Connecticut Cold War Warrior: Senator Thomas J. Dodd, the United States, and the World, 1945-1971

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Abstract

This thesis assesses the career of United States Senator Thomas J. Dodd, an underestimated figure in twentieth century American history. He played a key role in Congress with respect to American foreign relations in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia.

Dodd's legacy is ambiguous. He matured politically during the New Deal, and was a driving force behind the implementation of reforms in the areas of civil rights and gun control. Dodd's pious Catholicism, leading role at the Nuremberg Trials, and ties to the FBI shaped his visceral anticommunism, making him an intransigent stalwart. Dodd's anticommunist crusade resulted in the undermining of democratic reformers in the "third world", the escalation of the War in Vietnam, and clashes with "dovish" Democrats who challenged the Cold War orthodoxy.

This thesis draws on primary sources including the Dodd Papers, declassified State Department documents, newspaper articles, and oral histories.

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Introduction

"I'm just a typical American boy from a typical American town, I believe in God and Senator Dodd and keeping old Castro down."[1]

- Phil Ochs, 1965

In his song *Draft Dodger Rag*, protest singer Phil Ochs deftly captured the public persona of Connecticut Democratic Senator Thomas J. Dodd "a symbol of hawkish stolidity of the Vietnam War" [2] whose name was synonymous in American culture with the anticommunist crusade by which elites charted the nation's course. The inclusion of Senator Dodd in a popular 1960s protest song is evidence of his ubiquitous role as the archetypal Cold War liberal Democrat.[3]

Although 21st century observers may only be familiar with the controversy surrounding his son, current Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd,[4] the elder

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[1] Aniko Bodroghkozy, *Groove Tube: Sixties Television and the Youth Rebellion* (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001), 127.

[2] Todd S. Purdum, "Once a Disgraced Senator, Dodd Gets Presidential Salute." *New York Times*, 16 October 1995, section B1, available from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CEFDD153FF935A25753C1A963958260; Internet, accessed 20 June, 2007.

[3] At times, Connecticut newspaper editorials heralded Dodd as a Senate maverick. In 1959, he departed from Democratic Party orthodoxy (and his friend, Senate majority leader Lyndon Johnson) during the nomination process of General Lewis Strauss for Secretary of Commerce, and voted with the majority of Republicans for his confirmation. In what was a staggering blow to the Eisenhower Administration, Strauss, who had served as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in the 1950s, was rejected in a 49-46 vote after what *Time* magazine called one of the "biggest, bitterest confirmation fights in Senate history". See, "The Administration: The Strauss Affair," *Time*, 15 June, 1959. Democratic opposition to Strauss' confirmation was rooted in his instrumental role in revoking the security clearance of famed nuclear physicist Robert Oppenheimer. During the Strauss controversy, Dodd held that the case against General Strauss was "unclear".

[4] For a recent, succinct overview of Christopher Dodd's problems see Mark Hosenball, Suzanne Smolley, and Evan Thomas, "Like Father, Like Son", *Newsweek*, 8 June 2009, 46. He was elected to the House in 1974, served three terms, and was elected to the Senate in 1980 at age 36. Chris Dodd has pursued a markedly different path in the

Dodd was an influential, underestimated figure in U.S. history from before World War II to his death in 1971.[5] The trajectory and ultimate tragedy of Dodd's legal and congressional career (House 1953-1957 and Senate 1959-1971) is a case study in the domestic idealism and foreign policy paranoia that drove the agenda of supporters of the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations.

As the economist John Kenneth Galbraith pointed out, the confidence that LBJ had in domestic social programs "deserted him when it came to foreign policy...The gap was then filled by the generals and by, as they came to be called, the Cold War liberals."[6] Dodd was a classic example of those Cold War liberal Democrats who matured politically in the era of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal and supported its extension through the "New Frontier" and the "Great Society" programs in domestic politics, but concomitantly pursued a fanatical anticommunist crusade that often undermined democracy and human rights in much of the world - a foreign policy that had a major, and often negative,

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Senate compared to his late father, especially in the context of foreign policy. Chris Dodd's views were shaped in part by his work for the Peace Corps in the Dominican Republic, where he witnessed the intense anti-Americanism and abject poverty that pervaded the island. Ironically, Chris Dodd saw in the Dominican Republic the adverse effects of the U.S. intervention his father helped legitimize. The younger Dodd became one of the most vocal critics of the reignited Cold War aggression and militarism of the Reagan Administration, which funded the mercenary *contras* in Nicaragua against the left-wing Sandinista government, and provided military aid and diplomatic support to authoritarian right-wing military regimes guilty of extensive human rights violations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. For more on Chris Dodd's opposition to Reagan's policies, see Thomas G. Paterson *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 257. Noam Chomsky advances a more critical view of Chris Dodd and other "liberal doves" positions on foreign policy matters in Carlos Peregrín-Otero, ed. *Language and Politics* (Oakland: AK Press, 2004), 477, and in *The Culture of Terrorism* (Boston: South End Press, 1988), 44. On January 6, 2010 Chris Dodd announced he would not seek another term in the Senate.

[5] Dodd died of a heart attack at his home in rural Connecticut on May 24, 1971.

[6] John Kenneth Galbraith, *Name Dropping: From FDR On* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 154.

impact on the United States, the Democratic Party in particular, and on many foreign countries.

Dodd, however, was not the "garden variety" Cold War liberal Democrat. His experiences were unique. His pious Roman Catholicism and shattering experiences as the lead prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials contributed to a visceral, militant anticommunism that set Dodd apart from Democratic colleagues and even many Republicans. As an intransigent Cold War stalwart Dodd bears significant responsibility for the widening of the war in Vietnam and the schism in the Democratic Party that ultimately led to the election of Richard Nixon. He had little regard for the nuances of history conditioning the political landscape of other countries, and could not distinguish between anti-colonial and/or nationalist leftist movements, and Soviet or Chinese communism. This failure contributed to the undermining of democratic governments, with tragic results, in Latin American, Southeast Asian and African nations.

Dodd's liberal internationalism reflects, in part, the influence of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The Truman Doctrine, which pledged "support for free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," and NSC-68, (the document that inspired the Doctrine) oriented from the premise that the Soviet Union was an expansionist empire which sought to spread its Marxist-Leninist values throughout the "third world." Cold War

liberals like Tom Dodd recalled the era of McCarthyism in the 1950s, and Republican attacks against the Truman Administration and Democrats for the "loss" of China in 1949 to communism, and for allowing the Korean War (1950-1953) to end in a stalemate.[7] A 1962 speech reveals that Dodd too viewed events in China and Korea as Cold War "losses." He believed that Korean Communists scored numerous victories at the Panmunjon negotiations, paving the way for Communist inroads in Southeast Asia. In eerily prophetic terms Dodd stated, "The result was that in 1954, one year after the conclusion of the Korean Armistice, the Free World found itself obliged to sign over the 15,000,000 people of North Vietnam to Communist control. And this was only the first instalment we have had to pay for our failure to grasp the victory which was ours in Korea. We are still paying for this failure in Laos today, in the bitter war we shall have to fight for many years if South Vietnam is to be saved, and in the danger which now threatens the whole of Southeast Asia." Like other Democrats of his time, Dodd was acutely aware of the attacks launched against them by Republicans in the 1950s, who argued the Party was "soft on communism." Dodd refused to be a target for the right wing of the Republican Party. Notwithstanding the enunciation of the militaristic Truman Doctrine, massive aid to Greece and Turkey, and the Marshall

[7] Robert Mann, *A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam*. (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 25. Dodd campaigned for Connecticut Democrats against Joe McCarthy's crusade in the early 1950s, and proved a useful anticommunist tool for state boss John M. Bailey, who shrewdly used Dodd to answer to McCarthy, a fellow Catholic.

Plan to reconstruct Europe, Republicans consistently rebuked the Truman administration for, "selling America down the river."

At the apogee of his career in the Senate, however, Dodd was considered by some observers to be "the Senate's premier expert on Soviet Subversion."[8] In Connecticut, the *New Haven Register* hailed Dodd as "the great educator" on foreign policy.[9] Dodd's reputation as a "professional anticommunist" was so well known that in his second year serving in the U.S. Senate, he was lampooned by the Soviet satirical magazine *Krokodil* for "outstanding travail in the business of aggravating the Cold War and international tensions," and given a fictitious "Medal of the Atomic Walrus" for his anti-Soviet rhetorical flourishes.[10] The United States Information Agency (USIA) regularly published Dodd's speeches in its outlets throughout the world, and because of this, Dodd received "over 100 letters a year from groups who seek his aid against oppression or for freedom."[11] In the early 1960s, Dodd's office was "often one of the early points of call for delegations that come to the United States seeking support for opposition to communism in their countries, including both those who are now in the government, and those who would like to oust the government that is in."[12] Above

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[8] Thomas J. Dodd Research Centre, University of Connecticut, Fulton Lewis Jr. "Are We Ghana Stop," undated, Series VI, Box 269, Folder 6992. Hereafter referred to as "Dodd Papers".
[9] John Chamberlain, "Snipers Harass Independent Senator," *New Haven Register*, 21 June, 1963.
[10] Dodd Papers, "Dodd Distinction," *Waterbury Republican* 31 May 1959, Series VI, Box 269, Folder 6992.
[11] Robert D. Byrnes, "Freedom Fighters Ask Aid of Dodd," Hartford *Courant*, 1 July 1963.
[12] Ibid.

all, Tom Dodd's anticommunism was stronger than most Democratic Senators of his era, and it overshadowed in the public mind his laudable achievements in the domestic sphere, such as his tireless (and ultimately successful) efforts to enact reasonable gun control legislation, support for meaningful civil rights reforms, and the extension of New Deal programs. Although Dodd was a progressive in domestic affairs, his foreign policy views and strident anticommunism were set by the time he entered Congress in 1953 and never changed despite the turbulent events and dramatically different world situation that evolved in the late 1950s and 1960s.

Why Dodd?

Thomas J. Dodd is a political actor worthy of historical scrutiny for several reasons, but most importantly, a rendering of his outspoken role as a Cold War liberal Democrat is long overdue. This study draws on a wide range of primary and secondary sources including the Thomas J. Dodd papers which contain several oral histories with the Dodd family,[13] recently declassified documents from the State Department and CIA, his son's recent book with Larry Bloom *Letters from Nuremberg: My father's narrative of a Quest for Justice*[14], U.S. newspaper and magazine sources during Dodd's years in Congress, and many secondary sources which provide new insights into the career and influence of Dodd, a Senator who was a "puzzle to some."[15]

Dodd is regarded as a controversial politician in historical accounts due in part to his 1967 censure (by a vote of 92-5) for improper use of campaign finances.[16] The central focus of this study is not Dodd's much-publicized

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[13] The Dodd papers are housed at the Thomas J. Dodd Research Centre, a new library at the University of Connecticut open by President Bill Clinton in October 1995; the author visited the Research Centre twice to obtain primary sources for this paper.

[14] Christopher J. Dodd and Larry Bloom, *Letters from Nuremberg: My Father's Narrative of a Quest for Justice*. (New York: Crown Publishing, 2007).

[15] Jack Zaiman, "He Looked Part of a Senator," *Hartford Courant*, 25 May 1971.

[16] Dodd was the first Senator to receive a formal condemnation from his peers since the institution's 1954 rebuke of the notorious Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy and he was, at the time, only the seventh Senator in 178 years to be formally punished with the censure. Officially, the most damaging charges against Dodd were that he used $116,000 of campaign finances for personal use. Dodd was censured on this charge. The Senate Ethics Committee voted against reprimanding Dodd on the minor charge of double-billing. For a concise account of Dodd's Ethics Committee hearings, see Robert T. Mann, *Legacy to Power: Senator Russell Long of Louisiana* (New York: Paragon House, 1992), 260-266. Dodd himself voted against his censure. The only four Senators to back Dodd were Russell Long (D-LA) (who was Dodd's chief defender in the Senate Ethics Committee's probe), Strom Thurmond (R-SC), John Tower (R-TX), and Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT), Dodd's ally from the Nutmeg state. In the

corruption and censure by the Senate.[17] In fact, nearly all historical accounts of Dodd describe his Senatorial transgressions at the expense of sustained analysis on the role he played within the Cold War Congress.[18] Journalists Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson in *The Case Against Congress: A Compelling Indictment of Corruption on Capitol Hill* [19] focus so intensely on Dodd's Dewar's scotch, big cigars and office intrigue that their book reads more like a script for the popular American television series *Mad Men*.

Likewise, though whistleblower James Boyd's monograph *Above the Law: the Rise and Fall of Senator Thomas J. Dodd*[20] contains valuable insights into Dodd's life and career in the House and Senate, this lurid account contains little analysis of Dodd's positions on foreign and domestic policy, and critically lacks objective distance. Moreover, because Boyd was himself an anticommunist who routinely wrote speeches for Tom Dodd, *Above the Law* is not an uncoloured take

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events leading up to the Ethics Committee's hearings, Russell Long is reported to have stated to Dodd, "I'll support you all the way on this Tom, even if you're guilty." See, Mark Green, ed., *Who Runs Congress* (New York: Viking Press, 1979), 177-179. According to Chris Dodd, Senator Russell Long wanted to "introduce a resolution to exonerate my dad, but "I told him Russell, you don't have to. Every time I walk on the Senate floor it's a resolution." Michael Kramer "The Dodd Boy" *New York Magazine* 26 September 1983, 16.

[17] See James Boyd *Above the Law: The Rise and Fall of Senator Thomas J. Dodd.*

[18] The exception to this rule is historian Jeffrey Bass's expertly-crafted glimpse at the roots of Dodd's anticommunism, and the impact the Nuremberg Trials had on his career in public office. Bass, who spent years organizing the Dodd papers at the University of Connecticut, convincingly argues that Dodd's experiences at Nuremberg profoundly influenced his anticommunist crusade, and conditioned his outlook on most issues relating to foreign and domestic policy throughout his time in public office. Additionally, Robert Mann gives Dodd his due as a significant Johnson ally in *A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam* (New York: Basic Books, 2001).

[19] Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson, *The Case Against Congress; a compelling indictment of corruption on Capitol Hill* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1968).

[20] James Boyd, *Above the Law: The Rise and Fall of Senator Thomas J. Dodd* (New York: The New American Library, 1968).

on Dodd's policy positions and cannot be regarded as the complete evaluation of Dodd and his historical legacy.

The temporal focus of this analysis is the 1960s, but it contains some background context on the early Cold War of the 1940s and 1950s, the roots of Dodd's own anticommunist worldview, particularly resulting from his pious Catholicism and from his pivotal role at the post-World War II Nuremberg trials, and the historical evolution of American expansionism. This analysis advances the argument that, like other liberal Democrats who viewed America's role in the world through a Cold War lens, Dodd in particular helped cause the crisis that enveloped the Democratic Party in the mid-to-late 1960s. He also bears some responsibility for obstructing and undermining Senate debate on foreign policy measures- an act which helped escalate and lengthen the war in Vietnam- and for undermining the prospects for democracy in the developing countries that were dragged into the superpower struggle for global economic and military supremacy between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Dodd played a significant role in the House and the Senate in the Fifties and during the Kennedy administration but when his old friend Lyndon Johnson became President in 1963, his "power index shot up" and "the back door to the

White House was indeed open to him".[21] Robert Mann, in his engrossing work of narrative history *A Grand Delusion: American's Descent into Vietnam* describes Dodd as President Johnson's "most reliable ally" and "one of Johnson's most reliable defenders in the Senate" who often "echoed advice that Johnson was receiving from the Joint Chiefs".[22] Dodd was a friend of Johnson's since the 1930s and a loyalist who supported Johnson over John F. Kennedy in the 1960 Democratic Party nomination. In a letter to a constituent on May 23, 1960, Dodd indicated he supported Johnson "even though many good people in Connecticut support Jack Kennedy" because "Lyndon Johnson keeps excellent political company. He is not surrounded by left wingers, fuzzy thinkers and fake liberals....We ought to have a mature man who has feet on the ground and who can best steer our course through these difficult times."[23] By supporting Johnson in 1960, Dodd risked his political capital as "every major Democratic leader in Connecticut, except Senator Dodd, favours the nomination of Senator Kennedy."[24] Not surprisingly, Dodd instigated a major feud in the state Democratic Party when national committeeman and Kennedy ally John Golden announced that he was

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[21] Pearson and Anderson, 54.

[22] Robert Mann, *A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam*. (New York: Basic Books, 2001) 14, 15, 317, 318.

[23] Dodd Papers, Letter to J. Gerard Flynn, 23 May 1960, Series I, Box 12, Folder 378.

[24] "2 in Connecticut Split on Kennedy", *New York Times*, 1 January 1960. Kennedy's biggest supporter in Connecticut was state party chairman, John M. Bailey, who later took on the dual role of chairman of the Democratic National Committee under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Bailey and Dodd shared an uneven relationship. Bailey preferred other elites over Dodd, but he shrewdly used Dodd in the 1950s when he needed a strong anticommunist Democrat to counter Joseph McCarthy. In Connecticut, Bailey was a close ally with Abraham Ribicoff, the Senior Senator from the state in the 1960s.

"somewhat shocked" that Connecticut had not lined up uniformly behind Kennedy. Dodd shrugged off Golden's implicit criticism, and noted that he would not be dictated to by "political bossism." [25] In his book *The Best and the Brightest*, journalist David Halberstam observed that Dodd's support for Johnson in the 1960 Democratic primaries caused LBJ to experience a false sense of security, when the fact remained that without Tom Dodd, he had no prominent backing in New England.[26]

As outlined in Chapter Five, LBJ's cozy relationship with Dodd, the Cold War stalwart, irritated members of the Democratic Party who had increasing concerns about the administration's handling of the Vietnam War.[27] But Johnson's loyalty only went so far, as contrary to many historical accounts, Dodd was never a serious contender for the 1964 Vice Presidential nomination.[28] In reality, LBJ (in his true shrewd fashion) used Dodd as a "stage prop,"[29] to drum up media speculation on his choice for Vice President when he never had any doubt that Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) would be his VP. [30]

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[25] Ibid.

[26] David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest, Anniversary Edition* (New York: Random House, 1992), 440.

[27] Others were not so lucky. For his public opposition to Johnson's policies, LBJ's former close friend, J.W. Fulbright, was banished from the White House and alienated at social events by the President. Even Richard B. Russell, Johnson's mentor and close friend during his years in the Senate saw his friendship with the President erode when he became a Vietnam detractor.

[28] Former President Bill Clinton perpetuates this fiction in his lengthy memoir *My Life.*

[29] Doris Kearns Goodwin, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 202.

[30] Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s viewpoint is different. "If he takes on Hubert my guess is he will postpone things until the last possible moment on the theory that the torment would be good for Hubert's soul. LBJ rivals FDR in his delight in mystification and in his semi-sadistic teasings". Arthur Schlesinger Jr., *Journals* (New York: Penguin, 2007), 231.

Dodd, however, was both articulate and photogenic and therefore ideally suited to the new medium of television where he used his skills and contacts to influence public opinion. Legendary American broadcaster Walter Cronkite, who lived with Dodd at Nuremberg during the war trials, referred to him as "the major strength in the large cast of lawyers".[31] According to Cronkite, the thirty-eight-year- old Dodd, with his good looks, distinguished silver hair and commanding presence was "the kind of lawyer I had seen in the movies - superb at trapping the witness, pushing the witness to an admission the witness didn't want to divulge."[32]

Dodd was respected by the press corps who knew he would provide a good interview, whether on television or in print. Even as a freshman Senator he was the subject of a fawning feature in the *Washington Post*, where he was described as a "sterling character" and a "silvery-haired solon" who did not "believe silence is golden."[33] Dodd had an impact in shaping American public opinion; his Congressional activism did receive wide coverage in the American press. Dodd was regularly quoted and editorialized in Washington and New England newspapers and in such widely read American magazines as *Life*, *Time*, *Reader's Digest*, and *Harper's*; the Dodd Papers indicate that he published press releases on

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[31] Dodd and Bloom, 29.

[32] Dodd and Bloom, 30. Francis M. Gibbons writes that Dodd's virile good looks, his verbal skills, his self-confident attitude, and his government experiences were tailor-made for a political career. Gibbons asserts that these attributes later made Dodd a "cardboard figure" behind which lay a complex person with a dependency on alcohol, and a propensity for laziness. Francis M. Gibbons, *Jack Anderson: Mormon Crusader in Gomorrah* (New York: Universe Inc, 2003), 123.

[33] George Dixon, "Washington Scene," *Washington Post*, 28 July 1959.

a regular basis; he appeared regularly on television programs such as *Meet the Press* and *Washington Review* along with several radio broadcasts including Radio Free Europe.[34] For example, on March 1, 1962 the Congressional Record indicates Senator Paul Douglas (D-Illinois) took the floor to congratulate Dodd on his "magnificent appearance on the program 'Meet the Press' last Sunday" where he displayed "poise and balance" in discussing difficult issues such as U.S. polices in the Katanga region of Congo, China and other locations.[35]

Objective of this study

Against this background and the grounds for a focus on Senator Dodd's career, the objective of this study is three-fold. First, the analysis aims to assess the role Dodd played in the Cold War, and the crisis that enveloped the Democratic Party in the mid-to-late 1960s due to the "foreign policy disaster" precipitated by the war in Vietnam.[36] By the mid-1960s, the Democratic consensus built on the foundation of the New Deal eroded as Cold War imperatives and the morass of Vietnam gradually pitted Senators against each other. The ideological differences

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[34] According to sociologist John Foran, *Time* and *Life* "had arguably attained the stature of the most influential shapers of public opinion in the United States, particularly in Republican and Centrist circles." John Foran, "Discursive Subversions: Time Magazine, the CIA Overthrow of Mussadiq, and the Installation of the Shah," in Cold War Constructions, ed. Christian Appy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 165.

[35] Dodd Papers, Congress, Senate, Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois speaking, "Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut," 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Congressional Record* 108, p. 30 (1 March 1962), Series III, Box 194, Folder 4698.

[36] John Kenneth Galbraith, *Who Needs the Democrats: And What it Takes to Be Needed* (New York: Signet, 1970), 30.

between Dodd and his Democratic colleagues that simmered under the surface in the 1950s exploded by 1965, when a coterie of influential Democratic Senators including (but not limited to) J. William Fulbright, Mike Mansfield, George McGovern, Frank Church, and Stuart Symington started to question their previous assumptions on the nature of the Cold War, and eventually became opponents of the War LBJ and Dodd vigorously supported. In this process, Dodd became, according to the investigative journalist I.F. Stone, the "bête-noire" to the liberals in the Democratic Party.[37]

As a member of the prestigious Senate Foreign Relations and Judiciary Committees, Dodd positioned himself to play an integral role in the some of the biggest policy initiatives of the administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. He also served in the Senate during a period that witnessed an exponential increase in foreign policy subcommittees and a "decentralization of power within Congress on national security matters."[38] Dodd's vice-chairmanship of the Internal Security Subcommittee (ISS), an offshoot of the Senate Judiciary

[37] I.F. Stone, "Why Not Peace through Elections in South Vietnam?", *I.F. Stone's Weekly*, Vol. XIII, No. 24, 21 June 1965. Of all the Senators who formed the Cold War consensus, Stuart Symington underwent perhaps the most dramatic transformation. The Missouri Senator, who had served as Secretary of the Air Force supported fully the aims of the Pentagon during his first term in the Senate. As the War in Vietnam worsened, Symington "had come to see the Soviet Union not as an implacable enemy of his Cold War years but as a potential ally in ensuring a safer world through arms reductions and arms limitations." Linda McFarland, *Cold War Strategist: Stuart Symington and the Search for National Security* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 165. Dodd's profound experiences at Nuremberg ensured that he would never be able to view the Soviet Union in such a light.

[38] Robert David Johnson, "Congress and the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies* vol. 3 2 (Spring 2001): 91.

Committee, reflects the growth of previously non-existent avenues in which Senators could attempt to wield influence on policy matters.[39]

This study charts the historical, cultural, and experiential sources of Dodd's strident anticommunism to explain why the Senator supported certain policies, political allies, organizations, and leaders of foreign opposition movements and governments, while vociferously opposing others, including members of the party with which he was associated from the time of his youth. Dodd's personal correspondence, letters, diaries, and written accounts throughout his Congressional career can help to explore the roots of his anticommunism and domestic liberalism. Likewise, Dodd's personal accounts of visits to cold war "hot spots" on different continents are revealing sources that explain much about his anticommunism and policy stances. Finally, the paper will analyze the implications of Dodd's actions and policies on the U.S. Senate, people within the U.S., and in other countries that were part of the cold war battleground in the 1950s and 1960s.

Chapter One charts the roots of Dodd's stances on foreign policy and the development of his identity as an anticommunist cold warrior. Dodd's pious Roman Catholic faith and particularly, his shattering experiences as a prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials were both profound and unique factors that shaped his Cold

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[39] Ibid.

War outlook. At Nuremberg and later, Dodd often equated Communism with National Socialism.

Chapter Two outlines the roots of Dodd's left-leaning philosophy on domestic issues. Dodd's Catholic upbringing and modest, pro-union family roots, his work in New Deal programs, career and connections in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and work as a lawyer with the Justice Department during World War II were key influences that focused his concerns for civil rights and the lives of underprivileged Americans. Entering the Senate at a pivotal moment in 1958, Dodd was in a position to promote and support the New Frontier and Great Society programs of President John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. As a friend and loyal ally of LBJ, Dodd fought assiduously in the domestic arena for civil rights, Medicare, gun control, conservation, and the wider extension of New Deal-Fair Deal programs to cover the most vulnerable citizens in America. Moreover, by co-sponsoring a Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Dodd helped alter the course of the Cold War, and set a precedent for détente.[40] Though not without its critics, the "suprapartisan consensus" in the US Senate from 1960-1964 (of which Dodd was a part), accomplished some of the most important legislative achievements in American history, most of which proved impossible to codify just a few years earlier when,

[40] Carl Solberg, *Hubert Humphrey: a biography* (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Press, 2003), 218.

in the 1950s, the popular Eisenhower administration relegated the Democrats to the political "wilderness." Thus, Dodd deserves credit for his efforts on the implementation of progressive domestic legislation.

In Chapter Three the study analyzes Tom Dodd's nuanced role with regard to American foreign relations in Latin America, Africa, and Asia during the 1960s. The chapter will illuminate Dodd's vocal support (following the U.S.-engineered coup in 1954) for the military regime of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala, his role in creating fear and hysteria following the Cuban Revolution, and his opposition to the left-wing nationalism of Dr. Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana. Chapter Four explains Dodd's break with the Kennedy administration and his support of Moise Tshombe and his complex role in the context of the "Congo crisis" in the early 1960s.

The central focus on Chapter Five is the argument that Dodd and other intransigent Cold War liberal Democrats caused the crisis in the Democratic Party, and bear responsibility for the deteriorating situation that led to a wider war in Vietnam. By failing to engage with, and listen to, the growing wing of Democratic Senators and domestic critics opposed to the war, stalwarts such as Dodd missed an opportunity to mitigate the crisis in the Party and to forestall the tragic outcome of the wars in Southeast Asia. His critical support on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the Johnson administration's intervention in the Dominican

Republic was the catalyst for the schism in the Democratic Party; Dodd played a key role in the break in solidarity between Senator Fulbright and President Johnson. This chapter expands on the theme by examining the nadir of the crisis in the Democratic party, the breakdown of consensus, Dodd's place within the fractured American cultural milieu of the late 1960s, and his role in the Johnson administration's battle against domestic "subversives" and intellectual or "elite" opponents to the administration's Vietnam policy. Moreover, this section of the study focuses on the death of the "old politics" in the Democratic Party and interprets Dodd's distinction as a casualty of the growing public demand for more oversight on the activities of Congress and the Executive branch of government. Furthermore, this section will chart the Senator's growing disillusionment with the Democrats, explain his clear break with the Party to which he had been staunchly loyal since the New Deal era and document his final campaign as an independent candidate.

Chapter One

The Development of an Anticommunist Crusader: Dodd's Catholic Religion, Nuremberg Experiences, and Invocations of Munich

Dodd's visceral anticommunism was not a political gimmick; rather, it was a product of the time in which he matured politically, and formed the centrepiece of his identity, providing both political and financial benefits. Dodd's dogmatic brand of anticommunism was shaped by his Roman Catholic education and pious religious beliefs, career affiliations and experiences, personal financial interests, lack of knowledge or interest in the nuances of history in "third world" countries, and most importantly his disturbing experience as a lead prosecutor in the Nuremberg trials. With respect to anticommunism, Dodd was not just a garden-variety Cold War liberal Democrat – his fear and hatred of communism was real and those emotions influenced his political positions. Dodd's unyielding anticommunism and hawkish position on foreign policy distinguished him from other Senators who changed course during the turbulent 1960s.

Thomas Joseph Dodd was born in the shipping and manufacturing centre of Norwich, Connecticut on May 15, 1907 to Thomas and Abigail, working-class children of Irish immigrants. Dodd's parents were high school graduates, and taught their children the value of reading and education. In 1926, Abigail Dodd

died when Tom Dodd was just fourteen years old. Shortly thereafter, his father moved the family to the urban centre of New Haven, Connecticut to provide his children with more career opportunities.[41]

The Catholic Religion and Dodd's Anticommunism

As a young boy, Tom Dodd attended public schools in Norwich, but in his teenage years, his father sent him to the prestigious St. Anslem College, an institution founded by the Benedictines in the late 19th century in Manchester, New Hampshire. Dodd's parents instilled in their five children a strong devotion to Roman Catholicism. According to his older sister Mary Dodd-Dwyer, a pious young Tom would entertain his older sisters by reciting religious poems in the family home.[42] Dodd's dedication to Christianity carried through to his adult years; as a young man he briefly considered a career as a priest, and at length he entered a seminary in Buffalo, New York.[43] Though Dodd's father earned a modest wage in his occupation as a building contractor, he managed in the midst of the Great Depression to send his children to private Catholic preparatory schools.[44]

Following his years at the Catholic academy St. Anselm's College Dodd attended the private all-boys Dominican school Providence College in Rhode

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[41] Thomas Dodd Family Oral History Project, Interview with Mary Dodd-Dwyer, 9 November 1995, University of Connecticut, Center for Oral History Interviews Collection. Archives and Special Collections at the Thomas J. Dodd Research Center, University of Connecticut Libraries.
[42] Thomas Dodd Family Oral History Project, Interview with Mary Dodd-Dwyer.
[43] Boyd, 8.
[44] Thomas Dodd Family Oral History Project, Interview with Mary Dodd-Dwyer.

Island. It was here he "assimilated the basic Thomist view of life as a struggle between good and evil" which clearly influenced his visceral anticommunism.[45] At Yale University's Law School he intermingled with students aligned with the Democratic Party, and formed a group called the "Flying Wedge," comprised of like-minded "leather lunged orators" [46] who often warmed up the crowds prior to visits by President Roosevelt. Dodd overcame his fear of public speaking; his oratorical ability became one of his major strengths and increased his influence.

Dodd's studies at Yale exposed him to a secular curriculum that collided with his religious upbringing and ecclesiastical schooling. James Boyd remarked that at Yale, Dodd "laboured long to reconcile the absolutism of St. Thomas Aquinas with the relativism of Professor Harold Laski," but "he emerged an unshaken Catholic and a militant New Deal Democrat who believed in both the moral universe of the Scholastics and the welfare state of the Fabians."[47] In 1933, Dodd received his law degree from Yale, however, his law career in Connecticut stumbled when he failed the state bar exam.[48]

This study deploys religion as a category of analysis that explains the depth of Dodd's anticommunism. His career in Congress took place during a period in history which exhibited, as historian Seth Jacobs notes, a "tremendous religious

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[45] Pearson and Anderson, 33. Boyd, 8-20.
[46] Pearson and Anderson, 34
[47] Boyd, 8.
[48] Mark Grossman, *Political Corruption in America: An Encyclopaedia of Scandals, Power, and Greed* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2003), 101.

revival in the United States, an almost unprecedented upsurge of piety that frequently expressed itself in hatred and fear of America's godless geopolitical opponent."[49] In his book, *Freedom and Foreign Policy*, Dodd was more explicit. "Communism is total evil. It is all black. There is nothing gray about it. There is nothing good about it. Its ends are evil. Its means to those ends are evil...Communism is at war with the whole human race. It is based on the blasphemy that a human being is just a particle of matter, without independent mind or spirit. It seeks to destroy the family as an institution. It seeks to wipe out religion. It seeks to blot out the human conscience and to distort all concepts of right and wrong. It seeks to reduce man to a mere beast of burden, without a will, without personality, without a home, without personal property, without knowledge of God, without hope of eternal life."[50]

Above all, Tom Dodd approached the Cold War from this religious angle, and often cited the Soviet empire's persecution and "enslavement" of Catholics as proof that the political system of communism was incompatible with American life. The lack of spiritual substance in Communism and materialism was the main reason Dodd so viscerally opposed the Soviet Union. When it came to communism, Dodd had, according to his sister-in-law, "a real philosophy, and he never wavered from his philosophy of what he believed in. He was never here and

[49] Seth Jacobs, Review of William Inboden "Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment," *Passport*, 40, no. 1 (April 2009): 23.
[50] Thomas J. Dodd, *Freedom and Foreign Policy*. (New York: McFadden Books), 14-15.

over there. He had a straight line."[51] In a 1952 Connecticut radio and television broadcast which aired during his Congressional race, Dodd noted that "the fundamental thing to remember about Communism, is that it is atheistic and anti-God, and therefore utterly without principle in its foundation because, without a belief in God, there is no foundation for morals or principles in the world."[52] In the same broadcast, Dodd defended the Truman administration against the McCarthyist right wing of the Republican Party, and stated that the Alger Hiss debacle was a "red herring."[53]

Scholars are now examining the influence of religion on American foreign policy in the Cold War years. Millions of people in the United States believed the atheist Soviet Union was a threat to Christendom. In a review of four books on significant Americans – J. Edgar Hoover, Sidney Hook, Richard Nixon and William F. Buckley Junior – Richard Gid Powers noted that "anticommunism cannot be understood without reference to religion."[54] To Buckley, another Catholic with whom Dodd enjoyed a close friendship, Communism was "not merely a foreign ideology – like socialism or fascism – but a satanic faith that threatened the soul of Western civilization". [55] Another author who noted the

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[51] Thomas Dodd Family Oral History Project, Interview with Helen Farley, 17 November 1995, University of Connecticut, Center for Oral History Interviews Collection. Archives and Special Collections at the Thomas J. Dodd Research Center, University of Connecticut Libraries.
[52] "Dodd Asserts Red Problem Non-Partisan," *The Hartford Courant*, 11 October 1952.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Richard Gid Powers, "Review: Anticommunist Lives", *American Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (December 1989):720.
[55] Ibid.

importance of Christianity to the development of anticommunist ideology was William Inboden. In his book *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-60:The Soul of Containment* Inboden notes "Americans found it even more ominous that not only were the communists attempting to exterminate religious faith in their own orbit, but they were seeking to spread their godless materialism around the world".[56] Powers summarized the viewpoint on religion and communism by noting "If we pay attention to the explanations the anticommunists themselves offer for their lives, the simplest interpretation, as is so often the case, seem the truest. They were anticommunists because, for reasons that exactly reflect the mix of cultures that make up America, they hated Communism".[57] This was certainly the case with Tom Dodd who would never compromise with the atheistic Soviet Union.

In May 1959, Dodd wrote a letter to the head of the United States Information Agency (USIA) protesting the lack of religious material in the agency's "America exhibit" at that summer's Moscow Fair in Russia. As a result of Dodd's impassioned plea, the USIA pledged to "attempt to convey our nation's religious heritage" in the exhibit.[58] Dodd contended that the omission of churches and schools in the exhibit "missed a wonderful opportunity to demonstrate [to the millions of people who passed through the exhibit] the importance of religion in

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[56] Quoted in David Zeitsma, "Review of William C. Inboden, Religion and American Foreign Policy 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment", *Passport*, 40, no. 1 (April 2009): 20.
[57] Powers, 723.
[58] "The Spiritual Side," *New Britain Herald*, 2 May 1959.

the development of our history, and its great influence on contemporary American affairs."[59] In Connecticut, the editors of the *Bridgeport Post* applauded Dodd for his "excellent suggestion."[60]

During a 1962 coast-to-coast radio broadcast, Mutual Broadcasting System commentator Cedric Foster told his many listeners that Dodd "got down to good solid rock when he challenged the Soviets on spiritual grounds."[61] Foster found a recent speech Dodd gave at the University of Utah in which he laid out his fundamental opposition to the Soviet Union to be "one of his finest efforts... by the indefatigable fighter against the international communist conspiracy."[62] In the speech, Dodd proclaimed that "We are in the midst of an irreconcilable conflict with the communists...a conflict in which every element of our lives and our civilization is under an uncompromising attack. This irreconcilability between Western civilization and communism, and the obvious flourishing of the western world compels communism to destroy us in order to justify itself...to fulfil itself and save itself from collapse." Dodd continued, "We believe first of all, that God exists and that he is the creator of the universe...and that he revealed to us his existence and men's purpose. The communists believe that God is a myth; that religion is but a tool to exploit the people and that religion is an opiate to help them

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[59] "An Idea Sharp and Timely," *Bridgeport Post*, 20 April 1959.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Dodd Papers, Undated radio broadcast by Cedric Foster, Series VI, Box 269, Folder 6992.
[62] Ibid.

forget that they are being exploited. Thus we differ fundamentally on the most important question of our lives."[63]

Further outlining American differences with communism, Dodd stated, "We believe that there's a natural law... one that emanates from the hand of God, which should direct man's actions and should be the source of man-made law." Dodd contended that "Freed from the illusion that communism and western civilization are compatible we will begin to make the stupendous effort in the field of armament and free world mobilization and operation that must be made. Our policy is failing because it assumes that differences between the communist world and the free world can be explained in terms of traditional national interests...or by misunderstandings growing out of history...or to mutual ignorance of each other's good intentions." In addition to highlighting his religious opposition to the Soviet Union and the political system of Communism, Dodd used the Utah platform to hammer his opponents in Congress for "pouring out our substance in aid to Red dictatorships which have been given more than 4 billion dollars from the pockets of American taxpayers in recent years."[64]

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[63] Dodd Papers, Speech, "Remarks at the University of Utah," Salt Lake City, UT, 29 January 1962, Series III, Box 193, Folder 4685.

[64] Ibid. Outraged by the U.S. sale of wheat to the Soviet Union, Dodd drafted an amendment to the 1963 foreign aid bill that would have prohibited U.S. aid to Communist countries. Dodd believed that American shipments of wheat to the Soviet Union helped sustain the Soviet system and "divert manpower from the farms into the Soviet military machine." The Dodd amendment went down in defeat. See Arthur Krock, "Wheat Sale to Soviets Possible Mixed Benefit," *St. Petersburg Times*, 6 October 1963.

In identifying the differences between JFK and other prominent American Roman Catholics in the Democratic party, historian Arthur M. Schlesinger noted that Dodd was a part of "two divergent forms" of "intellectual Catholicism in American politics," and (unlike Kennedy and others) was ensconced in "the world of Holy Name Societies, Knights of Columbus, and communion breakfasts."[65] Dodd's former aide James Boyd noted that as a Senator, Dodd was never without his rosary beads and prayer books, and he "went to mass on all the required days, and many that were not required."[66] When Dodd later met Pope Pius XII in Rome, he could hardly contain his delight when anticipating the "big thrill" of meeting the holy leader.[67] In a letter to his wife, Dodd remarked that he was "terribly pleased" to meet the Pope, and after leaving his private meeting with the Bishop of Rome, "walked out as if treading on air."[68] Dodd added, "I feel that it is an experience that comes to few men...Communion in St. Ignatius' room does something to a man."[69]

In a 1960 speech on the floor of the Senate, Dodd recalled the "vital role which religious faith played in the founding of our country," and advocated for the prominent role "it should play in our national life today."[70] Although Dodd decried "the breakdown in self-discipline and moral conduct which is sweeping across the

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[65] Arthur Meier Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2002), 107.
[66] Boyd, 60.
[67] Dodd and Bloom, 151.
[68] Dodd, and Bloom, 153.
[69] Dodd and Bloom, 152.
[70] Dodd Papers, "Religious Faith and the Founding of our Country," *Congressional Quarterly*, 1960 August 24, Series III, Box 191, Folder 4544.

nation" he said it was caused by the "declining role of the three fundamental institutions of our society: the family, the school and the church". But, he went on to tell his audience of 5000 Catholic policemen, "we have taken out of school life discipline, competition, hard work, reward for success and punishment for failure" but "Catholic schools are an exception".[71]

He despaired about the lack of attention given by the State Department to the words of Catholic missionaries in cold war "hot spots". In 1961, Dodd observed that "we once disregarded the advice of American missionaries in China who tried to tell us the simple truth the Chinese Communists were not really agrarian reformers....By the time we rubbed this sand out of our eyes, the Chinese had gone communist". In the Congo that year, he met with "30 or 40 missionaries...who are an important and proper source of information, particularly in a primitive country". The missionaries who served in the Congo were, in Dodd's view, a better source of information than "a State Department desk officer who served somewhere in Africa".[72]

Dodd kept a diary of his trip to the "Far East" in May 1961. The diary makes it clear that he was more impressed with Catholic religious sites than any political aspects of his journey.[73] At Manila in the Philippines most of his comments deal

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[71] "Dodd Depicts Loss of Self-Discipline", *New York Times*, 9 April 1962.
[72] Thomas Dodd, *Freedom and Foreign Policy*, 91-92.
[73] Dodd Papers, Senator's Diary for the Far East Trip, 29 April- 15 May 1961, 29, Series V, Box 263, Folder 6886-6887.

with his visit to St. Thomas University "which is 300 years old and the largest Catholic institution in this part of the world. It is a Dominican school with over 241,000 students."[74] Dodd met a Dominican Father who was in his class of 1930 at Providence College, and when he said he was also educated by the Dominicans "the applause was heavy."[75]

In Saigon, he wanted to visit Catholic refugee villages housing those who fled from North Vietnam (Dodd was impressed that they very well established with churches and schools)[76] and in Vientiane Laos he took a walk to find the local Cathedral; Dodd described both the cathedral and the service in detail.[77] He then attended a mass at the larger St. Mary's Cathedral which "is Father Mat Menger's church, he is he oblate from Texas. He told the congregation of my presence which I wish he had not done because it makes it more difficult for me to concentrate on the mass when people stare at me."[78] In Taiwan he rose at 6:30 a.m. to hear Mass at a Jesuit Church and spent part of the morning talking with Jesuit priests. Dodd was also pleased that a Bishop who was a Providence College graduate came to see him off at the airport.[79]

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[74] Senator's Diary for the Far East Trip, 5.
[75] Senator's Diary for the Far East Trip, 5.
[76] Senator's Diary for the Far East Trip, 9.
[77] Senator's Diary for the Far East Trip, 14.
[78] Senator's Diary for the Far East Trip, 15.
[79] Senator's Diary for the Far East Trip, 25.

Dodd was a leading member of the pro-Chiang Kai Shek "China Lobby" in the United States, which was very strong in the Roman Catholic wing of the Connecticut Democratic Party.[80] American support for Chiang was, as Howard Zinn observed, a quixotic endeavour notwithstanding the billions of dollars of support Chiang received; even the U.S. State Department was aware that the Chinese communists were unbeatable.[81] Nevertheless, Dodd's warm regard for Chiang crystallized during this excursion to Asia. On May 10, 1961 he visited Chiang "who is in very good physical shape" and Madame Chiang who "is very attractive and looked very well; she speaks excellent English of course".[82] He was particularly impressed by gifts of a book of Mme Chiang's speeches, a volume of her paintings and "two lovely canisters of tea."[83] These personal contacts with Catholics in Asia reinforced Dodd's determination to defend them at all costs.

Dodd did not let up on his criticism of the Soviet Union's repression of organized religion and persecution of religious officials. In 1964, as Vice-Chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, he requested and obtained permission to conduct a study on "The Church and State under Communism." Dodd's committee produced a public report which condemned the Soviet Union for seeking "nothing less than a total liquidation of all vestiges of religion." The

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[80] Howard B. Shaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1993), 128.
[81] Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present*. (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 47.
[82] Senator's Diary for the Far East Trip, 22.
[83] Senator's Diary for the Far East Trip, 23.

Dodd report outlined how the Soviet Union was not adhering to its "constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion."[84] Thus, Dodd's pious Catholicism was central to his philosophy and explains his vehement opposition to "godless" communism.

The Nuremberg Influence

The outcome and aftermath of World War II cemented Dodd's anticommunist views. Following the Allied victory and widespread acknowledgement of the Nazi Holocaust and other atrocities, leaders of the Great Powers administered justice for the Nazis' conspicuous crimes against humanity. The London Charter of 1945 legitimated the first trials in the realm of international law, and set the stage for the manifold prosecutions that occurred in subsequent years.[85] When President Harry Truman appointed Robert B. Jackson, the Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to the position of Chief U.S. Prosecutor, the jurist insisted that Tom Dodd be added as a support staff member to the American delegation to the Nuremberg Trials.[86] The 22 defendants[87] were top Nazi leaders and henchmen of deceased Nazi Führer Adolf Hitler including Luftwaffe Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, Hitler's infamous "private secretary" Rudolf Hess, and Nazi "philosopher" Alfred Rosenberg.[88]

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[84] "Dodd Scores Soviet On Religious Curbs," *New York Times*, 9 December 1964.
[85] Telford Taylor, "The Nuremberg War Crime Trials: An Appraisal," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 23 No. 3 (May, 1949): 21
[86] Dodd and Bloom, 65.
[87] Three of the defendants were acquitted, seven sent to prison and twelve condemned to death. Christopher Dodd, "What My Father Saw At Nuremberg", October 1, 2006, p 1.
[88] Dodd and Bloom, 38-44.

Initially, Jackson relegated Dodd to a background role "interrogating prisoners" to "build potential cases."[89] Consequently, Dodd spent difficult months reviewing disturbing evidence of the Nazi economic preparations for aggressive war, the slave labour program and evidence that documented the existence of concentration camps, including films shot by Allied troops who liberated these camps.[90] Jackson promoted Dodd to the position of trial counsel, and then to the elite squad of four senior lawyers who served as Executive Counsel.[91] Though he missed his family, Dodd recognized that a counsel spot in "one of the greatest trials of history," would be a "great distinction," and "with attendant publicity and recognition as it should bring is a great asset for us and the children," as "it might lead to great opportunity."[92]

Justice Jackson framed the trials around the presentation of voluminous empirical evidence, initially causing "great tedium" to envelop the Trials.[93] As Lawrence Douglas remarked, the trials became "devoted to the numbing recitation of thousands of documents."[94] While Dodd respected Jackson and viewed him as a "very human and warm man,"[95] the flamboyant Dodd held opposing views concerning the methodology of prosecution. In a letter written to his wife in late-

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[89] Barrett, 6.
[90] Barrett, 6.
[91] Dodd and Bloom, 197.
[92] Dodd and Bloom, 187.
[93] Lawrence Douglas, "The Shrunken Head of Buchenwald: Icons of Atrocity at Nuremberg," *Representations* No. 63 (Summer, 1998): 39.
[94] Douglas, 39.
[95] Dodd and Bloom, 73.

November 1945, Dodd remarked that he carried the "heaviest part of the trial work- and the greatest amount of it," and questioned whether he made the right decision to participate in the Trials, which had become a "madhouse."[96]

In another letter home, Dodd lamented Jackson's lack of "oratorical talent," and questioned his boss's "reliance on documents".[97] Instead, Dodd sought to distil through the Trial a "greater use of evidence that shows the human stakes" of Nazi war conduct.[98] He got his wish and made the most of the opportunity. Jackson recognized Dodd's oratorical talents, and gave him more latitude in his cross-examination of witnesses. The turning point for Dodd at the Trial and perhaps for his future in politics and his own philosophy, took place on December 13, 1945. Dodd presented to the court "Exhibit USA-254", a shrunken head of a male prisoner of the Buchenwald Polish concentration camp; it had been used by Nazi officials as a paperweight.[99] The shrunken head, along with another "icon of atrocity"- tattooed human skin used as lampshades by the Nazis - "became some of the best-known images associated with the trial."[100] Douglas noted, "introduced as evidence under the novel concept of crimes against humanity, the shrunken head of Buchenwald conjured an image of these atrocities as crimes of atavism: horrific

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53 Dodd and Bloom, 197.
[97] Dodd and Bloom, 197-199.
[98] Dodd and Bloom, 197.
[99] Douglas, 40.
[100] Douglas, 40.

deeds committed in an orgy of mass savagery and lawlessness.[101] The shrunken head "performed a valuable, if not instrumental role," by conveying "an image of atrocity familiar to liberal jurisprudence: of the law as civilization's bulwark against barbarism."[102] In a study examining representations of "icons of atrocity" at Nuremberg, Douglas commented that the famous photo of Dodd holding the exhibit resembled "Hamlet contemplating the skull of Yorick." Dodd's sister Mary Dwyer remarked that her brother's "look of horror" was not a staged reaction and represented his true feelings.[103] Media outlets around the world published the photograph, helping to shape Dodd's reputation as a crusader for justice and human rights.

At Nuremberg, Dodd worked with French, British, and Soviet prosecutors, along with officials from the International Military Tribunal.[104] Dodd was deeply suspicious of the Soviets. In letters to his wife he indicated the Russians were "beasts and worse"[105] who were responsible for "stripping Germany of everything"[106] and that "The Achilles heel of this great trial is the Russian participation in it".[107] Chris Dodd said his father's "harshest words were reserved

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[101] Douglas, 40-2.
[102] Douglas, 42.
[103] Thomas Dodd Family Oral History Project, Interview with Mary Dodd-Dwyer.
[104] Dodd and Bloom 37, 44.
[105] Dodd and Bloom, 129.
[106] Dodd and Bloom, 104
[107] Dodd and Bloom, 337

for the Russians, who had little interest in a fair trial."[108] As a result of his experiences with the Russians who, in his view, were trying to undermine justice and a fair trial, Dodd was already thundering about the communist menace, telling his wife that "the communists are on the march...and the prospect of Russian totalitarianism – Russian Gestapo, Russian concentration camps, Russian *kultur* – seems to me the sorry result for a world that was fighting for freedom..."[109] and "the Russians are impossible at every turn...it makes me sick to see them prosecuting these Germans for they have done exactly the same things and worse".[110] Dodd summarized his views by declaring "This war has settled nothing much except that Russia is more of a menace than ever. It is a pity that we didn't let the Germans and the Russians wipe each other out. The rest of the world cannot live in peace with them – there is no doubt in my mind about that." [111] Dodd's pious Catholicism reinforced his views about the Russians, as did his visit with the Pope. On October 4, 1945 Dodd sent a letter home indicating that "Russia is behaving so badly...We have substituted...one dictatorship for another. Make no mistake about that. I resolved, yesterday, after talking to the Holy Father, to stand openly and firmly against this menace." [112]

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[108] Christopher Dodd, What My Father Saw at Nuremberg, October 1, 2006 accessed at http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q=node/3648/print Internet accessed September 8, 2007.
[109] Dodd and Bloom, 130.
[110] Dodd and Bloom, 165.
[111] Dodd and Bloom, 346.
[112] Dodd and Bloom, 155.

The parallels Dodd drew between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were not unique. As Thomas G. Paterson demonstrated, the concept of "Red Fascism" (the notion linking Nazi fascism and Soviet totalitarianism) was pervasive in the United States before World War II, taking hold around the time of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939. "Red Fascism" grew to such prominence in American culture that it "contributed to the establishment of world-wide alliances and military containment policies in Europe and Asia."[113] In the wake of World War II, even President Truman's thoughts on the likeness of Nazi Germany and to the Soviet Union mirrored those expressed by Dodd at Nuremberg.[114]

According to Paterson, long before the U.S. undertook its role as the preeminent global superpower in the postwar period, "many Americans linked Fascist and Communist ideologies as denials of human freedom, saw Germany and Russia as international aggressors, and pictured Hitler and Stalin as evil comrades."[115] Because "Red Fascism" had become firmly woven into the fabric of mainstream American culture by the mass media and policy makers before and after World War II, Dodd and other influential Americans could not see beyond it, and used this notion to exaggerate the communist threat facing the United States.

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[113] Thomas G. Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 15.
[114] Paterson, 3.
[115] Paterson, 7.

As Paterson writes, "The nightmare of 'Red Fascism' bestirred a generation of Americans, leaving its mark on the events of the Cold War and its warriors." [116] Jeffrey D. Bass observed that the Nuremberg experiences "largely defined Dodd as a legislator. He frequently evoked the imagery and symbolism of Nuremberg to dramatize the issues he championed so fervently".[117]

The people with whom Dodd associated at Nuremberg also influenced his anticommunism by reinforcing his ardent Catholicism. The most influential of these people was Father Edmund Walsh, a Catholic leader, writer, and self-styled philosopher, who founded the first American Foreign Service School at Georgetown University, a man whom scholars regard as "the most renowned Catholic spokesperson on geopolitics" of the day.[118] Walsh was also "the country's leading Catholic opponent of [Soviet] recognition, and part of a powerful network of strident anticommunists who pressured President Roosevelt to "ask the Soviets to release religious prisoners and grant religious freedom to Americans in the U.S.S.R."[119] Walsh's anticommunism predated Dodd's opposition to the Soviet Union. Writing on the persecution of Catholics in Soviet Russia, 1932, Walsh stated that in "this conflict between light and darkness... The stake is two-fold.

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[116] Paterson, 17.
[117] Jeffrey D. Bass, "Wellspring of a Connecticut Crusader: Thomas J. Dodd and the Nuremberg Trial", *Connecticut History*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1996), 31.
[118] Patrick H. McNamara, *A Catholic Cold War: Edmund A. Walsh and the Politics of American Anticommunism* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 130.
[119] Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 79.

First, the soul of a great nation whose exhausted body has been bludgeoned into passive submission by ten years of terrorism. But ultimately the prize is the soul, the body and the spiritual allegiance of the entire human race."[120] Walsh's experiences studying the organized campaign of terror against religious association led him to believe that "it is clear there exists on Russian soil an implacable, an organized, and a militant atheism, supported and sponsored by a sovereign State and designed to be imposed by force on the entire civilized world. If collectivism is the body of communism, atheism is its soul, and internationalism the be-all and end-all of its external operation."[121] Thus, by the time he travelled to Nuremberg, Father Walsh had prior knowledge of Soviet atrocities, and a visceral hatred of communism. Walsh educated Dodd on these issues during his stay at Nuremberg.

Walsh first met Dodd in 1945 at Nuremberg while "travelling about Europe investigating certain atrocities against Churchmen," and the two quickly became friends and travel companions.[122] Officially, Walsh was "called upon to act as a consultant" to Justice Jackson.[123] But Dodd allowed Walsh to sit in on his interrogations of Nazi planners, while Walsh provided the logistics for Dodd's visit

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[120] Edmund A. Walsh, "The Catholic Church in Present-Day Russia," *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (July 1932): 177.
[121] Edmund Walsh, 181.
[122] Dodd and Bloom, 133.
[123] Robert V. Schauer, review of *Edmund A. Walsh, S.J, A Biography*, by Louis J. Gallagher, S.J., *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 49, No. 3, (October 1963): 420.

to Vatican City to meet Pope Pius XII. Moreover, Walsh accompanied Dodd on a diplomatic mission to meet the President of Czechoslovakia in Prague.[124]

The documentary evidence suggests Dodd and Walsh shared a close bond at Nuremberg, with Walsh serving as Dodd's spiritual and philosophical advisor. Father Walsh was in telephone contact with Grace Dodd from Nuremberg to reassure her that the young prosecutor would be home soon. Dodd also sent a memorandum to Justice Jackson urging that Father Walsh be permitted to stay with the delegation, and fended off attempts to remove Walsh by other members who had grown tired of his presence. Dodd reserved particularly harsh judgement for General Robert Gill, Chief of the Prisoner of War Division. In his letters home, Dodd remarked that Gill "quietly cuts the heads off each Irish Catholic in town...he tried to get rid of Father Walsh last February - I blocked that."[125] Upon his return to the U.S., Father Walsh published a book, *Total Power*, a scathing anticommunist polemic which drew on own his experiences at Nuremberg. The Jesuit scholar Patrick McNamara, an expert on Walsh, noted that *Total Power* "Was not simply an account of Walsh's work in Germany, however; it was an extended meditation on both the Nazi German and Soviet Russian abuses of power, the roots of totalitarianism, and America's role in the postwar world."[126] McNamara observes

[124] Dodd and Bloom, 219
[125] Dodd and Bloom, 338
[126] McNamara, 128.

that it was Dodd who convinced Father Walsh to find a publisher for the book in 1948. [127]

Although *Total Power* received an uneven response from literary critics and scholars, it was digested by a wide audience, and hailed as an instructive manual on anticommunism by mainstream media outlets. In a 1948 *Life* magazine "round table," editors commended Walsh for his "profound knowledge of the misuse of power by totalitarian states."[128] Dodd likely devoured Father Walsh's third book, *Total Empire: the Roots and Progress of World Communism,* which "appeared at a time when Americans were apprehensive about the Soviet threat." [129] Father Walsh's *Total Empire* did well on several bestseller lists, and doubtless influenced public opinion in the United States.[130]

According to Jeffrey Bass, "Dodd returned to America in 1946 convinced of the moral equivalency of Communism and National Socialism".[131] In 1947 he charged that "all the elements in Nazism are present today in the Government of Russia" and began his campaign to convince Americans that one dire threat to

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[127] Ibid.
[128] "A Life Round Table on the Pursuit of Happiness," *Life*, 12 July 1948, 96.
[129] McNamara, 155.
[130] McNamara, 155-156. The literature is divided on whether Father Walsh directly influenced Joseph McCarthy to embark on an "anticommunist witch-hunt" in the early 1950s. According to McNamara, the investigative journalist Drew Pearson (who would later become a thorn in Dodd's side) implied in an article (based on dubious sources) that Walsh attended an infamous dinner with McCarthy at the Colony restaurant in Washington, and "planted the seeds of McCarthyism," by implying that it would be politically beneficial for McCarthy to exploit the issue of communism and domestic subversion. Although the tale continues to live on in the literature, most scholars consider apocryphal the Walsh-McCarthy-Colony story.
[131] Bass, 32.

humanity had passed only to be followed by a similar contagion.[132] In 1946, President Truman presented him with a citation and the U.S. Medal of Freedom. But in 1949, when the Polish government (then dominated by Moscow) offered him a prestigious award for his work at Nuremberg, Dodd refused to accept it. In a letter made public he wrote "The record of your government in both domestic and foreign affairs is shockingly familiar to the records of the Nazi tyrants…I see no difference between the despotism which your government has inflicted upon the people of Poland and that through they suffered under the Nazis".[133]

Dodd was so shaken with the evidence of Nazi atrocities that upon his return to Connecticut, he did not write about or discuss his experiences for a number of years even with close relatives.[134] Dodd himself observed that "my family was shocked by my changed appearance when I came home."[135] In an oral history interview, Dodd's sister Mary recalled that Dodd did not speak to her about his Nuremberg experiences for twenty years.[136] Though he was a sought-after speaker on "freedom" and a "pioneer in international law", Dodd was curiously silent on the "central events" of Nuremberg.[137] [138] As James Boyd observed, "for

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[132] Ibid.
[133] Bass, 32-33.
[134] Thomas Dodd Family Oral History Project, Interview with Mary Dodd-Dwyer.
[135] George Dixon, "Washington Scene," *Washington Post*, 28 July 1959.
[136] Thomas Dodd Family Oral History Project, Interview with Mary Dodd-Dwyer.
[137] Boyd, 12.
[138] Thomas Dodd wrote a lengthy article on the Trials entitled "The Nurnberg Trials" but he discussed strictly legal issues, difficulties with the location and the role of the defence. He made no mention of the emotional impact or

whatever the reasons for his uncharacteristic reticence- whether humility or a reaction to the horrors unearthed there, or remorse over some aspect of a searing experience- Dodd returned from Nuremberg a changed man."[139]

The overall significance of the Nuremberg trial to Dodd's thought and perspective cannot be underestimated; it reinforced his fear of atheistic communism and the Soviet Union in particular. Dodd's contribution to the success of the Nuremberg trials is underestimated. According to Edna Paris it was a "landmark achievement" in which postwar Germans "saw for themselves that the trials were conducted according to the highest principles of due process".[140] This in turn paved the way for today's International Criminal Court.

In 1948, the same year the United Nations (UN) adopted the Genocide Convention, Dodd tested his political stature by launching an unsuccessful bid for a Connecticut Congressional seat.[141] In that contest, Dodd defended the Truman administration against the third-party candidacy of Henry Wallace. In Connecticut, Dodd charged that they People's Party, the state wing of Wallace's Progressive

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of his relations with the Russians as described in his private letters. See Thomas J. Dodd, "The Nurnberg Trials" *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,* Vol. 37, No 5. (Jan-Feb 1947): 357-367.

[139] Boyd, 12.

[140] Erna Paris, *The Sun Climbs Slow: The International Criminal Court and the Struggle for Justice*. (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2009), 174.

[141] Ironically, 1948 was a triumphant year for Dodd's main political rival in Connecticut, Chester Bliss Bowles. Bowles won the race for Connecticut Governor that year. His political fortunes, however, were short-lived. Dodd defeated the well-connected Bowles for the Democratic nomination for Senate in 1958, and though Bowles later carved out a solid career as a Congressman, Ambassador to India, and Undersecretary of State, he never reached the political heights he sought. Bowles's public opposition to the Bay of Pigs fiasco surely infuriated his arch-rival Tom Dodd. This break with the Kennedys also ended Bowles's "public career." See John Kenneth Galbraith, *Name Dropping: From FDR On* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 165. For more on the Bowles-Dodd dispute, see Howard B. Schaffer, *Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold* War (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993).

Party, was dominated by Communists. Dodd wore the scorn of the People's Party as a "badge of honour," and by rejecting a "draft Dodd" movement for Lieutenant Governor, he made it clear to state Democratic leaders that he would "not be party to any effort to appease the Communist-dominated group in the State of Connecticut."[142] In 1952, Dodd won a hotly contested battle for Connecticut's First Congressional District, moving into Federal politics with his views on communism, the Soviet Union and social justice at home clearly defined – views that would not change during his years in Congress. "The freshman legislator quickly established a reputation as an anticommunist with a philosophy based upon his Nuremberg experience".[143] Throughout his career he reminded American audiences of the link between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. For example, in March 1960 he delivered a speech to the Senate in which he declared "Between the brutality of Soviet anti-Semitism and the brutality of Nazi anti-Semitism, there is little to choose. About all that is lacking so far in the U.S.S.R. is the gas chamber."[144]

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[142] "Dodd's Emphatic Refusal, *"The Hartford Courant*, 9 August 1948.
[143] Bass, 33.
[144] Dodd and Bloom, 5.

The Munich Influence

Dodd was also strongly influenced by Winston Churchill and his battle with Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy toward Adolf Hitler's Germany in the 1930s. Throughout his career Dodd continued to invoke the appeasement charge against those who were "soft on Communism" or "new isolationists" as he called them in many speeches during the 1960s. Just as Chamberlain's appeasement led to the Nazi aggression and atrocities he documented at Nuremberg, Dodd believed any weakness in the free world would empower the communist menace to commence similar atrocities. Stating "there were many lessons which Sir Winston Churchill taught the free world" Dodd observed "the chief of these lessons were that we must never yield to tyranny, that we must never appease tyranny, that we must never compromise our principles...never yield to force and the apparently overwhelming might of the enemy. Never yield in any way, great or small, large or petty, except to convictions of honour and good sense."[145] [146] Dodd told his audience in Montgomery Alabama that "if we guide ourselves by this precept, there is every reason to be confident that communism will be contained and

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[145] Dodd Papers, Speech titled "The World Situation," 3 May 1965, Series III, Box 202, Folder 5193.

[146] Dodd no doubt approved of Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech delivered at Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946. Churchill declared that "Communist parties or fifth columns" presented a "growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization" and called for Anglo-American resistance to Soviet aggression--views that were identical to Dodd's. As Stephanie Hirsch observes, Churchill's speech took place just as the Western powers and the Soviet Union were designing their arguments at Nuremberg, and Churchill's comments caused "glee" amongst the Nazi defendants. See Stephanie Hirsch, "The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda, and the Making of the Postwar Order", *American Historical Review* Volume 113, Number 3 (June 2008): 720.

freedom will prevail.[147] Chapters Four and Five illustrate the impact of the Munich influence as Dodd continually referred to links between 1930s appeasement and those (including Dr. Martin Luther King) who protested against the United States' aggressive stance against communism, particularly in Vietnam and in Africa. Dodd visited Munich in August 1945 and found most of the city destroyed. He also visited Hitler's house which was intact and still had the famous picture of Hitler, Chamberlain and Daladier at the Munich conference on the wall. This visit no doubt cemented Dodd's negative view of what he perceived to be the allied powers' weakness in the 1930s. In January 1946 Dodd and Father Walsh met with Czech President Eduard Benes who told them about Munch in 1938 and how the French and British ambassadors warned him that if he resisted Hitler he would be responsible for the war and that "even if you win we will take the area that the Nazis want away from you". [148] These personal contacts reinforced Dodd's belief that allied weakness and duplicity led to the atrocities and undermined "a man of courage and strong mind" like Benes. [149]

Given his views on appeasement and the Soviet threat, Dodd throughout his career was unwilling to consider conciliation with the communists. In a letter to the editor published in the *New York Times* on March 31, 1965, Dodd, as part of a feud with former Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan who had called for

[147] Dodd Papers, Speech "The World Situation".
[148] Dodd and Bloom, 219.
[149] Ibid.

less suspicion and an "act of faith" toward the Soviets, stated that if an act of faith could improve relations "the cold war would have come to an end a long time ago".[150] In Dodd's view, both the Yalta Agreement and the test-ban moratorium of 1958 were "acts of faith" which resulted in communist dictatorships imposed in Europe, the Castro revolution in Cuba and unilateral resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviets. In a statement that firmly defined his views about conciliation, Dodd concluded his letter by observing "The demonstrable fact is that each of our 'acts of faith' has been interpreted by the Communists as a sign of weakness and has inspired them to respond with contempt and ingratitude and new aggression".[151]

Thus, Dodd's pious religious beliefs, his shattering experiences at Nuremberg, his equation of Soviet and Nazi totalitarianism, and his disdain for appeasement and its consequences, guided his views, his support for policies and his consistent message to the American public throughout the Cold War years.

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[150] "Dodd Answers Kennan on Soviet Relations", Letter to the Editor, *New York Times,* 12 April, 1965.
[151] Ibid.

Chapter Two

The New Dealer

Tom Dodd's Democratic politics and the desire to support working families began at an early age. His father, a contractor, was a union man who instilled the value of hard work and care for the underprivileged. Dodd's sister Mary Dodd-Dwyer later said these core values influenced her brother's lifelong passion for civil rights.[152] Dodd's grandfather was heavily involved in local Democratic Party politics. In a revealing interview with George Dixon of the *Washington Post* on July 28, 1959, Dodd explained his lifelong support of working-class Americans. Dodd said "I couldn't be anything but for labour. I came from the other side of the tracks. Growing up, I saw labour underpaid and exploited. I worked in the linen mills for 30 cents an hour. Every day or so there'd be a scream, a woman losing a finger, a man a hand. If anybody suggested safety guards be installed he would be called a Bolshevik."[153] Dodd remained a strong supporter of the union movement and praised the AFL-CIO unions "as having more solid understanding on the subject of communism than any other major sector of our society."[154]

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[152] Thomas Dodd Family Oral History Project, Interview with Mary Dodd-Dwyer.
[153] George Dixon, "Washington Scene," *Washington Post*, 28 July 1959.
[154] Tom Kelly, "Specter to the Left is a Critic of the Right," *Washington Daily News*, 30 October 1961.

His political acumen and skill as an orator led to his being discovered by Homer S. Cummings, a well-connected Democrat who became the 55th Attorney General of the U.S. in President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's cabinet.[155] Cummings recruited Dodd to join the fledgling Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to give the ambitious Dodd a "springboard to a political career."[156] Dodd won the trust of the Bureau's powerful director, J. Edgar Hoover. The two forged an enduring relationship and Dodd became both the Director's and the Bureau's "champion in the Senate."[157]As Curt Gentry observed in his biography of Hoover, Dodd "delivered dozens of speeches extolling the personal virtues of Hoover, often streaking first out of the starting gate when either the director or his Bureau was criticized."[158] Dodd indicated his allegiance to Hoover when, in 1963 and 1965, he blocked a bill that mandated Senate confirmation of the FBI leader."[159]

Chasing down dangerous criminals such as John Dillinger proved to be a strain on Dodd, who was starting a family (he eventually had six children) with his wife Grace, the daughter of a well-heeled businessman from Providence, Rhode Island. In 1935, Dodd's "patron and mentor," newly-elected Connecticut Senator Francis T. Maloney, rewarded him for his efforts in the political campaign, and

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[155] Robert Sobel, *Biographical Directory of the United States Executive Branch, 1774-1989* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1990), 87.
[156] Curt Gentry, *J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and his Secrets* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), 591
[157] Gentry, 591.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid.

helped the young lawyer secure employment as Deputy Administrator of the Works Progress Administration (WPA). It was an important piece of FDR's New Deal, designed in part to repair the social and economic fabric of an America ravaged by the Great Depression. In the National Youth Administration (NYA), a critical branch of the WPA tasked with providing programs to give jobs to underprivileged youth, Dodd acceded to the position of Connecticut State Director, where he remained until 1945. Across the country, the NYA program provided "jobs for hundreds of thousands of young people," and helped lift the spirits of a generation whose futures were nearly ruined by the Great Depression.[160] At the NYA Dodd made his most important political connection, that of Lyndon Baines Johnson, who would later become "master of the Senate," and the 36th President of the United States. At an NYA conference in Texas, Dodd befriended the young Johnson, who was serving as that state's NYA director. While Dodd and Johnson both used their NYA positions to further their political goals, their respective jobs profoundly influenced their outlook on American society, and positions on domestic legislation in Congress.[161] [162] Thirty years later Dodd said the NYA experience was the most rewarding time of his life.[163]

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[160] Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 84-5.
[161] Kearns, 85.
[162] LBJ told Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in 1957 that "the Negroes in Texas voted for him because of his fairness to them when he was NYA Administrator". Schlesinger Jr., *Journals*, 52.
[163] Pearson and Anderson, 36.

From 1938 to 1945, Dodd carved out an impressive career in the Justice Department as a special assistant to the Office of the Attorney General. Dodd worked as special assistant to five Attorneys General, but as legal scholar Robert Q. Barrett remarked, "special assistant can be a most misleading title - in Dodd's day it meant, and he was, a real trial-level federal prosecutor."[164] Dodd knew Attorney General (and future Connecticut Senator) Brien McMahon well. Dodd reported to him and became a driving force behind the creation of the first civil rights division. This position in the Justice Department took Dodd far from the friendly confines of Connecticut into the racial cauldron of the Deep South, where he prosecuted members of the Ku Klux Klan, and battled racist law enforcement officials resistant to qualitative social change. Looking back in 1965, Dodd reminded constituents that "I have been a life-long advocate of Negro equality" and indicated that "as a member of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, I was fighting civil rights cases in the South in the 1930s, when Dr. [Martin Luther] King was still a boy – and at that early date I learned the meaning of racial hatred and intolerance and of having to be escorted out of towns by the police."[165] At this time, the political climate in the U.S. surrounding civil rights

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[164] Robert Q. Barrett, "From Justice Jackson to Thomas J. Dodd to Nuremberg," Legal Studies Research Paper Series, St. Johns University School of Law, 4, available from http://www.roberthjackson.org/documents/RHJDoddtexttoSCHS.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 January 2009.

[165] Dodd Papers, Press Release, "Senator Dodd Says Dr. Martin Luther King's Foreign Policy Intervention Supports Appeasement, Undermines Administration, Alienates Civil Rights Supporters," 11 September 1965, Series III, Box 203, Folder 5257.

was explosive. When Dodd defended "civil liberties in the dusty, sun-baked seats of the Deep South," New Dealers "dominated" the Supreme Court. But as Cornell Clayton observes, conservatives in Congress "loomed as the primary obstacle to Liberal reforms."[166] Liberals in the Justice Department tried to "encourage a more active role for the judiciary hoping to obtain liberal policy objectives in areas such as civil rights and civil liberties."[167]

Prior to World War II, Dodd participated in the prosecution of anti-labour "coal miners, executives, and law enforcement officials" for violation of the Wagner Act in the notorious Harlan County, Kentucky cases.[168] Health problems (high blood pressure) disqualified Dodd from military service during World War II but during the war he handled major federal prosecutions involving acts of industrial espionage, sabotage, and industrial fraud. In 1942, Dodd was instrumental in the prosecution of Gerhard Kunze, a notorious German-American Bund Leader in the U.S. who was convicted in Hartford, Connecticut, under the Espionage Act of 1917.[169] By 1945, Dodd was the government's lead trial lawyer in 285 cases.[170]

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[166] Cornell W. Clayton, *The Politics of Justice: The Attorney General and the Making of Legal Policy* (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1992), 158.
[167] Clayton, 158.
[168] Robert Q. Barrett, "From Justice Jackson to Thomas J. Dodd to Nuremberg," Legal Studies Research Paper Series, St. Johns University School of Law, 4, available from http://www.roberthjackson.org/documents/RHJDoddtexttoSCHS.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 January, 2009
[169] Keith Schonrock, "Tom Dodd Still Fights for Freedom," *Hartford Courant*, 28 September 1952.
[170] Barrett, 5.

Dodd was not a racist. Unlike many Southern Democratic Senators, including J. William Fulbright (D-Ark) and Richard B. Russell (D – GA) (both spoke with authority on foreign policy issues), who waged bitter battles against the expansion of civil rights legislation in order to protect both their careers, and the institutional system of segregation in the Deep South, Dodd was liberal on civil rights issues and was active in the passing of landmark legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964.[171] He genuinely sympathized with the plight of the black underclass in the United States and championed groundbreaking civil rights legislation in the Senate. Following riots that swept Los Angeles in 1965, although Dodd focused on what he perceived to be Communist agitation, he made it clear that "In order to effectively eliminate the danger of racial explosions like Los Angeles, we will have to eliminate the social conditions that breed frustration and anger and hatred among our Negro citizens... We will have to conquer the serious residue of discrimination that still exists in or society."[172] Dodd gamely fought the obstructionist challenges of Southern Democrats seeking to reduce the scope of these transformational laws in order to salvage the repressive system of

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[171] Randall Bennett Woods, "Dixie's Dove: J. William Fulbright, the Vietnam War, and the American South," *Journal of Southern History* 60 (August 1994): 538. Dodd served as a Democratic "captain" to see through the passage of H.R. 7152 (the Civil Rights Act of 1964). For more see Robert D. Loevy, ed., *The Civil Rights Act of 1964: The Passage of The Law That Ended Racial Discrimination* (Albany: State University of New York Press, Albany), 1997, 183.

[172] Dodd Papers, Press Release, "Senator Dodd Charges that Castro Incites American Negroes to Violence: Urges Elimination of Social Conditions which Breed Unrest," 2 September, 1965, Series III, Box 203, Folder 5255.

segregation, and save their political careers in states polarized by racial issues.[173] Moreover, Dodd's exposure to extremism as a member of the Justice Department's first civil rights division, and his unforgettable experiences as counsel at the Nuremberg Trials left him sympathetic to the plight of Jews.[174] He was a formidable enemy to domestic extremists and neo-Nazis through his work as acting chair of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS). But as the Cold War evolved, Dodd used SISS to attack critics of the Johnson Administration's foreign policy initiatives.

Dodd's commitment to ameliorating the circumstances of America's underprivileged did have limits; his own political ascendancy into the Senate's "Club", the "group of Senators who exercised decisive influence over crucial institutions, processes, and decisions" was his first concern.[175] This was most conspicuous in 1958, when upon entering the Senate, Dodd made a deal with then-Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson to vote with Southern Democrats on a

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[173] Though Russell's racism was more visceral than Fulbright's, both were signatories of the infamous "Southern Manifesto," a racist response to the Supreme Court's *Brown v. Board of Education* decision which declared segregated schools unconstitutional. Furthermore, the racist Southern bloc stubbornly used the filibuster to stall the Senate's drive to grant Hawaii statehood throughout the 1950s. Democratic Senators such as Russell, John Stennis, and James Eastland considered anathema the racial makeup of Hawaii. Hawaii was finally granted statehood in 1959, when the Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (who was by then contemplating a Presidential bid) shrewdly changed his position, and marshalled the necessary votes to push the legislation through the Senate, against the wishes of the Southern Democrats. See, Giles Scott-Smith, "From Symbol of Division to Cold War Asset: Lyndon Johnson and the Achievement of Hawaiian Statehood in 1959," *History* (UK) 89, no. 294 (April 2004): 256-273.

[174] In Congress, Dodd was a major supporter of Israel. His first-hand view of the evidence of Nazi brutality at the Nuremberg Trials emboldened his support for a Jewish state.

[175] Joseph A. Fry, *Debating Vietnam: Fulbright, Stennis, and their Senate Hearings* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 5.

"weak revision" of the Senate's Rule 22 on cloture (ending debate), which in practice, allowed Senators opposed to civil rights to filibuster related legislation.[176] When Dodd entered the Senate LBJ sat as the powerful Senate Majority Leader and immediately tested Dodd's loyalty on the critical issue of the "liberalization" of the Senate. The rule, which enforced the use of "cloture" on Senate filibusters, was a contentious issue among Democrats. Liberal Democrats, such as Senator Joseph Clark (D-Penn), saw Rule 22 as unfairly favouring Southern Democrats and Republicans, as it required "at least a two-thirds majority of the Senate" to end or prevent a filibuster.[177] Clark and his Liberal allies wanted to lower the number of Senators necessary to reach cloture, to prevent the anti-civil rights bloc of the Senate from "using or threatening" filibusters that could obstruct progressive legislation.[178] Dodd was one of only eight freshman Democratic Senators swept into power in the Party's 1958 landslide to back LBJ on a watered-down amendment of Rule 22, which still required two-thirds of the Senate to invoke cloture, but only those "present and voting" instead of "the entire Senate membership."[179] As John Roche and Leonard Levy noted, Rule 22 gave "enormous

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[176] Mark Grossman, *Political Corruption in America: An Encyclopaedia of Scandals* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 101

[177] Sean Savage, *JFK, LBJ and the Democratic Party* (Albany: State University of New York Press), 96.

[178] Savage, 96. Clark's effort to strongly amend Rule 22 failed again in 1961, when Senate Majority leader Mike Mansfield (with the tacit approval of JFK and LBJ) "referred Clark's proposal to the Rules Committee "effectively killing it." For a concise account on the history of Filibustering in the U.S. Senate, see Sarah H. Binder and Steven S. Smith *Politics or Principle: Filibustering in the U.S. Senate* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press,) 1997.

[179] Sarah A. Binder and Steven S. Smith, *Politics or Principle? Filibustering in the United States Senate* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 8.

power to a determined minority- they can simply keep talking against a bill, notably in the area of civil rights, until the press of business forces the other Senators to drop the issue".[180] James Sundquist observed that Dodd and his fellow freshman Senators were "vulnerable to 'the Johnson treatment' because they had not yet been assigned to committees."[181] In this context, Dodd's ambition superseded his zeal for civil rights reform, and he was handsomely rewarded for passing Johnson's test with seats on the Senate Foreign Relations, Judiciary, Appropriations, and Aeronautics and Space Science committees, which the *Congressional Record* calls some of "the most prestigious in the Senate."[182] In exchange for his vote, Dodd eventually received plum positions on the powerful Committees, and several influential Subcommittees.[183] As historian Sean Savage notes, of the incoming Democratic Senators elected in 1958, Dodd was among the (minority) group who chose to ensconce themselves in the traditional Senate seniority system, rather than break with Johnson to chart a more radical course.[184] Those who went against Johnson on Rule 22 were generally left out of the powerful committees.

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[180] John P. Roche and Leonard Levy, *The Congress* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1964), 49.
[181] James L. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1968), 239.
[182] Sean Savage, *JFK, LBJ and the Democratic Party* (Albany: State University of New York, 2004), 47.
[183] Savage, 47.
[184] Savage, 43, 47. Dodd briefly broke from The Club when, in 1963, on the floor of the Senate he publicly attacked Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's (D-MT) leadership style, and the 88th Congress for its failure to quickly pass important legislation, such as the 1963 Foreign Aid Bill. Dodd was briefly castigated by senior members of the Senate such as Everett Dirksen (R-IL) for airing the institution's dirty laundry. When other members of The Club came down on him for his failure to follow the unofficial rules of decorum, Dodd recoiled and presumably apologized to Mansfield. "The Senate: a Crisis in Leadership," *Newsweek*, 18 November 1963, 29-30.

Dodd's support for civil rights may have been "the great historical reference point of his life," but it was secondary to his anticommunism as demonstrated by his unyielding support for Belgian colonial interests in the Congo during the early 1960s, when he was the U.S. Senate's foremost advocate for Katanga secessionist Moïse Tshombe and the country's white elite (explored in Chapter Four).[185] In recognition of his years struggling for improvements in the domain of civil rights, however, Dodd received the prestigious "Brotherhood Award" from the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP).[186] But anticommunist imperatives ultimately superseded his passion for civil rights and the Great Society. For example, when Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., influential leader of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) used his pulpit to voice opposition to the American War in Vietnam, Dodd held the line on Vietnam and chastised King. Dodd launched a blistering attack on King for denouncing the LBJ line on "vital foreign policy issues." Dodd even threatened him with legal reprisals for attempting to engage in personal diplomacy with foreign powers to press for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.[187] In a searing press release in September 1965, Dodd thundered that "when Dr. Martin Luther King takes advantage of his

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[185] Dodd supported Tshombe even though, as historian Thomas Bortelmann observed "Africans, African Americans and antiracists around the world condemned Tshombe as a stooge of Belgian mining interests and were outraged by [Patrice] Lumumba's assassination, which they likened to an international lynching". Quoted in Thomas G. Paterson et al *A History of American Foreign Relations, Volume 2 Sixth Edition* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 335.

[186] Dodd Papers, NAACP Brotherhood Award, 1964, Series XI, Box 436.

[187] Peter John Ling, *Martin Luther King, Jr.,* (London: Routledge, 2002), 259.

pulpit...to call for the admission of Red China to the United Nations; to demand that the United States commit itself to negotiate with the Viet Cong; and to advocate that the U.S. reorient its foreign policy along the lines of accommodation with communism, then I can only regret that the leader of the civil rights movement, by his intemperate alignment with the forces of appeasement in foreign policy, has alienated much of the support which he previously enjoyed in Congress."[188] In stating that Dodd "backed away from the civil rights movement," scholar Gerald McKnight overstates the case, but in instances such as this, because of his strident anticommunism and foreign interventionism, Dodd collided against those with whom he was aligned on issues of civil rights and domestic reform.[189] The links of the civil rights and anti-war movements, and Dodd's inability to understand the connection, are discussed in Chapter Five.

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[188] Dodd Papers, Press Release, "Senator Dodd Says Dr. Martin Luther King's Foreign Policy Intervention Supports Appeasement, Undermines Administration, Alienates Civil Rights Supporters," 11 September 1965.

[189] Gerald McKnight, *The Last Crusade: Martin Luther King Jr., the FBI, and the Transformation of the Civil Rights Movement,* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 16. Interestingly, the Dodd censure factored into the ferocious climate of late-1960s American race relations. In 1967, Adam Clayton Powell, a black Congressman from Harlem was excluded from the House of Representatives for misuse of committee funds and other charges. African-American and white anti-racism activists argued that Clayton Powell's exclusion illustrated the double standard existing in American society. These critics questioned why the white Dodd (who was found guilty of similar charges) received only a censure, while the black Clayton Powell was dealt a career-ending blow and forced to suffer the embarrassment of a formal exclusion. According to scholar Charles Sumner Stone Jr., Clayton Powell's exclusion from the House was a "defining moment" for African Americans in the battle for racial equality. John Charles Boger and Judith Welch Wagner, eds., *Race, Poverty, and American Cities* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 522.

The liberal Democrat: Dodd's unwavering support for underprivileged Americans, civil rights, and gun control

Thus, by World War II the deeply religious Dodd developed a social conscience and understanding of the socioeconomic and civil rights challenges facing many Americans. He was a committed New Dealer determined to improve the standard of living and quality of life of underprivileged Americans. Like Lyndon Johnson, Dodd worked vigorously to build an America which afforded more equality, opportunity, prosperity, and social justice. Dodd's voting record in Congress reveals impressive support for the sweeping progressive liberal domestic policies under the auspices of John Fitzgerald Kennedy's New Frontier and LBJ's Great Society which promised to alleviate poverty, expand civil rights, reform arcane immigration laws, and increase funding to social programs such as Medicare, education, housing, social security, public works, and mass transit that stood to benefit millions of Americans residing in the middle and lower classes of society. For Dodd, the vision that was set, particularly by the Johnson Administration, was "the goal of a society free from every form of religious and racial discrimination, where every citizen not only enjoys complete political equality, but complete social equality and equality of opportunity as well."[190]

[190] Dodd Papers, Press Release, "Senator Dodd Charges that Castro Incites American Negroes to Violence: Urges Elimination of Social Conditions which Breed Unrest," 2 September, 1965.

Nevertheless, Dodd's strident anticommunism overwhelmed his domestic achievements to the point that, as Senator Paul Douglas (D-Illinois) observed in 1962, "There has been an attempt by some to label our colleague, Tom Dodd, as somehow being a very conservative, even reactionary person."[191] Douglas noted "I think the public should know that Senator Dodd's domestic voting record is one of strong support for liberal and progressive causes and that his opposition to communism is one based on the facts as he sees them and not on indiscriminate attacks on the innocent."[192] Douglas continued, "In recent years the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)...rated him from 80% to 100% in support of the programs they feel are important. On the other hand, I note that...the American Conservative Society of America rated him only 13% conservative and 87% anticonservative...while a vigorous anticommunist he has many times stood up in support of those who have been unfairly accused by the far right of communist leanings."[193]

Dodd did, in fact, have an exemplary congressional voting record in support of liberal domestic reforms. Among many other progressive bills, he voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Dodd co-sponsored the original civil rights recommendations submitted by President Kennedy and he

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[191] Dodd Papers, Congress, Senate, Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois speaking "Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut," 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Congressional Record* 108, p. 30 (1 March 1962), Series III, Box 194, Folder 4698.
[192] Ibid.
[193] Ibid.

voted against every amendment designed to weaken the Civil Rights Bill, which finally passed by a 73-27 vote.[194] He also voted for Medical Care for the Aged under Social Security, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (co-sponsored with Hubert Humphrey), Foreign Aid, the War on Poverty Package (he was a co-sponsor), the Accelerated Public Works Program, the establishment of the Peace Corps and the National Service (Domestic Peace) Corps, the Youth Conservation Corps and Employment, Expansion of Federal Housing and Renewal Programs, the Mass Transportation Act, Immigration Reform and Liberalization, Pay Raises for Federal Employees and the $11.5 Billion tax cut in the 1964 Tax Reduction Bill.[195]

Dodd was a strong supporter of public education.[196] He and Senator Abraham Ribicoff moved an amendment to the tax reduction bill to provide tax cuts for college expenses, but it was defeated. He supported a variety of public education bills providing aid to primary and secondary education, higher education, medical and dental schools and library services.[197] Dodd opposed, and helped defeat, attempts by Senator Goldwater to provide low-cost, long-term loans for construction at private schools.[198] Dodd was also very concerned about the impact of inflation. On July 18, 1960 he wrote a lengthy letter to constituent Anna

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[194] Dodd Papers, Senate Voting Record, 1963-1964, Series III, Box 223, Folder 6136-6137.
[195] Ibid. Dodd was a late-comer to the drive for the Senate's adoption of a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Following initial reservations about the Treaty, Dodd was brought on board by Humphrey and as a key foreign policy "stalwart" Dodd's support for the bill was crucial to its passage (for more details, see Chapter Three).
[196] Dodd's four sisters were all involved in the pedagogical field.
[197] Dodd Papers, Senate Voting Record, 1963-64
[198] Ibid.

C. Dalton of Derby, Connecticut where he indicated "For a long time I have considered this (inflation) as our most serious domestic problem. It is also our gravest economic injustice, since its effects fall principally upon people who are living on pensions, insurance programs, or savings, and people who are living on fixed salaries."[199] Although he stopped short of proposing wage and price controls because that would "destroy the free enterprise system, which is based upon the basic freedom of individuals and businesses to carry out their affairs free from government interference,"[200] he nevertheless charged that inflation was much the product of increased profits and price hikes over and above those justified by increased labour costs and steadily rising prices in industries "which are dominated by a few corporations that can fix prices without fear of real competition."[201] Excessive consumer credit and deficit spending by all levels of government also had an inflationary effect.

Dodd favoured stronger anti-trust legislation "that will break up the system whereby a few great corporations control whole industries and can fix prices and pre-determined levels which have nothing to do with the law of supply and demand."[202] Dodd's perspective on these issues was left of centre. He believed that "there is a great deal of waste in the military procurement in the field of

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[199] Dodd Papers, Letter to Anne C. Dalton, 18 July 1960, Series I, Box 11, Folder 349.
[200] Ibid.
[201] Ibid.
[202] Ibid.

government subsidies...which cost billions in lost revenue each year...On the other hand ...in such domestic fields as slum clearance, depressed areas, education, medical research and other fields require more spending than the President has called for."[203]

The Senator had no patience with those who "often style themselves as 'one hundred percent Americans'. They are in fact grotesque caricatures, symbols of everything that is essentially un-American."[204] Never one to mince words, at a Texas lunch Dodd lashed out at those who "proceed on the basis that a man is guilty until proved (sic) innocent, that the Constitutional rights of suspected persons would be abrogated, that foreigners, foreign goods and foreign ideas should be excluded from America....They are bigots. Their magazines and circulars are filled with hatred of Jews, Catholics, Negroes and all other groups except what they like to define as 'Americans'...Although this type of 100% American may like to drape himself in the Red, White and Blue during the daytime, his uniform at night is sometimes the white sheet".[205] He also, on the Senate floor, denounced the far right-wing John Birch Society (JBS), as "an affront to decency and intelligence."[206] Dodd charged that much like anti-Semites in the

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[203] Ibid.

[204] Dodd Papers, Remarks at Democratic Party luncheon, Fort Worth, Texas, 26 January 1962, Series III, Box 193, Folder 4684.

[205] Ibid.

[206] Time Magazine, "Nation: Storm over Birchers," available from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,874297,00.html; Internet, accessed 15 November 2009. Joining Dodd in the offensive against Robert Welch and the Birchers was Senator Thomas Kuchel (R-CA), a normally

U.S. and abroad who railed against the Soviet Union, the Birchers actually helped, rather than hurt the forces of international communism.[207] In 1965, Dodd charged the JBS with being a "real windfall" to the Soviet Union, "because it provides them with a caricature of anti-communism which they skilfully exploit to encourage the spread of anti anti-communism." But his longest struggle and fiercest battle against right-wing domestic opponents was over gun control.

The liberal campaign to enact stronger gun control legislation picked up steam in 1961, when Dodd, as chair of the Juvenile Justice Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, spearheaded an investigation into the sale of mail-order firearms.[208] Initially, liberal members of the Senate during the late 1950s wanted to implement stiffer gun control measures to restrict the importation of foreign-made firearms that had been cutting into the markets of domestic manufacturers. But as historian Alexander De Conde points out, throughout the

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"mild" and "patient" man who excoriated Welch and his organization for giving "aid and comfort to the Communist conspiracy." Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) defended Welch and the John Birch Society against the attacks of Kuchel and Dodd by stating, "A lot of people in my home town have been attracted to the society, and I am impressed by the type of people in it. They are the kind we need in politics."

[207] Thomas J. Dodd, Freedom and Foreign Policy (New York: MacFadden Books, 1962), 33. The Soviet Union's persecution of all religions deeply offended the pious Tom Dodd. According to Dodd, anti-Semitism was an "instrument" and "tool" of the Soviet Union. Dodd believed that although anti-Semitism was pervasive in the Soviet Union, it was cleverly used by the Kremlin's propaganda machine to underline the existing prejudices in the so-called "free world." Dodd also believed that the persecution of Jews in the Soviet Union and countries in its orbit was further evidence that "godless totalitarians" in Moscow were intent on destroying all vestiges of organized religion. In *Freedom and Foreign Policy*, Dodd cites numerous examples of Soviet anti-Semitism through the Stalin and Khrushchev eras. In the book, Dodd expressed his outrage that the "free world" had been "closing its eyes to the persecution of 3 million Jews in the Soviet Union." Dodd was incredulous that in the setting of this alleged repression, the U.S. was assisting the Soviet Union through increases in foreign aid, "stepped up cultural exchange programs," and legitimized Khrushchev's rule by inviting him to the U.S. for state visits. This was anathema to Dodd, who believed the Soviet Union was no less "evil" than Nazi Germany under the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler.

[208] William J. Vizzard, *Shots in the Dark: The Policy, Politics, and Symbolism of Gun Control* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 93-95.

1950s, support for firearms ownership outweighed the protests by the advocates for control. In the 1950s, "the [gun control] movement's dedicated supporters in Congress had introduced more than thirty-five regulatory bills. The gun lobby blocked all of them."[209]

The assassinations of John F. Kennedy in 1963, and Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy in 1968 shifted the boundaries of the debate on gun control. The harrowing assassination of three national leaders raised the profile of the gun control movement, and liberals such as Dodd used the tragedies to strengthen the case for the meaningful changes to antiquated legislation that had previously lacked support in Congress and the broader public. As chair of the Senate subcommittee on juvenile delinquency, Dodd introduced a bill to establish control over the merchandising of firearms. "The subcommittee's hearings had produced an abundance of evidence that such a law was needed....In 1963, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported there were 8,500 homicides in the United States; about 56 per cent of them were committed with firearms".[210] Senator Dodd introduced his gun control bill only four months before Lee Harvey Oswald, using a mail-order rifle for which he had no permit and which was ordered and received by mail at a Dallas post office, assassinated the President of the United States.[211]

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[209] Alexander De Conde, *Gun Violence in America: The Struggle for Control* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2003), 167.
[210] James Deakin, *The Lobbyists*. (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1966), 202-203
[211] Deakin, 204

Nevertheless, Dodd's bill met with "a massive grassroots pressure campaign" by the National Rifle Association (NRA), which was primarily responsible for "a delay that must rank as unconscionable in a civilized society and for diluting the bill as it affected mail-order sales of rifles and shotguns." [212] Following the assassination of President Kennedy, Dodd amended the bill to prohibit all mail-order sales of rifles and shotguns (except between licensed gun dealers and manufacturers) and this provision "drew the heaviest fire from the NRA, the National Shooting Sports Foundation and other firearms and wildlife [hunting] groups." [213] Capitol Hill was inundated with letters and telegrams from "sportsmen" opposing the bill, to the point that Dodd could not get a quorum on the subcommittee to vote for it. Finally, in 1966, the Senate subcommittee voted in favour of the bill by a 6-3 vote but without the ban on mail-order sales; two prominent Democratic liberals from states where hunting was an important source of tourism (Michigan and North Dakota) voted against the bill.

Dodd was frustrated by what he regarded as deliberate misstatements of fact and misleading information that caused unfounded opposition in both Congress and the public against the bill. He lashed out at the NRA "in some of the strongest language ever used by a Senator against a powerful interest group".[214] In the Senate on March 10, 1966 he charged the NRA and other organizations had

[212] Ibid.
[213] Deakin, 205
[214] Deakin, 211

"deliberately deceived the public with respect to the provisions of this bill" and "have been deplorably two-faced in their statements and actions...Apparently the majority of the leadership of the National Rifle Association will have to be dragged, kicking and screaming, into the twentieth century".[215] It added up, Dodd insisted, to "a campaign of falsehoods and deceptions" that intended to convince the public that it was a first step to banning the ownership of all guns and would prevent hunters from taking their rifles across state lines which was not true in either case (only felons and fugitives would be stopped from transporting rifles, not legitimate hunters).[216]

Ultimately, Dodd was successful in his courageous, pioneering efforts to implement gun control legislation even if a watered-down bill was finally passed by the Senate in 1968. As late as July 1968, Dodd supported a Connecticut state bill to strictly regulate firearms. Dodd was "roundly booed and repeatedly heckled" by a crowd of 500 opponents of the bill and after a calm 25-minute address the Senator "exploded just before leaving the podium and shouted out 'Eighty or 90 per cent of the decent people in America want this law, and your bad manners can't prevent it. You are gun nuts'".[217] Still a passionate advocate of gun control after his censure in the Senate, this was one of many victories for Dodd in

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[215] Deakin, 212-213
[216] Ibid.
[217] "Dodd Jeered at Hartford Gun-Control Hearing" *New York Times*, 17 July, 1968.

liberal domestic politics, and the gun control legislation was one of his most important achievements.

Chapter Three

The Cold War Crusader 1952-1964

Dodd came to Congress in the early 1950s during a period when the "anti-communist persuasion" was reaching a fever pitch.[218] As Robert Griffith remarked in *The Politics of Fear*, anticommunism had deep roots in American history and began as an "expression" against the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.[219] From there, right-wing critics in the U.S. Republican and Democratic parties often used the Communist demon to assail FDR's New Deal, and Truman's Fair Deal policies "in the mindless identification of all social change with communism."[220]

As an ardent New Dealer, Dodd did not join in with the early cacophony of anticommunist voices in American culture. This situation changed, however, with the onset of World War II, the Soviet Union's post-war status as a legitimate empire, and what many politicians (including Dodd) believed was "the loss of China" in 1949.[221] Those espousing the latter view believed that President Truman had not done enough to prevent communist leader Mao Tse-Tsung's revolution from taking power and removing the corrupt leader of the U.S.-backed Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-Shek. During Harry Truman's presidency in the post-war period, and Dodd's two terms in the House in the 1950s, conservatives in Congress

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[218] Robert Griffith, *The Politics of Fear* (New York: Hayden Book Company, 1970), 30-35.
[219] Griffith, 31.
[220] Ibid.
[221] Mann, *A Grand Delusion*, 21.

waged a ferocious war against liberals whom they blamed for "the suspicious blunders and failings that resulted in the Maoist victory in China."[222] In this tense climate of McCarthyism and pernicious red-baiting, no Democrat would dare stray from the orthodox philosophies informing American policy makers of the Cold War. Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson was the target of particularly vile attacks, and the policy of containment galvanized Republicans. California Republican Richard M. Nixon (who would become President in 1968) led the assault against Acheson, chiding the aristocratic North-eastern liberal for his "colour blindness" and "pink" tendencies which led to "a form of pink-eye toward the Communist threat in the United States."[223]

On foreign policy matters, Dodd was at the extreme right of the Democratic Party, and due to his overt anticommunist crusade, he could never be subject to the same bullying from which Dean Acheson and other members of the State Department and Congress suffered. Though he served in the "McCarthyite posse" of the House Internal Security Subcommittee, Dodd campaigned hard against McCarthy for Democratic candidates in Connecticut, and never wavered in his support for LBJ.[224] If the generic liberal embodied the "tweedy, middle-aged intellectual poring over the latest issue of *The New Republic* in a university

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[222] Kyle A. Courdileone, *Manhood and American Political Culture in the Cold War* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 45.
[223] Stanley I. Kutler, *The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 44.
[224] Mark H. Lytle, *America's Uncivil Wars: The Sixties Era from Elvis to the Fall of Nixon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 226.

library,"[225] Dodd was its antithesis. Dodd was a hard-drinking, powerful personality whose favourite publication was conservative beacon William F. Buckley's *National Review.*

Though he was not the progenitor of what scholar Michael Parenti termed the "anticommunist impulse," or even the first member of Congress to "exploit public fears of communists in government in the postwar years," Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy left an indelible mark (some would say stain) on American culture and society. McCarthy led the assault against the Congressional democrats he believed "wear the political label stitched to the idiocy of Truman," and had "rotted by the deceit of Dean Acheson."[226] Dodd was comfortable trumpeting the dogma of anticommunism, but as a "crusader" he stopped short of a descending into McCarthyist demagoguery and operated within the strictures of the Democratic Party. Dodd's anticommunism, though specific to his own background and life experiences, was similar to that practiced by his colleagues from the New Deal era. As Robert Mann aptly notes, even Harry Truman and LBJ "engaged in anti-communist demagoguery" for political expediency, and "virtually every member of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), Democrat

[225] Isserman and Kazin, 130.
[226] Mann, *A Grand Delusion,* 19.

and Republican, had made a career out of the Communists-in-government issue."[227]

Like HUAC members, Dodd emerged as an outspoken opponent of communism in the 1950s, a decade in which a visceral fear of communism enveloped millions of Americans. As Herbert Parmet notes, "Americans were tempted to recall the fifties as a 'placid' era", but "in reality, perhaps not since the time of the Alien and Sedition Acts and the battles over disunion and Reconstruction had Americans viewed one another with such distrust."[228] The gradations of American anticommunists participating in what Parmet called the "holy crusade," are barely perceptible in shading. Though Dodd did hold the party line by campaigning hard for Congressional Democrats throughout the 1950s, he had tight connections to the leading anticommunists in American culture, including his former boss, J. Edgar Hoover.

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[227] Mann, *A Grand Delusion,* 31.

[228] Herbert Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* (New York: MacMillan and Company, 1972), 226.

The Eisenhower Years and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Thomas Dodd viewed the world through the prism of the "domino theory" and containment of communism. John Kenneth Galbraith referenced the domino theory by stating "on no matter have so many of presumed intelligence been so wrong".[229] This certainly applied to Tom Dodd. Dodd was an important cast member in this chapter of American history when paranoia, fear, and imperialism blinded policy makers to the realities of a changing world and led to the adoption of the ill-fated domino theory. He was in short, as historian Stephen Rabe observed "a leading member of the ferociously anticommunist wing of the Democratic Party".[230]

Dodd established that reputation immediately after he was elected to the Senate in the 1958 Democratic congressional sweep when the Eisenhower administration was still in power. Even though there was a tradition that freshman Senators should be seen and not heard, the charismatic Dodd unleashed an incendiary 55-minute speech dramatizing America's determination to stay in Berlin.[231] Echoing what we he said privately from Nuremberg, Dodd charged "Our cause is the good cause. The Russian cause, the cause of murder, enslavement,

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[229] Galbraith, *Name Dropping*, 162.
[230] Stephen Rabe, *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story.* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina), 85.
[231] Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson, *The Case Against Congress: A Compelling Indictment of Corruption on Capitol Hill* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), 29.

aggression and falsehood, is not the good cause".[232] Dodd's name and reputation were broadcast. His image appeared on hundreds of front pages, in *Life*, and *Vital Speeches* printed the text. He told his staff "we've got to follow this up with a speech about the Communist menace, worldwide, not just in Europe".[233] Dodd's influence as a key anticommunist spokesperson was sealed.

He was a thorn in Eisenhower's side, strongly opposing the 1959 Summit Conference with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. In a lengthy speech on the Senate floor, Dodd articulated his disgust with the Eisenhower Administration's plan to welcome Khrushchev on a diplomatic mission to the United States. Couched in religious and apocalyptic language, the speech reveals not only Dodd's fierce opposition to President Eisenhower's invitation to the "red tyrant" and "hangman of the Ukraine" but also the deeper reasons that lay behind his disdain for Khrushchev.[234] In the speech, Dodd alleged that Khrushchev was unworthy of recognition by American officials due to the role he played in "helping to direct" brutal political purges in the Ukraine during the late 1930s.[235] Dodd considered a rapprochement with Khrushchev tantamount to "appeasement" with the "Butcher of Budapest" who put down the Hungarian revolution of 1956.[236] He even fell to

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[232] Pearson and Anderson, 30.
[233] Pearson and Anderson 31.
[234] Dodd Papers, "Visit of Premier Khrushchev to the United States," *Congressional Quarterly*, 19 August 1959, Series III, Box 191, Folder 4505.
[235] Dodd and Bloom, 59.
[236] Dodd and Bloom, 59.

the right of hawkish Vice President Richard Nixon on this issue, characterizing the VP's ambivalent opinion of Khrushchev- or the "terrorist in chief" as "peculiarly inept." Dodd also used this speech to highlight the Kremlin's "slaughter" and persecution of the Catholic Church.[237]

Dodd urged the President to resist a bilateral conference because it would provide the Russians with a way to divide the U.S. from the free world by playing upon "the fears and resentments of our allies".[238] Dodd was supported by other Catholics including the Archbishop of Philadelphia who offered a mass for the welfare of the President, and sent a cable to the White House indicating "Today's announcement leaves a deep wound". Eisenhower was forced to call Francis Cardinal Spellman to assure him there would be no surrender on Berlin.[239]

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[237] Dodd Papers, "Visit of Premier Khrushchev to the United States," and Dodd, *Freedom and Foreign Policy*, 35.
[238] Parmet, 546.
[239] Parmet, 546.

The Peace Movement and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

As a result of the 1950s obsession with the possibility of thermonuclear war, a strong peace movement developed in the U.S. The most important organization was the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE). By 1958, it had 25,000 members including John Hersey, Erich Fromm and Walter Reuther. The celebrated psychologist Fromm declared "the normal drive for survival has been put out of action by present propaganda...We must try to bring the voice of sanity to the people".[240]

Tom Dodd was a major player in support of American nuclear testing and a vocal opponent of SANE. The U.S. undertook a voluntary moratorium on testing in 1958, but in 1961 Dodd introduced a Senate resolution to resume nuclear testing, declaring that the decision to stop the tests was "the most fatuous blunder in all our history".[241] According to historian John Patrick Diggins, Dodd, "who provided not a scrap of evidence to back up his charge," dismissed SANE as "an instrument of the Kremlin."[242] As chair of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS), Dodd waged a ferocious battle against members of SANE, which caused the peace-oriented organization to suffer needlessly. By insisting the

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[240] Wittner, 199.
[241] Thomas J. Dodd, United States, *Time Magazine,* September 8, 1961 accessed at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,872715,00.html Internet accessed 08 January, 2010.
[242] John Patrick Diggins, *The Proud Decades: America in War and Peace, 1941-1960* (New York: W.W. Morton, 1988), 331.

organization was "infiltrated" by communists, Dodd almost single-handedly derailed SANE, and "drove many members out."[243] In particular, Dodd undermined the SANE rally at Madison Square Garden in May 1960 that attracted 20,000 people, including Eleanor Roosevelt. On the eve of the rally Dodd declared "If decent organizations like the Committee for a Sane Nuclear policy wish to protect themselves against the danger of communist infiltration, I cannot emphasize too strongly the need for an organizational climate that is openly inhospitable to Communists. This is a situation where a tepid declaration simply will not suffice while a neutral silence is an open invitation to disaster".[244] Dodd's challenge split the organization, created instability within SANE and effectively undermined the MSG rally.

Using inquisitorial techniques perfected at Nuremberg, Dodd initiated a campaign to interrogate and discredit members of this sincere effort to avert the worst possible outcome of the Cold War. Dodd's particular focus was the Nobel Prize winner Dr. Linus Pauling, who had been concerned about the effects of nuclear fallout since the mid-1950s (both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were conducting atmospheric tests at the time). For four years Pauling spent most of his time writing and speaking on peace activities and organized an international

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[243] Mark Lytle, *America's Uncivil Wars: The Sixties Era from Elvis to the Fall of Richard Nixon* (New York: Oxford University Press), 73.
[244] Milton F. Katz, *Ban the Bomb: A History of SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1987), 45.

conference in Oslo.[245] Dodd, as chair of SISS subpoenaed Pauling to testify in June 1960. Pauling was questioned about communist influences on his activities, but he refused to make public the names of people who supported and organized his petition against nuclear testing. He defied threats to charge him with contempt of Congress which made Pauling a hero in the Peace Movement.[246]

When the *Providence Journal* published an editorial supporting Pauling, Dodd fired off a letter on July 2, 1960 indicating Pauling's personal views on a nuclear test ban were "beside the point" and he had the right to hold these views, but SISS was "investigating one thing only: the evidence that the communists have infiltrated the nuclear test ban movement on a large scale and that they are attempting to use this movement as a prop for Soviet nuclear diplomacy."[247] In Dodd's view, "a petition organized by a secret group is of dubious validity" and he insisted Pauling reveal the people who helped him organize it (obviously not the 11,000 who signed it) and that by not revealing the names Pauling "is himself fostering the impression that he may have had cooperation which he does not wish to publicize."[248] Dodd continued to maintain that the supporters of a test ban had

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[245] Jeffrey Kovac, "Linus Pauling, the Bomb and the Ethics of Faculty Involvement in Public Affairs" 1998 Conference on Values in Higher Education, page 3, accessed at http://web.uk.edu/~unistudy/values/ethics98/kovac.htm Internet accessed 8 January 2010.
[246] Ibid.
[247] Dodd Papers, "Letter to the Editor of Providence Journal," 7 September 1960, Series I, Box 16, Folder 493.
[248] Ibid.

an important contribution to make, but only "if they take more active measures …to purge their ranks of the substantial communist infiltration."[249]

Dodd was ultimately unsuccessful in totally marginalizing SANE. It held a rally of 20,000 people against the Vietnam War in November 1966, combining with other groups to oppose the war.[250] Moreover, in yet another contradiction Dodd, while crusading against the peace movement whose goal was to ban nuclear weapons, advocated for a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty himself. Dodd's major concern, however, as he spelled out in lengthy letters to the Undersecretary of State C. Douglas Dillon and the Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Adrian S. Fisher, was the creation of an enforceable system for inspection of the treaty. In the 12-page letter to Dillon, Dodd noted he was "particularly worried that…we may accede to a nuclear test ban covering only detectable tests which contaminate the atmosphere, but non-detectable tests in space that do not result in contamination."[251] He feared voluntary moratoriums proposed by Russia because "We shall, I am convinced, discover that the Kremlin has used the entire period to develop new, more powerful and more flexible nuclear weapons."[252] Dodd continued, "Ultimately the Soviets would have a technological superiority in strategic weapons "which would make a surprise

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[249] Ibid.
[250] Wittner, 255.
[251] Dodd Papers, Letter to C. Douglas Dillon, 29 April 1960, Series I, Box 11, Folder 355.
[252] Ibid.

thermonuclear attack on the United States a distinct possibility."[253] As noted, because of his distrust of the Russians, Dodd favoured a renewal of nuclear underground testing and eventually moved a Senate resolution to resume the tests.

In the 22-page letter to Fisher on March 29, 1963, one in a series of exchanges, Dodd took umbrage with Fisher's contention that Dodd did not want the U.S. to sign a nuclear test ban treaty. Dodd noted "I have repeatedly made it clear that I do favour a properly safeguarded test ban treaty and that...I strongly support the quest for limitations on the arms race."[254] Dodd's concern continued to be, however, that the proposed treaty did not provide "adequate safeguards against the possibility of Soviet cheating" and there is a "mortal danger to our national security if the Soviets should ever achieve nuclear superiority over us."[255] Nevertheless, Dodd strongly supported a test ban treaty because "I consider it essential that we take every possible initiative to reduce the dangers that may result to the human race from continual atmospheric fallout."[256] Therefore, Dodd told Fisher, "I may yet vote for the treaty, if you can satisfy me that our national security would not be endangered if the Soviets, after agreeing to the treaty,

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[253] Ibid.
[254] Dodd Papers, Letter to Adrian Fisher, 29 March 1963, Series I, Box 40, Folder 1223.
[255] Ibid.
[256] Ibid.

continued to test in space and underground, did not develop a neutron bomb, and the testing procedure was a deterrent to Soviet cheating."[257]

In 1963, Dodd co-sponsored, with Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) a resolution in the Senate for a nuclear test ban treaty. In an oral history interview for the Johnson library in 1977 Humphrey revealed that Tom Dodd was critical to the passage of the Treaty.[258] Humphrey had been a proponent of a test ban treaty for years and was chairman of a special Senate subcommittee on arms control. Humphrey indicated that in order to get it passed he needed to "team up with somebody that seemed to be on the other side. Tom Dodd was looked upon pretty much as a right-wing hardliner on communists, you know, and Humphrey was looked upon as kind of a softee."[259] Humphrey observed that he and Dodd debated the issue for some time and finally he said to Dodd "you and I are seeing this thing [the limited Test Ban Treaty] pretty much eye-to-eye" and "We ought to join hands on this thing."[260] Humphrey emphasized that as a "new recruit" to the test ban treaty Dodd was "able to bring along some more people."[261] The Senate ratified the Treaty, which banned the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, under water and on the

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[257] Ibid.
[258] Transcript, Hubert H. Humphrey Oral History Interview III, 21 June 1977, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library.
[259] Ibid.
[260] Ibid.
[261] Ibid.

ground's surface by a vote of 80-19 on September 24, 1963.[262] The measure may have passed without Dodd, but his support helped the resolution gain strength, and turn hesitant or ambivalent Senators into supporters. Thus, despite his initial opposition, Dodd played a critical role in the passage of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

[262] David Tal, *The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma, 1945-1963* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse Universe Press, 2008), 233.

Thomas Dodd and the U.S. Intervention in Guatemala

The early 1950s constitute the golden age of American covert operations. For the U.S., the CIA's covert activities against democratic governments in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954) delivered critical benefits. The interventions installed anticommunist client regimes that maintained order and provided economic stability for American investors at a low cost to taxpayers, and spared the lives of American soldiers. On the other hand, the covert adventurism undertaken during this period, and supported by Tom Dodd, thwarted the social, political, and economic prospects of the countries involved, ultimately paved the way for regimes far more brutal and hostile to U.S. power, and stimulated further CIA incursions against sovereign countries.[263]

This section situates Dodd within the context of Guatemala during the mid-1950s, where he was an instrumental part of the post-coup network of American and Guatemalan oligarchic interests seeking to legitimate the rule of anticommunist General Carlos Castillo Armas and his "counterrevolution" after the successful coup. Dodd's anticommunist blinders and overlapping financial interests prevented him from grasping why the majority of Guatemalans threw their support behind Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz Guzman during the "democratic spring" of 1945-1954.

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[263] The Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961 ended the CIA's winning streak and paved the way for future covert failures which culminated in the Church Committee investigations of the early 1970s.

In 1953, the CIA, British SIS, and indigenous opposition groups managed to overthrow Iran's elected government led by the Western-educated Prime Minister, Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, a leader who "believed passionately in two causes: nationalism and democracy."[264] In 1951, Mossadegh graced the cover of *Time* magazine as their "Man of the Year," but later became the target of American and British policy makers when he nationalized of the Anglo-Iranian oil company (British Petroleum) with the support of Iran's Tudeh communist party, and was suspected of having ties to the international communist conspiracy in Moscow.[265] Mossadegh was replaced by Iran's Shah Reza Pahlavi who ruled the country until the theocratic revolution of 1979. This "successful" overthrow of an unfavourable third-world government prompted American policy makers to use the Iranian blueprint as a springboard for another covert intervention one year later in Guatemala, a small Central American country of three million people in America's "backyard".

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[264] Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq*. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006), 118.

[265] Kinzer, 118. There is no evidence that Mossadegh was a communist, and most scholars insist that he was not. In his political biography of Mossadegh, Farhad Diba asserts that Mossadegh "and his supporters were united in one thing, namely their opposition to Soviet domination and they would not consciously have permitted the establishment of Communist rule in Iran." Farhad Diba, *Mossadegh: A Political Biography* (Kent, U.K.: Croom Helm Ltd, 1986), 165. A concise account of U.S.-British intervention of Iran is Mark Gasirowski and Malcom Byrne eds., *Mohammed Mossadegh and the 1953 Coup in Iran Syracuse* (N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2004). Stephen Kinzer's All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons, 2003 is a strongly-written popularized account of the CIA incursion. Sociologist John Foran uses discourse theory to analyze the U.S. press's treatment of Mossadegh in "Discursive Subversions: Time Magazine, the CIA Overthrow of Mussadiq, and the Installation of the Shah" in *Cold War Constructions: the Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966*, ed. Christian Appy Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000.

From his seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, Tom Dodd and his fellow anticommunist stalwarts considered the communist threat in Latin America a neglected issue requiring further attention and action.[266] They would not be disappointed. Though he did benefit financially from the Guatemalan counterrevolution, for Dodd, anticommunist paranoia far outweighed any concern he had for the protection of American corporate rights in Guatemala, such as those of the United Fruit Company (later known as United Brands). Dodd erroneously believed that leftist reformers in Guatemala were agents of the international communist conspiracy. Ironically, Guatemala's democratic reformers were enacting policies similar to the New Deal/Great Society policies Dodd supported in the U.S.[267] On the heels of their clandestine triumph in Iran, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, oversaw a plan to overthrow the democratically elected government of Jacobo Arbenz.

As historian Richard Immerman demonstrated, in 1952, the administration of President Harry Truman had become deeply suspicious of the ideological persuasion of the Guatemalan government, and flirted with plans to subvert

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[266] Subcommittee to Investigate Communist Aggression in Latin America to the Select Committee on Communist Aggression House of Representatives Eighty-Third Congress Second Session United States Government Printing Office Washington 1954, 2.

[267] One of the policies implemented during Juan Jose Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz's "ten years of euphoria" was the national social security program of 1946. Additionally, public health programs, Hector Perez-Brignoli, *A Brief History of Central America* translated by Ricardo B. Sawrey and Susana Settri de Sawrey (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 128.

Guatemala's democratic experiment with the CIA's Operation PBFORTUNE.[268] E. Howard Hunt, a CIA operative who gained notoriety during the Watergate hearings in the early 1970s, acknowledges in his memoirs that with PBFORTUNE, the CIA began paying Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas (to whom the CIA gave the codename "Rufus") $3,000 per month "to train a small force of about 140 soldiers in Honduras".[269] Castillo Armas had a deeper connection to American officials, having honed his military skills in the United States at a training facility in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.[270] Although the Truman administration laid the groundwork for future covert action against the Guatemalan revolution, it was not until 1953 that the plans to overthrow the progressive Guatemalan government gained momentum.

The progressive government had little time to implement its reforms. In 1945, following decades of harsh dictatorial rule Guatemalans began the difficult process of building the country's democratic foundation when a genuine revolution fomented. The majority of Guatemalans had soured on dictator Jorge Ubico, who

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[268] Richard Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: the Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), 88-92. Stephen Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: the Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 48. Rabe observes that "evidence has appeared- which is both hazy and incomplete- that in the summer of 1952 President Truman discussed and perhaps approved a plan developed by CIA director Walter Bedell ("Beetle") Smith to foment revolution in Guatemala: the United States would clandestinely arm anti-Arbenz Guatemalans, using dictator Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua as a conduit."

[269] Everette Howard Hunt, *American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA, Watergate, and Beyond* (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), 75.

[270] Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard Immerman, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1999), 226.

ruled the country as his own personal fiefdom from 1931-1944.[271] The dictator became "the darling of the liberal elite" in the U.S., and amongst the American diplomats situated in the country. Ubico proved no threat to the domination of the U.S.-owned United Fruit Company (UFCO), which had a "virtual monopoly on the nation's bananas, railroads, and electricity."[272] In fact, Ubico assisted UFCO in the company's economic domination of the country.

But in 1944, Juan José Arévalo a youthful professor of philosophy who spent time in exile in Argentina, returned to Guatemala and emerged as a political force. Arévalo was not a communist, but a self-styled practitioner of "spiritual socialism" who aimed to alter the structure of Guatemala's repressive social system which had been controlled by the country's ruling classes and foreign corporations such as the United Fruit Company.[273] Historian Piero Gleijeses describes Arévalo as a magnetic politician who captivated crowds with his brilliant oratory and promises to reform the country. Arévalo triumphed in the 1945 elections with 85 percent of the popular vote, and ushered in a period scholars refer to as the "ten years of spring," during which he helped create a "new society where

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[271] Interestingly, the U.S. had not soured on Ubico, and continued to support him "until the last months of his presidency." Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: the Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), 22. Ubico escaped the Guatemalan revolution by taking exile in New Orleans where he lived until his death in 1946. According to Gleijeses, before his death, Ubico "began pestering the U.S. government about his property, which had been confiscated in Guatemala." Gleijeses, 29.

[272] Appy, 191, Paul Dosal, *Doing Business with Dictators: A Political History of United Fruit in Guatemala, 1899*-1944 (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), 176.

[273] Perez-Brignoli, 128.

liberal ideas and ideals were taken seriously."[274] When he entered office, Arévalo had to deal with Guatemala's 70% illiteracy rate. Sustaining this progressive era was not easy, as Arévalo "had to face twenty-five attempted military takeovers as a well as an insidious press campaign both inside and outside Guatemala."[275] As Gleijeses notes, Arévalo's implementation of progressive policies, such as freedom of the press and freedom of speech frightened the Guatemalan oligarchy but inspired the lower and middle classes. "Ubico had brought only hardship, and the political freedoms instituted by the 1944 revolution were very welcome."[276] As Immerman points out "The leaders of the 1944 revolution founded their economic and social programs on their analysis of Guatemala's developmental needs. In doing so, they unwittingly turned their country into a battleground of the Cold War."[277] After the fall of Jacobo Arbenz's left-leaning democracy, a thirty-five year civil war ensued, causing over 200,000 people (mostly poor Indian peasants, students and schoolteachers) to lose their lives.

The CIA's Operation PBSUCCESS took flight when "the CIA triumph [in Iran] fuelled optimism about the chances for a repeat performance in Guatemala."[278] Since the release of declassified U.S. government documents, the

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[274] Jennifer Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project: a Violence called Democracy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 12.
[275] Perez-Brignoli, 130.
[276] Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 43.
[277] Immerman, 88.
[278] Appy, 193.

1954 coup in Guatemala has become familiar ground for historians and is primarily regarded as a dark stain on the record of American foreign relations in the hemisphere.[279] Historian Greg Grandin calls the coup "perhaps the single most important event in twentieth-century U.S.-Latin American relations," which "represented the CIA's first Latin American intervention," that "brought to an end the last social democracy established in the postwar period, thus ending a short but consequential cycle of political reform."[280] Indeed, the U.S.-backed coup not only ruined the prospects of Guatemalan democracy; it paved the way for decades of ruthless state terror under the guise of "counterinsurgency," and the genocide of Guatemala's indigenous Mayan population. Surveying the Guatemalan military's destructive "scorched earth" policies and the excesses of "death squads," State Department officials acknowledged that "there is no country in this hemisphere that surpasses Guatemala's homicide and disappearance rates."[281]

Notwithstanding historians' detailed examinations of the coup in the literature, the critical U.S. role in the coup and events in Guatemala thereafter are little known outside scholarly circles. Historian Everard Meade says it was dismissed with

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[279] Christian Appy, "Eisenhower's Guatemalan Doodle, or How to Draw, Deny, and Take Credit for a Third World Coup," in Christian Appy, ed. *Cold War Constructions: the Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1996* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 191.

[280] "Interview with Greg Grandin, author of *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War*," 2004, University of Chicago Press official website, accessed 1 November 2009, available from http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/305724in.html; Internet.

[281] U.S. Department of State, "Guatemala's Disappeared: 1977-1986," Department of State Secret Report, National Security Archive at George Washington University, available from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB15/08-01.htm; Internet, accessed 25 December 2009.

relative ease in a post-traumatic, post-Cold War framework."[282] Meade castigates historians John Lewis Gaddis and Samantha Power for downplaying or omitting the Guatemalan coup from their sophisticated analyses on American foreign relations during the Cold War. As historian Christian Appy observes, "the U.S.-orchestrated overthrow of a democratically elected progressive government and the consequences in Guatemala over the next 50 years continue to be, for most Americans, unknown histories."[283] Scholar Susanne Jonas concurs, pointing out "that the genocidal acts [of the early 1980s] were almost unknown in many Western countries, certainly in the U.S., is a testament to the great silence about Guatemala during the most brutal years."[284] The history of the Guatemala coup is not common knowledge in the public domain precisely because it reflects poorly on the postwar U.S. record in the "third world" and brings into question the commitment American policy makers have to democracy outside the U.S. The coup in Guatemala and events afterward are, as Christian Appy remarks, a Cold War "script" that was "never meant to be read".[285]

Thomas Dodd first became involved in these Guatemalan politics through his work in 1954 on the House of Representatives Select Committee on

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[282] Everard Meade, Review "In from the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser. American Encounters and Global Interactions series. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008. *Canadian Journal of History,* Vol. 44, No. 2 (Autumn, 2009): 357.

[283] Appy, 213.

[284] Suzanne Jonas, "Guatemala: Acts of Genocide and Scorched-Earth Counterinsurgency War," in Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons eds., *A Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, third edition (New York: Routledge, 2009), 314.

[285] Appy, 209.

Communist Aggression. This committee spawned a "Subcommittee to Investigate Communist Aggression in Latin America" (H. Res. 346 and H. Res. 438) of which Dodd became chair. In their 1954 report on "Communist Aggression in Latin America," Tom Dodd and his colleagues referred to the 1954 "anticommunist uprising" in Guatemala as "one of the bright pages in the history of the Americas".[286] What the subcommittee failed to note was that the project could never have succeeded without the logistical, operational, and fiscal support of the U.S. government. Moreover, Dodd's subcommittee heralded the Guatemalan "liberation" as "one of the few clear-cut victories for the West in the Cold War, and a serious reversal to the Kremlin's plans".[287] Today, it would be difficult for any rational person to agree with this assessment, which omits the role played by the CIA in the coup, and credulously frames the analysis almost entirely around the opinion of a small network of anticommunist reactionaries from Guatemala and the U.S.[288]

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[286] Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate Communist Aggression in Latin America to the Select Committee on Communist Aggression House of Representatives Eighty Third Congress Second Session United States Government Printing Office 1954.

[287] Ibid, 2.

[288] The subcommittee's report repeatedly claims (without providing evidence) that Jacobo Arbenz's government was "completely Communist controlled...acting on direct orders and instructions from Moscow" and that "Moscow had been using Guatemala as its beachhead in the Western Hemisphere". The subcommittee report blindly follows Castillo Armas's assertion that Arévalo was a communist. Among the panoply of fanatical anticommunists who testified in the subcommittee's hearings were former Ambassador John Peurifoy, who repeated his predecessor Richard Cunningham Patterson's "duck test" on Arbenz, William Pawley, a wealthy Florida businessman who later factored into a failed plot in 1959 to thwart Fidel Castro's 26 July Revolution in Cuba, and Leo Carillo, a Spanish-American actor who portrayed the stereotypical Latin American sidekick "Pancho" on the American television show *The Cisco Kid.*

A recently- declassified State Department document obtained under a Freedom of Information (FOI) request from the National Security Archive at George Washington University confirms this fact. According to the document, a Foreign Service dispatch from the American Embassy in Guatemala, Castillo Armas' security forces engaged quickly in mass repression, arresting "approximately 4,000 persons," suspected of having communist sympathies even though "it appears that few of them were in any sense indoctrinated communists."[289] The U.S. despatch attributed the "excess" of the mass arrests to "free-wheeling elements" within the Guatemalan security forces.[290] Shortly thereafter, John Calvin Hill Jr., second secretary at the U.S. embassy in Guatemala, sent the State Department a report on the Castillo Armas regime's bungled mass-arrest program. Hill noted that authorities in Guatemala had "been severe in arresting officials and politicians of the Arbenz government who, however much or little they collaborated with the Communists, had not previously identified as communists." Hill continued "In contrast to the mass arrests of small agrarian leaders, the efforts to round up communists have been singularly unfruitful."[291] In 1955, one year after the CIA helped Castillo Armas overthrow Arbenz's democratically elected government the Guatemalan people were tiring of the

[289] Digital National Security Archive, "Mass Arrests of Communist Peasant Leaders," For Official Use Only, Despatch, 29 July 1954, 2pp, Collection: Guatemala and the U.S., Item Number: GU00012.
[290] Ibid.
[291] Digital National Security Archive, Political Arrests in Guatemala, Confidential, Despatch, 21 September 1954, 3pp., Collection: Guatemala and the U.S., Item Number: GU00014.

Colonel Castillo Armas's "dictatorial powers" and were longing for a "return to the democratic-nationalist principles of the 1944 revolution which overthrew Guatemala's last dictatorship. By 1955, U.S. officials in Guatemala were aware that Castillo Armas's government had produced a widespread feeling that "amounted to a national rejection of dictatorship as a means of settling the country's problems in favour of what is locally conceived of as democracy."[292] Notwithstanding this startling omission on the part of U.S. officials (along with other doubts about Castillo Armas's abilities which pervade the documentary record) Hill, Charges d'Affaires Thomas C. Mann, the State Department, and Congressional supporters like Tom Dodd continued to support Colonel Castillo Armas as the type of leader "favourable to U.S. interests, not only in being effectively anti-communist, but also in being on the whole in harmony with other U.S. objectives in the political and economic sphere."[293] In exchange for rolling back Arbenz's land reform, "over the next decade," the Guatemalan military government "became the major recipient of American military aid in Latin America."[294]

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[292] Digital National Security Archive, The New Phase in Guatemalan Political Life and It's Relation to U.S. Policy, [Includes Comments from Thomas C. Mann], Secret, Despatch, 24 June 1955, 11pp., Collection: Guatemala and the U.S., Item Number: GU00016.

[293] Ibid.

[294] Thomas McCormick, *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After* 2nd Edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 122.

Dodd personally profited from the reign of the strongman Castillo Armas. From 1957 to mid-1958, the Guatemalan government paid Dodd $66,666 to lobby on their behalf.[295] The salary for a U.S. Senator during this period was $22,500 per annum.[296] Though Dodd may have lost the 1956 Senate race to Prescott Bush (R-CT), he benefited handsomely from his work on behalf of the Guatemalan dictatorship, and received more money in 1956-1957 than he would had he won the 1956 election and served as a U.S. Senator. Dodd's lobbying must be put into perspective as this sort of lobbying was not out of character in the postwar Senate. In fact, a laundry-list of Senators and prominent American policy makers had, at one time or another, acted on behalf of foreign governments. George Smathers (R-FLA), a Kennedy crony who was "one of the Senate's chief spokesmen on Latin American affairs," owned a law firm that provided services for airline and steamship companies in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic.[297] Moreover, one-time Secretary of State Dean Acheson served as a registered agent for the government of Venezuela, and Thomas Dewey, the loser of the 1948 Presidential contest lobbied for the government of Turkey. As Francis K. Hsu pointed out, from

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[295] *Congressional Record*, 21 June, 1961, 11008-11015.

[296] United States Senate Website, "Senate Salaries since 1789," *United States Senate*, available from http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/senate_salaries.htm; Internet, accessed 11 November 2009.

[297] James Deakin, *The Lobbyists* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1966), 117.

1946 to 1981, twenty ex-Senators and 71 former representatives, including Tom Dodd, had registered as lobbyists for foreign governments.[298]

The Subcommittee to Investigate Communist Aggression in Latin America conducted public hearings in the fall of 1954, and questioned numerous individuals who "testified" before Dodd and the three other Subcommittee members, Congressman Patrick J. Hillings (R-CA), a staunch supporter and "protégé" of Richard M. Nixon[299], Alvin M. Bentley (R-MI), Michael A. Feighan (D-OH). Also present was one Patrick McMahon, a fanatical anticommunist whose official title was "consultant to the committee".[300] The hearings, which were held in Los Angeles and Washington were publicized and taped by the Voice of America in order to drum up public support for an increase in monetary aid to Guatemalan government.[301] The subcommittee's hearings produced an official 20- page report co-authored by Dodd which contains a remarkable array of factual inaccuracies and omissions and was based almost entirely on the opinions and "testimony" of Castillo Armas and his political allies.

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[298] Francis L. K. Hsu, *Americans and Chinese: Passages to Differences, Third Edition* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1981), 224.

[299] Herbert Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* 2nd edition (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 452.

[300] McMahon also became a paid lobbyist for the Castillo Armas government. Richard Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World. As historian Stephen Streeter points out in *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000), 114, McMahon served as editor for *American Mercury,* a fervently anticommunist magazine which "defamed" Jacobo Arbenz.

[301] North American Congress on Latin America, Guatemala (Berkley, CA: NACLA, 1974), 84. Hereinafter cited as NACLA.

According to the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), a prominent non-profit organization, Dodd "had perhaps the cosiest relationship with the Castillo Armas government."[302] As a Congressman, Dodd visited Guatemala on a fact-finding "mission" with his law partner Sheldon Kaplan, and upon his return "offered an amendment to increase aid to Guatemala from $10 to $15 million." [303] The U.S. government eventually settled on a much smaller amount for aid.

Shortly before Dodd urged Congress to provide more aid to the Guatemalan government, Castillo Armas's operatives embarked on a program of mass repression in the countryside, arresting thousands of innocent peasants suspected of harbouring sympathies for communists and Jacobo Arbenz.

Archival documents prove that unlike other members of Congress and the American public, Dodd experienced no moral or ethical dilemmas relating to U.S. covert intervention in Guatemala and Iran. In a 1965 speech before the "Mid-Career Development Course" for CIA agents, Dodd stated, "If the CIA did have a role to play in Guatemala and Iran, then it played its role successfully. It inflicted two great defeats on the Communists and thereby saved two vital countries from slipping into the Communist orbit. Is this something we should apologize for? No, on the contrary, it is something of which every American should be proud."[304]

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[302] NACLA, 84.
[303] Ibid.
[304] Dodd Papers, Speech, "The Role of the CIA in the World Today," 1 June 1965, Series III, Box 202, Folder 5210. In 1964, Dodd publicly defended the CIA against critics who charged the Agency was "out of control." Dodd asserted

Against the backdrop of events unfolding in Vietnam and other Cold War battlegrounds, Dodd expressed no concerns about the undermining of democracy in Latin America and the future implications of American covert operations in the hemisphere.

To Tom Dodd the archetypical cold warrior, Washington's apocalyptic struggle with Moscow overrode any concerns about or acknowledgement of American imperialism in Guatemala. The prospect of a communist-controlled "beachhead" on the hemisphere mortified Dodd and his Cold War liberal counterparts, so they cast their lot with Castillo Armas, whose loyalty and anticommunism, and commitment to order and stability was indisputable. Dodd misread the authenticity and legitimacy of the Guatemalan revolution of 1945 and supported the rule of political operators who proved more than capable of committing the same atrocities he routinely accused communists of perpetrating. The CIA's adventure in Guatemala helped fulfil Dodd's wish for a bulwark against communism in Guatemala, but the costs were steep. The counterrevolution for which Dodd lobbied took on a "particularly brutal character," destroyed the

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that this charge was "patently ridiculous," and objected to claims that the CIA was running its own foreign policy operation. As a practitioner of "old politics," Dodd believed that the existing Presidential, National Security Agency, and Congressional oversight over the CIA worked. In his defence of the CIA, Dodd was supported by the Conservative editorial board of *Life* Magazine. See, "Let's Stop Baiting the CIA," *Life*, 6 March 1964, 4.

prospects of democracy and social equality in Guatemala, and paved the way for the genocide of the country's indigenous Mayan population.[305]

Arbenz was much maligned by the Executive Branch, State Department, members of Congress like Dodd, and other corporate and anticommunist lobbyists in the 1950s, but as civil war raged in the Guatemalan highlands and government security forces increased their brutal counterinsurgency campaign, American staffers had a more sanguine view of the fallen leader. In 1979, a U.S. State Department official chillingly stated "What we'd give to have an Arbenz now. We're going to have to invent one, but all the candidates are dead."[306]

In 1999, in the wake of a damning report by the independent Historical Clarification Committee on human rights atrocities perpetrated by the Guatemalan military, U.S. President Bill Clinton acknowledged his country's support for right-wing military forces in Guatemala during the Cold War "was wrong" and that the "United States must not repeat that mistake."[307] Missing from Clinton's statement was any acknowledgement of the 1954 coup and the role U.S. policy makers like Dodd had in crushing the Guatemalan revolution, and creating in the process, a political climate in which military dictatorships could thrive. American policy makers were not the only actors who did not have to answer for their role in

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[305] Susanne Jonas, *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power, Latin American Perspectives Series, No. 5* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 64.
[306] Alan Riding, "Guatemala: State of Siege," *New York Times Magazine*, 24 August 1980, 66-67.
[307] Charles Babington, "Clinton: Support for Guatemala Was Wrong," *Washington Post*, 11 March 1999, A1.

shaping Guatemala's violent future. The right-wing military forces that terrorized the country for decades did so with relative impunity. As Leslie Gill remarks, "Most officers escaped prosecution, and by the mid 1990s, none had been convicted for ordering the murders and massacres that left two-hundred thousand Guatemalans dead."[308]

The dark legacy of Operation PBSUCCESS continues to haunt Guatemala. In 2008, Human Rights Watch (HRW), an international advocacy group, released a "Universal Periodic Review" of Guatemala's human rights landscape, and the results were overwhelmingly negative. The country continues to suffer "the effects of an armed internal conflict that ended in 1996," and from "high levels of violence associated with both electoral politics and common crime".[309] Moreover, HRW asserts that "clandestine groups" affiliated with government officials and organized criminals are responsible for widespread violence against opposition groups and "human rights defenders."

Dodd's history of lobbying for the Guatemalan government nearly came back to haunt him when he sought the Connecticut Democratic nomination for Senate in 1957. At the state convention, rumours abounded concerning Dodd's lobbying on behalf of Castillo Armas, but he prevailed in a bitterly-fought contest

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[308] Leslie Gill, *The School of Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas* (Duke University Press, 2004), 11.

[309] "Universal Periodic Review of Guatemala," *Human Rights Watch,* 4 May 2008, available from http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/05/04/universal-periodic-review-guatemala; Internet. Accessed 1 November 2009.

against the challengers (and preferred members of the regional Kennedy machine) Chester Bowles, and William Benton, and concerns over his history of lobbying for a foreign government did not materialize as a critical issue. Dodd's Guatemalan lobbying did not become an issue until he reached the Senate. In 1959, Dodd clashed with William Fulbright (D-Ark) on the Senate floor concerning a $50 million provision to a foreign aid appropriations bill earmarked for the Spanish dictatorship of Francisco Franco, whose own pious Roman Catholicism and hard-line anticommunism convinced Dodd that the Iberian Peninsula would be in good hands, and remain a bulwark against left-wing radicalism so long as it continued to receive U.S. foreign aid. Fulbright objected to aiding Franco's Spain, while Dodd offered his steadfast support. When Dodd argued that Fulbright's opposition was "odd and peculiar," Fulbright countered by bringing up Dodd's lobbying in the House on behalf of the Guatemalan government, and the paid legal work he did during the time punctuating his House and Senate careers. According to the *Hartford Courant*, the Senators "clashed with such heat that the Senate ordered the remarks of both [Fulbright and Dodd] expunged from the records."[310] In 1962, the American press resurrected the story of Dodd's work on behalf of the Guatemalan military dictatorship, when he avoided participation in a Senate investigation of the activities of foreign lobbyists in "sugar and all other fields

[310] Robert D. Byrnes, "Dodd, Fulbright Clash; Too Hot for the Record," *The Hartford Courant*, 13 September 1959.

involving United States policies."[311] Dodd's explanation for declining Senator James O. Eastland's (D-Miss.) request to head up a Judiciary Committee investigation was his heavy schedule. Dodd explained, "I have so many other committee investigations in process that it would be impossible for me to take on so serious a burden before the fall."[312] This was not the last clash between Senators Dodd and Fulbright. Chapter Five contains details of an even more serious confrontation over the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, which was a catalyst for the schism in the Democratic Party.

[311] John D. Morris, "Dodd Drops Role in Sugar Inquiry," *New York Times*, 8 July 1962. The provision for Franco's Spain passed easily, by a vote of 49-38 with Dodd voting in favour and Fulbright against it.
[312] Ibid.

Tom Dodd and the Cuban Revolution

The Cuban revolution and Fidel Castro's communist takeover was a shock to Dodd and most Americans, and exacerbated the Senator's anxieties concerning the spread of communism in the Western hemisphere. Declaring that "The Iron Curtain has been rung down 90 miles from our shores" Dodd lambasted the Eisenhower administration for its "innocence and gullibility" with regard to Castro and charged that it "mismanaged the Cuban situation so gravely."[313] He claimed that there could have been an orderly transition to a constitutional government and a compromise leader but there were those in the State Department "who were prone to accept as gospel the evaluation of the Castro movement" that it was not communist. Dodd blamed the *New York Times* and the CBS network for the "hokum" that built up "a hero image of Castro."[314] The prime targets of Dodd's wrath were the veteran *Times* reporter Herbert Matthews, who cultivated a reputation as an expert on the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), and a "prime-time" CBS documentary titled "Rebels of the Sierra Maestra: The Story of Cuba's Jungle Fighters" in which Castro was "treated with the adulation due a patriot, his enemies characterized as ruthless."[315]

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[313] Dodd Papers, Speech, "The Future of Latin America and the Problem of the Soviet Quisling Regime in Cuba," 10 September 1962, *Congressional Record*, Series III, Box 195, Folder 4774.
[314] Ibid.
[315] Robert Wright, *Three Nights in Havana: Pierre Trudeau, Fidel Castro and the Cold War* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2007), 42.

Dodd reserved his harshest criticism for Matthews. In 1957, Castro granted Matthews a privileged interview from his base in the Sierra Maestra where he was fighting a guerrilla war against the dictator Fulgencio Batista. Matthews' subsequent stories on Castro in the *Times* "brought him [Castro] to the attention for the first time to the outside world," and "shaped anti-Batista opinion in the United States and thus satisfied Castro's aim of rolling back U.S. support for the regime."[316] As historian Thomas G. Paterson demonstrates, Herbert Matthews never lived down his reporting during the Cuban Revolution. He endured "a standard charge levied against him by batistianos, U.S. right wingers, anti-Castro exiles, and U.S. ambassadors to Cuba," and that his laudatory stories on Castro influenced the State Department to "back away from Batista" causing people such as Dodd to hold Matthews partially responsible for Castro's rise to power.[317] In debunking this myth, Paterson explains that "no American journalist initiated the Cuban rebellion or fuelled the economic, social, cultural, and political conditions that sped it." Nevertheless, Dodd believed Matthews helped shape the views of the State Department, and during hearings of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary (SISS), he frequently attacked Matthews' credibility. To Dodd, Matthews was a one in a pool of "naive American sentimentalists,

[316] Wright, 41. Thomas G. Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 79.
[317] Paterson, Contesting Castro, 80.

deluded liberals, and open philo-Communists," who "abetted" Castro's rise to power.[318] Dodd's subcommittee work on Cuba helped to cultivate his reputation and influence in the media as an anticommunist standout and Cold War hawk.

The years when Dodd served in the Senate witnessed an exponential growth of powerful Senate subcommittees. As vice-chairman of the SISS, Dodd bolstered his image as an expert on the communist "menace" in a subcommittee that was the Senate equivalent to the witch-hunting House Un-American Activities Committee. In several exhaustive subcommittee hearings in the 1960s, Dodd strikingly replicated the inquisitorial role he played at Nuremberg by subpoenaing prominent American leftists and government staffers, questioning them under oath, and in some cases, damaging their credibility in an attempt to expose "subversive" individuals who directly or indirectly assisted the cause of the "international communist conspiracy." Like HUAC, the SISS hearings were largely unsuccessful in exposing widespread communist infiltration. The SISS hearings are significant, however, for what they reveal about the prevailing hysteria concerning the Cuban Revolution which pervaded the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government and a good portion of the public domain.[319] There were some

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[318] Dodd quoted in Richard E. Welch Jr., *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 107. Dodd, however, stopped short of supporting Barry Goldwater in urging U.S. military action against Cuba. Instead, invoking the Monroe Doctrine, Dodd favoured a "total embargo" against Cuba and encouraged U.S. covert support to the Miami exile community and other Cuban dissidents in the hope that these elements would eventually usurp Castro.

[319] Herbert Matthews, *A World in Revolution: A Newspaperman's Memoir* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), 298.

casualties from Dodd's "brutal and ruthless" committee hearings.[320] Some unfortunate "witnesses" had their careers destroyed by SISS. According to historian Randall Woods, the SISS hearings "ruined the career" of William A. Wieland, head of the Caribbean desk at the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. Herbert Matthews argued that "the crucifixion of William Wieland was one of the most shameful examples of witch-hunting that occurred during my career."[321]

Dodd's fear mongering and incendiary comments regarding Cuba were ongoing. Historian Louis A. Pérez Jr. of the University of North Carolina wrote on the fiftieth anniversary of the Cuban revolution that historians "will puzzle over the utter inability of American political leaders to engage the subject of relations with Cuba as a matter of rational policy decisions".[322] Of course, Tom Dodd had no interest in rational policy decisions when it came to communism, especially in Cuba, because as he saw it, the U.S. was "locked in a life-and-death struggle with an enemy of infinite cunning and infinite ruthlessness."[323]

Dodd feared, in 1960, that "In Cuba, in the Congo, in Japan and at many other points, we are today losing the cold war and we shall continue to lose it so long as we continue to pit our well-intentioned amateurs against the thousands of

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[320] Matthews, 308.
[321] Matthews, 310.
[322] Louis A. Perez Jr., "The Cuban Revolution at 50: Taking the Measure of a Conference in Canada", *Perspectives on History,* 47:7, October 2009, 28. The conference on the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution had to be held at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario. Cuban scholars were still not permitted to enter the United States because their presence at American conferences had been "deemed detrimental to the interests of the United States" by the State Department.
[323] Dodd Papers, Speech, "The Problem of the Soviet Quisling Regime in Cuba," Series III, Box 195, Folder 4774.

highly trained professionals whom the Kremlin graduates every year from its training academies."[324] To counter this alleged Soviet expertise, Dodd advocated for a Freedom Academy in the United States which would gather systematic knowledge of all aspects of "the Communist conspiracy", develop the "science of counter action" against Communist subversion and "train Americans and nationals of other free countries in the science of total political warfare."[325]

At a rally of the "Committee of One Million" at New York City's Carnegie Hall, Dodd stated that he strongly opposed the admission of "Red China" to the United Nations, "a government which, by its words and by its deeds, openly and consistently violates every basic principle for which the United Nations stands."[326] Dodd responded to those who said that the United States had already recognized the Soviet Union and its "satellites" so why not admit one more communist country to the UN, by saying "What we should say is that we were wrong to ever admit Russia; that we were wrong to ever admit any Communist regime; and that having been wrong a dozen times, we do not propose to be wrong the thirteenth time."[327] Dodd believed "the United Nations has admitted Communist regimes before, to its great discredit and shame. But at least it had the excuse of false illusions and of hopes that these regimes were prepared to live amicably in the

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[324] Dodd Papers, Letter to the Editor of the Providence Journal, 7 September 1960, Series I, Box 16, Folder 493.
[325] Ibid.
[326] Dodd Papers, Speech, "The Moral Death of the United Nations," 21 September 1961, Series III, Box 193, Folder 4650.
[327] Ibid.

family on nations. Such is not the case with Red China."[328] Dodd died only months before the People's Republic of China was admitted to the United Nations in 1971. Had he lived, Dodd surely would have regretted the U.S. government's decision to approve the People's Republic of China's admission to the United Nations.

When John F. Kennedy became President in 1961 the policies toward communism and to Cuba in particular, to Dodd's satisfaction, remained unchanged. Kennedy's top priority, as mentioned several times in the 1960 campaign, was to remove Castro from power.[329] John Kenneth Galbraith remarked that Dean Rusk, the new Secretary of State, "could not entertain the thought of change; the worldwide threat of Communism...he accepted as holy writ".[330]

Dodd, too, lashed out at anyone with a good word to say about the Soviet Union. When Dr. Ralph K. White, the leading expert on Russia at the United States Information Agency (USIA) gave a speech indicating the Russians were not that different from Americans, Dodd fumed that "we are not involved in any joint battle with the Communists against mutual suicide. They and they alone threaten the world with destruction."[331] He then issued a call for the immediate dismissal of Dr. White and a congressional investigation of the agency itself. Dodd contributed to the myth that the Cuban people were "exploited and oppressed more brutally than

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[328] Ibid.
[329] Lawrence Wittner, *Cold War America: From Hiroshima to Watergate* (New York: Praeger, 1974), 215.
[330] Galbraith, 163.
[331] Dodd Papers, Press Release, "Remarks concerning Dr. Ralph K. White, 8 September 1961, Series III, Box 193, Folder 4642.

chattel slaves."[332] He also noted that the Kennedy-backed Bay of Pigs invasion would have succeeded had "we determined in advance to support the Cuban freedom fighters on their beachhead with American air cover."[333] Using his usual techniques, Dodd claimed he knew "on the basis of information from reliable sources" that the situation for the people of Cuba was "more grave than has yet been indicated."[334] Dodd also contributed to the hysteria surrounding the 1962 missile crisis, which Arthur Schlesinger Jr. described at a conference in Havana on the fortieth anniversary of the crisis, as "the most dangerous moment in human history".[335] Speaking of the "fantastic build-up of Soviet planes and tanks and missiles" in Cuba, Dodd said it must be regarded as "an act of aggression and as a prelude to further aggression" and poses "a direct threat to the security of the United States."[336] According to Dodd, who provided no evidence to support his charge, these military arms were already being moved to other Latin American countries in an attempt to overthrow the government of Panama and place "the Panama Canal under the direct control of Moscow."[337]

He claimed to "have heard from many sources" that the Alliance for Progress was virtually unknown in Latin America and that funding to build schools

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[332] Dodd Papers, "The Problem of the Soviet Quisling Regime of Cuba and Future of Latin America," 18956.
[333] Ibid., 18957.
[334] Ibid.
[335] Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004), 74.
[336] Dodd Papers, "The Problem of the Soviet Quisling Regime in Cuba and Future of Latin America," 18957.
[337] Ibid.

was going to areas where "the professors in the universities are members of Communist-dominated unions" who "teach their wards to hate America and despise capitalism". Dodd claimed, without revealing a source, that up to 86% of teachers in Venezuelan schools were communists; communists "completely dominated the student movement in Brazil."[338]

On the Senate floor in 1962, Dodd put forward a six-point program to ensure the removal of the Castro regime, but stopped short of recommending a U.S. invasion. Stating that "the trouble is....we don't know how to go about winning the cold war" he urged a campaign which including support for a Cuban government-in-exile in the U.S., invocation of the Monroe Doctrine for a total embargo on Communist military equipment to Cuba, a propaganda campaign, a total blockade of Cuba except for food, and "open aid and increasing assistance to Cuba's heroic freedom fighters."[339] Coincidentally, the CIA had also come with a six-point plan called Operation Mongoose, which was designed to undermine Castro from within to "conclude with an overthrow of the Communist regime" in October 1962.[340] It was eventually shelved because it would require "decisive U.S. military action" to succeed.[341] Although there is no documentary evidence to prove it, Dodd may well

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[338] Dodd Papers, "The Problem of the Soviet Quisling Regime in Cuba and Future of Latin America, 18957.
[339] Ibid., 18960-61.
[340] Richard Gott, *Cuba: A New History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 195.
[341] Ibid.

have been privy to the CIA's plans as was the public mouthpiece in Congress for covert operations in Cuba.

In 1965, Dodd continued to urge the American public to oppose Castro because "The Cuban people must be liberated from Soviet slavery. The right of self-determination must be restored to them. But the task of liberation must be carried out, in the first instance, by the Cuban people themselves."[342] He was aware that "it has been said that we cannot deal with the problem of Castroism in Latin America unless we first deal with the problems of poverty and social backwardness and military dictatorship" but in Dodd's world "the converse is true: that we cannot properly deal with the problems of poverty and political instability unless we first deal with the problem of Castroism."[343]

Dodd told audiences that a popular uprising against Castro "is entirely probable" and that the U.S. should, short of military intervention by American forces, "Do everything in our power to encourage and to assist the forces of Cuban liberation."[344] He favoured an American declaration of independence for the Cuban people, according Cuban freedom fighters in the U.S. "latitude" and supporting the establishment of a Cuban government in exile in the United States. Dodd consistently raised the bogeyman of Castro and further communist regimes in Latin America. "If the day comes when we have 4 or 5 Castro regimes in Latin America

[342] Dodd Papers, "The World Situation," 3 May 1965, Series III, Box 202, Folder 5193, 4.
[343] Ibid.
[344] Ibid., 5.

instead of 1, we could find ourselves compelled to choose between doing nothing and letting the communists take over all of the southern portion of this hemisphere, or else, in self-defense, embarking on a desperate and belated military intervention."[345] In September 1965, Dodd implied that the Castro regime was implicated in the savage race riots that occurred in Los Angeles and Chicago. He claimed that broadcasts by individuals such as "renegade American Negro Robert F. Williams, over Castro's Radio Dixie, constitute an open, crude and brutal incitation to violence. They are now encouraging all American Negroes to follow the example of Los Angeles and carry it further."[346] Although Dodd was rational enough to admit it would be an exaggeration to say these broadcasts were responsible for the riots, "There is every reason for believing, however, that …their followers are encouraged to foment unrest, to take part in Negro riots and uprisings, to seek to provide them with leadership and direction, and to seek to extend the area of hostilities."[347]

Dodd charged that "If we permit the Castro regime to remain on the Latin American vine, in the hope that it will perish, the chances are that instead of

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[345] Dodd Papers, "The World Situation," 5.
[346] Dodd Papers, Press Release, "Senator Dodd charges that Castro Incites American Negroes to Violence: Urges Elimination of Social Conditions which Unrest," 2 September 1965, Series III, Box 203, Folder 5225.
[347] Ibid.

perishing of its own weakness, it will spread its disease to the rest of the vine."[348]

The next tendril on the vine was the small colony of British Guiana.

[348] Dodd Papers, "The Problem of the Soviet Quisling Regime in Cuba and Future of Latin America," 18958.

Dodd, the Cold War Liberal Democrats, and British Guiana

In some cases Dodd's policy prescriptions were carried out by the U.S. government with zeal. With respect to U.S. intervention in British Guiana- a country Dodd drew attention to as a cold war battleground requiring an American commitment- declassified government documents released in the 1990s prove the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency undertook a successful multi-year covert operations campaign to undermine Dr. Cheddi Jagan, a Western-educated leftist who sought to enact sweeping reforms in a country that was just beginning to break from the clutches of British Colonialism. Jagan, a dentist who studied at Northwestern University in the U.S. in the 1940s, returned to his native British Guiana shortly thereafter and in 1961 was elected President as leader of the People's Progressive Party (PPP).

Tom Dodd was the chief Congressional cheerleader for U.S. intervention in British Guiana. From 1961 to 1964, the United States imperial project extended to the tiny colony of British Guiana in the Caribbean Basin as policy makers in London "transferred control of the country's political system and economic and foreign policy to the United States."[349] Dodd led other Cold War liberal Democrats in a hawkish, anti-communist crusade to prevent, in their view, a "communist

[349] Cary Fraser, "The 'New Frontier' of Empire in the Caribbean: The Transfer of Power in British Guiana, 1961-1964," *The International History Review*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 2000): 584.

beachhead" from developing in South America. In fact, Guyanese leader Cheddi Jagan was trying to alter structural inequities, improve working conditions, establish public education, and rid the colony of British imperial rule. The story of American foreign policy in British Guiana reveals the extent to which anticommunist paranoia, fuelled by Tom Dodd, coloured policy making at the highest levels of the U.S. government. It also shows the striking level of ignorance policy makers exhibited towards the nuances of a country whose political outcome they desperately sought to manage. Moreover, this ugly chapter of U.S. imperialism exposed the ways in which politicians such as Dodd, and policy makers in the Executive Branch, State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked to undermine the prospects for democracy in the hemisphere.

In 1954, Guatemala's democratically elected President Jacobo Arbenz had the misfortune of being put to the "duck test" by American policy makers and suffered grave consequences when he passed it. [350] Thomas Dodd resurrected the test in 1961 and applied it to another third world politician caught in the Cold War crossfire:

"If an animal looks like a duck, walks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck and, lives habitually with ducks, I believe that every rational

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[350] Stephen Streeter, *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala*, 1954-1961 (Athens: University of Ohio Press), 21. U.S. Ambassador John Peurifoy, who performed as U.S. ambassador to Greece in the setting of the Truman Doctrine, performed the "duck test" on Arbenz while serving as the U.S. ambassador to Guatemala.

person would be prepared to agree that the animal in question is a duck. Cheddi Jagan talks like a communist. He behaves like a communist. He has played a leading role in communist front organizations. He has consorted with international communist leaders. He has distributed official communist literature. He has sided with the Kremlin in every conflict of policy with the free world. He has hailed communist victories in Cuba and in China and has himself been hailed and supported by the communist propaganda apparatus. Yet in the face of this record, there are still people who insist that perhaps Jagan is not a Communist, perhaps he is just a European-style social democrat or an agrarian reformer. I say that the proof has been in for a long time."[351]

Dodd's view was supported by Secretary of State Dean Rusk who believed Jagan was "very far to the left indeed" and observed, "we should plan for the possibility that we will have no responsible alternative but to work for Jagan's political downfall".[352]

As the British colony moved toward independence (it became Guyana in 1966) the U.S. and the CIA in particular intervened to depose the Western educated, democratically-elected leader and to delay independence.[353] Historian Piero Gleijeses refers to it as a "sordid and neglected episode of U.S. foreign policy" which humiliated Britain and caused chaos in the fledgling country.[354] Because of the activities of Dodd, when it was time for the American government to declassify its documents, the State Department and CIA refused, as "it is not

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[351] Dodd Papers, Speech, "British Guiana: Beachhead for International Communism," *Congressional Quarterly*, 31 August 1961, Series III, Box 193, Folder 4640.
[352] Rusk quoted in Hector J. Parekh, *Monthly Review,* October, 1999. Accessed online at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1 132/is_5_51/ai_57590187 Internet accessed September 2, 2009.
[353] Dodd Papers, Speech, "British Guiana: Beachhead for International Communism." Dodd was incorrect when he stated on the floor of the Senate that "nothing was being done" to thwart Jagan's rule.
[354] Piero Gleijeses, "A Sordid Affair: The Alliance for Progress and British Guiana," *Diplomatic History*, Vol.31, No.4 (September 2007): 796.

worth the embarrassment".[355] The declassified documents were heavily redacted and according to the *New York Times,* the still-classified documents "depict in unusual detail a direct order from the President to unseat Dr. Jagan".[356] Despite Dodd's "duck rhetoric" on the Senate floor, there was little evidence at the time, or in recently declassified documents, to prove that Jagan was a communist rather than a left-leaning freedom fighter in a British colony. In February 1964, British Labour Party "shadow" Foreign Minister Gordon Walker said to the Secretary of State that the "US exaggerated the menace of Jagan".[357] But Dodd and others assumed that he was a communist and connived to eventually replace Jagan with Forbes Burnham, leader of the People's National Congress, a legal scholar-turned despot who rigged elections and "ignited racial warfare" between those of East Indian descent (Jagan's supporters) and those of African descent (who supported Burnham).[358]

The tumultuous political events in British Guiana during 1961 received scant attention in the U.S. Senate, leaving Dodd -a man who admitted to knowing little about the country- the resident expert in the upper chamber on the "crisis" in the small nation. As Hector Parekh observes, only one Senator rose to challenge

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[355] William Blum, Killing Hope, 113.
[356] Blum, 113.
[357] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Foreign Relations of the United States*: Volume XXXII Guyana, 1964-1968, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 856. Hereafter cited as FRUS.
[358] Rabe, *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story*, 75, 76.

Dodd's rhetorical outbursts on the "threat" posed by Jagan and his People's Progressive Party (PPP) in British Guiana. George Aiken, a liberal Republican from Vermont and fellow member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations attempted to dissuade policy makers from honing in on Jagan as a Cold War target who needed to be removed, instead arguing for restraint and aid.[359] But Aiken was outnumbered by a broad coalition of anti-communist Democrats and Republicans in Congress who viewed as anathema any U.S. relationship with Jagan. With a perspective that transcended Cold War rhetoric, Aiken knew more about British Guiana than these hawkish members of Congress, and understood how U.S. economic aid to the country could have a long-term symbiotic effect. As historian Stephen Rabe aptly notes, "Unlike his colleagues, the Vermont Republican had visited the colony," but he failed because "congressional sentiment reflected constituent pressure".[360] [361]

The other key sources of anti-Jagan opinion in the U.S. were organized labour and African-American lobby groups who viewed the Afro-Guyanese Burnham and Conservative Peter D'Aguiar as palatable but considered the Indo-

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[359] Hector J. Parekh, "American Involvement with British Guiana, 1961-1963," M.A. thesis, University of Calgary, 1997.

[360] Stephen Rabe, *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story*, 85.

[361] Robert Mann, *A Grand Delusion*, 17, 34, 354, 543, 659. Incidentally, Aiken was one of a handful of Republicans opposed to Joseph McCarthy's demagoguery in the 1950s, and emerged as a thoughtful critic against escalation of the American War in Vietnam. Moreover, Aiken was vehemently opposed to the Nixon administration's extension of the war to neighbouring Cambodia in 1970. Aiken's opposition to escalation was conditioned by his trip to in South Vietnam in 1965 after which he, along with his close friend, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, "issued a pessimistic report about the course of combat." Gary Stone, *Elites for Peace: the Senate and the Vietnam War, 1964-1968* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2007): 71.

Guyanese Jagan as a dangerous Marxist who would undercut the harmony between business and anticommunist organized labour unions, and incite racial discord. Ironically, it was Burnham who, during his brutal regime, achieved the latter and former objectives when he nationalized industries, mismanaged the nation's economy, and exacerbated pre-existing racial differences. In his expertly-researched work *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: a Cold War Story*, Stephen Rabe proves false Dodd's assertion that Jagan was "on the payroll" of the Soviet Union. According to Rabe, Dodd "believed everything Burnham and D'Aguiar told him" and "passed on to the [Kennedy] administration documents, poorly forged by D'Aguiar's minions, purporting to prove that Jagan was on the payroll of the Soviet Union."[362]

Like the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba, American intervention in British Guiana began during the Eisenhower administration. In *Killing Hope*, Former State Department staffer-turned critic William Blum correctly observes that for a period of eleven years the United States "went to great lengths to prevent a democratically elected leader from occupying his office".[363] Although Jagan's program of encouraging foreign investment, attempting to strengthen the rights of unions and tenant farmers, and instituting public education was "hardly revolutionary", the

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[362] Rabe, *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story,* 85.
[363] William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II. (Munroe, ME: Common Courage Press), 108.

British saw him as a socialist and the US government "subjected him to a campaign of red-scare accusations and plain lies."[364]

The British initially played their part. The Winston Churchill government sent armed forces in 1956 and suspended the constitution. Nevertheless, in 1957 the Harold Macmillan government relented after Jagan was elected by a large majority. The key point was, according to historians Stephen Rabe and Piero Gleijeses, that "the British, having concluded that Jagan did not threaten Western interests, wanted to give democracy a chance in Guiana".[365]

The Kennedy and later the Johnson Administrations would have none of it. Smarting from Castro's victory and defiance, the Cold War liberal Democrats, led by Senator Dodd in Congress, were taking no chances elsewhere. Rabe observed that anyone the U.S. government supported had to have "unequivocally denounced communism and assented to US foreign policy positions."[366] Castro's successful defiance "caused the Kennedy administration to magnify the threat and heightened Washington's intolerance".[367] Moreover, domestic political considerations influenced the U.S. government's decision to rule out a productive bilateral relationship with Jagan. Declassified documents from the Kennedy Library reveal that the administration feared a negative reaction in Congress, and in particular

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[364] Blum, 108.
[365] Gleijeses, *"A Sordid Affair,"* 794.
[366] Rabe, 80.
[367] Gleijeses, *"A Sordid Affair,"* 794

Dodd's reaction to Jagan's possible inclusion in the Alliance for Progress. The Alliance was a cornerstone of Kennedy's foreign aid program and aimed to eliminate the root causes of communism in Latin America by dramatically improving social and economic conditions in the region.[368] In a memorandum to President Kennedy, aide Arthur Schlesinger suggested that Everett Melby, U.S. Consul in Guyana be used to persuade Dodd that the U.S. "should take the gamble of trying to be friendly to Jagan" by "bringing him into the Alianza". Schlesinger singled out Dodd as one who would be "alarmed" by any "friendliness" towards Jagan.[369] What Schlesinger should have realized, is that Dodd's anticommunism outweighed his commitment to the Kennedy administration's Alliance for Progress, and the progressive Latin American leaders the program sought to nurture. There was simply no way to bridge the gap between hawkish U.S. anticommunists like Dodd, and leftist reformers like Jagan.

Prior to the 1961 election in British Guiana, Dodd launched a vitriolic attack against Jagan on the floor of the Senate. In a speech entitled "British Guiana-Beachhead for International Communism," Dodd asserted that a Cheddi Jagan victory "is even more dangerous than the emergence of Castro" as the Communists

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[368] For an excellent account of how the Alliance For Progress failed to accomplish its objectives in Latin America, see David F. Schmitz, *Thank God They're On Our Side: The United States and Right Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999.

[369] FRUS, Volume XII, American Republics, Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant to President Kennedy, available from http://www.guyana.org/govt/declassified_documents.html; Internet, accessed 5 October 2009.

would then move arms from British Guiana into Venezuela, Brazil and Colombia.[370] According to Dodd, "the combination of Castro and Jagan would bring us to the brink of catastrophe in Latin America".[371] In this case, Dodd's evidence was a report from a single British conservative MP, who conducted his own private fact-finding mission. Lord Douglas-Hamilton dismissed Jagan as a communist, although it is telling that in his report he relied on hearsay from workers who claimed dynamite they used was stolen, and on the Roman Catholic Bishop and Anglican Archbishop who were both opposed to Jagan primarily because he instituted a public education system and took over the religious denominational schools.[372] After Dodd sounded the alarm on the Senate floor with respect to the communist "threat" in British Guiana, several colleagues, including Ernest Greuning (D-ALA) and Kenneth Keating (R-NY) thanked him for "bringing this matter to the attention of the Senate" and echoed Dodd's concern over the prospect of U.S. aid to Jagan. For his part, Greuning lauded Dodd for "the very effective points the Senator from Connecticut is making about this man [Jagan]."[373] Not surprisingly, no Senator rose to challenge Dodd on his red-baiting of Jagan; nor did anyone debate Dodd, Greuning, and Keating on the issue of providing monetary aid to Jagan through the World Bank.

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[370] Dodd Papers, "British Guiana: Beachhead for International Communism."
[371] Dodd Papers, Speech, "Communist Menace in South America," 17 July 1961, Series III, Box 193, Folder 4615.
[372] Ibid.
[373] Dodd Papers, Speech, "British Guiana: Beachhead for International Communism."

Despite Dodd's rhetoric and fear mongering, Jagan was elected once again in 1961 (even though the CIA was actively supporting the opposition). William Blum's polemical explanation for the Kennedy administration's hostility to Jagan is not believable. Based on reports by Arthur Schlesinger regarding a meeting Jagan requested with Kennedy at the White House in 1961, Blum claims the meeting went well until Jagan naively expressed admiration for the leftist journal *Monthly Review*. Blum claims this "effectively sealed his country's fate" as Schlesinger concluded that Jagan "was unquestionably some sort of Marxist." [374] This bizarre and simplistic explanation ignores the Kennedy campaign, already in progress, to depose Jagan and Dodd's incendiary comments in Congress. Aside from this regrettably partisan analysis, Blum's history of the U.S. intervention is instructive.

Dodd was directly associated with a group that intervened in British Guiana during the liberal and right-wing campaign against Cheddi Jagan. The Christian Anti-Communist Crusade (CACC) was, according to historian Sara Diamond, the "most successful" of the grassroots anti-communist organizations that cropped up in the Cold War culture of the U.S. The CACC was founded by Dr. Fred Schwartz, a right-wing Austrian physicist who established a name for himself in the U.S. in the 1950s as an opponent of communism. Schwartz, who published a best-selling

[374] Blum, 110, quoting Arthur Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 774-9.

book titled *How You Can Trust the Communists (To be Communists)* courted Dodd to give his organization some Congressional prestige. In October, 1961, Dodd took the stage of the Hollywood Bowl at a CACC rally billed as "Hollywood's Answer to Communism." The rally was attended by 12,000 people, and beamed out to approximately four million television viewers. Dodd was joined on stage by thespians John Wayne, Jimmy Stewart, and other prominent American anti-communists.[375] In 1961, the CACC "brought its travelling road show down" to British Guiana and splashed 75,000 dollars on "electoral propaganda" against Jagan, who was in the midst of a heated election campaign.[376]

Shortly after the election, on August 31, 1961, Thomas Dodd took to the floor in the Senate to once again denounce a democratically elected official and defend himself against attacks by both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. Both newspapers questioned the strategy of naming Jagan as a Communist "or the equivalent of one" with no evidence as this would drive the country into communist hands.[377] Dodd, the spokesperson for the liberal Democrats, claimed he did have evidence, which amounted to the "Duck Test" and a 1953 British White

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[375] Sara Diamond, *Roads to Dominion: Right Wing Movements and Political Power in the United* States (New York: Guilford Press, 1995), 58.

[376] Blum, 110. Dr. Schwartz made Dodd a distinguished "faculty member" of his travelling "school of anti-communism." The school was comprised of Hollywood actors, former FBI agents, prominent medical professionals, Cuban exiles, and army personnel. The hawkish representative Walter Judd (R-Minn.) joined Dodd in granting the organization some congressional prestige. See, "Sen. Dodd listed On Faculty Of Anti-Red School," *Hartford Courant*, 22 January 1962. The CACC's preferred the third party leader D'Aguiar, whom, as proprietor of the rum and soft drink company X/M, was one of the wealthiest men in the colony. D'Aguiar appealed to the American right as he held the most extreme views on communism and loathed the progressive taxation policies espoused by Jagan and to some extent, Burnham.

[377] Dodd Papers, Speech, "British Guiana-Beachhead for International Communism."

Paper which did not clearly indicate evidence of Jagan being a communist and whose purpose was to justify British suspension of the colony's constitution.[378] At most, the paper showed Jagan had leftist views and attended various socialist conferences in his youth in the 1940s and early 1950s and ignores the fact that many British politicians opposed independence for the colonies and were looking for reasons not to grant it.

Because Jagan hailed Castro as a "liberator" Dodd concluded that Jagan was "a faithful minion of the world communist conspiracy", "takes his orders from the Kremlin, and "parades in the guise of a reform and independence movement."[379] Dodd was not alone in this view, and the U.S. Congress was filled with members who viewed as anathema a Jagan-led government. As Cary Fraser points out, Kennedy's White House received 113 letters from members of Congress urging the administration to seek alternatives to Jagan in British Guiana. Naturally, the most extreme right-wing Congressmen such as California Republican John H. Rousselot urged Kennedy to consider Peter D'Aguiar's United Force as a prime alternative due to the latter's pro-business stance, and his cozy relationship with European oligarchs and landowners in the British colony.[380] The notion that British Guiana was fast becoming a Soviet satellite caught on in the right-wing parlance of the

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[378] Ibid.

[379] Dodd Papers, Speech, "British Guiana: Beachhead for International Communism."

[380] Prior to entering the United States Congress, Rousselot cut his teeth in politics as Western Regional Director of the John Birch Society. Echoing Dodd, Rousselot publicly pronounced that Jagan's British Guiana was "The first Soviet satellite on the continent of South America."

day. The popular conservative syndicated columnists Robert Novak and Rowland Evans also agreed with Dodd that British Guiana was "half-way within the communist bloc," and "ever closer to becoming South America's first communist satellite."[381] In their "Inside Report" column, Novak and Evans cited as prescient Dodd's 1961 jeremiads concerning the threat of an independent Guyana led by Jagan and the PPP.[382]

Dodd rejected the argument of self-determination for the people of British Guiana even though, as demonstrated above, he thought it was essential in Cuba and later in the Congo. He claimed that the U.S. had a right to intervene in the elections in the colony (they already had) because of the influence of communist propaganda, because the World Bank, with American approval, granted a $1.25 million loan to British Guiana prior to the election and because Jagan campaigned with "unlimited financial means of the world communist movement."[383]

In fact, the Kennedy administration granted no aid to British Guiana and the U.S. pressured Britain to delay the granting of independence (it did not become Guyana until Jagan was out of office in 1966). Washington launched a two-pronged offensive to undermine Jagan by fomenting riots, strikes, and providing

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[381] Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Inside Report: Communist Guiana?" *New York Herald Tribune*, 8 December 1963.
[382] Ibid.
[383] Dodd Papers, Speech, "British Guiana: Beachhead for International Communism."

support to the opposition. On February 16, 1962, "aided and abetted" by the CIA, arsonists set ablaze the colony's capital of Georgetown.[384]

Kennedy ignored British requests to "consider using economic aid as a way of fostering moderate policies in British Guiana" and to stop covert operations.[385] Declassified documents reveal that between 1962 and 1968 the Special Group/303 Committee approved $2.08 million for covert actions.[386] A lengthy declassified Memorandum of the 303 Committee dated March 17, 1967 reviews the history of British Guiana and states "the US government determined in 1962 that Cheddi Jagan would not be acceptable" as leader. The group wanted "to ensure Jagan's defeat by the provision of guidance and support to Burnham and D'Aguiar, leaders of Guiana's two anti-Jagan political parties,"[387] and that Burnham is "prepared to deny receipt of any such aid."[388]

Blum observed that "the centerpiece of the CIA strategy was a general strike that began in April 1963 and lasted for 80 days."[389] The CIA had been entwined with the local unions since the late 1950s. According to the *Sunday Times,* the CIA coordinated fundraising for local unions who supported Forbes Burnham. William Doherty Jr., who later became Executive Director of the American

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[384] Rabe, 91.
[385] Rabe, 82.
[386] FRUS, Volume XXXII, Guyana Editorial Note, 851.
[387] FRUS, Volume XXXII- Guyana, Memorandum prepared for the 303 Committee, 17 March 1967, 932.
[388] Ibid., 933.
[389] William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004), 111.

Institute for Free Labour Development, the CIA's principal labour organization in Latin America, led the recruiting and fundraising drive.[390] CIA officers gave advice to local union leaders on how to organize and sustain the strike. Jagan believed the union could not hold out but the *Sunday Times* reported the CIA "was providing the bulk of the strike pay, plus money for distress funds and the workers' daily 15 minutes on the radio".[391] The British mediator was shocked to discover that every time Jagan caved in to union demands "they erected more demands". [392]The British used the resulting unrest and instability to claim that Jagan could not run the country and provide the necessary stability for independence.

With the election of the Labour Party in Britain in 1964, Jagan hoped this conspiracy would be crushed, but he was disappointed. Secretary of State Dean Rusk left the new British Foreign Secretary "in no doubt that the United States would resist a rise of British Guiana as an independent Castro-type state".[393] Memoranda between the Deputy Director of the CIA and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (McGeorge Bundy) clearly indicate in May 1964 the intent to intervene in favour of Burnham to oust Jagan in the 1964 elections. Privately, "State [Department] feels the [British] election was

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[390] Cited in Blum, 109.
[391] Blum, 111.
[392] Ibid.
[393] Blum, 113.

sufficiently close so that Labour will be wary of tampering with the present course of events in BG."[394] This is exactly what happened.

A "Talking Paper" approved on October 14, 1964 for U.S. Ambassador Bruce in his first meeting with new Prime Minister Harold Wilson stated "Latin America is an area of the greatest importance to us. The establishment of an independent government in British Guiana under leadership which has been markedly receptive to communist ideas and vulnerable to communist subversion would create an intolerable situation for the United States....It is our intention to do what we can to assist a non-communist government in British Guiana."[395] And assist they would. Another secret file of a Memorandum from Gordon Chase of the National Security Council to McGeorge Bundy on October 17, 1964 indicated that it was important for the opposition parties to turn out the vote. "To this end the CIA, in a deniable and discreet way, is providing financial incentives to party workers who are charged with the responsibility of getting out the vote."[396]

Jagan was aware of, and frustrated by, U.S. actions. He told Delmar Carlson, American Consul General in British Guiana that, "I am opposed by everyone including the CIA, which I suppose is the American government...President Kennedy gave me to understand that he would help me but

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[394] FRUS, Volume XXXII- Guyana, Memorandum from Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 17 October 1964, 884.
[395] FRUS, Volume XXXIII- Guyana, Back Channel Message from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 14 October 1964, 883.
[396] Ibid.

he didn't ....I can only conclude that (President Kennedy) was a liar or that he was influenced to change his decision".[397] While Jagan was taking a moderate, conciliatory course, he was described, at a September 11 1964 meeting that included William Tyler and McGeorge Bundy, as "the same unrehabilitated bad egg" who was not "educated by the US/Cuban experience".[398] This meeting was part of a "Secret; Eyes Only" file declassified from the Johnson Library National Security File. At the same meeting, British and U.S. officials expressed their dislike and distrust of Burnham. Delmar Carlson, the U.S. envoy, indicated he had difficulty building a relationship with Burnham who was "a racist and probably anti-white, remembers slights and repays them... and takes advantage of people who treat him softly."[399] Burnham had previously been "named as a terrorist in the British police report" [400] and consistently branded by the CIA as "an opportunist, a thief and a racist." [401] On November 5, the British Foreign Secretary said he had "a very unfavourable opinion of Burnham who is a thoroughly unreliable person."[402] This proved to be an accurate summary of Burnham's character. Nevertheless, Burnham promised not to recognize the USSR and have nothing to do with Cuba so long as he could find other people to buy British Guiana's rice. He agreed to

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[397] FRUS, Volume XXXII- Guyana, Memorandum of Conversation, Georgetown, 25 May 1964, 864.
[398] FRUS, Volume XXXII- Guyana, Memorandum for the Record, 11 September 1964, 878.
[399] Ibid.
[400] Blum, 113.
[401] Rabe, 9.
[402] FRUS, Volume XXXII- Guyana, Memorandum of Conversation, 27 October 1961, 889.

join the OAS. Meanwhile, he extracted the promise of a new East-West road and an airport terminal should he be successful in the 1964 election. "The [303] group agreed that we should go along with Burnham on this."[403]

A meeting including President Johnson and PM Harold Wilson was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House on December 7, 1964. Following a jocular discussion of how to get re-elected, Johnson and Wilson turned to the agenda. Item two on the agenda, after Vietnam, was British Guiana. Wilson described Jagan as "a naïve Trotskyite" and stated the U.S. placed "excessive trust in Burnham" and favoured a Canadian or Australian distinguished judicial figure to go to British Guiana and lay the foundation of the judiciary. He believed the government could not be entrusted to either Jagan or Burnham.[404] Nevertheless, the U.S. continued with its covert operations to ensure a Burnham victory.

Despite the U.S. efforts, Jagan was victorious in the 1964 elections, but with a plurality of the vote (40.5% and 22 seats); the British governor asked Burnham to form a government in coalition with third place United Force party of Peter D'Aguiar. When Jagan refused to resign, an Order in Council for his removal was passed and the British army and navy were put on high alert.[405] Jagan accepted the inevitable and resigned. Dodd's campaign to undermine his leadership finally succeeded – he told a Security Forum in May 1965 that "We may derive legitimate

[403] FRUS, Volume XXXII- Guyana, Memorandum for the Record, 11 September 1964, 879.
[404] FRUS, Volume XXXII- Guyana, Memorandum of Conversation, 7 December 1964, 891-892.
[405] FRUS, Volume XXXII- Guyana, Editorial Note, 892-893.

comfort from the fact that over the course of the past year, both Brazil and British Guiana succeeded in rescuing themselves from the threat of communist takeover".[406]

In January 1965, the British government indicated it had "no illusions about Burnham's weaknesses and shortcomings" but the U.S. government, through the CIA, provided substantial funds to Burnham and Peter D'Aguiar's political parties, who formed a coalition to help them win the 1968 election. This is clear in the declassified documents, even a notation in Chase's handwriting that "FYI we need to write some checks for Burnham."[407] This was necessary because, as a Memorandum from CIA Deputy Director Richard Helms to McGeorge Bundy stated, "there is no evidence to indicate that Jagan has lost the political support of the vast majority of the Indian population" whose numbers were increasing.[408] This memo, a "smoking gun" outlines how the U.S. government was "providing approximately $12 million in financial aid to the Burnham government." The CIA's stated objectives were to: a) obtain intelligence on the PPP's capabilities and intentions, b) keep Burnham and D'Aguiar working together and c) counter Jagan's efforts to gain control of organized labour. This plan would be carried out

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[406] Dodd Papers, Speech, "The World Situation", 3 May 1965.
[407] FRUS, Volume XXXII- Guyana, Memorandum from Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 23 June 1965, 908-909.
[408] FRUS, Volume XXXII- Guyana, Memorandum from the Deputy Director for Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 6 August 1965, 913.

by "maintaining covert channels to Burnham and D'Aguiar."[409] Some of this memorandum is still classified, probably to limit knowledge of the extent of U.S. interference.

Nevertheless, Jagan maintained his popularity. Ambassador Carlson indicated in July 1965 that "Most East Indians do not think and will easily be convinced, despite a plethora of anti-Communist and anti-Jagan propaganda that Cheddi Jagan is anything less than an altruistic leader who although perhaps capable of error, loves his people and is motivated by a desire to act in their best interests."[410] Carlson had a number of suggestions for actions to undermine Jagan, from exiling Jagan and his wife to supporting the anti-Jagan Man Power Citizens Association representing 20,000 sugar workers. As predicted by the British, Carlson noted "Burnham...intends to remain in power indefinitely...if necessary he is prepared to employ unorthodox methods to achieve his aims."[411]

The U.S. was aware of Burnham's attempts to rig the 1968 election if necessary to stay in power. Burnham indicated that the overseas vote "could be manipulated pretty much as he wished,"[412] and in December 1967 the U.S. was aware that Burnham was "working on various schemes to enlarge the Negro vote"

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[409] Ibid., 913-914.
[410] FRUS, Volume XXXII- Guyana, Telegram from the Ambassador to Guyana (Carlson) to the Department of State, 15 July 1966, 924.
[411] Ibid., 928.
[412] FRUS, Volume XXXII: Guyana, Telegram from the Ambassador to Guyana (Carlson) to the Department of State, day unspecified, June 1967, 935.

but if these arrangements would not suffice "he would probably rig the election."[413] D'Aguiar discovered that Burnham was "padding the registration lists in the United Kingdom excessively."[414] Rather than oppose this attempt to undermine democracy, the 303 Committee decided to "provide covert support in order to assure his victory at the polls."[415] On April 10, 1967 the 303 Committee approved "a proposal to provide Prime Minister Forbes Burnham...with covert support in the next national elections" because the Committee actions were based "on the assumption that Jagan is a Communist or an accurate facsimile of one" and that his election "would prove a dangerous stimulus to Castro and would introduce an unacceptable degree of instability into the Caribbean area."[416] The actual amount of funds provided to Burnham and D'Aguiar is still classified, but "professional political organizers" provided to them did an excellent job of getting the parties organized and registering voters. At the same time, the US, Britain and Canada launched a 3-year economic development program to "demonstrate what a democratic government can achieve following the years of difficulties under the communist-oriented Cheddi Jagan."[417]

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[413] FRUS, Volume XXXII: Guyana, Special National Intelligence Estimate, 7 December 1967, 938.
[414] FRUS, Volume XXXII: Guyana, Memorandum prepared for the 303 Committee, 21 November 1968, 963.
[415] FRUS, Volume XXXII: Guyana, Memorandum prepared for the 303 Committee, 17 March 1967, 931.
[416] FRUS, Volume XXXII: Guyana, Memorandum from the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Director (Hughes) and Deputy Director (Denney), 6 December 1967, 936.
[417] FRUS, Volume XXXII: Guyana, Memorandum from Secretary of Agriculture (Freeman) and Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gaud) to President Johnson, 21 June 1968, 955.

Dodd and like-minded policy makers in Washington continued to use Jagan as a bogeyman to support Burnham and his schemes. When there was a border dispute with Venezuela in early 1968, Special Assistant to Johnson Walt Rostow adopted the strategy of restraining the Venezuelans by reminding them "that if they undermine Burnham they run the risk of getting a communist bridgehead at their back door under Cheddi Jagan."[418] With covert US support, Burnham won 30 of the 53 seats in Parliament in the December 16, 1968 election, which included a heavy majority of the overseas vote.[419]

The Cold War liberal Democrats in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations provided covert support to a corrupt leader to keep a candidate who they assumed was a Communist from maintaining power in British Guiana and Guyana. As noted above, Dodd was hardly alone in his negative opinion of Jagan; individuals in the State Department, Executive Branch, and Congress showed an aversion to the progressive leader.[420] But by leading the chorus, Tom Dodd amplified the tenor of the debate surrounding the potential of a Jagan-led Guyana. Dodd viewed the political events in British Guiana through the prism of the Cold War, and his anticommunist blinders prevented him from seeing events as

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[418] FRUS, Volume XXXII: Guyana, Information Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 25 January 1968, 947.

[419] FRUS, Volume XXXII: Guyana, Editorial Note, 966.

[420] Even Alaska Republican Senator Ernest Gruening, one of two lone voices against the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (the other being Oregon maverick Wayne Morse) hopped on Dodd's anti-Jagan bandwagon by co-authoring letters with the Connecticut Senator urging the Kennedy Administration and World Bank to reject Jagan's request for support and aid. Cary Fraser, "The New Frontier of Empire in the Caribbean: The Transfer of Power in British Guiana, 1961-1964, *The International History Review* Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 2000): 586, 597.

they were. As both Rabe and Gleijeses discovered, Jagan was not a Communist "and he represented no threat to the United States. The message was endorsed by the foreign companies that operated in the colony". [421] Moreover, by naively believing Burnham's feigning, and accepting the authenticity of forged documents handed over to him by aides of the dubious D'Aguiar, Dodd sold Congress and the American public a fallacious story, and helped to undermine Guyanese democracy.

For his part, Forbes Burnham proceeded to erect a national security state which exacerbated racial divisions, infringed upon civil liberties, rigged elections, mismanaged the economy, and terrorized the overwhelmingly poor population. As political scientist Joan Mars confirms, the U.S. government reinforced Burnham's contested rule into the 1980s by supplying the strongman with millions of dollars of military aid, and providing training to Guyanese police officers through the Office of Public Services (OPS). Close to 1000 police officers were trained at the OPS's "Latin American facilities" while a select few trained within the United States.[422] This American-backed police apparatus effectively "became indispensable to his [Burnham's] campaign of internal surveillance and the silencing of all dissenting voices."[423] Walter Rodney, a prolific Guyanese scholar was one of these voices who railed against the rule of Burnham or "King Kong" -

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[421] Gleijeses, *"A Sordid Affair,"* 795.
[422] Joan R. Mars, *Deadly Force, Colonialism, and the Rule of Law: Police Violence in Guyana* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 113.
[423] Ibid., 113.

Rodney's sobriquet for the strongman. After spending most of his career outside Guyana, Rodney returned to his native country in 1974, and was determined to beget political change under the banner of the Working People's Alliance (WPA), a conglomeration of dissident leftists. In 1980, Rodney's dream was cut short, when Burnham's thugs blew up his car, killing him "largely in response to his political activity directed against the incumbent regime."[424]

Burnham did not prove to be the champion of free-market economics his U.S. patrons hoped he would become. In fact, as political scientist W. Marvin Will observes, "the PNC government was probably as socialist as Jagan's PPC government."[425] By 1976, Burnham's experiment of "co-operative socialism" had nationalized the lucrative bauxite and sugar industries (the country's main exports), "miniaturized foreign owned banks and insurance companies; instituted a system of price, exchange rate, and trade controls; rationed foreign exchange and declared the paramountcy of the ruling PNC party in the economic sphere."[426]

The results of these measures were disastrous. By the early 1980s, Burnham's PNC was severely in debt, and became locked into a relationship of dependency with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. According to liberal economist John Gafar, "the story is that Guyana wasted two decades of

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[424] David Simon, *Fifty Key Thinkers on Development* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 207.
[425] W. Marvin Will, "NGOs and IGOs as Promoters of Liberal Democracy in the Caribbean: Cases from Nicaragua and Guyana," in *Democracy and Human Rights in the Caribbean* eds., Ivelaw L. Griffith and Betty Nelly Sedoc-Dahlberg (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 62.
[426] John Gafar, *Guyana: from state control to free markets* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), 41.

economic development and opportunities because of ideology, mis-rule, and bad economic policies."[427]

Ironically, at a conference in New York City in 1990 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. publicly apologized to Cheddi Jagan, who was present. "I think a great injustice was done to Cheddi Jagan".[428] This was not much consolation to Jagan or to his country. One of the better off Latin American countries in the early 1960s was among the poorest by the mid 1990s.[429] Jagan served as Guyana's president from 1992 until his death in 1997, and was succeeded by his wife, Chicago-born Janet Rosenberg-Jagan. The Cheddi Jagan Research Centre opened in Georgetown in 2000. This was the supreme irony - 40 years after Dodd's wild accusations and fear mongering in the Senate, Cheddi Jagan was a respected hero and father of his country, while Tom Dodd had left the Senate in disgrace.

[427] Gafar, 46.
[428] Blum, 113.
[429] Blum, 114.

Chapter Four

Trouble in the Congo: Tom Dodd and Moïse Tshombe

Tom Dodd's anticommunist crusade was not limited to Guatemala, Cuba, British Guiana or Southeast Asia. Dodd expressed deep concern over the currents of nationalism running through developing world, and urged his fellow U.S. policy makers to defend colonial powers over national leaders whose anticommunism was either uncertain or unproven. For example, in 1962, Dodd attempted to persuade fellow members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to support the Dutch against Indonesia's bid for control over Netherlands New Guinea. Dodd warned that U.S. failure to back the Dutch would result in "turning it [Guinea] over to a government that runs a great chance of falling to communism before the decade is out."[430] But one of Dodd's most pressing concerns was Africa and the Congo in particular. As, in Harold Macmillan's famous phrase, "the winds of change" swept across the African continent Tom Dodd focused on the international communist conspiracy's "three continent Cold War offensive."[431] He was alarmed with the possibility of the spread of Communism in the newly-independent nations

[430] "Dodd Backs Dutch Against Indonesia," *New York Times*, 18 April 1962. The Dutch official turned over Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia in 1969. By that time, Indonesia was under the iron-fisted rule of the anti-communist General, Suharto, whose rise to power was greatly assisted by years of American covert intervention against the leftist rule of his predecessor, Sukarno. Thus, Dodd was notably silent in 1969 when the Dutch ceded the territory to Indonesia.

[431] Thomas J. Dodd Papers, Speech, "Communism's Three Continent Cold War Offensive, 1 December 1964, Series III, Box 201, Folder 5149.

on the continent, and suggested that "in terms of its consequences for the Western world, the loss of Africa might be a disaster of an even greater magnitude than the loss of Southeast Asia."[432] This was an African version of the domino theory – if the Congo floundered, the Soviets and Chinese would use it as base for intervention on the continent.[433] It is important to note that the colonial powers in Africa were also western powers when it came to the cold war and once again, Dodd's visceral anticommunism, pious Catholicism and concerns with timidity and appeasement informed his actions to the detriment of the Congolese population.

Tshombe's Man in the U.S. Senate

Dodd was a major player and influential figure in Africa, particularly in the Republic of Congo (Zaire 1971-1997, Democratic Republic of Congo 1997-present) which he perceived to be "the number one target for Soviet and Chinese Communists."[434] This role brought Dodd into conflict with the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, the State Department, the CIA and the United Nations, and led to accusations that he was on the payroll of African politicians. The bizarre and tragic events in the Congo in the early 1960s included the murder of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, the mysterious death of UN Secretary-General Dag

[432] Thomas J. Dodd Papers, Speech, "The Communist Penetration of Africa," 16 March 1965, Administrative and Legislative Files, Series III, Box 201, Folder 5149.
[433] James E. Winkates, "U.S. Intervention in Africa: The Congo Case, Review: American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-1964 by Stephen R. Weissman, *Africa Today*, Vol. 23 No. 2, Tensions in the Horn of Africa (Apr.-Jun., 1976): 83.
[434] Thomas J. Dodd Papers, Speech, "Communism's Three Continent Cold War Offensive," Series III, Box. 201, Folder 5149.

Hammarskjöld, and the intrigues of Thomas Dodd in support of Katanga secessionist leader Moïse Tshombe who was later proved to be a participant in the assassination of Lumumba. This chapter argues that Tom Dodd's hawkish anticommunism, devout Catholicism and possibly his own personal interests were the motivating factors behind his vocal political support for Tshombe. Furthermore, it is this author's contention that the support Dodd and the Administration of Lyndon Johnson provided for Moïse Tshombe in 1964, at which time the U.S. "raised an army of white mercenaries to defeat a revolt that threatened to topple the pro-American government of Zaire," constitutes an irreparable stain on Dodd and Johnson's legacies, and the record of American foreign policy.[435]

The year 1960 represented a watershed for African nationalism as nineteen countries were granted independence from European imperial rule. Furthermore, the rampant nationalism that was brewing in the post-colonial African states, and the possibility that the Soviet Union and Communist China would capitalize on anti-imperialist sentiments worried Tom Dodd and other leading American policy makers. Dodd astutely observed that the Communists "are identifying themselves with the struggle against colonialism and against the white man."[436] When the Congo exploded onto the international scene in June, 1960 in the final months of

[435] Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 72.
[436] Thomas J. Dodd Papers, Speech, "Communism's Three Continent Cold War Offensive."

the Eisenhower administration, it became "the first arena for significant Cold War confrontation politics in sub-Saharan Africa".[437] In the words of the Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, "the new twilight war against Soviet communism was being waged through surrogates all over the world...and the hottest surrogate war at the time [President] Kennedy took office was in the newly-independent Congo."[438]

Congo's Troubled History

The Congo had a harrowing history and was the inspiration for Joseph Conrad's novel of greed and madness *Heart of Darkness* (Conrad was a river-boat Captain on the Congo River). Following the Berlin Conference of 1885, where European imperial powers embarked on the "scramble for Africa," the Congo was the personal property and playground of Belgian King Leopold II who desired a slice of the "magnificent African cake" and called his new territory the Congo Free State.[439] In pursuit of massive profits Leopold II proceeded to "plunder the country with a cynical brutality rarely matched in colonial history."[440] Although an international campaign against Leopold II's atrocities in the Congo forced the monarch to cede the territory to Belgium in 1908, the Belgians continued to exploit

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[437] James E. Winkates, Review: U.S. Intervention in Africa: The Congo Case, *Africa Today* Vol. 23, No. 2, Tensions in the Horn of Africa (Apr.-Jun., 1976): 83.
[438] Seymour M. Hersh, *The Dark Side of Camelot* (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1998), 193-194.
[439] Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (New York: Perseus Books, 2005), 94-95.
[440] Larry Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 5.

the huge resources of the area: ivory, rubber, copper, cobalt and diamonds. The colony was run by an alliance between the government, the Catholic Church and the colossal mining industries.[441] Up to the late 1950s Belgium continued to view the Congo as a docile cash cow oblivious to the "winds of change" and the decolonization of French and British African colonies in the 1950s. [442] "By 1959, the Congo was producing 10 per cent of the world's copper, 50 per cent of its cobalt and 70 per cent of its industrial diamonds."[443] As well, successful Catholic missionaries led an impressive network of primary schools. The role of Catholic missionaries and the reality that one-third of the population were professed Christians, were facts that did not escape Tom Dodd.[444]

In 1960, the complacent Belgians were caught off guard by political rioting and pillaging, especially in the capital of Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) by the indigenous population who objected to Belgian prohibitions on political activity. Belgium bears direct responsibility for the chaos that engulfed the Congo during the 1960s. Unlike France and England, the Belgians made no effort to prepare the colony for independence, and naively believed that they could grant political independence, including free elections, but continue to conduct business as usual,

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[441] Meredith, 96.
[442] Like the Belgians, the French did not want to go and quickly granted independence after Guinea alone voted against a proposed French Union in 1958 and then survived a sudden French withdrawal. Fearing other colonies will follow Guinea's example, French President Charles De Gaulle quickly granted independence in 1960, but in such a way as to maintain French control of the colonies.
[443] Meredith, 97.
[444] Ibid.

exploit the former colony's vast resources, and maintain order with an army staffed with Belgian officers. Belgian citizens (there were few settlers) continued to run the economy and were the officers in the Force Publique, the country's army, which was re-named the Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC). When Belgium suddenly granted Congo independence that year the country's lack of an educated population (there were twenty university graduates in a population on 14 million), dearth of technological capacity, and deep ethnic and political divisions made it unprepared for the challenges of independence. As scholar Collin Gonze cogently wrote at the time, the Congo "is really two countries. One is a series of overlapping economic domains controlled by banks, corporations, and individuals living abroad. The second country lies beneath the first- it is the traditional African society, sometimes peaceful and harmonious, sometimes frustrated, violent, and vindictive... the Congo as a unit was a fiction of [Belgian] colonial rule.[445]

At the time of independence, the elected Prime Minister of the Congolese central government was Patrice Lumumba, an uneducated but charismatic nationalist who denied being a communist, but quickly drew the scorn of Tom Dodd and American policy makers who believed he was one, and Belgian politicians who believed he constituted a threat to their economic interests and teetering colonial empire. Relations between Lumumba and Brussels were

[445] Collin Gonze, "Tshombe in Wonderland," *Africa Today*, Vol. 11, No. 7 (Sep., 1964), 5.

damaged at the outset. On June 30, 1960, Belgian and Congolese elites gathered in Leopoldville to mark the country's independence. After listening to a paternalistic speech from Belgium's King Baudouin in which the monarch lauded Leopold II and Belgium's historic achievements, Lumumba seized the moment of the independence festivities to launch into a vitriolic unscripted tirade against the harsh legacy of Belgian colonialism, stating it was time to end "the humiliating slavery" forced upon the Congo and invoking a struggle for independence that would require "tears, fires and blood."[446] After the incident, Lumumba was "portrayed in the Belgian press as a dangerous extremist"; the pleased Lumumba distributed the speech throughout the Congo.[447] Not surprisingly, Congolese society swiftly unravelled within days of independence, with lawlessness and civil strife prevailing, particularly after Lumumba refused to give the army a pay raise, and the Congolese soldiers, who hated most of their Belgian officers, began a mutiny. The resulting bloodshed, including attacks on Catholic missionaries and nuns, terrified the local European community and Tom Dodd.

Because of the political uncertainty in the Congo, which held some of the world's most extensive mineral deposits, much was at stake for countries seeking to supplant Belgian influence, and gain a strategic economic and political foothold. The United States was the world's most preeminent economic power after World

[446] Meredith, 94. Devlin, 8.
[447] Meredith, 94.

War II, and well-positioned to assume greater influence and enjoy some of the fabulous wealth the Congo's gold, copper, cobalt, tin, diamonds, and other minerals had to offer.[448] The Soviet Union had the same goal, and CIA Chief of Station in Leopoldville, Larry Devlin, reported that in July and August 1960 several hundred Soviet personnel entered the Congo.[449] Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union paid much attention to the Congo prior to 1960, but now the Cold War, and Senator Thomas J. Dodd, came to Africa.

On July 11, Moïse Tshombe, leader of the Congress of the Tribal Associations of Katanga (CONAKAT) political party and head of the Katanga province, announced that the province was seceding from the Congo due to "chaos" that enveloped the fragile country. Katanga was by far the country's wealthiest province, and the epicentre of Belgium's colonial project. The Belgian company Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) had a monopoly on the extraction of the region's vast mineral resources; Belgian politicians had no intention of giving up control of the Katanga mines.[450] The heart of Tshombe's military force in Katanga was a squad of white mercenaries most of whom were from South Africa and Rhodesia and were supplied, trained, and funded by the

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[448] Blum, 156.
[449] Devlin, 23.
[450] Incidentally, the uranium used for the infamous bombs dropped by U.S. planes at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan in World War II came from UMHK mines in Shinkolobwe, Katanga. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila: A People's History* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 29.

Belgian government.[451] Tshombe's Katanga secession would have been impossible without Belgian assistance.

The inexperienced Patrice Lumumba was left to deal with an army mutiny, political instability, and the secession of the country's wealthiest province and the flight of Belgian nationals, bringing the economy to a standstill. The situation deteriorated so quickly that the UN Security Council ordered the withdrawal of Belgian forces which had been sent to restore order, and a UN army arrived on July 15 to "provide military assistance". When the Belgian troops still tried to pacify the country, Lumumba stated on August 15 that he was breaking off diplomatic relations with Belgium and would consider asking "for the intervention of the Soviet Union."[452] This bombshell convinced local CIA operatives that Lumumba was playing into the hands of the Soviets (although Moscow never considered him to be a communist), alarmed the Eisenhower administration, and upset UN officials in the Congo who were blindsided by the announcement and were often attacked by locals.

Lumumba went to the U.S. in late July where he visited the United Nations and Washington officials. The visits with American officials did not go well (he demanded blonde female companionship for the night and the CIA provided it) and he was perceived as unstable and erratic. Ralph Bunche, an African-American

[451] Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 61.
[452] Devlin, 38.

Nobel Peace Prize-winner and assistant to the head of the UN operation in the Congo reported that Lumumba "was crazy and that he reacted like a child."[453] President Eisenhower opted not to meet Lumumba, as he was busy summering at his estate in Newport, Rhode Island. As Piero Gleijeses notes, the U.S. government under Eisenhower viewed Lumumba an "African Castro" and a "Soviet instrument" and never seriously considered supporting him.[454] This did not sit well with some American allies in Africa. Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of independent Ghana "felt a marked and mutual affinity with Lumumba" and was his biggest supporter from the newly-independent African countries.[455] When the U.S. and UN equivocated on the removal of Belgian forces from Katanga, a fissure developed in U.S.-Ghana relations. U.S. officials cooled on Nkrumah when Ghana rushed to aid Lumumba's forces. After his guarded support for Lumumba during the Congo Crisis, Nkrumah "put himself at sharp odds with the U.S... and by the logic of guilt by association, Washington characterized him a communist, the label assigned to Lumumba."[456] As Ebere Nwaubani demonstrates, the Congo Crisis gave American officials the opportunity to restructure U.S.-Ghana relations, and the way in which Nkrumah's and Washington's policies differed on Lumumba, the Katanga secession, and the role of the UN, poisoned future relations between the

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[453] Meredith, 106.
[454] Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 61.
[455] Ebere Nwaubani, "Nkrumah and the Congo Crisis," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Oct., 2001): 611.
[456] Nwaubani, 600.

two parties.[457] In later years, Tom Dodd repeatedly referred to Nkrumah as a communist in speeches on the floor of the Senate and to members of the anticommunist community in the U.S.

Lumumba's problems were not simply external. Although Lumumba had cultivated impressive grass-roots support in the countryside, his ineffectiveness in governing quickly became apparent. As Martin Meredith points out, "in the sixty-seven days that Lumumba held office as Prime Minister he had squandered all goodwill and accumulated a powerful array of adversaries."[458] During Lumumba's teetering reign, two powerful members of his big-tent party, the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), President Joseph Kasavubu and Mobutu Sese Seko, broke ties with the "impulsive and arbitrary" leader.[459] The world's great powers and Cold War antagonists (namely the U.S., Soviet Union, and China) attempted to shape the outcome of this crisis. But American influence far outweighed that of the communist powers during the years of the Congo Crisis. As Gleijeses observes, "The Communist bloc sent money and weapons to Zaire but its interference was paltry compared with that of the United States, both on its own and through the United Nations, over which it exercised an extraordinary degree of influence."[460]

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[457] Nwaubani, 612, 620, 622.
[458] Meredith, 113.
[459] Kasavubu had been the leader of the separatist Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO) which favoured an independent state for the province of Bakongo in the western Democratic Republic of the Congo. Various separatist forces continually undermined Lumumba and created an unstable situation.
[460] Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 61.

Nonetheless, in his speeches throughout the tumultuous Congo Crisis, Dodd held to the conviction that "the tempo at which the Soviets and Peiping have developed their activities in Africa is awe-inspiring."[461] By stating such falsehoods, Dodd did his part to exaggerate the communist threat and contribute to instability in the Congo.

Early on in the Congo Crisis, Larry Devlin, CIA Chief of Station in the Congo, met with CIA Director Allan Dulles, who informed him "the United States could not afford to lose the Congo to the Soviet Union" and that Devlin would play a key role. Devlin, who understood Dulles shared his view, was concerned that if the Soviets gained control of Lumumba they would use the Congo as a base to infiltrate nine other countries and colonies to establish a base in central Africa and gain control of oil, minerals and raw materials produced in the area.[462] Devlin did not believe that Lumumba was a communist, but he was "politically naïve and inherently unstable". Instead, the CIA helped engineer a coup that brought Colonel Joseph Mobutu, the army chief of staff, to power and Lumumba was placed under the protection of the United Nations. Lumumba was still a threat to regain power and incite the population so the CIA was soon tasked with finding a way to assassinate the charismatic leftist.[463] On September 19, 1960 Devlin received a

[461] Thomas J. Dodd Papers, Speech, "The Communist Penetration of Africa," 16 March 1965, Series III, Box 201, Folder 5179.
[462] Devlin, 49.
[463] Devlin, 54.

message to assassinate Lumumba with poison provided by the CIA and told he could use any method as long as it was not traceable to the U.S.[464] Devlin thought this was foolish and if the assassination effort leaked out the whites in Leopoldville would be massacred. In his memoirs he clearly stated the assassination was "immoral" and would not help with US objectives in any event.[465] He stalled, claiming he could not get at Lumumba who was protected by the UN. The Belgians and Moïse Tshombe, however, did not delay and after Lumumba tried to escape to safety in his stronghold of Stanleyville, he was imprisoned. On July 17, 1961 he and two colleagues were flown to Elisabethville in Katanga where they were severely beaten on the plane, then tortured. According to his butler, Tshombe had blood all over his clothing and during a drunken dinner the Katangese decided Lumumba should be executed.[466] Dutch journalist Ludo de Witte wrote a detailed account *The Assassination of Lumumba* in 1999, prompting an official Belgian inquiry in 2001 in which Belgium admitted it took part in the murder. According to de Witte, Tshombe was part of the convoy, with Belgian officers, who executed Lumumba, and later sent the bodies across Katanga where they were cut up and put in sulphuric acid. They ground up the skulls and teeth so there would be no trace of Lumumba.[467] As William Blum cogently notes, "the immediate and long-term

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[464] Devlin, 94-95
[465] Devlin, 262.
[466] Meredith, 111.
[467] Meredith, 112.

effect of Lumumba's murder was to make him the martyr and symbol of anti-imperialism all over Africa and elsewhere in the third world which such American officials had feared."[468]

Katanga continued to maintain its independence, even though it was not officially recognized by the U.S. or any other country in the world, and the UN attempted to broker deals to get Tshombe, who had the strong support of Tom Dodd in the U.S. Senate, back into the government. UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld had the difficult task of balancing the demands of UN members who sought to influence the Congo's future. The Soviet Union's UN staff demanded the Secretary-General's resignation because he had not done enough to "decolonize" Africa. The USSR wanted to replace the role of UN Secretary-General by a three-person *troika*. It is clear there was more than a shred of truth to Soviet claims that Hammarskjold's decision-making benefited the West. As scholar Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja points out, "nearly all of the top U.N. officials with responsibility for Congo matters shared a common Cold War outlook with U.S. policy makers and saw their mission as that of preserving the existing balance of forces in the world."[469] Historian Ebere Nwaubani concurs, arguing that under Hammarskjold, the UN was tilted against Lumumba in favour of any viable alternative. Nwaubani convincingly demonstrates that the UN proceeded in this

[468] Blum, 159.

[469] Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, "U.S. Policy Toward Zaire," in *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy,* eds. Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 226.

direction because "the bias of these high UN officials derived from the fact that they saw no contradiction between their position in an international, neutral, mediatory organization and their pro-western, as opposed to pro-Soviet, bent."[470] Nzongola-Ntalaja aptly notes that "For Congolese patriots, there is not ounce of doubt that Hammarskjold's actions did serve Western interests in the Congo."[471]

To Tom Dodd's satisfaction, Hammarskjold never used force to end the Katanga secession, as this decision was left to his successor, U-Thant. Tom Dodd was convinced that Tshombe, for several reasons, should be supported by the U.S. Dodd described Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's successor in Stanleyville, as a "Prague-trained Communist," and spoke of the imminent danger Gizenga posed. He spoke to the Archdiocesan Council of Catholic Women at Hartford, informing his audience he regarded Tshombe "not only as a man of exceptional ability, but as a symbol of African moderation...pro-Western, anti-communist and anti-racist." In Dodd's view, these were the exact reasons why Tshombe was considered "public enemy number one by the extremist cabal among the Afro-Asian nations."[472] The devoutly religious Dodd saw in Tshombe a fellow Christian and capitalist resisting the spread of atheistic communism. In a 1961 speech on the Senate floor, Dodd

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[470] Nwaubani, 610.

[471] Georges Nzongoloa-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History* (London, Zed Books, 2002), 115. In what became known as "neo-colonialism" the French and Belgians tried to install African puppets so they could continue to indirectly control and exploit their former colonies. Tshombe was widely seen as one of the puppets.

[472] Thomas J. Dodd Papers, Speech, "The Untold Story of the Congo, 8 May 1964, Series III, Box 199, Folder, 5037.

noted that Tshombe "and most of his cabinet members are devoutly religious men whose profound enmity toward communism springs from their adherence to moral values."[473]

From 1960-1966, Tom Dodd was the U.S.'s most vocal supporter of Moïse Tshombe. The leader of the Katanga secession was the darling of Belgian, French, and Portuguese neo-colonialists. He was reviled, however, by most black African leaders outside the Congo and by many African-Americans in the U.S. Scholars uniformly regarded Tshombe as a "white impersonator" and exceedingly corrupt politician who, it is now known, participated in the murder of Patrice Lumumba. Dodd's support for Tshombe also dovetailed with pro-colonial sentiments in Western Europe where nervous policy makers in Belgium, England, and France feared the spread of Pan-African nationalism, its inherent threat to white rule, and the further erosion of their empires. In Great Britain, Prime Minister Harold MacMillan- who defended Belgian colonialism- "viewed [Tshombe's] Katanga as a protection against the spread of radical nationalism to the Rhodesias."[474]
Not surprisingly, the Black press in the U.S. vehemently disagreed with Dodd's glowing assessment of Tshombe. A scathing 1961 editorial in the Black-owned popular magazine *Jet* derisively referred to the Katanga secessionist as "Uncle

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[473] Thomas J. Dodd Papers, Speech, "United Nations Policy in the Congo and the Danger of a Communist Takeover," 8 September 1961, *Congressional Quarterly*, Series III, Box. 193, Folder, 4642.
[474] William Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 149.

Tshombe," and stated that "To compare Tshombe's private army with the Freedom Fighters is like equating the hired Hessians of the 18th Century with our Revolutionary War heroes."[475] Tom Dodd was, in fact, the only prominent Cold War liberal in the "Katanga Lobby," which was a conglomeration of right-wing American elites who supported Moïse Tshombe's secession. Dodd's allegiance to Tshombe put him in league with Republicans (who needed an issue on which to challenge Democrats), Southern Democrats, and other conservative forces in the U.S. who favoured Tshombe for his U.S. missionary education, staunch anticommunism, and his pro-white stance which reaffirmed their racist tendencies.[476] One Republican Senator whose support for Tshombe mirrored Dodd's was John Tower (R-TX) a segregationist and Southern nationalist who opposed every major civil rights law passed from the mid 1950s to the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965.[477] The Katanga Lobby's label was a creation of the U.S. press, in reference to the groups of individuals in Belgium, Great Britain, and the U.S. who supported Tshombe's secession and opposed UN attempts to re-integrate the province with the central government. In the U.S., the biggest group associated with the Katanga Lobby was the American Committee for the Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters, the brainchild of Michel Struelens, "one of the most effective

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[475] "Ridiculous Comparison on Freedom Fighters," *Jet*, 28 December, 1961, 10.
[476] David N. Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 122.
[477] Joe R. Feagin, *Systemic Racism: A Theory of Oppression* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2006), 254.

lobbyists who ever worked the halls of Congress and the ranks of the press corps."[478] As an agent for Katanga, Streulens spread around $240,000 on a massive U.S. public relations campaign for Tshombe.[479] Streulens was able to gain temporary access to the U.S. as the head of the Katanga Information Service. His Committee for the Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters with which Dodd was associated had 81 prominent sponsors in the U.S. including Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-Ill), Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), former U.S. President Herbert Hoover, and future President Richard M. Nixon. According to Lawrence Kaplan, the Committee was "an articulate conservative organization" that splashed expensive advertisements supporting the Katanga cause in 19 major U.S. newspapers, including the *New York Times*.[480] In one ad, the Committee characterized Katanga as "The Hungary of 1961," urging American citizens to consider that "The people of Elisabethville and Katanga are fundamentally in the same positions as the people of Budapest and Hungary just five years ago."[481] Tshombe had a knack of appearing to agree with solutions to integrate Katanga with the Congo, and then reneging. He shrewdly managed to maintain the colony's independence throughout 1961 and 1962. Tom Dodd, however, in a 1962 article he penned for an issue of his friend William F. Buckley's right-wing *National Review*,

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[478] Devlin, 170.
[479] Minter, 149.
[480] Lawrence Kaplan, "The United States, Belgium, and the Congo Crisis of 1960," *Review of Politics* Vol. 29, No. 2 (Apr., 1967): 247, 248. Noer, 252.
[481] "Committee Says Katanga Like Hungary," *Eugene Register Guard* 14 December 1961 5A.

expressed the view that Congolese leaders' attempts to achieve unity were "scuttled by extremists in the Congolese government and the Afro-Asian extremists in the United Nations."[482]

In 1961, Dodd's support for Tshombe pitted him against the Kennedy Administration, which supported the use of the United Nations peacekeeping forces to solve the "Congo Crisis" by re-integrating Katanga into the central Congo state.[483] Dodd was strongly critical of both the UN and the Kennedy administration mainly because he opposed the use of the UN to intervene in the Congo, which "perverted the UN Charter" and set a dangerous precedent of the UN intervening militarily to maintain in power a government of their choice or to force reunification, and feared that UN intervention would permit the Soviet Union (and other pro-communist countries) to wield more influence in the country. In particular, Dodd worried that by using the UN to crush Tshombe, the U.S. was turning its back on Belgium, its NATO ally in the fight against worldwide communism, and giving in to the "Afro-Asian bloc" which constituted a sizable majority in the UN.[484] For their part, the Kennedy political forces and pro-UN members of the State Department including Assistant Secretary G. Mennen "Soapy" Williams and George Ball publicly blocked Tshombe's entry to the U.S.,

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[482] Dodd Papers, "Congo: The Untold Story," *National Review*, 28 August 1962, Series III, Box 195, Folder, 4771.
[483] Tim Stapleton, an historian of Africa, observed that "US policy shifted from supporting a pro-western and separate Katanga to using Katanga agents to control all of the Congo".
[484] Dodd Papers, "Congo: The Untold Story."

accused the "Katanga Lobby" of spreading false information about UN forces, and Department staffers began to derisively refer to Dodd as the "Senator from Katanga."[485] Underneath Kennedy's tough rhetoric lay real concern. The Kennedy Administration was worried enough about the impact public relations mastery of Struelens and criticism of Senators such as Dodd, Richard B. Russell (D-GA), and Richard Nixon (R-CA) that it sent in Undersecretary of State George Crews McGhee to work on the opposition and convince them that the Administration did not want to "eliminate" Tshombe, but to "encourage him to reach an agreement so that the Congo could be reunited." In his memoirs, McGhee points out that in the period of Senate discord on the Congo, he "practically lived with Dodd....conferring with him at home, and taking him to my club."[486] According to McGhee, Dodd "responded reasonably....in the end, I believe he helped the President's cause."[487] Interestingly, in this instance, Dodd deferred to the Kennedy Administration, departing from the context of policy in British Guiana in the same period, during which Administration attempts to convince Dodd that it could work with Cheddi Jagan failed to sway the Senator.

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[485] Thomas J. Noer, *Soapy: A Biography of G. Mennen Williams* (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 252.
[486] George Crews McGhee, *On the Frontline in the Cold War: An Ambassador Reports* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997), 154.
[487] Ibid., 154.

Dodd's Close Call: Rescued in Africa

Dodd's visit to the Congo in November 1961 was one of the strangest and most controversial events in his long career. It was initially believed Dodd went without the approval of the Kennedy Administration, but Dodd later indicated that he met Kennedy on November 20 and he was "gratified to discover that the President shared my belief that an agreement between Tshombe and [Prime Minister Cyrille] Adoula might yet emerge if the two men could be brought together." The US Air Force provided a special plane for the African portion of Dodd's trip.[488] In Leopoldville, however, Dodd aroused the ire of local CIA operatives and particularly Chief of Station Larry Devlin.[489] The CIA was annoyed that Michel Streulens was successful in ensuring pro-Katanga stories regularly appeared in the American press, and Streulens "painted Tshombe as the lone anti-communist leader fighting to prevent the Congo from slipping into the hands of the Soviet Union".[490] Devlin was frustrated that "for reasons that escape us" Senator Dodd "a senior and influential Democrat, appeared to accept Streulens' propaganda hook, line and sinker." Devlin's agents and contacts "could not

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[488] Dodd Papers, "Congo: The Untold Story."

[489] Amazingly, U.S. State Department staffers who released the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volume XX on the Congo Crisis left Devlin "absent" from their historical record of the events. As Gibbs notes, Devlin "played a key role implementing and to some extent formulating U.S. policy in the Congo." For more on this scathing criticism of the FRUS compilation, see David N. Gibbs, "Misrepresenting the Congo Crisis," Review: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XX: Congo Crisis by U.S. Department of State, African Affairs, Vol. 95, No. 380 (Jul., 1996): 457. Equally perplexing is the fact (that at the time of this writing) the State Department has left the Congo Crisis documents out of their online digital collection, presenting a needless obstacle for scholars seeking to study the period.

[490] Devlin, 171.

understand how one of the most powerful figures in the U.S. Senate could fail to understand that they, not Tshombe, were the ones holding the line against the Soviets." Devlin indicated "There were rumours that Dodd found it financially profitable to support the Tshombe bandwagon" but "there was no hard evidence."[491] Dodd responded to these rumours by sarcastically noting that the people who believed he was influenced by the large sums of money "that the so-called Katanga lobby is supposed to spreading around" also believed the Senator was against the income tax and fluoridation of water.[492] At no point has any scholar presented convincing documentary evidence proving without a doubt that Dodd personally profited from his support for Tshombe (and by extension, Belgian mining companies). But questions linger and the "circumstantial evidence" pointing to Dodd's breach of ethics in this context is indeed weighty. In his meticulously-researched monograph *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis,* political scientist David Gibbs observes that Moïse Tshombe admitted to UN official Brian Urquhart that he was "paying Dodd a large monthly stipend."[493]

Devlin said he was tipped off by a colleague who worked with Dodd at Nuremberg that the Senator was "a tough prosecutor prepared to trample anyone with an opposing opinion" and to weigh his words carefully in discussions with

[491] Devlin, 171.
[492] Thomas J. Dodd Papers, "Congo: The Untold Story."
[493] Gibbs, 123.

Dodd. After flattering Devlin about his war record, plying him with expensive cigars and listening intently to details about life and people in the Congo, Dodd turned on Devlin "and became the prosecutor" when the topic was Tshombe and Katanga. Devlin made it clear that the boundaries could not be redrawn without great conflict and that the Congo would be bankrupt if Katanga became independent. Dodd stood over him, "pointing his cigar at me" and "misquoting me on almost every point". In Devlin's view "he tried to frighten me into accepting his own warped interpretation of what I had said."[494] Needless to say, relations were poisoned between Dodd and the CIA and Dodd was not influenced by anything local CIA operatives said about the Katanga situation.

The following day Dodd was involved in a bizarre and dangerous situation, summarized by Devlin and by eyewitnesses in the UN case history *To Katanga and Back* by Conor Cruise O'Brien.[495] Dodd later wrote about his adventure in an issue of *Life* magazine.[496] At a reception for Dodd and his wife in Elisabethville, the party was raided by Katangese paratroopers led by a civilian; two UN officials were badly beaten and kidnapped, as was a Belgian banker. Dodd was fifteen minutes late and arrived to see the UN officials being thrown in a truck (they were rescued the next day) and the Banker was rescued on the spot by Lou Hoffacker,

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[494] Devlin, 171-172.
[495] Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History,* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1962), 319-326.
[496] Thomas J. Dodd, "In A Desperate Time, A Fearless Rescue," *Life*, 15 December, 1961, 36. In the same issue, *Life* editors hailed Dodd's as "one of the best informed" critics of the UN's military operations in the Congo, and quoted him as stating Tshombe and Adoula were "politicians Africa cannot afford to lose," 4.

the US Consul who was travelling with Dodd. Both Dodd and his wife were convinced that he was the real target because the Belgian banker "was approximately my age and build...being late for dinner may well have saved me".[497] Despite this dangerous episode, Dodd was impressed with Tshombe (with whom he spoke through an interpreter) and as Devlin wryly noted "Notwithstanding this raw example of Katangan democracy in action, Senator Dodd returned to Washington to preach the Tshombe gospel".[498] Dodd was pleased that he received a letter from Secretary of State Dean Rusk on January 10, 1962 indicating "The Administration did not oppose your visit. We feel that your efforts to assist in bringing about the meeting between Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Adoula...were beneficial."[499]

The Katanga Lobby's public relations blitz including "such political luminaries as former President Hoover and Senator Thomas Dodd,"[500] reached its apogee on March 7, 1962 when the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) held an event officially titled "The Conservative Rally for World Liberation Against Communism" in front of a "packed house" at New York City's Madison Square Garden. This was the same rally Dodd refused to attend due to the YAF's ties to Robert Welch of the John Birch Society. But on the issue of Tshombe and the

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[497] Thomas J. Dodd Papers, "Congo: The Untold Story."
[498] Devlin, 174.
[499] Thomas J. Dodd Papers, Speech, "Congo: The Untold Story."
[500] Kaplan, 248.

Congo, Dodd was in full agreement with the YAF. The YAF used Tshombe's Katanga struggle as a central theme of the event. Kaplan points out the irony of a rally being held at the same time Tshombe "had been denied admission to the United States, and his agent, Michel Streulens, was to be pushed out of the country within a few months."[501] After the State Department cancelled Streulens' visa, and the Justice Department refused his immigration application "based on a curt note from Dean Rusk to Attorney General Robert Kennedy," Dodd was outraged, and launched a subcommittee investigation into the Struelens affair. Dodd's committee report concluded that the State and Justice Department's collusion to remove Struelens "constituted a glaring abuse of the visa power and a performance unworthy of the government of a great nation dedicated to the principles of justice."[502]

Kaplan underestimates the impact the American right had on U.S. policy towards the Congo, when he notes that the Kennedy administration was able to "confine the friends of Katanga to the right fringe of American politics."[503] To be sure, the Dodd faction of Congress and the Katanga Lobby did not see their dream of an autonomous Katanga come to fruition. But they did have an impact in putting pressure on the pro-UN Kennedy administration which, according to historian

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[501] Kaplan, 248.
[502] "The Administration: An Abuse of Power," *Time* 28 December 1962, available from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,827923-1,00.html; Internet, accessed January 10, 2010.
[503] Lawrence Kaplan, 248.

Thomas Noer, "equivocated" and never pushed for Tshombe to be crushed.[504] In actuality, the chorus of right-wing voices had a major impact in shaping Tshombe as a palatable alternative and millions of Americans possibly remembered this when Tshombe's fortunes changed in the Congo in 1964. Streulens successfully painted Tshombe as "a Christian, a businessman, a friend of Belgium, and an enemy of communism."[505] As William Minter observes, "This right-wing activity had a disproportionate impact, because it was not matched by any comparable force advocating a policy to the left of the [Kennedy] administration."[506] Meanwhile, Dodd was lobbying and noted in a letter to New York lawyer Morris L. Ernst that he "talked with Hubert Humphrey about the Congo and he is very much in agreement with me that it would be a wonderful thing if you were advising Tshombe with respect to the constitutional question."[507] Ernst, who helped raise funds for Dodd's re-election in 1964, was a "self-styled expert on communism" and friend of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.[508] He was also a co-founder of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and fought vigorously in the era of McCarthyism to ensure the ACLU would not become a haven for

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[504] Noer, 252.
[505] Kaplan, 247.
[506] William Minter, 149.
[507] Dodd Papers, Letter to Morris Ernst, 5 October 1962, Series VIII, Box 401, 8919.
[508] Kyle A. Cuordileone, *Manhood and American Political Culture in the Cold War* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2005), 77.

communists or be perceived as such.[509] Dodd turned to Ernst for advice on legal issues in relation to Katanga's constitution, and both men shared the conviction that Tshombe was the man to protect America's interests in Katanga province- a region Ernst considered "the New Jersey of the Congo."

U-Thant finally issued a plan for reconciliation of the Congo that would unite the country on a federal basis, a reunification of the armed forces, and most importantly a provisional agreement for a 50/50 sharing of Katanga's revenues until a formula could be worked out. This was accompanied by a 10-day ultimatum to accept, which was strongly opposed by both Dodd and Dean Rusk. According to Dodd, "after discussing the matter with President Kennedy it was agreed that I should write a letter to Tshombe urging his acceptance" which Tshombe did, and in another letter informed Dodd he (Tshombe) accepted only because of Dodd's request, not because of the UN ultimatum.[510] The Kennedy administration tried to negotiate a Congo solution, without success, and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote in his journal on Christmas Day 1962 that "we have decided to make one more try to force Tshombe to permit the integration of Katanga with the Congo" but indicated he had stayed away from the issue because he didn't agree with friends such as Adlai Stevenson. The historian regarded "the deepening

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[509] Samuel Walker, *In Defense of Civil Liberties: A History of the ACLU* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 129.

[510] Thomas J. Dodd Papers, Speech, "Congo: The Untold Story."

U.S. involvement in the Congo as a mistake".[511] He believed the Congo needed to sort out its own problems because it was part of nationhood (the UN should not be a "midwife"), that neither the communists nor the Americans were going to get anywhere in Africa anyway, and the Americans should focus their talents and resources currently employed in Africa on Latin America.[512]

Schlesinger's words were prophetic. Weeks later, in January 1963, before any action occurred on the UN plan, drunken Katangese soldiers shot down a UN helicopter. This was the excuse the Secretary-General needed to resolve the situation once and for all, after "Tshombe had used every sly trick in the book to frustrate efforts to reunite his rebellious, copper rich province with the rest of the Congo."[513] The UN army (using equipment supplied by the U.S.) and supported by the Kennedy administration, invaded Katanga. A livid Tom Dodd told *Time* magazine on January 11, 1963 that "It is an unspeakable tragedy that the world organization which was set up to prevent war and preserve the peace should be starting wars."[514]

Dodd's pro-Tshombe stance represented the minority position in the U.S., and Tshombe was forced to flee the country as the UN conquered Katanga.

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[511] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Journals, 1952-2000* (New York: Penguin, 2007), 181.
[512] Schlesinger, Jr., 181-182.
[513] "The Congo: The U.N. Drives Implacably Ahead," Time, 11 January 1963, available from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,873011,00.html; Internet, accessed 5 January 2010.
[514] "The Congo: The U.N. Drives Implacably Ahead," Time, 11 January 1963, available from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,873011,00.html; Internet, accessed 5 January 2010.

According to Collin Gonze in the leftist journal *Africa Today*, Tshombe "departed with his liquid treasury. When the UN forces opened the vaults of his bank in Katanga, they found 10 pound sterling and a dead rat" while Tshombe "peacefully settled amongst friends and supporters in Madrid."[515] But in June 1964, internal Congolese politics produced a stunning series of events, and rebellions that led to the return of Tshombe from Spain and the shock of his rising to become Prime Minister on July 6 because he was the only leader who was perceived to have the leadership qualities needed to deal with revolts throughout the Congo. According to Gonze, the Scott-Allen Report written and widely distributed in the U.S. indicated that U.S. and Belgian officials met in early 1964 "and had agreed to support a Tshombe come-back" including military and technical advisors paid for by the U.S.[516] Needless to say, Dodd was pleased and wrote "I am glad that Tshombe is the new Prime Minister because I believe that he can pull the country together. I expect that the [Johnson] Administration will be friendly and helpful to the Tshombe Administration."[517] Certainly, given Dodd's influence with Johnson, the U.S. would be supportive, as were the Belgians, because as Gonze observed, although the Katanga mines continued to be extremely profitable, the rest of the Congolese economy, mainly owned by Belgians, had collapsed. With Dodd's friend LBJ now in the White House, the lingering doubts U.S. policy makers had

[515] Gonze, 4.
[516] Gonze, 5.
[517] Thomas J. Dodd Papers, Letter to Morris Ernst, 20 July 1964. Series VIII, Box 401, Folder 8921.

about Tshombe evaporated and the "U.S. reaction soon turned into a warm endorsement."[518] African leaders, on the other hand, who despised Tshombe and viewed him as "a walking museum of colonialism," were appalled by his appointment.[519] Initially, the newly-formed Organization of African Unity (OAU) did not want to hear Tshombe speak at a Heads of State meeting in Cairo because he was regarded as the villain in the Katanga secession and was using white mercenaries. Although they agreed to set up a commission they would not send armies to help Tshombe which disappointed "the Western powers, notably the U.S. and Belgium, which had wanted the African nations to shore up the crumbling Tshombe government."[520]

LBJ responded to the Stanleyville rebellion[521] by ordering three U.S. Air Force planes to the country to drop Belgian paratroopers into the city to save a few hundred whites threatened by the chaotic fighting. Days after the U.S.-Belgian operation LBJ framed the intervention as a humanitarian effort telling U.S. reporters "we think we saved hundreds of thousands of lives."[522] Scholars have long known that Johnson's pretext for intervention was simply a way for the U.S. to avoid the "loss" of the Congo without overtly entering in another costly military conflict, which would have been unpopular with left and right forces in Congress

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[518] Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 65.
[519] Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 65.
[520] George W. Shepherd Jr., "Tshombe at the OAU," Africa Today, Vol. 11, No. 8 (Oct., 1964): 8.
[521] Stanleyville (Kisangani) was Lumumba's stronghold and this no doubt contributed to its rebellion.
[522] "President Deplores Viet-Talk," Eugene Register-Guard, 28 November, 1964 6A.

already expressing lingering doubts about the human and monetary costs of the Vietnam incursion.[523] As Nzongola-Ntalaja writes, "using a humanitarian pretext and one that smacked of racism...the real purpose of this intervention was to pave the way for the recapture of those cities [Stanleyville and Paulis] by the Congolese government," led by Tshombe.[524] In the short-term, the intervention did achieve its goals. That success, however, was short-lived.

Despite the support of Belgium and the U.S., Tshombe could not succeed given the continual divisions in the country, which broke out into full revolt in 1964. Contrary to Dodd's assertion that Tshombe would "pull the country together," the leader's reign was disastrous, and his use of Western military forces and white mercenaries to gain power and maintain his rule exacerbated racial and ethnic tensions. An estimated one million people died in the 1964 rebellions.[525] Dodd insisted that the rebels represented "a communist guerrilla movement advised and supported by the Chinese Communists" from their embassies in other African countries and that the country was saved from communist takeover only by Tshombe's leadership and "the unconditional support of President Johnson in his drive to liquidate the communist insurrection." In an incendiary 1964 speech

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[523] As Gary Stone points out, Johnson's Congo intervention brought conservative Southern Democratic Senators like Richard Russell and John Stennis together with "doves" such as J.W. Fulbright in an effort to forestall further overseas "entanglements." *Elites for Peace: The Senate and the Vietnam War* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2007), 144.

[524] Nzongola-Ntalaja, *African Crisis Areas*, 232.

[525] Meredith, 115.

before the School for Governors Aides of the Governor's Conference on Cold War Education in Miami, Florida, Dodd told his audience that "one could not help be sickened by the accounts of men and women and children being beaten to death and cannibalized" and the Congolese forces "have reverted to the savagery of the ancient past...because they have been encouraged to do so by their communist mentors."[526]

Dodd's allegations were a fantasy and have been strongly criticized by a number of sources. The historian M. Crawford Young noted that the rebels were a coalition of forces who wanted to reassert Congolese control over its own destiny. There was a vague socialist commitment "but at the bottom it appeared far more a frame of mind and a style of expression rather than an interrelated set of ideas."[527] The scholar George Shepherd's view on the Congo Crisis parallels Young's position. He points out that in the Congo, "despite outward [Cold War] ideological trappings, the [Stanleyville] rebellion remains fundamentally a rivalry of tribal groupings and ambitious personalities."[528] The rebels did not proclaim a revolutionary program. In fact, U.S. intelligence reports reflecting the racism of the era indicated the revolt was "largely tribal...that no Communist country other

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[526] Dodd Papers, Speech, "Communism's Three Continent Cold War Offensive."
[527] M. Crawford Young, "Rebellion and the Congo," in Robert Rotberg, ed., *Rebellion in Black Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 230.
[528] Shepherd Jr., 8.

than China was involved, and that its role was incidental."[529] Furthermore, the abject failure of Cuban Revolutionary Che Guevara's six-month mission in the Congo during the year 1965 illustrates the lack of traction Marxist revolutionary philosophy had in the fragmented Congo.[530]

In reality, the East-West Cold War showdown mattered more to policy makers in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing than it did to Africans. Moreover, Tshombe did not receive a warm reception when he met with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1964 at its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The OAU wanted to find a solution to the latest Congo Crisis, and unify the country. Tshombe failed to convince the 34 African member states to send in troops to prop up his shaky regime. According to Marshall, the OAU member states were most disturbed by Tshombe's use of mercenaries from Apartheid South Africa and the former Katanga secessionist was "received in Addis Ababa with considerable coolness." The OAU's solution, an ad-hoc commission set up to help foster "national unity" and "establish normal relations between the Congo and her neighbours... fell far short of the hopes of the Western powers, notably the U.S. and Belgium, which had wanted the African nations to shore up the crumbling Tshombe government."[531] As Shepherd Jr. writes, none of the states wanted to fight on the same side as the mercenaries from South Africa, who symbolized to

[529] Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 66.
[530] Jorge G. Castañeda, Compañero: *The Life and Death of Che Guevara* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 318.
[531] Shepherd Jr., 8.

the independent countries everything egregious about the white rule of Africa which the OAU sought to replace.[532]

Nevertheless, as William Minter explains, like the Vietnam policy process, the 1964 decision to support Tshombe with white mercenaries "was carried out by predominantly liberal Kennedy appointees."[533] This rag-tag army, known as the "White Giants," mainly recruited in South Africa and Rhodesia, was according to the U.S. Ambassador "an uncontrollable lot of toughs." The CIA documented their "excesses" which included robbery, rape, murder and beatings.[534] As David Gibbs notes, Tshombe's secession and "alliance with white mercenaries and South Africa... appealed to racist sentiment" in the U.S.[535] Piero Gleijeses analyzed the press coverage of the rebellion and concluded that "*Life, Time, U.S. News & World Report* constantly assailed the rebels' atrocities....but none uttered a single word of criticism of the mercenaries."[536] This favourable press coverage was also evident in the U.S.-Belgian "rescue" operation in 1964, when American critics in the mainstream press and Congress sounded concern only about the possibility of a lengthy troop commitment and not the overall aims of U.S. intervention in the country. Minter demonstrates that the USIA and the American press played on racial stereotypes and constructions of African brutality by framing the

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[532] Marshall
[533] Minter, 151.
[534] Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 71.
[535] Gibbs, 122.
[536] Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 129-131.

intervention as an heroic effort that obviated further "African savagery."[537] For his part, Tom Dodd contributed to the popularized notion of the African "savage" in the Congo, and blamed Communism for what he perceived to be the "ancient" conduct of the Stanleyville rebels. In an audacious 1965 speech delivered before the National Strategy Seminar in New York City, Dodd stated "If the Congolese forces have now reverted to the savagery of the ancient past, it is because they have been encouraged to do so by their Communist mentors, it is because witchcraft and indiscriminate terror and even cannibalism have now become instruments of international Communism in the Cold War."[538] Yet Dodd said nothing about the atrocities committed by the "White Giants" against swaths of poor Congolese citizens. As in other instances during the time period, Dodd viewed the complexities of the Congo Crisis through the prism of the Cold War, and because of this he could not, or was unwilling to grasp the full scope of the Congo's problems.

By 1965, the pro-Western Tshombe had outworn his welcome in the Congo, and was fired and charged with treason by President Joseph Kasavubu.[539] According to Gleijeses "The removal of Tshombe – Lumumba's murderer and the leader of the Katangan secession – made it easier for African leaders to accept the

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[537] William Minter, "Candid Cables: Some Reflections on U.S. Response to the Congo Rebellions, 1964," in Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, ed., *The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Realities* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1986), 271-273.
[538] Dodd Papers, Speech, "The Communist Penetration of Africa."
[539] Devlin, 232, 233. According to the CIA Chief of Station, Devlin protected Tshombe from assassination by Kasavubu's forces.

mercenaries' victory in Zaire."[540] After fleeing to his luxurious retreat in Spain, Tshombe was later arrested in Algeria, and lived out the rest of his life there under house arrest. Dodd never forgot Tshombe, and continued to fight for his man in Katanga. Dodd publicly voiced his displeasure with Tshombe's exile, and worked to prevent Tshombe's extradition to the Congo, where he undoubtedly would have received a death sentence.[541]

Finally, on November 24, 1965 Joseph Mobutu stepped forward for a second time claiming the existence of the nation itself was threatened, suspended all political activity and took over the country in a bloodless coup.[542] Devlin claimed that the CIA was suspicious of Mobutu's plans but they were not involved in the coup and did not really care because "in Cold War terms the new government would be on our side and unfriendly to the Soviet Union."[543] In 1965, this appeared to be a respite[544] and it took five years for Mobutu to restore law and order while he remained on the CIA payroll and received advice from Larry Devlin.[545] After a few years of stable, progressive rule, Mobutu became known as the "great plunderer", amassed a personal fortune from the country's economy and established a cult of personality to maintain his power. He became one of the

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[540] Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 140.
[541] "After Censure: Dodd's Life Almost Same," *The Free-Lance Star*, Fredericksburg, Virginia, 31 July, 1967.
[542] Meredith, 293.
[543] Devlin, 234-235.
[544] Meredith, 116.
[545] Devlin, 294.

world's richest men with a fortune estimated at $5 billion (much of it in Swiss banks) in the 1980s (he died in 1997), while the country of Zaire fell into the catastrophe of corruption, a broken economy, disease and hunger yet as Meredith and others observe, despite its great riches, the Democratic Republic of Congo remains one of the poorest countries in Africa, beholden to imperial interests.[546]

Tom Dodd played a key role in prolonging the Katanga secession and helping to create instability in the fledgling country, while opposing the policy of the Kennedy Administration to reunite the Congo as expeditiously as possible. Dodd was actually on the side of the Belgians who could not understand why the U.S. "drove into exile the one Congolese who symbolized Western Christian civilization and effective anticommunism."[547] Dodd's manoeuvring ultimately undermined parliamentary government, led to rebellion, and eventually to the long, corrupt regime of Mobutu. This would be easy to explain if Dodd had been on the payroll of the Katanga lobby but although there are suspicions there is no solid evidence to support it. Instead, it appears that Dodd, given his devout Catholicism, fear of communism and reluctance to offer any appearance of appeasement, indeed swallowed the Tshombe-Katanga propaganda hook line and sinker as suggested by the CIA station chief. Significantly, the "influential right wing Catholic *La Libre Belgique* of Brussels...perpetuated the image of hostile, opportunistic American

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[546] Blum, 162.
[547] Kaplan, 247.

financiers ready to profit from Belgium's misfortunes" and wrote of a "vast political-financial intrigue from the other side of the Atlantic."[548] Dodd was again siding with the Catholic Church. The Vatican opposed the policies of the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to keep the Belgians out of the Congo and to unite the government. The Church claimed the policy was a conspiracy, by the U.S. government and corporations, to take control of the economy.

Once again, Dodd was unable to differentiate between left-leaning nationalists in former European colonies and actual communists. There was little evidence of a serious communist threat at any time. In 1962, former CIA Director and militant anticommunist Allen Dulles admitted on television that the United States had "overrated the Soviet danger in the Congo," even though the previous year he said Lumumba "remained a grave danger as long as was not disposed of."[549] David N. Gibbs, an expert on the topic, indicated that declassified documents "make clear that the USSR's involvement in the crisis was quite limited" and was confined to a period of less than one month during August-September 1960." [550] Tshombe, acting in his own interests and those of Belgian mine owners, had no coherent political ideology. He was cleverly stalling in order

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[548] Kaplan, 249, 250.

[549] Meredith, 108, 113.

[550] David N. Gibbs, "A Darker View of U.S. Policy During the Cold War", *Diplomatic History* (January 2010):195. Gibbs, employing his previous work on the topic, noted the Soviet intervention paled compared with the Western intervention of U.S. and Belgian intelligence officers, mercenaries and technical advisers along with the 14,000 members of the United Nations peacekeeping force. A 1964 U.S. intelligence report sourced in *Gibbs' Political Economy of Third World Intervention* noted that after the fall of Lumumba "the USSR has been extremely cautious in committing its prestige or resources in the Congo".

to either gain independence or at least a major share of copper and cobalt profits for himself and his province in a united Congo, but was able to convince Dodd he was working on behalf of Christians while opposing communism. Dodd was correct in his criticism of the United Nations, which instead of peacekeeping and working for a solution to the secession, resorted to military action in favour of one side in an internal dispute. However, Dodd's support in the United States enabled Tshombe to hold out against the UN's negotiating and increased the tension and frustration which ultimately led to a full-scale UN invasion, supported by the U.S.

In the long run, despite his disputes with the Kennedy Administration, the CIA and the UN, Dodd did see his goal of preventing communism in the Congo and achieving a pro-American government, albeit a dictatorship, come to fruition. But this was achieved at the expense of the Congolese who suffered years of chaos, more than a million dead in the civil war, and decades of rule by a selfish and corrupt dictator. Dodd's policy stance on the Congo stood in the way of the budding Pan-Africanism that was sweeping the continent, and had an overly negative impact on U.S. foreign policy in the country from 1960-1966. Gonze's conclusions ring as true now as they did in the mid-1960s - "There need never have been these sad chapters for us to outline had the struggle for power in the Congo remained a matter for Africans to settle among themselves."[551]

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[551] Gonze, 6.

Chapter Five

Vietnam, the Dominican Republic and the Democratic Party Schism

Like most Senators in the Democratic and Republican parties, Dodd was an energetic proponent of American intervention in Vietnam, and viewed the expansion of the U.S. military commitment in Southeast Asia as an essential step in the containment of global communism. Against the background of the Tonkin Gulf crisis, Dodd underlined the importance of Vietnam in relation to American interests, and spoke of themes under the aegis of the domino theory. When the 88th Congress tabled the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (H.J. RES 1145), just two Senators- former Republican Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR), and Ernest Gruening (D-AK) - cast dissenting votes against the legislation that gave President Johnson the legal justification to "take all necessary measures to repeal any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent any further aggression."[552] Dodd said "But we must face the world as it is. And the basic fact of our world is that Western civilization, itself terribly rent and divided, both politically and

[552] Edwin E. Moïse, *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), xi.

philosophically, has been forced into a twilight war of survival by a relentless and remorseless enemy.... Each year, the world Communist movement is committing more and more of its resources to the task of subjugating our allies, all around the perimeter of freedom. Against this background it is preposterous to maintain that we should reduce our effort and lessen our commitment to the great struggle of our century."[553] To Dodd, it was necessary to employ all tools at the disposal of the U.S. government to confront, contain, and roll back communism throughout the world. In Dodd's view "The defense of the free world rests on a very delicate balance. The key elements in that balance are American power and American determination. If we lack the power to maintain that balance, then certainly all is lost."[554]

Dodd had his own deeply-rooted views on the nature of the Cold War, and as Robert David Johnson notes, along with his fellow cold warriors in Congress "considered Vietnam an important testing ground and... questioned only Johnson's not sending more troops to the region."[555] But unlike his rivals in Congress who eventually broke with the Cold War consensus after 1964, Dodd rejected the premise of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, and insisted that a military victory

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[553] Thomas J. Dodd, "The New Isolationism" in *The Vietnam Reader; articles and documents on American foreign policy and the Vietnam crisis*, Eds. Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard Fall, (New York: Random House, 1965), 30.
[554] Thomas J. Dodd, "The U.S. Must Maintain Its Commitments (Speech to the U.S. Senate, February 23, 1965)" in William Dudley and David Bender, editors *The Vietnam War: Opposing Viewpoints* (New York: Greenhaven Press, 1990), 30.
[555] Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 109.

would be the only way for the U.S. to leave Southeast Asia honourably. Dodd also never wavered from his belief in the domino theory. "If we, for instance, allow ourselves to be pushed out of Viet-Nam, such a humiliation may indeed be the second shot heard around the world; and a dozen nations might soon throw in the sponge and make whatever accommodation they could with an enemy that would then seem assured of victory."[556] Using hyperbole as he often did, Dodd warned that if Saigon fell "we will find ourselves compelled to draw a defense line as far back as Seattle."[557] This may have been an attempt to trump Vice President Johnson who said, following his trip to Southeast Asia in May 1961, that if the Communists took South Vietnam they would push the war to "the beaches of Waikiki." Again mirroring Dodd's rhetoric, Johnson claimed that Diem was the "Churchill of Southeast Asia" but when questioned by Stanley Karnow about the comment said "Shit, Diem's the only boy we got out there." [558]

In this context, Dodd exacerbated and perpetuated LBJ's infamous "credibility gap" on the Vietnam issue by parroting President Johnson's fabricated assertions on "the appearance of American diplomatic and military progress in Vietnam" when the conflict was, in fact, spiralling into a protracted stalemate with

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[556] Dodd, 30.
[557] Dodd Papers, Speech, "Vietnam and the New Isolationism," 23 February 1965, *Congressional Record*, Series III, Box 201, Folder 5166.
[558] Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change From Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006), 155.

much bloodshed on both sides.[559] As one of Johnson's most loyal allies, Dodd assumed the key role of Congressional mouthpiece when the President began using the FBI to discredit domestic opposition to the war in Vietnam.[560] Furthermore, Dodd was a leading Congressional lobbyist on behalf of a coterie of right-wing anticommunist leaders abroad, and helped to construct a credible image of these leaders in the American collective conscience.

Dodd visited Saigon in May 1961 and was alarmed at the prospect of a communist victory in South Vietnam. He noted in his diary of the trip that after he was informed by (Catholic) President Diem that "we cannot go it alone – we need your help" Dodd "told him I would do all I could to convince Kennedy of the urgency of the situation."[561] Dodd was supportive of Diem's "restrictive measures" because of the "terror campaign which the Communists wage against him" and observed that "Diem has the usual soft head liberal problem here."[562] He concluded remarks in his dairy by noting "I have learned a great deal about the situation here and I am convinced that we must help these people at once!"[563] Following his visit to Southeast Asia, Dodd took to the Senate floor where he declared "If this United States and its free-world allies have so diminished in spirit

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[559] Savage, 257.
[560] Athan G. Theoharis, "A Brief History of the FBI's Role and Powers," in Athan G. Theoharis, ed.,*The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide* (Phoenix, AZ: The Oryx Press), 34.
[561] Dodd Papers, Senator's Diary, Far East Trip, 8.
[562] Dodd Papers, Ibid, 8-9.
[563] Dodd Papers, Ibid, 9.

that they can be laid in the dust by a few thousand primitive guerrillas, then we are far down the road at which there is no return. In right and in might we are able to work our will on this question. Southeast Asia cannot be lost unless we will it to be lost; it cannot be saved unless we will it to be saved."[564]

In the Senate, Dodd questioned not the moral implications of U.S. intervention in the third world and the use of overwhelming American military force against the small impoverished country of Vietnam, but rather the moral resolve of the American public in the setting of what he regarded as an apocalyptic struggle against an expansionist enemy, devoid of the religious and cultural values which formed the basis of American society. Indeed, in a speech he delivered at Providence College, New Jersey in 1965, Dodd stated "to me, the reasons for our presence in Vietnam are so crystal clear that I find it difficult to comprehend the confusion which now appears to exist on the subject... we are in Vietnam because our own security and the security of the entire free world demands that a firm line be drawn against the further advance of communist imperialism – in Asia, in Africa, in Latin America, and in Europe."[565]

By 1965, when influential members of Congress and the American public began to question the legitimacy of American military intervention in Southeast Asia, threatening to undermine the presidency of Lyndon Baines Johnson, Dodd

[564] Dudley and Bender, 31.
[565] Thomas Dodd, "Our Course in Vietnam," remarks delivered at Providence College, Providence R.I., 5 May, 1965, Series III, Box 202, Folder 5193.

fought against the dissenting voices of the "doves" in favour of the War. As Robert Mann observed, Dodd "would become one of Johnson's most reliable defenders in the Senate."[566] On February 23, 1965, Dodd took the U.S. Senate floor to describe the dangers of "the new isolationism" in the U.S. and to state his belief that the country had to continue its history (in his perspective) of helping people trying to maintain their liberty.[567]

Moreover, in Dodd's judgment anyone who believed the United States was overextended in its attempt to resist Communist aggression, and wanted to cut back on U.S. involvement was a "new isolationist". Dodd claimed that many Americans who were "new isolationists" wanted to de-emphasize the Cold War and reverse national priorities in favour of domestic improvements. They would withdraw from South Vietnam, believed that the military establishment and the CIA organizations that seemed particularly suspect because they are symbols of world-wide involvement, should be humbled and "cut down to size" and stripped of their influence in foreign policy questions. Those propositions, according to Dodd, "would strike at the heart of our national effort to preserve our freedom and our security; and collectively they add up to a policy which I can call by no other name than appeasement, subtle appeasement, unintentional appeasement, to be sure, but

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[566] Robert Mann, *A Grand Delusion,* 317.

[567] Dodd quoted in Dudley and Bender, 28. It is significant that Dodd's speech was used in a textbook to illustrate the position of the Johnson Administration on the Vietnam War and anticommunism in general.

appeasement nonetheless."[568] By invoking a term, which was still fresh in people's minds from British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s, Dodd was drawing a line in the sand that divided Americans and ruled out compromise on the Vietnam War.

Dodd rejected the idea – and was incorrect as events of the late 1960s showed – that the United States was overcommitted or over-involved. Dodd believed "we are enjoying a spectacular growth in every index of national strength" and far from overextending ourselves "we are actually in a period of declining defense budgets, of steadily lowered draft calls, of sharply reduced foreign aid, of one tax cut after another."[569] As events unfolded, Dodd was looking at the world through rose-coloured glasses, particularly when he declared "We are actually pursuing today a policy not only of both guns and butter, but of less guns and more butter."[570] Dodd continued to provide the public with overly optimistic reports tinged with fear-mongering. At a Security Forum in Montgomery Alabama on May 3, 1965 for example, he indicated he had just returned "from an extensive [four-week] tour of the Far East" where, he noted "over the entire continent, there hangs the shadow of the military might of Red China."[571] Dodd told his listeners that "A year ago, even six months ago, there was serious apprehension among our

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[568] Dodd quoted in Dudley and Bender, 29.
[569] Dudley and Bender, 29.
[570] Ibid.
[571] Dodd Papers, Speech, "The World Situation", 3 May 1965, Series III, Box 202, Folder 5193, 5.

Far Eastern friends. They were worried by the downward trend of the situation in Vietnam and Laos. They wondered whether the United States had the determination and the staying power to help Vietnam and other nations of Southeast Asia defend their freedom. Today that situation has dramatically improved."[572] Because Dodd visited leaders and the media in many countries in Asia he had credibility with the American media and public. He continued to say that "to a man [the leaders in Asia] are confident that America will stay by their countries, as resolutely as it is standing by Vietnam. Our prestige in this part of the world has never been higher than it is today." [573]

For Vietnam in particular, Dodd told his audience that "Our firm commitment to the defense of South Vietnam, moreover, and the decision to undertake the retaliatory bombing of North Vietnam have at one stroke restored the confidence of our Asian allies in our determination to defend them, and have put the communists on notice that we will no longer permit ourselves to be hobbled by the concept of the privileged sanctuary."[574] Thus, Dodd supported the escalation of the Vietnam War, the bombing of North Vietnam, and suggested the U.S. was succeeding against the Communists even though "the communists have not abandoned their efforts to subvert the Free World."[575] Dodd was convinced the

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[572] Dodd Papers, Speech titled "The World Situation", p 6.
[573] Ibid, p 7.
[574] Ibid, p. 1.
[575] Ibid, p. 1.

United States was in Vietnam for the long haul, and victory would not come easily. "I am confident, however, that if we persevere, and if we refuse to be swayed by the forces of timidity and appeasement, the growing weaknesses and divisions both in North Vietnam and in Red China will not be long in revealing themselves." [576] This continued to be Dodd's perspective for the rest of his life.

As one of Lyndon Johnson's key stalwarts, Dodd defended the administration against the criticism of the foremost theorists on foreign relations in American society both within and outside of Congress. In 1965 George Kennan, the so-called "father of containment" (who harboured deep reservations concerning American involvement in Southeast Asia) emboldened his criticism regarding the aggressive stance the U.S. took towards the Soviet Union and the escalation of the U.S. role in the Vietnam conflict. During that year, Kennan wrote newspaper articles, gave speeches, and provided testimony for a House subcommittee on the Far East and Pacific in which he questioned the importance of Vietnam to U.S. strategic interests, the need to chart a neutral course with respect to the Sino-Soviet split, and warned of the danger of Soviet-Chinese alliance if China was brought into the War in Vietnam.[577] Dodd took Kennan to task. As he did so many times throughout the Cold War, Dodd invoked the spectre of appeasement to counter Kennan's calls for a more moderate, conciliatory approach to the Soviet Union. In

[576] Dodd Papers, Speech "The World Situation", p. 8.
[577] Randall Doyle, *America and Australia: Writings and Observations from 'Empire' and Van Diemen's Land* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005), 12.

a March, 1965 speech picked up by the *New York Times*, Dodd characterized Kennan as one of the "wishful thinkers, and conciliationists and appeasers," who did not understand the threat posed by the Soviet Union. According to Dodd, Kennan and like-minded commentators could not see that "Our concessions, our demonstrations of goodwill, our commitment to the quest of peace, even to the point of imperilling our own security, have all been interpreted as signs of weakness and have inspired the Communists and extremists whom we sought to influence abroad to respond with contempt and ingratitude and new aggression."[578]

On March 11, 1965 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote in his journal that with regard to Vietnam things had become much worse. "Probably, the critical mistake, the point of no return as [long-time foreign policy expert] George Ball insists, was the decision to send in combat units in March 1965".[579] Nevertheless, President Johnson dramatically "escalated" the Vietnam War in the summer of 1965 increasing American fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men.[580] "Additional forces will be needed later and they will be sent. This will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 –

[578] "Dodd Calls Kennan A 'Wishful Thinker'," New York Times, 24 March 1965.
[579] Schlesinger Jr., *Journals*, 244.
[580] Dudley and Bender, 98.

which it is now – to 35,000, and stepping up our campaign for voluntary enlistments."[581]

Dodd was everywhere in the summer of 1965 issuing press releases and making speeches and public appearances in support of the increasing, and ultimately tragic, American involvement in Vietnam. Dodd defended the troop increase because "Our enemies have drawn this sword against us. There is no safety but only foolishness and ultimate destruction in refusing to face this challenge and in refusing to do what hard reality demands be done."[582] Dodd spoke of "Four Fundamentals" that became the basis of various speeches, press releases and appearances. A press release issued by Dodd on August 6, 1965 outlined the Four Fundamentals:

- "This is not a civil war but a communist war of national liberation, organized, inspired and directed from Hanoi and Peiping and that Hanoi was prepared to fight for 20 years, if necessary, to achieve victory
- The war cannot be viewed in isolation as it is a key front in the unfolding battle for control of Asia, and even in India, "an official

[581] Dodd Papers, Speech, "Freedom's Stake in Vietnam," Remarks before the Annual Convention of the International Platform Association, Sheraton Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., 5 August 1965, Series III, Box 202, Folder 5240.
[582] Ibid.

organ of the ruling Congress Party has warned" a communist victory might well spell the end of freedom in India

- If we fail to draw this line in Vietnam and hold it there, we may find it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to draw a serious line of defense anywhere else in the Far East, or, for that matter, anywhere in Asia
- Without confidence in American strength and belief in our good faith, no nation in the Free World could today feel secure against communist aggression and subversion. If we were now to withdraw or accept defeat, no nation in Asia or the Americas, or in Europe, could in the future have confidence in our word."[583]

Dodd also impressed on American audiences that the people of South Vietnam were totally opposed to Communism and had to be supported. He referred to the 400,000 refugees from the North who were being cared for in the South, and that following the 1954 -1955 Geneva Accords more than 900,000 Vietnamese people fled from the North to escape communist rule. "The Vietnamese people fight on. Despite heavy casualties they continue to defend themselves and their homes against the depredations of the Viet Cong. These are people who have earned our support a thousand times over; these are people who deserve our

[583] Dodd Papers, Press Release, "Senator Dodd Warns Vietnam Defeat Would Imperil All Asia; Calls for Backing of President Johnson's Vietnam Measures," 6 August 1965, Series III, Box 202, Folder 5240.

help."[584] Of course, Dodd neglected to acknowledge that the "Viet Cong" NLF members fighting the military government of South Vietnam were from that region themselves.

It is important to remember that most of the refugees from the North were Catholics. As Stephen Kinzer documented in *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq*, Diem was a devout Catholic and an intense anti-communist who lived in several U.S. seminaries in the early 1950s, and became a friend of the "militantly anti-communist Cardinal Francis Spellman" who introduced Diem to Catholic politicians such as John F. Kennedy.[585] The U.S. counterinsurgency expert Edward Lansdale was charged with helping Diem's regime and attempting to block the election of Ho Chi Minh. Amongst Lansdale's schemes was a mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Catholics from the North (many lived in the villages visited by Tom Dodd on his tour) including radio messages saying "Christ has gone to the south."[586]

Thus, Diem and his brothers were the proxy anti-communist regime for the U.S. in South Vietnam, even though Catholics represented only ten per cent of the population. Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Thuc was the Catholic Archbishop and "an avaricious investor who had made a fortune in rubber, timber and real estate."[587]

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[584] Dodd Papers, Speech, "Freedom's Stake in Vietnam."
[585] Kinzer, 152.
[586] Kinzer, 151-153.
[587] Kinzer, 153.

Tom Dodd, as noted following his trip to Southeast Asia, was determined that this Catholic enclave had to be supported no matter what the cost, and this would probably have been Dodd's position even if there was not a Domino Theory. The subsequent coup and assassination of Diem stunned Kennedy; a fellow Catholic was dead because of the American-organized plot. "The killings bothered him both as a moral and as a religious matter"[588] Too, the Ngo assassinations surely shook Dodd. In 1964, Dodd lashed out at the State Department and U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, for denying a U.S. visa to Madame Nhu, wife of slain Can Lao Party leader (and brother of Diem) Ngo Dinh Nhu. Dodd called the refusal of Madame Nhu's admission to the U.S. "most unfortunate" and urged the State Department to "reconsider its decision in this case, and its general attitude." Dodd used this incident to reiterate his disgust with the State Department's refusal to grant a visa to Moise Tshombe, his man in the Congo. Dodd regarded the State Department's actions as doing "to itself and our national reputation a disservice by arbitrarily denying visas to members of the free world coalition...while it grants visas to those... who are committed to the subversion and destruction of the free world."[589]

In the case of Vietnam, as he did so often, Dodd drew references to the 1930s, appeasement and the path to World War II. He had heard questions such as

[588] Kinzer, 169.
[589] Dodd Papers, Press Release, "Senator Dodd Deplores Denial of Visas to State Department Critics," 2 July 1964, Box 199, Folder 5063.

"Why are we in Vietnam?" "Who cares about Vietnam?" and "How did we get ourselves into this situation?" Dodd noted "I cannot help thinking what might have happened had we acted in a manner that called for similar questions all through the 1930's – had we been called upon to answer questions like 'Why are we involved with the Rhineland?' or 'Who cares about Manchuria?' or 'How did we get ourselves mixed up with Ethiopia?'[590] In Dodd's view, if the United States had been willing to play a responsible role in world affairs in the 1930s "and had we built up sufficient strength to back up such a role, Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese militarists would soon have learned that the free world was not going to stand aside while aggression fed on its neighbours…And the world would have been able to avoid the death and destruction of that global conflict."[591]

Dodd accorded, based on this rationale, "This is why we must refuse to be swayed by the counsels of despair and defeat…why we must persevere; no matter what the difficulties and the dangers. This is why we must give President Johnson the backing he requires to prosecute the war in Vietnam to the point where the communists abandon their aggression and accept his invitation to meet us at the conference table."

In February 1966, Dodd wrote a television address that summarized his answer to the question "Why Are We in Vietnam?" Dodd believed "the

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[590] Dodd Papers, Speech, "Freedom's Stake in Vietnam."
[591] Ibid.

consequences of an American defeat in Vietnam would be so catastrophic that we simply cannot permit ourselves to think about it."[592] Dodd predicted (accurately) that an American loss would lead to a bloodletting on a genocidal scale in Vietnam. Citing "students of communism" as a source, Dodd claimed that Chinese and Russian communism had cost the lives of 25 to 50 million people. He "shuddered to think" of what would happen to the Vietnamese who supported the American cause. "If we ...abandon the whole of Southeast Asia...it would result in the early disintegration of all our alliances, and in the total eclipse of America as a great nation. If our word is not good every place, it is not good any place. No nation can remain great when its assurances are considered worthless even by its friends."[593] Dodd, espousing the domino theory, claimed a loss in Vietnam would lead to more Vietnams, including at least six Latin American countries where guerrilla movements existed, and in Thailand where attacks had already begun. Dodd doubtless would have been mortified by the nature of the Khmer Rouge and their brutal implementation of communism in Cambodia had he lived long enough to see it.[594]

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[592] Dodd Papers, "Why Are We In Vietnam?" Radio-TV Program Script, 17 February 1966, Series III, Box 203, Folder 5305.

[593] Dodd Papers, "Why Are We In Vietnam?."

[594] Nevertheless, Dodd would have had to face criticism that American intervention in Southeast Asia and in particular the Nixon administration's secret war in Cambodia (which devastated the Cambodian countryside) helped create the political conditions which allowed Saloth Star (Pol Pot) to rise to power.

Once again comparing Vietnam with Nazi Germany, Dodd told his viewers that "The situation in Vietnam today bears many resemblances to the situation just before Munich. Chamberlain wanted peace, Churchill wanted peace. Chamberlain's policy won out, because it is human to avoid difficulties...but who was right – Churchill or Chamberlain? Who was the man of peace? The choice before us is not the illusory choice of war or peace, the real choice we have is between defeating aggression at this time and in this place or having to defeat it at a higher cost in a different place at a later time."[595]

By 1967, the U.S. was spending over $10 billion a year on the ill-conceived war in Vietnam. Yet Dodd remained convinced that the war was not only worth the money, but that the U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia was also advantageous with regard to regional Cold War imperatives. In a 1967 letter to a Connecticut constituent, Dodd stated "I do not agree with the thesis that we have failed in Vietnam. The war is a difficult and costly one...but I believe that on the periphery of the Vietnam War, our policy has resulted in important victories for the cost of freedom."[596] Dodd cited the example of Indonesia, which "escaped a communist takeover," as proof that "had it not been for the American presence in

[595] Dodd Papers, "Why Are We In Vietnam?"
[596] Dodd Papers, Letter to Mrs. Horton O'Neil, 9 August 1967, Series I, Box 82, Folder 2363.

Vietnam, there is absolutely no doubt in my mind" that the "abortive coup" of left-leaning Indonesian generals would have succeeded.[597]

The clash with anti-war "subversives" over Vietnam

Dodd's unwavering support for the war in Vietnam (and other hard-line initiatives) pitted him against a growing counterculture and anti-war movement in 1960s America that collided with nearly all of the foreign policy beliefs the Senator espoused. Dodd's place in the deeply divided American cultural milieu in the 1960s was on the side of the Cold War stalwarts. He faced off against leftists of various stripes, and even locked horns with civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr., with whom he agreed on domestic matters and civil rights in particular. On the contentious issue of Vietnam, Dodd was even at odds with some members of his own close-knit family. As the American military became entrenched in the morass of Vietnam, and as a groundswell of domestic critics called into question LBJ's handling of the war, for the first time since the Cold War began, Dodd lost traction on the main issue on which he staked his entire career and reputation. In a twist of fate, Dodd's fall from grace dovetailed with LBJ's own decline in political prestige. Though the censure in the Senate and its aftershocks destroyed Dodd's personal prestige, the emergence of what Sean

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[597] Ibid.

Savage termed "the politics of disconsensus" in the wake of American failures in Vietnam shattered Dodd's political influence.

Secret tapes from LBJ's White House reveal President Johnson's collusion with the FBI in an effort to root out domestic subversives opposed to U.S. interventions in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. These tapes prove that Dodd was a back channel between his former boss J. Edgar Hoover, and an increasingly worried LBJ. Expressing his concern about domestic subversives in a telephone conversation with the equally hawkish Democratic Senator from Wyoming, Gale McGee, LBJ advised McGee that FBI director Hoover had agents "going into the colleges and the faculties and the student bodies, and trying to get them to send...wires...that come right out of the communist headquarters."[598] In this pursuit, Dodd served as LBJ and Hoover's Congressional mouthpiece. On May 2, 1965, Dodd took the FBI's message to the public on NBC's television program *Meet the Press*, and thundered about the existence of a Communist "central outpost" in the third world.[599] Johnson then assured McGee that Hoover "said he was going to talk to Tom Dodd and try to get him to expose it (the outpost). Because he's been a former FBI agent." LBJ continued, "But a lot of our good,

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[598] Michael Beschloss, ed., *Reaching for Glory: Lyndon Johnson's Secret White House Tapes, 1964*-1965 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 295-6. Gale McGee formed a major piece of the pro-Johnson "stalwart" bloc in the Senate, and carried considerable intellectual clout. Before entering the Senate, McGee was a professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, and according to Robert David Johnson, he was "one of the Senate's finest extemporaneous speakers," more than able to hold his own while debating the articulate Senate "doves." See Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War*, 115.

[599] Beschloss, 296.

well-intentioned friends don't know how much these folks are urging that we have a cease-fire or stop our bombing. If we did, they'd raise so much hell we could never start it [again]...Their principal play is to bring pressure on us here to throw in the towel. And that's what they're asking the students to do. Now Hoover's got most of these groups infiltrated. And his people go right with them and hear all their discussions."[600]

The Dodd/Hoover friendship was a two-way street. In addition to receiving plum committee appointments and being shielded from the wrath of liberals by LBJ, Dodd's old employer J. Edgar Hoover ensured he would take care of the Senator. Curt Gentry noted that for his dogged efforts to help construct a positive image of Hoover and the FBI, Dodd was the recipient of Bureau largesse. He was "handed politically beneficial information uncovered by the FBI," occasionally carted around New York City by "an FBI agent in an FBI car," and tipped off by the FBI when "rumours and evidence turned up concerning his financial irregularities and other dangerous matters."[601] This cozy relationship with the FBI initially insulated Dodd from scrutiny over his personal transgressions. According to Dodd's long-time aide and eventual detractor, James Boyd, the troubled Dodd staffers decided against going to the FBI with damaging information on the Senator, believing the Bureau would protect Dodd. Ironically, this dead-end

[600] Ibid.
[601] Gentry, 591.

eventually drove Dodd's dissident staff members to their last resort: investigative reporters Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson.[602]

After the battle of Dien Bien Phu led to the fall of French Colonialism in Indochina, Dodd had told a group of Connecticut youths in 1954 that "What happens in Indochina will have a great effect on your lives. You must learn to face these issues, to think constructively about them."[603] Dodd could not have been more right about the future; however, he probably never expected that a massive anti-war movement would spread through the generation to whom he was speaking, would call into question the basic assumptions underlining U.S. foreign policy since World War II, and crack the edifice of the bipartisan foreign policy consensus. Dodd and the Johnson administration never expected that their fiercest critics on the war in Vietnam would come from the left of the political spectrum. But as a former FBI agent and House member tasked with investigating domestic subversives, Dodd was aware of the "threat" posed by the far left.

Dodd had, more than President Johnson, a grave fear regarding the potential of the student anti-war movement to undermine the administration's policy in Vietnam. For example, Dodd issued a press release on October 28, 1965, chastising the President of Colorado University regarding the need for attention to

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[602] James Boyd and Marjorie Carpenter believed that in addition to the FBI, it would be difficult to convince the Justice Department to move on anything with regard to Dodd, as he had a stellar reputation in that organization from his work there both before and during, World War Two.

[603] "Unity Against Reds Asked By Dodd At Youth Forum," *Hartford Courant*, 9 May 1954.

"the extremist influence on campus."[604] Dodd, speaking for the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, was annoyed that the University President J.R. Smiley had written to criticize the Subcommittee's report on activities on campus and lectured Smiley "That there have been some extremist influences at work in the anti-Vietnam teach-in on your campus is, I believe, clear from the documentation we have received." Dodd rejected the President's claim that the protesters were "loyal Americans" and as evidence referred to the showing on campus of the "Viet Cong film 'Heroic South Vietnam'" and a flyer indicating the film was sponsored by the Young Socialist Alliance along with a standing ovation for Mr. Sidney Lens who "did not conceal his open sympathy for the Viet Cong." This was but one of many interactions between Dodd and the anti-Vietnam movement throughout the United States. As Dodd noted, "The situation on your [Colorado] campus parallels the findings of the Subcommittee on the extremist influences in the anti-Vietnam agitation nationally."[605] Dodd was more observant than Johnson. According to Clark Clifford, Johnson told George Ball he was not much concerned about opposition from students or the left but feared a right-wing backlash - "don't pay any attention to what those little shits on campus do. The

[604] Dodd Papers, Press Release, "Senator Dodd Corrects Subcommittee Report on Colorado University. Says Extremist Influence on Campus Calls for Attention, 28 October 1965, Series III, Box 203, Folder 5276.
[605] Ibid.

great beast is the reactionary elements in this country. Those are the people we have to fear."[606]

Neither Dodd nor President Johnson comprehended the contradiction between their advocacy of civil rights in the United States and waging war in Southeast Asia or the natural links between the anti-war movement and the civil rights movement. Herbert Shapiro, a professor at Ohio State University, clearly summarized the view of civil rights leaders that the war in Southeast Asia was racist, a betrayal of Johnson's promises in the 1964 election, and an obstacle to the ongoing crusade for democracy and civil rights in America.[607] Senator Fulbright, of all people, addressed the irony of the situation when he declared "We are engaged in a savage and unsuccessful war against poor people in a small and backward nation. At home...our cities are exploding in violent protest against generations of social injustice." [608] Significantly, as Shapiro observed, draft calls impacted heavily on civil rights organizations which were deprived of their male leaders who received little sympathy from their draft boards in the South, and Blacks were suffering a disproportionate share of the casualties.[609] But Dodd and Johnson, seeing the war through only their anticommunist crusade and the domino theory, were blind to this growing threat to American solidarity in the war, and to

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[606] Clark Clifford, *Counsel to the President* (New York: Random House, 1991), p 417.
[607] Herbert Shapiro quoted in Paul A. Winters, ed., *The Civil Rights Movement* (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2000), 207.
[608] Quoted in Winters, 208.
[609] Winters, 208-209.

their own political power. Dodd continued to patronize Dr. Martin Luther King who, according to Dodd, "has absolutely no competence to speak about complex matters of foreign policy" and, although he knew King was not a communist, feared King provided ammunition to his enemies and, "His fate and, I fear, to some extent the fate of the civil rights movement is also at stake in the world struggle between the forces of freedom and the forces of communist tyranny."[610] Once again, when there was a conflict between civil rights and the anticommunist crusade, anticommunism would always be the dominant factor for Dodd. The Senator hoped that civil rights leaders would "be able to discipline their more unruly members, and expose and isolate the agents of Castro and Mao Tse Tung."[611] In lamenting Dr. King's "ill-advised adventure in the sphere of foreign policy", Dodd could not see that King was being pressured by more radical elements in the civil rights movement who viewed the Vietnam War as anti-colonial and racist rather than a crusade against communism. [612]

Only one Senator, Stephen M. Young (D-OH), stood up for Dr. King against Dodd's attacks, but he did so only by following the Senate's clubby rules of decorum. Young did not specifically mention Dodd's name when he defended

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[610] Dodd Papers, Press Release "Senator Dodd Charges That Castro Incites American Negroes to Violence: Urges Elimination of Social Conditions Which Breed Unrest", 2 September 1965, Series III, Box 203, Folder 5255.
[611] Ibid.
[612] Dodd Papers, Press Release, "Senator Dodd Says Dr. Martin Luther King's Foreign Policy Intervention Supports Appeasement, Undermines Administration, Alienates Civil Rights Supporters", 11 September 1965, Series III, Box 203, Folder 5257.

King on the Senate floor. Nevertheless, Young's counterpunch was blistering, as he accused King's opponents of "seeking to play god with the patriotism of other Americans," and noting that "it is dead wrong for any self-appointed vigilante to infer that Martin Luther King is a communist sympathizer."[613] Like Fulbright during the Congressional crisis surrounding the Dominican intervention, Young implied that Dodd's dismal attendance record on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations gave him no authority to speak on foreign policy matters.[614]

The anti-war movement demonized Dodd. In Connecticut, Socialist leader Norman Thomas, a perennial Presidential candidate, called out Dodd for being "as wrong on that [Vietnam] as he was on Santo Domingo." Thomas and his supporters assailed Dodd for wrongly red-baiting the anti-War movement in the U.S. In front of a 600 person crowd at Connecticut's Wesleyan University, Thomas countered Dodd's assertion that the anti-war movement was in fact, Communist-led. "Where does he get his information? Does he have some kind of extra-sensory perception?"[615]

Harry Elmer Barnes, in an article "Revisionism: A Key to Peace" in the Spring 1966 *Rampart Journal*, wrote "When, in the mid-1960s, a small minority of students began to shows signs of restlessness, this caused widespread surprise and alarm, and public leaders like Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut suggested

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[613] "Chides Sen. Dodd For His Attack on King," *Jet*, 30 September, 1965, 7.
[614] Ibid.
[615] John Roberts, "Socialist Thomas Blasts Dodd," *Hartford Courant*, 26 October 1965.

procedures which would have won them kudos from Hitler"[616] – a charge that must have infuriated Dodd. The basis of the charge against Dodd was that, as a member of the exclusive Senate Foreign Relations, Judiciary, and Aeronautics and Space Sciences committees, Dodd was a privileged member of "The Club"- the group of Senators who control the "levers of Senatorial power."[617] Though he enjoyed membership in "The Club", Dodd proved to be something of a maverick by parting with convention in attacks on members of his own party. It was Dodd whom, according to Francis Valeo, "initiated" the public questioning of Senate Majority Leader (and fellow Roman Catholic) Mike Mansfield's leadership.[618] Dodd was not only a key player in attempting to undermine opposition to the Vietnam War, but also in the breakdown of unity in the Democratic Party.

Schism in the Democratic Party

By 1968, the year in which violence engulfed the Democratic National Convention in Chicago and Richard M. Nixon defeated Minnesota Senator and Vice President Hubert Humphrey to win the presidency, Dodd was part of a small group of hawkish Democratic senators who unflinchingly supported the controversial ways in which the government had entered, fought, and sustained military intervention in Southeast Asia. The tragedy of the war in Vietnam shattered what Herbert Parmet called the "ephemeral consensus" in American

[616] Harry Elmer Barnes, "Revisionism: A Key to Peace", *Rampart Journal* (Spring 1966): 37.
[617] Oliver Pilat, *Drew Pearson: An unauthorized biography* (New York: Harper's Magazine Press, 1973), 260.
[618] Francis R. Valeo, *Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader: A Different Kind of Senate* (M.E Sharpe, 2000), 79-80.

politics, and by 1968 left the Democratic Party far weaker than the close election Humphrey lost to Republican Richard Nixon would indicate.

The Great Society initiatives that Lyndon Johnson believed would revitalize the social and economic fabric of America (which had been strongly supported by Dodd) and which formed the cornerstone of the chief executive's own legacy as chief executive evaporated with the onset of the costly war. The intensification of Cold War hostilities and expansion of the Vietnam War awakened the most bellicose side of Tom Dodd, who, along with Kennedy's "action intellectuals" like Dean Rusk, Robert MacNamara, and military elites "accepted with the power of religious belief that Communism was a unified world force."[619] But by 1968 the "direct costs" of the Vietnam War rose to $ 33 billion,[620] 30,000 young Americans (their average age, 19) had died and a worsening balance of payments undermined the economy.[621] Military budgets for the protracted war increased exponentially, causing the Great Society programs for which Dodd and his ally LBJ gamely fought to suffer from a dire lack of funding. Gabriel Kolko noted in his revisionist history, *The Age of War: The United States Confronts the World,* the massive escalation of the war caused "the rate of inflation in the latter half of the decade to become three times greater than during the first half, expanding the demand for

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[619] Galbraith, 155.
[620] Isserman and Kazin, 197.
[621] Thomas G. Paterson et al, *A History of American Foreign Relations, Volume 2, Sixth Edition* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 353-354.

labour so that the productivity of manufacturing fell dramatically, and weakening the dollar internationally". [622] Ironically, these issues – inflation, manufacturing and economic fairness – were key issues for Tom Dodd, but again his anticommunist crusade created conditions where Americans were vulnerable to the economic changes. Even worse, the Great Society reforms primarily benefitted the poor and black communities, but the Johnson Administration could not pay for both the war and the domestic reforms, so for over two years Johnson cut spending to the Great Society reforms to pay for the war. Only in July 1968 was a new tax bill enacted.[623] As Kennedy loyalist and liberal economist John Kenneth Galbraith observed, the war in Vietnam "brought to an end Johnson's concern for the poor; to it [the Vietnam War] the principal effort and most of the money had to go."[624]

Notwithstanding this disastrous climate for domestic reforms and for Dodd's vision of a more equitable America, he was unwavering in his support of the Vietnam War. Even when other Democratic Senators turned against the war, Dodd, driven by his experience in Nuremberg, memories of Munich and strong religious views, continued to maintain that the war must be fought at all costs. He refused to concede that the Vietnam War was a failure or to join those who gradually came to voice their opposition to the Johnson administration's policies in

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[622] Gabriel Kolko, *The Age of War: the United States Confronts The World* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 2006, 21.
[623] Kolko, 22.
[624] John Kenneth Galbraith, *Name-Dropping: From FDR On* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 154.

Vietnam. Even as the American war in Vietnam bitterly divided U.S. society, derailed the Presidency of Lyndon Baines Johnson, and turned Southeast Asia into an abattoir, Dodd never wavered from his belief that the forces of international communism posed a mortal threat to the U.S. and free world.

The tragedy of the war in Vietnam had a profound impact on Dodd's career. Like Johnson and other Cold War liberal Democrats, the obsessive anticommunism Dodd exhibited after World War II increased to a point where it eventually superseded his passion for New Deal-style domestic reforms. With a narrow policy focus dominated by Cold War imperatives, Dodd lost sight of the ideals that brought him to Congress. As a militant New Left and calls for a "New Politics" threatened Democratic Party orthodoxy, Dodd fell into the generational divide that enveloped American culture and society in the mid-to-late 1960s and waged a rhetorical war against these dissident factions- especially against those comprising the "New Left". It proved to be a quixotic effort. The winds of change and growing public scrutiny on Congressional corruption implicit in the "New Politics" relegated Dodd, a practitioner of "Old Politics," to a place outside the mainstream of the Democratic Party. Furthermore, had he showed less deference to LBJ by embracing his privileged seat on the Foreign Relations Committee, it is possible that Dodd would have come to question some of his deeply-rooted Cold War beliefs. Like his adversary before him John Fitzgerald Kennedy, who built a

"reputation for inattentive behaviour toward the drudgery of committee duties,"[625] Dodd spent much of his time in the Senate honing his florid rhetorical style in speeches and press releases on foreign policy, instead of making substantive contributions to the committees on which he sat. Dodd suffered an abysmal attendance record on the most important committees. This was most striking on the Foreign Relations Committee where Dodd attended less than ten percent of the meetings held, and even less on critical hearings such as those led by Fulbright on the issue of the Dominican intervention.[626] Dodd's deplorable record of attendance throughout his time on the Foreign Relations Committee-especially in the context of the Committee's unprecedented public hearings on Vietnam and the Dominican Intervention- reveals his lack of interest in dialogue, compromise, and conciliation on the course of American foreign relations.[627] His views were set and rational discussion or new information would not change his thinking.

Unlike some of his colleagues in the Senate (and Connecticut adversaries such as Chester Bowles) who wrote prolifically on international issues, Dodd derived his philosophy from other sources. In personal letters, Dodd was quick to note that in 1963 he published a book on his anticommunist perspective; however

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[625] Savage, 20.

[626] Woods, *Fulbright: A Biography*, 383-384. Dodd held that his subcommittee assignments kept him from attending critical SFRC hearings, however, most authors (including former aide James Boyd) contend Dodd's dismal attendance coincided with the period in which he began to rely on alcohol and exhibit a pattern of lazy behaviour.

[627] Gary Stone, *Elites for Peace: The Senate and the Vietnam War, 1964-1968* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2007), 95. Stone notes that Dodd's absenteeism and decision not to participate in all of the available "rounds of questioning" gave the anti-administration critics more "power in numbers" and time on national television to express their concerns about the Johnson administration's handling of the war.

Dodd's *Freedom and Foreign Policy* was simply a 320-page collection of the caustic speeches he delivered across the country. On the other hand, three years after *Freedom and Foreign Policy* quickly disappeared from the radar screen of political observers, Senator William Fulbright (D-ARK), already a prolific author of numerous articles and books, published *The Arrogance of Power*. It was a scorching critique and substantive analysis on the record of American foreign policy under "containment" and the "domino theory" that also grew out of a series speeches he made under the same name and contained a great deal of introspection. Fulbright took direct aim at the views held by the Cold War stalwarts such as Dodd, and called for a re-examination of the basic tenets of Cold War dogma, and argued that trying to force "freedom" on countries without the necessary democratic foundations (or the desire to implement them) was futile. Fulbright also questioned the ways in which the United States government exercised its massive power in the "Third World". Although Fulbright, the Senate's resident (self-styled) philosopher found a wide audience for his insightful treatise on the shortcomings of the bipartisan Cold War consensus and the dangers of excessive internationalism, his work actually galvanized Dodd and the stalwarts to resist the criticism lodged against them, as they believed just as strongly that the Cold War was being fought correctly, and that it was worth the considerable costs. Again, Dodd was too ensconced in the hawkish Johnson White House, too influenced by

his lifelong Roman Catholicism, the appeasement of Hitler prior to World War II, and too burdened by his personal experiences at Nuremberg to seriously consider the merits of Fulbright's lament. To Tom Dodd, no matter how eloquent or well-reasoned the critique of the Cold War consensus and orthodox anticommunism could be, there was no room for compromise; the fault lines simply ran too deep between Dodd and Fulbright and the emerging Senate dissenters.

Throughout his career in the House and Senate Dodd had attempted to meld his hawkish position on foreign policy matters with his strong commitment to a domestic liberalism historically linked to the tradition of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal.[628] In the Senate from 1959 to 1964, this strategy generally worked, as Dodd received prestigious committee assignments, and positioned himself as an authority on anticommunism, at the same time driving hard for progressive reforms to civil rights and aid to Medicare, housing, public works and education, mass transportation, gun control and the "War on Poverty."[629] But just as the costs of World War II and the Korean intervention stalled funding for New Deal and Fair Deal domestic programs, the expensive military demands for the war in Vietnam eroded Congress' appetite for funding for the Great Society. While

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[628] Bass, 34. According to Bass, Dodd spoke out against Communism with "nearly unparalled vigor."

[629] The liberal Democrats' drive to eradicate poverty was influenced in part by the work of sociologist Michael Harrington, whose book *The Other America* illuminated the staggering poverty afflicting tens of millions of Americans. Harrington's research challenged the orthodox assumptions of liberal economists such as John Kenneth Galbraith, whom in his monograph *The Affluent Society,* held that the majority of Americans had profited in the post-war era. Galbraith's work did open up a discursive space for the poverty issue, but as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. cleverly observed, "If Galbraith brought poverty into the national consciousness, Harrington placed it on the national conscience." See Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days*, 1010.

Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin contend that Johnson's Great Society "would likely have come to grief in the later 1960s, as it ran afoul of other conflicts breaking out between Americans over issues such as racial justice, crime, personal morality and economic security,"[630] the impact the Cold War had in "dividing democrats into feuding camps" cannot be underestimated. Without the Dominican intervention, Vietnam War, and other foreign policy imperatives, the chasm between Dodd and democratic counterparts like Fulbright and Bobby Kennedy would never have been so pronounced and dangerous to the party's stability.

As Noam Chomsky observed, gradually most Americans, except for Hawks like Dodd, turned against the war. By 1968 "it had become evident to influential and powerful groups in the United States that the cost of subduing the Vietnamese was too great and was harming the position of the United States vis-à-vis its industrial allies so the enterprise should be reduced in scale or liquidated."[631] Anthony Lewis wrote in the *New York Times* that "By 1969 it was clear to the world – and most Americans – that the intervention had been a disastrous mistake."[632] In *Hegemony or Survival* Chomsky indicates that "in 1962 public protest was non-existent" but by 1968 "fear of the public was so serious that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to consider whether 'sufficient forces would still be

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[630] Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, *America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 196.
[631] Noam Chomsky, *Towards a New Cold War* (New York: The New Press, 2003), 29.
[632] Quoted in Chomsky, 29.

available for civilian disorder control."[633] Notwithstanding, in 1968 neither Hubert Humphrey nor Richard Nixon seriously planned on ending the war (even though Nixon deceptively campaigned on such a promise). Following his defeat of Humphrey in 1968, and after continuing the war for four more years with his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, there were still enough people in President Nixon's infamous "silent majority" to re-elect him in a landslide in 1972.

Nevertheless, Tom Dodd stayed the course and continued to try to convince the American public to support the war. Writing to a concerned constituent in 1968 he recommended the pamphlet *Peace with Freedom*, "published by a new committee including former Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. This committee intends to speak for the 'silent center' of American life on the Vietnam situation."[634] Nor did Dodd accept that the Vietnam War was a "disastrous mistake." In a letter to constituent Mrs. Horton O'Neill on August 9, 1967, he once again repeated the domino theory argument, stating "We have to decide whether we are going to try to draw a line anywhere against the advance of communism and where this line should be drawn." He told his constituent "I do not agree with the thesis that we have failed in Vietnam...on the periphery of the Vietnam war, our policy has resulted in important victories for the cost of freedom...had it not been for the American presence in Vietnam, there is absolutely no doubt in my

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[633] Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival* (New York: Owl Books, 2004), 39.
[634] Dodd Papers, Letter to Stephen Anderson, 29 February 1968, Series I, Box 85, Folder 2435.

mind that they [the communists] would have been able to recruit far more Indonesian officers than they did in their abortive coup."[635] Dodd also believed that without the war in Vietnam, and blocking of Communist expansion, "the regime of Mao Tse Tung would probably still be intact."[636] There was still a chance, in Dodd's view, that if the Americans held the line in Vietnam a more democratic, less aggressive regime was possible in China.

Even before the Democrats became divided, Dodd was dismissive of Americans who did not support his anti-atheist, anticommunist crusade and who held a more nuanced view of foreign relations and events in developing countries. In 1962, he told a Texas audience that "a small group of Americans, some of them articulate and influential in the press, the arts and the communications media, have lost that sense of mission and confidence and optimism which is an essential part of the American story....The answers of the ultra-leftists to the challenge of our time are weasel words justifying the abandonment of Laos, Quemoy, Formosa, Berlin and other critical areas."[637] In Dodd's view, these protesting Americans "feel that there are no absolutes, that nothing is eternally true or false, right or wrong, that nothing is fixed and changeless, that all will change and pass away. And therefore they feel that no issue, no soil, no concept, not event freedom itself,

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[635] Dodd Papers, Letter to Mrs. Horton O'Neil, 9 August 1967, Series I, Box 82, Folder 2363.
[636] Ibid.
[637] Dodd Papers, Remarks at Democratic Party luncheon, Fort Worth TX, 26 January 1962, Series III, Box 193, Folder 4684.

is work risking life to defend."[638] Given this uncompromising position, that many of the protesters were Democrats, and that Democratic Senators had tried and failed to privately convince LBJ to change course, the ground was set for a schism within the Democratic Party. Events in the Dominican Republic, and Tom Dodd, himself, exacerbated that fissure and brought key Senators to the anti-war bloc.

Dodd, the Dominican Republic and the end of the Senate's bipartisan Cold War Consensus

Tom Dodd was a critical figure who supported President Johnson against influential members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in disputes over Vietnam and also the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. During the heated controversy surrounding this intervention and throughout the entire war in Vietnam, Dodd was a strong ally to LBJ and his administration when other Senators from the Democratic Party started to question the orthodoxy of American foreign relations in the Cold War.

On April 28, 1965, U.S. troops were ordered into the Dominican Republic to, according to historian Howard J. Wiarda, "thwart the democratic, Constitutionalist revolution apparently at that moment on the verge of succeeding."[639] Dodd supported this return to the Big Stick diplomacy that characterized the imperialism of the Teddy Roosevelt era of the early 20th century,

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[638] Ibid.

[639] Howard J. Wiarda, "Review: The United States and the Dominican Republic: Intervention, Dependency and Tyrannicide" in *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (May 1980): 247.

and a return to the American tradition of backing dictatorial rulers to ensure political and economic stability. The Dominican intervention was an American solution to what was otherwise a problem for Dominican political forces to resolve.

In his ferocious attacks on a small contingent of Democratic Senators who dissented from the Johnson line by gradually calling for more debate on U.S. commitments abroad, Dodd, as noted earlier, reached into the history of World War II, likening these "new isolationists" to adherents of "the discredited record of appeasement" and asserted that they were guilty of "timidity and retreat."[640] Dodd's erroneous claim that a "second Castro regime" was unfolding in the Dominican Republic grossly exaggerated the communist threat in the Dominican at a pivotal moment in both nations' histories.

Although the Vietnam War was the critical reason for the breakdown of the Cold War Consensus among Democrats, the 1965 Dominican intervention was the catalyst. The Johnson administration's intervention in the Dominican Republic caused a major fissure in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pitting Dodd (and the stalwarts) against J. William Fulbright (D-Ark) (and the "doves").[641] Information linking the White House and Dodd against Fulbright appears in Peter

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[640] "The Communist Penetration of Africa" Remarks of Senator Dodd before the National Strategy Seminar 1965, Town Hall, New York, New York, 16 March, 1965, Series III, Box 201, Folder 5179.

[641] The relationship between Dodd and Fulbright soured long before the Dominican crisis. According to historian Randall Bennett Woods, Dodd despised Fulbright "for many things" but mainly because his fellow Club member discovered that he was working as a highly paid unregistered agent for the Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle. In his scholarly biography *Fulbright*, Woods advances this assertion, but in his footnotes, he provides no documentary evidence to support the claim. Thus, until the allegation that Dodd had a financial relationship with the Somoza dictatorship is substantiated by credible evidence, it remains a matter of conjecture.

Felten's salient article *The Path to Dissent: Johnson, Fulbright, and the 1965 Intervention in the Dominican Republic.*[642] In April 1965, 25,000 American marines invaded the Dominican Republic, ostensibly to protect American nationals and prevent a communist takeover. The historians Pope Atkins and William Larman, experts on U.S.-Dominican relations, convincingly argue that while this was the "public rationale" the administration put forward, "domestic concerns were evident." Atkins and Larman demonstrate that although fears of communism were pervasive in the administration, the State Department, and the U.S. embassy in Santo Domingo, Johnson was also concerned with maintaining Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, and presenting a strong showing in the hemisphere to convince North Vietnamese leaders of his militaristic resolve. [643]

The American intervention was prompted by the efforts of Dominican supporters of former President Juan Bosch to return him to power. Ironically, three years earlier the U.S. perceived Bosch as a "third force saviour who would find a middle ground between the reactionary supporters of slain dictator Rafael Trujillo and the forces of Castroism." [644] After enjoying the support of the U.S. government for thirty years, Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo had fallen out of favour with

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[642] Peter G. Felten, "Johnson, Fulbright, and the 1965 Intervention in the Dominican Republic" in *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No.4, Intricacies of U.S. Foreign Policy (Fall, 1996), 1009-1018.
[643] G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson, *The Dominican Republic and the United States From Imperialism to Transnationalism* (Athens GA: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 136.
[644] Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 47.

U.S. policy makers. As historian Mark Gilderhus observes, the Eisenhower administration "initiated a process of cutting loose from him (Trujillo) and the Kennedy administration started the search for reform-oriented leaders.[645] Against the background of the Cuban Revolution, Trujillo's odious dictatorship became a liability, as American policy makers feared that his harsh rule might assist in the rise of a Castro-like movement in the Dominican Republic. As Jerome N. Slater points out, American policy makers now believed "support of the right might no longer be the best way to avoid radicalism in Latin America, but might rather be fostering it."[646] Thus, when conspirators against Trujillo planned to assassinate the dictator in January, 1961, the U.S. employed the CIA as an instrument to help oust Trujillo.[647]

Although there is no direct documentary evidence of the U.S. role as accomplice in Trujillo's assassination, in *Legacy of Ashes: A History of the CIA*, historian Tim Weiner convincingly demonstrates that all circumstantial evidence points to the CIA collaborating with Trujillo's assassins. "There were no fingerprints. But the assassination of Trujillo was as close as the CIA has ever come to carrying out a murder at the command of the White House."[648] Wiener's

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[645][645] Mark Gilderhus, *The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000), 191.

[646] Jerome N. Slater, "The Dominican Republic, 1961-1966," in Barry M. Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, eds., *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), 289-290.

[647] Slater, 291.

[648] Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (New York: Anchor Books, 2008) 199.

belief that the CIA was involved in the assassination is supported by scholars of American foreign relations such as Gilderhus.

The Kennedy administration took a cynical approach to events in Dominican Republic in the aftermath of the Trujillo assassination. On the subject of the Dominican Republic, Kennedy aide and family historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. quoted JFK as stating, "There are three possibilities in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third." [649]

Juan Bosch fit with the first "possibility" Kennedy had in mind. As leader of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (Dominican Revolutionary Party-PRD) Bosch sought to implement a program of land reform, low-rent housing, some nationalization of industries, and openness to foreign investment – what William Blum called "standard elements in the program of any liberal Third World leader serious about social change."[650] His initial efforts received the full support of the Kennedy Administration, which sought to create in Bosch a shining example of the Alliance for Progress.[651] Bosch was attempting through his reforms the difficult

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[649] Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days*, 769.
[650] Blum, 179.
[651] Atkins and Wilson, 132. The Kennedy administration supported Bosch, but as Jeffrey F. Taffet observes, "the bulk of [foreign] aid sent to the Domincan Republic came during, and in the aftermath of, the military intervention in 1965." Jeffrey F. Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America* (New York: Taylor and Francis Group, LLC, 2007), 123.

task of constructing a democracy after thirty years of Trujillo's brutal dictatorial rule. In the early 1960s, State Department analysts were convinced that Trujillo had "warped the political and economic framework of the country," leaving "an economic jumble of major proportions" after spending thirty years promulgating "economic policies designed primarily to funnel funds into the coffers of the Trujillo family."[652]

In 1962, after a landslide victory in the "first free and honest election since 1924", Bosch was unsuccessful in stimulating economic growth, consolidating his support, and proving his anticommunist credentials to conservative Dominican military officers and paranoid U.S. policy makers.[653] Within the Dominican Republic, Bosch ran afoul of the oligarchy, businessmen, leaders of the Catholic Church, and the military establishment due to his sweeping constitutional changes which benefited the working classes, land reforms that threatened the *latifundia*- or landed estates, secular programs, and his "modest" military reforms.[654] Although the State Department acknowledged that Bosch "reacted vigorously against communists and Castroists" he did so "only when he thought they posed direct challenges to his own position."[655] But for Bosch to be fully accepted by

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[652] FRUS, Volume XXXII: Dominican Republic, Special National Intelligence Estimate, 17 January 1964, 2.
[653] Atkins and Wilson, 129.
[654] Atkins and Wilson, 130-133.
[655] Atkins and Wilson, 130-133.

Washington, he needed to take a stronger stand against domestic subversives and the radicalized left.

Despite his determined attempts to erase the damage caused by Trujillo, U.S. policy makers did nothing when Bosch was overthrown and exiled by a military Junta in 1963, after only seven months in office. Documents from the State Department reveal the negative light in which Bosch was viewed by planners. Thomas Mann, a fellow Texan and ferocious anticommunist whom LBJ selected as his Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs, had a reputation in diplomatic circles as a "tough guy" with little tolerance for Latin American leaders whom he perceived to be soft on communism. Mann (who spoke Spanish fluently) proved his reputation in 1964, when he took a hard-line stance in negotiations to end the crisis that enveloped the Canal Zone in Panama, and supported a successful military coup by Brazilian generals against the left-leaning populist President João Goulart.[656] Mann's arrival at the desk of Inter-American Affairs ended the marked indecisiveness of the Kennedy administration with respect to military regimes, and ushered in a new policy geared toward pragmatism. The historian George C. Herring noted that an "off the record 1964 statement" Mann made shortly after being appointed "were widely interpreted to mean that the [Johnson]

[656] Walter LaFeber, *The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective, Updated Edition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 110, and David E. Kaiser, *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 312.

administration would not look unfavourably on military governments."[657] These statements later became known as the Mann Doctrine, which represented a new phase of U.S. policy toward the developing world. No longer would American planners be concerned about fostering progressivism or altering the social structure of Latin American countries; stability and anticommunism outweighed the needs of the hemisphere's poor and disenfranchised.[658]

Declassified State Department documents reveal the extent to which Mann and other U.S. officials distrusted Juan Bosch. In a telephone conversation with President Johnson prior to the Dominican intervention, Mann referred to Bosch as "the most impractical fellow in the world- sort of an idealist floating around on Cloud 9 type."[659] Although Mann stated "we do not think he [Bosch] is a communist" he advised Johnson that "we do not think that this fellow understands the communist danger...what we are afraid of is that if he gets back in, he will have so many of them around him; and that they are so much smarter than he is, that before you know it, they'd begin to take over."[660] Thus, the opinions Tom Dodd expounded in Congress were strikingly similar to the ones held by anticommunists such as Mann in the State Department.

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[657] George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 733.
[658] Brands, 72.
[659] FRUS, Volume XXXII: Dominican Republic, Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) and President Johnson, 27 April 1965, 7:17 am, 65.
[660] Ibid.

By 1965, "Johnson had come to regard Bosch as merely a dupe for more radical elements" [661] and the administration would not countenance another allegedly communist revolution. Johnson went on national television to declare that "the American nations...will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere."[662] As Wiarda noted, U.S. politicians "feared that no American president can be re-elected who permits 'a second Cuba' in 'our lake'."[663]

On May 24, Tom Dodd launched into a hard-hitting speech on the Senate floor, endorsing President Johnson's invasion and concluding "it is my firm conviction that history will endorse and posterity will applaud his courageous intervention against the communist conspiracy in the Americas."[664] Dodd's speech was, we know now, riddled with falsehoods and inaccuracies. He claimed Johnson was preventing "the emergence of a second Castro regime", the "evidence was conclusive that the communists had taken control of the uprising before the Marines were sent", and that the President acted with only hours to spare. Dodd further claimed that communists had taken over Santo Domingo's radio and television stations and urged the people to pour into the streets, and that all non-communist leaders had been captured by the communists, taken refuge in foreign

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[661] McCormick, 147.
[662] LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 159.
[663] Wiarda, 252
[664] Dodd Papers, Press Release, "The Dominican Crisis," 24 May 1965, Series III, Box 202, Folder 5208.

embassies or gone into hiding.[665] Dodd once again took Herbert L. Mathews of the *New York Times* to task. Reminding senators that Mathews had (in Dodd's words) described Fidel Castro as a cross between Robin Hood and Thomas Jefferson and defended Castro against the charge of communism, "I find it ironical...that Mr. Mathews should again have undertaken to lecture the administration and the American people on the non-communism of the Dominican Revolution and on the wickedness of American intervention."[666] Months later, Dodd continued to support the Johnson agenda, claiming "It is a matter of record that...a handful of communists in key positions can suffice to take over an entire country as they did in Cuba...and as they recently almost succeeded in doing in the Dominican Republic."[667]

Dodd's son (now Senator) Christopher was a Peace Corps worker who went to the Dominican in 1965. In an oral history interview he said he told his father that the U.S. "overreacted" to the Dominican situation, and, based on his hitchhiking travels throughout Latin America, he observed the United States "was not conscious of the emerging nationalism" in those nations.[668] This view was supported later by the political scientist Howard Wiarda who reviewed the work of Piero Gleijeses. Wiarda's research shows clearly "that the far left (Communists

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[665] Ibid.
[666] Ibid.
[667] Dodd Papers, "Castro Incites American Negroes", 2 September 1965, Series III, Box 203, Folder5255, 2.
[668] Thomas Dodd Family Oral History Project, Interview with Christopher Dodd, 9 July 1976, 5-9.

and Fidelistas) was an insignificant force in the planning of the revolution and that, contrary to the official American argument, *never* had any possibility of seizing control of the revolution."[669] Wiarda concludes that the principal justification for the intervention, consistently repeated by Thomas Dodd, which "was to prevent a potential 'Castro-Communist' take-over, has shown to have no legitimacy whatsoever".[670] Because of the misleading statements by both President Johnson and Senator Dodd "one can easily make the case that it was the Dominican intervention that first led to the 'credibility gap' between what the United States government says it does abroad and with it actually does" and that this gap prompted the disillusionment of informed opinion, initiated the poisoning of U.S. political relations and precipitated the ruin of Lyndon Johnson.[671]

Although it may have been true that in anti-war circles the marine landing in Santo Domingo "added to the suspicion that the U.S. government was bent on throwing its weight around as a kind of self-appointed policeman to the world."[672] The other significant long term consequence was a permanent split between Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright and President Johnson, a divorce in which Tom Dodd played a significant role. Fulbright and Johnson had been close friends

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[669] Wiarda, 250.
[670] Ibid.
[671] Wiarda, 248.
[672] Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, *America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s*, Second Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 178.

since the early 1950s [673] and Johnson secured him the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1959. When John F. Kennedy became President, Fulbright's role became more significant, particularly because he had privately criticized the Bay of Pigs invasion before it occurred. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in his journal recorded that at an April 5, 1961 meeting on the Cuban intervention Fulbright "denounced the operation as excessive...and hazardous." [674] In addition, Fulbright's "internationalist principles also meshed well with the reformist side of Kennedy's foreign policy".[675] He also strongly supported the Alliance for Progress in Latin America and urged Kennedy to use the Dominican Republic as "a single striking example" of positive change through reform and a "showcase for democracy."[676]

After Kennedy's assassination, Johnson relied heavily on Fulbright for support, and "more than ever the Foreign Relations Committee took a back seat to Fulbright's private lobbying." [677] Fulbright and Dodd were Johnson's chief Senate allies but Fulbright was independent and increasingly concerned about the direction on U.S. policy, especially in Vietnam. Johnson was annoyed when Fulbright warned about out-dated ideas in his speech "Old Myths and New Realities" but he and Johnson continued on good terms, particularly when

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[673] Betty Fulbright helped LBJ select presents for Ladybird Johnson.
[674] Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Journals (New York: Penguin, 2007), 108.
[675] Felten, 1009.
[676] Felten, 1009-1010.
[677] Felten, 1010.

Fulbright guided the Gulf of Tonkin resolution through the Senate and seconded Johnson's nomination at the 1964 Democratic National Convention.[678]

Nevertheless, following Johnson's victory, Fulbright suffered an attack of conscience. He was concerned that Johnson would escalate the war in Vietnam and "began to doubt the wisdom of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and to resent what he saw as Johnson's manipulation of him in its passage."[679] Fulbright privately expressed his concerns to Senators Richard Russell (D-GA) and Mike Mansfield (D-MT) in the hope that between them they could convince Johnson to avoid an escalation in Vietnam, but these efforts failed to persuade Johnson.

When Johnson ordered the invasion of the Dominican Republic, Fulbright was not initially perturbed as he considered it a sideshow to the increasing and critical problem of Vietnam. But on May 2, 1965 Johnson's televised speech was a disaster. The President's teleprompter broke down and he made preposterous claims about the intervention including "Some fifteen hundred innocent people were murdered and shot and their heads cut off."[680] Pushed by his aides and the anti-war sentiment in the country, Fulbright ordered executive session hearings on the Dominican intervention.

Despite the efforts of Johnson and Fulbright to maintain their friendship and solidarity in the Democratic Party, in July 1965 the executive session hearings

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[678] Woods, *Fulbright: A Biography*, 355.
[679] Ibid.
[680] Felten, 1012.

began, with Fulbright actively questioning State Department and CIA officers to explore "exactly what happened" because the "facts had become very controversial."[681] [682] Next, in July 1965 Johnson announced a substantial increase in U.S. troops in Vietnam. The White House snubbed Fulbright and did not invite him to the meeting with congressional leaders to discuss the new U.S. role.

Initially, Tom Dodd attacked his committee's incendiary brochure titled "Background information relating to the Dominican Republic," which broke ranks with the Johnson camp and included media sources critical of the administration's assertion that a communist takeover was imminent in Santo Domingo. On August 23, 1965, Dodd launched a public rebuttal to Fulbright on the floor of the Senate. In his speech, titled "The Story of the Dominican Uprising and the Division in the American Press," Dodd castigated his colleagues on the committee for excluding from their report the opinions of "distinguished" members from the (conservative) American press who contended that the Dominican intervention was legitimate and justifiable due to clear evidence of communist subversion.[683] Ignoring the intervention's blatant violation of the "non-intervention principle" of articles 15 and 17 of the OAS charter,[684] Dodd ironically highlighted the usefulness of the

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[681] Ibid.

[682] See Blum, 183-184 and LeFeber, 159-161 for extensive details on the US violation of OAS agreements, and misinformation regarding the Bosch regime perpetrated by the White House and U.S. media.

[683] Dodd Papers, Speech, "The Story of the Dominican Uprising and the Division in the American Press," 23 May 1965, Series III, Box 202, Folder 5207.

[684] Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson, *The Dominican Republic and the United States: From Imperialism to Transnationalism* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1988), 137.

OAS, stating "let us hope that, through the OAS, it will prove possible to establish either an interim caretaker government, or a provisional Dominican administration which is as broad as circumstances will permit, which recognizes the importance of preventative action against the communist conspiracy, and which contains enough ability and dedication to make orderly and progressive government possible."[685]

One day after Fulbright's speech, Dodd read a formal "Reply to Senator Fulbright" on the Senate floor in which he regretted Fulbright's "personal attack" against him, that Dodd regarded as an "effort to undercut my credibility." Dodd concluded by stating, "The only fact that matters is that somehow, a report was issued under the auspices of the foreign relations committee which turned out to be prejudiced and one-sided in content. For this the committee cannot escape responsibility."[686] This was to be Dodd's first salvo in the coming war between the White House and Fulbright.

Fulbright did not want to continue the Dominican hearings (even though liberals "will raise hell") but he prepared a speech summarizing his views on both the Dominican intervention and Vietnam escalation.[687] On September 15, he delivered the speech on the Senate floor in which he "criticized U.S. actions for being inconsistent and lacking candour, arguing the facts had been misrepresented in order to defend mistakes by American officials in Santo Domingo" and

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[685] Ibid.
[686] Dodd Papers, Speech, "A Reply to Senator Fulbright," 24 August 1965, Series III, Box 202, Folder 5247.
[687] Felten, 1013.

concluded "by emphasizing the need for Washington to support non-communist reform in Latin America."[688] Although the speech was relatively mild, a draft was sent to Johnson in advance, and it placed the blame not on Johnson but his advisors, "Johnson and his allies responded fiercely to the speech."[689] Even before Fulbright spoke, the White House assessed its strategy and decided Tom Dodd should give the rebuttal speech as he "would do it with enthusiasm."[690] Immediately after Fulbright's speech several Senators accused him of naively supporting communist goals in Latin America, but the "strongest barrage came the next day in a speech conceived at the White House and delivered in the Senate by Dodd, a well-known Johnson mouthpiece."[691]

In his usual searing rhetoric, Dodd asserted that Fulbright "suffers from an indiscriminating infatuation with revolutions of all kinds."[692] He implied that Fulbright was benefitting Castro and that the "speech will be picked up and played heavily by every Communist and crypto-Communist and fellow traveler and anti-American leftist who wields a pen in the Latin American press."[693] Felten's research shows that even the White House staff was concerned that Dodd's speech was "pretty hot" and aides wrote a memorandum recommending references to

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[688] Felten, 1013-1014.
[689] Felten, 1014.
[690] Felten, 1014.
[691] Ibid.
[692] "Erratic Attack" *Time Magazine*, September 24, 1965. Accessed at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,834360,00.html Internet accessed January 8, 2010.
[693] Ibid.

Fulbright in Dodd's speech be deleted, but McGeorge Bundy, Johnson's national security advisor, wrote "let it ride" in the memorandum's margins.[694]

On September 24, 1965, *Time* magazine provided extensive coverage of the Dodd-Fulbright split in the Democratic Party. In a two-hour Senate speech on September 15, 1965 Fulbright issued a "scalding denunciation" of the American intervention and accused the Johnson administration of intervening "not to save American lives, as was contended, but to prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement" wrongly judged to be Communist-dominated. Fulbright insisted the U.S. was backing a "corrupt and reactionary military oligarchy" in the Dominican Republic and concluded "if we are automatically to oppose any reform movement that Communists adhere to, we are likely to end up opposing every reform movement, making ourselves the prisoners of reactionaries who wish to preserve the status quo." Dodd responded by describing the U.S. intervention as an "unavoidable necessity" and again charged that Fulbright was dazzled by social movements in the third world. President Johnson, when questioned about the Fulbright-Dodd exchange replied "I would do it [the invasion] all over again, only we'd have done it earlier and tougher." The conservative *Time* magazine waded in to support the Johnson-Dodd alliance, claiming that Fulbright's comments

[694] Felten, 1014.

represented an "erratic attack" and his opinions were based on "the same old highly coloured newspaper reports."[695]

Johnson took Fulbright's criticisms personally and the divide between them crystallized. The White house barred him from ceremonies and refused him a jet for a flight to New Zealand. Fulbright later recalled that "Johnson never after (the September 15 speech) had another private conversation with me."[696] [697] Fulbright finally recognized the divorce and "led televised Foreign Relations Committee hearings on Vietnam which helped legitimize anti-war dissent and secured his position as a leading critic of the war."[698]

Dodd's ongoing anticommunist crusade divided even his own family. His son (now Senator) Chris Dodd as a member of the Peace Corps was part of generational change in the 1960s that Savage calls the "idealistic desire of more middle-class Americans, especially college students, to help and uplift the less fortunate both domestically and internationally."[699] Chris Dodd came back from the Dominican Republic unconvinced of the legitimacy of the U.S. intervention, and was also opposed to the means by which Americans exercised foreign policy in Latin America. This opposition extended to the Vietnam question. Chris Dodd

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[695] "Erratic Attack", *Time* Magazine September 24, 1965.
[696] Felten, 1015.
[697] Fulbright was not the only friend to be cut off by Johnson for dissenting with the President's foreign policy opinions. John Kenneth Galbraith, who dissented on the Vietnam policy, noted "my differences with L.B.J. were decisive. "I never saw him again". Galbraith, *Name Dropping*, 156.
[698] Felten, 1015.
[699] Savage, 140.

revealed in an oral history interview that there were verbal "brawls" around the family dinner table, and his older brother Jeremy was even more outspoken than Chris in his anti-War in Vietnam views. At one point, his younger brother secretly put a tape recorder under the table, and the family was shocked to hear the intensity of their verbal confrontations.[700]

President Johnson and Tom Dodd contributed significantly to the break in the Cold War consensus, the escalation of the War in Vietnam and the eventual split in the Democratic Party by refusing to accept any criticism of their anticommunist crusade by influential members of the Democratic Party, or warnings from experts on foreign relations. As the Democratic Party descended into turmoil and President Johnson's stature rapidly declined, so did Tom Dodd's once-promising political career. The fissure that grew out of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic and the worsening situation in Vietnam greatly exacerbated the differences between Dodd and fellow Democrats that simmered under the surface shortly after he entered the Senate in the "class of 1958." The policy failures in Southeast Asia and the Dominican Republic brought into question Dodd's authority to speak on foreign policy matters.

The growing number of Democratic Senators who came to cast doubt on President Johnson's handling of the war pushed Dodd out of the mainstream of

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[700] Thomas Dodd Family Oral History Project, Interview with Christopher Dodd, 9 July 1976, 8-18.

foreign policy thought, and onto the sidelines. As funding demands for the war in Vietnam increased exponentially, LBJ's promise that America could have both "guns and butter" became impossible. By 1968, the only Cold War liberal Congressmen willing to put their prestige on the line to defend Johnson's policies in Vietnam on the floor of the Senate were Dodd, and Wyoming's Gale McGee.

Fittingly, Dodd ended his Senate career in 1970 by joining with the Nixon Administration to fight the Hatfield-McGovern amendment designed to cut off funding for the military in Vietnam and bring the war to an end. Although the amendment was very unlikely to pass (even if polls showed a majority of the population supported it), Hatfield (R-Oregon) and McGovern (D-South Dakota) hoped 40 senators would vote for it – a symbolic victory indicating the depth of opposition to the war, and the need for the Senate to assume its constitutional responsibilities for fighting the war.[701]

Dodd issued a scathing press release accusing Hatfield and McGovern of conspiring to construct a formula for "defeat and disaster" and labelled the amendment a "sordid fraud." [702] The Nixon Administration, adopting Dodd's tactics and language, called Hatfield and McGovern "apostles of retreat and defeat" and "neo Neville Chamberlains."[703] Despite impassioned pleas by

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[701] Robert Mann, *A Grand Delusion*, 659-670.
[702] Dodd Papers, Press Release: Senator Dodd Assails McGovern-Hatfield Amendment as Formula For 'Defeat and Disaster' and 'Sordid Fraud' in Southeast Asia, September 1, 1970, Box 216, Folder 5996.
[703] Robert Mann, *A Grand Delusion*, 668.

McGovern, who even mortgaged his house to buy air-time on NBC, the amendment was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 55-39, which included Dodd's vote against the amendment.[704]

In 1969, another battle in a Senate, which was by then becoming increasingly dominated by the anti-war faction, occurred when Fulbright and liberal John Sherman Cooper (R-KY) authored a resolution "warning President Nixon and his successors not to promise or use U.S. troops or financial resources to aid any foreign country without 'affirmative action by Congress." Dodd opposed them.[705] In response to the Fulbright-Cooper Resolution, Dodd and Edmund Mundt (R-S.D.) co-authored a substitute resolution that called for the President "not to use or promise to use troops abroad without "appropriate affirmative legislative action," but would allow the President to "repel an attack," to meet any "direct and immediate threat" to national security, or to "protect U.S. lives and property."[706] The Dodd-Mundt substitute was voted down in a 50-36 vote, while the Fulbright-Cooper Resolution passed by a 70-16 margin. Thirty republicans voted in favour of Dodd's substitute, while only six Democrats supported it.[707] Thus, in just eleven (albeit tumultuous) years, Dodd, who had once spoken for the majority in the

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[704] Joseph Fry, *Debating Vietnam: Fulbright, Stennis, and their Senate Hearings* (Oxford, U.K.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 157.
[705] "Troop Use Vigil Urged by Senate," *The Spokesman Review*, 26 June 1969,
[706] Ibid.
[707] Ibid.

Democratic Party on foreign policy matters, was now on its fringes. This reality became clearer in 1970 when Dodd decided to run for re-election.

The Final Campaign

When the battered LBJ declined to seek the Democratic nomination for the Presidency in 1968 and became a "lame duck" President, Dodd lost the man who was chiefly responsible for his membership in the club of Senators who controlled the most important Congressional committees and business of the day. Dodd eventually wandered into the political wilderness. Furthermore, after his 1967 censure and the Democratic loss in the 1968 elections, Dodd was a shell of his former self in the Senate. Ironically, Dodd's political adversaries in Connecticut from the 1950s landed the final blow by thwarting his bid for re-election in 1970. The powerful Connecticut Democratic boss (and member of the Kennedy political machine) John M. Bailey ensured that Dodd would not receive the Connecticut Democratic nomination for Senate. The Democratic candidate was Reverend Joe Duffey, a former clergyman, ethics professor, and anti-war candidate and national chairman of the Americans for Democratic Action whose campaign was co-chaired by Hollywood actor Paul Newman. Duffey's campaign picked up steam when youths disillusioned with the war in Vietnam flocked to volunteer for him. The *New York Times* observed that Duffey's vital campaign exuded a "youthful vigour

that recalled the campaigns of Robert F. Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy."[708] Nevertheless, Dodd was encouraged to run as an independent by Democrats who regarded Duffey as a "leftist" who would be soft on communist influences and for whom his nomination victory was a "painful shock."[709] These constituents believed that Dodd had a good chance to win as an independent because "there is impressive evidence that the old-time political machines are running out of steam and can longer guarantee to deliver the votes they once tightly controlled."[710] As a result of his pro-labour and civil rights stances, Dodd was supported by unions, such as the Teamsters, that were not directly affiliated with the AFL-CIO, and his legislative voting record "last year was 100 percent in accordance with the issues forwarded by COPE, the political arm of the AFL-CIO."[711] Dodd was also counting on the support of African-Americans. Jim Gary, an African-American and a special representative of the Operating Engineers, supported Dodd because of his civil rights record, noting "We feel that Senator Dodd is no Johnny-come-lately to this field. Over the years he has consistently supported civil rights legislation and we aren't prepared to take chances on sending anyone else to the Senate who may not be as faithful."[712]

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[708] Joseph B. Treaster, "Youths Rallying to Dodd Opponent," *New York Times*, 15 February 1970.
[709] Dodd Papers, Letter to Dodd from Hubert W. Kregelor, 17 September 1970, Series VIII, Box 394, Folder 8696.
[710] Ibid.
[711] Dodd Papers, Unnamed article attached to Letter from William Loeb to Dodd's close friend, Karl Bissel, September 1970, Series VIII, Box 394, Folder 8696.
[712] Ibid.

The campaign to win back support lost due to his Censure and support for the War in Vietnam took its toll on the sixty-three-year-old Dodd, who was battered by the challenge of three younger candidates and slowed by health problems. Six weeks before the Democratic state nominating convention in which Duffey was chosen, Dodd suffered a minor heart attack and was forced to suspend his campaign for several weeks.[713] Although he was weakened by the heart attack and devastated by the state Democrats' choice of Duffey, Dodd fought hard.

Dodd himself said he was "approached by many people who are asking me to run as an independent."[714] But when he did there was not enough support. Dodd's independent campaign again split the Democratic Party. According to former U.S. President Bill Clinton, who worked in Duffey's campaign as a young Democrat, "his [Duffey's] strongest supporters were prosperous, well-educated, anti-war liberals who lived in the suburbs and young people drawn to his record on civil rights and peace." [715] Clinton ran into "stone walls" while campaigning in ethnic, blue collar areas, where people thought Duffey was "too radical, too identified with dope smoking, anti-war hippies." [716] Those Democrats mostly still voted for Dodd. In Clinton's appraisal "I was sure the Democratic Party was headed for minority status unless we could get back the kind of folks who voted for

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[713] "Dodd Is Stricken By Heart Attack," *New York Times*, 15 May 1970.
[714] "Dodd Considers Running For Senate Independently", *New York Times*, 10 June 1970.
[715] Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 175.
[716] Clinton, 177.

Tom Dodd."[717] On election night, the winner was Republican Congressman Lowell Weicker "a maverick who later left the Republican Party and served as Governor of Connecticut as an Independent."[718] Weicker got 42% of the vote and won because the Democrats split the vote with Duffey receiving 34% and Dodd 25%.[719]

Like President Johnson, Dodd's final years in public office were painful and he left the Senate a "broken" man. Bill Curry, a long-time friend of Chris Dodd was present at campaign headquarters the night of Tom Dodd's crushing 1970 defeat, and noted "it killed him."[720] Dodd suffered a second, fatal heart attack at the dinner table of his Connecticut home on May 24, 1971 at the age of sixty-four, just one year after voters from the Constitution State punished him for his alleged corruption and position on Vietnam and in the same year that public and congressional outrage over the passage of the infamous Tonkin Gulf Resolution resulted in its repeal.[721] It was a death, journalist Kirk Johnson observed, of a politician "who cast a wide shadow across the state [of Connecticut] for several decades".[722]

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[717] Ibid.
[718] Ibid.
[719] Weicker served with distinction during the Watergate hearings that forced President Nixon's resignation in 1974. When Clinton was President he appointed Duffey to run the United States Information Agency, which oversaw The Voice of America.
[720] "Like Father, Like Son", *Newsweek*, 8 June 2009, 46.
[721] "Ex Senator Dodd is Dead at 64; Censured in 1967 by Colleagues; Ex Senator Dodd of Connecticut is Dead," *New York Times*, 25 May 1971.
[722] Kirk Johnson, "Political Debt and a Son's Enduring Loyalty", *New York Times*, 9 March 1989.

Senator Christopher Dodd has undertaken a concerted campaign to rehabilitate his father's reputation, including the opening of the Thomas J. Dodd Research Center by Chris Dodd's friend Bill Clinton, the publishing of over 400 letters written from Nuremberg, and articles such as recognition of his father on the sixtieth anniversary of the verdicts in the Nuremberg trials.[723] Chris Dodd works at his father's old desk and Tom Dodd's portrait hangs in his conference room.[724] Chris Dodd's friends told *Newsweek* that Tom Dodd really did nothing wrong in using campaign fundraising monies for his personal expense – "There was no rule against it....The facts were never full proved and remain murky....There was just something so sad about it all." Long-time friend Bill Curry concedes, however, that "so much of his (Chris') life has been a kind of reclamation project for his father's reputation."[725] Chris Dodd continues to maintain that his father "was charged with no crime and broke no law" but was abandoned by Senators because of a "frenzy stirred by muckraking columnists Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson." [726] He frankly admits that the Dodd family "worked to secure Thomas J. Dodd's legacy", and it is the "family opinion that his censure was unjustified. This led to a bitter ending of his public life and contributed to his early death."[727]

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[723] Christopher Dodd, "What My Father Saw At Nuremberg", October 1, 2006 accessed at http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q=node/3648/print Internet accessed September 8, 2007.
[724] "Like Father Like Son", *Newsweek,* 8 June 2009, 2.
[725] Ibid.
[726] Dodd and Bloom, *Letters*, 60.
[727] Dodd and Bloom, Letters, 8.

Concluding Assessment of Thomas Dodd's Career and Influence

In the nascent stages of the Cold War when President Harry Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and their trusted bureaucratic apparatus built the American foundation of the Cold War with the Truman Doctrine and National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68), and intervened in Korea, Tom Dodd was already a "professional" anticommunist and this vocation defined his political identity. Throughout his career Dodd was unable to overcome his devout Catholicism and experience as a prosecutor at Nuremberg, which cemented in his mind the notion that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were expansionist, totalitarian, and inherently evil political regimes that differed only on ideological lines.[728] His belief in an "international communist conspiracy" ensured that his preoccupation with foreign policy overshadowed his very progressive stances on domestic issues. While the conspiratorial notion of a worldwide communist offensive permeated the Executive Branch, Congress, the State and Defence departments, and the fabric of American culture in the post-war era, Dodd's visceral Roman Catholicism and career experiences prior to entering public office

[728] Bass, 32.

tethered him to this ideological framework more than other members of Congress. In the foreign policy sphere, Dodd never wavered from the philosophy he formed in his early life, derived from Munich and experiences in Nuremberg. He entered Congress with his ideas rigidly formulated. As the Cold War progressed, the political and cultural upheaval in the United States and in developing countries during the 1960s came to a head, Dodd veered right and held to hardline Cold War positions similar to conservative Republicans and right-wing Southern Democrats.

The obsessive anticommunism which defined Senator Dodd's career in Congress distracted him from the social issues for which he showed concern, and where his brilliant oratorical skills would have been more useful. Had the Cold War not evolved the way it did, it is possible that Tom Dodd would have carved out an illustrious career fulfilling the dream of the Great Society he shared with LBJ since their days administering New Deal programs. Those anticommunist blinders Dodd wore caused him to view political currents in the "third world" through a very narrow prism. Dodd wore the same ideological blinders as many other American policy makers during the cold war, but, due to his devout Catholicism and shattering experiences at Nuremberg, they were narrower and the lens through which Dodd viewed the world was tighter. Unlike many others in the Democratic Party who broke from the cold war orthodoxy and gradually called into question the tenets driving Cold War foreign policy by the mid 1960s - J.

William Fulbright, Eugene McCarthy, Robert Kennedy and other prominent voices within the Democratic Party such as Clark Clifford - Dodd never demurred from the hard line views he held when he entered Congress. In fact, Dodd supported every major American foreign policy manoeuvre in the Cold War except in the Congo. He was a major proponent in the exercise of American hegemony abroad, fervently supporting covert operations and interventions that led to destabilization and the overthrow of democratically elected governments in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, along with the overt expressions of American dominance in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. Furthermore, Dodd's stealth backing of ruthless opposition leaders such as Forbes Burnham of British Guiana and Carlos Castillo Armas of Guatemala and open support of the manipulative Moise Tshombe represent the nadir of his tenure in Congress.

Dodd also bears some direct responsibility for the tragedy of the American war in Vietnam, and for thwarting the democratic processes of sovereign states in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia in violation of international law.[729] Moreover, the anticommunist path Dodd chose led him to areas of the world acutely affected by the leftist nationalism and the prospect of communist revolution. In these countries, Dodd met people from whom he would profit

[729] The number of U.S. military personnel from Connecticut killed in Vietnam is documented at 611 or 612 depending on the source. Dodd's vote for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution illustrates his legislative role in authorizing Congressional support for the intensification of the "conflict."

financially. Both of these factors reaffirmed Dodd's anticommunist zeal and exacerbated his descent into political corruption.

In the context of American foreign relations, Dodd was an activist and resident anti-communist spokesperson in Congress throughout the 1960s for various foreign dictators, a critic of left-wing anti-colonial nationalists, and a loyal defender of questionable overt and clandestine U.S. interventions in a range of countries spanning the globe. Unfortunately, Dodd's personal interests overlapped with his positions on foreign and domestic policy matters, causing him to urge U.S. support for some of the world's most unsavoury dictators whom he barely knew, in countries about which he understood even less. The leaders of foreign countries for whom Dodd offered his rhetorical support in Congress were, for the most part, right-wing anticommunist capitalist oligarchs or military strongmen: Carlos Castillo Armas of Guatemala, Anastasio Somoza Debalye of Nicaragua, Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran, Phoumi Nosavan of Laos and Moise Tshombe. In nearly all cases, the domestic interests of these potentates dovetailed with the goals of the U.S. government and multi-national corporations, to increase access to foreign markets and extend American empire abroad.[730] It is crucial to note, however, that although Dodd was primarily motivated to support Third World dictators based on their anticommunist credentials, and/or the value they offered to his personal interests,

[730] Guyana's Forbes Burnham was perhaps the only "leftist" in the group of anti-communist dictators who counted on Dodd for support in the U.S. Senate. Though Burnham espoused a brand of moderate socialism, anti-democratic authoritarianism characterized his brutal 30 year rule.

he also firmly believed in the supremacy of American corporations in the third world, and the importance of these small countries to the American imperial project. But while economic factors have underscored American imperialism since the late 19th century, Dodd was primarily motivated in foreign relations by what Michael Parenti called the "anticommunist impulse", not economic imperialism. Nevertheless, individuals and organizations that pursued U.S. economic interests in other countries could always count on Tom Dodd to see most left-leaning anti-colonialists to be communists, and to support clandestine operations to undermine their authority. However, even his own son said that by the end of his life Tom Dodd was beginning to agree that the U.S. was being "held up by petty dictators who threatened to go communist," if they did not get what they wanted from Americans.[731]

On the other hand, in the domestic sphere, Dodd remained committed to the principles of FDR's New Deal, which undergirded his early political philosophy as an active Democratic Party volunteer and student at Providence College and Yale. As a prosecutor in the Department of Justice, Dodd travelled to various parts of the country and bore witness to the racial and class exploitation permeating the fabric of American society at that time. For the most part during his tenure in Congress, Dodd voted with fellow Democrats to extend the New Deal to cover public health

[731] Thomas Dodd Family Oral History Project, Interview with Christopher Dodd, 9 July 1976, 8.

insurance (Medicare and Medicaid), higher social security benefits and minimum wage increases, public education and Head Start programs, housing, mass transit, improved educational opportunities for the poor, improved cultural life through endowments in the Arts and Humanities, and crucially, civil rights and voting rights for minorities. Moreover, Dodd's determined pursuit in the Senate for tougher gun control legislation, which drew scorn from individuals on the political right, was one of his most significant achievements. He played a critical role in the passage of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and in the passage of some of the most important domestic legislation of the twentieth century as components of the New Frontier and the Great Society that ameliorated conditions for millions of Americans, and provided future generations with hard-fought rights and beneficial programs codified in law. On his death, the *Hartford Courant* published an obituary observing accurately that "Many of the crusades upon which Mr. Dodd embarked first focused nation-wide attention upon conditions and issues that were to become our priorities. Juvenile delinquency, drug-abuse, civil rights, crime and gun controls were among these...and giving no quarter until he had seen the cause through to the end."[732]

Dodd's progressive streak in the domestic sphere is laudable, but when weighing his historical legacy, these accomplishments must be juxtaposed against

[732] Quoted in Christopher Dodd and Larry Bloom, *Letters*, 60.

his stances on American foreign relations, and his activities in the developing world. For instance, can Dodd, a winner of the NAACP's "brotherhood" award be regarded as a champion of black causes when he supported Katanga secessionist Moise Tshombe, a pro-white member of the oligarchy who pandered to Belgian colonial interests against the currents of Pan-African Black Nationalism? Or, when he paternalistically excoriated Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) leader, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., for his anti-administration position and "ill-advised adventure into foreign affairs" at the height of the war in Vietnam? In counterpoint, many of Dodd's speeches and press releases were peppered with pejorative terms such as "primitive", "savage", "witchcraft" and "cannibalism" when he wanted to whip up public opinion against his communist opponents in Africa.

Within the U.S., the disastrous course of the war in Vietnam weakened the thrust of Great Society reforms and presented the Democratic Party with a damaging internecine crisis; but abroad, the effects of American foreign policy were particularly grievous, as they detrimentally altered the course of history in many countries and produced negative social, political, and economic effects that continue through to the present day.

Notwithstanding his censure by the Senate in 1967, if historians were to assess Dodd's legacy based only on his pre-political career in New Deal

organizations, in the Justice Department and at Nuremberg, as well as his major domestic achievements in Congress, most fair-minded analysts would view the "Connecticut Crusader's" record as favourable. Unfortunately, Dodd's virulent anticommunism dominated his philosophical perspective, pushing domestic liberal pursuits into to the background. He became defined by his "professional" anticommunism that seeped through into his committee work on domestic matters. For a time, Dodd's ferocious anticommunism dovetailed with the aggressive direction of American foreign relations. If "the long arm of McCarthyism had reached out to grab [Lyndon] Johnson, holding him a hostage to the legacy of the 1950s", it also snarled Dodd, but it did so in a different way.[733] Believing that any inroads on any continent by supposedly communist or socialist forces represented a grave threat to the security of the United States, Dodd was closer to Congressional "hardliners" like Republicans Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon on the topic of Cold War foreign relations. Dodd summarized his hard-line views and lack of respect for the sovereignty and self-determination of other nations when commenting on the CIA role in the Guatemalan and Iranian coups he stated, as noted earlier: "It [the CIA] inflicted two great defeats on the Communists and thereby saved two vital countries from slipping into the Communist orbit. Is this something we should apologize for? No, on the contrary it is something of which

[733] William C. Berman, *William Fulbright and the Vietnam War: The Dissent of a Political Realist* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1988), 197.

every American should be proud."[734] On June 1, 1965 Dodd made his hawkish views completely clear when he told members of a CIA Mid-Career Development Course that "If your Agency did have anything to do with this episode [the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala] then it fulfilled its function well." Similarly, he referenced U.S. covert operations in Iran by noting "nor do I know whether your Agency played any part in assisting the patriotic Iranians who rescued their country from the lunatic Mossadegh regime in 1953...but here again, if what has been said about the role played by your agency is true, I truly believe that you deserve the gratitude of every American and every freedom-loving person."[735]

He was also a practitioner of hard-line anticommunism at home, often using his platform in the U.S. House of Representatives (1953-1957) and the Senate (1959-1971) to warn the American public of the threat posed by the international communist conspiracy, investigate U.S. citizens and groups he suspected of pro-communist subversion, and provide key Congressional support for the hawkish foreign policy decisions crafted by policy makers in the Executive Branch, State Department, Pentagon, and in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[736]

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[734] Dodd quoted in Stephen M. Streeter, *Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala 1954-1961* (Athens Ohio: Ohio University Centre for International Studies, 2001), 248.
[735] Dodd Papers, Speech "The Role of the C.I.A. in the World Today", June 1, 1965. Administrative and Legislative Files, Box 202, Folder 5210.
[736] Bass, 31.

Most significantly, Dodd's actions throughout the 1960s on behalf of the administration of his long-time friend, President Lyndon Baines Johnson, affected the dynamics of the Senate during that period of the Cold War. In his ferocious attacks on Democratic Senators who dissented from the Johnson agenda by gradually calling for more debate on U.S. commitments abroad, Dodd reached back into the history of World War II, likening these "new isolationists" to adherents of "the discredited record of appeasement" and asserted they were guilty of "timidity and retreat."[737] But as Clark Clifford observed, "The hawks argued that America's worldwide strength and credibility were on the line in Vietnam, which was not true. They argued that Vietnam was another Munich, which was not true."[738] Dodd was, to an even greater degree than the majority of his counterparts in the Democratic Party, unable to distinguish nationalist movements in the developing world from the Marxist or "communist" leadership in the Soviet Union and China. Dodd was unable to grasp the reality that political developments in countries such as Cuba, Vietnam, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, British Guiana and the Congo were rooted in anti-colonialism and revolutionary nationalism, owing more to local historical, social, and cultural nuances than to the bipolar military and economic viewpoint largely scripted in the corridors of power

[737] "The Communist Penetration of Africa" Remarks of Senator Dodd before the National Strategy Seminar 1965, Town Hall, New York, New York, 16 March, 1965.
[738] Clifford, 613.

in Washington and Moscow. He was unable to see that Vietnam was not another Munich.

The tragedy of Tom Dodd's career is not only his well-documented descent into political corruption; importantly his obsession with communism, understandable as it is, and efforts to undermine progressive democratic leaders in countries on the periphery of the American empire, constitute an indelible stain on his historical legacy. Dodd was one of the prime offenders of Gabriel Kolko's charge that the United States "marched into the future armed with the assumptions and institutions it had formulated in 1945, with scant insight into how the world was changing profoundly or the dangers of its responses."[739]

As well, Dodd's intransigence contributed to the breakdown on the Senate Cold War consensus, and to the fissures that disrupted the Democratic Party and its supporters. The refusal to back down on Vietnam and the intervention in the Dominican Republic, both strongly supported by Dodd, created the "credibility gap" between what the American government said and what it did. It weakened the Democratic Party and paved the way for Richard Nixon's victory in 1968, a triumph that was impossible to consider after Johnson's landslide victory over Barry Goldwater in 1964 which was "one of the greatest defeats in political

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[739] Kolko, 39.

history" and "turned conservatives into pariahs."[740] Following Johnson's failure and Hubert Humphrey's defeat, however, Republican "Western conservatives – some admittedly more conservative and more Western than others – held the White House for twenty of the next twenty four years."[741]

Furthermore, in the years since 1968, (mostly Republican) neo-conservatives in the United States have waged a lengthy battle to roll back the gains for underprivileged and middle and working-class Americans that were achieved by Tom Dodd and other Democrats through the New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier and Great Society. Despite his achievements, Tom Dodd inadvertantly played a key role in assisting his opponents negating his party's goals. The current neo-conservatives' long-term strategy has been simplified by the Cold War liberal Democrats' costly adventures in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America, which took both funding and attention from the key domestic policies, created divisiveness, and undermined the creation of a more equitable America. But neoconservatives are not the only group to blame for the ills plaguing American foreign relations. The liberal democratic descendants of Tom Dodd's generation have continued to support risky endeavours in the Cold War, and have yet to learn the lessons of Vietnam and the Cold War failures described at length in this essay. Although his son Christopher Dodd challenged the Reagan administration's

[740] John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge. *The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America*. Toronto: Penguin Books 2005, 57.
[741] Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 64.

incursions into Latin America in the 1980s, he (along with the vast majority of his Democratic Party counterparts) voted in favour of the authorization of military force against Iraq in 2002. This intervention continues to egregiously impact civilian and military populations in Iraq and the U.S., and to drain U.S. fiscal resources which could be better spent on more pressing domestic issues. The generation of Democrats who built their careers in the aftermath of Vietnam are now dealing with their own tragedy and failure to understand the complexities permeating countries either not ready or not willing to embark on building American-style democracies.

Implications for Historiography

A study of Tom Dodd's career is significant because, as Senator Daniel Moynihan wrote, "the neglect of Congressional history is something of a scandal in American scholarship."[742] Robert David Johnson, a leading scholar on the role of Congress during the Cold War notes "historians of U.S. foreign relations are a long way from solving the mystery of Congress's role in U.S. Cold War policy."[743] This is, Johnson argues, primarily due to a lack of research and analysis on the role Congress played throughout the Cold War, as historians have tended to "overlook" Congress, in favour of studies on the executive branch and State Department.

[742] Quoted in Robert David Johnson, "Congress and the Cold War", *Journal of Cold War Studies* vol. 3 2 (Spring 2001): xxiii.
[743] Robert David Johnson, "Congress and the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies* vol. 3 2 (Spring 2001): 100.

Moreover, as Johnson notes, new historians researching members of Congress encounter "practical concerns" relating to funding, travel, and have potential research projects derailed by the degree to which archives vary in quality.[744] The issue of copyright ownership is acute in the case of Dodd. The Senator's surviving family members own the rights and access to his papers at the University of Connecticut, and have the authority to restrict access to the papers and block publications as they see fit.

The path-breaking work of Robert Johnson challenges the commonly-held view that members of Congress were not major players in the trajectory of Cold War policy. Johnson demonstrates "that the executive had to devote more time and energy to coping with the assertiveness of ...legislators than has been recognized previously."[745] Dodd is a prime example of a Senator who found ways to participate in the Cold War discourse and have a major impact on the direction of American foreign policy. That policy during the Cold War benefitted certain wealthy countries (such as Germany and Japan) but had a devastating impact on "Third World" countries dragged into the conflict. As such, this study challenges the "triumphalist" school of Cold War historiography that casts the bipolar conflict as an American success story.

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[744] Johnson, 76-79.

[745] Peter Lowe, "Review of Congress and the Cold War", *The American Historical Review* Volume 112, Number 4 (October 2007): 1205.

Dodd was incorrectly viewed as a minor player in the Senate on domestic and foreign policy matters, but in fact, with regard to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and American intervention in British Guiana, the Congo, Guatemala, Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, he was, at different times and in different contexts, a key figure. For example, in the case of British Guiana historian Carey Fraser observed that the Kennedy Administration made decisions with one eye on Congressional opinion, and Dodd "a rapidly anti-Communist senior senator with the authority to embarrass the administration, co-authored a letter to Kennedy with Senator Ernest Gruening (R-Alaska) in which they questioned the administration's policy toward British Guiana.[746] Historian Edward C. Keefer, in a recent edition of *Diplomatic History*, reviewed the series of books published with transcripts from the tapes made during Johnson's presidency. Keefer notes that what these transcripts "show unequivocally is that initially he [Johnson] did not rely solely or even primarily, upon Kennedy's foreign policy advisers for advice and counsel, but rather turned to his oldest friends and colleagues from the Senate and beyond."[747] Again, this recent information makes it clear that it is important to assess the influence of Senators such as Dodd and other key policymakers in any analysis of U.S. foreign relations.

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[746] Cary Fraser, "'The New Frontier' of Empire in the Caribbean: The Transfer of Power in British Guiana, 1961-1964", *International History Review* Vol. 22, No. 3 (September 2000), 586.

[747] Edward C. Keefer, "LBJ Calling", *Diplomatic History* (January 2010): 198. Keefer points out that only slowly did Dean Rusk, and particularly Robert McNamara gain influence with the President, but ultimately LBJ did rely on McNamara's advice.

Secondly, a study of Senator Dodd's career raises issues about the question of power in Cold War analysis. As historian H.W. Brands observed in the journal *Diplomatic History*, the early Cold War historians almost always focused on the key powerful leaders, but during the 1960s there was a turn away from political and diplomatic history, and social and cultural factors dominated historians' analyses.[748] Although there are still sceptics, Brands, in a review of four new books focused on power and the Cold War, indicates "historians who examine power today can do so with greater confidence than any time in the last forty years that their work will receive a fair hearing." [749] As this study of Dodd's influence and career indicates, the focus on significant powerful individuals is both important and revealing, and as Brands observes when it comes to Cold War analysis "Historians – particularly historians of power – need to keep working."[750]

Thirdly, although the Nuremberg Trials of 1945-46 account for Thomas Dodd's virulent anticommunism, this study does confirm "the triumphalist account" of the Trials that "dominates the literature."[751] Essentially, this view is that the trials represented a liberal triumph is which Western prosecutors demanded that the Nazis receive a fair trial and this development "ushered in new era of

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[748] H.W. Brands "A Question of Power – and a Partial Answer", *Diplomatic History* 33 1 (January 2009): 166.
[749] Ibid.
[750] Brands, 171.
[751] Francine Hirsch, "The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda, and the Making of Postwar Order." American Historical Review Volume 113, Number 3 (June 2008):701

international human rights."[752] Most Western accounts describe Soviet involvement, as did Tom Dodd, as "the Achilles heel" of the trials.[753] Historians such as Francine Hirsch in the excellent article "The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda, and the Making of Postwar Order" use recently released Soviet documents to make a strong case that Soviet involvement was more complex and nuanced than previously known. Nevertheless, Hirsch admits that, as Dodd continually complained in correspondence, "the Russian archival record leaves no question that the Soviet Regime...envisioned Nuremberg as a 'show trial'" and made a significant effort to control the Soviet legal team throughout the process; the Soviet team was under surveillance and taking direction from home.[754] The Soviet chief prosecutor Rudenko was recruited by Stalin based on his experience in "show trials" of engineers and mine managers in the Ukraine in the 1930s. Stalin and Molotov were furious when three of the Nazi defendants were found not guilty because Soviet leaders assumed this was yet another "show trial" with a preconceived outcome resulting in the execution of the Nazi defendants, or "Hitlerites" as the Soviets termed it.[755] This recent archival evidence supports Dodd's view that the Soviets were uninterested in a fair trial which in turn increased his animosity toward them.

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[752] Ibid.
[753] Dodd and Bloom, 341.
[754] Hirsch, 703.
[755] Hirsch, 710,726.

Hirsch also makes it clear, however, that Dodd and the other Western prosecutors "alienated the USSR and exacerbated postwar tensions"[756] by permitting incriminating evidence of Russian atrocities to be admitted in court, while preventing any such evidence against the other major powers from being introduced. From the Soviet perspective, they were "double-crossed" by the British and Americans like Tom Dodd who allowed the German defence of their crimes to become a forum for attacking the USSR. Given Dodd's loathing of the Russians as documented in this study, it is not surprising this betrayal occurred and an apparent anti-Soviet agenda was a component of the Western prosecution of the trials. The Nuremberg Trials were, therefore, one of the early battles of the Cold War and helped to establish the enmity between the United States and the Soviet Union – an outcome that suited Tom Dodd.

Revisionist studies and new archival evidence has not revised the triumphalist narrative outlined by Dodd. In fact, in her recent study *The Sun Climbs Slow: The International Criminal Court and the Struggle for Justice*, Erna Paris notes that present day Germans are the world's strongest supporters of Nuremberg's "daughter" the International Criminal Court. Justice Jackson's and Tom Dodd's "vision of justice also informed the Nuremberg Principles that

[756] Hirsch, 727.

emerged from these landmark trials: the legal and philosophical standards that have helped to shape international criminal justice in the postwar West."[757]

Fourthly, this study makes it clear that religion continues to be an underestimated factor in Cold War analysis. The critical impact of Dodd's devout Roman Catholicism, which played out in his fear of atheistic Communism, biased his view against anti-colonial and nationalist movements, and mandated his intransigent support for Catholic regimes and populations in Guatemala, British Guiana, the Dominican Republic and particularly for the Diem regime in Vietnam and Moise Tshombe in the Congo (where Dodd was very concerned about the fate of Catholic missionaries in Katanga).[758] Dodd's conviction that the Cold War was a life-and-death struggle with a ruthless, atheistic movement that threatened to be another Nazi Germany meant he could not compromise on Vietnam and there was no consideration, on his part, for the rationale of dissenters and critics within the United States. Nobel Prize winner Dr. Linus Pauling and even Dr. Martin Luther King aroused Dodd's suspicions because of their efforts to find peaceful resolutions with the communist nations.

Historians now are re-examining the critical role that religion, as well as political, economic, security, military and cultural factors, played in the origins and

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[757] Erna Paris, 174.

[758] See Thomas J. Dodd, *Freedom and Foreign Policy*, 88-89. Dodd claimed twenty five Catholic missionaries and their assistants were massacred in Katanga by the National Congolese Army in early 1962, and blamed the UN for allowing this to occur.

development of the Cold War. Of particular significance was the publishing in 2008 of William C. Inboden's *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment.*[759] Inboden, Senior Vice President of the Legatum Institute for Global Development, and former senior director for strategic planning at the National Security Council under George W. Bush, "illuminates a surprisingly underestimated element of U.S. diplomacy in the early Cold War years."[760] The book is the focus of a lengthy roundtable discussion (really a series of reviews and Inboden's response) in the April 2009 edition of *Passport*, and a review in the December 2009 edition of *The American Historical Review.* Whether one accepts his controversial thesis that the Cold War was a religious crusade and that "balance of power realities, security concerns, and political and economic ideology are 'insufficient' because "they ignore God" is not the crucial issue.[761] More significant is that religion was, as in the case of Tom Dodd, an important factor in the foreign policy stances and decisions made during the Cold War. According to Inboden, President Truman viewed the Cold War as a battle between "nations who believed in God and morality, and those who did not" [762] and he tried to create an anti-communist alliance between different Protestant

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[759] William C. Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
[760] Laura A. Belmonte, "Review of William C. Inboden" *Passport,* 40, no. 1 (April 2009): 18.
[761] Inboden, 4.
[762] Inboden, 107.

groups and the Catholic Church – an enterprise he abandoned in frustration in 1951.

Seth Jacobs, in his review of Inboden's book, recounts that what really struck him as he reviewed government documents was how often U.S. policymakers "justified their decision 'to sink or swim' with Diem on religious grounds" and they "repeatedly cited his Catholicism as proof of his anticommunism, equated his devotion to the Catholic Church with allegiance to the free world" and dismissed the other religious groups in Vietnam as unreliable allies simply because of their religious beliefs.[763] Fortunately, Jacobs' thesis supervisor and other mentors supported his work to bring a religious explanation to Cold War analysis, even though as Andrew Preston noted in the November 2006 *Diplomatic History* "standard historiographical guides to the field of diplomatic history" did not include religion among the "methodological and theoretical schools to explain what drives American foreign policy."[764] Jacobs agrees with Inboden's assertion that Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles and other members of the American elite "were profoundly concerned with the religious component of foreign policy, even if diplomatic historians have, until recently, neglected it."[765] As this study shows, Tom Dodd can be added to that list of American

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[763] Seth Jacobs, Review of William Inboden, *Passport*, Volume 40, Issue 1 (April 2009): 23.
[764] Jacobs quoting Preston, *Passport*, 23.
[765] Jacobs, 27.

policymakers who were profoundly concerned with the religious component of foreign policy.

Significantly, Inbolden emphasises that a key point in his book is that "religion helps explain why the United States and Soviet Union pivoted so quickly form their posture as uneasy allies…to a posture as uneasy adversaries... establishing the boundaries of their own inchoate conflict.[766] Inboden, while acknowledging and responding to the criticisms in the reviews, hopes "their diversity testifies to the potential for continued lines of inquiry into the role of religion in diplomatic history."[767] This echoes Preston's hope that religion might take its place among the "rubrics, such as culture and race, that diplomatic historians employ to explain policy formulation."[768] This study of the religious origins of Tom Dodd's uncompromising, militant anticommunism indicates that historians indeed have a fertile religious field to explore for the Cold War years after 1960 and that religion must be considered in any analysis of Cold War events.

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[766] William Inboden, Author's Response, *Passport*, 40, no. 1 (April 2009): 28.
[767] Inboden, *Passport*, 27.
[768] Jacobs, 24.

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