

Working on the Margins: A Labour History of  
the Native Peoples of Northern Labrador

by

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## ABSTRACT

This study is an analysis of the changes in the social formations of the Inuit and Innut populations of northern Labrador as a consequence of interaction with Western capital, from approximately 1500 to the present. It is concluded that the significant changes which have taken place can only be explained if they are placed within a unified theoretical framework that combines both macro and micro levels of analysis. This requirement stems from the impact of the global nature of capital, and from the specific characteristics of the indigenous social formations in northern Labrador.

To facilitate the analysis, the history of the penetration of capital into northern Labrador has been divided into two major political-economic periods: mercantile: 1500-1926, and welfare state: 1926-present. The former is further subdivided into two phases: the competitive phase, 1500-1763, during which no one European power held sway; and the monopoly phase, 1763-1926, during which either Britain or one of its colonies was jurally the sole European authority. Finally, the welfare period, 1926-present, which includes a transitional period, 1926-1942, is characterized by the increasing importance of wage labour and state agencies. Each of these periods is examined in terms of the internal and external relations

between and amongst the European and native social formations which led to mutual modifications.

## RESUME

Cette étude s'adresse aux changements dans la formation sociale des populations Inuit et Innut dans le nord de Labrador, des conséquences de leur interaction avec le capital occidental, depuis environ 1500 jusqu'à présent. Notre conclusion est que les changements significatifs qui ont eu lieu ne peuvent être expliqués que dans un cadre théorique qui unifie les niveaux analytiques "macro" et "micro". Cet exigence découle de l'impact de la nature globale du capital, et de la spécificité des formations sociales indigènes dans le nord de Labrador.

Afin de faciliter l'analyse, nous diviserons l'histoire de l'entrée du capital dans le nord du Labrador en deux périodes politico-économiques principales: la mercantiliste, de 1500 à 1926; et l'Etat-providence, de 1926 jusqu'à présent. La première période est composée de deux phases: la phase compétitive, de 1500 à 1763, pendant laquelle aucun pouvoir européen n'a pu prédominer; la deuxième phase, de 1763 à 1926, pendant laquelle Grande Bretagne ou une de ses colonies était la seule autorité européenne juridiquement reconnue. Finalement, la période de l'Etat-providence de 1926 jusqu'à présent, incluant aussi une période de transition, de 1926 à 1942, est caractérisée par l'importance croissant du travail salarié et des organismes étatiques. Nous examinerons chacune de

ces périodes sur le plan des relations internes et externes  
entre, et parmi, les formations sociales européennes et  
indigènes /autochtones qui ont abouti à des modifications  
mutuelles.

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## Introduction

The aboriginal peoples of Canada occupy the bottom rung of the country's social hierarchy. In almost every category examined by the 1981 national census (see Appendix A), they are worse off than the rest of the population. For example, their average income is two-thirds that of non-aboriginals, their educational level is lower, they experience higher unemployment, and more than 16% of their homes need major repair, as opposed to 6.5% of non-aboriginal homes. This dismal state of affairs is the legacy of the impact of European intrusion, an intrusion that brought with it the penetration of capital into the economic practices of Canada's indigenous peoples.

The following analysis traces this process of penetration in northern Labrador, where current conditions are even more severe than the national figures indicate. The forms of capitalist penetration are delineated, and the dynamic linkages between them and the social formations of the aboriginal peoples are elucidated. Given this generalized impoverishment among the aboriginal peoples in Canada, the questions addressed for Labrador are of concern to the entire country.

An examination of the anthropological literature dealing with northern Labrador reveals two distinctive features. First, except for Henriksen (1971, 1973), the Innuit of Davis Inlet have been largely ignored. And second, the analysis of the Inuit and Settler populations

have been either ethnohistorical accounts of the impact of the Moravian missionaries (Brice-Bennett 1982, Richling 1979), or transactionalist treatments of current social interaction at the community level (Ben-Dor 1966, Kennedy 1982).

On their own terms, these analyses are good: they are well written, well documented and informative. However, there are a number of conceptual gaps in them that the following analysis will attempt to fill. Briefly, given that the most salient force contributing to social change during the post-contact period in northern Labrador has been the penetration of capital, the analytical tools used to comprehend that history should be sensitive to the inherent characteristics of capitalism as a political and economic system. Thus, in northern Labrador, the concepts of mercantilism and the welfare state are central, as abstract categories and as concrete objects of analysis. For a complete analysis, both aspects must be addressed.

In the studies noted above, the analyses have tended to focus on the latter, that is, the substantive component. Thus, mercantilism becomes synonymous with trade, and the welfare state is collapsed into the actions of the agents of government and bureaucracy. In short, they are not constructed in theory and, thus, the analyses based on them are locked within their own idiosyncratic series of events.

In contradistinction, the following analysis takes the concrete manifestation of mercantilism and the welfare

state in northern Labrador as only one in an array of conceptual instances. This approach facilitates the insertion of the history of the penetration of capital into northern Labrador within the context of capitalism as a global phenomenon. Mercantilism is thus a form of labour exploitation which has particular repercussions at the level of social formation. And the welfare state is a form of political intrusion that promotes the maintenance of the interests of capital in a region, while simultaneously producing a discourse that emphasizes fairness in the distribution of the national wealth.

Augmenting the number of conceptual referents attributed to mercantilism and the welfare state to include the abstract as well as the substantive is also a means through which to address the methodological issue of sample size. The total population of the communities in which fieldwork was conducted was only 804 in 1982. Therefore, when one begins to place members of the communities into social and/or economic categories, those categories become extremely small. For example, in Davis Inlet there was one entrepreneur. Obviously, extrapolating from such a sample is ludicrous. However, since the analysis operates at a number of levels of abstraction and takes a longitudinal view, the issue is not, how does the entrepreneurial class behave, but, why is there only one entrepreneur. From this perspective, historical processes come to the fore and the communities are addressed as aggregates of socially

constituted individuals confronted by the penetration of capital. Thus, mercantilism, the welfare state, and the social formations of the Inuit and the Innut are constructed in theory in order that the concrete behaviour of people, as documented through historical research and fieldwork, can be used to address the wider issues involved in analyzing the penetration of capital into peripheral regions.

Given the above discussion, the theoretical objective of the following analysis is to demonstrate that the transformations in the social formations of particular Inuit and Innut populations of northern Labrador are the result of a process involving their interaction with the various forms of the penetration of capital over the last four hundred years. The substantive objective is to explain selected aspects of the current social formations now extant in the northern Labrador communities of Hopedale and Davis Inlet.

The Communities

Hopedale, the more southern of the two villages, had a population of 468 in 1982. This population can be subdivided into four groups: outsiders, Settlers, Hopedale Inuit, and Hebron Inuit. The outsiders are representatives of the dominant society of southern Canada. They consist

of four officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Policemen (RCMP) and their wives, who are in Hopedale on three-year postings; nine school teachers, who only live in the village during the school year; an American social worker, whose salary is paid by the Methodist Central Committee, who is in the village on a three-year posting, and his wife and two children; one nurse, who takes care of the nursing station; and, finally, the store manager. Although the last individual was born in Mud Lake, a small community outside of Happy Valley in central Labrador, and thus could be classed as a Settler, he spent fourteen years in the Canadian Armed Forces, during which time he lived outside of Labrador. During the fieldwork period (Hopedale, July 1981 to March 1982; Davis Inlet, May 1982 to December 1982), there was no minister in the community.

These agents of the state and their families, regardless of varying commitments to their jobs, are generally there for only a few years. For example, a complete turnover of teachers every two years is not unusual. This lack of continuity encourages them to interact more with each other than with the rest of the inhabitants of the community, who are wary of these transient administrators.

The Settlers are the descendants of private European traders who took up residence on the northern coast of Labrador in the nineteenth century. At the outset, due to mutual dependence, their relationship with the Inuit was



quite close. The Settlers provided difficult to obtain trade goods, and the Inuit provided information about the environment and how to exploit it. In fact, the Settlers intermarried with the Inuit in the first generation, although now they are largely endogamous.

The labelling of the Inuit population by their village of origin is a little misleading, in that the villages are the result of colonial intrusion. Crosscutting these imposed spatial identities are those derived from the location that, prior to the intrusion of the Europeans, an extended kin group, or perhaps a number of kin groups, occupied on a seasonal basis, and over which they had de facto rights of usufruct. During the monopoly period of mercantile intrusion (1763-1926) these indigenous bases of identity were partially replaced by Moravian mission stations, where, through the agency of the Moravian missionaries, they began to spend more and more of their time. However, the people maintained their interests in their pre-contact areas of exploitation.

Nevertheless, the Hopedale Inuit are those people who were born in Hopedale. The Hebron Inuit are that part of the population who were resettled from the more northerly village of Hebron in 1959 as part of a government policy of consolidation of services, and their descendents.

Davis Inlet is an Inuit village with a population of three hundred, about sixty kilometers north of Hopedale. It was established as a trading post in 1831 by the A.B.

Hunt company, which was bought out by the Hudson's Bay Company in 1869; who ran the commerce in Davis Inlet until 1942, when they gave up the business to the Newfoundland government. The Innut did not begin to trade in Davis Inlet on a regular basis until 1850, after a period of severe privation in the interior.

In 1967, the village site was moved about two miles, and the construction of housing for the Innut began for the first time. By 1968, thirty-three houses had been built, sufficient for most people who were spending part of the year in the village. It must be noted that the Innut living in Davis Inlet are still not totally sedentarized. Many return to the land in the interior of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula for extended periods.

The infrastructure of the village includes a permanent mission which was established by the Roman Catholic Order of Oblates in 1952, after twenty-four years of annual visits by a priest to Davis Inlet. In 1982, the population of the village was 336, comprised of eighteen outsiders, 316 Innut, and two Settlers. The economic and political position of the outsiders is essentially the same as that in Hopedale, although three teachers have married into the community and the three RCMP visit only two weekends a month.

This brief outline of the social composition of the two villages belies another fundamental component of life in Labrador. That is, the socio-ideological process of

constructing an identity through the actions of Labradorians outside of the villages. At one level the Innut, the Inuit, and the Settlers are all extremely conscious of their identity as Labradorians. Part of this derives from their location in the political and economic grid of Newfoundland and Canada, which places them, as a region, in opposition to the larger political units. But their identity is also deeply rooted in the social and economic practices they partake in, as simple commodity and use value producers outside the villages. In one sense, the villages are not where they live; living in Labrador is defined in terms of access to and exploitation of the wildlife resources. The importance of these resources goes far beyond their economic value; the process of their production and consumption provide a focal point for the definition of self, and a large part of this process takes place outside of the villages.

In a later section, which examines the ideological consequences of the intrusion of European and Canadian agents and institutions, it will be demonstrated that there has been a partial rupture between particular social, political, and economic practices and that component of the total ideological configuration that informs them. For now, it is enough to note that living in Labrador means much more than can be accounted for by examining life in the villages. Labrador must be addressed as a region where people derive as much meaning from the hinterland as they

do from the villages, if not more.

Life in these villages is hard. The housing is poor. In the spring and fall gastroenteritis caused by bad water is a problem. And the economy, which is heavily subsidized by the state, maintains the people at a very low standard of living. These factors combine to create a pall of hopelessness which has led to the generation of serious social pathologies. The desperate straits in which these people find themselves is indicated by the mortality figures for the north coast of Labrador, collected and compiled by Kay Wooton, who was the medical officer for the region in the 1970's.

Table I

Mortality Rates, Nain to Rigolet, 1971-1980

Death rates per 1000 live births

1. Peri-natal mortality

Northern Labrador	34.4 p/1000
Other indigenous peoples in Canada	28.0 p/1000
National figure	11.8 p/1000

2. Post neo-natal (after 28 days)

Northern Labrador	33.8 p/1000
Other indigenous peoples in Canada	14.0 p/1000
National figure	3.7 p/1000

3. Infant (up to two yrs.)

Northern Labrador	65.2 p/1000
Other indigenous peoples in Canada	24.0 p/1000
National figure	11.0 p/1000

Suicide rates per 100,000

Northern Labrador	80.0 p/100,000
Other indigeneous peoples in Canada	24.3 p/100,000
National figure	14.0 p/100,000

Suicides in age range 15-24 yrs. per 100,000

Northern Labrador	337 p/100,000
Other indigeneous peoples in Canada	130 p/100,000
National figure	14.0 p/100,000

Accidents, Violence and Poisonings resulting in Death per 100,000

Northern Labrador	355 p/100,000
Other indigeneous peoples in Canada	
Amerindian	239 p/100,000
Inuit	160 p/100,000
National figure	72 p/100,000

Drownings per 100,000

Northern Labrador	142.0 p/100,000
Other indigeneous peoples in Canada	22.5 p/100,000
National figure	3.0 p/100,000

Deaths by Fire per 100,000

Northern Labrador	63.0 p/100,000
Other indigeneous peoples in Canada	23.3 p/100,000
National figure	3.5 p/100,000

Childhood accidents as percentage of Childhood deaths 0-16 yrs.

Northern Labrador	83%
Other indigeneous peoples in Canada	69%
National figure	9%

Source: Wooton (1983)

For both villages the obvious question is how did things get so bad? One's first inclination is to look for identifiable culprits; however, any argument that simply lays the blame uncritically at the feet of white society is insufficient, and a more complex approach is needed.

In both villages economic opportunities are restricted to the salmon and char fishery in the summer, hunting and trapping the rest of the year, and limited craft production and wage-labour year round. Further, the position of the two communities vis-à-vis the state are identical. Given this relative equality in objective conditions, the contrasting political and economic strategies of the Innut and Inuit provide the point of departure for the analysis. It is argued that the divergence in responses is not the result of cultural difference, but rather is to be found in their respective histories of contact. To facilitate the analysis, a number of abstract concepts are operationalized. These concepts are enumerated and defined in the next section.

### Theoretical Orientation

The theoretical components of the following analysis derive from modes of production and world systems theory.

A mode of production is defined as:

... an articulated combination of relations and forces of production structured by the dominance of the relations of production. The relations of production define a specific mode of appropriation of surplus-labour and the specific form of social distribution of the means of production corresponding to the mode of appropriation of surplus-labour.... 'Forces of production' refers to the mode of appropriation of nature, that is, to the

labour process in which a determinate, raw material is transformed into a determinant product. (Hindess and Hirst 1975: 9-10; in Katz 1980: 52).

While at first glance this definition seems inclusive, some elaboration is required. First, this concept is drawn from Marx, who elaborated a limited number of historically derived modes of production: pre-capitalist, feudal, Germanic, Asiatic, slave, and capitalist. Second, these categories were then theoretically refined to isolate, for each, the matrix of relations and forces of production in the abstract. In the process of this refinement, which has been further developed by other theorists (e.g., Althusser 1968, Althusser and Balibar 1970), the categories became static abstract structures, which pre-empted historical process by definition. This limitation has prompted critics such as Thompson (1978) to contend that the modes-of-production approach was of little value in dealing with class struggle. Third, in any concrete social formation it is analytically possible to isolate particular features of a number of modes of production (e.g., pre-capitalist sharing with capitalist production). It is proposed that more than one mode of production is in place, and that these modes of production are articulated. This latter aspect is qualified in that one mode of production is dominant, which means that the dominated mode no longer assures all its own conditions of reproduction and relies on input from the dominating mode of production.

The other theoretical position drawn on is that of world systems. In this approach it is argued that once a social formation has become integrated into the capitalist system in any of its productive practices, the entire system becomes part of the capitalist system. Thus, for theorists such as Wallerstein (1976) and Banaji (1977) the dominated mode of production is part and parcel of the capitalist system, and should not be analyzed as if it had a separate existence.

The implications of these two positions for the analysis which follows can be easily demonstrated by reference to a modern Amerindian trapper in northern Quebec who traps a beaver, sells the skin, and shares the meat. The modes-of-production position would hold that the production and sale of the beaver skin falls within the matrix of capitalist relations of production, while the sharing of the meat demonstrates the maintenance of pre-capitalist relations. The world-systems position would concur with the characterization of the production and sale of the beaver skin, but would maintain that the sharing of the beaver meat was in fact a deformed pre-capitalist relation of exchange which lessens the cost of reproduction of labour for capital, by placing the onus for this on the worker.

While the world-systems interpretation seems logical, it fails to explain the lack of class consciousness on the part of northern Quebec Amerindians. Laclau (1977)



contends that this problem stems from the confusion of levels of abstraction. He maintains that what is referred to as the capitalist mode of production is actually participation in the world capitalist system. There is no doubt that there is exploitation, but it is not at the instance of production, and it is thus outside the matrix of the capitalist relations of production. They are non-capitalist relations of production in which there are inherent barriers to the development of class. Other critics, such as Booth, propose that the world-system approach, in its "dependency theory" incarnation, does not present any convincing data to support its position. This is a problem which is exacerbated by the fact that the research that uses the model addressed only macro examples which corroborate or, as Booth argues, "illustrate", its position (1985: 762-765). The positive feature of this approach is that it permits the conceptualization of a much more complex capitalist mode of production, what Chevalier (1982) refers to as the "polymorphous development" of capitalism.

Finally, the concept of social formation refers to the economic, political, and ideological practices in a historically situated, spatially bounded social group. Further, each social formation is a product of a particular historical process, which includes modifications in the local situation and shifts in the prevailing international conjuncture that influence the local situation.

### Methodology

To operationalize these theoretical concepts in order to address the substantive objective of analyzing two current social formations in northern Labrador, Eggan's (1954) controlled comparative approach is adopted. This method restricts the data base in terms of both cases and variables examined. The methodological issues that accompany this procedure are: 1) Why look at only two communities? 2) On what criteria was the choice of the communities based? 3) Why limit the analysis to selected aspects of the social formations? 4) And why use a theoretical perspective derived from a "Grand Theorist," in this case Marx?

With regard to the first and third issues, the restriction of the analysis to selected cases and variables is necessary in order to provide sufficient historical depth. As Eggan notes:

... our best insights into the nature of society and culture come from seeing social structures and cultural patterns over time. Here is where we can distinguish the accidental from the general, evaluate more clearly the factors and forces operating in a given situation, and describe the processes involved in general terms. (1954: 775)

Since the following analysis goes back to the archaeological record to trace transformations in the social formations of the Inuit and Innuit of northern Labrador, the expansion of the analysis to include more regions would render it unmanageable. As Kobben states:

Given, however, the scarcity of time, money, and adequate ethnographic sources, it is true that for many intercultural problems one can better restrict oneself to a limited number of strategically chosen cases, even if the results one thus arrives at will never constitute proof in the mathematical sense of the word. (1973: 587)

This leads to the issue of why Hopedale and Davis Inlet were chosen, and why the Inuit and the Innut.

These choices were made on both the basis of circumstance and with an eye to limiting the breadth of the data base. The two groups were chosen because of their distinct histories during the period of mercantile intrusion (1500-1926). As will be discussed at length below, this distinctness is a critical factor in comprehending the subsequent transformations in their respective social formations and their current status.

Conversely, the choice of Hopedale and Davis Inlet was based on the proximity of the two communities and the similarities in the environmental and political situation. That is, the two communities are only sixty kilometers apart and share similar natural resource bases. Further, both communities come under the jurisdiction of the same federal and provincial agencies. Just as the distinctness of their experience during the mercantile period permits statements about mercantile capital, their similar experiences during the modern period (1926 to present) allow statements about the welfare state.

Finally, the choice to base the theoretical

perspective on a Marxian approach is an effort to raise the analysis above that of a regional report. There are, naturally, drawbacks to this method. As Kuper notes:

Even if we accept the Weberian position that the choice of focus is ultimately a moral and thus scientifically arbitrary, the fact remains that, once the focus is selected, it imposes its own analytical imperatives. (1980: 35)

This, however, does not invalidate the analysis. Rather, it necessitates stating clearly what the limitations of the analysis are. As Kobben has pointed out, many theories:

... suffer from what Hampel (1964: 318-319) calls the inadequate specification of scope [original emphasis], i.e., the failure to indicate clearly the range of situations (limits of tolerance) to which the statements refer. (1973: 589)

The concepts used are derived from Marx, but they are not the object of analysis, they are tools to facilitate the understanding of the history of northern Labrador. Whether or not the model derived from the analysis, which comments on the forms of the penetration of capital in peripheral areas, is transferable to other regions can only be ascertained by conducting the same type of intensive analysis in other regions. If the comparative method is to have any validity in making comments on social change, as opposed to correlating traits, the controlled comparison is the only route.

The most salient problem encountered in this task is that social formations are dynamic, that is, they are

responsive to changes in the social, economic, and environmental context in which they exist. Thus, the characteristics of the social formation of a given group at time "A" are not necessarily a useful frame of reference for understanding the social, economic, and ideological practices of the same group at time "B." The complexity of the problem is obvious, as not only do the European players in the historical process change over time, but the social formations with which they interact also change. To make sense of the overall interaction, it is necessary to provide analytical parameters through which meanings are attached to the practices of the subjects of the analysis.

#### Analytical Parameters

To deal with this problem, the labour history of the native peoples of northern Labrador will be divided into two periods: the mercantile period (1500-1926), and the welfare state period (1926-present). The former period is subdivided into two phases: the competitive phase (1500-1763) and the monopoly phase (1763-1926). During the competitive phase, no one European power exercised control over the Quebec-Labrador peninsula; while during the monopoly phase, either Britain or one of its colonial possessions was the sole jural authority. The welfare-state period, which includes a transition period

(1926-1942), is characterized by the growing influence of the state over the region and the increasing availability of wage labour.

These periods were characterized by particular forms of interaction between the European form of intrusion and the structure of the social formations of the native peoples. The transformations in the social formations, contingent on their incorporation into the intrusive social relations of production, will be examined in terms of three broad processes: economic dependency, political domination, and ideological hegemony. In certain historical conjunctures all three of these processes are involved, but this is not necessarily the case. Not only do levels of dependency, domination, and hegemony vary, but also their particular combinations.

Economic dependency as a concept is quite simple; it occurs when a producer can no longer survive without material input from an outside group which controls the needed resources. The problem is not one of defining dependency; rather, it arises in attempting to apply the concept, that is, when has a producer group become dependent, what is the point of no return? This is a central issue when examining native Labradorian response to the intrusion of capital. As long as subsistence production remains a viable option, the ability to induce increased production through strictly economic means is constrained, leaving a significant latitude of options open

to the producers. The issue is thus substantive.

The processes of political domination and ideological hegemony are more involved, and are intertwined with economic dependency. In this regard it is important to note that as the level of domination in one sector increases, while the domination of other sectors, does not follow mechanically, control is easier to achieve due to the weakened position of the producers. That is, there is no reason to believe that once a group has become economically dependent they will also be politically dominated, but it is much easier to convince people to submit to political domination if they are dependent.

Political domination refers to control over leadership, authority, and conflict resolution in the social, economic, and religious sectors, beyond the household level. Since political domination is multi-centric, it varies both as to degree and as to the sectors dominated. Resistance to such domination thus may take place in the sector of least domination.

Ideological hegemony refers to the transformation of the way in which people perceive reality such that becomes consonant with the intrusive relations of production. In fact, Larrain dispenses with the modifier and simply refers to ideology as "... a particular distorted kind of consciousness which conceals contradictions" (1979: 50). However, if the analytical category of ideology is reduced to false consciousness, it becomes impossible to entertain

any notion of resistance taking place at the ideological level. Thus, a broader approach is needed.

Instead of viewing ideology as false consciousness, or as a coherent amorphous set of beliefs whose abstract nature renders them powerless in the material world, ideology must, analytically at least, be broken into discrete, albeit related, sets of beliefs that are attached to and inform specific practices in a given social formation. Therefore, there is ideological content in all material practices.

At the analytical level, a given social formation, prior to the intrusion of capital, would have a set of economic and non-economic practices which are ideologically informed and necessarily largely congruent, although internal contradictions exist--that is, if the social formation is to continue intact through time, (e.g., Leach, 1954). Further, the capitalist system which intrudes also has a set of ideologically informed economic and non-economic practices, which again are largely congruent but have internal contradictions. When capital intrudes into a social formation, the analyst is faced with a maze of practices and ideologies which are interfacing both internally and externally in a highly complex manner. In order to comprehend the processes, it is necessary to break down these interfaces into discrete units to elucidate the linkages and interactions.

Admittedly, this approach downplays the



interpenetration of different facets of an overall ideology with itself and all other practices. However, in order to operationalize the concept in a comprehensible manner and to be able to discuss contradictions at the ideological level, the content of that ideology must be delineated, and that necessitates discussing that content in terms of a particular practice.

For example, in the intrusion of mercantile capital into northern Canada it is apparent that the process of labour subsumption is directly linked to the process of increasing dependency. But this does not necessarily mean that the ideology of production is transformed simultaneously. Rich (1960) has noted that the Amerindian fur producers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would not increase their production even when the price of furs was increased. Thus, the Amerindian producers were maintaining an ideology of production and consumption that was at odds with the ideology of mercantile capital, that is, the ideology of the form of production in which they were engaged. Not only was there a contradiction between economic ideology and economic practice, but ideology became an integral part of the production process. This latter point derives from the conception of ideology and practice as a unit, which, while they may be in contradiction, cannot be separated without doing unacceptable violence to the concept of praxis.

This argument can also be extended to non-economic

practices, for example, the relationship between political practice and ideology in a situation of foreign intrusion. In the case of northern Canada the state has established hierarchical local-level political structures which are totally alien to the egalitarian political system that had previously existed. In this case there is a high probability that the political practice and the political ideology will be in opposition at the local level while being congruent at the state level. This situation, which exists in northern Labrador, has practical effects at the concrete level as politicians attempt to deal with the ideological contradictions that obtain.

In sum, ideology is an important component in that it can act as the catalyst for confrontation and can also provide the forum in which the confrontation takes place. In this sense it is as much a material practice as any other.

Thus, the three processes through which intrusion occurs are all subject to internal restrictions, but they are also subject to the particular set of conditions at each historical conjuncture. As Marx pointed out, the level of domination accomplished is in part dependent on the solidity and internal structure of the producer society (1967: 332). Exploiting the weaknesses in the producers' pre-intrusion social formation is thus an important part of forced social transformation. Weaknesses occur naturally, but they can be aggravated or, at times, created by the

actions of the intrusive power. Therefore, it is necessary to have a clear idea of the characteristics of the social formations under duress in order to comprehend why the transformations take place.

Notes

1. For an explanation of the term Innut see Chapter 1: 28-30.
2. The term "native" is used to refer to Innut, Inuit and Settlers, while the terms "aboriginal" and "indigenous" refer only to the Inuit and Innut.

## Chapter 1: Baseline Social Formations

### Introduction

This chapter will outline baseline social formations for the barren-ground Inuit and the northern Labrador Inuit, utilizing available data. It will be established that there was a significant level of correspondence between the two groups in their economic practices, their secular and spiritual leadership systems, their forms of conflict resolution, and particular aspects of their respective ideological configurations. Thus, an initial point of reference will be provided to which subsequent transformations in the social formations of the Inuit and Inuit of Labrador will be related.

Prior to any comprehensive account of the traditional social formations of the Inuit or barren-ground Inuit of northern Labrador, both groups had already been in contact with Europeans or European commodities, to varying degrees, for some time. In fact, the Inuit expansion into central and southern Labrador from 1500 to 1700 was predicated, in part, on their desire to obtain European commodities (Fitzhugh 1978; Jordan 1977). It is possible that the barren-ground Inuit also modified their traditional subsistence cycle early in the seventeenth century in order to include trading expeditions to the French settlement of

Tadoussac on the north shore of the St. Lawrence River (Cooke 1969). Although the extent of Innut trade in the early period is not known, Rich (1958: 261) notes that in the mid-1700s there was an attempt to enlist Innut living on the north shore of the St. Lawrence River as middlemen, to establish trade with the barren-ground Innut. Nevertheless, regardless of the level of early interaction between the barren-ground Innut and the Europeans, there is no question of the incorporation of a number of European commodities into their tool kit (Denton 1983).

Given this, it is necessary to refer to a combination of archaeological, historical, and contemporary social anthropological data to establish a tentative baseline social formation for the two groups, to which subsequent transformations can be related. Of particular interest will be changes in economic practices, leadership and authority, conflict resolution, and the ideology which informs them. Since social change is the primary topic of this analysis, causality is the focal issue; and it is immediately apparent that any simple linear approach to causality is patently insufficient.

For example, the direct ancestors of the Labrador Inuit, the Thule, are believed to have begun their expansion into northern coastal Labrador in the fourteenth century. By 1450, they occupied the Labrador coast as far south as Saglak Fjord; and by 1600 they had reached Hamilton Inlet (Jordan 1978). As mentioned above, this

expansion was partially due to their desire to obtain European commodities; but it also corresponds to a period of general climatic deterioration in the Arctic. McGhee (1969/70) proposes that the expansion of the Alaskan whaling culture across the central and eastern Arctic in less than two hundred years can be attributed to climatic change and its effects on Thule access to marine mammals, especially whales.

Analytically, these two contributing factors (climate and trade) have given rise to two perspectives on the transformation of the Thule household, from nuclear to communal, a transformation that took place some time between the early Thule expansion and 1700. Schledermann (1976) attributes the shift to climatic deterioration which contributed to the adoption of communal houses in order to conserve heat. Further, he argues that the reduction in the accessibility of whales fostered a modification of food-sharing practices, as seal replaced whale as the primary subsistence resource. The extent of this substitution is indicated by the archaeological remains found in the sod winter houses that produced a preponderance of seal bones, accounting for 83% to 95% of the collection from individual houses, while caribou accounted for only 1.5% to 2.3% with only trace remains of whales (Jordan and Kaplan 1980).

Other archaeologists emphasize an intervening variable between the Labrador Inuit and the whales to account for

the change in household composition. Kaplan points out that coincidental with the domestic transformation " ... the European market for whale products was great and Eskimos [Inuit] in the south adopted the role of middlemen in a network of moving whale products and European goods" (1980: 650). Jordan has directly related this trade to the transformation in household structure. While accepting climatic change as important, he questions Schledermann's strictly environmental determinist position, positing that the rise of the role of middleman among the Inuit was also a major contributing factor. He states:

High status was usually the result of superior hunting abilities. In European contact situations, an adeptness in trading is also viewed by other Eskimos as extremely important (cf. Spencer 1959; Taylor 1974). Since European material goods would probably have fallen under the category of private property, access to these goods may not have been available beyond the household level of organization. This inclusion of larger numbers of both kin and non-kin members within a single household would have facilitated access to their resources and increased their prestige as a result of association with important hunter-traders" (1978: 184).

While this example refers to the two essential components for analyzing social change--the intrusive factors stimulating change and the form that change takes, in terms of the response of the people undergoing change--it tends to emphasize the former. However, it is the analysis of the latter component that reveals the nature of the relationship between the intrusive factors



and the people who are faced with the task of coping with them. That is, are the social changes being examined voluntary, forced, or some combination of the two? Further, in the event that the change is forced, have there been any local modifications which altered the original structure and/or intent of the directed change? These are questions which must be addressed if the people of northern Labrador are to maintain their integrity within the analysis. However, care must be taken not to overcompensate in this regard.

While it is true that during the early contact period the Inuit and Innuit were the dominant partners in their respective relationships with Europeans (Gosling 1910, Cooke 1969), both groups eventually came to be dominated. Whereas at one time they were able to control the character and structure of their interaction with Europeans, the progressive loss of their political and economic autonomy left them with only two strategies, cooperation or resistance.

Seen from this perspective, the modification of the Inuit household from nuclear to communal was a combination of environmental change, the opportunity provided by the Europeans for the Inuit to broaden their trade network, and the Inuit social formation in which the goods were appropriated and employed. It was not directed by the intruders.

For example, the Europeans who first frequented the

Labrador coast on a regular basis were Basques, who came to hunt whales, not trade with the Inuit. It was of little concern to the Basques what form the Inuit household took. The salient problem for the Basques was to cope with Inuit aggression, not modify the Inuit social formation (Barkham 1980). In sum, then, any modification in a domestic social formation, whether Inuit or Innuit, must be regarded within the context of the characteristics of the existing social formation and its linkages to the intrusive factors.

Since the above discussion on causality includes an introduction to the Labrador Inuit, the analysis will proceed with the delineation of the baseline social formation for the Inuit, which will be followed by a similar delineation and analysis of a baseline social formation for the barren-ground Innuit. These descriptions do not presume to be comprehensive; however, the aspects of the social formations which are highlighted reveal a fundamental correspondence between the two groups at the level of social organization. This correspondence is a necessary component of the argument presented herein, which proposes that the format of European intrusion, as opposed to the pre-contact social formation of the aboriginal groups, was the most significant factor in inducing and channeling social change. In this context, the responses of the aboriginal groups would demonstrate a high degree of similarity during the first period of European intrusion (1500-1763). In later periods, as the distinct formats of

intrusion cause differential transformations in the pre-contact social formations, the character and content of the responses would diverge. By the same token, when both groups are confronted by the welfare state there is a degree of convergence between the two groups in their responses.

A similar process has been described by Taylor for western Ireland. He states:

Local peasant communities in the west of Ireland were involved in a very long process of market integration.... This process was complex, and the results differed regionally according to both the nature of landlordship, and local patterns of social structure. (1980: 170).

The importance of the form of European intrusion to the types of transformations that took place in aboriginal social formations is indicated by the divergent forms of response exhibited by closely related groups to different forms of intrusion. For example, in chapter two the analysis compares the response of the north shore Innu to that of the barren-ground Innu, to whom they are closely related. While the north shore Innu strove to become middlemen in the fur trade, the barren-ground Innu kept their involvement with the trade to a minimum. In chapter four, the forms of response exhibited by a number of aboriginal groups to resettlement programs instituted by the state are examined. There it is noted that the barren-ground Innu and the Cape Smith Inuit, both of whom were primarily involved with the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC)

during the mercantile period, exhibited very similar responses, while the Hebron Inuit of northern Labrador, who were primarily involved with the Moravians, responded in a totally different way. That is, while all groups initially complied with the edict to move, the former two moved back to their original homes, while the latter has stayed resettled.

This is not to imply that indigenous social organization is irrelevant; in fact, the opposite is argued and an effort is made to link forms of early-contact social formation to subsequent transformations. This position is the one emphasized by Anderson (1985) in her comparative study of the transformation in the status of women among the Montagnais (north-shore Innu) and the Huron subsequent to the intrusion of the Jesuit missionaries into the St. Lawrence valley in the seventeenth century. Rather, the contention here is that the form of intrusion is a critical factor in channeling the forms of social transformation, and as such deserves the prominence it enjoys in this analysis.

### Inuit: Economy

The Inuit of northern Labrador, prior to European intrusion and for a long period thereafter, had a littoral subsistence hunting economy. Major resources included whale, seal, porpoise, caribou, bear, bird, and fish, and less important resources included as eggs, berries, and shellfish. Except for whale, all are still being utilized. The abundance and variety of resources was such that Taylor (1974) contends that there was more than enough to support the population of northern Labrador during the early contact period. This broad range of resources, the need to have the ability to exploit them all (as need often overrode preference), and seasonal availability of most had fundamental repercussions on the social formation of the Inuit.

There were differing levels of cooperation required for the exploitation of the various resources. Whereas a single man could hunt seals from a qajaq, a whaling crew required twelve men to handle an umiag and the necessary equipment. It is apparent that, at the basic level of subsistence production, there was a range of possible production/consumption units, depending on the accessibility and the nature of the resources. This required a flexibility in the social organization of the Inuit which enabled them to respond to situational exigencies. As will be discussed in later chapters, this flexibility in the social organization of the Inuit, and

also of the barren-ground Inuit, was curtailed by the effects of the intrusion of the Europeans. However, this is not to imply that there was no regularity in the lives of the Inuit. In fact, regularity was a necessity dictated by the animals they hunted, and by their efforts to maximize their odds for success.

Hunting is never without risk, and misfortune lurks in many places. Wildlife population cycles, variable local weather conditions, global climatic trends, seasonal availability of the various game species, illness, skill, knowledge, and luck all played a part in the outcome of a hunt. Richling (1979), while not disputing the presence of abundant resources, notes that the fairly frequent instances of privation among the Inuit in northern Labrador would indicate that access to resources may have at times been a problem, an opinion which is shared by Brice-Bennett (1982: 51) and Taylor (1974: 54); however, the latter stipulates that it was never to the point of starvation. Nevertheless, it seems plausible to assume that the Inuit would arrange their annual cycle to maximize their chances of survival. In fact, Taylor (1974) goes to some length to demonstrate just this point.

For the hunter, the minimum requirement is to be in the same place, at the same time, as the game pursued. This necessary condition was the single most important consideration in determining the pre-contact and early contact spatial distribution and population density of the

Inuit. Their semi-nomadic lifestyle and the flexibility of the communities were directly linked to the spring and fall migratory habits of their primary food animals and to the availability of resources in general during other seasons.

A critical feature of their lifestyle, revealed by an examination of their annual cycle, is a tension between the convergence of large groups when possible for communal hunts and socializing, and their dispersal at other times for economic and/or social reasons.

For example, among the Nunamiut of central Alaska there was no effective mechanism to maintain social cohesion above the level of the family. Legros (1978) argues that the Nunamiut kinship system encouraged the fissioning of larger groups, thereby inhibiting the production of caribou, which required significant cooperation.

In northern Labrador, groups of Inuit would split, or families would hive off larger agglomerations, but to what extent this interfered with production is open to question. Inuit from different settlements were quite willing to aid each other in the capture of whales.

Since all the people took part in the sharing of a captured whale, it was to everyone's advantage to catch one. There are few instances of any settlement failing to go to another's aid in pursuit of a whale. (Taylor 1974: 44)

In fact, evidence seems to support the opposite position, that fissioning was necessary for the more efficient

exploitation of the resource base.

In the late fall and winter, camps were located at sites that enabled access to both migrating whales and seals. This meant that, for the duration of the migrations and until the food caches ran low, the communities were in a good economic position. However, as the winter wore on, resources and stores became scarce, and large groups could no longer be supported. One consequence of this scarcity was the fissioning of the winter camps. Thus "... it was quite common for people to leave their winter houses much earlier in the winter [that April] and move to snow houses in other localities ..." (Taylor 1974: 17). But economic pressure was only one factor which influenced this behavior. The acephalous nature of Inuit society, which was emphasized by Legros (1978), would have facilitated the fissioning of larger winter groups in times of economic stress and/or social conflict.

From spring to mid-summer, the opposite process operated. At this time of year the Inuit families would disperse to spring camps to hunt seals as they migrated back up the coast. In opposition to this economically based dispersal, there was the convergence of larger groups in the bays, which inhibited their access to seals. Although not leading to economic hardship, it did mean that the exploitation of the resource base was below the optimum level. This would indicate that the convergence was not only in the interests of economic maximization, but



also for social interaction at a time of minimal economic stress. Therefore, between the poles of the economic variable of resource scarcity or abundance, leading to the convergence or dispersal of the production/consumption unit, is the intervening variable of social organization, providing a framework for the concrete behavior.

Freeman (1962) has also noted non-maximizing behavior in Inuit hunters, which, while he does not pursue the point, could have its genesis in social and cultural considerations. Other examples of the interaction between the social and the economic in situations of economic stress for a variety of peoples can be found in Laughlin and Brady (1978). Therefore, the convergence and dispersal of Inuit must not be viewed only in the context of the economic exigencies, but also in the social formation within which that behaviour takes place. The European intrusion penetrated this aspect of the Inuit social formation.

Prior to discussing of other features of northern Labrador Inuit social organization, one more aspect of their economic practice requires elaboration. As noted above in passing, trade was also a component of the Labrador Inuit economy, although to what extent is difficult to ascertain. It is known that different types of chert, in various stages of manufacture, made their way along the coast and into the interior (Denton 1983, Nagle 1983, Fitzhugh 1972). But as to the identity of other

trade goods, we are left to mere speculation. However, there did exist the basis and the opportunity for trade in other materials.

In sum, the economy of the Labrador Inuit, at the time of early contact, was hunting and gathering. This economy was capable of regularly furnishing more than simply their physical necessities (Scheffel 1980). Nevertheless, since in late winter resources were always scarce, any local aggravation of this general situation could lead to privation. This threat was minimized at the level of their social organization, which fostered equal access to the resource base by not obstructing dispersal in times of need and simultaneously allowing for convergence during periods of plenty.

The material risk of privation was thus balanced against the social desire to interact in larger groups, and this produced a basic tension in the social organization of the Inuit. First, having people dispersed over the area of resource exploitation increased the odds of encountering game. But if game were captured it had to be shared; therefore, there would be some convergence of the population. This assured the maximum benefit would be derived by the maximum number of people. In opposition to this was the tendency to disperse in times of stress. Thus, the risk of large groups of people suffering serious privation due to localized conditions of scarcity was minimized. Group solidarity would rarely, if ever, have

overridden economic necessity. Rather the exigencies of survival would have spurred the fracturing of large groups and their dispersal in search of food. The repercussions of these contrary tendencies reverberated throughout the social formation of Labrador Inuit society in the early contact period.

### Leadership and Authority

The question of leadership is ultimately a question of power. The issues that surround it are: how is it acquired, how is it maintained, what privileges and responsibilities attend to it, and how is it restrained by those who live under its influence? Lévi-Strauss' (1967) analysis of leadership among the Nambikuara, a South American group of hunters and gatherers, elucidates the linkages between some of these factors. By concentrating his discussion on the latter three issues, Lévi-Strauss (1967) demonstrates how the Nambikuara are able to fulfill their need for a leader while maintaining their egalitarian principles and keeping the leader under tight restrictions.

As hunters and gatherers, the Nambikuara are semi-nomadic, exploiting each resource in its season. Economically, their problem, as with all hunters and gatherers, is being in the right place at the right time.

The power and responsibility for deciding the group's movements, which are, in effect, their search for food, are left to the leader. The results of the performance of his duties in this regard are the basis on which his position is evaluated, and ultimately legitimated. The maintenance of the physical well-being of those under his aegis is his primary duty.

Along with the power and responsibility of decision making, the Nambikuara chief also has the privilege of being the only member of the group to have more than one wife. This privilege is offset by the expectation that his family shares more than other families. Levi-Strauss (1967) argues that the polygyny of the Nambikwara chief is an economic necessity if he is to maintain his position of prestige and power among his people. In the event that he is unable to fulfill his responsibilities as provider and finder of subsistence resources, the people can withdraw their support. Leadership, then is attached to performance, and this same criterion is a highly significant feature of early contact Inuit and barren-ground Innuit leadership.

The relationship between this form of leadership and the economic exigencies faced by the Inuit were similar to that of the Nambikuara. In order for the Labrador Inuit to maintain their economic options (i.e., to be able to disperse when the situation demanded), it was important that there not be any serious social impediments placed in

the way. One such impediment could have been a strong central leadership which had sufficient authority to hold a group together, to their detriment, in times of privation. For the Inuit this was not a problem.

By and large, all Inuit groups, prior to the intrusion of Europeans, were acephalous and the position of leader was extremely attenuated. Hippler and Conn (1972) note this characteristic, proposing that the successful leader among the Inuit was one who could lead without appearing to do so. As they put it: "... the necessary work [original emphasis] was accomplished through careful and deliberate subtlety" (1972: 26). Their analysis argues that this characteristic was innate, springing from the Inuit personality (1972: 6). While they mention, in a footnote, that there may be ecological variables as well, they do not consider them. The cause for this non-development of leadership is somewhat murky, but it appears that wrongheadedness is the explanation--a rather depressing conclusion, which makes one wonder how the Inuit, or anyone else, has managed to last so long. Nevertheless, while their explanation overemphasizes the psychological, their depiction of Inuit leadership is supported by data on all Inuit groups across the Arctic. Labrador is no exception, and the low development of supra-familial centralized institutional leadership was the case there as well.

In northern Labrador, leadership at the household level was well defined, but in larger groupings this was

not the case. Hawkes notes that:

They have had great leaders, great hunters or enterprising shamans, who have been accorded their positions by the general appreciation of their worth. But the office has never carried any particular authority with it. (1970: 110)

Taylor agrees with this sentiment, stating: "Evidence suggests that there was no authority figure capable of guaranteeing harmonious relations between different households" (1974: 81). Given this, it would be difficult for a leader to assure compliance with any directive which went against the judgment of a significant number of people.

In general, leadership in multi-household units was informal. Rouland (1979: 22) proposes that custom, as opposed to any formal structure, was the basis of political and judicial organization among the Inuit; and, further that while there were both secular and religious leaders, they were not above the will of the group. He states:

... le leader n'est pas un chef souverain a la façon de nos monarques européens: il n'est que l'instrument temporaire du groupe, qui le controle et peut le déposer, et dont il aide la volonté a s'exprimer. (Rouland 1979: 37)

This minimal development of a leadership structure, while not necessarily encouraging the fissioning of groups, did facilitate it when the need arose.

Thus, the Labrador Inuit would converge during periods of low economic stress, and disperse during periods of high economic stress. This cycle not only permitted a more

efficient exploitation of the resource base, it also minimized the conflict. Nevertheless, the Inuit of northern Labrador were no different from any other society, and disputes arose with some regularity over a variety of issues. Prior to examining this issue, a discussion of Inuit religious leadership, which overlapped considerably, and was at times coterminous with secular leadership, is necessary.

While all Inuit had a personal relationship with the spiritual world, the angedkok's (Inuit term for shaman) connection was considered to be stronger, and his or her knowledge greater. Generally speaking, the goal of religious practice among the Inuit, which was embedded in all other practices, was to maintain a harmonious relationship between the spiritual and physical universes. Harmony could be disrupted by various active and passive causes. For example, breaking a taboo through oversight could lead to negative repercussions such as privation in the corporeal world. However, the same result could obtain from an active cause, as in the case of sorcery. The role of the angedkok in both these instances was to re-establish the lost harmony through the exercise of his or her superior knowledge or skill. Once harmony was reestablished, the negative repercussions deriving from the supernatural dissonance would disappear.

This goal was accomplished in a number of ways. Rouland notes that: "... au Labrador, l'angedkok frappe le

coupable d'interdits religieux qui le contraignent à la fuite" (1979: 27). In addition, other methods, ranging from being an interpreter of custom to intervening directly to elicit confessions for heretical behavior, were also utilized. However, these methods were not always effective, that is a material crisis could persist despite the angekok's best efforts to alleviate it. This eventuality made any claims to total control over the supernatural by an angekok impossible. Further it also was a threat to his or her prestige and prompted the projection of responsibility for any physical suffering onto other individuals, including members of the angekok's own community. In doing so, the angekok was able to exercise a certain level of coercive control over his followers not available to secular leaders. Thus, as Balikci proposes:

Shamanism ... can be regarded as reflecting concrete tensions and existing environmental or social maladjustments in crisis situations. Through its ambivalent character and the resulting atmosphere of suspicion, shamanism was also a potent factor in the emergence of certain social phenomena, such as preferred cousin marriage, the high suicide rate and, at another level, new interpersonal hostilities. (1963: 394)

For example, where sorcery was deemed to be the cause of misfortune, the shaman intervened on behalf of the victim to alleviate whatever the symptoms were, from illness to poor hunting. To do this, he or she could accuse someone of sorcery and thereby destroy his or her reputation or cause him or her to be ostracized or even



killed. This level of coercive power gave the shamans a significant degree of leverage to have their opinions adhered to.

But this was not the only venue of an angedkok's power. As Robbe notes:

... le chamane ne se contente pas de reprendre ce qui avait été dérobé à l'ensorcelé, il prend quelque chose de plus puisque le sorcier peut aller jusqu'à mourir. A quelque chose de plus constitue pour la raingueur -la chamane- un surcroît de prestige et de puissance. (1983: 38)

In other words, there was a jural component to the role of shaman which operated to lessen tension by identifying the causes of stress.

Thus, the angedkok derived power from the ability to influence the physical world through appealing to his or her connections in the spiritual world. The angedkok was expected to influence weather, increase the success of a hunt, and cure illness. But, as with secular authority, a angedkok's authority was not assured by dint of occupying the position. This characteristic has led to diametrically opposed analyses of the position of angedkok in Labrador Inuit social structure.

Taylor posits that the angedkok's control was rather weak (1974: 87). Richling, referring to a period after the arrival of the Moravian Missionaries on a permanent basis (1771), states that the angedkut (plural of angedkok): "... wielded considerable power among the unconverted Inuit" (1979: 285). This divergence of opinion may derive from

the identification of the position of angekok with a particular individual. One could argue that the position of angekok represents merely potential for power which may or may not be fulfilled.

For example, Weyer points out:

As a rule the people hold to their deep-seated trust in shamanism, preferring rather to impute evil intent to the individual angekok than to ridicule his entire art as so much fraud. A medicine man whose operations seem to bring bad luck is likely to gain a reputation for working with definitely malicious spirits. Thus he may come to be classed with the 'sorcers, whose black magic is not to be confused with recognized shamanism. (1969: 451)

Jeness supports this position of the division of the role of shaman and the person who occupies it. In reference to the Copper Inuit he states:

A man acquires influence by his force of character, his energy and his success in hunting, or his skill in magic. As long as these last him, age but increases his influence, but when they fail, his prestige and authority can vanish. (1970: 93)

Thus, the authority invested in a particular shaman is a combination of the individual and the position.

Given the situationality of the level of authority exercised by a particular shaman, it is necessary, where possible, to put the analysis within a historical context. For example, Richling (1979) notes that it was the angekut who were often at the forefront of resistance to the Moravians. However, this status must be placed within the context of the pressure that was being applied to the

Labrador Inuit at the time. Just as Inuit middlemen took advantage of the new economic opportunities presented by the Europeans to enhance their prestige, the attention focused on the position of angedkok by the Moravians may have increased the stature of the individuals who occupied the position. In addition to this factor, the angedkut, as keepers of esoteric knowledge about Inuit spiritual customs which were being challenged by the Moravians, were the logical individuals to whom the Inuit would turn to deal with the spiritual crisis perpetrated by the Moravians.

In sum, as was the case with the secular leaders, the religious leaders were also subject to wide fluctuations in prestige and authority over their lifetimes. However, their spiritual affiliations made them a possible threat to the other members of the community, if they were able to aggregate too much power and authority and to exercise it in a coercive manner. The ambivalent status of the angedkok was one more factor contributing to the fluidity of Inuit social groups. Thus, in both religious and secular political practices there was a tendency towards atomism, that is, there were more factors pulling them apart than holding them together; this had repercussions for conflict and conflict resolution.

### Conflict and Conflict Resolution

Conflict in early-contact Inuit society arose for a variety of reasons, among them: food sharing, wife stealing, murder, poor marriage relations, refusal of a family to permit their daughter to marry, and adultery (Taylor 1974, Rouland 1979, Balikci 1970, Boas 1964). An important aspect of these confrontations is that they did not occur for lack of rules. Taylor notes:

There is a substantial body of data indicating the rules that governed the distribution of various types of game. However, it appears that these rules were often ignored, creating a source of conflict within traditional [Labrador Inuit] society. (1974: 88)

This point is also made by Hippler and Conn (1972), who propose that, to a certain degree, the issue was not what rules existed, but rather what a person thought he could get away with through strength or stealth (1972: 17).

A second important aspect of Inuit conflict was that access to and control of women by men appears to have been a primary irritant. In the list noted above, which was compiled from a number of sources, women figure largely. The structural nature of this is emphasized by Taylor (1974), who contends that wife stealing was an inevitable response to polygamy, as there were insufficient females to provide mates for all the males. Boas (1964) and Balikci (1970) note that in the central Arctic, the practice of female infanticide by the Inuit was a primary cause of the gender gap, which led to conflict between males over access

to women. However, even in northern Labrador, where the sex ratio favoured females, Taylor notes: "... that the demand for extra wives was even greater than could be supplied by the sex imbalance" (1974: 69).

Given these endemic causes of conflict, it would seem reasonable to expect that the Inuit would have developed a counterbalancing system of conflict resolution equal to the task. However, this does not appear to have been the case.

Among those mechanisms of social control through which disagreements were dealt with within the context of the community were: gossip, mockery, ostracism, formalized fist fights, song duels, highly circumscribed mediation, and execution (Balikci 1970, Hippler and Conn 1972, Boas 1964, Rouland 1979). These relatively non-disruptive confrontational approaches were augmented by several covert methods such as sorcery, murder, and blood feuds. These latter means, in contrast with the former, sometimes exacerbated the situation rather than calming it down.

Despite the existence of jural controls, it was incumbent on the individual to initiate the proceedings and follow through on his or her own. With the exception of elders, whose opinions were respected but who had no jural power, there was no formal institution to which one could appeal, and therefore the physical and mental capabilities of the individual loomed large in any confrontation. The leaders' position, for example, did not permit them much leeway in dealing with conflict. Even when a leader took a

position as a mediator, their "... task ... was only to point out necessary relationships for self-interest and then to step aside, but even this action was limited to hunting or subsistence activities" (Hippler and Conn 1972: 27). The formal methods of conflict resolution were based on the pitting of each individual's attributes against another's. The song duel was a competition of wit, and the formalized fist fight was a test of strength, stamina, and courage. Being in the right does not seem to have counted for much, unless one could garner support from the rest of the community. For these reasons, it would appear to have been in the interests of most to avoid conflicts.

Thus, avoidance was one of the primary methods of dealing with the conflicts, and it could be accomplished in a number of ways. One means was the redefinition of an alleged transgression to a less serious act. For example, theft could be downgraded to borrowing without informing the owner (Hippler and Conn 1972). A second means was for the transgressor to withdraw physically from the community. This option was facilitated by the fluidity of the local groups, which permitted a high level of mobility. And finally, as a partial corollary to the latter method, was the non-pursuance on the part of the injured party. However, as Jenness notes for a murderer among the Copper Inuit, "... there is always the danger ... that one day a relative may avenge him by driving a knife into the murderer's back" (1970, 95). Taylor (1974) reports that in

northern Labrador, retribution for more serious transgressions, such as wife-stealing or murder, were avenged in this manner. But this recourse to retributive homicide could itself lead to blood feuds and remain a cause of conflict for generations.

In cases where a particular individual was a chronic cause of social disruption, the community could act as a unit, and the individual in question could be either exiled or executed. However, for either of these measures to be resorted to, the level of antisocial behavior had to offend a large percentage of the community.

Hawkes (1970) notes one northern Labrador Inuit variant of communal action. If an individual exhibited unacceptable behavior, he would be admonished by the elders, and, in chronic cases, ostracized. And as Hawkes notes: "...'social death' is the worst thing that can happen to an Eskimo (1970: 108)." Since to be cut off from your social network was not merely psychologically stressful, but also meant being placed outside the sharing network, it was a fate that for all but the exceptional hunter meant hardship, if not death by starvation. Rouland (1979) has found references to both the intervention of elders and ostracism among other groups of Inuit as well. However, more drastic means were also known.

Execution was usually reserved for those so feared that no one person would dare attack alone. At least two examples of this form of justice being meted out to

disruptive individuals are known in Labrador. One occurred in the vicinity of Cape Chidleigh in 1886, where a man at the Hudson's Bay Company post known as Old Wicked was dispatched.

His arrogance and petty annoyances to the other natives became at length unbearable. It appears that these unfortunates held a meeting and it was decided that Old Wicked was a public nuisance which must be abated, and they therefore decreed that he should be shot, and shot he was .... (Boas 1964: 259)

While eighty years earlier: "[T]raditional justice [execution] was exerted at Okak to prevent the notorious shaman, Uiverunna's, from exercising his power over the Inuit in the region" (Brice-Bennett 1982: 130).

In sum, conflict resolution among the Inuit was largely the responsibility of the individual except in particularly serious and chronic situations. This left the avoidance of conflict as the most appealing of all possible methods of conflict resolution, as it could never have the consequence of escalating the conflict. Since there was no higher authority to which one could appeal, one's welfare depended on personal strength, the support of a strong person, or one's ability to negotiate. Therefore, if there was a good possibility that one would lose in a direct confrontation, it was best that confrontation never take place. In this instance, then, there was a convergence between social and economic practices. As was discussed in the section on the economy, there was the tendency to disperse in order to better exploit the environment. In



the case of conflict resolution, this practice could be invoked in times of stress to avoid overt conflict and thereby maintain social cohesion.

Thus, the jural practice of the Inuit meshed with their economic and political practices, providing a wide range of options (e.g., dispersion or convergence) which respected the autonomy of the individual. Although the personality of particular individuals infringed on this basic characteristic from time to time, the community could and did deal summarily with serious breaches of the social order. There was a thus tension between individual aspirations and the well-being of the community at large. During the early contact period no serious damage was effected on this system, but, as European intrusion penetrated deeper into the social formation of the Inuit, certain alternatives became inoperable. There was, in effect, a loss of power on the part of the Inuit.

### Summary

This section on the early-contact Inuit social formation had several aims. The most important two were to indicate contradictions in the traditional Inuit social formation and in those aspects of it which may have been adaptive to the precontact situation but were liabilities in the contact situation. Both these sets of attributes

are central to the comprehension, not only of the European strategy of intrusion, but also of Inuit forms of resistance. Thus, the sharing practices of the Inuit were extended by them to include the Europeans' and the Europeans failed to perform in this arena. The Inuit responded by withdrawing socially and economically from the Europeans, sphere of influence. And, as will be discussed next, the Innut, within the context of their own social formation, which was significantly similar to that of the Inuit, responded in the same manner.

#### Innut: Introduction

An analysis of the early-contact social formation of the ancestors of the people now living in Davis Inlet runs into serious problems from the very outset. Were they or were they not a distinct social group prehistorically, and where did they come from? Unfortunately, these fundamental questions do not as yet have definitive answers, although it is possible to make an educated guess from the available data.

Currently, the Innut population of the northern Quebec-Labrador peninsula is divided into three large groups: first, the James Bay Cree (James Bay Innut), who now live in communities in the southwestern interior of the peninsula, on the southeastern coast of Hudson Bay, and on

the coast of James Bay; second, the Montagnais (mainly north-shore Innut), who now occupy communities on the north shore of the St. Lawrence river and North West River in Hamilton Inlet, Labrador; and finally, the Naskapi (barren-ground Innut), who currently reside chiefly in Kawawachikamach, near the mining town of Schefferville in the northern interior of Quebec, and in Davis Inlet, on the north coast of Labrador.

These group labels have tended to take on a certain reality through their continual use over time in a variety of discourses, such as that of European traders and missionaries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and more currently by federal and provincial administrators. However they cover rather than expose the social and cultural history of the Innu people of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula. It is only recently that work in the area of linguistics, ethnohistory, and archaeology have begun to shed some light on the European labelling of aboriginal groups as distinct polities.

With regard to the north-shore Innut and the barren-ground Innut, it had been previously thought that they were distinct groups. For example, Tanner (1944) argued that the barren-ground Innut had been forced into their northern habitat some time in the mid-nineteenth century by the Iroquois, who were trying to gain a larger control of the fur trade by expanding their territory. This military explanation accounted for why they were

living in what is always referred to in the literature as a "harsh environment." Unfortunately, it left unanswered the question of the relationship between the north-shore Innut and the barren-ground Innut.

Tanner (1944) addressed this latter issue by using indigenous labelling as his justification. His argument proposed that the word Naskapi was a derogatory term applied to the barren-ground Innut by the north-shore Innut, in retaliation for the former's unwillingness to help the latter in their raids against the Inuit.

This general approach was refined and modified by Fitzhugh (1972), who rendered a better documented and wisely less emphatic assessment of the origins of the barren-ground Innut. At the time of his writing, very little archaeological work had been done in the interior of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula; Fitzhugh's (1972) analysis makes use of a variety of sources of data then available. By and large, he proposes that there is reason both to affirm and to deny the connection between the north-shore Innut and barren-ground Innut. In support of a close relationship are the cultural and blood-group data, while the linguistic material tends to indicate that the barren-ground Innut were closer to the James Bay Innut than to the north-shore Innut. In the face of these contradictory data and the fact that the historical record is confusing as well, Fitzhugh (1972) does not take a strong position, although he favours the former

hypothetical position. One reason for this is to provide additional support for his argument that the barren-ground Innut were comparatively new arrivals to the northern interior, entering the region in the early nineteenth century. This perspective would render the barren-ground Innut either part of, or at least closely related to, the north-shore Innut. There are some problems with the argument, although his conclusion about the relationship is probably correct.

Fitzhugh (1972) argues that the barren-ground Innut were not perfectly adapted to the the ecological niche they occupied in the nineteenth century. He proposes that this niche, which is the taiga and tundra region of the interior of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula, left the barren-ground Innut with only one choice as a means of subsistence--almost total reliance on caribou. This particular migratory ungulate is subject to still poorly understood population cycles and is also prone to altering its migration route in a seemingly capricious manner. For these reasons, the barren-ground Innut were continually subject to starvation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The problem with this is that it does not give enough weight to the fact that at this same time the barren-ground Innut were also involved in the fur trade, which affected their ability to realize optimal subsistence exploitation of the region.

Another problem with Fitzhugh's (1972) argument is

that although he proposes that the barren-ground Innut were able to develop a highly elaborated culture surrounding caribou despite their poor adjustment to the interior ecosystem, this was not the case when they moved to the coast in the early twentieth century. At that time, the barren-ground Innut were again unable to successfully adjust to a new environment. Whereas when they moved into the interior they were unable to maximize survival due to a poor material adaptation, when they moved to the coast the same result came about from a poor cultural adaptation. That is, they were unwilling to exploit the sea resources, as they were culturally committed to the resources of the barren-grounds. Both arguments, which are found in Fitzhugh (1972), tend to overlook the particular historical conditions taking place at the time, and therefore fall a little short of a sufficient explanation. However, as noted above, Fitzhugh (1972) was dealing with a far less complete record than now exists, which is not to imply that the current record is anywhere close to comprehensive.

More recent contributions permit a more complete analysis which supersedes the positions just reviewed. While the record is still incomplete, the Innut occupation of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula appears to have been more continuous than had been previously thought (Denton 1983). In addition, recent research into the relationship between the north-shore Innut and barren-ground Innut affirms the position noted above (Mailhôt 1983). That is, that

division between the two groups is misconceived, thus supporting a position which posits continuous occupation and not a disjuncture in the culture history of the interior as asserted by Fitzhugh (1972).

These two reassessments (Mailhôt 1983, Denton 1983) of the prehistoric situation of the Amerindian population of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula raise two important issues. First, if the occupation of the interior was continuous, the notion that the barren-ground Inuit were in the process of learning the optimal method of exploiting the interior at the time of early European intrusion must be dispensed with. And second, if the north-shore Inuit and barren-ground Inuit were in fact one group, it is also necessary to reassess the level of exposure of the barren-ground Inuit to European commodities at the time of early contact.

With regard to the first issue, this analysis will be concerned only with the period of cultural transition immediately preceding the intrusion of the Europeans. The situation in the more distant past is obviously not as critical to the comprehension of the barren-ground Inuit's response to the Europeans.

Prior to the appearance of the barren-ground Inuit in the archaeological record, an Amerindian culture referred to as Point Revenge occupied the central Labrador coast and the interior of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula from approximately 1000 A.D. (Fitzhugh 1972). On the coast they

disappear from the record between 1625 and 1650, while in the interior partial evidence of their occupation continues into the eighteenth century (Denton et al. 1982). While the ultimate fate of these people has yet to be determined, it is probable that, on the coast at least, they were displaced by the southward expansion of the Labrador Inuit (Fitzhugh 1978, Samson 1978). In the interior this pressure was absent, and indications of Point Revenge occupation continued into the protohistoric period. Samson presents archaeological evidence which: "... suggèrent une continuité culturelle du complexe Pointe Revenge jusqu'au 17e ou 18e siècle dans la région du Mushaua Nipi [barren-ground Innut]" (1978, 120). The presence of metal in some of the sites of this period would indicate that barren-ground Innut were present at least in the early phase of European contact and had access to European commodities. However, it should be pointed out, as do Denton et al. (1982), that not all the diagnostic attributes which make up the Point Revenge Complex are present in the later sites. This could indicate alternatively a transitional phase, or that the sites are atypical, or that they are not Point Revenge.

The vastness of the area and the comparatively little work that has been done there has led archaeologists to be quite cautious in their analyses. Nevertheless, both Samson (1978), on the basis of his work in the Indian House Lake region, and Denton et al. (1982), on the basis of



their work in the Caniapiscau Lake region, support the assertion that the occupation of the interior region was continuous. However, both note that data for the protohistoric period are especially sketchy, and thus there is still some doubt regarding the chronology.

The lack of data for the protohistoric period was one of the factors that contributed to the previous analysis (Fitzhugh 1972), which posited a gap in the occupation sequence of the interior. Further evidence suggesting that the region was unoccupied for a long period during the eighteenth century was that it coincided with a climatic cooling trend. The scenario was that the Point Revenge Complex disappeared from the interior in the seventeenth century, for unknown reasons, and the area was not reoccupied until the barren-ground Innut moved there in the nineteenth century. The recent occupation explained what was thought to be the poor adaptation of the barren-ground Innut, which in turn explained the starvation they suffered in the twentieth century. The analysis placed the responsibility on the barren-ground Innut and overlooked the effects of the fur trade. The reassessment of the length of occupation of the area would indicate that perhaps the barren-ground Innut were more in control of their destiny prior to the arrival of the Europeans than previously thought.

The second related issue is that of the relationship between the barren-ground Innut and the north-shore Innut.

From recent work in ethnohistory and linguistics, it can now be said with some confidence that they are closely related and that the division between them is the result of European intrusion. It was simply a case of Eurocentrism. The Europeans ignored the political, cultural, economic, and linguistic connections that existed between these Amerindian polities, and displaced them with each group's relationship to themselves. Southall (1970) makes a similar point concerning the creation of African tribes during the colonial period.

From linguistic data it has been established that there are definite dialectal differences between the various polities that resided in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula. These dialects crosscut the region on both a north-south and an east-west axis, but as MacKenzie states: "[I]t has become clear that, when all levels of language are taken into account, the Cree-Montagnais-Naskapi dialects form a continuum" (1980; 215). Further to this, while arguing that the barren-ground Innu were a distinctive sub-group, she notes that they are "... best seen ... as transitional between the y -dialects of East Cree and the n -dialects of North West River and the Lower North Shore" (MacKenzie, 1980; 220).

Jose Mailhôt (1983), in a careful examination of the historic record pertaining to the genesis of the terms Montagnais and Naskapi, posits that the division of the Amerindians in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula into these

particular categories is an artifact of European intervention. She states that:

... l'opposition Montagnais-Naskapi n'a pas toujours existé, qu'elle est née au tournant du XIXe siècle et qu'elle n'est fondée ni sur des critères culturels ni sur des critères linguistiques et encore moins sur les critères territoriaux. (Mailhôt, 1983; 85)

Mailhôt (1983) proposes that the distinction between Montagnais and Naskapi was generated through the agency of European traders and clergy, particularly the French. Essentially, she holds that those Amerindians of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula who were deemed to be Montagnais were the ones who interacted with the French on a regular basis; everyone else in the northern hinterland was Naskapi. As she states:

Donc, pendant la première moitié du XIXe siècle, le terme Naskapis est appliquée a des Indiens de toute la peninsula Quebec-Labrador, qu'ils soient de langue crie, attikamek ou montagnaise qui ont en commun, d'être en dehors de l'influence européenne. (Mailhôt 1983, 91)

From these two analyses, then, it is reasonable to propose that there were a number of delimited sub-groups (to use MacKenzie's term) in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula. However, they were not the groups delimited by the European intruders.

Innut: Economic Practice

Any consideration of the early-contact barren-ground Innut social formation and its subsequent transformations up to the modern period is inextricably linked to the fortunes of the barren-ground caribou. The barren-ground Innut exploited a variety of resources, such as white fish, lake trout, ducks, geese, partridges, loon, porcupine, beaver, and berries. But none could replace caribou as the staple. It provided not only food, but also the raw materials for making clothing, shelter, and a wide variety of tools. Therefore, as one might expect, the social organization of the barren-ground Innut was geared to facilitating the access to, and the harvesting of, caribou.

There is some debate as to the reliability of caribou as a primary subsistence resource. Sharp (1977) is of the opinion that most of the starvation reported among the Chipewyan caribou hunters west of James Bay during the fur-trade era was due to illness which rendered a sufficient number of hunters within a given production/consumption unit incapable of securing even the minimum subsistence requirements. Hammond (1982) places the responsibility at the feet of the HBC. While these two approaches would no doubt account for a large portion of the instances of privation, their very frequency (Ross 1979) would indicate a more complex set of circumstances.

In the same article, noted above, Sharp points out that a number of researchers have noted the unreliability

of caribou as a short-run subsistence resource. This unreliability derives from fluctuations in the caribou population and from the seemingly capricious nature of their behaviour. Kelsall (1968) lists a number of factors which can affect the plentifulness of caribou at any given time. This list includes localized weather conditions at the time of calving, which could affect the calf mortality rate. Weather can also affect the accessibility of forage; for example, a freezing rain could put it out of reach. In addition to this, there are also the factors of predators, disease, and accident.

Further, since caribou are migratory, access is also affected by where they are, as well as how many there are. In this regard, while there is probably some connection between population size and migration route, this has yet to be demonstrated. Even the seemingly self-evident negative factor of fires burning over forage areas causing a shift in land-use patterns of the caribou has been disputed (Scotter 1964). It would appear that there are a sufficient number of imponderables in the short-run to propose that at least some fraction of the incidents of starvation were the result of short run crises in the access to caribou. Of course, this would have to be accompanied by the absence of other game as well.

The ability to make up the subsistence shortfall when caribou could not be found with resources such as birds, fish, or small mammals was by no means a sure thing. While

the problem of being in the same place at the same time as the caribou were when hunting them is easily grasped, due to their migratory habits, the same problem is faced when harvesting the more sedentary resources such as fish or partridges.

Partridges were and remain an attractive subsistence resource for at least three reasons. First, when they are plentiful, they can support a small hunting camp to the exclusion of other resources. Second, they are easily procured with either a gun or a bow and arrow. This latter characteristic was brought home to me during my fieldwork, when I was cautioned not to get too close to a partridge when using a shotgun, as the impact from the blast is too great for the fragile structure of a partridge to withstand. This resulted in being put in the somewhat odd situation of walking away from game in order to shoot it. A third feature of the partridges' behaviour is that they are very forgiving. That is, if one misses on the first try (a rare occurrence for the Innut), a partridge will usually not fly away, permitting an opportunity to reload and take a second shot. Apart from these admirable qualities for a subsistence resource, it was their accessibility which proved to be the determining factor in whether partridges were a variable in aggravating instances of privation. From the HBC Journals it would appear that there were significant fluctuations in the availability of partridges. For example, in 1739 the factor at the HBC post at Eastmain

noted: "[T]here came in 2 of the starved Indians of I had sent away some a go and told me there was no partridges where they ware and they must come in or parish" (B59/a/3: March 10, 1739).

Fish, perhaps the most stable of subsistence resources, is also subject to problems of access. This is especially the case in winter, when the ice on the lakes and rivers can freeze to a depth of three meters. John McLean, who had been stationed at Fort Chimo between 1838 and 1842 and had made two trips through the interior of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula, described the problems of ice fishing in the dead of winter in northern Labrador.

Should they [barren-ground Innut] happen to miss the deer [caribou] on their passage through the country in autumn, they experience the most grievous inconvenience, and often privation, the succeeding winter; as they must then draw their living from the lakes, with unremitting toil - boring the ice, which is sometimes eight to nine feet thick, for the purpose of setting their hooks, and perhaps not taking a single fish after a day's hard work. Nevertheless, they must still continue their exertions till they succeed, shifting their hooks from one part of the lake to another, until every spot is searched. (Wallace 1932, 261)

But even with such a heroic effort as described above, there is no guarantee of success. Brice-Bennett notes that the northern Labrador Inuit came to the brink of starvation in 1838 when they were forced by Moravian missionaries to rely on inaccessible fish resources in the middle of the winter (1982: 329).

Given the above, it seems reasonable to believe that

privation was a threat. The barren-ground Innu's commitment to their mode of adaptation despite this threat suggests that they accepted the risk of privation as part of life. Their awareness of this negative aspect of their mode of adaptation is in part borne out in parts of their cosmology. The sacred relationship between the hunter and his prey, expressed in rituals, the treatment of carcasses, and the reliance on the supernatural to aid the hunter in the hunt, all indicate that the Innu were fully cognizant of the risk.

Henriksen (1973) describes the elaborate set of rules attendant to caribou harvesting, which cover all aspects of the butchering and disposal of remains of the caribou carcasses. In addition, there is the ritual meal of bone marrow, called the Mokoshan, which, like the butchering and treatment of the remains, is a demonstration of respect for the caribou spirit, as well as an offering of thanks to the caribou for permitting the hunter to capture it. All these demonstrations of respect on the part of the hunters to the caribou are to ensure that the latter will return and allow themselves to be taken again. Privation is the outcome of showing disrespect by not obeying all the prescribed rules.

An important characteristic of the demonstration of respect is that the responsibility for it is shared. Therefore not only is it the hunters that are responsible, but the entire human community of the region. For example, past declines in the animal populations have been



attributed by the Innut to white hunters, while in the early part of the twentieth century some barren-ground Innut blamed themselves for the disappearance of the caribou. They had not been diligent enough in the demonstration of respect for the animal spirits. This explanation accounted for localized fluctuations in animal populations and for good or bad luck in the hunt. For caribou especially, it was necessary for the prey to give itself to the hunter, a gift which could be withheld in a number of different ways, all of which could lead to localized privation.

A second supernatural explanation for a poor hunt was malevolent sorcery. Sorcery could inhibit the ability of a hunter either by affecting his skills or by influencing the behaviour of the animals. In the journal of his trip through the interior of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula from Fort Rupert to within fifty miles of Fort Chimo in 1820, Clouston notes an example of this. After an argument with one of his Innu guides, he decided to leave those who were giving him problems behind and continue on with the more agreeable guides. However, two days after he left: "[T]hey [his guides] have had several shots at deer, but killed none. The Indian is dispirited, saying those Indians whom we left are conjuring against us" (Davies 1963: 45).

A final indication that privation was a periodic problem are the references to hunger that occur in Algonkian mythology. Sharp (1977) proposes that the fact

that no one starves to death in Chipewyan myths is an indication that starvation was not a threat. However, this ignores numerous natural cycles with which the aboriginals had to deal. There was the obvious yearly cycle which was part of their cognized environment. But they were probably less aware of the complexities involved in the population cycles for all species of wildlife in their region and how these were interrelated, not to mention the influence of long-range global-scale climatic change. However, this does not mean that a structural response to any given situation was not forthcoming.

As has been pointed out for the north-shore Innut by Savard (1977), for the Tsimshian and Kayuru by Cové (1978), for the Yomut Turkman by Salzman (1978), and for the Nunamiut by Legros (1978), myths are, at one level, prescriptions for responses to cyclical periods of duress, cycles which, in some cases, may have exceeded a generation. The fact that no one starves to death would merely be the positive outcome of following the prescription. They are part and parcel of the people's social adaptation to their physical environment.

In sum, there are a number of sets of circumstances in which privation could come about: short-term animal and climatic cycles; long-term animal and climatic cycles; or natural or man-made cataclysms which seriously affect the animal populations. Obviously, cataclysmic change could not be planned for; however, cyclical change could be, and

was allowed for in the barren-ground Innut's social formation. That social formation was characterized, as was the Inuit's, by the facilitating of the fission and fusion of social groups and production/consumption units as the availability of subsistence resources permitted or dictated. The question that is pertinent to this study is, how did the economic exigencies of keeping body and soul together affect other components of the social formation. Once again, the analysis will focus on religious and secular authority structure, and conflict resolution.

#### Innut: Leadership

While no records exist of the structure of leadership among the barren-ground Innut prior to contact with Europeans, some inferences can be made from comments of traders, from early ethnographic reports, and from the current political practices of the barren-ground Innut and other Algonkian peoples. The outstanding feature of barren-ground Innut political organization that can be deduced from these sources was its egalitarian character. Their sense of personal integrity and responsibility notwithstanding, the barren-ground Innut were still faced with particular exigencies incumbent on communal production (Henriksen 1973, Wallace 1906), which would likely have necessitated some form of situational leadership. Whether

this authority extended beyond the event itself is not clear. Believing that the institution of leader among Algonkian groups was probably stronger before contact Rogers (1965) points out that there is no data to support this proposition. Henriksen (1973) also notes this lacuna in the data, but states his feeling that current forms of leadership and prehistoric forms differ only in degree and not in kind. That is, they were stronger in the past because of the demands of their economic strategies.

As with the Nambikuara and the Inuit, the barren-ground Inuit faced a similar set of problems in meeting their subsistence requirements. Therefore, it is not that surprising that their leadership shared similar characteristics. Barren-ground Inuit leaders were superior providers, and were followed and afforded prestige because of their success in this endeavour. Other attributes included oratorical skills and spiritual power, but these were probably secondary to the prestige attributed to a good hunter. This would have been the case in that not only would being in the leader's camp enhance an individual's chances of gaining access to game, but the individual would be less likely to suffer privation since s/he was also eligible to receive food shared by the leader, who by definition produced more than other hunters. It is arguably performance in this venue which determined the longevity of a leader's tenure in his position and the number of people he led.

The necessity for superior performance was a primary mechanism whereby a leader's authority was constrained. The need for groups to fission when there was a scarcity of game would diminish a specific leader's authority by reducing the number of people he led. If the camp fissioned all the way down to the household level, it was again a totally acephalous society with no supra-household leaders.

Leadership focused on the problem of producing food, and authority only extended to that sphere. The leader directed communal hunts and directed timing and location of moving to a new camp. Beyond that his power was minimal, and even within that sphere, it was tenuous. The only reward that appears to have accompanied leadership was prestige, as no one ever accumulated a material surplus, and polygynous marriages were not restricted, as with the Nambikuara, to the leader. This was partly a response to their economic adaptation, whose primary production/consumption unit was the family.

In his preamble to a discussion of the history of the Schefferville Innut, Quebec, Cooke states that:

The basic political, social, and economic unit of these people was the family: there was no higher authority. A family or a small group of families could range freely over this vast territory, and people came together in larger numbers only seasonally at good fishing locations or at good caribou-hunting grounds. (1976: 5)

This quote draws attention to a number of the central characteristics of early-contact barren-ground Innut social organization: cyclical fission and fusion, egalitarianism, and the household as the primary production/consumption unit; however, it glosses over their complexity, and hence certain internal dilemmas which had to be coped with by the Innut. An examination of caribou hunting techniques will provide an illustration.

Caribou could be hunted alone or cooperatively. Turner notes that one individual method was the use of snares, which were:

...suspended from trees or bushes in the defiles through which the creatures are made to pass; and by entangling their horns or feet within the noose, the reindeer [caribou] is securely held until the hunter visits the scene. (1894: 110)

While this passive method of capturing caribou appears, from Turner's report, to have been fairly effective, it could only produce one animal at a time. Cooperative methods were much more efficient, and, if reports by early observers are even remotely accurate (Turner 1894, Wallace 1932), could produce hundreds of animals in a very short period during the spring and fall migrations of the caribou. Samson lists two examples of cooperative hunting. He states: "[I]n winter they [caribou] were tracked or herded into fenced enclosures of stone or snow while in the summer they were stalked and stabbed with short spears from canoes" (1975: 55). The distribution of the meat from

these two methods of caribou production illustrates the counterbalancing nature of the situation-bounded practices which the Innut had to encompass within one system.

Henriksen (1973: 31-32) provides a succinct description of the various sharing practices for caribou, which, while practically based on the quantity procured, ultimately rested on the notion of generalized responsibility for survival. Therefore, if only one caribou has been taken, every household got a share; presumably this would be the case more often when individual forms of production were practiced, since production would be lower. Conversely, when many caribou had been produced, as would be the case in a communal hunt, they were divided more or less equally among the households along a fairly loose set of rules which included such factors as size of household, who killed each particular animal, kinship, who reached the carcass first, and so on. In effect, it was communal production linked to individual household consumption and individual production linked to communal consumption. Nevertheless, apart from ritual observances requiring the communal stockpiling of the marrow bones, the household remained the primary production/consumption unit. And despite variations, it was maintained as the core organizational element.

The one notable exception to the above is the Mokoshan, a ritual feast of bone marrow. In this case the stockpiling, preparation, and consumption is communal, at

least for males. At one level the Mokoshan is peripheral to the discussion of the production/consumption unit, in that it is essentially a religious event which demonstrates respect for the caribou spirit in order to ensure future success in the hunt (Henriksen 1973: 35-38). On other levels, though, it is very pertinent, especially with regard to secular leadership, which, as with the production/consumption unit, is complex.

Prior to the discussion of the specific characteristics of religious and secular leadership, a number of preliminary statements are necessary. First, data pertaining to both categories are sparse, and the only recourse is to extrapolate back from available material. Second, the distinction between secular and religious leadership is somewhat artificial. Secular leadership derived much of its legitimacy from the ability of the leader to facilitate the group's access to subsistence resources. Legitimation of spiritual leadership was dependent to a significant degree on the leader's ability to communicate with supernatural forces to solicit aid in the maintenance of good health, protection from sorcery, and the acquisition of food. Therefore, a good hunter would have been an individual who, by definition, had superior skills in exploiting the supernatural world as well. A good leader, at one level, was a person who could minimize uncertainty in the acquisition of food, and this involved skill in both the natural and supernatural worlds.



Finally, there is a distinction to be made among leadership, authority, and prestige. These distinctions refer to the passive and active qualities of leadership and the basis through which a leader's position is legitimized.

Power that is achieved through interaction with the supernatural world is, in part, acquired in the same manner as it is in interaction with the natural world--demonstrable superior access to resources, leading to a minimization of uncertainty and/or the improvement of the communal quality of life, such as in the treatment of illness. In the case of the natural world, this meant that a skillful hunter's ability provided him with a substantial foundation on which to base a claim to the role of leader. With regard to the supernatural world, the same mechanisms which transformed performance to prestige to authority and ultimately to leadership were pertinent, but there were a greater number of areas from which an individual could develop a claim to a position of authority in the supernatural world than in the secular.

Leacock (1958) points out that there are a variety of skills from which a person may derive prestige, but which would have had only minor import in any claim to leadership. For example, an individual could acquire prestige by being a skillful canoe builder, but whether the prestige acquired here was transferable is highly questionable. Secular leadership was largely task-oriented, and therefore a canoe builder would be

deferred to only when the problem being dealt with was building a canoe. This same logic applied to the skilled hunter; that is, his authority was restricted to the hunt, the contrast being that in directing a communal hunt or determining the timing and location of a camp move, the authority was more inclusive than that of a canoe builder. Although, as we have seen, the authority remained transient.

The power from which secular authority derived its effectiveness rested in the community; people were not led so much as they followed through choice. Conversely, some aspects of religious authority were coercive, although apparently to a lesser degree than what the angakut practiced among the Inuit.

Whether the same argument can be applied to Inuit religious authority is at least questionable on a number of grounds. However, it is first necessary to look at the general relationship between the Inuit and the supernatural world.

As with the secular world, access to the supernatural world was generalized; variations in prestige obtained from differential ability, as perceived by peers, to manipulate that world to one's own and/or the group's benefit, or as a tool of coercion, as in the case of sorcery. There were a number of forums in which to demonstrate this ability. First, there was the ability to locate game through recourse to the supernatural world. To this end, there

were forms of divination such as scapulamancy, in which a caribou scapula was over fire, and the resultant cracks were taken as an indication of where caribou could be found. Other means included the interpretation of dreams or direct communication with the spirit world by means of ritual performances such as the shaking tent (Speck 1977). Second, the demonstration of medical ability through curing ceremonies. And third, the practice of sorcery through which a spiritually powerful individual could affect someone else's access to subsistence resources, either by driving game away, or causing bad luck, injury, or sickness to other hunters.

The distinguishing characteristic of these practices, as opposed to those of the secular world, was that they were supernatural, and thus non-verifiable excuses could be evoked to explain non-performance. Thus, authority in this realm may have been more consistent than in the secular realm. Another reason would have been that an individual's spiritual power was felt to be enhanced with age, while that of a hunter's would peak at some time around middle age and then begin to deteriorate...It should be noted that, this increase in spiritual power notwithstanding, there are reports of the untimely demise of the elderly at the hands of their juniors during times of extreme material stress, which would suggest that at least some of the elderly were not considered spiritually powerful enough to justify their maintenance.

In sum, religious authority is more ubiquitous than secular authority and has recourse to more individualized coercive methods. Nevertheless, there are limits to a shaman's power, and his authority could be challenged either through natural events, such as extreme stress, including mass starvation; testing his ability to rationalize failure; or through a challenge to his authority, and therefore power by some other individual.

#### Conflict and Conflict Resolution

While data are sparse, and consequently conclusions are rather tenuous, traditional sources of conflict among the Inuit appear to have been akin to those which Taylor (1974) delineated for the Labrador Inuit. Henriksen (1973) documents conflict arising from current sharing practices, basing his analysis on two intrinsic contradictions--one psychological, one social. The first derives from the tension created between the social obligation to share and the personal desire to possess. Nevertheless, the sanctions which are applied to those who do not currently share production for use, and the accounts of sharing in the early-contact period, would indicate that this may have been a traditional basis for discord (Henriksen 1973: 39; Davies 1963: 44).

The second source of conflict endemic to sharing

practices, also noted by Henriksen (1973), arose when an individual was dissatisfied with the share he had received. This would have also been a problem in the case of multi-family camps, as there were no strict rules for sharing beyond the fact that everyone in the camp received some portion. The distributor was allowed a large degree of latitude in deciding who got what and how much. This personalized responsibility for the division of one's own production meant that people who felt slighted were afforded a focus for their animosity.

Another inherent source of conflict had the same basis as the forms of leadership that Innut evolved, that is the access to subsistence resources whose successful harvesting required the cooperation of the hunter and the hunted. Explanations for poor returns on effort expended in the hunt were sought in the realm of supernatural. There are at least two possible explanations which would have led to conflict: first, that someone was not observing the necessary rituals and was therefore angering the animal spirits, who in turn withheld game from the hunters (Garigue 1957: 131); or, second, that a sorcerer was either actively conjuring against the hunter to keep game away from him (Davies 1963: 45), or interfering with his ability to hunt through causing illness, bad luck, or accidents (Tanner 1944: 689).

Once again, as with the conflict arising from sharing practices, the animosity is individualized. Therefore,

while the repercussions may be suffered either collectively or individually, the cause is a particular individual, who, through his malicious or thoughtless action or inaction, is at fault.. An interesting feature of this form of conflict is that it often required the services of a shaman to identify the culprit. This responsibility would certainly have increased the coercive power of a shaman, whose accusations of ritual neglect or sorcery were significant sanctions.

Other sources of conflict which have been singled out are theft, wife abuse, murder, and jealousy between two wives of the same man. The latter points to another source of conflict which we can only speculate would have obtained from the practice of polygamy. An Inuit male was able to marry as many women as he could support (Wallace 1906: 212). Further, the ratio of women to men has been reported as both balanced (Turner 1894: 110) and unbalanced (Tanner 1944: 686); this indicates, perhaps, a degree of fluctuation in gender ratio. The periodic gender imbalance, if the Inuit example is any indication, could have at times led to conflict over women by males in search of a mate.

In sum, conflict which derived from structural features of early-contact Innu society focused on access to scarce resources. The egalitarian nature of their social formation placed personal responsibility on each member for his or her own behaviour.

Given the probability that intra-group conflict was endemic in Innu society, it, like all societies, was constrained to develop mechanisms for minimizing the occurrence of conflict and for dealing with it when it did arise. These mechanisms of conflict management, which included secular and religious components, were retribution, avoidance, and mediation; they could be mobilized by the individual's own guilt, other individuals, the group at large, or any internal faction of it.

For example, generous sharing was a highly valued quality. Conformity with this value was rewarded with prestige, while perceived non-compliance was subject to a variety of sanctions. This social imperative was exacerbated by the fact that placing an individual in one of these mutually exclusive categories was, in part, the result of the subjective assessment of each member of the redistribution network as well as the distributor. It was possible for an individual to perceive himself as generous and to be perceived by others as stingy. The potential for conflict in this instance derived from the contradictory perceptions, and the magnitude of pressure exerted to alter sharing behaviour was dependent on how widely the perception of stinginess was shared, up to and including the subject of the perception.

An individual who perceived himself as being stingy faced psychological pressures, deriving from his internalized values and beliefs, to alter his behaviour.

His religious instruction had taught that stinginess in food sharing was an insult to the spirit of the animal he had killed. The spirit, in retaliation, would council others of his species to withhold themselves, not only from the stingy hunter but from everyone else as well (Speck 1977). The responsibility for the well-being of the group was therefore placed on the shoulders of each individual; in effect, a supernatural sanction engendering acceptable sharing behaviour was implemented, thus reducing the possibility of conflict arising in this forum of this practice.

Conversely, if an individual viewed himself as sufficiently generous to appease the animal spirits, it was left to others who disagreed with this perception to coerce him to alter his behaviour. A person who felt himself personally slighted could resort to sorcery to interfere with his enemy's pursuit of food by causing him to fall ill or driving away game. The level of sorcery would increase with the number of people who shared this perception. Fear of sorcery was another mechanism through which individuals were coerced into behaving in a manner which would reduce the possibility of conflict (Davies 1963).

In the secular domain, the stingy individual was faced with the loss of prestige. This in turn blocked any hope of assuming a position of leadership in any form. If this perception became widespread and the stinginess was viewed as a serious breach, ostracism was an option as well.



(Henriksen 1973).

Other forms of unacceptable behaviour, such as wife abuse or murder, were at times redressed in kind or through the mediation of a chief (Garigue 1957). In addition, as was the case among the Inuit, conflict was avoided through the spatial separation of disputants through the fission of a particular social unit (Henriksen 1973), which the high mobility and loose structure of the Inuit organization permitted.

In sum, the mechanisms for the control of conflict were functional within the constraints of the relatively limited formal elaboration of the political and jural institutions. Reliance was placed on supernatural sanctions, which were either automatic or evoked, a value system which directly connected everyone's personal behaviour to the well-being of the group, and the fluid structure of group composition which facilitated fission and hence avoidance, to evade conflict.

These mechanisms rendered the need for formal political and jural institutions largely redundant, so long as conditions remained the same. Nevertheless, they were not totally successful in preempting or dealing with disputes, and conflict did occur, as the fear of enemies would indicate. These internal weaknesses are critical to the understanding of the successful intrusion of capital into the Inuit social formation.

In this chapter, certain aspects of the early social

formations of the northern Labrador Inuit and the barren-ground Inuit have been highlighted in order to establish a baseline to which subsequent transformations can be related. These aspects were: economic practice, political practice, conflict, and conflict resolution. It was noted that the primary characteristic of all these features was that there was a wide variety of options available to the Inuit and the Inuit in all forms of activity, constrained only by the environment and the social obligations created by mutual responsibility for communal well-being. The following analysis of the intrusion of European interests will delineate how these options were truncated and the forms of resistance to that process mounted by the Inuit and the Inuit.

## Chapter 2: Mercantilism: The Competitive Phase: 1500-1763

### Introduction

This chapter will examine the process of early European intrusion into the whole of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula from 1500 to 1763. First, ~~it~~ will outline a theory of mercantilism, and then it will apply that theory to the different regions of the territory. In the process, it will demonstrate the interconnectedness of all the regions and show that a transformation in one region had repercussions throughout the peninsula.

Mercantilism, as an economic system in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula, began in the early sixteenth century and persisted into the twentieth century, when it was replaced by the welfare state and a more generalized availability of wage labour. The subdivision of this epoch into political and economic periods is complicated by a number of issues. First, at the political level, jural and practical sovereignty did not coincide. The nation-states that asserted sovereignty over all or part of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula did not have direct control. Rather, their claim was established by proxy through mercantile interests that had agents in the region. Second, at the economic level, the Innut and the Inuit were confronted with different forms of intrusion, which placed

them on different political and economic trajectories, which they were to follow until the welfare state began to exercise effective administration at the local level.

Nevertheless, the mercantile period can be divided into two phases: the competitive phase (1500-1763) and the monopoly phase (1763-1926). This chapter will deal with the former. The competitive phase (1500-1763) is distinguished from the monopoly period on a jural basis, in that no one European nation-state or trading company had sole sovereignty in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula, although this was not for lack of trying. The competition between the various European interests went beyond the economic and much of it was also played out in the political and ideological arenas. Thus, it was a primary factor in the economic and political relationships which obtained not only for the Europeans, but also for the indigenous peoples of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula with whom they interacted.

The monopoly phase began with the Treaty of Paris (1763), and did not so much end as peter out. For the purposes of analysis, the year 1926 has been chosen as a cut-off date. In that year, the Moravian mission gave up its commercial interests in northern Labrador to the HBC. Subsequently, the HBC controlled most of the commercial activity on the north coast until 1942, when, for economic reasons, it transferred the responsibility to the Newfoundland government.

Obviously, these dates are somewhat arbitrary, and the

flow of social change spills over the edges of the events used to mark off the periods. But they are not meant to indicate historical disjunctures which led directly to significant social and economic transformations. The events only provide the sign posts for processual change. Thus, for example, the period between 1860 and the turn of the century could be isolated for the Inuit in terms of economic practice, in this case the floater fishery, which peaked between 1894 and 1898 and ended in the 1920's.

In addition to these temporal issues, there is also the question of the spatial limitations of the analysis. While it will eventually focus on two so-called "remote" northern Labrador communities, their isolation is more imagined than real. Wallerstein (1976) went to great lengths to document what he terms the world system of trade during the European mercantile period from the fourteenth century into the eighteenth century. He argued, as did Hechscher (1952), that it is impossible to talk about mercantilism without taking into account its global nature and inherent competitiveness. Both are salient characteristics which must be dealt with in any analysis of mercantile relations.

With regard to the latter, Hechscher (1955) and Wallerstein (1976) pointed out that the resolution of the competition was not through sweet reason. Rather, it was a constant economic, political, and military struggle which enveloped the lives of almost everyone who came into

contact with the European trading nations during this period. The consequence of this was that the relations within and between the indigenous groups in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula became entangled with those of the Europeans; and their conflicts were, if not generated, magnified by this situation. For example, the Five Nations Iroquois Confederacy grew in strength and territory during the fur trade at the expense of other indigenous groups, notably the Huron, but also the James Bay Innut and the north-shore Innut; whereas, within groups such as the north-shore Innut or the northern Labrador Inuit, there was also internal competition to become the primary middleman in the trade with Europeans.

It is also necessary to examine the whole Quebec-Labrador peninsula, as the effects of European intrusion during the early mercantile period were not restricted to the groups with which the Europeans had face-to-face dealings. The intra-Inuit and intra-Innut economic relationships facilitated the acquisition of European commodities by groups who were not in direct contact with the Europeans.

It is impossible to understand the Inuit of northern Labrador without examining their direct and indirect relationships with Europeans in southern Labrador. Similarly, one cannot look at the effects of European intrusion on the barren-ground Innut without examining their relationship with the north-shore Innut and the James

Bay Innut with whom they traded. Therefore, while it is not feasible to deal with the entire Quebec-Labrador peninsula in terms of the categories outlined in the previous chapter, it is necessary to trace the intrusion of the Europeans throughout the Quebec-Labrador peninsula. Prior to the substantive discussion of this intrusion, a short statement concerning the structural features of mercantilism as an economic system will aid in the comprehension of this period in the history of Labrador.

#### Mercantilism: Theoretical Orientation

Mercantilism, in Europe and most of North America, was the forerunner to industrial capitalism; though in northern Labrador, due to its peripheral status, mercantilism was followed by the post-industrial welfare state. This places mercantile relations of production at centre-stage in the analysis of European-aboriginal confrontation in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula. The issues that will be addressed in this treatment of mercantilism, and later the treatment of the post-industrial capitalist welfare state, are: the structural complexity of the matrices of the relations of production in confrontation, and the recursive nature of the process of transformation dependent on the interaction of people and systems at the concrete level.

In contradistinction to some approaches to industrial

capitalism, in which a single set of relations of production is delineated and then applied to particular situations ranging from the micro-level relationship between a worker and his employer to the macro-level of the relationship between nation states, an analysis of mercantilism cannot be so rigid. In mercantilism, rather than a single set of relations of production there is a matrix of relations of production within which both the dominated and dominant groups enjoy a fairly broad spectrum of possible strategies in all forums of practice. Further, this matrix of relations of production is not as rigorously delimited as the set of relations of production for capitalism and, in fact, their very nature militates against such a rendering. These characteristics do not preempt analysis; rather, they encourage a heavier reliance on the behaviour of the bearers of the relations of production at particular historic conjunctures.

For example, the Europeans who colonized West Africa were faced with a significantly different situation than those who dealt with the people of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula. In West Africa, the aboriginal peoples were living in kingdoms whose political structures permitted the mobilization of hundreds, if not thousands, more soldiers in military expeditions than did the political leaders in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula. This forced the Europeans to adopt different means to achieve essentially the same economic goals in both regions (Ross 1984).



Thus, mercantilism denotes a matrix of relations of production, but this is only one of its conceptual referents pertinent to this study. At the substantive level, the concept of mercantilism refers to a period in the history of northern Labrador extending from the early sixteenth century to the twentieth century. During this time, the primary source of exchange value accessible to the aboriginal peoples was the production of simple commodities, i.e., fish and furs. Further to these aspects of mercantilism, there were also those which pertain to the relations between the various European nation-states, whose actions and policies vis-à-vis each other had significant consequences. Among other practices, the various states handed out trade monopolies to trading companies and/or individual merchants, provided military protection for them from pirates, and engaged in the wars all over the globe, which were disruptive to commercial activities in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula.

At a more abstract level, mercantilism is at once a particular means of surplus appropriation, and a variably successful form of labour control, political domination, and ideological hegemony. As a means of surplus appropriation mercantilism is merely the process of buying cheap and selling dear. The complexity enters into the analysis in delineating the combination of factors which contribute to a merchant's ability to maximize this end, and the historically situated economic environment in which

it is accomplished.

Marx addresses the problem by distinguishing between the "monetary system" and the "mercantile system", on the basis of the evolution of capital and its centralization. Both are necessary conditions for the transition to the capitalist mode of production. The former:

...understood the autonomy of value only in the form in which it arose from simple circulation-money; it therefore made this abstract form [original emphasis] of wealth into the exclusive object [object] [original emphasis] of nations which were then just entering into the period in which the gaining of wealth as such [original emphasis] appeared as the aim of society itself. (Marx 1973: 327)

This corresponds to the definition of mercantilism as a European economic period which featured the drive for national economic aggrandizement. In addition to the highly competitive trade was the perception of wealth as being achievable only at the expense of other nations, thus necessitating military as well as commercial strength.

The latter is:

... an epoch where industrial capital and hence wage labour arose in manufacturers and developed in antithesis to and at the expense of non-industrial wealth. ... [also] the "early appreciation ... of money as capital, but actually only in the form of money, of the circulation of mercantile capital which transforms itself into money. (Marx 1973: 327)

This period is therefore a hybrid of incipient capitalism and the monetary system.

Despite this distinction between the monetary and the

mercantile systems, the appropriation of value in both occurs entirely within the circulation phase of the reproduction circuit. The distinction is not with the buy-cheap-sell-dear process, but rather where the value appropriated is subsequently utilized. In the former, it remains in the circulation phase. In the latter, it begins to be invested in the production phase, as Marx notes: "... at the expense of non-industrial wealth and of feudal landed property" (1973: 327). Viewed from within this context, the mercantile system is part and parcel of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe. However, from the perspective of value appropriation it remains totally in the circulation phase, and hence is identical to the monetary system.

The distinction is not of immediate concern to this analysis of the creation of capital through the exploitation of the direct producers outside the capitalist mode of production. At the core of mercantilism as a process of value appropriation is the metamorphosis of commodities into money and vice versa. Schematically this process can be represented as follows:

$$M - C - M'$$

$$M' = M + *M$$

M = money

C = commodity

\*M = profit

Two points should be made here. First, in one sense

the process of value appropriation exists outside of time, in that the actual transport, storage, and other expenses accrued in the distribution of the commodities is not a part of it, but is rather a part of the production phase. And second, the term metamorphosis is a misnomer, as the merchant's "... wealth exists always in the form of money and his money always serves as capital" (Marx 1977: 326). Therefore, regardless of the guise in which the wealth appears, i.e., as a commodity or as cash, it is always money to the merchant. Nevertheless, the distinction between commodity and cash and the transformation of one into the other is the key to the process of value appropriation, and Marx distinguishes them by referring to one as commodity capital and the other as commercial capital. The former "... always exists in the form of commodities on the market to be converted into money, [the latter]... exists on the market in the form of money, to be converted into commodities" (Marx 1977: 267). It is through this transformation of commodity capital into commercial capital, and back again, that the merchant is able to draw off a profit. He does this by paying the producers of the commodity less than its true value and selling it either at its true value or, if conditions permit, above its true value, pocketing the difference as his profit and starting the cycle again.

The maximization of the merchant's profit derives from two sectors. First is the obvious buy cheap, sell dear,

and the second is the velocity of the process of exchange, that is, the more times he can turn over the same money, the more value he is able to appropriate.

The critical point, both in theory and in practice, is that since the merchant's capital does not penetrate the instance of production, the transformations obtaining within a social formation deriving strictly from within its logic of accumulation are limited (Brenner 1977). In order to augment the degree of domination, and hence profit, the agents of merchant's capital must mobilize other mechanisms in non-economic spheres of practice. But this is not to imply that there are no necessary consequences to the penetration of merchant's capital. The most notable are the concentration of wealth in the hands of merchants and the incipient division of labour. Both are necessary conditions for the transition to the capitalist mode of production.

The former is basic to merchant's capital, as it is one of the two ways in which it can appropriate value, that is through the volume of trade. The more commodities it is able to transform into capital the more profit it accrues, as each unit adds its own increment to the profit. Marx traces this characteristic directly to the transition to capitalism. Merchant's capital:

... existence and development to a certain level are in themselves the development of capitalist production 1) as premises for the concentration of money wealth, and 2) because the capitalist mode of production

presupposes production for trade ... (1977: 327)

The latter is not so much a requirement as a consequence of the transition.

The function of selling [a commodity], of effecting the first phase of its metamorphosis, has passed from the manufacturer to the merchant, whereas previously it was a function which the producer had to perform himself after having completed the function of its production. (1977: 270)

Once capitalism has become the dominant mode of production, this separation of selling from producing provides two services to industrial capital.

In so far as it contributes to shortening the time of circulation, it may help indirectly to increase the surplus value produced by the industrial capitalists. In so far as it helps to expand the market and effects the division of labour between capitals, hence enabling capital to operate on a larger scale, its function promotes productivity of industrial capital, and its accumulation. (1977: 80)

Given that this separation is less well developed in a mercantile relationship, the mercantilist is faced with fairly serious problems in the area of labour control. As will be demonstrated below, the history of labour control in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula is the key to exposing the inherent weaknesses of mercantilism as a system of economic exploitation.

The mercantile period of European economic relations lasted from the fifteenth into the eighteenth century. During this period, the aims of the Western nation-states

were to achieve a favourable balance of trade and a position of strength, if not dominance, in the world balance of power. These goals were complicated by the fact that:

In the last instance, the ideas were based on a static conception of economic life: the view that there was a fixed quantity of economic resources in the world, which could be increased in one country only at the expense of another. (Hechscher 1955: 23)

This gave competition an almost desperate tenor, which is reflected in the history of the competition between the French and the English in the North American fur trade, a competition which the aboriginal peoples were able to exploit to their economic and political advantage. It was also, as Hechscher notes: "... one reason for the commercial wars, carried on almost without interruption from the end of the 17th century to 1815" (1955: 23).

Other manifestations of the national goals and perceived attributes of the world economy at the local level in northern Labrador can be discerned as well. The intrusion by European nations can itself be traced to their pursuit of wealth. Gosling cites an anonymous memoir from 1716, which reflects this intent. In part it states:

... it [Labrador] will furnish France with fish and oils, whalebone, skins of seals and caribous, furs, ivory and eider down, and all in such abundance that a large trade can be established with foreign countries. (1910: 137)

Unfortunately for the French, they were unable to realize this potential bonanza for a number of reasons, not the least of which was the aggressive posture of the Inuit they encountered.

In addition to the search for new sources of wealth, once they were secured, it was incumbent on the state concerned to protect them from other states, who, if given the opportunity, would usurp their position. For this a military presence was required.

In order to meet this demand, the English devised a scheme through which they could achieve both resource exploitation and military preparedness simultaneously. During the mercantile period, it was British policy to use its fishing fleet as a training ground for seamen, who would ultimately serve as crew on British warships. To ensure that the trainees were accessible both during and after their education, and that they got sufficient seagoing experience, efforts were made to maintain the fishing-fleet base in England. A consequence of this policy was the delay of the establishment of a permanent European population in the areas where the fishing was done, such as Newfoundland and Labrador.

Another consequence obtained from the local implementation of this national policy.

Commodore Sir Hugh Palliser, who became the Governor of Newfoundland in 1764, fervently subscribed to the doctrine that the maintenance of British dominance in the fisheries was vital to the naval strength of



the kingdom. He was determined in particular to develop the trade and fishery of the Labrador coast for fishing ships from Great Britain and, to that end, wished to secure the co-operation of the native Eskimo. (Whitely 1964: 30)

The eventual outcome of this policy was the Governor's support, along with that of the British Board of Trade, of the Moravians' application to set up missions in northern Labrador, to proselytize, to trade, and, most important to the British, to establish peaceful relations with the Inuit and contain them north of Hamilton Inlet.

Therefore, mercantile policy at the state level based on a particular conception of the world had its effect on northern Labrador. Over time, the aboriginal peoples were to become incorporated, at the instance of exchange, into the world system of trade. At the same time, their territory provided a training ground for European militias and an arena for competition between competing mercantile interests. Centuries later, there is an almost eerie reprise of two of these same interests in the post-industrial period in northern Labrador, as oil companies and European and North American military interests take up positions in response to a new set of political and economic exigencies. From its very inception, the mercantile period in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula illustrates the issues raised in this section:

Quebec-Labrador Peninsula 1500-1763: Introduction

The European intrusion into the Quebec-Labrador peninsula was predicated on a number of interconnected motives; although primarily economic, the political dimension was also a key variable. This linkage, while characteristic of all systems of exploitation, is of special significance for mercantilism, whose structure wedded political control to economic exploitation. The balance between these two polarities was in a constant state of flux, but the system as a whole moved inexorably in one direction, toward the political domination and the economic subsumption of the peoples confronted by the European mercantilists.

In the Quebec-Labrador peninsula, the commodities the Europeans coveted most were fish and furs. Innis, in his landmark study The Fur Trade in Canada (1970), goes so far as to argue that the southern political border imposed by the Europeans between the United States of America and Canada derived from the territorial extent of suitable beaver populations. While this may be a little overstated, it does express the central position of the fur trade in the motivation of European intervention into what is now Canada. However, this is not to say that all aboriginal polities experienced the same history. The vastness of the territory, and the variety of political and economic systems which the aboriginal polities had developed prior to European intrusion, presupposed differential responses.

This was the case in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula, where the various groups did not all interact with the Europeans at the same level of intensity, although they were all involved to some degree. The transformations in relations between particular aboriginal polities also varied, contingent on their involvement in the fur trade. However, just as significant a factor in this process was the pre-European inter-Amerindian and inter-Inuit relations, which were grounded in their spatial proximity and trade relations. The political and economic relations in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula were arranged around three axes: European-European, European-aboriginal, and aboriginal-aboriginal. It was the interplay of these three relationships, within the context of the pursuit of wealth and power by the Europeans, which structured the relations and the history.

This is not to imply that any particular result was preordained, that it occurred outside history, so to speak. Rather, while the structure of the European-aboriginal interaction was mercantile, and as such necessarily included a particular set of relations characterized by unequal exchange, the hand of man and singular unforeseeable natural events were also necessary components.

With regard to the former, the military and economic affiliation of the French with the north-shore Innut/Huron/Algonkian alliance in opposition to the Iroquois confederacy was one of the central political

features of the fur trade in the St. Lawrence valley. An example of the latter factor, that is, natural events impinging on the economic and/or political arenas, would be the epidemics which swept through St. Lawrence valley between 1634 and 1640, decimating the aboriginal population. Trigger makes a direct link between these epidemics and a particular set of European-aboriginal relations, stating:

The most fatalistic were the Montagnais [north-shore Innut] around Quebec City, whose hunting territories were becoming depleted and who were increasingly poverty stricken and dependent on the French. ... They were convinced [because of the epidemics] that the French were determined to exterminate them so that they could take possession of their land. (1976: 500)

This reference to a range of variables, which is absolutely necessary in order to arrive at a reasonable appreciation of the mercantile period, can be contrasted to the set of relations that obtains under capitalism. In a capitalist system, the dominant sector controls labour, land, and resources, that is, controls the components necessary for survival. Under these conditions the options open for the dominated sector to assert its will are more limited.

Such was not the case in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula for the period under consideration. For example, the north-shore Innut were loath to allow the French access to the interior, where they controlled the trade as middlemen. In the Jesuit Relations of 1640-41, an account of this

north-shore Innut policy is related.

"Being present...at a meeting where the Savages discussed sending their young men with merchandise to these more distant tribes, I offered to accompany them.... this somewhat troubled them, for they were unwilling that Frenchmen should have knowledge of their trade, and what they give to other Savages for their furs, and this they kept so secret that no one is able to discover it. (Thwaites 1896: vol. 21: 99)

The significance of this example is not only the position taken by the north-shore Innut but more importantly, their ability to enforce it.

In sum, while it was within the general frame of reference of mercantilism as a structured form of European trade that the logic for early European intrusion into the Quebec-Labrador peninsula was provided, particular events must be included if a reasonably comprehensive understanding is to be achieved.

#### St. Lawrence Valley and the North Shore

By the time the French explorer Cartier made his first voyage up the St. Lawrence River in 1534, Europeans were already in competition with each other over the resources of the so-called "New World," specifically fish. In 1527, fifty ships from Portugal, England, and France were taking advantage of the rich cod stocks off Nova Scotia and Newfoundland (Biggar 1901). This competition was not

restricted to the economic sector, but also included piracy. Innis states that:

An English document refers to a ship from Rouen loaded with 9,000 fish and manned by eleven men, which was captured, probably in 1523; and a later document dated December 2, 1531, refers to the plundering of a vessel from Brittany, carrying a cargoe (sic) of salted fish from the "new founde iland.... (1978: 16)

This escalation of economic competition to violent intervention is a central feature of the early mercantile period and had serious repercussions on relations between aboriginal polities and between aboriginals and Europeans.

The fur trade began as a side venture to the fishery. Fishermen would put into sheltered coves in order to erect stages on which to dry their fish, a practice which brought them into contact with the local population. Exchange was informal and consisted of crew members trading a few goods for furs in order to supplement their income from fishing. That the aboriginals were willing to trade is not surprising, in that they were already involved in extensive trade networks. Europeans were presumably viewed, at least economically, as merely an alternative source of trade goods.

From the 1530s to the 1550s, trade remained a minor adjunct to the fishery. The furs, once transported to Europe, were used in the manufacture of luxury clothing, and demand was not great. It was not until felt hats using beaver fur came into fashion in the late sixteenth century,

that fur became a serious trade item in its own right. Nevertheless, from 1550 on there was a sufficient market to encourage a regular trade.

The initial foray of Europeans into the St. Lawrence valley was, as noted, accomplished by Jacques Cartier, who had been commissioned by Francis I, the king of France, to make a voyage of discovery to North America. During this expedition he engaged in limited trade with a number of groups of aboriginals, as well as carrying out his cartographic responsibilities. But Cartier's interaction with Amerindians has a darker side as well. When he left, Cartier took two Stadaconan adolescents back to France.

Trigger (1976: 182-183) provides an interesting reconstruction from the historic record of how this was accomplished. Just prior to his return to France, Cartier erected a large cross on the shores of Gaspé Harbour which bore the arms of Francis I. Donnacona, the leader of the Stadaconan fishing party, whose home territory was in the Quebec City area, was at the same location and rebuked Cartier for this action, arguing that he had no right to erect any structure without permission. In response, Cartier signalled from his ship that he wanted to trade with the Stadaconans. Taking him at his word, a group of Stadaconans, with Donnacona in the lead, boarded Cartier's ship. Once on board they were all seized by Cartier's crew, and Cartier then proceeded to explain through gestures that the cross was merely a landmark so that both

the French and the Amerindians would know where to assemble when the French returned. He also proposed that Donnacona's two sons accompany him to France, which Donnacona permitted.

Cartier's motivations in taking the two boys were probably numerous, but among them was the desire to teach them French so that they could act as interpreters for Cartier when he returned. In addition, he also wanted to return to the royal court with exotica from the far-off land, and also to impress upon the Stadaconans the splendour of France, so that they could report it to their people. Donnacona's acquiescence to this action is somewhat harder to understand.

Trigger (1976) proposes that it was based on a complex set of conditions to which the European/aboriginal relations were subject. First, there was the political aspect. The year before this incident, two hundred Stadaconans had been massacred by another group of aboriginals, probably Micmac. Donnacona could have been looking to a future alliance with the French in order to protect his people from such aggressions. Second, there was the economic consideration of control of the Gaspé Peninsula, which would have given the Stadaconans equal or predominant access to European trade goods, which up to that time had been controlled by the more easterly Amerindian polities. Finally, there was the cultural reason, in that the exchange of children may have been an



expression of good will on the part of Donnacona. Therefore, "[P]aternal affection, as well as practical, political and economic considerations probably motivated Donnacona's restrained behaviour (Trigger 1976: 183)."

Cartier's second voyage of 1535, in the course of which he "... found Montagnais [north-shore - Innut] occupying the north shore of the St. Lawrence almost up to the narrows called Quebec" (Biggar 1901: 70), once again brought him into conflict with the Stadaconans. This time it was over his desire to reach a second Iroquoian village at Hochelaga (on what is now known as the Island of Montreal). Although Donnacona was relieved at the return of his sons, he viewed this move as a threat to his efforts to secure a bilateral alliance with the French and attempted to dissuade Cartier. It has been proposed by Trigger (1976) that this was the first attempt by a north Amerindian polity to establish themselves as middlemen. However, Cartier ignored or misunderstood these overtures and made the journey.

Although his visit to Hochelaga was brief, on his return up the river he remained in Stadacona over the winter. During his stay, relations between the French and the Stadaconans were tense. The French habit of carrying arms and their building of a fort was, for the Amerindians, a sign of bad faith. As it turned out, the latter were correct in their assessment. When Cartier left this time, it was not without once again spicing away more

Amerindians. This time there were ten, including Donnacona, and this time none were to return.

Cartier's third and final voyage to the St. Lawrence valley, in 1541, had a number of goals. In addition to exploration, which had characterized the previous two voyages, Cartier was to search for precious metals and gems and was also charged with establishing a colony. Given that the Stadaconans were upset at Cartier for raising a cross and a fort on their land without permission, it is understandable that they viewed the establishment of a colony as a serious breach of acceptable behaviour.

A further interesting feature of this expedition was the explicit religious content, which was considered as one of its primary motivations. This religious dimension was directly related to inter-European relations on a global scale and their competition over the rights to exploit newly discovered territories. To this end, Cartier had been replaced as commander of the French interests in the St. Lawrence valley by Francois de La-Rocque, sieur de Roberval.

Trigger outlines the relationship between religion and the European economic and political interests in the following way:

In Roberval's commission, much emphasis was placed on the conversion of the heathen, but this was to placate Pope Paul III and to counteract Spanish and Portuguese protests that the French were ignoring the decree of Pope Alexander VI, which had divided the New World between their two countries. (1976:

201)

It is clear from this that European international adventures during the early mercantile period were predicated on an extremely chauvinistic perception of the world, which they believed was theirs to parcel out in any way they saw fit. Unfortunately for Roberval, his first attempt to join this process was postponed for a year.

While Roberval was preparing for his expedition to the St. Lawrence valley, he found that he could not raise sufficient funds through conventional financing channels. To make up his shortfall, he spent a year as a pirate in the English Channel. In the interim, Cartier set out with five ships to establish a French colony in the St. Lawrence valley.

The site Cartier chose for his settlement was Cape Rouge, nine miles north of Stadacona. Almost immediately, his relations with the Stadaconans began to deteriorate, for several reasons. First, he returned without any of the Stadaconans he took to France on his last voyage. Second, he was accompanied by women, children, and livestock in addition to his crew. And third, he began building, once again without permission. It must have been obvious to the Stadaconans that this intrusion was very different from the previous two visits and that the French were preparing themselves for an indefinite stay.

In response, the Stadaconans began a war of attrition against the French. Since the French fort was too strong

for a frontal attack, they laid siege to it, attacking any Frenchman who ventured outside its walls and shutting down most of the trade. Cartier managed to stay for a year, but, by June, with no sign of Roberval, and deciding that he could no longer hold out, he packed up and left.

On his return journey to France, Cartier met Roberval in St. John's harbour, Newfoundland. Despite Roberval's order to return to New France with him, Cartier, believing that he had a cargo of precious stones, and with his crew near mutiny, headed home. As it turned out, Cartier's cargo was worthless, and he was never to again to return to North America.

Roberval continued on, after Cartier sneaked out of St. John's harbour under cover of darkness, and soon after established his settlement on the same site as Cartier had placed his. An indication of the economic returns that Roberval envisioned obtaining from this venture is found in his agreement with the ships' masters who transported his expedition. Biggar notes: "...it was stipulated that after landing Roberval and his company in the St. Lawrence the masters should be allowed to return one-third of all that was obtained by barter from the savages" (1901: 30-31).

There is little recorded of this attempt at colonization, which only lasted one year, during which fifty of Roberval's contingent died of scurvy. But there does not seem to have been the same degree of hostility

between the French and the Stadaconans as there had been during Cartier's tenure. This may have been, as Trigger (1976) suggests, because the Stadaconans had directed their hostility against Cartier personally, or it may be that the Stadaconans kept their interaction with the French to a minimum. While they may not have been hostile, neither were they particularly helpful.

Roberval's abandonment of the colony a year after his arrival, on the heels of Cartier's retreat, raises the question of what features of the French colonial venture into the St. Lawrence valley contributed to so dismal a performance. First, there were the poor relations the French had with the aboriginals, engendered by their insensitive and at times shoddy treatment of people who had accepted them as trading partners. This behaviour created an atmosphere that was hardly conducive to the establishment of a colony. Second, in conjunction with the political dimension was the inability of the French to discover precious metals or gems which were capable of generating sufficient capital to support a colony. Related to the second feature and central to the analysis of European intrusion into the St. Lawrence valley was the inability of the fur trade, on its own, to support a colony. Much later, the HBC would demonstrate that there was no need to establish a large European presence, with its concomitant high overhead, to exploit the fur resources efficiently. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest

that the continuing efforts of the French to establish their presence in force in St. Lawrence valley had a political motivation as well as an economic one. This factor was part and parcel of their attempt to become the major European political force to the exclusion of all others, as well as to derive economic benefits from their colonial possession.

The interplay between the political and economic practices was at the crux of the European enterprise during the early colonial period. It is understandable, then, that there was a wide variation in the ability of the Europeans to achieve their goals. The characterization of the European/aboriginal relationship as a partnership by some social historians (i.e., Francis and Morantz 1983) is true only to a certain degree. It must not be forgotten that the Europeans were eventually able to enforce their political and economic control in the St. Lawrence valley.

The European merchants were intent on profit, and in a mercantile relationship this is directly related to the volume and velocity of trade. The more people they engaged in trade, the more profit they reaped. This pursuit of profit was part of the political expansionist policy of the Europeans. Political control included economic control; the two could not be separated.

In terms of political control, what is interesting about the St. Lawrence valley is that the Europeans remained hemmed in on the coastlines and their direct

control of the interiors was minimal. The analysis must therefore be viewed within the context of the political autonomy of the interior. As will be discussed below, this differential level of interaction based on spatial proximity was instrumental in exacerbating schisms between aboriginal polities.

After Roberval left, trade in the St. Lawrence valley dropped off. However, as the demand for furs in Europe began to increase, expeditions whose primary purpose was to trade for furs began to be mounted. Biggar states:

In 1581 ... some merchants of St. Malo pushed once more into the upper St. Lawrence. ... In that year a barque of only thirty tons was sent, but so profitable was the return that a vessel of eighty tons was dispatched the following summer. (1901: 32)

This was followed up by sending three ships in 1583 and ten in 1585. The increasing interest in the fur trade, coupled with the continuing and expanding cod fishery, led to European state policies which would increase or at least protect their share of these lucrative resource regions.

During this same period, the north-shore of the lower St. Lawrence, specifically the region where the Saguenay debouches into the St. Lawrence, became an important trade centre. As Denton notes:

From 1580 until the end of the 17th century, by far the most significant source of goods was related to the French trade on the north-shore of the St. Lawrence. For much of the 17th century this trade was controlled by the Tadoussac Montagnais [north-shore Innut], who acted as middlemen. (1983; 11)

It remains very difficult to ascertain the levels of interaction between aboriginal groups, and harder yet to categorize them beyond the linguistic-spatial divisions outlined by MacKenzie (1980). However, there is some evidence to suggest regular interaction and cooperation between them, which the Europeans selectively encouraged in some areas and interfered with in others, as their economic strategies dictated. Therefore, while some pre-European trade became redundant, the fur trade opened up new forms and avenues of economic interaction. For example, in 1671, it is noted in the Jesuit Relations that:

Of Lake Saint-Jean Albanel said: "It was formerly the place whither all the Nations between the two seas [Atlantic Ocean and Hudson Bay], those of the East and the north, used to repair for purposes of trade; and I have seen more than twenty Nations gathered there." (Anik 1976: 478)

Moreover, there is some basis for proposing that in the pre-European period, the inter-aboriginal polity relationships went beyond the merely economic. Evidence of this is provided by Trigger (1976), who takes the position that political interaction was a necessary adjunct to trade, as illustrated by Donnacona's willingness to allow his sons to accompany Cartier back to France.

At the turn of the seventeenth century, the French tried again to set up colonies through the agency of the chartered monopoly. In 1599, Pierre Chauvin de Tonnetuit was granted a trade monopoly in northeastern North America with the stipulation that he would establish a colony.



While Chauvin agreed to this provision, he was less than enthusiastic in its execution. This lack of enthusiasm is illustrated even by his choice of Tadoussac as the site for the establishment of his settlement. This location had become a centre for trade. Unfortunately for the colonists, it was a poor choice to begin a settlement; the topography is rough and the soil not suited to farming.

It is said he [Chauvin] cared less for the welfare of the colonists than for the gains of trade.... Champlain indeed goes so far as to assert that Chauvin never intended to fulfill this condition of his monopoly but had taken out a few men merely to throw dust in the eyes of the government. (Biggar 1901: 42)

Chauvin's tenure lasted a mere three years. On his death, in early 1603, his monopoly passed on to Aymar de Chaste, who was not much more successful in establishing the colony on a firm basis.

One problem was the lack of people willing to embark on such a risky venture. In 1604, a new monopoly had been formed by merchants from St. Malo, La Rochelle, St. Jean-de-Luz, and Rouen, on the condition that they ship sixty settlers per year to New France for the ten-year duration of their monopoly. Such was the difficulty in finding colonists that: "... idlers and beggars both in the town and in the country might be seized, and the judges were instructed not to be too lenient in the infliction of the punishment of banishment..." (Biggar 1901: 51). Here the connection between the state and the merchant capital

is even more blatant, with the judiciary used to facilitate the interests of both. Nevertheless, it was to no avail, as all the profits from the company went to support the struggling colony, and so it failed. Once more, the link between state policy and mercantile practice was evident. This structural feature of mercantilism, that is, the close connection between political and economic aspirations of the Europeans, which derived from the zero sum gain attitude to the production of wealth prevailing at the time, is crucial. It is through this connection that the aboriginals were drawn not only into an economic relationship, which eventually led to the loss of their economic autonomy, but also into a political relationship, which led to the loss of their political independence.

During this early period of the fur trade, while the French were struggling to establish themselves in the St. Lawrence valley, the Dutch were carrying on a brisk trade south of the St. Lawrence in competition with the French. The Dutch practice of trading arms to the Iroquois had a significant impact on warfare in the region.

Prior to the intrusion of the Europeans, inter-aboriginal warfare was not only territorial or economic. Raids were made for revenge and as a means for the males of the community to gain status and prestige. Further, raids were usually restricted to the summer months, when foliage provided cover for the aggressors and travel by water was possible. It was only subsequent to

the arrival of the Europeans that economic wars of expansion became the more prevalent.

Aboriginal warfare was a critical feature of the fur trade. Although the post-European intrusion form of warfare carried with it many of the pre-European intrusion trappings, it had become essentially war for control of the trade routes. In order to prosecute these wars successfully, the aboriginals formed alliances among themselves, usually with pre-European trading partners. The aim of these wars was to disrupt the trade of one's opponents and hopefully to displace them altogether.

These wars began early on in the fur-trade era. Trigger places the zenith of Iroquois power in the St. Lawrence valley at 1600. But the Iroquois were not always in complete control. In 1603, when the French arrived at Tadoussac, they encountered one thousand north-shore Innut, Algonkians and Etchemins celebrating a victory over the Iroquois which had taken place some time in the recent past. Anik notes that: "[B]y 1603 the Montagnais [north-shore Innut] -Algonkian alliance had succeeded in opening the St. Lawrence below Montreal Island and for the first time the Hurons began to appear on the river" (1976: 3). Nevertheless, the Iroquois still controlled the river above Montreal.

One of the most significant features of this warfare was the political dimension. That is, these battles were not between individual bands, but rather between alliances.

The Iroquois confederacy consisted of five polities, the Seneca, the Mohawk, the Cayuga, the Onandoga, and the Onieda. Their primary aboriginal enemies during this period consisted of an alliance of north-shore Innut, Huron, Algonkian, Etchimen, and, later, the Ottawa. In addition to these alliances, a number James Bay Innut polities were also known to conduct raids against Inuit in the Eastern Hudson Bay region. Although the basis for these latter raids is not altogether clear, they may well have been motivated by economic as well as social and ritual reasons (Ross 1979, Francis 1979).

While the Europeans supported their aboriginal allies in their efforts to seize and control important trade routes, it was not until 1609 that they took part in an actual confrontation. Champlain aided the north-shore Innut in a battle against the Iroquois. In 1610, probably in response to this assistance, on his arrival at Tadoussac "... he found sixty Montagnais [north-shore Innut] warriors awaiting his return" (Trigger 1976: 256).

Even at this early stage, it is obvious that the aboriginals were quick to see the political and economic advantages of forming alliances with the Europeans. Of course, these alliances were of mutual advantage and were instrumental in the European's eventual success.

Up to this point, the analysis has concentrated on the St. Lawrence valley and the north-shore, which was the site of much of the European and inter-aboriginal conflict and

the blending of these two processes. As has been indicated, one response of the aboriginals was open warfare to gain control of the trade. This response was in consonance with the Europeans' aspirations, as they allied themselves with opposing aboriginal forces: the French with the north-shore Innut/ Huron/Algonkian alliance and the Dutch, and later the English with the Iroquois, in order to oust their European competitors.

For the aboriginals, these military encounters were also a mixture of political and economic factors. In 1649 "... a party of about one thousand Iroquois invaded Huronia and destroyed two villages and drove the remaining inhabitants into exile" (Francis and Morantz 1983: 19). Earlier in the decade, Mohawk harassment of Algonkian and north-shore Innut hunting parties effectively shut them off from their traditional hunting grounds south of the St. Lawrence, creating severe economic hardship. These conflicts were to continue unabated until France was ousted as a political force in North America by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Nevertheless, conflict related to trade remained an integral part of the fur trade, even though it shifted from conflict between European states to conflict between traders. It was simply that there remained money to be made from trade and, hence, it remained a source of antagonism.

Prior to an examination of the fur trade in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula, a few more observations on the

trade in the St. Lawrence valley must be made. First, the aboriginals were never in favour of a European trade monopoly, even though they accepted European military aid in attempting to establish their own. Trigger notes that: "[C]ollective resentment against official traders [monopolies] resulted in personal quarrels between French and Indians, leading to the killing of two Frenchmen in 1617 and two more in 1627" (1976: 363). Second, the fur trade quickly diminished in importance in the St. Lawrence valley, as opposed to the Quebec-Labrador peninsula, where its importance increased. Eccles notes that:

The pursuit of the fur trade for purely economic ends did not endure beyond the end of the seventeenth century. The amount of beaver exported to France had grown astronomically until by the 1690s it far exceeded what the market could absorb" (1979: 422)

Eccles offers further support for his position that the fur was not an important factor in France's designs for New France. livres of trade with all their colonies, only one million was from furs, that is, 0.71% of their trade. Therefore, one must look to the political dimension to help explain the tenacity of France's fight to hold on to its territory. However, despite Eccles' contention, it must be kept in mind that the private trading companies from France were intent on maintaining their trade. So, even if the trade was not substantial for the country as a whole, it was important to the trading companies, who no doubt lobbied the state for support and assistance in controlling

foreign interlopers.

Quebec-Labrador Peninsula

Prior to the arrival of the Europeans, the Quebec-Labrador peninsula had already been long occupied.

The occupation sequence for the area [Caniapiscau Lake region of northern Quebec] (Denton et al. 1981: 290-305; Denton et al. 1982: 102-111) runs from 4000-3500 years ago, into the historic period, with an apparent break between 2300 and 1500 BP" (Denton 1982: 2)

As was noted in the first chapter, the break in the occupation sequence is now less certain and, as more work is done, may disappear altogether.

Archaeological evidence indicates a pre-European trade network in which Ramah chert from northern Labrador and Mistassini quartzite from the Mistassini Lake region were traded throughout the Quebec-Labrador peninsula, in a preform or finished tool state (Denton 1983). In addition to this trade, given the birch-bark-canoe mode of transportation and the lack of suitable birch trees in the northern regions, as well as historic accounts of trade involving birch bark in exchange for caribou hides, it seems possible that this trade also existed prior to European intrusion. Therefore, the notion of unrelated hunting and gathering bands living in political and economic isolation from one another must be questioned.

While it is impossible to ascertain from the existing record the level of interaction between the various polities, one can be certain that it was sufficient to supply the needs of the people; therefore, it was regular. These connections were later to play an important role during the fur trade, both economically and politically. The efforts of the Europeans to disrupt or control them was a constant source of friction between the Innut and the Europeans.

The interior of this region was to remain the sole preserve of the Innut until well into the nineteenth century. Most of the fur trade was conducted through Innut middlemen, and they protected this role jealously. Francis and Morantz point out that:

The first [canoe route into the interior] was mentioned by Champlain in 1603. He learned from Indian informants that travellers ascended the Saguenay River as far as Lake St. Jean, continued by various routes to Lake Mistassini, then descended the Rupert River to James Bay. (1983: 17-18; from Biggar 1922: 1: 24)

This became an important trade route, and the home territory of the north-shore Innut placed them in an ideal position to control the traffic. As early as 1608, the north-shore Innut were refusing to guide the French into the interior and thirty-two years later this policy was still in place. They were able to maintain this status until the HBC began to open up trading posts on James Bay in the latter third of the seventeenth century, thereby



circumventing them.

The aboriginals attempted to isolate the Europeans from the interior in order to control the trade. While it has been argued that the Europeans were unable to penetrate the interior due to the threat of starvation, it seems apparent that political considerations were also important.

While the French were attempting to gain access to the fur resources of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula from their base of operations in the St. Lawrence valley, the English approached it from the north, through James Bay. Their initial foray had an interesting feature; they used personnel from their chief European rival to make the initial contact. In this case, they hired Radisson and Grosseliers, who were sent into the James Bay region to explore the possibilities of trade in 1668.

Of course this territory was already involved not only in the fur trade, but also in the political and military intrigues that were concomitant with it. In 1661, by which time the French had been permitted into the interior as far as Lac St. Jean, Father Gabriel Druillettes accompanied a party of forty canoes as far as Lake Nikabau. He noted: "[N]ekoubau [sic] is a place noted for a market that is held every year, to which all the savages from the surrounding country resort for the purpose of conducting their petty traffic" (Anik 1976: 477). Druillettes was intent on continuing further into the interior, but his guides refused to go for fear of the Iroquois. This fear

was hardly unfounded, as four years earlier, in 1665: "... a party of about thirty, both Mohawk and Onandoga, destroyed or captured about three times their number in an engagement at Lake Nemiscau" (Thwaites 1896 ; 50: 37ff: quoted in Francis and Morantz, 1983: 20).

Immediately following this incident, the French began a vigorous campaign against the Iroquois, and in 1666 managed to open the St. Lawrence valley up as far as the Great Lakes. But on their northern flank, they were still left with the English to contend with. The HBC, which received its Royal Charter in 1670, in contradistinction to the French chartered companies, was not required to establish a colony. "It was ... clear that settlement was envisaged as one possibility; but there is no word in the Charter which lays the fostering of settlement on the Company as a duty" (Rich 1958: 56). What followed was a rash of post openings in the 1670s, with the French moving from the south and the English setting up posts on the shores of James Bay. Fierce competition was quickly in full flight and was a complex mix of economic and political factors.

On the aboriginal side, the continuing Iroquois aggressions brought about a windfall diplomatic bonus for the French.

In the summer of 1761 seventeen Indian "nations," some of which were believed to inhabit the coast of Hudson Bay, met at

Sault Ste. Marie and according to French sources voluntarily placed themselves under the sovereignty of the French King. (ACC//A 13: 269; in Francis and Morantz 1983: 26)

Given that the French were in the process of opening up posts in the interior, Francis and Morantz's (1983) speculation that there was likely an economic dimension to this agreement is probably correct, especially in the light of the fact that, in 1682, a French company received a charter which coincided with that of the HBC.

The link between the political and the economic is easily demonstrated by the actions of the company's agents, who had jural powers over their areas of monopoly. For example, in 1763:

As Bayly [the Charles Fort factor] believed that Abanel [the French trader/missionary] had traded with Indians residing "within the Hudson's Bay Company Pattent" he detained him and sent him to England aboard the Company's ship. (Anik 1976: 479)

These military conflicts escalated to the point that, in 1686, the French invaded the James Bay region from the landward and captured all three HBC posts. The ambiguous position of the Innut in this is amply demonstrated by the fact that some James Bay Innut offered to assist the French in their raid, but were turned down. The French commander "... de Troyes did not trust them and refused their assistance" (Francis and Morantz, 1983; 29). Francis and Morantz (1983) propose that this offer on the part of some Innut was based on a specific complaint against a particular English post manager rather than on any

preference for the French over the English. However, during the war of Spanish succession (1701-1714), which brought England and France into conflict, the Innut were included in a French raiding party against the English posts on James Bay in 1709.

It is important to realize that while there was at times a coincidence between European and aboriginal military operations, in that what was bad for one side was by definition good for the other, one must be careful not to attach Innut political behaviour to the European competition. At one level, it was of little concern to the Innut which group of Europeans they traded with; in fact, competition was recognized as desirable. In 1633:

...Captanal [the Tadoussac north-shore Innut leader] warned Champlain that if the French attempted to reintroduce their trading monopoly, this would anger the Indians and might lead to acts of violence, as it had on two previous occasions. (Trigger 1976: 377)

In the James Bay region, the English attempts to infringe on the trading network of the leading Moose River Indian only led to the response of his playing off the French against the English for political and economic benefit.

Given this non-partisan approach of the aboriginals, in the sense of not viewing their loyalties, once declared, as immutable, it is not surprising that they did not necessarily require European prompting in order to initiate a raid. The Iroquois are perhaps the best example of this. In 1750 they were interfering with both the English and the

French. While the north-shore Innut, regardless of the fact that they, from early contact, traded with the French, in 1628 lent aid to the English by giving them information which helped the latter to take Quebec City in that year.

The antagonisms between the Innut and the Europeans also had disastrous effects for a number of English traders in the western James Bay region. In 1775, and again in 1776, Henley House was raided by two different groups of James Bay Innut, who murdered the inhabitants and looted the post. In neither case is there reference to European agitation. It has been posited by Bishop (1976) that these particular raids were the result of local misunderstandings. Even if this is correct, the raids still must be placed within the context of the fur trade, and the resulting violent solutions which were resorted to were an integral part of the system as it evolved.

The effects of the fur trade on the Innut of the interior of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula were far more circumscribed than the effects on those whose territories bordered on the St. Lawrence Valley. Nevertheless, it was to have significant repercussions. Denton, for example, proposes that the diminishing amounts of chert found in sites dating from the early fur-trade period in the Caniapiscau region of the peninsula:

... may suggest that, during the 17th century the trade networks in Ramah chert became attenuated, or at least supply was more sporadic, due to the increased use of the Labrador coastal zone by groups

associated with the Point Revenge complex.  
(1983: 11)

Denton (1983) goes further, proposing that the increased quantity of Mistassini quartzite uncovered in the same sites would indicate a shift from an east/west axis of trade to a north/south axis. While being extremely cautious as to the long-term validity of his conclusion, Denton (1983) proposes that, for the Caniapiscou region, the coexistence of traditional technology with European commodities survived over a long period. This would indicate that true economic dependency was not as serious an issue for the people of the interior as it was for those groups in the St. Lawrence valley. But this is not to imply that there were no socio-economic transformations among the interior Innut, concomitant not only with their involvement with the fur trade, but also with the repercussions that the fur trade in the southern regions had on them. With regard to this latter feature, as Francis and Morantz point out: "... by 1660 the James Bay country had become a refuge 'where various Algonkian Nations sought a retreat, fleeing from the Iroquois'" (Thwaites 1896; 45: 249) (1983: 19).

Nevertheless, in order to understand the history of the interior of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula, the particular set of conditions in which the relations developed must be delineated. The interior was not penetrated by the Europeans in any systematic manner until

the nineteenth There are a number of reasons for this, beyond its remoteness. First, the interior was never viewed as a possible region for European settlement. Second, the Europeans were already in receipt of furs from this territory through middlemen and therefore they had no pressing need to penetrate it. Third, the aboriginal middlemen were not anxious to have the Europeans intercept their trade, and actively discouraged them from entering the interior. As a result, as Samson points out:

Before the establishment of Fort Chimo [1830] the Tundra Indians met in the interior and gave their pelts to an elderly man who took them to the King's Posts or Eskimo Bay. It seems highly plausible that many Mushua Innuts died without seeing the coast. (1975: 128)

Therefore, there was much less political, economic, or territorial pressure put on the northern polities and, as a consequence, they were able to maintain their own social organization and practices.

Another prominent feature of the relationship between the Innut of the interior and the fur trade was their low commitment to fur production (Cooke 1969; Davies 1963). While this is partially explained by their remote location from European trading posts, the archaeological record indicates that they were in receipt of goods from the earliest period of the fur trade. So it was neither because of their ignorance of the benefits of trade, nor their location, that they chose not to produce furs for exchange.

One approach to comprehending this behaviour has been to refer to the independent spirit of the people of the interior (Cooke 1976). While this was no doubt a factor, well supported by documentation, it is also an argument presented to account for the exact opposite reaction. Whether it was the political and military policies of the Iroquois confederacy or the Tadoussac Innut's protection of their middlemen role, their independent spirit is offered as an explanation. It is obvious that this should be seen as a given, but it does not really explain the variability in the responses. In addition to this, given the economic and political integrity of the pre-European aboriginal polities, and particular historic conditions must also be brought into the analysis.

One important factor for the people of the interior was their preference for caribou; although they relied on other food resources as well, caribou was the most important. This central position of caribou in the corporeal world was replicated in their cosmology as well, in that caribou were at the centre of their spiritual relationship to their world. Further, in this northern region, beaver are not abundant; therefore, the fur bearers which were trapped were fox, mink, lynx, otter, marten, and wolf. None of these could serve, as did beaver, as a subsistence resource. The choice for the people of the interior was simple; either produce furs for exchange and become dependent on European food, or produce their own



food in a culturally meaningful way. As even the Europeans were reliant on local produce to subsidize the food they brought with them, it was obvious that the people of the interior would not risk starvation or cultural rupture in order to increase their consumption of European commodities, unless the returns were very high.

For example, the Chipewyan of the interior west of James Bay, who were also subarctic caribou hunters, took the opposite strategy in the trade and become middlemen. In addition, they also conducted raids of territorial expansion in order to gain a larger share of the fur trade in their region. Sharp (1977) posits that the role of middlemen did not have any significant disruptive effect on their social organization, but was merely subsumed under that of hunter, i.e., provider. Further, the Chipewyan never relinquished their primary dependence on caribou and were as disinterested in producing furs as were the people of the Quebec-Labrador interior. It would seem reasonable, therefore, to posit that the former had access to options not open to the latter.

One contributing factor for non-assumption of the role adopted by the Chipewyans was the relationship of the barren-ground Innut to their neighbouring Innut polities. The HBC records reveal that the people of the northern interior were subjected to raids by polities from the south and east of James Bay. Reports from Eastmain HBC journals state that "Cree" from Moose Factory would travel north in

raiding parties to ambush the "Esquimaux," and, if they could not be found, "northern Indians" were attacked. There is still some question as to who the "northern Indians" were, but this does not alter the fact that while there are reports of raids going north, there are none in the other direction. The northerly groups of the interior do not seem to have been in a position to imitate the Chipewyans' strategic solution of profiting from the fur trade, and were left to maximize it within the limits of their subarctic adaptation, which held few options for expansion. The non-participation of the interior politics of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula was dependent on their strategic relationship to their neighbours, the types of fur bearers available to them, as well as their independent spirit and remoteness from European trading posts.

The most significant repercussion of this low-level commitment to the fur trade was that the barren-ground Innu were able to maintain their independence from European commodities well into the nineteenth century. This minimal material dependence was translated into political independence, which permitted the maintenance of their traditional social organization. Nevertheless, they were eventually to lose this autonomy.

Southern Labrador

Southern Labrador presents a number of problems in the interpretation of the historical record which are as yet some distance from resolution. That Europeans from a number of nations were engaged in the whale, seal, salmon, and cod fishery and in limited trade with the aboriginal peoples in the region early on in the contact period (1500-1690) is an established fact. However, just which aboriginal groups they interacted with, and whether those groups were visitors, invaders, or residents of the area, is a matter of rather spirited debate among students of the region.

An indication of the level of the disagreement is Martijn's (1980) use of five exclamation marks in a five-and-a-half-page rejoinder to Taylor's (1980) interpretation of the archaeological and historical record pertaining to the presence or absence of a permanent Inuit population in southern Labrador during the early contact period. Taylor (1980) argues that there is no real basis to believe this, proposing instead that the people identified as what we now refer to as Inuit were in fact Algonkian. Martijn (1980), on the contrary, interprets the data as indicating that the Inuit were there, perhaps not in large numbers, but there nonetheless.

This analysis will not resolve the debate; that task must be left to the archaeologists, whose future work will be the final arbiter regarding the correct interpretation

of the historical record. Rather, the task here is to examine the form of European intrusion and the response of the aboriginal groups. Through this approach, the link between the political and economic practices of the Europeans and the aboriginal peoples, in isolation and in the various combinations which took place within the logic of the mercantile system, will contribute to the understanding of the later forms of interaction in northern Labrador.

After the early explorers had established the wealth of marine resources that existed in the "new world", mercantile entrepreneurs began to mount fishing expeditions to the region. The fishery quickly became a very significant addition to the economies of some European nations, both in terms of capital coming into the country, and of that appropriated by the state directly in the form of taxes. It is therefore not surprising that they saw it in their best interests to protect the investments of their nationals. By 1522:

Not only had the French fleet reached considerable size [eighty ships] but the amount of English capital also invested in these fisheries was now so large that ... Fitz-William, the Vice Admiral, deemed it advisable to send several men-of-war to the mouth of the English Channel to protect the returning fleet from French privateers. (Biggar 1901: 20)

During most of the early contact period, the fishery was primarily migratory, that is, seasonal, with ships returning annually to their respective countries with the

ships' company. Later, during the French period of dominance (1690-1763), this form of exploitation was joined by the concession system, in which permanent shore stations were set up to exploit seals. In this latter form, a small group of Europeans occupied a post year round. Although they made some effort to trade with the aboriginals, the poor relations between the French and the Inuit would perhaps indicate that they were there as much to protect their investments as to trade. Nevertheless, the increased use of the coastal resources by the Europeans inevitably brought them into greater contact with the indigenous groups, and therefore increased the amount of European commodities available to the aboriginals.

In addition to the French, British, and Portuguese fisheries, there were the Basque whalers. The importance of the Basques in this region has only recently come to light. As the historical and archaeological work progresses, their history in southern Labrador may prove quite significant to the comprehension of the history of the Amerindians and Inuit who were affected, directly or indirectly, by their presence.

Trudel notes that: "[The [Basques] are said to have arrived on the coasts of Newfoundland, Labrador, and the Gulf of St. Lawrence between 1528 and 1545" (1981: 163). This seventeen-year spread has been tightened up somewhat by Barkham (1980), who points out that during the period 1537-1542, harmony existed between the Basques and the

Amerindians they encountered.

The extent of the Basque presence in southern Labrador was substantial. During the height of their exploitation of the region (1545-1585): "... there appear to have been well over a thousand Basques living and working for at least six months of the year in various ports" (Barkham 1980: 56). These ports include Red Bay, Chateaux Bay, Port Neuf, Carrol Cove, Penware Bay, Schooner Cove, and Middle Bay. As would be expected, the large numbers of Europeans and their spatial extent brought them into contact with the aboriginal peoples.

While the Basques were involved in the whale fishery, other European interests were pursuing the cod fishery. This fishery, from which profits of from 30% to 50% could be expected, had two significant characteristics. First was the role of the merchant company as the mechanism for raising capital to mount fishing expeditions, and second was the role of the state in protecting those investments and regulating its operation.

Due to the expense involved, very few merchants were wealthy enough to finance a fishing expedition. This situation grew worse as time went on and the capital investment required increased from L5000, in the fifteenth century, to L12000 in the eighteenth century (Trudel 1981: 154). Since, as was noted in the theoretical discussion on mercantilism, volume and velocity are the keys to profit: the more tonnage set afloat on the fishing grounds of the

"new world," the higher the profits. The merchants of St. Malo saw the wisdom of this logic and nearly tripled their tonnage from 1581 to 1582, after realizing the profits that could be made in trade in the St. Lawrence Valley. And in the migratory fishery, merchants from Rouen formed a large company to send to the fishing banks in 1570 (Biggar 1901: 24).

While profits derived from the migratory fishery were becoming concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, the European states were involved in a more complex activity which interwove their political and economic aspirations. From the very outset, it had been the states that had funded the early exploration whose purpose had been to search for new wealth and new land to occupy. In order to foster these two ends and protect them from the encroachments of others, the European states adopted policies which led to military confrontation and usually attempts to accelerate colonization.

For example, in 1567 the Portuguese attempted to found a colony on Sable Island, while the French attempted the same strategy twice near the end of the sixteenth century. The explicit purpose of establishing a physical presence was "... to check encroachment of foreign fishermen and fur traders by establishing a strong post ..." (Biggar 1901: 41). These later efforts were directly promoted by the state, which bestowed monopolies on merchants with the condition that they transport a specific number of

colonists to the "new world" each year.

These attempts were not very successful for at least two internal reasons. First, the merchants charged with establishing the colonies viewed this particular responsibility as being a distant second to that of profit-making. And second, even had they acted entirely in good faith, their inability to recruit legitimate colonists left them reliant on the cast-offs of their own society, who were not prepared, physically or mentally, for the demands which were placed on them. Of course, not all European states followed the same path to political and economic security.

Initially, the British did not encourage colonization; in fact, in Newfoundland and southern Labrador it was actively discouraged. Nevertheless, they too were intent on protecting their economic investment and establishing, if not political sovereignty, at least an exclusive economic zone. Hakluyt noted in 1584 that:

... that we [British] did note fortifie ourselves about Cape Briton the Frenche, the Normans, the Brytons or the Duche or some other nation, will not only prevent us, of the mighty Baye of St. Lawrence, where they have gotten the starte of us already, but will deprive us of Newfoundland nowe wee have discovered. (Biggar 1901: 36)

From the European perspective, these efforts to ensure the success of their North American undertaking falls well within the parameters of a mercantile system. In the protection of its fishing fleets, a European nation not



only increased its own exchequer, but, by definition, decreased that of others. In direct relation to this economic asymmetry, there was also the inherent political component in which control, through what amounted to unilateral annexation of newly encountered territories, was seen as essential. In the context of mercantilism, each individual holding need not be profitable in its own right in order to warrant protection. The pride of the national elite as well as the influence of special economic interest groups saw to it that this end was achieved.

In southern Labrador, during the competitive period, the European area of exploitation extended from Brador Bay to the Straits of Belle Isle. After the Basques abandoned their whaling in the early 1630's, the area remained predominantly in the hands of the French until 1763, when it passed to the English. However, prior to that, the migratory fishery was augmented by the sedentary seal fishery. This development had significant repercussions on the relationship between the Europeans and the aboriginals.

From 1661, the French crown began to grant land concessions to merchants and ex-military officers, giving them certain economic rights in return for particular services. "All of ... [these]... concessions were aimed at favouring an orderly commercial exploitation of the resources of the area, and not colonization" (Trudel 1981: 283). The terms of reference of the concessions obligated the grantee to pay rent and to report any mineral deposits

discovered to the crown. In return, the grantee enjoyed exclusive rights to the seal fishery and trade with the aboriginal peoples and was permitted to participate in the cod fishery. This latter right was not as advantageous as the former two, as the grantees lacked the technical knowledge and sufficient capital to pursue it. Up until 1713, the cod fishery was left to the metropolitan merchants who could afford it. However, the level of interest in the concessions (Trudel, lists 52) indicates that there was money to be made in them and, as was the case with the migratory fishery, they were worth defending. Pressure came from two quarters, the actions of other Europeans and those of the Inuit.

The local conflict with other Europeans took two forms. First was the conflict which was an extension of international conflict. For example:

In the summer of 1690, an English naval force seized all the merchandise of the vessel of Jolliet [a French trader] evaluated at 10 or 1200 pounds, while in 1692, the English destroyed Jolliet's port at Mingan. (Trudel 1981: 283)

These attacks continued throughout the period, sometimes in response to local initiatives and at other times the consequence of conflicts in other areas of the global trade system. Further to this, it was not necessary for a remote conflict to impinge directly on the local operations, as the disruption of the trade was sufficient to have a deleterious effect on the profitability of the fishery and

trade.

The second form of intra-European conflict was that between the grantees and the migratory fishermen, both of whom were also subject to the interference of pirates who periodically raided them. Innis argues, with regard to Newfoundland, where grantees were given exclusive fishing rights, that:

The [migratory] fishing interests relied that "no privilege [is] given by charter to planters for fishing before others; if choice of places is admitted, contrary to common usage, the petitioners contend that they ought rather to have it." ...

The general confusion arising from the struggle encouraged piracy. (Innis 1978: 62)

However, intra-European conflict was not the only form extant on the coast of southern Labrador at this time; the aboriginal groups also contributed to the hostilities.

The primary economic relationship between aboriginal people and Europeans in southern Labrador was trade, although wage-labour was also a small component. The Basques do not seem to have been overly interested in either, but rather were concerned with their whaling. Nevertheless, interaction did occur. Amerindians, provisionally identified as Montagnais (north-shore Innut) by Trudel (1981), were involved in the shore portion of the whaling industry. They are described by Barkham as being: "...ready to assist [the Basques] with great labour and patience, in the killing, cutting, and making of traineoyle without expectation of other reward than a little bread,

and some such small hire" (1980: 54). In addition to these peaceful and mutually advantageous relations between the aboriginal population and the Basques, there was also conflict. Some earlier authors have focused on the latter aspect. Gosling, for example proposes that the: "... Basques had been compelled to abandon the fishery not for failure of supply, but because of the attacks and depredations of the Eskimo" (1910: 133). However, while there is no question that the Inuit took an aggressive posture toward the Europeans, their military effectiveness is at least open to question.

Barkham (1980) suggests a number of reasons for doubting the ability of the Inuit actually to drive the Basques out, had the latter been determined to stay. First, given that their numbers were around the one thousand mark, there were more Basques than Inuit in southern Labrador, which Clermont (1980) puts at a few hundred. Further, the Basques were armed individually with swords and guns and their ships were mounted with cannons and swivel guns. Despite the fact that the small arms were probably less effective than the Inuit's traditional weapons, (Townsend 1983), the addition of artillery no doubt made a significant difference. And as Barkham points out: "... there were between 15 and 20 of these well-armed ships in the Strait of Belle Isle each year up until 1586" (1980: 56). In Barkham's opinion, the reason the Basques left the whale fishery in Labrador in the early 1630's is

as yet indeterminate. As she states:

To what extent, if any, pressure by southward moving Inuit bands played a role in this development remains unclear. Until more research has been carried out on the nature of Basque-Inuit and Basque-Indian contacts it would be futile to speculate further about this question. (1980: 57)

After the departure of the Basques, the French were left as the primary European interest exploiting the coast of southern Labrador. Trudel (1977, 1980, 1981) suggests that the economic activities of the French brought them into direct conflict with the Inuit. There were two forms of French economic exploitation in southern Labrador, the sedentary seal fishery and the migratory cod fishery. The former was the province of the concession grantees which were dispensed by the King of France. As mentioned above, the French were given exclusive rights to the seal fishery and in the year 1760 harvested between 16,890 and 22,050 seals (Roy 1934: 218 in Trudel 1981: 321). In Trudel's opinion, this activity interfered with the Inuit exploitation of the same species and thus brought them into conflict with the Inuit. It should be noted that no mention is made of the topics of restricted access to seals or pressure on the species; but rather the mere presence of the French in permanent stations on the coast in significant numbers. In 1760 for example, there were 174 employees of grantees working at the stations. This number probably approached that of the Inuit.

The second economic practice of the French during this

period was the migratory French fishery. The fishery consisted of French ships putting into suitable harbours on the coast where they could erect stages on which to dry their fish. The most important stations were at Isle-à-Bois, Blanc Sablon, La Forteau, and Anse-à-Loup, but they also visited Saint-Modet, Aux Islets, Isle-aux-Marmettes, and Isle de Carculeau.

While these operations were not in as direct economic conflict with the Inuit as was the seal fishery, their scale was much greater. Trudel notes: "... the annual employment never dropped below 1000 men and went over 2000 at once. The total average for the thirteen years where data exists [1718-1743] was 1,307 men" (1978: 109). It seems obvious, given the fact that the Inuit probably numbered no more than a few hundred and were mostly seasonal visitors to the region, their ability to physically oust such a large presence was, for all intents and purposes, nil. However, they did try, or at first glance it appears that way.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that the French fully expected to trade with the Inuit. It was, after all, one of the monopolies given to the holders of concessions. But trade never became a significant economic practice during this period. Neither the grantees nor the cod fishermen ever entered into regular trade with the Inuit. It was at best sporadic and a minor adjunct to the direct exploitation of seal and cod. Further to this, the

Inuit do not appear to have been used as either simple commodity producers or as a labour force, as were the north-shore Innut in the St. Lawrence valley and in southern Labrador.

While the Amerindian population of southern Labrador appears to have been more amenable to exploiting the new economic and political opportunities provided by the presence of the Europeans through peaceful means, such as trade and/or exchange of labour for food or commodities (Gosling 1910: 132), the Inuit were decidedly combative. Virtually without exception, students of the French fishery in southern Labrador and the Strait of Belle Isle make some mention of this conflict. Gosling (1910), for example, points out that the reports which Brouage, who replaced Courtemanche as commander of Labrador in 1717, sent to the Council of the Marine for forty-one years consisted: "... principally of accounts of the depredations of the Eskimos, and of his efforts to warn and protect the fishermen" (1910: 150).

Direct conflict between these two groups took two forms. First, there was the plundering and destruction of the unmanned shore stations during the off-season. Second, there were the attacks on the occupied posts of the grantees, during which deaths on one or both sides were not uncommon. The seriousness of the situation from the French point of view is indicated by the appointment of:

Courtemanche and Brouage ...[as]... commanders of the coast of Labrador by the King and entrusted with the mission of protecting the fisheries of the coast of Labrador, mainly in the vicinity of Baye de Phelypeaux. Both received an annual gratuity of 20 to 30 guns, of 200 to 300 pounds of gunpowder and the same quantity of shot. (APQ, RAPQ, 1922-23: 380 in Trudel 1978: 117)

This intervention of the state in the protection of the economic practices of its nationals was augmented by that of the fishermen themselves, who formed mutual-protection associations which were also used as lobby groups to solicit state aid.

The position of the French in these conflicts appears to have been largely defensive, that of the Inuit aggressive. Trudel (1978) characterizes the form of aggression practiced by the Inuit as guerrilla warfare, that is, small bands of Inuit, using the element of surprise, would overpower a poorly defended French outpost.

One motivation for the Inuit was the acquisition of European commodities. But why they chose aggression over trade, given that they were producing what the Europeans wanted, seals, and given that the Europeans wanted to trade, is somewhat of a problem. It is possible that the Inuit felt they could get more goods through raids than through trade, and only incurred the cost of the subsistence production it took to sustain the raiding party. The fact that they were able to maintain this approach to acquiring European commodities for over a



century would indicate that it was successful. Therefore, any effort on the part of the French to institute peaceful trade relations had to overcome what was possibly perceived by the Inuit as a better method; this, judging from their success, would have been difficult at best.

Still, the French attempted to normalize relations with the Inuit. As early as 1715, the French outlined a set of regulations to effect such a change. These were:

- 1) to forbid the Montagnais Savages and other Savages to make the war...;
- 2) to forbid (French) fishermen and others--under rigorous sanctions--to fire on the Inuit and to chagrin them;
- 3) to order the fishermen and other French to try to draw on them and to make them all kinds of friendly gestures and even presents to those who will be contacted;
- 4) in exchange for their merchandise and in the commerce which will be had with them, to arrange so that they will never be discontented, and in all occasions to treat them with gentleness and kindness;
- 5) to give them food, but not give or sell the liquor;
- 6) to hire Jesuits to undertake that mission, to go among them and to win them  
....(Trudel 1981: 336).

However, the continuing hostilities allowed little chance for their implementation.

Through their actions the Inuit were able to acquire commodities without entering into a trading relationship, that is, without becoming simple commodity producers. Given this fact, it would seem that Jordan and Kaplan's

(1980) thesis of good traders becoming the leaders of communal households may have to be rethought, as they may have in fact been good military strategists.

As was noted above, the response of the French took a number of forms. First, there were efforts on the part of the state to educate the fishermen in order to constrain them to act more peacefully toward the Inuit. However, the relations were so poor that the fishermen were more apt to shoot first and ask questions later than look for a dialogue. Second, there was a defensive response, which consisted of collecting all the fishing gear at one location in the off-season to protect it from Inuit raids. And third were direct efforts on the part of the French administration to improve their relations with the Inuit.

In the end, relations settled down into a chronic war of attrition, but efforts were constantly made to ameliorate the situation. For example, the French capture of Inuit during some of the hostilities and their subsequent removal to Quebec City, where they were held as virtual slaves by various members of the elite, was not simply an economic decision.

Following Brouage's example, all those officials attempted to their best to instruct those prisoners, with the hope of sending them back to Labrador so as to conciliate their group of origin. Those plans were also unsuccessful, since all those Inuit died of smallpox in their younger age except one. After having learned French, this Inuk was sent back to his people in Labrador and was killed by the Inuit for being half French and half

stranger. (M. Trudel 1960: 81; in F. Trudel 1981: 329)

This incident indicates a further issue. While it demonstrates efforts on the part of the French to establish peaceful relations with the Inuit, it also comments on the notion of the stranger among the Inuit and where this fits into the relationship between the French and the Inuit in southern Labrador.

As indicated, this relationship was a mix of political and economic motives. However, in this instance the linkage between ideology and political practice is also apparent. Rowley (1984) indicates that in all Inuit groups for which data exist, there was a means by which strangers could be incorporated into their group. The choice not to do this, due either to economic conflict or the unwillingness or to inability of the French to utilize this mechanism, adds one more dimension to the hostilities between the two groups.

Given all the levels of conflict, it is no wonder that the Europeans eventually adopted a policy of containment rather than a mutually advantageous trade relationship, which the Inuit did not seem to have viewed as in the realm of possibility in any case. The following chapter, which deals with the monopoly phase of the mercantile period, will examine this policy and the repercussions it had for the Inuit. In addition, it will examine the increasing involvement of the barren-ground Inuit in the fur trade.

Chapter 3: Mercantilism: The Monopoly Phase: 1763-1926Introduction

This chapter will examine the distinct forms of intrusion practiced by the Moravian mission and the HBC. The former was the primary European contact of the Inuit and applied pressure in both economic and non-economic forums of Inuit social organization. The latter were the chief European contact of the barren-ground Inuit and concentrated almost exclusively on the economic forum. It will be demonstrated that these distinct forms of intrusion elicited distinct responses from the native Labradorians, in terms of both social change and the forms of resistance.

The focal question of this chapter is: how did the Moravian missionaries and the HBC come to occupy the dominant position in their relations with the Inuit and the barren-ground Inuit respectively? Initially, they had only partial control over commodities which the Inuit and the Inuit wanted, because these aboriginal peoples also had access to competitive sources of European commodities, such as rival independent traders or aboriginal middlemen. Further, the Inuit and the barren-ground Inuit kept using indigenous technology well after they were aware of and could obtain substitute European goods (Denton 1983). Be that as it may, through the implementation of either of

these options, the Innut or Inuit could have eschewed the economic influence of the two major intruders and thus avoided the European efforts to transform their economic practice. In order for the Moravian mission or the HBC to become dominant, recourse had to be taken to other avenues of influence. These were more compelling economic means, political domination, and/or ideological hegemony. While the Moravian mission utilized all three, the HBC focused exclusively on economic means.

This does not mean to imply that the Europeans were able to effect total control or that at some point there was an end to resistance on the part of either aboriginal group. Rather, over time the resistance became a diminishing threat to the dominant sector and increasingly a process through which solidarity was maintained, until conditions become ripe for the reassertion of independence.

In addition to the economic relations between the Europeans and the aboriginals, another material factor played a significant role in the particular relationships that developed; this was the occurrence of privation among the Inuit and barren-ground Innut. As was noted in Chapter One, hunting in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula is not the most reliable way to assure oneself of a steady flow of calories. With both aboriginal groups relying to a significant degree on migratory animals, to which access was periodically obstructed by natural causes, the HBC trading posts and Moravian mission stations became

important resources for the aboriginal peoples in times of need. Unfortunately, the utilization of these resources of last resort was not without cost. What the aboriginals saw as the basis for a reciprocal relationship, the Europeans translated into debt. Through their dominant economic position, the Europeans were able to impose their definition. And control over the access to European subsistence and productive supplies became a potent economic club used by both the HBC and the Moravian missionaries to control labour.

This kind of behaviour on the part of the Europeans provided ample illustration to the Inuit and the barren-ground Inuit that they were not dealing with people who understood the principle of reciprocity, a concept which was at the core of their own social and economic ideologies. Disagreements and fundamental misunderstandings in this forum of activity dogged the relationship between the agents of mercantilism and the aboriginal peoples and is still a bone of contention between the modern native population and the state (Scott 1984). It provided and provides many opportunities for the expression of resistance to the dominating sector. The following discussion of the particular practices of the Moravian mission and the HBC styles of intrusion will focus on this aspect of the relationships and, in addition, deal with the rest of the spectrum of practices involved in the process of intrusion, the evolution of European dominance

and the native resistance.

From the seventeenth century until the mid-twentieth century, the Inuit and the Innut of northern Labrador fulfilled their needs for European commodities through the production of simple commodities, primarily fish and/or fur. However, while both groups did so from within the general logic of mercantile production, the particular formats were distinct.

The Inuit were confronted with the Moravian missionaries, who were not only intent on transforming them into reliable, simple commodity producers, but also on converting them to Christianity. This dual mandate, resting uncomfortably between the profit motive and the humanitarian ideals of Christianity, was not only difficult to justify to themselves, it was virtually impossible to justify to the Inuit. Thus, it became a focus of political and economic resistance for the Inuit (Brice-Bennett 1982).

The Europeans with whom the Innut interacted were fur traders, primarily those representing the HBC. In contradistinction to the Moravians, the HBC traders were first and foremost merchants, intent on encouraging and then appropriating the commodity production of the barren-ground Innut. They were not encumbered, as were the Moravians, by any desire to save the souls of "savage heathens." The one purpose to which all their efforts were directed was profit. In order to accomplish this, they used a variety of methods to pressure the Innut to alter

their social formation to accommodate the trade.

This chapter will document the relationships between the agents of mercantile capital and the producers, as it developed within the logic of mercantilism. Where applicable, the analysis will focus on the transformations in the features of social organization delineated in Chapter One, that is, economic practice, leadership, authority in the secular and spiritual arenas, and conflict resolution. Through this analysis, the processes in and the linkages between the various components of the social formation which were transformed under duress will be examined. It will be demonstrated that in neither the case of the Inuit nor that of the Innut was directed change yielded to without a struggle. Further, conditions which obtained at the micro level were the product of competition on the regional and, at times, the international level. The interplay is more involved than the confrontation of the agents of merchant's capital with aboriginal producers. It is the confrontation of political, economic, and ideological practices, which includes not only the aboriginal/European axis of conflict, but also the aboriginal/aboriginal and European/European axes as well. It is only by adopting a broad perspective that events lose their idiosyncratic appearance and begin to be seen as part of the larger process in which they were embedded. In northern Labrador, that process was the penetration of merchant's capital.



The Moravians and the Inuit:      Moravian      Non-Economic  
Intrusion

While the Moravian political, economic, and ideological intrusion into the lives of the Labrador Inuit was subject to the influence of particular events, such as a fall of commodity prices, a bad year for fur, fish, or seal harvesting, or epidemics among the Inuit, it existed within a particular political and economic structure. In coastal northern Labrador, this structure was dictated by the religious and economic goals of the Moravians in opposition to those of the Inuit, both of whom were bonded by the growing dependence of the Inuit on European commodities. The advantage was decidedly on the side of the Moravians, although the Inuit mounted a sustained struggle.

Apart from the fundamental economic contradiction incumbent in the production of commodities, in which the unpaid labour of the producer is appropriated by the merchant, the method of Moravian intrusion into northern Labrador carried with it another contradiction. This was their program for the preservation of as much of the Inuit social formation as possible, while altering those aspects which they believed detracted from the Inuit's development as good Christians. Bettelheim (cited in Katz, 1980) has referred to this as the "conservation/transformation process." By this he means that certain practices may remain totally unaltered in appearance and meaning, some

might remain the same in appearance but with altered meaning, some might be abolished, and some might be introduced. The Moravians provide a good example of this type of intrusion. The Moravian mission intrusion was an assault on the social organization of the Inuit on all fronts: economic, political, and ideological. Their success in transforming the Labrador Inuit into "Moravian Eskimos" can be attributed to this breadth of intervention.

As was noted in Chapter One, the political system of the Inuit was geared to their particular adaptive needs, given their level of technological development. Leadership was not a highly elaborated institution. Secular leaders achieved their position through the accumulation of prestige gained by the consistent demonstration of superior skill in the performance of valued practices, the procurement of food being the foremost in this category. Good hunters became leaders, as those who followed them were less likely to suffer privation. This was a decision which, given the circumstances, was nothing if not rational.

Spiritual leadership was also achieved by means of demonstrable skill. That these skills included the tricks of the stage magician, which were attributed to the supernatural, by no means detracted from the spiritual leader's prestige or authority. In fact, there is reason to believe that most people knew that in certain instances they were witnessing sleight-of-hand, but they did so with

the complete credulity of faith (Lévi-Strauss 1978). Nevertheless, ultimately the shaman was also constrained to produce, just as was the hunter. In contradistinction to the hunter, though, the shaman had recourse to the supernatural as both a justification for the success and an excuse for the failure of any activity.

In terms of leadership style, the distinction between secular and spiritual was at one level that of example versus coercion. This is not to infer that all angekut were megalomaniacs who manipulated fear of the unknown among their peers in order to appropriate power, prestige, and wealth, as they are depicted in many of the reports of the Moravians (Hutton 1912, 1929). Rather, their ability to appeal to and control spiritual forces was an essential component of their power, which was necessarily used for the good of the community. Their invocation of these spiritual forces to confront the Moravian missionaries and to maintain control of their followers reveals more about the level of stress during the period of confrontation than it does about their relationship to the rest of their community under optimal conditions.

In addition to these two forms of leadership, there was the authority which accrued to the head of a kin group. This authority was based on age and the apical position within the structure of the kin group. It should be added, though, that the age and position criteria were only operable while the holder was in good physical condition

and could utilize the knowledge he or she had gained for the benefit of the group. In times of extreme stress, if an elder was weak and/or infirm, he or she sometimes abdicated his or her position through suicide, rather than risk more widespread death.

It was into this political structure that the Moravian missionaries had to insert themselves, to undermine or co-opt the indigenous leaders, in the end hopefully displacing effective Inuit leadership altogether.

The institutional structure that the Moravians introduced eventually included three major components: the Kivgat or chapel servants, the Elders, and the Choir system. Each of these institutions had a specific function within the secular and religious organization of the Moravian communities in Labrador. Briefly, the Choir system organized the entire population of the communities into separate groups based on age, sex, and marital status. The Kivgat provided an intermediary level of leadership primarily concerned with issues pertaining to the operation of the church. And finally, the Elders were mission-sanctioned Inuit leadership elite who, after the position was instituted in 1901, occupied a position just below that of the missionaries in the political hierarchy. They were intended to fulfill the roles of secular leaders and moral exemplars, as well as acting as conduits of information in both directions.

### The Choir System

The Moravians arrived in Labrador with a prefabricated political system designed in Europe, where it had been created and implemented to institutionally replace the family as the primary social unit. Gollin states that it was a means of: "... explicitly subordinating a Moravians' familial obligations to his religious duties ...[to]... maximize the individual's loyalty to the religious goals of the family" (1967: 66).

As noted, the Choirs divided the congregation into separate groups by age, sex, and marital status, the members of which were answerable for their behaviour to the Choir leaders and each other. They became one of the primary mechanisms of secular and religious integration into the community. The process of socialization, that is, the transmission of values, was appropriated by the church. As a necessary adjunct to this role, the Choirs were also one of the primary forums within which social control was exercised. Since the institution provided social sustenance in the form of community, which was attached to the policy of undermining other forms of community such as the family, the chief form of sanction was denial of access to the community. This practice was called church discipline.

The Moravians were not content to punish overt transgressions; they also resorted to public confessions known as "speakings." During these "speakings," an

individual member of a Choir would stand before his or her peers and confess to transgressions, for which punishment would be assessed. Sanctions included the denial of the right to attend religious and social gatherings, reduction of weekly pay, corporal punishment, and even exile from the community (Gollin 1967: 87). Since in Europe the members of the Moravian community had all chosen to join as a response to religious persecution elsewhere, the final option was terrible indeed.

Decisions were often made by lot, which was a means by which God could be consulted and with whom the responsibility for the subsequent decision rested: the lot was believed to be divine intervention. The method was simple: from a collection of papers, each with an inspirational saying or a quote from the scriptures written on it, one was chosen at random and interpreted to find the will of God. Gollin (1967) proposes that the texts were so general that the lot merely acted as a form of legitimation for the decisions of the community elite.

When the Choir system was transplanted to the northern Labrador Moravian communities, it provided the missionaries with a potent non-economic means by which they could restructure Inuit social organization. In order to achieve their aims, it was not sufficient for the Moravians to rely on strictly economic means. Inuit would come to their stations to trade and would even profess Christianity if that was what it took to assure themselves of access to

European commodities. But the missionaries were after more than this; they were interested in no less than the realignment of the Inuit value system to that of Christianity and the transformation of their social organization to reflect Christian values. That they were not entirely successful is a tribute to the resilience of the Labrador Inuit pre-Moravian social formation, but it in no way precludes the fact that the Moravians did effect significant change. It is therefore necessary to analyze the Choir system as a dialogue between two systems, one of which is dominant but not omnipotent.

Among the benefits the Inuit obtained through the existence of the mission stations was help in times of privation. "In many instances the economic motive for moving to the mission has played its part. In the village no one would starve to death, even if the sealing failed" (Kleivan 1966: 74). Kleivan (1966) goes on to propose that this was an important criterion for the northern Inuit in their decision to move south to Okak and Hebron. However, as he also points out, the migration to mission stations did not take place, en masse, but was a gradual process which had repercussions for both those living at the stations and those left behind.

As was noted in Chapter One, part of the Inuit yearly cycle included their dispersal into nuclear or extended families as the production unit. If the primary hunter decided to move to a mission station, this would cause

serious hardship among those who remained, and would be a significant inducement for the others to find their faith and move as well. It was necessary for them to become converts, as the Moravians applied a great deal of pressure upon those who resided at their stations to stop all interaction with non-Christian Inuit.

The obverse side of this process was the case of the Inuk who decided to move to a station and was not accompanied by his kin. In this instance, the Inuk was left without a network on which to rely, leaving him or her socially isolated. The Choir system was a structure for these Inuit to plug into, providing them with a prefabricated network designed entirely by the Moravians. Thus, the Choir system functioned just as it had in Europe, as a replacement for the family. That the Choir system was an alien structure did not preclude its fulfilling the role of social integration in a time of social upheaval.

The Choir system was also a means by which the Moravians effected social control. The most efficient method was through public "speakings," or confessions. The Inuit living at the stations were expected, just as their European counterparts were, to stand in front of their peers and confess to moral transgressions. These would include such offenses as drinking, dancing, pre-marital sex, adultery, and engaging in what the Moravians considered "... heathen practices and beliefs (e.g., feuding, shamanism, blood revenge, theft of women) and



other 'offenses' ..." (Richling 1979: 125). And for punishment, there was not only the humiliation of admitting moral error before the community, there was also church discipline.

Church discipline was, in effect, an object lesson for the Inuit of the maxim "What the Lord giveth, the Lord taketh away." As punishment for their transgressions, individual Inuit were not permitted to participate in church-related activities for a specified period of time. If an individual proved totally recalcitrant or committed a heinous crime, he or she could be barred from the station entirely. These sanctions were supposed to ensure compliance; however, the plans of the Moravians did not always meet their expectations, and the Choirs sometimes became focal points for dissension and resistance.

#### Resistance and the Choir System

One means through which the Choir system acted as a vehicle for the expression of dissension and resistance was during the Lovefeasts. Lovefeasts were held on one day a year for each Choir as celebrations of their community and faith. However, they did not always work out that way. Sometimes they provided forums for passive and active challenges to the Moravian's power in the community.

As was noted above, an individual could be placed

under church discipline for a variety of reasons, thereby excluding him from participation in church-related activities, including the Lovefeasts. Therefore, attendance at the Lovefeasts acted as a gauge of the Moravians' success in altering the moral behaviour, and thus the ideology, of the Inuit to conform to the former's idea of Christian standards. As late as the 1930's, the Moravians still had some distance to go in this regard. In 1939, for example, most of the young men in Hopedale were under church discipline and could not attend the Lovefeast (Church Diary, Hopedale 1939: February 1-6), while in 1935, "... nearly all single lads ... [were] ... excluded for immorality and several single women, to say nothing of married people ..." (Church Diary, Hopedale 1935: October 22). Given the level of non-compliance with Moravian dictates, the sparsely attended Lovefeasts provided a mute testament to the community that, in some areas of behaviour, the level of Moravian dominance was tenuous at best.

In addition to this passive message of resistance, which was transmitted through the structure of the Choir system, there were also active challenges to Moravian authority. As was mentioned, the Lovefeast was supposed to be a celebration of faith and, as such, was to reflect this religious content with all the decorum such a ritual should entail. The Inuit, however, took this opportunity, provided by their own presence in substantial numbers, to

have a party and, much to the horror of the Moravian sponsors of the events, to dance, a practice which was strictly forbidden. In 1949, on the occasion of the Kivgat Lovefeast, there was an open challenge. The missionary noted at the time:

All went well, until discussion began on dancing and also the rule against dancing in Church was mentioned. The two elders ... got hot against any attempt to cut out dancing, even did not wish to follow Church rules. (Hopedale Diary 1949: February 27)

In this case, there was the transformation of a religious occasion into one that had definite secular political content and provided the opportunity for an open confrontation with their missionary. It is obvious from this that, while the Moravians may have been able to impose certain institutions on the Inuit, they were not able to control the content of those institutions. The Inuit not only injected secular meaning into them, but also used them as a vehicle for political protest, that is, a challenge to Moravian power.

#### Leadership: The Angekut

Even with the Choir system and their set of sanctions, the Moravians could not really make much headway until they displaced the angekut as the spiritual leaders of the Inuit. In order to achieve this, the Moravians

openly challenged the power of the individual angekok, and hence the cosmology of the Inuit. While most recent analysis gives precedence to economic necessity as the driving force behind Inuit conversion, there remains a rather questionable ideational dimension to some positions. The approach refers to the Inuit perception of death:

Heaven and an after-life were new concepts to Inuit. Their traditional belief system failed to explain death.... The Moravians offered Inuit a view of death that could alleviate their fears and uncertainty. (Brice-Bennett 1980:31)

This argument has also appeared in Hiller (1965) and in Scheffel (1980), and seems to have developed out of the alleged response of the Inuit to the story of the crucifixion of Christ which, from Hiller's account, impressed them immensely. Hiller notes:

... the Moravians had found that they could touch the heathen hearts more speedily by concentrating on the crucifixion. The inculcation of doctrine could come at a later stage; much more important was a genuine change of spirit produced by dwelling on the sufferings and death of Christ. (1965: 82)

However, it should be noted that it was the Moravians who first focused on the crucifixion as the central symbol of their devotion to Christ, finding solace in his wounds (Gollin 1967). And it is from their own explanations that the Inuit seem to have been left with a rather large gap in their cosmology; death, it would appear, not only had dominion, but one that was totally undefined by those confronted by it on a regular basis.

I would contend that this is essentially the easy way out of dealing with the complex problem of understanding the process of conversion. To argue that the Inuit felt no compunction to devise a place for their spirits to reside after death does them a disservice. The naming of children after recently deceased relatives, which insured one spirit helper, the belief that the aurora borealis was the visible manifestation of departed souls, and the shamanistic practice of dying and coming back to life with news from the afterworld, all belie the notion that there was a serious lacuna in the cosmology of the Inuit (Oswalt 1979, Hawkes 1970, Weyer 1969). It is necessary to look for other factors to explain their conversion.

Before going on to discuss methods used by the Moravians to insert their cosmology into that of the Inuit and to displace the angedkok as their spiritual leader, a few points must be made. First, the Inuit did not all convert at once. Second, once converted, the Inuit did not always stay converted; backsliding (as the Moravians referred to it) was quite common. And, finally, the Inuit did not accept Christianity verbatim, but at times altered it to suit their needs.

The Moravians used their attack on angedkut as their primary method of undermining the Inuit cosmology. Their approach was to challenge the power of angedkut in both the spiritual and secular arenas. As was noted in Chapter One, while secular power was based on performance and had no

recourse to coercion, the spiritual leaders could use the threat of supernatural retribution to force compliance with their wishes. This use of fear as a coercive tool naturally caused resentment among those who had to suffer the psychological stress related to it and also the desire to free themselves from its hold. The Moravians provided the means to achieve both of these objectives by instituting an alternative power structure in both the secular and spiritual arenas. They would protect the Inuit from the aggression of the angedkut, but, since the angedkut's power derived from the supernatural world, it was necessary to resort to supernatural protection, that is, Christianity. In order to convince the Inuit that Christianity was more powerful than their own cosmology, the Moravians had to convince the Inuit that they themselves were more powerful religious leaders than the angedkut. So they embarked on a program of destroying the spiritual credibility of the angedkut.

The Moravian challenge to the status of angedkut within the Inuit social formation took place in both the religious and secular arenas. Their assault was not only on the cosmology of the Inuit, but also on individual angedkut. This latter technique, which by definition questioned the power of the Inuit spirits in relation to the Christian God, was also concrete competition between their respective worldly agents as secular leaders. In the discussion of leadership among the Inuit at the time of the arrival of

the Moravians, it was indicated that, since they had recourse to the spirit world, they could visit illness, bad luck, or even death on their enemies. Their power was thus partially of a coercive nature, that is, relying on the fear of retribution to maintain authority. However, in order to achieve and maintain their position, it was necessary for them to produce benefits for their followers as well. This meant to cure illness, to bring animals within range to hunt, and to protect them from malevolent spirits. Failure in these activities weakened their ability to coerce compliance, as their spiritual strength would be brought into question.

The Moravians were, in some cases, successful in challenging the spiritual power of angedkut and thereby undermining their status as secular leaders. Taylor provides an example of such a confrontation between the Moravians and an angedkok. Two Moravians, Haven and Drachart, travelled up the coast in 1770, visiting with Inuit where they encountered them. At one stop, north of Davis Inlet, they met a group of Inuit among whom was an angedkok.

He cried out "I fear you not, nor am I afraid of your killing me", struck on his breast and began to put himself into his conjuring postures. I asked him, "Art thou a conjurer?" He cried out with a horrible noise, "Yes, and a great one too. I am not afraid of thee." ... For all the Eskimos looked at him and lay all flat upon their Kayaks.

[Haven showed him a toy and said]  
"Can you make such a one."

"No."

"Aye but" say I [Haven], "Then you are no such great conjurer. .... You have still to learn from me."

His conjuring inspiration left him and the people raised themselves up again in their kayaks and he was much laughed at, particularly by those Eskimos on board. [Haven and Drachard 1770: July 26] (1974: 87)

In this instance, the angekok lost face at both the supernatural and secular levels. The successful ridiculing of his ability to conjure, for that moment at least, shattered his ability to maintain his status among his compatriots through fear. However, such incidents militated against the achievement of ideological hegemony by placing the potential dominating group in an obvious position of opposition, thereby galvanizing resistance.

#### The Elders and Kivgat

In addition to the direct attack on the Inuit spiritual leadership, the Moravians also used the Kivgat and the Elders as institutional means of directed social change. And, just as with the Choir system, these structures were appropriated by the Inuit to further their own ends. This response was possible because, in order for the political institutions introduced by the Moravians to have legitimacy, they had to be populated by Inuit.

The criteria used by the Moravians for their selection



of local representatives to fill their institutions were that they had to be well respected in the community and to exhibit what the Moravians considered to be good Christian behaviour. This, for the Moravians, included rational economic behaviour. While this assured that the leaders they appointed had legitimacy in the community because of their status, they were often also the initiators of resistance to the Moravians, as they acted on behalf of themselves and the people they represented. Moravian efforts to co-opt Inuit leadership were therefore not a total success.

Simultaneously, the institution of the Kivgat was incorporated into the community political structures as soon as suitable candidates became available for service. Once these institutions began to function, the inherent contradiction in their mandate manifested itself. Brice-Bennett (1982) notes that the Kivgat became "... the Brethren's main link to their congregations and ... wielded considerable authority ..." (Brice-Bennett 1982: 351). Those two characteristics illustrate the basic tension which was an integral part of the practice. Analysts have stressed one aspect or the other in trying to describe the position.

Both Kleivan (1966) and Brice-Bennett (1982) emphasized the chapel servants' independence, citing their role in the resistance to the Moravians. Richling, in partial opposition, notes that:

It is difficult to avoid concluding ... that the native helpers [Kivgat] were primarily extensions of mission power which afforded the Moravians access to information about their clients who lived away from the stations during certain times of the year, and through whom social control could be exercised. (1979: 126)

These divergent views demonstrate that the nature of the position of chapel servant provided the potential for either or both to be the case. The Kivgat were jurally linked to the Moravian missionaries and were their eyes and ears in the community. They were also the organizers and leaders of resistance. This seemingly inconsistent behaviour was the legacy of the context in which it took place.

As the Inuit became increasingly dependent on the Moravian missionaries with each passing year, the power of the ankekut diminished, and the position of chapel servant was a legitimate path to power which partially circumvented the pre-Moravian power structure by appealing to the status of the Moravians. Kleivan provides the following example of this phenomenon:

[The ankekok]

...Tuglavina got into touch with the very first missionaries, and worked as a pilot for them on the coast. It is said that he was held in high esteem by his country men, and through the friendship with him the missionaries were able to establish contact with the population more easily. Tuglavina however, was not the first. As he grew older and weaker people's respect for him waned, and the missionaries indicate that he began to be afraid of relatives of persons he had killed when he was in his prime. It is obviously anxiety which is the reason

why, in 1790, he earnestly requested to be allowed to move to Nain with his wife and children. [Moving to a station meant one had to be a Christian]. After having been baptized, he began to agitate for Christianity in order to get more people to move into the village. (1966: 73-74)

In this case, a shaman extended his longevity as an influential person through the use of the mission. It is true that the Moravians were manipulating traditional secular leadership among the Inuit to suit their goals. It is also true that the Inuit were manipulating the political structure provided by the Moravian mission to further individual political goals. Thus, it seems reasonable to propose that the Inuit did not lose their autonomy through the mere imposition of the political structure of chapel servants, Elders, and Choirs. Other, more insidious means, which appeared in the form of benefits, were also applied. In the Moravian period, these appeared in the form of relief, medical aid, and education, and they became much more ubiquitous during the modern period of the welfare state. The issue here is not that it would have been better for people to remain illiterate or die of treatable conditions; it is rather that the political and economic costs of those benefits was the loss of autonomy.

Kleivan understood this aspect of Moravian intrusion and discusses the place of education in the Moravian strategy. He states:

Immediately after the mission stations of Nain and Okak were established, the mission started a school for Eskimo children. All

instruction, then as later, aimed at the mission's primary goal: to Christianize the Eskimos. (1966: 79)

The subjects which were learned in school at this time were entirely concerned with religious matters. Even the teaching of literacy was intended to permit the reading of Christian scriptures.

In addition to this direct dissemination of Christian cosmology and morality, was a secondary adjunct, as the children recounted to their parents what they had learned in school. Through education, the children were to become indoctrinated into the Moravian social, moral, and cosmological pattern, thus, in time, eroding the basis of Inuit resistance and achieving true hegemony. This did not and has not taken place.

#### Moravian Economic Intrusion

The delineation of the Moravians' strategy to undermine, transform, and at times displace certain aspects of the Inuit social organization could not have attained the success it did had it not been for the fact that their political and ideological strategies for domination were accompanied by an economic strategy. Essentially, the Moravians went about transforming the economic practice of the Inuit through fostering dependence on European commodities, which could only be obtained in exchange for

simple commodities. However, this objective was subject to a number of factors which interfered with its accomplishment. Among the most salient were Inuit resistance to becoming simple commodity producers, competition from independent European traders and Inuit middlemen, and the inherent contradiction within the Moravian form of intrusion, which combined proselytizing with trade.

This latter point is the central argument in Brice-Bennett's thesis (1982), which proposes that the Inuit were willing to accept the Moravians as long as they observed the principle of reciprocity, that is, shared their wealth. This principle meshed very well with the Christian ideology of caring for one's neighbour (which partially explains the acceptance of that ideology by the Inuit), but it is in fundamental conflict with the mercantile rationale of making a profit. The Moravian production of what the Inuit perceived as contradictory discourses provided them with the ideological ammunition to attack the Moravians at their most basic level, Christian ideology. This contradiction also took its toll on the missionaries in the field, who had to live it. They often found themselves at odds with their flock as they preached Christian charity in the church and drove their congregation further and further into debt at the store. Reichel, who was sent to Labrador in 1861 to assess the state of the Moravian mission, keyed on this contradiction

as a major obstruction to the primary aim of the mission, which was to convert the Inuit to Christianity. However, it remained in place until 1926, when continuing financial losses finally drove the Moravians out of the trade component of their mission, and forced them to give it over to the HBC.

The Moravians in Labrador were therefore involved in trade with the Inuit for 155 years, a fact which Richling (1979) emphasizes to argue his case for the centrality of the profit motive for the Moravians. Richling's (1979) premise is that once the Moravians established themselves in Labrador, the Inuit turned to them in times of privation. The Moravians, for their part, were loath to give something for nothing and therefore demanded simple commodities or labour in return for aid. With this basis of exchange underpinning the economic relationship, there was the progressive development of a relationship based on dependence, and a chronic debt cycle eventually obtained. Richling (1979) proposes that the Moravian commercial interests on the coast collapsed due to their inability to compete with other traders and the drain on their resources placed on them by the Inuit demands for relief.

Taylor (1974) contends that the resource base for the Labrador Inuit was more than sufficient to support the population. On the other hand, Richling (1979), Brice-Bennett (1982), and Kleivan (1966) all indicate that there were times of privation among the Inuit a fact which

Richling (1979) posits as a prime factor in the attraction of the mission stations for the Inuit.

For both Brice-Bennett (1982) and Richling (1979), the essential contradiction inherent in the Moravian form of intrusion fostered resistance and brought about their downfall as a mercantile interest on the coast. Nevertheless, while the Moravians may have failed as a commercial enterprise, they were more successful in transforming the social formation of the Inuit than the HBC were with regard to the Inuit. It is therefore necessary to examine their economic practice, for without it the other aspects of their intrusion would never have taken hold.

During the period in which the Moravians were involved in the northern Labrador trade, (1771-1926), the relationship between the Inuit and the Moravians was in a constant state of turmoil. This situation derived directly from the divergent aspirations connected to their respective economic practices. The Inuit wanted to acquire European commodities at the most favourable rate of exchange and to have unrestricted access to Moravian supplies in times of need. The Moravians wanted the Inuit to increase simple commodity production, take credit instead of relief in times of need, and trade exclusively with the mission. Neither side was able to achieve its aims, but it was not for lack of trying. The period ended in what was in some ways a stalemate.

While the economic relationship was one of tension, the Moravians consistently applied direct pressure, with the hope of transforming the non-economic practices of the Inuit at the same time as they were attempting to transform their economic practices. This integrated approach is being disaggregated here for the purposes of analysis, to indicate how each particular practice contributed to the transformation of the Inuit social formation and to elucidate the linkages between each forum of practice. For the Inuit, however, the Moravians were a monolithic presence whose actions were inconsistent. Much of the resistance by the Inuit was the attempt on their part to inject some logic into the relationship. The Moravians were also conscious of the contradictory nature of their religious and economic practices, but were constrained to attempt to make them appear consistent. To some degree, they were able to rationalize their behaviour as the paternalistic protection of the Inuit from their unscrupulous competition who traded in luxuries and from the Inuit's own irresponsible subsistence and exchange production habits.

As was noted in Chapter Two, the initial impetus for the Newfoundland governor's support of the Moravian missions' presence in northern Labrador was the hope that they would contain the Inuit north of Hamilton Inlet and stop them from interfering with the fishery in southern Labrador. The Moravians were only too willing to aid the



colonial administration in this course of action, as they wanted a monopoly on European contact with the Inuit. This monopoly would facilitate the achievement of their secular and spiritual goals.

Transformations did take place in the Inuit social formation during the Moravian period, but none were attained through a smooth transition. The Moravians had to contend with competition from other European traders and the constant resistance of the Inuit. To be sure, there was change, but not totally directed change.

After the demise of the commercial whale fishery, the Europeans became more interested in four other renewable resources available in northern Labrador which could be transformed into commodities: fish, seal skins, seal oil, and fine furs, and they engaged the Inuit to produce them.

From the discussion of mercantilism, it can be assumed that the Europeans were not trading for altruistic reasons. The pursuit of profit ruled their actions. However, as previously mentioned, their relationship with the Inuit was far more complex than that of simple traders. This situation turned out to be both a boon and a bane to their economic goals.

In order to comprehend this period in the labour history of northern Labrador, it is important to be aware that neither the Inuit nor the Europeans constituted homogeneous groups. In addition to the Moravians, the Inuit also were in contact with free traders, such as the

French trader who began trading south of Hopedale in 1788; Cartwright, who traded for fifteen years on the south coast of Labrador beginning in 1775; the HBC, who set up operations in Ungava Bay in 1830 and on the north coast of Labrador later in that century; and the Newfoundland fishermen who participated in the floater fishery in northern Labrador from the mid-eighteenth century until well into the twentieth.

As for the Inuit, the issue is complicated by two factors: first, the pre-contact spatial division of the Inuit into local groups, albeit fluid; and second, the fact that during the period under discussion, the Inuit were in a period of territorial expansion. Nevertheless, four groups can be discerned by their relationships to the Europeans: the Inuit who resided at the mission stations; those who lived in the Moravian sphere of influence, but not on station property, those that made regular trips or lived in southern Labrador; and the more northern group whose interaction with the Moravians was sporadic and who eventually began trading with the HBC. Including the Europeans and the native Labradorians, then, there were ten groups who engaged in economic intercourse prior to the intrusion of the state into northern Labrador. Although each one played a role in the development of the European-Inuit economic relationship, this analysis will examine them in terms of how they affected the key dyad, the Moravians and the station Inuit. For the Inuit, the

Moravians were the primary intruders, and it is in terms of this relationship that the others must be understood.

In the economic relationship between the Inuit and the Moravians, there was a fundamental tension which can be addressed through the categories of compliance and resistance. Both the Moravians and the Inuit had their own priorities, and the factors which caused the slow, painful loss of autonomy by the Inuit is the story of the conflict of those priorities and the eventual domination of the Europeans.

Assuming that the Inuit, at the time of Moravian intrusion, were rational economic decision makers who valued their autonomy, the obvious question is, why did they abandon their independence and place themselves within the economic and political purview of the Moravians? One answer is that the Inuit have never abandoned their autonomy; rather, parts of it have been taken from them against their will. This position garners support from the enumeration of the various forms of resistance practiced by the Inuit during the entire Moravian period and the modern period as well. However, despite the obvious merit of this approach in depicting the Inuit, not as impotent pawns being moved by the whims of history but rather as active participants in the construction of that history, there is still the fact that they were transformed from "Inuit" into "Moravian Eskimos." This transformation was not achieved behind their backs, but, just as they resisted and in some

cases rejected certain aspects of Moravian intrusion; they accepted others. So, once again, the question of why must be posed.

The non-economic factors of Moravian intrusion were discussed in an earlier section, but their efficiency as agents of social change would have diminished had they not been attached to the economic factors. It is in the economic arena, ruled by the logic of mercantilism during the Moravian period, that the Inuit became involved in, and were eventually trapped by, the production of simple commodities. Without this material component of the Moravian intrusive strategy, it is possible that they could still be looking for their first convert. However, this was not the case; hence, the genesis of the "Moravian Eskimos."

The economic strategy of the Moravians was dictated by a number of goals: first, to keep the Inuit from going south; second, to keep the Inuit as self-sufficient as possible; and third, to support their mission in Labrador through the profits generated by their trade with the Inuit. They were unsuccessful in accomplishing any of these goals over the long run. Among the obstacles were competition from other Europeans, Inuit efforts to fulfill their own ambitions, the internal contradiction within the Moravian economic strategy between the goal of fostering self-sufficiency among the Inuit and simultaneously promoting trade, and the contradiction between their

religious and secular programs.

At the time of their intrusion, in 1771, the Moravians were entering into a situation in which their prospective clients, the Inuit, were already familiar with, and wanted to acquire, European commodities. In addition to this mutual desire to trade, the Moravians, through their experience in Greenland, also had the advantage of speaking Inuttitut and were therefore better equipped to conduct trade with the Inuit than were other traders on the coast. Finally, they were spatially the closest Europeans to the Inuit and enjoyed the advantage of proximity. A successful enterprise would seem to have been assured. But the moral and economic ambitions they had for the Inuit constrained their commercial activities, eventually causing its demise.

The Moravians were explicit about their desire to keep the Inuit self-sufficient and, while they were instrumental in fostering Inuit dependence (Brice-Bennett 1982: 193), they periodically bemoaned the reliance of the Inuit on European goods (Kleivan 1966: 152). However, while the Moravians played a major role in this process, they were in the habit of blaming other Europeans for Inuit dependence and tended to view their own trade as in the best interests of the Inuit.

In the beginning, the Moravian trade policy forbade trade in guns, food, and luxury goods, and relief was linked to debt and the rate of trade. As a consequence of the latter feature, their trade rates were lower than those

of the private traders, who did not have to carry the same overhead costs. The response of the Inuit to this policy was to make trading trips south, where they could obtain the rifles and any other goods they wanted at a better rate of trade. In the final analysis, it was the impetus provided by the competition that was instrumental in forcing the Moravians to amend their trade policies.

For while the Moravians continued attempting to maintain their initial position, their policies were always being tinkered with in an effort to meet the demands of the Inuit that could be, and often were, satisfied elsewhere. For example, after fourteen years of watching the Inuit take their trade south and returning with rifles, the Moravians began to trade guns in 1785. This change in policy was the forerunner of what was eventually to become the rule in Moravian/Inuit relations. The Moravians would make a rule, the Inuit would find a way of circumventing it, either on their own or with the help of Moravian competitors, and the Moravians would change the rule. It should be added that the Moravian actions were also informed by humanitarian morality, in that they made an effort to see to it that the Inuit did not suffer from want too severely, although the periods of privation, at times to the point of starvation, can be attributed, in part at least, to the economic and political presence of the Europeans in northern Labrador.

The repercussions obtaining within the Inuit social

formation deriving from their increasing economic involvement with the Europeans can be linked to four factors: production, consumption, credit, and relief. The latter two are closely tied to the incidence of privation, which is in turn linked to the impact of the Europeans on the physical well-being of the Inuit, their economic practices, their social organization, and the transformations in their ideology. The complexity is obvious; therefore, each factor will be taken in turn before the subject of Inuit resistance to the Europeans, which took place in all forums, is discussed.

While the transformation in the economic practice of the Inuit was directly attributable to the presence of the European agents of mercantilism amongst them, it was the Inuit desire to obtain European commodities that is at the root. In order to obtain these commodities after the demise of the raiding method, they were forced to become simple commodity producers. The end of the raiding can perhaps be linked to the effects of epidemics, the extra-economic impact of the Moravians, and a perception that the production of simple commodities was more prudent, since European stations were no longer unmanned and easily looted. Therefore, seal skins, seal oil, fish, and fine furs became the commodities which were produced to exchange for European commodities. These European commodities included items that would increase their productive capabilities, such as rifles, seal nets, wooden boats,

axes, knives, and other consumer goods, among which were cloth, food, and cooking utensils. This increasing reliance on European commodities demonstrates the process of the creation of needs, which was one component in the development of the Inuit's dependent relationship with the Europeans. While it was no doubt possible for them to survive physically without European goods throughout this period, it would have had to be done at a level which the Inuit no longer perceived as acceptable. Both the Moravians and the private traders saw that it was in their interests to promote this dependence, albeit for different reasons and with different rationalizations.

The HBC were nothing if not explicit about its propagation of aboriginal dependence on European goods. It was clear to the HBC that once an aboriginal had acquired a taste for European commodities, the former had a lifetime producer working for it, provided, of course that it got rid of the competition. The problem for the HBC, after it had engendered dependence on European commodities, was not getting people to produce, but rather getting them to produce at a high rate, and to exchange with it exclusively. With regard to the former, the HBC met with mixed success (Rich 1960), while the latter was largely an inter-European conflict rather than one between the aboriginals and the Europeans. The attempts to control where the aboriginal producers traded could only be enforced once all European competition had been eliminated



and the debt system put in place (Hammond 1982). These issues will be explored in more depth below; for now, they will serve as a counterpoint to the Moravian system.

The Moravians' economic practice was a little more convoluted than that of the HBC and private traders, whose only aim was profit; they had social and ideological goals to attain as well. Ostensibly, they were interested in maintaining the self-sufficiency of the Inuit, unfortunately, their actions in all forums of activity contributed to the opposite outcome--dependency.

At first glance, dependency appears to be an issue of consumption; that is, the dependent population requires material input from the outside in order to reproduce itself. However, this is only part of the picture, since there is also a necessary transformation in the productive process through which a given population is no longer able to supply itself with the standard of living to which it aspires. Therefore, this transformation includes the creation of needs by capital beyond those necessary for the mere maintenance of the body, as well as the partial or total shift to simple commodity production in order to produce exchange value to satisfy those needs. This is because capital not only requires labour to exploit, it also must control that labour and have a market in which to dispose of its manufactured goods. Thus, while the Inuit were producing fish, fur, and seal skins for the European market, they were also consuming commodities made by

exploited European labour.

The Inuit were intent on acquiring European goods. The Moravians were intent on getting them to produce simple commodities to exchange for their imported commodities. This aspect of their intrusion was clear early on. In 1788, the missionaries were urged: "... to promote trapping among the Inuit because a variety of furs was expected to yield considerable returns" (Richling 1979: 153). The Moravians not only wanted the Inuit to produce simple commodities, they also wanted a high level of production to increase profit. Therefore, the Moravians introduced nets to catch seals and fish around 1800, by which time steel traps and rifles to capture fur-bearing animals had been in use for some time. Since the Moravians retained ownership of the seal nets, they appropriated part of the catch as their own. Therefore, the Moravians not only benefitted from the increased production, but also from what amounted to rent.

An interesting aspect of the use of nets to catch seals was that it not only increased the number of seal skins produced, but also the amount of meat. The Moravians encouraged this practice, as it became more and more difficult to feed the sedentary Inuit population at the stations, and the large influx of meat and fish helped alleviate this problem. With regard to seal meat, though, it is significant that even today there is a preference for seal meat from a seal that has been shot, rather than from

one that has been netted. Informants indicate that meat from a drowned seal does not taste as good. Nevertheless, nets came into general use during the nineteenth century in order to increase the production of seal.

But increased production is only one method by which profits can be taken in a mercantile system. The second way is through the price differential between the exchange rate received by the producer and the price received by the mercantilist in the European market, where the simple commodity was ultimately sold.

The Moravians were not naïve in this aspect of the trade relationship either. For example, in 1825, they were exchanging ten to twelve shillings worth of cloth for a silver fox fur worth several pounds on the London market (Brice-Bennett 1982: 192). The rate of profit here is in the vicinity of 100%. However, this was not the only form of profit for the Moravians; they also took profit from the sale of goods in their stores through a method which indicates their level of mercantile sophistication.

The Moravians established a local monetary unit known as the "speck" or "syrik," which was based on a given amount of seal oil. It is interesting to note that the quantity of seal oil varied from thirty-two to forty pounds, depending on the station. But this was only one component of the means by which this currency system was used to profit from Inuit production of simple commodities. The "speck" or Labrador shilling's, value, assigned by the

mission, was one-half that of the English shilling. Therefore, the Moravians took 100% profit at the instance of exchange, in the acquisition of Inuit production, and another 100% in selling the European commodities.

The Moravians justified the profit-taking through two rationalizations. First, they argued that they accepted furs of any quality at the same rate of exchange, while independent traders only accepted the best. And second, they contended that they had to support a much higher overhead in maintaining the permanent stations and in supplying relief and/or credit to the Inuit when necessary. Their relationship with the Inuit was much more complex than that of the private traders who attempted to maintain theirs on a pay-as-you-go basis.

The relationship established by the private traders allowed them to provide a higher standard of trade than the Moravians. Further, they felt no compunction in trading low-volume, high-value luxury commodities such as alcohol. This permitted the private traders to keep their shipping costs to a minimum, which led to higher profits. The Moravians saw this as unfair competition, the independent traders saw it as good business, and the Inuit just went on trying to make the best deal they could.

In addition to this material aspect of the competition from independent traders, the Moravians also had to contend with a challenge to their legitimacy mounted by the private traders. The private traders used their ability to attract

Inuit producers through their better rates of trade and then, as did all traders, attempted to increase their control over those producers.

By directly challenging the Moravians' religious and jural authority, the Southlanders [private traders] introduced new ideas to converted Inuit which encouraged them to question the legitimate extent of the Brethren's control. (Brice-Bennett 1982: 322)

Despite this ongoing challenge to the Moravians' status, they were able to maintain their influence. This can be linked to the material travails of the Inuit, which the Moravians were able to ameliorate through the judicious use of relief and credit. But it must be recognized that the material problems which that encountered by the Inuit during the Moravian period were in large part the legacy of the European presence in Labrador. One repercussion of the European intrusion was the economic transformation of the Inuit from use producers to simple commodity producers. This meant that they began to produce more simple commodities instead of food, and hence became dependent on European goods. Another repercussion was health problems, ranging from chronic illness, which interfered with their ability to produce either for use or exchange, to epidemics, which decimated the population.

Health

Kleivan (1966), in the appendix to his study of northern Labrador, notes the instances of epidemics at the Moravian stations from 1788 to 1955. From the data he provides, there is no doubt that every station was visited by some ailment (usually respiratory) almost every year. In this regard, it is important to note that illness plays a role beyond increasing the mortality of the population: it affects their ability to perform their economic tasks. If a hunter is sick, he cannot hunt, and if his children are sick, the family may decide to remain at the station, where medical and subsistence help are available, rather than dispersing to the areas where more resources are available.

Nevertheless, mortality, the most dramatic effect of the constant epidemics in northern Labrador, had serious repercussions; at times, such as 1907, the missionaries despaired of the very survival of the Inuit population. This fear almost became a reality during the Spanish flu epidemic of 1919. In Okak, which was the worst hit, 207 out of a population of 263 died and this brought about the closing of the station.

Scheffel (1984) has documented the general effect of the intrusion of the Moravians on the health of the Inuit living in Labrador. In a paper on the transformation of the marriage practices of the Inuit during the nineteenth century, he provides data that indicate a startling

deterioration in the health of the aboriginal peoples. From 1800 to 1919, the percentage of males in Hopedale reaching age seventeen dropped from 61% to 28% and the percentage of females dropped from 73% to 29%. In addition, the percentage of males reaching age forty-one for the same period in Hopedale dropped from 37% to 17%, and the percentage of females dropped from 44% to 19%.

Another aspect which Kleivan (1966) notes that the missionaries commented on was the increasing presence of widows and orphans at the mission stations during this period. This meant that there was an increase in the amount of relief that the Moravians had to provide for non-producing members of their communities. This problem was obviously exacerbated by the fact that there was less wild food coming into the community (since the hunters were engaged in the production of simple commodities), and by the effects of illness on production. This, in turn, led to greater dependence on European goods.

One further important component of the economic relationship between the Inuit and the Moravians was that of relief and credit. For the Moravians, these were inextricably linked to both their social and economic programs. It was also the component to which, given the sharing practices among the Inuit, they had the most trouble relating. Payment for a gift or a formalized debt, as opposed to generalized reciprocity, were decidedly alien concepts. Along with the standard of trade, these

practices provided the most serious foci for confrontation between the Inuit and the Moravians.

### Debt and Credit

While the barren-ground Inuit debt was increased largely as part of the putting-out system, in which the HBC would supply a trapper at the beginning of a season against his subsequent production, debt for the Inuit seems to have been more directly related to privation. And privation was linked to the sedentarization of the Inuit, the increase in Inuit morbidity, the increase in widows and orphans at the stations, the partial shift to simple commodity production, and the impact of the Moravian intrusion on the non-economic sectors of the Inuit social formation. This latter aspect could also affect the ability of the Inuit to produce food, for example, the prohibition of hunting on Sundays. These factors plus the natural factors contributed to the regular occurrence of privation among the Inuit. However, the Inuit also incurred debt in the same manner as the barren-ground Inuit, that is, taking credit against future production. The outcome was that the Inuit were faced with a chronic debt situation which was one of the primary mechanisms for labour control exercised by most European traders, including the Moravians.

The Moravians viewed the chronic debt of the Inuit as



a serious problem, but they were obliged to provide both relief and credit if they hoped to maintain their position as the dictators of morality among the Inuit. But in doing so, they made serious efforts to keep debts derived through both mechanisms firmly in the economic arena. Therefore, all such transactions took place within the context of the store and not in the religious component of their institutional infrastructure. In this way, they hoped to impress upon the Inuit that while Christian charity endeavoured to see that no one suffered too severely from need, all debts incurred by the able-bodied were expected to be repaid, either in simple commodities or in labour. They were singularly unsuccessful in achieving this end.

Throughout the entire Moravian and HBC periods, and after the Newfoundland government took over the administration of relief, the Inuit of Labrador carried a debt load. The Moravians tried all manner of methods to get the Inuit to reduce their dependence on relief and credit. Periodically, they forgave part or all of the debts or tightened up the credit policy. The latter solution was usually greeted by such a high level of resistance from the Inuit that they had to return to a more liberal policy. It was an unmitigated disaster and was the most visible cause of their failure as mercantilists on the coast.

It must not be inferred from this that the Moravians were alone in their failure to cope with the demands for

relief and credit placed on the Europeans by the Inuit. When the HBC took over the trade from the Moravians in 1926, it established a policy of no credit to those in debt. However, part of its deal with the Newfoundland government was that, in exchange for a virtual trade monopoly and significant tariff breaks, the HBC was responsible for the administration of relief to the Inuit. Much to the Company's chagrin, it found that, despite their almost exclusive trade, they continually lost money. This occurred despite the fact that the responsibility for relief had been taken over by the Newfoundland Rangers in 1934.

#### Economic Resistance

Thus far, the discussion of the Moravian period has focused on the Europeans, their policies, such as those relating to credit, the competition amongst them, and the unforeseen consequences such as disease, all of which contributed to the eventual development of dependency by the Inuit on the Europeans. Despite this, the Inuit did not simply submit to European dominance. That may have been the inevitable consequence, given their involvement in simple commodity production, which required the exchange of simple commodities with a much more economically, politically, and militarily powerful society. However,

this was not the way it appeared to the Inuit at the time. The record shows that, while the Inuit wanted European commodities, they continually attempted to manipulate the relationship in their own favour and constantly resisted any policies which seriously challenged their view of how the world should work or which caused undue hardship. To conclude this section on the Moravian period, the forms of Inuit economic resistance will be examined.

The primary form of economic resistance to the Moravians practiced by the Inuit was trading with other Europeans (Brice-Bennett 1982, Richling 1979). For the Moravians, this practice was a challenge not only to their economic monopoly, which meant a loss of trade but also politically. It was, in their eyes, akin to a breach of contract. While they, as all traders, were in pursuit of profit, this was tempered by the humanitarian (Christian) component of their policy vis-à-vis the Inuit. Therefore, they felt that if they were going to supply relief and credit to the Inuit, they should reap the rewards of Inuit production.

The Inuit took exception to this and, when necessary, made long journeys to trade with independent traders. In doing so, they were able to benefit from a better standard of trade and were also able to acquire commodities not carried by the Moravians. This was not always necessary, as the independent traders also set up seasonal and eventually permanent operations as close to the Inuit as

the Moravian land grants would permit. In addition, some Inuit were not merely content with challenging the Moravian trade monopoly through their choice of European trading partners, but also actively recruited other Inuit to do the same by extolling the benefits of trade with the independent traders (Richling 1979: 89-90).

A second form of economic resistance was to minimize, when possible, the level of simple commodity production. This was a little more difficult to practice in later periods as the growing dependence of the Inuit on European commodities constrained them to produce commodities. However, there are comments in the Moravian records which note that once the Inuit had supplied their subsistence requirements they would totally neglect simple commodity production (Brice-Bennett 1982: 155). The more northerly groups of Inuit, who hunted caribou in the Ungava district, saw themselves as so well off materially that Moravian entreaties to convert to Christianity fell on deaf ears (Brice-Bennett 1982: 151). Therefore, although dependent on some European commodities, and although the desire for others to improve their standard of living was also a factor in controlling Inuit labour, there was a variable level of optimum consumption which, once attained, led to the curtailment of production. This response was obviously at odds with an economic system that requires that the volume of production be maintained at a high rate in order to assure a high rate of profit. In this context, the

Inuit were able, within limits, to mold the system to their requirements.

A third form of resistance was the disputes which arose over the debt system. The factors involved here were the relief policies of the Moravians, the system of generalized reciprocity of the Inuit, and the opposed perceptions of accumulation of the Inuit and the Moravians. In times of need, the Inuit would receive relief from the Moravians in kind, which the Moravians expected the Inuit to pay back as soon as they were able. For the Inuit, they were able to repay their debt when they could satisfy all their own requirements, those of other Inuit with whom they were required to share, and a good portion of their whims, and still have a surplus. For the Moravians, the Inuit were expected to repay debts when they were minimally well off in terms of food and clothing, and still had a surplus. The Moravian policy provided that before any new goods could be acquired from the store, the Inuit had to pay off their debt. This requirement struck the Inuit as unreasonable, given the obvious wealth displayed in the stores, and this led to conflict between the Inuit and the Moravians (Brice-Bennett 1982: 48).

In addition to confronting the Moravians with their apparent selfishness, the Inuit had a second strategy to cope with the problem of debt. They would run up a debt at more than one station, or trade with independent traders when they were in debt with the Moravians. Therefore,

while the Inuit were acting within the logic of their own system of generalized reciprocity, they were also maximizing their returns in the mercantile system by encouraging European competition. The Moravians were constrained to maintain their relief and credit system in place, they were the most potent economic lever they had to establish their non-economic program.

The Inuit also confronted the Moravians with the disparity in the rates of trade between the stations. As was noted above, the "Labrador shilling" was worth different amounts of seal oil at different stations. Further, the better rate of trade obtained from the independent traders continually forced the Moravians to standardize and increase their own rates of trade in response (Richling 1979: 283).

A more covert form of resistance was to falsify seal returns of the number of seals caught using Moravian nets (Brice-Bennett 1982: 350-351). While, for obvious reasons, the covert forms of resistance are less well recorded, the fact that, even today, seal skins are specially treated to conceal nicks and the less perfect fish are buried amongst good ones indicate that the spirit of covert resistance still exists and more than likely flourished during the Moravian period as well.

The most spectacular form of resistance was direct violent confrontation, such as took place in Hebron in 1888, 1889, and 1938. While never resulting in the loss of

life, the Inuit did break into the stores periodically. Once they took hostages, and on another occasion a shot was fired in anger at a Moravian. The Moravians saw themselves as enlightened leaders, who were not dictating to the Inuit, but establishing policies for the benefit of the Inuit. A violent response on the part of the Inuit, who viewed the actions and policies of the Moravians as oppressive, must have come as quite a shock to the Moravians. How could the Inuit respond in such a negative way to the Moravians if the Moravians were such a positive influence? Despite their relatively rare occurrence, the violent confrontations were a graphic reminder of the power relationship between the Inuit and the Moravians, which the Moravians viewed as a partnership, albeit with themselves as the senior partner and, therefore, the leader. This leadership was not based on force, but, from the Moravian perspective, on the benefits they were passing on to the Inuit, economically, morally, and socially. The Inuit, as Brice-Bennett (1982) points out, were of another opinion, which was expressed most strenuously from time to time.

The Inuit did not restrict their resistance to Europeans strictly to the Moravians; they also confronted others who threatened their interests. In 1903, for example, a group of Inuit in the Ungava district are said to have sunk a ship belonging to some Europeans who were hunting in the Inuit's territory (Cabot 1920; 100).

Finally, the economic resistance took the form of

direct economic competition with the Moravians. In 1916, an Inuk set up a trading post near Hopedale, cutting into the Moravian trade there.

Through these forms of economic resistance, the Inuit put into practice their opposition to the Moravians and other Europeans. It is important to note, though, that the Inuit were totally opposed neither to European presence nor to trade; rather, they wanted more control over the way the trade was conducted in order to obtain more benefits from it. It would seem that they objected to having their labour exploited.

The discussion will now deal with the barren-ground Inuit's experience during the same period. Through this discussion, the variability of the mercantile system will be demonstrated by examining the relationship between the HBC and the barren-ground Inuit, which was significantly different from that of the Inuit and the Moravians.

#### The Barren-Ground Inuit: Introduction

The key to understanding mercantile intrusion, and, hence, the mercantile period in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula, is that the only constant was the core of the exchange relationship between the producer and the merchant, from which the merchant's profit was appropriated. All else is subject to variation, depending



on the particular set of objective conditions, ranging from the local to the international, within which the mercantile relationship was acted out. Further, the actions of the individuals involved in the exchange relationship define and redefine its parameters through their behaviour.

For the Labrador Inuit, the colonial government's desire to protect the southern Labrador fishery from Inuit depredations, the Moravian program of social engineering, the competition for the Inuit trade by the various European interests, disease, privation, and the Inuit involvement with and manipulation of their economic and political relationships with the Europeans all combined to define their history during the mercantile period. For the barren-ground Inuit, a different set of conditions and goals prevailed. Once again, while the exchange relationship was freely entered into, it was largely confrontational, given the basic contradiction inherent in the appropriation of profit from the unpaid labour of the producers. Thus, while appearing quite distinct, the experience of the barren-ground Inuit shared a basic kinship with that of the Labrador Inuit during the same period.

This section will examine how the barren-ground Inuit confronted the agents of mercantilism and how that confrontation transformed their social formation. Once again, it is the recursive nature of the interaction between the Europeans and the aboriginal producers that

defined their relationship at the local level. Both had to respond to the actions of the other and, while European policies may have been designed in Europe, Montreal, or Quebec City, their implementation at the local level required some mutual agreement as to the rules of the game. In this sense Marx was correct in saying that people make their own history but not under conditions of their own choice. For the Labrador Inuit and the barren-ground Inuit, those conditions, during the period under consideration, were defined by mercantilism and the basic exchange relationship that entailed.

Unfortunately for the reconstruction of the history of the barren-ground Inuit, the ethnohistorians have been faced with the same problem that confronted Conrad's protagonist in his novel Heart of Darkness. The northern interior of the Quebec-Labrador remained a large white space on the map until well into the nineteenth century.

Prior to the opening of the HBC post at Fort Chimo on Ungava Bay in 1830 and Erlandson's explorations in the interior of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula north of the 54th parallel in 1834, Europeans were notable in the area by their absence. The interaction between the barren-ground Inuit and the Europeans was low-level and sporadic; therefore, not only was the form of European intrusion different from that experienced by the Labrador Inuit, the extent and intensity of it were also critical differentiating features.

Despite the fact that the interior of the northern Quebec-Labrador peninsula remained the sole preserve of the barren-ground Innut until the mid-nineteenth century, European trade goods had penetrated the area from trading posts on the north-shore of the St. Lawrence river and James Bay by the early eighteenth century. Thus, the time of European intrusion does not date from the mid-19th century, when the Europeans finally penetrated the interior, but from much earlier, when their commodities became available and production for exchange became an economic option for the barren-ground Innut. As with the analysis of the Inuit experience for this period, the chronology of events is to be found in the appendix. The concern here is to examine the components of economic intrusion in terms of their effect on certain components of the barren-ground Innut social formation.

#### Hudson's Bay Company Intrusion

In contradistinction to the Moravian missionaries, the HBC's self-defined mandate was not clouded by any pseudo altruism. It had one, and only one, aim: profit. Thus, the policies implemented by the HBC and the actions of its agents bring the logic of mercantile value appropriation, which is based on maximizing the value and velocity of trade, into stark relief. This was tempered, in the case

of the barren-ground Innut, by several factors. The first was their remote location vis-à-vis the main trading entrepôts on southern James Bay and in the St. Lawrence river valley. Second was the lack of interest expressed by the barren-ground Innut in the fur trade, which facilitated the maintenance of a high level of independence from European commodities and a concomitant low non-economic involvement with Europeans. Third, the competition the HBC faced from independent traders, as well as from the North West Company in the peninsula, which, despite the relatively low returns they were able to generate, forced them to pursue the trade vigorously. Finally, there was added the ecology and topography of the interior and northern reaches of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula which proved, at times, to be insurmountable obstacles for both the traders and the producers, as they struggled to generate their livelihoods.

All these factors are related to the central contradiction which confronted the barren-ground Innut. While the northern Labrador Inuit could produce seal skins and seal oil at the same time as they produced food, and the James Bay Innut could produce meat and beaver pelts simultaneously, the barren-ground Innut were not afforded this luxury. For them, it was an either/or proposition; they could either produce food in the form of fish, birds, or caribou, or they could produce fur in the form of fox, lynx, otter, or marten. While the fur bearers are edible,

being at the top of the food chain they are also less abundant. People consider them less appetizing than the preferred food of caribou and they are subject to cyclical population crashes (Elton 1942).

The difficulty of the barren-ground Innut had in fulfilling their subsistence requirements at the same time as they produced for exchange indicates a possible explanation for their low involvement in the fur trade. This fundamental contradiction intruded into other facets of their social organization as well. In order to maximize returns from foxes, a trapper must set out a trap line, which may take a week to check. Hence, a large tract of land is required. In addition to this, the best time to trap is in the early winter, when the furs are in their best condition and travel is facilitated by snow and frozen rivers and lakes. These two requirements unfortunately clashed with the fall caribou hunt of the barren-ground Innut which, if successful, would permit a large group to remain together for extended periods in the winter. These practices militated against large trapping territories to accommodate long trap lines and early winter trapping. Despite this, and given that the barren-ground Innut were rational decision-makers, it would follow that had the HBC or any other traders been able to assure them a basic level of material security, they might have modified their annual cycle to accommodate more fur production. But no such assurances were ever forthcoming; in fact, evidence would

suggest just the opposite, that is, that trade led to increased privation and not surplus. Erlandson notes in the South River House Report of 1832-33 that:

I cannot hold out prospects of better [trade] success next year, supposing the post would be kept up and that the same Indians would again trade here. It was by great persuasion and extraordinary encouragement I endured them to look after martens in the early winter. Subsequently some of them were starving, which they blamed me for, saying I enticed them to hunt furs when they could have killed an abundance of deer [caribou]; they then came not only expecting, but demanding, food which I was unable to supply them with. Now, said they, we hunted skins for you, we are hungry and you have nothing to give us, do you expect we will again hunt for you? (Davies 1963: 221)

The barren-ground Innut well understood that the margin of error they were permitted by the northern Quebec-Labrador peninsula eco-system was slim. Privation was a constant threat and the involvement of the barren-ground Innut in the fur trade more than likely enhanced the possibility (Hammond 1982).

By the mid-eighteenth century, the barren-ground Innut also had the option of trading on the east coast of the Quebec Labrador peninsula, with the opening of a post in Hamilton Inlet by Louis Fornel in 1743. There is no question, given the level of European presence on the edges of the barren-ground Innut territory and the pre-European exchange networks, that the factors of knowledge and opportunity were both present, and it is this that makes the response of the barren-ground Innut to largely opt out.

of the trade so intriguing.

As noted, the James Bay Innut were able to absorb the production of furs into their economic system without causing a major disruption to their social formation. This was due to the fact that their primary product, beaver pelts, had a higher exchange value than use value to them, after the basic level of production had been achieved which satisfied their needs. Thus, they could fulfill the needs once filled by beaver pelts with other materials, either acquired from Europeans or from substitute local materials, and still acquire other European commodities as well. Further, all beaver-pelt production included the production of meat as well, thereby fulfilling the subsistence requirements of the hunter/trapper and his dependents.

The north-shore Innut, as discussed in Chapter One, were affected much more severely by the penetration of the Europeans, at the level of both economic and political practice. In partial response, they became middlemen in the fur trade and active participants in the fur-trade wars over the control of the St. Lawrence River valley. While both these responses were incumbent on the existence of the fur trade and the inter-European competition which derived from European mercantile practices, they were decisions made by the north-shore Innut in order to enhance and/or maintain their economic and political status. But, it was not only the impact of the fur trade which influenced their decisions; they also suffered through epidemics which

decimated their population and, through the aggressions of the Iroquois, lost their access to their hunting grounds south of the St.-Lawrence River.

The responses of these groups were thus subject to the macro-situation of the existence of European mercantile competition, in which the fur trade was only one component, and the micro situation which includes relations to neighbouring groups, incidence of disease, abundance of the desired commodity, and so on. Even though all North Amerindian groups were eventually caught up by the exchange relationship with Europeans at some point in their history, generalizations beyond that become suspect. Therefore, while it is likely that the barren-ground Innut wanted to acquire European commodities as much as everyone else, their choice not to transform their social formation to the extent necessary to become largely exchange-value producers rather than use-value producers presented the agents of mercantile capital with problems particular to their relationship with the barren-ground Innut.



Hudson's Bay Company Trade Practices

The HBC was intent on achieving a monopoly in the fur trade in order to fulfill one of the prime requirements of mercantile accumulation: volume. It did not want a major share of the furs, it wanted all the furs. Once that had been achieved, it could begin to work on the second requirement, increasing the velocity of trade, more effectively. So long as there remained competitors for their trade, the producers had the option of playing the traders off against one another and thereby forcing the fur prices up. Once the prices of furs were high, they could fulfill their commodity needs with fewer furs, and consequently production dropped (Rich 1960). From the perspective of the HBC, competition was a very bad thing indeed. Therefore, the HBC was willing to absorb losses in certain regions of its trading operations in order to protect more lucrative trade elsewhere. George Simpson, who was one of the HBC's North American governors during the nineteenth century, made the following statement espousing this policy:

Since I have been connected with the Service the fundamental principle of our business has been to collect all the furs [original emphasis] obtainable within the range of our operations. If we are to retain control of the Trade, we must prevent other parties from getting into it, which can only be done by preventing Furs in any large quantity falling into their hands. This obliges us to outbid our opponents; and it has always been a maxim with us that the Compy [sic] are able to pay as high as any other party (Galbraith 1977: 11)."

This policy, probably more than any other, explains the doggedness of the HBC in pursuing the trade in the northern interior of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula. It fought on the frontiers to protect the centre, and the barren-ground Innut eventually paid a high price for it.

That the barren-ground Innut territory was viewed as frontier can be seen in the reponse of John McLean on being assigned by the HBC to Fort Chimo ca. 1837. He

... appealed against Simpson on the ground that Simpson alone had put him on one side when a majority of the Council had decided that he was due for a Chief Trader's post, and he had been exiled to the unprofitable post of Chimo in Ungava... [emphasis added] (Rich 1959: 466)

As it turns out, Fort Chimo did in fact turn a profit (Cooke 1969); despite this, the perception on the part of the HBC employees that being sent there was undesirable indicates its relative status vis-à-vis other HBC operations in North America. Nevertheless, the HBC's efforts in the northern Quebec-Labrador peninsula brought the barren-ground Innut to the brink of extinction, and it was possibly only through the belated emergency assistance of the state in the 1950's that an even greater tragedy was prevented.

### Barren-Ground Innut Dependency

Throughout the late eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth century, while the northern Labrador Inuit were struggling to maintain their economic and political autonomy in the face of the concerted Moravian effort to wrest it from them, the barren-ground Innut were still masters of their own destiny. The level of their dependency, by far the most significant factor in transforming economic practices, was restricted to what they perceived as necessary. Erlandson, on meeting a large group of barren-ground Innut near Fort Chimo in 1834, commented:

During the winter they have been in the vicinity of the fort, occupied slaughtering deer [caribou], and it does to appear that they intend hunting for animals this season, having by trading deerskins obtained sufficient ammunition to render them independent for a season. (Davies 1963: 247)

This response on the part of the barren-ground Innut, from the HBC's viewpoint, was somewhat mystifying. Their experience in other areas was that the aboriginal peoples' wanted to acquire their goods. In fact, it was the policy of the HBC to nurture this desire for European goods in order to control the production of trappers, not only in terms of volume and velocity, but also in what commodities were produced; that is, the HBC wanted fine furs rather than caribou skins. But if the barren-ground Innut could satisfy their needs for European goods while producing meat, they would choose to produce caribou. It was

therefore necessary for the HBC to create a greater dependence on the commodities they controlled.

In the mid eighteenth century, Captain W. Coats provides an eloquent statement of this approach. He notes with regard to the fur trade in the eastern Hudson Bay region that:

...those few that has frequented the settlements, begin to like our commodities better; their women like our nicknacks and quegaws, and the men begin to love brandy, bread, and tobacco, so that a little address and management will bring these happy drones out of their profound lethargy. (Williams 1963: xxxv)

For the structural reasons discussed above (i.e., the contradiction between the production of use and exchange value), and the more practical ones that will be examined below, the barren-ground Innut never became as economically dependent as the HBC hoped and projected they would. Nevertheless, their participation in the fur trade, even at a low level, coupled with ecological and health factors, later created an extremely hostile environment for the barren-ground Innut and very nearly killed them off entirely.

### The Debt System

The HBC's policy vis-à-vis competition was to either destroy it or buy it out. This ruthless approach was necessary if the Company was to control the bulk of the fur trade, and was especially prevalent in the outer reaches of their fur trade empire in North America, where the Company had not consolidated its holdings.

The necessity of eradicating the competition was not only directed at assuring that all the furs trapped in an area were exchanged with the HBC, it was also a necessary condition for the implementation of the debt system. The debt system was the HBC's most potent weapon in its efforts to control labour. In this system, each trapper was attached to a particular trading post. The attachment was established through the putting-out system whereby the HBC would outfit a trapper at the beginning of a trapping season against the value of his catch (Tanner 1978a). In the spring, at the end of a trapping season, the trapper would return to the post that had outfitted him, pay off his debt, and buy whatever else he wanted. In the fall, the process would start all over again. The object of the process for the HBC side was to assure that the trapper was constrained to produce furs every season if he expected to get any access to European goods, whose consumption, as was noted above, the traders were actively promoting. In order to achieve this end, though, the traders had to control access to European goods, that is, control competition.

In contradistinction, the barren-ground Innut trappers had other aims in mind: they wanted to fulfill their needs for European goods with the minimum of effort and to maintain their autonomy vis-à-vis European traders. This was one of the central contradictions in the fur trade. The HBC wanted to establish a population of debt slaves; meanwhile, the prospective slaves were actively trying to prevent this from ever happening. In this regard, one must give the devil his due; the HBC did eventually achieve a monopoly, and the barren-ground Innut did become chronic debtors, but not without a struggle.

Prior to the establishment of the fur monopoly the barren-ground Innut had the option of trading with a number of competing traders. This option opened up a number of strategies. They could run up debts with one trader and trade their furs with another. They could bargain for a higher standard of trade by threatening to take their trade elsewhere. Finally, they could divide up their furs and offer the best to traders with whom they had no debt, thereby maximizing their return, while offering the less valuable furs to the trader with whom they carried a debt. This latter strategy allowed them to maintain their relationship with the trader who supplied their outfit, thereby assuring that they would receive it every year, but did not allow the relationship to diminish their returns. They were manipulating the debt system to their advantage, a strategy they were unfortunately unable to continue due

to the response of the HBC which was to control and eventually eliminate the competition.

The response of the HBC to the strategies of the barren-ground Innut to minimize their dependence on trade goods and to maximize their return on the furs they did produce had several components. First, it established trading posts in or near the territory of the barren-ground Innut, thereby facilitating the trappers access to its posts, rather than to those of its competitors. Second, the Company raised the standard of trade at its posts to encourage trade with it and to meet competition from other traders at the level of return on production. Third, it set up posts in close proximity to its competitors so as to offer trappers a highly visible choice at the point of exchange. Finally, once the monopoly was established, the Company vigorously enforced the debt system, thereby forcing a trapper to restrict his possible locations of exchange to one post (Hammond 1982). These strategies notwithstanding, it was essential that the barren-ground Innut be dependent on European goods or they retained the option of not trading, an option which was anathema to the HBC and, therefore, one it had to undermine.

The Dependency of the HBC on the Innut

While it was true that the barren-ground Innut were partially dependent on the HBC, the opposite was also true. The company needed guides, transporters, and labour to help maintain its posts, supply firewood, hunt country food for European consumption, and act as messengers carrying news and information pertaining to the trade to all the posts to keep them apprised of local conditions all over the peninsula. This relationship was important in that it affected the image of Europeans who were suppliers of scarce commodities to the barren-ground Innut, but were demonstrably dependent on them (Davies 1963: 192). Further to this, the fact that the aboriginals were supplying food to the Europeans, regardless of whether they were paid for it or not, established from the perspective of the barren-ground Innut the basis for a reciprocal relationship that had to be made good when they required food. That is, the Europeans were required to supply relief, a contract which was not honoured at all times (Cooke 1976: 53).

This breach of contract, which was so far removed from the way the barren-ground Innut treated each other, brought into question the very humanity of the Europeans. How could a person let another starve when he had the means to prevent it? This high threshold for other people's suffering before instituting some ameliorating action was a common feature of the relations between the Europeans and the barren-ground Innut during this period. It is a



situation, which continues today, and which accounts for some of the resistance put up by the barren-ground Innut to the presence of whites in their midst.

The European relief policy, its morality aside for the moment, was simply part of the HBC's maximization of profit. While it was necessary to keep its labour force alive to work, there was the feeling that, if it were too generous with relief, the trappers would simply become dependent on relief and not bother to produce simple commodities. Therefore, as with the Moravians, relief was incorporated into the debt system. Further relief was not always in the form of food, it was also in the form of means of production, such as ammunition, in order to facilitate the procurement of food.

Since the Europeans were dependent on the Innut to supply them with meat, it is not surprising that they could not supply a large contingent of hungry people for an extended period from their own supplies. Therefore, when the barren-ground Innut came into a post starving, they were given supplies and encouraged to return to the land. The stinginess of the Europeans in supplying the Innut with even the tools with which to procure food for themselves led to privation, which, as one would expect, led to more debt. This debt would put the Innut trapper in a position where, in order to acquire the goods necessary for the next seasons trapping, he had to pay off his debt, which was in part the result of privation. This, in turn, was caused to

some degree, by the need to trap in the first place.

From this perspective, privation and debt were two key variables in the intrusion of the Europeans into the northern Quebec-Labrador peninsula. One was the basic trade practices of the Europeans to establish control over their labour force, and the other was a combination of the effects of that level of control on the ability of the Innut to produce their subsistence requirements.

#### Privation

It follows that an important question is, was natural threat of privation an important factor in the Innut loss of economic autonomy? One indication is that the Inuit living north of Hebron rejected the enticements of the Moravians to convert and join their mission stations. They argued that if they made the move, they would lose access to the caribou. That is, they would rather risk the possibility of privation than join the Moravians and be assured of a steady diet, albeit a less interesting one. Therefore, the environment can only be taken as one factor in a complex of factors which combined to engender dependence.

The historic record documents that the barren-ground Innut starved, at times to death, fairly frequently. The latter half of the nineteenth century was the most horrific

period. In 1893, 150 died (Cooke 1976: 58), while in 1859, fifty to seventy died (Richling 1979: 267), and in late 1843, twenty deaths were recorded (Cooke 1976: 52). From an analytical perspective, there are a number of questions. Was starvation the result of participation in the fur trade and the dependence that obtained? Was the fur trade merely a contributing factor which had to be joined by the environmental factors, such as the alteration in a caribou migration route causing the Innut to miss them, which might not have happened had they not been involved in the fur trade? Or was it entirely the result of the environment, such as a crash in the caribou population, leaving the hunters with nothing to hunt?

Unfortunately, as has been discussed above, caribou are still not totally understood and their population cycle less so. However, several points in favour of an ecological argument can be made. First, privation occurred among the aboriginal population of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula on what appears to have been a fairly regular basis--not only among the barren-ground Innut, but among the James Bay Innut as well. The sheer number of reports, (Ross 1979) leads one to the conclusion that the threat of starvation, while localized in many instances, was real. It should be noted that the James Bay Innut, unlike the barren-ground Innut, were producing food at the same time they were producing furs. Further, the animal population they chiefly exploited (beaver) was easier to acquire than

caribou. In addition to this characteristic, the James Bay Innut also had other options beside caribou, such as the goose hunt and, in Richmond Gulf, whales. Given that they were running into periods of privation, it seems plausible that the barren-ground Innut, with more capricious game, would do as well. Also, there is evidence from Labrador that caribou populations can reach very low numbers and still rebound (Tanner 1978b, Jackson 1985). This is not to downplay the role of trade in causing privation, but only to point out that there is evidence to support the proposition that natural means could have caused it as well and that the fur trade aggravated an already risky situation.

Forest fires were also may have caused a disruption in the population cycle of the caribou. These fires started by natural causes, such as lightning, but the barren-ground Innut were also in the habit of setting the woods on fire to signal their position (Cooke 1969). These fires burned over vast areas of pasture and affected the caribou population, in terms of both how much pasture was available and what routes the caribou would use to migrate.

Given these natural factors, the population and annual cycle of caribou, and the incidence of disease interfering with the procurement of meat, the impact of the fur trade as an aggravating or even a direct causal factor in the starvation must be examined. As has been noted, some analysts propose that the James Bay Innut were able to

incorporate the fur trade into their pre-trade economy with a minimum of disruption. That is, while it is possible that the production of exchange value is a logically distinct practice from the production of use value, from the perspective of what people are actually doing no great change was observed, by either the Innut or the analysts.

In contradistinction to this position is one held by Hammond (1982) with regard to the barren-ground Innut. He argues that the debt system, which attached particular hunters to particular posts, disrupted the kinship system, making post groups largely endogamous and cutting the flow of information between these artificially generated bands. The destruction of the communication network resulted in starvation, because if one group missed the caribou there was no information about where they were. This was not only the case at any particular moment, but also regarding where they had been over a number of years. The problem was a combination of short-term sporadic crises coupled with a long term degradation of environmental knowledge. This latter situation would subsequently lead to a greater threat of starvation.

Another reason the fur trade was a primary cause for starvation focuses on the contradiction between the production of furs and the production of food. In this scenario, the barren-ground Innut were so intent on trapping furs in order to get out of debt that they would neglect to hunt food (Cooke 1976). This argument, while

conceivable, requires the barren-ground Innut to act in an economically irrational manner, that is, choosing to produce exchange value at the expense of use value, to the point of starvation. This appears, from anthropological data taken from almost anywhere in the world, to be virtually impossible (Dalton 1967). People can be coerced to the point of starvation, but they rarely choose it as an option.

Hammond's (1982) thesis, though, is not so easily dispensed with. Its merit is that it proposes a transformation in the social formation of the barren-ground Innut as a result of their involvement with the fur trade, specifically the debt system, which truncated their economic options. However, this would have to be accompanied by a significant level of dependence on European commodities, such that they could no longer survive without European input. This does not seem to have been the case. Rather, the distinctive feature of the barren-ground Innut was their low level of dependence on European goods. In fact, they continued to keep up a significant level of indigenous technology well into the fur trade. This would indicate that for a substantial period after European intrusion, the barren-ground Innut were able to reproduce themselves without the input of European goods. A second necessary condition would be that the barren-ground Innut would not take the option of giving their furs to someone who had a debt at another post and

have him take them into trade and thereby run up a debt at two posts, albeit in someone else's name. This would also seem a plausible option, given that the Innut to whom Clouston spoke in 1820 (Davies 1963) mentioned that he gave his furs to someone else to trade for him.

The point here is not to imply that Hammond's (1982) thesis is wrong, but rather that a number of options remained for the barren-ground Innut despite their involvement with the fur trade. Therefore, I would propose that the natural factors delineated above were also important in understanding not only the starvation but also why the barren-ground Innut got involved with the fur trade at all.

### Resistance

The threat, but not necessarily the occurrence, of privation was an added impetus for the barren-ground Innut to decide to get involved with the fur trade, as was the desire to obtain European goods. That this decision in fact increased the probability of starvation is likely, but may not have been appreciated as such until it was too late and the relationship of dependence and debt had been established. Nevertheless, the barren-ground Innut were not the unthinking dupes of the HBC and resisted the more deleterious policies of the latter. This section will deal

with the forms of resistance practiced by the barren-ground Innut during the mercantile period.

By the time the HBC established Fort Chimo in 1830, in an effort to tap the fur resources of the northern Quebec-Labrador peninsula, its method of labour exploitation had been in place for well over a century. The HBC promoted a material dependence on commodities only it could provide and then offered credit in kind, thereby assuring that the producer was always in debt. Effectively, this meant that the producer could never get out of debt, since this year's production was credited to last year's outfit and this year's outfit was advanced against next year's production. If conditions were right, it was possible for the merchant to guarantee that he would receive furs by the power enjoyed through his control of needed European goods. Of course, the system did not work perfectly because other factors impinged on its simple elegance. From independent traders providing an alternative source for European goods to the less than total dependence of the barren-ground Innut on European commodities, the two basic pillars on which the HBC's control of trade rested were undermined. In fact, it turned out to be easier for the HBC to deal with other European traders than it was to control the barren ground Innut.

The three main European competitors of the HBC in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula were the North West Company, the



King's Posts, and the private traders working out of Hamilton Inlet. In 1821, after a bitter struggle for supremacy in the fur trade over an extremely large area, the HBC and the North West Company amalgamated. In 1830 the HBC bought back the leases on the King's Posts that it had let lapse in 1822, after it had acquired them through its takeover of the North West Company the year before. And finally, in 1836, the HBC opened up a post in Hamilton Inlet to compete with the private traders operating there and, in 1837, bought them out. It is obvious from these actions that the HBC was successful in outmanoeuvring and overpowering its European competition and in establishing its trade monopoly in the Quebec-Labrador peninsula. Except for the Moravian mission on the northern Labrador coast, up until the Revillon Frères began to trade at Fort Chimo in 1903, the HBC was supreme in northern Labrador.

Therefore, one necessary condition to maximizing the volume and velocity of trade had been fulfilled--the HBC was in receipt of the overwhelming majority of the furs being produced in the entire length and breadth of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula for most of the mercantile period. But in order to wring even more profit out of the trade, the HBC had to turn its entire attention to the producers.

The barren-ground Innu were notorious amongst the agents of the HBC for their lack of commitment to the fur trade. When access to caribou was high, they would not

produce furs because they were well off. When access to caribou was low, they would not produce furs because they were starving. When access was somewhere in between, from the perspective of the agents of the HBC, they would not trap because they were contrary. For example, Finlayson, chief factor at Fort Chimo, noted in 1832 that: "I would gladly communicate with Mr. Chief Factor Clarke at Mingan but there is so little dependence to be put on these Indians here that I determined on sending to Moose [Factory]..." (Davies 1963: 191). McLean characterized them as being "... very indolent, a habit which long custom has confirmed" (in Cooke 1976: 35 (B/38/b/2/75)).

What the agents of the HBC overlooked, from time to time, was that the barren-ground Innut had their own priorities. Even after the HBC had achieved a monopoly, this did not by any means assure that the barren-ground Innut would produce furs at what the HBC thought was an acceptable rate. Therefore, despite Cooke's (1969) demonstration that Fort Chimo was marginally profitable during its first incarnation, this was apparently not obvious to the agents in the field nor to the administrators in Montreal and London. Just before its closing in 1843, McLean had recruited some James Bay Innut to migrate to Fort Chimo in the hope that they would produce more furs than the barren-ground Innut were producing. This plan failed due to the closure of the post, and almost ended in tragedy for the migrating

hunters, who luckily met with some HBC personnel just as they were getting ready to evacuate the post.

This form of resistance, which can be added to the demand for higher standards of exchange and the manipulation of the debt system, represents the efforts of the barren-ground Innut to tailor the system to their own needs (Cooke 1976). From this perspective, they accepted the intrusion of the Europeans and were trying to maximize their returns from it while minimizing the level of their participation. However, they also expressed their disapproval in more direct ways.

In addition to complaining that the the barren-ground Innut did not produce enough furs, the agents of the HBC also complained about their independence, in the sense of a character trait. That is, they just would not do what they were told. This trait was amply demonstrated to Erlandson, who in 1834 had hired a number of barren-ground Innut to guide him from Fort Chimo, on Ungava Bay, to the Mingan, on the north-shore of the St. Lawrence River. The expedition was for the purpose of exploring the country and assessing the possibilities of establishing an overland route in order to supply Fort Chimo from posts on the north-shore of the St. Lawrence river. The barren-ground Innut had other ideas, and guided Erlandson to Hamilton Inlet. Not only did Erlandson not end up where he wanted to, but he was confronted with a competitor's trading post which was paying more for barren-ground Innut furs than the HBC was

at Fort Chimo. In this act of defiance, the barren-ground Innut had made two statements: first, that in the country they were supreme; and second, that they were well aware that the HBC was exploiting them at a higher level than its competition.

In addition to these factors, the logistical problems of supplying Fort Chimo, which, in 1834, had been left without sufficient supplies, led Erlandson to comment:

... being told at one time a ship would arrive with the necessary supplies--which did not arrive; at another time that men would arrive and a trading post established in the interim--which proved equally fallacious; they began even at that early period to consider us a parcel of fools come hither to deceive them (Davies 1963: ixix)

This is not the statement of a man in complete control; he was now aware not only that the barren-ground Innut's set of priorities did not always coincide with the HBC, but also that the Innut priority took precedence.

The clash of wills was not always limited to such benign fallout as a statement of exasperation on the part of a HBC employee. It must not be forgotten that the HBC controlled access to European goods that the barren-ground Innut needed and wanted. This, coupled with the fact that the HBC was out to make a profit, led to conflict when the barren-ground Innut did not produce sufficient furs to acquire the goods they wanted, and the HBC withheld these goods when they had extended credit to the limit they had set. In the early twentieth century, this led the

barren-ground Innut to "...rush the Davis Inlet post, being denied what they had asked" (Cabot 1920: 100). This direct action, while motivated by economic need and, no doubt, a sense of betrayal, provides ample evidence of the inherent contradiction in the fur-trade relationship. The barren-ground Innut knew from the existence of different standards of trade extant in the past that they were being exploited, but were willing to put up with that as long as their requirements were met. When this relationship was ruptured, the Innut opted out.

#### Impoverishment of the Barren-Ground Innut

The above discussion examined the forms of mercantile intrusion and the respective responses of the Inuit to the Moravian mission and of the Innut to the HBC. It was demonstrated that the method of the Moravians included a conscious effort at directed change in most of the components of the Inuit social formation, while the HBC restricted itself to the economic component. There are two questions to be dealt with in this section on the mercantile period. Substantively, the question deals with the response of the HBC and the Moravian mission to the falling rate of profit that was endured by them in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. Through an analysis of their

respective responses it is possible to further distinguish the practical differences between them. This will provide a further theoretical basis upon which to make a more substantial comment on mercantilism as a form of capital penetration and labour control. Finally, it will be seen whether any of this is pertinent to the analysis of social change among the Inuit and the barren-ground Inuit as a result of mercantile intrusion. Did it really make any difference over the long run whether they were dealing with the Moravian mission or the HBC?

The transition from the mercantile period to the welfare state and the wage-labour period was the direct result of the demise of the fur trade in northern Quebec-Labrador. And it is the behaviour of the Inuit and the Inuit during the following period that provides the basis for discerning whether their distinct experiences during the mercantile period were influential in determining their subsequent behaviour. This proposition would appear logical, in that it is widely accepted that the pre-mercantile social formations were instrumental in shaping the responses to mercantile intrusion (Scott 1984). But prior to this, it is necessary to complete the discussion of the mercantile period as the hold of mercantile capital wanes and finally disappears.

In the northern Quebec-Labrador peninsula, the HBC was faced with logistical problems which arose out of its policy regarding competition. It wanted to establish a

permanent presence in order to attract barren-ground Innut traders away from independent traders and the King's Posts. After ascertaining that the barren-ground Innut were sophisticated enough in the fur trade to refuse to trade at less than premium rates offered by their competition, and hence raising its rates to meet the discrepancy, the HBC still was faced with the problem of supplying Fort Chimo with European goods in a way that did not eat up all their profits from the exchange. One method was to visit every two years leaving a double outfit, thereby cutting down on transportation costs. This proved unsatisfactory in that, the ship failed to arrive, there was no stock to trade. This happened in 1837, and the agents of the HBC saw that their image as honourable men took a beating among the barren-ground Innut as a result.

The second plan, which by the time it was achieved, became immediately redundant due to the closing of Fort Chimo, was the establishment of an overland supply route from either Hamilton Inlet or James Bay. This failure notwithstanding, the practical fallout of these exploratory missions of the late 1830's and early 1840's was the establishment of posts in the interior, such as Forts Nascopie, Manuan, and Trail in the central and eastern section of the peninsula, and Nichicun and Kaniapiscau on the western side. Most of these posts had either brief or sporadic lives with little substantial effect as far as the barren-ground Innut were concerned, except for shifting

their place of trade. For example, Fort Nascopeie took over from Fort Chimo in 1842 as the HBC's primary trading post. With short periods of overlap, Fort Nascopeie, which was closed in 1870, kept this status until 1866, when Fort Chimo was reopened and was, in its turn, superceded by Fort MacKenzie in 1916.

The juggling of posts in the interior of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula up to the end of the nineteenth century was taking place during an extremely low ebb in the fortunes of the barren-ground Innut. Beginning in 1842, starvation began to haunt them. The causes of these periods of starvation reported in 1842, 1847-1849, 1857, 1858, 1885, and 1893 are not entirely apparent, but their devastating impact on the barren-ground Innut is undeniable.

For the purposes of this analysis, perhaps the most salient impact of the starvation was the permanent removal of one section of the population of barren-ground Innut to the eastern part of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula, where they began to trade regularly at Davis Inlet. There is some archaeological evidence to suggest that the Innut were utilizing this part of the peninsula prehistorically, but, in this context, the concern is not with continuity of use patterns, but rather with the discontinuity engendered by the impact of the fur trade. Therefore, the fact that McLean found a group of barren-ground Innut who had abandoned trading at Fort Chimo for Hamilton Inlet in



1834-1835, the year the HBC ran out of supplies to trade, is significant. A group of barren-ground Innut had chosen to move to an area where they were guaranteed not only a good standard of trade but also a steady supply of European goods. This same situation prevailed for those Innut who began to reside in the vicinity of Davis Inlet during the period of severe privation. They were able to trade with the A.B. Hunt Company, which established a post there in the 1840's, and also had recourse to the Moravian mission stations in times of need. This latter option was exercised in 1857 at Nain and in 1885 at Zoar. It is probable that the existence of a fur-trade post on the Labrador coast merely re-established a prehistoric regional division among the barren-ground Innut. However, for the purposes of this analysis, the important point is that the division established in the mid 1800's has since taken on a political, jural and economic reality, which has persisted up to the present.

#### Response of Producers

The response of the producers to this increasing debt load was to ignore it until the credit policy of the merchant was altered. As far as they were concerned, as long as they could acquire the European commodities they wanted, the value owed in simple commodities not yet

produced did not affect them in any substantive way. This was not the case for the merchants; they were losing money, and it became apparent that unless a pay-as-you-go policy was introduced there was hardly any hope for making any profit, let alone for maximizing it. In this context, then, the cyclical nature of fine-fur-bearer populations, coupled with the subsistence/exchange contradiction, created a situation in which producers could not produce sufficient furs to pay off their debts, which in turn led to a permanent debt load.

The response of the merchants was not to cut off credit immediately; rather, they tightened it. This move had an immediate effect of restricting the producers' access to European commodities, notably guns, ammunition, and food, which negatively affected their ability to sustain themselves and to produce for either subsistence or exchange. This policy had tragic repercussions for both the Inuit and the Innut. In the winter of 1838, the Inuit of Nain were denied relief and were counselled instead to go inland, in winter, to fish in the lakes; starvation was the result (Brice-Bennett 1982: 329). In 1843, the factor at Fort Nascope was so stingy in distributing ammunition to the barren-ground Innut that a group of them also starved. In these instances, tight credit policy resulted in death over the long run; it had the effect of impoverishing the producers, while it purported to be offering them a higher standard of living through the

dissemination of European commodities.

The fact that people starved to death, though, does not seem to have affected the credit policy in any positive way vis-à-vis the producers. The instances of starvation were viewed as exceptional; the real issue was to make the fur trade a paying proposition. In the northern Quebec-Labrador peninsula, this was impossible from within the debt system, given the mass privation that was occurring during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The HBC responded to this situation by cutting off credit in 1893, which may have been instrumental in convincing a group of barren-ground Inuit to go to the Labrador coast to trade with a private trader at the behest of one of his employees, with they had met at Fort Nascofie. Tragically, on arrival they were told they had not brought sufficient goods to trade and were sent back into the interior, where 150 died (Cooke 1976: 58).

As for the Moravian missionaries, they could not so easily shed their responsibilities for the well-being of the Inuit. Nevertheless, faced with annual deficits piling up regardless of how they attempted to manipulate the debt system or coerce the Inuit, they finally got out of the fur trade altogether and sold their business interests to the HBC in 1926 which in turn, got rid of its Labrador holdings to the Newfoundland government in 1942.

The state's intrusion into the commerce of Labrador marks the assumption of responsibility for the welfare of

the aboriginal peoples in times of crisis, that were in large part the result of European intrusion.



## Chapter 4: The Transition to the Welfare State

### Introduction

Except for the period from 1774 to 1809, when Labrador came under the jurisdiction of Quebec, Newfoundland, first as a British colony, then as a British home rule region, and finally as a Province of Canada, has always maintained a jurial interest in northern Labrador through its assertion of the right to control commercial activity in the region. It was not until well into the twentieth century that the state began to establish a permanent physical presence there. Prior to that time, Newfoundland was content to permit the Moravians and the HBC to act as its agents in northern Labrador. By this means, the state was able to simultaneously demonstrate its sovereignty, if only by proxy, and be relieved of the day-to-day responsibility of the welfare of the Inuk, Innu and Settler residents, who were all, jurally speaking, citizens.

Had conditions remained in stasis, this situation could have continued for some time, as it was beneficial to all three intrusive powers. The state maintained its sovereignty, while the Moravians and the HBC were given a free hand to conduct their affairs, all at the expense of the native populations. However, throughout the 1920's and 1930's the intruders were confronted with political and/or

economic exigencies which required a response outside the established arrangement.

Before going on to discuss the substantive factors involved in these transformations in the concrete forms of domination, a further analytic point must be made. While the causes of direct state intervention can be traced to particular events and relationships, the form of intervention can only be accounted for in terms of the characteristics of the liberal democratic state in the capitalist system. There is an interplay between the events and the framework within which those events take place. That is, a significant fraction of the causality of change is structural. Just as mercantilism as a system has a structure which guides practice, the state in a capitalist system is critical but not deterministic, since the political relations are enmeshed with the economic relations. Thus, this chapter will examine the rise of wage labour as a viable economic activity and the changing role of the state.

## A Theory of the State

The status of the state within the capitalist system has been the subject of a protracted and, at times, vociferous debate. While the debate takes place at all levels of abstraction, it is based essentially on the question of whether the state is an autonomous actor in the struggle for the domination of the relations of production, or whether it is merely a mechanism through which the dominant sector of society exercises its power to maintain and enhance its position.

It has been, by and large, a debate about political strategy. If the state is autonomous, getting control of it, even within the existing relations of production, is a positive step. But if it is totally impregnated by the logic of the capitalist system, there is no point in getting control of it without first getting control of the economy. The question, in the end, is whether incremental change is possible and whether it is worth trying to manipulate the existing state structures.

This debate has tended to obscure how the state acts in particular instances, because the theoreticians strive for internal consistency in their models. Nevertheless, it has provided a measure of uniformity, at least in terms of what questions are asked. The debate has focused on how the state functions to reproduce the existing capitalist relations of production, by examining three facets of the state. The first is the determination of the means and

forms of interaction between the agents of the state and the agents of capital (Miliband 1977, Poulantzas 1978); the second involves how and in whose interests the state exercises power (Block 1978, Gramsci 1971); and the third, how the state is legitimated (Habermas 1975).

With regard to the final area of focus, Therborn (1978) has made the point that whether or not a state is perceived as legitimate is not always an especially relevant question. He argues that at the heart of all discussions of legitimacy is the assumption that the only reason people do not revolt is that they perceive the state as legitimate. Therborn contests this, stating:

... economic and political constraints apart, there are a number of other reasons why people do not revolt. They may be broadly ignorant of and disinterested in the form of rule to which they are subjected. They may not be aware of alternative modes of social organization, and even if they are, they may feel powerless to affect the existing state of affairs. (1978: 171)

This perhaps overstates the case somewhat, and Therborn (1978) himself draws back from it, noting that the feelings of disinterest, ignorance, and lack of confidence are all generated within a social formation in which one class is dominant. Then, following Althusser (1971), he discusses the process of interpellation as the means by which people are socialized into a particular view of social reality. Thus, Therborn (1978) argues both sides of the position. On the one hand, lack of revolt does not necessarily mean a legitimate state, while, on the other hand, the dominant



class, through its control of the economic agenda, can direct the form and content of the ideological discourse and, hence, the process of interpellation. Harrison presents an example of this process in a discussion of the generation of consumerism. She states:

Now in order for risk-taking to be minimized, in order for there to be some certainty that what is produced will be consumed, the advertising must be successful. In order for the advertising to be successful, a huge number of people must desire the product. Since the craving for certain products constitutes, essentially, the acceptance of the symbols of a particular culture, the multinationals would fare most successfully if the whole world were to share the same culture. Hence, nationalism has been perceived as dangerous. Thus the dictates of the global economy have been at loggerheads with those of a national culture, at least any national culture which has defined itself in terms antithetical to the use of the products touted by the multinationals. A dependent economy, then, has meant a dependent culture. (1981: 103)

In the case of northern Labrador, this moderation of Therborn's initial position is not necessary. In northern Labrador, the state is not legitimated; the people are interested in and aware of another system; still, they do not revolt. Lack of confidence may be a factor, but a closer look at the first two features of the liberal democratic state, i.e., the interaction between the agents of the state and the agents of capital and how and in whose interests the state exercises power, may be more helpful in determining why the people of northern Labrador remain dominated.

These questions are related to the disagreement among theorists over the degree of autonomy exercised by the state system. This debate has had numerous contributors, the review of which would amount to a separate study in itself (e.g., Jessop 1977). This analysis is concerned first and foremost with how the people in northern Labrador reacted to the intrusion of the state and will only touch on the salient issues raised in the debate. It is, however, important to understand the rationale behind the behaviour of the state theoretically in order to place it within the context of northern Labrador, Newfoundland, Canada, and the world capitalist system.

An important feature of the debate over the relative autonomy of the state is connected to the class belonging to the agents of the state (i.e., legislators and bureaucrats). Miliband (1972) for Britain, and to some extent Clemment (1975) and Olson (1980) for Canada, propose that the elite of industry and the state not only are members of the same class, but are socially integrated and ideologically consistent with each other.

This inferred high level of solidarity among the members of the ruling class, deduced from a particular reading of the data, in effect collapses the agents of the state and capital into one category. Therefore, while their structural position in the system may not be identical, both groups are committed to maintaining the status quo in order to maintain their elite position. From

this perspective, then, the state is not very autonomous and usually acts in the interests of capital for what would seem to be mostly personal reasons.

Poulantzas (1978) takes a more structural approach. Rather than focusing on individuals, he focuses on the relationship between the institutions they occupy and on their relationships to each other and to capital. In doing so, he attempts a rigorous analysis of the state as a critical component in the functioning of a capitalist system, one which permits a much broader spectrum of practices than that extant in Miliband's analysis, which Jessop (1977) has characterized as instrumentalist. Jessop means that the state is simply a tool of the agents of capital. Poulantzas' criticism of instrumentalism is that: "... the designation of any existent State as the pure and simple agent of big capital seems to me, taken literally, [original emphasis] to give rise to many misinterpretations" (Poulantzas 1972: 250).

According to Poulantzas, Miliband's misinterpretation is that his empiricist bias glosses over political complexity. Whereas, as Laclau points out, Poulantzas:

... is interested in determining, at the theoretical level, the autonomy of the political within the capitalist mode of production, [original emphasis] and in that sense he emphasizes the elements of separation between dominant class and fraction holding power. (1977: 66)

Thus, while Miliband is trying to establish the close connections between members of the ruling elite, Poulantzas is trying to demonstrate that those links are not as solid as Miliband would have us believe. Therefore, Poulantzas argues that the state does possess a significant level of autonomy. Furthermore, this autonomy is necessary for the state to fulfill its rôle in the capitalist system, which is to assure the ongoing health of the system as a whole. This leads to the second question concerning the state posed above: how and in whose interests does the state exercise power.

With regard to the former, if it is accepted that people will comply with the edicts of a state without necessarily believing in its legitimacy, it is apparent that the state must have recourse to one or more methods to ensure compliance. In the previous chapters, the forms of labour control utilized by the Moravians and the HBC were examined. It was argued that while the HBC relied almost exclusively on economic means, the Moravians invoked a series of economic, ideological, and social mechanisms to coerce, cajole, or convince the native population into the mold they had designed for them. Further, as a corollary, the forms of native resistance were structured not only by their own social formation, but also by the forms of intrusion practiced by the Europeans. This correlation between the form of intrusion and the form of resistance holds throughout the modern period. For the purposes of

this analysis, therefore, the question of how the state acts will be addressed in terms of northern Labrador. In order to address the latter question, i.e., in whose interests the state acts, it is necessary to open up the analysis to a much broader field of reference.

While the debate over the degree of the relative autonomy of the state appears to be ongoing with no sign of letting up, there is no question that any instrumentalist position is unacceptable. As research among political economists has progressed, one thing has become extremely clear: within each class there are fractions which have conflicting short-term goals. As a result, as each of these fractions attempts to achieve its goals, it forms alliances not only within its own class, but across class lines. This process includes the agents of the state.

While the overall function of the state is to maintain an environment in which capital as a whole can accumulate, not all fractions of the capitalist class are in agreement as to the policies the state should implement. This encourages what appears to be contradictory behaviour on the part of the state. The state mediates not only inter-class conflict but also the conflicts that arise between fractions of capital, which necessitates taking sides against one faction of that class. The state does this in order to create the conditions necessary for the reproduction of a specific set of relations of production which in the long run, facilitate the accumulation of

capital.

The question of in whose interests the state acts is, therefore, much more complex than the instrumentalist position would have it, at least beyond the most general level. It is a question which demands to be addressed in terms of a particular historical conjuncture.

Thus, the state fulfills two functions which require that it maintain relative autonomy. First, it provides a structure and forum within which class conflict can take place in a non-disruptive manner and in which any escalation in a conflict can be redirected away from confrontation. As Kaminski has pointed out:

When a handicapped group adopts a radical ideology and organizes subversive action, an effort is made at incorporating it into the political system. The perspective of co-optation offers to the leadership of the group the possibility of gaining some advantages for themselves and other members, but in exchange they must give up more radical claims. If they accept the offer, then the "real" political issues become transformed into technical, administrative matters. (1977: 43)

To achieve this, the state must be permitted the leeway to provide benefits to that fraction of the population which is denied access to the mechanisms for the accumulation of wealth.

Second, the state mediates conflicts between fractions of the capitalist class. This role derives from the state's position in the power structure, in that the state serves more than one master. It is not necessary

that these masters accept the legitimacy of the state for it to control their behaviour (as the actions of major industrial polluters demonstrate), but they must permit the state the means to enforce its jural decisions or risk the modern equivalent of Hobbes' war of "all against all." Thus, it follows that there is tension between the non-state participants in a capitalist system and the state. The state, as a historical construction, has been ceded a certain degree of authority in order to assure the reproduction of the capitalist relations of production. What is central to the comprehension of the modern state is that this autonomy has increased. The state has transformed from being a forum in which compromises are struck to being an arbiter of conflicts, with its power resting on the control of the jural and repressive apparatus. Thus, while compromise is always sought, recourse to coercive enforcement is an option.

Nevertheless, there are controls over the state, not at the level of state as a structure, but rather at the level of the agents who occupy that structure and derive the benefits from their position. This is the legacy of liberal democracy; the ability to control who occupies the state structures is largely in the hands of capital, but not one fraction of capital. Therefore, while long-term behaviour of the state can be predicted with some confidence, short-term prediction is fraught with dangers.

C.B. Macpherson (1977) has approached this problem by

looking at the philosophical antecedents of the liberal democratic state. He proposes that: "... liberal-democratic thinkers have tried to combine the acceptance of the capitalist market society with a humanist ethical position" (1977: 21), a program which he argues is essentially impossible since it is self-contradictory. That is, on the one hand, the capitalist market society assumes a high degree of the pursuit of individual desires which, at the level of utility, are all equal (i.e., a new organ for your church is the equal to a new stereo system for your home). On the other hand, the humanist tradition assumes that people will be responsible for each other's well-being. As far as Macpherson is concerned:

In this founding model of democracy for a modern industrial society, then, there is no enthusiasm for democracy, no idea that it could be a morally transformative force; it is nothing but a logical requirement for the governance of inherently self-interested conflicting individuals who are assumed to be infinite consumers, that his overriding motivation is to maximise the flow of satisfaction, or utilities to himself from society, and that a national society is simply a collection of such individuals. Responsible government, even to the extent of responsibility to a democratic electorate, was needed for the protection of individuals and the promotion of the Gross National Product and nothing more. (1977: 43)

In sum, therefore, from a monolithic perspective, the state acts in the interests of capital, but once the analysis drops to the level of practice, the internal tensions within the system are visible and the interests of the state beyond that of capital become apparent. This



perspective is necessary in order to arrive at some understanding of the liberal-democratic state in its present guise, the welfare state.

The development of the welfare state has been an effort to fulfill the humanist component of liberal democracies within an economic system that exploits and/or impoverishes large numbers of people. The express purpose is to reduce suffering and to facilitate another aspect of liberalism, which is to give each member of a society the opportunity to fulfill his or her potential. (Macpherson 1977: 47). But Gough has pointed out that:

... "social problems," from the middle-aged redundant to the victims of urban redevelopment to thalidomide children, can be interpreted as the social costs associated with rapid economic and technological progress. (1979: 92)

So, the internal contradiction in the state's position within a capitalist society re-emerges: the state is both the cause and the solution. If the state were not helping capital in its program of accumulation, then the social problems may not exist at all. But, given that they do, it is up to the state, as the representative of all classes in society, to act to ameliorate the deleterious implications of its actions in one sector on another. However, this would never be to the extent that the underclasses have the option to choose not to work for capital. At this level of analysis, the implementation of welfare policies becomes critical. Help is offered, but in such a way as to

pre-empt real progress.

### Welfare Colonialism

In northern Labrador, the role of the state will be examined in terms of the material benefits to the people. The establishment of state infrastructure at the local level in the form of health, education, and political-jural institutions is both the method of control and aid. Paine (1977) has called this practice in northern Canada "welfare colonialism".

The term "welfare colonialism" was coined to characterize the type of economic and political system perpetrated on the peoples of northern Canada by the federal and provincial governments. It refers to the government's administration and transfer-payment programs, which seriously interfered with the ability of northern peoples to determine their own futures. As Paine notes: "An outcome of "welfare colonialism" has been to make the Inuit aware how decisions are 'made for' them by whites ..." (1977:47). This aim was achieved while simultaneously maintaining the state's interests and concomitantly those of capital in the natural resources of the north.

This period can be contrasted to the mercantile period in that the native peoples of northern Labrador were appreciated neither as a labour pool nor as a consumer

market. Capital tends to import labour into the north for its projects and there are not enough people in the north to constitute a significant market. These features have the dual effect of arresting the development of class, while maintaining the dependence of the native peoples.

Further, in consonance with the position presented by Macpherson (1977), the state in northern Labrador has developed policies to encourage economic development stipulating that native labour must be hired. With reference to this policy, Kennedy notes: "... the Division [Division of Northern Labrador Affairs, DNLA, Department of Public Welfare] decision to create local employment was a logical outcome of responsibility for native peoples of Labrador" (1977: 287).

Therefore, this period is characterized by contradictory processes. On the one hand, the native peoples are encouraged to engage in wage labour but are not permitted full access. On the other hand, their social, cultural, and economic integrity is undermined by policies which appropriate initiative in all sectors of their lives, leaving them as "wards of the state." In northern Labrador, the transition from the mercantile period, which coincided with the ever-increasing importance of wage labour, began in the late 1920's and was fully established by the time Newfoundland entered Confederation in 1949. As was the case for the transition from the early contact-period to the mercantile period, this transition

was not structurally or temporally identical for the Inuit and the Innut. Although both have arrived at essentially the same place, they have done so, or, perhaps more properly, were coerced, along different routes. Therefore, prior to a discussion of the forms of resistance and the political and economic practices which are currently taking place in Hopedale and Davis Inlet, a brief review of the transition period is required.

#### The Transition to the Welfare-State Economy

The transition of Davis Inlet from the mercantile period to the state period began in 1928 when a Roman Catholic priest began to visit the HBC trading post at Davis Inlet every summer. This practice was maintained until 1954, when a priest became a permanent resident in Davis Inlet. Unlike the Moravian mission, the Roman Catholic church did not have any mercantile ambitions. Nevertheless, their practices were not restricted to the religious sphere. As Henkixsen (1973) has pointed out, they played an important role as patrons for the people of Davis Inlet. While an argument could be made for the altruistic motives of the representatives of Christianity at the material level, in that they derived no material gain from their relationship with the Innut, their practices were not without political cost for the Innut.

The fact remains that, in order for these priests to be patrons, the Innut were necessarily clients. The argument is not that either the welfare policy or the actions of the Roman Catholic priests were based on premeditated malicious intent to usurp the cultural or political integrity of the Innut. Rather, due to the structure in which their actions took place, their efforts to help brought these eventualities about. There was no way, within the economic and political context of their practices, to do the job right.

When the priest arrived in 1928, he was confronted with a serious situation which required immediate action. People were on the verge of starvation. This situation immediately placed the priest at odds with the state and, to some degree, with the agents of the HBC. As noted in the previous chapter, the HBC was the consummate mercantile enterprise, which used a debt system to control labour. At the concrete level, though, the issuing of debt appears as a mechanism to aid the producers by providing them with the means to outfit themselves at the beginning of the simple commodity production cycle, in the fall.

One informant stated that he preferred the HBC method of dispensing cash to the welfare system for just that reason. This was so despite the fact that the priest noted, in 1928, that the Innut were only producing enough in the winter to cover their debts, and were destitute the rest of the year. The response of the priest in 1929 was

to appeal to the HBC to provide the wherewithal to support the Innut and then to appeal to the Newfoundland government to reimburse the Company for its expenses. In addition to this, the priest also procured clothing from Roman Catholic charities and encouraged the Innut to produce crafts for sale.

Therefore, by the late 1920's, the Innut of Davis Inlet were at the nexus of a variety of intrusive practices. Briefly, these were:

1. continuing debt relationship with the HBC;
2. maintenance of status as simple commodity producers, but with increased emphasis on crafts, whose production was encouraged by the Roman Catholic priest;
3. the transference of the patron role from the agent of the HBC and private white traders to the priest;
4. the state is asked for and delivers relief to the Innut;
5. all intruders--HBC, state, and the Roman Catholic Church, through their role as dispensers of relief--are able to enhance their political position.

All these practices represent parts of a new process of change. In order to gain relief from severe material

distress, the Innut became entangled in a set of relations which resulted in a net loss of their political freedom. It was a process which, over the next sixty years, became fixed. The changes that it engendered in their social formation became institutionalized through the emplacement of the infrastructure of the welfare state within the limits of the village the Innut came to occupy permanently in 1969.

The first salvo in this process was the transfer of the trading rights from the Moravian mission to the HBC in 1926, which was much more traumatic for the Inuit than it was for the Innut. Unlike the Innut, the Inuit were constrained to learn a new set of rules. The forms of resistance they were able to mount against the Moravians were not effective in their relations with the HBC, whose attention was totally focused on profit. The immortal souls of its agents or the native producers with whom it traded were of no concern to the HBC. There were thus fairly abrupt changes in the basic structure of the relations between the Inuit and the primary mercantile interest. These changes, while they appear as isolated disjunctures, in fact became a part of the process which led directly to the welfare, wage-labour, and simple-commodity-producer status of the native peoples of northern Labrador today. Four of the more salient repercussions obtaining from the HBC takeover are examined below.

The first is the credit/debt policy instituted by the HBC, which had two components. The HBC credit policy held its agents personally responsible for recouping the debts incurred by their clients. A bad debt came out of the agent's salary. In response to this, agents of the HBC were averse to giving out too much credit for fear that they would end up having to make good on the debt themselves. Therefore, there was already a built-in bias toward providing only the minimum of support.

The second repercussion of the HBC credit policy, however, soon overrode any independent action that its agents might have wished to take. In 1926, after their takeover, the HBC restricted credit in an effort to rationalize the trade. When this action did not seem to be a sufficient response, the HBC refused to extend credit to anyone who was already in debt and in 1932 cancelled credit altogether. This transformation in the relationship between the Inuit and the mercantilists led immediately to conflict between the HBC and their Inuit clients. As early as 1933, the HBC agent in Nain complained of the difficulty of getting the Inuit to accede to the new "pay-as-you-go" policy.

The third repercussion was the increased emphasis on fine furs such as fox and otter, as opposed to seal. Thus, there was a dramatic increase in fur production, partly encouraged by a drop in prices. This emphasis on the production of commodities whose exchange value greatly



exceeded their use value transformed the relationship between the hunter and the prey. In terms of the production of fine furs, the use value in the form of meat became a mere by-product of the production process, whereas, in seal production, the exchange value had held that status, because seal was an important part of the Inuit diet and used as feed for their draught dogs.

The stress on the production of exchange value meant a drop in production for use and this had two results. First, there was the increased risk of privation since time spent in exchange production was taken away from use production. And second, the increasing production of exchange value meant an increased consumption of European goods, and this led to the creation of needs and, consequently, increased dependence.

The final, and major, repercussion that accompanied the transference of the trading rights to the HBC was the presence of HBC personnel. These agents became competitors of the Moravians for the hearts and minds of the Inuit, which inevitably led to conflict between the HBC and the Moravians. At one level, this situation disrupted the communities. The Inuit were now being sent at least two messages about what constituted acceptable behaviour in terms of their European patrons. The HBC was much more tolerant than the Moravians when it came to what the Moravians would call non-Christian behaviour. At another level, the existence of an internal division among the

Europeans gave the Inuit a weakness to exploit politically, just as they had exploited the presence of a number of European outlets for their production in years gone by.

This intra-European conflict became more and more important as state intervention in northern Labrador increased. For example, in 1934, a formal police force, the Newfoundland Rangers, was established in northern Labrador. They immediately became responsible for the dispensation of relief, which was one of the primary means by which influence over the native peoples was exercised. This responsibility placed the Rangers in opposition to both the Roman Catholic priest and the Moravian missionaries, who had taken care of it until then.

The ascendancy of the HBC as a major player in the history of all of northern Labrador is thus linked to both its own economic practices and to the economic and political practices of the native peoples and the other Europeans. Up to 1940, these European groups were primarily the Moravian mission, the Roman Catholic church, private traders, and the crews of Newfoundland schooners who came to Labrador every summer to fish. While each of these intrusive groups did not have equal access to or influence over the native peoples, each brought with them a distinct perspective not only on how best to control and exploit the native peoples, but also, and perhaps in the long run more dangerous, how to help them.

It is this latter activity which links the

mercantilist colonial period to the welfare colonial period. There has always been an attempt on the part of some Europeans to improve the lot of the native people of northern Labrador. There have been continuing attempts to rationalize their economic behaviour, bring their cosmology and hence aboriginal morality more closely into line with those of the western Christian tradition, and, most recently, to bring them into the formal political structure of Canada through the imposition of the Euro-Canadian political infrastructure.

Thus, the transition from the mercantile to the state period must be perceived as being processual. There are direct connections between the economic policies of the HBC, the Moravian mission and those of the state vis-à-vis simple commodity production: the former's credit, relief, and wage labour in lieu of relief, are analogous to the latter's welfare, unemployment insurance, make-work and transfer-payment policies. Mercantilism provided the framework for the transformations in the pre-contact social formations of the native peoples. Thus, the social formations of the native peoples were already deformed by the time of state intrusion.

The transference of responsibility for the fur trade and the import of European goods into Inuit communities from the Moravian mission to the HBC, the arrival of the Newfoundland Rangers as the state's agents, and the growing interest of the state in the welfare of the native peoples

had a number of repercussions for the forms and forums of resistance practiced by the native peoples in the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's.

For the Inuit, given that the Moravian Mission maintained its political and ideological stance, resistance to them was merely a continuation of the type they had practiced all through the mercantile period. Thus, so-called immoral behaviour by the Inuit, such as dancing and drinking, remained a preoccupation of the Moravians, since these actions were an indication of Inuit independence from them. However, the transference of economic control to the HBC and the Newfoundland Rangers created new forums of resistance for the Inuit. For example, in 1939, when the store in Hopedale issued flour contaminated with kerosene as a relief measure, the Inuit complained bitterly to the Moravians about their mistreatment at the hands of the HBC. While the issuing of contaminated flour was a particularly vivid example of the European attitude toward the Inuit, the crisis which led to the need for relief was the result of the debt policy of the HBC. The Inuit viewed the debt policy as unfair and appealed to the Moravian mission to make some sort of intervention. Unfortunately, short of offering the Inuit some wage labour to alleviate their suffering (which in 1939 was considerable, with dogs starving to death and a community-wide outbreak of scurvy in Hopedale), the Moravians no longer had the means or the authority to

intercede.

Nevertheless, the transformations which occurred during the intrusion of the HBC were minor compared to those that accompanied the intrusion of the state, not only in terms of the intrusion of the Newfoundland Rangers, but also in the social and economic policies which emanated from or were approved by the central authority of the state in St. John's and later in consort with Ottawa. This intrusion was to have profound effects on both the Inuit and the Innuit.

#### State Intervention

The Inuit had their first taste of state intervention, aside from the relief, in 1939. In that year, the Rangers imposed a law which required that all dogs be tied up when not in use as draught animals. This law was intended to prevent the dogs from attacking people. The Inuit viewed the law as an intrusion into one of their spheres of responsibility and, while they made representations for its repeal, their most effective response was to ignore it. This latter response could be termed passive resistance. The reaction not to comply with a directive has become a primary form of resistance for the Inuit of northern Labrador. While there have been a number of instances of active resistance, such as the revolt of the elders in

Hebron in 1938 and the much more recent and highly organized land-claim movement, which sets the Inuit in opposition to the state, avoidance has always been a significant feature of Inuit resistance. This response will be examined more closely below, in the discussion of current political practice in Hopedale.

For the Innut, introduction to the coercive nature of the state was much more traumatic than that of the Inuit. Their response not only indicates the level of coercion to which they were subjected, but also provides an example of the connection between the form of mercantile intrusion and the form of response during the state period.

In 1948, the Davis Inlet Innut were resettled by the state 160 km. north to an area near Nutak, where it was thought that the cod fishery would prove more productive. As with the dog law noted above, the intention of the state was to help. In this case, the state wanted to facilitate simple commodity production and thus improve the standard of living of the Innut.

The state attempted to assure compliance with its directive in a number of ways. First, it appealed to the poverty of the Innut, that is, arguing that they would produce more fish, thus earn more money, which would enable them to consume at a higher level. Second, it attempted to legitimate the move in terms of liberal democracy by taking the chief, whom the agents of the state perceived to be the political leader of Davis Inlet, to the new location to

get his approval. Finally, the state resorted to coercion and shut down the store at the old village. Prior to discussing the response of the Innut, a closer look at the motivation behind the behaviour of the state in this instance will help to clarify the theoretical points concerning the state in liberal democracies made above.

As noted, the expressed reason for the relocation of the Innut was for their economic betterment. Assuming that the state based its decision on information which would lead it to believe that this would indeed be the case, the state was acting in good faith, at one level at least. However, as noted in the theoretical discussion, the state necessarily represents many disparate interests, is working within a particular ideology, and has limited resources which constrain its practices. The motivation is therefore more complex than the expressed reason, but this does not make it a lie; the sin, if one exists, is one of omission rather than commission.

In the economic forum, the relocation would benefit the state in one important way. If the Innut became successful simple-commodity producers, the state would save money, because the amount of relief it had to dispense would be reduced. The money saved here could then be redirected into other areas to appease other demands.

Increased simple-commodity production would reduce the amount of relief dispensed to the Innut because they would become more self-sufficient. While it is unlikely that

anyone thought the Innut would ever become tax-payers, a reduction in their cost to other tax payers would raise the state's standing with other sectors of its constituency. There is a fundamental contradiction underlying this motivation, because while the state was acting to improve the economic status of the Innut, it was simultaneously infringing on Innut economic, political, and cultural integrity.

At the political level, the state actively sought to co-opt what it perceived to be the local Innut leader. At this point, the relationship between the state and the Innut had made only minimal progress in the imposition of a European-style hierarchical political system. While the visiting priest had appointed a chief during the 1920's, his authority was not analogous to that of a European leader, although his opinion was highly respected. Therefore, at the same time that the state was trying to accomplish its economic goals, it was inadvertently establishing a new political system. However, the actions of the state were totally consistent with the liberal-democratic ideology, outlined by Macpherson (1977), of providing each individual the opportunity to fulfill his or her potential, but in a decidedly Western cultural framework of individuality. This effort at co-optation illustrates the process Kaminski (1977) outlined, of convincing one fraction of an oppressed group that if they comply with state policy, it would prove beneficial to the



entire group. The Innut were not fooled, and were independent enough at the time to respond in a way that left the state no option but to acquiece.

The response of the Innut was simple and effective: they walked back to Davis Inlet, not as a group under any individual's leadership, but a few families at a time. Innut informants indicated that they refused to stay in Nutak because they did not know the land on that part of the coast nor its immediate interior very well and there were not many trees. No one ever mentioned whether the cod fishing was better or worse.

The state was confronted with a political entity whose structure was so diffuse that the state had no one to talk to. The individualistic way in which the Innut evacuated Nutak left little room for the co-optation of local leadership and put the state on notice that its policies were subject to drastic revision at the local level.

In 1950, the state attempted to resettle the Innut again, this time to North West River. The Innut, now on their guard, refused to go and, in 1952, the store in Davis Inlet was reopened.

The Innut response to state efforts at resettlement provides a fair indication of their political and economic autonomy at this point in their history. However, their independence must not be reduced to an innate ethnic characteristic. Rather, it is a consequence of their

colonial experience with the HBC that much of their political, ideological, and economic systems were left intact. The primary factor in determining the Inuit response was historical context and not cultural disposition. A discussion of the responses of three groups of Inuit to similar situations will further accentuate the link between colonial experience and native response, while simultaneously indicating the intervening impact of the immediate context.

In northern Labrador, the Moravian mission was not just in the business of opening up mission stations; they also closed them down, with little or no consultation with the Inuit. Between 1895 and 1959, six stations were closed and, with one exception, discussed below, the Inuit complied with these decisions and moved to other mission stations.

The exception took place in the Okak region. The Moravians established the mission station there in 1775 and it became quite prosperous by Labrador standards. In 1919, it was struck by a devastating influenza epidemic, which took 207 of 263 lives, effectively wiping out the adult population and resulting in the closing of the mission. Despite this, since the Okak region enjoyed:

... extremely rich resources..., the area was voluntarily repopulated primarily by Nain and Hopedale Inuit.... Between the 1920's and the 1950's the Hudson's Bay Company and lately the Division [Division of Northern Labrador Affairs], operated trading stores at nearby Nutak. (Kennedy 1982: 33)

In this instance, the availability of a rich resource base, in terms of use and exchange, provided an opportunity for the Inuit to disregard the lack of a European presence and to act on their own volition. It was up to the state and the HBC to respond in order to take advantage of the Inuit production and maintain some political and ideological control over a group of people who could have traded at the Hebron station forty kilometers to the north. The presence of that station permitted a certain degree of economic choice for those Inuit and must be viewed as an important consideration in their response.

Thirty years later, the northernmost Labrador Inuit were faced with a much more serious threat, in which compliance appears to have been the only choice available. By the 1950's, the state and the Moravian mission had begun to view simple-commodity production as a less viable economic basis for northern Labrador. At the time, wage labour had become a significant part of the economy of several communities along the coast, notably Hopedale and Goose Bay. Kennedy (1982) proposes that the economic bias of the Europeans, as well as the expense in maintaining and administering the two northernmost communities of Nutak and Hebron, resulted in their closure and the resettlement of the residents.

In the case of Hebron, the closure took place in 1959. In addition to inadequate logistics, which almost resulted in the Hebron Inuit spending the winter in Hebron without

shelter, the move south was viewed by those Hebron Inuit now living in Hopedale as bad. One informant indicated that being forced to move was worse than the move itself. Their compliance with the decision was a combination of several factors, the weighting of which is difficult; however, the role of the Moravian mission in the process was central.

At the time of the resettlement, Hebron had been in existence for 129 years; nevertheless, it was not a true community. The closing of Ramah, Okak, and Killinek had left it isolated and with a compound population. As Kennedy notes:

... Hebron missionaries encouraged Inuit from other mission stations and from isolated districts to repopulate Hebron. The population of what may be called "new Hebron" was described by one Hebron missionary as "more of a composite congregation than others on the coast". (PA 1924: 334; 1982: 34)

Kennedy proposes that this lack of cohesion was an important factor in the lack of resistance mounted against the move by the Hebron Inuit, even though they did not want to move.

The impact of Moravian mission colonialism on the response of the Inuit in Hebron was expressed in two forms. First, in an effort to stop the move, the elders sent a letter to the Newfoundland government expressing their disapproval. This demonstrates their use of the political structures which had been imposed on them by the Moravians

and the state. Second, as Kennedy points out, the announcement of the move was made in church "... where established rules prohibited open discussion" (1982: 35). However, these were not the only responses.

In contrast to the Okak repopulation, there were no alternatives for trade nearby. Nain, the nearest station, was 70 kilometers away, which was a substantial distance to travel at that time. They were therefore constrained at the economic level to comply. However, this does not lessen the significance of the fact that their response took place within a political framework that had been imposed, nor that the Moravians had exercised their political power to control debate.

This political response of the Labrador Inuit was quite different from that of the Kititarruamuit of northeastern Hudson Bay. This group of Inuit moved from more northern camps in the Cape Smith region to Povungnituk after the HBC closed down its store in the former area in 1952. Between 1952 and 1975,

... [while] the Cape Smith people stayed in Povungnituk, they had hardships because of the relative lack of food resources around there. Thus, while they lived in the settlement of Povungnituk, they were forced to depend on and exploit food resources in the Cape Smith region. (Kishigami 1985: 34)

This situation proved to be unsatisfactory, at several meetings in the early 1970's, the Cape Smith people decided to move back to their previous location. The interesting feature of this move was the similarity it bears to the

evacuation of Nutak by the Innut. The move did not take place en masse; rather, one family made the move in 1973, and in the years thereafter people drifted back in family units. Once again, the political response was characterized by diffuseness. Just as the Innut were able to maintain much of their own political structure while dealing with the HBC, so were the Kititaruamuit in their move, as expressed in their response. This is not to imply that the northern Labrador Inuit were more prone to accept European imposed transformations; rather, they were under a great deal more pressure than either the Innut or the Kititaruamuit. It is to their credit that they have been able to salvage as much as they have and are currently undergoing a recovery process as they negotiate their status with the state today.

In sum, then, it was not only immediate conditions or cultural predisposition that dictated compliance or rejection of European coercion or its form; the social formation in which the response was articulated was also instrumental. In northern Canada, the social formations extant are the product of the complex interplay of indigenous social formations and those which were imposed with varying success.

Thus, as late as the 1950's the political responses of the Inuit and the Innut to European intrusion were still defined in part by their respective mercantile experiences. As the modern period progressed, the divergence in their

responses start to converge as the state began to apply a unitary policy to all residents of northern Labrador and wage labour became a viable economic option. Prior to 1941, wage labour was at best a minor supplement to household incomes and was usually in the form of short-term jobs. Rather than dispensing relief, the Moravian mission or the HBC offered job to the native peoples when they were in need.

One notable project was the lumber camp which operated in the late 1930's and early 1940's south of Hopedale. Along with a crew of outside labourers, some local residents from neighbouring Inuit villages were hired. However, it was not viewed as much of an option by the Inuit. In 1940, the missionary in Hopedale noted that the pay at the camps was so low that no one took work there. This was so despite the fact that 1940 was a hard year for the people of Hopedale. It should be added, though, that the decision whether or not to work was not based solely on economic reasoning. One informant noted that his mother would tell him not to stay in the house too long when he returned from a stint at the lumber camp because he smelled too much like a forest; so it would appear that cultural preferences also played a role. Nevertheless, wage labour was to become a key element in the economy of northern Labrador.

For the Settlers and the Inuit, wage labour became a serious option. in 1942, while for the Inuit it started a

decade later and only made significant inroads after a quarter century. In both instances, the state played an important role.

The linkage between the intrusion of the state and the creation of a significant wage-labour sector in the economy demonstrates that even a region as remote and sparsely populated as northern Labrador is not isolated from the impact of world affairs. Just as international power struggles during the mercantile period were an important variable in determining the form and substance of European intrusion into northern Labrador, and hence the subsequent transformations in the pre-contact social formations of the native peoples living there, the Second World War and the Cold War which followed it were instrumental in causing a fundamental reorientation in the economic practices of the native peoples between 1941 and 1969.

Overlapping that period by sixteen years, the state started to expand its interests in northern Labrador, commencing with the first federal-provincial agreement, which was signed in 1954. For a term of ten years subsequent to the signing, the federal government:

... assumed most of the responsibility for Indian and Inuit health services. In 1965, this agreement was expanded to include funding for the construction, maintenance, and development of Inuit and Indian communities. (Kennedy 1977: 282)

The latter amplification of the federal government's obligations was a critical factor in the circumstances that



led to the construction of the community and, hence, wage labour in Davis Inlet.

The following section will examine three projects which altered the economy of northern Labrador permanently and, in the process, the social formations of the Inuit and the Innut. These were the Goose Bay military airport, the Radar base in Hopedale, and the construction of a new Davis Inlet, five kilometers from the old location.

#### Wage Labour: The Military Airport at Goose Bay

In 1941, the American government, as part of its effort to resupply Europe in the early years of the Second World War, began construction of a military airport in Goose Bay, at the head of Hamilton Inlet in central Labrador. By the summer of 1942 and continuing until 1945, construction jobs were plentiful and a large contingent of Settler and Inuit men and some women migrated to Goose Bay from the north coast in search of work. That these two groups were so quick to take advantage of this opportunity to earn wages, as opposed to remaining on the coast to produce simple commodities for domestic consumption, is an indication of two aspects of their social formation at that time. First, they wanted to augment the level of exchange value produced, the only purpose of which was to buy more

European goods. Granted, some of these goods were in the form of means of production, such as rifles, boats, and fox traps, but even this consumption increased their dependence on the Europeans, which, in turn, required more production of exchange value. Second, their choice of wage labour indicates an acceptance, grudging or not, of a hierarchically structured work situation, a structure which was the diametric opposite of their early-contact production structure.

The immediate context in which these decisions were made was one of privation on the north coast. Thus, the opportunity to alleviate material privation was a significant factor in the choice of wage labour. However, other factors played a role, as neither the Innut from North West River or from Davis Inlet, who were also suffering material privation, took work at Goose Bay.

The response to the wage-labour opportunities available in Goose Bay was a combination of cultural factors, the nature of the work, and its spatial location. While it would seem initially that the Innut merely rejected wage labour in favour of simple-commodity production as a more culturally meaningful economic practice, the fact that some Davis Inlet Innut took work in Hopedale in 1952 would suggest a more complex causality.

The primary factor discouraging Innut from taking wage-labour jobs in Goose Bay was the rigidity it introduced into the productive process. In

contradistinction, the Inuit and the Settlers were, by this time, familiar with less flexible systems of work organization. Their experience was with the fishery and lumber camps; the Innut's experience had been in fur production, which was a less structured activity. In fur production a choice could be made on a daily basis as to whether to opt for use-value or exchange-value production. Wage labour does not permit this option.

This situation was exacerbated by the fact that workers in Goose Bay were discouraged from bringing their families and, since the primary productive unit was the family, the loss of necessary productive members added a further restriction to the economic options available to the Innut. In addition to this, Goose Bay was a fair distance from the Davis Inlet Innut's hunting territories which were in the interior, east and north of Davis Inlet, and would further discourage them from making the move to Goose Bay. And finally, since the Innut were not fishermen at that time, the fact that fish prices were at the time then would not have acted as an impetus for them as it did for the Inuit and Settlers (Zimmerly 1975: 233).

These factors can be contrasted to the situation in 1952, when wage labour was available in Hopedale. First, the Davis Inlet Innut were much closer to Hopedale than they were to Goose Bay. Second, they were able to bring their families and camp in an area where they had stayed before, across the harbour from Hopedale. They went there

to trade at the store or with the residents of Hopedale. Both of these factors injected a degree of flexibility not available in Goose Bay. In short, to take work in Goose Bay would have been much more disruptive than the situation they faced in Hopedale.

— Thus, the necessity of keeping economic options open was a significant consideration in the Inuit decision in 1942. This response is linked to their social formation, which was the product of the interaction between their pre-contact social formation and their relationship with the HBC. Throughout their history of contact up to this point, they had not been required to produce within a regimented framework. Conversely, the Inuit had had long experience with just that labour format through their interaction with the Moravian mission and were therefore better prepared to function within such a system. Thus, cultural factors were important; however, the construction of culture is influenced by the historical context in which it is formed and transformed. Therefore, when one infers strategic economic choice to cultural preference, that context must be noted and included in the analysis. This linkage becomes more apparent in the next two events: the construction of the radar station in Hopedale (1951-1957) and the construction of a new Davis Inlet (1966-1969).

### Hopedale: The Radar Base

By 1945, there was no more construction work in Goose Bay. Although one-half of the migrants decided to stay in Goose Bay in maintenance and domestic positions, the rest returned to the coast and went back to simple-commodity production. For the people of Hopedale and a fair number of residents from other communities, there was an interval of five years before the next major construction project started, a radar base just outside Hopedale. The period between projects was not an easy time for anyone on the north coast. In 1947, Hopedale suffered through a dog epidemic, and many people were forced to turn to relief, as they could not produce enough food. As has already been mentioned, the state attempted, unsuccessfully, to relocate the Davis Inlet Innut to Natak in 1958 and to North West River in 1950. Further to these events, there were a number of bureaucratic modifications in the way northern Labrador was administered.

In 1949, Newfoundland entered Confederation, thereby getting out of debt and receiving various federal payments and programs. In 1951, the Newfoundland Rangers were absorbed by the RCMP, the Canadian federal police force. That same year, the Newfoundland Department of Public Welfare took over responsibility for the DNLA and an ex-Newfoundland Ranger was appointed as its chief. Simultaneously, the DNLA began to extend its mandate beyond economic development. It was a time of transition, which,

for the people of Hopedale, was accelerated in 1951 when the construction of the radar base began just outside the village. In the same way that the military airport was a response to the Second World War, the radar base was a response to the Cold War. During the next seventeen years, when the base was under construction and/or operational, it provided many jobs. This, in addition to the impact of the presence of large numbers of American servicemen, who manned the base and interacted regularly with Hopedale residents, made the base an effective agent of social change.

The two primary consequences of the construction phase of the radar base were, first, the Settlers moved from their widely dispersed homesteads along the north coast and took up permanent residence in the village; and second, there was a wholesale abandonment of the fishery. The former created a situation in which ethnic identity came to the fore as a significant variable in the local social interaction. The latter heralded the entrenchment of wage labour as the primary form of acquiring exchange value, a status that was given further impetus by the policies of the state, which, by 1957, saw the economic future of northern Labrador in the wage-labour sector rather than in simple-commodity production. This was a fundamental shift which was, in part, a misreading of both the response of the residents of northern Labrador to the availability of wage labour and the economy of northern Labrador.

Nevertheless, as with the welfare policy, the state based its policy on what it perceived as a logical set of criteria. In 1954, the annual report of the DNLA noted that private enterprise could not operate profitably in northern Labrador. Thus, the state had to assume the responsibility of providing the people of northern Labrador not only with welfare services, but also with a commercial presence. To the state, this meant that simple-commodity production in northern Labrador was not economically viable and that the economy should be reoriented. The response of the Settlers and the Inuit and, to some extent, the Innuit, to the wage-labour opportunities they had been afforded up to that point reinforced this opinion. As far as the state could surmise, the people of northern Labrador wanted wage labour and were willing to abandon simple-commodity production in its favour. This assessment was substantially wrong.

In focusing on the obvious economic reasons of a much higher and steadier income from wage labour, the state ignored two features of the organization of work on the radar base that played a role in the decision of northern Labradorians to take work there. First, in the organization of the job site, all the foremen were outsiders, while local residents had unskilled positions. In this context, it was not necessary for Labradorians to give each other orders. Given the egalitarian nature of the Labradorian social organization, this was an important

feature. The fact that no one was a boss meant that they were not subject to jealousy deriving from occupying a structurally dominant position; nor did they have to face the significant level of social pressure which would be directed at such a person. While this appears to be inconsistent with the argument presented above, it should be noted that the agents who occupied the positions of elders within the Moravian political institutions were already community leaders: the Moravians merely gave them another forum in which to exercise their influence. In the case of the radar base promotion in the workplace was based on performance in an activity which had no validity in the context of northern Labrador and totally ignored the position the individual had in the social network of the community. A person who had not achieved enough prestige in the community even to offer an opinion would, placed in a position to give orders, face severe social pressure to abandon the position. As one informant noted, while he had been offered the position of foreman he had turned it down as not worth the aggravation. Therefore, even in the context of working on the base, the Inuit were able to maintain their egalitarianism while working in a hierarchical structure.

The second feature of the wage labour on the base was that, during the most intense period of construction (1952-1954), when most of the males who wanted wage labour could have it, work was restricted to the snow-free period



(Hopedale Diary November 15-20: 1953). This meant that the people did not have to abandon simple-commodity and use-value production in the form of seal and fur; rather, they merely replaced the fishery with wage labour and maintained an extensive interest in other forms of production. Perhaps if wage labour had been offered in such a way as to pre-empt access to these other forms of production the response would not have been as enthusiastic.

The social disruption caused by the presence of the base and the American personnel who populated it almost drove the Moravians to the brink of despair. Alcohol abuse became rampant, as residents would go to clubs on the base or Americans would enter the village well stocked with alcohol, looking for parties and women. Violence, alcohol abuse, and death through misadventure while inebriated increased dramatically. There is no doubt that the base was a direct cause of a significant number of social pathologies which began to flourish.

In spite of this, residents of Hopedale have mixed feelings about the base. A short play written by students with the aid of a teacher in the early 1980's focused on the detrimental effects of the base, such as the alcohol abuse and the cultural disruption. In contradistinction, informants noted that the pay was good and the parties exciting.

In sum, then, the base ushered in a new era in

Hopedale. Wage labour gained a prominent position in the economy and has held onto that position, in no small part, through the policies of the state.

A number of Innut families went to Hopedale in 1953 to find work; however, their stay there was brief. The exact reason for this is not clear, but there were a number of contributing factors. The priest, who was in Davis Inlet at the time, felt that they were ordered back by their chief when he could not find a job. Informants gave several reasons, including the fear of high explosives and the lack of accommodation. However, since their return to Davis Inlet coincided with the time the Innut usually prepared to go inland to hunt caribou during the fall migration, it is also possible that this influenced their decision. In any case, it was not until 1966 that wage labour became a significant economic option, a position it has held ever since.

#### Davis Inlet: House Construction

The interval between the construction of the radar base in Hopedale and the housing project in the new Davis Inlet, which began in 1966, was not a time of complete stasis. In 1957, the last public shaman in Davis Inlet died, removing an important obstacle to the penetration of European ideology. In 1958, a program was started which

flew groups of Innut into the interior of northern Labrador, thereby easing their access to their primary use-value production region. In that same year, an experiment with a lumber mill in Davis Inlet came to an end; although it was resurrected a few times in later years, it never became a viable operation. In 1961, the state delivered ten fishing boats to Davis Inlet and ferried people to and from fishing berths in the hope of increasing production. In 1964, a school was opened. Over the years, this has acted as a deterrent for people travelling into the interior during the school year, since many Innut have opted to stay in the community so that their children could attend school.

All these events, which represented incremental increases in the penetration of the state into the social formation of the Davis Inlet Innut, have culminated in what is now a welfare community in which the state is the primary provider of cash. However, the most important events in the recent history of Davis Inlet were the construction of the new village, which began in 1966, and the move to that village in 1969.

As mentioned above, a provision of the second federal-provincial agreement of 1965 was that the federal government would provide funding for the construction of housing for the native peoples of northern Labrador. The decision to take advantage of this and move Davis Inlet at the same time was based on the fact that the old site was

unsuitable for construction.

The construction of houses began at the new location in 1966; by 1969, there were thirty-three houses providing shelter for all residents. Two significant repercussions obtained from this, one from the construction phase and one from the transformation in the form of shelter.

The construction phase signalled the opening of a new sector in the economy, which has continued to hold a central place. Until that time wage labour had only been a minor supplement to the household incomes and was usually in the form of doing odd jobs for the white residents. These tasks were usually accomplished in the summer months, which was an economic down time for the Innut in that, despite the best efforts of the state, the Innut had never become highly productive fishermen. Further, during the late 1960's, there was a sharp decline in the cod stocks and the inshore fishery was in the process of shifting from cod production to salmon and char production. Therefore, the wage labour made available provided an opportunity for the Innut to acquire exchange value outside the simple commodity production arena.

Subsequent to the construction phase, the state has continued to provide various forms of wage labour through make-work programs. In 1970, a teachers' residence and a slipway were built. In 1973, the Native Association of Newfoundland Labrador received a grant from the Federal government providing funds for house repair. In 1978, a

floating dock was built out of funds from the Canada Works program. And, in 1982, a house repair program was in operation. All of these make-work schemes had three goals: first was the construction of the necessary physical infrastructure for the village; second, the income the work provided for the families; and third, the income earned by participation in the construction could be stretched out over the year through the unemployment insurance program of the federal government.

In the economic forum, the intrusion of a significant level of wage labour had the effect of pre-empting the necessity for the Davis Inlet Innut to pursue the fishery. Further, it had the effect of transferring some of the support of the Innut the provincially funded welfare to federally funded unemployment insurance. In this instance, the economic development of the Innut was and continues to be caught up in the complex interaction between the federal and provincial governments in Canada.

At the level of economic ideology, the wage labour-unemployment insurance cycle provided an example to the youth of the village of a new economic option, breaking the ground for the capitalist system to penetrate a little more deeply into the social formation of the Innut. However, this penetration was not restricted to the economic forum, and, along with other forms of penetration such as the education system and the shift to permanent dwellings brought about by the housing project, had social

repercussions.

Prior to the construction of permanent housing, all the Innut, except for the chief, lived in tents. Henkiksen (1973) points out that this form of shelter was amenable to the political organization and form of conflict resolution practiced by the Innut. For example, he notes that a group of Innut who were in conflict with the priest over lifestyle removed themselves across the bay from the old Davis Inlet and set up camp, thereby minimizing their contact with the priest. The move into houses made this format largely inoperative.

Although some Innut still move a short distance out of the village and live in tents, there are a number of social costs involved which were not present in the old village. First, with the establishment of new political institutions, it is more important to be in the village. Second, there is electricity in the village. And third, being out of the village makes it more difficult for the children to attend school. Therefore, the houses, the school, the church, the nursing station, the welfare, and make-work programs are all part of the process of the welfare state's intrusion into Davis Inlet, and thus are integral components of the pressure put on the Innut to alter their social formation.

With each new intrusion and new state policy, the social and economic options available to the Innut became more restricted. As was discussed in Chapter 1, both the

Innut and the Inuit had evolved social systems, at the heart of which was flexibility. Their social and political organization permitted many options, and the strong ideology of individual freedom, which was respected within a framework of mutual responsibility, had been confronted with varying levels of pressure to transform to be in congruence with the European tradition. In the intrusive structure of the state, individual freedom was restricted, while, simultaneously, mutual responsibility was undermined as the state and the church attempted to take over the obligation for community welfare. As will be discussed below, both these processes have met with resistance, but, given that the welfare state is in control of the economic well-being of the native peoples, the response of the latter has been both to play along with the state and to resist in selected forums.

The establishment of community councils in Davis Inlet and Hopedale in 1968 and the later installation of a variety of other political and parapolitical institutions were significant events in this process. The response of the native peoples to these institutions provides an interesting illustration of how this form of intrusion operates.

## Chapter 5: Current Social Formations

### Introduction

This chapter will examine selected aspects of the current economic, political, and ideological practices in Hopedale and Davis Inlet. It will be demonstrated that the encouragement of certain economic practices, the availability of transfer payments, and the imposition of alien political institutions have led to the generation of new political and economic strategies by the native Labradorians. Further, it will be shown that, while the political and economic practices have undergone significant changes, ideological practice has maintained a higher degree of continuity. This latter situation has resulted in ideological dissonance between the Labradorians and the agents of the welfare state, which is played out in other forums of practice.



### Economic Practice

In both Davis Inlet and Hopedale, there is a four-sector economy: simple-commodity production, wage labour, entrepreneurship, and various forms of state subsidies such as unemployment insurance, the child tax credit, old age pension, and welfare. Taking the household as the unit of analysis, almost none rely exclusively on one sector; except for a few households where all the income derives from welfare, most are involved in some combination of the four sectors.

While simple-commodity production was introduced to both groups during the mercantile period in the form of the sealskin and fine-fur trade, the cod fishery, and craft production, this did not result in similar forms of economic practice. For example, in Hopedale, craft production is currently run on a piece-work basis and provides a minor level of supplementary income for thirty-seven households. In Davis Inlet, it is a wage system employing four women.

Craft production, which includes items such as mittens, carvings, dolls, and moccasins, is perceived by the state as a means through which the residents of the two communities can market their ethnicity in a way that the state believes is valid. That is, the state sees itself as acting in the liberal-democratic tradition of permitting citizens to fulfill their economic and cultural potential. However, the divergence in the form of craft production

between the two communities indicates that the native Labradorians are defining the productive activity in different terms. That is, the form of production is not determined by cultural considerations or simply by the need for money; rather, it is determined by the particular set of political and economic circumstances with which each group of producers must deal.

In Hopedale, while there is a craft committee, made up of local residents which oversees the craft sector of the economy in 1982, the production was organized by the wife of the social worker. This individual, as an informal agent of the state, was constrained to work within the parameters set down by the state. She strove to maximize the income through crafts by increasing production and improving the quality of the crafts.

In Davis Inlet, where craft production was locally controlled, a different solution to this problem was found. In 1982, the craft producers in Davis Inlet confronted the state over the attempt by the state to institute a piece-work system. In an effort to coerce the Davis Inlet craft producers, the state withheld funds slated for the craft centre for several months. Despite this, the craft producers held their ground, producing a few crafts for sale within the community to maintain some income until, in the end, the government gave in and released the money.

A number of variables influenced the decision of the craft producers in this matter. The first is the structure

of the unemployment insurance system, which multiplies twenty weeks of wage work into fifty-two weeks of income. Second, the labour intensive nature of craft production and the limited market available to the producers means that they never receive the value of their products in a piece-work system. Finally, there is a cultural variable, in that the wage-labour system equalizes income regardless of skill or rate of production and is, therefore, in keeping with the egalitarian ideology of the Innut.

In this instance, the craft producers in Davis Inlet were able to confront the state and win because they were in political control. The political and economic context in which the confrontation took place was much more important to them than the opportunity to produce crafts. Their goal was to maximize income, not maintain cultural integrity as it was perceived by the state. There is a distinction between a pair of moccasins made for domestic use and those made for sale; while the skills required are the same, the purpose of production is different. Despite the fact that the state may view its craft-production policies as enlightened, the people are merely trying to maximize the returns on their labour within the economic structure in which they have been forced to live.

Fur and sealskins are two other widely produced simple commodities in both communities. Unfortunately, the return for them, especially sealskins, is quite low, both in terms of the cash return and in terms of the effort expended in

producing a skin for sale. For example, in Hopedale the hide of a jar seal, the most commonly produced, had a top price of \$35.00 in 1982. However, this price was almost never received because most seals were shot; therefore, the price dropped to \$10.50 because the sealskin was damaged. One informant expressed his frustration at this policy, stating: "What do they expect, you gotta shoot 'em, so they gotta have a hole."

In addition to the low price, the hunter, as noted above, has to take into account the effort it takes to produce a sealskin. Take the following hypothetical example of hunting seals at the ice edge--a round trip of three hours, and four hours at the ice edge producing four seals. For a skilled worker, each seal takes about an hour to clean and about a half-hour to mount on a drying rack. This averages out to approximately \$3.00 per hour and does not include depreciation of equipment, the cost of gas and ammunition, or the risk involved in hunting at the ice edge, which is considerable.

The response of hunters to the low price has varied and depended on their economic situation. Some have cut down on hunting seals and merely sell skins from the seals they have produced for food. Others are looking for alternative markets which will yield a higher price, while still others are stockpiling sealskins and waiting for a higher price at the local store. The latter two strategies are not very widespread, as most households need all the

income they can generate as quickly as possible.

The third form of simple-commodity production is the salmon and char fishery, and, as with crafts, there is a significant difference between the two communities. In Davis Inlet, there were six fishermen in 1982, which was a drop of fourteen over the previous three years, while in Hopedale there are thirty-six and the issue of restricted fishing licences is prominent among fathers whose sons cannot get into the fishery. As with the decision of the craft producers to hold out against the government, the decision not to fish by the majority of Davis Inlet fishermen rests on a number of variables.

First, there is a cultural consideration; that is, the Innut were traditionally hunters adapted to the interior of Labrador and, as such, they preferred not to fish (Henriksen 1973). While this is an important consideration, it must be viewed in the context of other variables; for example, if Somolian pastoralists, who were the victims of the drought and war in their traditional homeland, could become fishermen (Haakonsen 1979), it is likely that Innut, given no other options, could become fishermen as well.

In the summer of 1982, there were nineteen speedboats in working order in Davis Inlet. Of these, eleven were owned by men who had fished before and were still able-bodied. Of the five men not fishing, all were missing one or more necessary pieces of equipment. But, as with

the cultural variable, this explanation also serves to conceal. Problems with keeping equipment in good working order are the same for everyone on the north Labrador coast, and in all other communities commercial salmon and char fishing is much more popular.

Over the last few years, the salmon and char fishery in the Davis Inlet area has been poor. Therefore, the unemployment insurance benefits paid out to fishermen have been low or non-existent, as benefits are tied to production. As a consequence of this, and in conjunction with the other two variables, many of the would-be fishermen are opting out of the fishery and are relying on wage labour, wage-labour-generated unemployment insurance and welfare to supply their cash requirements.

The wage labour sectors in Hopedale and Davis Inlet, as is the case everywhere else in Canada, be subdivided into full-time, part-time, seasonal, occasional, and government make-work schemes. In the summer and fall of 1981 and winter of 1982, there were twenty full-time jobs, seven part-time, five seasonal, five occasional, and twenty-one state subsidized positions in Hopedale. For the period of May to December 1982, Davis Inlet had nineteen full-time jobs, five part-time, five occasional, one seasonal, ten state, and four ten-week construction jobs provided by the church. Therefore, except for the entrepreneurs, the rest of the households are dependent on government-subsidized employment schemes or the fishery in

order to qualify for unemployment insurance, which assures a steady income for the winter months at a substantially higher rate than can be obtained on welfare.

A critical characteristic of wage labour in Hopedale and Davis Inlet is that it creates no new wealth. All wage labour derives from the institutional infrastructure, such as the school, the store, or the nursing station. State-subsidized jobs are devoted to improvement of the physical infrastructure of the communities and involve projects such as spring clean-ups or house repair.

This state of affairs can only be understood by referring to the form of intrusion of the state and capital into northern Labrador. Capital, which has spent quite liberal sums of money in northern Labrador in the form of resource exploration and development (e.g., Churchill Falls hydro dam and offshore oil exploration), has left the local economies virtually untouched. State intervention has merely been an extension of the welfare policy designed for the industrialized sector of the national economy. There has been no serious effort at local economic development, while capital-intensive resource development projects, which import labour, have been encouraged.

One response of the local population to this structure has been to attempt to manipulate it to their maximum advantage, as the fishermen and craft producers of Davis Inlet illustrate. But there are other strategies as well, as the following two examples from Hopedale will

illustrate.

One evening, the local social worker was visited by a young Inuk male who came over to ask if he could get hired on with the house-repair crew. The social worker explained that this was impossible as he, the visiting Inuk, had already qualified for unemployment insurance through his participation in the salmon and char fishery. The Inuk's response was that of course he had qualified because he had worked hard. Furthermore, he pointed out that he and his father had built their own house, while others had been given houses by the government. The social worker, although sympathetic to the complainant, maintained his position and the young Inuk left, clearly frustrated and angry.

A second example demonstrates a more direct approach. One day, after a heavy snowfall, an Inuk male went to the council office and asked the community clerk if he could borrow a shovel. The clerk, believing the man wanted to shovel out the front of his house, lent him a shovel. Two hours later, he returned and asked for two hours' pay as he had just snowed off the walkway and the steps to the council office. The clerk was a little amazed, but complied with the man's request.

While these events may seem a little mundane, they must be viewed in the context of the relationship between the native people and the state, in which the former are in a decidedly disadvantaged position. A large part of their



income derives from welfare or unemployment insurance, a fact which is not lost on them, and which is an important consideration in their economic strategies.

The third form of income derives from entrepreneurship. In Hopedale, there are four entrepreneurs, all Settlers. One owns a pick-up truck, a dump truck, and a store, and has held contracts for oil and gas, garbage collection, and the Department of Transport's weather station in Hopedale. During the fieldwork period, he lost the oil and gas contract. The second owns a pick-up truck and ran a store until he took over the oil and gas contract. The third owns a large flatbed truck and the fourth runs a store.

In Davis Inlet, there is only one entrepreneur, a Mic Mac from Conn River, Newfoundland, who has taken up residence in the community, is cohabiting with a local woman, and owns a store.

The employment opportunities that arise out of these entrepreneurial activities all occur in Hopedale. These include two part-time jobs in garbage collection, one part-time job in a store, three full-time jobs at the weather station, and one full-time job pumping oil and gas. In addition, there are occasional jobs in garbage collection and in loading and unloading trucks.

The self-image of members of this sector is that they are community benefactors, supplying needed services. The fact that they make money at it is seen as only fair.

The communities at large, especially the Inuit and Innut populations, tended to view the entrepreneurs as stingy, since they would not share their obvious wealth. As one Inuk said of one of the entrepreneurs, "He's a hard one for money."

In terms of the economic structure of the communities, the entrepreneurs do little to generate new money for the community. Their activities fall into the service or transport sector and, as such, contribute nothing to the growth of the local economies.

The final sector of the cash economy is that of government transfer payments, such as unemployment insurance and welfare. As the implications of the unemployment insurance policy on economic practice have already been discussed, comments will be restricted to the welfare system.

Some of the sources of welfare are: household heads who have not qualified for unemployment insurance, unemployed dependents over eighteen still living at home, single mothers living with relatives, chronic unemployables, and the disabled. In terms of economic practice, the significance of welfare is how it affects other sectors. For example, in 1982, a single mother living with relatives received \$213.00 per month; put another way, this is equivalent to twenty jar-seal skins with bullet holes in them per month. From this perspective, it is apparent that welfare is a substantial

form of household income in terms of the labour it would take to generate an equal amount of cash.

In sum, the economic practices in Hopedale and Davis Inlet derive, to a large degree, from the structure of the system that has been imposed by the state. The state derives much of its structure from the fact that it evolved out of a liberal-democratic tradition within the context and logic of the capitalist mode of production.

#### Political Practice: Davis Inlet

Presently, local-level political practice in Davis Inlet is in a state of change, obtaining not only from the simultaneous existence of two authority systems--a hierarchical coercive and a non-hierarchical consensus, but also three styles of leadership. This is further complicated by the fact that claims to political legitimacy, or illegitimacy, are appropriated by competing politicians from one authority system and applied to the other. Further, the competency of leaders is assessed by the public from the perspectives of both authority systems.

This particular set of circumstances derives from the ever increasing intrusion of the state into the political arena of the Davis Inlet Innut, which has included the introduction of formal political institutions. These institutions--the community council and the Naskapi

Montagnais Innu Association, which are subsumed within the hierarchical logic of the coercive authority system--have provided the forum for the development of two styles of leadership, which are both in opposition to the non-coercive domestic style. Political practice, therefore, occurs in two overlapping arenas. One highlights the opposition of the domestic authority system to that introduced by the state, and the other relates to which style of leadership takes precedence in the state-introduced political institutions.

It must be emphasized that the analysis of political practice is not simply concerned with the dynamic relationship between abstract categories, but also, and more importantly, with the relationship between people. Thus, in addition to examining authority and leadership as categories, the analysis will also consider the behaviour of the local politicians.

As noted above, the state has been and is an important component in the political life of Davis Inlet. From its introduction of formal political institutions to its intrusion into the economic and jural sectors, the state has become omnipresent.

At both the federal and provincial levels, the state is universally condemned in the village. However, this does not preclude a contradictory relationship between it and the Innut. This relationship exists at both the individual and community levels. At the individual level,

the state provides welfare, unemployment insurance, old age pension, and child tax credits, which account for a large fraction of the income for most households. At the community level, the state funded the construction of the infrastructure and currently provides the community council with an operating budget. Out of this funding, the community council provides services such as garbage collection, laundry facilities, and house-repair programs. In addition to the services themselves, the employment generated through them accounts for most of the wage labour available in the village.

At one level, then, the state is a provider, but it is also the source of most jural coercion evident in the village and in northern Labrador in general. The RCMP maintain a presence in Davis Inlet one weekend out of every two and has been involved in a good many confrontations. Further, the people of Davis Inlet are fully aware that Innu from North West River have been arrested for hunting caribou out of season. While they themselves are not subject to that particular law, the community was outraged that any Innu could be arrested for hunting. In these contexts and many others, the state is perceived as a powerful malevolent force, a perception which, coupled with the benefits derived from it, creates the contradiction with which a politician must deal.

In terms of political practice, these contradictory characteristics of the state are expressed in opposing

styles of leadership adopted by the politicians, within the context of the formal political institutions available to them. One style exhibits some cooperation, while the other stresses confrontation with the state. The content of these styles of leadership, which fall into the coercive system, are modified by two intervening variables. The first is the domestic authority structure, which emphasizes consensus and immediate and visible performance, and the second includes the internal social divisions in the community.

The domestic authority system, which was at one time the only system of authority, is now most apparent in hunting camps. The characteristic type of leadership that accompanies it has several distinctive features. First, it is ceded to those who, due to their status derived from past performance in particular spheres of activity, are relied on to make the correct decisions for the good of the camp community. However, the others in the camp are under no obligation to follow and, if the leadership proves unrewarding--for example, if little food were being caught--support can be revoked and another individual would assume the position.

Second, it is temporally and spatially restricted. For example, during my fieldwork, I had the opportunity to spend a month and a half in a spring hunting camp in the interior. The camp consisted of two households living in two tents. For the most part, the households were

autonomous except when decisions had to be made that affected them both. At these times, the decisions were always made by the head of one household. He chose the two campsites occupied, decided when to move, and, when caribou were first sighted, organized, and directed the hunt.

Finally, the authority does not necessarily transfer to other activities. This last feature became apparent after our return to the village. The head of the household with whom I had lived, who had demonstrated no hesitation or ill will in complying with the decisions made in the country, questioned the ability of the other man to accomplish a particular task in comparison with himself.

However, the domestic authority system is, as mentioned above, not the only authority system available in the village. As a consequence, it has suffered some erosion in legitimacy. Another example will illustrate this aspect of the current political practice of the Davis Inlet Innut.

In the fall of the same year, I had the opportunity to accompany the same household I had stayed with in the spring to a second camp, with a different household. The following incident occurred on a return trip, by canoe, from the village to the camp with a load of supplies. In the canoe were its owner and, therefore, the trip leader, the other household head, myself, and a young man who had joined us for the ride. About four hours out, the young man got hungry and asked me for some food. In response, I

pointed to the groceries upon which we were all sitting. He said he could not eat any of them because they did not belong to him. So I reached into some of the supplies I had brought and gave him something to eat.

What is interesting about this is not that there was any question about the ownership of food, but, rather, who he decided to approach for food. I had the lowest status and was also closest in age to the young man and, therefore, was more accessible. In addition, it is important to look at whom he did not ask. That is, he did not ask either of the two older men, who, over their lifetimes as hunters, had gained a certain amount of prestige. However, just as with the leader of the first camp, this prestige did not carry over totally intact into the village, where other rules were operating as well.

In the village, the men who could not be approached for food faced serious challenges. For instance, one was ridiculed in a community meeting by the younger members of the village for putting his name forward to be a representative for the NMIA, the organization which is responsible for presenting the Innu land claim to the federal government. as well, other members of his generation have been assaulted by younger men in the heat of argument. While incidences such as these are not totally absent outside the village, they are rare. Part of the explanation for this behaviour is the ability to appeal to the other authority system inside the village. This



permits the questioning of domestic leadership. However, this does not preclude the assessment of that leadership, which operates within the logic of the hierarchical authority system, in terms of the domestic system.

Social divisions are the second intervening variable. In Davis Inlet, there are two primary divisions which cross cut each other and are cross-cut by a series of secondary ones. The primary divisions are age and attitude towards whites.

The age division is between those who are over forty and those who are under thirty--the group of thirty to forty is very small--while the attitude division (nebulous as it may sound and inexact as it is) is between the virulently anti-white and the moderately anti-white. Secondary divisions include drinkers vs. non-drinkers, wage-labourers vs. other incomes, bilingual vs. unilingual, gender, and education. However, the problem of analyzing political practice in Davis Inlet is not only lining up factions obtaining from these divisions in opposition to one another; it is also delineating how political actors manipulate the meaning attached to those factions for themselves and for their opponents.

For example, as is the case in some other small native communities in Canada in which a white religious leader is also a patron, the attitudes toward the local priest vary. Some people make a point of having little to do with him, while others regard him as a possible resource both

materially, in the way of jobs, and politically, in dealing with the state, and as a powerful local ally. These opposed factions correspond, in large part, to those formed by the drinkers and non-drinkers. This correspondence is not a coincidence, in that it is well known that the priest disapproves of drinking. For example, he supported a now lapsed regulation that members of the community council be non-drinkers. That this regulation is no longer observed is, in effect, a statement on the part of the new council of their independence from the priest and other local whites who disapprove. However, even members of ostensibly non-drinking councils did, in fact, imbibe from time to time.

This is not simply because they are weak-willed and caved in to social pressure; rather, it is because the stipulation that members of the council be abstainers was a reaction to only one kind of drinking in Davis Inlet, that of binge drinking. It totally ignored the place of drinking as a social pastime and a forum for the exchange of information. No one in Davis Inlet denies that binge drinking is an ongoing problem, which has been the direct cause of a number of tragedies. However, they are also aware that social drinking is a part of everyday life. To offer a visitor a cup of homebrew when he enters your house is simply a common courtesy. And for a group of eight or ten people to sit in someone's living room or tent, passing the time of day in conversation, as they wait for the only

cup in the household to get around to them, is a normal occurrence.

For the politician, this latter form of drinking is where much of the business of politics gets done. It is in this and similar settings that issues are discussed, opinions aired, complaints voiced, and solutions offered. To opt out of this forum places the abstaining politician at a disadvantage.

During the period that the non-drinking regulation held sway, there were three options open to politicians in this regard. One was to abstain totally from drinking, thus limiting oneself to one faction and aligning oneself with the priest and other whites in the community. The second was to engage in all forms of drinking, including binge drinking, risking the censure of the priest and the retribution called for by the regulation, which was disbarment from the council. Finally, there was the option to participate only in social drinking and in as discrete a manner as possible.

All three of these options have been practiced, but it is the final one that illustrates the communication of a contradictory message as a political strategy. It is an attempt to play both sides of the fence by not engaging in the most disapproved of form of drinking, but still managing to maintain links to the drinking faction. As a consequence of this, links to a major local information network are also maintained and, perhaps more important

politically, of one's independence from white rules is demonstrated.

This same strategy also takes place in the other direction. For example, most young political aspirants will take a virulently anti-white position. They argue that the whites destroyed the old ways, do not understand the Innut, and, worse, are planning to expropriate the land belonging to the Innut. However, this position must be juxtaposed with the fact that, as a political tactic, some have imported consumer goods produced by white society, which are distributed at cost or free. This practice is analogous to the redistribution of domestically produced food, in that it not only redistributes wealth, but also communicates success and, therefore, enhances status. Nevertheless, this transformed variant of the domestic practice of redistribution of wealth indicates a contradiction in the attitude to white society among the younger political aspirants, which is being played out in the political forum.

It is apparent that individuals engage in contradictory behaviour in order to improve their political position. However, the inherent danger in this is that political competitors are able to appropriate one facet of it in order to undermine whatever gains might be achieved.

The second primary division is that of age. On this basis, the community can be divided into two large factions, as mentioned above: those over forty and those

under thirty. These age factions take on a greater significance in that they correspond, by and large, to the proficiency in English and the education divisions. As a result of this, the younger generation is better equipped to deal with the state and is in fact, preferred by agents of the state. These younger members are able to take an alternative route to political office, in that the skills they have learned in school are valued in the new authority system. Therefore, they are able, to some degree, to bypass the traditional system and still attain power. An examination of the operation of the formal political institutions will elucidate how these divisions and the parallel authority systems affect political practice in Davis Inlet.

The requirement of the state for formalized hierarchical power structures with which to deal has resulted in the establishment of two alien political institutions in Davis Inlet--the NMIA and the community council. The NMIA, as mentioned above, is the native organization which represents the two Innu communities in Labrador to the federal government for their land claim, and, as such, is in opposition to the state. Each community elects four representatives to the board of directors, and the president and vice-president are elected by the population of the two communities at large. In addition to these elected offices, there is also a small bureaucracy located in North West River which includes an

executive committee, with some non-elected members.

Despite the fact that the land claim is generally viewed as a serious issue, there is disagreement in Davis Inlet as to the negotiating strategy adopted by the executive of the NMIA. In addition, it is commonly believed that most of the decision making is taken without consulting the people of Davis Inlet and, worse, without even informing them of what decisions have been made. This feeling of alienation from the land-claim process is exacerbated by the lack of any visible progress. Finally, it is felt that the NMIA could be more involved in community affairs, as is the land-claim organization which represents the Inuit and Settler population of northern Labrador, the Labrador Inuit Association. These perceived deficiencies notwithstanding, the NMIA elections provide a vehicle for political aspirants to enter the formal political arena and, in fact, contribute to the desirability of being a representative.

Since the NMIA has both a positive and negative image locally, the elected representatives can appropriate the positive side, that is, working on a land claim for the benefit of the community as a whole, while deflecting criticism onto the executive and the state. However, serving on the NMIA is not entirely without risk.

Criticism of local NMIA representatives falls into two general categories. First, they are admonished for indulging in unacceptable behaviour at meetings, such as

getting inebriated. This criticism is linked to the second one, which is that they do not take the position seriously enough, and that is why there is no progress. However, so long as the representatives maintain a negative attitude towards white society and periodically criticize the executive of the NMIA, they are able to minimize the political liabilities inherent in the position.

In terms of political practice, the most striking feature of the NMIA representatives is that they are all proficient in English and most of them are under thirty. In fact, in the 1982 election, the average age dropped by 3.2 years, from 33.4 to 30.2. This above-thirty average is a little misleading in that one member is over fifty. However, it is interesting to note that, for one meeting which was to take place in North West River, he was left standing on the runway as younger men filled up the plane.

This blatant usurpation of an older man's position is raised to the level of a structural problem by some older Inuit, who propose that the only reason these people are on the NMIA is because they speak English, not because they know anything about the land. This is knowledge, they point out, which all NMIA representatives should possess. In this instance, the age division emerges as linked to other cleavages through the political process.

The community council has a much more direct effect on day-to-day life, as it is in charge of spending monies received from the state for community projects and special

programs. For example, as mentioned, the council is in charge of such ongoing services as the garbage collection and the laundry service, and it also selects those who will receive cut-rate snowmobiles or get space on the planes which ferry families into the country. In addition to providing these services, it is the primary link between the village and the state. Therefore, in contradistinction to the NMIA, the community council must take a more cooperative position vis-a-vis the state, although by no means exclusively. These distinctive stances toward the state are critical to the comprehension of the political practice in Davis Inlet.

The community council is also distinguished from the NMIA in that it includes the position of chief (the only paid local political office), which has some history in the village. As mentioned above, a chief had been appointed by the first priest to visit Davis Inlet, a position he held until his death in 1974. This precedent being set, it is the popular notion, which largely corresponds to fact, that the chief is the sole authority and is personally responsible for all decisions. In addition to this, the chief is also perceived by the white community as being responsible for the upholding of liberal democratic ideals within a hierarchical framework.

For example, one chief who left office through the prudent strategy of not running, was the brunt of a great deal of criticism, despite his best efforts. The agents of



white society criticized him for not saying no, that is, for not being authoritarian enough. This demonstrates their poor grasp of the social reality in Davis Inlet, where to be perceived as bossy is political death. The Innut, however, criticized him for the decisions he did make. Once, this chief was even forced to defend himself physically against an irate resident who disagreed violently with the distribution of subsidized snowmobiles. The assailant had not received one. This response, though somewhat exceptional in its form, was indicative of the general opinion of the chief's perceived favouritism in the distribution of state monies and programs.

Challenges to the chief's authority did not appear only at the individual level. Half-way through his incumbency, a group of disgruntled members of the community held their own election, and those elected began to act like the official council. This situation continued for a week, until the legally elected council convinced the bank to stop cashing cheques issued by the renegade council and ended the situation.

As he neared the end of his term, the chief's actions demonstrated his efforts to recoup some of the status he had lost during his time in office. For example, he ordered ten more snowmobiles than had been planned, and even went so far as to give his most severe critic and primary political rival a part-time job. It is obvious, therefore, that there are contradictions in the office of

chief deriving from the context in which the role must be performed.

In order to get elected, a prospective chief must have achieved a position of status within the community. For older men, this is usually accomplished outside the village milieu in the country, where they are in control of the situation. However, in the village, the actions of a chief are constrained by the state, which controls the resources made available to the community. The low level of state investment in programs and the strictures placed on their administration leave the local leadership with insufficient means to cope with the severe and chronic social and economic problems that face the community. Nevertheless, as the individual responsible for the well-being of the community and the only person physically present, as opposed to the abstract entity of the state, the chief is left to answer for the failures of the system.

The election of the parallel council illustrates how this perception of non-performance was interpreted through the logic of the domestic authority configuration, with its feature of the rapid replacement of unsatisfactory leadership. The failure of this strategy only postponed the inevitable until the next legal election. At this time, the incumbent chief, who did not run, was replaced by an individual who took a more confrontational approach to whites than the incumbent.

Political practice in Davis Inlet is in a state of

flux, which derives from two sets of conditions. First is the essential powerlessness of the community in relation to the state. Politically, this has two consequences: first, the ability to deal with the state on its own terms is becoming a valued skill which includes the assumption of an aggressive and confrontational posture towards the state; second is the existence of two authority systems.

These two authority systems are, theoretically at least, mutually exclusive categories. In practice, though, this is only partially true; while ideally each form of authority relies on different means of legitimation and fulfills different categories of needs, in Davis Inlet there is as yet much intermixing of the two. Eventually, one form may supersede the other, but not necessarily. If the need for and opportunity to exercise traditional authority persist, that is, if there is some level of political and economic independence, it is possible that both forms may coexist in mutually exclusive spheres of activity. However, for the time being, while the existence of these two systems may be obstructive to the maintenance of authority, political aspirants are quite sophisticated in their ability to manipulate the inherent contradictions for political gain. The internal divisions and dual authority systems only provide the lines along which the local political practice is expressed. But it is the context of dependency and powerlessness that defines its character.

While this appears to argue that there are now more options for political practice in Davis Inlet since the introduction of foreign political institutions, the control of those institutions is in the hands of the state and, in fact, restricts the options by restricting the power inherent in the new positions. In Hopedale, the same process is underway, but with some local variations.

#### Political Practice: Hopedale

After the construction boom in Hopedale ended, wage labour became scarce and there was a resumption of the cod fishery. This response proved adequate until 1968, when the cod stocks failed, obliging fishermen to exploit other species, the two most important of which are salmon and char. But this change was not easily accomplished. In the first place, the technology required to fish salmon and char is totally different from that needed for cod. Second, the salmon and char fishery is more capital intensive. And third, in an effort to protect the fish stocks, the state restricted the number of fishing licenses. The effect was to force people who could not adapt to the new conditions, out of the fishery. Notably, the Hebron Inuit, as mentioned above, were relocated in 1959.

This is understandable in that they had the least

cash, were least familiar with the local environment, and had the least claim to good fishing berths. The latter two points will be elaborated on, as they are central to the comprehension of the cleavage between the Hopedale and Hebron Inuit.

Access to the resource base is organized such that particular families, both Inuit and Settler, had de facto rights of usufruct to particular places where they had maintained seasonal residences in the past. In practice, this meant that a given family's knowledge of a particular micro-environment was far more complete than anyone else's. Throughout the mission period, even after the Inuit had moved to the mission stations for much of the year, they still maintained strong attachments to their seasonal residences; for some, this is still the case. For the Hebron Inuit, this system of rights of usufruct based on past occupation presented obvious problems in the Hopedale area; there they did not have any rights.

In addition to this, two other consequences derived from their resettlement one at the level of economic practice in terms of domestic production, and the other at the level of political ideology. Examples will best illustrate them.

When the Hebron Inuit first arrived in Hopedale, they were victims of several outbreaks of botulism caused by eating bad seal meat. This occurred because the climate in the Hopedale region, 300 kilometers south of Hebron, is

sufficiently different to require some modification in the curing of meat. Ignorance of this bit of local knowledge ended in tragedy and demonstrates the importance of knowledge of the micro-environment.

The second example refers to political ideology, and hence, political practice, demonstrating the link between place of origin and identity. One day, during a discussion about the rather dismal state of affairs in Hopedale, an Inuk woman, who had grown up in another community and had married into Hopedale, stated that she did not care what happened in Hopedale because she did not belong to Hopedale. That is, her attachment was to another community. For the Hebron Inuit, the same logic holds: they do not belong to Hopedale and, therefore, have no stake in what goes on. Thus, in addition to the practical economic impediments of access to resources, there is also the feeling of alienation from the community itself. This ideological factor is replicated in the spatial ghettoization of most of the Hebron Inuit in one part of the village.

Conversely, the Settlers were had the most cash, had an intimate knowledge of the local environment, and could lay claim to prime fishing berths. While the Hopedale Inuit had knowledge and a claim on fishing berths, they lacked cash.<sup>4</sup> The discrepancy in cash reserves can be linked to the Inuit sharing practices, which result in any surplus being quickly dissipated to less fortunate families. This

obviously militated against the accumulation of capital and, hence, the purchase of expensive equipment, such as speedboats.

In addition, as mentioned above, the Moravian policy of isolating Settlers had constrained them to become self-sufficient. This adaptive strategy required them to pursue the production of use and exchange value more diligently than the Inuit, who relied on each other and the Moravians when necessity demanded. Therefore, at the time of the switch to the salmon and char fishery, the Settlers were in the best position to make the change. This is reflected in their over-representation in the fishery.

Of the male work force over the age of twenty, the Settlers represent 28.3% of the population, while taking up 53% of the full-time fisherman positions. For the Hopedale and Hebron Inuit, it is 38.2% and 34.6% of the male work force and 28% and 19% of the fisherman positions, respectively.

Turning to the wage-labour sector, once again the Hebron Inuit were at a disadvantage, being newcomers to the community. Taking the work-force as a whole, the Hopedale Inuit represent 43.3% of it, while the Hebron Inuit take up 32.2%, and the Settlers 25.9%. But, as with the fishery, there is some disparity. In the case of wage labour, this disparity lies in who occupies the majority of positions available in the two major forms of employment in Hopedale--full-time and state make-work projects.

Of all the full-time jobs available in Hopedale, 58.3% were held by Hopedale Inuit, 21.7% by Settlers, and 17.3% by Hebron Inuit. An examination of just who holds the jobs among the Hopedale Inuit reveals that 50% are taken up by the descendants of the three most powerful Inuk leaders of the previous generation. Further, an additional 35% are held by one family whose head has been a lifelong employee of the state and is now an assistant store manager in a neighbouring community, from which he makes a difficult trip on most weekends to be with his family.

The Hebron Inuit are concentrated in the state make-work projects where they occupied 52% of the positions in 1982. These jobs are provided by the state in order to allow people the opportunity to get enough weeks of work in to qualify them for unemployment insurance. While fishermen also rely on unemployment insurance to supplement their incomes, they only require ten weeks to qualify, whereas wage labourers need twenty weeks. The fisherman is also able to increase his income from unemployment insurance, as his rate of payment is attached to the level of fish production, while the rate for the wage labourer is fixed to the wage, which, in most cases, is the minimum allowable by law.

Two consequences derive from the lower cash income of this wage labour/unemployment insurance cycle. First, the time spent in wage-income jobs is taken away from the domestic-production sector and, therefore, leaves that



sector of the population more reliant on store food. This increased reliance, in turn, causes a drain on their cash reserves, limiting their ability to acquire capital goods. Secondly, because they are unable to save to acquire capital goods, when they do engage in domestic production, they are constrained to do so in a more traditional way than those who can afford new technology. This makes them less productive in the domestic sector.

For example, in the fall, some species of seal migrate along the coast. The speedboat owner can cruise the shoreline, looking for herds of seals, or go to a place that seals are known to frequent and wait for them. This latter method still requires a boat, as the seal must be retrieved from the water after it has been shot. Conversely, for those without a boat and who cannot arrange to hunt with someone who has, the only option is to wait in one of the bays near the community where seals usually appear in the fall. The problem of retrieving the seal was overcome in one such place, when I was there, by a Hebron Inuk leaving a homemade plywood rowboat on the shore for communal use.

This method of seal hunting not only cuts down on the access to seals by restricting the number of seals encountered, but also, since there is usually more than one hunter waiting, the number of opportunities to shoot at the seals encountered are fewer. Hunting etiquette is on a first-come, first-served basis; that is, the first hunter

to arrive shoots until he kills a seal, and then the next hunter, and so on. The problem is that once the shooting starts the seals are scared off and the wait between chances increases. Also, since one must wait one's turn, it takes longer for the hunters to produce the same number of seals than a lone hunter in a boat.

In addition to the actual harvesting of seals, the hunter with no mechanical means of transporting his kill is left with the task of hauling his catch home manually over rough terrain. The oval shape of the seal causes it to twist and slide on hills and icy embankments, making the job very difficult and requiring a great deal of strength.

In terms of ethnic identity, this economic disadvantage is transformed into a positive attribute evoked by the Hebron Inuit to set themselves off from the rest of the community. This linkage between economic practice and ethnic identity or, more properly, group identity is expressed in a variety of ways. The response of a Hebron Inuk listening to a hunting story which culminated in the fact that it took two Settlers and myself to haul a large seal into a boat was telling. After hearing my rendition of the event, he simply said that it would have taken only one Hebron Inuk to do the job.

The division of the Hopedale population into three groups can be linked to the colonial history of northern Labrador, but the divisions are reinforced by current economic practices. Further, these economic practices are..

used as sources of identity which are communicated to the rest of the community, a fact which, as will be discussed below, has consequences at the level of political practice.

There are four political institutions in Hopedale: the Community Council, the Fisherman's Committee, the Elders and Chapel Servants, and the Labrador Inuit Association.

While the day-to-day running of the village is left up to the town clerk, the Council controls the purse strings. Further, it makes the decisions as to what improvements to the community infrastructure take priority and, until recently, was the only local institution with which state agencies communicated. Therefore, the Council not only has considerable authority over community affairs, but also controls much of the communication between the community and the state.

Current membership on the Council is four Settlers and one Hopedale Inuk. But this ratio was not always the case. From 1969, when the first Council was elected, until 1975, the Hopedale Inuit held the majority of seats. The shift from Hopedale Inuit to Settlers corresponds to two significant occurrences. First, in 1973, the Labrador Inuit Association was formed with the express purpose of representing the Labrador Inuit in their land claim. This effectively bypassed the Council's monopoly on lines of communication with the state. Second, this period saw the rise of a local entrepreneur whose political ambitions matched his economic ones. As the mandate of the Council

emphasized budget issues, the fact that the most successful entrepreneur was elected Council Chairman is not that remarkable, despite the fact that his preoccupation with the accumulation of wealth was met with almost universal criticism. This perception of the link between cash and the Council is also reflected in the economic sector occupied by the other members of the Council: out of four, only one is a full-time simple-commodity producer. Therefore, the Council is not mainly representative of only one ethnic group, but of one fraction of that group.

The Fishermen's Committee, representing the fishermen of Hopedale, expresses opinions to the state on what improvements they regard as necessary for the well-being of the fishery and, also, any criticisms they have of state regulations. The major concerns of the Committee in Hopedale were the restriction on salmon licenses which kept young men out of the fishery and the need to upgrade the fish plant from a holding plant to one that could process fish. Failing that, their concern was to at least get an ice machine that was reliable.

Membership on the Fishermen's Committee is entirely Settler, reflecting their over-representation in that sector of the economy. While two are also on Council, one is semi-retired and only fishes part time.

The Elders and the Chapel Servants have been combined, since due to the implementation of the Community Council, the secular authority of the Elders has been downgraded to

the point where they are no more powerful than the Chapel Servants, at least formally. Of the three Elders, one is a Hebron Inuk, one a Hopedale Inuk, and one a Hebron Inuk married to a Hopedale Inuk. Of eleven Chapel Servants, three are Settlers, one of whom is the widow of a Hopedale Inuk, one is a Hebron Inuk and eight are Hopedale Inuit. Therefore, the Hopedale Inuit control the institution with the least power. This reflects both their lack of interest in serving on Council, which they share with the Hebron Inuit, and their ambiguous ethnic position deriving from their economic practice, which, as will be discussed, affects their suitability for the Labrador Inuit Association.

The Labrador Inuit Association was formed for the purpose of representing a land claim to the federal government and has since expanded into other areas. Until 1975, Settlers were excluded, but they are now in a position to share in any of the benefits which may accrue to the people of northern Labrador as a result of a land-claim settlement. This has brought about some rapprochements between the Inuit and the Settlers, as the Settlers downplay their distinctive status while emphasizing their native Labradorian identity in certain contexts.

Nevertheless, the representation from Hopedale on the Labrador Inuit Association is made up of two Hebron Inuit and one Hopedale Inuk married to a Hebron Inuk. Two

factors account for this. First, the Hebron Inuit are constrained to engage in more traditional, i.e., less mechanized, economic practices. This, coupled with the perception that a more traditional lifestyle corresponds to a higher level of Inuitness, results in the Hebron Inuit being elected to the only expressly native political organization.

The structure of the land-claim process is dictated by the state and requires the successful communication of cultural uniqueness and integrity in order to successfully argue an aboriginal claim to the land. Thus, it is not surprising that the land-claim organization, the Labrador Inuit Association, emphasizes culture, both in dealing with the state and to mobilize and galvanize local public support.

As in Davis Inlet, political practice in Hopedale is constrained by the intrusion of formal political structure introduced by the state. The establishment of the above institutions has been the impetus for further transformations in the social formations of the Inuit and the Innu. The dependent status of the people of northern Labrador has acted to restrict their political and economic options; nevertheless, neither group has ever ceased to resist what they perceive to be inappropriate intrusions into their social formations, as the following discussion of ideological practice will demonstrate.

### Ideological Practice

Ideology, as noted in the introduction, refers to a set of beliefs that inform a particular practice. Where the form of the practice and those ideological constructs that inform it are in contradiction as a result of the intrusion of a foreign system, two possibilities exist. The contradiction may be resolved in favour of one or the other system, or it may be tolerated in order to permit a particular form of practice, which is viewed as necessary. Two examples of the link between ideology and practice will illustrate this.

In both communities, when someone comes to your house in need and asks for something that it is in your power to provide, there is a strong obligation to accede to the request. While this is more the case with aboriginal populations, Settlers periodically exhibit the same behaviour.

In Hopedale the value of sharing one's wealth was brought into conflict with an economic practice when the assistant store manager, a local woman of mixed ethnic status married to a Settler, was asked to take over the grading and buying of furs. She complied with the request, but after a short time asked to be relieved of the responsibility, as she could not take the pressure. The pressure arose from the fact that she was constrained to use the government's guidelines for grading furs. This meant that she was rapidly gaining a reputation for being

stingy, which, from her position, was totally undeserved, and so she asked to be taken off the job.

In Davis Inlet, an example of two ideologies of conflict resolution confronting one another also indicates ideological dissonance. One evening, an Innu gentleman was having a small party at his home. At some point in the evening, one of the female guests became violent and started to do some damage to the house. The host attempted to calm her down, but without success, and in the end, called the RCMP to take care of the situation.

When the police officer arrived, he presumably assessed the situation and decided to place the woman under arrest so that she could sleep it off in jail. This action appears to have been the reasonable response, or at least the one expected of a Canadian police officer confronted with a drunk and disorderly person. The host, however, felt that this response was an over-reaction and, in relating the incident, said that he had tried to intervene on the woman's behalf. He explained that it had not been his intention to have the woman arrested, he had just wanted order restored to his home.

He had expected the RCMP officer to conform to the Innut style of conflict resolution rather than respond with coercion. The form of conflict resolution used by the RCMP officer brought home to this individual that it was impossible, in this case at least, to bridge the gap between the two political ideologies.



These two examples of ideological dissonance indicate the level of divergence between the perceptions of the state and those of the native peoples in the economic and jurial forums of activity. However, dissonance is only one aspect of the ideological practice in northern Labrador. The people of Labrador are also engaged in constructing an ideology which counters that imposed on them by the state. Given the level of economic, political, and ideological pressure that the native peoples of northern Labrador have been subject to, their decision to remain in Labrador is a graphic demonstration of their continuing will to resist the intrusion of white society into their social formations.

In sum, the current social formations in Hopedale and Davis Inlet should be viewed within the context of the contact experiences during the mercantile phase of intrusion and the structure which has been imposed during the modern period of intrusion by the state and industrial capital. Further, the resistance engaged in by people of these two communities, both in the past and currently, is indicative of their protracted struggle against the intruders who exploited them in the past and now maintain them in an economically dependent and culturally besieged condition.

Given that the Inuit and Innut have been under political and economic duress for over two hundred years and have had to struggle continually to maintain even a

modicum of control over their own lives, it is somewhat surprising that they have weathered the onslaught as well as they have. The economy in northern Labrador is in a shambles, political control has been abrogated by the state, and social pathologies are numerous. Despite this dismal picture, the people of northern Labrador have elected to remain there. It is obvious that, while they have been bloodied, they are not beaten. The conclusion of this thesis will examine the reasoning behind the decision to stay and also the resistance at the level of ideology.

Conclusion

Staying in northern Labrador is the result of a variety of circumstances of which the social construction of a positive identity as a Labradorian is central. This identity is enmeshed in the act of living in Labrador and the material practices that are, or appear to be, unique to the region. For the Labradorians, this is what sets them apart from and makes them superior to those who live outside Labrador. This opinion is held despite the obvious problems of poverty and the accompanying social disorder; Labradorians believe that their world is at least potentially better than anyone else's, an opinion that is linked to their positive image of place.

The construction of a positive image of place, which is a variable in the decision to stay in northern Labrador, is directly linked to the relations of production, within which the relation between the producer and the product is central. In these terms, it is easier for a hunter to generate a positive image of, and attachment to, his surrounding environment than it is for a wage worker. The hunter is in greater control of the process and the product of his labour than the wage worker, who is alienated from both the production process and the product. That is, he is usually responsible for only part of the labour input required for the production of a commodity or service. And since labour is exchanged for wages, the worker has no control over the product of his labour. This

disintegration of the labour process and the relation of the producer to the product combine to alienate the worker, not only from the work, but from the place where it occurs.

It follows from this that workers involved in a wage-labour production process would be more prone to move than those who have a higher level of control over their economic practice. This appears to be the case. In Labrador, for example, when the military air base at Goose Bay in central Labrador cut back its labour force, the population dropped by 12%. According to census figures, during the same period the population in Hopedale, which experienced a comparable economic depression, dropped 5%, and if figures compiled by Barnett Richling in 1975 and my own from 1981 are used, there was a population increase of 3.7%. In either case, it is apparent that Hopedale is holding on to a much larger proportion of its population.

However, this position oversimplifies the economic and social relations in Hopedale. As noted, in the economic arena a substantial portion of household income comes from wage labour, simple-commodity production, and transfer payments. At the social level, not only is there more than one identity group, but each group tends to occupy a separate sector of the economy. In addition, there is the division of labour by gender. At the level of ideology, these crosscutting factors of social organization and economic practice combine, in a recursive process, to produce discourses about place.

An important differentiation is made in the discourses between Hopedale and "up the bays," that is, outside the village. The basis for this distinction resides both in the fact that the very existence of Hopedale, as a village, is the legacy of European intrusion, and, the fact that the quality of life is, to a large degree, a function of the welfare and regional-development policies of the federal and provincial governments. These factors, coupled with the imposition of an alien political infrastructure, create an atmosphere of powerlessness for the native people. Conversely, they have a much higher level of control when they are "up the bays;" hunting or fishing, they are in total control of their lives and beyond the reach of the state. This gap of control between the village and being "up the bays" widens the further removed one is from the place of optimum power.

This perception of place helps to account for the temporary migration of people from the coastal villages to Goose Bay in the early 1940's, during the construction phase of a military airport. People were willing to move for work as long as they were able to stay fairly close to the north coast of Labrador. But informants also noted that they missed hunting while they were in Goose Bay, and one-half returned to their villages when employment opportunities declined in Goose Bay.

Of course, the definitions of place are not uniform and there are contradictions, as there are in all arenas of

practice. In general, however, this depiction of the perception of place holds. An examination of some of the content of the discourse of the "ideology of place" will illustrate this.

While economic practice is the most important component, others are linked to it and influence a variety of practices, including the production of the ideology. Factors such as kinship, friendship, education, experience of the outside, and the intrusion of the European political and jural systems all contribute to the meaning attributed to Hopedale and "up the bays" as places.

For example, the displacement of pre-European jural systems by the Canadian legal system, complete with laws, police, courts, and jails, is differentially appropriated by Labradorians, according to location. Its application to problems of social control inside the village encounters little resistance, as opposed to its application to the production process, which takes place outside the village, where there is significant resistance. Inside the village, the intervention of police in situations where someone is being violent is often sought by a member of the household in which the disturbance is taking place. Conversely, government regulations that pertain to the harvesting of country food are viewed as inappropriate in the extreme.

An example of this was the criticism expressed about a regulation that required all the passengers in a speedboat (a four to five metre open boat equipped with an outboard

motor) to wear a life jacket. There were three general criticisms. First, there was the expense of outfitting an entire family, which was prohibitive for most. The second was based on the lack of knowledge exhibited by the state in passing such a regulation: it was pointed out that the water in the Labrador Sea was so cold you were likely to freeze to death before you had a chance to drown. And the third criticism related to the production process: in most cases, people were out in speedboats to hunt and/or fish, and all but the most expensive life jackets interfered with these tasks.

The general conclusion was that the state had once again clearly demonstrated that it had no conception of life in Labrador and had instituted regulations with no regard for their effectiveness or deleterious repercussions. Further, at the level of ideological practice, the criticisms of the life-jacket regulation also demonstrate resistance to the attempts of the state to exert its control.

Another important feature in the construction of the "ideology of place" is connected not so much to the control over the production process, but to the attributes required to be a good hunter, trapper, or fisherman. In Hopedale, the gauge used to measure this is in terms of how much acceptable risk and hardship a producer will endure to complete his task. I use the term "acceptable risk" because there is a distinction made between being a hard

man and being a foolish one. A hard man is strong, stoic and willing to endure unfavourable conditions to accomplish a given task. This could entail fishing in foul weather, working long hours, or overcoming the hardship caused by a mechanical breakdown. These are legitimate problems whose supersession indicates superior competence. However, had the hunter gone out knowing his engine would probably break down, or risked going over bad ice in a snowmobile without good reason, he would not garner any respect and would be hard pressed to elicit any sympathy for the suffering he endured.

This component of identity construction does not end with the act itself. Through the retelling of the incident it becomes the subject of part of the community discursive repertoire. There are therefore social and ideological components to the material act of producing. In order to become known as a hard man, a hunter must continually demonstrate ability, tenacity, and judgment. When these actions are then recounted, they not only communicate the skill of the hunter, but also his attachment to, and intimate knowledge of, Labrador. Therefore, this component of personal-identity construction, which is necessarily linked to the harvesting of the natural resources in Labrador and, by definition, can only take place in Labrador, contributes, at the social level, to the construction of a community-inclusive "ideology of place."

Thus far, the analysis has focused on males who are,



with a few exceptions, fishermen, hunters, and trappers. Males therefore have been better able to maintain a continuity in their productive practices throughout the periods of Moravian and state intrusion. They have been able to accomplish this even with the influence of new technology, since most of their traditional skills and knowledge remain in current use. However, women have experienced a significant change in terms of their position in the production process, which has affected their productive activities. Skills such as making sealskin boots and sewing clothes have been devalued with the availability of ready-made replacements. Also, their child-care responsibilities have been reduced by the imposition of state-sponsored institutions, such as schools.

The women are left with a narrower range of economic choices than the men, and those choices are becoming more focused in the village production process of wage labour and craft production. On top of this spatial restriction of economic opportunity to the village, women are also becoming ghettoized in what are perceived (by southerners at least) as women's jobs, that is, nurse's assistants, teacher's aides and clerks. The manual-labour opportunities, which represent the largest proportion of jobs available, are reserved for men.

In addition to these factors, but still linked to the production process, is the fact that the men have greater

access to the bays. Males are the purchasers of the means of transport and have unrestricted access, while the women do not. Further to this, the transformation of hunting techniques obtaining from new technology, such as snowmobiles and speedboats, has dramatically decreased travelling time. This has permitted hunters to leave their families behind in the village and go out on daily hunting excursions. These factors have combined to restrict the women's access to the bays, leaving them more and more with only the village to identify with.

This differential access to the bays as a place, as opposed to Hopedale as a place, has not as yet produced any dramatic difference in the movement of people out of Hopedale on the basis of gender, but there are some small indications that this may become the case. One is that, while being forced out of some traditional productive responsibilities, women are opting out of others. For example, as a consequence of the fact that seal skins are now produced almost exclusively for their exchange value, and the intrusion of southern notions of femininity, younger women no longer clean seal skins, but leave the job for the males. This has the effect of separating women still further from from life outside of the village. Another indication that gender-specific economic change may affect migration is that, of the five students who were attending university in St. John's in 1981, four were women. Although their intention is to return to Labrador

to teach, the lack of opportunity may force them to look elsewhere. This proposition finds support in Carmen Lambert's current research dealing with native migrants to Montreal, in which she has found that women are more prone to migrate than males (Lambert per. com.).

In addition to that part of the "ideology of place" which is based in the relations of production, part is also linked to other factors. One of the most important of these is kinship. On the north coast of Labrador, all Inuit/Settler communities are intermarried. Therefore, there is less reticence about moving from one village to another, as opposed to moving out of Labrador entirely. Nevertheless, even internal migration is not taken lightly.

As well as the practical problems faced by the internal migrants, which include familiarizing themselves with a new micro-environment and, for some, finding a productive fishing berth not currently in use, there are also the social factors of kinship and friendship, which tie people to a place. These networks, while obviously having a practical side, such as being one criterion for choosing a hunting partner, also support a high level of social interaction through which a sense of community is generated, overarching the ethnic and economic divisions in the village. This community spirit was even extended to myself; despite the fact that I was an obvious stranger and a possible spy, I was continually admonished not to be lonely.

Being lonely--that is, being outside of a social network--was given as a reason for the lack of spatial mobility. People who had been sent to the hospital in St. John's or who had gone away to school would complain of loneliness. One informant expressed concern about moving to Happy Valley, a community near Goose Bay, for two months to spend time with the family of one of her sons, because she would get lonely for her friends and family in Hopedale. Therefore, the social relations beyond those of production also contribute to the meaning ascribed to a place.

Finally, as well as the construction of an "ideology of place" based on simple-commodity and use production, for the most part by males, the people must also confront the material reality of living in northern Labrador. The economy in Hopedale, for the majority of residents, barely supports a standard of living that approaches the poverty level. Today, seals are almost not worth hunting, given the low price received for a skin; foxes provide only a small income supplement; and the fishery, through both natural and legal restrictions, only accounts for one-third of the male labour force. Therefore, transfer payments such as welfare, unemployment insurance, and child tax credits have become essential additions to most household budgets. In other words, the state provides the material base which permits people to stay in northern Labrador. It should quickly be added, though, that many are living in a

state of human misery that would daunt any social worker, no matter what his previous experience. Kay Wotton's documentation of the cost of this poverty in terms of the health of the people in northern Labrador, presented in the introduction, demonstrates the seriousness of the situation.

These data would not come as a revelation to the people of Hopedale. They might not have the figures, but they are all too familiar with the effects of poverty which, in addition to a high death rate, include child neglect, wife battering, and alcohol abuse. In spite of all these social problems, which are exacerbated by physical ones such as poor housing, a poor water supply and a scarcity of wood for fuel, people tend to stay. However this should not be seen in terms of Hopedale. A fact was graphically illustrated in 1983, when 79% of the community voted to move to a new location, a plan that was quashed by the provincial cabinet.

The people are not staying in Hopedale; they are staying in Labrador and this is related to the relations of production "up the bays." The push, in the case of Labrador, has not overcome the desire of people to stay there.

These same arguments hold for Davis Inlet. The village is seen as a scar on the land, and everything from poor health to violence is attributed to the stress of living in the village. Conversely, prestige is attributed

to those who demonstrate skill outside the village. Even the availability of new political institutions, through which one form of power can be acquired, is not without its drawbacks and does not carry with it the same respect as that garnered by a leader in the country.

Thus, while most of the actions of the state have had deleterious effects on the people of Davis Inlet and Hopedale, they turn to the land to express their independence and resistance to the state. It is there that the people of northern Labrador live, despite the best efforts of the state to attach them to the villages. And it is over control of that resource base that the current confrontation between the state and the natives of northern Labrador is taking place.

#### A Final Comment

This analysis had three objectives: first, to demonstrate that the transformations in particular social formations in situations of confrontation between two or more social formations obtain from a complex recursive process of interaction; second, to explain certain aspects of the current social formations in two northern Labrador communities; and third, to elucidate the linkages between the two former levels of analysis.

Given this set of goals, the text of the analysis

switched back and forth between two levels of abstraction, depending on what issue was being examined. This format was necessitated by the fact that the questions of why merchant capital came to Labrador, or why a radar base was built just outside of Hopedale, are of a different order than those of why the craft producers in Davis Inlet confronted the state over their form of remuneration, or why the Settlers are over-represented on the Fisherman's Committee in Hopedale. It was, in effect, an effort to combine a micro and a macro approach within a single study. It was not an attempt at a synthesis, which purports to develop an integrated model; rather, it was the application of distinct levels of theory to discrete, but linked, levels of phenomena.

To demonstrate the linkages between the levels of abstraction, the phenomena had to be examined first in their own terms and then placed within an inclusive context. Thus, at the micro level, the Davis Inlet craft producers were maximizing their individual and collective returns in the context of the Canadian state. The structure of the Canadian state was generated from within the context of the capitalist system and the liberal-democratic philosophy. And the capitalist system and liberal-democratic philosophy themselves developed out of the mercantile system and the transformation of the world economy.

Thus, the linkages between the different orders of

phenomena are nested within each other. If the analysis had restricted itself to either level, only a partial picture would have emerged. If only a macro approach is used, significant amounts of detail are lost, leaving an analysis incapable of being operationalized into political action with which the people concerned can identify. By the same token, a micro analysis obscures the historical process which brought them to their present situation. A combination of the two levels is a minimum requirement for a comprehensive, comprehensible analysis useful to the people who were its subjects.

In order to address these two levels of inquiry, the analysis focused on three general forums of practice: the economic, the political, and the ideological. In addition to this, there was the assumption, supported in the data, that all social formations have contradictions which, when subjected to duress, provide the impetus for social change. It is essentially a question of the old solutions no longer being effective due to altered circumstances.

This is not necessarily a bad thing. The technological advancement of man has rendered many solutions redundant, since the problems they were developed to deal with do not exist any more. On the other hand, new problems are generated and, thus, new solutions are needed; hence, change. If history happened in a vacuum, this process would unfold like a chemical reaction in a test tube. However, this is not the case; interference in the



evolution of one social system by another is the rule, not the exception. The altered circumstances are more often than not caused by the intrusion of other groups and the demands they make on those intruded upon. Finally, the change is not only in one direction; there is a process of accommodation. Obviously, the more powerful group in the relationship is not required to make as many compromises, but it must make some or be faced with a situation oscillating between open resistance and potential resistance waiting for the opportunity to erupt.

To comprehend this process in the concrete it is necessary to delineate the structure of the economic, political, and ideological systems in confrontation. This is an analytical exercise and disaggregates what are largely integrated systems. It is, however, the only methodological means to get at the dynamic linkages between analytically discrete practices internal to a given social formation and between different social formations. In this sense, the understanding of social change is a different order of reality than the change itself. It does, however, have the positive attribute of directing attention to those aspects of the interaction which appear to the analyst to be the most worthy of consideration, in terms of both social and political development and for the furtherance of our understanding of social change.

This thesis has been an effort to provide analytical input into this process and, in doing so, to make some

comments about mercantilism and the welfare state. To do so, it was necessary to examine all facets of the interacting systems without blinking. No social formation is perfect, but the individuals who people them deserve the right to decide for themselves what changes are required and not be coerced in any direction.

For this analyst, the issue is clear. The people of Hopedale and Davis Inlet are in pain. Tinkering with the existing structure will not help. As the above analysis has demonstrated, the penetration of capital over the last four hundred years has brought about two fundamental changes in the conditions of existence of the native people of northern Labrador. These are relative material impoverishment and the loss of their political and economic autonomy. While there have also been efforts to transform certain ideological practices to bring them into harmony with those of the dominant sector, this has been less successful. It is in this forum that the people of northern Labrador can begin to rebuild, if they are ever given the chance. However, if the state maintains its authority and continues trying to help, more misery is the only prognosis. The people must be given political and economic control over their own lives. While there are no guarantees in this, at least there is hope.

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
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Appendix "A": The Status of the Native Peoples of Canada

Percentage of Native People\* and of the Non-native Population\*,  
With Less than Grade 5 and With University Degrees, Canada, 1981



\*Population 15 years and over not attending school full-time.  
Source: 1981 Census of Canada.

Housing Conditions of Native and Non-native Private Households,  
Canada, 1981

Housing conditions	Status (on reserve) %	Status (off reserve) %	Non-status/ Metis %	Inuit %	Total native households %	Non-native households %
In need of major repairs		23.0	14.2	13.4	17.3	16.2
Lack central heating	50.7	18.8	16.5	26.3	26.0	9.0
Crowded	31.8	14.3	10.1	42.2	17.9	2.3
Lack Bathroom	30.0	7.7	6.9	14.4	13.1	1.1

Source: 1981 Census of Canada

Percentage Composition by Source of 1980 Income, Native People\* and Non-Native Population\*, Canada, 1981

%	Native People	Non-Native Population	%
100 -			100
	D 2.9%	D 9.6%	
	C 17.2%	C 8.3%	
		B 6.2%	
80 -	B 3.4%		80
60 -			60
40 -			40
	A 76.5%	A 75.9%	
20 -			20
0			0

A. Wages and salaries.

B. Self-employment.

C. Government transfer payments.

D. Investments, retirement and other income.

\* Population 15 years and over.

Source: 1981 Census of Canada.


Average 1980 Income of Native People\* and of the Non-native Population\*, Canada

	Status (on reserve)	Status (off reserve)	Non- status	Metis	Inuit	Total non- native people	Non- native population
	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$
Total	7,100	8,800	9,900	9,500	8,300	8,600	13,000
Male	8,300	11,000	12,800	12,200	10,100	10,700	17,000
Female	5,300	6,300	6,700	6,400	5,700	6,100	8,400

\*Population 15 years and over.


\*Source: 1981 Census of Canada.

Percentage Distribution by Labour Force Activity of Native People\* and of the Non-native Population, \* Rural and Urban Areas, by Sex, Canada, 1981




- A. Not in the labour force.
- B. Unemployed.
- C. Employed.

\*Population 15 years and over.  
Source: 1981 Census of Canada.




Estimated proportion of registered Indians receiving social assistance, by province, 1973-1974




Source: Social Security: National Programs, Catalogue 86-201, 1978.


Major offences of native and non-native inmates in federal penitentiaries on December 31, 1976



Source: Operational Information Services; Canadian Penitentiary Services.



Hospital admissions per 100,000 persons, by type or cause of illness 1976.



1. Figures for all Canadians are for 1975.

2. This figure represents the total of admissions, i.e. an individual is counted each time admitted to hospital.



3. The native sample includes registered Indians from Saskatchewan and British Columbia and persons residing on reserves in Alberta.

Source: Hospital Morbidity, Catalogue 82-206, 1975; unpublished data, Health Division, Statistics Canada.

Appendix "B": Map of Quebec-Labrador Peninsula

Map Key

1. Cape Chidleigh
2. Nachvak Post
3. Ramah
4. Saglak Fjord
5. Hebron
6. Okak
7. Nain
8. Zoar
9. Davis Inlet
10. Hopedale
11. Avertok
12. Aillik
13. Makkovik
14. Hamilton Inlet
15. Rigolet
16. North West River
17. Mud Lake
18. Cartwright
19. Chateau Bay
20. Strait of Belle Isle
21. Bed Bay
22. Anse-a-Loup
23. Brador Bay
24. Blanc Sablon

25. Mingan
26. Lake Nikabau
27. Lake Nemiscau
28. Fort Rupert
29. Eastmain Post
30. Great Whale River Post
31. Little Whale River Post
32. Richmond Gulf
33. Povungnituk
34. Cape Smith
35. Fort Chimo
36. Manuan Post
37. South River House (later renamed Fort Mackenzie)
38. Indian House Lake
39. Fort Trail
40. Caniapiscau Lake
41. Fort Nascopeie



Appendix "C": Chronology of the Quebec-Labrador Peninsula

## Introduction

The following chronology is a list of events which took place in northern Labrador, or which took place outside of northern Labrador but had a direct effect on life there. However, it is important to understand that there are no turning points in this chronology. Rather, all the events took place within a historical context and are part of the process of the penetration of capital or the response to it. The events do not speak for themselves; rather, it is the placement of the events in an analytical framework which give them meaning.

Nevertheless, the events were chosen to highlight five features:

1. the documentation of the penetration of capital;
2. the constant threat of privation faced by the aboriginal peoples in all regions of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula;
3. the competitive relationship between the European intruders;
4. the political-economic relationships between the aboriginal polities and the Europeans;

5. the political-economic relationships between the aboriginal polities.

Further, not all the entries that appear in the chronology appear in the text. To do this would have been impractical, in that it would have made the text too cumbersome. Nevertheless, the chronology is an effort to speak to this lacuna in the text by providing a more complete rendering of the history of northern Labrador.

Mercantilism: The Competitive Phase

1501 Henry VII grants some Bristol merchants and three Portuguese ten-year trade monopolies in the New World, with permission to enter one vessel duty-free for four years (Biggar 1901).

1522 With the French fleet reaching eighty ships and the large amount of English capital invested in the fisheries, the Vice Admiral deems it advisable to send several men-of-war to the mouth of the English Channel to protect the returning fleet from French privateers (Biggar 1901: 20).



1527 Fifty Portuguese ships on the grand Banks (Biggar 1901).

1534 Cartier's first voyage to the St. Lawrence valley.

1535 Cartier's second voyage during which he meets north-shore Innut as far north as Quebec City (Biggar 1901).

1541 Francis I sends an expedition of five ships, four hundred sailors, and three hundred soldiers which is to conquer the Kingdom of the Saguenay (Anik 1976).

Cartier's third voyage to the St. Lawrence.

1545 Cod becomes one of the regular export items from France to England (Biggar 1901).

The height of the Basque whale fishery; 1545-1585 (Barkham 1980)

1567 The Portuguese attempt to found a colony on Sable Island (Biggar 1901).

1570 A large company is formed at Rouen for sending ships to the Banks (Biggar 1901).

1581 St. Malo merchants send one thirty-ton barque to the upper St. Lawrence to trade, and in the years following they increase their tonnage. (Biggar 1901).

1586 About three hundred ships working the Banks (Biggar 1901).

The French presence in southern Labrador extended from Brador Bay to the Straits of Belle Isle (Richling 1976).

1594 Pierre Chauvin grants a ten year monopoly for trade in New France on condition he take fifty settlers a year for the duration of the monopoly (Biggar 1901).

1600 Beaver skins begin to be used in the manufacture of luxury hats around this time, and become an important trade item. The apex of Iroquois power on the St. Lawrence (Trigger 1976).

Inuit occupation of Hopedale region begins (Jordan 1977).

Tadoussac is the centre for the fur trade (Denton 1983).

1601 Chauvin's monopoly is partially undermined as trade is extended to merchants in Rouen and St. Malo (Biggar 1901).

1603 Eighty ships visit the Banks. Jural restriction on bartering by crews with aboriginals is resented. Champlain feels that without a trade monopoly, colonization would never succeed (Biggar 1901).

North-shore Innut-Algonquian-Huron -- alliance succeeds in opening up the St. Lawrence below Montreal Island. The Iroquois still control the river below Montreal (Anik 1976).

1604 France grants a new-ten year monopoly, with the proviso that sixty settlers be transported every year. Only the shareholders were allowed to trade, not the settlers (Biggar 1901).

1608 Quebec becomes the capital of New France.

French help the north-shore Innut and Algonkians raid the Iroquois.

- 1610 French help the north-shore Innut against the Iroquois again (Anik 1976).
- St. Malo merchants petition the King for two warships to attack Inuit who were interfering with the fishery (Trudel 1981).
- 1611 Henry Hudson spends the winter in Hudson Bay, enters into some barter.
- 1617 Resentment against monopolies result in disagreements between traders and Amerindians: two Frenchmen are killed (Trigger 1976).
- 1623 Tadoussac Amerindians became dependent on European commodities (Trigger 1976).
- 1627 Cardinal Richelieu forms the Company of 100 Associates (The Company of New France) to trade in New France (Anik 1976).
- 1628 British capture seven of the Associates' ships in the Gulf of the St. Lawrence (Munroe 1938).
- 1629 Scottish and English Company is formed and obtain its charter from Charles I (Munroe 1938).

- 1632 Habitant Company is formed (Munroe 1938).
- 1634 Six years of epidemics begin among the north-shore Innut (Trigger 1976).
- 1636 Three hundred Iroquois invade the Richelieu Valley.
- 1641 Montreal is founded, and is continually harrassed by the Iroquois until 1661 (Anik 1976).
- 1643 Mohawk raids shut off the north-shore Innut from their hunting grounds south of the St. Lawrence river (Trigger 1976).
- 1645 Colonists in New France get the right to trade (Munroe 1938).
- 1647 Forty private traders organize flying camps which did not set up trading posts (Munroe 1938).
- 1649 Iroquois destroy two Huron villages (Francis and Morantz 1983).
- 1650 Hurons abandon Huronia (Anik 1976).
- Iroquois begin to raid the James Bay region (Francis and Morantz 1983).

1654 Tadoussac colonists ask for and get a policy of free trade (Munroe 1938).

Flying Camps outlawed (Munroe 1938).

1660 James Bay region becomes a refuge for those Amerindians trying to avoid raids by the Iroquois (Francis and Morantz 1983).

1661 The King of France grants land concessions that covered all the territory from Isle-aux-Oeufs to Brador Bay (Trudel 1981).

1663 The Company of New France is dissolved and the King's Posts created, covering the territory stretching from Ile-aux-Coudres to two leagues below Sept-Îles along the St. Lawrence and northward to Hudson Bay (Anik 1976).

1668 English establish Charles Fort on the Rupert River, abandoned 1755 (Voorhis 1930.)

Grosseilliers winter at the mouth of the Rupert River and traded for furs (Cooke 1976).

1670 Hudson's Bay Company receives a Royal Charter.

1672 The French open a post at Lake Mistassini (Francis and Morantz 1976).

1673 English build Moose Fort at the mouth of the Moose River (Francis and Morantz 1983).

English capture a French trader in the James Bay region and send him to England (Anik 1976).

1678 France grants La Salle a monopoly that pre-empts other French traders (Anik 1976).

1682 Grosseliers and Raddisson trade with Inuit in Okak region (Taylor 1974).

1683 French open a post on Lake Temiscaminique (Anik 1976).

The HBC opens Fort Albany (Voorhis 1930).

1685 Compagnie de Nord grants a twenty-year monopoly for trade in the Hudson Bay region (Anik 1976).

- 1686 The French invade James Bay and capture all three English posts (Francis and Morantz 1983).
- 1690 Hudson's Bay Company is oversupplied with furs; the price begins to drop (Francis and Morantz 1976).
- 1690 The English burn down Mingan (Anik 1976).
- 1692 The English send an expedition to retake Albany Fort (Francis and Morantz 1983).
- 1694 Some trade between the Inuit and participants in the French migratory fishery (Trudel 1981).
- Inuit trade with the French north of Chateau Bay; by this time they have already obtained many European wooden boats (Taylor 1974).
- 1702 Courtemanche gets trading concession for territory from Kegusha River to Hamilton Inlet to establish trade with the Inuit and pursue the seal fishery (Taylor 1974).
- 1709 One hundred French Canadians with the aid of thirty Mowhaws, attack Moose River and Albany Forts, unsuccessfully (Francis and Morantz 1983).



1710 Some traders restrict their trade to liquor (Anik 1976).

1711 English burn down Mingan again (Anik 1976).

1712 The French begin to fish for cod in the Strait of Belle Isle again, after the stoppage in the 1630's (Trudel 1981).

1713 Treaty of Utrecht signed, depriving France of its posts on Hudson Bay (Innis 1970).

Inuit make raids against French fishing stations, and continue until 1763; French retaliate by killing Inuit (Trudel 1981).

French grant concessions to merchants for sections of southern Labrador (Trudel 1981).

1715 Conflict between the French and the Inuit is exacerbated by the Inuit's acquisition of guns, probably from American traders (Richling 1979).

Up to thirty north-shore Inuit families work for French traders of the Rivière-des-Esquimaux post in the seal fishery and as suppliers of fresh meat (Trudel 1981).

1716 Inuit do some trade with members of the migratory cod fishery in the Strait of Belle Isle (Trudel 1981).

As trade intensifies, alcohol becomes more important as a trade item (Francis and Morantz 1983).

1720 Cuget is given a five-year lease over the King's Posts, and eliminates the liquor trade (Anik 1976).

Brandy becomes one of the Hudson's Bay Company's most important trade items (Francis and Morantz 1983).

1723 The HBC builds permanent post at the mouth of the Eastmain River (Davies 1963), closes 1838.

1727 Moravian mission create a worldwide missionary movement (Richling 1979).

1728 Recommendation is made by a HBC employee to build a trading post at Moose River, as the Indians are starving trying to get to Eastmain (Francis and Morantz 1983).

1730 The HBC begins to rebuild Moose Fort, which had been destroyed around 1696 (Voorhis 1930).

Twenty-six reports of privation from Eastmain region (1730-1739) (Ross 1979).

1738 Moose River and Albany Amerindians go north on a raiding party (Ross 1978).

1740 Thirty reports of privation from the Eastmain region (1740-1749) (Ross 1979).

The HBC traders are angry over the establishment of a trade network by the leading Moose River Indian, who continue to play the French off against the English with great success for twenty years (Francis and Morantz 1983).

1741 Inuit trade eight quintals of baleen at Belle Isle (Trudel 1981).

The HBC opens Henley House, closes 1759; it is reopened 1764, and closed 1857 (Voorhis 1930).

1743 Europeans at Cape Charles fire on a group of Inuit; in retaliation, the Inuit attack the post and kill three Europeans (Trudel 1981).

Fornel establishes a post in Hamilton Inlet (Zimmerly 1975).

1746 Cuget loses money and does not renew his lease (Anik 1976).

1748 Dobbs launches a campaign against the HBC (Davies 1963).

1749 The HBC post established at Richmond Gulf, closes 1749 (Voorhis 1930).

1750 Inuit summer trading journeys to southern Labrador a regular occurrence; up to three hundred people (Taylor 1974).

Twenty-two reports of privation from the Eastmain region (1750-1759) (Ross 1979).

1752 First Moravian attempt at setting up a mission ends with seven Europeans being killed, and the mission house plundered (Taylor 1974).

1753 Amerindians came into Eastmain complaining of a hard winter (Ross 1978).

1755 Henley House is attacked and looted, five Englishmen killed (Francis and Morantz 1983).

1756 Amerindian hunters at Eastmain complain about the interference of the "French traders" (Francis and Morantz 1983).

Fur and fishery on the north-shore disrupted by the Seven Years War (Trudel 1981).

1758 Letter from Moose River to Eastmain expresses fear of an Amerindian attack (Ross 1978).

1759 English warships attack and destroy French fishing and trading stations on the north-shore up to the Strait of Belle Isle (Trudel 1981).

Wolfe captures Quebec for the English.

A James Bay Innut leader tries to get some support among the Amerindians and the French for an attack on Moose Factory (Francis and Morantz 1983).

Henley House is attacked by Innut, one Englishman is killed (Francis and Morantz 1983).

1760 England conquers New France (Trigger 1976).

Reports of New England fishermen attacking north-shore Innut during the 1760's, 1770's's, 1780's, and 1790's (Trudel 1981).

Thirty-nine reports of privation from Eastmain region (1760-1769) (Ross 1979).

Gosling notes that the Inuit who travel south to raid the fishing stations in southern Labrador are an organized band (1910).

1761 The Governor of Canada grants eight concessions in southern Labrador to Quebec City merchants for periods ranging from one to nine years (Trudel 1981).

Mercantile Period: The Monopoly Phase

1763 Treaty of Paris is signed, Labrador becomes a British possession, and the French are not allowed to land on the coast (Taylor 1974).

English take over King's Posts and leases them to

private traders (Cooke 1976).

Labrador coast is put under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Newfoundland (Hiller 1977).

1764 Palliser, Governor of Newfoundland, abolishes concessions, allows free access to all British subjects (Trudel 1981).

Jens Haven, a Moravian missionary, meets with a group of two hundred Inuit, on the Island of Querpont, who had been trading with the French (Trudel 1981).

More than one hundred ships were exploiting the whale fishery in the Labrador Sea (Trudel 1981).

Haven reports to Palliser that peaceful trade with the Inuit is possible (Richling 1979).

The crew of a Boston Whaler are reported to have robbed and plundered a group of Inuit, taking away five of them (Trudel 1981).

1765 Four Moravians visit the north coast of Labrador, unsuccessfully looking for a mission site (Hiller 1977).

Moravians ask for four hundred thousand acres from the British government in order to establish a mission station. The British are flabbergasted (Richling 1979).

French continue poaching in Labrador and in the Strait of Belle Isle (Gosling 1910).

Palliser issues an edict concerning the treatment of the Inuit in an effort to improve relations (Richling 1979).

Haven and Palliser visit the Labrador coast and meet with three hundred Inuit in Chateau Bay (Trudel 1981).

1766 Palliser issues his proposals for the the Labrador fishery in which he links the fishery to training sailors for the British navy: also included are recommendations for free trade, no permanent residents in Labrador, a bonus for captains going to Labrador, a defence and judicial plan, a plea for the acceptance of the Moravian plan.

Moravians ask for one hundred thousand acres for the establishment of a mission station (Richling 1979).



New England fishermen are accused by Palliser of harassing the Inuit (Gosling 1910).

1767 Independent traders competing with the HBC force the Company to increase the gifts they offer to the Amerindians (Francis and Morantz 1983).

York Fort is established to enforce the fishing regulations (Taylor 1974), closed 1775.

Inuit raid a post in southern Labrador, and kill three. In response, a detachment is sent from York Fort to take revenge; they kill twenty and capture nine (Trudel 1981).

English fishermen complain to Palliser that other nationalities are disrupting the fishery (Gosling 1910).

1768 Moravians reapply for a land grant (Hiller 1977).

1769 Through an Order in Council the Moravians to acquire a one hundred thousand acre tract of land.

The HBC increases the price offered for furs to meet the competition (Francis and Morantz 1983).

1770 Cartwright establishes a trading post on the south coast of Labrador which operates for fifteen years (Taylor 1974).

The southern Labrador whaling station of Captain Darbny is attacked by Inuit in retaliation for the attacks of New England whalers (Taylor 1974).

Moravian mission made three agreements with Inuit for land purchases (Hiller 1977).

Thirty-seven reports of privation from the Eastmain region (1770-1779) (Ross 1979).

1771 Moravians establish first mission station at Nain.

1772 Two hundred Inuit die of exposure during a trading expedition to southern Labrador (Trudel 1981).

1773 Captain Cartwright takes five Inuit back with him to England in order for them to be able to explain England to other Inuit. Four of them die, and the other is a carrier of disease on her return (Trudel 1981).

1774 Quebec Act authorizes the return of colonial jurisdiction of Labrador to Quebec (Richling 1979).

An Order in Council grants the Moravians two more one hundred thousand acre tracts of land, one north of and one south of Nain (Hiller 1977).

1775 One hundred British ships are working the floater codfishery (Black 1960).

1776 Moravians open Okak, closed 1919.

1777 Moravians choose land for Hopedale settlement and acquire it from the Inuit (Hiller 1977).

1778 Report of Moose River and Albany Fort Amerindians going north to raid Inuit (Ross 1978).

Independent trader working south of Hopedale (Williamson 1964).

1779 North West Company is formed to compete with the HBC (Francis and Morantz 1983).

A poor year in Hopedale economically leads to some privation (Richling 1979).

Many corpses of Inuit are found at the entrance to Hamilton Inlet, death possibly caused by an epidemic of smallpox (Trudel 1981).

1780 Twenty-six reports of privation from Eastmain region (1780-1789) (Ross 1979).

1781 Report of Moose factory Amerindians making raids north (Ross 1978).

Inuit travel south to obtain guns (Trudel 1781).

1782 Moravians establish Hopedale.

1783 Eighty Inuit from Nain go south to trade (Taylor 1974).

To encourage the Inuit to move to their stations, the Moravians start to build houses for them in Hopedale and Nain (Kleivan 1966).

1784 Two associations of Quebec City traders open up posts at the mouth of the North West River, remain in operation until the turn of the century (Trudel 1981).

- 1785 Moravians begin to trade guns (Taylor 1974).
- 1786 An Inuit leader in Avertok, an Inuit settlement near Hopedale, holds a meeting in which he tells those who attend not to have anything to do with the Moravians (Brice-Bennett 1983).
- 1788 Missionaries are directed to encourage trade in fine furs as it is believed that a high profit can be obtained from them (Richling 1979).
- 1789 The Inuit in Hopedale are visited by the Superintendent of the Labrador mission, who holds a meeting in which he reasserts the authority of the Moravians following a challenge by the Inuit leader in Avertok (Brice-Bennett 1982).
- 1790 Thirty-five reports of privation from Eastmain region (1790-1799) (Ross 1979).
- 1791 The HBC begins to trade whale oil produced by Amerindians in Great Whale River region (Francis and Morantz 1983).
- 1792 Inuit report death from starvation in southern Labrador (Brice-Bennett 1982).

1793 HBC attempts to set up a trading post at Little Whale River, which ends in failure, as Europeans are thought to have been attacked by Inuit (Francis and Morantz 1983).

1795 A "bad year for Inuit in the Hopedale region (Richling 1979).

1796 Epidemic among the station Inuit in Labrador; Moravians complain that they resort to shamanism for a cure (Brice-Bennett 1982).

Each Moravian mission is assigned a "store brother," whose only responsibility is taking care of the commerce at each mission station (Richling 1979).

1799 Missionaries stop local European inhabitants from using their seal nets in the Hopedale region (Richling 1979).

Privation in Nain region; Inuit cut firewood for the Moravians in order to obtain supplies (Brice-Bennett 1982).

Privation in Avertok region near Hopedale (Richling 1979).

A religious revival takes place in Hopedale (Kennedy (1977)).

1800 Whaling in Okak region fails (Taylor 1977).

Report of privation in Avertok region (Richling 1979).

Seventeen reports of privation from the Eastmain region (1800-1809) (Ross 1979).

1801 Report of privation in Avertok region (Richling 1979).

1802 Moravians meet two English traders in Okak region (Brice-Bennett 1982).

Group of Innuit goes north on a raid against the Inuit (Ross 1979).

North West Company takes out a twenty-year lease on the King's Posts.

Moravians on the coast apply to their head office to remit all debts due to the hard economic times (Richling 1979).

1803 The North West Company invades James Bay, and the HBC responds by opening a post at Big River, which is moved to Great Whale River in 1813 (Francis and Morantz 1983).

Privation in Hopedale (Richling 1979).

1804 After a number of years of economic hardship there is a second wave of spirituality among the Inuit in Hopedale (Richling 1979).

1805 Dependence of the Inuit on trade necessitates their participation in the fishery (Brice-Bennett 1982).

1806 Seal nets are introduced (Gosling 1910).

Inuit are still practicing shamanism (Brice-Bennett 1982).

1809 Labrador is returned to Newfoundland.

1810 Fifteen reports of privation from Eastmain region (1810-1819) (Ross 1979).

Heathen camps north and south of Hopedale begin to rely on the Moravians during periods of privation (Richling 1979).



- 1815 Privation in Okak and Nain (Brice-Bennett 1982).
- 1816 Privation in the Okak and Nain region (Brice-Bennett 1982).
- HBC opens up a post at Lake Nichicun.
- 1818 New period of spirituality in Hopedale (Brice-Bennett 1982).
- Hopedale Inuit catch a large number of seals and decide against the cod fishery (Brice-Bennett 1982).
- Order in Council gives the Moravians the Hebron land grant (Hiller 1977).
- The HBC closes some of its interior posts, believing that it has enough to attract interior Amerindians (Francis and Morantz 1983).
- 1820 Missionaries hire Inuit to work mission-owned nets to catch harp seals (Richling 1979).

1821 Poverty forces Inuit living north of Okak into the station (Brice-Bennett 1982).

Privation in Nain (Brice-Bennett 1982).

North West Company and the HBC amalgamate.

1822 Privation in Nain (Brice-Bennett 1982).

Famine widespread in northern Labrador (Brice-Bennett 1982).

The HBC does not renew its lease on the King's Posts (Cooke 1976).

1823 Large numbers of Inuit moving to mission stations in response to famine (Brice-Bennett 1982).

1826 HBC open up posts in Hamilton Inlet and at Rigolet.

Newfoundland sets up a circuit court, which runs until 1833 when it is abandoned due to lack of business and high costs (Goudie 1973).

1830 The HBC buys back King's Posts, which gives it an effective monopoly (Cooke 1976).

The HBC establishes Fort Chimo in Ungava Bay, which is closed in 1849, and reopened in 1866.

Moravians establish Hebron Mission, closed 1959.

1831 Barren-ground Innut first visit Fort Chimo (Cooke 1969).

A.B. Hunt open up a trading post at Davis Inlet (Richling 1979).

1832 Newfoundland gets colonial status.

The HBC opens South River House, closed which is 1880 (Voorhis 1930).

Barren-ground Innut first trade at Fort Chimo (Cooke 1976).

There is privation in Hebron and Nain.

1833 Conversion of the Inuit proves to be a slow process: in Hebron in 1833 none were converted, in 1834 only one, and six in 1835.

1834 The HBC opens Kaniapiscaw Post, which it closes in 1869 (Voorhis 1930).

Barren-ground Innut visit free traders at Hamilton Inlet and find a better standard of trade than at Fort Chimo (Cooke 1969).

The HBC raises standard of trade in response to the demands of the barren-ground Innut (Cooke 1976).

The Moravians recognize the permanent nature of the independent traders and begin to refer to them as "settlers" (Brice-Bennett 1982).

1835 Children at mission stations begin to attend school at age five. Their curriculum includes hymns, verses, Biblical readings, the alphabet, and spelling (Brice-Bennett 1982).

Most of the Amerindians stay away from Fort Chimo (Cooke 1976).

Many families in Hopedale are near starvation (Brice-Bennett 1982).

1836 The HBC opens up a post at North West River to compete with the independent traders; after one year it buys out the competition (Cooke 1976).

There is a hard winter in Okak and Nain.

1837 Scarcity of seals in Hopedale region causes hardship (Brice-Bennett 1982).

Hopedale Inuit earn food by cutting wood for the Mission (Brice-Bennett 1982).

The HBC opens Kaipokok, which it closes 1879 (Voorhis 1930).

1838 The HBC opens Fort Siverright (later called George River Post), which is the first HBC post to deal exclusively with Inuit.

There is starvation in Fort Chimo region (Cooke 1976).

The HBC opens Fort Nascopie, which it closes 1880 (Voorhis 1930).

A Moravian report notes that there is a great deal of debt among the Inuit (Richling 1979).

1839 Hebron Inuit take their trade to the HBC  
(Brice-Bennett 1982).

Inuit in Okak make false seal returns to the  
Mission (Brice-Bennett 1982).

Hopedale Inuit begin to build houses out of wood  
instead of sod (Brice-Bennett 1982).

The HBC opens Fort Trail, which it closes 1842.  
(Voorhis 1930).

1840 There is privation in Nain (Brice-Bennett 1982).

The HBC opens Ailik House, which employs a number  
of Inuit; it closes in 1871 (Voorhis 1930).

Hopedale Inuit begin to build wooden boats  
(Brice-Bennett 1982).

Twenty Inuit die of starvation in the interior  
(Cooke 1976).

1841 The HBC institutes beaver conservation policy,  
which is repealed in 1841 (Francis and Morantz).

1843 Barren-ground Innut suffer serious privation because a HBC agent does not supply enough ammunition (Cooke 1976).

1844 Epidemic in Nain (Kleivan 1966).

1845 Famine in Nain due to poor sealing (Kleivan 1966).

Disease widespread in Hopedale (Brice-Bennett 1982).

1846 Starvation amongst the barren-ground Innut (Cooke 1976).

1847 In an effort to stop Inuit from trading with private traders, the Moravians make doing so a sin, the punishment for which is exclusion (Brice-Bennett 1982).

1848 Privation experienced by the barren-ground Innut (Cooke 1976).

Increasing European presence on the south coast of Labrador acts as a draw for the Inuit to trade their production (Brice-Bennett 1982).

1849 Privation among barren ground Innut (Cooke 1976).

Moravians increase tarriffs in Hopedale in response to competition (Richling 1979).

Incidence of shamanism in Okak (Brice-Bennett 1983).

Privation on the Labrador coast (Kleivan 1966).

1850 The barren-ground Innut regularly travel to the coast of Labrador to trade with the HBC (Heniksen 1973).

Inuit suffer severe privation (Brice-Bennett 1982).

1851 Labrador Inuit suffer severe privation (Brice-Bennett 1982).

Settlers begin to attend Moravian services in Hopedale (Richling 1979).

1853 Labrador Inuit suffer severe privation (Brice-Bennett 1982).



1855 Labrador Inuit suffer severe privation  
(Brice-Bennett 1982).

Newfoundland granted Home Rule.

1856 Hopedale Inuit have poor seal fishery and cannot  
get out of debt (Brice-Bennett 1982).

Famine in Okak region (Brice-Bennett 1982).

1857 Fifty barren-ground Inuit die from starvation;  
seventy evacuate to Nain (Cooke 1976).

Privation in Nain leads to a break-in at the  
mission store (Brice-Bennett 1982).

Settlers join the Hopedale congregation (Kleivan  
1966).

1858 Barren-ground Inuit begin to trade regularly at  
Davis Inlet and Voisey's Bay, on the Labrador coast  
(Williamson 1964).

There is increasing interest shown in the Labrador  
fishery by Newfoundland fishermen; thus, goods not  
available from the Moravian mission could be  
obtained from the schooner men (Brice-Bennett 1982).

The HBC open Zoar, which it closes in 1861 (Voorhis 1930).

1859 Forty to seventy Innut die of starvation (Richling 1979).

1861 Two hundred heathen are still living north of Hebron (Kleivan 1966).

1862 Many people in Hopedale are subsisting on credit (Richling 1979).

Serious privation in Nain region (Kleivan 1966).

1863 Moravians tighten credit (Richling 1979).

Labrador circuit court reestablished.

1865 Moravians open a station at Zoar, which is closed in 1890.

1866 Lay storekeepers are hired by Moravians (Richling 1979).

Newfoundland rejects confederation with Canada.

The mission tightens credit again (Kennedy 1977).

Fort Chimo is reopened (Voorhis 1930).

- 1867 The British North American Act is passed.
- 1868 One hundred and eight schooners reach Hopedale (Gosling 1910).
- 1869 Five hundred schooners pass by Hopedale (Richling 1979).
- 1870 Oatmeal, which had been given to the James Bay people in times of need, is made a trade item (Francis and Morantz 1982).
- 1871 The Moravians establish Ramah, which is closed in 1907.
- 1873 The Moravians place limits on credit (Richling 1979).
- 1877 There is generalized impoverishment (Kleivan 1966).
- 1881 An epidemic of measles in Nain interferes with the fishery (Kleivan 1966).

- 1882 Many fishermen in Okak cannot fish due to illness (Kleivan 1966).
- 1885 There is privation among the barren-ground Innut who trade at Zoar.
- 1891 Moravian's profit margin drops 125%; they remit L5 from all outstanding debts and credit a like amount to accounts with surpluses (Richling 1979).
- 1893 One hundred and fifty barren-ground Innut die of starvation (Cooke 1976).
- 1894 The peak of the floater fishery 1894-1898: 1500 to 1800 schooners and 15,000 to 20,000 men (Gosling 1910).
- 1895 A group of unconverted Inuit are still living north of Ramah and trading with the HBC at Nachvak (Kleivan 1966).
- There is serious privation at Nain (Kleivan 1966).
- 1896 The Moravians establish Makkovik.

1898 Universal remission of 50% of all Moravian debts (Richling 1979).

1900 The HBC starts cash purchases (Richling 1979).

The Paris based company, Revillon Frères, begins to compete seriously with the HBC (Cooke 1976).

1903 Revillon Frères open a post at Fort Chimo which operates until 1930, and has the effect of driving up fur prices (Cooke 1976).

Inuit in Ungava scuttle a European ship in response to the ship's crew hunting in their territory (Cabot 1912).

The Moravians open a hospital in Okak (Kleivan 1966).

A few years prior to 1903 the Inuit are said to have rushed Davis Inlet post after having not acquired what they wanted (Cabot 1912).

1904 There is an influenza epidemic among unconverted Inuit north of Ramah (Kleivan 1966).

Moravians found Killinek, which is closed in 1924

- 1905 Labrador Inuit who were taken for display purposes to Europe and the U.S. return with diseases which they spread among the population (Kleivan 1966).
- 1909 There is an influenza epidemic in Okak (Kleivan 1966).
- 1911 Mention is made of tuberculosis in Nain (Kleivan 1966).
- 1915 The HBC open Fort Mackenzie, which runs until 1948 (Voorhis 1930).
- 1916 Ground rents are introduced by the Moravians (Hiller 1977).

Caribou shift migration route (Henriksen 1973).

The Moravians invoke territorial privilege to stop an Inuk trader from operating on mission property. The Newfoundland Minister of Justice informs the Moravians that they have no legal right to stop the Inuk from trading near Hopedale (Richling 1979).

The first cases of measles are discovered (Kleivan 1966).

1918 There is a spanish flu epidemic; 875 out of a population of 1270 survive (Tanner 1944).

1920 During decade 1920-1930 the floater fishery comes to an end, the caribou populations are depleted, beluga whales retreat north (Kennedy 1977, Henriksen 1973, Williamson 1964).

1921 Hopedale cod fishery is a failure, a precursor of severe privation (Richling 1979).

1924 Inuit debts are at an all time high (Richling 1979).

The Moravians tighten credit (Kleivan 1966).

A Roman Catholic priest visits Davis Inlet and appoints a chief (Henriksen 1973).

1925 It is a good year for foxes in Hebron, but people still suffer from privation (Kleivan 1966).

The Welfare State: Transition period

1926 Moravians sell out to the HBC, which wants fine furs to the exclusion of seal and cod (Williamson 1964).

1927 There is a settlement of the Labrador-Quebec boundary dispute in favour of Newfoundland.

1928 A Roman Catholic priest begins annual visits to Davis Inlet.

It is a poor year for fur in Davis Inlet; Innut live off state relief.

1929 There is privation in Davis Inlet; Priest asks state for authorization to issue relief.

1930 The price of fox furs drops in 1930's (Williamson 1964).

The HBC authorized to import duty-free if it handles Labrador welfare (Kennedy 1977).

1931 There is privation in Davis Inlet.



1932 The HBC cancels credit.

1933 Several cases of tuberculosis are reported among the Innut at Fort Mackenzie (Hammond 1982).

1934 The Newfoundland Rangers take over the issuing of relief (Heniksen 1973).

Newfoundland is administered by a Commission.

Newfoundland Rangers are stationed in Hopedale.

An Inuk is banished from Hopedale for holding dances.

There is privation in Hopedale.

The Inuit in Hopedale are angry at the HBC credit policy and threaten the store manager.

1935 Nearly all single males in Hopedale are excluded for immorality.

An independent trader in Cartwright is paying better prices than the HBC.

1936 On learning that a private trader is on his way up the coast, the HBC increases its prices.

A Newfoundland Ranger asks for some return on the relief he dispenses.

1937 Whooping-cough epidemic in Davis Inlet.

1938 The Elders in Hebron are accused of fomenting dissent against the Moravians (Richling 1979).

There is privation in Hopedale.

1939 There are reports of scurvy in Hopedale.

Hopedale residents complain about the "no debt" policy.

1940 There is privation in Hopedale.

1941 Construction of military airport at Goose Bay begins.

There are reports of privation from Nain and Hopedale.

Influenza is reported in Davis Inlet.

There is privation among the Innut while they are in the interior.

The Welfare State

1942 The HBC gets out of the Labrador trade, and the Newfoundland government takes over.

Seventy-two boats built in Bonivista are provided to Labrador fishermen through a government loan program (1942-1949) (Williamson 1964).

Elders are elected for first time in Hopedale.

There is influenza in Hopedale.

There is reference to unconverted living near Hopedale.

There is an epidemic in Davis Inlet during the summer.

1943 There are sixty cases of influenza in Hopedale.

1944 The Newfoundland government introduces cod traps (Williamson 1964).

There is privation in Hopedale.

A Newfoundland Ranger throws out Inuit homebrew.

There is privation among Davis Inlet Innut.

1945 The Newfoundland government directs economic development policy toward wage labour (Kennedy 1977).

1946 Dogs are starving to death in Hopedale.

Labrador is democratically represented (Kennedy 1977).

Some Hopedale families move to Kaipokok Bay to work in a pulp-wood operation (Richling 1979).

1948 A day school is started in Hopedale; before this the children had been sent to Makkovik.

Oblates start a permanent mission in Davis Inlet.

- 1949 Newfoundland enters Confederation.
- 1951 Construction of radar base in Hopedale begins.  
Settlers move to Hopedale.  
The Newfoundland Rangers are absorbed by the RCMP.  
The federal government acknowledges responsibility for the native people of Labrador.
- 1952 A permanent priest stationed at Davis Inlet (Henriksen 1973).
- 1953 The fishery in Hopedale is almost abandoned.
- 1954 First federal-provincial agreement.
- 1956 Housing program begins, which lasts until 1963; seventy-one houses are built (Kennedy 1977).
- 1957 Unemployment insurance is extended to include fishermen.
- 1961 The state encourages Davis Inlet Innu to participate in the cod fishery (Henriksen 1973).

- 1963 Housing program starts, which lasts from 1963 to 1973; 313 houses are built.
- 1965 Second federal-provincial agreement is signed.
- 1966 Housing project in Davis Inlet (1966-1969); thirty-three houses are built.
- 1967 The first teacher arrives in Davis Inlet.
- 1968 There is a decline in cod stocks.
- First Community Council in Hopedale.
- 1972 Representatives of the Quebec Inuit Association visit Nain.
- 1973 The Native Association of Newfoundland/Labrador is formed.
- The Labrador Inuit Association is formed.
- 1975 The Naskapi-Montagnais Innu Association is formed.