

Theorizing Racialized Discourse:
Perils and Paradoxes in Canadian National Security

By
Madalena Santos

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Abstract

This study investigates the racialized exclusion of “others” in the Canadian national security discourse on counter-terrorism in the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)* and the practice of security intelligence gathering by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service. It is argued that in the exclusionary discourse of the *IRPA*, the government has *unofficially* designated a category wherein racialized classifications are *officially* practiced. An interdisciplinary analytical framework that bridges critical discourse analysis with evaluation theory and other critical approaches is used to identify the discursive argumentation strategies, lexical associations and narratives and myths which construct a divide between “us” and “them” and present non-citizens as former, present or future “terrorists”. Comparisons with the racist mistreatment of Japanese-Canadians in Canada during World War II are made. The study finds that the racialized discourse of internment, deportation, and the legal exclusion of “others” is still present in current national security legislation and practice.

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Table of Contents

1	Introduction.....	1
1.0	Overall Aims	1
1.1	Direction of Research	3
1.2	Research Questions.....	6
1.3	Limitations and Caveats.....	6
1.4	Social Significance of Analysis	7
1.5	Theoretical and Analytical Orientation.....	8
2	Review of the Literature.....	11
2.0	Introduction.....	11
2.1	The Origins of “Race” and Racism.....	15
2.1.1	The Persistence of Racism: Theoretical Explanations	20
2.1.2	The Dichotomy of “Old” versus “New” Racism	26
2.1.3	Orientalism.....	30
2.1.4	The Historical Construction of the Racialized Muslim “Other”	38
2.2	Constructs of “Nation”	44
2.2.1	Constructing National Identity.....	46
2.2.2	Citizenship and Immigration.....	50
2.2.3	Multiple Identities: Challenges to Hybrid Models of National Identity	54
2.2.4	Designating National (In)security: Protection for and from Whom	56
2.2.5	Discourse-Analytical Approaches to Uncovering Racism	69
2.3	Evaluation/Appraisal Theory	86
2.4	Conclusion	103
3	Theoretical and Methodological Framework.....	107
3.0	Defining Racialized Discourse	107
3.1	Dimensions of National Security Discourse	109
3.2	The Methodological Approaches and Interpretative Framework	111
3.2.1	Van Dijk’s Thematic Patterning: Macro and Micro Analysis.....	113
3.2.2	Wodak: An Archetype for Racialized “Othering”	118
3.2.3	Lazar and Lazar: “Outcasting”	121
3.2.4	Karim: Categorical Generalizations of the Arab/Muslim Stereotype	126
3.2.5	Martin, and Thompson & Hunston: Uncovering Judgement in Discourse .	132
3.3	Jackson: Interpretative Counter-Terrorism Framework	137
4	Analysis	139
4.0	Historical Contextualization	139
4.1	Historical Overview: Japanese Internment.....	140
4.2	Outline: Documents for Analysis.....	146
4.2.1	Methodological Approach.....	147
4.2.2	Background Context and Course of Action: <i>IRPA</i>	148
4.2.3	Identification of Racist Discourse	151
4.2.4	“Out-casting”	169
4.2.5	Background Context and Course of Action: CSIS Summary Reports	184
4.2.6	Paradigms for the Analysis of Racialized Arab/Muslim “Othering”	186
4.3	Discussion: Interpretative Counter-Terrorism Framework	206
5	Conclusion	226
	References.....	237

Appendices

Appendix A: CSIS Backgrounder.....	237
Appendix B: Macrothemes in CSIS Security Intelligence Report Summaries	247
Appendix C: List of Terrorist Entities	253
Appendix D: Narratives and Myths in the IRPA	257

Table of Figures

Figure 1. Dimensions of Discourse as Social Practice	80
Figure 2: Dimensions of National Security Discourse	110

List of Tables

Table 1: Three Linguistic Features to Signal Evaluation.....	96
Table 2: Martin's Affect	99
Table 3: Martin's Judgement	100
Table 4: Martin's Appreciation.....	101
Table 5: Steps for Macro-Structural Analysis	114
Table 6: Micro-Analysis: Lexical Themes	115
Table 7: Identification of Racist Discourse	120
Table 8: Microstrategies of "Out-casting"	126
Table 9: Violence and Barbarism: Terrorism and Jihad	132
Table 10: Inscribed/Evoked Evaluation: Positive and Negative.....	135
Table 11: Thompson and Hunston's Three Linguistic Features to Signal Evaluation	136
Table 12: The Characteristics of Counter-Terrorism Discourse.....	137
Table 13: Historical Context: Japanese Evacuation, Internment and Deportation	142
Table 14: National Security Discourse	145
Table 15: Importance of Context	153
Table 16: Inscribed/Evoked Evaluation: Positive and Negative.....	162
Table 17: Lexical Associations	166
Table 18: Ancient History/Ancient Hatred	189
Table 19: Reduction of Islam to Fundamentalism	190
Table 20: Actions: Past, Habitual, Current and Future	194
Table 21: "Bellicosity"	195
Table 22: "Duplicity"	196
Table 23: Intertextuality.....	198
Table 24: Misappropriation/Misuse of Terms	204
Table 25: Misappropriation/Misuse of Terms	206
Table 26: The Characteristics of National Security Discourse	207

1 Introduction

1.0 Overall Aims

My aim in this research is to examine the possible manifestation of racism in the national security discourse of democratic nation-states. More specifically, to investigate the possible interconnection of racism and the security measures of democratic nations, I explore the discursive realization of the seemingly contradictory positions of democracies as purveyors of equality, justice and freedom, on the one hand, and the simultaneous implication of racist thought and practice in the security measures of the nation-state, on the other. The association of racism to the rise of independent democratic nation-states and the construction of national security discourse is discussed from an interdisciplinary perspective to nationalism and racism in the approaches offered by Aiken (2007), Anderson (2006), Karim (1997), Lee (2007), Reisigl and Wodak (2001), van Dijk (1993), Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart (1999), and Wodak and Reisigl (2003). Before this link is considered, however, I discuss several theoretical approaches to racism that provide the historical context needed for an examination of the origin of the creation of racial difference as well as the complex notion of racism as a form of “othering”¹. Additionally, I take into account theories of racism that explain both the existence and the persistence of racist practices in national security policy, legislation and practice in liberal democracies.

In so doing, I reflect upon the crucial question of why, in the first place, nation-states which claim democratic principles resort to exclusionary means that permit for the categorization of individuals as threats to national security and prohibit access to uniform legal protections. According to Benedict Anderson (2006) the answer lies partly in the fact

¹ Please note that throughout my study I use the lower case for terms such as “othering” and “orientalism” except in cases when citing directly from texts which use the uppercase for these terms. Also, I use quotation marks around “other” and its various forms (e.g., “others”, “othering”) to mark it as concept of exclusion and to differentiate it from the ordinary use of the word.

that nations are “imagined as *limited*” (p. 7; italics in the original). Thus as separate entities, nation-states necessarily exclude people from belonging since it is impossible to include all peoples under one nation (Anderson, 2006, p. 7). Nevertheless, however necessary it may be, this exclusion enables the labeling of people as “other”, facilitates their removal from the protective measures of the nation-state, and permits their classification as national security threats. The ability for nation-states to deny basic legal rights to all peoples, for instance the right to due process, raises the question of who is entitled to equal treatment under the law and who remains outside of nation-state protections as well as how this exclusion is legitimated. The theoretical basis for such exceptional measures leads to a consideration of the purpose for the foundation of the nation-state, and the nation-state’s dichotomous relationship of exclusion and inclusion.

Sherene Razack (2007) refers to the practice of exclusion as “a state of exception” through which by legal means a category is created wherein law no longer applies. In Razack’s (2007) study of national security measures in Canada she continues the significant contribution to the question of exceptional nation-state powers identified in Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) study on the historical and philosophical context of the state of exception in the democracies of Western Europe and the United States. Agamben (2005) argues against the theoretical claims that the extension of nation-state power is a question of pragmatics and calls for an examination into the application of state of exception measures that disable the democratic principles of equality and remove legal protections for those identified as threats to national security.

The question of how state of exception measures are discursively constructed to create an enemy “other” who is excluded from the legal protections of the nation-state and

the basis for the justification of this exclusion are crucial to the concern in my study. This limitation of legal rights is then considered in relation to the practice of racialized² “othering”. Taking the Canadian context as a case in point, I explore the possibility that the practice of racialization is invoked in the creation of an identifiable threat to national security. Over time national security discourse in Canada has undergone many transformations yet despite changes in the discourse some critical “race”³ theorists maintain that Canada has consistently excluded peoples based on racialized characteristics (Aiken, 2007; Li, 2007; McDonald, 2007). According to Sharryn Aiken (2007) Canada’s legal framework has utilized the discourse of exclusion and inclusion for perceived racialized differences since its inception (p. 56).

1.1 Direction of Research

The discursive construction of national security threat has a history as long as that of the evolution of the Canadian nation-state during which exclusionary policies and practices have denied those identified as security threats to the legal rights granted to other peoples in Canada (Aiken, 2007, pp. 92-3; Razack, 2007).⁴ Although the definition of what constitutes this threat has remained fairly constant, those who have been discursively determined to be threats to national security due to behavioural, ideological and at times racialized characteristics have changed according to the geo-political focus and socio-economic climate

² I employ Henry and Tator’s (2002) definition of “racialized” and “racialization” which they define as “the processes by which race is attributed to particular social practices and discourses in such a way that they are given special significance and are embedded within a set of additional meanings... *Racialization* is part of a process by which ethno-racial populations are categorized, constructed, thought inferior, and marginalized” (p. 248; italics in the original).

³ Throughout my writing I apply quotation marks around “race” to demonstrate my view that like gender “race” is a category of social construction rather than a system of actual difference.

⁴ At times, the people denied legal rights in Canada have been naturalized or Canadian born citizens as in the case of over half those held in Japanese internment camps (Conklin, 1996, p. 228). At other times, such as with current policy and legislation, the groups have not been officially recognized as Canadian citizens but rather as immigrants and refugees (Aiken, 2007, pp. 92-93; Razack, 2007).

of the day (Aiken, 2007; Karim, 1997; Jackson, 2005; Li, 2007; Razack, 2007). Moreover, the language used to define those who remain outside of the protective measures of the nation-state has served to justify limitations to their legal rights.

While Aiken (2007) argues that from the start of Canada's colonial foundation the government has relied on exclusionary policies and practices that prohibit rights based on socially constructed differences of "race", I suggest that times of heightened insecurity may give rise to the creation of newly defined threats of racialized "others" which are necessary to maintain Canada's selective sovereignty over those perceived to jeopardize the desired "white" nation-state.⁵ To consider the changing nature of exclusion in Canadian national security policy during periods of crisis, I present critical perspectives on the historical construction of national security measures over time in the review of the literature and provide a brief historical overview of the Canadian government's legislation against Japanese Canadians to situate my analysis of current day practices. In so doing, I examine how the concept of national security threat is discursively constructed, the ideological framework upon which this threat is based, the classification of people as security threats, and the manner in which this threat is manifested discursively in policy and legislation. In my overview, I reflect upon the relationship between the historic discursive role of language in Canada's legislation, evacuation and relocation of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War in selected Privy Council's Orders in Council, Wartime Committee Meeting Minutes, Secretary of State Wartime Records, and records of the Royal Canadian Mounted

⁵ As Aiken (2007) notes, "numerous authors have documented how the objective of building a white Canada translated into an explicitly racist immigration policy and how immigration law and its underlying ideology continue to exclude or restrict the admission of racialized persons today" (Arat-Koc 1999; Matas 1996; Jakubowski 1997; Li 2003; Preston 2003; Sharma 2005; Simmons 1998; Walker 1997 as cited in "From slavery to expulsion" Aiken, 2007, p. 56; full references at end of chapter).

Police (RCMP).⁶ Here I consider the use of overt racialized categories of “otherness” which permitted the legal detention and deportation of Japanese Canadians including those who were citizens of Canada. This concise account of selective events of the past forms a context for my concern with current Canadian policies and practices in the Security Certificate legislation of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)*.⁷

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, changes in Canadian law enabled the arrest and detention of any person not considered to be a citizen of Canada under security certificate legislation (Aiken, 2007, p. 93; French, 2007, p.50; Kruger, Mulder & Korenic, 2004, pp. 77-80). This legislation deprives those subject to security certificates of the right to due process including the right to see the evidence against them (French, 2007, p. 50). My analysis centers on the legal discourse of the national security measures of the *IRPA*, and the security certificate intelligence reports from the Canadian Security and Intelligence Agency (CSIS) as an example of one division of the Canadian security body which (re)interprets and draws upon national security legislation and policy. The CSIS summary reports which were made public on the Federal Court’s website relate to the five men currently detained under security certificates: Hasan Almrei, Adil Charkaoui, Mohamed Harkat, Mahmoud Jaballah, and Mohamed Mahjoub. Through these national security discourses, I investigate the role of the Canadian government, and its courts and legal enforcement bodies in the (re)creation and (re)interpretation of national security threat as

⁶ For the purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to highlight official ways in which a racialized enemy was discursively constructed during the Second World War in comparison with the current day’s enemies in the “war on terror”. As such, I do not analyze these documents but discuss them in section 4 to historically situate my current focus on the detention of security certificate subjects as threats to national security.

⁷ The *IRPA* received royal assent on November 1, 2001, and came into effect on June 28, 2002. Amendments to the security certificate process of the *IRPA* were made on February 13, 2008 following the Supreme Court ruling on Charkaoui vs. Canada in February 2007. This is discussed in more detail in my Conclusion in Chapter 5.

well as in the normalization of the denial of legal rights which targets racialized communities in the name of national security.

1.2 Research Questions

1. How is national security defined and who is it aimed to protect?
2. Who is excluded from this protection and what reasoning is provided for this exclusion?
3. Given the lack of “race” designation in current legislation and policy how do national security measures become translated into the practice of racialization?
4. How is racism discursively manifested in this practice?

1.3 Limitations and Caveats

The categorization of exclusion from the legal rights afforded to others happens within a cultural and historical context. At different historical periods, ideological shifts have lead various groups to be identified as security threats. While in their classification as “other” all are linked in their exclusion from legal protections that are granted to “preferred”⁸ Canadians, the length of this study and depth of analysis required to examine each affected community which has been targeted by national security legislation goes beyond what this thesis can offer. To enable a comparative discussion on the racialized practices of national security in Canada however, I provide a brief overview for two historical periods that are marked by their “war”-time status. It is important to note the distinction between these times in relation to conflict. Although the Privy Council’s Orders-in-Council were drafted and implemented during the Second World War when opposing nation-states declared war and

⁸ As Erin Kruger, Marelene Mulder, and Bojan Korenic (Fall 2004) note in their paper “Canada after 11 September: Security Measures and ‘Preferred’ Immigrants”: The defining policy criterion instigated through the 1910 [Immigration] Act was the notion of *preferred* versus *nonpreferred* source countries; preferred immigrants were from the United States, the British Isles, and northwestern Europe...The forty-five thousand Chinese immigrants who came to Canada between 1886 and 1904 exemplify how nonpreferred were discriminated against, as they had to pay a “head tax” for the privilege of working in Canada. (pp. 73-74; emphasis in the original)

used military force against one another, the current “war on terrorism” has not been proclaimed against any particular nation-state per se but rather on a vague and contested concept -- terrorism. The commonality between these “war”-time situations is the manner in which an enemy is discursively constructed through racialized “othering”.

Though my study only briefly documents the mistreatment of people of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War in the national security discourse of the time, my analysis in the current context of security certificates in the *IRPA* details the possible discursive interplay involved in legislating national security between the discourse communities of the government, its courts, and law enforcement agencies.

1.4 Social Significance of Analysis

As the public mindset in relation to exclusionary practices based on constructed labels has shifted over time so has the expression of racist thought and practice altered from overt to more concealed forms of racism. In the instances examined, overtly racist language employed in the national security law and policy documents that relate to a created “enemy other” such as in the Privy Council’s Orders-in-Council has been transformed to appear as “race”-neutral in the current security certificates legislation framed as national security measures against “terrorist threat”. These changes in legislative language have removed direct references to “race” yet continue to negatively affect racialized communities. Through the consideration of both overt forms of racist discourse and the analysis of less obvious racialized practices this study provides the tools to demonstrate historical similarities in the construction of racialized enemies of the nation-state and to make explicit the concealed forms of racist discourse that permit racism to flourish. It is hoped that these analytical tools will be applied by others and modified when necessary to further make apparent the

persistence of racist discourse in national security measures and to contest the existence of such discourse as well as to question accepted notions of difference in relation to the protective measures of the state that continue to mask systemic and institutional racism.

1.5 Theoretical and Analytical Orientation

Though there has been a great deal of analysis of national security measures post-September 11, 2001, little exists from the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Of that which is presented, almost none considers the Canadian viewpoint which I explore. To inform my analysis of the Canadian context, I draw on the CDA work of Richard Jackson (2005) who has written on the more global subject of the “war on terrorism” as related to the events following September 11. Jackson (2005) argues that language is not only fundamental to the social consensus required to enact political violence but that public language on the war on terrorism surpasses propaganda in its ability to construct what is accepted. In fact as a practice that is “predicated and determined by the language of counter-terrorism”, Jackson (2005) asserts that the war on terrorism is its own discourse (p. 8). Thus it is at once “a set of actual practices -- wars, covert operations, agencies and institutions -- and an accompanying series of assumptions, beliefs, justifications and narratives [that requires an understood and accepted language]” (Jackson, 2005, p. 8).

I propose that the “success” of counter-terrorism discourse relies at least partially on the “othering” of people who are excluded from basic legal and human rights. A look at past and current national security measures reveals that racism likely plays a substantial role in this process. To explore this possibility I examine the approaches to “othering” offered from CDA (Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Karim, 1997; Jackson, 2005; Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; van Dijk, 1993; Wodak, 1997, 2001; Wodak & Reisigl, 2003) as

well as postmodern (Said, 1978) and critical historical-political perspectives (Aiken, 2007; Lee, 2007; Li, 2007; Razack, 2007). I also employ the tools of evaluation/appraisal theory (Martin, 2000a, 2003; Thompson & Hunston, 2000) to investigate the role of evaluation in constructing an ideology that justifies a discourse of exclusion in the legal discourse of national security. This examination, which is inspired by Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl's (2001, 2003) discourse-historical approach,⁹ investigates actual realizations of Canadian counter-terrorism measures in the form of security certificates which have utilized racialized "othering" methods and have arguably targeted the Muslim and Arab community in Canada as well as facilitated the detainment of people in prison or under house arrest without legal rights to due process. I further reflect on the similarities and differences between current national security measures and those employed in the past in the Canadian government's legislated mistreatment of Japanese Canadians.

One probable difference between past and current security measures is the manner in which racism is discursively manifested in the national security policy, legislation and practice for the two chronologically distant periods. It is likely that the cultural norms for the period of the Second World War and those following September 11, 2001 would correspondingly allow for more and less overt forms of racist discourse. As such, the need for historical contextualization of the discourse is essential. Yet even for discourse that occurs within similar or simultaneous timeframes, differences in the discursive manifestation of racism are evident. In stating this, I therefore concur with Wodak (2001) in her assertion

⁹ As Reisigl and Wodak (2001) state, "In investigating historical and political topics and texts, the discourse-historical approach attempts to integrate much available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in which discursive 'events' are embedded" (p. 35). To contextualize my research, I provide historical background information that describes the socio-political climate for each discursive period. In so doing, I endeavour to accomplish the aim of the discourse-historical approach as set out by Reisigl and Wodak (2001) to the greatest degree possible given that I am bound by space and time limitations.

that “the great challenge, nowadays, is to explain the contradictions and tensions which occur between nation states and supranational entities on many levels...” (p. 64). For instance, while official government discourse may speak against racism and for equal rights, legal discourse may legislate the opposite in excluding peoples from the protective measures of the nation-state based on racialized characteristics such as in the current Canadian national security legislation of the *Anti-terrorism Act*.¹⁰

The search for approaches that uncover meaning instead of theories which attempt to find truth is of central concern to Wodak (2001). Hence for her the question to consider in the exploration of theoretical approaches is not: “‘Do we need a grand theory?’ but rather, ‘What conceptual tools are relevant for this or that problem and for this and that context?’” (Wodak, 2001, p. 64). Given that racism materializes differently at different times various approaches are required to uncover racist thought and practice. The notion that at different times in various analyses that are undertaken for different purposes different tools may apply better than others is one that I also explore here.

¹⁰ See my discussion on “Designating national (in)security” in section 2.2.4, especially footnotes 38-40.

2 Review of the Literature

2.0 Introduction

I present a number of interdisciplinary approaches in my review of the literature to offer a comprehensive understanding of the possible interdiscursive link between nationalism and racism as well as to examine the connection between the origin of racist thought and practice, its persistence in democratic nation-states as well as its blatant and less obvious discursive manifestations in national security discourse. In accordance with Ruth Wodak¹¹ (2001, pp. 63-94), and Teun van Dijk (2001, pp. 95-120), in each analyst's call for an interdisciplinary approach to CDA, I attempt to move beyond the "pure linguistic dimension" of analysis "to include more or less systematically the historical, political, sociological and/or psychological dimension ... [of each discursive event studied]" (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 383). I further underscore the significance of the dynamic intertextual and interdiscursive connection between disparate "fields of action" (such as law-making, political executive or administrative frames, and the formation of public opinion; see Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, pp. 383, 384; figure 19.1) in order to establish a modifiable framework for the analysis of national security discourse and its link to racism.

My review of the literature is organized into three separate yet interrelated sections so that I may consider the complex relationship between racism and the discursive creation of national security measures. In the first part of this review, I investigate the ideology of racism. In this section, I first discuss the etymological concept of "race" and its chronological usage (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; van Dijk, 1993). I then take into account the various causes

¹¹ It is important to note that I explore a number of Ruth Wodak's (1997, 2001) studies on racism and nationalism as well as those which she has co-authored (Reisigl & Wodak, Wodak et al., 1999, Wodak & Reisigl, 2003) because of her significant contributions to this area of study in CDA. As a general guideline, I consider both her single and co-authored work under the subsections on racism (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, Wodak & Reisigl, 2003; especially subsections 2.1, 2.1.1, 2.1.2) and nationalism (Wodak et al., 1999; especially subsection 2.2.1).

and motives for the formation of racism including the origin of racism and its historical escalation (Anderson, 2006; Arendt, 1958; Balibar, 2005; Every & Augoustinos, 2007; van Dijk, 1993; Wodak, 1997). Theoretical explanations for racism based on social, psychological, economic, and cognitive accounts as well as the critical theories of Miles (1994), Reisigl and Wodak (2001), Outlaw (1990), van Dijk (1993), and Wodak and Reisigl (2003) are thus briefly considered (Miles, 1994 and Outlaw, 1990 as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003). Following this, I further reflect on the notion of “cultural” and “democratic” racism from a critical “race” theory perspective that can expose possible differences between past and present racism (Henry & Tator, 2002; Li, 2007). As my project concerns two periods of racialized “othering” shaped by a West versus East nationalist discourse, I discuss Edward W. Said’s (1978) seminal contribution to “othering” in *Orientalism* and relate his work to the framework provided in Karim H. Karim’s (1997) CDA study of the resilience of stereotypes of the Muslim “other”. Said’s (1978) study of the historical European ideological creation of the Orient demonstrates the structure of thought which has enabled racist discourse to flourish in the West and contextualizes my study of the racialized “other”.

The second portion of this review explores Benedict Anderson’s (2006) notable anthropological investigation into the “imagined community of nation”. Anderson’s (2006) study structures my discussion on the interdisciplinary critical approaches to nationalism and racism which I present here (Aiken, 2007; Cohen, 2001; Conklin, 1996; Dedeoglu, 2003; Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Jackson, 2005; Larsen, 2006; Lee, 2007; Li, 2007; McDonald, 2007; Smith, 2007; van Dijk, 1993; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1999; Wodak & Reisigl, 2003). In this section, I begin with an examination of the key terms related to the creation of the “imagined nation”, the construct of “national identity”, the subsequent

legislation and policy of “national security” as well as the connected idea of “terrorism”. The power to exclude and include who is afforded security rests on what and who defines the nation-state and nation-state identity. The question of whose security and for what ends is inextricably linked to who is deemed deserving of security or not, and who and what is labeled as a terrorist threat, and is thus central to the analysis of “othering” in this context. To explore this question, I discuss the concept of (national) security as well as that which poses a threat to it. This exploration leads me to reflect upon the importance of discourse in the construction of the “nation” and its possible ties to racist discourse. I then put forward two discourse analytical approaches from van Dijk (1984; 1993; 2001), and Wodak and Reisigl (2003; as well as from Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) that allow for a thorough investigation of racism in national discourse in its various manifestations.

In the final part of my review, I introduce the analytical tools of evaluation/appraisal¹²

¹² Evaluation/appraisal theory is an extension of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) first outlined by Michael Halliday (1996). The central tenet in SFL is that of choice. Since all articulation of language involves choice it underlies the way in which language is used. Choice can be analyzed through the analysis of register and genre theories. Register theory is used to examine the context of the situation in which language occurs while genre looks outside of the language at the social context of culture (Eggins, 2004, p. 9). Three basic constructs upon which the relationship between language and linguistic code is based are built into the register: the field, the tenor, and the mode. The field concerns the content of the activity that language is being used to talk about; the tenor relates to how and why the interactants are using the language; and the mode involves the role that language plays in the interaction itself such as whether a text is written or spoken to be read, or if it is written to be read or written to be spoken or both. These constructs are then realized by three general sets of metafunctions of language: the ideational, the interpersonal and the textual. The ideational conveys the content of a text and is related to the situation of field. It involves the processes, participants and circumstances at the semantic level and is labeled at the lexico-grammatical stratum using transitivity analysis. The interpersonal concerns the changes in the interactive role of the text and hence is the semantic expression of tenor. It involves an examination of how attitudes are expressed through speech functions and attitudinals. On the lexico-syntactic level, it is labeled by mood, modality and attitudinal elements. A textual exploration, on the other hand, is the linguistic coding of mode. At the semantic level, the textual deals with questions of coherence and cohesion as well as the themes chosen and how the themes are represented. The textual is realized on the lexico-grammatical continuum by ellipsis, reference, collocation, substitution, reiteration, links, and topical elements. In contrast to SFL which situates the expression of attitude/opinion solely within the interpersonal stratum, evaluation theory maintains that the ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions can all discursively express opinion.

in the work of Geoffrey Thompson and Susan Hunston (2000), and Jim Martin (2000a; 2003). Evaluation concerns the expression of attitude, viewpoint or feelings about a subject by a writer/speaker. Evaluation/appraisal theory endeavours to account for the language used to express the writer/speaker's opinion that influences the point of view of the reader/listener. As such, evaluation theory provides an indispensable mechanism to help uncover uses of government and legal discourse which are shrouded within bureaucratic forms that disguise evaluative positioning and obscure meaning in the practice of national security measures. This mechanism enables the researcher to demonstrate that evaluation is determined not only through evaluative lexis but also in the ideational construction of the field of discourse or, in other words, what language is being used to talk about and by whom. The ideological framing of a nation-state's legal and protective measures can therefore be conveyed linguistically through evaluation.

For example, the field of discourse can reveal whether the issue is framed as one of "security" or "the limitation of rights", and can be shaped by the speaker as a "government official" or as an "activist". Hence evaluation can express communal value-systems, construct and maintain relations between community members as writers/readers or speakers/listeners as well as organize the discourse so that it is understood by communities of practice. Accordingly, what is considered as virtuous or not, what is perceived as fact or fiction, and what means are viewed as necessary for the purpose of protecting national security depends upon the discursively constructed communities in question. Moreover, as evaluation is "the hidden persuader" (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 1) the tools of evaluation can reveal the manner in which the discursive construction of "others" as national security threats comes to be accepted in legal and public discourse. While the aforementioned

analytical approaches to the analysis of racist discourse situate particular instantiations of racism within a historical framework and thus contextualize racist utterances, evaluation theory permits a detailed investigation of selected utterances which can further assist in exposing how “race” becomes an “unofficially” designated category in the practice of national security measures that do not “officially” allow for racialized classifications.

Rather than focusing on the differences between the analytical and methodological approaches presented, I unite their common elements under the theoretical umbrella or “grand theory” (Wodak, 2001, p. 69) of postmodern “othering” and contend that each approach grants a further insight into the discursive construction of the “other” which can help to expose racist discourse concealed as nationalist security measures. Like Wodak (2001), I contend that causal explanations cannot fully encompass all situations and are therefore not enough to explain the practice of racism (p. 64). Consequently, there is a need to be flexible and open to a variety of conceptually pragmatic approaches, and “to [further] clarify conceptual tools and to construct new ones by following the criteria of utility rather than truth” (Mouzelis, 1995, p. 9 as cited in Wodak, 2001, p. 64). In so doing, this study solidifies the existent foundation for the examination of the discursive construction of racism and provides a collaborative model for future investigations into discourse and racism in the legislation of Canadian national security measures.

2.1 The Origins of “Race” and Racism

In order to examine the process of racialized “othering” as a form of racism in discourse, it is first necessary to briefly consider the historical process of how the socially-constructed concept of “race” came to be, what gave rise to racist thought and practice, and the possible reasons for the persistence of racism. Although the linguistic origin of the

concept of “race” is relatively recent, Wodak and Reisigl (2003) contend that the term is neither precise nor clear (p. 373). Based on their historical-political etymology of the concept, the first instances of its use appear in the Romance languages of Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and French in the thirteenth century, and occur with more regularity in English at the start of the sixteenth century (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 373). At different points in time “race” has been utilized for a variety of semantic purposes such as in the classification of “species” or “genus”, “social” and “political” differentiation, and the separation of language groups (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 373). Prior to the scientific period of the eighteenth century, however, Wodak and Reisigl (2003) claim that the term was mainly used to distinguish between aristocratic and feudal classes and was not yet linked to perceived anatomical differences (p. 373). As the theoretical application of the use of “race” to explain perceived differences between humans increased so, according to Wodak and Reisigl (2003), did the rise of racist thought that occurred during the latter part of the Enlightenment period (pp. 373-374).

Like Wodak and Reisigl (2003), van Dijk (1993) similarly locates the escalation and intensification of racism in the Enlightenment period. According to van Dijk (1993) the rise in racist thought and practice is inseparable from the mindset that was used as justification for the onset of European colonization of the Americas. He asserts that while the existence of racism can be traced to the Greek and Roman practice of slavery, the scale and devastating impact of the sweeping late fifteenth century, European conquest marks 1492 as a distinctive period in the institutionalization of racism (van Dijk, 1993, p. 53). This epoch of slavery, imperialism and colonialism established the political and social landscape necessary for the ideologically racist determination of the distribution and maintenance of power based on

“otherness” (van Dijk, 1993, pp. 53-54). It was upon this foundation that the scientific revolution established the beginning of the distinction between peoples based on pseudoscience and anthropological differences.

The rise of Darwinism saw an increase in the ideological stance of “white” supremacist thought as elite scholars such as David Hume and Diderot maintained and supported the “scientific reasoning” behind the perspective which deemed the “other” as lesser (van Dijk, 1993, pp. 53, 54). Van Dijk (1993) claims that although racial inequality became an increasingly worldwide political issue after the First World War and that following the Second World War the need for human rights and equality could no longer be ignored, discriminatory policies and practices in the West continued under nationalistic pretenses (p. 58). The more recent studies into racism and political discourse in Australia by Danielle Every and Martha Augoustinos (2007) further support the view that present day racism originates from this expansionary time that was justified at least in part through racist divisions and beliefs in racial superiority.

Rather than Darwinism itself, Wodak and Reisigl (2003) argue that it was the *misappropriation* of Darwin’s theory of evolution which led to the increased misuse of “race” as a category to account for supposed differences in human anatomy (p. 373; italics added). While “race” theorists based their theoretical explanations on ideology rather than scientific substantiation, they used the idea of evolution to explain history as a racialized struggle for survival (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 373). This unscientific use of the term “race” soon led to the classification of all peoples worldwide and proliferated in political-historical literature that transferred the conventional use of the concept into the narrative of human history (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 373).

Though it is possible to trace racist practices and policies from anywhere between the eleventh to the early nineteenth century (see for example van Dijk, 1993; Wodak & Reisigl, 2003) as noted above, the critical idea of *racism* only took hold in the 1930s. It was during this period that the systematic genocidal application of “race” theory was employed to differentiate between humans as biologically separate classes. As Wodak and Reisigl (2003) state, “The extremely radicalized ‘race’ theory of the German antisemites and National Socialists ... tied together syncretistically religious, nationalist, economist, cultural, and biologicistic antisemitism, which then served as the ideology to legitimize systemic, industrialized genocide” (p. 373). While the combination of different systems of belief under the extreme racist ideology of the German antisemites is not dealt with at length in Wodak and Reisigl (2003), Hannah Arendt’s (1958) significant contribution to this area of study in *Origins of Totalitarianism* explores how the idea of “race” was utilized during the period of National Socialism. Arendt’s (1958) work further provides a vital theoretical contribution to the materialization of racism in totalitarian regimes.

In her study, Arendt (1958) investigates the ideology of totalitarian nations and connects the lack of democratic principles in these regimes with the genocidal practice of racism. She associates the pursuit of colonial power, as a model of totalitarianism, to the emergence of National Socialism and identifies the legal mechanisms through which a political power legitimized the segregation and killing of a population. According to Arendt (1958), “race-thinking” enabled a situation to exist where people believed in “racial” purity for the integrity of the “nation” while at the same time rejecting the notions of equality upon which democratic nations are based. For Arendt (1958) it was this illogical thinking that led to the downfall of the nations which pursued a “racially” pure aim:

Race-thinking, rather than class-thinking, was the ever present shadow accompanying the development of the comity of European nations, until it finally grew to be the powerful weapon for the destruction of those nations. Historically speaking, racists have a worse record of patriotism, than the representatives of all other international ideologies together, and they were the only ones who consistently denied the great principle upon which national organizations of peoples are built, the principle of equality and solidarity of all peoples guaranteed by the idea of mankind. (p. 161)

Despite Arendt's (1958) significant contribution to the field of racism she fails to consider the contradictions inherent to all forms of "nationalism" in their dichotomous principles of exclusion and inclusion whether under the semblance of totalitarianism or democracy. This contradiction begs the question: Is it possible to have equality and solidarity and simultaneously exclude? Some theorists such as Anderson (2006; see section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 for a fuller discussion on link between nationalism and racism) argue that the parallel between nationalism and racism exists solely in the case of colonial nationalism or the "nationalism of the dominant" and not in relation to the "nation" conceived as linguistically and culturally congruous (pp. 141, 142); others like Balibar (2005) view the relationship between the constructs of nationalism and racism as historically reciprocal (p. 53). For Balibar (2005), racism within and outside of the nation-state is a constant cycle and emerges out of nationalism (p. 53). He claims that the cyclic association between nationalism and racism "is the temporal figure of the progressive domination of the system of nation-states over other social formations" (Balibar, 2005, p. 53). In spite of their differences, both Anderson (2006) and Balibar (2005) maintain the existence of a link between national constructs and racism, and further situate the spiraling increase in racist thought in the ideology of dominant nationalism.¹³

¹³ The marked difference between these theories is that Anderson (2006) believes that nationalism can exist independently of racism while Balibar (2005) contends that if nationalism is "not the sole cause of racism" it is a "determining condition" without which it could not exist (p. 37). For more on Anderson's (2006) perspective see section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 below.

2.1.1 The Persistence of Racism: Theoretical Explanations

The complexity and interrelatedness of –isms, such as racism and nationalism, is brought to light in Reisigl and Wodak’s (2001) seminal study entitled *Discourse and Discrimination*. In their introductory chapter, they begin with a series of questions on how to define the issue of racism. They observe that the answers to their queries regarding matters such as the manner in which racism is manifested in discourse to the difficulties of distinguishing between “overlapping discriminatory phenomena like anti-semitism, nationalism, [and] ethnicism” have yet to achieve satisfactory answers (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 1). Rather than attempt to address all the questions put forward, to illustrate the theoretical difficulties in attempting to provide a concrete definition of racism, they briefly outline the diverse perspectives of the theorists who they claim have made significant contributions to the study of racism.¹⁴

Analogous to their earlier study, Wodak and Reisigl’s (2003) more recent discussion in “Discourse and Racism” succinctly summarizes eight of what they maintain as the “foremost” approaches on the causes and motives for racism from a multidisciplinary perspective (p. 374). Here the authors synthesize the central arguments for the existence and promulgation of racism from social cognitive, social identity, psychoanalytical, political-economic, critical, postmodern and cultural theoretical perspectives. These approaches offer possible reasons for the basis of racism and provide an overview of the most widely known and accepted theoretical perspectives. In Wodak and Reisigl’s (2003) summation of the various theories, they critique the approaches that “play-down” and/or “justify” racism as a result of an innate human trait to hold prejudice as they claim that the belief in the innateness

¹⁴ According to Reisigl and Wodak (2001) these “prominent theorists” include: Albert Memmi, 1992; Colette Guillaumin, 1991, 1992; Detlev Clausen, 1994; Philomena Essed, 1991, 1992; Mitten, 1992, 1997; Robert Miles, 1992, 1993, as well as their own approach (see pp. 5-10).

of prejudice removes individual and societal responsibility for racist thought and practice (p. 374).

They argue that since social cognitive, social identity, and psychoanalytical accounts for racism universalize “the conditions of racism” in their failure to differentiate between people as well as the various ways that they may experience similar incidents and create categorizations, these approaches are prone to be used as a justification for racism (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003. pp. 374-375). For instance, Wodak and Reisigl (2003) posit that social cognitive theory views society and social environments as constant and unchanging, and explains racism as the result of the “social categorization [of] the cognitive concepts of ‘prototypes’, ‘schemas’, ‘stereotypes’, and ‘object classification’ ” (p. 374). Accordingly, individuals are inherently apt to make racial categorizations. Social identity theory, on the other hand, “recognizes the importance of socialization and group experiences in the development and acquisition of social categories” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 374). Despite this fact, however, Wodak and Reisigl (2003) assert that this theory constructs wide-sweeping generalizations about the effects of group membership on racist and ethnocentric views. Furthermore, they argue that the causal links of social identity theory are based on small-scale group experiments formed from a “simplistic frustration-aggression hypothesis” and “hasty” analogies which make the generalities claimed all the more suspect (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 375). Likewise, Wodak & Reisigl (2003) find psychoanalytical accounts problematic as they “ascribe to all persons the same dependency on unconscious aggressions and fixations” or the “thanatos” (innate death instincts) to naturalize antagonisms in relation to others who are perceived to be different (p. 375). Like social cognitive and social identity theories, psychoanalytical approaches tend toward a “universalistic viewpoint” which

minimizes the possibility of societal responsibility for the proliferation of racism and undermines the political ability to present critical views of society (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 375).

For Wodak and Reisigl (2003) neither the “colonial paradigm/race relations” approach nor the “political economy of migration” paradigm can successfully account for all forms of racism. From the classical Marxist perspective, the “colonial paradigm” maintains that racism was established along colour lines and through other characteristics of visible difference “to legitimate colonial exploitation” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 376). As a result, it furthers the view of the concept of “race” as a category of visible difference. In so doing, the “colonial paradigm” considers one form of racism to the exclusion of others and does not take into account racism that occurs where external differences are non-existent or minimal as with anti-semitism or racism of “interior” minorities that happens within nation-states or continental borders such as in the case of the Roma in Europe (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 376). In an equally reductionist way, the “political economy” paradigm regards “race” in a manner akin to “social class” and “reduce[s] racism primarily to economical factors” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 376). Although the “political economy” perspective rejects the sociological paradigm central to “race relations”, both views consider “race” to be a valid analytical category. These approaches are therefore limited in their ability to be critical of racist thought because they fail to take into account the complexity of racism which can include, but also extend beyond visible difference and social class (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 376).

In contrast to the above perspectives, the views presented in postmodern and cultural studies put forward a broader scope of possible motives and causes for racism (see for

example Bauman, 1989, 1991; Bhabha, 1990; Fanon, 1986; Gilroy, 1987; Hall¹⁵, 1978, 1980, 1989, 1994; Rattansi, 1994; Rattansi & Westwood, 1994; Said, 1978, 1993; Westwood, 1994 as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 376). These approaches take into account the “cultural, ideological and, political construction of racism” and consider all cultural depictions of peoples who are constructed as sharing common aspects related to ethnic, national or perceived racial characteristics as politically charged (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 376). Thus representations of collective identities in the form of ethnicity, nationalism, and racism are part of the “cultural politics of representation...in which narratives, images, musical forms and popular culture more generally have a significant role” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 376). Postmodern and cultural approaches view the domination and exploitation of peoples as the flip side “of western modernity” and argue that concepts of “nationalism”, “racism”, “ethnicism”, and “class struggle” fail to account for “the chronic disembedding, decentering, de-essentialization, and reinvention of traditions and ‘collective’ identities” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, pp. 376-377). In contrast to the aforementioned theories, cultural and postmodern theoretical approaches offer a critical view of the part that society plays in the promulgation of racism.

Noted as “an alternative neo-Marxist theorization of racism”, the “racism after ‘race’ relations” paradigm provides another critical view of society’s role in racism (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 377). Wodak and Reisigl (2003) describe this account of racism proposed

¹⁵ Hall’s (1978, 1980, 1989, 1994) contributions to cultural theory in relation to his post-colonial narrative approach are frequently cited in the writings of analysts using CDA in their work on racism (e.g., Henry & Tator, 2002; Hier & Greenburg, 2002; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 1997; Wodak & Reisigl, 2003) and thus deserve mention. This literature review acknowledges Hall’s important influence on discourse analysis shaped by his view that particular narratives are a result of the ideology of particular audiences. However, while references to his work are made throughout this review, his narrative approach to discourse will not be utilized in my research due to space limitations.

by Miles (1994) as the result of the capitalist contradiction between “universalism and humanitarianism” and “the reproduction of social inequality and exploitation” (Miles, 1994, p. 204 as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 377). Miles (1994) identifies three fundamental capitalist contradictions that lead to racism. The first occurs from the opposition between the potential for universal equality in the “commodification” of all things and “the capitalist necessity to reproduce social inequality” (Miles, 1994, p. 77 as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 377). Miles (1994) claims that to justify the “social inequality and uneven development” which results from this contradiction, particular characteristics are ascribed to social groups that “essentialize” and “naturalize” constructed differences (as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 377). For instance, through constructed attributions poor farmers in the South may be characterized as uneducated which “essentializes” their inability to take ownership of their production yet discounts the existence of economic inequality. This essentialization of characteristics ignores the fact that farmers’ wages do not justly reflect their work contributions and further ensures that they continue to live in a cycle of poverty which makes it impossible for them to access the capitalist systems of production that maintain wealth and power in the North. The second contradiction which Miles (1994) defines concerns the capitalist tendency toward the notion of universalization and cultural diversity, and the simultaneous limitation of alternative means of development (as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 377). This leads to the view of inferior production systems in comparison to capitalist methods. The outcome of this according to Miles (1994) is the racialization of groups who resist “capitalist ‘progress’ as primitive and inferior [such as those from the South who have countered economic globalization measures]” (as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 77). The final contradiction that Miles (1994) outlines relates to

“the partial confinement of capitalist relations of production within the political form of nation-states wherein political subjects are nationalized and racialized” (as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 377). This tendency results in the preservation over the control of the means of production in the rich North and the simultaneous establishment of regulations that enable racialized workers from the South to live and work within the nation-state without granting them full status rights.

Like the “cultural and postmodern” and “racism after ‘race’ relations” theoretical paradigms, critical theory (also referred to as critical social theory – see Outlaw 1996, p. 159) offers a further method for the analysis of racist discourse which stresses the significant role of society in racism. Wodak and Reisigl (2003) cite a number of theorists known for their contribution to critical theory (Adorno 1973, 1993; Fromm 1988; Horkheimer 1992 as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 375). Critical theorists “combine neo-Marxism, politically committed psychoanalysis, and sociopsychology” to address the manner in which racism is formed within the individual and how it manifests in society (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 375). While most early approaches to critical theory focus on the analysis of anti-semitism in an attempt to explain the circumstances that gave rise to Nazi fascism, the critical approach of Lucius Outlaw (1990) brings together economic, political, cultural and socialization structures to develop a critical theory of “race” (as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 375). Outlaw (1990) contests the notion that there are self-evident “races” and “points to the danger of taking an essentializing and objectivizing concept ‘race’ as the focal point of contention, thereby supplying a shorthand explanation for the source of contentious differences” (as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 375; see also Aiken, 2007, p. 59). The significance of critical theory is that it takes into account the individual and society, and

regards the childhood socialization process as integral to the formation of racist thought. It therefore moves beyond simple descriptions of racism to consider the “conditions for the emergence and social maintenance of ... racist prejudice” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 375).

2.1.2 The Dichotomy of “Old” versus “New” Racism

Though current scientific thought maintains as “undeniable fact” that the category of “race” is not a biological reality but a social construction (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 373) and thus “there are no scientific grounds to use phenotype or biological heredity” (Aiken, 2007, p. 61) as an explanation for dividing the world into “races”, racism persists nonetheless. The no longer widely accepted overt articulations of racist thought and practice are instead manifested in naturalized ways “as a set of *unquestionable assumptions*” which are based on racist premises and propositions (see Hall, 1981, pp. 10-11 as cited in Henry & Tator, 2002, p. 23; italics in the original). Henry and Tator (2002) propose that this practice is a form of “new racism” which in contrast to “old racism” “manifests itself in more subtle and insidious ways and is largely invisible to those who are a part of the dominant culture” (p. 23). The “old” versus “new” paradigm therefore relates to the manner in which racism is manifested as well as the ideological reasoning behind “race-thinking”. Since most discrimination based on perceived racial difference is no longer blatantly racist but rather couched in covertly racialized linguistic terms and references this theory posits that overt forms of racism are indicative of “old” racism, while less obvious or concealed racism marked by cultural distinctions are demonstrative of “new” racism.

For instance, the employment of euphemistic language especially by “elite” groups like those of Western parliaments has largely replaced overtly racist language (van Dijk, 1993, p. 84). As van Dijk (1993) notes, Western government discourse utilizes linguistic

terms such as “not motivated and/or underachiever” to replace harsher synonyms like “lazy” in relation to minority immigrant workers from the South (p. 84). In a similar and perhaps more germane way for the purposes of this study, the turn of phrase “level of commitment” used by Canadian security agencies in relation to Islam as an indicator of those who are likely to be terrorists or connected to terrorists conceals the racialization of an entire religious group.¹⁶

Prevailing attempts to establish a chronological divide between “old” and “new” forms of racism appear to be widely accepted and employed in much of the literature on racism (see critical approaches of Balibar, 1991; Balibar & Wallerstein, 1990, 1988; Barker, 1981; Kalpaka & Rathzel, 1986; Taguieff, 1987 as cited in Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 9, and in Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Hall, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976 as cited by Henry & Tator, 2002, p. 9). Yet despite this fact, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) seek to maintain a non-chronological perspective on the promulgation of racism. They concur with Miles (1994) who “refuses to speak in terms” of the dichotomy of “old” versus “new” and prefers a “chronologically neutral distinction ... [as it is not possible to assert that current forms of racism are] really fundamentally ‘new’ or different” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 9). Like Miles (1994), Reisigl and Wodak (2001) do not dispute that less obvious forms of racism are more common now than they were in the past but they caution against using terms that distinguish current racism as cultural (see Miles, 1994 as cited in Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 9). Since as Reisigl and Wodak (2001) assert all racism due to its “syncretist nature” is at

¹⁶ For example, the Canadian Council on Arab-American Islamic Relations ([CAIR-CAN] 2004) reports in its study “A National Survey on Security Visitations of Canadian Muslims” that Canadian security agencies such as CSIS asked Canadian Muslims a number of problematic questions regarding their faith, including their “level of commitment to the Islamic faith” (p. 17). CAIR-CAN notes that “such questions are problematic because they insinuate that a commitment to Islam is undesirable and potentially dangerous to Canada” (p. 17).

least in part connected to differentiations of culture (p. 9). Thus “even the classical pseudoscientific racism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries always included a reference to the cultural or national ‘character’ and ‘uniqueness’” (Rattansi 1994, p. 55 as cited in Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 9).

This point is reaffirmed in Peter Li’s (2007) consideration of Goldberg’s (1992 in Li, 2007) work on “race” wherein Li explains how “race” has figured in cultural manifestations in a variety of forms over time. He maintains that throughout history “specific ‘racial’ connotations” have been reformed to express “racial” differences which are part of “the cultural frameworks with which people make sense of their times” and that these “cultural representations” perform the dual function of reflecting current social thought while shaping relationships between “races” by giving the appearance of “rational” support for racial divisions (Li, 2007, p. 38). Tensions arise within society from the conflict between “the ideology of Canada as a democratic liberal state and the racist ideology that is reflected in the collective belief system operating within Canadian cultural, social, political, and economic institutions” (Henry & Tator, 2002, p. 23, see also Li, 2007 in section 2.2.3 below). The deeply embedded racist beliefs and behaviours in “democratic” societies which contradict democratic liberalism’s stated goals of equality, multiculturalism, and human rights enables racism to flourish under the guise of “rationality” (Henry & Tator, 2002, p. 23).

Following the aftermath of September 11, 2001, a return to more blatant forms of racism became apparent in the questions posed in opinion polls as well as in the mainstream media news stories that ensued which vocalized overtly racialized beliefs. Li (2007) cites numerous polls commissioned by *Maclean’s*, Global TV, and Southam News which inquired about “restricting the number of immigrants from Muslim countries” (Strategic Counsel as

cited in Li, 2007, p. 50), and refers to the subsequent headlines of several newspapers in Canada in relation to these polls which read “Limit Muslim Immigration, 44% Say” in the *National Post*, and “Keep Muslims Out, Poll Says-Nearly Half Canadians Want Immigration Crackdown” in the *Times Colonist* (Blanchfield as cited in Li, 2007, p. 50). Li (2007) believes that the fear created through the September 11, 2001 attacks simultaneously produced an environment where the expression of intolerant feelings became more socially acceptable (p. 50). He further claims that during periods of panic such as this “the use of ‘race’ and the attributing of undesirable connotations to ‘race’ become normal and natural as long as they are constructed in the context of preventing public danger and upholding public good” (Li, 2007, p. 51). Rather than a return to an “old” form of racism, this climate of fear permitted previously concealed racist thoughts and practices to rise again to the surface.

The manner in which racism appears discursively as either “direct and explicit”, or subtle and under the surface depends upon the construction and normalization of racialized discourse as “a convincing rationalization” (Li, 2007, p. 51). In addition to the rationale provided for racist thought and practice, the syncretic complexity of racialization which is “criss-crossed by ethnic, national, gender, class, and other social constructions and divisions ... [is rooted in multiple and wide-ranging causes and motives]” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 377). Due to this complexity, no one particular theory is capable of encompassing all aspects of its development and articulation since racism materializes in numerous ways and for a multitude of purposes. As such, it requires a multidimensional and interdisciplinary approach to analysis rather than a theory which attempts to provide holistic explanations.

2.1.3 Orientalism

One particularly useful approach to examine the continuation of racism that provides a historical context for the current process of racialized “othering” of Arabs and Muslims is found in Edward W. Said’s (1978) seminal theoretical study on “orientalism”.¹⁷ Situated within a cultural and postmodern framework, Said’s (1978) doctoral thesis is central to the understanding of the myths and categorizations that have led to the West’s conception of the Muslim “other”. His concern lies with how ideology and politics is textually interwoven into the discourse of the “Orient”. He establishes a link between the manner in which perceptions of the “other” are conceived through the individual learning process and the institutions that influence societal views including schools, libraries, and governments (Said, 1978, p. 201). In a similar approach to the more recent discourse-historical analysis furthered by Reisigl and Wodak (2001), Wodak (1997), and Wodak and Reisigl (2003), Said (1978) employs an intertextual methodology that attempts to make evident the interrelationship between power and discourse as well as to reveal concealed discursive meanings in order to challenge “self-evident” accepted understandings of the East.

According to Said (1978), orientalism has three interdependent meanings that form a Western understanding of the Orient. The first relates to the academic pursuit of studies and research on the Orient. Orientalism or the more currently preferred “*Oriental or area studies* [applies to the perspectives of those who teach, write or research the Orient, including anthropologists, sociologists, historians, or philologists]” (Said, 1978, p. 2; italics in the original). The views held by orientalists, whether in the “new or old guise”, are transferred

¹⁷ In Henry and Tator’s (2002) summation of Said’s (1978) study they state that “Orientalism is a form of Eurocentrism: the European construction of the ‘Orient’ acts as a vehicle for the expressing Eurocentric values, assumptions, and norms” (p. 21). Said’s (1978) work subsumes “Orient” to mean primarily lands in the Near East or Middle East or “India and the Bible lands” (see Said, 1978, p. 4; Karim, 2000, p. 55).

over time and “live ... on academically through ... [the] doctrines and theses about the Orient and the Oriental” (Said, 1978, p. 2). Associated with “this academic tradition” is a generalized conception that shapes the second meaning of orientalism through a comparison of the “ontological and epistemological” differences between “the Orient” and “the Occident” (Said, 1978, p. 2). The result of this tradition has enabled “a very large mass of writers ... [to accept] the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, ‘mind’, destiny, and so on” (Said, 1978, pp. 3-4; quotation marks in the original). The connection between writers and the power elite has had grave implications for the Orient as those involved in the reification of Eastern culture such as poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators have -- through their influence over the Western political elite and in their construction of imaginative cultural creations -- shaped the way an entire people have been perceived by those of a European tradition (Said, 1978, p. 3). The significance of the relationship between writers and political authority leads Said (1978) to identify the third meaning of orientalism as the political dominance of the West over the Orient (p. 4). Employing the notion of discourse provided in Michel Foucault’s (1972, 1977) *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and *Discipline and Punish*, Said (1978) contends:

that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage -- and even produce -- the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period In brief, because of Orientalism the Orient was not (*and is not*) a free subject of thought or action. This is not to say that Orientalism unilaterally determines what can be said about the Orient, but that it is the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that peculiar entity “the Orient” is in question. (p. 3; italics added)

A basic principle that underlies Said's (1978) analytical framework is the idea of history as a creation (p. 5). His approach does not depend on the analysis of every text that denotes an orientalist bent, but instead considers "the set of historical generalizations" that make-up the orientalist canon as outlined above (Said, 1978, pp. 3-4). In this view, the Orient and the Occident are human constructions of geographical and cultural entities that "support and to a certain extent reflect each other" (Said, 1978, p. 5). Yet according to Said (1978) the notion of the Orient as an idea must be qualified since there is a corresponding reality to the view of the Orient created by the West (p. 5). Nevertheless, his concern in his study of orientalism is with the "created internal consistency and its ideas about the Orient ... despite or beyond any correspondence, or lack thereof, with a 'real' Orient" (Said, 1978, p. 5).

Connected to the concept of the idea and reality of the Orient, Said (1978) puts forward his second qualification which calls for the study of relationships of power necessary for all serious analyses of ideology, culture and history (p. 5). The study of power involved in orientalism demonstrates that "the Orient was Orientalized not only because it was discovered to be 'Oriental' in all those ways considered commonplace by an average nineteenth-century European, but also because it *could* be-that is, submitted to being-*made* Oriental" (Said, 1978, pp. 5-6; italics in the original). Said (1978) argues that consent was not a necessary requirement to make the claims of an orientalist. Due to the sheer political and economic strength of the Occident, the Orient was not given a voice and was rather spoken for.

The consideration of power relations introduces Said's (1978) third qualification for the creation of the "system of ideas" about the Orient (p. 6). Accordingly orientalism "is not some airy European fantasy about the Orient ... [but a conscious effort based on] a created

body of theory and practice [that serves specific political and ideological purposes]” (Said, 1978, p. 6). Since orientalism is a field that exists outside of totalitarian states, Said (1978) contends that its promulgation relies on the process of hegemony. Hegemonic power rests on non-coercive measures of cultural consent rather than military or other state might (see Said, 1978, p. 7). The investment made into the orientalist creation of the East has filtered through into “Western consciousness” and has become the accepted perspective by “the general culture” of the West (Said, 1978, p. 6). The notion of cultural difference between the Orient and the Occident is a result of this created divide that places the European in a superior position to the Eastern non-European. It is an “us” versus “them” divide that posits the Westerner as an independent, skeptical and thus superior thinker to the backward Easterner (see Said, 1978, p. 7). Through the lense of the West, Said (1978) notes that the conception of the Orient as “suitable for study in the academy, [emerged and was primarily shaped] for display in the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses about mankind and the universe” (pp. 7-8). It is in this discussion that Said (1978) connects the colonial pursuits of the West with the perspective of “self” required by colonial powers to justify their exploits (pp. 7-8).

Said (1978) warns that in any analysis there is a dual danger in attempting to be so far-reaching that one’s research becomes too general and thus not acceptable or in endeavouring to be so meticulous that significant generalities and connections across the spectrum of the research body go unnoticed. This is particularly the case in large-scale qualitative analyses such as the one undertaken in *Orientalism* (Said, 1978). To reconcile the duality of these approaches, which according to Said (1978) are really “two perspectives of

the same material”, he explores the following three aspects of his “contemporary reality”(p. 9): First, he addresses “the distinction between pure and political knowledge”; second, he establishes a clear “methodological question”; and third, he contends with the “personal dimension” of the research study (Said, 1978, pp. 9, 15, 25 respectively).

Firstly, Said (1978) argues that although in theory it may be possible to claim impartiality to distinguish between “pure and political knowledge”, in reality it is an impossible premise to adhere to since a scholar (or researcher) is necessarily involved in life and its subsequent social circumstances which include “a class”, “a set of beliefs” and “a social position” (p. 10). He furthermore claims that there can be no distinction made between these two types of knowledge as they are intertextually related (Said, 1978, p.13). Cultural texts influence political texts and vice versa. Thus to study the political nature of orientalism he considers a number of interrelated questions that concern the origin, function, modification, reproduction and linkage between state and culture in the “imperialist tradition” of what are considered cultural or political writings (Said, 1978, p. 15). In spite of this assertion, while he argues that culture and politics cannot be artificially separated from one another, he contends that there are no “hard-and-fast rules about the relationship between knowledge and politics” and hence each examination of discourse must consider the connection between “the specific context of the study, the subject matter, and its historical circumstances” (Said, 1978, p. 15).

Secondly, Said (1978) claims that there is no clear starting point in any analysis. It is left to the researcher to establish a point of departure, to mark a cut off point or a point of “delimitation” in order to settle upon a manageable set of materials for the purpose of study (Said, 1978, p. 16). In a sense, this demarcation necessitates creating a false point of origin.

What is important for Said (1978) is that this limitation be stated and explained. In his study then he resolves to consider the aforementioned questions to “the Anglo-French-American experience of the Arabs and Islam, which for almost a thousand years together stood for the Orient” (Said, 1978, p. 17). In doing so, he notes that he eliminates “a large part of the Orient” only because it is possible to discuss the Near East without a discussion of the Far East, with the exception of India and Persia due to their connection with Egypt (Said, 1978, p. 17).

The impact of orientalist writing resounds today as some modern “Middle East experts ... still draw on the vestiges of Orientalism’s intellectual position in the nine-teenth-century Europe” (Said, 1978, p. 19). Due to this, Said (1978) maintains that the significance of the authoritative stance taken in orientalist writings cannot be overlooked. He argues that although the “intellectual authority” in texts may appear as natural, in contrast it is “formed, irradiated, [and] disseminated” in order to be “persuasive”, and signify “certain ideas...as true”(Said, 1978, p. 19). Said (1978) proposes two methodological devices to study the manifestation of this “intellectual authority” which he labels “*strategic location*” and “*strategic formation*”(p. 20; italics in the original). He uses the term “strategy” to illustrate his claim that all writing on the Orient is problematic in its attempt to form a comprehensive and cohesive whole through “‘narrative voice’, ‘structure’, ‘images’, ‘themes’ and ‘motifs’ that circulate in ...[the] text” (Said, 1978, p. 20). While strategic location describes the author’s position in the text, strategic formation analyzes “the relationship between texts and the way in which groups of texts, types of texts, even textual genres, acquire mass, density, and referential power among themselves and thereafter in the culture at large” (Said, 1978, p. 20).

At first, Said's (1978) claim that the "strategic authority" of orientalist writing is neither abstract nor concealed but rather appears on "the text's surface" seems to contradict the perspective taken by critical discourse analysts (such as Wodak & Reisigl, 2003; van Dijk 1993) who attempt to reveal hidden forms of racism and other unequal power relations in texts (Said, 1978, p. 20). However, his position on how orientalist re-presentations become known as "truth" is simply another way of stating similar contentions made in CDA in relation to dominant discourses. Namely, what Said (1978) asserts is on the surface of the text is what in CDA is often referred to as that which has become normalized¹⁸ in discourse. Normalized discourse appears to be a reflection of reality or truth since it is accepted as such, yet may be far from this in actuality. According to Said (1978) the authoritative position of texts results from an intertextual understanding of the Orient which includes what is accepted as truth by the authors of the texts, and what is put forward as such for the West (pp. 20-21).

Since the discourse of orientalism like the discourse of all forms of "othering" is "delivered as a ... *re-presence*, or a representation" it therefore must be analyzed as such and not from the perspective that it is a reflection of "reality" or "truth" (Said, 1978, p. 21; italics in the original). Indeed, Said (1978) argues that orientalism is more about the West than it is about the East because it "depends more on the West than on the Orient" to make sense of the representations which "rely upon [Western] institutions, traditions, conventions, [and] agreed-upon codes of understanding ..." (p. 22). Thus Said (1978) claims that what must be considered in the analysis of such discourse is the "style, figures of speech, narrative devices, historical and social circumstances [of the time, and] *not* the correctness of the representation

¹⁸ I use the term "normalized" to stand for the process by which dominant beliefs and/or opinions are considered as factual representations of "truth". My use of "normalized" is meant to encompass the ideas of such processes as presented in Norman Fairclough (2006) and van Dijk (1993; 2001). Fairclough (2006) uses the term "naturalized" as opposed to "normalized", while van Dijk (2001) discusses this notion as a factor of "social re-presentations" and "collective memory".

nor its fidelity to some great original” (p. 21; italics in the original). For Said (1978), the authoritative stance of cultural discourse is “re-presented” as “truth” not only “in the avowedly artistic (i.e., openly imaginative) text ... [but also in] the so-called truthful texts (histories, philological analyses, political treatises)” (p. 21). Consequently the representation of “others” in all texts whether presented as fact or fiction must be scrutinized.

Moreover, each contribution to the body of orientalist literature is significant and requires consideration according to Said (1978). In a departure from Foucault (1972, 1977)¹⁹ who does not acknowledge the “individual text or author” as contributing substantially to discourse, Said (1978) stresses the significance of individual writers on the canon of orientalist texts (p. 23). Though “greatly indebted” to Foucault (1972, 1977), Said (1978, p. 23) like Wodak and Reisigl (2003) recognizes that it is individuals who form the collective whole and it is individual actions, which are in this case located in the form of references and citations of the orientalist body of writing, that create discourse (Said, 1978).

Said’s (1978) final but no less important point emphasizes the need to take a personal inventory of one’s purpose and personal investment as a researcher (p. 25). Following Gramsci’s (1971) call to “know thyself”, Said (1978) establishes his inventory of what personal investment he holds in studying the discourse of orientalism (Gramsci, 1971 as cited in Said, 1978, p. 25). In adherence to his first contention that no scholarship whether “cultural or political” is “pure” or without bias, Said (1978) reveals his own personal influence on the framework for analysis which he establishes as a foreign born Arab Palestinian taught under the orientalist tradition (pp. 25-28). He further appeals to all

¹⁹ Postmodern thinkers such as Foucault (2007) and Derrida (1976) note the problematic nature of “truth-telling” and “truth-telling as an activity”. This way of thinking marks a change with modern theoretical approaches that attempt to uncover a truth and rather enables for the possibility of holding multiple truths depending on the manner in which discourse is shaped.

researchers to bring forth their own personal inventories to enable readers to understand the theoretical lense which is being utilized and why it is so. In this vein, the previously mentioned critical “race” theorists (e.g., Aiken, 2007; Razack, 2007) and critical discourse analysts (e.g., Jackson, 2006; Wodak et al. 1999; Wodak & Reisigl, 2003; van Dijk, 1993) follow in Said’s (1978) path.

2.1.4 The Historical Construction of the Racialized Muslim “Other”

Said’s (1978) theoretical influence on the analysis of the orientalist perspective resounds throughout Karim H. Karim’s (1997, 2000) research on the racialized Muslim “other”. In his vital contribution to the collaborative CDA study of “others in discourse” entitled “The Historical Resilience of Primary Stereotypes: Core Images of the Muslim Other”, Karim (1997) establishes a framework for the analysis of the topos or primary stereotype of the Muslim “other”. Like Said (1978), Karim (1997) accentuates the significance of the process by which harmful stereotypes are promulgated and the rationale that lies behind them. Said’s (1978) emphasis on the importance of intertextual analysis and the strategic formation of “intellectual authority” in Western portrayals of Arabs and Muslims is reflected in Karim’s (1997) historical overview on the discourse of the Muslim “other” and the thematic patterns which emerge from the study of such. Karim (1997) also demonstrates the purposeful and partial construction of a Muslim enemy and further reveals how primary stereotypes that are repeatedly and uncritically utilized become accepted in the public discourse.

Karim (1997) begins by defining CDA in accordance with van Dijk’s (1993) appeal for an interdisciplinary study of the relations “between text, talk, social cognition, power, society, and culture” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 253 as cited in Karim, 1997, p. 153). Like van Dijk

(1993) and Wodak and Reisigl (2003), he locates the historical foundation and vehicle for the continuation of racist rationale in the Enlightenment period (Karim, 1997). In a treatment comparable to van Dijk's (1993) analysis of the origin of racist thought, Karim (1997) draws upon the works of Rodinson (1979), Dossa (1987) and Hentsch (1982) to present three conflicting but "essentially compatible views" that mark the starting point for racist divisions of the Muslim "other" in order to "develop a framework for the discursive analysis of Eurocentric discourses on Muslims" (Rodinson, 1979; Dossa, 1987; Hentsch, 1982 as cited in Karim 1997, pp.159-160 & 176: footnote 1). Modeled after van Dijk's (1993) analytical structure, Karim (1997) uses a global level thematic approach to note the reoccurrence over time of what he terms the old-age fear of "Muslim threat" that is framed as rational argument (Karim, 1997, pp. 153-154 compare with van Dijk, 1993, p. 87 in relation to Rushdie affair).

The first argument outlined by Karim (1997) is expressed in Maxime Rodinson's (1979) work "The Western Image and Western Studies in Islam". Rodinson (1979) claims that "although Christian polemical attacks on Islam began with the earliest contacts of the two religions", perceived racial superiority took root predominately with the commencement of European unification in the eleventh century (Rodinson, 1979 as cited in Karim 1997, pp. 159-160). To regain the Spanish, Italian, and Sicilian territory occupied by Muslims required that Europeans create an identity which excluded Muslims. According to this line of reasoning, the movement to bring together "Western Christendom under the Holy Roman Empire and the papacy seems to have contributed to the rise of the Muslim as the primary Other" (Karim, 1997, p. 160). Karim (1997) suggests that the simultaneous creation of a European "self" and an Islamic "other" may have led Christian leaders to stress differences rather than similarities in the religious beliefs of Muslims and Christians due to the perceived

threat of assimilation by European Christians to Islam (Karim, 1997, p. 162). Indeed, as Rodinson (1974) argues in an earlier study, the image of Islam was more a product of the “slowly welded ideological unity of the Latin Christian world” than of the Crusades (p. 11).

A second perspective discussed in Karim (1997) is from the work of Dossa (1987) who asserts that West versus East divisions were first evident in the works of the Greek philosophers (Dossa, 1987 as cited in Karim, 1997, p. 159). Belonging to the Occident, Greek thinkers such as Aristotle considered themselves as rational whereas Orientals were deemed barbaric. Dossa (1987) argues that Aristotle perceived “all Orientals as slavish” while people of the Occident were viewed as “rational, just, humanistic, cultured and free” (Dossa, 1987 as cited in Karim, 1997, p.160). Unlike Rodinson’s (1979) Western Christian versus Eastern Muslim divide, Dossa (1987) traces the first incidence of “othering” to peoples considered to be “un-Greek” (Rodinson 1979, Dossa 1987 as cited in Karim, 1997, p. 160).

The final view presented in Karim’s (1997) brief historical exploration that is upheld by Thierry Hentsch (1982) counters the previous assertions made by Rodinson (1979) and Dossa (1987). Hentsch (1982) argues that the artificial divide of land in sixteenth century created a false geopolitical boundary which recognized Greece as part of the West (Hentsch, 1982 as cited in Karim, 1997, p. 160). Prior to this time, Hentsch (1982) contends that the Greek, Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman empires had regarded the northern Mediterranean region as part of the Orient. As the historical boundary between the Orient and the Occident, “began to assume its contemporary [European] shape and identity [with the onset of the modern period, European identity was transformed]” (Karim, 1997, p. 160). This

transformation entailed the exclusion of people considered to be “other” than European and led to the current divide between West and East.

Although the three perspectives suggest different points of origin for the beginning of the racialized Muslim “other”, Karim (1997) maintains that regardless of the view taken all share the contention that the construction of the East as “other” became more greatly solidified with the exploration for a greater definition of the Western “self” (p. 160). In this way, Karim (1997) like Said (1978) recognizes the complexity of designating a point of departure in research. Simultaneously, Karim (1997) acknowledges the importance of the great similarity between the different perspectives which rests with the significance that each theory places on the separation of Islam from Europe rather than on the specific date when this division occurred.

The rise of secular thought did not allay the divisions between West and East according to Karim (1997). In fact he claims that “despite the rise of secularism, the prejudices that developed during the intermittent conflict between Christian and Muslim societies seem to have remained extant in collective memories” (Karim, 1997, p. 163). Karim (1997) contends that with the collapse of the Soviet Union the West needed to construct a new enemy in order to continue as a legitimate superpower and thus portrayals of Muslims as a threat to Western civilization abounded (p. 163). For Karim (1997) the transfer of the enemy “other” from Communism to Islam occurred with alarmingly relative ease (p.165).²⁰ In the early 1990s, newspapers and magazines declared the new enemy with headlines such as “Cold war battle transferred to Gulf” (Mackenzie, 1991 as cited in Karim, 1997, p. 165)

²⁰ This point is dealt with in depth in Karim’s (2000) work on media and globalization in *Islamic Peril*. I refer to this text at the beginning of this section but do not explore it in depth as my focus is on the historical discursive construction of the racialized Muslim “other” and not on the media specifically.

and “The cross and the crescent” (Kaplan, 1993 as cited in Karim, 1997, p. 165) which transformed the view of the Communist enemy to that of the Muslim “other”. As Karim (1997) notes, changes in Western government policies and tactics preceded this media-sized change in perspective so that after the fall of Communism the U.S. the Central Intelligence Agency reallocated spending from fighting the Eastern Bloc to fighting Islam (p. 166). This transformative measure facilitated the ability for one superpower to exist while it reinstated the image of the Muslim “other” as threat -- an image which Karim (1997) argues remains and continues with little if any critique.

In an echo of Said’s (1978) claims, Karim (1997) notes that the principal Muslim stereotypes which compose the “collective cultural memory” of Islam in the West are reinforced in literature, schools, the media, and the arts (p. 163). He contends that the proliferation of Muslim and Arab stereotypes is a consequence of the West’s control over international communication and its subsequent influence on global views. When a particular group is represented in a certain way the portrayal can seem isolated but it really belongs to an accepted discourse (Karim, 1997, p. 178). For example, resistance fighters in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine who are labeled as “terrorists” are often referred to as “Islamic fundamentalists” in the media.²¹ Aside from the fact that the fighters in these disparate regions are fighting for different reasons, the use of the term “fundamentalist” alongside “Islamic” suggests that those who strictly adhere to Islam are terrorists. The constant association of Islam with terrorism has come to be accepted as part of the discourse on security and terrorism so that the terms “Muslim” and “terrorist” are almost synonymous. From literature to toys, comics, video games, television and movies, portrayals that depict as

²¹ An online search of the Canadian newsstand database on September 5, 2008 found 1128 documents with the terms “Islam” or “Islamic” or “Muslim” and “terro*” in the document title. The dates for these documents run from March 5, 1996 to August 29, 2008.

jealous and violent a threatening Muslim “other” persist in dominating world perspectives and opinion (Karim, 1997, p. 163). The reproduction of these stereotypes “which frequently have negative implicit and explicit references to Muslims [ensures their continuance in Western culture]” (Karim, 1997, p. 163).

This negative collective memory is clearly expressed in a number of surveys that reveal the attitudes of Americans and Canadians toward Arabs and Muslims (Karim, 1997, p. 164). According to Karim (1997) “[a] survey of American attitudes toward Arabs elicited the responses ‘anti-American,’ ‘anti-Christian,’ ‘cunning,’ ‘unfriendly,’ and ‘war-like’” (Shaheen, 1984, p. 7 as cited in Karim, 1997, p. 164). Karim (1997) also cites two surveys conducted in Canada which required respondents to rank their level of comfort and impressions of various ethnocultural groups that “put Muslims near the bottom of both lists” (Angus Reid Group, 1992, p. 51 & Decima Inc., 1993, pp. 39-40 as cited in Karim, 1997, p. 164). As noted previously in Li (2007; see section 2.1.2), more recent opinion polls reveal a negative portrayal of Muslims and the resultant disapproving view in relation to immigration. These “discursive strategies” have developed and been normalized over time so that they are no longer questioned (Karim, 1997, p. 177).

From the discussion thus far it is evident that the construction of a racialized Muslim “other” is neither new nor impartial. Interestingly, Karim’s (1997, 2000) studies which examine the Western rationale behind the association of Islam with acts of violence and terror -- a Western rationale that fails to do the same for other religious groups -- occurred prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S. Indeed Karim’s (1997, 2000) texts reaffirm the findings of Said’s (1978) earlier research. The surveys and polls about attitudes toward Arabs and Muslims both in Karim (1997) and Li (2007) support Said’s (1978)

contention that the proliferation of negative images and portrayals of the East lie on the surface of texts.

So how is it possible that these negative images exist and are propagated in a nation that prides itself on being accepting of differences and tolerant to “others” such as Canada? One way appears to be through the discursive construction of an enemy “other” that excludes people on the basis of national security concerns. As Aiken (2007), Li (2007), McDonald (2007) and Razack (2007) maintain, over time various enemy “others” have been constructed for political and socio-economic purposes in the name of national security. The connections between the promulgation of racialized stereotypes, the global socio-economic and political environment, and the nation with its power of inclusion and exclusion are profoundly intertwined. This invariably raises questions concerning “nation” and the foundation upon which it rests. Does a nation, by its very nature, have to exclude or is there a way to allow for inclusivity? To explore the underlying principles for the exclusion of people from national protection measures and their simultaneous inclusion as possible threats to national security thus requires an investigation into what is deemed the “nation” and how the concept of “nation” is discursively constructed.

2.2 Constructs of “Nation”

Originally published in the early 1980s, Benedict Anderson’s (2006) influential anthropological study on the “imagined communities of nations” contributed to an emergent multi-disciplinary interest in the concept of nationalism and continues to be cited in the research of numerous CDA analysts and critical scholars (see for example Henry & Tator, 2002; Hier & Greenburg, 2002; Lee, 2007; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak et al., 1999).²²

²² See preface in Anderson (2006) pp. xi-xii for more on influence in “new scholarship” of nationalism and the final chapter for notes on translations into multiple languages (pp. 207-209).

In his work, Anderson (2006) explains the rise of nationalism in the eighteenth century as the consequence of the naissance of a mass network of written communication and what he terms “print capitalism” which ushered in the creation of the “imagined community” and also the paradoxical creation of the primordial “other” (p. 39).

At the outset of his exploration into the origins and implications of “nation-hood”, Anderson (2006) establishes a working definition of “nation” to address the challenge of analyzing what he notes as the “notoriously difficult” concepts of “nation”, “nationality”, and “nationalism” (p. 3). He describes “nation” as that of “an imagined political community ... [which is] both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). With this designation in place, he attempts to examine the historical construction and transformation of nations over time and seeks to comprehend “why these cultural artefacts have aroused such deep attachments” (Anderson, 2006, p. 4).

Central to his view of nationalism is the idea of “cultural creation” and “imagining” rather than “falsity” or “genuineness” since in his estimation “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined” (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). What is of consequence to Anderson therefore is not whether communities are “true” but more significantly the manner in which they are imagined and hence the way they are created. His description reveals a threefold concept of nation that is imagined as: 1. limited, 2. sovereign, and 3. community. In the first case, he states that as “even the largest of [nations] ... has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations”, none considers the inclusion of all humanity within its imagined boundaries (Anderson, 2006, p. 7). It is thus imagined as limited. His second premise holds that the nation is imagined as sovereign due to the economic and development changes which took

place during the period of the Enlightenment and Revolution. These transformations, especially those in the area of mass communications, replaced the need for face-to-face contact required to maintain power in religious and dynastic communities and challenged the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm which was eventually destroyed (see Anderson, 2006, pp. 7, 36).

The increase in mass literacy which resulted from the rise of print capitalism brought into question three widely-held beliefs that had previously ensured the authority of the ruling class: 1. the ability of “script-language” to provide “privileged access to ontological truth”; 2. the notion that society “was naturally organized” around divinely ordained hierarchical rulers; and 3. the temporal concept that the natural world and the world of humanity were identical (Anderson, 2006, p. 36). The growing uncertainty in these taken for granted truths, allowed for the necessary speculation to question authoritative powers and initiated the search for novel ways to connect with others. Anderson’s (2006) final assertion declares the nation as an “imagined community of related peoples” who share a great deal of love for one another despite the fact that unequal differences in treatment are realized in practice. It is this “deep, horizontal comradeship” which he believes has made it possible for so many people “not so much to kill, as to willingly die for such limited imaginings” (Anderson, 2006, p. 7).

2.2.1 Constructing National Identity

Like Anderson (2006), Wodak et al. (1999) identify the problematic nature of defining the concept of “nation”. They first attempt to clarify the meaning of nation in order to explore the discursive manner in which “national identity” is created (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 18). They cite two concepts of nation which originate from German theory, one political and the other cultural, and discuss the challenges and limitations that that each notion

presents. They define “*Staatsnation*” or “*Willensnation*” in political terms as the “nation by an act of will” (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 18; italics in the original); “*Kulturnation*” on the other hand, is explained in relation to culture “which is often linguistically defined and ethnically based” (Wodak et al., 1999, p.18; italics in the original). The contradictions in the theoretical terms of *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation* “have been the focus of social scientific and historical controversy” and bring to light the variance in perspective as to what constitutes the nation (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 19). A consideration of these varying perspectives enables for an examination of the underlying ideologies upon which each is posited.

Staatsnation allows for the inclusion of peoples from a diversity of ethnic backgrounds and is grounded in a unified body politic. Under this model, borrowed from Jürgen Habermas (1993), rights and obligations of the nation are to be shared by all citizens (Habermas, 1993 as cited in Wodak et al. 1999, p. 19).²³ The drawback of this model according to Wodak et al. (1999) is that it equates citizenry with national identity (p. 18). It therefore does not account for the fact that there may be many nations in one political state. Unlike advocates of *Staatsnation* who center their views on universalistic principles, *Kulturnation* theorists employ what they maintain are “objective criteria” such as “language, culture and territory” that reveal a common nation (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 9). Wodak et al. (1999) contend, however, that these supposed objective criteria upon which this theory rests are based on false notions of linguistic variables and borders (p. 19). As they note “the

²³ Other theorists who have contributed to the discussion on nation mentioned in Wodak et al. (1999) are: Bauböck (1991, p. 75), Ritcher (1994, pp. 312, 316), Uri Ram (1994, p. 153), John Rex (1995, p. 27) and Rudolf Burger (1994, p. 168) (as cited pp. 19, 20 respectively). Though these views are not dealt with at any length in this review, to reveal the complexity of undertaking to provide a clear definition of nation it is important to note the points on which these alternate perspectives concur. While each approach differs in its conception of the nation, all recognize the challenge of providing a definitive description of nation under the umbrella of either *Staatsnation* or *Kulturnation*. Simultaneously, all affirm the notion that national identity is separate and distinctive from other collective identities.

linguistic unity of a population can just as easily be the result of random intervention ... [while] ...state borders do not [necessarily] coincide with linguistic ones” (Wodak et al. 1999, p. 19). They propose instead an alternative notion of “culture” that is oppositional to that employed in the *Kulturation* framework. Their concept of culture is defined by standards of conduct that are understood “as a system of rules and principles for ‘proper’ behaviour, analogous to the grammar of a language, which sets the standards for ‘proper’ speaking [rather than by realizations of behaviour or cultural artifacts]” (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 20).

What is notable in these approaches to nation is their shared claim that the idea of nation is rooted in a collective construction of identity. As Wodak et al. (1999) assert following Burger (1994a), this “contrived” creation brings together the notion of a selective history for “identifiable” interests with an affective and mythologising purpose (Burger, 1994a, p. 18 as cited in Wodak et al. 1999, p. 20).

For Anderson (2006) the employment of linguistically emotive terms that associate “kinship” or “home” to nation reveals a profound human attachment to the nation of one’s birth (p. 143). As an unchosen invention he claims that there is a “natural” connection to nation-hood that is linked in a shared language. He argues that it is this “naturalness” that enables “nation-ness” to be absorbed into other unchosen categories such as “skin-colour, gender, parentage and birth-era” (2006, p. 143).²⁴ While his view recognizes and upholds nation-hood as an imagined creation, the comparison in this section of his text is problematic because it fails to consider the social construction of most of the other categories of naturalness to which nation-hood is compared. Instead, Anderson (2006) emphasizes the

²⁴ For more on Anderson’s (2006) view see “Patriotism and racism” (pp. 141-154).

appearance of the naturalness of nation-hood without sufficient consideration of the role of socialization in this creation.²⁵

Namely, what is possibly more significant in the comparative categories which Anderson (2006) lists, is not their naturalness or choice but the process of socialization that is connected to language which provides the motivation and impetus for the attachment to identity. According to Wodak et al. (1999), the development of attachment to national identity or the realization of nationhood results from the reification of constructed social norms and practices in the discourses of the nation. As they state:

If a nation is an imagined community and at the same time a mental construct, an imaginary complex of ideas containing at least the defining elements of collective unity and quality, of boundaries and autonomy, then this image is real to the extent that one is *convinced* of it, *believes* in it and *identifies* with it emotionally. The question of how this imaginary community reaches the minds of those who are convinced of it is easy to answer: it is *constructed and conveyed in discourse*, predominately in narratives of national culture. *National identity is thus the product of discourse*. (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 22; italics added)

The connection to national identity is therefore a process that is learned and reproduced through language. Without language there would be no attachment to national identity which is unlike the emotional relationship of attachment that develops with parentage. Parentage involves physical closeness and the provision of life's necessities as well as the affective bonds that are established through words. National identity is not natural but rather made to appear natural. It is given the illusion of naturalness (see Jackson 2005, p. 60). Indeed, the belief that there is a naturalness about the differences between people in relation to what in actuality are constructed differences may be at the heart of the paradox of nationalism.

²⁵ Though Anderson (2006) argues throughout his work that the nation is an imagined construct, what is troublesome in his argument in the chapter cited is his association with categories that are either not discussed as discursively constructed such as "skin-colour", "gender" and "birth-era" or for which he establishes a connection to the natural, i.e, not a socially constructed category, as with parentage.

Although nation like skin-colour reflects a lack of choice, what is more important is that nation is a socially constructed category of difference. Perceptions of nationhood based on language and/or religious distinctions often appear entangled within the contentious category of skin-colour which is further influenced by media-sized perspectives of current socio-political climates. A recent example of this is cited in the work of Ezra Yoo-Hyeok Lee (2007). In “Racism Masquerading as Nationalism: Wars, Japanese Americans, and Arab Americans”, Lee (2007) makes reference to several telling studies which reveal incongruities in the ideological construction of “whiteness” in relation to Arab Americans that are reflective of changes within the political environment of the U.S. (see Joseph, 1999; Samhan, 2006; Suleiman, 1999 as cited in Lee, 2007, p. 288). As Lee (2007) states, though Arab Americans were first regarded as “white”, they are now “considered to be more like Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans [Consequently, their] sense of belonging has started to fluctuate ... just as it did for Asian Americans due to the changed political situation in America” (p. 288). The link between “colour” and national identity therefore appears to mirror both individual and collective perceptions of national belonging.²⁶

2.2.2 Citizenship and Immigration

The legal category of citizenship further complicates the notion of who belongs to the nation as well as who is deemed deserving of the rights and protections afforded to nationals. In Jean McDonald’s (2007) study “Citizenship, Illegality, and Sanctuary” she discusses the intricate connection between citizenship, nationalism and racism. To do so she reflects upon

²⁶ Despite the fact that the formation of national identity is a social process, it is important to note that socialization does not exist outside of the individual. As Wodak et al. (1999) underscore, the role of the individual is integral for the internalization of common beliefs and opinions, attitudes and behavioural dispositions that result from social processes to create national identity. In this respect Wodak et al. (1999) take into account the dynamic role of the individual in society who is simultaneously a part of and an influence on the social processes including the discursive practices which form national identity. This point is also made by Jackson (2005).

the manner in which the practice of citizenship simultaneously includes and excludes and acts as a “marker of belonging within the community of the nation” (McDonald, 2007, p. 113). McDonald (2007) claims that the ability for governments to delay or even deny citizenship status and the resultant classification of people as illegal provides the foundation for their labeling as “other” and lays the groundwork for the creation of racialized peoples. As she states, “manifested through processes that include and exclude ... [citizenship] is a practice and a status, and becomes an indicator of the Othering necessary to the creation and the reproduction of the nation-state” (McDonald, 2007, p. 113). Since citizenship is granted along created nationalist premises, the interconnection between the exclusionary principles of citizenship and nationalism is central to the reasoning behind affording citizenship status. Nationalism thus enables a state to exclude based on perceptions of cultural difference and these perceptions according to Aiken (2007), Lee (2007), Li (2007), and McDonald (2007) are often founded along racialized lines.

McDonald (2007) contends that the relationship between racism and nationalism “is one of mutual conditioning rather than a perversion of nationalism” (p. 114). As such the ideologies of racism and nationalism reinforce each other and work in a relationship of consolidation. Those who appear more like “Canadian nationals”, for instance, are more likely to be granted citizenship than those who look less like the majority (McDonald, 2007, p.114). For McDonald (2007) “the ‘imagined nation’ [of Canada] has involved the production of differentiation, and stigmatization of Others; thus, nationalism and racism have become intertwined in discourses that racialise some individuals and groups” (p. 114). The ideas behind the construct of the imagined nation lie beneath the exclusionary measures of the state and result in the practice of racism within the legalized system of immigration.

In contrast to McDonald (2007), Anderson (2006) asserts that nationalism in itself does not lead to racist thought and practice but rather that racism is the result of the manipulation of nationalist discourse for the purposes of class division and the maintenance of power by an elite group. Though he believes a dilemma in nationalism exists, he claims that it rests not with the “popular vernacular nation” of the common people but with the “official nationalism” which originated from European colonialism. Considering vernacular nationalism as separate from, rather than associated to racism, Anderson (2006) maintains that it is erroneous to consider racism and antisemitism as derivative of nationalism (pp. 146, 148).²⁷ He instead asserts that nationalism leads to love and the production of cultural artifacts and rarely to fear and hatred (Anderson, 2006, pp. 141-142).

For Anderson (2006) the foundation for the creation of nationalism and racism is distinct since he argues that nationalism is rooted in history while racist thought and practice employs an ahistorical perspective that attempts to exist without any historical context. As he explains, “nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless sequence of loathsome copulations: outside history” (Anderson, 2006, p. 149). He cites the frequent occurrence of racism within nations as evidence that the hierarchical illusion of “race” is not a product of the nation and instead links the ideology of racism with class rather than nation (Anderson, 2006, pp. 149-150). Thus in contrast to the imagined nation of independent common people is the official nation defined and pursued by the threatened “Empire”. Anderson (2006) contends that “official nationalism was typically the response on the part of threatened dynastic and aristocratic groups -- upper *classes* -- to popular vernacular

²⁷ Anderson (2006) makes a case against Tom Nairn’s contention that nationalism results in racism and refers to the argument put forward by Nairn in *Break-up of Britain* (in Anderson, 2006, pp. 141, 148, especially).

nationalism” (2006, p. 150; italics in the original). According to this perspective, the Empire employed racist ideologies and practices to assume innate superior positions first within the domestic European realm and then in their quests for colonial expansion.²⁸

Interestingly, the similarities between McDonald (2007) and Anderson (2006) are as telling as their differences. Both McDonald (2007) and Anderson (2006) consider the significance of class in relation to racialized “othering”. Though McDonald (2007) proposes that in its basic form nationalism leads to exclusionary practices that cause certain groups to become racialized, she also notes the substantial role of class in this process:

Nationalist assumptions such as “assimilation” and “integration,” which have historically guided immigration policies, have conveniently allowed the entry of middle-to high-income white Europeans and Americans while becoming barriers to lower-to-middle-income people of colour from the global South as well as people from Eastern Europe. (p. 114)

The marked difference between her argument and that of Anderson (2006) is that she roots her analysis in a cultural theoretical framework while Anderson (2006) employs a class-based theoretical approach. As one aspect of created social hierarchies, it is undeniable that in certain instances class can play a fundamental role in racism and in some cases may be the sole cause for racist motives and actions. This literature review demonstrates, however, that class is not the only factor and at times does not at all center in racist thought and practice.²⁹

²⁸ As Anderson (2006) states: “[The Empire] did so [first] by generalizing a principle of innate, inherited superiority on which its own domestic position was (however shakily) based to the vastness of the overseas possessions, covertly (or not so covertly) conveying the idea that if, say, English lords were naturally superior to other Englishmen, no matter: these other Englishmen were no less superior to the subjected natives Second ... the colonial empire, with its rapidly expanding bureaucratic apparatus ... permitted sizeable numbers of bourgeois to play aristocrat off centre court, i.e., anywhere in the empire except at home” (p. 150).

²⁹ A brief discussion of the function of class and other social hierarchies is presented in the previous subsection, 2.1.1 on the theoretical explanations for the persistence of racism.

2.2.3 Multiple Identities: Challenges to Hybrid Models of National Identity

Whether as constructs of “national identity” or of “race”, all created notions of difference can be contested and transformed. As such it is possible to frame nationalism within an integrative multicultural discourse that permits openness rather than a closed imagined community of a dominant “white” nation. In Lee’s (2007) work on nationalism and racism, she presents Stratton and Ang’s (1998) argument in favour of a multicultural framework of unity (Stratton & Ang as cited in Lee, 2007, p. 281). Stratton and Ang (1998) assert that if the “ideal of national unity” is relinquished in favour of “the promise of a flexible, porous and open-ended culture”, multiculturalism as a national ideology is an achievable goal (Stratton & Ang, 1998, p. 135 as cited in Lee, 2007, p. 281). This perspective resonates in the theoretical configuration of multiple identities discussed in Wodak et al. (1999). Informed by the views of Pelinka (1995), and posited as a hybrid model for national identity, Wodak et al. (1999) suggest that “if one assumes that every identity inevitably involves inclusion and exclusion, then hybrid, multiple identities represent a potential corrective element which can counteract the practices of exclusion and differentiation” (Pelinka, 1995 as cited in Wodak, 1999, p. 17). This positive perspective seeks to construct the possibility of an imagined community of plurality. Nevertheless, it remains questionable if the contradictions between the creation of nationalism and multiculturalism are reconcilable. As Richter (1994, p. 316) contends in Wodak et al. (1999), it is doubtful whether a “‘nation of citizens’ as postulated in the writings of sociologists and political scientists ever existed, as even the ‘good’ nation of citizens needs its image of an enemy in order to conceive itself as a nation” (Richter, 1994 as cited in Wodak et al., 1999, p. 20; see also McDonald, 2007; Aiken, 2007).

Since the late 1970s and especially the latter part of the 1980s, Canada has arguably attempted to establish an inclusive political national identity in its multicultural framework. It was former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's intention, in the pursuit of national unity, to foster "respect for others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions.... [through a] vigorous policy of multiculturalism" (as cited in Kruger et al., 2004). Yet supposing this to be the case, the Canadian nation "is not completely immune to operating with ethnic-cultural symbols" and continues to create obstacles that prevent it from being truly inclusive (see reference to John Rex in Wodak et al., 1999, p. 20). Li (2007) reveals this inconsistency in the Canadian public's view of "race", culture and equality. As he states:

Many public opinion polls indicate that Canadians strongly endorse a policy of multiculturalism and an ideology of "racial" and ethnic equality ... Yet these same polls also indicate that people do not find it objectionable to express an opinion on the social desirability of immigrants and "racial" minorities based on superficial features, such as skin colour. Indeed, Canada seems to be confronted with two sets of values that on the surface are difficult to reconcile. On the one hand, there are strong values of democracy, justice, and equality, and yet on the other hand, "race" and "racial" differences remain meaningful and alive in the ideas, values, and ... normative system of Canada. (Li, 2007, p. 39)

In fact, perhaps the concept of multiculturalism as a model in which the dominant culture remains in political power and is thus able to classify those who belong or not, is "a form of racism in disguise" (Lee, 2007, p. 275). As such, the dominant culture is the measuring stick to which all other cultures must determine their sense of belonging. Despite this fact, while the balance of power between dominant and subordinate groups is unequal, the relationship is not unidirectional but dialectical and in this the potential for creative "resistance and agency [exists]" (Lee, 2007, p. 276).

However, as Lee (2007) notes, during the course of war when nationalism is especially used to mask racist undercurrents the possibility for empowered creative

opposition to racialized classifications is minimized (p. 275). It is at these times that “racism masquerading as nationalism exacerbates the physical and psychological alienation and rootlessness that ethnic minority groups -- in earlier times, Japanese Americans and now, Arab Americans -- have already been experiencing” (Lee, p. 276). The overwhelming feeling of powerlessness encountered by targeted groups which results from the exclusionary policies and practices in the discourse of national security thus limits their potential for active resistance.

2.2.4 Designating National (In)security: Protection for and from Whom

Similar to the contentious concepts of nation and national identity, “national security” is a complex and challenging notion. Mike Larsen’s (2006) dissertation analyzes official Canadian narratives on security post-September 11, 2001 and explores the dilemma faced in attempting to examine the ambiguous term of national security. Citing a range of approaches to national security from criminology, to legal and policy perspectives (e.g. Canada, Royal Commission on Security, 1969; Friedland, 1979; Kinsman et al., 2000; Rigakos, 2001; Weinberg et al., 2004 as cited in Larsen, 2006), Larsen (2006) observes that “critiques of national security policy by academic and civil libertarians have traditionally examined a facet of the concept, rather than the process as a whole” (p. 31). Larsen’s (2006) examination addresses the imprecise conception which comprises the two widely disputed notions of “national” and “security”. In his review of the literature, he reflects on the two concepts invoked in national security which taken together denote certain political assumptions. Larsen (2006) maintains that while “security” implies safety with respect to the modifier “national”, the concepts of “nation”, “state” and “nation-state” which are also implicated do

not refer to the same notion (p. 32).³⁰ Since the implied concepts entail quite distinct views, the employment of the term national security can be used to substantiate significantly disparate measures in relation to the protection of such.

Larsen (2006) notes the opposing understandings of the concept as it is conceived in academic and policy literature. The differences in meaning relate to the field of discourse since those who designate the definitions of the term (e.g., “policy maker” versus “legal scholar”), and the assumptions that underlie their descriptions are mirrored in their disparate definitions (e.g., “protection of the state” versus “increased privatization of police and greater surveillance”).³¹ The commonality that all definitions share is a perception of threat. It is important to note, however, that this threat is ever-changing and what once was presumed as dangerous may be replaced by another entity or force. As Larsen (2006) states:

As a concept, “national security” is consistently associated with “threats” in academic and policy discourses, although the nature of these threats is such that what is at one time considered to be existential peril to the security of the nation (communist

³⁰ Similar to the contrasting views on the concept of nation and national identity, positions on the nation/state divide are often at odds with each other. What complicates the matter further is that at times the terms are used interchangeably (see Jackson, 2005, p. 61). To illustrate this problem, Wodak et al. (1999) present conflicting approaches for the connection between nation and state. Some, like Peter Alter (1983; 1985) and Anthony D. Smith (1991), consider collective identity as the foundation for national identity based on shared ethnic-cultural histories which existed prior to the formation of states; others such as A. H. Richmond (1987) argue that nations and states must be distinguished from each other “because states can consist of several nations and nations can also be polyethnic” (Alter, 1983, 1985 ; Richmond, 1987; Smith, 1991 as cited in Wodak et al., 1999, p. 20). Michel Foucault (2007) defines a state as a practice that “is inseparable from the set of practices by which the state actually became a way of governing, a way of doing things, and a way too of relating to government” (p. 277). Accordingly, a state does not necessarily entail shared ethnicity or culture but rather involves a common system of governing practice. This review posits that while states comprise physical, geographical and territorial boundaries as well as political and legal principles, these may not be mirrored in national discourse. Though states may be inclusive of populations which consider themselves as distinct nations, it must be recognized that racialized groups who are “absent from national histories, marginalized within institutions, and disparaged in discourse” may be excluded from the created nation yet legally considered part of the state (Agnew, 2007, p. 237). In my study, I use the term “nation-state” to refer to the state of Canada as both a political entity and as an entity that attempts to establish a particular national consciousness.

³¹ For a succinct discussion on the reasons given for national security measures and changes in policies see Larsen, 2006. pp. 25-40.

subversion, for example) is later overlooked in favor of new forms of danger. The designation of a group or movement as a threat to national security therefore appears to be based on a historically contextualized and political assessment of its status, as opposed to exclusively objective criteria. (pp. 25, 26)

Reinforcing the view proposed by Larsen (2006), Aiken (2007) and Charles C. Smith (2007) consider how the discourse of national security threat has changed over time and further link Canada's national security policies to racist practices which limit the intake of people from "non-white" nations (see Aiken, 2007, pp. 91-96; Smith, 2007, pp. 251-255). Smith (2007) contends that "historically, 'national security' has served as a useful tool of immigration control, a 'shield for white Canada's fear that foreign Others were corrupting the nations' 'racial purity' and 'political fabric'" (see Aiken, 2001 as cited in Smith, 2007, p. 252).

While national security measures currently do not openly endorse racial discrimination, the discretion of legal administrators reveals that certain groups are targeted based on perceived "race" differences (Aiken, 2007, p. 91). The laws on national security appear "race neutral" but in practice there is evidence of systemic racism. As Aiken (2007) states:

Well before September 11, the Canadian Council for Refugees had documented the extent to which certain refugee communities seemed to be particularly targeted under immigration security provisions, including Iranians associated with the Mujahedin-E-Khalq movement, Kurds, Sri Lankan Tamils, Sikhs, Algerians, and Palestinians, while other groups were not subjected to the same levels of security scrutiny. (p. 92)

Systemic discrimination relies on the use of stereotypes to label people as potential threats. This technique known as profiling, although officially denied, is commonly practiced in the creation of categories of physical attributes and behavioural patterns for scrutiny by security agents.³²

³² Larsen (2006) cites for example the following from the International Association of Chiefs of Police Training Key no. 581 which instructs officers to look for these characteristics which are associated with suicide bombers:

A brief reflection on the reasoning behind which groups have been labeled as “national security” threats over time demonstrates the significance of the political environment in designating who is a potential threat.³³ According to Larsen (2006) each group is labeled as “other” for what is determined to be a heightened likelihood of deviant behaviour that results from character traits (p. 36). Citing a 1969 Report of the Royal Commission on Security, Larsen (2006) explains how during the Cold War period homosexuals were defined as potential threats especially if they were “employed in the public service, due to the belief that their character...[made] them ‘more readily compromised than non-deviate persons’” (as cited in Larsen 2006, p. 36). Prior to this, during the Second World War Japanese Canadians in Canada were identified as enemy aliens. In addition to the fact that over half of this targeted population was born in Canada, what is especially noteworthy about their classification as enemies of the state is that they were not considered as a threat to national security by the military but were transformed into such by legal definitions.³⁴ In the following, William E. Conklin (1996) raises important questions concerning the fruition of this racialized practice:

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- A fresh shave -- a male with a fresh shave and lighter skin on his lower face may be a religious Muslim zealot who has just shaved his beard so as not to attract attention, and blend in better with other people in the vicinity.
 - A hand in the pocket or tightly gripping something -- this could be someone clutching a detonator or a trigger for an explosive device
 - Evasive movements. It seems obvious that anyone who tries to avoid eye contact, or to evade security cameras and guards, or who appears to be surreptitiously conducting surveillance of a possible target location, may be a bomber. (as cited in Larsen, 2006, p. 37)

³³ For a discussion on this, see Aiken, 2007; Jackson, 2005, p. 60; Larsen 2006; Smith, 2007.

³⁴ Conklin (1996) cites a number of Parliamentary speeches, Orders-in-Council, Police staff communiqués and meeting minutes to examine the lack of evidence against those of Japanese ancestry in Canada regarded to be threats to national security. As he notes: “The documentary evidence suggests that the reason for the ... [forceable evacuation and re-location program] was unrelated to military service. Indeed, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army stated before the dispersal program that ‘from the Army point of view, I cannot see that ... [people of the Japanese race] constitute the slightest menace to national security.’ The Federal Police reported that an internment, let alone the massive relocation, was unnecessary, since the few persons who were likely

The issue, then, is how did the juridical agents of the state picture the categorized persons so as to consider their internment and deportation valid and authoritative? Why do the judgements of the courts at all levels read as if the exile of Canadian citizens were natural, inevitable, reasonable and authoritative? Why do the judgements read as if the judges had no choice but to sustain the classification of living beings as “persons of the Japanese race”, with all the consequences for their experiences that the classification entailed? How is it possible that the highest courts in one of the most rights conscious legal cultures in industrialized states would validate acts, which in hindsight, suggest the germ of familiar scenes today? Were the lawyers and judges just plain out-and-out racists whose judgements may be discarded as an aberration of rights conscious legal culture? Or is there something special about a legal discourse, independent of race, which makes the internment on grounds of race seem a natural aspect of legal reasoning? (pp. 231-232)

In putting forth these fundamental questions, Conklin (1996) offers an important critical perspective on the possibility that legal discourse in itself may permit and justify the employment of racist practices more than the manner in which law is interpreted and by whom.

The uncertainty that troubles Conklin (1996) is also present in Aiken’s (2007) view of immigration law. While Aiken (2007) recognizes the legal achievements made in courts and believes that judicial appointments should better reflect the diversity of society, she regards the potential within the legal system for these much-needed changes as limited. She also considers the possibility for any substantive change through the channels of Parliamentary politics as unlikely (Aiken, 2007, p. 63). According to Aiken (2007), “[litigation strategies] have been ineffective in attacking the embedded discriminatory premises of immigration law and utterly impotent in addressing the deeper roots of inequality in society” (pp. 63, 64). Indeed, she contends that immigration law purposely excludes people since immigration is deemed a privilege rather than a right. Thus “immigration regulation becomes a means of inclusion and exclusion, of differentiating who may belong to the nation and who is

to commit subversion had been interned prior to the War. There was no evidence presented at Cabinet meetings that Japan intended to invade Canadian soil” (p. 230).

‘alien’”(Aiken, 2007, p. 57). Even after “legalized” entry into the country, limitations to the rights afforded to immigrants as “non-citizens” carry on so that they can be subject to criminal and security measures that do not apply to Canadian citizens.³⁵

Wodak et al. (1999) place particular importance on the impact of discursive practice in the construction of national identity and its influence on the manner in which legal practices are realized. They state that although laws regulate practices of inclusion and exclusion what is realized on the ground may be quite disparate from law itself. They assert that “as a special form of social practice ... some of the discursive practices of ‘national identity’.... condense into laws which regulate the social practices of inclusion and exclusion of individuals in the form of fixed institutional discursive practices” (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 30). Yet they note that “these legally prescribed practices do not always coincide with the practices actually realized ... [which] both as actions and as discursive acts, may deviate in either negative or positive ways from the laws” (Wodak et al., 1999, pp. 29-30).

Though a change in law and legal discourse has transformed “explicitly racist” language and practice into “less obvious systemic forms” of discrimination, racism continues to persist (Aiken, 2007, p. 57). According to Aiken (2007), the link between racism and immigration policies and practices is likely to come as a surprise to many Canadian citizens who cling tightly to the myth of Canadian national identity which considers Canada “as an egalitarian, pluralist society free from the scourge of racism that exists in the United States and throughout most Western societies” (p. 57). The failure to recognize the various manifestations of racist discourse in Canadian society is evident in the public opinion polls

³⁵ This is the case with the current security certificate legislation as all non-citizens, including permanent residents are subject to these measures.

cited by Li (2007).³⁶ Given these perspectives, it is likely that many Canadians would not consider the negative shift in views of immigrants in the post-September 11, 2001 context noted by Kruger et al. (2004) as racist. For Li (2007) the discursive processes that enable groups to be labeled as racialized “others” who possibly pose a “national security” threat and the simultaneous belief that racism is non-existent may be located within the various levels of “encoded” national discourse (p. 42).

Li (2007) identifies how the discourse of “race” is concealed within the texts of societies considered to be democratic which advance a human rights agenda. To begin he defines “[‘racial discourse’] as the adoption of a language form that uses encoded concepts, hidden subtexts, and a coherent syntax that, taken together, provide a logical apparatus for individuals to signify ‘race’ and ‘racial’ differences without having to abandon the democratic principles of equality and justice”(Li, 2007, p. 42). He maintains that people can feel at ease as racial discourse enables people to “articulate ‘race’ comfortably ... without contravening the principle of equality and justice” central to democratic societies (Li, 2007, p. 42). Since racial discourse provides the discursive structure that normalizes discussions of “race”, it “becomes an integral part of the normative structure of [nations such as Canada]” and influences the common understanding that provides for individual actions (Li, 2007, p. 42). Li (2007) contends that it is this structure which “supplies concrete meanings for ‘race’ and sustains its social import, without tarnishing the image of Canada as an open and tolerant society” (p. 42).

Jackson (2005) examines the link between normalized “othering” discourse and the legislation of national security measures in greater depth. In his study, he examines the

³⁶ As previously noted in sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.3, Li (2007) cites numerous public opinion polls that reveal normative inconsistencies in the way Canadians endorse multicultural policies on the one hand and express racist attitudes toward new/applying immigrants and refugees on the other (pp. 39-41).

fundamental interconnection between the language and practice of counter-terrorism which “co-constitutes social and political reality” and observes that “apart from some notable exceptions” little research currently exists in the study of counter-terrorism discourse (Jackson, 2005, p. 9). His work, which attempts to “fill this gap through a systematic and critical analysis of the main features and aspects of the language of the ‘war on terrorism’”, is motivated in part by the lack of analysis available (Jackson, 2005, p. 9). He begins with a brief overview of the practice and institutionalization of the “war on terrorism” in international relations and American domestic life. Throughout his study, he considers the linguistic and rhetorical manifestations in the discourse on the “war on terror” and provides an explanation for the import of discourse analysis necessary to achieve a comprehensive understanding of political events for which he offers an applied CDA approach.

Similar to Lee (2007), Jackson (2005) claims that at times of war (or for purposes of national security) the language of national identity is used to create an excluded “other” who is demonized so that the policies and practices implemented which would likely be considered unjust for “nationals” are accepted as necessary protective measures against a vilified “other”. This discursive process is employed to legitimize limitations to legal rights and further justify human rights abuses that might otherwise be contested by the public. Accordingly, Jackson (2005) posits that the social construction of war and counter-terrorist measures necessitates language that renders the “other” inhuman:

The social construction of war requires a unique kind of “othering” process ... because intensive political violence is actually very difficult to sustain otherwise Constructing a large-scale project of political violence such as global counter-terrorist war requires an extremely powerful process of demonisation and dehumanization to overcome the natural reticence over the destruction of human life for political reasons. ... For both soldiers and wider society the common everyday language of human recognition and respect has to be replaced by the language of hate and fear; perceptions and emotions have to be profoundly altered so ordinary people can more

easily countenance the deliberate infliction of suffering. There is no better way to achieve this than by replacing the language they ordinarily use with a new language of hate and fear based on powerful categories of identity: them and us, citizen and foreigner, civilized and savage, terrorist and soldier. (pp. 59-60)

In a similar manner, Kruger et al. (2004) describe how the process of vilifying “others” occurs in official government discourse that relates particular foreign nationals to terrorist networks.³⁷ While definitions of foreign nationals as terrorists are not explicitly made, Kruger et al. (2004) contend that particular instantiations of governmental discourse draw parallels between those who are not Canadian citizens and their likelihood to be threats to national security:³⁸

The association of foreign national and terrorist allows the terrorist threat to become an imported problem, encouraging a security-driven, regulatory mentality that seeks to prevent and deter outsiders from entering Canada. Both rationales of terrorist prevention and deterrence depend on the fundamental notion of inadmissibility. (p. 78)

The problems of exclusion and inclusion as well as ambiguity that are associated with defining nation and national security also emerge in the theoretical discussions on “terrorism”. Beril Dedeoglu’s (2003) study posits that the dilemma regarding the legal definitions of terrorism arises not from the establishment of a definition on the international level, but rather as a result of whom and what is considered to be a “terrorist” and hence who is defined as a threat under legal measures. Dedeoglu (2003) claims that while it is theoretically viable for nation-states and international bodies to ascribe certain actions as acts

³⁷ Kruger et al. (2004) quote Martin Rudner, a professor at Carleton’s NPSIA who has consulted and lectured on security and counter-terrorism issues to various departments and agencies of the Government of Canada, as saying that Canada’s immigration policy has led to “the presence of large, identifiable homeland communities from societies in conflict, [which have] created a distinctly attractive arena for international terrorist networks” (p. 78).

³⁸ As Krueger et al. (2004) write, “Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness reinforces ... the idea [of equating terrorists with foreign nationals] by stating that, ‘the best way to stop terrorists from entering Canada is to stop them before they get here’ and that ‘many of the real and direct threats to Canada originate from far beyond our borders’” (pp. 78-79).

of terrorism, the difficulty and what he considers the paradox of this situation is in the attempt to define terrorists and terrorist organizations which are a “subject of law” (p. 82). Although definitions of terrorism have existed for some time, Dedeoglu (2003) maintains that the development of the descriptive categorization of terrorist and terrorist organization by state entities really emerged following September 11, 2001 (p. 81). The accepted definition of terrorism according to Dedeoglu (2003) relates to how a state defines its enemies and the legal measures it takes to protect itself from terrorist threat. Since definitions of terrorists do not lead to legal penalization, he contends that enemy lists were drafted to label particular persons and/or organizations as terrorist (Dedeoglu, 2003, p. 93).

To consider the disparities in global views of who is perceived as a terrorist threat, Dedeoglu (2003) compares the classification of terrorist groups by the United States with those identified as such by the European Union and other international bodies such as the United Nations. More than half of the entities listed by the United States are of Arab-Middle Eastern origin, unlike the more diverse range of groups named by other world organizations (Dedeoglu, 2003, p. 93). This being the case, Dedeoglu (2003) argues that “the main enemy of the United States is [identified as] ‘Islamic terrorism’, and the international system proposed by either the persons or the organizations in question is definitely rejected by the United States” (p. 93). Like the United States, Canada’s “enemy list” is centered on Arab-Middle Eastern organizations.³⁹ As such, the process of racialization which includes categorized attributions of “race”, religion, and cultural beliefs to an “other” facilitates the construction and identification of an enemy threat.

³⁹ Out of 39 “terrorist” entities currently listed, 26 are Arab-Middle Eastern (see *Canada Gazette* at <http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partII/2006/20061129/html/si133-e.html>. Retrieved online on June 6, 2008).

The problematic nature of employing the term terrorism in law and policy documents is echoed in the studies of Smith (2007) and Aiken (2007). Smith (2007) maintains that the “overly broad and vague definition of terrorism [causes confusion that negatively impacts people in Canada and Canadian charitable organizations]” (p. 254).⁴⁰ In a similar vein, Aiken (2007) notes the detrimental effect of the ambiguity of terrorist definitions on immigrants and refugees. She states that under the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)* prospective immigrants and refugee claimants may be deemed “inadmissible” if it is believed that “they will ‘engage in terrorism’ or are ‘members’ of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe will ...engage in terrorism” (Aiken, 2007, p. 92). Given that the categories of terrorism and membership remain without a legal definition the decision to refuse entry to non-citizens is left up to the discretion of immigration officers and judges. This is also true for those who have been permitted to enter but are subsequently deemed subject to removal once the immigration procedures have concluded or should a “security

⁴⁰ Smith (2007) contends that the ambiguity of the term enables the government through the *Charities Registration Security Act* to remove charitable status from certain organizations deemed as terrorist (p. 254). It further allows those who participate in these organizations or those who donate to them to be considered as terrorist threats. The following excerpt from the Canadian government’s Public Safety website further illustrates the confusion and ambiguity of terrorism and terrorist groups:

The listing of an entity is a very public means of identifying a group or individual as being associated with terrorism. The definition of an entity includes a person, group, trust, partnership or fund, or an unincorporated association or organization. The *Anti-Terrorism Act* provides measures for the Government of Canada to create a list of entities.

It is not a crime to be listed. However, one of the consequences of being listed is that the entity’s property can be the subject of seizure/restraint and/or forfeiture. In addition, institutions such as banks, brokerages, etc are subject to reporting requirements with respect to an entity’s property and must not allow those entities to access the property nor may these institutions deal or otherwise dispose of the property. *It is an offence* to knowingly participate in or contribute to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group. This participation is only an offence if its purpose is to enhance the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity. (Retrieved online at <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-en.asp> on June 6, 2008; italics added) According to this information, while it is not a crime to be listed, it is a crime to be involved for the purposes of terrorism, i.e., “knowingly participate in or contribute to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group ... if its purpose is to enhance the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity”.

certificate” be issued (Aiken, 2007, p. 92). The ability to decide who can enter and who can remain is therefore left in the hands and to the judgement of a very few.

Stanley Cohen’s (2001) study on terrorism and state actions further challenges the notion that nation-states can legally determine categories of terrorists. He argues that to ascribe certain persons and organizations as terrorist excludes nation-states from the concept of terrorism since it is nation-states that create and implement law. Who and what is not included in the definition of terrorism is thus essential for an understanding of the intent behind the labels. Official government discourse necessarily excludes itself from this definition while nation-states as previously mentioned rely upon the exclusion of “others” to assert their identity and to create a threat.

Jackson (2005) also notes the inculpability of the nation-state in defining a terrorist threat. He claims that “the language of identity” is carefully construed and employed to “fulfill a number of specific political functions” (Jackson, 2005, p. 8). Primarily, it is designed to establish a “moral purpose” and “justify the use of counter-violence” through the manipulation of public opinion for the acceptance of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of prisoners as well as the massacres of thousands of foreign fighters (Jackson, 2005, p. 89). The linguistic application of the terrorist label thus removes the humanity of the people categorized as such and permits their exclusion from nation-state protections (see Jackson, 2005, p. 89).

This brief consideration of nation, national identity, national security, and terrorism clearly illustrates the complex entanglement of these concepts. Language is the principal element in the creation of these constructs which are fundamental to the idea of nationalism, the subsequent categorizations of belonging as well as in the labeling of enemy threats.

Though other signs play a considerable role in the formation of the nation, such as visual symbols of flags and maps amongst others, it is through discourse that the idea of nation is transferred; indeed, without language the notion of nation could not exist (see Wodak et al., 1999 in section 2.2.1). Anderson (2006) emphasizes the significance of written signs in the creation of the nation and acknowledges the crucial function of discourse in these “imagined communities [which are] conceived in language, not in blood” (p. 145). Language not only permits but is used to justify the concurrent processes of inclusive and exclusive divisiveness required in the social construction of all concepts related to the nation. As Anderson (2006) states, “seen as both a *historical* fatality and as a community imagined through language, the nation presents itself as simultaneously open and closed” (p.146; italics in the original). Since it is impossible to encompass all peoples within one nation, it is necessarily both exclusionary and inclusionary (see Anderson, 2006, p. 7). Nevertheless nations, especially democratic nations, want to perceive themselves in a positive manner even while excluding others and potentially putting them in danger as is the case in the denial of their right to due process or in their deportation to nations where they risk torture or possibly death.

To investigate the rationalization behind this legal and political exclusion and the subsequent normalization of the denial of rights requires an analysis of national security discourse that can reveal why at different historical periods certain groups are refused the rights afforded to others and how this practice is legitimized through language. Since the frequently racialized classification of people as national security threats and the manner in which they are discursively constructed as such changes over time, a reflection of the discursive and non-discursive manifestation of racism in national security discourse requires

a consideration of past policies, legislation and practices. Wodak and Reisigl's (2003; also in Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) discourse analytical approach provides a framework for this historical overview. Before discussing their approach it is first appropriate to look at van Dijk's (1993, 2001) discourse analytical approach to racism as his concepts and categories are central to many CDA studies (e.g., Henry & Tator, 2002; Karim, 1997) including that provided in the analytical framework of Wodak and Reisigl (2003).

2.2.5 Discourse-Analytical Approaches to Uncovering Racism

Van Dijk's (1993) overall aim in his research on racism and political discourse⁴¹ is to contribute to the understanding of "the discursive reproduction of racism" and to offer a general overview of the "political context of these reproduction processes in other domains" (p. 49). Although he recognizes that popular discourse effects as well as reflects "elite" forms of discourse, such as political, media, academic, and business discourse, his primary interest lies in the dialectical process between elite institutions. He claims that while everyday, common discourse and that of the elite are linked, the impact and process of influence of each discourse "is predominately top-down" (van Dijk, 1993, p. 50).

To comparatively examine the prevalence and manifestation of racism in Western democracies, van Dijk (1993) analyzes the elite political discourse of selected parliamentary debates on immigration, refugee and ethnic issues in the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands (p. 63). From a 1980s corpus he investigates a qualitative

⁴¹ Please note that while in conducting my research I looked at a number of van Dijk's (1984, 1993, 2001, 2003, 2006) writings, his work on "elite racism" (1993) is the most appropriate for my review of the literature as it concerns racism and discourse. In my methodology section, however, I refer to van Dijk's (2001) work "Multidisciplinary CDA: a plea for diversity" as it provides a clear method of macro and micro analysis which I utilize in my study. His chapter on "Critical discourse analysis" (2003) explains CDA more broadly and gives examples of the types of research that is analyzed using a CDA approach, whereas his later study (2006) explores the use of manipulation and persuasion in political discourse and provides an analysis of a Tony Blair speech on the need for UK participation on the US lead war on Iraq.

selection of parliamentary debates “that more or less explicitly deal with attributed properties of immigrants or resident minorities, as well as discrimination, racism, and general policies and principles of political action regarding immigration and minority affairs” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 63). Although van Dijk’s (1993) methods for data selection are not quantitatively representative, he maintains that his aim is not to consider how often “derogatory remarks about minorities or immigrants” occur but rather to qualitatively analyze what is said in relation to these comments. His goal therefore is to analyze the manner in which these comments are discursively expressed either explicitly or implicitly as well as to provide a model for the analysis of racism in the political discourse of democratic nation-states (van Dijk, 1993, p. 64). The primary concern of his study, however, rests with the expression of less obvious or hidden forms of racism in Western democratic nations rather than overt articulations that are common amongst the right-wing, especially in European countries.⁴² Still, van Dijk (1993) believes that the extreme views of the right wing play an important role in the positions of other parties. He claims that the not so acceptable racist expressions of the right-wing are transformed via “more palatable language” into what are in essence “the same policies”(van Dijk, 1993, p. 61). Thus he locates the fundamental role that language plays in re-shaping the less acceptable views of the right-wing into more agreeable forms.

According to van Dijk (1993), while these debates are spoken, they “generally do not have the properties of spontaneous ongoing talk, such as hesitations, false starts, repairs, repetition, ungrammatical sentences, simplified syntax, lack of local coherence, and so on” (p. 66). In most cases the “talk” is read from prepared statements with some possible “spontaneous deviations”(van Dijk, 1993, p. 66). As parliamentarians understand fully that

⁴² Van Dijk (1993) provides a number of examples of right-wing parties in European countries such as Belgium with the Flemish Block, France with Le Pen’s Front National, as well as in Denmark, and Germany (see pp. 60-62).

their talk will be recorded and that they bear official responsibility for the statements they utter as well as the positions they take, “there is generally no question of spontaneous ‘errors’ when delegates talk about ethnic affairs ...” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 66; according to van Dijk this is also noted in Wodak, Nowak, Pelikan, Gruber, De Cillia, & Mitten, 1990). Consequently his analysis reflects the nature of the discourse of parliamentary debates as planned and fixed and hence focuses on the intent of the statements made.

Van Dijk (1993) posits that there is a biased tendency to believe that politicians are racist rather than to trust claims that the statements made by the political elite have been misinterpreted and decontextualized so as to appear racist (p. 64). Since particularized statements of all individuals require context specificity for interpretation, the propensity to focus on decontextualized claims and assertions in the examination of racism in political discourse may therefore allow for a greater level of bias (van Dijk, 1993, p. 65). To contend with this inclination toward bias in his research, van Dijk (1993) focuses on “the social system, processes, activities, and cognitions involved in the reproduction ... [of racist discourse instead of the racist comments made by individuals]” (p.65). Thus his research investigates the persuasive techniques and rhetorical argumentation strategies and style of the “text and talk” of the selected passages instead of the racist statements made by individuals (van Dijk, 1993, p. 64). He uses the criterion of consistency to distinguish between what he terms “face-keeping” statements and “true anti-racist” claims about minorities and ethnic relations (van Dijk, 1993, p. 65). Accordingly, van Dijk considers statements in the debates as true anti-racist assertions if the language used is consistent with the policies of the party in question. On the other hand, if they are not reflective of “both contextual and textual

structures” they are considered as part of face-keeping measures that are employed so as not to appear racist (van Dijk, 1993, p. 65).

To validate his research findings van Dijk (1993) makes an effort to compare his study with previous research. He notes that his analysis is limited in this respect however, due to the lack of scholarly research available on ethnic affairs (van Dijk, 1993, p. 66). Despite the near absence of data on this topic, he identifies a crucial study by Reeves (1983) “who studied the ‘racialization’ and deracialization’ of British political discourse on ethnic affairs” (Reeves, 1983 as cited in van Dijk, 1993, p. 66). Van Dijk (1993) summarizes the thematic arguments and rhetorical forms proposed in the work of Reeves (1983), and further demonstrates that many of the themes are central to current practices which attempt to legitimate restrictions to immigration (p. 67).

Van Dijk’s (1993) findings reveal that the persuasive techniques as well as the topics on ethnic affairs remain, in a “rather stereotypical” manner, largely the same in the selected parliamentary debates of the various countries assessed (p. 71). In his investigation of the methods utilized to sway opinion he identifies five discursive and social cognitive strategic patterns that fall under two major themes of positive “self”-- and negative “other”-- presentation (van Dijk, 1993, p. 71). While van Dijk (1993) does not attempt to establish a definitive classification system for each strategic concept and prefers to present them as interconnected, he distinguishes the subsequent “major argumentative [strategies] and semantic moves and rhetorical ploys” generally drawn upon in the debates as: 1. “nationalist rhetoric”, 2. “disclaimers and denials of racism”; 3. “white” racism; 4. the “numbers game”; and 5. “anti-racism and resistance” (pp. 71-112).⁴³

⁴³ The first two strategic persuasive techniques are most relevant to this study. As such, I do not detail the other three in my text but provide a brief summary here: The strategy of “white” racism

Van Dijk (1993) first illustrates how linguistic choices at the single-word level are used to invoke nationalistic rhetoric. Through the use of adjectives such as “humane”, “benevolent”, “hospitable”, “tolerant”, and “modern” comparisons with other countries are made to present a positive “self” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 72). Nouns like “responsibility”, on the other hand, are used to disguise blame placed on minorities and/or immigrants who might face discriminatory obstacles to finding employment. As a case in point, van Dijk (1993) recounts the language used in a debate about a new minority policy in the Netherlands where the then Dutch Prime Minister “argues for a ‘less soft’ minority policy, which should stimulate minorities to take ‘more responsibility’ in finding jobs” (p. 73). This statement places the full responsibility for lack of employment on those belonging to minority groups (i.e., “minorities ... [should] take more responsibility”) when jobs may not exist and in doing so simultaneously dismisses the possibility that racism plays a part in their inability to find work. This is not to say that adjectives are always used to present a “positive face” while nouns present a negative “other”. Indeed, the subtle or indirect use of adjectival terms or what van Dijk (1993) calls “buzz-words” that need little interpretation such as “oversensitive”, “underachieving” or “too-demanding” often replace “blatant derogatory labels” and attribute “oversensitiveness to others” so as deny one’s own racism (p. 84).

involves claims that “ordinary people” (i.e., “white” people) are discriminated against by policies meant to ensure fairness and equality such as Affirmative Action programs in the U.S. This negative “other” strategy often makes use of the term “reverse-racism” (see van Dijk, 1993, pp. 99-107). The “numbers game” also concerns a negative presentation of the “other”; however, in this case the strategy is related solely to immigration. As van Dijk (1993) states, “the ... rhetorical use of quasi-objective figures, convincingly suggesting how many [immigrants and refugees] ‘come in’ every day, week, month or year, is one of the most compelling scare tactics in the formation of public opinion” (p. 107; also see pp. 107-109). The strategy of “anti-racism and resistance”, on the other hand, concerns the use of tactics by more left-leaning or liberal parties which are according to van Dijk (1993) “primarily political... and not just, or not primarily [formulated] as moral or ideological opposition against everyday political racism of the Right” (p. 109).

Van Dijk (1993) maintains that all nations attempt to present a positive image of themselves as exemplars of freedom, democracy and tolerance in relation to immigration policies and civil rights (p. 77). In his section on “disclaimers and denials of racism”, he highlights the significance of the context of utterances in sustaining this presentation. He asserts that an examination of the context of the language event is necessary “to understand the broader ideological, sociopolitical, and local argumentative function [of nationalist rhetoric]” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 77). The desire to validate with “positive self-presentation”, according to van Dijk (1993), may be a manifestation of guilt and/or the awareness of inconsistency between policies and norms and values of the nation (p. 77). Every and Augoustinos (2007) support this contention in their research on racism as “talk-about-the-nation” (pp. 424-426). In Every and Augoustinos’ (2007) recent study they refer to the work of several researchers who maintain that a “discourse of the nation” is often employed to legitimate opposition to minority group, immigration and refugee claims of unfair limitations to rights and liberties (p. 424). For example, the findings of Wetherell and Potter (1992) cited by Every and Augoustinos (2007), show how “white New Zealanders used the repertoire of ‘we are all New Zealanders’ to position Maori calls for land rights as divisive and unwarranted, and to present their opposition to these land rights as ‘not racist’ but patriotic” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992 as cited in Every & Augoustinos, 2007, p. 424). This process involves negative depiction of those that “white New Zealanders” wish to exclude (ie., the Indigenous Maori population) and the concurrent positive presentation of the included “self”(i.e., “as patriotic”).

Whatever the motivation to sustain policies that are in direct contradiction to the positive image put forward, nations rely on the politics of “othering” to enable them to create

categories of people for which these values and rights do not apply. The criterion used to determine who to “other” is not based on impartial decision-making but rather depends on institutionalized state objectives that are enacted through individuals as representatives of the state (van Dijk, 1993, p. 80). For instance, the objective of the nation-state in relation to immigration, which is unlikely to be openly expressed, may be to maintain a preferred “white” population. Categories such as “skilled workers” make immigration difficult for those who desire to emigrate from impoverished non-white nations.⁴⁴ When these controls are actualized, immigration officers have the discretionary power to remove whomever they wish from the list without need for explanation. Since it may not be acceptable to state racist desires outright, van Dijk (1993) asserts that policies may be implemented under the ideologically Eurocentric guise of “reasonable and rational” immigration practices (p. 80). Accordingly, as noted above, categories of exclusion are discursively constructed and rely on reproducing stereotypes to present the “other” as negative while simultaneously presenting the nation as “tolerant”, “reasonable and rational, and “tough but fair” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 80;

⁴⁴ The recent changes to immigration measures in Canada with Bill C-50 are a working example of “othering” based on nation-state objectives. Concealed within Bill C-50, the budget bill, the Harper Conservative government introduced a series of amendments to the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* passed in early June 2008 that went forward without any proposition before Parliament (see *CBC* online June 9, 2008, “Tories survive another confidence vote, MPs vote in favour of Bill C-50”, and “Tory budget passes with help from Liberals” by David Akin in *National Post* online June 9, 2008. Retrieved on June 10, 2008 respectively from <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/06/09/immigration-vote.html>, and <http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=575441>).

New discretionary powers permit the Minister and her department to reject visitor visa, residency and refugee applications without any court review. The Minister also has the power to issue quotas and restrictions on the category (including Family Class and Economic Class immigrants) and *country of origin* (see *Pacific free Press* online May 21, 2008, “Bill C-50: Canada’s ‘Back-Door’ Immigration Changes”. Retrieved on June 10, 2008 from <http://pacificfreepress.com/content/view/2630/81/>; italics added). The federal government’s rationale for Bill C50 is that it will assist in ridding the backlogged system of long waiting lists through better immigration bureaucratic controls while “matching Canada’s labour market needs with immigrants’ skills and potential”. (See “Dissenting opinion of the conservative members of the citizenship and immigration committee” in the letter from the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration to M.P. Rob Merrifield in regard to Bill C-50 dated May 15, 2008. Retrieved on June 10, 2008 from http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/392/cimm/webdoc/wd3507808/392_CIMM_C50/392_CIMM_C50-e.pdf).

see also Every & Augoustinos, 2007). Immigration and refugee policies and legislation thus enable “us” to decide who comes over to visit and for how long as well as determines who may stay while those who desire entrance have to be grateful for our “firm but fair” rules including measures which could lead to their exclusion. In this “for their own good” setting which is normalized in the national discourse on immigration and refugee policy, it is believed that those who apply to enter the country should be grateful for being denied beforehand (Every & Augoustinos, 2007, p. 421; van Dijk 1993, pp. 95, 97).

In a similar way, the discourse of national safety and security in Canada can be said to normalize the classification of those determined to pose a threat to national security as well as to the subsequent limitations to their legal rights which consequently appear not to undermine “the [Canadian] principles of equality, justice, and fairness” (Li, 2007, p. 52). As van Dijk (1993) aptly states:

Positive self-presentation, face-keeping, keeping up appearances, and related strategies of impression formation in ethnic affairs discourse not only emphasize our positive properties but also, and even more emphatically, deny, conceal, play down, excuse, or otherwise mitigate our negative ones, according to the standard formula: “We are not racist, *but ...*”. (van Dijk, 1993, p. 81; italics in the original)

In order to minimize objections to racist practices and policies or those that might be considered as such, van Dijk (1993) further notes that there are few changes within the law “to keep the others, such as the opposition as well as the people from the ‘outside,’ from seriously objecting to them” (p. 81). Through these examples van Dijk (1993) demonstrates how seemingly innocuous language or language that expresses “civic virtues” (e.g., tolerant), “self-glorification” (benevolent), and the notions of “values” and “freedom” can be employed for exclusionary purposes that permit racialized practices to subsist.

From this discussion, it is evident that the multifaceted reproduction of racist discourse “is a complex process” that requires more than a simple analysis of dominant white ideology (van Dijk, 1993, p. 113). In fact, van Dijk (1993) states that the systems that enable racism to persist are “sophisticated and even contradictory” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 113). Like Li (2007), van Dijk (1993) asserts that democratic nations may at times present conflicting values, and practices. In his concluding remarks, van Dijk (1993) succinctly summarizes the complex and at times paradoxical situation of racism in the political discourse of democracies:

In the realm of politics, contemporary ethnic-racial attitudes and practices that maintain or legitimate an overall system of inequality Subtle ethnicism and racism may be countered by equally moderate anti-racism. Tolerance and intolerance, either way, may be combined with indifference. Also, political discourse, cognition, and decision making are not independent or autonomous, but multiply interact with those of other elites, as well as with broader, popular forms of xenophobia. Minority groups themselves may more or less accept, become resigned to, or even internalize a system of inequality, or they may more or less radically oppose and resist it. Despite the obvious national and regional differences ... the prevailing political discourse of race is remarkably homogeneous, both as to topical content and as to rhetorical and argumentative strategies of persuasion, rationalization, and legitimation. And despite the differences between ... [nations] true ethnic-racial equality, justice and multiculturalism have still not been realized anywhere in the West. (p. 113)

This complex view of racism as posited by van Dijk (1993) also resonates in the work of Wodak and Reisigl (2003). In their discourse historical analytical approach to the analysis of the intricacy of racist thought and practice, Wodak and Reisigl (2003) combine and alter a number of theories, concepts, and categories from a variety of theoretical perspectives to formulate a methodology of their own.⁴⁵ Their aim is to transcend the pure linguistic

⁴⁵ These include Uta Quasthoff’s (1973, 1978, 1980, 1987, 1989, 1998 as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 378) socio-psychological categories of racialized prejudice and stereotypes for the purpose of social cohesion to achieve “in-group solidarity”; Teun van Dijk’s (1984, 1991, 1993, 1998a, 1998b as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, pp. 379, 380) concepts and categories of positive “self”/negative “other” presentation; the Duisburg group’s (S. Jäger & Link Jäger, 1993; Kalpak and Räthzel, 1986; Link, 1990, 1992 as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 380) transtextual, interdiscursive,

dimension of analysis “to include more or less systematically the historical, political, sociological, and/or psychological dimension in the analysis and interpretation of a specific discursive occasion” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 383). They locate the continuance of racist thought and practice in a learned system of behaviour, thought and belief that results from the attempt by individuals to belong to a social network. As such, they reject the socio-cognitive, social identity, and psychoanalytical approaches mentioned earlier in section 2.1.1 which explain racism as the result of an innate human process of discrimination (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 382). Consequently, they do not concur with the socio-cognitive aspect of van Dijk’s (1993) approach which contradicts their “hermeneutic ...model” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 382). Despite this fact, they emphasize the importance of van Dijk’s approach to “collective or social memory” as it allows for the elaboration of a discourse-analytical theory about racist discourse that extends beyond the one sentence basis of analysis and provides “the heuristic assistance ... [to link] the generation of prejudice to discursive units larger than the sentence” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 22).

Like the approaches that influence their work⁴⁶, Wodak and Reisigl (2003) perceive discourse as a social practice inclusive of both written and spoken language (p. 383). They understand discourse to consist of a “complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic (oral or written) tokens that belong to specific

sociopolitical, and historical perspective as well as their emphasis on collective symbols and metaphors; and Wetherell and Potter’s (1992 as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 381) critique of the universalizing conditions for racist discrimination (see Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, pp. 382, 383 for more on the influence on the author’s approach). Since I employ van Dijk’s (1993, 2001) approach, I have detailed his influence on the theoretical perspective of Wodak and Reisigl (2003) unlike the other aforementioned theories which are provided here with a brief summation.


⁴⁶ As stated in the above footnote.

semiotic types (genres)” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 383). “Fields of action”⁴⁷ are determined as “segments of the respective societal ‘reality’ which contribute to constituting and shaping the ‘frame’ of discourse” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 383). In the field of politics, for example, action can be distinguished “among the functions of legislation, self-presentation, manufacturing of public opinion ... governing as well as executing, and controlling” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 383). Accordingly, specific topics within a discourse can begin within one field of action and proceed through to another (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 383). For instance, the discourse topic of the right to due process may occur within the discourse of national security that may begin within the field of action of lawmaking procedures such as in the genre of laws and proceed to the field of action of self-presentation in the genre of the press releases. In fact, it is possible for the discourse topic to extend via different genres through all the noted fields of action as depicted below:

⁴⁷ This interconnection between texts and discourses--in what Wodak and Reisigl (2003) refer to here as “fields of action”-- is discussed earlier in this review in the work of Jackson (2006), Karim (1997), and Said (1978) is also referred to as “intertextuality”(Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 383).

Figure 1. Dimensions of Discourse as Social Practice⁴⁸

Field of Action Lawmaking Political Procedure	Field of Action Self-presentation & Formation of Public Opinion	Field of Action Law Enforcement/ Policing	Field of Action Political & Executive Administration	Field of Action Political Control (opposition)
Genres <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • laws • amendments • speeches and contributions of MPs • regulations • recommendations • prescriptions • guidelines • etc. 	Genres <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • press releases • press conferences • interviews • demographic surveys and opinion polls • press articles (reports, comments, columns) • comments of MPs • etc. 	Genres <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • report on the administration of the laws on foreign nationals • letters about policy enforcement • etc. 	Genres <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • decisions • governmental answers • etc. 	Genres <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • grounds for petition • parliamentary questions • speeches • press releases/conferences/declarations/statements of NGOs, human rights organizations • etc.



To take into account the manner in which discursive practices are constitutive of social practices, Wodak and Reisigl (2003) propose that the following be considered:

1. Discursive practices are central to the origin and (re)production of “certain social conditions”, such as the social construction of categories of “race”, and “nation”;
2. They play a role in the continuation, reproduction, or justification of a normalized “status quo (and

⁴⁸ Adapted from Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 384; figure 19.1

“racialized,” “nationalized,” and “ethnicized” identities related to it); 3. They help to alter the aforementioned “status quo”; and 4. They can effect change to the extent that they can help dismantle or even destroy “the status quo (and of racist, nationalist, ethnicist concepts related to it)” (p. 385). Understanding these goals of discourse helps to make the distinction between the various functions of the discursive practices as either: “constructive, perpetuating, transformational, and [sic] destructive” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 385).

Wodak and Reisigl’s (2003) model for examining racist discourse developed from their grounded approach to research in their earlier study of racism in Vienna which spanned the period of two decades (see Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). Their methodology transformed through three phases in this extensive study. First, “specific *contents* or *topics* of a specific discourse with racist, antisemitic, nationalist, or ethnicist” elements were found and then “the *discursive strategies* (including argumentation strategies) were investigated” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 385; italics in the original). Finally, “the *linguistic means* (as types) and the specific, context-dependent *linguistic realizations* (as tokens) of the discriminatory stereotypes were investigated” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 385; italics in the original). From these materialized findings, Wodak and Reisigl (2003) established the basis for their analysis in the context of a language event. Reminiscent of van Dijk (1993) as well as Said (1978), their approach thus considers the context of: 1. the immediate utterance; 2. the intertextual relationship “between utterances, texts, genres, and discourses”; 3. the “social/sociological variables and institutional frames” of a particular contextual situation which is external to language; and 4. “the broader socio-political and historical context that the discursive practices are embedded in and related to” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 385). Although they maintain that there are a number of discursive elements and strategies that are fundamental to

discourse-historical analysis they identify five linguistic and rhetorical means that “deserve special attention” (2003, p. 385). Namely, they suggest that researchers examine the following questions:

(1) How are people named and referred to linguistically? (2) Which traits, characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to them? (3) By means of which arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons or social groups try to justify and legitimate the exclusion, discrimination, suppression and exploitation of others? (4) From which perspective or point of view are these nominations, attributions, and arguments expressed? (5) Are the respective discriminating utterances articulated overtly, are they even intensified, or are they mitigated? (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 385)

As Wodak and Reisigl (2003) are especially interested in the discursive strategies⁴⁹ involved in the “othering” process, they incorporate van Dijk’s (1993) analytical framework which offers a significant basis for analyzing concealed forms of racism in the examination of language choices (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 382). In their strategy-based model of analysis outlined in the following, Wodak and Reisigl’s (2003) integrate van Dijk’s (1993) positive “self”-- and negative “other” -- presentation as well as his “in-group” and “out-group” categorizations that are central to the “othering” processes:

First... *referential...or nomination strategies* by which one constructs and represents social actors; for example, in-groups and outgroups ...via membership categorization devices, including reference tropes like biological, naturalizing, and depersonalizing metaphor ... [are employed;] Second, once constructed or identified, social actors as individuals, group members, or groups are linguistically provided with predications... [through *predicational strategies* that aim at labeling social actors either positively or negatively and may] be realized as stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates...Third, there are *argumentation strategies* ... through which positive and negative attributions are justified ... [such as] social and political inclusion or exclusion, and ... discrimination or preferential treatment, of the respective persons or groups of persons...Fourth, discourse analysts may focus on the ... *framing, or discourse representation* by which speakers express their involvement in discourse and position their point of view in the report, narration, or quotation of discriminatory events.

⁴⁹ Wodak and Reisigl (2003) use “strategy” to mean “a more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a certain social, political, psychological, or linguistic aim” (p. 386).

Fifth, there are *intensifying strategies* ... and *mitigation strategies*...both of ...[which] help to qualify and modify the epistemic status of a proposition by ...[sharpening or toning down] the illocutionary force of racist, anti-semitic, nationalist or ethnicist utterances. (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 386; italics in the original)

Van Dijk's (1993) influence on the above strategies is notable. Specifically, the "referential" or "nomination" strategies employ van Dijk's (1993) "in-group" versus "out-group" distinction; Wodak and Reisigl's (2003) "predicational" strategies are also informed by his positive "self"/negative "other" approach. Their identification of argumentation strategies that consider the manner in which language is used to justify people's inclusion and exclusion, in addition to "intensifying" and "mitigation" strategies that conceal racism through language (third and fifth above), are also discussed by van Dijk (1993; see especially pp. 75-78 in this review).

While Wodak and Reisigl (2003) uphold many of van Dijk's (1993) contributions the analysis of racism and political discourse, one area in which they depart is in their approach to the individual's role in shaping discourse. Unlike van Dijk (1993), they emphasize the importance of the individual and thus take issue with his top-down causality approach to manipulation and opinion-making which assumes a homogeneous elite and a homogeneous mass of "ordinary people" (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, pp. 382, 383). As such, van Dijk does not address the fourth strategy of "framing or discourse representation" identified by Wodak and Reisigl that stresses the speaker's involvement in discourse, at any length. Interestingly, van Dijk (1993) recognizes the crucial role of the individual in the everyday practice of immigration and refugee policy (p. 80). He notes that as immigration officers are the first to make a decision on the ground in relation to the applications they receive and whether they are believable or not, individual beliefs are an important factor in selection processes (van

Dijk, 1993, p. 80). Nevertheless, van Dijk's main interest and focus is on institutionalized rather than personal judgement. Wodak and Reisigl (2003) recognize that racism is "institutionalised and backed by hegemonic groups", yet they believe that all analyses must at least consider individual responsibility.

Because their approach stresses the importance of agency, they further suggest the careful use of the term "institutional racism" since linguistically it connotes that racism exists outside of any actor (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak & Reisigl, 2003). They propose that the terms "'institutionalised' or 'institutionally supported racism' ... [be] utilized instead of institutional because these phrases leave an (admittedly backgrounded) syntactical trace of actors in the form of passive verbal processes" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 8). Despite the fact that individual actors are responsible for their own actions, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) acknowledge that individuals may not act out of their own accord but in conjunction with the accepted norms of the institution that realize conventional social practices. As Reisigl and Wodak (2001) state:

From the normative ethical point of view that we adopt ... individuals are responsible for their own actions, although there is no doubt that-in an institution-the organisational differentiation and segregatory division of labour can lead to a parceling out of the responsibility. Also, an institution may often gather momentum in the sense that the organisational frame and partition of labour favors administrative procedures which, only in combination, bring about systematic discriminations that may even be unintended at the level of the individual action of the institution's members. (p. 9)

This view of racism acknowledges the potential for unintended consequences for individuals in institutionalised settings yet also holds the individual accountable. It further demonstrates the complexity of racism, which Wodak and Reisigl (2003), like van Dijk (1993) assert cannot be explained by simplistic theories. As there is no single cause that shapes the foundation for all racist thought and practice, they state, no approach that takes on a

“monocausal and monodimensional approach is adequate to grasp the complexity of racism” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 377). Hence they also pay heed to Miles’ (1994) approach which seeks to affirm that multiple causes may be located as the source of “exclusionary practices and racist opinions” (Miles, 1994, p. 207 as cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 377; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 10).

Wodak’s (1997) examination of the Kurt Waldheim affair led to methodological innovations in discourse analysis that permit analysts to discern the manner in which “discourses of difference” are created and the potential consequences of such, namely, racism, anti-semitism, and ethnicism (Wodak, 1997, p. 66). To investigate Waldheim’s 1986 campaign for Austrian presidency following the exposure of his Nazi past, Wodak (1997) applied a grounded theoretical approach. In her analysis and interpretation of the texts, she systematically integrated all of the available background information related to Waldheim’s bid for candidacy to generate the categories and discursive identification strategies needed for later analyses on anti-semitism (Wodak, 1997, pp. 71). In this framework, she identified seven differentiation categories which when merged to form a singular group reality referred to as “race”: 1. physical traits, 2. spiritual-cultural or socio-historical traits, 3. religion, 4. nationality, 5. social traits, 6. socioeconomic features, and 7. politics. She considered discrimination based on these amalgamated constructs as racist (Wodak, 1997, p. 70).

Through this multidimensional perspective, it can thus be argued that a variety of approaches for uncovering racialized discourse may be required in an analysis. For the purposes of this study, a methodical approach that can assist in uncovering concealed forms of racism in the “fields of action” of law-making political procedures, information gathering, and political and executive administration in relation to the discourse topic of national

security is required. Since, as stated in the onset of this review, bureaucratic language can obscure and mask evaluative positioning in the practice of national security measures, a methodology is needed to help expose how the discursive construction of “others” as national security threats comes to be accepted in legal and public discourse as well as to reveal the manner in which “race” becomes “unofficially” designated in the practice of national security measures that do not “officially” allow for racialized classifications. While in the case of racist discourse the language used to state a writer/speaker’s opinion may not make explicit references to “race” an investigation of evaluative structures may reveal the manner in which racist ideas are masked. A systematic method for the examination of discursively expressed opinion which may uncover concealed forms of racism is found in evaluation theory.

2.3 Evaluation/Appraisal Theory

Thompson and Hunston (2000) define evaluation as “the broad cover term for the expression of the speaker or writer’s attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on or feelings about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about” (p. 5). Evaluation theory attempts to account for the fundamental characteristics of the language used to express the opinion of the writer/speaker which subsequently has an effect on the point of view of the reader/listener.⁵⁰ As the concept of evaluation is used in different ways in discourse analysis (e.g., Labov, 1972; Hoey, 1983 as cited in Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 5), and in a more “restricted sense” in the lexical investigations of attitude and stance (e.g., Carter, 1987 as cited in Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 5) it can easily cause confusion. However, as Thompson and Hunston (2000) note this type of challenge is not unique to “evaluation” and occurs with other terms available including in Martin’s (2000a) use of the word “appraisal”

⁵⁰ Thompson and Hunston (2000) use “hearer” rather than listener but I believe that hearing does not necessarily signify listening as it is possible to hear without cognition.

(p. 5). For that reason, Thompson and Hunston (2000) choose to use the superordinate term of evaluation to encompass their expansionary view of evaluative language. In their self-described “combining” analytical approach, evaluative language relates to the expression of terms as good/positive or bad/negative as well as to the likelihood of the occurrence of various events and the evidence for the claims made from the perspective of the writer/speaker, traditionally referred to as “modality” (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 3).

The language choices that writers or speakers make greatly influences the way in which a language event is understood. A frequently cited but still useful example of this is found in the descriptive choice of “freedom fighter” over that of “terrorist” to describe a person involved in armed resistance to state occupation. The choice between these terms reflects the ideology of the language user. For Thompson and Hunston (2000) the “affect” and “attitude” of language users rather than language items that “have” connotations is what is substantial in investigating evaluative language (p. 2). In view of this, they contend that the focus of discursive analysis should be on the emotions, attitudes and opinions of people. According to Thompson and Hunston (2000), the evaluative approach to analysis is significant as “the expression of the writer’s or speaker’s opinion is an important feature of language ... that ... needs to be accounted for in a full description of the meaning of texts ...[which] is not always a straightforward matter (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 2). An example of the complexity involved in comprehending the meaning of texts can be seen in the employment of the term “devout”. While the word in itself is an expression of piety or religiosity, in the current context depending upon the speaker when “devout” is combined

with “Muslim” it can be used to negatively characterize someone who may be considered suspect.⁵¹

As an extension of Halliday’s (1996) Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), a fuller comprehension of the mechanism of evaluation involves a consideration of the interrelated nature of three functions: 1. the expression of value systems of people and their community, 2. the way in which relations between the writer/reader or speaker/listener are constructed and maintained as well as 3. how the discourse is organized so that it is understood by communities who share the same set of knowledge and values or, in other words, “communities of practice” (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, pp. 6-13). Firstly, the expression of value systems tells the reader/listener what the writer/speaker feels. Every instantiation of evaluative language helps to maintain and continue that value-system or ideology (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 7). As language can express communal or sub-group value-systems, it can belong to a segment of society rather than the individual or the whole. Evaluation is therefore a key linguistic concept since ideologies are sets of values that convey to the communities to and for which they speak “what counts as good or bad, what should or should not happen, [and] what counts as true or untrue ” (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 8).

Essential information which expresses the value systems of the community in question can occur both within texts and between them or intra- and intertextually. Intertextuality is the interconnected meaning established from past texts that inform present texts, which then enlighten the texts of the future. Though each text plays a role in the next, this process should not be considered linear since texts can weave together disparate voices

⁵¹ This is noted in the CAIR-CAN (2004) study cited in section 2.1.2 which explains how in their interviews CSIS and the RCMP considered Muslims who adhered closely to their religion to be more likely to participate in acts of terror than Muslims who claimed to be non-practicing.

to function “interdiscursively” (Young, 2008). The notion of intertextuality is thus understood by Thompson and Hunston (2000) as central to evaluation theory, in a similar manner to the aforementioned discourse analytical perspectives of Jackson (2005), Karim (1997), Said (1978) and Wodak and Reisigl (2003), because “ideologies ... [neither] exist in silence ... [nor are] usually expressed overtly... [but are] rather ...built up and transmitted through texts” (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 8).

The concept of intertextuality brings into play the second function of evaluation which concerns the establishment and maintenance of relations between the writer/speaker and reader/listener (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, pp. 8-9). In an attempt to manipulate and/or persuade the reader/listener to take a particular side or view of events evaluative terms are used to present a certain perspective. Once the reader/listener assumes the point of the view of the writer/speaker a relationship is created. The continued use of evaluative language can help to maintain this relationship. An example of this can be seen in the overt evaluations made by the Bush administration in their use of enemy discourse in the “war on terror”. As Jackson (2005) points out “establishing the identities of the primary characters - the heroes and villains or the ‘good guys’ and the ‘bad guys’ – was a key element in constructing the overall narrative of the ‘war on terrorism’” (p. 59). The evaluative terms used to label the terrorist “other” made “the war on terrorism” understandable to the American and indeed to the greater Western public. The consistent re-production of this evaluative language ensured the maintenance of the relationship between the viewpoint of politicians and the media as writers/speakers and the public as readers/listeners.

Thompson and Hunston (2000) contend that evaluative language is “particularly difficult to challenge, and therefore is particularly effective as manipulation, when it is not

the main point of the clause” (p. 8). When evaluative information is “given” in a clause the reader/listener is not positioned to make a decision on whether or not to agree with the assessment of the writer/speaker but rather to accept the evaluation without consideration for the claims made (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 8). In the following, Thompson and Hunston (2000) provide an example of how “given” information is presented not as new opinion but rather as fact which expresses judgment, yet does not ask the reader to consider the position taken:

In retrospect, the solemnity-and to modern eyes and ears, pomposity-of the politics and media of the past may be seen as in part a reflection of the current or very recent reasons to be serious: the daily expectation of invasion or death. Similarly, the frivolity and triviality of much modern discourse ... is a product of a decade in which nothing seemed to matter very much (The *Guardian*, 30.5.98, p. 23 as cited in Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 9)

Here nouns such as “*solemnity, pomposity, frivolity, and triviality*”, which are more commonly used in their adjective form to limit or qualify nouns, are employed to evaluate information without enabling the reader to decide for her/himself whether s/he agrees or disagrees with the stance taken (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 8; italics in the original). The assumption of the writer is that the reader will agree with her/his evaluative position.

As discourse labels, certain nouns can function not only to summarize previous text but also to evaluate prior claims and/or assertions made in the text or intertextually. For example, “these words” or “this question” play a summarizing role, while “this claim” or “this non-sense” acts as an evaluation of the text (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 9). Since discourse labels often appear as information or fact their validity is unlikely to be questioned (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 9). This enables the writer/speaker to frame the way a situation is understood and thus to create a relationship with the reader/listener. The introductory paragraph below that was used to set the stage for a series of questions posed in

a telephone research study⁵² on the Canadian public's opinion and knowledge of the *Anti-terrorism Act* ([ATA] 2002) aptly illustrates how evaluation is employed in the discourse labels of what appear as a set of straightforward statements. In the first section of this study conducted for the Canadian Department of Justice, respondents were asked about their awareness and concern about terrorism and anti-terrorism legislation. Mid-way through this section those interviewed were provided with the following information about the new bill and were subsequently asked to respond to questions related to their views on the application of terrorism-related legislation, racial profiling in Canada, the impact of anti-terrorism legislation, as well as personal travel experiences:

In the fall of 2001, the Canadian Parliament passed new anti-terrorism legislation called the Anti-Terrorism Act (formerly referred to as Bill C-36). This *law* has taken steps to combat terrorism and terrorist activities at home and abroad through tough new measures. The new package of legislation: creates measures to deter, disable, identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorist groups and provides new investigative tools to law enforcement and national security agencies. (Crutcher & Budak, 2005, p. 19; italics added)

The first sentence provides new information about the bill passed, and is therefore not problematic. The subsequent statement, however, tells the listeners what to think about this bill and is thus evaluative. In a survey which aims to gather information on the opinion of such measures, it is likely that the manner in which the *ATA* (2002) is described influenced how respondents answered questions about the necessity, application and possible limitations to freedoms associated with this bill.

⁵² The purpose of the study by Environics Canada researchers' Crutcher and Budak (2005) entitled *The Anti-terrorism Act and Security Measures in Canada: Public Views, Impacts and Travel Experiences* was to build on previous research conducted for the Canadian Department of Justice. It was used to explore claims made within an earlier body of research which indicated concern about the possibility of racial profiling. It was also carried out to enhance other findings as part of a series of research studies used to aid the Department in preparation for a review of the *ATA* (2002).

Of note is the manner in which the researchers close the above with the following statement that speaks to the intention rather than to the execution of the bill: “The law is also *intended* to ensure that Canadian values of respect and fairness are preserved through rigorous safeguards to ensure that the fundamental rights and freedoms of Canadians are respected” (Crutcher & Budak, 2005, p. 20; italics added). Unlike the previous claims, there is some hedging in this assertion with the use of the word “intended”. This usage functions to allow for the possibility of uncertainty in that the law may not do what it has been proposed to do in this respect, i.e., it may not ensure that Canadian values, rights and freedoms are respected. Hedging or the “adjust[ment] of truth value or certainty to a statement” is understood by shared communities and thus permits the creation or maintenance of collective meaning (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 10). The use of hedging in the anti-terrorism public opinion survey further works to establish a relationship of trust between the Canadian government and the respondents in that the government claims that it wants to retain the fundamental aspects that Canadians expect and desire, although it may not be capable of doing so.

As Thompson and Hunston (2000) maintain, hedging enables the social construction and social reification of relations between communities of practice (p. 10). At the same time, speakers/writers can present certainty through a lack of hedging and unmodified assertions to create a climate with readers/listeners where information is not to be questioned. In his chapter on “Writing Identity: Evil Terrorists, Good Americans”, Jackson (2005) provides a number of concrete instantiations of this process in the speeches of Bush and Ashcroft. To create a binary “us” versus “them” enemy discourse, Bush employs no modality in the

following claim for why people would attack the U.S.: “They⁵³ *hate* what we see right here in this chamber -- a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They *hate* our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other” (Bush, 20 September, 2001 as cited by Jackson, 2005, pp. 63-64; italics in the original). Bush does not use hedging here because he presents the information as fact which is therefore uncontestable.

Conjuncts such as “if”, “and”, and “but” and subordinators such as “because”, “thus”, and “although” also assume a common ground between listener/reader and speaker/writer in terms of what is expected so that relationships can continue to be upheld. An example of this can be seen in the following excerpt from an online CSIS (February 2005) backgrounder on the issuing of security certificates:

If a certificate is deemed to be reasonable, it is considered conclusive proof that the permanent resident or foreign national named in it is inadmissible. The certificate *then* automatically becomes a removal order that cannot be appealed. There is *thus* no need to hold an admissibility hearing after such a determination. (CSIS Backgrounder No. 14, February 2005)⁵⁴

From this text a reader is likely to assume that a process is in place that ensures that security certificates are reasonable measures (i.e., “if ...deemed ... reasonable, [then] ...conclusive proof [of guilt]”) for removing someone from the country (i.e., “then ...automatically”) without an ability to have the case re-examined.

Evaluation shapes the manner in which texts are understood or in other words, the evaluative organization of the discourse enables the listener/reader to know which genre is utilized as well as what to expect in the discursive text. For instance, political election

⁵³ Given the context of this speech, i.e., shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the “they” here refers generally to Muslims and Arabs.

⁵⁴ See Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Certificates Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)”, Backgrounder No. 14, Revised Feb. 2005. Retrieved from <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/backgrounders/backgrounder14.asp> (last visited March 2008).

advertisements are likely to use emotional appeals in an attempt to sway the voter. These appeals are related to what politicians and their communication's staff perceive as most pertinent to voters at the time of the election such as the economy, environment or security concerns. In a similar way, speeches are texts that are purposely construed to be persuasive and consequently are inherently value-laden. In spite of their opinionated nature, however, the evaluations made in persuasive texts may not be presented as value judgements but rather as common sense statements. As such it is important to consider how the structure of all texts can influence the listener/reader.

Thompson and Hunston (2000) assert, following Sinclair (1987), that evaluation in writing as well as in speech “tends to occur at boundary points in a discourse, thereby providing a clue to (‘monitoring’) its organization” (Sinclair, 1987 as cited in Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 11). Therefore, although evaluation occurs all along the narrative, it clusters at various points in the beginning, in the mid-section, and at the end (see Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 13). The writer/speaker will tend to re-assert the claims that s/he has made at these boundary points in an attempt to ensure that the reader/listener follows her/his assertions and agrees with them. As Thompson and Hunston (2000) state:

It is as if the writer kept up a constant commentary on the progress of the discourse itself: ‘The discourse has started, and it is going to be divided into three parts. Here is the first part, here is the end of the first part and this is why it is interesting. Assuming you are with me so far, now we move on to the second part (p. 13)

Again Jackson (2005) provides a suitable example for this method of evaluation in his re-presentation of a speech by John Ashcroft which seeks to construct the foreign enemy as “alien”:

As September 11th vividly illustrates, *aliens* also come to our country with the intent to do great evil [....]

The Department of Justice will prevent *aliens* who engage in or support terrorist activity from entering our country. We will detain, prosecute, deport *terrorist aliens* who are already inside the nation's borders [....]

The *Foreign Terrorist* Tracking Task Force that Mr. McGraw will lead will ensure (sic) that federal agencies coordinate their efforts to bar from the United States all *aliens* who meet any of the following criteria: *aliens* who are representatives, members or supporters of *terrorist organizations*; *aliens* who are suspected of engaging in *terrorist activity*; or *aliens* who provide material to support *terrorist activity*. (Ashcroft, 31 October, 2001 as cited in Jackson, 2005, p.72; italics in the original)

The first claim states and evaluates the problem: primarily, foreigners like the September 11, 2001 attackers who purposely intend to commit acts of evil in the U.S. are labeled as "aliens". The second statement re-asserts the definition of "alien", while the third announces the future actions to punish and/or rid the state of enemy "aliens" within their borders. The final set of statements reiterates the claim that the threat to the U.S. is from "aliens" and not from American citizens. While evaluative claims are made throughout the text, in the final section Ashcroft encompasses all the ways that foreigners may be potential terrorists. Ashcroft's use of the term "aliens" plays a dual evaluative role here in suggesting that these people classified as "aliens" are somehow not human as well as in implying that there are many "aliens" who are likely to be terrorist threats or who are directly linked to terrorism, and that terrorist actions would not be committed by citizens of the U.S., despite the fact that there are a number of instances when this has occurred (e.g. Oklahoma City bombings).

Though this brief analysis does not amount to definitive proof that the purpose of Ashcroft's speech is an attempt to get the listener to adhere to the assertions made about enemy "aliens" so as to be suspicious and fearful of those who are foreigners as well as those who appear as such but may in fact be citizens, it does illustrate how evaluation is organized within a speech and that this organization depends on the interaction with the listener/reader. Thompson and Hunston (2000) contend that "as the relationship between writer [/speaker]

and reader[/listener] is built up, part of that relationship is a mutual awareness of the boundaries in the discourse” (p. 13). Listeners and readers have certain expectations of discourse and presume in the case of persuasive texts such as speeches that they will hear/read claims that are emphasized for importance, which often occurs through repetition, and a call to action.

Since evaluation can be employed in a variety of ways, any use of language can be considered evaluative. Lexical items can assist in pointing to the possibility of an evaluative event that “interpretative measures can help us to uncover and relate to the goals” of a text (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 14). The following table synthesizes Thompson and Hunston’s (2000) framework for linguistic identification of evaluative language that can help identify when lexis is used comparatively, subjectively and as an indication of social value.

Table 1: Three Linguistic Features to Signal Evaluation⁵⁵

<p>1. Evaluation involves comparison of the object of evaluation against some other object/measure: the comparators. These include: comparative adjectives and adverbs indicating affect; adverbs of degree; comparator adverbs such as just, only, at least, certainty, and doubt; expressions of negativity (morphological, such as un- and other affixes; grammatical, such as not, never, hardly; and lexical, such as fail, lack.); adjectives indicating affect, certainty, and doubt; comparators, such as negatives, futures, modals, quasimodals, questions, imperatives, or-clauses, superlatives, and comparatives.</p>
<p>2. Evaluation is subjective: the markers of subjectivity. This includes modals and other markers of (un)certainity, (im)possibility, necessity, and prediction; non-identifying adjectives, certain adverbs, nouns, and verbs; sentence adverbs and conjunctions; report and attribution structures; marked clause structures, including patterns beginning with it and there; verbs indicating affect, certainty, and doubt; hedges (e.g. sort of); emphatics (e.g. for sure, really); explicatives, clauses introduced by subordinators such as <i>while</i>, <i>though</i>, <i>since</i>, or <i>because</i>.</p>
<p>3. Evaluation is value-laden: the markers of value. These may be divided into two groups: lexical items whose typical use is in an evaluative environment; and indications of the existence of goals and their (non)achievement; intensifiers, such as gestures, expressive phonology, quantifiers, repetition, and ritual utterances.</p>

⁵⁵ Table adapted from Biber and Finegan, (pp. 18-19) Labov (p. 19), and Thompson and Hunston (p. 21) in Thompson and Hunston, 2000, pp. 18-19, 21.

While Thompson and Hunston (2000) take on what they term a “combining” approach to the analysis of evaluation which seeks to emphasize the similarities between the relationship of good/positive or bad/negative and certainty/uncertainty, Martin (2000a) employs a “separating” methodology under the name of “appraisal theory” that understands attitude and modality as distinct (see Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 4). Situated within SFL, Martin (2000a) utilizes an analytical framework based on a three system approach for uncovering evaluative choices that further permits a close examination of the type of evaluation made (p. 142). Although he remains committed to the perspective offered through SFL, he nevertheless identifies a need to elaborate beyond what an SFL analysis can provide. As he states, “SFL approaches to [discursive] data ... [have traditionally considered grammatical evidence such as the MOOD of a clause and thus fail to account for] how the interlocutors are feeling, the judgements they make, and the value they place on the various phenomena of their experience” (Martin, 2000a, p. 144). There are emotions, judgements and values where negotiation for solidarity may take place in a text which a traditional SFL analysis might elude (Martin, 2000a, pp. 144-145). As such Martin’s (2000a) “appraisal” works together with traditional “grammar-founded models ... [to offer a more] elaborate lexically oriented system” (p. 145).

Martin (2000a) uses the term “appraisal” to incorporate “the semantic resources used to negotiate emotions, judgements, and valuations, alongside resources for amplifying and engaging with these evaluations”(p. 145). He observes that “meanings can be adjusted by degree to reflect the strength of evaluation” and cites comparable models of evaluation in the work of Labov (1972, 1984), Biber and Finegan (1988, 1989), and Chafe (1986) (as cited in Martin, 2000a, p. 145). Despite the complexity of evaluation, Martin contends that it is

reducible to sets of options in the meaning potential of language (p. 143). His theoretical model of “appraisal” identifies the meaning potential of evaluative lexis through: affect, judgement, and appreciation (Martin, 2000a, pp. 145-147). Affect involves emotions, and/or reactions to behaviour, other texts/processes or phenomena. Affect is thus the resource for “construing emotional responses ... [e.g.,] happiness, sadness, fear, loathing, etc.” (Martin, 2000a, p. 145). Since affect, appreciation and judgement “all encode feeling” affect can be considered the basic system from which the sub-systems of judgement and appreciation diverge (Martin, 2000a, p. 147). According to Martin (2000a) judgement and appreciation recontextualize affect “as an evaluation matrix” for controlling behaviour (judgement), or for valuing achievement (appreciation) (p. 147). As such, judgement is the system of ethics and morals, and is therefore the resource for “construing moral evaluations of behaviour ... [e.g.,] ethical, deceptive, brave, etc.” (Martin, 2000a, p. 145). Appreciation meanwhile is concerned with aesthetics and the evaluation of texts/processes or phenomena to act as the semantic resource for construing “‘aesthetic’ quality of semiotic text/processes and natural phenomena ... [e.g.,] remarkable, desirable, harmonious, elegant, innovative, etc.” (Martin, 2000a, p. 146).

For purposes of text analysis and in line with SFL descriptive principles, Martin (2000a) provides a global outline of the resource of affect that seeks to be “holistic” and culturally specific (p. 148). He classifies affect according to the following:

Table 2: Martin's Affect⁵⁶

1. Feelings popularly construed as positive or negative by culture: Positive – the boy was happy Negative – the boy was sad
2. Feelings realized by surge of emotion involving paralinguistic or extra-linguistic manifestation or experienced as a predisposition or ongoing mental state: Behavioural surge - the boy laughed Mental disposition – the boy liked the present/the boy felt happy
3. Feelings directed at or reacting to external or ongoing mood: Reaction to other – the boy liked the teacher/the teacher pleased the boy Undirected mood – the boy was happy
4. Feelings graded as: Low – the boy liked the present Median – the boy loved the present High – the boy adored the present
5. Feelings involve or do not involve intention with respect to stimuli that relates to future/unrealized state or present: Realis – the boy liked the present Irrealis – the boy wanted the present
6. Feelings expressed as un/happiness, in/security, dis/satisfaction: In/security – the boy was anxious/confident Dis/satisfaction – the boy was fed up/pleased Un/happiness – the boy was sad/happy

Like affect, judgement has positive and negative dimensions with corresponding positive and negative judgements about behaviour. Martin (2000a) contends that judgements can be divided into two major groups: 1. *social esteem* - “normality”- how usual someone is (e.g., “lucky” or “unlucky”), capacity - how capable they are (e.g., “powerful” or “weak”), tenacity - how resolute they are (e.g., “brave” or “cowardly”); and 2. *social sanction* – veracity - how truthful someone is (e.g., “credible” or “deceitful”), and propriety - how ethical someone is (“ethical” or “evil”) (see Martin, 2000a, p. 156; italics added).

⁵⁶ Adapted from Martin, 2000a, pp. 149-150.

Table 3: Martin's Judgement⁵⁷

Social Esteem 'venial'	Positive (admire)	Negative (criticize)
normality (fate) 'is s/he special?'	lucky, fortunate ... normal, average, everyday ...	unlucky, unfortunate ... odd, peculiar, eccentric ...
capacity 'is s/he capable?'	powerful, vigorous ... insightful, clever ... balanced, together, sane ...	mild, weak ... slow, stupid ... flaky, neurotic, insane ...
tenacity (resolve) 'is s/he reliable, dependable?'	brave, heroic ... dependable... tireless, persevering, resolute ...	cowardly, despondent ... unreliable, undependable ... weak, distracted, dissolute ...
Social Sanction 'moral'	Positive (praise)	Negative (condemn)
veracity (truth) 'is s/he honest?'	truthful, honest, credible ... real, authentic, genuine ... frank, direct ...	dishonest, deceitful ... bogus, fake ... deceptive, manipulative ...
propriety (ethics) 'is s/he beyond reproach?'	good, moral, ethical ... law-abiding, fair, just ... sensitive, kind, caring ...	bad, immoral, evil ... corrupt, unfair, unjust ... insensitive, mean, cruel ...

Appreciation also has positive and negative dimensions but rather than institutionalizing feelings about behaviours, it evaluates the context of propositions, texts and processes (see Martin, 2000a, pp. 159-161). Martin (2000a) identifies three variables in this system as follows: 1. *reaction* – “degree to which the text/process in question captures our attention” and “emotional impact” on us (e.g., “infuriated”, “calmed”); 2. *composition* – “perceptions of proportionality” and “detail ... in a text/process” (e.g., “unified”, “contradictory”); and 3. *valuation* – “assessment of the social significance of the text/process” (“useful”, “shallow”) (see Martin, 2000a, pp. 160-161; italics added). Martin (2000a) claims that valuation may be connected to the field of discourse more than other dimensions of appreciation because “the criteria for valuing a text/process for the most part are institutionally specific” (p. 160). Still he notes that all evaluative dimensions in

⁵⁷ Adapted from Martin, 2000a, p.156.

judgement and appreciation, and I would argue in the broad spectrum of appraisal as a whole, are “sensitive to field” since they all institutionalize feeling (Martin, 2000a, p. 160).

Martin (2000a) provides two separate tables for the field specific analysis of appreciation in English and linguistics; however, few terms were different in each table. A more interesting contrast might have been made between more disparate fields such as science and English. Despite the limitation of Martin’s (2000a) examples in addressing field differences, with an understanding of the importance of field in mind, I have combined his linguistic and English field specific tables into a general framework in order to offer a visual representation of how texts are evaluated based on the three variables of reaction, composition, and valuation.

Table 4: Martin’s Appreciation⁵⁸

	Positive	Negative
Reaction: impact	arresting, captivating... fascinating exciting, moving ... timely, long-awaited ...	dull, boring, tedious ... dry, ascetic, uninviting ... untimely, unexpected
Reaction: quality	lovely, beautiful, splendid... appealing, enchanting ... interesting, stimulating ...	plain, ugly ... repulsive, revolting ... pedantic, didactic, uninspired...
Composition: balance	balanced, harmonious, unified, consistent... thorough, well-considered...	unbalanced, discordant, fragmented ... disorganized, contradictory ...
Composition: complexity	simple, elegant ... intricate, rich, detailed, exhaustive...	simplistic, extravagant ... complicated, narrow, vague, unclear ...
Valuation: (field genesis)	challenging, significant, illuminating ...	shallow, unconvincing, unsupported ...

According to Martin (2000a) all texts are structured to evoke affinity, ie, solidarity with readership (pp. 165-166). He emphasizes that the expression of attitude is an interpersonal rather than a personal matter “in that the basic reason for advancing an opinion

⁵⁸ Adapted from Martin, 2000a, pp. 160-161.

is to elicit a response of solidarity with the addressee”(Martin, 2000a, p. 143; see also p. 169). This is significant because the speaker/writer seeks not simply to comment “on the world” but as Thompson and Hunston (2000) propose in expressing evaluation the speaker/writer attempts to maintain or establish a relationship with the listener/reader. As Martin (2000a) contends, “just as it is impossible to include without excluding so it is also impossible to appraise without running the gauntlet of empathy and alienation”(p. 166). Every institution is loaded with a way to understand as well as construe meaning. Socialization into a discipline further involves alignment with an institutional practice and affinity with attitudes one is expected to have towards those practices (Martin, 2000a, p. 161). The kind of evaluations that speakers/writers make therefore depends on their institutional position, eg, editorial journalists have full range of judgemental resources while reporters of hard news do not because they are supposed to appear objective.

Martin’s (2000a) approach further distinguishes between “inscribed” appraisal which is explicit in texts (e.g., an *evil* enemy) and appraisal that is “evoked” as an evaluative response projected by reference to events/states that are “prized” (e.g., This law *has taken steps to combat terrorism and terrorist activities at home and abroad*), “frowned upon” or more suitably, in the case of this study, feared (e.g., a person who *poses a security threat to Canada or Canadians*) (see Martin, 2000a, p. 142). Inscribed evaluation “is harder to resist or ignore” and is more likely to be “prescriptive about the reading position naturalized” than evoked evaluation which is more open to “accommodating a wider range of reading positions” (see Martin, 2000a, p. 155). Because evaluation is determined not only through evaluative lexis but also in what language is being used to talk about, the construction of ideational meaning (i.e., the content of a text) may also be used to evaluate (Martin, 2000a, p.

161). Consequently, there is a need to be cautious when analyzing ideational meaning, e.g. rain could bring great joy to farmers but not to those travelling for vacation purposes (Martin, 2000a, p. 154). Like van Dijk (1993), and Wodak and Reisigl (2003), Martin (2000a) therefore stresses the role that context and field play in any discursive analysis. A consideration of the “field of discourse” or “field of action”, according to Wodak and Resigl (2003), can thus reveal how evaluation encoded at the ideational stratum often goes unnoticed (pp. 383-384).

Reflecting upon the given discussion on nationalism and terrorism, several instances of racialized discourse can be revealed through evaluation/appraisal theory. As noted by Larsen (2006) earlier in this review, the term “national security” is far from straightforward. Depending upon the “field of discourse” this concept is associated with a number of different threats which change over time and “evoke” various responses.⁵⁹ Martin’s (2000a) detailed approach further allows for the examination of Conklin’s crucial questions⁶⁰ which suggest that although all evidence showed that those labeled “enemies of the state” were not considered as threats to national security by state officials, racist policies and practices of internment camps and deportations continued. In the current climate the tools provided by Thompson and Hunston (2000) and Martin (2000a) suggest that beneath the surface of more recent national security legislation, namely, security certificates, also lie racialized policies and practices.

2.4 Conclusion

This review of the literature brings together a number of theoretical and analytical approaches to consider an interdisciplinary perspective for the examination of the

⁵⁹ See my discussion in section 2.2.4 “Designating national (in)security”, especially pp. 60-61.

⁶⁰ See p. 61 in this review.

interdiscursive connection between nationalism and racism in democratic nation states; additionally, it serves to ground the methodological approach that I utilize in my analysis to explore the possibility of the existence of racism in current Canadian government policy on national security and to reflect on this possibility with a discussion of past racialized policy and practice which has used the discourse of “war” to construct an enemy “other”.

Anderson’s (2006) substantial contribution to the study of nationalism is recognized, especially his emphasis on the nation as an imagined community, his link between the use of nationalism as a justification for colonial expansion and the rise of racism, and the importance he places on language that enables the discourse of nation to flourish. Nevertheless, the literature suggests that the most significant part of the attachment to an imagined community may not be so much a consequence of profound love of nation but rather due to a widely assumed fear of threat -- whether actual or not. The critical theoretical perspectives considered in this review posit that the construction of national identity may be partly the result of a perceived threat that is real, as in the form of colonial expansion, or manufactured, as in the creation of the Canadian born Japanese enemy during World War II. To achieve the goals of those in power and to further maintain their power, the threat of an “other” -- whether real or constructed to appear so -- connects people under nation.

Though it is not the purpose of this research to determine the guilt or innocence of those currently identified as threats to national security in Canada, this study explores the possibility that this second threat of manufactured fear and its link to racialization may be at work in the creation and application of national security legislation and in the language of national security itself that has permitted the discursive construction of categories of people

for which no laws apply or who, in other words, exist in what Razack (2007) terms “a state of exception”.

So how is it that this discursive racialized construction can be understood and examined? First, it is necessary to acknowledge that discursive systems are a part of communities. The knowledge and ability to create, (re)create and (re) interpret texts thus depends upon the community to which one belongs or to its intertexts (Lemke, 1995; Thompson & Hunston, 2000). Yet significantly, though texts operate within shared communities they also influence wider discourse communities (Lemke, 1995, pp. 38-39). Texts can be understood without prior knowledge through category construction (Jackson, 2005; Karim, 1997; Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Wodak, 1997) thematic patterns (Jackson, 2005; Karim, 1997; Lazar & Lazar, 2004; van Dijk, 1993; Wodak, 1997), and value positioning and organizational structures (Martin, 2000a; Thompson & Hunston, 2000). In this way, semantic thematic categories are utilized to stress the continuity and interdependency of texts, while value positioning and organizational structures help to describe the manner in which participants, processes, and circumstances construct what comes to be perceived as normal or natural. The “spread” of racist discourse can thus be seen to occur through a fluid process in which present texts and future are informed by past texts.

Said’s (1978) post-modern cultural analysis of “orientalism” explores the importance the notion of intertextuality along with van Dijk’s (1984, 1993) thematic approach, both of which shape Karim’s (1997) analytical model that I adapt and implement in this study. From an applied language studies standpoint the significance of the intertextuality is also proposed by Jackson, 2006; Thompson and Hunston, 2000; Wodak et al., 1999; and Wodak and Reisigl, 2003 who posit that meaning cannot occur outside systems of discourse. In a

comparable manner, I contend that texts cannot be understood in isolation, as a comprehension of the interdependency of language use is essential for analyzing discourse.

Though the identification of patterns and structures in texts is fundamental for linguistic and cultural contextualization, an understanding of the context of the situation is also necessary for a more comprehensive examination of discourse formation. Like the approaches of van Dijk (1993) and Karim (1997), Wodak (1997; 1999; 2001; 2003; 2006) emphasizes the need for a historical view of the construction of social meaning which enables discourses to be transferred and repeated over time. While van Dijk (1993) and Karim (1997) consider the study of the discursive construction of social norms and practices as fundamental in their analyses, their approaches focus on the top-down nature of discourse which flows from elite sources such as the media, academic institutions and the government to the public. Jackson (2005), Wodak (1997), Wodak et al. (1999), Reisigl and Wodak (2001), Said (1978) and Wodak and Reisigl (2003) on the other hand, view these discursive relationships as multidirectional and stress the need to make transparent the discursive connection between action, institution, and political power.

3 Theoretical and Methodological Framework

3.0 Defining Racialized Discourse

In this section, I outline the central analytical approaches that provide an inclusive framework for the analysis of racism in national security discourse. As observed and presented thus far it is evident that “race” is a complex category, primarily because it is a social construction. Consequently, the meaning of “race” and what constitutes racism can differ from one discourse community to another. Although differences in the use and understanding of “race” abound in order to explore the possibility that racism is situated within the texts that I consider, a descriptive definition is presented here. It brings together elements of Karim’s (1997) framework for “othering”, Wodak’s (1997) identification pattern for racist discourse, and Jackson’s (2005) characteristics of counter-terrorism discourse with the more recent approach put forward in Every and Augoustinos’ (2007) work on racism in the Australian parliament. Accordingly, in my analysis racist discourse includes the talk and action that constructs “categorical generalizations; differential treatment of non-citizens; and talk about the nation [which entails the use of seemingly neutral language to evoke a sense of nationalism in order to mask racial discrimination and prejudice]” (Every & Augoustinos, 2007, pp. 415, 424).⁶¹

Following Reisigl and Wodak (2001) and Miles (1994), I dispute the paradigmatic division between “old” versus “new” racism and instead propose that the complex formation of racist thought and practice manifests itself in disparate ways depending upon the manner in which racism is normalized in discourse at a particular place and time. It is through discourse that policies of exclusion which on the surface may appear “race”-neutral come to

⁶¹ These constructs are taken from Every and Augoustinos (2007). The authors credit M. Barker (1981) for the definition of “talk about the nation” in his work *The new racism*. London.

be accepted and spread. The methods in this analysis show that the discursive (re)production of racist opinions and beliefs occurs in the implementation of legal “discriminatory exclusionary policies” which establish the groundwork for the promulgation of racism and further legitimate the practice of racialized exclusion (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 1). For that reason, in undertaking this discourse-historical analytical approach to the complex phenomenon of racism I emphasize that racism as both “a social practice” and “an ideology” is revealed through discourse (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.1).

To demonstrate how this occurs discursively, I apply a triangulated approach to my analysis as advocated in the discourse-historical approach (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp. 35, 40).⁶² In agreement with Wodak and Reisigl (2003) and van Dijk (1993) who call for an interdisciplinary critical approach to discourse analysis, I put forward a methodology that offers a number of ways to uncover racism and to establish racism’s link to nationalist discourse. I further demonstrate that depending upon the genre in question, at different times, each of the analytical methods discussed provides a focused avenue in which to expose “othering” discourse and to reveal its connection to the racialized practice of national security. I not only contend that different approaches are at times better apt to capture the expression of racism in different discourse genres, but that in applying numerous methods the risk of bias is reduced.

⁶² Triangulation is commonly used in the social sciences to verify results and requires that a number of analytical tools, methods or approaches be used to support the original findings of the analysts. Reisigl and Wodak (2001) posit that the discourse-historical approach employs the principle of triangulation by considering historical, political, sociological and/or psychological dimensions of the research which provide significant information that may be otherwise ignored in a purely linguistic study. They also emphasize that the use of multiple approaches to scrutinize the data can assist in removing researcher bias. For more on the use of triangulation in the discourse-historical analytical approach, see Wodak (2001), Reisigl and Wodak (2001), and Wodak and Reisigl (2003).

My study demonstrates that while previous legislation in Canada was overt in its racist targeting of Japanese peoples in the name of national security, the current social context makes such obvious expressions of racism less likely, especially as stated by government. Yet in spite of this lack of racialized language in the elite discourse of the federal government's national security policies, the practice of racism continues in the security certificate process evident in the detention of racialized groups.


3.1 Dimensions of National Security Discourse

The link between discourse topics that are part of the discourse of national security and their interconnection and influence upon each other is illustrated in Figure 2 below. This model, adapted from Wodak (1997), and Reisigl and Wodak (2001), presents different fields of action, genres, and possible discourse topics (presented in the ovals) that comprise the dimensions of national security discourse which I reflect upon and at times analyze in this study. The fields of action constitute and shape how discourse is framed in its genre form. For instance, one of the functions in the “lawmaking” field of action is the production of the genre of laws such as the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)*. The field of action of “information gathering”, on the other hand, is expressed in the genre of public reports on individuals who pose security threats, such as in the CSIS reports. The discourse topics which extend from the fields of action and their genres also extend beyond those fields of action and genres to overlap with other discourse topics. Namely in the model below, the “immigrant and refugee protection” discourse topic moves across the lawmaking field of action and the genre of “laws” in the section in the *IRPA* related to security certificates to intersect with the discourse topics of “terrorist entities”, “foreigner criminality” and “targeting of racialized groups”. Thus, it encompasses all of the fields of action and a number

of the genres within them. This is shown below in Figure 2 with the overlapping ovals. In my analysis, I consider the lawmaking field of action and its associated genres of laws and bills in the security certificate legislation of the *IRPA*, and the law enforcement/information gathering field of action and its genre of public website reports on individuals who pose security threats in the examination of the CSIS reports. While my analysis focuses on the discourse topics of immigrant and refugee protection, the expulsion of criminal foreigners, foreigner criminality and the targeting of racialized groups, in my discussion and conclusion I take into account all the discourse topics, genres and fields of action listed.

Figure 2: Dimensions of National Security Discourse⁶³

Field of Action Lawmaking Political Procedure	Field of Action Self-presentation & Formation of Public Opinion	Field of Action Law Enforcement/ Policing/Information Gathering	Field of Action Political & Executive Administration	Field of Action Political Control (opposition)
Genres • laws • bills/ amendments • speeches & contributions of MPs • regulations • etc.	Genres • press releases • interviews • surveys & opinion polls • press articles (reports, comments, columns) • etc.	Genres • public website reports on individuals who pose security threats • letters about policy enforcement • etc.	Genres • decisions • report on the administration of the laws on 'aliens' • governmental answers • etc.	Genres • parliamentary questions • speeches • press releases/ conferences/ declarations of human rights organizations • etc .



⁶³ Adapted from Wodak (1997) pp. 80-81 and Reisigl & Wodak (2001) pp. 38-39.

3.2 The Methodological Approaches and Interpretative Framework

The analytical approaches that I employ in my study serve to illustrate how the discursive relationship between racism and national security discourse constructs categories of people who, as Razack (2007) states, are subject to a “state of exception” in which fundamental legal rights do not apply. I suggest that at different times the discursive practices of genres that are particular to their fields of action require different and sometimes multiple approaches to unearth possible racist underpinnings which may otherwise go unnoticed. To identify the practice of racialization in my study, I utilize the CDA approaches offered by Wodak (1997), Lazar and Lazar (2004), and Karim (1997). These analytical approaches reveal the thematic patterns and argumentation strategies of racialized “othering”, the linguistic construction of criminalized, vilified, enemy “others”, as well as the racialized stereotyped categorizations of Arabs/Muslims in Canadian national security discourse. I further employ the evaluation/appraisal approaches of Martin (2000a) and Thompson and Hunston (2000) at particular instances when legal discourse appears to obscure evaluation in order to consider in greater detail how the apparently “race”-neutral language of the *IRPA* enables the practice of racism to take place in the application of security certificate policy, and to make the link between discriminatory language and racist practice more transparent.

Following my examination of the texts using the aforementioned approaches, I subsequently locate my analytical findings within Jackson’s (2005) interpretative counter-terrorism framework. Initially, I had intended to use Jackson (2005) to complete the preliminary step of my textual analysis but in my attempt to apply his approach I discovered that his framework relies, for the most part, more on interpretation than analysis. In the recognition of the analytical limitations of Jackson (2005) I became aware, however, that his

framework provides a rich outline from which to understand and explain the results of my analysis. I therefore detail his framework in section 3.3 that I later use to explore my findings.

In this section of my paper, I begin with a brief outline to provide a structure for the order in which I detail the analytical approaches that I employ in my research:

First, I explain van Dijk's (2001)⁶⁴ contribution to the analysis of ideologically biased discourse as his thematic patterning approach influences many of the other approaches considered here.⁶⁵

Second, I describe the phases of analysis of the racialized "other" put forward by Wodak (1997) in her work on the Kurt Waldheim affair in Austria.

Third, I explain Lazar and Lazar's (2004) categories of what they term "out-casting" that provide the mechanisms to analyze counter-terrorism discourse which legally excludes, criminalizes, racially stereotypes and vilifies an "other".

Fourth, I discuss Karim's (1997) steps for the identification of Arab/Muslim racialized discourse through thematic constructs, linguistic references, associations, and the misuse of terms.

Last, I describe the linguistic tools of evaluation/appraisal theory in the methods of Martin (2000a) and Thompson and Hunston (2000) that are used to detect evaluation in apparently "neutral" texts.

⁶⁴ As noted earlier in my review of the literature, I consider van Dijk's (2001) "Multidisciplinary CDA: A Plea for Diversity" in my methodology section because in it he provides a step by step approach to macro and micro analysis (see section 2.2.5).

⁶⁵ Karim (1997), Lazar and Lazar (2004) as well as Wodak (2001) acknowledge the influence of van Dijk's (1984, 2001) thematic approach on their analytical frameworks.

3.2.1 Van Dijk's Thematic Patterning: Macro and Micro Analysis

All critical discourse investigations should begin with a thematic structural analysis according to van Dijk (2001) since thematic patterns in topic choices, propositions and lexical items represent the forms of meaning that are directly linked to beliefs, attitudes and ideologies (p. 99). His macro/global and micro/local semantic approach provides the researcher with a way to analyze the evaluative stances within discourse as well as facilitates the identification of discourse communities and themes in the form of macro/global and micro/local propositions.⁶⁶ The identification of macro-structures can help explain the logic of the discourse, the manner in which it is constructed to form a coherent whole, and the way that language is used strategically to achieve a certain comprehension of the text (van Dijk 2001, p. 102). As users of language can influence and manipulate as well as emphasize particular understandings of a text, the creation of a framework based on global semantic topics further enables closer scrutiny of the way in which meaning is realized at the local-level in the lexical choices made. Micro-analysis considers the meaning of word choices and what impact these choices may have on the reader/listener.

The initial step in van Dijk's (2001) thematic patterning approach is to conduct an overall structural analysis of the discourse that summarizes the meaning of the entire text (van Dijk, 2001, p. 102). The semantic macro-structures are summaries of global themes/topics of the discourse listed in the form of macro-propositions (global topics). These macro-propositions can be further reduced to one overall topic or macro-proposition that presents the ideology, principles and/or beliefs located in the text.

⁶⁶ In agreement with van Dijk (2001), I use the terms macro/global, micro/local, and topics/themes interchangeably. Propositions refer to statements/claims/declarations made while structures represent arrangements of information that are not necessarily in the form of complete clauses.

To demonstrate the steps to follow in a macro-structural thematic analysis, I have analyzed a CSIS text on security certificates from the “self-presentation and formation of public opinion” field of action in the genre of a public information fact sheet.⁶⁷ The macro-propositions were identified by their repeated occurrence as global topics in the discourse. This involved summarizing the patterns of similar themes found in subtitles, thematic sentences and conclusive statements. To remain close to the intended meaning of the discourse and to limit researcher bias I used language similar to the original text to list the macro-propositions. The macro-propositions are labeled from **M1** through to **M6** in step 1 of Table 5. I then identified the overall macro-proposition which presents the belief that CSIS holds regarding the security certificate process listed in step 2 of Table 5.

Table 5: Steps for Macro-Structural Analysis ⁶⁸

<p>1. Identify macro-propositions: Summarize topics/ themes based on the global topics/themes that reoccur throughout the entire text and list. Often expressed through the following: titles, headlines, summaries, abstracts, thematic sentences, conclusions</p> <p>M1. Security certificates are issued by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP) and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (CIC) through a provision contained in the IRPA to remove non-citizens from Canada.</p> <p>M2. These certificates are only issued when there is a great deal of evidence that those who are subject to them pose a significant threat to Canada and Canadians.</p> <p>M3. The security certificate process is based on a just and rigorous process of information gathering and risk assessment by CSIS and the Minister of PSEP.</p> <p>M4. The security certificate process is based on the decisions of judges.</p> <p>M5. A summary that enables the subject to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the certificate must be provided.</p> <p>M6. Any limitation to the rights of individuals under security certificates, including the right of the subject and his/her lawyer to see the evidence against him/her, is justified.</p>
<p>2. Identify the overall ideology/principle or belief of the text based on the macro-propositions:</p> <p>Security certificates are a necessary and just process to ensure the safety and security of Canada and Canadians.</p>

⁶⁷ As the text is lengthy I have included a complete analysis of it in Appendix A.

⁶⁸ The steps for macro-structural analysis are adapted from van Dijk (2001) pp. 101-103.

Van Dijk's (2001) next choice for analysis is to examine the smaller meaningful structures of the discourse or "micro or local" themes (van Dijk, 2001, p. 102). Micro or local themes are identified through the context within which the more global themes are employed by patterned usage of the same, related or oppositional lexis that fall under the overarching macro/global themes. A study at this level considers lexical meanings and associations, propositional structures, and coherence and cohesion (van Dijk 2001, p. 103). Like the examination of macro-structures, an analysis at this level reveals the "socially shared beliefs" of the speakers/writers of the text (van Dijk, p.103). Through lexical choices the meaning of the text is controlled so that the receiver of the information takes on a particular understanding of the ideas/issues/opinions presented.

The micro-themes for the previously referred to CSIS text are presented in Table 6 below.⁶⁹ The left-hand column presents the micro-thematic structures that are considered for analysis, while the right-hand column presents the analysis from the text.

Table 6: Micro-Analysis: Lexical Themes

Meaning of words: consider i. Synonyms ii. Definitions	i. security = safety, sanctuary, refuge, safe-keeping ii. 1. the state or feeling of being safe and protected 2. the assurance that something of value will not be taken away
Collocations/word associations: Look for words that are linked or associated with each other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ security/national/ Canada/Canadians ▪ permanent resident or foreign national= inadmissible on grounds of security, espionage, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality ▪ security certificate process= security/Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP)/Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (CIC)/CSIS/judges ▪ security certificate process= rigorous/deliberate/exhaustive/ information from multiple sources ▪ security certificate process = evidence heard in private/

⁶⁹ As my purpose here is to demonstrate how to conduct a micro-thematic analysis only some of the micro-themes are listed.

	<p>evidence in the absence of the subject/ no appeal/ conclusive proof</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ security certificates subjects = Islamic terrorists, Russian nationals engaged in espionage, Sikh terrorists, Hindu extremists in support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, secular Arab terrorists and a right-wing extremist.
<p>Polarizations: Look for words and propositions that divide groups or ideas, create and/or harden opposition, and/or or make opposition more extreme</p> <p>The polarized groups are identified as: 1. those subject to (security) certificates (bolded) and those who the certificates serve to protect (i.e., Canada, Canadians; <i>italicized</i>), and 2. those who administer or otherwise participate in the security certificate process, which includes the ability to access all the information/ evidence against the subjects of the security certificates (<i>italicized</i>), and those who are subject to security certificates, the information they are permitted to have and the information/ evidence that they cannot access (bolded).</p>	<p>A certificate-also referred to as a security certificate-is one way for the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to remove from this country a person who poses a security threat to Canada or Canadians.</p> <p><i>The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) contains provisions which allow a certificate to be prepared and signed by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP) (formerly referred to as the Solicitor General of Canada) and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (CIC) when a permanent resident or foreign national (the subject) is deemed to be inadmissible on grounds of security, espionage, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality.</i></p> <p><i>The judge provides the subject with a summary of the information or evidence heard in private and in the absence of the subject.</i></p> <p>The subject has an opportunity to be heard in an open hearing and can present evidence and testimony.... If, however, <i>the judge decides that it is reasonable, then the certificate becomes a removal order. The Federal Court's decision cannot be appealed.</i></p>

The micro-themes in the above example concern the national “security” of Canada and Canadians over those the rights of “foreign” individuals including the right to security. This is evident through the collocation of the terms “security”, “security certificates”, “CSIS”, the “Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP)”, “the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (CIC)” and “judges” with protection for “Canada and Canadians”. In opposition to this group who is afforded security, as non-Canadians, “foreign nationals”, “permanent residents”, and “refugees” associated with the “*IRPA*” are subject to security certificates. Information on non-Canadians who pose a threat to national security is gathered through “deliberate and rigorous” processes. Since judges see the evidence against

the security certificate subject, should the certificate be found reasonable, there is no “right of appeal”. A look at the structure of propositions and connection to other propositions demonstrates an overall coherence and consistency in the argument made throughout the text. This argument is the same as that presented in step 2 Table 5: Security certificates are a necessary and just process to ensure the safety and security of Canada and Canadians.

An investigation of macro and micro-structures further assists in the recognition of communities in opposition or what van Dijk (2001) terms “ingroups” and “outgroups” or “us” and “them” (p. 103). The ingroups are presented as positive while the outgroups are negatively represented. Through this categorization the ideological polarization of these communities is signified. Accordingly, in the above, foreigners are negatively presented as outgroups, while Canadian citizens are positively presented as the ingroup.

What is especially interesting in this text, which van Dijk’s (2001) micro-analysis moves the researcher to consider, is the lexical meaning of the word “security”. In itself the word belongs to neither the “in” nor “out” group. It simply means the state or feeling of being safe and protected, and additionally the assurance that something of value will not be taken away. The association of the term with Canada and Canadians and not with non-Canadians, however, illustrates the ideology of “othering” that is present throughout the text. While for some, the fact that laws are different for citizens and non-citizens of Canada is not surprising, a consideration of the meaning of security raises important questions concerning whose security and for what ends. It also brings the researcher to think about the methods of justification that make it possible to have one set of laws for insiders and another for outsiders.

3.2.2 Wodak: An Archetype for Racialized “Othering”

Wodak’s (1997, 2001) approach provides a way to investigate “othering” through the linguistic argumentation strategies at the word and text level. Indeed, her framework brings together a number of linguistic tools to establish “an archetype” that can assist in uncovering for all forms of “othering” and racist discourse (Wodak, 1997, pp. 85-86). Van Dijk’s (1984, 1993, 2001) influence on Wodak’s (1997) study in relation to thematic patterning at the macro and micro level, and the categorization of positive “self” and negative “other” presentation is evident throughout Wodak’s (1997) analytical model.⁷⁰ For purposes of clarity and ease of use, I present her approach to analysis, shown in Table 7 below, in a three-phase framework which is subdivided into stages of analysis.

First, in what I identify as phase 1, Wodak (1997) emphasizes the importance of the context of the situation in which the discursive event has taken place. Within this phase she outlines a five-step procedure for the examination of the setting, formality, participants (i.e., people involved), topic and the presence of the “other” which illustrates the relationship between the contextual elements of the discourse event and further connects to the subsequent phases of the construction of the “other”.

Next, in what I label Wodak’s (1997) second phase, she calls for a three-part investigation (labeled A, B, and C in Table 7) into the argumentation strategies used to construct a racist discourse. These strategies, though similar to and likely influenced by van Dijk’s (1984) micro-thematic analysis of polarizations, provide valuable guidance for ways in which to examine the process of “othering”. Wodak (1997) puts forward specific categories for which to look for patterns that create a binary division between “in” and “out”

⁷⁰ It is important to note that van Dijk’s work on thematic patterning predates Wodak’s (1997) research. She acknowledges his influence on her approach, primarily in her joint research with Martin Reisigl (see Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak & Reisigl, 2003).

groups. In part A she suggests one look firstly for the discursive elements that create divisiveness between groups and establish a “we-discourse” and subsequently, for the manner in which arguments are construed to place blame on the “other” while rejecting any possible responsibility on the “self”.

In association with this strategy of group construction, Wodak (1997) proposes a close exploration of the strategies of justification (part B-see next page) which enable speakers/writers to make evaluations and assign responsibility and guilt. The aims of these strategies are to present the speakers/writers as free of prejudice or at times to even reverse prejudice. At stage B a careful examination of the following is considered: first, the construct of a dichotomous division of the world into good and bad which often includes an emphasis on the distinction between “we/insiders” and “they/outside” as positive “self”/negative “other”; and second, the distortion of information, perspectives and the like which seeks to trivialize and/or exaggerate the views of the “other” both at word level, in the individual lexical choices made, through vagueness, predication, assertion and at text level, in relation to the text as a whole, through stories, unreal scenarios and comparisons. The terms for Wodak’s (1997) self-defined argumentation “strategy of distortion” can be understood to mean: 1. *Vagueness*- any term that is not explicit or unclear in meaning or intention; 2. *Predication* – a term or set of terms that affirms or denies something about something else; use of implicit and/or explicit predicates, e.g., “He is a criminal” and 3. *Assertion* – any term used to state strongly that something is true, e.g. “He **lied** about his identity”. It is important to note that while words may be clearly understood in isolation, the combination of associated lexical terms may make the text itself difficult to understand and hence the categories of vagueness, predication and assertion also apply to the text as a whole.

The third and final phase of Wodak's (1997) approach as noted here involves the identification of stereotypes which function to label and categorize people as "other". Although Wodak (1997) maintains that stereotypes are found mostly in motifs in newspapers and semipublic realms, my study examines how these materialize in what may first appear to be "race"-neutral discourse such as in the legal text of the *IRPA*. The three-step process for the identification of stereotypes examines language that is used to ascribe characteristics to individuals and groups of people. The methods of analysis in this phase reflect van Dijk's (2001) macro and micro structural analysis which requires the scrutiny of: 1. lexical associations/collocations, 2. thematic patterns of "othering", and 3. predication and/or assertion.

Table 7: Identification of Racist Discourse⁷¹

1. Importance of context

1. the setting : public, private, mass media and the like
2. the formality of the situation
3. the type of participants
4. the topic
5. the presence or absence of the racialized "other"

2. Argumentation strategies

A. Strategies of group definition and construction

1. strategies construct a discourse of difference "we-discourse"
2. rejection of responsibility of guilt and displacement on "other" as a whole

B. Strategies of justification

1. division of world into a dichotomy – good and bad with "we/insiders" and "they/outsideers" emphasized
2. strategy of distortion

3. Methods of labeling and categorization for identification of stereotypes

1. Lexical associations
2. Thematic patterns
3. Predication and assertion

⁷¹ Adapted from Ruth Wodak, 1997, pp. 73-85.

3.2.3 Lazar and Lazar: “Outcasting”

Like van Dijk (1984, 1993, 2001) and Wodak (1997), Lazar and Lazar (2004) put forward an approach to examine the manner in which “others” as “individuals and/or groups are systematically marked and set aside as outcasts” (p. 227). The process of “othering” in what they term the macrostrategy of “out-casting” constructs a false dichotomy of “us” and “them” which leads to the exclusion of individuals and groups from the legal rights and privileges afforded to “us”. The significance of this approach is not in the consideration of individual lexis but rather on the identification of patterns of themes at the ideational level to consider who is doing what to whom where, when and how. The ideational conveys the content of a text and is related to the “field of action”. It involves the processes (e.g., what is happening in the text), participants (e.g., who is involved) and circumstances (e.g., under what conditions) at the semantic level and is identified through lexical choices. Reminiscent of the earlier studies of van Dijk (1984, 1993, 2001) and Wodak (1997, 2001), Lazar and Lazar (2004) emphasize the need to look for thematic patterns through which meaning is constructed. Moreover, their focus on the creation of “others” who are criminalized, orientalized, and vilified adds crucial elements to the previously mentioned frameworks which offer a broader approach to the study of racism. Since their analytical framework focuses on the construction of an “enemy other” in the post-September 11, 2001 climate, Lazar and Lazar’s (2004) model also provides a detailed linguistic structure in which to locate current problematic and racist texts. Their framework thus affords me with an opportunity to illustrate the racialized language that is used in the accusations against the security certificate subjects evident in the CSIS reports. A classification of the four aspects to

analyze in the macro-strategic process of “outcasting” is outlined in Table 8 at the end of this section.

To identify how “others” are cast out, Lazar and Lazar (2004) distinguish the following strategies: 1. “enemy construction”, 2. “criminalization”, 3. “orientalization” and 4. “(e)vilification” (p. 223). The first aspect of “enemy construction” concerns the clear pronouncement of an “enemy” which according to Lazar and Lazar (2004) is essential to distinguish the “moral order” of a community (p. 227). The ideological construction of “enemy others” establishes and maintains out-groups or “them” who oppose the values of the in-group or “us”. The articulation of difference between out-group enemy “others” and in-group “community” occurs through the semantic juxtaposition of values such as “enemies of freedom”. In this construction the “other” is prevented from desiring the same values as those of the in-group. The “other” is thus easily “excluded from having a stake in freedom ... [and the subsequent label of] terrorist or ... tyrant ... becomes easily justifiable” (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 229). The strategy of enemy construction denies the “other” the use “of ideologically respectable terms like ‘soldiers’ or ‘freedom fighter’; at the same time it makes counter-violence an urgent task” (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 229). Similar to Wodak’s (1997) argumentation strategy of distortion, the strategy of enemy construction, thus downplays the seriousness and importance of the perspectives of “others”.

Additionally, this strategy fuses the beliefs, views and ideologies of a wide-range of individuals and groups who may have nothing more in common than the created category as enemy. Lazar and Lazar (2004) assert that “the lack of differentiation makes this an ‘efficient rhetorical ploy to emphasise how bad the Others are’” (van Dijk, 1995 as cited in Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 230). It further depoliticizes the practice of “othering” to make it “appear

non-ideological” (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 230). The values of the in-group are therefore made to appear neutral and good while those of the enemy are ideological and bad.

The purpose of the second strategy of “outcasting” - the strategy of criminalization- is to delegitimize the “political actions of the enemy” (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 231). To do so, Lazar and Lazar (2004) claim that all political violence associated with the “other” is criminalized so as to be perceived as illegitimate (p. 231). The political nature of enemy actions is removed and the historical events which precede the actions are made irrelevant. To ensure that historically significant relations of power are not discussed, the strategy of criminalization combines a lack of context for the political actions of the “other” with the simple discursive practice of lexical designation to describe the enemy “others” as “killers”, and “murderers”, along with their associated criminal actions of “killing”, “raping”, and “murdering”. The attribution of criminality to political actors occurs through “relational processes” realized by the verb “be”, e.g., they **are** criminals, while criminal actions are designated through “material processes” realized by verbs of doing, e.g. they are **killing** innocent civilians. Integral to this strategy is the description of actions as past, habitual and projected in order to assert what criminal acts the enemy has done, does and is going to do. Coupled with this time frame is often the use of language that shows the actions of the “other” as calculated and premeditated. The methodical intention of the enemy’s violence is expressed through terms such as “mission”, “schooled in the methods”, “deliberate”, “determined” and “systematic” (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 231). A final and interrelated factor in the strategy of criminalization is the use of lexical associations through positive and negative terms to distinguish between “us” as honourable and “them” as ignoble. As Lazar and Lazar (2004) remark, “the giving of one’s life for some important purpose is a notion

that is used both of enemy and of self – but of course with quite different connotations” (p. 223). For instance, the use of the adjective “ultimate” with the noun “sacrifice” as in “ultimate sacrifice” has a positive meaning. Yet, the same term “sacrifice” used as a verb in “they sacrifice human life” to describe the action of taking another life has a clearly negative meaning. As van Dijk (2001) and Wodak (1997) also note, what is important is not so much the individual terms, as nouns, adjectives or verbs, but rather the context within which the terms are used.

Historical context is also important to the third aspect of “outcasting” outlined by Lazar and Lazar (2004) in the discursive strategy for the constructed divide between East and West known as “orientalization”. Using dependency theory to present the “strategy of orientalizing”, Lazar and Lazar (2004) acknowledge Said’s (1978) significant contribution to their identification of orientalizing as a strategy that maintains “as ‘core’ a unitary Western moral order, and ... [that] out-casts the “other” into the “periphery” (p. 234). Since Lazar and Lazar (2004) take into consideration many of the political aspects of “the discourse of the New World order” throughout their study, their approach to stereotypes introduces critical elements for the analysis of the current climate of racism post-September 11, 2001. It thus adds substantially to Wodak’s (1997) analytical argumentation strategy in the identification of stereotypes, which as previously mentioned is meant to be a model that can be adapted to fit the situation at hand. It also complements as well as enhances the discursive constructs of the Arab/Muslim stereotype described in the work of Karim (1997) which I explain later in this chapter.

Lazar and Lazar present four main orientalist stereotypes. I list them here along with the ways in which to identify their use: 1. bellicosity- the notion as Said (1978) describes that

“strife not peace [is] the ‘normal’ state of affairs”(Said, 1978, p. 49 as cited in Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 234). This is recognized in lexical associations of “their” lives as “aggressive” or “brutal”. The belief is that “we” value peace while “they” thrive on “conflict”; 2. moral degeneracy – this stereotype which is also seen in the construction of “an enemy other” promotes an ethnocentric view of “we” as morally superior to the orientalized “other”. This is seen in the unnecessary use of descriptors or in other words “overlexicalization” of synonymous terms that are used to influence the reader/speaker’s perspective, such as: cruelty, ruthlessness, mercilessness, brutality and absence of conscience (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 234); 3. duplicitous - establishes the Arab/Muslim “other” as untrustworthy through the use of lexical descriptors, such as “devious” and material processes, such as “to plot”, and “to hide” (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 235); and 4. uncivilised – the “other” is presented as in need of discipline, control and restraint through lexical terms such as “barbaric” and metaphors like “bestial” and “parasitic” (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, pp. 234-235).

While the process of vilifying the enemy is common to all the strategies outlined above, Lazar and Lazar (2004) use “the term [which they coin] ‘(e)vilification’ ... to highlight a particular and powerful kind of vilification ... based upon the spiritual/religious dichotomy between ‘good’ and ‘evil’” (p. 236). The process of constructing an evil and ungodly threat occurs in three ways through: 1.lexical reiteration in the repetition of “evil”; 2. attribution in the clause (relational attributives), for instance in “They **are** evil”; and 3. action, “either [as] the goal of the enemy’s activities or the object of ‘our’ perceptual vision”, e.g., enemy’s goal=They plot **evil**; object of our vision=We see **evil** (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 236; bold added). In the first instance the (re)presentation of the utterance makes “evil” the

goal of the enemy, while in the second the utterance illustrates that “we” perceive the actions of the enemy as “evil”.

As in the approaches advocated by van Dijk (1993, 2001) and Wodak (1997), the importance of recognizing thematic patterning is emphasized in the analysis of microstrategies described by Lazar and Lazar (2004, pp.227-237). To aid in this task, I list language and forms to look for in the text which can then be applied to the appropriate microstrategy: 1.lexical chains - reoccurrence of the same or similar words e.g. security, safety; 2.collocational sets - words that are repeatedly associated with one another so that they appear almost inseparable or as a single term e.g., “national” and “security”; “foreign” and “national”; 3. participants - description of people in the text as victims or aggressors; actors/agents or recipients; 4. processes - what is happening in the clause; 5. actions – the actions of the people are described as past, habitual, or projected.

Table 8: Microstrategies of “Out-casting”

- | |
|---|
| <p>1. Enemy construction – Linguistic construction of enemy through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. semantic field, e.g., chaos, disorder, despotism ii. collocations- e.g., tyranny and control iii. elaborating statements – e.g., As per the <i>IRPA</i>, the summary must include sufficient information to enable the individual to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the certificate, <i>but that does not include anything which, in the opinion of the judge, would be injurious to national security or the safety of any person.</i> iv. material processes, e.g., remaking, imposing <p>2. Criminalization - Political actions of enemy as illegitimate:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. ahistorical context ii. lexical designation of “other” as criminal, e.g., killers, murders iii. lexical designation of action as criminal, e.g., kill, rape iv. actions – past, habitual, projected v. calculated harm – e.g., mission, schooled in the methods, deliberate vi. “us”= honourable / “them” = ignoble - lexical associations through positive and negative terms <p>3. Orientalization – Arab/Muslim stereotypes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. bellicosity-strife not peace as “normal” ii. moral degeneracy – overlexicalization of synonymous terms: cruelty, ruthlessness, mercilessness, brutality and absence of conscience iii. duplicitous- lexical descriptors; processes iv. uncivilised – lexical terms e.g., “barbaric”; metaphors, e.g., “bestial”, “parasitic” <p>4. (E)vilification –Vilifying enemy through spiritual/religious dichotomy between ‘good’ & ‘evil’ via:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. lexical reiteration, e.g., evil ii. processes- attribution in clause (relational attributives), e.g., They are evil. iii. enemy’s action as goal or object, e.g., They plot evil. |
|---|

I end my overview of the CDA approaches that I employ in this study with my description of Karim's (1997) contribution to the analysis of racialized discourse. Karim (1997) examines the use of the primary stereotype as a core discourse strategy in depth. His approach explores how Arabs/Muslims as a particular group are racialized through thematic constructs, linguistic references, associations, and the misuse of terms and therefore enables a specific analysis of Arab/Muslim racialized discourse. In this particularized manner, Karim (1997) enhances Wodak's (1997) methods for identifying racial stereotypes which she discusses on a broader scale in order to provide a flexible framework to be adapted according to the research in question. Karim's (1997) approach also serves as a point of comparison for the microstrategic analytical approach proposed by Lazar and Lazar (2004). More importantly, his framework makes it possible for me to consider how the legal rights of the racialized groups who are currently "othered" are diminished in the practice of national security.

The conduit used to facilitate "othering", or in Lazar and Lazar's (2004) terms "outcasting", is the cognitive tool of the primary stereotype or topos.⁷² Karim cites Ivie to define topos as "a 'reservoir' of ideas or core images from which rhetoric statements can be generated" (Ivie, 1980, p. 281 as cited in Karim, 1997, p. 153). According to Karim (1997), topos, as a broader concept than script, enables people to make sense of their world. As he states, "the primary stereotype or topos ... operates as a referential basis of interpretation and is essential in making textual accounts seem coherent within a particular culture's norms" (Karim, 1997, p. 153). Topos relies on visual and linguistic signifiers that intertwine and entrench categories of the "other" and therefore permit for their perseverance. The primary stereotype naturalizes views of the "other" within collective cultural memory.

⁷² The plural for topos is topoi.

Karim (1997) first considers the presentation of “facts” that promulgate the view of “Arab terrorism” as “ancient” and which further attempt to trace political assassinations as rooted in Islam (p. 167). He not only disputes the claim that Arab terrorism has an “ancient” history which results from an “ancient” hatred, but also notes the Western ideology that is behind such points of view. According to Karim (1997) the claim that all political assassinations in the Middle East can be linked to Islam follows the same logic as that which would attempt to make all the assassinations of political leaders in the U.S. inherent to American politics (p. 167). In this way, Karim’s (1997) approach takes note of the depoliticization of discourse that invokes images of Muslims as irrational terrorists. As Karim (1997) states, “not only does such a view imply that the religion of Islam promotes gratuitous destruction, it completely disregards the structural violence ... [that results from the West’s hegemonic power of the economy and culture around the world] as well as the direct violence supported ... [by Western powers against Eastern interests]” (George, 1986 as cited in Karim, 1997, p. 166). The presentation of “ancient hatred”, which Lazar and Lazar (2004) also reflect upon in the microstrategy of “criminalization”, thus fails to address important issues of power relations.

While in the microstrategy of “criminalization” Lazar and Lazar (2004) discuss the technique of depoliticization in relation to how political acts are transformed to be seen as purely criminal (see Table 8:2 above), Karim (1997) addresses how power is removed from the context of discourse with the construct of a genealogy or history of Muslim terrorism (p. 167). Karim’s (1997) identification of such orientalist presentations (identified in Table 9:1) is also evident in the “bellicosity” aspect of Lazar and Lazar’s (2004) microstrategy of “orientalization” which presents violence in the East as “normal”.

Connected to the employment of representations of “ancient” hatred is the perspective which reduces Islam to fundamentalism. Karim (1997) observes how little attention is paid to the differences and diversity of Muslims globally since racist views do not distinguish between disparate voices in groupings based on ethnicity, culture, and/or religion (p.155). Through thematic patterning the perspective of few Muslims is used to represent all and consequently the voices of extremists are not separated from other points of view. The reduction of Islam to fundamentalism is identifiable through the repeated discursive employment of lexical choices of words such as “Muslim rage”, “angry faith”, and “dark side of Islam” to describe Islam as linked with anger and violence as well as in the repetition of lexical associations of Islam with extremism such as “Muslim fundamentalist”, “Islamic radical” and “Islamic terrorist” (see Table 9:2). The identification of this category complements Lazar and Lazar’s (2004) classification of the use of lexical and metaphorical references to Arabs/Muslims as “uncivilized” (see Table 8:3, iv) and also adds a racialized aspect to their criminalization classification of an “us” versus “them” (see Table 8:2, vi). Both Karim (1997) and Lazar and Lazar’s (2004) categorizations problematize the discursive orientalist strategies used by demonstrating how language is employed to reduce racialized people who share a religion and/or language into narrow constructs that remove their humanity.

Another discursive structure identified by Karim (1997) is the use of lexical references to Islam or in other words the use of overcompleteness that presents irrelevant information to create an association between facts that may not exist. For example, Karim (1997) cites the following account from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that appeared in a United Press (1987) article: “Fawaz, *a devout Muslim*, and alleged master-mind of a 30-

hour airliner hijacking two years ago was interested in buying a large quantity of drugs for his further sale, officials said” (as cited in Karim, 1997, p. 168; italics added). This passage provides unrelated information about the person’s adherence to Islamic religious beliefs to describe his criminal act and thus to link the Islamic religion with criminal pursuits, although no reason for this association is explicitly made. There is no justification given for why these two are linked which is likely to go unquestioned because of the prevalence of the Arab/Muslim stereotype. As Karim (1997) states, “the writer did not feel it necessary to justify the implicit link because the script for Muslim terrorism renders even such ambiguity coherent” (p. 168). In considering the fact that justification is not needed to make such associations, Karim’s (1997) classification of the use of overcompleteness enhances the category of “moral degeneracy” noted in Lazar and Lazar (2004) as well as in Wodak’s (1997) examination of the use of justification in her presentation of argumentation strategies (see Table 7: 2b).

Karim’s (1997) fourth identification of the primary stereotype examines the intertextual merging of fact and fiction. The hybrid result is presented within fictional narratives such as novels and film which most often present “facts” in historical representations. He cites the depiction of a Palestinian terrorist as Muslim in the popular John Le Carre novel *The Little Drummer Girl*. The “fact” however is that during the 1980s the most common Palestinian resistance groups were secular (Karim, 1997, p. 168). In my study, I extend this category to include the reverse discursive process so that a consideration of fiction buried within fact is also addressed.

The origin of information also plays a crucial role in the particular use of Muslim terms that are taken out of context and/or are erroneous. In the final category that I consider

from Karim (1997), he addresses the mistaken distinction of the terms “jihad” and “mujahidin”. According to Karim (1997) “jihad” means “literally, righteous struggle” while “mujahidin” refers to those who take part in this struggle (p. 168). The interpretation of what the struggle may be, what means will be used to embark on it and for what ends depends on those who employ the terms. Yet Karim (1997) notes that while some Muslims use the concept of “jihad” as the reason for “their military or socioeconomic actions” their actions are dismissed as “a holy war” that is “inexplicable”, “irrational”, “deviant” or “barbaric” (p. 168). The idea that there is any logical motivation behind their actions thus goes unrecognized and is misrepresented in a depoliticized manner. In a similar vein to Wodak (1997) in her identification of the argumentation strategy of distortion, the use of “jihad” as incomprehensible distorts the actual meaning of the term and further removes any possible socio-political rationale for its use. Like Wodak’s (1997) distortion strategy, Karim demonstrates that through the misuse of these concepts the views of the “other” are either trivialized or exaggerated.

The ideology for employing these terms varies with time. Karim (1997) notes that during the Cold war “mujahidin” was employed in a positive manner to describe fighters in Afghanistan who were opposed to Soviet occupation, while “jihad” was used unfavourably to discuss “the coverage of Muslim groups in Egypt and Lebanon fighting their respective national governments” (p. 170). Karim (1997) notes that the misappropriation of these terms in Western discourse leads to confusion and raises the question of why lexical terms such as “fighters”, “soldiers”, and “armed resistance” which are more widely understood are not employed instead.

Table 9 below briefly presents Karim's (1997) main categories of Arab/Muslim "othering" used to discursively construct, promulgate and reduce Arabs/Muslims into stereotypical categories that establish a division between "us" and "them".⁷³

Table 9: Violence and Barbarism: Terrorism and Jihad⁷⁴

1. Presentation of "facts":

Ancient history/ ancient hatred –

e.g., brief history of Muslim terrorism, genealogy of Muslim terrorism

2. Thematic chains:

Reduction of Islam to fundamentalism – through lexical choices and associations

As ignoble faith- e.g., Muslim rage, angry faith, dark side of Islam,

As fundamentalism - e.g., Muslim fundamentalist, Islamic radical, Islamic terrorist

3. Overcompleteness: - Lexical references provide irrelevant information related to being Muslim/Arab without justification

e.g., Fawaz, *a devout Muslim*, and alleged master-mind....

4. Intertextuality: Facts vs. Fiction—Fiction vs. Fact

merging "facts" within a fictional narrative and/or the reverse

5. Misappropriation/ misuse of terms:

jihad, mujahid

3.2.5 Martin, and Thompson & Hunston: Uncovering Judgement in Discourse

I end my overview of the analytical approaches that I employ in my study with a description of evaluation/appraisal theory which can assist in uncovering the problematic nature of apparently "neutral" texts in the lawmaking field of action. Like other concepts that are employed in a variety of ways, Thompson and Hunston (2000) recognize the different and sometimes restricted manner in which the term "evaluation" is used in discourse analysis to consider only lexical evaluative signs of affect and attitude, and not how evaluative language is used to express value systems, establish and create relationships, or organize the discourse so that it commonly understood. Nonetheless, Thompson and Hunston (2000)

⁷³ Although Karim (1997) identifies four topoi in his study, I have detailed the categories of "violence" and "barbarism" only as the other two, "lust" and "avarice", are for the most part not directly applicable to my analysis.

⁷⁴ Adapted from Karim H. Karim, 1997, pp. 166-171.

choose to use the term “evaluation” since they believe that it is able to encompass an expansionary view of evaluative language that expresses terms as good/positive or bad/negative as well as the likelihood of the occurrence of various events and the evidence for the claims made from the perspective of the writer/speaker (p. 3). Martin (2000a), on the other hand, maintains that the commonly limited use of the term “evaluation” leads to confusion when the term is employed to consider broader understandings of evaluative language and hence he prefers to use the word “appraisal”.

In its attempt to appear neutral, legal discourse often conceals its evaluative positioning. Since it can be difficult to locate discriminatory practices in the language of legal texts, evaluation/appraisal theory provides a systematic method for revealing when evaluations are made that are at times otherwise difficult to assess. The approaches offered in Martin (2000a), and Thompson and Hunston (2000) consider particularized uses of language that enable a detailed examination of problematic evaluative discourse. The evaluation/appraisal frameworks that are most applicable to my study are Martin’s (2000a) framework for “evoked” appraisal, and Thompson and Hunston’s (2000) “Three linguistic features to signal evaluation”.

My intention in bringing into play evaluation/appraisal theory is to demonstrate how this approach can further enrich an already detailed study. Given the constraints of this research, I cannot fully explore all the instances when evaluation adds to the analysis presented. Thus I have selected particular instances in the *IRPA* and the CSIS summaries to examine in detail where I believe evaluation theory adds a further degree of depth and affords an additional way to look at how evaluation takes place within the texts. Below, I explain the evaluation/appraisal methods of Martin (2000a) and Thompson and Hunston

(2000) as they pertain to my analysis of concealed evaluative judgement in the legal text of the *IRPA* and in the practice of security reporting in the CSIS summaries.

As noted in my review of the literature, since current racism in Canada is less overt than it was in the past, the expression of racist ideology often occurs implicitly. This is especially true of official discourse such as that which I explore in my study. It is useful then to consider Martin's approach to the analysis of texts that are implicitly rather explicitly evaluative. As previously stated, Martin (2000a) distinguishes between "inscribed" appraisal which is explicit in texts (e.g., an *evil* enemy), and appraisal that is "evoked" as an evaluative response projected by reference to events/states that are "prized" (e.g., This law *has taken steps to combat terrorism and terrorist activities at home and abroad*), or "feared" (e.g., a person who *poses a security threat to Canada or Canadians*) (see Martin, 2000a, p. 142). Martin (2000a) contends that inscribed evaluation "is harder to resist or ignore" than evoked evaluation because the prescriptive nature of inscribed evaluation leads the reader to take a particular reading position (p. 155). Evoked evaluation, on the other hand, is more open to "accommodating a wider range of reading positions" because it does overtly direct a reader to read a text in a certain way but rather uses language to construct ideational meaning (Martin, 2000a, p. 155). For the same reason, the subtlety of evoked evaluation is also more difficult to contest. Individual evaluative lexical items, such as good, bad, hate, and dislike, are not enough to determine evoked evaluation as more extended units of language are used by the reader to construct value judgements. As such, the context and the field of discourse/action play an essential role in the analysis of ideational meaning since different communities will read the same texts differently. For example, the Minister of Safety and Preparedness Canada will likely understand the evaluative statements made in the CSIS

summary reports on the security certificate subjects differently than those who are accused of posing a threat to the security of Canada. Consequently, as less obvious forms of evaluation do not rely on evaluative lexis but on the creation of ideational meanings, each instance of evoked evaluation must be considered with respect to the context, field of action and discourse community.

To aid with my analysis of the *IRPA*, I have created Table 10 below to examine the evocation of positive and negative evaluation. It is important to note that inscribed behaviour is more likely to be present in the CSIS text than in the more neutrally-worded text of the *IRPA*. My focus in investigating evoked evaluation is therefore on the *IRPA* text.

Table 10: Inscribed/Evoked Evaluation: Positive and Negative

Evaluative instance	Inscribed/ Evoked Evaluation
a <i>good</i> soldier	Inscribed - positive evaluation
a <i>vicious</i> fighter	Inscribed - negative evaluation
This law <i>has taken steps to combat terrorism and terrorist activities at home and abroad.</i>	Evoked - positive evaluation
a person who <i>poses a security threat to Canada or Canadians</i>	Evoked - negative evaluation

According to Thompson and Hunston (2000) evaluation is best understood with a consideration of the interrelated nature of three functions: 1. the expression of value systems of people and their community, 2. the way in which relations between the writer/reader or speaker/listener are constructed and maintained as well as 3. how the discourse is organized so that it is understood by communities of practice (pp. 6-13). The expression of value systems tells the reader/listener what the writer/speaker feels and what is valued by the community to which s/he belongs. Value systems occur both within texts and intertextually.

The consistent re-production of evaluative language creates a relationship between the reader/listener and writer/speaker. The genre of a text tells the reader what language can be expected. In the case of this study, the genre of the lawmaking text of the *IRPA* tells us, as readers, to expect legal language and neutrality. As Thompson and Hunston (2000) contend, however, since evaluation can be employed in a variety of ways any use of language can be considered evaluative. For this reason, I draw on the framework of Thompson and Hunston (2000) presented in Table 11 to assist in identifying when language is used evaluatively in the *IRPA*.

Table 11: Thompson and Hunston's Three Linguistic Features to Signal Evaluation⁷⁵

<p>1. <i>Evaluation involves comparison</i> of the object of evaluation against some other object/measure: the comparators. These include: comparative adjectives and adverbs indicating affect; adverbs of degree; comparator adverbs such as just, only, at least, certainty, and doubt; expressions of negativity (morphological, such as un- and other affixes; grammatical, such as not, never, hardly; and lexical, such as fail, lack); adjectives indicating affect, certainty, and doubt; comparators, such as negatives, futures, modals, quasimodals, questions, imperatives, or-clauses, superlatives, and comparatives.</p>
<p>2. <i>Evaluation is subjective</i>: the markers of subjectivity. This includes modals and other markers of (un)certainity, (im)possibility, necessity, and prediction; non-identifying adjectives, certain adverbs, nouns, and verbs; sentence adverbs and conjunctions; report and attribution structures; marked clause structures, including patterns beginning with it and there; verbs indicating affect, certainty, and doubt; hedges (e.g. sort of); emphatics (e.g. for sure, really); explicatives, clauses introduced by subordinators such as <i>while</i>, <i>though</i>, <i>since</i>, or <i>because</i>.</p>
<p>3. <i>Evaluation is value-laden</i>: the markers of value. These may be divided into two groups: lexical items whose typical use is in an evaluative environment; and indications of the existence of goals and their (non)achievement; intensifiers, such as gestures, expressive phonology, quantifiers, repetition, and ritual utterances.</p>

⁷⁵ Table adapted from Biber and Finegan, (pp. 18-19) Labov (p. 19), and Thompson and Hunston (p. 21) in Thompson and Hunston, 2000, pp. 18-19, 21.

3.3 Jackson: Interpretative Counter-Terrorism Framework

According to Wodak (2001), interpretative frameworks will always be necessary to mediate between empirical analysis and theoretical approaches as a gap between “the social and the text [will always exist]” (p. 93). To bridge this gap, as mentioned at the outset of this chapter, I use Jackson’s (2005) counter-terrorism framework as an interpretative guide for my discussion of the findings in my analysis in my discussion/conclusion in Chapter 4. His framework, labeled and explained in Table 12, identifies seven macro categories for defining counter-terrorism discourse which shape the manner in which national security and terrorism are discursively constructed. By exploring the results of my analysis from the above approaches through Jackson’s (2005) framework, I am able to illustrate how national security discourse depends on other texts, repetitive narrative articulations and vague language to create an enemy “other”. In doing so, I am further able to show how this enemy “other” who in a state of exception is excluded from the legal rights of Canadian citizens and how this process of exclusion permits for the practice of racialized “othering”.

Table 12: The Characteristics of Counter-Terrorism Discourse⁷⁶

1. hybridity and intertextuality; discursive amalgam or hybrid that weaves together a range of other discourses, myths and narratives-it draws on the other “texts” in society as seen in the following:	
<i>threat and danger narratives</i>	= enemy within; security threats; foreign terror
<i>foreign policy narratives</i>	= enemy aliens; Osama Bin Laden; al-Qaeda; Bin Laden network
<i>religious myths and narratives</i>	= jihad; mujahidin; Muslims; Christians; Crusades
<i>nationalist myths</i>	= national security
<i>“good” war narratives</i>	= Afghani war against Soviets; “war on terrorism”
<i>“bad” war narratives</i>	= “terrorists” against U.S.
2. consistency in primary narratives – frequently telling the story in the same or similar way lends a great deal to coherence which reinforces believability and influence	

⁷⁶ Adapted from Jackson, 2005, pp. 154-159. I have not included his gendered language category that identifies traditional patriarchal male-female roles which serve the important political function of legitimating certain ways of thinking and behaving over others because this category was not present in my analysis.

3. genealogy of discourse – continuity of earlier responses to security and national threats; use of identical language over time, e.g., justice, threat posed by terrorism

4. highly reflexive – has to continuously reconstruct and reinvent itself as something new and different; new need for war: i. new legal-military category invented -- enemy combatant

ii. the terrorist enemy had to be invented – since terrorism is a method more than an ideology how can you fight individuals and tiny groups all over the world? Group them all together under one umbrella term called “terrorism” with “outlaw nations” and “territories”

5. opacity – lack of transparency; terms and phrases never properly defined or explained, e.g., no clear explanation of what “security” actually means or what is considered “terrorism”

6. ideological character – refers to ideology as meaning in the service of power or as construction of meaning attributed to the reproduction and transformation of relations of domination in society ∴ not neutral

7. silences and gaps – what is missing from discourse is often more revealing than what is present or offered in the text - little to no mention of history therefore difficult to understand the context within and reasons why events such as terrorist attacks occur – assumes a “year zero” attitude

4 Analysis

4.0 Historical Contextualization

To contextualize my study and historically situate my current focus on Arab/Muslim racialized “othering” in accordance with critical “race” theorists Aiken (2007) and Razack (2007), Said’s (1978) post-modern-cultural emphasis on the intertextual, and the CDA approaches of Karim (1997), Jackson (2005), Lazar and Lazar (2004), and Wodak and Reisigl (2001), I provide an overview of past racialized national security discourse in Canada. I begin with a brief summary of the case of racialized “othering” in the Canadian national security legislation of Japanese internment camps during the Second World War. Using the discourse of national security, the Canadian government at that time created a classification system to label Japanese Canadians⁷⁷ -- the majority of who were Canadian citizens -- as “enemy aliens”. In the following, I present a chronological synopsis of governmentally legislated Canadian policies and procedures to demonstrate the various fields of action and textual genres that enabled racist practices against Japanese Canadians to occur on the grounds of national security. As stated in my introduction, I chose to compare the current situation of legal “othering” with that of the racial discrimination against Japanese Canadians because both are instances when the discourse of “war” has been used to legitimize the denial of rights afforded to “others” and when racialization of the “other” is evident in the practice of national security.

⁷⁷ Following Kirsten Emiko McAllister (2000) I use the unhyphenated term Japanese Canadians as both a noun and an adjective to refer to all Japanese people in Canada who were immigrants, naturalized citizens or as peoples born in Canada, citizens. As McAllister (1999) states “in a social and historical context where the founding nations were recognized as English and French, the hyphen seemed more to attach Canadian-ness to so-called foreign-ness, making them [groups who use the hyphenated term] foreigners who were also Canadians rather than Canadians with particular socio-cultural ... histories” (p.2:3).

It is important to note that due to the space and time limitations of a thesis, I put forward only a concise account of anti-Japanese legislation in Canada and the public mindset in relation to it during World War II rather than a detailed analysis of the racialized “othering” of Japanese Canadian peoples. As such, in my current study, I have not analyzed the texts related to the legislated practice of racism in Canada against Japanese Canadians, and leave this examination for future work.

4.1 Historical Overview: Japanese Internment

For the duration of the Second World War all Japanese Canadians--including those recognized as Canadian citizens--were officially designated a threat to national security. Through national security legislation in the Privy Council Orders-in-Council (PC), the Canadian government removed the legal rights of this racialized group and thereby excluded them from the rights afforded to all other peoples in Canada. At this time, the federal government issued numerous PCs which called for the removal of property, the confiscation of land, and the evacuation of all Japanese Canadians from the West Coast of British Columbia. An examination of official federal and provincial government (British Columbia), and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) texts concerning anti-Japanese national security policy and legislation reveals an explicit use of racist terminology in which Japanese Canadians were discursively classified as “enemy aliens”. To provide a historical overview of this instance of official racialized practice in Canadian history, I briefly discuss legislation, amendments to policy, and police practices presented in Table 13 below which reveal overt racism by the Canadian government against Japanese Canadians throughout World War II.

According to Conklin (1996) anti-Japanese sentiment and legislation in Canada predates the Second World War. However, it was following Japan’s bombing of Pearl

Harbour that the Canadian government created legislation that expanded the RCMP's powers to search without warrants, impose curfews, and confiscate property. This began with the implementation of PC 9760 on December 16, 1941 which ordered the RCMP to make re-registration of all persons of the "Japanese race" compulsory.⁷⁸ Soon afterwards, under PC 365⁷⁹ and PC 2483 the Canadian government authorized "officials to herd 20,881 persons ["of the Japanese race"] into a livestock building ... and to confiscate their [property including] vehicles, radios, cameras, homes and businesses" (Conklin, 1996, p. 227). On February 19, 1942 under PC 1348 the government "under the authority of the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927" authorized the establishment of work camps for male "enemy aliens" on projects located outside of the "protected area" (i.e., off the coastline of British Columbia). After three years of being detained in camps, "persons of a Japanese race" were given the option of being repatriated to Japan or evacuated to other parts of Canada "East of the Rockies" (PC 7355, 7356, 7357; Conklin, 1996, p. 229).

Significantly, while Japanese Canadians were excluded from the legal rights of other Canadian citizens, they were also excluded from the legal category of "internment" (Conklin, 1996, p. 228). As Conklin (1996) points out, in government discourse the evacuation of "people of the Japanese race" to empty towns, work camps and Prairie farms was referred to as a "transfer" and thus this classified "enemy" group was not included in "the legal category of 'internment'" (p. 228). Nevertheless in legislation, as noted in Table 13, they were officially "described as '*internees*'" (p. 228; see PC 2483, italics added). The use of the term "*internment*" was also used in documents from the government Commissioner to the RCMP

⁷⁸ Throughout the noted PC legislation and RCMP texts Japanese Canadians were overtly referred to by "race" and most frequently described as "people of the Japanese race"; following this was the use of the term "Japs".

⁷⁹ PC 365 refers to "persons of a Japanese race" as "enemy aliens".

(see Table 14: RG 18, F3, Headquarters, Security, no. 2 in “Genres of Self-presentation & Formation of Public Opinion”; italics added).

For the most part the noted government legislation and interrelated texts of the RCMP target a specific racialized group, although there is also mention of Chinese peoples -- another racialized group -- in some anti-Japanese legislation (PC 9760). Other than broad statements that Canada was at war with the Japanese (i.e., the nation of Japan) what seems to be missing in these texts is the reason for targeting this population. Canada was also at war with Italy and Germany yet no such legislation was created. Moreover, as Conklin (1996) observes high-ranking military officials revealed that the majority of Japanese Canadians posed no threat to the national security of Canada (p. 230; as noted by Conklin from Yon Shimizu, 1993, p. 203).

Table 13: Historical Context: Japanese Evacuation, Internment and Deportation

Genres of Lawmaking Political Procedure ⁸⁰
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. PC 9760: December 16, 1941- makes re-registration of all persons of the “Japanese race” by RCMP compulsory; 2. PC 365: January 27, 1942 – removal of classified group (i.e., Japanese Canadians) from the “protected area” of a one mile radius from the coastline of British Columbia; 3. PC 1348: February 19, 1942 – authorizes the establishment of work camps for male “enemy aliens”, including Japanese Nationals, on projects located outside of “protected areas”; 4. PC 1665: March 4, 1942 – sets up the B.C. Security Commission-a civilian body- with wide powers to supervise and direct the evacuation of Japanese from protected areas; “Custodian” (i.e., the acting agent of the internees) given control of certain specified property; 5. PC 2483: March 27, 1942 – Custodian acting as an agent of <i>internees</i> authorized to liquidate all confiscated property to pay for the cost of the camps; 6. PC 7355: December 15, 1945 – makes provisions for deportation of Japanese; 7. PC 7356: December 15, 1945– revokes naturalization of persons deported;

⁸⁰ In the genre of “lawmaking political procedure” I have considered selected anti-Japanese legislation from the Privy Council Office Cabinet Orders-in-Council ([PC] RG2,1) that make overt references to “enemy aliens”, evacuation, deportation, revoking naturalization (i.e., citizenship) and “Japanese race”. All PCs mentioned were obtained from Library and Archives Canada.

8. PC 7357: December 15, 1945 – authorizes appointment of Commission to inquire into conduct during the war of persons of the “Japanese race”; if loyalties of persons found to be with Japan then these persons were subject to forced deportation.
Genres of Self-presentation & Formation of Public Opinion ⁸¹
1. copy of PC 365 with suggested amendments calling for deletion of term “enemy aliens” from PC 365 January 16, 1942; 2. RG 18, F3, Headquarters, Security: two letters March 2 & March 4, 1942 - re. Japanese (C11-19.2) to Assistant RCMP Commissioner F.J. Mead from RCMP Commissioner S.T. Wood The March 2 letter warns about “fickle” nature of public opinion which could lead “municipal forces to be inclined, due to pressure of public opinion, to prosecute members of the Japanese race – whether enemy aliens or not”; it further suggests that publicity should be given to the fact the only penalty for non-concurrence with the Orders of the Minister [i.e., not identifying oneself as Japanese] ... is <i>internment</i> ... [and that] the Japanese should be advised ... of their rights in connection with <i>internments</i> ”(p.1; italics added).
Genres of Law Enforcement/ Policing/ Information Gathering
Department of National War Services, Directorate of Censorship letter March 3, 1944 - re. manner in which Japanese people are referred to: “enemy alien”, “Japs”
Genres of Political & Executive Administration
Amendments to Privy Council Orders-in-Council re. Japanese Evacuation & Internment
Genres of Political Control (opposition)
Letter re. media and discrimination against Japanese

The language used to describe Japanese Canadians, their internment and the conditions in which they were interned reveals many contradictions and assumptions during this period in Canadian history. Even a cursory overview of the texts that I have briefly described here and presented in Table 13 demonstrates that not only were overt references to “race” made in the Canadian government’s legislation, but further illustrates what Conklin (1996) argues as the “concealed harm” of this legislation which does not allow the “harmed” person to articulate “her/his pain into the phrases of the official discourse” (pp. 235-236). For Conklin (1996) the obvious harm in the internment of Japanese Canadians concerns the actual confiscation of their property, their forced detainment, and their deportation. The concealed harm, however, rests in the language used to construct them as “other”. The

⁸¹ I have included a summary from the files of the RCMP (RG 18, F3, Headquarters, Security) and the PC in the genre of “self-presentation & formation of public opinion” as an example of the language used in these texts.

repeated juxtaposition of the term “persons of the Japanese race” with “enemy aliens” were read so that the terms became synonymous (Conklin, 1996, p. 233). It was through the use of lexical signifiers that racially “othered” Japanese Canadians and transformed meaning so that Japanese Canadians could be placed in what Conklin (1996) terms “de-citizenship camps” and what I consider a “state of exception”. This exclusionary practice denied Japanese Canadians the legal rights available to those who did not belong to this racialized category.

Like Japanese Canadians, the current security certificate detainees have also been “othered” through legal language, also denied rights afforded Canadian citizens, and also put in “de-citizenship camps”. The difference between these situations is in the practice of racialization. While the current legal category of exclusion for security certificate subjects is located within legal texts in a similar way to the exclusion of Japanese Canadians, it is in the practice of the present day national security legislation that racism comes into play. It is in considering these similarities that one can posit the relationship between these two national security discourses.

To demonstrate the possible intertextual connection between the legislation of the Japanese internment and that of the current security certificate legislation, I have outlined the genres that fit within the fields of action for both the previous racialized legislation and the current “race”-neutral security certificate legislation of lawmaking political procedures, self-presentation and formation of public opinion, law enforcement/policing/information gathering, political and executive administration, and political control in Table 14 below.⁸² Though I do not directly explore the influence of each text on the other in this study, it is my contention that not only do the national security texts within each period influence each other

⁸² I have adapted Wodak and Reisigl’s (2001) “Dimensions of discourse as social practice” model, which I depict in Chapter 3: Figure 2, into a table format for easy comparison between the time periods described.

(i.e., the influence of current national security texts of the *IRPA*, the *ATA*, Public safety Backgrounders, CSIS reports, etc) but I also claim that past texts, i.e., in the case of anti-Japanese legislation, have some bearing on current national security measures. In my analysis, I have chosen to investigate the texts of the *IRPA* and the CSIS summaries highlighted in Table 14,⁸³ while I consider the other texts in my background overview of each text. The discourse topics for these genres include but are not limited to: immigrant and refugee protection, illegal immigration, terrorist entities, expulsion of criminal foreigners, increase in executive powers, foreigner criminality, legal rights, rights of non-citizens, right to habeas corpus, right to due process, human rights, human rights abuses, and the targeting of racialized groups. My intention in laying out this framework is to illustrate a number of texts that in my view should be examined for their intertextual influence and to furthermore call for an exploration of the possibility that in current legislative practices we are failing to address past wrongs and instead ensuring their continued existence.

Table 14: National Security Discourse

Past: Japanese Evacuation & Deportation	Current: Security Certificates
Genres of Lawmaking Political Procedure	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Privy Council Orders-in-Council re. Japanese Evacuation & Internment • <i>War Measures Act</i>, Ch. 206 Revised Statutes of Canada 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Immigration & Refugee Protections Act (IRPA)</i> • <i>Anti-Terrorist Act, (ATA)</i> 2002 • Bill C-3 An Act to Amend the <i>IRPA</i> (Certificate and Special Advocate) • Listed “terrorist” entities • <i>Security of Information Act</i> • <i>Public Safety Act</i>
Genres of Self-presentation & Formation of Public Opinion	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Letter from government minister to RCMP re. public opinion • Newspaper articles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Safety & Preparedness press release • Public Safety & Preparedness backgrounder • CSIS -- <i>IRPA</i> backgrounder in regard to security certificates • CSIS -- FAQ • Statistics Canada public opinion survey
Genres of Law Enforcement/ Policing/ Information Gathering	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Department of War Services – Directorate of Censorship March 3, 1944 –Letter to T. Stone 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>CSIS summary reports</i>

⁸³ Please note that neither the genres nor the discourse topics in Table 14 are inclusive.

from Department of External Affairs RCMP re. Japanese Evacuation & Internment Camp	
Genres of Political & Executive Administration	
• Amendments to Privy Council Orders-in-Council re. Japanese Evacuation & Internment	• Supreme Court ruling • Federal Court
Genres of Political Control (opposition)	
• Letter re. media and discrimination against Japanese	• Charkaoui vs. Canada • People's Commission on Immigration "Security" Measures • Coalition Justice for Adil Charkaoui • CAIR-CAN public opinion survey

4.2 Outline: Documents for Analysis

In my analysis I first illustrate how the genre of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)* as a form of national security discourse which belongs to the political lawmaking field of action creates categories of exclusion that enable racism to persist. Despite the absence of racialized Arab/Muslim "others" in the *IRPA*, the text nevertheless establishes a classification system of exclusion which is transformed into racialized practice in the national security field of action of law enforcement and information gathering.⁸⁴ My research demonstrates that in the application of the *IRPA*'s categories of exclusion or states of exception racialized practices have occurred through interconnected fields of action. As a case in point, in my analysis I have examined the practice of racialization from the information gathering field of action in the selected texts of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) summary reports on the five men currently under security certificates. The CSIS reports employ racialized language that draw on the categories of "national security threat" established in the *IRPA*. I investigate excerpts from these reports as posted on the Federal Court website because they not only reveal the type of information

⁸⁴ It is important to note that the text is not "race"-neutral, however. The *IRPA* refers to another racialized group with the misnomer "Indian". I will raise this point in my analysis and discuss it further in the discussion section of my paper.

which the federal government has used in the issuance of certificates against the men in question, but the reports also demonstrate how these men are discursively constructed into enemy threats. A further point of interest lies in the fact that these documents were posted on the Federal Court website for a short period in late February 2008 that is normally reserved for judgements. Since these men have not been tried, the CSIS documents may have been read as judgements due to their appearance on this site.

4.2.1 Methodological Approach

I examine how the seemingly “race”-neutral text of the *IRPA* as a genre of the field of action of lawmaking is transformed into the racialized practice of the field of action of information gathering in the genre of the CSIS reports on the security certificate subjects. My purpose is to reveal how these national security texts are interrelated, how the discourse topics (immigrants and refugee protection, foreigner expulsion, foreigner criminality, terrorist entities, human rights) within them permeate other discourse topics and the discourse of national security as a whole, and how racism comes into effect when laws which allow exclusion from rights based on “otherness” are accepted as just. In order to examine and bring to light the manner in which racism comes into force in what appear as “race” neutral policies, I conduct a thorough analysis of each of the texts using the approaches of Karim (1997), Lazar and Lazar (2004), van Dijk (2001) and Wodak (1997) to locate themes of nationalism/national security as justification for “othering” and how this in turn becomes realized as a racialized practice in relation to Arabs/Muslims. To understand the context of each of the documents I provide a brief explanation of the purpose of each text and then follow with the analysis using the approaches I outline here. As I apply multiple approaches

in my analysis, for reference I provide a step by step breakdown of my analytical course of action below.

Course of action: Analysis

- 4.2.2 Background Context and Course of Action: *IRPA*
- 4.2.3 The Identification of Racist Discourse - Wodak
- 4.2.4 “Outcasting” - Lazar and Lazar
- 4.2.5 Background Context and Course of Action: CSIS Summary Reports
- 4.2.6 Paradigms for the Analysis of Racialized Arab/Muslim “Othering” - Karim and Lazar & Lazar
- 4.3 Discussion: Interpretative Counter-Terrorism Framework - Jackson

4.2.2 Background Context and Course of Action: *IRPA*

Changes to the security measures in the *IRPA* were made following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S. These included amendments to the security certificate process that received Royal Assent in 2002. As Aiken (2008) states, “the amended *IRPA* reworked a [security certificate] procedure that had been in informal use since the late 1970s. Among other important changes, this act constituted a ‘terrorism’ category of inadmissibility and established procedures for the detention and removal of foreign nationals and permanent residents” (Davies, 2006, p. 381 as cited in Aiken, 2008, p. 383). On February 13, 2008 further changes were made as a result of the Supreme Court decision a year prior to strike down the security certificate process of the *IRPA* that the Court deemed was in violation of sections 7, 9 and 10(c) of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (Charkaoui v. Canada, 2007). The Court determined that as “the [security certificate] process may lead to the person’s removal to a place where his or her life or freedom would be threatened”, deciding whether or not a certificate is reasonable deprives the person of the right to life,

liberty and security guaranteed in section 7 of the *Charter* (Charkaoui v. Canada, 2007, p. 6). In addition, the Court ruled that the security process could and did lead to arbitrary detention due to the lack of a review process that infringes s. 9 and s. 10(c) of the *Charter* (Charkaoui v. Canada, 2007, p. 7). As a result of this determination by the Court, the federal government was given a year to make amendments to the process. Bill C-3, *An Act to amend the IRPA* or the “special advocates” bill was drafted in October 2007 and received Royal Assent on February 13, 2008. According to the Public Safety and Preparedness Canada, the special advocate has the ability to challenge the government’s claims in relation to disclosure of information that is considered injurious to national security or presents a danger to the safety of any person.⁸⁵ Special advocates are selected by the government and although they may “communicate with the subject of a security certificate without restriction” this is only the case “until such time as they see the confidential information upon which a certificate is based” (Public Safety Canada, 2008).

I first begin my analysis of the *IRPA* by utilizing Wodak’s (1997) approach as her framework provides ways to examine racialized discourse as a whole. Her approach considers the context of discourse as well as the particular language used. As her analytical framework acts as “an archetype” for all forms of “othering” it can further be adapted for a particular group, which in my study concerns the racialization of Arabs/Muslims. It thus enables me to investigate the discourse of the *IRPA* that for the most part appears as a “race”-neutral text. Second, I identify the “microstrategies of enemy construction” outlined by Lazar and Lazar (2004) in the legal language of the *IRPA* to analyze as well as compare and contrast the findings that each analytical approach offers. At certain points within my

⁸⁵ As presented by Public Safety Canada at <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/seccert-eng.aspx> last visited November 12, 2008.

analysis, I utilize the mechanisms of evaluation/appraisal theory to demonstrate how these methods can offer additional linguistic analytical richness.

Although I consider the entire *IRPA* text, I have analyzed in detail only the sections of direct concern to national security and not those which relate to immigration and refugee measures in general since my aim was to analyze national security legislation and the practice of racialization that occurs in its implementation.⁸⁶ As such I have focused my analysis on the following divisions and sections as cited in the *IRPA* for which I have given a brief summary: the title and the first two lines which immediately follow – provide a *précis* of the act; Interpretation - sets out the definitions for the rest of the act; Objectives and Applications - discusses purpose and intent of the act; Enabling Authority - delineates who has power to enact act, and publication regulations; Agreements - specifies other agreements that impact application of the act entered at national and international level which is an important aspect of intertextuality; Division 3: Entering and Remaining in Canada – sets out who can enter Canada and the documents required which is central to determining categories of belonging; Division 4: Inadmissibility – states who is not admissible to Canada and on what grounds, the notion of security plays an integral role in this part of the text; Division 5: Loss of Status and Removal – while I consider this division in its entirety, I focus mainly on the sections that concern security; Division 6: Detention and Release – states rules and

⁸⁶ The *IRPA* is divided into three parts: Part 1- Immigration to Canada; Part 2 – Refugee Protection; and Part 3 - Enforcement. The first sections of the *IRPA*, which are not entitled “Divisions”, set out the interpretation, objectives and enacting authority for the act as a whole, while the “Divisions” pertain to particular parts of the act as described above. I have not analyzed Part 1 Division 1 and 2 of the *IRPA* text which relate to the application and examination measures for entering Canada such as sponsorship; Division 8 which sets forth conditions for a judicial review by the Federal Court (i.e., a review of the judge) as well as the processes and rules for such a review; Division 10 that concerns loans, fees and social insurance number cards; Part 3 that stipulates enforcement related to human smuggling and trafficking or Part 5 which relates to amendments not directly linked to security measures.

conditions for arrest, detention, release and reviews of same; Division 7 – right of Appeal – establishes conditions for right of appeal, dismissal of appeal and rejection of this right; Division 9 – Protection of Information: examination on request by the Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness – this section which deals specifically with security certificates was amended in the *IRPA* post September 11, 2001; Part 2: Refugee Protection – Division 1 – sets out the definitions of refugees and protected persons; Division 2 – sets forth how claims for refugee status can be made, ineligibility, cessation of protection and appeal measures; and Division 3 - Pre-removal Risk Assessment – pertains to refugee and protected person application for protection to not be removed to country where they risk persecution for reasons of “race”, religion, nationality, membership in particular social groups, political opinions, or torture, or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, and the exception to such measures.

4.2.3 Identification of Racist Discourse

The first step in Wodak’s three phase framework for analysis identifies the importance of the context of the situation in which the utterance (i.e., the text of the *IRPA*) is expressed as illustrated in Table 15 below. The first two subcategories in this phase of the analysis, 1.i. Setting and 1.ii. Formality, are based on the type of text that is analyzed and when it comes into play, first as a text that belongs to the lawmaking field of action, and second as a genre of legal text which is used in both open (i.e., public) and closed (i.e., private) settings at immigration and refugee hearings, when immigrants and refugees exit and enter the country, and in Federal Court. The text is therefore, both private and public, and formal.

The types of participants (1.iii) are identified as those individuals and groups referred to throughout the text.

The topic of “immigration and refugee policy” (see 1.iv.a below) is the overall global topic according to van Dijk’s (2001) macro-structural analysis.⁸⁷ That is, it is the main topic of the legal text. Because I am concerned with the way security policies and legislation that are seemingly “race” neutral are transformed into racialized practices the sub-topic of security certificates (see 1.iv.b below) is the one that I have chosen to focus on in my analysis. The sub-topic of security certificates is reflected in all sections of Division 9 and in “Protection of Information: examination on Request by the Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness” in particular as it includes amendments to the security process made in 2002. The sub-topic of security is also evident in numerous sections throughout the document as mentioned above in the context of the *IRPA*. I further discuss the interrelation between the sections cited and examined in my analysis in the discussion segment of my study, unless otherwise noted.

The final category (see 1.v) in this phase of my analysis relates to the presence and absence of the racialized group in question, i.e., Arabs/Muslims. Although the *IRPA* does not contain any references to Arabs/Muslims, which for the purposes of my research may aid in the appearance of neutrality in the text, this absence may serve to conceal covert bias against groups as permanent residents and foreign nationals who are vulnerable to racialization.

⁸⁷ I use van Dijk’s (2001) method for identifying thematic patterns throughout my study in the approaches of Wodak (1997), Karim (1997) as well as Lazar and Lazar (2004) since van Dijk sets out clear guidelines for the identification of global/macro themes and local/micro themes. I explain how I employ his approach at points when I use it.

Table 15: Importance of Context

1.i. Setting: public and private
1.ii. Formality: formal
1.iii. Type of Participants: foreign nationals, permanent residents, refugees, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, Canadian society, Canadians, the Government of Canada, provincial governments, foreign states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, immigration officers, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, temporary residents, subject (of a report; of a certificate), Chief Justice of the Federal Court/judge of that Court designated by the Chief justice (judge)
1.iv. The Topic: a. Immigration and Refugee Policy b. Security certificates
1.v. The Presence or Absence of Arabs and/or Muslims: not present

2. A. i. Argumentation strategies: Strategies of group definition and construction
The construction of “we” and “they”

To identify the first stage of strategies of group definition and construction in the *IRPA*, I looked for thematic patterns that present a division of “we” and “they”. I have separated the “we” into two groups as **1.a.** those who are not subject to the security certificate legislation and **1b.** those who administer or otherwise participate in the security certificate process. The “they” group is also divided in a similar manner as **2a.** those who are subject to the certificates and **2b.** those who act in defense of the security certificate subjects.

1a. We = not subject to security certificates

Canadians, Canadian citizens

1b. We = administration of security certificates

Immigration and Refugee Board, the Government of Canada, provincial governments, foreign states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Chief Justice of the Federal Court/judge of that Court designated by the Chief justice (judge)

2a. They = subject to security certificates

foreign nationals, permanent residents, temporary residents, subject (of a report; of a certificate)

2b. They = acting in defense for those subject to security certificates

their [i.e., security certificate] counsel

Note, that “foreign states” are included in the “we” while “foreign nationals” and “permanent residents” form the “they”. This distinction between “we” and “they” is evident in the following sections of the *IRPA* which concern the definition of “information” in relation to the security certificate process. I have *italicized* the “we” and **bolded** the “they” for easier identification.

76. "information" means security or criminal intelligence information and information that is obtained in confidence from a source in Canada, *from the government of a foreign state, from an international organization of states or from an institution of either of them.* ...

77. (1) The Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness shall sign a certificate stating that **a permanent resident** or **a foreign national** is inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality [based on the aforementioned information] and refer it to the Federal Court, which shall make a determination under section 80. (*IRPA*; emphasis added)

2. A. ii. Argumentation strategies: Strategies of group definition and construction Guilt & Displacement on the “other”

The second stage of group definition and construction examines the argumentation strategy that places blame and/or guilt on the “other”. To illustrate how blame on the “other” occurs in the denial of the legal right to due process for those issued security certificates and how guilt of the “other” is established in the removal of this right as a consequence of the perceived threat or risk posed, I outline three examples from the *IRPA* text. I have *italicized* the text that demonstrates the displacement of blame and guilt to which I refer.

2.A.ii. 1. The normal review of detention period before a determination is made is “within 48 hours” (see section 57(1) of *IRPA*). This period is extended to six months in relation to the reasonability of security certificates in the case of the detention of permanent residents issued security certificates (see subsection 80(1) referred to in the excerpt below). As stated:

83(2) *The permanent resident must, until a determination is made under subsection 80(1), be brought back before a judge at least once in the six-month period following*

each preceding review and at any other times that the judge may authorize. (*IRPA*; italics added)

2.A.ii. 2. According to section 83(3), a judge may continue the process of detention without determination on the reasonability of the certificate for an indefinite time if s/he believes the detainee continues to pose a danger, or will fail to appear at a proceeding:

Order for continuation

[83](3) *A judge shall order the detention to be continued* if satisfied that the permanent resident continues to be a danger to national security or to the safety of any person, or is unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal. (*IRPA*; italics added)

2.A.ii. 3. The responsibility for not being able to access the systems of justice afforded to others is placed in the hands of those issued security certificates because of their risks to security.

64. (1) *No appeal may be made to the Immigration Appeal Division by a foreign national or their sponsor or by a permanent resident* if the foreign national or permanent resident has been *found to be inadmissible on grounds of security*, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality. (*IRPA*; italics added)

2. B. Argumentation strategies: Strategies of justification

Strategies of justification enable speakers/writers to make evaluations and assign responsibility and guilt. The aim of these strategies is to present the speakers/writers as free of prejudice or at times to even reverse prejudice. A careful examination of the *IRPA* text reveals the employment of the following two justification strategies:

2. B. i. The first strategy identifies an attempt to establish a dichotomous division of the world into “good” and “bad”. I use van Dijk’s (2001) microanalytical approach to locate the strategic division of “good” and “bad” through lexical patterning, and collocation sets. To begin, I traced the lexical repetition of terms about “security” and “safety” as a marker of

“good”, and “security certificate” and “inadmissible” as an indicator of “bad” using the “find” option in my word processing software program:

Good = Out of a total of 41 instances of the term “security” I identified 8 instances of the use of “national security; I identified 16 instances of the term “safety of Canadians/any person”;

Bad = I noted 27 instances of [security]“certificate”, I identified 45 instances of “inadmissible” [for reasons of security]

I then identified an emphasis on the distinction between “we/insiders” and “they/outside” which as Wodak (1997) posits is used to maintain and/or establish a dichotomous division between good and bad. I noted the polarizations in words and propositions that divide groups, create opposition, and/or make opposition more extreme between processes/ individuals/ groups who are: 1. “**good**” (in **bold**) as the security certificate process as well as those who administer and/or otherwise participate in the security certificate process, and those who are: 2. “*bad*” (in *italics*) as those individuals/groups who are subject to security certificates and inadmissibility as well as the acts that they are associated with. I focused on two passages (identified below as **a** and **b**) from the sections related to security certificates in the *IRPA* to do so.

a. Security

34. (1) *A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for*
 (a) *engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic government, institution or process as they are understood in **Canada**;*
 (b) *engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government;*
 (c) *engaging in terrorism;*
 (d) *being a danger to the security of Canada; (IRPA, Division 4)*

b. Referral of certificate

77. (1) **The Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness** shall sign a certificate stating that *a permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality* and refer it to the Federal Court, which shall make a determination under section 80. [...]

(e) on each request **of the Minister or the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness** made at any time during the proceedings, **the judge** shall hear all or part of *the information or evidence in the absence of the permanent resident or the foreign national named in the certificate and their counsel* if, **in the opinion of the judge, its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person; [...]**

(g) *the information or evidence described in paragraph (e) shall not be included in the summary but may be considered by the judge in deciding whether the certificate is reasonable if the judge determines that the information or evidence is relevant but that its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person; (IRPA, Division 9)*

2. B.i. 1. Good = We = (national) security, Canada The Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the opinion of the judge, the safety of any person

2. B.i. 2. Bad = They = permanent resident, foreign national for engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic government, institution or process; engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government; engaging in terrorism; being a danger to the security of Canada; the information or evidence about these acts (*IRPA*, Division 4,)

Another clear example of polarization occurs in the definition of what constitutes “information” in section 76 (as noted in 2.A.i -2.b above). Groups are listed as possible sources for security and criminal intelligence information to issue security certificates. “We” and “they” are labeled according to the role each individual/group plays in the process of security certificates. Again, those who are responsible for issuing, administering or gathering information in relation to security certificates are considered “we”, while those who are subject to them are considered “they”.

We = Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, Canadian society, Canadians, the Government of Canada, provincial governments, foreign states⁸⁸, foreign government sources, foreign/international intelligence sources, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Chief Justice of the Federal Court/judge of that Court designated by the Chief justice (judge)

They = foreign nationals, permanent residents, temporary residents who are subject to security certificates

⁸⁸ Please refer to 2.A.i category 1b which notes that foreign states are included in the “we” while “foreign nationals and “permanent residents” comprise “they”.

We = As insiders, *Canadian nationals* are not subject to security certificate legislation and are guaranteed the right to due process under the law, including the right to see the evidence against “us” and the right to not be held indefinitely. **They** = As outsiders, *permanent residents, foreign nationals, temporary residents and refugees* are subject to security certificates and therefore not able to see the evidence against “them”.

2. B.ii. In the second step for the strategy of justification, I examine the distortion of information, perspectives and the like which seeks to trivialize and/or exaggerate the views of the “other” both at word level, in the individual lexical choices made, through vagueness, predication, assertion and at text level, in relation to the text as a whole, through stories, unreal scenarios and comparisons. While words may be clearly understood in isolation, the combination of associated lexical terms may make the text itself difficult to understand and hence the categories of vagueness, predication and assertion also apply to the text as a whole.

The terms for the “strategy of distortion” can be understood to mean:

1. *Vagueness*- any term that is not explicit or unclear in meaning or intention;
2. *Predication* – a term or set of terms that affirms or denies something about something else; use of implicit and/or explicit predicates and
3. *Assertion* – any term used to state strongly that something is true.

The use of assertion and predication is evident in sections 80(3) and 81(a)(b)(c) below. In the text I have listed and identified the instances of *predication* (in *italics*) and **assertion** (in **bold**).

80 (3) *The determination of the judge is final and may not be appealed or judicially reviewed.*

Effect of determination — removal order

81. If a certificate is determined to be reasonable under subsection 80(1),

(a) *it is **conclusive proof** that the permanent resident or the foreign national named in it is inadmissible;*

(b) *it is **a removal order** that may not be appealed against and that **is in force without the necessity of holding or continuing an examination or an admissibility hearing;** and*

(c) *the person named in it may not apply for protection* under subsection 112(1).⁸⁹
(*IRPA*, Division 9; emphasis added)

First, there is an assertion of the judge's determination that "may not be appealed or judicially reviewed". This assertion also employs the predication "is final". The judge's determination also appears in the predication that "it is conclusive proof". This policy leads to the assertion "that the permanent resident or the foreign national named in [the certificate] ...is inadmissible. This leads to another predication of deportation as the certificate "is a removal order", which is followed by the assertion "that [it] may not be appealed". This assertion leads to a further predication that the removal order "is in force without the necessity of holding or continuing an examination or an admissibility hearing". The last assertion states that "the person named in it may not apply for protection". In this section of the *IRPA* those served security certificates have no legal mechanism to challenge the judgements made against them and in this way their lives and views are negated.

Evaluation theory enables a further examination of the above text to consider the manner in which the value system of the *IRPA* is upheld in the lawmaking field of action. As we have seen so far, the value system of the *IRPA* is one which affords protection from the security certificate process for the community of Canadians as "we/us/insiders" and excludes the same protection for the community of permanent residents and foreign nationals as "they/them/outsideers". The adjustment of certainty in a statement or in other words, the use of hedging, can be used by shared communities to create or maintain collective meaning.

⁸⁹ 112(1) falls under Part 2 Division 3 "Pre-removal Risk Assessment Protection: Application for protection", which states "A person in Canada, other than a person referred to in subsection 115(1), may, in accordance with the regulations, apply to the Minister for protection if they are subject to a removal order that is in force or are named in a certificate described in subsection 77(1)." According to 81(c) this process is not available to those deemed inadmissible by a judge under security certificates.

Alternatively, writers can also present certainty through a lack of hedging and unmodified assertions to create a climate with readers where information is not to be questioned (Thompson & Hunston, 2000, p. 10). From this text readers are likely to assume that a process is in place that ensures that security certificates are reasonable measures (i.e., “if ...deemed ... reasonable, [then] ...conclusive proof [of guilt]”) for removing someone from the country (i.e., “then ...automatically”) without an ability to have the case re-examined. As such, the community of “us” is led to accept the process as it is “reasonable” and establishes “conclusive proof” of “they’s” guilt.

The idea of community and its significance on the evaluations that one makes is also discussed by Martin (2000a). He contends that the evaluations that writers articulate are shaped by the institutional position that they hold. This is the result of the process of socialization into an institution which involves alignment with an institutional practice and affinity with attitudes one is expected to have towards those practices (Martin, 2000a, p. 161). For instance, in the above, while judges have full access to the evidence against the security certificate subjects because they are supposed to appear objective, the lawyers for these subjects do not have the same access because they are supposed to represent their subject’s interest.

To uncover implicitly evaluative language that reflects the lawmaking field of action in the *IRPA*, I drew on Martin’s (2000a) approach to the analysis of texts that “evoke” rather than “inscribe” appraisal. As I noted in Chapter 3, Martin (2000a) distinguishes between “inscribed” appraisal which is explicit in texts and appraisal that is “evoked” as an evaluative response projected by reference to events/states that are positive or “prized” (e.g., *This law has taken steps to combat terrorism and terrorist activities at home and abroad*), and

negative or “feared” (e.g., a person who *poses a security threat to Canada or Canadians*) (see Martin, 2000a, p. 142). According to Martin (2000a) inscribed appraisal prescribes evaluative meaning and explicitly tells the reader to take on a particular reading position (Martin, 2000a, p. 155). In contrast, evoked appraisal accommodates a wide range of reading positions because it does not overtly direct a reader to read a text in a certain way and instead uses language to construct ideational meaning. Because it is less obvious, however, it is also more difficult to notice and therefore contest. Individual evaluative lexical items, such as good, bad, hate, and dislike are not enough to determine evoked evaluation as more extended units of language are used by the reader to construct value judgements. As such, the context and the field of discourse/action play an essential role in the analysis of ideational meaning since different communities will read the same texts differently.

In Table 16 below, I present instances of both positively and negatively inscribed and evoked evaluation that occurs throughout the *IRPA* text (evaluative language is *italicized*). I analyzed language from the beginning of the *IRPA* which sets out the objectives of the act as it relates to security and safety. I also looked at language from two sections of Division 9 of the *IRPA* that relate to the security certificate process which I examined previously using Wodak’s argumentation strategies of justification in 2.Bi, ii above. Martin’s (2000a) evaluative approach, like that of Thompson and Hunston (2000) adds to Wodak’s identification strategy to further enable the reader to see how a dichotomous view of “we/us/insiders” and “they/them/outsideers” is presented in the text.

Table 16: Inscribed/Evoked Evaluation: Positive and Negative

Evaluative instance	Inscribed/Evoked Evaluation
<p>3(2)(d)to offer <i>safe haven</i> to persons with a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular group ...</p> <p>3(2)(e)to establish <i>fair</i> and <i>efficient</i> procedures</p>	inscribed- positive evaluation
<p>3(1)(i) to promote international justice and security by fostering respect for human rights and by denying access to Canadian territory persons who are <i>criminals</i> or <i>security risks</i></p> <p>3(2)(h) to promote international justice and security by denying access to Canadian territory to persons, including refugee claimants, who are <i>security risks</i> or <i>serious criminals</i>.</p>	inscribed- negative evaluation
<p>80(1) The determination of the judge <i>is final and may not be appealed or judicially reviewed</i>.</p> <p>81. If a certificate is determined to be reasonable under subsection 80(1),</p> <p>(a) <i>it is conclusive proof that the permanent resident or the foreign national named in it is inadmissible;</i></p> <p>(b) <i>it is a removal order that may not be appealed against and that is in force without the necessity of holding or continuing an examination or an admissibility hearing;</i></p>	evoked- positive evaluation
<p>77(1) The Minister [of Canadian Immigration and Citizenship] and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness shall sign a certificate stating that a permanent resident or a foreign national is <i>inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality</i> and refer it to the Federal Court, which shall make a determination under section 80. [...]</p> <p>(e) on each request of the Minister [of Canadian Immigration and Citizenship] or the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness made at any time during the proceedings, the judge shall hear all or part of the information or evidence in the absence of the permanent resident or the foreign national named in the certificate and their counsel if, in the opinion of the judge, <i>its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person</i>; [...]</p> <p>(g) the information or evidence described in paragraph (e) shall not be included in the summary but may be considered by the judge in deciding whether the certificate is reasonable if the judge determines that the information or evidence is relevant but that <i>its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person</i>; (IRPA, Division 9)</p>	evoked - negative evaluation

In the instances of inscribed evaluation noted above, the italicized terms present a judgement of good = safe haven, fair, efficient, and bad = criminal, security risks. Yet the method to determine what is considered fair or efficient, and who is considered criminal or a security risk is also based on evaluative processes; however, in this case they are implicit or evoked rather than explicit. Since less obvious forms of evaluation do not rely on evaluative lexis but on the creation of ideational meanings, each instance of evoked evaluation must be considered with respect to the context, field of action and discourse community. In the case of the *IRPA*, the Minister of Canadian Immigration and Citizenship (CIC) and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP) understand the evaluative statements in 80(1) and 81(a)(b) as positive, while those subject to security certificate legislation and their counsel would see these as negative evaluations since the judge's determination denies the subjects the right to appeal. On the other hand, in 77(1) the information and evidence that is used against the accused is perceived as negative by the CIC and PSEP because its disclosure might be "injurious to national security or the safety of any person". In this instance those subject to security certificates and their counsel would likely consider access to the evidence and information as positive since it would help them to build a proper defence. It is important to note that there are often uses of inscribed evaluative language, e.g., "safety", "injurious", within evoked evaluation which can lead the reader to assume the evaluative position without noting that a less overt tool of evaluation is also guiding the reader to assume that reading position.

3. Identification of stereotypes

In the final phase of analysis according to Wodak's (1997) framework, I looked for thematic patterns and lexical associations as well as the identification of situations when labels and categories are employed to ascribe characteristics to individuals and groups of people.

3.1 Thematic patterns:

I first examined sections of the *IRPA* for the identification of stereotypes through the use of thematic patterns as proposed by Wodak (1997) and according to the steps of macro-structural thematic analysis as suggested by van Dijk (2001). I chose to analyze Part 1, Divisions 4-7 and 9, and Part 2, Division 3 in the *IRPA* as these sections pertain directly to the security certificate process. The macro-propositions were identified by their repeated occurrence as global topics in the discourse. This involved summarizing the patterns of similar themes found in subtitles, thematic sentences and conclusive statements. To remain close to the intended meaning of the discourse and to limit researcher bias, I used language similar to that in the original text to list the macro-propositions. The macro-propositions are labeled from **M1-M9** under headings that reflect the Divisions of the *IRPA*. I then identified the overall macro-propositions which presents the ideology that *IRPA* holds regarding the security certificate process.

Macro-propositions:

Division 4 - Inadmissibility

M1. Permanent residents and foreign nationals including refugees are inadmissible on security grounds for engaging in the one or more of the following acts: espionage; subversion against a democratic government, institution or process as understood in Canada; instigating the subversion by force of any government; terrorism; being a danger to the security of Canada; violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada; being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has

engaged or will engage in these acts (see section 34(1)(a-f) and in relation to refugees see Part 2, Division 3 section 112(3)).

Division 5 - Report of inadmissibility

M2. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (CIC) may refer a report of inadmissibility to the Immigration division for the above grounds if the Minister is of the opinion that the report is well-founded (see sections 44(1) and 44(2)).

Division 6 – Detention and release

M3. The Immigration Division may order the detention of a permanent resident or a foreign national if it is satisfied that the permanent resident or the foreign national is the subject of an examination or an admissibility hearing or is subject to a removal order and that the permanent resident or the foreign national is a danger to the public or is unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing or removal from Canada (see section 58(2)).

Division 7 – Right of Appeal

M4. - No appeal may be made to the Immigration Appeal Division by a foreign national or their sponsor or by a permanent resident if the foreign national or permanent resident has been found to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality (see 64 (1)).

Division 9- Protection of Information

M5. Once the CIC Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP) sign a certificate stating that a permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality they then refer it to the Federal Court (see section 77(1)).

M6. The judge for the Federal court ensures the confidentiality of the information and/or evidence related to the certificate and determines if its disclosure would be injurious to national security or the safety of any person (see section 78 (a-d)).

M7. The CIC Minister and the PSEP Minister may request that information and/or evidence be heard in the absence of the permanent resident or foreign national named in the certificate and their counsel (see section 78 (e)).

M8. The judge may consider this information in his determination but may not include it in the summary of information provided to the permanent resident or foreign national (see section 78 (g)).

M9. If a judge determines on the basis of the information and evidence available, that a certificate is reasonable:

- (a) it is conclusive proof that the permanent resident or the foreign national named in it is inadmissible;
- (b) it is a removal order that may not be appealed against and that is in force without the necessity of holding or continuing an examination or an admissibility hearing; and
- (c) the person named in it may not apply for pre-removal risk assessment protection. (see section 81(a-c) and Part 2, Division 3 section 112(1)).

The overall macro-propositions are:

1. Permanent residents and foreign nationals including refugees who pose or may pose possible threats to national security, violated, violate or may violate human or international rights, and have been involved, are involved or may be involved in serious criminality or organized criminality are inadmissible to Canada.
2. Due to this past, present or possible future threat, they must be kept in detention until a judge determines their guilt.
3. After their guilt is determined, they will be deported with no access to appeal.

3.2 Lexical associations/collocations

To consider the use of stereotypes in the *IRPA* according to Wodak's (1997) category of lexical associations/collocations, I used van Dijk's (2001) approach which as noted earlier in my analysis offers a systematic way to analyze micro/local theme identification of lexical associations/ collocations. This required examining the context within which the patterned usage of the global themes of "inadmissibility", "detention", "appeal", "protection of information" and "national security" were employed. I considered the lexical meanings and associations of the macro-propositions of the *IRPA* as identified above which are used to manage the information that we as readers receive to assume a particular understanding of the ideas/issues/opinions presented. These are presented in Table 17 below. The left-hand column presents the micro-thematic structures considered for analysis, while the right-hand column presents the analysis from the text.

Table 17: Lexical Associations

<p>Collocations/word associations: Look for words that are linked or associated with each other = associated with ∴ therefore</p>	<p>Microthematic structures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ permanent residents or foreign nationals, including refugees = subject to security certificates ▪ permanent residents or foreign nationals, including refugees = inadmissible on grounds of: espionage; subversion against a democratic government; instigating the subversion by force of any government; terrorism; being a danger to the security of Canada; violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada; being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in these acts
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ permanent residents or foreign nationals, including refugees = subject to security certificates ∴ not able to access information/evidence ▪ information/evidence = against permanent residents or foreign nationals, including refugees ▪ information/evidence = available to Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP)/ Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (CIC)/judges ▪ permanent residents or foreign nationals, including refugees = subject to security certificates ∴ not able to access information/evidence ▪ security certificate process = security for Canada
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While permanent residents, foreign nationals and refugees are not directly labeled as criminals and/or terrorists they are repeatedly associated with this possibility throughout the *IRPA* which is made evident through the thematic patterns presented in 3.1 and the lexical collocations in 3.2. They are not permitted the right to see the information and/or evidence against them because they pose a possible threat as criminals and/or terrorists. For the same reason, they are also not permitted the right of appeal. From this thematic and lexical analysis, the overall stereotype is that permanent residents or foreign nationals, including refugees are likely to pose a threat to the national security of Canada and Canadians as well as to commit other criminal acts.

3.3 Predication

I have used Wodak's (1997) category of predication to note how people are labeled and categorized in relation to stereotypes. As we have seen in "strategies of justification", predication is the use of a term or set of terms to affirm or deny something about something else. In 2.Bii, the use of predication was noted as a method employed to distort information in order to trivialize and/or exaggerate the views of the "other". It entails the use of implicit

and/or explicit predicates, e.g., “They **are** criminals”. Here I examined how predication is used to attribute circumstances and characteristics to permanent residents and foreign nationals. The following predications were identified in the sections of the *IRPA* that are most germane to my study because, as noted in phase 3.1 above, they are directly related to the security certificate process. Aside from the markers which I have used to show the **predicate** (in **bold**) and the *person(s)* referred to as well as the *actions* which are attributed to them (in *italics*), the text is presented in its original form:

1. *A permanent resident or foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for*
(a) engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic
government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada;
(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government;
(c) engaging in terrorism;
(d) being a danger to the security of Canada;
(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of
persons in Canada; or
(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe
engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).
(34(1)(a-f)).
2. The Immigration Division may order the detention of a permanent resident or a foreign national if it is satisfied that the *permanent resident or the foreign national is the subject of an examination or an admissibility hearing or is subject to a removal order and that the permanent resident or the foreign national is a danger to the public or is unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing or removal from Canada (58(2)).*
3. The Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness shall sign a certificate stating that *a permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality* and refer it to the Federal Court (77(1)).
4. If a judge determines on the basis of the information and evidence available, that a certificate is reasonable:
(a) it is conclusive proof that the permanent resident or the foreign national named in it is inadmissible(81(a)).

In a similar manner to the thematic patterns and lexical associations seen in the previous two steps on stereotypes, permanent residents and foreign nationals are linked through predication to inadmissibility due to security concerns.

4.2.4 “Out-casting”

As I stated at the outset of my analysis of the *IRPA* (4.2.2 “Background”) while I considered the act as a whole, my direct concern in this analysis was with the sections that are explicitly linked with national security and not those which relate to immigration and refugee measures in general. My goal was to analyze national security legislation and the practice of racialization that occurs in its implementation. Thus my analysis draws attention to the beginning of the Act where definitions and interpretations are outlined as well as Part 1- Division 3 on entering and remaining in Canada; Division 4 on inadmissibility; Division 5 on loss of status and removal; Division 6 on detention and release; Division 7 on the right of appeal; Division 9 on the protection of information; and in Part 2 Divisions 1, 2, on refugee protection and Division 3 on pre-removal risk assessment.⁹⁰

I now turn to Lazar and Lazar (2004) to examine how the process of “othering” or in their words, “out-casting” occurs according to the discursive strategies that they identify: 1. “enemy construction”, 2. “criminalization”, 3. “orientalization” and 4. “(e)vilification” (p. 223).

The first aspect of “enemy construction” to look for according to Lazar and Lazar (2004) is the creation of “out-groups” or “them” and “in-groups” or “us”. The expression of difference between “in” and “out” groups occurs through the semantic juxtaposition of values. Through the lexical use of terms such as “danger to the security of Canada” the “other” is excluded from having the right to the same values as those of the in-group, such as “the right to appeal”. This strategy likens a number of diverse individuals and groups who hold a variety of beliefs, views and ideologies and may have nothing more in common than

⁹⁰ For a fuller explanation of what each of these sections comprises see 4.2.2 “Background context and course of action: *IRPA*”.

the created category as enemy. Parallels exist in the divisive construction of “us” and “them” and labeling techniques between Lazar and Lazar’s identification of the microstrategy of “enemy construction” and that of Wodak’s (1997) argumentation strategies and stereotypes. Like Wodak’s (1997) argumentation strategy of distortion, the strategy of enemy construction dismisses the seriousness and importance of the perspectives of “others”. It depoliticizes the practice of “othering” to make it “appear non-ideological” (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 230). The values of the in-group are therefore made to appear neutral and good while those of the enemy are ideological and bad.

Despite the similarities in the approaches of Lazar and Lazar (2004) and Wodak (1997), I use both in my analysis as each provides a different frame from which to understand the strategies used. In addition, when the strategies are alike I have analyzed different sections of the *IRPA* whenever possible to demonstrate a consistent pattern of “othering” or “out-casting” that I discuss more fully in my discussion and conclusion.

1. Enemy construction

The linguistic construction of enemy occurs through the microstrategies identified below in **1.i-iv**. I first note instances of each strategy and then explain how and where I located each strategy in the text.

- i.** Semantic field - security risk, national security
- ii.** Collocations - security risk/national security associated with permanent residents, foreign nationals, refugees; safety of Canada, Canadians, Canadian citizens
- iii.** Elaborating statements - emphasize democratic processes
- iv.** Material processes – engaging (3 out 4); instigating; engages; has engaged; will engage

1.i. Semantic field - I identify these terms as those which apply differently to “in” and “out” groups within the text of the *IRPA*. The meaning of security is the state or feeling of being safe and protected, as well as the assurance that this state will not be taken away. The

meaning of risk is the chance that something may go wrong, including a danger that injury, damage or loss will occur. The meaning of national is that which relates to, belongs to, represents or affects a nation.

1.ii. Collocations – This category looks for lexical associations between terms to determine how the “enemy” is labeled. The analysis of the *IRPA* text demonstrates a consistent pattern of “out-casting”. Parallels with Wodak’s (1997) argumentation strategies of group definition and the identification of stereotypes are discussed in more detail in my discussion as mentioned above.

To identify the construction of a dichotomous world of “us/outsidiers” and “them/insiders” I examined the collocation (association) of terms related to security certificates in the text. The dichotomy of “us” versus “them” is evident in the “Interpretation” section of the *IRPA* which appears at the beginning of the act and is presented below. It sets out the categorical division between “insiders” as Canadian citizens and “outsiders” which includes “foreign nationals” and “permanent residents” as well as people who are “stateless”:

“foreign national” means a person who is not a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident, and includes a stateless person.

“permanent resident” means a person who has acquired permanent resident status and has not subsequently lost that status under section 46. (*IRPA*)

Us/Insiders = Canadian citizens

Them/Outsiders = foreign nationals, permanent residents, stateless people

Notably, the distinction between “insiders” and “outsiders” appears in a different manner in Part 1, Division 3, section 19 in relation to “the right of entry”. While Canadian citizens and people registered under the *Indian Act* are identified concurrently in subsection 19(1), permanent residents are referred to in a separate subsection 19(2) but are also permitted “the right of entry” (noted in **bold**). Foreign nationals, on the other hand, are listed under

“obligation on entry” which places the onus on foreign nationals to produce the proper visa or documents to establish their status (noted with *italics*). As stated in the *IRPA*:

Right of entry of citizens and Indians

19. (1) **Every Canadian citizen** within the meaning of the *Citizenship Act* [italics in original] and **every person registered as an Indian** under the *Indian Act* [italics in original] **has the right to enter and remain in Canada in accordance with this Act**, and an officer shall allow the person to enter Canada if satisfied following an examination on their entry that the person is a citizen or registered Indian.

Right of entry of permanent residents

(2) An officer shall allow **a permanent resident to enter Canada** if satisfied following an examination on their entry that they have that status.

Obligation on entry

20. (1) *Every foreign national, other than a foreign national referred to in section 19, who seeks to enter or remain in Canada must establish,*

(a) to become a permanent resident, *that they hold the visa or other document required under the regulations and have come to Canada in order to establish permanent residence; and*

(b) to become a temporary resident, *that they hold the visa or other document required under the regulations and will leave Canada by the end of the period authorized for their stay.*

Us/Insiders = Canadian citizens, registered “Indians”, permanent residents as identified with that status

Them/Outsiders = foreign nationals, those seeking permanent resident status, temporary residents

1.iii. Elaborating statements - Elaboration involves the development of previous meanings in primary clauses by additional information relayed in secondary clauses to particularize a point of view or perspective. In the construction of an enemy of the West, elaborative statements work in conjunction with the semantic meaning and collocations employed to create an enemy “other” or “outcast”. According to Lazar and Lazar (2004), the use of elaboration for enemy construction involves linguistic references to “Western capitalist liberal democracy” (p. 228). Elaborating statements in this context allude to principles and/or terms of democratic judicial processes, national security and the safety of Canada as well as people in Canada.

In the following section of the *IRPA*, statements 78(b) - (h) and (j) contain elaborative understandings of the security certificate process in which the judge plays a crucial role in determining the value/relevance of the information/evidence against the security certificate subject as well as its disclosure to the subject, his/her counsel and the public due to “national security” or “safety of any person” concerns. The *elaborations* are identified through the use of *italics*.

78. The following provisions govern the determination:

(a) the judge shall hear the matter;

(b) the judge shall ensure the confidentiality of the information on which the certificate is based and of any other evidence that may be provided to the judge if, *in the opinion of the judge, its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person*;

(c) the judge shall deal with all matters *as informally and expeditiously as the circumstances and considerations of fairness and natural justice permit*;

(d) the judge shall examine the information and any other evidence *in private within seven days after the referral of the certificate for determination*;

(e) on each request of the Minister or the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness made at any time during the proceedings, the judge shall hear all or part of the information or evidence *in the absence of the permanent resident or the foreign national named in the certificate and their counsel if, in the opinion of the judge, its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person*;

(f) the information or evidence described in paragraph (e) shall be returned to the Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and shall not be considered by the judge *in deciding whether the certificate is reasonable if either the matter is withdrawn or if the judge determines that the information or evidence is not relevant or, if it is relevant, that it should be part of the summary*;

(g) the information or evidence described in paragraph (e) shall not be included in the summary *but may be considered by the judge in deciding whether the certificate is reasonable if the judge determines that the information or evidence is relevant but that its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person*;

(h) the judge shall provide the permanent resident or the foreign national with a summary of the information or evidence that enables them to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the certificate, *but that does not include anything that in the opinion of the judge would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person if disclosed*;

(i) the judge shall provide the permanent resident or the foreign national with an opportunity to be heard regarding their inadmissibility; and

(j) the judge may receive into evidence anything that, *in the opinion of the judge*, is appropriate, *even if it is inadmissible in a court of law*, and may base the decision on that evidence. (IRPA, Division 9: 78 (a-j))

The next section also reveals the use of elaboration (identified with *italics*) in relation to security certificates and inadmissibility for those who seek refugee protection. In Part 2, Division 3 under the “Principle of Non-refoulement” the security certificate process of determining inadmissibility concerning refugees is determined by the “opinion of the Minister” rather than the “the opinion of the judge”.

115. (1) A protected person or a person who is recognized as a Convention refugee by another country to which the person may be returned shall not be removed from Canada to a country where they would be at risk of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion or at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.

Exceptions

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in the case of a person

(a) who is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality and who constitutes, *in the opinion of the Minister, a danger to the public in Canada*; or

(b) who is inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights or organized criminality if, *in the opinion of the Minister, the person should not be allowed to remain in Canada on the basis of the nature and severity of acts committed or of danger to the security of Canada*. (IRPA, Division 3: 115 (1),(2) (a-b))

1.iv. Material processes - Material processes or action processes (realized by verbs of action or doing) that are associated with “out-casts” help to establish the construct of an “enemy other”. When linked with “security”, “subversion of democratic governments” and “terrorism” material processes such as “engaging”, and/or “instigating” are recognized as immoral in the Western democratic context of the government of Canada as explicitly stated in the IRPA. Section 34(1) of Division 4 outlines the *material processes* (identified with *italics*) which are related to the “enemy” in the text:

34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for

- (a) *engaging* in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada;
- (b) *engaging* in or *instigating* the subversion by force of any government;
- (c) *engaging* in terrorism;
- (d) being a danger to the security of Canada;
- (e) *engaging* in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada; or
- (f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe *engages, has engaged or will engage* in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c). (*IRPA*; italics added)

2. Criminalization

According to Lazar and Lazar (2004), the strategy of criminalization is used to delegitimize the “political actions of the enemy [in which no context is provided so as to remove the possible political motivation behind the actions/events in question]” (p. 231). Although as Lazar and Lazar (2004) claim some forms of political violence may be considered legal and in compliance with the standards set, the strategy of criminalization removes the legitimacy of all acts of violence by removing the political context in which they take place (p. 231). As a result, all acts are made criminal rather than political. Hence this strategy involves the depoliticization of all forms of violence associated with the “other” by labeling the actions and/or individuals/groups as criminal.

2.i. Lexical designation of goals as criminal - Rather than employ the descriptors for criminal actions and actors proposed in Lazar and Lazar’s (2004) identification of the “microstrategy of criminalization” (see Table 9:2.ii, iii above), my analysis considered the lexical designation of goals used to establish criminality. Because the stated actions are in themselves vague, (e.g., “engaging”) without a consideration of what is hoped to be achieved by the actions in question, I chose to examine the goals which are more concrete (e.g., “engaging in *violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada*”).

The sections of the *IRPA* that I examined in my analysis concern security certificates. These segments interweave depoliticized criminal goals with those of a political nature. Political goals are defined here as those which involve “espionage”, “acts of subversion against governments”, “being a danger to the security of Canada”, and “terrorism”, while criminal goals are those which do not suggest a political nature, such as “violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada”. This can be seen in the above noted section 34(1) which lists politicized goals in a-d and f, and depoliticized goals in e.

The merging of political and criminal is also seen in Division 9. For instance section 76 gives the following definition for information where security relates to information of a politicized nature (in *italics*):

“information” means *security or criminal intelligence information* and information that is obtained in confidence from a source in Canada, from the government of a foreign state, from an international organization of states or from an institution of either of them.

In the next section concerns of a politicized nature (in *italics*) versus those of criminality (in **bold**) are explained through the choice of the lexical categories “national security” and “safety of any person”:

78. (b) the judge shall ensure the confidentiality of the information on which the certificate is based and of any other evidence that may be provided to the judge if, in the opinion of the judge, its disclosure would be injurious to *national security* or to the **safety of any person**

(e) on each request of the Minister or the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness made at any time during the proceedings, the judge shall hear all or part of the information or evidence in the absence of the permanent resident or the foreign national named in the certificate and their counsel if, in the opinion of the judge, *its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person*....

(g) the information or evidence described in paragraph (e) shall not be included in the summary but may be considered by the judge in deciding whether the certificate is reasonable if the judge determines that the information or evidence is relevant but that *its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person*;

(h) the judge shall provide the permanent resident or the foreign national with a summary of the information or evidence that enables them to be reasonably informed

of the circumstances giving rise to the certificate, but that does not include anything that in the opinion of the judge *would be injurious to national security* or **to the safety of any person** if disclosed.... (*IRPA*)

This pattern is also evident in the following passages which I have identified in the same manner as the above:

82. (1) The Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of a permanent resident who is named in a certificate described in subsection 77(1) if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the permanent resident is a danger to *national security* or to **the safety of any person** or is **unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal**.

84(2) A judge may, on application by a foreign national who has not been removed from Canada within 120 days after the Federal Court determines a certificate to be reasonable, order the foreign national's release from detention, under terms and conditions that the judge considers appropriate, if satisfied that the foreign national will not be removed from Canada within a reasonable time and that the release will not pose a danger to *national security* or to the **safety of any person** (*IRPA*)

2.ii. Actions: Past, Habitual, Projected

Integral to the strategy of criminalization is the description of actions as past, habitual and projected in order to assert what criminal acts the “enemy” has done, is doing and will do in the future. In most cases, with the possible exception of identity fraud, people are classified as inadmissible based on the likelihood that they were involved in past criminal actions, projected future actions, or on occurrences in the present. This is seen in the following section:

33. The facts that constitute inadmissibility under sections 34 to 37 include facts arising from omissions and, unless otherwise provided, include facts for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that *they have occurred, are occurring or may occur*. (*IRPA*; italics added)

2.iii. “Us”= honourable / “Them” = ignoble

In the final category of criminalization that I locate within the *IRPA*, I considered the use of lexical associations through the positive attribution of “us” as honourable from the negative terms to distinguish “them” as ignoble. To note the positive attributions made in

relation to “us”, I examined the language used to describe and define the *IRPA* itself as a legislative act, and those who administer or otherwise participate in the administration of the act. I cite instances below in numerical order with an explanation at the end of the list. The *positive attributions* are highlighted in *italics*:

1. “*Immigration and refugee protection act*” (title)
2. “An Act *respecting immigration to Canada and the granting of refugee protection to persons who are displaced, persecuted or in danger*”(first line)
3. 3. (1) The objectives of this Act with respect to immigration are
 - (a) to permit Canada to pursue the *maximum social, cultural and economic benefits of immigration*;
 - (b) to *enrich and strengthen the social and cultural fabric of Canadian society, while respecting the federal, bilingual and multicultural character of Canada*;
 - (h) to *protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society*
 - (i) to promote *international justice and security* by fostering *respect for human rights* and by *denying access to Canadian territory to persons who are criminals or security risks*
4. (2) The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are
 - (a) to recognize that the refugee program is in the first instance about *saving lives and offering protection to the displaced and persecuted*
 - (c) to grant, as a fundamental expression of Canada’s *humanitarian ideals, fair consideration to those who come to Canada claiming persecution*;
 - (d) to offer *safe haven to persons with a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group, as well as those at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment*;
 - (e) to establish *fair and efficient procedures* that will maintain *the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system*, while upholding Canada’s *respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings*;
 - (g) to *protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society*; and
 - (h) to promote *international justice and security* by *denying access to Canadian territory to persons, including refugee claimants, who are security risks or serious criminals*.
5. “The Immigration Division is the *competent* Division of the Board with respect to the review of reasons for detention under this Division” (Division 6: 54).
6. An officer may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of a permanent resident or a foreign national who the officer has *reasonable grounds* to believe is inadmissible

and is a danger to the public or is unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing or removal from Canada. (Division 6: 55(1))

7. 55 (2) An officer may, without a warrant, arrest and detain a foreign national, other than a protected person,
 - (a) who the officer has *reasonable grounds* to believe is inadmissible and is a danger to the public or is unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing, removal from Canada, or at a proceeding that could lead to the making of a removal order by the Minister under subsection 44(2); or
 - (b) if the officer is not satisfied of the identity of the foreign national in the course of any procedure under this Act. (Division 6)

8. 55(3) A permanent resident or a foreign national may, on entry into Canada, be detained if an officer (b) has *reasonable grounds* to suspect that the permanent resident or the foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of security or for violating human or international rights. (Division 6)

I begin my selection with the title of the act as it sets off the positive nature of the text with the lexical use of “protection”. Second, I consider what the act is about as set out in the text as “respecting immigration” and “granting refugee protection”. This assertion to “respect and grant” also determines the authority of the act to take on this role. Third, in numbers 3 and 4, I examine the objectives of the act “with respect to immigration” (number 3) and “with respect to refugees” (number 4). Positive attributions in relation to the act and immigration are noted as permitting Canada “to pursue the maximum social, cultural and economic benefits”, “to enrich and strengthen the social and cultural fabric of Canadian society”, “to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society” and “to promote international justice and security by fostering respect for human rights and by denying access to Canadian territory to persons who are criminals or security risks”. Positive attributions in relation to the act and refugees are noted as “saving lives” and “offering protection”, “fair consideration” for those who claim persecution, to “offer safe haven”, to establish “fair and efficient procedures”, and like the objectives of immigration “to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian

society” as well as “to promote international justice and security”. In number 5, I highlight “competent” as a positive attribution of the Immigration Board. Finally, in numbers 6 through 8, I select the term “reasonable grounds” as a positive attribution of the process of security as determined by an immigration officer. The term “reasonable” is also seen later in Division 9 on the “Protection of Information” in relation to judicial determinations of security certificate subjects.

In contrast to the positive associations of the act as fair, just, and reasonable and those involved as protectors of people, promoters of health and security, and savers of life, permanent residents and foreign nationals are associated with criminality and security risks. In the following instance, the lexical choice of “inmate” negatively establishes a criminal context through which to understand the arrest and detention of permanent residents and foreign nationals (in **bold**):

If a warrant for arrest and detention under this Act is issued with respect to a permanent resident or a foreign national who is detained under another Act of Parliament in an institution, the person in charge of the institution shall deliver the **inmate** to an officer at the end of the **inmate’s** period of detention in the institution. (*IRPA*, Division 6:59)

Negative lexical attributions are also made in relation to permanent residents and foreign nationals as “them” who are subject to security certificates for engaging in or instigating, having engaged or instigated, or in the likelihood that they will engage or instigate “the subversion by force of *any* government” (see (34(1)(b)(f) cited above in Enemy construction, 1.iv. Material processes). Yet notably the same actions might be framed differently depending upon the political ideology of the governments that “they” subvert, have subverted or intend to subvert. For instance, if the permanent resident or foreign national had been involved in an action to “subvert by force” the Ba’athist party of Saddam Hussein in 2003

given Hussein's "enemy" status in Canada at the time, the Canadian government would not likely consider this act criminal. I will consider this aspect more fully in my discussion.

3. Orientalization

While as stated earlier there are no Arab/Muslim racialized stereotypes⁹¹ in the *IRPA*, and therefore no direct link to "orientalization" can be made, the category of duplicity which as Lazar and Lazar (2004) note is associated with the Arab/Muslim stereotype is present in the *IRPA* text and thus deserves mention. A consideration of the issuance of past and current security certificates reveals that the majority of certificates have been issued to "orientalized" people.⁹² I will reflect more on this issue in my discussion.

Lexical descriptors and processes describe how these "others" as permanent residents and foreign nationals may be detained if there is reason to believe that they are duplicitous such as for failing to appear for examination as marked in italics in the passage below:

55(1) An officer may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of a *permanent resident* or a *foreign national* who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe is inadmissible and is a danger to the public or is *unlikely to appear for examination*, an admissibility hearing or removal from Canada. (*IRPA*; italics added)

And again in the following:

58(1)(b) they [permanent residents and foreign nationals] *are unlikely to appear* for examination, an admissibility hearing, removal from Canada, or at a proceeding that could lead to the making of a removal order by the Minister under subsection 44(2)...(*IRPA*; italics added)

⁹¹ As noted in my application of Wodak's (1997) category of "Stereotypes", Indigenous people who are registered under the "Indian Act" are referred to under the racialized category of "Indians"(*IRPA*). The fact that this unsuitable term which was used to create a racialized "other" continues will be considered in my discussion section.

⁹² A CSIS FAQ from February 2005 notes that "a review of all certificates [27] demonstrates that they have been directed at a broad range of subjects including Islamic terrorists, Russian nationals engaged in espionage, Sikh terrorists, Hindu extremists in support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, secular Arab terrorists and a right-wing extremist". Interestingly out of the six groups mentioned, three are Muslim/Arab while two others (i.e., Sikh and Hindu) belong to other "orientalized" groups. The original text from csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/backgrounders/backgrounder14.asp last visited March 2008 is no longer available online- see <http://csis-scrs.gc.ca/nwsrm/bckgrndrs/index-eng.asp>.

Like the passage cited in “Actions: Past, Habitual, Projected” possible future duplicitous actions are again used to describe permanent residents and foreign nationals as “unlikely to appear at a proceeding” (82(1)) as well as the likelihood that they will be involved in future crimes (see section 33).

4. Vilification

The (e)vilification process that constructs a spiritual/religious dichotomy between “good” and “evil” as defined by Lazar and Lazar (2004) is not present in the *IRPA*. However, a similar process that attributes malevolent, immoral and criminal actions and ideology with the “out-casts” of this text, which I refer to here simply as “vilification”, does occur through lexical reiteration and attribution in the clause realized by the verb “be”.

4.i. lexical reiteration - To locate lexical reiteration, which involves identifying the repetition of the same or related words, thematic patterns are noted. The lexical identification of “insider/outsider”, “we” versus “they”, and “us” versus “them” groups was previously noted using Wodak’s (1997) classifications system under “participants” in the importance of context, and argumentation strategies 2.Ai, ii. To recall my findings, in 2.Ai I first looked for thematic patterns which presented a division of: 1a. “we” as those who are not subject to the security certificate legislation as well as 1b. those who administer or otherwise participate in the security certificate process, and 2a. “they” as those who are subject to the certificates as well as 2b. those who act in defense of the security certificate subjects. In 2.Aii, I then examined the argumentation strategy that places blame and/or guilt on the “other” and removes responsibility from the “self”.

1a. We = not subject to security certificates
 Canadians, Canadian citizens

1b. We = administration of security certificates

Immigration and Refugee Board, the Government of Canada, provincial governments, foreign states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Chief Justice of the Federal Court/judge of that Court designated by the Chief justice (judge)

2a. They = subject to security certificates

foreign nationals, permanent residents, temporary residents, subject (of a report; of a certificate)

2b. They = acting in defense for those subject to security certificates

their [i.e., security certificate] counsel

This division of “we/us/insiders” and “they/them/outside” has also been determined in the examination of collocations used to construct an enemy as noted in 1.ii of Lazar and Lazar’s (2004) framework:

Us/Insiders = Canadian citizens, registered “Indians”, permanent residents as identified with that status

Them/Outsiders = foreign nationals, those seeking permanent resident status, temporary residents

Using the previously cited instances, I determine the following pattern (\approx almost equal to; = equal to): foreign nationals and permanent residents \approx security risk, national security = inadmissible.

4.ii. attribution in the clause – Through the use of relational attributives (realized by the verb “be”, e.g. they *are* a danger) negative characteristics are attributed to the “outcast” individual or group. In the following, permanent residents and foreign nationals are described as a possible “danger to the public”, threat to security or violator of “human or international rights” (identified in *italics*).

58. (1) The Immigration Division shall order the release of a permanent resident or a foreign national unless it is satisfied, taking into account prescribed factors, that
(a) they *are a danger to the public*

(c) the Minister is taking necessary steps to inquire into a reasonable suspicion that they *are inadmissible on grounds of security or for violating human or international rights (IRPA; italics added)*

The most common relational attributive found throughout the *IRPA* is that which states that foreign nationals and permanent residents “*are inadmissible*”. This occurs 45 times within the text as indicated using the “find” option of my word processing program.

4.iii..action – The final category of vilification concerns the way the goal of an “enemy’s” activities are described or alternatively the way “we” are described to perceive the “enemy’s” goals. In the first case, the “out-cast” individual/group is (re)presented as malevolent, immoral or criminal through the determination of his/her/their goals. In the second instance, vilification occurs in the way “we” perceive these actions as malevolent, immoral or criminal. Section 34 (1)(a-f) provides an example of the first of these determinations in which the goal of the “enemy”(i.e., permanent residents or foreign nationals including refugees) is vilified (e.g. engaging in espionage, subversion of government, terrorism, etc.), while sections 55 (1) and 82 (1) respectively exemplify how “we” perceive the “other” as “a danger to the public” (immoral/ criminal), “unlikely to appear for an examination, an admissibility hearing or removal from Canada” (criminal) and “a danger to national security” (immoral/ malevolent).

4.2.5 Background Context and Course of Action: CSIS Summary Reports⁹³

In the following section, I present my analysis of the CSIS summary intelligence reports for the five men currently detained under security certificates. Since complete access to the information and evidence against the security certificate subjects is not permitted under

⁹³ Throughout my study I interchange “CSIS reports”, CSIS intelligence reports”, and “CSIS summaries” for the title “CSIS Summaries of the Security Intelligence Reports”.

the *IRPA*, as noted in my analysis above, the CSIS reports are particularly important to my study of the security certificate process. Namely, the reports provide a textual sample of part of the information that is used by the government to issue security certificates. As such, the CSIS reports represent one of the ways that the practice of national security discourse takes place under the legislation of the *IRPA*. Moreover, as these reports serve to demonstrate how racialization comes to be realized from the practice of the near “race”-neutral government legislation of the *IRPA*, they are integral to my analysis of current racism in national security discourse.

According to the *IRPA* the security certificate process requires that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP) and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (CIC) issue a certificate against a permanent resident or foreign national based on “information” that establishes inadmissibility “on the grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality”(77(1)). “Information” as defined in Division 9 of the *IRPA* “means security or criminal intelligence information and information obtained in confidence from a source in Canada, from the government of a foreign state, from an international organization of states or from an institution of either of them”(76). The PSEP and the CIC then refer the certificate to the Federal Court which proceeds to make a determination based on the “information” obtained by the PSEP and CIC.

The CSIS summary intelligence reports are a genre of text from the “information gathering field of action” that belongs to the discourse of national security (see Table 14, pp. 145-146). I have analyzed the reports here as an example of the “information” prepared for the PSEP and the CIC which is used in the “political executive field of action” to issue the

genre of security certificates. The reports dated February 22, 2008 contain summaries of information and evidence that was used by PSEP and CIC to determine the issuance of certificates against the five men who are currently the subjects of security certificates. In late February 2008, these reports became available online when they were published on the Federal Court website. They were removed within one week from when they first appeared online. I was able to gain access to them by filing a request to the court registrar at the Federal Court in Ottawa on March 27, 2008. They were sent to me via email on March 31, 2008.

4.2.6 Paradigms for the Analysis of Racialized Arab/Muslim “Othering”

I have employed the complementary approaches of Karim (1997) and Lazar and Lazar (2004) to examine the discourse of the selected CSIS report on Mohamed Harkat, as I explain below. Because my aim at this point in my analysis was to investigate how the practice of racialization occurs in the reports with the application of the “race”-neutral text of the *IRPA*, Karim’s (1997) identification of “Topos” as the primary stereotype served as my core approach. As previously noted, Karim (1997) defines topos as a concept which is broader than script that enables people to make sense of their world. Topos relies on visual and linguistic signifiers that intertwine and entrench categories of the “other” and therefore permit for their perseverance. Accordingly, the primary stereotype naturalizes views of the “other” within collective cultural memory. To complement my analysis of the primary stereotype as presented by Karim (1997) and to further enhance the richness of my findings, I have also utilized Lazar and Lazar’s (2004) analytical identification strategies throughout my examination of the text.

Due to the space and time constraints of a thesis, I cannot offer an exhaustive investigation of all of the CSIS summaries. I have thus chosen to focus my analysis on the report of one of the security certificate subjects, Mohamed Harkat, which serves as an exemplar for the other summary reports.⁹⁴ I based my decision to examine the Harkat text on two main factors: 1. the recent Federal Court decision of Wednesday October 8, 2008 to allow certain classified information to be made available to Harkat and his lawyer, and subsequently also to the public,⁹⁵ and 2. the accompaniment of CSIS interviews in the text. First, the release of classified information is significant because the greatest legal point of contention in the legislation of the security certificate process is that subjects and their lawyers are not permitted to see the evidence against them, but only summaries of information. The recent decision to allow secret information to be viewed by Harkat and his lawyer serves to demonstrate that the current process is at the very least, problematic. Second, the CSIS text relating to Harkat is the only report that contains interviews between CSIS and a security certificate detainee. The interviews not only reveal what type of information CSIS is concerned with, but also the manner in which security officials (namely, CSIS agents) pose questions and the assumptions they make in the framing of their queries.

Although my analysis examines the Harkat text in detail, I have also noted the central thematic patterns for all of the CSIS intelligence reports in Appendix B for the five men who

⁹⁴ In this section of my study, I refer to the CSIS summary report concerning Mohamed Harkat alternatively as “the Harkat text”, “the (CSIS) text”, and “the (CSIS) report” as this text is the focus of my analysis.

⁹⁵ According to an article by Andrew Duffy in the *Ottawa Citizen* on Wednesday October 8, 2008 (p. A10), Mohamed Harkat -- one of the men subject to a security certificate which has him under house arrest -- has been granted the ability to access more information in his file regarding the allegations made against him. The *Citizen* article states that the changes to security certificate legislation in relation to special advocates who are able to see the information used as evidence against the accused but are not permitted to speak to the accused about this information have successfully fought to have make this information available to Mr. Harkat.

are currently subject to security certificates: Hasan Almrei, Adil Charkaoui, Mohamed Harkat, Mahmoud Jaballah, and Mohamed Mahjoub.

1. Presentation of “facts”: Ancient history/ ancient hatred

To begin I examined what Karim (1997) defines as the discursive (re)presentation of Arab/Muslim “facts” which propagate a view of “Arab terrorism” as an “ancient” manifestation of “hatred” rooted in Islam. This strategic presentation overlooks important power issues of social and economic imbalances between East and West that result from political decisions and at times military might. The presentation of ancient hatred, in other words, depoliticizes the discourse through its invocation of images of Muslims as irrational terrorists. According to Karim (1997), the detection of orientalist presentations that remove power issues from the construct of discourse can be identified in a text through the uncritical use of genealogies or histories which attempt to provide a chronology of Muslim terrorism to link Islam with past terrorist violence, hatred, and/or organizations.

To locate the presentation of “ancient history/ancient hatred facts” I examined the selected Harkat text for brief histories and/or genealogies of Muslim terrorism. Because histories and genealogies chart the order of events in the past and are used in this context to note similar patterns in the future, I looked for references to future as well as past terrorism. To help identify historical and/or genealogical texts in the report, I used the lexical indicators of “jihad”, “infidel”, Islam/Islamic, martyrdom, new, old, Qur’an, terror/terrorism, and theology which I have highlighted in Table 18 below. The table shows instances of the “ancient history/ancient hatred” texts which appear as footnoted citations for information referred to within the main body of the Harkat text. The first column notes the appendix or page number and footnote designation for the instances where the listed “factual” texts

appear, the second column lists the citation of the information as presented in the CSIS report, while the third column presents the number of times this source is used.

Table 18: Ancient History/ Ancient Hatred

pp. 13, ft. 26, 27; 14, ft. 28	Tab 9, Simon Reeve, <i>The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the future of terrorism</i> , London: Deutsch Limited, 1999, p. 4;	3
pp., 13, ft. 26; 30, ft. 64	Tab 10, Washington Post, "Bin Laden: Architect of New Global Terrorism, Evolving Movement Combines Old Theology and Modern Technology in Mission Without Borders", September 16, 2001, p. 3.	2
p. 22, ft. 50	Tab 22, <i>The Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , New Edition, Prepared by a Number of Leading Orientalists, Edited by B. Lewis, V.L. Ménage, Ch. Pellat and J. Schacht, Volume III, H-Iram, 1986, London Luzac, pp. 283-284;	1
p. 27, ft. 60	Tab 29, "Waiting for al-Qaeda's next bomb: The Underground World of Jihadists in Great Britain", ERRI daily intelligence report, Vol.13, no. 124, May 4, 2007, p. 7;	1
p. 29, ft. 61	Tab 32, Mail on Sunday, "The Jackal of Islam: After Armageddon Schooled in high-technology by Britain, trained to hate in Afghanistan-the young man whose one aim is massacre", Simon Reeve, September 16, 2001, p. 6.	1
p. 31, ft. 68	Tab 38, <i>Jihad: From Qur'an to bin Laden</i> by Richard Bonney, First published in 2004 by Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p.4.	1
p. 38, ft. 92	Tab 60, ITAC Report, "Islamic Extremism : Threats to North America", January 28, 2005.	1
Appendix "G", ft. 116, 119, 120, 121	Tab 85, Maclean's, "The House of Khadr: Canada's 'first family of terror' is caught between two worlds – hoops and holy war, infidels and the Internet, movie scripts and martyrdom", August 4, 2006, p. 2;	4
Appendix "G", ft. 118	Tab 86, <i>Historical Dictionary of Terrorism</i> , Second Edition, Sean K. Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies and Movements, No. 41, Historical Dictionaries of War, Revolution, and Civil Unrest, No. 21, The Scarecrow Press, Inc. Lanham, Maryland and London 2002, p. 2.	1

2. Thematic chains: Reduction of Islam to fundamentalism

Related to the representation of Islam and "ancient" hatred, in the next section of my analysis I explored Karim's (1997) second category for the identification of Arab/Muslim topos -- the reduction of Islam to fundamentalism. This category of Islamic reductionism considers how language is employed in the dominant discourse to (re)present diverse Muslim views as a unified grouping of extremist perspectives regardless of differences in ethnicity,

culture, and/or religious beliefs and practices. Thematic patterns which link Islam with a desire to rule the world, impose religion and oppress women are used to reduce Islam to fundamentalism. I have identified the use of fundamentalist themes through the repetitive use of lexical collocations (associations) of Islam with extremism such as “Islamist extremist”, “Islamic terrorist” and variations on this theme.

Using the find option in my PDF reader, I located 131 instances of the use of “Islam” or a form of the word such as “Islamist”, and “Islamic” in the Harkat text. To narrow the search, “extremist” was added for which there are 20 instances that are noted in Table 19 below. I also list other associations which link Islam to terrorism and extremism from numbers 21-37 in the table. All examples are highlighted.

Table 19: Reduction of Islam to Fundamentalism

#	Location in text	Citation from text
1	p.1 From Table of Contents	Concealing his previous whereabouts and links with Islamist extremists : Maintaining links
2	p. 1 From Table of Contents	Assisting Islamist extremists in Canada and their entry into Canada
3	p.1 From Table of Contents	Maintaining contacts with Islamist extremists
4	p. 5: 4	assisting Islamist extremists in Canada and their entry into Canada;
5	p.5, ft. 7	CSIS uses the term “ Islamist extremists ” to refer to individuals who, through an extreme interpretation of Islamic principles , espouse the use of serious violence in order to achieve an ideological, religious or political objective
6	p. 5: 4	maintaining contacts with Islamist extremists
7	p. 14: 21	HARKAT used methodologies typical of “sleepers” such as the use of false passports, aliases, keeping a low profile and concealing his previous whereabouts and links to Islamist extremists .
8	p. 14: 25.	The exploitation of Saudi passports has surfaced repeatedly in the Service’s investigation of Islamist extremists in Canada.
9	p. 14: 25	The Service has concluded that Saudi passports were the document of choice for Islamist extremists wishing to enter Canada because prior to 2002, Saudi passport holders did not require a visa to enter Canada.
11	p. 14: 26	The Service concludes that HARKAT used aliases (see footnote 1) in order to hide his identity and his real activities on behalf of Islamist extremists
12	p. 18: 34	Concealing his previous whereabouts and links with Islamist extremists

13	p. 18: 34.	HARKAT lied in his statements made to the Service on October 4, 1997, ³⁶ and on June 11, 1998, ³⁷ that he has never been in Afghanistan and was never involved in supporting Islamist extremists , including during the time period he spent in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ³⁸
14	p. 23: 45	Assisting Islamist extremists in Canada and their entry into Canada
15	p. 24: 48	Maintaining contacts with Islamist extremists
16	p. 28: 55	The Service concludes, based on the information presented in this summary, that HARKAT assisted Islamist extremists entering Canada, and received funds from Islamist extremists abroad.
17	p. 28: 55	HARKAT's method and route of travel to Canada, untrue statements made to Canadian officials, his support for individuals and groups involved in political violence or terrorist activity, his alliances with Islamist extremists , lead the Service to conclude that HARKAT has been associated with organizations that support the use of political violence and terrorism.
18	p. 30, ft. 63	re. "Bin Laden alliances" Tab 35, Middle Eastern Quarterly, " Sunni Extremists ", June 2000, Volume 7, Number 2, p. 1, para. 6
19	p. 37: 12	Islamist extremists remain intent on attacking targets in Canada. ⁹²
20	p. 37, ft. 92	Tab 60, ITAC Report, " Islamic Extremism: Threats to North America ", January 28, 2005. [The Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, an integrated security group consisting of members from various partner agencies (government departments and police agencies) produces comprehensive threat assessments distributed to the intelligence community and first-line responders.]
21	p. 46: 1	Ahmed Said Khadr, born on March 1, 1948, Cairo, Egypt, ¹¹¹ was a very well connected Islamist extremist and was well known to the Service for his links to terrorism , prior to his death during a firefight with Pakistani security forces in October 2003.
22	56. p. 28	This network engages in acts of terrorism to attain its stated objective of purging all secular and Western influences from the Islamic world and establishing Islamist states based on a fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law, or sharia.
23	Appendix "A", p. 29, ft. 61	Bin Laden is believed to have become an ideological beacon for non-aligned groups and individuals to undertake jihads against the West and is viewed by his supporters and potential new recruits as a true warrior for Islam and for its global prestige. Some consider him as much a cult figure as a terrorist leader.
24	Appendix "A" p. 30: 3	In 1988, with the end of the Afghan-Soviet War in sight and intent on extending the Islamic struggle beyond Afghanistan, Bin Laden created a new organization, Al Qaeda ("the Base").
25	Appendix "A" p. 30: 3	The aim of Al Qaeda is to unite all Muslims and establish governments which follow Islamic law or sharia. To this end, Al Qaeda is committed to overthrowing secular governments in Islamic countries which Bin Laden considers to be corrupt and eliminating all Western influences from these countries.
26	Appendix "A" p. 31: 3	Jihad in this latter sense is without limit of time or space and continues until the whole world accepts Islam or submits to the Islamic state.
27	Appendix "A" pp.31, 32:4	Under the leadership of Bin Laden, training camps and elaborate infrastructure were established and statements were regularly issued warning the enemies of Islam , in effect the West - that "...we will

		continue fighting you and we will continue martyrdom operations inside and outside the United States until you stop your injustice, and you end your foolishness.”
28	Appendix “B” p. 46:1	The Algerian Front islamique du salut (FIS) (Islamic Salvation Front) was established in 1989 by Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj to represent the flourishing Islamist movement.
29	Appendix “D” p. 51:2	It has been reported that Ibn Khattab went to Afghanistan in 1987 to fight against the Soviets, moved to Tajikistan circa 1993 to continue the Jihad, then circa 1995 to Chechnya to train Islamists where he became famous for his success against the Russians.
30	Appendix “D” p. 52:4	However, contrary to Bin Laden, Ibn Khattab has never been quoted as calling for a struggle between Islam and the West, and has never called for Jihad against America or Jews.
31	Appendix “D” p. 52, ft. 105	Tab 75, Mideast Mirror, “Are Russia and Islam heading for war?” September 30, 1999, p. 3;
32	Appendix ‘G’ p. 56, ft. 118	While this [suicide bombing] appears to be a tactic specifically associated with Islamic fundamentalists, in fact non-Muslim groups in the Middle East have also used it.
33	June 11, 1998 CSIS Interview with Harkat p.85	Are you aware of individuals who might have left the FIS to join other Islamic Groups or organizations? Who and what group?
34	June 11, 1998 CSIS Interview with Harkat p.87	Were you ever injured during an Islamic / Mujahedeen attack or any other conflict?
35	June 11, 1998 CSIS Interview with Harkat p.92	Any earnings or revenues from the FIS or other Islamic group, foundations, organization?
36	June 11, 1998 CSIS Interview with Harkat p.94	While you were assisting the FIS in Algeria or other groups in Pakistan, did you ever witness an Islamic or Mujahedin attack or training?
37	September 14, 2001 interview p. 105	Subject was than asked if he had concerns about potential repercussions to the Islamic community because of the event [September 11, 2001]: harassment on the Muslim community and the words of caution passed by the Imams in Ottawa.

A thorough examination of the above table reveals that in the Harkat text, CSIS presents Arabs/Muslims as a uniform body. Rarely is Islam associated with anything other than extremism, fundamentalism, terrorism, terrorist networks, such as “the Bin Laden Network” and “Al Qaeda”, or the names of groups that are considered illegitimate, such as the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) and Al Gamaa Al Islamiya (AGAI). An exception to this is the found in 8 references made to the Muslim World League (MWL) which CSIS recognizes as a

charity.⁹⁶ A further point of interest lies in the footnoted text of a magazine article from the *Mideast Mirror* entitled “Are Russia and Islam at war?” (see no. 31, Appendix “D” p. 52, ft. 105 as shown above). The use of sources is examined in more detail in the intertextuality section below.

3. Depoliticization: the microstrategy of Criminalization

Like Karim’s (1997) classification for the problematic identification of the stereotype of “ancient history/ancient hatred”, Lazar and Lazar (2004) also enable the consideration of how political acts are transformed into those seen as purely criminal through the identification of the microstrategy of “criminalization”. To construct a view that simplifies complex power relations this technique utilizes the presentation of actions as past, habitual, current and projected so as to depict an inherent link between Islam and terrorism.

In my examination of the text, I have identified the terms used to create a history of criminal activity associated with orientalism under the columns of past, habitual, current, and future actions listed in Table 20 below. To identify which category of action the terms fall under I considered words that indicate time or time periods such as “Amargeddon”, “infidels”, “martyrdom” as well as texts associated with or that chart the distant past as signifiers of past; those that imply intention, such as “aim” are considered as indicators of future actions; the use of the progressive tense, such as in terms like “leading” are noted as indicators of current actions as well as people who are associated with current or events of the recent past; and nouns such as extremism, terrorism, Islam and “jihad” as ongoing or habitual actions.

⁹⁶ In Appendix “F”, CSIS asserts that the MWL is a legitimate charity organization.

Table 20: Actions: Past, Habitual, Current and Future

Past	Habitual	Current	Future
		Osama Bin Laden	future of terrorism
	Islamic Extremism	New Global Terrorism	
Encyclopaedia of Islam	Islam	Leading Orientalists	
	The Underground World of Jihadists	Waiting for al-Qaeda's	next bomb:
Armageddon	trained to hate in Afghanistan	The Jackal of Islam	whose one aim is massacre
Qur'an	Jihad	bin Laden	
	Islamic Extremism		Threats to North America
infidels; martyrdom; holy war		Canada's 'first family of terror'; caught between two worlds	
Historical Dictionary	of Terrorism		

The association made between Islam and “extremism” further depoliticizes the context within which these groups -- although not considered legitimate by Western standards -- operate by linking religious beliefs with fanaticism only, and not considering the power relations involved. In the text, CSIS explains its use of the term “Islamist Extremist” “to refer to individuals who, through an extreme interpretation of Islamic principles, espouse the use of serious violence in order to achieve an ideological, religious or political objective” (Table 19, no.5, p. 5: 7 shown above). The connection then is between the religion of Islam and its interpretation, and not with the power imbalances that exist between East and West. Though CSIS states in this definition that “serious violence” may be used to achieve a “political objective”, the violence emanates from the interpretation of Islam rather than from a political goal.

Interestingly, while in a footnote CSIS make a distinction between “groups involved in political violence” and those involved in “terrorist activity”, they do not explain the differences between the two anywhere in the text (see Table 19, no.17, p. 28:55 above). In

my discussion, I reflect on the possible reasons for this omission as well as the collocation of Islam with fundamentalism noted earlier.

4. Orientalization: Bellicosity & Duplicity

A further point considered in the examination of the collocations in the Harkat text is the representation of violence in the East as “normal” or what Lazar and Lazar (2004) label as “bellicosity” in their microstrategy of “orientalization”. Since the text is a report based on allegations made against Harkat, I did not attempt to make a comparison between East versus West (or “them/they/outside” and “us/we/inside”) in this part of my analysis but rather focused how Arabs/Muslims are represented in relation to “bellicosity”. To do so, I considered the lexical references that present Arabs/Muslims as associated with continuous struggle against the West. These references include: Islamic struggle/Islamic struggle against the West, uniting Muslims to overthrow secular and/or Western governments, forcing people to submit to Islam, and continuous fighting.⁹⁷ I have highlighted these terms in Table 21 below.

Table 21: “Bellicosity”

#	Location in text	Citation from text
1	Appendix “A” p. 30: 3	In 1988, with the end of the Afghan-Soviet War in sight and intent on extending the Islamic struggle beyond Afghanistan, Bin Laden created a new organization, Al Qaeda (“the Base”).
2	Appendix “A” p. 30: 3	The aim of Al Qaeda is to unite all Muslims and establish governments which follow Islamic law or sharia. To this end, Al Qaeda is committed to overthrowing secular governments in Islamic countries which Bin Laden considers to be corrupt and eliminating all Western influences from these countries.
3	p.31: 3	It [Jihad] can be extended to mean an obligation imposed by Allah on all Muslims, to strive unceasingly to convert or to subjugate non-Muslims.

⁹⁷ While the last instance cited in Table 21 explains that Ibn Khattab has never called “for a struggle between Islam and the West and has never called for Jihad against America or Jews” the contrast here is with Bin Laden who has made these calls. The effect in making this assertion is not so much to state that Islam should not be related to struggles against the West but to distinguish between Khattab and Bin Laden.

4	Appendix "A" p. 31: 3	Jihad in this latter sense is without limit of time or space and continues until the whole world accepts Islam or submits to the Islamic state.
5	Appendix "A" pp.31, 32:4	Under the leadership of Bin Laden, training camps and elaborate infrastructure were established and statements were regularly issued warning the enemies of Islam, in effect the West - that "...we will continue fighting you and we will continue martyrdom operations inside and outside the United States until you stop your injustice, and you end your foolishness."
6	Appendix "D" p. 52:4	However, contrary to Bin Laden, Ibn Khattab has never been quoted as calling for a struggle between Islam and the West, and has never called for Jihad against America or Jews.

"Orientalization" also occurs in the portrayal of the Arab/Muslim "other" as duplicitous which presents Arabs/Muslims as untrustworthy through the use of lexical descriptors and material processes that are linked with deceitfulness. To illustrate the construct of duplicity, I have identified the following lexical descriptors, and material and verbal processes (in **bold** in the text) and their association with Islamic groups and terrorist organizations (in *italics*) in Table 22 below.

Lexical descriptors: "the use of false passports", "aliases", "keeping a low profile", and "untrue statements"

Material processes: "concealing", "to hide",

Verbal process: "lied"

Table 22: "Duplicity"

#	Location in text	Citation from text
1	p. 14: 21	HARKAT used methodologies typical of "sleepers" such as the use of false passports, aliases, keeping a low profile and concealing his previous whereabouts and <i>links to Islamist extremists</i> .
2	p. 14: 25.	The exploitation of Saudi passports has surfaced repeatedly in the Service's investigation of <i>Islamist extremists</i> in Canada.
3	p. 14: 25	The Service has concluded that Saudi passports were the document of choice for <i>Islamist extremists</i> wishing to enter Canada because prior to 2002, Saudi passport holders did not require a visa to enter Canada.
4	p. 14: 26	The Service concludes that HARKAT used aliases (see footnote 1) in order to hide his identity and his real activities on behalf of <i>Islamist extremists</i>
5	p. 18: 34	Concealing his previous whereabouts and links with <i>Islamist extremists</i>
6	p. 18: 34.	HARKAT lied in his statements made to the Service on October 4, 1997, and on June 11, 1998, that he has never been in Afghanistan and was never

		involved in supporting <i>Islamist extremists</i> , including during the time period he spent in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ³⁸
7	p. 28: 55	HARKAT's method and route of travel to Canada, untrue statements made to Canadian officials, his support for <i>individuals and groups involved in political violence or terrorist activity</i> , his alliances with <i>Islamist extremists</i> , lead the Service to conclude that HARKAT has been associated with <i>organizations that support the use of political violence and terrorism</i> .

5. Intertextuality: the use of “factual” information

The intertextual merging of fact and fiction which results in a hybrid blend of historical representations of “facts” within fictional narratives such as novels and film is a further indicator of the primary stereotype according to Karim (1997). Proponents of evaluation theory Thompson and Hunston (2000), claim that genre can help guide the reader to know what language to expect. In the case of this study, the genre of the information gathering text of the CSIS report tells us, as readers, to expect allegations and evidence for accusations. In my analysis, I have thus extended Karim's (1997) category of intertextual mergers to include the discursive process of the intermingling of “factual” texts such as intelligence reports with other “factual” texts such as newspapers, books and magazines so that in a circular fashion each text cites the other with little to no critical analysis of the information provided, including the ideology behind the source cited. This is most evident in the footnoted texts to which CSIS refers.

In Table 23 below, I have noted the instances when newspapers, magazines, online publications, and books are referenced in the Harkat text and what information is obtained from the texts. In this section of my analysis, I focused on the information pertaining directly to the accusations made against Harkat as my concern here is with the (re)presentation of “factual” information and its questionable use in relation to the allegations made.⁹⁸ As such, I

⁹⁸ I analyze Part I: Introduction; Part II: Harkat's Membership/Associations with the Bin Laden Network Prior to Arriving in Canada; Part III- Harkat's Activities Prior to Arriving in Canada; Part

have not cited the instances when Federal Court immigration/refugee proceedings and interview transcripts are used since I do not dispute these as sources of legal “fact”. In the first column, I listed the type of “factual source”, i.e., newspapers, magazines, online publication, or books. In the second column, I cited the number of times that type of source was used. In the third column, I noted the name of the text used as well as the title, publication date, place, and page number (if given). In the fourth column, I have provided the location of the footnote within the Harakat text, and in the fifth column I have provided the paraphrased information or citation as it appears in the text.

Table 23: Intertextuality

“Factual sources”	#	Name of text	Place in report	Information paraphrased or cited
Newspapers	1	La Presse, “Terrorisme: Le réseau Montréal, deux membres du réseau se mettent à table”, p. 3 December 4, 2001.	Footnote 19, p. 10	Adnani (HARKAT) has been a political refugee in Canada since 1995.
	2	Washington Post, “Bin Laden: Architect of New Global Terrorism; Evolving Movement Combines Old Theology and Modern Technology in Mission Without Borders”, September 16, 2001,	Footnote 26, p. 13	Preceding the activation of the operation, they may live as regular citizens, leading unremarkable lives, and avoiding attention from local authorities. ⁹⁹
	3	“War vs. Terrorism Debate in Embassy Bomb Appeal”, The New York Times, December 11, 2007, p.1; and “4 Sentenced to Life in Prison for Embassy Bombings”, The New York Times, October 19,	Footnote 27, p. 13	The business allowed some Al Qaeda supporters to live inconspicuously until called into action by Osama Bin Laden for the Nairobi bombing. ¹⁰⁰

IV: Harkat’s Activities on Behalf of the Bin Laden Network in Canada; and Part V: Conclusion. I also consider Appendix “H”: Service interviews of Mohamed Harkat; however, I do not examine the appendices about the following organizations: Appendix “A”: Al Qaeda and The Bin Laden Network; Appendix “B”: Front islamique du salut (FIS) and the Armée islamique du salut (AIS); Appendix “C”: Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA); Appendix “D”: Ibn Khattab; Appendix “E”: Gamaa al Islamiya (AGAI); Appendix “F”: Muslim World League (MWL); Appendix “G”: Ahmed Said Khadr.

⁹⁹ This information was also taken from Simon Reeve’s text *The New Jackals* see Table 23, Books 1.

¹⁰⁰ This information was also cited from Reeve’s text see Table 23, Books 2.

		2001, pp.1-2.		
	4 x2	London Times, "The hunt Terrorists' Trade in Stolen Identities", September 22, 2001, p. 1; and Washington Post, "Investigation: Flight 77 Investigation", September 23, 2001, p. 2.	Footnote 29, p. 14	Two of the 9/11 airline hijackers who entered the United States were able to do so using Saudi passports, and some of the passports used by the hijackers had been reported lost or stolen.
	5	Edmonton Journal, "Ressam to testify about Canada's porous passport system: He easily received a new passport under a false name", June 27, 2001, p. 1.	Footnote 30, p. 15	He [Ressam] then used false documents to travel to Afghanistan undetected and later to come back to North America
	6x2	Montreal Gazette, "'Millennium bomber' to be sentenced today: Refuses to negotiate prison term with U.S. Montrealer Ressam slipped under Canadian radar, caught when Customs questioned Costco ID", July 27, 2005, p. 1; and Edmonton Journal, "Ressam to testify about Canada's porous passport system: He easily received a new passport under a false name", June 27, 2001, p. 1.	Footnote 31, p. 15	Ressam had obtained the document (a legitimate Canadian passport) by using a false name.
	7	Baltimore Sun, "Bin Laden, associates elude spy agency's eavesdropping, Encrypted calls may keep NSA off track", September 16, 2001;	Footnote 35, p. 18	It has been reported that Bin Laden's associates operate in a compartmentalized cell structure and are careful with their communications in order to avoid detection. ¹⁰¹
	8x2	"El Pais", Madrid, Spain, May 1, 2007, p.1; and "The Independent on Sunday", London, United Kingdom, February 11, 2007, p. 1.	Footnote 50, p. 22	He [Pacha Wazir] ran a chain of hawalas, storefront banks, and wire transfer stations across South Asia and Europe. ¹⁰²
	9	Ottawa Citizen, "The case against Harkat: CSIS is sure the Ottawa man is an al-Qaeda sleeper. But even his lawyer isn't allowed to see the evidence", December 21, 2002, p. 4.	Footnote 51, p. 24	In December 1996, Al Shehre was caught trying to enter Canada, carrying a knife, a garrote and a handwritten booklet on assassination methods.

¹⁰¹ This information was also cited from a Jane's publication see Table 23, Magazine 1.

¹⁰² This information was also cited from *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, see Table 23, Books 4.

	10	The Toronto Star, "Canada ousts alleged Saudi bomb terrorist. Another suspect deported last week", June 5, 1997, p. 1.	Footnote 52, p. 24	On May 29, 1997, amid allegations of involvement in terrorism, Al Shehre was deported by Canadian authorities to Saudi Arabia where he was arrested on May 30, 1997.
	11x3	Convicted Al-Qa'ida Bomber Tells UK Interviewer of Alleged Role in 9/11 Training", London, The Sunday Times, November 25, 2007, p. 2-3; and "Waiting for al-Qaeda's next bomb: The Underground World of Jihadists in Great Britain", ERRI daily intelligence report, Vol.13, no. 124, May 4, 2007, p. 7; and "UK Terrorist Expert Says Al-Qa'ida Evolving, Reorganizing Into Renewed Threat", London, The Observer, March 11, 2007, p. 6.	Footnote 60, p. 27	Based on its investigation, the Service concludes that HARKAT has associated with Abu Zubaydah, one of Bin Laden's top lieutenants since the early 1990s.
Magazine	1	Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, "Bin Ladin's activities exposed in New York trial", March 13, 2001, p. 2.	Footnote 35, p. 18	It has been reported that Bin Laden's associates operate in a compartmentalized cell structure and are careful with their communications in order to avoid detection.
Online sources	1	Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism	Footnote 16, p. 9	In the mid-1990s under the leadership of Jamal Zeitouni, the GIA became associated with the most depraved practices and indiscriminate killings.
	2	Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism	Footnote 17, p.9	In 1997, the FIS distanced itself from the civilian massacres committed by the GIA and publicly denied that the two organizations would join forces.
Books	1	Simon Reeve, <i>The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the future of terrorism</i> , London: Deutsch Limited, 1999, p. 4;	Footnote 26, p. 13	Preceding the activation of the operation, they may live as regular citizens, leading unremarkable lives, and avoiding attention from local authorities.
	2	Simon Reeve, <i>The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama</i>	Footnote 27, p. 13	The business allowed some

		<i>bin Laden and the future of terrorism</i> , London: Deutsch Limited, 1999, p. 4.		Al Qaeda supporters to live inconspicuously until called into action by Osama Bin Laden for the Nairobi bombing.
	3	Simon Reeve, <i>The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the future of terrorism</i> , London: Deutsch Limited, 1999, pp. 3-4.	Footnote 28, p. 14	While in Africa, his [Wadih El Hage] five children attended local schools and his wife was a member of the parent-teacher association.
	4	<i>The Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , New Edition, Prepared by a Number of Leading Orientalists, Edited by B. Lewis, V.L. Ménage, Ch. Pellat and J. Schacht, Volume III, H-Iram, 1986, London Luzac, pp. 283-284;	Footnote 50, p. 22	He [Pacha Wazir] ran a chain of hawalas, storefront banks, and wire transfer stations across South Asia and Europe.
	5	<i>The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11</i> , Simon & Schuster, New York, 2006, by Ron Suskind, p. 142, 160	Footnote 51, p. 23	Wazir is known to have been to Pakistan.

6. Misappropriation/misuse of terms

According to Karim (1997), the origin of information also plays a crucial role in the particular use of Arab/Muslim terms that are taken out of context and/or are used erroneously. In my final analytical category of the Harkat text, I have examined the interweaving of the previously cited “factual” sources and CSIS’ interpretation of such in the (re)presentation of what Karim (1997) identifies as the faulty definition of, explanation for, and association with the terms “jihad” and “mujahidin”. Karim (1997) maintains that these widely misunderstood terms are used to further the stereotype of Muslims as violent and barbaric. He provides a definition of “jihad” as that which means “literally, righteous struggle” and “mujahidin” as those who take part in this struggle (Karim, 1997, p. 168). The interpretation of what constitutes the struggle, the manner in which it will be carried out and for what ends depends on those who employ the terms. Karim (1997) claims that while some

Muslims use the concept of “jihad” as the reason for “their military or socioeconomic actions” through the discursive use of evaluative lexical associations, such as “violent”, “pre-eminent terrorist threat”, and “extremist”, their actions are dismissed as incomprehensible because there appears to be no rationale for their actions other than religious adherence. The use of “jihad” as incomprehensible distorts the actual meaning of the term and further removes any possible socio-political rationale for its use. Thus the notion that there is any logical motivation behind their actions goes unrecognized and is misrepresented in a depoliticized manner. Consequently, the views of the “other” are devalued through the misuse of these concepts which removes the political context within which they may be used.

Although CSIS acknowledges interpretative differences for the term “jihad” in one instance of the Harkat text as cited below, the repetitive negative association of “jihad” with violence, terrorism and subjugation in the text restricts the reader’s frame of reference. Namely, in its explanation of the different definitions for “jihad”, CSIS demonstrates that it is aware of the multifaceted use of the word. Yet the framing of this acknowledgement begins with the premise that the literal meaning of “jihad” is “the justified use of violence to achieve certain goals” (in **bold**) which then limits the possibility for other interpretations (in *italics*).

As the CSIS report states:

Jihad, or the justified use of violence to achieve certain goals, is interpreted in two ways by Muslims. First, Jihad can be *interpreted spiritually as a struggle to lead a holy life*. Secondly, it can be extended to mean an obligation imposed by Allah on all Muslims, **to strive unceasingly to convert or to subjugate non-Muslims. Jihad in this latter sense is without limit of time or space and continues until the whole world accepts Islam or submits to the Islamic state.** (p. 31:3)

Thus while CSIS asserts that “jihad can be interpreted spiritually as a struggle to lead a holy life” which does not imply the use of violence, their initial assertion posits that jihad stands for “the justified use of violence”. As Thompson and Hunston (2000) contend in their work

on evaluation theory, the ordering of information establishes a relationship between the writer and reader of a text which thereby confines the reader to earlier given information. The consistent (re)production of evaluative language in the reiteration of “jihad” linked with violence, hatred, and the subjugation of people who are not Muslim, therefore creates and maintains a relationship between the reader and writer in which there is an accepted understanding of the term.

In the Harkat text “jihad” is most often negatively associated with the terrorism; terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, and individual terrorists, such as Bin Laden; incessant struggles to subjugate people to Islam and hatred of the West. Under the category of lexical associations below and in Table 24 (in **bold**), I have noted all associations linked to “jihad”. The term “mujahid”, also noted in Table 24, follows a similar pattern of association with Islamic fighters, training, Bin Laden and loyalty to him. Notably in one instance in which CSIS refers to Richard Bonney’s text, the Qur’an is linked with Bin Laden in relation to “jihad”(see #6 in Table 23; p. 31, ft. 68). As stated above, while there is also a positive association of “jihad” with spiritual struggle, this must be understood in the context of the statement that jihad = violence which precedes it. The link between “jihad” and violence, hatred and subjugation for religious purposes without political intent dominates the Harkat text and removes the notion of unbalanced power relations from the picture.

Lexical associations: support of Islamist terrorism; al-Qaeda and; bombs; Bin Laden; against the West, Islamic fighter, justified use of violence; spiritually as a struggle to lead a holy life; an obligation imposed by Allah on all Muslims to strive unceasingly to convert or to subjugate non-Muslims; without limit of time or space and continues until the whole world accepts Islam or submits to the Islamic state; the Qur’an and bin Laden; Afghanistan, Chechnya and Kashmir; the pre-eminent terrorist threat to North America; extremist sympathizers; support terrorist operations; statements by Bin Laden; cause (x2); suicide bombers; training Islamists; Khattab and Bin Laden; against America or Jews; espouse a violent hatred of the West; support for Al Qaeda

Table 24: Misappropriation/Misuse of Terms

Jihad 18 instances pp. 17, 27, 29, 30, 31x4, 34, 37 x 3 jihadist and jihadism, 38, 41, 50, 51x2, 57		
#	Location in text	Citation from text
1	p. 17: 31.	In February 1998, HARKAT stated that he had to keep a “low profile” as he needed status in Canada. Further, HARKAT said that as soon as he received his “status” he would be “ready”, which the Service concludes meant that HARKAT would be prepared to undertake jihad in support of Islamist terrorism once his status as a Canadian permanent resident was established.
2	p. 27: Footnote 60	“Waiting for al-Qaeda’s next bomb : The Underground World of Jihadists in Great Britain”, ERRI daily intelligence report, -Tab 29, Vol.13, no. 124, May 4, 2007, p. 7;
3	p. 29: Footnote 61	Bin Laden is believed to have become an ideological beacon for non-aligned groups and individuals to undertake jihads against the West and is viewed by his supporters and potential new recruits as a true warrior for Islam and for its global prestige. Some consider him as much a cult figure as a terrorist leader.
4	p. 30: Footnote 65	Mujahideen: Islamic fighter in a jihad .
5x 3	p. 31:3	Jihad , or the justified use of violence to achieve certain goals, is interpreted in two ways by Muslims. First, Jihad can be interpreted spiritually as a struggle to lead a holy life . Secondly, it can be extended to mean an obligation imposed by Allah on all Muslims, to strive unceasingly to convert or to subjugate non-Muslims. Jihad in this latter sense is without limit of time or space and continues until the whole world accepts Islam or submits to the Islamic state. ⁶⁸
6	p. 31 Footnote 68 Tab 38,	Jihad . From Qur’an to bin Laden by Richard Bonney, First published in 2004 by Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p.4.
7	p. 34:9	Most of the seven accused admitted supporting jihad in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Kashmir and several, allegedly including Khawaja, had travelled to Pakistan for training in weapons and explosives.
8 x2	pp. 36, 37: 12	On January 28, 2005, Canada’s Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) ⁹¹ concluded that the pre-eminent terrorist threat to North America emanates from the jihadist movement and extremist sympathizers who may take up jihadism or support terrorist operations .
9	p. 37: 13	These statements [regularly issued audio and video statements by Bin Laden] are propaganda coups for Al Qaeda which serve to motivate fellow Muslims to take up the jihad cause .
10	p. 38: 15	All of these statements [regularly issued audio and video

		statements by Bin Laden] are propaganda coups for Al Qaeda, which serve to motivate fellow Muslims to take up the jihad cause . ⁹⁴ (ft. 94 Tab 33, Jane's World Insurgency And Terrorism, "Al-Qaeda", May 18, 2007, p 11.)
11	p. 41 from Chronology	May 2003 Twelve suicide bombers from the Al Qaeda-inspired groups Salafia Jihadia , Assirat al Moustaquim and el-Takfir wal Hijra, detonated at least five bombs in Casablanca, Morocco, killing 45 people.
12	p. 50: 2	It has been reported that Ibn Khattab went to Afghanistan in 1987 to fight against the Soviets, moved to Tajikistan circa 1993 to continue the Jihad , then circa 1995 to Chechnya to train Islamists where he became famous for his success against the Russians. (italics in the original)
13	p. 51: 4	Both [Khattab and Bin Laden] individuals are similar in that they are both Wahhabists from the Arabian peninsula, and both have participated in, and called for, Jihad . (italics in the original)
14	p. 51: 4	However, contrary to Bin Laden , Ibn Khattab has never been quoted as calling for a struggle between Islam and the West, and has never called for Jihad against America or Jews . His struggle was against Russia and its occupation of the Caucasus. ¹⁰⁶ (italics in the original)
15	p. 57: 5	His [Khader] widow and six children, with the exception of one son, continue to share his views and espouse a violent hatred of the West and support for Al Qaeda and Jihad . ¹²¹ (121 Tab 85, Maclean's, "The House of Khadr: Canada's 'first family of terror' is caught between two worlds – hoops and holy war, infidels and the Internet, movie scripts and martyrdom", August 4, 2006, pp. 2,3.)
Mujahid/mujahideen – 7 instances pp. 10, 30x2, 50x2, 69x2		
1	p. 10: 13	When asked about other activities in Pakistan , such as being involved in helping mujahideen , HARKAT claimed that he was never involved. ²¹ (²¹ service interview of HARKAT (May 1, 1997), see Appendix "H".)
2	p. 30: 3	The group was originally made up of mujahideen ⁶⁵ who fought alongside Bin Laden in Afghanistan and chose to remain loyal and continue to work with him . ⁶⁶ Tab 33, Jane's World Insurgency And Terrorism, "Al-Qaeda", May 18, 2007, p. 15.
3	p. 30: Footnote 65	Mujahideen: Islamic fighter in a jihad.
4	p. 50: Footnote 103 Tab 71 FBIS ID: FTS19990913000345	"Profile of Mujahidin Commander Khattab ", September 10, 1999, p. 1;
5	p. 51: Footnote 104 Tab 71, FBIS ID: FTS19990913000345	"Profile of Mujahidin Commander Khattab ", September 10, 1999, p. 2;
6 x2	p. 69: 22	Because of his leg problem, Mohamed claimed he could not have been a Mujahid nor could he have received training to be a Mujahid .

To show that the patterned use of the problematic terms of “Islamist extremist”, “jihad” and “mujahid” identified in the Harkat text also occurs in all of the CSIS summaries, I have noted the instances of their use in Table 25 below:

Table 25: Misappropriation/Misuse of Terms

Terms	Charkaoui¹⁰³	Almrei	Jaballah	Mahjoub
Jihad	30 instances	33 instances	87 instances	70 instances
Mujahid	6 instances	5 instances	4 instances	not present
Islamic Extremist	9 instances	14 instances of “extremist”: 6 directly linked with Islam	9 instances of “extremist”: 4 directly linked with Islam	6 instances of “extremist”: 3 directly linked with Islam

4.3 Discussion: Interpretative Counter-Terrorism Framework

As stated in Chapter 3, interpretative frameworks serve to mediate between analytical and theoretical approaches to bridge the gap that exists between “the social and the text” (Wodak, 2001, p.93). To situate and interpret my analysis, I use Jackson’s (2005) counter-terrorism framework as an interpretative guide for the discussion of my findings. Jackson (2005) identifies seven macro categories which shape the manner in which national security and terrorism are discursively constructed. I use these categories, presented in Table 26 below, to explore the results of the macrothemes in my analysis of the *IRPA* text and CSIS reports. In doing so, I illustrate how the intertextual nature of national security discourse, the repetitive articulations of counter-terrorism myths and narratives, and the use of vague language help to create an enemy “other”. I also discuss how the process in the *IRPA* which excludes the constructed enemy “other” -- in a “state of exception” -- from the legal rights of

¹⁰³ The CSIS report on Charkaoui is in French, as such the terms appear as “jihad”, “moudjahid”, and “Islamistes extremist”.

Canadian citizens further enables the practice of racialized “othering” to occur as evident in the use of Arab/Muslim topos in the CSIS reports which I presented earlier in section 4.2.6.

Following the presentation of Table 26, I provide a definition for each category with an explanation of how each text is situated within the interpretative framework as well as what meaning is construed from this reading and analysis of the texts. Since, as characteristics of national security discourse, the categories are interconnected, many of the themes transcend the bounds of one classification. I have therefore presented recurrent themes in all categories in which they play a major role in the texts (e.g., terrorism is cited in the categories of hybridity and intertextuality, consistency in primary narratives, highly reflexive and opacity).

Table 26: The Characteristics of National Security Discourse¹⁰⁴

National Security Discourse	IRPA	CSIS report
1. Hybridity & Intertextuality <i>threat and danger narratives</i> =	security risks; security threats; foreign terror; criminality; organized criminality; terrorism; acts of subversion; acts of violence; secret evidence/information; enemy within	enemy within (Canada’s ‘first family of terror’); security threats; foreign terror; terrorism; sleepers; aliases
<i>foreign policy narratives</i> =	international rights; international justice; human rights; foreign government protection; inadmissibility; deportation; commonwealth (her majesty); “othering”	orientalism; Osama Bin Laden; al-Qaeda; Bin Laden network; Algerian Front Islamique du salut (FIS); Ibn Khattab ; Gamaa Al Islamiya (AGAI)
<i>religious myths and narratives</i> =	Not present	jihad; mujahid; infidel; martyrdom; Muslims; Islam; Islamist Extremists; Qur’an; holy war; fundamentalists/ism; Islamic warriors; sharia
<i>nationalist myths</i> =	espionage; national security; public safety; safe haven; immigration; refugee protection; multiculturalism;	national security; immigration; the West

¹⁰⁴ I have adapted and renamed Jackson’s (2005, pp. 154-159) identification categories under the rubric of “national security”.

	human rights; democracy; fair and efficient; right of appeal; due process; habeas corpus; citizenship; "Indians"	
<i>"good" war/"war"</i> ¹⁰⁵ narratives =	"war" on "terror" ; foreign/international intelligence sources	Afghani "war" against Soviets; "war" (in "war" versus "terrorism")
<i>"bad" war/"war"</i> narratives=	subversion by force of any government	Islam versus the West; Bin Laden/al Qaeda against the West; Islam at war with Russia; holy war; jihad against America; "terrorism" (in "war" versus "terrorism"); insurgency
2. consistency in primary narratives	"national security"; security threats; "terrorism"	"inadmissibility"; "national security"; "terrorism"; "war on terror" ; Islam versus the West; Bin Laden/al Qaeda against the West; Islam at war with Russia; holy war; jihad against America; "terrorism" (in "war" versus "terrorism"); insurgency
3. genealogy of discourse	national security; national security threat; deportation; repatriation/return	national security; national security threat; deportation; Arab terrorism as ancient hatred
4. highly reflexive	"terrorist/terrorism"= new category for "othering"	"terrorist" enemy = Jihadist/ mujahid security certificate subjects associated with number of "terrorist/ fundamentalist/Islamic extremist groups"
5. opacity	security; "terrorism"; injurious to public safety; the process that the judge will use to determine the "reasonability" of the certificate; non-disclosure of information	security; "terrorism/terrorist"; sources
6. ideological character	values of community = rule of governmentally instituted law and order; state-security regime; "othering" as rights of citizens over the rights of non-citizens (esp. in identification of argumentation strategies & categories of enemy construction = dichotomy of "we/us/insiders" and	values of community = state-security regime; criminality; orientalist fear of Islam (e.g. forced submission to Islam, esp. in category of Bellicosity & Duplicity)

¹⁰⁵ I use quotations around "war" to note that the narratives identified in this category may not be defined officially as such.

	“they/them/outsiders”)	
7. silences and gaps	Missing = The reasons for the changes to the <i>IRPA</i> ; Missing = which governments are implied in the <i>IRPA</i> in reference to security certificates being issued for acts of “subversion by force against <i>any</i> government” (italics added)	Missing = the actual information/evidence used against the certificate detainees and how it is obtained e.g., under torture in other countries; Missing = the reasons why individuals may be or may have been involved in acts of subversion by force against a government, e.g. corrupt and violent regime; Missing = reason why all the current certificate detainees are Arab/Muslim men

1. Hybridity and intertextuality:

Jackson’s (2005) framework first considers the hybridity and intertextuality of counter-terrorism discourse which I look at in relation to national security discourse. In this category I reflect on the range of other discourses in society, such as the myths and narratives of foreign-ness, exclusion, nationality, and citizenship, which the primary discourse of national security brings together and draws upon. The *IRPA* text interweaves the narratives of threat and danger, foreign policy, and nationalist policy as well as nationalist myths. This is seen in the lexical collocations which associate the words “national” with “security”, and the terms “security certificates” with “permanent residents”, “foreign nationals”, and “refugees”; thematic discourse patterns of “we” = national versus “they” = foreign; argumentation strategies that present a good versus bad dichotomy; as well as the value systems that the present the *IRPA* as a legal, just, and democratic process.

Like the *IRPA*, the CSIS text also relies on previous threat and danger, foreign and national policy narratives as well as nationalist myths in order to weave its story. But while the *IRPA* appears as a seemingly “race”-neutral text, the CSIS report appears biased and

racialized. This is most apparent in CSIS' use of religious myths and narratives. As revealed in my examination of the Harkat text using the approaches of Karim (1997) and Lazar and Lazar (2004), the presentation of the topoi that portrays Arabs/Muslims as a homogeneous body fails to account for the diversity of peoples who practice Islam, the regions in which these populations (Arabs and/or Muslims) are found, and the views and beliefs that they hold. In the CSIS text, Islam is seldom associated with anything other than extremism, fundamentalism, terrorism, terrorist networks as Table 19 of my analysis illustrates.¹⁰⁶ Islam is linked 37 times with "extremist", and/or "terrorist" organizations such as "the Bin Laden Network" and "Al Qaeda", and groups considered illegitimate by the Canadian government, such as the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) and Al Gamaa Al Islamiya (AGAI).

The significance of the intertextuality and the interweaving of different genres of text is also considered in my modified version of Karim's (1997) identification of the use of "fiction" in "factual" texts (see Table 23). Under the category of "intertextuality", I reveal how the CSIS text relies on intertextual sources to gather its information which I suggest needs to be questioned. The accuracy of information and motivation behind the information gathering sources of news media, and as Said (1978) warns much earlier, from orientalist historians should not go unnoticed. A prime example of the problematic nature of this information appears in the footnoted text of the magazine *Mideast Mirror* entitled "Are Russia and Islam at war?" (Table 19, no. 31; Appendix "D" p. 52, ft. 105). The use of a source that posits that an entire religion is at war with a state in a genre that belongs to a governmental security intelligence-gathering field of action is dubious at best.

¹⁰⁶ A noted exception in my analysis shows that 8 out of 131 references to Islam were made to the Muslim World League (MWL) which CSIS recognizes as a charitable organization.

According to CSIS' own information in its Backgrounder (February 2005) as well as in the CSIS summaries, the evidence for issuing security certificates "must be reliable and come from multiple sources". Yet in the CSIS report examined, I found the sources of much of the information to be arguably neither necessarily reliable nor multiple (see Table 23). If one means by reliable that certain groups will be consistently listed as terrorist organizations, then the often cited newspaper and online sources such as *Jane's Intelligence Review* certainly are reliable; however, if the criteria for reliability extends beyond the citation of repeated sources -- that present mainly Middle Eastern and/or Islamic groups as "terrorist" -- to the provision of information from legal "factual" texts, and texts that more importantly promote a discussion concerning what is considered an act of "terrorism" and why, as well as what criteria are used for the listing of "terrorist" organizations then CSIS' claim is problematic.

2. Consistency in primary narratives

Consistency in the re-telling of primary narratives, like the repeated use of literature that identifies Muslim/Arab groups as terrorists, is essential to create coherence and reinforce believability and influence in a discourse. Similar to the position of Thompson and Hunston (2000) on the importance of genre in building and maintaining community, Jackson's (2005) category of consistency in primary narratives involves the frequent re-telling of the same or similar story in a familiar way. According to the *IRPA*, foreign nationals and permanent residents are not like Canadian citizens. This is repeated throughout the text and is made evident through the "we" versus "they" identification strategies of Wodak (1997) and Lazar and Lazar (2004). While Wodak's (1997) argumentation strategies show how a chasm between citizens and non-citizens is created, Lazar and Lazar's (2004) microstrategy of

enemy construction reveals how the *IRPA* establishes an “enemy other” category in the security certificate subject who poses a possible security threat to Canada and Canadian citizens, and therefore should not be afforded the same rights as Canadian citizens.

The CSIS text reiterates the narrative of the *IRPA* and develops it. In fact, all five of the CSIS reports re-state the sections of the *IRPA* under which the person named should be considered “inadmissible” according to CSIS.¹⁰⁷ As noted in the “bad war” narrative, the CSIS text not only presents the narratives of “national security”, “terrorism”; and “war on terror” that occur within the *IRPA* but also the racialized narratives of Islam versus the West, holy wars, jihad and indeed Islam at war with entire nations such as Russia and America. My analysis of the predominance of the use of the reduction of Islam to fundamentalism as well as the misappropriation and misuse of religious terms, as seen in Tables 19 and 25, respectively, illustrates the problematic enemy “other” narrative that CSIS constructs in its report.

3. Genealogy of discourse

The continuity of earlier responses to security and national threats in the use of identical language over time is described in Jackson’s category of the genealogy of discourse. The terms “national security”, “national security threat” and “deportation” evident in the *IRPA* were also prevalent in the language used by the Canadian government during the Second World War against Japanese Canadians. This is noted in my brief historical overview of anti-Japanese legislation in Table 13 under the “lawmaking field of action” (see Privy Council Orders-in-Council). Not surprisingly, this language re-appears in the counter-terrorism discourse of “national security”. Unlike the threat that was discursively constructed in the Privy Council legislation, the threat under the *IRPA* is not racialized. It remains a legal

¹⁰⁷ See Appendix B- CSIS summary reports.

category of exclusion, however, that denies basic legal rights to people who are deemed “other”, in this case, permanent residents and foreign nationals.

Deportation was also present in the earlier national security discourse of the Canadian government against Japanese Canadians and was used to remove “enemy aliens” from Canada. In the contemporary context of the *IRPA*, deportation is also present. While a process exists in the *IRPA*’s “pre-removal risk assessment” (PRRA) to determine the possible risk that a detainee may face if s/he returns to her/his country of nationality, the procedure is conducted by the CIC and not an independent body. Ministers are put in the role of judges to first ascertain the claim that risk is involved and then the decision is assessed by a judge. It is unclear if the judge considers where the information that the Ministers use to determine risk is obtained or if the judge simply considers whether or not the person subject to the certificate faces a risk as stated in the PRRA.

Though not explicit in the *IRPA*, what is implicit in the text is the right for “these foreigners” to leave and return to their “home” countries. As stated in section 84(1): “The Minister may, on application by a permanent resident or a foreign nationals, order their release from detention to permit their departure from Canada” (Division 9, *IRPA*). This raises two important questions: 1. If the person named poses a threat and is linked to global “terrorist” cells, why would the Canadian government allow the person to leave? Surely, there are ethical and moral implications in allowing a known “terrorist” to leave the country. 2. If the government believes that the person named in the security certificate is a threat and that the person will be dealt with after “their departure from Canada”, is the Canadian government then not responsible for the possible persecution, torture and/or death that might ensue? The process of “release from detention”, akin to the negative inducement strategy of

“repatriation” for Japanese Canadians following the end of the World War II, removes the onus from the government to provide just treatment to all peoples, and places responsibility for adverse consequences in the hands of those who are classified as a threat. In so doing, the *IRPA* rejects any notion that Canada may be violating international law for deporting people who are fleeing persecution and have come here to seek refuge.

In my analysis, I examined the argumentation strategies outlined by Wodak (1997) which are used to displace guilt from those in power, in this case the Canadian government, and shift it to those who have been “othered”, i.e., security certificate subjects (see 2.Aii.1-3). I also analyzed the strategies of justification which attempt to exonerate the Canadian government from any negative recourse that might result from the implementation of the certificates (see 2.Bi, ii; evaluation/appraisal). The continual theme that occurs throughout these strategies is the divide that is constructed between Canadian citizens who are not subject to security certificate legislation as “good/we/us/insiders” and belonging to the nation, as opposed to some permanent residents and foreign nationals who -- not part of the nation -- are subject to this legislation and therefore “bad/they/them/outsideers”.

The genealogy of national security discourse is also evident in the CSIS text. Beyond the notion of national security threat and deportation, however, the CSIS text also invokes the genealogy of “Arab terrorism” as noted in my analysis of Karim’s (1997) category of ancient history/ancient hatred” (see Table 18). The uncritical use of texts that present as “fact” associations between Islam and “terrorism” illustrates the orientalist attitudes of the methods used in CSIS’ information gathering. Moreover, as stated in my analysis the use of ancient history/ancient hatred texts fails to address the real power imbalances that exist between East and West. The genealogy of discourse enables previous national security measures to

continue without a consideration for the political motivation behind acts of “terrorism” that are linked with social and economic struggles for resources, such as oil, water, and land.

4. Highly reflexive

According to Jackson (2005), counter-terrorism discourse has to continuously reconstruct and reinvent itself as something new and different in order to justify its constant need for a new “war”. In the current context, under national security, the “terrorist” enemy had to be invented. Since, as Jackson notes (2005), “terrorism” is a method more than an ideology, the umbrella term of “terrorism” has enabled different individuals and groups from numerous places to be aligned in the world under a racialized classification system. It is important to note that while in relation to security certificate measures the text of the *IRPA* is not itself racialized¹⁰⁸, the application of the security certificate processes which the *IRPA* validates depends upon racialized practices. Namely, the security certificate process under the *IRPA* is contingent on information gathered using racial profiling techniques.

The 2001 amendments to the *IRPA* security certificate process enacted in 2002 followed the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US and were concurrent with the legislation of the *Anti-Terrorism Act* ([*ATA*], 2002). The addition of the undefined category of “terrorism” to the list of inadmissibility claims as well as secret evidence procedures signified changes in Canadian national security policy. While on the surface these changes

¹⁰⁸ Despite the absence of overt articulations of Arab and Muslim “others” in the *IRPA*, the racialized presence of the Indigenous people of this nation as “Indians” continues. Additionally, the two times where Indigenous people are mentioned they are preceded by the listing of “Canadian citizens” which thereby places them in a secondary position and with the still racialized misnomer of “Indian” (*IRPA*, 19(1), 45(b-d)). While my study is primarily concerned with the practice of racism in current national security discourse, and hence the racialized “othering” of Arabs/Muslims, I think that it is significant to point out that overt articulations of racialized “othering” of the Indigenous population persist in government discourse. This fact strengthens the premise that the Canadian state is built on the ideology of a white nation, as asserted by Aiken (2007) and Razack (2007) among others.

appear to indicate a greater move toward non-acceptance of “others” under the semblance of greater security for the Canadian nation-state, it is important to note that the new legislative measures did not mark a fundamental shift in Canadian policy or the value-system of the Canadian government. Instead the changes in legislation in the immigration and refugee process reveal the mirroring of the contemporary social-political environment. The current national security discourse of security certificate legislation in the *IRPA* belongs to the larger “war on terror” narrative along with the *ATA*, listed “terrorist” entities, *Security of Information Act*, *Public Safety Act* listed under the law-making field of action. Although the present-day measures in the *IRPA* immobilize rights to due process which thereby allow for indefinite detainment and deny the person named under the certificate and his/her counsel the right to see the evidence against him/her, the elimination of rights of the “other” and the creation of “states of exception” is not new. According to Rob Aitken (2007) the narrative of security in the form of the *IRPA* began in 1991 and took the place of an earlier procedure instituted in the 1970s (p. 382). Over time it has been reconstructed and reinvented to fit the social period at hand but its end result of eliminating rights for mostly racialized “others” and creating “states of exception” remains the same.

Though the *IRPA* is a nearly “race”-neutral text, the application of the security certificate division of the *IRPA* which since 2001 has been used to detain predominately Muslim/Arab men by the Minister based on the information provided by CSIS. Karim’s (1997) framework, like the “orientalization” segment of Lazar and Lazar’s (2007) model of “outcasting” (part 3) is based on categories of racialized discourse that presents Arabs and/or Muslims as violent and/or barbaric and likely to be either terrorists or connected to terrorism. No thematic chains, lexical choices or references in clear association with Arabs and/or

Muslims are stated in the current legislation of security certificates of the *IRPA*. Yet, while the categories identified by Karim (1997) do not apply to the *IRPA* itself, in order to fulfill its objectives the *IRPA* refers to and depends upon other interrelated texts that demonstrate racialized “othering”. This includes the list of terrorist entities documented by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP) on July 23, 2006 in the *Regulations Establishing a List of Entities*, subsection 83.05(9) of the *Criminal Code*.¹⁰⁹

Moreover, CSIS is the primary source of information/evidence that the the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP) and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) use to issue security certificates. The information gathered by CSIS is subsequently used by the federal court judge to determine a certificate’s “reasonability”. The classification systems of terrorist groups in the CSIS text reveal racist ideology which is evident in the numerous associations of Islam with extremism and terrorism. The misuse and misappropriation of terms such as jihad and mujahid further reflects the syncretic nature of racism based on religion, culture, nationality, and political beliefs which manifests in the CSIS reports (see Tables 18-25).

5. Opacity

The lack of transparency in the discourse of national security in which terms and phrases are never properly defined or explained works to create an atmosphere of fear of the “other”. The use of unclear language or vague terms creates simplistic dichotomies between “good/we/us/insiders” and “bad/they/them/outsideers” so that processes go unquestioned. In both the *IRPA* and the CSIS text there is no clear explanation of what “security” actually means or what constitutes “terrorism”. Instead these terms are used as identification labels for those deemed to be “inadmissible”.

¹⁰⁹ See Appendix C – list of terrorist entities.

One of the most profound instances of the use of opaque language that is cited in my analysis using the perspectives of Wodak (1997) and Lazar and Lazar (2004) occurs in the *IRPA* under section 34(1) which lists the reasons for “inadmissibility”. This list includes:

- (a) engaging in an act of espionage or an **act of subversion** against a democratic government, institution or process as they understood in Canada;
- (b) engaging in or **instigating** the subversion by force of **any** government;
- (c) engaging in **terrorism**;
- (d) being a **danger to the security** of Canada (*IRPA*, 34(1)(a-d); bold added)

All the terms that appear in bold have negative connotations but are vague. What would qualify as an act of subversion, for instance? And what does “being a danger to the security of Canada” involve? By this definition no members of the Bush administration would be permitted to enter Canada on the grounds that they have “engaged or instigated the subversion by force of [a] government” both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet the *IRPA* defines the relationship between those who are likely to commit these acts -- permanent residents and foreign nationals as “they/them/outsideers” -- as criminal, while the acts of the Bush administration are likely seen as political. Lazar and Lazar’s (2004) microstrategy of “criminalization” reveals the manner in which the *IRPA* depoliticizes the possible political motivation behind the acts of “others”. Through lexical designations of criminal goals; descriptors of past, habitual and projected criminal activities; and the separation between acts of “others” as ignoble and those of “the self” as honourable, permanent residents and foreign nationals are removed from the political arena and criminalized (see 2i-iii. Criminalization).

Other notable instances examined concern the use of vagueness in the definition of “information” used to issue a security certificate and the judgment that is based on this information. According to the *IRPA*, “‘information’ means security or criminal intelligence information and information that is obtained in confidence from a source in Canada, from the

government of a foreign state, from an international organization of states or from an institution of either of them” (76). This definition leaves a great deal of uncertainty as to who the vaguely referenced sources are, what the intentions of these sources may be, and how this information was obtained. The possibility that it was obtained through torture as is the case in the information used against Adil Charkaoui and Mohamed Harkat for instance is not unfounded.¹¹⁰ Although changes to the security certificate process through Bill C-3 (February 13, 2008) have made information obtained from torture inadmissible, those working to end the security certificate process consider the change difficult if not impossible to apply since information from the US and other foreign intelligence sources which are admissible could likely have been obtained through such measures.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ According to the Coalition Justice for Adil Charkaoui:

Abu Zubaydah was named as having provided information against Charkaoui in a public summary released by the Federal Court in August 2003. Testimony and reports indicate that Zubaydah had been tortured while in US custody in Afghanistan and later held in a secret site with no oversight or accountability (for example, Human Rights Watch, "The United States' 'Disappeared': The CIA's Long-Term 'Ghost Detainees'", October 2004)... Significantly, official doubts about the reliability of Zubaydah's information pre-dated the arrests of both Harkat and Charkaoui. On 6 September 2006, US President George Bush, in an extraordinary admission about CIA-operated secret prisons, advanced Abu Zubaydah as the poster boy of what Bush described as "an alternative set of procedures" to encourage suspects not to "resist interrogation". Bush stated, "Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures, and soon he began to provide information ... ". Abu Zubaydah later surfaced in Guantanamo Bay (*Globe and Mail*, 17 April 2007). Finally, the CIA admitted publicly in February 2008 that Abu Zubaydah had been subjected to a form of torture known as "waterboarding". However, the Ministers have continued to cite Abu Zubaydah in Charkaoui's file. (Retrieved from <http://www.adilinfo.org/en/node/324>. Last visited November 22, 2008)

¹¹¹ As noted in "Brief on C-3" (January 2008) from the Coalition Justice for Adil Charkaoui:

Under the old law, statements made under torture were submitted as information by CSIS. For example, information sourced to Abu Zubaydah, known to have been tortured in American custody, is still being used in the case of Charkaoui. With amendments introduced by the Standing Committee, information believed to have been obtained as a result of the use of torture is no longer admissible (83(1.1)).

Much as the reality which necessitated it is abhorrent, this addition is certainly an improvement. However, *it is difficult to see how the prohibition could be assured in practice as long as CSIS obtains information from [the] US and other foreign intelligence sources who use torture. SIRC, the oversight body of CSIS, wrote in its 2006 annual report of CSIS that the spy agency was in no position to make "an absolute assurance" that information it receives from allied spy agencies is not obtained as a result of torture.* Moreover, while

“Non-disclosure” of information ensures that aside from a summary, all information/evidence can be withheld from those subject to security certificates as well as their lawyers. While the *IRPA* states that a security certificate will only be issued based on “reasonable grounds”, the sources used to establish these grounds as noted in the “intertextuality” section of Jackson’s (2005) framework and especially in relation to the CSIS reports are troubling. What determines “reasonability” is left up to the judge’s interpretation of the information and evidence which is not accessible to the subject of the certificate or his/her counsel. As stated earlier, many of these sources are from newspaper articles, orientalist books and *Jane’s Intelligence* review which could be arguably not accurate or reliable sources. Yet regardless of the factual weight given these texts and the problematic nature in their use, the end result of “non-disclosure” denies individuals issued security certificates the right of habeas corpus and as such, the right to due process.

Since the evidence which the judge uses to base her/his decision is not accessible to the detainee or his/her lawyer, the term “if satisfied” in relation to the judge’s determination is also of concern. An instance of its use and the difficulties that it presents can be seen in the subsequent example: After a review following up to a six-month detention period wherein the person held has not been tried, the judge determines whether the person held should continue to be detained “if satisfied that the permanent resident continues to be a danger to national security or to the safety of any person, or is unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal” (*IRPA*, 83(3)). This process can lead to long holding periods for detainees in which they wait in uncertainty in an ambiguous condition -- not having been tried yet held in

foreign intelligence agencies such as the CIA remain intent on covering their tracks to the point of destroying records, it will remain difficult to prove that torture has taken place. (Retrieved from <http://www.adilinfo.org/en/node/232>. Last visited on November 21, 2008; italics added)

custody as though guilty. The men under security certificates have been subject to a review process for years now. In its own words, the government of Canada claims that the *IRPA* “ensures that decisions taken under this Act are consistent with the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, including its principles of equality and freedom from discrimination”(p. 4; 3(3)). In spite of this, the government evades responsibility for the failure to guarantee timely decisions in relation to security certificates, and rather frames the matter to be the result of the nature of the possible dangers that those issued certificates pose, which thereby places the responsibility on the security certificate detainees.

6. Ideological character

While as a legal text the *IRPA* gives the semblance of neutrality, the ideological character of the text is apparent in its meaning construction and reproduction of the values of the dominant powers in Canadian society. The clear delineation between “us” and “them” as mentioned throughout this interpretative framework illustrates that “we” as a Western capitalist liberal democracy are in control of “they” who enter and leave according to the rules of the Canadian nation-state (see 1.iii Enemy construction: elaborating statements). The objectives of the *IRPA*, described in 3(1), set out what Canada intends to gain mostly in terms of social, cultural, and economic benefits from the immigrants who are permitted to enter the country. This is followed by the objectives, in 3(2), “with respect to refugees” in relation to offering protection and a safe haven from persecution. The dominant vision of Canadian society is that it welcomes immigrants based on a fair and just system and is a “safe” country that offers refuge for those in need. Yet the *IRPA* permits an unjust and undemocratic system of differentiation to exist. In section 4.2.3 of my analysis under Wodak’s (1997) identification of argumentation strategies (2.Bii), I show that the rights of security certificates

subjects are not considered as valuable as those of Canadian nationals since they are limited in a number of significant ways, i.e., not being able to see the evidence against them and being held indefinitely with the risk of being deported should a judge determine that they are guilty. As I demonstrate using Lazar and Lazar's identification category of criminalization, the positive attributions to Canada and Canadians in the *IRPA* are used to distinguish "us" as honourable from "them" as ignoble (see 2.iii Criminalization). According to the *IRPA* Canada is a "democratic country" which protects and grants status to those who are so deserving. Those deemed "inadmissible" are not permitted entry on the "reasonable grounds" that they pose a threat to "national security" and place "Canada" or "Canadian citizens" in danger based on information that "they" cannot see or hear. This process which according to the Canadian government would never be used on Canadians is deemed fair, just and reasonable simply because "they" are "other".

As CSIS provides the source of the information for the issuance of security certificates, it is necessary to consider the ideology of this intelligence gathering body. While the *IRPA* attempts to appear neutral, CSIS is unequivocal concerning its stance as an integral part of the state-security regime. CSIS text adheres to an ideology of secrecy and Canadian government protection. It works to uncover sources of criminality through secret information gathering techniques. In my exploration of the Harkat text, CSIS also exhibits its orientalist fear of Islam in the presentation of texts that historically link Islam with violence (Table 18), the employment of lexical collocations that reduce Islam to fundamentalism (Table 19), the creation of criminal activities associated with orientalism which present Islam linked with past, habitual, and present as well as projected future "terrorist" actions (Table 20; also Duplicity Table 22), and finally in the representation of Islam as a continuous and violent

struggle that sets as its two principal goals the forced submission of non-Muslims and the overthrow of secular and/or Western states (Table 21). Though CSIS's primary function is to serve the Canadian government and thus the dominant power, the relationship between itself and the government is not unidirectional. CSIS provides the information for the PSEP and the CIC based on the legislated categories of the *IRPA*. Moreover, the determination of the reasonability of this information is first reviewed and accepted by the Ministers and then by a Federal Court judge. As such, the racist ideology behind the CSIS text cannot be seen in isolation from the views held by the Canadian government and its courts.

7. Silences and gaps

This missing link in the discourse is what Jackson (2005) asserts is often more revealing than what is presented or offered in the text. Many silences and gaps occur within the *IRPA* that are connected with past discriminatory uses of immigration policy. Like Karim (1997), Lazar and Lazar (2004) and Wodak (1997), Jackson (2005) warns that when there is little to no mention of history it is difficult to understand the context within and reasons why events occur. The *IRPA* text begins with the assertion that it aims to adhere to the principles of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* yet as previously noted it does not guarantee such basic rights as the right to the evidence against oneself and the right to due process. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized this in their decision in *Charkaoui versus Canada* (Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) and consequently affirmed in its ruling that:

The procedure under the *IRPA* for determining whether a certificate is reasonable and the detention review procedures infringe s. 7 of the *Charter*.... [Further] the lack of review of the detention of foreign nationals until 120 days after the reasonableness of the certificate has been judicially confirmed (s. 84(2)) infringes the guarantee against arbitrary detention in s. 9 of the *Charter*, which encompasses the right to prompt

review of detention under s. 10(c) of the *Charter*. (Charkaoui v. Canada, 2007, pp.6, 8)

Another significant omission, which I noted earlier with regard to the ideological character of national security discourse, occurs in reference to *IRPA*'s purpose or "objective" to provide sanctuary for those who fear for their security. This offer of refuge is granted to those fleeing persecution for reasons such as "political opinion or membership in a particular social group" but eliminates this "offer of safe haven" to those who are deemed "security risks". What the *IRPA* text omits is the context that may allow for an individual to be escaping persecution for her/his "political opinion or membership in a particular social group" on the one hand, yet be labeled as a threat to security for the same reasons on the other. It is possible that individuals may be or may have been involved in acts of subversion by force against a corrupt government and/or violent regime that is not officially recognized as such by the Canadian government.

The political context of these acts fails to be considered in both the *IRPA* text which maintains neutrality and the CSIS report which attempts to establish criminality and Islamic terrorist links. Another crucial missing link concerns the legitimacy of the detainment of the current certificate subjects who are all Arab and Muslim men. The history of the West in the region and politics of the East cannot go unnoticed. The repeated association of Islam with war, terrorism, extremism and fundamentalism in the CSIS text clearly demonstrates that Muslims are being targeted as potential "terrorist" threats.

A related vital source of information that is only briefly referred to in the *IRPA* is the *Canadian Gazette*, which lists all Acts of Parliament that have been passed. This text is significant because it contains the list under the *Criminal Code* of what are considered terrorist organizations in Canada. This means that any "foreign national" or "permanent

resident” who is associated with any of the groups listed could be held as inadmissible according to the *IRPA*. As mentioned earlier in my review of the literature, out of 39 listed entities, 26 are Arab and/or Muslim.

5.0 Conclusion

The motivation for this study emanated from my questions concerning the use of legal methods of exclusion which manifest into racist practices against non-citizen “others” by democratic nations in the name of national security. My aim was to explore the paradox between the espoused values of equality, justice and freedom by liberal democracies, and the concomitant practice of “othering” with its underlying implication of “race”-thinking in the national security policies, legislation and practices of democratic nations. To examine the possible link between exclusionary national security policies and racialized practices, I endeavoured to move beyond a purely linguistic analysis to include analytical and theoretical approaches that enabled an exploration of the historical, political, and sociological dimensions of racialized “othering”. To this end, I discussed the literature on the origin of racist thought and practice, and its persistence in democratic nation-states in blatant and less obvious forms from a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives (Aiken, 2007; Anderson, 2006; Arendt, 1958; Balibar, 2005; Cohen, 2001; Conklin, 1996; Dedeoglu, 2003; Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Henry & Tator, 2002; Jackson, 2005; Karim, 1997; Larsen, 2006; Lee, 2007; Li, 2007; Miles, 1994; McDonald, 2007; Razack, 2007; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Said, 1978; Smith, 2007; van Dijk, 1993; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1999; and Wodak & Reisigl, 2003).

As stated in Chapter 2, the power to exclude and include who is afforded security rests on what and who defines the nation-state and nation-state identity. As such, my review of the literature took into account the fundamental terms related to the creation of the “nation” as “an imagined community” (Anderson, 2006), the construct of “national identity”, the subsequent legislation and policy of “national security” as well as the connected idea of

“terrorism”. This led me to explore the creation of orientalist fear in the current national security discourse. For this reason, I discussed Said’s (1978) seminal contribution to orientalism as well as his influence on my analytical framework in the approaches of Karim (1997) and Lazar and Lazar (2004).

Using Canada as a case in point, I investigated actual realizations of counter-terrorism measures in two national security discourse texts in the Canadian government’s security certificate legislation under the *IRPA* and the practice of security intelligence information gathering in the CSIS summary reports on security certificate subjects. I examined the link between the *IRPA*’s legal category of exclusion of non-citizens and the racialized practice of intelligence information gathering by CSIS which has targeted Canadian Arab and Muslim communities and subsequently resulted in the issuance of security certificates by government Ministers to five Arab and Muslim men in Canada.¹¹² My study made evident how the security certificate process has facilitated the detainment of people in prison or under house arrest without legal rights to due process by creating a “state of exception” wherein law determines the suspension of law (Agamben, 2005; Razack, 2007). To examine how an officially excluded “other” without access to legal rights granted to included citizens is constructed in the language of the *IRPA*, I employed Wodak’s (1997) identification for racist discourse and Lazar and Lazar’s (2004) microstrategic approach for “outcasting”. The approaches of Wodak (1997) and Lazar and Lazar (2004) which reflected the use of “we”/“they” discourse, strategies of justification and displacement of blame as well as enemy construction, criminalization and vilification strategies that present non-citizens as former,

¹¹² For further information on the investigative methods used and the impact of such on Arab and Muslim communities see Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations [CAIR-CAN]. (2004). *Presumption of Guilt: A National Survey on Security Visitations of Canadian Muslims* (pp. 1-22). Ottawa: CAIR-CAN.

present or future “terrorists” revealed how the legal system of the *IRPA* has permitted two systems of law to exist based on “othering” -- one for citizens and the other for non-citizens. The legal construction of an excluded “other” was then further considered using the analytical tools of evaluation/appraisal theory from Thompson and Hunston (2000), and Martin (2000a). To illustrate the manner in which evaluative processes establish a category of non-deserving “other” within seemingly neutral legal texts, in selected instances of the *IRPA*, I examined the use of certainty, and implicit (evoked) appraisal used to create and maintain the values of the lawmaking community, and still reject responsibility for the victimization of “others”.

Next, I turned to the CSIS reports on the security certificate subjects to investigate the discourse of the main source of intelligence information required for the issuance of security certificates under the *IRPA*. To facilitate this investigation, I used the approaches of Karim (1997) and Lazar and Lazar (2004). I analyzed CSIS’ use of past texts and orientalist information, its failure to consider historical power imbalances between East and West, and its continual framing of Islam as a violent religion historically linked to “terrorism”. To bridge the gap between the analytical findings of my study and my interpretation, I then used Jackson’s (2005) counter-terrorism framework as an interpretative mechanism to identify and categorize the different argumentation strategies, lexical associations, and narratives and myths used to construct a divide between “us” and “them” as “good” and “bad” and deserving of legal rights or not.

While the primary focus of my study was with current day racialized “othering” in Canadian national security practices, the beginning of my analysis briefly explored past national security measures against Japanese Canadians in the Canadian Privy Council

Orders- in-Council. Despite their differences, both current and past exclusionary practices are shaped by a West versus East nationalist discourse. In the case of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War, government legislation was overtly racist. Yet although there is an absence of obvious racism in the present day security certificate legislation, the *IRPA* does not exclude “race” as a factor in the implementation of the law. Indeed, as seen in my analysis of the CSIS reports, the current day’s “race”-thinking presents the Arab/Muslim “other” as “terrorist”. My analysis reveals that in the exclusionary discourse of the *IRPA*, the government has “unofficially” designated a category wherein racialized classifications are “officially” allowed in practice. Not only did CSIS employ racialized practices in its repeated association of Islam with terrorism, terrorist groups and terrorist individuals from which it based its allegations against the security certificate subjects, but it used the *IRPA* and other government policies, such as the listing of terrorist entities, as justification for its practices. In turn, CSIS provided the government with secret information of a racialized nature that was used to issue the security certificates against Hasan Almrei, Adil Charkaoui, Mohamed Harkat, Mahmoud Jaballah, and Mohamed Mahjoub.

On June 13, 14, and 15, 2007 three of the security certificate subjects, Adil Charkaoui, Hassan Almrei, and Mohamed Harkat challenged the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (in Harkat also the Attorney General of Canada) on constitutional and *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter)* grounds in relation to *IRPA* security certificate legislation. In particular, the three appellants, Charkaoui, Almrei and Harkat, presented a number of constitutional and *Charter* challenges to the “scheme under which certificates issued and detentions ordered” under the right to life, liberty and security of person; fundamental justice; fair hearing; secret

evidence and information; removal; deportation; arbitrary detention; lack of prompt review; and right to equality concerning *Charter* ss. 1, 7, 9, 10(c), 12, 15 and *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 33, 77 to 85” (Charkaoui versus Canada, 2007, p. 5).

In February 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that the process under the *IRPA* which permits foreign nationals to be detained for up to 120 days without a review infringes the guarantee against arbitrary detention.¹¹³ They further determined that the certificate reasonability and detention review procedures infringed the right to life, liberty and security granted under s. 7 of the *Charter* because the process could permit a non-citizen to be deported to a place where his/her “life or freedom would be threatened” (Charkaoui v. Canada, 2007, p. 6). According to the Court:

While the deportation of a non-citizen in the immigration context may not in itself engage s. 7, features associated with deportation may do so. Here, s. 7 is clearly engaged because the person named in a certificate faces detention pending the outcome of the proceedings and because the process may lead to the person’s removal to a place where his or her life or freedom would be threatened. Further, the *IRPA*’s impairment of the named person’s right to life, liberty and security is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. The procedure for determining whether a certificate is reasonable and the detention review procedure fail to assure the fair hearing that s. 7 requires before the state deprives a person of this right. [13-14] [17-18] [65]However, the lack of review of the detention of foreign nationals until 120 days after the reasonableness of the certificate has been judicially confirmed (s. 84(2)) infringes the guarantee against arbitrary detention in s. 9 of the *Charter*, which encompasses the right to prompt review of detention under s. 10(c) of the *Charter*. (Charkaoui v. Canada, 2007, pp. 6, 8 , respectively)

¹¹³ As stated in the court’s ruling:

The detention of foreign nationals without warrant does not infringe the guarantee against arbitrary detention in s. 9 of the *Charter*.... However, the lack of review of the detention of foreign nationals until 120 days after the reasonableness of the certificate has been judicially confirmed (s. 84(2)) infringes the guarantee against arbitrary detention in s. 9 of the *Charter*, which encompasses the right to prompt review of detention under s. 10(c) of the *Charter*. (Charkaoui vs. Canada, 2007, p. 8)

According to the Supreme Court's reading of the *Charter* the distinction between Canadian citizens and foreign nationals in relation to deportation was not in itself a problem.¹¹⁴ What was problematic as maintained by the Court was the ability for one judge to determine the fate of an individual who had no right to see the evidence against him/her and no manner to appeal his/her case. A person named under the security certificate could be deemed inadmissible without access to an appeal or review according to one person's judgement. As this process did not allow for the possibility of judicial error or a review of the facts that would lead to the judge's determination, the Supreme Court gave the federal government one year to amend the security certificate process under the *IRPA*.

To respond to the Supreme Court's ruling, the federal government introduced Bill C-3, *An Act to Amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (certificates and special advocates) on October 22, 2007 which received Royal Assent on February 13, 2008. The new legislation established a special advocate role in the certificate process, which according to the government is intended to protect the interests of the person subject to a certificate. According to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP), during in camera sessions (i.e., closed proceedings), the special advocate has ability to challenge the government's claim that the disclosure of information used to support the security certificate would be injurious to national security or would endanger the safety of a person. The special advocate is authorized to cross-examine witnesses and make submissions to the Court, as well as to "communicate with the subject of a security certificate without restriction until

¹¹⁴ As the Supreme Court asserts in *Charkaoui versus Canada* (2007): "Since s. 6 of the *Charter* specifically provides for differential treatment of citizens and non-citizens in deportation matters, a deportation scheme that applies to non-citizens, but not to citizens, does not for that reason alone infringe s. 15 of the *Charter*" (p. 10).

such time as they see the confidential information upon which a certificate is based”.¹¹⁵ A significant issue here pertains to the process which enables the “special advocates” to speak with the security certificate detainees. This must occur before they are able to see the information/evidence. In the recent cases of Harkat and Charkaoui, neither they nor their counsel were permitted to speak to the special advocates.¹¹⁶

While the government claims that in relation to the security certificate process it is “committed to respecting individual rights under the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and to take international human rights obligations seriously”, it is difficult to have faith in the honesty of this declaration.¹¹⁷ Given the language that excludes the legal rights of “others” in the *IRPA* and which further conceals the realization of racialized processes in the information gathering techniques of CSIS, this statement appears as a flagrant contradiction to the legislated and practical reality of the security certificate process. Indeed in its press release on Bill C-3, the PSEP invokes the lack of commitment it has to justice in its assertion that “a person subject to a security certificate is free to leave Canada at any time and return to their country of origin”.¹¹⁸ This statement is a slap in the face to those whose freedom to return means the risk of persecution, torture and possibly death.

Looking back at the Canadian government legislation against Japanese Canadians, the divisive pattern of racialized “othering” is clearly identifiable in the current national security context which attempts to justify the limitations of legal rights for the “other”. The question of whose security and for what ends is inextricably linked to who is deemed deserving of security or not. What may need to be considered then is how we imagine the concept of

¹¹⁵ See <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/seccert-eng.aspx>

¹¹⁶ See Coalition Justice for Adil Charkaoui at <http://www.adilinfo.org/>

¹¹⁷ See <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/seccert-eng.aspx>

¹¹⁸ See <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/seccert-eng.aspx>

nation and the security of such as it concerns who is included and who is excluded in this imagined state. As Martin French (2007) contends:

Although security is framed as a collective, universal good, it presumes social exclusion. ... The pursuit of security tends to rely on the identification of suspect populations. Operating according to a utilitarian logic, the pursuit of security relies on profiling groups that are believed not to have a stake in the system, and those who are perceived to be outside of the influence of deterring sanctions. (p. 57)

To extend the notion of security so that it is inclusive rather than exclusive involves questioning the root of what makes us want to exclude. This is what I have attempted to examine.

In order to eradicate the roots that underlie the racist ideology of exclusion in our society significant steps need to take place to first rid our laws of the racist undercurrents which now ebb and flow from their construction. This would mean eliminating policy and legislation that permits unequal treatment of peoples irrespective of their birthplace or nation-state status. We have a *Criminal Code* that applies to the citizens of this nation, why should it not also apply to people who come to secure their futures -- as immigrants to work and live, or as refugees to seek safe haven and re-establish their lives -- who happen not (yet) to fall under the legal category of "citizen"? While according to the Supreme Court the *Charter* permits the differential treatment of non-citizens, it is necessary to question the legitimacy of this claim as a nation-state that is based on a narrative of equality and justice so as to propose that all peoples -- whether citizens or not -- be subject to the same laws.

To move toward a critical mindset that enables an exploration of this possibility and examines our current context, I present a reformulation of Conklin's (1996) questions concerning the racialized "othering" of Japanese Canadians, and put forward an analytical

approach that can help to further uncover as well as explain the origin of racist discourse in Canada which moves beyond what I have been able to offer in this thesis.

Conklin's questions:¹¹⁹

1. How do the juridical agents of the state picture the categorized persons so as to consider their internment and deportation valid and authoritative?
2. Why do the judgements of the courts at all levels read as if the exile of permanent residents and foreign nationals is natural, inevitable, reasonable and authoritative?
3. Why do the judgements read as if the judges had no choice but to sustain the classification of living beings as "inadmissible" due to "threats to national security", with all the consequences for their experiences that the classification entail?
4. How is it possible that the highest courts in one of the most rights conscious legal cultures in industrialized states would validate acts, which in hindsight, suggest more of the same?
5. Are Ministers and judges just plain out-and-out racists whose judgements may be discarded as an aberration of rights conscious legal culture? Or is there something special about a legal discourse, independent of race, which makes the internment on the grounds of "othering" seem a natural aspect of legal reasoning?

With reference to the research questions set forth at the start of this study which sought to explore the possibility that racism exists in current national security policy and practice, a survey of Conklin's questions reveals a disturbing pattern. The findings of this research show that the racialized discourse and practices of internment, deportation, and exclusion of "others" from legal rights is still present in the legislation and practice of the *IRPA*.

As a conduit that acts as an initial building block for the study of racialized discourse, this project points in the direction of essential future research that would foster a broader contemplation of the uncertainties illuminated by Conklin (1996). Namely, this research indicates the need to comprehensively examine the similarities and differences between the Canadian government's mistreatment of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War and that caused to other racialized groups in the current "war on terror". This future study

¹¹⁹ Adapted from Conklin (1996) pp. 231-232.

would involve a thorough investigation of the language of deportation and the “choice” of repatriation not only in “officially” legislated discourse but also in the openly disseminated governmental texts of policy, public statements and press releases. Since public discourse is integral to the discursive construction of national security, a further point of examination would entail looking at the formation of public language on this subject. Although the public is recognized as an active agent in the construction of discourse, the sheer monopoly of the dominant media both construct and constrain the narrative of what is acceptable with respect to national security and thus the media play a crucial role in normalizing what might otherwise be considered grave human rights abuses that are sanctioned by the government. What is accepted by the public through the frame of the media also affects public fear and possible acquiescence for government policies and legislation which may otherwise be considered unjust and may lead to public inaction in opposing discriminatory racist measures. In exploring the creation of public opinion, it would therefore also be necessary to look carefully at the media’s role as a private institution with close relationships to the state which may impact the media’s ability to critically (re)present information provided by governments both in past and contemporary contexts. Finally, to account for the view of the affected racialized community in question, in addition to that of the greater public, an analysis of public forums, surveys, and interviews as well as that of studies conducted by other researchers would be required.

Critical discourse analytical approaches, especially those that take into account historical, political, and sociological dimensions of research are imperative to developing a comprehensive understanding of national security discourse constructs. Through a critical discourse-historical analytical approach, this study has demonstrated that an interdisciplinary

and multimethod analysis can reveal the ambiguity and uncertainty created in the use of terms such as nation, security, and terrorism that facilitate the exclusion and “othering” of racialized peoples. Yet in the call for further research on the injustice and inequality of national security discourse, a much underexplored yet vitally important avenue for change must also be considered. So long as unjust measures of the state have existed, so have individuals and groups who have worked to uncover racist government policies and practices that are promulgated under the guise of citizenship, nation, identity, security and more recently, terrorism. The significant contributions of grassroots organizations whose determination to ensure that human rights for all peoples are respected have challenged the construction of security discourse and profoundly impacted the views of the media, the government and its courts as well as the public. An analysis of the language employed in the alternative discourse of social justice coalitions and communities would therefore enable a critical analysis that exposes problematic discourse as well as provides adequate and challenging responses to current injustices and would contribute substantially to the deconstruction and contestation of injustice as well as to the presentation of more inclusive ways to conceive of our imagined community.

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Appendix A: CSIS Backgrounder no. 14, Certificates under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) Revised February 2005

1. Macro-propositions:

I have underscored, italicized, bolded, and highlighted the text in green and blue to identify the pattern of global topics/themes.

M1. Security certificates are issued by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP) through a provision contained in the IRPA to remove non-citizens from Canada.

M2. These certificates are only issued when there is a great deal of evidence that those who are subject to them pose a significant threat to Canada and Canadians.

M3. The security certificate process is based on a just and rigorous process of information gathering and risk assessment by CSIS and the Minister of PSEP.

M5. A summary that enables the subject to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the certificate must be provided

2. Overall ideology/principle or belief of the text based on the macro-propositions:

Security certificates which limit the rights of individuals are a necessary and just process to ensure the safety and security of Canada and Canadians.

What is a Certificate?

A certificate-also referred to as a security certificate-is one way for the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to remove from this country a person who poses a security threat to Canada or Canadians. A certificate is only issued when there is sensitive information that needs to be protected for reasons of national security or the safety of any person.

The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) contains provisions which allow a certificate to be prepared and signed by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP) (formerly referred to as the Solicitor General of Canada) and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (CIC) when a permanent resident or foreign national (the subject) is deemed to be inadmissible on grounds of security, espionage, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality.

At the request of the Minister of PSEP and the Minister of CIC,

[REDACTED], its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person.

The judge provides the subject with a summary of the information or evidence [REDACTED]

Such summary has to enable the subject to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the certificate. [REDACTED]

The subject has an opportunity to be heard in an open hearing and can present evidence and testimony. [REDACTED]

Certificates have been used as a means to remove inadmissible non-Canadians since 1991.

What Leads to the Issuance of a Certificate?

A carefully considered and rigorous process is undertaken when it comes to the issuance of certificates. The decision by the Ministers of PSEP and CIC to sign a certificate is based on a security intelligence report (SIR). SIRs are normally prepared by CSIS.

Due to the serious implications of issuing a certificate, the preparation of supporting documentation by CSIS is both deliberate and rigorous. Several conditions must be met before CSIS even considers preparing a SIR:

- *The individual must be assessed as posing a significant threat to the security of Canada.*
- *CSIS must possess sufficient threat-related information and intelligence.*
- *That information must be reliable and come from multiple sources.*
- *The removal must be of strategic value in light of CSIS' investigative priorities.*
- *CSIS must have sufficient releasable open-source information to support the unclassified summary document.*

The SIR must present sufficient security and intelligence information to allow the Minister to conclude that an individual is inadmissible to Canada as defined by IRPA. The preparation of the SIR entails an exhaustive review of all information collected by CSIS. The result is a very detailed document, the contents of which are meticulously "facted".

[REDACTED] the Ministers of PSEP and CIC decide to sign a certificate

[REDACTED]. Under this process, the government can seek the removal of an individual from Canada on the stated grounds, [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] if the Ministers of PSEP and CIC issue a warrant for his or her arrest and detention, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the permanent resident is a danger to national security or the safety of any person or is unlikely to appear at a proceeding for removal.

[REDACTED], at the request of the Ministers of PSEP and CIC in accordance with Section 78 of the IRPA, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] how much information will be included in an unclassified summary to be provided to the subject of the certificate and the subject's counsel. As per the IRPA, the summary must include sufficient information to enable the individual to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the certificate, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], would be injurious to national security or the safety of any person [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] if it would be injurious to national security or the safety of any person. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], the person named in the certificate, if eligible, can make an application for a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Minister may seek assurances from the applicant's country of nationality that the applicant's human rights will be protected upon return. [REDACTED]


The Effect of Certificates

Certificates, as instruments for removing inadmissible permanent residents and foreign nationals who pose a threat to the security of Canada, have been available under Canadian immigration legislation since 1991. Given the serious consequences of issuing certificates and the extensive resources that must be dedicated to their preparation, the process has been used judiciously over the years and is employed only in exceptional cases. In total, 27 certificates have been issued between January

1991 and October 2003. Of these 27 certificates, three were quashed by the Federal Court. One of these three certificates later became the subject of a 2nd certificate.

A review of all certificates demonstrates that they have been directed at a broad range of subjects including Islamic terrorists, Russian nationals engaged in espionage, Sikh terrorists, Hindu extremists in support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, secular Arab terrorists and a right-wing extremist.

Certificates are used when there is information that needs to be protected for reasons of national security or the safety of any person.



The Government of Canada takes a broad-based approach to addressing security threats. The certificate process is one of the many tools at the government's disposal to ensure the safety and security of Canadians.

Appendix B: Macrothemes in CSIS Security Intelligence Report Summaries

The CSIS security intelligence report summaries for the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration dated February 22, 2008 list accusations against the men currently under security certificates. The following global/macrothemes were identified in the CSIS accusations using van Dijk's (2001) thematic patterning approach. The macrothemes are ordered numerically but do not necessarily appear in that order. The location of the macrothemes is listed beneath the names of the accused. Not all macrothemes are present within all texts. This is indicated in the table with the words "not present". The numbers in the table correspond to the numbered paragraph of the text not the page number for easy identification in the original text. Appendices are attached to all the accusations but for that of Hassan Almrei. These are listed under the table and have been considered in this analysis. In the table, the paragraph numbers for Appendix information follows the number sign (#). Additional information is provided as a footnote in order to further explicate the passages. Except for the summaries for Hassan Almrei and Adil Charkaoui, all begin with a "Table of Contents". This is followed by an introduction that states the position of CSIS in relation to admissibility as follows "[name of person] belongs to a class of persons *inadmissible* to Canada, pursuant to paragraphs 34(1)(c), 34(1)(d) and 34(1)(f) of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)* [in the case of Mahmoud Jaballah and Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub also 34(1)(b)]" (emphasis added).

Macrothemes	Almrei	Charkaoui	Jaballah	Harkat	Mahjoub
1. Position of CSIS	1; 5; 45; 46; 47; 67; 71; 72	1; 19 ¹²⁰ ; 41 ¹²¹ ; 44; CSIS conclusions: 64, 65, 66	1 ¹²² ; 4; 16; 17; 20; 21; 72 ¹²³ ; 83 ¹²⁴ ; 89; 90; 91 ¹²⁵ ; 103; Discrepancies claimed by CSIS: 104, 105, 106, 107, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115; CSIS conclusions: 108, 109, 117, 118	1; 17 not truthful; 21 “used methodologies of ‘sleepers’”; 26-27 re. use of aliases; 30; 31; 32; 34; 36-37 not truthful; 39-41; 44 re. money transactions and gambling; 51 “un-truthful” re. knowing Khader; 55; 56; 57	1; 3 re. VOC; 22 re. credibility; 28; 29
2. Arrival in Canada	2	2	18	2	6
3. Status in Canada	37; 38; 39; 40; 41; 42; 43	2		2; 19	7-9 (see also- Other)
4. The Threat	3	3 ¹²⁶ ; 26; 27; 28	6 ¹²⁷	3	3 ¹²⁸
5. Detention	4	7 ¹²⁹	2	7	2

¹²⁰ Under the category “Idéologie du jihad” CSIS claims that Charkaoui demonstrates his advocacy for violent “jihad” (p. 10; par.19)

¹²¹ CSIS claims Charkaoui has characteristics of a sleeper agent

¹²² CSIS states that Jaballah is inadmissible. They cite an Interpol notice states that “should he be returned to Egypt ‘the maximum *possible* sentence is death, while maximum *probable* sentence is sentence is hard labour for life” (p.7; italics added).

¹²³ According to CSIS “While many of his [Jaballah] contacts [in Canada] came from differing political backgrounds, they shared similar *political philosophies of Islam and jihad*. In its analysis of *the Islamist threat*, the Service has observed that alliances between various groups and individuals within this milieu are fluid and characterized by rather informal networks built on well-developed individual contacts” (pp. 38-39: 72).

¹²⁴ CSIS claims that Jaballah distributing “jihad” cassettes

¹²⁵ CSIS claims Jaballah acted as a communications contact for US embassy bombings

¹²⁶ According to the CSIS there are reasonable grounds to believe that Charkaoui is a member of a terrorist organization; that he has or *will* commit terrorist acts and that he constitutes a threat to Canada. More precisely they claim that he is or was a member of Al Qaida, he participated in training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, has kept in contact with “Islamic extremists”, has discussed plans with terrorists, has financed criminal activities for “jihad” and is a sleeper agent for Al Qaida (CSIS pp.2,3 : par. 3,4; original in French). Interestingly, they provide a brief explanation of their use of “Islamic extremist” as a footnote to 4c). in which they state that the term is used by CSIS to describe individuals who adhere to an extreme interpretation of Islam and who embrace violence to obtain their religious, political or ideological object. The footnote in the original French text is as follows: « L’expression « Islamistes extrémistes » est utilisée par le Service pour décrire des individus qui adhèrent à une interprétation extrême des principes de l’Islam et qui embrassent la violence pour atteindre un objectif religieux, politique ou idéologique » (p.3; ft.4).

¹²⁷ According to CSIS “Jaballah *will* engage or instigate the subversion by force of the Egyptian government and has/ *will* engage in terrorism” (italics added).

¹²⁸ According to CSIS “Mahjoub *will* engage or instigate the subversion by force of the Egyptian government and has/*will* engage in terrorism” (italics added).

¹²⁹ Charkaoui was arrested in on May 16, 2003 and released with conditions on February 17, 2005.

6. CSIS Sources of information	6, 7	5, 6	5-Interpol; 7, 8	5,6	4, 5
7. History of proceedings	Not present	7-11 ¹³⁰	Not present	7 ¹³¹	Not present
8. Other criminal actions	65	37-39	Not present	Not present	3 & 29 subversion by force of Egyptian gov't & engaged in terrorism
9. Alleged membership/associations with/ connections to:					
Bin Laden (or Bin Laden Network)	47	As linked with Al Qaeda	As listed below	4; 38; 53	24; 25; 26; 27
Al Jihad	Not present	Not present	3 ; 9; 55	Not present	19
Al Gamaa Al Islamiya (AGAI)	Not present	Not present	Not present	12	Not present
Al Qaeda	Not present	12; 13 ¹³² ; 15 & 17 camps; 34-34 re. financing "le jihad"	55	Not present	Not present
Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA)	Not present	Not present	Not present	10	Not present
Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM)	Not present	18	Not present	Not present	Not present
Ibn Khattab (Individual)	Not present	Not present	Not present	11 ; 42	Not present
Vanguards of Conquest	Not present	Not present	21; 55	Not present	See 19; Appendix "B" #4
Arab Afghans	53, 54	Not present	Not present	Not present	Not present

¹³⁰ Paragraph 10 is important as it recounts the Supreme Court's ruling; 11 recounts evidence by CSIS in his case he demanded that the security certificate process to determine "reasonability" be stopped which was rejected.

¹³¹ Important information about the Supreme Court ruling the "On February 23, 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada in *Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)* [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350; 2007 S.C.C. 9 February 23, 2007 declared the security certificate provisions of *IRPA* to be of no force and effect, finding that the procedure for determining the reasonableness of the certificate and for reviewing detention deprived the individuals named in the certificates of their constitutional rights under section 7 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights*" (p.6:7).

¹³² Charkaoui claims that he travelled to Pakistan to study Islam, but CSIS contends that he was training with Al Qaida in Afghanistan (see pp. 6.7: par. 13).

Individual “terrorists” & /or linked with “terrorist” organizations	54; 58; 62; 63	14 ¹³³	12 ¹³⁴ ; 15 ¹³⁵ ; 21 & 23; 24 & 25 ¹³⁶ ; 24 & 26; 27; 28 ¹³⁷ ; 31-34; 36; 37; 41-43 ¹³⁸ ; 46; 47; 48; 49; 51 ¹³⁹ ; 53; 54; 56 ¹⁴⁰ ; 58; 60 ¹⁴¹ ; 66-71 ¹⁴² ; 78; 79; 80 ¹⁴³ ; 84; 85	44; 48; Ahmed Said Khader; 54 Abu Zubaydah	10; 11 – Mubarak Al Duri/Abdul-Razak; 13-15 -- Mahmoud Jaballah (other s.c detainee); 16 -- Ahmed Said Khader; 17-18-- Essam Mohamed Hafez Marzouk
Other “Islamic Fundamentalists/terrorists”	50	Annexe “D” #1-7	12, 21 ¹⁴⁴	21; 45; 46; 47	Not present
10. Overview of “Terrorist” networks¹⁴⁵:					
Bin Laden Network	8; 9	See Annexe “A”	9; 86, 87, 88 (re. AJ & bombings of US embassies); Appendix “A” #4, 5 (also about Al Qaeda)	33; Appendix “A” #1,2	Appendix “B” #7, 8 (re. Bin Laden Network and Al Qaeda)
Al Qaeda	10; 12; 15; 16; 17; 20; 21; 35; 36	Annexe “A” #1, 2	see Appendix “A” Connection with AJ #1-3; Appendix “A” #11	Appendix “A” #3, 6, 13-16	Appendix “B” #13

¹³³ Charkaoui linked with Ahmed Ressam.

¹³⁴ Jaballah linked to members of AJ, Bin Laden, Ansar-al Islam; Libyan Islamic Fighting Groups in Canada.

¹³⁵ Jaballah’s link to Mahjoub (another security certificate detainee) and other AJ members.

¹³⁶ Jaballah’s contact with Al Zawahiri (founding member of AJ)

¹³⁷ Jaballah’s contact with Thriwat Shehata (AJ)

¹³⁸ Jaballah’s contact with Al Bari

¹³⁹ Most of paragraph concerns Eidarous

¹⁴⁰ Jaballah’s contact with Mahjoub

¹⁴¹ Jaballah’s contact with Ahmad Said Khader

¹⁴² Jaballah’s contact with Izzat re. CSIS false documentation

¹⁴³ Jaballah’s contact with Krer (LIFG)

¹⁴⁴ Jaballah’s contact alleged communication with “other Islamists”

¹⁴⁵ Please note that this is a general discussion--with no connection to the person accused --of the networks, specific individuals with established links to these networks, their methodologies and the threats they pose on Canada. Because of the interconnection between subthemes, some of the paragraphs/appendix information (items) fall under more than one classification. In these cases I have chosen to list the items according to the subtheme I believe it to be best associated. However, it must be recognized that these subthemes are interrelated categories of the larger thematic structure of “terrorist” networks.

Training Camps	11, 13	Annexe "A" #3, 4	Not present	Appendix "A" #4	Not present
Individual "terrorists" &/ or linked with "terrorist" organizations	14; 18; 23; 30; 50; 52; 55; 56; 57; 59; 60; 61	Annexe "C" # 1	29; 30 re. Shehata; 35; 41 & 45 re. Al Bari, 51 & 52 ¹⁴⁶ ; 59; 60 re. Marzouk; 62-65 re Khader; 76; 77; 81; Appendix "A" #7 Momin Khawaja	19; 20; 52; Appendix "A" # 9 (Momin Khawaja); Appendix "D" # 1-5; Appendix "G" #1-5 Ahmed Said Khader	12 re. Mamdoh Mahmoud Salim; 19 re. Essam Mohamed Hafez Marzouk
Other "terrorist" groups	19	Annexe "B" re. GICM # 1,2	re. AJ: 86, 87; Appendix "A" re AJ #1, 2, 3; Appendix "A" # 6 re. "third tier" bombings; #9 re. Toronto terror cell	43, 48 (alleged) Appendix "A" # 6, 7, 8, 10 (Toronto terror cell); Appendix "C" Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) #1-5; Appendix "E" # 1,2 Al Gamaa Al Islamiya (AGAI) – deny association with Bin Laden;	19 VOC; Appendix "B" #1, 2, 3 re. AJ &4, 5 re.VOC; Appendix "B" # 9 re. "third tier" bombings
Operational methodologies of "terrorist" groups	22- 29, 31, 32; 64	40; Annexe "A" #5-9	10; 92, 93	18, 22, 23, 25; Appendix A# 5	Not present
Threats to Canada or Canadian Interests by the above mentioned "terrorist" groups and/or "terrorists"	33, 34	Annexe "A" #10 ¹⁴⁷	Appendix "A" # 9, 10	Appendix A -#11 ¹⁴⁸	Appendix "B" #10, 11, 12 ¹⁴⁹
11. Confessionary statements/admissions					
Travel to Afghanistan	44	denied	denied	denied	Not present
Possession of photos of "terrorists"	48	Not present	Not present	Not present	Not present
Support for "jihad"	51 (also "Jihad")	20 ¹⁵⁰ ; 21 ¹⁵¹ ; 22; 23; 24; 25	Not present	Not present	Not present

¹⁴⁶ CSIS notes that Eidarous was released from prison after being diagnosed with advanced leukemia.

¹⁴⁷ The same information appears in Appendix "A" #9, 10 for Jaballah except Charkaoui's text is in French.

¹⁴⁸ The same information appears in Mahjoub (in appendix) and Almrei; in Almrei's case however it is within the text.

¹⁴⁹ The same information appears in Harkat (in appendix) and Almrei; in Almrei's case however it is within the text.

¹⁵⁰ This is in relation to statements Charkaoui allegedly made while watching a "jihad" video.

¹⁵¹ This is in relation to statements Charkaoui allegedly made in a discussion about Bosnia, as well as those he made about Abdallah Azzam who participated in a "jihad" against the Israeli occupation of Palestine (see p. 11; ft 23).

	in Afghanis tan)				
“Jihad” in Afghanistan	49	denied	Not present	Not present	Not present
Individuals linked with “jihad”	62	As seen in 11. iii	13 ¹⁵² ; 39 ¹⁵³ ; 74 ¹⁵⁴	Not present	Not present
False documentation	58, 68	Not present	10, 19	24	Not present
Not truthful	Not present	Not present	50 ¹⁵⁵	29, 35, 50 re. meeting Ahmed Khader	23
12. Other	63 ¹⁵⁶ , 67 ¹⁵⁷ , 69 ¹⁵⁸ , 70 ¹⁵⁹	29 -33 ¹⁶⁰ ; 42 ¹⁶¹ , 43 ¹⁶² ; Annexe “E” #1 ¹⁶³	2 ¹⁶⁴ , 14 ¹⁶⁵ , 38 ¹⁶⁶ , 40 ¹⁶⁷ ; 57 ¹⁶⁸ ; 73 ¹⁶⁹ 75; 94-97& 99 ¹⁷⁰ , 98 ¹⁷¹ ; 100, 101& 102; 116;	9 ¹⁷² ; 13-15 & Appendix F ¹⁷³ ; 28 Appendix “B”; FIS #1, 2; Appendix “F”	6-9 ¹⁷⁴ , 20 ¹⁷⁵ , 21 ¹⁷⁶ , Appendix “B” #13 ¹⁷⁷

¹⁵² Jaballah indicated having used alleged AJ leader Shehata’s services as a lawyer in Egypt, but denied awareness of Shehata’s involvement in Islamist militant activity or any knowledge of him beyond his official capacity as a lawyer; he testified in Federal Court to having had contact with Al Bari (linked to Bin Laden) under the auspices of the International Office for the Defence of Egyptian Peoples (IODEP).

¹⁵³ Admitted contact with individuals arrested in UK testified met Kassem Daher; testified contact with Hassan Farhat.

¹⁵⁴ Jaballah testified met Kassem Daher; testified contact with Hassan Farhat.

¹⁵⁵ Jaballah re knowing Eidarous (AJ) and contacting IODEP.

¹⁵⁶ Almrei linked with Hisahm Al Taha.

¹⁵⁷ Almrei re. missing number of security passes

¹⁵⁸ Almrei re. arranged marriage between Ibrahim Ishak and an employee

¹⁵⁹ Almrei re. Thailand known for black market

¹⁶⁰ In relation to CSIS claim of Charkaoui’s “violent temper”.

¹⁶¹ Speculation that Charkaoui’s marriage part of sleeper methodology to integrate into Canadian society.

¹⁶² Charkaoui’s university studies: completed MA while under house arrest and currently completing Doctorate program in Education at l’Université de Montréal.

¹⁶³ Photographs of Charkaoui used by CSIS identified by Ahmed Ressam as in the same training camp in Afghanistan

¹⁶⁴ Jaballah’s first certificate quashed but reason for this not stated

¹⁶⁵ Jaballah claims involvement with Islamic anti-government group named Badr when a student at university and then recants statement

¹⁶⁶ Jaballah’s opinion on arrests in UK and bombing in Africa as work of Egyptian Intelligence Service

¹⁶⁷ Jaballah does not provide names of overseas contacts

¹⁶⁸ Jaballah testified that he met Majoub in 1999 and then that he did not know him

¹⁶⁹ Jaballah’s contacts within Canada

¹⁷⁰ CSIS claims Jaballah practised a degree of security”, re communication by phone, fax, postal mail

¹⁷¹ CSIS claims Jaballah sent and received materials re. ‘jihad’

¹⁷² Harkat’s support for Front islamique du salut (FIA) in Algeria-“When Harkat was a supporter of FIS, it was a legitimate political organization”.

¹⁷³ Harkat’s involvement in the Muslim World League (MWL). Appendix “F” concerns the MWL which is not listed as a terrorist organization.

¹⁷⁴ Mahjoub’s Personal Information Form (PIF) re. left Egypt to claim refugee status

¹⁷⁵ Mahjoub’s awareness of being followed

¹⁷⁶ Mahjoub re. phone number to use

¹⁷⁷ Chronology of terrorist and other activities involving AJ, Al Qaeda and Bin Laden Network. Please note Mahjoub is **not** directly and only once indirectly (i.e., in the April 1999 listing of AJ members sentences in absentia) referred to in this.

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Appendix B: Macrothemes in CSIS Security Intelligence Report Summaries

List of Appendices:

1. Almrei

No appendices

2. Charkaoui

Annexe « A » Al-Qaida

Annexe « B » Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM)

Annexe « C » Ahcene Hassan Zemiri

Annexe « D » Contacts

Annexe « E » Ressam reconnaît Adil Charkaoui

3. Harakat

Appendix “A”: Al Qaeda and The Bin Laden Network

Appendix “B”: Front islamique du salut (FIS) and the Armée islamique du salut (AIS)

Appendix “C”: Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA)

Appendix “D”: Ibn Khattab

Appendix “E”: Gamaa al Islamiya (AGAI)

Appendix “F”: Muslim World League (MWL)

Appendix “G”: Ahmed Said Khadr

Appendix “H”: Service interviews of Mohamed HARKAT

4. Jaballah

Appendix “A”: The Egyptian Islamic Jihad/Al Jihad (AJ) The Bin Laden Network and Al Qaeda Chronology of Terrorist Activity

5. Mahjoub

Appendix “A”: *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)*

Appendix “B”: Al Jihad, Vanguard of Conquest and Al Qaeda

Appendix C: List of Terrorist Entities

List of Terrorist Entities as they appear in the Canadian Gazette¹

From the 39 groups listed here, 26 are either Arab/Islamic or both. The Arab/Islamic entities are shown in **bold**.

1. **Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (AGAI)** (also known as Islamic Group (IG))
2. **Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI)**
3. **Al Qaida**
4. **Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)** (also known as Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat)
5. **Al Jihad (AJ)** (also known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ))
6. **Vanguards of Conquest (VOC)**
7. **Armed Islamic Group (GIA)** (also known as Groupe islamique armé (GIA))
8. **Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)** (also known among other names as the Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan (IAAA), the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA), Aden Islamic Army, Islamic Aden Army, Muhammed's Army / Army of Mohammed and the Jaish Adan Al Islami)
9. **Harakat ul-Mudjahidin (HuM)** (also known among other names as Al-Faran, Al-Hadid, Al-Hadith, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Harakat al-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harakat ul-Ansar, Harakat al-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami, Harkat Mujahideen, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen al-Almi, Holy Warriors Movement, Movement of the Mujahideen, Movement of the Helpers, Movement of Islamic Fighters and Al Qanoon)
10. **Asbat Al-Ansar** ("The League of Partisans") (also known among other names as Osbat Al Ansar, Usbat Al Ansar, Esbat Al-Ansar, Isbat Al Ansar and Usbat-ul-Ansar)
11. **Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)** (also known among other names as Islamic Jihad Palestine (IJP), Islamic Jihad-Palestine Faction and Islamic Holy War)
12. **Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)** (also known among other names as Jaish-i-Mohammed (Mohammad, Muhammad, Muhammed), Jaish-e-Mohammad (Muhammed), Jaish-e-Mohammad Mujahideen E-Tanzeem, Jeish-e-Mahammed, Army of Mohammed, Mohammed's Army, Tehrik Ul-Furqaan, National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty and Army of the Prophet)
13. **Hamas** (Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya) ("Islamic Resistance Movement")
14. **Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)** (also known among other names as Kurdistan Workers Party, Partya Karkeren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Labor Party, Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress, KADEK, Kurdistan People's Congress, Kurdistan Halk Kongresi (KHK), People's Congress of Kurdistan and Kongra-Gel)
15. **Aum Shinrikyo** (also known among other names as Aum Shinri Kyo, Aum, Aum Supreme Truth, A. I. C. Comprehensive Research Institute, A. I. C. Sogo Kenkyusho and Aleph)
16. **Hizballah** (also known among other names as Hizbullah, Hizbollah, Hezbollah, Hezballah, Hizbu'llah, The Party of God, Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War), Islamic Jihad Organization, Islamic Resistance, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, Ansar al-Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansarollah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansar Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance), Organization of the Oppressed, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of Right Against Wrong and Followers of the Prophet Muhammed)

17. **Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)** (also known among other names as Fatah Revolutionary Council, Revolutionary Council, Revolutionary Council of Fatah, Al-Fatah Revolutionary Council, Fatah-the Revolutionary Council, Black June, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, Black September, Egyptian Revolution, Arab Fedayeen Cells, Palestine Revolutionary Council and Organization of Jund al Haq)
18. **Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)** (also known among other names as Al Harakat Al Islamiyya (AHAI), Al Harakat-ul Al Islamiyya, Al-Harakatul-Islamia, Al Harakat Al Aslamiya, Abou Sayaf Armed Band (ASAB), Abu Sayaff Group, Abu Sayyef Group and Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF))
19. **Sendero Luminoso (SL)** (also known among other names as Shining Path, Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui, Partido Comunista del Peru, Communist Party of Peru, The Communist Party of Peru by the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui and Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and the Thoughts of Chairman Gonzalo, Revolutionary Student Front for the Shining Path of Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru-By Way of the Shining Path of Mariategui, PCP-por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariategui, PCP and PCP-SL)
20. **Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI)** (also known among other names as Jemaa Islamiyah, Jema'a Islamiyya, Jema'a Islamiyyah, Jema'ah Islamiyah, Jema'ah Islamiyyah, Jemaa Islamiya, Jemaa Islamiyya, Jemaah Islamiyya, Jemaa Islamiyyah, Jemaah Islamiyah, Jemaah Islamiyyah, Jemaah Islamiya, Jamaah Islamiyah, Jamaa Islamiya, Jemaah Islam, Jemahh Islamiyah, Jama'ah Islamiyah, Al-Jama'ah Al Islamiyyah, Islamic Group and Islamic Community)
21. **Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)**
22. **Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)** (also known among other names as Basque Homeland and Liberty, Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna, Euzkadi Ta Askatasanu, Basque Nation and Liberty, Basque Fatherland and Liberty and Basque Homeland and Freedom)
23. **Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade (AAMB)** (also known among other names as Al-Aqsa Intifada Martyrs' Group, Al-Aqsa Brigades, Martyrs of al-Aqsa group, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion and Armed Militias of the Al-Aqsa Martyr Battalions)
24. **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)** (also known among other names as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP), National Finance Commission (Comisión Nacional de Finanzas) and Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera Simon Bolivar (CNGSB))
25. **Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)** (also known among other names as Autodéfenses unies de Colombie and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia)
26. **Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)** (also known among other names as National Liberation Army and the Army of National Liberation)
27. **Babbar Khalsa (BK)**
28. **Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)**
29. **International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)**
30. **Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)** (also known among other names as Lashkar-e-Toiba, Lashkar-i-Toiba (LiT), Lashkar-i-Taiba (Holy Regiment), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous), Lashkar-e-Taibyya, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Army of the Pure and Righteous), Lashkar-e-Taiba (Righteous Army), Lashkar-Taiba (Army of the Good), Lashkar e Toiba, Lashkar e Taiba, Lashkar-E-Tayyaba, Lashkar e Tayyiba)
31. **Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ)** (also known among other names as Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhangvie, Laskar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkare Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhangwi, Lashkar-i-Jhangwi,

- Jhangvi Army, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, Lashkar Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhanvi (LeJ), Lashkar-i-Jangvi, Lashkar e Jhangvi, Lashkar Jangvi, Laskar e Jahangvi)
32. **Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)** (also known among other names as PLF-Abu Abbas Faction, Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP))
 33. **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)** (Al-Jibha al-Sha'biya lil-Tahrir Filistin)
 34. **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)** (Al-Jibha Sha'biya lil-Tahrir Filistin-al-Qadiya al-Ama)
 35. **Ansar al-Islam (AI)** (also known as the Partisans of Islam, Helpers of Islam, Supporters of Islam, Soldiers of God, Kurdistan Taliban, Soldiers of Islam, Kurdistan Supporters of Islam, Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan and Followers of Islam in Kurdistan)
 36. **Gulbuddin Hekmatyar** (also known among other names as Gulabudin Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin Khekmatiyar, Gulbuddin Hekmatiar, Gulbuddin Hekmartyar, Gulbudin Hekmetyar, Golboddin Hikmetyar and Gulbuddin Hekmetyar)
 37. **Kahane Chai (Kach)** (also known among other names as Repression of Traitors, State of Yehuda, Sword of David, Dikuy Bogdim, DOV, Judea Police, Kahane Lives, Kfar Tapuah Fund, State of Judea, Judean Legion, Judean Voice, Qomemiyut Movement, Way of the Torah and Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea)
 38. **Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK)** (also known among other names as Sâzimân-i Mujâhidin-i Khalq-i Irân (Holy Warrior Organization of the Iranian People) / Sazman-i Mojahedin-i Khalq-i Iran (Organization of the Freedom Fighters of the Iranian People) / Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (Organization of People's Holy Warriors of Iran) / Sazeman-e Mujahideen-e-Khalq-e-Iran, Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), Mujahiddin e Khahq, al-Khalq Mujahideen Organization, Mujahedeen Khalq, Modjaheddins khalg, Moudjahiddin-é Khalq, National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA) (the military wing of the MEK) / Armée de Libération nationale iranienne (ALNI) and People's Mujahidin Organization of Iran (PMOI) / People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI) / Organisation des moudjahiddin du peuple d'Iran (OMPI) / Organisation des moudjahidines du peuple)
 39. **The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)** (also known among other names as the Tamil Tigers, the Eellalan Force, the Ellalan Force, the Tiger Movement, the Sangilian Force, the Air Tigers, the Black Tigers (Karum Puligal), the Sea Tigers, the Tiger Organization Security Intelligence Service (TOSIS) and the Women's Combat Force of Liberation Tigers (WCFLT))
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Appendix D: Narratives and Myths in the IRPA

Narratives & Myths	Instances in IRPA text (section # first time they appear)
<i>threat and danger narratives</i> Lexical references	security risks 3(1)(i); espionage 34(1)(a); subversion 34(1)(b); terrorism 34(1)(c);
<i>foreign policy narratives</i> Acts	<i>Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</i> (Convention Against Torture) 2(1); <i>Refugee Convention</i> 2(1); <i>Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act</i> 35(1)(a)(b)
<i>nationalist policy narratives</i> Acts	<i>Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms</i> 3(3)(c); <i>Canada Border Services Agency Act</i> 4(2); <i>Citizenship Act</i> 19(1); <i>Indian Act</i> 19(1); <i>Criminal Records Act</i> 36(3)(b); <i>Contraventions Act</i> 36(3)(e); <i>Young Offenders Act</i> 36(3)(e); <i>Criminal Records Act</i> 53 (f); <i>Federal Courts Act</i> 75 (1); <i>Statutory Instruments Act</i> 92 (3); <i>Quarantine Act</i> 100(5); <i>Extradition Act</i> 105 (1); <i>Criminal Code</i> 133; <i>Canada Post Corporation Act</i> 140 (2); <i>Customs Act</i> 140 (2); <i>Public Service Superannuation Act</i> 153(1)(f); <i>Government Employees Compensation Act</i> 153(1)(f); <i>Aeronautics Act</i> 153(1)(f); <i>National Capital Act</i> 157; <i>Inquiries Act</i> 165
<i>nationalist myths</i> Lexical references	Canada's commitment to international efforts 3(2)(b); Canada's humanitarian ideals 3(2)(c); safe haven 3(2)(d); Canada's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings 3(2)(e); security of Canadian society 3(2)(g); reasonable grounds 33; democratic country, process and practice 34(1)(a); national security 78 (b)(e)(g)(h)