Natality from Chaos:
Hannah Arendt and Democratic Education

A Thesis submitted in Candidacy for the Degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy

Institute for Christian Studies

Toronto, Ontario

by

TRICIA K. VAN DYK

August 2006

Supervisor: Lambert Zuidervaart

Internal Examiner: Ronald A. Kuipers

External Examiner: Johanna Selles

Your file Votre référence
ISBN: 978-0-494-30198-2
Our file Notre référence
ISBN: 978-0-494-30198-2

Abstract

This thesis considers contemporary education from a philosophical angle via the work of Hannah Arendt in light of education's key place at the intersection of responsibility for the past, empowerment to effect change in the present, and hope for the future. Chapter 1 sets out an understanding of human community as a chaotic system in the technical sense via Arendt's concept of natality, applying this understanding to the project of education as a way of helping educators facilitate students' ability to contribute something new without controlling students' potentially unique contributions. Chapter 2 questions in more detail the applicability of some of Arendt's philosophical and political ideas to multicultural education, addressing also the need for setting goals for action without assuming a deterministic, mathematically linear process. Chapter 3 examines Arendt's firm distinction between education and politics in the context of globalization and the possibility of continual renewal and transformation of our world.

Contents

Introduction

I find myself in a position like that of a person who has just seen the ocean for the first time. Dazzled by the sunlight on the waves, mesmerized by the pounding breakers, I am drawn to wet my feet in it, to see what it feels like for myself. I find the coolness of the water delightful and refreshing, and after playing in the waves and running across the wet sand for some time, I wish that I could introduce others to this marvelous encounter. When I start to look about, however, I realize that to my surprise, a lot of people know about the ocean already, and in fact go there regularly. But what surprises me even more is how differently many of them react to it than I do. Some surf expertly in brightly-coloured wetsuits, some go out in boats to fish or look for whales and sea birds, some lie next to it with their eyes closed, while others dump trash and chemicals into it.

Thus it was with my introduction to Hannah Arendt. When I took a course on Arendt's thought as a first-year M.A. student, I found her the most thrilling thinker I had ever come across. I regretted that in 5 years as an undergraduate philosophy major, I had somehow missed out on her. After wetting my feet a bit, I became eager to connect with others who were familiar with her. However, it did not take me long to realize that although there has begun in recent years a dramatic surge of commentary on Arendt's life, thought, and writings, not everyone responds to her thought with the excitement it brought me. There are those who seek to treat her as a systematic philosopher and spend their time pointing out inconsistencies and inadequacies, disregarding her longtime denial of the title "philosopher." There are those who look superficially at her ideas and call her names which any serious consideration proves ridiculous. There are those who find her insights powerful and useful, but who cannot help including in their writings backhanded comments that ask the reader to laugh with them at her foibles. And there are a few, like me, who simply find her inspiring and useful.

Setting the Stage: Background and Approach

Hannah Arendt was born in 1906 in Hannover, Germany, and died in 1975 in New York City. In between, she experienced, as philosopher Seyla Benhabib puts it, "persecution, statelessness, exile, a brief internment in a detention camp, immigration, success, and public recognition."[1] Arendt came from an assimilated Jewish background, and the rise of the Nazis caused her to flee Germany for France in 1933, and then in 1940 to the United States. There she wrote prolifically; writing was part of her method of seeking to understand, and the desire to understand was the impetus behind her work.[2]

Arendt's thought can be situated in relation to many other thinkers, for she was constantly responding to various philosophers both implicitly and explicitly. Of course, different commentators emphasize the importance of different philosophers in the development of her thought. Kant, Marx, Nietzsche, and St. Augustine all had significant influence on the directions her ideas took. Montesquieu, Machiavelli, and Walter Benjamin inspired diverse strains of her thought both methodologically and substantively. And the list could go on. It is undeniable, however, that two of the greatest influences in her philosophical development were her teachers: Karl Jaspers and particularly Martin Heidegger. Benhabib has convincingly demonstrated that some of Arendt's best-known concepts, such as world, action, and plurality, were categories which Arendt picked up from Heidegger and then radically transformed.[3]

First and foremost, however, I believe Arendt responded to the concrete political and social situations in which she found herself or about which she learned. Fernando Bárcena Orbe notes that while this is true of all thinkers, the way in which Arendt's thought is "rooted in and conditioned by" [*vinculado, y condicionado por*] her life is distinctive.[4] For Arendt, to think was

---

[1] Seyla Benhabib, *The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt*, New edition. Modernity and Political Thought (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 221.

[2] Margaret Canovan, *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 2.

[3] This is the main thesis of Benhabib's book, *The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt*. (See page xxxviii in the introduction for her statement of this thesis; see the rest of the book for the convincing demonstration.)

[4] Fernando Bárcena Orbe, "La comprensión política: la voluntad de sentido en Hannah Arendt" in *El Oficio de la Ciudadanía: Introducción a la educación política* (Barcelona: Paídos, 1997), 178.

to feel most alive.[5] She found thinking not only a necessity, but a pleasure. This understanding of her approach guides my reading of Arendt's work. Unlike Benhabib, I do not consider Arendt a phenomenological essentialist. Benhabib believes that Arendt's fondness for categories indicates a belief that everything in human life has a proper place.[6] Arendt certainly does make frequent categorical distinctions, but again, these distinctions were made for the purpose of understanding, not defining, what she was thinking about. For example, Arendt's distinction between labor (the unending response to biological necessity) and work (building a durable human world), if taken as a phenomenological description of humanity's activities, is clearly lacking. Not only are there many ambiguities where the two converge, as in the case of maintaining that which has been built,[7] but it is practically impossible to imagine how to identify contemporary forms of employment in terms of the two categories.

Understanding Arendt's distinctions as phenomenological descriptions is an example of what I mean by thinking for the purpose of defining. In contrast, I believe her approach is better understood as analogous to parting a stand of reeds in different places in order to gain insight into what the reeds may conceal beneath them. Arendt, I suspect, recognized the rather muddled, contradictory way most of us see the world. I don't think she necessarily considered this a bad thing in itself, but she was drawn to part this muddle in different places in order to reveal what is concealed behind it, so to speak. These divisions are not meant to be boundaries between different sections of the reed bed, but are made for the purpose of gaining insight into what is happening at the roots. The analogy is perhaps a bit strained at this point, but let me return to the example of her distinction between labor and work to try to make it clearer. This distinction does have a phenomenological facet in that it points to different aspects of the human condition. But the motivating force behind the distinction is Arendt's ever-present concern about the totalitarian impulses to be found in modern society. Our muddled perspectives on the world can easily allow

---

[5] Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 123.
[6] Benhabib, 123-4.
[7] Arendt herself was aware of this kind of ambiguity; see *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 100.

such tendencies toward totalitarianism to grow unchecked and unnoticed. And it is precisely because she so strongly abhorred the totalitarian belief that historical processes are inevitable and unstoppable that she sought to draw attention to these processes through the use of unusual distinctions.

As Margaret Canovan has pointed out, Arendt's readers often fail to take seriously her commitment to anti-systematic thinking because of the way her naturally systematic mind linked ideas together.[8] Yet her commitment was real. Canovan reminds us that "when she made statements about her approach to her work she emphasised its tentativeness and flexibility. Authentic political thought necessarily arose, she believed, out of real political events, and had to be rethought in response to them. In any case, thinking itself (as she argued in *The Life of the Mind*) was like Penelope's weaving, constantly undoing its own construction."[9] It may be that her style of thinking can best be understood as meditation rather than analysis, or at least as a kind of meditative analysis. Perhaps it is because her writing style represents her desire to think about and respond to problems, rather than build a systematic philosophical edifice, that people find her ideas applicable to so many different areas.[10] Education is one area in which thinkers have begun to take notice of the potential in Arendt's ideas. Already the application of her ideas to educational theory has shown promise of great fruitfulness.

Arendt and Education

I would like to consider contemporary education from a philosophical angle via the work of Arendt. Her ideas on natality, the public world, and judgment, for example, are particularly relevant to education. I propose to examine the topic of education as consciousness raising; that is, I believe a key role of education is to prepare students to engage with and seek to positively affect the world into which they are born. Part of this engagement must be that they learn to take

---

[8] Canovan, 6.
[9] Ibid., 5.
[10] Of course, these approaches are not necessarily opposed, but in Arendt's case she self-consciously sought to avoid the latter.

responsibility for their actions and attempt to think about things for themselves, rather than merely accept what they hear from "experts" or the media. Arendt saw as a disturbing modern inclination the tendency to locate responsibility in general trends, making judging matters for oneself superfluous, if not impossible. As a North American, I situate my perspective in terms of an ideally democratic, multicultural context in which educators take responsibility for the world they show to their students and seek to prepare those students to in their turn both take up responsibility for and initiate new possibilities for transformation in the world. The situation of our earth today—globalizing in uneven patterns which exhibit extreme gaps between rich and poor, war-torn, divided by unreflective ideological commitment, and bewildered by an ever thickening network of technology and bureaucracy—requires us, if we choose to preserve hope, to seek out ways in which that hope can be made manifest. Education holds a key place at the intersection of responsibility for the past, empowerment to effect change in the present, and hope for the future.

I will approach my topic from three interconnected angles. First, I will set out an understanding of human community as a chaotic system in the technical sense via Arendt's concept of natality. I will apply this understanding to the project of education as a way of helping educators facilitate students' ability to contribute something new without controlling or directing—and likely stifling—students' potentially unique contributions. Second, I will question in more detail the applicability of some of Arendt's philosophical and political ideas to contemporary multicultural education, addressing also the need for setting goals for action without assuming a mathematically linear (and thus deterministic) process. And finally, I will examine Arendt's firm distinction between education and politics in the context of globalization and the possibility of continual renewal and transformation of our world.

1. The Miracle That Saves the World: Natality in Education

> Since action acts upon beings who are capable of their own actions, reaction, apart from being a response, is always a new action that strikes out on its own and affects others...This boundlessness is characteristic not of political action alone, in the narrower sense of the word, as though the boundlessness of human interrelatedness were only the result of the boundless multitude of people involved, which could be escaped by resigning oneself to action within a limited, graspable framework of circumstances; the smallest act in the most limited circumstances bears the seed of the same boundlessness, because one deed, and sometimes one word, suffices to change every constellation.[11]
>
> Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*

Introduction: Chaos and Education

When a person uses the word "chaos," what he generally means to refer to is a situation which is extremely disordered or confused. If the person is a physicist, however, what she means may be something quite different from what is commonly intended by the term. In physics, "chaos" is a word used to describe a specific kind of physical system. Despite its name, chaos is not completely irregular—nor completely regular—although it does tend toward our everyday understanding of the word in that it is described mathematically by a kind of nonlinear equation which cannot be solved. Chaotic systems are characterized by extreme sensitivity to initial conditions; a small change in the system as it begins to evolve leads to exponentially different effects over time. This means that what will happen in the system very quickly becomes unpredictable.[12] Some everyday examples of chaos, in the technical sense, are a flag in the wind, cigarette smoke, a dripping faucet, and the weather.

A "system" in physics is, simply put, a group of interrelated phenomena. An important first step in studying anything in physics is to determine what constitutes the system under consideration. It is a matter of deciding on the limits of your inquiry, like drawing an imaginary line around what you want to study. A system can be extremely tiny, as when physicists are studying at the level of atoms and smaller, or it can include the entire universe, which is the

---

[11] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 190.

[12] Hans Georg Schuster, *Deterministic Chaos: An Introduction* (Weinheim, Germany: VCH Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995), 2.

system under consideration for those who search for a so-called Theory of Everything. A system can also vary in its level of reality. College physics students study imaginary systems in textbooks, which often leave out significant factors like friction or heat loss. They also study real systems in lab settings and even in playgrounds. The purpose of this flexibility is to allow physicists to gain insight by looking at things from different angles. Studying an imaginary, frictionless system, for example, can allow people to notice important internal relationships, such as between the mass of an object and the force applied to it. Studying a merry-go-round at the playground, on the other hand, can enable them to see how the formulas they have learned describe and do not describe the phenomena themselves. This can make for a better understanding of the way in which the system is situated within a larger context, as well as allow knowledge to be gained about the system itself.

An important aspect of studying any system is the recognition that it is a way of looking at things for a certain purpose. Looking at something as a system is not the same as understanding it as an ontologically distinct entity; nor is a system merely an abstraction. Rather, it is a kind of flexible framework that allows differing levels of focus and breadth of study. Also, everything within a system is expected to have an effect on everything else, but it is a fatal mistake to assume that the system under consideration must not be affected by something outside the lines you have drawn. Defining a system is always temporary, since there might always be something that has been left out that will add important information at some point in the future. I find this understanding of a system to be a helpful philosophical tool as well as a physical one.

With this understanding in mind, I would like to suggest that a common chaotic system, though largely unrecognized as such, is human community, and particularly the common, public world of human beings. In this age of globalization, human beings find themselves part of a worldwide group of people as well as various more localized communities, and in this global context widespread poverty, injustice and oppression often lead conscientious members of richer areas to feel both guilty and helpless. They recognize that they are in some way complicit in the rampant injustice that takes place in poorer countries by the fact that they benefit from the

system. Yet they see no way to escape their complicity, much less reverse it. On the other hand, those trapped in poverty feel even more helpless to effect change, since they often find their very life contexts and choices determined by the actions of faceless people in far-away cities. People in various walks of life feel fated by their social positioning, helpless to take on the task of transformation. This is the world into which teachers have the duty of introducing their students. In a very real manner the world does seem chaotic in the non-technical sense—it is entirely out of hand and uncontrollable, and there seems to be no end to the mess except, perhaps, death.

Yet it is this very chaotic nature of the human world which allows us to hope. Because the consequences of our actions are unpredictable, we do not find ourselves necessarily, incontrovertibly doomed. We are not merely conditioned by our state of mortality, as Hannah Arendt points out, but also by *natality*, and it is this miracle of birth and beginning that means we can not only hope for, but initiate change. Thus birth, says Arendt, is the phenomenon that maintains the possibility of life in more than just the biological sense: "The life span of man running toward death would inevitably carry everything human to ruin and destruction if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it and beginning something new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an ever-present reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but in order to begin."[13]

"Human birth is a world-creating event," says Patricia Bowen-Moore in her exposition of Arendt's philosophy of natality.[14] Bowen-Moore emphasizes that in Arendt's conception of natality, there is no distinction between the birth of a child and the advent of the principle of beginning. When a new human being enters the world, the possibility of a new beginning arrives

---

[13] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 246. The reader may notice that I have chosen to leave Arendt's use of the word "man" unaltered, despite its non-inclusive nature (although she herself meant it as a generic term; however, times have changed, and so has our response to this term). In doing this, I am following the example and reasoning of Natasha Levinson, whose footnote on the subject runs as follows: "In keeping with my argument about what it means to learn to live in 'the gap between past and future,' I have decided not to alter Arendt's use of the generic male (although my need to draw attention to this decision underscores a certain discomfort). My concern is not merely with the integrity of her text, but with my reluctance to rewrite the past in the image of the present. Eliminating language that makes us uncomfortable does little to help us understand the exclusions and erasures of the past. As a consequence, our motivation to transform contemporary exclusionary practices becomes less and less clear." (Natasha Levinson, "The Paradox of Natality: Teaching in the Midst of Belatedness," in *Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing Our Common World*, ed. Mordechai Gordon [Boulder: Westview Press, 2001], n. 1, p. 33)

[14] Patricia Bowen-Moore, *Hannah Arendt's Philosophy of Natality* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 32.

with her. The concept of beginning and the existential framework of birth are inseparably joined due to the temporal nature of human existence.[15] Since human beings are born in a particular time and place, the novelty they bring with them affects their context from the moment of birth. A child arrives as a stranger to his parents, his setting, and himself, but his arrival corresponds to not only his own newness but also his power to initiate.

Natality is of particular importance in respect to education. In fact, Arendt, in her typically clear-sighted manner, points out that the essence of education is natality, that new human beings are born into the world and must be introduced to it.[16] If it were not for the continual arrival of new people in the world, education need hardly exist at all. Simply put, education is the process of adults introducing an always old world to the newcomers, the children. As Arendt says, a teacher is like a "representative of all adult inhabitants, pointing out the details and saying to the child: This is our world."[17] At the same time, the newness which children bring into the world is what gives the world hope, so that teachers must be careful to introduce the world to the children without dictating how the children's own potential contribution will look. In a common world built by mortals to be their home for a limited amount of time, the risk is unrelenting that the world itself may wear out. If it is not to run inevitably to ruin, Arendt insists, the world stands continually in need of renewal.[18] And because we all, through our birth, have become a part of the human world, this task of renewal faces all of us. Education, says Arendt, is "where we decide whether we love our children enough not to expel them from our world and leave them to their own devices, nor to strike from their hands their chance of undertaking something new, something unforeseen by us, but to prepare them in advance for the task of renewing a common world."[19]

---

[15] Ibid., 25.
[16] Hannah Arendt, "The Crisis in Education," in *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: The Viking Press, 1968; Penguin Books, 1977), 174.
[17] Ibid., 189.
[18] Ibid., 192.
[19] Ibid., 196.

What is this world to which children must be introduced? The "world" for Arendt is fundamentally the home which human beings have built for themselves; it is characterized by plurality and durability, although this durability is not absolute. The world, in both its tangible and less tangible aspects, must be maintained and renewed or it will decay.[20] Canovan summarizes Arendt's idea of "world" as follows: "It is something artificial and durable produced by transforming natural material into an environment that can outlast individual lives. It includes such things as artifacts, cultivated land and the products of organisation, such as political institutions."[21] The world is produced by human beings, but also conditions them. Arendt says, "because human existence is conditioned existence, it would be impossible without things, and things would be a heap of unrelated articles, a non-world, if they were not the conditioners of human existence."[22] Her debt to Heidegger's understanding of the way in which the human experience of things is what makes these things into a world is obvious here. However, the significance of plurality for Arendt's understanding of the world makes her conception distinct from his. For Arendt, the creation of a world is always a matter of plurality, and is part of what allows human beings to be plural individuals rather than interchangeable animals.

The world is built largely through work; that is, the making of things. These things have a stabilizing function for human life, says Arendt, for we can relate to the same things over time, and many of them outlast a single lifetime. Thus the world is a matter of plurality through time as well as among human beings at the same time: "The reality and reliability of the human world rest primarily on the fact that we are surrounded by things more permanent than the activity by which they were produced, and potentially even more permanent than the lives of the their authors."[23] This world of things Arendt also refers to as "the human artifice." But the world of things is not merely a matter of functionality: "In order to be what the world is always meant to

---

[20] My understanding of Arendt's use of the word "world" comes largely from *The Human Condition*, 6, 9, 52, 94-6, 112-5, 134, 136-7, 167-8, 173, 204, 209, 247, 250, 301. I have also been informed by Canovan, *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought*, 32, 35, 38-9, 55, 72-3, 83, 92, 103, 106-111, 117, 124, 128-9, 150, 154, 194, 201, 226, 258.

[21] Canovan, 108.

[22] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 9.

[23] Ibid., 95-6.

be, a home for men during their life on earth, the human artifice must be a place fit for action and speech," Arendt proclaims.[24] And, in fact, Canovan notes that much of what Arendt means by "world" can be summed up as "culture."[25] This can also be seen in Arendt's understanding of art works as the most worldly of tangible things, due to their durability (particularly in a cultural sense) and the way they transcend sheer functionality.[26] The "world" also overlaps significantly with Arendt's conception of public space, which draws together individuals while allowing them space for their uniqueness. This world which human beings have built over time is that to which children must be introduced, and which it is their task to renew.

Although Arendt speaks of education primarily in respect to children, it is interesting to note that she believes that, in the American environment, education (as distinct from learning, which need have no end) comes to an end only after college.[27] Because she sees education as a preparation for entrance into the public world, her comments on the education of children can thus apply to higher education as well. In fact, in our contemporary context in which many adults return to school for further education, it is worth considering how her thoughts might apply to what we know as "lifelong learning." In any case, I am choosing to use university-level education as my framework, even while I make use of Arendt's vocabulary to speak of students as children, in the sense of newcomers to the larger world. Natality is not a one-time event, but a continuing potentiality for every human being; it is the ever-present possibility of initiating something new. Before we turn in more detail to Arendt's ideas on natality and its importance for education in light of chaos theory, it will be helpful to take a closer look at the theory itself.

Chaos theory is an area of physics that has only recently been seriously studied and accepted, although some of the basic insights behind it have been around for more than a century. In 1898, a French mathematician named Jacques Hadamard demonstrated that making small changes in initial conditions can lead to results that are vastly different from each other, making

---

[24] Ibid., 173.
[25] Canovan, 109.
[26] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 167, 173.
[27] Arendt, "The Crisis in Education," 196.

prediction of the outcome of the process effectively impossible.[28] Perhaps the most well-known early thinker on the subject is Henri Poincaré, another turn-of-the-century French mathematician who, in addition to doing mathematics, also considered scientific questions philosophically. He discussed examples such as the weather, arguing that the undependability of weather forecasting is a result of the system's sensitivity to initial conditions, rather than chance, as seems intuitively to be the case.[29]

Strangely enough, no one paid much attention to these analyses, except as oddities, until about seventy years later, and even then scientists such as E. N. Lorenz (who described and named the well-known "butterfly effect") and David Ruelle (who did groundbreaking work in understanding the transition to turbulence in liquids as not only chaotic, but centred around "strange attractors") were not taken seriously until well into the 1970s.[30] Today the study of chaos is a popular and growing field, as scientists recognize its functionality in diverse areas of research in the hard sciences. In fact, chaotic systems—demonstrating neither entirely regular nor irregular motion—are actually the rule rather than the exception in the physical world.[31]

Although the study of chaos in areas such as physics, mathematics, meteorology and even, to some extent, biology has shown itself to be extremely fruitful, David Ruelle cautions against expecting too much from chaos in fields such as economics, the social sciences, and some areas of biology. Studying chaos mathematically requires a quantitative description of the system, usually in terms of basic mathematical equations, but these equations in the soft sciences are simply not available, giving way instead to "models" as a way of describing systems. Also, the basic equations—although what they are is not known—in economics, social sciences, and so on, actually change over time. This means that for systems like these, chaos theory must at this point be used philosophically rather than scientifically.[32]

---

[28] David Ruelle, *Chance and Chaos* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 47.
[29] Ibid., 49.
[30] Schuster, 1, 4.
[31] Ibid., 5.
[32] Ruelle, 79.

It is in this context, then, that the idea of chaos can be applied to the common, human world. I am not suggesting that chaos theory be employed directly in a mathematical sense, but that a philosophical comparison be made between the theory's major concepts and the way human beings act together. In light of the idea of sensitivity to initial conditions, Arendt's thoughts on natality and the unpredictability of human action provide space for a viewpoint outside that of the mass culture that is such an intrinsic characteristic of our globalized world. In fact, this very divergence between mass society and human beings as thinking individuals is one that Arendt addressed when the trend toward a global consumer society as it has now emerged was just beginning.

The Social and the Political

Arendt distinguishes between human beings as political and as social. "Political" for Arendt does not merely refer to a narrow sphere of government-related activities; it also describes a way of being in the world that relates to the fundamental plurality of human existence. For Arendt, the political realm is the scene of action, a term she uses technically in distinction from "labor" and "work": "Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world."[33] This action is, in Arendt's terms, a matter of "who," as opposed to "what" a person is. The "who" can perhaps be compared to the mysterious inner kernel of a person's identity, while the "what" is like the more visible outer shell of someone's persona. "What" a person is refers to characteristics which he or she shares with others, such as ethnic background, economic status, athletic ability, or temperament, for example. "Who" a person is refers to the unique and distinct kernel of identity which makes each person different from every other. It is this unique identity, according to Arendt, which can be disclosed through speech and action in the public realm. In fact, Arendt suggests, it is likely that the "who" remains always hidden from the person herself, and is only revealed through

---

[33] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 7.

speech and action with other people; she compares this "who" to the Greek *daemon* who looks over each man's shoulder from behind and is visible only to those he meets.[34] As always, the fact of human plurality remains at the forefront of Arendt's thought even when she considers a potentially non-plural topic such as individuality.

Arendt identifies the social realm as a sort of hybrid between the public and the private which has arisen in the modern age along with the nation-state.[35] Society, says Arendt, is the realm in which "private interests assume public significance";[36] in terms of the modern nation state this means that the entire nation is understood as one big household with a single common interest.[37] However, Arendt notes, as separate realms the political and the social are indistinct: "the two realms indeed constantly flow into each other like waves in the never-resting stream of the life process itself."[38] It is perhaps most helpful to understand the political and the social as two aspects of human life, with society being the more dominant way of being in the contemporary setting. But the political, though less common, is the site of a more meaningful and worthy kind of interaction.

Human beings as political act as equals; it is this context in which they can show their individuality, where they can together initiate and carry through deeds that are worth remembering. Socially, on the other hand, human beings conform to patterns of behavior which are based on the idea of their sameness; that is, on "what" they are. Arendt refers to this as mere "behaving" rather than acting. An obvious example of this is the various marketing groups into which populations are divided as targets for advertising. Economics and statistics take advantage of people behaving socially, assuming in fact that real action is rare and not significant for interpreting history and everyday life—not realizing that it is these "rare" actions which actually reveal the meaningfulness of both life and history.[39] As I understand it, human beings who live

---

[34] Ibid., 179-80.
[35] Ibid., 28.
[36] Ibid., 35.
[37] Ibid., 39.
[38] Ibid., 33.
[39] Ibid., 42.

primarily as merely social by and large fail to respond to the fact of human plurality in spite of—or perhaps because of—the sameness that is at the base of social behavior; in thoughtless conformity they end up isolating themselves from each other. The possibility of real political action is a matter of individuals acting in concert; the power that arises from this kind of action comes from people coming together from their various unique positions to focus on a common project.

To clarify the distinction between the social and the political, let us turn to Seyla Benhabib's insightful explication of the matter. The fundamental difference, Benhabib points out, is what might be called a difference in attitude, not a difference in topic or persons involved:

> The constitution of a public space always involves a claim to the generalizability of the demands, needs, and interests for which one is fighting. In struggling for the eight-hour working day, or against child labor, or for universal health insurance, one is also struggling for justice, for interests that we as a political community have in common....Whichever class or social group enters the public realm, and no matter how class or group specific its demands may be in their genesis, the process of public-political struggle transforms the *attitude of narrow self-interest into a more broadly shared public or common interest.* This, I think, is the fundamental distinction between the "social-cum-economic" and "political" realms for Hannah Arendt. Engaging in politics does not mean abandoning economic or social issues; it means fighting for them in the name of principles, interests, values that have a generalizable basis, and that concern us as members of a collectivity.[40]

The larger the population involved, the more accurate statistical description will be—and the more likely the public realm will be social instead of political. When in large groups, people tend to pursue broad trends, showing intolerance for anyone who does not follow along. In this kind of society, it becomes very difficult for real action to disclose meaning or change anything.[41] Arendt's description of mass society is terribly accurate for much of Canadian and American culture, and the monolithic, thoughtless character of these nations tends more and more toward consumerism, materialism, and an ever-increasing dependence on behaving like everybody else. It seems as if human interaction in mass society is in danger of losing its sensitivity; it becomes

---

[40] Benhabib, 145. Emphasis in the original.

[41] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 43.

predictable. The chaotic nature of the community is quashed by the very weight of the linearity for which it searches, funneling the potential for initiative into an ever narrower scope of sameness. Even those who see the downside of the system often feel so entangled in it that they, too, come up with Arendt's diagnosis of society: there is no action to be taken that can make a difference.

This conclusion, however, is a false one. It would be true if human communities were *merely* societies, acting as linear systems—once they have started toward a certain end, they continue on course invariably and predictably. Fortunately, this does not have to be the case, since human beings are not only social but also political, and the social and political realms are not completely distinct. Neither is Arendt's verdict on society her last word on the matter. Her insight into the nature of natality informs her view of action. For Arendt, with every new human being there comes into the world both a new beginning and an inherent power to initiate. That is, each new person and each new action creates a change in the initial conditions of the human world, which, chaos theory tells us, makes the consequences of any person's single deed enormously volatile. The unpredictability which is intrinsic in the nature of beginning makes it impossible to treat human affairs as simply following a pattern of cause and effect; human beings "have never been and never will be able to undo or even control reliably any of the processes they start through action," says Arendt.[42]

Arendt sees joining the world of human affairs as a kind of second birth which arises from the principle of beginning, a principle which enters the world with every human being. This second birth is a response to our own beginning, a chance for us to begin something new on our own initiative. This initiation is one and the same as real action.[43] Although people may see themselves as a mass or crowd of uniformity, the fact remains that as political beings they remain a group of individuals, each one with the power to initiate action—the potential to begin something new.

---

[42] Ibid., 232-3.
[43] Ibid., 177.

"The Paradox of Natality"

According to Arendt, the task of education is to preserve this newness for each generation as it takes its place in the world. This is no easy task. As Natasha Levinson puts it, "Teachers are positioned very oddly in relation to the new, since we are asked to facilitate its emergence at the same time as Arendt reminds us that we can neither predict nor control the forms this newness will take."[44] Levinson also identifies two aspects of natality which complicate the possibility that students might bring something new into the world. One is the condition of plurality. Arendt has identified this as a fundamental aspect of being human which contributes to the unpredictability of action. Since our efforts toward newness take place in the context of other acting beings, it is very unlikely that our actions will come to completion without being interrupted and changed by others' actions along the way.[45] Another factor which complicates the matter is, to use Homi Bhabha's term, the fact of "belatedness." When we arrive in the world as newcomers, we discover that the world both precedes us and helps to form us. We cannot experience ourselves as completely new because those around us already fit us into familiar categories before we are even aware of them, and which are then also part of who we are. Perhaps this reflects the social character of human beings; we consist of a tendency toward sameness as well as the capacity for the new.

In "The Paradox of Natality," Levinson speaks in terms of the framework of a multiracial classroom in which students have the opportunity to confront each other on issues of racism and social positioning. This is a context which brings the reality of belatedness strongly to the fore. The challenge for teachers, Levinson reminds us, is to preserve newness in the face of this belatedness. As students become aware of themselves as not just individuals, but as *kinds* of people, they may have difficulty finding a way to respond productively to the structure of their social positioning. On the one hand, their belatedness may weigh them down to the point of paralysis. On the other hand, they may refuse to accept it, thus denying also the connections

---

[44] Levinson, 14.
[45] Ibid., 13, 14.

between the past and present as well as their own position of being in relation to others.[46] This weight of belatedness is perhaps to be expected in light of the heavily social nature of the societies of which these students are a part.

Another challenge for teachers in the face of racism and other forms of injustice is the repetitive nature of teaching. This may lead to weariness and frustration on the part of both the teacher and those students, usually of minority or oppressed groups, who have been made aware of their belatedness early on. However, it is important to remember that these encounters are not actually repetitions.[47] Levinson reminds us that "What seems like old hat to the teacher may well be quite new to some of the participants, particularly those who have never before discussed racism in a mixed-race group.... Even if these encounters are familiar to some students—and thus reinforce rather than ameliorate their sense of belatedness—it is important to bear in mind the asymmetrical way in which students become aware of their belatedness."[48] These encounters, then, are both familiar and new. Natality and belatedness are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin.

The challenge for teachers, then, is to find a way to create space for students to come to terms with their belatedness without being paralyzed by it. This is where the comparison with chaos theory becomes helpful. Belatedness—finding ourselves in a world that already exists in certain, often unjust ways—need only be paralyzing if we live in a universe which moves along a mathematically linear, and thus entirely predictable, trajectory. Because of natality's ever-present possibility of newness, however, human action takes on a boundless character which means that any teacher or any student can begin something that will change the world. Again, this chaotic arrangement does not mean that the call for action is a call for complete bedlam. Chaotic systems too are patterned; however, these patterns do not allow us to see far ahead to a definite outcome.

---

[46] Ibid., 15.
[47] Ibid., 13.
[48] Ibid., 27.

The Capacity for Action

Action, then, is the basis for the unexpectedness innate in human beings. According to Arendt, unexpectedness is in fact inherent in the very nature of beginning. And since something new is always a surprise in a culture steeped in the certainty of statistical trends, human action as beginning appears miraculous, and yet this is part of what makes people human, and indeed is what is to be expected from them.[49] And since the interaction between human beings which makes them political is in fact a web of relationships, in which every member has equivalent power to initiate something new, action rarely achieves its purpose as such. Action by one group is met by reaction by others, and since these re-actions are in fact new actions themselves, action takes on a boundless character in which the smallest act can have far-reaching consequences.[50] Education, then, must show students not only their own potential to change the world, but also the way in which others' actions will interfere to produce unintended consequences, whatever the intentions of the actors may be. Fortunately, these consequences can be positive as well as negative.

Arendt's ideas were in many ways ahead of her time. Perhaps if more physicists had read her writings in the 1950's, chaos theory would not have taken so long to catch on, for clearly the basic principles of the theory are what she recounts in her depiction of human action. She describes human beings as beginnings—or, as we might say, initial conditions—in which any small action can lead to exponentially diverse consequences. Although this may seem to be a frightening conviction in a world seemingly bent on destruction, the idea that we can make a difference is not only encouraging, but absolutely vital. If it were not for the capacity to begin something new, we would be doomed to the course set by our ancestors, trapped in an inflexible snare with no freedom in sight.

But human beings do possess the gift of freedom, the possibility of action. And, as Levinson points out, "Education can foster students' capacity for action or it can foreclose it."[51]

---

[49] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 178.
[50] Ibid., 184, 190.
[51] Levinson, 18.

Not only is the responsibility of teachers to foster rather than foreclose students' capacity for action vital for the future of the world, but it is part of their task to introduce the students to the world as it is. This is part of the responsibility to which Arendt calls educators, to introduce students to the world as it is, not only as it could be or as they wish it might be.[52] Levinson identifies several important reasons for this responsibility. First of all, part of the reason for introducing students to the world is not only to prepare them to make their way in it, but to remake it. If students are to understand the need for and challenge of renewal and transformation, they must see the world with all its flaws and brokenness.[53] Also, Levinson notes that there is always more to the world than one teacher's perception of it; a teacher must not merely indoctrinate students into his or her worldview, but must try to show the students a variety of perspectives. "To orient students to the world is thus not to impose a singular reading of this world on them. Rather, it is to expose them to a representative sample of the many and varied ways in which the world is experienced and interpreted by its inhabitants past and present."[54]

I would add to this that an important part of introducing students to the world as it is must be to show them the chaotic nature of human beings acting together. If students come to the world with an expectation of linearity—and thus complete predictability—their efforts cannot but go awry, since the nature of human action is not linear. If, however, they are aware of the boundlessness that comes with the gift of natality, they can perhaps be open to understanding themselves not as potential rulers of the world, dictating outcomes, but as they really are: beginners who contain the possibility of initiating renewal once again. This hope carries risk with it, of course. A chaotic system does not lead automatically to death, but neither does it lead automatically to life. This, too, is an aspect of human freedom. The consequences of our actions can sometimes be as disastrous as leaving the world to run automatically to destruction would be. However, action is also the site of potential renewal; without it, disaster would be inevitable, as the human world without rejuvenation goes the way of all things over time.

---

[52] Arendt, "The Crisis in Education," 189.
[53] Levinson, 19.
[54] Ibid., 20.

To be free and to act are one and the same, says Arendt. Canovan reminds us that in order to understand Arendt's writings on freedom we must keep in mind her preoccupation with plurality. For Arendt, all individual human beings contain the seed of freedom in their capacity to begin, but this freedom only comes to fruition when people come together in action. Canovan suggests thinking of something like Amnesty International or another human rights organization, as an example to help understand this: "At the root of any such organisation lies the capacity that belongs to all individuals for starting something that had never existed before: but the acting in concert that called something new into existence in the world is what enables us actually to *see* freedom, as Arendt said, as a worldly reality."[55] Freedom manifests itself in action. And with freedom comes responsibility—ongoing responsibility, for we never leave our actions behind us except perhaps through forgiveness. A common mistake is to understand action as something like a work of art. After an artwork has been produced, it is no longer dependent on the process or artist and can stand by itself. Action, on the other hand, cannot be left to itself because, contrary to current popular belief, it is not about the end product.[56] This distinction is an important one. In a linear system, the end can be deduced from the beginning. In terms of human community this is the sort of statistical behavior mentioned earlier.

Arendt points out that all processes tend to become automatic, for they are always embedded in the natural processes of the earth of which human beings too are part. This is so, she says, even in the political arena, though this is the space in which human action begins things. And historical processes that have become automatic lead to death as inevitably as automatic biological processes do. The power of human freedom, however, is the ability to interrupt automatic processes by what Arendt calls a miracle—something entirely new and unexpected.[57] Levinson, too, notices the problem of assuming linearity when seeking to transform the world, pointing out that "we need a different conception of progress and social

---

[55] Canovan, 213-4. Emphasis in the original.
[56] Arendt, "What is Freedom?" in *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: The Viking Press, 1968; Penguin Books, 1977), 153.
[57] Ibid., 168.

renewal, one that attends to the snail's pace of change. The idea that social progress proceeds seamlessly toward a utopian future...is in many ways an evasion of the responsibility that attends our being with others in the world."[58]

Looking for the Miracle

If the human condition of natality is not taken into account, the odds are overpowering that tomorrow will be just like yesterday, Arendt says. However, history, unlike nature, is full of miracles, for historical processes are "created and constantly interrupted by human initiative...Hence it is not in the least superstitious, it is even a counsel of realism, to look for the unforeseeable and unpredictable, to be prepared for and to expect 'miracles' in the political realm. And the more heavily the scales are weighted in favor of disaster, the more miraculous will the deed done in freedom appear; for it is disaster, not salvation, which always happens automatically and therefore always must appear to be irresistible."[59] Strange as it may seem, this capacity for the miraculous is a fundamental aspect of human nature. The ability to act is the ability to begin a new process whose end is unpredictable, and therefore potentially very unlike what the statistics may show for tomorrow from today's polls. For teachers, as Levinson points out, this means that educating for the possibility of social transformation demands constantly renewed effort, for "what is new will never proceed in a straightforward fashion toward a recognizable end point."[60]

Perhaps because the social has so effectively supplanted the political in North America, as can be seen in the mass economic culture fed by media and technology, leaders tend to assume that they can set something in motion and then watch it achieve its goal without further interference. Clearly there must be some rationale behind an approach which, in light of chaos

---

[58] Levinson, 32. I think Levinson is right to identify change, at least fundamental change, as proceeding at a snail's pace. Rapid technological innovation or even revolution rarely, I think, reach immediately to the roots of the way things are in terms of the human motivations and understandings through which both the status quo and the changes are formed.

[59] Arendt, "What is Freedom?", 170.

[60] Levinson, 33.

theory, can never really work in the realm of human affairs. It is rather astonishing how people continue to be surprised when their neat plans go awry, whether at the level of a local church community or in the far-reaching realm of international relations. Despite the evidence, leaders continue to assume that the initiatives they take will merely be carried through, and then the story will be over. I suspect this cause-and-effect attitude comes from noticing how well it works to treat human beings statistically in areas such as advertising. My conjecture is that the reason society can be treated as predictable and linear in these areas is that they take into account very short-term goals, despite the fact that, over time, trends turn out to be unpredictable.

Arendt finds a remedy for action's irreversibility and unpredictability through the possibility of forgiveness and promise-keeping. Making promises allows people to create islands of constancy in an uncertain future, and forgiveness frees both the forgiver and the forgiven from the chain of endless, unhindered reaction.[61] These ideas have important consequences for the way we approach the chain of events which we set in motion whenever we act. I suggest that forgiveness may perhaps need to be not only a new action itself, but an approach informing continuing action. Forgiveness, as a new beginning in a messy world, allows us to approach the world flexibly. We do not remain bound to the past's trajectory, but can act and re-act according to the continual change, the product of human natality, which we find around us. Forgiveness is in fact a kind of rebirth, a gift for both oneself and for others—as miraculous as it is wholly unexpected, for with it comes the possibility and the responsibility to begin again.

Nearly half a century ago, Arendt recognized the troubling modern desire to ascribe responsibility to general societal trends.[62] This approach easily leads people toward a feeling of helplessness; nothing they do, be it good or bad, really makes a difference in the long run. But the fact is that actions *do* make a difference, and if we're not aware of that, the effects quickly get out of hand. Unintended effects are much more likely to be constructive, I believe, if action is undertaken with the understanding of its chaotic possibilities at the fore. Recognizing that each

---

[61] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 237, 241.

[62] Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (New York: The Viking Press, 1963; Penguin Books, 1994), 297.

action we take is a beginning in itself, a change in the initial conditions of the system, we can choose to take responsibility for our past actions by continuing to work with their consequences, reflectively acting anew, rather than leaving the past—which then becomes the unchangeable future—to follow whatever course it will. Yet we are left with an important question: Is it possible to find criteria for this renewal, to retain some sense of direction in our actions without assuming predictable results? This question is one of the issues to be considered in the next chapter.

2. Something in Common

> [T]he term "public" signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it. This world, however, is not identical with the earth or with nature, as the limited space for the movement of men and the general condition of organic life. It is related, rather, to the human artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to affairs which go on among those who inhabit the man-made world together. To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time.[63]
>
> Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*

Introduction: Who, Not What

Hannah Arendt is one of the few writers who catch the interest of people from all different walks of life. From well-known contemporary philosophers, to political activists from diverse backgrounds, to an isolated, little-educated Mormon woman who read her books under the covers at night,[64] Arendt's appeal is hard to pin down. A large part of it, perhaps, is the way in which her thought is so much a response to real-life problems. Her distinction between what and who a person is, and the creative tensions which can be noticed in her ideas on the nature of the public are helpful in various contexts, including the classroom. Her understanding of human limits mitigates the utopian tendencies so often found in theorists of democracy and education, of whom Dewey remains one of the foremost. Yet Dewey's understanding of ends as aims, always changing in interaction with the consequences of one's actions, adds an important element to Arendt's perceptive description of the unpredictability of action.

The project of democratic education, theorist Aaron Schutz points out, though it has often been on the margins of educational theory, has been continually engaged throughout the last century and has if anything been more strongly pursued in recent years. The diverse group of scholars who are committed to democratic education struggles against what they see as the undemocratic tendencies present in, for example, the resegregation of schools and the attempt to standardize students through constricted forms of assessment. Their desire, Schutz notes, has

---

[63] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 52.

[64] Ann Lane, "Hannah Arendt: Theorist of Distinction(s)," *Political Theory* 25, no.1 (February 1997): 137-8.

consistently been to "foster citizens empowered to change society for the better."[65] Today this project continues to play a marginal role, "taking a backseat to fears about global competitiveness, declining academic achievement, and individual morality, among other issues."[66]

Hannah Arendt, however, is a thinker whom educators are beginning to pick up as a potential bridge between the project of democratic education and the need to address pressing global issues. In her essay entitled "Is Hannah Arendt a Multiculturalist?" Ann Lane discusses a seminar that she gives on Arendt at the University of California at Santa Cruz. Lane has a wide variety of students from diverse backgrounds, and her experience of studying Arendt with them has allowed her to come to some important insights about what Arendt has to offer. Lane notes that many commentators view Arendt "against a backdrop of philosophical debates or in the context of an abstract struggle of ideas about political life."[67] In contrast, Lane's students find that the assertions and distinctions that trouble these commentators are the very things which speak mostly directly to their own life struggles.[68]

Lane has found that the ten-week course is full of contention, for the students come from such different backgrounds that they do not find it easy to explain their points of view to each other. However, Lane notes that Arendt's thought is helpful to them not only in terms of its content, but methodologically as well. Her distinction between "what" and "who" a person is, applied to their own classroom context, helps the students tailor their interaction to see themselves "first as human, political agents, not primarily as poor people, women, blacks, or Jews."[69] This perspective enables them to better understand each other and to find common ground for discussion. Lane finds particularly interesting the fact that there are several points on which this diverse group of students come together in agreement: the concepts of the conscious

---

[65] Aaron Schutz, "Contesting Utopianism: Hannah Arendt and the Tensions of Democratic Education" in *Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing Our Common World*, ed. Mordechai Gordon (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 93.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ann Lane, "Is Hannah Arendt a Multiculturalist?" in *Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing Our Common World*, ed. Mordechai Gordon (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 156.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid., 157.

pariah and the council system, and the distinction between the political and the social. She says, "I have come to believe the students' collective observations on these issues are illuminating precisely because they differ markedly from the conclusions drawn by those critics who examine themes and passages in Arendt against a series of philosophical debates. Perhaps Arendt is indeed a multiculturalist but one who needs multicultural readers, engaged in political action, who can comprehend that line of force in her work."[70]

Lane's conclusions resonate strongly with my own perspective on the unique value of Arendt's thought. Although many commentators take note of the fact that her theories arise out of experience, they rarely take the next step of seeing her thoughts as responses to real-life problems *first and foremost*, rather than categorical models addressing traditional philosophical issues. Lane's experience with her students demonstrates to me that Arendt's thought is too powerful to be dismissed as philosophically inadequate. And, in fact, I do not think it is philosophically inadequate if approached appropriately. In any case, it is undeniable that many of the so-called incoherencies in her writings are the ones that speak most powerfully to people, perhaps because our lives are so very rarely coherent. As Lane says, "Perhaps her critics are correct about her severe historical limitations and philosophical incoherencies. What my students from such varied backgrounds have compellingly demonstrated to me, nonetheless, is that it is precisely the most difficult and troubling aspects of her thought that address their deepest concerns about democratic possibilities in an increasingly multicultural world."[71] Let us take a closer look at some aspects of Arendt's thought which can be productively applied to the project of multicultural democratic education.

Accepting Limits: Public Space in Education

In his contribution to *Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing Our Common World*, Aaron Schutz addresses two important themes. First, he discusses the way in which Arendt's

---

[70] Ibid., 157-8.
[71] Ibid., 171.

work mitigates the utopian tendencies common in theorists of democracy, most of whom follow the path set by John Dewey. Second, he examines Arendt's model of "public space" in terms of education, demonstrating the significance of the tensions involved in this concept. Throughout the essay he exhibits a perspective which emphasizes the importance of allowing for a multiplicity of approaches—a point of view which resonates with Arendt's idea of "enlarged mentality."

Schutz begins by tracing out some basic similarities and differences between Dewey and Arendt. He notes that Dewey, like Arendt, believed that democratic communities are groups of individuals working together on a shared project, that he was committed to the uniqueness and potential of every human being, and that his work was written in response to concerns about the increasing feeling of powerlessness that individuals experienced in the face of industrialism. Dewey also argued that democracy could not be considered a clearly defined goal, but should instead be understood as a process.[72] These kinds of themes are strongly represented in Arendt's work. However, Schutz also calls attention to a fundamental difference between the two theorists: "Dewey firmly believed that anything was at least possible for human beings and that all barriers could at least potentially be overcome through careful 'scientific' inquiry."[73] This is part of what Schutz considers a "subtle 'utopian' aspect" to Dewey's democratic model.[74]

Schutz looks to Arendt's idea of the public as a kind of corrective for the utopian impulses he sees among theorists of democracy. He thinks that Arendt's perspective is particularly helpful because it takes the limits and costs of human freedom seriously. Schutz is concerned, with Cornel West, that Dewey and other theorists of democracy and education fail to take into account the way in which human struggles against specific evils, even when successful, produce new forms of evil.[75] Arendt, in contrast to Dewey, argued that the belief that anything is possible is extremely dangerous; that the Nazis believed this is the reason they were able to see

---

[72] Schutz, 94-5.
[73] Ibid., 95.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid., 96.

everything, including people, as temporary obstacles to their plans: "the Nazis taught Arendt that the very practice of aiming toward utopian ends, the belief that everything is possible, the refusal of human limitations, can be the first step toward totalitarianism."[76] Human beings, for example, cannot legitimately escape their condition of plurality, nor their temporal existence between birth and death.

In explicating his second theme, Schutz points out that for Arendt, there are several criteria which characterize public space, a concept she sees in two distinct but related ways. Briefly, the public is a space for "action" (which is for Arendt what makes us distinctively human) and for the speech which through its narrative power brings action beyond personal feelings and meaningless events. In a public space, only what is relevant to a common project—ultimately, I think, the common project of world transformation and renewal—can be tolerated.[77] In other words, human beings must come together politically on equal terms, regardless of private matters of relative wealth, friendships, and the like, and must keep to the common subject at hand in order to remain together in a specifically public way.

This is not to say, of course, that "private" matters are irrelevant in a fundamental sense. As Schutz notes, "the prepolitical engagements that we have with others, getting to know them in their full cultural and personal individuality, are fundamental requirements for the development of public spaces in which all but the most homogeneous might join together."[78] If carried through into public discourse, however, "private" issues—often relating to "what" a person is—cause the discussion to disintegrate into inequality and lack of a common topic. When, for example, rich and poor people try to come together in the public realm *as* rich and poor, they relate first of all as unequal, rather than equal human beings. Of course, this distinction is closely related to the need for the institutions of the public realm to be truly guided by the principle of equality, so that rich and poor people can both be involved in the first place. Arendt also describes the public world as a table, which both separates and relates those who sit around it: "The public realm, as

---

[76] Ibid., 97.
[77] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 50-1.
[78] Schutz, 104.

the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak."[79] Without the "table" of the public realm, it is unclear how individuals are related to each other in a way that allows them to see what they have in common.

This public world must be built to transcend the life span of a single generation, and yet in another sense it appears and disappears as people gather together with a common goal and then disperse again. This demonstrates the distinct but related ways in which Arendt understands the public. Perhaps the clearest way to put it is that a public *realm* should be built to last, but it is only potentially a space of public *appearance* until people come together in speech and action.[80] The reality of this public realm is dependent on the presence of a variety of perspectives, says Arendt. "Only where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without changing their identity, so that those who are gathered around them know they see sameness in utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably appear."[81]

Creative Tensions

Schutz identifies three fundamental tensions in Arendt's concept of public space. These tensions, far from undermining the worth of the concept, are what provide it with the delicate balance which is the source of its great creative power. He summarizes these tensions as follows:

> First of all, if they are to avoid either splintering their space apart or collapsing it into a realm of mass society, actors must be willing to risk disclosing their unique perspectives while restraining themselves from expressing their full singularity. Second, although participants must constantly make judgments, courageously taking sometimes controversial positions, they must avoid attempts to coerce others through assertions or logical demonstrations of incontestable truth and certainty. Finally, if they are to maintain possibilities for free action, participants in a public space must establish some stability and predictability in their shared space but must reject efforts to control and dominate the future.[82]

Schutz goes on to refer to these tensions as distinctiveness/banality, truth/relativism, and control/chaos.

---

[79] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 52.
[80] Ibid., 199.
[81] Ibid., 57.
[82] Schutz, 101-2.

In the tension between distinctiveness and banality, the individual, to be who she is, needs to express herself in the public space, but the very nature of that public space limits her expression. This, I think, is a difficult balance for people in our day and age to learn, for we are accustomed to spouting opinions and taking stands on issues rather than trying to honestly work together. If individuals seek to appear in their full distinctness, without regard for relevance to the common project at hand, "the entire space can splinter completely apart, as participants become lost in the isolated singularity of their own experience, as the *common* nature of their efforts is entirely lost."[83] On the other hand, "banality, shallowness, and attempts to submerge oneself into the crowd" lead to the collapse of the public space through lack of plurality. Schutz applies this balance to the classroom, where students can learn to participate in public spaces through separating personal friendships from public relationships (analogous to the different ways spouses who are also colleagues must relate to each other in different settings) and helping each other keep their contributions relevant, while listening carefully to each other to avoid labeling innovative ideas as irrelevant. Schutz also notes that "the complexity of these ideas means that no set of predetermined rules could ever do them justice. The very idea of 'relevancy,' for example, would need to be grappled with constantly in the course of their collective engagements."[84]

The tension between truth and relativism is one which Schutz identifies as particularly compatible with Dewey's vision, especially since Dewey emphasized the "constant change and uncertainty human beings must always face."[85] On the one hand, public space is not amenable to the presence of a person who holds the truth, says Schutz, since that person would not need to listen to opposing opinions, and if he succeeded in convincing the others to share his opinion, the public space would immediately disintegrate. This is why Arendt saw the public as a place to deal with things that cannot be figured out with certainty—it is not the place for scientific

---

[83] Ibid., 103.
[84] Ibid., 104.
[85] Ibid., 106.

inquiry, for example.[86] However, she also saw the need for the people in the public space to put forth collective effort in their care for the world, which would preclude complete relativism and disintegration into a conglomeration of individual interests. Applying this to a classroom context, Schutz suggests that for students "authentic public action would entail a constantly shifting engagement with the world and with the multiple perspectives of other participants, the unique ways of seeing of each becoming a resource for their shared effort."[87]

The final tension Schutz identifies in Arendt's conception of public space, between control and chaos, is one of the most exciting and challenging aspects of Arendt's thought: "The most difficult tension of the public arises from the fact that the very conditions that generate creative power in the public also produce instability and unpredictability, the effects of which reverberate uncontrollably into the world and constantly threaten to tear apart public spaces (and sometimes the world itself). For, *by definition*, one can never control the results of one's actions in a public space or the ways in which others interpret what one says."[88] This is indeed a challenging balance to attempt, but as we have seen in the previous chapter, it is vital to the task of education. Schutz indicates how, in order to respond to this tension in the classroom, the teacher would need to help the students

> learn to accept, and perhaps even value, the mistakes of others. Further, although they would need to create a collective plan for action, this plan would need to remain open to the creative actions of others, often refraining from mapping out the future in specific terms. They would need to learn to traverse the tension between agreements that mean nothing and contracts that are set in stone, unbreakable regardless of changes in the world. Finally, with respect to the world beyond their small public, helping children understand this particular tension of public spaces would almost seem to require engaging students in an activity, like an attempt to change a state's child seat-belt laws, that takes them beyond their classrooms. For it is very difficult to simulate the complex and often perverse workings of the larger society inside a school.[89]

---

[86] Ibid., 105.
[87] Ibid., 107.
[88] Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
[89] Ibid., 111-2.

Ends, Means, and Control: Dewey and Arendt

It is in this examination of the tension between chaos and control that Schutz identifies the greatest difference between the visions of Dewey and Arendt. Dewey, says Schutz, "saw democratic action as a process of seeking increasing control over one's environment."[90] For Dewey, action is aimed at particular ends to be accomplished, even though they are not necessarily final ends. Action is judged by its consequences. Arendt, however, argued that "actors should never treat their engagement in public as an attempt to achieve particular ends."[91] Let us flesh this statement out a little further. In order to be free, Arendt tells us, action must not be controlled by either the motive for action or the predictable outcome; although these are important dynamics of action, action's freedom arises from its ability to transcend motive and aim.[92] This is because free action is ruled neither by the mind nor the will, but is inspired by something which Arendt calls principle, such as honour, love of equality, fear, or distrust, to name a few examples. "In distinction from its goal, the principle of an action can be repeated time and again, it is inexhaustible, and in distinction from its motive, the validity of a principle is universal, it is not bound to any particular person or to any particular group"[93]—at least in the view of the one who acts. "Action" legitimized by principle is a common thing nowadays, but too often principles are used as a façade for motives. This type of activity is a far cry from what Arendt believes action is.

Canovan points out that Arendt's understanding of principle is indebted to Montesquieu, who identified governments as having both a structure and a guiding principle. For example, he singled out "virtue" as the principle of a republic, "honour" of a monarchy, and "fear" of a despotism. Arendt, says Canovan, took up this idea and expanded it to emphasize its dynamic possibilities: "For at the centre of her political thought lies the claim that human beings are free. They are not automatons; they are not restricted to mere predictable behavior, nor can their

---

[90] Ibid., 110.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Hannah Arendt, "What is Freedom?", 151.
[93] Ibid., 152.

activities be encompassed by the notion of pursuing means toward a goal. Human beings have the capacity to *act* in the sense of beginning something new and unpredictable, and such action cannot be understood as the practical application of a theoretical rule. Instead it is inspired and informed by a 'principle.'"[94]

Principles, whether admirable or no, inspire political action. The other side of the story is the need to set limits, particularly since not all principles are equal. For this Arendt turned to institutions which human beings can establish together. Canovan notes that Arendt considered institutions to be a more reliable defense against evil than depending on personal goodness or good intentions.[95] Arendt did not often talk about what might lead us to choose certain principles or institutions over others, other than her never-ending emphasis on plurality. This is not the place to get into a detailed discussion of the matter, but I would like to point to the resources available in Arendt's writings for further reflection. Her emphasis on plurality, her anti-utopian yet hopeful vision of the need for continual renewal, and recognition of the contingent and dynamic nature of the human world all provide resources for a global ethical outlook.

A principle, like almost anything else, can be twisted into the shape of something it is not; it can be used as an end or an excuse but it remains something fundamentally different. Principle is perhaps like that unspeakable something which guides action, deeper than exchangeable values or explanations. Our intellect can lead us astray, and we can will to do something which is wrong, but to do something "on principle" says something about a person's character which cannot be swayed. Like the few people in Nazi Germany described by Arendt who remained free of complicity, there is something that is neither reason nor choice which says, "I cannot do certain things, because having done them I shall no longer be able to live with myself."[96] It is this kind of immovable standard which, for those (always the minority) who choose not to be merely social, must guide human action. If this is the case, however, is it possible to educate students in

---

[94] Canovan, 172-3.
[95] Ibid., 194.
[96] Hannah Arendt, "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy" in *Responsibility and Judgment*, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), 97.

the way of principles? And how does one choose by which principles to be inspired? Is it possible to make a choice?

Schutz finds Arendt's call for principled action too vague and unsatisfactory, believing that Dewey is a bit more accurate on this point: "Dewey, for example, is surely right that although we can never fully know the results of an action, we can certainly begin to notice patterns of results that occur when we act and thus begin to achieve a level of control in our environment, even if it is never perfect."[97] In a footnote to his essay, Schutz connects what he considers Arendt's extreme response to the problem of the uncontrollability of action with her view of "making" and "work," which she saw in a quite Platonic sense. Because of her idea that work is guided by an ideal in the mind which precedes the actual making of a thing, says Schutz, she believed that an end once attained lost its power to guide means. Schutz points out that this is the kind of understanding of work which Dewey was very much against: "He argued that one does not simply aim for a static ideal in work; instead, one reconstructs one's aims and one's means continually through interaction with one's environment."[98]

Schutz is perhaps a bit unfair to Arendt here in that he criticizes her concepts of "making" and "work" as if they were freestanding definitions rather than one part of her distinction between labour, work, and action. In her explication of Arendt's work on totalitarian elements of Marxism, Margaret Canovan summarizes clearly why Arendt considered it so dangerous to approach action as if it were work (which is for Arendt the domain of means and ends): "Work is a matter of transforming material in order to make something: domination, violence and the sacrifice of the means to the end are inherent in the activity of fabrication. When this model is applied to politics, which is concerned with dealings between plural persons, it is other people who become the material to be dealt with violently and sacrificed to the end that is to be achieved."[99] We may, as Schutz does, take exception to this understanding of what making is or should be, but the fact remains that in our technological society this is precisely how making

---

[97] Schutz, 110.
[98] Ibid., 123-4, n. 35.
[99] Canovan, 73.

currently exists. Once again Arendt is helpful for contesting utopian tendencies—in this case, Schutz's own inclination to understand making as he thinks it ought to be, rather than how it is.

Schutz refers to Arendt's discussion of the matter in *The Human Condition*, where she states that "as long as we deal with ends and means in the political realm, we shall not be able to prevent anybody's using all means to pursue recognized ends."[100] Schutz points out that Dewey would consider this a mistaken understanding of means/ends. I understand him to be referring to Dewey's dislike of the idea that an end is a kind of full stop, an end-in-itself, which seems to be the understanding Arendt has of the matter. Dewey spoke very strongly on the subject of approaching aims as if there were a single, fixed end for which one is headed: "It is willful folly to fasten upon some single end or consequence which is liked, and permit the view of that to blot from perception all other undesired and undesirable consequences.... It is not possible adequately to characterize the presumption, the falsity and the deliberate perversion of intelligence involved in refusal to note the plural effects that flow from any act by picking out that one consequence which will enable us to do what we wish to do and for which we feel the need of justification."[101] Dewey sees this mistaken perspective as a matter of stagnant habit, a refusal to accept the ever-changing nature of reality. He supports instead an understanding of ends as ends-in-view which continually change in interaction with the consequences of one's actions. He believes that ends cannot successfully be abstract; something "becomes an aim or end only when it is worked out in terms of concrete conditions available for its realization, that is in terms of 'means.'"[102]

In fact, what Schutz calls Arendt's dislike of means/ends logic is very similar to Dewey's criticism of what he considers only an erroneous approach to ends and means. It is based on a belief in the dangers inherent in taking action on the basis of abstract thinking which has not taken into account the way things are concretely. Arendt's concerns about means and ends are directed at what she saw as the major threat of our time, totalitarianism. This is, in Canovan's

---

[100] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 229.
[101] John Dewey, "The Nature of Aims" in *John Dewey on Education: Selected Writings*, ed. Reginald D. Archambault (New York: Random House, 1964), 74.
[102] Ibid., 78.

simple summary of the concept, "the combination of a hubristic sense that 'everything is possible' with the experience of being in the grip of unstoppable processes."[103] What Schutz fails to take note of in this discussion—although he deals with it positively earlier in the article—is the fact that Arendt's concerns about the matter are based on her experience with the Nazi regime, who indeed were willing to use "all means" to pursue their ends. It is this experience which gives Arendt an allergic reaction to any form of a means/ends distinction in the realm of action. Schutz does point out that Arendt's vision of action indeed draws attention to the potential implications of an important area neglected both by Dewey and many contemporary scholars—that we are definitely not increasing our control over our environment, at least not it any positive sense. The risks involved in the complex technological, environmental, and societal situation we have worked ourselves into stand in direct opposition to Dewey's vision of increasing control, notes Schutz. To fail to address these issues with students is both "enormously problematic and potentially dangerous."[104]

However, I think Schutz is also right in pointing out that there is something missing in Arendt's view of action, and that Dewey was right about our ability to recognize and work with patterns. Dewey's understanding of the way in which one's aims and means can be continually changing in interaction with one's environment is, I think, a good addition to Arendt's clear view of the way in which one cannot control the consequences of action. In fact, I think Dewey is perhaps even more helpful on this point than Schutz himself realizes. Dewey's understanding of "control" is somewhat different from the strict understanding we tend to have of the word today. In the beginning pages of *Democracy and Education*, Dewey sets up his understanding of "control" in terms of the way in which a plant grows: "Understanding the word 'control' in this sense, it may be said that a living being is one that subjugates and controls for its own continued activity the energies that would other wise use it up."[105] He makes it quite clear that he dismisses a view of control which means coercion or compulsion rather than active and interactive

---

[103] Canovan, 79.
[104] Schutz, 111.
[105] John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1944; Macmillan Company, 1916), 1-2.

direction.[106] Seen in this light, perhaps Arendt would not necessarily be opposed to Dewey's description of the way in which one's aims can be fluid rather than static. Still, however, we are left with the question of what must guide these aims.

To Think, Evaluate, and Choose

Julia Kristeva, in her discussion of Arendt's ideas about "the banality of evil," makes an insightful statement that can apply to this question. The best of what the Western tradition has to offer, she says, is "not 'values,' which even at their best can lead to noxious behavior if we apply them without thinking, but the ability to question each value as a fundamental characteristic of thinking."[107] In terms of education, this means that seeking to instill values is not sufficient for the encouragement of real action, or to provide guidance for action's aims. The points to be emphasized in this case are rather the practice of thinking for oneself, and, I think, the attainment of what Arendt refers to as "enlarged mentality," a concept we will explore in more detail in the final chapter. As Kristeva puts it, what is necessary is "to reconnect the universal with the particular, to evaluate, and to choose."[108] Thinking about what is good is not the same as doing good, but the *activity* of thinking is perhaps the best safeguard against doing what is not good. This may be especially true in our day and age, in which much of what is not good is done very much without thought.

Since newness is at the heart of the human condition, it is in a certain way descriptive of not only the hope of renewal that is the gift of natality, but also the complex and often terrible situations we have created for ourselves—the emergence of a phenomenon like totalitarianism is something new, which cannot be easily fit into traditional categories of judgment, Arendt tells us. Education, as a method of preserving newness, has as its task the preparation of each generation to think anew in response to the newness that continues to arise through the natality of human

---

[106] Ibid., 24.
[107] Julia Kristeva, *Female Genius: Life, Madness, Words—Hannah Arendt, Melanie Klein, Colette*, vol. 1, *Hannah Arendt*, trans. Ross Guberman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 152.
[108] Ibid., 153.

beings. Natality, the essence of education, is the reason it is not enough to introduce students to static values as a guide. Since we cannot predict the outcome of our own actions, we must instead be prepared to think about whatever arises. As Arendt says, "a being whose essence is beginning may have enough of origin within himself to understand without preconceived categories and to judge without the set of customary rules which is morality."[109] This is very much like Dewey's idea of ends-in-view; what we aim for can only be worked out in terms of concrete conditions.

Education is always a matter of passing on ideas about how we should respond to each other and the world around us, and the question of morality is always a pressing one for parents and teachers who are concerned about the state of the world, whether their outlook is narrow or broad. After her experience with the totalitarian regime in Nazi Germany, Arendt spent much of the rest of her life asking something along the lines of, "How could this have happened?" This led her to struggle with questions of individual and collective morality, and the need to safeguard ourselves, as far as we are able, from the horrors of which the Nazis showed human beings capable. Perhaps because of her honest lack of utopian belief in innate human goodness, many commentators have found her musings on ethical topics unsatisfactory. This is understandable; it is difficult to moralize about how human beings should act without tending to think that they actually can and will act as they should. Canovan points out that Arendt also could not bring herself to assume that the universe is morally coherent; she began with an understanding of the universe as fragmented and incoherent.[110] And yet, her honesty and depth of thought on these subjects invite both a hopeful outlook and further reflection. Let us accept this invitation, turning now to the question of thinking for oneself in the context of globalization.

---

[109] Hannah Arendt, "Understanding and Politics," *Partisan Review* 20/4 (July-August 1953), 390-1, quoted in Canovan, 70.

[110] Canovan, 173.

3. Let Every Butterfly Have Wings: Education for Judgment in a Globalizing World

> Critical thinking is possible only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection. Hence, critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from "all others." To be sure, it still goes on in isolation, but by the force of imagination it makes the others present and thus moves in a space that is potentially public, open to all sides; in other words, it adopts the position of Kant's world citizen. To think with an enlarged mentality means that one trains one's imagination to go visiting.[111]
>
> Hannah Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*

Introduction: Education in the Face of Globalization

Globalization presents a unique challenge to the task and character of education, and particularly democratic education, at all levels. The ever-increasing complexity of the structures and issues which we face from day to day is often overwhelming. The distance between cause and effect, particularly on the political, economic, and cultural levels, is frequently almost inconceivable. The so-called 'butterfly effect' seems no longer to apply only to the weather. The world itself appears to have become a chaotic system, but with a critical difference: in the world system, some butterflies consistently have more effect than others. The flapping of wings in the United States government or OPEC can unleash hurricanes, while in Africa or Latin America no amount of wing-fluttering seems to reach very far. Poverty, genocide, AIDS—in today's world, when the actions of a few people in wealthy countries can mean life or death to thousands on the other side of the globe, education has a key role to play in both empowering those who seem to have few possibilities for flourishing and guiding the comparatively wealthy toward a sense of global responsibility.

I suggest that living in the context of a globalizing world necessitates more emphasis on teaching students to think for themselves—to practice conscientious judgment which takes into account the varied perspectives around them. Good judgment in the face of globalization seems to me to require both the ability to form one's own opinions, rather than thoughtlessly follow along with the latest trend, and to base one's judgments on an impartial, rather than narrowly

---

[111] Hannah Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, ed. and with interpretive essay by Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 43.

self-interested account of the situation. I suspect the first of these requirements is to a large extent based on the second. Hannah Arendt is one thinker whose insights on the nature of impartial judgment are exceptionally appealing. In particular, she speaks of the possibility of impartiality not as a perspective which is 'objective' or outside people's views but as the enterprise of taking others' viewpoints into account. She also uses the term 'enlarged mentality' to speak of this approach. In her lectures on Kant's political philosophy she makes the following famous description: "To think with an enlarged mentality means that one trains one's imagination to go visiting."[112] This impartial or enlarged perspective is what enables a person to judge fittingly, and it is this ability which is urgently needed in the face of the complexity that is a hallmark of globalization. For Arendt, however, judgment is a political rather than educational matter. She made a strong distinction between education, which she saw as a realm of authority, and politics, which she saw as a realm of equality. Although useful in protecting politics from an unwarranted intrusion of authority, this distinction cannot be generalized in terms of education and requires further nuance in the face of the need to educate students for responsible judgment in the larger world.

I would like to explore education's vital role in moving towards responsible global citizenship by bringing Arendt into conversation with thinkers such as Mihai Spariosu, Paulo Freire, and others who seek to advance the project of multicultural democratic education. Focusing on university-level education, I will consider the goal of education as global orientation, Arendt's distinction between education and politics, her and others' views on the place of authority and equality in education, and finally return to the connection between education and politics in the context of multicultural education. In an increasingly globalized world, a narrow, idiosyncratic perspective which does not seek to understand issues from others' points of view is ever more problematic. The ability to pay attention to all relevant perspectives calls for students to learn to think for themselves, understanding themselves not as helpless pawns of fate but as human beings who have the power to transform the reality into which they

---

[112] Ibid., 43.

have been born. Educators, by taking responsibility for the world which they show to their students and guiding them toward what Spariosu calls "global intelligence," can help prepare them to make a unique contribution to, in the words of Arendt, "the task of renewing a common world."

Education for Global Intelligence

While Arendt addresses her idea of a common world mostly toward human culture in a historical/political sense, Mihai Spariosu asks us to extend this understanding beyond ourselves and our cultures to the entire universe. Drawing on early Buddhist and Taoist teachings as well as later Islamic Sufism and contemporary systems theory to inform his perspective, Spariosu demonstrates an outlook which, in comparison to most other scholars who have written about globalization, is quite consistently and incisively global. He does not assume that only the small percentage of the human population with access to high-speed technology and long-distance travel is significant in tracing world patterns, and he is clearly very much aware of the richness which non-Western cultural traditions have to offer. In his own terms, though, he would call his approach not global, but globally oriented. Rather than global, he calls for "local-global" learning environments. "Local-global" is his expression for a way of approaching globalization which can take into account the fact that even while they should be globally oriented, theories and communities are still necessarily local: "Communities around the world do not engage in interaction with a universal or a global community—although they may often imagine such communities—but with other local communities, some of which may happen, at one historical juncture or another, to become globally dominant or visible as far as their ideas and ways of life are concerned."[113]

This local-global framework allows Spariosu to see an important distinction between what he calls "globality" and "globalism." He describes globality as "an infinitely layered

---

[113] Mihai I. Spariosu, *Global Intelligence and Human Development: Toward an Ecology of Global Learning* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 30-1.

network of variously interconnected and interactive actual and possible (or imagined) worlds or localities."[114] This reference frame, he suggests, escapes human understanding. It cannot be captured by politics, science, art, or religion, and it includes much more than just the human world. In fact, globality appears to entail an aspiration toward self-transcendence on the part of human beings. Globalism, for Spariosu, is an expression of the aspiration toward globality which has been present throughout history in one form or another. Power-hungry imperialist impulses are negative manifestations of globalism, or what Spariosu terms "globalitarianism." He identifies positive forms of globalism as historically being rooted mostly in religion, although religions too have demonstrated their share of globalitarianism.[115]

Spariosu identifies education as of utmost importance in helping us to work toward positive forms of globalism, notably what he calls "global intelligence": "the ability to understand, respond to, and work toward what is in the best interest of and will benefit all human beings and all other life on our planet."[116] Of course, it is unlikely that everyone will agree on what will be beneficial, but Spariosu is more concerned with taking the first step than trying to plan the entire path in advance. The first step of taking all planetary life into account, rather than focusing only on national or even human interests, would be significant. This is not a call for cultural homogenization or the ability to feel comfortable anywhere in the world. Rather, it is a call for recognition of the interconnectedness of human and other life on all levels. This is, I suspect, a particularly important call for those who live in relatively wealthy and influential countries; the potential for global impact in my opinion requires a particularly dedicated pursuit of global intelligence. However, Spariosu does well to point out that in terms of global intelligence, development has little to do with economic status. Many so-called "developing" or "undeveloped" parts of the world have a long history of an approach to life which recognizes the interconnectedness of all things, while so-called "developed" countries are often far behind in

---

[114] Ibid., 27.
[115] Ibid., 28.
[116] Ibid., 6.

this respect. And in terms of global intelligence, Spariosu emphasizes, all societies are "developing" ones.[117]

Although we have a long way to go, hindered as we too often are by self-righteousness and exemptionalism, Spariosu makes a good case for hope. Resources for global intelligence are available in societies and traditions in every part of the globe, and it is in the nature of things for something new to arise from out of the old. Like Arendt, Spariosu recognizes that the possibility of newness is joined to the requirement not to dictate what that newness will look like. We can dream and imagine, of course, both of which can be helpful in direction-setting. As Spariosu is aware, however, what we lack nowadays is rarely plans or directions; global elites, in particular, seem to do hardly anything else. What we too often lack is a sense of flexibility and a willingness to change our plans as we go. We can work toward a global intelligence, but we cannot predict precisely where we will end up: "it is not something pre-given, but an end-in-the-making, informing all of our life choices at the same time that it is continuously modified by such choices."[118] Spariosu's recognition, through his concept of globality, of the many worlds we inhabit also resonates with Arendt's ideas on the need for an impartial (in the sense of not merely self-interested) or enlarged mentality which pays attention to the diversity of perspectives around us. For Spariosu this is primarily a task for education. Arendt, however, considered this a political matter rather than an educational one. Yet many commentators have noticed how fruitfully her thoughts on politics can be applied to education.

Authority, Equality, Responsibility

Since in the single essay she wrote on the topic of education, "The Crisis in Education" (written in 1968), Arendt makes a strong distinction between education and politics, we must consider the appropriateness of applying her political ideas to education. In the American context which is under scrutiny in "The Crisis in Education," Arendt points out that education is of

---

[117] Ibid., 5.
[118] Ibid., 158.

specifically political importance because of the immigrant foundation upon which the country is built, which necessitates the so-called "Americanization" through education of a vast array of immigrant cultures.[119] In terms of education for global intelligence, this introduction should be a matter of moral orientation rather than cultural homogenization. Whether they are new to a place through birth or newly arrived through immigration, education is a basic method of introducing newcomers to the world in which they have arrived, and informing them of the general outlines of the role they are expected to play in it.

The political implications of this type of introduction cannot be denied. And, in fact, education is widely understood throughout the world as an important means of forming newcomers into good citizens. Arendt's understanding of education as the introduction of newcomers to a shared world sets the stage for her analysis in the rest of her essay. She sees in the American context a wholesale struggle for equality, even to the extent of equality between teachers and students. Although Arendt is speaking specifically of America in her essay, the struggle for equality is one we can see in many parts of the world. There are benefits to this struggle for equality both humanly and educationally, she emphasizes, but the downside of this equality is that it can only be attained through the loss of the teacher's traditional authority.[120] Equality for Arendt is proper to the realm of politics, while authority has been proper to the realm of education; a change in the place of authority in education will not be without repercussions that should not be ignored. As we saw in the previous chapter, change necessitates rethinking things.

One reason for the importance of thinking about authority in education is that in her view authority and responsibility are inextricably linked. In Arendt's view, a teacher, as a representative of the world to children, must take responsibility for the world even though he or she might wish it to be other than it is. And, in fact, the teacher's authority is fundamentally based on this taking of responsibility.[121] The connection between authority and responsibility holds as

---

[119] Arendt, "The Crisis in Education," 175.
[120] Ibid., 180.
[121] Ibid., 189.

true for the political realm as it does for education, and here too Arendt sees both vanishing. In contemporary politics, Arendt points out, authority has either a highly disputed role or no role at all:

> [P]eople do not wish to require of anyone or to entrust to anyone the assumption of responsibility for everything else, for wherever true authority existed it was joined with responsibility for the course of things in the world. If we remove authority from political and public life, it may mean that from now on an equal responsibility for the course of the world is to be required of everyone. But it may also mean that the claims of the world and the requirements of order in it are being consciously or unconsciously repudiated; all responsibility for the world is being rejected, the responsibility for giving orders no less than for obeying them.[122]

In the instance of education, Arendt believes that the latter is the case, and the rejection of authority by adults means that they refuse to take responsibility for the world into which they have brought the children. This is the basis for her strong distinction between education and politics. Historically, she suggests, political authority was based on the model of the parent/child, teacher/student pattern of authority. This was a mistaken analogy, according to Arendt, since the temporary authority of a parent or teacher cannot be applied directly to non-temporary relationships. She notes that this historical connection, however, makes it almost inevitable that questioning authority in the political realm will lead to questioning authority in parent/child, teacher/student relationships as well.[123]

However, since politics for Arendt is chiefly a domain of equality, the rejection of authority need not mean the complete rejection of responsibility as well, since it is possible to require equal responsibility from all adults in the public, political arena. Whether the same is true of teachers and students must bear serious consideration. When we are speaking of college students, it seems that at the very least they are in a place of transition to shared responsibility. Peter Schouls has made the interesting suggestion that there is an intrinsic connection between authority and insight, so that both teachers and students have authority insofar as they

---

[122] Ibid., 190.
[123] Ibid., 191.

demonstrate insight.[124] In this case, I expect the responsibility, as well as the authority, must be shared. Although I will not examine it further, the place of insight in education definitely bears further consideration. In Arendt's view, speaking of younger children, the reality of their newness in the face of an always older world makes it unreasonable to require children to take responsibility for the world before they have been adequately introduced to it. Her understanding of the mutuality of responsibility and authority thus leads her to insist on the application of the idea of authority to education, while keeping it from public, political life.

If Arendt's belief in the importance of a teacher's authority over students was unpopular when she wrote the essay 50 years ago, I suspect that in many places it would only be more unpopular today. Yet if we look at the word more closely we may find that it echoes differently in different ears. In Western ears, authority tends to be thought of as barely a step away from authoritarianism. To have authority is to have power, and likely absolute power at that. For Arendt, however, a teacher's authority is not simply—and at the college level, perhaps not at all—a matter of having power over students. Rather, the term most strongly carries the connotation of knowledgeableness or experience, as in the phrase "to be an authority on the subject." This is also the understanding of a teacher's authority which we find in Eastern countries such as China. Authority is directly related to expertise, and only tangentially associated with a sense of power over someone else; in fact the authority of a teacher on her or his subject is likely to extend to other areas of life only at the choice of the student.

Education as Problem-Posing

Paulo Freire, the well-known Brazilian educator, definitely takes exception to the idea of a teacher having authority over students. This understanding of education, he asserts, is a vestige of a system of oppression. Rather than coupling authority with responsibility, Freire puts authority and freedom together, contrasting them to authoritarianism and license: "Just as

---

[124] Peter Schouls, *Insight, Authority and Power: A Biblical Appraisal*, Christian Perspectives Series (Toronto: Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1972), 41-2.

authority cannot exist without freedom, and vice versa, authoritarianism cannot exist without denying freedom, nor license without denying authority."[125] Since he is responding to an environment of systematic oppression, he seeks to avoid the two extremes of authoritarianism—the denial of freedom which is part of the oppressive system—and total license, which ignores the fact that the people have become accustomed to oppression and need to adjust to freedom.

Authority for Freire is a matter of delegation rather than position. The educator must not impose his or her will and worldview on the oppressed, but come alongside them to guide them toward their own liberated understanding of themselves. This conception of authority stands in contrast to Arendt's belief that a teacher's authority derives from his or her status as "an authority." Of course, Freire was concerned primarily with adult education, which may be the root of the seeming difference. And when we look at it from this angle, we see that there is not so much difference after all, since it seems clear that Arendt would consider adult students as voluntarily—and temporarily—placing themselves under a teacher's authority; that is, they delegate authority to the teacher specifically in relation to the teacher's area of expertise.

When we are considering the role of education as leading students to think for themselves, however, the concept of authority does not carry us far enough. Particularly in the case of college students who are on the edge of taking their place in the common, public world, authority and responsibility, even if delegated temporarily to the teacher, must begin to shift from the teacher to include the students as well. Freire sheds light on this transformation in his explication of the way in which oppressed Latin American peasants make the move from experiencing themselves as mere objects to experiencing themselves as subjects. Guiding them toward an understanding of themselves as world-transformers requires the educator to not simply inform the students about the world, but to come together as a fellow student with students who also become teachers.[126]

---

[125] Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos, new revised ed. (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1993), 159.
[126] Ibid., 50, 61.

The task of the educator according to Freire, then, is not to *present* the world to the students, but "to *re-present* [emphasis mine] that universe to the people from whom she or he first received it—and "re-present" it not as a lecture, but as a problem."[127] This is the essence of what Freire calls the "problem-posing" method of education, as opposed to the "banking" method. The banking method of education sees students as empty vessels to be filled by the expert teacher. The problem-posing method, on the other hand, does not treat the students as ignorant and the teacher as all-knowing. Rather, the role of the teacher is to listen to the students and then pose the situations of the students' lives back to them as problems to be solved. In this way, teacher and students both teach and learn from each other. Expertise is still needed on the part of the teacher in order to recognize the disparate threads of the students' lives and crystallize these into a form to which the students can respond and from which they can gain an understanding of their lives in a larger context; here again there is the need for insight. The banking method is particularly problematic for Freire because it persuades the students to understand themselves as passive receptors or observers of a static world. The problem-posing method, on the other hand, encourages students to recognize social reality as a product of human activity which does not change by chance, but which it is their task to transform.[128]

Despite the differences in their approaches, then, we can see a deep resonance in the ideas of Freire and Arendt. Freire's understanding of education as re-presenting the world to the students is a noteworthy echo of Arendt's idea of representational thinking; that is, imagining others' viewpoints on the way to forming an enlarged mentality. While the ideas have somewhat different trajectories, central to both is the importance of listening to each other in order to gain a better sense of reality. Fundamentally, both Freire and Arendt believe that the goal of education is to guide students toward realizing themselves as transformers of the world.

Although they were responding to different specific situations, and thus emphasized different things, their ideas come together in a way that is powerfully helpful for contemporary

---

[127] Ibid., 90.
[128] Ibid., 33, 120.

thinkers who are concerned about the need for global transformation. Freire and Arendt have each articulated an important strand of thought for this project. Freire demonstrates most strongly the need for societal transformation, over and above Arendt's discussion of renewing a common world. While Arendt's thought certainly allows for—and for contemporary readers indeed invites—this emphasis on challenging oppressive societal regimes, her overriding concern with the menace of totalitarianism led her to focus on more subtle forms of inegalitarian forces within Western societies. On the other hand, she provides an inspiring account of the possibility of change through her conception of natality, which is at the heart of both education and action. And both Freire and Arendt were deeply opposed to the sense of helplessness which pervades people in all walks of life, and which their ideas forcibly combat; for both, to be human means that one should be free to act and affect the course of the human world.

Perhaps a large part of the reason they articulate this in different ways is that they are approaching the matter from different fields of study. Freire, who worked primarily with illiterate peasants in Latin America, writes as an educator who has first-hand experience with the effects of poverty and oppression. Arendt, a German Jew who left Germany for France and then the United States when Hitler came to power, is first and foremost concerned with political and social issues. Yet the resonance between their ideas is powerful, which may indicate that Arendt's categorical distinction between education and politics is not exclusive. In fact, many contemporary philosophers of education who emphasize the importance of democratic, multicultural approaches are taking note of how fruitfully Arendt's political ideas on impartiality, an enlarged mentality, and reflective judgment can be applied to education.

Education for Judgment

It is important to note at this point that Arendt's decisive division between education and politics is made to protect the political realm from an unreasonable notion of authority more than it is to apply that concept of authority to the realm of education. Therefore we need not be overly hesitant to examine her ideas on politics for what they may have to say to education, since it is

the reverse which she is largely seeking to guard against in making the distinction. In fact, in a certain sense the complete separation of politics and education is obviously impossible to maintain, since any form of education is necessarily impacted at the very least by the commitments of the teachers and students involved. Postmodern thinkers have drawn attention to the way in which even the most supposedly objective education carries political (in the narrower sense) baggage of one sort or another, often in the service of systemic oppression of one social group by another.

Kimberly Curtis draws on this understanding together with Arendt's emphasis on the distinction between politics and education to provide a clear picture of the task of multicultural education, an ever more important venture in a globalized world. Fundamentally, she points out, in a world in which increasing numbers of people have lost touch with traditions that gave security, the only certainty we have of the existence of the world at all is the confirmation we gather from others in all their different ways of approaching the world. When any relevant voices are left out, our knowledge of the world is diminished.[129] An impartial view, as Arendt calls it, is one that has considered all possible perspectives. This is of course impracticable on a large scale, but stands as an ideal—something to strive for in any situation.

Impartiality is not a simple goal, however, in a world which tells some stories loudly and others not at all. Curtis notes that "the conditions in which the need for multicultural education arises are conditions of domination and subordination in which ideological distortions, lies, silences, and dense webs of deception dominate and structure public knowledge."[130] In light of this, educators need to foster vast critical capacities, continually seeking what has been left out of dominant accounts that needs to be included for fuller comprehension. Educators of this sort cannot simply abide by Arendt's categorical distinction of education and politics, because the old world to which the students must be introduced cannot but be introduced through stories told

---

[129] Kimberly Curtis, "Multicultural Education and Arendtian Conservatism: On Memory, Historical Injury, and Our Sense of the Common," in *Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing Our Common World*, ed. Mordechai Gordon (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 138.
[130] Ibid., 144.

from human, limited viewpoints—and often biased ones. Our textbooks have been written according to certain political perspectives, while other perspectives have not only been left out, but have not even had a chance to be written. It is not as if suppressed voices are merely waiting to be uncovered. In a profound way, they need yet to be given birth. This, declares Curtis, is deeply political, for systematic oppression is the reason these voices have had no chance to come to articulation. For multicultural educators, then, partisanship—that is, partisanship toward the oppressed—is essential if the truths of sufferers' lives are to emerge.[131] The balance has been skewed in one direction, says Curtis, so in the quest for impartiality educators must compensate by leaning the other way.

The need for partisanship in terms of making spaces for oppressed voices to arise is only one side of the coin, however. Educators must also maintain the space for their students to think for themselves and come to their own conclusions. The need to search out and give space for the coming to expression of oppressed voices cannot be allowed to overrun the goal of impartiality to the extent that a teacher refuses to pay attention to other perspectives. Ignoring dominant perspectives for the sake of suppressed ones does not fulfill the objective of multicultural education any more than leaving the oppressed voiceless does. This is one reason Curtis believes Arendt's voice is also a particularly important one for multicultural educators to hear. While Arendt's desire to divorce education and politics cannot in Curtis' view be sustained, we also cannot "do without the tension it places on the urge to politicize education."[132]

Stacy Smith is another commentator who emphasizes the educational importance of Arendt's ideas on judgment. Smith, like Curtis, highlights the need to take into account "the plethora of other stances in relation to the world that one's fellow human beings occupy and experience."[133] From this "fullness of perspectives" comes the ability to make capable judgments regarding our complex and confusing world. In contrast to Arendt, however, Smith believes that

---

[131] Ibid., 145, 147.
[132] Ibid., 148.
[133] Stacy Smith, "Education for Judgment: An Arendtian Oxymoron?" in *Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing Our Common World*, ed. Mordechai Gordon (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 73.

this fullness is best achieved through actual communal interaction with others; imagination is not enough.[134] This again points to the important role of education. Smith believes that education must both provide students with the opportunity to learn to think representatively, that is, to achieve enlarged mentalities, and also provide students with opportunities to practice real-life judgment.[135] In a multicultural classroom, this begins with students practicing the skill of listening to each other and trying to imagine the world from each other's points of view.

From this we can see the obvious analogy between a multicultural classroom and a world in the process of globalization. To use Spariosu's terminology, a local-global classroom is in fact an ideal site and practice ground for an emerging global intelligence. In the face of globalization, not only the oppressed peasants of whom Freire speaks, but people in almost every walk of life seem to feel like helpless objects rather than world-forming and -transforming subjects. But when local views engage each other with a global orientation—that is, recognizing the interconnectedness of humanity and the rest of the planet—this local encounter becomes a global act. Indeed, even a very limited range of perspectives under one classroom roof can have global impact. Who can say what the wings of one butterfly might set in motion?

---

[134] Ibid., 84.
[135] Ibid., 80.

Conclusion

Looking at the human world as a chaotic system takes into account the way in which the chain of action which anyone can initiate might either die away to obscurity or explode into world-transforming events. This perspective allows us to accept the difficulty of seeking to make a positive difference in a global context while encouraging us to make a beginning, which may just possibly have a far greater impact than we ever hoped. Arendt's description of human beings as both social and political, and her conception of the human condition of natality which leads to both the need for education and the possibility of people coming together in action, resonate with the unpredictability, incomprehensibility, and great potential inherent in the chaotic system of our world.

Of course, the newness which human beings bring through their gift of natality does not always lead in good directions. Yet the humanly instigated brokenness of our world is so obvious in so many areas that if we cannot change our direction at all we clearly have little hope for the future. That our actions can lead to unexpected consequences means that we are at greater risk of sudden destruction, perhaps, but it also means that we can effect positive changes that may snowball against all expectation. And, in fact, I feel that the winds of our time are changing: more people are beginning to realize their potential for impact, and many are making efforts to begin chains of action leading to greater justice, peace, and flourishing.

Education has a key role to play in drawing young people's attention to the problems we face at both local and global levels. Education also has a key role in fitting them for the task of responding to these problems, and many of Arendt's ideas are relevant to this project. Arendt helps us recognize that the human condition includes both the possibility for immense creativity and the necessity of recognizing the limits of our situation, generating space for hopeful engagement with our surroundings without committing to unattainable utopian plans. Some kind of vision of what we wish for the future is necessary, of course, but in my opinion these visions are if anything overabundant among both well-intentioned and self-centered kinds of people.

What we stand in need of in addition is an approach to our visions which interacts flexibly with the concrete situations we deal with, and recognizes that unintended consequences will attend our plans as we implement them.

Along with this, we need to be ready to think about and rethink our projects and our situation as they interact over time. These are issues about which I think Arendt has much to say, bringing to the table her insightful ideas on public space, an enlarged mentality, and reflective judgment, among others. Also, a need which I see in almost all walks of life is the need to combat the sense of helplessness which pervades much of the human population, whether poverty-stricken South American peasants or middle-class American suburbanites. Here we come again to Arendt's conception of natality, as well as human plurality, freedom, and action. These ideas have much to offer those of us who seek to challenge each new generation to understand themselves as world-formers, and potentially world-transformers.

Understanding the global situation as a problem to be solved, a reality which is ours to transform, is one step toward responsible global intelligence. Sharing perspectives in the course of attaining enlarged mentalities while seeking to flexibly interact with the ongoing chains of action which we create together is another. These steps are vital in the process of our shared responsibility to educate ourselves and our children in the task of renewing our common world. In the words of Arendt, "Our hope always hangs on the new which every generation brings."[136] In an ever-changing world, each child is born to the possibility of being part of the unending project of transformation and renewal.

---

[136] Arendt, "The Crisis in Education," 192.

Bibliography

Arendt, Hannah. "Auschwitz on Trial." In *Responsibility and Judgment*, ed. Jerome Kohn, 227-256. New York: Schocken Books, 2003.

_____. "The Crisis in Education." In *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*, 173-96. New York: The Viking Press, 1968; Penguin Books, 1977.

_____. "The Crisis in Culture: Its Social and Its Political Significance." In *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*, 197-226. New York: The Viking Press, 1968; Penguin Books, 1977.

_____. *Eichmann in Jerusalem.* New York: The Viking Press, 1963; Penguin Books, 1994.

_____. *The Human Condition.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.

_____. *The Life of the Mind.* One-volume edition. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978.

_____. *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy.* Ed. and with interpretive essay by Ronald Beiner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

_____. *Love and St. Augustine.* Ed. and trans. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

_____. "Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship." In *Responsibility and Judgment*, ed. Jerome Kohn, 17-48. New York: Schocken Books, 2003.

_____. "Reflections on Little Rock." In *Responsibility and Judgment*, ed. Jerome Kohn, 193-213. New York: Schocken Books, 2003.

_____. "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy." In *Responsibility and Judgment*, ed. Jerome Kohn, 49-146. New York: Schocken Books, 2003.

_____. "Thinking and Moral Considerations." In *Responsibility and Judgment*, ed. Jerome Kohn, 159-89. New York: Schocken Books, 2003.

_____. "What is Freedom?" In *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*, 143-71. New York: The Viking Press, 1968; Penguin Books, 1977.

Bárcena Orbe, Fernando. "La comprensión política: la voluntad de sentido en Hannah Arendt." In *El Oficio de la Ciudadanía: Introducción a la educación política.* Barcelona: Paídos, 1997.

Benhabib, Seyla. *The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt.* New edition. Modernity and Political Thought. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003.

Bowen-Moore, Patricia. *Hannah Arendt's Philosophy of Natality*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989.

Canovan, Margaret. *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Curtis, Kimberly. "Multicultural Education and Arendtian Conservatism: On Memory, Historical Injury, and Our Sense of the Common." In *Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing Our Common World*, ed. Mordechai Gordon, 127-52. Boulder: Westview Press, 2001.

Dewey, John. *Democracy and Education*. New York: The Free Press, 1944; Macmillan Company, 1916.

_____. "The Nature of Aims." In *John Dewey on Education: Selected Writings*, ed. Reginald D. Archambault,70-80. New York: Random House, 1964.

Freire, Paulo. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Translated by Myra Bergman Ramos. New revised ed. New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1993.

Kristeva, Julia. *Female Genius: Life, Madness, Words—Hannah Arendt, Melanie Klein, Colette*. Vol. 1, *Hannah Arendt*. Translated by Ross Guberman. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

Lane, Ann. "Hannah Arendt: Theorist of Distinction(s)." *Political Theory* 25, no.1 (February 1997): 137-59.

_____."Is Hannah Arendt a Multiculturalist?" In *Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing Our Common World*, ed. Mordechai Gordon, 153-73. Boulder: Westview Press, 2001.

Levinson, Natasha. "The Paradox of Natality: Teaching in the Midst of Belatedness." In *Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing Our Common World*, ed. Mordechai Gordon, 11-36. Boulder: Westview Press, 2001.

Ruelle, David. *Chance and Chaos*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.

Schouls, Peter. *Insight, Authority and Power: A Biblical Appraisal*. Christian Perspectives Series. Toronto: Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1972.

Schuster, Hans Georg. *Deterministic Chaos: An Introduction*. Weinheim, Germany: VCH Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995.

Schutz, Aaron. "Contesting Utopianism: Hannah Arendt and the Tensions of Democratic Education." In *Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing Our Common World*, ed. Mordechai Gordon, 93-125. Boulder: Westview Press, 2001.

Smith, Stacy. "Education for Judgment: An Arendtian Oxymoron?" In *Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing Our Common World*, ed. Mordechai Gordon, 67-91. Boulder: Westview Press, 2001.

Spariosu, Mihai I. *Global Intelligence and Human Development: Toward an Ecology of Global Learning*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004.