostructural iconicity, which

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[3] Mitchell, W. J. 1986. *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

could be termed macroiconicity, the diagrams themselves being simply 'icons.' There is no need to argue or to prove the usefulness of the above diagrams-icons, since dreams (say, Alyosha or Dmitri's), nightmares (Ivan's), and almost any kind of iconologic demarche can easily be identified throughout *The Brothers Karamazov.*

2) Icon and Iconostasis

It is iconically palpable that the above diagrams (from Mitchell and Nänny-Fischer) could be semiotically, not personologically or theologically, equated with an assemblage of icons, and at least metaphorically they could also be called 'iconostasis' (the macroconstraint imposed on a set of items makes them intericonic; more on this see section(4)). Florensky, an Orthodox theologian, conjoined the image of iconostasis with that of a dream; moreover, in this operation he could not go without the implicit concept of world-versions.

In addition, from the perspective of imagic iconicity, as a logical and imaginative inference, one could adopt the image of Iconostasis and terminologically consecrate it as 'iconostatic iconicity.' The Trinity is the first example of this sort of plural co-presence of images, 'degenerating' under varying and different constraints into a looser confederation of imagic icons. In this context, for the purposes of a mere schematic picture of a mutable iconostasis of a person, I would take from Florensky's *Iconostasis* (1996) his reference to dreams. Dreams in Dostoevsky's fiction are hypostatic macrostructural events (usually emplotted in a self-contained narrative, as in "The Dream

of a Ridiculous Man") that translate a person's mutation from one condition into another (sometimes mutations could be positive, metanoia-like events as in the case of Alyosha, Dmitri, or the Ridiculous Man).

It is beyond my current scope to interpret Dostoevsky's employment of dreams in the novel (however, Ivan's nightmare I address in the section on inanity in Dostoevsky). The first thing I would like to attempt here is to correlate dreams and iconicity, that is a semiotic-organic involuntary event with a person's freedom, power/powerlessness and responsibility. A person, most probably should be revolted that it is left at the mercy of a nightmare, as it is basically left prey to the predicaments of nature (sickness, aging) or victimhood (slavery, crime). The entity status of a dream, all the more of a fictional dream, is relevant also for the light it throws on hypostatics (one can safely postulate the existence of such a subdiscipline in the field of figures and tropes; and if deconstruction flaunts perpetual deferral of meaning, hypostatics, as its possible opposite, would secure the simultaneous copresence of various meanings). Thus Florensky:

> "*Dream*: This is our first and simplest (in the sense that we are fully habituated to it) entry into the invisible world [*stupen' zhyzni v nevidimom*: the first degree of our life in the invisible]. This entry [*stupen'*: degree, level] is, more often than not, the lowest. Yet even the most chaotic and crude dream leads our soul into the invisible, giving even to the least sensitive of us the insight that there is something in us very different from what we uniquely call life. And we know this, too: when we stand on the threshold between sleep and waking, when we stand at the boundary between two worlds [visible and the invisible], our soul is engulfed with dreams. [...] Few have sufficiently considered, however, the infinite speed of the dream-time, the time that turns inside out, the time that flows backward. For, indeed, very long sequences of visible time can, in the dream, *be wholly instantaneous* [emphasis added] – and can flow from future to past, from effects to causes. This happens in our dreams precisely when we are moving from the visible world to the invisible, between the actual to the imaginary [*kogda nasha zhyzn' ot vidimogo perekhodit v nevidimoe, ot deistvitel'nogo – v mnimoe*] (1996: 34-35). "[W]e may also say that the composition of the dream is teleological: its events occur because of its *denouement*, in such a way that the *denouement* will not be left hanging in the air but will, instead, exhibit deep pragmatic rationality

> [*glubokuiu pragmaticheskuiu motivirovku*]" (38). "A dream therefore occurs when – *simultaneously but with differing orders of clarity* [emphasis added] – both shores of existence are given to consciousness (43). [...] There are, it is true, other possible phenomena of the invisible realm. But for such phenomena to occur in us, it is necessary that some powerful inward shock take place, some essential separation of oneself from oneself." (44) "What is true of art and dream, is also true of mystical experience: a common pattern holds everywhere" (45). "The wall [*altarnaia pregrada*: the altar's barrier] that separates two worlds is an iconostasis. One might mean by the iconostasis the boards, the bricks or the stones. In actuality the iconostasis is a boundary between the visible and the invisible worlds, and it functions as a boundary by being an obstacle to our seeing the altar, thereby making it accessible to our consciousness by means of its unified row of saints [...] that surround the altar where God is, the sphere where the heavenly glory dwells, thus proclaiming the Mystery. Iconostasis is vision. [...] *Iconostasis is the saints themselves* [and not a physical barrier-wall]." (62)

The speed of a dream is an iconologic speed, one that, Hermes-like (the messenger of gods), allows if not institutes an interworld hermeneutic: an iconologic hermeneutic.

The saints are icons on the screen of an iconostasis that separates the altar from the naos in Byzantine rite churches. In the quote above we have traversed the distance between the dream and iconostasis with an intentional progression of imagery, quasi-modeled on the density of the dream. We have also seen the main chain formed by icon-hypostasis-iconostasis coherence. There is no need to prove in what way a dream is iconic, since the dream's similitude to plural simultaneous things is self-evident.[4]

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[4] Literary and art critics, sensitive and knowledgeable of the icon (for instance, Uspensky 1976. *The Semiotics of the Russian Icon*) describe the icon's unique representational force in terms of poetics (structure and composition) and semiotics. Todorov in his *Introduction to Poetics* says: "All the aspects of an object are determined by the vision we are afforded of it. This importance has been acknowledged in the visual arts, and literary theory has much to learn from the theory of painting. To cite but one example among others, specialists have often remarked the presence of perspectives and their decisive role for the picture's structure in Byzantine icons: it is evident that several points of view are utilized within one and the same icon, according to the part that the figure represented is to play: the chief figure is turned toward the spectator, whereas, according to the scene represented, this figure should be turned toward his or her interlocutor" (1981:33). The simultaneous copresence of several 'images-visions' (similar to iconostasis) advances a reconstructive enterprise, not a deconstrutive indefinite deferral

What counts for our iconologic and hypostatic framework, however, arises from such expressions as "simultaneously but with differing orders of clarity of existence" (a shorthand definition of hypostasis), instantaneous co-presence and reverse mobility of dream events and of causality (hypostatic transcendental temporality). The model offered by the image of iconostasis felicitously captures, as Florensky has shown, the kindred domains of dream, art and mysticism, all three deciding the meanings of *The Brothers Karamazov*. This iconologic-hypostatic mechanism is present in the Legend, whose interpretation yields a coherent spectrum of icons, that is an iconostasis. What is more, in the novel the person itself is sequenced into stages of iconic successions, of iconic identities, that is, an iconostasis. In the novel, the myth of the three temptations is actualized in its fullness in the narrated present and every person actualizes itself in its current hypostatic version identifiable by an icon. That's why Alyosha wonders whether the Grand Inquisitor's monologue – as his current macroicon – is his mere fantasy or delusion. Ivan, on the other hand, is less concerned about the realism's constraints that are spoiling Alyosha (see 14:228). In conclusion, iconostasis is a useful device for thinking about persons as iconic continuities or iconic instabilities.

In the context of iconostasis, valuable are Florensky's meditations on face-appearance and icon-countenance, since an iconostasis is constituted by such entities.

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of any presence (even of a meaning). Hypostatics comes to oppose deconstruction (the insistence on absence) and institutes God's presence (parousia) via an iconic copresence of things and persons. One of the most insidious psychological puzzlements probably would be the epistemologic inability to see things *in presentia*, for which iconology seems to compensate. The relegation to partiality, ignorance, or even illusion in knowledge depicts the cognitive subject in its existential predicament, against which some of Dostoevsky's heroes rebel. For instance, Ivan demands an answer to the question posed by innocent suffering here and now (in an iconic present), not in some hope-driven future. Ivan's will is an iconic and hypostatic will, but a frustrated one: the universe appears to him as a disjointed deconstruction with an absent meaning.

Everything has a face and thus appearance: "We must see in *face* (*litso*) a boundary between subjectivity and objectivity, a boundary whose clear distinction is never given to our consciousness. [...] When we see a face, we see its objective reality only (as it were) hiddenly" (Florensky 1996:51).

The face entails an epistemologic and artistic labor, being captured and rendered in mutable and approximating sketches: "Once completed, the *face* becomes (using the language of literary criticism) an artistic image, a perceptual portrait that is not the ideal form but is, instead one that is simultaneously typical and relative" (Florensky 1996:51).

A personalized face becomes a *lik* (countenance), which is effectively an icon. Countenance (*lik*), semiotically translatable into an icon, represents the image (*obraz*) and the likeness (*podobie*) of a person, capturing, Florensky says, the ontological, invisible depth of a person: "Countenance (*lik*) is the full realization of the likeness [*podobie*] of God within the [person's] face [*v litse*]" (1996:52). Further Florensky notes that one of the senses of the Russian *lik* (a word related to *lichnost',* person) suggests the Greek *eidos, idea,* evoking thus the central concept of the prototype's image itself or the epiphany of a spiritual essence, meaning that the contemplation of the countenance equals with the contemplation of the image of God. Florensky's distinction between *face* and *countenance* places an immense responsibility on the freedom of a person: a person's iconologic will and conduct transfigure (through a metanoia) a mere natural face into a divine countenance.

To the personologic distinction between *lik* (countenance) and *litso* (face) Florensky introduces the useful for us distinction between *lik* (countenance) and *lichina* (mask):

> The absolute opposite of *countenance* [*lik*] is *mask* (*lichina*). The first meaning of mask may be seen in the word 'larve' (relate to modern *larva*), meaning that which resembles a face, being both presented and accepted as a face but which is empty inside; that is, it has physical materiality but no metaphysical substance. [...] Significantly, the Latin term *larva* had already, in ancient Roman culture, acquired the meaning of *astral corps*, 'empty' (*inanis*)[5] or 'substance-less,' that which is left after death: that is, the *larva* or *astral mask* as the dark, impersonal vampire who seeks its sustenance in fastening onto a living face and sucking out all the blood from it, showing forth the face's essence as its own. [...] By exfoliating [*otslaivaia*] essence into appearance, sin brings into a *countenance* [*lik*] – i.e., into the purest revelation of God's image – that which is alien to the countenance and, in so doing, it overshadows the light of God. [...] Dostoevsky well understood this process in his character Stavrogin, whose face had become a stony mask and no longer a real face: such is one of the steps in the disintegration of personality.[6] (1996:53-56)

But there is a profound similarity between a person's countenance and iconostasis, since the iconostasis is a macrocountenance.

Father Paissy, for instance, in *The Brothers Karamazov* has a lot to say about *lik*-countenance under the synonymic category of *oblik* (image, iconic make-up), whose power to convey every person's iconicity he describes to Alyosha:

> [T]he science of this world, having united itself into a great force, has, especially in the past century, examined everything heavenly that has been bequeathed to us in sacred books, and after hard analysis, the learned ones of this world have absolutely nothing left of what once was holy. But they have examined parts and missed the whole, and their blindness is even worthy of wonder. Meanwhile the whole stands before their eyes as immovably as ever, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. Did it not live for nineteen centuries, does it not live even now in the movements of the popular masses? Even in the movements of the souls

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[5] The concept of inanity, as we can see, is positioned within a set of iconologic concepts such as *lik*-countenance, *litso*-face, and *lichina*-mask. Florensky is semiotically sensitive to the iconologic substance-lessness (inanity) that a human being can become. Here we have a clear iconologic prolepsis to our treatment of inanity in Augustine and Dostoevsky.

[6] We will encounter Stavrogin (a hero from *The Possessed*) again in our treatment of freedom in Augustine and Dostoevsky. The disintegration of personhood is accomplished by its being emptied of any meaningful iconologic content that makes a life iconically signifying: a person ceases to be an icon and turns into an inane, stony mask.

> of those all-destroying [*razrushivshikh*] atheists, it lives, as before, immovably! [*nezyblemo*, also firmly, irremovably]. For those who renounce Christianity and rebel against it are in their essence of the same image [*oblika*] of the same Christ, and such they remain, for until now neither their wisdom nor the ardor of their hearts has been able to create another, higher image [*vysshego obraza*] of [rather: for] man and his dignity than the image [*obraz*] shown of old by Christ. And whatever their attempts, the results have been only monstrosities [*urodlivosti*]. (171; 14:155-156)

The dismantling of everything heavenly and saintly is a futile attempt since the image that gives meaning to the whole cannot be removed or surpassed by any monstrosities (*urodlivosti*). But here the iconicity of man is reaffirmed not in terms of character or mind, but of image-*oblik*. One can notice that the word 'image' translates both *oblik* (face, make-up) and *obraz* (icon). The word *urodlivosti* (monstrosities) is counter-iconic and deiconizing,[7] and it constitutes a constant threat in the iconologic realm of personhood. Father Paissy, however, expresses his iconologic certitude that man has received the gift of the iconic ideal given by Christ, which is insurmountable, and which constitutes a constant obsession in Dostoevsky's work.[8]

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[7] The word *urodlivost'* in Dostoevsky pertains to the same deiconizing paradigm as the word *bezobrazie* (icon-lessness, ugliness, disfiguration). Jackson, a comprehensive critic of Dostoevsky's aesthetics, says: "In his profound despair over the brutalization of man, Ivan, symbolically, is prepared to discard Dostoevsky's vital distinction between *obraz* and *bezobrazie* in the definition of man; commenting upon man's bestial and supremely 'artistic' cruelty to his fellowman, Ivan declares: 'I think if the devil does not exist and therefore, man has created him, he created him in his own image.' Here the dual nature of man vanishes [as the *obraz*-image and *podobie*-likeness to God], and the spiritual countenance of man (*obraz*) is replaced by the mask of moral *bezobrazie*. Ivan in his near-atheism posits the idea that man is created in the image of the devil" (Jackson 1966:59). Another significant assessment of iconology in Dostoevsky by Jackson runs like this: "The moral-esthetic spectrum of Dostoevsky begins with *obraz* – image, the form and embodiment of beauty – and ends with *bezobrazie* – literally that which is 'without image,' shapeless, disfigured, ugly." (1966:58)

[8] Dostoevsky's personal beliefs that could be usefully correlated with his fictional rendition and dialogizing of these beliefs are given in this well-known non-fictional text (expressed in a letter):

And now I wish to stress one last important point regarding Florensky's iconology. What is most surprising for a student of both Bakhtin and Florensky, when a conjunction between icon and polyphony is visualized, is that Florensky is probably the first one to use the word 'polyphonic' in conjunction with the study of the icon, and it is quite probable that he used this term, although with different connotations, well before Bakhtin. When referring to the integral nature of the icon Florensky says:

> Painting the face is called *lichnoe* [person-centered] while painting everything else is termed *dolichnoe* [pre-person-centered]; and by *lik* [countenance] is

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> It is not enough to define morality [*nravstvennost'*] as fidelity [*vernost'*: faithfulness; *vera*: faith] to one's own convictions. One must continually pose oneself [*vozbuzhdat' v sebe*: stir in oneself] the question: are my convictions true? Only one verification of them exists – Christ. But this is no longer philosophy, it is faith, and faith is red color. [...] I cannot recognize one who burns heretics as a moral man [as the Grand Inquisitor does], because I do not accept your thesis that morality is agreement with internal convictions. That is merely honesty [*chestnost'*] (the Russian language is rich), but not morality. I have a moral model [*nravstvennyi obrazets*] and an ideal, Christ. I ask: would he have burned heretics? – No. That means the burning of heretics is an immoral [*beznravstvennyi*] act [*postupok*]. [...] Christ was mistaken – it's been proved! A scorching feeling tells me: better I remain with a mistake, with Christ, then with you. [...] Living life has fled you, only the formulas and categories remain, and that, it seems, makes you happy. You say there is more peace and quiet (laziness) that way. [...] You say that to be moral one need only act [*postupat'*] according to conviction. But where do you get your convictions? I simply do not believe you and say that on the contrary, it is immoral to act according to one's convictions. And you of course cannot find a way to prove me wrong. (quoted in Bakhtin 1984:97-98)

Even if Dostoevsky posits the centrality of Christ, this Christ is 'merely' an icon, an ideal, to be continuously elaborated, deliberated and redecided upon. Being an effort of deliberation, decision, and choice, not a simple conformity to 'laziness' and 'honesty,' morality is a continuous struggle of a 'living life.' What is remarkable is that Dostoevsky equates this deliberation with faith. We must understand this as being a Dostoevskian faith, one modalized by the burden of deliberative and choice-driven freedom, by an open-ended internal dialogism and an open-ended external polyphony. This certainly resembles the Aristotelian proairetic process, the process of hitting the moral mark. Faith is not following of conviction (their normativity would be arbitrary: 'you cannot prove me wrong,' says Dostoevsky to the opponent), but a continuous and burdensome reconstruction of Christ's model within man's iconostasis.

> understood those secondary organs of expressiveness (i.e., the little countenances [*melen'kie litsa nashego suschestva*: the little faces of our person]) of hands and feet. In this division of the icon's whole content into the processes of *lichnoe* and *dolichnoe* we plainly see the Greek patristic understanding of existence being divided into *man* and *nature*; a division wherein each is at once distinct and inseparable from the other; hence, it is a division expressing the primordial paradisical harmony of inwardness and outwardness. On the contrary, when sin rent the creation asunder [*grekhovnoe razdroblenie tvari*], man and nature became opposed to one another, an opposition concluding itself precisely in the fine-arts division between landscape and portraiture; [...] The portrait's real goal now is only the face's expression. On the contrary, the icon preserves the equilibrium of both originating principles, but it accords the first place to the king and the betrothed of nature – to the face, and to nature and the bride, the second. Thus, when we consider the process of division between *lichnoe* [*lichnikom*] and *dolichnoe* [*dolichnikom*], we must see not only an external arrangement in iconpainting but also, through such a division, the expressive possibilities of a polyphonic choral originating principle [translation improved]. (1966:136; 1995:128)

It is astounding how the polyphonic originating and constitutive principle is working within the icon. Florensky endows every entity represented in the icon with the dignity of a countenance (in a sense, even objects). The choral coexistence of every countenance and every entity in an iconic space[9] is governed by the polyphonic principle in Florensky. This basically restates in a shorthand the foundational principle of this thesis.

3) Nature, Icon, and Hypostasis

Todorov and Ducrot draw many pertinent distinctions between sign and symbol. They are bound to have implications for our understanding of the economy between nature and semiotics, otherwise overlooked and probably unnoticeable unless projected in their

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[9] On a profound correlation of the religious icon and materiality, see Charles Lock, 1997, "Iconic Space and the Materiality of the Sign," *Religion and the Arts* 1:4, 6-22.

deeper implications for the categories of nature and person (and our underlying categories revolve around the concepts of nature, person (hypostasis), and icon):

> Symbolization is more or less stable association between two units of the same level (that is two signifiers or two signifieds). The word *flame* signifies flame, but it also symbolizes love in certain literary works.[10] [...] The practical test that allows us to distinguish between a sign and a symbol is the examination of the two related elements. In the sign, these elements are necessarily *different in nature* [italics added]; in the symbol, as we just have seen, they must be homogeneous.[11] This opposition sheds light on the problem of the arbitrary aspect of the sign, a problem brought back into focus in linguistics by Saussure. The relation between a signifier and a signified is necessarily unmotivated;[12] the two are different in nature, and it is unthinkable that a graphic or phonic sequence should resemble a meaning.[13] At the same time, this relation is *necessary*[14] in that the signified cannot exist without a signifier, and vice-versa. On the other hand, in the symbol, the relation between symbolizer and symbolized is unnecessary (or arbitrary), since the symbolizer and the symbolized (the signifieds *flame* and *love*) sometimes exist independently of each other; for this reason, the relation cannot be other than motivated, since if it were not motivated,[15] nothing would compel its establishment.[16] These motivations are customarily classified in two major groups drawn from the psychological classification of association: resemblance [metaphor] and contiguity [metonymy]." (Ducrot and Todorov 1979:102)

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[10] There is an internal perceived homogeneity and analogy, and thus motivational structure, between the nature of flame and that of love, which the semiotic unit *flame* captures.

[11] That is they must be of the same *nature*. We notice here the same centrality of the category of nature that we are bound to find in some of the religious models and paradigms (obsessed with the homogeneity or heterogeneity of nature), especially in the model of 'hypostatic union.'

[12] Meaning, there is no intrinsic correlation of *nature*.

[13] If, however, we have any level of semiotic analogy to nature economy, we have an icon.

[14] It must be noted, however, that this necessity is not strictly a natural necessity, but a fiat necessity, a legislated convention.

[15] That is, not issuing from nature.

[16] By contrast, there is a 'compelling' necessity for the sign's very subsistence, since the sign does not preexist the semiotic act of establishing it.

One cannot fail to notice that the way the sign and the symbol are described uncannily resembles some concepts employed for the description of the hypostatic unity (defined as unity of two heterogeneous natures, human nature and divine nature). The hypostatic unity functions similarly to the sign, meaning that it is created by an act of incarnation, being a volitional act, an imposed personologic necessity (for instance the unity of the icons 'freedom' and 'bread' united in the sign 'Christ' is an instance of iconic hypostatic unity). Symbol is motivated by nature similarity but it is effected arbitrarily, since symbolic homogeneous nature preexists the symbolic unity (unlike in the sign). In both sign and symbol, however, we notice degrees of convention. Now, is icon a similarity between heterogeneous natures, say between a semiotic nature and personologic nature? It appears to be so. If we detect motivation between sign and referent or between sign and representation, we have an iconic sign. For instance, the sound of the word *cuckoo* stands in iconic relation to the song of the bird or its representation: "But there cannot be any motivation between the sound and the meaning of *cuckoo* [although mere sound coincidence secures iconicity], between the word [sound of] *flame* and its meaning [the sounding of the sign-word *flame* does not sound like fire, does not look like fire, has nothing to do with the nature of fire]" (Ducrot & Todorov 1979:102). It appears from the above argumentation that the icon is the glue that holds together the heterogeneous levels of existence by virtue of their similar internal economy.

Above I have tried to reinterpret Todorov's insightful description of sign/nature economy for my purposes of iconology and hypostatics, where, by definition, icon implies person (hypostasis), and hypostasis implies nature. One should stress here that this study would hardly be possible without some degree of certainty afforded by

semiotic insights about sign and nature or by conceptual coherence implied in the concepts of nature, person, and semiosis.

But this is not all. Icon and nature generated much trouble during the historical period of iconoclastic controversy, and we revisit this debate in order to show how actual and pertinent the substance of that debate still is. Here I will adduce some thoughts from Eliade.

The iconoclasts, says Eliade, state that 'it is impossible to paint the figure of Christ without implying that one is representing the divine nature (which is a blasphemy), or without separating the two inseparable natures in order to paint solely the human nature (which is a heresy). By contrast, the Eucharist represents the true 'image' of Christ, since it is imbued with the Holy Spirit; thus the Eucharist, in contrast to the icon, possesses both a divine and a material dimension" (1985, 3:60).

To the above imputations, the iconophiles replied that "those who deny that Christ can be represented by an icon deny implicitly the reality of the Incarnation. [...] The image constitutes a resemblance which, while reflecting the model, maintains a distinction from it. Consequently, the iconoclasts are guilty of blasphemy when they consider the Eucharist as an image; for being identical essentially and substantially with Christ, the Eucharist *is* Christ, and not his image" (Eliade 1985, 3:60-61).

The first striking common feature between Todorov and Eliade's arguments is the focus on image and nature, and in the case of iconoclasts the confusion between person and nature. The iconoclasts, as one can see in the quote above, were concerned exclusively about the imaging of nature. But therein lies their main fallacy, since an icon, within a strictly religious framework, is not an image of nature, of either nature (human

or divine),[17] but exclusively of a hypostasis (that is of a person). Having two natures to represent, so the iconoclasts believed, the icon is liable to commit two forms of impiety: either *blasphemy*, by claiming to be able to represent also the divine nature by mere representing the human nature in the icon of Christ, or it would commit *heresy*, by claiming to represent solely the human nature and thus separating the two (divine and human) inseparable natures.

I restated the iconoclastic argument in order to correlate *blasphemy* and *heresy* with the association through similarity (metaphor) and contiguity (metonymy) mentioned by Todorov above. Usually in semiotics and literary studies, there is much talk about paradigmatic and syntagmatic associations, but I am not aware of a systematic talk about dissociation or, for that matter, bad or malicious association. It appears that the iconoclastic controversy invites the inauguration of such a talk, leading to some pertinent correlations between nature, icon and person. In the case of blasphemy, on the claims of iconoclasts, we encounter a phenomenon of improper, prohibited association of divine and human natures within an icon (to anticipate: an icon associates only images, not

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[17] The theology and anthropology of the image certainly underwent its iconoclastic period, but iconoclasm is an inescapable syndrome and companion in fictional personologic hermeneutics: doubts and incompleteness plague any translation of a person into a semiotic convention. Iconology, however, is not fearful of incompleteness, heterogeneity, or dissimilarity in capturing the person: "The image of God-Man was precisely what iconoclasts could not understand. They asked how the *two natures* of Christ could be represented. But the Orthodox did not even think of representing either the *divine nature* or the *human nature* of Christ. They represented his person, the person of the God-Man who unites in Himself the two natures without confusion or division" (Ouspensky 1992, I:153). This iconologic principle, derived from theology, is also a personologic principle: the representation of a person is valuable only to the extent that an icon performs the labor of transposition into a representation. The same formula applies to a fictional person: one can never grasp the *nature* of a person in fiction, but only the iconic 'partiality' of a person, that is its acts of freedom, love or faith, as its hypostatic transpositions (Ivan Karamazov, for instance, remains mysterious even to

natures, although an icon must be conceived as having its proper iconologic 'nature'). In the case of heresy the opposite operation is made: it is claimed that the icon improperly dissociates, and separates the divine from the human nature. Thus in iconologic blasphemy we have improper association of natures, while in iconologic heresy improper dissociation of natures, both impious according to iconoclastic belief (certainly, we ignore their iconologic fallacy here, being interested only in the rules of association and dissociation). Heresy, for us, then, is apostasy, separation, while blasphemy is confusion, indistinction: but all entities must somehow hang together. The specification of compossibility of entities or items instantiates a world-version, and the concern about this compossibility becomes eloquent in an icon.[18]

The iconophiles in turn accuse the iconoclasts of blasphemy and heresy too, that is of the improper handling of the principle of compossibility. Their argument also merits restating, being an argument that is not internally fallacious and being historically victorious in Orthodoxy. The iconophiles' valid argument does not confuse nature with person, being careful to state that the image of Christ is not identical with the nature of Christ (this kind of discernment and circumspection between sign and nature is decisive for our modern semiotics, as we have seen in Todorov). To make valid statements about

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Dmitri, for whom he is, in the novel's words, an 'enigma', a 'tomb').

[18] The restrictions of 'compossibility,' partitioning, and segregation are foundational for any world-version: "The simplest way to introduce the primary narrative world is in terms of its 'inhabitants', i.e. in terms of individuals that exist in it. If the individuals of narratives are called narrative agents (acting characters), then the primary narrative world can be defined *as a set of compossible narrative agents*" (Doležel 1979:196). The rule of restrictions imposed on a world applies equally to any entity that founds and makes possible a world. The iconoclastic struggle championed contrary 'compossibilities' (in terms of nature, icon, and person) issuing in incompatible world-versions. Christ and the Grand Inquisitor argue precisely over what is compossible and what is not. As we can see

nature, the iconophiles argued by making recourse to the nature of the Eucharist. The Eucharist, they said, is not the image of Christ (as the iconoclasts claim), it is Christ's nature: the Eucharist *is* Christ qua nature. By collapsing the heterogeneous image-icon into the Eucharist, the iconoclasts committed the impiety of blasphemy, of improper association: they associated entities, which are of radically different natures, one semiotic the other naturalistic. The iconoclasts' heresy of improper dissociation, on the other hand, is committed by their implicit denying of incarnation: to claim that an icon of Christ is impossible is to dissociate the divine nature from the human nature (since the icon depicts Christ through the human face of the human nature). This heresy-dissociation means that the hypostatic unity (the sole dimension amenable to representation through icon), which is the person of Christ, is being denied.[19] Thus the iconoclasts' blasphemy consists in

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from the above debates, in this context the most generous compossibility is iconic compossibility.

[19] It appears that one could speak more felicitously about nature and icon by introducing besides hypostatic union of natures a hypostatic union of images, or iconic hypostatic union. Since the religious icon conjoins the divine image-prototype with the human image-countenance - a hypostatic union of heterogeneous images, not natures, is effected at the level of the person that an icon depicts. For instance, Theodore the Studite insists on the necessity of being aware about the distinction icon/nature within the constraints of hypostatic, shared, likeness: "The prototype is not essentially [as nature] in the image. If it were, the image would be called prototype, as conversely the prototype would be called the image. This is not admissible, because the nature of each has its own definition. Rather, the prototype is in the image by the similarity of hypostasis, which does not have a different principle of definition for the prototype and for the image" (*On the Holy Icons* 1981:102-103). For an expanded argument supporting our assertion about the iconic hypostatic union, see Lock 1997. Lock, inter alia, forcefully underscores the uniqueness and the eventness of Theodore's semiotics of the iconic prototype and iconic image:

> "It is the most dramatic moment in the history of semiotics between Augustine and Locke, and it foreshadows, even overshadows Saussure. [...] 'For there would not be a prototype if there were no image.' In eliding temporality, in positing simultaneity, Theodore not only finds the image and the prototype inhering in each other; he cannot even allow the temporal primacy of the prototype over the image. How than can one suppose the ontological primacy of

improper association of icon with the Eucharist, while their heresy is derived from the improper, and religiously impious, dissociation of the two natures in Christ. In short, blasphemy is *improper association*, while heresy is *improper dissociation*. Now, for instance, is the kiss-association between Christ and Antichrist (Christ kisses the Grand Inquisitor on his lips at the end of the Legend) insinuating both a blasphemy and a heresy? Most probably both, thus leaving the kiss-association between Christ and Antichrist open to alternative dialogical interpretations.

It is of great value for our understanding of the struggle between Christ and the Grand Inquisitor to be able to employ also the technical concepts of association and dissociation. The entire iconic tension in the temptations revolves around the question of what to associate or dissociate. In our interpretation of the Three Temptations, we have intimated these operations through two etymologically validated concepts, sym-bolic and dia-bolic. As we have seen there, symbolic and diabolic economy is usually diagrammatically emplotted.

Starting from the diagrammatic iconicity and its fictional emplotment, one must acknowledge that a diagram might be an entire narrative, a point repeatedly and felicitously stressed by Stock in relation to Augustine (see the section on inanity in

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> the prototype over the image? Theodore does not suppose even this, for in any prototype there must be a potential image. There can be no idea or concept without its potential sign. The non-semiotic status of words, their immateriality, has been decisively rejected." (Lock 1997:15-16)

Again, our limited scope here is to merely illustrate the coincidence between the depth of linguistic and semiotic models (as illustrated by Todorov) and religious semiotic models, which should not be trivialized or in any way dismissed simply because they are 'religious.' Human cultural concerns are expressed in the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor in both semiotic and religious modeling strategies.

Augustine). Thus, in support of this iconic narrativity I will adduce a 'metonymic' statement from Eco (there is no need for the entire argument):

> An iconic sign is indeed a text, for its verbal equivalent (except in rare cases of considerable schematization) is not a word but a phrase or indeed a whole story. [...] The units composing an iconic text are established – if at all – by the context. Out of context these so-called 'signs' are not signs at all, because they are neither coded nor possess any resemblance to anything. Thus insofar as it establishes the coded value of a sign, the iconic text is an act of code-making. (1976:215)

A text can be visualized not only as an icon, but also as a hypostasis. For instance, the Romantic enjoyment of a text-hypostasis (as a new kind of nature or self-contained ontic entity) is esthetic, before going into any semiotic interpretation. Eco's discussion of the meaning of the artistic text for the Romantics is instructive precisely through his employment of the term 'hypostasis': "Schelling identifies works of art with symbols because they are hypostases, self-presentations, and, instead of signifying an artistic idea, they are that idea *in themselves*" (Eco 1984:141). What counts here is an additional twist in the meaning of hypostasis, achieved not through sheer hypostatization of a quality, but through a newly created entity.

Let us now elaborate somewhat on the term of hypostasis (semiotically not ignored by Eco) within an additional correlation between Dostoevsky's hypostatic thinking and Orthodoxy, coming from a typologically attuned critical awareness, from Kristeva. In her chapter on Dostoevsky, entitled "Dostoevsky, the Writing of Suffering, and Forgiveness," Kristeva[20] employs, quite suggestively, the theological category of hypostasis. For Kristeva, it seems the category is potent enough by itself, since it illuminates the crucial problems posed by the Dostoevskian image of man. In analyzing the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, we spoke of man in terms of love, freedom, and faith,

[20] Kristeva, Julia. 1989. *Black Sun. Depression and Melancholia*. New York: Columbia

and icons related to them, but in Dostoevsky man is also hypostatized as suffering (and freedom is suffering and unhappiness). Kristeva starts her survey of Dostoevsky's image of suffering from the ascertaining of the role of epilepsy (that is of the cataclysmic status of the soul and mind) in his fictional worlds:

> The tormented world of Dostoevsky is ruled more by epilepsy than by melancholia in the clinical sense of the term. [...] One should also take note of the *hypostasis of suffering* [emphasis added], which, without having any explicit, immediate relation to epilepsy, compels recognition throughout his work as the essential feature of his outlook on humanity. (Kristeva 1989:175)

Kristeva's full penetrating analysis of suffering in Dostoevsky is, regretfully, beyond our current scope. What counts for our immediate purposes, however, is that any transposition of a person into her image could be presented in hypostatic terms, and that Kristeva's use of 'hypostasis' is similar to ours. The hypostasis as suffering is palpable through the icon of suffering, where icon contains the translation and transposition of a person's hypostasis. That is: person as suffering (and a person's suffering is different from any other person's suffering) would be non-hypostatic (undifferentiated, unaware, without autonomy, anonymous, unrecognized) if there were no icon (that is semiotic translation, 'representation') to contain, circumscribe, and ascertain it.

That Orthodox Christianity informs decisive turns and structures in Dostoevsky's fiction, is a guiding premise for Kristeva:

> It would be impossible to understand Dostoevsky without it [the Orthodox logic]. His dialogism, his polyphony undoubtedly spring from multiple sources. It would be a mistake to neglect that of Orthodox faith whose Trinitarian conception (difference and unity of the three Persons within a generalized pneumatology inviting any subjectivity to a maximal display of its contradictions) inspires the writer's 'dialogism' as well as his praise of suffering *at the same time* as forgiving. (Kristeva 1989:214)

Kristeva's finding that the hypostasis of suffering would be hopelessly obscure (uniconic)

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without that of forgiveness and mercy is better understood when traced back to the understanding of hypostatic suffering (that is not mere suffering, but thematized, iconized, suffering) by the Greek Fathers:

> The clearest source for the notion of forgiveness, which Christian thought has elaborated upon for centuries, goes back in the New Testament to Paul and Luke. Like all basic principles of Christianity it was expanded by Augustine. It is, however, in the works of John of Damascus (in the eighth century) that one finds a *hypostasis* [emphasis added] for the 'benevolence of the Father' (*eudoxia*), 'affectionate mercy' (*eusplankhna*), and condescension (the Son lowers himself to our level – *synkatabasis*). (Kristeva 1989:208)

What I am interested in here is, again, the mere use of the category hypostasis, not necessarily its religiously correct use, for, as it could be argued, the Father's hypostasis is one and not many, or that there are only two additional hypostases. But the category of hypostasis could be used metaphorically too, or unrestrictedly, that is going beyond the canonical "one nature in three hypostases," and thus one can employ the category as being present in any iconic manifestation of a person (a strategy adopted by us in this study).

In this context it would seem mandatory to mention Kristeva's designation of a person's *umilenie* as hypostasis:

> [T]he praise of salvation/love and especially the *hypostasis* [emphasis added] of affection (*umilenie*), at the intersection of suffering and joy and within Christ; the movement of those who have undergone the Passion (*strastoterptsi*), that is, those who have actually been brutalized or humiliated but respond to evil only with forgiveness. Such are some of the most paroxysmal and concrete expressions of Russian Orthodox logic. (Kristeva 1989:214)

This logic is one of strange compossibility, but precisely because of that the most eloquent expression of the hypostatic power of conversion between heterogeneous or antinomic entities: forgiveness is able to mutate evil into salvation through the Passion and through love-*umilenie*.

Now let me correlate Kristeva's above suggestions with the main icons of the Legend: freedom and love. The word *umilenie* is derived from *milost'* (mercy), being an imitation of divine mercy, an icon of it. Thus *umilenie* is not just being affectionate, but its religious aura contains strong moral connotation of love, mercy, compassion, communion, and pity. If suffering (also as Passion, mentioned by Kristeva) expands the semantic field of freedom, human *umilenie* and divine mercy will iconize the horizons of love as forgiveness and salvation.

And now let me at least suggest through a number of examples the immense range of *umilenie* (a hypostasis of love) operative in *The Brothers Karamazov*:

1) *Umilenie* as the state of a person in expectation of Parousia, of the Second Coming of Christ: "[H]e says nothing in the poem, he just appears and passes on. Fifteen centuries have gone by since he gave the promise to come in his Kingdom, fifteen centuries since his prophet wrote: 'Behold, I come quickly.' 'Of that day and that hour knoweth not even the Son, but only my heavenly Father,' as he himself declared while still on earth. But mankind awaits him with the same faith [*s prezhneiu veroi*, rather: with the same previous, old faith] and the same *tender emotion* [*s prezhnim umileniem*, emphasis added]" (247).

The rendering of *umilenie* as "tender emotion" does not do justice to the force of this hypostasis, but the translation has little choice. The Garnett translation decided to render *umilenie* here as "with the same [previous, old] love" (228). This only underscores the fact that *umilenie* is a hypostasis of love. In the quote above one should not overlook the copresence of faith and love, their figuring in the same iconic representation of man awaiting Parousia (in the novel instantiated by Christ's coming into the realm of the

Grand Inquisitor).

2) *Umilenie* as the state of a person (of the soul, mind, and body) hypostatized in prayer: "But before going to sleep, he [Alyosha] threw himself on his knees and prayed for a long time. In his ardent prayer, he did not ask God to explain his confusion [*smuschenie*, meaning also: 'his troubled, non-peaceful mind', rendered freely but suggestively by Garnett as 'he did not beseech God to lighten his darkness'] to him, but only thirsted for *joyful tenderness* [*radostnogo umilenia*, emphasis added; in Garnett: 'joyous emotion'], the same tenderness [*umilenia*] that always visited his soul after praising and glorifying God, of which his prayer before going to sleep usually consisted. This joy that visited him always drew after it a light and peaceful sleep" (159).

The figurative icon of *umilenie* is prayer: one prays in *umilenie* but also for being granted *umilenie*, the capacity to enjoy and love this world-version.

3) *Umilenie* is the state of a person who has encountered sainthood and its countenance, for instance in the face of Father Zosima:

> For Alyosha there was no question of why they [the people] loved him so much, why they prostrated before him and wept tenderly [*plachut ot umilenia*] just at the sight of his face. Oh, how well he understood that for the humble soul of the simple Russian, worn out by toil and grief, and, above all, everlasting injustice [*nespravedlivost'*] and everlasting sin, his own and the world's, there is no stronger *need* and *consolation* [emphasis added, since a person is lack and need in search for consolation in another person], than to find some holy thing or person, to fall down before him and venerate him: 'Though with us there is sin, unrighteousness [*nepravda*, as different from the above *nespravedlivost'*, injustice], and temptation [*iskushenie*], still all the same, there is on earth, in such and such a place, somewhere, someone holy and exalted; he has the truth [*pravdu*: being both righteousness and truth]; he knows the truth [*pravdu*: the truth of righteousness]; so the truth does not die on earth, and therefore someday it will come to us and will reign over all the earth, as has been promised. (30)

This, almost unamenable to paraphrase text, with the density of an icon, cumulates the main parameters of love (in its guise of *umilenie*), righteousness, and salvation. *Plachut*

ot umilenia here is rendered as "wept tenderly," but the text extends its iconic range when it describes the "strong need," "consolation" and veneration as correlates of *umilenie*.

There is no need to cite every occurrence of *umilenie*, but the text of the novel is explicit that Dmitri and Ivan also experience or want to experience *umilenie*. The most memorable exhortation towards *umilenie* comes from Zosima, and it relates to children (whose suffering plays the central role in Ivan's rejection of theodicy):

> Love children especially, for they, too, are sinless, like angels, and live to bring us to tenderness [*zhyvut dlia umilenia nashego*] and the purification of our hearts and as a sort of example[21] to us. Woe to him who offends a child. [...] Keep company with yourself and look to yourself every day and every hour, every minute, that your image [*obraz*: image-icon] be ever gracious [*blagolepen*, in Garnett: seemly]. See, here you have passed by a small child, passed by in anger, with a foul word [*skvernym slovom*, where *skverna* is wickedness], with a wrathful soul; you perhaps did not notice the child, but he saw you, and your unsightly [*neprigliadnyi*] and impious [*nechestivyi*] image [*obraz*] has remained in his defenseless heart. You did not know it, but you may have planted a bad seed in him, and it may grow, and all because you did not nurture in yourself a heedful, active love [*liubvi deiatel'noi*].[22] Brothers, love is a teacher, but one must know how to acquire it, for it is difficult to acquire, it is dearly bought, by long work over a long time, for one ought to love not for a chance moment but for all time.[23] (319)

Zosima teaches that a person should make it his/her perpetual commitment to project an image of her icon in the awareness that it is a seed (seed-as-*obraz* and *obraz*-as-seed are central to the eucharistic economy of the novel[24]) for another person, and especially for

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[21] And therefore an icon.

[22] The category of 'active love' is decisive for the novel's economy and for the burden of interpersonal responsibility. We shall encounter this new icon of love in our presentation of Zosima's world-version.

[23] One must simply become a hypostasis-love and remain so for all time.

[24] It is Zosima who repeats and thus implants into Alyosha the words-seeds from the Gospel of John (12:24), words that reintroduce the very motto-icon of *The Brothers Karamazov* into the novel and into a person from another person: "'Except a corn of

the defenseless child's heart. Here we must grasp Zosima's depiction of a person's icon (comprising wrath, impiety, wickedness, love, word, soul, etc.) in its integral comprehensiveness and in its precarious progression: from nature to person to icon. It is the instability of the person's icon and the nurturing it involves that are paramount here. That is, love is not an automatic result of a volitional fiat (a person could project a wicked idol even involuntarily), but an interpersonal effort of active love, a communion-like responsibility.

In this context, the iconologic power of children becomes redeeming to those who would forget to eternally refashion and cultivate their image, to be responsible in the maintenance of their iconostasis. That children live to bring us into the state of *umilenie* (love-mercy-tenderness) and *blago-lepie* (iconic seemliness) is a revealing statement, according to which children, saints, and Christ form the same paradigm of love and sainthood, that are all part of the same iconostasis.

4) Iconologic Similarity and Dissimilarity

When we have stipulated, for instance, that the icon of love is Christ's icon, we implicitly have appealed to imagination. Peirce allowed for imagination and thus for intentionality to be factored into the ways one accounts for iconicity or constructs icons or a set of icons. Since the concept of likeness, be it as 'sensuous' likeness (images: pictures) or abstract relations by analogy (diagrams: maps, algebraic formulas), or parallelism as

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wheat [*pshenichnoie zerno*; *zerno*: 'seed'] fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit [*preneset mnogo ploda*; *plod* : 'fruit].' Remember that" (285).

inter-kind projections (metaphors: 'Time is money') is taken as central to iconicity, Peirce was nevertheless dubious whether one always needs inherent likeness to qualify a sign as an icon. In the chapter "Logic as Semiotics: a Theory of Signs" (1955:98-119) Peirce says:

> It may be questioned whether all icons are likenesses or not. For example, if a drunken man is exhibited in order to show, by contrast, the excellence of temperance, this is certainly an icon, but whether it is likeness or not may be doubted. (1955:107)

The semiotic process of exhibiting something iconically is an intentional act, and unless one acts cognitively to correlate the physically palpable domain of a drunken person and an item of the abstract domain of virtues (here temperance), no iconic signification will arise. The intriguing aspect in Peirce's example consists in its stressing interdomain dissimilarity (contrast) and not, as usual, interdomain (or inter-item) similarity, in order to establish an icon: drunkenness displays iconicity towards temperance. Peirce's illuminating example about the workings of iconicity (not exclusively anchored in similarity) offers liberating advantages for interpretation. In the chapter about the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor we have iconized not only Christ's person as being freedom or love or faith, but we have also suggested that antinomic icons of mystery, authority and miracle cannot but iconically foreground Christ.

Now, the mere exhibiting of all the images-predicates pertaining to the three persons of the dialogue in an iconostasis (as we have done in our diagrams throughout the analysis of the Legend) places iconologic constraints on all of them, showing their participation in the status of icons. To place items, categories, or kinds in a constraining set is in itself an iconizing process, a process replete with moments of intentionality and

interpretation. Another example from Peirce will show how the construction of a diagram presents iconologic virtues:

> Many diagrams resemble their objects not at all in looks; it is only in respect to the relations of their parts that their likeness consists. Thus, we may show the relations between the different kinds of signs by a brace [for convenience, I substituted the brace with vertical lines], thus:
>
> | Icons,
> Signs: | Indices,
> | Symbols.
>
> *This is an icon* [emphasis added]. But the only respect in which it resembles its object is that the brace shows the classes of *icons, indices,* and *symbols* to be related to one another and to the general class of signs, as they really are, in a general way. [One may supplement Peirce by saying that the word 'icons' in the above icon is not itself an icon]. When, in algebra, we write equations under one another in a regular array, especially when we put resembling letters for corresponding coefficients, the array is an icon. Here is an example:
>
> $a_1x+b_1y=n_1$
> $a_2x+b_2y=n_2$
>
> *This is an icon* [emphasis added], in that it makes quantities look alike which are in analogous relations to the problem. In fact, every algebraical equation is an icon, in so far as it *exhibits*, by means of the algebraical signs (which are not themselves icons), the relations of the quantities concerned. (1955:107)

Iconic signification usually carries with it a variable quantum of indexical (natural aspect) and symbolic (conventional aspect) modalities of communication enhancing therefore the force of its inherent status of iconicity (see Peirce 1955:112). Thus in the algebraic icon above the constituent letters are symbols, the subscript numbers are indices.

At this juncture, for our purposes of iconologic interpretive efficacy, I would like to correlate (an iconologic operation in its own right) Peirce and Florensky. Peirce constructs a constraining set for three classes of signs and calls its synoptically exhibited appearance an icon. As we have seen in the section on Florensky and iconostasis, the Orthodox tradition calls the set of icons represented by person-saints in a Church an

iconostasis. For Florensky an iconostasis translates into visible countenances an invisible world whose inscrutability is iconologically overcome.

In line with iconostatic constraints of compossibility, following Pierce and Florensky's suggestions, we can construct a trinity of persons from the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor:

	| Grand Inquisitor
Antichrist Trinity:	| Christ
	| Satan

Certainly this trinity is, by simply being called so (and also being an iconologic set), an analogue of the Christian Trinity, where Satan, called by the Grand Inquisitor 'the spirit of self-destruction and nonbeing', substitutes the Holy Spirit, and the Grand Inquisitor himself takes place of God (the Grand Inquisitor does not believe in God):

	| Father
Christian Trinity:	| Son
	| Holy Spirit

And if the two trinities offer intertrinitarian iconicity between the Antichrist Trinity and Christian Trinity, one can exhibit the intratrinitarian iconicity by renaming the set constraints that would govern it:

	| Grand Inquisitor
Hypostasis:	| Christ
	| Satan

Hypostasis captures the relevant commonality among the three persons: that they hypostatize differently the same internal semiotic substance over which the contest of signification is conducted. Hypostasis is a personologic magnitude and thus mutable and

openended: one could imagine, for instance, a possible world where the Grand Inquisitor kisses Christ as an ultimate gesture of reconciliation and hypostatic communion.

Our limited appeal to Peirce in this section has modestly illustrated how one can exercise iconic imagination about possible set constraints by similarity or dissimilarity.

THREE: IVAN AND ZOSIMA'S WORLD-VERSIONS

In this section, we address in explicit terms the notion of fictional worlds and the notion of world-versions in their connection to *The Brothers Karamazov*. Since in our treatment a person is beset by both ontic and iconic threat, by being a simultaneous denizen of an ontologic and iconologic (ontology is merely the theory of the ontic, while iconology of the iconic) order, it follows that a person, its mind, and its image cannot hang together unless there is a world that permits their compossibility. We shall see in the next chapter that Augustine cannot conceptualize his ontic existence, his mind, and his precarious mind-iconicity unless he postulates a 'region of dissimilitude' (being a world-version that he now inhabits) as well as an alternative world (God's world), a world of 'similitude,' where he expects to be offered an eternal citizenship. With equal force, the concept of world-version applies to many of the Dostoevskian fictional persons, but in a polyphonic (that is multi-person set of equal persons with their self-consciousnesses) universe.

a) Interpersonality as Interworldliness

The Brothers Karamazov is primarily a constellation of equal persons. Persons are producers of discourses that designate personal realities, fused with personhood and selfhood. Personal realities, consciousnesses, discourses, are interpretable in terms of ontic (that is having some definable substantive origin and identity) and semiotic (having capacity to be translated into communication) worlds. Usually worlds contain persons,

but persons of necessity contain or generate worlds.[1] Persons thus are world-bound entities. Many persons in Dostoevsky construct their own fictional worlds (however limited and restricted, those worlds are an iconologic construct based on other world-versions) that serve as an interpretive mechanism for their personal and necessarily interpersonal status.

Clashes of persons become clashes of world-versions, as inter-personal, polyphonic, communications imply participation in personal worlds. Nowhere is this more evident than in the cases of the personological "pneumatology" (on Dostoevsky as a "pneumatologist", i.e. "a symbolistic metaphysician" of the spiritual flux in persons, see Berdiaev 1957:26) developed by Ivan Karamazov and Father Zosima.

The book of the novel describing the projection of worlds by Ivan is book five "Pro and Contra," especially chapter four, "Rebellion" (in the present treatment, the world-version contained in "The Grand Inquisitor" is to be factored in implicitly). Book six, "The Russian Monk," and the chapter "Conversations and Exhortations of Father Zosima", is devoted to the world-projection ascribed to Father Zosima. The polyphonic inter-dependency of these world-versions can become obvious only through inter-personal fluidity of worlds (fictional worlds, being primarily verbal constructions "travel" or are accessible within the inter-personal space).

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[1] Bakhtin postulates an explicit mutual entailment between multiple worlds and polyphony, for instance, in his comparison of Shakespeare and Dostoevsky: "But to speak of fully formed and deliberate polyphonic quality in Shakespeare's dramas is in our opinion simply impossible, and for the following reasons. First, drama is by its very nature alien to genuine polyphony; drama may be multi-leveled, but it cannot contain *multiple worlds* [*mnogomirnoi*]; it permits only one, and not several, systems of measurement [*system otcheta*]" (Bakhtin 1984:34). By invoking 'systems of measurements', Bakhtin evokes Einstein.

Ivan presents his own world version with the specific purpose of targeting Alyosha, who is a putative carrier of Zosima's world-view. In Alyosha's world, the other worlds, that of Ivan and Zosima, intersect. The complexity of interworld polyphonic coexistence must be grasped interpersonally: Ivan is the geometrical space for the intersection of a multitude of world projections: that of Christ, of Satan, and that of the Grand Inquisitor (Satan's version intersects and partially coincides with that of the Grand Inquisitor). But Ivan's personal projection of his own world-version, primarily as denial of worlds, is contained in the chapter "Rebellion."

Engaging a text interpretively we are usually faced with many interpretive strategies as options. They put to the test our personal semantic encyclopedias (in Ivan's instance, once God is postulated, an encyclopedia handling a theodicy must be entailed, or if a world or a person is postulated, their versions are inherently envisaged), and, moreover, they challenge our interpretive assumptions or our interpretive competence. In this context, one should privilege the assumptions that a text is endowed with the capacity to contain or suggest its own theory, and that a text is replete with the indications of the way it is to be read (that is, it suggests ways one can appeal to an encyclopedia that would permit the individuation of a given world's entities). Thus even if a text can suggest a strategy of reading, interpretation, and world-construction, still the text itself is unable to provide all the theoretical categories permitting the fixation of its meanings.

Usually, a text is understood on the level of immanent intertextually, i.e., other literary text of an author or discrete stretches of texts within a novel, as we shall see, cooperate in the elucidation of the meanings of a global text (e.g., texts produced by Ivan

or Alyosha-Zosima form an inter-interpretive set). The immanent intertextuality is complemented by extrinsic intertextuality (for instance, the biblical text about Job, mentioned by Zosima, illuminates Ivan and Zosima's category of suffering).

But a set of well-defined or tentative categories is also offered by theoretical texts, texts that necessarily cooperate in the capturing of the meanings of our literary text, generating thus a different level of intertextuality (i.e., theory interrelates and interfaces with literature). Non-theoretical approaches to Dostoevsky, it could be argued, deprive the interpretive capacity of at least one level of intertextuality. Thus, the theoretical texts that provide us a lexicon and guidance needed in our interpretation of Dostoevsky's texts pertain to the theory of Fictional Worlds (see especially Doležel 1979, 1988, 1989; Lewis 1986; Pavel 1986; Plantinga 1974; and Ronen 1994). There is no need, however, to display the theoretical assumptions of the fictional worlds here, our purpose is merely to reiterate what is partially guiding us throughout this study (as we have referred to some of the authors above in the preceding chapters), and especially in this chapter. At crucial junctures of our argument and interpretation in this chapter, whenever required, we appeal for theoretical help.

b) Ivan's World-Version

In what follows Ivan's world projection will be interpreted as an anticipation of Zosima's world-projection. The polyphonic co-dependency of the two world versions is grounded in the personological dependency of literary characters in the Dostoevskian fictional world. We will understand fictional worlds as alternative possible worlds. Fictional

worlds may be possible alternatives to our real world (since we are reading a text "indexically", i.e., from a locus of our reality), or to the real world the novel is presenting. The real world of the novel (semantically: the reference world, or the primary world) is the world that fictional characters live in. This is not a trivial assertion, since fictional characters can construct their own fictional worlds (i.e., characters become authors, as, evidently, Ivan does). These alternative fictional worlds serve as interpretive tools directed towards the fictional real world of the novel, and on the basis of the alternative models of worlds constructed by fictional persons, the real world of the novel can be misunderstood, not understood, or even rejected.

Thus, Ivan Karamazov rejects this world, i.e., his real world, as he perceives it in the novel. Moreover, he also rejects the known alternative to this world, that is, the possible future world (it is evident already that, methodologically, we equate our, the readers', real world with Ivan's real world). Following Ivan's suggestion, this world will be called the Euclidian world (hereafter E-World), and the alternative to the real world will be called the Harmony-World (hereafter H-World).

Since in Dostoevsky worlds are person-dependent, they must also be interpersonal (according to the Bakhtinian axiom that a person can be defined solely interpersonally). That is why Ivan tests his world vision and his world version by challenging Alyosha's model of the world. And Alyosha's world is basically coextensive with that of Zosima; Zosima, therefore, becomes an explicit person-target for Ivan's nihilism. Ivan's aim is stated in no ambiguous terms:

> "Why are you trying me?" Alyosha cried, with sudden distress. "Will you say what you mean at last?"
> "Of course, I will; that's what I've been leading up to. You are dear to me, I don't want to let you go, and I won't give you up to your Zosima." (220)

By establishing the centrality of persons as carriers of worlds (necessarily depicted in word-discourses), persons in Dostoevsky's fiction will be perceived as targeting other persons with the purpose of annihilating, supplanting, or damaging their world-versions. And Ivan's "confession" is aimed at questioning and ultimately rejecting the vision of both worlds (of the E-World and H-World), a vision shared by both Alyosha and Zosima.

Ivan's rejection of the E-World and of the H-World is detailed by Dostoevsky in two chapters: "The Brothers Make Friends" and "Rebellion" (we reiterate that "The Grand Inquisitor" depicts the world versions projected by Christ and the Inquisitor as Anti-Christ).

So, what is the secret and the mystery contained in Ivan's logic directed towards rejection of the worlds known to him? In order for this world to exist, it must be created. Therefore Ivan postulates and accepts God as the Creator, but only within the framework of a devious logic that enables him to perform the reductio ad absurdum (a method of proof which proceeds by assuming the falsity of what we wish to prove and showing that it leads to a contradiction. Hence, the statement whose falsity we assumed must be true): if God is accepted, then His world cannot be accepted, or if this world is accepted, then God cannot be justified by it (no theodicy is possible). Either way, a rejection and a separation between spheres of being is implemented:

> "And therefore I tell you that I accept God simply. But you must note this: if God exists and if He really did create the world, then, as we all know, He created it according to the geometry of Euclid and the human mind with the conception of only three dimensions in space. Yet there have been and still are geometricians and philosophers, [...] who doubt whether the whole universe or to speak more widely the whole of being, was created in Euclid's geometry; they even dare to dream that two parallel lines, which according to Euclid can never meet on Earth, may meet somewhere in infinity. I have come to the conclusion that, since I can't understand even that, I can't expect to understand about God [...] I have a Euclidian earthly mind, and how could I solve problems that are not of this world?" (213)

Basically, Ivan postulates God, but under the mental reservation that he doesn't and can't know what God is. This is so, because Ivan's ontological and epistemic assumption is that man is exclusively a Euclidian creature: gnoseologically, Ivan is a reductionist (i.e.,

human knowledge is by design limited; he conveniently forgets the ontology of man as the imago Dei), and he urges Alyosha never to think about God, and especially "whether He exists or not" (203).

So, God is postulated only to be immediately dismissed. First of all this axiom of a person-God has to be removed from Alyosha's horizons: the ontological interpersonality would thus be discounted and Alyosha's solitude and suffering would permit Ivan to realize his nihilistic world-version. From Ivan's resolve to "recreate" Alyosha (persons as well as worlds are ontologically prone to assume or to be subjected to "versions"), we must conclude that a person is by definition interpersonal, that this world's "geometry" is also interpersonal and thus anti-Euclidian: since versions are possible, the rigidity of the cause-effect concatenation falters.

But Ivan dismisses God as an absolute creator and attempts to recreate Alyosha in his own image by depriving him of the non-Euclidian hypothesis called God. Ivan's acceptance of God, as I indicated already, is to serve his dialectic of negative enlightenment aimed at Alyosha and reductio ad absurdum aimed at this world; persons should be solitary, and Creation should be God's agony:

> "And so I accept God and am glad to, and what's more I accept His wisdom, His purpose -which are utterly beyond our ken; I believe in the underlying order and the meaning of life; I believe in the eternal harmony in which they say we shall one day be blended. I believe in the word [*slovo*; logos] to which the universe is striving, and Which Itself was 'with God,' and which itself is God and so on, and so on, to infinity [...]. Yet, would you believe it, in the final result I don't accept this world of God's, and, although I know it exists, I don't accept it at all. It's not that I don't accept God, you must understand, it's the world created by Him I don't and cannot accept."(213)

God has to be accepted (or postulated) so that the world could be imputed to Him. A Godless world would emasculate any rhetoric of rejection of the E-world. In Ivan's view,

the E-World cannot be denied since its being self-evident is conclusive, but it can be rejected or declared unacceptable, since it betrays the impossibility of love (love as unity of persons) and harbors the unjustifiable suffering (as separation and destruction of persons). And the person that created this world didn't endow human persons with the capacity to understand the meaning of suffering and hate within the rules and laws of the E-World, to such an extent that even the primordial sin cannot justify the suffering of the absolutely innocent, the children.

To prove the irreconcilability of children and suffering, and thus the inconsistency of the E-World, Ivan summons the most telling examples of children's suffering (the examples are so evident and explicit that we will not insist on them and their interpretation by Ivan). Still, once God is postulated, God is a Harmony-Person that should entail a Harmony-World. But the E-World with its Euclidian suffering (cause-effect suffering) in Ivan's logical projection is unacceptable and absurd even if the H-World would ultimately supplant it and thus provide the revelation of the meaning of suffering, hate and destruction:

> "Let me make it plain. I believe like a child that suffering will be healed and made up for, that all the humiliating absurdity of human contradictions will vanish like a pitiful mirage, like the despicable fabrication of the impotent and infinitely small Euclidian mind of man, that in the world's finale, at the moment of eternal harmony, something so precious will come to pass that it will suffice for all hearts, for the comforting of all resentments, for the atonements of all crimes of humanity, of all the blood they've shed; that it will make it possible not only to forgive but to justify all that has happened with men - but all that may come to pass, I don't accept it. I won't accept [...]. That's what's at the root of me, Alyosha; that's my creed." (231)

Ivan's creed is that the rejection of the E-World is the best way to reject God. Ivan rebels against his Euclidian condition that does not allow him to grasp how the future condition of the H-World could justify all the suffering in the E-World: Ivan's rebellion is an epistemological rebellion against his mind's power limitations. Ivan almost alleges that he might have been created 'in jest' (like the Grand Inquisitor's weaklings), as an

ontological mockery. Once the E-World and H-World are rejected, Ivan takes care of the interworld transfer and his transworld identity (his Euclidian identity), since Ivan himself refuses to change, to transfigure himself in order to match the H-world:

> "Oh, with my pitiful, earthly, Euclidian mind, all I know is that there is suffering and there are none guilty. [...] I need retribution, otherwise I will destroy myself. And not justice in some remote infinite time and space, but here on earth, and that I could see myself. I have believed in it. I want to see it, and if I am dead by then, let me rise again, for if it all happens without me, it will be too unfair. Surely I haven't suffered, simply that I, my crimes and my sufferings, may manure the soil of the future harmony for somebody else. ... I want to be there when everyone suddenly understands what it has all been for [...] Listen! If all must suffer to pay for that eternal harmony, what have children to do with it, tell me, please? [...] What pulls me up here is that I can't accept that harmony. (244)

In the above quote to the category of suffering its complementary is suggested: that of responsibility ("there are none guilty"); in this instance it is the lack of responsibility. The identity of the E-World is thus given by suffering without responsibility. Ivan, therefore, takes nothing else but suffering to be his ticket into the future harmony, but solely in order that he could refuse that harmony and accuse God by making Him responsible. The accessibility to the Harmony-World is guaranteed by every person's suffering, but a person is ontologically designed with the freedom to reject even the H-World. On the other hand, a responsible God should impose justice and punishment on guilty persons as a prerequisite for the H-World. Therefore, beyond the limits of the E-World another option would be Hell: "What do I care for a hell for oppressors? What good can hell do, since those children have already been tortured? And what becomes of harmony, if there is hell?"[2] (245).

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[2] In our interpretation of the person's freedom in the section on freedom in Augustine and Dostoevsky we will encounter the concept of hell in connection to Stavrogin. Here Berdiaev is consonant with the freedom assigned to persons by Dostoevsky. A person is

The ontological objection to this world is suffering and to the Harmony-World, Hell as justice. Hell cannot atone for personal suffering, therefore responsibility or guilt are futile: punishment cannot remove the ontology of suffering (once suffering took place, even God and "His" hell cannot undo it). Suffering is necessary and responsibility impossible. Ivan is sincere in refusing this kind of Euclidian explanation of suffering and sees no non-Euclidian explanation of suffering and evil.[3] That's why Ivan returns the ticket to the harmony:

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above any finalizing justice, and as Berdiaev argues, a genuine love and freedom cannot remain content with any damnation or hell:

> 'True believers' send 'heretics' to hell in accordance to human and not divine justice. [...] It is utterly inadmissible that men should usurp God's right to judge. God will judge the world, but he will judge the idea of hell too. His judgment lies beyond our distinction between good and evil. This idea may have found a reflection in the doctrine of predestination. Man's moral will ought never to aim at relegating any creature to hell or to demand this in the name of justice. [...] The true moral change is a change of attitude towards the 'wicked' and the doomed, a desire that they too should be saved, i.e. acceptance of their fate for oneself and readiness to share it. [...] Paradise is impossible for me if the people I love, my friends or relatives or mere acquaintances, will be in hell – if Boehme is in hell as an 'heretic', Nietzsche as an 'antichrist', Goethe as a 'pagan' and Pushkin as a sinner. Roman Catholics who cannot take a step in their theology without Aristotle are ready to admit with perfect complacency that, not being a Christian, Aristotle is burning in hell. [...] If I owe so much to Aristotle or Nietzsche I must share their fate, take their torments upon myself and free them form hell. Moral consciousness began with God's question, 'Cain, where is thy brother Abel?' It will end with another question on the part of God: Abel, where is thy brother Cain?'" (Berdyaev 1960:276). Or: "The idea of an eternal realm of bliss by the side of an eternal hell is one of the most monstrous human inventions – an evil invention of 'the good.' (ibid: 286)

Berdiaev, however, and with him Ivan and Zosima, would not deprive persons of their freedom to choose hell or reject God. For Ivan paradise and hell are simply incompossible, but not unqualifiedly: Ivan cannot accept that God would impose such a world-version on persons.

[3] The argument from evil and suffering ('Why a failed Creation?'), demanding a theodicy (justification of God), is tackled by every serious philosopher of religion. The aporia of

> "And while I am on earth, I make haste to take my own measures...While there is still time I renounce the higher harmony altogether...Is there in the whole world a being who would have the right to forgive and could forgive? I don't want harmony. From love for humanity I don't want it. I would rather be left with the unavenged suffering. I would rather be left with the unavenged suffering and unsatisfied indignation, even if I were wrong. [...] And so I hasten to give back my entrance ticket, and if I am an honest man I am bound to give it back as soon as possible. And that I am doing. It's not God that I don't accept, Alyosha, only I most respectfully return Him the ticket. 'That's rebellion,' murmured Alyosha, looking down." (245)

Ivan's rebellion is radical and ontological, his measures are implemented here and now, even if he were wrong. Such radical ontological behavior implies several forms of negation: the negation of the Euclidean-World, of the Harmony-World, of the Hell-World, and, what's even more immediate and blasphemous, the negation of Ivan himself.

God's omnipotence-omnibenevolence vs. freedom-evil-Creation is usually solved through the justification of moral freedom: "A world containing creatures who are sometimes significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but he cannot *cause* or *determine* them to do only what is right. For if he does so, then they are not significantly free after all; they do not do what is right *freely*. To create creatures capable of *moral good*, therefore, he must create creatures capable of moral evil; and he cannot leave these creatures *free* to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so. God did in fact create significantly free creatures; but some of them went wrong in the exercise of their freedom: this is the source of moral evil. The fact that these creatures sometimes go wrong, however, counts neither against God's omnipotence nor against his goodness; for he could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by excising the possibility of moral good" (Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity,* 1974:166).

It is quite obvious that God created the best possible world, and chose the best version from among every possible alternative. And it is quite self-defeating for Ivan to claim that he does not accept this world-version, since, one could argue, if the best world-version is possible at all, it cannot be realized by anybody else but God. Even Ivan's argument from Euclidean ignorance has ultimately little standing, since God's allowing ignorance could be justified the same way one justifies God's allowing evil, since ignorance is evil. Finally, since God allows both ontic evil and ontic ignorance (that is, as their being constitutive of the very design of Creation), it follows that both are inherent to the authentic experiencing of freedom. No less valuable experiencing of freedom consists in the refusal or even rebellion against any justification of Creation through a design-driven God or freedom. One can say here, therefore, that any kind of religious moralizing (and not logical argumentation) of Ivan's positions and arguments is bound to sound small-minded, since Ivan's profound and sincere relation to both God and his Creation

This self-negation is contemplated by Ivan as an exit from God's Creation by committing suicide: "But to hang on to seventy is nasty, better only to thirty" (209). Moreover, after Ivan's recital of "The Grand Inquisitor," Alyosha exclaims: "With such a hell in your heart and your head, how can you? No, that's just what you are going away for, to join them...if not, you will kill yourself, you can't endure it!" And Ivan replies: "...only perhaps till I am thirty, and then..." (238).

Still, the problem is whether a person can opt ontologically (not purely existentially) for nothingness. Ivan believes that he can choose nothingness by annihilating himself, and that he will be resurrected solely to witness the possibility of the impossible, that is of the H-World. On the other hand, in Zosima's version of the world, as we shall see, a person is indestructible.

An entity capable of committing suicide in order to slander and devalue this world or any other world, aims at slandering the Creator himself by declaring His creation a dismal failure. Ivan places himself in a nightmare and in hell already in the E-World: Ivan and the devil inhabit the same ontological compossibility, the same chronotope. And to escape hell's sufferings Ivan is ready to commit suicide. Moreover, suicide is a form of ultimate rebellion against Creation, not only the Creator. That's why Zosima will consider suicide to be the greatest of human sins, because it is the strongest objection to God and Being.

So what is Ivan's world-version, what are the features of his world? We must acknowledge that Ivan has no world-version, but solely negations of all world-versions and of all person-versions (i.e., of the sufferers, the guilty, the responsible). Even God is not able to be responsible; moreover, He is "irresponsible" since He created the

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only testifies about the ontic (design-derived) dignity of the human person.

unjustifiable world of suffering, the E-World. The world as it is, has no right to existence, has no justification, and only serves as negative theodicy, since it only serves to impugn God. Nothingness should be reinstituted, nothingness - the only matching counterpart of God, nothingness – the authentic image, the authentic icon of God. Thus sounds the dreadful ontology of Creation envisaged by Ivan.

On the other hand, in order to reject Christ, Ivan builds a world-version of miracle, mystery and authority, a world subsisting as a projection of the Grand Inquisitor. To the extent to which the Grand Inquisitor is a hypostasis of Ivan, then Ivan is a proponent of a possible world-version. But the identification of Ivan with the Inquisitor doesn't mean that the Inquisitor's version of the world is more justifiable and more acceptable than Ivan's negative projection of the E-World, since Ivan knows that the totalitarian world is built on imposture (i.e., misinterpretation of the iconologic status of persons) and falsehood (i.e., misrepresentation of Creation's ontology and iconology). The Inquisitor's world is not a world of happiness or non-suffering even for the Inquisitor himself: his world-version is designed to disprove the possibility of the salvation of this world and to reassert this world's predicament to God-forlorness, Christ-forlorness and self-destruction.

In conclusion, Ivan's projection of the world is a litany of negations directed towards all the worlds, all the persons, and especially God, God as their creator and sustainer. Radical slandering of the worlds and of God culminates in Ivan's self-negation: with his iconizing of suicide. But no victory will be given to universal negation and no supremacy to self-negation, to suicide, says Father Zosima.

c) Zosima's World-Version

Zosima's projection of worlds has to be understood in strict antinomic relation to Ivan's projection of worlds. All central persons introduced in Zosima's narratives claim the opposite of what Ivan claims about this world: this world is not hell (suffering) and chaos, but paradise. Not a potential paradise, but an actual one. It only depends on our personal decision and choice, since person is the crown of Creation. Thus, Zosima's brother, Markel, in spite of his imminent and untimely death, proclaims the revelation that paradise is built into the ontology of this world: "Don't cry mother...life is paradise, and we are all in paradise, but we don't want to know it, but if we would, we should have heaven on earth the next day" (260).

Man is endowed with powers capable of reshaping the world, of grasping the beauty and glory of the world. Since man has paradise at hand, how is it possible to account for suffering? Suffering can be understood and justified only as the result of persons' universal responsibility (here, one should remember Ivan who said 'that there is suffering and that there are none guilty'). To be a person is to assume responsibility for suffering, for everything, even for the status of Creation itself:

> "And another thing, mother, everyone of us has sinned against all men, and I more than any [...]. Mother [...] believe me, everyone is really responsible to all men for all men and for everything. I don't know how to explain it to you, but I feel it is so, painfully even. And how is it we went on living, getting angry and .not knowing? [...] One day is enough for a man to know all happiness [...]. Let's go straight into the garden, walk and play there, love, appreciate, and kiss each other, and glorify life." (288)

To Ivan's slandering and cursing of Creation and life, Markel opposes the beauty and glory of Creation and life. These events, Markel's death and Markel's glorification of life, occurred in Zosima's childhood. Their image and their meaning effected Zosima's metanoia (i.e., his spiritual transfiguration) when, prodded by pride and vanity, he got trapped by the fatalities of a duel (since a duel could be interpreted as an ethical

commitment to both crime and suicide).

It is the duel that activates the model of the world and the version of the world that were dormant in Zosima's soul for a long time. Markel's seed of the Harmony World (or Paradise-world, but certainly not Utopia) awakens in Zosima's soul and generates words and actions that glorify life and repudiate death:

> "'Gentlemen,' I cried suddenly, speaking straight from my heart, 'look around you at the gifts of God, the clear sky, the pure air, the tender grass, the birds; nature is beautiful and sinless, and we, only we, are sinful and foolish, and we don't understand that life is heaven, for we have only to understand that and it will at once be fulfilled in all its beauty, we shall embrace each other and weep." (299)

One last quote will illuminate once more the locus and the significance of the Harmony-world in Zosima's life. It is taken from book 6, chapter 2 referring to the mysterious visitor, who, inter alia, says:

> "That life is paradise [...], that I have been long thinking about [...] Heaven lies hidden within us - here it lies hidden in me now, and if I will it, it will be revealed to me tomorrow and for all time [...] And in very truth, so soon as men understand that, the kingdom of Heaven will be for them not a dream, but a living reality [...] It's a spiritual, psychological process. To transform the world, to recreate it afresh, men must turn into another path psychologically." (303)

It is an essential feature of this world that it is identifiable as heaven, paradise, beauty, glory. This world is a gift of God, a compossibility of gifts given as an intersection of worlds. But this world is also a community of persons, and each person is a carrier of worlds. This world thus could become also a gift of human persons, since they have only to access the worlds within them and understand themselves as creators or implementors of worlds.

To understand this plurality of worlds that co-exist with the plurality of persons already in this version of the world, one must interpret the text contained in 'Of prayer, of love, and of contact with other worlds' from chapter 3, book six. It depicts primarily inter-world accessibility and inter-world 'traffic.' According to the text, this world

(slandered by Ivan as being an E-World epistemologically and actual Hell-World psychologically) is not only a glorious paradise, but it is a privileged place where all the other worlds meet and cooperate in the realization of the best possible world-version:

> "Much on earth is hidden from us, but to make up for that we have been given a precious mystic sense of our living bond with the other world, with the higher heavenly world, and the roots of our thoughts and feelings are not here but in other worlds. That's why the philosophers say that we cannot apprehend the reality of things on earth.
>
> God took seeds from different worlds and sowed them on this earth, and his garden grew up and everything came up that could come up, but what grows lives and is alive, only through the feeling of its contact with other mysterious worlds. If that feeling grows weak or is destroyed in you, the heavenly growth will die away in you. Then you will be indifferent to life and even grow to hate it. That's what I think" (291).

As we see from the above quotes, this world is, first, rooted in different worlds and, second, different worlds are sown inside persons themselves, persons thus being carriers of worlds. Moreover, the status of this world and its destiny depend on inter-world co-existence that is realized through the mediation of persons.

Although the theoretical discussions related to fictional worlds were restricted to a minimum in this section, one should, nevertheless, introduce at this juncture an indispensable category, that of accessibility between worlds. The category of accessibility is related to possible worlds semantics, and is treated as accounting for the compatibility among worlds and transformability among structures of the given worlds:

> Whatever the relation that makes one world accessible from another, possibility is defined by a type of accessibility relation. A state of affairs is possible in one world (w1) only in case it is true in at least one world (w) accessible to w1. Once a world is relatively possible or accessible to another world, it means that every situation that obtains in the one is possible in the other. (Ronen 1994:62)

So, how do we know that a world-version called paradise (the H-World) is possible? From the existence of paradisal states of affairs experienced by persons located in this world. H-World has to be understood, therefore, as an option-version realizable in this

world, or as another world accessible from this world. That is why, in Zosima's projection of the universe, love and prayer are forms and channels of accessibility to other worlds that necessarily resemble ours.

Actually, this world is a sister-world to other worlds, since the seeds of other worlds are constitutive of this world. Moreover, since there is a relation of resemblance between human persons and God, God becomes accessible also. Through love and prayer man can influence states of affairs and events that take place in another world, primarily because man has access to God. And Zosima teaches that love as imitatio Dei entails God's "imitation" of man:

> "How touching it must be to a soul standing in dread before the Lord to feel at that instance that for him too, there is one to pray, that there is a fellow creature left on earth to love him too. And God will look on you both more graciously, for if you have had so much pity on him, how much more will He have pity Who is infinitely more loving and merciful than you. And He will forgive you for your sake." (289)

The thought on love is one of the most profound in Zosima's thinking: If Zosima can forgive and be merciful, how much more God. We can know that God is a loving and merciful person, since our capacity to be similar (iconic) to God and his love is a palpable reality in this world. And the compossibility of worlds is given by their intersecting sets. Love is a channel (one among many others) of communication between the two worlds and between persons located in the two worlds due to the isomorphic structures of both worlds. Love secures the overlapping of the two worlds and thus reveals the other world. On the other hand, since love is the image of God in this world, its power is directed also towards the states of affairs, events, entities and persons of this world. Actually, through love this world imitates the H-World and ceases to be an exclusive E-World:

> "Brothers, have no fear of men's sin. Love a man even in his sin, for that is the semblance of Divine Love and is the highest love on earth. Love all God's creation, the whole and every grain of sand in it. Love every leaf, every ray of

> God's light. Love the animals, love the plants, love everything. If you love everything, you will perceive the divine mystery in things. Once you perceive it, you will begin to comprehend it better every day. And you will come at last to love the whole world with an all embracing love." (289)

To love each entity of this world is to spread paradise all over the E-World; moreover, love conquers sin, and thus it is *Imitatio Dei*. Now it is possible to summarize the inter-world dependency: all the worlds are defined by Zosima as existing in strict relation to love or lack thereof. In this world, love could be conceived as a gift from another world. Therefore, love is not an exclusive feature of paradise, that is of the H-World. The H-World overlaps with and depends on the E-World: ultimately, the H-World is populated with persons from the E-World, persons that preserve their trans-world identity in terms of love. It is this trans-world identity of persons that is decisive for an understanding of Hell and of its compossibility with the H-World. That hell is compossible with the E-World was evident in Ivan's case. But it is less evident how Hell could be necessary in the case of generalized paradisal structures. Hell is described by Zosima in "Of hell and hell fire, a mystic reflection." Since both the E-World and the H-World were defined in terms of love, the same applies to Hell. And Zosima teaches as follows:

> "Fathers and teachers, I ponder 'What is Hell?' I maintain that it is the suffering of being unable to love any more [*stradanie o tom, chto nel'zia uzhe bolee liubit'*] . Once in infinite existence [*beskonechnom bytii*], immeasurable in time and space, a spiritual creature was given on his coming to earth, the power of saying, 'I am and I love' [*ia esm' i ia liubliu*]. Once, only once, there was given him a moment of active *living* love [*mgnovenie liubvi deiatel'noi*] and for that was earthly life given to him, and with it times and seasons. And that happy creature [*schastlivoe suschestvo*] rejected the priceless gift, prized it and loved it not, scorned it and remained callous. Such a one, having left the earth... beholds heaven and can go up to the Lord. But that is just his torment, to rise up to the Lord without ever having loved, to be brought close to those who have loved when he has despised their love...Even though I would gladly give my life for others, it can never be, for that life is passed which can be sacrificed for love, and now there is a gulf fixed between that life and this existence." (293)

A person in Zosima's perspective is ontologically bi-dimensional: "I am" and "I love". And so are the worlds, both the E-World and the H-World. But the Hell-World is reduced to an exclusive "I am," without its counterpart "I love." The ontology of the E-World is so privileged that the E-World is the exclusive place where sacrificial love is possible. Moreover, the E-world is destined to determine the ontology of Hell, where no love is possible any more. And love is the hypostasis of responsibility.

Actually, Hell-World is the suffering of having irrevocably lost the E-World (the possibility of love and responsibility). Hell thus offers the strongest testimony for the unique ontological and iconologic value of the E-World: the necessity to project Hell as a world-version to the E-World serves to justify the uniqueness of love possible solely in the E-World (the earthly sacrificial love, the responsible love, the 'living love'). But insofar as Hell is compossible with the H-World (Paradise), some semblance of love is reflected from the potent love of Paradise even in Hell. Still, paradisal love of forgiveness cannot substitute for sacrificial love:

> "For even if the righteous in Paradise forgave them, beholding their torments, and called them up to heaven in their infinite love, they would only multiply their torments, for they would arouse in them still more keenly a flaming thirst for responsive, active and grateful love which is now impossible. In the timidity of my heart I imagine, however, that the very recognition of this impossibility would serve at last to console them. For accepting the love of the righteous together with the impossibility of repaying it, by this submissiveness and the effect of this humility, they will attain at last, as it were, to a certain semblance of that active love which they scorned in life, to something like its outward expression." (293)

The inhabitants of Hell sacrificed (by scorning it and devaluing it) love in the E-World, sacrificing thus the paradisal dimension of the E-World. We saw that for Ivan love is impossible in the E-World; therefore, according to Alyosha, Ivan is already in Hell. Ivan, as a person constituted of love and being, kills love, first, and, second, contemplates

committing suicide (by attempting to kill his "I am"). Actually, Ivan's suicide is a two-stage process: the suicide of the "I love" and then the suicide of the "I am." That is why in Zosima's teachings suicide is the strongest ontological objection to God (as love and person) and to Creation (as nature and being):

> "But woe to those who have slain themselves on earth, woe to the suicides! I believe that there can be none more miserable than they. They tell us that it is a sin to pray for them and outwardly the Church, as it were, renounces them, but in my secret heart I believe that we may pray even for them. Love can never be an offense to Christ" (293).

Love for the suicides, therefore, is the extreme form of love possible in the E-World. But once Hell is instituted, once the links among worlds are severed, then Hell becomes an absolute deprivation of love. Moreover, it becomes the locus of absolute hatred. Hell is thus a homogeneous continuum: it stretches, as we have seen above, from the impossibility to love and possible semblance of love to, as we shall see, ontological hatred of God-Love and Creation-Being:

> "Oh, there are some who remain proud and fierce even in hell, in spite of their certain knowledge and contemplation of the irrefutable truth; there are terrible ones wholly in communion with Satan and his proud spirit [*priobschivshiesia satane i gordomu dukhu ego vsetselo*]. For them hell is [already] voluntary and insatiable [*dlia tekh ad uzhe dobrovol'nyi i nenasytimyi*]; they are sufferers by their own will [*te uzhe dobrokhotnyie mucheniki*]. For they have cursed themselves by cursing God and life. They feed upon the wicked pride as if a hungry man in the desert were to start sucking his own blood out of his own body. But they are insatiable unto ages and ages, and reject forgiveness, and curse God Who calls to them. They cannot look upon the living God without hatred, and demand that there be no God of life, that God destroy Himself and all his creation [*chtob unichtozhyl sebia bog i vse sozdanie svoe*]. And they will burn eternally in the fire of their wrath, thirsting for death and nonbeing [*zhazhdat' smerti i nebytia*]. But they will not find death [*no ne poluchat smerti:* but death will not be granted to them]." (323)

This crucial quote ends Zosima's teachings. It describes the Hell-World where the nihilistic logic and ontology are drawn to their liminal and ultimate conclusions. Hell is not only the impossibility of loving any more; it is also the impossibility of loving God.

Moreover, Hell is ontological hatred of God and His creation. Ontological hatred means ontological negation of the God of life, God the Creator out of nothingness and out of love. We have seen above already that suicide is the strongest negation of love and existence in the E-World.

The logic of suicide (which is Ivan's logic of disproving the tenability of God's Creation and of God's love) survives also in Hell, and it is eternally being directed from Hell towards God: Hell asks that the God of life "should be annihilated, that God should destroy Himself and His own creation." That is, Hell demands that God as God-Love and God-Creation annihilate both Himself and His Creation: *Hell demands that God commit suicide.* This is how, according to Zosima, the logic of Hell climaxes with the image of absolute nothingness: *with the image of the absolute suicide.* The model of the negative imitation of man (*imitatio humani* and not *imitatio Dei*) and of his suicide is constructed by Hell as a temptation of God Himself: man and Hell attempt to "impose" on God the negative "revelation" of God's suicide. This is an enormous and unprecedented conjunction between man and nothingness: man attempts to effect a post-apocalyptic (not a post-creation) fall, the 'fall' of God Himself into nothingness.

Hell is the ultimate perversion of being: it is the ultimate misunderstanding of the God of life. But even man's suicide in the E-World (Euclidean World) is ontologically impossible, since man is created eternal, and this, paradoxically, is precisely what Hell comes to prove: man's immortality, and thus Ivan's immortality, is the irrefutable argument of Hell. (Ivan will have the proof of God's love and existence via his immortality in Hell, where not everything but only Hell is permitted). Hell wants nothingness, but it cannot become nothingness: Hell must subsist as the unwilling accomplice of Being, paradoxically feeding on love that grants an inescapable subsistence. Suffering as the impossibility of loving anymore is matched by suffering as the impossibility of non-being through self-annihilation. And this is the most profound

and the most original meaning of Hell in Dostoevsky: its suffering is derived from its impossibility of vanishing into an absolute non-existence, into ontic nothingness-*nihil*, as well as into an absolute iconologic inanity (since it preserves a semblance of love).

Persons in Hell hate creation and themselves, but, in spite of that hatred, the option of suicide is impossible and unavailable. Suicide on earth thus should be considered as an ontological (though not personologic or iconologic) illusion (we encounter and insist on the problematic of suicide and its illusionary magnitude in the treatment of freedom in Augustine and Dostoevsky). That's why in Hell's logic the only possibility for non-existence is God's self-destruction (i.e., God's suicide), since, according to that logic, God can do anything (which is a fallacious logic: God's omnipotence cannot undo, annihilate His own omnipotence, nor can God undo, for instance, the law of two plus two makes four). Thus, suicide (the negation of love) and annihilation (the negation of being) are not possible alternatives for the God of life.

These options (to annihilate themselves, God and His creation) are also impossible for the fierce inhabitants of Hell, once they are impossible for God. The only alternative for them is the unlimited existence in Hell, Hell as a continuous asymptotic powerless negation of God's and human love and the impotent negation of the created being. As long as there is love, that is God (and one of the delusions and sufferings in Hell is the 'hope' that God might be persuaded not to love and then even not to exist), even the love-deprived penal existence of hell has no choice but to participate in love through a hellish existence. It is this disarming impossibility of total nonbeing, of nothingness, as well as the victorious immutability of God's love towards a rebellious, hellish being that constitutes the essence of suffering in hell. Hell is not merely the individual and personal impossibility of loving anymore, as Zosima states at the beginning of his meditations about Hell, but also the impossibility of escaping God's love for an entire eternity. Hell is the apotheosis of a double hate of God and His Creation

through the refusal of the theosis (divinization, on the Orthodox doctrine) of every man, as well as of itself, of his own hellish Creation (hell is freely chosen and created by those who hate being, in the hope for the further step into nothingness). Hell is the delusion of having the power to effect total nothingness (the inescapable concept of power is discussed in our section on ontic power in Augustine and Dostoevsky).

Does Ivan know that by returning his ticket of entry into paradise he undermines God's apokatastatic and theotic design forever? Isn't this capacity and freedom of choosing the eternity of Hell the main source of Zosima's belief in the eternity of Hell?

Three types of worlds are advanced by the texts describing the destiny of persons in *The Brothers Karamazov*: Euclidian-World, Harmony-World, and Hell-world. All three worlds are person-dependent. Persons, as has become evident from the interpreted texts, decide the status of a world. Interworld accessibility testifies to the homogeneous nature and structure of the universe, that is, about worlds' interdependency. In interworld accessibility and compossibility love plays the foundational role, since existence and interpersonality are possible only through love. Persons as such (including God) are interpreted in terms of love and being; love is also responsibility, and being is also suffering (primarily as loss and failure). Love (that is person, hypostatized and translated in terms of icon), therefore, is both the source and the climax of being. Persons and worlds, love and being, suffering and responsibility, suicide and nothingness, are some of the most comprehensive and in the same time the most specific polyphonic (personologic) and dialogic (semiotic, iconologic) categories that the text of *The Brothers Karamazov* can suggest for its own interpretation.

FOUR: ICON AND HYPOSTASIS IN AGUSTINE AND DOSTOEVSKY

1) Ontic Power in Augustine and Dostoevsky

In our discussion and interpretation of the Legend we have continuously encountered the concept of power (*sila*), which we prefer to call 'ontic power.' Conceptually, ontic power is to be opposed to, or at least it should be distinguished from, political power (*vlast'*) and authority (*avtoritet*). Authority is a member of the Grand Inquisitor's three icon-powers (*sily*), and thus it can be spoken of in terms of inherent, ontic power too, although it clearly is a prevalently political power. In what follows, in section (a) I shall identify the main Augustinian, both ontologic and ethical, concepts that will help us sketch a dialogic picture between Augustinian and Dostoevskian ethical icons. In section (b) I will try to give a more detailed description of the concept of power (*sila*) than it was possible during the interpretation of the three temptations. In section (c) I shall engage the central Dostoevskian slogan of both freedom and power proclaimed by Ivan's 'everything is permitted.'

a) Ontic Power in Augustine

Augustine's doctrine of the freedom of choice of the will is mainly contained in his *On the Free Choice of the Will* [*De Libero Arbitrio Voluntatis*]. In this work Augustine debates many foundational items of his theology and anthropology, but his primary target is to establish the notions of order and hierarchy (both ontological and personological) within which the ontology of the soul (*anima*) encounters the personology of the mind

(*mens*). Whatever the condition of the original soul (and Augustine confesses a measure of ignorance on the origin of the soul),[1] in this fallen world the soul must function as a mind (roughly, as epistemologically-ethically constrained reason, will, and emotions),[2] undergoing the painful process of conversion (*conversio*) towards God in order to delete its own fall and fault (triggered by the moment of *aversion*, the turning away, from God). The acts of aversion and conversion by the ontic soul and epistemological-ethical mind make strong personologic sense, as I shall attempt to show, when the concept of power is attached to the soul and, respectively, the concepts of knowledge and ignorance to the mind. In Augustine, the soul's natural power and rank within an ontic hierarchy, its capacity for not being overpowered by lower and thus inferior in power entities, testifies

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[1] See *De Libero Arbitrio*: "I do not intend in this discussion to cause anyone to think that we forbid that he who is able should examine, with the help of the divinely inspired Scripture, whether the soul is propagated by a soul [*anima de anima propagator*], or whether each soul is created for and individual body, or whether, at divine will, they are sent from somewhere to rule and animate the body, or whether they enter bodies of their own will [*vel propria voluntate se insinuent*]. [...] A man should not be incensed if another man does not accept his view concerning the origin of the soul" (3.62:214-215).

[2] "So we call sin not only what is properly called sin because it is committed from free will [*libera enim voluntate*] and in full knowledge [*ab sciente*], but even that which must follow from the punishment of sin. Thus we speak of nature in one way when we refer to man's nature as he was first created, faultless in his own class; and we speak of it in another way when we refer to the nature into which, as a result of penalty of condemnation, we were born mortal, ignorant, and enslaved by the flesh. [...] God, the highest Ruler of the universe, justly decreed that we, who are descended from the first union, should be born into ignorance [*cum ignorantia*] and difficulty [*cum dificultate*], and be subject to death [*cum mortalitate*], because they sinned and were hurled headlong into the midst of error, difficulty, and death. [...] The willing man should not only be hindered, but even be aided in overcoming, through conversion to God, the punishment which his origin merited because of its having turned from God" (*De Libero Arbitrio* 3.54-55:185-186). There are, among other things, three concepts to be capitalized upon in this text: ignorance (refers to the ethical-intellectual and thus person dimension in a man), difficulty (evokes the powerlessness of a deranked, penal, imprisoned nature), and mortality (thematizes the state of an ontological threat against the entire man, foregrounding his person's and nature's finitude).

about the goodness of creation. Even in its utterly fallen condition, the soul's nature is still ontically better and ethically-epistemologically more praiseworthy than any other earthly, if not cosmic, entity. Under such conditions, the mind, and thus the person that is derived from it, is under duty to preserve the ontic dignity and integrity of the soul and not misuse it for lower and base purposes. Overall, I am using "knowledge" as the umbrella term for the epistemological and ethical workings of the mind, but in Augustine, in *De Libero Arbitrio*, the mind and thus the person is concretely constituted by 'virtues,' which are usually divided into moral and intellectual. Although the soul and its earthly companion (or even version), the mind, have some limited capacity for an ethically and intellectually virtuous and thus happy life, there is no room for compromise in Augustine's doctrine of salvation: here solely God has the power to effect man's restoration-cum-salvation and ultimately even to power and sustain the workings of man's feeble virtues. Within such soteriological parameters, man is wretched and powerless, ruled ontically by death and ethically-intellectually by ignorance and dissimilitude: the soul's fallen condition generates a disenfranchised and deiconized mind, a mind thirsting for ontic restoration of power (of nature) and iconologic salvation of person.

For Augustine, the ontic, God-given, mainspring of the soul and the mind is the will. It is the synergy between the will's freedom and the will's power that decides the course of ethical happiness as well as (alongside with God's restorative grace) of salvation or perdition. Augustine is quite scrupulous in his lengthy process of establishing the intuitively obvious fact that there is such a thing as 'the will.' Naturally, the will implements itself as 'a good will' or 'an evil will.' The question "What is a good will

[*quid est bona voluntas*]?" arises within a hierarchical (God-governed), and teleological (goal-driven and order-driven) ethical context, but equally within the ontological context of the will's own power and nature (autonomy). The possible answer to the Augustinian question ('What is a good will?') takes care, first, of both ethical and intellectual dimension (righteousness-cum-wisdom) and, second, of the ontic dimension (power-cum-goodness of the will):

> "A [good will is a] will by which we seek to live rightly and honorably [*recte honesteque* vivere] and to come to the highest wisdom [*summam sapientiam parvenire*] (1.25.83). Now I think you see that it lies in the power of our own will [*in voluntate nostra esse constitutum*] to enjoy or to lack such a great and true good [as the good will itself]. For what lies more truly in the power of the will than the will itself? Whoever has a good will certainly has a thing to be preferred by far to all earthly realms and all pleasures of the body. Whoever does not have a good will surely lacks that very thing which is more excellent than all the goods not in our power [*omnibus bonis in potestate nostra non constitutis*], that thing which the will alone [*sola voluntas*] may give." (*De Libero Arbitrio* 1.35-26.85-86)

A good will (that is, ontically good will) is ruled by strategic rationality, one that aims at the attainment of righteousness (in terms of practical virtues) and highest wisdom (in terms of intellectual virtues; in Dostoevsky this sort of intellectual wisdom is called *premudrost'*, as we shall see below). But before any outward targets for the will (virtues, wisdom), the ontic goodness of the will itself is placed center-stage and thematized by Augustine. The will's self-reflexive identity is given by the will's realization (since everything that exists is good) that it's ontic goodness is its own goal, that a good will is the preeminent earthly good to be desired by a person's will. And such an act of self-identification and self-targeting is within the will's power: the will possesses the power to exercise its own goodness of choice by choosing itself as the inauguration of an ethical life. As we have seen above, in Augustine we encounter a decisive element for the

understanding of a person's mind: 'the will's power' (especially when the will is understood as a faculty, as a domain of the mind), rendered by such expressions as 'it lies in the power of our own will' (*in voluntate nostra esse constitutum*) or 'all the goods not in our power' (*omnibus bonis in potestate nostra non constitutes*). In Augustine, not only the will's freedom, but also the will's power, the infrastructure of freedom, becomes a function of both ethics and soteriology.

It is crucial to realize that consciousness of power and of powerlessness, being the structuring and nourishing force of the freedom of choice, underlies the ethical life in Augustine. Moral choice and freedom of choice function in a world where things counted as being good or bad are, respectively, sought or avoided. The devices and mechanisms (being acquired, learned habits) of the mind employed in the process of moral and ethical choice are called virtues and vices. Augustine, in *De Libero Arbitrio*, inherits and adopts the four cardinal virtues paradigm from the classical tradition; the virtues – temperance, fortitude, prudence, and justice – in their maximal flourishing and functioning yield the condition of happiness, the fully meaningful and accomplished life of a mind and person.

In *De Libero Arbitrio* one cannot but notice that the central villain or hero of an unhappy or happy life is the will in that it has the power, and precisely the power, to choose. Virtues are also called 'goods' to be desired and pursued since they lie within our power, as the good will itself is 'a good' and therefore lies within our power and thus is desirable. The exercise of virtuous power imposes a clear strategy: in ethical strategies, one does not aim (although not in Augustinian religious strategies, and later in his life even in Augustinian ethical strategies) at what lies beyond our powers, at what pertains to impossibility (or, we might say, the realm of 'impossibilia'), to unattainability through

our agency of choice.[3] Moreover, whatever lies within our power, by definition we can attain without any extraneous help, say, God's grace. Later in his work Augustine will amend or modify his power stance by saying that any virtuous act is effected by the power of grace alone, or at least that one should not boast, that grace alone should be credited and praised for any virtuous performance, and not the freedom of choice, that is *liberum arbitrium.*[4]

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[3] Among 'impossibilia,' things lying beyond our power of choice, Aristotle identifies 'immortality', a thing decisive for Ivan's ethical life, as we shall see. In *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle says: "Choice [*proairesis*, equatable with the Augustinian *libera voluntas*] is not even the same as wish, although the two seem to be close to one another. For [moral] choice does not have the impossible as its object, and if anyone were to assert that he is choosing the impossible, he would be considered a fool. But wish can be for the impossible, e.g., immortality. Wish has as its objects also those things which cannot possibly be attained through our own agency. We might, for instance, wish for the victory of a particular actor or a particular athlete. But no one chooses such things, for we choose only what we believe might be attained through our own agency. Furthermore, wish is directed at the end rather than the means, but choice at the means which are conducive to a given end. For example, we wish to be healthy and choose the things that will give us health. Similarly, we say that we wish to be happy and describe this as our wish, but it would not be fitting to say that we choose to be happy. In general, choice seems to be concerned with things that lie within our power [*eph'hemin*: are up to us]" (1111b:20-30).

For Aristotle (see *Nicomachean Ethics* 1111b-1113a), choice (*proairesis*) is not merely a voluntary act (also possessed by children and animals), but a voluntary act effected after a complete and meaningful deliberation about things that are within our power, which we desire, and which can be realized in action (*praxis*): "Since the object of choice [of *proairesis*] is something within our power [*eph'hemin*: up to us] which we desire as a result of deliberation, we may define choice as a deliberate desire for things that are within our power: we arrive at a decision on the basis of deliberation, and then let the deliberation guide our desire" (1113a9-16).

Christian hope, as a religious strategy (not ethical), would largely coincide with the Aristotelian 'wish' (*boulēsis*), since hope for immortality and immortal happiness lies beyond our powers, standing in need for divine powers.

[4] About persons who exalt themselves in self-assurance, trusting in their own virtuous strength of character, Augustine says: "If such persons think they can keep their lives under their own control and slip up nowhere, fall short nowhere, with never a wobble, never a blurring of vision, and if they claim the credit for themselves and their own strength of will, then even if they have carried out the whole program of righteous

Let us present a short description of the four cardinal virtues in the order Augustine himself presents them in *De Libero Arbitrio*: prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice.

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conduct as far as human eyes can discern, so that nothing in their lives can be faulted by other people, God nonetheless condemns their presumption and their pride. What happens, then, if someone has thought to justify himself, and takes his stand on his own virtue? He falls. But if anyone considers himself and thinks about his weakness, and presumes on God's mercy, neglecting to purify his life from sin and sinking into a whirlpool of iniquity, he falls too. [...] Do not presume on your own virtue to win you the kingdom, don't presume on God's mercy and think you can get away with sinning" (*Exposition on the Psalms* 31.2.:1, 2000:363). A person cannot surrender to iniquity by claiming powerlessness, no more that it can rely on the power of virtue to claim or win salvation. Again, one must notice, that the concept of 'ontic power' is inherent to any hermeneutics or polyphonics of person.

Augustine does not shy away from ascribing to God alone the agency and thus the power to institute and then sustain the working of human virtues. Such statements might sound too strong in some contexts centered on freedom and autonomy and could thus be misleading. Augustine's position, however, may be interpreted charitably, meaning that God's role cannot be overcredited to the detriment of man's autonomous power, since God is the creator and the sustainer of that very autonomy whose function is to freely acquire virtues for virtuous action, as well as to incur guilt and responsibility. Essentially, only in this qualified sense, God forestalls any virtuous action.

Augustine's description of nature-dependent virtue, and through virtue of a person's happiness, cannot be divorced from the precariousness and powerlessness of man's nature: "For who is competent, however torrential the flow of his eloquence, to unfold all the miseries of this life? [...] For is there any pain, the opposite of pleasure, any disturbance, the contrary of repose, that cannot befall a wise man's body? [...] Then again, what of virtue itself, which is not one of the primary gifts, since it supervenes on them later, introduced by teaching? Although it claims the topmost place among human goods, what is its activity in this world but unceasing warfare with vices, and those not external vices but internal, not other people's vices but clearly our own, our very own? [...] In fact, if they are genuine virtues (and genuine virtues can exist only in those in whom true godliness is present) they do not profess to have the power to ensure that the people in whom they exist will not suffer any miseries; genuine virtues are not such liars as to advance such claims. But they do claim that though human life is compelled to be wretched by all the grievous evils of this world, it is happy in the expectation of the world to come, just as, in expectation it is saved. For how it can be happy, if it is not yet saved?" (*City of God* 19:4).

Clearly, in Augustine, the notions of power and virtue correlate with happiness, and thisworldly and otherworldly happiness activates the concepts of salvation and predestination. On some complications that arise from the semantic and power interface between freedom of choice and God's predestination – see, for instance, Wetzel 2000.

Augustine calls prudence "the knowledge of what should be desired and what avoided" (1.27.89). One can easily notice that knowledge is the function of reason and, therefore, prudence could be called, quite conventionally, the virtue of the domain of reason (for main models of partitioning of the mind into domains, see, for instance, de Sousa 1991:21-35).

The second cardinal virtue, fortitude, is defined in a question form as follows: "Is not fortitude that condition of the soul [*animae affectio*] by which we despise all hardships [*incommoda*] and losses [*damna*] of things that have not been placed under our control [*non in nostra potestate constitutarum*]?" (1.27.89).

Since fortitude handles the element of control (that is the substance of power, *potestas*), one can safely assign this virtue to the domain of the will. Things, which are not in our power to attain, or can be lost due to our insufficient power to retain them, are loved by an evil will, says Augustine, and in that sense belong to the realm of 'evil' and 'impossibilia.' And a happy man "is the lover of his own good will, a man who spurns, by comparison, every other good, which can still be lost even when the will to keep it remains" (1.28.95). Augustinian fortitude, in a Stoic fashion (and, ultimately, with some refinements, in a Christian modality), is effectively freedom from 'externalia' and 'loseabilia' together with the love of one's will and autonomy, a virtue which only partially covers, probably through the despising of hardships, the enterprising, outward going, danger-meeting, virtue of Aristotelian courage-bravery (*andreia*; see, for instance, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1107a28-8b10). We can read the conduct of Dostoevskian heroes both in terms of fortitude (being, basically, the capacity to disengage from any action, or despise any 'good') and bravery (the capacity to face danger and engage in creative

action-praxis). The most glaring example of courage/fortitude interplay is Zosima's behavior during the time of his duel (295-301; 14:268-273). My purpose here is not to describe every virtue, or lack thereof, but merely to indicate and exemplify in what kind of dialogic tension a person, as a virtue-structure, could be positioned.[5]

The mind's virtue of temperance is "a quality [*affectio*] which checks and controls the desire [*appetitum*] for those things that it is base to desire," and justice is "the virtue according to which each man receives what is his due" (1.27.89-90). Temperance, we could say, rules the domain of mind's emotions, while justice takes charge of the interpersonal domain. It is clear that *The Brothers Karamazov*, being constructed in terms of passions (that of Dmitri's or Fyodor's) or justice and injustice (correlated, say, with the parricide) cannot avoid being read through the guidance of iconized virtues.

Temperance, for Augustine, is "the virtue which restrains lust (*libidines cohibet*). What is as hostile [*inimicum*] to the good will as lust [*libido*]? From this you know that this man who loves his good will [*bonae voluntatis suae amatorem*] resists and opposes lust [*libidinibus*] in every way he can, and therefore can justly [*jure*] be called temperate" (1.27.92). It is to be noted in this context already that in Augustine and Dostoevsky's world-versions, lust-libido is strongly iconized, becoming an inalienable part of any paradigm-iconostasis.

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[5] On an overall survey of the implicit iconicity ('mimesis') of virtues in an explicit connection to Zosima, see Linnér, Sven, 1975, *Starets Zosima in The Brothers Karamazov: A study in the mimesis of virtue*. Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell.

b) Ontic Power in Dostoevsky

At this stage, we have accumulated a series of concepts in a semantic field that visualize and portray a mind and a person: good will, power, desire, libido, righteousness, wisdom, and the four cardinal virtues. Now let us scrutinize a Dostoevskian text with a similar import:

> Do you know that centuries will pass and mankind will proclaim with the mouth of its wisdom [*premudrosti*: supreme wisdom, a Biblical term] and science that there is no crime [*prestuplenia net*], and therefore no sin [*net i grekha*], but only hungry men? 'Feed them first, then ask virtue [*dobrodeteli*] of them!'-that is what they will write on the banner they raise against you, and by which your temple will be destroyed. [...] No science will give them bread as long as they remain free, but in the end they will lay their freedom at our feet and say to us: "Better that you enslave us [*porabotite nas*], but feed us." They will finally understand [*poimut*] that freedom and earthly bread in plenty for everyone are inconceivable together, for never, never will they be able [*sumeiut*: intellectual ability of knowledge and wisdom] to share among themselves. They will also be convinced [*ubediatsia*] that they are forever incapable [*ne mogut*] of being free [*byt' i svobodnymy*], because they are feeble [*malosil'ny*: 'of little power'], depraved [*porochny*; *porok*: vice], nonentities [*nichtozhny*; *nichto*: nothingness] and rebels [*buntovshchiki*]. You promised them heavenly bread, but, I repeat again, can it compare with earthly bread in the eyes of the weak [*slabogo*], eternally depraved [*vechno porochnogo*], and eternally ignoble [*vechno neblagorodnogo*: eternally of ignoble birth] human race? And if in the name of heavenly bread thousands and tens of thousands will follow you, what will become of the millions and tens of thousands of millions of creatures [*suschestv*] who will not be strong enough [*ne v silakh budut*: will lack the power, strength] to forgo [*prenebrech'*: to disregard, to scorn] earthly bread for the sake of the heavenly? Is it that only the tens of thousands of the great and strong [*velikikh i sil'nykh*] are dear to you, and the remaining millions, numerous as the sands of the sea, weak [*slabykh*] but loving you, should serve only as material [*posluzhit' materialom*] for the great and the strong [*velikikh i sil'nykh*]? No, the weak, too, are dear to us. They are depraved and rebels, but in the end it is they who will become obedient [*stanut poslushnikami*]. (253; 14:230)

For the Grand Inquisitor's weaklings, within the parameters of the first temptation, the ultimate meaning of man's supreme wisdom (*premudrost'*, equatable with the

Augustinian *summa sapientiae*) is not only that virtue, science, righteousness are not an aim but that there is no crime and sin, no vice. This claim's anti-ethical magnitude is made possible by the pivotal category of 'power': it is beyond man's power to exercise freedom of choice, since the desire for freedom is incommensurable with the will's power. The only 'capacity' man can exercise (the only thing that is up to him), the only freedom he can have is the freedom and capacity to sin, be depraved (*porochnyi*: vice-ridden). The Grand Inquisitor employs potent ontological concepts in order to describe the nature (in Christianity, it is a definitional, analytic, quality of nature to be synonymous with power) of man: 'eternally depraved' (*vechno porochnyi*), eternally ignoble by birth (*vechno neblagorodnyi*), nonentities (*nichtozhnosti*), slaves, rebels because of their natural weakness, and a simple material for the great and strong.

The opposition nature/freedom is homologous to the opposition power/freedom of choice: "Is that how human nature was created-to reject the miracle, and in those terrible moments of life, the moments of the most terrible, essential, and tormenting questions of the soul, to remain only with the free decision of the heart?" (255). Rebellion is a logical consequence of powerlessness (thus Ivan, for instance, does not rebel against God out of excess of power, but out of Euclidian powerlessness, being malcontent with his personal ontic status). The new commandment-like proclamation, issued against Christ - 'Feed them first, then ask virtue [*dobrodeteli*] of them!' – conjoins the concept of power with that of virtue. Two sources of power, then, would rule, underlie, animate, and be the life-giving source of man's freedom: the heavenly bread (Christ's freedom), and the earthly bread. The Grand Inquisitor's case against Christ argues that man was created powerless to carry out any commandment of Christ's freedom; even worse, man is unable to

exercise the freedom with which he was born (ontic freedom), and thus live a life of virtue; worse still, man is unable to manage the distribution of bread itself, the source of his earthly power and through it of a minimal slave-like freedom.

It is significant that the Grand Inquisitor uses the term *premudrost'* (highest wisdom), usually used to describe God's wisdom (*premudrost' Bozhiia*), not only to ironically portray the 'knowledge' of weaklings (*bessil'nykh*), but also to sincerely visualize the mind of the dread-inflicting spirit. Unless the few mighty and powerful choose to follow the counsel of "the dread (*strashnyi*) and wise spirit (*premudryi dukh*)" (255) of Satan, no power would be able to secure any modicum of virtue and happiness for the creatures created merely 'in jest' (*v nasmeshku*):

> "Behold and judge, now that fifteen centuries have passed, take a look at them: whom have you raised up to yourself? I swear, man is created [*sozdan*] weaker [*slabee*] and baser [*nizhe*] than you thought him! [...] He is weak [*on slab*] and mean [*i podl*]. [...] Pouring out their foolish tears, they will finally acknowledge that he who created them rebels no doubt intended to laugh at them. [...] Have we not, indeed, loved mankind, in so humbly recognizing their impotence [*bessilie*], in so lovingly alleviating their burden [*noshu*] and allowing their feeble nature [*slabosil'noi prirode*] even to sin; with our permission?" (256-257; 14:233-234)

Such expressions like 'man is weak (*slab*), base (*nizok*), and mean (*podl*)" and 'man is created weak (*slab*) and impotent, powerless (*bessil'nyi*)' describe two aspects in a person: ontic and moral. *Slabosilie* (weakness of power), *bessilie* (powerlessness), *slabost'* (weakness) refer to the condition of *natural, ontic* endowment of a person, while *podlost'* (meanness) and *nizost'* (baseness) relates to the moral dimension. Ivan, as we shall see below, invents a formula for the immoral power that would allow him to weather life's aporias and despair: the power (*sila*) of Karamazovian baseness (*nizosti*). Ivan also calls himself '*podlets'* (scoundrel, villain, rascal) to convey his moral failure

and his dubious role in relation to his father and Smerdiakov: "I am a scoundrel! [*ia podlets*]" (14:255). Dmitri assigns to himself (14:443) a series of synonymic negative moral terms: *podlets* (scoundrel), *merzavets* (vile, loathsome person), *zver'* (a beast). Moral terms described above refer to some ethical failure of power, not to some ontic incapacity, since things and actions that Ivan and Dmitri failed to perform lay within their ontic power.

The entire exercise we have attempted in a limited fashion here was to design a conceptual field that would cover, first, the ontic power of a fictional person, and, second its moral profile. But both conceptual magnitudes (ontic and moral) iconize, primarily in the Legend, the palpable negativity of a person (both her ontic powerlessness and her ethical baseness), since the novelistic projection of a person is mainly centered on what renders a person's image frail and problematic.

c) Everything is Permitted

In *The Brothers Karamazov* we have, through the Grand Inquisitor and Ivan, a decisive progression from innate incapacity and moral or even criminal disarray (the above 'scoundrel,' and 'vile' or 'base' person) of persons into, what Ivan terms, 'everything is permitted.' It is of paramount value, therefore, to establish that 'everything is permitted' operates on both ontic and moral levels. As we see from the above examples from Ivan's poem, his dictum is not exclusively moral: whatever lies within our power, good or bad, is permitted, once we establish or postulate, says Ivan to Zosima (14:64-65), that there is no God and immortality:

> [Miusov:] No more than five days ago, at a local gathering, predominantly of ladies, he [Ivan] solemnly announced in the discussion that there is decidedly nothing in the whole world that would make [*zastavlialo*: compel] men love their fellow men [*sebe podobnykh*][6]; that there exists no law of nature [and thus ontic power] that man should love mankind, and that if there is and has been any love on earth up to now, it has come not from natural law but solely from people's belief [*verovali*; *vera*: faith] in their immortality. Ivan Fyodorovich added parenthetically that that is what all natural law [*zakon estestvennyi*] consists of, so that were mankind's belief [*veru*: faith] in its immortality to be destroyed [*unichtozhte*][7], not only love [*liubov'*] but also any living power [*zhivaia sila*][8] to continue the life of the world would at once dry

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[6] *Sebe podobnykh*: those similar to himself; *po obrazu i podobiiu* being 'in the image and similarity.' The expression conveys an iconologic attitude of superiority and mockery at the notion of image itself by those who know that God and immortality do not exist.

[7] The word *unichtozhat'* (to destroy) reminds us of the Great Spirit, called also 'the spirit of self-destruction and nonbeing,' *dukh samounichtozhenia i nebytiia*. Here the word is iconized again in order to convey the destruction of two of the most cherished ideas, God and immortality. Throughout our interpretation of many icons and persons we recurrently refer to the role of the concept of nonbeing in Dostoevsky.

[8] *Zhivaia sila* (living power) is one of the best expressions of what we term 'ontic power' of a person. As we can see, love (*liubov'*) would dry up first, but then the ontic power itself would vanish. The distinction between *liubov'* (ethical level) and *zhivaia sila* (ontic level) enables the intelligibility of any meaningful life or of any rebellion against a power-deprived and meaning-deprived life. To be power-deprived, again, is not to be understood politically (as *vlast'*), but ontically (as *sila*). Ivan, for instance, rebels against his Euclidean powerlessness to make any reasonable sense of God and his world. Political power is quite easily available to people like Ivan and the Grand Inquisitor: Alyosha openly expresses his suspicion that Ivan might join the Jesuits. The expression 'law of nature' belongs also to the ontic domain: there is no law of nature that would dictate or effect love in mankind, that is 'love' is merely a result of a belief, that is, love is personologically and ethically (nomothetically) instituted due to a false belief in immortality and God. It is obvious that belief is possible only because man is subject to ontic weakness; belief and faith are inherently objectionable for Ivan: were man powerful enough, he would simply have certainty. In such a context, one can understand Augustine's uncompromising soteriology according to which in this world man is alienated from God, deiconized in the region of dissimilitude and thus powerless: the only solution for man's restoration is total return to God who will give man all the power for acquiring certainty and felicity. Augustine's soteriology is thus 'power-hungry,' he is content with nothing less but direct access to God's power. In essence, the problematic of power (contained within the notion of God and man's nature) starts with Christ's hypostatic union. In the model of hypostatic union it is not man's person that is assimilated into Christ, but exclusively man's nature, and thus man's ontic power:

> up in it. Not only that, but then nothing would be immoral [*beznravstvennogo*] any longer, everything would be permitted [*vse budet pozvoleno*], even anthropophagy. And even that is not all: he ended with the assertion that for every separate person [*chastnogo litsa*], like ourselves for instance, who believes [*ne veruiushchego*] neither in God [*ni v Boga*] nor in his own immortality [*ni v bessmertie*], the moral [*nravstvennyi*] law of nature ought to change immediately into the exact opposite of the former religious law, and that egoism, even to the point of evildoing [*zlodeistva*], should not only be permitted [*dozvolen*] to man but should be acknowledged as the necessary, the most reasonable [*razumnym*], and all but the noblest result [*iskhodom*: outcome] of his situation. From this paradox, gentlemen, you may deduce what else our dear eccentric and paradoxalist[9] Ivan Fyodorovich may be pleased to proclaim, and perhaps still intends to proclaim."
>
> "Allow me," Dmitri Fyodorovich suddenly cried unexpectedly, "to be sure I've heard correctly: 'Evildoing [*zlodeistvo*] should not only be permitted but even should be acknowledged as the most necessary and most intelligent solution [*vykhodom*; above *iskhodom*][10] for the situation of every godless person'! Is that it, or not?"
>
> "Exactly that," said Father Paissy.
>
> "I'll remember." (69-70; 14:64-65)

Let us see now how Ivan in his meeting with Alyosha, just after he had recited his poem 'The Grand Inquisitor,' corroborated his anti-ethical slogan 'everything is permitted' with the concepts of power and morality. It is important to note that now Ivan needs some naked power in order to survive, a power that is different from moral power, and which Ivan calls 'the power of Karamazovian baseness':

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salvation consists in this very capacity upgrading of man's nature with divine nature and thus with divine power. Christianity's primary obsession therefore is with the concepts of nature and its ontic power, and in Orthodoxy ending with the doctrine of *theosis* (divinization). In this matrix of nature-power we see an uncanny coincidence in the theology of both Dostoevsky and Augustine. The Grand Inquisitor, to recall the temptations, believes and hopes in no hypostatic participation in Christ's power, in no upgrading of man's nature.

[9] Dostoevsky also calls the Underground Man a 'paradoxalist' (5:179).

[10] Both *vykhodom* and *iskhodom* should be understood synonymically as meaning 'the only way out'; the 'only exit' out of the predicament of godlessness and ontic finitude is into evildoing and immorality. That is the ultimate form of rebellion.

"You don't think I'll go straight to the Jesuits now, to join the host of those who are correcting his deed [*podvig*]! Good lord, what do I care? As I told you: I just want to drag on until I'm thirty, and then - smash the cup on the floor!"

"And the sticky little leaves, and the precious graves, and the blue sky, and the woman you love! How will you live, what will you love them with?" Alyosha exclaimed ruefully. "Is it possible, with such hell in your heart and in your head? No, you're precisely going in order to join them ... and if not, you'll kill yourself, you won't endure [*ne vyderzhysh'*] it!"

"There is a force [*sila*: power] that will endure [*vyderzhyt*] everything," said Ivan, this time with a cold smirk."

"What force [*sila*]?"

"The Karamazov force...the force [*sila*] of the Karamazov baseness [*nizosti*]."

"To drown in depravity [*v razvrate*], to stifle your soul with corruption [*rastlenii*], is that it?" "That, too, perhaps ... only until my thirtieth year maybe I'll escape it, and then ..."

"How will you escape it? By means of what? With your thoughts, it's impossible [*nevozmozhno*]."

"Again, in Karamazov fashion [*po-karamazovski*]."

"You mean 'everything is permitted [*vse pozvoleno*]'? Everything is permitted, is that right, is it?"

Ivan frowned, and suddenly turned somehow strangely pale.

"Ah, you caught that little remark yesterday, which offended Miusov so much ... and that brother Dmitri so naively popped up and rephrased?" he grinned crookedly. "Yes, perhaps 'everything is permitted,' since the word has already been spoken. I do not renounce it. And Mitenka's [Dmitri's] version is not so bad."

Alyosha was looking at him silently.

"I thought, brother, that when I left here I'd have you, at least, in all the world," Ivan suddenly spoke with unexpected feeling, "but now I see that in your heart, too, there is no room for me, my dear hermit. The formula, 'everything is permitted,' I will not renounce, and what then? Will you renounce me for that? Will you?" (263; 14

Let us now see how Dmitri relates to 'everything is permitted.' Prior to Dmitri's trial, Alyosha visits him in prison. Nothing is more tormenting for Dmitri than his legal innocence facing indictment for parricide and his possible sentencing to Siberia as a criminal. But, despite his legal innocence, Dmitri does not feel morally or hamartiologically (sin-wise) innocent. Although Alyosha, in his futile attempt to be salvifically omnipresent, plays the role of a spiritual comforter, it is another visitor who capitalizes on Dmitri's current predicament: Rakitin. Rakitin is a theology student, a careerist and most probably a future ideologue of communism. Rakitin's role will fall within the strategies of allurement and temptation that modalize so many actions in the

novel. From him Dmitri receives the bad tidings (they are good tidings for Rakitin) about two things: the existence of Ethics and the existence of Science. First, let us see how Dmitri (already without freedom, indicted, and facing the trial) and ethics collide:

> "[...] Well, Alexei, my head will roll now! [*propala moia golova*; literally: my head is lost now]"
> He sat down on the bench and sat Alyosha down next to him.
> "Yes, tomorrow is the trial. You mean you really have no *hope* [emphasis added] at all, brother?" Alyosha said with a timid feeling.
> "What are you talking about?" Mitya looked at him somehow indefinitely. Ah, yes, the trial! Devil take it! Up to now we've been talking about trifles, about this trial and all, and I haven't said a word to you about the most important thing. Yes, tomorrow is the trial, but I didn't say my head would roll because of the trial. *It's not my head that is lost, but what was sitting in my head, that's what has been lost* [text retranslated; emphasis added]. Why are you looking at me with such criticism on your face?"
> "What are you talking about, Mitya?"
> "Ideas, ideas, that's what! *Ethics. What is ethics?* [emphasis added]"
> "Ethics?" Alyosha said in surprise.
> "Yes, what is it, some sort of science?"
> "Yes, there is such a science...only...I must confess I can't explain to you what sort of science it is."
> "Rakitin knows. Rakitin knows a lot, devil take him! He won't become a monk. He's going to go to Petersburg. There, he says, he'll get into the department of criticism, but with a noble tendency. Why not? He can be useful and make a career. Oof, how good they are at making careers! Devil take ethics! *I am lost, Alexei, it is I who is lost, you man of God*! [text retranslated; emphasis added]. I love you more than anyone. My heart trembles at you, that's what." (587-588)

The first consequence for Dmitri that follows from his discovery of ethics is that he is lost. All this will affect the status of his person: "It's not the head that will roll, but what was [is] in my had." Dmitri's spiritual-semiotic structure contained in his head will undergo erasure and revamping. Dmitri feels lost not because of the trial or even Siberia, on the contrary, he feels lost because of ethics, which is directly connected and founded by science:

> [...]Who is this Carl [Claude] Bernard?" [...]
> "He must be a scientist," Alyosha replied, "only I confess I'm not able to say much about him either. I've just heard he's a scientist, but what kind I don't know."

"Well, devil take him, I don't know either," Mitya swore. "Some scoundrel [*podlets*], most likely. They're all scoundrels. [...]

"But why are you lost ? What were you just saying?" Alyosha interrupted.

"Why am I lost? Hm! The fact is...on the whole...*I'm sorry for God, that's why!*"

"What do you mean, sorry for God?"

"Imagine: it's all there in the nerves, in the head, there are these nerves in the brain (devil take them!) ...there are little sorts of tails, these nerves have little tails, well, and when they start trembling there. ..that is, you see, I look at something with my eyes, like this, and they start trembling, these little tails...and when they tremble, an image appears [*iavliaetsia obraz*], not at once, but in a moment, it takes a second, and then a certain moment appears, as it were, that is, not a moment-devil take the moment-but an image, that is, an object or an event, well, devil take it-and that's why I contemplate, and then think ...because of the little tails [Dmitri just has attempted to explain the theory of Claude Bernard], and not at all because *I have a soul or am some sort of image and likeness* [*chto u menia dusha i chto ia kakoi-to tam obraz i podobie*], that's all foolishness. Mikhail [Rakitin] explained it to me, brother, just yesterday, and it was as if I got burnt. It's magnificent, Alyosha, this science! *The new man will come* [emphasis added], I quite understand that...And yet, *I'm sorry for God*!"

"Well, that's good enough," said Alyosha.

"That I'm sorry for God? Chemistry, brother, chemistry! Move over a little, Your Reverence, there's no help for it, chemistry's coming! And Rakitin doesn't like God, oof, how he doesn't! That's the sore spot in all of them! But they conceal it. They lie. They pretend. 'What, are you going to push for that in the department of criticism?' I asked. 'Well, they won't let me do it openly,' he said, and laughed. 'But,' I asked, 'how will man be after that? *Without God and the future life?* It means *everything is permitted now* [*teper' vse pozvoleno*; Dmitri learned this formula from Ivan in their meeting with Zosima][11], one can do anything [*vse*

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[11] "Everything is permitted" is expressly thematized in stark ethical terms already in *Crime and Punishment*: "'No, those men [like Napoleon] aren't made like that; the real overlord [*vlastelin*: one who possesses and wields *vlast'*, that is the Grand Inquisitor's idol of *political power*], to whom all things are permitted [*vse razreshaetsia*], ransacks Toulon, *commits a massacre* in Paris, *forgets* an army in Egypt, *throws away* half a million men in his Moscow campaign and talks his way out at Vilna with a clever remark; and after his death they put up statues to him - and that means that *everything* is permitted to him [*vse razreshaetsia*]. No! Men like that don't have bodies but lumps of bronze!" In *Crime and Punishment* the above text is immediately followed with: "It wasn't a person but a principle that I killed! I killed the principle, but I didn't step over it, I remained on this side of it...All I was able to do was to kill. And the way it's turning out, it seems I didn't even manage to do that...The principle? Why was that imbecile Razumikhin calling the socialists such rude names just now? They're hard working, businesslike people; they occupy themselves with the "common happiness" [*obschim schastiem*] ...No, life has been given me once and it won't come along again: I don't want to wait for "universal happiness" [*obschim schastiem*]. I want to live my own life, too, otherwise I'd do better not to live at all" (6:211). I wanted to insist on the common genealogy of the themes "everything is permitted", power and happiness in order to

> *mozhna delat'*]?' 'Didn't you know?' he said. And he laughed. '*Everything is permitted to the intelligent man*,' [emphasis added] he said. 'The intelligent man knows how to catch crayfish, but you killed and fouled it up,' he [Rakitin] said, 'and now you're rotting in prison!' He said that to me. A natural-born swine! I once used to throw the likes of him out-well, and now I listen to them. He does talk a lot of sense, after all. He writes intelligently, too. About a week ago he started reading me an article, I wrote down three lines of it on purpose; wait, here it is." Mitya hurriedly pulled a piece of paper from his waistcoat pocket and read:
>
> "'In order to resolve this question it is necessary, first of all, to put one's person in conflict with one's actuality.' Do you understand that?"
>
> "No, I don't," said Alyosha. [...]
>
> "I don't understand it either. Obscure and vague, but intelligent." (588-589)

The Brothers Karamazov cannot be interpreted without a theory of morality implicit in it, but for Dmitri the problem resides in clarifying the foundations of that morality. Dmitri's discovery of ethics and science would be innocuous without its theological and anthropological consequences. That is why Dmitri is outraged by a different discovery too: that he might not be (that is effectively be, not simply initially made in) some sort of 'image and likeness [*obraz i podobie*],' as we have read above. Dmitri feels lost because he is 'sorry for God' who has been lost. Dmitri feels or proclaims to be lost because he may have lost his divine image and thus deiconized: he suggestively calls the neurons which produce images (*obrazy*) – little tails (*khvostiki*), which could be imaginatively equated with little devils. This means that Dmitri may not be moral according to his divine image but only according to some artificially imposed or chosen ethics, to some teachings or voluntaristic strategies of action. If a person is not constitutively, that is by her nature good (as science would teach), it just might follow that 'everything is permitted,' that everything is up to a person's will, or, conversely, that a person is simply a victim of 'actuality' (of the environment). Here the fundamental dichotomy

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highlight the principle that pervades Dostoevsky's fictional worlds. These themes, as we see, are programmatically iconized throughout *The Brothers Karamazov*.

nature/person reasserts itself anew and the limits of freedom and the will are correlated with God's existence and His Creation.

But Dmitri is not prepared to give up on God or on his own image and likeness to that God, and swiftly changes his own self-description (by activating that image an likeness, we might say) and launches into reaffirmation of God. What is probably more immediate at this juncture for Dmitri is that he confesses and reasserts interpersonality by kissing Alyosha: "Excited, he went up to Alyosha and suddenly kissed him. His eyes lit up" (591).

Dmitri's kiss falls within a series of other kisses within the novel (Christ's, Ivan's, Alyosha's), being a recognition of Alyosha's personologic and salvific iconicity, as well as a reassertion of Dmitri's own self-regenerating personhood. Dmitri's kiss stands in direct iconic relation to Ivan's kissing of Alyosha after the recounting of the legend of the Grand Inquisitor (in the novel, the iconicity of the kiss displays pervasive ruling authority alongside with the iconicity of the heart, a theme beyond our current concern).

In his self-reiconization and metanoia, Dmitri needs Alyosha and his iconic, restorative force to stand in opposition to Rakitin. The novel's text below presents a picture of Dmitri that is relentlessly polyphonic and profusely dialogic. After administering a liturgical kiss to Alyosha and therefore establishing a sacramental level of interpersonal communion, Dmitri instantaneously switches onto a 'logos' of confession and quasi-prophesizing:

> "Rakitin wouldn't understand this," he began, all in a sort of rapture, as it were, "but you, you will understand everything. [...] I've been waiting till this last time to pour out my soul to you. Brother, in these past two months I've sensed a new man in me, a new man has arisen [*voskres*][12] in me! He was shut up inside me, but

if it weren't for this thunderbolt, he never would have appeared. Frightening [*strashno*]![13] What do I care if I spend twenty years pounding out iron ore in the mines, I'm not afraid [*ne boius'*] of that at all, but I'm afraid [*mne strashno*] of something else now: that this risen man [*voskresshyi chelovek*] not depart from me! Even there, in the mines underground [*pod zemleiu*: under earth], you can find a human heart [*chelovecheskoe serdtse*] in the convict and murderer standing next to you, and you can be close to him, because there, too, it's possible to live, and love, and suffer! You can revive [*vozrodit'*] and resurrect [*voskresit'*] the frozen [*zamershee*][14] heart in this convict, you can look after him for years, and finally bring up from the cave [*vertepa*][15] into the light a soul that is lofty now, a

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[12] The term *voskres* (resurrected) appears in the formula *Khristos Voskres*. Dmitri, now a resurrected man, similarly to the resurrected Christ, will descend into the underground-hell, where he jointly with other damned-convicts will not renounce God's commandment of joyfulness, love, and suffering.

[13] Dmitri experiences the awe before the epiphany of a new selfhood and dread of negativity before its vanishing away in terms of '*strashno,*' whose semantic field includes, for instance (see Dal' 1978, 4:336-337), sacred terror or fear of God (*bozhyi strakh*) or the Last Judgment (*Strashnyi Sud*). Here, again, we may recall that Christ's temptations are initiated by the dread and intelligent spirit (*strashnyi i umnyi dukh*), that is by Satan (as the spirit of non-being and self-destruction). As one can see, the iconicity of '*strashno*' accompanies some crucial moments in the novel, showing also that the connection of 'dread' and non-being is unavoidable. Here Dmitri dreads the possible loss (disappearance into non-being) of his new self, being tortured by the precariousness of selfhood and beset by interpersonal vicissitudes. One can certainly read the novel through the iconic prism of 'dreadfulness' and 'sacred terror' in order to see what grounds and what crowns such persons as Satan and Christ.

[14] The word *zamershee serdtse* (roughly 'deadened heart,' where *umeret'* is '*to die*') is a felicitous and evocative conjunction with the words 'to be reborn' (*vozrodit'*) and 'to resurrect' (*voskresit'*). The iconicity of the heart, on the other hand, is pivotal for *The Brothers Karamazov*. We have, for instance, Christ's kiss penetrating unto (not into) the Grand Inquisitor's heart (in 'The Grand Inquisitor'), and Dmitri's assertion that the human heart is the locus where God and the devil confront each other: "Can there be beauty in Sodom? Believe me for the majority of people, that's just where the beauty lies – did you know that secret? The terrible thing is that beauty is not only fearful [*strashnaia*; again the centrality of the iconic word *strshno*] but also mysterious. Here the devil [*d'iavol*] is struggling with God, and the battlefield is the human heart" (108; 14:10). The compossibility, the conflation of Sodom, beauty, God, and the devil in the heart indicates how heterogeneous icons could generate an original and dynamic iconostasis.

[15] Another evocation of Christ's resurrection through the belief that death itself and the cave-grave cannot overcome a person and its light, the suffering consciousness: the iconicity of Dmitri's Christian rhetoric is unmistakable here.

> suffering consciousness [*stradal'cheskoie soznanie*: martyr-like consciousness], you can revive an angel, resurrect a hero! And there are many of them, there are hundreds, and we're all guilty for them! Why did I have a dream about a 'wee one' at such a moment? 'Why is the wee one poor?' It was a prophecy to me at that moment! It's for the 'wee one' that I will go. Because everyone is guilty for everyone else. For all the 'wee ones,' because there are little children and big children. All people are 'wee ones.' And I'll go for all of them, because there must be someone who will go for all of them. I didn't kill my father, but I must go. I accept! All of this came to me here...within these peeling walls. [...] Oh, yes, we'll be in chains, and there will be no freedom [*voli*],[16] but then, in our great grief, we will arise [*voskresnem*] once more into joy [*v radost'*], without which it's not possible for man to live, or for God to be, for God gives joy, it's his prerogative, a great one ... Lord, let man dissolve in prayer! How would I be there underground without God? Rakitin's lying: if God is driven from the earth, we'll meet him underground! It's impossible for a convict to be without God, even more impossible than for a non-convict! And then from the depths of the earth, we, the men underground, will start singing a tragic hymn to God, in whom there is joy! Hail to God and his joy! I love him!" [...] "No, life is full, there is life underground, too!" he began again. "[...] I want to live now, what thirst to exist and be conscious has been born in me precisely within these peeling walls! Rakitin doesn't understand it. [...] And besides, what is suffering? I am not afraid of it, even if it's numberless. I am not afraid of it now; I was before. You know, maybe I won't even give any answers in court...And it seems to me there's so much strength [*sily*][17] in me now that I can overcome [*poboriu*] everything, all sufferings, only in order to say and tell myself every moment: I am! In a thousand torments-I am; writhing under torture - but I am. Locked up in a tower, but still I exist, I see the sun, and if I don't see the sun, still I know it is. And the whole of life is there-in knowing that the sun is." (591-592; 15:30-31)

It is quite evident from the above quote that Rakitin is a nihilistic hypostasis of Ivan, and that Dmitri transcends his own ethical and legal predicament and embraces life, passing

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[16] Freedom in *The Brothers Karamazov* is usually rendered by *svoboda*, as in 'The Grand Inquisitor.' Here we encounter a different, folkloric term, *volia* (prevalently 'liberty,' as social latitude), which coincides homonymically with *volia* (the will), essentially being also identical in concept: *svobodnaia volia* translates as 'freedom of the will.'

[17] Here again the icon of power comes into play, or 'power' (*sila*) is iconized. It seems that now Dmitri can tap into his ontic powers differently, since he upgraded himself by the resurrection into new moral powers, by which he can overpower (*poborot'*) any suffering and thus maximize his 'I am.' Dmitri would surprise the Grand Inquisitor by his stance and his proclamation of power, since Dmitri finds the fountain of joyfulness in himself and in God. Dmitri would not subscribe to the Grand Inquisitor's empire of happiness; Dmitri's awareness of the sun alone is enough to justify his happiness.

thereby into the camp where both Alyosha and Zosima exercise the anthropologic dignity of the image and similarity to God, who is joy and life. The term *voskres* conveys the status of being 'resurrected' after Dmitri declares that he is a 'lost man.' While Ivan, under epistemological (since feeling ontically incapacitated in his cognitive powers about God's ways of doing things) and ethical duress (every 'nomos-law' is false and should be destroyed, especially such beliefs-by-convention like belief in God and immortality) contemplates the option of suicide, Dmitri, on the contrary, under the worst legal threat of deprivation of freedom, contemplates resurrection. Here we have seen how two persons, Ivan and Dmitri, project divergent world-versions on the ground of 'everything is permitted.' Certainly, we cannot exhaust the many semantic implications of all the icons that gravitate around a Dmitri or an Ivan. But it is sufficient to indicate in what iconostatic clusters they become meaningful.

Let us now address, as expeditiously as possible, a very important point, that of the origin of the expression and of the slogan 'everything is permitted (*vse pozvoleno*),' as we have seen above being used by Ivan and Dmitri. It was noted already by Dostoevskian critics, especially by Sandoz (2000:131), that 'all is permitted' originates or might come from St. Paul's first letter to the Corinthians. What we want ultimately to point out is how this concern about legal or ontic permissibility expresses itself in Augustine's Confessions.

Let us quote the relevant passage from St. Paul: "All things are lawful for me [*vse mne pozvoleno*],[18] but not all things are expedient [*no ne vse polezno*]. All things are

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[18] Here I am following the New Testament which Dostoevsky himself consulted (available in the electronic edition). Newest version of 'all is lawful' is rendered as '*vse*

lawful for me, but I will not be brought under the power of anything [*nichto ne dolzhno obladat' mnoiu*]" (1Cor 6:12). The Latin version from the Vulgate goes like this: "*Omnia mihi licent* [Gr.: *Panta moi ezestin*] *sed non omnia expediunt* [Gr.: *sympherei*] *omnia mihi licent sed ego sub nulis redigar potestate* [Gr.: *ezousiasthesomai*]." One cannot overlook the fact that power (*potestas*) and authority are explicit in this text, and one cannot

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mne pozvolitetel'no,' which would translate as all is permissible (not 'permitted') to me. Now, a profound discussion could ensue from this in case one wants to clarify in what sense all is permitted or permissible to one, whether in terms of ontic power (in the Gnostic sense of being within one's superior powers, since one is a 'pneumatic' person, and not merely 'psychic') or in terms of legal stipulation that imposes no constraint on one's powers and freedom, whatever they are. Paul, supposedly, favors the Gnostic version, although, as a consequence a pneumatic will therefore be free from law too: "While psychics are bound to the law, and must avoid especially sexual sins, idolatry, greed, thievery, and drunkenness [1 Cor 6:9], Paul declares that for him – as for all the elect – 'all things are authorized [lawful]' precisely because the pneumatic 'will not be subjected to authority by anyone' (6:12) (Pagels 1992:66; see also pp 73-74"). It is still to be kept in mind that the above distinction is a decisive one: in what sense one is not subjected to any authority (power), whether in terms of having superior powers, or in terms of legal insubordination (as a source of martyrdom or anomie). As we have seen, in the case of the Grand Inquisitor we have the inferior power of the weaklings that does not allow them to practice Christ's freedom. For another discussion of 'everything is permitted' in connection to Christianity let us turn to Bultmann: "It is no wonder that Christian and Gnostic zeal for 'knowledge' united, and that in Corinth an eagerness for 'knowledge' was unleashed (I Cor. 8:18). Nor is it any wonder that pride flourished over the fact that 'we (all) have knowledge' (I Cor. 8:1ff). Neither is it surprising that the Christian consciousness of delimitation from the world and the superiority over unbelievers should have taken on Gnostic form of claiming to be 'man of Spirit,' because possessed of higher nature, and hence looking down upon mere 'men of soul' (psychics) or 'the weak' (*astheneis*). [...] This consciousness flaunted itself not only in the phenomena of enthusiasm and ecstasy within the meeting of the congregation but also and especially in the genuinely Gnostic claim to have '*liberty*' and '*authority,*' on the strength of which the 'man of Spirit' disdained to be bound to the concrete ecclesiastical fellowship (I Cor. 8:1ff) and also made light of being bound morally – 'all things are lawful to me' (I Cor. 6:12ff.; cf. 10:23)" (Bultman 1955, 1:180). The modality of 'everything is permitted' imposes constraints on a world that are called 'deontic', making it function under the concepts of obligation, permission, and prohibition (see Doležel 1976a:7). The fictional world of *The Brothers Karamazov* is prominently and explicitly governed by deontic modalities.

overemphasize that both power and authority, as well as 'everything is permitted' are decisive for the Dostoevskian fictional world of *The Brothers Karamazov.*

Let me present now a quote from Augustine's *Confessions*, where he addresses an incident of a theft in terms of power, perverse imitation of freedom, and lawfulness (permissibility):

> Thus doth the soul commit fornication when she turns away from Thee, and seeks without Thee what she cannot find pure and untainted until she returns to Thee. Thus all pervertedly imitate Thee who separate themselves far from Thee and raise themselves up against Thee. But even by thus imitating Thee they acknowledge Thee to be the Creator of all nature, and so that there is no place whither they can altogether retire from Thee. What, then, was it that I loved in that theft? And wherein did I, even corruptedly and pervertedly, imitate my Lord? Did I wish, if only by artifice, to act contrary to Thy law, because by power [*potentatu*] I could not, so that, being a captive, I might imitate an imperfect liberty [*mancam libertatem*] by doing with impunity things which I was not allowed to do [*non liceret*], in obscured likeness [*similitudine*] of Thy omnipotency? Behold this servant of Thine, fleeing from his Lord, and following a shadow! O rottenness! O monstrosity of life and profundity of death! Could I like that which was unlawful only because it was unlawful [*potuitne libere quod non licebat, non ob aliud nisi quia non licebat*]? (*Confessions* 2.6.14)

What we can straightforwardly see in Augustine's quote is his use of the same word for permissiveness as the Vulgate uses: '*non liceret'* and '*non licebat'* send us directly to the expression 'All is lawful, everything is permitted' ("Could I like that which was unlawful [*quod non licebat*] only because it was unlawful [*quia non licebat*]?"). Augustine here equates the attraction of what is unlawful with imperfect liberty, and obviously 'everything is permitted' is a perverse imitation of liberty.

But the most striking Augustinian coincidence with Dostoevsky consists in his using of the term power, equally applying it to himself and to God : "Did I wish, if only by artifice, to act contrary to Thy law, because by power [*potentatu*] I could not, so that, being a captive, I might imitate an imperfect liberty [*mancam libertatem*] by doing with

impunity things which I was not allowed to do [*non liceret*], in obscured likeness [*tenebrosa similitudine*] of Thy omnipotency [*omnipotentiae*]?" It is uncanny how Dostoevsky and Augustine similarly engage the meaningful Christian life in terms of ontic power, freedom, authority (permission, lawfulness), and similitude ('obscured likeness' above).

My limited purpose in this section has been to identify the existence and the value of the concept of ontic 'power' (*sila*) in both Augustine and Dostoevsky. It is indubitable that such a discussion can be expanded upon in various ways and in various directions. At least one thing protrudes if not iconizes itself undeniably: in both Augustine and Dostoevsky the iconologic thematization of the ontic power establishes the starting point of the systematic description of a person's fictional or non-fictional anthropologic and theological status.

2) Inanity in Augustine and Dostoevsky

In this part of my study, I shall identify some of the modalities by which the person and its iconology interface into a meaningful hypostatic, self-subsistent, unit. Iconology in our strategies of interpretation is an umbrella term for any semiotic construct, be it ethics, religious doctrine, or semiotically codified personal beliefs. Iconologic (semiotic) constructs or entities appear in Augustine and Dostoevsky's texts in conjunction with their negative counterparts such as meaninglessness, falsehood, absurdity, ugliness, or dissimilitude. We argue that for all such negative terms as well as for the entire semiotic

field of negativity the umbrella term 'inanity' would be the most useful. The category of 'inanity,' we detected in Augustine's *Soliloquies*, which we employ in an exclusively semiotic (not ontic) sense by placing it in opposition to iconologic order and meaning. Basically, inanity itself belongs to the iconologic realm, since it is possible in and through the subverting of that realm. The main purpose of this enterprise is to highlight the inestimable benefit that accrues from the personologic and polyphonic interplay between Augustine and Dostoevsky's ontology of meaning.

a) Inanity in Augustine

A person, on our interpretive assumption, besides being nature (flesh) and mind, is an iconologic (religiously: logos) construct, and the semiotic coherence that inhabits a person's mind is not an innocent aimless structure, but an intentionality-ridden identity that expresses itself in an ethical or soteriologic praxis, facing failure or success in a blameworthy or a praiseworthy action.

Stock, whose methodological dialectic, inter alia, between the self and text/narrative I attempt to place at the basis of my textual interpretation,[19] has engaged Augustine also from an ethical perspective, and in what follows I intend to stage a reduced dialogue between Augustine and Dostoevsky on ethical grounds (and, metonymically, on iconologic grounds). For Stock, the problematic of the ethical in Augustine resides in the fact that, besides being personal and interpersonal, the nature of

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[19] See Brian Stock, 1997, *Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and Ethics of Interpretation*. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press.

the ethical is inherently semiotic, textual, and narrativized. Thus Stock:

> My assumption throughout the enquiry is that for Augustine, as for Plato, Aristotle, and their later ancient successors, to talk about literature, profane or sacred, is to talk about ethical matters. Literary theory is intended to provide a means of understanding texts through the study of grammar and rhetoric [...]
>
> Augustine approaches these issues [literary and ethical] in one way through the narrative of *Confessions* 1-9. He tackles them in another in his analytical writings, where he argues that our moral outlook arises from instinctual or emotional reactions which are specific to each of us, and from acts of will by which we connect ourselves to nonpersonal frameworks for ethical behaviour. He also maintains that our ethical choices are frequently made on the basis of habit, not through rational weighing of potential benefits or liabilities. They are implicit rather than explicit options for courses of action, and, to the degree that we habitually live a life that we would not consciously choose to live, we dwell in what Plato terms 'a zone of unlikeness.' The problem is how to bring about change in the pattern of such a narrative, or, to put the matter in Pauline terms, to get from an outsider's to an insider's story. Needless to say, the more the self is guided by authentic narrative, the more easily it can be detached from inauthentic temporal concerns. (1996:126)

Several anchoring items are constitutive of Stock's concern with Augustinian ethics and personology: the self, the narrative, and the "zone of unlikeness." A good, authentic conjunction, we can surmise, between the narrative (a semiotic-iconologic structure) and the self (in essence, a consciousness-bound structure in terms of a genuine will, reason, and rational, free choice) would yield a 'zone of likeness.' Both the 'zone of unlikeness' and the 'zone of likeness' essentially stipulate world-versions in which the self and a semiotic structure are rendered compossible. Ethical choices, effecting a 'zone of likeness,' are exercised through the guidance of an authentic (since, probably, authenticated and committed to) narrative, or such choices could revise the narrative itself through its internalization and fusion with the person. On the other hand, ethical failure of a person, her unconscious (choiceless, depersonalized) staying adrift, would enmesh a person into a 'zone of unlikeness,' and thus into a different world-version. Most probably, the zone of likeness itself, on an extended interpretation, could also be

conceptualized in terms of what Stock calls a "spiritual community" (1996:169).

But before turning to the iconic concept of 'unlikeness' in Augustine, let me relate to a number of points that Stock makes about self and narrative, points that largely coincide with this thesis' underlying assumptions (besides Bakhtin, also inspired by Stock's methodology) about person (and personology) and its semiotic structure (mainly narrative, iconology, doctrine, and ethics). In this respect, Stock's seminal statement for our interpretive purposes is one that intericonizes the self and its image, that is, narrative-cum-text:

> Augustine abandons reason [as a strictly personologic, non-semiotic agent-power] as his principal guide to self-understanding. The bishop knows that he is just an actor in his narrative [primarily in a semiotic and textual 'spiritual community']; he cannot pretend to be outside it, unaffected by its events. If this life has an author and an authority, they must be located beyond the reason's limits, as are the sources of his ethical imperatives. He experiences these forces in a mediated form in which reason offers logistical support for his thinking but provides no solutions in itself. [...]
>
> All this gives rise to a set of potential connections between lives and writings that is unparalleled in the literature of late antiquity. In Augustine's view, reading the self is like reading a body of writing, not because the soul is in any sense a text but because humans understand the ineffable in souls only as expressed in comprehensible images and words. Reason and authority are aspects of the literary understanding of the resulting narratives." (Stock 1996:212)

A stronger version of the conjunction between self and text would not err at all by stating that the self is also a 'textual structure,' meaning a semiotic, constantly mutable construct (personally or communally constructed). One only has to remember Augustine's own conversions and avatars from one textual allegiance or apostasy to another (from Cicero, Manichees, Academics, to Neoplatonics), basically from one "heresy" to another (not excluding also such 'anti-textual' crusades as his anti-Pelagianism), until the moment he was persuaded that Christian texts are the source of the truth, so much so that he was ready to abandon his own person and his own will unto the powers of a semiotic authority

(Scriptures).

In this sense Augustine practiced self-rewriting, almost self-reprogramming, on every occasion he encountered and was overpowered by a text-software (by, say, a *doctrina*). Surely, a text (having a mind behind it; see Stock 1996:41)[20] becomes reading (a semiotic and personologic encounter), but still it is far less than a self, than a person: "Reading is not a *cause* of conversion; it is a new *symbol* of conversion [of a personologic event]" (Stock 1996:39).

Stock's focus on the text-narrative-time continuum and its interface with the mind and the self has also a stronger version (if we are content in considering the previous text/person hypostatic unit as a weaker version). God, for instance, is iconized in Augustine as a sort of text, but a person-text, not a semiotic text: "The angels have no need of reading in order to know God's word. They see his face directly, and 'there they read, without the syllables that mark time,' whatever his will desires. 'They read, they choose, they love: they read forever, and what they read never passes away. In reading, they choose, and, in choosing they love. Their codex is never shut, their book never closed: for God is their text in himself and eternally so'" (Stock 1996:242; *Confessions*

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[20] "In accordance with ancient norms, the moment of insight is one of seeing (*uidare*, 3.5.2 [in *Confessions*]). But the inner vision also has a hermeneutic quality, since the 'unveiling' reveals to Augustine the inner sense of a text that is read. In the end, it is not the words that enlighten this reader, still less an official interpretation that is passed from one person to another. He 'enlightens' himself as he participates in a mind that is implanted in the literary work that is before him. Here it is the mind of human author; later, as he becomes acquainted with the Bible, it will be the mind of God." This thesis roughly underlies our interpretive strategy, according to which a person deposits her voice into the word-icon that carries it. We can also detect here that the main target for intentionality is a person behind the icon, not merely the icon (similarly to the prayer before an icon), since a person is iconologically mutable and thus polyiconic, and to the extent that it situates herself in an inter-mind space, she is polyphonic.

13.15.18).

Augustine's awareness of man's semiotic and iconologic predicament in this life cannot be better illustrated than by presenting a world-version where there is no need for thiswordly texts, for "syllables that mark time." The interpersonal, polyphonic, participation between God and angels is substantive, not semiotic. This is why, by contrast, this life is intelligible only as a text which subsists under the duress and precariousness of temporality:

> Life is a text, whose living is its reading; for, if the mind is the measure of time, the internalization of scripture can set up a narrative structure by which the self is guided from within. Lacking such guidance, the awareness of time is only an extension of the mind (*distentio...animi*, 11.26.20-21). And that is what is wrong with it. It is not a beneficial 'extending' or 'intending,' but rather a 'swelling.' (Stock 1996:239)

Stock's capturing of the concept *distentio* as meaning the mind's 'swelling,' and in opposition to the mind's extending-growing, or its intending/self-transcending, has significant consequences for the understanding of the Augustinian religious mind. The Augustinian *distentio*, on Stock's rendition of it, primarily appears to refer to an emptied, naked mind (which would resemble a time deprived of the substance of time, that is, of memory, perception-attention, and anticipation), a person without semiotic mediation or content (without the substance of narrative and scripture). In *Confessions* 11.29.2, Augustine equates his own life with *distentio*: *"Distentio est vita mea* [My life is but a distention-distraction]" (quoted in Stock 1996:406n207).

Distentio, then, would stand in conceptual tension with the word *intentio,* which yields the well-known personologic concept of 'intentionality,' as the mind's self-transcending into 'aboutness' that targets internal or external objects ('internalia' or 'externalia'). Intentionality of the mind, say, God as an object of love, is the aboutness of

the mind that shows 'what is good with it' (to reverse Stock's formula). In this world, intentionality is semiotically and naturally mediated. It is not excluded that the mind's *distentio*[21] could be also semiotically mediated (say, by a delusion), but in the wrong

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[21] In our context of narratology and literary interpretation, we should note that the Augustinian *distentio* is identified and placed in dialectical and aporetical contrast with *intentio* by Ricoeur: "Two features of the human soul are set in opposition to one another, features which the author [Augustine in *Confessions*, Book 11], with his marked taste for sonorous antithesis, coins *intentio* and *distentio animi*. It is this contrast that I shall later compare with that of *muthos* and *peripeteia* in Aristotle" (*Time and Narrative*, 1984, 1:5). The best understanding of *distentio* is given by the Augustinian interpretation of time in terms of the mind: "There are three times; a present of the past things, a present of the present things, and a present of the future things. Some such different times do exist in my mind, but nowhere else [*alibi*] that I can see. The present of past things is the memory; the present of present things is direct perception [*contuitus*; later the term will be *attentio,* which better denotes the contrast with *distentio*]; and the present of future things is expectation" (*Confessions* 11.20.26; quoted with commentary in Ricoeur 1984, 1:11). Augustine asserts that he sees that time is merely distention, though of what it is a distention he does not know: "I wonder whether it is an extension of the mind itself," says Augustine (*Confessions* 11.26.33). Ricoeur also tackles the origins of distention in Augustine and points out (relying on adequate bibliography, which there is no need to adduce here) that Christian writers like Gregory of Nyssa freely adapted the Plotinian terms *diastema-diastasis*, and that "the notion of *diastema* is used essentially as a criterion for distinguishing the divine trinity from creature. In God there is no *diastema* between the Father and the Son, no interval, no distance. Consequently *diastema* characterizes creation as such, particularly the interval between the Creator and the creature. [...] Even assuming that this adaptation of the Plotinian terminology by the Greek fathers was known to Augustine, his originality remains. He is the one to derive *distentio* from just the extension of the soul" (1984, 1:233-234n20).

In a strictly Slavic field of inquiry, the notion of *diastema* (based on Paulos Mar Gregorios' book: *Cosmic Man. The Divine Presence. The Theology of St. Gregory of Nyssa*, 1988) is originally and vigorously engaged by Charles Lock in a Bakhtinian context (see his "Bakhtin and the Tropes of Orthodoxy" in Felch and Cantino 2001:97-119). It was Lock's study that brought to my attention the concept of *diastema*, which consequently facilitated *diastema's* conjunction with Stock's version of the Augustinian *distentio* (as swelling of the mind into an undirected autonomy, that is, into the Fall-ready autonomy, yielding distentionality, not intentionality). In this context, what counts for our strategies of interpretation of the self's distention is that a person is a gap-ridden, discontinuous, diffused entity (both personologically and iconologically), torn between memory, perception (attention), and anticipation, and in perpetual need of intentionality that would collect it from dispersal and render it unified and meaningful both for ethical praxis and doctrine/text-based salvation (in Augustine, however, grace is the ultimate

direction, in the sense of 'swelling.' The mind's autonomous swelling is the mind's *distentionality* (as an analogue construction to intentionality), the mind's emptying itself of its personologic substance through an exclusively wrong orientation onto itself as self-sufficient or self-deranking entity (and thus independent of God and 'doctrine'). (To anticipate, *distentio* could become functional as personologic emptiness, while inanity, which we address later, would be semiotic, iconologic, or text/narrative emptiness.)[22]

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agent in the complete restoration of the self).

The notion of *diastema*, in our case, could be said to be applied by the Grand Inquisitor to Christ, whose nature and freedom just cannot be commensurate with the human nature (due to the radical heterogeneity of nature and thus to *diastema*). Human being, according to the Grand Inquisitor, therefore, is marked by an unbridgeable gap in its relation to God (if God exists at all, or else *diastema* would simply be a misleading mask of nothingness). The Grand Inquisitor's anthropology obviously ignores Christ's hypostatic unity, as a new form of bridging the *diastema* (interpersonally), and a new modality of suspending, if not overpowering, *distentio* (intrapersonally). In this sense, a self cannot avoid being concerned with both *diastema* and *distentio*. Overall, *diastema* and *distentio* are extremely helpful for the understanding of hypostasis. Hypostatic existence is a gapless existence (free of both *diastema* and distention), similarly to the gapless Trinitarian continuum (where there is no *diastema* interpersonally, on the level of the Trinity, and no *distentio* intrapersonally, inside one person-hypostasis). Thus, when we think of freedom-love-faith hypostatics, we think of their adiastemic and adistentional unity, of their homogeneous perichoretic (co-inherent) substance, which, it seems, also the Augustinian 'trinitarian' time could possess if its *distentio* were to be overcome. But, it seems, the sheer living in the region of dissimilitude could bring destabilization to time (forgetfulness, hopelessness) as well as to the hypostatic unity of freedom-love-faith or faith-love-hope.

[22] Personologic emptiness is emplotted by Dostoevsky in *Notes from the Underground* (5:99-179), where the Underground Man subjects himself consciously to mental asymptotic deactivation of his mind (the will, emotions, and reason) and thus to asymptotic suspension of intentionality (only suicide could deactivate a mind totally, as Ivan's moments of distentionality indicate), practicing in fact an entropic distentionality conducive ultimately to a world-version that could be called 'Entropia': "After all, the direct, legitimate, immediate fruit of consciousness is inertia, that is, conscious thumb twiddling. [...] Spite, of course, might overcome everything, all my doubts [...]. But what can be done if I do not even have spite? [...] Again, in consequence of those accursed laws of consciousness, my spite is subject to chemical disintegration [*khimicheskomu razlozheniiu*]. [...] The result – a soap-bubble and inertia" (5:108-109).

Religiously, distentionality would translate as 'pride' (roughly, here pride is fall into autonomy, or rebellion in and because of one's finitude, and consequently separation from the ontological, and iconological source). The rebellion against God then could have started as distentionality and not as intentionality, although it is quite likely that both

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The Underground Man is the best illustration of what we call personologic emptiness (the suspension-deactivation of the mind itself, where not even spite, as an emotion, is possible, let alone positive intentional action), which is usually encountered or exercised after an iconologic emptiness (an emptiness of a semiotically codified meaning - say, of the non-existence of God and immortality) takes hold of a person.

Let us quote Bakhtin's thoughts on the Underground Man as a person who is described as being denuded of virtues and character, of fixed features and delineations, being thus in flux and open-ended, or, as shown above, personologically emptiness-bound:

> The Underground Man not only dissolves in himself all possible fixed features [*tverdye cherty*, literally 'firm characteristics' pertaining to his *character*] of his person [*svoego oblika*], making them all the object of introspection [*refleksii*, reflexion], but in fact he no longer has any such traits at all, no fixed definitions [*tverdykh opredelenii*: firm delineations], there is nothing to say about him, he figures not as a person taken from life [*chelovek zhyzni* – literally: 'a man of real life'] but rather as the subject [*subiekt*, in the sense of 'sub-stance'] of consciousness and dream [*mechty*]. And for the author as well he is not a carrier of traits and qualities [*kachestv i svoistv*] that could have been neutral toward his self-consciousness and could have finalized him; no, what the author visualizes is precisely the hero's self-consciousness and the inescapable open-endedness, the vicious circle [*durnuiu beskonechnost'* – rather the Hegelian 'bad infinity'] of that self-consciousness. Thus the real-life characterological definition of the Underground Man and the artistic dominant [i.e., the visualization of self-consciousness] of his image are fused into one." (Bakhtin 1984:51)

In Bakhtin's text just quoted, *oblik* (*'svoego oblika'*) is appropriately rendered as 'person,' while usually the word *lichnost'* is equivalent to 'person.' *Lichnost'* is connected to *ob-lik* through their common root *lik* (face, appearance, image, icon, person). *Oblik* is a potent iconic, visual word. It is a compound formed by the verbal prefix *ob-* and the noun *lik* ('face, countenance'). Here *ob-* carries the sense of 'surface make-up', or comprehensive, full, finilized formedness of the face or appearance. Someone's *oblik* also denotes his cast of mind, and the expression *moral'nyi oblik* means 'moral make-up', 'moral character'. What counts here first of all is the meaning of the person as flesh and mind unity contained in the words *lik* and *oblik* (words central to the category of personologic iconicity). The dissolution of the *lik* and *oblik*, we might argue, represents the personologic deiconization of the Underground Man.

intentionality and distentionality enjoy or submit to a kind of hypostatic codependency or even natural coinherence. As far as I can see, Augustine might need intentionality to detect and target his own distentionality.

But Augustine is alarmed by his distensional (call it dysfunctional, deiconized) life in a very specific world, a world that he calls 'the region of dissimilitude"[23]: "And Thou didst beat back the infirmity of my sight, pouring forth upon me most strongly Thy beams of light, and I trembled with love and fear; and I found myself to be far off from Thee, in the region of dissimilarity [*regione dissimilitudinis*]. [...] And I said, 'Is Truth, therefore, nothing because it is neither diffused through space, finite, nor infinite? And Thou criedst to me from afar, 'Yea, verily, 'I am that I am'" (*Confessions* 7.10.16).

For Augustine, in the region of dissimilarity, the truth itself, quite similarly to time, is questioned in terms of nothingness, diffusion, finiteness, and infinity (and subjectively, it appears, in terms of '*distentio,*' of the personologic incapacity to apprehend it). The world is a region of dissimilarity on two counts: iconologically (one cannot cognitively grasp God and the world in valid semiotic terms) and personologically (due to the gap between God and an estranged world). But Augustine, although shaken iconologically, receives an ontic assurance from God-the-person, who claims for himself genuine existence and meaningful truth.

In *The Brothers Karamazov*, Ivan (as we shall see below) is the one who stages

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[23] On the extensive literature about *regio dissimilitudinis* see Stock 1996:332n266. In Stock's reading of Augustine, the entire semiotic realm that confronts the self (in terms of signs, texts, narratives, doctrines, readings, or interpretations) is closely related to the world of dissimilitude and thus estrangement: "Augustine thereby introduces a new idea into ancient interpretive theory – the notion that reading's ethical value can take place in a situation of perceived estrangement from truth" (1996:169).

the rebellion against God and his creation, he is the one who in his 'swelling' thinks of suicide as maximal distentionality and proud negation of a dissimilitude-ridden world. Here distentionality is enacted, paradoxically, as a suspension of any intentionality, as wanting nothingness. Obviously, Ivan finds himself in an Augustinian-like "region of dissimilitude" where very few things make any iconologic sense.

Now, in the region of dissimilitude life in distention (of the self) combined with truth-forlorness (iconologically) will yield a case of a precarious person. The ontic predicament of being consigned to (or thrown into) a deiconized world usually functions jointly with the semiotic ignorance and impairment. As a liminal case, we could envisage a world in which the self is threatened by ontic non-being (say, Ivan Karamazov's contemplating suicide) and ontic decay or vanishing of entities, and, on the semiotic side, the self could be threatened by semiotic inanity (as a degree-bound or theoretically absolute dissimilitude).

Below I am attempting to clarify in what sense the category of 'inanity' is useful in understanding Augustine, and through him Dostoevsky.

In *Soliloquies* Augustine, in a dialogue between himself and reason[24], starts off, at the advise of reason, by entreating the God of truth and of creation out of nothing to set

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[24] Augustine's *Soliloquies* is mentioned by Bakhtin in connection with his discussion of soliloquy as a genre: "Dreams, daydreams, insanity destroy the epic and tragic wholeness of a person and his fate: the possibilities of another person and another life are revealed to him, he loses his finalized quality and ceases to coincide with himself. [...] This destruction of the wholeness and finalized quality of a man is facilitated by the appearance of, in the menippea, of a dialogic relationship to one's own self (fraught with the possibility of split personality). Very interesting in this respect is Varro's Bimarcus,, that is, The double Marcus. [...] This dialogue between two Marcuses, that is between a person and his conscience, is in Varro presented comically, but nevertheless as a sort of artistic discovery it exercised crucial influence on the *Soliloquia* of Augustine. We should

him free from the region of dissimilitude and a life of distention (to use some images from *Confessions*):

> "God, Framer of the universe, grant me first rightly to invoke Thee; then to show myself worthy to be heard by Thee; lastly, deign to set me free [*postremo ut liberes*]. [...] God, who out of nothing [*de nihilo*], hast created this world, which the eyes perceive to be the most beautiful. God, who to the few that flee for refuge to that which truly is, showest evil to be nothing [*ostendis malum nihil esse*]" (*Soliloquies* 1, 2).

Liberation is one of the constant motifs, the perpetual rhetorical shifter that governs Augustinian's discourse in his entire oeuvre. Here in this life Augustine strives to be liberated from pride and distention (personologically) and from error and dissimilitude (semiotically), and, ultimately Augustine clings to a hope that is eloquent about his total liberation from the ontic and iconologic finitudes of thisworldly life. In this life, Augustine faces his preceding semiotic and iconologic self in terms of a prodigal son who has been alienated by fallacies (and fallacies are iconologic entities):

> "O Lord, most merciful Father receive, I pray, Thy fugitive; enough already, surely, have I been punished, long enough have I served Thine enemies, [...] *long enough have I been a sport of fallacies* [emphasis added; *satis fuerim fallaciarum ludibrium*]. Receive me fleeing from these, Thy house-born servant, for did not these receive me, though another Master's, when I was fleeing from Thee? To Thee I feel I must return: I knock; may Thy door be opened to me; teach me the way to Thee. *Nothing else have I than the will* [emphasis added; *Nihil aliud habeo quam voluntatem*]: nothing else do I know than that fleeting and falling things are

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mention in passing that Dostoevsky too, when representing the phenomenon of the double, always preserved alongside the tragic element of the comic as well (in *The Double*, and in Ivan Karamazov's conversation with the devil)" (1984:116-117).

The Augustinian dialogic tradition, illustrated in the benefic split of Augustine into hypostases of the self and reason (as fleshed out in *Soliloquies*), are illuminating genre precursors and anticipators of Dostoevskian iconology and hypostatics. The Grand Inquisitor's monologue is constructed according to the dialogic model of a self with his conscience (here personified as Christ). In Dostoevsky, the dialogue, in its strongest versions, is emplotted as a phenomenon (called above by Bakhtin 'the phenomenon of the double') of personologic splitting of the self, where two persons inhabit one nature, as a pathologic inversion of hypostatic union (defined as two natures in one person). The most powerful narrative of such an inversion we encounter in the chapter "The Devil," which we address when treating inanity in Dostoevsky.

> to be spurned, fixed and everlasting things to be sought. This I do, Father, because this alone I know, but from what quarter to approach Thee I do not know. Do Thou instruct me, show me, give me my provision for the way. If it is by faith that those find Thee, who take refuge with Thee then grant faith: if by virtue, virtue: if by knowledge, knowledge. Augment in me, faith, hope, and charity. O goodness of Thine, singular and most to be admired!" (*Soliloquies* 1, 5)

Augustine, as a God-forsaken and errant self, perceives himself as being denuded into "nothing else than the will," a person emptied of all previous semiotic content (called malicious fallacies). Starting as if from scratch in his restoration of the self, Augustine wants to know "God and the soul [and] nothing [more] whatever" as he states in response to his dialogic reason (*Soliloquies* 1, 7).

Augustine enumerates all the possible contents that could restart and restore (as if from sickness and emptiness) his self: freedom, virtue, knowledge, faith, hope, and charity (love). All these content-icons are both semiotic and personologic (from the perspective of nature, in *Soliloquies* [1, 1] *Augustine* also prays for health which relates to his natural power). One cannot but notice that already in *Soliloquies* (387 AD) Augustine grants a locus of preeminence to the three theological virtues (faith, hope, and love) which will be fully addressed in his *Enchiridion* (421-423 AD). In *Soliloquies* the three virtues are still connected to Reason (as seeing and understanding), while in the *Enchiridion* they will be connected to worship (for the Grand Inquisitor, worship is a component of the Third Temptation, being an icon-imposture of the Great Spirit of non-being). In pursuing the healing of the soul, Reason asserts the power of faith, hope, and love in the restoration of the self:

> "Now I, Reason, am that in the mind, which the act of looking is in the eyes. For to have eyes is not the same as to look; nor again to look the same as to see. Therefore the soul has need of three distinct things: to have eyes, such as it can use to good advantage, to look, and to see. Sound eyes, that means the mind pure from all stain of the body, that is, now remote and purged from the lusts of mortal

> things: which, in the first condition, nothing else accomplishes for her than Faith. For what cannot yet be shown forth to her stained and languishing with sins, because, unless sound, she cannot see, if she does not believe that otherwise she will not see, she gives no heed to her health. But what if she believes that the case stands as I say, and that, if she is to see at all, she can only see on these terms, but despairs of being healed; does she not utterly condemn herself and cast herself away, refusing to comply with the prescriptions of the physician? A. Beyond doubt, above all because by sickness remedies must needs be felt as severe. R. Then Hope must be added to Faith. A. So I believe. R. Moreover, if she both believes that the case stands so, and hopes that she could be healed, yet loves not, desires not the promised light itself, and thinks that she ought meanwhile to be content with her darkness, which now, by use, has become pleasant to her; does she not none the less reject the physician? A. Beyond doubt. R. Therefore Charity must needs make a third. A. Nothing so needful. R. Without these three things therefore no mind is healed, so that it can see, that is, understand its God." (*Soliloquies* 1, 12)

Augustine here counts the three theological virtues as being foundational for a new self, Reason or any of the classical virtues could ensue only as a consequence of this reconnection to God:

> "When therefore the mind has come to have sound eyes, what next? A. That she look. R. The mind's act of looking is Reason; but because it does not follow that every one who looks sees, a right and perfect act of looking, that is, one followed by vision, is called Virtue; for Virtue is either right or perfect Reason. But even the power of vision, though the eyes be now healed, has not force to turn them to the light, unless these three things abide. Faith, whereby the soul believes that thing, to which she is asked to turn her gaze, is of such sort, that being seen it will give blessedness; Hope, whereby the mind judges that if she looks attentively, she will see; Charity, whereby she desires to see and to be filled with the enjoyment of the sight. The attentive view is now followed by the very vision of God, which is the end of looking; not because the power of beholding ceases, but because it has nothing further to which it can turn itself: and this is the truly perfect virtue, Virtue arriving at its end, which is followed by the life of blessedness. Now this vision itself is that apprehension which is in the soul, compounded of the apprehending subject and of that which is apprehended: as in like manner seeing with the eyes results from the conjunction of the sense and the object of sense, either of which being withdrawn, seeing becomes impossible." (*Soliloquies* 1, 13)

Paradoxically, this is what it means to be set free: to return to God. But man is not free as yet. He is a member of two basic orders in this life: the ontic order and the iconic order, both interpretable in terms of the True. In the ontic order man is beset by mutability,

perishing, and non-being, in the iconic order he is beset by error, dissimilitude, and falsehood. In *Soliloquies* Augustine is uncannily modern or actual in addressing the iconic order of the True:

> "Define therefore the True. A. That is true which is so as it appears to the knower, if he will and can know. R. That therefore will not be true which no one can know? Then, if that is false which seems otherwise than it is; how if to one this stone should seem a stone, to another wood? will the same thing be both false and true? A. That former position disturbs me more, how, if anything cannot be known, it results from that that it is not true. For as to this, that one thing is both true and false, I do not much care. For I see one thing, compared with diverse things, to be both greater and smaller. From which it results, that nothing is more or less of itself. For these are terms of comparison. R. But if you say that nothing is true of itself, do you not fear the inference, that nothing is of itself? For whereby this is wood, thereby is it also true wood. Nor can it be, that of itself, that is, without a knower, it should be wood, and should not be true wood. A. Therefore thus I say and so I define, nor do I fear lest my definition be disapproved on the ground of excessive brevity: for to me that seems to be true which is. R. Nothing then will be false, because whatever is, is true." (*Soliloquies* 2, 8)

Above Augustine has just defined truth in terms of being, that is the identity of 'is' with 'true,' even if there is no knower of this identity or distinction. But once falsehood is introduced, its status seems to be knower-dependent. Whatever the status of the True, it cannot be defined without the concept of falsehood and similitude (iconicity). In what follows Augustine presents his own take on what we call 'iconicity':

> "R. [...] What is falsity? A. I wonder if there will turn out to be anything, except what is not so as it seems. R. Give heed rather, and let us first question the senses themselves. For certainly what the eyes see, is not called false, unless it have some similitude of the true [*similitudinem veri*]. For instance, a man whom we see in sleep, is not indeed a true man, but false, by this very fact that he has the similitude of a true one [*eo ipso quod habet verisimilitudinem*] . For who, seeing a dog, would have a right to say that he had dreamed of a man? Therefore too that is thereby a false dog, that it is like a true one [*similis vero est*] . A. It is as thou sayest. R. And moreover, if any one waking should see a horse and think he saw a man, is he not hereby misled, that there appears to him some similitude of a man [*hominis similitudo*]? For if nothing should appear to him except the form of a horse, he cannot think that he sees a man. A. I fully concede this. R. We call that also a false tree which we see in a picture, and a false face which is reflected from

> a mirror, and a false motion of buildings to men that are sailing from them, and a false break in the oar when dipped, for no other reason than the verisimilitude in all these things. A. True. R. So we make mistakes between twins, so between eggs, so between seals stamped by one ring, and other such things. A. I follow and agree to all. R. Therefore that similitude of things which pertains to the eyes, is the mother of falsity. A. I cannot deny it." (*Soliloquies* 2, 10)

Certainly, this is a shrewd dialogue and Augustine's answer will have to be amended in its unavoidable iconic partiality:

> "A. When I consider that that which we call false has both something like and something unlike the true, I am not able to make out on which side it chiefly merits the name of false. For if I say: on the side on which it is unlike, there will be nothing which cannot be called false: for there is nothing which is not dissimilar to some thing, which we concede to be true. And again, if I shall say, that it is to be called false on that side on which it is similar; not only will those eggs cry out against us which are true on the very ground of their excessive similarity, but even so I shall not escape from his grasp who may compel me to confess that all things are false because I cannot deny that all things are on some side or other similar to each other. But suppose me not afraid to give this answer, that likeness and unlikeness alike give a right to call anything false; what way of escape wilt thou give me?" (*Soliloquies* 2, 15)

As we can see, iconologic agonizing is extremely instructive in Augustine. Augustine is relentless in his iconologic reasoning, and there could be no doubt that his interrogative impetus and depth are powered by genuine existential and soteriologic concerns. Man lives under a strange predicament in this region of dissimilitude: in order to state something true, he has no choice but to struggle with the semiotic convention of 'falsehood.' Nowhere is this status of entities illustrated better than in literature as fiction. The iconology of fiction does not escape Augustine's attention:

> "*R.* What think you, unless that all these things are in certain aspects true, by this very thing that they are in certain aspects false, and that for their quality of truth this alone avails them, that they are false in another regard? Whence to that which they either will or ought to be, they in no wise attain, if they avoid being false. For how could he whom I have mentioned have been a true tragedian, had he been unwilling to be a false Hector, a false Andromache, a false Hercules, and innumerable other things? or how would a picture, for instance, be a true picture,

> unless it were a false horse? Or how could there be in a mirror a true image of a man, if it were not a false man? Wherefore, if it avails some things that they be somewhat false in order that they may be somewhat true; why do we so greatly dread falsity, and seek truth as the greatest good? *A.* I know not, and I greatly marvel, unless because in these examples I see nothing worthy of imitation. For not as actors, or specular reflections, or Myron's brazen cows, ought we, in order that we may be true in some character of our own, to be outlined and accommodated to the personation of another; but to seek that truth, which is not, as if laid out on a bifronted and self-repugnant plan, false on one side that it may be true on the other. *R.* High and Divine are the things which thou requirest. Yet if we shall have found them, shall we not confess that of these things is Truth itself made up, and as it were brought into being from their fusion--Truth, from which every thing derives its name which in any way is called true? A. I yield no unwilling assent. (*Soliloquies* 2, 18)

One should not forget that Augustine's iconology is developed with the purpose of healing of the soul. Ontic and iconic hierarchies reflecting, respectively, degrees of being and meaning (of truth) flank the soul in its journey towards the fullness of being and meaning, that is God. Sure, in the anagogy of ontic and iconic hierarchy the mind encounters disciplines (say rhetoric or grammar) to which one barely can ascribe, if at all, any falsehood. Overall, Augustine's iconology is underpinned by his ontology: if every being is threatened by non-being, so every semiotic entity could come under the threat from falsehood (which we may call the threat of deiconization). Iconologically, semiotic entities by their ontic constitution contain the attributes of both similitude and dissimilitude, as, ontologically, every entity is a mixture of being and non-being. A more felicitous iconologic definition of falsehood, therefore, is the one that accounts not only for falsehood but also for non-being, that is, when the iconic is stated in terms of the ontic:

> "Is that not false which is accommodated to the similitude of anything [*quod ad similitudinem alicujus accommodatum est*], yet it is not the likeness [*simile*] of which it appears? [...] A. But yet that is commonly called false, which is far removed from the similitude of the true [*Sed tamen solet falsum dici, etiam quod a verisimilitudine longe abest*]. R. Who denies it? But yet because it implies some

> imitation [*imitationem*] of the true. A. How? For when it is said, that Medea flew away with winged snakes harnessed to her car, that thing on no side imitates truth; inasmuch as the thing is naught, nor can that thing imitate aught, when itself is absolutely nothing [*nec imitari aliquid possit ea res que omnino sit*]. R. You say right; but you do not note that that thing which is absolutely nothing [*eam rem que omnino nulla sit*], cannot even be called false. For if it is false, it is: if it is not, it is not false [*Si enim falsum est, est: si non est, non est falsum*]. A. Shall we not then say that monstrous story of Medea is false? R. Assuredly not; for if it is false, how is it a monstrous story [*nam si falsum est, quomodo monstrum est*]? [...] A. I now assent: [...] whatever we call false is not rightly so called, unless it have an imitation of something true [*quidquid falsum dicimus non recte dici, nisi habeat veri alicujus imitationem*]." (*Soliloquies* 2, 29)

But, finally, it is the iconologic status of the soul which requires an answer: does the truth and immortality pertain to the soul? Is the truth itself immortal? (The questions of truth and immortality torment Ivan Karamazov also).

After considering whether the Truth always abides, or is merely the theory of argumentation, Augustine masterfully settles in favor of the eternity of the Truth: "R. From this truth, as I remember, that Truth cannot perish, we have concluded, that not only if the whole world should perish, but even if Truth itself should, it will still be true that both the world and Truth have perished. Now there is nothing true without truth: in no wise therefore does Truth perish. A. I acknowledge all this, and shall be greatly surprised if it turns out false" (*Soliloquies* 2, 28).

Once the truth of immortality about the Truth becomes irrefutable or at least defensible, it follows that something that contains the Truth, even in the self-defeating or absurd formulation that it is true that there is no Truth, must also be immortal. And this could be called the order of immortality to which man is called to cling by hope.

There appears a curious concept in Augustine's *Soliloquies* that is worth positioning within the comparative framework of iconology and ontology, the concept of inanity:

> "R. You send us a long journey, but I will use all compendious speed. For certainly what you call the Inane is one thing, what you call Truth another [*Certe enim aliud est quod inane appellas, aliud quod veritatem*]. A. Widely diverse, indeed. For what more inane than I, if I think Truth anything inane, or so greatly seek after aught inane [*Quid enim me inanius, si veritatem inane aliquid puto, aut tantopere aliquid inane appeto*]? For what else than Truth do I desire to find? R. Therefore perchance you grant this too, that nothing is true which does not by Truth come to be true. A. This became manifest at an early stage. R. Do you doubt that nothing is inane except the Inane itself, or certainly that a body is not inane [*Num dubitas nihil esse inane praeter ipsum inane, aut certe corpus*]? A. I do not doubt it at all. R. I suppose therefore, you believe that Truth is some sort of body. A. In no wise. R. What is a body? A: I know not; no matter: for I think thou knowest that even that inane, if it is inane, is more completely so where there is no body [speaking ontically]. R. This assuredly is plain. A. Why then do we delay? R. Does it then seem to thee either that Truth made the inane [*An tibi aut veritas videtur fecisse inane*], or that there is anything true where Truth is not [*aut aliquid verum esse ubi veritas not sit*]? A. Neither seems true. R. The inane therefore is not true [*non est ergo inane verum*], because neither could it become inane by that which is not inane [*quia neque ab eo quod inane est, inane fieri potest*]: and it is manifest that what is void of truth is not true [*et quod veritate caret, verum non esse manifestum est*]; and, in fine, that very thing which is called inane [*et omnino ipsum quod inane dicitur*], is so called because it is nothing [*ex eo quod nihil sit dicitur*]. How therefore can that be true which is not [*Quomodo igitur potest verum esse quod non est*]? Or how can that be which is absolutely nothing [*aut quomodo potest esse quod penitus nihil est*] ? A. Well then, let us desert the inane as being inane [*Age nunc inane tanquam inane deseramus*]." (*Soliloquies* 2, 31)

The inane becomes a concept that, in its absolute meaning, would mean a complete emptiness of truth and meaning. But the complete emptiness of anything simply equates with nothingness (*nihil*). Complete emptiness, complete inanity would be complete nothingness. Thus, there is no complete emptiness of meaning, since an ultimate meaning would still arise from the fact that it would be true that every ontic entity vanished. That is, if anything disappears, if any entity vanishes from existence, the truth of that very event will survive any entity. The ontology of truth survives the ontology of the created entity. But even if the truth itself were to disappear, Augustine assures us, the truth of its

disappearance would still perdure: hence truth cannot disappear (the argument is a form of reductio ad absurdum).

What we propose, following Augustine's suggestions, is that inanity should be thought in conjunction with 'falsehood' (as a generic term for any failure of meaning and truth), where inanity is the semiotic counterpart of the ontic nonbeing. Inanity vitiates semiotic entities (in terms of falsehood) while nonbeing vitiates ontic entities (in terms of evil). We therefore use the term inanity in its relative, degree-dependent, vitiation or usurpation of meaning, since absolute inanity is straightforwardly equatable with pure *nihil*-nothingness (on the distinction between relative nonbeing and absolute nothingness it would be possible to elaborate in a section entitled "Ontic order in Augustine and Dostoevsky").[25] Ontic evil in Augustine, as the well-known privation of being, is that

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[25] It is decisive to understand that the notion of being and nothingness is directly connected with both iconology and iconography. In his analysis of iconography, Florensky is very receptive to the distinction between absolute nothingness (Rus.: *nichto*, Gr. *to ouk on*; Lat.: *nihil*) and relative nothingness, nonbeing (Rus.: *nebytie, ne sushchee*; Gr.: *to me on*), ontic concepts that are underlying the understanding of the genesis of icon:

> Western rationalism believes that it can create something – indeed everything – from this non-existence [absolute nothingness, oukonic non-existence, *nihil*]. But the ontology of the East believes otherwise, saying that *ex nihilo nihil* and that something - again, everything – is created by the Real One, by the Creator. In the iconpainting process, the golden color of the superqualitative existence first *surrounds* the areas that will become the figures, manifesting them as possibilities to be transfigured so that the abstract non-existents [*otvlechennoie nichto*; that is *ouk on*, abstract *nihil*] become concrete non-existents [*konkretnoie nichto*; that is *me on*]; i.e., through the gold, the figures become potentialities. These potentialities are no longer abstract, but they do not yet have distinct qualities, although each of them is a possibility of not any but of some concrete quality. *To ouk on* (the non-existent [*ne suschestvuiushchee*]) has become *to me on* (nonbeing, the potential [*stalo ne-sushchym*]). (*Iconostasis*, 1996:138)

kind of nonbeing that corrodes the wholesomeness of any entity, detracting thus from its natural power. (The fall of man is primarily an ontic fall, a diminution of his nature and his power, and therefore the deranking of nature entails cognitive incapacitation, that is threat from doubt, confusion, falsehoods, and dissimilitude, that is - iconologic disorder, deiconization). Thus while being is active conjointly with its 'hypostatic' counterpart, nonbeing, truth is intelligible only in its negative synergy with inanity, as overcoming of dissimilitude and deiconization, and derivatively of both nonbeing and nothingness (we could iconize these entities in a foundational iconostasis: truth/inanity and being/nonbeing). In Augustine, it is the person, the self, or the mind, that has to choreograph its earthly journey between the powers of ontic, nature-based, deficiency (due to sin and evil) and iconologic, cognitive incapacitation. And the personologic dimension of existence in Augustine is a precarious, mutable construct that erects its edifice on the substance of nonbeing-ridden ontology and inanity-ridden iconology. It is self-evident now why Augustine clings to a single hope, according to which God's grace (read 'power') will salvifically upgrade our person into a new ontology of nature and a new iconology of knowledge. Augustine envisages the possibility of such a state of completeness and thus happiness only in the Kingdom of God (for further elaboration on the theme, see the section 'Freedom, Hope, and Happiness").

As we can see, ontic entities are derived from nothingness, by exclusive power of God. In this sense, the icon is merely an imitation of Creation, as if starting from absolute nothingness, and then going through relative nonbeing into full-blown figuration.

b) Inanity in Dostoevsky

Inanity, as we have seen in Augustine, is related to truth, sense, and meaning, and, analogously to nonbeing's ontic corrosiveness, it expresses the vitiation of semiotic entities. Now it is clear that man, as a tri-hypostatic composite (nature, person, and icon), cannot be integrally conceived without his semiotic dimension (generically called by us 'iconology,' but also, and why not, 'software' or 'doctrine,' or 'logos'). For Ivan, for instance, beliefs in God and immortality and for Augustine any of his successive avatars through quite a number of religious and philosophical doctrines (the main source of his lamenting about the 'region of dissimilitude'), constitute the semiotic-iconologic component of a person. One of the features of this component consists in its mutability and conventionality, and, in being so, it renders a person iconologically (that is, as consciousness of her self-identity) precarious and semiotically unstable, and thus subject to ideology or idolatry (a cognitive-semiotic fact, supremely mastered by the Grand Inquisitor).

Let us now identify some instances of 'inanity' in *The Brothers Karamazov*. In the novel, many plot and dialogic situations could be read with significant benefit from the perspective of iconologic inanity. We encounter inanity instantiations in Ivan's rebellion against God's creation and its meaninglessness, in Ivan's nightmare and his encounter with the devil, or in Zosima's death and the corruption of his body. Basically, no fictional person can escape the crucial moments of life that are ranked and defined by inanity (both Dmitri and Smerdiakov, for instance, face the meaning-depriving of

'everything is permitted' or of crime and suicide). All such moments are moments of crisis, which test the status of semiotic structures that make sense of what a person is.

In Book 5 ('Pro and Contra'), chapter 4 ('Rebellion') Ivan tries to make sense of children's suffering. He embarks on a lengthy diatribe against the disorder of this world and meaninglessness of its suffering, and at the end of his argumentation, he tests Alyosha's capacity for outrage, as opposed to forgiveness, against the villains who committed cruelties against children:

> "I believe the general was later declared incompetent to administer his estates. Well ... what to do with him? Shoot him? Shoot him for our moral satisfaction? Speak, Alyoshka! "
> "Shoot him!" Alyosha said softly, looking up at his brother with a sort of pale, twisted smile.
> "Bravo!" Ivan yelled in a sort of rapture. "If even you say so, then ...A fine monk [*skhimnik*] you are! See what a little devil [*besenok*] is sitting in your heart, Alyoshka Karamazov!"
> "What I said is absurd [*nelepost'*], but..."
> "That's just it, that 'but...,'" Ivan was shouting. "I tell you, novice [*poslushnik*], that absurdities [*neleposti*][26] are all too necessary on earth. The world stands on absurdities [*na nelepostiakh mir stoit*], and without them perhaps nothing at all [*sovsem nichego*] would happen [*proizoshlo*][27]. We know what we know!"
> "What do you know?"
> "I don't understand anything," Ivan went on as if in delirium [*v bredu*][28], "and I no longer want to understand [*ponimat'*] anything. I want to stick to the fact. I

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[26] *Nelepost'* indicates senselessness, emptiness of meaning, nonsense. Etymologically, *nelepost'* carries an iconologic sense also, since *lepyi* means 'seemly,' 'beautiful' (see Dal' 1978, 2:278). *Nelepost'* therefore indicates a semiotic and iconologic incoherence, absence of beauty-meaning.

[27] Nothing would take place, occur, originate, and develop without absurdities and inanities. Here we see that events that take place are not natural or physical, but events caused by intentional actions of persons. Such actions are translated and codified into semiotic systems that make sense of them. Alyosha's reaction subverts his own doctrinal 'software,' his system of 'logos,' his beliefs. Ivan here anticipates the devil's statements in Ivan's nightmare that the devil's role in this world is to make things happen in order to avoid an immutable, eternalized 'hosanna' directed towards God.

> made up my mind long ago not to understand. If I wanted to understand something, I' would immediately have to betray the fact, but I've made up my mind to stick to the fact..."
>
> "Why are you testing [*ispytuiesh*][29] me?" Alyosha exclaimed with a rueful strain.
>
> "Will you finally tell me?"
>
> "Of course I'll tell you, that's just what I've been leading up to. You are dear to me, I don't want to let you slip, and I won't give you up to your Zosima." (243; 14:221-222)

Ivan's confession of epistemic defeat, his iconologic incapacity to produce a meaningful configuration of fact and understanding ('I do not understand anything ... I made up my

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[28] The words '*v bredu*' (in a delirium) and *koshmar* (nightmare) attach Ivan to the problematic of semiotic instability, effected in a person despite his autonomy and will. The states of dream, delirium, and nightmare (endowed with potent iconologic force by Dostoevsky) are semiotic processes (we ignore here the physiological infrastructure or causality, since we are guided by what is the dominant-*dominanta*) in which a person is sidelined or not in control of associations and dissociations, hybridizations and metamorphoses of meanings and images. Such uncontrollable processes are scandalous for a person.

[29] In the novel *ispytyvat'* (to test) a person coalesces its meaning with *iskushat'* (to tempt) and *soblazniat'* (to lure, to scandalize). These terms constitute modalities of interpersonal dialogue, but as we can see, their negative power requires a religious, that is radical, liminal confrontation of consciousnesses, similar to Bakhtin's 'threshold dialogue': "In the Socratic dialogue, the plot situation of the dialogue is sometimes utilized alongside anacrisis, or the provocation of the word by the word [and not by plot situation as in Menippean satire], for the same purpose [of the ideological event of seeking and testing truth]. [...] Of course, the freedom to create extraordinary situations, situations provoking a profound word, are very limited in the Socratic dialogue, due to the historical and memoirist nature of the genre (in its literary stage). Nevertheless we can speak of the birth, even on this soil, of a special type of 'dialogue on the threshold [*dialog na poroge*]' (*Schwellendialog*), which became widespread in Hellenistic and Roman literature and, ultimately, in the literature of the Renaissance and Reformation. In the Socratic dialogue the idea is organically combined with the image of a person, its carrier (Socrates and other essential participants in dialogue). The dialogic testing [*dialogicheskoe ispytanie*] of the idea is simultaneously also the testing of the person [*cheloveka*] who represents it. [...] It must be emphasized, however, that in contrast to *the image of an idea* [*obraz idei*] in Dostoevsky, the image of an idea in the Socratic dialogue is of a *syncretic* sort [image is not differentiated from concept]" (1984:111-112). We might point here to the fact that Bakhtin's historical genre analysis of Dostoevsky (starting with the Greek and Hellenistic periods) partially inspired our dialogic analysis of religious ideas in Augustine and Dostoevsky.

mind long ago not to understand ... If I wanted to understand something, I would immediately have to betray the fact') unveil an inanity condition, which is a semiotic condition of emptiness, where facts, though available, are divorced from any possible meaning and therefore from person. 'The world stands on absurdities' (similar to religious assertions that the world lies in sin) means that the world runs on inanities. If there is an ontically nihilating attitude, poised on destruction (primarily idolized by the Great Spirit of nonbeing), there is, Ivan seems to be saying, also a semiotically nihilistic attitude eager to empty the world of any meaning. If suffering is an ontic event, its senselessness arrests any meaning-making, instituting therefore the rule of inanity, of emptiness of meaning. What remains to be done in conditions of inanity is explicitly paraded by the Grand Inquisitor: there are three powers that can obviate meaninglessness and emptiness (for the Grand Inquisitor, Christ's appearance itself is empty, since powerless to effect any positive, salvific meaning): miracle, mystery and authority. These powers are manipulative iconologic (semiotic, ideological, logos) constructs based on lies and imposture, and Ivan's conatus here and elsewhere in the novel is one of rebellion against, as he perceives them, religious and ethical inanities (vacuous or vacatable doctrines, beliefs, commitments, duties). We here as elsewhere only analytically separate iconologic powers from purely political (personologic) powers or natural powers. It is a premise of this study that all three kinds of powers usually operate jointly if not hypostatically. One should not forget, however, that both fictionality and reality afford situations where any power can function independently (for instance dreams, or nightmares)

Let us now turn to the next most significant illustration of inanity in the novel, to a nightmare. It is contained in Book 11 ('Brother Ivan Fyodorovich'), chapter 9 ('The Devil [*Chert*]. Ivan Fyodorovich's Nightmare'). Ivan's encounter with the devil, being a nightmare, right from its very beginning thematizes the notion of the dream:

> [The devil to Ivan:] "But you're not listening. You know, you seem rather out of sorts [*ne po sebe*: not yourself] tonight," the gentleman[30] paused for a moment. "I know you went to see that doctor yesterday ... well, how is your health? What did the doctor say?"
>
> "Fool [*durak*]!" snapped Ivan.
>
> "And aren't you a smart one! So you're abusing me again? I'm just asking, not really out of sympathy. You don't have to answer. And now this rheumatism's come back..."
>
> "Fool," Ivan repeated.
>
> "You keep saying the same thing, but I caught such rheumatism last year that I still remember it."
>
> "The devil with rheumatism?"
>
> "Why not, if I sometimes become incarnate [*voploshchaius'*]? Once incarnate, I accept the consequences. Satan *sum et nihil humanum a me alienum puto.*'"
>
> "How's that? Satan *sum et nihil humanum*[31]...not too bad for the devil! "
>
> "I'm glad I've finally pleased you."
>
> "And you didn't get that from me," Ivan suddenly stopped as if in amazement, "that never entered my head - how strange..."
>
> "*C'est de nouveau, n'est-ce pas*? This time I'll be honest and explain to you. Listen: in dreams [*v snakh*] and especially in nightmares [*v koshmarakh*], well, let's say as a result of indigestion or whatever, a man sometimes sees such artistic dreams[32], such complex and real actuality, such events, or even a whole world of

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[30] Satan merely chooses to appear as a normal 'gentleman,' as a meager devil (*chert*). This 'devil' was present at the resurrection, and at that moment had the power, he claims, to end the world events; he also claims to have been the one who tempted Job.

[31] The devil practices incarnation in imitation of Christ, only that it is a parodic, deiconized, recurrent incarnation. The devil's becoming fully man is a parody on Christ's total humanity, so that nothing human is alien to the devil (*nihil humanum a me alienum puto*: nothing human is alien to me). One can think of the devil, with some iconological imagination, in terms of legion, as one thinks of Christ in terms of the Trinity. The nightmare facilitates the impostorial or parodic transfer of Christ's human qualities onto the devil.

[32] In his *Confessions*, for instance, Augustine, who was obsessed with the power of erotic libido, could not reconcile himself to the fact that erotic dreams with unpleasant nocturnal

> events, woven into such a plot, with such unexpected details, beginning from your highest manifestations down to the last shirt button, as I swear even Leo Tolstoy couldn't invent; and, by the way, it's not writers who occasionally see such dreams, but quite the most ordinary people, officials, journalists, priests ... There's even a whole problem concerning this: one government minister even confessed to me himself that all his best ideas come to him when he's asleep. Well, and so it is now. Though I am your hallucination, even so, as in a nightmare, I say original things, such as have never entered your head before, so that I'm not repeating your thoughts at all, and yet I am merely your nightmare and nothing more."
>
> "You are lying. Your goal is precisely to convince me that you are in yourself and are not my nightmare, and so now you yourself assert that you're a dream." (639; 15:74)

Ivan rebels against the power of nightmares and dreams, against their inanity. Now we know from Augustine that falsehood itself is impossible and unsustainable without a substratum of truth or being. Falsehood, nightmare, and dream have a modality of existence, which could be called parasitic (Ivan points out to the devil that the devil himself is merely an expression of Ivan's own worst personal features). One can always detect a semiotic infrastructure on which inanity feeds: there is no absolute, unqualified inanity.

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consequences would overpower or totally ignore his reason and his will: "Verily, Thou commandest that I should be continent from the 'lust [*concupiscentia*] of the flesh, and the lust of the eye, and the pride [*ambitione*] of life' [1 John 2:16]. [...] But there still exists in my memory – of which I have spoken much – the images of such things as my habits had fixed there; and these rush into my thoughts, though strengthless, when I am awake; but in sleep they do so not only so as to give pleasure [*delectationem*], but even to obtain consent, and what very nearly resembles reality [*factumque simillimum*]. Yea, to such an extent prevails the illusion of the image, both in my soul and in my flesh, that the false persuade me, when sleeping, unto that which the true are not able when waking. Am I not myself [*ego non sum*] at that time, O Lord my God? And there is yet so much difference between myself and myself, in that instant wherein I pass back from waking to sleeping, or return from sleeping to waking! Where then is the reason [*ratio*] which when waking resists such suggestions?" (10.30.41). It is offensive to Augustine's religious dignity that the autonomy or supremacy of his person's reason is subverted or even overpowered by both the autonomy of nature (*concupiscentia*) and the autonomy of iconology (false images). Ivan is no less scandalized by his demonic nightmares than Augustine is by his uncontrollable, lust-driven dreams.

Let us now bring another example, in which the devil elaborates on his own nightmarish nature:

> 'You seem to take me decidedly for some gray-haired Khlestakov, and yet my fate is far more serious. By some pre-temporal assignment, which I have never been able to figure out, I am appointed 'to negate [*otritsat'*],' whereas I am sincerely kind [*dobr*: good] and totally unable [*ne sposoben*] to negate.[33] No, they say, go and negate, without negation there will be no criticism, and what sort of journal has no 'criticism section'? Without criticism, there would be nothing but 'Hosannah.' But 'Hosannah' alone is not enough for life, it is necessary that this 'Hosannah' pass through the crucible of doubt [*gornilo somnenii*], and so on, in the same vein. I don't meddle with any of that, by the way, I didn't create it [*ne ia sotvoril*], and I can't answer for it. So they chose themselves a scapegoat, they made me write for the criticism section, and life came about. We understand this comedy: I, for instance, demand [*trebuiu*] simply and directly that I be destroyed [*unichtozhenia*]. No, they say, live, because without you there would be nothing. If everything on earth were sensible [*blagorazumno*][34], nothing would happen. Without you there would be no events, and there must be events. And so I serve grudgingly, for the sake of events, and I do the unreasonable [*nerazumnoie*] on orders. People take this whole comedy for something serious, despite all their undeniable intelligence. That is their tragedy. (642; 15:76-77)

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[33] The devil's action of negation is identical to the actions of the Great Spirit of nonbeing and self-destruction of which the Grand Inquisitor speaks. One should think of the devil, on the same hypothesis or the principle of legion, as being identical with Satan. If the devil is distinct from Satan, then by the very presence of a devil one should assume Satan's presence. One should not overlook that the devil in *The Brothers Karamazov* calls himself 'Satan.'

[34] *Blago-razumie* (according to reason, reasonableness, prudence) is a composite of *blago* (good, right) and *razum* (reason) and it sends us to the ethical concepts of 'right reason' and 'practical reason,' the Aristotelian *phronesis* and the Augustinian *prudentia*, the virtue of reason of which we spoke when enumerating the cardinal virtues in Augustine. Effectively, the devil contends that the dominion of reason and ethics (of virtues) would render the world uneventful, creative of no meaning, and thus inane. The devil is a promoter of doubt and confusion, of goal-less, non-ethical existence, and he claims that the capacity for vice and negativity is a source of life. The devil's statements, as many semiotic constructs in Dostoevsky, fare better when treated dialogically, not monologically, which should entail that they are ambivalent and ambiguous, since the devil's actions are 'underwritten' by God.

In this quote, we can see that the devil, basically, expounds Ivan's ideology about Creation and ethics. The devil faced with the inanity and the comedy of the world directly demands destruction of his own person (which reminds us of Ivan's readiness to commit suicide). His relation to this world is in terms of creation: he does not understand why he should care about a world he did not create and which does not make sense (the concept of 'best possible world' created by God is ironically insinuated here). The devil uses felicitous ethical terms in order to position his own predicament: he subverts reasonableness (*blagorazumie*) by doing the unreasonable (*nerazumnoie*) not by his own choice, but upon a decree. The devil did not choose his own ontic existence, his own world in which to live, and now even his ethical and iconologic life is not of his own choosing. One could conclude that the argument from inanity applies with the same force to Ivan also, and the argument from inanity (in the iconologic dimension), as we have seen, operates conjointly with the argument from nonbeing and self-destruction (in the ontic dimension).

Dostoevsky is very insistent in presenting the devil in conjunction with inanity (to reiterate, ontically, Satan is equally visualized in conjunction with non-being and suicide). Let me bring still another example, from the same text "The Devil," to illustrate the centrality of inanity in Dostoevsky:

> I am perhaps the only man in all of nature who loves the truth and sincerely desires good. I was there when the Word who died on the cross was ascending into heaven, carrying on his bosom the soul of the thief who was crucified to the right of him, I heard the joyful shrieks of the cherubim singing and shouting 'Hosannah,' and the thundering shout of rapture from the seraphim, which made heaven and all creation shake. And, I swear by all that's holy, I wanted to join the chorus and shout 'Hosannah' with everyone else. It was right on my lips, it was already bursting from my breast ... you know, I'm very sensitive and artistically susceptible. But common sense [*zdravyi smysl*] - oh, it's the most unfortunate quality of my nature-kept me within due bounds even then, and I missed the

> moment! For what-I thought at that same moment-what will happen after my 'Hosannah'? Everything in the world will immediately be extinguished [*ugaslo*][35] and no events will occur. And so, solely because of my official duty and my social position, I was forced to quash the good moment in myself and stay with my nasty tricks. Someone takes all the honor of the good for himself and only leaves me the nasty tricks. But I don't covet the honor of living as a moocher, I'm not ambitious. Why, of all beings in the world, am I alone condemned to be cursed by all decent people, and even to be kicked with boots, for, when I become incarnate, I must occasionally take such consequences as well? There's a secret here, I know, but they won't reveal this secret to me for anything, because then, having learned what it's all about, I might just roar 'Hosannah,' and the necessary minus would immediately disappear and sensibleness would set in allover the world, and with it, of course, the end of everything, even of newspapers and journals, because who would subscribe to them? I know that I will finally be reconciled, that I, too, will finish my quadrillion and be let in on the secret. But until that happens I sulk and grudgingly fulfill my purpose: to destroy thousands so that one may be saved. For instance, how many souls had to be destroyed, and honest reputations put to shame, in order to get just one righteous Job, with whom they baited me so wickedly in olden times! No, until the secret is revealed, two truths exist for me: one is theirs, from there, and so far completely unknown to me; the other is mine. And who knows which is preferable...Are you asleep?" (647)

We have chosen our examples in this section as in others merely for the purposes of illustration. We should however keep in mind that our strategy of reading and interpretation iconizes both inanity and nonbeing, and it is applicable (certainly, in a regime of degree-dependency) to every fictional entity in the novel, since entities are at risk of being threatened ontically by nonbeing or iconologically by meaninglessness.

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[35] This statement by the devil is ambivalent, and thus dialogic (it potentially carries many meaning-voices) since it seems to imply that no events would occur in both ontic (for instance, births, deaths, or natural events) and iconic (any semiotic exchange) order. But the dominant meaning here is the iconologic one, since inanity is possible only if there are ontic events (say, suffering), only that they are meaningless, that is not codifiable within a semiotic coherence. We may say also that a rudimentary iconic order is compelled to exist, once the ontic order of subjectivity inhabits a world.

3) Freedom in Augustine and Dostoevsky

In this section, I address one of the central categories of *The Brothers Karamazov*, the category of freedom. Freedom is connected to the argument of the Grand Inquisitor and his three powers (miracle, mystery, and authority), to the meaning of Christ's soteriology (being Christ's icon on the level of the First Temptation), and to nearly every pivotal narrative and plot moment in the novel. In the first part of this section, I present the main features of Augustine's understanding of freedom of choice of the will and of Christian liberty (*libertas*), and in the second, I shall try to identify the Dostoevskian insight into both man's freedom and Christ's freedom in the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor and other segments of the novel. The comparative basis offered by Augustine's coping with the difficult problematic of freedom, will only facilitate our understanding of Dostoevsky's complicated and, as we claim, novel kerygma (religious message) of freedom.

a) Freedom and Liberty in Augustine

In our interpretation of the Three Temptations in the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor we encountered the icon of Christ's *freedom* (*svoboda*) on the level of the First Temptation, and on the level of the Second Temptation we assigned the icon of freedom of choice (*svoboda vybora*) to the person of Great Spirit. It is obvious then, that freedom and freedom of choice are co-dependent icons, a fact spelled out in our interpretation. But what still remains unclear, is what constitutes the internal substance and meaning of the two icons that pertain to the free will and freedom (that is of both *svoboda vybora* and *svoboda*).

In this segment on Augustine's conception of freedom, I will limit my inquiry to concepts that carry an immediate relevance for understanding of freedom in Dostoevsky. These concepts are, basically, *liberum arbitrium* and *libera voluntas*, which I am going to equate, on the basis of textual end conceptual-linguistic evidence, with 'power of choice' and 'freedom of choice' respectively. We have discussed the power of choice under the terms of *potestas* (power) in Augustine and *sila* (power) in Dostoevsky in section (1) on ontic power. In this portion of our discussion we shall try to prove that *liberum arbitrium* is identical to ontic power and thus to ontic *potestas* (power). *Libera voluntas*, on the other hand, usually translated as 'free will,' should be effectively made identical to 'free choice,' which for us it makes sense to be called 'ontic choice' (since it lies within our nature-endowed power). *Ontic power* and *ontic choice* will constitute, as we shall try to show, through their synergy and their common hypostatic substance a hybrid concept, which we shall call '*ontic freedom*' (in Dostoevsky *svoboda vybora*). It should be obvious by now that an unqualified concept of freedom is an empty word, as is an unqualified concept of the will, although, intuitively, the will, as a constitutive faculty-potentiality of the mind (as it appeared when we have discussed ontic power) would issue into the exercise of freedom, into the actuality of freedom. But the concepts of the will and of freedom become usefully transparent only when we realize that the concepts of power and choice join forces to make them intelligible.

When we use the word 'ontic' to qualify power, choice and freedom, to reiterate, we designate an entity that is innate, naturally endowed and dependent exclusively on man. Therefore, ontic power and ontic choice, and thus man's autonomous ontic freedom are not, as a rule, ordered or given by God's grace. The establishment of an ontic domain

for man's freedom, we shall try to show, is indispensable for the understanding of both Augustine and Dostoevsky's concept of freedom, since both thinkers adduce evidence of a new, Christian freedom, one that is different from ontic freedom. In Augustine this new freedom, as we shall see, is called *libertas*, and in Dostoevsky *svoboda*.

In the section on the ontic power in Augustine and Dostoevsky, we have seen that whatever constitutes a person as a valid capable agent in an ethical and even soteriological action is derived primarily from the infrastructure of his ontic power. No virtuous move would be possible to be carried out unless a person engaged in an action rests her ethical practice and her virtues on an ontic domain of powers (capacities, abilities). A virtue is instituted then as a function from the domain of power into a range of freedoms. For instance, it is important to specify what kind of virtue one activates, whether, let us say, the virtue of courage is activated from a person into an action and conduct, or the virtues of faith or hope; this kind of specification is eloquent about the way we implement virtue-options in order to obtain action-versions and thus world-versions. And such options are offered by palpable evidence in Augustine and Dostoevsky, where a person can choose to act courageously in order to advance its status in this world, or have faith in Christ or harbor hope in the future world.

In such a general context of power domains, freedom ranges, and worlds, the immediate question arises about the kinds of freedoms, that is, what kinds of values are available in a given world to a person who wants to practice or is able to practice them. In Augustine and Dostoevsky, the ethical praxis is even more relevant, since they are concerned about the equation freedom-evil, that is with intentionally negative action, and

thus about the ranges of evil a person's powers permit (Dostoevskian persons test not only their virtues, but expressly their evil power through their vices).

In Augustine, a strong conceptual overlap or even confusion between the domain of power and range of freedom is due to the historical and linguistic context of capturing freedom, an issue we summarily address at the middle of this section. Now let us see how we can disentangle the confusion between power and choice (with the awareness that freedom is usually reduced to choice). Overall, to reiterate, we shall argue, that freedom should be identified with the synergy between power and free choice. In one place of his treatise on the will, Augustine says the following:

> E. Unless I am mistaken, reason has shown that we commit evil through free choice of the will [*ex libero voluntatis arbitrio*]. But I question whether free will [*liberum arbitrium*] – through which, it has been shown, we have the power to sin [*peccandi facultatem habere*]– ought to have been given to us by Him who made us. For it seems that we would not have been able to sin, if we did not have free will [*liberum arbitrium*]. And it is to be feared that in this way God may appear to be the cause [*auctor*] of our deeds [*malefactorum*]. (*De Libero Arbitrio* 1.16.117).

From this quote, it is easy to retain the centrality of committing evil through *liberum arbitrium*. Here Augustine clearly calls *liberum arbitrium* a power, even better: he calls it a faculty (usually a rendition of the Aristotelian *dynamis*-potentiality) that has the ability to sin (*peccandi facultatem habere*).[1] And that kind of faculty is God-given, that is it is endowed to us ontically. Clearly, we retain from here that we are not responsible for having a power that is capable of sinning, although we might be responsible, as we know from previous contexts, for the way we use it or abuse it. The distinction, however,

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[1] Augustine explicitly identifies power with *liberum arbitrium* also in this quote: "E. Now, if possible, explain to me why God gave [*dederit*] man free choice of the will [*liberum voluntatis arbitrium*], since if he had not received it he would not be able to sin [*peccare non posset*]" (*De Libero Arbitrio* 2.1.1).

between having something and using something has to be kept in mind, since to properly use our power we need good functions which mediate power into choices, and which we call virtues, that is habits that must be acquired.

Following the aporia indicated in Augustine's quote that God's authorship of the power of choice might incur responsibility for evil deeds, Augustine further tackles the question about God's authorship of necessity, that is of the necessary power that determines every putatively freely chosen action. Moreover, Augustine when talking about *libera voluntas*, he now resorts to the concept of power proper (*potestas*), instead of *liberum arbitrium*, which we encountered in the above quote, since, as it appears, that conjunction of *potestas* and *libera voluntas* is conceptually more transparent: we need *potestas* (power) to be able to exercise *libera voluntas* (free will-choice). Necessity, on the other hand, would obviate any free will, any choice, that is, it would be raw power dictating any necessary choice. Thus Augustine:

> A. By assuming necessity, he [the opponent] tries to exclude will [*voluntas*].[2] If it is necessary that he will, how can he will, if there is no will [*unde volet cum voluntas non erit*]? If he says, in another way, that since it is necessary that he will [*quia necesse est ut velit*], this very will is not in his power [*ipsam voluntatem in potestate non habere*], he is to be answered with what I just said when I asked whether you would be happy without willing it. You answered that you would be happy if it were in your power [*si potestas esset in* te] to be happy,[3] and that you wanted to [*velle*], but were not yet able [*sed nondum posse*]. Then I interposed

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[2] To anticipate, and for facilitating the interpretation, *voluntas* (being equatable with 'thus I will') should be read as 'choice.' *Libera voluntas* (being free will because it can choose freely) is the one that carries the meaning of freedom (by being *libera*). It is not a faculty, a potentiality, as we saw above, like *liberum arbitrium*, on the contrary it is an act of choice (of will), and, therefore, an actuality.

[3] This sentence states very clearly the distinction between power and choice, and why it is important for real and fictional persons, that is due to the quest for happiness. A person wants happiness, but if it is unable to choose (paradigmatically, by, say, a prisoner or a slave), that is, his *voluntas*-choice would be an empty exercise.

> that the truth had cried out from you because we cannot deny that we have the power [*habere nos potestatem*], unless we cannot obtain what we will through an act of will or unless the will [*voluntas*] is absent. When we will, if the will itself is lacking in us, we surely do not will. If it cannot happen that when we will we do not will, then the will is present in the one who wills. And nothing else is in our power except what is present to us when we will. Our will, therefore, is not a will unless it is in our power [*voluntas igitur nostra nec voluntas esset, nisi esset in nostra potestate*]. And since it is indeed in our power [*porro quia est in potestate*], it is free in us [*libera est nobis*]. What we do not, or cannot, have in our power [*quod in potestate non habemus*] is not free for us [*non enim est nobis liberum*]. So it follows that we do not deny that God has foreknowledge of all things to be, and yet that we will what we will [*velimus quod volumus*]. For when He has foreknowledge of our will, it is going to be the will that He has foreknown. Therefore, the will is going to be a will because God has foreknowledge of it. Nor can it be a will if it is not in our power [*nec voluntas esse poterit, si in potestate non erit*]. Therefore, God also has knowledge of our power over it. So the power is not taken from me by His foreknowledge, the power to will will more certainly be present in me, since God, whose foreknowledge does not err, has foreknown that I shall have the power.
>
> E. I no longer deny that whatever God foreknows must come to be, and that he foreknows our sins in such a way that our will still remains free [*voluntas libera*] in us and lies in our power [*atque in nostra posita potestate*]. (3.3.32-35)

The decisive meaning from the above quote allowing the capturing of the co-inherence of power and choice resides in this statement: "Our will [*voluntas*], therefore, is not a will unless it is in our power [*voluntas igitur nostra nec voluntas esset, nisi esset in nostra potestate*]." Here *voluntas* (choice) and *potestas* (power) are interdefinable, and, surprisingly, without any *liberum arbitrium*. That translates into saying that a choice would not actualize itself, unless we were able to effect it by our power, and not, for instance, through God and his necessity. Another central statement correlates our concepts of power and choice to freedom: "And since it is indeed in our power [*porro quia est in potestate*], it is free in us [*libera est nobis*]. What we do not, or cannot, have in our power [*quod in potestate non habemus*] is not free for us [*non enim est nobis*

liberum]." Evidently, freedom equates with choice, that is, with free will (*libera voluntas*).

But what is freedom's mode of being? That is, what is specifically man's import into freedom, what is man-given and not God-given? Augustine complicates the concepts again, by saying that God gave man free will (*libera voluntas*) also, not only *liberum arbitrium* (power of will):

> E. For man himself, insofar as he is a man, is a good, because he can live rightly when he so wills [*quia recte vivere, cum vult, potest*].
> A. If this is so, the question that you proposed is clearly answered. If man is a good, and cannot act rightly unless he wills to do so, then he must have free will [*liberam voluntatem*], without which he cannot act rightly. We must not believe that God gave us free will so that we might sin, just because sin is committed through free will. It is sufficient for our question, why free will should have been given [*libera esset voluntas data*] to man, to know that without it man cannot live rightly. (*De Libero Arbitrio* 2.1.4-6)

We can settle the conundrum by accepting Augustine's eagerness to assign anything which is good in man to God. From the perspective of an analytic truth, however, God gives both power and choice to man (man does not create himself) and then man exercises them both. This is the main reason we can call man's God-given power - ontic power, and man's God-given free will - ontic will. As we can see Augustine attaches the modifier 'free' to both *arbitrium* and *voluntas*, making freedom intelligible only through them. But Augustine goes even further and iconizes the modifier '*liber*' into a third moment called *libertas*.

In what follows, we shall touch upon the concept of non-ontic, not naturally endowed (and thus 'supernatural') freedom in Augustine. Augustine thinks that true freedom can ensue only after liberation takes place, and that true freedom is secure only in God:

> A. Our freedom [*libertas nostra*] then consists in submission to the truth. It is our God Himslf who frees us [*nos liberat*] from death, that is, from the state of sin. Truth itself, when it speaks as a man, says to those who believe in him, 'If you remain in My word, you shall be My disciple indeed, and you shall know the truth and the truth will make you free' [John 8:31-32]. The soul enjoys nothing with freedom [*cum libertate*] unless it enjoys it securely. No one, however, securely possesses those goods which he can lose although he does not wish to. And no one can lose truth and wisdom against his will, for no one can be physically separated from them. (*De Libero Arbitrio* 2.13.143)

What we notice in the above quote is that Augustine as though disjoins or splits *libera voluntas*, and focuses now on the concept of *libertas*. He spoke of freedom through two categories, *liberum arbitrium* and *libera voluntas*. But those are not connected to *libertas*, and are not *libertas,* since our true freedom consist in our submission to the truth (to God). As a consequence of this seemingly important distinction between God-given freedom at man's creation and God-given freedom at man's liberation, we decided to call that freedom which was given at man's creation, which depends exclusively on us, lies within our power, is only up to us - 'ontic freedom,' in order to adequately correlate it with 'ontic power.' This is so, we have argued, since *potestas* and *liberum arbitrium* are identical to 'ontic power,' and *libera voluntas* captures the ontic freedom.

Let us now clarify some new aspects of *libera voluntas*. *Libera voluntas* primarily is a will-centered (due to the category of '*voluntas*-will') moral choice, rather than an intellect-centered *proairesis*, but it has, as we shall see below, features of *proairesis* (we defined *proairesis* more extensively when we were dealing with the First Temptation an especially in the section on ontic power). Any movement of the will, Augustine says, would not be a voluntary movement (*motus voluntarius*) and equally it would not lie within our power ("*nisi esset voluntarius atque in nostra positus potestate*" – see *De Libero Arbitrio* 3.3.13) were it not our own God-given will (in our current understanding

as a general faculty). And, Augustine adds, "Nothing is so completely in our power as the will itself [*Quapropter nihil tam in nostra potestate, quam ipsa voluntas est*]" (*De Libero Arbitrio* 3.3.27), here specifically as *voluntas-proairesis*. Here we can tentatively conflate the two choices (*proairesis* and *libera voluntas*) into one now, in order to give a better picture of what we mean by 'ontic freedom.' The ontic freedom as choice is indispensable for understanding any real or fictional person in terms of the modal category of possibility (since as we recall, *proairesis* targets only the realm of *possibilia*). What is possible or impossible counts if a real or fictional person wants to be happy or immortal, and yet those things are not within her power, although they might be within her wish.

Let us now bring an example where Augustine deals with happiness in terms of freedom and possibility, since a person chooses a praxis (that is, exercises his ontic freedom) in order to achieve the goal of happiness. Augustine, in what follows, refers to suicide as a strategy of choosing peace-happiness, while, paradoxically choosing *nihil*-nothingness. And it is precisely the word 'to choose' (*eligo*) and its synonyms (prefer, believe, desire) that should be iconized in the quote below, since they seem to represent a new aspect in the power and target of choosing. We refer to this unusual strategy, since it is extremely important for the freedom of numerous Dostoevskian heroes, especially Ivan:

> A. If you add gradually to this beginning, that is, to your will to exist, little by little you will rise and build toward that which *is* in the highest degree. You will be kept from any fall by which the lowest form of existence passes into nonexistence and drags down with it the strength of the man who loves it. Hence the man who prefers not to exist so as to avoid unhappiness becomes unhappy because he *cannot not exist* [*quia non esse non potest*]. On the other hand, the man who loves to exist more than he hates to be unhappy may shut out what he hates by adding what he loves. And when he begins to exist perfectly in his own

class [*in suo genere*], he will not be unhappy. See how foolish [*absurde*] and inconsistent [*inconvenienter*] it is to say, 'I would prefer not to be, than to be unhappy.' The man who says, 'I prefer this to that,' chooses something; but 'not to be' is not something [*aliquid*], but nothing [*nihil*]. Therefore, you cannot in anyway choose rightly when you choose something that does not exist. [...] However, what does not exist cannot be better; therefore, you should not have willed this. [...] No one, therefore, can rightly choose not to exist [*nemo igitur recte potest eligere ut non sit*].[4] We should not be impressed by the judgment of the men who, in their unhappiness, committed suicide. [..] The man that chooses not to be, surely chooses to be nothing [*se nihil eligere*]. [...] When someone who believes that at his death he will cease to exist is driven by unendurable troubles to yearn for death [*cupiditatem mortis impellitur*], he makes his decision [*decernit*][5] and takes his life. He has the false opinion that he will be totally annihilated [*omnimode defectionis*], but his natural feeling is a longing for peace [*quietis*]. What is at peace, however, is not nothing [*nihil*]; on the contrary, it exists to a greater degree than something that is not at peace. [...] Every willful desire [*appetitus in voluntate*][6] for death is directed [*intenditur*][7] toward peace, not toward nonexistence. Although a man erroneously believes that he will not exist after death, nevertheless by nature, he desires to be at peace; that is, he desires to *be* in a higher degree [*magis esse desiderat*][8]. Therefore, just as no one can will in any way not to exist, so no one who exists should be ungrateful [*ingratus*] for the goodness of the Creator." (*De Libero Arbitrio* 3.8.74-84)

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[4] To choose here (usually equatable with *proairesis* and *voluntas*) is rendered with the verb *eligo* in its combination with two other decisive words in Augustine, 'to be able, to have the power' (*possum*) and rightly, properly (*recte*); *recta ratio*, right reason (*orthos logos*) in charge of practical conduct, also comes to mind.

[5] The word decision alerts us, again, to the Aristotelian *proairesis* as well as to his category of deliberation, and equally to the Augustinian *libera voluntas*. It is enormously instructive to read Augustine with Aristotle's concepts in one's mind.

[6] This expression rendering the 'appetite of the choice' indicates also a faulty deliberation, not only arbitrariness of choice.

[7] *Intenditur* evokes intentionality, being a prerequisite if not the equivalent of choice (both *voluntas* and *eligo*).

[8] If we want to compare this misguided yearning for nature and person upgrading with hypostatic union, that is for the correct yearning for power and peace upgrading (peace is primarily stability of nature), we can obtain a picture of person-versions for different world-versions. Ivan Karamazov, for instance, out of rebellion against his deficient Euclidean nature, and out of his peace-deprived, hellish, heart - contemplates committing suicide, and Zosima prays for the suicides, much like Augustine would, for whom suicide seems to be merely a cognitive error, not an intent to commit malicious evil.

The Augustinian stance is that man has done nothing to bring himself into existence, and that man's ungratefulness for existing or his rebellious option for death are misguided strategies of choosing of what is possible. The discussion of a willful desire, one that is not underpinned by deliberation and decision, effectively exhorts man to enhance his modalities of being to a higher degree through correct choices of possibilities. It is remarkable, however, that peace is the ultimate target of choice, peace where there is no more choosing. This reminds us of the 'burden of choice' of which the Grand Inquisitor argued as being the worst gift for humanity.

Certainly, we have the concept of ontic power, but this power does not function independently of the mind, since that power is ruled by the modality of ignorance. We can be, together with Ivan, justly revolted that anybody's ignorance would lead him, for instance, to suicide, as we have seen above. Thus, Augustine expressly thematizes knowledge and ignorance in terms of power, which should be counted as supervening onto ontic power, since we can call knowledge, or habits, or virtues as being the second nature. For Augustine, not only knowledge can supervene, be added, to ontic powers, but also penalty, as diminution of power, can become the second nature:

> A. Every penalty that is just is a penalty for sin, and is called punishment. [...] It follows, therefore, that this just penalty comes from man's condemnation [*damnatione*]. We should not be amazed that, because of his ignorance, man has not free choice of the will to choose what he should rightly do [*non habeat arbitrium liberum voluntatis ad eligendum quid recte faciat*]. [...] Thus the man who does not act rightly although he knows what he ought to do, loses the power to know that is right; and whoever is unwilling to do right when he can, loses the power to do it when he wills to. In fact, two penalties – ignorance and difficulty – beset every sinful soul. Through ignorance, the soul is disgraced by error. Through difficulty, it is tormented by pain. The approval of false things as true, so that that man makes a wrong judgment against his will [*ut erret invitus*], and the lack of power [*non posse*] to abstain from lust [*a libidinosis*] because of the opposition and torments of the bondage of the flesh these are two things that are

> not in nature of man as he was made [*non est natura instituti hominis*], but are the penalties of man who has been condemned. When we speak of the will that is free [*de libera voluntate*] to do right, we speak of the will with which man was first made [*in qua homo factus est*]. (*De Libero Arbitrio* 3.18.175-179)

Two penalties equate with two modalities of diminution, reduction of the ontic power, of human nature, and therefore of human ontic freedom. Ontic freedom is *libera voluntas*, Augustine says, the freedom of choice with which man was first made. Therefore, the status of ontic power and ontic freedom is impaired by the penalty of sin.

Let us now try to clarify the concepts of *liberum arbitrium* and *libera voluntas* (especially from the perspective of penalty-impairment) so that we could achieve a higher degree of correlation with the concept of freedom of choice (*svoboda vybora*) in Dostoevsky. *Voluntas*, as we insinuated above, would roughly coincide with the Aristotelian *proairesis* (moral choice), only that in Augustine (as in Seneca and Epictetus)[9] it has a voluntaristic, and thus character-centered flavor, whereas the Aristotelian *proairesis* is more intellectualistic, being thus knowledge-centered.[10] But

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[9] See, for instance, Rist for whom freedom is almost an empty term: "'Freedom' in particular is now almost a meaningless term. It was not meaningless for Augustine, though it did not carry the same emotional overtones as those with which we are familiar" (1972:220). Thus, again, Rist: "But freedom is less our immediate concern than 'will/*voluntas*/-*proairesis*' [...] In Aristotle the word *proairesis* indicates a 'deliberated desire' – the deliberation being about means to a desired end. [...] But the Aristotelian usage, though familiar, is not that with which we are now concerned, nor would *voluntas* be the Latin rendering of that sort of *proairesis*. The sense we need for *proairesis* is visible in the writings of the Stoic Epictetus in the first century AD, in whom *proairesis* seems to be more or less equivalent to *voluntas* as used by near-contemporary Seneca" (1994:187). See also footnote 10.

[10] The genealogy of the term *voluntas* is interesting since it is, at least on one account, a conversion of an intellectual magnitude into a voluntaristic one. Reale quotes Polenz, who gives this interesting explanation: "For Seneca the decisive factor for self-education is will. It is a trait which is non-Greek but Roman which was introduced by Seneca into

both in Augustine's *libera voluntas* as in Aristotle's *proairesis* the main meaning resides in 'choosing ethically and responsibly,' whatever the ultimate decisional dominant is (respectively, will or reason), although the integrality of the person (that is the person's maximizing of both reason and will) should underlie either of the two forms of choice. If we just equate the two terms with moral and responsible free *choice*, it seems to me that their basic meaning is preserved. As a consequence, if the category of freedom (the exercise of *voluntas* and *proairesis*) is bound to mean anything, it will primarily mean

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the Stoa. [...] When he composed the *De beneficiis* for *dianoia* [thought] ... he substituted almost involuntarily *voluntas*, and once it found a formulation, Roman thinking extended it to other fields of ethics" (quoted in Reale 1990, IV:64). Although, as we have seen, *voluntas* could be equated to *proairesis* (see footnote 9), and here it is claimed to come from *diainoia* (thought), Kahn, on the other hand, claims that *voluntas* would be the equivalent for the Aristotelian *boulēsis* (usually translated as 'wish'): "*Voluntas* is established, since Cicero, as the standard Latin rendering for *boulēsis*. And that seems both inevitable and correct, since *voluntas* is the verbal noun from *volo* 'I want,' just as *boulēsis* is the nominalization for the corresponding Greek verb, *boulomai*. But the secondary connections of the Latin noun are quite different, and these differences will weigh heavily on the philosophical career of *voluntas*. Thus in pre-philosophical Latin, to do something *voluntas sua* is to do it spontaneously, of one's own accord; and the adjective *voluntarii* is the normal term for 'volunteers' in the army. Hence Cicero naturally translated the Greek term *hekousion* as *voluntarium*, and as a consequence we still call it 'the voluntary'" (Kahn 1988:241).

Now we have not only the connection of *voluntas* to *boulēsis*, but also, at least partially, to *hekousion* (for Aristotle, a non-deliberative, non-decisional, and thus non-proairetic voluntariness available also to animals and children). It seems that the conceptual substance and the genealogy of *voluntas* might be validly derived through all three linguistic conversions (from *dianoia*, *boulēsis*, and *proairesis*). For our perspective on the person, this might only prove the integral functioning of the person. As to the *boulēsis*, which deals with the domain of the possible and impossible, in Aristotle (see below) it is straightforwardly connected with the choice of ends, while *proairesis* is concerned with the choice of means, but, and this is paramount, only the choice of means is problematic (requiring a genuine exercise of *voluntas*), not the choice of ends (health, happiness, etc., all straightforwardly unproblematic ends, requiring no real deliberation). It is no wonder, therefore, that conceptually *voluntas* is equatable with the will's faculty 'dominant': *proairesis*. If *voluntas* were to be a simultaneous, fictionally possible, exercise of both *boulēsis* and *proairesis* functions (and by implication of *dianoia*), then that would testify about its exclusive integral personologic power, which we would be happy to apply to the hypostatic person.

'moral choice' that deals with the burden of good and evil (to recall the Grand Inquisitor), that is, with the ethical praxis-action towards a goal. Aristotle (see *Nicomachean Ethics* 1111b5-1113b30) explicitly states the fact that *proairesis* is a choice between good and evil, and it is not ruled by the dichotomies of truth/falsehood (opinion domain), pain/pleasure (appetite domain) or possible/impossible (wish domain). It is this Aristotelian stance that places *proairesis* (choice between good and evil) not entirely in an intellectualistic camp, and makes it, for our purposes, equatable with *voluntas* and *svoboda vybora* (freedom of choice).

Let us now turn to the second component of freedom, and theologically, probably more important than *voluntas* or *proairesis*, about which we spoke above only in passing, that is to *liberum arbitrium*. Rist has captured very well the central meaning of the component of 'freedom' conveyed by *liberum arbitrium* in Augustine:

> Consider the experiment of seeking a Greek equivalent for Augustine's title '*De Libero Arbitrio Voluntatis*' – which may be rendered long-windedly as 'On the externally unihibited power to choose which we have as moral agents', and which I rendered *On Human Responsibility*. The Greek would have to be 'peri tou autexousiou tes proaireseos': that would have been intelligible to Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine's near-contemporary, and a possible title for one of his books. The notion of 'freedom' would be captured in the word *autexousiou* (self-determining):[11] a connotation required in texts where Augustine speaks not of a free will but of a free choice (or power to choose) of the will. (1994:186).

We have seen in numerous quotes from Augustine that the concept of power is central to any activity of the will, and in our section on ontic power, we have discussed the significance of an infrastructure of power for any free choice or virtuous action. It constitutes a felicitous conceptual and linguistic occasion that *liberum arbitrium* is

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[11] Here Rist provides the following note: "Cf. Jerome, *Adv. Pel.* 3.7.: 'autexousion nos liberum appelamus arbitrium." Jerome simply equates 'liberum arbitrium' (freedom of choice) with autexousion (self-determination, or, closer to our debates –autonomy and sufficiency of power).

associated with 'the power to choose' in Rist's analysis of Augustine's freedom. When we derive *liberum arbitrium* from *autexousion*, the only basic translation of *liberum arbitrium* would be 'power of choice', which is equivalent with what we term 'ontic power.' That is why Augustine repeatedly says that God created us with '*liberum arbitrium*,' that is with *autexousion*, which is constituted, endowed with the power, the capacity to choose, and only derivatively with the freedom to choose (*libera voluntas*). This is not trivial, since the concept of human nature and its constitutive powers are the basic concern of Christianity. In his *Confessions* Augustine portrays most forcefully his struggle in terms of power and choice precisely in connection with his conversion to a novel form, Christian form, of exercising the freedom of choice:

> [Victorinus] appeared to me not more brave than happy, in having thus discovered and opportunity of waiting on thee only [since he, by choosing to remain a Christian, was forbidden to teach grammar and rhetoric] which thing I was sighing for, thus bound, not with the irons of another, but my own iron will. My will [*velle meum*] was the enemy master of, and thence had made a chain for me and bound me. Because of a perverse will [*ex voluntate perversa*] was lust [*libido*] made [*facta est*]; and lust indulged in became habit [*facta est consuetudo*]; and habit not resisted became necessity [*facta est necessitas*].[12] [...] But that new will [*voluntas nova*] which had begun to develop in me, freely to worship Thee, and to whish [*vellem*] to enjoy Thee, O God, the only sure enjoyment [*iucunditas*], was not able as yet to overcome my former willfulness, made strong by long indulgence. Thus did my two wills [*duae voluntates*], one old and the other new,

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[12] In this textual sequence, one can easily notice an explicit progression from a perverse will to libido, and from there to libido-habit, and ultimately to libido-as-necessity. *Libido* here could be usefully conceptualized in terms of necessity as naturalized power, libido as second nature and thus power-necessity, or libido-as-power. This moment of confrontation with *libido* is not erotic-sensual, it simply is a moment of confrontation of powers (against *libido-potestas*), since it exhibits Augustine's outrage against his own depersonalization and disempowering of the will. Augustine feels that he himself is not choosing, but something else in him exercises the power of choice, against his own free *voluntas* and power of choice. Hence the spectrum of two *voluntas* arises and a split between the carnal (here to be understood as habit-necessity overpowering and overruling the self) and the spiritual immediately follows, and Augustine has good reasons to search for an imminent exit from his person's dissipation-distention.

> one carnal, the other spiritual, contend [*confligebant*] within me; and by their discord they unstrung [*dissipabant*] my soul (*Confessions* 8.5.10).[13]

Dissipation certainly evokes distention, that is, a personologic incapacitation that plagues a person in the exercise of his/her will. In the quote below Augustine again displays his

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[13] O'Donnell (see Augustine 1992a) in his commentary on *Confessions* (8.5.10) says: "Bk. 8 is pre-eminently the book of *voluntas*. A. Dihle, *The Theory of the Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley, 1982), largely confirms the traditional view that A. 'invented' the notion of 'will' that thrives in later western philosophy, and traces (Dihle 132-44) the influence on A.'s notion of the Latin vocabulary he had to work with. His discussion of A.'s own view approaches, but does not explain, the prominence *voluntas* has in this book: Dihle 128, 'Sensuality itself is by no means the cause of evil, as the Manicheans believed. It was present already in the original, undistorted condition of man, but firmly controlled by his undistorted will. Everything depends on whether the will of man is directed to spirit (*spiritus*) or flesh (*caro*), i.e. to the more or less valuable. . . . *Cupiditas* or *libido* (e)pithumi/a), *ambitio* or *superbia* (filarxi/a, filotimi/a), and *curiositas* (fantasi/a) do not result, as the neo-Platonists believed, from a misconception of reality but from the perverted will (*mala voluntas*). The neo-Platonic idea of the separation of an individual being from the order of being [...] was explained in terms of will. Evil as the mere *privatio boni*, the absence of good, . . . was replaced by ill will without, however, attributing substance to evil, as the Manicheans did.'

A difficulty is that conventional discussions of the 'will' in Platonism and in A. concentrate on the 'freedom' of the will (hence there is nothing relevant here in TeSelle, Burnaby, G. R. Evans [*Augustine on Evil* (Cambridge, 1982)], or C. N. Cochrane [*Christianity and Classical Culture* (Oxford, 1939)]). The most interesting discussion is J. M. Rist, *Plotinus* (Toronto, 1967), 136-137: 'The great difference between Plotinus and Christian thinkers, which it has become fashionable to trace to Plotinus' alleged lack of interest in or ignorance of the role of free will, is to be traced to the nature of Platonic knowledge and, more fundamentally, to Plotinus' optimistic view of human capabilities. When man is produced in the Plotinian world, he is a being capable, produced capable, of returning to his origins, of attaining *omoiosis theu*. He can attain it because part of his soul has not fallen, has not been swamped by the passions, but remains above in the Intelligible World. . . . Freedom then for Plotinus is not simply equivalent to the power of choice. Rather it is freedom from that necessity of choice which the passions impose.'" That is, we could say, a freedom free from the naturalized power of passions (which we encounteded in the above *libido*-power see – footnote 12): this freedom is simply functioning with its original genuine power. It appears to be quite clear why Rist's capturing of Plotinus could be valuable for Augustine: Rist is making an implicit distinction between the power of choice (still partially present and uncorrupted in Plotinus) and freedom of choice based on that power. In Augustine the Christian, it appears, no residue of uncorrupted power is left in man, and therefore freedom of choice is accordingly impaired.

capacity for almost unlimited introspection and self-experimentation of the will, where the power of the will (*facultas*) and his *voluntas* both have to contend with an insidious failure of choice.

> I was disquieted in spirit, being most impatient with myself that I entered not into thy will and covenant, O my God [...] For not to go only, but to enter there, was naught else but to will [*velle*] to go, but to will [*velle*] it resolutely [*fortiter*] and thoroughly [*integre*];[14] not to stagger and sway about this way and that, a changeable and half-wounded [*semisauciam*] will [*voluntatem*], wrestling, with one part falling as another rose. Finally, in the very fever of my irresolution, I made many motions with my body which men sometimes desire to do [*volunt*], but cannot [*non valent*], if either they have not the limbs, or if their limbs be bound with fetters, weakened by disease, or hindered in any other way. Thus, I tore my hair, struck my forehead, or if, entwining my fingers, I clasped my knee, this I did because I willed it. But I might have willed and not done it [*potui autem velle et non facere*], if the power of motion in my limbs had not responded. So many things, then, I did, when to have the will was not to have the power [*ubi non hoc erat velle quod posse*], and I did not that which both with an unequalled desire I longed more to do; because shortly when I should will I should will thoroughly. For in such things the power [*facultas*] was one with the will, and to will was to do, and yet was it not done (*Confessions* 8.8.19-20).

Augustine suggest here that there is a gap-quality across the constitution of the mind, and a person under such conditions stands in need of the most fitting assistance, that of divine grace.

Let us now turn to another source of meditations about freedom, to Eastern Patristics. Since Gregory of Nyssa, mentioned by Rist, inherits the Greek concepts grappling with the problematic of the freedom of the will, let us present several quotes on freedom, all of them taken from Gregorios' book.[15] Thus, Gregory of Nyssa says:

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[14] Here we have a clear indication of the integrality of the person's choices, and this quote's value is unique in this very aspect. The question thus arises whether the *voluntas-proairesis* alone is able to shift a person into hypostatic integrality, that is into a complete personologic functioning of all the faculties of the mind, as one might expect, say, in Christ.

> All freedom is one in nature, homogeneous in itself. Therefore it logically follows that all that is free [*eleutheron*] will be harmonized with all else that is free. Virtue has no master [it is *adespoton*]. Therefore all that is free is in virtue, for the free has no master either. (quoted in Gregorios 1988:131)

Two concepts are remarkable here: freedom (*to eleutheron*) which in Stoicism and in Augustine (see below) is rendered in its social connotations as *libertas*, and thus associated with liberty, and its correlative 'free of master' (*adespoton*). The Grand Inquisitor's master-like dominion over the slave-like individuals directly denotes an offence against the ontological status of a person (the Grand Inquisitor says to Christ: "give them bread and only then ask of them virtue"). In our interpretation of the Grand Inquisitor's monologue, homogeneity of nature between freedom and other virtues indicates their hypostatic identity (and the potent obsession with 'nature' is inescapable in anthropology and soteriology: the entire meaning of Christ is the capacity to unite two non-homogeneous natures; virtue itself then will be reckoned with primarily in terms of nature). Thus, what is also important for our interpretive strategies of fictional persons is that Gregory of Nyssa says that freedom has its own specific nature: "All freedom is one in nature, homogeneous in itself." We also see that virtue and freedom go together in their 'adespotic' status, that virtue is straightforwardly freedom ("all that is free is in virtue"), much like in Augustine's dialogue on the freedom of choice. Let us adduce another quote from Gregory of Nyssa, where the concept of freedom is more explicitly correlated with that of power:

> This [to say that man was made in accordance with the image of God] is the same as to say that He made human nature participant in all good. [...] There is thus in us the form [*idea*] of all good, of all virtue and wisdom, and all that is conceived in the higher nature. But first among these is necessarily Freedom [*to eleutheron*]

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[15] Gregorios, Paulos Mar. 1988. *Cosmic Man. The Divine Presence. The Theology of St. Gregory of Nyssa*. New York: Paragon House.

> and not to be subjugated to any power of nature, but to have in one's own control the capacity to turn will and knowledge to whatever one chooses. For virtue is something that acknowledges no master [*adespoton*] and acts of free will [h*ekousion*] since that which is compelled and forced can never be a virtue" (132). [..] For he who has sovereign authority overall, out of a great respect for man, left something to be within our own authority, something of which each of us ourself alone can be lord. This is the faculty of will or choice [*he proairesis*], something not slavish, being its own authority [*autexousion*], seated in the freedom of the mind (133). [...] For it is indeed God-like to be self-ruling [*isotheon gar esti to autexousion*]. (quoted in Gregorios 1988:132-137)

Several crucial concepts appear here: *hekousion, proairesis, autexousion. Hekousion* is an act of free and noncompulsory will (the Aristotelian voluntariness, or the Augustinian *motus voluntarius*, which we encountered above), a term to be reckoned with in conjunction with *eleutheron* [*libertas*]. In Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, *hekousion* represents consent to a deliberate and intentional action or conduct. *Proairesis* (moral choice), meaning a deliberate (that is resting on a complete deliberation over available options) choice of a goal-directed course of practical action (*praxis*). *Praxis* deals exclusively with possibilia (one does not choose to pursue the impossible) and only with what lies within our power, what is up to us (one does not choose to pursue what is beyond our powers to bring about: the Grand Inquisitor's weaklings, to reiterate, want to practice a freedom that is beyond their power).

This status of *proairesis-voluntas*, the exercise of valid ethical choosing, is defined by the underlying power that permits its implementation, that is, by *autexousion-liberum arbitrium*, with being or having one's own authority: *proairesis* has *autexousion*, *voluntas* has its *liberum arbitrium* (it has its own power and authority, not somebody else's, say a god's or a demon's authority). And, finally, we can translate *De Libero Arbitrio Voluntatis* as *On the Power of Choice of the Will.*

We can find a revealing remark about *eleutheron* and *autexousion* in Vernant and Vidal-Naquet[16] (who quotes a study by Gauthier-Jolif):

> The term *eleutheria* (*Nicomachean Ethics* V, 1131a28) 'at this period [of Greek tragedy] refers not to psychological freedom but to the legal condition of a free man as opposed to that of a slave; The expression 'free will' only appears in Greek language very much later when *eleutheria* acquires the sense of psychological freedom. It was to be *to autexousioon* (or *he autexousiotes*), literally, self-control. The earliest instance occurs in Diodorus Siculus (1st century B.C.) but it does not have its technical sense here. The latter is already firmly established in Epictetus (1st century A.D.); from this date onwards the word is fully accepted in Greek philosophy.' The Latins later translated *to autexousion* as *liberum arbitrium.* (1990:424n22)

It might be safely assumed that this moment of *autexousion-liberum arbitrium* marks the birth of what was to become a person's autonomy and freedom, expressed in terms of power. We find this concept in Christianity, in Augustine, and, we can assume that through normal historical and cultural channels it was inherited, with all the supervening strata, also by Dostoevsky. Gregorios, an Orthodox theologian, presents Gregory of Nyssa's understanding of man's freedom and autonomy as follows:

> It should be clear [...] that for Gregory man as man is free in his nature, not simply because he is a Christian, or because he has been redeemed by Christ. By his very creation he is Lord of the earth. That is his true nature, even when he is a poor slave of some rich lord. Sin is not the true nature of man, but freedom. And every man, every last man is free. (1988:136)

This is an explicit formulation of the ontic dignity of man, independent of any doctrine or religion. This ontic dignity, expressed in terms of nature, secures man with his power and freedom of choice, as we have seen above.

Now, what is the case with so-called Christian freedom, which is rendered in Augustine as *libertas* or in Gregory of Nyssa as, most probably, *eleutheria*? We have

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[16] Vernant, Jean-Pierre and Vidal-Naquet, Pierre. 1990. *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece.* New York: Zone Book.

seen that there is a constitutive freedom of man, which we called ontic freedom (containing both power and choice), and which represents the ontic dignity of man. There is a gap between natural freedom and supernaturally given freedom, which Augustine and Christianity explain either through the event of the fall or that of salvation.

In the following text from *Enchiridion* the tension between two freedoms will be obvious, between the first freedom, called *proairetic* freedom (in Augustine: *libera voluntas*), or in Dostoevsky 'the freedom of choice' (or 'the burden of choice'), and the second freedom, called by Augustine *libertas*. It is the second kind of freedom that is of extreme comparative value to the overall personology in this study. In the text below, Augustine adopts a position, which in many ways resembles the Grand Inquisitor's, but compared to Christ's understanding of the second freedom, Augustine's *libertas* will be even more illuminating:

> But this part of the human race to which God has promised pardon [*liberationem*] and a share in His eternal kingdom, can they be restored [*reparari*] through the merit of their own works? God forbid. For what good work can a lost man perform [*operare potest perditus*], except so far as he has been delivered from perdition [*a perditione liberatus*]? Can they do anything by the free determination of their own will [*libero arbitrio voluntatis*]? Again I say, God forbid. For it was by the evil use of his free-will [*libero arbitrio*][17] that man destroyed [*perditit*][18] both it and himself. For, as a man who kills himself must, of course, be alive when he kills himself, but after he has killed himself ceases to live, and cannot restore himself to life; so, when man by his own free-will [power of choice: *libero*

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[17] *Liberum arbitrium* and *libera voluntas* are both usually rendered by translators as 'free will'. That makes the comprehension of the text problematic. Now we can safely read *liberum arbitrium* as 'power of choice,' and not 'freedom of choice' or 'free will,' concepts that merely rely on ontic power of the *liberum arbitrium*, and are not identical to it.

[18] That *liberum arbitrium* can be destroyed only reminds us of the corruption of nature that is effected by the fall. The corruption of nature yields the deranking of power in Augustine and Christianity, and the concept that deals with the nature-power status is, to reiterate, spelled out by the category of *liberum arbitrium*.

> *arbitrio*] sinned, then sin being victorious over him, the freedom of his will [*liberum arbitrium*] was lost.[19] "For of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage" [2Pet 2:19]. This is the judgment of the Apostle Peter. And as it is certainly true, what kind of liberty [*libertas*], I ask, can the bond-slave possess, except when it pleases him to sin? For he is freely in bondage who does with pleasure the will of his master. Accordingly, he who is the servant of sin is free to sin [*peccandum liber est*].[20] And hence he will not be free [*liber*] to do right, until, being freed from sin [*a peccato liberatus*],[21] he shall begin to be the servant of righteousness. And this is true liberty [*vera libertas*], for he has pleasure in the righteous deed; and it is at the same time a holy bondage, for he is obedient to the will of God. But whence comes this liberty [*libertas*] to do right to the man who is in bondage and sold under sin, except he be redeemed by Him who has said, "If the Son shall make you free [*liberavit*], ye shall be free indeed [*veri liberi eritis*]?" [John 8:36]. And before this redemption is wrought in a man, when he is not yet free [*nondum est liber*] to do what is right [*ad operandum bene*], how can he talk of the freedom of his will [*libero arbitrio*] and his good works, except he be inflated by that foolish pride of boasting which the apostle restrains when he says, "By grace are ye saved, through faith [*Gratia salvi facti estis per fidem*]" [Eph 2:8]. (*Enchiridion* 1.9.30)

We have no choice here, but to notice that Augustine's liberty-*libertas* can be granted solely by a liberator, who effects the restoration of the fallen, corrupted, incapacitated nature, and therefore of its ontic power. *Libertas* is not that condition with which man

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[19] The analogy with suicide is remarkable here, since it postulates that the fall was in a fundamental sense similar to an act of suicide. The iconology of the fall and suicide can yield, most probably, new insights into the psychology of freedom and necessity (to recall that a suicide's option for nothingness and peace is merely an illusion in Augustine, as we have seen above). For our immediate purposes it is sufficient to note that Augustine argues for a substantive loss of nature when man fell, which equates with, say, losing a limb or even life. If the *liberum arbitrium* committed suicide, it is impossible to think that it has the power to restore itself anymore. A further iconology would lead us to analogizing restoration with both liberation and resurrection.

[20] Here we have the astounding statement that a fallen man, whose *liberum arbitrium* committed suicide, is free only to commit sin (*peccandum liber est*). In terms of freedom, man has a master now, and his master is sin.

[21] In being free only to commit sin, man has to be liberated from his incapacitated condition, and precisely liberated from powerlessness and sin. Since whatever man deliberates, decides, and chooses to practice it will merely be sin, that is corrupted, deranked, and slave-like. Again, this condition arises only as a result of the corruption of power-nature.

comes into this world. Even worse, man comes into this world with a corrupted *liberum arbitrium*. Thus *libertas* is not merely a restoration of *liberum arbitrium* and of *libera voluntas* (or *proairesis*), it constitutes a rejoining to God and thus an effective upgrading in power. This power is given solely by grace (not through the merit of man's own work), and the process is called redemption-liberation.

Now let us see how Augustine describes a world-version where the ontic power, on which we insisted at length above, is finally restored and even a new power, the power of true freedom (*vera libertas*) is granted. In the *City of God*, Augustine gives one of the most compact, and, one might say, the most beautiful, description of what he means by such terms as power, possibility, and freedom in the world-version of the Kingdom of God:

> Now the fact that they will be powerless [*non poterunt*] to delight in sin does not entail that they will have no free will [*liberum arbitrium non habebunt*: will have no power of choice]. In fact, the will will be freer [*magis quippe erit liberum*] in that it is freed [*liberatum*][22] from a delight in sin and immovably fixed in a delight in not sinning. The first freedom of will [*liberum arbitrium*], given to man when he was created upright [*rectus*] at the beginning,[23] was an ability not to sin [*potuit non peccare*], combined with the possibility of sinning [*sed potuit et peccare*].[24] But this last freedom [in the Kingdom of God] will be more potent [*potentius erit*], for it will bring the impossibility of sinning [*quo peccare non poterit*][25]; yet this also will be the result of God's gift, not of some inherent quality of nature

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[22] Augustine here states something which should not be overlooked, or which should be insisted upon. *Liberum arbitrium*, the ontic condition of a created man or of a fallen man, is preserved in paradise, only that its status now is to be liberated, and thus much freer.

[23] Here 'in the beginning' means the creation of Adam in paradise.

[24] Now, here ability is the synonym of power, and possibility is the synonym of choice. We see that there is a synergy between ability and possibility, where possibility is effectively the actualized power.

[25] 'Impossibility of sinning' (*quo peccare non poterit*) could be also translated as 'with powerlessness, inability to sin,' since the status of having the power counts.

[*non suae possibilitate naturae*].[26] For to be a partaker of God is not the same as to be God; the inability to sin belongs to God's nature [*Deus natura peccare non potest*],[27] while he who partakes of God's nature receives the impossibility of sinning [*ut peccare non possit*][28] as a gift from God. Moreover, the stages[29] of the divine gift had to be preserved. Free will was given first [*ut primum daretur liberum arbitrium*], with the ability not to sin [*quo non peccare homo posset*]; and the last gift [*novissimum*] was the inability to sin [*quo peccare non posset*]. The first freedom was designed for acquiring merit; the last was concerned with the reception of a reward. But because human nature sinned when it had the power to sin it is set free by a more abundant gift of grace [*largiore gratia liberatur*] so that it may be brought to that condition of liberty [*libertatem*] in which it is incapable of sin [*in qua peccare non possit*].[30] For the first immortality [*prima immortalitas*], which Adam lost by sinning, was the ability not to die [*posse non mori*]; the final immortality will be the inability to die [*non posse mori*].[31] In the same way, the first free will [*primum liberum arbitrium*] is the ability not to sin [*posse non peccare*]; the final freedom [*novissimum*] will confer the inability to sin [*non posse peccare*].[32] For as man cannot lose the will to happiness [*voluntas*

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[26] Augustine is scrupulous in stressing that this new freedom (which he called in *Enchiridion libertas*) is a gift, not a quality of nature (not an ontic freedom).

[27] Here we have a clear conjunction of nature and power, God's nature is unable, 'powerless', to sin, that is, God as person by his very nature is unable to sin.

[28] Again, to participate in nature is to participate in power. Augustine, as far as I know, has no explicit category of hypostatic union (Augustine died in 430, before the doctrine was formulated explicitly), but this description of co-inherence of natures in the Kingdom of God comes as close as possible to the Chalcedonian (451) conceptualization.

[29] This is an explicit statement that man's nature and power are upgraded in degrees and stages.

[30] The powerlessness, inability to choose sin is qualified as the condition of *libertas*, and it is available only in the City of God.

[31] Adam had the power not to die when he was first created, but now he will be unable to die, which means now he will be unable to choose death (similarly as we are unable to choose suicide now, being healthy and in charge of our capacities, although we might have the power to choose suicide). Person-versions and world-versions are important tools for visualizing power and choice.

[32] It should be noted that Augustine calls the final capacity, the final and new freedom *liberum arbitrium,* although we agreed that its best name is *libertas.* This is because *liberum arbitrium* contains and conveys the concept of power, while *libertas* might not be

> *felicitatis*], so he will not be able to lose the will to piety and justice [*voluntas pietatis et aequitatis*].[33] By sinning we lose our hold on piety and happiness; and yet in losing our happiness we do not lose the will [*voluntatem*] to happiness.[34] Certainly, God himself cannot sin; are we therefore to say that God has no free will [*Certe Deus ipse numquid, quoniam peccare non potest, ideo liberum arbitrium habere negandus est*: Is God Himself in truth to be denied to have free will, because He cannot sin]?[35]
>
> In the Heavenly City then, there will be freedom of will. It will be one and the same freedom in all [*voluntas libera*],[36] and indivisible in the separate individuals. It will be freed [*liberata*] from all evil and filled with all good, enjoying unfailingly the delight of eternal joys, forgetting all offences, forgetting all punishments. Yet it will not forget its own liberation [*liberationis*], nor be ungrateful to its liberator [*liberatori suo*]. (*City of God,* XXII: 30)

We insisted on the concept of freedom and power in Augustine for many reasons. The concept of freedom is central to the Dostoevskian iconostasis as we saw in diagrams [3.1] and [3.2]. We find Augustine congenial to Dostoevsky in that both thinkers cannot think of freedom without the concept of power.

Let us now turn to the indispensable examples from Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*, which iconize power and freedom with equal force to that of Augustine.

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that specific. Since the first power of choice (*liberum arbitrium*) sinned, the new upgraded power of choice will be unable to sin.

[33] The will (*voluntas*) to happiness, piety, and justice is effected through choice, since *voluntas* is choice, that is the exercise of the power of *liberum arbitrium*.

[34] We might have the will to happiness (*voluntas*) even when we do not have the power to carry it out. Then it simply becomes whish or hope for happiness, in need of a liberator with the power to effect it.

[35] The strategy of person-version is forcefully illustrated here by ascribing to God himself the *liberum arbitrium*. But once we equate *liberum arbitrium* with power, the assertion will appear to be less scandalous. God cannot sin, since he cannot choose to sin. He certainly has the power to sin, but not the will-choice to sin. Similarly man, once upgraded to the condition of *libertas* and new power of a new *liberum arbitrium*, will not have the willingness and the choice to sin.

[36] Here Augustine explicitly expresses the choice-capacity in terms of *voluntas libera*. This *voluntas* will be unified and freed from the powerlessness of evil and will delight in happiness.

b) Freedom and Choice in Dostoevsky

Dostoevsky's concept of freedom is thematized and iconized in an iconologic field, which functions as an iconostasis where icons are structured in a trinitarian fashion. Thus freedom generates a ternary structure of freedom, faith, and love on the level of Christ, but also a ternary structure of burden of choice (freedom of choice), faith, and miracle on the level of the Second Temptation (see, for instance the diagrams [2.2] and [3.1]).

But internally the concept of freedom is a hybrid tension between power and choice, or, better still, between power of choice (ontic power) and freedom of choice (ontic choice),[37] as we have seen in Augustine, for which usually the metonymic solution is found in calling it simply 'the freedom of choice.' Now the question arises how does the internal hybridization of freedom cast itself in Dostoevsky (the *sila*-power aspect of freedom we have discussed on the section 'Ontic Power in Dostoevsky') when considered in its relation to the external hypostatic coherence given by all the icons of the three temptations.

In the quote below, the Grand Inquisitor is maximally aware of the conundrums of freedom, and he interprets freedom precisely in terms of freedom of choice (*svoboda*

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[37] It appears that there is still another advantage to the identity between *libera voluntas* and ontic choice, namely, even if we have a compulsory choice, a choice which is not entirely free, it still remains an ontic choice up to that person. There still is another way for handling the will as faculty by calling it ontic will, which is not a will driven, say, by God, that is, it is not God's will.

vybora) and freedom-*libertas* (*svoboda*), which coincides with the main distinction in Augustine:

> Now see [*vzgliani*][38] what you did next. And all again in the *name of freedom* [*vo imia svobody*]! I tell you that man has no more tormenting care [*net zaboty muchitel'nee*][39] than to find someone to whom he can hand over as quickly as possible that *gift of freedom* [*dar svobody*] with which the miserable creature is born.[40] But he alone can take over the freedom of men who appeases their conscience [*sovest'*].[41] With bread you were given an indisputable banner: give man bread and he will bow down to you,[42] for there is nothing more indisputable than bread. But if at the same time someone else takes over his conscience [*ovladeet ego sovest'iu*][43]---oh, then he will even throw down [*brosit*] your bread and follow him who has seduced [*obol'stit*][44] his conscience. In this you were

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[38] This is a synonym for 'judge for yourself,' since what follows is synonymic with "what are the consequences of your choices.' Christ performed choices through the exercise of his freedom, in the name of freedom. But precisely the word freedom would be an empty and blind concept, unless we were prepared to scrutinize it in terms of power and choice.

[39] Here man is under the torment of 'deliberation' before a choice is made 'to hand over' his gift of freedom.

[40] This is precisely the ontic gift, the ontic power contained in the innate freedom; the semantics of the gift reminds us of Augustine's God-given ontic freedom (*liberum arbitrium* plus *libera voluntas*).

[41] In Augustinian terminology, who liberates them from the burden of suffering for sins, and from the burden of choosing good and evil.

[42] Effectively, the Grand Inquisitor says, that man will choose to bow down to Christ, to worship Christ, without any deliberation, but in a pure choice before an overwhelming, indisputable evidence. Again we judge freedom in terms of choices and what imposes itself as more powerful, here also cognitively powerful.

[43] *Ovladet'* comes from *vlast'* – political power, whose operational modality is more ideological than ontic, targeting man's conscience. And conscience is an ethical entity, dealing in terms of good and evil. Here conscience is equatable with *libera voluntas* or *proairesis*, that is, with freedom of choice (*svoboda vybora*).

[44] One can construct a potent religious paradigm governed by the concept *iskushat'* (to tempt) that comprises words like *obol'stit'* (to seduce), *soblaznit'* (to lure). This kind of a semantic field would handle concepts that correlate with choice and choicelessness, as well as with the capacity to oppose an evil intent coming to invade man's power and freedom of choice.

right. For the mystery of man's being is not only in living, but in what one lives for. Without a firm idea of what he lives for, man will not consent to live and will sooner destroy himself than remain on earth, even if there is bread all around him.[45] That is so, but what came of it? Instead of taking over [*ovladet'*] men's freedom [*svobodoi*], you increased [*ty uvelichil ee*] it still more for them! Did you forget that peace [*spokoistvie*: tranquility, lack of disturbance] and even death [*smert'*][46] are dearer to man [*cheloveku dorozhe*] than *free choice* [*svobodnogo vybora*] in the knowledge of good and evil [*v poznanii dobra i zla*]? There is nothing more seductive [*obol'stitel'nee*] for man than the freedom of his conscience [*svoboda ego sovesti*], but there is nothing more tormenting [*muchitel'nee*] either. And so, instead of a firm foundation for appeasing [*uspokoienia*] human conscience [*sovesti chelovecheskoi*] once and for all, you chose [*vzial*: took][47] everything that was unusual, enigmatic, and indefinite, you chose [*vzial*] everything that was beyond men's strength [*ne po silam*: not within the power], and thereby acted [*postupil*][48] as if you did not love them at all-and

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[45] Any choice is goal-driven; if there are no goals, but merely a sheer, naked subsistence, why choose at all? Or, choice is inherently a choice if and only if it is inscribed within a meaningful practice. Here we see that the specter of inanity is palpably present: meaninglessness can trigger an ontic threat of nonbeing. We should keep in mind that the hypostatic principle of joint operational intericonic force is central in Dostoevsky.

[46] Here we can recall Augustine's conflation of peace and death in the case of suicides. Dostoevsky says even more, that the freedom of choice alone is so burdensome that death is considered as an option of a final choice.

[47] This 'mistranslation' is a good opportunity for specifying what kind of freedom is exercised by Christ (see also note 6 in the section 'The First Temptation'). We are referring in this note to the confessional or theological Christ, not to the fictional Dostoevskian Christ of the novel. The confessional Christ himself does not exercise freedom of choice, his freedom being *telemic*. The exercise of freedom of choice, of the *proairetic* freedom, entails deliberation and degrees of knowledge (to make an 'informed' choice): Christ is not constrained by such difficulties. Christ's will is nature (divine nature), he does not need to choose, he just straightforwardly, naturally acts. In Orthodoxy, *proairetic* freedom is called gnomic freedom, person-dependent freedom, a freedom that is not part of the hypostatic person of Christ. 'Gnomic' means intentionality-driven freedom, and well-formed intentionality results from deliberation that ultimately yields choice (*proairesis*). Being exclusively human and personal, gnomic freedom is constrained by sin, and Christ assumed, enhypostatized only human nature unaffected by sin (see, for instance, Louth, Andrew. *Maximus the Confessor*. 1996:61-62).

[48] To act is to enter the chain of choices within a praxis. The Russian translation for the Aristotelian praxis is *postupok* (see *Aristotel'. Nikomakhova Etika*. Moskva: Eksmo Press. Translation by Nina Braginskaia, 1997). Once we realize that *postupok* is action

> who did this? He who came to give his life for them! Instead of taking over [*ovladet'*; *vlast'*: power] men's freedom [*liudskoi svobodoi*], you *increased it* [*umnozhil ee*] and forever burdened [*obremenel*] the kingdom of the human soul with its torments. You desired [*vozzhelal*] the free love [*svobodnoi liubvi*] of man, that he should follow you freely, seduced and captivated by you. Instead of the firm ancient law man had [*dolzhen*][49] henceforth to decide [*reshat'*][50] for himself, with a free heart [*svobodnym serdtsem*], what is good and what is evil [*chto dobro i chto zlo*], having only your image [*tvoi obraz*] before him as a guide - but did it not occur to you that he would eventually reject [*otvergnet*] and dispute [*osporit*][51] even your image [*tvoi obraz*] and your truth [*tvoiu pravdu*][52] if he was oppressed by so terrible a burden as *freedom of choice* [*svoboda vybora*]? (emphasis added) (254-255; 14:436)

The quote above is one of the most difficult to analyze, due to the synonymic series it generates. Thus the concept of 'freedom of choice' (*svoboda vybora*), is terminologically recast as 'free heart' (*svobodnoe serdtse*), 'burden' (*bremia*), 'freedom of conscience' (*svoboda sovesti*), and 'free love' (*svoboda liubvi*). Freedom of choice (*svoboda vybora*)

(praxis) following a deliberation and a decision-choice (even more significantly, Christ's soteriological choice), we inscribe such acts within the paradigm of freedom. Bakhtin's book on responsibility of *praxis-postupok* (*Towards of Philosophy of the Act*. Austin: University of Texas Press. Translated and notes by Vadim Liapunov, 1993) is relevant for Dostoevskian strategies of freedom, since it champions a responsibility of "non-alibi in Being": "That which can be done by me can never be done by anyone else. The uniqueness or singularity of present-on-hand being is completely obligatory. This fact of my non-alibi in Being [tells me that] *everyone* occupies a unique and never-repeatable place, *any* being is once-occurrent. [...] This acknowledgement of the uniqueness of my participation in Being is the actual and effectual foundation of my life and my performed deed [*postupka*]" (1993:40).

[49] *Dolg* is duty, meaning that man will be under duty to decide responsibly on matters of choice.

[50] Another term indicating the burden of deliberation, but of a deliberation with more options and less guidance, and therefore maximizing freedom and responsibility, and taxing the very ontic capacity of man's powers.

[51] That is, on the basis of new evidence, the evidence of man's powerlessness to bear the terrible burden of freedom, man will make blasphemous choices. Again, power and choice combine in a meaningful personologic unit.

[52] *Tvoiu pravdu* would translate as your righteousness, ethical truth, since the epistemological truth is *istina*.

is thus concerned with the burden of good and evil ('man had henceforth to decide for himself, with a free heart, what is good and what evil'), and this concern makes it an equivalent of both *libera voluntas* and *liberum arbitrium* (and thus also of *proairesis*).

The main assertion of the Grand Inquisitor states that Christ, instead of alleviating man's burden of choice, to the contrary increased it: "Instead of taking over men's freedom [*liudskoi svobodoi*], you increased it [*umnozhil ee*] and forever burdened [*obremenil*] the kingdom of the human soul with its torments." This should be understood in the context of other imputations, according to which Christ removed the ancient law as guidance, and left to man only uncertainties and indeterminacies: "everything that was unusual, enigmatic, and indefinite." The sole possible guidance in the process of responsible ethical decision-making is the icon of Christ: man has to decide "for himself, with a free heart [*svobodnym serdtsem*], what is good and what is evil [*chto dobro i chto zlo*], having only your image [*tvoi obraz*] before him as a guide.'

Now, the main meaning of Christ's icon is derived from his strategy of choosing when faced with the temptations: he does not choose to cancel human freedom of choice. And by removing previous scriptural constraints he even increases that very freedom of choice: it is not a power increase, it does not represent an upgrading of nature. The Grand Inquisitor raises the imputation that Christ had too much confidence in the innate capacity of man to be free, and now, as we have seen in our analysis of the three temptations, the Grand Inquisitor points out to Christ how wrong and misguided Christ has been, since man is a powerless slave. And precisely here we encounter the new kerygma of freedom that the Legend expresses: Christ did not come to liberate man from his supposedly corrupted and fallen free will, Christ did not come with an additional

libertas which would be designed to cancel all natural weakness in man, on the contrary, Christ came to authenticate the human will's good and noble current condition.

The Dostoevskian Christ proclaims his *kerygma* (religious message) as follows: man is good as he is, man was not created a weakling, or in jest; the meaning of man resides in his freedom of choice marked by a specifically human power. Christ's freedom (*svoboda-libertas*) in the Legend, it must be argued, is a liberation but a liberation from the misconceived or misbegotten idea that man's freedom of choice (and thus *svoboda vybora*, *liberum arbitrium*, *libera voluntas*, and *proairesis*) is insufficient for man's dignity and responsibility. That is why Christ kisses the Grand Inquisitor at the end of the Legend and leaves him with his freedom of choice.

For the purposes of facilitating the grasping of freedom in Dostoevsky let me reproduce here the diagram from our interpretation of the Second Temptation:

[2.2]

	SATAN	CHRIST	GRAND INQUISITOR
TEMPTATIONS	QUESTION	ANSWER	INTERPRETATION
FIRST TEMPTATION	Bread	Freedom	Mystery
SECOND TEMPTATION	Good-evil of conscience	Faith	Miracle

The above iconostasis could be better specified for our current purposes by substituting good and evil of conscience with its hypostatic equivalent, freedom of choice (*svoboda vybora*):

[4.1]

	SATAN	CHRIST	GRAND INQUISITOR
TEMPTATIONS	QUESTION	ANSWER	INTERPRETATION
FIRST TEMPTATION	Bread	Freedom *Svoboda*	Mystery
SECOND TEMPTATION	*Svoboda Vybora* Freedom of choice	Faith	Miracle

Since above, as well as on the level of the Second Temptation, we established that the 'good and evil of conscience' is identical to the freedom of choice and thus, we can say now that both are identical to another two icons of freedom: *liberum arbitrium* and *proairesis*. Let us position the Augustinian *liberum arbitrium* and *libertas* within the Dostoevskian iconostasis:

[4.2]

	SATAN	CHRIST	GRAND INQUISITOR
TEMPTATIONS	QUESTION	ANSWER	INTERPRETATION
FIRST TEMPTATION	Bread	*Libertas*	Mystery
SECOND TEMPTATION	*Liberum arbitrium libera voluntas*	Faith	Miracle

Paradoxically, the Dostoevskian *svoboda*, championed by the Christ of the Legend, targets precisely the Augustinian *libertas* and its necessity: now man does not need the Augustinian *libertas*, whose intent is to 'restore' man to his 'previous' condition, or to 'upgrade' man to a higher condition. The Dostoevskian '*libertas*' wants to liberate man from the current need for the Augustinian *libertas*. Christ's *svoboda* proclaims that man must rely on his gift of ontic powers as they are and exercise his freedom of choice on the basis of those good and sufficient powers, without any excuse or expectation of an unwarranted *libertas*, that might come in its guise of an upgrade of nature, or of a transfer

into a different world-version: through such a misguided focus man fails to exercise his world-bound freedom of choice and love. The future world-version and its *libertas*, however, is not abrogated by Christ (Christ does not practice reduction or destruction of worlds), but Christ was incarnated into this world's hypostatic present for the benefit of glorifying this world-version and its unique freedom of choice and unique love, unrepeatable and unreplicatable in any other world-version (as Zosima proves).

On the other hand, the Grand Inquisitor wants a Christ that would come with an Augustinian *libertas*, with the liberation from an impotent, as he claims, freedom of choice. Failing to receive the gift of liberation from Christ, the Grand Inquisitor turns to Satan's '*libertas*', to Satan's proposed liberation from the burden of choice through his three temptations. The consequence is that humankind will voluntarily hand over the freedom of choice to the Grand Inquisitor. The Grand Inquisitor will not overpower man's free choice by force, to the contrary, and ironically, humanity will exercise its freedom of choice to get rid of the human freedom of choice:

> Oh, we shall convince them that they will only become free when they resign their freedom to us, and submit to us. Will we be right, do you think, or will we be lying? They themselves will be convinced that we are right, for they will remember to what horrors of slavery and confusion your freedom led them. Freedom [*svoboda*], free reason [*svobodnyi um*], and science will lead them into such a maze, and confront them with such miracles and insoluble mysteries, that some of them, unruly and ferocious, will exterminate themselves; others, unruly but feeble [*malosil'nye*], will exterminate each other; and the remaining third, feeble and wretched, will crawl to our feet and cry out to us: "Yes, you were right, you alone possess his mystery, and we are coming back to you - save [*spasite*] us from ourselves." (258; 14:235)

The Grand Inquisitor effectively says that human beings are not only weak, but that in addition, iconologically, they received a noxious doctrine. Here the Grand Inquisitor is careful to show to Christ that he is not practicing a tyrannical power, that he is not

deceiving man about his powerlessness. The Grand Inquisitor is sincere in his belief that man is constituted defectively and in jest, being a wretched creature and thus in need of salvation and liberation from the freedom of choice (from his ontic freedom). Salvation from the freedom of choice is a reduction in the status of person, and by derivation also a reduction in the status of nature, since, as the Grand Inquisitor claims, the strong one will perish or commit suicide, and the humanity will be reduced to the weaklings alone. But that reduction is possible precisely because of the misassessment of nature and the misuses of nature by the strong. Thus the only strong standing will be those, like the Grand Inquisitor, who chose Satan's liberation (we can notice here the ironic reference to Augustinian liberation and *libertas*) from the delusions of the free will and its freedom of choice. The Grand Inquisitor's will, similarly to God's omnipresent will in paradise, will be the only will carrying the burden of decision and choice, and every person will be doing the Grand Inquisitor's will. Thus the Grand Inquisitor plays the role of God within the new Trinity that impostorially usurps Christ's image (his iconology) and mysteriously assimilates (through gnosis and choice) the ontic powers of Satan. This intricate trinitarian polyphony (personology) is exercised through the dialogic interplay of icons.

A cautionary note is in order here. We must not forget that the polyphonic and iconologic interdependency of the entities in the novel complicates and nuances any statement once we introduce an additional person (in this case, say, Zosima). It is sufficient, however, to state that this version of Christ pertains to the Grand Inquisitor and Ivan, and that in being iconologic (dialogic) and polyphonic (personologic) it can be variously correlated with other icons and persons of the novel.

The Augustinian conceptualization of freedom proves to be indispensable to students of Dostoevsky's fiction, especially when tackling the aporias of God's relation to freedom and man in Dostoevsky. Berdiaev, an Orthodox existentialist philosopher, tries to present Dostoevsky's freedom in Augustinian terms also, and his take on Dostoevsky's freedom, it seems to us, offers a good comparative basis for our own approach:

> There are two sorts of freedom, initial and final, and between the two stretches man's road, beset with suffering, the road of inner division. St. Augustine, also, in his campaign against Pelagianism had taught that there were two freedoms, *libertas minor* and *libertas maior*. The lesser freedom was the beginning, freedom to choose the good, which supposes the possibility of sin; the greater freedom was the ending, freedom in God, in the bosom of God. Augustine was the apologist of the second and greater freedom, and at last reached the doctrine of predestination which, though the Church had modified it where it concerns freedom, may nevertheless be said to have had an influence on Catholicism's being unfavorable to freedom. He sanctioned persecution and death penalty for heretics. Anyway, it is certain that there are two freedoms and not one only, the first to choose between good and evil, the last in the heart of good – an irrational freedom and a freedom within reason. Socrates knew only the second of these, the rational freedom. And the words of the gospel, 'You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free,' also refers to the second freedom, freedom in Christ. [...] The dignity of man and the dignity of faith require the recognition of two freedoms, freedom to choose the truth and freedom in the truth. Freedom cannot be identified with goodness or truth or perfection: its nature is distinctive [*samobytnuiu prirodu*], it is freedom and not goodness. Any identification or confusion of freedom with goodness and perfection involves a negation of freedom and a strengthening of methods of compulsion; obligatory goodness ceases to be goodness by the fact of its constraint. But free goodness, which alone is true, entails the liberty [*svobodu*] of evil. That is the tragedy that Dostoevsky saw and studied, and it contains the mystery of Christianity. Its tragic dialectic works out thus: Goodness cannot be compulsory, one cannot compel to goodness. Freedom of goodness involves the freedom of evil; but freedom of evil leads to the destruction of freedom itself and its degeneration into an evil necessity. On the other hand, the denial of the freedom of evil in favor of an exclusive freedom of good ends equally in a negation of freedom and its degeneration – into a good necessity. But a good necessity is not good, because goodness resides in freedom. (*Dostoevsky* 1957:68-70)

Berdiaev endows freedom of choice with an irrational component, while calling libertas

'rational freedom.' He effectively expends freedom of choice and reduces the second freedom, *libertas*, to a Socratic and thus proairetic freedom, where the rule is the maximizing of the good, knowledge, and reason. The irrational component, on Berdiaev's interpretation of Dostoevsky's Christianity (with whose correctness we could easily agree), asserts its ontic right to practice evil, to choose willfully the option which is not regulated by any legal or ethical normativity, except one's freedom of choice. No necessity of any kind could override the autonomy of the personal freedom.

Clearly, since at any time a person will reside within some kind of necessity, it will never be completely free. Berdiaev seems to be quite original (despite his ontic and modal incoherence in handling necessity and freedom: only if there is necessity there is freedom from it, or else why need empty freedom at all) in his thinking, in that he says, that freedom is the revolt against necessity (and it should be understood as generalized necessity, good or evil). There is no 'good' necessity (this thought is extremely aporetic at best). But Berdiaev captures perfectly well, the nature of the irrational freedom, which is the freedom to commit evil, not merely to err. Irrational freedom is the hopeless revolt against any necessity, that's why it is irrational. And one cannot imagine, for instance, anyone choosing hell, unless one postulates an irrational freedom, and in Dostoevsky persons freely choose hell, they are not sentenced to it (as Zosima's world-version proves).

Strictly ontologically, however, we must say that in a world without necessity (and equally, Aristotle would say, probability), *proairesis* or irrational freedom would be impossible, let alone Christ's liberty. No world-version is possible without an underlying necessity (usually captured by, so-called, alethic modalities: necessity, possibility,

impossibility[53]).

Certainly, for Augustine this irrational freedom which Berdiaev identifies, quite paradoxically, in the heart of Christianity, would simply be irredeemably perverse freedom, perverse imitation of freedom (which he mentions in the case of the theft of pears in his *Confessions*). But what in essence Berdiaev and Dostoevsky are saying is that precisely Christianity guaranties the irrational freedom, a freedom not guided by any compulsory good, any compulsory goal of ethics or soteriology. Christ did not come to obviate the irrational freedom but to secure the right to it, there was no apocalyptic liberation coming from Christ's power that would impose compulsory goodness of a superior liberty. That liberty has to be freely chosen, without any intervention from grace, or even doctrine (the weaklings effectively inherited only an image-icon of Christ, of which they can make little use, and no power, implementible doctrine, or liberty). That is the supreme message of Christ to the Grand Inquisitor, for instance.

Let us now see how Berdiaev exemplifies a new Christian behavior that is mindful of the fact that to commit evil is not necessarily a birthright, but it certainly is something edifying for the new Christianity. In Augustine, as we have seen above, and in Dostoevsky (see "Zosima's World-Version"), suicide is a delusion. Now, at times, the act of suicide, most certainly, is genuinely committed, is it then a sign of freedom or perversity? For Augustine it would be clear that suicide is a perverse freedom and a perverse search for peace, but not for Ivan, or Ipollit (in *The Idiot*), or for Stavrogin and Kirillov (in *The Possessed*). And it sounds frivolous to say that those noble characters are

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[53] See Doležel, Lubomir. 1976a. "Narrative Modalities." *Journal of Literary Semantics*, 5.1:5-14

simply hell-bound since some of them committed suicide. Berdiaev argues masterfully, for instance, Stavrogin's case from Dostoevsky's *The Possessed.* Stavrogin, a powerful, charismatic person, sunken into utmost debauchery and willfulness of action ultimately commits suicide, and Berdiaev argues in favor of his liberation from hell (see 1989b). Thus Berdiaev:

> In Dostoevsky the very problem of debauchery, dissoluteness, depravity is immeasurably more profound than the problem of sin. Through perdition it is revealed more than through religious wellbeing. Stavrogin is not solely a negative phenomenon, neither is his perdition irreversible. [...] After a tragic perdition, a new birth will follow, resurrection will take place. And with our love towards Stavrogin we will precipitate his resurrection. Dostoevsky himself loved Stavrogin too much to acquiesce in his perdition. [...] For us that kind of faith is impossible, in which there is no salvation for Stavrogin, in which there is no outlet for his powers [*silam*] into creativity. (1989b:110)

Praying for or strongly loving the damned, not merely praying for the sinful, it seems to us, is unthinkable for an Augustine, who placed justice above the person. The new *kerygma* of love proclaimed by Dostoevsky's Christianity, Berdiaev thinks, renders a person irreducible to either justice or damnation. Dostoevsky's God, Berdiaev seems to claim, practices predetermination, only that it is a pandeterminism of mercy and love, and any damnation is exclusively by free choice; even better: in Dostoevsky, no genuinely free person would think that God's business is to practice *eternal* damnation.

Let us now bring some new examples of personal freedom in *The Brothers Karamazov.* The most impressive way of free behavior we encounter in the case of elders-*startsi*, whose best representatives are Zosima and Alyosha:

> What, then, is an elder? An elder is one who takes [*berushchii*][54] your soul, your will [*vashu voliu*] into his soul and into his will. Having chosen [*izbrav*] an

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[54] Here 'to take' expressly means 'to choose', but it is a unique choice. By choosing, a

elder, you renounce [*otreshaetes'*] your will [*ot svoei voli*] and give it [*otdaete*] to him under total obedience [*v polnoe poslushanie*] and with total self-renunciation [*s polnym samootresheniem*]. A man who dooms himself [*obrekaiushchii sebia*] to this trial [*iskus*],[55] this terrible [*strashnuiu*][56] school of life, does so [*prinimaet*: accepts, chooses] voluntarily [*dobrovol'no*],[57] in the hope [*v nadezhde*] that after the long trial [*iskusa*] he will achieve self-conquest [*pobedit' sebia*], self-mastery [*ovladet' soboiu*][58] to such a degree that he will, finally' through a whole life's obedience, attain to perfect freedom [*sovershennoi svobody*][59] - that is, freedom from himself [*svobody ot samogo sebia*]- and avoid the lot of those who live their whole lives without finding themselves in themselves. This invention-that is, the institution of elders-is not a theoretical one, but grew in the East out of a practice that in our time is already more than a thousand years old. The obligations [*obiazannosti*] due to an elder are not the same as the ordinary "obedience" [*poslushanie*] that has

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hypostatic transfer occurs, a transfer of substance takes place, and therefore the personologic substance (the soul and the will) becomes common. It should be noticed that both the soul and the will of one person are hypostatized into the soul and the will of another person. It becomes obvious already here that the problematic of freedom acquires or obeys different and unprecedented rules on the interpersonal level. A good approach to the monastic 'freedom' is given in the book by Hausherr, Irénée SJ. 1990. *Spiritual Direction in the Early Christian East.* Michigan: Kalamazoo. Translated from French by Anthony P. Gythiel.

[55] A related expression that contains *iskus*, *monasheskii iskus* - translates as 'novitiate.' The word *iskus* (trial, ordeal, probation) has the same root as *iskushenie* (temptation), words that modalize a person, and test the power of his personal nature, and therefore a person's freedom. The entire exercise of self-renunciation and obedience is instituted freely to test the natural limits of a person in order to acquire new spiritual and natural powers as a basis for a new freedom.

[56] Again, here we encounter the central iconic word of the novel, *strashnyi*, which, as we recall, is used to describe the *strashbyi dukh nebytia* (the dread spirit of nonbeing).

[57] *Prinimaet dobrovol'no* (chooses voluntarily) is the best illustration of a new freedom in obedience exercised through the mechanisms of deliberation and decision.

[58] *Ovladet'* (to overpower, to take control) is related to *vlast'* (power), and, to still another relevant term in this semantic field, *vlastelin* (master). To achieve mastery over oneself simply means not to be a slave of oneself, and such metamorphosis is possible only through the interpersonal initiation by 'slavery-obedience'

[59] This perfect freedom resembles the Augustinian *libertas*, only that it is achievable in this world. Effectively, an entire life is needed and is sacrificed for this exploit of self-freeing from oneself; this is also the main reason for why this sacrifice appears to be terrifying.

> always existed in our Russian monasteries as well. All disciples accept an eternal confession to the elder, and an indissoluble bond between the one who binds and the one who is bound. They say, for instance, that once in the early days of Christianity there was such a disciple who, having failed to fulfill a certain obedience imposed on him by his elder, left his monastery in Syria and went to another country, to Egypt. There, after a long life of great asceticism, it was finally granted him to suffer torture and die a martyr for the faith. When the Church, already venerating him as a saint, went to bury his body, suddenly, at the deacon's exclamation: 'All catechumens, depart,' the coffin containing the martyr's body tore from its place and cast itself out of the church. This happened three times. In the end, it was discovered that this holy martyr had broken his obedience [*poslushanie*] and left his elder, and therefore could not be forgiven without the elder's absolution, even despite his great deeds. The elder was summoned and absolved him of his obedience, and only then could his burial take place. Of course, all that is only ancient legend, but here is a recent fact: one of our contemporary monks was seeking salvation on Mount Athos, and suddenly his elder ordered him to leave Athos, which he loved and adored with all his soul as a haven of peace, and go first to Jerusalem to venerate the holy places, and then back to Russia, to the north, to Siberia: "Your place is there, not here." Stricken and overcome with grief, the monk went to Constantinople, to the Ecumenical Patriarch; and implored him to release him from his obedience, but the Ecumenical bishop replied that not only was he, the Ecumenical Patriarch, unable to release him but there neither was nor could be any power [*vlasti*] on earth that could release him from his obedience, once it had been imposed by the elder, except the power [*vlasti*] of the very elder who had imposed it. (27-28)

The power (*vlast'*; usually political or master over slave power) of an elder here is not his ontic power (*sila*), but a contractually instituted interpersonal power to rule over another person. And within this power's domain one places the range of freedoms that order a life and its freedoms.

As we see, a person is projected in terms of will, freedom, obligation, obedience, and many other things. But what counts most is the statement of interpersonality, the kind of perichoretic interpersonal existence, simply meaning that the personal substance of a person (intents, emotions, thought patterns) as well as its iconologic substance (sometimes reduced to the exclusivity of an uninterrupted prayer) are handed over to the

elder-*starets*. Iconologically, through confession, the entire construction of meaning states and processes is reviewed and systematically corrected by the elder.

Obviously this stuff of power is not without risks, especially in terms of freedom and person:

> Thus elders are, in certain cases, granted a boundless [*bespredel'noiu*] and inconceivable [*nepostizhimoiu*] power [*vlast'iu*]. That is why in many Russian monasteries the institution of elders was first met almost with persecution. Yet elders immediately found great respect among the people. For instance, common people as well as the highest nobility flocked to the elders of our monastery so that, prostrating before them, they could confess to them their doubts, their sins, their sufferings, and ask for advice and admonition. Seeing which, the opponents of the elders shouted, among other accusations, that here the sacrament of confession was being arbitrarily [*samovlastno*][60] and frivolously [*legkomyslenno*][61] degraded, although a disciple's or layman's ceaseless confession of his soul to the elder is not at all sacramental [*tainstvo*: a sacrament]. In the end, however, the institution of elders held out and is being established little by little in Russian monasteries. It is also true, perhaps, that this tested [*ispytannoe*] and already thousand-year-old instrument for the moral regeneration of man from slavery [*ot rabstva*] to freedom [*k svobode*] and to moral perfection may turn into a double-edged weapon, which may lead a person not to humility [*smirenia*] and ultimate [*okonchatel'nogo*] self-control [*samoobladania*] but, on the contrary, to the most satanic pride [*sataninskoi gordosti*] - that is, to fetters [*tsepiam*] and not to freedom [*svobode*]. (28-29)

It is to be noted that this new freedom is itself tested, which tests are administered by other persons. The freedom of humility however is one that follows the freedom of choice and its human, limited power. This freedom is practiced as the reaffirmation of humanity, of natural incapacity and sinfulness, but not in a damning sense, but as normal experience of evil and of human powerlessness. Otherwise even a *starets*-elder

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[60] *Samovlastno*, again relates to power, being constituted from *sam* (self) and *vlast'* (power) and it denotes the abuse of one's personal and interpersonal power willfully.

[61] *Legkomeslenno* correlates well with the lack of due deliberation that should underlie a valid choice, being thus a practice of a false freedom.

could overestimate his own power, which, as a norm, should remain at all times only human, and not fall into 'the most satanic pride.'

The Brothers Karamazov presents a powerful version of this risk of the satanic pride in Ivan's nightmare. The risk in the exercise of freedom of the will and power are presented by the devil in still another of Ivan's legends, a legend called 'Geological Cataclysm.' The central concept iconized by this legend is that of destruction (*razrushenie*) of the iconologic realm and foundation of a new world without God, but exclusively on the basis of the ontic power and ontic freedom, exalted to the degree of 'satanic pride'. What follows is a world-version made possible in direct opposition to the Augustinian scenario of freedom and happiness in the Kingdom of God, and in direct opposition to what elders would teach in their humility:

> "My friend, I know a most charming and dear young Russian gentleman: a thinker and a great lover of literature and other fine things, the author of a promising poem entitled 'The Grand Inquisitor' ...It was him only that I had in mind."
>
> "I forbid you to speak of 'The Grand Inquisitor,'" Ivan exclaimed, blushing all over with shame.
>
> "Well, and what about the 'Geological Cataclysm'? Remember that? What a poem!"
>
> "Shut up, or I'll kill you!"
>
> "Kill me? No, excuse me, but I will have my say. I came in order to treat myself to that pleasure. Oh, I love the dreams [*mechty*: daydreams] of my friends - fervent, young, trembling with the thirst for life! 'There are new people now, 'you decided [*reshil*][62] last spring, as you were preparing to come here, 'they propose to destroy [*razrushyt'*] everything and begin with anthropophagy.[63] Fools, they

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[62] Here we have a central word for choice: to decide (*reshat'*). What follows is an exposition of Ivan's deliberations and choices for action. We might recall, that the Grand Inquisitor tells Christ: 'decide (*reshi*) who was right,' foregrounding the moment of openness that a person constantly faces in his burden of choice.

[63] Ivan certainly thinks of socialists here, whose world-version implies more than simple destruction of the previous system of beliefs (iconology), it implies also 'anthropophagy'.

never asked me! In my opinion, there is no need to destroy anything, one need only destroy [*razrushit'*] the idea of God in mankind, that's where the business should start! One should begin with that, with that - oh, blind men, of no understanding! Once mankind has renounced [*otrechetsia*] God, one and all (and I believe that this period, analogous to the geological periods,[64] will come) , then the entire old world view will fall of itself, without anthropophagy, and, above all, the entire former morality, and everything will be new. People will come together in order to take from life all that it can give, but, of course, for happiness [*dlia schastia*] and joy [*i radosti*][65] in this world only [*tol'ko v zdeshnem mire*].[66] Man will be exalted [*vozvelichitsia*] with the spirit of divine [*bozheskoi*],[67] titanic pride [*gordosti*], and the man-god [*cheloveko-bog*][68] will appear. Man, his will

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The system of choices facing persons here, therefore, depends on their iconologic-cognitive power too, since Ivan complains about their foolishness and blindness.

[64] 'Geological period' is a concept that introduces a universalized ontic perspective, where everything is an exclusively natural event. In the legend about the 'Quadrillion of Kilometers,' as we shall see below, the devil repeats this idea within the framework of the universe-version of the eternal return.

[65] It is uncanny that all strategies for choices, from Aristotle and Augustine to Dostoevsky, have the same goal, expressed with the same conceptual apparatus: happiness, joy. In Dostoevsky, however, happiness and joy (*radost*) is something available here and now, in the current world-version (especially in Zosima and his brother Markel).

[66] The non-discrimination against any world-version is the main idea here; the current world, says a rebellious Ivan through the devil, deserves the entire amount of happiness and joy. This is effectively one of the central statements by Dostoevsky in *The Brothers Karamazov*: that this world-version's life *is* paradise. Markel, Zosimas' brother, in essence says the same thing as Ivan, only that nothing has to be destroyed ontically or iconologically in order to achieve full happiness and joyfulness: "[L]ife is paradise, and we are all in paradise, but we do not want to know it, and if we did want to know it, tomorrow there would be paradise the world over. [...] Why count the days, when even one day is enough for a man to know [*uznat'*] all happiness [*vse schastie*]" (288-289). This kind of happiness may be called hypostatic happiness, since one day alone in this world-version is able to contain the entire sense and substance of happiness. In Dostoevsky, paradise is constitutive of this world, and therefore contributes to this world's powers. This contrasts with Augustinian yearning for a different world and complete uninterrupted happiness, as we saw above. In Augustine, authentic happiness cannot be a hypostasis of this world, unlike in Dostoevsky.

[67] Here *bozheskoi* means god-like, similar to gods, explained further by the word 'titanic'; *bozhestvennyi* would be divine.

[68] The terms man-god (without God) and God-man (Christ) constitute the two alternatives

[*voleiu*][69] and his science no longer limited, conquering nature every hour, will thereby every hour experience such lofty delight as will replace for him all his former hopes [*upovania*][70] of heavenly delight. Each will know himself utterly mortal [*smerten ves'*], without resurrection, and will accept [*primet*] death proudly and calmly, like a god. Out of pride he will understand that he should not murmur against the momentariness of life [*chto zhizn' est' mgnovenie*: that life is only a moment], and he will love his brother then without any reward [*mzdy*]. Love will satisfy only the moment of life, but the very awareness of its momentariness will increase its fire, inasmuch as previously it was diffused in hopes [*rasplyvalas' v upovaniakh*][71] of an eternal love beyond the grave' ... well, and so on and so on, in the same vein. Lovely! [...] "'The question now "my young thinker reflected [*dumal*],[72] 'is whether or not it is possible for such a period ever to come. If it does come, then everything will be resolved and mankind will finally be settled. But since, in view of man's inveterate stupidity [*gluposti*],[73] it may not be settled for another thousand years, anyone who already knows the truth [*soznaiushchemu istinu*][74] is permitted to settle things for himself, absolutely as he wishes, on the

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for man's self-overcoming, and, in our terminology, of understanding of man's powers and freedom. The two alternatives were proposed by Soloviev, whom Dostoevsky knew very well (see Kostalevsky, Marina. 1997. *Dostoevsky and Soloviev: The Art of Integral Vision*. New Haven: Yale University Press).

[69] The importance of the will is decisive for its equivalence with freedom and thus power and choice. Man will be reduced to his exclusive ontic freedom (ontic power and ontic choice) without any hope or need for a different power or freedom (say, for *libertas*).

[70] Hope for heavenly happiness is Augustinian, and here we notice the precarious nature of hope: once man decides to be really free, his authentic freedom replaces the need for hope. Here, therefore, we have another explanation for the iconologic trinity assigned to Christ, freedom, faith, and love, which in an iconostasis shift, similar to the paradigm shift, replaces the old iconologic trinity of faith, hope, and love.

[71] Here we see that love and its substance will be hypostatic with the time-moment of life, while before it was diluted in a wrongly directed hope. Here hope is denigrated again.

[72] Thus the question is deliberated with the purpose of choosing.

[73] This is, despite appearances (of being a cognitive term), a qualifier of man's innate powerlessness.

[74] The translation should go this way: being cognizant of the truth, having the consciousness of the truth. It is quite evident that this esoteric knowledge resembles a gnosis, in which the true nature of man is revealed, after an iconologic pathology is removed, since Ivan thinks that man might have the power to liberate himself from the false idea of God and immortality, which only obfuscates his power. Thus here gnosis is a cognitive grasp of power, being effectively an unleashing of the ontic power.

> new principles. In this sense, "everything is permitted"[75] to him. Moreover, since God and immortality do not exist in any case, even if this period should never come, the new man is allowed to become a man-god, though it be he alone in the whole world, and of course, in this new rank [*v novom chine*],[76] to jump lightheartedly over any former moral obstacle of the former slave-man [*raba-cheloveka*],[77] if need be. There is no law for God! Where God stands-there is the place of God! Where I stand, there at once will be the foremost place ..."everything is permitted," and that's that!" (648-649)

The entire argument made by the devil relates to alternative world-versions, and it stands in direct contradiction to the Christian world-version. The main point here stresses the absence of God and immortality, and advances the new possibility, exclusively natural, of a man-god. And a natural entity is bound to occur similarly to the geological periods.

The concept of 'geological period' (and the cyclicity it entails) is meaningful in connection with still another legend (or an anecdote) which could be called 'The Legend about the Quadrillion Kilometers.' The devil recounts to Ivan a legend (as it turns out, invented by Ivan) detailing the punishment of an atheist in the afterlife, who, after his death, was surprised that there is an afterlife at all. The sinner protested against the evidence by saying that it contradicted his convictions. However, for his atheism (rejection of faith, conscience, laws, and especially the future life) he received the penalty to walk a quadrillion kilometers in darkness, and then the gates of paradise

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[75] Now man realizes that there is no other power superior to his, or that his power is independent of any other personal power, except the power of nature.

[76] This is an upgrade in iconolgy, and the only one man can obtain, since the ontic power remains the same. Here the meaning of liberation acquires additional force, since man is freed from an iconological imposture of powerlessness and otherworldliness.

[77] The *rabo-chelovek* (slave-man) will be supplanted by *bogo-chelovek* (god-man) within the realm of new freedom, where there is no law for gods.

would be open for him and all would be forgiven. Already under the sentence, he lay down and refused to move (and it is surprising that the possibility of choice is made available in this world-version), out of principle:

> "Bravo!" cried Ivan, still with the same strange animation. He was listening now with unexpected curiosity. "Well, so is he still lying there?"
> "The point is that he isn't. He lay there for nearly a thousand years, and then got up and started walking."
> "What an ass!" Ivan exclaimed, bursting into nervous laughter, still apparently trying hard to figure something out. "Isn't it all the same whether he lies there forever or walks a quadrillion kilometers? It must be about a billion years' walk!"
> "Much more, even. If we had a pencil and paper, we could work it out. But he arrived long ago, and this is where the anecdote begins."
> "Arrived! But where did he get a billion years?"
> "You keep thinking about our present earth! But our present earth may have repeated itself a billion times; it died out, let's say, got covered with ice, cracked, fell to pieces, broke down into its original components, again there were the waters above the firmament, then again a comet, again the sun, again the earth from the sun-all this development may already have been repeated an infinite number of times, and always in the same way, to the last detail. A most unspeakable [*neprilichneishaia*][78] bore [*skuchishche*]..."
> "Go on, what happened when he arrived?"
> "The moment the doors of paradise were opened and he went in, before he had even been there two seconds - and that by the watch, the watch (though I should think that on the way his watch would long ago have broken down into its component elements in his pocket) - before he had been there two seconds, he exclaimed that for those two seconds it would be worth walking not just a quadrillion kilometers, but a quadrillion quadrillion, even raised to the quadrillionth power! In short, he sang 'Hosannah' [...] (644)

In this segment, the devil speaks out of his own creaturely limitations, both in terms of ontic power and cognitive powers. The anecdote is taken as a sample from the realm of

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[78] *Neprilichnyi* is a word connected to *litso* (face) and it connotes an iconic meaning of something that is unbecoming, unseemly, deiconied, like the boredom of the eternal return. Here Dostoevsky resonates with Nietzcshe. Alternative worlds are possible variously, and the awareness of the legends in *The Brothers Karamazov* foregrounds the range of different choices, powers and freedoms. The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor joins here the legend of the 'Geological Cataclysm' and the legend of the 'Quadrillion Kilometers.'

the devil, where there is no certain knowledge of what exactly paradise is made of. But what also counts in the narrative of the devil is his description of the myth of the eternal return (the endless cycle of reconstitution and destruction of the earth), the most terrifying tautology of Being. There is no wonder then that the devil wants to exercise his ultimate choice of self-destruction, but, paradoxically, he is not allowed to carry it out. Such global macroevents recounted by the devil, as eternal return or "Geological Cataclysm' only testify that there is no meaningful freedom of choice, and that, ultimately, there is no power to get rid of the impaired freedom of choice. For the devil, this is the authentic description of hell.

In this section we surveyed some of the most important aspects of the Augustinian and Dostoevskian freedom. Primarily, our main strategy was dictated by the concepts that we detailed in the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, which are positioned in an iconostasis in our diagram [3.1] and [3.2] at the level of the third temptation. The concept of freedom is central to Dostoevsky, but no less is love, or faith. However, it lies beyond our current purpose to detail every iconized concept in *The Brothers Karamazov*. As an illustration, in this section we chose to focus only on the icon of freedom.

c) Freedom, Hope and Happiness

We have seen above that Ivan through the voice of the devil (and in this instance we have the best illustration of double-voiced words, that is, of the iconologic and dialogic status of discourse) denounces hope as being a misdirected freedom. But hope for the Grand

Inquisitor is an essential ingredient of his imposture. Let us now see how the Grand Inquisitor presents the final supremacy of a Utopian happiness in terms of freedom and hope:

> Receiving bread from us, they will see clearly, of course, that we take from them the bread they have procured with their own hands, in order to distribute it among them, without any miracle; they will see that we have not turned stones into bread; but, indeed [*voistinu*], more than over the bread itself, they will rejoice [*rady budut*] over taking it from our hands! For they will remember only too well that before, without us, the very bread they procured for themselves turned to stones in their hands, and when they came back to us, the very stones in their hands turned to bread. Too well, far too well, will they appreciate what it means to submit [*podchinit'sia*] once and for all! And until men understand this, they will be unhappy [*neschastny*].[79] Who contributed most of all to this lack of understanding [*neponimaniu*],[80] tell me? Who broke up the flock and scattered it upon paths unknown? But the flock will gather again, and again submit, and this time once and for all. Then we shall give them quiet, humble [*smirennoe*] happiness [*schast'e*],[81] the happiness of feeble creatures [*slabosil'nykh suschestv*], such as they were created [*sozdany*].[82] Oh, we shall finally convince them not to

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[79] The man will submit to the Grand Inquisitor only after he understands that his power of choice and freedom of choice cannot even distribute bread, let alone practice a superior Christian freedom. Man will thus be equal to a subsistence without the burden of choice, where the will of the Grand Inquisitor is his will. Happiness ensues only when one renounces one's own will in favor of an exclusive and all-pervasive will of the Grand Inquisitor. This represents an extreme parody of the hypostatic transfer of the will operated in the case of monastic interpersonal exchange, of which we spoke above, as well as of the total subjection of one's will to God's will.

[80] The Grand Inquisitor stresses the iconologic dimension of the Christian doctrine, which promises happiness but in fact delivers only suffering and torments. While reading this text, we should keep in mind the distinction between iconology (doctrine, cognitive aspect) and personological power (ontic aspect), since Christ was mistaken about ontic magnitude of man, he proclaims thereby a false iconology, a false image of man, thus misleading humankind both in terms of its power and self-image.

[81] *Smirenie* (meekness, humility) is a foundational virtue in Christian ethics, and it obviously carries kenotic connotations, since it was Christ who humbled himself into a lower condition. The expression 'meek happiness' is therefore a parody of kenosis.

[82] Here again we may recall the ontic endowment of powerlessness and weakness with which man is created. The centrality of the ontic power reasserts itself recurrently in the Grand Inquisitor's discourse. The Grand Inquisitor's happiness, therefore, is the only one

be proud [*ne gordit'sia*], for you raised them up [*voznes ikh*] and thereby taught [*nauchil*] them pride [*gordit'sia*];[83] we shall prove to them that they are feeble, that they are only pitiful children, but that a child's happiness is sweeter than any other. They will become timid and look to us and cling to us in fear, like chicks to a hen. They will marvel and stand in awe of us and be proud that we are so powerful [*tak moguchi*] and so intelligent [*tak umny*][84] as to have been able [*mogli*][85] to subdue [*usmirit'*] such a tempestuous flock of thousands of millions. They will tremble limply before our wrath, their minds will grow timid, their eyes will become as tearful as children's or women's, but just as readily at a gesture from us they will pass over to gaiety and laughter, to bright joy and happy children's song. Yes, we will make them work, but in the hours free from labor we will arrange their lives like a children's game, with children's songs, choruses, and innocent dancing. Oh, we will allow them to sin, too [*razreshim im i grekh*]; they are weak [*slaby*] and powerless [*bessil'ny*],[86] and they will love us like children for allowing them to sin. We will tell them that every sin will be redeemed if it is committed with our permission; and that we allow them to sin because we love them, and as for the punishment for these sins, very well, we take it upon ourselves.[87] And we will take it upon ourselves, and they will adore us as benefactors, who have borne their sins before God. And they will have no secrets from us. [...] The most tormenting secrets of their conscience-all, all they will

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that can match the incapacitated human ontic power, a power that now practices only happiness, and not freedom of choice. The disparagement of hope by the devil and of happiness by the Grand Inquisitor testifies about their problematic status in the novel.

[83] The meaning of 'Christ taught pride' is exclusively iconologic, since all Christ has to do (and as a consequence Christianity itself) is to remind man about his ontic dignity, which means that man was not created weak (in terms of power), but that his status is commensurate to God's original design, according to which man is good as he currently is.

[84] Two things are strongly asserted here (1) 'that we are so powerful,' and (2) 'that we are so intelligent.' This division fully accords with our distinction between the ontic (power) and iconologic dimension of a person. Although even 'intelligence' appears to be rendered also in terms of power, it might be argued that any knowledge is power, but nevertheless that is an iconologic knowledge. This only proves that any dimension of man's person cannot be separated from its synergy with power.

[85] Again, here we have a constant reiteration of power, so central to any rhetoric of salvation.

[86] The Grand Inquisitor is relentless in his reiteration of man's ontic condition, which can be constantly translated into a vision where God botched human being at its creation.

[87] This is the most perverse imitation of Christ's soteriological mission, who was incarnated in order to take upon himself the sins of humanity.

> bring to us, and we will decide all things, and they will joyfully believe our decision, because it will deliver them from their great care and their present terrible torments of personal and free decision. And everyone will be happy, all the millions of creatures, except for the hundred thousand of those who govern them.[88] For only we, we who keep the mystery, only we shall be unhappy.[89] There will be thousands of millions of happy babes, and a hundred thousand sufferers who have taken upon themselves the curse of the knowledge of good and evil. Peacefully they will die, peacefully they will expire in your name, and beyond the grave they will find only death. But we will keep the secret, and for their own happiness we will entice them with a heavenly and eternal reward. For even if there were anything in the next world, it would not, of course, be for such as they. (258-259; 14:235-236)

The climax of the Grand Inquisitor's rhetoric fuses current 'happiness' with the concept of hope into 'a heavenly and eternal reward.' Clearly, the Grand Inquisitor does not believe in a future world, and for him the concept of hope is the emblem of an ontic imposture, that is of the impossibility of an alternative world-version.

From the close textual interpretation of the Grand Inquisitor's discourse we have distilled the units that are central to his argument: power, freedom, submission, happiness, and hope. When happiness and hope reign, we see that there is no freedom in the kingdom of the Grand Inquisitor. What I am going to argue now, is that in the Legend we encounter the iconologic substitution, mediated by Christ, of the icon of hope with that of freedom, since the two main icons that clash irreconcilably in the Legend are the icon of freedom and that of hope. Christ is that soteriologic power and entity, which removes the concept of hope from the ruling human iconostasis and substitutes it with freedom. As we can recall from our analysis of the Three Temptations, the three icons

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[88] This exclusive club of powerful people who flaunt a power able to assume the sins of humanity represents a self-elected few, similarly to Christ's limited number of chosen saints, of which, the Grand Inquisitor says, the Apocalypse speaks.

[89] The price of self-electivity is, the Grand Inquisitor claims, an exclusive unhappiness. This unhappiness parodies Christ's self-sacrifice and crucifixion.

that represent Christ are freedom, faith, and love. But the usual iconostasis of theological virtues tells us that the main ruling salvific virtues are faith, hope, and love. Augustine examines the three theological virtues in depth in his work *The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love.*

In what follows, I will summarize his argument about the three theological virtues. By way of introduction, let us recall that Augustine analyzed the four cardinal virtues - prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice – within the parameters of the ontic freedom and ontic will, both open to the possibility of being exercised even if one is not a Christian. However, when speaking about the three theological virtues, Augustine foregrounds the praxis of soteriology (not ethical practice), which practice one can exercise exclusively through the mediation of worship, not through the autonomy of will or reason. For Augustine now the true wisdom does not consist necessarily in acquiring cardinal virtues, but in piety:

> The true wisdom of man is piety. You find this in the book of holy Job. For we read there what wisdom itself has said to man: "Behold, the fear of the Lord [*pietas*], that is wisdom" [Job 28:28]. If you ask further what is meant in that place by pietas, the Greek calls it more definitely *theosebeia*, that is, the worship of God. The Greeks sometimes call piety *eusebeia*, which signifies right worship, though this, of course, refers specially to the worship of God. But when we are defining in what man's true wisdom consists, the most convenient word to use is that which distinctly expresses the fear of God. And can you, who are anxious that I should treat of great matters in few words, wish for a briefer form of expression? Or perhaps you are anxious that this expression should itself be briefly explained, and that I should unfold in a short discourse the proper mode of worshipping God? Now if I should answer, that God is to be worshipped with faith, hope, and love, you will at once say that this answer is too brief, and will ask me briefly to unfold the objects of each of these three graces, viz., what we are to believe, what we are to hope for, and what we are to love. (*Enchiridion* 1.2-3)

What we are to believe, that is the category of faith, is connected by Augustine not only to religious faith but also to cognitive knowledge, since we believe the facts of the past only on testimony (for instance facts about Christ's earthly ministry):

> Again, can anything be hoped for which is not an object of faith? It is true that a thing which is not an object of hope may be believed. What true Christian, for example, does not believe in the punishment of the wicked? And yet such an one does not hope for it. [...] Accordingly, faith may have for its object evil as well as good; for both good and evil are believed, and the faith that believes them is not evil, but good. Faith, moreover, is concerned with the past, the present, and the future, all three. We believe, for example, that Christ died,--an event in the past; we believe that He is sitting at the right hand of God,--a state of things which is present; we believe that He will come to judge the quick and the dead,--an event of the future. Again, faith applies both to one's own circumstances and those of others. Every one, for example, believes that his own existence had a beginning, and was not eternal, and he believes the same both of other men and other things. Many of our beliefs in regard to religious matters, again, have reference not merely to other men, but to angels also. But hope has for its object only what is good,[90] only what is future, and only what affects the man who entertains the hope. For these reasons, then, faith must be distinguished from hope, not merely as a matter of verbal propriety, but because they are essentially different. The fact that we do not see either what we believe or what we hope for, is all that is common to faith and hope. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, for example, faith is defined (and eminent defenders of the catholic faith have used the definition as a standard) "the evidence of things not seen."[91] Although, should any one say that

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[90] That is hope is exclusively concerned with future and with happiness. And therefore here we discover the basic imputation against hope from the perspective of freedom which always must be exercised here and now.

[91] Frye's own fascination with cultural iconology and the interface of Biblical and literary logos-icons is illustrative of how words become iconologic powers. My limited appeal to Frye is meant to show that soteriologic words are icons and hypostases. In his *Words with Power* (1990) Frye engages precisely this religious semiotic capacity of speaking of the invisible world-version in terms of the quasi-visible: "Faith is described in the New Testament (Hebrew 11:1) as the *hypostasis* of the hoped-for, the *elenchos* of the unseen [so faith is the *hypostasis* of hope]. *Hypostasis* is a term in Greek philosophy for which the Latin equivalent is *substantia*, and hence the AV, following the Vulgate, renders it 'substance.' Modern translations usually say 'assurance,' because Paul uses the word in that sense, but Paul is not the author of Hebrews, and I suspect that 'substance' is closer to what is meant here (see also Hebrews 1:3). The believer is being told that he has got something, not that he is sure of getting it eventually. *Elenchos* means proof or evidence. [...] Belief is rather the creative energy that turns the illusory into the real. Such belief is

> he believes, that is, has grounded his faith, not on words, nor on witnesses, nor on any reasoning whatever, but on the direct evidence of his own senses, he would not be guilty of such an impropriety of speech as to be justly liable to the criticism, "You saw, therefore you did not believe." And hence it does not follow that an object of faith is not an object of sight. But it is better that we should use the word "faith" as the Scriptures have taught us, applying it to those things which are not seen. Concerning hope, again, the apostle says: "Hope that is seen is not hope; for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for? But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it." When, then, we believe that good is about to come, this is nothing else but to hope for it. Now what shall I say of love? Without it, faith profits nothing; and in its absence, hope cannot exist. The Apostle James says: "The devils also believe, and tremble." --that is, they, having neither hope nor love, but believing that what we love and hope for is about to come, are in terror. And so the Apostle Paul approves and commends the "faith that worketh by love;" and this certainly cannot exist without hope. Wherefore there is no love without hope, no hope without love, and neither love nor hope without faith. (*Enchiridion* 1.8).

It is crucial to foreground Augustine's last sentence: that faith, love and hope are hypostatic entities, that is, they are basically dealing with the same substance of worship and salvation. What is also central, as we have noted already, is hope's exclusive orientation towards the substance (the good) of the future, which should be equated with all the elements of happiness on which we elaborated in this section, that is a complete restoration of human nature and then permanent participation in God's nature, where it is impossible to sin anymore or fall anymore.

About love Augustine elaborates in accordance with St Paul's preeminence offered to love's role:

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neither rational nor ideological, but belongs on the other side of the imaginative. One could practically paraphrase the Hebrews verse as: 'Faith is the reality of hope and of illusion.' [...] So literature, with its sense of 'anything is possible' and its conventions of suspending disbelief even in the most fantastic assumptions, is a mode of language with a particular relation to hope. The New Testament implies that this hope is an analogy [and analogy is *iconic* under iconologic treatment] of a more substantial virtue, in Hebrews the faith which is the substance of hope, in Paul the love which is the substance [*hypostasis*] of both, the love that 'believeth all things, hopeth all things' (I Corinthians 13:7)" (1990:129-130). Frye's focus on hope and hypostasis is consonant with our overall assumptions in this study.

> And now as to love, which the apostle declares to be greater than the other two graces, that is than faith and hope [1 Cor 13:13], the greater the measure in which it dwells in man, the better is the man in whom it dwells. For when there is a question as to whether a man is good, one does not ask what he believes, or what he hopes, but what he loves. For the man who loves aright no doubt believes and hopes aright; whereas the man who has no love believes in vain, even though his beliefs are true; and hopes in vain, in though the objects of his hope are a real part of true happiness;[92] unless, indeed, he believes and hopes for this, that he may obtain by prayer the blessing of love.[93] For although it is not possible to hope without love, it may yet happen that a man does not love that which is necessary to the attainment of his hope; as for example if he hopes for eternal life (and who is there that does not desire this?) and yet does not love righteousness, without which no one can attain to eternal life. (Enchiridion, 2.117)

This focus on love displays the love's hypostatic capacity to represent happiness and to describe the meaning of faith and hope (in Augustine even the will is represented as 'a set of loves'; see Rist 1992:186). If it is possible to hope without love, why wouldn't it be possible to love without hope, as in Dostoevsky's personologic scenarios? (For instance, praying for Stavrogin might be a hopeless exercise of love, on Berdiaev's strategy of unlimited salvation). What is worth noticing here, is that in Dostoevsky, if we follow Augustine's figure of thought, not only freedom substitutes hope, but freedom is greater then love, although the exercise of assigning magnitudes to any of the hypostases, as if reduces their equal substantive status. Let us represent this new situation in which hope is eliminated (and thus the concern with the futuristic happiness) from the ruling soteriological iconostasis in a diagram. As we can recall, the Three Temptations present Christ's icons generated by his rejections of the temptations in a hypostatic ternary structure:

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[92] Here we have another confirmation that the object of hope is precisely happiness.

[93] Love thus could be an imminent happiness, although temporarily still placed in the future.

[5.1]

CHRIST'S ICONS		
FREEDOM	FAITH	LOVE

Since the Augustinian ternary structure functions also hypostatically, we can construct an analogous structure to the one from the legend and collapse them into one iconostasis:

[5.2]

AUGUSTINE'S ICONS		
HOPE	FAITH	LOVE
CHRIST'S ICONS		
FREEDOM	FAITH	LOVE

Since the Dostoevskian iconostasis of freedom, faith, and love constitutes a paradigm of soteriologic behavior, then to obtain it, a paradigm shift has to be effected from the previous paradigm of hope, faith, and love, proclaimed by St Paul and Augustine into a new paradigm of freedom, faith, and love proclaimed by the Christ of the Legend. Since the entities constituting the two paradigms are icons representing hypostases, we would choose to call this operation or hypostatic mutation 'iconostasis shift.' Christ's iconostasis, however, is a dynamic structure, which can be interpreted dialogically and polyphonically. From the perspective of Christ, it might be argued that there is no need to direct hope into a future life, since to doubt that life is folly and self-deception (as we have seen, this occur in the case of the suicides). The only thing being expected from man is the exercise of his creative freedom, not hope. We have seen how the Grand Inquisitor deprives hope of any genuine meaning by assigning to it an impostorial meaning, but he does the same to freedom. For Christ, on the other hand, (and this can be seen in

Zosima's world-version), man's communion with him and with God should not be doubted, and, therefore, precisely hope would be an exercise of weaklings, if their hope were a weak hope, and not an absolute exercise of freedom (targeting *theosis*).

Let me bring now an additional illustration of the hypostasis of happiness that Zosima depicts to Alyosha who is about to abandon the monastery and immerse himself into the world. Alyosha will have to die not to the world (fruit), but to the monastery (seed), a movement opposite to Zosima's overcoming of the world (seed) and converting it into fruit (monastery), as we are going to see below (the novel's motto about the seed is repeated and iconized by Zosima in the same text sequence). Thus Zosima:

> And you, Alexei, I have blessed in my thoughts many times in my life for your face [*za lik tvoi*], know that,' the elder said with a quiet smile. 'Thus I think of you: you will go forth from these walls, but you will sejourn in the world like a monk [*inok* as 'monk' implies otherness] you will have many opponents, but your very enemies will love you. Life will bring you many misfortunes [*neschastii*][94], but through them you will be happy [*schastliv*],[95] and you will bless life and cause others to bless it – which is the most important thing." (285)

Zosima has decided to send Alyosha's *lik*-icon-countenance into the world, being sure that Alyosha's iconologic power will convert misfortune into happiness, and, in a

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[94] *Ne-schastie* has a double-voiced iconic force, since it comprises both misfortune and unhappiness. Misfortunes befall a man blindly, while unhappiness, on a moralistic definition, necessarily ensues from a failure to erect a structure of virtues or to exercise it. In the theological iconology of *The Brothers Karamazov*, *schastie* (happiness) is an icon of man that acquires its imagic and diagramatic configuration in opposition to the icon of future hope (in hypostatic happiness man's 'hope' becomes iconologically palpable here and now, as a hypostatic grounding and crowning of existence).

[95] Happiness, not freedom and suffering, is the regulative, normative icon for the Grand Inquisitor. Here *schastie* is closer to the Greek happiness-*eudaimonia* that prevails in spite of misfortunes befalling a hero. Certainly, the novel's kind of happiness is Christian and thus hypostatic happiness, a happiness *through* misfortune, as we have fruit through the dying seed which the motto of the novel iconizes. The overcoming of death and suffering itself is the definition of this unique and liturgical life.

mysterious eucharistic move, will bring many into communion with life, blessing it. Now, to bless[96] life (*blagoslovit' zhyzn'*) and not curse it (as Ivan or Smerdyakov or the Hell would do) is, next to God's creation of life, an iconic act of theosis, of divinization of Creation. (One should notice here that the pair bless/curse -*blagoslovit'/prokliat'*- inscribes itself within the paradigms of love, freedom, and faith). Alyosha's blessing of life cannot be invalidated by hope in the eternal life (unless it is presupposed), since, as we have already argued, in Dostoevsky questions of hope and eternal life should be settled almost a priori, and not be overly concerned with them. Zosima, similarly to his prophecy to Alyosha, also tells Ivan that his struggle over the double faith in God and immortality should be resolved into the negative or the positive in the realm of current freedom, otherwise he will be unhappy here and now, where it counts, where the substance of the living life and sacrificial love coinhere, being unavailable in any future happiness. Future happiness, pace Augustine, cannot be equal to either of the two, being

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[96] To bless is to behave liturgically, to celebrate and consecrate (the opposite of diabolic desecration and slandering of life and existence encountered in the Legend). The exclamation with which the eucharistic Liturgy opens reaffirms the fusion of life and of man's (in our case Alyosha's) blessing it: "Blessed [*blagoslovenno*] is [it is a contemporaneous ascertainment of fact, not a 'blessed be' of hope] the Kingdom of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." The verb *blago-slovit'* is a compound of *blago* (good, blessing, fortune, virtue, or happiness) and *slovo* (word, logos): it means that man should bestow, through the mediation of the word-logos, the supreme praise upon life, enjoying therefore the hypostatic happiness of this world-version. The word *blago* is religiously as powerful as that of *slovo*-logos. It is constitutive of many religious words, such as *blago-dat'* (God's given grace), *blago-veschenie* (Annunciation), *blagost'* (according to Dal' and his *Tolkovyi Slovar'*: the highest degree of love and mercy; the unity of all virtues), *blazhennyi* (blessed, applied also to St. Augustine), or *blago-razumie* (i.e., *razum*-reason acting in accordance to *blago*, being the Russian rendition of the Aristotelian and Augustinian virtue of prudence-phronesis).

The devil in Ivan's nightmare performs his function well only when he acts against, as he asserts, '*blagorazumie.*' There are many more words constituted by *blago*, but I mentioned only the most important ones to underscore the Dostoevskian meaning of life as supreme goodness (*blago*) and man's mission in blessing it: life should not be disvalued in the name of either the future life or its intrinsic fallenness.

also unable to de-hypostatize them through the hypostasis of hope.

Thus Zosima, referring to the Ivan's credo that 'everything is permitted if there is no God and immortality,' says:

> "Can it be that you really hold this conviction [*ubezhdeniia*] about the consequences of the exhaustion [*issiaknoveniia*] of man's faith in the immortality of their souls?" the elder suddenly asked Ivan Fyodorovich.
> "Yes, it was my contention [*utverzhdal*]. There is no virtue [*dobrodeteli*] if there is no immortality.[97]"
> "You are blessed [*blazhenny*] if you believe so, or else most unhappy [*neschastny*]![98]"
> "Why unhappy?" Ivan Fyodorovich smiled.
> "Because you yourself do not believe either in the immortality of your soul or even in what you have written about the Church and the Church question.[99] [...] The idea is not resolved in your heart and torments it. But a martyr, too, sometimes likes to toy with his despair, also from despair, as it were. [...] The question is not resolved in you, and there lies your great grief, for it urgently[100] demands resolution..."
> "But can it be resolved in myself? Resolved in a positive way?" Ivan Fyodorovich continued asking strangely, still looking at the elder with a certain inexplicable smile.

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[97] This statement can easily be translated into: "there is no happiness in this world if there is no immortality in the future world," since virtue is conducive to happiness here and now, especially when practiced as sacrificial love. Ivan is concerned about the possibility and compossibility of virtue and happiness in this living life if and only if the future world-version underwrites and warrants the current world-version, that is, Ivan is concerned with what counts in this world, since he wants this world-version to be successful. He must know already that the happiness of sacrificial love is not an option in the future happiness or in 'immortality,' that's why Ivan also wants here and now, besides hypostatic happiness, his hypostatic non-Euclidean knowledge about the meaning of life-suffering.

[98] Two potent words converge against Ivan here, blessedness and happiness, both creating an emergency condition for him here and now.

[99] Ivan has written an article, now redebated in Zosima's presence, in which he raises the question of Church and state mutual or hierarchical subordination.

[100] This urgency demands the exercise of the burden of choice and decision, implying a conversion to love and faith, where faith simply consists in the belief that this world is the best of all possible worlds, a world which has sufficient power to show that immortality should simply be taken for granted.

> "Even if it cannot be resolved in a positive way, it will never[101] be resolved in the negative either – you yourself know this property of your heart, and therein lies the whole of its torment. But thank the Creator that he has given you a lofty heart, capable of being tormented by such a torment. [...] May God grant that your heart's decision [*reshenie*][102] overtake you still on earth, and may God bless your path!" (70)

Zosima's blessing of a nearly accursed Ivan is the blessing of the Creator and thus of Creation itself in and through Ivan. For Zosima, his encounter with Ivan as well as his blessing of him, constitute an hypostatic opportunity to experience the entire substance of love and happiness, of hypostatic happiness, here and now.

In this section, we have discussed the main components of several iconostasis-versions of the freedom that defines a person and his interpersonal status in possible world-versions.

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[101] The word 'never' was anticipated by the word 'urgently.' Zosima's loving understanding of Ivan (God gave Ivan a lofty heart) correlates his possibly eternal torment with the assurance that if Ivan cannot decide his question in this world, then he might not be able or willing to solve it in any other world either (and hence the emergency). That's why hell is commpossible with any other world, even with paradise, for those who are unable or unwilling to decide and choose in such matters. What counts here, is that if one incurs the risk of leaving such a crucial question unresolved in this world, Zosima still allows the possibility and thus the inherent freedom to solve the question in a future world, but under similar conditions to this world. This world's opportunity thus should not be wasted.

[102] The appeal to deliberation, choosing, and decision-making modalizes every personal iconic self-transposition. Christ, to reiterate, is invited to *decide* who was right in the confrontation of the Three Temptations, making thus possible their reactivation-deliberation.

Concluding Remarks

In this study's parameters, the status of a person in Dostoevsky and Augustine is generated by a paradigm of world-bound icons. The central comparative thesis of this study states that in Dostoevsky the foundational icons constituting a person are freedom, faith, and love, and in Augustine - faith, hope, and love. This study claims that through the supplanting of the Augustinian hope by the Dostoevskian freedom an iconostasis shift is effected in Dostoevsky's fictional worlds. A Dostoevskian world-bound person receives a new kerygma of freedom and autonomous power from a new Dostoevskian Christ, while an Augustinian person is committed to the primacy of liberation from this world-version, being anchored in hope. In Dostoevskian and Augustinian world-versions, personal and interpersonal responsibility is also exercised and experienced through the interplay of power and freedom. The iconology of power, choice, and freedom underlies the ontologic and personologic domains of a person in Augustine and Dostoevsky, placing both authors within a common semiosphere.

This study proposes an interpretation of the *The Brothers Karamazov* from two complementary perspectives. On the one hand, it expands the theoretical parameters, relying on the Bakhtinian polyphonic and dialogic view of fictional worlds in Dostoevsky; on the other hand, it practices intensive textual analysis that generates concrete iconologic and hypostatic items. From the theoretical perspective, the literary category of the dominant is intimately linked with the personologic category of self-

consciousness, both categories being indispensable for an efficacious partitioning of the novel's texture into personal domains governed by the person-bound icons.

Dostoevsky and Augustine thematize a person's self-consciousness in terms of icon and hypostasis in order to foreground the world-bound dominants that govern man's ethical and soteriological praxis. The two authors iconize in a dramatic way the human condition in this world in terms of ethical happiness and religious salvation. The ethical and the religious status of a person are always world-bound, but the person is primarily freedom to project world-versions and person-versions through the exercise of his/her ontic, iconologic and personologic powers. In Dostoevsky, mapping out of the imagic and diagrammatic transpositions of persons into mutable and evolving iconostases is secured by the complementary categories of 'voice' and 'hypostasis.' In Dostoevsky, the hypostatically-polyphonically structured icons of freedom, faith, and love constitute a generative paradigm of voices that engenders an open-ended iconostasis (mystery-miracle-authority or conscience-choice-bread). In both Augustine and Dostoevsky, a person inescapably falls under cardinal categories of icon, hypostasis, and world-version.

It is iconically palpable that this study's project constitutes just a beginning in a larger enterprise of a fruitful comparative research of Dostoevsky and Augustine. In analyzing Dostoevskian and Augustinian world-versions, we have engaged such topics as freedom and power, but commensurable topics are still awaiting their comprehensive researcher and interpreter, such as love, faith, worship, nothingness, lust, mystery, or authority. The Dostoevskian and Augustinian common iconostasis is open-ended. Probably, in order to capture the magnitude of the task that the interface between Augustine and Dostoevsky presupposes, and simultaneously the partiality of such an

enterprise, one should quote Bakhtin: "Tragic catharsis (in the Aristotelian sense) is not applicable to Dostoevsky. The catharsis that finalizes Dostoevsky's novels might be – of course inadequately and somewhat rationalistically – expressed this way: n*othing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is still in the future and will always be in the future*" (Bakhtin 1984:166).

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