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***“... With the Propriety and Decorum which Characterize the Society of Gentlemen”:  
The United States Naval Academy and its Youth, 1845-1861***

By

Mark C. Hunter

A thesis submitted  
in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Masters of Arts

Department of History  
Memorial University of Newfoundland

Summer 1999



When I was a child, I spake as a child,  
I understood as a child. I thought as a child:  
but when I became a man, I put away childish things.  
(I Corinthians. 13:11)



Alfred Thayer Mahan. Sixteen Years Old, c.1856.

(Source: Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Volume 1, 1846-1889* [Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1975]).

(Note: Seager and Maguire Image reprint from the Naval Historical Division).

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***To all those killed and injured in school violence  
at the end of the twentieth century....***

### ***Abstract***

This thesis is a social history of naval officer education at Annapolis, Maryland from 1845 to the outbreak of Civil War. Naval Academy historians have largely conducted administrative histories without looking too deeply at the students, their goals, or life at the institution. Even though the students were adolescents, no one has looked at the intersection of Academy and youth history, nor has anyone placed law and discipline there within this framework. This thesis will show that the establishment of the Naval School at Annapolis in 1845 represented a continuity with the older naval education system, but by 1849 reforms began which broke this continuity with the School's renaming to the Academy in 1850 and then the establishment of a four-year training program. The Academy showed a greater concern with the students as youths who needed a longer period of nurturing before going to sea. This was exemplified in 1851 with the establishment of the summer training cruises which provided the students with a safe environment for introduction to sea life. The Academy became an intermediate place where middle-class youths were introduced to naval life.

This new Academy was more in tune with the middle-class view that adolescents should be raised in a safe transitional area, and it catered to youths just beginning life away from their parents, unlike the older youths of the School era. Youth historians have discovered that in this period middle-class youths went from learning the same trades as their fathers, often at home, to having more personal career choice. But in return the middle class wanted their children schooled for a future career in a controlled, structured environment which catered to them as "youths" rather than "adults." This thesis will show that the Academy became a transitional phase in these middle-class youths' lives while they decided if they liked a naval career.

### ***Acknowledgments***

I would like to thank Michael Lonardo and the staff of the Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, for tracking down primary-source material and getting it in my reach, and my supervisor Professor Lewis R. "Skip" Fischer for his guidance and patience. I would also like to thank Dr. Shannon Ryan and Dr. Chris Youé for their advice and assistance during this project. The staff of the Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, especially their Special Collections and Government Documents sections, also deserve my thanks for their help, above and beyond the call of duty, while I conducted my research. I would like to acknowledge Naval Academy archivist Gary A. LaValley for his assistance in sorting through Academy regulations, and candidate data, during my brief research trip to Annapolis. And finally, I would like to thank Dr. Daniel F. Vickers for his continual support and guidance, without which this project would not have been possible.

Mark C. Hunter  
St. John's  
Summer 1999

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## ***Chapter One – An Introduction***

American naval history has concentrated primarily on battles, tactics, strategies, and the roles of great commanders in battle or war. It has rarely focused on sailors as a group: their social backgrounds, training, or the society of which they were a part. In 1845, Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft used existing naval appropriations, circumventing Congressional approval, and founded a Naval School at Annapolis, Maryland, under the command of Commander Franklin Buchanan. At Annapolis, authorities treated the students like youths and the program reflected their skill level. In time, Annapolis became a place where young, middle-class American youths could be safely introduced to naval life, rather than being thrown straight into the sea as in the past. But at its creation the School represented a continuity with previous efforts at shore-based naval education.

The break with the past only arose in 1849 when reforms began at the School. By 1850 it was renamed the Academy and by 1851 it had a four-year training program. Naval education at Annapolis reveals that young, middle-class youths could choose careers different from their parents as long as they were introduced to it safely. The most dramatic break with the past was the establishment in 1851 of summer practice cruises dedicated only to Academy students. Here they were supervised by Academy authorities and introduced to life at sea in a gradual and safe manner. By 1859 this system was fully integrated with the shore-based system with a school ship tied up at the Academy during the academic year. The naval skills these youths learned onshore from October to June were now supplemented with practical training at sea during the summer. By the 1850s, the Academy became a place where middle-class parents could be assured their sons were educated in accordance with the middle-class belief in raising adolescents in a safe, structured, environment.

Because of the changes that began in 1849, I will divide this thesis into two periods:

the School and Academy eras. The former encompasses the time when the School catered to older midshipmen with prior sea experience (1845-1849); the latter the time when Annapolis educated younger students without prior sea experience, from the School's reorganization in 1849-1851 to the outbreak of Civil War. During both of these eras statistical data dealing with student backgrounds and discipline will largely be expanded upon by numerous vignettes. These vignettes will show the goals of these youths first setting out in life, how the navy responded to their needs as youths, the differences between the two eras, and how these adolescents reacted to their environment.

During both these periods the navy responded to the students' needs and trained them onshore for their future career and disciplined them as youths, rather than subject them to the full force of naval law. Although as a whole the system was slow responding to the educational needs of youths. Students in the School era often went straight to sea, or spent little time at the School, resulting in largely older youths at the facility. Despite the unsettled nature of the academic program until 1849, the authorities disciplined students in consideration of their youth and the students responded in kind and were generally well behaved, except for isolated cases of disobedience when they felt their rights were violated. My research will show that, despite the efforts of the navy, a large portion of these youths must have gone on to other careers because they left the navy while still young. Annapolis provided a safe middle-class transitional phase from childhood to adulthood while the students decided if they liked naval life. But naval officer education from 1845 to 1861 must first be put in the context of US naval history, which has traditionally neglected this avenue of research, to understand why this historian has been forced to elements of youth history, dealing with the middle class, in which to frame his analysis. With traditional US naval history's concentration on battles and tactics, it lacks the "tools" needed to analyse youths at Annapolis.

Traditional American naval history had its origins with Alfred Thayer Mahan in the late-nineteenth century. The main works, based on Mahan's Naval War College lectures, from which naval historians have adopted their paradigm, are *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* (1890) and *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812* (1892).<sup>1</sup> Mahan laid down six principles which affected the rise of a nation as a maritime power: geographic position; physical conformation, including climate and natural resources; extent of territory; size of population available for oceanic use; character of people; and the character of government and institutions. Mahan then used historical examples to illustrate his points. He was a technological determinist and his studies showed that in the age of sail the tactical advantage lay with the fleet in the weather-gauge, which enabled it to choose the time of battle.<sup>2</sup> He concluded that the advent of steam power gave the advantage to the fleet with the fastest vessels. Mahan also warned that changes in technology led to shifts in tactics. He qualified his technological determinism somewhat and wrote that "the interval between such changes [in tactics] has been unduly long. This doubtless arise[s] from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class:"

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<sup>1</sup> Mahan's first publication was "Naval Education for Officers and Men," and his first book was *The Gulf and Inland Waters*, published in 1883. *Life of Farragut* was published in 1892 and in 1896 a two-volume biography of Horatio Nelson, *The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain*, was published, with a second, revised edition, in 1899 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1899). In 1898 Mahan was called back to service on the Naval War Board during the Spanish-American War, which led to *Lessons of the War with Spain and Other Articles* (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, Limited, 1900) and for three years starting in 1902 he worked on *Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812* (William E. Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power* [Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981], 3-24).

<sup>2</sup> In the age of sail, the vessel in the weather-gauge had the tactical advantage because the wind blew into the sails in such a way that the vessel did not have to tack to engage the enemy. The attacking fleet could sail directly at the enemy, while the enemy would have to tack to sail towards the oncoming attacker. If the attacking commander so desired, he could hold off the attack until the time of his choosing.

this conservatism was a “great evil.”<sup>3</sup>

The primary lesson naval historians took from Mahan was the importance of the aggressive commander in setting the stage for the decisive battle. The epitome of this was Horatio Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar on 21 October 1805.<sup>4</sup> According to Mahan, Nelson believed that what Britain wanted was “not merely a splendid victory, but annihilation [of the French]: ‘numbers only can annihilate.’” Nelson planned to form his fleet into two columns: “[t]he essential feature of his plan was to overpower twelve of the enemy by sixteen British, while the remainder of his force covered this operation.” The battle was successful for the British, but not for Nelson, who died of wounds suffered in the encounter. Napoleon planned to invade Britain, but this was “frustrated when [Pierre Charles] Villeneuve gave up the attempt to reach Brest and headed for Cadiz,” where he was crushed by Nelson’s fleet. The sequence of events culminating in the Battle of Trafalgar changed Napoleon’s strategy, forcing him to rely on land warfare, commerce-destruction, and the exclusion of British commerce from Europe: hence the “influence” of sea power upon history.<sup>5</sup> Mahan believed that superior sea power would enable a nation to drive its rivals

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<sup>3</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1805* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 16-33. This is a one-volume abridged edition of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* and *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812*.

<sup>4</sup> *The Life of Nelson* is a sweeping book taking the reader from Nelson’s birth to his death at Trafalgar. A romantic work, Mahan professes that Nelson’s qualities of boldness and courage were evident from childhood. Nelson’s destiny was clear, and the biography ended with the hero apparently aware he was to die, but with his duty accomplished (Mahan, *The Life of Nelson*, 1-37 and 713-742). *The Life of Nelson* was meant to foster a support of sea power among the common people, Mahan and elite, conservative elements of British society, for example members of the Naval League, wanted to advance the goal of naval expansion. But Mahan’s goal of reinventing the heroic image of Nelson failed as the image he created was out of step with British society. The biography was priced out of the reach of most of the middle class, and the image of Nelson was of a member of the elite in a time of British labour unrest in the early 1900s (Gerald Jordan, “Mahan’s *Life of Nelson*,” *The Northern Mariner: Le Marin du nord*, 8:2 (April 1998): 39-49). The tradition of naval biography has continued, for example, with Samuel Eliot Morison work *John Paul Jones: A Sailor’s Biography* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, reprint, 1989) and Clark G. Reynolds’ *Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991). All of these works couch naval history in the context of the famous commander, rather than the not-so-famous officer or common seaman.

<sup>5</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1805*, 246-251.

from the ocean.<sup>6</sup>

But he also warned his readers that the success of a nation rested on more than its development in oceanic history: "Sea history, however, is but one factor in that general advance and decay of nations which is called their history; and if sight be lost of the other factors to which it is so closely related, a distorted view, either exaggerated or the reverse, of its importance will be formed."<sup>7</sup> Mahan's works on the influence of sea power, combining "laws" for the rise and fall of a great power, the importance of the decisive battle, technology, and the individual, gave naval historians a set of principles from which to write. Several works from twentieth-century US naval history show the influence of Mahan on its authors as well as the limitations of his framework for this thesis. Most US naval historians have written in Mahan's style and have ignored the common officer, while little has been written on the common seaman.

One such work of traditional US naval history is *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918* by Harold and Margaret Sprout, published on the eve of the Second World War. The Sprouts stated that their purpose was to analyse the role of the navy in both peace and war, and how its role was shaped by public and political opinions. In Mahan's footsteps they

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<sup>6</sup> Mahan credited Henri Jomini as one of his influences. Jomini emphasized the application of superior force on the communications lines of an enemy for a successful outcome in a battle. In a lecture to the Naval War College, Mahan said Jomini's *Art of War* (see Henri Jomini, *Art of War*, translated by Capt. G.H. Mendell and Capt. W.P. Craighill, [Philadelphia: Lippincott & Co., 1868; reprint Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971] ) and *History of the Wars of the French Revolution* (see Henri Jomini, *Histoire critique et militaire des guerres de la Révolution* [Paris: Anselin et Pochard, 1820-1824]) were works he used to extend the strategic discussion of war into the sea. Mahan's concept of the decisive battle between capital ships parallels Jomini's philosophy of concentrating military force on a decisive point in the war theater. Mahan also owes to Jomini his ideas on the importance of interior lines and lines of communication during a war. For Mahan, communications lines needed to be defended as they maintained the line of supply for the navy. Being on the interior line in a battle, as on land, gave the commander flexibility in choosing his opponent and the time of attack. But where Mahan's initial naval analysis was lacking was the role of politics in naval affairs. Mahan was unable to read German, therefore was not initially influenced by Carl von Clausewitz's famous work *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, reprint 1976). It was only in later works that Mahan acknowledged naval operations were extensions of political affairs, and reserve strength was also important in determining the outcome of a war (Thomas R. Pollock, "The Historical Elements of Mahanian Doctrine," *Naval War College Review*, 35:4 [1982]: 44-49).

<sup>7</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1805*, 68.

analyzed naval development in relation to the character of the government, the people, and the role of the “great man” in putting into place those elements of naval policy reflected in the successful decisive battle. The Sprouts wrote that “we launch this initial volume hoping that it may contribute something at least to a reasoned public opinion on this great national issue [the coming of war].”<sup>8</sup> The Sprouts’ goal was to spur public opinion to demand naval building. They concluded that “today’s ominous struggle for armed security upon the sea is but the resumption of a process perceptible before the war, accelerated during and as a result of that struggle, and partially, if temporarily, arrested by the Washington Conference of 1921-1922.”<sup>9</sup> The United States’ fleet in 1939 essentially contained the same components as at the end of the Great War and the Sprouts did not wish to see a reversal of a solid naval policy.

In this polemical manner, the Sprouts saw in the past, for example, the election of Thomas Jefferson and the defeat of the Federalists as causing a shift in the power base from the seaboard and its concerns to the interior of the nation and agriculture, taking along with it support for the navy. The Sprouts concluded that a “[d]istrust of the military, which in those days was still strong, especially within the ranks of the dominant Jeffersonian Party, forbade any delegation of policy-determination to the officers of the Navy.” Despite the lessons of the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, American strategic policy failed to change substantially: it was still geared mainly to coastal defence and commerce-raiding. Meanwhile, a war scare with France in 1835, combined with an economic recovery in America, led to calls for an increase in the navy, but the next year was an election year and Senators wanted the money distributed to the states. The Sprouts warned that American

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<sup>8</sup> Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), vi.

<sup>9</sup> Sprout and Sprout, 2.

policy makers had failed “by either word or act, to show any grasp of the organization or use of massed power to secure and hold the regional command of the sea necessary to defend the coastline and to keep open the ports of the United States in case of war with a strong naval Power.”<sup>10</sup>

Walter R. Herrick’s 1966 book, *The American Naval Revolution*, also centred on shifting American naval policy and the rise of American naval power. Herrick gave one man credit for shifting American naval doctrine: “The man directly responsible for this abrupt departure [in a four-year period] from the peace-navy tradition was [President Benjamin] Harrison’s imperialist secretary of the navy, Benjamin Franklin Tracy.”<sup>11</sup> Herrick was so convinced of Tracy’s importance to the naval revolution that he devoted six of the book’s nine chapters to the period of Tracy’s influence. Herrick concluded that Tracy’s accomplishments lived on after he left the Navy Department and allowed naval expansion to continue when the political will was once again in its favour.<sup>12</sup>

Perhaps the most polemical example of naval history is *Sea Power: A Naval History*, edited by E.B. Potter. Originally published in 1960, with a new edition at the beginning of the Reagan era, *Sea Power* was meant as a textbook for the United States Naval Academy.

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<sup>10</sup> Sprout and Sprout, 54-55: 93-109.

<sup>11</sup> Walter R. Herrick, *The American Naval Revolution* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), 11. Other works, like Kenneth J. Hagan’s *This People’s Navy* (New York: The Free Press, 1991) also reach a similar conclusion as the Sprouts and Herrick. But Hagan’s work is written in a narrative style similar to Samuel Eliot Morison’s, and contains no footnotes: only what the author calls a “Bibliographic Essay.”

<sup>12</sup> Herrick, 152. A similar work is Benjamin Franklin Cooling’s *Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father of the Modern American Fighting Navy* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1973). Cooling’s work is a biography of Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Franklin Tracy, which focused on the rise of the New Navy. Cooling thanked such naval historians as Walter R. Herrick, Jr., and Kenneth J. Hagan and concluded Tracy’s personal qualities of imperialism, expansionism, loyalty and professionalism guided him in his role as Secretary of the Navy. Cooling wrote, “[h]is personal code of honor quickly translated into national honor when bumptious America faced either an unrepentant Chile or a stubborn United Kingdom.” After the defeat of the Harrison administration in elections in 1892, the rise of American naval power continued, but Cooling, as had Herrick, concluded it was Tracy who had laid the groundwork. Events like the Homestead Strike in the summer of 1892 were simply historical accidents Tracy had to work around to acquire steel for the New Navy, while personnel changes were simply policy decisions; sailors had no faces, it was the ships that counted (Cooling, 130 and 146).

The philosophy is clear. As with the Sprouts and Herrick, *Sea Power* focused on the rise of naval powers. The rise of American naval power was attributed to “her dynamic young president, Theodore Roosevelt.” The results were the decisive battles at Manila Bay and Santiago de Cuba. In addition to analysing naval history from a Mahanian perspective, *Sea Power* downplayed politically sensitive episodes in American diplomatic history. For example, *Sea Power* minimized the US role in fomenting a revolt in Panama over the Canal Zone. The Colombians were described as “stalling,” while the revolution in Panama was orchestrated by one Bunau-Varilla from the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York. The authors of *Sea Power* attributed any talk of the acquisition of the Canal Zone by America as “international piracy” to “liberal journals,” and insisted it was “an indirect exercise of a kind of [the] ‘right of eminent domain’.” But they did admit that the American role in Panama was “not calculated to increase the popularity of the United States in Latin America, particularly in Colombia.”<sup>13</sup>

Meanwhile, two followers of Mahan have removed naval matters from the context of the surrounding history and have concentrated solely on technology and battles. In its most extreme form, the decisive-battle element of the Mahanian paradigm led two political scientists, George Modelski and William R. Thompson, to treat battles and wars as “black

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<sup>13</sup> Herrick, 179-189. This patriotic trend is evident in the work of other American naval historians. The most well known naval historian during the post-World War II period was Samuel Eliot Morison. Morison was the official historian of the United States Navy of the Second World War, completing a 15-volume set titled *The History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947-1975), and a condensed version *The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974) in 1963. At a time when the United States, and non-naval history, was being rocked by social upheavals, American naval historians were towing the same old line. Morison was critical of the effect of pacifists and public opinion on military affairs. Morison believed the lack of naval progress in the interwar years was a result of “public attitude, which Congress represented, and of presidential indifference.” He concluded, “[i]t must be remembered that the average American of that era, conditioned by twenty-one years of antimilitarist indoctrination by movies, books, preachers and teachers, could be induced to enlist in the armed forces . . . [if there was] not too much work and plenty of recreation” (Morison, *The Two Ocean War*, 7-9 and 39).



boxes.”<sup>14</sup> The black-box technique utilizes inputs and outputs — in this case world powers — but ignores the process by which change occurs. In *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1993*, Modelski and Thompson proposed a positive correlation between the rise and fall of great powers over time — the long-cycle approach to global politics<sup>15</sup> — and the sea power which those nations possessed.<sup>16</sup> In what amounted to “ship counting,” the authors translated sea power into what they felt was a measurable quantity. They derived their methodology from “the Mahanian concept of command of the sea attained in battle between the principal units of opposing powers.”<sup>17</sup>

Modelski and Thompson backdated the rise of American imperialism and naval expansion to 1816. Their rationale, arising from their black-box technique, “follows from our rule that global power membership is backdated whenever possible to the beginning of a new

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<sup>14</sup> A less extreme version is David Syrett’s work *The Defeat of the German U-boats: The Battle of the Atlantic* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994). Syrett uses decryptions of German U-boat transmission and Allied reports to analyze battles between the U-boats and the Allies, including the United States Navy. As a result of using sources based on the point of contact between belligerents, Syrett’s work fails to place a battle in the context of the general political and military history of a war. The U-boat simply becomes the hunted, and the anti-submarine forces the hunters. The fact they are German or American does not matter. The U-boats are destroyed in decisive encounters by superior Allied (usually American) air power and intelligence. Each chapter ends like the score of a game with losses tallied for each side. Marc Milner, in *The U-boat Hunters: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Offensive against Germany’s Submarines* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), analyzed the influence of technological competition between the belligerents during the Second World War. Although he briefly mentioned political aspects of the war, from the point of view of the Canadian government, an issue such as problems in the ship construction industry, and its effects on the war, were relegated to an appendix. Primarily this was because it failed to fit those aspects of the Mahanian paradigm which Milner had chosen as the framework of his analysis, namely that changes in technology lead to changes in tactics.

<sup>15</sup> According to the authors “the long cycle of global politics refers to the process of fluctuations in the concentration of global reach capabilities which provide one foundation for world leadership” (George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1993* [Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988], 97).

<sup>16</sup> Modelski and Thompson, 15.

<sup>17</sup> Modelski and Thompson, 24. Mahan did not explicitly advocate ship-counting, rather he believed one should ensure that adequately armed ships, of similar design and speed, could be concentrated against an opponent. He suggested balancing the aggregate displacement of the fleet against the numbers of vessels in the fleet so as to provide it with maximum tactical flexibility in combat. In other words a fleet of 15 vessels could be tasked to do more things than a fleet of 8 vessels. Once 10,000 tons is locked up in the construction of one vessel, it cannot be broken up again if one needs two vessels. With adequate numbers of vessels Sampson was able to check Cámara’s fleet in Europe should it have made a move against Dewey in the Philippines, while Schley was able to check Cervera’s force in Cuba (Mahan, “Distinguishing Qualities of Ships of War,” *Lessons of the War with Spain and Other Articles*, 257-273).

post-global war period regardless of the precise year in which the capital ship and extra-regional activity requirements are viewed as fully satisfied.”<sup>18</sup> The authors use this strategy to make the data fit their model, and it makes their treatment ahistorical. In the end, the fall of a world power was not explained: it simply happened slowly. The British were able to slow their fall, according to Modelski and Thompson, only because they “were able to take advantage of innovations in naval technology to retard or ‘stretch out’ their positional decay throughout most of the nineteenth century.”<sup>19</sup> Moreover, “defeat in the Second World War terminated the global power status of both Germany and Japan.”<sup>20</sup> Finally, the authors attempt to project their findings into the future to predict which countries may someday become world or global powers.<sup>21</sup> Their work contains little about the political decisions or

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<sup>18</sup> Modelski and Thompson, 98.

<sup>19</sup> Modelski and Thompson, 127. In *Admirals and Empire: The United States Navy and the Caribbean, 1898-1945* (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), Donald A. Yerxa explained that Britain withdrew from the Caribbean and the United States filled the vacuum. The United States saw the Caribbean as strategically important and their subsequent actions were to prevent European powers — namely Germany — from getting a foothold in the region. The United States Navy is portrayed as an instrument of foreign policy, as well as having interests of its own in promoting this strategic view of the Caribbean. Yerxa claims not to wholly reject Mahan, but to rely on the maritime empire concept of Clark G. Reynolds, whereby “empires have based their policies and strategies on commerce, overseas dependencies,” naval forces, have sought to protect imperial spheres of interest from encroachment by other powers, and policed regions “to remove internal threats to the stability of the empire” (Yerxa, 1). In the final analysis, this is of no practical difference from Mahan’s philosophy of securing control of the sea by driving one’s competition from it. In *Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires* (London: Robert Hale & Company, 1976), Reynolds laid out the same underlying principles of sea power that Mahan had professed. Among the authors Reynolds’ thanked for their influence were Mahan, Morison, and Potter. Reynolds divided countries into maritime nations who used their navies to obtain command of the sea; continental powers who relied on their armies for power and made alliances with maritime nations; and small powers who used navies for self-defence and who made alliances with continental or maritime nations (Reynolds, 1-16). In a fashion similar to Mahan, Reynolds then illustrated his principles with historical examples. Reynolds saw the rise of American naval power in the context of the British concentration of its naval forces in home waters as a balance against the rising naval power of Germany. Powers rearranged their forces around the world to maintain world and regional balances of power (Reynolds, 276-435).

<sup>20</sup> Modelski and Thompson, 99.

<sup>21</sup> Projecting findings into the future is not the goal of most historians, and is the strongest indication that the authors are political scientists. They base the logic of their projections of which country could become global powers on the potential of those countries to acquire the capital ships of this era: nuclear ballistic submarines and their associated supports. Based on their 1988 assessment, the authors believed the European Community, Japan, China, and India, were capable of fulfilling the minimal requires — 10 submarines — to achieve global power status. The danger of projecting findings into the future is evident in the fact that the authors failed to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union, and actually used it as an example of a political union successfully achieving global power status (Modelski and Thompson, 137-138).

military commanders, and nothing about the common sailor.

The Mahanian style of naval history has left most naval historians unwilling, or unable, to tackle questions that fall outside their traditional framework. Most standard works on American naval history in the Mahanian form have ignored the lives of the common sailor. The only significant social history of the United States Navy is *Social Reform in the United States Navy, 1798-1862* (1967) by Harold D. Langley. Langley believed that the years from 1812 to the Civil War were a period of national reform, characterized in particular by the elimination of flogging and the grog ration. Some men and women believed they had to be “their brother’s keepers” and this desire for reform spread into naval life. “They raised funds, distributed literature, prayed, exhorted, and lobbied to bring about changes in society. From the point of view of the Navy, the most influential of these groups was the American Seamen’s Friend Society.” Civil groups wanted to improve the “dignity” of naval men, “without destroying discipline.”<sup>22</sup>

Throughout this era the American Seamen’s Friends Society through its publication, *The Sailor’s Magazine and Naval Journal*, and Congressional lobbying, tried to rid the navy of flogging and grog. Eventually, the House passed a bill outlawing flogging on 23 September 1850, 131 to 29. Langley concluded that the voting pattern indicated “some interesting sectional characteristics”: 96 of those who voted in favor of abolishing flogging came from the North, while only 14 came from the South and 21 from border states. The Bill then moved to the Senate where, after some debate, and near failure, it passed 26 to 24. The President signed the Naval Appropriation bill, with the anti-flogging provision, into law on 28 September 1850.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Harold D. Langley, *Social Reform in the United States Navy, 1798-1862* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1967), 39-40.

<sup>23</sup> Langley, 188-192.

The struggle to eliminate grog took much longer. The final push to pass regulations eliminating the grog ration came during the Civil War, when many who opposed its elimination were no longer in a position to oppose such a measure. Republican Senator James W. Grimes, from Iowa, declared in 1862 that the elimination of grog would make the ships better places and “[b]y abolishing the whiskey ration we shall take away one of the strongest reasons why parents are unwilling that their minor sons should enlist in the naval service of the United States.” The bill passed and was signed into law by Lincoln on 14 July 1862.<sup>24</sup> In all, Langley did a good job linking non-traditional areas of naval history to the politics of the larger society.<sup>25</sup>

Another important work on the men of the United States Navy is by Frederick S. Harrod. His work, *Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940*, published in 1978, was based on his thesis at Northwestern University. To supplement his statistical analysis, Harrod used the few autobiographies of enlisted men, interviews with former denizens of the lower deck, issues of *Our Navy* (a publication by and for bluejackets) private papers and memoirs of officers, issues of the *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, and Congressional hearings.<sup>26</sup> Harrod concluded that the driving force

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<sup>24</sup> Langley, 264-269.

<sup>25</sup> Indeed something that John B. Hattendorf was still suggesting that naval historians should strive for in 1995. John B. Hattendorf (ed.), *Doing Naval History: Essays Toward Improvement* (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1995), 1-4.

<sup>26</sup> Frederick S. Harrod, *Manning the New Navy: The Development of A Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), 63. The most exemplarily example of Harrod's use of sources to supplement his statistical analysis is during his reconstruction of the treatment of minority groups in the navy. Statistically reconstructing the percentages of African-Americans in the navy from naval records was fairly straight forward, but for a religious group like the Jews, it was not as simple. As the navy could classify them as “white” and no data on religious affiliation was kept, statistical analysis proved futile. Harrod turned to a novel *Delilah* by Marcus Goodrich in which one character, Mendel, “was ostracized, in part because he was Jewish,” although a 1931 issue of *Our Navy* reported the United States Navy was the most tolerant institution in the world. By far the best example of the application of literary theory to naval history is Michael L. Hadley's *Count Not The Dead: The Popular Image of the German U-boat* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995). Hadley, a professor of German literature at the University of Victoria, treated fictional and non-fictional German accounts of the U-boat as artifacts to assess how their image changed over time, as well as how the Germans felt about the U-boats' “guilt” in the war.

behind the change in the composition of the crews of the United States Navy from 1899 to 1940 was the rise of the "New Navy." American naval expansion at the end of the nineteenth century increased the number of vessels and outpaced the ability of coastal communities to supply sailors. In addition, the new vessels were more specialized and required crews with different skills to operate "such varied innovations as electric motors, gyrocompasses, and self-propelled torpedoes." In short, the New Navy required "sailor-technicians," while the men of the Old Navy were valued "more for their strength than intelligence," and needed only "to be able to reef, furl, and steer." <sup>27</sup> The New Navy did not want the old Jack Tar. <sup>28</sup>

While authors like the Sprouts and Herrick have concentrated the traditional areas of policy and strategy, and Langley and Harrod have studied changes which affected naval seamen, little significant scholarly work has been done on the lives of common officers. <sup>29</sup> Indeed despite the fact that the Naval School, and later the Academy, has been in existence for about one hundred and fifty years, life at the main institution for officer training today has received little historical scholarly attention. One of the earliest historical works on the Naval Academy was *Historical Sketch of the United States Naval Academy* (1876) by James Russel Soley. Soley's work is essentially an administrative history of the Naval School and later the Academy, and contains little about the average student. The Naval School was a modified version of an older system and by the late 1840s was under strain with the irregular attendance of the students. But rather than ask Congress to change how the School

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<sup>27</sup> Harrod, 4-5 and 166.

<sup>28</sup> A Canadian naval historian, David Zimmerman, in "The Social Background of the Wartime Navy: Some Statistical Data," in Michael L. Hadley, Rob Huebert, and Fred W. Crickard (eds.), *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), also used statistical analysis to draw conclusions about sailors. In Zimmerman's case he concluded that the Royal Canadian Navy was closely connected, both in organization and strategy, to the Royal Navy because of the close cultural and ethnic affinity of the two.

<sup>29</sup> This author could only find one substantial work on the topic, and then only for the period 1794 to 1815: Christopher McKee, *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794-1815* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991).

functioned. Soley concluded they handled the matter internally and amended the School's regulations and system from 1849 to 1851.<sup>30</sup> Another attempt at a history of the Academy was by Thomas G. Ford, whose "History of the Naval Academy," written in 1887, and has never been published. Recent works on the Naval Academy have been popular illustrated histories, for example, *United States Naval Academy: The First Hundred Years* (1945), by John Crane and Lt. James F. Kieley, and Gale Gibson Kohlhausen and Ellen Boraz Heinbach's 1995 work *USNA: The United States Naval Academy. A Pictorial Celebration of 150 Years*, while the only work on the Academy from 1845 to 1861 is Charles Todorich's 1984 work, *The Spirited Years: A History of the Antebellum Naval Academy*, based largely on the Ford manuscript.<sup>31</sup>

Most literature on education at the Naval School and Academy strongly implies that its creation was a radical departure from past naval education. Unsurprisingly, those authors who feel that the institute was a more radical change in naval education are those who are most closely associated with the Academy. Thus far, those who believe Annapolis is the latest installment of US naval educational practices are in the minority: Soley acknowledges the fact, but this minority view is elaborated by Henry L. Burr.

Burr's work, "Education in the Early Navy," his 1939 Temple University PhD thesis, found that the establishment of the United States Naval School, and later the Academy, was the result of the evolution of naval education. He saw the establishment of the new School

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<sup>30</sup> James Russel Soley, *Historical Sketch of the United States Naval Academy* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876), 88-89.

<sup>31</sup> Thomas G. Ford, "History of the Naval Academy." Unpublished manuscript in the Special Collections Division of the U.S. Naval Academy Library, 1887. The description of the Ford manuscript in this chapter is based on Charles Todorich's discussion of Ford in *The Spirited Years: A History of the Antebellum Naval Academy* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984), xiii-xiv. See also John Crane and Lt. James F. Kieley, *United States Naval Academy: The First Hundred Years* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1945); and Gale Gibson Kohlhausen and Ellen Boraz Heinbach, *USNA: The United States Naval Academy. A Pictorial Celebration of 150 Years* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1995).

at Annapolis as the result of a gradual process of evolution and continuity. There were forms of naval education from the beginning of the United States Navy, but they changed only slowly. The Naval School at Annapolis built on the traditions of the past, rather than wiping out the old system entirely and constructing a new one. But his thesis dealt with the previous naval education program and ended with its consolidation at Annapolis in 1845.

Burr found that midshipmen originated in the Royal Navy as men or boys who were stationed amidships to carry messages to various parts of the vessel. In later periods they were called "reefers" because they led men up the masts to reef sails. By 1653, in the Royal Navy some of these midshipmen were given higher pay to attract better individuals to the service. By 1656 only those deemed capable of carrying out the duties of an officer were appointed and by 1676 Charles II began placing the sons of gentry in the ranks of the midshipmen. These boys were usually below eleven years old, but later it was restricted to those above thirteen, although officers' sons younger than thirteen were still allowed. But midshipmen were not officially recognized as officers until 1748. In 1827 US Secretary of the Navy Southard noted that the navy made promotions to officers from the ranks of the midshipmen. He concluded that it was only by the proper education of this class of officers that the navy could be ensured to have the best men.<sup>32</sup>

The first naval schools were in Tripoli, established by stranded US officers in 1803, and then Sackets Harbor, New York, when they returned home. Then schools were established at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Norfolk. Burr concluded that these

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<sup>32</sup> Henry L. Burr, "Education in the Early Navy," PhD Dissertation (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1939), 7 and footnote b. The only information that Burr had about the early education of midshipmen came from those who were became successful. Edward Macauley (1827-1894), who became a Rear Admiral, began his education in Tripoli as his father was a consul. Macauley was said to be able to converse in French, Italian, and speak Arabic and Turkish. While Charles Morris (1784-1856), who eventually became a Commodore, learned what he could while on his father's farm. He later became a midshipmen and while living ashore at Norfolk attended Hamilton Moore's school to learn navigation. Burr noted that in Morris' time there were classes in some seaport towns that taught navigation and astronomy. After another cruise, Morris spent his furlough at an academy in Woodstock, Connecticut (Burr, 33-34).

schools were established in “response to the permanent establishment of examinations.” Introductory courses were given to midshipmen before they went to sea, while the finishing course lasted six to eight months before they wrote the lieutenant’s exam. From 1838 until the founding of the School at Annapolis, all finishing work was carried out at the Philadelphia school. Naval educational reform was a result of changing technology, according to Burr, but there were other contributing factors. In addition to the advent of steam power, reforms sought to address the problem of “[u]ndue responsibility given to the wrong youths, [and] indiscriminate political influence[.]”<sup>33</sup> But in the end, Burr concluded that reform was a slow process.

The majority view of the place of the Naval School and Academy at Annapolis in US naval history is represented by Jack Sweetman and Charles Todorich. Sweetman, in *The U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History* (1979) wrote more than a popular history, but it was not a social history of the Academy. Instead he provides a broad overview of the entire history of the Academy and concentrates on administrative history and some details on education. Sweetman believed that the final push to create a formal naval school came from George Bancroft, and this new system was a dramatic break from the past: Annapolis was the new shining glory of the navy.<sup>34</sup>

Sweetman, although aware of the existence of naval schools before the founding of the School at Annapolis, downplayed their history. Sweetman recalled that after Bancroft met with Professor William Chauvenet, who ran the Philadelphia Naval Asylum School, he decided that another approach to creating a permanent school was needed. Previous attempts had been tried to get the support of Congress first, but Bancroft decided that he had to set up

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<sup>33</sup> Burr, 215-216.

<sup>34</sup> Jack Sweetman, *The U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 12-15.



a naval school with existing funds first and show Congress it worked before getting approval. Sweetman's work reveals that it was through compromise and consensus that the Naval School, later the Academy, was founded in 1845.<sup>35</sup> He concluded that "[t]he history of the Naval Academy, like that of any other century-old institution, consists of brief bursts of change followed by long periods of consolidation."<sup>36</sup>

Charles Todorich in *The Spirited Years: A History of the Antebellum Naval Academy* (1984), echoed Sweetman, although he alluded to the fact that naval education had a longer tradition than at Annapolis. He noted that John Paul Jones first proposed in 1777 that an improvement in officer education was needed, and that by 1840, Matthew Fontaine Maury was the twenty-sixth person to propose a naval academy. Senior naval officers opposed the creation of an academy and believed at-sea training was sufficient, while younger officers supported the creation of an academy. The advent of steam-powered vessels in 1839, requiring better trained sailors, and the success of the Naval Asylum in Philadelphia to augment officer training, gave impetus to the drive to found a naval academy.<sup>37</sup>

Sweetman and Todorich primarily concentrated on the administrative history of Annapolis and the institution's training efforts. We learn little about how midshipmen related to one another, or how the authorities conceptualized their relationship to the students. Burr dealt in depth with the lives of midshipmen, but his work only covered the period up to the creation of the School at Annapolis; we learn nothing of the midshipmen after this time. Meanwhile, the United States Naval Institute's *Proceedings* published an edition in 1946 to commemorate the one-hundredth anniversary of the Academy. The edition contained such articles as: Sarah Corbin Robert, "Extracurricula Midshipmen Organizations and Activities":

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<sup>35</sup> Sweetman, 15-16.

<sup>36</sup> Sweetman, 215.

<sup>37</sup> Todorich, 10-12.

C.T. Houpt, "Graduation Exercises at the Naval Academy, 1854-1914"; Walter Aamold, "Naval Academy Athletics – 1845 to 1945"; and a reprint of Sara I. Corbin Robert, "The Naval Academy as Housekeeper," among other articles. These articles compose the bulk of the social history that has been done on the Academy, and the period 1845-1861 often only composes a small portion of those articles.<sup>38</sup> With a dearth of American naval literature to which to turn, the historian studying midshipmen life at Annapolis from 1845 to 1861 must turn to other areas of history for illumination.

Langley alluded to the fact that naval reforms in the mid-nineteenth century – in particular the elimination of grog – were partially to benefit youths. The lives of young people have been studied in greater depth by "youth historians" and this is one avenue that the naval historian can explore. An understanding of how young adults have been acculturated into the adult world is critical to understanding life at the navy's institute at Annapolis, where young boys grew into young men before entering into a career in the navy. While it is unnecessary to delve into a complete historiography of youth studies, several works show the major trends in the field applicable to my thesis, in particular those related to the emergence of career choice in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. As the centuries progressed there emerged a distinct stage of life which the midshipmen at Annapolis share: adolescence.

The seminal work on the history of young people is *L'Enfant et la vie familiale sous l'ancien régime*, by Philippe Ariès. Published in 1960, the work has been translated into English under the title *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life*. In *Centuries of Childhood*, Ariès proposed that before the early-modern period, little difference was seen

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<sup>38</sup> Sarah Corbin Robert, "Extracurricula Midshipmen Organizations and Activities," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* (hereafter *USNIP*), 72 (April 1946, part II): 47-57; C.T. Houpt, "Graduation Exercises at the Naval Academy, 1854-1914," *USNIP*, 72 (April 1946, part II): 131-137; Walter Aamold, "Naval Academy Athletics – 1845 to 1945," *USNIP* 72, (April 1946, part II): 105-117; Sara I. Corbin Robert, "The Naval Academy as Housekeeper," *USNIP*, 71 (November 1945): 1341-1351.

between adults and anything but the extremely young child: it was only as the centuries progressed that there emerged greater differentiation between stages of life: infant, child, adolescent, and adult. Childhood and adolescence were stages of life that were slowly discovered as the modern era approached. Part of the problem was linguistic. Neither French nor English had many words to differentiate the various stages of growing up. Ariès found that by the seventeenth century the term “child” began to be used much more like its modern meaning, by the middle class. He concluded that, “[t]he idea of childhood was bound up with the idea of dependence: the words ‘sons’, ‘varlets’ and ‘boys’ were also words in the vocabulary of feudal subordination. One could leave childhood only by leaving the state of dependence, or at least the lower degrees of dependence.”<sup>39</sup> A boy could only leave childhood if he could make it in the world on his own.

Our conception of adolescence began to emerge in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Ariès found it in literary works associated with “budding love,” and in recruiting posters aimed at conscripting youths in the eighteenth century.<sup>40</sup> Adolescence was also depicted in nineteenth-century composer Richard Wagner’s work *Siegfried*. In *Siegfried*, Ariès found “the music of *Siegfried* expressed for the first time that combination of (provisional) purity, physical strength, naturism, spontaneity and joie de vivre which was to make the adolescent the hero of our twentieth century, the century of adolescence.”<sup>41</sup>

This was also an era when people began to wonder about the thoughts of teenagers. Scholars, according to Ariès, began to wonder about this age group: they felt they had the ability to revive an aging society. But Ariès believed the more modern concept of

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<sup>39</sup> Philippe Ariès, *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life*. Translated by Robert Baldick (New York: Random House, 1962), 26.

<sup>40</sup> Ariès, 38.

<sup>41</sup> Ariès, 30.

adolescence emerged only after the First World War, when “the troops at the front were solidly opposed to the older generations in the rear.” A common bond along the front lines developed in which they all knew they were young.<sup>42</sup>

Other historians have followed Ariès’ model. Edward Shorter’s work *The Making of the Modern Family* (1975) follows Ariès’ school of thought. In a linear manner, Shorter follows the Western family as it moved from a traditional to modern form. Shorter’s family went from caring little about itself to cutting all ties to the community and becoming private. But his explanation for this change is clearly Marxist. Shorter concluded that “[m]arket capitalism was probably at the root of the revolution in sentiment”: the rise of romantic love, the change in the mother-child relationship, and the creation of a private, family world.<sup>43</sup> Market capitalists became concerned with market forces, industrialization raised the standard of living, and most importantly created an “industrial proletariat” and the wage-labour economy.<sup>44</sup> Shorter’s argument and evidence was compelling in places, although he was often simply trying to prove how more, or less, modern was a family.

There are critics of the Ariès school. Adrian Wilson, in “The Infancy of the History of Childhood: An Appraisal of Philippe Ariès” (1980), believed Ariès was too present-minded. Wilson concluded that Ariès’ present-mindedness caused him to look to the France of the past simply to see how different the French conception of children was from modern ideas, rather than actually discovering what the French conception was. He concluded that Ariès methodology and mind-set were to blame for the failings of his work. Because he was

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<sup>42</sup> Ariès, 30.

<sup>43</sup> During this period from 1700 to 1900 there was the rise of personalization, privacy, and the domestically centered bourgeois family. For more details see Matthew Johnson, *Archaeology of Capitalism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1996); and Carole Shammas, *The Pre-Industrial Consumer in England and America* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), in particular “Housing, Consumer Durables, and the Domestic Environment,” 156-193.

<sup>44</sup> Edward Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1975), 170.

present-minded. Wilson believed Ariès' work followed a natural, linear progression from non-modern to an emergence of a modern conception of childhood sometime in the seventeenth century. Wilson believed that "[t]he result is that the story cannot but appear as continuous and inevitable: for everything has its place on the continuum (from 0 to 1), and that continuum has inscribed within it the all-encompassing destination of the present."<sup>45</sup>

Another criticism of Ariès' work came from Linda Pollock. In her 1983 work, *Forgotten Children: Parent-child Relations from 1500-1900*, Pollock lambasted Ariès and his followers. Pollock believed that Ariès' assertions, and those of his followers, were "a myth brought about by over-hasty reading, a burning desire to find material to support the thesis and a wilful misinterpretation of evidence." There was no revolutionary change in how parents raised their children beginning in the eighteenth century. Pollock asserted that parental concern for children was continuous throughout time: she suggested that "[i]nstead of trying to explain the supposed changes in the parent-child relationship, historians would do well to ponder just why parental care is a variable so curiously resistant to change."<sup>46</sup>

Through studying hundreds of diaries of adults and children, and supplementing it with newspaper reports to assess the general population, Pollock found parents had a conception that children were different from adults. They were willing to intercede if they felt their children were being punished too severely, while newspapers reported with horror cases of child abuse. And in the sixteenth century Pollock found parents who were distressed by the death or illness of a child, while other liked talking and walking with their children. Pollock surmised that "even if children were regarded differently in the past, this does not

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<sup>45</sup> Adrian Wilson, "The Infancy of the History of Childhood: An Appraisal of Philippe Ariès," *History and Theory*, 19 (1980): 139-152.

<sup>46</sup> Linda A. Pollock, *Forgotten Children: Parent-Child Relations from 1500 to 1900* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 271.

mean they were therefore not regarded as children."<sup>47</sup> But the midshipmen at Annapolis in the mid-nineteenth century were not children, but teenagers and young adults.

The historical study of teenagers has been a more recent avenue of historical study, arising in the past twenty years from the study of children, and especially from the study of adolescents in anthropology and psychology.<sup>48</sup> But the modern concept of adolescence was popularized in the early twentieth century by Professor Stanley Hall with his 1904 publication *Adolescence: Its Psychology, and its Relations to Anthropology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education*.<sup>49</sup> Hall believed adolescence was a cross-cultural phenomenon: a stage between childhood and adulthood the same everywhere in the world.<sup>50</sup> But Margaret Mead, an anthropologist, with her work *Coming of Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization* (1928), believed that adolescence was a culturally specific phenomenon, different in different parts of the world.

Mead admitted that her work was a polemic to find a way to better treat adolescents of the early-twentieth century. In 1961 she wrote that she was affected by the social, political, and economic upheavals of the 1920s and hoped her work would be read by teachers and educators, not essentially fellow anthropologists. Mead disagreed with the traditional belief that "[a]dolescence was characterised [sic] as the period in which idealism flowered and

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<sup>47</sup> Pollock, 262-271. But the child-labor of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was, according to Bruce Bellingham, more of a problem for Pollock. How does one explain how a loving parent could send a child into the work force at such a tender age? For Pollock the parents had little choice in the matter, because the were poor they had to send their children into the work force for pure survival (Bruce Bellingham, "The History of Childhood since the 'Invention of Childhood': Some Issues in the Eighties," *Journal of Family History*, 13 (1988): 349).

<sup>48</sup> see John and Virginia Demos, "Adolescence in Historical Perspective," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 31 (1969): 632-638; and Joseph Kett, "Adolescence and Youth in Nineteenth-Century American," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, II (1971): 283-298.

<sup>49</sup> Stanley Hall, *Adolescence: Its Psychology, and its Relations to Anthropology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education* (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1904).

<sup>50</sup> As described in John Demos, "The Rise and Fall of Adolescence," in John Demos, *Past, Present, and Personal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 93-94.

rebellion against authority waxed strong, a period during which difficulties and conflict were absolutely inevitable.” Mead focused her study mainly on Samoan girls and discovered that their adolescence experience was different than in America. She used her findings to suggest that the reason adolescence was such a tumultuous time in the Western world was because it was one in which youths faced many choices in the last one hundred years, and had to reconcile them with the beliefs their parents had taught them. In Samoa there were much fewer choices, therefore less conflict. In the West when a girl, in Mead’s case, contemplated sex, she was faced with a conflict between her generation’s and her parent’s standards. Mead concluded that if a girl “remain[s] true to the tradition of the last generation, she wins the sympathy and support of her parents at the expense of the comradeship of her contemporaries. Whichever way the die falls, the choice is attended by mental anguish.” The upheavals of adolescence were cultural byproducts unlinked to biological changes. Mead suggested what had to be done was to teach adolescents how to cope with their choices – whether sexual, career, or educational – in their complex society, rather than restrict their choice or isolate them from their peers.<sup>51</sup>

An historian who has recently tackled the road that youths take to adulthood, and the choices they make, is Harvey Graff. His major study on the history of youth is *Conflicting Paths: Growing Up in America*, published in 1995.<sup>52</sup> Graff believed that adolescence in America has essentially been the same over time. All parents loved their children, but the expression of this love has taken different forms.<sup>53</sup> Graff thought children acquired the social

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<sup>51</sup> Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa. A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilisation* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1961 reprint of 1928 edition), Preface 1961 Edition: 1-13; and 234-248.

<sup>52</sup> See also, Harvey J. Graff, “Early Adolescence in Antebellum America: The Remaking of Growing Up,” *Journal of Adolescence*, 5:4 (1985): 411-427; and Harvey J. Graff, “Remaking Growing Up: Nineteenth-Century America,” *Histoire sociale / Social History*, 24:47 (mai-May 1991): 35-59.

<sup>53</sup> Harvey J. Graff, *Conflicting Paths: Growing Up in America* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995), 3-4.

habits they needed to survive in the adult world through learning, but this often led to conflict over everything from what time to go to bed, to cleaning one's room. Building on the work of others like Mead, Graff found that in the teenager there was a conflict of internal and external goals which caused conflicts between parents, friends, peers and schools.<sup>54</sup> The paths taken to adulthood in different periods, and with different groups, have been what has changed: the struggle to grow up has remained the same.<sup>55</sup> Graff believed "[g]rowing up has never been anything other than difficult and complicated."<sup>56</sup>

Graff identified four major paths children took to grow into adults from the 1740s to the early 1800s: traditional, transitional, female, and emergent paths. In the traditional path of growing up "[s]ons followed in the footsteps of their fathers, within the bonds and bounds of family, typically in settled farming areas but also in migrations to the frontier and in artisanal or professional work." The transitional path was an intermediate phase between the traditional and the emergent. Young people were sometimes educated very early, and often lived away from home, but there was little personal choice involved. The female path was one which Graff set aside for women. Girls shared paths with their brothers, experiencing both the traditional path and the transitional path, but they also experienced something separate based on gender.<sup>57</sup>

Graff's fourth path was the emergent path, which was marked by personal choice and

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<sup>54</sup> Graff, *Conflicting Paths*, 13.

<sup>55</sup> Glen H. Elder, Jr. has broken down life-course studies into three categories: an individual's lifetime; social time; and historical time. Lifetime studies is the study of the chronological progression of a person's age. Social time (the first most important category from Graff's perspective) deals with a person's transition to various stages of time, like schooling, leaving home, obtaining employment, and marriage. Of equal importance is the person's historical time, in which they are placed in the context of their historical surroundings and their group (Glen H. Elder, Jr., "Adolescence in Historical Perspective," in Harvey J. Graff (ed.), *Growing Up in America: Historical Experiences* [Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987], 6-7).

<sup>56</sup> Graff, *Conflicting Paths*, 18.

<sup>57</sup> Graff, *Conflicting Paths*, 29-31.



life planning for a career. Graff believed this path was rare until the nineteenth century, but that it was marked by a desire for social mobility, higher education, and opportunity. Graff concluded that “[a]ttendance at college, though not yet expected, began to take on a closer relationship to professional preparation and particular career opportunities, especially when combined with a willingness to migrate or to make other sacrifices to enhance one’s chances of success.” The pathway to adulthood of the emergent path is much more like that taken today.<sup>58</sup> The United States Naval School and Academy, from 1845 to 1861, was a place where young people grew up. By Graff’s definition naval education became an emergent path to adulthood.

Through more formalized professional socialization, the Naval Academy provided a more structured career path for young men wanting to become naval officers. They entered as boys with the ways of the young, and emerged as men ready for a career in the navy. This process is what military historians have called “professional socialization.” Samuel P. Huntington, in *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1957), concluded that the professional officer had a duty to society and was more than a wage-labourer. He believed that professionalism in the military was composed of three elements: expertise, responsibility, and “corporateness” (in naval terms the “Band of Brother’s philosophy”).<sup>59</sup> The professional needed a type of specialized knowledge, or expertise different from the public which was acquired through special training at institutions. He obtained some of his education through liberal education, while specialized training a technical endeavour geared toward the goals of his chosen profession. Such

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<sup>58</sup> Graff, *Conflicting Paths*, 32.

<sup>59</sup> This “team” concept is mostly associated with Nelson and his fellow officers, but probably has a longer tradition. Captains traditionally consulted their crews and fellow captains and ideally would only make decisions if there was a consensus. Eventually, this led to the naval officer class seeing itself much like a family. As we will see with the midshipmen at Annapolis, this led to fellow midshipmen rarely “ratting” on another classmate.

training and education were needed so that the professional, the soldier, could properly serve his client: society.<sup>60</sup> While learning his skills, the soldier was also instilled with what it was meant to be part of the service.

This thesis will show that Annapolis provided middle-class American adolescents a place where they could be introduced to naval life: the life they might choose. It is clear that traditional, Mahanian, naval history lacks what is needed for this project. Therefore, for my analysis, I will look to youth history and largely frame the thesis in terms of Graff's emergent path to adulthood, while using the same definition of adolescence used by Natalie Zemon Davis: "from the onset of puberty to the full assumption of adult roles" which "is given some recognition, however slight, in every society; and [in which] one might then examine systematically the different ways in which it is defined, valued, and organized."<sup>61</sup> The Naval School originally catered to older experienced youths in their early twenties, but the reorganization that began in 1849, and led to the creation of the Naval Academy in 1850, lowered the age demographic of the school. It then became a safe place where parents could send younger teenagers, in their mid-teens, to be introduced to a new career different from their parents. In turn, the Academy treated them like youths and was concerned with their well-being, discipline, and gradual introduction to naval life, a philosophy reflected in the institution's age requirements, restructuring, discipline, and summer cruises.

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<sup>60</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957, reprint 1964), 8-9.

<sup>61</sup> Natalie Zemon Davis, "The Reasons of Misrule," in *Society and Culture in Early Modern France: Eight Essays* by Natalie Zemon Davis (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1975. Originally published in 1965), 108.

## ***Chapter Two: The Foundation of a System***

Change in how America educated its naval officers in the nineteenth century was gradual and culminated in the establishment of naval schools and their consolidation at Annapolis. Before centralization, midshipmen attended several tenuous naval shore schools and were educated at sea. These “schools” were in naval yards or on ships attached to those yards, and relied on the good offices of sympathetic commanders to keep them running. Secretaries of the Navy, and some members of Congress, advocated the establishment of more formal naval education, but disagreements over its nature stalled change. When he became Secretary of the Navy in 1845, George Bancroft reorganized the system by centralizing it at Annapolis using existing resources and powers which had been given him with his office. He intended to show Congress that the new school worked, but the idea was neither new, revolutionary, nor a dramatic break with the past. In this old system, new officers were sent straight to sea and trained on the job. This old system conflicted with the rising middle-class belief in a safe, structured, environment for educating adolescents, but the new system laid the groundwork for their safe transitional area to their career.

In the nineteenth century, middle-class youths spent a great amount of time at home before leaving to create their own lives and school became one of the primary, structured, locus to ensure that young people became proper adults. Samuel Busey, of Maryland, for example, sought an appointment to West Point, while his mother insisted he become a doctor. For the middle class, schools became a place to ensure proper training for a future career and where teenagers were protected from the evils of the world unlike the poorer children seen in squaller in the streets.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Harvey J. Graff, “Remaking Growing Up: Nineteenth-Century America,” *Histoire sociale Social History*, 24 (1991): 48-59.

The increased socio-economic gulf between the classes forced the poor to send their children into the streets to work, steal, peddle or become prostitutes. The increased number of poor labouring children in the streets had its effect on the middle class. They reacted to the independence they saw as "delinquent and symptomatic of domestic failure" and wanted more control over their children and adolescents. Graff concluded that "[e]lements of protected childhood and early adolescence and institutional development stood high among them . . . In turn, middle-class families and reformers emphasized the need to maintain the dependency of their own youngsters." One response was the creation of boarding schools like Muhlenberg's Flushing Institute for children from 13 to 18 years old. Private boarding schools were closed, self-contained, institutions where, hopefully, young people could be controlled. Like reform schools created for the poor, boarding schools protected the rich and laid the groundwork for secondary schools.<sup>2</sup>

The system of naval education in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries was not like a secondary school system, but rather a hands-on approach to learning. When it was reorganized it appealed to the new middle-class values which desired a safe, efficient, place for their children to learn a career.<sup>3</sup> One of the first Americans to consider a formal

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<sup>2</sup> Graff, "Remaking Growing Up," 51-55.

<sup>3</sup> Joseph F. Kett, in *Rites of Passage: Adolescence in America 1790 to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1977) is one youth historian who briefly discussed the United States Naval Academy. Kett can be classified with those youth historians who disagree with Ariès. Kett found that while Americans in the late-eighteenth century used words like "youth" and "children" interchangeably for people ranging from seven to seventeen, this did not mean people failed to see any difference between them. He found, for example, that boys over seven in Massachusetts were kept from sleeping with younger children and those between ten and sixteen were eligible for military education (Kett, 12). Kett believed that between 1800 and 1900 industrialization and demographic changes in America led to life-course changes for youths. Industrialization uprooted youths while demographic changes were reflected in decreased family size. Kett believed that between 1790 and 1840 youth were displaced from farming occupations, moved to the cities, and were also presented with more career and educational choices. From 1880 to 1900 Kett found there arose differences between middle-class and lower-class career paths. Middle-class parents adopted "new strategies to guarantee the satisfactory placement of their children in occupations, strategies which emphasized the young people's passivity and acquiescence" (Kett, 3-5).

Kett found that the experience of youths in the early-nineteenth century, could be divided into three stages: dependence, semidependence, and independence. Dependency on parents was shorter than today and probably remained until the child was about seven. At about that time they were sent into the labour force, but they were still semidependent on their families. There was a period of working then returning home, most likely in the winter months, and going to school.

education for officers was John Paul Jones. Jones believed they should be educated for efficiency and culture, that only “gentlemen” should be considered for commissions, and that they should be educated in both the theory and practice of officership. In linking the two concepts, Jones declared that no officer should be appointed to command who was unable to put his ideas to paper in a manner suited to his role. Jones’ thinking may have been influenced by John Locke, whose work he encountered while moving among an educated circle that included political leaders. Undoubtedly, Jones would have been exposed to Locke, who wrote on the education of gentlemen. Jones echoed Locke’s views that: illiteracy was the greatest defect among gentlemen.<sup>4</sup> Jones also believed that seamen should be educated on board ship. Each frigate-class vessel needed a little academy to train the sailors. John Adams agreed that there should be a school on every frigate of the US navy. When in port.

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This period of semidependence lasted until around aged twenty-one when the ‘child’ became independent. But Kett also found economic variants. Children of poor families were sent out to work more quickly than children of wealthier landholding families, while children of “wealthy manufacturers and merchants left early, but because of parental preference rather than necessity.” Kett believed that changes began between 1815 and 1840 with the “transportation revolution” which allowed people more freedom to move about the country. With increased industrialization young people moved at an earlier age from rural agricultural communities to take industrial jobs, often in the cities. Kett believed that in larger communities “the corporate life of youth shifted from involuntary associations (family and village) to voluntary associations such as academies, young men’s societies, and political clubs.” In all it became a “curious balance between dependence and independence” with the weight “increasingly on the side of independence” (Kett, 11-31)

Kett also found there was a conflict between the newly required efficiency in education and the idea of a prolonged period of childhood. One example he saw of this was the struggle between “regular and irregular (or ‘accidental’) education” that was found in professional schools, in particular the United States Naval Academy. Specially Kett stated that the “earliest instance of a collision between two different ideals of professional education lay in a change which took place at the United States Naval Academy in the 1850s.” While Kett misinterpreted some aspects of Academy life in this period, he correctly assessed the change that he believed occurred at the Academy. Kett found that the Naval School era was simply meant to prepare midshipmen for their lieutenant’s exam, but he also thought, somewhat incorrectly as we will later see, that “the discipline of the 1840s was loose, with middies often not even bothering to wear uniforms and with an occasional duel between students a tolerated if not recommended practice.” But conditions changed in the 1850s when Superintendent George P. Upshur took command of the facility. Kett concluded that Upshur believed in strong discipline and was moved to implement a regular course of instruction, mainly because he “belonged to a new breed of naval officers oriented toward steam power and naval engineering[.]” Kett concluded that in the 1850s the Academy became “a totally structured environment, in the fashion of contemporary boarding schools, for midshipmen whose ventures to sea would henceforth be confined to practice cruises and whose education would be gained through a consecutive four-year course sequence.” In general, the nineteenth century began where a youth could venture into the world by themselves and meet with success. Yet, by the turn of the century such a philosophy was believed to be the root of failure. A more structured way to a career was the correct path (Kett, 155; 172). As this thesis will show, Kett’s conclusions on the changes between the Naval School and Academy eras, while only encompassing one page of his book, were essentially correct.

<sup>4</sup> Henry L. Burr, “Education in the Early Navy,” PhD Dissertation (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1939), 8-9.

seamen would be required to attend shore academies to learn more about science and art needed for character formation.<sup>5</sup>

But a naval education was to instil certain values in an individual. Officers were to be merciful, empathic, and humble, like heroes along the lines of Oliver Hazard Perry. They were to be free from personal scandal – unlike Britain’s Nelson with his alleged infidelity – and their behaviour, according to Secretary Robert Smith, had to be free of self-destructiveness and other vices. The officer had to be clean, neat, and should get along well with his fellow officers, a philosophy that would be echoed at Annapolis.<sup>6</sup> Henry L. Burr concluded that “[n]aval education of the period, then, was socially realistic in preparing for a practical career, disciplinary in inculcating the military virtues, and idealistic in being a means to an end.”<sup>7</sup>

Key to the professional socialization of young men into the pre-1815 navy were role models. It was generally accepted that small gunboats were an inappropriate place to train young men. The commanders of the smaller vessels were usually sailing masters or older midshipmen, and were unsuitable role models for young midshipmen because they were too close to their crews; real officers were ideally a class on their own. The small gunboats also stayed close to shore and their small crew complement and small number of officers – usually one or two – were insufficient to instruct the new midshipmen in how to work as a team, or learn shared values and attitudes through a common routine. The gunboat failed to

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<sup>5</sup> Christopher McKee, *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794-1815* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 194; and Burr, 16.

<sup>6</sup> McKee, 169.

<sup>7</sup> Burr, 18-20.

instil, it was thought, the proper sense of "corporateness" into the new midshipmen.<sup>8</sup>

In their sea duties, midshipmen did everything from commanding to being personal servants. At times, if needed, they were promoted to acting lieutenant, master, or sailing-master, and the more experienced were made officers of the deck. While onshore, some midshipmen worked in the Navy Department and with the Secretary. When other officers were unavailable, midshipmen were put to work as clerks, while the youngest might be responsible for giving the captain his pistols and belt when the crew was called to quarters. Older midshipmen were posted about the ship to provide general supervision: they ensured that the lieutenant's orders were comprehended and followed, provided the officer of the deck with assistance, mustered the men on deck at night and kept them awake. Other midshipmen were stationed at the guns, or in the tops, and the more experienced ones were sent to the foretop. More often than not, older officers acted like parental figures to the young midshipmen. When one Captain Bolton found Farragut asleep on deck, rather than place him on report he put a pea-jacket over him to shelter him from the elements. When Midshipman Lynch arrived on his first ship, another older midshipman was friendly to him and showed him the ropes.<sup>9</sup> Even before the establishment of more formal naval education, older officers appreciated the youth and inexperience of new midshipmen.

While new midshipmen were sometimes looked out for, they were still sent to sea at

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<sup>8</sup> McKee, 156. This philosophy probably has its origins in the Royal Navy. Arthur N. Gilbert has found that in the eighteenth-century Royal Navy the class-like separation of officers and men may have led to officers thinking severe discipline was appropriate. In a unique bit of psychoanalysis Gilbert concluded that the RN midshipman, while in training on board ship, saw the vices and evils of the common men below decks, while striving for the ideals of the ordered, gentlemanly, society of officers above deck. Although this author fails to grasp the psychological nuances which support the study, somehow the midshipman's exposure resulted in the grown officer imposing severe discipline on the men in an attempt to impose the same order below deck (Arthur N. Gilbert, "Crime as Disorder: Criminality and the Symbolic Universe of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century British Naval Officer," in Robert William Love, Jr., (ed.), *Changing Interpretations and New Sources in Naval History: Papers from the Third United States Naval Academy History Symposium* [New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1980], 110-122).

<sup>9</sup> Burr, 84-88; and 102-103.

a tender age. For the first time they were exposed to the rigours of naval life with a minimal transition period, and were expected to fit in with the rest of the crew. Stephen Bleecker Luce, eventually one of the nineteenth-century's most famous advocates of naval education was born in Albany, New York, on 25 March 1827. On 4 November 1841, when he was only 14 years old, Luce was ordered to report to the *North Carolina*, a receiving ship at New York. Luce wrote about his first experiences on the *North Carolina* in *Youth's Companion*, on 22 December 1892. "To be suddenly cut adrift from one's mother's apron strings and landed on the deck of such a ship was," he wrote, "for a boy of fourteen, a tremendous change." First, he reported to the Commodore, then to the Captain, then to the first lieutenant, and finally to the officer of the deck. His name was put in the ship's log and he was then escorted by the midshipman of the watch down a maze of ladders into the gun-room, then deeper to another deck "where it was so dark that I had to grope my way along, and was in constant fear of falling through into some nameless abyss." His escort was about his own age and had been on board for about four weeks. He showed Luce his locker and where his hammock was to be hung.<sup>10</sup> Luce wrote that the young man told him

many other things the meaning of which I could not understand. I was appalled at first by the very idea of living in such a dreadful place, but my eyes adapted themselves in a little while to the darkness, and as the humorous remarks and cheerful voice of my companion reassured me, I soon began to think it might be possible to become reconciled to such life if others could.<sup>11</sup>

Luce's education began immediately as he started to learn the various ropes, what they were for, how the sails were set, and other practical knowledge needed by the sailor. But

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<sup>10</sup> Albert Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U.S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College* (New York: G.P. Sons Putnam's, 1925), 6-8.

<sup>11</sup> Luce in Gleaves, 8.



more importantly was his sense of initiation into the “wooden world.” He saw that the “captain of the top” was a man who looked like he had a good, solid, English education, but he also had some unique characteristics. He sported gold rings in his ears and on his chest was a tattoo of the *Constitution*. Luce recounted that the man told the young midshipmen that they all must have a tattoo of an American national emblem on their arms. The young midshipmen went through this tattoo ritual and “the captain of the top would accept no recompense from the midshipmen except a glass of grog.” The receiving ship was also the site of hazing. Luce wrote that the new arrivals would band together to stave off hazing from the older midshipmen, then haze new arrivals themselves. Luce wrote, “[t]he gun-room was the mess-room of the passed midshipmen, the youngsters being admitted on sufferance. The passed midshipmen we regarded as belonging to a superior order of beings.”<sup>12</sup> Luce spent six months on the *North Carolina* and concluded to their practical knowledge

they added a chivalric sense of honor . . . [we] were [all] being educated all the while, silently, unobtrusively and in a manner according to each individual character effectively. Two educational processes were in continual operation – *absorption* and *habituation* [emphasis in original].<sup>13</sup>

A chronicler later wrote that Luce’s journals of this period “are filled with notes and neat pen and ink sketches relating to damages to spars and rigging; how to avoid accidents, what to do in cases of emergency, and how to effect repairs, all of which were later embodied in his great work on practical seamanship.” The young midshipmen were learning while at sea.<sup>14</sup>

Despite the fact midshipmen were educated at sea, there was a rudimentary shore-based education system, but it was largely meant for officers already in the navy, rather than

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<sup>12</sup> Gleaves, 9-10.

<sup>13</sup> Luce in Gleaves, 13.

<sup>14</sup> Gleaves, 22.

for raw appointees. One oddly placed naval shore school was opened in 1803 in Tripoli by imprisoned sailors from the *Philadelphia*, after the loss of their vessel. Some of the officers studied mathematics, history and French, and were supplied books by the Danish consul. The school was established by William Bainbridge and David Porter, Jr.; the former later went on to attempt to establish a school in Boston after he returned to America. Meanwhile, back in America, Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith was an early advocate of shore-based naval education. In 1802, he ordered Chaplain Robert Thompson to the Washington Navy Yard to educate midshipmen in navigation and mathematics. Smith felt that the little shore academy was an important step in better naval education. He required Thompson to send regular reports on the progress of the midshipmen to the yard's commandant, John Cassin, who was then required to forward them to the Secretary. From 1804 to the middle of 1806, there was a break in education at the Washington Navy Yard when Commodore Samuel Barron's squadron was ordered to the Mediterranean along with all the midshipmen. Smith tried to get Congressional recognition for the Washington yard academy by attempting to have Congress change Thompson's title from chaplain to naval mathematician. Congress killed the proposal, thinking that Smith was attempting to create a new office, but Smith instructed Thompson to continue his instructions. The yard's academy eventually offered a four-month program of study for a wide age range of pupils, with short bursts of intense study, interwoven with periods of work. Thompson died in 1810 and was replaced by Andrew Hunter.<sup>15</sup>

It took persistence on the part of Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton to attract Hunter to the post. A graduate of the College of New Jersey in 1772, he had served in the

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<sup>15</sup> McKee, 203-205; and Burr, 147-148. Naval chaplains doubled at sea as teachers, as well as the captain's secretary, so it is no surprise that one was asked to teach navigation and mathematics. The chaplain was only given time away from serving the captain, for teaching midshipmen and other crew members, if their captains, like Captains David Porter or Thomas Truxtun, believed in classroom-style education (McKee, 201).

army as a chaplain and was later ordained a Presbyterian minister. He ran two academies in New Jersey and in 1804 was appointed to the chair of mathematics and astronomy at his alma mater. After discussing the offer with friends and family, Hunter, now in his sixties, accepted the offer. He continued Thompson's program of astronomy and mathematics with a slant toward naval operations. Throughout his tenure, about one hundred midshipmen passed through the program, spending approximately sixty-five days at the academy. Approximately two-thirds were able to attend only three to eighteen weeks. The 40% who stayed for less than five weeks already had a background in mathematics and astronomy and attended as a test of their competency. Those to whom Hunter gave poor reports were usually the "slack or ignorant" who refused to devote time to their studies. The academy was shut down by Secretary William Jones in 1813 as the new Secretary cleared the navy of Hamilton's appointments. Later, Commodore Isaac Chauncey and Chaplain Cheever Felch opened a mathematical school at Sackets Harbor, New York, in 1814-1815, for officers stranded at Lake Ontario by the winter ice. But the school closed when peace came in 1815.<sup>16</sup>

While the education efforts on the shores of Lake Ontario ended, more little naval schools were coming up over the horizon. On 10 December 1815 Bainbridge, on the *Independence*, opened a naval school at the Boston naval yard. The institution was to be opened every day of the week from 9am until 1pm, except for Sundays. Little is known about it, but pupils were required to study Bowditch's *Navigation*, as well as to take daily observations of their latitude and longitude. After they had versed themselves sufficiently in required areas of seamanship, they were to devote time to learning Spanish, French, advanced mathematics, and science. They were also to study tactics, naval battles, steam engines, and maritime and national law and were encouraged to observe the ships under repair or construction at the yard. While the Boston naval school appears to have remained

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<sup>16</sup> McKee, 205-208.

in existence until 1845, another one was opened in New York sometime between 1821 and 1825. Discipline at the New York school was relaxed, and when the midshipmen had free time they often jumped the yard walls and headed into town. They were required to attend church on Sundays, and were taught Spanish, French, and mathematics.<sup>17</sup>

The first naval school at Norfolk was established on the *Guerrière* in 1821 and confirms that these 'shore schools' were sometimes held on board ships tied up at naval yards rather than in permanent facilities. It was run by a Mr. Adams and gave midshipmen the opportunity for self improvement.<sup>18</sup> One Captain Sinclair concluded that he considered it

unnecessary to enter into detail of the necessary discipline to be used in the Government of those youths; they are in the character of gentlemen – have generally been bred as such – and as such you know how to treat them – I must, however, observe that the more a Student absent himself from study, the greater inclination he feels to continue it[.]<sup>19</sup>

He also believed the students should not be too idle on shore to avoid attracting commentary from the local population; still, the students often rough housed on board the ship and "ran races in the woods abreast the ship; the officers were always glad to have them ashore." The school taught mathematics and some languages, but it originally was intended to teach history, geography, naval tactics and laws. By 1833 the *Guerrière* was replaced by the *Java*, and the school probably remained in operation until 1845.<sup>20</sup>

The most prominent naval shore schools before the establishment of the Naval School

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<sup>17</sup> Burr, 151-154.

<sup>18</sup> Burr, 161.

<sup>19</sup> Burr, 162.

<sup>20</sup> Burr, 162-164.

at Annapolis was at Philadelphia. It was founded in 1839 at the Naval Asylum and originally taught eleven midshipmen mathematics during an eight-month academic year. The Philadelphia school was the only school devoted to offering a finishing course, while the other schools offered both introductory and finishing courses. The establishment of a finishing course appears to have occurred sometime in the 1820s, when the midshipmen began to request permission to have an extra period allotted to them to study before they were examined. At Philadelphia, the midshipmen were not allowed into the city too often, but could go to evening parties. Meanwhile, the Navy required the administration to submit a monthly progress report for each student. Midshipmen were allowed outside the Asylum until sunset, but could only leave at night with special permission, and lights out was at 9pm. Yet the administration was flexible and some midshipmen were allowed out on Sundays after they petitioned for permission. But card playing was forbidden and those caught were reported to the department.<sup>21</sup>

Despite the rules, there was little discipline at the Philadelphia school because there was no one in charge of discipline. This led to some disobedience, but only in protest of rights the students felt had been violated. In February 1840, some of the midshipmen had been placed on "leave of absence pay," and believed that this permitted them to leave the school and avail themselves of the rights of others of the same standing. The Secretary of the Navy disagreed and denied their request. In protest, the young men broke regulations and grew mustaches, only to shave them off before their exams.<sup>22</sup>

The last two years of the Philadelphia school were a mixture of success and failure. In 1843-1844 Professor William Chauvenet, by then the school's head, planned to institute a two-year program of study, but it was cancelled by Secretary J.Y. Mason. Naval officers

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<sup>21</sup> Burr, 149-157.

<sup>22</sup> Burr, 157-158.

at the time wanted the midshipmen freed up for duty, rather than spending two years in school. Chauvenet attempted to provide more teachers, and in the last year of the school Henry Lockwood joined, as well as one Mr. Belcher to teach maritime law, Lt. James H. Ward to teach gunnery, and Samuel Marcy to teach navigation; Chauvenet, Ward, and Marcy would go on to teach at the Naval School at Annapolis when it opened in 1845. But despite Chauvenet's efforts to run the school, a report to Secretary Mason on 16 February 1845, indicated that one midshipman had committed suicide and another had gone insane. On 25 February 1845 it was reported that a midshipman who had arrived on 21 December 1844 disappeared, kept requesting money for travel to return, but had not been seen since. He only returned on 3 April 1845.<sup>23</sup> The old system was faltering, and some thought the system had to be reformed for the well-being of the midshipmen.

Historians have believed that support for a naval school grew in 1842 as a result of the *Somers'* mutiny and the introduction of steam power. The navy's first steam vessel, the *Fulton*, was launched in 1837, and by 1839 Congress had authorized the construction of three more such craft. But with shore naval training already in existence, these factors seem an unlikely reason to establish a centralized facility, despite the calls from some for more technically inclined officers. According to the consensus, the *Somers'* mutiny – in which a young midshipman, son of the Secretary of War, was executed – put pressure on the government to provide a better method of training officers, while the technological revolution created pressure for better trained officers.<sup>24</sup> Yet the navy was years before they

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<sup>23</sup> Burr, 159-160.

<sup>24</sup> John P. Lovell, *Neither Athens nor Sparta? The American Service Academies in Transition* (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1970), 28; and Jack Sweetman, *The U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 3-5.

settled on the exact way to use steam-powered craft in their fleet – paddle or screw.<sup>25</sup> In the end, while some legislators on Capitol Hill advocated the establishment of a formal naval school for the youth, it turned out to become simply a rationalization and centralization of existing resources at Annapolis in 1845.

While the ad hoc training was operating, there was a move to establish less tenuous schools that were formally recognized in law rather than the training budget in a naval appropriation bill. In his Annual Report for 1841, Secretary of the Navy A.P. Upshur discussed the establishment of naval schools that would be more like West Point. He concluded that with the increased use of steam power, more scientific training was required. This involved training and examining engineers to ensure their proficiency. Upshur concluded, “[t]his important object can be best attained by the establishment of naval schools, provided with all necessary means of uniting practice with theory.” Upshur recommended mathematics professors be given a rank so that they would not have to mess and sleep with their students, since “[t]his close and constant association is well calculated to weaken the respect and influence which their relation to the young officers ought to inspire, and which is absolutely necessary to give due effect to their instructions.” He felt that “[t]he advantages which the army has derived from the Academy at West Point afford a

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<sup>25</sup> The navy experimented with several configurations – paddle or screw-driven – for steam-powered vessels, and even by the time the Naval School at Annapolis was created, many ships were still considered experimental and not part of the regular fleet. In October 1843 the navy ordered the vessel *Allegheny*, designed by Lt. William W. Hunter. Hunter eliminated the inverted-bell cross-section of the hull, as well as the high-pressure boilers, that had given him trouble with his previous designs. After a voyage from New Orleans to Norfolk, she had four of eight paddles removed, but the *Allegheny* proved a virtual failure: she burned 2,000 pounds of coal per hour and only averaged 4.92 knots. After four of the paddles were removed, her speed increased to 5.9 knots, but so too did her coal consumption, now up to 2,096 pounds per hour. Her consumption rate from 1847 to 1849 averaged 1,940 pound per hour, providing her with an average speed of 5.89 knots. The *Allegheny*’s horizontal wheels were eventually replaced with a screw-propellor, but she was eventually laid up, then used as a receiving ship, and sold by 1869. The navy planned more experimental vessels, but none were constructed. The era of experimentation had ended, and by 1845 the Secretary of the Navy was warning the government not to experiment with “doubtful novelties” (Donald L. Canney, *The Old Steam Navy, Volume One: Frigates, Sloops, and Gunboats, 1815-1885* [Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1990], 27-30).

sufficient proof that a similar institution for the navy would produce like results.”<sup>26</sup>

Military education in the United States had a history which influenced to a degree the system of naval education. The Naval School at Annapolis was influenced by the Army’s military academy, West Point. Bancroft sent Passed Midshipman Samuel Marcy, son of the then Secretary of War, to West Point to study its training methods. Marcy reported that West Point was a fine institution, and thought that the navy would benefit from creating one for itself along similar lines.<sup>27</sup> The American concept of a closed, formally-structured, military academy was introduced at West Point. The Military Academy’s Superintendent from 1817 to 1833, Sylvanus Thayer, was responsible for putting this concept into place. Thayer was influenced by the French *École Polytechnique* and instituted at West Point a school that was highly disciplined and rigorous in its education. Cadets were restricted to the Academy’s grounds unless they had good reason to leave and could be dismissed if they tried to go “over-the-wall” to visit a tavern. Cadets were also required to attend church, and were graded daily and took their classes in a seminar format. Grades were weighted, with subjects like math having a higher value than French. In comparison to other universities, West Point was ahead of the game in terms of mathematical and natural philosophical education, and it substituted classical languages like Latin and Greek with modern languages like French. It would be well after Thayer left before other universities fully adopted these subjects.<sup>28</sup>

But the debates in Congress about naval education mainly centred on the best age for midshipmen and whether shore naval education was practical for the service, and in the end

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<sup>26</sup> A.P. Upshur, “Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” Appendix to the *Congressional Globe* of the Second Session of the Twenty-Seventh Congress, 1841-42, 4 December 1841, 22.

<sup>27</sup> Lovell, 29. See also, Henry Francis Sturdy, “The Establishment of the Naval School at Annapolis,” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, 72 (April 1946, part II): 10-12.

<sup>28</sup> Some cadets were not up to the challenge of West Point: in 1831 Cadet Edgar Allan Poe was dismissed for neglect of duty, missing parades, church, and his studies for two weeks! (Lovell, 17-27).



they led nowhere. On 8 August 1842 a debate occurred in the Senate about the establishment of five new, permanent, naval schools. The bill to establish the schools had been introduced earlier in the session and came to its second reading. The debate was divided into those who favoured their establishment and those who opposed it. Those arguing for the establishment of the schools had little to say, but those against felt they were too expensive, would give too much power to the Secretary of the Navy, and would be used to educate the rich and wealthy elements of society. Besides, training young men ashore for life at sea flew in the face of logic.<sup>29</sup>

Those who favoured the naval schools believed that onshore training would produce better officers. Senator Archer told his colleagues that five naval schools would be established onshore. These schools would not cost the government much and would be beneficial to the navy. The new schools would use five old army forts and the only additional expense would be \$5000 for furniture. To bolster his argument in support of the new schools, Archer also reported that young men could already become midshipmen at 14 years of age, and asked the Senators, “[h]ow far can he be qualified to make an able officer at that age?” He believed that an efficient naval officer had to be trained in more things than simply running a ship: “Very often the highest questions of diplomacy are necessarily referred to the officers of the navy.” It was shameful, in his view, that the Government had failed to provide the best possible measures to ensure the adequate training of these young men for their duties.<sup>30</sup>

The main opponents of the naval schools were Senators Williams, Allen of Ohio, Smith of Connecticut, and Buchanan. Williams questioned the cost of the schools. He believed it would be too great an expense if more than one school were opened. Allen

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<sup>29</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Senate 8 August 1842, 859.

<sup>30</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Senate 8 August 1842, 859.

believed that the schools would become like West Point, which he felt had deteriorated into an institution of political patronage and education of the elite at public expense. He believed that if the naval schools were established, they should be for the benefit of “sons of poor widows, or of officers who have fallen in the service of their country[.]” As with West Point, he felt that once the young men had received their education, they would enter law or some other profession and not serve their country in return for their free education. He felt that the present system was sufficient. Another senator, Smith of Connecticut, declared that the establishment of naval schools would simply be “forming Government hot beds for stimulating one class of individual to rise at the expense of the public, above the natural talents, enterprise, and ability of other individuals.”<sup>31</sup>

Allen reminded his colleagues that these young men entered the navy at 13 or 14 years of age and travelled the world. He believed this world experience provided them with all the knowledge they needed. In addition, he felt the sea was where young men belonged: he had no time for “these land-lubber schools.” From his encounters with young midshipmen, he felt they were intelligent. He declared the ancients taught their young men to fight by sending them to the gymnasium and ensuring they had bodily exercise, and he did not understand how putting young midshipmen in “cloisters” or a “college cell” would teach them how to manage a ship in a storm. Allen told his colleagues to “[s]end him to sea, and there let him learn how to control the elements.”<sup>32</sup>

Senator Buchanan was concerned about the power that would be transferred to the Navy Department. The navy would now be solely responsible for running these facilities that had been originally constructed as forts for the army to defend the people of the United States. Buchanan questioned the costs and benefits of the schools and believed the estimate

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<sup>31</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Senate 8 August 1842, 859.

<sup>32</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Senate 8 August 1842, 859-860.

of \$400 to outfit each of the five forts was too small an estimate. He also questioned the benefit of spending \$1000 to purchase a steam engine, to be placed onshore, that would cost \$5000 to operate. He felt that it made more sense to train the midshipmen at sea in the use of steam under real conditions. Buchanan concluded: "Get these fortifications into the power of the Secretary of the Navy, and, ere long, there will be a magnificent establishment, and the Secretary soon clothed with the power to send whom he pleases to these schools, to be educated by the Government."<sup>33</sup>

To placate those objecting to the establishment of the schools, Senator Simmons suggested that the number of proposed schools be reduced to from five to three. The amendment passed but voting on the bill a third time was then postponed.<sup>34</sup> But on 9 August 1842 the Senate debated the number of schools once again. This time it was resolved to strike the number five from the bill. Then the Senate debated on the proper number. It was proposed to set the number of schools at two, but Calhoun said there should be one. He also added that the school should be established somewhere on the Chesapeake Bay.<sup>35</sup> Others suggested other locations, and it was decided to put the school at some fortification, probably "at or near Fort Monroe."<sup>36</sup>

Senator Allen then reiterated his objections to the establishment of the naval schools. He told the Senate that "[t]hese naval schools will, sir, in my judgement, degenerate into mere funds of political patronage; and that patronage be made to minister to those who least need it – to the wealthy, not the poor." In a heartfelt speech, Allen declared that the naval schools would not be for the poor or helpless, or the "obscure" and "powerless citizens" of

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<sup>33</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Senate 8 August 1842, 859-860.

<sup>34</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Senate 8 August 1842, 860.

<sup>35</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Senate 9 August 1842, 864.

<sup>36</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Senate 9 August 1842, 864.

America. Nor would they be for the poor orphan child or anyone of the lower classes no matter how bright they may be. Allen declared “[n]o, sir, all experience is against such a belief. The sons of the great, the powerful, the wealthy men of the nation – they who can speak with authority and effect to the appointing power – their sons will, with few, if any exceptions, be the chosen objects of this national gratuity.”<sup>37</sup>

Allen then questioned the practical education that was taught at West Point. He declared that the taxpayers of the nation were unaware that they were funding a “dancing school.” Allen read to the Senate a letter he received from a cadet of West Point:

I am drilled twice a day at infantry drill, and once at artillery drill. We rise in the morning at a quarter before 5 o'clock; at a quarter past 5 o'clock we police; at half past 5 until half-past 6 o'clock, infantry drill; from half past 6 o'clock till 7, recreation, or cleaning arms; from 7 to 8, breakfast; from 8 to half-past 8, dress parade and guard mounting; from half past 8 until 9, recreation, from 9 to 10, artillery drill; from 10 to 1, recreation; from 1 to 2, dinner; from 2 to 4, *dancing lessons* [emphasis in original]; from 4 to half past 4, recreation from half past 4 until 5, police; from 5 till 20 minutes past 6, infantry drill; from 20 minutes past 6 till 7, dress parade; from 7 till 9, supper; from 8 till half past 9, recreation; from half past 9 till a quarter of 10, prepare for bed; at a quarter of 10, signal for extinguishing lights. These are all the duties we have to perform during the day. When we go on guard, (which happens one day out of five days) we are two hours on guard, and four off.<sup>38</sup>

Allen was aghast that these men were taught to dance for two hours. He told the Senate that West Point ought to be a place “where men are to be taught to fight.”<sup>39</sup>

Senator Woodbury also thought naval education should concentrate on practical

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<sup>37</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Senate 9 August 1842, 864.

<sup>38</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Senate 9 August 1842, 864.

<sup>39</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Senate 9 August 1842, 864.

matters. He told his fellow senators that the deck of a vessel was the best training ground for the sailor. It was best to send him to sea to prove his worth first; then, if he were found to be fit, continue his training onshore when he was onshore, and at sea when the sailor was at sea. But “[i]t was no more proper to send the army officer or the cadet at West Point to sea, than to keep the naval officer much on shore, and attach him strongly to shore pursuits. The most abhorrent idea to a genuine tar is a land-lubber.” The bill passed the Senate 22 to 5 and was received by the House on 13 August 1842, but appears to have died in committee.<sup>40</sup>

The Secretary of the Navy renewed the call for something to be done about the state of naval education later in 1842. Although not mentioning the *Somers'* mutiny directly, Upshur believed that the navy exhibited as many abuses as any other society; those onshore simply failed to attract the same public attention. Upshur believed that reform must first begin with the midshipmen. He told his audience that “[a]fter a time, these boys become men [emphasis added], and these midshipmen become lieutenants, and commanders, and captains.” He believed that only those young people who were qualified should be appointed to the navy. There were no clear rules by which midshipmen were appointed, and the Secretary often was left to appoint them without clear knowledge of their qualifications. Upshur believed this often led to a poorer quality of candidate. He wrote, “[i]t is a notorious fact, that wayward and incorrigible boys, whom even parental authority cannot control, are often sent to the navy, as a mere school of discipline, or to save them from the reproach to which their conduct exposes them on shore.”<sup>41</sup>

As part of the solution, Upshur proposed that naval schools be based on shore. Upshur wrote that while midshipmen were trained on receiving ships and at sea, their

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<sup>40</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Senate 9 August 1842, 864; House 13 August 1842, 888.

<sup>41</sup> A.P. Upshur, “Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department,” Appendix to the *Congressional Globe* of the Third Session of the Twenty-Seventh Congress, 1842–43, December 1842, 41.

education was often interrupted; it seemed that he hoped permanent shore schools would remedy the problem. He probably would be saddened that when the Naval School was established at Annapolis, the manpower needs of the navy still interrupted the students' education. It was a testament to the current lot, thought Upshur, that they had fared so well. Upshur believed that a proper foundation for naval education could only be provided on land. He noted that in the last session of Congress a bill to establish a naval school had passed the Senate but died in the House. He proposed that Congress address the matter once more, and left the regulation of the school to them. He felt the school would be best established at a former military fortification, and officers, teachers, and equipment for the establishment would come from those already in the navy. This would make the schools cost-effective.<sup>42</sup>

Upshur proposed that instruction at the school be given to those entering the navy and to midshipmen already serving. Admission to the school would be regulated as at West Point. "[N]o boy shall receive an acting appointment in the navy, until he shall have passed a certain period of diligent study at a naval school" or received the proper certification. Upshur believed these regulations would provide a better level of officer for the navy. He felt that by the time the boy had been educated and physically trained at a naval school, he "will have attained a period of life when the character is generally well developed, and, in some degree fixed; so that the country will have good reason to trust him in the higher grades of the service." The proposed system would relieve the navy of its current problems and "keep it in a healthy condition."<sup>43</sup>

In addition to providing a better quality of officer, Upshur believed a formal education would serve the new needs of the navy; which despite the views of some historians, lacked mention of a need for steam engineers. The naval officers were most often

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<sup>42</sup> Upshur, "Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department," December 1842, 41.

<sup>43</sup> Upshur, "Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department," December 1842, 41.

the only representative of the United States in a foreign land. The officer had to run his ship and crew, and represent the flag. Currently, the West Point cadet was “well-founded in the principles of solid and useful learning, and fully prepared to engage with advantage in any pursuit, whether of civil or military life,” but the naval candidate was simply asked if he could read and write. Given the duties of naval officers, Upshur believed the government had a responsibility to elevate their character to equip them for their duties. Upshur concluded that “[t]his can be best done by giving him a suitable preparatory education, and by providing proper and ready means of removing him from the ranks of his profession, whenever he may be found unworthy to occupy a place in them.”<sup>44</sup>

On 27 December 1842 Senator Richard Bayard from Delaware, chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, introduced a bill to reorganize the navy department as well as to establish naval schools. The bills were read twice and referred to the Naval Affairs Committee, but again died there.<sup>45</sup> In late 1843 and into the 1844 session of Congress, little headway was made. Bayard introduced a bill in the Senate on 23 January 1844 to establish naval schools of instruction, but it too died.<sup>46</sup> And naval education in the 1845 sessions met with a similar fate; it took a new Secretary of the Navy, George Bancroft, with a new vision and a bold mentality, to achieve progress.

Bancroft became Secretary of the Navy under President James K. Polk in March 1845. It was not long before he learned of the previous attempts to create a naval school. He met with Professor William Chauvenet of the Philadelphia Naval Asylum School, and

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<sup>44</sup> Upshur, “Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department,” December 1842, 42.

<sup>45</sup> *Congressional Globe*, Senate, 27 December 1842, 84-85. Bayard’s biographical information from, U.S. Congress, Senate, *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-1989* (Washington: GPO, 1988; updates at <http://bioguide.congress.gov>) Senate Document 100-34.

<sup>46</sup> *Congressional Globe*, First Session of the Twenty-Eighth Congress, Volume XIII, 176, 611.

decided to circumvent Congress to create the new school. The navy's budget for 1845 included \$28,272 simply allotted for "Instruction;" Bancroft took this, and Fort Severn in Annapolis, which the Army had abandoned, and founded the Naval School. Bancroft was from a conservative, New England, background and a consolidation of existing educational efforts was more in step with his beliefs than radical change.<sup>47</sup>

Bancroft concluded that his goal would best be attained not by creating new offices, but by using what the law and budgets had already allotted for educating naval officers. The school was to ensure that when midshipmen were ashore they were occupied in the "study of mathematics, nautical astronomy, theory of morals, international law, gunnery, use of steam, the Spanish and French languages" and any other task required of a naval officer. Bancroft felt that this new system would be better than that which currently existed because midshipmen on shore were left to their own devices. He believed that "[a]t present they are left, when waiting orders on shore, masters of their own motions, without steady occupation

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<sup>47</sup> Sweetman, 12-16. George Bancroft was born into the family of a New England minister, Aaron Bancroft, on 3 October 1800. The young George was brought up in a family where his father preached that it was in youth that good moral habits were founded and self-control, obedience, and restraint were pivotal to a person's success. George and his sister Lucretia were taught at home by their father and then by one Alfred Wright. Later they attended Nelson's school but for Lucretia, formal education would go no further. After Nelson's school George attended an academy at Exeter, New Hampshire, where he studied for entrance into Harvard. But Bancroft had insecurities and he felt bound by obligation to do the best he could in his academic pursuits. At Exeter he learned Greek and Latin and joined a semi-military company known as the Washington Whites. In August 1813 George graduated and then moved on to Harvard. Harvard was meant to "prepare men for life" and a career, rather than make teachers, and young Bancroft decided that he would follow in his father's footsteps and aim towards becoming a minister. But it was at Harvard that his New England religious background combined with the school's program of moral philosophy to instill in Bancroft the outlook for the rest of his life (Lilian Handlin, *George Bancroft: The Intellectual as Democrat* [New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1984], 18-34). Historian Lilian Handlin concluded

[t]hat philosophy generated a progressive and optimistic, but also cautious, outlook. It did not extol man's innate goodness or his inner capacity to discover God, but neither did it limit knowledge to sense impressions or exclude intuition. The impact on George Bancroft was overwhelming. The peculiar mixture of ebullient visions and realistic calculations, of surface radicalism and deep conservatism, that characterized the Democratic Whig Bancroft later became was partly the outcome of his Harvard education (Handlin, 34).

Before his exploits in his brief tenure as Secretary of the Navy, Bancroft ran for several elections, both for governor of Massachusetts and for Congress, but in the end the only political office he held before becoming Secretary of the Navy, was running the custom's house in Boston until he resigned on 8 March 1841. All the while Bancroft held the view that the "existing order . . . could be reformed without violent upheaval" (Handlin, 113-181).



– young, and exulting in the relief from the restraints of discipline on shipboard.”<sup>48</sup> What these young men needed was constant structure in their lives.

Bancroft centralized the existing professors in Annapolis so that this resource would not be wasted. Under current regulations “[f]or the purposes of instruction, the [Navy] Department can select from among twenty-two Professors and three Teachers of Languages.” It was Bancroft’s goal to put them to the best possible use. But he pointed out that current naval regulations classified midshipmen as officers as soon as they were appointed, and they could be called back to sea at any time, rather than as students at an introductory school like the cadets at West Point. Therefore, when midshipmen returned from sea, regardless of the time of year, they would be sent to the Naval School. Under these conditions their classes were to be arranged “in such a manner as will leave opportunity for those who arrive to be attached to classes suited to the stage of their progress in their studies.”<sup>49</sup> But by 1849 and 1850 this system of midshipmen coming and going forced the school to reorganize.

Franklin Buchanan, the School’s first Superintendent, recommended that the Secretary of the Navy was to appoint the Superintendent of the Naval School from a list of naval officers, but the man chosen could rank no higher than Commander, although Buchanan failed to specify the reason for this belief. The Examining Board was to consist of two captains appointed annually, but it was the Superintendent who was responsible for managing the School. The professors and instructors were also to be selected from the navy and, when ordered by the Superintendent, were to constitute a board for the purposes of examining the midshipmen in their courses, as well as to make suggestions as to the

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<sup>48</sup> George Bancroft to Franklin Buchanan, 7 August 1845, in United States, *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis* (Washington: C. Alexander, Printer, 1847), 3-4. Held by the William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.

<sup>49</sup> George Bancroft to Franklin Buchanan, 7 August 1845, in *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis*, 5-6.

improvement of those courses and the School. Buchanan recommended that “[e]very applicant for admission to the school must be of good moral character,” and between thirteen and seventeen years old. They were to be examined for medical fitness and they “must be able to read and write well, and be familiar with geography and arithmetic.” An Academic Board was to examine them and assure the School that the applicants were fit for service.<sup>50</sup>

Once a midshipman received his appointment he was to be sent to the School “subject to the exigencies of the service.” There he was to be subject to semi-annual exams: those who failed would be “dropped from the lists and returned to their friends.” Only those whose “conduct and proficiency” were suitable to the Academic Board and the Superintendent would be sent to sea. They would remain at sea for six months and “receiving a favorable report of his conduct during that time from his commander . . . will be entitled to a warrant bearing the date of his acting appointment.” Buchanan concurred that all midshipmen onshore were to report to the School. After three years service at sea, and being allowed a leave of absence to return home, they were to report to the School to prepare for their final examinations. Buchanan recommended that their course of studies encompass “English Grammar and Composition; Arithmetic, Geography, and History; Navigation, Gunnery, and the use of Steam; the Spanish and French Languages” and any other subjects required of a naval officer. He also recommended that a sloop-of-war or brig also be attached to the School “as a school of practice in seamanship, evolutions, and gunnery.” As Bancroft suggested, “[c]lasses will be arranged according to the acquirements and capacity of the Midshipmen[.]” but “[t]he final examination for promotion [to Lieutenant] will embrace all the branches taught at the School.”<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Franklin Buchanan, “Plan of the Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis, MD,” in *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis* 9-10.

<sup>51</sup> Buchanan, “Plan of the Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis, MD,” in *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis*, 10-11.

Although the Naval School was to teach a variety of topics, seamanship was emphasized. Buchanan wrote that the midshipmen would be examined by a board in Annapolis every fifteenth of July. Professors were to examine the midshipmen on their courses before the board, but the board was also to take into consideration the averages submitted by the professors. The board was to be responsible for ranking the midshipmen and letting the Department of the Navy know of their progress. The board was to take into consideration such factors as the general and moral character of the midshipman, as well as his academic abilities. For each branch of study, the board was to assign a merit scale of between one and ten. Averages were to be used for assigning rank, but in seamanship a "multiplier of five" was to be used. Buchanan concluded that "[a]s a much higher value is thus placed on seamanship than on the other branches, the board is directed to exercise a sound judgement in deciding upon the numbers to be given to the candidate before them previous to the examination of another."<sup>52</sup>

A student could fail other subjects, as long as he passed seamanship and navigation with high marks; he would be rejected and dropped from the navy list otherwise. But the board had the right to grant a reprieve if he proved he could be valuable and provided a good excuse for his poor academic performance, such as sickness. If he failed a second time he would be dropped from the list without any further consideration. The rules for examination were to be virtually the same for the junior classes of raw appointees as for those midshipmen being examined for promotion to lieutenant (or passed midshipman), although the examination would be more "cursory" and "seamanship will be omitted." The board was also responsible for reporting how the midshipmen had spent their time at the school and whether they "show[ed] a clear incapacity for the naval service," in which case they would

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<sup>52</sup> Franklin Buchanan to George Bancroft, "Rules to govern examinations at the Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis, Maryland," 14 August 1845; approved 28 August 1846, in *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis*, 18-19.

be dropped.<sup>53</sup> From 1845 to 1850, the Naval School was a hybrid institution to serve the needs of both the older students and the raw appointees. The older students would acquire the education needed to supplement their sea experience before becoming lieutenants, while the younger midshipmen would find in the School a transitional place to introduce them to naval life and the requirements of the navy.

The internal operating rules for the new school composed by Franklin Buchanan on 10 October 1845 were straightforward. He ordered that all at the School were to abide by the regulations and any subsequent rules which might be issued by the Superintendent. All officers were required to treat each other with respect and anyone with a complaint against another would present it before the Superintendent. But the seventh article declared that

[a]s obedience and subordination are essential to the purposes of the School, all therein are required to obey the commands of the Professors. The strictest attention to order and study is required in the recitation halls, and no midshipman is allowed to absent himself from the room without permission from a Professor, and then only for a few minutes.<sup>54</sup>

On 15 October 1845 Buchanan promulgated some additional regulations. They were to stay in their assigned rooms unless given permission by the Superintendent to leave. They were also ordered to “prepare their clothes for the wash women before recitation hours on Monday morning.” And finally, the Superintendent decided to give one midshipman in each room some responsibility: “[o]ne midshipman from each room occupied by the students, will

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<sup>53</sup> Franklin Buchanan to George Bancroft, “Rules to govern examinations at the Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis, Maryland,” 14 August 1845; approved 28 August 1846, in *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis*, 19-20.

<sup>54</sup> Franklin Buchanan, “Rules and Regulations for the internal government of the Naval School,” 10 October 1845, Letters received by the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, 1845-1887 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M949, roll 1); Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, Newfoundland. Hereafter, letters received.

perform the duties of superintendent of the room for one week: and he will be held responsible for the cleanliness and general neat arrangements of the room.”<sup>55</sup>

Buchanan’s recommendations were eventually adopted by the Navy Department on 28 August 1846 and were essentially little different from those of the shore schools and ship school which had previously existed. Bancroft had ordered that the new School take advantage of existing resources; Buchanan had complied. It would take another four years for the Naval School to evolve into an institute that was markedly different from the previous system of naval education.

In George Bancroft’s *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, delivered in December 1845, he told Congress of the establishment of the Naval School at Fort Severn. He reminded Congress that previously professors were stationed at the Naval Asylum in Philadelphia or they went to sea with the midshipmen. He concluded that this was ineffective and that a ship was unsuited to educate midshipmen. The teachers on the receiving ships were in a similar position and provided little or no instruction to oncoming midshipmen. This was not the fault of the professors but rather the system.<sup>56</sup>

The old system of naval education consisted of “on the job” training at sea, supplemented by brief periods of training at several shore facilities. Although these “shore schools” were in existence for some years, it was a tenuous existence. Although Congress provided a budget of teachers, they were scattered about naval facilities on ships attached to shore or in naval yards, and they had to rely on educationally inclined commanders to let them teach for any extended period. These old “schools” appear to be informal at best, with the most structured of them being in Philadelphia. Before 1845 there were calls for the

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<sup>55</sup> Franklin Buchanan, 15 October 1845, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>56</sup> George Bancroft, “Report of the Secretary of the Navy 1845,” appendix to the *Congressional Globe*, for the First Session, Twenty-Ninth Congress, 1 December 1845, 17.

establishment of more permanent facilities to provide better training for the young midshipmen, but Congressional inertia stalled any progress. But Bancroft hoped to make the system more efficient.

He told his audience that he had concluded it would be more efficient to instruct midshipmen onshore while they were between cruises. The instructors would be paid out of funds already allotted, and combined with the use of old Fort Severn, the school “was immediately organized, on an unostentatious and frugal plan.” Bancroft hoped that the Naval School would provide a measure of transition to naval life. He concluded,

[t]his institution, by giving some preliminary instruction to the midshipmen before their first cruise, by extending an affectionate but firm supervision over them as they return from sea, by providing for them suitable culture before they pass to a higher grade, by rejecting from the service all who fail in capacity or in good disposition to use their time well, will go far to renovate and improve the American navy.<sup>57</sup>

Yet despite Bancroft’s idea to educate existing midshipmen and new appointees at Annapolis, the needs of the service maintained the status quo. By the time most students managed to attend the School, they were in their early twenties.

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<sup>57</sup> Bancroft, “Report of the Secretary of the Navy 1845,” *Congressional Globe*, 17.

### ***Chapter Three: Choice for Youth and the Naval School, 1845-1849***

When the Naval School opened at Annapolis in October 1845 most of the students were midshipmen with prior sea experience. Many young people had applied to the Secretary of the Navy, their local Congressmen, or the navy, to obtain midshipmen's appointments as one possible way to have a life apart from their parents. This was the middle-class way of obtaining a career in life, and the midshipmen were largely from the middle class. But once in the navy the needs of the service often meant these young people were still sent to sea, rather than spending time at the Naval School: if they were lucky enough to go directly to the School, they were often recalled to sea. The Naval School's curriculum reflected the needs of the service and concentrated largely on elements of practical seamanship naval education. Yet, instead of being gradually introduced to naval life, many of these youths found themselves thrown as virgins into the seas, and in essence the School maintained continuity with the old system. The administration tried its best to deal with the midshipmen's comings and goings, but by the late 1840s it found many students were performing poorly, probably because they had been away from school for such a long period. The ages of the students then covered a wide range, and authorities became increasingly concerned about the influence of the older students on the younger pupils. It was the concern over the poor academic performance of the students, and the increasing age differences, that sparked the movement for reform by 1849.

The nineteenth century was a period of change for young people. As society industrialized more opportunities opened for a youth on his or her way to adulthood. Historians have found that this explosion of choice, change, and confusion began in the early- nineteenth century, leading young people to have a certain level of semi-independence from their families. But by the end of the nineteenth century, the lives of young people had

become much more regulated. The specific needs of the navy combined with the patterns of middle-class American youths who sought a road to adulthood through more structured training, but with a level of personal choice. Their families held the belief that they should grow up in a structured environment, which taught them what was needed for their careers.<sup>1</sup> One nexus of the navy and the middle class occurred in naval education. It allowed young teenagers to seek a life of adventure and personal choice, while still following the emergent middle-class road to adulthood.

Before the industrial revolution dramatically changed Western society, many people were scattered about the countryside in sparsely populated areas. When young children reached seven or eight they took on some responsibility and cared for some animals and helped prepare food. In this world the daughter was like her mother and the son was like his father. But John Demos concluded that grown-ups considered them morally and physically inferior and some tasks were considered to be "only for children." The family structure during this period also provided the child with an age-maturity reference: because families were large, often with eight to ten children, the younger children had a reference by which to measure their social and physical development; to see what they would be like when they grew older, they simply had to look at an older brother or sister.<sup>2</sup>

Demos believed that while adolescence was always problematic, with its manifestations in incidents like the Salem witch trials, it was only in the nineteenth century that "youth," the period from childhood to adulthood, became a pronounced, common, problem. Teenage boys were moving into and out of their parents' homes and were expected

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<sup>1</sup> See Edward Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1975); Harvey J. Graff, "Remaking Growing Up: Nineteenth-Century America," *Histoire sociale Social History*, 24 (1991): 48-59; and Joseph F. Kett, in *Rites of Passage: Adolescence in America 1790 to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1977).

<sup>2</sup> John Demos, *Past, Present, and Personal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 97.



to be home during the summer, often to help with the harvest, but were free to leave in the winter. They frequently found other work, and some went to school for irregular periods. One twenty-five year old son in the 1840s spent time away from home in Boston, but had to send money home to help support his family. Still, he was told by his father what time he should get up in the mornings and what time to go to bed. Demos concluded the early-nineteenth century was a period of confusion "in social expectation of age-appropriate behavior."<sup>3</sup>

Demos believed that in the early-nineteenth century choices, ranging from occupation to mate, emerged for young people. The beginning of the nineteenth century was one of uncertainty for young people as they searched for mentors in their lives now that their fathers worked away from home. But by the end of the century adolescence became codified and "confined;" much more "modern."<sup>4</sup> There was a move in the latter half of the century to separate the ages of students in classrooms and a move from semi-dependence to a longer period of dependency on adults.<sup>5</sup> Demos concluded that, "[t]he larger impulse which underlay all such activities, whether within or outside the home, was to create systematically

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<sup>3</sup> Demos, *Past, Present, and Personal*, 98-102. College and university life also showed that adults were concerned about regulating student lives. Demos gave the example that Yale required students to remove their hats when within ten yards of a tutor, and within sixteen yards of a professor! He also found that the early-nineteenth century was one of unprecedented unruliness on the part of the students: they participated in brawls and duels, both among each other and with professors. The violence at the University of Virginia became so bad that one of its professors was murdered by students in the 1830s.

<sup>4</sup> Mary P. Ryan believed that the remoteness of boys from their fathers may explain their restlessness. Ryan found a report in the *Mother's Monthly Journal* for 1838 where a little boy cried that he wanted to be as big as his father. While in 1842, the journal decried that boys were hard to deal with, were always into trouble, and uncooperative with their mothers and sisters ("Privacy and the Self-Made Man: Family Strategies of the Middle Class at Midcentury," in Harvey J. Graff (ed.), *Growing Up in America: Historical Experiences* [Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987], 249).

<sup>5</sup> This period saw the rise of organizations like the YMCA. The YMCA was created in 1859 to provide "a halfway home for young men recently uprooted from the parental family" (Ryan, 259). See also, David I. MacLeod, "Act Your Age: Boyhood, Adolescence, and the Rise of the Boy Scouts of America," in Graff (ed.) *Growing Up in America*, 397-413. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Archetypal Patterns of Youth" in Graff (ed.) *Growing Up in America*, concluded that youth organizations usually appear when a society is in transition between a feudal to modern society. This period is marked by increased migration, industrialization, mobility, and urbanization, which break down traditional societal structures. In contrast to the greater career variety offered to youth, Eisenstadt concluded that these youth organizations are totalistic institutions created by adults. These institutions seek to provide youth with "clear role models and values" and "in which the extent of choice allowed youth is very limited and the manifestations of personal spontaneity and autonomy are restricted" (53 and 58).

planned environments for the young. Youth might then progress in a more orderly fashion toward the great goal of adulthood, bypassing insofar as possible the perils and pitfalls [of youth] along the way.” With the expansion of life-choices for teenagers, there also arose an identity crisis. Demos felt that “[t]he process of deciding who one was, what one wanted to be, and how one’s particular choices would intersect with the social order: here was a labyrinth of personal – and social – perplexities.”<sup>6</sup>

Harvey J. Graff believed that the amount of change in the patterns of growing up in the nineteenth century has been underestimated. He believed that this period was marked by a greater instance of transitional paths, where youths often learned skills on the job, sometimes away from home, according to the wishes of their parents, to the more modern path of growing up involving formal schooling geared toward a chosen choice. The nineteenth century was marked by the traditional path as well as the transitional path. He saw that there were four types of transitional paths: artisan-apprentice; a discontinuous path that took the young person to a school or college; a path of western migration as the frontier expanded; and a path of religious conversion, where religion played a large part in maturation.<sup>7</sup> These changes were a result of industrial changes in society which led to the emergence of the modern middle-class and the reorganization and nuclearization of the family. Graff concluded, “[o]f special significance were the spread of the marketplace, growth of wage labor, separation of home and workplace, and parallel processes of reshaping familial and gender roles and responsibilities.” For the middle class, adolescence became a period of longer dependency, institutionalization – in schools and colleges – and predetermined career goals: for example, if a youth wished to become a doctor, and his

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<sup>6</sup> Demos, *Past, Present, and Personal*, 105-107.

<sup>7</sup> Harvey J. Graff, *Conflicting Paths: Growing Up in America* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995), 69-70.

parents agreed, he went to medical school.<sup>8</sup>

Mary P. Ryan, from her study of mid-century Utica, believed that with father and son removed from direct association with each other, a different way of raising young adults had to be constructed. In 1830 a group of concerned citizens met to complain about the quality of education in New York state. Fathers declared that they wanted their sons, between the ages of five and sixteen, educated to be able to take a place in commercial society, and to be able to take care of themselves in the world.<sup>9</sup> Prior to the 1840s, schools were taught by

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<sup>8</sup> Graff, "Remaking Growing Up," 40-43.

<sup>9</sup> The opinions of this group of concerned citizen is part of a debate that mainly focused around college and university education in the early-nineteenth century. The role of the university in American society was affected by the political philosophies of the time. In 1828 Andrew Jackson was elected president and became a symbol of the ideals of the age. The previous president, John Quincy Adams, became president without a majority of the popular vote, something many saw as undemocratic. This was an age which valued laissez-faire, democratic governance, and equality of opportunity (Robert V. Remini, *The Legacy of Andrew Jackson: Essays on Democracy, Indian Removal, and Slavery* [Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988], 7-44). Universities like Yale were now institutions "cradled in privilege in an age that insisted upon being democratic." This period also saw socio-economic cleavages at the universities. Princeton was perceived by many as a college for the sons of wealthy southern plantation owners, while Harvard was the training ground for Boston's young elite. Meanwhile, "in South Carolina, too, and in Missouri the people did not allow to go unnoticed the fact that the university students were overwhelmingly drawn from the wealthy counties" (Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University: A History* [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962], 131-134).

The early-nineteenth century saw a battle between those conservative elements in the universities that wanted to keep a classical curriculum, and those who wanted the schools to be more in tune with the needs of a society that was becoming industrialized. In 1828, Jeremiah Day, President of Yale, wrote the Yale Report of 1828 on behalf of the faculty, which "stated the case for the classical curriculum in America with such finality that not until the next generation would another band of reformers assail the old course of study" (Rudolph, 131). The Report advocated maintaining an Aristotelian style of education. The Yale faculty rejected notions that they were out of step with the wants of the age. Day concluded,

[t]he two great points to be gained in intellectual culture, are the discipline and the furniture of the mind; expanding its powers, and storing it with knowledge." These points might be best gained by adherence to the ancient subjects, for these were the subjects most certain to discipline and most worthy to furnish a balanced mind. Mathematics shaped the mind as an instrument of reasoning. The classic helped to achieve balance by bending the mind toward taste (Rudolph, 132-133).

Yale argued that wealthy men being forged by "American abundance" should be given a liberal education (Rudolph, 133). The wealthy did not need practical education, as for the lower classes: "the laboring classes" would be introduced to what they needed to know by "men of superior education," by college men, the trained, balanced leaders whose minds had been furnished and disciplined, tested and proven by a course of study that had not only stood the test of time but had as well been remarkably practical and receptive to change (Rudolph, 134).

But by the late 1840s and 1850s colleges and universities in America were suffering from a crisis. There had been an initial boom in the number of universities founded in the United States, but by the 1850s "in New England the number of students in colleges was declining both actually and proportionately to the population" (Rudolph, 281). Where fifty-five Catholic colleges were founded between 1850 and 1866, by 1866 50 percent of them had closed. Denison College in Ohio had been opened for twenty years, but by 1859 had only graduated 65 students. And it was only in 1860 that Harvard graduated a class of 100 students. To maintain their relevancy in America of the 1850s, the universities would have to

college or academy students, and usually contained children between the ages of five and fifteen. The schools also contained, in the winter, a number of older boys between 16 and 17 and sometimes as old as 18 to 20 years of age.<sup>10</sup> By the 1840s, schools were being established in Utica mainly to provide boys with a social base. The New York State census of 1845 recorded that most of the children between five and sixteen years old were in school: 69% of those from Utica and 80% for Whitestown.<sup>11</sup>

Other ways of socializing young men were developed in Utica: there flourished a number of boys' newspapers, with names like the *Sun*, the *Diamond*, the *Eagle*, and the *Star*, which were written and published by boys between the ages of twelve and fifteen, in emulation of the adult papers. In place of direct training by their fathers came institutionalized education and emulation of adults.<sup>12</sup> Wealthy sons, meanwhile, often left home early in the beginning of the nineteenth century, with one nineteen-year-old son of a wealthy merchant ending up in St. Petersburg in the role of a supercargo and then becoming a partner in the company. Other middle-class youths became apprentices between the ages of twelve and sixteen.<sup>13</sup> Others became more independent because they could secure jobs as a result of territorial and industrial expansion. Some boys became factory overseers when only sixteen. Joseph F. Kett concluded that most boys between the ages of 17 and 21 had

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diversity and offer more science-based and practical programs (Rudolph, 221-240). Henry Tappan, eventually president of the University of Michigan, concluded in 1851, "[t]he commercial spirit of our country, and the many avenues of wealth which are opened before enterprise, create a distaste for study deeply inimical to education. The manufacturer, the merchant, the gold-digger, will not pause in their career to gain intellectual accomplishments. While gaining knowledge, they are losing the opportunities to gain money" (Rudolph, 219-220).

<sup>10</sup> Joseph F. Kett, "Growing Up in Rural New England, 1800-1840," in Graft (ed.) *Growing up in America*, 176-177.

<sup>11</sup> Ryan, 250.

<sup>12</sup> Ryan, 251.

<sup>13</sup> Kett, "Growing up in Rural New England," 179.

enough money to go out into the world by themselves, but there were “no fixed experiences which automatically led the young to success.”<sup>14</sup> One can only assume their ability for independence was by choice, for the higher classes, and by necessity for the lower classes. As we will see, it was at least by choice for those middle-class youths who chose careers as naval officers.

Graff gave several examples of the paths youths took to reach adulthood in this period. Elliott Story, born in 1821 in Virginia, took the traditional path. He had a desire to leave home and become a teacher, but like his father, he eventually became a farmer. By 1848 his father had been dead for three years and Elliott took over the family farm and taught school, but even drought in 1848 and the desire to move west failed to move him. He entered into a short mercantile partnership, which failed when his partner died. By 1856, when he was 35 years old, he “acquiesced in his traditional path,” bought the family farm from his mother, married, and built a house. Henry Conklin had a similar experience. In 1854, at the age of twenty-two, he had fallen in love with a former schoolmate, Elizabeth, acquired a farm, cabin, and cow, and then married his love. Branson Harris was born in Wayne County, Indiana, in 1817, and he too took a traditional path. He married Martha Young when he was twenty-two and remained in the same neighbourhood in which he was born for the next 68 years.<sup>15</sup>

The middle-class path to adulthood emphasized a greater amount of formal education geared toward a professional career. Samuel Busey, for example, was born in 1828 on a farm in Montgomery County, Maryland. Both his parents died when he was young and he left home and went to Rockville Academy between 1841 and 1845. He went home on weekends and spent time with his girlfriend. When he was seventeen he moved to Washington, DC.

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<sup>14</sup> Kett, “Growing up in Rural New England,” 180-181; 183.

<sup>15</sup> Graff, *Conflicting Paths*, 74-78.

and studied medicine at a medical office in Georgetown, while his girlfriend studied nearby. He moved to Philadelphia and received his degree from the University of Pennsylvania in 1848, then moved back to Washington and set-up a medical practice and married his girlfriend in 1849 when he was twenty-one years old. Similarly, Riley Adams was born in Bristol, Vermont, in 1808. After attending a common school he was sent to the American Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy in Norwich, Vermont, a private military school. He was lonely at first, but soon adjusted. He learned Latin and mathematics, as well as military drill. He was also immersed in topography, agriculture, music, and mineralogy. Graff concluded that “[c]ollegiate tradition and more than a bit of adolescent high spirits combined in outbreaks of disorder. Riley reported that sometimes firecrackers were set off [at] nighttime and instances of classmates putting hot coals down each others’ necks.” There were also conflicts along regional lines. Once, jokingly, Riley said that “southerners were cowards.” Graff concluded that “[g]rowing up was sometimes a physical struggle as peers reinterpreted adult roles while shaping their paths and experiences.” He believed that formal institutions, like the Quaker boarding school William Northey attended in 1843, were increasingly setting “boundaries for growing up” in this period.<sup>16</sup> While middle-class youths could receive some structure in their lives in the private sector, the military provided a pre-existing structure which could be imposed on their lives if chosen by them and their parents.

The Naval School represented one way the middle class believed young people should grow up. The School, and midshipmen life, became an acceptable way for young people to have their sense of adventure while still satisfying one middle-class idea about how young people should grow-up: in a structured environment geared toward preparing them for some professional careers. Rather than an institution created expressly for the middle class, the School became a place where middle-class youths could go.

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<sup>16</sup> Graff, *Conflicting Paths*, 94-97.

Those who attended the Naval School from 1845 to 1850 (and some as late as 1853) were appointed between 1841 and 1849. Legislation in 1845 regulated the appointment of midshipmen to Annapolis, stipulating that they were to be appointed from the states and territories based on the proportion of representation each had in Congress, and midshipmen were required to be residents of the state or territory from which they were appointed.<sup>17</sup> For this period the geographic breakdown of the residence from which appointed, for 365 midshipmen for whom data could be found, was different from the period earlier in the nineteenth century studied by Christopher McKee (see Table 3.1). McKee's officers generally came from the middle Atlantic states and from New England, but by the 1840s there had been a shift away from New England toward the South and the Central states, especially Ohio. But the number of midshipmen appointed from Ohio was still smaller than the number of white males between 15 and 24 in 1840 would have warranted. The percentage of white males in the population of Ohio was 11.8% in 1840, while the percentage of appointments from Ohio was only 6.8%; McKee found in the period 1800-1814 only 0.4% of the midshipmen were appointed from Ohio. The increase in the number of appointments from Ohio was probably a function of its representation coming into line with its population of white males, and the fact that some candidates simply relocated to Ohio long enough to claim residence and hence an appointment: only 4.1% of the midshipmen appointed from Ohio were born there.<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile, the larger portion of

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<sup>17</sup> Walter C. Ford and J. Burroughs Stokes, "The Selection and Procurement of Better Candidate Material for the Naval Academy," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings* (hereafter *USNIP*) 71 (April 1946, part II): 19.

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, *Register of Alumni, Graduates and Former Naval Cadets and Midshipmen, 91<sup>st</sup> Edition* (Annapolis, Maryland: The Naval Academy Alumni Association, 1976), hereafter *Register of Alumni*; and United States Naval Academy, *Registers of Candidates for Admission to the Academy, Oct. 1849-Oct. 1860*, Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. (Mainly for those who did not graduate), hereafter *Registers of Candidates for Admission*. Percentage of white males between 15-24 years old calculated from Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1976), Series A 195-209, "Population: Population of States, by Sex, Race, Urban-Rural Residence, and Age: 1790 to

appointees from Maryland, DC, and Virginia, is most likely a function of those regions close proximity to the seat of power and hence the ease of contacting those responsible for midshipmen appointments.

Table 3.1: Geographic Origins 1800-1814 and 1841-1849 Compared

State	1800-1814	1841-1849	Birth State	15-24 year old WM
NH, VT, MA, RI, CT	17.4%	7.1%	7.3%	13.0%
NY, NJ, PA, DE	29.4%	20.0%	20.2%	35.1%
MD, DC, VA	35.2%	15.1%	22.5%	6.9%
NC, SC, GA	12.6%	6.6%	6.6%	4.9%
OH, KY, TN, MS, LA	5.4%	14.8%	9.4%	20.2%
Others and unknowns	0 %	36.4%	34.0%	19.9%

(Source: U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, *Register of Alumni, Graduates and Former Naval Cadets and Midshipmen*, 91<sup>st</sup> Edition [Annapolis, Maryland: The Naval Academy Alumni Association, 1976], hereafter *Register of Alumni*; and United States Naval Academy, Registers of Candidates for Admission to the Academy, Oct. 1849-Oct. 1860, Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. (Mainly for those who did not graduate), hereafter Registers of Candidates for Admission. Percentage of white males between 15-24 years old calculated from Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present* [New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1976], Series A 195-209, "Population: Population of States, by Sex, Race, Urban-Rural Residence, and Age: 1790 to 1970," 24-37); and Christopher McKee, *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794-1815* [Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991], Table 2).

(Note: For consistency for comparison purposes McKee's geographic breakdowns for the states as well as his statistical methods will be employed here to compare the Naval School students with their immediate predecessors. Only McKee's known state residences are used, hence the 0% unknown cases).

A much more accurate reflection of the true origins of the midshipmen is their birth states. In the cases of the Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Louisiana, the proportion of midshipmen born there is much lower than those appointed from that region.

Unfortunately information on the occupational backgrounds of the midshipmen's

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1970," 24-37); and Christopher McKee, *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794-1815* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), Table 2.



parents or guardians was much harder to obtain. The Naval School's appointment records provided little information about the family backgrounds of midshipmen appointed in the 1840s. In fact, information was only found for thirty-nine of the midshipmen. Although one cannot draw definite conclusions based on such a small sample, it seems likely that they were mainly from middle-class America. (See Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Occupational Background of Parents or Guardians of Midshipmen 1841-1849

Father/Guardians Occupation	Total
Army Officer	6
Lawyer	6
Merchant	6
Navy officer	4
Public Officer	3
Physician	3
Farmer	3
Judge	2
Planter	2
Clerk	1
Carpenter and Farmer	1
Justice of the Peace	1
Post Master	1
Unknown	326

(Source: Registers of Candidates for Admission).

With a dearth of statistical information about the backgrounds of the common midshipman appointee, the argument that they originated from the middle class and were seeking careers in the navy is also revealed in School letters and letters received by the Secretary of the Navy in 1845 and 1846 requesting that sons, and sons of acquaintances, be appointed to the new Naval School.

Young men of a variety of ages and backgrounds wrote the Secretary of the Navy asking for information or appointments. In some cases their fathers or other relatives wrote on their behalf. The young man was not the only person interesting in procuring the new

career; the candidate's family also played a role in trying to start him off. But the regulations that governed Fort Severn until the reorganization set the age range for new appointees at between thirteen and seventeen.<sup>19</sup> John Parrish, Jr., wrote the Secretary of the Navy on 17 April 1846 to express his disappointment over the age rules. Parrish was twenty years old and was dismayed that no one over eighteen, he thought, could receive a midshipman's warrant. Parrish begged the Secretary to make some exception for him because of his heartfelt desire to serve on a man-of-war and defend the flag of the United States.<sup>20</sup> Age restrictions aside, some of the letters received by the Secretary of the Navy in 1845 and 1846 requesting appointments as midshipmen give some indication as to the goals of those who applied and of their family members.

Some interested young men, like Marcus L. Dadley, seventeen, of Baltimore, had sea experience and saw the navy as another place to ply their trade. On 16 September 1845 Dadley wrote the Secretary of the Navy and asked for an appointment as a midshipman so that he could attend the new Naval School. Marcus told the Secretary that he was born in Massachusetts and had sailed many times between Boston and Maryland, was now attending school, and he had experience working with merchants involved in various oceanic trade. But he wanted a new career because he no longer liked working for the merchants. He told the Secretary that he had his mother's support in seeking a midshipman's warrant and although he was poor, he believed that "a poor man with an education may rise to greatness for adverse fortune gives rise to sentiments that one would not feel were it not for adversity."

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<sup>19</sup> Franklin Buchanan, "Plan of the Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis, MD," in in United States, *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis* (Washington, DC: C. Alexander, Printer, 1847). Held by the William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.

<sup>20</sup> John Parrish, Jr., to Secretary of the Navy, 17 April 1846, Miscellaneous Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy (National Archives Microfilm Publication M124, roll 222); Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Record Group 45; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. Hereafter, misc. letters received by the Secretary.

Marcus hoped to improve his lot by becoming a naval officer.<sup>21</sup> Charles Trimbull Van Allen, nineteen and from New York, also had prior sea experience and his brother wished to get him an appointment as a midshipman.<sup>22</sup>

The same was true of Montgomery Davis Parker, the son of Richard Parker, an acquaintance of Secretary Bancroft's from Boston. Richard wrote Bancroft to seek a midshipman's appointment for his son. The elder Parker reminded Bancroft of their friendship and believed his son would make a good midshipman: he had an English education and sea experience. Montgomery had made two voyages to Samoa and one to St. Helena, but was currently on the US Brig *Boxer* serving as the Captain's clerk. Parker exclaimed that "I shall be exceedingly gratified" if with Bancroft's favourable attention and sense of "deep obligation in mature years" his son would receive an appointment.<sup>23</sup> Meanwhile, Daniel H. Chandler wrote the Secretary on 30 May 1846 and asked that his son, then at the School, be sent to sea on a larger vessel, if he was as yet unassigned, where he could improve his level of seamanship. Chandler told the Secretary that his son believed sea experience would give him a "superior opportunity" to acquire "Seamanship over a Brig or Schooner."<sup>24</sup>

Robert Taylor from Philadelphia wrote the Secretary on 24 November 1845 to ask that his 18 year old son receive a midshipman's appointment. Taylor told the Secretary that he supported his son's efforts to seek fame and gratification in such an honourable profession, even though he believed that his son might be better off in seeking his fortune

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<sup>21</sup> Marcus L. Dudley to Secretary of the Navy, 16 September 1845, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 217.

<sup>22</sup> James Van Allen to Secretary of the Navy, 30 January 1846, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 219.

<sup>23</sup> Richard G. Parker to Secretary of the Navy, 27 May 1846, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 223.

<sup>24</sup> Daniel H. Chandler to Secretary of the Navy, 30 May 1846, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 223.

“among the mercantile class[.]”<sup>25</sup> In January 1845, Washington Haxtun wrote the Secretary in to discuss his son, Milton, who was already a midshipman. He told the Secretary that his son had been at sea almost constantly since his appointment in 1841, except for one week of shore leave. Washington recounted that his son’s devotion to duty and moral standing were high, according to his commanders, and he wanted Milton transferred to the Naval School.<sup>26</sup> John Davis had a similar request and asked the Secretary of the Navy to transfer his son to the School for professional development.<sup>27</sup> In the meantime, Henry Stair had written the Secretary in December requesting information on a midshipman’s career. Stair was currently 16 years old with a common English education and was living with his brother. His parents were dead and Stair had been studying medicine for one-and-one-half years but could not afford to finish.<sup>28</sup>

Lawrence J. Reiss of Baltimore wrote the Secretary on 26 March 1846, telling him that he was 20 years old and had wanted to join the navy since he was twelve, but had been discouraged. Lawrence was fond of adventure and believed that the navy was where it could be found. He was the son of a well known Baltimore mechanic, who would soon give up his business and retire. Lawrence confessed that “this makes me acquaint you of my intent as I have no trade whereby I could make my bread.” He wanted a career as a midshipman in order to be independent from his father.<sup>29</sup> Isaiah Townsend also wanted a better life for a relative and wrote Senator SG Dickinson on 27 March 1846 on behalf of his uncle. Townsend’s

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<sup>25</sup> Robert Taylor to Secretary of the Navy, 24 November 1845, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 218.

<sup>26</sup> Washington Haxtun to Secretary of the Navy, 16 December 1845, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 218.

<sup>27</sup> John W. Davis to Secretary of the Navy, 7 January 1846, roll 219.

<sup>28</sup> Henry Stair to Secretary of the Navy, 1 December 1845, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 218.

<sup>29</sup> Lawrence J. Reiss to Secretary of the Navy, 26 March 1846, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 221.

uncle was a man with little political connections, but Townsend's mother was an old friend of Dickinson, so Townsend decided to call in his connection. Townsend's nephew, sixteen year old Henry Townsend, wanted to be a midshipman. Townsend believed that it was time that his family, and area, received a midshipman appointment and wanted Dickinson to use his influence with the Secretary to obtain the berth for the young man. Townsend ended his letter hoping to appeal to Dickinson's sense of charity and informed him that his uncle was a farmer who had toiled hard on his farm to raise his family. Dickinson was moved enough by Townsend's request to at least forward the letter to the Secretary.<sup>30</sup>

Fathers of younger sons also wanted a place for their boys. On 16 May 1846, Mr. H. Nutes of Harrisburg discussed his son Henry's fate. Henry was fourteen, generally well educated, and showed good progress in arithmetic, mathematics, and grammar. Nutes hoped that he could obtain a midshipman's warrant for the boy so that he could attend the Naval School. But Nutes concluded he knew little of the regulations governing entry and wished more information on them.<sup>31</sup> Meanwhile, sons from military families were also interested in joining the navy. Representative Paul Dillinghouse, Jr., wrote the Secretary on 12 March 1846 and asked that a 16 or 17 year old son of a now dead soldier receive an appointment as a midshipman in the navy.<sup>32</sup>

The winds of war also brought out applicants. On 13 February 1846 John Lawrence of Fredericksburg, Virginia, wrote the Secretary of his desire to enter the navy since he was sixteen. His relatives had discouraged his ambitions, however, because of the large number of junior officers already in the navy: the odds of career advancement were low. Lawrence

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<sup>30</sup> Isaiah Townsend to GS Dickinson, 27 March 1846, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 221.

<sup>31</sup> H. Nutes to Secretary of the Navy, 16 May 1846, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 223.

<sup>32</sup> Paul Dillinghouse, Jr., to Secretary of the Navy, 12 March 1846, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 221.

wrote his local Congressman, who promised him a midshipman's warrant, yet Lawrence had heard nothing from him since. Lawrence wrote the Secretary in February because he believed that the growing tensions between the United States and Britain, and the calls for an expansion in the navy, would lead to an increase in the demand for new officers.<sup>33</sup> The winds of war were also a reason some gave to remain at sea rather than go to School. John Davis wrote the Secretary on 13 May 1846 on behalf of his son, a midshipman, then at sea. This time the threat was from Mexico. Davis declared that "The post of danger is the post of duty" and requested that his son remain at sea rather than be dispatched to the Naval School.<sup>34</sup> Another young man, George Springer – who it seems signed his name with an X – also wanted a midshipman's berth: if that was impossible he wanted a letter of marque to run a privateer so he could help make Mexico "smart for her impudence towards us[.]"<sup>35</sup>

But not all rejected applicants were disappointed, some applicants only saw joining the navy as one way to bide their time while they finalized which career they would choose. In true middle-class form, some wished to use the navy as an intermediate phase in their life from childhood to adulthood, and some were pleased to be rejected as they had already found a better place elsewhere. One such applicant was George Twiggs of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, who wrote the Secretary on 13 June 1846 and told him that in the end he was happy that his request to be appointed as a midshipman was rejected. Twiggs was studying to be a lawyer and wrote the Secretary to request a midshipman's appointment to "wile away the time that must elapse since my final examination before I can be admitted to the Bar." Twiggs was glad the navy rejected him because if he had received the appointment he would

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<sup>33</sup> John Lawrence to Secretary of the Navy, 13 February 1846, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 220.

<sup>34</sup> John Davis to Secretary of the Navy, 13 May 1846, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 223.

<sup>35</sup> George Springer to the President of the United States, 16 May 1846, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 223.

have been forced to decline it or his "prospects would have been damned for life." Twiggs was happy with his life as it was presently, and he was even getting involved in politics and newspapers.<sup>36</sup>

A career as a midshipman was one career path acceptable to the parent of the young men interested in the navy. This was especially the case for the middle class. While some, like Robert Taylor, would have preferred their sons to seek their fortune in the mercantile class, they did their best to support their sons' goal. Family members, as well as the interested young men, wrote the Secretary – and their Congressmen – and used any small amount of political connection they may have had to seek an appointment. A career in the navy was one way to "make bread" for young men in the mid-nineteenth century, without working for their families. It was probably acceptable to the families because the young men were needed less than in poorer homes. The letters received by the Secretary of the Navy are full of calls from poorer families of enlisted men and boys demanding that their sons be released from service because they were needed at home or had not received permission from their parents to join the navy.<sup>37</sup>

But once in the navy midshipmen were given command duties while at sea and often sea-life treated them poorly, long before they were sent to the Naval School. Often they spent many years at sea before setting foot in the Naval School. Stephen B. Luce was born in Albany, New York, on 25 March 1827. At around eight years of age he and his family moved to Washington, DC, and he joined the navy at fourteen. While at anchor in the Canton River, Luce was assigned to get water, a difficult operation that required ship's boats to carry sixty gallon casks. While getting the water part of the crew he was supervising went missing, got

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<sup>36</sup> George Twiggs to George Bancroft, 13 June 1846, misc. letters received by the Secretary, roll 224.

<sup>37</sup> The large number of these letters makes it virtually impossible to select any specific example, but if one takes any roll of microfilmed letters received by the Secretary it is not long before one can find complaints from the parents of enlisted men (see misc. letters received by the Secretary).

drunk and wreaked havoc in a local village. Luce and the coxswain went to retrieve the drunken sailors: "I had drawn my sword and was prepared to use it, for I was no match in a hand-to-hand conflict with those stalwart seamen, half crazed as they were by liquor. I was but little over sixteen at that time, of slight build and not particularly strong; so that I would have been a mere child in the hands of any one of the crew disposed to do me bodily harm." He took a long time to return to the ship, and the captain was furious, asking who had given him permission to return so late? Luce started to explain himself by stating that he was "thinking," to which the captain informed him that it was not his job to think. Later, Luce was assigned command of another task, and rushed back to the ship so as not to be late. Hurrying during a storm caused his small craft to become swamped while docking alongside the *Columbus*, killing the livestock he and his men had obtained onshore. Again, the captain was furious. Luce explained saying "I did not think, sir." To which the captain replied, "You didn't think? Why what was your head given you for?" The rest of Luce's voyage on the *Columbus* was uneventful but for a cholera outbreak at Manila, when in six days twenty men perished. On 8 March 1848, the *Columbus* arrived home at Hampton Roads and Luce was reassigned to the Naval School.<sup>38</sup>

Luce reported to the School's Superintendent on 1 April 1848; by this time Luce was 21 years old. Luce was near the top of his class at the outset, but by graduation had fallen somewhat due to disciplinary problems. When President Taylor was elected in 1848, Superintendent George Upshur was permitted to let the midshipmen attend the inauguration ceremonies, but he refused. The midshipmen were upset and one night protested by ringing the School bells and firing off guns. Luce was connected with the protests and the Secretary of the Navy decided that all those involved in the affair would be penalized. But the punished

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<sup>38</sup> Albert Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U.S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1925), 23-35.



midshipman by August 1849 had finished his stay at the School and was assigned to the *Vandalia*, and a month later was promoted to Passed Midshipmen.<sup>39</sup>

The pre-Annapolis exploits of Francis Gregory Dallas are similar to Luce's. Between October 1837 and November 1841, Dallas and his father made several attempts to get the young man a midshipman appointment. Navy Secretary Mahlon Dickerson, from New Jersey, wrote Lieutenant A. J. Dallas on 17 October 1837 and told him that his letter on behalf of his son had been received and filed, but "at present no more appointments can be made, but the case will be respectfully considered."<sup>40</sup> In 1838 another attempt was made in which Dickerson passed on the request for appointment to the President, but warned that "[t]here is not at present a single vacancy in the Corps of Midshipmen, and besides, the State of Massachusetts has the full share to which its population entitles it."<sup>41</sup> From 1838 to 1841 Dallas continued to press the new Secretary, James K. Paulding, only to be told again that there were no vacancies. Francis' father even received a letter from a former Congressman from New Hampshire, Samuel Cushman, who expressed his hopes that Francis would get his appointment.<sup>42</sup> On 8 November 1841 Secretary A.P. Upshur wrote Francis, now about seventeen, "[y]ou are hereby appointed an Acting Midshipman in the Navy of the United States, and if your commanding officer shall, after six months of actual service at sea, report favorably of your character, talents, and qualifications, a Warrant will be given to you, bearing the date of this letter."<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Gleaves, 39.

<sup>40</sup> The Secretary of the Navy to Lieutenant A. J. Dallas, 17 Oct 1837 in Gardner W. Allen (ed.), *The Papers of Francis Gregory Dallas, United States Navy: Correspondence and Journal, 1837-1859* (New York: De Vinne Press, 1917, reprint), I. Hereafter, *Dallas Papers*.

<sup>41</sup> The Secretary of the Navy to F.G. Dallas, 2 April 1838, in *Dallas Papers*, 2.

<sup>42</sup> Hon. Samuel Cushman to Lieutenant A.J. Dallas, 24 June 1839, in *Dallas Papers*, 3-4.

<sup>43</sup> The Secretary of the Navy to Acting Midshipman F.G. Dallas, 8 November 1841, in *Dallas Papers*, 5.

On 24 November 1841 Dallas received a letter ordering him to report to the receiving ship *Columbus*; his commander would be Commodore Downes. Downes told him to report to Captain Foxhall Parker of the *Columbia* to ship out with the rest of the crew. In March 1843, Dallas was still on the *Columbia*, although he had received his warrant. He served on the *Columbia* until January 1845, when Secretary John Y. Mason informed him that he was permitted three months leave, after which he was to report back to the Navy Department.<sup>44</sup> In April he was ordered to report to the Pensacola Naval Yard and about one year later he was sent to duty with the Home Squadron, specifically the USS *Mississippi* under the command of Andrew Fitzhugh.<sup>45</sup>

Dallas' pre-Annapolis career was uneventful, but sea life treated the young man poorly. He spent some time in the Pensacola Naval Hospital in 1846 before being released and assigned to the USS *John Adams*. On 4 July 1846, off Vera Cruz, he wrote to Commodore Conner complaining that his health was again bothering him, and he requested to be transferred to the *Princeton*, farther north, for his health. He wrote: "I find the duty on board of so active a vessel [as the *John Adams*] to be more than my health allows me to attend to with the alacrity I should wish, the duty on board of a steamer I think I should find lighter." Commodore D. Conner replied that his request could not be filled, but if his health was truly bothering him that much, he could be permitted to go to the naval hospital at Pensacola if the ship's surgeon and the fleet surgeon agreed. By 16 September 1846 Dallas once again wrote the Commodore to request that he be permitted passage on the U.S. Schooner *Flirt* to go home. Dallas complained that his health was so bad that in the past

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<sup>44</sup> The Secretary of the Navy to Acting Midshipman Dallas, 24 November 1841; The Secretary of the Navy to Acting Midshipman Dallas, 24 December 1841; Downes to Dallas, 28 December 1841; The Secretary of the Navy to Midshipman Dallas, 21 March 1843; The Secretary of the Navy to Midshipman Dallas, 11 January 1845, in *Dallas Papers*, 6-9.

<sup>45</sup> The Secretary of the Navy to Midshipman Dallas, 7 April 1845; The Secretary of the Navy to Midshipman Dallas, 10 March 1846; Captain F.H. Gregory to Midshipman Francis G. Dallas, 19 March 1846, in *Dallas Papers*, 10-12.

fourteen months he had to be hospitalized three times. J. Winthrop Taylor, Assistant Surgeon of the US Navy, concluded that Dallas suffered from acute meningitis as a result of a head injury. Dallas' condition was so bad between 7 August and 20 September that at one point he tried to jump overboard while docked at Tampico.<sup>46</sup> He also appealed to the Commodore to let him go home because he had not had leave in five years – contrary to the letter of permission granted in 1845. In the meantime, he was suffering from a lung ailment and had suffered a concussion. In addition, his father had passed away, leaving behind two orphaned sisters and “affairs which have long required my attention to arrange.” On 18 September 1846, Commodore Conner granted Dallas to return home.<sup>47</sup>

On 4 November 1846 Secretary of the Navy J.Y. Mason confirmed that Dallas had two months leave because of ill health. The Secretary also informed Dallas that, as of that time, midshipmen who were appointed since 20 September 1841 were not required to attend the Naval School at Annapolis the next year. In January 1847, the Secretary renewed the sick Dallas' leave for another two months, but by 2 March 1847 Dallas asked to be put back in service on a vessel in the Gulf of Mexico squadron. On 10 March the Secretary ordered Dallas to report to Commodore Skinner on the USS *Saratoga*, and by the end of the year Dallas was reassigned to the store ship *Electra*. But by 1848 Dallas was at the Naval School in Annapolis.<sup>48</sup>

Luce and Dallas were not alone. By the time other young men entered the Naval

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<sup>46</sup> Assistant Surgeon Taylor to Midshipman Dallas, 15 May 1848, in *Dallas Papers*, 24.

<sup>47</sup> Midshipman Dallas to Surgeon Hulse, 3 June 1846; Commodore Conner to Midshipman Dallas, 4 June 1846; Midshipman Dallas to commodore Conner, 4 July 1846; Commodore Conner to Midshipman Dallas, 4 July 1846; Midshipman Dallas to Commodore Conner, 16 September 1846; Commodore Conner to Midshipman Dallas, 18 September 1846, in *Dallas Papers*, 12-18.

<sup>48</sup> The Secretary of the Navy to Midshipman Dallas, 4 November 1846; The Secretary of the Navy to Midshipman Dallas, 6 January 1847; Midshipman Dallas to the Secretary of the Navy, 2 March 1847; The Secretary of the Navy to Midshipman Dallas, 10 March 1847; Commodore Matthew C. Perry to Midshipman Dallas, 20 November 1847; Commander Upshur to Midshipman Dallas, 6 May 1848, in *Dallas Papers*, 18-22.

School many had spent much of their time at sea. Such students were like John W. Bennett, who was appointed on 10 February 1840 and warranted on 30 March 1841. At times he served on the *Delaware* and the *Congress* under the command of Commodore Morris. Bennett appears to have served on the *Congress* for almost two years and was given leave for three months on 14 March 1845. It was only on 6 September 1845 that he was ordered to report to the Naval School by 10 October. Allen T. Brown had a similar pre-School career and was appointed a midshipman on 26 February 1841 and by 27 March was on a receiving ship at New York. On 16 October he was transferred to an oceangoing ship and appears to have remained there until 1 October 1844, when he was transferred to the store-ship *Erie*. On 30 October 1844 he was detached to the *Jamestown* and appears to have served on her for a time, but was detached on 27 September 1845 from the *Preble* and ordered to the Naval School by 20 October 1845. Joseph Seawell was appointed on 2 July 1842 and by 21 July was on the *Marrion*. On 29 June 43 he was transferred to the *Macedonian* and by 23 January 1845 was warranted as a midshipman. He then served on such vessels as the *Cumberland*, before eventually being sent to the Naval School.<sup>49</sup>

While there were several, like William H. Smith, Felix Grundy, John Adams, Ralph Chandler, and John Hamilton, for example, who were appointed midshipmen and sent right to the School, others were sent and then quickly detached only to return in the 1850s. Philip Carrigan Johnson was appointed on 31 August 1846 and sent to the Naval School, but by 3 December he was detached to the *Ohio* and warranted on 26 October 1847. In 1849 he served on the *Dale* until he was sent to the School again on 13 October, but by the following May he was once again detached to the *Congress*. It was only on 12 July 1851 that he was detached from the *St. Louis* and ordered back to the Academy by 1 October; he was

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<sup>49</sup> United States, Abstracts of Service Records of Naval Officers ("Records of Officers"), 1798-1893 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M330, volume 8); Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Record Group 45; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. Hereafter, Abstracts of Service Records.

warranted as a Passed Midshipman on 9 June 1852 and sent to the *Princeton*. Hudson M. Garland was moved around in a similar manner. He was appointed on 20 November 1848 and by 12 May 1849 he was detached from the School to the *Mississippi* and warranted on 11 May 1850. Between 1852 and 1853 he served on the *Independence*, *Dolphin*, and Practice Ship *Preble*, until he was sent back to the Academy on 18 June 1853. On 8 December 1853 he was turned back one year for misconduct and detached from Academy to the *Albany*, then served on the Coast Survey Ship *St. Bibb* until returning to the Academy on 1 October 1854; he was warranted as a Passed Midshipman on 12 June 1855.<sup>50</sup>

Those midshipmen appointed in the Naval School era often spent a long period of time at sea before being sent to the School, or were quickly detached from the School and sent to sea before returning again to study for their lieutenant's exams. This resulted in the Naval School students often being in their twenties; the ages recorded were for when they began attending the School. Unfortunately, I have only been able to find age data for the "Dates" of 1845, 1846, and 1847, but their average age was in the twenties because a large percentage of the students spent many years at sea before attending the School.<sup>51</sup>

Table 3.3: Ages of Students during Naval School Era  
By Date of Original Appointment (1845-1847)

	1845	1846	1847
Average age	21.6	20.9	21
Minimum age	20.3	17.6	16.3
Maximum age	23.3	22.6	23.3
Standard deviation	1.25	1.56	1.47
Missing cases	0	8	33

(Source: Registers of Candidates for Admission).

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<sup>50</sup> Abstracts of Service Records, volume 8.

<sup>51</sup> The use of "Date of" instead of "Years" in this context is because the navy referred to midshipmen appointments using the phrase "Date of" rather than years. For example, Date of 1845, often also referred to as '45 Date.

The minimum age is slowly falling in this period, as one might expect, as more younger students are going first to the School prior to going to sea.

The School's program was structured in light of the fact that these midshipmen had prior experience. Throughout the period from 1845 to the reforms of 1849-1851, the School was racked by the dilemma of whether it should provide practical education in seamanship or broaden the midshipmen's minds, although the School largely emphasized those topics suited to the midshipmen's careers.

The goals of the Naval School and the goals and values of the middle class were slowly merging. The School's curriculum at least provided the beginning of the structured environment the middle class desired that their sons be exposed to while training for their chosen career. But while the middle class valued a safe environment, the navy had yet to properly address the fact that the students were still pulled away, or not even sent to the facility, because of the needs of the service. This disruption was the major failing of the Naval School. Still, the professors, under the direction of the Superintendent, and under the supervision of Lt. James Ward, drew up the academic program for the first year of the School. They proposed that the school run a program of nine months ending in June. They divided the training into ten subject areas: mathematics; natural philosophy; chemistry; ordnance, gunnery, and the use of steam; history, geography, and English; and French and Spanish. The Board also recommended that the midshipmen be instructed in fencing, by a qualified gunner's mate, but this was optional. The Board also recommended that "manual exercise, or infantry-drill, be introduced. It would occupy not more than a half-hour daily, would be a healthy exercise, and would tend to elevate the military character of the school." Professor Henry Lockwood volunteered to teach the midshipmen the task. In addition, they

recommended that a course in drawing be introduced.<sup>52</sup>

They divided the pre-1850 School into junior and senior classes. The junior class would be composed of those midshipmen who had just entered the service and had been sent directly to the school. Those midshipmen who were sent to the school to study for their examination for promotion to Passed Midshipman (equivalent to Lieutenant) were to be members of the senior class. Meanwhile, any student who had sea experience in the navy, but was not studying for his lieutenant's examination, would be placed with those students whom the authorities deemed best suited their needs. The needs of the junior class were more basic and they were required to study such subjects as: geography, English, Spanish and French; mathematics; and "navigation as far as the sailings and the use of the quadrant." They were also required to attend lectures in chemistry, natural philosophy, and ordnance that would be delivered to the senior class. Meanwhile, the senior class was taught at a higher level and studied more advanced mathematics, like spherical trigonometry, as well as nautical and descriptive astronomy, mechanics, optics, steam, history, magnetism and electricity. All the classes were also to be instructed in fencing and infantry-drill when those subjects were introduced.<sup>53</sup>

It was proposed that the students be in school from 8am to 12 noon, and be provided with dinner and "recreation" from noon until 1:30pm. School would then resume and continue until 4:30pm, unless it was Saturday. Another break period and dinner would follow from 4:30pm to 6pm, while study hours were prescribed to be in effect from 6pm to 10pm. The senior class' instructions in math and natural philosophy were divided into two sections:

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<sup>52</sup> Lt. Ward to Franklin Buchanan, 7 October 1845, Letters received by the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, 1845-1887 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M949, roll 1); Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland. Hereafter, letters received

<sup>53</sup> Lt. Ward to Franklin Buchanan, 7 October 1845, letters received, roll 1.

8am to 9am and 9am to 10am each day. This was followed by a study period from 10am to 11am. On Tuesday and Saturday, they were to be taught in steam, gunnery, and ordnance from 11am to 12noon. Chemistry was relegated to Thursday from 11am to 12noon, while History and writing were taught from 11am to 12noon on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. Foreign languages occupied the senior class for the bulk of their afternoons except Saturdays, from 1:30pm until they were dismissed at 4:30pm. Meanwhile, instruction "in the use of the sextant and other astronomical instruments [was] at any hours favourable to observation, provided such exercise does not in any way interfere with recitations in other branches, or with the preparation for the same."<sup>54</sup>

The junior class operated under a slightly different timetable. Their days were governed in the mornings by a class in natural philosophy from 8am to 9am, while they were required to study from 9am to 10am. After their study period, the midshipmen were taught in math from 10 to 11am, while gunnery, chemistry, and any other appropriate subjects were slotted for 11am to 12noon. The junior classes spent less time on foreign languages, learning French and Spanish from 1:30pm until 2:30pm each day, except Saturdays. After their foreign language instruction, they turned to such subjects as English and geography until they were dismissed at 4:30pm. Again they were to study from 6pm until 10pm, but as with the senior classes, there was a vagueness as to when they were to be instructed in navigation: "[t]he class [is] to be exercised at suitable times in the use of the quadrant."<sup>55</sup>

The courses at the School taught a variety of subjects deemed applicable to the midshipmen's careers. The mechanics and physics course was divided into several topics, which closely resemble engineering courses. Midshipmen education was divided into lessons, with the first set of mechanics and physics lessons composing five lessons in

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<sup>54</sup> Lt. Ward to Franklin Buchanan, 7 October 1845, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>55</sup> Lt. Ward to Franklin Buchanan, 7 October 1845, letters received, roll 1.



mechanics. The pupils were also taught the mechanics of liquids, pneumatics, acoustics, and optics, while lessons four and five were composed of classes on electricity and heat. The students were also then taught on chemistry and steam. The mathematics course was divided into eight parts. The midshipmen were taught arithmetic, such as "the principles and practice of operations in whole numbers and in vulgar and decimal fractions." Meanwhile, the Department of Astronomy, Navigation and Surveying was, naturally, divided into the three fields of astronomy, navigation, and surveying.<sup>56</sup> From this Department they were also taught navigation. These classes included such subjects as:

Sailing by compass; sailing on a great circle; finding a ships [sic] place by dead reckoning; construction and use of charts; principles and use of the sextant and circle of reflection, and application of the glass prism to these instruments; the artificial horizon; variation compass; methods of correcting the compass for local attractions on ship board; construction of instruments for determining a ship's rate of sailing; [and] sounding instruments.<sup>57</sup>

The students were also instructed in finding their azimuth by variations in the compass, and in finding their latitude by meridian observations of the stars, planets, sun and the moon. They were also taught the use of their chronometer, and learned how to rate "the chronometer on shore by single altitudes and by equal altitudes, as seen by series of lunar observations."<sup>58</sup>

Despite the plans of the administration, some students had academic problems. By December 1845, the students found the physics course difficult, so they wrote their professor. They told Professor Lockwood that their writing was no reflection on him, and they

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<sup>56</sup> Prof. Chauvenet, Prof. Coffin, and Prof. W.F. Hopkins. "Courses of Studies Recommended to be pursued at the Academy," fall 1845, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>57</sup> Prof. Chauvenet, Prof. Coffin, and Prof. W.F. Hopkins. "Courses of Studies Recommended to be pursued at the Academy," fall 1845, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>58</sup> Prof. Chauvenet, Prof. Coffin, and Prof. W.F. Hopkins. "Courses of Studies Recommended to be pursued at the Academy," fall 1845, letters received, roll 1.

appreciated that he cared for their improvement, but they failed to grasp the material. They wished the text book changed from “the present text book (Peschel’s *Physics*) [to] one of a more elementary character, such as Lardner’s *Mechanics*, or any others, the selection of which we leave to your judgement.” They desired this change to help their studies, because up to that time their studies had met with little success.<sup>59</sup>

After three months it was time to pass judgement on the success of the School. On 30 January 1846 Superintendent Buchanan submitted his first quarterly report to Secretary Bancroft.<sup>60</sup> Buchanan was pleased with the progress of the School and its students. Since October, eight-five midshipmen had attended the School and their health had been good, with only one serious illness. Meanwhile, visitors had made favourable remarks about the midshipmen’s “gentlemanly bearing[.]” The level of merit of each midshipman was recorded each week and those with low merit numbers were “hard students[.]” Buchanan believed that their standing reflected their poor prior academic experience, but they were willing to work. The Secretary’s decision to allow only one examination for promotion had prompted those who had shown some indifference to their studies to take their work more seriously. Unfortunately, there were several midshipmen for whom Buchanan had little hope and who he expected to fail their examinations.<sup>61</sup>

Buchanan requested that a sloop-of-war be attached to the School to provide students with a leisure activity and instruction in the practical aspect of their careers. In that regard,

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<sup>59</sup> Robert Marr, et al., to Professor Lockwood, 5 December 1845, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>60</sup> The quarterly reports contained a cover letter with any comments that the Superintendent wished to make, followed by the grade reports of the professors of various subjects. Presumably copies of the attached grade reports are with the records related to the Secretary of the Navy, but this author was unable to find them with the letters sent by the Superintendent of the Naval Academy.

<sup>61</sup> Buchanan to Bancroft, 30 January 1846, Letters sent by the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy 1845-1865 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M945, roll 1); Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, Newfoundland. Hereafter, letters sent.

Buchanan also recommended a special two-month refresher course in seamanship for those midshipmen scheduled to take their promotion exam. He concluded, after all, that seamanship was the most important branch of their profession.<sup>62</sup> By April 1846 little had changed at the School. Buchanan found that the merit numbers of the midshipmen had generally improved since January, although there were still several who, despite his efforts, had failed to improve.<sup>63</sup> But in the meantime, some of the students were ready to be examined in April 1846.

On average, the students did equally poorly in each subject, although probably a little worse in chemistry. But as was planned, the grades were given different weights for the final analysis. Mathematics was multiplied by three, as was French and English. Natural Philosophy was multiplied by two and chemistry by one. Lt. Ward reported that “these multipliers being adopted by the Board to express the degree of labor devoted to the subjects respectively, and their comparative importance in an elementary education.” The sum of each student’s grades, after multiplication, was then taken “to express relatively its estimate of each individual’s proficiency” while at the School.<sup>64</sup>

Their report divided the midshipmen into three groups: good, indifferent, and bad. Ward wrote that “[t]hose named in the second column may by increased industry and attention exhibit more satisfactory proofs at the second examination of fitness for the service; but those in the third column give but little promise that it will find them prepared for its ordeal.” Ward concluded that the exams and marking represented the “merits of each individual” and clearly indicated who had improved themselves “so as to afford some

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<sup>62</sup> Buchanan to Bancroft, 30 January 1846, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>63</sup> Buchanan to Bancroft, 16 April 1846, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>64</sup> Lt. Ward to Franklin Buchanan, 25 April 1846, letters received, roll 1.

evidence of future usefulness to the service.”<sup>65</sup> But at least one of the “bad” students of this group went on to prove himself worthy to the navy. William Henry Smith, for example, graduated from the School and went on to serve in the navy, but was lost while still a midshipman serving with the Pacific Squadron.<sup>66</sup>

In the middle of 1846, Buchanan ordered a report on the progress of those midshipmen of the ‘41 Date; those midshipmen appointed in 1841.<sup>67</sup> Lt. Ward reported that all these were progressing adequately, with the exception of one individual: Midshipman Robert Patton who, “wants capacity to acquire any of the branches taught in this institution.”<sup>68</sup> And indeed, Patton failed to graduate.<sup>69</sup> But the Board of Examiners found that the breadth of the program of studies was “sufficiently extensive” and that it occupied most of their time. This left only “short intervals” for recreation. The Board’s only suggestion for change was for boats to be found for the midshipmen to use to occupy their time and to give them exercise in rowing.<sup>70</sup> They believed that,

[t]hese and other facilities of harmless relaxation would doubtless have a tendency to divert the young gentlemen from a practice of mingling too generally in the society and amusements of the Town, by which their minds are distracted from their studies, and expenses falls upon them, which their pay is inadequate to meet. The undersigned would not discourage a occasional intercourse with polite society, sensible as they are of its

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<sup>65</sup> Lt. Ward to Franklin Buchanan, 25 April 1846, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>66</sup> *Register of Alumni*.

<sup>67</sup> Midshipmen were often referred to by their date of appointment to the navy. Hence ‘41 Date, or 1841. Date refers to those midshipmen appointed in 1841. This date does not necessarily correspond to the year in which the midshipmen began studying at the Naval School, or later the Academy. Only when midshipmen began going directly to the School and Academy upon appointment do the dates coincide.

<sup>68</sup> Lt. Ward to Commander Buchanan, 11 July 1846, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>69</sup> *Register of Alumni*.

<sup>70</sup> Board of Examiners, Naval School, to Secretary of the Navy, 11 July 1846, letters received, roll 3.

inestimable advantage to youth.<sup>71</sup>

But these years were to prove draining on the School because of the Mexican-American War, which erupted on 13 May 1846. The next day Superintendent Franklin Buchanan asked to be ordered to sea, but Secretary Bancroft denied his request and told him that his work at the School was much more important. The midshipmen had a similar desire to go to war and fifty-six applied for active service, but most were denied. Still, some of the early midshipmen did ship out: John Adams, Thomas T. Houston, W.B. Hayes, and John R. Hamilton, were ordered to the USS *Dale*, while S.S. Bassett went to the *Truxtun*, and H.G.D. Brown and Seth L. Phelps were sent to the New York Naval Yard. The rest of the midshipmen were forced to stay at the School and were examined by the Academic Board in July 1846: forty-seven passed, received their warrants as passed midshipmen and were ordered to sea. The remainder were sent home until October. The “youngsters” – or Acting Midshipmen with no prior sea experience – were also ordered to sea for the summer, but probably for training rather than for war service. In the end, Secretary Bancroft decided to give in to some of the midshipmen’s demands for a role in the war and pushed their examinations up by four months. The midshipmen from the next academic year during the war received similar treatment, and those who attended from 1846 to 1847 even raised money to erect a monument to their fallen comrades.<sup>72</sup>

By early 1847 the war began to drain personnel from the School and to disrupt the classes. Buchanan finally received permission to go to sea on 2 March 1847 and took command of the *Germantown*. In the meantime, Lt. James H. Ward became the Acting Superintendent until he was replaced by George P. Upshur. Ward was then also sent to sea

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<sup>71</sup> Board of Examiners, Naval School, to Secretary of the Navy, 11 July 1846, letters received, roll 3.

<sup>72</sup> Louis H Bolander, “The Naval Academy in Five Wars,” *USNIP*, 71 (April 1946, part II): 35-36.

in command of the *Cumberland*. The academic year 1847 to 1848 was a period of confusion. Attendance was poor and the midshipmen were examined over a stretch of thirty-one sessions of the Academic Board, and then examined one at a time. The Navy Department began to strip the midshipmen from the School and classes were irregular. Nonetheless, the School pushed on until the close of the war. Although it lost a number of midshipmen and personnel, and had its organization disrupted, School-trained officer helped show members of Congress that Annapolis had a beneficial role to play in training America's naval officers.<sup>73</sup>

Despite the interruptions the School persevered in the 1840s, although not without problems. The strains between naval practicality and broadening the student's minds became even greater. By the fall of 1846, Lt. Ward gave his frank opinions on the School. A year had passed since it opened, and with the summer to reflect, Ward had several suggestions. In his position as President of the Academic Board, as well as a naval officer, Ward was in a unique position to note the troubles that were brewing. The program of instruction had been developed by professors who "have spent their early lives in cultivating and promoting habits of mental application which render close study easy," while the midshipmen "led active lives, wholly adverse to habits of application, and tending to render close study irksome and discouraging[.]" Ward believed that the midshipmen had become discouraged early in the last academic year and had relaxed or discontinued much of their study. He thought the main problems were poor study habits and a lack of appreciation of this by the part of the professors.<sup>74</sup>

Ward disagreed with what had been done thus far to fix the problems in the program. He concluded that "there has been in some cases too eager a disposition to push forward

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<sup>73</sup> Bolander, 36.

<sup>74</sup> Lt. Ward to Commander Buchanan, 13 August 1846, letters received, roll 1.

certain studies, and give them a prominence not due to their relative importance in a naval education and incompatible with the plan of instruction originally contemplated[.]” He believed that only three subjects could be handled by the midshipmen at a time, and suggested they concentrate on mathematics, French, and Gunnery and Steam as a single course. He believed that mathematics should remain with the weight it currently had at the school, while “Gunnery and Steam” should be expanded from two days to three days a week, as well as the battery exercise on Saturdays. Meanwhile, he suggested that natural philosophy instruction be reduced from three to two days a week. Theoretical aspects should be kept to a minimum and the topic should be “taught popularly and so far as possible illustrated by experiment.” He believed that mathematical analysis should be “forbidden altogether in the class, as calculated to occupy time which cannot be spared from other more important studies.” He felt that the students should occupy themselves with only “mechanical philosophy” of the type in “Olmsted’s small edition[.]”<sup>75</sup>

Ward also felt there were some problems with the mathematical program. Before the midshipmen were examined in mathematics, they should be experts in algebra. For some reason, Ward then suggested that the midshipmen should be thoroughly knowledgeable in Bowditch’s work on navigation before moving on to algebra. Practical navigation, he believed, should be taught in a mechanical form, as it was a mechanical practice: learning navigation should come before mathematics.<sup>76</sup> He concluded that

no one, whether mathematician or not, would pass here [the School] without being a good navigator, and the Institution would consequently not be under the imputation of spoiling men capable of making good navigators in the frequently abortive attempt to make them mathematicians, or of sending men into the service as mere mathematicians who are almost useless as

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<sup>75</sup> Lt. Ward to Commander Buchanan, 13 August 1846, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>76</sup> Lt. Ward to Commander Buchanan, 13 August 1846, letters received, roll 1.

navigators.<sup>77</sup>

Ward concluded that his views went against the majority of the members of the Academic Board. He exclaimed that "I have in vain urged many of them both in and out of the Board, and as I desire fully to acquit myself of all individual responsibilities which may be thought to attach to my present position, I place those view on record." Ward wrote that he would continue to carry out his duties as the president of the Academic Board, but he only noted one member by name that he liked, Professor Lockwood. Ward concluded that "I entertain for that gentleman personally and officially sentiments of high respect, and trust that the Institution will long enjoy the benefit of his knowledge and skill in instruction."<sup>78</sup> Regardless of Ward's complaints, the academic program from 1846-1847 was little different from the previous year. The School regulations in effect for 1847 stated that students could fail other subjects as long as they passed seamanship and navigation with high marks; they would be rejected and dropped from the navy list otherwise.<sup>79</sup> Ward left in 1847, when he was ordered to sea probably a happier man.<sup>80</sup>

In the years from 1845 to 1849, the Naval School was a hybrid institution designed to serve the needs of both the older students and newer appointees. The former acquired the education needed to supplement their sea experience before becoming lieutenants, while the latter would find in the School a transitional space to introduce them to naval life and its requirements. Although still catering mainly to older students, some pupils with less sea

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<sup>77</sup> Lt. Ward to Commander Buchanan, 13 August 1846, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>78</sup> Lt. Ward to Commander Buchanan, 13 August 1846, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>79</sup> Franklin Buchanan to George Bancroft, "Rules to govern examinations at the Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis, Maryland," 14 August 1845; approved 28 August 1846, in *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis*, 19-20.

<sup>80</sup> James Russel Soley, *Historical Sketch of the United States Naval Academy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1876), 85-86.



experience were beginning to creep into the system. On 6 October 1847 the School issued that year's timetable of classes dividing the midshipmen into junior and senior classes.<sup>81</sup>

In early 1847, Buchanan also found problems with the School. Since it reopened in October 1846, sixty-two midshipmen and twenty acting midshipmen had attended. Nine of the midshipmen and eight of the acting midshipmen had been detached from the School, while one midshipman had resigned. By January 1847 there were fifty-three midshipmen and twelve acting midshipmen still in attendance. After reviewing the professors' merit reports, Buchanan concluded that many of the midshipmen were deficient in their areas of studies. He believed, as previously, that this was still caused by the fact that many of the students had only encountered their subjects when they came to the School. But again, he was hopeful that the ambition and effort he saw in many of the students would prevail over this weakness, although he was still concerned that there were students without much hope. Buchanan specifically pointed out one Midshipman Cushman as an example. All efforts by both Buchanan and the professors to motivate Cushman were failing and the Superintendent saw little hope that the young man would pass his examinations. He recommended that Cushman's father be notified and that Cushman be given a chance to resign from the navy rather than be expelled for failing his examinations.<sup>82</sup>

While the School still had problems, some improvements had occurred. Before Bancroft left as Secretary of the Navy, he had authorized Buchanan to construct more rooms to house the midshipmen. In addition, a brick building was under construction for the mess hall, lyceum, and kitchen, as well as a wooden building for the sick. The new construction was nearing completion and the midshipmen "will then be accommodated in 24 rooms calculated to contain 90 persons comfortably." Buchanan's request for money to buy

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<sup>81</sup> Ward to Buchanan, 6 October 1846, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>82</sup> Buchanan to J.Y. Mason, 14 January 1847, letters sent, roll 1.

standard works for the library had also met with success. Meanwhile, the midshipmen were generally well behaved both inside the School grounds and during their visits to Annapolis. Buchanan concluded that this was “evidence of their appreciation of the many valuable advantages given them by the Gov[ernment] to make themselves useful and accomplished officers.” There had been only one case of misbehaviour which Buchanan had to place before the department. Although he failed to give details, he believed the outcome had “a beneficial effect on that officer and his associates here.”<sup>83</sup> By spring Buchanan had little to add to his previous report.<sup>84</sup>

In the fall of 1847, the Academic Board passed several resolutions for the consideration of the Superintendent. It suggested that instruction in steam be added to the course on chemistry, and that the subjects be taught by the same professor. In addition, it recommended that there be academic exercises before breakfast. The Board also resolved “[t]hat in the opinion of this Board prayer should be introduced as a part of the exercises of the School, so soon as the hours of the other exercises can be arranged to admit of it.”<sup>85</sup> In late 1847 Superintendent Upshur ordered the Academic Board to study the present allotment of time for various courses to see if they could be better arranged. In November the Academic Board recommended that the total time devoted to each course remain the same, but that it should be divided differently. Upshur reported to the Navy Department that the “all important course of gunning” was expanded by one month, while the others were divided so that no more than “three subjects are embraced in any one division of time.” Once they were completed, the students would then embark on the next three courses. Upshur’s notice to the Department was more out of courtesy than obligation because he believed, under the current

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<sup>83</sup> Buchanan to J.Y. Mason, 14 January 1847, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>84</sup> Buchanan to J.Y. Mason, 26 April 1847, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>85</sup> William Chauvenet to Commander Upshur 11 October 1847, letters received, roll 1.

regulations, he had the power to arrange the courses however he wished without Departmental approval.<sup>86</sup> On 30 October 1847 the Academic Board issued the School's timetable for that year. There were some changes. The recommendations that the courses be broken up so that no more than three were studied at one time was acted upon.<sup>87</sup>

From 1 June until they were examined, the midshipmen reviewed their studies. Meals were served along the summer schedule, but "the details of the division of time after June 1<sup>st</sup> are left for future arrangement." The schedule was the same every day during these periods, except for Saturdays, when the students studied grammar for one hour every morning, then spent an hour on infantry drill, and had the rest of the afternoon off. In addition, the professors scheduled lectures in maritime and international law, "to be delivered once in two weeks in the place of a lecture in chemistry or steam, and the midshipmen are required to present written abstracts of the preceding lectures on that subject."<sup>88</sup> With their recommendations submitted, Upshur approved of the program for that academic year.

In January 1848 Superintendent Upshur concluded, like his predecessor, that most of the midshipmen were making good progress in their studies and duties because of their diligence, although there were some who were doing poorer than others.<sup>89</sup> Early in 1848, the Navy Department, acting on the Board's recommendations, hired a new professor to teach steam engineering. On 18 February 1848, Secretary Mason ordered Charles W. Copeland, an engineer from New York, to proceed to Annapolis by 6 March 1848 to instruct "the midshipmen on the science and practice of steam and the use of the steam engine by a course of lectures and experiments." For this purpose, the Department agreed to pay his

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<sup>86</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, [undated November] 1847, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>87</sup> William Chauvenet to Commander Upshur, 30 Oct 1847, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>88</sup> William Chauvenet to Commander Upshur, 30 Oct 1847, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>89</sup> George P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 20 January 1848, letters sent, roll 1.

transportation to Annapolis, as well as the packing and shipping of the models used in his course. Mason expressed "the wish of the Department that your lectures shall consist of a full course": three years after the foundation of the School, it finally had someone specifically hired to teach steam.<sup>90</sup> By 6 May 1848 Upshur was finally able to submit his report for the period 1 January to 31 March. During this quarter pure mathematics concluded by 1 February and the mechanics course had begun. There was the short course on steam given by Copeland, but the topic was continued by Professor Lockwood as part of his chemistry course, although since it was only lectures, no grades were assigned. Meanwhile, the students' English course had finished early in January. Upshur was pleased with the progress of the midshipmen, but for some academic problems in the lower sections.<sup>91</sup>

Despite the attendance of "Oldsters" with prior sea experience, often in their twenties, the School did concern itself with younger, poorer boys. By 1848, Superintendent Upshur took particular interest in the plight of one young boy, George A. Trotter of Mississippi, who had failed at his first attempt to gain admittance to the School. Upshur wrote the Secretary of the Navy and asked that the boy be given a second chance. Upshur told how the boy, "not yet 14 years of age," was an orphan since his father's death, and now found himself thousands of miles from home with little money or clothes, and few friends. Upshur thought he was a bright and intelligent young man, but his education had been seriously neglected since the death of his father.<sup>92</sup> Upshur only asked that he be given a second chance. In the meantime, before he was reexamined, Upshur told the Secretary that

I will cheerfully assume the responsibility of placing him in College [St.

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<sup>90</sup> J.Y. Mason to Chas. W. Copeland, 18 February 1848, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>91</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 6 May 1848, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>92</sup> G.P. Upshur to Acting Secretary of the Navy, 15 October 1848, LS1.

John's] at this place, will watch over his progress and have him properly clothed and provided for until I can hear from his guardian in Mississippi to whom I will write as soon as it shall please the Department to make known to me its decision in his case.<sup>93</sup>

The young man was eventually admitted to the School and assigned with the 1847 Date, but records indicate that he failed to finish his education.<sup>94</sup>

By late 1848 Upshur became disillusioned with the School's admission process. He believed that "the present mode of admitting candidates for Mid[shipmen] appointments into the Naval School is very defective and productive of injury as well to the young officer as to the service," and he directed Professor Chauvenet, President of the Academic Board, to meet with the Board to study the matter. Upshur found training older students, often with a lower quality education, difficult.<sup>95</sup> The Board met, studied the problem, and made recommendations to which Upshur agreed forwarded on to the Secretary of the Navy, recommending that they be adopted as soon as possible.<sup>96</sup>

Midshipmen appointees who attended the Naval School were middle-class youths who, by the time they arrived, were often in their twenties and had sea experience. Those who applied sought a career apart from their parents so they could make money on their own. They may have had a common English education, but by the time they entered the School they had been out in the world for several years, had forgotten much of their irrelevant schooling, or often the Naval School was their first encounter with many topics. In addition, the navy still wanted midshipmen with strong practical knowledge of seamanship, with the

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<sup>93</sup> G.P. Upshur to Acting Secretary of the Navy, 15 October 1848, letters sent, roll I.

<sup>94</sup> *Register of Alumni*.

<sup>95</sup> G.P. Upshur to Chauvenet, 22 December 1848, letters sent, roll I.

<sup>96</sup> George P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 31 January 1849, letters sent, roll I.

added bonus of some theoretical knowledge. The School's program, while introducing the students to nonessential topics, focused the students' training on seamanship and navigation. They could fail other topics as long as they passed what the navy deemed important. But if the system of shore-based naval education was to create a new type of naval officer, things had to change. Under the current system, students were coming and going as the navy required. The navy needed a longer program and it needed to get its students into the system at an earlier age. Beginning in late 1848 there were calls for reforms to the Naval School. The result of these reforms led to a drop in the average age of the students as they entered into the new Naval Academy directly from school. Rather than a consolidation of the existing system, the new Naval Academy became a place where the new, young students, could be slowly introduced to naval life, rather than simply being sent off to sea at the navy's whim: it became a safe emergent pathway to their future career.

But for now, the ages of students were beginning to mix between young and old and it was causing a problem that needed action. Upshur's concern over the young midshipmen included the effect a "bad apple" might have on the others. One young man, Charles Cushman from Maine, posed an immediate problem for Upshur. The discussion of his fate reveals that discipline at the School had as much to do with the midshipman's offence as with the influence of his parents and how he got along with his fellow midshipmen. Cushman's appointment to the School was forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy on 25 March 1849, but by the next day Upshur wanted it revoked. As soon as Cushman had settled in his room, he surrounded himself with young acting midshipmen and proceeded to misbehave. Upshur was particularly upset by Cushman's foul language, which he used to offend a midshipman, his mother, and the "memory of his deceased father[.]" Cushman's language was so bad that Upshur felt it would be even improper to quote it in his report. But his conclusion was clear: Cushman was a bad seed and he wanted him removed. He told the

Secretary that he feared “the corrupting influence of his [Cushman’s] language and example upon the acting mid[shipmen] some of whom are only 13 year olds.”<sup>97</sup>

Cushman’s father, a judge, then wrote the Secretary of the Navy, complaining about how his son was treated. Judge Cushman believed Upshur misrepresented the facts of the case. In his defence, Upshur said that the testimony of witnesses supported his case and that he, contrary to Judge Cushman’s assertion, gave young Cushman every chance to defend himself. Upshur added that after Cushman finished his defence, he informed him that his use of vulgar language was still unacceptable. The Superintendent added that he told young Cushman that “I can not in justice to boys of 13 and 14 years of age, or to their parents, consent to place him [Cushman] in a room with them. That as there was no vacant room at the School, it was proper that he should return to the Hotel and remain there until the decision of the Department upon his case could be received.”<sup>98</sup> Later one of the young midshipmen who heard Cushman use vulgar language came to Upshur’s residence. The young midshipman received a letter of apology from Cushman and he wished Upshur’s opinion as to whether he should accept it. Upshur told the Secretary that because he was “very young I counseled him to accept it, but advised against personal intercourse with Mr. Cushman.” Upshur concluded that if the Department decided to reinstate Cushman he should be sent to sea immediately. Upshur felt that he could go to sea because of the advanced stage of his training and because he was seventeen years old. “I think he would not be cordially received by the young officers now at the School, and it would be difficult for him to establish an acceptable companionship with them,” he wrote.<sup>99</sup> In the end, Cushman appeared to have been reinstated, since he graduated, served in the navy for twenty-eight years, and

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<sup>97</sup> G.P. Upshur to William B. Preston, 26 March 1849, letters sent, roll I.

<sup>98</sup> G.P. Upshur to William Ballard Preston, 28 April 1849, letters sent, roll I.

<sup>99</sup> G.P. Upshur to William Ballard Preston, 28 April 1849, letters sent, roll I.

retired as Commander.<sup>100</sup> But the system was faltering and failed to respond to how society thought young people should be treated. Change was necessary so that the navy could start training midshipmen onshore at an earlier, more uniform age, without the students constantly being called to sea. The changes that began in 1849 created a break with the past and brought naval education more in line with how society believed middle-class youths should be educated.

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<sup>100</sup> *Register of Alumni.*



#### ***Chapter Four: Choice for Youth and the Naval Academy, 1850-1860***

In 1849 there were changes at Annapolis that led to the renaming of the School to the Academy in 1850 and then the establishment of a four-year training program. Some of the School administrators suggested that Congress enact legislation to govern the school, but this was shelved because it was realized that if any subsequent changes needed to be made, the process of going back to Congress for amendments or to repeal old legislation would be too slow. Instead, they decided to revise the internal regulations.<sup>1</sup> This reorganization changed the School from a consolidated version of the shore-school system to a full fledged Naval Academy. This change also resulted in the recruitment of more and younger middle-class youths, many of them joining directly from civilian schools. The new system was a break from the past and was better at educating younger adolescents and introducing them gradually to naval life in the way the middle class believed they should be taught. Yet despite the moves for reforms, the new system still had to deal with older midshipmen appointed under the old system, and until the establishment of summer cruises in 1851, they still lacked a way to gradually introduce the younger students to life at sea.

The 1849 regulations provide some indication of the policy shifts occurring at Annapolis.<sup>2</sup> Candidates for admission reported to the Academy between 1 and 5 October to be examined and had to be able to read, write, spell, be of “good moral character[,]” and be between 13 and 15 years-old. If they passed their admission exam, they were appointed acting midshipmen and immediately attached to the Academy. After two years of service,

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<sup>1</sup> James Russel Soley, *Historical Sketch of the United States Naval Academy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1876), 88-89.

<sup>2</sup> It is unclear from the documentation when these regulations came into effect. But, although called the 1849 regulations, it seems likely that they only came fully into effect in the fall of 1850 when the Academy was formally instituted. But age profiles of the 1849 academic year are dramatically lower than previous years, and in line with the 1849 regulations. It seems that some or all of the 1849 regulations were in effect that year.

they were ordered to sea for six months. If his commanding officer deemed his conduct proper, the acting midshipman received his midshipman's warrant; three years after leaving the Academy he then returned to study for up to two years for his lieutenant's exam.<sup>3</sup> By 1849 and 1850 the Academy was becoming more of a transition to a naval career than a place where a midshipman went after years at sea.

One stimulus for reform was the success of the army in the Mexican-American War. On 22 August 1849 the Board of Examiners advised the Secretary that the School's regulations should be brought in line with those at West Point because of the usefulness the country obtained from West Point and the "glory to the army after the victories of the late War [Mexican-American]." The Board recommended that the probationary period for midshipmen be six years, only two of which would be spent at Annapolis.<sup>4</sup> It concluded that

they [would] then undergo a rigid examination: if this examination proves satisfactory they [would] be sent to sea under the present regulations as to recommendations from their Commanders, and after at least three years service at sea they [would] return to the School for one year and then be examined to ascertain their qualifications, professional and moral, for promotion and that any Midshipman rejected at this final Examination, [would] be dropped from the service.<sup>5</sup>

In 1850 the School was formally reorganized, renamed the Naval Academy and made part of the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography. Ranking at the Academy was reorganized:

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<sup>3</sup> United States Naval Academy, *Regulations of the United States Naval Academy* [1849] (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1849). Held by the William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. Hereafter, *Regulations*, 1849.

<sup>4</sup> William Branford Shubrick to William Ballard Preston, 22 August 1849, Letters received by the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, 1845-1887 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M949, roll 3); Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland. Hereafter, letters received.

<sup>5</sup> William Branford Shubrick to William Ballard Preston, 22 August 1849, letters received, roll 3.

the Superintendent was made the President of the Academic Board, but still reported disciplinary issues to the Secretary of the Navy. The Executive Officer oversaw tactical and seamanship education; and below him were the professors, assistant professors and officer-instructors. The ranks of midshipmen were henceforth based on the date they were enrolled in the Academy. The Academy taught six subjects: "naval tactics and practical seamanship, mathematics, natural and experiment philosophy (science), gunnery and infantry tactics, ethics and English, and modern languages." A grading system ranging from 0 to 4.0 was introduced: 2.5 was required to pass. A system of demerit points was also introduced to regulate student conduct: if a midshipman received 200 demerits he could be dismissed. In any event, the number of demerits were factored into the student's final grade. In addition, any number of activities were now formally forbidden, although they were probably frowned upon previously: for example, profanity, duelling, card playing, bringing alcohol onto the school grounds, going to bars in Annapolis without permission, and forming drinking and partying clubs. A dress code was introduced with school uniforms, and naval hair and beard regulations were enforced. In addition, midshipmen were not to marry while at the Academy, which meant a stifling of romance with the local ladies, and a curfew was introduced: 8 pm in the winter and 9 pm in the summer.<sup>6</sup>

The new regulations were meant to solve some of the problems of the old system, especially to make the students' stay at the Academy more stable than in previous years. In 1851 the system was changed again and in October 1851 a four-year training program was created and the students were required to spend summers in a training ship.<sup>7</sup> Still, by 1852 the Academy was still operating under a two-tiered system. Those midshipmen in the system

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<sup>6</sup> Charles Todorich, *The Spirited Years: A History of the Antebellum Naval Academy* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 68-70.

<sup>7</sup> Although the attachment of a sloop-of-war had been regulated since at least 1847, it was only instituted in practice for the summer of 1851 (see Chapter 7).

before 1851 were still required to finish their studies, but only for one year before they were examined for promotion. Stribling reported that the midshipmen of 1847 were in 1852 at the Academy, while those appointed in 1848, 1849 and 1850 were yet to attend the institution. Stribling estimated that it would be up to three years from June 1853 before all those midshipmen who were appointed before 1851 concluded their studies. He believed that only when the Academy finished with those midshipmen would the new four-year system become fully effective. Meanwhile, the Academy continued with a plan for the education of the regular students.<sup>8</sup>

The Academic Board's stress on the type of education shifted after 1851. On 10 January 1852 it declared that if midshipmen did not obtain at least a 2.5 in Math and English every week, they were to be individually tutored. But "[o]nly 275 of the 1,000 aggregate points were allotted to subjects that did not have a strong practical or professional bent. The rest went to learning how to sail or steam a ship to distant lands, how to talk to the people you found there, and — if necessary — how to fight them." The final exams were restricted to seamanship and tactics.<sup>9</sup> And by December 1852 a system of scale values was adopted for the various branches of education at the Academy. (See table 4.1).

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<sup>8</sup> C.K. Stribling to John P. Kennedy, 22 November 1852, Letters sent by the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy 1845-1865 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M945, roll 1); Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland. Hereafter, letters sent.

<sup>9</sup> Todorich, 81-84.

Table 4.1: Table of Course Values

Seamanship	50
Mathematics	30
Natural and Experimental Philosophy	20
Gunnery and Infantry Tactics	20
Ethics	10
French	20
Conduct	30

(Source: C.K. Stribling to the Academic Board, 28 December 1852, letters sent roll 1).

The scales encompassed both a midshipman's academic and conduct performance.<sup>10</sup> If one is graded out of a possible 50 points in seamanship, while only 10 points in ethics, ethics is probably the harder course. A loss of one point in seamanship will impact the student's standing much less than a one-point loss in ethics. Whether it was easier to obtain one point in ethics than seamanship is difficult to assess, but it is clear non-traditional subjects were gaining some greater prominence in the course load.

In 1853 the Academy regulations were revised again. The age qualifications were changed – candidates for admission had to be between 14 and 16 years old – and students attending under the old system regulations were told that after three-years service they were allowed to stay only one more year. The regulations stipulated that “[w]hile at the Academy, the midshipmen will be subject in all respects to the same regulations as to discipline as the Acting Midshipmen.” Finally, the older students would be examined in June; if they failed to pass a second examination, they were to be dismissed from the navy.<sup>11</sup>

But the authorities were still trying to find a balance between the age of candidates,

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<sup>10</sup> C.K. Stribling to the Academic Board, 28 December 1852, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>11</sup> United States Naval Academy, *Revised Regulations of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland* [1853] (Washington, DC: Robert Armstrong, Printer, 1853). Held by the William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. Hereafter, *Revised Regulations* 1853.

their maturity, and suitability for training at the Academy. Superintendent L.M. Goldsborough believed they had yet to hit upon the right combination, and in July 1854 he was pleased that the Secretary of the Navy decided that the age of admission would be changed. Goldsborough thought, and the Board of Examiners recommended, that the age of admission should be set between 15 and 17 years old, rather than between 14 and 16. The Board, “[a]fter witnessing the examination of all the classes throughout, & being particularly struck with the *remarkable* proficiency of the graduating class of Acting Midshipmen even in Seamanship & Naval Tactics,” believed setting the age between 15 and 17 would be ideal. In connection with the change in age requirements, midshipmen should only be required to spend two years at sea before their promotion examination, rather than the existing three and one-half, which included time on the training ship. It seemed that the Academy was hoping to find the age where midshipmen would be good students while still being young when they finally began their naval career.<sup>12</sup> Goldsborough concluded that the

united effect [of the changes] would be simply to take one year from the Sea-Service now required after graduation, & to add that time to the limits of age at present imposed for admission; so that candidates would thus be able to join this establishment at a more befitting age than now, & then become Passed Midshipmen just about as early in life as the existing rules prescribe.<sup>13</sup>

Goldsborough would have been pleased as the age requirements stipulated in the 1855 regulations – which were republished in 1858 – stipulated that candidates must be between fourteen and seventeen years old. By 1855, older students were admitted and the institution appears to have found its feet in several respects. For example, every aspect of Academy life had corresponding regulations that fully outlined the student’s and institution’s rights and

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<sup>12</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 10 July 1854, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>13</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 10 July 1854, letters sent, roll 1.

responsibilities.

The Commandant of Midshipmen was not to be below the rank of Lieutenant and was the Executive Officer of the establishment. The Superintendent was to be no lower than a Commander and was responsible for the government and discipline of the Academy; he was the administrator. Meanwhile, the Commandant taught “practical seamanship, practical naval gunnery, and naval tactics.” The Executive Officer had three assistants, no lower in rank than a Master; the most senior of the three was the “principal assistant” to the Executive Officer. By 1855 there were also attached to the Academy professors of drawing and draughting; French; Spanish; ethics and English studies; field artillery and infantry tactics; natural and experimental philosophy; astronomy; navigation, and surveying; and mathematics. There was also a teacher in the art of defence.<sup>14</sup> The educational topics were divided into nine departments: Practical Seamanship, Naval Gunnery, and Naval Tactics; Mathematics; Astronomy, Navigation, and Surveying; Natural and Experimental Philosophy (which included mechanics of solids, mechanics of liquids, mechanics of aeriform fluids, acoustics, electricity, heat, chemistry, and the steam-engine); Field Artillery and Infantry Tactics; Ethics and English Studies (which included English grammar, descriptive geography, physical geography, outlines of history, rhetoric, ethics, and political science); French; Spanish; and Drawing and Draughting.<sup>15</sup>

The students were divided into four classes plus the remaining “Oldsters” or midshipmen – as opposed to the “Youngsters” which were the acting midshipmen. (See Appendix A, Table A.1). The classes were subdivided into more manageable sections according to the standing of its members. Each class was to study one of the courses of the

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<sup>14</sup> United States Naval Academy, *Regulations of the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland* (Washington, DC: A.O.P. Nicholson, Printer, 1855), 5-6. Held by: Georgetown University Special Collections, V415.C3. Hereafter, *Regulations* 1855.

<sup>15</sup> *Regulations* 1855, 13-19.

departments, but the most difficult branches could be left for the more senior sections. The professors were also given assistants who were to teach some sections, but the professor was to occasionally take over the section to assess the quality of the assistant's teaching. Professors and instructors were also responsible for the good order of their classes; students were forbidden to leave their recitations without good reason and they had to tell the instructor if they were unprepared for the class. Instructors were also required to keep daily notes of the students' progress, and assistants had to make weekly reports to the department heads. All reports were to be handed weekly to the Superintendent who in turn forwarded monthly reports to the Secretary of the Navy.<sup>16</sup>

Each year there were two examinations. The semiannual exam was held in February while the annual one was held in June. The Academic Board examined the students in all their subject areas and anyone found deficient was reported to the Secretary of the Navy. A student was examined in each department by its head in the presence of the Board and the instructor. A student found deficient could be dismissed from the navy or allowed to be examined again. There was even room for advanced students: a candidate could join any class if he could prove he was qualified, and he could graduate at any annual examination.<sup>17</sup> Meanwhile, a complex system of merit points for academic, military, and conduct assessment had been composed. The merit system had an aggregate of 1000 points, with seamanship, gunnery, and naval tactics comprising 220. This was balanced by the fact that other subjects were marked on a different scale. For example, drawing's highest grade was 40 points, while ethics and English studies were graded out of a maximum of 90. As any student knows, a loss of 1 point out of 40 is worse than a loss of 1 point out of 90, or 1 point out of 220. While seamanship was still given a high priority in the final grade, the importance of the other

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<sup>16</sup> *Regulations* 1855, 19-20.

<sup>17</sup> *Regulations* 1855, 21-22.



“non-professional” topics was also noted.<sup>18</sup>

Still, the grading system often failed to assess the students adequately because it tested facts rather than mental development. As well the professors were starting to wake up to the implications of the weighting system. The professors believed that a student must be assessed in all branches at one time rather than cumulatively over the course of their studies. The professors concluded that

[w]hat we contend for here is simple that the student, who has faithfully attended his whole course and steadily progressed from a low standing, resulting from imperfect preparation, to perhaps the highest position in his class at the time of graduation, should have full credit for such progress, inasmuch as such a student is evidently far superior in mental vigor and professional training to those, who with better preparation at the time of their admission have nevertheless suffered him to surpass them.<sup>19</sup>

The professors thought that the rules should be open to greater interpretation and that the Academic Board should be given more power to decide the academic fate of the midshipmen.<sup>20</sup>

The professors also questioned giving special weight to certain subjects. While some might be of more practical value, others given less weight were often truer tests of a midshipman’s abilities because they tested his mental vigour. They concluded that while seamanship professionally was the most important subject even second-rate sailors were able to pass the exams, making it difficult to rank the classes based on grades in seamanship. The same was true of gunnery: they believed that practical gunnery should be given less weight

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<sup>18</sup> *Regulations* 1855, 23.

<sup>19</sup> J.H.C. Coffin, Henry H. Lockwood, and William Chauvenet to Commander L.M. Goldsborough, 28 June 1855, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>20</sup> J.H.C. Coffin, Henry H. Lockwood, and William Chauvenet to Commander L.M. Goldsborough, 28 June 1855, letters received, roll 2.

and theoretical gunnery more weight, as the theoretical side provided a better means of differentiating good officers from bad. Ten years after the formation of the Naval School, the professors were finally coming to grips with the effect of weighting less important subjects lower than professional subjects:

It can easily be seen that when the . . . aggregate [mark] is 1400, it matters little whether geography for example counts 15 or 20. If it counts 15, the difference in favor of the best student in geography over the worst is 10; if it counts 20, the difference in favor of the best is 13 1/3 – Should the extremely improbable case happen, that those two students stand next to each other in the final merit roll, the best geography student being below the other, he will only gain 3 1/3 merits on his competition by substituting 20 for 15 in the maximum for geography.<sup>21</sup>

The professors therefore proposed a weighting system with maximum marks of 500, 400, 300, 200 and 100 points. And the grades would be separate for each year, thus allowing midshipmen to show improvement over time. Ironically, the professors concluded, ten years after the foundation of the facility at Annapolis that, “we would remark that the proposition we now submit is in every respects similar to the plan in actual operation at West Point. Upon comparison however, we are disposed to regard our own as superior to that at West Point in clearness & more just in its apportionment of weight and in the mode of their application.”<sup>22</sup>

But there was more to a student’s development than education and grading. To round

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<sup>21</sup> J.H.C. Coffin, Henry H. Lockwood, and William Chauvenet to Commander L.M. Goldsborough, 28 June 1855, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>22</sup> J.H.C. Coffin, Henry H. Lockwood, and William Chauvenet to Commander L.M. Goldsborough, 28 June 1855, letters received, roll 2.

out the student's life, he was required to attend chapel.<sup>23</sup> All students were required to gather in the chapel fifteen minutes before breakfast each day and on Sundays all were required to attend a full divine service. Anyone who misbehaved was subject to dismissal from the navy or other punishment deemed appropriate.<sup>24</sup> The Academy regulations approved by the Department on 25 January 1855 were modified on 20 January 1859. The requirement that officers attend the "Divine Service" on Sunday was relaxed; the "Officers will be excused by the Superintendent from such attendance upon their declaration in writing that they cannot conscientiously attend."<sup>25</sup> But the amendment failed to qualify what "conscientiously" meant, or whether the new regulation applied to the midshipmen or just the staff at the Academy.

An incident in 1859 illuminates how the regulations were used in practice. If students wished, with the consent of their parents, they were permitted on Sundays to attend the church of their choice in Annapolis. The Academy chapel was presided over by the chaplain, who could be of any denomination. In early 1859 the chaplain, for example, presided over an Episcopalian service because that was his denomination. When Superintendent George S. Blake addressed the concerns of one Presbyterian parent, he told him that his son was permitted to attend the Presbyterian church in Annapolis on Sundays and communion days, and would only be exempted from the Academy chapel if Blake were informed in writing that their son could not conscientiously attend. But Blake advised the parent that while the

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<sup>23</sup> According to a letter from an organ dealer, Henry Erben, who was asked to give an estimate of the best type of organ for the chapel, it was 55 feet long and 25 feet high. Erben had a son who went to the Academy, Henry, Jr., who was appointed with the Date of 1849. The younger Erben graduated from the Academy and served in the navy for 45 years, retiring at the rank of Rear Admiral (U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, *Register of Alumni, Graduates and Former Naval Cadets and Midshipmen*, 91<sup>st</sup> Edition [Annapolis, Maryland: The Naval Academy Alumni Association, 1976], hereafter, *Register of Alumni*). His father wrote, "I feel disposed to do *as much as I possibly* can [regarding the organ], feeling an interest in the Institution on an account of *my son having* been there and also the interest I take in the Navy [Emphasis in original]." He concluded that no time should be lost in installing an organ in the chapel (Henry Erben to William Chauvenet, 16 July 1853, letters received, roll 1).

<sup>24</sup> *Regulations 1855*, section 19.

<sup>25</sup> G.S. Blake, 20 January 1859, letters received, roll 2.

chaplain was currently Episcopalian, that could soon change and the chapel's service could soon be Presbyterian. Blake concluded that "we have Chaplains of different denominations in the Navy, and no particular form of worship is prescribed for any of our Naval or Military establishments."<sup>26</sup>

In addition to their standard academic training and being required to attend church, the students were also taught moral science. The earliest mention of Wayland's *Moral Science* at the Academy is in 1851, but the work was used previous to that date. It was still used at least up to 1858, when two copies appeared in the inventory of books of the Department of Ethics and English Studies.<sup>27</sup> Secretary of the Navy Graham wrote Superintendent Stribling on 15 September 1851 to discuss the book. Graham told Stribling that the Department "does not sanction the tearing out of the leaves of the book, but directs that the Professor inform the young men that the objectionable parts, being upon a disputed question in this country, they are not [to be] taught as a part of the course."<sup>28</sup> There are probably a number of reasons why the students rejected the work, from its inapplicability to their profession and its ramifications for those students from the South – in particular Wayland's belief in the right of slaves to be free.

One of the goals of the Academy was to broaden the midshipmen's minds to enable them to think their way through any situation, rather than simply having a known set of facts upon which to call. On initial inspection, moral science would seem like a course that would instill in the young men the moral values of the time. But moral science, despite its name, had the additional goal of teaching the officers-to-be decision-making skills. Couched in Christian terms, with reference to biblical evidence, the Academy used Francis Wayland's

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<sup>26</sup> G.S. Blake to H.H. Wiling [illegible], 26 February 1859, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>27</sup> J.E. Nourse to G.S. Blake, 8 December 1858, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>28</sup> Graham to Stribling, 15 September 1851, letters received, roll 3.

text *The Elements of Moral Science*, originally published in 1835.<sup>29</sup>

Wayland's book was based on a series of lectures he gave at Brown University. In the preface, he wrote that the text should be studied by the students before their classes. In recitation form, neither the student nor the professor would ideally consult the book, and they were to review the lessons again the next day. Wayland concluded that this method of study would provide a greater understanding of the material and "cultivate the power of pursuing an extended range of argument; of examining and deciding upon a connected chain of reasoning; and will, in no small degree, accustom the student to carry forward in his own mind a train of original investigation."<sup>30</sup> By this method, the students were to learn such topics as "The Origin of our Notion of the Moral Quality of Action;" "Conscience, or the Moral Sense;" "The Nature of Virtue;" "The Holy Scriptures;" "Prayer;" "Observance of the Sabbath;" "Duties to Man;" "Personal Liberty;" "Justice as it Respects Reputation;" "The Law of Parents" and "The Law of Children;" "Duties of the Officers of a Government;" and other spiritual and ethical topics.<sup>31</sup> But despite their lofty titles, many of the sections were meant to guide the reader to make good decisions.

Key to understanding moral science is the author's definition of the subject. For Wayland, law was what gave order to the world and provided a sequence of events from action to consequence, as well as punishment for "wrong actions, since moral philosophy held that there were right and wrong actions that could be known: a moral act was a good act, and people knew good from evil. Moral law was that which established the sequence of

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<sup>29</sup> Wayland revised his 1835 edition and it was republished in 1837 and sold about 75,000 copies. The 1835 and 1837 editions were also used at other colleges as well as the Naval Academy. "A Note on the Text" Joseph L. Blau in Francis Wayland, *The Elements of Moral Science* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963. Reprint of 1837 edition).

<sup>30</sup> Wayland, 6-7.

<sup>31</sup> Wayland, 9-16

events between the quality of one's actions and their consequences. Wayland concluded that "Moral Philosophy, or Ethics, is the science which classifies and illustrates this moral law." This moral law was taken from the laws proclaimed by God as revealed in the Bible. The consequences of breaking God's moral laws were as inevitable those of the laws of physics. Yet, the punishment for breaking God's moral laws might not be as speedy as the consequences of a law of physics. Wayland warned his readers that a "higher authority has admonished us. 'Be not deceived, God is not mocked; *whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap* [emphasis in original].'" <sup>32</sup>

Wayland's work then set forth points to follow for carrying out decisions in life, whether personal, spiritual, or official. He believed that each person should judge each of his actions to assess whether they were moral, but also to keep in mind that conscience can be an imperfect guide. After each action the individual ought to reflect upon it and judge its moral character. This task had to be done deliberately, by oneself, with the understanding that each person was "a moral and an accountable being." One also had to be impartial and "[r]emember that you are liable to be misled by the seductions of passion and the allurements of self-interest. Put yourself in the place of those around you and put others in your own place and remark how you would then consider your actions." If a person found that he had done wrong, he was required to remember what sequence of events had led him to this error and to guard against a recurrence.<sup>33</sup> Wayland implied that each individual knew what was really right and wrong, and that God had given him the faculty to decide. He concluded that

[i]t is an ever present faculty. It always admonishes us if we will listen to its voice, and frequently does so even when we wish to silence its warnings. Hence we may always know our duty if we will but inquire for it. We can,

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<sup>32</sup> Wayland, 18-19.

<sup>33</sup> Wayland, 71-74.

therefore, never have any excuse for doing wrong, since no man need do wrong unless he chooses; and no man will do it ignorantly unless from criminal neglect of the faculty which God has given him.<sup>34</sup>

The guide to deciding what was right and wrong was the Holy Scriptures.<sup>35</sup>

Despite what in modern terms would seem to be conservative views on religion and moral values, Wayland's work is also liberal in some respects. When he discussed personal liberty and reputation, Wayland echoed in many respects John Stuart Mill. Wayland believed that a person could do anything that he wished as long as this did not interfere with the rights of another individual.<sup>36</sup> But with rights also came obligations. For example, a parent had the right to control the actions of his children until they reached the age of majority. Wayland believed that the parent "is under obligation to render that child a suitable member of the community" and to support the child in infancy.<sup>37</sup> But what must surely have been a controversial issue was Wayland's handling of slavery and personal liberty: these were most likely the sections which were reportedly torn out by the students and which the Secretary directed be omitted from the course.

Wayland believed that God's laws applied equally to all beings, including slaves. Slavery was an immoral act that denied the slave personal freedom and choice. He believed that a master having control over his slaves was akin to man's control over brutes.<sup>38</sup> Wayland believed that the institution also went against the doctrines of the Bible: "The moral precepts of the Bible are diametrically opposed to slavery. They are, Thou shalt love thy *neighbor* as

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<sup>34</sup> Wayland, 74.

<sup>35</sup> Wayland, 134-135.

<sup>36</sup> Wayland, 183.

<sup>37</sup> Wayland, 187.

<sup>38</sup> Wayland, 188.

*thysself*, and *all things whatsoever* ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them.”<sup>39</sup> The slaves were brought to America against their wills and were therefore not responsible for the consequences of this violation of their rights.<sup>40</sup>

Despite its lofty goals, the students had objections that the course was unnecessary for their careers. On 20 November 1852, twenty-seven midshipmen wrote the Academic Board to complain about their program of study. The students believed that their time would be better spent studying more practical topics. At that time the recitations in “Moral Science” occupied two hours a week and “three or four hours more necessary to prepare for those recitations.” The students believed that their time would be better spent “in acquiring a knowledge of Drawing or some other branch, more practically useful in our Profession.” They did not wish to “slight the prescribed course of study,” but rather suggested that the Board “take the necessary steps to relieve us of this study, & for it substitute Drawing, or whatever other branch the Board may consider best adapted, to our peculiar circumstances.”<sup>41</sup>

Despite what the midshipmen may have thought about the usefulness of a course in moral science, near the end of the text Wayland commented on its applicability to officers of government. He wrote that government derived its authority from society and its officers were bound by the moral laws of God. They had a duty to carry out their duties in accordance with this law. But oddly, Wayland concluded that the duty of the military officer was to carry out his orders to the best of his ability, rather than judge their legality.<sup>42</sup> He wrote,

the officer has no right to question the goodness or wisdom of the law; since

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<sup>39</sup> Wayland, 191.

<sup>40</sup> Wayland, 197.

<sup>41</sup> A.E.K. Benham et al. to the Gentlemen of the Academic Board, 20 November 1852, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>42</sup> Wayland, 329-332.



for these he is not responsible. His only duty is to execute it so long as he retains his office. If he believe the action required of him to be morally wrong or at variance with the constitution, he should resign. He has no right to hold the office and refuse to perform the duties which others have been empowered to require of him.<sup>43</sup>

While moral science was meant to teach the young man how to make morally correct decisions when it regarded his own life and actions, the line became much firmer when it came to interpretation of orders. Moral science was meant to guide the individual in carrying out his duties, but he still had to carry them out or resign.

Notwithstanding what can be learned from their program of study, regulations, and texts, a true understanding of the dynamics of life at the new Academy can only be understood through the students, their backgrounds, time at the Academy, and how the Academy viewed their progress. Some of what the Academic Board expected of the educational backgrounds of candidates for admission to the Academy can be gained from one case that came before them just prior to the outbreak of Civil War. Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey wrote Superintendent Blake on 27 February 1861 to discuss the latest batch of youths who were to be examined for admission. One lad was "a youth by the name of Hooke," who wanted an "informal examination" to assess whether he was "sufficiently advanced" to gain admission. Toucey agreed and the young man was examined and on 4 March 1861.<sup>44</sup> Professors J.H.C. Coffin and H.H. Lockwood reported to the Superintendent that he was

wanting in that knowledge of practical skill in the arithmetic of whole numbers, which are required of candidates, and that without much more thorough study of this branch, he would fail in passing the examination for

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<sup>43</sup> Wayland, 332.

<sup>44</sup> Isaac Toucey to George Blake, 27 February 1861, letters received, roll 1.

admission in September. He has not been to school for some time and appears to have forgotten what he studied several years ago. In other branches his examination has been satisfactory.<sup>45</sup>

The Academy could take older students who had been out of school for awhile, but younger ones, just out of school and with knowledge still fresh in their minds, had a clear advantage now that naval training focused more on academic knowledge. Meanwhile, the ideal student's educational background may have been like that of Edward Wing, a fifteen-year old from an Ohio farm. His school principal U.D. Lathrop, wrote the Academy on 8 August 1854 and included Wing's grades. He felt that Wing's work was "ordinarily" to the satisfaction of his instructors: he received a 9/10 in Latin as well as Greek, a 10/10 in arithmetic, and had only been absent from prayers once during his time at Kenyon College.<sup>46</sup>

While a candidate was judged on his educational background, he also had to be physically fit. Although a student could be rejected on medical grounds, rejections were sometimes appealed. One such case was that of Wesley Williams, who was rejected by the Academy surgeon because of a physical problem. Williams appealed the decision and a special medical board of the Navy Department was convened in 1850 to review the case. The board ruled in his favour and Superintendent George P. Upshur was informed that the young man was to be examined by the Academic Board. The special board concluded that "the want of perfect symmetry in his left arm" will not disqualify him from discharging all the duties of an officer in the navy."<sup>47</sup> The order was passed along to Upshur's successor, C.K.

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<sup>45</sup> Coffin and Lockwood to Blake, 4 March 1861, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>46</sup> Age and personal background from *Register of Alumni* and United States Naval Academy, Registers of Candidates for Admission to the Academy, Oct. 1849-Oct. 1860, Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. Hereafter, Registers of Candidates for Admission; educational background from U.D. Lathrop to Naval Academy, 8 August 1854, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>47</sup> William B. Preston to George P. Upshur, 14 May 1850, letters received, roll 1.

Stribling, in October 1850.<sup>48</sup> Williams was eventually appointed to the Academy but failed to graduate.<sup>49</sup>

Another gentleman, Mr. J.A. Webber, wrote Stribling on 2 October 1851 to discuss the medical rejection of Frank P. Webber. Mr. Webber told Stribling that the boy's "heart had long been fixed" on a naval appointment, and he hoped that his case would be reconsidered. Webber pointed out that in "his time of life" the boy's body is "in a state of rapid change[.]" but he had the assurances of another surgeon that the boy was fit. He concluded that "his deafness," which was evidently the cause of his rejection, "has never been more than slight and temporary." Mr. Webber, who had done military service, told Stribling that the surgeon at his post assured him that boy would be able to pass the medical examination if given another chance.<sup>50</sup> Meanwhile others, like John Campbell, were admitted to the Academy with some strings attached. In Campbell's case, the Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery concluded that he could be admitted, but if his condition took "the form of permanent disease, he will be dropped from the list" of students at the Academy.<sup>51</sup> Fifteen-year-old John Campbell of Kentucky, was admitted to the Academy under these conditions, but failed to graduate.<sup>52</sup>

Even if a candidate failed to gain admission, he could be given a second chance. One such case occurred in January 1853 when the Academic Board examined the son of Captain Sawyer. The Board found that he was "not duly qualified" to join the navy, but Stribling told Secretary John P. Kennedy that "[a]s the age of young Sawyer is hardly within the limits to

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<sup>48</sup> William A. Graham to C.K. Stribling, 5 October 1850, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>49</sup> *Register of Alumni*.

<sup>50</sup> J.A. Webber to C.K. Stribling, 2 October 1851, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>51</sup> William A. Graham to C.K. Stribling, 3 October 1851, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>52</sup> Registers of Candidates for Admission and *Register of Alumni*.

authorize his admission into the Navy, and as he appears to be a bright boy” he should try again in September. He added that “[i]n the meantime he can be preparing himself for the examination at some private school.”<sup>53</sup> The exact identities of Captain Sawyer and his son are unclear, but there was later a George A. Sawyer appointed to the Academy in the 1854 Date. This young Sawyer was 14 and one-half years-old, appointed from Vermont, and his father was listed as a naval officer.<sup>54</sup>

Although students during the Academy era were younger than their Naval School counterparts, they were still generally from middle-class backgrounds. Thomas O. Selfridge, Jr.’s great-great-grandfather, Edward A. Selfridge, was from Scotland and emigrated to Ireland during the English Civil War. He did not like Ireland, so he moved to America and settled in Worcester County, Massachusetts. Thomas’ grandfather had five children, but he died when they were still young. Thomas’ uncle, Edward Selfridge, “[d]eprived of a father’s care at an early age . . . shipped before the mast and made a voyage to the northwest coast of America.” By age nineteen he was in command of a merchant ship sailing from Antwerp to Boston, but the crew mutinied and killed him. His other uncle, Christopher, was a Naval Constructor, but died of yellow fever in 1855. His father, Thomas Oliver Selfridge, obtained a warrant as a Midshipman and joined the navy in January 1818. After one voyage he returned to the US, but at that time it was hard for a midshipman to get a promotion, so the senior Selfridge left the navy and joined the merchant ship *Union* as third mate and made a voyage to China. Later he made voyages to Russia and the West Indies as second and first mates. The owners of the ships offered him the command of his own ship, but the senior

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<sup>53</sup> C.K. Stribling to John P. Kennedy, 31 January 1853, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>54</sup> *Register of Alumni and Registers of Candidates for Admission*.

Selfridge decided to rejoin the navy instead.<sup>55</sup>

Thomas O. Selfridge, Jr., was thus born into a family with a strong maritime and naval tradition. Thomas, Jr., was born on 6 February 1836 in Charlestown, Massachusetts. He recalled that he was inspired to join the navy by his family, who gave him "an almost instinctive knowledge of rudimentary naval matters." Although he changed schools frequently during his father's career, Selfridge, Jr., attended the English High School in Boston the year before he joined the Academy. He reminisced that reforms to the Academy were instituted in 1850, but that year's class was sent to sea early because of a shortage of naval officers. His "51 date" had "the honor of being the pioneer class under the present system" of the four-year curriculum. But again his class was also affected by the lack of naval officers, and although scheduled to graduate in 1855, eleven of the best students were advanced to graduate in 1854. Five of the eleven failed to keep up with the pace of the advanced placement and were returned to the "51 date" grouping. Selfridge remembered, "I was duly graduated in 1854 at the head of the remaining six, and therefore can justly claim the distinction of being the pioneer graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy."<sup>56</sup>

George Dewey wrote that his forefathers lived in New England and were "of the old Pilgrim stock whose character has so eminently impressed itself on that of the nation." The first Dewey to America was Thomas Duee, of Huguenot ancestry, who moved from Sandwich, Kent, to Dorchester, Massachusetts, in 1634. George's father was a Doctor, Julius Yemans Dewey, who trained at the University of Vermont and set up a practice in Montpelier. George was born on 26 December 1837, the youngest of three sons; his mother died when he was five. He attended the district school and lived the life of most boys his age

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<sup>55</sup> Thomas O. Selfridge, Jr., *What Finer Tradition: The Memoirs of Thomas O. Selfridge, Jr., Rear Admiral, U.S.N.* (South Carolina: University of South Carolina, reprint, 1987), 3-6.

<sup>56</sup> Selfridge, 8-10.

at the time. Dewey wrote, “[o]ne of my favorite deeds of bravado was descending the old State-house steps blindfolded, with the on-lookers wondering whether I would slip on the way and take the rest of the flight head first.” He also enjoyed swimming in the Onion River near his home, and another time he destroyed his father’s cart – the horse survived – when he managed to send it into the river.<sup>57</sup>

Dewey thought he was a bully in his school. He recounted that “[s]ome of the boys of my age regarded it as their business to test each new appointee.” He was a handful, and his father decided that the young boy needed a more structured life, and at fourteen sent him to the Military Academy at Norwich, Vermont. Dewey recounted that “[a]t one time its reputation had been so high that it was considered superior to West Point, and many boys from the South, where the military spirit was more common in those days than in the North, had been among its pupils.” The young boys at Norwich lived in dormitories and received military drill, but young Dewey eventually left the school. One night in 1854 he and some other boys broke up a church hymn-sing by singing themselves. They were brought before the court at Woodstock and found guilty of the offence. Dewey concluded of the episode, “[l]ife in that school provided us with little relaxation. The very insistence of the authorities on continual study in a solemn manner was bound to awaken the spirit of mischief.”<sup>58</sup>

He left the school in 1854, at seventeen years of age, and entered the Naval Academy. Cryptically, Dewey wrote, “[a]t the time that I left Norwich . . . West Point had a great name as a disciplinary institution. There boys had to obey. Annapolis was not then so well known as West Point, being only nine years old.” Whether Dewey and his father picked Annapolis for this reason is unclear, but given Dewey’s experience at Norwich, it would be a logical

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<sup>57</sup> George Dewey, *Autobiography of George Dewey: Admiral of the Navy* (New York: AMS Press, reprint, 1969), 3-7.

<sup>58</sup> Dewey, 8.

conclusion. But Dewey wrote that he attended Annapolis because there were no spaces for political appointments at West Point. Another boy, George Spaulding of Montpelier, had been unable to take up his appointment to the Academy, so George's father influenced Senator Foote and obtained for the young man the place at the Academy. Still a teenager, Dewey wrote that once he and his father arrived at Annapolis they went to see a comedian. Dewey wrote, "I had never seen a real stage comedian before, and I laughed so hard that I fairly lost control of myself, and my father made me leave the theatre."<sup>59</sup>

Dewey recalled that the entrance exam for the Academy was easy, but that the attrition rate once enrolled was high. Sixty students entered the Academy in 1854, but Dewey recalls that only fifteen graduated in 1858; they lost twenty-three students after the first year and another nine after the second. As at Norwich, Dewey's discipline record hurt him. After the first year he reported he was number thirty-three out of thirty-five because of all the demerit points he had accumulated, and after the first year he had already reached 113; he only needed 200 to be dismissed. He recounted how he was poor in history, geography, tactics and gunnery. But "[a]s for tactics and gunnery, in which I had also been low, I had practice in the Civil War which was far more valuable than any theory."<sup>60</sup>

Dewey's description of life at the Academy gives some insight into the effect it had on its students. He remembered that the Academy contained students from all over the country. Dewey felt that the country was "not yet nationalized by the broad community of thought and intelligence of to-day [and] had to be welded by the spirit of corps into a common life and purpose." Dewey concluded of the Academy at that time: "[w]hen you enter the academy you cease to be a Vermonter or a Georgian or a Californian. You are in the navy; your future, with its sea-service and its frequent changes of assignment, makes you first

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<sup>59</sup> Dewey, 10-13.

<sup>60</sup> Dewey, 14-15.

a man of the country's service and only secondly a man of the world." Life at the Academy was often monotonous: "[t]he rule was one endless grind of acquiring knowledge[:]" their only breaks were dances called a "stag hop" held in the basement of the recitation hall. They lived in steam heated barracks with gas lamps, two students to a room, and they "had to make our own beds and sweep our own rooms, but [for a] negro women who came in at stated intervals [and] did the scrubbing." Dewey concluded that because the numbers of students were low, they all got to know each other well. The only break from the Academy came after their second year, when they were allowed a furlough.<sup>61</sup>

When Alfred Thayer Mahan entered the Naval Academy in September 1856, the last of the class of "Oldsters" had just graduated. The "Oldsters" had spent five years at sea and then their sixth at the Naval Academy. Mahan wrote that these midshipmen had been at sea and often had experienced responsibilities away from their superiors. He asked, "[h]ow could such be brought under the curb of the narrowly ordered life of the school, for the short eight months to which they knew the ordeal was restricted?"<sup>62</sup> Mahan recounted that while taking his oral entrance exam he overheard the exam of another. The other appointee had failed out previously, but from what Mahan gathered from talking with the fellow, he had been reappointed because of political "influence." Mahan did not see the appointee again at the Academy, "but [I] suppose from his name, which I remember, and his State, of which I am less sure, that he took, and in any event would have taken, the Confederate side in the coming troubles."<sup>63</sup>

Although he entered the Academy after the last of the "Oldsters" graduated, Mahan

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<sup>61</sup> Dewey, 16-20.

<sup>62</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life* (New York: Da Capo Press, reprint 1968), 47.

<sup>63</sup> Mahan, *From Sail to Steam*, 72-73.



believed they left behind a certain *esprit de corps*. One example was the attitude toward hazing, which Mahan wrote was virtually nonexistent at the Academy. There was the opinion that such a practice was beneath the sailors. It was the type of activity the midshipmen expected at West Point, but at the Academy they were all officers and gentlemen, and they had to behave as such. He believed that this gentlemanly attitude was the result of the "Oldsters": because they were older, the young students looked up to them with a certain amount of respect that young people accorded those a few years older than themselves. Mahan wrote, "[a]nd these men were not merely more advanced in years. They were matured beyond their age by early habits of responsibility and command, and themselves imbued by constant contact with the spirit of the phrase 'an officer and a gentleman,' which constitutes the norm of military conduct." Mahan was unsure how hazing eventually developed at the Academy. He opined that it was the result of the "school-boy nature" that often arises if left unchecked.<sup>64</sup>

Charles E. Clark's background and road to the Academy was similar to the others. Clark was born in Bradford, Orange Country, in Vermont, on 10 August 1843. His father was James Dayton Clark, cousin of Rear Admiral James Dayton. Charles' father was also born in Bradford and married Mary Sexton of Brookfield, Vermont. His family's roots were in Roxbury, Massachusetts, from where his great-grandparents moved to Bradford. Charles' father was orphaned at two and had few political connections and little wealth, but supported his family with his bookbinding shop. Charles wrote that early on he expressed an interest in military things. When playing as a young boy he built a small fortification on top of his roof, only to fall off and only be saved by a lucky landing. Later he became interested in the new technology of the parachute and decided to try to jump out of his home's second-story window. The endeavour was initially successful until his makeshift parachute – an umbrella

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<sup>64</sup> Mahan, *From Sail to Steam*, 54-56.

– collapsed, sending him straight to the ground. On another occasion he and his brother played with a little cannon, setting it off and nearly striking themselves with its projectile.<sup>65</sup>

Charles started his schooling at the Bradford district school and then went to the Bradford Academy. When he was away from his studies his father kept him occupied in the bookbindery, “but as he remarked, when there was any real work to do, I suddenly became a great reader.” In his father’s book shop the young boy read about the exploits of such men as Marlborough and Napoleon, instilling in him the desire to become a military man and to seek a life of adventure. By the time he was sixteen, Charles convinced his father to write their representative, the Honourable Justin S. Morrill, to obtain an appointment at West Point. Several days later Morrill replied that there were currently no vacancies at West Point for any young boys from his district. Charles had been just a little too late: the appointment to West Point had gone to Doctor Rockwell’s son from Brattleboro. However, Morrill pointed out another option: the Naval Academy. He told Charles that the vacancy for his district at the Naval Academy had been offered to a boy from Chelsea, Judge Hibbard’s son. Charles’ father and Judge Hibbard were talking one day and as it turned out that the Judge wanted his son to seek a career somewhere other than at Annapolis. Morrill offered Charles the appointment. At first the young man turned it down, saying he could not stand to see his mother’s grief at his impending departure. But Morrill wrote him again and told him of the benefits of going to school at Annapolis and of receiving an education at the expense of the government. Charles then accepted the appointment and set out for the Academy.<sup>66</sup>

Appointed in the spring of 1860, young Charles would have headed out towards Annapolis that fall. He travelled from his home to Troy, where he went by boat to Albany

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<sup>65</sup> Charles E. Clark, *My Fifty Years in the Navy* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1917, reprint 1984), 1-3.

<sup>66</sup> Clark, 4-5.

and on to Philadelphia. Eventually making his way to Baltimore, he caught a train to Annapolis. On the train he saw what he guessed to be a young midshipman dressed in his uniform. He was engaged during the trip in a conversation with a father and son who asked him all about naval life and the Academy. When Charles arrived in Annapolis he found it full of other boys like himself being examined. He walked the narrow, "quaint" streets of the town, probably taking in all the new sights and sounds. Along the streets he overheard some boys asking if Yates Stirling had been accepted. Stirling and Thomas Williams – who turned out to be the midshipman Charles saw on the train – later became his first-year roommates until the Commandant of Midshipmen broke up their group. Williams was later dropped for academic deficiencies, while Stirling went on to become a Rear Admiral and commander of the Asiatic fleet.<sup>67</sup>

But Robley D. Evans had the most interesting journey to the Academy of the famous Academy alumni. Evans was born 18 August 1846 in Floyd County, Virginia, son of Samuel Andrew Jackson Evans, a doctor. He grew up in the mountains of Virginia and recalled that the area was "almost as wild and rough as the partially settled mountains of the West." Robley's father owned some slaves, farmed, and served in the state legislature. His region was poor and sparsely settled, but people helped their neighbours and were hard working, although "they sometimes took the law into their own hands to enforce their ideas." The younger Evans by the age of six had a "gun, a pony, and a negro boy" of his own. Evans wrote that the young slave child taught him to smoke and chew tobacco, as well as "many superstitions and dreadful ghost stories, some of which I remember to this day." The young man was raised by a "black mammy," like many other white boys in the South. He loved his "mammy," and despite the fact she had numerous children of her own, "[n]o matter how busy she might be, she could make the time to coddle her young master and comfort him in

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<sup>67</sup> Clark, 5-6.

a way that no other could.”<sup>68</sup>

His “mammy” was freed in the early days of the Civil War and she moved to Washington, DC, where she died at 102. There were few slaves where Evans lived; most whites were poor and did their own farming. Evans thought his family’s slaves were happy and well treated. His father apparently only whipped one for “having ill treated a riding horse.”<sup>69</sup> His father never sold any of his slaves, but rumours of a sales, according to Evans, resulted in one slave trying to chop off his own hand so he would not be sold. In his autobiography he concluded that

[o]f course, no one can defend slavery as it existed in our Southern States, nor indeed in any form; but we must admit that in some ways the results were not wholly bad. No one can deny that in many cases slaves were cruelly treated, but this was not the general rule; it was not the business way of looking out for valuable property . . . Slaves, as a rule, were too valuable to be ill treated or neglected.<sup>70</sup>

Robley’s father died when he was ten and the family moved to Fairfax Courthouse, Virginia. In 1857, his uncle Alexander Evans invited him to move in with him at his home in Washington, DC. Alexander Evans was a lawyer, clerk of the House Committee on Claims, and a newspaper man. Robley started public school but soon found himself in trouble. While sailing a toy boat on a school pond, another boy smashed Robley’s boat with a stone. In retaliation Robley did the same to the other boy, sending him “home on a door.” Young Robley was expelled and soon started at Gonzaga College, a Roman Catholic preparatory school for Georgetown College. Evans wrote that he spent a great deal of time

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<sup>68</sup> Robley D. Evans, *A Sailor’s Log: Recollections of Forty Years of Naval Life* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, reprint, 1994), 10-12.

<sup>69</sup> Evans, 15.

<sup>70</sup> Evans, 16.

around the political centres of Washington, but he loved to spend time on the waterfront watching the sailing vessels. According to Evans, this inspired him to join the navy.<sup>71</sup>

Evans at first decided to run away and enjoy life at sea, but then met William Hooper, Congressman from the Utah territory. Hooper offered Evans an appointment to the Academy under one condition: he had to move to Salt Lake City. Evans agreed and was given four days to pack for the long overland trek leaving in 1859 by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Evans travelled half way by train, at times stopping along the way. He was still a young boy and enjoyed playing with other children his age. At St. Joseph he met some boys and they shared a wagon. While at St. Joseph Robley had a small accident: "I had gone to a gymnasium with some other boys of my own age, when one of them did a trick on the horizontal bar which I was invited to imitate. I tried, but brought up squarely on top of my head on the floor. Slight concussion of the brain was the result, and the doctor had me in hand that night and part of the next day." But when Evans felt better they were ferried across the Missouri River and started out on their long trek across the prairies.<sup>72</sup>

During his trip to Salt Lake City, Evans and his troop encountered some Native Americans and he lived with Chief Washakie for a period of time, although at first under duress, but in the end happily. Eventually, he made it to Salt Lake City where he stayed with the family of William Henry Hooper. It is unclear how long Evans stayed in Utah, but he left when he felt he had stayed long enough to claim residency.<sup>73</sup>

As in the Naval School era only so much can be learned of the backgrounds of Academy students from the records of the famous. In 1899 the Academy compiled some statistics on the general backgrounds of some of the candidates for admission after 1850.

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<sup>71</sup> Evans, 16-20.

<sup>72</sup> Evans, 22-23.

<sup>73</sup> Evans, 30-39. More will be said of Clark's and Evans' experiences at the Academy in the concluding chapter.

Between 1851 and 1860 there were a number of sons of army or navy officers examined for admission. They would be pursuing what Harvey Graff would term a more “traditional pathway” to adulthood: following their fathers into a military career. Thirty-eight candidates whose fathers were military officers were examined for admission between 1851 and 1860. Of the thirty-eight, eighteen could be clearly identified as being the sons of naval officers, while seven could be identified as being the sons of army officers; the remainder only specified a rank which could have belonged to either. Of those candidates examined, fifteen were rejected.<sup>74</sup>

Meanwhile, the ages of the students for whom data is available varied with the admissions regulations, but they were generally between thirteen and eighteen years old. The average ages of the students dipped in the first several years of the Academy era, then began to rise again as the navy decided to admit candidates of a slightly higher age. But the average age remained between fifteen and sixteen years old, with a low standard deviation, indicating that the students’ ages clustered around the average. (See Table 4.2) The new students of the Academy started there at a much younger age than their Naval School counterparts.

Table 4.2: Ages by Date of Appointment (1849-1859)

	1849	1850	1851	1852	1853	1854	1855	1856	1857	1858	1859
Average	16.2	15.4	15.1	15.3	15.3	15.2	15.5	16.0	16.4	16.7	16.53
Minimum	14.8	13.8	13.2	13.8	14.3	14.0	13.8	14.2	14.1	14.2	14.17
Maximum	16.9	17.0	17.3	16.5	16.1	16.2	17.6	17.0	18.0	18.0	18.08
Standard Deviation	0.74	0.98	0.89	0.78	0.52	0.66	1.08	0.73	1.06	1.10	1.01
Cases	34	46	47	47	27	57	47	62	73	62	83
Missing	23	2	4	0	5	5	19	9	8	16	8

(Source: Calculated from United States Naval Academy, Registers of Candidates for Admission to the Academy, Oct. 1849-Oct. 1860, Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. Hereafter, Registers of Candidates for Admission).

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<sup>74</sup> Mr. Chase et al., “Sons of Officers who Reported and were rejected, admitted, or Subsequently Rejected” in “Portfolio of Statistics....” 1 September 1899, letters received, roll 2.

Despite the presence of some students who tried to follow in their father's footsteps, the vast majority tended to pursue careers different from their father's or guardian's. Statistics compiled from the Registers of Candidates for Admission to the Academy reveal that the students who attended the 1850 to 1859 were from middle-class American, but they pursued different careers than their parents or guardians. (See Table 4.3).

Table 4.3: Backgrounds of Parents or Guardians of Academy Students 1850 to 1859

Legal (Lawyer, Judge, JP, Sheriff)	62
Farming	54
Merchant	52
Medical (Doctor, Druggist)	39
Military	26
Government	25
Manufacturing	21
Financial	11
Maritime Industry	10
Religious	8
Clerk	5
Railroad	5
Agent	5
Educational	4
Editor	4
Slaver	3
Other (Book keeper/seller, baker, land holder, etc.)	38
Missing	179

(Source: Registers of Candidates for Admission).

A large portion of the students came from families of lawyers, followed by farmers, merchants, and doctors. All the parents or guardians of these students held positions that were clerical, managerial, or higher; they were not proletarians.

The appointment procedures during the Naval School era were clarified in 1852. The Naval appropriation legislation passed on 31 August 1852 stipulated that the only pupils allowed to attend a US naval school were those appointed on the recommendation of a

member of Congress.<sup>75</sup> The students tended to hail from the most populous states in the Union. The exceptions were several states that sent many more appointees than their portion of the population, like Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana, and some states that sent much less, like Ohio, Virginia, and Illinois. But for the most part the origins followed the same trend as in the School era. (See Table 4.4).

Table 4.4: Origins of Appointees 1850-1859

States	Totals	Sent (%)	15-24 Years Old WM (1860)
NY	70	12.7%	13.6%
PA	62	11.3%	9.9%
OH	32	5.8%	8.3%
MA	26	4.7%	4.3%
MS	23	4.2%	1.3%
IN	21	3.8%	5.0%
KY	20	3.6%	3.3%
VA	20	3.6%	6.2%
SC	17	3.1%	1.0%
TN	16	2.9%	3.0%
AL	16	2.9%	1.9%
IL	16	2.9%	6.5%
GA	15	2.7%	2.1%
NC	14	2.5%	2.2%
LA	14	2.5%	1.3%
ME	12	2.2%	2.2%
NJ	12	2.2%	2.3%
MD	11	2.0%	1.8%
UT	0	0%	0.1%
Other	76	13.9%	23.7%
Missing	58	10.5%	0
Total	551		4067.4 WM (1860, Thousands)

(Source: Based on data collected from U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, *Register of Alumni, Graduates and Former Naval Cadets and Midshipmen, 91st Edition* [Annapolis, Maryland: The Naval Academy Alumni Association, 1976], hereafter, *Register of Alumni*; and Registers of Candidates (Mainly for those who did not graduate). Percentage of white males between 15-24 years old based on data in Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present* [New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1976], Series A195-209, "Population: Population of States, by Race, Urban-Rural Residence, and Age: 1790 to 1970," 24-37).

(Note: Birth-state analysis is not included as the number of missing cases was 302, or 50.8% of the data set, which in this author's opinion renders the analysis meaningless).

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<sup>75</sup>Walter C. Ford and J. Burroughs Stokes, "The Selection and Procurement of Better Candidate Material for the Naval Academy," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings* (hereafter *USNIP*), 71 (April 1946, part II): 19-20.



A letter of reference for Marx J. Etting gives some indication of the qualities of the students who gained appointments. John W. Faires, a classical teacher in Philadelphia, wrote to Marx's father, Benjamin, describing the boy; the letter was later forwarded to the Superintendent. Faires wrote that Marx was a knowledgeable young man who had succeeded in all the studies he had undertaken at Faires' school. Faires opined that Marx was like most boys, and had improved a great deal with the drilling he had received at school. Faires believed that the boy was "attentive and diligent" and was of an affectionate disposition. Marx's general character made him well liked by both his teachers and his peers. Faires pointed out that Marx believed in honesty and abhorred lying, but also believed in honour. At one time Marx suffered great ridicule at the hands of a teacher, and took the blame for a charge when he was innocent, rather than expose "a companion who was guilty." Faires concluded that Marx was "respectful to those who have authority over him" and was ambitious. Marx's teacher believed that "he appears to me to possess those qualities of mind and of heart, which not only are essential to success, but almost invariably ensure it, in the honourable profession of which he has made choice."<sup>76</sup> Marx was the type of young man the navy was looking for and he was appointed to the Academy in 1851, although he did not graduate.<sup>77</sup>

Notwithstanding the fact that the majority of the Academy students were middle-class, some poorer or disadvantaged students applied for admission and the Academy was concerned about their fate. James M. Todd's "parent or guardian" may have been a merchant,<sup>78</sup> but the boy was actually the orphan son of a US naval officer. Joseph Smith was in the practice of looking out for young orphans who came his way. He was "instrumental"

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<sup>76</sup> John W. Faires to Benjamin Etting, 26 February 1851, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>77</sup> *Register of Alumni*.

<sup>78</sup> Registers of Candidates for Admission.

in sending young Todd to the Academy, and was also concerned about the young orphan son of a surgeon, Waters Smith, who he hoped would also find a place in the Academy.<sup>79</sup> On 12 May 1858, A.H. Wilcox of Albany, New York, wrote the Superintendent that his son had long wanted to join the Academy, but he was poor and could not afford to pay the boy's way. He asked the Superintendent if "there [was] any chance for him [and] if so on what condition."<sup>80</sup>

Even if a candidate failed to meet the Academy's requirements, the Superintendent still felt the navy owed him something if he seemed to merit it. One such case was that of J.J. Miller from western Missouri. Superintendent Stribling wrote Secretary Graham that Miller was examined and found "duly qualified," although Stribling doubted he would last long. Stribling recounted that Miller had "no advantages of education" and that his friends should have made sure he was better prepared to join the Academy before convincing him to try. The Superintendent concluded that if Miller were allowed to enroll, he would quickly lag behind the rest of his class. Yet he felt sorry for him and thought the navy should pay his expenses "to enable him to return to his home."<sup>81</sup>

The changes that occurred after 1850 were observed by the Board of Examiners and other Academy officials. The Board and officials made recommendations and passed judgement on the program, but generally believed the Academy had finally found its place in the American military establishment. The students responded in kind and generally only objected to life at the Academy when they felt their rights were violated.

The Board of Examiner's report for 1852 was generally positive in its comments on the Academy. But the Board believed that the system of still having midshipmen who

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<sup>79</sup> Joseph Smith to C.K. Stribling, 27 September 1851, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>80</sup> A.H. Wilcox to Superintendent, Naval Academy, 12 May 1858, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>81</sup> C.K. Stribling to William A. Graham, 21 May 1852, letters sent, roll 1.

received their warrants before 1851 was harming their development. The Board found that these midshipmen, after spending much time at sea, spent much of their time at the Academy “constantly engaged in occupations which give them no time for study[.]” Therefore, they took longer to learn those “branches of professional science” that was required. The Board recommended that those midshipmen appointed prior to 1851 spend two years at the Academy then be examined in seamanship by the Board and awarded their merit numbers before returning to sea. Those found deficient would then be dropped from the service. In contrast, the Board found a different story with the younger classes of midshipmen: while the older classes were foundering, “the younger classes commencing at an early age, are kept constantly at their studies, [and] with nothing to distract [sic] their attention [they] gradually advance step by step to the more easy attainment of the requisite knowledge[.]”<sup>82</sup>

Meanwhile, Superintendent Stribling was concerned that the pace of change to the new system was taking too long. He thought that placing midshipmen who had four or five years’ sea experience under the same rules as young students would not work. But he also thought that having two sets of rules was equally unacceptable. As it now stood, if the older midshipmen, with prior sea experience, were allowed to stay (even if the Board of Examiners had recommended in June that they only be allowed to remain for two more years) the Academy would be overcrowded.<sup>83</sup>

In 1853 the Board of Examiners for the first time commented on the new four-year system. It told the Secretary of the Navy that the system had been in place for too short a period to assess properly the midshipmen who had been exposed to it. But from their examination of the older midshipmen they concluded that in a few years the nation would

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<sup>82</sup> M.C. Perry, President of Board of Examiners to William A. Graham, 10 June 1852, letters received, roll 3.

<sup>83</sup> C.K. Stribling to John P. Kennedy, 14 September 1852, letters sent, roll 1.

see its benefits.<sup>84</sup> It opined that

the Institution will annually furnish to the country which has so liberally sustained and fostered it, a Corps of Officers well prepared to uphold her interests and sustain her honor in times of War, and who, during the period of peace that we may be permitted to enjoy, will contribute largely to her growing greatness and improvements to the Arts and Sciences.<sup>85</sup>

But the situation with the older students was intolerable and the students themselves started to complain. The views of midshipmen still attending the Academy early in the 1850s reveal the schism between how the acting midshipmen were treated – like inexperienced youths – and how the older midshipmen felt they should be treated: like adults. By 1853, those students still attending the Academy, but with prior sea and command experience, were annoyed by the rules under which they had to live, and they struck a committee to approach the Superintendent. They concluded that the existing rules “were originally intended to be applied to the Acting Midshipmen and to which we think we should not be subjected.” The committee believed that the rules could be changed without any adverse impact on discipline. They felt they had to work too hard at routine chores and believed they were entitled to more servants, especially to make their beds and sweep their rooms. The committee even complained that the lack of help at the Academy had forced them “from time to time not only to light our lamps, bring up our wood and make our fires, but also to black our boots and in some cases to bring our water from the pump.” But they felt their extra workload was not the fault of their one servant, who had to serve thirty midshipmen both in the residences and at

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<sup>84</sup> C.S. McCauley, President of the Board of Examiners to J.C. Dobbin, 17 June 1853, letters received, roll 3.

<sup>85</sup> C.S. McCauley, President of the Board of Examiners to J.C. Dobbin, 17 June 1853, letters received, roll 3.

the mess hall. In connection with the mess hall, they also demanded more food.<sup>86</sup>

In addition to servants and food, the midshipmen also felt their activities were unjustly restricted. They believed the system of being reported for offences, and having to report offences even if they were personally unaware they had occurred, was unjust. Despite the fact that they had the right to deny committing the offence, they were simply at the whim of the Commandant of Midshipmen. They also felt they were being treated like children: "We would say that when we request permission to go out in the City to attend church, we expect to go for that especial purpose, and when we do so, we consider that we can conduct ourselves as becomes officers and gentlemen without being put under the charge of any particular individual." They believed that they should be accorded the rights and privileges of their rank, rather than the limitations imposed on the acting midshipmen.<sup>87</sup>

Even while the Academy was trying to deal with the complaints of the "Oldsters," they found that regardless of age or sea experience, the acting midshipmen came from a variety of educational backgrounds and were also giving problems. While discussing the merit roll Professors Coffin, Lockwood, and Chauvenet commented that the present ranking system failed to reflect the different abilities and backgrounds of the students. At that time, an aggregate number was used, composed of the total score from all courses, to rank the students. They believed this method failed to adequately show improvement over time. Because of the varying backgrounds of students, they felt this should be changed and they wrote,

[s]tudents are admitted to the Academy with very different degrees of preparation. Some pursue easily the elementary studies of the first year, and

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<sup>86</sup> L. Howard Newman et al. to Commander L.M. Goldsborough, Superintendent, 2 November 1853, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>87</sup> L. Howard Newman et al. to Commander L.M. Goldsborough, Superintendent, 2 November 1853, letters received, roll 1.

attain a high standing with but little labor. it is to them but a review & continuance of studies. which to a greater or less extant they have pursued before. They appear for the time to excel. Others labor with the difficulties of defective preparation. The studies are new to them; their minds are not habituated to study: & at the outset. they meet with obstacles at every step.<sup>88</sup>

But after diligent study. some of these students became proficient in their studies by the end of the course. Yet. the professors concluded, "in the aggregate of numbers assigned him for that branch in the several years. he falls below those. whom he is fully acknowledged in actual attainment & ability to be above." They proposed that the final grade in the series of examinations be used to rank students in a particular branch. Even as late as 1855. despite reforms that began in 1849. the varying backgrounds of the students were structuring the program at the Academy.<sup>89</sup>

The changes were suggested by the results of the first examination in which "the studies of four years were combined[.]" The professors wrote that the four-year system was one which gradually went into more demanding areas of study. in the first year by teaching the "elementary branches" in a system that was parallel to the common schools. The goal was gradually to teach the pupil things that would be useful to them in their future careers. "but occuring [sic] as a higher object. a continuous mental development." The real goal was not only to learn facts but to give the students the tools they needed to be able to assess any situation.<sup>90</sup>

As Mahan pointed out. the last class of "Oldsters" finished at the Academy in the

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<sup>88</sup> J.H.C. Coffin. Henry H. Lockwood. and William Chauvenet to Commander L.M. Goldsborough. 28 June 1855. letters received. roll 1.

<sup>89</sup> J.H.C. Coffin. Henry H. Lockwood. and William Chauvenet to Commander L.M. Goldsborough. 28 June 1855. letters received. roll 1.

<sup>90</sup> J.H.C. Coffin. Henry H. Lockwood. and William Chauvenet to Commander L.M. Goldsborough. 28 June 1855. letters received. roll 1.

spring of 1856. Although the age problem was solved, there were still disagreements over what subjects should be taught. William Harwood wrote Superintendent G.S. Blake on 8 January 1859 informing him that he intended to ask the Navy Department to assign him to teach the law classes at the Academy. Harwood's letter was generally a critique of the Academy's educational system at the end of the decade. He felt that the students should be taught by one professor, rather than being passed from professor to professor for various different subjects. In this manner, the grading of students would be more accurate because they would all be assessed by the same professor in different subjects and would be held to the same standard.<sup>91</sup>

Harwood also believed that English instruction at the Academy was insufficient. In all the courses, not one major English author was studied. In addition, the composition courses usually consisted of copying from the texts rather than writing original essays. The composition course consisted of little more than learning grammar and penmanship. Like previous professors, Harwood concluded that the course of study at the Academy should stress teaching the students to think. The composition course should require "that the writer form accurate thoughts on a subject, arrange them, and give them proper expression. Without this practice there is hardly a step taken towards acquiring the art of composing."<sup>92</sup>

Notwithstanding the changes that had occurred in the Academy's and the shifting demographics of the students in the new naval education system, the navy still attracted those with the same outlook on their education and its role. This is evident by the opinions of the midshipmen at the beginning of the last full academic year before the eruption of the Civil War. On 14 October 1859, twenty-three midshipmen presented a petition to the Commandant of Midshipmen, Commander T.T. Craven, about "the scholastic routine of this institution."

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<sup>91</sup> William Harwood to Captain George S. Blake, 8 January 1859, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>92</sup> William Harwood to Captain George S. Blake, 8 January 1859, letters received, roll 1.

They believed that the amount of time spent on "Professional Department" at the Academy was too little, and would leave them unprepared for their futures as "graduates of the Naval Academy[.]" The midshipmen believed that the one weekly recitation in gunnery was too little. "while for the ensuing term no time whatever has been allowed for this branch." In the amount of time allotted, they were expected to become proficient in the lessons of Lt. Simpson's course on ordnance, Professor Dahlagren's course on boat howitzers, as well as gunnery theory and 400 pages of written material. They believed this was too much material in too little time. They felt the same was true with seamanship. They judged that the small fraction of time spent on "this important study cannot fail to produce an undesirable deficiency in our nautical information": so much so that they were willing to "sacrifice our knowledge in some Department of a less practical character, rather than fail to avail ourselves of the base advantages now offered us for improvement in our profession[.]" The midshipmen also believed that their three recitations a week in chemistry were of little professional value and should be dispensed with. They argued that in the previous year they had covered all the material in that topic that was stipulated by the regulations, and they saw no reason to continue. The midshipmen did not want time off; instead, they wanted the extra time devoted to seamanship and gunnery.<sup>93</sup>

Nonetheless, in general the students only protested when they believed their rights as officers and gentlemen were violated. They protested if they felt they failed to get paid on time: on 1 November 1853, several midshipmen petitioned the Superintendent and wrote that "[w]e the undersigned respectfully request permission to draw our allowance of money for this and the last month as we have not yet received that due for the last month."<sup>94</sup> In addition, the acting midshipmen were rarely given any time off during Christmas. On 13 December

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<sup>93</sup> James L. Tayloe et al. to Commander T.T. Craven, 14 October 1859, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>94</sup> Midshipmen E. Keanry et al. to L.M. Goldsborough, 1 November 1853, letters received, roll 2.



1858, nineteen midshipmen petitioned the Secretary of the Navy for leave over the holidays, commenting that “most of us have not seen our relatives since September 1857, and it may be doubtful whether we will be able to visit them during the next summer.”<sup>95</sup>

They also took out their anger out on a professor if they believed he had wronged them. On 22 October 1853 the acting midshipmen of the gunnery class decided to report Prof. H.H. Lockwood for “using threatening language to the Midshipmen while at Great Gun exercise today.” The midshipmen reported that he threatened to put some students in the guard house “under a sentry’s charge” if they disobeyed the orders of the captain of the gun while it was being loaded. The midshipmen questioned “whether any professor has the right to threaten us and the power to punish whenever he may deem it necessary.”<sup>96</sup> Lockwood replied that while he was correctly quoted, he had simply wanted to impress upon them his desire that they follow orders so they would not be hurt during the exercise. Lockwood also wished to disavow any right to punish midshipmen on his own authority. In retrospect, he concluded that it would have been more appropriate not to have made any references to the guard house or the use of a sentinel.<sup>97</sup> Mahan wrote that some midshipmen also protested over being forced to drill. In the spirit of their youth, they took advantage of their civilian instructor, a graduate of West Point, who had a stutter. Once during drill while the instructor struggled to say “H-H-H-Halt!”, a group of midshipmen marched over the sea-wall and into the ocean.<sup>98</sup>

If a midshipman felt wronged by a professor, there was another recourse of action than bad behaviour: the midshipman could ask the Superintendent to intervene. Midshipman

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<sup>95</sup> W.R. Butt et al. to Isaac Toucey, 13 December 1858, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>96</sup> Midshipman C.M. Garland et al. to C.K. Stribling, 22 October 1853, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>97</sup> H.H. Lockwood to C.K. Stribling, 24 October 1853, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>98</sup> Mahan, *From Sail to Steam*, 61-62.

S.A. Smith wrote Superintendent L.M. Goldsborough on 18 April 1854 to complain about how Assistant Professor J. Philip had treated him in class. Smith believed that Philip was giving him lower grades than he deserved and that he “has not allowed *me* [emphasis in original] the privileges allowed by all Professors, due to a protracted absence from the section room.” Smith believed that Philip was putting him “lower and lower” in his class and that he had “magnified mistakes whenever they occurred.” Smith recounted how on 15 April, Philip gave him a problem to solve. Smith went to the board and solved it, then said he checked his book to see if he had done it right. Smith then recounted how “Mr. Philip then accused me of taking unfair advantage of him and my class-mates” then ordered him to his seat and gave him a zero on the assignment. Smith concluded by stating that “Mr. Philip has also given higher marks for exercises to persons whose exercises were in some cases the same and in others not so correct as mine, the proof of which I have in my possession.”<sup>99</sup>

Unsurprisingly, one other aspect of life over which midshipmen could protest was food. But their protest was limited to stating what they believed they had the right to have. Although, this could also result from lacking the food that they were accustomed to as middle-class youths. On 19 January 1854 twenty-six midshipmen petitioned the Secretary of the Navy about the quality of their food. They complained that the coffee was bad and that they were supposed to be provided with hashed or cold meat five days of the week for breakfast, which they rarely got. Instead, they received fried liver three or four times a week, an item “which many of us cannot eat.” The oysters and salt fish were also of poor quality. In addition, “[n]o butter is allowed: We find it very inconvenient to do without this necessary. It is an article that the [sic] most of us have never dispensed with even at Sea.” For supper they were not allowed the meat they believed they needed to enable them to drill every afternoon. They concluded that everywhere they had lived – except for the Naval

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<sup>99</sup> S.A. Smith to L.M. Goldsborough, 18 April 1854, letters received, roll 2.

Station in California – they had eaten better for a lower price. Elsewhere they could eat for around \$10 a month, while at the Academy they found they were spending \$11 to \$12 a month. The midshipmen could accept the higher price if the food were better, but they reluctantly concluded they would live with the food as it was if the price was lowered.<sup>100</sup>

Acting Master E. Simpson, inspector of the mess hall, agreed with the midshipmen's assessment of the coffee. As for the hashed meat, Simpson spoke to the mess steward about it earlier and was told that the steward had to discontinue it until the mornings became longer, which would give him more time to prepare it. As for the fried liver, Simpson felt it was "thrown in as an extra." The midshipmen had also complained about the corn bread, although Simpson had no problem with it or the oyster soup. The students had complained of "tainted articles," but Simpson could only find one instance of some salt pork gone bad. While the butter was scarce in Annapolis in the winter, "this Mess has been supplied with a capital article" and in general Mr. Swan's cooking had been above and beyond that called for, especially on Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year's Day. Simpson also disagreed with the midshipmen's assessment that better food could be supplied for the same price: he calculated that to increase the quality of the food would run an extra 37.5 to 40 cents a month. Simpson concluded that the midshipmen had "no idea of the expense of ordinary living in the United States, and I conceive that they do injustice to Mr. Swan in giving the impression that he supplies bad meats and is an illiberal purveyor."<sup>101</sup> Perhaps the "ordinary living" Simpson referred to is that of ordinary folk, rather than the living of the middle class from which most of the students originated.

Superintendent Goldsborough concluded that nothing at the Academy had caused as much complaint as food. He believed the trend would continue "as long as this institution

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<sup>100</sup> J.W. Hester et al. to J.C. Dobbin, 19 January 1854, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>101</sup> E. Simpson to L.M. Goldsborough, 20 January 1854, letters sent, roll 1.

lasts” and that “there are no students, living together at a general table, any where [sic], who, as a general thing, are better fed than those now here[.]” Goldsborough told the Secretary that the current high price of goods prohibited any reduction in the price of meals, but the Academy had taken steps to regulate price, and every quarter he appointed a board of three officers to assess the price of food. As of his writing, however, the Board had yet to make a decision because the mess steward was still readying his data. In addition, the quality of food was kept in check by an officer eating with the students. If he discovered anything wrong with the food he was required to report the problem to the Superintendent. Goldsborough added that since he became Superintendent, the officer at the mess table had never reported any instance of poor food. Despite Goldsborough’s opinions – and some questions as to the propriety of how the petition was submitted – he decided to forward it to the Secretary.<sup>102</sup>

Despite the growing pains, by June 1859 Superintendent Blake believed that the institution was holding its own with West Point. He thought that “[t]he preparation of graduates [at Annapolis] is now nearly as great as at West Point, and if the earliest age, and the standard of qualifications for admission are a little advanced, the number of graduates, I am quite sure, would be equal to the growing wants of the service.”<sup>103</sup> But sometime in late 1860 the Superintendent read a newspaper editorial titled “Naval Academy.” The author, an “Old Salt,” wrote that the standard of discipline at the Academy was too high. While he agreed that no one should be retained who “has not the qualification morally and physically to make a first rate officer” the “Old Salt” felt that the system of “espionage” at the Academy was unacceptable. He believed that the young students were forced to spy on each other and would be dismissed if they failed to report their fellows. The “Old Salt” wrote that “[p]ersons

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<sup>102</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 21 January 1854, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>103</sup> George S. Blake to President of the Board of Visitors, 13 June 1859, letters received, roll 1.

have been dismissed from the school for not informing on their fellows in cases where they had no participation in what might be called at most mischievous pranks of boys scarcely in their *'teens.'* [Emphasis added]" As a result, the Academy may have lost students who were otherwise well qualified candidates. The anonymous author criticized Blake, stating that he had been there too long. He concluded that a "more paternal relation should exist between the head of the school and the middy's and the excessive rigor complained of should be modified in some degree[.]" He felt that Blake had "lost sight of the fact that the institution was created to benefit the navy, and not to injure it," and that personal politics had come into the fray.<sup>104</sup>

The author concluded that the Superintendent would too often accept the complaints against the midshipmen without "giving them a calm investigation." He believed that either the rules were too strict or that "American youths are very deficient in moral qualifications[.]" The author concluded that supporters of the Academy would prefer a more paternalistic government at the school and less strictness. He believed that supporters would "be glad to see instead of the pale faced youths, who graduate, a set of men who have more Physique, and who would be better qualified to lead the boarders, and stand the wear and tear incident to naval life."<sup>105</sup> Yet, the "Old Salt" contended that the school was being too easy on the boys and was not letting them grow up into men. Blake disagreed with these remarks and concluded that there were few dismissals during his tenure, while some students had resigned for academic reasons. Blake concluded that the Academy graduated more students than West Point, disciplinary figures were falling, and the number of graduates would

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<sup>104</sup> Blake, undated notes or remark, possibly to the Secretary of the Navy, attached to anonymous newspaper article, c. 1860, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>105</sup> "An Old Salt," "Naval Academy," name of newspaper illegible, c. 1860, letters received, roll 1.

actually increase every year.<sup>106</sup>

The Academy had undergone major transformations between 1849 to 1859, and despite criticisms, the program was enjoying success. The four-year program still emphasized seamanship, but acknowledged the importance of other areas. The students were younger and coming directly for school, while the "Oldsters" still governed by elements of the previous system slowly declined in number. The Academy was now a "safe" transitional place where young, middle-class teenagers could be educated for a possible future career in the navy. But nothing illustrates the navy's concern for recruiting youth more than their introduction to naval law and discipline or their first introduction to life at sea.

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<sup>106</sup> Blake, undated notes or remark, possibly to the Secretary of the Navy, attached to anonymous newspaper article, c. 1860, letters received, roll 1.

### ***Chapter Five: Discipline and Law in the School Era***

The Naval School did not act in a lawless vacuum, but provided a transitional area for socializing the new midshipmen into naval regulations and discipline. The disciplinary method reflected the general philosophy of American military management and the reformist attitudes toward maritime life in this period. Military law was meant to ensure discipline rather than to guarantee personal rights, freedoms, or justice. But it was also meant to rid the navy of those individuals it did not want. What remained were those whom the service believed were best suited to defend the country.<sup>1</sup> While the School was subject to the regulations of the navy, it was also meant to indoctrinate the students. The students in both the School and Academy eras were regulated to teach them to “conduct themselves upon every occasion with the propriety and decorum which characterize the society of gentleman.”<sup>2</sup> But discipline and the application of naval law also took into consideration their youth and newness to naval life. At first authorities would treat the students leniently, and according to the seriousness of the offence, but if their misbehaviour persisted or worsened, the authorities would respond in kind. Despite the problems the School had with midshipmen being called to sea, this aspect of School life corresponded more to middle-class attitudes of training youths in a structured environment.

The institution’s disciplinary tactics show it was a part of the society in which it existed. David Edwin Leiby, in his study of Academy life in the 1970s, concluded that in American-military society, people led instead of ruled. This philosophy of “consensual

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<sup>1</sup> James E. Valle, *Rocks & Shoals: Order and Discipline in the Old Navy, 1800-1861* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 29 and 36.

<sup>2</sup> United States Naval Academy, *Regulations of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland* (Washington, DC: A.O.P. Nicholson, Printer, 1855) Held by, Georgetown University Special Collections, V415.C3. Hereafter, *Regulations* 1855.

management” was much more in step with the democratic ideals of American society.<sup>3</sup> The influence of American democracy on managing people probably accounts for Linda Pollock’s finding on school discipline in Britain and America: severe discipline peaked in the early-nineteenth century, and declined as the century progressed. She concluded that “American children had a better chance of escaping cruel punishments, particularly in the late 19th century, than British children. This corresponds with the evidence on home discipline – that British parents were more concerned with discipline than American.” The Naval School and Academy reflected the belief of many parents to try and “reason with adolescents.”<sup>4</sup> In particular, discipline at Annapolis was in a structured environment that reflected middle-class values on how young people should be raised.

The Old Navy that existed from 1800-1861 was based on a system of authority and dominance over its subordinates, but it was also undergoing a shift from brutal discipline to more measured responses.<sup>5</sup> The laws governing the US Navy had their origins with the Royal Navy. When the Continental Congress turned its attention to the navy, it tasked John Adams to draw up the regulations. His Articles of War of 1775 were based on elements of the laws governing the Royal Navy as well as older Roman code. But Adams believed the American navy should be less brutal than its British parent. He thought that sailors breaking the law should be made to wear badges of shame or collars rather than flogged for every violation, something he felt was un-American.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> David Edwin Leiby, “Professional Socialization of the Naval Officer: The Effect of Plebe Year at the U.S. Naval Academy,” PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 1968, 54-58.

<sup>4</sup> Linda A. Pollock, *Forgotten Children, Parent-Child Relations from 1500 to 1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 199. Pollock even found one child, Stephen King-Hall, who attended a naval college (probably in the United Kingdom) who described in his diary instances of rare floggings (Pollock, 198).

<sup>5</sup> Valle, 3-4.

<sup>6</sup> Valle, 41.



But the regulation that was to last until the introduction of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950 was the “Act for the Better Government of the United States Navy” passed on 23 April 1800.<sup>7</sup> The statute reveals what the government expected of its sailors. They were to be of good moral standing, loyal to the navy, and act as a cohesive group. In this light, commanders were to be examples to their men and “show in themselves a good example of virtue, honour, patriotism and subordination[.]” More importantly, they were to regulate the actions of those who served under them; the commander was to inspect their behaviour to insure that any immoral practices were suppressed. If anyone was found guilty of such activities, the commander was to rectify the situation “according to the usage of the sea service.”<sup>8</sup>

After the guiding principles were laid down, the regulations became more specific. If an officer was found “guilty of oppression, cruelty, fraud, profane swearing, drunkenness, or any other scandalous conduct,” he could be cashiered or otherwise punished by a court martial. Meanwhile, the captain could give a “private” flogging, not to exceed twelve lashes, or put the perpetrator in irons. Any stronger punishment would have to come from a court martial.<sup>9</sup> The death penalty was reserved for serious breaches of duty. A commander and his men were expected to remain at their posts and prepare for battle when ordered. Failure to comply meant death or whatever punishment a court martial deemed appropriate. A similar fate was in store for those who encouraged others to desert their station in battle. Officers and men were to be bold in battle and not show cowardice. They were to do their “utmost to take or destroy every vessel which it is his duty to encounter,” as well as to “do his utmost

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<sup>7</sup> Valle, 43.

<sup>8</sup> United States, “An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States,” Article I, in Richard Peters (ed.), *The Public Statutes of the United States . . . Volume II* (Boston, Massachusetts: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1845).

<sup>9</sup> United States, “An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States,” Article III.

endeavour to afford relief to ships belonging to the United States.” under pain of death or other such punishment a court might impose. They were expected to do their duty and help their fellows when called upon to do so, no matter the cost.<sup>10</sup>

Mutiny and disobedience of orders were intolerable. Anyone who formed a mutinous party, or attempted to form one, would, if convicted by a court martial, “suffer death.” No other option was stipulated in the regulations. As well, anyone who simply uttered seditious words or talked of mutiny, or tried to cover up such talk, was at the mercy of a court martial. The same was true of anyone who treated his superior with contempt or failed to do his best to stop a mutiny. Officers and men were also required to obey lawful orders of the superiors and were forbidden to strike them or draw a weapon on them while they were trying to execute their duties. Punishment for this offence was death or any other sentence deemed appropriate by a court martial. In fact the navy officially forbade quarrelling between people in the navy, even with words. Finally, the navy declared that if any of its men simply deserted or “rebelled” the punishment was death. Naval personnel were even required to report deserters from other naval vessels and were forbidden to encourage anyone to desert.<sup>11</sup> Personnel were to be loyal to the navy, each other, and to remember that they were a cohesive group.

The navy could also punish, by court martial, any officer or man who neglected their duty. Such neglect included running the ship aground, sleeping on duty, neglecting their assignments, or leaving their station before their watch had ended. Such actions could be punishable by death, or other means. If they were a naval private, they could be flogged with

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<sup>10</sup> United States, “An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States.” Article V and Article VI. The reader should note that this author has found in his sources that sometimes US documents and letters from this era used British spellings as opposed to what is today modern American spellings, hence “endeavour” rather than “endeavor.”

<sup>11</sup> United States, “An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States.” Articles, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII.

up to twelve lashes, or put in irons.<sup>12</sup> The high crime of murder was, of course, forbidden, and could be punished by death.<sup>13</sup> Their duties towards merchant vessels were clear: officers and privates were to carry out their duties and convoy the merchantmen. They were forbidden to demand any extra fee for this service, and were to treat the officers and crew of the merchantmen with respect. If they failed to carry out their duties, or maltreated the merchantmen and their crews, the naval officers and men were subject to “making such reparation as a court of admiralty may award, and of suffering such further punishment as a court martial shall adjudge.”<sup>14</sup>

But most importantly, the regulations stated that “[n]o commanding officer shall, of his own authority, discharge a commissioned or warrant officer, nor strike, nor punish him otherwise than by suspension or confinement[.]”<sup>15</sup> The court martial was the arena for more serious crimes and disciplinary problems.<sup>16</sup> The “Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States” was meant to ensure that officers were a band of brothers; all were appointed by the same higher authority, and it was to this higher authority that they were ultimately answerable; they could not punish each other. The regulations ensured that all knew their duties and relations to each other, as well as to the general public. These ideals of brotherhood and honourable duty were the ideals which carried through the navy of the nineteenth century.

But this was also an era of reform in maritime society. Organizations like the American Seamen’s Friend Society called for the better treatment of sailors in maritime

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<sup>12</sup> United States, “An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States,” Article XIX, XX.

<sup>13</sup> United States, “An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States,” Article XXI.

<sup>14</sup> United States, “An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States,” Article XXII.

<sup>15</sup> United States, “An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States,” Article, XXX.

<sup>16</sup> United States, “An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States,” Articles XXXV-XLII.

industries and the navy, and the abolition of corporal punishment. In 1842 a pamphlet entitled *An Inquiry into the Necessity and General Principles of Reorganization in the United States Navy, with an Examination of True Sources of Subordination*, was published. The anonymous "Observer" was John Murphy, who criticized the fact that despite calls for naval reorganization, none had occurred. He also criticized punishment in the navy. In some cases he agreed with the use of the cat-o'-nine tails, but he believed that punishment should increase in severity with rank. He felt the navy had a duty to elevate the character of its men, rather than sink to the lowest. In 1843 Tiphys Aegyptus published another pamphlet entitled *The Navy's Friend*, covering his 39 months in the navy. He criticized the men's disobedience of rules and condemned "commanders who allowed young midshipmen 'to execrate the crew in the most violent manner.'" "It was this abuse, more than anything else, that induced me to write this pamphlet."<sup>17</sup>

In general, US naval law and discipline followed a disciplinary tradition laid down by influential officers such as officers as Thomas Truxtun and Edward Preble. Truxtun ran his ship like a miniature kingdom and he expected complete subordination from his crew. Officers were only to give their opinion if asked and they were to follow his orders without question. He also believed in regulating his ship to a tee, decreeing that no one was to sleep while on shore without first obtaining permission from him. Nor were they to drink. Officers were not to become too close to their men. Truxtun influenced John Rodgers, who went so far as to keep shore leave to a minimum. But Rodgers' men generally liked him and he only had to use force on rare occasions. Also in this vein of commander was Edward Preble, who believed that crews were made up of "bad characters" and that it was his job to rid the ship of them. One midshipman, Thomas Baldwin, had been giving Preble trouble and was caught

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<sup>17</sup> Harold D. Langley, *Social Reform in the United States Navy, 1798-1862* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1967), 161-188 and footnote 63, 188.

shoplifting. Preble convinced him to resign from the navy rather than humiliate his family with a court martial. But Preble's real goal was to rid the service of the troublemaker. Preble knew that if there was a court martial, the man would probably get a slap on the wrist and be sent back to sea. By convincing the young man to resign, Preble rid the service of an undesirable.<sup>18</sup>

The navy had several levels of military hearings that doled out punishments to officers and men. At the top was the general court martial, followed by a court of inquiry and a summary court martial. Captains could also "handle" minor breaches of discipline at the "captain's mast." A general court martial was convened by the President of the United States, the Secretary of the Navy, a ship's captain or the commander of a squadron. The general court martial was comprised of a panel of five to thirteen officers and could try both officers and enlisted men whose offences were more than could be handled by twelve lashes, suspension, or confinement. The court martial was used both at sea, on shore, and at the Naval School.<sup>19</sup>

The court martial was presided over by a president, who acted much like a civilian judge. The accused could defend himself or be represented by an officer or a civilian lawyer. He could also "object to members of the court and have them removed if he believed they were prejudice[d] against him." The prosecutor was generally another officer or a civilian lawyer, and was known as the judge advocate. All involved in the court-martial proceedings had the right to question witnesses. The Secretary of the Navy acted as Judge Advocate General over all naval courts martial. Evidence was submitted and testimony given under oath, and the proceedings of the case were recorded. The first part of a court martial was public and both sides presented opening statements and evidence, and could cross-examine

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<sup>18</sup> Valle, 45-47.

<sup>19</sup> Valle, 50.

witnesses. But the second part of the court martial was a closed affair. The board met in secret to deliberate on the guilt or innocence of the accused. A simple majority was needed to convict in all cases except those punishable by death or dismissal. In the latter case, a guilty verdict required a two-thirds majority. But in either case no one on the board was allowed to discuss in public the proceedings or deliberations. The Secretary of the Navy reviewed the results of each case, except if the court martial was carried out on a foreign station. In the end, either the Secretary or the President of the United States could overrule the verdict.<sup>20</sup>

By contrast, a court of inquiry was only an investigating body. As with the court martial, it could be convened by a ship's captain or squadron commander, the Secretary of the Navy or the President of the United States. The court of inquiry used a smaller board than the court martial. It consisted of a judge advocate and three commissioned officers. Primarily, the court of inquiry was used to look into any subject involving neglect of duty. It could call witnesses and question them in the same manner as the court martial, but was restricted in that it could only report fact. The results could possibly lead to a court martial, but those officers on the court of inquiry could not serve on the court-martial board. The records of the court of inquiry were given to the Secretary of the Navy, who then decided the next course of action. But the records of the proceedings could remain secret or be published, depending on the mood of the navy.<sup>21</sup>

The other two forms of naval disciplinary hearings were much quicker and less formal than either the court martial or the court of inquiry. A hearing at the captain's mast,

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<sup>20</sup> James E. Valle concluded that the results of courts martial or other disciplinary action had little impact on an officer's career. In this period, promotion was based on seniority, and even with a disciplinary record, an officer could still advance in the navy. A record did not carry the same "stigma" that it does today. In addition, "[j]unior officers who were suspended often resigned from the navy, especially midshipmen who were young enough to start over again in some other profession" (Valle, 51-58).

<sup>21</sup> Valle, 53-54.

also known as the “deck court.” took place aboard ship and was used against enlisted men. No records of the proceedings were generally kept, although the punishment and offence were entered in the ship’s log. The captain would simply hear the charges from a commissioned officer, make a decision, and execute the punishment.<sup>22</sup>

The new Naval School at Annapolis therefore operated in the context of existing naval law and discipline. Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft believed that putting midshipmen in a naval school would help uphold the ideals of the naval officer. He concluded that there the midshipmen would see “that a warrant in the navy, far from being an excuse for licentious freedom, is to be held a pledge for subordination, industry, and regularity – for sobriety, and assiduous attention to duty.” He felt that the Naval School, rather than setting a lower moral and disciplinary standard than the civilian colleges and universities, should have a higher standard. He concluded that “the President expects such supervision and management as shall make of them [the midshipmen] an exemplary body, of which the country may be proud.”<sup>23</sup> Bancroft bestowed upon the school’s first Superintendent, Franklin Buchanan, “all the powers for discipline conferred by the laws of the United States, and the certainty that the Department will recommend no one for promotion who is proved unworthy of it from idleness or ill conduct, or continuing ignorance, and who cannot bear the test of a rigid examination.”<sup>24</sup>

On 10 October 1845 Superintendent Buchanan enunciated these expectations. He told the students and staff that naval regulations required that the students undergo a through

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<sup>22</sup> Valle, 55.

<sup>23</sup> George Bancroft to Franklin Buchanan, 7 August 1845, in United States, *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis* (Washington: C. Alexander, Printer, 1847), 4. Held by the William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.

<sup>24</sup> George Bancroft to Franklin Buchanan, 7 August 1845, in United States, *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis*, 4.

examination of their professional abilities and moral character before being promoted to lieutenant. Because of this, Buchanan expected the students to take every opportunity to learn about their profession and to remember that “a good moral character is essential to your promotion and high standing in the navy.” He urged them to avoid intemperance and to remember what their country expected of them. Meanwhile, he told the officers and instructors that they had to enforce the law, “however painful” it might be, and that they had no room to overlook anything. Buchanan believed they had no discretionary powers when it came to the law at the School, even though commanders were given some leeway. He also felt that any officer who failed to enforce the law was committing a dereliction of duty.<sup>25</sup>

Superintendent Buchanan took Bancroft’s instructions to heart and became a strong believer in the inflexibility of naval law. For example, on 4 December 1846 he discovered a drunken midshipman and judged that the only way such behaviour could be handled was by a court martial: naval law left him no choice.<sup>26</sup> He concluded that

[t]he laws of the navy do not grant to a commander discretionary power to overlook such an offence as drunkenness or any offence against those laws: they point out the punishment for certain offences. And my experience as Superintendent of this School since its organization convinces me of the propriety and necessity of adhering strictly to them.<sup>27</sup>

Buchanan believed it would be a “dangerous precedent” to be lenient in this case, for if the law was not strictly enforced, everyone would expect leniency. This was particularly true of drunkenness. Buchanan believed that drinking led to most cases of insubordination in the

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<sup>25</sup> Franklin Buchanan to Naval School, 10 October 1845. Letters sent by the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy 1845-1865 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M945, roll 1); Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, Newfoundland. Hereafter, letters sent.

<sup>26</sup> Buchanan to J.Y. Mason, 5 December 1846, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>27</sup> Buchanan to J.Y. Mason, 5 December 1846, letters sent, roll 1.



navy and it was "an offence I never overlook."<sup>28</sup>

The original "Rules and Regulations for the Government of the U.S. Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis," formally promulgated in 1846, although probably in force since the School's opening, stipulated that all at the School were required to abide by the regulations. These regulations included not only those in the original charter, but also any that the Superintendent decided to issue. All officers were "required to observe towards each other a courteous deportment, and to conduct themselves, on all occasions, with propriety and decorum."<sup>29</sup> The professors were responsible for order and discipline in their classrooms when class was in session, and anyone having a complaint against another was to make it known to the Superintendent, rather than handling the matter individually.<sup>30</sup> The professors had little true power of their own. The regulations stated that "[t]he Professors are not permitted to exercise any discretionary power in excusing the students for absence from recitation, or for tardiness, but must report all such cases to the Superintendent."<sup>31</sup>

Meanwhile, the activities of midshipmen were strictly regulated. During study hours they were to stay in their rooms and were "not permitted to lounge or promenade about the grounds of the institution." There was also a conduct roll, where any infractions of the regulations or other misbehaviours, would be noted. These could include "neglect of duty, disobedience of orders, inattention to studies, tardiness at recitations, breaking liberty, incorrect deportment at recitation, indecorous conduct at the mess-table, or elsewhere.

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<sup>28</sup> Buchanan to J.Y. Mason, 5 December 1846, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>29</sup> Franklin Buchanan, "Rules and Regulations for the government of the U.S. Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis," Article 3, in United States, *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis*.

<sup>30</sup> Franklin Buchanan, "Rules and Regulations for the government of the U.S. Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis," Article 4, 5, in United States, *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis*.

<sup>31</sup> Franklin Buchanan, "Rules and Regulations for the government of the U.S. Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis," Article 7, 8, 9, in United States, *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis*.

irregularity at meal hours.” The most serious infractions would be sent to the Secretary of the Navy to decide upon the action to be taken. The regulations stated that one of the goals of the School was “to ascertain whether their qualifications and deportment are calculated to reflect credit upon the Navy if retained in it[.]”<sup>32</sup>

The midshipmen also had a variety of other rules and regulations to keep them in line. When in their rooms, one midshipman acted as the superintendent and kept it clean and tidy for a period of one week until the duties passed to his roommate. The regulations banned the importation of liquor onto the School grounds, and no midshipman was allowed to cook food in his room without permission from the Superintendent. And a midshipman was only allowed to eat his meal in his room if he was sick and the surgeon recommended “room service[.]”<sup>33</sup> Meanwhile, smoking tobacco took up almost five lines of the regulations: “Smoking cigars is prohibited in any of the Midshipmen’s rooms, recitation halls, or mess-room. Chewing tobacco in the mess and recitation rooms is positively prohibited; and no Acting Midshipman will be permitted to chew or smoke tobacco.”<sup>34</sup> Finally, the regulations added “[t]he students are cautioned and enjoined not to mark, cut, or in any manner deface or injure the public buildings or property of any kind.”<sup>35</sup>

During their stay at the School, midshipmen were required to spend almost all their time within the grounds. They were allowed to go into Annapolis, but they had to record their names in a “liberty-book” by 4pm. The officer-of-the-day then took it to the Superintendent.

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<sup>32</sup> Franklin Buchanan, “Rules and Regulations for the government of the U.S. Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis,” Article 10, 11, 12, in United States, *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis*.

<sup>33</sup> Franklin Buchanan, “Rules and Regulations for the government of the U.S. Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis,” Article 14, 15, 16, 17, in United States, *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis*.

<sup>34</sup> Franklin Buchanan, “Rules and Regulations for the government of the U.S. Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis,” Article 19, in United States, *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis*.

<sup>35</sup> Franklin Buchanan, “Rules and Regulations for the government of the U.S. Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis,” Article 20, in United States, *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis*.

or his substitute, to approve the request. The amount of time the midshipmen were allowed outside the grounds was limited: “[p]ermission to be absent will be granted only after the regular hours appropriated to recitations and study during the day, and extend only until 10 o’clock P.M., unless [given] special permission to exceed that hour.” Upon returning, the midshipmen were required to report to the officer-of-the-day, who recorded their return in the liberty-book, which was inspected by the Superintendent at 9 o’clock each morning.<sup>36</sup>

The rules which Buchanan submitted to George Bancroft in August 1845, and which were officially approved on 28 August 1846, were to govern the School until the reorganization began in 1849. The rules and regulations governing the midshipmen reflected in the spirit – if not the precise words – those which governed the navy as a whole. It was only after reorganization that more specific punishments and demerits were prescribed for infractions. But for the “pre-Academy” era, disciplinary records exist for the period from 1846 to 1850. While not all midshipmen attending the naval school in this period committed offences that were deemed serious enough to be recorded, the records illuminate the types of activities the midshipmen undertook which authorities deemed improper. It also allows us to generalize about the character of midshipmen during this era. For the period 1846 to 1850, a twenty percent random sample was taken of the records of 202 midshipmen who were recorded as committing offences. Unfortunately, the punishments inflicted, and the individual who reported the infraction, were not recorded. The forty records extracted yielded a total of 111 infractions.

The most common infraction was breaking liberty: 50 out of the 111 infractions, or

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<sup>36</sup> Franklin Buchanan, “Rules and Regulations for the government of the U.S. Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis,” Article 23, in United States, *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis*.

45%, were so categorized by the authorities.<sup>37</sup> Of those who overstayed the time they were permitted to be gone from the School grounds, seven of the offenders were less than one hour in returning, while 43 were for an undefined period during a specific date (based on the vagueness, it could have been anywhere from 12 minutes to 24 hours). The next most common infraction was being tardy to a recitation, or class (26 infractions, or 14%). (A subsequent breakdown of these numbers is telling if one concludes that being late for class was a function of how much one either enjoyed the topic or felt it was applicable to one's career). For example, learning different languages would better allow them to represent the United States abroad, while learning more scientific skills would better equip them for the changing role of technology in naval affairs. But there was a tendency among the first lot of midshipmen to be late for French: fifteen of the twenty-six tardy infractions involved that course, while 7 were for English. Meanwhile, three tardiness infractions were for being late for Math, while only one was an infraction for being late for mechanics. The practical side of naval education was still winning supporters, at least among the students.

The traditional historiography of the pre-1850 reform era of the Naval Academy has led people to the assumption that the midshipmen, in particular the older men, were harder to control than those of the later periods.<sup>38</sup> Speculation has been that one reason for this is that these officers had prior sea-experience, and often command, and failed to take kindly to being ordered around. But the 1846 to 1850 disciplinary records reveal that the midshipmen

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<sup>37</sup> For the purposes of analyzing the 1846-1850 records, I have used the same general headings as listed in the Academy records: Breaking Liberty, Disobedience of Orders, Drunkenness, Inattention to Studies, Indecorous Conduct, Neglect of Duty, Tardy at Recitation, and Unofficerlike Conduct.

<sup>38</sup> For example, see Charles Todorich, *The Spirited Years: A History of the Antebellum Naval Academy* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 36-37.

had a greater tendency towards order in this period than previously thought.<sup>39</sup> (See Appendix B, Table B.1). While 24 of the 111 infractions listed were for neglect of duty, 23 were in connection with rules involving liberty. Eleven of the infractions were for remaining outside the grounds beyond the time set by the Superintendent; 3 more were for neglecting to report when they returned from leave; and 9 were for neglecting to report their return from liberty and overstaying their time off the grounds. One midshipman was guilty of being in bed at noon when the Superintendent went to inspect his room; he was charged with neglect of duty.

The infractions that fell under the "Disobedience of Orders" category also show that these older midshipmen were relatively orderly. Three of the seven "Disobedience of Orders" infractions were for leaving the yard without permission; another midshipman lost his temper and slammed a window shutter; another failed to carry out orders properly in a small boat; and another incurred debts in Annapolis contrary to orders.<sup>40</sup> Of the 111 infractions noted, only two were for behaviour unbecoming of an officer. One infraction – for indecorous conduct – was for breaking a barn door and chasing a horse; while the other was awarded to Midshipman F.A. Boardman for attacking Midshipman Cheever and using reproachful language while doing it! Only one infraction was for inattention to studies, and one was for drunkenness in Annapolis.

The conduct rolls alone cannot prove, one way or another, how well the midshipmen responded to regulations and "school" life during this period. The pre-1850 regulations were not as numerous as those that would follow, and the midshipmen also spent less time at Annapolis and therefore did not have the time to commit the same number of infractions as those in later periods. But the offences committed by the midshipmen during this period

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<sup>39</sup> It is difficult for one to conclude, based on the conduct rolls alone, that they were more (or less) inclined to follow school or naval regulations than those students in later periods. If anything, the types of offences committed and listed shows that the midshipmen had a tendency to act more grown-up than in later periods, as will be seen.

<sup>40</sup> The final "Disobedience of Orders" infraction was unclear, and was simply reported by Lt. Ward.

were far from open rebellion against their instructors or the institution. In response, the School handled the matter internally, rather than subjecting them to the full force of naval law. But sometimes the latter was necessary and discipline was handed down at court martial or court of inquiry.

Statistics alone cannot reveal the dynamics between the authorities and the midshipmen, but supplementary information shows how these groups interacted in the pre-1850 period. In 1847 George P. Upshur became Superintendent and had a more lenient view of discipline because of the age of the students. One of the clearest examples of Upshur's style of discipline occurred in October 1849. On 27 October the Superintendent permitted seven midshipmen – only six actually decided to go – to visit Annapolis between 5 and 8pm. Before they left Upshur reviewed the regulations that governed their conduct outside the School and reminded them that they were forbidden from visiting a tavern, hotel, or “other house of public entertainment.” But when they returned later that evening one of their number, Acting Midshipman Chapman, was drunk. He admitted that he visited an apartment in one of the local hotels and drank champagne. Upshur was disappointed in the young man, but he told the Secretary of the Navy that Chapman was a smart person and would eventually prove to be a “valuable officer.” The Superintendent hoped that the Department would grant him clemency because “these young gentlemen have been only a few days at the School and have had very little time to make themselves acquainted with its rules and have as yet no knowledge of the naval laws[.]”<sup>41</sup>

Upshur had shown similar restraint on previous occasions. On the night of 1 May 1847, the watchman reported that some unknown people, most likely midshipmen, were seen returning to the School by jumping over the walls after 2 am. Lt. Ward investigated and found that Midshipmen J.T. Walker and another midshipman were recorded in the liberty

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<sup>41</sup> G.P. Upshur to William B. Preston, 30 October 1849, letters sent, roll 1.

book as having returned at 9:40pm, but in reality had returned much later by jumping over the wall near the lower gate.<sup>42</sup> Ward reported the matter to Upshur, who decided to investigate and handle the matter himself rather than bother the Secretary of the Navy. Upshur concluded that only two officers were involved in the incident and the offence was forgivable.<sup>43</sup>

The next step up the disciplinary ladder was suspension. But here too the youth of the offender could play a mitigating role in his punishment. During the night of 28 May 1847, Midshipman H.C. Hunter was discovered to have broken into the kitchen and taken some food. Hunter was suspended from duty and told to remain within the School grounds, but was allowed to attend recitations. Lt. J.H. Ward, then Acting Superintendent, reported the matter to the Secretary of the Navy. Further investigation revealed that it was common practice – “as old nearly as the School” – for midshipmen to enter the kitchen without permission and take food. Ward believed that because of Hunter’s “extreme youth” and “frankness in making the acknowledgment” of his crime, his suspension from duties and privileges would be sufficient punishment for him and a warning to others.<sup>44</sup>

On 19 June 1847 Superintendent Upshur wrote Secretary Mason to remind him of the case. Hunter had been under suspension for twenty days and Upshur thought that because Mason had been absent when Ward originally reported the affair, it may have slipped the Secretary’s mind. Upshur found that Hunter was truly sorry for what he did and reported that he “has evidently experienced considerable mental suffering in consequence of his present

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<sup>42</sup> Lt. John Ward to George P. Upshur 2 May 1847, Letters received by the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, 1845-1887 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M949, roll 2); Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, Newfoundland. Hereafter, letters received.

<sup>43</sup> George P. Upshur, 4 May 1847, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>44</sup> J.H. Ward to H.C. Hunter, 29 May 1847; J.H. Ward to H.C. Hunter, 1 June 1847; and J.H. Ward to J.Y. Mason, 1 June 1847, letters sent, roll 1.

position.” Upshur recommended that the Department restore Hunter to his duty and privileges. The Superintendent suggested that the Secretary send Hunter a letter of admonishment which, with his punishment, would be sufficient “in the case of one so young and so sensitive as Mid[shipman] Hunter.”<sup>45</sup>

A student’s willingness to cooperate could also play a part in convincing the Superintendent to show clemency. If offending midshipmen accepted the restrictions placed on them as punishments they were given the lesser punishments. On 23 July 1849 Midshipmen Alexander Simmons and William Van Wyck got into a fight. Several punches were thrown before they could be separated. Superintendent Upshur called both gentlemen into his office – separately – and asked them to pledge to refrain from solving their disputes in future by fighting. Both were given time to consider their fates: Simmons declined to pledge not to fight, while Van Wyck accepted the pledge under the condition that he would be allowed to defend himself if attacked. Van Wyck was not suspended, while Upshur suspended Simmons mainly for his unwillingness to pledge never to fight again while under his command.<sup>46</sup>

But if the students failed to respond to moderate forms of discipline, the authorities retaliated in kind. In 1848 Midshipman James B. Yates failed to respond to the subtle pressures of lenient discipline. Upshur found that Yates consistently neglected his studies and for three weeks prior to his suspension – and his second report to the Secretary – had failed to show up to half a dozen recitations. When Upshur asked why, the young man replied that he had been unprepared. Upshur failed to accept this and concluded that “counsel, advice, argument, lectures, rebuke, orders, are of no avail – all are utterly wasted on him.” Upshur believed that Yates was hopeless. On 24 January 1848, for example, he left the yard without

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<sup>45</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 19 June 1847, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>46</sup> G.P. Upshur to William Ballard Preston, 24 July 1849, letters sent, roll 1.



permission and no one could find him when Upshur called him to his office. Upshur ordered the officer-of-the-day to keep an eye out for him and at 10:30pm a light appeared in Yates' room; he had returned clandestinely. Upshur called him to his office and asked him when he had left and returned to the yard. Yates declined to respond, but failed to deny his absence.<sup>47</sup>

Upshur decided to suspend the midshipman from everything but his academic pursuits and forwarded his case to the Secretary. Upshur was sad that he had to report Yates for the second time, but felt he was "learning nothing, literally nothing valuable at this School," and he expected the Board of Examiners to reject him at the next round of examinations. In the end Upshur considered Yates "altogether unfit for the navy."<sup>48</sup> Yates' fate is unclear, but he failed to graduate from the School.<sup>49</sup> A similar incident involved Midshipman Henry Key, who also left the grounds without permission. When Upshur failed to find him, he sent a sergeant into Annapolis to look for him. The sergeant returned with Key and reported that he found him in a hotel playing billiards. Upshur concluded that Yates and Key were alike, always breaking rules, and that "they are also uselessly occupying quarters to the exclusion of men greatly their superiors in every respect."<sup>50</sup> By February 1848, Upshur was exasperated over the number of midshipmen leaving the yard without permission. He reported Midshipman J.M. Ford to the Secretary for leaving without permission and suspended him from everything except his academic duties. In Upshur's mind the situation was out of control: Ford was the third midshipman now under suspension for leaving the grounds without permission. Upshur was at a loss as to what to do. His only

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<sup>47</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 25 January 1848, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>48</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 25 January 1848, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>49</sup> U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, *Register of Alumni, Graduates and Former Naval Cadets and Midshipmen*, 91<sup>st</sup> Edition (Annapolis, Maryland: The Naval Academy Alumni Association, 1976). Hereafter, *Register of Alumni*.

<sup>50</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 27 January 1848, letters sent, roll 1.

belief was that prompt dismissal from the navy was the only cure for the epidemic of leaving the yard without permission.<sup>51</sup>

Despite Upshur's style of discipline, the Navy Department reminded him that if his efforts to discipline the midshipmen leniently failed, it might be necessary to resort to greater force. Secretary of the Navy J.Y. Mason wrote Upshur that he believed the midshipmen's actions were those of misguided young officers. Mason ordered that the offenders were to confine themselves to the grounds and that the entire class was to be lectured about the offender's fates. Mason concluded that if anyone committed such an offence again, they would be tried by court martial for disobedience of orders.<sup>52</sup>

Another case occurred with Midshipman Edward Pasteur on 24 February. At 10pm Surgeon Lockwood found Pasteur drunk on the streets of Annapolis and trying to enter a house where he knew some women. Eventually he was convinced to return to his room. Upshur thought Pasteur was a bad seed, frequently leaving the grounds and getting drunk, but until then was unable to prove it. Upshur thought that Pasteur possessed "none of the acquirements essential to an officer and makes no perceptible progress in his studies." The Superintendent thought that the School would be better off without his "example." When Upshur questioned him on the matter, Pasteur refused to answer. Upshur decided to suspend him from his privileges and forwarded his case on to the Secretary.<sup>53</sup>

Yet another incident occurred on 28 February. Midshipman John H. Tillotson left the yard without permission and when questioned admitted his guilt. Upshur believed there were others who went with him, but their names were unknown. Tillotson was a good student, had made good progress with his studies and was successfully refraining from

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<sup>51</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 9 February 1848, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>52</sup> J.Y. Mason to George P. Upshur, 23 February 1848, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>53</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 1 March 1848, letters sent, roll 1.

drinking as much as he had previously. Tillotson had only recently been reappointed to the navy after resigning earlier. Upshur thought he was doing well, but that he should be sent to sea as punishment. In the meantime he was suspended from all non-academic pursuits and privileges.<sup>54</sup> In the end Tillotson only lasted another year at the School and resigned again in February 1849.<sup>55</sup>

When all else failed, the Annapolis authorities finally threatened or even used a court martial or court of inquiry, as the ultimate demonstration that they were serious. But the establishment of the Naval School changed the disciplinary patterns of midshipmen. The numbers of courts martial fell after 1845, when discipline began to be administered at Annapolis. Courts martial now only dealt with extremely serious offences, like gross misconduct. The School's demerit system instead "kept the midshipmen out of the toils of the regular naval justice system except for the most aggravated cases, usually involving fights or duels."<sup>56</sup>

Superintendent Buchanan believed that a court martial could be used to make an example of a misbehaving midshipman. One such case occurred in late January 1846, when Buchanan discovered that Midshipman Norris had been beyond the School bounds without permission after he had specifically told him to stay within the limits because he had been neglecting his studies. Buchanan wished to make an example of him and told the Secretary of the Navy that the young man had been suspended. But Buchanan also wanted a court martial because he believed there had been a "flagrant" violation of the School's regulations in a disrespectful manner. Buchanan thought it was "necessary that a serious example should

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<sup>54</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 29 February 1848, letters sent, roll I.

<sup>55</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 13 February 1849, letters sent, roll I.

<sup>56</sup> Valle, 91.

be made [of Norris] to preserve the discipline of the institution."<sup>57</sup>

Drinking, combined with any other offence, also led to trouble with the Superintendent, and often to an immediate escalation in discipline to the court martial level. On 17 February 1846, Midshipman Augustus McLaughlin requested permission to go to Baltimore to visit his sick mother. Superintendent Buchanan gave him permission and was under the impression the midshipman was in Baltimore when he ran into him. The next day Buchanan decided to visit Annapolis to meet a visiting friend at a local hotel. When Buchanan arrived at the establishment, he checked its billiard room to see if his friend was there; instead he found McLaughlin playing billiards; he appeared to have been drinking.<sup>58</sup> McLaughlin explained that the servants had somehow delayed his departure for Baltimore and he missed his "car." Buchanan was upset that McLaughlin had been drinking after he had pledged to abstain. The young man exclaimed that this was the first time he had broken his pledge, but Buchanan was unsatisfied and ordered him to return to the School.<sup>59</sup>

The two departed the hotel and walked back to the School, where Buchanan ordered McLaughlin to his room. He refused, and in front of Buchanan, Professor Lockwood, and the officer-of-the-day, proceeded to leave the School grounds. Buchanan ordered him to stop; again he refused. Buchanan then ordered the officer-of-the-day to go after him and order him to return; again McLaughlin refused to obey. That was the last that Buchanan saw of the young man. Rumour had it that he had left Annapolis by "car" and Buchanan requested that the navy hold a court martial to deal with him.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Franklin Buchanan to George Bancroft, 1 February 1846, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>58</sup> Franklin Buchanan to George Bancroft, 17 February 1846, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>59</sup> Franklin Buchanan to George Bancroft, 17 February 1846, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>60</sup> Franklin Buchanan to George Bancroft, 17 February 1846, letters sent, roll 1. McLaughlin was then listed as a deserter. In May 1846 Buchanan made another request for a court martial. Midshipmen Blake and Wiley had argued and used disrespectful language when, reportedly, Blake refused to give Wiley the sugar dish. Again Buchanan believed that

While the School's authorities punished, the students reacted and often stuck together during an investigation. Even though they were young officers with some sea experience, they showed a remarkable level of group solidarity: they were a band of brothers who would stick together. Sometimes when a fellow student was dismissed, the others would petition for his reinstatement. For example, after Midshipman McLaughlin was dismissed, some of his friends petitioned the navy on his behalf. Buchanan forwarded the petition to the Secretary because it was prompted by "the kind feelings of the mid[shipmen] for their companion," but the Superintendent could see little justification in reinstating someone who had violated naval law.<sup>61</sup> Still, this reaction to disciplinary escalation shows the comradery of the corps.

The School authorities found that when they investigated an incident involving students, the midshipmen subscribed to a code of silence. The students often failed to offer information to aid in a fellow's punishment: they would not snitch on another student. One such case during the School era occurred in November 1847. The residents of Annapolis were sometimes subject to the pranks and noise of the midshipmen. On 19 November 1847 some midshipmen were in Annapolis misbehaving. At 10pm that evening, Mr. Capa Crabb and Mr. Goodman McBlair, a visitor to Annapolis, came to Upshur's residence to report a disturbance. About ten to fifteen minutes before, Crabb and his family were bothered by a noise outside their residence. When Crabb went to investigate he found that the enclosure around his and neighbouring homes, and some nearby trees, were damaged. He discovered the culprits to be "navy officers" and politely told them to stop what they were doing. They apparently did and he followed them back to the School. He returned to fetch Mr. McBlair

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the fact the midshipmen were disrespectful required the navy severely censure them with a court martial (Buchanan to Bancroft, 21 May 1846, letters sent, roll 1).

<sup>61</sup> Franklin Buchanan to Secretary of the Navy, 19 February 1846, letters sent, roll 1.

and they proceeded to Upshur's residence.<sup>62</sup>

Upshur called the officer-of-the-day and the gate watchman and they reviewed the liberty book. It showed that at 9:35pm. shortly after the incident occurred. Midshipman William West returned. The officer-of-the-day also noted that someone came back with West, but it was not recorded in the book because the officer-of-the-day and the watchman were busy at other tasks. The next day Upshur visited the scene of the crime and found it as Crabb had described. Upshur sent a carpenter and workers from the School to repair the damage to the enclosure, but the tree was not replaced because it was rare and Upshur had yet to find a new one. That afternoon Upshur questioned the officers who had returned before and after West, but all denied participating in the disturbance and claimed ignorance of it. Meanwhile, West refused to say whether he was involved. Upshur demanded that West tell him who came in the yard with him. West replied that someone had entered the yard with him but he declined to reveal his name. Upshur repeated his order with the same results. The Superintendent then asked West if the other man was an officer; again West refused to say, but he added that the gentleman was not attached to the School.<sup>63</sup>

Upshur knew of one captain and two passed midshipmen in Annapolis who were not attached to the School. The Superintendent believed the captain was not involved in the affair, and concluded he had "neither the right nor the disposition to believe that it was either of the others." While Upshur still wanted the truth, he failed to see the need to punish West if he were really innocent. Upshur believed "it possible that a false idea of honor or friendship might [have] induce[d] him even if innocent to suffer reproach, rather than incur the risk of involving a guilty companion, I offered him the only alternative I could." Upshur told West that the evidence before him made him look guilty, and explained that while he

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<sup>62</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 25 November 1847, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>63</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 25 November 1847, letters sent, roll 1.

could not force West to admit his guilt, he was honour-bound to acquit himself if he were indeed innocent. West asked for one half-hour to consider his fate. When his thirty minutes were up, Upshur asked him about his involvement once more, but again West still declined comment. Upshur then told him that he had no choice but to conclude that he was guilty and to forward the facts to the Navy Department. The Superintendent then suspended West from duties and privileges, but ordered him to continue attending classes.<sup>64</sup>

Another such case occurred when a group of mysterious midshipmen hung Professor Lockwood in effigy. This incident made Superintendent Upshur question his style of lenient punishments, while at the same time revealing the unity of the midshipmen. Three midshipmen sacrificed their own fates rather than see all their classmates punished. But they and their classmates also refrained from revealing who else was involved, despite Upshur's belief that the three alone could not have carried out the task. On 21 March 1848 a number of midshipmen gathered in the lower part of the School yard and began to chant. The midshipmen were unsatisfied with their gunnery course and were chanting "Down with Gunnery" and "Text Book, Text Book ...." Thus began the most famous incident of disorder in the pre-Civil War era. The Executive Officer, in the Superintendent's absence, restored order and the students returned to their duties and recitations. But the next morning there appeared an effigy of Professor Henry Lockwood, the gunnery instructor, hanging from the School's flagstaff. A key to a storage space that contained a model gun was taken to obtain the model to hang on the effigy. Upshur concluded that the incident was clearly premeditated and was an "unparalleled assault upon law and discipline[.]" Eventually the effigy was taken down and the midshipmen were assembled to discover who, in the dead of night when all should have been asleep, had done the deed. Upshur threatened to punish the whole class if

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<sup>64</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 25 November 1847, letters sent, roll 1. It is probable that Midshipman William West was William C. West from New York, of the 1841 Date. West eventually graduated from the School and rose to the rank of Commander before he retired (*Register of Alumni*).

the culprits failed to present themselves. whereupon Midshipmen J. McLeod Murphy, Edward Scovell, and John Gale came forward. Upshur immediately suspended them, but concluded there must have been more midshipmen involved.<sup>65</sup>

Upshur was upset and disappointed that the behaviour of the midshipmen had degenerated to such a degree and he came close to blaming himself. As Superintendent he hoped to impose restrictions as few as possible. Instead, he hoped to govern by "moral rather than by legal force[.]" In this respect he tried to "maintain good order and obedience at as small a cost of personal feeling as practicable" and was as lenient and as understanding as "the nature of the institution under my charge would admit of." But he speculated that he may have "carried the system too far, at least it has not in every instance produced the desired result." Previously he had "counseled, advised, persuaded, lectured, rebuked, suspended and reported, and you [the Secretary] have reprimanded and finally ordered offenders to sea" to deal with discipline problems. Upshur found that sending offenders to sea impressed upon the others the seriousness of the offences, and he felt that prompt dismissal from the navy would have an even greater impact on the midshipmen.<sup>66</sup> But as for the effigy incident, it went to a court martial.

On 17 April 1848 a Naval General Court Martial was convened at the School to deal with the charges against Murphy, Scovell, and Gale. The court was presided over by Captains Charles Morris, Charles W. Morgan, and Charles J. McCauley, and four commanders, David G. Farragut, Robert Ritchie, Franklin Buchanan and Samuel Barron. The Judge Advocate was Mr. Pinkney Whyte, of Baltimore.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 24 March 1848, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>66</sup> Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 24 March 1848, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>67</sup> J.Y. Mason, "Charges and specification of charges preferred by the Secretary of the Navy against Midshipman J. McLeod Murphy of the Navy," 8 April 1848, in Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy), Records of General Courts-Martial and Courts of Inquiry of the Navy Department, 1799-1867, case 1081 (National Archives Microfilm



Murphy was charged with treating his superior – Professor Henry Lockwood – with contempt, and with riotous and disorderly behaviour, thus violating the third article of the School's regulations.<sup>68</sup> Murphy had several legal arguments to make against the legal basis of the charges and had researched several works of law in preparing his defence. He felt the charges were invalid because they failed to state whom he had supposedly aided in hanging the effigy. Moreover, the charges failed to state whom the effigy represented, and they failed to suggest how Murphy prevented Lockwood from carrying out his duties. Murphy also believed that the second charge, violating the third article of the School regulations, was too vague. The article stated that those at the School had to treat each other with proper decorum. But the charge failed to state which officer he had offended or how it had breached Murphy's duty. Besides, Murphy argued, the third article was a "rule of politeness" rather than a law. But Murphy's strongest argument against the charges was that they violated his rights as an officer. Specifically, he objected to being charged with treating his superior with disrespect, since Lockwood was not a superior under naval law. The professor, Murphy argued, did not hold a commission and his appointment as an instructor was neither confirmed by the Senate nor signed by the President. Under existing law, Lockwood could only be deemed to hold the equivalent rank of petty officer. It therefore went against naval tradition and law to charge Murphy with contempt for a superior. Murphy believed that if the court found the charge valid, it would have ramifications for the whole navy: a port captain, commander, or captain might be placed in charge of the police department of the School and find himself outranked by a hypothetical civilian superintendent.<sup>69</sup>

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Publication M273, roll 63): Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy). Record Group 125: National Archives Building, Washington, DC. Hereafter, JAG and case number.

<sup>68</sup> J.Y. Mason, "Charges and specification of charges preferred by the Secretary of the Navy against Midshipman J. McLeod Murphy of the Navy," 8 April 1848, in JAG 1081.

<sup>69</sup> File JMLM No. 1, JAG 1081.

The Judge Advocate responded to Midshipman Murphy's statement. Whyte asserted that while it was desirable for the charges to contain the utmost precision, it was not incumbent on the framer to "use the technical strictness with which indictments are drawn." Whyte quoted Lord Hale, who had declared that the technical strictness demanded by an accused for the charges was growing to such an extent that it was becoming easy for the "grossest crimes" to go unpunished.<sup>70</sup> Whyte also believed that the charges sufficiently indicated that Professor Lockwood was the injured party and that no greater description was required. But Whyte agreed, to a degree, with Murphy's contention that a professor was not an officer. Finally, Whyte agreed that the second charge against Midshipman Murphy was indeed too vague to hold up in court. Whyte declared that "[i]t never should be considered by any prosecutor to be his duty to labor 'to gain a cause,' but to elicit facts and apply them to the law and by the law to govern the mode by which the facts are to be obtained." He agreed that the wording of the second charge was such that an accused would be unable to defend himself against the accusations. In addition Whyte agreed that the charge did not specify which article the accused had violated. Murphy was not given a description of the offence he was accused of committing nor was he provided with information upon whom he committed the offence. Whyte noted that he had not seen the charge before it was written but concluded that he could not defend it before the court.<sup>71</sup>

After hearing both side's arguments, the court deliberated on the charges. When the court reconvened it found Murphy not guilty on both charges. The court concluded that under the present law, Professor Lockwood's rank was only equal to that of a petty officer and therefore he was not Murphy's superior. The court also agreed that the second charge was

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<sup>70</sup> File JA No. 1, JAG 1081.

<sup>71</sup> File JA No. 1, JAG 1081.

too vague.<sup>72</sup>

The court martial of Midshipman Gale convened on 25 April 1848. The Secretary of the Navy did not leave himself open to the same procedural attacks initiated by Midshipman Murphy. Gale was charged with disobedience of orders in connection with the hanging of the effigy of Professor Lockwood. Gale had failed to show a courteous deportment towards Professor Lockwood, thus “disobeying the first clause of the third Article of the Rules and Regulations for the government of” the School. Gale had also disobeyed the second clause of the third article of the School’s regulations and had failed to conduct himself with proper decorum.<sup>73</sup> While the Judge Advocate constructed a case against Gale for hanging the effigy, the defence laid the groundwork for a claim that the midshipman’s rights had been violated because he was not informed that offences at the School would be handled by a court martial and that his confession was made under duress. Previously, the Superintendent had handled discipline himself and in a more lenient manner than would a court martial.

In his defence, Gale questioned the admissibility of his confession, since it was not voluntary. Under the law a confession, Gale argued, was not voluntary if it were given under duress. Gale told the court that his confession was made after threats by the Superintendent and that it ought therefore be inadmissible. Gale averred that the standard here ought to be higher where the individual in authority is the accused’s superior.<sup>74</sup>

Gale conceded that discipline and subordination to authority were essential to the efficient running of a military organization. Gale told the court that

[o]bedience to orders – subordination to authority, are the first precepts

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<sup>72</sup> JAG 1081.

<sup>73</sup> J. Y. Mason, “Charge and specifications of a charge preferred by the Secretary of the Navy against Midshipman John Gale of the Navy,” 24 April 1848, in JAG 1082, M273, roll 63.

<sup>74</sup> File JG No. 1, JAG 1082.

taught by the older officer to the younger – the first lessons learned on the entrance upon his novitiate by the young aspirant for the duties and honors of a proud and itemly [sic] disciplined service. Thus taught him almost from his very childhood these principles grow with his growth and strengthen with each succeeding year. They are at once his pride and his duty, and become as apart of his being.<sup>75</sup>

Therefore, when the officer is ordered to do something, he carries out that order without hesitation. Thus, the accused's admission of guilt was the result of being ordered to admit his part in the affair by the Superintendent. Gale, by carrying out his duty, was forced into self-incrimination and his admission was not voluntary.<sup>76</sup> But the court disagreed and admitted Gale's confession into the records.<sup>77</sup>

After the prosecutor questioned several officers in charge at the School, he called Midshipman Arthur H. Otis, who provided vague testimony about his recollection of events. He told the court that during the period of the effigy incident he lived in room 17 with Gale, a Mr. West, and a Mr. Hunter. Under the Judge Advocate's questioning, Otis confirmed that a copy of the rules of the School as entered into the evidence was put in their room. But he could not say whether the regulations were in the room on 21 and 22 March. When cross-examined Otis told the court that he was uncertain if the rules had been in the room since Gale had come to live there, but that when they were, they were kept near the fireplace. Otis was then excused and the Judge Advocate informed Gale that if he had any evidence to present to the court, he was now permitted to do so.<sup>78</sup>

Gale called Midshipman John V. Philip, who supported the claim that the confessions

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<sup>75</sup> File JG No. 1, JAG 1082.

<sup>76</sup> File JG No. 1, JAG 1082.

<sup>77</sup> JAG 1082, pp. 7-8.

<sup>78</sup> JAG 1082, pp. 22-24.

were given under duress.<sup>79</sup> Then Gale called Midshipman Francis G. Clarke, who testified that Upshur had declared that he would rule with a strong arm from that point forward and that there had been some discussion among those assembled about reporting to the Superintendent to declare that they were all involved. Under questioning Clarke also told the court that he saw nothing about the effigy to indicate it was intended to represent Professor Lockwood. To the contrary, Clarke told the court that there had been some talk that the effigy was a “stuffed paddy” connected with St. Patrick’s Day. But under cross-examination, Clarke admitted that when he saw the canon on the effigy he assumed it referred to Professor Lockwood.<sup>80</sup>

Gale next called Midshipman Joseph B. Smith who also vouched for Upshur’s temper and recounted that he told the assembled midshipmen that while he had tried indulgence and persuasion in the past, henceforth he would use force. Smith also told the court that he too heard some others mention that they believed the effigy to be a “stuffed Paddy” rather than a representation of Professor Lockwood.<sup>81</sup> The testimony of the witnesses Gale called also substantiates other observances of midshipmen behaviour. The midshipmen failed to provide any testimony that would harm their fellow midshipmen, but when asked a direct question by the court – in this case whether they thought the effigy reminded them of Professor Lockwood – Clarke did his duty and answered truthfully that it had.

In closing, Gale argued that the prosecution had failed to show a disobedience of orders. Like Murphy, Gale tried to play a game of semantics and argued that the School’s regulations were not in themselves orders but laws. Thus, he challenged the third article of the School’s regulations because it was not “expressed in terms of sufficient directness and

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<sup>79</sup> JAG 1082, pp. 24-27.

<sup>80</sup> JAG 1082, pp. 27-30.

<sup>81</sup> JAG 1082, pp. 27-33.

simplicity of subject meaning, to constitute orders.” Like Murphy, Gale added that the charges were flawed because it was impossible to tell what was meant by “proper decorum” and “deportment.” Gale also told the court that the charge of improper deportment against another officer was invalid because Professor Lockwood was not an officer. Finally, Gale reiterated his arguments about the inadmissibility of his confession because it had been given under duress.<sup>82</sup> The court found that Gale’s involvement in hanging the effigy was unproven, but did accept that he had failed to show proper decorum to a superior. The verdict ordered that Gale was to “be publically reprimanded at such time and in such manner as the Secretary of the Navy shall direct in the presence of the officers of the Naval School, and that he be dismissed from the said School and not allowed to return to it until required to present himself there at the next examination.”<sup>83</sup> The sentence was not only meant to punish Gale, but to serve as a warning to others.

On 29 April 1848 Midshipman Edward H. Scovell faced the charge of disobedience of orders. Specifically, he was accused of hanging or aiding in the hanging of an effigy, thus disobeying the regulations which said that fellow officers should be treated with a courteous deportment, and of violating the second clause of the third article of the School’s regulations for not conducting himself with “propriety and decorum[.]”<sup>84</sup> Scovell pleaded not guilty.<sup>85</sup> After the prosecution outlined its case, the first witness for the defence was Midshipman William Law, who recounted how Upshur had assembled the midshipmen the morning of the hanging of the effigy. Law thought that Upshur was excited but he said nothing that Law

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<sup>82</sup> File JG No. 2, JAG 1082.

<sup>83</sup> JAG 1082, pp. 34-35.

<sup>84</sup> J. Y. Mason, “Charge and specifications of a charge preferred by the Secretary of the Navy against Midshipman Edward Hunter Scovell of the Navy,” 23 April 1848, in JAG 1083, M273, roll 63.

<sup>85</sup> JAG 1083, pp. 4-5.

deemed to be threatening. Law told the court, as others had, that Upshur said there would be consequences if the guilty failed to come forward. The midshipman was uncertain of Upshur's precise words but when Murphy, Gale, and Scovell came forward, Law "thought they had saved the rest of the School from the probability of a punishment." Law also told the court that he had formed no opinion at the time of the effigy incident as to whom the effigy was meant to depict, but neither did he recall anyone comparing the effigy to a "stuffed Paddy." Nor did Law have any recollection of the assembled midshipmen desiring to go to the Superintendent's office to claim they had all been involved in the incident.<sup>86</sup>

The next day Midshipman Charles McGary appeared for the defence. When the Judge Advocate later asked McGary, "Do you not know that the actors in the disturbance of the day previous were known to the Commander or that Lieut. Lee had informed him who they were?" "I do not know," McGary replied. Unsatisfied, the Judge Advocate meandered in his questioning until he asked McGary about prior discussions of the event to weaken McGary's credibility. Specifically, Whyte was curious to know how often since 22 March McGary had discussed the assembly with other midshipmen. McGary replied that he was uncertain, but that "the conversation has been repeatedly spoken of by myself with others of the midshipmen." Scovell then tried a redirect and asked McGary if when Upshur called for the guilty parties to come forward he told them to what offence they were answering. McGary replied that Upshur had not been clear on this point. But the court then asked McGary if the midshipmen had been told what the assembly was about when they were called. McGary tried his best not to let his fellow midshipman down and replied vaguely, simply stating that they had been assembled to discuss the "act" which had occurred. Unimpressed, the Judge Advocate stepped in and pressed McGary for more information. "In what act?" questioned Whyte. "In hanging up the image or in the manner in which their disapprobation had been

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<sup>86</sup> JAG 1083, pp. 13-16.

expressed.” McGary admitted. But under further questioning by the defendant, McGary admitted that some midshipmen had expressed a desire to go to the Superintendent but only to admit to “feeling” for the act rather than participating in it.<sup>87</sup>

The defence then called Midshipman John K. Wilson, who offered little new.<sup>88</sup> The final witness Scovell called was Midshipman William Law. Previously Law had claimed that there was no later attempt by the other midshipmen to admit involvement. Scovell asked Law if upon further reflection he wished to amend his previous statements. Law replied that “I have not a distinct recollection that there was a proposition made in precisely those words [used by the accused in court] – but there was one, something to that effect.”<sup>89</sup> Law did not want to stretch his actual recollection of events to support his fellow midshipmen any more than reality would allow. He was caught between his loyalty and duty.

In his defence, Scovell told the court that the charges and the evidence were virtually identical to the Gale case; Scovell stated that “I may almost be said to have been tried already.” As Gale had argued, Scovell judged that he could not be charged with disobedience of orders because the third article of the School’s rules was not an order but a law. Scovell told the court that “a violation of said article therefore does not constitute the military crime of disobedience of orders.” In the case of the first specification, the first clause of the third article governed relations between officers and, as had already been proven, Professor Lockwood was not an officer. As for the second specification, Scovell argued that charging a midshipman with breaching propriety and decorum for suspending an effigy, without showing any motive for the suspension, was unacceptable. By this definition, Scovell argued, the suspension of anything could be taken as a breach. As had Gale, Scovell also argued that

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<sup>87</sup> JAG 1083, pp. 19-21.

<sup>88</sup> JAG 1083, pp. 22-26.

<sup>89</sup> JAG 1083, pp. 25-26.



his “confession” had been made under duress – he was following orders to confess under pain of punishment for the entire school.<sup>90</sup>

Finally, Scovell argued that in the heat of the moment the Superintendent and the students misunderstood which charges they were answering, therefore the confessions could not be entered into evidence. Scovell told the court that in the heat of the moment Upshur may have been solely focused on the effigy incident and was unclear in his speech. Upshur erroneously assumed that they knew to what he was referring. For his part, Scovell told the court that in the heat of the moment he had answered to what he thought the charges were rather than to what Upshur may have meant. Scovell said that he assumed that he must be implicated to some degree in some of the conduct, not just the hanging of the effigy. He also contested the assumption that some kind of guilt was present among all the midshipmen: “Here we see a number – many of whom *must* have been innocent, seriously proposing to acknowledge themselves guilty [emphasis in original].” Scovell then asked the court, “[w]hat then is more probable than that those who *did* go over only *carried into effect* what others *proposed*? [Emphasis in original]”<sup>91</sup>

In the end Scovell told the court that evidence could not be based on acts motivated by feelings no one could prove. And besides, the prosecution had failed to present any physical evidence that the accused had committed the crime. The effigy had been created by some unknown group of midshipmen whose identities were never proven. In the end, the effigy had reflected no ill will towards anyone and the accused had only admitted guilt by on the assumption that as a typical student he must have been guilty of something.<sup>92</sup>

In the end the court found the first charge against Scovell to be unproven, but the

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<sup>90</sup> File EHS No. 1, JAG 1083.

<sup>91</sup> File EHS No. 1, JAG 1083.

<sup>92</sup> File EHS No. 1, JAG 1083.

second was proven to its satisfaction. The court martial thus found Midshipman Scovell guilty on the charge of disobedience of orders and sentenced him to be publicly reprimanded and dismissed from the Naval School “and not allowed to return to it until required to present himself there at the next examination.”<sup>93</sup> Scovell’s case reveals the ideal of midshipmen solidarity – in the alleged desire of the midshipmen to accept responsibility for the effigy incident as a group – as well as the level of obvious discomfort the witnesses for the accused felt when they had to be slowly pressed into admitting that the evidence against the accused was correct. In the end, Scovell’s defence that he was unaware that he was answering to the charge of hanging the effigy shows that he felt he had been wronged, but that he felt this wrong could be corrected.

While midshipmen stuck together when battling the authorities, midshipmen unity became fractured when they fought among themselves. Fights between students at the School at least twice took the form of duels over matters of honour.<sup>94</sup> On 4 May 1848 Midshipmen Byrd W. Queen and Walter W. Stevenson fought a duel. Duelling had a long tradition in the military for settling personal disputes between men. Superintendent Upshur was aware of this history, but he was also aware of the history the Naval School was trying to make. When Upshur reported the duel to the Secretary of the Navy, he argued that the duel must be

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<sup>93</sup> JAG 1083, pp. 26-27.

<sup>94</sup> James R. Webb, screenwriter of *How the West Was Won* (1963), and historical writer, concluded that few school boys get through school without an “I’ll see you after school” type of fight. These fights were usually fought “in the immediate heat of anger,” but duels were a different matter. Webb concluded that duels were matters of honour tending to “be an occupational hazard of the military, lawyers, politicians, gay young blades of the southern landowning class, and newspaper editors.” But of all the military organizations, Webb concluded duelling was most common in the navy: “possibly because of the frictions created by the close quarters of shipboard life” (James R. Webb, “Pistoils for two . . . Coffee for one,” *American Heritage* 1975 25(2): 66 and 70). Given the social backgrounds of the midshipmen and the desire to be true naval officers, one should not be surprised that duels occurred at the Naval School. For extreme examples of the role of duels in society, see Ute Frevert 1991 work, *Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel* (England: Polity Press, English translation, 1995). In particular chapter three, “The honour of officers.” Duels were a regular occurrence at the German naval college in Kiel in the early-twentieth century. In fact they were even supervised by a senior officer, “which means that they were afforded quasi-recognition as an institutional means of settling conflicts of honour” (Frevert, 75). Duelling only came to an end in Germany with the fall of the Nazis and the subsequent de-Nazification of the country, purging the military ethos from society (Frevert, 228-231).

punished or other people attached to the School would duel on the grounds because “they feel secure against the civil laws of Maryland.”<sup>95</sup> Upshur also noted that “[d]uelling however reprehensible in itself has hitherto been sanctioned by precedent and practice among military men as a necessary evil. Without expressing an opinion on that point, I would respectfully remark that a grave aspect is imparted to this act by the time and place in which it was perpetrated.”<sup>96</sup> Because Upshur wanted the School’s name to remain unsullied, the incident led to a court of inquiry to ascertain the facts.

The inquiry convened at the School on 29 May 1848.<sup>97</sup> Most students called to testify denied actually witnessing the duel, but details did emerge over what had caused the dispute. According to Midshipman Robert Stuart, Stevenson recounted that he told Queen that he had failed to vote for him as a member of a School club, because he did not like Queen and felt that other students at the School would make better members. Queen then apparently uttered some remark which Stevenson said proved Queen was a coward.<sup>98</sup> Midshipman J.C.P. DeKrafft told the court that on 1 May around 11pm in Annapolis, he heard Stevenson call Queen a coward then Queen called Stevenson a “infamous liar.” Stevenson tried to hit Queen but was restrained by one of his friends. Queen asked Stevenson to fight as they were being pulled apart but then they both returned to the School yard by different routes only to meet once again at the gate. Stevenson demanded an apology but Queen told him that he had started the affair.<sup>99</sup>

The court concluded that Queen apologized to Stevenson at the gate but he withdrew

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<sup>95</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 12 May 1848, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>96</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 12 May 1848, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>97</sup> J.Y. Mason to Commander George P. Upshur, 24 May 1848, in JAG 1091, M273, roll 63.

<sup>98</sup> JAG 1091, pp. 30-35.

<sup>99</sup> JAG 1091, pp. 36-40.

it the next day by a note. This led to a “challenge” from Queen. The court found that this caused the duel on 4 May at the Tenpin alley within the School grounds, where James Johnston acted as Stevenson’s second and an unknown citizen as Queen’s second. The duel resulted in Queen being shot in the hip at a distance of fifteen paces. But the court made no recommendations for punishment, as the duty of a court of inquiry was simply to provide the Navy Department with the facts.<sup>100</sup>

In the end, the court of inquiry into the duel was different from the courts martial into the hanging of the effigy of Professor Lockwood. In the Lockwood case the midshipmen called to testify seemed much less willing to present evidence against their fellow midshipmen, since it was the midshipmen against the establishment. In the Queen-Stevenson duelling case, on the other hand, it was a matter of personal honour between two midshipmen and did not involve the entire School population and its group beliefs. Therefore, in the latter case the students seemed more willing at least to tell the court how the dispute started.

On 7 June 1848 there was yet another duel. At 8pm Midshipman Francis G. Dallas was carried into the School yard in a carriage with a bullet wound to his right shoulder, the result of a duel with Midshipman J. Gale, who had earlier been dismissed from the School by a court martial.<sup>101</sup> While at the School Dallas became embroiled in a dispute over honour between himself and some other midshipmen. On 24 May, Dallas wrote Midshipmen Harrison and Dibble complaining that his reputation had been insulted and asserting that he was ready to fight for his honour. The dispute seemed to centre around Dallas’ past service record, in defence of which Dallas produced letters from Surgeon Barrington detailing his ill health. In early June, Midshipman Gale wrote Dallas that the charges against him arose

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<sup>100</sup> JAG 1091, pp. 57-59.

<sup>101</sup> G.P. Upshur to J. Y. Mason, 8 June 1848, letters sent, roll 1. It is unclear if J. Gale was John Gale, but it seems likely.

long before coming to the Naval School and that he was prepared to prove it, even if he were “compelled to resort to measures as disagreeable to me as they ought to be to you.” Things came to a head on 6 June, when Dallas and Gale finally settled matters with a duel outside School grounds at Bladensburg. Midshipman Charles C. Hunter acted as Gale’s second, while a non-Naval School gentleman was Dallas’ second.<sup>102</sup> Dr. W. Gray Palmer reported on 7 June that Dallas received a shot to his shoulder and was left unable to raise his right arm. But Palmer reported both sides were eager for another round: “I mean that Mr. Dallas demanded it and the other party was willing to oblige him: they were, as I said before, prevented by my intervention.”<sup>103</sup>

When the case was being reviewed by the Secretary of the Navy, Dallas was informed on 4 July 1848 that he had passed his lieutenant’s examination. But shortly thereafter the Secretary informed him that the President had decided to dismiss him from the service. Dallas retorted that the President had committed “a *gross* act of *injustice* [emphasis in original].” Secretary Mason, sounding somewhat sympathetic to the young man (he signed his name informally as simply J.Y.M) informed him that Gale and Hunter had also been dismissed. Mason also returned Dallas’ letter containing his comments about the President, adding that his chances of being reinstated “will not probably be promoted by such language as you employ in this letter.”<sup>104</sup> Dallas was kicked out of the navy: the navy would not have

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<sup>102</sup> Commander Upshur to the Secretary of the Navy, 8 June 1848, in Gardner W. Allen (ed.), *The Papers of Francis Gregory Dallas, United States Navy: Correspondence and Journal, 1837-1859* (New York: De Vinne Press, 1917, reprint), 31. Hereafter, *Dallas Papers*.

<sup>103</sup> Midshipman Dallas to Midshipman Harrison, 24 May 1848; Midshipman Dallas to Midshipman Dibble, 24 May 1848; Midshipman Gale to Midshipman Dallas, 6 June 1848; Certificate of Dr. Palmer, 7 June 1848, in *Dallas Papers*, 25-30.

<sup>104</sup> Captain Chas. W. Morgan to Passed Midshipman Dallas, 4 July 1848; The Secretary of the Navy to Passed Midshipman Dallas, 6 July 1848; Passed Midshipman Dallas to the Secretary of the Navy, 3 September 1848; The Secretary of the Navy to Late Passed Midshipman Dallas, 9 September 1848; Late Passed Midshipman Dallas to the Secretary of the Navy, 12 September 1848, with note attached from Mason returning the letter, in *Dallas Papers*, 45-49. In the meantime, Lieutenant-Colonel de Russey wrote Dallas and told him “you *did* trespass against the Rules of the Service” but told him to apply to his Congressmen to look into the matter. On 25 September 1848 Mason wrote Dallas again and told him that

its young men duelling and behaving badly.

In the end Midshipmen Queen, Stevenson and Johnston were also dismissed for participating in the first duel.<sup>105</sup> Dismissal was the ultimate form of punishment for misbehaviour and often – but not always – ended the midshipman's career. Sometimes midshipmen were given second chances, like Edward Scovell, and were allowed to be examined for readmission. After Scovell was expelled from the School he remained in Annapolis and tried to prepare for his examinations anyway. Scovell had difficulty finding a teacher outside the School to help him and Upshur believed without one he would make little progress. But Upshur reported that Scovell now appeared to be aware of the gravity of his offence and recommended that if the Department decided to readmit Scovell, it should do so by 1 December 1848 so that he would have enough time to prepare to rejoin his section in January.<sup>106</sup> It is unclear if Scovell was reinstated, but he failed to graduate from the School.<sup>107</sup>

In the 1840s the Naval School provided a structured environment where youths could learn more about their profession, but could still be kept under control. School discipline

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his record, up until this point, was fine and that "[t]here was nothing in the report which affected your character, or made you subject to a dishonorable discharge." Despite letters from friends, and former commanders, to the President and the Secretary of the Navy, nothing worked to get him reappointed to the service at that time. By May 1849, Dallas was frustrated by the lack of progress and he began to court the German Navy. By 3 August 1849 Dallas received a commission as Lieutenant, 2<sup>nd</sup> class, in the German navy and was assigned to the Steam Corvette *Hansa*. Dallas served for about four years in the Imperial German Navy and then reapplied to be reinstated in the US Navy. On 23 February 1853 Secretary of the Navy John P. Kennedy wrote Dallas to inform that his case had been reviewed, and given the personal testimonies on his behalf, as well as his record of service in the German Navy, he had been reinstated as a Passed Midshipman. To prepare for his return, he was given leave until 1 January 1854. (Captain Foxhall A. Parker to the President, 8 December 1848; Abbott Lawrence, Esq., to the President, 11 December 1848; Lieutenant-Colonel de Russy to the Secretary of the Navy, 29 December 1848, in *Dallas Papers*, 51-57; The Secretary of the German Navy to Late Passed Midshipman Dallas, 3 August 1849, in *Dallas Papers*, 63-64; Late Passed Midshipman Dallas to the Secretary of the Navy, 17 February 1853; The Secretary of the Navy to Passed Midshipman Dallas, 23 February 1853; The Secretary of the Navy to Passed Midshipman Dallas, 23 February 1853, in *Dallas Papers*, 108-111).

<sup>105</sup> As noted in G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 14 June 1848, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>106</sup> G.P. Upshur to J.Y. Mason, 13 November 1848, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>107</sup> *Register of Alumni*.

acted in the context of naval law and the authorities increased the severity of their punishments with the seriousness of the crime. Contrary to the belief of some scholars, midshipmen in this period were generally well behaved. Daily infractions included tardiness and overstaying leave, while gross examples of insubordination were virtually nonexistent. When midshipmen did become rambunctious, often, like in the protests against their gunnery course, they felt they had a grievance against the School.

During this era, authorities disciplined the students in kind, but often the midshipmen would only cooperate if threatened. They felt loyalty to others involved and refused to snitch, and many, especially during the courts-martial or inquiry cases, pleaded ignorance. But the midshipmen would fight their own over matters of honour. This dynamic between Annapolis authorities and the midshipmen continued in the Academy era and the behaviour of the students revealed that if the authorities refused to punish a student who violated student norms, they would do it themselves. Still, for the most part the students of both the Naval School and the Naval Academy behaved themselves and accepted the institution's style of naval discipline. In both eras, the students' discipline was structured and despite the attitudes of some Superintendents, the navy sometimes gave an offender clemency on account of his youth.

### ***Chapter Six: Discipline and Law in the Academy Era***

The period of reform that began in 1849 brought little change in how authorities at Annapolis handled discipline. The 1849 regulations, which governed the Academy until they were revised in 1853, contained a provision for demerit rolls which were compiled by the Academic Board in June and October of each year. The delinquencies were to be put in various classes and the highest class offence would carry a demerit of ten points. Any delinquency above the fourth-class was to be added to by a multiple of one-sixth for the third class, one-third for the second class, and one-half for the first class. If a midshipman received more than 200 demerit points in a year, he was deemed “deficient in conduct” and subject to dismissal.<sup>1</sup> Again the Academy applied naval law, but they kept in consideration the students were new to the navy. The students responded in kind, and usually only misbehaved as a group if they felt their rights were violated.

The laws of the navy still applied to the Academy and the Superintendent had the right to make additional rules. The Superintendent and the Executive Officer also had the right to inspect every part of the Academy. Midshipmen were only allowed out on Saturday afternoons and had to be back by 8pm, while only half were allowed to leave the grounds at any one time. Sickness had to be proven and no one was allowed in another’s room (or out of their own) during study hours. Fighting – with deadly weapons or otherwise – was formally forbidden (although as we have seen it was unacceptable in the School era) as were cards and other games, alcohol and visiting local hotels or taverns. The Midshipmen were also banned from forming associations or clubs. They had to use proper language, and only

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<sup>1</sup> United States Naval Academy, *Regulations of the United States Naval Academy* [1849] (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1849), section 11. Held by the William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. Hereafter, *Regulations* 1849. Because the reforms began with the 1849 regulations, for the purposes of this analysis, this author considers the Academy era to have begun in 1849.



were allowed to carry firearms with the Superintendent's permission. The pupils were also told again not to mark, cut, or deface "public buildings or property of any kind." And they all had to attend chapel.<sup>2</sup>

Discipline at the Academy was graduated and nonviolent. Meanwhile, the 1850s were a period of reform in the US navy as it tried to find nonviolent means to punish its offenders. As the political crisis in the country deepened over slavery, discipline in the navy also became wrapped up in the debate. Southerners wanted the navy to keep flogging, an opinion which "reenforced the abolitionist stereotype of the lashwielding master." Northerners, on the other hand, claimed Southerners supported "tyranny" at sea and at home. The debate over flogging was "useful [as a] propaganda device" and "to relate the antiflogging movement to the larger political issues of the day." The House passed the bill outlawing flogging on 23 September 1850 by 131 to 29.<sup>3</sup> The Bill then moved to the Senate where passed 26 to 24; the President signed it the same day.<sup>4</sup>

With flogging removed as a disciplinary option, there also arose the problem of devising new punishments. There was a limited attempt to restore flogging, which revealed more of the differences between North and South. Stephen R. Mallory, a Senator from Florida, told the Senate that Americans who served the nation previously had been trained under the lash. He objected to the characterization that sailors were treated as poorly as slaves: "Slaves were not scourged. If a slave or a freeman was scourged, it was because he was a criminal." Mallory believed that the navy was composed of a variety of men from the all depths of society and an effective means of discipline should not be removed just because

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<sup>2</sup> *Regulations 1849*, section 12 and section 24.

<sup>3</sup> Harold D. Langley, *Social Reform in the United States Navy, 1798-1862* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1967), 161-188 and footnote 63, 188.

<sup>4</sup> Langley, 192.

the North thought it was as degrading as slavery. He questioned why the government made a sailor feel that flogging was degrading when the sailor did not feel this way. To buttress his point, Mallory pointed out that the sailor entered the profession knowing what the life was like.<sup>5</sup>

The navy had prepared a code of discipline comprising 46 chapters, called the "System of Orders and Instructions," which was proclaimed by the President on 15 February 1853. But by 5 April the Attorney General, Caleb Cushing, found that the regulations had taken away from Congress the right to make regulations in this area and that therefore the regulations were illegal. New regulations were passed on 2 March 1855, called "An Act to Provide a More Efficient Discipline for the Navy," which laid out various punishments ranging from discharge to demotion or loss of liberty for various infractions.<sup>6</sup> But this act was only a supplement to the regulations of 1800, which had been guiding the navy to this time.<sup>7</sup>

The 1855 act in fact clarified the regulations in the 1800 act. It also provided new measures to help the navy deal with the vacuum that had been created with the abolition of flogging. When a vessel of the United States returned to port, the commanding officer was now required to submit to the Secretary of the Navy a list of those enlisted crew-members who had served for three years and had carried out their duties and whom the captain believed were suitable for honourable discharge. The crew member was to be issued a certificate confirming his "fidelity and obedience." The dishonourable discharge allowed "any seaman, ordinary seaman, landsman, or boy" that reenlisted within three months to be

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<sup>5</sup> Langley, 200-201.

<sup>6</sup> See United States, "An Act to Provide a More Efficient Discipline for the Navy," in George Minot (ed.), *Statutes at Large and Treaties of the United States . . . Volume 10* (Boston, MA: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1855).

<sup>7</sup> Langley, 202-205.

given back-pay for those three months as if they had remained in the service. The “faithful and obedient” were also to be given preference by the captain when he issued temporary shore leave.<sup>8</sup> Both stipulations were obviously intended to attract, and maintain, a more loyal crew: the latter amendment would add to the weight against those who the navy wanted to rid from the service.

Floggings of petty officers and other inferior ratings were replaced by the summary court martial. The punishments handed out by this body were to be equivalent to a flogging.<sup>9</sup> Summary courts martial were presided over by three officers and could be called at the behest of the ship or shore-station commander. Evidence and the proceedings were recorded and forwarded to the Navy Department. The medical officer on board ship or station was to ensure that the punishment inflicted would not adversely affect the health of the accused.<sup>10</sup> The summary court martial was intended to be for “the trial of offences which he [the commander] may deem deserving of greater punishment than the commander of a vessel himself is by law authorized to inflict of his own authority, but not sufficient to require trial by general court-martial.”<sup>11</sup>

The new punishments were aimed at those privileges sailors disliked losing. The panel was permitted to hand out sentences ranging from discharge with bad conduct; solitary confinement for no more than thirty days, optionally in irons and with diminished rations; confinement for no more than two months; reduction in rank; loss of liberty; or an increase

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<sup>8</sup> United States, “An Act to Provide a More Efficient Discipline for the Navy,” Section 2 and 3.

<sup>9</sup> James E. Valle, *Rocks & Shoals: Order and Discipline in the Old Navy, 1800-1861* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 55.

<sup>10</sup> United States, “An Act to Provide a More Efficient Discipline for the Navy,” Sections 5-8.

<sup>11</sup> United States, “An Act to Provide a More Efficient Discipline for the Navy,” Section 4.

in duties or loss of pay.<sup>12</sup> The punishment could also be issued by a general court martial, which opened up the punishment scheme to infliction upon the officers.<sup>13</sup>

A new set of regulations was passed on 17 July 1862, entitled an "Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States." The new act outlawed flogging both at sea or by court martial, and restated the disciplinary actions that could be taken under the 1855 act.<sup>14</sup> It also declared that all punishments must be noted in the ship's log.<sup>15</sup> After the new regulations of 1855, and even after the outbreak of the Civil War, naval discipline was to be governed more by a gradual set of punishments than by brute force.

Naval law and discipline at the Academy fits into this new reform setting, and introduced new midshipmen to what was expected of them under naval regulations. In the end, the US Navy from 1800-1861 was only a violent, oppressive place when it needed to be. But discipline at the Naval Academy in the pre-Civil War era was different from that of the navy. The Academy tried to handle its discipline internally, and only on a few occasions did it reach the court martial or court of inquiry level. By disciplining the students in the manner it did, the Academy hoped to instil in them the values of a naval officer in a manner suited to how society believed youth should be raised.

During this period the Academy showed concern for the pupil's moral values and youth, as well as fearing that bad behaviour would spread like a disease. Hence, a breach of the moral norms was a serious offence. On 12 October 1852, six midshipmen were reported to the Secretary of the Navy for a "breach of morals and discipline" which the Secretary said

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<sup>12</sup> United States, "An Act to Provide a More Efficient Discipline for the Navy," Section 7.

<sup>13</sup> United States, "An Act to Provide a More Efficient Discipline for the Navy," Section 10.

<sup>14</sup> See United States, "Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States," in George P. Sanger (ed.), *Statutes at Large, Treaties . . . Volume 12* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1863).

<sup>15</sup> Langley, 202-205.

had caused him "much mortification." He believed that "grave offences against discipline and morals cannot fail to injure the Institution." Kennedy hesitated to dismiss the midshipmen because they had only recently enrolled. He told Superintendent C.K. Stribling to assemble all the midshipmen and read his correspondence "as a warning to all[.]" As for the "delinquents," he proclaimed that they were to remain within the Academy grounds for the next three months and to abstain from any misconduct under pain of being disqualified for naval service. Kennedy told Stribling to tell the midshipmen to "resist all temptations, however seductive, to a vice which will degrade and disqualify any officer for his duty, and, if habitual, must separate him from the service." But nowhere in the correspondence did Kennedy refer to the nature of this ghastly "vice."<sup>16</sup>

During this period, Academy authorities were often lenient toward the students because of their youth, but they were willing to resort to greater force if the offender was older. In late April 1850 Midshipmen Morrison, Boardman and Adams committed acts of insubordination. The matter was serious enough that it was reported to Secretary of the Navy William Preston, who concluded that it had impaired the standing of the "young officers themselves" as well as the Academy, but he believed these acts were the fault of the midshipmen's "youth and indiscretion." The Secretary told George P. Upshur that he was to express the Department's "Unqualified disapprobation" of the midshipmen's "violation of discipline and morals." But the Secretary decided that the midshipmen were worthy of the Department's leniency because they promised that their behaviour would be good in the future. The Secretary ordered that Morrison and Boardman, whom he believed were the "principal offenders," be denied all privileges beyond the Academy and were to remain

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<sup>16</sup> John P. Kennedy to C.K. Stribling, 14 October 1852. Letters received by the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, 1845-1887 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M949, roll 2); Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405: Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland. Hereafter, letters received.

within the school grounds for one month. As for the others involved, the Secretary hoped that the example made of the two midshipmen would be “properly appreciated by all their associates and brother officers[.]” And he ordered that their punishments be read publicly to the professors and students.<sup>17</sup>

For the lesser offences the Academy sometimes used money as leverage.<sup>18</sup> A “Report of Conduct of the Acting Midshipmen for the Month of July 1852” revealed that sixteen of the forty-four midshipmen listed were punished by having their pocket money withheld. Four were punished in this manner for smoking, while the others were chastised for unspecified infractions.<sup>19</sup> Meanwhile, the youth factor mitigated an offence that might otherwise have been dealt with harshly: disobedience of orders. An incident with the boats occurred in October 1852 involving seven midshipmen. Orders to remain away from land or other boats were clearly known to the midshipmen, but they landed at a wharf in Annapolis anyway. Even worse, they then loaded liquor on board, which was grounds for dismissal. But Stribling concluded that “they are to be sure mere boys, and allowance must be made accordingly[.]”<sup>20</sup>

On 21 May 1853, youth once again was a factor in the student’s fate. The new Secretary of the Navy, J.C. Dobbin, ruled on the fate of Midshipmen Bigelow, McDougal,

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<sup>17</sup> William Wallard Preston to George P. Upshur, 27 May 1850, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>18</sup> Margaret Mead, in her conclusion to *Coming of Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilisation* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1961 reprint of 1928 edition) commented that revoking allowance was a common form of punishment used by parents, at least in the 1920s, to enforce their will on their children. If young Sally was wearing skirts that were too short: cut off the money she used to buy them. But this means of parental control evaporated when the adolescent obtained a job while still living under the parents’ roof (Mead, 238-240).

<sup>19</sup> Henry H. Lockwood to C.K. Stribling, July 1852, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>20</sup> C.K. Stribling to John P. Kennedy, 12 October 1852. Letters sent by the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy 1845-1865 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M945, roll 1); Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, Newfoundland. Hereafter, letters sent.

Ingraham, Cushman, Vultee, McCrall, and A.J. Ashe. They were charged with violating Academy regulations, but “[i]n pursuance of your recommendation [Stribling’s] of the delinquents on account of their youth, the Department is inclined to extend forbearance, and permit them to remain at the Academy.” Still, the Secretary informed Stribling that he was to reprimand them and “warn them of the consequences of a similar offence hereafter.”<sup>21</sup>

Meanwhile, older students were dealt with more harshly because the authorities feared their influence on the younger pupils. One such case involved Acting Midshipman John Adams Howell, who was appointed in 1854 and was approximately 17 years old by 1857.<sup>22</sup> Lt. J. Taylor Wood reported Howell for leaving the mess hall without permission. Wood concluded that Howell “thus allowing in himself a disregard & contempt of the Regulations” had set “a bad example to the junior class.”<sup>23</sup> The authorities seemed concerned that disciplinary problems with one student would spread to others like a malignancy. Lt. R.H. Wyman wrote on 31 October 1859 that Midshipman Hiatt had been on “every report of delinquency and generally for two or three different offences against the regulations of the ‘Academy’.”<sup>24</sup> Wyman concluded that “I consider his whole bearing and conduct as tending to contaminate the young gentleman with whom he is associated.”<sup>25</sup> In the end, Samuel Hiatt

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<sup>21</sup> J.C. Dobbin to C.K. Stribling, 21 May 1853, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, *Register of Alumni, Graduates and Former Naval Cadets and Midshipmen, 91<sup>st</sup> Edition* (Annapolis, Maryland: The Naval Academy Alumni Association, 1976), hereafter, *Register of Alumni*; and United States Naval Academy, Registers of Candidates for Admission to the Academy, Oct. 1849-Oct. 1860, Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. Hereafter, Registers of Candidates for Admission.

<sup>23</sup> J. Taylor Wood to Captain G.S. Blake, 12 October 1857, letters received, roll 1. Ironically, Howell graduated the Academy and went on to spend 48 years in the navy and rise to the rank of Read Admiral, before retiring in 1902 (*Register of Alumni*).

<sup>24</sup> Probably Samuel Hiatt, about 16 years old of the ‘59 Date (*Register of Alumni* and Registers of Candidates for Admission).

<sup>25</sup> Lt. R.H. Wyman to T.T. Craven, 31 October 1859, letters received, roll 1.

would never graduate.<sup>26</sup>

Later in life, Alfred Thayer Mahan reflected on the cat-and-mouse game the midshipmen played with the authorities in the 1850s while he was at the Academy. The discipline that Mahan suffered at the Academy often caused the boys to rebel. The sometimes “uproarious” larking, which, while officially condemned, was secretly tolerated by the staff. An overseer patrolled the midshipmen’s residences wearing rubber soles to avoid detection. In reprisal, Mahan wrote, the students often tapped on the gas-pipes from room to room to warn colleagues of the inspector’s approach. Mahan believed that but for the advance warnings, many students would have been reported for violations of regulations.<sup>27</sup>

Mahan also reported there was once a lieutenant who liked to play detective. He often made surprise visits to the rooms when the midshipmen were supposed to be asleep. On one occasion some of the students were out of their rooms cooking oysters, a process that took a considerable amount of time because the frying pan they used was small. As the covert culinary operation neared completion, their enemy sprung forth and tossed the whole dinner out the window. But none of the midshipmen were reported for their nighttime gastronomic foray. On another occasion a midshipman was visiting another’s room when the warning came along the gas-pipes that an inspection was imminent. The visiting midshipman hid under his friend’s bed, but accidentally left his hand exposed. The lieutenant came in the room with his lantern, saw the exposed hand, and stepped on it. The midshipman let out a yelp of pain and surprise, but the lieutenant left that as his punishment.<sup>28</sup>

In the Academy era midshipmen’s infractions were recorded, like in the School era.

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<sup>26</sup> *Register of Alumni*.

<sup>27</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life* (New York: Da Capo Press, reprint 1968), 56.

<sup>28</sup> Mahan, *From Sail to Steam*, 57-58.



but demerit points were also issued for each offence. A memorandum from the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography enclosed with a letter to the Superintendent dated 19 January 1855 outlined the importance of the conduct rolls. The Bureau believed that "as at West Point, the object of a separate roll being to give prominence to conduct."<sup>29</sup> Even if midshipmen went over the allowed number of demerit points, the authorities gave them some leeway. Midshipmen Offley and Dodge in May 1851 had exceeded the demerit limit and were "liable to the penalty of" dismissal, but on Stribling's recommendation they were saved. Instead, Secretary Graham told Stribling to warn them that while they would be permitted to be examined in June, they had to show improvement in the interim because "the Department will forbear no longer."<sup>30</sup>

Yet the behaviour of the midshipmen from 1850 to the outbreak of the Civil War was generally good. As for the Naval School era, a twenty percent random sample of the conduct rolls was analyzed. In general, offences that could be characterized as riotous, mutinous, or otherwise challenging to military authority were almost so rare as to be hardly worth noting. Offences that warranted demerit points generally dealt with absences without permission, room order and cleanliness, visiting during forbidden periods, tardiness, general noise, and skylarking.

The academic years 1853-1854 and 1854-1855 were typical. Absenteeism topped the list of infractions in these years, comprising 22.7% of the offences, followed by having a messy room (9.7%), military exercise offences (poor marching, etc., 9.1%) and comparable offences in the class room (8.6% ). Meanwhile, lateness comprised 5.6% of the offences. In contrast, disobedience of orders made up only 1.5% of the offences, while disrespect to a

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<sup>29</sup> Chief of Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography to L.M. Goldsborough, 19 January 1855, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>30</sup> Graham to Stribling, 6 May 1851, letters received, roll 2.

superior and insubordination each accounted for 0.4% of the violations. The remaining offences were miscellaneous infractions each comprising between 0.2% and 4.6% of the total. (See Appendix B, Table B.3). About 76% of the absences involved military functions, while the failure to turn up for academic functions only comprised 16.4% of the violations. Similar results were found for the specific breakdowns for lateness: military, 54.1%; academic, 31.1%; mess (breakfast, dinner, supper), 13.1%; and joint military and academic offences (an offence the authorities happened to list and count together), 1.6%. Generally the midshipmen offered no excuses for their violations, and midshipmen themselves made up 39.5% of the reporting personnel. This figure appears to fly in the face of the “band of brothers” argument, but all the other academic years sampled show that officers of the Academy comprised the highest percentage of reporting personnel by a 16.2% margin over the midshipmen. (See Appendix B, Table B.6).

Virtually the same pattern of midshipmen misbehaviour ashore was found for each of the academic years analyzed, with little variation. (See Appendix B, Tables B.5, B.6, and B.7, for aggregate figures). In general the Academy era students were well behaved. Even for those who received demerits, half of the demerits issued were accounted for by 20-30% of the midshipmen. The demerits also show that the authorities were generally lenient on the students. The average demerit points issued fell approximately between 4 and 5, out of a possible high of 10 points, with a low standard deviation. (See Appendix B, Table B.7). And even the guilty got a reprieve under the Academy system. On 17 May 1854, for example, the Superintendent forwarded a request from the midshipmen that their demerit points for forgivable offences be reduced. The Secretary of the Navy, J.C. Dobbin, approved a scheme to do so under certain circumstances.<sup>31</sup> The conduct rolls are full of instances where the Superintendent reduced a midshipman’s total number of demerit points, probably for

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<sup>31</sup> J.C. Dobbin to L.M. Goldsborough, 17 May 1854, letters received, roll 2.

subsequent good behaviour.

Josiah G. Beckwith, Jr., was one student with demerit problems, but only because he was a bad student. Beck, fifteen when he joined the Academy in 1853, was the son of a doctor and politician. He thought that demerits should only be given for serious offences and that discipline at the Academy was harsh. He felt that demerits were given for "little trifling omissions, such as being late or absent from roll call when perhaps you did not hear the drum beat; or for stepping into a neighboring room for a book to find out how a lesson is in study hours." Beckwith also found the Academy had numerous "internal regulations" issued by various Superintendents, not specially stated in the official regulations, which could also receive demerits. It is likely Beckwith found discipline hard because he was unwilling to accept it. His letters often stated that although his demerits were high, he would not disappoint his parents and be dismissed or resign. The letters give the reader the impression that the young man knew he was in trouble from the outset, and in the end he was forced to resign after being caught drinking.<sup>32</sup>

Despite the fact that demerit points could be issued for "venial" offences, some Academy staff questioned their effectiveness and level of standardization. In June 1853 Superintendent Stribling questioned the former. He felt that because of their youth some better method of disciplining the students had to be found. Stribling suggested the creation of a guard house, where offenders could be confined for a period of time. He believed that "there are many boys, who require some more stringent mode of punishment, than we can now adopt, to produce the desired effect; for such boys, moral suasion will not answer[.]" Stribling suggested to Commodore C.S. McCauley, President of the Board of Examiners, that

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<sup>32</sup> Anne Marie Drew, "Those Demerits Are a Perfect Humbug: The Letters of Josiah G. Beckwith Jr.," in Anne Marie Drew (ed.), *Letters from Annapolis: Midshipmen Write Home, 1848-1969* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 12-30; J.G. Beckwith, Jr., to J.G. Beckwith, Sr., March 1853, in Drew (ed.), 15; J.G. Beckwith, Jr., to J.G. Beckwith, Sr., 23 January 1855, in Drew (ed.), 28-29.

confinement might be the solution.<sup>33</sup>

When the pupil's behaviour warranted the Academy punished. The authorities gave the students second chances, but they remained concerned with instilling in them an appreciation of discipline and preventing them from getting out of control. When all hope was lost, a court of inquiry or court martial was held, or a midshipman could be dismissed from the navy. One such case concerned that of Midshipmen Hammond and Haralson, who were caught drinking in their rooms in December 1852. Stribling noted that "I have reason to fear that they have been in the habit of thus violating the regulations" and he knew of only one way that remained to handle their case: dismissal.<sup>34</sup> On 4 December 1852 Stribling reported another midshipman, Clarence Barrett, who was only 15 years old, for smuggling alcohol into the Academy.<sup>35</sup> Stribling was becoming extremely concerned about the effect of alcohol on the institution and decided enough was enough: an example should be made of those students involved in alcohol-related offences, regardless of the circumstances. He told Secretary John Kennedy that "[u]nless a speedy example is made of those detected in committing this demoralizing offence, I fear very serious injury will be done to the Youth at the Academy, and to the usefulness of the Institution."<sup>36</sup>

On 9 December 1852, under instructions from Kennedy, a Board of Inquiry was ordered to investigate the activities of Hammond, Haralson, William H. Smith, and Barrett.

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<sup>33</sup> C.K. Stribling to C.S. McCauley, 14 June 1853, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>34</sup> C.K. Stribling to John P. Kennedy, 2 December 1852, letters sent, roll 1. The exact identity of these midshipmen is unclear, but the only Hammond and Haralson this author was able to find failed to graduate from the Academy (*Register of Alumni*).

<sup>35</sup> *Register of Alumni* and Registers of Candidates for Admission.

<sup>36</sup> C.K. Stribling to John P. Kennedy, 4 December 1852, letters sent, roll 1.

although no detailed record of the inquiry seems to have survived.<sup>37</sup> Secretary Kennedy then wrote to Stribling that four other midshipmen investigated by the Board of Inquiry should be given the "right to resign" over the incidents. Hammond's father wrote the Secretary that he was disturbed about his son; in response, Kennedy told Stribling to let those charged in the four cases investigated by the Board of Inquiry resign.<sup>38</sup>

As with other midshipmen who had been found committing serious offences, the Secretary was mortified by Midshipmen Smith, Hammond, Haralson, and Barrett. He concluded that their offences went "against the moral propriety which should characterise [sic] the conduct of gentlemen in every relation of life." He hoped that their actions were the result of the "thoughtlessness of youth rather than to any fixed habit of delinquency," and he hoped they would take their punishments as a warning against the vices that "invariably destroys the character of all who allow it to obtain the master of habit." Midshipmen Smith and Barrett were allowed to resign while Hammond and Haralson were turned back one year in their class and sent to sea until school resumed on 1 October 1853.<sup>39</sup>

Despite the lenient options available, sometimes a court of inquiry was required to investigate more serious charges. On 8 December 1852, Superintendent Stribling, Lt. T.T. Craven, and Acting Master L.R. Carter convened a Board of Inquiry to investigate charges against Acting Midshipmen Law, Erwin and Joy. The first case they investigated was against Law for being drunk on 9 November 1852. On that Sunday morning, after inspection, Lt. Marcy was walking toward the executive office when a Mr. Armstrong told him that he had found Midshipman Law drunk in one of the round houses. Law was so drunk that he was

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<sup>37</sup> C.K. Stribling to T.T. Craven and Samuel P. Carter, 9 December 1852; and C.K. Stribling to Hammond, Haralson, W.H. Smith, and Barrett, 9 December 1852, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>38</sup> Kennedy to Stribling, 9 December 1852, letters received, roll 2

<sup>39</sup> John P. Kennedy to C.K. Stribling, 16 December 1852, letters received, roll 2.

unable to take care of himself. Eventually, Marcy found Law under a bed in one of the rooms. He removed the bed from over Law and told the young man that he better go to his own room. Marcy then discovered that Law had taken off his outer garments and some of the other occupants lent him some clothes. Law's clothes, cap and jacket were dirty and it looked as though he had fallen down on the ground. While walking to his room, Marcy noticed that Law was unsteady and offered assistance, but it was declined. Marcy then confined Law to quarters. The Academy doctor visited Law to see whether he was sick or drunk and ascertained it was the latter. After he sobered up, Law was called before the Board and asked if he had any statement to make, to which he replied that "he had nothing to say." The Board then told him that he would be unaffected by revealing who gave him the liquor, but Law "declined to say where he got it." Law was then permitted to leave and the Board turned to Acting Midshipman Erwin's case.<sup>40</sup>

Erwin was charged for the same offence, as well for using improper language to the Superintendent and Lt. Marcy. On 9 November Stribling, Marcy, and Erwin were in Erwin's room assembling a trunk. Marcy recounted that Erwin was "much excited" and on several occasions made uncalled for remarks. At one point Erwin commented that if the trunk were his, "no Negro should search it." Marcy noted that he had little strong evidence that Erwin was drunk, but felt that given his excited state, he must have imbibed. Acting Midshipman Selfridge was called before the Board and asked if he had seen Mr. Erwin "in a state of intoxication." Selfridge replied, "No sir – I did not." When asked if he had seen Erwin drinking, Selfridge again replied that he had not seen Erwin drinking that day. Captain Stribling then stated that when he was in Erwin and Joy's room working on the trunk he thought that Erwin's behaviour was improper, insubordinate, and that he was very excited. Stribling concluded that he believed Erwin was "under the influence of liquor." Erwin denied

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<sup>40</sup> "Proceedings of a Board of Inquiry ..." 8 December 1852, letters received, roll 2.

that he was drunk, but admitted that he indeed had been excited that day. When asked where he obtained the liquor, Erwin declined to answer, but denied that he had been "over the walls" to get it. He also declined to answer whether he had been drinking in the previous twenty-four hour period. Finished with Erwin, the Board then moved on to his roommate, Acting Midshipman Joy.<sup>41</sup>

Acting Midshipman Joy was charged with disgraceful and insubordinate conduct because he was intoxicated, smoked, and used insubordinate language toward the Superintendent and Lt. Marcy. He was also charged with bringing liquor into the Academy. After church on Sunday, Marcy went to Erwin and Joy's room and asked who owned a trunk. He was told it was Joy's and he sent for the midshipman. When Joy finally arrived, Marcy found that he was "excited." He told Marcy that the trunk was his private property and no one had a right to search it. Marcy replied that he wanted to know who owned the trunk and had said nothing about wanting to search it. Joy refused to answer any questions about the trunk and thought that it was improper of Marcy to ask. Marcy told the Board that Joy continued in an excited manner. Joy and Marcy went to see Captain Stribling to discuss the matter, and upon returning, Marcy noticed that Joy's breath smelled of liquor. Stribling joined the two back at Joy's room and asked Joy for the key to the trunk; Joy replied that he did not have it. When Joy was asked if he had opened the trunk that day, he simply replied in a confused manner. Stribling broke open the trunk to reveal that the contents were acceptable, except for the discovery of a piece of tobacco. But Marcy concluded that, by the smell of his breath, Joy had been drinking that day.<sup>42</sup>

The Board asked Marcy why he wanted Joy's trunk opened. The lieutenant replied that before church he was visiting some of the rooms of the lower building, and that when

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<sup>41</sup> "Proceedings of a Board of Inquiry ..." 8 December 1852, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>42</sup> "Proceedings of a Board of Inquiry ..." 8 December 1852, letters received, roll 2.

he entered Erwin and Joy's room, he smelled an odour. There were also some "peculiarities about the room" which, combined with the smell, made him wonder what was in the trunk. He specifically wondered if the trunk contained, or had contained, liquor. Marcy rocked the trunk back and forth and heard something solid moving around inside and wished to know what it was: he "inferred from this there was a bottle either full or empty, inside the trunk." When he returned to the room again he did the same thing, but the bottle-like sound was now absent. Stribling told the Board that when Marcy informed him of his suspicions, he ordered it opened. Stribling concluded that Joy "doubted his [Stribling's] authority to have his trunk opened" and had asked if the Secretary of the Navy had given him the authority to do so. Stribling replied that he "should not answer any such question" and, believing that Joy might give Marcy some difficulty, followed the two to Joy's room. Stribling corroborated Marcy's account of events and concluded that he "had no doubt that he [Joy] was under the influence of liquor." The Board then told Joy that if he had anything to say, that he must say it now: Joy declined. When the Board asked him if he had been drinking on Saturday or Sunday, he also refused to answer. The Board then asked Midshipmen Broadhead, Fyffe and Ragland if they saw, or knew, how Mr. Erwin, Joy, and Law obtained the liquor they used on Saturday or Sunday. Like a good band of brothers, all three midshipmen answered that they knew nothing of the matter.<sup>43</sup> The Secretary warned Law that he concluded that his conduct was

altogether inadmissable [sic] in a pupil of the Academy. He has forgotten the high character of the duty and responsibility that belong to an officer of the US Navy. He must henceforth learn to distinguish between the conduct expected from that position and that of a mere schoolboy. A repetition of such an offence will incur a more severe comment from the Department.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> "Proceedings of a Board of Inquiry ..." 8 December 1852, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>44</sup> John P. Kennedy to C.K. Stribling, 16 December 1852, letters received, roll 2.



Regardless, by 17 January 1853, the Secretary caved in to the wishes of the Board and dismissed Law, while Erwin and Joy had their yard privileges suspended for three months. Kennedy told Stribling that if he could think of anything else to do, he would consider approving it. Kennedy, now seemingly confusing Erwin with Joy, concluded that Erwin's case was more one of insubordination and "some foolish notion of his rights:" it was unclear whether he was actually intoxicated.<sup>45</sup>

Meanwhile, inquiries were completed for several other midshipmen, for various offences, and Stribling forwarded the findings to the Secretary. Stribling concluded that for the sake of the younger midshipmen these offenders had to be disciplined. He told the Secretary that "the younger Students unfortunately look up to the Midshipmen, & are easily led by them: their influence has already had an injurious effect, and nothing will in my opinion, stop the evil habits exhibited in these cases & others heretofore reported, but a rigid enforcement of the Laws & regulations."<sup>46</sup> In the end the midshipmen pledged never to use alcohol again while they were at the Academy. Since Stribling believed that their pledge would be good for both the students and the Academy, he recommended leniency. The pledge saved the navy from "the necessity of dismissing from the Navy, many who might otherwise become ornaments to the Service."<sup>47</sup>

Stribling and the Navy Department probably felt their somewhat lenient style of discipline was working, thus the 1849 Academy regulations were only slightly revised in 1853. First-class offences still received ten points and were meant for willful neglect of duty, orders, or use of profanity; being in a club or house of public entertainment in Annapolis; publishing without permission; or using firearms or fireworks without authorization. Second-

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<sup>45</sup> John P. Kennedy to C.K. Stribling, 17 January 1853, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>46</sup> C.K. Stribling to John P. Kennedy, 17 January 1853, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>47</sup> C.K. Stribling to John P. Kennedy, 17 January 1853, letters sent, roll 1.

class offences won a pupil eight points for doing such things as bringing strangers into the mess hall or having one's light on after taps. Absenteeism, a third-class offence, received six points, as did dress uniform violations; loud talking, abusing servants, or being unkempt were fourth-class violations and received four points. Fifth-class offences were for lateness or anything else an officer deemed worthy, while they could also issue one to ten points for "disrespectful, ungentlemanly, disorderly, insubordinate, or unmilitary conduct[.]" And for any class of offence greater than fourth, the same multiplication factors applied as were used in the 1849 regulations.<sup>48</sup>

The midshipmen then present at the Academy proved a special case. Despite the reforms that had taken place in 1849 and 1850, there were still some older midshipmen. Despite advocating some degree of leniency, Superintendent L.M. Goldsborough felt that the older midshipmen had to take greater responsibility for their actions. He wrote, "nearly every one of the Midshipmen now here has attained the age of manhood, & been several years at sea, & therefore cannot plead either ignorance of Naval customs, laws, or regulations, or *extreme youth* [emphasis added], in extenuation of any really bad conduct." But just as importantly, they were to be role models for the younger acting midshipmen: "they [the midshipmen] are all old enough to know & feel the full force of their example, good or bad, upon the minds of all the Acting Midshipmen who are so much younger, & possess so much less experience, than themselves." Sending offenders to sea, or dismissing them from the navy after their second offence, would "at once produce a wholesome moral influence" and help stop the problem of intoxication.<sup>49</sup>

Despite the specificity of the regulations, Superintendent Goldsborough expressed

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<sup>48</sup> United States Naval Academy, *Revised Regulations of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland* [1853] (Washington, DC: Robert Armstrong, Printer, 1853), 21-23. Held by the William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. Hereafter, *Revised Regulations* 1853.

<sup>49</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 5 December 1853, letters sent, roll 1.

disapproval about the quality of the revisions. He believed that the Academy should handle drunkenness as it was done at West Point. His concerns came to a boil when on Saturday, 26 November 1853, Midshipmen Garland and Maxwell were found drunk.<sup>50</sup> After Goldsborough detailed their case, he told Secretary Dobbin his views on drinking at the Academy. The Superintendent believed that “drunkenness is bad under any circumstances; but in an establishment like this composed mainly of unsophisticated youths,” where social and military values were to be instilled and discipline maintained, it was unacceptable. Goldsborough believed it had been a problem since the Academy was founded and was a source of most of the disciplinary problems. But he admitted that at present the vice seemed to be restricted to a few midshipmen. The only way he knew to deal with the problem was by immediate dismissal of those who were proven guilty. They should be immediately sent to sea and put back a year, or dismissed from the service if they were found guilty a second time. Goldsborough said that at West Point, which had fifty years of experience dealing with the problem, the rule was that “ ‘Any Cadet found drunk, or under the influence of wine, porter, or any spirituous or intoxicating liquor, shall be dismissed [from] the service.’ ” Goldsborough submitted that the navy should be more lenient towards the students and at least provide them with a second chance “to afford the offender an opportunity of reformation.”<sup>51</sup>

On 13 March 1854 Superintendent Goldsborough reviewed the types of punishments that were allowed at the Academy. Although there was a demerit system, Goldsborough discerned that it was meant as a “numerical register” of violations rather than as punishments, and only had repercussions at the final examination. The Academy needed an immediate form of punishment that would have a greater effect on the students. The

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<sup>50</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 5 December 1853, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>51</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 5 December 1853, letters sent, roll 1.

regulations needed specific punishments for varying classes and needed to affirm the Superintendent's right to punish. As it stood, the lack of any specificity in the regulations made for inconsistent discipline and forced the Superintendent constantly to refer matters to Washington.<sup>52</sup>

Goldsborough continued to subscribe to the belief that military discipline should be graduated. But the present regulations left him merely as a "medium of complaints" rather than an enforcer of order and discipline. While he admired West Point, Goldsborough still conceived of the Naval Academy as having a different purpose. Still, they were similar in one regard: they were designed to educate youths.<sup>53</sup> He concluded that both institutions were responsible for

educating youths for the use of the government of the United States, they are, assuredly, identical. Again, they are both schools – military schools – one for the benefit of the land, & the other for the benefit of the sea, forces: & as discipline, in its comprehensive sense, means the same things in either service, the general rules to enforce it there, cannot, in reality, be inapplicable here: & hence, if those in vogue do afford, confessedly, good results, we could not, it would seem, go materially astray by imitating them [West Point] ourselves as closely as circumstances will permit.<sup>54</sup>

The more Goldsborough thought about the regulations at West Point the more he felt they were designed out of need.<sup>55</sup>

A few weeks later Goldsborough made another suggestion about how disciplinary procedure could be escalated beyond demerits or dismissal, while maintaining the

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<sup>52</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Commodore Charles Morris, 13 March 1854, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>53</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Commodore Charles Morris, 13 March 1854, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>54</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Commodore Charles Morris, 13 March 1854, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>55</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Commodore Charles Morris, 13 March 1854, letters sent, roll 1.

institution's philosophy of handling matters internally. He suggested giving the Superintendent the right to call a general court martial as well as implementing a series of harsher punishments to suit more serious offences. Students could be suspended from privileges and duty; reprimanded; confined to quarters and the Academy grounds; or arrested. They could also be subjected to confinement in a darkened prison or dismissal from the Academy. In addition, they could be put back one year; dismissed from the navy after finishing their final exam; given the option to resign; or dismissed without an option to resign. The Superintendent should also have the right to suspend midshipmen from duty, take away their privileges, or confine them to the Academy grounds or their rooms. If the student disobeyed, the Superintendent could then confine them in a darkened cell; alternatively, a general summary court martial could sentence a midshipman to the same fate. But a midshipman could only be dismissed from the service – in any manner – by the President of the United States or by the sentence of a general court martial.<sup>56</sup>

It was naval justice in miniature, but Goldsborough admitted that such a procedure could only be established by an act of Congress. He told the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, Commodore Charles Morris, that "I have purposely varied the punishments [in his proposal] in order to meet different shades of offences[.]" But he sounded like he would be happy if disciplinary procedures were clearly laid out for both the students and officers of the Academy.<sup>57</sup>

The Navy Department heeded some of Goldsborough's suggestions and the Academy regulations were revised again in 1855. The disciplinary section of the 1855 regulations clearly put the Superintendent in charge of discipline. Everyone at the Academy was ordered to "give implicit obedience to his commands," while he was held responsible for maintaining

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<sup>56</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Charles Morris, 20 March 1854, letter 1, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>57</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Charles Morris, 20 March 1854, letter 2, letters sent, roll 1.

discipline and good order. The prohibitions against the students were essentially the same as in previous versions, but the punishments were more clearly defined. They were broken up into three classes. The first class consisted of “[c]onfinement to the limits of the academy grounds. Private reprimands. Deprivation of recreation within the grounds. Confinement to room or apartment. Reprimand to be read on parade. Suspension from recitations and from all drills and exercises.” The second class of punishments was “[c]onfinement in guardroom,” while the third-class punishment was dismissal, “unless the offender avail himself of a privilege that may be granted of him of resigning. Public dismissal.”<sup>58</sup>

First- or second-class offences could be issued by the Superintendent or officer in command. Loss of recreation rights could only last up to twenty days, while suspension from drills, exercises, and recitations were only up to fourteen days. Meanwhile, a student could be confined on the order of the Superintendent to the guardroom for only one week unless directed otherwise by the Secretary of the Navy. Confinement to the guardroom was the most serious form of escalation before dismissal. The regulations proclaimed that it was to be used only “upon those who, in the judgement of the Superintendent or commanding officer, shall be guilty of highly insubordinate, riotous, or mutinous conduct, or who shall not conform to the conditions imposed when ordered to confine themselves to their rooms, apartments, or to other limits which may be prescribed to them.” If a pupil hesitated or refused a punishment, he left himself open to the ultimate punishment: dismissal.<sup>59</sup> By 1855 it seems that the Academy had formalized its disciplinary procedures. The navy department was not, however, so cold as to follow Goldsborough’s recommendation that some youths were criminal enough to be placed in a darkened cell as punishment. Despite the view of some

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<sup>58</sup> United States Naval Academy, *Regulations of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland* (Washington, DC: A.O.P. Nicholson, Printer, 1855), Articles 34–42. Held by: Georgetown University Special Collections, V415.C3. Hereafter, *Regulations* 1855.

<sup>59</sup> *Regulations* 1855, Articles 34–42.

Superintendents, the navy believed in humane punishment. From that point until the outbreak of the Civil War, the disciplinary aspects of the Academy regulations remained virtually unchanged.

Goldsborough's requests for more regulations were most likely to give him and other Academy authorities more specific measures to escalate the level of punishment. A 50% sample was taken of the "Orders for the Suspensions of Acting Midshipmen, 1856-62" for the period before the outbreak of Civil War. The sample contained 60 orders concerning 95 students: often groups of students were suspended for committing offences together. One such group contained Acting Midshipmen Boggs, Robertson, Tyson, and Ogden, who were caught playing cards on 5 October 1858. They were suspended and deprived of their right to recitation until 15 November, which was the longest duration suspension in the sample, 41 days. But the average suspension, 8 days, was much shorter and the smallest duration was for 2 days.<sup>60</sup>

Suspensions could involve confinement to quarters, the school ship, or guard hut, for a variety of more serious offences. On 1 December 1856, E.H. Crump was suspended for leaving the Academy without permission and conducting himself in a manner "unbecoming" a young gentleman. The suspension also stipulated that he would be confined to the guard hut if he violated any more regulations. But on 14 December he submitted his resignation rather than be dismissed. As in other disciplinary cases, youth also played a factor in the outcome of a suspension. On 9 February 1857 Acting Midshipmen Furber, Howison, Herman, Meade, and Prentiss were suspended for leaving the grounds without permission. They were deprived of recreation privileges and had to remain within the Academy. But

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<sup>60</sup> There were five missing cases (of suspension end-dates) for this sample. Those students were either dismissed or resigned rather than their suspension lifted. For the entire sample, the standard deviation of the total suspension time was 6.39 (United States Naval Academy, Orders for the Suspension of Acting Midshipmen: Record Group 405; William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. Hereafter, Orders for the Suspension of Acting Midshipmen).

“Meade & Prentiss, in consequence of their being very young, were released Feb 21<sup>st</sup>/57 & the rest . . . Feb 24<sup>th</sup>/57.” An apology sometimes mitigated the effects of the suspension. On 3 March 1859 Acting Midshipman Ames was suspended for being disrespectful toward a professor. But he was released on 6 March because he wrote an apology and pledged that another incident of that sort would never happen. The Academy authorities also took into consideration a student’s level of guilt compared to other students involved in an offence. Students Dowling and Lewis were suspended on 2 May 1857 for being drunk. Dowling resigned, but Lewis was released from his suspension on 18 May, probably because he was found to be less inebriated than Dowling. Similarly, on 25 March 1861 Acting Midshipmen Sanders, Trigg, and Al Johnson were suspended for making a noise on the *Constitution*. Sanders was released on 27 March because he was found less guilty, while the others were released on 6 April.<sup>61</sup>

While suspension and confinement became better methods for handling moderate offences, a court martial or inquiry could still be used, although not indiscriminately. On 24 January 1855 there was another effigy incident, although it is unclear what precipitated it. This time some of the midshipmen decided to hang an effigy of one Acting Master Scott, one of the Commandant of Midshipmen’s assistants. Superintendent Goldsborough resorted to every means available to investigate, including talking to groups of students as well as individuals, but no one breathed a word. Goldsborough finally told the Secretary that “I am not indisposed to discriminate between the offences of boys & those of men, but then in every military institution there are certain offences which cannot be overlooked with propriety” and the hanging of an effigy was one of them. Goldsborough wanted to hold a court of inquiry to investigate the case and threatened the midshipmen with informing the Secretary of what had happened and his intent to call for a court of inquiry. Their only hope

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<sup>61</sup> Orders for the Suspension of Acting Midshipmen.



was to come clean and for those involved in the affair to come forward.<sup>62</sup>

But the Navy Department rejected Goldsborough's request. Secretary Dobbin concluded that a court of inquiry could not be used as a general inquiry into discipline at the Academy, but only to deal with an individual. The purpose of the court of inquiry was similar to that of a grand jury, to assess whether there was sufficient evidence to take further action. Dobbin remarked that if Goldsborough could suggest a specific individual who could be brought before the court of inquiry, that would be the proper course of action.<sup>63</sup>

As in the Naval School era, the behaviour of the midshipmen was sometimes a reaction to what the Academy subjected them to, as well as to each other. Alfred Thayer Mahan suggested that the classes at the Academy considered themselves a group, and that there were tensions between various years. Mahan wrote that when the sailors from the 1841 Date, for example, entered the Academy, their sheer numbers made them a force to be reckoned with: "At that time the '41 Date," then in the prime of life, was obnoxious to those below it; not for its own fault, but because of its numbers, which, with promotion strictly by seniority, constituted a superincumbent mass that could not but be regarded bitterly by those who followed."<sup>64</sup> As in the previous era, they could make themselves known to the Academy.

When midshipmen felt they were not respected, their discipline degenerated. Acting Midshipman George M. Bache felt humiliated over how he was treated one day in class. On 22 April 1858, Bache told Mr. J.A. Miller that he was unprepared for the recitation. Miller ordered him to go to the blackboard and "there tell him that I was unprepared," which Bache felt was treatment "unbecoming an officer, and for the purpose of humiliating me before the

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<sup>62</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 26 January 1855, letters sent, roll I.

<sup>63</sup> Dobbin to Goldsborough, 7 February 1855, letters received, roll I.

<sup>64</sup> Mahan, *From Sail to Steam*, 73.

section."<sup>65</sup> Miller recounted that Bache told him that "I do not wish you to speak to me in that manner in the sect[ion] room."<sup>66</sup> When Bache discussed the matter with Captain T.T. Craven, the Commandant of Midshipmen, he found "[i]t was impossible for me to control my feelings, and speak to him as I would have done in cooler moments."<sup>67</sup>

When Miller sent Bache to the Commandant's office, Craven asked for an explanation for his disrespect. Bache replied that he "did not wish to be treated as a child." Craven then ordered him to the Superintendent's office, but Bache instead returned to his quarters. Craven ordered him to Blake's office a second time, but Bache replied that he would do so after returning his textbook to his room. Craven gave the order a third time, whereupon Bache slowly started to move in the direction of Blake's office. Craven found that Bache's "manner and bearing through out were highly disrespectful and insubordinate."<sup>68</sup> Regardless of the exact version of events, Bache felt indignant about being treated as anything but an adult officer.<sup>69</sup>

While they protested against the Academy when they felt their rights were violated, midshipmen also protected their fellows. On 17 January 1853, 107 midshipmen signed a pledge not to drink.<sup>70</sup> Kennedy believed their pledge was meant to persuade the Department to be more lenient on Erwin, Law, and Joy (see above). He was greatly satisfied at the act of the pupils and was sure that they would uphold their "pledge of honor[.]" Kennedy therefore

<sup>65</sup> George M. Bache to G.S. Blake, 22 April 1858, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>66</sup> J.A. Miller to T.T. Craven, 22 April 1858, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>67</sup> George M. Bache to G.S. Blake, 22 April 1858, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>68</sup> T.T. Craven to G.S. Blake, 22 April 1858, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>69</sup> The behaviour of students at the Academy is similar to that discovered by N.A.M. Rodger in *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy* (London: Collins, 1986). Rodger found that naval men in this period only mutinied or protested their lot if they believed their rights were being violated.

<sup>70</sup> Pledge to Superintendent, 17 January 1853, letters received, roll 2.

agreed to the “purpose they have proposed” and decided to lessen the punishments against the midshipmen. Kennedy told Stribling to impose any punishment he deemed fit on Erwin, Joy, and Law, short of dismissal.<sup>71</sup>

Several years later there was another case of several midshipmen writing in support of one of their own who was suspended for drinking. On 6 March 1856 ten midshipmen wrote Superintendent Goldsborough for the release of Acting Midshipman Bigelow from suspension. He had been reported drunk, but they testified that they were convinced he was sober. They had known Bigelow for some time, were familiar with his usual behaviour and thought it unlikely he could have deceived them. They felt the reporting officer must be “laboring under a strange delusion, that he should give an opinion, upon which devolved so much, at a time that, *ten* [emphasis in original] others, when referred to declared to the contrary.”<sup>72</sup> Another case of the midshipmen rallying behind one of their own arose in 1857. When Acting Midshipmen Bishop was reported for intoxication, his classmates rallied to support him and sixty-six students signed a pledge to refrain from drinking. They did this because they were “anxious to place his [Bishop’s] case in as favorable light as possible with the Department[.]”<sup>73</sup> Thirty-two midshipmen did the same in support of Acting Midshipmen Stanton and Doolittle, also “[i]n order that the Department may look favorably upon” their cases.<sup>74</sup> Unfortunately, the outcome of the cases is unclear.

The midshipmen were also like a band of brothers when the authorities came calling to investigate their bad behaviour. On the evening of 14 January 1858 there was an explosion of gunpowder on the third floor of Building Number 3 of the midshipmen quarters.

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<sup>71</sup> John P. Kennedy to C.K. Stribling, 19 January 1853, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>72</sup> Edward E. Potter et al. to L.M. Goldsborough, 6 March 1856, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>73</sup> E. Furber et al. to Superintendent, 14 December 1857, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>74</sup> R.M. Hooe et al. to Superintendent, 14 December 1857, letters received, roll 2

Commander Joseph F. Green, the Commandant of Midshipmen, went to investigate and questioned the thirty-four occupants of the building. Green reported that “they individually, excepting Act[ing] Mid[shipman] Orth, disavowed having knowledge of the persons or any circumstance connected” with the explosion. Midshipman Orth told Green that he was on the third floor that evening and attempted to explode gunpowder. His attempt failed and he declined to partake any further in trying to create the explosion. But Orth declined to give Green the names of others who were present at the time. Green could find no damage as a result of the explosion, and he also could not discover how much gunpowder was used. Orth became the only midshipmen to be reported for the explosion, but he refused to implicate any others.<sup>75</sup>

Another such case arose on 9 June 1858 when Lt. C.H. Cushman saw someone leaving Midshipman Lambert’s room. Cushman questioned Lambert and asked who the midshipman was, but he refused to report him. Lambert believed that he should not report the midshipman because Midshipman Robertson, the man in question, had assured him that Cushman did not see him come out of the room. Yet Lambert later acknowledged that he understood the order and that Robertson was indeed in his room.<sup>76</sup> In June 1858 there were a rash of incidents of broken furniture and gas pipes in Building Number 3 causing \$18.55 in damages.<sup>77</sup> Some of the midshipmen were shortly thereafter on the practice ship *Preble* under the command of Commander Craven, who questioned them on the matter and found that Acting Midshipman Meade knew something of the incidents. Craven reported that “Meade said that he knew of one person who was engaged in it, but that he did not like to mention his name.” When ordered to talk, Meade acquiesced and told Craven that Acting

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<sup>75</sup> Green to Blake, 16 January 1858, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>76</sup> C.H. Cushman to T.T. Craven, 12 June 1858, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>77</sup> Lt. Carter to Captain Blake, 21 June 1858; and Lt. Carter to Blake, 25 June 1858, letters received, roll 1.

Midshipman William Robinson was the only person he knew who was involved. Craven questioned Robinson, who admitted to breaking one of the pipes in his room by accident, as well as breaking a chair in Midshipman Snell's room.<sup>78</sup> The letters enclosed by Craven from the midshipmen generally denied breaking the property, claimed it was accidental, or simply speculated on what had occurred.<sup>79</sup>

When a midshipman finally broke down and gave up a comrade it was usually for one of two reasons: a conflict between loyalty to a comrade and duty to a superior, where the former won; or a personal dispute between midshipmen. On Christmas day 1854, between 10pm and midnight, Acting Master Mayo returned to his room in Building Number 3 when he saw a number of people enter. He followed, and as he entered he heard the sound of moving feet from the second floor. Mayo climbed the steps to the second floor and saw someone coming down in the darkness. Mayo yielded the stairs to the oncoming person so that they could have the rail. Then, unexpectedly, the man grabbed Mayo by the neck and started to strangle him. Mayo figured that person was excited by the holiday, so he demanded his name, but there was no reply. Two other men appeared and tried to wrestle the assailant from Mayo. It was during this time that Mayo realized that his assailant was under the influence of alcohol, but that the other two men were sober. Mayo did not know what the actual intention of the other two people, so he demanded their names as well. As with his assailant, the other two men refused to reply. Probably fearing for his life, Mayo then called out for Midshipman Cheever whose room was nearby.<sup>80</sup>

At that point the men identified themselves as Midshipmen Walker, Cushman, and

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<sup>78</sup> Craven to Blake, 23 June 1858, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>79</sup> J.P. Robinson to Craven, 23 June 1858; Robert Boggs to Craven, 23 June 1858; R.L. Meade to Craven, 23 June 1858; R.S. McCook to Craven, 23 June 1858, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>80</sup> W.K. Mayo to L.M. Goldsborough, 27 December 1854, letters received, roll 2.

Loyall: Walker was Mayo's assailant. Mayo believed that Cushman and Loyall were as guilty as Walker because they had refused to give their names when Mayo had demanded them. By this time Commander Craven had arrived and Mayo asked Loyall why he failed to give his name. Loyall replied that "*there* [emphasis in original] was a struggle between his association and his duty."<sup>81</sup> Mayo expressed the belief that

I am pained to think that this officer who came to this Academy with every recommendation that high-tone and integrity could give deemed the calls of "association," more potent than the demands of that duty and of that reverence for the laws which require him to bring to punishment all offenders; and, being witness to any mutiny or sedition, to do his utmost to suppress it.<sup>82</sup>

Acting Midshipman Loyall was unamused by Mayo's recollection of the incident. Loyall believed that Mayo was accusing him of an act of mutiny for allegedly participating in the affair and then keeping his name, and the names of the other midshipmen, a secret. Loyall said that he neglected to tell Mayo his name because he failed to hear the request and because he was occupied "in the *strict* [emphasis in original] performance of my duty." Loyall believed that the accusation of mutiny was simply the result of a misunderstanding between himself and Mayo. Loyall explained that his "struggle between duty and association" meant that "if possible it was my desire that an affair so unfortunate for Mr. Walker should not be made public."<sup>83</sup> Loyall concluded that

if there is any thing at all connected with any act of mine on that evening, that can be construed, or even tortured into an unwillingness to suppress insubordinate or mutinous conduct, it is beyond my humble power to

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<sup>81</sup> W.K. Mayo to L.M. Goldsborough, 27 December 1854, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>82</sup> W.K. Mayo to L.M. Goldsborough, 27 December 1854, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>83</sup> P. Loyall to L.M. Goldsborough, 31 December 1854, letters received, roll 2.

comprehend the virtual meaning of a strict construction of the rules and regulations of the United States Navy. And I think that a little more reflection would be sufficient to persuade my accuser, that he is giving a latitude to the bearing of a clause in those articles, which the occasion cannot in any [way] warrant.<sup>84</sup>

It appears that Loyall interceded as best he could to do his duty, but also to maintain his loyalty to a fellow midshipman.

Sometimes the authorities were able to get to the bottom of a case if one midshipman confessed while the other one remained noncommittal. The Secretary of the Navy, J.C. Dobbin, called for a court of inquiry into the misconduct of Acting Midshipmen Norman H. Farquhar and William Welch on 6 March 1857. It was alleged that on 15 February Farquhar and Welch entered the offices of the Superintendent and clandestinely searched through papers and official reports. Captain Jean M. Powell acted as the President of the inquiry, while Commander William W. Hunter and Lt. George F. Eammons acted as members with James R. Howison as the Judge Advocate.<sup>85</sup>

The first witness called was Commander Green, the Commandant of Midshipmen. Green told the court that on 15 February, between four and five o'clock, he saw Welch and Farquhar enter the Academy, pass the guard house, and enter the Superintendent's office. Green, then in his quarters and observing events from a window, expected the midshipmen to emerge quickly from the office when they discovered that, because it was a Sunday, neither the Superintendent nor his secretary were there. But when the midshipmen failed to come out, Green got dressed and headed out to the watchman's post at the guard house to

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<sup>84</sup> P. Loyall to L.M. Goldsborough, 31 December 1854, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>85</sup> United States, Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy), Records of General Courts-Martial and Courts of Inquiry of the Navy Department, 1799-1867, case 2015, pp. 1-3 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M273, roll 85); Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy), Record Group 125; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. Hereafter, JAG and case number.

direct him to see what Welch and Farquhar were up to. When he reached the guard house he found it empty, so he continued to the Superintendent's office, expecting to find the watchman there. But en route Green realized that the watchman was elsewhere so Green continued to the Office. There he saw Welch leave the Superintendent's office and head toward the back door. As Green entered he met Farquhar coming out and asked him what he was doing there. Farquhar replied that he went to the office to get his passbook and had only been there two minutes, but Green told the court that Farquhar had actually been there about fifteen minutes.<sup>86</sup>

Superintendent Goldsborough told the court that the day after the incident he called Midshipman Welch into his office and asked him why he had been there. Goldsborough told the court that Welch explained that he and Farquhar had been looking for their passbooks, but finding the passbook box locked, they entered Goldsborough's office to look for the key hanging in the office; when they could not find it, they left. Goldsborough told the court he was unsatisfied with Welch's answer and that it should have taken less than fifteen minutes to look for the key. Welch assured Goldsborough there was nothing more to the incident, but he failed to explain the time discrepancy; Goldsborough was sure he was hiding something. Goldsborough then sent for Farquhar. Farquhar explained that the two had indeed done more than Welch had let on. The midshipmen, after being unable to find the key to the passbook box, took the key to the secretary's office, unlocked that door and entered. Farquhar told Goldsborough that Welch was with him when he entered the secretary's room and admitted that they examined some books in the secretary's office, but said they did not contain the class reports. Farquhar and Welch saw some other books but left them unexamined. Goldsborough lectured Farquhar about his behaviour, as he had done with Welch, and

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<sup>86</sup> JAG 2015, pp. 3-6.



dismissed him from his office.<sup>87</sup>

On 9 March the inquiry made its report. It found that Welch was less than forthcoming in his explanation to the Superintendent when questioned, but that Farquhar promptly admitted his and Welch's actions. A note of unknown authorship at the end of the file on the case added "Mid[shipmen] Farquhar and Welch. Let them be dismissed."<sup>88</sup> In the end Farquhar was not dismissed but spent forty-seven years in the service and retired in 1902 with the rank of Rear-Admiral. But Welch, who was from a seafaring background from New York, failed to graduate from the Academy; it is unclear if he was dismissed because of this case.<sup>89</sup>

As in the School era, disputes sometimes erupted between students. One occurred between Midshipmen Moffitt and Lynch on 27 April 1851 over a matter of honour. The inquiry opened on 6 May with Lt. Thomas T. Craven as president. Passed Midshipman Samuel Marcy as a member, and Passed Midshipman Samuel Carter as a secretary/member.<sup>90</sup> On 10 May the court found that Moffitt told one Mr. Davidson that Lynch was showing people, inside and outside the Academy grounds, letters between Lynch and Davidson "prejudicial to the character of Mr. Davidson." On 27 April, Davidson went to the Academy to see Lynch. The gentlemen talked and resolved the matter between them, although Davidson refused to tell Lynch the name of his informant. Lynch decided to "use such means as would make the person, if a gentleman, acknowledge to his having told Mr. Davidson such thing concerning him (Mr. Lynch)." Lynch told the midshipmen assembled before mess that someone was circulating rumours about him defaming Davidson. Lynch exclaimed that

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<sup>87</sup> JAG 2015, pp. 14-16.

<sup>88</sup> JAG 2015, p. 23 and Attachment B.

<sup>89</sup> *Register of Alumni*.

<sup>90</sup> JAG 1264, pp. 1-2, M273, roll 70.

person was a “liar, a coward, and no gentleman.” but the court concluded that Moffitt was elsewhere at the time. The inquiry surmised that at the mess table Moffitt was informed of Lynch’s speech, so he came forward to claim responsibly for telling Davidson of the rumour. The court found that the situation then degenerated into the fight outside the mess hall.<sup>91</sup>

The court found that Lynch’s course of action was “most unusual[.]” They concluded that his actions were “demoralising [sic] in its tendency, and calculated to effect most injuriously the discipline of the school.” The inquiry concluded that such behaviour had to be dealt with and recommended a minimum punishment of being “put back one year in date of his warrant.” Meanwhile, it decided that Moffitt was involved in the fight because of the circumstances with which he was faced and recommended that he only be publically reprimanded.<sup>92</sup> Later, another student, A.J. Dallas, came to Moffitt’s defence and asked the Secretary of the Navy to transfer some of Moffitt’s punishment to him for his role in the affair, although he denied that he helped spread the rumours to get Lynch and Moffitt at each other’s throats.<sup>93</sup>

The whole affair was thus thrown into some confusion and the inquiry, finished with its fact-finding mission, forwarded its report to the Secretary of the Navy to sort out the details. On 6 June Secretary Graham concluded that the difficulties between the two midshipmen “seems to have been mainly occasioned by the instrumentality of Midshipman Dallas.” Three years earlier there had been a disagreement between Mr. Lynch and one Mr. Davidson, which would have faded into the past except that Mr. Davidson asked one Mr. McGunneple if Lynch had been heard making any derogatory remarks about Davidson. McGunneple replied he had not heard anything of that nature from Lynch, where upon

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<sup>91</sup> JAG 1264, pp. 29-32.

<sup>92</sup> JAG 1264, pp. 32-33.

<sup>93</sup> A.J. Dallas to W.A. Graham, 12 May 1851, JAG 1264.

Midshipman Dallas was told that if he ever heard Lynch speaking in a disrespectful manner about Davidson, he “would consider it his duty to inform him.” Moffitt became involved in the affair and somehow he and Dallas thought that Lynch had been speaking unkindly of Davidson. However Moffitt became involved, the Secretary concluded that Dallas “is advised to be less meddlesome in the affairs of others for the future.” The Secretary concluded that the language and behaviour of Lynch on the parade ground, and Lynch and Moffitt at the supper table, was a “gross violation of the regulations of the Academy[.]” Lynch was suspended on furlough pay for two months, while Moffitt was suspended with furlough pay for one month. Graham concluded that the decision was to be “read in the presence of the several classes.”<sup>94</sup> Dallas seems to have gotten off with just the warning.

As in the Naval School era, the midshipmen not only directed their misbehaviour against the Academy, but also against fellow midshipmen. Taking regulations too seriously often landed midshipmen in trouble with their peers, as happened to Alfred Thayer Mahan.<sup>95</sup> While at the Academy, Mahan reported his class for an offence. Some of his friends stood by him, but in retaliation most of the class ignored him. Mahan’s father, a professor at West Point, told him about similar problems there if someone reported one of their fellows. The results were the same as what had happened to Mahan. The students stopped speaking to the tattler, but they eventually realized their mistake and apologised to him. Mahan told his friend, and former roommate, Sam Ashe, that “I hardly give the present first class credit for so much manliness as to make that reparation, even should they find that their course should be a wrong one.” Mahan was pleased that his father supported his reporting his classmates, and was happy that his friends Billy, Cenas, and Borchert still supported him. But as for the

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<sup>94</sup> Graham to Stribling, 6 June 1851, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>95</sup> Valle, 92.

rest, they “may go to hell.”<sup>96</sup>

The Academy even had its share of bullies. On 11 March 1858 Acting Midshipmen William Anderson Hicks, about 16 years old, reported that another midshipman, Andrew Jefferson Clark, was constantly after him to fight. Clark was a little over 17 years old and from a farming background in Alabama.<sup>97</sup> Hicks wrote of always trying to avoid Clark, and often gave him the right-of-way to remain clear of him. A week earlier Hicks was standing in the doorway of a building, saw Clark coming, and tried to get out of his way. Clark, instead of passing through the doorway, lunged into Hicks and tried to hit him. Hicks tried to defend himself, and then returned to his room. He had just arrived when Clark showed up with a rock, but the fight failed to materialize that night. The next day, Sunday, Hicks returned from breakfast and was once again attacked by Clark, this time with a stick. Hicks, after being struck twice in the head, told Clark that if he wanted a fight he was willing to provide one the next day. Clark agreed, but then hid in a room up a flight of stairs waiting once more for Hicks. When confronted, Clark agreed to fight another day and the two met in Hicks’ room on Monday and “had it out.”<sup>98</sup> Hicks wrote that

I think that it [the fight] was more forced on me altogether. For Clark had taken up an idea that he had gotten me afraid of him. And was determined that I should have no peace at all. He has had difficulties with nearly every student in our building. And he had been trying to get up the name of a bully which I don’t think he will ever succeed in doing.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan to Sam Ashe, 5 December 1858, in Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire (eds.), *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Volume I: 1847-1889* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1975).

<sup>97</sup> Registers of Candidates for Admission.

<sup>98</sup> Hicks, 11 March 1858, letters received, roll 1. It is unclear to whom this letter is addressed, probably the Commandant of Midshipmen as a written excuse for a disciplinary infraction.

<sup>99</sup> Hicks, 11 March 1858, letters received, roll 1.

On 14 March 1858 Clark replied to Hicks' charges. Clark agreed with the basic narrative of events, but put a different spin on them. He acknowledged running into Hicks when he tried to pass through a door, but asserted that it was an accident. In return Clark said that Hicks struck him before Clark tried to hit him with a brick and twice with a stick. Then Hicks challenged him to a "fair fight," to which Clark agreed, but then "after I accepted the challenge he carried a stick for me."<sup>100</sup> Commander Green investigated the affair, reported both midshipmen for the fight, but concluded that Clark was more in the wrong because he assaulted Hicks with a stone to the head and then a stick.<sup>101</sup> It is difficult to assess who was actually to blame for the incident, but it is clear that the administration felt it was Clark. Hicks graduated from the Academy, while Clark eventually left without graduating, although it is unclear under what circumstances.<sup>102</sup>

Sometimes the student body's displeasure with a comrade went so far as to punish him themselves if they felt that the authorities had failed to handle things properly. Midshipman Henry Foot was a terror at the Academy and a disgrace to his comrades. Foot joined the Academy in 1856 and was put in charge of the money used to pay the cook. The midshipmen contended that he kept the money for himself rather than pay the cook. While on the practice ship the previous summer he took other midshipmen's provisions and when questioned denied the charge. Instead he attacked one of the ship's company who reported his action, but "at the demand of a mid[shipman]" he confessed to the crime.<sup>103</sup>

The midshipmen reported him to the Superintendent, but he asked them to withdraw the report. The midshipmen were getting nowhere with Foot and on 2 April 1859 he

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<sup>100</sup> Clark to the Commandant of Midshipmen, 14 March 1858, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>101</sup> Green to Blake, 20 March 1858, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>102</sup> *Register of Alumni*.

<sup>103</sup> G.W. Hayward et al. to Isaac Toucey, 8 April 1859, letters sent, roll 2.

dishonoured them again by assaulting the slave girl who worked in Professor Lockwood's house. He returned to the Academy drunk and beat her when she refused to gratify "his passion." Although the witnesses were unable to "fully prove" the facts of the case, Foot admitted to committing the crime. The midshipmen finally had enough with the troublemaker: the attack on the slave girl was the last straw. After repeated attempts to get him to reform, the students committed an "outrage" against him in retribution.<sup>104</sup> One hundred and sixteen midshipmen petitioned the Secretary of the Navy in defence of the actions several of the midshipmen took against Foot. The petitioners griped that "for two years we have been forced to behold wearing the uniform of the Navy, an individual, who would not have been admitted in respectable society – one, so degraded by his vices that to be seen in his company was considered a disgrace – Sir, we feel deeply for the honor of the service" and that was why some of their members took action against Foot. They concluded that what they did might be undefendable, but they felt the punishment was deserved and the result of provocation. Finally, in a show of group solidarity, they petitioned the Secretary so that a few would not take the fall for an action which all supported.<sup>105</sup>

The administration finally decided to do something about Foot and a court of inquiry was ordered for 11 April.<sup>106</sup> Foot was dismissed from the service and on 27 April the Secretary dismissed seven midshipmen for what they did to Foot in retribution. Fourteen other midshipmen were allowed to stay in the service for their part in the affair but the "Department further directs that you [Superintendent G.S. Blake] will have them transferred

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<sup>104</sup> Charles Todorich claimed that the other students tarred and feathered Foot. Unfortunately, Todorich's source for this information is unclear and I have been unable to confirm his description, although his assertion seems logical (Charles Todorich, *The Spirited Years: A History of the Antebellum Naval Academy* [Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984], 153).

<sup>105</sup> T. T. Craven to G.S. Blake, 3 April 1859, letters sent, roll 2; and G.W. Hayward et al. to Isaac Toucey, 8 April 1859, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>106</sup> Isaac Toucey to George S. Blake, 6 April 1859, letter 1, letters received, roll 2.

at the earliest moment to the Practice Ship, and, from your receipt of this communication until the termination of the cruise, withhold from them the usual indulgences extended to the Acting Midshipmen."<sup>107</sup> Six of the midshipmen who were originally dismissed – Bruce Lambert, James F. Fuller, James P. Robertson, Thomas D. Fister, Morgan L. Ogden, and Stephen A. McCarty – were reinstated on 20 May and ordered to join the practice cruise under the same restrictions that had been imposed on the other midshipmen.<sup>108</sup>

Despite the scale of justice that was weighed at the Academy, sometimes authorities had to resort to dismissal to get their point across. But even when dismissal was considered, youth still was a factor. For example, it played a role in the discipline of Acting Midshipman Stockton – probably Edward C. Stockton of the 1849 Date, who was almost 15 years old when he was appointed – and Whitten.<sup>109</sup> On 27 July 1850 Stockton and Whitten left the Academy grounds without permission. Stribling admitted that under normal circumstances such a violation of regulations would not be tolerated and they would be dismissed from the navy. But Stribling believed there were mitigating circumstances which he felt warranted some leniency. That day a group of students from Baltimore visited Annapolis and paraded in front of the government house. Stockton and Whitten were curious and wanted to see the visitors so "with the usual thoughtlessness of boys [they] left the premises to see them." Stribling decided to report the incident to the Secretary but told him that Stockton and Whitten were "both very young, and were not at the moment perhaps, aware of the very grave offence they committed."<sup>110</sup> Stribling surmised that he would be able to fashion some

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<sup>107</sup> Isaac Toucey to George S. Blake, 27 April 1859, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>108</sup> Isaac Toucey to George S. Blake, 20 May 1859, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>109</sup> Stockton's biographical information is taken from Registers of Candidates for Admission, but the identity of Whitten is unknown.

<sup>110</sup> C.K. Stribling to Secretary of the Navy, 27 July 1850, letters sent, roll 1.

other punishment for them, other than dismissal, which would impress on them and the other students “the necessity of strict obedience of orders, at all times and under all circumstances.”<sup>111</sup>

Despite the practices of individual Superintendents, discipline at the School and Academy operated along a continuum from lenient to severe. Lenient punishments used conduct rolls and demerit points, while students were punished more severely with suspension, confinement, courts martial, and dismissal. But the authorities also punished according to the age of the student and their length of time in the navy. Older students were expected to be on better behaviour and be role models for the younger ones: older students were expected to be fully aware of what the navy expected of them.

For their part, the midshipmen responded in kind and were well behaved. When they failed to do so it was often for minor offences – drinking, smoking, being late, or losing their temper. The institution accepted this level of misbehaviour as part of growing up and responded accordingly. But sometimes the midshipmen had other ideas and wanted to be treated like adults when they clearly were still youths. At other times the students tried to protect their own and hesitated offering help in an investigation.<sup>112</sup> Unfortunately, when the midshipmen felt that justice was not proceeding swiftly enough, they took it into their own hands, as in the case of Midshipman Foot. But they also disapproved if one of their own – like Alfred Thayer Mahan – took the regulations too seriously and snitched on his comrades. There was a delicate balancing act between duty to the service and one’s “band of brothers.”

Annapolis provided a structured environment which reflected the reformist attitude in naval society, as well as the beliefs of society on how youths should be raised. Annapolis

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<sup>111</sup> C.K. Stribling to Secretary of the Navy, 27 July 1850, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>112</sup> This behaviour is in line with Jana Lynn Pershing’s findings, for 1992-93 students, that peer pressure can override reporting a comrade (“Balancing Honor and Loyalty: Social Control at the United States Naval Academy,” PhD Dissertation [University of Washington, 1997]).



became a place where middle-class youths could learn the proper behaviour of a naval officer. Yet the most important change in the Academy era was not the safe transitional area created on shore, but the safe and supervised life created on board the summer training ships. Here students were safely introduced to life at sea, practical seamanship, and the discipline required on a warship.

## *Chapter Seven – A Change of Course*

Before the reforms that led to the Naval Academy and a four-year program, there was little need to teach students the practical aspects of seamanship on a vessel at Annapolis. When the school was founded, Superintendent Franklin Buchanan recommended that a sloop-of-war or brig be attached to the School “as a school of practice in seamanship, evolutions, and gunnery,” and although the 1849 regulations required that a third-class sloop-of-war be stationed at the School, a formal system of training the students on a ship, attached to the institution, only arose in 1851.<sup>1</sup> The establishment of summer training cruises, along with the four-year, shore-based, training program, marked a true break from the old system of naval education. Now youths went straight into the Academy and were then gradually introduced to life at sea in a controlled environment that was supervised by Academy authorities. The summer cruises were wholly devoted to the students and provided them with that safe place the middle class wanted for their adolescents training for future careers.

On these cruises they learned practical seamanship and visited naval yards and other countries they would have to visit later as part of their duties as officers. By 1859 the summer-cruise system was fully integrated with the shore-based system. By 1859 a school ship was attached to the Academy during the academic year to teach new appointees without leaving shore. This integration proved successful and led to better student performance at sea. The only true problem the administration faced was finding a large enough vessel to accommodate the growing numbers of students. The Academy did not tolerate a Jack Tar

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<sup>1</sup> Franklin Buchanan, “Plan of the Naval School at Fort Severn, Annapolis, MD,” in United States, *Plan and Regulations of the Naval School at Annapolis* (Washington: C. Alexander, Printer, 1847), 10-11. Held by the William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland; and United States Naval Academy, *Regulations of the United States Naval Academy [1849]* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1849), section 6, paragraphs 1-6. Held by the William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. Hereafter, *Regulations* 1849.

among the students, and for their part they were generally well behaved and took to applying their shore-acquired knowledge.

Previous to the reforms many students experienced service in the regular navy afloat and the School was a place where they learned more theoretical aspects of seamanship and studied for their lieutenant's exams. While at the School, many of the students were sent to sea again as the navy required, especially during the Mexican-American War.<sup>2</sup> But the Academy's new philosophy was best summed up by Superintendent George S. Blake before the start of the 1859 summer cruise. Before setting sail he reminded Thomas T. Craven, Commandant of Midshipmen and in charge of the pupils at sea, that "[t]he young gentlemen will receive under your command their earliest impressions of the discipline, & etiquette of a ship of war, & it is most essential that these impressions should be correct in every particular."<sup>3</sup>

The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography promulgated the regulations for the governance of the practice ship on 18 July 1851. The existing "Act for the Better Government of the Navy" as well as any other departmental circulars and orders, either past or future, applied to the practice ship. The role of the ship as a training vessel was paramount. Its rules declared that "all else is to be considered subservient to this object except the cleanliness and safety of the ship."<sup>4</sup> The students were to spend two hours each

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<sup>2</sup> Midshipmen – not acting midshipmen – were often transferred to and from the Naval School and active sea service. For example, five midshipmen were ordered to the USS *Falmouth* on 7 April 1849 (G.P. Upshur to William B. Preston, 7 April 1849, Letters sent by the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy 1845-1865 [National Archives Microfilm Publication M945, roll 1]; Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland. Hereafter, letters sent).

<sup>3</sup> G.S. Blake to T.T. Craven, 22 June 1859, letter 1, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>4</sup> Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, "Regulations for the Practice Ship..." 18 July 1851. Letters received by the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, 1845-1887 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M949, roll 2); Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland. Hereafter, letters received.

day, with the exception of Sundays, being instructed in seamanship. This included reefing, making and taking in sails, as well as furling. The midshipmen were also taught how to tack, wear, and conduct gun exercises. Between their instructions on seamanship and gunnery, they were required to learn how to use the equipment to find the ship's position. When the ship entered or left port, the midshipmen were to be exercised "in heaving the lead, and are required to note the various land marks, so as to acquire a knowledge of the entrances to the different ports they may visit during the cruise." The Commandant of Midshipmen was responsible for overseeing the whole course of instruction and specifically that pertaining to seamanship. Meanwhile, the Professor of Gunnery and Infantry Tactics was responsible for teaching gunnery and the Professor of Mathematics supervised instruction in navigation.<sup>5</sup>

Once the practice ship arrived in a harbour the students were required to be drilled in the operations of a vessel while in a port. They were allowed one shore visit during each port-of-call and they had to return to the vessel by sunset. Their behaviour at sea and ashore was important: "no profane swearing will be permitted – politeness and courtesy will be insisted upon at all times and under all circumstances." Smoking tobacco was also forbidden and no one was allowed to work or perform any duty on Sundays unless the "duty of the ship render[ed it] necessary." The practice ship also was regulated to give the acting midshipmen a taste of the routine of naval life. Their meal hours were regular and sufficient time was allowed for them to eat. They were divided into two messes and were required to live on navy rations. The regulations concluded that "[n]o commutation of rations or parts of rations will be allowed" and "[t]he students will not be allowed to take on board live stock of any kind as sea-stores." The practice ship was intended to instruct the acting midshipmen in

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<sup>5</sup> Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, "Regulations for the Practice Ship..." 18 July 1851, letters received, roll 2.

practical seamanship as well as to give them a good introduction to the rigours of naval life.<sup>6</sup>

The midshipmen spent most of the year at the Academy, but after their June exams they were sent on their practice cruise. This was comparable to summer encampments at West Point, but Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote that “at West Point it was accompanied by a degree of social entertainment impossible to ship conditions.”<sup>7</sup> The 1851 summer cruise was the Academy’s first. In June the Academic Board decided that while the summer practice cruise would teach the students seamanship and gunnery, they would stick close to home. It therefore recommended that the ship stay along the north east coast of the United States and visit ports from Maine to Chesapeake Bay.<sup>8</sup> By mid-July Superintendent Stribling believed that the students should be on board the USS *Preble*, the summer practice ship, as soon as possible because they were not attending classes and discipline was beginning to suffer. Stribling wanted the USS *John Hancock* dispatched to bring the students to New York, where they would join the *Preble*. Even if she was still being prepared, Stribling thought that it would give the students a good opportunity to gain a knowledge of the ship and that they would also be “under proper discipline.”<sup>9</sup>

On 21 July Stribling finally ordered Commander Craven to the *John Hancock* and he arrived on 24 July in New York. The students and crew of the *John Hancock* transferred to the *Preble* and by 29 July the ship was ready to set sail, but she was delayed until 5 August

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<sup>6</sup> Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, “Regulations for the Practice Ship...” 18 July 1851, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>7</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life* (New York: Da Capo Press, reprint 1968), 94.

<sup>8</sup> “Extract from the proceedings of the Academic Board, 26 June 1851” in C.K. Stribling to William A. Graham, 27 June 1851, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>9</sup> C.K. Stribling to Commodore Lewis Warrington, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, 17 July 1851, letters sent, roll 1.

by one Captain Salter.<sup>10</sup> Craven also believed that “so long as this Cuban excitement continues, unless we are releaved [sic] from the present condition of things, I very much fear that the cruise of the Practice Ship will not extend beyond the limits of New York harbor.” The ship remained in port in case it was needed for service, but Craven believed they would be just as ready if they set sail. He believed they would be in and out of port anyway and a few days practising at sea would only increase their efficiency in case they were called “upon for any thing extra.”<sup>11</sup>

On 5 August 1851 Craven received orders from the Navy Department for the *Preble* to set sail.<sup>12</sup> Once they were out to sea, he taught the students seamanship, gunnery and navigation, but the cruise soon ran into trouble and Craven found himself in shoal water enveloped in a dense blanket of fog.<sup>13</sup> The *Preble* had entered shallow water around 3am and Craven was called on deck. He ordered the helm hard to starboard “and then braced up on the port tack.” When the vessel came into the wind, she grazed the bottom. Not knowing exactly where they were, and not wanting to make matters worse, Craven ordered the anchor overboard and furled the sails. When the fog lifted and Craven saw where he was, he ordered the *Preble* to fire her guns every fifteen minutes to attract the attention of a pilot. Around 9:15am they heard someone hail the *Preble* and discovered it was six men in a boat: one was a pilot from the steamer *Bibb*.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 October 1851 letter 2, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>11</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 August 1851, letters received, roll 2. It is unclear which specific incident Craven was referring. Kenneth J. Hagan concluded that London and Washington were “jousting for prominence” in Cuba and Central America in the 1850s. Spain was also thrown into the fray and war almost erupted over Cuba in 1852 after Spain detained the *Black Warrior*, a merchantman, in Havana (Kenneth J. Hagan, *This People's Navy* [New York: The Free Press, 1991], 155-156). Undoubtably, it was some period of tension over Cuba among the great powers, to which Craven was referring.

<sup>12</sup> Craven to Stribling, 5 August 1851, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>13</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 August 1851, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>14</sup> Craven to Stribling, 18 August 1851, letters received, roll 2.

By 11:50am the fog lifted and they proceeded on their way, but at 12:30pm a steamboat of the Nantucket Steamboat Company passed alongside and asked if they required help, to which Craven responded "no." By 1:50pm they were clear of the shallows, discharged the pilot, and proceeded on their way.<sup>15</sup> The boat of the Nantucket Steamboat Company dispatched to help the *Preble* wanted compensation.<sup>16</sup> Craven wrote the company and stated that he had not called for the assistance of a steamer; Craven ordered the *Preble* to fire her guns to obtain a pilot rather than in distress. But he decided to pass on the compensation request to his superior.<sup>17</sup>

With the exception of going off course, Craven found that the cruise was going well. The weather was pleasant and he believed that "the young gentlemen committed to my care are making daily progress in the practical part of their profession." But Craven felt mortified about running the ship into the shoal and believed that Acting Master Sam Marcy was putting too much blame on himself for miscalculating their position: Craven believed that he too should accept some portion of it. As for the Nantucket Steamboat Company, he believed that it was not legally entitled to compensation, but because of the prompt offer of assistance they "should perhaps receive some little remuneration."<sup>18</sup> In all, Craven found the crew were well and pleased with the work they were carrying out: they were the best crew he had ever commanded since joining the navy. The *Preble* was scheduled to leave Eastport on 19 August and continue on to Bath, Portland, Portsmouth, and Boston. Craven hoped to leave

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<sup>15</sup> Craven to Stribling, 18 August 1851, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>16</sup> C.B. Swain to Craven, 9 August 1851, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>17</sup> Craven to C.B. Swain, Agent Nantucket Steamboat Co., 14 August 1851, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>18</sup> Superintendent Stribling was sympathetic to the Steamboat Company of Nantucket's request for compensation for assisting the *Preble*. Stribling told Craven that he had fired the ship's guns in fog and the steamboat had only come thinking the *Preble* was in serious trouble. Stribling thought that the company should be compensated if they were asking for a reasonably sum of money, but in any event the request would be passed on to the Navy Department for a decision (C.K. Stribling to T.T. Craven, 26 August 1851, letters sent, roll 1).

Boston by 12 September.<sup>19</sup>

On 1 September he reported from Portland, Maine. The *Preble* was readying to set sail the next day for Boston. He felt it was getting late in the season and wanted to be west of Nantucket as soon as possible, so he pushed the cruise's timetable ahead so that they would leave Boston for New London on 8 or 9 September. Unfortunately, they had lost two men at Eastport and three in Portland by desertion, although the behaviour of the crew was generally good. Flogging had recently been outlawed and Craven concluded that "even had the 'old law' been in force . . . no offence occurred which would have justified punishment by whipping."<sup>20</sup> On 27 September they were back at Annapolis, where Craven hoped soon to report the "proceedings during this first experimental and very interesting cruise."<sup>21</sup>

Craven was pleased with the progress the students had made on the first training cruise. He felt that some of the students showed "extraordinary aptitude in the acquirement of every branch of practical knowledge, and all have made far greater progress in the essentials of their profession than usually results from an ordinary cruise of a year." Craven believed that some members of the class of 1850 were "able to take charge of the deck" and could carry out normal duties such as wearing and tacking. Meanwhile, all the students had acquired knowledge of tacking, weaving, steering, making knots, splicing ropes, and other elements of practical seamanship.<sup>22</sup> During the cruise the *Preble* fired 175 single 4lb shots, but Craven concluded the students were already proficient in gunnery from their instruction

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<sup>19</sup> Craven to Stribling, 18 August 1861, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>20</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 September 1851, letters received, roll 2. For details on the abolition of flogging see Harold D. Langley, *Social Reform in the United States Navy, 1798-1862* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1967), 132-205.

<sup>21</sup> Craven to Stribling, 27 September 1851, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>22</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 October 1851 letter 2, letters received, roll 2.



onshore under the supervision of Professor Henry Lockwood.<sup>23</sup> Yet

advantage however was taken of every favorable occasion to practice with shot at the target in a sea-way – the precision and accuracy with which the guns were directed was a subject of general remark – the oldest seamen expressing great surprise that boys so young should so far excel themselves in the practice of this highly important branch of the naval profession.<sup>24</sup>

The students' progress in practical navigation was better. The weather was poor during most of the trip and the *Preble* had an inadequate supply of navigation textbooks and instruments. Marcy did his best to instruct the boys in practical navigation: despite the problems, they learned methods for dead reckoning, obtaining distances, and bearings. Craven concluded that "many [of the students] are well practiced in the use of the sextant, and can determine with ease and facility the ships [sic] position at sea by observations of the sun."<sup>25</sup>

Craven was disappointed that the first practice cruise had only lasted six weeks instead of the planned two months, but he still deemed it a success. The *Preble* had visited Eastport, Portland, Boston, New London, and Norfolk, and the students had availed themselves of the opportunity to visit the dockyards.<sup>26</sup> Craven determined that the cruise had

shown satisfactorily to my mind that the four years course of instruction at the Academy – twelve or sixteen months of which will be passed on board the Practice Ship at sea, will afford the students opportunities for acquiring far more in the essential parts of the naval profession than can be expected from the old system, by six years . . . cruising in the capacity of a midshipman, without the detailed elementary instructions taught on board of

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<sup>23</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 October 1851 letter 1 and 2, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>24</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 October 1851 letter 2, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>25</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 October 1851 letter 2, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>26</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 October 1851 letter 2, letters received, roll 2.

the Practice Ship.<sup>27</sup>

The Board of Examiners concluded that the practice ship was a beneficial part of the Academy despite the short duration of the cruise and believed that the cruises were “an excellent feature in the arrangements made by the Navy Department for forwarding the professional knowledge of the youths committed to its care.”<sup>28</sup>

By June 1852 preparations were underway for that summer’s cruise. On 9 June Superintendent Stribling wrote to Commodore Matthew C. Perry, President of the Board of Examiners, and asked him to bring to the attention of the Board that the *Preble* was too small for the number of students. Stribling believed that there should be a well-rigged frigate-class vessel attached to the Academy and, most importantly, that it should be steam-powered so that the pupils could also be taught the “management of steam vessels.” In addition, Stribling thought there should be a small, 80-ton brig attached to the Academy on which the students could learn how to rig the ship, go up and down the masts and yards, learn the use the sails and other aspects of seamanship.<sup>29</sup> But in the end the Academy had to make do with the *Preble*.

Stribling also recommended that those youths appointed acting midshipmen, and scheduled to arrive at the Academy in October, should report between 20 and 30 September. He believed that they should experience a full year at the Academy before being sent to sea as many of them had no prior sea experience; to send them to sea immediately could cause them serious injury. In addition, a full year would weed out those who were unfit for service. This also provided those unfit to be “restored to their friends without having acquired any

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<sup>27</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 October 1851 letter 2, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>28</sup> D. Conner, President of Board of Examiners, to William A. Graham, 10 October 1851, letters received, roll 3.

<sup>29</sup> C.K. Stribling to M.C. Perry, 9 June 1852, letters sent, roll 1.

taste for the sea, or habits unfitting them for the ordinary pursuits of life.”<sup>30</sup>

Stribling directed that instruction in seamanship and gunnery was the most important thing for the students during the coming cruise. Craven, again in command, was to teach them seamanship, while another qualified officer was to instruct them in other fields. But the “young gentlemen” were never to be employed at anything other than those duties that were part of their instruction. They were only to be used in the boats if they were learning how to manage them, but they were forbidden to be used to transport officers to or from the *Preble*.<sup>31</sup> The students were there to learn.

The 1852 cruise was scheduled to take the students farther away from home. It was scheduled to visit western Madeira and the Canary Islands returning via St. Thomas, and arriving back at Annapolis by the last week of September. The Secretary of the Navy, William A. Graham, instructed that “[i]t is essential that she [the *Preble*] should keep [to] the sea as much as practicable and to touch at no port unless absolutely necessary.”<sup>32</sup>

The students embarked on the *Preble* on 14 June, and by the 22<sup>nd</sup> the vessel sailed down the Severn River to Annapolis Roads. They began their instruction on the 25<sup>th</sup> and by the end of the cruise Craven seemed pleased with their progress. Craven felt there were only four pupils who failed to be more expert at seamanship than the best ordinary seamen: many of the pupils were more than capable of taking command of the deck and carrying out basic naval evolutions. Unlike the previous year, the weather was better and the students had plenty of opportunities to learn how to use the sextant and take various measurements of position and distance.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> C.K. Stribling to M.C. Perry, 9 June 1852, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>31</sup> C.K. Stribling to T.T. Craven, 21 June 1852, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>32</sup> William A. Graham to CK Stribling, 10 June 1852, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>33</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 October 1852, letters received, roll 2.

The *Preble* called at Orta, Madeira, Santa Cruz, and Palma in the Canary Islands, and at St. Thomas in the West Indies. On the outward passage, when they were at Hampton Roads, Craven took the students to visit the Norfolk Navy Yard. This excursion allowed the young men to visit the dry docks, machine shops, and the *Pennsylvania*, where they could observe, first hand, various elements of naval operations. The Commandant reported that they had not lost one man due to death or desertion and the behaviour of the crew was good, with the exception of a few cases of disorderly conduct as a result of being drunk; Craven failed to specify whether any included the students. But he concluded that the cruise was a success and that it proved the importance of the four-month practice cruise in the system of naval education.<sup>34</sup>

By the end of the 1853 academic year it became clear to Stribling that the Academy was growing and needed a bigger practice ship. The *Preble* could only hold fifty students, in addition to the officers and men, and he expected sixty students would be embarked in 1854, and as many as seventy-five in later years. Stribling requested that a frigate, then under construction, with steam auxiliary propulsion, be attached to the Academy. He felt it would allow students to be taught not only seamanship and navigation but also steamship management. Stribling concluded that "I consider this a matter of great importance as every year, steam is more and more applied to sea going vessels, and particularly to Men of War."<sup>35</sup> On 15 June 1853 the Board of Examiners wrote J.C. Dobbin, the Secretary of the Navy, supporting Stribling's request for a bigger ship because it was important for midshipmen to be trained at sea for the "active duties of their profession[.]" But it failed to mention that Stribling desired a steamship for the task.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 October 1852, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>35</sup> C.K. Stribling to Board of Examiners, 15 June 1853, letters received, roll 3.

<sup>36</sup> C.S. McCauley, Present of the Board of Examiners to JC Dobbin, 15 June 1853, letters received, roll 3.

Again, Stribling was stuck with the *Preble* for the summer. Despite having a ship he thought was inadequate, he continued with the plan for the coming cruise. As soon as the student's examinations were finished he wanted them on the ship, and before they put to sea he wanted them instructed "in reefing, furling, sending up & down yards[.]"<sup>37</sup> On 21 June 1853 Stribling ordered Craven to the *Preble* and for the cruise to begin as soon as possible. He reiterated the usual orders for the employment of the students, and stressed proper decorum when they were in port: "the character of the Officers & Gentleman [sic] should never be forgotten; you cannot impress this too strongly upon their minds."<sup>38</sup> He added that

I would call your special attention to the use of Tobacco by the young Gentlemen, either on board or when on shore, this habit should be checked by *all* [emphasis in original] lawful means, the use of profane or obscene language should never be allowed to pass without rebuke, there is no good excuse for the use of improper language at any time by an Officer or Gentleman [sic].<sup>39</sup>

The students were to be held to the same standard on ship as at the Academy: there was no room for a stereotypical Jack Tar in the seedling officer corps.<sup>40</sup>

The Secretary instructed the vessel to visit the coast of Spain: on the return leg the Commandant was only to visit authorized ports, and only as long as they arrived back at Annapolis by the end of September. He also reiterated the Department's view that the ship

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<sup>37</sup> C.K. Stribling to James B Dobbin, 15 June 1853; which Craven was ordered to do, see C.K. Stribling to T.T. Craven, 20 June 1853, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>38</sup> C.K. Stribling to T.T. Craven, 21 June 1853, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>39</sup> C.K. Stribling to T.T. Craven, 21 June 1853, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>40</sup> Frederick S. Harrod, in *Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940* (Westport, Connecticut and London, England: Greenwood Press, 1978), looked at the enlisted man in the US navy in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. He concluded there was a shift away from using foreign crews to American citizens, and the navy disliked the stereotypical Jack Tar. This trend appears to also exist earlier in the nineteenth century in the officer corps as revealed by the Academy's opinion on how their students should behave.

should stay at sea as much as possible, only visiting ports to resupply.<sup>41</sup> The *Preble* left Annapolis on 23 June but was delayed at Hampton Roads until the end of the month because of crewing and supply delays. As with the previous sailings, the students were taught seamanship and navigation.<sup>42</sup>

During periods of poor weather the students were required to make drawings of the yards, masts, and sails “in detached parts, showing in detail the different methods of fitting the standing and” running rigging. Once the drawings were completed, they were required to explain them. Craven concluded that “[t]hese two methods, the rigging of yards and the making of drawings, combined with oral examinations, I found to work most admirably. For they served to fix very thoroughly upon their minds the proper arrangement of the rigging of a ship and the management of the sails.” During the day the first class took command of the deck “so that every evolution of tacking or wearing, boxhauling and chapelling, making and taking in sail being performed under their own directions, necessarily added much to their practical experience.” While in Chesapeake Bay they also brought the ship to anchor against the tides, winds, and other obstacles; and throughout the cruise they carried out various gunnery and navigation exercises.<sup>43</sup>

The *Preble* visited the island of Fayal as well as Galicia and Funchal at Madeira.<sup>44</sup> They arrived at Spain on 28 August, after sailing for seven days from Fayal. The Captain General and the military and civil governors of Galicia visited the *Preble* and seemed impressed. They also invited the ship and its crew to visit the naval arsenal at a port twelve miles away. Craven accepted their invitation because he believed that it would be a useful

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<sup>41</sup> J.C. Dobbin to C.K. Stribling, 18 June 1853, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>42</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 October 1853, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>43</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 October 1853, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>44</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 October 1853, letters received, roll 2.

instructional opportunity. But he was upset about how his hands were often tied by Navy Department instructions. He felt the directive to only visit ports mentioned in the instructions forbade him to change plans if something instructional, like the naval arsenal visit, presented itself. To bend the rules, he decided to let the crews go to the arsenal in the *Preble*'s boats: the vessel then sailed for Madeira and waited off the coast "whilst the young gentlemen, in charge of Mr. Marcy, examine[d] the [arsenal] works at Ferrol."<sup>45</sup> They finished the 1853 cruise bypassing Martinique because of reports of sickness, and arrived back at Hampton Roads around 17 September, took on supplies, and continued to Chesapeake Bay.<sup>46</sup>

The only real problem during the 1853 cruise came from Midshipman Quackenbush.<sup>47</sup> Craven believed he was a bad influence on the acting midshipmen. While the ship was at Hampton Roads in October, Quackenbush asked for permission to visit Norfolk. Permission was granted, but he remained there until he was sent for. Craven concluded that from all reports – in particular from the son of the British consul at "Old Point" – Quackenbush behaved poorly and "there are reports of his having been drunk – and of his enticing some of the youngsters to violate their pledge [not to drink] and to join him in drinking." Craven was unable to substantiate the claim, yet he was tempted to send Quackenbush ashore with orders to report to the Secretary of the Navy for disobedience of orders.<sup>48</sup> Craven concluded that "his presence here is certainly prejudicial to the well being of the acting mids – he is now under suspension and I shall take good care that he does not

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<sup>45</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 August 1853, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>46</sup> Craven to Stribling, 1 October 1853, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>47</sup> Probably Stephen Quackenbush of the date of 1840 (U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, *Register of Alumni, Graduates and Former Naval Cadets and Midshipmen, 91<sup>st</sup> Edition* [Annapolis, Maryland: The Naval Academy Alumni Association, 1976], hereafter, *Register of Alumni*).

<sup>48</sup> Stribling reported Quackenbush to the Secretary of the Navy and added that the only other time that Quackenbush was drunk was also when he had gone ashore from the *Preble* (C.K. Stribling to J.C. Dobbin, 3 October 1853, letters sent, roll 1).

again have the opportunity of sleeping ashore.” But the “youngsters” had behaved themselves well and Craven believed there were “amongst them some very promising boys.”<sup>49</sup>

Despite the fact that the Academy used the practice ships as a relatively safe way to introduce new officers to sea life, and tried to keep bad influences away, some parents still complained. In 1854 the midshipmen embarked on the summer cruise at the close of their examinations. But some of the parents of the fourth-class midshipmen who were put back a year voiced their concern that their sons were being sent to sea. They requested that they be allowed to spend the summer at home with their parents, but Superintendent L.M. Goldsborough thought they should continue their studies as usual and then be sent to sea on the practice ship. Goldsborough felt the issue was whether the midshipmen should be allowed to spend extra time with their friends if they were put back. If this were permitted, he feared it would only encourage a midshipman to be put back a year to be able to spend time with his friends.<sup>50</sup>

The issue was settled as far as Goldsborough was concerned, and the *Preble* left Annapolis for the Norfolk Navy Yard on 20 June to take on supplies. She had on board Craven, the students of the first, second, and third classes, some officers, and Professor William Chauvenet.<sup>51</sup> The geographic extent of the cruise was slightly different from the previous ones: Secretary Dobbin instructed that the *Preble*, outward bound from the United States, was to visit the English Channel, including Plymouth, Portsmouth, Brest, and Cherbourg. On the return the Commandant of Midshipmen was given permission to visit

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<sup>49</sup> Craven to Stribling, 19 October 1853, letters received, roll 2; and C.K. Stribling to J.C. Dobbin, 3 October 1853, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>50</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 19 May 1854, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>51</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 20 June 1854, letters sent, roll 1.



Madeira as well as one port in the West Indies, if there was time.<sup>52</sup> Evidently Craven's concerns about being allowed discretion had been heard. By 10 June the Secretary amended his orders to allow the Commandant permission to visit the "Western Islands" as well as "the Dock Yards and Naval Establishments at the ports mentioned in the instructions of the 9<sup>th</sup> instant."<sup>53</sup>

By 24 June the *Preble* was anchored off "Old Point" and had met good winds since leaving Annapolis. Craven was pleased to note that the *Preble* had beaten all square-rigged vessels that it had so far encountered and that the "boys have had a nice time practicing with the lead" and the sails.<sup>54</sup> By 28 June they finished getting the stores aboard and set sail on the main part of the voyage. They were short some crew members, but had the pleasure of receiving the President and his entourage, who "appeared to be highly gratified with the performances of the youngsters."<sup>55</sup> The cruise varied little from the earlier ones in terms of instruction. This year the "young gentlemen" of the second class had command of the deck during the day, carried out the daily duties, and appeared proficient in their tasks. When they arrived back in Chesapeake Bay the class had the opportunity to practice such tasks as "riding head to tide with wind abeam; wind on the quart; aft and particularly that of riding head to wind and tide in a narrow channel" as well as avoiding various hazards. Both classes of midshipmen were good at steering and various duties as helmsmen or leads men.<sup>56</sup>

The practice ship also served to test the efficiency of the Academy's shore-based training system. The gunnery went unsatisfactorily that summer because of poor weather at

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<sup>52</sup> Dobbin to Goldsborough, 9 June 1854, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>53</sup> Dobbin to Goldsborough, 10 June 1854, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>54</sup> Craven to Goldsborough, 24 June 1854, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>55</sup> Craven to Goldsborough, 28 June 1854, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>56</sup> Craven to Goldsborough, 30 September 1854, letters received, roll 2.

sea, but when the *Preble* returned to Chesapeake Bay they resumed their exercises. Craven found there was a distinct contrast between the ship's crew and the students when it came to handling the guns. On three or more occurrences the entire crew was divided into two groups – the regular crew and the students – for gun exercises with the broadsides.<sup>57</sup> Craven concluded that

the results were in each case that the firing of the young gentlemen who had had the benefit of instruction at the Academy was vastly superior to that of the crew who had only been exercised at the guns for the time the ship had been as sea, and a majority of whom were, as far as acquaintance with the routine and exercises of a man of war are concerned, very much the kind of men we should have to depend on for manning our ships in case of war.<sup>58</sup>

In the exercise on 25 September twenty-three shots were fired by the crew and no more than four reached within ten feet of their intended target. Yet the same number of shots were fired by the pupils and only one fell outside ten feet of its intended target. The target, a launch, was about 940 yards from the *Preble* and Craven concluded he could “confidently assert that fifteen of the 23 shots fired by the young gentlemen were within two feet of the centre of the target – two of them struck the flag-staff and five others were certainly within six or eight inches of it.” Craven believed the structured, shore-based education had had an impact on the quality of the officers in the navy, and the running of the ship.<sup>59</sup>

Training in navigation also went well. The second-class students learned methods for finding the ship's position as described in Bowditch's work on the subject. Once the *Preble* left Brest, the second class took turns navigating and Craven often called on them, day or

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<sup>57</sup> Craven to Goldsborough, 30 September 1854, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>58</sup> Craven to Goldsborough, 30 September 1854, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>59</sup> Craven to Goldsborough, 30 September 1854, letters received, roll 2.

night, to give him the ship's position. Meanwhile, the pupils of the first class were taught the use of the sextant and how to find the ship's position by dead reckoning, latitude by the sun, as well as other methods. This practical education was supplemented by the visits the *Preble* made to Plymouth, Cherbourg, and Brest. In every locale, Craven found that the commanders of the stations were "very kind and polite in their attentions to us, and afforded us every facility for viewing and examining every part of their docks."<sup>60</sup>

In addition to testing their system of naval education, the practice cruises also brought the Americans into contact with other countries' naval education systems. One unique opportunity they enjoyed while at Brest was to visit the French school ship *La Borda*. Unfortunately, the students were absent and it left the crew of the *Preble* little chance to investigate the French naval education system. But Craven was impressed by the facilities the French had for training seamen. They had a big vessel where those entering the navy were taught to read and write, and were instructed in gunnery and seamanship. For instruction in seamanship, the French had two brigs where two to three hundred boys, aged thirteen to sixteen years, were daily taught how to put the ship under way, make and take in the sails, and reef and furl. At the end of a six-month period, one thousand of the best qualified were then drafted into the navy.<sup>61</sup> The practice cruises were learning experiences not only for the students but also for the Academy's officers.

During the fall and winter of 1854-55, Academy officials reviewed the practice-ship system and made recommendations for its improvement. The system could also benefit the enlisted service, but as it was the current ship was still too small to be fully effective for training. In November 1854, Lt. Robert H. Wyman reviewed the system and made recommendations to the Superintendent. Wyman emphasized the important role the practice

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<sup>60</sup> Craven to Goldsborough, 30 September 1854, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>61</sup> Craven to Goldsborough, 30 September 1854, letters received, roll 2.

ship played in a midshipman's education. It was where a midshipman first learned the "ideas of the Naval Service afloat" which "influence[d] their whole future career, sowing the seeds for either an active or a careless officer[.]" With that in mind he recommended that the practice ship be a full man-of-war.<sup>62</sup>

At that time the crew of the practice ship was drafted to serve only a week or two before she set sail with the students. Wyman felt that in order for the ship to be a proper man-of-war, her crew had to be aboard for much longer and "broken into shape[.]" He recommended that the ship should be fully manned and ready to put to sea at any time. She should have officers and crew stationed on her and between 100 and 150 boys, aged between seventeen and twenty years old, who would be enlisted to remain with the ship for five years. These boys should "be instructed in the rudiments of an English Education and for this purpose two teachers selected and rated as School-Masters." They should then be exercised for a few months before the summer cruise. Wyman added that "none but American born boys should be received." The crew should be tried out first and any who were found deficient should be replaced. Wyman believed that would be all that was required to bring the crew up to the proficiency necessary to handle the students from the Academy.<sup>63</sup> He also believed this would have the added benefit of providing the navy with a small annual quota of well-trained American seamen.<sup>64</sup> The system would provide "active and intelligent American Seamen to man our National Vessels, soon giving a surplus which would fall to the Commercial Marines, and the more ambitious and intelligent would no doubt qualify themselves for positions as 'Warrant' and 'Petty Officers' in the Naval Service and of Mates

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<sup>62</sup> Robert H. Wyman to L.M. Goldsborough, 25 November 1854, letters sent, 1.

<sup>63</sup> Robert H. Wyman to L.M. Goldsborough, 25 November 1854, letter sent, roll 1.

<sup>64</sup> See Harrod, *Manning the New Navy*.

in Merchant Vessels.”<sup>65</sup>

Early in 1855 Superintendent Goldsborough was able to estimate the number of students that would probably be sent to sea that summer: twenty-four students from the second class and sixty-six from the fourth class. But the *Preble* could hold only fifty students comfortably, so a bigger ship was needed. Goldsborough discerned that “it would, in many particulars, work badly for the Students themselves, as well as for the programme and arrangements of this Academy, if the whole number of 90 were not to go to sea.” He recommended the USS *Plymouth*: she had a larger deck, and even though she was a sloop-of-war, was larger than the *Preble*.<sup>66</sup> (See Appendix D, figures 1 and 2). But Goldsborough would be disappointed: the *Preble* was once more the practice ship for the 1855 summer cruise.<sup>67</sup>

The 1855 summer cruise began late in June and was commanded by Lt. Commander Joseph F. Green, then Commandant of Midshipmen. As with previous summer cruises, the *Preble* was ordered to embark her students – in the end twenty-four first-class and fifty-five third-class – and proceed to Hampton Roads to take on supplies.<sup>68</sup> But this year’s cruise would be coastal and Green was authorized to take on a coastal pilot, if he thought it necessary, to ensure safety. Once again the order of the day was to instruct the students in gunnery, navigation, and other professional matters. Before Green left Annapolis, Goldsborough reminded him to familiarize himself with Academy rules because they were

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<sup>65</sup> Robert H. Wyman to L.M. Goldsborough, 25 November 1854, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>66</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 21 February 1855, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>67</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Joseph F. Green, 22 June 1855, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>68</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Joseph F. Green, 22 June 1855; and “US Practice Ship *Preble* Summer Cruise June 22, 1855” L.M. Goldsborough [unsigned] to Joseph F. Green, [undated], letters sent, roll 1.

equally applicable while the students were at sea.<sup>69</sup> Goldsborough emphasized that,

[w]hen in port, the indulgence of leave to visit the shore is to be judiciously regulated, & I trust that a watchful & vigilant eye will be given to the conduct & deportment of students to whom such leave may be granted, in order that no departure from propriety, or conduct unbecoming a young gentleman aspiring to a Naval Officer's position, can be perpetrated with impunity.<sup>70</sup>

The students were also to be taught to be economical. They were forbidden to draw any of their pay or articles from the purser without Green's permission. Goldsborough hoped that they would be able to return to Annapolis with "as much pay due them as circumstances connected" would allow. Students were to be "kept accustomed to the exercise of self-denial" and to maintain proper care over their belongings as well as themselves. Tobacco and alcohol were forbidden, as was obscene and profane language. Green was to deal with any infractions quickly and with due punishment. But Goldsborough also told Green not to limit himself to the style of discipline and punishments the Superintendent stipulated. Goldsborough had every confidence that Green would instill in his charges the proper elements of their profession and he needed few specific instructions.<sup>71</sup> The *Preble* visited Eastport, Portland, Provincetown, Boston, and other ports along the American coast.<sup>72</sup> In August they touched at Portland, where Green updated Goldsborough on their progress: all were well and he concluded "I do not think that the same number of boys could be found whose conduct is so generally so generally unexceptionable [meaning good.]"<sup>73</sup> The ship then

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<sup>69</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Joseph F. Green, 22 June 1855, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>70</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Joseph F. Green, 22 June 1855, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>71</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Joseph F. Green, 22 June 1855, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>72</sup> Mr. Chase et al., "Portfolio of Statistics....," 1 September 1899, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>73</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Morris, 17 August 1855, letters sent, roll 1.

set sail for Boston on 16 August and was expected home on 25 September.<sup>74</sup>

Early in April 1856 Superintendent Goldsborough estimated that sixty acting midshipmen would be embarked on the summer practice ship for the 1856 summer cruise. Again he told the Department that the *Preble* was too small and the students were too crowded. Packed in as they were, eating, sleeping, and caring for their belongings was an uncomfortable experience. Goldsborough felt it was a poor introduction to sea life for many of the students who were fourth-class midshipmen without any prior sea experience. The ship had to be big enough for their comfort and, because of their lack of experience, contain enough crew to handle the ship in bad weather or other emergencies. He added that "[l]ast year, owing to the excessively crowded state of the 'Preble,' great inconvenience & positive discomfiture were experienced by both students & crew."<sup>75</sup>

Goldsborough was also concerned with the thought of an epidemic on the crowded ship. The *Preble*'s hull also needed repairs and, besides, the one-decked ship forced the crew and students to be "too intimately associated."<sup>76</sup> Goldsborough again recommended that the *Plymouth* should be outfitted as the practice ship: it was large enough and, with the guns cleared, the upper deck could be used for exercises and drills. Whatever ship the Department decided to use, Goldsborough reminded the Secretary that it should have a large enough

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<sup>74</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Morris, 17 August 1855; and L.M. Goldsborough to Passed Midshipman Wilson McGunnegele, 19 September 1855, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>75</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 2 April 1856, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>76</sup> No sexual reference is implied in this comment. More likely Goldsborough was upset that officers and crew might be associating too closely with each other. This probably had to do with the navy's new philosophy for educating its young officers. In the old navy they were simply thrown into the fray, but the Academy system was meant to safely introduce them to naval life. Putting the young students in direct, constant contact, would have gone against this philosophy. Arthur N. Gilbert in "Crime as Disorder: Criminality and the Symbolic Universe of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century British Naval Officer," in Robert William Love, Jr. (ed.), *Changing Interpretations and New Sources in Naval History: Papers from the Third United States Naval Academy History Symposium* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1980), 110-122, conducted a psychoanalysis of the attitude of British naval officers to crime on board ship which gives an indication of what it may have been like in the US navy under the old system. In the US Navy the officer's desire for order and cleanliness, which their Royal Navy counterpart also desired, was assured for young people on the practice ship.

steerage to accommodate the students' lockers, while the furniture of the *Preble* could easily be transferred to the new vessel.<sup>77</sup> This year the *Plymouth* was theirs.

The *Plymouth* was a first-class sloop-of-war and the Department decided to keep her original spars, unlike the *Preble*, which had been modified for use by the Academy. But regardless of her configuration, Goldsborough believed that she should be operated like a full-fledged man-of-war so that the students would become familiar with the various naval evolutions required on such a vessel. Meanwhile, the Department should adopt his recommendations for the crew complement (seventy fewer people than the maximum) because it had been composed with the understanding that "two thirds of the students [that were] to go to sea this summer are very young," and had no prior sea experience, while the remainder only had three months at sea.<sup>78</sup>

Several of the Academy's officers were then ordered to Norfolk to ready the *Plymouth* and sail her to Annapolis. But Lt. Wyman, who was in command of readying the ship, reported that the boatswain was yet to arrive because the original man had been called elsewhere. Another had been found and Goldsborough pointed out that it was important that the *Plymouth* had a good boatswain to "instruct the young gentlemen properly in knotting, splicing, strapping blocks, & various other mechanical points of Seamanship" as well as his other duties. But Goldsborough expected the *Plymouth* to arrive at Annapolis no later than 9 June, which she did.<sup>79</sup>

By 5 June the *Plymouth* was ready for service as a training vessel.<sup>80</sup> The students –

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<sup>77</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 2 April 1856, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>78</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 11 May 1856, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>79</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 6 June 1856; and L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 10 June 1856, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>80</sup> J.C. Dobbin to L.M. Goldsborough, 5 June 1856, letters received, roll 2.



fifteen members of the first class and thirty-eight of the third – were embarked at the end of June and Commander Green was ordered to Hampton Roads to pick up a new galley before proceeding to sea.<sup>81</sup> The same elements of practical seamanship were to be taught that summer as previously and the officers were to maintain the same standard of discipline. Commandant Green, was in charge of supplies for the students, who were to receive the same quality meals as at the Academy. The other regulations were the same, but with one addition: the students were to keep their hands out of their pockets while at sea or on shore. Goldsborough closed with his obligatory comment that Green was to do all he could to ensure that the midshipmen acquired the requisite social and work skills of an officer, and that they maintained “habitual courtesy & respect towards superiors, & also towards each other; and a manly propriety, & a gentlemanly politeness of deportment, on all occasions.”<sup>82</sup>

While the *Plymouth* sailed along the US coast, stopping at Boston, Portland, and Newport, that summer all was not smooth sailing. A major incident began on the afternoon of 24 September while the *Plymouth* was making its way up Chesapeake Bay. Green noticed that eleven of the pupils were below deck without permission. He ordered them on deck and told them to stay there until 8pm, with a half hour break for supper; they were then to be called on deck at 4am the next morning for morning watch.<sup>83</sup>

The next morning, while somewhere in Chesapeake Bay near Annapolis, Lt. William Wilcox ordered the acting midshipman in charge, Mr. Alexander, to summon the students on a list that Commander Green had given him the previous evening. Alexander directed Acting Midshipman Ashe to summon them, but he returned to report that Acting

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<sup>81</sup> L.M. Goldsborough [unsigned, “US Practice Ship Plymouth Summer Cruise June 26<sup>th</sup> 1856.” [undated]; and L.M. Goldsborough to J.F. Green, 26 June 1856, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>82</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.F. Green, 26 June 1856, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>83</sup> J.F. Green quoted in L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 30 September 1856, letters sent, roll 1.

Midshipman Green said he was sick, and that the rest, with the exception of Acting Midshipman Slamm, refused to come on deck. The First Lieutenant then took two of the first-class midshipmen, Mills and Alexander, to repeat the order. When the midshipmen were still unresponsive, the First Lieutenant tried again. After about thirty minutes the order was finally obeyed, but in a "mutinous manner." They had so misbehaved that Wilcox had to separate them into pairs. Wilcox found that Acting Midshipmen Butt, French, and Brown were particularly fractious, while Bristow and Crump, although not ordered on deck, came anyway and began creating a ruckus. Midshipman Butt was specifically singled out: "on leaving the deck at 8 o'clock [he] exclaimed in the most mutinous manner as he descended the ladder – 'Extra Watch.' 'Extra Watch.'" <sup>84</sup>

The students admitted that their action was wrong, but said that it was in protest because they thought their rights had been violated. They informed Green that "we have been under the impression, for sometime back, that you had no authority to place us on Extra Watch, we admit, Sir, that we have been wrongly advised" and they hoped he would excuse their transgression. <sup>85</sup> When the matter came to the attention of Superintendent Goldsborough, it immediately raised his concerns. Like most military people, he agreed that mutinous conduct was unacceptable. But he feared that this type of behaviour was generally growing in the US navy. <sup>86</sup> He told the Secretary that

[t]here is, of late years, an evident & constantly increasing disposition among individuals of various classes belonging to the Navy to question orders of their superiors, even their Commanding officers, & refuse obedience to them. How far this state of things may have influenced these young gentlemen in

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<sup>84</sup> Lt. W. Wilcox to Commander Joseph F. Green, 27 September 1856, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>85</sup> W.R. Butt, J.H. Hackett, H.F. Condict, J.L. Tayloe, and L.L. French to J.F. Green, 28 September 1856, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>86</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 30 September 1856, letters sent, roll 1.

their course of conduct I can only conjecture: but, certainly, it must be crushed in a suitable way, or else no proper discipline can be maintained[.]<sup>87</sup>

If the Academy failed to drill the students to obey orders, they would be “useless for the Naval Service.” It was the first combined action of midshipmen of this sort during Goldsborough’s term as Superintendent and he hoped the Department would take steps to ensure that it never recurred. For now they were suspended, but Goldsborough felt they should be made examples of and dismissed. They might be youths, but the Superintendent believed that if they were treated leniently, others would follow in their path.<sup>88</sup>

The pupils were dismissed for their “insubordinate and mutinous conduct.” Acting Secretary Charles Welsh reviewed their cases upon receiving requests from them for reinstatement. Welsh reinstated Midshipmen Tayloe, Hackett, and Butt after they assured him they were “unconscious of the true character of the offence committed by them.” and that they were now aware of its seriousness and would behave in the future. Welsh trusted their assurances, and given their previous good conduct and standing, decided to let them rejoin their class. Welsh told Goldsborough to impress upon them once more the seriousness, “in a military point of view,” of what they had done, and the lesson they should learn from the Department’s leniency. Meanwhile, Midshipmen French and Condict had also been found deficient at their recent examinations, and combined with their misbehaviour, the Department “can perceive no grounds for their claim to its further indulgence – particularly on the part of Mr. Condict, who appears to have been foremost in the recent disorderly proceedings.” Their dismissals stood.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 30 September 1856, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>88</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.C. Dobbin, 30 September 1856, letters sent, roll 1.

<sup>89</sup> Charles Welsh to L.M. Goldsborough, 10 October 1856, letters received, roll 2.

The 1857 practice cruise was scheduled to begin as usual in June after the close of final examinations. On 14 June Superintendent Goldsborough wrote the Secretary to ask that orders for the cruise be soon sent as the term was drawing to a close. Goldsborough requested that the ship be ordered to restrict her calls to Madeira, the Azores, the Canary Islands, and the Cape Verde Islands. He left it open to Commander Green to decide which places for supplies, as long as he returned to Annapolis Roads by 28 September.<sup>90</sup> Unfortunately, the Academy returned to using the *Preble* and on 22 June Goldsborough ordered Green to get the second- and fourth-class midshipmen – about sixty-two souls – on board as soon as possible.<sup>91</sup> The students were all embarked by 29 June and Green was ordered on his way. Goldsborough's proposed cruise had been approved, but he warned Green to avoid any ports where he thought there were epidemics. In any event, he was to stay at sea as much as possible and only come into port for supplies. For it was at sea, as always, that the pupils were taught the practical aspects of seamanship, and if in port they were expected to maintain proper deportment. Goldsborough added that if Green found any problems with the ship when they put to sea, which could not be fixed with the ship's assets, he could put into Hampton Roads or Norfolk for repairs.<sup>92</sup> The *Preble* arrived back at Annapolis on 28 September 1857.<sup>93</sup>

Early in 1858 Commandant Green made some recommendations for the coming summer cruise. The *Preble*, as various Superintendents had pointed out, was too small. Green estimated that the total number of second- and fourth-class midshipmen that would

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<sup>90</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Isaac Toucey, 14 June 1857, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>91</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to Joseph F. Green, 22 June 1857; and L.M. Goldsborough to J.F. Green, 26 June 1857, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>92</sup> L.M. Goldsborough to J.F. Green, 29 June 1857, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>93</sup> G.S. Blake to Isaac Toucey, 28 September 1857, letters sent, roll 2.

go to sea in 1858 was over one hundred, most of them fourth-class. Green rejected the idea of reducing the crew size, since it was already small and the men were needed to man the ship. He needed the crew to stay at its present size so the men would be “sufficiently numerous to cook and attend to the cleanliness of the ship independently of the students [sic] assistance.” He concluded that the *Plymouth*, or one of her class, was the best practice ship, but if the *Preble* had to be used, Green recommended some modifications.<sup>94</sup> Hammocks should be rearranged and backs put on the steerage lockers to prevent them from getting wet from leaks. The ship also needed more of them amidship, and the *Preble* needed a first-class sloop’s galley. The sinks needed to be raised and the shutters on the main deck needed to be refitted, among other items to be fixed or added.<sup>95</sup> Superintendent Blake forwarded Green’s comments to the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, and argued that the *Preble* was too small.<sup>96</sup> But in the end the ship that summer was again the *Preble*.

On 29 May 1858 Secretary Isaac Toucey approved Blake’s plan for that summer’s cruise and detailed a guard of marines for the *Preble*.<sup>97</sup> Commandant Craven received permission to sail to Cherbourg, Cadiz, Funchal, and then to the Windward Islands if he wished. If he arrived back in Chesapeake Bay early, he could exercise the students as he saw fit, as long as the *Preble* did not anchor at Annapolis before 27 September. Craven had experience commanding the practice ship before and Blake was confident of his skills. Although his orders were generally the same as for previous cruises, Blake added that he was to take care that the pupils should be fed as well as always, and that they were to take care

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<sup>94</sup> J.F. Green to G.S. Blake, 26 January 1858, letter sent, roll 2.

<sup>95</sup> J.F. Green, “Memorandum of Alterations &c required to be made in the Practice Ship *Preble*,” in J.F. Green to G.S. Blake, 26 January 1858, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>96</sup> G.S. Blake to Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, 27 January 1858, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>97</sup> Toucey to Blake, 29 May 1858, letters received, roll 2.

of their dress and personal habits while at mess.<sup>98</sup>

In the end, first-, second-, third- and fourth-class midshipmen were embarked on the *Preble* which put to sea on 24 June and arrived at Cherbourg on 18 July.<sup>99</sup> From Cherbourg they sailed on 20 July to Cadiz, arriving on 3 August. On 6 August they departed and arrived at Madeira on 11 August, before setting sail on 14 August for Norfolk, where they arrived on 12 September. The weather on the passage to Cherbourg and Cadiz was poor and many of the acting midshipmen suffered from seasickness. This resulted in much practice time aloft, and the battery time cut short, but better progress was made after they left Cadiz. As soon as they had set sail, the pupils were divided into two groups: one at the guns and another for making sail and getting underway. In addition, a day-and-night quarter-watch was instituted. Training was the same as on previous cruises, although Craven took pains to point out that the students were drilled as firemen and showed good progress. There was also a third class of midshipmen aboard who were occupied in determining the position of the ship, as well as in the use of the sextant and the chronometer.<sup>100</sup>

On 5 August 1858, Craven wrote from the *Preble*, that they had an arduous 14-day journey from Cherbourg. He reported that “we are all well – and the youngsters are *generally* [emphasis in original] behaving themselves.”<sup>101</sup> The only substantial blemish occurred when *Preble* returned to Chesapeake Bay. During the cruise the first lieutenant caught Acting Midshipman George Bache chewing tobacco. This was prohibited both at the Academy and at sea and the lieutenant should have reported the violation to Commander Craven, but instead told Bache he would overlook it if he pledged to refrain in the future. Bache so

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<sup>98</sup> G.S. Blake to T.T. Craven, 21 June 1858, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>99</sup> [unsigned], “US Practice Ship *Preble* off Naval Academy, Annapolis Md.” 21 June 1858, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>100</sup> Craven to Blake, 20 September 1858, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>101</sup> Craven to Blake, 5 August 1858, letters received, roll 1.

pledged, but he was later caught smoking. It was clear that Bache intended to continue to break one of the most stressed rules at the Academy, and Superintendent Blake told him that if his behaviour continued, the tobacco incident would be laid before the Secretary. Even so, Blake gave him another chance: he advised him to change his ways and told him that if he were good, the officers and professors would show him “all the kindness & consideration which *you will permit* [emphasis in original] us to extend to you.”<sup>102</sup> Bache was warned about his smoking again on 1 April 1859, but again was simply admonished and told again to refrain from the practice or face stronger action.<sup>103</sup>

Craven had looked forward to conducting several evolutions in the bay, but he was disappointed because on 15 September he received orders for the *Preble* to return at once to Annapolis to proceed immediately to Norfolk to be refitted for an expedition to Paraguay.<sup>104</sup> Craven felt that the abrupt end of the cruise deprived him the opportunity to instruct the students fully. He believed that returning to Annapolis removed “the very best means of carrying out through the coming session, a more thorough system of practical instructions in seamanship and gunnery than can be so well attained any where else as on board ship.” But he felt that the cruise went well and that there were many promising students on board.<sup>105</sup> Unfortunately, Lt. Cushman disagreed, but only because the ship was too small. He concluded that “I think that with the best the progress [of the Acting Midshipmen] may be looked upon as very good indeed. [I] Regret to say that there are too many whose want of ambition, combined with the difficulty of attending properly to so large a number of pupils

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<sup>102</sup> G.S. Blake to George M. Bache, 25 September 1858, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>103</sup> G.S. Blake to G.M. Bache, 1 April 1859, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>104</sup> Isaac Toucey to G.S. Blake, 14 September 1858, LS2; and Isaac Toucey to George S. Blake, 14 September 1858, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>105</sup> Craven to Blake, 20 September 1858, letters received, roll 2.

conspire to render the general result less favorable than I could have wished."<sup>106</sup>

Luckily, the Navy Department once again heeded the officers' complaints. On 28 May 1859 Isaac Toucey approved Superintendent Blake's summer cruise suggestions of 24 May 1859. That year the practice ship was the *Plymouth*, which carried one hundred and seven acting midshipmen on their training cruise beginning on 22 June. They visited Plymouth, Brest, and Funchal. They had put into Cadiz, but were placed in quarantine because the health officer informed them that the law required all vessels visiting the port to have a clear bill of health. The *Plymouth* was more welcome at Plymouth and Brest, where the local admirals invited the students to tour the naval facilities. Craven dispatched the pupils in parties under the command of Lieutenants Marcy and Carter. Seamanship and navigational training was similar to previous years, and Craven noted that after the morning watch the students were exercised aloft for one and one-half hours. The watch, from 10:30 until 11:30am, and from 1 until 3:30pm, was drilled in strapping blocks, knotting, splicing, and fitting the rigging. Meanwhile, the watches below spent two and one-half hours before and after noon studying navigation. And as always, on the homeward passage the acting midshipmen of the first class were in charge of the deck from 8am until 8pm. One new addition for the 1859 cruise was the requirement of the acting midshipmen to keep journals.<sup>107</sup> Craven concluded that "their journals have been examined by me and many of them show a very creditable degree of observation on the parts of those who have written them."<sup>108</sup>

On 26 June 1859, Commander Craven wrote about the beginnings of the 1859

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<sup>106</sup> Lt. C.H. Cushman to Commander T.T. Craven, 18 September 1858, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>107</sup> Some of these are housed in the Special Collections section of the Academy Library. But unfortunately, due to time constraints, the author was unable to assess them for this project.

<sup>108</sup> Craven to Blake, 27 September 1859, letters received, roll 2.



summer practice cruise. Thus far everything was going well on the *Plymouth* and he was pleased with the attitude of the students. He wrote that several of the officers' "styles have an electrifying effect upon the youngsters and crew – the boys all seem to be determined to make the most of their time – and improve themselves – and I hope I may be able to make a good report of them on our return."<sup>109</sup> Soon after the vessel left Annapolis, Craven posted a general order describing what was expected of the students in seamanship, navigation, and duty. By late July they had arrived in Plymouth and Craven once more wrote to Blake to report their progress. The cruise was going remarkably well, the students carried out their duties to the best of their abilities and were making good strides in learning seamanship and navigation. There had only been two complaints against the students, and those simply involved "leaving the deck without permission."<sup>110</sup>

On its way to Plymouth, the *Plymouth* passed through "the Banks" – the Grand Banks of Newfoundland – on 8 July. Craven wrote that they "passed through a fleet of fishermen [and] took advantage of the occasion to supply ourselves with some 600 lbs of fresh codfish and halibut." He noted that "[t]he poor French man, whom we boarded, was quite happy when our boat left him – as he remarked that he thought war had broken out between England and France and that we were English in disguise."<sup>111</sup> When they arrived in Plymouth, they were "most cordially received by Sir Barrington Reynolds – the Port Admiral" who invited the students to tour the dockyard and for Craven to join him for dinner. Craven thanked him for the offer, but declined the dinner invitation because he had enough to do to "take care of the youngsters" and ready them for touring the dockyard.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> Craven to Blake, 26 June 1859, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>110</sup> Craven to Blake, 25 July 1859, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>111</sup> Craven to Blake, 25 July 1859, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>112</sup> Craven to Blake, 25 July 1859, letters received, roll 1.

The next stop was Brest, where Craven planned to stay long enough “for the youngsters to take a run through the dock yard.”<sup>113</sup> On 1 August, Craven wrote again from Brest. He and the students were getting ready to sail after having to return due to bad weather and the need for repairs. Craven told Blake that they had sailed from Plymouth on 25 July and had first arrived in Brest on 28 July. Craven let “the boys have a run on shore” and then tried to sail on Saturday evening, only to be forced back by the bad weather. He was sad to have to write that some of the “young gentlemen [emphasis in original]” were behaving like “black guards [emphasis in original]” and he wished to see Acting Midshipman Morgan Lewis Ogden, of the ‘58 Date, dismissed from the Academy.<sup>114</sup> During the last day they were in Plymouth, Craven had let Ogden and some other students go ashore with Lt. Carter to visit the dockyard. Once they landed, all the party except Acting Midshipmen Merriman<sup>115</sup> and Bradley,<sup>116</sup> ditched Lt. Carter and left the yard. When they returned to the *Plymouth*, Ogden, Phoenix,<sup>117</sup> and Bowen<sup>118</sup> were drunk. Craven wrote that “Ogden was so drunk that he” was lying “in the bottom of the boat, and was obliged to be lifted on board by some of the boats [sic] crew.”<sup>119</sup> They were far from model officers.

Craven also wrote that he hoped people would not worry if they were later returning

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<sup>113</sup> Craven to Blake, 25 July 1859, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>114</sup> Craven to Blake, 1 August 1859, letters received, roll 1; and *Register of Alumni*.

<sup>115</sup> Probably Edgar Clarence Merriman, about 18 years old of the ‘57 Date (*Register of Alumni*).

<sup>116</sup> First name unknown.

<sup>117</sup> Probably Lloyd Phoenix, about 17 years old, of the ‘57 Date (*Register of Alumni* and United States Naval Academy, Registers of Candidates for Admission to the Academy, Oct. 1849-Oct. 1860, Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. Hereafter, Registers of Candidates for Admission).

<sup>118</sup> Probably Thomas Bowen, about 18 years old, of the ‘57 Date (*Register of Alumni* and Registers of Candidates for Admission).

<sup>119</sup> Craven to Blake, 1 August 1859, letters received, roll 1.

to Chesapeake Bay than had been planned because the winds were proving “very variable, and have not blown with their usual force for nearly two months past.” But he took the opportunity in Brest to fill up on extra water in the event the cruise lasted longer than expected. Craven also wrote that, due to the unpredictability of the cruise, one of Blake’s relatives on board would be unable to meet with his father, George Batty Blake, in Paris. Craven wrote, “the time of our arrival at and departing from Cadiz are too uncertain to warrant the risk of the youngster’s going to Paris with a view of rejoining the ship at Cadiz.”<sup>120</sup>

The *Plymouth* arrived at Hampton Roads on 15 September, but Craven was too tired to file much of a report that day.<sup>121</sup> Their arrival at Cadiz had not gone well. The authorities there had placed them all in quarantine because they did not have bills of health. Craven was perplexed because the previous year the port did not require them to produce such a document. Craven wrote that he had waited nineteen hours for a decision and ended up leaving “in disgust.” Next they sailed to Madeira, where they found the USS *Constellation*, which Craven thought was a “fine ship miserably officered.” From there they sailed to Cape Hatteras, averaging about 140 miles a day.<sup>122</sup>

Craven was pleased at the behaviour of the acting midshipmen. There had been the one incident of drunkenness at Plymouth, but otherwise he found no complaint with the students. Craven wrote that

I have never seen a more manageable set – and the 1<sup>st</sup> class have from the beginning shown every disposition to improve themselves, and set a good example to the others – They navigated the ship – unaided by any one up to

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<sup>120</sup> Craven to Blake, 1 August 1859, letters received, roll I.

<sup>121</sup> Craven to Blake, 15 September 1850, letters received, roll I.

<sup>122</sup> Craven to Blake, 19 September 1859, letters received, roll I.

the Capes, all the way from Madeira – and a better “land fall” was never made – when I told the officer of the deck, last Wednesday night that it was “about time to see the light ahead – from the fore yard” – he sent a man up there who immediately called out light ho! – right ahead sir!<sup>123</sup>

They were then at Hampton Roads and rooms were being assigned to the students. Craven had decided to let each draw a room by lot, then pick his roommate. Craven believed this was the fairest thing to do, and would also prevent “cliques getting an advantage over us.” He was now waiting for supplies to come from the navy yard and would soon proceed home.<sup>124</sup>

By the fall of 1859 there was something of a housing crisis at the Academy and some of the newer classes of students had to be housed on a school ship docked along side the institution.<sup>125</sup> What may have started out as a crisis turned out to be beneficial for the students. The school ship provided a place where the new appointees could be introduced to naval life and discipline while being educated in the safety of a ship tied up along shore. The institution of the school ship starting in 1859 gave these students added practice in seamanship and naval discipline, which showed during the summer cruise of 1860. Shore-based and sea-based training were now a fully integrated system.

In the fall of 1859 twenty-one of the pupils from the last year’s fourth class were repeating a year. Blake recommended that they be trained onshore and kept separate from the new fourth class; the new appointees, about eighty-five, should be sent to the *Plymouth*.<sup>126</sup> The fourth-class students were put on the *Plymouth*, but they were well looked after. Even though they were housed on the ship they needed a steward, cook, landsmen, and cabin

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<sup>123</sup> Craven to Blake, 19 September 1859, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>124</sup> Craven to Blake, 19 September 1859, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>125</sup> Anne Maire Drew, (ed.), *Letters from Annapolis: Midshipmen Write Home, 1848-1969* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 31.

<sup>126</sup> G.S. Blake to Isaac Toucey, 27 September 1859, letters sent, roll 2.

servant to look after everybody.<sup>127</sup> In addition, books were put on board for the students to use and they were forbidden to draw books from the Academy library, until they were housed on shore.<sup>128</sup> By 19 November there were fifty-three students on the *Plymouth* and Blake expected that another fifty-five would pass their admission tests and also be placed on the ship. The *Plymouth* was too small and Blake hoped that a larger ship could be stationed at the Academy to house the fourth-class midshipmen.<sup>129</sup>

The school ship *Plymouth* was not without its disciplinary problems, but the pupils were generally well behaved. A 20% random sample of the conduct roll for the school ship for the academic year 1859-1860 revealed that about 22% of the students committed almost 60% of the offences that were given demerit points. They tended to commit offences related to their study periods: study-hours or study-room offences composed 34.0% of the sampled offences; the next highest was absenteeism which was far behind at 9.0% of the sampled offences. Offences such as disobedience of orders were, like onshore, hardly worth mentioning: 0.5% of the sampled offences. Generally the pupils tended to be absent more from military functions than academic ones; while it is impossible to compare lateness because there were only two cases found in the sample. As with on shore, most of the students were reported by officers attached to the school ship, as opposed to other midshipmen. And the students provided no excuse for 75% of the sampled offences. (See Appendix B, Tables B.8 and B.9).

Disciplinary tactics on the school ship were similar to those on shore. The Superintendent gave the pupils second chances, but after repeated disorder he dealt with

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<sup>127</sup> G.S. Blake to Isaac Toucey, 14 October 1859, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>128</sup> G.S. Blake to T.T. Craven, 31 October 1859, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>129</sup> G.S. Blake to Isaac Toucey, 19 November 1859; he reiterated his call on 9 May 1860 (G.S. Blake to Isaac Toucey, 9 May 1860, letters sent, roll 2).

them more seriously. Drinking was a concern on the school ship, as on shore. Midshipman Thomas T. Turner was found with some other midshipmen on the spar-deck of the *Plymouth* with a bottle of liquor. He admitted being there, but denied he was under the influence of alcohol. The members of the fourth class pledged to refrain from alcohol in response to Turner and another student, G.K. Haswell, being apprehended. But Craven returned their pledge to them because he believed it was formulated too quickly and that they should think more about it.<sup>130</sup> By March 1860 the Superintendent determined to removed one-third of the demerits of the acting midshipmen on the *Plymouth* if they maintained their general good behaviour, and told Craven to inform them, probably to give them added incentive to be good.<sup>131</sup>

But despite Blake's incentive, Haswell was found drunk on 29 February 1860, but "as it was your first offence, & you expressed great contrition for it, I did not recommend your dismissal." Still, the Secretary reprimanded him. Blake reminded Haswell that the Secretary warned him to be on good behaviour or he would be left without any choice but take stronger actions. When Blake discovered that Haswell was involved in a disorder on the school ship during the night on 9 April, Blake told him that his time may have run out: "I am now deliberating whether to recommend your dismissal from the service or not – Have you any explanation to offer?"<sup>132</sup>

On the night of 9 April there was a disturbance on the *Plymouth*. About forty-three students were involved in making noise, throwing tables and water, and yelling into all hours of the night. They even tried to break into the steward's locker and succeeded in keeping the

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<sup>130</sup> Thomas T. Turner to Lt. Wyman, 4 January 1860; T.T. Craven to G.S. Blake, 11 March 1860; and J.H. Reed et al. to G.S. Blake, 26 February 1860, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>131</sup> G.S. Blake to T.T. Craven, 19 March 1860, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>132</sup> G.S. Blake to G.K. Haswell, 13 April 1860, letters sent, roll 2.

servants and crew awake all night.<sup>133</sup> After the racket, Blake concluded that it showed much had to be done to ensure it never happened again. He ordered that another lieutenant be stationed on the *Plymouth*, for a total of two; one was to remain on duty at all times – two if needed – to ensure good order and discipline. The lieutenant on duty was ordered regularly to visit the berth deck, which was to remain well lit at night. Blake also ordered Craven to do whatever was needed to prevent such an outburst again.<sup>134</sup> There was an attempt to hold an inquiry on the school ship, but questions over its legitimacy appear to have resulted in a termination of its investigation.<sup>135</sup> Lt. John Upshur also tried to question the students, but most refused to comment on the noise. The whole matter was reported to the Secretary: through Blake he told them that only their “limited knowledge of the usages of the service” saved them all from dismissal.<sup>136</sup>

The Superintendent suggested, and the Secretary of the Navy agreed, that their disorder was caused by the “impression prevailing among the young gentlemen that, by combining, they can commit irregularities with impunity.” The Secretary suggested that for their own and their friend’s sakes, they should “disabuse their minds of this impression without delay.” Secretary Toucey believed that subordination and the ability to enforce it was critical for the running of any military organization.<sup>137</sup> He wanted to stamp out any idea that the pupils could combine forces to have their own way:

Combinations to set discipline at defiance will be prevented at all hazards:

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<sup>133</sup> J.H. Upshur to T.T. Craven, 10 April 1860, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>134</sup> G.S. Blake to T.T. Craven, 11 April 1860, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>135</sup> T.T. Craven, Samuel Marcy, and E. Simpson to G.S. Blake, 10 April 1860, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>136</sup> G.S. Blake to T.T. Craven, 24 April 1860, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>137</sup> Isaac Toucey to George S. Blake, 20 April 1860, letters received, roll 2.

and, if it be necessary, those who are guilty and those who combine with them to screen them from the consequences of their guilt, will be confounded in one common punishment. And, however large the number of those whom the Department might find it necessary to dismiss from the service, it would find no difficulty in replacing them by others more willing to submit to the necessary restraints of military discipline.<sup>138</sup>

Toucey told Blake to read his comments to the students and then to use “such admonitions” as he thought were needed to drive the point home. They were warned that the Department would refrain from taking action against them now, but “their names are on record here” for their misbehaviour.<sup>139</sup> The Academy tried to escalate the level of punishment as their behaviour worsened, and the students fought back by sticking together.

The 1860 summer cruise showed the success the Academy authorities found with the increasing integration of shore-based and sea-based training, in particular with the establishment of the school ship. In Blake’s annual instructions to Craven, he told him to carry out the same training – educational and disciplinary – as always. But there was one new instruction: Craven was to visit US consuls at the ports at which they called to help the commercial interests of the United States wherever he could “without sacrificing the special objects of your cruise.”<sup>140</sup> The summer cruises were to show the flag.

The 1860 cruise embarked members of the first, second, third and fourth classes.<sup>141</sup> although some students were aboard before it officially set sail. On 17 June the vessel anchored off Hampton Roads en route to the Gosport Navy Yard to outrig the ship for the summer. Edward Simpson, another officer, reported that they had made slower time getting

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<sup>138</sup> Isaac Toucey to George S. Blake, 20 April 1860, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>139</sup> Isaac Toucey to George S. Blake, 20 April 1860, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>140</sup> G.S. Blake to T.T. Craven, 20 June 1860, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>141</sup> [unsigned], “US Ship “Plymouth” off Naval Academy, June 11<sup>th</sup> 1860,” 11 June 1860, letters sent, roll 2.



there than he had hoped. He reported that this gave the students a chance to practice before they entered the open sea where they would find that the motion of the ship would make their jobs harder. Presently, Simpson reported, they were “stationed as loosers and furlers on the lower, top gallant, and royal yards, and have become quite expert in furling in light weather.” Simpson was impressed at how well they handled themselves aloft, in particular the fourth class midshipmen – the youngest. Simpson commented that the older students did well but that “it is not natural to suppose that young men who have not been on board of a ship for the space of two years, can compete with others who have been living on board for nine months and whose playground during that time has been the rigging.” Simpson attributed the improved quality of that year’s students to the practice of housing the younger ones on board the school ship. He professed that if the class sizes fell in the next few years so that all the classes could be housed on shore, ridding the Academy of the school ship would be a step backwards.<sup>142</sup>

By 1860 the summer practice cruises had settled into a routine: teaching the future commanders how to run a ship by simulating various procedures and emergencies, as well as training them in practical seamanship. Still, the students were youngsters and needed constant structure in all aspects of life. One thing that Simpson was missing at present was a Chaplain. He declared that the practice ship, of all ships in the navy, needed a Chaplain: “it seems very hard that these young gentlemen, in whom so much interest is felt in all parts of the country, should be turned adrift so young without some spiritual provision being made for their eternal welfare.”<sup>143</sup> The *Plymouth* set sail from Norfolk on 27 June, stopped at the Azores, arrived at Fayal on 17 July, then sailed for Cadiz. When the students arrived on the *Plymouth* they were divided into watches every quarter to perform various evolutions, and

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<sup>142</sup> Edward Simpson, 17 June 1860, letters received, roll 3.

<sup>143</sup> Edward Simpson, 17 June 1860, letters received, roll 3.

Craven ensured that there was always one watch on deck to help the crew. The classes were instructed as they had been in previous years – the first class in the use of the sextant, finding the position of the ship, the use of the chronometer, and variations of the compass at different latitudes. This year they were also taught how to find their position using the moon and stars by the “Summers’ method,” as well as to find latitude by the first and second Bowditch’s methods. During previous summer cruises Craven had instructed the students in the use of the marking spike, but found that this year it was unnecessary because they were sufficiently drilled during the academic year on the school ship.<sup>144</sup>

Craven’s comparison of the classes on the summer cruise shows that afterward he thought the first and third classes did better than the second and fourth. The average rank of the first and third classes fell between good and very good, while the second and fourth classes averaged between fair and good. When it came to attention to duty alone, the second class only averaged between tolerable and fair. The fourth-class midshipmen averaged third behind the first and third classes, and ahead of their older comrades in the second class. (For details of analysis procedure see Appendix C, Table C.1, C.2, and C.3).<sup>145</sup>

Their training during the academic year also allowed the students on the practice cruise to spend more time on other topics. The extra shore training enabled Craven to devote more time to the older classes and “at an earlier period of the cruise to place the young gentlemen of the 1<sup>st</sup> class in charge of the deck, requiring them when so occupied to perform all the duties of Lieutenant in charge of the watch.” The first class had progressed well during this year’s cruise. They had navigated the *Plymouth* from Teneriffe to Cape Henry and Craven was confident of their abilities. They were able to measure the heights of mountains and find their position in a harbour using the chart and the “three point problem” method.

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<sup>144</sup> Craven to Blake, 30 September 1860, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>145</sup> Craven’s aptitude report, in Craven to Blake, 30 September 1860, letters received, roll 2.

During one of their stops. Lt. Buckner was able to use some spare time to introduce the first class to “in surveying, measuring the angles and running lines of soundings for an outline sketch of the rivers mouth.”<sup>146</sup>

The ship arrived at Cadiz on 1 August and was, like the previous year, immediately put into quarantine because Fayal officers in the Azores noted in the ship’s bill of health that they had been in areas reportedly with a contagious disease. Craven reported that the ship had sailed terribly, there was a growth of oysters on her bottom and she was out of trim. But “the boys so far have given me no trouble – and they work ship almost equal to an old practiced crew.” Craven hoped to be back in Chesapeake Bay by 5 or 6 of September, where “drill will be a thousand times more instructive than it can [be] on these long cruises.” He concluded that “all on board are well – exceedingly so – and appear to be happy.”<sup>147</sup> But he was unable to obtain an answer as to how long the *Plymouth* would be in quarantine before the crew were allowed to go ashore, so they left again the next day with the intention of going to Gibraltar, but because of poor weather sailed instead to Madeira. They anchored off Funchal on 5 August for three days before proceeding to Santa Cruz, arriving on 10 August. The *Plymouth* only stayed at Santa Cruz for the day, then set sail for Chesapeake Bay, and arrived on 3 September 1860 at Hampton Roads.<sup>148</sup>

The *Plymouth* arrived home off “Old Point” on 3 September 1860, after twenty-two-and-one-half days sail from Santa Cruz. Craven reported that the cruise had been pleasant and that the boys gave him no trouble. He hoped that their early arrival in America would allow him to drill them more so that “by the time we arrive at Annapolis [they] will have learned something worth while.” He intended for the *Plymouth* to spend some more time at

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<sup>146</sup> Craven to Blake, 30 September 1860, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>147</sup> Craven to Blake, 2 August 1860, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>148</sup> Craven to Blake, 30 September 1860, letters received, roll 2.

“Old Point” and to depart on Friday or Saturday for Annapolis, slowly making its way up Chesapeake Bay so that it arrived at Annapolis by the end of September.<sup>149</sup>

On 15 September, Craven wrote Blake that they were progressing faster than had been planned because his servant was dying of consumption. In the meantime, he began assigning rooms to the students for the coming year. Room assignments had been by lottery and any leftover rooms could be drawn by those who already had roommates. But Craven then decided to assign the room so that “each class will be kept entirely separate” to aid in keeping them well behaved. He wished that Blake could come and watch the first class perform its duties, as Craven was impressed by their progress. Craven planned to “keep the boys busy until it is time for us to anchor in the Severn – on our arrival off the Academy – the ship will be worked entirely by the youngsters.”<sup>150</sup> In another letter sent on 15 September, Craven countered the claims that there had been “terrible sickness” on the *Plymouth*; there had never been a healthier crew.<sup>151</sup> In the meantime, the *Plymouth* lingered off Point Lookout and ran drills. On 19 September they fired at a target and exercised with the yards, masts, and reefing. On 20 September they practised with the topmast, lower yards, and stripped the main mast.<sup>152</sup> The final summer cruise of the Pre-Civil War Naval Academy was drawing to a close.

But the increasing size of the classes of midshipmen had a detrimental impact on the training cruises. The first class was larger than in previous years and left the practice-cruise instructors with little time to devote to the third class of acting midshipmen. Craven reported that by the time the *Plymouth* arrived at Fayal the third class “could work out satisfactorily

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<sup>149</sup> Craven to Blake, 3 September 1860, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>150</sup> Craven to Blake, letter 1, 15 September 1860, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>151</sup> Craven to Blake, letter 2, 15 September 1860, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>152</sup> Craven to Blake, 20 September 1860, letters received, roll 1.

the ‘dead reckoning’ and have since become expert in plane traverse, middle latitude and traverse sailings and many of them have acquired skill in the use of the sextant.” The training for all the classes had gone particularly well since they had arrived back in Chesapeake Bay and each member of the first class took charge of the deck. Under instructions from Craven and the other members of the crew, the first class practised getting the *Plymouth* underway or bringing her to anchor, as well as methods of wearing and tacking. They were also drilled on how to handle the ship during various cases of danger, such as the loss of the rudder, and how to put the vessel in various positions and courses under different weather and wind conditions.<sup>153</sup>

The students were also drilled on how to transfer heavy anchors between two ships as well as how to heave off if the ship ran aground. In one exercise, they transferred an anchor that weighed more than 5000 lbs between two quarter boats. The anchor was then placed fifty fathoms from the ship and forty-five fathoms of cable were “hailed out under the same two boats and shackled to the fifteen fathoms already out.” Occasionally, as an exercise during the cruise, there was called out the alarm of “man overboard.” Craven was impressed with how the students in charge of the deck handled themselves.<sup>154</sup> In one particular case the

cry of “man overboard” was once given when the ship was going at the rate of eight knots; the life buoy was let go, the [life] boat lowered [.] the ship brought to, the buoy picked up, the boat alongside again & hoisted up in her place, the ship . . . [was] away & [was] standing on her course under all sail, in seven minutes & twenty seconds from the time of the first alarm.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Craven to Blake, 30 September 1860, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>154</sup> Craven to Blake, 30 September 1860, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>155</sup> Craven to Blake, 30 September 1860, letters received, roll 2.

The students were also drilled in gunnery, which went well, but Craven was most impressed by the effect he believed the school ship had on the overall performance of the midshipmen on the practice ship. Craven was impressed by the performance of the third class and believed that the improvement of the lower classes was a result of the school ship. Craven thought that "it seems to me the experiment of putting the 4<sup>th</sup> class on board ship for the first year of the academic course, has proved eminently successful." Craven felt that the abilities of the third class were better than those of the first class when it came to practical seamanship. The third class was efficient and useful "where prompt assistance was required in the management of the yards" and sails.<sup>156</sup> The *Plymouth* arrived at Annapolis on 29 September 1860 and Superintendent Blake agreed with Craven's assessment that the school ship had benefited the summer practice cruise.<sup>157</sup> The shore and sea-based education system for midshipmen was becoming fully integrated, complementing each other, and this showed at sea with better acting midshipmen. But the 1860 summer cruise was the last before the outbreak of Civil War.

From 1851 to 1860 the summer practice cruises trained the students for their future careers. Their behaviour was generally good, but the Academy had no room for anyone who wanted to be a stereotypical Jack Tar and handled them accordingly. At sea they learned how a ship was run, and how naval officers were to behave both at sea and in foreign ports. For several years the Academy had difficulty accommodating the students on the small practice ship, and they constantly demanded a larger vessel. Yet despite the problems, by 1859 the summer cruise was supplemented with a shore school ship for the fourth-class midshipmen which benefited them when they went to sea the next summer. The summer cruises

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<sup>156</sup> Craven to Blake, 30 September 1860, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>157</sup> G.S. Blake to Isaac Toucey, 28 September 1860; and G.S. Blake to Isaac Toucey, 4 October 1860, letters sent, roll 2.

complemented the onshore training and provided the students with a safe, practical, transition to their naval career. There can be little doubt that most of the parents of these middle-class youths would have been pleased with how their sons were introduced to life at sea.

But this strategy was interrupted during the 1860-1861 academic year by the Civil War. That fall new students were embarked on the school ship *Constitution*, while other classes continued instruction on shore. For most of this last academic year life was normal, but as the Civil War slowly approached, cracks began to show in Academy life. There were few disputes between students, or between students and the authorities. It was only when all hope seemed lost, as states seceded from the union, that regional attachments bubbled to the surface and students went their separate ways. They were truly a "band of brothers" until the final days.

### ***Epilogue: Outbreak of War***

At first the last academic year of the Academy at Annapolis before the outbreak of Civil War was like any other. Classes resumed in October as in previous years and administrative routine was normal. On 12 December 1860 the Navy Department approved Superintendent George Blake's suggestion of 11 December that "the howitzer drill submitted by Lieut. Parker be substituted for the one now used at the Academy, and that it be conducted by Lieut. Parker himself."<sup>1</sup> On 14 January 1861 the Department approved the recommendations of the Academic Board to add topographical and hydrographical drawing to the program and to substitute Winslow's *Ethics* for Wayland.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, on 25 February 1861 the Secretary of the Navy, Isaac Toucey, authorized the top five students in each class to wear a metallic star on their jacket sleeves for their achievement.<sup>3</sup> Previously, a star was placed next to their names, but W.B. Maclay suggested as an added stimulus it was to be worn on their uniforms and to be awarded at each examination.<sup>4</sup>

But some stresses showed. The number of students was still increasing and the Academy was still having difficulty accommodating them. The increased class sizes brought calls from the professors for more assistants to help them teach. Before the fall session began, French Professor Girault complained that the third class would consist of 90 pupils, while 47 would be in the second class. Girault wanted an assistant because he believed he

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<sup>1</sup> Isaac Toucey to Capt. George S. Blake, 12 December 1860. Letters received by the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, 1845-1887 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M949, roll 1); Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland. Hereafter, letters received.

<sup>2</sup> Isaac Toucey to Capt. George S. Blake, 12 January 1861, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>3</sup> Isaac Toucey to George S. Blake, 25 February 1861, letters received, roll 3.

<sup>4</sup> W.B. Maclay to Isaac Toucey, 21 February 1861, letters received, roll 3.



and his present staff would be unable to instruct that number adequately.<sup>5</sup> Joseph Winlock, professor of mathematics, had the same concerns and wanted four assistants.<sup>6</sup> Professor H.E. Nourse, who taught ethics and English, also desired more help and suggested the appointment of Master E.P. Lull, who was willing to help.<sup>7</sup> By 6 September, Secretary Toucey responded: Lt. Parker and Master Lull were appointed assistant professors of mathematics, while Lt. Selfridge was appointed assistant professor of ethics.<sup>8</sup>

Professor Winlock still believed he needed more assistants and opined that the classes should be divided into smaller numbers. He felt that this was particularly important in the lower classes so that each student would receive some measure of individual attention.<sup>9</sup> Winlock concluded that

in the fourth class, particularly, so much is dependent upon an early and correct knowledge of the acquirements and mental aptitudes and the consequent correct classification of this large numbers of youths of very unequal ability and education, that any want of sufficient attention to them in the beginning of the term, must, inevitably serve to increase the number of failures at the February examination.<sup>10</sup>

He also argued that the officers assigned to teaching should be knowledgeable and have the time to carry out their tasks properly.<sup>11</sup> But the Navy Department responded slowly to

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<sup>5</sup> Girault to Isaac Toucey, 7 July 1860, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>6</sup> Winlock to Blake, 21 July 1860, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>7</sup> H.E. Nourse to Blake, 30 July 1860, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>8</sup> Toucey to Blake, 6 September 1860, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>9</sup> Winlock, 6 October 1860, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>10</sup> Winlock, 6 October 1860, letters received, roll 2.

<sup>11</sup> Winlock, 6 October 1860, letters received, roll 2.

requests for more instructors.

Regardless of the growing pains, life at the Academy continued. Once again during the academic year students were housed on a school ship tied up alongside the Academy – ironically, the USS *Constitution*. The Commandant of Midshipmen for that year, C.R.P. Rodgers, wrote in February 1861 that “[t]his ship endeared to every American by her glorious history, has become the threshold over which the officers of our navy are hereafter to enter their profession, and will be the standard to which they shall refer for comparison, whatever they may hereafter observe, in the equipments of ships of war.”<sup>12</sup> He believed that the *Constitution*, like the *Plymouth*, the previous school ship, would be the place where the midshipmen of the Academy would learn their craft before going into the open sea.<sup>13</sup> The second and third classes spent some time on board learning the traditional ways of the sea. Under the supervision of an instructor, they combed the vessel to study her rigging and other features. They were required to “exhibit their sketches and make recitations upon those subjects to which their attention had been directed.” Rodgers believed that the ship was a textbook: “our young aspirants will derive their knowledge not merely from printed books or models, but from a ship of war” similar to the type they would one day command.<sup>14</sup>

But even in early 1861, Academy officials were concerned over the safety of the young men. In the event of bad weather, the second and third classes were occupied on shore, rather than aboard the ship in the Severn River. Their time was still “advantageously used under cover” at the battery or receiving instruction from one of the petty officers, who taught

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<sup>12</sup> C.R.P. Rodgers, Commandant of Midshipmen and Instructor in Seamanship to Capt. G.S. Blake, Superintendent, 23 February 1861, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>13</sup> A reminder to the reader not to confuse the school ships (the *Constitution* and the *Plymouth*) and the summer practice ships (the *Preble* and the *Plymouth*). The school ships remained tied up at the Academy from October to June, while the practice ships went out to sea during the summer. (See chapter 7).

<sup>14</sup> C.R.P. Rodgers, Commandant of Midshipmen and Instructor in Seamanship to Capt. G.S. Blake, Superintendent, 23 February 1861, letters received, roll 1.

them seamanship skills, such as knotting and splicing rope. Meanwhile, the second class would "spend its time in receiving oral instruction, or will be questioned by its instructors and exhibit upon the black board, the knowledge its members may have gleaned from the rigging and interior of the ship." Rodgers believed that the goal of the Academy was to instruct the midshipmen in the routines of warship operations so that they would be "prepared to enter upon the duties which shall be assigned them as midshipmen, masters, and watch officers." It was the object of the instruction to "give the youth committed to our charge a practical knowledge of what will be required of them in the lower grades, rather than a theoretical knowledge of that which pertains more particularly to the higher."<sup>15</sup> But despite his advocacy of shipboard and practical education, he concluded that the department of seamanship needed "a good text book upon naval routine, evolutions, and the general handling of ships and boats. And another upon stowage, masting, rigging and all matters pertaining to equipment."<sup>16</sup> At the Academy there had to be a balance between book and practical learning.

By 26 September the *Constitution* was outfitted as the fourth-class school ship for that academic year. Superintendent Blake thought Old Ironsides appropriate, but feared that it would later be unsuitable as the summer practice ship because her draught was too great and she was unable to leave harbour unless she was unburdened. He estimated that it would require six weeks to refit the ship to practice-ship standards, an expensive task which would interfere with the fourth-class's studies. The *Constitution*, a much larger ship than the *Plymouth*, also needed one hundred more crew to operate as a practice ship. Blake believed that the *Plymouth* was the best-suited vessel for the students and he advocated that she

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<sup>15</sup> C.R.P. Rodgers, Commandant of Midshipmen and Instructor in Seamanship to Capt. G.S. Blake, Superintendent, 23 February 1861, letters received, roll I.

<sup>16</sup> C.R.P. Rodgers, Commandant of Midshipmen and Instructor in Seamanship to Capt. G.S. Blake, Superintendent, 23 February 1861, letters received, roll I.

remain the Academy's summer ship.<sup>17</sup>

It appears that several classes of students were housed on the *Constitution*: the fourth-class of new appointees from that fall, and the second and third classes by at least early 1861. The age of the fourth-class students averaged 16.43 years, and ranged between 14 and 18.25 years.<sup>18</sup> On 15 September, Robley D. Evans passed his Academy entrance exam and after five days leave reported to the *Constitution*. Evans found the exam easy; otherwise "many of us would not have followed the navy as a profession." But an Academy candidate had to be physically fit and to have "a fair foundation on which to build the education required of a sea officer[.]" although this excluded applied science, education and law, concentrating instead on seamanship and gunnery.<sup>19</sup> Evans thought he owed George Rodgers, captain of the *Constitution*, everything that made up his professional life. As for his class:

We had one hundred and twenty-seven men in the class when we settled down to work, an average lot, from all parts of the country, and representing the various classes of American life – North, South, East, and West. I was the only one from Utah, and I believe the first one ever appointed from that Territory either in the navy or the army.<sup>20</sup>

Life on the *Constitution* was qualitatively better than that led by midshipmen before the creation of the Academy. Evans wrote that "[o]ur life on board ship was pleasant and

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<sup>17</sup> G.S. Blake to Isaac Toucey, 26 September 1860, Letters sent by the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy 1845-1865 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M945, roll 2); Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland. Hereafter, letters sent.

<sup>18</sup> Of the 114 cases of students appointed in 1860, there were 30 missing cases. The standard deviation was 1.06 (G.S. Blake to Isaac Toucey, 20 September 1860, letters sent, roll 2).

<sup>19</sup> Robley D. Evans, *A Sailor's Log: Recollections of Forty Years of Naval Life* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, reprint, 1994), 41-43.

<sup>20</sup> Evans, 45; editor's note reveals the first from Utah was actually Edward S. Ruggles appointed 21 September 1858, while the first to West Point was Samuel McKee, who began 1 July 1854 as a cadet (Evans, footnote 5).

novel, and our education on the lines that would fit us for the duties we would in the future have to perform.” Although the ship was tied up next to the Academy, Evans believed it isolated because it was approachable only along the long narrow wharf or by boat. All their lessons took place on board, separate from the older classes: “[w]e never came in contact with them except when on shore for drill, or on Saturday, when we passed their quarters on our way to the town on liberty.”<sup>21</sup> Evans reflected that life was simple on the *Constitution*. He remembered that

[o]n board ship we had our hammocks to sleep in instead of bunks, and our messing was regulated just as it would have been on a cruising vessel. In fact, we lived under service conditions; and while it is now the fashion to decry such training in favour of barracks on shore, I have yet to be convinced that for the conditions then existing it was not the best.<sup>22</sup>

Evans believed that he and his fellow students “grew into ship life gradually and naturally[.]” slowly learning all the parts of the ship. Later in life, he felt that in no other way could sea knowledge have been gained.<sup>23</sup>

Charles E. Clark was another student who started naval life on the *Constitution* that fall. The young midshipmen had a good relationship with Lieutenant John H. Upshur’s wife. Charles wrote that as a young boy he was concerned about his mother, often running home to see if she had been kidnapped. He thought Upshur’s wife appreciated his fears; he wrote that “[s]he not only was lovely to look upon, but had an unrivalled [sic] faculty for detecting the homesick, shy, and despondent among the boys and drawing them into the charmed circle about her.” Lt. Upshur told one young man, William “Bill Pip” K. Pipkin, to escort his wife

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<sup>21</sup> Evans, 46.

<sup>22</sup> Evans, 48.

<sup>23</sup> Evans, 48.

home, but Pipkin replied he was unable to do so because “the last thing Dad and Ma said to me when I left home, was: ‘Bill Pip, you beware of the women!’” Pipkin was about a year older than the other students and had “fallen back” into Charles’ class. Charles concluded that but for the support of Mrs. Upshur, Pipkin probably would have failed at the first round of examinations. As it was, Pipkin never became a naval officer and “[r]umor says he became the colonel of a Confederate regiment when only twenty-three, and ended his life as a millionaire.” The editor of Charles’ autobiography noted that the rumour was false: instead, Pipkin became a private in the Second Missouri Cavalry and probably served as an enlisted man in the Confederate Navy. After the Civil War, Pipkin practised law in Missouri until 1880, when he left his wife and children and became a miner in Idaho, where he died in 1919.<sup>24</sup>

The *Constitution* had four recitation rooms and the students were housed under the poop deck and in a deckhouse. The gun deck had three study rooms and each pupil had a locker along the wall of the berth deck. The ship had a few washbasins forward. During their evening recreation break, between supper and the evening study periods, “one of the six gun crews would be marched over to the bathhouse on shore. I [Clarke] think I may say that the majority of us considered it a great hardship that one of our short periods of recreation should be taken for such a purpose.” The *Constitution* was virtually stripped of her guns, with the only ones remaining being eight to ten thirty-two pound guns on the quarterdeck that the pupils used for practise. Meanwhile, they were also exercised on sails. Clarke remembered Lieutenant Rodgers ordering him and Acting Midshipman Glidden to “lay aloft and overhaul down the buntlines,” much to the Charles’ confusion. Rodgers then shouted, “Yes, sir! The b-u-n-t-l-i-n-e-s!” To which Charles “hurried aloft, determined to overhaul down any rope

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<sup>24</sup> Charles E. Clark, *My Fifty Years in the Navy* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1917, reprint 1984), 7-8 and editor’s note footnote 10.

that offered.”<sup>25</sup>

Robley Evans thought discipline on the *Constitution* was strict. He had become good friends with a fellow midshipman, James Baldwin from Columbus, Mississippi. One day his friend got into a fight with a larger man, who attempted to hit him with a stool. Evans came to his friend’s aid: “I grabbed him from behind, preventing the blow, and thus myself became part of the row.” The following morning he was called up to the quarterdeck, was read the Articles of War, and lectured on his offence. As punishment Evans was locked in the wardroom and was convinced that he was going to be hung by the yardarm. He wrote his uncle that he had better visit soon if he wished to see his nephew alive; the uncle replied simply that the discipline was good for him, and that he would wait for the sentence to be passed before paying a visit. Evans spent three days in confinement before meeting with the commanding officer to discuss his offense. After the officer released him, Evans saw that another midshipman had taken his place in the wardroom as punishment for a different offense.<sup>26</sup>

The midshipmen’s behaviour on the *Constitution* was reasonably good. By the end of December 1860, Blake was confident enough in their conduct to agree with Lt. George W. Rodgers, the ship’s captain, that a portion of the fourth-class’s demerits could be removed.<sup>27</sup> Unfortunately it is difficult to assess accurately the behaviour of the students on the *Constitution* that year from the conduct rolls, but some general comments can still be made.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Clark, 11-12.

<sup>26</sup> Evans, 47-48.

<sup>27</sup> G.S. Blake to G.W. Rodgers, 31 December 1860, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>28</sup> When disorder erupted in Maryland many of the students were put on the ship, and the ship housed several classes unlike the *Plymouth* the year before. Therefore direct comparisons between the two years is impossible. To make matters worse the conduct roll continues on after the *Constitution* and all the students who remained with the North, sailed to Rhode Island. The name index thus covers the whole time frame until the end of the Academic year in June, rather than until the outbreak of war. As the name index was used to gather the 20% random sample, the sample covers this whole

The most common offences were those that dealt with study hours or study room violations, comprising 24.9% of the offences. The next highest category were those offences – like marching out of step – that occurred in a military context, accounting for 11.6%. This was followed by offences in an academic setting – like making noise in class, and inattention to recitations – which were 7.3%. As was the case onshore (see chapter six), offences like insubordination and disrespect to superiors made up less than 2% of offences, while disobedience of orders composed 2.9%. But there were new offences that occurred on ship, like hammock offences (0.4%) and having articles in their “Luck Bag” (0.2%). (See Appendix B, Table B.10).

But despite the general good behaviour of the students, there were some who misbehaved. One such individual was Acting Midshipman Gustavus English. Blake had suspended English for fighting and disorder in the study rooms, but he persisted in misbehaving. On the morning of 6 April 1861 English was reported for “a disgusting offence upon the berth deck of the *Constitution* last night, for which you offer no excuse.” Blake regretted that he so often saw English in conduct reports and reminded the young man that if he received over two hundred demerit points, Blake would be “compelled by the regulations to report you to the Secretary of the Navy as deficient in conduct.” But the Superintendent hoped English’s conduct would improve and gave him a ray of hope: “Be assured that the authorities of the Academy desire your success, & in the hope that you will hereafter be more mindful of the obligation you assumed on entering the Institution.”<sup>29</sup>

In all though, the students tended to be generally well behaved. As in other contexts,

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unstable period. (Registers of Delinquencies [“Conduct Roll,” “Conduct Roll of Cadets”], 1846-50, 1853-82; Volumes 354 [National Archives Microfilm Publication M991, roll 3]; Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, Newfoundland. Hereafter, Registers of Delinquencies).

<sup>29</sup> G.S. Blake to Gustavus English, 6 April 1861, letters sent, roll 2.



a small portion committed a large portion of the offences: 22.7% of the students sampled committed 52.0% of the offences. But on the *Constitution* that year students were more likely to report each other to the authorities. Other students made up 55.9% of the reporting personnel for the sampled offences, while officers comprised 38.6% of the reporting personnel. (See Appendix B, Table B.11). One wonders if this was a manifestation of the deteriorating relations between students as a result of the conflicts in the country? One can only speculate that as order in the country broke down, so too did students' loyalty to each other.

Alfred Thayer Mahan's recollections of life at the Academy reveal the schisms that developed between students from the North and South. He reflected that Maryland was a border slave state and that "the general sentiment [at the Academy] was, as might be expected, a blending of North and South." Northerners were divided over the issue and seemed to be willing to do anything for the Union to survive. But the "Southern flavor" was ever-present: "every Southerner was convinced that the justice was on their side, that their rights were being attacked." Mahan at first felt sympathy for the South because his father, a West Point professor, was from Virginia. But when Mahan actually encountered slaves and the horror of slavery during the Civil War, his "early training fell away like a cloak," as did his father's. Mahan concluded that "[i]n this the membership of the school reproduced the political character of the House of Representatives, with whom appointment rested; and at our age, of course, we simply re-echoed the tones of our homes."<sup>30</sup>

While on his first practice cruise in 1857, Mahan recounted that a North Carolina student from the class below his – the son of a North Carolina member of Congress – said that President Buchanan would be the last President of the United States. Mahan felt "[h]e

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<sup>30</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life* (New York: Da Capo Press, reprint 1968), 85-92.

was entirely unmoved, simply repeating certitudes to which familiarity had reconciled him; I, to whom such talk was new, was much aghast as though I had been told my mother would die with the like term. This outlook was common to them all.” Mahan concluded.

[i]n the service outside I found somewhat the same point of view, but repulsion was keener. The navy then, even more than now, symbolized the exterior activities of the country, which are committed by the Constitution to the Union. Hence, the life of the profession naturally nurtured pride in the nation; and while States'-Rights had undermined the principle of loyalty to the Union, it had been less successful in destroying love for it. But to most the prospect was gloomy.<sup>31</sup>

The navy and the Academy were perched on the edge of a precipice.

Charles Clark observed that by September 1860 the unrest that was spreading across the country began to have an impact on the Academy.<sup>32</sup> He recalled that there were no real fights between Northerners and Southerners, simply some “wrangling”; the Northerners were unsure of the strength of their position. By December, South Carolina had left the Union and Clark found that his Southern fellows became more sure of themselves. Some stated that because New York had the Military Academy at West Point, it was natural that the Naval Academy, located so much farther south, belonged to the South. They declared that the Seventh Regiment in New York City – and New York City in general – was on their side and would fight with them if the time came. As for places closer to Annapolis, Baltimore would

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<sup>31</sup> Mahan, 88.

<sup>32</sup> Onshore during the 1860-1861 academic year, specific North-South offences recognized by the Academy tended to be low. The 20% random sample of offences recorded in the conduct roll for that period revealed only one related to the degenerating relations between North and South. On 14 October 1860, Acting Midshipman J.E. Fiske (probably James E. Fisk, 1857 Date, of a New Jersey merchant family background, U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, *Register of Alumni, Graduates and Former Naval Cadets and Midshipmen*, 91<sup>st</sup> Edition [Annapolis, Maryland: The Naval Academy Alumni Association, 1976], hereafter *Register of Alumni*; and United States Naval Academy, Registers of Candidates for Admission to the Academy, Oct. 1849-Oct. 1860, Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; William W. Jeffries Memorial Archives, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. Hereafter, Register of Candidates for Admission) was awarded four demerit points for flags with electioneering emblems displayed in room (Registers of Delinquencies).

never let federal reinforcements pass through the city on the way to Washington to defend the capitol. Clark recalled, perhaps embellishing a little, that one day William T. Sampson – future hero of the Spanish-American War – the “ranking cadet officer,” passed by a group of Southerners declaring their position with respect to Baltimore. Sampson replied that if Baltimore failed to let federal troops through, troops would “march *over* [emphasis in original] Baltimore – or the place where it stood!” Clark concluded that the North would face a daunting task: six months with his Southern compatriots revealed to him that they were of a military class.<sup>33</sup>

Life at the Academy started to break down in early January 1861. Eighteen members of the first class petitioned the Secretary of the Navy to give them their graduation certificates in the event they were forced to withdraw or resign from the Academy if their states withdrew from the Union.<sup>34</sup> Superintendent Blake disapproved the request, but forwarded the petition to the Secretary nonetheless.<sup>35</sup> Soon midshipmen from the South began to resign. Bryan, from South Carolina was one of the first to go, and he later wrote to his former classmates that he was now a real midshipman serving on the *Excel* in Charleston harbour. Shortly thereafter, midshipmen from the Gulf States began to leave, one of whom was William Earle Yancey, the son of an Alabama secessionist. The final bell was tolled when Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated as President in March 1861. With the fall of Fort Sumter shortly thereafter, the end of peace was at hand. Clark recalled that fort after fort fell, until the loss of Harper’s Ferry virtually cut off the Academy from the North. Rumours started to circulate that Maryland was about to secede and take the Academy, her vessels, and armaments, with her. The Academy’s guns were taken down and stored on the *Constitution*.

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<sup>33</sup> Clark, 14-15.

<sup>34</sup> J.M. Spencer et al. to Isaac Toucey, 7 January 1861, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>35</sup> G.S. Blake to Isaac Toucey, 9 January 1861, letters sent, roll 2.

and the students prepared to defend the grounds when word circulated of an impending attack.<sup>36</sup>

Early in April 1861 word came that the steamer *Maryland* was on the way with troops from the 8<sup>th</sup> Massachusetts Regiment. The Governor of Maryland, although a Unionist, wanted a minimal show of force out of fear that anything larger would escalate secessionist sentiments. The landing of the troops was delayed and the Academy's officers used the time, and the extra men (mainly sailors and seamen from Massachusetts), to aid in moving the *Constitution* to a safer location in the bay. Ten of Clark's class remained on board to help, while the rest were put ashore. Clark believed that the Academy had little to repel an attack, as old Fort Severn was only used as an exercising battery and was useless for defence. Moreover, "[w]e numbered less than two hundred in all, and the average age of the midshipmen in the four classes was eighteen years."<sup>37</sup>

The fear that was gripping the American countryside was palpable by the middle of April. Superintendent Blake was also afraid for the Academy and voiced his concerns to Secretary Gideon Welles. Blake described the situation in the country as "threatening" and wanted instructions on what to do if the Academy were attacked. Blake explained that the Academy was unable to defend itself against a superior force. He claimed that "the only force at my command consists of the students of the Academy, many of whom are little boys, and some of whom are citizens of the seceded states." Blake proposed that if the Academy were attacked by a force it could not repel, he would embark the students and officers on the *Constitution* and put to sea.<sup>38</sup>

Lt. Stephen B. Luce went to Washington to meet with the chief of the Bureau of

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<sup>36</sup> Clark 16-17.

<sup>37</sup> Clark, 17. The average age was much less, see above.

<sup>38</sup> G.S. Blake to Gideon Welles, 15 April 1861, letters sent, roll 2.

Ordnance and Hydrography to present the Superintendent's views. Because of the situation, Blake recommended that the *Constitution* be moved to a northern port and that the *Plymouth* take her place at Annapolis. In the *Constitution*'s present location, she could not swing on her anchor, and Luce opined that if she remained at Annapolis she should be moored outside the bar where she could freely swing. If worse came to worse, she would defend herself to the end, but they would scuttle her rather than let her fall into enemy hands. In the event that the situation became even worse, Blake recommended that the first-class students be immediately graduated while the others put on leave, since they were too young to be relied upon. Meanwhile, Fort Severn was in a vulnerable position if nearby Fort Madison fell into enemy hands and was armed.<sup>39</sup>

Luce reported that the Chief of the Bureau thought that decisions affecting the Academy would need time to be considered – time, however, that was rapidly running out. Blake's request, Luce was told, would be forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy for consideration, but the Chief took a nonchalant attitude toward the Academy's safety. He reasoned that there would be plenty of warning if there were an attack and any mob would be surely easily repelled. But Luce pointed out this would only be true if the Academy were not taken by surprise or treachery, so he suggested that more marines be stationed there. The Chief replied that if a requisition was sent by telegraph – Luce had no authority on his own to request marines – they would be sent.<sup>40</sup>

By 21 April nerves were on edge. Commandant Rodgers reported that around 10pm the sentinel at the northwest wharf saw a boat that he thought was coming toward the Academy. He hailed it three times but received no reply, so he fired his musket "over the boat" to attract the attention of its captain. Rodgers told Blake that the sentinel's assumption

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<sup>39</sup> S.B. Luce to George S. Blake, 17 April 1861, letters received, roll 3.

<sup>40</sup> S.B. Luce to George S. Blake, 17 April 1861, letters received, roll 3.

that the boat was approaching the Academy seemed correct. but that he was under orders not to fire at anyone or thing. The musket was only to be fired to get the attention of the officer of the guard. But. Rodgers pointed out, "the boat in question was filled with armed men," although he failed to specify if they were friend or foe.<sup>41</sup>

By 22 April all life at the Academy was centred around the Civil War and no educational activities were accomplished. There were rumours that the people of Maryland wanted the *Constitution* to be "the first ship of the war to hoist the flag of the Confederate States" and Blake thought that all communications over their telegraph were falling into enemy hands.<sup>42</sup> The academic routine was "completely broken up by the occupation of the grounds and a portion of the buildings of the Academy by National troops; – and it will be a long time, in any event, before it will be possible to resume a regular course of instruction at this place." Blake ordered the acting midshipmen to the *Constitution* and planned to send her to New York under the command of Lt. George W. Rodgers, who would "preserve organization and discipline until further orders," while Blake and some of the other officers remained behind to mind the Academy's property. Finally, Blake recommended that the Academy be moved somewhere north of the Delaware, probably to Fort Adams, Rhode Island. He concluded that "the officers & students of the Academy will constitute an efficient peace garrison to any fort they may occupy."<sup>43</sup>

The tension remained and for several days more troops came. The 71<sup>st</sup> New York Regiment, as well as the 69<sup>th</sup> Irish, a German regiment, and the 1<sup>st</sup> Rhode Island Regiment arrived. Charles Clark recalled that he and his fellows threw their books from the Academy windows in celebration of the cancellation of classes, but their joy was short-lived. One

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<sup>41</sup> C.R.P. Rodgers to George S. Blake, 21 April 1861, letters received, roll 3.

<sup>42</sup> G.S. Blake to Gideon Welles, 22 April 1861, letters sent, roll 2.

<sup>43</sup> G.S. Blake to Gideon Welles, 24 April 1861, letters sent, roll 2.

morning they were ordered to board the *Josephine* and depart for the *Constitution*, where they and “Old Iron Sides” would be taken out of harm’s way. When they arrived on board the students found a change in the old girl: their study rooms were no more and the guns had been moved from the spar deck. The crew was now composed of students from the four classes, two companies of the 8<sup>th</sup> Massachusetts regiment, and about twenty-five other sailors. Evans recalled that Captain C.R.P. Rodgers told them all “My boys, stand by the old flag!” and then broke into tears.<sup>44</sup>

On 27 April the Secretary of the Navy wrote Superintendent Blake that the navy had decided to move the Academy to Rhode Island. Gideon Welles ordered Blake to “proceed to carry into effect the transfer of personnel and material from Annapolis to Ford Adams [Newport, Rhode Island] with as little delay as possible.”<sup>45</sup> On the same day, Welles explained to the Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, that “[i]n consequence of the disturbed condition of affairs in Maryland, and the hostile demonstrations towards the authorities of the Federal Government, the naval school at Annapolis has become broken up, and the Frigate *Constitution*, with some of the officers and students on board, has sailed for New York.”<sup>46</sup>

The *Constitution* departed Annapolis under tow by the *R. R. Cuyler* and headed down the Chesapeake, escorted as far as the Capes by the *Harriet Lane*. Once clear of the Capes, the *Constitution* made its way to New York, where the midshipmen enjoyed the sights and sounds of the city, and then sailed to Newport, where the Naval Academy stayed until the end of the Civil War.<sup>47</sup> On 6 May Colonel Abel Smith wrote Captain Blake that “a proper guard

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<sup>44</sup> Clark, 18-22; and Evans, 53..

<sup>45</sup> Gideon Welles to George S. Blake, 27 April 1861, letters received, roll 4.

<sup>46</sup> Gideon Welles to Simon Cameron, 27 April 1861, letters received, roll 4.

<sup>47</sup> Clark, 18-22.

has & will be kept over the buildings containing the instruments & apparatus belonging to the U.S. government until such time as the proper dept. send for them."<sup>48</sup> And on 8 May the *Constitution* and the steam ship *Baltic*, carrying Academy material, arrived at Fort Adams. It was almost like starting all over again: there were no quarters at Fort Adams, only some casements which were damp and unused for eighteen months, but they were safe at their new home.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Colonel Abel Smith to Captain George S. Blake, 6 May 1861, letters received, roll 1.

<sup>49</sup> C.R.P. Rodgers, Commandant of Midshipmen to Captain Andrew Harwood, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, 9 May 1861, letters sent, roll 2.



### ***Conclusion: The Pathway to Adulthood***

Naval education at Annapolis had come to an end for the time being. But for a large portion of the students the navy was only part of their lives before they settled on some other career. It was a phase in their lives, while the navy meant it as an introduction to a naval life. Youth historians have concluded that different strategies for reaching adulthood emerged in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. Middle-class youths went from learning skills at their father's feet or in an apprenticeship, to choosing careers different from their father. There arose an intermediary stage where these youths often were schooled for their future career at colleges, and spent a longer period dependent on adults.<sup>1</sup> Thus, Annapolis became a place where middle-class youths could prepare for a career in a safe, structured environment that was acceptable to their parents.

As industrialization swept America, fathers spent less time at home working alongside the family, and spent more time in the factories. They were now separated from their sons and could no longer teach them the skills they needed for careers as adults. Instead, sons were often apprenticed out to learn skills. By the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, youth historians have found there was increased choice for youths, ranging from their mates to finding jobs. Yet there was still a level of dependency on adults. Adolescence has always been a time of trouble, in particular for Western youths, but what has changed is how society responded to those problems. John Demos concluded that as the nineteenth century progressed families wanted their young educated in structured environments to alleviate the "pitfalls" of youth. Harvey J. Graff found that this philosophy was held

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<sup>1</sup> See Edward Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1975); Harvey J. Graff, "Remaking Growing Up: Nineteenth-Century America," *Histoire sociale Social History*, 24 (1991): 48-59; Harvey J. Graff, *Conflicting Paths: Growing Up in America* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Joseph F. Kett, in *Rites of Passage: Adolescence in America 1790 to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1977).

particularly by the middle class of America. This middle class preferred to have their adolescents educated in an institutionalised setting, like a school or college, for a career acceptable both to the parents and the youth.<sup>2</sup>

When the Naval School was created at Annapolis in 1845 it represented a consolidation of existing shore-based officer training efforts. It was not a break from the past, but it maintained continuity with the old system of education. At the new Naval School, midshipmen, often with prior sea experience, acquired theoretical knowledge and studied for their lieutenant's exams. Despite the efforts of the institution to train these new officers, the needs of the service often meant they were called back to sea. Most students were sent to sea after their appointments, and while still teenagers, often returning to the School when they were in their twenties. Those that did manage to start at the School from the outset, were often sent to sea after little time at the institution. The Naval School failed, with the exception of their style of discipline, to live up to the rising idea of the middle class that their children should be educated for a career in a gradual, structured, and safe manner with greater dependency on adults.

This pattern continued until 1849 when problems coping with educating the migrant midshipmen created calls from the institution's administration to get them into the facility at an earlier age. In this manner the students would still be familiar with the knowledge they had acquired in the civilian world, and could be fashioned into naval officers in an easier manner. By the 1850s the School had changed to the Academy and had a four-year training program. The students had to finish school before going to sea unsupervised, and spent a longer time being introduced to naval laws, education, and customs. The Academy was a dramatic break from the past and these youths now entered the Academy at a younger age

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<sup>2</sup> John Demos, *Past, Present, and Personal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 97-107; Graff, *Conflicting Paths*, 69-70; and Graff, "Remaking Growing Up," 40-43.

and spend a longer period dependent on adults. This philosophy is epitomised by the establishment of summer training cruises in 1851. These cruises were completely devoted to the students and the ships used were not, at the same time, partaking in regular naval actions. The students learned practical seamanship, applied the theoretical knowledge they acquired on shore, and visited the foreign ports and naval yards that they would be forced to deal with later in their careers. The Academy era therefore was a reflection of how the larger society believed middle-class youths should be educated.

Regardless of the goals of the navy, and the fact the Academy eventually was representative of this new way to train adolescents for a career, many youths simply used the Academy as a transitional phase in their lives. During the period from the creation of the Naval School to the Academy's retreat to Rhode Island, alumni records show that over 1000 students passed through its doors.<sup>3</sup> But only a little over half of those who attended the School or Academy actually graduated. (See Table 9.1). The remainder, therefore, must have gone on to do other things. They pursued other careers and only used the Academy as a stepping-stone to adulthood. In this way it was truly a transitional place they used while settling upon their road in life.

While a total of 572 graduated, only 150, or 26.2%, retired from the navy: their average service time was 38.9 years. Of these 14, or 9.3%, stayed for 20 years or less; 12, or 8.0% stayed for between 21 and 30 years; while 121, or 80.7% stayed for between 31 and 49 years service before retiring. Meanwhile, 132, or 23.0%, resigned from the navy, although not over official sympathy to the Southern cause. Of those who resigned, their average service time was 12.8 years; 53 of these, or 40.5%, resigned after 10 years or less service.

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<sup>3</sup> For the statistical analysis carried out in this thesis, a base of 1030 students was used compiled from U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, *Register of Alumni, Graduates and Former Naval Cadets and Midshipmen, 91st Edition* (Annapolis, Maryland: The Naval Academy Alumni Association, 1976), to find information about the common student. It is unclear what happened to 5 of the midshipmen for whom this author searched for information.

Meanwhile, 71 graduates left the navy and “Went South” at the outbreak of Civil War, while 214 graduates died while still serving their country.<sup>4</sup> It is clear that a large portion of the students who attended the Naval School or Academy left the navy while still fairly young either by not graduating, or later resigning or retiring. If these men were healthy, they must have gone on to other careers; their life in the navy was simply one phase of their youth. I would have liked to discover what these former students did later in life, but that task is beyond the scope of this project.

Table 9.1: Graduates versus Non-Graduates

Date of	Total	Graduates	Non-Graduates
1840	55	47	8
1841	173	136	37
1842	8	7	1
1845	6	3	3
1846	24	16	8
1847	65	47	18
1849	34	21	13
1850	46	21	25
1851	47	18	29
1852	47	19	28
1853	27	15	12
1854	57	15	42
1855	47	20	27
1856	62	25	37
1857	73	26	47
1858	62	31	31
1859	83	55	28
1860	114	50	64
Total	1030	572	458
		55.5%	44.5%

(Source: U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, *Register of Alumni, Graduates and Former Naval Cadets and Midshipmen*, 91st Edition [Annapolis, Maryland: The Naval Academy Alumni Association, 1976] ).

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<sup>4</sup> For more details on resignations or dismissals of officers of the United States Navy due to the Civil War, see William S. Dudley, *Going South: U.S. Navy Officer Resignations & Dismissals on the Eve of the Civil War* (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Foundation, 1981).

The establishment of the Naval School at Annapolis in 1845 was not a dramatic break from the past and at first it trained mainly older midshipmen, often in their early twenties, with prior sea experience. But by the 1850s the Academy had been transformed into a four-year officer training program with summer training cruises. Changes in regulations lowered the age requirement for entry and attracted young, middle-class youths directly into an institution where they could prepare for a future career without being thrown immediately into the open seas. The numerous vignettes in this thesis, based on sources from “above” and “below,” show the goals of the students on applying for midshipman warrants, how they were treated at the School and Academy, and their experiences under the institution’s laws and discipline. Taken as a whole, this holistic approach shows the goals of the middle class, and that the Annapolis authorities conceptualized and “worried about” these students as youths. The general naval social reformist attitude of the era, and societal views on how adolescents should be raised, seeped into Academy life.

The students were taught in a structured environment and disciplined as youths rather than adult officers. With this in mind, the Academy became a transitional place where these youths would be slowly introduced to naval life. This philosophy was evident in how the students were educated and disciplined on shore as well as at sea during the summer. The Academy became what youth historian Harvey Graff would have termed the middle-class emergent pathway to adulthood. But as the attrition rates at the Academy show, many youths simply used the Academy as an emergent pathway to adulthood, and went on to other careers. Some of those who remained left the navy after some years and were still young men, while others, if they were not killed in action, went on to long years of service. It was these men, like Alfred Thayer Mahan, who laid the groundwork for the spectacular American naval expansion in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.

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**Appendix A: General Information**  
**Table A.1: 1855 Class Schedule**

Class	Midshipman	First Class	Second Class	Third Class	Fourth Class
Reveille to 7 am	Drum beats at 6.15 or at 6.30, according to season. Police of quarters; inspection of rooms. Roll-call at 6.45, or at 7.15, according to season. Chapel Service				
7 am to 8am	Breakfast at 7, or at 7.30, according to season. Sick call 3mins after breakfast.				
8am to 10.30am	Recitation in gunnery or in seamanship, or in natural and experimental philosophy. Study.	Recitation in seamanship, or in astronomy and navigation; or in gunnery. Study.	Recitation in seamanship, or in mathematics; or in astronomy; or in gunnery; or drawing. Study.	Recitation in mathematics. Study.	Recitation in English grammar; or in history. Study.
10.30am to 1pm	Recitation in mathematics; or in navigation. Study.	Recitation in seamanship; or astronomy; political science; or Spanish. Study.	Recitation in natural and experimental philosophy; or in Spanish. Study.	Recitation in history and composition; or drawing. Study.	Recitation in mathematics. Study.
1pm to 2pm	Dinner at 1pm. Recreation. Class parade at 2pm.				
2pm to 4pm	Recitation in seamanship; or gunnery; or navigation. Study.	Recitation in astronomy, navigation, & surveying; or in natural and experimental philosophy or moral science. Study.	Recitation in French; or in rhetoric; or in Spanish. Study.	Recitation in French. Study.	Recitation in geography; or drawing. Study.
4pm to sunset	Military exercises: art of defence or infantry, or artillery drill. Recreation, parade, and roll-call at sunset.				
Sunset to call to evening studies	Supper after parade and roll-call. Recreation. Call to evening studies at 6.25 or 6.55 according to season.				
Call to studies	Study				
9.30pm to 10pm	Tattoo at 9.30pm. Signal to extinguish lights. Inspection of rooms.				

(Source: United States Naval Academy, Regulations of the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland. Revised Regulations of the Naval Academy 1855 [Washington, DC: A.O.P Nicholson, Printer, 1855], Form A, 47. Held by Georgetown University Special Collections, V415.C3)



### ***Appendix B: Disciplinary Appendix***

An analysis of midshipmen conduct was conducted using the Registers of Delinquencies ("Conduct Roll," "Conduct Roll of Cadets"). 1846-50, 1853-82. (National Archives Microfilm Publication M991, roll 1, 2, and 3); Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland. This analysis was done by taking a 20% random sample of midshipmen housed onshore, based on the name index for each section of the rolls, usually an academic year after 1853. Unfortunately, there is a gap in the records from 1850 to 1853, and the records from 1846-1850 only contain the name of the students and a basic description of his offence. The records sampled from 1853 to the end of the 1860 academic year contained such information as the offence, reporting personnel, and demerit point issued. Because the specific name an offence was given often changed from day to day, the offences were reclassified into the general headings shown in the detailed analysis.

**Table B.1: Counted Offences for 1846-1850**

<b>Offence</b>	<b>Total</b>
Breaking Liberty	50
Disobedience of Orders	7
Drunkenness	1
Inattention to Studies	1
Indecorous Conduct	1
Neglect of Duty	24
Tardy at Recitation	26
Unofficerlike Conduct	1

(Source: United States Naval Academy, Registers of Delinquencies ("Conduct Roll," "Conduct Roll of Cadets"). 1846-50, 1853-82; Volumes 346-355 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M991, rolls 1-3); Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland. Hereafter, Registers of Delinquencies).

**Table B.2: Tardiness Breakdown for 1846-1850**

<b>Recitation</b>	<b>Total</b>
English	7
French	15
Math	3
Mechanics	1

(Source: Registers of Delinquencies).

**Table B.3: Offence Analysis for Academic Years 1853-1854 and 1854-1855**

<b>Offence</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absences	250	22.7%
Room Order and Cleanliness	107	9.7%
Military Offence (Out of order, poor marching, etc.)	100	9.1%
Visiting	99	9.0%
Class Offences (disorder, etc.)	95	8.6%
Lateness	61	5.6%
Dereliction of assigned Duty	51	4.6%
Study Hour Violations (Out of room, receiving visits in)	43	3.9%
Skylarking	43	3.9%
Mess Hall Offence (Noise, throwing bread, etc.)	35	3.2%
Using Tobacco in some form	32	2.9%
Specific Academy Regulation violations	25	2.3%
General Noise	22	2.0%
<b>Offences that make up &lt;2% of total offences</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>11.1%</b>
Leave Violations	16	1.5%
Disobedience of Orders	16	1.5%
Dress Uniform Violation	15	1.4%
Broken Property	14	1.3%
Playing Games (Billiards, Cards, Chess)	12	1.1%
After Taps Violations	9	0.8%
Making some form of mess	7	0.6%
Throwing Objects	5	0.5%
Hands in Pockets	5	0.5%
Church Offence	4	0.4%
Disrespect to Superior	4	0.4%
Swearing or Profanity	4	0.4%
Insubordination	4	0.4%
Poor Conduct (Unbecoming of an Officer, etc.)	3	0.3%
Fighting	2	0.2%
Drinking	2	0.2%
Unclassifiable Offences	12	0.2%
Missing cases (offences)	2	0.2%
Total number of offences in 20% sample	1099	
Total number of midshipmen in 20% sample	41	
Missing cases (midshipmen)	1	
Size of population sampled	196	

(Source: Registers of Delinquencies).

Table B.4: Detailed Analysis for Academic Years 1853-1854 and 1854-1855

<b>Absence Breakdown</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Military	190	76.0%
Academic	41	16.4%
Room (not in study hours specifically)	12	4.8%
Military and Academic joint	6	2.4%
Church	1	0.4%
<b>Lateness Breakdown</b>		
Military	33	54.0%
Academic	19	31.1%
Mess	8	13.1%
Military and Academic joint	1	1.6%
<b>Leave Violations</b>		
From academic function without permission	5	31.3%
From grounds without permission	4	25.0%
From military function without permission	4	25.0%
From church without permission	2	12.5%
Overstaying leave	1	6.3%
<b>Dereliction of Duty Breakdown</b>		
Other	32	62.7%
Permitting midshipmen to break rules	15	29.4%
Not reporting fellow midshipmen	4	7.8%
<b>Reporting Personnel</b>		
Midshipmen	434	39.5%
Officers	286	26.0%
Unable to identify	191	17.4%
Professors	181	16.5%
Missing cases	7	0.6%
<b>Excuses Recorded</b>		
No excuse made	817	74.3%
Rejected	141	12.8%
Accepted in full or in part	95	8.6%
Missing cases	41	3.7%
Remitted or Withdrawn	5	0.5%
<b>Demerit Point Analysis</b>		
Average	4	
Maximum	18	
Minium	0	
Standard Dev.	2.44	
Number of offence which received demerits	1093	
25.6% of the midshipmen committed 52.2% of the offences		
(Source: Registers of Delinquencies).		

**Table B.5: Analysis of Aggregate of Offences for Academic Years 1855-1860**

<b>Offence</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Dereliction of assigned duties	378	9.55%
Study hour violations (out of room in, visiting, etc.)	378	9.55%
Room order and cleanliness	376	9.50%
Absences	374	9.45%
Class offences (disorder, etc)	359	9.07%
Military offence (out of order, poor marching, etc.)	318	8.03%
Lateness	269	6.80%
Tobacco related offences	251	6.34%
Visiting (visiting or receiving visits outside study hours)	178	4.50%
Dress uniform violations	129	3.26%
Leave violations	123	3.11%
Visiting (outside study hours)	104	2.63%
Mess hall offence (noise, throwing bread, etc.)	103	2.60%
Broken property	81	2.05%
Unclassifiable offences	67	1.69%
Skylarking	66	1.67%
General noise	63	1.59%
After taps violations	46	1.16%
Making some form of mess	32	0.81%
Specific Academy regulation violations	29	0.73%
Visiting	27	0.68%
Lounging about (outside study hours)	26	0.66%
Poor conduct (Unmilitary, unofficerlike, etc.)	25	0.63%
Playing games (Cards, chess, fiddle, etc.)	23	0.58%
Throwing things (Snowballs, water, rocks)	17	0.43%
Disobedience of orders	16	0.40%
Disrespect to superior	14	0.35%
Regulations not complied with (unspecified)	14	0.35%

(Source: Registers of Delinquencies).

Table B.5 – Continued.

Offence	Count	Percent
Church offences	11	0.28%
General talking	9	0.23%
Swearing or profanity	9	0.23%
Drinking	9	0.23%
Insubordination	8	0.20%
Fighting or threatening to fight	8	0.20%
Committing improper acts or improprieties	6	0.15%
Hands in pockets	5	0.13%
General disorder	2	0.05%
Disorderly (location not specified)	2	0.05%
Not Guilty	1	0.03%
Offences related with North-South conflict	1	0.03%
Missing cases (offences)	1	0.03%
Total aggregate cases	3958	

(Source: Registers of Delinquencies).

**Table B.6: Breakdown Analysis of Aggregate of Offences for Academic Years 1855-1860**

<b>Absence Breakdown</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Military	318	85.03%
Academic	37	9.89%
Church	7	1.87%
Military and Church	6	1.60%
Academic and Military	4	1.07%
Mess	1	0.27%
Military and Mess	1	0.27%
<b>Lateness Breakdown</b>		
Military	219	81.41%
Academic	35	13.01%
Mess	14	5.20%
Church	1	0.37%
<b>Dereliction of Duty Breakdown</b>		
Other (unclassifiable)	228	60.32%
Permitting midshipmen to break rules	118	31.22%
Not reporting fellow midshipmen	32	8.47%
<b>Reporting Personnel</b>		
Officers	2028	51.24%
Midshipmen	1386	35.02%
Professors	413	10.43%
Unidentifiable	111	2.80%
Doctor	6	0.15%
Asst. Librarian	2	0.05%
Missing cases	12	0.30%
<b>Excuses recorded</b>		
No excuse made	2754	69.58%
Rejected	689	17.41%
Accepted in full or in part	466	11.77%
Missing cases	42	1.06%
Withdrawn/Mistaken	3	0.08%
Delinquency acknowledged	2	0.05%
No such report	2	0.05%

(Source: Registers of Delinquencies).

Table B.7: General Summary Statistics for Academic Years 1855-1860

	1855-56	1856-57	1857-58	1858-59	1859-60 <sup>1</sup>	1860-61 <sup>2</sup>
<b>General</b>						
Sample size (midshipmen) <sup>3</sup>	25	29	36	39	27	34
Population size	126	147	179	193	137	168
Missing cases (midshipmen)	0	0	0	0	1	2
Offences <sup>4</sup>	552	882	784	587	332	821
Missing cases (offences)	0	1	0	0	0	0
% Midshipmen approx. 50% <sup>5</sup> did 50.4%	28%	24.1%	27.8%	23.1%	29.6%	31.1%
% Midshipmen approx. 50% <sup>5</sup> did 50.4%	28%	24.1%	27.8%	23.1%	29.6%	31.1%
<b>Demerit Point Analysis</b>						
Average	3.7	4.0	4.1	4.6	4.6	3.6
Maximum	10	24 <sup>6</sup>	10	10	10	10
Minimum	0	0	0	0	1	1
Standard Deviation	2.04	2.29	2.54	2.48	2.29	2.3
No. which received demerits	546	872	777	583	330	813

(Source: Registers of Delinquencies).

(Note: Not all offences were issued demerits. Analysis does not count demerits later removed by Superintendent).

<sup>1</sup> Does not include school ship conduct roll.<sup>2</sup> Does not include school ship conduct roll. Name index for this academic year included all those midshipmen who committed offences from the beginning of the academic year to its close; this sample includes some offences committed after the outbreak of Civil War and the Academy's relocation to Rhode Island.<sup>3</sup> 20% sample of population.<sup>4</sup> Number of offences committed by 20% sample of midshipmen.<sup>5</sup> Percentage of midshipmen who committed approximately 50% of the recorded offences.<sup>6</sup> PS Sanderson was given 24 demerit points for being absent from parade; all section formations and recitations on 4 March 1857. This was analyzed as one offence because the authorities dealt with them all at once.

**Table B.8: Offence Analysis for School Ship Academic Year 1859-1860**

<b>Offence</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Study hours or study room offences	64	34.0%
Absence	17	9.0%
Class offence	15	8.0%
Military offences	13	6.9%
Swearing	12	6.4%
Dress uniform violations	10	5.3%
Dereliction of assigned duties	10	5.3%
After taps violations	7	3.7%
Mess offences	6	3.2%
General noise	6	3.2%
Throwing objects (books or leaves of books)	3	1.6%
Broken or defaced property	3	1.6%
Articles in Lucky Bag	2	1.1%
Lateness	2	1.1%
Fighting	2	1.1%
Skylarking	2	1.1%
General talking	2	1.1%
Church offences	1	0.5%
Making some form of mess	1	0.5%
Tobacco related offences	1	0.5%
Disobedience of orders	1	0.5%
Poor conduct	1	0.5%
Off ship without permission	1	0.5%
Specific Academy regulation violations	1	0.5%
Unclassifiable offences	5	2.7%
Total number of offences	188	
Missing cases (offences)	0	
Size of population sampled	92	
Number of midshipmen in 20% sample	18	
Missing cases (midshipmen)	0	

(Source: Registers of Delinquencies).



**Table B.9: Detailed Analysis for School Ship Academic Year 1859-1860**

<b>Absence Breakdown</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Military	9	52.9%
Academic	4	23.5%
Prayers	3	17.6%
Hammocks	1	5.9%
<b>Lateness Breakdown</b>		
Academic	1	50.0%
Mess	1	50.0%
<b>Dereliction of Duty Breakdown</b>		
Other	4	40.0%
Not reporting fellow midshipmen	4	40.0%
Permitting midshipmen to break rules	2	20.0%
<b>Reporting Personnel</b>		
Officers	104	55.3%
Midshipmen	74	39.4%
Professors	10	5.3%
<b>Excuses Recorded</b>		
No excuse made	140	74.5%
Rejected	27	14.4%
Accepted in full or in part	20	10.6%
Missing cases	1	0.5%
<b>Demerit Point Analysis</b>		
Average	4.6	
Maximum	10	
Minimum	2	
Standard Dev.	2.24	
Offences for which demerits were assigned	188	
22.2% of the midshipmen committed 58.5% of the offences		
(Source: Registers of Delinquencies).		

**Table B.10: Offence Analysis for School Ship Academic Year 1860-1861**

<b>Offence</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Study hour/room offences	122	24.9%
Military offences	57	11.6%
Academic offences	36	7.3%
Lateness	31	6.3%
Dereliction of assigned duties	25	5.1%
Mess offences	24	4.9%
Absences	22	4.5%
Dress uniform violations	21	4.3%
Disobedience of orders	14	2.9%
Tobacco related offences	13	2.7%
Skylarking	12	2.4%
General talking	10	2.0%
Swearing or Profanity	10	2.0%
Fighting	8	1.6%
Room order and cleanliness	8	1.6%
General noise	7	1.4%
Throwing things	7	1.4%
General disorder	5	1.0%
Disrespect to superior or other officers	4	0.8%
After taps violations	4	0.8%
Making some form of mess	4	0.8%
Leave violations	3	0.6%

(Source: Registers of Delinquencies).

**Table B.10 – Continued.**

<b>Offence</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Playing games (pennies)	3	0.6%
Insubordination	3	0.6%
Broken or defaced property	3	0.6%
Lounging about	3	0.6%
Visiting (outside study hours)	2	0.4%
General hammock offences	2	0.4%
Drinking	1	0.2%
Church offences	1	0.2%
Articles in Lucky Bag	1	0.2%
Specific Academy regulation violations	1	0.2%
Unclassifiable offences	23	4.7%
Total number of offences	490	
Missing cases (offences)	0	
Size of population sampled	130	
Number of midshipmen in 20% sample	26	
Missing cases (midshipmen)	4	

(Source: Registers of Delinquencies).

(Note: This analysis covers the period to the end of this academic year, after the *Constitution* left Annapolis, because the name index from which the sample was composed covers this entire period).

**Table B.11: Detailed Analysis for School Ship Academic Year 1860-1861**

<b>Absence Breakdown</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Military	15	68.2%
Academic	3	13.6%
Surgeon's call	2	9.1%
Church	1	4.5%
Hammocks	1	4.5%
<b>Leave Violation Breakdown</b>		
Absent from building without permission	2	66.7%
Absent from quarter deck without permission	1	33.3%
<b>Dereliction of Duty Breakdown</b>		
Other	20	80.0%
Not reporting fellow midshipmen	1	4.0%
Permitting midshipmen to break rules	4	16.0%
<b>Lateness Breakdown</b>		
Late for military function	18	58.1%
Late for Hammock formation	9	29.0%
Late for academic function	4	12.9%
<b>Reporting Personnel</b>		
Midshipmen	274	55.9%
Officers	189	38.6%
Professors	22	4.5%
Doctor	1	0.2%
Unidentifiable	4	0.8%
<b>Excuses Recorded</b>		
No excuse made	346	70.6%
Rejected	104	21.2%
Accepted in full or in part	37	7.6%
Missing cases	3	0.6%
<b>Demerit Point Analysis</b>		
Average	3.7	
Maximum	10	
Minimum	1	
Standard Dev.	1.95	
Offences for which demerits were assigned	485	
22.7% of the midshipmen committed 52.0% of the offences		
(Source: Registers of Delinquencies).		

### *Appendix C: Summer Cruises*

After the 1860 summer the Commandant of Midshipmen, Thomas Craven, filed an assessment of aptitude and attention to duty for all of the embarked students. Unfortunately, Craven's report ranked the students from poor to excellent; a non-numerical scheme which makes generalizing about the students difficult. I assigned each grade a number between 0 and 6, then conduct a basic statistical analysis. Several other officers of the practice ship also filed reports, but Craven's was selected for analysis because he was the highest ranking officer, he was in charge of the students on the ship, and reported all his findings to the Superintendent. In the table, Excellent = 6; Very Good = 5; Good= 4; Fair= 3; tolerable= 2; indifferent= 1; poor/none/very little=0.

**Table C.1: First and Second Class**

Name	Aptitude	Value	Attention	Value	Name	Aptitude	Value	Attention	Value
<b>First Class</b>					<b>Second Class</b>				
Armstrong	Good	4	Very	5	Duer	Fair	3	Tolerable	2
Banche	Excellent	6	Excellent	6	Higgingson	Good	4	Good	4
Backus	Tolerable	2	Good	4	Leonard	Indifferent	1	Poor	0
Carnes	Fair	3	Tolerable	2	Moore, TS	Indifferent	1	Indifferent	1
Comestock, JH			Good	4	Rowland	Good	4	Good	4
Cromwell	Very Good	5	Excellent	6	Smith, NY	Good	4	Good	4
Cushing	Good	4	Good	4	Swift	Good	4	Fair	3
Dexter	Good	4	Very	5	Tyson	Good	4	Very Good	5
Fiske	Tolerable	2	Tolerable	2	Average		3.13		2.88
Holden	Very Good	5	Very	5	Std		1.27		1.62
Hudgins	Fair	3	Good	4	Missing		0		0
Ingraham	Very Good	5	Very	5					
King	Very Good	5	Very	5					
McFarland	Very Good	5	Excellent	6					

(Source: Craven's aptitude report, in Craven to Blake, 30 September 1860, Letters received by the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, 1845-1887 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M949, roll 2); Records of the United States Naval Academy, Record Group 405; Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland. Hereafter, letters received).

**Table C.1 – First Class Continued.**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Aptitude</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Attention</b>	<b>Value</b>
McKay	Very Good	5	Very	5
Mullan	Good	4	Very	5
Philip	Good	4	Tolerable	2
Picking	Very Good	5	Very	5
Rodgers	Fair	3	Fair	3
Ryan	Good	4	Good	4
Sampson	Excellent	6	Excellent	6
Snell	Good	4	Very	5
Spencer	Very Good	5	Good	4
Steece	Fair	3	Excellent	6
Stove	Excellent	6	Very	5
Sturdivant	Excellent	6	Excellent	6
Wilson	Good	4	Very	5
	Average	4.31		4.59
	Std	1.12		1.19
	Missing	1		0

(Source: Craven's aptitude report, in Craven to Blake, 30 September 1860, letters received, roll 2).

Table C.2: Third Class

Name	Attitude	Value	Attention	Value
Abbott	Very Good	5	Good	4
Adams	Good	4	Good	4
Alexander	Fair	3	Very Good	5
Anderson	Excellent	6	Excellent	6
Bacot	Good	4	Good	4
Barker	Good	4	Good	4
Bartlett	Good	4	Good	4
Batchellor	Fair	3	Good	4
Blake, CF	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
Bridgman	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
Brown	Very Good	5	Good	4
Beirne	Good	4	Very Good	5
Camm	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
Carroll	Good	4	Good	4
Chew, RS	Excellent	6	Very Good	5
Chew, FT	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
Claybrook	Good	4	Very Good	5
Dalton	Tolerable	2	Tolerable	2
Floyd	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
French	Good	4	Good	4
Gregory	Good	4	Good	4
Hammett	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
Haskins	Very Good	5	Good	4
Haswell	Excellent	6	Very Good	5
Hazeltine	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
Halcombe	Good	4	Very Good	5
Hunt	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
Hutter	Good	4	Good	4
Jackson	Good	4	Good	4
Johnson, HS	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
Johnson, MS	Very Good	5	Excellent	6
Jones	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
Lowry	Good	4	Very Good	5
McCormick	Excellent	6	Excellent	6

(Source: Craven's aptitude report, in Craven to Blake, 30 September 1860, letters received, roll 2).

Table C.2 – Continued.

Name	Aptitude	Value	Attention	Value
McDermott	Good	4	Very Good	5
Mason	Fair	3	Good	4
Miller	Good	4	Good	4
Naile	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
Pearson	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
Porter	Very Good	5	Excellent	6
Preble	Good	4	Good	4
Price	Fair	3	Tolerable	2
Read, JH	Fair	3	Fair	3
Rumsey	Tolerable	2	Fair	3
Sanders	Good	4	Good	4
Scales	Fair	3	Fair	3
Shepard	Good	4	Good	4
Tracy	Good	4	Good	4
Trigg	Good	4	Fair	3
Turner	Very Good	5	Good	4
Walker	Good	4	Good	4
Wallace	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
Wood	Good	4	Very Good	5
Woodward	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
	Average	4.33		4.43
	Std	0.90		0.87
	Missing	0		0



(Source: Craven's aptitude report, in Craven to Blake, 30 September 1860, letters received, roll 2).



**Table C.3: Fourth Class**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Aptitude</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Attention</b>	<b>Value</b>
Chester	Tolerable	2	Good	4
Cook	Very Good	5	Very Good	5
Craig	Excellent	6	Very Good	5
Dana	Very little	0	Indifferent	1
Danton	Good	4	Very Good	5
Flournoy	Good	4	Good	4
Fortune	Fair	3	Good	4
Health	Tolerable	2	Fair	3
Long	Tolerable	2	Fair	3
Ludlow	Good	4	Good	4
McClure	Tolerable	2	Fair	3
McDaniel	Good	4	Good	4
Mallory	Good	4	Good	4
Poor	Good	4	Fair	3
Pipkin	Good	4	Good	4
Robinson	Tolerable	2	Tolerable	2
Sands	Fair	3	Fair	3
Sigsbee	Good	4	Good	4
Stafford	Good	4	Good	4
Thomas	Fair	3	Fair	3
Vance	Very Good	5	Excellent	6
Van	Fair	3	Very Good	5
Wheeler	Indifferent	1	Fair	3
Wilkinson	Very Good	5	Tolerable	2
Wyman	Very little	0	Fair	3
Young	Fair	3	Good	4
	Average	3.19		3.65
	Std	1.47		1.07
	Missing	0		0

(Source: Craven's aptitude report, in Craven to Blake, 30 September 1860, letters received, roll 2).

**Appendix D: Vessels of the Naval Academy 1851-1861****Figure 1** *USS Preble***Figure 2** *USS Plymouth***Figure 3** *USS Constitution*

(Source: Howard I. Chapelle, *The History of the American Sailing Navy: The Ships and their Development* [New York: WW Norton & Company, Inc.], 1949, insert 120-121; 401, and 441).

(Note: Drawings approximately to scale).