

THE QUEBEC GENERAL ELECTION
OF 1962

by
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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts.

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August 1963.

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PREFACE

In recent years, social scientists, as well as politicians, have been studying Quebec with renewed interest. Our knowledge about many aspects of Quebec politics and French-Canadian society is still scanty, and the result is that even graduate students can feel capable of adding something to the sum of this knowledge. It is not for me, of course, to claim any such distinction for my own thesis, but this factor did influence me to choose the Quebec election of 1962 as my subject.

The completion of this thesis would have been impossible without the assistance, cooperation, and advice of many others. To Professor Saul Frankel, my director of studies, I owe the original suggestion that I write on the Quebec election, using the Nuffield College, Oxford series of monographs on postwar British general elections as my methodological model; I am also very grateful for his constant advice on how to improve the content and style of the manuscript. Professor Michael Oliver gave me valuable bibliographical references as well as factual information about the role of the New Democratic Party in the 1962 Quebec election.

Interviews were a most vital source of information. The discussion of the role of the left in the election is in large part based upon an interview with Professor Charles Taylor of McGill University. I am also indebted to Professor Raymond Breton of McGill University and Mr. Serge Rousseau, members of Le Groupe de Recherches Sociales, for discussing with me the still unpublished second survey of political attitudes in Quebec conducted by Le Groupe. The bulk of my information about party organization and publicity was obtained in lengthy interviews with Mr. Maurice Sauvé, M.P. for the Magdalen Islands and one of the most important figures in the

Quebec Liberal Federation, and with Mr. Fernand Girard, Secretary-General of the Union Nationale. Their frankness and willingness to make available to me various party documents greatly facilitated my research. I also discussed the election with a number of organizers and officials of both parties, most of them prefer to remain unnamed, and gained from them information about and insight into the workings of constituency campaigns. Mr. Roland Martel of the Collyer Advertising Agency in Montreal spent several hours giving me detailed information about the Liberal party's public relations campaign in 1962.

I must also acknowledge the kind assistance of the Minister of Natural Resources of Quebec, Mr. René Lévesque, for making available to me, in the midst of the campaign, a portfolio of speeches and articles dealing with the nationalization of electricity. Mr. René Therrien, Director of Public Relations of Hydro Quebec, gave me full access to his department's files on the nationalization issue.

I would like to express my thanks to my friends, Mr. Daniel Trevick and Mr. Michael Stein, for reading parts of the manuscript and suggesting alterations. My brother, David Citrin, helped in compiling the statistics and advised on the form of their presentation. My father, Mr. Walter Citrin, read and reread the final manuscript, suggesting corrections and revisions. Without his help and that of Miss Lee Rubin, whose constant encouragement and help in typing and rewriting the manuscript was invaluable, this thesis could not have been successfully completed. Needless to say, I am solely responsible for whatever errors or mistakes in judgment that appear in the text.

INTRODUCTION

This study of the Quebec general election of 1962 is undertaken in the conviction that "elections are of fundamental importance in any democratic society, constituting almost the only occasions when the power of the citizen is brought to bear directly and formally upon his rulers."¹ General elections, in a democracy, decide who is to rule and on what terms; every general election, therefore, is a potential turning point in national history. For this reason, if for no other, psephology is an important part of political science.

Elections have been analyzed in several ways, the researcher's choice of method depending upon his interests and purposes.² This thesis is modeled upon the Nuffield College monographs on British general elections.³ The methodological approach of the Nuffield studies is founded upon the authors' belief that "the main reason for examining what happens during elections lies in their importance as political and historical events, and in the way in which they reveal new aspects of party politics."⁴ I have followed the Nuffield model in adopting what has been called the "structural-functional" approach to the study of politics, giving primary attention to the mechanics of the 1962 Quebec election campaign.

1. D.E. Butler, The Study of Political Behaviour, London, The Macmillan Co., 1958, P.68.

2. For a short discussion of another method of studying elections, see the Note on Methodology at the end of this introduction.

3. There have been five such studies, beginning with R.B. McCallum and A. Readman, The British General Election of 1945, London, The Macmillan Co., 1947. I owe a special debt to the latest book in the series, D.E. Butler and R. Rose, The British General Election of 1959, London, The Macmillan Co., 1960. J.H. Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962, is also modeled on the Nuffield's monographs. M. Duverger, F. Goguel, and J. Touchard, Les Elections Françaises du 2 Janvier 1956, Paris, Armand Colin, 1957, is a methodical and detailed analysis on the same lines.

4. D.E. Butler and R. Rose, op.cit., p.4.

The Nuffield model places primary emphasis on the description of party activities, discussing the procedure for the nomination of candidates, evaluating the role of party organization, and assessing the quality of party propaganda. This focus is understandable, for in parliamentary democracies of the British type, where cabinet government prevails, political parties are the organizations most significantly involved in the conduct of election campaigns, and elections tend to be party-oriented rather than candidate-oriented as is the case, for example, in the United States. The Nuffield model, therefore, can be readily applied to the study of elections in Quebec, and I have followed it as closely as possible in the belief that this approach yields fruitful insights into the nature of elections and party politics in this province.

Special attention has also been paid to the role of modern campaign techniques in the 1962 Quebec election. Both professional politicians and academic students of politics have recognized that the impact of the media of mass communications and the development of professional public relations techniques are transforming the nature of political campaigning. I intend to analyze the reaction of political parties in Quebec to the development of "modern" methods of electioneering, pointing to the major contrasts and important similarities in the response of Liberal and Union Nationale parties.⁵

5. There has been some discussion of this subject, particularly in reference to television in politics, in other election studies. D.E. Butler and R. Rose, op.cit., include several chapters on these problems. There has been more discussion of the subject in America, where these modern techniques originated. See T.H. White, The Making of the President 1960, New York, Doubleday & Co., 1961, and J.S. Kelley, Professional Public Relations and Political Power, Baltimore, John Hopkins, 1954. Numerous articles have also dealt with this problem, albeit in a more impressionistic manner.

My study, again following Butler and Rose, is divided into three parts. The first consists of a brief description of the events leading up to the election; the second, and major portion, discusses the campaign on the provincial level; and the concluding section deals with the election results, placing these in historical perspective and attempting to verify certain hypotheses about voting patterns in Quebec. It has, however, been impossible to follow the Nuffield model as closely as I would have wished. The studies of the British general elections were the result of the research of many, whereas this thesis is the product of one student. I have, therefore, been unable to investigate fully certain aspects of the 1962 election; I have omitted, for example, any discussion of selected constituency campaigns. In this connection, however, The British General Election of 1959 is more complete than the earlier studies of the Nuffield series, and future studies of elections in Quebec can similarly be expanded and refined.

A more serious problem was posed by the paucity of published material on political parties and elections in Canada. Until very recently, historians' descriptions of federal and provincial elections and some discussion of voting patterns constituted the sum total of research in this aspect of Canadian politics. Meisel's The Canadian General Election of 1957, therefore, represents a landmark in this field of study. Little has been written on the Canadian party system and still less on party organization in Canada. I have, in these circumstances, been forced to rely heavily upon the limited quantity of party publications and upon interviews with party officials for information concerning electoral organization, party propaganda, and party finance. Unfortunately, it is party policy, in Quebec at least, to be somewhat uncommunicative when asked about such matters. For example, almost no information concerning

election expenses, information which, in Britain, the law requires to be published after an election, was forthcoming.

Much of my research, therefore, has consisted of compiling empirical data, and, again because of the gaps in our knowledge of French-Canadian politics, lengthy passages of what follows have had to be purely descriptive, rather than critical, in style. The primary purposes of this study are to contribute some empirical knowledge about party politics in Quebec and to demonstrate that a particular methodological approach to the study of elections can be fruitfully applied to the analysis of elections in Quebec. I would be happy if this thesis were to act, in some small way, as a guide to further studies of parties and elections in Quebec.

NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

Examples of the most important alternative method of studying elections are P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice, 2nd ed., New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, B. R. Berelson, P. R. Lazarsfeld and W. N. McPhee, Voting, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954, A. Campbell, G. Gurin, and W. E. Miller, The Voter Decides, Evanston, Ill., ~~Mc~~ Petersen, 1954, and R. S. Milne, and H.C. Mackenzie, Straight Fight, London, The Hansard Society, 1954. These studies are more concerned with the psychology of voting than with the election seen as an incident in the larger political life of a community, concentrating on an extremely detailed examination of how people made up their minds in an election campaign, with primary emphasis on how they were affected by exposure to the mass media of communications.

The methodological linchpin of this type of study is the panel design; a panel of respondents is carefully selected and interviewed at relatively

frequent intervals throughout the campaign. While the interview technique itself has defects, (as is pointed out by D. E. Butler, Political Behaviour, op.cit.) perhaps the major shortcoming of this approach to the study of elections is that its emphasis on the doctrine of social determinism tends to take the politics and of the study of electoral behaviour. It seems that the ultimate goal should be some sort of synthesis of this sort of microanalysis with the macroanalysis of studies on the Nuffield model. A detailed analysis of the broadest implications of Voting, The People's Choice, The Voter Decides, and Straight Fight is E. Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck eds. American Voting Behaviour, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1959, especially the following chapters: P. H. Rossi, "Four Landmarks in Voting Research," T. Parsons, "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," E. Burdick, "Political Theory and the Voting Studies," L. A. Fiedler, "Voting and Voting Studies," and V. O. Key Jr. and F. Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: the Case of Indiana."

CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND TO QUEBEC POLITICS

I

Classical democratic theory envisaged an electorate composed of educated, rational men, capable of understanding the issues at stake and eager to inform themselves before casting their votes. In this view, the election becomes the process of giving a particular candidate or party a mandate to carry out his or its policy on a specific issue. This conception likens the election to a referendum, but in practice the mandate theory of elections⁶ is rarely, if ever, an accurate description of reality. For there will always be great difficulty in obtaining general agreement concerning what precisely is at stake. Voters tend to create issues unforeseen by the political parties and new disagreements between the parties are engendered in the heat of the campaign. And, since "any fool can ask a question but to ask the right question and to ask it in the right way is another matter,"⁷ referendums often lead to the falsification of public opinion. The electorate is artificially divided into two massive blocks; the opponents of the proposal in question are offered no alternative to outright rejection; and the voters are subjected to the common psychological bias that tends to induce a positive response.

The difficulties of the mandate theory aside, the classical theory of democracy collapses because the articulate electorate it presupposes simply does not exist. Recent studies have confirmed this and have indicated that many voters are influenced more by a party's surface characteristics or by family voting traditions than by a rational consideration of policy statements.

6. The mandate theory was cited by Mr. Lesage as the justification for calling the "snap" election of 1962. His argument is discussed in a later chapter.

7. J.F.S. Ross, Elections and Electors, London, Edge, Spotworth & Co., 1955, p.23.

Furthermore, the pace and complexity of social, economic, and technological change has created a situation in which the greater majority of the electorate is incapable of understanding vital political issues. But, while conceding that empirical evidence refutes the classical theory of democracy, modern democrats continue to believe that periodic elections constitute the most important practical control which the ruled exercise over the rulers. These "neo-democrats" have altered the content given to the word democracy and have fashioned a new image of the common man.⁸ Admitting that the average citizen plays almost no part in the formulation and implementation of specific policies, they, nevertheless, insist that on election day the voters make the ultimate decision concerning the general course of government. And, although incapable of fully comprehending complex economic issues, for example, the average citizen retains the capacity to make a rational choice between two or more candidates, basing his decision upon an individual assessment of their character and political attitudes.

For the modern democrat too, therefore, the ability of the average voter to deliberate and choose rationally is fundamental to the validity of his theory. The intrusion of appeals to the irrational in modern election campaigns, the manipulative and monopolistic uses of the mass media, the undue influence of money on election results, and a host of unscrupulous election day activities have, therefore, created a double danger for democracy: that the electors'

8. The differences between classical democratic and "neo-democratic" theory have been widely discussed, usually in the face of an elitist attack. Examples of this literature are: C. Friedrich, The New Belief in the Common Man, Boston, John Day & Co., 1943; M. Duverger's conclusion to his Political Parties, 2nd ed., London, 1961; J. Plamenatz, "Election Studies and Democratic Theory", Political Studies, Vol 6, No. 1, Feb. 1958, p. 1-9.

deliberative process will not be rational, and that electoral corruption will prevent the true opinion of the majority from prevailing.⁹

It is, however, possible to formulate a set of criteria by which to determine and measure the democratic nature of a given election. First, the following basic conditions must be satisfied.

- a. There must be a campaign in which two or more parties compete, with at least two having a real chance to win.
- b. Both parties (there can, of course, be more than two) must appeal not only to their own supporters, but also to the supporters of their opponents and to the "floating" vote.
- c. The short-term goal of the competing parties must be to win the election, and the long-term objective, for the defeated parties in particular, to prepare to fight the next election.
- d. The election must be honest, i.e. there must be no question of "une élection faussée".

In the 1962 Quebec election, conditions a, b, and c above were clearly satisfied. Two parties, the Liberals and the Union Nationale, contested every constituency and there was no assurance that either party was a certain winner. The Liberals appealed to all supporters of the nationalization of electricity, whatever their party, while the Union Nationale appealed specifically to anti-nationalization Liberals and Social Credit supporters. And the results of the election left the Union Nationale with enough seats in the legislature to form a coherent opposition group. Having won more than 40% of the popular vote, the party was certainly in a position to work towards victory in future

9. This last danger has haunted Quebec. See P. Laporte, "Les Elections ne se font pas avec Les Prières" in Le Devoir, Oct. 1 - Dec. 7, 1956.

elections. As for condition d, the answer cannot be as conclusive. The campaign included the usual quota of scandals, accusations, and counter-accusations. A Union Nationale official told me that the Liberals had bought so many votes that only remarkable popular support for the Union Nationale had prevented the government party from winning 85 seats. In the same vein, a Liberal organizer noted that Mr. Johnson, in conceding defeat, had expressed "surprise" at the results. He speculated that what had surprised Mr. Johnson was the failure of his party's plan to "steal the election." These comments, however, should not be taken too seriously, and there has certainly been no evidence that the 1962 election results had been significantly affected by corruption.

Once the above conditions have been satisfied, the potential rationality of the voting decision is maximized:¹⁰

- i. when there is a high level of citizen participation at all social levels.
- ii. to the extent to which citizen participation is based on an understanding of the issues and the belief that the voting decision will have a real influence on the course of government.
- iii. when there is effective political deliberation and the existence of a meaningful choice. This is a particularly important factor, for irrational electioneering techniques will have a relatively smaller effect when there are real differences between the competing parties.
- iv. to the extent to which no monopoly of the mass media with a pervasive influence exists.

10. These criteria and much of the accompanying discussion are drawn from M. Janowitz and D. Marvick, Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent, Michigan Governmental Series No. 32, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1956, pp.1-11, R.A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1959, also puts forward conditions for a democratic election.

v. to the extent to which the influence of interpersonal pressures operate substantially independent of that of the mass media.

The technical means of investigating the degree to which factors i, ii, and v. prevailed in the Quebec election of 1962 were unavailable to me. I have, however, attempted to show that, with respect to factors iii and iv, the 1962 Quebec election must be considered a "democratic" election. These 5 criteria do not, however, touch on an extremely important element of a community's politics, its political culture. For the application of these "technical" criteria can be invalidated if a community's political culture is "anti-democratic."

Many students of French-Canadian politics have argued that Quebec's political culture has prevented the development of effective democratic government in the province. In "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec,"¹¹ Professor Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, a prominent exponent of this thesis, claims that French-Canadians have never believed in democracy as intrinsically valuable. Democratic institutions and practices, he continues, have, in Quebec, been appreciated not for the civil liberties they guarantee or for the opportunity citizens are given to participate in governing themselves, but for their usefulness in the struggle "pour la survivance nationale." And the "national" question has, since the hanging of Louis Riel, remained the fundamental issue in Quebec politics.

In any election, therefore, the party which seems the staunchest defender of the traditional rights and values of the French-Canadian nation

11. P.E. Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec," J.-C. Falardeau and M. Wade ed. Studies in Canadian Dualism, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1960. In La Grève de l'Amiante, Montreal, 1954, Prof. Trudeau points to the authoritarian bent of Quebec's traditional political ideology. The same point is made in M. Tremblay "Orientations Nouvelles de la Pensée Sociale" in J.-C. Falardeau ed. Essais sur le Québec Contemporain, Québec, Presses Universitaires Laval, 1953.

is voted into office. The victorious party is then reelected at successive elections until it has, in the eyes of the electorate, betrayed its nationalist trust. Thus, the Conservatives fell from grace when they allowed the hanging of Riel, the Liberals some fifty years later when the provincial wing of the party acquiesced in the increase of the federal government's powers during World War II while the federal Liberal Cabinet almost simultaneously introduced conscription.

The overriding influence of the "national" question has radically affected the working of the two-party system, and has also resulted in the resemblance of Quebec's politics to those of the U.S. South and of the newly-independent, under-developed nations of Africa and Asia.

In a more recent article, however, Professor Trudeau sees the democratic spirit developing in Quebec.¹² Earlier, he had blamed the widespread "incivisme"¹³ in Quebec on the purely instrumental conception of the values of democracy held by most French-Canadians, and had differed from other left wing writers in his continual emphasis on the need for "la démocratie d'abord."¹⁴ The optimism of his "Note sur la Conjoncture Politique" is based upon an evaluation of the results in Quebec of the 1958 and 1962 federal and the 1960 provincial elections.

In 1958, Quebec voted for the Progressive Conservative party, long considered an inveterate opponent of the "national" claims of French Canada. In Trudeau's eyes, "Québec avait enfin appris le premier postulat de toute action démocratique: Lorsqu'un gouvernement se prétend irremplaçable, c'est le signe certain qu'il doit être remplacé."¹⁵ The results of the 1960 provincial

12. P.-E. Trudeau, "Note sur la Conjoncture Politique, Cité Libre, No.49, Aug-Sept. 1962, pp.1-4.

13. P.-E. Trudeau, "Réflexions sur la politique au Canada Français," Cité Libre, No.3, Dec. 1952, p.5.

14. P.-E. Trudeau, "Un Manifeste Démocratique," Cité Libre, Oct. 1958 is the definitive presentation of this viewpoint.

15. P.-E. Trudeau, "Note sur la Conjoncture Politique," p.2.

election, for Trudeau, made clear that the government party could no longer base its claim to reelection solely upon its title of 'Defender of the French-Canadian Nation.' "Le Québec avait appris... que l'enjeu des élections n'est pas le simple remplacement d'une élite par une autre: c'est la substitution d'une idéologie politique (ou, plus précisément, d'une technique de gouvernement) à une autre."¹⁶ Finally, the success of Social Credit candidates in June 1962 is interpreted as proof that voters in Quebec have become capable of rejecting both the traditional elite and the "established" ideology, in order to focus upon the failure of these to cope with pressing economic and social problems.

Professor Trudeau's thesis is both interesting and plausible, but it is not necessary to accept its widest implications in order to agree that Quebec politics have been characterized by popular misunderstanding of the spirit of democracy. Studies of electoral corruption,¹⁷ exposes of administrative malpractices,¹⁸ and analyses of political and social thought in Quebec¹⁹ have made it clear that the essential principles of democratic government have often been ignored in Quebec. If Trudeau is right in his belief that the spirit of democracy is taking root in Quebec, then the manner in which the November 1962 election was conducted could have encouraged this favourable development. The future of democracy in Quebec is brighter to the extent to which the 1962 election was "democratic"²⁰ in character.

16. Ibid.

17. See P. Laporte's articles, op.cit., G. Dion and L. O'Neill, Le Chrétien et les Elections, Montreal, Les Editions de L'Homme, 1961, and J. Hamelin and M. Hamelin, Les Mœurs Electorales Dans le Québec, Montreal, Les Edition du Jour, 1962.

18. The inquiries of the Public Accounts Committee in 1935-36 and the Salvas Commission Report of Aug. 1962 provided many examples of such venality.

19. M. Oliver, The Social Political Ideas of French-Canadian Nationalists, 1920-45, unpublished Phd. thesis, McGill University, 1956, discusses anti-democratic patterns in French-Canadian thought.

20. The word democratic is used in the sense of Janowitz and Marvick, op.cit., as is explained infra. pp.7-8.

II

Postwar Quebec presented the statistician and observer with a series of paradoxes. In 1956, 69 percent of the province's population resided in urban areas, 36 percent living in metropolitan Montreal.²¹ Moreover, the province's rural population had increased by only 3.5 percent from 1951 to 1956, while urban population grew by 19.4 percent in the same period.²² Nevertheless, rural voters are heavily overrepresented in the provincial legislature, metropolitan Montreal being represented by only 17 members in the 95-seat Legislative Assembly.

The labour movement in Quebec grew rapidly in the 1950's and in 1959 the revenue derived from wages and salaries comprised 71 percent of the province's total personal income.²³ Yet Quebec's labour legislation remained primitive and repressive, and a sizable percentage of working-class voters consistently supported an anti-labour government.²⁴ Parliamentary institutions had a long history in Quebec, and elections were called at regular, four-year intervals, but mass participation in politics resembled that of spectators watching professional athletes compete. Citizens tended to see their relationship with the public authorities as a superior-inferior relationship, and a widely prevalent attitude was one of "reconnaissance envers le député."²⁵

21. Canada 1961, pp.36-37

22. Ibid.

23. Quebec Statistical Yearbook 1961, p. 637.

24. For some discussion of the Union Nationale's labour legislation, see H.F. Quinn, The Union Nationale Party, A Study of Nationalism and Industrialism in Quebec, unpublished Phd. thesis, Columbia University, New York, 1959.

25. By this is meant that many citizens felt that the social benefits of public expenditure accrued to them not by right but due to the benevolent activity of their MLA.

Most striking of all, however, was the gap between the economic and social system and the image of this system which underlay the "established" political ideology. Although the rapid industrialization of Quebec had begun early in the twentieth century, the province's intellectual and social elites sought to preserve belief in the traditional, rural values and way of life.²⁶ This reactionary tendency was reflected in political policy from time to time, as when a back-to-the-land colonization program emerged as the Taschereau regime's response to the Great Depression. Today, Daniel Johnson, Union Nationale Leader, talks of the need to preserve the rural electoral divisions because they are social and cultural entities embodying cherished values.²⁷

Capital investment in Quebec is predominantly controlled by foreigners and by the province's minority ethnic group; but, despite its advocacy of "national" rights, the French-Canadian elite has traditionally denied that widespread government economic activity can be a valid means of increasing the economic power of Quebec's majority ethnic group. Their emphasis on minor attacks on the dominant position of the English-Canadian in Quebec's economy, such as L'Achat Chez Nous movement of the 1930s, their continued insistence, in the face of social and economic change, that the occupations of farmer and small businessmen were most suitable for the average French-Canadian, and their stubborn maintenance of an educational system out of touch with the requirements of an industrial society make it clear that Quebec's traditional elite nostalgically favoured a return to a predominantly agricultural society. For the policies it advocated could only result in an even weaker position for French-Canadians in an industrial society.

26. H.F. Quinn, *op.cit.*, discusses this, pp.1-40

27. Mr. Johnson repeated this statement in his opening speech of the 1962 campaign at Amqui on Sept. 23. See L'Action Catholique, Sept 24, 1962, p.1.

Until 1959, the official ideology of Quebec's leaders and much of the province's economic and social legislation bore little relation to existing material conditions. In practice, however, both Liberal and Union Nationale governments abandoned the goal of a tradition-bound, rural society. Quebec's governments actively encouraged industrialization, but the enduring ideological bias against state interference in economic affairs influenced public policy in such a way as to help produce the loss of French-Canadian control over the management of Quebec's economy and the unmitigated exposure of large sections of the province's population to the ravages of rapid industrialization. Professor Trudeau has eloquently described the situation:²⁸

Nos idéologies, toutes faites de méfiance de l'industrialisation, de repliement sur soi, de nostalgie terrienne, ne correspondaient plus à notre éthos bousculé par le capital anonyme, sollicité par les influences étrangères, et émigré sans bagage dans un capharnaüm moderne où la famille, le voisinage, la paroisse-piliers traditionnels contre l'effondrement n'offraient plus le même support. Dans la société industrielle, telle que développée par le capitalisme, il fallait d'autres remèdes à l'ignorance, à l'insécurité, aux taudis, au chômage, à la maladie, à l'accident et à la vieillesse que l'école paroissiale, le bon voisinage, la charité individuelle, et l'initiative privée. Or notre pensée sociale n'avait jamais imaginé que des solutions tellement inadéquates à ces problèmes qu'elle avait réussi tout au plus à prendre corps dans les programmes écrits d'organismes artificiels, oiseux et débilitants. Quant à nos institutions vivantes, celles à qui leur essence même commandait à adhérer pragmatiquement à la réalité, elles devaient renoncer à toute idéologie, ou voir leur dynamisme sacrifié.

28. P-E. Trudeau, La Grève de l'Amiante, p.88.

In the late 1930s, however, the writings of several of the younger nationalists showed concern about the consequences of this gap between ideology and reality. Their very admission that "social" questions could be as vital as "national" issues constituted a significant departure from the conventional wisdom.²⁹ The Bloc Populaire was, in a sense, the political expression of this nascent intellectual movement, for its electoral program called for economic and social reforms as well as the maintenance of the rights of the French-Canadian nation. After World War II a group of "social nationalists" led by André Laurendeau found a home in Le Devoir. They ... recognized that there could be class conflict within the French-Canadian community and combined nationalist fervour with an awareness of and concern for the mounting social problems with which Quebec was confronted.

A left wing movement also gradually emerged after 1945. Many French-Canadian thinkers of the postwar generation were profoundly influenced by the left wing Catholic philosophy of Emmanuel Mounier, and, in 1952, several of this group combined with other left wing thinkers to found Cité Libre, the intellectual offspring of Mounier's Esprit.³⁰ Its mildly socialist editorial policy, the secular and sometimes anti-clerical tone of its articles, and its downgrading of the "national" question all served to alienate the Cité Libre group from the traditional intellectual elite.

These new schools of thought emphasized the intrinsic value of democratic institutions and attempted to encourage wider public understanding of the

29. M. Oliver, op.cit., gives a good account of the growth of "social nationalism."

30. I am indebted to Professor Charles Taylor for pointing out to me the influence of Mounier upon the Cité Libre group.

true meaning of the spirit of democratic government. Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, for example, played a leading role in the creation of the Rassemblement, an educational organization designed to promote popular belief in the values of democracy and to suggest solutions to Quebec's political and economic problems. This stress on "democratie d'abord" contrasts with the prewar popularity among intellectuals of corporatism and charismatic leadership.⁴¹ Robert Rumilly, a leading exponent of the traditional dogma, bemoaned the growing influence of the new ideas and attacked the "infiltration gauchiste" into such trusted institutions as Le Devoir, l'Action Nationale, l'Association Canadienne de la Jeunesse Catholique,⁴² and l'Union Catholique des Cultivateurs (U.C.C.).

The renaissance in French-Canadian political thought was paralleled by a general outburst of artistic and literary creativity. Here, too, artists and writers explored new themes, abandoning the traditional preoccupation with "le folklore." On an institutional level, a important development was the emergence of a vigorous labour movement. The Asbestos strike of 1949 marked the end of the Confederation of National Trade Unions' docility and led to a general upsurge of working-class consciousness. The new militancy of labour found expression in the anti-Duplessis political activity of the unions in the 1952 provincial election; and in 1961 the Quebec Federation of Labour decided to affiliate to the New Democratic Party, although the Catholic union federation has refrained from going this far. In 1956, following the revelation of large-scale electoral corruption in the provincial election of

41. For a discussion of the impact of corporatist ideas in Quebec see M. Oliver op.cit.

42. R. Rumilly, L'Infiltration Gauchiste au Canada Français, Montreal, Imprimé Pour L'Auteur, 1956.

that year,⁴³ a number of political morality leagues were organized on the municipal level. And, in the later 1950s, there was evidence that even sections of the historically ultra-conservative Catholic church hierarchy were advocating progressive reforms in Quebec's social legislation.⁴⁴

In the face of these developments and of the continuing transformation of Quebec's economic and social structure, Mr. Duplessis' Union Nationale government remained unmoved. Until his death in September 1959, the provincial government persevered in its laissez faire economic and social policies, rationalizing its actions by appeals to Quebec's nationalist dogma. The Union Nationale had been born in 1935 of an electoral alliance of the Action Libérale Nationale, independent nationalists, and the provincial wing of the Conservative party. The party first won office in 1936 on a program of radical economic and social reform, but Duplessis soon purged the party of its radicals and prevented the implementation of its campaign promises.⁴⁵ His self-avowal of the nationalist cause was often belied by his government's actions, but Mr. Duplessis' "supreme skill... consisted of keeping in touch with the nationalistic sentiments of his compatriots while pursuing at the same time an anti-nationalistic policy."⁴⁶ Many never questioned the sincerity of Duplessis' nationalism, but others, such as Andre Laurendeau, came to reject

43. See P. Laporte's "Les Elections ne se font pas avec les Prières," op.cit. for an account of electoral immorality and Dion and O'Neill's Le Chrétien et les Elections, op.cit., for a call for reform.

44. The first evidence of this change was during the Asbestos strike. See G. Dion's chapter "L'Eglise et le Conflit," in P-E Trudeau, ed., La Grève de L'Amiante, op.cit.

45. An account of the birth of the Union Nationale is given by Mason Wade in The French Canadians, 1760-1945, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1955. Duplessis "betrayal" became an election issue in 1962.

46. G. Bergeron, "Political Parties in Quebec" University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol. 27, No.3, Aug. 1958, p.357.

his policies as reactionary.³⁷

Why, then, was the Union Nationale reelected at three general elections after World War II? For the Duplessis regime had clearly shown that it had no intention of carrying out the original Union Nationale program, nor of facing the many problems engendered by Quebec's industrialization. No definitive answer to the above question can be given, but following points at least should be noted. The main strength of the Union Nationale lay in the fact that it identified itself and was identified by the voters with French-Canadian nationalist feeling.³⁸ It attained this status of popularly-acknowledged guardian of nationalist aspirations and interests by its vigorous defense of the Quebec point of view on conscription and provincial rights, and by capitalizing on the widespread popular resentment of the Liberals, who had favoured the war effort. Opposition to the centralization of government struck a responsive chord in Quebec, where it had long been feared that an increase in the powers of the federal government threatened the survival of the French-Canadian culture.

The Union Nationale cultivated the rural vote very carefully, increasing farm credit, establishing agricultural schools and the Rural Electricity Board, and concentrating on a rural road building program. The over-representation of rural voters, therefore, became an important factor in the Union Nationale's string of election victories. A third factor was that

37. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss in detail the legislation of the Union Nationale. A useful discussion is included in H.F. Quinn, The Union Nationale Party, op.cit.

38. Les Electeurs Québécois, Attitudes et Opinions à la Veille de l'Election de 1960, un rapport du Groupe de Recherches Sociales, Montreal, 1960, has pointed out that there seems to be an ambivalent attitude to nationalist issues where their espousal might mean material discomfort. Further investigation would perhaps reveal the true strength of nationalist sentiment.

"the party's control over the legislature and administration enabled it to build up a powerful political machine which used the expenditure of government money for purely partisan purposes."³⁹ In this respect the Duplessis government was merely perfecting the electioneering tactics of its predecessor, the Taschereau regime.

The weakness of the provincial Liberal party was another source of Union Nationale strength. At the end of the war, the provincial Liberals, considered overdependent on the federal wing of the party and hence suspect on the touchy issue of provincial autonomy, were discredited in the eyes of the voters. In 1948, the Liberals were left with only eight MLAs, and neither the acquisition of a new leader in Georges Lapalme in 1950, nor the support of the union movement in 1952, nor the union in 1956 of "toutes les forces de l'opposition" were able to avert defeat for the party in the elections of 1952 and 1956.

But, although the Liberal party never won more than 25 percent of the seats in the Legislative Assembly, it obtained over 40 percent of the popular vote in 1948, 1952, and 1956. The party's organization was strengthened by the creation in 1954 of the Quebec Liberal Federation, but what the Liberals lacked most of all in the post-war years was a leader capable of diverting popular support from Duplessis, a politician of consummate skill.⁴⁰ Events were to prove that Jean Lesage, elected to the party leadership in 1958, was just such a leader.

39. H.F. Quinn, "Defeat in Quebec," Canadian Forum, Vol. 40, Aug. 1960, p.102.

40. G. Bergeron in "Political Parties in Quebec," op.cit. calls the Union Nationale a man without a party and the Liberals, a party without a man. P. Laporte, The True Face of Duplessis, Montreal, Harvest House, 1960, gives testimony of Mr. Duplessis' skill as a politician.

After the 1956 election, opposition to the Duplessis regime grew, although it found expression outside the Legislative Assembly. Several observers felt that the unwillingness of Mr. Duplessis' government to modify its policies to meet the needs of an industrial society would lead to its defeat in the coming election. Mr. Duplessis died before the election, however, and his successor as Premier, Paul Sauvé, set out to give a new direction to government policy.

III

Following the revelations of the "natural gas scandal" in April 1958, attacks on the Union Nationale regime and demands for reform grew in volume and intensity. Reforms did come, but from a somewhat unexpected source - the Union Nationale itself. Paul Sauvé, the ideal progressive conservative, initiated the closing of the gap between Quebec's institutional needs and her existing social legislation. His brief tenure in office laid the foundation for the later reforms of a Liberal government, and the evident popularity of Sauvé's break with the Duplessis tradition encouraged the Liberals to formulate and enact a program of more extensive reforms.

The most important of the contributions of the short-lived Sauvé government was the introduction of a concept of government in many ways alien to that which underlay the Duplessis regime. Mr. Duplessis' overriding concern with keeping political power gave way in his successor to a willingness to recognize the need for fundamental changes in legislation, in order to meet the requirements of an industrial society. Mr. Duplessis' one-man rule was replaced by Sauvé's encouragement of ministerial initiative. Sauvé's accession

also led to a reduction of narrow-minded government suspicion of cultural activity, new hope for fair treatment in the ranks of the labour movement, and a curb on the more unjustifiable activities of some civil servants and provincial policemen.

The new Premier was described as "lui qui a inauguré la politique du dialogue et de la collaboration."⁴¹ His policy on federal-provincial relations, for example, was animated by a desire to cooperate with the Ottawa government, and he did not spend time searching for excuses to refuse federal proposals of joint activity. Mr. Duplessis, on the other hand, had rejected any form of federal-provincial collaboration, and had justified non-participation in programs financed by the federal government partly out of taxes paid by Quebec residents by claiming that the loss of the benefits of these taxes was the necessary price of "la survivance nationale." And his stand was supported by many nationalists, including the dean of nationalist publications, l'Action Nationale.

Most of the new legislation introduced by the Sauvé Cabinet had to do with the province's educational system, but the new Premier also initiated negotiations with the federal government regarding Quebec's participation in the national hospitalization insurance plan and in the construction of the Trans Canada highway. He recognized that modern government required an efficient rather than a politically loyal civil service and, before his premature death, had planned certain administrative reforms. Sauvé's government also projected an overhaul of provincial labour legislation and amended the Election Act to reinstate the system of two enumerators in urban consti-

41. In his obituary, Relations, No. 230, Feb. 1960, p.2.

tuencies. This struck a blow at the Union Nationale's election organization, reducing the degree of partisan influence over the preparation of the electoral lists. The new government moved gradually towards the establishment of the principle of statutory grants to municipalities, school commissions, and universities, apparently unmindful of the danger to the municipal arm of the party's election machine.

In the domain of education, Sauvé began by tackling the touchy issue of federal aid to universities.⁴² The formula finally reached provided that Quebec's universities would receive statutory grants of \$1.75 per capita. The grants were to be financed by a 1 percent increase in the provincial corporation tax, and, to prevent an increase in the tax load of corporations in Quebec, federal legislation raised the deduction allowed them on the federal corporation tax by the corresponding 1 percent. Another law gave the provincial government the right to guarantee loans made to universities and colleges classiques for the construction of new facilities. Legislation increased government payments to colleges classiques and écoles normales secondaires, gave new powers of taxation to school commissions, facilitated the expansion of the province's public library system, and improved the status of teachers by raising their minimum salary, making membership in their professional organizations mandatory (contracting-out was allowed), creating an improved pension scheme, and permitting arbitration in disputes involving rural teaching personnel.

In some cases, Sauvé's educational reforms were completed by the Barrette

42. The educational reforms of the Sauvé government have been discussed by C. Bilodeau "L'Education au Québec" in J. Saywell ed., Canadian Annual Review 1960, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961.

ministry. They pointed the way to the much-vaunted Gérin-Lajoie legislation which was introduced in 1960-62 by the Liberal government. The attention given by Mr. Sauvé to the needs of Quebec's system of education implied his recognition that the province's traditional institutional framework would have to be revised to meet the new requirements of an industrial economy. For this reason, the educational reforms symbolized the spirit of "the 100 days of Paul Sauvé," and embodied his desire to give Quebec modern social institutions and a more efficient government.

Sauvé was succeeded as provincial Premier and Union Nationale Leader by Antonio Barrette, the compromise choice of the Union Nationale parliamentary caucus.⁴³ Behind the scenes, however, a Byzantine struggle for power continued, with Daniel Johnson, an ardent spiritual disciple of Mr. Duplessis, the most eager aspirant for the post of party Leader. Barrette, whatever his personal inclinations, lacked the prestige and strength of character to be able to pursue Sauvé's policies. Faced with party dissatisfaction with the scope of the new reforms, he was forced to steer a middle course between the Duplessis and Sauvé examples. His most notable achievements were the conclusion of the federal-provincial agreement on aid to Quebec's universities and a well-received personal tour of Ontario. His overt sympathies for the federal Conservatives, however, had left him open to Liberal charges of "softness on autonomy." The electoral chances of the Liberals were improved when death ended Sauvé's attempt to meet the

43. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of the procedure used in the changes in Union Nationale leadership, see J.R. Mallory, "The Royal Prerogative in Canada, The selection of a successor to Mr. Duplessis and Mr. Sauvé," Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science, Vol. 26, No.2, May 1960.

mounting criticism of Quebec's economic and social legislation, for the Liberal program called for widespread reforms, and the death of Sauvé put an end to their fears that these promises might be undermined by the Union Nationale's adoption of similar policies.

The death in quick succession of the Union Nationale's two best-known and most popular personalities, the factional strife that followed their deaths, the revelation of widespread corruption involving cabinet ministers, and growing popular disillusionment with Barrette's ability to continue on the course charted by Sauvé, combined to place the opposition Liberal party in a strong tactical position at the outset of the 1960 election campaign. Moreover, the Liberals were well-organized, well-financed, and well-led. Their political manifesto combined French-Canadian nationalism with emphasis on the economic expansion of the province; it called for a larger role for French-Canadian in the management of Quebec's autonomy and a "positive" approach to provincial autonomy. Finally, the Liberals relied upon modern public relations techniques in their electioneering. Their campaign strategy was based upon the results of a detailed motivational research survey and party publicity used the slogans "la politique de grandeur," "l'équipe de tonnerre," and "c'est temps que ça change" to project a favourable "brand image."

The Liberal program helped to secure the party the support of progressive voters, and also induced René Lévesque, considered by most the representative of the left wing, to run as a Liberal candidate. The program also embodied a philosophy of government radically new for Quebec. It advocated government participation in the management of the economy and the encouragement of economic growth; it can be interpreted as pointing towards the welfare state

as its goal.⁴⁴ The Union Nationale, troubled by internal dissension, was unable to renege on its past and admit that its concept of government was, even when honestly administered, inadequate for the solution of Quebec's contemporary problems. The government party was unable to discard an antiquated doctrine and its habitual practices at a time when the traditional adherents of the doctrine were losing confidence in it and when the trend of public opinion was definitely antagonistic to the old social philosophy. The party responded by falling back on the old themes. Mr. Barrette defended his party's record, claimed that it had ensured the survival and development of the French-Canadian way of life, and charged that the Liberal intellectuals were socialists who would, if the Union Nationale were defeated, either "sell out" to Ottawa or institute a secular, "bolshevistic" regime.

These basic differences between the two parties were reflected by their respective positions on the important issues of the campaign, the Liberals advocating fairly widespread government activity in economic and social affairs. In discussing Quebec's high rate of unemployment, for example, the Liberals claimed that the government's "outmoded" economic policies did not attempt to solve the problem, while in reply Mr. Barrette denied the responsibility for acting in this domain, asserting that only the Federal government possessed the powers necessary for a full attack on unemployment.⁴⁵ The Liberals also promised more active government participation in education,

44. P-E.Trudeau in La Grève de l'Amiante op.cit. has pointed out that French-Canadian politicians and nationalists have traditionally been hostile to state economic activity. The term welfare state is here given its journalistic usage. It includes the "mixed economy" and a highly developed social security system.

45. Les Electeurs Québécois, op.cit. p.153-156 points out that Mr. Barrette's statement was a tactical error since more than 90 percent of the electorate believed that the provincial government can contribute to the reduction of unemployment.

social security, and the development of the province's natural resources, accusing the Union Nationale of massive corruption and of bringing about Quebec's relative "backwardness". The government party countered these charges by enumerating its accomplishments, lauding the political experience of its leaders, and warning the electorate of Liberal incompetence.

Although the Liberals were careful to keep their nationalist fences mended, the 1960 Quebec election represented, to a certain extent, the conflict between reformers and traditionalists, and the defeat of the Union Nationale was generally regarded as a victory for the new schools of political thought, for the Liberals were supported by the province's progressive and left wing political movements. The Union Nationale was in difficulty from the outset of the campaign, and even its well-oiled election machine suffered many defections as the campaign progressed. The Liberals won 51.2 percent of the popular vote and 52 of 95 seats in the legislature. The new government had been elected largely because of its promise to give Quebec "modern" and honest government; the Liberals had focussed public attention and resentment on the sins of their opponents, and for this reason their own errors are less likely to be tolerated by the electorate.

CHAPTER II

CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT 1960-62

Since "democratic politics involve an increasing struggle for votes, a new election campaign begins as soon as a new parliament meets."¹ Government policy will inevitably be judged on election day, and the achievements or shortcomings of the government of the day, as well as long-term social changes, influence the outcome of an election. In 1962, the Quebec election was fought on two major issues; the nationalization of the province's private power companies and the record of Lesage Cabinet.

In 1960, the Liberal party campaigned on the slogan, "It's time for a change." The Union Nationale, Mr. Lesage charged, had allowed Quebec to become a "backward" province of which her residents were "ashamed." The Liberal political manifesto of 1960 concluded by reiterating what was proclaimed the operative principle of the Lesage government: "the Province of Quebec needs reform, and the Liberal party pledged to carry it out." This manifesto, still the official party program, is predicated on the belief that only a carefully-planned, well-coordinated set of reforms can bring Quebec "into touch with the modern world."

Government policy from 1960 to 1962 was founded on two major principles, each of which diverged from the underlying philosophy of the Union Nationale governments. The Liberals accepted the view, heretofore rejected in Quebec,² that only substantial government activity would promote economic growth, create a larger role for French-Canadians in the management of the province's

1. D.E. Butler and R. Rose, op.cit. p. 35.

2. Most treatises on French-Canadian nationalist thought have noted this rejection of state economic activity. The Gouin, Taschereau, and Duplessis regimes' "laissez faire" Philosophy of government did not, therefore, conflict with Quebec's established ideology.

economy, and lead to the establishment in Quebec of educational and welfare institutions similar to those available in the majority of Canadian provinces and in most industrial societies.

The second major premise underlying the Liberal party program was not radically new, but it did develop in a more positive sense the "two-nation" theory of Confederation. The government's policy in cultural affairs and federal-provincial relations envisaged Quebec as the "home" of a French-Canadian nation which includes non-residents of Quebec. The government of Quebec, in this view, became the representative of a sovereign state, l'Etat du Québec,³ with the duty of promoting the development of French-Canadian culture protecting the constitutional rights of all French-Canadians, and ensuring for them a status within Canada at least equal to that of their English-speaking compatriots.

Premier Lesage defended his government's conception of the role of the state in this way:⁴

Il nous faut des moyens puissants non seulement pour relever les défis inévitables que nous rencontrerons dans les années qui viennent, mais aussi pour mettre le peuple canadien-français au diapason du monde actuel. Or le seul moyen puissant que nous possédions c'est l'Etat du Québec, c'est notre Etat. Nous ne pouvons pas nous payer le luxe de ne pas l'utiliser.

The government, was to play the principal part in the creation in Quebec of the institutional fabric of a modern industrial state. The principal beneficiaries of the new government's policy, therefore, were the

3. L'Etat du Québec connotes a sovereign state and is certainly a more imposing title than La Province.

4. This passage, from Premier speech to the St. Jean-Baptiste Society in 1961, is quoted in J. Saywell ed., Canadian Annual Review 1961, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962, p. 42-43.

urban middle classes which had been spurned by Mr. Duplessis.⁵ The Liberal government's reforms were important in that they recognized the social and economic problems produced by Quebec's industrialization and attempted to change traditional government policies to meet these needs. It must, however, be noted that these principles were mitigated in practice by the Cabinet's reluctance to antagonize the more conservative elements of French-Canadian society, to actively encourage the support of the labour movement, or to introduce the widespread changes in administrative procedure that would be necessary if the enlarged sphere of government activity was to be efficiently conducted.

The contrast between the Liberal and Union Nationale attitudes is, nevertheless, striking. In important speeches made on Oct. 31st and Nov. 6th, 1961, Daniel Johnson, the newly-elected leader of the opposition party, placed the Union Nationale unequivocally behind private enterprise.⁶ In a later speech, he attacked the government for its "conceptions socialisantes et totalitaires,"⁷ and for adhering to the principle of general legislation, which gave "la même mesure d'assistance aux riches et aux pauvres."⁸ Mr. Johnson advocated a return to the principles of government which had prevailed under the Union Nationale regime, stating that:⁹

5. H. Guindon, "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered," Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science, vol. 26, No. 4, Nov. 1960, points out that Mr. Sauvé's government had also catered to the middle class, white collar bureaucracies.

6. The texts of these speeches can be found in Le Devoir Nov. 1st and Nov. 7, 1961.

7. This statement was made in Mr. Johnson's speech in reply to the budget address on May 8, 1962. It was reprinted as "Le Québec, Mendiant ou Souverain?" by the Union Nationale Service d'Information, p. 1.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid. pp. 1-2.

chaque fois que l'Etat assume des tâches et des responsabilités qui pourraient être mieux remplies par les familles, les groupements professionnels et les communautés locales, il en coûte infiniment plus cher en argent et en liberté, pour des résultats toujours pitoyables.

The Union Nationale, therefore, maintained its faith in the classical liberal conception of the role of government, while the Liberal party had come to accept most of the practical policies of neo-liberalism. This ideological clash provided the framework for the legislative battles from 1960-62 and the 1962 general election.

The Liberal government assumed the responsibility for promoting the expansion of the province's economy and saw French-Canadian management of Quebec's economic growth as the only means of satisfying "toutes nos aspirations."¹⁰

It initiated a fiscal policy that was, for Quebec, heretical. Whereas the Union Nationale had prided itself on achieving annual budget surpluses and on reducing the province's per capita public debt, the budgets of the Liberal government showed deficits, which were to be financed by public borrowing. The Union Nationale charged that the government was ruining the credit of the province and indebting future generations, but the Liberals defended the deficits by pointing out that they were due to expenditures on capital account which would benefit the generations to come. It is only fitting, they argued, that those who will benefit from the government's legislation should share in meeting its cost.

10. Le Programme Politique du Parti Libéral du Québec, 1960, p.6. It is worth noting that this reference is missing in the English translation.

In order to assert a greater degree of government direction en economic development, new institutions were created. The Economic Advisory Council and a Bureau of Economic Research were established, and the office of Regional Commissioner of Commerce instituted. The Economic Advisory Council was responsible for the careful research which resulted in the creation of the General Investment Corporation (SGF) and the decision to undertake the establishment of a steel complex in the province. The SGF, in which private investors, the commercial banks, and the government (25 percent of the total), participate, was established in order to help "bring private French-Canadian capital out of the sock, mattress, and Caisse Populaire, and into industrial development."¹¹ Finally, the Liberal program committed the government to a policy of economic planning with the objectives of industrial decentralization and balanced economic growth. One of the first moves by the new government was to merge the Departments of Mines and Hydraulic Resources into the Department of Natural Resources. This ministry, perhaps because of the dynamism of its minister, Mr. René Lévesque, has become chiefly responsible for promoting industrial expansion. One of Mr. Lévesque's justifications for the nationalization of private power, for example, was that government control over the hydroelectricity industry would significantly contribute to the establishment of new industries in the underdeveloped regions of the province.

It is not the purpose of this paper to analyze in detail legislation

11. P. Desbarats, "Jean Lesage of Quebec," Canadian Forum, Vol. 42, Oct. 1962, p. 152.

introduced by the Liberal government and I have limited myself to describing somewhat perfunctorily the major reforms, stressing those which became the subject of dispute in the 1962 campaign. Some of the most important achievements of the government were in the field of education. The Minister of Youth, Mr. Gérin-Lajoie, to whom responsibility concerning educational matters had been transferred, continued Paul Sauvé's policy of regarding an improved system of education as the key to greater French-Canadian control over Quebec's economy and to the reduction of unemployment. Mr. Gérin-Lajoie's reforms, however, were of a more comprehensive nature and were based upon the principle that only by increased government participation in the planning and administration of education could there be any substantial improvement. Education in Quebec has traditionally been regarded as the social preserve of the family and the church, so the policies of centralization and increased state participation in this domain naturally had opponents in the school commissions and elsewhere. The Union Nationale echoed the fears of some in protesting the new measure of "étatatisation."

Following the promulgation of the Grand Charter of Education, which proclaimed the ultimate aim of free education at all levels, the government set up two royal commissions to inquire into the needs of Quebec in the field of education. The Tremblay Commission was to recommend a general plan for a system of technical education, while the aim of the Parent Commission was to examine completely the Province's educational institutions and to recommend a plan of overall reform. Mr. Gérin-Lajoie's reforms must therefore be regarded, despite their significance, as interim measures. These reforms included the establishment of free education until the end of the eleventh year and the raising of the age until which education is compulsory

from 15 to 16. The government also agreed to pay up to \$200 per student towards the tuition fees of students in the 8th-11th years at private secondary schools recognized by the Provincial Council of Public Education. Legislation also abolished tuition fees at technical schools and the government assumed the costs of all school textbooks. Finally, regional school commissions were established for the first time, and a new system of financing the operations of all school commissions was introduced. The government took away from the school commissions the right to impose a sales tax, increased the provincial sales tax by 2 percent, and administered the collection and distribution of the tax itself. This reform, which created a more favourable position for the poorer school commissions, has been described as "une initiative prise dans le sens du bien commun."¹²

This series of reforms, which aim at raising the standard and easing the financial burden of education, was widely praised. Administration of the new laws, however, encountered several difficulties, and in certain cases administrative confusion aroused the opposition of school commissions and teachers. The Union Nationale's attitude towards these reforms was somewhat ambiguous. Its principal objections were to the reduction in the powers of the school commissions and to the centralization of administrative authority in the Ministry of Youth. The party also criticized the provision which enabled the government to pay \$200 a year towards tuition fees of students in private high schools, pointing out rightly that these payments help relatively wealthy families while doing nothing to reduce the financial burden of education to the families of "les pauvres cultivateurs".

12. J. Pellerin, "Le Gouvernement Lesage devant ses Juges," Cité Libre No. 51, Nov. 1963, p. 12.

Mr. Johnson repeated these objections in the 1962 campaign, when he promised "amendment" but not "abolition" of the new education reforms.

The Lesage government was also responsible for some changes in the province's welfare legislation. The Department of Social Welfare was given added responsibilities and renamed the Department of Family and Social Welfare; this ministry undertook enquiries into the juridical, economic, and social status of the family, and into the solution of social and personal problems engendered by alcoholism. Family allowances and old age pensions were each increased by \$10 per month. For its part, the Department of Health conducted investigations into the state of mental care in the province, and into the administration of certain private hospitals.

The most important accomplishment in the domain of health and welfare, however, was the decision of Quebec to participate in the Federal Hospital Insurance Act. This decision, made possible by the government's new attitude towards joint programs, resulted in the passage of legislation by which the provincial and federal governments shared the costs of hospitalization with the patient. The Union Nationale, in the debate on this legislation, expressed support for the measure in principle, but claimed that the government proposals would result in a loss of freedom for hospitals and for doctors, and in unsatisfactory treatment for many patients.

The Liberals' public works policy also favoured the province's urban residents. Whereas the Union Nationale had concentrated on the construction of rural roads to the neglect of the major routes, the Liberals undertook a program of superhighway construction. The government approved Quebec's inclusion in the Trans-Canada highway, projected the building of an autoroute from Montreal to Sherbrooke, and created a Bureau of Autoroutes with

jurisdiction over all such highways in the province. The disregard for the construction of rural roads, however, was a politically dangerous policy, which the Union Nationale in 1962 exploited in its attempt to win the rural vote.

It has already been noted that a strength of the Union Nationale was general public approval of its stand on provincial autonomy.¹³ During the 1960 election campaign, Mr. Lesage was accused of "centralizing" tendencies, and the provincial Liberal party had long been suspect of subservience to its federal counterpart. In 1960, l'Action Nationale, the dean of French-Canadian nationalist publications, still could not bring itself to accept at face value the belated espousal of autonomism by the Liberals. With the zeal of a recent convert, however, Mr. Lesage proceeded to take a strong stand on this issue.

Upon taking office, the Liberals announced the creation of a Department of Federal-Provincial Affairs, the Premier himself becoming Minister. He expressed his government's position on provincial rights in the following terms:¹⁴

The province of Quebec... intends to safeguard the rights and powers given it by the Constitution. We wish to... use them fully with a view to promoting the welfare of our population in all matters under the provincial jurisdiction. But we have no intention of retiring into a state of isolation which would be unrealistic for any province and harmful to the whole nation.

Mr. Lesage recognized, however, that "an adequate solution of many problems will require constant cooperation between governments" and, often, joint action on their part.¹⁵

13. Les Electeurs Québécois, op.cit. p.89. confirms this assertion.

14. Premier Lesage's budget speech, April 14, 1961, pp. 74-75.

15. Ibid. p.75.

At the federal-provincial conference held in Ottawa, July 25-27, 1960, Mr. Lesage took the offensive in pressing Quebec's demands.¹⁶ He called for the establishment of annual interprovincial conferences and the creation of a permanent federal-provincial secretariat. While expressing Quebec's dissatisfaction with joint programs on the grounds that the requirements imposed by the federal government prevent the provinces from fully utilizing their revenues as they see fit and from taking local conditions into account, the Premier broke new ground when he announced that Quebec would participate nonetheless since these programs were being financed by taxes paid by residents of the province. Quebec, he argued, could not allow itself the luxury of non-participation. This policy opened the door to Quebec's participation in joint programs in the following areas: hospital insurance, the Trans Canada highway, technical education, public works, and social welfare. Finally, Premier Lesage called for the reservation to the provinces of 25 per cent of the income tax, 25 per cent of the corporation tax and 100 per cent of succession duties paid by Quebec residents.

What was new in this attitude in addition to the willingness to participate in joint programs, was the initiative taken in suggesting new institutions on the interprovincial level. The Union Nationale had also opposed the existing fiscal arrangements and, mindful of his party's autonomist reputation, Mr. Johnson chided the Premier for speaking of the priority of Quebec's fiscal needs rather than the priority of her rights in direct taxation.

Another innovation was the Liberal policy on cultural affairs. Its

16. The text of Mr. Lesage's remarks at the conference is found in Conférence Fédérale - Provinciale, 1960, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1960, pp.30-38.

objective was to work vigorously towards the continuing development of French-Canadian culture. To this end and to safeguard the "French fact" in Canada, the Department of Cultural Affairs, comprising the French Language Bureau, Extra-territorial French-Canada Branch, Provincial Arts Council, and Historical Monuments Commission, was created. An important responsibility of this Department, in addition to the diffusion of French-Canadian culture in Canada, was the expansion of economic and cultural contacts between Quebec and European states in particular France. A Quebec House was established in Paris, and similar offices were planned for London and Rome. It was these manifestations of Quebec's "sovereignty" that lay at the heart of "la politique de grandeur," the purpose of which was to make Quebec the object of the admiration and not pity¹⁶ of other Canadians and Europeans.

Although in their first two years in office the Liberal government was unable to fulfill completely the pledges made in the party's political manifesto, it, nevertheless, had succeeded in introducing important reforms in the province's political and social institutions. The efficient administration of the government's new legislation, however, required a transformation of Quebec's administrative procedures, for its notoriously inefficient and patronage-ridden civil service was definitely unsuited for the smooth conduct of modern, "big" government.

Having pledged to bring modern government to Quebec, the Liberals were obliged to introduce new concepts of administrative procedure and to alter the typical behaviour patterns of the civil servants. The Salvas Commission, although set up for largely partisan purposes to investigate administrative

16. This, it will be remembered, was what Mr. Lesage believed the situation to have been while the Union Nationale governed.

practices (or malpractices) of the Union Nationale, did serve to reveal the more shocking misdemeanors and, in this way, to create critical public attitude. A Civil Service Commission was established to conduct the recruitment of civil servants on the basis of examinations, and the government refrained from full-scale dismissals of Union Nationale appointees. This policy, although a useful departure from the spoils system, also provided the Liberal regime with a useful scapegoat to blame for its failures.

The 1960 Liberal manifesto pledged the abolition of patronage and, upon taking office, the government instituted the practice of calling public tenders for all government contracts above \$25,000. This practice, it was estimated, reduced the cost of building 39 bridges, to cite a single example, from \$4,351,412 to \$2,912,487.¹⁷ A Treasury Board modelled on its federal counterpart was charged with the supervision of all government expenditure. These anti-patronage measures created widespread discontent within the Liberal party itself, Mr. Arsenault and Mr. Pinard, both cabinet ministers, coming to distinguish between "le bon et le mauvais patronage."

Other reforms were effected by the Attorney-General. The notorious Quebec Liquor Police force was abolished and the Liquor law was amended despite obstruction by the Executive Council. Although liquor licenses multiplied, they were no longer issued on the basis of partisan considerations, but in conformity with well-publicized uniform procedures. The Provincial Police, which had been an important political arm of the Union Nationale regime, was purged of its "undesirable"¹⁸ members, and French-Canadian

17. Premier Lesage's budget speech, April 14 1961, p.10.

18. Several of those discharged became Union Nationale organizers.

officers of the RCMP were hired to lead the force.

The government's "snap" election call left it with much unfinished business. The reform of the Election Act, for example, had to be abandoned until after the election, and the dissolution in September 1962 came before the Liberal regime introduced any important farm or labour legislation. An undoubtedly important event, however, which is treated at some length later, was the personal campaign waged by Mr. Levesque in favour of the nationalization of eleven major power companies, a measure which reflects both the government's economic and its nationalist policies.

The listing of the accomplishments of the Liberal regime was not intended as unequivocal praise of the Lesage government. Its purpose was simply to describe the major changes in government effected from 1960-62. The "quiet revolution" was neither complete nor painless, and the large program of reform was accompanied by many administrative bottlenecks and much inefficiency, many reforms met strong opposition from important segments of the population, while from others there was a quick snapback. The Treasury Board's zeal, for example, resulted in curbing the initiative of many civil servants,¹⁹ and the creation of the regional school commissions, although commendable, resulted in much confusion. The extent of the reforms in education and welfare, for example, aroused cries of "socialism" and "anti-clericalism," the Liberals being accused of working to destroy the traditional fabric of French-Canadian society.

But, while some accused the government of going too far, the chief

19. Maclean's Magazine, Oct. 20, 1963, p. 3.

complaint of the left was that the Liberals had not gone far enough. The new government was generally friendly towards the trade union movement, but although arbitration procedures were amended,²⁰ the Liberals did not introduce any major labour legislation or amend the Labour Code as pledged.²¹ The agricultural policy of the government which followed that of its predecessor closely and relied predominantly on the extension of farm credit, did not satisfy the leading agricultural interest groups. The government had also failed "revaloriser la fonction publique." One reason for this was intraparty conflict on the place of patronage in government;²² another was Mr. Lesage's refusal to grant the civil servants full union rights.

But, from the electoral point of view, the Liberals' main weaknesses lay elsewhere. In a speech of June 1st, 1960, in the heat of the election campaign, Mr. Lesage had promised that the Liberal program would be realized without any tax increases,²³ but the ensuing months saw the raising of a variety of taxes. The most important change was the reduction in the base of the provincial income tax exemption to \$2000 for married taxpayers and \$1000 for bachelors. Although Mr. Lesage justified these changes on the grounds that they were necessitated by the "financial hemorrhage" left by the Union Nationale, the new taxes placed the relatively heaviest burden on the lower income group and certainly did not add to the popularity of "la politique de grandeur."²⁴ The attack on high taxes became, in 1962,

20. J. Saywell ed. Canadian Annual Review 1961, op.cit., p.48.

21. Even Liberal officials admitted to me that this was due to the "incompetence" of the Minister of Labour.

22. See G. Pelletier "Patronage, où est la victoire?" Cité Libre, No.51, Nov. 1953.

23. Le Devoir, June 2, 1960, p.1.

24. In fact, most observers assume that this tax was raised to meet the cost of the hospital insurance plan.

Mr. Johnson's most popular campaign theme.

The fact that economic conditions in Quebec had not noticeably improved since it took office naturally made the government subject to criticism, and since it had taken on the responsibility of promoting economic growth the Lesage regime was especially vulnerable on this score.²⁵ Agricultural conditions remained poor in many areas, while unemployment was not reduced. The overriding public concern with unemployment in the province's economically underdeveloped regions was illustrated to the government when Premier Lesage, on a tour of the Gaspé in July, 1962, was greeted by the jeers and protests of groups of angry, disillusioned unemployed.

"La politique de grandeur" was never properly explained in the province's rural regions where it was most likely to encounter opposition, and, the major achievements of the government were in the domains of education, health, and cultural affairs, but not in economic policy. Its reforms, as Mr. Lesage admitted himself, were made for the middle-class. The poorer regions of the province were neglected while the highly-industrialized urban centres largely inhabited by businessmen, professionals, and white-collar workers, benefitted most from the new legislation. To be sure a new atmosphere and modern conceptions of government now prevailed, but, to the politically less sophisticated citizens in the province's depressed areas these factors seemed less important than their immediate material needs.

The Union Nationale, for its part, spent the greater part of the two years since its defeat in resolving intraparty disputes. Less than three

25. During the 1960 election campaign, it will be remembered, Mr. Lesage severely criticized Mr. Barrette for denying that the provincial government was responsible for the reduction of unemployment.

months after the 1960 election, Mr. Barrette, the party Leader resigned, stating that his attempts to democratize the party were being thwarted by chief party organizer, Mr. J.D. Bégin, party treasurer, Mr. G. Martineau, and Montreal district organizer, Mr. Jean Barrette. Shaken by this declaration, the Union Nationale's legislative caucus chose first Mr. Prevost and then Mr. Talbot as interim Leader. Meanwhile, preparations were made for a leadership convention, the first in the party's history.

In July, 1961, the Salvas Commission's investigations further discredited the Union Nationale when they revealed the extent of the corruption that had permeated the highest levels of the UN regime. Mr. Gerard Martineau, MLC, was singled out for special criticism. His reply to the Commission took the form of an advertisement which appeared on July 7, 1961, in the province's French dailies, Mr. Martineau's statement defended patronage as an ineradicable feature of Quebec's political life and a desirable method of income redistribution; his argument could not have added to his party's stature.

Party unity received another blow at the leadership convention held in Quebec City from Sept. 21-23, 1961. At the convention, Mr. Daniel Johnson, the representative of the party's "old guard" and a self-avowed disciple of Mr. Duplessis, defeated by a surprisingly narrow margin Mr. Jean-Jacques Bertrand, who emphasized the need to renovate the party. Mr. Johnson, on the other hand, made it clear that he felt that the Liberals and not some of this erstwhile colleagues were the party's chief enemy. In the aftermath of this bitter struggle, it was rumoured that the Bertrand faction would leave the party and form an independent political grouping. Nothing concrete

came of this, however, and fairly loose party discipline prevailed.

Under Mr. Johnson's leadership, the Union Nationale concentrated on building up local associations and recruiting new members. In the legislature, Mr. Johnson proved himself an adroit parliamentarian and on several occasions provoked Mr. Lesage into unseemly outbursts. The basis of his criticism of the Liberal administration has already been mentioned. He concentrated on attacking the government for introducing "alien" and "outdated" concepts of government, for its large deficits, higher taxes, and its "neglect" of the farmer. He was also contemptuous of that he called the "inefficiency of apprentice-ministers." Indeed, the bulk of the Opposition's criticisms of government policy often dealt with the details and not the principles of Legislation. The government was severely attacked for administrative failures, and for not taking regional particularities into consideration. For its part, the Union Nationale at all times stressed the importance of taking into account local problems.

The Union Nationale entered a phase of transition following its defeat in 1960. Its organization, doctrine, and policies remained fluid. There was some doubt, therefore, as to the future of the Liberal reform program were the Union Nationale to be reelected in 1962, for the party had, seemingly, still to choose between the Duplessis and Sauvé traditions. What is certain, however, is that, in 1962, the Liberal and Union Nationale parties presented the voters with distinct ideological alternatives. The theoretical foundation of the Liberal program on the party's advocacy of state interference in social and economic affairs differed sharply from Mr. Johnson's espousal of the traditional, conservative social philosophy and his notion of "l'état supplétif." The two parties also appealed to different social classes.

The Liberal party consciously catered to the province's urban residents, educated middle-classes, and to the upper income groups, while Mr. Johnson explicitly appealed for support to "les petits gens", the lower income groups of the province, residing predominantly in rural counties. This tactic was the essence of his attack on legislation which treated "the rich and the poor equally."²⁶

The 1962 Quebec election, then, can be seen as the conflict of two opposing concepts of government. In this respect, therefore, an essential condition of a "democratic" election was satisfied, for the voters were given a meaningful choice between two parties with a chance to win. To many observers, the choice was between "duplessisme" and "democracy."²⁷ Perhaps an apter and less partisan summation of the 1962 election appeared in Maclean's Magazine,²⁸ which headed a column on the campaign "What Price Reform?"

26. This statement, which implies the return of the "means test" was widely quoted by Mr. Johnson's opponents as proof that the election of the Union Nationale would mean a return to the "pre-Sauvé" concept of government.

27. This was the view of most left wing observers, and also of Le Devoir, La Presse, and the Montreal Star. Precisely what is meant by "duplessisme" has never been completely clear to me, but the word seemingly is used to connote all the undesirable elements of the Duplessis regime.

28. Maclean's Magazine, Oct. 20, 1962, p. 3.

CHAPTER III

THE NATIONALIZATION OF ELECTRICITY

On 19 September 1962 Premier Lesage announced that a provincial general election, at which the government would seek a popular mandate to nationalize eleven private power companies, would be held on November 14. The Premier's announcement ended a period of more than six months during which Mr. Lévesque's nationalization proposal completely overshadowed all other governmental activity. The nationalization issue also dominated the 1962 election campaign.

French-Canadian nationalists have advocated the nationalization of the "electricity trust" since the early 1930s, and Mr. Lévesque's campaign can be seen as the third and final phase in "la Bataille de l'électricité."¹ The first phase began in 1929 when Dr. Philippe Hamel first denounced the province's private power companies for overcharging and for hindering the growth of industry in Quebec. Denunciation of "le plus pernicieux des trusts de la Province" became an important chapter in the Union Nationale's "Catéchisme des Electeurs" in 1936, but Mr. Duplessis' actions once he was elected did not seriously curb the private power companies.

Following what many nationalists consider Mr. Duplessis' "betrayal" of Dr. Hamel and his supporters, the Liberal party led by Mr. Godbout became the carrier of the nationalization theme. The Liberals regained power in 1939, and in early 1943 the government supported a popular campaign for the reduction of electricity rates. The power companies finally conceded

1. J-V. Dufresne, "La Bataille de l'électricité," Le Magazine Maclean's, Vol. 2 No. 11, Oct. 1962, gives this name to the nationalization campaign. I have spent very little time discussing the history of "la bataille," it is treated in detail elsewhere, see in M. Wade, The French Canadians 1760-1945 op.cit., Castell Hopkins Canadian Annual Review, l'Action Nationale, and in R. Rumilly, Histoire du Québec, 34 vols., Montreal, 1941-62.

on this point, the rate reduction offered taking the form of one month's supply of electricity free for domestic consumers. The government then announced in late 1943 its intention to nationalize the Montreal Light, Heat, and Power Co. Over the protests of the power companies, large sections of the province's business community, and Mr. Duplessis, the legislation expropriating the assets of Montreal Light, Heat and Power Co., and creating Hydro Quebec passed third reading on April 1st, 1944.

After the Union Nationale's return to office in 1944, little more was heard of the nationalization of electricity, and Les Electeurs Québécois suggests that the electorate was satisfied with the Duplessis government's natural resources policy.² The 1960 Liberal political program made no mention of nationalization, but Article 11 of the manifesto did promise that a Department of Natural Resources would be created by a Liberal government. Among the new ministry's responsibilities would be "to assure the ownership and development by Quebec Hydro of all undeveloped hydroelectric power wherever it is economically feasible to do so, to standardize the rates for electricity, and to reduce rates when they are deemed to be too high."

If their provisions did not in themselves include anything the private power companies considered intolerable, the appointment of Mr. René Lévesque as Minister of Natural Resources was, it seems, received with some apprehension.³ In public speeches and in negotiations with the power companies, Mr. Lévesque soon made the basis of his policy clear. The role of private enterprise, in his eyes, was to contribute to the province's economic development. His own responsibility was to ensure that the exploitation of the province's

2. Les Electeurs Québécois, op.cit. p.68

3. J-V. Dufresne, "La Bataille de l'Electricité," op.cit., p.81.

natural resources was conducted in the public interest. In a speech in December, 1961, he reiterated his belief that government intervention was becoming increasingly necessary in the planned exploitation of Quebec's natural resources. His remarks in this respect were, at the time, completely in harmony with the general policy declarations of Mr. Lesage,⁴ who continually emphasized that state economic activity alone could bring about the economic emancipation of French-Canadians and balanced economic growth.

The third and final phase of the nationalization campaign was opened by Mr. Lévesque on 12 February 1962. In a speech inaugurating La Semaine de l'Electricité, he described the existing structure of Quebec's hydro-electric power industry and concluded in the following terms: "Un tel fouillis invraisemblable et coûteux ne peut continuer, si l'on veut agir sérieusement dans le sens d'un aménagement rationnel de notre économie... Des réformes s'imposent..." He advocated the progressive unification of the province's electricity network in order to make possible a coordinated investment policy for the whole industry, the maximum utilization of the existing water supply, the reduction of fixed costs, a uniform rate policy, and the recuperation of the federal corporation taxes paid by the private power companies. Mr. Lévesque argued that an integrated electricity network would contribute to industrial decentralization, and stressed that both public and private economic activity should contribute to Quebec's development.

The private power companies reacted immediately to Mr. Lévesque's speech. Officials of the Shawinigan consortium (composed of Shawinigan Water and Power Co., Quebec Power Co., and Southern Canada Power Co.) called

4. The quotation is taken from the text of Mr. Lévesque's speech which was made available by the Department of Natural Resources.

a press conference to reply to the minister. The power companies represented the issue of public ownership of the province's power resources in terms of a struggle between free enterprise and socialism. They claimed that not only had it not been proved that state economic activity in this domain was more efficient than private enterprise, but also that a public monopoly would endanger the general interest. Shawinigan's officials pointed to their company's past contribution to the economic development of the province in their defense of the existing structure of ownership of hydroelectric power resources.

In one sense, however, the immediate reply of the power companies was a tactical error, for it made the nationalization of electricity a public issue before Mr. Lévesque had accused a specific company or proposed detailed reforms. The minister answered Shawinigan with a statement issued on February 15th. Reiterating his arguments for the integration of Quebec's electricity network, he dismissed Shawinigan's denigration of the record of public ownership in this field by pointing to the successful growth of Hydro Quebec. And, while admitting that the private power companies had contributed to the province's economic development, he called this "past history" and pointed out that the companies had not lost money in the process. His concern, he repeated, was the public interest, and this would be best served by further state activity in the hydroelectric industry.

The exchange between the minister of Natural Resources and the Shawinigan officials having reawakened public interest in the nationalization of electricity, Mr. Lévesque attempted in other speeches to stimulate the growth of a body of public opinion favourable to nationalization. The French language press, the union movement, the U.C.C., business and professionals

groups began to debate the merits of Mr. Lévesque's case. In a very real sense his campaign became a public campaign, for the overwhelming majority of newspapers and organizations that expressed an opinion on the matter came out in support of the nationalization of the private power companies. In fact, the arguments of Le Devoir, La Presse, and Le Nouveau Journal in favour of nationalization later reappeared in the Liberals' defense of their policy on this issue.

In speeches in March and April, Mr. Lévesque was reported as saying that "la nationalisation de Shawinigan rapproche," His supporters took up this theme. The Quebec Federation of Labour (FTQ), the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CSN), and the Union of Catholic Cultivators came out in favour of immediate nationalization of the private power companies, as did the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale in May. From May 5-15, La Presse published a nine-article study of the merits and demerits of nationalization and concluded that the immediate nationalization of electricity was dictated by both economic and political reasons.

The government, meanwhile, remained silent. When pressed by Opposition Leader Johnson in late May, Mr. Lesage said only that he had not yet discussed nationalization with his Minister of Natural Resources. For his part, Mr. Johnson avoided taking a definitive position on the issue. On May 16th, he stated that while a general policy of nationalization was "anti-Christian," in "exceptional cases" nationalization could be justified. In the case of electricity, he admitted that nationalization was possible "one day," provided that it could be shown that this action would result in the lowering of rates. At first, Mr. Lesage's silence met with understanding and even approval in the press, which surmised that he had delegated to Mr.

Lévesque the responsibility of building popular support for nationalization. But, by the beginning of June, he was urged to declare his policy at once. The press also complained that the government's initiative in all matters seemed to have been stifled by its indecision on the nationalization issue.

On June 3rd, the St. Jean-Baptiste Society's provincial congress endorsed Mr. Lévesque's campaign and called for the nationalization of electricity. The support of this traditionalist, conservative, nationalist society took the sting out of charges that nationalization meant "socialism"; this action led Le Devoir to exclaim jubilantly "la Bataille est gagnée." Mr. Lesage's response was less enthusiastic. In the Legislative Assembly on June 6th, he stated that the minister of Natural Resources had never spoken of nationalization, but simply of "integration" of the province's hydro-electric resources. This verbal sophistry, however, satisfied no one, for Mr. Lévesque's meaning was clear to all, the private power companies included.

The private power companies, however, seized the opening offered by Mr. Lesage. Mr. Pagé, the ex-President of Southern Canada Power, who was brought out of retirement to help lead the anti-nationalization campaign, called a press conference on June 7th and there claimed that the "integration" of the province's hydroelectric power resources could be achieved without nationalization, since the private power companies were eager to cooperate with Hydro Quebec. Throughout the struggle, the Shawinigan consortium led the opposition to Mr. Lévesque's policy. It organized a series of meetings and press conferences, mobilized support among its employees and municipal authorities, published brochures defending its record, and even produced a television program lauding the achievements of private enterprise.

The indecision of the government on the nationalization issue continued, however, and the Cabinet met to discuss the problem on July 26th, amid mounting rumours that Mr. Lévesque would resign unless it was agreed to nationalize the private power companies.⁵ Following the late July Cabinet meeting, there was a noticeable lull in the activity of both Mr. Lévesque and his opponents, but in late August, the pressure on the government was renewed. On August 22nd, La Presse revealed that the Economic Advisory Council had recommended the nationalization of electricity in a heretofore secret report some six or seven months earlier. On August 30, a sub-committee of the permanent Policy Committee of the Quebec Liberal Federation passed a resolution approving the nationalization of electricity. On Sept. 1st, the FTQ, CSN, and UCC called on the government to immediately nationalize the private power companies, while local and regional Chambers of Commerce continued to align themselves against nationalization.⁶ It was, therefore, in an atmosphere of tension that the Cabinet and officials of the Quebec Liberal Federation met at Lac à l'Epaule to decide the Liberal policy on the nationalization issue.

The ministers were faced with several choices. In the first place, they could have agreed to Mr. Lévesque's policy and nationalize all privately-owned hydroelectric power resources in the province. The theoretical possibility of doing nothing also existed, but this was never seriously entertained. A third possibility was the nationalization of selected private

5. These rumours, widely circulated in the daily newspapers, claimed that Mr. Lévesque had promised the NDP that he would leave the Liberal party to lead a new, left wing group if nationalization were refused by Mr. Lesage.

6. In the Gaspé and Abitibi, local Chambers of Commerce gave their support to nationalization, accepting the thesis that this measure would stimulate the development of these depressed areas.

power companies, namely those serving the Gaspé and Abitibi regions, where the problems of economic depression and poor electricity service was most acute.⁷ The government could also have considered setting up a Royal Commission to inquire into the needs of the hydroelectricity industry in the province. This policy was strongly advised at the beginning of September by the Chambers of Commerce of Montreal and Quebec City. A possible, although highly unlikely decision, was to allow Quebec's power companies to participate in the national power grid advocated by the federal government. Finally, the government could have decided to make specific administrative reforms increasing the degree of integration of the province's hydroelectric power resources, while allowing the structure of ownership of these resources to remain unchanged.

The positions of most of the Cabinet ministers were only inaccurately and vaguely known. While no Cabinet member had openly expressed disagreement with Mr. Lévesque, their silence had been conspicuous, and only Mr. André Rousseau was considered to be a strong supporter of the Minister of Natural Resources. The Liberals were faced with a positive party split and must have been shaken by rumours of a possible Lévesque-Drapeau-Bertrand alliance. When Mr. Lévesque was unwilling to compromise, therefore, the cabinet had little choice but to follow his lead. The policy of nationalization was, after all, a logical corollary of the 1960 Liberal political manifesto, whose dual themes were the economic expansion of the province and an enhanced status for French-Canadians in all phases of national life.

The real issue of Lac à l'Epaule seems to have been how to proceed with

7. The government had seemingly embarked on this policy in July when it negotiated with officials of the Lower St. Lawrence Power Co. for the sale of that company to Hydro Quebec.

the nationalization of electricity, and, for reason of political expediency, it was decided to seek a mandate for the nationalization of electricity at a general election. This decision remained a well-kept secret and only leaked to the press on September 18th, when Le Devoir carried a front page story predicting an imminent "snap" election call. Mr. Lesage issued a denial, but on September 19th, following a caucus of Liberal MLAs and organizers, he announced at a press conference that his government had indeed decided to ask the people for a mandate to nationalize all private companies which produced and distributed electric power, and promised just compensation to the companies involved.

The Liberal party's policy on the nationalization of electricity remained consistent throughout the election campaign. The principal exponent of this policy was, of course, Mr. Lévesque, and his arguments were drawn from his own public speeches and from newspaper articles and editorials which supported nationalization.

The essence of Mr. Lévesque's argument was the principle that the state is the guardian of the community's interests. Therefore, since Quebec's natural resources are public property, private exploitation of these resources is justifiable only if the rights of exploitation are exercised in the public interest. Whenever the government should feel that the public interest would be better served by state economic activity, it becomes its duty to take the necessary steps to bring about the new system of production. Recourse to nationalization, in this view, is to be decided upon purely practical grounds. The critics of Mr. Lévesque were, therefore, correct in stating that further nationalization was possible. But his reply was equally truthful, for while denying that he envisaged further nationali-

zations in the foreseeable future, he agreed that other forms of state economic activity in the exploitation of Quebec's natural resources might become necessary.

The nationalization of the private power companies was justified on nationalist and economic grounds. The nationalist basis of Mr. Lévesque's policy reiterated that the economic activity of the state was the principal means by which French-Canadians could influence the management of Quebec's economy. And, since the natural resources of the province constitute inalienable public property, what better place is there for state economic activity? This argument was backed up by a condemnation of the employment policies of the private power companies. In his study of the nationalization issue, Mr. Jean-Claude Paquet estimated that 190 of 243 or 84% of Hydro Quebec's engineers were French-Canadian, against 20 of 175 or 12% of those hired by Shawinigan Water and Power Co., and he pointed out that in 1944 only 3 of 53 "chefs de service" of Montreal Light, Heat and Power Co. were French-Canadian.⁸ Mr. Lévesque cited these figures throughout the campaign, claiming that nationalization of the private power companies would result in more jobs for French-Canadian engineers and technicians.

The principal justification for nationalization, however, was Mr. Lévesque's belief that this measure was a prerequisite of Quebec's continued economic development. A Liberal election slogan claimed that "l'électricité, c'est la clé de notre économie." Liberal speakers cited the Gordon Commission's report on Canada's Economic Prospects to show that the availability of abundant hydroelectric power has always been a vital factor in the

8. These figures are given in the fifth article of Mr. Paquet's study in La Presse, May 10th, 1962.

industrialization of Quebec.

The crux of the Liberal position is summed up in the following paragraph which is worth quoting fully:⁹

En effet, pour que l'électricité puisse jouer son rôle essentielle dans l'expansion économique de la province, et tout spécialement dans la décentralisation industrielle et dans la mise en valeur des régions peu développées, il faut une planification, une coordination des services, une harmonisation des tarifs qui exigent la nationalisation d'une forte partie du secteur privé, le plus tôt possible, et notamment du groupe Shawinigan. Ce serait en effet la seule façon de corriger d'une manière efficace et équitable, l'inégalité dont souffrent certaines régions quant à la qualité et au coût du service de l'électricité, de supprimer des gaspillages intolérables provenant du défaut de coordination dans la distribution de l'électricité....

The existing structure of ownership in the hydroelectricity industry, therefore, made for confusion and contradictions in the industry's investment policy and prevented a flexible rate policy encouraging industrial decentralization from emerging. In its anti-nationalization campaign, the Shawinigan consortium first attempted to meet this argument by claiming that the cost of electricity is not an important influence in determining the location of industry. But, as Mr. Lévesque pointed out, the private power companies themselves gave the lie to this argument when they praised their own role in the industrialization of the areas they served.¹⁰

9. P. Sauriol, La Nationalisation de l'Electricité, Montreal, Les Editions de L'Homme, 1962, pp.23-24. The Liberal party apparently agreed with the arguments of Mr. Sauriol, for his book was included in the "kit" given each Liberal candidate at the Sept. 19 caucus.

10. The Shawinigan officials had taken credit for promotion the industrial development of La Mauricie at the press conference of Feb. 13. They stressed this factor throughout their anti-nationalization campaign.

The Liberals stressed that the availability of electricity and not its cost is the key factor. And to the suggestion of Shawinigan officials that nothing prevented Hydro Quebec from undertaking to make hydroelectric power available to the province's depressed areas, Mr. Lévesque retorted that he saw no reason why Hydro should undertake unprofitable ventures while leaving the private power companies the more lucrative activities. He pointed out that the private power companies were no longer willing to provide remote, underdeveloped areas with electricity, and that cooperatives had had to be formed to perform this function.

A second economic argument in favour of the nationalization of electricity claimed that this measure would make possible better electricity service in the Gaspé and Abitibi. These regions currently received service on a 25 and not 60 cycle current. Domestic service was poor, therefore, and, since industrial equipment is usually made for use on a 60 cycle current, the 25-cycle current discouraged the industrial development of these underdeveloped regions. Furthermore, large sections of the Gaspé and Abitibi were supplied electricity by cooperatives and small power companies and the cost of this service was very great. Whereas a domestic consumer in Montreal pays \$4.92 for 400 kwh, the consumers in La Sarre and Marsoui must pay \$10.10 and \$22.50 respectively for the same supply. Mr. Lévesque promised that nationalization would make possible a flexible rate policy and a reduction in the cost of electricity in the Gaspé and Abitibi; the Liberals also pledged to immediately convert the electric current in these regions from 25 to 60 cycles.

The nationalization of electricity would, it was argued, end the "gaspillage absurde et ruineux" entailed by the existing system. Mr. Lévesque

estimated that the integration of the province's hydroelectric power resources into one system would result in a saving of \$5,000,000 in fixed costs. Unification of the province's electricity network would, also permit the optimum utilization of the total water supply. The existing system allowed the Shawinigan Water and Power Co., for example, to buy a considerable amount of off-peak power at very favourable prices from Hydro Quebec's Beauharnois plant, because there are no water storage facilities at the Beauharnois site. All power not sold, therefore, is lost. By buying this power cheaply, Shawinigan conserved its own water sources for use in low flow periods. In these circumstances, the company profited by buying secondary power from Hydro at low prices.

Finally, Mr. Lévesque pointed out that by nationalizing the private power companies, Quebec would recuperate approximately \$15,000,000 which, under the existing system, are paid in corporation taxes to the federal government. A crown corporation, however, is exempt from these taxes, and this saving would presumably cover part of the cost of nationalization. The Liberals estimated that nationalization would cost \$600,000,000, \$350,000,000 of which would have to be borrowed, Hydro Quebec taking over the \$250,000,000 hypothecary debt of the private power companies. Nationalization of electricity, however, was to bring the province \$40,000,000 a year: \$20,000,000 in profits, \$15,000,000 in recuperated taxes, and \$5,000,000 from savings engendered by the integration of the network. This sum would be sufficient to pay the debt charges, and, in the first year, to transform the electric current in the Gaspé and Abitibi from 25 to 60 cycles. Mr. Lévesque, basing himself on these figures, could say that "la nationalisation est une proposition payante."

The government's policy on the nationalization of electricity represented best its "modern" approach to Quebec's economic and social problems. This policy combined the advocacy of government activity to promote economic and social welfare with the realization that economic planning was necessary to encourage industrial decentralization and balanced growth. Nationalization was presented as the basis for future economic activity, the foundation for the economic development of the province.

The long-term economic benefits of nationalization were discussed on a relatively high intellectual level, and the Liberals may have worried that these arguments held only a limited popular appeal, for they also tried to show that there were direct benefits to be derived from this measure, such as more jobs and lower electricity rates. The nationalist content of this policy: the attacks on the federal corporation taxes and the re-presentation of Hydro Quebec as a haven for French-Canadian engineers, was designed to attract wide public support.

The Union Nationale remained silent on the nationalization issue until after the election call. During the campaign, however, Mr. Johnson, without taking a definite stand, did make use of the arguments of Mr. Lévesque's opponents in order to cast doubt on the validity of the Liberal party's policy. The major anti-nationalization arguments are therefore presented here.

The opponents of the nationalization of the private power companies, notably Messrs. Fuller, Mainguy, Beique and Page', based their argument on the principle of the sanctity of private enterprise. The creative spirit of private enterprise, they stated, has been responsible for the economic development of Quebec, and this being the case, the nationalization of the

private power companies would be, at the very least, an act of base ingratitude. The nationalization of electricity was characterized as the first step to "socialism,"¹¹ which would discourage foreign investment in Quebec and so bring on economic decline.

These arguments were designed to appeal to the instinctive fear of Quebecers for "socialism" but were quite readily answered by the protagonists of nationalization, who pointed out that the private power companies had not denied that they no longer practised an expansionist policy designed to develop remote regions, but had merely claimed they should be left to Hydro Quebec. If this were to be the case, however, state ownership of hydroelectric resources was not dangerous, but necessary. The charge that nationalization of electricity would inevitably lead to a "socialist" state, that is, to a policy of widespread nationalizations was also met. For other communities, such as Ontario, France, and Italy, have nationalized the electricity networks and remained "non-socialist." Why then should Quebec be different? Mr. Lévesque argued the "mixed economy" was generally accepted in industrial states and that Quebec too should adopt this economic system. He noted that Mr. Brasseur, the Belgian Minister of Commerce, had said in Quebec City on 9 March, 1962 that the nationalization of electricity would in no way reduce Belgian investment in Quebec.

The Shawinigan consortium also claimed that nationalization would not mean lower prices, and pointed out that in certain areas power supplied by private companies cost less than the corresponding amount supplied by Hydro Quebec to Montreal. They emphasized that electricity costs less in Quebec

11. The word socialist used in this pejorative sense is hard to define, but its users implied by socialist state a police state with all industrial activity under government control. An imaginative view, perhaps, but hardly one justified by factual evidence.

than anywhere else in Canada and that only 1% of the domestic budget was being spent on electricity. Why, then, should the government not attack high prices in other areas? The power companies claimed that "integration" was possible without nationalization and that the competition afforded by the existing structure of ownership allowed for healthy competition. To this, Mr. Lévesque replied that "interconnection" was an insufficient solution and that in fact no competition existed, since each company enjoyed a monopoly in the area it served.

The Shawinigan authorities made, with some success, a determined effort to win the support of municipal authorities by claiming that nationalization would result in a loss of tax revenues for municipalities and school commissions. They claimed that the private power companies had paid 2.6 times more taxes to the province in 1960 than had Hydro Quebec.¹² Both before and during the election campaign, the Liberals tried to meet this challenge, and solemnly pledged that Hydro Quebec would pay the same taxes as the private power companies had paid, and that the total revenues received by the municipalities and school commissions would not be reduced.

The debate on the nationalization of electricity symbolized the confrontation between the new elements in the Liberal Cabinet's concept of government and the more traditional political practices. For at the centre of the dispute lay the question of the appropriate role for the state in promoting the economic and social welfare of the community. The very fact that the protagonists and opponents of nationalization spoke on different levels revealed the fundamental basis of their clash. While supporters of

12. This statement and his answer to it are included in Mr. Lévesque's statement of Feb. 15. Copies are distributed by the Department of Natural Resources.

nationalization spoke of planned economic growth, industrial decentralization and the long-term benefits nationalization would bring the province, its opponents, their impassioned defense of private enterprise aside, avoided discussion of these larger issues and concentrated on the questions of municipal taxes and good electricity service. Having failed to answer the economic and nationalist arguments in favour of nationalization, the opponents of the measure made the bogey of "socialism" their most important tactical weapon.

Thus the 1962 election, ostensibly fought to decide "La Bataille de l'électricité," in effect was the continuation of the dispute between two conflicting philosophies of government.

CHAPTER IV

THE COURSE OF THE CAMPAIGN¹

Premier Lesage's "snap" election call was motivated exclusively by partisan considerations.² Certain elements of the Liberal party had never approved of the Lesage government's "new look" and were anxious to return to the more habitual patterns of government. And, while the nationalization of electricity undoubtedly was opposed by some Liberals, the real conflict within the party was between the supporters of "honest" government and "les patronneux," between reformers and traditionalist conservatives. Weakened by intraparty dissension and seemingly unable to generate enthusiasm for "la politique de grandeur" in the rural areas, the cabinet seemed paralyzed by the need to reach a decision on the nationalization issue. The decision to call a general election, it seems, was designed to recreate party unity and to give the cabinet the opportunity for a fresh start. Liberal leaders evidently hoped that, faced by the prospect of losing power, all factions of the party would cooperate in fighting the common enemy.

The timing of the election was particularly opportune for the Liberals, since the opposition parties were all unprepared for full-scale election campaign. The Union Nationale, although strengthened since its leadership convention, was still engaged in rebuilding its organizational structure, and party officials would, undoubtedly, have preferred not to have to fight

1. This chapter deals almost exclusively with the activity of the Liberals and Union Nationale in the campaign. It attempts to trace the development of the campaign in terms of the advantages for these parties. The role of third parties and interest groups is discussed in the next chapter.

2. This is not to suggest that elections are not ordinarily timed to secure the government party the maximum political advantage. The 1962 Quebec election was a "snap" election in that it was almost totally unexpected. And, in announcing it, the government broke with the tradition of calling an election every four years. For this reason, it seems worthwhile to place special emphasis on the role of partisan considerations in determining the government's decision.

an election for some six months. The Social Credit party, since the June 1962 federal election a major antagonist of the Liberals in Quebec, had decided against immediate participation in provincial politics at the August convention of the Ralliement des Cr ditistes. The New Democrats were, in September, 1962, only embryonically organized and definitely unequipped for electoral action, and the Rassemblement pour l'Ind pendance Nationale was in the process of deciding whether or not to transform itself into a political party.

Public attention was focussed on the Liberals in the first three weeks of September, as both supporters and opponents of nationalization urged the government to decide immediately on a definite policy. Protagonists of nationalization were encouraged by a statement issued on August 30 by the Episcopate of the Catholic church in Canada suggesting that, in certain circumstances, "socialization" can be justified and can serve as an effective barrier to socialism and totalitarianism.

On Sept. 1st, the FTQ, CSN and U.C.C. made public their joint appeal for the immediate nationalization of the province's private power companies; several days later the Chambers of Commerce of Montreal and Quebec called for the establishment of a commission of inquiry; and on Sept. 8th the Association Professionnelle des Industriels, reiterating its opposition to nationalization, called on the government to put an end to the atmosphere of suspense and tension. The government, however, took no notice of these demands and, as late as Sept. 18th, Premier Lesage remained noncommittal, issuing a denial of Le Devoir's front page article predicting an imminent announcement of the election.

On Sept. 19, Liberal legislators met in caucus and were told of the

cabinet's decision to call an election. Mr. Lesage then formally announced at a press conference that his government would ask the electorate on November 14th for a mandate to nationalize all private power companies. In elaborating the government's policy. Mr. Lesage carefully repeated the arguments developed by Mr. Lévesque.³ He also explained that, while the government was convinced that the nationalization of electricity was in the public interest, it could not proceed with the enactment of the measure, since the Liberal political manifesto had not mentioned it. The government, therefore, was seeking a specific mandate from the electorate so that it could democratically enact its policy. To make this argument palatable, the election was depicted as the consultation with the 5,300,000 shareholders of Quebec's natural resources. that should rightly precede government action.

Although in early September the Liberal party was more in the public eye than the Union Nationale, the government was not placed in a flattering light, for the press concentrated on discussing the alleged rupture between Mr. Lévesque and his ministerial colleagues and on accusing the government of vacillation. The initial reaction to the announcement of the election was also unfavourable. Mr. Vincent Prince, writing in La Presse,⁴ called the election unnecessary and the decision to hold it a violation of democratic principles. The government, he wrote, had no need of a specific mandate to nationalize electricity and was merely exploiting an important issue for partisan purposes. Mr. Johnson, for the Union Nationale, described the government's action as a "holdup" of the electorate, and claimed that the government had resigned because of internal dissension.⁵

3. The Liberal policy on nationalization was described in the previous chapter.

4. In editorials, Sept. 20 and 21, 1962.

5. An important Liberal organizer agreed that Mr. Johnson's explanation was partially correct and that there had been considerable opposition to the scope of the government's reforms and to the priority given the nationalization measure.

Mr. Lesage rationalized the "snap" election call by the mandate theory of elections, but his argument was a weak one.⁶ A general application of the principle that no government policy can be enacted until it has received a specific endorsement at a general election would make orderly government impossible. But Mr. Lesage's argumentation seems particularly inappropriate in the case of the 1962 election, for while the Liberal manifesto of 1960 did not specifically promise the nationalization of electricity, among its objectives were rapid economic growth and the economic emancipation of French-Canadians, and Article 11 of the manifesto called for the standardization of electricity rates and the decentralization of industry.

It has been pointed, however, out that at an election broadly-defined goals and not specific policies are endorsed. The nationalization of electricity, according to the Liberals, was a means to the objectives of the 1960 Liberal manifesto, and since these objectives had presumably been endorsed in 1960, the government had, in effect, a full mandate to nationalize the private power companies.

In describing the 1959 British general election campaign, Butler and Rose divide the campaign into three distinct phases:⁷ an initial period of preparatory activity favourable to Labour, a period of Labour advance, and a final phase in which the Conservatives counterattacked. In making this division, which must remain arbitrary to some degree, they relied upon press opinion, upon information given them by party officials, and particularly

6. It must be noted that the debate on whether or not the government was justified in calling the election evoked very little public interest.

7. Butler and Rose, op.cit., p. 46.

upon the results of public opinion polls. It is impossible to divide the 1962 Quebec election campaign in a similar manner. The most important indicators of the ebb and flow of popular support, regular public opinion samples, were unavailable, and the alternative sources of information were also scanty. The information that is available, however, suggests that the campaign was characterized not by alternating periods of Liberal and Union Nationale gains, but rather by a gradual upswing in support for the Liberals.

At the outset of the campaign, most observers and party officials agreed that the parties were on a roughly equal footing; some commentators even felt that the Union Nationale held a slight advantage.⁸ The first important indication of Liberal gains appeared in the week beginning Oct. 25th when the Le Devoir and the Montreal Star reports on Mr. Lesage's provincial tour described it as "trionphale."⁹ On Nov. 3rd, the Gazette pointed the results of a survey of the opinions of newspaper editors throughout the province. More than two-thirds of these predicted a Liberal victory. And on Nov. 5th, Le Devoir wrote that there were still no indications of a "wave" of popular support for either party, but that the Liberals had gained perceptibly in the campaign and would probably be reelected with a slightly increased majority. This impression was strengthened in the closing days of the campaign, but at its close only the party Leaders themselves were predicting a landslide victory for their respective parties.

8. See, for example, Maclean's Magazine, Nov. 17, 1962, pp. 3-4. Since soon after the 1960 election there was speculation that the Union Nationale might completely disintegrate, the situation at the beginning of the 1962 campaign represented a marked increase in that party's popularity, or a strong decline in popular support for the Liberals.

9. It should be remembered, however, that these newspapers strongly supported the Liberals.

I have divided the 1962 Quebec election into four phases, each of which was characterized by the dominance of a particular theme of the campaign.¹⁰ The initial period, Sept. 20-Oct. 1st, was relatively quiet as the parties were busy drafting publicity, securing funds, organizing nominating conventions. During this phase, only one major speech was made by each party leader. The second phase, lasted from Oct. 1st until Oct. 19th. It was characterized by a lack of dialogue between the two parties; the Liberals spoke almost exclusively of the nationalization of electricity, while the Union Nationale made the "socialist issue" the dominant theme of its campaign. In this period too "demagogic" electioneering was rampant.

The third phase of the campaign continued until Nov. 5th, and this period saw the emergence of new themes. The nationalization issue received somewhat less discussion, and there was real debate on the relative merits of the party programs, and on the record of the Liberal government. In this period, the Liberals began to gain steadily and by the beginning of the final ten days of the campaign party spokesmen were predicting "un balayage." The final phase of the campaign included the television debate between Mr. Lesage and Mr. Johnson and giant rallies in Montreal; in this period too the Liberals consolidated their advance. But the end of the campaign was marked by the impact of the voting slip scandal and degenerated into a battle of mutual recriminations, leading La Presse to editorialize "il faut voter Octobre 14."

10. This is, of course, an arbitrary classification and is based partly on a subjective evaluation and partly on more objective factors, such as the subject of the party leaders' speeches and the content of party propaganda.

The first major speech of the campaign was made by Mr. Johnson at Amqui on September 23rd. In this address he laid down the general lines of the Union Nationale's campaign strategy and elaborated for the first time its policy on nationalization. The Union Nationale advocated the immediate nationalization of the Lower St. Lawrence Power Co. and the Northern Quebec Co., admitting that the cost and quality of electricity service in the Gaspé would have to be improved. The status of the remaining private power companies would be, were the Union Nationale to be elected, decided at a referendum. Mr. Johnson explained that without knowing the financial situation of the province it would be irresponsible of him to take a definitive stand on the nationalization issue. Other members of his party, however, were free to announce either support for or opposition to nationalization.

Since most of the province's French-language daily newspapers unequivocally supported the nationalization of electricity, press reaction to Mr. Johnson's speech was unfavourable. He was supported only by Montréal-Matin and the Quebec Chronicle Telegraph, while Le Droit, Le Soleil, and La Presse criticized the vagueness, of his proposals, calling them unwise. André Laurendeau branded Mr. Johnson the potential "avorteur de la nationalisation," and this theme was taken up by Liberal speakers and, later, by "Les Amis de Philippe Hamel." Perhaps in response to the unremitting pressure of the press or merely because he became convinced of the popularity of the nationalization measure, the Union Nationale Leader later developed party policy in a sense more favourable to nationalization, but his basic argument remained that enunciated at Amqui.

Having disposed of the nationalization issue to his own satisfaction,

Mr. Johnson went on to deal with what he felt was the "real" subject of the campaign, the record of the Liberal government. He attacked the Liberal government for incompetence and corruption, singling out the activities of the Bureau du Bois de la Manicougan; he accused it of leading the province into bankruptcy while creating innumerable new taxes. The Union Nationale Leader closed his Amqui speech by outlining his "politique du bon sens," designed to save the interests of "les petits gens." He promised to pass legislation providing a \$1 per hour minimum wage and to raise the basic provincial income tax exemption from \$1,000 to \$2,000 for bachelors and from \$2,000 to \$4,000 for married men. Appealing specifically to the rural voters, he alleged that the Liberal government was planning to eliminate 20 rural constituencies, and promised renewed emphasis on the construction of rural roads and extended farm credit.¹¹

The Liberal response to Mr. Johnson's speech characterized the Union Nationale as opposing the nationalization of electricity, and, therefore, as an enemy of the public interest. The government had considered the same policy on nationalization, but "nous l'avons jeté dans la fosse" because it burdened Hydro Quebec with the operation of unprofitable activities while the private power companies were left to conduct the more profitable operations. Mr. Lesage claimed that the adoption of Union Nationale's promise to lower taxes would cost the provincial treasury \$40,000,000 a year; Mr. Johnson was therefore asked whether or not this meant his party favoured the reduction of public expenditure for education and welfare.

The first major Liberal speeches were made at a Quebec Liberal

11. L'Action Catholique, Sept. 24, 1962, p.1.

Federation banquet in Montreal in September. In the preceding week, there were several important developments. On Sept. 25th, the Ralliement des Cr ditistes decided not to contest the election, two days later the founding of l'Action Provinciale was announced; and on Sept. 26th, Mr. Johnson promised that if elected he would convene a provincial-municipal conference to discuss the distribution of tax revenues.¹² For his part, Mr. Lesage attempted to undermine the Union Nationale's pledge of a \$1 per hour minimum wage by announcing that the minimum wage of more than 15,000 workers in various industries was being raised to \$1 per hour or more. Throughout the campaign, the government party continued to exploit the advantages of its status. . . . Later, for example, the salaries of civil servants were increased in attempt to gain support for the Liberals in Quebec City ridings, and in a similar manner, the report of the Economic Advisory Council advocating economic planning and, indirectly at least, supporting Liberal campaign themes was published at a strategic time.

At the Sept. 30th Liberal gathering, the Premier and Mr. L vesque spoke of the nationalization of electricity while Mr. Lapalme developed the party's second major campaign theme, that the election of the Union Nationale would mean a return to widespread corruption in government. Liberals developed this theme with gusto, using inflammatory slogans such as "Their hands are still dirty." "They have not spent long enough in purgatory," and "They want to reintroduce a Gestapo system." Mr. L vesque, speaking mostly in English, gave his assurance that no general policy of nationalization was being considered by the government and explained again why he thought

12. The importance of local political conditions and influence of local "notables" in determining the outcome of elections in Quebec is underlined by the efforts of the parties to curry favour with mayors and school commissioners.

the nationalization of private power companies was necessary. He also announced that he and Premier Lesage were in complete agreement on the policy of the government, and asserted that party was united in its support of nationalization.¹³

The Premier's keynote speech enthusiastically enumerated the by-now familiar arguments for the nationalization of electricity, but introduced a new note when he represented the issue as a struggle "between the people and the trusts."¹⁴ The nationalist overtones of his speech had been clearly foreshadowed by a full-page Liberal advertisement which appeared in the September 29th French-language daily newspapers throughout the province. In this advertisement, the Liberals, describing the nationalization of electricity as "La Clé du Royaume," emotionally called on French-Canadians to put an end to their eternal status as "l'Adjoint de l'Autre."

This development in the Liberal campaign was welcomed by Paul Sauriol in Le Devoir, but was greeted with unconcealed dismay by the province's English-language press. The Montreal Gazette, for example, deplored the misrepresentation of the power companies as a "trust" and warned that English-Canadians and foreign investors might be deterred by such slogans from putting capital into Quebec. The Liberal advertisement in question was also criticized and observers speculated this would strictly limit its popular appeal. At any rate, whether to quell the fears of English-Canadians and businessmen or because the political value of this particular

13. At Amqui, Mr. Bertrand had similarly attempted to scotch the rumours of party disunity and had expressed his devotion to and support of Mr. Johnson.
 14. In doing so Mr. Lesage seemingly cut the ground from Mr. Levesque's assurances to the business community.

advertisement was considered very small, this form of pro-nationalization propaganda was not used again.¹⁵ The "people versus the trusts" slogan was also quickly dropped and this electioneering tack abandoned.

The week of October 1st-7th saw the beginning of intensive campaigning by both parties, although each scheduled the formal opening of their campaigns for October 7th. In this second phase of the campaign Mr. Lesage and Mr. Lévesque, who together shared the Liberal spotlight, concentrated on elaborating the party's policy on the nationalization of electricity. Every aspect of nationalization was carefully explained and related to the "economic emancipation" of French-Canadians and the development of Quebec's economy. Mr. Lesage deviated from this topic only to castigate the Union Nationale for its earlier sins.

Mr. Johnson built the Union Nationale's campaign on a somewhat broader base. His strategy concentrated on winning the province's predominantly rural constituencies, but he was able to promise something to every group he encountered. And, while his speeches tended to be only loosely united, they were inspired by the promise to secure immediate material benefits for the province's "petits gens." In cultivating the support of lower income groups, the Union Nationale attacked the Liberal government for raising taxes and failing to reduce unemployment. He reminded his audiences that the Union Nationale had accomplished "much more" while spending much less. To farmers he promised to build more rural roads and to preserve the rural electoral constituencies; to workers a reduction in the provincial income tax and the \$1 per hour minimum wage. He accused the Liberals of trying to

15. This particular format reappeared only once in the campaign, in Le Devoir in early October. Presumably Le Devoir's readers were considered more likely to be appreciative.

make English-Canadian Quebecers "second class citizens," but on another occasion he charged "English students at McGill University" with fomenting separatism.

Mr. Johnson's apparent unconcern for consistency was reflected also in his speeches on the nationalization issue, for while insisting that the Union Nationale was not opposed to the nationalization of the private power companies, he proceeded to raise a variety of objections to the feasibility and desirability of the measure.

The dominant issue of the second phase of the campaign was Mr. Lévesque's alleged predilection for nationalization and "socialism." It has been pointed out that the opponents of Mr. Lévesque's campaign against the private power companies relied on "l'épouvantail de socialisme" to arouse public support for their cause. The nationalization of the private power companies alone, it was argued, would be relatively harmless, but in fact this measure represented "the thin wedge of creeping socialism." And, while Mr. Levesque replied that the examples of Ontario, France, and Italy contradicted this reasoning, he himself inadvertently added fuel to his opponents' campaign, in a speech on Oct. 4th.

At this time he again promised that no further nationalizations were envisaged, and said that in industries other than hydroelectricity, nationalization would not help achieve the goals of the government's economic policy. In the mining and pulp and paper industries, for example, other formulae would have to be used to increase French-Canadian participation in their management.

The Montreal Gazette seized upon Mr. Lévesque's remarks and a front page article on October 5th was headlined "Lévesque eyes formulae for mines, paper;" it implied that the Minister of Natural Resources was contemplating

further "socialistic" measures. In his reply, a statement issued on October 6th, Mr. Lévesque accused the Gazette's reporter, Mr. Bill Bantey, of conveying the opposite of what he himself had meant. He was supported by the pronationalization press and on Oct. 10th, Le Devoir's André Laurendeau in an article titled "The Gazette, The Star et Nous" warned English-Canadians not to raise the false spectre of socialism in an attempt to thwart the nationalization of electricity. In spite of this warning, however, Mr. Bantey's article provided the inspiration for several pamphlets which were circulated in the predominantly English constituencies of West Montreal and which urged voters to defeat Mr. Lévesque before "he can get his hands on the telephone, paper, mines, and trucking."¹⁶

The exchange between Mr. Lévesque and Mr. Bantey coincided with the official opening of the Union Nationale campaign on October 7th. The opposition party made Mr. Lévesque its chief target, attacking his "leftist" tendencies and referring to him as the real leader of the Liberal party.¹⁷ A minor speaker at the Union Nationale rally claimed that the Liberal slogan "Maîtres Chez Nous" had been used previously by Fidel Castro; he went on to liken Mr. Lévesque to the Cuban leader.¹⁸ This theme was quickly taken up by Montréal Matin, which titled its Oct. 8th editorial "René (Castro) Lévesque."

Mr. Johnson himself added a new element to the attacks on Mr. Lévesque

16. This particular statement appeared in a handbill distributed by "a group of independent women interested in fighting nationalization, socialism, and communism."

17. The phrase usually used in this connection named Mr. Lesage as "he who held the steering wheel while Mr. Lévesque had his foot on the gas."

18. Later in the campaign, in an even more far-fetched comparison, Mr. Germain Caron, UN, MLA for Maskinongé, claimed that a bearded René Lévesque would strongly resemble Lenin. The connection between the two men apparently stems from the fact that "Maîtres Chez Nous" had also been a slogan of the Quebec Communist party.

and raised another familiar bogey when he claimed that the reelection of the Liberals would mean that "l'éducation sera étatisée avant l'électricité,"¹⁹ for state control of the province's education system has traditionally been associated with the secularization of education. He pursued this theme on October 13th calling Mr. Lévesque, "le faux aumônier de la patente du Dr. Mackay."²⁰ and also promised to grant a university charter to the Jesuit College Ste.-Marie in Three Rivers, implying that the University of Montreal no longer qualified as a "Catholic" university.

To Mr. Lesage, the Union Nationale leader appeared to be unjustifiably "mixing religion and politics," and he angrily accused Mr. Johnson of "demagogy" and "fabricating scarecrows." The vice-rector of the University of Montreal in a statement which expressed confidence that education at the University of Montreal was in no danger of becoming secularized, also took issue with Mr. Johnson. And Abbe Louis O'Neill warned that to accuse falsely a political adversary of anti-clericalism is a grave moral fault. To this, however, Mr. Johnson retorted that it was the duty of all Catholics and not only of priests and bishops to protect their religion.

The Union Nationale caricature of Mr. Lévesque as Fidel Castro and Mr. Johnson's statements on education led La Presse and Le Devoir to sharply criticize "demagogic" campaigning. While admitting that Mr. Lesage had also indulged in demagogy, these newspapers reserved the lion's share of the blame for Mr. Johnson; in reply to the Montréal-Matin editorial, "René (Castro) Lévesque," André Laurendeau headed his "Chronique d'une campagne" column "Daniel (Hitler) Johnson" and charged the Union Nationale leader with attempting "propager une cauchemar." But Montréal-Matin seemed

19. L'Action Catholique, Oct., 12, 1962, p. 1.

20. Dr. Jacques Mackay is the president of the Mouvement Laique Français which seeks nonconfessional schools for French-speaking Protestants.

unconcerned by the criticism of its colleagues and suggested that René Lévesque himself was not particularly displeased by the comparison to Dr. Castro.²¹ Mudslinging tended to subside, however, in the third phase of the campaign which began on Oct. 18th. The day before, Mr. Jean-Jacques Bertrand demanded that demagogy be eliminated from the campaign, criticising Mr. Lesage and more indirectly, the Leader of his own party.²²

It should be noted that while Mr. Bertrand seemingly pointed to dissension between himself and Mr. Johnson, Mr. George Marler, Liberal MLC and Minister Without Portfolio, also on October 17th, denied that he disagreed with the Liberal policy on the nationalization of electricity. This measure, he said, was necessary for "economic reasons." These statements in effect opened the third phase of the campaign in which new themes were given prominence. The Liberal manifesto had been published on Oct. 12th; it was limited to an enumeration of party policy on the nationalization measure, noting in conclusion that nationalization was a precondition of the realization of the party's 1960 program. As the campaign progressed, however, Liberal speakers gave increasing attention to the achievements of the Lesage government. This change, which was reflected in the content of party propaganda, was in part motivated by the results of public opinion surveys made for the provincial party organization.²³

21. Another editorial was titled "René Levesqué, est-il vraiment fâché?"

22. See La Presse, Oct. 18, 1962, p.1, for a summary of Mr. Bertrand's remarks.

23. The exact results of these private surveys, some taken midway in the campaign, have not been revealed, but a Liberal party official indicated to me that they had a strong influence on shaping party strategy. Le Groupe de Recherches Sociales was engaged in a second study of political attitudes in Quebec when the announcement of the election was made. At the request of the Quebec Liberal Federation, the sponsor of the study, the completion of the report was speeded up and some results given to the Liberal party during the campaign. I am greatly indebted to Professor Raymond Breton and

On October 19th, Mr. Lesage announced Quebec's agreement to participate in the Federal Agricultural Rehabilitation Development Act, describing this federal-provincial program as part of the government's long-range plan to improve the lot of the farmer. Beginning a lengthy tour of Abitibi, the Gaspé and Lac St.-Jean, regions which had given strong support to Social Credit in the June 19th federal election, he spoke of the need to get to the roots of the province's problems and called for a "mature" attitude in economic affairs. The warmth with which Mr. Lesage was received by what many felt would be hostile audiences seems to have given a strong impetus to the Liberal campaign. Marcel Thivierge wrote in Le Devoir that "le tour de M. Lesage prend un caractère populaire" and the reports of other newspapers also reflected the feeling that the campaign was turning in favour of the Liberals.

Mr. Lesage exuded confidence as he attacked the Union Nationale's record and flayed Mr. Johnson for his role in the natural gas scandal, quoting the report of the Salvas Commission to support his criticism. On October 24th he went so far as to call on Mr. Johnson to retire from public life. For his part, the Union Nationale Leader continued to criticize many of the Liberal reforms and called for the Union Nationale, and presumably the province as well, to effect "le retour aux origines."

Mr. Serge Rousseau of Le Groupe de Recherches Sociales for discussing the study with me and for allowing me to see some preliminary findings, which, while incomplete, were most interesting and revealing. They seemed to indicate popular approval of the Liberal reforms in education and welfare and a very favourable public image of Premier Lesage. The nationalization of electricity seems to have been relatively less popular, while major Liberal weaknesses appeared to be in the domains of farm and tax policy. The preliminary results of this report also influenced the Liberals to concentrate, in the later stages of the campaign more, on the accomplishments of the government than on the nationalization of electricity.

He promised again to amend rather than abolish the new education laws and to modify the hospital insurance plan in such a way as to reduce government control of the administration of hospitals, while raising its standard.. But he seemed to go further than the Liberals when he promised to move towards the establishment of a health insurance plan.

Throughout the campaign, the Union Nationale stressed its attractive minimum wage promise, and Mr. Johnson suggested that the \$1 per hour minimum wage would contribute more to making French-Canadians "masters in their own house" than would the nationalization of electricity. The Liberals seemed concerned that the Union Nationale's promise would win wide working-class support, and both Mr. Lesage and Mr. Lévesque criticized the \$1 per hour pledge. Mr. Lesage claimed that were this minimum wage generally applied a massive increase in unemployment would result; Mr. Lévesque said that it would be "stupid" to promise a high minimum wage, for although a desirable goal this was completely impracticable for the foreseeable future. The Liberals also pointed out that Mr. Johnson had excluded farm labourers and hotel and restaurant employees from the purview of the promised increase in the minimum wage.

The Union Nationale published its program on October 24th, although large sections had already been made public. This program promised to apply humane, socially just, democratic, financially and morally sound, and Christian policies to the government of Quebec. It repudiated socialism and reiterated the party's "Christian and personalist philosophy." The program stressed the role of "les corps intermédiaires" in social and economic affairs, and promised that the needy would be favoured by a Union Nationale government. It repeatedly promised to respect the rights of the family and

the church in education, underscoring its devotion to the main principles of Quebec's traditional social philosophy.

The Union Nationale program then went on to make a variety of more specific promises. It envisaged the creation of ministries of Tourism, Regional Development, and Rural Rehabilitation, the establishment of a Provincial Commission of Sports and Leisure, and of a crown corporation to buy at a fixed price lumber salvaged by farmers and colonists, the introduction of a portable pension funds, and the convocation of the States-General of Quebec to consider the revision of the Canadian Constitution. Other new elements in the program of the Union Nationale were the proposals to create a bipartisan parliamentary committee to supervise all transactions involving the expenditure of public funds and to have the Public Accounts Committee sit permanently.²⁴

Press reaction to the Union Nationale program was, in general, quite favourable. The party's only other formal program or manifesto had been "Le Catéchisme des Electeurs" in 1936, and the new initiative was widely praised. Montréal-Matin predictably gave the program wide coverage and fulsome praise, while most other dailies gave it mixed reviews. The proposed new ministries, crown corporation to buy lumber, and new parliamentary committee were commended, as was the portable pension plan, but the Union Nationale was again criticized for its ambiguous policy on nationalization. The major complaints, however, expressed in similar terms by Le Soleil, Le Presse, and Le Devoir were that many proposals were "too vague," and that the Union Nationale would be unable to carry out its promise of reducing

24. Only what was new in the Union Nationale program has been enumerated here. The text of the program Action Plan for a Young Nation is easily available.

taxes without cutting back on government expenditure for education, welfare, and public works.

Discussion of the nationalization of electricity continued in the last week of October, and the cost of nationalization emerged as a major issue. The Union Nationale program specified that the proposed referendum on the fate of the major private power companies would take place before June 30, 1963; this stipulation was generally interpreted as a gesture favourable to nationalization. But Mr. Johnson, while not taking a definite stand on the measure, continued to raise objections to the nationalization of electricity. He claimed on numerous occasions that the province was in financial disorder and implied that it could not, therefore, afford the expropriation of the private power companies at a fair price. In reply, Mr. Lesage termed the financial situation of the province excellent and noted that even after nationalization Quebec's per capita public debt would be considerably less than that of Ontario or British Columbia.

On October 23rd, Mr. Johnson took issue with the Premier, claiming that the per capita public debt was not \$254, as Mr. Lesage had announced, but \$387. He added that by March, 1963, it would have reached \$437. The Liberal Leader immediately reaffirmed his original statement and pointed out that he had cited figures prepared by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. The technical aspects of the dispute are unimportant,²⁵ but the substance of the conflict was the difference in the fiscal policies of the two parties. The Union Nationale retained its traditional preoccupation with budget surpluses, while the Liberal government supported deficit financing as a

25. Le Devoir and La Presse, in separate studies of the financial and accounting aspects of the dispute, concluded that both Mr. Lesage and Mr. Johnson were partially correct since their figures, in fact, referred to different things. But both articles tended to favour the Liberal Leader.

means of promoting economic growth. Mr. Johnson's argument implied again that the nationalization of electricity could not be afforded.

Mr. Lévesque had always given \$600,000,000 as a fair price for the assets of the 11 private power companies to be nationalized; but Mr. Johnson suggested that \$750,000,000 or even \$1,000,000 was a truer estimate; he suggested that the benefits to be derived were not worth this large sum.

In answer to Mr. Lesage's challenge that he declare himself for or against the nationalization of electricity, Mr. Johnson declared on October 24th that he would announce his immediate support for the measure if the presidents of the private power companies would agree that the price suggested by the Liberals was a fair one and that the province could afford the cost.²⁶ This declaration served to add fuel to Liberal charges that Mr. Johnson was Quebec's latest "roi nègre."²⁷ And, since he had claimed on other occasions that the Liberals would nationalize electricity in such a way as to favour the power companies, La Presse was led to editorialize, "il est pour et contre à la fois."

While English-language newspapers and Montréal-Matin were concerned that the final price offered the private power companies for their assets might be too low, Le Devoir, La Presse, and "Les Amis de Philippe Hamel" warned of the opposite danger that too high a price might be paid in order to appease business interests. Financial circles also questioned the justice of the price suggested by the Liberal government. A certain Mr. McDiarmid,

26. La Presse, Oct. 25, 1962, p. 1.

27. This vivid phrase was coined by André Laurendeau and is used to describe a French-Canadian politician who is considered to be the lackey of English-Canadian and American business interests. These last represent the colonial power in Mr. Laurendeau's metaphor and French-Canadians the native population of the colony.

a financier from Fort Wayne, Indiana, and a large shareholders of Shawinigan Water and Power Co., claimed on October 25th that \$800,000,000 was a fairer estimate of a just price than \$600,000,000.²⁸ The next day, Mr. Levesque reaffirmed that \$600,000,000 should be the government's highest offer, and he was echoed by Mr. Lesage in a speech on October 27th. Mr. Johnson, however, also on October 27th, again mentioned \$1,000,000,000 as the probable cost of the nationalization of electricity, citing Mr. McDiarmid and an article in the October 27th, 1962, edition of the Financial Post to support his contention. He claimed that the differences of opinion as to the cost of nationalization indicated the wisdom of the Union Nationale policy which envisaged an investigation of this and other factors before the referendum and suggested that an independent tribunal be established to determine the price to be paid for the assets of the private power companies. And the Nov. 3rd, 1962, issue of the Financial Post included a lengthy article evaluating at \$1,000,000,000 the assets of the private power companies that the Liberals hoped to nationalize.²⁹

28. L'Action Catholique, Oct. 30, 1962, p. 1.

Mr. McDiarmid, in another of the campaign's references to history, went on to compare Mr. Lévesque to Robespierre.

29. The essence of the dispute was the choice of a method of evaluating the assets of the private power companies. This is a technical problem which is of no real concern here. Mr. Lévesque's calculation assumed Hydro Quebec would buy the equity shares of the power companies at a price somewhat above their market value and assume the responsibility for the hypothecary debt of the companies. Mr. McDiarmid felt that an "equitable" price would have to be more than 50% greater than either the book or the market value of the companies' shares. The Financial Post advocated that the evaluation estimate the replacement value of the companies' assets. Mr. Levesque received his usual support from Le Devoir and La Presse whose studies of the question found the minister's offer a generous one, and claimed that the evaluation of the Financial Post included considerable double counting. See J-P Fournier's article in Le Devoir, Nov. 3, 1962, p. 1. and M. van Schendel's series of articles on the cost of nationalization in La Presse, Nov. 3-10, 1962, especially articles III and V, in La Presse Nov. 7th and 9th respectively.

At the end of October, indications of Liberal gains were reported in the press, and Mr. Johnson attempted a major counterattack on his tour of Abitibi and other areas which had strongly supported Social Credit in the June 1962 federal election. In every speech, he included a flattering reference to Mr. Caouette and appealed to the Cr ditistes to assist him in ridding the province of Ren  L vesque and the Liberals. Mr. Johnson's acceptance on October 30th of the date proposed by Mr. Lesage for their television debate³⁰ was also probably motivated by the realization that the Union Nationale had fallen behind.

The Union Nationale suffered a bitter blow, however, when Mr. Caouette again refused to offer his endorsement or support. It was placed in a bad light when the "affaire Opino"³¹ was revealed on Oct. 30th, giving the Liberals a new opportunity to denounce the Union Nationale's "racket electorale" and claim that the party "had not spent long enough in purgatory."

In the final days of October too, Mr. Lesage devoted considerable attention to his party's agricultural policy. On October 29th, he made a major policy address, asserting the need for large-scale planning in agricultural development and emphasizing the value of joint marketing cooperatives. In this respect, he promised a revision of the existing legislation regulating the activities of cooperatives. On Nov. 3rd, in answer to the appeal of the U.C.C.³² he again affirmed his concern for the welfare of farmers and his determination that agricultural conditions be improved.

The third phase of the campaign ended on Nov. 4th with the Liberals

30. The television debate is examined in detail in chapter 7.

31. This too is discussed in chapter 7.

32. See Chapter V for an account of the UCC declaration and Mr. Lesage's answer.

seemingly perceptibly ahead. The party's campaign strategy was considerably altered in this period as Liberal speakers discussed the achievements of the Lesage cabinet as much as the nationalization of electricity. Mr. Johnson had, therefore, at least, partially succeeded in shifting the focus of the campaign; his policy on nationalization apparently convinced many voters that this measure would be effected whatever party was elected and helped shift public interest to other issues, the pro-Liberal press notwithstanding. In addition, to many voters nationalization of the private power companies was less important than their immediate economic situation;³³ the Liberals, therefore evoked a favourable response when they were able to modify their advocacy of "la politique de grandeur" to include references to more concrete problems.

In a sense, the fourth and final phase of the campaign, beginning Nov. 5th, was a continuation of the third, for in the final days of the campaign the Liberals seemed to consolidate their advantage. But the revelations of Nov. 3-4, beginning on the weekend of another "affaire electorale," "l'affaire des faux" marked the end of serious dialogue between the two parties, and the campaign quickly degenerated into endless mutual recriminations, accusations and counteraccusations.

"L'affaire des faux" itself was somewhat complicated. In the evening of Nov. 2nd, provincial police, tipped off by an informer, arrested Mr. Omer Fontaine in the act of taking a bag out of a locker in Windsor Station in downtown Montreal. The bag contained approximately 4,000 forged voting

33. This, at least, is indicated by reports on constituency campaigns in Abitibi, the Gaspé, Lac St.-Jean, and other regions.

slips,³⁴ divided into two packages, addressed to the chief organizers for the Union Nationale candidates in Montreal-Ste.-Marie and Montreal-St.-Jacques respectively. The mailing instructions to these packages and Mr. Fontaine's statements to the police implicated Mr. Andre Lagarde, chief Union Nationale organizer for the Montreal electoral division,³⁵ and Mr. Gaston Archambault, a former provincial police sergeant turned Union Nationale organizer and who then quickly and voluntarily surrendered to the police.

Liberal speakers immediately accused the Union Nationale of trying to win the election by fraud. Mr. Lesage, who earlier had called on Mr. Jean-Jacques Bertrand to leave his party, now issued an "ultimatum" to Mr. Johnson's "chief lieutenant," giving him two days in which to resign the Union Nationale. Failing this, Mr. Bertrand would be judged on the basis of his fellow party members' actions. Predictably enough, this final attempt to provoke a split in the ranks of the Union Nationale was repulsed by Mr. Bertrand, who announced that he would remain in the Union Nationale because this party stood the best chance of giving Quebec an honest government. For his part, Mr. Johnson called the discovery of the forged voting slips "une machination machiavelique et frauduleuse montée par les Libéraux."³⁶

The legal aspects of the case soon became quite complex. On Nov. 3rd Judge Fortier set Nov. 9th as the date for the trial of Mr. Lagarde and Mr. Archambault, and ordered them released on \$5,000 bail each. Two days

34. A voting slip is given each voter by the enumerator for his country. It must be presented to the deputy returning officer and registrar as identification before the voter is allowed to cast his ballot.

35. For electoral purposes both the Union Nationale and Liberal parties divide the province's constituencies into two regions - the regions of Montreal and Quebec. See Supra Chapter VI.

36. Le Devoir, Nov. 5th, p. 1.

later, however, Judge Archambault, Chief Justice of the Session of the Peace, reversed these decisions on an appeal by the lawyers for the defense, advancing the date of the trial to Nov. 7th and reducing each defendant's bail to \$1,500. Angered, in turn, the lawyers for the Crown took out a writ of certiorari against Judge Archambault, claiming that he had acted with bias. Ultimately, it was decided to postpone the trial until after the election. While this legal wrangle took place, the Liberal party became unfavourably involved in the case when it was revealed that Mr. Johnny Rougeau, a well-known supporter of Mr. Lévesque, had had a hand in the somewhat irregular arrests of several suspects.

The Union Nationale continued until the end of the campaign to denounce "l'affaire des faux" as a "frame-up" by the Liberals; after their initial outburst, however, spokesmen for the government party discreetly avoided mentioning the case, pointing out it was sub judice. And, although the voting slip case dominated the mass media's coverage of the election, more normal campaign activities also took place and several new commitments were made.

On Nov. 7th, Mr. Johnson added to the Union Nationale's policy on the nationalization of electricity, announcing that a five-man committee of inquiry would be established to investigate the merits of nationalization before the June 30th referendum, and that both Mr. Bertrand and Mr. Armand Maltais, avowed supporters of nationalization, would be members of the committee. For the rest, he repeated the major themes of the Union Nationale campaign and defended himself against the indictment of the Salvas Commission.

Mr. Lesage too closed the campaign on familiar themes, but he did, in its closing days, promise farmers a crop insurance plan and announce that

"Je suis pret a me battre pour \$600,000,000" as the price to be paid to the private power companies.

The major event of the campaign's final week was the television debate between Mr. Lesage and Mr. Johnson. Union Nationale strategists had hoped that Mr. Johnson would make decisive gains in the debate, but, in fact, its outcome consolidated the Liberals' advantage, since most observers believed that Mr. Lesage's performance was the stronger of the two.

Each party closed its campaign with a mammoth rally in Montreal, and both Mr. Johnson and Mr. Lesage predicted landslide victories for their respective parties. At the Union Nationale rally, Mr. Johnson made his last appeal for his "politique du bon sens," and received yet another pledge of loyalty from Mr. Bertrand. At the Liberal rally, meanwhile, Mr. Lévesque again called on working-class voters to disregard Mr. Johnson's "tainted" minimum wage promise and claimed that the Liberal government had proved its friendliness towards the trade-union movement and the working-class. Mr. Lesage's final speech was a fervent plea for the nationalization of electricity.

The campaign, then ended on almost the same note on which it had begun. Few new issues had been raised, and the new commitments made in the campaign, such as the revisions of the Union Nationale's nationalization policy, were largely the product of the pressure of newspapers and interest groups. For the most part, however, Mr. Lesage and Mr. Johnson were content to campaign on the basis of policies elaborated well before the announcement of the election, and both campaigned hard and effectively. At the end of the campaign, some newspapers and interest groups made endorsements of a specific party. The only mild surprise was the stand taken by the Montreal-Gazette,

whose lack of enthusiasm for the nationalization of electricity was well-known. On Nov. 10th, the Gazette asked the voters to give the Liberals the opportunity to continue their program of reform, and hoped that the Union Nationale would continue to renovate itself while in opposition. The results of the election seemed to indicate that the majority of voters also were convinced that the policies of the Liberals were more suitable for Quebec's modern economy and changing needs.

CHAPTER V

THIRD PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS

I

Of the four political parties that are active in Canadian politics on the federal level, only the Liberals and Conservatives have participated significantly in Quebec's provincial politics.¹ The CCF failed to attract popular support in the province, and when the Legislative Assembly was dissolved and the writs of election issued in September 1962, its successor, the New Democratic Party, had not formally organized its Quebec wing, the nascent provincial organization of this party being governed by a Provisional Council. Social Credit had made sporadic appearances at postwar provincial elections under the pseudonym of l'Union des Electeurs, but made a major impact only in the federal election of 1962, the Ralliement des Cr ditistes led by Deputy National Leader Mr. R al Caouette won 26 seats and more than half a million votes in Quebec.

In the June 1962 federal campaign, Social Credit's major antagonist in Quebec was the Liberal party. Mr. Ren  L vesque emerged at this time as the special enemy of Mr. Caouette and his supporters by taking to television to denounce Social Credit as a "fraud" and "utopia." It is also well-known that many Union Nationale organizers, disillusioned with their erstwhile Conservative allies, worked for Social Credit candidates. The Union Nationale therefore, expected Mr. Caouette's assistance in the provincial campaign

1. In 1936, the Quebec wing of the Conservative party merged with dissident Liberals and independent nationalists to form the Union Nationale, which, although professing to be a "strictly provincial" party, has maintained strong informal ties with the federal Progressive Conservatives.

and was certain to resent any Social Credit action that might be detrimental to its chances of victory.

Although the August convention of le Ralliement des Cr ditistes had decided that the party would stay out of provincial politics "for the moment,"² the calling of the election aroused renewed pressure for the immediate formation of a provincial Social Credit party from certain party organizers and M.P.s. The supporters of Social Credit participation in the November election envisaged Dr. Guy Marcoux, M.P. for Montmorency, as leader of the party's provincial wing, and argued that immediate action was imperative in order that the party take full advantage of the wave of Social Credit popularity. But Mr. Caouette and Mr. Legault, President of the Ralliement des Cr ditistes, consistently opposed the demands for an early Social Credit entry into provincial politics, and at a caucus of Quebec's Social Credit M.P.s and party organizers on Sept. 25th it was unanimously decided that the party would not contest the November election and that no official recognition would be given to any candidate claiming to be a Social Credit representative.³

It is only possible to speculate as to the reasons for this decision, which was probably motivated by tactical considerations. In the first place, the party was surprised by the announcement of a snap election and its electoral organization, bereft of Union Nationale assistants, was unprepared for a large-scale electoral contest. Secondly, it was by no means certain that the Social Credit's attack against "les vieux partis," which had been so successful in June, would be as effective in a provincial election, where

2. Montreal Gazette, Sept. 21st., p. 1.

3. Le Devoir, Sept. 26th, 1962, pp. 1-2.

the Liberals were campaigning on a fairly radical, nationalist program. Social Credit candidates, it was surmised,⁴ would take votes away from the Union Nationale not from the Liberals and, in this way, would contribute to Liberal victories while they themselves suffered the "usual" fate of third party candidates in the single-member constituency, single-ballot electoral system.

Furthermore, it could be argued that by remaining aloof Social Credit stood to gain, whatever the election's outcome. In the event of a Liberal victory, the party's prestige would not be damaged, while an overwhelming defeat of the Union Nationale could conceivably open the door for the emergence of Social Credit as the second party in Quebec's two-party system. And a Union Nationale victory would inevitably weaken the federal Liberal party, Social Credit's chief antagonist in Quebec, paving the way for a Social Credit-Union Nationale alliance, the Union Nationale supporting Social Credit in federal politics in return for non-participation of Social Credit in provincial elections.

Although Social Credit had announced that it would not contest the election, many observers⁵ felt that statements made by party spokesmen, and by Mr. Caouette, in particular, could have a decisive influence on the results of the election. Having decided not to participate directly in the campaign, Social Credit was left with several alternative policies. The party could maintain a neutral silence throughout the campaign; it could appeal to its supporters to vote for a particular party's candidates; or

4. Montreal Gazette, Sept. 21st, p. 1.

5. For example, Maclean's Magazine, Nov. 17, 1962, p. 4, Liberal organizers agreed that, at the outset of the campaign, Social Credit's influence was thought to be a key factor in determining the results of the election.

it could confine its activity to expressing its opinion on specific issues.

In many constituencies,⁶ Social Credit organizers and supporters campaigned for the Union Nationale, but Mr. Caouette and le Ralliement des Cr ditistes consistently refused to endorse either the Liberals or the Union Nationale. During the campaign, the Liberal policy was to avoid antagonizing Social Credit supporters and neither Mr. Lesage, Mr. L vesque or any other prominent Liberals made any reference to Mr. Caouette's party. Mr. Johnson, on the other hand, "lui a fait la cour, tout particuli rement dans les r gions rurales qui fait  lire des d put s cr ditistes au parlement canadien."⁷ Beginning on Oct. 26, Mr. Johnson, on a tour of constituencies which voted Social Credit in the June 1962 federal election, made daily appeals to Social Credit supporters for their assistance. At several rallies, the Union Nationale distributed pamphlets reminding the creditistes that the Union Nationale was "a strictly provincial party, whereas in a few months you will be fighting the Liberals on the federal level."⁸ The pamphlets also reproduced the derogatory remarks about Social Credit made by Mr. Ren  L vesque during the federal election campaign and urged Mr. Caouette's supporters to make use of their opportunity to vote against Mr. L vesque.⁹ At an assembly in Valleyfield on October 29th, the National Union leader emphasized the inherent hostility the Liberals felt for Social Credit, stating that "Mr. Lesage says he wants to wipe out Social Credit and the Social Crediters.... As for me, I appeal to all Social Crediters to help

6. The reports on constituency campaigns in La Presse, Le Devoir, and Montr al-Matin make this clear.

7. Dimanche-Matin, Nov. 4, 1962, p. 2.

8. Montreal Gazette, Nov. 5, 1962, p. 39.

9. Ibid.

me oust the Liberal regime."¹⁰ At Rouyn, Mr. Johnson praised Mr. Caouette, calling him "un homme de coeur sur lequel il (Mr. Johnson) pouvait compter pour mettre en pratique le programme économique de l'Union Nationale."¹¹

But, despite this heavy dose of flattery, Mr. Caouette, consistently refused to urge his followers to vote for the Union Nationale, maintaining that it was impossible for him to support either "vieux parti." He made no direct attack on the leading personalities in the Liberal camp,¹² confining his comments on the provincial election to the expression of his opposition to the nationalization of electricity. Speaking on television, he claimed that nationalization was a threat to private enterprise and the freedom of the individual, and that it would lead to an increase in the per capita provincial debt.¹³ At a Loyola College conference on public affairs, he referred to the Liberal's election slogan, echoing a theme of the Union Nationale campaign. "Comment peut-on dire: Soyons maîtres chez nous, quand on va chercher l'argent à l'étranger pour financer la nationalisation?"¹⁴ But Mr. Caouette also made it clear that the similarity of his statements on nationalization to some of Mr. Johnson's should not be interpreted as approval of the Union Nationale's program, pointing out that Mr. Johnson had not taken a definite stand on nationalization.¹⁵ Denying rumours that he had instructed Social Credit organizers to support Union Nationale candidates, he announced a few days before the election that "nos membres sont

10. Montreal Star, Oct. 30, 1962, p. 20.

11. Dimanche-Matin, Nov. 4, 1962, p. 2.

12. Both Mr. Lesage and Mr. Caouette seemed anxious to avoid a direct confrontation with each other throughout the campaign.

13. Le Devoir, Oct. 15, p. 1. On another occasion, he stated that "everything" is in danger of nationalization, see Le Devoir Oct. 10, p. 1.

14. La Presse, Nov. 3, 1962, p. 1.

15. La Presse, Nov. 5, 1962, p. 1.

libres de voter comme ils le désirent... Je ne prends pas position et l'association créditiste ne prend pas position non plus. Je suis contre le socialisme il est vrai... mais les deux partis veulent en faire."¹⁶

Given the uncertainty concerning the future role of Social Credit in provincial politics, Mr. Caouette's attitude seems to have been wise, for he would have been at a disadvantage in making the election a trial of strength with the Liberals. Not having staked his prestige on the outcome of the election, he was able to accept the Liberal victory with equanimity. Despite the fact that the election results provided no evidence of the existence of a "Social Credit bloc vote,"¹⁷ the election cannot be considered to have truly tested the influence of Social Credit and Mr. Caouette in provincial politics. Mr. Caouette greeted the results of the vote enigmatically: "I am happy for the Liberals and happy for the National Union."¹⁸ He expressed confidence that the Liberal victory would not affect the Social Credit party on the federal level, and claimed that the election results should not be taken as evidence of popular approval of the nationalization of electricity, because with both the Liberals and the Union Nationale favouring the measure, the voters had been unable to register their disapproval.

A number of minor Social Credit organizers and supporters remained dissatisfied with the party's decision not to participate in the November election. Several of this group, together with other opponents of the nationalization of electricity, held hurried meeting in the days following

16. La Presse, Nov. 8, 1962, p. 20.

17. A careful analysis of this factor is found in the discussion of the election's results.

18. Montreal Star, Nov. 15, 1962, p. 39.

the Sept. 25th Social Credit caucus, and on Sept. 27th they announced the formation of a new political party to contest the election on a "70 per cent créditiste" program and an unequivocal anti-nationalization policy.¹⁹ The name tentatively given the new party was L'Action Libérale Nationale²⁰ and its prospective leader was Mr. J.A. Mongrain, mayor of Three Rivers and in 1952 and 1956 the Liberal candidate opposing Mr. Duplessis in that riding. While Mr. Mongrain was deciding whether to accept the leadership of the new party, it was to be governed by a five-man executive committee. On October 5th, Mr. Mongrain announced that he had refused to lead the new party, reserving the right to change his mind. In the closing days of the campaign, however, he endorsed the Union Nationale, on the basis of his approval of its policy regarding aid to municipalities and school commissions.²¹ Following the withdrawal of Mr. Mongrain, Mr. Hertel Laroque, another member of the executive committee (whose four members had all been active Social Credit organizers), was named Acting Leader, a position which he held until the end of the campaign.

Officially named l'Action Provinciale, the new party was launched on October 11th at a meeting attended by several Social Credit M.P.s, including Dr. Marcoux. L'Action Provinciale declared itself to be "one hundred per cent for private enterprise"²² and opposed to the nationalization of electricity because this would merely serve as the first step on the road to socialism. Mr. Larocque also claimed that in five or ten years hydro-electric power would be replaced by nuclear energy, this development making

19. Montreal Gazette, Sept. 28, 1962, p. 4.

20. This had been the name of the dissident faction of Liberals which led the opposition to the Taschereau regime from 1934-36.

21. La Presse, Nov. 13, 1962, p. 2.

22. Montreal Star, Oct. 12, 1962, p. 27.

nationalization of electricity a wasteful operation. On another occasion l'Action Provinciale's leader saw the Liberal "nationalizing everything... pulp, paper, mines, power, even distilleries and breweries."²³ He voiced his expectation that l'Action Provinciale would obtain the balance of power in the Legislative Assembly and suggested that his party offered "the last time Quebec will have the opportunity to vote on the right wing."²⁴

The program of l'Action Provinciale called for the creation of a new educational system and for a provincial family allowance commission to replace the federal system. It advocated the establishment of a more equitable system of tax-sharing between the province and the municipalities, an extensive program of public works to reduce unemployment, and the encouragement of the cooperative movement.²⁵

The optimism of Mr. Larocque notwithstanding, however, the role played by l'Action Provinciale proved to be predominantly one of comic relief. Only 11 candidates ran on the Action Provinciale ticket, a number far too small to represent a serious right wing alternative to the Liberals and Union Nationale. Financially destitute, the party's candidates were forced to attend the rallies of their opponents in order to make themselves heard. The unkindest cut, however, was delivered by Mr. Réal Caouette, when he refused to meet with Mr. Larocque who had come to Ottawa to seek an explanation for the utter indifference shown the l'Action Provinciale by the leader of Quebec Social Crediters.

L'Action Provinciale was treated fairly, if with some humour, by the

23. Montreal Gazette, Oct. 26, 1962, p. 33.

24. Ibid.

25. Le Devoir, Oct. 26, 1962, p. 3, gives a summary of the program of l'Action Provinciale.

Montreal newspapers. The voters, however, were less tolerant and the 11 Action Provinciale candidates averaged only 100 votes each. This disappointing result understandably left Mr. Larocque bitter and he charged that "we were betrayed by Social Credit leader Réal Caouette and we went down to slaughter."²⁶

The unfortunate foray of l'Action Provinciale certainly is no true indication of the possibilities for third parties in Quebec. In fact, the experience of this short-lived party proved nothing. It merely lent support to the contention that the presence of Mr. Réal Caouette is necessary to move large numbers of Social Credit supporters.

II

What constitutes the left wing in the political spectrum of any community is probably impossible to define precisely, for the terms "left" and "right" are purely descriptive and not scientific categories. Moreover, one is neither a "leftist" nor a "rightist" in the abstract but only in relation to a given "centre" position, and, therefore, what is considered left wing in one country may be seen as "centre" or even right wing elsewhere. Nevertheless, the term "left wing" has come to be used to describe parties and individuals professing to be socialists or near-socialists, and it is in this sense that I use the term.

The left wing forces in Quebec can be said to include the following major groups: an indefinite number of Liberal party members led by Mr. René Lévesque, the embryonic provincial wing of the New Democratic Party, the

26. Montreal Star, Nov. 15, 1962, p. 39.

Quebec Federation of Labour, the Confederation of National Trade Unions, and a number of intellectuals with no formal political affiliation, the most prominent of whom form the "Cité Libre group." The position taken by the "Lévesque Liberals" during the election campaign needs no explanation. The adherents of this group evidently believed that a Liberal government was, in the existing situation, the most practical means of realizing the reforms they advocated. They argued that the very acceptance, by the Liberals, of Mr. Lévesque as an important Cabinet minister, the achievements of the Lesage ministry, and the commitment of the party to the nationalization of electricity proved the validity of their contention.

The positions of the remaining left wing groups, and, in particular, that of the New Democratic Party, were somewhat more complex. The New Democrats were faced by the traditional dilemmas of socialist parties. They had to decide whether, in the given political situation, the interests they represented would best be served by cooperation with the Liberals or by independent political action. How far was ideological purity to be compromised in order that practical reforms might be achieved? How could their long-run goals be balanced against the sacrifices necessitated by the short-run political configuration? To what extent could the Liberals be relied upon to introduce progressive reforms? These questions were debated by Professors Pierre-Elliott Trudeau and Charles Taylor in the November 1962 edition of Cité Libre.²⁷

Professor Trudeau's article may be taken as a fair presentation of the attitude adopted by many left wing intellectuals.²⁸ His argument ran as

27. P.-E. Trudeau, and C. Taylor, "L'Homme de Gauche et les Elections Provinciales," Cité Libre, No. 51, Nov. 1962.

28. I am indebted to Professor C. Taylor and McGill University for information on the attitudes of this group.

follows. By refusing, in 1958, to participate in the Union des Forces Démocratiques, the New Democratic Party supporters (at that time members of the Parti Socialiste Démocratique), had created the situation in which "le seul homme de gauche qui ait exercé le pouvoir dans la province l'a fait en tant que ministre dans un gouvernement purement libéral."²⁹ In the November election, the man of the left was faced with the alternatives of a Liberal government which "en deux ans et demi a réussi à débloquent plus de secteurs que le gouvernement antérieur en seize ans"³⁰ and a Union Nationale regime which would probably mean "la morte ou le silence" for Quebec's left wing.³¹ The independent participation in the election of the New Democratic Party could possibly result in the defeat of the Liberals. Therefore, the party should give its support to the government, and, following the election, examine the possibilities of some sort of alliance with the Liberals which would allow the organized left to grow into an important force in provincial politics.

Professor Taylor's article supported the opposite view that the New Democratic Party should contest the November election. He discounted the possibility of a Liberal government initiating far-reaching, left wing reforms,³² and suggested that the nationalization of electricity may very well prove to be the final important left wing measure which the Liberal Cabinet will concede to Lévesque.³³ And, while admitting that the Liberals are, for "l'homme de gauche," to be preferred to the Union Nationale, he did not feel that the difference between the two parties is as great as that suggested

29. "L'Homme de Gauche et les Elections Provinciales," op.cit. "L'Opinion de Pierre-Elliott Trudeau", p. 4.

30. Ibid., p. 5.

31. Ibid., p. 5.

32. "L'Homme de Gauche et Les Elections Provinciales," op.cit. "L'Opinion de Charles Taylor", p. 21.

33. Ibid., p. 7.

by Professor Trudeau and refused to admit that "le parti libéral constitue la seule planche de salut pour la gauche québécoise."³⁴

Professor Taylor proposed that the New Democratic Party contest selected ridings "pour assurer un avenir dans la province... et aussi pour assurer que... on n'oublie pas qu'il existe d'autres préalables aussi indispensables que la nationalisation au progrès et à la justice dans cette province."³⁵ Warning of the dangers inherent in the collaboration of a third party with an established party, he refused, "au nom des exigences à court terme, (se) désintéresser totalement des plus lointaines échéances."³⁶

Although the New Democratic Party did not, in the end, field any candidates, its spokesmen made it clear that the party had accepted viewpoints expressed by Professor Taylor, and that its failure to participate resulted not from a lack of desire but from financial and organizational difficulties. Mr. Romeo Mathieu, President of the Provisional Council of the provincial New Democratic Party, greeted the "snap" election call with a statement condemning the action of the Liberal government. "He (Lesage) has a full mandate. The nationalization issue is really a pretext for calling the election."³⁷ At this time, Mr. Mathieu indicated that the New Democratic Party would participate in the election, although, to what extent, would be decided by a meeting of the Provisional Council.

In the ensuing discussions of the Provisional Council two alternative policies were debated.³⁸ The party clearly lacked the resources necessary

34. Ibid., p. 21.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Montreal Gazette, Sept. 21, 1962, p. 1.

38. Again I am grateful to Professor Taylor for an account of the proceedings of these meetings.

for large-scale electoral activity and was, therefore, forced to choose between total abstention and the nomination of a limited number of candidates to run in selected constituencies, preferably in opposition to notoriously right wing Liberals. On October 2nd, it was announced that the party would contest about 10 seats, possibly including Montreal-Laurier, where Mr. René Lévesque was the Liberal candidate.³⁹ In the following three weeks, however, it proved impossible to find constituencies in which the New Democratic Party was relatively well-organized and well-financed, and in which French-Canadian candidates willing to run were available. On October 25th, Mr. Mathieu announced that the party would not contest the forthcoming election. He explained that the decision had been made solely because the party was inadequately organized and that it in no way indicated support of the Liberals.

In other statements, NDP spokesmen indicated the party's support for the nationalization of electricity, but reiterated that this measure alone could not lead to the "economic emancipation" of French-Canadians. They consistently maintained that the government could have nationalized without calling for an election, and Mr. David Lewis went so far as to claim that Mr. Levesque was fighting a "phony war," a statement which drew Le Devoir's reproof that Mr. Lewis knew little about Quebec politics.

On the local and individual level, those members of the NDP who did campaign actively supported the Liberals. In Verdun, for example, the President of the NDP Association requested party members and supporters to vote for the official Liberal candidate, although he did not endorse the Liberal program in its entirety.⁴⁰ There is no evidence, however, to

39. Their disappointment that Mr. Lévesque "had been granted" nationalization by the Liberal cabinet and therefore did not leave that party apparently led some NDP leaders to consider him as "enemy of the true left!" See "L'Opinion de P.-E. Trudeau," *op.cit.*, p. 4.

40. Montreal Gazette, Nov. 10, 1962, p. 3.

indicate fairly extensive NDP activity on behalf of the Liberals, certainly nothing as extensive as Social Credit support of the Union Nationale.

The Quebec Federation of Labour (FTQ), the Quebec wing of the Canadian Labour Congress, is formally affiliated to the New Democratic Party. It was natural, therefore, that its policy regarding the November election should have been very similar to that of the NDP. Mr. Provost, FTQ President, severely condemned the government's explanation of why the election was to be held, accusing the government of staging an "unjustifiable political manoeuvre, a psychological coup that has only the exterior appearances of democracy."⁴¹ The FTQ had previously indicated its support for the nationalization of electricity, but insisted that the government already had received a full mandate to initiate this measure. In the only formal statement issued by the FTQ during the campaign, Mr. Provost called upon "les familles ouvrières" to vote for the party "qui offre les garanties les plus sérieuses qu'il va effectuer sans retard la nationalisation de l'électricité."⁴² This could only be interpreted as an indirect endorsement of the Liberal party, but lest it be read as unqualified approval of the Liberal party, Mr. Provost made it clear that the FTQ was dissatisfied with both the Liberal and the Union Nationale parties. "Nous avons des sérieux griefs contre le gouvernement actuel... Ce n'est pas de gaieté de coeur que nous nous voyons contraints de lui fournir un appui indirect."⁴³ The anti-labour past of the Union Nationale, however, placed in it an even more unfavourable light. "La FTQ se montre impitoyable envers le manoeuvre par

41. Montreal Gazette, Sept. 21, 1962, p. 1.

42. La Presse, Nov. 10, 1962, p. 27.

43. Ibid.

lequel l'Union Nationale veut saboter, pour le compte de l'entreprise privée, la nationalisation de l'électricité..."⁴⁴ Mr. Provost added that in view of the Union Nationale's previous attitude towards organized labour he could only look with scepticism at its promise of a \$1 per hour minimum wage and portable pension plan. The FTQ's position, therefore, supported that of the New Democratic Party, and Mr. Provost expressed the hope that an independent left wing party would soon be ready to enter provincial politics.

The position of the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CSN) differed, at the outset of the campaign, from that of the FTQ. It was unaffiliated with the New Democratic Party and, in addition, its President, Mr. Jean Marchand, was a personal friend of René Lévesque who believed that "l'expérience de René Lévesque est la plus valable expérience de la gauche de ma génération."⁴⁵ Mr. Marchand, it was rumoured, would run in the election as a Liberal, and, if victorious, would be appointed Minister of Labour. At the Montreal convention of the CSN held Oct. 12-15, however, Mr. Marchand announced that he would not be a Liberal candidate. And, when Le Devoir interpreted his pro-nationalization attitude as support for the Liberals,⁴⁶ he issued a prompt denial, agreeing with Mr. Provost that the Lesage government's labour legislation "était nulle."⁴⁷

It appears that Mr. Lesage withdrew the invitation to Mr. Marchand to stand for election as a Liberal. The explanations of this action vary, left

44. Ibid.

45. Mr. Marchand's remark was quoted to me by Professor Taylor, in a discussion of the role of the left in the 1962 election.

46. Le Devoir, Oct. 13, 1962, p. 1. The denial was pointed in Le Devoir, Oct. 15, 1962, p. 1.

47. Le Devoir, Oct. 13, 1962, p. 1

wing commentators taking it to be an indication that the Liberals considered one left wing Cabinet minister adequate. The Liberal explanation,⁴⁸ however, is that Mr. Marchand was taking a long time in deciding whether to accept the invitation and that his TV debate with Mr. Caouette had made him a prime enemy of Social Credit supporters, thus making Mr. Lesage, fearful of antagonizing these voters, decide to withdraw the offer. Whatever the reason, there seems little doubt that this action and the failure of Mr. Lévesque to strongly support Mr. Marchand's candidature were at least partially responsible for the CSN leader's coolness towards the Liberals throughout the campaign. Mr. Adrien Plourde, another leading officer of the CSN had also been mentioned as a potential Liberal candidate, but ultimately he too did not run.

The attitude finally adopted by the CSN was almost identical to that of the FTQ, although privately some CSN organizers did work for Liberal candidates.⁴⁹ Mr. Marchand, however, limited himself to turning down Mr. Johnson's appeal that he urge CSN members to vote Union Nationale, stating that "comme la politique officielle de la CSN favorise la nationalisation immédiate des réseaux d'électricité, les travailleurs qui veulent tenir compte de l'opinion syndicale n'auront pas de difficultés à s'orienter lors de prochain scrutin provincial."⁵⁰ Like Mr. Provost, he placed little faith in the Union Nationale's minimum wage promise, for not only was this filled with loopholes, but the memories of Asbestos, Louiseville, and Murdochville "nous a rendu très sceptiques sur les intentions formulées dans le programme de l'Union Nationale."⁵¹

48. The attitude of Mr. Lesage was explained to me by an important party official.

49. So I was told, at any rate, by officials of both parties.

50. Le Devoir, Nov. 9, 1962, p. 1.

51. Ibid.

The trade union movement, therefore, and most supporters of the NDP desired a Liberal victory in the election, while maintaining serious reservations about several aspects of the Liberal regime. Without a third, left wing alternative, however, they unanimously opted for the Liberals. Mr. Marchand, for example, expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the election, observing hopefully that the results might signify the death of the Union Nationale, and noting that the Liberal victory at least made certain that the labour movement would have a future in Quebec.⁵²

III

The nationalization of electricity remained throughout the campaign the most prominent election issue and most interest group activity too focussed on this subject. The St. Jean-Baptiste Society of Quebec, for example, reiterated its support for nationalization in its only statement relating to the provincial election. The Montreal and Quebec City Chambers of Commerce, on the other hand, had indicated their opposition to nationalization before the announcement of the election, suggesting that a commission of inquiry be set up to study the problems faced by Quebec's hydroelectric industry. During the campaign, the Chamber of Commerce and other business groups maintained a discreet silence, although it seems unlikely that their members included many ardent supporters of Mr. Lévesque. The President of the provincial Chamber of Commerce accepted the outcome of the vote with resignation, and not enthusiasm.⁵³

The major agricultural interest groups, l'Union Catholique des

52. Ibid.

53. La Presse, Nov. 15, 1962, p. 48.

Cultivateurs and the Cooperative Fédérée de Québec, turned their attention away from the nationalization issue. Although the U.C.C. had previously endorsed this measure, a public statement issued jointly by the two groups on Nov. 1st, made no mention of nationalization, concentrating, instead, on problems relating to "le relèvement de l'agriculture, qui traverse l'époque la plus sombre de son histoire."⁵⁴ The joint statement complained that neither the electoral manifesto of the Liberal party nor that of the Union Nationale party inspired much hope for immediate improvement in agricultural conditions. It called on the parties to make clear before the end of the campaign their policies regarding the following matters:⁵⁵ the elaboration of a master plan for the orientation and development of agricultural production, the reform of the existing system of municipal and school taxation, the reconsideration and amendment of the laws on ~~co~~operatives, the marketing of farm products, and the farmers' demand that the Quebec Farm Credit Loan Board be allowed to issue bonds to finance its operations. The declaration stressed the need for government assistance and planning if the existing state of widespread rural poverty was to be eliminated. It did not, however, make clear what action would be taken if it found the parties' replies unsatisfactory.

Mr. Lesage replied immediately and his answer was expressed in a fairly lengthy statement made on Nov. 2nd. He announced that the Liberal party was determined "d'appliquer dans la province une planification progressive sur le plan agricole,"⁵⁶ and cited as a step in this direction Quebec's agreement to participate in the Federal Agricultural Rehabilitation

54. Le Devoir, Nov. 2, 1962, p. 3.

55. Ibid.

56. La Presse, Nov. 3, 1962, p. 23.

and Development Act, the terms of which foresee the expenditure in Quebec of \$20,000,000 the next three years for agricultural development and conservation projects. He indicated that a provincial royal commission would be set up to study the distribution of taxes for provincial, municipal, and educational purposes, promised that new legislation dealing with the cooperatives would be introduced in the next session, and maintained that government borrowing on behalf of the Farm Credit Board allowed the financing of its operations at a lower cost. Finally, he reiterated the agricultural policy of the Liberal party, stressing his belief in the need for the planning of agricultural development and for joint marketing plans if agricultural prosperity was to be assured.

The Union Nationale, on the other hand, made no direct reply to the declaration of the farmers' representatives. One of its major campaign themes, however, reminded rural voters that the Union Nationale had always been the "party of the farmer." Its election manifesto devoted considerable attention to agriculture, promising the creation of a ministry of rural rehabilitation, the adoption of a Cooperative Code, the establishment of a system of crop insurance, and an intensified program of marketing farm products. The Union Nationale program, therefore, did deal, albeit in general terms, with the questions posed by the U.C.C. and the Cooperative Fédérée de Quebec.

The farm organizations confined their election activity, on the provincial level at least, to the one public statement and did not follow up by expressing their opinions of the response to their questions. The only significant political activity, during the campaign, of the province's major labour, business, and farm organizations, therefore, took place, if

at all, on the local level.

The most significant action in the campaign taken by Quebec separatists was the decision of Dr. Marcel Chaput, at that time president of the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN), to run as an Independent in Bourget. The RIN itself, although supporting Dr. Chaput's candidacy, decided at its October convention not to transform itself into a political party before the spring of 1964. Although the organization did not officially endorse the Liberals, its program advocated the nationalization of all public utilities and widespread economic planning⁵⁷ and, following the election, it termed the Liberal victory the "premier pas vers l'indépendance du Québec."⁵⁸

As for Dr. Chaput, he campaigned quite actively, preaching the separatist doctrine and advocating a "cooperative system" of government.⁵⁹ He too called for the voters to support the nationalization of electricity and confessed his personal admiration for René Lévesque. It seems, therefore, that the separatist movement preferred a Liberal to a Union Nationale victory, again largely because of the former party's unequivocal support of the nationalization of electricity. For example, a political commentator felt that separatist support for the Liberal candidate in Duplessis could make the difference between his election and defeat.⁶⁰

The leaders of the Union Nationale and Liberals made only passing reference to separatism, but Mr. Lesage provoked Dr. Chaput's criticism when he expressed the opinion that "si le Québec n'est pas économiquement

57. Le Devoir, Oct. 22, 1962, p. 1.

58. La Presse, Nov. 15, 1962, p. 48.

59. For a full exposition of his doctrine, see Dr. Chaput's Why I am a Separatist?, Toronto, 1961.

60. Marcel Thivierge in Le Devoir, Oct. 15, 1962, p. 6.

fort, il n'aura pas les moyens de se separer des autres provinces. S'il est économiquement fort, il n'aura pas besoin de se séparer."⁶¹ To this the separatist leader retorted that the provincial government would be unable to build a strong economy in Quebec without full control over money supply, credit, taxation, customs, transportation, and immigration. This exchange provided the only direct conflict between the Premier and Dr. Chaput, who garnered 3,286 votes out of 73,044 cast. His candidacy cannot, therefore, be interpreted as a separatist success, but it would be equally unwise to measure the popularity of the idea of separatism by Dr. Chaput's showing.

The debate on the merits of the nationalization of electricity gained an additional participant when "Les Amis de Philippe Hamel," a movement of "economic education," was born in the middle of campaign. This group was, and presumably still is, led by the former Independent MLA Mr. René Chaloult, and numbered among its members Mr. Jean Marchand, the president of the St. John Baptiste Society of Montreal, and the president of the Students' Association of the University of Montreal. The goal of the movement is "exercer une action apolitique en faveur de la libération économique du Quebec, en commençant par la nationalisation de l'électricité."⁶² During the election campaign, it devoted itself purely to propagandizing in favour of nationalization, putting forward its case at meetings in the urban centres of Quebec. Mr. Chaloult, who quickly came to dominate the movement, was usually the principal speaker of these meetings.

Although the announced intention of "Les Amis de Philippe Hamel" was to avoid partisan activity, Mr. Chaloult soon made evident his opposition to the Union Nationale and its leader. At each meeting, he reminded his

61. Le Devoir, Oct. 10, 1962, p. 1.

62. Le Devoir, Oct. 24, 1962, p. 3.

audience of how Duplessis had "betrayed" Dr. Hamel and refused to nationalize Quebec's private power companies. Depicting Mr. Johnson as a "replica" of Duplessis, he asked whether the Union Nationale's new leader might not, in his turn, renege on his promises if elected. Mr. Johnson, furious, replied by suggesting that Mr. Chaloult was being paid by the Liberals to lead the electorate into error.⁶³

Mr. Chaloult, in fact, concentrated more on warning his audience about the potential enemies of nationalization than on discussing the economic advantages of the measure. Mr. George Marler and "les juges retrogrades" were singled out as possible threats, for Mr. Chaloult was concerned that an exorbitant price might be paid to the private power companies. He urged Premier Lesage to set a firm price and to deprive the companies' shareholders of recourse to the courts.⁶⁴ In the closing days of the campaign, Mr. Chaloult finally gave his full official support to the Liberal party.

In sharp contrast to the role of Mr. Chaloult was that of Mr. Richard Holden, an Independent candidate in Westmount-St. Georges, who based his campaign on unequivocal opposition to both the nationalization of electricity and René Lévesque. Mr. Holden claimed to have the support of a large number of voters of all political faiths, these citizens, allegedly sharing his fear that nationalization of electricity was to be "the thin edge of the wedge of socialism."⁶⁵ Mr. Holden was obviously hoping to capitalize on the presumed fear Montreal's English-speaking residents hold both of nationalization of any kind and of French-Canadian nationalism. His opponent,

63. La Presse, Nov. 2, 1962, p. 25.

64. The campaign of "Les Amis de Philippe Hamel" had been enthusiastically supported by Le Devoir, La Presse, and L'Action Catholique, but the suggestion that the government act as both buyer and price fixer was condemned as undemocratic. See La Presse, Nov. 1st, 1962, p. 4.

65. Montreal Gazette, Oct. 12, 1962, p. 29.

also mindful of these factors, was quoted as saying that "personnellement, je suis porté à croire que nous allons un peu loin dans cette nationalisation de l'électricité actuellement."⁶⁶

Mr. Holden's speeches, in which he claimed that the "English are no longer at home in Quebec" and accused Mr. Lévesque of being a "modern Machiavelli" scheming to damage "the already weak fabric of French-English amity,"⁶⁷ led Mr. André Laurendeau to title him "un espèce de pied noir," and certainly made no contribution to French-English amity. Nevertheless, English-speaking Liberal candidates were, at one stage of the campaign, running scared, and they induced the provincial Liberal organization to improvise a television broadcast which, featuring Mr. Leslie Roberts interviewing Mr. Lévesque, was designed to assure the voters that the Minister of Natural Resources was not quite as sinister as Mr. Holden depicted him. The highlight of the campaign in Westmount-St. George was a debate between candidates Hyde and Holden, at which much noise, but very little sense was made.⁶⁸ On election day, Mr. Holden obtained more than 4,000 votes, but he failed to save his deposit, as Montreal's "English" constituencies voted heavily Liberal.

IV

What emerges from this description of third party and interest group activity in the campaign is the predominant role played by the nationalization

66. Le Devoir, Oct. 18, 1962, p. 1. Mr. Hyde subsequently denied having implied that he did not support the nationalization campaign.

67. Montreal Gazette, Nov. 2, 1962, p. 3.

68. The Hyde-Holden debate is described with some humour in the Montreal Star, Nov. 13, 1962, p. 3.

issue. Many organizations confined their pronouncements on the election to a statement setting forth their policy on nationalization. One group was formed primarily to propagandize for the measure. Labour and farm organizations and the majority of nationalist societies strongly favoured nationalization, leading them to give at least indirect electoral support to the Liberal party. The unwillingness of Mr. Johnson to take a firm stand on this issue, therefore, may have lost for his party the potential support of several pronationalization groups, while it is only remotely possible that a firm anti-nationalization stand could have gained the Union Nationale Mr. Caouette's endorsement.

CHAPTER VI

PARTY ORGANIZATION AND PARTY PUBLICITY

I

The importance of party organization in the conduct of an election campaign is both continuous and fundamental, for the ultimate confrontation of the voter with a choice between alternative candidates and policies is the end of a long process. For the voter the campaign period is one of deliberation, of deciding how to cast his ballot. In a parliamentary democracy, moreover, the political parties are largely responsible for confronting the voter with distinct alternatives. The election process comprises a number of specific tasks and actions, and political parties are deeply involved in the performance of these tasks. The parties nominate candidates and draft political manifestos; they publicize and canvass support for their respective policies; many thousands of voters rely upon them for interpretation of the Election Act; in Quebec, political parties are partly responsible for the drawing-up of the electoral lists and the supervision of the polls on voting day. Successful fulfilment of these functions is crucial to democratic government and, therefore, efficient party organizations are also, in a sense, crucial to democracy.

The principal objective of political parties is, of course, to influence, by electing members or supporters, the course of government. The contributions of political parties to democratic elections are, in fact, a by-product of purely partisan activity; but it is through the continuous competition for power of several parties that democracy is safeguarded. In an election campaign, not every party activity is of importance to the

democratic nature of the election. "Telegraphing" votes, for example, and even the projection of party images certainly contribute nothing to this end. These activities are, however, important in determining the outcome of elections. This chapter is concerned with the description and comparison of the electoral organizations, on the provincial level, of the Union Nationale and Liberal parties in 1962. It is concerned with the techniques and structures used by the parties to conduct their campaign activities.

Historically, party organizations in Quebec have been very little more than electoral machines. Party activity was confined to the period of the election campaign, the party organization often disintegrating between elections. Party members were limited in number. The membership in each constituency was composed of the party candidate, his organizers, and a group of active supporters; these local groupings were loosely bound by a common loyalty to the party leader and a common antagonism towards supporters of the rival party. The government party tended to have the active support of civil servants and provincial policemen¹ and a change in government would see a wholesale change of administrative personnel. Political party organizations in Quebec, therefore, were weakly-articulated.² Until very recently the basic unit of both the Liberal and the Union Nationale parties was the "caucus." Quebec's political parties, in terms of their organization at least, resembled the Conservative and Radical parties of 19th century Europe. The existence and maintenance of this form of party structure has

1. See J. and M. Hamelin, Les Moeurs Electorales dans le Québec, Montreal, Les Editions du Jour, 1962, for a historical treatment of this subject.

2. This terminology and analysis is based on M. Duverger, Political Parties, London, Methuen & Co., 1961, especially Ch. 1.

been due to the political predominance of a traditional, middle-class elite, the failure of universal suffrage and industrialization to produce a socialist party and mass participation in party activity, and to the uninominal single-member constituency electoral system.³

The formation of the Quebec Liberal Federation (QLF) in 1955 constituted an important change in the organization of the Liberal party, for it meant that the caucus system of party organization was being discarded, and the branch system adopted. The reasons for the change were similar to those which had led non-socialist parties in Europe to adopt the branch system: the recognition that the mass membership on which this system is based can be an important electoral asset, and "the desire to 'democratize' the party, to give it a structure more in accord with the political doctrines of the period."⁴

Although the Quebec Liberal Federation was created in an atmosphere of optimism and enthusiasm, the crushing victory of the Union Nationale in the 1956 election completely demoralized the Liberals, and the organizational and research activity of the Federation gradually dwindled. On his election to the party leadership, however, Mr. Lesage reactivated the committees of the Federation. Particular attention was given to strengthening Liberal constituency associations and to political research, which helped in

3. Leon D. Epstein, "British Mass Parties in Comparison with American Parties," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 71, no. 1 March 1956, warns that Professor Duverger's typology is not applicable to American political parties and disputes the contention that the American party system and American party organizations are "backward." Canadian political parties, it has often been pointed out, strongly resemble the American parties in many ways and Professor Epstein's criticisms should therefore be kept in mind. For descriptive purposes, however, the use of Professor Duverger's terminology seems warranted.

4. M. Duverger, Political Parties, op.cit., p. 26.

the formulation of the 1960 Liberal program. The activities of the Quebec Liberal Federation proved to be an important factor in the party's victory, for in 1958-60, the QLF's Policy Committee had worked on the elaboration of the party's political manifesto; organizational clinics had been held to train election day workers; and a network of publicity directors had been created in order that coordination of the party's campaign propaganda be assured.

In the 1960 campaign, the Liberals relied considerably on "scientific," or "modern" electioneering techniques. The party campaign was based in large part upon an extensive public opinion survey⁵ which sought indications of what issues the electorate considered important and of the public's images of the Liberal and Union Nationale parties and Leaders. Liberal officials stressed centralized control of the party's campaign, in part because it was felt that this enabled the party's campaign strategy to be executed more efficiently, and in part because Liberal organization in many constituencies was comparatively weak.

In sixteen uninterrupted years in office, the Union Nationale had created a formidable election "machine," relying in most constituencies upon the support of local government officials and prominent businessmen, while the Liberals, cut off from the source of patronage, were unable to build a similar network of influential supporters, and in 1960 they attempted to overcome this weakness by selecting local notables as candidates in many constituencies. The Quebec Liberal Federation provided the party with an efficient organizational base on the provincial level, and party officials

5. The survey in question is Les Electeurs Québécois, op.cit. It was sponsored by the QLF in order to help it plan both short- and long-term strategy.

are convinced that the provincial campaign has become increasingly important in determining the outcome of elections. It is clear that the development of the mass media and extensive use of radio and television in campaigning have given added importance to the provincial party organization, for in a provincial campaign only at this level can full advantage be taken of the new electioneering techniques.

The organization of the Union Nationale was completely reformed between the elections of 1960 and 1962, for in these years this party, in its turn, decided to abandon the caucus system of organization. The decisions taken at the party's 1961 convention aimed at the transformation of the Union Nationale into a mass party. Even before the September 1961 convention, the Union Nationale began to organize local associations with formal membership. The immediate functions of these associations were to elect delegates to the convention, and to submit resolutions to the eight study groups which had been created to consider these proposals and to present them to the convention for approval.

At the convention itself, several important decisions affecting the structure of the party organization were made. It was decided that there would be no Union Nationale federation on the provincial level; the party was to consist of 95 constituency associations, each "completely autonomous." On the provincial level, there would be a secretariat at Quebec City and a sub-secretariat in Montreal. In between elections, the secretariat's activities were theoretically, to be confined to the publication and distribution of the official party newspaper, Le Temps, and to assisting in the organization of activities in which more than one constituency association was involved. The Secretary-General was to be appointed by the party Leader, whose position in relation to the Union Nationale's provincial organization

resembles very closely that of the Conservative Leader to the party's Central Office in Britain.⁶ The Union Nationale Leader also exerts effective control of the five-member political organization committee and the administrators of the trust fund which was created to replace the party's earlier financing techniques, for he appoints the members of these bodies and they are responsible to him alone.

The Union Nationale party organization is today only in the process of formation and it would be unwise to assume that its present structure will be permanent. Nevertheless, unless the direction the party has taken will be completely reversed, certain features will remain. By rejecting the notion of a federation of local associations, the Union Nationale had committed itself to a weakly-articulated party organization and, on the surface at least, to a relatively great degree of autonomy for the constituency associations. The party organization on the provincial level is firmly controlled by the party leader and the activity of the party's Central Agencies is not subject to even the formal control of the party's mass membership. These changes in the Union Nationale organization, however, had no noticeable effect on the party's electoral organization. In 1962, the party's Secretary-General became provincial organizer, an arrangement that is likely to become permanent.

The electoral organization of the Liberal party in 1962 had changed very little from 1960. The policy of relying as much as possible upon the structurers and personnel of the Quebec Liberal Federation was continued,

6. R. Mackenzie, British Political Parties, London, The MacMillan Co., 1954, gives a clear analysis of both the constitutional and real powers of the Conservative Party Leader.

and a final step in this direction was the decision of the Liberals not to appoint a provincial organizer. This decision was motivated by the desire to avoid the development of rivalry between the QLF and a separate organization of electoral agents. Constituency candidates were therefore encouraged to choose their organizers in consultation with the executive of the local Liberal Association. Since the November election had not been expected the QLF was unable to make the elaborate preparations that had preceded the 1960 campaign. For example, public opinion surveys could not be used in the same way, although party officials are convinced that the results of these surveys are very helpful.⁷

In an election campaign, both the Liberal and Union Nationale parties divide their organization into two major regional subdivisions; the region of Montreal comprising 54 constituencies, and the region of Quebec, comprising the remaining 41. In 1962, the Union Nationale's central headquarters were in Quebec City and were directed by the provincial organizer, an appointee of the party Leader. The provincial organizer appoints his assistant for the Montreal region and also the chairmen of the functional committees of which the party's electoral organization is composed. The most important are the Organization, Finance, Publicity, Conventions, Legal, and Assemblies Committees. The chairmen of these committees, the provincial organizer, the Montreal region organizer, and several important assistants form a Central Executive Committee that exercises ultimate control and authority over the Union Nationale campaign. This group, in consultation with the party Leader's personal advisers, make the key policy decisions

7. I have already mentioned, *infra*. p.78 the use the Liberals made of such surveys in 1962. It should be noted, however, that the private surveys taken during the campaign were on a relatively small scale.

concerning the party's campaign strategy.

The Union Nationale program was drawn up by this Central Executive Committee, on the basis of the resolutions passed at the party's 1961 convention. This committee was also responsible for deciding the itinerary of the Leader's tour of the province, although the minor administrative details, such as the dates of particular assemblies and the selection of other platform speakers, were left to be worked out by the Assemblies Committee in consultation with local organizers. The Central Committee also supervised the writing and distribution of publicity on the provincial level. A professional advertising agency was employed to produce the party's radio and television broadcasts and to prepare the final copy of the party's printed publicity, but the Central Executive Committee prepared the publicity budget, decided upon the distribution of the total volume of publicity among the various mass media, and gave final approval to the text of any publicity issued in the name of the Union Nationale provincial organization.

While the committees of the Union Nationale electoral organization are formed ad hoc, the Liberals continue to use the permanent committees of the QLF in the campaign period. The advantages to this are that it makes immediately available at the upper level election workers who are experienced and who have worked together over a continuous period. The use of well-defined, stable organizational structures permitted the Liberals to start their campaign activity without having to create and staff anew their electoral organization.

Of the eight permanent committees of the QLF, the Organization, Publicity, Finance, and Policy Committees become, in an election campaign, particularly important. The Policy Committee is chiefly responsible for drafting the party's election manifesto. Although this is presumably based upon

resolutions passed at QLF congresses in the years between elections, the manifesto drawn up by the policy committee is subject only to the ratification of the party Leader. Party policy on major issues is, of course, the result of decisions made at the cabinet level, and the work of the Policy Committee is merely to articulate these decisions. The role of the Finance Committee is to collect campaign contributions, to draw up a budget and to authorize expenditures. It is also an important coordinator of the electioneering in the various constituencies, for these rely upon the provincial organization for approximately half of their campaign funds.⁸

The provincial organization has two major functions in an election campaign. Its primary role is to plan and direct the party's campaign at the provincial level to arrange the leader's tour, draft the party program, write and distribute party publicity. But the provincial organization also plays an important part in the conduct of constituency campaigns, by supervising nominating conventions, supplying enumerators and revisers, sending speakers to local assemblies, and by financing part of the constituency campaign. In the Union Nationale organization this secondary function is performed largely by the Conventions, Organization, and Assemblies Committees. For the Liberals the Organization and, to a lesser extent, the Publicity Committee are responsible for assisting the constituency campaigns.

In 1962, the Liberal party's equivalent for the Union Nationale's

8. P. Laporte, "Les Elections ne se Font pas avec les Prières," op.cit. gives this as the average proportion of the cost of constituency campaigns paid by the provincial organization in 1956. Liberal officials estimated that approximately the same proportion was paid by the provincial organization in the 1962 election. For a detailed analysis of the financing elections in Quebec and elsewhere see H. M. Angell, Report on Electoral Reform of the Province of Quebec, an unpublished study prepared for the Quebec Liberal Federation in Quebec, 1961.

Central Campaign Committee was a committee of about 15 men, drawn from the QLF's Publicity and Organization Committees, and including the party's secretary-general, assistant secretary-general, and director of public relations. These three officials are appointed by the Executive Council of the Quebec Liberal Federation. This committee met daily and made all important decisions concerning campaign strategy. It was, like its counterpart in the organization of the Union Nationale, the linchpin of the party's election machine.

In 1962, the Liberals again stressed strong central control over the constituency campaigns, feeling that consistency in the statements of all Liberal candidates is necessary. The Quebec Liberal Federation proved to be of value here too, for it provided definite channels of communication between the central office and the local organizations. It should be noted too that since executive members of local Liberal associations as well as of the QLF also occupied key positions in the party's electoral organization, the individuals involved were experienced in working together.

The Liberals paid special attention to the coordination of the constituency and provincial campaigns. Each constituency Association elects a public relations officer whose participation in the Liberal candidate's campaign organization was again encouraged. Party publicity, therefore, could be more easily distributed and the coordination of local publicity with that issued on the provincial level was simplified. The six regional Liberal federations were used only sparingly during the 1962 election campaign, but were easily available to organize large assemblies serving several constituencies or to perform other duties. In 1962, there were very few instances of disunity in the Liberal campaign. The Montreal

"English" constituencies were left, more or less, to their own devices, although a publicity officer responsible for all these constituencies was appointed and acted as the chief liaison with the provincial organization. There were no overt examples, however, of candidates deserting the party line, and when Mr. Richard Hyde was quoted as saying that nationalization of electricity is going a bit too far, he promptly issued a denial. A more strongly-articulated party organization, therefore, while not a guarantee of party discipline, certainly does encourage it.

The Union Nationale campaign, however did reveal contrasts between the campaign conducted by Mr. Johnson and those of several candidates. The most significant example, of course, was the difference between the Union Nationale leader and Mr. Jean-Jacques Bertrand on the nationalization issue. The Johnson-Bertrand tension, however, can in no way be attributed to poor electoral organization. Nevertheless, one sometimes felt, during the campaign, that the Union Nationale candidates were fighting individual campaigns. The absence of clear channels of communication and the party's general stress on local autonomy must have been partly responsible for the inconsistencies. The Union Nationale's central campaign organization did, however, exercise a measure of control over constituency campaigns. To achieve this it relied principally on its control of the campaign finances, on the Union Nationale caucus of candidates and organizers at Amqui at the beginning of the campaign, and on liaison between local organizers and provincial officials.

In summary, then, the most important contrasts in 1962 between the two parties in terms of their electoral organization were the greater stability of the Liberal organization, due to its reliance on the per-

ment structure of the QLF, and the greater emphasis placed by the Liberals on the centralized management of their campaign. This is probably explained by the fact that the Union Nationale was at this particular juncture in the midst of rebuilding its structure and also divided by factional strife, and that the party's organization had historically stressed local autonomy. The Liberals, on the other hand, possessed a more strongly-articulated, centralized organization which provided better channels of communication between constituency organizations and provincial Liberal officials.

Both the Liberal and Union Nationale parties have realized that an active mass membership can contribute greatly to electoral success. In Professor Duverger's sense, therefore, Quebec's political parties are "modernizing."⁹ It is, however, in the field of party propaganda that modern techniques have had their greatest impact.

II

The development of the media of mass communications has meant a decline in the importance of the mass meeting in electioneering.¹⁰ Public relations techniques¹¹ have replaced face-to-face contact between voter and candidates as the principal means of carrying a political party's "message" to the electorate. While party publicity can and in some cases,

9. Professor Epstein, whose objections have been mentioned, might disagree.

10. This was pointed out to Liberal organizers by Mr. Maurice Sauvé before the 1960 election. The text of his advice is to be found in his chapter "la Publicité," in Organization Electorale, a brochure published by the Quebec Liberal Federation.

11. By this term is meant the whole range of techniques—press, poster, radio, television, and cinema advertising— which can be used to communicate ideas and attitudes to the public.

does serve as source of information to voters,¹² its primary purposes are to make them aware of the general lines of the party program and to try and create a favourable party image. The projection of party images has received considerable attention in the United States and Great Britain,¹³ and there is evidence that this "American" idea is also entering Canadian politics.¹⁴

"A party image is nothing more than a party as it appears to the public, the picture left by its surface characteristics."¹⁵ Party publicity alone cannot create this picture, for a party's policy and its activity in Parliament will also influence the voters' image of it. The importance of a party's "brand image" in influencing voting behaviour cannot be denied, however, and recent studies have shown that many electors "are more influenced by a party's surface features than by its policy statements."¹⁶

The conscious projection of a favourable party image is a long-term process, for this involves altering, if ever so slightly, stable party loyalties. Almost every election study emphasizes that most voters have decided how to cast their ballots long before the beginning of the campaign,

12. In 1962, for example, certain Liberal advertisements listed the increased welfare payments introduced by the Lesage government. Similarly, the Union Nationale gave the facts and figures about new taxes.

13. For the U.S., see J.S. Kelley, Professional Public Relations and Political Power, especially Ch.I. Butler and Rose, op. cit. discuss this aspect of the 1959 British election in Chapter III.

14. The Liberal campaign in the 1962 federal general election clearly owed much to Madison Avenue. The use of motivational research surveys in Quebec is important too, for the surveys' results indicate what form a favourable party image is likely to take. Nevertheless the full impact of "American" electioneering techniques has not yet reached Canada.

15. Butler and Rose, op.cit., p. 17.

16. Ibid., p. 18.

and it has been found further that "media exposure.... solidifies preferences. It solidifies and reinforces more than it converts."¹⁷ In addition, during a campaign, "people cannot help but be aware.... that they are the targets of deliberate propaganda."¹⁸ The voters expect attempts at persuasion and, therefore, are prepared to resist them.

The projection of a party image is the result of a cumulative process, and the major role in this is played not so much by official party propaganda as by the less obviously partisan output of the mass media. At any rate, neither the Liberals nor the Union Nationale actively propagandized from the 1960 election to the beginning of the 1962 campaign, but party officials have recognized that a favourable image is most important political asset¹⁹ and that professional public relations techniques should be used to secure the maximum political advantages from party propaganda. For the 1962 campaign, both parties hired professional advertising agencies to plan, help write, and distribute their publicity.²⁰

In the 1962 election campaign, both the Liberals and the Union Nationale publicity was based upon a professionally-formulated "master plan." Liberal party strategists had, at the campaign's outset, hoped to limit discussion to the nationalization issue, and Liberal publicity in the early weeks of the campaign was, therefore, limited to the espousals of the nationalization of electricity, linking the issue's nationalist

17. B. Berelson, P. Lazarsfeld, and W. McPhee, Voting, p. 248

18. K. and G. E. Lang, "The Mass Media and Voting," in American Voting Behaviour, p. 219.

19. Liberal officials told me in October that they were, after the election, going to begin to propagandize between elections, using television and films predominantly.

20. In this Chapter, whenever party publicity is discussed I am referring to publicity issued by the parties' provincial, and not regional or local, organization.

aspect- "Maîtres Chez Nous" - to the province's economic development- "Tarifs plus bas," and "Emancipation Economique." Predictably, however, other issues developed,²¹ and the Liberals added a second slogan- "Un Gouvernement Sérieux" to their campaign. On November 3, advertisements appeared in the daily newspapers enumerating the Liberal government's achievements in education, health, welfare, and agriculture.

The Liberal campaign in 1960 had been predicated upon the assumption that economic and social changes in the province would make new political attitudes popular. Their campaign in 1962, like "la politique de grandeur," was designed to appeal to the province's middle-class and its urban voters, although the nationalist theme was expected to evoke a universal response. The image the Liberal public relations campaign intended to convey was that of a group of men aware of Quebec's needs and capable of solving Quebec's problems. "Quebec is a modern province," the Liberals told the voters. "It needs a modern government and modern solutions to her problems. We alone can provide such government and we offer you already one such solution- the nationalization of electricity."²²

As the opposition party, the Union Nationale based its campaign on the theme that two years of Liberal government had proved only that the Liberals could not govern. Union Nationale publicity dealt with a variety of issues, but each printed advertisement or pamphlet purported to show that the Liberal government had created a general sense of malaise in Quebec. As a Union Nationale advertisement read, "Ça Va Mal Partout!"

21. This development is discussed in Chapter 4, *infra*.

22. This summary description is the result of several interviews with Liberal officials and with a member of the Collyer Advertising Agency, which handled the Liberal advertising during the campaign.

In accusing the Liberals of administrative incompetence, the Union Nationale pointed to its "16 Years of Achievement" and suggested that its more experienced candidates would set things right again. In contrast to the Liberals, the Union Nationale's "politique du bon sens" attempted to identify that party with the average citizen, "les petits gens," and attacked some Liberals' proposals as alien to Quebec. The use of professional public relations experts by both parties enabled them to accurately reflect these basic themes in the content and presentation of their publicity.

It has been pointed out that mass media propaganda is important in projecting the personality of party Leaders.²³ Both Mr. Lesage and Mr. Johnson figured prominently in the propaganda of their respective parties. The Union Nationale in particular attempted to create a respect for and faith in "le chef."²⁴ Mr. Johnson's picture appeared in an inset on most Union Nationale printed publicity and he spoke on almost every one of the Union Nationale's 15-minute radio and television broadcasts, Mr. Bertrand appearing on one or two occasions. Montréal-Matin included daily photographs depicting Mr. Johnson's "triumphal" tour of the province, and references by Union Nationale speakers to "le discours d'Amqui" and "la bataille de Rouville" were also part of the party's attempt to create a set of traditions and symbols focussing on Mr. Johnson's heroic role in the past. In a very real sense, his was a "one-man" campaign.

Mr. Lesage shared, to some extent, the Liberal spotlight with

23. K. and G. E. Lang, op.cit. discusses this in some detail.

24. For a discussion of "cheffism" in Quebec, see M. Oliver, op.cit., H. Guindon, op.cit. and M. Tremblay, "Réflexions sur le Nationalisme," Ecrits du Canada Français, vol. 5, 1958.

Mr. Lévesque. There was no doubt, however, in the minds of Liberal organizers that Mr. Lesage is more popular than his party, and an attempt was made to project an image of Lesage the Statesman rather than Lesage the party Leader. On Nov. 13th, the last Liberal advertisement of the campaign consisted solely of a full-page photograph of distinguished-looking Mr. Lesage. Candidates in the Quebec City ridings campaigned as part of a Lesage-Godbout or Lesage-Beaupré "team," and several organizers have expressed the opinion that Mr. Lesage's popularity helped gain two Quebec City seats for the Liberals. On radio and television, the Liberals used four speakers on 15-minute programs - Mr. Lesage, Mr. Lévesque, Mr. Lapalme, and Mr. Gérin-Lajoie. Mr. Lévesque, because of his special role in the nationalization campaign and because of his broadcasting experience, appeared almost as often as Mr. Lesage on French-language radio and television, but he spoke less often on the English networks.

Party propaganda appeared in the daily newspapers, in suburban and rural weeklies, in mass circulation weekend papers, on radio, on television, and even on film. There ~~was~~ a major contrast in the parties respective "master plans." The Liberals public relations campaign placed **more** emphasis on printed publicity than the Union Nationale did. They made **more** use of newspaper advertising and party pamphlets, while the Union Nationale stressed radio and television campaigning.

PARTY PAMPHLETS

The Union Nationale party program, a four-page brochure in red and blue, was mailed to every household in the province. This brochure contained the complete text of the party program, a listing of its most

salient features, and a letter from Mr. Johnson which enumerated the party's basic principles. The Union Nationale also made available to opinion leaders copies of two of Mr. Johnson's speeches, his reply to the Throne Speech of 1962 and his address in the same year's budget debate.²⁵ The party also printed a series of fourteen cards which listed the accomplishments of the 1944-60 Union Nationale regime on a department-by-department basis. These were not widely circulated, however, and were primarily used by Union Nationale speakers to document their claims.

The Liberals made greater use of printed brochures. Every household in the province received a copy of the 12-page pocket-sized brochure, "Jean Lesage et son Equipe." This pamphlet, which was printed in both French and English, listed the major accomplishments of the Lesage government. The brochure included no less than eight pictures of Mr. Lesage in various surroundings, and each page was headed "Jean Lesage tient promesse!," concluding with "Grâce aux efforts de Jean Lesage et de l'équipe libérale...."

960,000 copies of a special edition of La Réforme were mailed to French-Canadian householders throughout the province. This 16-page issue was devoted almost entirely to the nationalization issue, stressing the necessity for Quebec's "libération économique." All aspects of the problem were analyzed, pictures and charts figuring in the presentation. Again, Mr. Lesage was prominently displayed, his picture appearing in an

25. These addresses were reprinted by the Union Nationale Service d'Information, with the title "Rôle de l'Etat Québécois" and "Québec, Mendiant ou Souverain?" respectively. I am describing in this chapter, it should again be stressed, publicity issued by the central party organization.

inset at the top of every page, under the slogan- "Votons Lesage, Votons Libéral." The Liberal party manifesto in 1962 dealt exclusively with the nationalization issue. 50,000 copies of the manifesto were published in the form of a 16-page, pocket-sized brochure, 35,000 being mailed to opinion leaders throughout the province. The manifesto was a sober presentation of the decision to nationalize electricity and enumerated the favourable effects of this measure.

Since the Liberal organizers were determined that all party candidates and spokesmen maintain a consistent attitude on nationalization, at the September 19th caucus of Liberal candidates and organizers, each was given a copy of Mr. Lévesque's major speeches on the subject and a copy of Mr. Paul Sauriol's La Nationalisation de l'Electricité. In addition a 16-page pamphlet on the nationalization of electricity was printed, 100,000 being distributed for use in Liberal committee rooms.

NEWSPAPER ADVERTISING

The Liberals relied more heavily than the Union Nationale on newspaper publicity. The Liberals bought 14 pages of advertisements in the province's French-language daily newspapers, excepting the strongly pro-Union Nationale Montréal-Matin. This total was made up of 23 insertions. Of the 14 pages, 9 were filled by full-page advertisements in favour of nationalization. The Liberals used five separate presentations for their pro-nationalization publicity; two stressed the role of nationalization in creating new jobs, and another claimed that it would result in lower electricity rates for almost half a million households. The remaining two presentations were simpler in form and made a direct appeal to French-Canadian nationalist sentiment, calling for the voters to support the

Liberals and so become "propriétaires de toute la production et la distribution de l'électricité... au meilleur intérêt du Québec."

The remaining Liberal advertisements stressed the accomplishments of "un gouvernement sérieux" in the domains of agriculture, education, health, and social security.

The Union Nationale bought 11 pages of advertisements in the French-language dailies, and Montréal-Matin printed 35 tabloid size pages of Union Nationale publicity. The Union Nationale newspaper advertisements were more elaborate in form than those of the Liberals, and touched on a greater number of issues. In sharp contrast to the Liberals, the Union Nationale barely mentioned nationalization, confining themselves to promising a referendum on the issue after the election. Its advertisements generally combined an attack on Liberal policies with a favourable presentation of Union Nationale campaign pledges. Montréal-Matin's 35 pages of publicity included 8 pages dealing with the \$1 an hour minimum wage promise, $5\frac{1}{2}$ pages attacking tax increases introduced by the Liberals, and 4 pages promising the plan for portable pension funds. This emphasis clearly reflected the major themes of Mr. Johnson's speeches.

Both parties advertised in the rural weekly newspapers. The Liberals inserted 8 advertisements in almost every French-language rural weekly throughout the province, while the Union Nationale placed only 3 advertisements in selected rural weeklies. In the weekend newspapers, the Liberals placed 9 advertisements and the Union Nationale only 2, although one of these was a four-page reproduction of the party program. A two-page program also appeared in the daily newspapers, but these were perhaps the least effective advertisements of the campaign. The news-

paper pages in question were crammed with small print, and it seems unlikely that many people would read this costly propaganda carefully. Union Nationale officials agreed that probably only a few read the program carefully, but that the advertisement was mainly intended to impress voters with the "seriousness" of the party. Liberal advertisements in the weekend papers included several dealing with the nationalization issue, and the party again placed no publicity in what it considered to be a strongly pro-Union Nationale journal, in this case Nouvelles Illustrés. Finally, the Union Nationale prepared a four-page spread on Mr. Johnson's career which was printed in the mass circulation weekend magazine Perspectives.

Publicity in English-language newspapers appeared only rarely. The Liberals bought four advertisements in both the Star and the Gazette; one advertisement dealt with nationalization, justifying the measure on economic grounds and the remaining three pledged continued "honest" government. The Union Nationale provincial organization advertised only once in the English-language dailies, presenting itself as the guardian of the free enterprise system. The Liberals also bought more publicity in English-language weekly papers.

RADIO AND TELEVISION

Both the Union Nationale and the Liberals used these media of publicity extensively.²⁶ Radio publicity placed by the central electoral organization was limited, by both parties, to 20 second, 40 second, and one minute "spot" announcements. In addition, Sunday afternoon mass

26. Organizers for both parties agree that radio and television electioneering is very effective, but they bemoan the great expense involved.

meetings were broadcast on a province-wide radio network. Finally, the Liberals bought two hours of radio time on November 10 and 11 in order to allow radio listeners throughout the province to telephone and ask questions of Mr. Lévesque. Constituency candidates relied more heavily on radio advertising, so both parties provided professional technical assistance to its candidates, and also prepared broadcasts which could be used by local candidates instead of personal speeches. Both parties, but in particular the Liberals, emphasized that local radio and television broadcasts should be coordinated with the province-wide broadcasts on the CBC.

Television publicity included both spot announcements and fifteen-minute broadcasts. The Liberals produced six and the Union Nationale ten 15-minute programs in French. Of the six Liberal programs, four dealt with the nationalization issue. Mr. Lévesque spoke twice, as did Mr. Lesage. Mr. Lapalme and Mr. Gérin-Lajoie appeared on the remaining two broadcasts. For the Union Nationale, Mr. Dozois and Mr. Maltais each spoke once, Mr. Bertrand twice, and Mr. Johnson six times. The telecasts were uniformly solemn and fairly dull, although Mr. Lévesque, by using blackboard and chalk, was able to make his TV appearances more lively than the rest. Perhaps the most entertaining publicity broadcast of the campaign was a ten-minute interview in English between Mr. Leslie Roberts of the Montreal radio station CJAD and Mr. Lévesque.

Both parties increased the volume of their radio and television publicity in the closing days of the campaign. The Liberals bought up to one hour of time on private television stations throughout the province on Nov. 10th and 11th. The party broadcast excerpts from speeches of

party leaders and, time permitting a film which featured Mr. Lévesque explaining the nationalization issue. The Union Nationale, for its part, did not, broadcast any special ~~programs~~ in the closing days of the campaign. Its only program longer than 15-minutes was seen at the beginning of the campaign, when it produced a half hour condemnation of the Liberal government's policies.

All television broadcasts were carefully supervised by public relations experts, and no speaker made a serious error. Mr. Lévesque was the most effective, perhaps because of his relaxed "on camera" manner, but there was little to choose between the performances of the party Leaders. Mr. Lesage seemed the more solemn, even a little pompous, while Mr. Johnson's major faults ~~were~~ speaking too quickly and constantly reading, also at a rapid pace, the Union Nationale party program.

FILM

Mr. Lévesque campaigned tirelessly but he could not, of course, attend every major Liberal rally. His presence, however, was in great demand, and, realizing his effectiveness in defending the nationalization of electricity, Liberal party strategists produced a film of Mr. Levesque explaining the nationalization measure, so that he could be seen and heard even when physically absent. 95 copies of the film were made, one copy being sent to each constituency for use either at assemblies or at briefings of organizers and canvassers. If shown at a meeting, the film proper would be preceded by an insertion of a brief speech by the constituency candidate, whose remarks usually included a reference to his friendship with ~~and~~ admiration for Mr. Lévesque.

The film itself was technically competent and proved to be a helpful

addition to the Liberal campaign.²⁷ It revealed nothing that was new and merely reiterated the familiar pro-nationalization arguments. The role of nationalization in promoting the economic development of the province was given particular attention. Mr. Lévesque presented his explanation lucidly and imaginatively, utilizing simple charts to illustrate his point. In previous years, but not in 1962, the Union Nationale had used films to publicize its achievements.

SUMMARY

Party propaganda on the provincial level was, for both parties, based upon a "master plan" drawn up by professional public relations experts. It was, therefore, possible for all aspects of party publicity to effectively communicate the major themes of the campaign to the electorate. In 1962, unlike previous years, each party had sufficient resources to present its case adequately to the voters. While the Liberals issued a greater volume of written publicity, the Union Nationale broadcast more TV programs. At any rate, the difference in the total volume of publicity bought by the two parties was not great; certainly neither monopolized the influence of the mass media. In these circumstances, and in view of the findings of other election studies,²⁸ it would seem that the quality of party publicity had only a **very small** role in determining the results of the election.

27. Liberal strategists were so pleased with its effect that they plan to produce a series of films dealing with other aspects of party policy.

28. Voting, The People's Choice, and Straight Fight agree that party propaganda does little to change the minds of voters or to determine the choice of the undecided voter. See K and G. E. Lang, op.cit. and I. de Sola Pool, "TV: a New Dimension in Politics," in American Voting Behaviour, op.cit.

CHAPTER VII
THE MASS MEDIA

If the democratic nature of an election is to be assured, all competing political parties must have access to the media of mass communications, and the coverage of the election by the news media must be such that each party receives a relatively unbiased hearing.¹ The essence of democratic government is the opportunity for its citizens to make a significant decision on election day. The monopoly by a single party of the mass media's pervasive influence, by presenting the voters with only one point of view, can eliminate the element of choice from the voting act. In assessing the democratic nature of a particular election, therefore, one is led to a content analysis of the mass media's election coverage.

The mass media also exert an important influence on the shape of the campaign. It has been pointed out that party images are not the product of a single election campaign and that the public image of a party or candidate will rarely be changed by publicity in the campaign period alone. But the mass media can help bring about a change in the image of what is important in a campaign, by stressing certain issues while neglecting to discuss others. In the 1962 Quebec election, for example, the nationali-

1. Mr. Johnson and the Union Nationale did on several occasions during the 1962 campaign, accuse certain newspapers of having a pro-Liberal bias, singling out Le Devoir and La Presse. On another occasion, however, he expressed satisfaction with press coverage of his campaign. Union Nationale officials certainly resented the generally pro-Liberal attitude of the press. An official told me that Le Devoir, La Presse, L'Action Catholique, La Tribune, Le Droit, La Voix de l'Est, and the Montreal Star showed in his opinion, a consistent pro-Liberal bias.

zation issue was emphasized by Le Devoir and La Presse, while Montréal-Matin attempted to focus public attention on other issues. In addition, the mass media contribute to the creation of a particular political climate by the tone of their articles and broadcasts.

In reference to the problem of determining whether or not partisan bias can be imputed to the newspapers, the following observations must be made. First, there is clearly a distinction between news reporting and editorial comment. The latter form of expression is rightly open to partisan opinion, and impartiality here is not to be expected. News reporting, however, provides the voter with the information upon which to base his decision and ~~should~~ therefore be accurate rather than partisan. Secondly, the requirement that no political party monopolize the mass media does not eliminate the possibility of certain newspapers giving more coverage to a particular party. Complete equality in the news space devoted to each party and a total absence of partisanship in reporting is only a theoretical possibility. What is important is that each party is given enough coverage by the mass media for the electorate to become fully cognizant of the policies it advocates. No party or personality must be given so much more treatment that their opponents pale into insignificance.

My investigation concentrates exclusively on the role of the daily newspapers in the 1962 campaign, for this is the medium generally acknowledged to be the voters' most important source of information. The following newspapers were included in the analysis: Le Devoir, La Presse, L'Action Catholique, Le Soleil, La Tribune, Le Nouvelliste, Le Droit, Montréal-Matin, the Montreal Gazette, and the Montreal Star.

An initial distinction can be made, on the criterion of the extent of the reporting of the campaign, between the Montreal dailies and those published in other parts of the province. The latter group, including L'Action Catholique and Le Soleil (Quebec City), La Tribune (Sherbrooke), Le Nouvelliste (Three Rivers), and Le Droit (Hull-Ottawa), confined election coverage to a daily report on the activities of the party leaders and information concerning the campaigns in local constituencies. The stories carried by these newspapers were predominantly based upon Canadian Press reports, the papers' own reporters being used to report the local campaigns. The nationalization issue was given special attention, and, for this reason, the speeches of Mr. Levesque were frequently reported. These newspapers also concentrated on the more general campaign issues, tending to omit the more unsavory aspects of the campaign, such as the accusations and counteraccusations of patronage and demagoguery. Whereas the Montreal dailies made much out of Mr. Johnson likening Mr. Lévesque to Fidel Castro, for example, neither this nor incidents of a similar nature were discussed in the other newspapers. Similarly, the major scandals of the campaign, the "doctored" interviews of l'Institut Opino and the discovery of false voting slips, were given much less play than they were in each of the Montreal dailies, which discussed these aspects of the campaign at length.

The Montreal dailies, larger and better-staffed, were able to report the election in greater depth. Every newspaper assigned a staff reporter to follow the tours of Mr. Lesage and Mr. Johnson, and, in addition, included reports on the campaign activities of leading members of each party. Of the Union Nationale candidates, Mr. Bertrand, in

particular, was the focus of attention, while for the Liberals the campaign speeches of Mr. Lévesque, Mr. Lapalme, and Mr. Gérin-Lajoie were usually reported. Le Devoir and La Presse devoted ample space to speculation about potential friction between Mr. Bertrand and Mr. Johnson, thus putting Mr. Bertrand in the limelight, and all the Montreal newspapers agreed that Mr. Lévesque's role as the prime mover of the nationalization campaign and chief target of the Union Nationale made him a natural focus of public attention.

Perhaps because campaigning in the Montreal ridings very often does not include many public meetings, proportionately less space in the Montreal dailies was devoted to local campaigns. A capsule sketch of the candidates in each Montreal constituency, however, appeared in both La Presse and the Montreal Star. On the other hand, l'Action Provinciale's campaign activity, as well as that of both Dr. Chaput and Mr. Holden, received full attention in Montreal, although almost completely disregarded elsewhere.

What particularly distinguished the election coverage of the Montreal dailies, however, was the inclusion of "special features." Le Devoir, for example, included special reports on regional issues and campaigns, analyses of the campaign techniques of both Mr. Lesage and Mr. Johnson, André Laurendeau's "Chronique d'une Campagne," and "cloc-notes," a daily column of minor election news and gossip. Montréal-Matin, the unofficial organ of the Union Nationale, was the prime instrument in that party's attempt to create an image of Mr. Johnson as "le chef invincible." His speeches were reported in detail and a two-page spread of photographs documenting his "campagne triomphale"

was included in each edition. Since Montréal-Matin devoted almost all of its election coverage to candidates of the Union Nationale, it was able to report on many constituency campaigns at some length.

La Presse's election coverage was the most extensive and wide-ranging. It included a series of analyses of constituency campaigns, a column of "bloc-notes," the syndicated column of R. Daigneault and D. Clift, "La Démocratie en Québec," which during the campaign dealt predominantly with various aspects of the election, a detailed discussion in a series of articles of l'Affaire Opim, and an investigation of the charge of patronage made by the Union Nationale candidate in Chambly against his Liberal opponent, Mr. Pierre Laporte.

The Montreal Gazette and the Montreal Star, while devoting less space to the election than the French-language dailies, paid special attention to issues and personalities in which English-speaking voters, presumably, were particularly interested. Mr. Holden's candidacy, the role of separatism in the campaign, the "threat of socialism," and the nationalization issue were discussed at considerable length in these papers. "Les Amis de Philippe Hamel," however, was given only passing mention in the English dailies, although Le Devoir and La Presse included several reports discussing this group's activity, and several editorials praising it.

Did the daily press in fact display a general pro-Liberal bias, as the Union Nationale suggested? The measurement² of the quantity of news

2. I did not add the number of inches of news space devoted to each party, but rather made a less accurate estimate by adding the number of columns dealing specifically with the campaign activities of each party on a day-by-day basis. A column on the front page was considered the equivalent of 1½ columns elsewhere in the newspaper.

space devoted to the election campaign by each daily newspaper studied reveals no general policy of giving greater coverage to the Liberal party. On only seven days of the campaign, for example, did L'Action Catholique print significantly more about the Liberals than about the Union Nationale. On four other days, the Union Nationale was favoured in this way. In Le Nouvelliste, the Liberals received significantly more attention on nine days, the Union Nationale on eight; in Le Soleil, the corresponding figures are nine for the Liberals and seven for the Union Nationale. It is important to note, however, that the same party received more attention from all newspapers on the same day. On October 8th, for example, the Liberal party was given more space, but this is explained by the fact that the party formally opened its campaign on the 7th. Similarly, a major event in the Union Nationale campaign, such as the publication of the party program, would dominate the news pages the day following its occurrence.

The Montreal dailies' election coverage was, in certain instances, coloured by partisan considerations. Montréal-Matin barely mentioned the Liberal campaign, while Le Devoir devoted somewhat more space to the Liberal party than to the Union Nationale. A possible reason, however, for the quantitative advantage of the Liberals is that governmental activities take on a decidedly political aspect during an election campaign,³ and the reporting of these activities, therefore, tended to appear as the reporting of party affairs. Also, the nationalization issue was constantly the centre of attraction in most newspapers. La

3. The federal-provincial agreement on ARDA, announced on October 18th, could only be seen as a part of the Liberal party agricultural policy and was so reported in the press.

Presse carried a six-article analysis of the economic aspects of nationalization, and Le Devoir printed a series of editorials by Mr. Paul Sauriol that also carefully examined the consequences of the measure. Both studies strongly advocated nationalization, in much the same terms as did the Liberals; interest group activity in the campaign too consisted largely of support for the nationalization of the private power companies. The mere inclusion, therefore, of pro-nationalization articles increased the number of stories dealing with the Liberal party's campaign themes. Finally, while Mr. Johnson conducted almost a "one-man" campaign, Liberal electioneering featured two main stars, Mr. Lévesque's prominence being another source of newspaper articles.

The Liberal party, therefore, received approximately 60 per cent⁴ of the total coverage of the daily newspapers studied, but there was certainly no effort made to avoid mention of the Union Nationale campaign. Every newspaper gave its readers full opportunity to study that party's program, provided information about its leader, and included full reports on the party's local candidates. Montréal-Matin was the sole newspaper which showed, in quantitative terms, an extremely partisan attitude.

It is more difficult to determine whether the reporting itself was seriously distorted by the political sympathies of the newspapers and reporters. It is almost impossible to eliminate subjective impressions when writing, for example, about an election meeting, and one would be

4. This figure is an estimate, based on the total number of columns devoted to campaign activities considered to be of more than merely local significance.

given different impressions of the same meeting by reading Montréal-Matin on the one hand and Le Devoir or the Montreal Star on the other. Arbitrarily taking the Canadian Press reports of the campaign speeches of the party leaders as an objective standard, one can test by-lined articles of staff reporters describing the same speeches for impartiality.

Since, as has been noted, only the Montreal dailies relied predominantly on their own resources rather than on those of the Canadian Press, L'Action Catholique, Le Tribune, Le Droit, Le Soleil, and Le Nouvelliste can be considered to have been impartial in their election coverage, for the Canadian Press accounts usually limited themselves to paraphrasing the text of campaign speeches, omitting almost all analytic comment.

The articles in the Montreal dailies differed from those of the Canadian Press in that they contained more critical comment, which sometimes tended to reflect the editorial stand of the newspaper in which they appeared. Despite this, however, the bulk of articles dealing with election meetings were devoted to straightforward reporting of what was said. While differences in emphasis between the newspapers often occurred, this must be distinguished from conscious distortion, which rarely appeared. Often sensational headlines belied the balanced report that followed. La Presse, which enjoys the largest circulation of any newspaper in the province, showed admirable objectivity in its news reporting. Not all of its "special features" were favourable to the Liberals; its investigation of patronage charges against a prominent Liberal candidate, Mr. Pierre Laporte, for example, concluded that he seemed to have been guilty of a moral if not legal transgression.

One is led to conclude that, on the whole, the Union Nationale was fairly treated by the daily press in its reporting of the campaign.

Where partisan considerations did influence newspaper coverage of the campaign, this was reflected largely in the decision to give prominence to or to exclude discussion of certain issues. Le Devoir, and to a lesser extent La Presse, took every opportunity to suggest that the Union Nationale was split into supporters of Mr. Johnson on the one hand and of Mr. Bertrand on the other. These newspapers also gave prominence to criticisms of Mr. Duplessis. Montréal-Matin saw only harmony in Mr. Johnson's relations with Mr. Bertrand and publicized, in its turn, every indication of dissension in the Liberal ranks. As was to be expected, the press supporters of the nationalization of electricity emphasized that this measure would stimulate economic growth while the opponents of nationalization gave wide circulation to reports that it would cost too much and therefore result in higher taxes.

Montréal-Matin often denounced the Liberals, and Le Devoir the Union Nationale in extreme and even violent terms. Likening Mr. Lévesque to Fidel Castro, or calling Mr. Johnson "l'avorteur de la nationalisation" could only serve to stimulate antagonism between supporters of the two parties. Ultimately, these highly charged denunciations appealed to the emotions and not to reason and therefore tended to detract from the democratic nature of the election.

While news reporting should be impartial if the democratic nature of an election is to be ensured, the expression of partisan comment editorially is perfectly justified. It seems that in accusing some of the province's major daily newspapers of favouring the Liberals during

the 1962 election campaign, the Union Nationale spokesmen were overlooking this basic distinction in journalistic practice. Democratic elections are threatened when news reporting distorts reality for partisan purposes, or when news is not reported at all. Provided, however, that a newspaper is successful in separating its political sympathies from factual reporting, it is fully justified in expressing its opinion on the editorial page. If editorial comment is to be taken as the measure of a newspaper's political sympathies, however, then it is clear that the majority did indeed favour the Liberals.

The extent of editorial support for the Liberals can be seen from the brief summaries which follow.

MONTREAL-MATIN was the only major daily newspaper which supported the Union Nationale. From September 20th to November 14th, forty two editorials dealt with the election campaign. All of these either praised the Union Nationale or criticized the Liberals in terms that echoed the campaign speeches of Mr. Johnson.

LE DEVOIR remained throughout the campaign the most ardent of Liberal supporters among the dailies. Of its twenty-four editorials on aspects of the campaign, none were seriously critical of the Liberals, whose nationalization and "autonomist" policies were strongly supported. A series of editorials by Paul Sauriol closely followed René Lévesque's argument for nationalization, while André Laurendeau, both in editorials and in his column, "La Chronique d'une Campagne," was a trenchant critic of the Union Nationale and Mr. Johnson. In a closing editorial, it officially endorsed the Liberal party, reiterating its support for nationalization and the Liberal-initiated reform program and its fear

that a Union Nationale victory would result in the reemergence of "duplessisme."

LA PRESSE also favoured the Liberals but was more willing to find fault with the government party than was Le Devoir. La Presse endorsed the Liberal program on nationalization and praised the government for its work of "déblocage." It criticized both Mr. Lesage and Mr. Johnson for "demagogic statements," but was particularly severe with Mr. Johnson, attacking his "evasiveness" on the nationalization issue and his "duplessiste" past. Its November 13th editorial urged support of the Liberals, seeing in them a guarantee that the nationalization of electricity would be effected and a hope for new progressive reforms.

THE MONTREAL STAR, although generally a supporter of the Liberals in federal politics, had in 1960 endorsed the Union Nationale. In 1962, while initially cool to the Lesage government's nationalization proposal, the Montreal Star came to accept it somewhat resignedly, and on November 10th urged voters to vote Liberal, basing its endorsement on its approval of the achievements of the Liberal administration.

MONTREAL GAZETTE. The conversion of this conservative, "businessman's" newspaper was somewhat more surprising. Its editorial comment on the election was limited, but its dissatisfaction with the proposed nationalization of electricity was only barely concealed. On November 10th, however, the Gazette too endorsed the Liberal party. Its editorial maintained reservations about nationalization, but noting satisfaction with the achievements of the Liberal government, expressed the belief that the Liberals "should be given the chance" to introduce further reforms.

Editorial comment was infrequent in daily newspapers outside of Montreal. None of those studied here directly endorsed either party. L'Action Catholique, an influential Catholic daily, explained that nationalization was in the common good and that the papal encyclical, Mater et Magistra, justified "socialization" in these circumstances. Le Nouvelliste's only editorial, appearing on election day, urged all citizens to vote. Le Soleil also favoured the nationalization of electricity, but its editorial policy was not, ~~in general,~~ more favourable to the Liberals than to the Union Nationale.

The Union Nationale's equivocation on the nationalization issue, Mr. Johnson's unwillingness to admit that Mr. Duplessis' regime had had certain undesirable characteristics, and unhappy memories of its past record, therefore, cost the Union Nationale the support of the press. The Montreal dailies were especially antagonistic and gave open editorial support to the Liberals, while the major newspapers in the rest of the province limited their editorial comment to approval of the immediate nationalization of electricity, which was generally interpreted as an indirect endorsement of the Liberals. The ridings of Metropolitan Montreal did vote large majorities to Liberal candidates, but it would be unwise to attribute any significant influence on this outcome to press support of the Liberals.

II

Political broadcasts on Canadian radio and television are regulated by the provisions of the Broadcasting Act. The relevant section of the

Act reads as follows:⁵

17. (1) No licensee shall
 - a) broadcast in dramatized form any program, advertisement or announcement of a partisan political character, or
 - b) broadcast a program, advertisement or announcement of a partisan political character on any day that an election is held for the election of a member of the House of Commons, the legislature of a province or the council of a municipal corporation, or on the two days immediately preceding any such day.
- (2) A licensee shall immediately preceding and immediately after broadcasting a program, advertisement or announcement of a partisan political character, identify the sponsor and the political party, if any, upon whose behalf the program, advertisement or announcement was made.

These provisions are supplemented by procedural regulations that have been laid down by the CBC and by the Board of Broadcast Governors.

The most important of these stipulate that the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's (CBC) regular political programs are to be canceled during the campaign, that the CBC should make available free time for party broadcasts on both radio and television, and that paid broadcasts on a provincial network must be controlled so as to ensure that, both in terms of quantity and quality of air time, no political party receives an unfair advantage. The distribution of the free time broadcasts is based on the showing of the competing parties in the last election.

This last provision has been criticized for discriminating against

5. The Broadcasting Act, R. S. C., 7 Elizabeth II, Ch. 22.

minor parties,⁶ and another shortcoming of the existing statutory regulations is the ban on dramatized broadcasts. This clause was probably designed to prevent the intrusion of "Madison Avenue techniques" and appeals to the irrational into Canada's political broadcasts, but its effect has been to eliminate the use of slides, film clips, music or animation in TV broadcasts.⁷ Sincerity, even if false, and solemnity are encouraged, and the result has been a dull series of speeches and restrictions on the capacity of the political parties to exploit fully the electioneering opportunities created by the technical advances in mass communications.

The strict restrictions placed upon political broadcasting limit radio and television coverage of the election largely to brief references made on news broadcasts and to editorial comment of a presumed nonpartisan character. The major function of radio and TV in Canadian elections, therefore, is not to act as a source of information. This role is played principally by the daily newspapers. The role of radio and, more particularly, of television is to provide a more direct confrontation between the party leaders and the electorate, to permit candidates to personally explain and defend their policies to the many citizens who do not attend mass meetings. This function is performed by the free time broadcasts. In 1962, these broadcasts were shared by the Liberals and the Union

6. K. McNaught, "The Failure of TV in Politics," Canadian Forum, Vol.38, August 1958, pp. 104-105.

7. Ibid. Party broadcasts during the campaign, therefore, showed the speaker sitting behind a large desk solemnly making his address. Compare this to the lively campaign broadcasts in Britain, described in Butler and Rose, op.cit.

Nationale, the government party being given slightly more air time.

The CBC French TV network devoted 3 hours and 15 minutes of free air time; the Liberals were given seven 15-minute broadcasts, the Union Nationale six. The CBC English TV network shared 2 hours and 15 minutes between the two parties, the Liberals broadcasting five 15-minute periods and the Union Nationale four. Both the French and English CBC Radio networks also decided on this last distribution of free air time.

While the CBC Radio election coverage was, excluding the reporting of the results on election day, limited to these party broadcasts, both the French and English television networks included another program. The English network produced a one hour "Newsmagazine" dealing with the election. The broadcast was not particularly enlightening since it merely repeated information already made available in the newspapers. The French network broadcast two "Conférences de Presse," featuring Mr. Johnson and Mr. Lesage as guests. On this program the party leaders were questioned by six journalists and the broadcasts proved to be quite interesting. Mr. Johnson, who appeared on October 30th, chose this time to make public his acceptance of the date proposed by Mr. Lesage for their television debate.

The major shortcoming of the program was that the journalists were selected, it seems, on the principle that each party leader should be faced by an equal number of supporters and opponents. Both Mr. Lesage and Mr. Johnson performed well, although the Premier seemed the more assured, Mr. Johnson having been slightly shaken by questions on his nationalization policy. Mr. Lesage also was much more direct in his answers, although his very assuredness bordered, at times, on condescension.

But TV's major contribution to the campaign was the Lesage-Johnson

debate, broadcast on November 11th, the last day before the election for legal political programs. The television debate first emerged as an important campaign technique in the 1960 U. S. Presidential election campaign, and it has been suggested that his successful performance in the debates was an important factor in the victory of Mr. Kennedy.⁸ Taking this as his cue, Mr. Johnson on October 15 challenged both Mr. Lesage and Mr. Levesque to debate with him on television. In Shawinigan, on October 7, Mr. Lesage replied that he would accept Mr. Johnson's challenge and suggested that the subjects of the debate be the nationalization of electricity and the "economic emancipation" of Quebec. He also announced that Mr. Levesque too was ready to debate the National Union leader. But, although the party leaders agreed that the debate should take place, agreement on the time, subject, and format of the debate itself was reached only after many delays and substantial public argument, in the course of which Mr. Johnson accused the CBC of "conniving"⁹ with Mr. Lesage. The principal cause for this unseemly public quarrel was, I think, the unwillingness of the political parties to settle the outstanding points at issue between themselves, before making arrangements with the CBC. Instead, both the Liberals and Union Nationale made separate representations to the CBC, which was placed in an embarrassing position when both political parties maneuvered to gain a tactical advantage in the ensuing dispute.

Mr. Johnson, in keeping with his stated preference for private enterprise, suggested that the debate be broadcast on Montreal's private

8. For the role of the TV debates in the 1960 U. S. Presidential campaign, see T. H. White, *The Making of the President 1960*, New York, Doubleday & Co., 1961.

9. Montreal Gazette, October 16, 1962, p. 1.

television stations, which, he announced, were prepared to make air time available on November 3rd and November 4th. He claimed that a province-wide hook-up of private stations could be arranged. This was denied by the Liberals, who insisted that the debate be carried by CBC-TV. Mr. Johnson's suggestion that there be a second debate, in English, was never seriously taken up, and he himself withdrew his offer to debate Mr. Lévesque, observing that such a meeting would not be in keeping with his position as party Leader. The date of the Johnson-Lesage debate, to be broadcast by the CBC if at all, now became the chief point of conflict.

Union Nationale strategists desired a date relatively early in November. Mr. Johnson originally suggested that the debate take place, confident that he would be able to provoke the Premier into losing his temper and mindful of the fact that he, as the underdog in the election race, stood to benefit from the "exposure" in such a meeting. The Union Nationale hoped that the debate would change people's minds; they therefore strenuously opposed the November 11th suggestion, arguing that at this stage in the campaign almost all voters would already have decided how to cast their ballots. The Liberals, however, felt that they could win without the debate. Although refusing to debate was considered politically inexpedient, the Liberal strategists sought the latest possible date, obviously hoping that a poor performance by Mr. Lesage at such a late stage in the campaign might not greatly affect the outcome of the election.

Initial discussions between representatives of the two parties and the CBC failed to break the impasse. The Liberals maintained their insistence on November 11th, claiming that Mr. Lesage's administrative responsibilities and campaign timetable made this the only possible date.

A party statement¹⁰ further argued that by this date the parties would have had a chance to present their platforms to the electorate and that holding the debate before the 11th would necessitate the re-arrangement of previously-scheduled party broadcasts.

When the CBC mentioned November 11th as a possible date (this occurred before the Liberals issued the statement cited above), Mr. Johnson charged that it had "connived" with Mr. Lesage, for earlier "it (the CBC) had given us a list of political broadcast times which ended November 9th."¹¹ A CBC spokesman immediately denied this, stating that the four dates the parties had originally been offered were November 1st, 4th, 8th, and the 11th. Mr. Johnson, however, refused to accept the 11th and no further progress was made until October 30th when the Union Nationale leader announced that he would, after all, meet Mr. Lesage on November 11th. His change of heart was probably motivated by evidence that there had been a recent surge of popular support for the Liberals.

All that remained was to specify the subjects to be debated and to arrange the debate's format. These matters were quickly settled in negotiations between party representatives and CBC officials. The debate of one hour and forty-five minutes was broadcast on the French network of the CBC, with simultaneous translation into English on CBC radio. It consisted of four periods of 20 minutes, which included a 7-minute speech by each participant on one of the four subjects of the debate and 6 minutes of questions by the selected journalists, and a 5-minute summation by each party leader. The four subjects of the debate were:

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid. These discussions took place from October 10-15th.

the nationalization of electricity, the "natural gas scandal" and the Trans Canada Pipeline, the party programs, excluding the nationalization issue, and the record of the Liberal administration.

A final dispute arose over the selection of the six journalists who were to question the debaters. Mr. Lesage suggested leaving the choice to the CBC, but Mr. Johnson refused this outright. He also refused the proposal that the six journalists who had participated on "Conférence de Presse" be invited to ask the questions at the debate, and insisted that each party be allowed to designate "ses trois"¹² journalists. The Liberals agreed to this "contrecœur,"¹³ but the journalists approached refused to participate as representatives of a political party. The Liberals then asked the Union Canadienne des journalistes de Langue Française to select the three Journalists the party had been assigned. This organization, however, refused to designate only half the journalists, yet Mr. Johnson continued to insist that he choose "ses trois." Ultimately, however, he agreed to the selection of the same journalists who had questioned the party leaders on "Conférence de Presse."

The debate itself, watched by an estimated two million spectators, proved to be somewhat of an anti-climax. The strict rules, which were rigidly enforced, prevented any direct confrontation of the party Leaders. The 7-minute speeches were merely a repetition and summary of what had already been said many times during the campaign, and the only flurry of excitement occurred while Mr. Lesage was discussing the "natural gas scandal". Mr. Johnson, speaking first on this subject, denied having bought 150

12. La Presse, November 7, 1962, page 43.

13. Ibid.

shares of Quebec Natural Gas Corporation stock, claiming that he had never owned that quantity of shares and that prominent Liberals had purchased more shares than he. He also accused the Salvas Commission of a want of objectivity. In his reply, Mr. Lesage read the statements of the Salvas Commission on this matter, reiterating that Mr. Johnson had indeed bought 150 shares and had, because of special knowledge available to him as a Cabinet minister, made a profit of \$5,350 on the transaction. While Mr. Lesage was reading his statement and quoting the Salvas Commission report, Mr. Johnson interposed on several occasions, muttering "mais, c'est faux." This intervention, a transgression of the rules of debate, was quickly silenced by the moderator, but it made a poor impression nonetheless.

The rest of the debate produced no further incidents. Both Mr. Lesage and Mr. Johnson spoke not to each other but to the listening audience, and since "ils n'ont pas parlé le même langage,"¹⁴ the decision as to the winner could only be a subjective one. The majority of the journalists' questions were directed at Mr. Johnson and he benefited from questions asked by Montréal-Matin reporters, seeming to be completely prepared for certain queries.

Assessments of the debate varied. The Montreal Star called it a draw, Montréal-Matin claimed victory for Mr. Johnson, and Le Devoir headlined "Le Débat tourne à l'avantage de M. Lesage," emphasizing Mr. Johnson's weakness on the natural gas issue. While even Liberal

14. Le Devoir, November 12, 1962, p. 1.

organizers discounted the theory that the debate strongly influenced the election's outcome,¹⁵ there is no doubt that the Union Nationale had failed to make any gains. Several observers had questioned the wisdom of Mr. Lesage's agreeing to debate, but he had not only kept his own temper but also provoked Mr. Johnson into losing his composure. The format of the debate, it must be noted, placed a premium on oratorical and not debating skill and partly nullified what most thought would be an advantage to Mr. Johnson. The statements made after the election by party representatives probably reflected the true feeling in their respective camps. Mr. Johnson, speaking with some restraint, expressed "satisfaction" with the debate's result, but, as La Presse reported, "la joie régnait hier soir dans la chambre des joueurs libéraux."¹⁶

The verdict, then, is that the debate influenced the election results very little, coming too late in the campaign to seriously change the voting preferences of many citizens. Another shortcoming was that no real discussion between the party leaders was permitted, the viewers being offered, in a highly dramatic form, speeches which had been read or heard before. The most revealing part of the debate proved to be the questioning period. It seems, therefore, that the adoption of the format of the Kennedy-Nixon debates, where each candidate was called upon to answer briefly the same question, would have permitted discussion on a wider range of issues. This format would also have served to better contrast the policies of the two parties on specific issues.

15. Mr. Maruice Sauvé suggested to me that the debate may have influenced the size of Liberal majorities, but he did not feel that it gained any seats for the Liberals.

16. La Presse, November 12, 1962, p. 22.

In the 1962 election campaign, the Board of Broadcast Governors was called upon in two instances to make rulings affecting political broadcasts. The first case was a relatively simple one, involving Sunday afternoon broadcasts of campaign assemblies on a province-wide private radio network. Both the Liberals and the Union Nationale scheduled major rallies for the Sunday afternoons of the campaign, but the Union Nationale, quicker to the punch, reserved the prime time from 4:00 to 5:30 p.m. for every week's rally. The Liberals appealed to the Board of Broadcast Governors (BBG) to order a more "equitable" distribution of the Sunday afternoon air time, and the BBG acceded to this request, ruling that the total air time sold by radio stations should be "fairly" divided between the two political parties, in terms of quality as well as of quantity. In the light of this ruling, the parties agreed to share the prime air time on Sunday afternoons equally, with Union Nationale and Liberal assemblies being broadcast from 4:00 to 5:30 p.m. on alternate weeks.¹⁷

The second case to come before the BBG was somewhat more complicated and involved the interpretation of Section 17 of the Canadian Broadcasting Act. The program in question consisted of a number of taped interviews dealing with the election campaign. The interviewees were presumably average voters and the interviews were conducted by l'Institut d'Opinion et de Recherches (Opino), an organization which had been incorporated on October 12, 1962. The interviews were almost exclusively favourable to the Union Nationale, and the Liberal policy on nationalization

17. An account of this incident was given to me by Mr. R. Martel of the Collyer Advertising Agency. His version was confirmed by Union Nationale officials.

came in for special criticism.¹⁸ In spite of this, however, only one of the 27 radio stations which broadcast the interviews from October 27-29th, announced that the interviews were sponsored by l'Institut d'Opinion et de Recherches on behalf of l'Union Nationale.¹⁹ The remaining stations made no mention of the Union Nationale when identifying Opino as the program's sponsor.

Immediately after the interviews were broadcast for the first time, the Liberal party sent a formal complaint to the BBG, claiming that the program should be banned on the grounds that 17 (2) of the Canadian Broadcasting Act, which requires clear identification of the sponsors of a political program, had been transgressed. In support of their complaint the Liberals also cited a letter sent to radio and television stations in Quebec by the president of the BBG, who had apparently been forewarned of the Opino interviews. The letter, dated October 26th, included the following passage:²⁰

si l'organisme ABC retient une période de temps à titre payant et diffuse des émissions ou messages en faveur du parti X, les stations doivent annoncer que ces émissions sont réalisées en faveur du parti X et commanditées par l'organisme ABC.

Upon receipt of the Liberal complaint, the BBG ordered on October 29 that the emission of the controversial interviews cease, and its members were quoted as agreeing that the program was "obviously" of a partisan character.²¹ But on November 1st, presumably upon the legal advice of a

18. La Presse, October 30, 1962, p. 1.

19. La Presse, November 3, 1962, p. 4.

20. La Presse, November 2, 1962, p. 1.

21. La Presse, November 2, 1962, p. 1.

Mr. Roger Seguin, the BBG reversed itself and announced that the programs' diffusion would be allowed. Although no reason for the new decision was formally given, it seemed to be based upon two considerations. The first argument put forward was that the program was not, after all, of a partisan political character, since several of the interviews favoured the Liberal party. In addition, the BBG seemingly was told by Mr. Seguin that there was no evidence²² of any Union Nationale involvement, in the affair, and that the programs could not, therefore, be considered to have been made "on behalf of" that party.

These arguments are worth examining more closely. While it is true that several of Opino's interviews were favourable to the Liberals, this was probably the result of, as Mr. Pelletier wrote in La Presse,²³ the interviewees in question having been badly chosen. For the questions asked made a pro-Liberal answer very difficult, if not impossible. Questions on the nationalization of electricity, for example, were phrased in the following terms.²⁴

Depuis deux ans, le gouvernement de la province de Quebec a été obligé d'emprunter au-delà de 300 millions de dollars. M. Lesage a affirmé que ces emprunts avaient pour but d'aider le gouvernement financer la gratuité de l'enseignement et l'assurance-hospitalisation. Cela n'a pas empêché le gouvernement de taxer les citoyens, d'abaisser la base d'exemption de l'impôt sur le revenu des particuliers. Mon cher monsieur, est-ce que le fait de consacrer de 600 millions à un milliard de dollars pour la nationalisation de l'électricité n'entraînerait pas de nouveaux emprunts et de nouvelles taxes? Quel est votre avis là-dessus?

22. Ibid. Nevertheless the lawyer for the radio station (CJLR) where the interviews were prepared was Mr. Noel Dorion, a wellknown Union Nationale supporter. Other individuals involved were also considered to be supporters of the party.

23. La Presse, November 3, 1962, p. 4.

24. Ibid. p. 1.

It is evident that questions of this nature were designed to produce responses favourable to the Union Nationale, and, this being the case, if the BBG did indeed believe that the inclusion of two or three pro-Liberal interviews in a total of 35 were sufficient to make the programs in general politically neutral, it may have misinterpreted the intent of the Broadcasting Act.

The second line of argument that the BBG, presumably, took to justify its decision involved a particular interpretation of the words "on behalf of" in Section 17 (2) of the Broadcasting Act. The BBG evidently took this to mean that a political party must itself have authorized the broadcast of a program favourable to it if the phrase "on behalf of" were to apply. This interpretation, it has been noted, seems to permit easy evasion of the intent of the Broadcasting Act, for it allows any group of party supporters to form a private association and propagandize freely in favour of their party's policies. "On behalf of" can, however, be taken to mean "in favour of," in which case, the partisan nature of the Opino interviews having been determined, the BBG clearly possessed the legal authority to ban their diffusion. This interpretation too has its shortcomings, for a strict application of this principle would prevent almost any editorial comment on politics from being expressed on radio or television. In the case of l'Institut d'Opinion et de Recherches,²⁵ seemingly created for the purpose of pro-Union Nationale activity, the latter interpretation of "on behalf" would have been the more reasonable. Indeed, the letter of Mr. Stewart to the radio stations that has been

25. This case was usually referred to as "l'Affaire Opino."

cited would seem to indicate that this was the direction the BBG intended to take. Events, however, proved otherwise.

Mr. Lesage was not content to accept the BBG's ruling, and immediately entered another complaint, basing it this time on new grounds. He argued that a commercial enterprise did not have the right of sponsoring politically controversial programs, and also that the Opino interviews were broadcasts "in dramatized form," since several of the interviewees were, he claimed, fictitious and since the original form of many interviews had been altered by the Institute. Dramatized broadcasts, as has been mentioned, are forbidden under Section 17 (1a) of the Broadcasting Act. Before the BBG could make a ruling on this second complaint, however, l'Institut Opino voluntarily stopped the broadcasts of its recorded interviews.

"L'affaire Opino" made clear that sections of the Broadcasting Act are capable of ambiguous interpretation. The provisions of the Act, in fact, are inadequate if the potential contribution of broadcasting to electioneering is to be fully realized. It seems that amendment of the existing legislation and regulations regulating political broadcasts is overdue.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CANDIDATES

It has been observed that, in Britain, "constituency parties..... are in a sense relics of bygone age, their original *raison d'être*-securing the election of the local standard-bearer- having in large measure been taken from them by the centralization of politics."¹ Only in marginal constituencies, therefore, is the outcome of the campaign ever determined by local conditions, the ability of the candidate, and the quality of his organization.²

In Quebec, however, the centralization of politics has not proceeded as far, for several of the factors that have combined in Great Britain to produce the nationalization of politics and of electioneering are lacking. The British situation, in which local conditions seemingly exert only a very slight influence on the course of politics, is the result of a unique historical experience and a highly-developed industrial economy. A complex system of transportation and communication served to produce an integrated community, thus standardizing public opinion, and to create the technical possibility of political managers conducting an election campaign on a national basis. The nature of the British party system, characterized by the relatively early development of mass parties and competition between two strongly-articulated party organizations³ divided on class lines, is another important factor contributing to the centralization of politics.

1. J. E. Butler and R. Rose, *op.cit.*, p. 119.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 119-120.

3. The terminology describing the British political parties is taken from M. Duverger, *Political Parties* 2nd, ed., London, Methuen & Co., 1961.

The electorate in Quebec, in contrast, is scattered geographically over a vast area, and the province's system of transportation and communication is as yet relatively underdeveloped.⁴ Substantial elements of the population, therefore, remain isolated, and this combined with the concentration of industrial development in the metropolitan Montreal region and the regionalization of economic prosperity,⁵ has helped to maintain the importance of local political attitudes. Until very recently, the organization of Quebec's political parties was based on the "caucus," a system of organization that increases the independent influence of local party organizations on the outcome of elections.⁶

I do not intend to claim that the centralization of politics and of electioneering is not relevant to Quebec. On the contrary, the discussion on party organization⁷ has, I hope, made clear that recent years have seen significant steps being taken in this direction. Here too the mass media and television, in particular, made their contribution. Television, "cet incomparable instrument de communication a, de toute évidence, contribué à rapprocher les hommes. Il a mis l'information à la portée du plus grand nombre; il contribue à développer à un rythme plus accéléré et d'une façon plus globale la conscience nationale..."⁸ What I do wish to stress is the continuing importance of essentially local or regional

4. Figures pertaining to Transportation and Communications in Quebec can be found in Quebec Statistical Yearbook, 1961, Ch. XVII. Comparison with the situation in Canada's other provinces is made in Canada Yearbook 1961, Ch. XVII, especially Section 2.

5. The relevant statistics are found in Quebec Statistical Yearbook 1961, Chs. II, XIV, and XVI, especially pp. 72-73, 464-473, and p. 518.

6. The term "caucus" is used in the sense explained by M. Duverger, Political Parties, Ch. 1, where the nature of "caucus parties" is explored.

7. See my chapter on party organization, *infra*. Ch. VI.

8. J. Pellerin, "Le gouvernement Lesage Devant ses Juges," in Cité Libre, no. 51, Nov., 1962, p. 9.

conditions in determining the outcome of a general election in Quebec.⁹ In a series of reports on the 1962 campaign on the constituency level¹⁰ La Presse noted that in a great many ridings purely local political scandals, the quality of the candidates and their organizations, or the endorsement of local notables could be more significant than the broader campaign issues in determining the results. For example, commenting on the results in the Lac St. Jean area, La Presse stated flatly that voters in the three constituencies concerned had indicated their preference for specific candidates and not for the parties or programs these represented.¹¹ In this context, therefore, one must be wary of making sweeping generalizations regarding the role of broader issues in determining the outcome of an election.

Perhaps the most important function of a constituency organization is the selection of the party's candidate. The normal method of nominating Liberal candidates is by a convention; the Union Nationale also uses the convention, but the selection of the party candidate by a small caucus of local party organizers has not been uncommon.¹² Furthermore, during the Union Nationale's long tenure in office it became almost axiomatic that any sitting MLA would be automatically renominated. The practice of the Liberal party was almost identical and in many constituencies there was no real contest for the nomination of either party.

In 1962, both Mr. Lesage and Mr. Johnson formally announced that

9. This, as has been mentioned, is not the case in Great Britain, and the Nuffield studies have therefore paid relatively little attention to specifically local and regional conditions.

10. This informative series of articles, beginning Nov. 2, 1962 has proved to be most helpful.

11. La Presse, Nov. 15, 1962, p. 48.

12. This description of the nominating procedure of the Union Nationale was given to me in an interview by an important official of the party's secretariat.

sitting members would not be obliged to go before a convention to be recognized as official candidates. Mr. Lesage rationalized his decision on the grounds that the mandate the deputies had received in 1960 had not yet expired. But the election itself was presented by the Liberal party as an appeal for a mandate on the issue of the nationalization of electricity, and if the mandates of the MLAs had not as yet expired, why should they have been forced to face reelection? A referendum on the nationalization of electricity could have been held to decide this single issue. If, on the other hand, the deputies, as well as the Cabinet, required an additional mandate before undertaking the nationalization of Quebec's private power companies there does not seem to be any valid reason to circumvent the party regulations regarding the nomination of candidates.

Mr. Lesage's purpose seems to have been to avert public competition between pro- and anti-nationalization Liberals, or pro- and anti-patronage Liberals. If this was, in fact, his aim, then his manoeuvre proved to be largely successful, for while it was criticized as undemocratic¹³ and aroused the resentment and dissatisfaction of some Liberal party members, there were very few cases of open intraparty conflict.

The most serious of these took place in Joliette, where the sitting member had only won the party nomination in 1960 by a narrow margin after a hotly-contested struggle. In 1962, Mr. Lambert, the MLA for Joliette, was again opposed by Mr. Maurice Desrochers who, in the intervening two years, had become President of the Joliette Liberal Association. Mr. Lesage's edict spared Mr. Lambert the possible loss of the party nomination, but

13. See Le Devoir, Sept. 27, 1962, p. 4. Le Soleil also criticized Mr. Lesage's decision.

it infuriated his opponents who proceeded to set up a rival Liberal Association which nominated Mr. Desrochers as the "official" Liberal candidate in the riding. The bitter feud between the two factions necessitated a hurried visit to Joliette by the Premier in order to confirm the status of Mr. Lambert. Nevertheless, the two Liberal candidates expended most of their energy throughout the campaign in fighting each other, and this public quarrel probably contributed greatly to the easy victory of the Union Nationale candidate in Joliette.

Although this was the only example of a serious split in the Liberal ranks on the local level, there were reports¹⁴ that Mr. Lesage's edict had saved the sitting MLA from being cast aside in at least one other constituency. Ultimately, however, only three Liberal MLAs did not stand as candidates in the 1962 election. Mr. Bélanger, MLA for Saguenay, withdrew because of illness. Mr. Brousseau, MLA for Sherbrooke, it was announced, was to devote his organizational abilities to special duties in the Quebec Liberal Federation and, therefore, could "obviously" not serve simultaneously as a deputy. Other reports, however, suggested that Mr. Brousseau's reputation as a "patronneux" and the availability of the "ministrable" Mr. Fortin for the Sherbrooke nomination had led party leaders to persuade the former to step aside. Dr. Plante, MLA for Bellechasse, also did not contest his seat; he cited his disagreement with party policy on the hospital insurance plan and the nationalization of electricity as the reason for his withdrawal.

14. Le Devoir, Sept. 25, 1962, p. 1 mentions Mr. Jean Meunier, MLA for Bourget. Liberal officials admitted that several deputies would have had difficulties in being renominated at a convention.

To avoid encouraging increased resentment among the party's rank-and-file, most Liberal MLAs went through the formality of being re-nominated by acclamation at a convention which was usually open to the public and whose real purpose was to open the candidate's campaign with a flourish. In most cases, a delegation of the local party Association would visit the MLA some days before the scheduled convention and would, at this time, express on behalf of party members in the constituency, their hope that he would allow himself to be renominated.

Mr. Johnson's announcement that Union Nationale MLAs were, if they sought reelection, to be automatically renominated, encountered no noticeable opposition, perhaps because it had been preceded by Mr. Lesage's statement on this matter. The one case in which some intraparty strife was generated involved a sitting member who was pressured to step down. Mr. Bégin, MLA for Dorchester, had been a Cabinet minister, chief Union Nationale organizer, and a close associate of Maurice Duplessis. He had come under severe criticism by the Salvas Commission for his part in the arrangement of kickbacks to be paid on government contracts, and this was the presumed cause of the UN's desire to have him retire.¹⁵ Although it was briefly rumoured that he would run as an independent candidate if repudiated by the Union Nationale,¹⁶ a new candidate was nominated and no more was heard from Mr. Bégin.

Most UN sitting members did stand for reelection, and a pro forma convention was usually held, the same procedure as that used by the Liberals being followed. In all other constituencies excepting the

15. Montreal Gazette, Sept. 21st, 1962, p. 1.

16. Ibid.

seventeen metropolitan Montreal seats, nominating conventions were held to select the party candidate. In the Montreal ridings, party officials feared that a convention could be easily packed and that "the delegates would not know the prospective candidates well enough to make a meaningful choice."¹⁷ In these constituencies, therefore, the candidates were selected by a nomination committee set up by the chief organizer for the Montreal electoral region. Before making their decision, the committee members consulted with members of the executive of the constituency association, local party organizers, and leading Union Nationale supporters.

Where conventions were held, their organization was supervised by the Conventions Committee established on the provincial level. This committee coordinated the dates of the various conventions and helped to provide each meeting with a distinguished guest speaker. Voting delegates at the conventions consisted of all those members of the newly-formed constituency organization who wished to attend or, in some of the larger constituencies, a specified number of elected delegates per poll.

And where no well-defined local association had been created, the convention was organized by local party organizers, the voting delegates being recognized party supporters.

226 candidates filed nomination papers on October 31st; this continued the trend to reduce the number of independent candidates. Both the Union Nationale and the Liberals contested every riding, l'Action Provinciale filed 11 candidates, and there were several independent candidatures which generated interest. Among them were separatist leader Dr. Marcel

17. These remarks were made by Mr. F. Girard, Secretary-General of the Union Nationale, in an interview in which he explained fully the procedure for nominating Union Nationale candidates.

Chaput, Mr. Frank Hanley, MLA for Montreal St. Anne's, and Mr. Richard Holden, the anti-nationalization candidate in Westmount-St.-Georges.. The following pages classify the candidates of the Liberal and Union Nationale parties on the bases of age, occupation, educational background, and political experience. The purpose of this exercise is a comparative one, so the analysis has been limited to candidates of the two major parties, the number of Action Provinciale candidates being too small to allow for meaningful comparison. The date for the classification has been drawn from the official biographies of the Liberal and Union Nationale candidates distributed by the respective party organizations. While information about the age of candidates was very easy to classify, and difficult to obtain only in the cases of the more reticent woman candidates, classification of information concerning the occupations and education of the candidates was somewhat difficult and some degree of arbitrariness was unavoidable. Where a candidate had worked at more than one occupation, the selection made was that occupation which seemed to have had a formative influence.

A majority of the 95 Liberal candidates were aged 41-50, and together with the 23 candidates in the 31-40 age group they comprised 75% of all Liberal aspirants. In contrast, more Union Nationale than Liberal candidates were in the 51-60 and 61-70 age groups, most of them MLAs of long standing or men who had sat in the Legislative Assembly while the Union Nationale had governed from 1944-60 but were defeated in the 1960 election. The 40 Union Nationale candidates who were running for office for the first time, however, included many in the 31-40 age group. This party, in fact, fielded both the oldest candidate, 77 year old Romulus Ducharme in L'Aviolette, and the youngest, 27 year old Jacques Loranger in Westmount St.-Georges; the

youngest elected candidate, 30 year old Paul Allard, in Beauce, was also a member of the Union Nationale. Table 1 gives a precise classification of the candidates by age groups.

TABLE 1
AGE OF LIBERAL AND UN CANDIDATES.

| AGE | LIBERAL | | UNION NATIONALE | |
|-------|---------|---------|-----------------|---------|
| | TOTAL | ELECTED | TOTAL | ELECTED |
| 21-30 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| 31-40 | 23 | 18 | 22 | 7 |
| 41-50 | 49 | 27 | 34 | 11 |
| 51-60 | 19 | 15 | 24 | 7 |
| 61-70 | 3 | 3 | 10 | 4 |
| 71-80 | | | 2 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 95 | 63 | 95 | 31 |

It is interesting to note that while the number of Liberal candidates aged 31-40 is greater by only one than the Union Nationale candidates in the corresponding age group, 78% of the Liberals were elected, the corresponding figure for the Union Nationale being 32%. Many of these Liberal candidates had been elected in 1960 whereas most of the Union Nationale hopefuls in this age group were running for the first time, and often in strongly Liberal ridings.

An analysis of the occupational backgrounds of the candidates is important, for it helps to describe the composition of Quebec's political elite. It is generally recognized that socioeconomic class is an important, perhaps the most important, determinant of political attitudes¹⁸ and voting

18. This issue has been exhaustively discussed. See B. Berelson, P. Lazarsfeld, and N. Gaudet, The People's Choice, op.cit., P. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and W. McPhee, Voting, op.cit., Robert E. Lane, Political Life,

behaviour, and it is therefore likely that men with similar educational and occupational backgrounds share a common political outlook. This is not to say that there is an exact and automatic correspondence between the class basis of a political party and the degree of its representativeness. It is possible for men from the upper strata of society to be the ideological representatives of the poor, and the preference the electorate often shows for men with expert knowledge, necessarily a smaller group, is another factor that leads to a discrepancy between the class composition of the officeholders and that of the general population. The belief that only men of a particular profession or class should actively involve themselves in politics is likely to prevail where the community's understanding of democracy is underdeveloped as seems to have been the case, at least until recently, in Quebec.¹⁹

The most striking observation that emerges from the classification of the Liberal and Union Nationale candidates according to occupation is the similarity of the two sets of candidates. Each party numbered among their 95 candidates, 44 professional men and 35 men employed variously in business. Lawyers accounted for half of the professionals, while the vast majority of those somehow engaged in business were self-employed, either as managers of a family business or partners in small concerns. Most of those who were employees also worked in smaller businesses, only

Glencoe, The Free Press, 1959; M. Benney, A.P. Gray and R.H. Pear, How People Vote, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956; P. Lazarsfeld, S.M. Lipset, A. Barton, and J. Linz, "The Psychology of Voting" in Handbook of Social Psychology, G. Lindzey ed. vol. II Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1954; and S.M. Lipset, Political Man, New York, Doubleday, 1960.

19. See my discussion in Chapter 1, and P.-E. Trudeau "Same Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec," op.cit.

one Liberal and two Union Nationale candidates being employed by large corporations in executive positions. Table II also reveals that each party fielded only a handful of working-class candidates.

It is clear, therefore, that both the Liberal and Union Nationale parties are staffed primarily by members of the traditional social elite - by lawyers, doctors, journalists, tradespeople, lesser industrialists, and some wealthy farmers. The rapid social and economic changes Quebec is undergoing have created new professions, but the growing number of engineers, technicians, administrators, and managers have not as yet become members of the political directorate. Quebec's political parties are predominantly middle class parties that resemble in their composition the Conservative and Radical parties of 19th century Europe.²⁰ Furthermore, Table III reveals that the occupations of MLAs have changed very little between 1956 when the Union Nationale held 72 of 93 seats and 1962 when the Liberals won 63 out of 95. In these years, however, the province's social structure was being rapidly transformed.

How can this picture of two parties as "alike as Tweedledee and Tweedledum" accord with my earlier assertion that the Liberal and Union

20. M. Duverger, op.cit., p. 20. The resemblance will not seem unnatural to the supporters of Prof. Trudeau's analysis of democracy in Quebec. His description likens the politics of Quebec to those of 19th century European democracies. I do not mean to suggest that Quebec's political parties and representation in the Quebec Legislative Assembly differ, in this sense, from the situation in the rest of Canada. On the contrary, J.R. Williams, "Representation in the House of Commons," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. 18, no. 1 Feb. 1952, p. 83, and C. Lang, "The Nature of Canada's Parliamentary Representation," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. 12, no. 4, 1946 show that the situation in Quebec strongly resembles that in federal politics too. The warning of Leon D. Epstein in "British Mass Parties in Comparison with American Parties," op.cit. should again be remembered.

TABLE II
OCCUPATIONS OF CANDIDATES

| | LIBERAL | | UNION NATIONALE | |
|---|---------|---------|-----------------|---------|
| | TOTAL | ELECTED | TOTAL | ELECTED |
| PROFESSIONS | | | | |
| Lawyers | 20 | 17 | 22 | 7 |
| Doctors* | 7 | 4 | 8 | 2 |
| Notaries | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| Pharmacists | | | 1 | 0 |
| Agronomists | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Engineers | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Teachers | | | 1 | 0 |
| Civil Servants | | | 1 | 1 |
| Accountants | 9 | 8 | 3 | 1 |
| Armed Services | 1 | 1 | | |
| TOTAL | 44 | 35 | 44 | 14 |
| BUSINESS | | | | |
| Manufacturers, Merchants, Traders | 27 | 15 | 22 | 8 |
| Management | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Salesmen | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Agents | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Insurance Brokers | 5 | 1 | 5 | 1 |
| Clerical | | | 1 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 35 | 18 | 35 | 10 |
| WORKERS AND ARTISANS | | | | |
| Brakemen | | | 1 | 1 |
| Electricians | | | 1 | 0 |
| Potters | | | 1 | 0 |
| Printers | | | 1 | 0 |
| Carpenters | 1 | 1 | | |
| Master Jewellers | 1 | 1 | | |
| TOTAL | 2 | 2 | 4 | 1 |
| MISCELLANEOUS | | | | |
| Journalists | 5 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| Publicists | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Farmers | 3 | 2 | 7 | 3 |
| Manager of Cooperative Union Rep. | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Professional Athletes | 2 | 2 | | |
| Retired Director of Ferme Avicole | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 14 | 8 | 12 | 5 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | 95 | 63 | 95 | 31 |

* This category includes dentists and veterinarians.

TABLE III
OCCUPATIONS OF MLAs 1956 AND 1960

| | LIBERALS | | UNION NATIONALE | |
|-------------------------------------|----------|------|-----------------|------|
| | 1956 | 1960 | 1956 | 1960 |
| PROFESSIONALS | | | | |
| Lawyers | 6 | 14 | 12 | 7 |
| Notaries | | 2 | 3 | |
| Doctors | 2 | 6 | 8 | 3 |
| Agronomists | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Accountants | 1 | 4 | 3 | 2 |
| Pharmacists | | | 1 | 1 |
| Engineers | | 1 | | 1 |
| TOTAL | 10 | 28 | 29 | 16 |
| BUSINESS | | | | |
| Manufacturers | 7 | 11 | 22 | 11 |
| Merchants, Traders, and Shop-owners | | | | |
| Management | | | 1 | 1 |
| Insurance Brokers | | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Salesmen | | | 2 | |
| Agents | 1 | 3 | 1 | |
| Clerical | | | 1 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 8 | 16 | 29 | 17 |
| WORKERS AND ARTISANS | | | | |
| Brakemen | | | 1 | 1 |
| Carpenters | | 1 | | |
| Printers | | | 1 | |
| Electricians | | | 1 | 1 |
| Others | | | 1 | |
| TOTAL | 0 | 1 | 4 | 2 |
| MISCELLANEOUS | | | | |
| Farmers | | 2 | 8 | 7 |
| Journalists | | 3 | | |
| Retired | | | 2 | |
| Professional Athletes | 2 | 2 | | |
| TOTAL | 2 | 7 | 10 | 7 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | 20 | 52 | 72 | 42 |

N.B. For 1956 and 1960 complete biographies of all candidates were unavailable so the analysis is limited to those elected.

Nationale parties in November 1962 represented distinct ideological alternatives? The "quiet revolution" in Quebec, it has been pointed out, has been a middle-class revolution led by middle-class men. The reforms introduced by the Liberals have seemed radical only because the political context in which they took place, for Quebec had previously been governed by a series of reactionary governments. If an ideological distinction between the Liberal and Union Nationale parties can be made, it seems to me to resemble, roughly speaking, the difference between the British Conservative and Liberal parties in the first decade of the 20th century. If the Union Nationale comes to accept the principles underlying the Liberal program of reform²¹ the ideological alternative will tend to disappear. For both the Liberal party and the Union Nationale are staffed by men of essentially conservative social classes; neither, for example, includes in its ranks important representatives of the labour movement, a fact which is reflected in the province's backward labour legislation. And, although the socioeconomic background of its members cannot be considered the sole influence in the formation of a political party's policy, historical evidence indicates that, in the long-run, differences between essentially middle class parties tend to be over power and not principle, and that a party of this nature is unlikely to effect a radical transformation in the pattern of society unless continually prodded from the left.

21. The experience of Paul Sauvé, the Union Nationale program for the Nov. 1962 election, and the trend of recent statements by party leaders indicate that this could happen soon. The party's organizers stressed, in my interviews with them, that the Union Nationale's main quarrel was not with the substance of most Liberal reforms but with the manner in which they are being administered. It is, of course, difficult for any organization to repudiate its past, but the process Professor Duverger calls "sinistrisme" seems to be in operation. S. M. Lipset, in Political Man, op.cit. concludes by asserting that this is a normal process in modern democracies.

The educational backgrounds of the two sets of candidates also are remarkably similar, the large number of professional men nominated by each party accounting for the high proportion of candidates with a university level education. The only contrast between the two parties revealed by Table IV is that the greater number of Union Nationale than Liberal candidates ended their education at the primary school level.

TABLE IV
EDUCATION OF CANDIDATES

| LEVEL OF EDUCATION | LIBERAL | | UNION NATIONALE | |
|---------------------------|---------|---------|-----------------|---------|
| | TOTAL | ELECTED | TOTAL | ELECTED |
| Primary | 2 | 2 | 9 | 3 |
| High School | 14 | 8 | 8 | 3 |
| Primary and commercial | 7 | 2 | 13 | 4 |
| High School and technical | 9 | 8 | 9 | 3 |
| Collèges classiques | 15 | 7 | 7 | 1 |
| University | 48 | 36 | 49 | 17 |
| TOTAL | 95 | 63 | 95 | 31 |

There is a large disparity between the proportion of candidates who attended university and the proportion of the province's population which has attained the same educational level. 51% of the 190 candidates of the Liberal and Union Nationale parties attended university, all but a handful obtaining degrees and many completing postgraduate professional training as well. In 1959-60, however, only 26% of the population of Quebec, or 61.9% of Quebec residents aged 5-24, were attending schools at all levels.²²

22. Quebec Statistical Yearbook 1961, p. 221.

In 1948-49, when many of the younger and middle-aged candidates of 1962 were still completing their education, the corresponding figures were 20.3% and 49.6%.²³ In 1950-51, only 4.5% of those attending school were students at the university level and the corresponding figure for 1959-60 was still only 5%.²⁴ While only 11 of 190 candidates, or 7% of the total, ended their education at the primary school level, in 1955-60 the number of students attending high schools in Quebec was only 22% of those in the primary schools.²⁵ These statistics show that about 75% of those attending primary school do not go on to complete their secondary education, and it must also be remembered that school attendance in the underdeveloped regions as the Gaspé and Lac St. Jean is substantially below the provincial norm.²⁶

The Liberal and Union Nationale candidates, therefore, viewed collectively, comprised a very well-educated group and, in the statistical sense at least, were unrepresentative of the electorate.

Much has been made of the influence of the uninominal, single-member, territorial constituency electoral system on the roles of the individual candidate and local organization in an election.²⁷ This electoral system increases the influence of the local organizations within a party, a tendency which is reinforced when party organization is weakly-articulated.²⁸

23. Ibid.

24. Quebec Statistical Yearbook 1961, pp. 237 and 222.

25. Ibid. pp.222-223.

26. Ibid. p. 228.

27. A detailed examination of this question can be found in M. Duverger, Political Parties, and in F. Goguel et al., L'Influence des Systèmes Electoraux sur la Vie Politique, Paris, 1950. These studies emphasize the role of a community's electoral system in determining the nature of its party system. G.E. Lavau, Partis Politiques et Réalités Sociales, Paris, 1952, takes issue with Professors Duverger and Goguel and argues that "national" characteristics are most significant in shaping a community's party system.

The conditions that tend to create "partis des notables" exist in Quebec, therefore, and it is not surprising that, in 1962, both the Liberal party and the Union Nationale drew many of their candidates from men steeped in the experience of municipal politics. In 1960 the Liberals deliberately selected local politicians as candidates in an attempt to overcome the party's weakness in the rural areas, and in 1962 35 Liberal candidates, 22 of whom were elected, had at one time or another held municipal office. 28 Union Nationale candidates, of whom 9 were elected, had had similar political experience.

Both in 1960 and in 1962, the party organization served as a major source of Liberal candidates. The Quebec Liberal Federation and the party's local Associations proved a useful training-ground for young Liberal supporters and, in 1962, 47 Liberal candidates, 29 of whom were elected, had previously served as party organizers, on committees of the Quebec Liberal Federation, or as executive members of constituency Liberal Associations. The Union Nationale only began to organize local Associations with mass membership at the beginning of 1962, and party organization at the constituency level was still in its formative stage. Nevertheless, the party was able to draw on a large reservoir of experienced election organizers for candidates and, in 1962, 15 of the party's candidates had served either in this capacity or as executive members of the fledgling Union Nationale constituency Associations. Only one member of this group was elected.

While the Liberal candidates, as a group, had greater experience in formal party activity, the legislative experience of the Union Nationale

candidates was of longer duration. The Union Nationale had governed Quebec from 1944 to 1960 and many of its candidates in 1962 had previously sat in the Legislative Assembly; nevertheless its set of candidates did include, in addition to men of long legislative experience, candidates who had never previously sought election to the legislature. But, although the legislative experience of the Liberal candidates was of shorter duration, the party never electing more than 23 MLAs from 1948-60, several Liberal candidates, including Mr. Lesage, Mr. Lapalme, and Mr. Arsenault, Minister of Lands and Forests, had sat as members of the House of Commons. No Union Nationale candidate had sat as a federal M.P.

Table V provides a detailed classification of the candidates on the basis of legislative experience. A candidate's legislative service, in this table, is dated from his first election to the Legislative Assembly.

TABLE V
LEGISLATIVE EXPERIENCE OF CANDIDATES

| | LIBERALS | | UNION NATIONALE | |
|-------------------------------|----------|---------|-----------------|---------|
| | TOTAL | ELECTED | TOTAL | ELECTED |
| 1st Candidature | 27 | 11 | 40 | 8 |
| Previously defeated candidate | 17 | 8 | 8 | 1 |
| elected 1931-35 | | | 1 | 1 |
| elected 1935-36 | | | 2 | 2 |
| elected 1936-39 | | | 6 | 1 |
| elected 1939-44 | | | 3 | 1 |
| elected 1944-48 | | | 3 | 2 |
| elected 1948-52 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 6 |
| elected 1952-56 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 2 |
| elected 1956-60 | 7 | 7 | 14 | 6 |
| elected 1960-62 | 35 | 28 | 1 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 95 | 63 | 95 | 31 |
| Previously a federal M.P. | 9 | 6 | | |

These figures reveal clearly that the Liberal "old guard" was re-elected en bloc as all 16 candidates who had been elected to the Legislative Assembly before 1960 retained their seats. Several of the more experienced Union Nationale stalwarts, however, failed to win election, only 15 of the 32 candidates who had been elected to the Legislative Assembly before 1956 emerging victorious. Finally, candidates who were nominated for the first time in 1962 fared worse, as a group, than did their more experienced colleagues. 41% of the new Liberal candidates were elected, while no less than 86% of those who had previously sat as MLAs were reelected. In the case of the Union Nationale, the corresponding figures are 20% and 47%.

CHAPTER IX

THE RESULTS

In contrast to the heated, sometimes violent, campaigning that preceded it, November 14th, election day, was, for the police, at least, "calm and very quiet." Only a few, isolated cases of attempted ballot-box stuffing and other irregularities that have traditionally been an integral part of a Quebec election were reported. November 14th was also a quiet day also for Mr. Lesage and Mr. Johnson. Both, after predicting a landslide victory, retired to their homes in Quebec City and St. Pie de Bagot respectively, and watched the returns on television. The earliest tabulations showed the Liberals leading, and it soon became evident that the government party had been reelected. The television studios' electric computers, most modern of political prophets, never altered their original forecast (on the basis of the very first returns) of a Liberal victory, and shortly before midnight Mr. Johnson conceded defeat.

The final results gave the Liberals 63 seats and the Union Nationale 31- a net gain of 9. The turnout, although high, decreased by 2.1% from 1960 (from 81.7% to 79.6%). The Liberals won 56.4% of the vote (5.2% more than in 1960) and the Union Nationale 42.2% (4.6% less than in 1960). The 11 Action Provinciale candidates won only 1,603 votes between them, and the party Leader, Mr. Larocque obtained 117 votes in Montreal-Laurier, where Mr. René Lévesque was reelected by a wide margin. Mr. Frank Hanley was again the only Independent to win, retaining Montreal-Ste. Anne's but with a greatly reduced majority; Mr. Chaput and Mr. Holden failed to

save their deposits, although the latter did finish second in Westmount-St-Georges, ahead of the Union Nationale candidate.

The only minister to lose his seat was Mr. André Rousseau; Mr. Arsenault and Mr. Couturier saw their 1960 majorities reduced, and the remaining Cabinet members were reelected with increased majorities. The Union Nationale's "old guard" again saw its ranks diminish, as seven former ministers lost their seats and several others, defeated in 1960, failed again.

The 1960 election saw 44 seats being decided by less than 1000 votes, and Mr. Paul Cliche, writing in La Presse, showed that a total displacement of 95 votes in 5 constituencies (Montmagny, Gaspé-Nord, Drummond, Verchères, and Montreal-St-Louis) in favour of the Union Nationale would have prevented the Liberal victory. The outcome of the vote in these 44 marginal constituencies, it was considered before the election, would determine the final winner of the 1962 campaign.

20 of the 44 marginal seats were held by Liberals, 14 of which were gains from the Union Nationale in 1960. In 1962, the Liberals lost 4 of these 20 seats, increasing their majorities in 15 of the remaining 16. Altogether in 1962, 17 Liberal candidates won by less than 1000 votes, but nine of these constituencies were gains from the Union Nationale and in only 4 cases was a 1960 Liberal majority reduced to less than 1000 votes.

Of the 24 marginal seats held by the Union Nationale before the election, 11 were lost to Liberals, but in 10 of the remaining 13 constituencies Union Nationale candidates increased their majorities. 17 Union Nationale candidates were elected by less than 1000 votes; nine of these gained Liberal seats and 5 were incumbent members whose previous

majority had been greater than 1000.

The Liberals, therefore, made significant gains in the marginal seats (11 of the 17 seats the Liberals gained were marginal constituencies); they also consolidated their hold on seats which were won in 1960 by very slim margins. The trend favourable to the Liberals that emerged in 1960 was considerably strengthened.

A comparison of the 1962 and the 1960 results shows that the Liberals made their greatest gains in the urban centres of Montreal and Quebec City. The swing to the Liberals in the metropolitan Montreal area was 11.4% and 7.5% in the Quebec City ridings. In only one other region, Montreal-Sud was the swing greater than the province-wide figure of 4.9%. The government party did win increased support in most other regions, but nowhere else was there a major increase in the Liberals' share of the popular vote. In fact, if we exclude the 21 metropolitan Montreal and Quebec City seats and consider the remaining 74 constituencies, the overall swing to the Liberals becomes only 1.2%. The Union Nationale candidates were more successful in Bas St. Laurent, Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, and the rural area around Quebec City, where the figures for the swing are -1.8%, -2.9%, and -0.7% respectively.¹

The extent of the Union Nationale's defeat should not, therefore, be exaggerated. The opposition party won 45% or more of the vote in every region of the province except metropolitan Montreal and the sparsely populated Côte Nord.

In many constituencies, observers noted, purely local issues or the

1. For a key to the regions and detailed figures see Appendix I. The swing is the average of the Liberal % gain and the Union Nationale % loss.



THE RESULTS IN METROPOLITAN MONTREAL




FIG. 2

THE RESULTS IN QUEBEC CITY



quality of the candidates and their organization determined the outcome. Certainly there were several cases of constituencies voting against the trend in the region in which they were situated. The Union Nationale, for example, won Gaspé-Nord from the Liberals, but lost neighbouring Gaspé-Sud. Similarly the Liberals gained Kamouraska, but lost Montmagny and l'Islet, constituencies in the same area. The swing in Kamouraska was 4.0% while in l'Islet it was -11.3%. Most commentators agreed that Mr. Plourde, former Liberal MLA for Roberval, lost his seat because he was reputed to be "un patronneux", while Mr. Collard, Liberal MLA for neighbouring Lac St-Jean, had his majority cut because he shunned patronage.

Figure 4 shows the range of variation of the swing in individual constituencies. The spread was quite great: from 17.2% in Jacques-Cartier to -0.1% in Levis and -11.3% in l'Islet. In 41 constituencies, however, the swing was less than 3.0% to either party. The largest swings to the Liberals in addition to those in constituencies in metropolitan Montreal and Quebec City, were in Gatineau, Châteaugay and Iles-de-la-Madeleine. Roberval and Temiscouata as well as l'Islet showed large swings to the Union Nationale. In all, 63 seats showed a swing to the Liberals and 30 to the Union Nationale (in 2 constituencies the swing cannot be calculated).

It is significant that the largest swings to the Liberals were mostly in urban seats, while the large swings to the Union Nationale were in rural, economically depressed constituencies. Mr. Gerard Fillion noted in Le Devoir² that support for the Union Nationale was particularly strong in constituencies characterized by

2. See his articles in Le Devoir, Nov. 15, 1962, p. 1 and Nov. 16, 1962, p. 4.

VARIATION IN THE SWING IN INDIVIDUAL CONSTITUENCIES.




FIG. 4

marginal agriculture and little industry. The party won in 9 geographically contiguous ridings on the south shore of the St. Lawrence (this belt stretches from Wolfe and Compton in the southwest to l'Islet in the north-east) and maintained its hold on several rural ridings near the United States and Ontario borders. These regions have been beset by economic difficulties, and Saguenay-Lac St-Jean, a region where the Union Nationale won increased support was also suffering from the absence of industry and widespread unemployment.

The Liberal party, in contrast, found its greatest strength in the metropolitan and industrial centres on the upper bank of the St. Lawrence, particularly in the region of Montreal which had prospered greatly in the accelerated industrialization of Quebec since 1945.

Les Electeurs québécois stressed that, in 1960 at least, the Union Nationale tended to be the party preferred by the lower income, relatively uneducated groups, while the Liberal party generally found favour with the wealthy, better-educated voters. The preliminary findings of Le Groupe de Recherches Sociales' second study of political attitudes in Quebec indicate that in 1962 the same basic pattern prevailed, although the Liberals gained substantially increased support from the salaried middle classes.³

The results of the 1962 election, therefore, corroborate the findings of Les Electeurs Québécois. This development was, in fact, quite logical. The Union Nationale, throughout the 1960 campaign, appealed for support

3. Again on the basis of preliminary results, it is indicated that while the Liberals gained support between 1960 and 1962 from workers and professionals, the party's largest gains were among salesmen, agents, and clerks.

LIBERAL AND UNION NATIONALE STRENGTH BY REGIONS
 (MAJORITY OF LIBERAL OVER UNION NATIONALE OR UNION NATIONALE OVER LIBERAL in Percentage of votes)

190



THE KEY TO THE REGIONS IS GIVEN IN APPENDIX I.

FIG. 5

to "Les Petits Gens," and depicted itself as the guardian of rural interests; party strategists hoped to win a majority of seats by concentrating on the small rural ridings where "la politique de grandeur" had never been popular. While Liberals could argue that their policies were designed to create longrun economic prosperity in currently depressed areas by laying the foundation for industrial decentralization, it seems that many a vote the lower income groups opted instead for the more immediate material benefits promised them by the Union Nationale. The degree of support for the Union Nationale among the relatively poor is indicated by the fact that the only metropolitan Montreal or Quebec City seats the party managed to retain were in the lower-class residential constituencies.

It can, therefore, be argued on prima facie evidence, that the economic situation of voters was the most important factor influencing their voting decision. This conclusion finds general support in other voting studies. This hypothesis could be tested by setting up a rank correlation between the level of average income in each constituency and the percentage of the vote won by Liberal candidates in each constituency; this would show whether or not the Liberals consistency received relatively greater support in the more prosperous regions of the province. Unfortunately, the data available is inadequate to enable this analysis to be performed. The Canadian census does not give average income figures, and the figures that are available are based on federal counties and census divisions, not on the provincial electoral divisions. Neither is there any statistical information dealing with the regional distribution of unemployment

in Quebec, another possible index for economic well-being.⁴

II

It has been pointed out that the Lesage government's reform program appealed primarily to the urban middle classes; from 1960 to 1962 Liberal policy was most concerned with the creation in Quebec of social institutions required in a modern industrial society. It was, therefore, to be expected that urban voters, shunned by the Duplessis regime, would strongly support Mr. Lesage's party.⁵

In 1962, the 95 constituencies were divided by the Chief Returning Officer into three categories: 18 urban constituencies, 58 urban-rural constituencies, and 19 rural constituencies.⁶ This division was somewhat, artificial, however, since a constituency of more than 100,000 electors which included only 2 rural polls, for example, would automatically be classified as an urban-rural constituency. To avoid this sort of false classification, I have included in the following analysis Bourget, Chambly, Jacques-Cartier, Laval, and Three Rivers as urban and not urban-rural constituencies, modifying the official classification accordingly.⁷

Table 1 and 2 show the distribution of seats and votes in urban, urban-rural, and rural constituencies in 1956, 1960 and 1962.

4. It would, of course, have been possible to examine this question by interviewing relected voters. I was unable to do this, and, as I have pointed out, the alternative method of analysis was inapplicable.

5. Since Quebec's urban areas are general prosperous and her rural regions economically depressed, an analysis of the voting in urban and rural areas indirectly tests the hypothesis regarding the level of income's relationship to support for the Liberal party.

6. The classification is based upon whether a constituencies' polls are in an urban area, in both urban are rural areas, or in rural areas only.

7. The Chief Returning Officer's classification of constituencies for the 14 Nov. 1962 election is easily available.

Table 1

Distribution of seats between Liberal and Union Nationale parties in urban, urban-rural, and rural constituencies.

| | Urban | | | | Urban-Rural | | | | Rural | | | |
|------|-------|-----|----|-----|-------------|-----|----|-----|-------|-----|----|-----|
| | Total | Lib | UN | Oth | Total | Lib | UN | Oth | Total | Lib | UN | Oth |
| 1956 | 22* | 10 | 11 | 1 | 38 | 7 | 31 | - | 33 | 3 | 30 | - |
| 1960 | 23** | 13 | 9 | 1 | 42*** | 26 | 16 | - | 30 | 13 | 17 | - |
| 1962 | 23 | 18 | 4 | 1 | 53 | 37 | 16 | - | 19 | 8 | 11 | - |

* This figure includes Chambly, Jacques-Cartier, Laval, and Three Rivers.

** Bourget was created in 1960.

*** Duplessis was created in 1960.

Table 2

Distribution of votes between Liberal and Union Nationale parties in urban, urban-rural, and rural constituencies.

| Year | Urban | | | | Urban-Rural | | | | Rural | | | |
|------|----------|---------|----------|------------|-------------|---------|----------|------------|----------|---------|----------|------------|
| | % Lib | % UN | % Oth | % Swing | % Lib | % UN | % Oth | % Swing | % Lib | % UN | % Oth | % Swing |
| 1956 | 49.0 | 47.2 | 3.8 | | 41.4 | 53.7 | 5.4 | | 43.5 | 56.4 | 0.1 | |
| 1960 | 51.9 | 44.2 | 3.9 | 3.0 | 51.2 | 48.1 | 0.7 | 7.4 | 49.3 | 50.3 | 0.4 | 6.0 |
| 1962 | 62.5 | 35.0 | 2.5 | 9.9 | 52.4 | 46.8 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 48.7 | 51.1 | 0.2 | -7 |

The figures for the urban constituencies in 1956 do not include Montreal-St-Anne, since the Union Nationale did not nominate a candidate for this riding in that year.

The figures in Table 2 confirm clearly that the greatest strength of the Liberals lay in the urban constituencies, while a majority of the voters in rural constituencies continued to support the Union Nationale. While the overall swing to the Liberals from 1960-62 in the urban ridings was 9.9%, in the urban-rural ridings it was only 1.3% and the rural ridings showed a small swing of 0.7% to the Union Nationale.

Table 1 shows that the Liberal victory in 1960 was due to large gains

in the urban-rural and rural constituencies. In 1956, Liberal candidates won in only 9% of the rural and 18% of the urban-rural ridings, but in 1960 the figures were 43% and 62% respectively. In the 1960 election Liberal gains in the urban ridings were, in contrast to the outcome in 1962, relatively small; the swing to the Liberals here was only 3.0% in 1960, while it was 7.4% in the urban-rural and 6.4% in the rural constituencies. In each of the 1956, 1960 and 1962 elections, however, the difference between the voting pattern in Montreal and that in the rest of the province remained significant.⁸

The purely rural constituencies are gradually disappearing. Should the present differences between the philosophies and policies of the Liberal and Union Nationale parties prevail, therefore, the continuing process of industrialization and urbanization will probably mean additional support for the Liberals. The reform of the electoral map to create more ridings in metropolitan Montreal would also favour the government party. For in 1962 567,991 votes in 23 urban constituencies won 18 seats for the Liberals, while 545,818 votes in the urban-rural constituencies were sufficient to win 37 seats. The Union Nationale's 96,556 votes in 19 rural constituencies secured 11 seats for the party.

III

Social Credit's role in the 1962 election was discussed in Chapter V, and it will be recalled that while Mr. Caouette refused to support

8. See P. Cliche, Les Elections Provinciales dans le Québec de 1927 à 1960, unpublished M.A. thesis, Laval University, Quebec City, 1960, for an explanation of urban-rural voting patterns in Quebec.

openly either the Liberals or the Union Nationale, many of his followers campaigned for Union Nationale candidates. To many observers, therefore, it seemed that the best chances of a Union Nationale victory lay in the en bloc support of Social Creditors.

In the June 1962 Canadian federal election Social Credit candidates won 26 seats in Quebec and ran second in four others. These 30 federal ridings comprise 37 provincial ones,⁹ almost all located in the Bas St-Laurent, Lac St-Jean, Abitibi, Cantons de l'Est and Quebec regions. In 1960, the Liberals won 25 and the Union Nationale 12 of these constituencies, and it is clear that the uniform opposition of Social Credit voters would be a great threat to the Liberals' chances of winning reelection. However, only 9 of these 37 "Socred" seats changed hands in the 1962 election; the Liberals gained three (Kamouraska, Charlevoix, and Quebec-East) and the Union Nationale six seats (Beauce, Bellechasse, l'Islet, Montmagny, Roberval, and Wolfe.). Most observers agreed that only in l'Islet and Montmagny could the Union Nationale's victories be attributed to Social Credit support; the small Union Nationale net gain of 3 seats was considered as evidence that no Social Credit "bloc vote" existed. As André Laurendeau asked in Le Devoir on November 15th, "Où était donc hier le Crédit Social....".

9. The 37 provincial constituencies which correspond to the 30 federal ridings in which Social Credit candidates ran first or second in the June 1962 federal election are referred to from now on as the "Socred" constituencies.

Table 3

Percentage of support for Liberal candidates in "Socred" constituencies, on a regional basis, 1960 and 1962.

| A r e a | No. of "Socred" seats | 1960 Lib % | 1962 Lib % | 1960-1962 Difference in Lib % in "Socred" seats | 1960-1962 Difference in Lib % in <u>all</u> seats |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|---------------|---|--|
| The Province | 37 | 52.0 | 52.9 | +0.9 | +5.2% |
| Bas St. Laurent | 6 | 51.9 | 49.1 | -2.8% | * -2.8% |
| Saguenay-Lac-St. Jean | 4 | 54.5 | 52.9 | -1.6% | * -1.6% |
| Quebec City | 2 | 50.3 | 57.7 | +6.3% | +7.6% |
| Quebec "Hinterland" | 8 | 53.1 | 52.7 | -0.6% | -0.5% |
| Three Rivers | 3 | 50.6 | 50.3 | -0.3 | +1.1% |
| Cantons de l'Est | 10 | 49.2 | 52.5 | +3.3 | +3.3% |
| Outaouais | 1 | 60.9 | 63.4 | +2.5 | +2.7% |
| Abitibi-Temis- Camingue | 2 | 51.6 | 54.8 | +3.2 | +3.8% |
| Cote Nord | 1 | 59.1 | 57.4 | -1.7 | +0.8% |

* In these areas all ridings were "Socred" ridings.

Table 4

Comparison of 1960-62 swing in "Socred" constituencies with 1960-62 swing in all constituencies, on a regional basis.

| A r e a | 1960-62 Swing in "Socred" seats | 1960-62 Swing in all seats |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| The Province | +0.7% | +4.9% * |
| Bas St. Laurent | -1.8% | -1.8% * |
| Saguenay- Lac-St. Jean | -2.9% | -2.9% * |
| Quebec City | +7.2% | +7.5% |
| Quebec "Hinterland" | -0.8% | -0.7% |
| Three Rivers | -0.3% | +0.4% |
| Cantons de l'Est | +2.9% | +3.3% |
| Outaouais | +2.0% | +2.4% |
| Abitibi- Temiscamingue | +3.0% | +3.7% |
| Cote Nord | -1.7% | +0.7% |

* In these areas all constituencies were "Socred" constituencies.

Table 3 compares the showing of Liberal candidates in the "Socred" constituencies in 1962 with that of 1960 and Table 4 compares the 1960-62 swing in "Socred" constituencies with the 1960-62 swing in all constituencies, on a regional basis.

The increase in the Liberal percentage of the vote in the "Socred" constituencies from 1960 to 1962 was 0.9%, substantially lower than the 5.2% increase in the Liberal percentage of the entire popular vote. In no region did the Liberal candidates in "Socred" constituencies increase their percentage of the total vote by more than the increase in the Liberal percentage for the whole region. In Bas St-Laurent and Saguenay-Lac-St-Jean, where all constituencies were "Socred" constituencies, Liberal candidates lost support.

The swing to the Liberals was smaller in "Socred" constituencies. The 4.9% overall swing to the government party was based on large gains in the Montreal region and if regions 6 or 7, in which there were no "Socred" constituencies, are excluded, the province-wide swing to the Liberals becomes only 1.2%.

But while it is true that Liberal candidates fared relatively worse in the "Socred" constituencies than elsewhere, it should be noted that the difference was everywhere quite small; in no region was the swing to the Liberals 1% greater than it was in that region's "Socred" constituencies. Furthermore, closer analysis of the vote in the "Socred" constituencies indicates that it closely resembled the overall provincial voting pattern. In urban Social Credit strongholds, such as Quebec City, Hull, and Rouyn-Noranda, Liberal candidates substantially increased

their percentage of the vote, but the rural "Socred" constituencies gave increased support to the Union Nationale.

The majority of the "Socred" constituencies were located in predominantly rural, economically depressed areas where the Lesage government was unlikely to be popular. As has been pointed out, these were the regions to which the Union Nationale made a special appeal and where its candidates were most successful. The fact the urban "Socred" constituencies voted strongly for the Liberals leads one to conclude that differences in the level of income and place of residence were the more significant than the influence of Social Credit in determining the outcome of the 1962 provincial election.

At any rate, there was no evidence that a Social Credit "bloc" vote existed. Perhaps this should have been anticipated. Most observers agree that the sudden emergence of Social Credit strength in Quebec's federal politics was primarily the expression of radical dissatisfaction with the very poor economic conditions prevailing in certain regions of the province; those who voted Social Credit, therefore, presumably favoured radical changes. On the provincial level, however, the Liberal party was identified as the party of change; the parties and issues in the June 1962 federal election and the November 1962 provincial election were not the same; and when Mr. Caouette refused to directly support the Union Nationale, it seems that Social Credit supporters went their separate ways.

IV

Ethnic origin, as well as socioeconomic status and place of residence, is an important determinant of voting behaviour. It has been widely assumed that French-Canadians have always voted for the party they consider represents best their "national" interests. If this assumption is true and since the interests of French and English-Canadians in Quebec politics have often been in conflict, it would appear that English-Canadian voters in Quebec should favour the least nationalistic of the competing political parties. Professor Harry Angell has shown,¹⁰ that, in the 1920's at least, the voters in Quebec's provincial elections were divided more on urban-rural than on English-French lines. Urban voters, English and French alike, supported the opposition Conservative party, while rural voters kept the Liberals in office.

I have followed Professor Angell's example and have analyzed the relative importance of ethnic status and place of residence in determining the vote in the "English" constituencies in the 1956, 1960 and 1962 Quebec provincial elections. My findings, which are given in Table 5, confirm his conclusions, although in 1960 and 1962 English and French urban voters were, for once, supporting the party in power.

10. H. Angell, Quebec Provincial Politics in the 1920s, unpublished M.A. thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 1960.

Table 5

Support for Liberal candidates in "English" constituencies compared to overall support of Liberals in the same areas.

| Election Year District | 1956 | | | 1960 | | | 1962 | | |
|--|----------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| | Total Seats | Lib. Seats | Lib. Vote % | Total Seats | Lib. Seats | Lib. Vote % | Total Seats | Lib. Seats | Lib. Vote % |
| Montreal "English"* Constituencies | 15 | 5 | 71.7 | 5 | 5 | 61.6 | 5 | 5 | 73.8 |
| Montreal General* | 15 | 8 | 51.0 | 16 | 11 | 52.8 | 16 | 14 | 64.0 |
| "English" consti- tuencies outside of Montreal | 7 | 1 | 43.1 | 7 | 2 | 46.1 | 7 | 4 | 48.9 |
| The rest of the province excl. Montreal | 77 | 12 | 42.2 | 78 | 41 | 50.6 | 78 | 49 | 52.2 |

* Excluding Montreal-St-Anne for reasons given under Table 2.

I have chosen as "English" constituencies these with a population including 20% or more residents of British ethnic origin. I have selected this figure as the criterion because I feel that a lower percentage would only rarely influence the outcome of an election.

The Montreal constituencies included are; Jacques-Cartier, Montreal-N.D.G., Montreal-Outremont, Montreal-Verdun, and Westmount-St-Georges. The other "English" constituencies are; Argenteuil, Brome, Chateaugay, Gatineau, Huntington, Pontiac, and Stanstead.

If people of Jewish ethnic origin are considered for the purposes of the analysis as "English", Montreal-St-Louis would also qualify. This immigrant riding, however, should, I believe be considered a special case.

In 1956 and 1960 the Union Nationale was generally considered the "nationalist" party. While the "English" constituencies in Montreal all elected Liberal candidates, at both elections the "English"

constituencies elsewhere supported the Union Nationale which won 6 of 7 seats in 1956 and 5 of 7 in 1960 outside of Montreal. In 1960, however, the Liberal percentage of the vote in Montreal's "English" constituencies decreased by 10.1% while Liberal candidates in the remaining metropolitan Montreal ridings gained support. This increase in support for the Union Nationale in Montreal's "English" constituencies, was almost certainly due to satisfaction with the progressive government of Mr. Paul Sauve.

In 1962, however, the Liberal party campaigned on a rationalist platform, and the Union Nationale on several occasions warned that its opponents were resorting to racism. Nevertheless, the "English" constituencies in Montreal returned their Liberal MLAs and the Liberal percentage of the vote in these ridings rose to 73.7%. At the same time, the 7 "English" constituencies outside of Montreal, which are predominantly rural, elected 4 Liberal candidates and increased the Liberal percentage of the total by 2.8%.

In all three elections, but particularly in 1956, the Liberal percentage of the vote in the "English" constituencies of Montreal was substantially higher than the party's total percentage of the vote in all Montreal ridings. In the rural "English" ridings, however, the Liberal percentage of the vote was only 0.9% higher than the party's proportion of the vote outside Montreal, and in 1960 and 1962 the rural "English" constituencies lagged behind the rest of the province in their support for Liberal candidates.

It appears, therefore, that in the 1956, 1960, and 1962 election, at least, the voters were influenced more by their place of residence than by their ethnic origin. Urban "English" constituencies uniformly supported the Liberal party, even in 1962 when the party assumed a strongly rationalist stance, while predominantly rural "English" constituencies voted for the Union Nationale, "the party of the farmer."

It is true that the "English" constituencies in Montreal were much more strongly Liberal than the "French" ridings in the city. This is explained by the fact that the "English" ridings are in middle-class and upper-class residential areas, while the "French" ridings are predominantly in working-class districts. It may, however, be true that English-French tension is greater in Montreal than in smaller communities. The decrease in the support of Montreal's "English" constituencies for Liberal candidates in 1960, when the party was gaining support elsewhere, and the reversal of this trend in 1962, when the Liberals accentuated the rationalist implications of their policy, can be attributed to their desire for progressive government, irrespective of its source. Supposed "national" interests were, by voters of English ethnic origin at least, subordinated to interests engendered by their place of residence and socioeconomic status.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

I

Mr. Lesage was understandably, jubilant with the election results; his victory statement proclaimed "nous sommes maîtres chez nous maintenant." For his part, Mr. Johnson resignedly accepted "un résultat inexplicable," and promised that the Union Nationale would serve the public interest in Opposition while preparing to fight the next election. Editorial comment on the outcome of the election, however, was somewhat more restrained than the pronouncements of the party Leaders. Le Devoir and La Presse expressed satisfaction with the result, noting that it made the nationalization of electricity a certainty and kept Quebec on the course of reform. Both newspapers also pointed out approvingly that the Union Nationale had elected enough MLAs to form a vigilant and vigorous Opposition. The Montreal Star was also pleased with the result, but suggested that the government should be generous when buying the assets of the private power companies so as not to lose the trust of the business community and foreign investors. Montréal-Matin's November 15th editorial accepted the verdict of the people, but warned the Liberals against betraying the faith of the electorate. It too was thankful that an able Opposition group had been elected to act as a check on the government.

II

In retrospect, the study of the 1962 Quebec provincial election has revealed certain interesting, possibly significant, facts. In the first place, it has pointed to the shortcomings of the mandate theory of elections. The Liberal party tried to conduct the election as though it were a referendum on the nationalization of electricity. This manoeuvre, however, failed the moment Union Nationale policy seemingly did not oppose nationalization; many voters could therefore assume that whichever party was elected, the nationalization of electricity would eventually take place. In addition, the electorate appeared to be more concerned with other issues, and the nationalization issue receded into the background in the later stages of the campaign.

Throughout the campaign, however, the press and interest groups focussed their attention on the nationalization issue. Since, nevertheless, the electorate remained relatively disinterested in this aspect of the campaign, it seems that there are limits to the capacity of the mass media, opinion leaders, and the political parties themselves to mould the shape of an election campaign. What is important in an election is, to a certain extent at least, determined by the political "situation"¹ and by long-term social and economic trends. The Liberals, by over-emphasizing the nationalization issue, and the Union Nationale, by assuming again traditionalist postures on a variety of issues, were adopting an

1. This term is used in the sense explained by D. Easton, The Political System, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1961.

unreal attitude somewhat removed from what seems to have been the true feeling of the electorate.

The results of the 1962 election seem to bear out the assertion that the government's accomplishments, far more than its policy on the nationalization of electricity, was responsible for its reelection. For Liberal candidates were most strongly supported in regions which were promised no material benefits by the party's nationalization policy: Montreal and Quebec City. In the Gaspé and Abitibi, which were promised better and cheaper electricity service and the acreation of new industries, Liberal gains were more moderate, while Bas St. Laurent and Saguenay-Lac-St. Jean, which were to benefit in the same way, were the areas of greatest Union Nationale gains. This also supports the findings of Chapter IX, which suggest that support for the two parties was divided mainly on urban-rural lines.

III

The 1962 Quebec election has been presented also as an incident in the political modernization of the province. It has already been pointed out that the most significant development in Quebec politics in recent years has been the attempt, initiated by the Sauvé government and continued by Mr. Lesage's Cabinet, to formulate government policies that take into account the needs of a modern industrial society. In 1962, the voters were presented with a choice between the continuation of this attempt and a return to the traditional pattern of government; the reelection of the Liberal party ensured that government policy will

continue to serve the interests of the province's urban majority. And, unless the Union Nationale radically modifies its policies to take into account the changed nature of Quebec society, the province's continuing industrialization and urbanization will serve to strengthen the position of the Liberal party. If, in addition, the proposed reform of the electoral map, which would increase the representation of urban voters to the Legislative Assembly, is enacted, the Liberals will remain in office for the foreseeable future.

IV

The 1962 election also demonstrated that "les mœurs électorales dans le Québec" have yet to be reformed. The campaign had the usual quota of "affaires électorales," accusations of patronage, and mudslinging that sometimes bordered on calumny.

This seemed to have no effect on the results, however, for all candidates allegedly implicated in the various scandals were reelected. Mudslinging and "demagogic" campaigning stir the emotions and make for colourful copy, but this emphasis in electoneering, if taken seriously by the voters, can only serve to deepen the antagonism dividing the supporters of different candidates and make rational debate of fundamental campaign issues much more difficult. If, however, as seems to be the case in Quebec, "les affaires électorales" and unrestrained mudslinging are regarded as an integral part of the game of politics, popular cynicism about the value of political action is encouraged. In either instance, the growth of the democratic spirit is checked.

V

I have shown in Chapter VIII that, although the transformation of Quebec's economy has produced new social groups, the province's political parties continue to be staffed almost entirely by members of the traditional social elite. It seems to me certain that the new elite will begin to participate more actively in the political life of Quebec, although perhaps only when it has consolidated its position in other aspects of social life. Precisely what role the new social groups will choose for themselves, however, will probably be determined by the nature of the provincial government's policy in the coming years. Liberal policy since 1962 has consciously catered to the salaried middle class, from which the new elite is largely drawn, and should this party prevail in its present course it may very be selected by the new elite as the vehicle for the safeguarding of its interests. The transformation of the Union Nationale into a mass party should result in the alteration of its class composition, however, and the apparent willingness of Quebec voters today to support third parties also means that other developments are possible.

Quebec, therefore, provides an excellent case study for the analysis of the effect of the modernization of a community's economy and social structure upon the composition of its political elite.

VI

The 1962 Quebec election confirmed the trend to an increasing reliance on modern campaign techniques. The development of the Quebec

Liberal Federation has enabled the Liberal party to refine and rationalize its electoral organization, and the reform of the Union Nationale's organizational structure should bring the same benefits to this party. The provincial campaign and general issues are becoming increasingly influential in determining the outcome of elections, and such local attractions as l'assemblee contradictoire are now much less important. In this context, officials of both parties paid particular attention to the quality of central party publicity and to the projection of a favourable image of the party Leader. Officials of both parties are convinced of the value of professional public relations techniques in electioneering, abandoning the old apprehensions Canadians have often voiced about "American gimmicks." Until now, neither the Liberals nor the Union Nationale have engaged in systematic propaganda activity between elections; there has been no real attempt to project a particular party image. The Liberals have, however, embarked in this direction since the 1962 election; they now sponsor a weekly 15-minute television program featuring Mr. Lesage explaining various aspects of party and government policy.

VII

The analysis of the election results strongly suggested that the most significant determinants of the voting decision were the level of income and place of residence of the voters. The extent to which the Liberal party is supported by the relatively prosperous and the Union Nationale by the relatively poor has already been investigated by Le Groupe de Recherches Sociales, but it is a question which merits more detailed

study.

Another important factor which should be investigated in future studies of Quebec elections is the political attitude of the French-Canadian working-class. In 1962, the Union Nationale, despite its history of opposition to the labour movement, again was given strong support in French-Canadian working-class districts.² In Quebec provincial politics today, the Liberal party must be considered as the major party most left wing, and working-class support of right wing parties has been described as characteristic only of communities with an underdeveloped economy, weak organized labour movement, and a generally low level of political sophistication.³ If this is true, contemporary economic and social changes in Quebec should, eventually, lead to a shift in the political sympathies of the province's working-class voters. Since the leaders of both major trade union movements indirectly endorsed the Liberal party in 1962, it would be enlightening to compare the results of the vote in districts where the trade-union movement is well-organized and the influence of union leaders great to the results in other working-class districts. On prima facie evidence, it would seem that the former districts would have given a greater percentage of the vote to Liberal candidates in 1962.

My analysis also suggested that voters in Quebec are not deeply divided on French-English lines, as has been often assumed in the past.

2. See H. F. Quinn, The Union Nationale Party, op.cit., for an indication of the extent of working-class support for the Union Nationale in previous elections.

3. S.M. Lipset, P.F. Lazarsfeld, A. Barton, and J. Linz, "The Psychology of Voting" op.cit., p. 523.

It would be foolish, however, to conclude from this that "nationalist" issues are of minor importance in Quebec today. The analysis of the extent to which the "national" question is important, and of the relative importance to voters of their economic and "national" interests would also be most valuable.

IX

This chapter has been both a summingup of a fairly long study of the 1962 Quebec election and a confession that certain important aspects of the election were not analyzed. That this should be so has brought home to me the need to combine the two major methods of studying elections, for the analyses of the psychology of voting and the macroanalytic studies of the election as an important incident in the political life of a democratic society are complementary.

This study is of the latter type and in many ways the 1962 Quebec election was particularly important. The voters were presented with the opportunity to make a distinct ideological choice and this in itself fulfills a fundamental precondition of any democratic election, that the decision of the voters have real significance. And, as I think has been shown, the results of the election constituted another step towards the political modernization of the province.

APPENDIX I

KEY TO THE CONSTITUENCIES

| | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1 - Abitibi-West | 40 - Matane |
| 1A- Abitibi-East | 41 - Matapédia |
| 2 - Argenteuil | 42 - Mégantic |
| 3 - Arthabaska | 43 - Missisquoi |
| 4 - Bagot | 44 - Montcalm |
| 5 - Beauce | 45 - Montmagny |
| 6 - Beauharnois | 46 - Montmorency |
| 7 - Bellechasse | 48 - Jesus Island |
| 8 - Berthier | 49 - Montreal Island) (16 Units) |
| 9 - Bonaventure | 50 - Napierville-Laprairie |
| 10 - Brome | 51 - Nicolet |
| 11 - Chambly | 52 - Papineau |
| 12 - Champlain | 53 - Pontiac |
| 13 - Charlevoix | 54 - Portneuf |
| 15 - Chateauguay | 55 - Quebec County |
| 16 - Chicoutimi | 55A- Quebec City (4 Units) |
| 17 - Compton | 56 - Richelieu |
| 18 - Deux-Montagnes | 57 - Richmond |
| 19 - Dorchester | 58 - Rimouski |
| 20 - Drummond | 58A- Roberval |
| 20A- Duplessis | 59 - Rouville |
| 21 - Frontenac | 59A- Rouyn-Noranda |
| 22 - Gaspé-South | 60 - Saguenay |
| 23 - Gaspé-North | 61 - Shefford |
| 24 - Iles-de-la-Madeleine | 62 - Sherbrooke |
| 25 - Hull | 64 - Stanstead |
| 26 - Gatineau | 65 - Saint-Hyacinthe |
| 27 - Huntington | 66 - Saint-Jean |
| 28 - Iberville | 67 - Saint-Maurice |
| 29 - Joliette | 68 - Temiscamingue |
| 29A- Jonquière-Kenogami | 69 - Temiscouata |
| 30 - Kamouraska | 69A- Three Rivers |
| 31 - Labelle | 70 - Rivière-du-Loup |
| 32 - Lac-St-Jean | 71 - Terrebonne |
| 35 - L'Assomption | 72 - Vaudreuil-Soulanges |
| 35A- Laviolette | 73 - Verchères |
| 36 - Levis | 74 - Wolfe |
| 37 - L'Islet | 75 - Yamaska |
| 38 - Lotbinière | |
| 39 - Maskinongé | |

NOTES TO THE REGIONAL TABLES

1. In the regional tables the constituencies have been grouped in the economic regions used by government statisticians.
2. In 1960 and 1962 both the Union Nationale and the Liberal parties contested every seat.
3. The swing has been calculated as the average of the Liberal % gain and the Union Nationale % loss.

The regions:

| Region | Sub-Area | Constituencies Included |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| 1. Gaspé-Rive Sud | 1a. Gaspé | Bonaventure, Gaspé-North, Gaspé-South, Matane, Matapédia, Magdalen Islands. |
| | 1b. Bas St. Laurent | Kamouraska, L'Islet, Montmagny, Rimouski, Rivière-du-Loup, Temiscouata. |
| 2. Saguenay- Lac-St-Jean | | Chicoutimi, Jonquière-Kenogami, Lac-St-Jean, Roberval. |
| 3. Quebec | 3a. Quebec City | Quebec-Centre, Quebec-East, Quebec-West, St. Sauveur. |
| | 3b. Quebec "Hinter-land" | Beauce, Bellechasse, Charlevoix, Dorchester, Levis, Lotbinière, Montmorency, Quebec County, Portneuf. |
| 4. Trois Rivières | | Berthier, Champlain, Laviolette, Maskinongé, Nicolet, St. Maurice, Three Rivers. |
| 5. Cantons de L'Est | | Arthabaska, Brome, Compton, Drummond, Frontenac, Mégantic, Richmond, Sherbrooke, Stanstead, Wolfe. |
| 6. Montreal | 6a. Montreal Richelieu | Bagot, Iberville, Missisquoi, Napierville-Laprairie, Richelieu, Rouville, St. Hyacinthe, St. Jean, Verchères, Yamaska. |

| Region | Sub Area | Constituencies Included |
|----------------------------|-------------------|--|
| 6. Montreal | 6b. Montreal-Nord | Argenteuil, Joliette, Labelle, l'Assomption, Montcalm, Terrebonne, Vaudreuil-Soulanges. |
| | 6c. Montreal-Sud | Beauharnois, Chateauguay, Deux-Montagnes, Huntington. |
| 7. Metropolitan Montreal | | Bourget, Chambly, Jacques-Cartier, Laval, Maisonneuve, Montreal (MTL)-Jeanne-Mance, MTL-Laurier, MTL-Mercier, MTL-Notre-Dame-de-Grace, MTL-Outremont, MTL-Ste-Anne, MTL-Ste-Marie, MTL-St-Henri, MTL-St-Jacques, MTL-St-Louis, MTL-Verdun, Westmount-St-Georges. |
| 8. Outaouais | | Gatineau, Hull, Papineau, Pontiac |
| 9. Abitibi - Temiscamingue | | Abitibi-East, Abitibi-West, Rouyn-Noranda, Temiscamingue |
| 10. Cote Nord | | Duplessis, Saguenay |

THE NATIONAL RESULTS

| | Electorate | Votes Cast | Total Valid Votes | Liberal | Union Nationale | Action Provinciale | Other |
|------|------------|------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|----------------|
| 1960 | 2,608,439 | 2,130,215 | 100% 2,096,597 | 51.2% 1,037,318 | 46.8% 981,125 | - | 2.0% 42,144 |
| 1962 | 2,721,933 | 2,166,475 | 100% 2,136,966 | 56.4% 1,205,253 | 42.2% 900,817 | - 1,603 | 1.4% 29,293 |

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

| | Total Membership | Liberal | Union Nationale | Other |
|------|---------------------|---------|--------------------|-------|
| 1960 | 95 | 52 | 42 | 1 |
| 1962 | 95 | 63 | 31 | 1 |

THE RESULTS TABULATED

| | Elec- torate | Voting | Change in % Voting 1960-62 | Member Elected* | | | | | | Votes (as % of votes) | | | Swing(1960- 62) average of Lib % gain & UN % loss |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|--------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|-----|----|-----|-----------------|-------------|--------------------------|------|-----|---|
| | | | | Total | Lib | UN | Oth | Lib Gains | UN Gains | Lib | UN | Oth | |
| The Province | 2,721 | 79.6 | -2.1 | 95 | 63 | 31 | 1 | 19 ⁺ | 8 | 56.4 | 42.2 | 1.4 | 4.9 |
| 1. Gaspé-Rive Sud | 183 | 85.3 | -1.9 | 12 | 8 | 4 | - | 3 | 3 | 50.4 | 49.6 | - | -1.2 |
| A. Gaspé | 88 | 87.0 | -0.6 | 6 | 5 | 1 | - | 2 | 1 | 51.7 | 48.3 | - | 0.4 |
| B. Bas St. Laurent | 95 | 83.6 | -3.2 | 6 | 3 | 3 | - | 1 | 2 | 49.1 | 51.9 | - | -1.8 |
| 2. Saguenay-Lac-St-Jean | 115 | 87.2 | -1.1 | 4 | 2 | 2 | - | 0 | 1 | 52.9 | 47.1 | - | -2.9 |
| 3. Quebec | 342 | 87.0 | -0.9 | 13 | 7 | 6 | - | 3 | 2 | 53.3 | 46.5 | 0.2 | 2.3 |
| A. Quebec City | 120 | 87.6 | +0.6 | 4 | 3 | 1 | - | 2 | 0 | 55.1 | 44.9 | - | 7.5 |
| B. Hinterland | 222 | 86.3 | -2.3 | 9 | 4 | 5 | - | 1 | 2 | 52.3 | 47.4 | 0.3 | -0.7 |
| 4. Trois Rivières | 151 | 88.3 | -1.2 | 7 | 3 | 4 | - | 2 | 0 | 49.7 | 50.2 | 0.1 | 0.4 |
| 5. Cantons de L'Est | 231 | 86.8 | -2.8 | 11 | 7 | 4 | - | 0 | 1 | 52.7 | 46.8 | 0.5 | 3.3 |
| 6. Montreal (MTL) | 385 | 86.9 | -2.5 | 21 | 14 | 7 | - | 4 | 1 | 51.6 | 46.6 | 1.8 | 2.9 |
| A. MTL Richelieu | 157 | 87.8 | -2.0 | 10 | 7 | 3 | - | 1 | 0 | 52.7 | 46.8 | 0.5 | 2.8 |
| B. MTL Nord | 158 | 86.4 | -3.1 | 7 | 4 | 3 | - | 1 | 1 | 49.6 | 46.2 | 4.2 | 2.1 |
| C. MTL Sud | 69 | 86.6 | -2.2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | - | 2 | 0 | 53.3 | 46.7 | - | 5.0 |
| 7. Metropolitan Montreal | 1,096 | 68.6 | +2.8 | 17 | 14 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 64.0 | 32.3 | 3.1 | 11.4 |
| 8. Outaouais | 92 | 19.4 | -4.7 | 4 | 2 | 2 | - | 1 | 0 | 52.7 | 47.3 | - | 2.4 |
| 9. Abitibi-Temiscamingue | 74 | 86.6 | -2.2 | 4 | 4 | 0 | - | 1 | 0 | 55.0 | 48.0 | - | 3.7 |
| 10. Cote Nord | 42 | 79.2 | +0.2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | - | - | - | 58.8 | 41.2 | - | 0.7 |

* The gain is the difference between the distribution of seats at the time of the 1962 dissolution and the new distribution after the 1962 election. Between the 1960 and 1962 elections the Liberals gained Joliette and Rouville at by-elections.

CONSTITUENCY RESULTS

THE METROPOLITAN MONTREAL RIDINGS

| Constituency | % Voting 1960 | % Voting 1962 | % Lib. | % UN | % Oth. | Swing in % 1960-62 |
|-------------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------|---------|-----------|--------------------------|
| Bourget | 76.0 | 73.2 | 58.7 | 34.8 | 6.8 | 8.0 |
| Chambly | 79.0 | 76.9 | 63.8 | 33.8 | 3.4 | 14.5 |
| Jacques Cartier | 73.1 | 72.5 | 77.7 | 22.3 | - | 17.2 |
| Laval | 80.2 | 76.7 | 66.3 | 33.0 | 0.7 | 10.3 |
| Maisonneuve* | 72.1 | 71.7 | 58.9 | 41.1 | - | 11.1 |
| MTL-Jeanne-Mance* | 74.9 | 68.2 | 59.6 | 39.6 | 0.8 | 11.7 |
| MTL-Laurier | 79.3 | 76.4 | 58.2 | 41.4 | 0.4 | 8.2 |
| MTL-Mercier* | 74.9 | 75.6 | 54.1 | 43.5 | 2.4 | 6.9 |
| MTL-Notre-Dame-de Grace | 60.9 | 59.9 | 78.5 | 16.4 | 5.1 | 14.9 |
| MTL-Outremont | 58.4 | 60.3 | 77.6 | 20.3 | 2.1 | 11.0 |
| MTL-Ste-Anne | 63.7 | 57.9 | 40.2 | 14.0 | 45.8 | - |
| MTL-Ste-Marie | 71.2 | 67.4 | 47.1 | 52.5 | 0.4 | 5.2 |
| MTL-St-Henri | 74.9 | 70.3 | 53.0 | 45.4 | 1.6 | 1.9 |
| MTL-St-Jacques | 66.1 | 65.7 | 47.4 | 52.1 | 0.5 | 1.9 |
| MTL-St-Louis | 61.3 | 61.0 | 58.2 | 41.8 | - | 8.0 |
| MTL-Verdun | 72.2 | 72.3 | 66.0 | 34.0 | - | 7.6 |
| Westmount-St-Georges | 55.1 | 59.0 | 69.0 | 8.6 | 22.4 | - |

1. The swing is calculated only for seats where Liberal and Union Nationale candidates provided the top two in the poll at both the 1960 and 1962 elections.

* These seats were Liberal gains.

CONSTITUENCY RESULTS

THE PROVINCE

| Constituency | % Voting 1960 | % Voting 1962 | % Lib. | % UN | % Oth. | Swing in % 1960-62 |
|----------------|------------------|------------------|-----------|---------|-----------|-----------------------|
| Abitibi-East | 86.2 | 85.2 | 51.9 | 48.1 | - | 0.3 |
| Abitibi-West | 90.2 | 88.5 | 57.0 | 43.0 | - | 4.2 |
| Argenteuie | 89.9 | 86.2 | 36.6 | 54.6 | 8.8 | 1.0 |
| Arthabaska | 93.5 | 91.7 | 53.5 | 46.5 | - | 0.5 |
| Bagot | 91.5 | 92.4 | 44.9 | 55.1 | - | 0.7 |
| Beauce** | 87.2 | 87.2 | 48.0 | 52.0 | - | -6.1 |
| Beauharnois* | 91.7 | 90.2 | 51.7 | 48.3 | - | 2.0 |
| Bellechasse** | 87.0 | 80.8 | 48.6 | 51.4 | - | -3.5 |
| Berthier* | 89.6 | 85.6 | 50.1 | 49.2 | 0.7 | 3.6 |
| Bonaventure | 86.1 | 85.3 | 57.3 | 42.7 | - | 5.7 |
| Brome | 87.2 | 81.4 | 55.8 | 44.2 | - | 0.3 |
| Champlain | 91.6 | 91.0 | 47.3 | 52.7 | - | -2.4 |
| Charlevoix * | 87.8 | 87.2 | 52.2 | 47.8 | - | 4.8 |
| Chateaugay* | 88.1 | 84.0 | 54.8 | 45.2 | - | 9.3 |
| Chicoutimi | 88.9 | 88.0 | 49.7 | 50.3 | - | 1.0 |
| Compton | 89.1 | 87.3 | 44.5 | 54.4 | 1.1 | -1.2 |
| Deux-Montagnes | 89.5 | 86.9 | 57.3 | 42.7 | - | 6.2 |
| Dorchester | 86.8 | 83.8 | 46.4 | 53.6 | - | -2.7 |
| Drummond | 92.0 | 91.0 | 57.2 | 42.8 | - | 7.0 |
| Duplessis | 78.0 | 79.5 | 59.8 | 40.2 | - | 3.3 |
| Frontenac | 90.7 | 87.9 | 47.5 | 52.5 | - | -0.7 |
| Gaspé-North** | 89.3 | 88.1 | 47.3 | 51.8 | 0.9 | -2.3 |
| Gaspé-South* | 90.5 | 89.1 | 50.4 | 49.6 | - | 3.1 |
| Gatineau* | 79.5 | 77.8 | 54.6 | 45.4 | - | 10.6 |
| Hull | 84.3 | 78.0 | 63.4 | 36.6 | - | 2.0 |

In those cases where there was a straight fight both in 1960 and 1962, the figure for the swing has been printed in red type. In several constituencies the swing was distorted. In Chambly, this occurred because the swing does not take into account the intervening by-election. The same is true of the swing for Joliette, where, in addition, the Liberal vote in 1962 was seriously split by a breakaway candidate.

** These seats were Union Nationale gains.

| Constituency | % Voting 1960 | % Voting 1962 | % Lib. | % UN | % Oth. | Swing in % 1960-62 |
|------------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------|---------|-----------|-----------------------|
| Huntingdon | 85.8 | 85.2 | 45.9 | 54.1 | - | 2.6 |
| Iberville | 92.8 | 91.1 | 55.9 | 44.1 | - | 1.6 |
| Iles-de-la-Madeleine* | 89.1 | 92.1 | 51.9 | 48.1 | - | 8.9 |
| Joliette** | 89.6 | 85.9 | 26.9 | 53.0 | 20.1 | 1.7 |
| Jonquière-Kenogami | 87.8 | 86.5 | 60.4 | 39.6 | - | -0.8 |
| Kamouraska* | 84.6 | 82.0 | 50.2 | 49.8 | - | 4.0 |
| Labelle | 89.9 | 84.5 | 41.0 | 57.1 | 1.1 | -5.8 |
| Lac-St. Jean | 91.9 | 89.2 | 52.6 | 47.4 | - | -4.6 |
| L'Assomption | 89.1 | 84.5 | 55.1 | 44.9 | - | 5.1 |
| Laviolette | 88.9 | 85.2 | 46.4 | 53.6 | - | -1.9 |
| Levis | 90.2 | 88.5 | 54.9 | 44.9 | 0.7 | 0.1 |
| L'Islet** | 86.5 | 83.9 | 46.8 | 53.2 | - | -11.3 |
| Lotbinière | 90.8 | 88.6 | 46.4 | 53.6 | - | -2.9 |
| Maskinongé | 92.9 | 91.9 | 46.3 | 53.7 | - | 0.6 |
| Matane | 84.5 | 83.2 | 50.4 | 49.6 | - | -3.1 |
| Matapédia | 86.1 | 84.3 | 51.1 | 48.9 | - | -5.7 |
| Mégantic | 91.8 | 88.9 | 55.1 | 44.9 | - | -4.1 |
| Missisquoi | 89.8 | 84.8 | 42.6 | 57.4 | - | 0.3 |
| Montcalm* | 90.3 | 88.5 | 55.1 | 44.9 | - | 7.6 |
| Montmagny** | 89.2 | 86.6 | 49.5 | 50.5 | - | -0.6 |
| Montmorency | 90.2 | 88.3 | 47.1 | 50.7 | 2.2 | 2.6 |
| Napierville-Laprairie* | 90.0 | 86.3 | 56.5 | 43.5 | - | 6.6 |
| Nicolet* | 84.6 | 86.0 | 51.7 | 48.3 | - | 4.6 |
| Papineau | 90.5 | 85.7 | 44.7 | 55.3 | - | -1.6 |
| Pontiac | 82.1 | 75.9 | 40.2 | 59.8 | - | -1.4 |
| Portneuf | 90.3 | 85.4 | 51.3 | 48.1 | 0.6 | -2.8 |
| Quebec-Centre* | 83.9 | 84.1 | 55.1 | 44.9 | - | 8.6 |
| Quebec Comté | 88.2 | 87.1 | 57.9 | 42.1 | - | 1.2 |
| Quebec-East* | 88.7 | 88.6 | 52.2 | 47.8 | - | 4.7 |
| Quebec-West | 87.0 | 88.2 | 67.9 | 32.1 | - | 11.8 |
| Richelieu | 88.9 | 90.1 | 55.6 | 44.4 | - | 2.4 |
| Richmond | 90.6 | 85.1 | 57.9 | 42.1 | - | 4.4 |
| Rimouski | 85.7 | 82.7 | 52.2 | 47.8 | - | -3.6 |
| Rivière-du-loup | 88.4 | 85.7 | 51.2 | 46.8 | - | -0.2 |
| Roberval** | 83.7 | 85.1 | 44.8 | 51.2 | - | -10.3 |
| Rouville | 89.1 | 86.8 | 56.1 | 43.9 | - | 8.8 |
| Rouyn-Noranda | 88.9 | 85.5 | 60.1 | 39.9 | - | 7.8 |
| Saguenay | 80.1 | 79.0 | 57.4 | 42.6 | - | -1.7 |
| St. Hyacinthe | 85.6 | 84.9 | 56.3 | 43.7 | - | 1.1 |
| St. Jean | 91.8 | 89.6 | 50.6 | 45.6 | 3.8 | 1.9 |
| St. Maurice | 91.0 | 88.2 | 55.7 | 44.3 | - | 1.6 |

| Constituency | % Voting 1960 | % Voting 1962 | % Lib. | % UN | % Oth. | Swing in % 1960-62 |
|---------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------|---------|-----------|-----------------------|
| St. Sauveur | 88.6 | 89.3 | 48.6 | 51.4 | - | 7.4 |
| Shefford | 88.1 | 85.2 | 46.7 | 50.0 | 3.3 | 1.4 |
| Sherbrooke | 84.1 | 81.3 | 52.5 | 47.3 | 0.2 | 0.6 |
| Stanstead | 86.5 | 84.3 | 56.3 | 43.0 | 0.7 | 5.4 |
| Temiscamingue * | 89.7 | 87.2 | 53.0 | 47.0 | | -0.2 |
| Temiscouata | 86.6 | 82.4 | 39.3 | 60.7 | | -7.2 |
| Terrebonne | 90.0 | 85.0 | 59.0 | 41.0 | - | -0.5 |
| Trois Rivières | 89.2 | 90.0 | 48.5 | 51.6 | - | -1.4 |
| Vaudreuil-Soulanges | 89.6 | 90.4 | 57.5 | 42.5 | | 7.1 |
| Verchères | 91.0 | 87.6 | 58.5 | 41.5 | | 8.2 |
| Wolfe ** | 92.2 | 90.2 | 46.4 | 52.9 | 0.7 | -5.4 |
| Yamaska | 87.9 | 84.6 | 39.8 | 60.2 | - | -4.7 |

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