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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN CANADA: A "CLUSTER THEORY" EXPLANATION

RELATIONS CIVILO-MILITAIRES AU CANADA: A LA LUMIERE DE LA THEORIE DES GRAPPES

A Thesis Submitted

To the Division of Graduate Studies of the Royal Military College of Canada

By

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ABSTRACT

Ring, Thomas; MA; Royal Military College of Canada; April, 2009; *Civil-Military Relations in Canada: A "Cluster Theory" Explanation*; Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky and Dr Philippe Lagassé .

The field of civil-military relations examines the relationships between military leaders and the duly constituted authority that exercises civil control of the military. Some have questioned whether these relationships have changed since Canada's involvement in the war in Afghanistan, and called into question the appropriate public role for military leaders. This thesis argues that the principle of civil control remains firmly established in Canada both in theory and in practice. However there has been significant change in the civil-military dynamic, which is the complex web of relationships that determine how this control is exercised. The thesis identifies three clusters of relationships in this web and examines how the players in these clusters contributed to the constantly changing nature of civil-military relations over three distinct time periods. Given the assumptions of traditional liberal-democratic civil-military relations theory, this thesis examines whether these changes are problematic or merely an evolution to a new state of affairs that will enhance our understanding of defence issues in Canada. The change, this thesis argues, has altered the relationships in a way that does not threaten the principle of civil control. This new reality has however had a significant impact on the formulation and implementation of the government's overall policy agenda during the past five years.

Keywords: Civil-Military Relations; Civil-Military Dynamic; Civil control; defence decision making; shared responsibility theory; military politics; defence policy.

RÉSUMÉ

Ring, Thomas; M.A.; Collège militaire royal du Canada; avril 2009; *Relations civilo-militaires au Canada : a la lumiere de la theorie des Grappes;* Joel J. Sokolsky, Ph. D., et M. Philippe Lagassé, Ph. D.

Le domaine des relations civilo-militaires examine les rapports entre les leaders militaires et l'autorité dûment constituée qui exerce le contrôle civil des militaires. Certains se sont demandés si ces relations avaient changé depuis la participation du Canada à la guerre en Afghanistan et ont remis en question la pertinence du rôle public joué par les leaders militaires. Le présent mémoire soutient que le principe du contrôle civil demeure fermement établi au Canada tant en théorie qu'en pratique. Cependant, un changement important est survenu dans la dynamique civilo-militaire, toile complexe des relations qui détermine la façon d'exercer ce contrôle. Le présent mémoire définit trois groupes de relations dans cette toile et se penche sur la façon dont les acteurs de ces groupes contribuent à la nature en constante évolution des relations civilo-militaires pendant trois périodes distinctes. Compte tenu des hypothèses de la théorie des relations civilo-militaires libérales-démocratiques traditionnelles, le mémoire examine si ce changement est problématique ou s'il s'agit simplement d'une évolution vers une nouvelle réalité qui nous permettra de mieux comprendre les questions de défense canadiennes. Ce changement, soutient ce mémoire, a transformé les relations d'une façon qui ne menace pas le principe du contrôle civil. Cependant, cette nouvelle réalité a eu des répercussions importantes sur la formulation et la mise en œuvre de l'ensemble du plan d'action gouvernemental des cinq dernières années.

Mots clés : Relations civilo-militaires; dynamique civilo-militaire; contrôle civil; prise de décision ayant trait à la défense; théorie de la responsabilité partagée; politiques militaires; politique de défense.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The study of civil-military relations examines the relationships between military leaders and the duly constituted authority from whom the military takes orders. One focus of the study of civil-military relations is the structures and processes by which the authority exercises civil control over the armed forces of the state. While the formal control mechanisms by civilians are typically clear and unambiguous, the day-to-day exercising of such control for defence matters has long been regarded as a shared responsibility between military officers and civilian leaders.[1] The academic literature exploring in detail the offices and individuals involved in this shared responsibility is relatively limited, particularly in the Canadian context. This thesis offers a unique analysis of how several "clusters" of players involved in the civil-military relationship dynamic influence the policy process and outcome.

Civil-military relations have only infrequently been a subject of public policy debate in Canada. With their soldiers fighting and dying in southern Afghanistan, Canadians have become more engaged on military and defence matters. Furthermore, there have been questions regarding who has been setting and defining military and

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[1] Examinations of the complexities of the relationships between military officers and the civil authority that underpin the concept of "shared responsibility" are found in most works on the subject of civil-military relations. This includes Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), Book 8, Chapter 6; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); and, Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 26, no.1, Fall 1999; Douglas L. Bland, "Who decides what? Civil-Military Relations in Canada and the United States," *Canadian-American Public Policy*, no. 41, Feb 2000; and Douglas L. Bland, "Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 27, No. 4, summer 2001.

defence policy during this conflict and who should do so in a time of war.[2] For the first time in decades, the high media profile of Canadian Forces' leadership is also raising questions about the appropriate relationships between military leaders and politicians and their respective responsibilities to the public. The recently retired Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), General Rick Hillier, was accused of "crossing the line" into the realm of policy and politics.[3] For his part, at the end of his tenure General Hillier did not go quietly. During his final speech as CDS, Hillier declared that there was no problem with the principle of civil control of the military. However he then warned against the unnecessary intrusion into military matters by "field marshal wannabes in the civil service." Hillier did not elaborate at that time, leaving others to interpret the meaning of his words.[4] Such assertions, whether valid or not, do not enhance our understanding of this important field of study. They do however illustrate the value of re-examining present day civil-military relations in Canada.

This thesis examines both the structures and processes that provide for civil control of the military, as well as the web of relationships that comprise the shared responsibility component of how civil control plays out in day-to-day decision making. This latter element of civil-military relations is defined for the purpose of this thesis as the civil-military dynamic. The thesis identifies three clusters of individuals or office holders, such as the Minster of National Defence, or groups of individuals or office holders, such as the Cabinet, in this web of relationships. Hereafter these are referred to

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[2] See for example "An Uneven Power Struggle," *Globe and Mail* editorial, July 27, 2007, and "O'Connor Speaks, Hillier Contradicts," *Globe and Mail* editorial, July 31, 2007.
[3] "Gen. Hillier steps out of bounds," *Globe and Mail* editorial, February 26, 2008, and James Travers, "Hillier's Personality Masked Mistakes," *The Toronto Star*, April 19, 2008.
[4] Comments accessed on July 3, 2008 at http://watch.ctv.ca/news/latest/change-of-command/#clip63996.

as the "players" in the civil military dynamic. The first cluster operates at the national level, the second one at the governmental level and the final one within the Department of National Defence. The first shapes the state's general defence philosophy or approach to the use of its military forces. The second helps shape the policy choices available to the government to implement its desired approach. The final one contributes to the development of the policy options and is responsible for implementation of the agreed upon policy choices. Reviewing the three distinct eras of the Cold War, the post-Cold War and the post-9/11, the thesis examines how the interaction of the players both among and within these clusters contributed to the constantly changing nature of the civil-military dynamic.

The thesis concludes that the principle of civil control remains firmly established in Canada both in theory and in practice; however there has been significant change in the civil-military dynamic. Given the assumptions of traditional liberal-democratic civil-military relations theory, it should be asked whether these changes are problematic or merely an evolution to a new state of affairs that will enhance our understanding of defence issues in Canada. This study concludes that the change has altered the relationships in a way that does not threaten the principle of civil control. This study shows however that the impacts of changing circumstances, personalities and leadership had a significant impact on the formulation and implementation of the government's overall policy agenda during the past five years. Thus, while the structures that determine the functioning of civil control remain largely unchanged, the functioning of civil-

military relations was anything but static. This however cannot be objectively labeled as a problem with civil-military relations in Canada.

1.2 Research Approach and Chapter Overview

Understanding the nature of civil-military relations should be central to how decisions regarding the real or apprehended use of armed forces are made. The subject area of civil-military relations encompasses more than just defence matters. It has both direct and indirect impacts on several related fields of public policy in Canada, with military and defence policy being the most obvious. Security and foreign policy are also affected by civil-military relations.[5] Elected and unelected officials in numerous government institutions are engaged in the processes that contribute to the elaboration, approval and implementation of policy in these areas. Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, combining significant increases in military presence and aid spending has contributed to the elevation of defence, security and foreign policy questions to the forefront of public discourse.[6] Given the extension of Canada's mission to Afghanistan until 2011 and the significant increases in military spending, the importance of civil-military relations is likely to remain part of the Canadian political reality for some time to come.

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[5]For a general discussion on the horizontal nature of policy making in the Federal government see Donald J. Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers, and Parliament* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 214-215; for a discussion on the nexus of defence, foreign and security policy see Jane Boulden, "A National Security Council for Canada?," *The Claxton Papers*, (Kingston: Queens University, 2000), 6-7.

[6] Evidence of the increased importance of defence, security and foreign policy issues includes a first ever National Security Policy in 2004, the International Policy Statement in 2005, two parliamentary debates on the Afghanistan mission, the Manley Commission report in 2008, and the new Canada First Defence Strategy released in June 2008.

1.2.1 Research Questions

In order to assess whether there has been a material change in civil-military relations in Canada in the post-9/11 era, several questions will be examined in this paper. What are the constitutional and legal structures and processes that provide for civil control of the military and have they changed since Canada's post-9/11 involvement in Afghanistan? What was the pattern of civil-military relationships (i.e. the civil-military dynamic) prior to the mission in Afghanistan? How has this relationship changed post-9/11? Who exactly is involved and what are the influences that shape behaviours in this relationship? These questions explore what is largely unfamiliar territory for many Canadians, including some of those involved in decision making on defence matters.[7]

1.2.2 Chapter Overview

In chapter two, the examination of several theories of civil-military relations help to identify some of the principles for assessing the degree of civil control of the military and for understanding the normally accepted actions and behaviours of the military. The principles identified are: a) the subordination of the military to civil authority; and b) the separation of functions between military and civilian organizations. The former deals with the relationship between the military authority and elected officials and is often assumed to be a given in democracies. Recent explanations suggest however that merely stating that a military is subordinate to the civil authority does not necessarily mean that

[7] One of the few formal processes for furthering the understanding of the linkages between these policy areas, the National Defence College Course, was eliminated in 1995.

the civil-military dynamic is uncomplicated.[8] The separation principle acknowledges the distinction between the aims of policy and the use of military force to achieve it, as well as the need for separation of the decision-making structures and processes that contribute to the consideration of these issues.

Chapter three reviews several important Canadian studies that have assessed civil-military relations in this country, and in particular the work of noted military academic Douglas L Bland. Most of these studies have looked at the Canadian situation prior to 9/11. The challenge facing analysts in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods was a real or perceived decline in the importance of military and strategic affairs leading to a tendency to declare that there were problems with civil-military relations in Canada.[9] Bland's study of civil-military relations has however provided important insights into the concept of shared responsibility that is the focus of much of this thesis.

Examining the concepts of civil control and the civil-military dynamic requires an understanding of the regime that defines the rules for all players and the accountability mechanisms that control how they interact.[10] Chapter four analyzes the elements of the Canadian structures that contribute to civil control and also make up the civil-military dynamic. This includes three interdependent components. The first is Canada's constitutional and legal structures and processes. Next are the players who influence in the civil-military dynamic such as the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Minister of National

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[8] For a more complete examination of the paradoxes inherent in civil-military relations and the civilians "right to be wrong" see Peter C. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 4-7.
[9] See for example Bland, "Who Decides what?" 33-44.
[10] Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," 20.

Defence, Parliament and the other administrative and bureaucratic players. Their respective roles and responsibilities can be grouped into three "clusters." Each cluster has a specific role in the functioning of the civil-military dynamic and the study of the relationship dynamics within and among these clusters provides important insights into the actual conduct of civil-military relations. Lastly, the chapter identifies the factors contributing to the domestic and international context that influences the actions and behaviours of the players. These last two elements comprise the framework for analysis used to assess the civil-military dynamic in Canada in each of the Cold War, post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras in chapters five through seven.

Thirty interviews were conducted for this research, including many of the principle players in the civil-military dynamic in Canada including former Chiefs of the Defence Staff, Ministers of National Defence, Deputy Ministers of Defence and Clerks of the Privy Council. The main purpose of this aspect of the research was the validation of the Cluster Theory concept and the resulting framework for analysis referred to above. One of the consistent refrains expressed by interview respondents was the inadequate level of understanding of the dynamics of the civil-military relationship in Canada, even on their own part as they first assumed positions within the decision-making structures of government that involve matters of national defence.

1.3 Defining Civil-Military Relations

The term "civil-military relations" is relatively broad and is frequently used to describe different elements of the overall relationship framework that guides the

interaction between military officers and their civilian leaders. Numerous descriptions, explanations and definitions have been proposed since the Second World War. Almost all academic assessments of civil-military relations cite the classic work by Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*.[11] In some cases, the expression civil-military relations refers to attempts to assess the degree of civil control over the military, that is, the extent to which a democratic state's military capability is subordinate to the authority of elected civilian representatives.[12] More often however the actual conduct of civil-military relations involves a variety of various other dynamic influences. This can include factors such as the domestic political agenda, the threat environment, and the relationships among those who have direct impact on shaping the government's overall policy agenda such as the Prime Minister, Cabinet, the Department of Finance or the Privy Council Office. Most theories of civil-military relations suggest that the ideal state is a balance between these various influences, one that preserves and respects the various roles and responsibilities of the actors involved and yet achieves the government's desired policy outcomes.[13]

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[11] While there is no single accepted definition of civil-military relations, two concepts are ever present in any consideration of the subject. These are civil control of the military or the subordination of the military to the wishes of civilians and the notion that civil-military relations are comprised of a complex framework of relationships. See Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, viii. Huntington's theory suggested that the optimal way of ensuring control was the acceptance of and support for military professionalism. See chapter 4.

[12] Civil-military relations in non-democratic states would not entail a relationship with elected officials. This study deals with the expected relationships in a liberal democratic regime where subordination of the military to elected officials is a basic principle of civil-military relations.

[13] Huntington, 2. Other explanations of the concepts of balance and equilibrium can be found in Clausewitz, 89; and, Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 4.

1.3.1 Civil Control

This thesis is based on there being a clear separation between civil control and the dynamic influences that affect decision-making relationships involved in the operations of government, the civil military dynamic. It analyzes these two distinct components of the civil-military relationship in Canada and assesses whether there has been any weakening of civil control as implied in the suggestions that Canada's military leadership has increased its involvement in decision making on military/strategic policy in the post-9/11 era. To assess whether such a conclusion is valid it is necessary to first determine whether in fact there has been an increased involvement by Canada's military leaders in "defence decision making" using comparative time periods. Second, has this alleged increase weakened the principle of civil control?[14]

The question of whether or not civilians controlled the military may have been a relevant avenue for inquiry in the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, the evolution of democratic societies and the institutions that support them in most western liberal democracies and Canada in particular have rendered this question largely secondary to the question of how this control is exercised. Even Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, written over 50 years ago, examined the issue from the perspective of how to minimize the power of the military relative to civil authorities. His analysis concluded that it is not a question of whether civilians control the military but how.[15] Similarly, Samuel Finer, also writing during the post-Second World War era, stated that in countries

[14] This is an exceptionally long period of time for a study of this nature. The goal of including the three eras is to identify possible trends and therefore assess the impact that changed trends have on the perceptions of altered civil-military relations. The Cold War era is post-Second World War to 1990; post-Cold War is 1990-2001.

[15] Huntington, 80-85.

with developed political cultures, the military lacked the moral authority or legitimacy to govern such societies.[16] More recent analysis such as that by Peter Feaver also suggests that civil control be taken as a given and suggests that the real issue is how the control relationship plays out on a day-to-day level.[17]

Nevertheless, for civil control in liberal democratic states to function both in theory and practice, the basic democratic institutions to support the authority of elected civilians over the military must exist. Usually these are found in the country's constitutional and legal arrangements, including both the formal ones and those established over time by interpretation, historical precedent and convention. This thesis argues that notwithstanding the high profile of the most recent CDS and the Canadian military in the last several years, the key preconditions or principles necessary for civil control of the military in a liberal democratic state have remained firmly in place and adhered to in Canada in the post 9/11 environment. This issue is explored in Chapter 4.

1.3.2 The Civil-Military Dynamic

Civil control is therefore largely a matter of legislative and constitutional structures that can usually be assessed or judged. The civil-military dynamic however, or how this civil control is exercised, is made up of day-to-day interactions among people and organizations, often involving personal judgments using less than complete information.[18] These judgments must also be considered in relation to the circumstances

[16] Samuel E. Finer, *The Man On Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* 2nd ed., (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), 14-22.
[17] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 1.
[18] Confidential interview by author, 2008.

acting upon the state. For example, the threat environment will influence the public mood and therefore perceived national interests and values. This will inform the actions and influence the behaviours of both elected and appointed individuals who manage the decision-making processes of the state. Thus the civil-military dynamic is "an ecosystem as opposed to a set of rules as is the case in the management of civilian public service organizations."[19] According to Peter Harder, a former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and a public servant with extensive experience in the civil-military dynamic, this concept is only inconsistently understood by many of the key decision makers.

1.4 Explaining the Cluster Theory Concept

In the Canadian situation, the complex web of relationships and resulting behaviours of civilians and military leaders in the formulation and implementation of defence policy has been described by Douglas Bland as a shared responsibility.[20] According to Bland, shared responsibility means that civil control of the military is managed and maintained in a national regime of "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge."[21] The theory assumes that the regime for "civil control" is dynamic and susceptible to changing values, circumstances, interests and personalities.[22] This is not to suggest however that the final authority of elected officials is anything but clear and unambiguous.

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[19] Peter Harder, interview with author, September, 2008.
[20] Bland's use of the shared responsibility descriptor is extensive and found in most of his writing on civil-military relations. One of the earlier works is Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces*, (Toronto: Brown Book Co., 1995).
[21] Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," 9-10.
[22] Ibid.

Bland's explanation of shared responsibility is helpful in attempting to understand how civil-military relations actually work. This study accepts this explanation and expands on it in two very important ways. First it accepts that while the overall regime for civil-military relations is dynamic, the elements related to "civil-control" in the Canadian regime are largely static and unchanging over time. This is supported both by the constancy of the structures that provide the basis for civil control as well as the extensive experiences of those players in the civil military dynamic interviewed for the thesis. Thus what does change and cause the dynamic nature of civil-military relations are the various players and the factors that influence their actions and behaviours. The second enhancement of Bland's shared responsibility explanation is the identification of the various clusters of players who share this responsibility, the grouping of them into relationship clusters, and the evaluation of the impact of a group of factors on the various relationships. Assessing the interaction of these factors and players allows us to evaluate how and why the civil-military dynamic has changed over time and thus the impact this has on the management and implementation of defence priorities relative to other policy priorities or government objectives.

Examples of this constantly changing civil-military dynamic are numerous. For example, if the government's overarching priority is the domestic economy and the threat environment is perceived to be relatively benign, the influence of military leaders will be limited. Such was the case in Canada during the 1990s. Conversely, as was experienced in the post 9/11 era, a high threat environment combined with the political will to make the Canadian Forces the key instrument of foreign policy enabled strong and united

leadership within the defence department to increase the influence of the military in defence and foreign policy matters.

There is no single ideal or desired civil-military dynamic. Nevertheless, for those involved in the making of public policy decisions, understanding the factors that contribute to this dynamic and how their behaviours and actions affect it will result in improved decision making. Friction and conflicting opinions can occasionally result in better public policy decisions. However in matters of defence policy the principle of unlimited liability, the concept that military members accept that they may sacrifice their lives in the conduct of their duties, should be an ever present consideration because this imbues defence policy decision making with an importance that it is usually not present in other areas of public policy.

1.5 Conclusion

This study argues that the complex array of relationships that impact the civil-military dynamic in Canada are more numerous, nuanced and subtle than the existing explanations found in Canadian literature on civil-military relations. Three clusters of individuals or groups are identified for study. The first group includes relationships at a national level involving the government, the people and the military. The second group involves decision makers in the civil authority (Prime Minister and Cabinet), departments and agencies of the public service outside the Department of National Defence (DND), and those directly interested in defence matters. The third group includes the Minister of National Defence, the Canadian Forces and the civilians within DND. The relationships

within and among these clusters will be examined to assess the impact on the civil-military dynamic. In addition to these three clusters of players, the Canadian civil-military dynamic is also shaped by a range of factors such as the domestic political environment, the threat environment, and the relative strengths and weaknesses of those in positions of influence.

While the actual conduct of civil-military relations in Canada is dynamic and ever changing, the thesis concludes that it falls within the accepted norms established for civil control of the military in western liberal democratic regimes.[23] However, concluding that the principle of civil control remains firmly established in the Canadian regime does not sufficiently explain civil-military relations in Canada. As noted above, the key question is not who ultimately makes decisions on defence and foreign policy in Canada but how they are made. How decisions are made usually depends on the factors that dominate the public policy discourse at the time decisions are needed, and the interaction of the various clusters of players in the civil-military dynamic.

In Canada, as in all other liberal democratic states, the factors and players change constantly. The players invariably search for a balance or equilibrium in a dynamic interaction where, as Feaver notes, the civilians assert a "right to be wrong" in a dialogue that is never equal in any circumstance.[24] Whereas the civil authority seeks to have a

[23] This expression is generally intended to mean post-Second World War democracies in the British Parliamentary tradition. This thesis however is not a comparison of the Canadian regime of civil-military relations with other such states. Rather, it is an analysis of the Canadian experience informed by the available civil-military relations theory.

[24] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 6. For an explanation of the concept of "unequal dialogue," see Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime,* (New York: Random House, 2003), 208-224.

pliant military that implements its policies without resistance or at a minimum making public pronouncements that contradict the government line, the military holds the view that policy or political direction be explicitly articulated and that its professional expertise be acknowledged and taken into account at all times. This inevitable tension in the civil-military dynamic can result in politicians expressing a preference for "silent soldiers," while military leaders warn against being directed by civilian "field marshal wannabees."[25] This tension takes on an added significance when a country's military forces are engaged in conflict or war.

In this thesis the evidence of the changing dynamic is viewed through the lens of the various clusters of players involved in the conduct of civil-military relations. By assessing the changing dynamics both within and among the clusters, as well as the factors that affect the players within the clusters, we are able to observe how civil-military relations actually work in Canada, rather than how it should work in theory.

[25] Brooke Claxton, Canada's Minister of Defence in the post Second World War period, used the expression "silent soldiers." On his departure as Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier warned of unwanted intrusion in military affairs by "field marshal wannabees."

CHAPTER 2: CIVIL-MILIARY RELATIONS THEORY

2.1 Introduction

The study of civil-military relations is one of the oldest subjects in political science and was central to the thinking and writings of early theorists in the field of war and politics such as Sun Tzu, Plato, and Machiavelli.[26] The works of these writers deal generally with the challenges facing political leaders and often deals with the subject of civil-military relations. Eliot Cohen's analysis of the relationship between President Abraham Lincoln and his American Civil War generals in *Supreme Command* clearly demonstrates that the relationship between political and military leaders can be a difficult one, even when it is successful. The evolution of both democratic institutions and the societies they serve continues to alter the actual conduct of these relationships. Nevertheless, certain basic principles have been identified over time. Additional scholarship in the past two decades has attempted to provide us with a deeper understanding of how these principles are applied in modern democracies.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the most notable theories of civil-military relations to assess whether they provide a full or partial explanation of the relationships between political and military leaders in Canada. As it turns out, they all have some general applicability to the conduct of civil-military relations in this country. However, most are case studies that focus on civil-military relations in the United States, whose geopolitical and strategic interests, not to mention military capabilities, render direct comparisons to Canada problematic at best. Individually, none can be considered a

[26] Cohen, 241.

complete explanation of how the actors in the civil-military equation in Canada behave. Chapter three will therefore examine existing explanations of civil-military relations in Canada.

Theories of civil-military relations help to explain both why that relationship exists and how it functions within the state. The "why" is the central challenge of maintaining a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask, while ensuring that the military is sufficiently subordinate to do only what the civilian leadership authorizes.[27] This principle of subordination is so well established in democratic states that it is almost considered an article of faith.[28] The mechanisms that serve to ensure the principle of subordination is followed are usually deeply embedded into the constitutional and legal arrangements that establish the state itself.[29] Understanding "how" civilians actually exercise control over the military represents a more difficult challenge for the purpose of this study, and is explored further in later chapters.

One of the central problems of the study of theory in the field of politics or political science is attempting to explain the behaviours of individuals and groups within a social or political context that changes constantly and rarely repeats itself in quite the same way. However the challenge should be more than one of interest only to students of politics or civil-military relations. Identifying the factors that shape the day-to-day

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[27] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 2.

[28] While Finer suggests that the main question ought not to be why the military engages in politics but why they ever do otherwise, his analysis of the possibility of intervention in countries with developed political culture underscores the illegitimacy of military rule and therefore reinforces the principle of subordination of the military to civilian authority. Similarly Feaver abstracts out of his analysis the supremacy of civilians over the military and deals with the question of how this control is exercised.

[29] For an explanation of the elements of the Canadian arrangements see Bland, "Who decides what?," 23-30.

relationship between the military and their civilian masters is central to the democratic enterprise.[30] It is this very fact that renders the examination of civil-military relations relevant, despite the difficulties associated with the application of existing theoretical constructs. Beyond the principle of civil control in democratic states, nothing about the conduct of civil-military relations is obvious.[31]

The approach used in this study divides the existing literature into three groups. Each group is examined to identify the principles and factors that go into the conduct of civil-military relationships. The first group includes the writings of Carl von Clausewitz and Harry Summers, and is referred to in this study as the Classics. The second group of analysts includes Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz and Samuel Finer. This group is labeled the Modernists. The end of the Cold War saw a new wave of scholarship in the field of study focusing on the relationship between the military and the government. Two works in particular offered new insights. These are the agency theory posited by Peter Feaver and the structural theory advanced by Michael Desch. This group is referred to as the Contemporaries.

2.2 The Classics

The very basic principles upon which civil-military relations are based are explored in detail by Carl von Clausewitz in *On War*. The timeless relevance of his examination of the relationship between the political objective and the military means to achieve it has rarely if ever been refuted, if sometimes forgotten, misinterpreted or

[30] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 2.
[31] Cohen, 242.

ignored by both politicians and the military.[32] Clausewitz was not the first to consider the relationship between the military and the government, but his is the most definitive and unequivocal assertion of the principle of subordinating the actions of the military to policy or political objectives. According to Clausewitz, these objectives were established by what he referred to as statesmen or what we would today call the civil authority.[33]

The essence of the linkage between the goals of political authorities and the use of military force to achieve them is the often quoted maxim, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means."[34] The policy goal and the use of military force are not however always directly related. The example of Canada's current involvement in Afghanistan is a case in point. According to Janice Stein and Eugene Lang, the political considerations leading to the Canadian military's involvement in that war rarely involved consideration of Canada's political aims or policy goals in Afghanistan. The use of force in that country was intended to achieve a political objective related to Canada/U.S. relations.[35] The aim of the political decision was to be seen to be contributing to something that was of importance to the Americans. Nevertheless, the linkage between the use of military force and the policy goal was real, if not always so expressed.

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[32] Some scholars have rejected the continuing relevance of von Clausewitz, notably Martin van Creveld. His book *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991) outlined a non-trinitiaran analysis that suggested the work of Clausewitz was outdated and no longer relevant with the increased prevalence of non-state actors in regional and local conflict. Nevertheless more recent works such as that of Rupert Smith, a former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander with NATO, makes no reference to van Creveld but instead relies on the principles in Clausewitz to explain the revolution in armed conflict from industrial war to "war amongst the people." See Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 58.

[33] Clausewitz did not use the term "civil authority" and was writing in a period before liberal democracies as we now understand them were established. However his intent, as can be seen in his use of the term statesman in Book Eight, Chapter 6, clearly refers to those who are empowered to decide on the nature and purpose of the use of military force. Also see Smith, 58.

[34] Clausewitz, 87.

[35] Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada In Kandahar* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 2007), 68 and 177.

The clarity and strength of Clausewitz's analysis and observations regarding the indivisibility of politics and military action and the subordination of the latter to the former are invariably cited in all examinations of civil-military relations. They have been referred to as the first theoretical justification for civilian control of the military.[36] Clausewitz notes:

> Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that has created war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political.[37]

The other element of importance in the Clausewitzian teachings required for understanding the civil-military equation is the role of the people:

> As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity ... of the play of chance and probability ... and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.
> The first of these three aspects concerns the people, the second the commander and his army and the third the government.[38]

The very essence of war, he argues, is found in the variable relationships among these three aspects (referred to hereafter as the Clausewitzian Trinity or just Trinity) one to the other and to ignore any one of them would conflict with reality. Clausewitz's analysis of the relationship between the government's use of the instrument of war as a policy choice and the impact on military strategy and plans was extensive and dominated

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[36] Huntington, 58. While Clausewitz did not use the term civilians, he explicitly drew a distinction between the military man and the statesman. See for example Book Eight, Chapter 6.
[37] Clausewitz, 607.
[38] Clausewitz, 89.

several chapters in *On War*. His analysis of the role of the people and the essential element of what he termed the "passion" is less complete. With the evolution of institutions of democratic governance and societal values, the "enmity and hatred" Clausewitz referred to as inherent in the "passions" of the people element of his Trinity are probably less relevant. In today's society we would likely use the term public support in place of Clausewitz's "passion."[39] Clearly there are difficulties in applying Clausewitz's 19th century Trinity to modern democratic societies. While some adaptation may be necessary, the general influences of the three aspects of the Trinity remain nonetheless important in understanding the civil-military dynamic today.

The publication in 1976 of a new and more accessible translation of *On War* by Peter Paret and Michael Howard provided the impetus for the U.S. military's examination of the Vietnam experience. The timelessness of Clausewitz's theories was subsequently illustrated in Harry Summers work *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Summers used the elements of the Trinity to analyze the apparent failure of U.S. forces to achieve military victory in Vietnam. Summer's analysis suggests that the U.S. failure in that conflict can be seen as a failure in the civil-military relationships essential to the conduct of war. An incoherent strategy with no clear political aim, combined together with a failure to engage the American people doomed the effort.[40] Thus, Summers provides a concrete and modern example of the possible consequences of ignoring the

[39] Clausewitz's use of the term passion in the 18th century context can be taken to mean the hostile feelings or passion needed to generate and sustain an army to engage an enemy. However in the modern context it should also be interpreted to include what we would now call public support for the decisions of government respecting armed conflict and war. This notion is also explored in Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1982), 5.
[40] Ibid, 86-96.

complex relationships set out by Clausewitz in the 19th century.[41] His review of the associated factors contributing to the situation also touched on the domestic political situation and threat environment as key elements of the civil-military relationship.[42]

Harry Summers work is credited with renewing the debate about the ongoing relevance of Clausewitz and provided fresh evidence of the timelessness of the Prussian's treatment of the complex relationships in the civil-military equation. Together, *On Strategy* and *On War* are used extensively by most U.S. military educational institutions to better understand the relationships between the aims of policy (the government), the use of force to achieve these aims (the military), and the essential element of public support (the people).[43] The events of the Vietnam War and the scholarly examination after the fact caused a significant reframing of the relationship between the civil authority and military leaders. Officers in the "never again" school were urged to not only speak up and provide military advice, but to insist in areas that were believed to be ones of exclusive military expertise.[44]

Further evidence of the ongoing impact of the Clauswitzian Trinity, and equally likely the impact of Summers modern application of the principles, can be seen in what has come to be known as the Weinberger Doctrine.[45] In a speech entitled "The Uses of

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[41] It should be underlined that Summers largely blamed the U.S. military for the failure of ignoring the consequences of the basic principles of war as outlined by Clausewitz.
[42] Summers, 12.
[43] Ibid, xiv-xv.
[44] The seminal work supporting the views of those in the never again school is H.R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam*, (New York: Harper Collins, 1997).
[45] While Feaver suggests that the direct linkage between the Weinberger Doctrine and the Clausewitzian principles is debatable, it is clear that strong arguments can be made either way. See *Armed Servants*, 35.

Military Power," then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger set out the parameters for involving U.S. forces in conflict and war.[46] Prominent among the considerations were the political (or foreign policy) aims to be achieved, the use of overwhelming force to achieve military goals and the support of the American people prior to the engagement. In the lead up to the first Gulf War, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell restated, but did not significantly change, these points in what has become known as the Powell Doctrine.

The writings of Clausewitz are sometimes criticized on the basis that they advocate total war. Yet a careful reading of *On War* demonstrates that Clausewitz wrote extensively about the different ways of applying military force to achieve political/policy goals.[47] These considerations continue to be used to frame the public debates surrounding the use of U.S. military power. Thus the teachings of Clausewitz continue to inform and shape the U.S. debate on many issues, but particularly ones related to the relationship between military officers and those who decide the policy objectives of the state.

2.3 The Modernists

At the outset of the Cold War, the United States faced an ongoing threat to its security for the first time in over a century. It was required to maintain large standing forces that were forward deployed and globally engaged. The civilian control of such a capability and the implications for the security of the state resulted in numerous attempts

[46] While he made no direct reference to Summers in the speech, Weinberger did cite Clausewitz. The sections of the speech that deal with the ends and means of the use of force in Vietnam allow a reasonable conclusion that the doctrine was influenced by Summers work. Document accessed at www.afa.org/magazine/jan2004/military_power.pdf.

[47] See particularly Book Eight of *On War*.

to further the understanding of the principles and factors affecting the dynamics of this new relationship.[48] The most well known of these and still the most widely cited is Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.*

Huntington explained civil-military relations as a framework of interdependent elements which he suggested would be valid in any society.[49] There are five elements of Huntington's work that have a direct impact on the principles of subordination and separation: functional versus societal imperatives; ideology; professionalism of the military; the method of control of the military; and structural separation of powers.

The first of these elements deals with the competing and separate forces of the societal imperative of social forces, ideology and institutions dominant within society against the functional imperative of protecting the state from threats.[50] The former is the domain of the people and their government. The latter is the domain of the military. These imperatives are, according to Huntington, often in conflict and finding the balance or equilibrium between them is the "nub" of the problem of civil-military relations.[51] While a balance between these forces is required, finding the equilibrium is not inevitable in all societies, particularly in societies incapable of providing their own military security. For the United States at the outset of the Cold War, Huntington believed that finding a

[48] Huntington, 2-3.
[49] Ibid, viii.
[50] Ibid, 2.
[51] Ibid.

new equilibrium was vital to national security, and civil-military relations was a key element of the security puzzle.[52]

In his assessment of the differences between the military's fulfillment of a functional imperative (defence of the state) and the political role to fulfill a societal imperative (advancement of the society), Huntington draws a sharp distinction between the criteria for assessing military efficacy versus political wisdom. He argues that military imperatives are seen as limited, concrete and objective whereas political wisdom is indefinite, ambiguous and highly subjective.[53] Yet this conflict must be resolved, he argues, in favour of the superior political wisdom of the politician if civil control of the military is to be anything other than an abstraction.[54] Huntington's analysis of the potential conflicts between the politician and the military as they attempt to reconcile the often murky terrain between the achievement of policy and military goals brings into sharp focus the divisions which must exist if the interests of the state as a whole – and therefore its people – are to take precedence over the limited pursuit of purely military objectives.

The second element of the Huntingtonian model of civil-military relations is the issue of ideology. Huntington believed that the "gap" between the liberal democratic values and ideology of American society and the conservative values and ideology of the military that provides its protection was a threat to the security of the United States.

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[52] Ibid, 3.
[53] In *The Utility of Force*, Rupert Smith argues that military imperatives are no longer limited, concrete nor objective in "war amongst the peoples," but nevertheless he reaffirms Huntington's assertion of the primacy of political goals in determining military objectives.
[54] Huntington, 76.

According to Huntington, the requisite for military security was a shift in societal values to a more basic conservatism.[55] The impact of globalization, the all-volunteer force and the continued evolution of societal norms and values in American society have all contributed to making this "gap" issue a significant part of the civil-military debate in the United States.[56]

The third element is the professional nature of military officership. Here, Huntington relies on two complementary considerations. The first is his assertion that the military officer is a professional, combining the attributes of specialized expertise, societal responsibility and internal controls on the ethics and behaviour within the military community. This, he argues, is not unlike other professional undertakings such as doctor or lawyer. The second component is the distinctive military mindset. Summarizing the military ethos as both conservative and realist, he tells us that members of the military profession believe in the weakness and evil resident in human nature, the supremacy of society over the individual and the importance of order, obedience and hierarchy.[57]

The fourth element is the mechanism for control of the military. Utilizing Carl Frederick's distinction between objective functional responsibility and subjective

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[55] Ibid, 464.
[56] Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds, *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 1-11.
[57] Ibid, 79. Accepting Huntington's definition of the attributes of the military profession permits an interesting and somewhat counter-intuitive analysis of the nature of Canadian and American societies. "Order, obedience and hierarchy" all appear somewhat at odds with the American founding creed of life liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Yet American society is usually described as being militaristic. Conversely, the military traits of order, obedience and hierarchy seem very similar to the Canadian creed of peace, order and good government, when Canadian society is usually considered less military in its political culture than the United States.

political responsibility in public service more generally, Huntington describes two varieties of civilian control. Objective control he asserts is achieved by maximizing military professionalism. This will reduce, to the point of elimination, any tendency for military professionals to become involved in the political affairs of the state. Preserving military power through professionalism will render the military institution politically sterile and neutral.[58] Subjective control on the other hand involves maximizing civilian power in relation to the military. This can be accomplished he suggests through constitutional arrangement, social structures or governmental institutions.[59] In both cases however, civilian control of the military is key. In the circumstances of subjective control the end result is achieved by "civilianizing" the military whereas objective control achieves its goal by "militarizing" the military.[60]

The final element in the Huntington model, the structural separation of powers, largely focuses on the formal roles and responsibilities of military and political leaders. Huntington makes clear that the separation of powers between military leaders and elected officials as well as between various elements of the U.S. Congressional system of government are key elements of the balance needed for effective civil-military relations. His examination of the political role played by the senior military leadership in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the responsibilities of these leaders in relation to Congress and the separation of functions within the defence administration all suggest that there is no single arrangement that maximizes civilian control. Effective civil-military relations will invariably be conditioned by the strength of the leadership skills of

[58] Ibid, 84.
[59] Ibid, 81-84.
[60] Ibid.

those who hold positions of authority in the dynamic relationship between military leaders and elected officials.[61]

Maximizing the professionalism of the military as the best way to ensure its subordination to civilian authority has been the cause of considerable debate in civil-military relations literature. Two other noted scholars in the modernist group, Morris Janowitz and Samuel Finer offer different analyses on the relationship between the civil authority and the military. Neither challenges directly the fact that the principles of subordination and separation are essential to the conduct of civil-military relations. However each describes additional factors that could influence the military in its relationship with the civil authority.

Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier: A social and political portrait*, provided a detailed sociological assessment of the military as a professional group. The U.S. military, he argued, was a socially diverse group, albeit one vested with significant power. This power made it an important pressure group within the political fabric of the society it served.[62] His assessment of organizational issues, unique skills of the profession, selection, recruitment, career path and the tendency to be involved in political affairs offered new insights into how the military should or could behave. The modern military, he argued, had evolved from the idealistic notion of heroic leader to a condition which embodies that ideal as well as that of manager and technical specialist, equipped to

[61] Ibid, 374-399.
[62] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: The Free Press, 1971), vii.

participate in the management of international security affairs with high levels of administrative skill.[63]

Whereas Huntington's conceptual framework tended to treat the principles of subordination and separation as absolutes, Janowitz's analysis offers a much more nuanced and perhaps realistic perspective on the behaviour of the military as a public institution. As noted above, the military was, and would continue to be, an effective pressure group on the government.[64] However Janowitz argued that the U.S. military would evolve into a kind of international constabulary – one which is not raised in response to emerging crises as had been the case historically, but one that is ever ready, professional, and understands and contributes to international relations including the use of limited force as an instrument of statecraft.[65]

For Janowitz, the nature of the domestic political situation and the state of the military itself were key factors in the conduct of civil-military relations. Being "above politics" did not mean un-political. Above politics in this context meant partisan neutrality, but not a total absence from the political affairs of the state.[66] When combined with the international constabulary concept that requires the military to be a continuous presence in society, the problem of civil-military relations becomes one of a lack of

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[63] Ibid, 425-425.
[64] Ibid, vii.
[65] Ibid, 418.
[66] Ibid, 234. While not specifically stated, Janowitz's clear intent here is that the military is above "partisan politics." Any of the normal definitions of the word politics such as activities associated with government, or power relationships within an organization or group suggests that the military is anything but "un-political."

clarity regarding the rules for governing the behaviour of the military as a political pressure group.[67]

Samuel Finer's *The Man On Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, also supports the principles of subordination and separation as key elements of the functioning of the civil-military relationship. Finer asserts that among the factors that inhibit military intervention into the affairs of the State is the "principle of civil supremacy."[68] Neither the origins of this "principle" nor the basis for its assertion are provided. For Finer, like many other theorists in the field, the subordination of the military to civil authority seems to be a given, thus giving rise to endless debates on the precise meaning and application of the principle. Terms such as civil control, civilian control, civil supremacy, civil authority, are all used sometimes interchangeably to describe the concept of subordination.

Finer's analysis however, like that of Janowitz, offers a different perspective on the nature and consequences of the professionalism of military forces in general. Military professionalism, he states, can often be one of the root causes of military intervention or coup attempts. The military's consciousness of themselves as professionals can lead them to see themselves as servants or guardians of the state rather than the government.[69] The most well known example of military leadership which drew such a distinction is American General Douglas MacArthur. In a hearing before Congress, MacArthur stated that the U.S. military owed its allegiance to the Constitution and therefore the people, not

[67] Janowitz, 234.
[68] Finer, 28-29.
[69] Ibid, 26.

the elected government. This assertion, while technically correct, makes no reference to the first principle of loyalty to the Constitution in a democratic state which is supporting the right of its civilian citizens to determine the national interest.[70]

Finer suggests that the professionalism of the military is neither "the sole nor the principal force inhibiting the military's desire to intervene."[71] Professionalism, he therefore argues, can be precisely the reason why militaries intervene in the political affairs of the state. The notion that there is a distinction between the national interest and the interests of the government is indeed dangerous, for in a democracy only a government is vested with the legitimate authority to determine the national interest and in so doing must take into account the interests of the people and therefore the interests of the state. The military does not and can not determine the national interest in a democracy.

Finally, Finer suggests we ask ourselves not why the military engages in politics, but why it ever does otherwise.[72] His own answer to the rhetorical question is the assertion of the principal of civilian supremacy. For Huntington the answer is rooted in the notion of professional ethics. The same is true for Janowitz, albeit in a more nuanced fashion. This entire modernist group bases their assessments of the civil-military relationship on the principles of military subordination to a civil authority and the consequential separation of civilian and military roles and responsibilities. Each offers an

[70] Finer categorically rejects the legitimacy of such claims. There are however occasional debates on the merits of this concept but the body of opinion holds that when this claim is made by military officers it is usually a cover for a fundamental disagreement over government policy.
[71] Finer 24.
[72] Finer, 5.

explanation for the behaviours and conduct of the military that rely on one or more of the factors of the domestic political situation, the professional conduct of the military, and the role required of the military in responding to external threats.

The work of the modernist group was understandably influenced by the geopolitical circumstances of the time. Following the Second World War, the American population believed its armed forces had been the saviours of the free world. American soil had seen no fighting save for Pearl Harbor. An aura of invincibility permeated America. From its outset, the Cold War conflict was expected to last decades. It would also require the maintenance of significant military capabilities that would occupy a prominent place in the social and political life of the United States. Thus, civil-military relations emerged as a new field of political studies that was being explored for the first time. The hypotheses and theories, along with the assumptions that supported them, represented original thinking. However the debate among a relatively small group of analysts, despite all their purported differences, reveals more similarities than variances regarding the basic principles underpinning the civil-military relationship as well as the place of the United States in the post-Second World War and Cold War contexts.

As the Cold War drew to a close, two starkly different lessons provided the boundaries for the debate on the nature of what Cohen describes as the "unequal dialogue." The threat of nuclear war made America vulnerable and yet the consequences of this potential occurrence increased civilian control over military strategy. In fact, civilian control was a central feature of nuclear strategy and posture. Vietnam on the

other hand, allegedly taught the dangers of too much civilian oversight of military operations in situations of limited war or where the use of military force was a tool of diplomacy or statecraft. The debate over the right balance in the unequal dialogue will likely never end.

2.4 The Contemporaries

The post-Cold War era brought renewed emphasis to the study of civil-military relations. Despite the challenges and trauma of the Vietnam War, the United States military was now a major part of the social and political landscape both in that country and around the world. The lone remaining global superpower's ability to project force worldwide caused concern for some and comfort for others. Yet the academic study of the field of civil-military relations had advanced little from the work of the modernists. In the early 1990s a group of analysts warned of a crisis in civil-military relations.[73] Stormy relations between the recently elected administration of President Bill Clinton and American military leaders caused observers and commentators to question whether military leaders were challenging the civilian role in decision making over such issues as the role of homosexuals in the military and the use of force in places like Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti and Kosovo.[74] Numerous alternative theories were developed and offered as explanations for the why and how of the military's evolving relationship with their civilian masters.

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[73] The literature on the 'crisis school' is extensive. One excellent example that is widely cited is Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 57, No. 5, October 1993, 27-58.
[74] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 2.

Two prominent contributors to the new wave of scholarly study in the field were Peter Feaver and Michael Desch. Both suggested that the theoretical examinations of civil-military relations by Huntington and Janowitz no longer offered viable explanations for the conduct of the military in liberal democratic society.[75] However both Feaver's Agency Theory and Desch's Structural Theory adhere to the basic principles of military subordination to the civil authority and the separation of roles and responsibilities.

In *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, Feaver sets out a theory of civil-military relations which is an explicit alternative to the Huntington model.[76] The core of Feaver's analysis rejects the social or value divide crucial to Huntington's description of the nature of relationships between the military and their civilian overseers. The principal-agent framework he uses is an approach developed by economists to analyze the problems where one person has delegated authority to someone else to act on his behalf.[77] This complex management arrangement includes the motivations of both the principals and the agents, the incentives used to encourage desired actions and the monitoring and corrective action choices used to either encourage compliance or punish misbehaviours. Feaver's Agency theory identifies civilian oversight and the threat of sanctions against the military as the main causal factor that determines whether the military will "work" or "shirk" in reaction to the principle's requirements.[78] His application of Agency Theory seems to acknowledge that factors such as the threat

[75] Feaver's application of his Agency Theory applies only to the United States although he asserts that the basic principles hold more general applicability.
[76] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 7.
[77] Ibid, 55.
[78] Feaver notes the challenges associated with the normal meanings of the words work and shirk and the multi-dimensional uses in the application of the theory. A nuanced understanding of his definitional explanation is helpful in understanding the full impact of the Agency theory. See *Armed Servants*, 59-68.

environment and the domestic political situation play a role in determining the military's preferences in the work or shirk equation. Evidence of this is his analysis of the military's behaviour during the Clinton administration and the numerous references to both these factors.[79] Despite this acknowledgement of the presence of influences such as the threat environment, Feaver's Agency Theory does not account for the possible impact of such factors.

Despite his assertion that he offers an explicit alternative to Huntington, Feaver's approach is an attempt to further understanding of the relationship between the military and political masters without rejecting either the institutional analysis of Huntington – the relationship between the military and political leaders – or the sociological examination of the relationship between the military and society by Janowitz.[80] In fact, Feaver suggests that the Agency Theory is actually useful in linking together the works of Huntington and Janowitz. In other words, his analysis represents not a rejection of the principles espoused by the modernists, but rather an evolution in their thinking. His application of an econometric model to civil-military relations also reflected the growing trend in the field of political science to attempt to explain patterns of behaviour by using quantitative theoretical constructs.[81]

Michael Desch's *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* was hailed as a landmark contribution to the emerging debate on civil-

[79] Feaver, Chapter 8.
[80] Ibid, 10.
[81] Ibid, 54-58.

military relations in the post-Cold War era.[82] Desch tries to explain the relationship between the military and their civilian political leaders by examining the question of what causes variation in civilian control. Why in some cases does the military do exactly as it is asked, as in the first Gulf War, but not in other circumstances – such as the dispute between the Clinton administration and the military over the adoption of the International Land Mine Treaty?

Desch's theory is founded on the assumption that the variability in civil control of the military is based in part on the nature and intensity of the threats facing the state. His model includes both internal and external threats. He argues that when threats are weak or non-existent, the military organization of the state will be weak and divided due to reduced cohesiveness against a known threat and the emergence of factionalism within the military. Conversely, a state facing high external threats will produce cohesion among both civilians and military leaders and result in more stable civil-military relations.[83]

Desch notes that external and internal threats can each affect the actions of the military, the civilian government and the rest of society.[84] However his case studies rarely explore in detail the effect that the rest of society has on the actions of the government or the military and more particularly how the threat is perceived. In the case of Canada, the use of the military is rarely related to a direct or even indirect threat. Rather the use of the Canadian Forces usually occurs after public pressure to provide

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[82] Peter Feaver, Review of "Civilian Control of the Military," by Michael Desch in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 2, (June 2000), 506-507.
[83] Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 15-17.
[84] Ibid,12.

assistance of a humanitarian or "peacekeeping" nature. Thus Desch's structural theory has limited application to Canadian circumstances. This notwithstanding, the threat model is useful for explaining the variances in the relationship between the military and the government. In his analysis of seventy-five civil-military "conflicts/issues" involving the United States military since 1938, Desch shows that domestic and international threats are a key variable in determining the behaviours of civilian and military leaders.[85] However the absence of analysis on the role of society and whether the public agrees with the threat limits the usefulness of the model in a more fulsome understanding of the ever changing civil-military dynamic. Rebecca Schiff in her theory of Concordance posits that society must be an active partner in the civil-military equation and that cultural factors such as values and attitudes will inform both the nations view of its military's role but also the military's own view of that role.[86]

2.5 Conclusion

From 19th century military strategists to post Cold War political scientists, theories and explanations of civil-military relationships have all examined the dynamic relationships that exist among the government, the military and the society they both serve. Many variables have been identified, including internal and external threat environments, institutional structures, political processes, the dominant societal ideology, and the behaviours of individual leaders. All of these are useful in developing an understanding of the complex dynamics of civil-military relations. However the analysis

[85] Ibid, 135-139.
[86] For an more complete explanation of civil-military relations theory that stresses the importance of the role society plays see Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil-military relations reconsidered: a theory of concordance," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 22, No. 1, (Fall 1995).

of the most significant theorists who have written about civil-military relations is not suitable for direct application to the Canadian circumstances of a relatively small military and few direct threats to security. As a result, the military has infrequently been central to the agenda of the government of the day, even in matters of security or foreign policy. As Bland and others have noted, the study of civil-military relations has suffered from too little theorizing and this is especially the case in Canada. [87]

[87] Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," 7.

CHAPTER 3: THE STUDY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN CANADA

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter identified several of the key theorists in the field of civil-military relations and their explanations of how to evaluate civil-military relations. This chapter reviews some of the existing analysis of civil-military relations in Canada. It will show that the available literature has identified some important concepts essential to the understanding of the general functioning of civil-military relations in this country. In particular, the concept of civil-military relations as a "shared responsibility" merits further examination. The Canadian literature, while focusing on several important issues, does not however examine in detail the various players and factors that influence this shared responsibility and thus shapes the civil-military dynamic in Canada.

Several analysts have written extensively on the decline of the Canadian military, and in so doing have often made reference to the subject of civil-military relations.[88] As Eliot Cohen notes, the relationship between the military and its civilian masters can be characterized as an "unequal dialogue."[89] According to Cohen this occurs because while there may be a blunt exchange of views and opinions, in the final analysis the authority of the civilian leader is unambiguous and unquestioned. The declinist literature in Canada suggests that the civil-military relationship in this country is overly unequal. This

[88] Literature dealing with the decline of the Canadian military is extensive and is a dominant feature of defence and strategic studies. Notable works include: Douglas L. Bland ed., *Canada Without Armed Forces* (Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2004); J.L.Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2004); and, David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, The Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1996).
[89] Cohen, 208-224.

assertion, however, is often based on the alleged poor state of the Canadian military and not on the basis of a detailed examination of either the theory or application of the principles of civil-military relations identified in the second chapter.

The most significant body of scholarly work on civil-military relations in Canada has been produced by Douglas Bland, who has authored numerous books, monographs, and articles that examine civil-military relations either directly or indirectly.[90] Of particular note are three articles, written during the period from 1999 to 2001, that specifically examine civil-military relations in Canada. In these articles, Bland contributes to our understanding of the complexities involved in the civil-military dynamic with his theory of shared responsibility.[91] His explanation of this theory suggested that the simplified relationship between "civilians" and "the military" required additional detailed examination.[92] Other Canadian works touching on the subject of civil-

[90] These include: Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces*, (Toronto: Brown Book Co., 1995); Douglas L. Bland, ed., *Canada's National Defence*, vols. 1 and 2, Queen's University School of Policy Studies, (Kingston: 1997); Douglas L. Bland, *Parliament, Defence Policy and the Canadian Armed Forces*, The Claxton Papers, Queen's University School of Policy Studies, (Kingston: 1999); Douglas L. Bland , "National Defence Headquarters: A study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia," (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1997); and, Douglas L. Bland and Roy Rempel, "A Vigilant Parliament: Building Competence for Effective Parliamentary Oversight of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces," *Policy Matters*, Vol. 5, no. 1, February 2004. The three articles by Bland cited above, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,"; "Who decides what? Civil-Military Relations in Canada and the United States,"; and, "Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations" elaborate his concept of civil-military relations as a shared responsibility.

[91] The basic concepts of Bland's "shared responsibility" can be found in some of his earliest works. An entire chapter is dedicated to exploring the complex relationships involved in defence decision making in *Chiefs of Defence*, although it is not described specifically as a theory of civil-military relations. In "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," Bland sets out the parameters for the theory of "shared responsibility."

[92] Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," 21.

military relations have been reviewed for this paper, but Bland's work dominates the field and must be thoroughly examined.[93]

Just prior to 9/11, Bland asserted that civil-military relations in Canada was a function of the relationships amongst the civil authority, the government of the day, and the leaders of the armed forces in a context where national defence is of little concern to either Canadians or their government.[94] Such a conclusion would be difficult to substantiate in the post-9/11 period where security and defence issues have been a high priority for Canadians and their governments. Whether this assessment is accurate for the post-Cold War period when viewed through the lens of the frequency of foreign deployments is also contestable.[95]

Beyond the three articles noted above, numerous books and other articles touch on the subject of civil-military relations within the context of dealing with defence-related issues. Among these subjects are the unification of the Canadian Forces, defence

[93] Many other works touch on the subject of civil-military relations. Beyond the declinist literature noted above there are numerous works dealing with the unification crisis and its aftermath. Examples include Daniel P. Gosselin, "The Storm over Unification of the Armed Forces: A Crisis of Canadian Civil-Military Relations," in *The Insubordinate and the Noncompliant*, ed. Howard G. Coombs, (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2007); and R.B Byers, "Canadian Civil-Military Relations and Reorganization of the Armed Forces: Whither Civilian Control?" in Hector J. Massey, ed. *The Canadian Military: A Profile* (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing, 1972), 197-228.

[94] Bland, "Who decides What?" 49-50.

[95] The Canadian Forces were deployed to Somalia, East Timor, Haiti, and numerous places in the Balkans during the 1990s, suggesting that the military was a key element of the Government's foreign policy. While defence budgets were cut, this was not unique to the CF due to fiscal considerations discussed elsewhere in this study. In fact, as soon as the deficit was eliminated the Chrétien government increased defence spending by $700 million.

administration and organization, the alleged problems of civilianization, and the stagnation of defence budgets and decline of related capability.[96]

Invariably, Bland's analysis of civil-military relations has focused extensively, if not exclusively, on three "problems." The first of these relates to the role that politicians in general and Parliament more specifically plays in the conduct of civil-military relations.[97] The second relates to organizational structures and decision making processes affecting the administration of national defence and command of the Canadian Forces. The third relates to the making of defence policy.

3.2 The Role of Parliament

Bland's prescriptions for addressing problems of civil-military relations in Canada frequently call for an enhanced role for Parliament in the shaping of defence policy and a restructuring of roles and responsibilities between military officers and civilians within the Department of National Defence. In some cases these twin prescriptions are combined into a single concept. For example:

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[96] The literature dealing with these issues is extensive and Bland's contributions, cited above, deal with the issues of defence administration and organization and budget and capability decline. The analysis of the unification issue is clearly divided into Cold War and early post-Cold War era critiques of Hellyer's initiative and Bland's extensive research in the mid 1990s into the need to combat internal CF "tribalism" with a unified strategic direction led by a strong CDS. An example of the former category is Peter T. Hayden, "The Changing Nature of Canadian Military Relations in the Aftermath of the Cold War," in David A. Charters and J. Brent Wilson, eds. *The Soldier and the Canadian State*, Fredericton: Proceedings of the Second Annual Conflict Studies Workshop University of New Brunswick, 1995; Bland's *Chiefs of Defence* is the seminal work in the latter category. Civilianization can be taken to have several meanings including: the changing social values between the military and the society it serves, see for example Peter C. Kasurak, "Civilianization and the military ethos: civil-military relations in Canada," *Canadian Public Administration*, vol. 25, no. 1, Spring 1982; and the perceived increased influence of civilians within DND, see for example W. Harriet Critchley, "Civilianization and the Canadian Military," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 16, no. 1, Fall 1989.

[97] Bland, "Civil-Military Relations Problems in Canada," in "Who decides what? Civil-military relations in Canada and the United States," 33-44.

> Parliament must reassert the legal basis for defence organization, separate military command from defence department administration and insist on an ethically directed decision-making process in the armed forces and DND. There is no need to rewrite the National Defence Act. But Parliament should demand of itself, officers and officials that the defence establishment conforms to the spirit and letter of the Act.[98]

There is little evidence to suggest that Parliament did any of these things over the past thirty years and yet as this thesis will argue, the post 9/11 era saw a significant change in the civil-military dynamic in Canada. Parliament's role in the exercise of civil control of the military, and as a factor in the civil-military dynamic, needs to be considered within the context of the Canadian system of government and the Constitution. What exactly is meant when one uses the term "Parliament" is also important. For example, if the word "Parliament" is intended as a synonym for government, then civil control of the military can be seen as one of its responsibilities. This however is hardly the meaning of the term "Parliament" in the Constitution as it would imply little if any distinction between the legislative and executive branches of government.

Parliament (specifically Members of Parliament in the House of Commons and the Senate as the legislative arm of government) has oversight of defence policy and other matters related to the administration of defence. This is consistent with the conventions in most Westminster based systems. This cannot however be taken to mean

[98] Bland, *National Defence Headquarters: Center for decision*, 62.

civil control, as this responsibility in Canada's system of government rests with the Executive branch of government headed by the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Thus the role of Parliament in the defence policy formulation processes within Canada's system of constitutional government is quite circumscribed. Given its limited role, it is difficult to assess the actual shortcoming that critics would wish to see addressed. Rather, it seems that calls for an increased Parliamentary role are aimed at redressing the perceived central problem of military and strategic affairs in Canada, the alleged political indifference on the part of both Ministers of National Defence and Prime Ministers towards defence policy.[99] It appears that the premise that Parliament should be more active and involved is based on the assumption that if Parliamentarians know more, they will be more supportive of defence issues and the military. Equally likely is the outcome that such an arrangement would alter the civil-military dynamic to a more American model with Parliament being lobbied by the military for increased budgets and influence and the related consequence of that body tending to become involved in management of the day-to-day administration and operations of the Canadian Forces.[100] Further, the arguments for increased oversight by Parliament seem to assume a majority government with either a Liberal or Conservative dominance. A divided minority Parliament where the New Democratic Party has greater influence on defence policy could have the effect of frustrating both military and civilians roles.

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[99] Bland frequently asserts this "indifference" as a key problem in the civil-military equation in Canada. For an alternate perspective on the way Canadian politicians address military matters see Joel J. Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy," *Policy Matters*, vol. 5 no 2 (June 2004).

[100] James M. McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process* (Toronto: Thompson-Wadsworth, 2005), 295-332.

Perhaps, as Bland asserts, the weak role of Parliament is a problem of civil-military relations. However this is likely true only in the broadest sense. His proposition that the role of Parliament weakens the accountability and control arrangements for civil-military relations is unsubstantiated. In fact, given that accountability for government decisions rests with the executive branch in Westminster systems, giving Parliament the ability to lobby and pressure the executive for defence policies could weaken the principle of Ministerial accountability.[101] This "lack of oversight" likely benefitted the CF in its recent transformation initiative where the authority of the Minister and the CDS as set out in the National Defence Act enabled early and rapid decision making.

3.3 Arrangements for Defence Administration

If any area of civil-military relations in Canada has been extensively explored, albeit again by a single analyst, it is that area focusing on the arrangements for defence administration.[102] Bland's concerns over the higher organization for national defence have dominated several scholarly volumes of work and largely, if not singularly, shaped the nature of the debates on many aspects of civil-military relations in Canada. Two generalizations dominate his work in the field. The first is that the arrangements for defence management and administration directly impact the civil control principle in Canada.[103] The second is that defence policy is an outcome of defence structure.[104] Other factors contributing to the conduct of civil-military relations include weak Parliamentary control mechanisms, the influence of inter-service rivalry, the ambiguous separation of

[101] The impact that the new office of the Parliamentary Budget Office has on the role of Parliament in matters of defence budgets has yet to be seen.
[102] See especially Bland, *Canada's National Defence*, vol. 2, Defence Organization.
[103] Ibid, xiv.
[104] Ibid, xiii.

functions between military officers and civilians, and finally an alleged undue influence by civilians within the Department of National Defence.

These four contributing factors, while apparently separate and distinct, are often dealt with in combination thus complicating any analysis of the relative impact of any single factor. For example:

> The organization of the defence establishment, the formal and informal relationships of authorities to each other, conditions civil-military relationships by directing and limiting Parliament's access to information and advice. For example, a defence establishment based on three independent services would present Parliament with more varied problems and opportunities than a single service system. Similarly, in an organization in which the deputy minister and the CDS are clearly separated, Parliament might receive policy choices from two different perspectives. On the other hand, in an organization headed by a DM/CDS diarchy, Parliament could expect a single point of view generated by internal bargaining and consensus-making and consequently, political decision makers might have little choice at all.[105]

There are several problems inherent in the "defence structure" problem presented in the above excerpt, not the least of which is the incorrect conclusion that the organizational structure of the Department of National Defence directly determines the type of information presented to Parliament, thus ignoring the role of the Minister and Cabinet in such a process. In order to examine the perceived negative impact of inter-service rivalry and the influence of civilians, it is necessary to briefly review the evolution of organizational arrangements for defence administration. There were numerous studies and reports on the arrangements for defence administration conducted

[105] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 91. This suggests that Parliament has a role in defence decision making not accorded to it under Canada's constitutional arrangements.

during the period 1960 to 1990. Two of these tackled the problems of inter-service rivalries, the challenges associated with multiple and potentially conflicting military advice to a Minister, and defence administration more generally. These were the Royal Commission on Government Organization (the Glassco Commission), and the reorganization of the Canadian Forces under Defence Minister Paul Hellyer which led to the unification of the three services. Four additional studies after unification round out the major reports and studies on defence management and administration. This latter group of reports attempted to deal with the understandable organizational fallout of the integration and unification initiatives.

3.3.1 The Glassco Commission

The aim of the Glassco commission's study of National Defence was to examine the role of the department in the formulation and implementation of defence policy and the suitability of the organizational arrangements for carrying out these roles.[106] The Glassco commissioners examined the challenges associated with the historical independence of the three service components.[107] Service unification, one of the options considered, was rejected in favour of stronger service integration under the independent direction of a single authority. Two options were considered. The first was to strengthen the role of the then Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to specifically give that office the authority to exercise "power of direction" over the armed forces. The second option was to strengthen the role and authority of the Deputy Minister. They recommended the former while acknowledging that the continued strict separation of

[106] Government of Canada, *Royal Commission on Government Organization*, vol. 4, Special Areas of Administration, 1964, 64.
[107] Ibid, 69.

duties and responsibilities between military officers and civilians was unwarranted and undesirable.

In order to complement this increased centralization of power in the office of what was to become the Chief of the Defence Staff, Glassco also recommended the expansion of responsibilities of the Deputy Minister to assist the Minister in the discharge of his or her responsibilities for the control and management of the Canadian Forces.[108] This was not an attempt to limit the separation of responsibilities for military matters. It was rather an acknowledgement of the unique nature of the defence function and the need to ensure that the Minister had access to strong support and advice from numerous sources if he were to be able to exercise his authority and be answerable to Parliament.

The Glassco report therefore set the stage for the origins of a blended civil-military defence headquarters by asserting that such an organization would improve the overall functioning of the defence establishment. Sharply segregating military and civilian roles, the report argued, would result in organization antagonisms that would decrease the overall efficiency of the defence establishment. In crafting its recommendations on the organization of the armed forces and the civilians in defence headquarters it acknowledged the need for balance between administrative efficiency and operational effectiveness.[109]

[108] Ibid, 74-79.
[109] Ibid.

Glassco also reinforced the principle of military subordination to the civil authority.[110] Some may argue that the commissioners contributed to blurring the separation of military and civilian roles in the administration and management of the defence establishment by recommending an enhanced role for the Deputy Minister. Such a role, however, was envisaged in support of the Minister, who at the time was receiving multiple sets of military advice from each of the environmental chiefs (Army, Navy, Air Force), and not as a diminution of the role and responsibility of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee (or soon to be CDS).

3.3.2 Unification

In the mid 1960s, Defence Minister Paul Hellyer initiated a series of changes that "dramatically and traumatically" altered the structures and processes of Canada's defence establishment.[111] Taking up the service unification concept rejected by Glassco, Hellyer used both defence policy and administrative efficiency arguments to support the concept of service unification.[112]

The unification legislation, Bill C-243, was a continuation of the integration process that began with the establishment of the position of Chief of the Defence Staff and related Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) in 1964. As such it did not focus on the principle of separation of military and civilian roles and responsibilities as much as the separation of authorities and accountabilities within the three services and the CFHQ. Military subordination to the civil authority was considered to be a given.

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[110] Ibid, 76.
[111] Bland, *Canada's National Defence*, vol. 2, Defence Organization, 93.
[112] Ibid, 95-97.

So disruptive was the unification issue that almost two generations of leadership later, many officers (as well as observers and experts in the defence field) continue to blame Hellyer for many of the ongoing problems of the CF and the perceived evils that have befallen them.[113] However, the inter-service rivalries and bottom up planning, which unification and the creation of the office of the CDS were intended to address, continued unabated for decades after Hellyer's departure.[114]

3.3.3 Other Administrative Studies

Following the Hellyer unification in 1968 and prior to the end of the Cold War, four studies were completed that examined the administration, management and decision making processes of the Canadian Forces together with the civilian components of the defence establishment in Canada:

1) The Management Review Group (MRG) – 1971/72
2) Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces – 1980
3) Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification – 1980
4) The Functions and Organization of National Defence Headquarters in Emergencies and War – 1989

Each of these organizational studies was subjected to comprehensive examination by Bland.[115] At various points in his assessment of these studies and in addition to the previously discussed subject of weak Parliamentary control, problems in civil-military relations in Canada are attributed to inadequate or inappropriate organizational

[113] Ibid, 98.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid.

arrangements and civilian interference. The arguments supporting these two additional causes for civil-military problems are usually conflated and occasionally contradictory in that they are often presented in support of the potential for the increased influence of a strong DM/CDS partnership, a potential that was realized in the post-9/11 era.[116]

Concerned about the provision of military advice in the first few years of its administration, the Trudeau government tasked a group of outside experts to review the management and administration of the department. The MRG made sweeping recommendations for change, many of which were never implemented.[117] One recommendation which was eventually adopted was the creation of a single headquarters organization for the oversight of the Canadian Forces and for the administration of the civilian arm of the department. While the responsibilities of the Deputy Minister were expanded, albeit not as extensively as recommended by the MRG, certain functions were transferred and became the responsibility of the civilian component of DND. The most notable of these was Policy Planning, which eventually became the group known as ADM (Policy). As clearly illustrated in a recent comprehensive analysis of defence policy making, this group has played a crucial role in all defence policy matters ever since.[118]

The decision to establish a more blended military/civilian organization was first proposed by Glassco. The 1973 adoption of it in the form of NDHQ is likely the single

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[116] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 25.
[117] As Bland notes in *Canada's National Defence*, vol. 2, Defence Organization, 163-164, the MRG report was fatally flawed and therefore doomed.
[118] Brian W. Tomlin, Norman Hillmer, and Fen Osler Hampson, *Canada's International Policies: Agendas, Alternatives, and Politics* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007), Chaps. 6-7.

most cited factor of the cause of problems in civil-military relations in Canada. According to Bland, the creation of NDHQ in 1972 "decapitated and buried" the Canadian Forces Headquarters which was the centerpiece of unification.[119] After 1972, "operational issues withered, civil servants advanced in power and influence and command authority in the Canadian Forces atrophied."[120] The CDS, Bland states, was isolated and made dependant on officers and officials who had interests different from his own.[121]

However, the functions of CFHQ which existed after its creation in 1964 remained under the responsibility and authority of the CDS within the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) organization after 1972. Further, to suggest that the CF should operate in isolation of any civilian influence would be unique to the civil-military relationship of any democracy, inconsistent with the notion of objective control posited by Huntington, weaken the principle of civil control and is even repudiated by Bland himself in his theory of shared responsibility. The views of most former senior military officers interviewed for this research shared the assessment of former vice-chief of the Defence Staff George Macdonald who believes that a balanced integrated NDHQ is the ideal construct.[122] The cause of repeated organizational change is more likely due to a

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[119] Bland, *Canada's National Defence*, vol. 2, Defence Organization, 163-164. Bland's arguments center on the combining of administrative and bureaucratic responsibilities for both the CF and the Department of National Defence into a single organization, NDHQ, in 1972. In a study prepared for the Somalia Commission of Inquiry in 1997 and in numerous works and publications both before and after, Bland asserts that the functioning of NDHQ and its role in policy making, command and administration goes beyond the role intended by Parliament, beyond the legal mandate and has a significant negative impact on civil-military relations in Canada.

[120] Ibid.

[121] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 260.

[122] George Macdonald, interview with author, September, 2008. General Macdonald was VCDS from 2001-2004.

natural organizational evolution resulting from the imposed integration and unification processes combined with the increased role for civilians within the defence establishment.

A common theme of the studies noted above is the furthering of individual service interests. The creation of the office of the Chief of the Defence Staff was intended to address the often conflicting advice provided to Ministers by officers of the three environments whose loyalty was service-based. Bland argues that an incoherent structure for the Canadian Forces, combined with competing loyalties and divided interests, have limited the ability of the CDS to carry out the role intended.[123] Given that several of these reports were focused on issues stemming from unification, strong arguments can be made that the real organizational issues were the advancement of the objectives of individual services and not the split of responsibilities between the military and the civilian component of defence headquarters.

Despite the contention that there has been an unnecessary and unwarranted "invasion by civilians into the military's lawful and professional domain," the Chief of the Defence Staff retains the authority under the National Defence Act to establish the organizational arrangements for command of the Canadian Forces. While such a change would require the agreement of the Minister, it is unlikely that this authority, if sought by the CDS, would be refused. Changing the organizational arrangements of the Canadian

[123] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 290.

Forces would thus have a dramatic impact on the relationship with civilians within the Defence Department.[124]

In fact, this authority was used in 2005 with the initiation of the CF transformation set out in the International Policy Statement (IPS). This re-organization had the support of both a Minister and Deputy Minister who shared similar views on the need to make changes to increase the effectiveness of the CF. In this particular case, the Prime Minister was aware of and approved the changes as part of the process to select the Chief of the Defence Staff.[125] The Cabinet also reviewed the IPS prior to its publication and thus approved the new organizational arrangements. Therefore the civilian/military organizational arrangements were not an impediment to organizational and command arrangements of the CF as suggested by Bland.

Interestingly, the goal of CF transformation was a "fully integrated and unified approach to operations." To achieve this goal, the functions of force employment and force generation needed to be assigned to the newly established commands for domestic and overseas operations. This move limited the authority of individual service chiefs as envisaged first by Glassco and then by Paul Hellyer. Thus almost 60 years after the first attempts to integrate the functions and operations of the individual services, and 40 years after the Hellyer unification, the CDS exercised the authority vested in him and reorganized the CF to make these concepts real, with the support of the civilian

[124] Ibid, 107.
[125] Confidential Interviews, October, 2008. See also Stein and Lang, *Unexpected War*, 150.

leadership within the defence establishment which, according to Bland, had been one of the key impediments to advancing the interests of the CF for over five decades.

3.4 The Making of Defence Policy

The processes and structures for formulation of defence policy are variable and complex. In their recently published analysis of the inputs to the making of international relations policy, *Canada's International Policies: Agendas, Alternatives and Politics*, Brian Tomlin, Norman Hillmer and Fen Osler Hampson suggest that the policy making process is often messy and unpredictable.[126] Using a multiple streams model developed by John Kingdon, they argue that problem identification and solution generation must converge with a political imperative to arrive at a change in the policy agenda.[127] Applying this model to the making of defence policy, they conclude that each of these factors was involved in the five major defence policy statements of 1964, 1971, 1987, 1994, and 2005.[128]

The four issues or objectives that have shaped thinking on defence policy during the three eras examined in this study are: protecting Canada from threats or assisting to natural disaster response; defence of North America; contributions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and contributing to international security and stability.[129] The policy alternatives that were considered to achieve these objectives invariably involved trade- offs among the four. Further, the evolution of ideas or solutions

[126] Tomlin, Hillmer, and Hampson, 2.
[127] Ibid, 23.
[128] Ibid, 132.
[129] Ibid, 101.

frequently involved the debate and discussion among communities of specialists scattered both inside and outside government. While the impetus for examining or renewing defence policy varies, the extent of policy change was usually dependant on a convergence of political and other factors, as predicted by the multiple streams model.[130]

Tomlin, Hillmer and Hampson's comprehensive analysis of the five case studies in question illustrate the dynamics of the multiple influences in the policy drafting and decision making processes. These influences and their impact on the civil-military dynamic are further explored in the next chapter. Finally, the military institution itself has almost no role in the formal approval process. As the lead military advisor to the government, the Chief of the Defence Staff may be asked to assist Cabinet in its consideration of the military aspects of particular policy choices but the decisions on defence policy are taken by Ministers of the Crown alone. In the post 9/11 period, it has frequently been asserted that military leaders, and in particular General Rick Hillier, have played a larger role in the defence policy process. As will be explored below, such assertions often mistake an increased role in the policy formulation process for an increased role in the approval/decision process.[131]

3.5 Conclusion

Bland's concept of shared responsibility holds that how civilians exercise control over the military is determined by a regime of principles, rules, norms, and decision

[130] Ibid, 25.

[131] Hon. Bill Graham, interview by author, 2008. Graham, who was the Minister at the time stated clearly and with considerable authority that Hillier had little if any role in the approval processes for either defence policy or military deployment issues, other than as one of many advisors to Ministers and the Prime Minister.

making procedures. It offers a practical starting point for a normative analysis of what Huntington calls the "system" of civil-military relations. To understand the complex equilibrium however, we must also understand the influences exerted by key individuals or groups and assess the impact of cultural, historical and political factors that impact on the sharing of responsibility.

Neither statements of defence policy nor organizational arrangements are, in and of themselves, enduring or powerful influences on the decision making processes of government. For organizations to actually be powerful, they require people who demonstrate strong leadership. This is true of Cabinet, Central Agencies, the Canadian Forces and the civilians within the Department of National Defence.[132] This reality has certainly been evident in the post-9/11 period where the leadership of a small group of individuals significantly shifted the civil-military dynamic in Canada. Without this leadership, organizations are in fact "just so many boxes and lines on a chart." [133]

[132] A more complete description of "Central Agencies" is included in Chapter four.
[133] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 91.

CHAPTER 4 – THE STRUCTURES, THE PLAYERS AND THE FACTORS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the three elements of the complex arrangements that comprise civil-military relations (both civil control and the civil-military dynamic) in Canada. The first of these elements is the legal structures that provide for civil control of the military. In Canada, these legal arrangements are found primarily in Canada's constitutional arrangements and conventions and in the *National Defence Act,* and for the most part are relatively straightforward.[134] Less clear and perhaps less understood are the players and the extra-constitutional factors that influence the civil-military dynamic. As Huntington specifically stated and many others have cited in their assessments of civil-military relations, the civil-military problem of the modern state is not so much the fear of armed revolt as it is the management of the relationships between the experts in the management of violence and their political masters.[135] In a modern democracy, we need to understand how the other players and factors shape and at times constrain the relationships between the military and the civil authority.

In addition to the structural arrangements for civil control, the second element is the review of the various players that participate in the civil-military dynamic. The nature of relations among these individuals and groups varies over time due to changes in leadership, government priorities and the administrative and bureaucratic structures and

[134] Bland, "Who Decides What?," 51. The conclusion that there have been no issues related to civil control of the military in Canada was a prominent although not unanimous theme during the interview process of former military officers, civil servants, and elected officials.
[135] Huntington, 20. While this quote is frequently attributed to Huntington, it is also one of the central themes in *On War*.

processes of government, particularly within the Department of National Defence. Interviews with many of the key participants in the various decision making processes leads to the conclusion that the nature of civil-military relations is never static.[136] This examination of the various players takes up the challenge issued by Bland to "parse the notion of shared responsibility into finer categories."[137]

The third and final element is the various factors that have a direct impact on the civil-military relationships and affect the interaction among the players. The factors identified and used in the analysis in this study are the domestic political situation, the threat environment, the Canada/U.S. relationship, and the state of Canada's military and military professionalism. The identification of these factors was endorsed by all interview informants, and while several suggestions on the relative impact and weighting of the factors were made there were no additional factors identified.

4.2 Civil Control and the Canadian Constitution

An extensive examination of the importance of the constitutional arrangements setting out Canada's system of responsible government will result in a less than complete understanding of how modern civil-military relations are conducted.[138] Two points are central to the evolution of the principles of subordination and separation that underpin civil-military relations in liberal democratic states.

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[136] This conclusion was evident in almost all interviews conducted but was especially emphasized in an interview with a former Clerk of the Privy Council.
[137] Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," 22.
[138] Many interviewees made the point that the arrangements for the legal and constitutional separation of roles and subordination of the military to the civil authority are well established in Canada and never in question.

First, the origins of responsible government and Canada's democratic governance framework evolved from one of the very first problems of civil-military relations. Taxation without representation by the Crown to fund war efforts gave rise to the principle of separating the powers of the Sovereign and the government in military matters. The Sovereign would have authority to engage the military in armed conflict or war, but it was the responsibility of the government to raise and maintain military forces. This principle of separation remains central to Canada's modern system of responsible government.[139]

Second, the foundation of the principle of subordination of the military to civil authority is found in section 91 of the Constitution Act of 1867 which gives to the Crown, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and the House of Commons, exclusive responsibility for all matters relating to "Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence." While the exclusive responsibility for the military is constitutionally vested with the Crown, the role of Parliament is to provide oversight of and ensure accountability for the decisions of the Crown, or in actual fact in Canada, the Ministers of the Crown. As long as the government retains the confidence of Parliament, the powers of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to make decisions, including all defence matters, are subject only to legal and financial constraints.[140] There exists no legal or constitutional "control" function for the House of Commons and the Senate.

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[139] Peter Aucoin, Jennifer Smith and Geoff Dinsdale, *Responsible Government: Clarifying Essentials, Dispelling Myths and Exploring Change*, (Ottawa, Canadian Center for Management Development, 2004), 17.

[140] The thesis of the expanding powers of the Prime Minister and his closest advisors is central to two seminal works by Donald Savoie. Both *Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers, and Parliament*, and, Donald J. Savoie, *Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability in Canada and the United Kingdom* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), provide detailed explanations for and examples of

The exercise of power in Canada largely resides within the constitutional responsibilities of Ministers including and especially the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Ministers of the Crown, while answerable to Parliament, are both individually and collectively responsible for the activities of government. Through the law, and the convention of the Constitution, all power and responsibility is concentrated in their hands. Therefore, civil control over the military is actually exercised through the individual and collective ministerial responsibilities within the Parliamentary system.[141]

The Prime Minister's power and authority includes the prerogative to select Cabinet Ministers and replace them as he or she sees fit. Not only does the Prime Minister decide on who does what job in Cabinet, he or she has considerable control over what matters are brought before Cabinet, and therefore great influence on the decisions that are taken. Nevertheless there are some general limitations on the Prime Minister's ability to control the business of government. For example, a Prime Minister would not table in Cabinet an official statement of defence policy for its consideration as this would indicate a loss of confidence in the Minister of National Defence. However the Prime Minister could initiate a discussion at Cabinet and then direct the Minister to prepare a policy based on the ensuing discussion and Cabinet decision.[142]

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the growing power and authority of the Office of the Prime Minister and the limited constraints on their ability to make and implement government decisions. Savoie's thesis on expanded powers of the office of the Prime Minister can only be viewed as descriptive of the circumstances of a particular period of time as the system's dynamic nature can alter the relationships and thus decision making dynamics at any time.

[141] Government Document, *Responsibility in the Constitution*, (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1993), Chapters 2&3.

[142] Some have suggested an exception to the norm that Prime Ministers do not present their own defence policies to Cabinet. In 1969, Prime Minister Trudeau tasked his foreign policy advisor with doing a study on Canada's defence policy that was subsequently circulated to Cabinet, but not by the Minister of National Defence. However, Trudeau then replaced the Minister of Defence and asked his successor to develop a defence policy that reflected the study considered by Cabinet.

4.3 Civil Control and the *National Defence Act*

The *National Defence Act* (NDA), supplemented by regulations made pursuant to the Act, governs almost all aspects of the administration of Canada's national defence arrangements.[143] To accomplish this, the NDA establishes two broad areas of jurisdiction that guide the relationships between the military and the civil authority. These two are the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. These are established separately under the Act and while the connectivity between them is vague and perhaps intentionally ambiguous, this ambiguity has the effect of placing checks and balances on the exercise of powers contained in the Act. The Minister of National Defence is charged with the "management and direction" of the Canadian Forces and for all matters relating to national defence. Responsibility for the "control and administration" of the Canadian Forces is vested in the Chief of the Defence Staff who exercises these powers under the direction of the Minister. The precise definition of these terms is not spelled out in either the Acts or related regulations.

> The NDA has evolved, however, into an instrument that sacrifices clean managerial lines in order to address the more important problems of civil-military relations: overseeing the military's use of power, checking abuses of the military by politicians, disciplining the armed forces and controlling the expert problem in defence ministries. The Act does this by purposefully separating authority and accountability for policy, command and administration between politicians, officers, and officials.[144]

The above assessment of the *National Defence Act* by Bland is at the same time a critique and an endorsement of the necessary checks and balances essential to the effective functioning of civil-military relations. Finally, while the Governor General, as

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[143] Bland, *National Defence Headquarters: Center for Decision,* 17.
[144] Ibid, 26.

the representative of the Queen in Canada, is nominally the Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Forces, this designation involves no practical application for the management of defence matters, nor for the control or administration of the Canadian Forces. The National Defence Act effectively performs the legal function of separating civil and military authority and accountability while ensuring that the military is subordinate to the civil authority. It accomplishes this by instituting the required checks and balances that prevent abuse of power from either civilian or military officials.[145] The act thus performs the vital civil control function, considered a given in liberal democratic states.

4.4 The Players in the Cluster Concept

In a democratic system with complex checks and balances, the ability to exercise power and responsibility is not only determined by legal authority but also by the ability of players to influence others.[146] Civil-military relations are not necessarily therefore a contest between the civil authority and the military about sovereignty over decision making.[147] Decision making is an area where the shared responsibility concept is often in evidence. As Corey Dauber notes, the practice of argument is almost always a vital tool in policy making and the ability of the various political actors to achieve their desired outcome in matters of budgets, mission definition, the use of force and others.[148]

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[145] There are several ways that a CDS could limit the abuse of power referenced here. Appeals to the Prime Minister, in his role as military advisor to the PM or to the Governor General in their role as Commander-in-Chief are examples. Other avenues include resignation of office while stating the cause of departure in an effort to direct public opinion on the issue.

[146] For example see Cory Dauber, "The Practice of Argument : Reading the Conditions of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 24, No. 3, Spring 1998, 435-446, and Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain*, 138. The dynamic nature of the system and the importance of personality and leadership were emphasized by all interview participants.

[147] Bland, *Who Decides*, 9.

[148] Dauber, "The Practice of Argument," 436.

It is therefore important to understand the roles and responsibilities of not only Ministers, Cabinet and Parliament, but also the other players in the Canadian system of government who can be observed to be exercising influence on defence matters. While the roles of the Prime Minister and the Ministers in Cabinet are reasonably clear, the intricate workings of political and bureaucratic decision making is rarely the subject of specific analysis.[149]

In his widely acclaimed work, *Breaking the Bargain*, Donald Savoie explores the complexities of the policy making process in modern government. His exploration of the sometimes byzantine horizontal policy development processes identified many of the players involved in decision making, including some players such as the Deputy Minister of Finance who have important roles but who are not normally considered part of the civil-military dynamic.[150] While Savoie's work rarely focuses exclusively on defence matters, there is no evidence to suggest that defence decision making falls outside the norms of bureaucratic processes. Reading Savoie's study of the functioning of Canada's bureaucracy it is easy to see that the list of "field marshal wannabes" referred to by General Hillier could include the Deputy Ministers of Defence, Finance or Foreign Affairs, a number of senior officials in the Privy Council Office, or members of the Prime Minister's staff.

Any listing of the players involved in the civil-military equation is likely to be incomplete and open to question and debate. For example, the officials in the department

[149] Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain*, 7.
[150] Ibid, Chapter 7.

of Public Works and Government Services (PWGSC) are responsible for the purchasing of defence equipment. Likewise, centrally devised personnel policy is developed and implemented by the Public Service Commission.[151] Both have an impact on the day-to-day administration and operations of the Department of National Defence. The challenge of trying to determine relative influence is compounded by the ever-changing dynamic of different personalities, leadership and circumstances. For example, during the deficit reduction exercise in the mid 1990s, the Deputy Minister of Finance, and indeed many other officials of the Department of Finance, exercised significant influence over defence funding decisions.[152] Ten years later, the circumstances had changed and the holders of these offices supported the largest budget increase for defence in several decades.

4.4.1 The National Cluster

The various players that impact the civil-military dynamic can be organized into three clusters, each comprising several or more components. In some cases these components may be divided into sub-components. Each cluster plays a different role in the civil-military dynamic and there is an implicit yet ill-defined hierarchy from one cluster to another.

The first cluster shapes the policy direction for defence issues in Canada. Cascading down from this, the second has the principle role in elaborating and deciding on the policy choices available to achieve the desired direction and the third cluster

[151] There have been several reorganizations of the government's central personnel functions and the use of the term Public Service Commission is used to reflect the function and not the actual organization that may exist at any time.
[152] Stein and Lang, *Unexpected War*, 7.

determines the specific actions required to achieve policy implementation. The clusters do not operate as discrete stand-alone "silos." There is often overlap between and among the clusters and some players have different roles in more than one cluster. Each component/player within a cluster has a relationship with each other component individually as well as with all components collectively. Finally, the relationships and relative influence among the players may remain static for brief periods of decision making but more generally are in a continuous state of change, rendering any assessment of the civil-military dynamic in Canada specific to a particular context that includes the individual players and the factors during that specific period of time.

The first of these groupings, THE NATIONAL CLUSTER, determines the direction that the country wants to follow in respect of military affairs. It reflects the Clauswitzian Trinity of the People, the Government and the Military.[153] These players in the National Cluster are best viewed as general categories or non-specific actors, unlike the players in the remaining two clusters.

The people component of the National Cluster can be said to have numerous elements. The general public is one, although in Canada the general public rarely indicates that defence issues are a priority. The only identifiable circumstance in the past several decades where Canadian viewed defence and security matters as an important

[153] The formulation of the Trinity as the People, the Army and the Government is based on the modern interpretation of Clausewitz's work most notably by Harry Summers. The actual Trinity as set out in *On War* is comprised of three forces, those being primordial violence, enmity and hatred; chance and probability; and the rational pursuit of political or policy goals.

problem facing Canada was in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.[154] Specific defence matters can be of interest to certain parts of the general population, often referred to in public opinion polling as the elites or opinion leaders. This group will often be publicly active in any debate on a current policy issue. When defence and security are high priorities, they will be subject to public scrutiny by this group. Finally, the role of the media in shaping public opinion on defence issues has been an area of concentrated study since the Vietnam War where the media was cited by many as one of the key determinants of the war's outcome.[155] The views and opinions expressed by editorial writers and media commentators can be notoriously fickle yet will play a role in shaping the public environment, and therefore perceptions on matters of public debate.[156]

The government component of the National Cluster does not represent a single branch or department of government but rather the strategic direction chosen by the government to reflect their commitment to the electorate on defence and security matters. Likewise, the military component represents the concept of an armed force whose purpose is to protect the society it serves and not an individual or specific formation, tasking or action of the Canadian Forces.

In the post 9/11 era interest in defence issues has increased. However, in the several decades prior to that timeframe they have not been consistently high on the

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[154] "The Focus Canada Report – 2001-2," Environics Research Group, Ottawa.
[155] See for example Frank J. Stech, "Winning CNN Wars," *Parameters*, US Army War College Quarterly, Autumn 1994, p 37-56.
[156] One example among many of the fickle nature of media and commentator views are the polar opposite views offered in *Globe and Mail* editorials in "Ottawa should let Hillier be Hillier," April, 2006 and "Gen. Hillier steps out of bounds," February, 2008.

public's agenda. Nevertheless, Canadian governments have usually been conscious of public opinion on defence issues. Recent examples include the decision on whether to participate in the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence program and participation in the Iraq War. During the Cold War, the relationship between the government and the people on defence issues has been cited by Granatstein as the cause of the downfall of the Diefenbaker government.[157] For the most part however, as they are only rarely a factor in electoral success, the government usually tries to keep defence issues off the public agenda by not drawing attention to them. During the Cold War and post-Cold War era, the military's relationship with the people largely centered on what can be termed "the peacekeeping consensus," and key defence issues rarely if ever were at the center of government decision making. [158]

4.4.2 The Governmental Cluster

Cascading from the first cluster is the group that formulates specific defence policy choices, namely THE GOVERNMENTAL CLUSTER which is comprised of four components. The first three are the Civil Authority, the Public Service (excepting DND), and the Defence Establishment. The fourth component includes a variety of interest groups and stakeholders with a stake in governmental policy outcomes on defence and foreign policy. As this component attempts to influence the players in this Cluster, they are considered a part of the policy formulation process.

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[157] J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military*, 57-59.

[158] The term "peacekeeping consensus" refers to the belief, deeply imbedded into the views and attitudes of Canadians that Canada is a nation of peacekeepers. Despite the ongoing nature of Canadian Forces combat operations in Afghanistan, the report "Views of Canadian Forces," by Ipsos Reid Public Affairs in March, 2008 found that the majority of Canadians maintain the strong belief that "Canada is a nation of peacekeepers." Many defence analysts reference the peacekeeping myth in describing the tasks that the Canadian Forces have been asked to perform by their government in the past two decades.

In Canada's system of ministerial government, the Civil Authority is composed of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. As long as the Prime Minister and Cabinet retain the confidence of Parliament, it is the Civil Authority that exercises civil control over the military.[159] The Minister of National Defence as a member of Cabinet has a role to play in this group. While the Minister of National Defence has latitude to make decisions that fall within the ambit of the NDA he or she does not actually make key decisions such as defence policy, budgets or deployments. On these matters the Minister recommends courses of action to the Cabinet which is chaired by the Prime Minister. However, the latitude of the Minister of National Defence in presenting defence issues before cabinet or even to Canadians directly for their consideration should not be underestimated. For example, Minister of Defence Perrin Beatty was successful in having the 1987 Defence White Paper considered by Cabinet and released publically. Public support for the policy was minimal and it had little Cabinet support for its spending proposals. Funding for it was therefore ultimately not supported by the Prime Minister.[160] In contrast, the 2005 International Policy Statement and related budget increase demonstrated the crucial role a strong Minister of National Defence, supported by the Prime Minister, can play in the Cabinet process.[161]

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[159] While Savoie argues in both *Breaking the Bargain* and *Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability* that the power and influence of Cabinet in government decision making has declined and the relative influence of unelected officials in the Prime Minister's office has increased, the basic tenets of the collective accountability of Cabinet to Parliament and thus the people remains intact in Canada's constitutional system of democratic governance. Strong arguments were presented by a former Clerk of the PCO, that broad generalizations regarding the workings of the cabinet system should be avoided due to the variability of its functioning over time.

[160] Tomlin, Hillmer and Hampson, 143.

[161] Several former Ministers of National Defence and numerous other interviewees emphasized the point that the civil-military dynamic in Canada is determined largely if not exclusively by the Prime Minister. This view was countered somewhat by a former Clerk of the Privy Council who noted that the Prime Minister's latitude to make decisions can be legally and constitutionally more prescribed that that of the Cabinet.

The Public Service component of this cluster is defined as those departments and agencies that are continuously involved in the administration and management of defence issues. These include the Privy Council Office, the Treasury Board Secretariat and the Department of Finance, usually referred to as the "Central Agencies" in policy making circles in Ottawa. A clear differentiation was made by one former Clerk of the PCO concerning the normative power of central agencies versus the involvement of 'Line departments' in the workings of the civil-military dynamic.[162] Further, one former Vice Chief of the Defence Staff felt that the Clerk of the Privy Council Office can play a role of nearly unsurpassed importance yet largely unseen by all but the most senior officials in government.[163] Despite this, the role of this official is not frequently referenced in academic consideration of civil-military relations in Canada.

This component also includes a variety of other line departments regularly involved in key defence decisions. These include the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the department of Public Safety. Other departments such as Public Works and Government Services (PWGSC), and Industry Canada are occasional participants but not continuously involved. Public servants in all these organizations provide advice and guidance to their Ministers or the Prime Minister, as the case may be. Thus on matters involving the military that will be considered by Cabinet, they exercise an influence on the civil control responsibility of the Civil Authority. For example, before Cabinet consideration of any matter, all Ministers are

[162] Confidential interview by author, 2008.
[163] George Macdonald, interview with author, Sept, 2008. Many other former senior military officers highlighted in particular the role of the Clerk of the Privy Council Office, as both the Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister and in his or her relationship with Ministers and other senior officials.

briefed by their own officials, both public servants and political staff. Such briefings cover the substance of the issue from the perspective of the presenting department, but the briefing will also include the implications for that Minister's departmental or even political responsibilities.[164]

The Defence Establishment component of this cluster includes the Minister of National Defence, the Canadian Forces (headed by the Chief of the Defence Staff), and the civilian part of the Department of National Defence (headed by the Deputy Minister). The Minister, as a member of Cabinet, has a relationship with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues. One of his responsibilities in Canada's system of collective responsibility is to ensure other members of Cabinet are provided with an appreciation of the issues within the defence portfolio that may impact the functioning of the government. Likewise the CDS and the Deputy Minister, as the two most senior officials of the Defence Department, develop relationships with other key representatives within the Governmental Cluster in order to advance the interests of the Defence Department Cluster.

The fourth component of the governmental cluster is the collection of non-governmental groups that attempt to influence the outcomes of decision making by the Civil Authority. This includes defence industries, pressure and interest groups on the left and right of the political spectrum, academics and lobbyists. Their role is more challenging to assess but has been influential at times. Certainly their active participation

[164] Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain*, 102-131.

in Canada's political processes can have an impact on the positions of Ministers in consideration of matters before Cabinet.[165]

4.4.3 The Defence Department Cluster

Cascading down from this group is the DEFENCE DEPARTMENT CLUSTER. The role of this cluster is to advise on the detailed implementation of defence policies formulated by the Governmental Cluster, in compliance with the direction shaped by the National Cluster. The components of this group all reside within the Department of National Defence and include the Minister, the Canadian Forces and the civilian component of DND. The Minister's responsibilities for the management and direction of the Canadian Forces are laid out in the National Defence Act. The Canadian Forces is led by the Chief of the Defence Staff who is charged with the control and administration of the CF. The evolution of the responsibility for CF decision making since unification has served to reduce but not entirely eliminate inter-service rivalry. Therefore, the respective Navy, Army and Air Force service chiefs maintain considerable power and influence over internal defence decisions, and this fact plays a role in the formulation of key policy proposals to be presented to the Minister for consideration. The final part of this cluster is the civilian component of DND headed by the Deputy Minister. From time to time it has been asserted that this component of DND has exerted too great an influence on defence decisions. [166] This claim however must be tempered with the acknowledgement that when the three components in this cluster form a partnership in achieving a shared objective the

[165] Ibid. See also Tomlin, Hillmer and Hampson, 154.
[166] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 154-165.

outcome can significantly alter the civil-military dynamic in Canada, as was the case with the development and drafting of the Defence policy statements of 1987 and 2005.[167]

In summary the clusters of influences that shape the civil-military dynamic are:

1. The NATIONAL CLUSTER also known as "The Trinity" of the People, the Government and the Military.

2. The GOVERNMENTAL CLUSTER is comprised of four components. These are: that part of the Government known as the "Civil Authority" which includes the Prime Minister and the Cabinet; the non DND Public Service; the Defence Establishment; and interest groups, lobbyists and industry interests.

3. The DEFENCE DEPARTMENT CLUSTER which includes the Minister, the Canadian Forces and the civilian component of DND.

One further consideration in understanding the application of this model is that while organizations may well be distinct, their actions and interactions are by no means discrete.[168] For example, the Minister of National Defence plays a role in all three clusters. The Minister has latitude to make decisions that fall within the ambit of the

[167] See Tomlin, Hillmer and Hampson, 139-143 on the 1987 Defence White Paper for example. The partnership leading to the 2005 IPS was validated by all of the principals in the interview process.
[168] See Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain*, 6-7 for a description of the notion of distinct spaces for the political and bureaucratic players and the blurring of the lines that separate their roles and responsibilities.

NDA in the Defence Department Cluster. By virtue of membership in Cabinet, the Minister is also part of the Civil Authority in the Government Cluster. Finally, as a member of the Government, the Minister is also a part of the National Cluster. His influence therefore in both the civil control function and in the various relationships of the civil-military dynamic is considerable.

4.5 The Factors

In addition to the components and sub-components of the various clusters, there are readily identifiable factors that influence the behaviours of those individuals and groups involved in the decision making processes on defence matters, or otherwise stated, the civil-military dynamic. These influences can be either internal or external to the state itself and their impact will vary over time due to a range of circumstances. Civil-military relations theorists have devoted considerable study to the understanding of these variables, usually with the goal of determining the predictability of the conduct of civil-military relations.

4.5.1 The Threat Environment

The first concern for either elected or unelected officials in the field of defence and security matters is the issue of threats to Canada, whether real or perceived, internal or external. As noted in Chapter two, Desch believes that this factor is one of considerable predictive value when assessing the state of relations between the military and civilian authorities. Canada's geographical proximity to the United States, and thus the linking of Canadian security with that of the U.S., has often meant that assessments of

the threats to our interests regularly involve these joint considerations. Frequently, Canada's interests are defined in economic terms and here again the linkage to the United States is generally the main concern. Nevertheless, as evidenced by the National Security Policy of 2004 and the two statements of defence policy issued since, there has been an considerable increase in the importance of defence and security policy issues since the changed threat environment caused by the 9/11 attacks. This change has had real and significant impacts on the civil-military dynamic in Canada.

4.5.2 The Domestic Political Situation

While it may be correct to state that what matters most to politicians is getting elected or re-elected as the case may be, the factors contributing to the achievement of this objective for Cabinet Ministers include both representing the people within their electoral ridings and all Canadians more generally in matters of national interest. On issues related to the use of the military, matters of national interest are usually linked to diplomatic or political interests rather than security concerns. Infrequently, the public may demand action as was the case with Kosovo in 1999 or more recently the humanitarian crises in South Asia and Pakistan. In most cases, the public environment with respect to the use of the military is permissive as long as the government remains within fiscal or commitment levels. Nevertheless, the national interest remains the primary concern and the domestic political situation affects the decisions that governments take on matters of defence and security.[169] When such decisions have only limited local impact, the policy making process may have less input from elected

[169] This conclusion was endorsed by all former Ministers' of Defence interviewed for the thesis.

officials, but the election imperative, and thus the domestic political situation, is ever present.

4.5.3 The Canada/U.S. Relationship

The third factor is the imperative of the Canada/U.S relationship. As noted above, in matters affecting the Canada/U.S. relationship, it is often difficult to separate security from economic influences. In fact, the two factors are frequently intertwined. For example, after the attacks of 9/11, the government of Canada fast-tracked a budget that committed significant spending for new security measures. This initiative was a reflection of the interconnectivity of economic and security issues. According to then Foreign Minister John Manley, "The priority in December 2001 was how we make sure we are not seen as the source of weakness and threat to the Americans."[170] Canada's efforts in this regard reflected more than a concern over physical threats to either Canada or the United States. As Joel Sokolsky notes, it is well understood in Ottawa that with more than 80% of Canada's trade dependant on an open border, convincing Washington that Canada itself is not a security threat was a matter of basic political survival.[171] Most other key decisions on defence and security matters during the post-9/11 era were usually viewed through the lens of their impact on the Canada/U.S. relationship and the resulting imperative of ensuring that our actions minimized the threats to Canada's economic relationship with our largest and most influential trading partner. One former Minister of Defence felt that the ties between Canada and the United States were of such importance

[170] Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, 7.
[171] Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy," 3-4.

that U.S. officials could actually be included as players in the workings of the various clusters in Canada's civil-military dynamic.[172]

4.5.4 Military Professionalism and the Defence Institution

The final factor of the assessment framework is the state of Canada's military and the defence institution that supports it. Canada's military has experienced numerous peaks and valleys from the early Cold War years to the present day. At the end of the Second World War, Canada's military force was one of the largest in the world. This was followed by a relative decline for many decades due in part to factors that included a relatively stable security environment, a political leadership focused on other priorities and a strategy of commitments that put individual service interests first.[173] Canada's military did not occupy a central or particularly prominent position in the shaping of public policy priorities. The level of influence reached its nadir in the aftermath of the Somalia affair when the broken bond of trust between the military and both the government and the people rendered it more vulnerable to the government's deficit reduction initiatives than most other public institutions. One former Clerk of the Privy Council noted that the department was particularly ineffective in dealing with the decision making machinery of government.[174] It is not solely the military however that shapes the influence of this factor. Margaret Bloodworth, a former Deputy Minister of National Defence, echoed the views of numerous former holders of that office when she said that "the state of professionalism and the relative capability of the civilians within the defence institution can also have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the

[172] Confidential interview, 2008.
[173] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*,123.
[174] Confidential interview, 2008.

department."[175] Some of the former senior military officers interviewed expressed the view that if the senior cadre of civilians within the National Defence Headquarters does not fully understand the military ethos, the overall level of professionalism of the defence institution is less than optimal.

This long-term decline of the influence of the defence institution caused Bland to declare in 2003 that the crisis caused by years of "willful disarmament" threatened Canada's place in the international community.[176] Recent studies, however, have shattered the myth of military inactivity during the post-Cold War era and despite the Somalia crisis, Canada's small fighting force was used extensively, and some would argue over used, in the 1990s.[177] Further, Canada's recent contribution to the international effort in Afghanistan has been singled out for praise by leaders in the United States and other NATO countries.[178] It is difficult if not impossible to measure the impact that the challenges of the Afghanistan mission have had on the level of military professionalism and the state of the defence institution. Despite the ongoing ambivalence of Canadians towards the mission, public support for the Canadian Forces grew strongly and the unity of effort of all the players in the civil-military dynamic meant that by the winter of 2005 the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence were at the heart of the government's agenda.[179] Thus, when examined through the lens of how the players in the various Clusters react to the factors that influence their decision making,

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[175] Margaret Bloodworth, interview by author, 2009.
[176] Bland, "The Fundamentals of National Defence Policy are not Sound" in *Canada Without Armed Forces*, 23.
[177] Government of Canada, *Making Choices*, Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 2003-2004, 18.
[178] See for example Samantha Power "Keeping Canada in Afghanistan," *Time Magazine,* April 17, 2008.
[179] In Stein and Lang's *Unexpected War*, they report that the situation caused one senior defence official to declare "we own this town now,"160-161.

and thus shape the defence policy and decision making processes, a defence institution that is perceived as highly professional will have a significant impact on the functioning of the of civil-military dynamic across all Clusters.

4.6 Conclusion

The value of using a framework for analysis that combines a broad range of factors influencing policy making with the various individuals and groups that influence the policy process is that it recognizes that in Canadian civil-military relations, so-called non-military factors (the area of expertise the military cannot claim exclusivity in), are going to be injected into the overall decision making process concerning all civil-military decisions. Canada's relatively unique security situation, as a neighbour of the world's sole military super power, means that considerations other than pure defence or military ones will always be a part of the political equation.

Moreover, the fact that elected politicians are part of all three clusters means that the role of the people or the electorate in the National Cluster will play an important part in every aspect of the civil-military dynamic. Throughout most, if not all of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, the relationship with the people was the exclusive domain of the politicians. This changed in 2005 when the CDS decided to strengthen the relationship between the military and the people, thus altering the civil-military dynamic.[180] Further analysis of these relationships and factors in each of the Cold War, post-Cold War and post 9/11 eras illustrate how the civil-military dynamic functioned during each era and how it changed in response to the influences of the players and the factors.

[180] Confidential interview, 2008.

CHAPTER 5 - THE CIVIL-MILITARY DYNAMIC IN THE COLD WAR ERA

5.1 Introduction

The structures and processes that provide the essential framework for civil control over the military in Canada have remained largely static over the past fifty years. Thus the key elements of civil control - subordination of the military to civil authority and clear separation of roles and responsibilities - have remained constant. However, the relationships among the players in the Clusters and the factors that influence the civil-military dynamic have been anything but static.

The administrative and bureaucratic processes that transform policy and strategy into operational outputs are under continuous change. These changes are caused by numerous variables, most notably the factors identified in chapter four. These four factors (threat, domestic political situation, the Canada/U.S. relationship and military professionalism) are usually the dominant forces in shaping the relationships both within and among the Clusters. Further, these factors cannot be considered in isolation one from the other. For example, in Canada's case it is often challenging if not misleading to attempt to separate the impact of Canada/U.S. relations from the domestic political situation, or the threat environment. As Huntington noted, multiple interdependent factors are at play in many aspects of civil-military relations.[181]

[181] Huntington, viii.

5.2 The Threat Environment

The international security situation represented by the nuclear arms buildup and subsequent standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States was undeniably the defining factor in shaping civil-military relationships during the Cold War, not only in Canada but throughout the Western world. While the Soviet nuclear arsenal was a clear threat to Canada, especially considering the joint defence arrangements for North America on Canadian territory, Canada itself was not threatened by conventional military forces. Despite having a military capability that had played a significant role in the Second World War, neither the Canadian military nor their political masters articulated a clear strategy on the continuing requirement for such a military force.[182]

One method of assessing the government's perception of, and response to, the Cold War threat environment is to examine the government's approach to strategy and defence policy during this period. According to Bland, two factors were ever-present. The first was a tendency within the defence establishment to perpetuate a bottom-up planning process that often placed individual service interests ahead of any national strategy.[183] The second was a reliance on a strategy of commitments.[184] Bland has frequently asserted that the combination of these two prevented the elaboration of a new uniquely Canadian defence strategy. As a consequence, political leaders focused on issues of social and economic matters and by extension treated defence issues in a minimalist fashion.

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[182] Bland's assessment of the disinterested and confused political leadership on defence matters during the Cold War era is best summarized in *Chiefs of Defence,* 18-22.
[183] Ibid, 31-59, and 175-210. See also Bland, "Who Decides What?"
[184] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 260-261.

Early in the Cold War, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King instructed his Defence Minister Brooke Claxton to reduce defence expenditures. This initiative however was cut short by the war in Korea and the call for deployments to support NATO. As the Cold War became better defined in the early 1950s, politicians concluded that Canada's proximity to the United States limited the need to worry about strategic matters.[185] Nevertheless, throughout the Cold War era, decisions had to be made on issues of deployments and procurements and these unavoidable decisions led to occasional tensions in the civil-military dynamic.[186]

Canada's strategy of commitments included membership in alliances such as NATO and defence partnerships like NORAD as well as activities in support of the United Nations. Canada's contribution to activities that derived from these commitments became the *raison d'être* for the military, and the basis for the maintenance of armed forces. Meanwhile, the post-Second World War priority for politicians was to rebuild the Canadian economy while encouraging social welfare and economic prosperity for its citizens. The strategy of commitments was therefore one that politicians were only too willing to accept as it minimized pressure for a new Canadian-based defence strategy. Defence policy statements reflected this strategic direction, a direction that was generally supported by Canadians.

The situation changed little until the early 1960s and the appointment of Paul Hellyer as Minister of National Defence. Hellyer, as well Prime Minister Pearson, were

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[185] Ibid, 18.

[186] One of the more controversial decisions during this era was the Diefenbaker government's cancellation of the Avro Arrow. See Granatstein, 47-50.

determined not to repeat the stumbling performance and inconsistency of the Diefenbaker government on defence issues that included public criticism on numerous files.[187]

Hellyer's approach to the management of defence matters was a combination of both strategy and structure. The strategy set out in his 1964 Defence White Paper also embraced the existing approach of strategic commitments. Defence policy objectives included:

(a) collective measures for maintenance of peace and security as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) collective defence as embodied in NATO;

(c) partnership with the United States for defence of North America; and

(d) national measures for the security and protection of Canada.[188]

Although the order and thus implied priority of these objectives was reversed in the 1971 defence policy paper these principles represent the "inevitable strategy for Canada."[189] The other part of Hellyer's approach, the structure to give effect to the strategy, was one of the most controversial defence issues in the history of Canada and came closest to causing an actual crisis in civil-military relations in Canada.[190] The undertaking to establish a more integrated defence establishment towards the ultimate goal of a unified Canadian Forces was a key part of the 1964 Defence White Paper.

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[187] Bland, *Canada's National Defence*, vol.1, 58.
[188] Ibid.
[189] Ibid, 59.
[190] Gosselin, "The Storm over Unification of the Armed Forces: A Crisis of Canadian Civil-Military Relations," 312.

Hellyer rejected the concept of three separate services and noted that the demands of modern warfare required a single integrated service to respond to the needs of fast decision making and quick response to respond to the changing nature of conflict resolution.[191] His unification initiative was aimed at addressing this problem. Interestingly, 40 years later the stated goal of the 2005 Defence Policy Statement was a CF capable of a "fully integrated and unified approach to operations."[192] This suggests that much of the analysis and commentary largely critical of the unification initiative may need to be re-examined.[193]

The remaining two defence policy statements during the Cold War offered no new assessment of either the threat environment of the government's strategy for responding to it. "Defence in 70's", produced by Minister Donald MacDonald for Prime Minister Trudeau reflected both a shift in the foreign policy approach of the government and a desire to free the federal budget from the demands of the Cold War.[194] Further, there was a growing realization among Canadians that there was no threat to Canadian sovereignty that could be credibly addressed using Canada's armed forces.[195] Any threats to Canada's sovereignty, such as those at sea with regard to illegal fishing or to the environment in the north, were generally thought to be more likely to come from our allies than from Cold War enemies. There was a role for the armed forces in meeting these threats, but more in

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[191] Paul Hellyer, "Hellyer's Reorganization," in *Canada's National Defence: Defence Organization*, ed. Douglas L. Bland, (Kingston: Queen's University School of Policy Studies, 1998), 141.
[192] Government of Canada, *International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence* (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 2005), 11.
[193] Bland expresses an opinion that is an exception to the critics of the unification initiative and presents a strong case that unification should have strengthened and unified the national defence strategy planning process.
[194] Bland, *Canada's National Defence*, vol.1, 112.
[195] Ibid, 113 and *Chiefs of Defence*, 18-22.

the way of constabulary operations than by the use of weapons acquired to meet allied obligations as part of Canada's contributions to the containment and deterrence of the Soviet Union.

The last Cold War policy statement was issued in 1987. Its purpose had been to correct the decline in the Canadian military establishment which had been underway since the late 1950s. However the fact that the document's analysis did not account for the end of the Cold War meant that it was fatally flawed. In the end, due to the over commitments recommended in the document, it likely had the opposite affect and contributed to the overall decline of the Canadian Forces.[196] In particular it engendered disappointment within the defence establishment over unfulfilled promises which likely contributed to the failure of senior military leadership that plagued the CF through the 1990s.[197]

The fact that the broad question of defence strategy has remained relatively constant throughout the Cold War era means that the issues of defence policy and strategy were rarely matters that dominated the national agenda within the National Cluster. The reality was that preparations to defend against military threats to Canada (most likely nuclear war) were largely addressed by Canada's allies. Within the strategy of commitments, the political leadership judged defence expenditures according to their political and diplomatic value.[198] Here peacekeeping was seen to have greater value than

[196] Bland, *Canada's National Defence*, vol.1, 189, and *Chiefs of Defence*, 252-257. See also Tomlin et. al., *Canada's International Policies; Agendas, Alternatives and Politics*, 139-143.
[197] Bland, *Canada's National Defence*, vol.1, 189.
[198] Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy."

maintaining a level of warfighting capability that most analysts felt would never be needed. Thus, while never wholly abandoned, military expertise in warfighting was not always seen as essential to the defence and security of the state.

In this period, the relationship between the government and the people within the National Cluster was invariably focused on matters of economic and social progress.[199] With few exceptions, the relationship between the military and the people was largely dormant. Even the civil-military crisis over the unification issue caused limited public debate and virtually no broad public concern, as military leaders had almost no public profile. Thus it should not be a surprise that successive governments felt the relationship between the military and the government not central to their goal - electoral victory.

With little or no widespread concern over the general direction of defence and security issues within the National Cluster, the civil-military dynamic centered on the adoption of specific responses to issues and events as they arose (the role of the Governmental Cluster) and discussion and debate on how to implement these responses (the role of the Defence Department Cluster). The case of the 1987 Defence White Paper is illustrative. The Defence Department Cluster issued a bold new defence strategy with a fiscally weak foundation. Yet the focus of attention of the National Cluster was on free trade and upcoming constitutional negotiations. Furthermore, the impending end of the Cold War suggested that the proposed policy ignored a certain political reality. The result was a fundamental policy disagreement between the Defence Department Cluster and the

[199] The one exception to this in the Cold War saw the defeat of the Diefenbaker government due to its mismanagement of military matters.

Governmental Cluster, especially the civil authority (Prime Minister and Cabinet). Defence Minister Beatty's proposals met strong resistance in Cabinet.[200] Despite the unanswered questions on funding, *Challenge and Commitment* was made public but support in the National Cluster was tepid at best. The domestic circumstances combined with the collapse of the Soviet Union quickly led to the inevitable shelving of the policy proposal.[201]

5.3 The Domestic Political Situation

The second factor affecting the civil-military dynamic is the domestic political situation. Other than several brief periods of minority governments, the country has been led by relatively stable majority governments. As discussed above, for most of these majority governments, the Cold War nuclear threat was of little direct relevance in the lives of most Canadians. Successive administrations were content to treat defence issues as a secondary consideration. Some critics, like Granatstein, charge that most governments either reduced defence budgets or allowed them to wither.[202] Defence spending did increase from time to time, but as the level of spending as a percentage of GNP and overall government expenditures was in steady decline, these critics claim that military capability decreased.[203] However, given the threat environment noted above, it was difficult to make a compelling case that Canada's national security was at risk. For the most part, Canadians embraced the concept of peacekeeping as the main role of the CF, without rejecting the concept of strategic alliances as a key component of Canada's

[200] Tomlin, Hillmer and Hampson, 142. Also confidential interviews, Ottawa, 2008.
[201] Ibid, 143.
[202] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military*, 8.
[203] Bland, *Canada Without Armed Forces,* 106.

defence policy. Following the military controversies that dogged the Diefenbaker government around the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the Cold War became an accepted part of the domestic political landscape. Until the emergence of a significant peace activism movement in the late 1980s centered on the testing of cruise missiles in western Canada, there was little if any public debate over military issues.

In contrast, social and economic concerns dominated the public discourse. Within the National Cluster the relatively weak relationship between the military and both the people and the government meant that the relationship between the government and the people on economic and social issues carried the greatest influence. Similarly, within the Governmental Cluster, the threat environment was not a persuasive influence. At times the perceived threat environment was high such as during the Cuban missile crisis. For the most part however, the long term stability of the threat situation throughout the length of the Cold War meant that the defence establishment was not a pervasive influence in government decision making. Defence issues, when they arose, were often related to procurement matters like the Avro Arrow, and thus examined for their political rather than operational impacts.[204] Thus social and economic concerns dominated both the National and Governmental clusters. The introduction of social programs such as Medicare in the 1960s, wage and price controls and related economic uncertainty in the 1970s and the trade and constitutional debates of the 1980s all dominated the national agenda and thus the attention of policy decision makers.

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[204] See for example Alan S. Williams, *Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement: A View from the Inside*, (Montreal: Breakout Educational Network, 2006), 9.

5.4 The Canada/U.S. Relationship

The third factor affecting the civil-military dynamic is the state of Canada/U.S. relations. Canada's defence partnership with the United States, as manifested in the strategy of commitments, was often a key factor in the bilateral relationship in the era prior to free trade. The maintenance of our European commitment within the NATO alliance and the establishment of NORAD for the joint defence of North America were two significant commitments. So too was the Pearson government's peacekeeping initiatives, with some analysts suggesting that Canada's involvement in the Cyprus dispute led to the United States favourable consideration of the auto pact in the mid 1960s.[205] Perhaps the low point of the Canada/U.S. relationship during the Cold War era was the administration led by Diefenbaker during the late 1950s and early 1960s. While Trudeau has been accused by some as having a bias against the United States, his successive administrations were a model of Canada/U.S. harmony compared to the Diefenbaker era. The high point of Canada/U.S relations occurred during the two Mulroney administrations of the 1980's. The negotiation of the free trade agreement made visible and tangible for Canadians the reality that had existed for some time regarding the interdependence of the trading relationship between the two countries.

The close relationship between the Canadian and U.S. militaries was a key consideration for the Defence Department Cluster during the Cold War.[206] Meanwhile, the ebb and flow of pro- and anti -American sentiment in Canada was often at the center

[205] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military*, 19.
[206] Confidential interview by author, 2008.

of the relationship between the government and the people in the National Cluster.[207] In the later stages of the Cold War, the economics of the Canada/U.S. relationship, as evidenced by the free trade negotiations, was increasingly viewed by both the National and Governmental Clusters as a matter of critical national importance. Thus balancing the important defence and economic relationships with the ebb and flow of public opinion presented a continuing challenge. While the public ran hot and cold on relationships with the Americans, Canada's military leadership responded to the changing threat environment with an unwavering commitment to interoperability and close cooperation with the U.S. military.[208]

Throughout the Cold War, the public either supported or was largely indifferent to the mechanisms of bilateral defence cooperation. At times there was a public perception that Canadian sovereignty was at risk or Canada was not being independent enough. This was particularly evident during the voyage of the *Manhattan* through the waters of the Arctic Archipelago in 1969 and with cruise missile testing the 1980s. This usually resulted in a change to the civil-military dynamic within the National and Governmental clusters. The military tended to judge defence relations with the United States from the point of view of how best to meet the shared objective of collective defence and viewed cooperation with allies as an essential component of their expertise and professionalism.

[207] Two examples of the ebb and flow are the problems confronting the Diefenbaker government described by Granatstein in *Who Killed the Canadian Military* as "the folly of anti-Americanism" and the negative views of Canadians on the Mulroney/Reagan relationship described in Sokolsky, *Realism Canadian Style*, 13.

[208] Paul Manson, interview with author, 2008.

The civil authority on the other hand frequently tried to use anti American sentiment to achieve political advantage.[209]

5.5 The Military Profession and the Defence Institution

The fourth factor is the actions and behaviours of the military. This variable is largely confined to the Defence Department Cluster. The dominant factors shaping how Canada's military behaved during the Cold War period were inter-service rivalry combined with the bureaucratic complexities associated with harmonizing the workings of civilian and military structures within the same government department. These factors combined with the lack of political priority on security and defence matters ensured the preoccupations of the Defence Department Cluster were inward-looking. This served to diminish the role of military forces as an element of Canada's foreign policy. Any external focus was almost exclusively directed at maintaining the status quo of strategic commitments to NATO allies in general and the United States in particular.

One notable exception to the normal pattern of disinterest within the National and Governmental Clusters to what was happening in the Defence Department Cluster was the public debate over the unifications proposals of Defence Minister Hellyer during the 1960s. In his detailed examination of this issue, Daniel Gosselin suggests that the "storm over unification" was indeed a crisis in civil-military relations, one that was rooted in a loss of confidence by the civil authority in the professional military advice they were receiving. The open criticism of the government's proposed policy by military

[209] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military*, chapter 2.

commanders was therefore rightly interpreted by the civil authority as a struggle over the government's right to control the military.[210]

One of the stated goals of unification was an attempt to make the three elements of the Defence Department Cluster work closer together in partnership. However, the incubation period for such massive organizational and transformational changes is usually measured in generations. Thus, as noted above, over forty years passed before the circumstances permitted the achievement of Hellyer's ultimate goal of an integrated and unified CF that could operate in a manner consistent with an overarching defence policy that had not been drafted to accommodate service interests or a strategy of commitments.

5.5 Conclusion

For most of the Cold War era, the relationship between the government and the people was the dominant one within the National Cluster. It was however focused for the most part on economic and social priorities: defence issues were not a primary concern. Thus the relationships between the military and the people, and between the government and the military, were relatively less important than that of the people to its government.

Within the Governmental Cluster, the relationship between the civil authority and the public service was, relative to the others, the most influential. This reflects the fact that defence issues were rarely a national priority. Nevertheless, the defence establishment tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to have the civil authority assign greater

[210] Gosselin in Coombs (ed.), 333.

priority to defence matters. When the civil-authority became interested in defence matters, it was frequently over the impact of procurement on regional economic benefits and the impact this had on public opinion and the domestic political situation. Given the declining Cold War threat, the public service and the defence establishment had widely divergent views on the importance of defence and security issues on matters ranging from equipment procurement to the costs of overseas operations. Further, the practice of having senior military leaders change positions every two years inhibited the relationship building essential to the effective functioning of the civil-military dynamic between the military and the public service within the Governmental Cluster.[211]

Within the Defence Department Cluster, the relationship between the Minister and the Canadian Forces was variable. Hellyer and Macdonald had poor relationships with military leaders, while Beatty's relationship during the formulation of the 1987 White Paper was considered excellent.[212] The relationship between the CF and the civilian component of DND was also variable and usually reflective of the personalities involved.[213] The attempts to make adjustments to the organizational arrangements of the department and thus shape the relationships between the civilian and military components of the department resulted in the initiation of the series of reviews outlined in Chapter 3. The most widely cited of these, the Management Review Group of 1972, resulted in the creation of a National Defence Headquarters.

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[211] This conclusion was referenced by most if not all of interviewees.
[212] The comment on the nature of the relationship between Beatty and his officials was confirmed in interviews with both Robert Fowler and Paul Manson.
[213] Paul Manson, interview by author, 2008. This issue is also a key component of Bland's *Chiefs of Defence*, 154-165.

Among the Clusters, the relationship between the National Cluster and the Governmental Cluster was the most influential. The relationship between the Defence Department Cluster and the National and Governmental Clusters was either weak or variable. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Cold War threat environment in Canada became relatively stable thus minimizing the political imperative to formulate defence strategy. The overarching political priorities were usually domestic in nature, (for example, economic challenges in the 1970s, trade and constitutional agreements in the 1980s) and were deemed more important than the requirement for an effective national defence. Added to this was a domestic constituency largely uninterested in military affairs. Finally, there was bureaucratic instability within the Department of National Defence caused by inter-service rivalries and angst over the perceived growing role of civilian defence officials. These all served to produce an institutional focus rather than a strategic or operational one, one where the military's professional expertise would have played a larger role.

After the Cold War, an increased commitment to overseas deployments in the Balkans and elsewhere would strengthen the military's claim to expertise. This, combined with the weakened state of the armed forces should have provided the justification for a shift in the dynamic within and amongst clusters, one where the Defence Custer and the military component of that cluster would prove to have relatively more influence. Unfortunately, the imperative to address the domestic fiscal situation and the tragic events of a failed mission in Somalia served to alter the civil-military dynamic in another way.

CHAPTER 6 - THE CIVIL-MILITARY DYNAMIC IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

6.1 Introduction

Despite the changed threat environment, the variables shaping civil-military relationships in the early post-Cold War period were again largely dominated by domestic considerations. Free trade agreements, constitutional negotiations, and deficit reduction played a considerably larger role in the shaping of the public agenda than did the subjects of defence and security. Additionally Canada's economic situation was in peril. This reinforced the belief among those who influenced the policy choices presented to Cabinet for its consideration that defence and security issues had become less of a priority. The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union served to rationalize the continual decline of the Cold War's strategy of commitments. This notwithstanding, foreign deployments of the Canadian Forces increased and a new post-Cold War strategy of commitments added stress on a military that was still struggling to define its role in the new world order of the early 1990s. These factors contributed to a new civil-military dynamic, one that set the stage for the dramatic shift that occurred in the post 9/11 period.

6.2 The Threat Environment

The sudden end of the Cold War left a defence policy vacuum. The final defence policy of the Cold War period was produced even as defence planners became keenly aware that the end of the Cold War was imminent.[214] However, the reality of the changing security environment was ignored as defence planners were seduced by the possibility of significant reinvestment in the Canadian Forces to achieve the

[214] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military,* 136.

government's stated intention of closing the commitment-capability gap.[215] It would have been reasonable to expect that the end of the Cold War would cause a significant reassessment of the strategic goals of Canada's defence policy. This however did not happen.

The government tried to fill this vacuum with several defence statements that acknowledged the changed security environment. These statements or updates were produced periodically in between the two White Papers of 1987 and 1994. However they offered no new foreign policy goals nor did they explore how defence policy would be used to serve Canada's national interests. In fact, military commitments to NATO were reduced by 1,400 ground forces in 1991 and the 1992 budget called for further reductions in the role of the air force in Europe. Overall CF strength fell by over 8,000 in the period 1989-1993.[216]

One year following the election of a Liberal majority government in 1993, the first complete post-Cold War White Paper was made public. The security threat it identified was a non-traditional one. At a time when the international security situation was far from stable, as evidenced by the deteriorating situation in the Balkans in the early 1990s, it was the economic challenge facing Canada that dominated the 1994 Defence

[215] The difference, whether real or perceived, between what the Canadian Forces has been committed to do and the actual level of funded capabilities has over time become known as the "commitment-capability gap." It is referred to by most observers and commentators on defence and strategy and receives its most comprehensive examination in Bland's *Canada Without Armed Forces.* However Bland himself questions whether or not the supposed "gap" is merely a bureaucratic rhetoric designed to promote individual service interests. See *Chiefs of Defence*, 259.

[216] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military*, 136-137.

White Paper.[217] While noting the continued turbulence and uncertainty in world affairs, this paper emphasized that Canadians were faced not only with defence-centric challenges but also with the challenge of more limited resources.[218] Nevertheless, the policy included a commitment to the maintenance of a multi-purpose combat capable force, a promise that then Minister David Collenette, felt was a significant victory given the fiscal environment.[219] The policy proposed that the roles of the armed forces evolve in a manner consistent with fiscal realities, and with a defence budget under continuing pressure. Many programs and projects then scheduled would have to be eliminated, reduced or delayed.[220] As Granatstein notes, the 1994 policy statement pledged both to maintain real military strength and to reduce budgets. The former pledge dissolved while the latter was scrupulously kept.[221] Balancing these two competing priorities while fulfilling the promise of foreign intervention for humanitarian purposes would eventually cause problems for the Canadian Forces.

The government had devoted considerable energy and resources to informing Canadians of the economic perils that would result if the fiscal situation was not addressed. Thus, within the National Cluster, reducing spending and eliminating the deficit were viewed as the major threat to Canada. Canada's military would be expected to contribute to the effort like every other government organization. In certain quarters, the end of the Cold War brought expectations of a "peace dividend." Collenette warned his Cabinet colleagues that it was premature to attempt to cash in on such a peace

[217] Bland, *Canada's National Defence*, vol. 1, 359. This was also confirmed in Confidential interviews.
[218] Ibid.
[219] David Collenette, interview with author, November 2008.
[220] Bland, *Canada's National Defence*, vol.1, 359.
[221] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military*, 167.

dividend and expressed doubts that one actually existed.[222] The prevailing public view however reflected the success of the government's communications efforts. The federal debt was out of control and the public was therefore disinclined to favour increased defence expenditures. In reality, the actual global security situation was far from certain. While the global situation was not a direct threat to Canada, there remained a general expectation on the part of Canadians that the Canadian government and the Canadian Forces would play an active role internationally, in concert with our allies and partners in NATO, NORAD and the U.N. The unstable situation in the Balkans, where Canadians were being deployed in increasing numbers, was not however a matter that formed part of the day-to-day lives of Canadians, a situation that well-suited the policy goals of the government. The general sense of well-being that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the symbolic end of the Cold War clouded the reality that certain parts of the world remained fractured and unstable.

6.3 The Domestic Political Situation

Most of the post-Cold War period saw relatively stable federal governments in Canada. The lone exception to the norm of stability was the short-lived Conservative government of Prime Minister Kim Campbell in 1993, and the occasional uncertainty caused by political crises, with the 1995 Quebec referendum being one such case. The political agenda during this era was mostly focused on domestic issues. The agenda of the Mulroney government during the first part of the post-Cold War period was dominated by the failed Meech Lake and Charlottetown constitutional initiatives. Neither the international security situation nor the increased operational deployments on international

[222] David Collenette, interview with author, November 2008.

operations was of much interest to Canadians. When Vice Admiral Chuck Thomas, Canada's second highest ranking military officer, resigned in 1991 to protest the government's failure to fulfill the policy commitments contained in the 1987 White Paper, the action was largely met with disinterest in all three clusters, and was virtually dismissed out of hand by the Chief of the Defence Staff and other defence officials as just inter-service "parochial interests."[223]

Public dissatisfaction with the Mulroney administration, and a weak and divided opposition following the election of the Chrétien government in 1993, helped to ensure that the dominant relationship in the National Cluster was the one between the government and the people. Defence and security issues were not key priorities for most Canadians. The domestic political agenda of successive Chrétien governments up to the 9/11 period was in clear evidence in the 1994 Defence White Paper. Fiscal responsibility and budget reductions were the goal, and little argument was advanced that such objectives were not valid. It fell to the Governmental Cluster to implement the domestic agenda and there were important influences in this cluster which felt defence matters were relatively unimportant.[224] The implementation of this domestic agenda, the absence of any noticeable public concern regarding the international security situation, the impact that increased deployments were having on the Canadian Forces and the Somalia scandal (explored in detail below) all served to weaken the bonds between the government and its military in the National Cluster. The relationship of the Defence Establishment with both

[223] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 272.
[224] Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, 7. In addition to the reference here to senior officials of the Department of Finance, numerous interviewees noted that the Prime Minister's lack of familiarity with military issues and the Canadian Forces could easily have been misinterpreted as disinterest.

the Civil Authority and the Public Service in the Governmental Cluster during this period was described by one former senior official as ineffective at best.[225] Further, the relationships within the Defence Department Cluster were strained due to the combined effect of the domestic political imperative of deficit reduction, and the loss of trust in the institution due to the Somalia Affair.[226]

6.4 The Canada/U.S. Relationship

The 1990s saw a deepening rather than a diminution of US-Canada military and diplomatic cooperation overseas in the face of regional crises and ethnic conflicts.[227] The Canadian Forces were involved in more overseas commitments than at any time during the Cold War, and interoperability with our American allies was a center piece of military planning in the 1990's.[228] Meanwhile, the cooperative work with the Americans under NORAD continued, albeit with little public profile.

The expansion of trade with the United States under the North America Free Trade Agreement emphasized the fact that Canada's economic security was tied to relations with the Americans. Like most nations, America tends to assess bilateral relations through the lens of its own national interests. In the aftermath of the Cold War and certainly throughout the early years of the Clinton administration, the approach to a foreign policy of "engagement and enlargement" had significant economic

[225] Confidential interviews, 2008.
[226] Maurice Baril, former Chief of the Defence Staff, interview with author, 2009.
[227] Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy," 17.
[228] Ibid, 16.

components.[229] During the post-Cold War era, this focus on economic issues was consistent with the Canadian policy imperative of balanced budgets thus ensuring that the agendas of the two countries were aligned.

It was economic policy that was at the heart of Canada's foreign policy priorities. Team Canada missions that focused on job growth and finding new markets were the main thrusts of the Chrétien government's realism agenda according to Sokolsky, and these goals mattered more than troops, planes and overseas commitments.[230] The governments in both Ottawa and Washington were "singing from the same song sheet" and neither was focused on the lack of attention to defence and security issues.

6.5 The Military Profession and the Defence Institution

The post-Cold War decade was one of significant upheaval for Canada's military establishment in general and the Canadian Forces in particular. The political priority was one of fiscal restraint and establishing balanced budgets, even if the military had been experiencing a stressful succession of peaks and valleys for several decades.

The budgetary and related personnel decline of the Canadian Forces which began after the Korean War, and continued most especially during the post-Cold War period, has been documented by a number of analysts. The fiscal crisis of the early 1990s caused the government of Jean Chrétien to reduce defence budgetary projections by almost 50% for the period up to the end of that decade. Personnel strength was to be reduced from

[229] McCormick, 181-192.
[230] Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy," 16.

almost 89,000 at the end of the Cold War to 60,000 by the end of the 1990s, a reduction of over 30%. Equipment purchases were reduced, cancelled or deferred. Fiscal considerations completely overwhelmed defence and security considerations. This is not to suggest that the fiscal concerns were not a real problem, or even a real threat to Canada. However, the fiscal situation was not caused by excessive defence expenditures. The government chose to ignore Collenette's warning that any post-Cold War peace dividend was a chimera and instead viewed the cutting of defence expenditures as a vital part of the solution to the problem.

This was compounded by a new post-Cold War strategy of commitments that created an operational tempo of overseas deployments not seen since the Korean War. In what should have been a clear indication of the need for a well-equipped, well-trained military, the number of operations involving CF personnel during the post-Cold War period was three times the number in the period 1945-1989.[231] The number of personnel deployed frequently exceeded the maximum sustainable ceiling, placing a considerable strain on a military which saw itself as a highly professional force.[232] The operational tempo experienced by the CF during the period of this 30% decline in personnel and budgets served to undermine the military's ability to maintain high professional levels and this severely weakened the relationship between the Defence Department Cluster and the Governmental Cluster.[233] Near the end of the post-Cold War era, as some CF

[231] Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence*, 7.
[232] The responsibility for the high operational tempo and resulting strain on the CF is not exclusively a political one. Numerous interviewees noted that in the aftermath of the Somalia Inquiry the leadership of the Canadian Forces felt it had little credibility with the government and was thus reluctant to reject a request to perform a task.
[233] Confidential interviews, October, 2008.

members were forced to use food banks to make ends meet, some defence officials feared for the very survival of the institution.[234]

Meanwhile, the human security agenda advanced by then Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy further confused an already unclear strategic situation regarding the potential uses of Canada's military. The government's calls for intervention on humanitarian grounds seemed to give the Canadian Forces a defined role in the post-Cold War era. Such a role also seemed to suggest, and in the eyes of the military promise, additional resources. While Axworthy had raised the human security agenda to the level of national policy, it was based on ideals not interests.[235] The implementation of such a policy was therefore discretionary and thus from the government's view subject to the higher priority of fiscal constraint.[236]

Political leaders seemed oblivious to the crisis within the Canadian Forces that was being slowly created over time. There was growing concern among defence analysts over another commitment-capabilities gap.[237] The budgetary reductions were causing equipment rust out and personnel burn out. The government seemed to be guided in its decisions on overseas commitments not by asking "How much is enough" but by trying to determine "How much is just enough"?[238] As Sokolsky and Jockel have noted, military

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[234] Ibid. Despite the sometimes difficult circumstances, there were notable efforts to upgrade equipment from time to time. Examples include the purchase of armoured personnel carriers, CF 18's and the CPF program.
[235] Axworthy's Human Security agenda was never officially adopted by the government as its policy but did dominate both the thinking and actions of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
[236] See Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy: Human security and the rescue of Canadian defence policy," *International Journal* 56, Winter 2000-2001.
[237] Bland, *Canada Without Armed forces,* xi.
[238] Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style," 10.

leaders may have resented this approach to military decision-making and the impact it was having on the Canadian Forces, but they said very little in any public forum.[239]

Whether this volatile mix of high expectations, failed promises and dangerous over-use contributed to the defining event of the civil-military relationship of the post-Cold War period remains a question of some debate. Beyond debate is the fact that when the United Nations' mandated mission to Somalia in the early part of 1993 went horribly wrong and resulted in murder, alleged cover-up, and public inquiry, the tensions that had been developing in the civil-military dynamic were exposed.

6.5.1 Somalia

Multiple factors contributed to the systemic failure that resulted in the torture and beating death of a Somalia teenager in March 1993. Some analysts have argued that what happened in Somalia was the inevitable result of the decades of neglect by successive governments.[240] No doubt the transition from a Cold War focus with added peacekeeping responsibilities to a post-Cold War operational focus on peace support missions contributed to the confused and ill-prepared deployment of Canadian troops to Somalia.[241]

Following two years of unanswered questions, theories, allegations and alleged cover up, a full Commission of Inquiry was established in March 1995 in an attempt to

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[239] Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATO's Odd Man Out Steps Forward," *The Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, vol. 6, issue 1, (April 2008): 100-115.
[240] Bercuson, *Significant Incident,* vi-vii; and Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military*, 159.
[241] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*, Executive Summary, (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1997), 47-51.

answer many troubling questions. Two years of exhaustive examination later, the inquiry's work was abruptly terminated by the government. The Inquiry's Terms of Reference included both a detailed examination of the facts surrounding not only the beating death of Shidane Arone but other suspicious incidents earlier in the deployment, as well as the leadership, command decision making and the actions and decisions of the Defence Department in respect of the Somalia operation. Among the many themes and issues explored by the Inquiry was the issue of the military's relationship to the society it serves and civil-military relations. Unfortunately, the Commission of Inquiry's analysis of the issue of civil-military relations was focused almost exclusively on the organizational arrangements within DND and therefore dealt only marginally with the military/people relationship and almost not at all with the civil-military relationships inherent in the governmental cluster.[242]

Rightly or wrongly, the Somalia affair was the dominant influence in the relationships within the National Cluster during most of the post-Cold War period. This incident further damaged what had become an untended relationship between the military and the people and threatened the basic trust essential to a democratic society's acceptance that it must maintain an armed force.[243] The Canadian public was horrified by both the incidents and the misrepresentations and misdeeds implicit in the alleged cover up. The leadership of the CF looked weak and ineffective in the eyes of both the public

[242] The main elements of the Commission of Inquiry's work on civil-military relations are drawn from a study prepared for the Commission by Bland. This report entitled *National Defence Headquarters: Center for Decision* deals almost exclusively with the organizational structures and decision making arrangements within the defence department cluster. The study concludes that civil-military relations in Canada are "floundering and uncertain" due to inadequate oversight of the Canadian Forces by Canada's political leadership, and recommends both an increase in Parliamentary oversight and a review of the organizational and command arrangements within DND.

[243] Maurice Baril, interview with author, 2009.

and the government. In response to this scandal and several subsequent public incidents that embarrassed the government, the decision was taken to disband the Canadian Airborne Regiment, a decision that was met with little if any noticeable public reaction outside defence circles. This decision further weakened the relationship between the military and the government.[244]

While Canada's political leaders responded to public concerns by establishing a formal inquiry, their other actions demonstrated little concern for the underlying causes of the long-term decline of the institution.[245] Such a decline in any institution will inevitably lead to a crisis in leadership. In the case of a public institution such as the Canadian Forces this failure of leadership must be shared by all of the players involved in the civil-military dynamic. Within the Defence Department Cluster, military and defence leaders played a role in continuing to accede to requests for deployments despite the obvious strains that were being placed on the Canadian Forces.[246] For the most part, the Civil Authority and the central agencies of the Public Service viewed the Department of National Defence largely as a contributor to deficit reduction, an approach that was later proven to be wrong.[247] Within the National Cluster, the Canadian people saw no reason to demand more care be paid to a national institution of dubious relevance whose primary role in their minds was that of a discretionary peacekeeper.

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[244] Confidential interviews by author, 2008.
[245] In the immediate aftermath of the Somalia Affair, the Defence budgets of 1994-1998 reduced expenditures by 23% in 1993 dollars. By the end of this period, the crisis within the Canadian military was such that some CF personnel had become users of food banks thus giving rise to concerns, confirmed during interviews of senior defence officials from that era, of a total system collapse.
[246] Former CDS Baril contends that the only solution to rebuilding the loss of trust over the Somalia Affair was to demonstrate competence by performing all assigned tasks with full professionalism, thus the institution walked a fine line between accepting the tasks assigned to them by the government and privately complaining about a deteriorating asset base.
[247] Confidential interview by author, 2008.

6.6 Conclusion

Many of the analyses of Canada's military in the post-Cold War period identify political leadership or political "indifference" as the key problem in civil-military relations.[248] However, terms such as "crisis" and "problems" ought to be used with some caution for fear of overstating what is essentially "not a contest about sovereignty over civil-military relations" but "rather a subtle contest between political actors over budgets and missions."[249] Assessing the relationships within and among the Clusters shows how this subtle, or often not so subtle, contest affected the civil-military dynamic in Canada during the post-Cold War.

Within the National Cluster, the issue of political leadership and the relationship between the government and the people ought to be the dominant factor in shaping the civil-military dynamic. If this is not the case, then there is greater risk that the military will lose sight of its basic mission namely to serve society and its government. No Prime Minister and few other Ministers have shown much interest in defence policy, excepting during war and crisis.[250] If there is no immediate threat and our allies and partners seem satisfied, then how much is just enough, or "realism Canadian style," fairly describe the way that analysts have attempted to explain the actions of Canada's political leaders in matters of national defence. However, even some of the most critical observers of the actions of the political leadership acknowledge that as citizens in a democracy, we must

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[248] Granatstein's *Who Killed the Canadian Military* deals almost exclusively with perceived failures of politicians in defence matters. See also J.L. Granatstein, "This is No Way to Run a Modern Military," *Globe and Mail*, July 17, 2008. The alleged problem of political indifference is featured prominently in many of Bland's works, including *Who Decides*, and *Center for Decision*.

[249] Bland, *Who Decides*, 9.

[250] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 18.

accept ultimate responsibility for the actions of the governments we elect.[251] In our democratic system of government, voters choose elected representatives in part based on their stated intentions to pursue certain policy choices. There may be ones other than defence and security, thus forcing those elected to find the balance between choices related to the security of the state, and the will of the people in a democracy.

Throughout the post-Cold War era the dominant concern of political leaders and the people was therefore restoring fiscal stability. This priority within the National Cluster was very strong and so too was the relationship, whereas the relationship between the government and the military was weak. In the absence of a direct conventional military threat, defence and security matters were of concern to only those with interests directly connected to the defence establishment outside of the occasional public demands to deploy military forces noted above. Finally, the relationship between the military and the people was also weakened by the Somalia Affair and the fact that the civil authority (PM and Cabinet) was not entirely open about the operations on some of the missions, especially in the Balkans. An under-manned and ill-equipped Canadian Forces was facing completely different challenges than those of previous peacekeeping operations. Yet the government, likely implicitly rather than explicitly, did not want to draw attention to the increased challenges posed by these missions and thus did not champion the military and help rally public support for the CF personnel engaged in dangerous and deadly missions. In the absence of a proactive role within the national cluster on the part of the military, or more particularly and appropriately the government, the public did not know the full

[251] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military*, 202.

story and, given its overall policy priorities, the government was content with this situation.[252]

Given this dynamic in the National Cluster, the relationships and consequential actions of the players in the Governmental Cluster were entirely understandable. The public service in general, and particularly the Central Agencies, took on the task of designing the policies to effectively implement the government's agenda.[253] This should not be seen in a negative light since this is how policy decisions must flow in a democracy. In fact the 1990s in general was a period of intense strategic policy coherence in Ottawa centered on the battle to beat the deficit. This imperative defined everything and thus the relationship between the public service and the civil authority in this cluster was the strongest. Despite the woes of declining budgets and personnel strength, high operational tempo and the crisis caused by the Somalia affair, Canada's military leaders obediently accepted the fact that the government's priorities were not related to defence and security. The behaviours of military officers towards the civil authority respected the principle of subordination. As members of the CF like to say, the military "stayed in its lane."

Within the Defence Department Cluster, the relationships were variable, depending on the personalities of the players and factors external to Defence. The Minister's ability to aggressively represent the interests of the Defence Department actions were often limited by his responsibilities to the electorate as a part of the National

[252] This conclusion was endorsed by some senior military officers and civilian public servants who occupied positions within the Department of National Defence during the era.
[253] This was confirmed in numerous interviews with former public servants and elected officials.

Cluster and his responsibilities in the Governmental Cluster as a member of Cabinet. For example, in the Somalia case, the public pressure for a response to the problems with the Airborne Regiment, and the subsequent decision to disband the unit placed the Minister in a difficult position with the CF in the Defence Department Cluster.[254]

Given the demands put upon the military it terms of multiple deployments and declining budgets, the post-Cold War era Canadian military did its duty and did it well, with little acknowledged public support or understanding. The state of civil-military relations in Canada was as it should be: the military obeyed and performed even though it believed the political leadership was wrong in its attempt to have "armed servants" implement a discretionary and to some extent unfunded agenda. By the end of the post-Cold War era, the Canadian Forces had taken significant steps to redress the broken bonds of trust with Canadians as a result of the Somalia affair and there was a growing public consciousness of the perils of the long-term decline of Canada's military. In the post 9/11 period, the military would not challenge the political leadership's "right to be wrong" but would seek to enhance its influence within all three clusters in order to make sure that the implications of the decisions made were fully understood and the public was well informed of what it was asking the military to do.

[254] David Collenette, interview with author, November 2008.

CHAPTER 7 - THE CIVIL-MILITARY DYNAMIC IN THE POST 9/11 ERA

7.1 Introduction

The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 marked the end of the post-Cold War era and represented a new international security environment. The changed security environment had a dramatic impact on the balance between the various policy priorities of the government and relationships in the civil-military dynamic. The attacks on the United States thrust concerns over continental defence to the forefront of public consciousness. The resulting security environment brought with it a redefined imperative in the field of Canada/US relations. The remaining variables of the domestic political situation and the state of military professionalism would also soon have an impact on both the relative and real influence of the three clusters of influencers and thus the civil-military dynamic. This changed dynamic served to shift the equilibrium of civil-military relations in favour of defence and security policy priorities in a way that caused some to suggest that the relationship between the military and the civil authority is broken.[255] These assertions are usually linked to the public comments of General Rick Hillier, and as this thesis argues is not evidence of a fracture in Canada's civil-military relationship. For his part, Hillier rejects the premise that his public comments were inappropriate. He does assert however that the respective roles and responsibilities of all the players in the civil-military dynamic need to be clearly defined. Otherwise, he suggests, the concept of

[255] Numerous articles, editorials and opinion pieces have suggested that the normal state of civil-military relations had been altered in a negative manner. These include the previously cited articles: Travers, "Hillier's Personality Masked Mistakes,"; "Gen. Hillier steps out of bounds," *Globe and Mail* editorial; and "An uneven power struggle," *Globe and Mail* editorial.

shared responsibility leads to confusion and ambiguity over accountability for important decisions.[256]

7.2 The Threat Environment

During the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, threats to Canada were usually seen through the prism of threats to the United States or threats to NATO allies. The 9/11 attacks served notice that Canada's national security involved much more than territorial security.[257] In response, the government of Canada published two major policy statements that dealt with this changed threat environment. In 2004, the government produced Canada's first National Security Policy, *Securing an Open Society*. It was billed as a strategic framework and action plan designed to ensure that Canada would be prepared for and could respond to current and future threats.[258] For the first time in several decades Canada's national security was a major policy concern. *Securing an Open Society* was not however a statement of defence policy. The potential uses of military force in general, and the Canadian Forces in particular, occupy a very small portion of the government's framework and action plan. The document did note that an updated statement of defence policy would be forthcoming.

As noted in Chapter two, the relationship between a higher threat environment and civil-military relations is the subject of Desch's structural theory.[259] This theory holds that the strength of civilian control over the military is fundamentally shaped by

[256] Rick Hillier, interview by author, February 2009.
[257] Government of Canada, *International Policy Statement*, May 2005, Introduction, 6.
[258] Government of Canada, "*Securing on Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*," April 2004, vii.
[259] Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, 11.

structural factors such as threats. A higher threat environment alters the behaviours of individual leaders, military organizations, the government and the society thereby improving civilian control of the military by producing increased unity of purpose.[260] In Canada's case, threats may be non-military. It has been argued that Canada's national security is closely linked to our economic relationship with the United States.[261]

The second major policy statement of the post 9/11 period was *Canada's International Policy Statement – A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* was released in April 2005. In stark contrast to the 1994 White Paper's focus on reducing defence expenditures to help deal with the country's fiscal crisis, the 2005 policy statement acknowledged the requirement to reinvest and rebuild the Canadian Forces.[262] With the new higher threat security environment as a defining parameter for foreign and defence policy, the government committed to a major expansion of the Canadian Forces and a transformation of the way it operated in this new environment. The new international security environment thus had an impact on the domestic political agenda and altered the relationship between civilian and military leaders as predicted by Desch's structural theory.[263]

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[260] Ibid 10-12.
[261] An example of this linkage is the post 9/11 Federal Budget which provided almost $6 Billion for security, very little of which was for military or defence purposes
[262] Government of Canada, *The International Policy Statement – A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence,* 1-4.
[263] Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, 131.

7.3 The Domestic Political Situation

A third consecutive majority government for Prime Minister Chrétien in 2000 seemed to provide a relatively stable domestic political environment during the period leading up to and shortly after 9/11. However, not long after the 9/11 attacks, internal leadership dynamics within the governing party had a negative impact on this stability.[264] The resulting leadership contest and change of government in 2003 served to focus attention on internal domestic politics rather than the external threat environment and the appropriate government responses to a still tenuous security situation.

In December 2003, Paul Martin became Prime Minister and inherited a majority government. His administration was quickly forced to deal with a political scandal which caused further instability in the domestic situation.[265] Throughout the first six months of 2004, the Martin government was primarily focused on this political scandal and the preparations for an election expected during that calendar year. The June 2004 election resulted in a Liberal minority government with an opposition that had strong positions on defence and security issues. This caused the relationship between the government and the military within the National Cluster to become a priority on the government's policy agenda. The minority election result also weakened the connection between the government and the people within this Cluster. Within the Governmental Cluster the effect of dealing with the administration of a minority parliament, for the first time in

[264] For the range of views and opinions on the internal party politics during this time, see: Eddie Goldenberg, *The Way it Works: Inside Ottawa*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2007), 370-381; Paul Martin, *Hell or High Water: My Life in and out of Politics*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2008), Chapter 16; and Jean Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, (Toronto: A.A. Knopf Canada, 2008), 369-401.

[265] The Martin government's handling of the Sponsorship scandal is extensively explored in his memoirs *Hell or High Water*, Chapter 19.

recent memory, caused further instability in the decision making processes. Finally, the defeat of the Martin government's Defence Minister in the 2004 election provided the impetus for a new leadership team within the Defence Department Cluster. In short order, the dynamics of the new relationships within these Clusters resulted in the emergence of the new defence policy that was the centerpiece of an integrated International Policy Statement and a reinvestment in the military as the dominant public policy issue of the Martin government.

When the Martin government was defeated in January 2006, the incoming Conservative minority government of Stephen Harper was faced with the situation of a high profile military leadership that had seized the opportunity presented by the new external threat environment and empowerment by political leadership to begin the process of rebuilding the Canadian military and reestablishing a connection between the military and the Canadian people.

7.4 The Canada/U.S. Relationship

The three key decisions that largely shaped Canada's current involvement in Afghanistan are all based primarily on considerations stemming from the relationship with the United States. Each decision to incrementally increase the military commitment to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) was based on the optics of Canada/U.S. relations.[266] The first decision was taken by the government of Jean Chrétien in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11. Canada's military commitments in support of the GWOT

[266] Stein and Lang, *Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*. The intertwining of decisions on Afghanistan and the Canada/U.S. relationship is one of the key themes of *Unexpected War* and was confirmed by numerous interview respondents.

included some naval and air assets. This was supplemented in early 2002 by a battle group of 800 soldiers in the southern part of Afghanistan. As Sokolsky contends ought to be the case, the more substantive Canadian response to the attacks of 9/11 was rooted in such issues as border security and the realities of our economic interdependence with the United States.[267]

The second decision, to increase Canada's involvement in Afghanistan in 2003, was also taken by the Chrétien government. Domestic political considerations again played a key role as public support for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was virtually non-existent. To offset the consequences associated with the decision to not participate in the invasion of Iraq, Canada decided to accept a leadership role in the NATO-led ISAF mission in Kabul, Afghanistan.[268]

The third decision was to further increase Canada's military involvement in the southern region of Afghanistan. This decision can be directly linked to the decision to not participate in the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program. While public opinion clearly favoured the rejection of the BMD program, the Martin government was vulnerable and the Conservative opposition had signaled that defence and security would be key elements of the next election. Efforts to identify an offset to placate the Americans therefore centered on next steps in Afghanistan.[269]

[267] Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style,"3-4.
[268] Stein and Lang, Chapters 3-4.
[269] Ibid, 177.

A further factor in the Canada/U.S. dynamic was the new leadership team within the Defence Department Cluster. The newly appointed Minister was Bill Graham, whose recent Cabinet portfolio was Foreign Affairs, was well-versed in the intricacies on the relationship with the Americans. A new Deputy Minister who had led the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service for ten years arrived shortly thereafter. Finally Lieutenant General Rick Hillier had just returned from commanding the ISAF forces in Afghanistan and would soon be appointed as the new Chief of the Defence Staff. An earlier posting as the Deputy Corp Commander in Fort Hood, Texas, had served to reinforce a deep respect for an American military that was at the time engaged in two wars, one in Iraq and the other in Afghanistan. All three officials shared the view that increased emphasis on defence and security were the key to strengthening the Canada/U.S. relationship.[270]

7.5 The Military Profession and the Defence Institution

Leadership matters. Public institutions are not simply organizations, or as previously noted "just so many lines and boxes on a chart." For example, political leadership during the post-Cold War era led to a successful campaign to overcome threats to Canada's fiscal situation. This principle is particularly valid when applied to military institutions where leadership plays a crucial role in the very fabric of the institution. In the decade since the Somalia scandal, Canada's military leadership had been renewed and regenerated. A "new generation of Generals," enabled by a political imperative to

[270] Ward Elcock, interview with author, September, 2008.

enhance the role of the military increased the influence of the Defence Department Cluster within Canada's civil-military dynamic.[271]

According to Bland, Canada's current military leaders have been conditioned by their post-Cold War experiences. During this period they were deployed nearly continuously on international missions that had little resemblance to their training and experience.[272] This situation was made worse by the realization that their government and most Canadians cared little for what they were doing, or the effect these endless conflicts were having on them or their soldiers.[273] Problems with poor equipment and political and public indifference to the actual nature of the operation were compounded by the poor performance by the CF's senior leadership over the Somalia incident. In its aftermath, this failure of leadership served to underline the importance of re-examining the values and ethics associated with professional military service.[274]

The Somalia Commission's report underlined the problems that failures of professionalism and leadership can cause in military organizations.[275] Shortly thereafter a process was initiated to conduct an extensive examination of the nature of military

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[271] Douglas Bland used the expression "New Generation of Generals" to describe the changes in senior military leadership that were caused in part by the fallout of the Somalia affair. See Douglas S. Bland, "Hillier and the New Generation of Generals: The CDS, The Policy and the Troops," *Policy Options*, March 2008, 54-58.
[272] Ibid.
[273] Ibid.
[274] Lorne W. Bentley, *Canadian Forces Transformation and the Civilian Public Service Defence Professional*, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, (Kingston: Queen's Printer, 2007), 33.
[275] One of the constants in the analysis and assessment of the Somalia Affair is the failure of professionalism and leadership within the Canadian Forces. However this is not to suggest that the institution was without values or ethics prior to this period. In fact it was the innate professionalism of the Canadian Forces and its commitment to military ethos that caused it to rededicate itself to the examination and adoption of new standards of values and ethics. In addition to the report of the Commission of Inquiry, see also Bercusson, *Significant Incident*.

professionalism and its related attributes and core values. The end product of this analysis was *Duty with Honour – The Profession of Arms in Canada.* In redefining military professionalism, *Duty with Honour* identified three core components of the conduct of the profession of arms in Canada:

> Beliefs and expectations about military service, fundamental Canadian values and core military values. The beliefs are unlimited liability, fighting spirit, teamwork and discipline. Fundamental Canadian values are derived from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the precept of absolute military subordination to elected representatives comprising the Canadian government and, axiomatically reflecting the will of the Canadian people. The core military values are Duty, Loyalty, Integrity and Courage.[276]

The reaffirmation of the principles of military professionalism in Canada and the rededication of Canada's military to its ideals has been a success story. Ethics and values are central not only to the members of a military organization, but also represent a necessary component of a balanced civil-military relationship in that the precept of absolute subordination is a core value in the military ethos.[277] The principles and values in *Duty with Honour* are taught in every Canadian Forces educational venue and are a source of pride within the institution.

Several examples are particularly illustrative of the change in attitude from the previous two eras where "silent soldiers and sailors" were the norm sought by politicians.[278] In the first instance, the frequency and clarity of briefings to the media about military operations in Afghanistan throughout the deployment there but in

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[276] Ibid, 35.
[277] For a more detailed examination of the importance of military values and ethics and the challenges associated with their continuous application in a large and diverse organization see Richard A. Gabriel, *The Warriors Way: A Treatise on Military Ethics*, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007).
[278] Brooke Claxton, *Claxton Memoirs*, 1524, as quoted in Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 45.

particular in the post 2006 period stands in sharp relief to the sporadic attempts during operations in the 1990s (Kosovo excepted) to inform Canadians on the CF missions overseas. Second, in 2002 then-Defence Minister Eggleton was questioned on how the CF would handle captured Taliban fighters. He stated that this was entirely a hypothetical issue but newspaper photos later showed that such was definitively not the case. Eggleton quickly declared that he had not been informed that CF forces in Afghanistan had captured Taliban fighters. He may have expected that dutiful military officers would back up this incorrect statement.[279] Instead, he was summarily contradicted in parliamentary testimony by both the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff.[280]

A third example occurred in 2008 when a spokesperson in the Prime Minister's Office told the media that the CF had not informed the government about a key operational decision respecting the transfer of prisoners. After a stinging rebuke by numerous senior military leaders, the official recanted and said she had "misspoke."[281] The fundamental values and principles in *Duty with Honour* did not include covering political failures or indiscretions or blaming the military as a matter of political convenience. Even while acknowledging Feaver's assertion that politicians have "the right to be wrong," blind obedience to the civil authority is not part of the ethical code of the military profession. In fact, the military value of loyalty in *Duty with Honour* is a reciprocal one. When such loyalty between the military profession and the government

[279] Bland, "Hillier and the New Generation of Generals," 58.
[280] Ibid. This should not be taken as a suggestion by the author that prior to that time military officials would have willfully misled a Parliamentary Committee.
[281] Campbell Clark and Brodie Fenlon, "PMO Backtracks on Detainees," *Globe and Mail*, January 25, 2008.

and people they serve are truly reciprocal, the relationship bonds needed for strong stable civil-military relationships are enhanced. Canada's military had gone to great lengths to re-establish a values based approach to serving Canadians after Somalia and it was ill-inclined to allow this new connection to be undermined.[282]

7.5.1 Connecting with Canadians

The bond between Canada's military and the Canadian public eroded slowly during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. With no real threat and the number of veterans declining, the nature of Canadians understanding of the importance of maintaining military forces weakened. With few exceptions, Canada's Prime Ministers and Defence Ministers were content to follow the strategy of commitments and were largely uninterested in strategic matters and defence policy.[283] There was no visible public role for military leaders, and for the most part politicians preferred it this way. The establishment of the office of the Chief of Defence Staff in 1964, and unification efforts of Paul Hellyer did little to alter either the service oriented focus of the military leaders or their public profile.[284]

The nadir of the relationship between Canada's senior military leaders and the Canadian public occurred during the immediate aftermath of the Somalia affair. The public hearings underscored the growing realization that Canada's military leadership had failed in its leadership responsibilities and the bond of trust between the military and the

[282] Bland, "Hillier and the New Generation of Generals," 58.
[283] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 18-22.
[284] Ibid, 265-266.

society they serve – so essential to the civil-military dynamic – was broken.[285] The rebuilding of that trust-based relationship began with the examination of military ethics and values. It was fueled by the deep embarrassment that had been visited upon a proud organization where the principle of unlimited liability – the acceptance that one will sacrifice ones life for country – was an accepted fact. And it was cemented with a fraternal commitment of 'never again.'[286]

During the final years of the post-Cold War era, two events helped to begin the process of re-establishing the trust that was lost following Somalia. The domestic operations during the Manitoba Red River flood in 1997 and the ice storm in central and eastern Canada in 1998 demonstrated to Canadians that the CF was an instrument of public good. Both operations were important visible demonstrations that Canadians could count on their military for assistance when they needed it. The new bonds of trust were strengthened when the deaths of four soldiers in a friendly-fire incident in 2002 transfixed the country and further accelerated in 2005 when the Canadian Forces leadership moved to deliberately strengthen what it saw as its "center of gravity," its credibility with Canadians.[287]

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[285] The commentary on the breaking of the bond of trust between the CF and Canadians is extensive as well as the role played by the media in both uncovering the Somalia incident and reporting to Canadians on its aftermath. See: Dennis Stairs, "The media and the military in Canada: Reflections on a time of troubles," *International Journal*, vol. 53 Issue 3, summer 1998, 544-553; Bernd Horn, ed. *From the Outside Looking In: Media and Defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership*, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), Chapters 1 and 7; Bercusson, *Significant Incident;* and Bland, "New Generation of Generals,"

[286] Bland, "New Generation of Generals,"

[287] Government document, "Connecting with Canadians," June 18, 2006.

The senior Canadian Forces officer leading the response to the ice storm operation was then Brigadier-General Hillier. The extensive and almost exclusively positive media coverage of the work of the Canadian Forces made a great impression on the officer who, in the post 9/11 period, would become Chief of the Land Staff, Commander of the ISAF force in Kabul, Afghanistan and be selected as Canada's sixteenth Chief of the Defence Staff. Hillier's experiences throughout his career underscored the importance of connecting with Canadians and his actions as CDS have helped make the CF a visible and respected part of the Canadian fabric.[288]

The origins of the reconnection are not however based solely on the public statements or public persona of any single individual or group of military leaders. The undertaking required an institution-wide commitment to the openness and transparency recommended by the Somalia Commission of Inquiry. Following the Commission's report the Public Affairs branch (singled out for special criticism by the Inquiry) was reorganized and new leadership was tasked with setting out the principles and guidelines to give effect to the openness and transparency recommended by the Inquiry. The recommended cure for the ills that had befallen the Canadian Forces largely as a result of aggressive work by the media seemed illogical. Larry Gordon, a respected communications consultant hired to effect change, recommended and later enacted a policy that authorized all National Defence employees uniformed or civilian to speak to the media, effectively without prior approval.[289] Despite the potential negative impact on

[288] General Rick Hillier, interview by author, 2009.
[289] Nigel Hannaford, "The Military and the Media in Canada since 1992," *Security and Defence Studies Review*, vol. 1, Winter 2001, 207-210. See also Larry Gordon, "Let Canadians Decide," in Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, eds., *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral* (Toronto: Vanwell Press, 2000), 373-382.

the principle of Ministerial responsibility, the limitations on this authority were relatively minor.[290] This change of internal procedure, which was at odds with the procedures elsewhere in government departments and agencies, was the single biggest reason the CF was able to re-establish a trust-based relationship with Canadians.

Combined with almost a decade of formal communications training and assistance to commanders of all rank levels, together with a branch of trained communications specialists available around the clock, the National Defence public relations capacity was recently described by Derek Burney of the Manley Afghanistan Panel as virtually unparalleled among public institutions in Canada.[291] The effects of the internal changes to the relationship within the media were first seen in the latter stages of the post-Cold War period during the Kosovo bombing campaign. War and conflict, and any association with them, can be toxic to politicians concerned with domestic re-election. As the Kosovo air war began in earnest it was clear however that some public communications would be required. The Minister turned to one of his senior officials, the media-savvy and bilingual Ray Henault to provide almost daily briefings to the media. The resulting exposure undoubtedly contributed to Henault being selected as Canada's fifteenth Chief of the Defence Staff in 2000.[292]

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[290] While the process limitations were relatively minor, the authority to speak with the media only covered elements of the individual's job and not matters of governmental or departmental policy. In this way the principle of Ministerial accountability was maintained.

[291] Burney made this assessment while speaking at a public panel on Afghanistan sponsored by *The Walrus* magazine and the Public Policy Forum at the National Arts Center in Ottawa on April 23, 2008.

[292] Confidential Interviews by author, Ottawa, 2008.

In 2005, as the CF moved to begin its largest and most dangerous mission since the Korean War, the Canadian Forces had a story to tell, the capacity and knowledge on how to tell it, and a spokesman who was committed to reversing the leadership debacle of a decade earlier:

> Certainly, Hillier's ability to engage the public effectively in matters important to the Canadian Forces and to Canada's national defence helps explain his public popularity. But his popularity is more likely due to Canadians willingness to trust what he says.[293]

The evidence of this trust can be found in the extremely high levels of public support for Hillier as he moved to leave office in 2008.[294] While Canadians did not overwhelmingly support the government's policies in Afghanistan, the levels of public support for the Canadian Forces in general and the now increasingly visible senior leadership grew to unprecedented levels.

7.6 Conclusion

The increased in influence of the Defence Department Cluster within the overall civil-military dynamic can be attributed to several factors. First and foremost was the enabling support of the civil authority that sought to increase the role of National Defence in the strategic framework of government policy priorities.[295] Second was the strong partnership of key individuals within the cluster during the 2004-2006 timeframe combined with the entrepreneurial leadership of these individuals. Finally, the uncertain political environment caused by successive minority governments had the effect of a

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[293] Bland, "New Generation of Generals," 58.
[294] Mike Blanchfield, "Gen Hillier has massive public approval rating, poll shows," *Ottawa Citizen*, April 19, 2008.
[295] Hon. Bill Graham, interview by author, 2008.

relative weakening of both the relationship between the government and the people within the National Cluster and the influence of the Governmental Cluster overall.

It has been suggested that General Hillier's leadership unbalanced the relationship between the civilians and the military in the defence department and also between Defence and other departments.[296] After decades of declining influence within the National and Governmental Clusters, senior military leaders were given responsibility for shaping Canada's defence policy - historically the domain of civilians - and were singled out for their role in obtaining the largest budget increase in generations, $13 billion in the 2005 budget.[297] In the early days of 2005 the Canadian Forces were suddenly at the heart of the government's agenda.[298]

Despite the critics of this increased influence of the military, there were no definable instances of insubordination or disobedience throughout this period by any CF leaders. What did happen was that the dynamic of civil-military relations in Canada changed. There was a relatively sudden shift of influence toward the defence cluster and within that cluster toward the military. The military also strengthened its position within the national cluster by connecting with Canadians. This too increased its relative influence. These shifts, both within clusters and among them, afforded the military greater relative influence over decisions. In large measure this greater influence responded to a political imperative to address the need to improve Canada/U.S. relations

[296] Janice Stein and Eugene Lang, "Too Few Hilliers," *The Walrus Magazine*, April 2008; see also *Unexpected War*, 260.
[297] Stein and Lang, *Unexpected War,* 151.
[298] Ibid, 160.

and also respond to the real requirement to fight a war in Afghanistan. The military did not do anything the government did not want it to do; it merely provided the public support and the means to implement the wishes of the civil authority. In the final analysis decisions on military matters that fell within the purview of the civil authority remained with the civil authority.

The relative influence within and amongst the three Clusters is an ever-changing dynamic. With the election of the Harper government in 2006, the partnership within the Defence Department Cluster changed with the appointment of a new Minister and Deputy Minister. And in July, 2008 a new CDS was appointed. As seen in 2004, new leadership can change the civil-military dynamic. Thus the partnership within the Defence Department Cluster that had led to the shift in influence will now find a new equilibrium, one that constantly shifts in response to personalities, leadership and changing circumstances.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

Theories of civil-military relations invariably focus on two central themes. The first deals with questions related to the existence of, or problems with, civil control of the armed forces of the state. To be sure, in many new or emerging democracies, such questions are relevant and can frequently have real life consequences. However this is not the case in Canada where civil control of the military is as much an article of faith as our belief in democracy itself - indeed these two concepts are directly related. As Bland notes, in a situation where the civil authority has the legitimacy and the armed forces have the guns, the willing obedience of military officers to the civil authority rests on the belief that democracy cannot exist without civil control of the armed forces. Perhaps not coincidentally, this view was strongly endorsed by four former Chiefs of the Defence Staff interviewed for this thesis. Therefore, civil control exists not because it is imposed upon the military. Rather it exists because the military insists upon it, takes pride in carrying out its mandate in a professional manner, and is prepared to sacrifice Canadian lives to uphold the principle.

The second theme of theoretical examinations of civil-military relations is aimed at explaining how the relationship between the military and the civil authority could, or in some cases should work. Most of the resulting theories look at the structural factors, (military professionalism, threat environment or contractual relationship are some examples) that theorists believe are key variables in the civil-military relationship. These theories usually abstract out of the examination the relationships between specific office

holders and the influence of individual personalities on the actions taken. Structural theories are indeed important components of our attempts to understand the complex systems inherent in civil-military relations, and offer important insights on the nature of the functioning of civil control of the military. Yet in every interview with key stakeholders in the civil-military dynamic in Canada, it was noted that civil-military relations is dramatically affected by the dynamics of leadership and personality. Therefore, the study of how civil-military relations actually functions within the context of the state should be about both civil control and the dynamics of civil-military relationships. The Cluster Theory used in this thesis thus provides a framework for analysis by identifying the players involved in these relationships as well as the various factors that influence the actions and outcomes involving the use of the military and its resources. It is an articulation of how civil-military relations do work in actual practice and not, by contrast to other studies, a theoretical explanation of how civil-military relations should work.

This thesis has identified three groups of players and four factors that influence the behaviour of these players. It has been argued that the interaction of the players in the National Cluster, (the people, the military and the government), serves to shape the direction of defence and security policy for Canada. Thus, during the Cold War era, the concept of Canada as a member of NATO, a partner in NORAD, and frequent contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations was recommended by the government and endorsed by the people and the military. The factors of threat environment, domestic politics, Canada/U.S. relations and military professionalism all contributed to the

adoption of these policies. The players in the Governmental and the Defence Department Clusters guided themselves accordingly, and by the latter stages of the Cold War, the myth that Canadian soldiers were "peacekeepers" was formed.[299]

The post-Cold War era saw the functioning of a much different civil-military dynamic. The end of the Cold War and resulting perception of a benign threat environment combined with the widespread belief that Canada was a peacekeeping nation meant that the National Cluster dynamics had only minimal impact on the functioning of the civil-military dynamic. The government's strategic objective of deficit reduction served to minimize most if not all consideration of defence and security issues, notwithstanding an uncertain global security situation and a military that was clearly in a state of serious decline. During the same period of time, the weakening of military professionalism meant that the Defence Department Cluster role was minimized. In fact the weakened position of the Department of National Defence meant that it disproportionately contributed to the achievement of the government's strategic objective of deficit reduction.[300] In these circumstances, the non-defence players in the Governmental Cluster concentrated their efforts on the achievement of the government's over-arching objective of deficit reduction despite the reservations of Defence Department Cluster players.

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[299] Evidence of the continued strength of this belief was contained in the March 2008 report by Ipsos Reid, "Views of the Canadian Forces." It may be self-evident but is nonetheless worth repeating that peacekeeping is not a profession or a vocation. It is simply one of the many tasks that soldiers are trained to carry out. It is not much different than the situation involving virtually every police officer in every community in Canada every day. They are trained peace officers. However in the conduct of their jobs they may be required to use force or even deadly force with weapons. We never pretend, for reasons of political expediency, that they are only peace officers.

[300] Confidential interview by author, 2008.

Finally, the post-9/11 era has seen a further shift in the civil-military dynamic. In these circumstances, the factors of threat environment, the domestic political situation, Canada/U.S. relations and the resurgent military profession have all combined to allow the Defence Department Cluster to become a more influential if not the dominant force in Canada's civil-military dynamic. In addition to the influence of these factors, the, leadership, personalities and relationships also played a role in the changed civil-military dynamics. The military leadership of the Canadian Forces enhanced its relationship with the people in the National Cluster. The players within the Defence Department Cluster formed a strong and unified partnership based on a shared belief in the importance an increased emphasis on defence and security. Finally, the willing support of a Prime Minister seeking to enhance Canada's role in the world allowed all these factors to contribute to a changed dynamic. As a consequence the dynamics of the Governmental Cluster were for the first time in several decades dominated by defence and security issues. Within the National Cluster, the five-year combat mission fighting an insurgency in Afghanistan has failed to alter the belief among Canadians that the Canadian Forces are peacekeepers, but has seen positive overall impressions of the CF rise to nine out of ten Canadians.[301]

Relationship dynamics in a network of multiple players is frequently complex. Where multiple players have varying responsibilities within different but related networks the complexity increases. When the variable of ever-changing external factors is added to this mix, the challenges associated with outcome prediction are further increased. There are however some general indicators that can be used to assess the

[301] "Views of the Canadian Forces," Ipsos Reid Public Affairs, March, 2008.

functioning of the civil-military dynamic in Canada. The first is the philosophical predisposition of the Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister believes that defence and security matters are a priority for the government then the relationship dynamics of the Defence Department Cluster will likely have an increased profile in the list of strategic government priorities. The second indicator is the various relationships in which the Minister of National Defence (MND) is involved. The PM/MND relationship is first and foremost followed by the MND/CDS and MND/DM dynamics. As the CDS has a direct relationship with the Prime Minister as his military advisor, the way in which the relationship between the Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff is handled will affect the relationship dynamic in the Defence Department Cluster.[302] Also, as was seen in the post 9/11 era, when the relationship dynamic among the MND/CDS/DM is a strong equal partnership, the ability of the Defence Department Cluster to influence the players in the Governmental and National Clusters is enhanced.

The elaboration of this framework of factors and players used to assess civil-military relations is consistent with the theme of shared responsibility. As Bland notes, the concept of shared responsibility is found in most literature on civil-military relations, but perhaps is most in evidence in Huntington's *Soldier and the State*.[303] The various factors used in the Cluster Concept are often components of structural theories of how civil-military relations can or should work. For example, professionalism in Huntington,

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[302] Several former Ministers and Chiefs of the Defence Staff noted that even the CDS's role in state ceremonial functions can be important as it brings the holder of the office into regular contact with the Prime Minister.

[303] As cited in Bland, *A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, 11. Huntington describes the conduct of civil-military relations as a system composed of interdependent elements attempting to achieve equilibrium between the authority, influence and ideology of military and non-military actors. Feaver's Agency Theory is similarly based on a sharing of influence and authority in a circumstance where this sharing is part of a "contractual" principal-agent relationship.

threat environment in Desch, the domestic political situation in Finer and Schiff. While many of the extant theories consider the dynamics between the military professional and the relevant civilian authority, the existing literature frequently does not further define these two groups into actual functioning networks where the interaction of the players can be observed.[304] The delineation of the Governmental and Defence Department Clusters accepts that these are separate and distinct networks that do interact and indeed overlap on many issues. The functioning of these networks is also independently affected by the various factors at play. Numerous works, such as those by Savoie, make reference to the functioning of the players in the Governmental Cluster, although not usually in the context of civil-military relations.[305] Finally, the identification of a National Cluster and the roles of its players help to bring a higher strategy or purpose to the examination of the civil-military dynamic, rather than looking exclusively at issues of a tactical or transactional nature, as tend to be the case in the Governmental and Defence Department Clusters. As such, this thesis provides a useful addition to the examination of civil-military relations in Canada and perhaps elsewhere as well.

The primary research aspect of this study validated the assessment framework represented by the Cluster Concept and provided an understanding of how the clusters work. Each of the thirty interviewees was a key player in the civil-military dynamic

[304] Certainly an exception here is Huntington who devotes several chapters to the roles of the various players in the defence establishment and the relationships between military officers and elected officials. This analysis is however now dated.

[305] The literature that examines the authority and influence of the various players in the Governmental Cluster is very limited. Savoie's *Governing from the Center*, *Breaking the Bargain* and *Court Government* do focus on these players but not in the context of civil-military affairs. Bland's *Chiefs of Defence* devotes an entire chapter to "shared responsibility" for defence but does not mention the broader role of Cabinet or the influence of other agencies and departments of government.

during one or more of the three periods studied.[306] While this thesis has identified the three groups of players and the factors that influence their behaviours and actions, numerous additional avenues of research may be useful to determine if there are any direct relationships between each cluster and each factor. For example, understanding how these clusters function within the system of civil-military relations may facilitate deployment decision making, or at least make it somewhat more transparent to all the players. Despite some assertions that the Hillier period caused a problematic change in civil-military relations in Canada, there is no evidence to substantiate such claims. Elected officials in Canada have consistently recognized the importance of military expertise and this principle of any civil-military regime has perhaps been strengthened in the post 9/11 era with the military leadership that Canada has experienced during this time. This was not unexpected, as every respondent stated emphatically that the personalities and leadership of key individuals, especially but not exclusively the Prime Minister, is an important consideration. The never ending debate over the appropriate balance between "war is too important to be left to the generals," but also "too important to completely ignore their advice," will continue.[307] Canadians however are likely better served by a more visible and transparent system of civil-military relations where the "unequal dialogue" may well have become more equal.

[306] See Appendix A for a list of interviewees.

[307] For an excellent discussion on the relative merits between these two conflicting points of view see Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 1-14. The first viewpoint is attributed to Georges Clemenceau as cited in Cohen, 54. The second (emphasis added) is a summation of a widely held school of military thought in the United States reflecting on the issue of political involvement in military decision making following the Vietnam and first Gulf Wars. See Cohen, 3.

Because the variables of leadership and individual personality will always be key factors in the functioning of the Cluster Concept, the analysis of civil-military relations using this assessment framework may well preclude outcome prediction and thus be judged unsatisfactory for those seeking a theoretical explanation for how a regime of civil-military relations should work in a given set of circumstances. Nevertheless, it serves the study of civil-military relations well by offering an explanation for how such relationships actually do work in the Canadian system.

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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Name	Former Position	Date
Baril, Maurice	Chief of the Defence Staff	1997- 2001
Bloodworth, Margaret	Deputy Minister DND	2002- 2003
Bourgon, Jocelyn	Clerk of the Privy Council	1994- 1999
Buck, Ron	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff	2004- 2006
Calder, Kenneth	ADM Policy, DND	1989- 2006
Campbell, Kim Rt. Hon.	Minister of National Defence	1992- 1993
	Prime Minister	1993- 1993
Cappe, Mel	Clerk of the Privy Council	1999- 2002
Collenette, David Hon.	Minister of National Defence	1993- 1996
Eggleton, Art Hon.	Minister of National Defence	1997- 2002
Elcock, Ward	Deputy Minister DND	2004- 2007
Fowler, Bob	Deputy Minister DND	1989- 1994
Frechette, Louise	Deputy Minister DND	1995- 1998
Garnett, Gary	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff	1997- 2001
Gosselin, Helene	Deputy Minister DND (Acting)	2003- 2004
Graham, Bill Hon.	Minister of National Defence	2004- 2006
Harder, Peter	Deputy Minister, Foreign Affairs	2003- 2007
Henault, Raymond	Chief of the Defence Staff	2001- 2005
Hillier, Rick	Chief of the Defence Staff	2005- 2008
Judd, Jim	Deputy Minister DND	1998- 2002
O'Donnell	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff	1993- 1995
MacDonald, George	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff	2001- 2006
McCallum, John Hon.	Minister of National Defence	2002- 2003
McClure, John	Deputy Minister DND (Acting)	1994- 1995
Manson, Paul	Chief of the Defence Staff	1986-1989
Murray, Larry	Chief of the Defence Staff (Acting)	1996- 1997
	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff	1995- 1996
Williams, Alan	ADM Material, DND	1999- 2005

CURRICULUM VITAE

Thomas Ring was born in St. John's N.L. He studied at Memorial University and underwent naval training as a member of the local reserve unit, completing his qualification as a navigating officer in 1978. He joined the public service in 1979 and has held various positions of increasing responsibility in numerous government departments, most recently as the Assistant Deputy Minister of Public Affairs at the Department of National Defence. He began the Masters of Arts in War Studies program at the Royal Military College in September 2006.