NAVAL DIPLOMACY AND THE UNITED NATIONS:
NAVAL PEACEKEEPING IN A NEW WORLD ORDER

by

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ABSTRACT

The Twenty-first Century will unquestionably challenge the world community into more imaginative thinking and more innovative methods of dealing with growing international security dilemmas. Nevertheless, what seemed to be impossible only a few short years ago, during the Cold War, is now feasible – indeed it has become a pressing international requirement. In a world rife with many simmering conflicts with a maritime dimension, international peacekeeping at sea has become increasingly relevant and timely. The possibility of "naval peacekeeping" under the auspices of the United Nations has therefore gained considerable interest in recent years. This paper attempts to identify the historical precedents for such a naval force and looks at the future viability of multinational cooperation and 'naval diplomacy' on the oceans of the world. The possibilities, practicalities and inevitable problems of instituting a United Nations Standing Naval Force are many. Nonetheless, the world is at last in a position to put into effect the intentions of the UN's founding fathers.

We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war...

In the future, "Send in the Navy!" may well become a well-worn phrase in United Nations diplomatic jargon.
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<td>CSCE</td>
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<td>EEI</td>
<td>Essential Elements of Information</td>
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<td>Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship</td>
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<td>Multinational Maritime Forces</td>
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<td>MPA</td>
<td>Maritime Patrol Aircraft</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Staff Committee</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Co-operation Council</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NAVOCFORMED</td>
<td>Naval On-Call Force for the Mediterranean</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations</td>
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<td>NETF</td>
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<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Central America</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
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<td>PfP</td>
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<td>RAN</td>
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<td>STANAVFORLANT</td>
<td>Standing Naval Force Atlantic</td>
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<td>STU - III</td>
<td>Secure Telephone Unit</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation</td>
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<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>US Pacific Command</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Although a study of limited scope, this paper attempts to address an inadequacy within the United Nations' portfolio of security-building measures. Woefully, since the inception of the world body at the end of the Second World War, there has been limited international attention devoted to the possibilities of naval peacekeeping. This paper considers the establishment of a New World Order specifically with respect to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and its newly implemented provisions for international maritime law and the subsequent implications for naval forces. It then examines the various guises and historical attempts at naval peacekeeping from the time of Nelson to the Gulf War in order to see from whence we came. The innovative Canadian proposals for UN Rapid Reaction Forces as well as the Canadian navy's peacekeeping record offer examples of an individual nation's commitment to peacekeeping and reform. The paper then describes the creation and design of some of the world's most successful rapid reaction multinational forces - those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The naval forces of NATO provide an model upon which a future Standing United Nations Naval Force could be established. The paper then describes the possible roles and missions of such a Standing Naval Force. All great ideas are not without their problems. The paper then identifies two of the largest problems facing the establishment of such a force - namely command and control and financing. Finally, the paper analyses the realistic chances of establishing a Standing United Nations Naval Force.
A NEW WORLD ORDER

A new world order requires international and regional organizations capable of putting forces in place for peacekeeping and enforcement. It requires the leadership of powerful States recognizing that new policies of sharing and stewardship must be built into the new international system... Without a commitment by the powerful to make a change of this magnitude, a new world order will, indeed, remain illusionary.¹

The end of the Cold War has transformed the international security situation. The apparent strength of the United Nations following the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union bodes well for a new world order. Indeed, it may be argued, that the likelihood of global war has been significantly reduced. However, the potential for regional conflict has increased greatly as the control mechanisms imposed by the superpowers have been withdrawn. This post-Cold War era has unleashed forces of political fragmentation, social upheaval and acrimonious nationalism over which there seems to be very little control. At the same time, the paralysis that often gripped the United Nation’s Security Council during the Cold War has given way to a more assertive and interventionist interpretation of the United Nations Charter, resulting in a significant increase in peacekeeping and peacemaking missions. Politically and militarily, the globe has returned to its pre-First World War condition – multipolar and unstable. However, with the end of the East-West stand-off, the opportunity now exists to facilitate the creation of a new world order, one that promotes peace, prosperity and justice – at sea as well as on land. What seemed unfeasible only a few years ago is now practical – indeed, an urgent requirement.

UNITED NATIONS REFORM

Are we to go on from crisis to crisis improvising in haste? Or can we now pool our experience and our resources, so that the next time we, the governments and peoples whom the United Nations represents, will be ready and prepared to act?²

In recent years, there has been a heightened demand for new UN peacekeeping missions. These operations have met with varying degrees of success and have called into question the very foundations of the UN’s diplomatic, economic and military policies. Consequently, the international community has renewed its efforts to strengthen the UN and its peacekeeping mechanisms so that it can finally live up to the first of the purposes listed in its Charter:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement or international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.³

This revival in UN prominence has been most evident in the Security Council. During the Cold War years, the very instrument that was supposed to maintain global security was itself immobilised by superpower rancour which was responsible for most of the vetoes cast. However, current developments in peacekeeping and crisis management have led experienced critics of the international system to remark that the UN has perhaps entered its second youth. UN reformers have called for consensus building on global security issues as

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² Lester B. Pearson, 1957.
³ Charter of the United Nations
well as procedural reforms to facilitate Security Council authorisation of sanctions and deployment of 'trip-wire crisis prevention forces'.

The polemic issues of international security and crisis prevention will challenge both politicians and diplomats into developing new imaginative mechanisms to meet the international security demands of the 21st Century. Despite the pessimism of the past, international security issues are resolvable, if and only if, there is a concerted, co-operative political will on the part of UN Member States, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council. In 1992, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali attempted to address some of these security issues in his publication *An Agenda for Peace*.

**AN AGENDA FOR PEACE**

The times call for thinking afresh, for striving together and for creating new ways to overcome crises. This is because the different world that emerged when the cold war ceased is still a world not fully understood. The changed face of conflict today requires us to be perceptive, adaptive, creative and courageous, and to address simultaneously the immediate as well as the root causes of conflict, which all too often lie in the absence of economic opportunities and social inequities. Perhaps above all it requires a deeper commitment to cooperation and true multilateralism than humanity has ever achieved before.5

Anticipating a resurgent role for the United Nations, the UN Security Council held its first Heads of State and Government Summit in January 1992. At that summit, the Security Council members reaffirmed their commitment to the collective security system of the

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UN Charter to deal with “threats to the peace and to reverse acts of aggression.” The Security Council Summit commissioned Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, shortly after his election, to develop proposals for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building in an effort to strengthen the UN’s ability to identify areas of instability and potential crises. In his report An Agenda for Peace, submitted to the Security Council in June 1992, the Secretary-General attempted to identify and define the range of collective security measures of the UN Charter.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali began by defining the concepts involved in his report which included the following terms:

- **Preventive diplomacy** – is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

- **Peacemaking** – is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

- **Peace-keeping** – is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

- **Peace-building** – is the action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.\(^7\)

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\(^5\) Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, 1995


In terms of preventive diplomacy, the report envisions early intelligence processes encompassing economic and social trends (such as the mass movements of populations, the threat of famine and the spread of disease) as well as political developments which may lead to increased tensions. Rather than merely waiting for a crisis to occur, there could be "preventive deployment" of UN forces at the request of a government or all of the parties concerned. Preventive deployment could take place when a country is threatened and requests the deployment of an appropriate UN presence. In times of crisis within a country, preventive deployment could help alleviate the immediate suffering and limit the amount and level of violence. Humanitarian assistance would then save lives and develop conditions of safety in which negotiations could take place.

In the case of peacemaking, the report calls for increased usage of Chapter VI of the Charter, in that it provides means by which states can bring disputes to the Security Council for non-violent settlement. The new found co-operation within the Security Council gives it more leverage and persuasive power to direct hostile parties toward negotiations. The report also envisions the increased use of experts in mediation and negotiation to resolve disputes. It was also recommended that the World Court be made a more powerful instrument of the UN by having all states accept the general jurisdiction of the Court, without any reservation. This is to be accomplished before the end of the UN Decade of International Law in the year 2000.

If these peaceful means fail to resolve disputes, then there is recourse that there should be action by a military force under the direction of the UN (unlike the action in the Gulf where the Council authorised states to take measures on its behalf). This requires states making armed forces available to the UN on a permanent basis. Although these military
formations would not be large enough to deal with a threat from a major aggressor, they would deter aggression, imminent or actual. Designated peace-enforcement units, more heavily armed and better trained than peacekeeping forces, would then be given the task of restoring and maintaining cease-fires and peace accords.

In the traditional field of peacekeeping, the report foresees considerable enlargement of the UN's capacity to field forces quickly. It is hoped that as many countries as possible will make up to 1,000 troops available on 24-hours notice for peacekeeping operations. Although the nature of peacekeeping operations has changed radically in recent years, the basic conditions for success remain unchanged:

- a clear and practicable mandate;
- the co-operation of the parties in implementing that mandate;
- the continuing support of the Security-Council;
- the readiness of UN Member States to contribute personnel;
- adequate financial and logistical support and;
- provisions for post-conflict peace-building.

Increasingly, peacekeeping requires that civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officers, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists, civilian police and 'non-traditional' players perform as central a role as the army. Training of such diversified personnel needs to be instituted. As peacekeeping operations are increasingly fielded to help implement dispute settlements that have been negotiated by peacemakers, the problems of logistics, equipment, personnel and finance grow. Nevertheless, all these obstacles can be resolved with
both the commensurate political will and the necessary money. Boutros-Ghali felt strongly about the variance between what is spent on war and peace:

*The contrast between the costs of United Nations peace-keeping and the costs of the alternative, war - between the demands of the Organization and the means provided to meet them - would be farcical were the consequences not so damaging to global stability and to the credibility of the Organization.*

The publication of *An Agenda for Peace*, commenced a period of debate in both the General Assembly and Security Council. Even the Secretary-General did not envisage the UN as acting in a leading military role when it comes to enforcement under Article 42 (for example, in such cases as the Gulf War). For this reason, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's focus was restricted to peace operations. The smaller states, therefore, saw the report as a means of protecting their own security, whereas, the larger states saw it as an encroachment on their own sovereignty.

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Perhaps the words of the Australian Ambassador, Richard Butler can settle the debate.

If by having an effective preventive diplomacy mechanism in place, we could have prevented a situation from deteriorating into a Somalia or a Yugoslavia or an Iran-Iraq War or an Afghanistan or a Cambodia, would it not have been worthwhile? Should we not proceed with all haste to prevent the possibility of future bloodshed in disputes...?

COMMON SECURITY

If there is one word that can sum up the vastness of the new thinking about how the planet must be managed in the interest of common security, the word is "equitable."10

Although Charter reform would provide a new framework for the settlement of international disputes, it is possible that by strengthening the UN’s peace-building skills, reform could be begun within the present UN Charter. This was clearly the approach advanced by Boutros-Ghali, who envisioned peacekeeping reform emerging from within the existing UN framework — "The tasks ahead must engage the energy and attention of all components of the United Nations system...".11 The United Nations possesses a unique assortment of capabilities for mediation and conflict resolution. The organisation is distinguished for its neutrality and impartiality; essential characteristics for acting as the global arbiter of conflicts and crises. As the architect of collective responses to breaches of the peace, the UN has a recognised right to authorise the full range of diplomatic, economic, and military actions to restore the peace. The qualities required for collective security are authority,

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9 Statement by Australian Ambassador Richard Butler to UN General Assembly, October 9, 1992.
confidence, credibility, capabilities and resources. The formidable task facing the UN with respect to collective security rests upon these last two requisite qualities – the ability and the wherewithal.

Collective security is not a technical term, even though it has acquired a variety of complementary and differing meanings, it is quite simply a variation on the theme that ‘we are all in it together.’ It is a compelling sentiment – our security really does depend on cooperation rather than competition – but sentiment is not a compelling foundation on which to base alternatives to the present security system. Proposals for security alternatives need to be partly attitudinal and conceptual, and partly political and technical. Pondering upon new approaches to the pursuit of security is not by definition the abandonment of realism or an escape into utopian realms. Indeed, the search for alternatives requires a realistic approach that recognises the unreal expectations of security that are attached to the current “insecurity system.”

It is an inescapable truth that our security is common to, and depends on, all areas of human activity and circumstances. Our security, as individuals and as collective political entities, cannot be separated from our physical environment, from our social and economic order, or from our psychological well-being. Human security requires a “holistic” approach. The pursuit of global security is a definite challenge – it requires both a re-examination of existing strategies as well as the imagination to propose new strategies for keeping the peace. It is no less than an invitation to explore new visions for a global society. There is a need for transitional strategies in the pursuit of global security – multi-national and
collective security arrangements will not in themselves establish the world of our visions, but, they are a beginning.12

The collective security arrangements taken by the UN for the Gulf War13 were unprecedented and the organisation has attained considerable influence in formulating and directing global policy. Since its first operation in Indonesia in 1947, the UN has increased the scope and intensity of its peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, if there is one surprising attribute of peacekeeping in the fifty years since Indonesia, it is the minimal use of naval forces in these operations. In spite of the fact that every country which the UN has entered has had a seacoast, the number of times that naval forces have participated in peacekeeping missions is insignificant. The UN has developed limited doctrine for ground forces in peacekeeping operations, but if naval forces are to be integrated into peacekeeping, there are several issues that must be resolved, including, the Law of the Sea and sovereignty, interoperability, command and control, rules of engagement, financing and logistics and most importantly, reform of the United Nations to allow it to happen.

CONCLUSION

War is easier to make than peace.

The UN has attained considerable influence in formulating and directing global policy, and many regard the UN as the legitimate master in the conduct of international ocean policy. Though never envisioned in the UN Charter, peacekeeping has become an integral, 


13 The multinational naval operation in the Gulf War was not a peacekeeping in the traditional sense. It does offer valuable insight to those who seek to bring together future multinational maritime efforts. While not precisely a UN-mandated action, the operation was carried out under a series of UN resolutions. The Multinational Force operated both in the Gulf and in the Red Sea in three stages: the Desert Shield embargo, Desert Storm, and the post-war embargo.
and the most high profile component of UN operations. The tragedy of man's attempt to bring order into his political and international relations is that this attempt has always floundered between armed conflict and peacekeeping without ever coming to rest on something in between – multinational power projection. A common misconception is that traditional diplomacy is the only valid method of settling international disputes. Peacekeeping has evolved to the point where there are UN operations where there is in fact, no peace to keep. Many new missions in fact, fall under the categories of peace-building, peacemaking or preventative diplomacy.
CHAPTER II

SEA POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA

He who commands the sea has command of everything.
Themistocles, Greek statesman, 480 B.C.

INTRODUCTION

The belief that our oceans have miraculously been rendered safe by new legal regimes or the collapse of a hostile ideology is premature. We now live in a very uncertain and unpredictable world. The oceans still form over two-thirds of that world, and we should be constantly aware of the threats to maritime security, writ large, and strive to understand the ways by which we can work together to prevent violent conflict.\(^\text{14}\)

The future of our planet’s oceans in this ever-changing world is uncertain at best. All those who use the oceans to fish, transport, drill for oil, mine and sail are all affected by new developments in the oceanic order. It is safe to assume that no maritime actors are more concerned with the changes in the laws of the ‘high seas’ than are the world’s major naval forces. Traditionally, the unhindered mobility of naval vessels in international waters has been one of the most potent assets of a powerful navy. Any restrictions on the freedoms of the high seas could quite easily transform the nature of naval predominance and the strategy of sea power.\(^\text{15}\)

The law of the sea has evolved from both custom and treaty. It is a collection of rules which, over the years, has attempted to accommodate various international interests to create order in the marine environment. The law of the sea is unique in that it is one area of


international jurisprudence which has enjoyed almost universal acceptance with a minimal change for over three centuries. Its most basic tenet is the principle expounded by Hugo Grotius who, in 1604 declared "that no part of the sea may be regarded as pertaining to the domain of any given nation," or quite simply freedom of the high seas affords that the sea is open to use by all.16

There can be little doubt that Grotius' arguments were tailored to suit the interests of Dutch commerce and the Dutch East India Company in particular. It is therefore not surprising that his thesis drew fire from certain major maritime powers who saw their commanding positions threatened. The concept of freedom of the seas survived, nonetheless, and eventually gained widespread acceptance. European leaders were beginning to realise, albeit in terms of national aggrandisement, that the economic and political growth of Western civilisation increasingly would depend upon the use of the sea for trade, exploration, warfare, and the communication of ideas. Furthermore, it was evident that there was more than enough ocean for everyone who possessed the assets and were willing to compete.

Considering the expansiveness of ocean space and man's limited ability to control and exploit the sea, it must have seemed odd for any one country to claim large sections for its exclusive use. It was widely held that the sea was not prone to possession or occupation and that assertions of ownership would be difficult to defend with either logic or force.

A state, regardless, is thought to possess the inherent right to defend itself and to provide for the safety of its citizens. Consequently, it became generally accepted that a coastal state must be afforded the right to exercise sovereignty over a narrow band of the sea adjacent to its coast for reasons of national security. By the nineteenth century, it was widely

16 Commander Richard C. Knott, U.S. Navy, 'Who Owns the Oceans?' To Use the Sea: Readings in
conceded that three miles—based on the average range of a cannon-shot—was a reasonable limitation to the breadth of the territorial sea. This concept prevailed without serious challenge until the early 1900s when Imperial Russia claimed a 12-mile exclusive fisheries zone. The Soviets in their turn declared that this was in reality a territorial sea, thus producing a significant fracture in the international consensus. This fracture was to widen further as a result of underlying forces born of technology, population growth, and political change.

It was the Second World War which provided the catalyst for major change. Great navies and merchant fleets occupying themselves in the business of global conflict roamed the seas revising old notions of security and strategy. An enormous acceleration in the development of ocean technology took place and new devices came into existence which not only affected the techniques of warfare but also had important implications for the exploitation of ocean resources. In 1945, President Truman of the United States, recognizing the importance of these technological developments as they could be applied to undersea deposits of petroleum and minerals, declared that the natural resources of the continental shelf were henceforth to be considered as “appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.” While great care was taken to differentiate between the continental shelf and the water column over it, many countries chose to overlook this important distinction and took the position that the United States’ action established a precedent for unilateral claims over all or any part of the marine environment.

Perhaps the most significant consequence of the Second World War, was the political change it wrought. The balance of power shifted and the colonial empires


disintegrated. Former colonies grasped the opportunities that their independence now allowed, but, they soon found that independence was hollow without economic viability. Large, industrially-developed countries still controlled the wealth of the world and the normal give and take of international economic competition seemed certain to widen rather than narrow the development gap. Developing nations found themselves faced with an accelerating population growth rate and a decreasing capability to satisfy rising expectations and even basic needs. To many, the oceans seemed to offer a way out of their dilemma. The possibility of finding rich oil and mineral deposits or of establishing lucrative fisheries off their coasts had great appeal. This idea set in motion a new undercurrent of change and a new threat to both the application of the freedom of the seas doctrine and sea power.¹⁸

SEAPower and Naval Forces

Despite the provisions in the Convention, a long-standing debate over the application of innocent passage to warships was left unresolved in UNCLOS III. Although many of the conditions for innocent passage relate to the activities of these ships, some states continue to insist that warships cannot enter their territorial seas under any circumstances without permission.¹⁹

Sea power is simply defined as force and threat of force on the oceans. It is usually embodied in a nation's navy and composed of vessels most of which are armed and capable of striking at other ocean vessels and at targets on land. Virtually every country in the world possesses a navy, whether it is on a coast, lake, or river it may have vessels ranging from massive aircraft carriers to tiny patrol boats. There are more than 120 navies in the world at


present. Most of these navies can do little more than operate close to home because their ships are small and rely on local ports for logistical requirements and on the support from shore-based guns and aircraft. There are, however, some navies which can operate far from their own shores. In the world today, there are only four countries which possess a considerable blue water navy: the United States, Great Britain, France and Russia (many naval strategists would argue that the present state of the Russian Navy would preclude it from being included in this select group).

It was during the period of British supremacy on the oceans that British sea power helped consolidate an international maritime regime based on the freedom of the high seas; freedom to travel and to fish without coastal state regulation outside a three-mile territorial sea. This was customary law, not written in any convention or treaty and therefore not binding in any way. It was interestingly enough, remarkably effective, respected by most states in times of peace from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the end of the Second World War in 1945. Therefore, for over a century, navies and other maritime entities could sail freely on oceans covering two-thirds of the earth's surface. It was only within the narrow band of three miles — the territorial sea — that coastal states put some limits on the mobility of naval forces.

The quest for economic resources upset this traditional oceanic order which had been so favourable for naval mobility. In 1945, the Truman Proclamation asserted United States ownership of the oil and gas beneath the offshore continental shelf — an underwater plateau extending, in many places, hundreds of miles out to sea. In 1947, the oceanic order was to change once more, when Chile, Ecuador, and Peru claimed 200-mile maritime zones to protect their fishing resources. These and other unilateral claims to national control threatened
to diminish international waters and to replace free use of the oceans with coastal state management. The states that benefited from freedom of the high seas rejected most of the claims to extended national zones. The United States was in the embarrassing position of having been the initiator of the rush for larger national zones and then leading the battle against national claims in the Tuna Wars. The opposition of the United States to the 200-mile zone was based not only on a desire to protect national tuna fishermen, but on the premise that other maritime interests, such as the Navy, would be adversely affected by the increased jurisdictions. The law of the sea has grown both out of custom and necessity and has been the subject of comprehensive negotiations at the United Nations to finally codify maritime policy into international law.

CUSTOMARY LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA

The traditional law of the sea was much more the creature of customary laws than of any formal conventions. The customs of the major maritime nations were the basis for most of the rules of oceanic order in the 19th and early 20th centuries. It was not until 1958 that general conventions were drafted which attempted to cover the main body of the law of the sea. The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva was followed by subsequent Conferences and more than 150 states have participated in these modern attempts to create and adopt a new law of the sea. Until the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea entered into force in 1994 most of the laws of the sea were still customary. The four Geneva Conventions were, more a codification of existing customary law than they were an establishment of new legal rules. Notwithstanding the Convention, until the United Nations possesses the ability to enforce the provisions of the Convention of the Law of the Sea, violations will continue.
In the development of the law of the sea by custom, individual states made claims about the nature of the law by way of their own maritime practice. If these claims were left unchallenged and if the practice formed a pattern and was long-standing, then a new customary law was said to have developed. If on the other hand, claims by one state were challenged by counterclaims from other states, and if one nation's practice was countered by the contrary or opposing practice of another nation, then the customary process continued until either the claim or the counterclaim prevailed. This customary process of developing international law was not orderly or effortless and it sometimes never lead to anything tangible. The old ocean order, based on customary development, was perhaps the best example of how ineffective a customary process could be. When nations would or could not agree on written rules, the customary process became an alternative way to develop international law. Customary law still finds favour with a number of nations even today and this is especially the case in terms of naval forces.

In the customary law-making process, naval operations and the exercise of sea power played a vital role in forming the laws of the sea. Notwithstanding the Convention coming into force, violations will likely to continue in that, naval activities are an authoritative and forceful expression of a state's interest and its foreign policy. Ships and aircraft possess the inherent ability to enforce claims to increased national maritime jurisdiction by attempting to force foreign vessels to leave the claimed areas or to pay fees or obey national laws. Conversely, navies can also used to assert national claims over straits and counterclaims to free or innocent passage. Navies may protect national or international deep-sea mining ventures or may interfere with them. Navies can protect the passage of merchant vessels, or they can just as easily interrupt them. All of these actions are now in violation of international law. There are great possibilities of dangerous conflict when navies are used in the application of freedom
of the high seas. Navies are historically an instrument of force, and they will be construed as such. The use of sea power may further unsettle troublesome situations. In fact, naval operations may be counterproductive and only aggravate differences among states. It is for these reasons that the United Convention on the Law of the Sea must be recognised by all nations as a legally binding international document. The danger of developing the law of the sea by claim and counterclaim makes it all more desirable that the new oceanic order be framed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is equally important that a United Nations Standing Naval Force be formed to enforce the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans.

NAVAL INTERESTS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATIONS

Since the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva in 1958 and subsequent Conferences, more than 150 states have participated in negotiations at reaching an international convention for the law of the sea. Each state has sought to promote national maritime interests in the hope that any new ocean order would facilitate national ocean uses. One of the most important national ocean interests has been the protection of naval operations. This has been the case not only for the four major blue water naval powers, but also for states with smaller coastal navies.

Naval forces, large and small, have duties and missions which are established by the branch of the national government responsible for national security. Some typical missions are coastal defence, protection of shipping and fishing grounds, nuclear deterrence, amphibious assault, and naval presence. Nations and their naval forces seek to use their sea power in different fashions, depending on perceived national security interests.
Although the four naval powers might have had the predominance of naval forces during the negotiations, they certainly did not have a predominance of the votes in the conference setting. Developing countries made up a full two-thirds of all the states attending these conferences and therefore they were able to marshal the majority of the votes. Even so, it was broadly understood that if the law of the sea conventions did not have the support of the maritime powers and especially the support of the United States and the Soviet Union there was little chance of effective implementation. Similarly, the naval powers needed the votes of the developing countries to produce a document at all. Since the naval powers recognised their many other uses for the oceans, such as fishing, shipping, mineral exploitation, and research, there was a genuine desire for give-and-take on all sides.

Naval participation in the national ocean policy process, therefore, did not end in the nation’s capital. Naval representatives accompanied the negotiating teams to the law of the sea meetings and maintained a naval input while national ocean policies were being negotiated. The naval powers were not the only ones to send naval representatives, African, Asian, Latin American states also sent naval or defence delegates to the Law of the Sea Conferences. Joined by other special interest representatives for fishing, mineral exploitation and research, these naval representatives were able to advise on technical questions, channel information about the negotiations back home to their respective establishments, and serve as checks to ensure that their perceived interests were not too greatly compromised in the negotiations. Thus naval interests were forwarded not only by the resolved national ocean policies of states but by naval representatives on location at these sessions which eventually led to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
THE 1982 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON LAW OF THE SEA

Prompted by the desire to settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding and co-operation, all issues relating to the law of the sea and aware of the historic significance of this Convention as an important contribution to the maintenance of peace justice and progress for all peoples of the world...20

After a decade of study and perhaps the most complex series of international negotiations ever undertaken, agreement was reached by the international community for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Convention was opened for signature on the 10th of December 1982 in Jamaica, having been adopted by UNCLOS III earlier that year.21 The Convention came into force in November 1994, where it was for the most part accepted as the law of the sea.

The United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea lays down a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world’s oceans and seas; it is an umbrella convention which establishes rules governing all uses of the oceans and at the same time introduces new legal concepts and regimes and addresses new concerns. The Convention provides the framework for further development of specific areas of the law of the sea. The Convention comprises 320 articles and nine annexes, governing all aspects of ocean space, such as delimitation, environmental control, marine scientific research, economic and commercial activities, transfer of technology and the settlement of disputes relating to ocean matters.


21 The vote was not unanimously favourable, four nations, including the United States, voted against the Convention, and seventeen others abstained. In general, the dissention was driven by the seabed mining provisions of Part XI and some of the Annexes.
Some of the key features of the Convention are the following:

- Coastal States exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea which they have the right to establish its breadth up to the limit not to exceed 12 nautical miles; foreign vessels are allowed "innocent passage" through those waters;

- Ships and aircraft of all countries are allowed "transit passage" through straits used for international navigation; States bordering the straits can regulate navigational and other aspects of passage;

- Archipelagic States, made up of a group or groups of closely related islands and interconnecting waters, have sovereignty over a sea area enclosed by straight lines drawn between the outermost points of the islands; all other States enjoy the right of archipelagic passage through designated sea lanes;

- Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection;

- All other States have freedom of navigation and overflight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;

- Land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States have the right to participate on an equitable basis in exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the EEZ’s of coastal States of the same region or sub-region; highly migratory species of fish and marine mammals are accorded special protection;

- Coastal States have sovereign rights over the continental shelf (the national area of the seabed) for exploring and exploiting it; the shelf can extend at least 200 nautical miles from the shore, and more under specified circumstances;

- Coastal States share with the international community part of the revenue derived from exploiting resources from any part of their shelf beyond 200 miles;
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf shall make recommendations to States on the shelf's outer boundaries when it extends beyond 200 miles;

All States enjoy the traditional freedoms of navigation, overflight, scientific research and fishing on the high seas; they are obliged to adopt, or co-operate with other States in adopting, measures to manage and conserve living resources;

The limits of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of islands are determined in accordance with rules applicable to land territory, but rocks which could not sustain human habitation or economic life of their own would have no economic zone or continental shelf;

States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas are expected to co-operate in managing living resources, environmental and research policies and activities;

Land-locked States have the right of access to and from the sea and enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of transit States;

States are bound to prevent and control marine pollution and are liable for damage caused by violation of their international obligations to combat such pollution;

All marine scientific research in the EEZ and on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal State, but in most cases they are obliged to grant consent to other States when the research is to be conducted for peaceful purposes and fulfils specified criteria;

States are bound to promote the development and transfer of marine technology "on fair and reasonable terms and conditions", with proper regard for all legitimate interests;

States Parties are obliged to settle by peaceful means their disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention;

Disputes can be submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established under the Convention, to the International Court of Justice, to arbitration or special arbitration by technical experts. Conciliation is also available and, in certain circumstances,
submission to it would be compulsory. The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over deep seabed mining disputes.\(^2\)

The impact of naval interests on the law of the sea negotiations can be clearly seen in the Convention. This analysis considers the Convention and notes the impact of naval interests on it. The text deals with many topics (deep-sea mining, fishing, pollution, as well as a host of other issues) that are only peripherally linked to naval concerns and that display no particular impression of naval interests. Some parts, though, especially those relating to passage through straits, show that naval interests have been crucial in their formulation. The crucial navy related articles concerning straits in the Convention are found in Part III, Section 2 of the Convention under Articles 37 and 38.

**Article 37 – Scope of this section**

This section applies to straits which are used for international navigation between one area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.

**Article 38 – Right of transit passage**

1. In straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded, except that if the strait is formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland, transit passage shall not apply if there exists seaward of the island a route through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics.

2. Transit passage is the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. However, the requirement of continuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that State.

3. Any activity which is not an exercise of the right of transit passage through a strait remains subject to the other applicable provisions of this Convention.²³

Article 39 provides some duties for ships and aircraft in transit passage, but these are much less severe than those imposed for innocent passage under Articles 17 to 21. First, there is no innocent passage for aircraft. Second, submarines are, as usual in rules of innocent passage, required to surface and show their flag.²⁴ Third, innocent passage prohibits a long list of military activities including intelligence gathering, launching of aircraft or military devices, and weapons practice.²⁵ Article 39, on the other hand, includes only a more general injunction to:

(a) proceed without delay through or over the strait;


(b) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;

(c) refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress;

(d) comply with other relevant provisions of this Part.\textsuperscript{26}

The other provisions relating to transit passage provide for compliance with international regulations for safety and for pollution, and with national regulations for traffic separation, oil pollution, and customs, immigration, and sanitary control.

Naval interests have been less important in influencing other segments of the Convention. Territorial sea limits are restricted by Article 3 of Section 2 to 12 miles, but pressure for 12-mile limits was widespread and did not come only from naval powers. Beyond 12 miles it is not absolutely clear that full high seas passage rights remain. Article 57 establishes a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. The naval powers fought to include this zone within the high seas and reserve certain rights to the coastal state for economic exploitation. Instead the Convention creates a zone which is neither high seas nor territorial seas. The text first sets out the coastal state's economic rights in Article 56 and then in Article 87 gives other states the "freedoms of navigation and overflight."\textsuperscript{27} This, of course, is preferable to innocent passage rights in territorial seas, but not as good as retention of freedoms of the high seas would be for naval forces. Rights to research in the exclusive economic zone are given to the coastal state from whom other states must get permission.


The exclusive economic zone articles do not contain restrictions on other military activities. Thus, according to law, there should be no problem for passing naval vessels. There is perhaps a problem with regard to shows of force, the exercise of the naval presence mission, or in using one nation's economic zone for operations against another nation. The argument might be made that these naval activities interfere with coastal state economic rights or do not fall within general rights of 'navigation'. Unquestionably, the naval powers would probably prefer a much broader grant of freedom between 12 and 200 miles. The very nature of the exclusive economic zone articles as they stand tends to establish coastal state control. This provision, viewed from a blue water naval perspective at first glance is not terribly desirable.

Viewed as a trade-off, however, the provisions for the exclusive economic zone are not unsatisfactory for the naval powers. There is not only a distinction between the economic zone and the high seas, but one between the economic zone and the territorial sea. Navigation rights are explicitly protected. The favourable articles concerning transit passage are, in part, an exchange for the grants to the coastal state in the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. This is not a bad compromise position.

With regard to the third area of naval concern, the deep seabed, the Convention states in Article 141 that the area shall be used "exclusively for peaceful purposes." This would seem to be nearer the avowed preference of Russia rather than that of the United States due to technological competency, however, the military use of the seabed is no longer an important issue in the seabed debate. Even if the term 'peaceful' can be

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interpreted in many ways and it is likely that any ocean floor listening device would be regarded
as a means toward peace.

NAVAL POWER AND THE NEW OCEANIC ORDER

If international law is adopted, it has to be monitored and, if necessary, enforced. After all, nobody would think anything of laws of a nation-state that weren’t enforced at all. We need a system like this: A convention exists on tankers not being allowed to clean their tanks at sea. So tank cleaning should be monitored, and once you’ve caught a tanker doing it at sea, and issued a couple of warnings, somebody goes out and drops a very small bomb down a funnel: “That’s it, boys, you’ve had two warnings to stop it. The third time down you go.” The moment that one tanker, after three warnings are ignored, goes to the bottom, I don’t think there will be any more tanks being cleaned at sea.29

If the new oceanic order is to prove to be acceptable to most countries, there will have to be a reconciliation of competing maritime interests, including naval interests. Since states derive their very raison d’être from their sovereignty and security, settlements about issues concerning sea power are bound to be made carefully and probably with some hesitation. As a result of the political influence of naval forces, and without an accommodation of differing naval interests, the success of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea will prove difficult in the future. Mere formal agreement on the part of the majority of nations will not be enough. No effective law of the sea will be possible unless most ocean users respect the provisions of the Convention. In the 19th Century, the theory and practice of the law of the sea were so inextricably linked that the oceanic order existed without formal conditions. If theory and practice are to correspond again, states will have to appreciate that their best interests are served by a universal obedience to international maritime norms. A
reconciliation of national ocean interests is vital not only for treaty ratification but for order itself, because order diminishes the loss of life and ensures reasonable and sustainable development of the ocean’s resources. One of the strengths upon which the new oceanic order must rely is an acceptance of various interests including the sea power.

Any law of the sea must be a part of international order, reflecting patterns of compromise and consensus, among the competing and complementary interests of states. Since national security issues are essential to every country, it is only reasonable to expect that states will consider sea power when formulating new oceanic policies. Sea power influences the enforcement of the Convention by imposing the need to reconcile naval interests in many international disputes. States also use naval forces to advance national claims which are often in contravention of the Convention. The law of the sea can no longer be developed by custom as it was in the past. Outside of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, states will still attempt to develop laws of the sea in traditional maritime practice, however, this will now be in violation of international law. Naval forces may either have a positive or a negative effect on the enforcement of the Convention in future years, as with everything in international law, it will ultimately depend upon the conduct of the Member States of the United Nations.

In the future, states may still attempt to use their naval forces to demonstrate and enforce their perceptions of the law of the sea with specific naval activities which are now in violation of international law. Customary law of the sea as it once existed is no longer accepted maritime practice and as such the written regulations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea must take precedence. In this regard, naval forces, will

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29 Lance Morrow, "An Interview: The Man in the Middle" MHQ The Quarterly Journal of Military
prove to be invaluable in the maintenance and preservation of international maritime law under the Convention. If the Common Heritage of Mankind is to be realised enforcement of the Convention is requisite. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is an excellent example of international law, its due regard for the sovereignty of states, demonstrates that successful collaboration between the United Nations and its Member States can be achieved through earnest negotiations. The true determination of the Convention’s ultimate success, however, will depend upon whether the new oceanic order is upheld and adhered to by all nations and all the navies of the world. Naval interests, however, must be reconciled if the Convention is to be protected and maintained in the future. Perhaps, the formation of a United Nations Standing Naval Force will be the key to establishing and maintaining this new oceanic order.

CONCLUSION

The oceans are our great laboratory for the making of a new international order, based on new forms of international cooperation and organization, on a new economic theory, on a new philosophy or weltanschauung.30

The navies of the world rely upon freedom of the high seas to meet certain mandates and carry out specific missions. It is for this reason that all, more or less, uniformly stress the need to preserve high seas freedom. To a certain degree, this naval assertion has been successful in legal development, both in customary practice and in the law of the sea negotiations. Most importantly, the right of transit through international straits has been protected.

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It must be remembered, however, that national and international forces pushing to allot the seas to coastal jurisdiction are strong. There are progressively more unilateral claims to control of the oceans and increased national control at that. The 12-mile territorial sea and the 200-mile exclusive economic zone are probably the two best established new proposals emanating from the Convention on the Law of the Sea. The reasons for this trend rest not so much in anti-navy sentiment as they do in the realisation that ocean resources need to be protected and authoritatively allocated. There are simply not enough non-renewable resources in the oceans of the world to go around, and there is a need for effective ocean management if problems such as pollution and ocean safety are to be mastered.

The old oceanic order based on freedoms was premised on the notion that the oceans had enough for everyone. This premise is no longer accepted in the closing years of the 20th Century. The real choice is not between the freedom of the high seas and coastal state control; it is between international and regional management on one side and national management on the other. The 12-mile territorial sea and the 200-mile exclusive economic zone are examples of national management and the international seabed authority and the regional attempts at fishery and pollution control are examples of international and regional management. All these new assertions threaten to restrict the historical supremacy of navies on the high seas, however, the same assertions add credence to the concept of naval diplomacy under the United Nations and ultimately the continued relevance of navies in the world today.

The new oceanic order is bound to create some difficulties for naval operations in that it will impose restraints on ocean use where before there were none. The navies of the world will be called upon to respect the new international and national maritime laws, and also to establish rules in times of conflict and uncertainty. This will be no easy task, however, it
must be remembered that the navies of the world have demonstrated an adaptability to profound change which is second to none. It is hoped that the new oceanic order perhaps will succeed with the international co-operation of navies. Perhaps, in due course, the United Nations will realise that there is a requirement for an international force of warships to ensure that the laws of the sea are adhered to by all the nations of the world. Although the United Nations has seldom called upon ships for naval peacekeeping, keeping the peace on the oceans of the world has been carried out in the past.
CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS FOR NAVAL PEACEKEEPING

INTRODUCTION

The pace set must therefore be increased if the United Nations is to keep ahead of the acceleration of history that characterises this age. We must be guided not by precedents alone, however wise they may be, but by the needs of the future and by the shape and content that we wish to give it.31

The UN has sponsored peacekeeping operations all over the world since 1947, but naval forces have rarely been involved, a surprising circumstance, given the utility of navies. Only a small number of UN naval peacekeeping operations have ever taken place. As a result, most of the formal and informal discussions of prospective UN peacekeeping missions do not consider possible naval missions. The former Secretary-General’s An Agenda for Peace, in fact, makes no specific mention of naval forces, except for a call for increased sealift to support land-based operations. In recent years however, there has been a flurry of interest in naval peacekeeping with academics and naval officers alike championing the use of navies in much more of a constabulary role. This constabulary role is not new, ships (particularly those of the Royal Navy) have been acting as ‘gunboats’ since the beginning of the 19th Century. Gunboat diplomacy as practised by the Royal Navy was in keeping with the valid principles of international law of the 19th Century and as such was overwhelmingly accepted as one of the great stabilisers of the age.

GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY IN THE 19th CENTURY

Gunboat Diplomacy – Diplomacy that makes use of the threat of military intervention in order to achieve its purpose.32

At the beginning of the 19th Century, Britain’s Royal Navy was fighting its greatest battles and achieving its highest peak of efficiency. At the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson drove Napoleon off the seas and confined him to the mainland of Europe and the western edge of Asia. The Royal Navy was to make the most of its century of sea supremacy, making the oceans of the world safe and free for the trade of every nation. The Royal Navy put an end to piracy on the high seas and stopped the slave-trade. It studied the sciences of the sea, surveyed all the coasts and oceans of the world, and published its findings for seafarers the world over. On the day Napoleon surrendered, the Royal Navy’s role changed abruptly and forever. The officers and men were now not only warriors, but also peacekeepers, were not just confined to conquering but now possessed constabulary duties and turned from simple sailors to scientists of the sea. This new naval concept came to full fruition in Queen Victoria’s time with the small steam-powered gunboat. Until the First World War, “Send a gunboat!” became a well-worn phrase in British diplomacy.

Gunboats were very seldom used as offensive weapons, and very rarely supported the British army on its campaigns. For the most part they were equivalent to the constable on patrol, and all over the world both subjects and foreigners in difficult situations asked for their help and protection. British traders caught up in riots or revolutions in distant lands sent urgent requests for gunboats; so did missionaries, colonial governors, consuls, and foreign rulers. In the year 1858, for example, requests came from New Zealand (to help fight

the Maoris), Panama, the Kuria Muria Islands (to protect the guano trade), Honduras (to settle a border dispute), Siam, Brazil (to stop a revolt), Sarawak (to fight pirates), Alexandria, Vancouver (to police a gold rush), Vera Cruz, Morocco, and the fishing-grounds off Newfoundland. Every one of these requests was granted.

Gunboats were effective, simply because they could turn up wherever there was trouble. They seldom opened fire, due to the fact that the mere sight of a gunboat flying the Royal Navy's White Ensign steaming off the coast or into a river mouth with a conscious air of nonchalant rectitude was enough to discourage most troublemakers. It was a threat, a pledge of power, a reminder that a naval power was keeping an eye on things. It was the growl of a mighty lion. Gunboat diplomacy unquestionably did more good than harm. Of course, it put British interests first—not principally British conquests, but British trade. However, it often went far beyond that, gunboat diplomacy sorted out potential trouble-spots where Britain was scarcely involved at all—it supported small nations whose regimes were peaceful and opposed regimes inclined to sabre-rattling, it enforced the ideals of law and morality, and it prevented large-scale conflict the world over for close to a century. Perhaps it was arrogant, but to most Britons at the time it seemed a duty, one of the obligations of wealth and power. Very few nations, among them other naval powers, resented this projection of power, most of the world was content to let the Royal Navy carry on with its laborious and almost thankless chore, and to reap the benefits of peace.

Seafarers for the most part, were safe from pirates, slavers, coral reefs, and granted free passage on the oceans of the world. In times of peace, it is sometimes taken for granted that ships of every nation can sail unharmed wherever they wish. This however, is not an ancient right of mariners nor an indisputable freedom of the high seas. It was a legacy of
the century when the Royal Navy decreed that it should be so. Pax Britannica would begin to wane with the storm clouds of the First World War.33

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS NAVY

After the First World War, a British politician named Alfred Duff Cooper, first Viscount Norwich commented on the League of Nations and its uncertain beginnings.

When I found that the League of Nations was a live issue my first instinct was to denounce it for the sham I believed it to be. Before doing so I felt bound to give some attention to the subject, and the result of my enquiries convinced be that either the League of Nations must triumph or there must be another war. I therefore, served on the executive committee of the League of Nations Union.

Often people would say to me, people who were surprised that I should take the subject seriously, ‘Do you really believe in the League?’ I would retort, ‘Do you believe in the fire brigade?’ I disapprove of houses on fire and I know of no organisation for putting them out other than the fire brigade. It may be badly managed, it may be inefficient, but none the less if I could help it I would certainly do so. I disapprove also of war. I know of no mechanism that exists for preventing it other than the League of Nations. The League may fail. If so God help us all. But so long as there is the faintest chance of succeeding I believe that we should give it all the help we can.34

The genesis of UN Standing Forces is in all likelihood found within the proposals for the United Nations’ antecedent organisation – the League of Nations. On the 11th of November 1918, the day the armistice was signed ending the First World War, plans were already proposed for multinational naval co-operation after the war. Allied naval officers


and an American professor from the Naval War College presented the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations with a proposal for a standing League of Nations Army and Navy to enforce the League Covenant. Unfortunately there was nothing in the archives to indicate what action was taken on the proposal, or how much consideration was given to it in the end. This is perhaps a result of the eventual ineffectiveness of the League of Nations as a world body.

At the end of the war, there were still concerns about the numerical superiority of the Royal Navy. It was for this reason, that the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and his staff eventually recommended that the League should rely on a combination of national navies to enforce the sanctions of the League. In the end, the United States did not even seek membership in the League, and consequently no standing League of Nations Navy was ever established. The proposal is however, an intriguing archetype and one of the first recommendations calling for the formation of a standing naval force.

The plan envisioned for the League Navy consisted of a permanent standing force of at least twice the size of any single nation's navy. It was argued that this would provide the League with a sufficient enforcement force to maintain security against external and internal disturbance. The significant contribution proposed for both the Royal Navy and the United States Navy would be inconceivable today. As shown in TABLE A-1 PROPOSED LEAGUE OF NATIONS NAVY COMPOSITION, the proposed national allotment of personnel would virtually have established a standard of naval equality between Great Britain and the United States, but would have also committed at least half of each of those nation's fleets to the League. The perceived plan also allowed for the possibility that all of one or more navies might be placed under the operational control of the League. Given the
world's present political and economic situation, a 'press-ganging' of such proportions would be unimaginable today. Operational control is a sensitive issue especially to the Americans who have traditionally maintained operational control of their Armed Forces in every peacekeeping operation in which they have been involved. The uncertainty of the geo-political spectrum would also preclude any one nation from contributing half of its fleet to a United Nations Standing Naval Force. Notwithstanding the proposed force structure and the limited number of contributing nations, the proposal contains many insights which would be relevant in the formation of a United Nations force.

**TABLE A-1 PROPOSED LEAGUE OF NATIONS NAVY COMPOSITION**

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The plan was quite visionary in its attempt to halt the scourge of global conflict in the future. The proposal was designed to regulate both the size of national navies and begin a global programme of disarmament. The drafters of the proposition believed that this would

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35 The goal was to establish an international force outside the control of any one nation, but under the controlling influence of the United States and Great Britain.
have encouraged the dissolution of the naval arms race while still allowing a certain degree of autonomy amongst the naval powers.

The proposal also envisioned an international force outside the control of any one nation, but under the controlling influence of Great Britain and the United States. The plan called for the League Navy to be under the administrative control of a seven-member League Admiralty Board selected by the League. The three highest ranking officers of the League Navy would have been selected by the Board, but would always be of different national origin so as to prevent nationalisation or monopolisation of the force. At the same time, the percentage of representation was designed such that Great Britain and the United States would practically control the League Navy, and thereby "properly police the seas."\(^\text{37}\)

Finally, the plan implicitly recognised the need for integrated training of personnel in League colleges and training schools to ensure 'internationalisation' of the League Navy. Unfortunately, the proposal did not explicitly suggest a need for peacetime sea-going exercises to enhance interoperability. This was quite an oversight given the importance of training a multinational force at sea. Interoperability and the 'internationalisation' of any UN standing naval force could be achieved in a similar manner and further broadened to include exchange programmes and foreign personnel training which currently exist within most navies. Peacetime interoperability trials would most definitely be an integral addition to any multinational training exercise for the UN today. This would be necessary to enhance the interoperability and the combat readiness of any multinational standing naval force.


It is important, of course, to keep in mind the context in which the League proposal was made. The plan was fully consistent with the lofty expectations for the League at the time. Furthermore, it was developed at a time when the U.S. Navy was numerically inferior to the Royal Navy and represented an alternative means of redressing this inferiority and avoiding another costly ship-building programme. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that such a proposal was ever made to the highest levels of the naval leadership. Given today's geopolitical climate, less sweeping standing naval force proposals than this can have a place in an expanded UN international security architecture, and need to be accorded as much analytical attention as other possible forms of UN naval co-operation.\(^{38}\) It would take another World War and the formation of another international body before the concept of international standing forces would again be contemplated.

**THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE REPORT**

Someone once asked Austin whether he did not become tired during the apparently interminable debates at the UN. "Yes, I do," he replied, "but it is better for aged diplomats to be bored than for young men to die.\(^{39}\)

The question of international naval peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the UN is theoretically as old as the organisation itself; Article 42 of the Charter provides that the Security Council "may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Naval forces were an important component of the UN forces envisioned by the Military Staff Committee in its original

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deliberations in 1946 and 1947. Article 43 of the UN Charter obliges Member States to make forces available to the Security Council on demand for enforcement actions, in accordance with agreements reached with the Security Council. In 1946, the Security Council directed the Military Staff Committee (MSC) to study and report on the provisions of Article 43 from a military standpoint. The report, submitted in 1947, indicated extensive agreement among the members of the MSC on the overall purpose and mission of national armed forces made available to the Security Council. As was expected, disagreement as to the overall strength and composition of the forces became the major impediment. The Soviet Union believed that the Western powers were attempting to limit the use of Soviet forces by creating a UN force composed largely of Western naval and air components while leaving the Soviets with the main responsibility for ground forces. By contrast, the Western powers believed that the Soviet Union wanted to reduce the forces available to the UN for enforcement actions to the level of those the Soviet Union could contribute, thereby limiting the role for UN enforcement actions. This disagreement precluded the conclusion of Article 43 agreements, and stalemated the work of the Military Staff Committee. The Military Staff Committee has been an ineffective arm of the United Nations ever since.

The Report, however, suggests some recommendations which would be equally relevant for the formation of a UN Standing Naval Force today. Firstly, although the Charter does not mention Command and Control arrangements, the report identifies the desire

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40 The Military Staff Committee (MSC) is composed of the Chiefs of Staffs of the five permanent members of the Security Council (or their representatives) and is responsible for the discharge of the Security Council’s peacekeeping responsibilities. The MSC advises and assists the Security Council on all questions relating to the Charter’s Chapter VII provisions, including the employment and command of forces and plans for the application of UN armed forces and is responsible for the “strategic direction” of any forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. The inability of the permanent members of the Security Council to cooperate stalemated the work of the MSC and rendered ineffective some of the provisions of the Charter. The MSC has since met in pro forma formal meetings every two weeks.
of the five permanent members, meeting as the MSC, to provide for international direction of national forces, but with national tactical command and control left intact. Hence, forces called upon for the fulfilment of measures envisaged in Article 42 of the Charter shall come under the “control” of the Security Council (Art. 37 of the Report), and shall be employed by the Security Council under the “strategic direction” of the MSC (Art. 38 of the Report). All delegations agreed that “overall” or “supreme” commanders may be appointed by the Security Council, on advice of the MSC (Art. 41 of the Report), but specified that “command of national contingents will be exercised by Commanders appointed by the respective Member Nations” (Art. 39 of the Report). While decentralised command across national sectors is consistent with the standard peacekeeping format that has since been established by the UN, it may be inconsistent with the demand for effective command and control under combat conditions.

Secondly, the Military Staff Committee Report did not envisage integrated multinational forces, specifying instead that national contingents should retain their “national character” and be provided with their own national logistical support. Hence, there was no recognition of any need for a significant level of interoperability in doctrine, equipment, intelligence-sharing, logistic support, and so on. Achieving the level of interoperability required for modern warfare is difficult outside an alliance context, even for UN-authorised military operations.

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41 A disagreement ensued over whether there would be "overall commander(s) (supported by the US, USSR and Chinese delegations) or "supreme" commander(s) (supported by the UK and French delegations). The UK and France subsequently did not accept Article 41, although they did accept the principle of unity of command under a supreme commander.

42 See Articles 39 and 29 of the Report, respectively.
Thirdly, the report recognised the importance of time responsiveness for the success of action under Article 42 of the Charter. For example, Article 6 of the report specified that the forces should be limited in strength to enable quick action, and article 19 noted the military advantages of prompt action. Unfortunately, the report did not specify the readiness levels of forces, nor did it identify the process by which a command structure would be established. The French delegation supported the Security Council's prerogative to appoint component commanders, whereas the other delegations wanted the method of designation of the command structure to be determined when the occasion arises.33

Naval forces were an important component of the UN forces envisioned by the Military Staff Committee. It was their assessment that naval blockades and bombardments were plausible strategies for enforcement operations and preferable to ground operations. Naval blockades have certainly been a mainstay of recent peacekeeping missions in the Persian Gulf and the Adriatic Sea off the coast of the former-Yugoslavia. In the 1947-1948 discussions on the size of the forces to be assigned to the Military Staff Committee, the five delegates made the following suggestion for the composition of its naval forces:

Eventually the effort to create a UN naval force fell apart under the political stresses associated with the developing Cold War. The political realities of the Cold War also rendered the Military Staff Committee powerless. The International Peace Academy, *Peacekeeper's Handbook* states:

> It was the intention that the Military Staff Committee should be responsible for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. However, due to a lack of unanimity among its members from the beginning the influence and effective capacity of the Committee has diminished to a point where it is no longer consulted by the Council when peacekeeping operations are being planned. Although it meets regularly at bi-weekly intervals it is never called upon to function as it was required to do under the Charter. Whether it ever will again will depend upon

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adjustments being made in United Nations current structure, machinery and policy for mounting peacekeeping operations.⁴⁶

There are many political obstacles associated with reviving the UN Military Staff Committee especially with respect to the establishment of a standing UN naval force. However, it is hoped that recent changes in the international situation will result in the rediscovery of the Military Staff Committee's potential, especially for future UN naval peacekeeping missions.

UNITED NATIONS ‘NAVAL’ PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Obtaining of military units to carry out the will of the United Nations has never been a serious problem. The constant difficulty was caused in part by the lack of concerted, cooperative, political will on the part of the UN member states, especially those of the Security Council, to meet squarely the challenges to international peace and security...⁴⁷

Naval peacekeeping has never been a clearly defined concept within the UN Charter or its unwritten peacekeeping doctrine. As a result, only a handful of UN naval peacekeeping missions have ever been undertaken. Consequently, most of the formal and informal discussions of prospective UN military action avoid consideration of purely naval missions or even those missions assisted by naval forces. Historically, United Nations peacekeeping has been limited to the more traditional and celebrated land-based operations. Nonetheless, naval forces have been utilised with great success within the context of the United Nations. The exact origin of UN naval peacekeeping is somewhat obscure, however, perhaps the first mission came shortly after the Report of the Military Staff Committee.

The United Nations has had some experience in handling naval vessels since the very beginning. In 1948, American and French warships sailed with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in support of the peacekeeping efforts in Palestine. In the absence of world government and the continued emphasis on state sovereignty, however, these operations have been impossible to organise except under unusual circumstances – the Korean War being a good example of this fact. During the Korean War, ten nations provided warships to the UN Blockade and Escort Force during its more than three years of operation (Australia, Canada, Columbia, France, Thailand, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the United States). In addition, the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) included a Landing Ship Tank (LST) for some years to give practice to troops in loading and unloading personnel and vehicles from beaches. The UN Security Force in West Irian included about five coastal vessels (ships on loan from the Royal Netherlands Navy and crew from the Pakistan Navy) for supplying essentials to the population and the UN troops ashore. A small naval component for UNEF II to patrol the Straits of Tiran had been accepted from Iran, but never materialised because of the revolution in that country. Presently, Multinational Force Observers (MFO) patrol the Red Sea using three Italian minesweepers to guarantee Israeli access to the Red Sea port of Elat. The Royal Navy blockaded the port of Beira as part of the UN sanction effort against Rhodesia in 1966.


48 In June 1950 North Korea, which had been heavily armed by the Soviet Union, invaded the south, capturing Seoul within a few days. The United States sent troops to help resist the invasion; the UN Security Council urged other nations to do the same - no Soviet veto blocked this move, as the Soviet Union was then boycotting the council's meetings - and altogether 16 nations sent troops to fight in Korea under the UN flag. By June 1951 the UN allies had fought their way back north of the 38th parallel again, China's army had suffered huge losses, and it agreed to negotiations; but these talks dragged on until 1953, when an armistice was signed. It is interesting to note that this was the first instance in which naval forces fought under the flag of the United Nations.

More recently, Argentinean patrol boats conducted surveillance operations in the Gulf of Fonseca, to reduce the flow of small arms from Nicaragua to guerrilla forces in El Salvador, as part of the UN Mission in Central America (ONUCA) in 1989.

The need for naval peacekeeping became more acute after the Iran and Iraq War spread to the Persian Gulf, resulting in frequent attacks on tankers and oil installations. These attacks gave rise to the Security Council Resolution 598 of July 20th, 1987, that requested an immediate cease-fire, to be supervised by the UN Secretary-General – a task which included exclusively naval peacekeeping for the first time in the history of the UN. It was during this period that the Soviet Union introduced an action in the United Nations to consider the creation of a United Nations Naval Peacekeeping Force. The proposal was aimed at allowing UN control of such an operation at both the policy making and implementation levels, rather than allow one nation (or a coalition outside United Nations control) to operate in a manner that might not serve the interests of the larger community of nations. While events have passed the Soviet proposal, a coalition under the auspices of the UN, indeed, came to pass during the Gulf War.

THE GULF WAR

In the Gulf we saw the United Nations playing the role dreamed of by its founders, with the world’s leading nations orchestrating and sanctioning collective action against aggression.51

This statement by former United States President, George Bush is rather misleading in that the founding members of the UN envisioned collective action under UN

command and not under the command of just one nation (the United States in this case).

Nevertheless, a coalition of UN Member States was formed under the auspices of the United Nations. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2nd 1990, the Security Council, referring expressly to Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter, demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces — United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)660 —, imposed a trade and financial embargo on Iraq and required mandatory sanctions (UNSCR 661), and called on all states co-operating with Kuwait that had maritime forces in the area to halt inward and outward maritime shipping to ensure implementation of the embargo (UNSCR 665). This led to the Maritime Interception Force (MIF) operations conducted by coalition members.

The Gulf War demonstrated that effective collective action could result from Security Council resolution. Although UN authorisation provided political legitimacy to the collective action, especially at sea, the co-ordination of coalition forces came about because of procedures established through years of practice (primarily, but not exclusively through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)). Special arrangements were made so that non-NATO navies could use NATO doctrinal procedures in theatre. As well, those forces with limited capability were not fully integrated into the operations. As a result, interoperability problems resulting from command, logistics, and support inefficiencies or incompatible rules of engagement were largely overcome. However, successful multinational naval operations do not occur inadvertently, they require preparation and commitment. As U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank B. Kelso, in speaking of naval operations in the Gulf, stated:

It was surely no accident that such a large number of forces from so many nations could form together so rapidly, and operate safely and effectively in tandem. The procedures that allowed this to happen were not arrived at by chance. This overwhelming success was underwritten by years of bilateral and multinational exercises throughout the world. These exercises have resulted in unprecedented levels of interoperability among naval forces from every continent.\(^\text{52}\)

Overall, the Gulf War demonstrated that coalition operations under UN authorisation can be effective in a mission requiring coercive enforcement. Though the arrangements did prove to be successful, some participating states were concerned by the lack of UN control over the strategic direction of the war. Once the Security Council had authorised the use of force under Resolution 678, it had no control over the military operation. As well, in the post-war period during intercept operations, it proved difficult to maintain consensus over participation because of the ad hoc nature of the operation. More formal UN involvement might have provided greater mission consensus and thereby increased UN moral pressure on nations to sustain such commitments.\(^\text{53}\)

Under the auspices of the UN, naval forces have also been involved in a number of recent peacekeeping missions including riverine observer duties in Cambodia as part of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia; sanction enforcement in the Adriatic Sea off the coast of the Former Yugoslavia; and direct support of coalition forces ashore in Somalia.

\(^{52}\) In an address by Vice-Admiral Edward W. Clextom, Jr. USN, Deputy Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe at the CONFERENCE ON MULTINATIONAL NAVAL COOPERATION IN A CHANGING WORLD, Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich 12-13 December 1991.

CONCLUSION

With the lessons of nearly 50 years under its belt, the UN should look again at the idea of a standing force. On the one hand the process of mustering suitable peacekeeping forces has proved much more difficult than envisioned; on the other hand some of the problems of such a force are not now as formidable as they were thought to be in 1945.\(^4\)

The trend today, particularly among politicians and theorists alike is to promote ‘naval peacekeeping’ as the maritime peace dividend resulting from the end of the Cold War. In fact, the tasks being propounded for naval peacekeeping have for the most part been traditional naval tasks that have been performed by warships ever since the age of sail. The inherent flexibility of warships have always allowed them to change tasks quickly and without any major loss of efficiency. Britain’s Royal Navy in the 19th Century seized the peace dividend brought about by the end of the Napoleonic Wars and introduced the world to ‘gunboat diplomacy’. Peace was maintained upon the oceans of the world for over a century. Gunboat diplomacy meant that at the earliest hint of trouble anywhere in the world (principally within the British Empire) – an intervention force conducting ‘presence diplomacy’ was able to diffuse the situation.

Perhaps the phrase “gunboat diplomacy” has far less positive connotations at the close of the 20th century, than at the close of the 19th century. Unfortunately today the expression is incorrectly applied to the coarsely intimidating gestures of the United States. However, if a UN multinational force is given the wherewithal to conduct missions in the trouble spots of the globe, then hopefully the mere sight of a UN naval force flying the United Nations blue ensign will discourage most troublemakers and redefine the old expression “Send

a gunboat!" and perhaps replace it with “Send in the Navy!”

In the declining days of the 20th Century and amidst political correctness, perhaps the phrase ‘gunboat diplomacy’ should be replaced with the comparable, yet far less intimidating phrase ‘naval diplomacy’. Naval diplomacy may well be defined as the use of naval forces to support diplomatic efforts to assist, persuade, deter, or compel – to promote peace and security. Canada has devoted much effort in the past fifty years toward the promotion of peace and stability in the world and toward the evolution of United Nations peacekeeping.
CHAPTER IV
CANADIAN PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES

INTRODUCTION

The requirements of peace preservation in the future may not always be satisfied by skilful improvisation and by the willingness of a few to do their duty. The growing interest in improving peace-keeping methods must be broadly stimulated into advance planning and preparation. Canada, I know, is resolved to draw on its own experience in a way which will give leadership and encouragement in this effort.\textsuperscript{55}

These were wise words from the Canadian who first proposed a UN military mission along the lines of what we have come to know as peacekeeping. In 1956, Canada won world-wide recognition for its diplomatic efforts when Great Britain, France and Israel attempted to prevent Egypt from seizing control of the Suez Canal. Canada’s then Minister for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, proposed forming and deploying a United Nations peacekeeping force to “secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities”. Pearson was subsequently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his initiative and his long-term commitment to peace. Ever since, Canada has been a strong supporter of the UN and peacekeeping, and has participated in almost every mission since 1956. Canada has an exemplary record in peacekeeping and stands poised to continue its long-standing commitment to the United Nations – both by contributing peacekeepers and by improving the mechanisms associated with successful peacekeeping.

An overriding problem, apparent in a number of recent operations, is the often lethargic response of the UN to emerging crises. While some operations, of course, do not
require hasty preparation and deployment, what is most noticeable in today's peace operations is the inability of the UN to act quickly and respond rapidly to emerging global threats. The present day security dilemmas, which are predominantly intra-state and increasingly complex, require swift and decided responses by the UN. Fortunately, some nations, like Canada, have taken the initiative and offered the UN viable ideas for reforming peacekeeping operations in the future. Canada has continually been an active proponent of a United Nations Rapid Reaction Force and has recently completed a study which recommends changes to the UN system that would enhance the UN's capability to respond rapidly and effectively to crisis situations.56

CANADIAN STUDY ON A UN RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY

In my years as Ambassador and before that as a Parliamentarian working in the UN, it was evident to me that Canada's blending of idealism and pragmatism enabled us to be a strong influence in UN affairs. Not the least of Canada's attributes is that we are trusted—by both the developing and developed nations alike. We have neither a colonial past nor pretensions to grandeur. Canada, in short, is ideally placed to advance the issues of common security that are at the heart of a new world order. This is not just a question of altruism. It is in the deepest self-interest of the Canada of generations to come to be a vigorous partner in the striking of new coalitions of middle powers of East, West, North and South.57

In 1995, the Government of Canada produced a report for the UN entitled:

Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations. The Canadian study was in fact launched the previous year at the 49th General Assembly of the United Nations in September

55 Lecture by the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada, in the Dag Hammarskjold Memorial Series, at Carleton University, Ottawa, May 7, 1964.
1994. At that time, it was evident that traditional approaches to peacekeeping could no longer be applied to deal effectively with global crises. The objective of the Study was to present practical recommendations to enhance the UN's rapid-reaction capability in the field of peace operations in the short, medium and long-term.

The Study concluded that while there have been many improvements in how the UN manages peace operations, there have also been deficiencies in the many missions undertaken in the past five or more years. United Nations peacekeeping operations have grown in size, scope and number since the end of the Cold War, and the UN has not always been allocated the resources to carry out missions effectively. Despite recent misgivings about the direction of certain missions, there continues to be the expectation that the UN can and should play a pivotal role in resolving conflict.

The report itself was a proposal to the UN to enhance its capability to deploy rapidly in the event of crisis. As such, it was a 'technical' study, examining the obstacles to rapid reaction and providing concrete recommendations for decreasing the time required to respond effectively and efficiently to crises. It was also an examination of rapid-reaction capabilities in selected national contexts, as well as in NATO. The report concluded that a rapid-reaction capability consists of six generic capabilities: early warning; effective decision-making processes; strategic transportation and infrastructure resources; logistics support; adequate financing; and the availability of well-trained troops. To this end, the Canadian Study focused on the following areas:

- improving the quality of military advice in the UN, leading to better and faster decision-making by the Security Council.

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57 Douglas Roche. A Bargain for Humanity: Global Security by 2000. Edmonton: The University of
• changing the UN's financial procedures to enable those in charge of rapid-reaction machinery to plan and initiate their operations more quickly.

• filling the current vacuum at the operational level of the UN by creating a UN operational-level headquarters for a rapid-reaction group.

• enhancing the UN's standby arrangements system to make it more amenable to rapid reaction.

• improving other aspects of the UN's approaches to peace operations, including logistics, training and equipment.

• continuing to study, among other long-term ideas, the possibility of a permanent, standing UN Emergency Group.\(^{58}\)

In all, twenty-one recommendations were made in the Report, however, there was no mention of any type of UN rapid reaction naval force. Many of the recommendations were based on the premise that the key to effective peace operations is related to personnel. Substantial emphasis was therefore placed on advanced training and ensuring that qualified personnel are available for UN peacekeeping operations on short notice. The Report also called for continued study of alternative arrangements, including the use of new technology, building standing capabilities in the area of civilian peace, the creation of a permanent UN Standing Emergency Group, and independent financing for the UN system. Oddly enough, the Report makes no specific mention of naval peacekeeping, however, it also states that 'alternative visions' should not be discounted and that Member States should determine that

peace operations need to be done in a fundamentally new way.59 Analysts believe that Canada should take a leading role in future UN naval operations.

On the military side, I believe commitment to the concept of multinational naval force operations should be the cornerstone of Canadian international security policy. We have the experience, the equipment, and the temperament to be leaders in that role.60

In fact the Canadian Navy has been involved in naval peace operations since 1956 until the present day. See APPENDIX – CANADIAN NAVAL PEACE OPERATIONS: 1956 – THE PRESENT.

PEACEKEEPING AND THE CANADIAN NAVY

When the Canadian Navy contributes to the achievement of our shared foreign policy objectives abroad, its accomplishments help shape a better world for this and future generations.61

The Canadian Navy is at a challenging juncture in its history. While the direct threat to Canada has diminished since the end of the Cold War, the use of the Canadian Forces has actually increased largely due to peacekeeping and peacemaking issues. The new international climate coupled with destabilising world events have transformed both the operational orientation of the Canadian fleet as well as its very mandate and priorities. The Canadian Navy's mission and tasks are changing dramatically in this new strategic environment

and as a result maritime strategic defence policy has been broadened and modified to encompass such things as:

- Regional and global co-operation in formulating an effective security regime in the 'new world order';
- Transnational matters, such as drug interdiction, illegal immigration, terrorism and environmental issues; and finally,
- Peacekeeping and peacemaking missions under the auspices of the United Nations.

This last category is increasingly becoming the most consequential for Canada given the rise of new peacekeeping missions around the world. Canadian foreign policy has traditionally been based on the principle of international stability and the rule of law within the framework of the United Nations.

The Canadian Navy is recognised by the Government of Canada to be inherently flexible and mobile, making it an extremely effective instrument of Canadian foreign policy. Canadian naval vessels operate anywhere in the world outside the limit of other nations' recognised territorial waters. Ships of both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets can deploy quickly, remain in an area for extended periods of time, and conduct a variety of tasks. The Canadian Navy has developed considerable expertise in operating alongside the navies of many other nations. As a result of their tremendous flexibility, mobility and interoperability, naval forces are often used by the Canadian Government as its foreign policy instrument of choice. The Canadian Navy offers political symbolism at relatively low risk. Ships are not easily targeted by parties to conflicts in the growing number of intra-state disputes and dispatching a naval vessel to an area of tension, in concert with other states, rarely attracts public opposition.
Due to the inherent flexibility of balanced, combat capable, general purpose maritime forces, the Canadian Navy can play a leadership role in naval peacekeeping operations. Canadians have been world leaders in the field of peacekeeping, in large measure because of the professionalism of its armed forces and the experience gained in nearly all of the peacekeeping operations since 1947. Successive Canadian governments have demonstrated their commitment to peacekeeping, and there is no indication that Canadians want to reverse that tradition. The Canadian Navy can offer a wealth of experience gained from years of service with NATO's standing forces as well as other international activities.

RECENT CANADIAN NAVAL OPERATIONS

The following is a synopsis some of the operations undertaken by the Canadian Navy since the end of the Cold War:

A Task Group of three Canadian warships participated in United Nations sponsored operations in the Persian Gulf that successfully liberated Kuwait. During hostilities, the Canadian Task Group was responsible for the co-ordination and safety of the coalition's vital ship resupply operations in the Gulf, which served eleven nations. Interestingly, this was the only theatre of operation which was not commanded by an American during the war. The Gulf War underlined the continuing utility of a flexible, naval combat capability. After the Gulf War, Canadian warships operated in the Red Sea as part of a multinational interdiction effort which enforced continuing United Nations sanctions against Iraq.

The Navy co-ordinated and provided the bulk of Canadian assistance to disaster relief operations in Florida and the Bahamas after the devastation caused by Hurricane Andrew. The Canadian Navy also supported the United Nations' humanitarian relief
operation in Somalia by providing a resupply vessel with embarked helicopters and a logistics support detachment in Kenya. These units played key roles in Canadian and multinational efforts to alleviate human suffering and multiplied their own effectiveness by supporting the activities of more than 20 non-governmental relief organisations working in the region.

A Canadian naval contingent, working through the UN, was instrumental in the re-establishment of peace among warring factions in Cambodia. While there, Canadian sailors also provided support to many other UN agencies and offered humanitarian assistance to the local population. Canadian naval observers have also participated in recent United Nations and European Union peacekeeping initiatives in the former Yugoslavia, and the UN peacekeeping successes in Central America.

As part of Canada's association with NATO and in concert with forces of the Western European Union, the Navy contributed to the enforcement of a UN embargo in the Adriatic Sea. Canada also commanded the NATO maritime force at one time, contributed various destroyers and frigates, maritime patrol aircraft and a replenishment ship to the effort; and supported the infrastructure needed to conduct operations in the former Yugoslavia.

Canada has maintained warships in maritime interdiction operations off the coast of Haiti as part of the UN effort to restore democracy and hope to the people of that island state. Additionally, in early 1994 a Canadian naval officer was in command of the combined embargo force of ships from the six participating nations. In support of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian Navy has taken part in the Middle East Peace Process, by successfully facilitating the development of an agreement among conflicting parties dealing with the prevention of incidents at sea.
Recent Canadian experience highlights the utility of ships in naval peacekeeping roles:

- ships do not require land bases to support them, nor do they require overflight clearances;
- they have the capability to provide the widest range of government options, ranging from sanctions to full multi-threat warfare;
- they can remain in an area for long durations due to the replenishment capability of our Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment ships, which accompany Canadian Task Groups on extended deployments; and
- ships can respond quickly to national political direction, because each and every one of them has excellent long range command, control and communication facilities.62

Future requirements for Canadian naval contribution to a Standing United Nations Naval Force will depend upon the level of conflict and the level of co-operation with the other navies contributing to the force. Generally speaking, multi-purpose destroyers and frigates with organic helicopters and accompanying support ships are ideally suited for peacekeeping duties. Canadian warships possess a multi-purpose configuration which allows for the inherent mission flexibility — with helicopters for surveillance and underway boarding and an excellent self-defence suite should the need arise.

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CONCLUSION

Canada has an interest in promoting international stability and peaceful change, while attempting to alleviate human suffering wherever it might occur.63

Canada's past successes in peacekeeping have not been due to a specialisation in specific peacekeeping tasks, but more due to the fact that the Canadian Forces are highly trained, adequately equipped, well-commanded, disciplined, professional and prepared for the demands of both armed conflict and peace operations. The Canadian Navy has been involved in many multilateral operations in the past. Personnel and units are experienced in combined operations and the Navy possesses a compatibility in such areas as command and control, communications, standard operating procedures and logistics support. The present and projected composition of the Canadian Navy is well-suited to the tasks of naval diplomacy and naval peacekeeping.

UN Member States like Canada continue to serve with distinction in their quest for stability and security through more effective multilateral co-operation. There continues to be recognition that multilateral co-operation is preferable to unilateralism, and that action by the UN in the name of the international community confers a legitimacy that is well worth the difficulties of blending the efforts of many states of varying backgrounds and cultures. The creation of a United Nations Standing Naval Force depends upon a co-ordinated United Nations command and control system and standard operating procedures (SOPs) to prove successful in any peacekeeping mission. The evolution of NATO's multinational naval forces presents an excellent model for the establishment of a United Nations Standing Naval Force.

CHAPTER V
THE STANDING NAVAL FORCES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

INTRODUCTION

In contrast to NATO, with a sophisticated force planning system and a high degree of force commitment and availability, the UN has had to rely on a much more informal, cumbersome process to acquire its operational and tactical resources.\(^{64}\)

Shortly after the end of the Second World War, the nations of the North Atlantic realised the need for military co-operation in the face of the perceived threats from the Soviet Union. Out of meetings in 1947 and 1948 grew the organisational structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. These meetings were aimed specifically at developing “closer standardization in the field of planning, operations and logistics.”\(^{65}\) The North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949 brought into being an Alliance of independent countries with a common interest in maintaining peace and defending their freedom through political solidarity and adequate military defence to deter and, if necessary, repel all possible forms of aggression against them. Created within the framework of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which reaffirms the inherent right of individual or collective defence, the Alliance is an association of states united in their determination to preserve their security through mutual guarantees and stable relations with other countries. Member nations of NATO include:

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Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.\textsuperscript{66}

On April 10, 1952, three years after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C., Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) began operations with its headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. The Officer in Command of this formation is the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) and is always a U.S. Marine Corps General. Nominated by the President of the United States and approved by the North Atlantic Council – NATO’s highest governing body – the Commander receives his direction from the NATO Military Committee. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander is always a British Vice-Admiral.

SACLANT is one of NATO’s two major military commanders and the only one in North America. The command is the senior military authority for NATO land, sea and air forces in the North Atlantic area, from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer, and from the East Coast of North America to the West Coast of Africa and Europe, approximately 12 million square miles. It is the command that links North America with Europe. Geographic realities bear out the fact that NATO is an Atlantic alliance, dependent on the vital sea lines of communication for economic well being in peacetime and survival in war. The two World Wars of this century attest to the necessity of controlling and utilising the Atlantic lifelines to sustain freedom and democracy.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{66} This exclusive membership will be expanded in 2000 to include three former Warsaw Pact countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.

\textsuperscript{67} Represented on the SACLANT staff: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Represented by Military Mission to SACLANT: France and Spain.
The SACLANT staff consists of more than 400 members from 13 of the 16 NATO nations, including Spain and France which have missions located near SACLANT Headquarters. SACLANT has a permanently assigned multinational naval force called the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), which consists of six to 10 ships from different NATO nations. The command is also responsible for the SACLANT Undersea Research Center, located in La Spezia, Italy, which conducts marine research for both major NATO commands and operates the research vessel ALLIANCE.

NATO'S IMMEDIATE REACTION NAVAL FORCES

If the UN is to achieve a rapid-reaction capability, many of its systems and procedures at all levels will need review and reform.68

When NATO was created in 1949, efforts at multinational naval co-operation finally developed into a more formal and effective structure. The first meeting of the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group gave rise to NATO's unified naval command structure, vested in the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic or SACLANT. Although the political environment and political landscape in Europe have changed radically, the fundamental mission of NATO's maritime forces has not. Indeed, with the reduction of forces in Europe and the increased emphasis on force build-up and reinforcement, (most of which must travel by sea) the relative importance of maritime issues and capabilities has increased. Maritime forces, with their inherent mobility, flexibility and endurance are ideally suited to provide various response options and will continue to be among the most desirable forms of peacetime military presence and crisis response. They convey calculated ambiguity and calibrated response, and their presence does not commit the maritime force to a given
course of action, but provides an array of choices. In the Alliance’s Strategic Concept which was agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome in 1991, it was stated:

Maritime forces, because of their inherent mobility, flexibility and endurance, make an important contribution to the Alliance’s crisis response options. Their essential missions are to ensure sea control in order to safeguard the Allies’ sea lines of communication, to support land and amphibious operations, and to protect the deployment of the Alliance’s sea-based nuclear deterrent.69

SACLANT has developed maritime force structures equipped for today’s security environment in keeping with NATO’s new and broader concept of security which places much greater stress on the importance of crisis management and conflict prevention. Utilising a building-block approach, NATO’s maritime forces now provide an array of force level options to respond across the entire spectrum of peace, crisis and conflict.

In times of peace, NATO’s Standing Naval Forces, together with individual national naval deployments, provide routine presence and surveillance throughout various areas of operations. These Standing Naval Forces being immediate reaction forces, rapidly respond to a crisis, establish alliance presence, demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and resolve, and contain the crisis below the threshold of open conflict. Multinational Rapid Reaction Forces would then respond when the scope of a crisis exceeds the capabilities of the immediate reaction forces. Maritime Main Defence Forces would be employed if a crisis escalates to the point of large scale hostilities. Augmentation forces would then comprise the balance of the maritime forces needed in the event of a full-scale conflict. There is one Maritime Immediate

Reaction Force operating in Allied Command Atlantic – Standing Naval Force Atlantic was the world’s first permanent, multinational squadron operating in peacetime.

STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTIC

Proposals for extending UN naval operations have been put forward by commentators, academics and non-government organizations (NGOs), some of them drawing on NATO’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic as a model.⁷⁰

During NATO’s early years, warships operated within their own national groupings. In 1965, a British suggestion brought together a British frigate, a Canadian destroyer escort, a US escort vessel, and a Dutch destroyer that deployed as a multinational force for five months. By 1967, the NATO Council had decided to convert this exercise configuration into a more permanent force known as the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) which is now more commonly known as SNFL. Composed of destroyer or frigate class ships drawn from the navies of member countries, this force comes under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. Ships from Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States form the permanent membership of the force. They are joined periodically by naval units from Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Portugal. The force carries out a programme of scheduled exercises, manoeuvres, and port visits and can be rapidly deployed to a threatened area in times of crisis or tension. These warships not only serve as a quick reaction force, but also are a visible symbol of multinational co-operation and commitment.

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⁷⁰ The Alliance’s Strategic Concept. Part IV - Para. 49 (c)

The aims of Standing Naval Forces Atlantic are:

- To demonstrate the unity and common purpose of the Alliance, the NATO flag and flags of the member nations at sea and in harbour.
- To improve effective multinational naval teamwork through continuous Force training and experience.
- To be capable of acting as an immediate reaction Force.
- To form the nucleus around which a more powerful naval force could be built if required.

Full operational compatibility within STANAVFORLANT, however, did not come easily nor are all NATO members able to maintain the necessary capability for permanent membership in STANAVFORLANT. Even as the force operates in a truly combined sense, its effectiveness has been constrained by political realities: “Its flexibility was limited by the need to first obtain higher approval from allied political authorities who themselves would have to reach some kind of consensus before issuing certain orders in a crisis. Moreover the ships were still subject to recall at any time by the contributing nations.” The concept of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic was subsequently applied to other maritime forces within NATO.

NATO’s OTHER STANDING NAVAL FORCES

These forces provide NATO with a continuous naval presence and are a constant and visible reminder of the solidarity and cohesiveness of the Alliance. They provide an immediately available deterrent force and make an important contribution to the Alliance’s operational capabilities.72


There are two Maritime Immediate Reaction Forces operating in Allied Command Europe (ACE). The Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) consists of destroyer/escort ships and provides the core of Supreme Allied Commander Europe's (SACEUR) multinational maritime force in periods of tension or crisis. A Standing Naval Force for mine countermeasures, Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN), consisting of minehunters and minesweepers, operates primarily in the Allied Forces North West Europe (AFNORTHWEST) area and provides NATO with a continuous mine countermeasures capacity. Both are under operational command of Supreme Allied Commander Europe. They can be deployed NATO-wide, if and when required.

The Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN) was commissioned in May 1973. It consists of mine countermeasure vessels and operates under the Command of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Channel (CINCHAN). Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are regular contributors to the force. Danish, Norwegian and United States ships also join the force from time to time.

A Naval On-Call Force for the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) was created in 1969. Similar in purpose to STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORCHAN, this naval force was assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. It was not permanently in being and assembled only when called upon. Between exercises, normally twice a year, the ships remained under national command. Italy, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States normally contributed ships to the force and units of other nations exercised with the force from time to time.

As part of the reorganisation of Allied forces required to meet the objectives of the Alliance's Strategic Concept, NAVOCFORMED was replaced by a Standing Naval Force
Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) on 30 April 1992. The new force is composed of destroyers and frigates contributed by Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Ships of other NATO nations participate from time to time.

These forces provide NATO with a continuous naval presence and are a constant and visible reminder of the solidarity and cohesiveness of the Alliance. They provide an immediately available deterrent force and make an important contribution NATO’s operational capabilities. The Commanders of the Standing Naval Forces are naval officers from the participating nations, normally of the rank of Commodore in the case of the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and the rank of Commander for the Standing Naval Force Channel.

**NATO’S ROLE IN PEACEKEEPING**

In December 1992, the Alliance stated its readiness to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security.\(^{73}\)

The Alliance’s Strategic Concept adopted at the Rome Summit in 1991 recognised that “the potential of dialogue and co-operation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to diffuse crises and to prevent conflicts”. NATO Heads of State and Government announced that to this end they would support the role of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE),\(^{74}\) and its institutions, and recognised that other

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\(^{74}\) The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), formerly known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), was initially a political consultative process involving 53 participating states from Europe, Central Asia and North America. It became an Organisation in January 1995.
bodies, including the European Community, Western European Union (WEU) and United Nations could have important roles to play.

The basis for the NATO’s role in peacekeeping in support of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was formalised at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, in 1992, when NATO Foreign Ministers announced their readiness “to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with their own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE”. This included making available NATO resources and expertise for peacekeeping operations.

In 1992 and 1993, NATO took several key decisions in support of UN peacekeeping initiatives in former Yugoslavia, leading to operations by NATO naval forces, in conjunction with the WEU, to monitor and subsequently enforce the UN embargo in the Adriatic; and to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina thus far monitored by NATO aircraft. NATO also offered to provide close air support to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and authorised air strikes to relieve the siege of Sarajevo and other threatened areas.  

NATO ships belonging to the Alliance’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and eventually the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPAs), began monitoring operations in the Adriatic in July 1992. These operations were undertaken in support of the UN arms embargo against all republics of the former Yugoslavia (UN Security Council Resolution 713) and the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (UN Security Council Resolution 757). The UN imposed what was a complete and

general embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to the region. In
November 1992, as an extension of the maritime monitoring operations, NATO and WEU
forces in the Adriatic began enforcement operations in support of UN sanctions. Operations
were no longer restricted to registering possible violators but enabled maritime forces to stop,
ipinspect and divert ships when required.

A joint session of the North Atlantic Council and the Council of the Western
European Union was held on 8 June 1993. The two Councils approved the combined
NATO/WEU concept of operations, which included a single command and control
arrangement under the authority of the Councils of both organisations. Operational control of
the combined NATO/WEU Task Force was delegated, through NATO's Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, to the Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe
(COMNAVSOUTH). The operation was named 'SHARP GUARD'.

OPERATION SHARP GUARD

The joint NATO-WEU Operation SHARP GUARD lasted for more than
three years and effectively enforced both the economic sanctions and the arms embargo. This
operation helped to contain the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and create the conditions for
the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. During SHARP GUARD, no ships
successfully broke the embargo, 74,000 ships were challenged, almost 6,000 ships were
inspected at sea and more than 1,400 ships were diverted and inspected in port.

As a serving Naval Officer onboard Her Majesty's Canadian Ship TORONTO which was part of the
Standing Naval Force Atlantic on Operation Sharp Guard between August 1994 and January 1995, I
saw first-hand the success of multinational naval operations with a single command and control
arrangement and operational command vested in a shore-based authority.
Organised in combined task groups, NATO and WEU ships conducted continuous patrolling in the southern Adriatic Sea to enforce the embargoes. The ships established direct communication with the Masters of transiting vessels to determine the nature of their cargo, its origin and ultimate destination. Vessels entering or leaving the territorial waters of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were halted and inspected to verify compliance with the UN Security Council Resolutions. If ships were determined to be suspect then they were diverted to an approved port or anchorage for further inspection. On May 1st 1994, Yugoslav Naval ships attempted to interfere with SHARP GUARD forces which were preventing an oil tanker from violating the maritime embargo. The tanker, the Maltese-registered LIDO II, was eventually escorted to Italian territorial waters.

On October 1st 1996, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1074 and in a statement said that, satisfied with the recent elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Security Council decided to immediately terminate all sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The following day, NATO and WEU announced that, Operation SHARP GUARD was terminated. The joint statement concluded that the first combined operation by NATO and WEU under the auspices of the UN had served as a positive demonstration of the strengthening ties and intensifying co-operation between the organisations.

Throughout this period, NATO conducted contingency planning for a range of options to support UN activities relating to the crisis. At the request of the United Nations, NATO provided contingency plans for enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina; the establishment of relief zones and safe havens for civilians in Bosnia; and ways

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77 The nations which contributed forces to Operation SHARP GUARD were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
to prevent the spread of the conflict to Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Possible contingency arrangements for the protection of humanitarian assistance, monitoring of heavy weapons, and protection of UN forces on the ground, were also made available to the UN.\textsuperscript{78}

**NATO AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE**

We have decided to launch an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and the participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and co-operation to forge a real partnership – a partnership for peace.\textsuperscript{79}

These words were announced by Alliance leaders at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, in which NATO invited the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) and other OSCE countries to join a Partnership for Peace (PfP). Twenty-seven states have since accepted this invitation and in most cases, detailed Individual Partnership Programmes have been agreed upon and are being implemented.\textsuperscript{80} This partnership, established within the framework of NACC, is a practical programme going beyond dialogue and co-operation, designed to forge a partnership between the Alliance and participating states. Partnership for Peace is intended to develop new security relationships between the Alliance and PfP partners.

Concrete objectives of the Partnership include:

- facilitating transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;

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\textsuperscript{80} The 27 PfP member states are: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
ensuring democratic control of defence forces;

- maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE;

- developing co-operative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;

- developing, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of including new members in NATO. Alliance governments have stated that they “expect and would welcome” the addition of new members to the Alliance “as part of an evolutionary process taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.” Article 10 of the Washington Treaty provides for the inclusion in NATO of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.81 The Partnership for Peace Programme will lead to increased membership in NATO by the year 2000 and will consequently increase the pool from which warships can be called upon for designation to one of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces.

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81 Under Article 10, the Allies may, “by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state, in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area, to accede to this Treaty.”
CONCLUSION

True to its renowned geostrategic flexibility, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has made remarkable adjustments to keep itself relevant in the post Cold War era. Nowhere is this more the case than at sea, where the allied navies have brought with them a legacy of multilateral maritime co-operation uniquely well suited to the Alliance’s new roles.\footnote{Joel J. Sokolsky, "NATO’s New Maritime Role: The Seapower Solution or Allies Adrift?", Paper Presented to the Maritime Strategy Colloquium Centre for Foreign Policy Studies Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia 23-26 June 1994, p. 14.}

In the past few years, NATO has trimmed and simplified the structure it developed during the Cold War, redesigned its fighting forces along more multilateral lines and created smaller, more mobile forces. At SACLANT Headquarters, planning is well underway to make seapower, based on Multinational Maritime Forces (MNMF) part of the revised NATO. The “concept of an overarching non-threat specific maritime force structure has been adjusted to support the new NATO strategy”. Multilateral Standing Naval Forces (SNF) “together with individual national deployments” will provide presence and surveillance and constitute the Alliance’s maritime immediate reaction forces in the event of a crisis.\footnote{Admiral L.A. Edney USN, “Future Alliance Maritime Posture”, NATO’s Sixteen Nations 37 (1/92) pp. 4-6.} Should the situation be prolonged and conflict become a possibility, the SNF would be joined by On-Call forces organised into a NATO Task Group (NTG). With the addition of more units from the naval component of the Allied Main Defence Forces, the NTG would be expanded into a NATO Task Force (NTF) or with more units a NATO Expanded Task Force (NETF). It is estimated that the SNF would be available in as little as two days while the NTG, NTF and
NETF would take from five to thirty days to assemble. In the event of a prolonged conflict, the Alliance would draw upon maritime units from its combined augmentation forces.84

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation must evolve further but, nevertheless, its relevance in a new world order will only increase as it responds to both regional and global threats. Most specifically, NATO and the individual alliance Member States have capabilities to contribute to a range of global mediation and crisis resolution efforts. Of primary importance is the NATO experience in commanding and operating within a combined and joint environment.

Specific contributory capabilities of NATO include:

- the technical base and training programmes which can assist multinational coalitions and forces;

- NATO's highly trained and proficient command cells and military units can serve as observers, mediators, peacekeeping forces, and command elements for various multinational-national forces;

- common and national logistical capabilities can provide needed support services to diverse, multinational-national forces;

- NATO procedures, concept plans, and Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the co-ordination of multinational-national operations can be adapted to the requirements of United Nations naval peacekeeping forces;

- the existing Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence (C4I) infrastructure can facilitate multinational-national command and control.

Most importantly, NATO can serve as a model for organising, training, and commanding multinational-national naval forces engaged in UN sponsored peacekeeping operations. Thus in the search for a model of multinational naval co-operation, perhaps NATO's STANAVFORLANT warrants careful examination. However, NATO's political limitations must be admitted and transcended in any effective United Nations Standing Naval Force. The evolution of a comparable United Nations unified naval command must be driven by the very real and unpredictable threats to global maritime peace and prosperity. Given the bleak outlook for the security climate of the future, the efficacy of a United Nations Standing Naval Force will be irrefutable.
CHAPTER VI

A UNITED NATIONS STANDING NAVAL FORCE

There are many possible tasks for peacekeeping on the oceans.85

INTRODUCTION

I would like to see the UN operate on a much more systematic basis. Up to now, it's been a kind of sheriff's posse: Something terrible happens and the UN, with a little luck, gets together a group of chaps that'll go off and do their best just to put a stop to it. But the ideal thing would be to prevent it from happening in the first place. That should be possible in a number of places if it were known that there is an intervention force ready to go if something really goes out of control.86

The evolution of a United Nations Standing Naval Force for various peacekeeping missions should proceed from a clearly defined set of requirements. Once these requirements or duties are established and the political will has been generated, then the UN can search for a means -- a structure and a method -- to accomplish its objectives. This statement of objectives should reveal the eventual nature and composition of such a force. If the political purpose of the force is to deter or defeat any seaborne aggression, then the naval force will be have to be brawny and use traditional military means to achieve its end. If, however, its political purpose is to discourage aggression and provide a stabilising influence in

times of crisis, then the naval force will exhibit less violence and will use observation and
communication to achieve its end.87

UNITED NATIONS NAVAL PEACEKEEPING

Multinational naval forces offer unique capabilities to
United Nations operations and often provide the only
lifeline to forces ashore.88

In the past half century, the United Nations has undertaken far ranging
peacekeeping operations, from military observer missions to collective security enforcement
actions, the UN has attempted to halt global conflict through various means. Remarkably, the
UN has not used naval forces to any great degree, nor has it developed a uniform means of
operating on the world's oceans in either a naval peacekeeping or maritime enforcement role.
The UN has not been without concerns at sea, however, and it has recently experimented with
naval forces. From November 1989, until December 1991, Argentina provided four patrol
boats with multinational crews to the United Nations Observer Group in Central America
(ONUCA) to help monitor irregular cross-border traffic in the Gulf of Fonseca, between
Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. The boats had UN observers onboard, flew the UN
flag, and reported to the senior UN observer ashore.89 Also, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in
1990, the first military action authorised by the UN was the naval embargo against Iraqi
shipping in the Persian Gulf. The UN is coming to realise the value of naval assets for forward
presence and crisis response.

88 Commander A.W. Forsyth, Royal Navy
Department of Public Information, 1990, p. 394.
The fact that the UN has not had much of a naval role so far should not be allowed to rule out a considerable role in the area in the future. The task of building a more effective UN peacekeeping force is worth undertaking and it should be done quickly and with international support, including financial, military, and political support. Naval capabilities may be essential in future UN peacekeeping missions, either for enforcement or for pacific settlement of disputes and peace-building purposes. As for the types of missions, there are several that are worthy of being conducted under the aegis of the UN.

MISSIONS FOR A UNITED NATIONS NAVAL FORCE

The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself insure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.  

Navies could be indispensable for a large number of low-intensity operations in peacetime which would scarcely fit the traditional definition of peacekeeping. As such a UN multinational naval force should be able to carry out a variety of maritime and related tasks. In broad terms, future roles for a Standing United Nations Naval Force may include the following:

- presence as a political symbol of international authority;
- traditional peacekeeping involving: inter-positioning, monitoring disarmament and cantonment of vessels, logistic support, transport and sovereign base facilities for peacekeepers on land;
- embargoes and blockades, maritime policing (including drug interdiction), amphibious operations, deterrence and enforcement actions;

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humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, ensuring freedom of navigation (mine-countermeasures and convoying).

More specific non-traditional missions could include the following:

Presence and Power Projection

As Commander of the Royal Navy’s Task Group in the Adriatic Sea, Admiral Blackham made some observations with respect to ‘Poise Operations’:

In my last two jobs as Commandant of the Royal Navy Staff College and Director of Naval Plans, I have spilled a lot of ink – and breath – on the subject of poise. It is the most classic, most ancient, and in the future, probably the most likely form of naval operations. It is the Navy holding itself ready to support the land battle at short notice in whatever way the Land Force requires and when, where and how it requires it – not earlier and quite certainly not later. It has the inestimable advantage that it does not commit your actions or your prestige until you choose to be committed and, while you are poising, you do not need anyone’s approval or agreement to be there – for you are on the high seas, the common property and highway of all mankind. It demonstrates clear commitment and intent at low initial risk. Moreover, it can be sustained for very long periods... Most usefully, perhaps, poised Naval Forces can hold the ring until more specialist air or other forces can be assembled, airfields found, diplomatic clearance (for overflight) obtained, and so on.  

The presence of a UN naval force can avert confrontation and support UN aims without necessarily violating national sovereignty. The concept of preventative diplomacy as presented by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace can be expanded to accommodate traditional notions of naval diplomacy. UN diplomatic efforts can be strengthened by UN naval forces ‘showing the flag’ in a benign fashion as an indicator of UN

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91 Rear Admiral JJ Blackham, "Maritime Peacekeeping". RUSI Journal, August 1993, pp. 18-23.
interest and latent capabilities, thereby helping to stop emerging conflicts among states. Routine presence in all the oceans of the world could be carried out by regular UN patrols and by conducting UN exercises at regular intervals. These UN naval forces would offer an effective UN presence in a crisis area that would demonstrate UN cohesion and resolve as well as deter potential aggressors. Alternatively, UN naval forces could be deployed as a deterrent for specific missions and be given limited Rules of Engagement. Finally, UN naval forces could protect or ‘shield’ states at their request by conducting surveillance to gather information and intelligence, identify potential threats, and monitor military activities in the area. The more capable the UN naval forces are the more they can employ surface, air, sub-surface and amphibious forces to reinforce UN peacekeeping forces ashore, or provide a mobile headquarters for the forces when a shore-based headquarters is not feasible. These naval peacekeeping tasks may be the most dangerous of all, given the possibility that not all groups will co-operate or refrain from challenging deployments of these types. Even if effective, presence, deterrent, or protective functions may require operations within territorial waters, however, UN naval forces are still less intrusive to a nation’s sovereignty than are UN troops ashore. UN territorial operations generally have been constrained by the notion of sovereignty, however, this need not be the case for operations at sea. Even within territorial waters, political perceptions of presence without consent are likely to be different than on land, particularly if there are conflicting claims.

**Arms Verification and Disarmament**

The various duties of UN naval forces can be extended to include arms verification and disarmament at sea. UN naval forces could be directly involved in UN inspection, custody and destruction of weapons at sea. This is certainly the case with respect to
mine countermeasures, which are a concern for all UN efforts where seaborne delivery of aid, forces or supplies requires secure sea lines of communication. The surveillance of merchant shipping and enforcement of arms embargoes, as well as the establishment and enforcement of demilitarised zones are supporting tasks that UN naval forces could possibly perform in the future. In fact, recent operations in the Adriatic and in Cambodia have proven the efficacy of UN naval forces in enforcing arms embargoes (as in the Adriatic) and disarming warring factions (as in the case of Cambodia). At the far end of the spectrum, UN naval forces could become an integral part in coercive anti-proliferation activities to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction. UN naval forces could conceivably perform surveillance duties and determine the locations of suspect nuclear, biological or chemical facilities.

**Assistance to Peacekeeping Forces Ashore**

Naval forces could participate directly as peacekeepers or, indirectly, by providing support to shore-based peacekeeping operations. Naval forces would most certainly continue to provide sealift of UN personnel and equipment as has been provided in the past. A Standing United Nations Naval Force could also provide seaborne C4I to support UN peacekeeping missions ashore and provide a positive presence off the coast of the troubled nation. Integration with shore-based operations could also include marines which would provide a quick-reaction force with amphibious capabilities. Should peacekeeping operations go awry ashore, then the naval force could provide a rapid extraction capability for the troops on the ground.
Mine Counter-Measure Operations

Mine counter-measures includes all means used to prevent or reduce the danger to surface ships and submarines from mines. Many of the world's naval forces have developed expertise in both mine-hunting or minesweeping operations in shallow water, deep water, close to shore and in the open ocean. In a complex mine clearance operation, with mines spread over large dissimilar areas, the capabilities of several different navies would be required to form such a multinational force.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

International famine and a continuing series of natural and man-made disasters have combined to make humanitarian relief a growing concern of the United Nations. Certainly within the scope of the UN's mandate, this all important mission of humanitarian assistance can be abetted by UN naval forces which can deploy a wide range of resources to assist local authorities. This is one capability that is likely to be called upon more and more in the future in that multinational naval forces have an inherent capability to conduct humanitarian missions or disaster relief operations. The operational supporting tasks for humanitarian assistance involving naval forces could include the following:

- Transportation and Logistic Support - UN naval forces can transport humanitarian assistance and relief personnel and provide resupply for field personnel ashore. Ships are valuable for this purpose because of their large sealift capability with some ships even possessing large helicopter decks to add to their transport capacity.

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92 In December 1991, the UN adopted a resolution creating the new post of humanitarian co-ordinator responsible to the Secretary-General and giving the UN authority to intervene in states to protect human rights.
• Medical, Command and Control and Communications Support – Humanitarian or disaster relief operations are often conducted in countries with little or no infrastructure to provide assistance or support a national response to disasters. UN naval forces can support humanitarian operations ashore by providing medical facilities and care, recovery of victims and forensic identification, damage control and emergency repairs, engineering equipment and other civilian welfare support. As well, a robust temporary command, control and communications network can be established very quickly. Finally, naval intelligence gathering and accurate meteorological forecasts could also assist efforts ashore.

• Evacuation of Non-Combatants and Refugees – Various countries have frequently used their naval forces for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) in many countries plagued by political upheavals or civil wars. Foreign Nationals, civilians of other nations and refugees are evacuated by naval forces which can conduct operations off the coast of the troubled nation.

**Sea Control and Sea Lines of Communication**

Sea control is the employment of forces to ensure the unimpeded use of an offshore area and is accomplished by conducting surveillance and interdiction operations. UN naval forces could establish control over a sea area deemed vital to the UN by locating, tracking and targeting surface, sub-surface, and air contacts around the force. UN naval forces would then carry out deterrent or peace enforcement operations to prevent interference with UN economic or reinforcement, resupply shipping in the crisis area. Naval forces, specifically sea-based aircraft could be used to secure humanitarian enclaves and no-fly zones, while the ships themselves could establish coastal control to support such enclaves.
Search and Rescue

A United Nations naval force would also possess the intrinsic naval aptitude to search for and rescue civilians, refugees and UN ground personnel in distress at sea or on land. A UN mission of this type could also involve coast guards and other civilian maritime organisations.

Suppression of the Narcotics Trade

One other possible area for UN naval forces is the suppression of the narcotics trade. Drug smuggling on the high seas is now a global problem with many of the drugs being smuggled by sea or air. Naval forces by virtue of their ability to remain on station and to conduct wide area surveillance and interdiction have been used in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific to suppress the movement of narcotics. There is international recognition of the need to halt the illicit trade of narcotics at sea. There now exists a host of bilateral and multilateral agreements between various countries which involve both military and civil organisations and will likely lead to future UN involvement.

Anti-Piracy Operations

The seriousness of the piracy problem is difficult to determine given its widespread area of operations. The three main areas are South East Asia, West Africa and the Caribbean, although the Indian Ocean and the waters of Latin America have also been affected. Although piracy is considered to be a peripheral threat to international security, it is one area of maritime law which warrants a stronger response by the world community. This stronger response may some day be in the form of a UN naval force.
Resource Protection

Another domain which will certainly be relevant for UN naval forces in the future is resource protection. Increasingly nations are relying on the sea not just for food resources, but, for mineral wealth in the form of oil and metals. Although the Law of the Sea Convention has established ground rules for resource exploitation, many nations have yet to ratify the treaty. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that groups or nations will be increasingly challenging others for the control of ocean areas for the resources that lay near or below the surface. The ongoing struggle for control of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea is a case in point. Another possibility is increasing international control of scarce resources beyond Exclusive Economic Zones either to preserve them or to protect the ecology. For example, there is increasing pressure to control drift net fishing in the Pacific. While diplomatic measures must be the primary method of exercising this control, nations may conclude that the only practical method is to apply international regulations on the scene using UN naval forces. UN naval forces would obviously have more of an impact in such cases rather than national forces alone.

Protection of the Marine Environment

Much of what was undertaken by the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea dealt with the protection of the marine environment. Given the number of recent oil spills at sea, a UN naval force could provide stop-gap measures until professional oil spill clean-up crews arrive on the scene. Also, many Developing Nations do not possess any of the necessary equipment to clean-up oil spills and, therefore, are unable to avoid the inevitable environmental damage to their coastlines. A UN naval force could quite easily embark oil booms, absorbent pads and other materials as standard equipment to assist in the clean-up of
these spills. International law at sea could also be enforced by a UN naval force. The current laissez-faire attitude with respect to merchant vessels cleaning their tanks at sea could be reversed by UN naval enforcement at sea coupled with the inherent use of force against any perpetrators. In the future there may be many more marine environment issues (such as oceanographic research), which will have to be addressed by the United Nations and inevitably will become the responsibility of a United Nations Standing Naval Force.

**FORCE STRUCTURE**

In general, maritime forces would need to be strong on surveillance, reconnaissance and mobility. Patrol boats, corvettes or small multipurpose frigates would suffice for many activities. But despite the multipurpose facility of naval platforms, operations are likely to be *sui generis* and force structures would have to be task specific.⁹³

Thus, the UN requires sufficient naval force levels to react to a threat or crisis in any part of the world, while retaining sufficient presence and response capabilities in all other regions of the globe. It will be necessary and prudent to establish the levels of force required to deal with the entire spectrum of crisis response including the most serious but least likely risk – all out war. Available intelligence and warning indicators will allow some forces to be placed in lower categories of readiness and availability. United Nations naval forces, while primarily regionally based, must be available to deploy to any ocean of the world as the situation requires. Training must therefore reflect this flexibility. Reliance on the sealift capability to provide both reinforcement and resupply of forces is required to deter a major threat and sustain operations for an indefinite period of time. Mission success implies a

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continuing requirement for sufficient naval forces to provide presence, surveillance and to defend if necessary the sea lines of communication.

The size and capabilities of naval forces vary considerably throughout the world. Many nations possess only one or two small naval vessels to patrol vast expanses of coastline. Other nations, particularly the United States possess large capable fleets with the ability to project power globally. Between these two extremes are many maritime nations with varying force structures and capabilities which could be called upon for future naval peacekeeping missions.

A common term used to differentiate between the various fleets of the world is the term "blue water navy". The designator "blue water" denotes the ability to operate on the high seas and suggests some degree of self-sufficiency. Naval self-sufficiency requires that deployed ships are able to sustain operations on the high seas for extended periods without having to return to port for fuel or provisions. Most of the time this requirement is met by having a replenishment ship with the naval formation. With the exception of coastal patrols and riverine duties, resupply at sea is considered essential for the majority of naval peacekeeping activities, because host nation support cannot always be guaranteed.

As has been the case for the latter half of this century, the United States possesses the world's largest navy. Any movement toward a United Nations Standing Naval Force would require the co-operation and support of the United States Navy. An assessment of world-wide fleet capabilities would indicate that there are perhaps 12 to 15 navies which would be able to contribute ships to naval peacekeeping operations within the concept of a United Nations Standing Naval Force. These navies range from the nuclear navies (France, Great Britain, Russia, the United States, and to a lesser degree China) through members of the
already formed multinational naval forces such as NATO (Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) to a handful of other navies with the prerequisite ability to co-operate effectively (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, India, Japan, and New Zealand).\textsuperscript{94} This list is by no means comprehensive and does not include other navies with limited capabilities which could put to use in limited missions.

The force structure for a Standing United Nations Naval Force does not demand that it be composed exclusively of naval personnel. Conceptualising large-scale naval activity composed of 'gunboats' engaged in open hostilities is perhaps misleading. A great many of the duties envisioned for naval peacekeeping forces would be composed of observation, monitoring and establishing a presence or poise operations in order to discourage hostile activities. Some of these duties would be technologically advanced, including the use of high-tech monitoring apparatus and communications equipment. Naval personnel are well-trained in these areas and are certainly qualified to undertake these duties, however, there are many talented civilian personnel with comparable training in the scientific and engineering communities, including those with previous maritime experience and even prior naval training which could also perform these duties. In the event that political sensitivities preclude the possibility of heightening military tensions through the use of overt naval forces, civilian personnel could unequivocally be employed.\textsuperscript{95}


MULTINATIONALITY


While it may be appropriate to sound a cautionary note in over-emphasising multinationality as it applies to land forces, the same cannot be said of naval forces which have been operating multinationally for many years. Indeed, NATO's Standing Naval Forces have proven their efficacy and their Commanders have praised their performance. Multinational formations at any force level provide a synergistic effect that acts as a force multiplier as different nations bring their particular expertise and capabilities to the force. For most nations, the capabilities of multinational forces far outstrip those they can muster on their own. Even the blue water navies are unable to provide all the capabilities they need for a particular mission in an era of steadily declining defence budgets. Multinationality allows nations to focus on particular areas such as anti-submarine warfare or mine-countermeasures while allowing them to feel that they are making a worthwhile contribution to world security.

Another aspect of multinational naval operations which cannot be understated is the concept of 'tokenism'. Tokenism, quite simply, is allowing a country with limited military capabilities to contribute to a mission. In the case of naval peacekeeping, this would perhaps be the addition of a less-capable ship from a country in the region for the purpose of presenting a united front to both the world and the aggressor nation. As is the case with traditional land-based UN peacekeeping missions, 'tokenism' goes a long way toward legitimising UN presence and resolve in certain sensitive missions. Flying the ensign or flag of the United Nations is also paramount if naval peacekeeping is to succeed in the future. The
UN ensign denotes that the naval force is sailing the oceans of the world for the ideals of the United Nations — a world body and not just for one nation. This is a contentious issue in a world still ruled by the nation state, however, if it is possible anywhere, it is with the navies of the world which share both a common bond and a common interest — the sea.

CONCLUSION

But multinational military operations are, like all military activities, essentially political in purpose. If politicians perceive a need for naval peacekeeping and there is a political will to realise it, the naval establishments will have to find the means to implement it.\(^7\)

No other body commands the legal and normative authority of the United Nations. It operates under a charter that outlines norms of behaviour, establishes means if settlement of disputes, and gives powers to the Security Council under Chapter VII for the enforcement of peace. Perhaps the growing political will among the UN membership reflects an appreciation of the unique contribution the UN can make in peacekeeping. The mandates of peacekeeping operations have become broader as the post-Cold War period has evolved. Improving UN efficacy in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations is vital and future missions will require both innovative techniques and viable mandates to prove successful.

The concept of naval forces in a multinational co-operative role in both the present and projected international security environment is something which is therefore, long overdue. The world has witnessed unparalleled change over the past few years. Ironically with the disappearance of the great East-West, bipolar stand-off, long dormant sources of conflict and instability have re-emerged. The spectre of a global war and the potential for massive

nuclear exchange have been replaced by the possibilities of regional conflict brought on by national rivalries, ethnic animosities and religious fanaticism and some would argue, the basic competitive nature among nation states. Compounding the magnitude and violence of this discord is the proliferation of sophisticated arms and weapons of mass destruction. Non-traditional threats have also emerged, such as: the illicit drug trade, terrorism, over-fishing and environmental issues which are now causing increased concern.

Despite the many changes in the international arena, the maritime arena remains much the same in most respects. The trading nations continue to rely upon the oceans for transporting their commodities and assuring access to key markets and resources. Statistically, over 90 percent of all international trade is seaborne, and all this within a unique environment which is free of borders and the hindrances of sovereignty. The principle of Sea Control and maintenance of the Sea Lines of Communication crucial to the world economy as it is to the international security of the world itself. Since time immemorial, naval forces have been able to sail the high seas unhindered by the constraints associated with land-based forces. The navies of the world continue to perform roles which have been applied and accepted over the centuries whilst remaining uniquely flexible instruments of national power. Whereas navies continue to foster trade and friendships between the peoples of the world, they are also able to demonstrate concern by appearing on the horizon, coerce by show of force, and, if necessary, bring power to bear as a last resort. As such navies are multi-purpose instruments of foreign policy. The world has changed considerably in the past fifty years. Today the sovereignty of states is being undermined by multinational corporations and capital flows, and the voluntary integration of economics. The spread of international regulations such as the international law of the sea have fogged the notion of national borders and forced the navies of the world to rethink the age old theory of unhindered sea power. In recent years, the navies of the world
have come together like never before – naval operations in the Persian Gulf and the Adriatic Sea have legitimised alliances and proven the viability of multinational naval co-operation. These missions have also brought to the fore the endemic problem associated with any type of peacekeeping mission, be it on land or at sea – basic organisation. The creation of a United Nations Standing Naval Force depends upon a co-ordinated United Nations command and control system and standard operating procedures (SOPs) to prove successful in any peacekeeping mission.
CHAPTER VII
INTEROPERABILITY, COMMAND AND CONTROL AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

The UN's problem is not the absence of information. Rather, it is the absence of a path for information to flow, linking early warning to the other processes crucial to rapid reaction, especially political decision-making and contingency planning. 98

Interoperability, Command and Control and Rules of Engagement are crucial to any multinational naval operation. Traditionally the forte of sovereign nations and their respective national military commands, implementation of these essential military skills is a highly problematic issue. Critics of multinational naval operations hold that national and alliance rules of engagement, codes and communications procedures could be disclosed to potential enemies operating in concert with the peacekeeping forces. However, "it should not be beyond the wit of cryptologists and communication-link experts to devise systems and procedures which could be used for peacekeeping but which do not compromise national or alliance systems." 99 The fact is that during the Gulf War, all the naval forces except units of USPACOM (US Pacific Command), had greater commonalty than did the ground and air forces operating in theatre. Nonetheless, operations in the Gulf also demonstrated the need

for more effective command and control and improved interoperability for multinational naval operations.¹⁰⁰

INTEROPERABILITY

The potential is limited at the moment, and it will take time to bring other navies up to required operating standards so they can be effective members of a team without jeopardizing either the aim or individual safety.¹⁰¹

With the advent of a new world order, there are real opportunities for modern approaches to international collective security. Firstly, the evolving partnership between the former antagonists of the Cold War now can facilitate both greater co-operation and collaboration in dealing with the full range of global challenges. Secondly, the revised international power bases — the United Nations, NATO, and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and other regional associations — can promote collective security regimes built upon shared responsibilities, shared accountability and shared operating procedures.

Interoperability and standardisation between NATO forces provide a vital contribution to the combined operational effectiveness of the naval forces of the Alliance. Standardisation also allows substantial cost saving measures to be realised. Extensive efforts are therefore made in many different spheres to improve co-operation and eliminate duplication in research, development, production, procurement and support of defence systems. NATO Standardisation Agreements for procedures and systems and equipment


components, known as STANAGs (Standing NATO Agreements), are developed and promulgated by the NATO Military Agency for Standardisation in conjunction with the Conference of National Armaments Directors and other authorities concerned. By formulating, agreeing, implementing and maintaining standards for equipment and procedures used throughout NATO, a significant contribution is made to the cohesion of the Alliance as well as its interoperability capabilities.102

In recent years, it has been suggested that NATO might provide a model for interoperability in the case of a Standing United Nations Naval Force. In fact, the basis for interoperability and standardisation for many of the navies of the world today has derived from NATO doctrine and publications. During the final years of the Cold War interoperability with NATO and Warsaw Pact forces was almost impossible. Today through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative, modern NATO tactics and doctrine are becoming available through the unclassified series of Experimental Tactics (EXTACS). The unclassified EXTACS, known as the 1000 Series, will have an influence beyond the PfP as many of the Western navies have recently conducted bilateral exercises with the navies of developing countries. Invariably, standard operating procedures manuals had to be developed for these exercises incurring both considerable cost and time. These documents can now be replaced by the 1000 Series with the addition of short bilateral or multilateral annexes to ensure interoperability. Thus, EXTACS allow a good level of interoperability and can be quickly adapted for most United Nations peacekeeping missions.103 This fact was borne out in the recent deployment of ships to the Adriatic Sea.


Rear Admiral Blackham commanded both HMS ARK ROYAL and the Royal Navy's Task Group in the Adriatic Sea off the coast of the Former Yugoslavia in 1993 and saw the flexibility of naval forces. These 'Poise Operations' (as they are commonly referred to in military circles) have definite advantages in terms of time and commitment, and the importance of a co-ordinated multinational-service, multinational effort in confronting such a volatile and bloody trouble spot. He made the following conclusions with regard to interoperability:

The fact is that ships of NATO navies are extremely accustomed to operating in mixed national groups of all shapes and sizes, the procedures are both well known and well oiled, and the necessary communications plans are all in place. When, in due course, one of my escorts was replaced by a Dutch frigate, it made no difference to our modus operandi or effectiveness. Indeed, all that was needed to convert these disparate national groups into a true multinational-national force was an appropriate command and control (C2) architecture – exercising and training on a day-to-day basis was easy and quick to set up and our ability to co-operate formally was limited only by rules of engagement (ROE) and political directives or even perceptions.104

COMMAND AND CONTROL

As with most other elements of the multinational effort against Iraq, the command, control, and communication (C3) system used to support the coalition was derived from the systems of incoming services and developed coherence as the cooperative effort progressed.105

The deployment and employment of naval forces undertaking peacekeeping operations requires less resupply, lift, and maintenance support than do land operations.

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104 Rear Admiral JJ Blackham, "Maritime Peacekeeping". RUSI Journal, August 1993, pp. 18-23.

However, command, control, communications, and intelligence are absolute requirements for a successful operation. Early identification of potential contributors (such as NATO) of these capabilities would facilitate the successful deployment and employment of assigned naval forces operating under a United Nations mandate.

The identification of a chain of command is a critical issue for all United Nations peacekeeping missions. Of late, UN Under Secretary-General Marrick Goulding stated that:

Existing structures in New York have found it increasingly difficult to plan, command and control the greatly increased peacekeeping activities of recent years.106

There are two types of command structures used by the UN in its operations. The first type of command structure is command that is delegated to a member state or group of Member States, and in which the states control their own forces. This is the type that has been used in the major enforcement operations such as the Gulf War and the Korean War, and permits a state to maintain control of its forces, while operating under a UN authorisation. The forces are bound by the conventional laws of armed conflict and act as agents of the UN, but under their own flags. Peace operations like those which took place in Korea and the Gulf are not in accord with the United Nations Charter. Military operations such as these are unique, in that the peacekeeping forces are not under UN command, but rather under the command of a single nation.

The second type of command structure, which is used for peacekeeping operations (shown in Figure 1), is command entrusted to an individual appointed by and
responsible to the UN, but wanting in disciplinary authority. With the consent of the Security Council, the Secretary-General appoints the commander, who then reports to the Secretary-General through the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Affairs. The commander may be a military officer, as in the most recent operation in the Former Yugoslavia, or civilian, as in the recently completed mission in Cambodia. The military commander will ultimately have a civilian “Special Representative” to assist him just as his civilian counterpart will have military advisors. Because the Military Staff Committee is inoperative, creation and organisation of the peacekeeping force is arranged by the Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Affairs, assisted by the Military Advisor to the Secretary-General. The Military Advisor, who is typically a General Officer from a nation other than the permanent members of the Security Council, has no executive authority, but is just a co-ordinator and can only recommend action. The Military Staff Committee is purposely omitted from responsibility for peacekeeping operations to underscore the civilian character of the missions.

106 Comments made by Ambassador Marrack Goulding, UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, at the Cyril Foster Lecture at the Examination School, Oxford University, March 4, 1993.
The fact of the matter is that there are indeed shortcomings with Command and Control at the UN that have been identified in after action reports and staff studies. United Nations Headquarters in New York has a limited C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) infrastructure. Communications from the mission to New York are now primarily conducted via commercial satellite links, such as INMARSAT (International Maritime Satellite). A civilian version of the Secure Telephone Unit (STU-III) is used for encrypted traffic, and is backed up by commercial telephone lines and cablegrams. There is distressingly no command centre with 24-hour operations, nor is
there a supporting crisis action staff for the Secretary-General. There is no fully functioning military planning staff and the intermediate leadership level is not fully developed. Many complaints involving ongoing UN peacekeeping operations have centred on this contentious issue. In a scathing assessment, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, former UN field commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina, states that there is no Command and Control system:

Over the past few years, the number of UN peacekeepers deployed around the world has grown from fewer than 5,000 to well over 60,000, and yet, at the time of writing, there is still no military-style command centre in UN New York: no one on duty twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week; no communications room with maps of the various operational areas on the wall, and mission-knowledgeable duty officers manning the radios and keeping a log of all the information and requests coming in from the field. The solution is simple, and various nations are ready to take on responsibility for helping to provide it: a full-time UN peacekeeping operations centre should be established as a matter of priority. It should be manned by experienced officers with previous UN peacekeeping service, and it should have planning capability.107

For the foreseeable future, there will be an increased need for a combined force of military personnel, police, and civilians to participate in regional and international conflict resolution operations. There will be a requirement for a fully trained Combined Operations Command element with the requisite C4I capability to provide a clear and accurate tactical picture and the ability to direct and control all phases of a peacekeeping operation.108 These operations require the identification of available and ready forces; the deployment of


108 A first attempt at detailing the C3I (Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence) requirements which would give the potential for effective operational control to the Military Staff Committee, urging that they would be best pioneered in the context of naval forces is to be found in Gwyn Prins "The United Nations and Peace Keeping in the Post Cold War World: the case of naval power", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 22(2), June 1991, pp. 135-155. The discussion is extended in an essay with the same title in UNIDIR Newsletter, 4 (3) Sept 1991, pp. 10-12.
those forces to trouble spots; and a logistics system that supports the forces. NATO (primarily the United States) and a few other navies such as those from Argentina, Brazil, India and the Russia have the resources and expertise to support such peacekeeping operations. Specific contributions could include such things as:

- the use of existing Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence (C4I) infrastructure to facilitate multinational command and control;

- the use of national and alliance logistical capabilities that can provide needed support services to multinational operations;

- highly trained and efficient command structures and military units that can serve as command elements for multinational operations;

- national and alliance maritime, ground and air forces which can support UN-sanctioned missions through presence, surveillance, enforcement of sanctions and no-fly zones.

With the technological edge of the NATO Alliance, the United States and Russia, there currently exists a broad range of capabilities that can assist a multinational operation. The space-based systems of the United States and Russia, for example, can provide the UN-designated civilian Special Representative or military Field Commander real time intelligence needed to conduct operations and activities in a quickly changing situation. During the Gulf War, the US Central Command and the coalition forces were provided with an accurate picture of the movement of all Iraqi forces. In less time-sensitive situations, the intelligence and information gathering capabilities within the NATO Alliance, the United States and Russia can provide a Special Representative and a Field Commander with the data needed to conduct routine coalition activities. In the military, this is referred to as 'Essential Elements of Information' (EEI). Of particular interest to command could be data on:
the capabilities and limits of assigned units;

- the capabilities and limits of the non-compliant factions;

- the existing national infrastructure that can support relief and recovery operations;

- the global, regional and national logistics that can assist multinational activities.

While not a complete listing of available information, this is illustrative of the information requirements that a military operational commander or a civilian Special Representative could use and which the global information network can provide. Rather than attempt to recreate a new C4I infrastructure, the UN should consider seriously the use of these expansive capabilities already in existence.

The type of operational control used in peacekeeping operations — that of command entrusted to an individual appointed by and responsible to the UN, is readily adaptable to forces at sea and would not interfere with the ascendancy of the ship. The authority of the force commander extends only to the commanding officer of the ship, who retains full disciplinary authority over his ship's company. The commanding officer would report to two authorities: the force commander for operations, and his national government for everything else. If there is a dilemma in this, it would arise when the force commander ordered the ship to do something that is detrimental to the interests of its own flag. Presumably, the mission would be defined to such a degree that this would not occur, but if it did, the commanding officer would be able to consult with his own government through national communications channels. Thus, the agreement that transfers the ship to operational command of the UN must be explicit and clearly describe the terms of the operation.
An embarked force commander who is not of the same nationality as the ship may present a security problem, but this is not insurmountable. The UN has been very amenable to appointing a commander who is acceptable to all parties, and the countries that supply the forces have a voice on his selection. Forces are offered voluntarily to the UN for peacekeeping operations, and a government always has the option to withdraw its offer of forces if the commander is unacceptable. Furthermore, it is not strictly necessary to have the force commander embarked at all as long as the ships are responsive to his direction.

A ship which has the force commander embarked would be regarded as being under his continuous operational control, but ships without the commander onboard have a flexible option not available to land forces, that of temporary operational control. Land forces need continuous operational control to legally remain in the host country, but a ship can patrol in international waters without additional authority. Therefore, ships can come and go from the mission as required, and need hoist the UN flag at the yardarm only when actively involved in the operation. This type of operational control could apply to drug interdiction and EEZ patrols, in which ships can be available for assignment to the operation while engaged in routine, non-UN related duties.
All this, of course, raises the question of Command and Control in the event that multinational or, more probably, multinational UN operations, should become necessary. I have already explained the value of NATO procedures and practices in achieving ad hoc arrangements, and I have no doubt that a regional defence organisation like NATO is the best basis for Command and Control of UN operations. I believe that the regional organisation would be most effective if it were acting as a mandated agent for the UN, the precise arrangements, like the prime tasking, would necessarily be determined at the time and are anyway above my pay grade. I am confident, however, that at the tactical and operational levels the route I have suggested would be relatively straightforward.  

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

One of the most potentially difficult factors in the close operation of different groups under national command is that they may well be – almost certainly will be – operating under different ROE without being clearly aware of each other’s rules.  

United Nations peacekeeping forces traditionally have only one Rule of Engagement: to use force only in self-defence. To quote from the wording of a typical peacekeeping resolution:

The force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character. It will not use force except in self-defense. Self-defense would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. The force will proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict will take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Council.

110 Ibid, pp. 18-23.
It is important to recognise that every peacekeeping operation undertaken by the UN requires criteria for the use of force and depending on the stated objective, the criteria for engagement, and rules applying to the use of assigned military units, may vary. The criterion for engagement provides a screening mechanism to avoid potential military or political disasters. Of course the first step of any peacekeeping mission is the decision to commit military forces. The next step is the development of specific Rules of Engagement which provide the necessary political and legal guidance to commanders at all levels. These rules govern the use of force as well as the conduct of all military personnel involved in the operation. With the commitment of military units, the command authorities provide an appropriate ROE commensurate with the level of conflict. For operations involving limited objectives and limited response requirements, the ROE would perhaps include:

- use of force should be preceded by repeated warnings to stop;
- if there is an immediate threat to lives, casualties have already incurred, or the warning increases the risk of death or injury, the use of force should not be delayed;
- employ the minimum force consistent with achieving the aim;
- the degree of force should be proportional to the aggressor’s force so as to not escalate the engagement;
- the use of force should cease once the attack ceases;
- reasonable precautions should be taken to avoid collateral damage;
- retaliation and reprisal should never be authorised.

The problems associated with Rules of Engagement and moreover their exact interpretation is perhaps the most critical issue facing the UN in any future naval peacekeeping
initiative. In the case of the UN, a misuse of force could escalate a conflict and jeopardise both the mission itself and the indispensable political cohesion. However, the problems associated with various national contingents of a UN-flagged operation to accept ROEs which err on the side of caution and raise the level of risk to themselves are significant. Rules of Engagement are necessary to control the use of force whilst allowing for self-defence and will not only vary from mission to mission but are likely to change during the course of a mission. It has taken many years for NATO to establish a common naval standard for ROE, however, it has been done and could be applied to UN naval missions.

CONCLUSION

At every level and at all stages of an operation, there must be an integrated approach to a problem which reflects the diverse range of capacities within the UN system and among Member States, and which brings in other relevant organizations which have roles to play.112

For the foreseeable future, there will be a need for a combined force of military, police, and civilians to participate in regional and international conflict resolution operations. There will be a requirement for a fully trained Combined Operations Command element with the requisite C4I capability to provide a clear and accurate tactical picture and the ability to direct and control all phases of a contingency operation. This composite force should be prepared to achieve the assigned objective of any mediation and crisis resolution operation.

To facilitate such operations, clearly articulated joint and combined doctrine is required. This doctrine will provide a range of guidance to a command element and its assigned capability package. In this instance, the United States, Russia, and the NATO

Alliance along with the Partnership for Peace nations as well as other Middle Power navies can contribute established doctrine, concept plans, and Rules of Engagement for the co-ordination of multinational operations that can be adapted to the requirements of standing naval forces.

In order to allow UN naval forces to attain their full operational potential, most units must be equipped with modern communications as well as capable digital command decision aids that can link with other units ashore and afloat. These systems are particularly critical in the ships of the afloat commanders so that they have access to the latest intelligence and directives from UN Headquarters. Without such systems, they will not have access in a timely manner to the information needed for decision making. Similarly, integrated logistics support is imperative to ensure that these naval forces can be sustained on station for extended periods. It is vital that UN naval commanders have control over logistics assets (i.e. supply ships) and that nations assign these logistics assets to multinational forces in the same manner as they assign combat units.

A United Nations Standing Naval Force would require two methods of preparation to reach peak efficiency. Firstly, professional education with respect to peacekeeping and enforcement procedures, naval theory and practice and political and institutional knowledge would have to be given to a mixture of multinational and United Nations personnel. This type of training would transfer not only information and procedures but the requisite attitude adjustment necessary for non-military roles to be performed by naval forces which are predominantly trained for war. The second method of preparation would involve operational training. A Standing Naval Force will have to exercise at sea together to train its personnel and test the equipment and techniques of a multinational force committed to various contingencies – both military and non-military in character. If done properly, a
Standing United Nations Naval Force would soon become a highly professional standing organisation which would be competent in all aspects of ocean operations and in the pertinent aspects of both law enforcement and the laws of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{113} Organisation alone will not be able to sustain such a naval force; adequate and prompt funding is essential if missions are to prove successful.

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CHAPTER VIII
FINANCING UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: A DILEMMA FOR THE FUTURE?

INTRODUCTION

It is not realistic for us to accept any new peacekeeping operations this year (1992). We haven't got the money, so it would be at the expense of other operations.114

As Boutros-Ghali further explained in his chapter on Financing in An Agenda for Peace, "A chasm has developed between the tasks entrusted to this Organization and the financial means provided to it."115 In essence, the United Nations is still faced with the quandary of not being able to perform its principal task for a peace-starved world at a time when further peacekeeping missions are being demanded.

These demands on the UN have risen dramatically in the last five years. By mid-1993 (the height of UN peacekeeping operations), some 80,000 UN troops, observers, police and civilians were deployed on 13 missions world-wide. The three largest operations namely, Cambodia, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia – consumed the greatest share of troops and resources, and emerged quite unexpectedly.116 Yet the possibility of future missions will continue to rise: civil wars in Albania, the Congo and Rwanda all have the potential to destabilise their respective regions and may necessitate the use UN peacekeeping forces. In short, financial crisis or not, the world expects the UN to perform peacekeeping upon demand.

This chapter will attempt to explain the genesis of this financial crisis and offer some suggestions on how it might be overcome. Both the costs of peacekeeping as well as the traditional funding methods will be analysed with a look at possible alternatives for the future.

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF PEACEKEEPING

It would be difficult to over emphasize the degree to which inadequate, inefficient and constraining financing systems and procedures contribute to the problems of the UN.117

There are two basic budgets within the infrastructure of the UN – the regular budget and the peacekeeping budget. Since 1945 both these budgets have expanded substantially and costs have escalated dramatically in the last few years. In 1963, for example, peacekeeping costs amounted to $400 million; in 1992, the total was $1.5 billion.118 In 1993, the operations in Cambodia, Somalia and Yugoslavia alone cost in excess of $3.5 billion.119

These vast expenditures came at a time when the UN had experienced a significant shortfall in both its regular budget contributions and its peacekeeping contributions. On May 15th 1992, the UN Secretary-General issued a report on “The Financial Situation of the United Nations.”120 The report was disturbing and remarked that the United Nations is owed nearly $1.8 billion in regular and peacekeeping dues – most of it by the United States – and may have to cease operations at the end of the year. By mid-July 1992, UN members owed

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a total of $908.52 million in unpaid regular budget dues for 1992 and previous years. They were also some $844.44 million in arrears for various peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{121}

Politics has a major role to play in the financial instability faced by the United Nations. For example, during the Reagan administration, disenchantment with the UN over a variety of political issues caused the U.S. to withhold a portion of its annual assessments, including portions that would have been allocated to the peacekeeping budget.\textsuperscript{122} By the end of 1992, 87 states were still delinquent in their annual payments,\textsuperscript{123} the peacekeeping budget $765 million in arrears. The American debt accounted for nearly 50 percent of the total.\textsuperscript{124} This reluctance to pay on the part of the United States has carried right on through to the present Clinton administration.

**TRADITIONAL FUNDING FOR PEACEKEEPING**

While the traditions of the UN’s financial system tend toward centralization of control, the idea of delegation to appropriate levels of authority needs to be pressed with vigour.\textsuperscript{125}

The financing of UN peacekeeping operations is a difficult venture which frequently draws on both UN budgets as well as other sources of finance. Both the officials of the UN Secretariat and representatives of Member States make no pretence to the contrary. Due to shortfalls in assessed contributions, there have been numerous instances when the UN


\textsuperscript{123} Canada has always paid its annual payments on time.


has had to draw on one budget to keep the other solvent. At the end of 1991 as he concluded his ten-year term as Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, in an extraordinary report noted:

> It is a matter of profound concern to me that at a time the world community has entrusted to the United Nations new and unprecedented responsibilities, the Organization should continue to find itself on the brink of insolvency. It is the member states who must collectively bear the responsibility for this most unfortunate situation.\(^{126}\)

At present, there are three sources for UN funding. First, percentage assessments on Member States provide for the regular budget. Second, somewhat different percentage assessments fund peacekeeping operations. Finally, voluntary contributions support both peacekeeping operations and individual UN agencies. The method of assessment highlights one source of the UN's funding problems. Article 17 of the UN Charter provides: “The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.” The apportionment of expenses is normally made on the basis of a scale of assessments, approved by the Assembly on the advice of the Committee on Contributions, a group of experts elected by the Assembly. Each member is assessed on the basis of its capacity to pay, which is measured by such factors as population, Gross Domestic Product, per capita Gross National Product (GNP), external debt – and, as will become clear, some political factors.\(^{127}\)

The regular budget for the UN is worked out by the Committee on Contributions every three years and approved by the General Assembly. In the case of the richer 50 percent of UN members, assessments are almost exactly proportional to GNP. For


the others, there are complex offsets for low per capita GNP and high external debt. There is also a ceiling rate (25 percent of the regular budget, paid by the United States), and a floor rate (0.01 percent, paid by 84 of the smallest and poorest members, according to the 1992 scale of assessments).¹²⁸

Under the Financial Regulations and Rules of the UN, Member States have the legal obligation to pay their assessed contributions, whether for the regular budget or for the peacekeeping budget, in full within thirty days of receipt of a letter from the Secretary-General informing them of their assessment. According to Article 19 of the Charter, a member state loses its vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due for the preceding two full years. In actual fact this is more policy than practice; loopholes have been found to avoid applying this sanction, with the inevitable result that this threat of applying Article 19 has met with little success in pushing non-paying Member States into payment.

As a consequence of Article 19 not being enforced, the UN Secretary-General’s report shows that only “fifteen countries had paid in full by the end of January 1992, that 24 had paid in full by April 30, and that 26 others had paid something towards the current year’s assessment (among them Germany and Japan). This left Russia and the U.S. among the Member States that have paid something towards arrears in 1992. One hundred and twenty-four Member States had failed to meet their statutory financial obligations to the Organisation. Of these, 74 Member States owed more than their current year’s assessment. Moreover, 65 Member States had made no payment at all for the regular budget by the end of April.”¹²⁹

The history of the efforts by the UN to arrive at an equitable and practical way of financing UN peacekeeping operations has been tenuous. In December 1973, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the financing of UNEF II which became the model for subsequent operations and missions. General Assembly Resolution 3101 (XXVIII), asked the Secretary-General to set up a special account outside the regular budget to cover the costs of the force. For the purpose of peacekeeping assessments, the Member States were divided into four categories. Reflecting their position of political power in the Security Council, the five permanent members (Group A), pay roughly 22 percent more for peacekeeping costs than if peacekeeping were assessed using the scale for the regular budget. Group B includes the economically developed Member States which are not permanent members of the Security Council, such as Canada. They are assessed at the same rate as for the regular budget. The peacekeeping rate for economically less developed states, which constitute Group C, is estimated at one-fifth of the regular budget assessment rate. The rate for the poorest countries — falls to one tenth of their regular assessment or 0.001 percent.130

In his gloomy May 1992 report, the former Secretary-General pointed out that because of the delinquency in payments, throughout 1991 it had been necessary to draw on the reserves of the UN to meet the basic operating requirements. Furthermore, from mid-August until mid-October, and intermittently thereafter until the end of the year, funds were borrowed (from the few peacekeeping operations that had cash in excess of their immediate requirements) to meet both regular budget obligations and the cash requirements of other new peacekeeping operations. Short-term loans between certain peacekeeping accounts continued to be necessary in 1992 to cover daily operational requirements. Such short-term borrowing

mechanisms are "manifestly inadequate," particularly in the face of increasing peacekeeping demands.\textsuperscript{131}

Proponents for the status quo have argued that the financing system with all of its vagaries and imperfections has worked thus far and should not be tampered with. There is indeed a view that the UN has cried wolf over finances so frequently that they need not be heeded. This is basically a politically convenient assessment which does nothing for those who have to deal with the problems of inadequate funding. The peacekeepers, diplomats and aid workers on the peacekeeping operations are more often than not just left to their own devices. The new demands for UN peacekeeping operations make it clear that the traditional funding methods – and the ad hoc arrangements devised to muddle through financial crises – are clearly inadequate. It is therefore, imperative to consider alternatives for the future.

**FUNDING FUTURE PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES**

Inspired leadership and managerial skill are needed to mobilize the U.N. system to its full potential.\textsuperscript{132}

When compared to the cost of war, peacekeeping is inexpensive. As Brian Urquhart has written, "to say that peacekeeping is very expensive is misleading. One and a half days of the cost of Desert Storm, the operation which finally liberated Kuwait, would have paid for all the UN operations world-wide for one year."\textsuperscript{133} The question is: Will Member States realise that what they spend on peacekeeping will save them from the expense of going to war?


One time United Nations Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, made a number of financial proposals prior to the end of his term in an attempt to remedy the financial situation of the United Nations. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was in broad agreement with the proposals and included them in his An Agenda for Peace. The three proposals are:

- **Proposal One** – This suggested the adoption of a set of measures to deal with the cash flow problems caused by the exceptionally high level of unpaid contributions as well as with the problem of inadequate working capital reserves:
  
a) Charging interest on the amounts of assessed contributions that are not paid on time;
  
b) Suspending certain financial regulations of the United Nations to permit the retention of budgetary surpluses;
  
c) Increasing the Working Capital Fund to a level of $250 million and endorsing the principle that the level of the Fund should be approximately 25 percent of the annual assessment under the regular budget;
  
d) Establishment of a temporary Peace-keeping Reserve Fund, at a level of $50 million, to meet initial expenses of peace-keeping operations pending receipt of assessed contributions;
  
e) Authorisation to the Secretary-General to borrow commercially, should other sources of cash be inadequate.

- **Proposal Two** – This suggested the creation of a Humanitarian Revolving Fund in the order of $50 million, to be used in emergency humanitarian situations. The proposal has since been implemented.

- **Proposal three** – This suggested the establishment of a United Nations Peace Endowment Fund, with an initial target of $1 billion. The Fund would be created by a combination of assessed and voluntary contributions, with the latter being sought from

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Governments, the private sector as well as individuals. Once the Fund reached its target level, the proceeds from the investment of its principal would be used to finance the initial costs of authorised peace-keeping operations, other conflict resolution measures and related activities.\textsuperscript{134}

While it is easy to be critical of proposals such as the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and the Peace Endowment Fund on practical grounds — since they would implicitly challenge cherished notions of national/state sovereignty — they merit consideration. If properly funded and applied, they would provide the UN with some financial independence and a degree of flexibility in responding to crises. Speed is imperative if the UN is to impose its authority during the crucial first few weeks of a peacekeeping operation. The establishment of a Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, in particular, would strengthen the UN’s ability to act quickly once the decision to deploy a force had been taken.

In his 1992 Financial Report, the former Secretary-General stated that he was “convinced that it would be appropriate and financially sound for the United Nations to institute the practice of charging interest, at commercial rates, to those Member States which have not paid their assessed contributions within 60 days after issuance of a letter of assessment.”\textsuperscript{135} This proposal would do much for the UN in providing the requisite funds for peacekeeping operations. Another funding idea which has been bandied about lately is a tax on international arms sales. The peace dividend which was expected this decade has not been realised and arms sales have shown no sign of decreasing since the end of the Cold War. Taxing the billions of dollars spent annually on arms would certainly alleviate the funding

problems facing the UN, however, taking on big business is far more difficult than taking on a military dictatorship. Clearly, alternative sources of income for the UN — outside the existing assessments — need to be explored thoroughly. Member states must realize that their peacekeeping contributions are practical efforts towards the prevention of conflict and towards the establishment and maintenance of international peace, security and stability.

THE NAVAL PERSPECTIVE

All of these requirements lead to the conclusion that a maritime peacekeeping and enforcement organization will be expensive and extensive — it will cost a great deal and require a well-developed support structure.\(^{136}\)

Naval forces are very expensive and if the UN intends to use them in naval peacekeeping operations, it should expect to reimburse participating governments for their costs, just as it does for ground operations. As is the case of traditional peacekeeping, the funding should be for ‘extraordinary costs’, over and above those associated with the normal operating costs for the United Nations. These costs would have to include fuel consumption while on station in the area of operation, transportation of logistics to deployed forces, and the sundry expenses associated with ships both at sea and in port. By using its international offices, the UN can arrange for port calls to resupply the ships, and absorb the administrative costs of the port visit, including tugs, pilots and berthing arrangements. Since the majority of proposed naval peacekeeping missions may require extended operations on the high-seas, underway replenishments will also be necessary.


Considering the over-stretched UN budget, financing will no doubt be the largest obstacle to overcome if naval forces are to participate in peacekeeping. Paradoxically, financing by the UN could also be the largest inducement, too. Rather than turn ships over to the total control of the UN, countries could exchange token control (ie. fly the UN ensign) in return for token reimbursement. A low level of initial commitment would allow countries to experiment with UN control while they perform missions that they would do anyway, and the UN would be able to determine the probable costs and benefits. Everyone would gain, the UN would be able to achieve its peacekeeping mission, the contributing countries would receive UN authorisation and financial reimbursement, and would be able to evaluate the potential for further operations.

It has been suggested that actual operating costs for those nations contributing units to multinational naval forces may be greater than the UN reimbursement due to increased time at sea and the requirement to equip ships to a higher standard for inclusion in the Standing Naval Force. This may well be the case, but those increased costs are offset by the benefits that operating in such a force brings to the nation in terms of better training, increased operational readiness, and improved operational experience. On the whole, it must be concluded that participation in multinational maritime forces is of benefit to a nation’s maritime forces.

CONCLUSION

Now that the cold war is over, there is a lot of possibility of doing the right thing for the right reason. The only trouble is that we have hit a period when there is no money. But there is also a lot of humbug on that subject. Consider that the debts of Robert Maxwell, as known now, are $4.3 billion. The total cost of the current United Nations peacekeeping operations for one year is $2.7
billion. So Maxwell, with no apparent disaster to the society at large, ripped off half again as much as UN peacekeeping costs this year. You mean the entire world cannot come up with that kind of money? Two days of Desert Storm would comfortably pay for all UN peacekeeping operations worldwide for one year. If you want to do something, you can pay for it.\textsuperscript{137}

Over the long term, the UN will need a rapid reaction force which is effective, reliable and cost effective. Unfortunately, as long as the UN remains wholly dependent for its financing on Member States, the UN will never have the adequate funding to form a Standing United Nations Naval Force or mount successful peacekeeping missions. A number of ideas for securing an independent source of revenue for the UN have been advanced. Some have been widely discussed, including a surcharge on currency transfers and a tax on arms exports. There has been considerable debate about the likely revenues to be generated by these schemes as well as the systems which are necessary to ensure the collection of this money. Unfortunately, none of these ideas has commanded much international support.

United Nations peacekeeping operations must be based on sound financing. The current financial situation at the UN is obviously untenable. For this reason, the idea of generating independent revenues for the UN is vitally important and should merit further study, notwithstanding the current political obstacles. An independent source of revenue, is the best way of assuring a stable funding base for an organisation whose work is crucial to international stability. Perhaps, it would be prudent for the UN to instigate a process by which the many proposals for funding could be assessed and considered for implementation. It is vitally important that reform of the UN include some of these imaginative solutions to avoid financial infirmity in the future.

\textsuperscript{137} Lance Morrow, “An Interview: The Man in the Middle” MHQ The Quarterly Journal of Military
Some have argued that the UN is devoting too much attention and too many of its scarce resources to peace operations, especially at a time when development assistance efforts are flagging in many quarters. To this argument it is worth responding along the following lines: first, investments in international security through peacekeeping will bring developmental returns by ensuring the stability which permits development to take place; and second, we can reduce the investments in peacekeeping, and enable states to focus on development assistance, by taking more timely, effective action. In order to do this, we need a UN which is able to react more rapidly.

It should be acknowledged that the concept of a Standing United Nations Naval Force is an expensive option. Although these are expenses beyond the current capacity of the UN, there might be a time when they can be accommodated within the framework of a coherent UN peace and security programme. By contributing ships and personnel to multinational naval forces, national governments can sell the concept of expensive naval capital acquisitions to their respective electorates and legitimise the possession of sizeable fleets.138

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CONCLUSION

But in spite of all the difficulties and differences, the shocks and surprises, the United Nations has shown itself capable of brilliant improvisation and has succeeded in making its peace-keeping presence effective. Its record of achievement has been good; all the more so because it was never permitted to be prepared.\footnote{\textit{Lecture by the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada, in the Dag Hammarskjold Memorial Series, at Carleton University, Ottawa, May 7, 1964.}}

FORGING A NEW WORLD ORDER

Why not, for example, a television miniseries that, instead of drug dealers, pimps, gang members, and corrupt cops, makes a hero out of a UN Blue Helmet — or out of the heroic individuals who stand against ethnic cleansing at the risk of their own lives?\footnote{\textit{Per Mare Per Terras.}}

The world faces a period of great change in the coming millennium. These changes will inevitably be disruptive and even violent at times. Notwithstanding, the fear which is associated with rapid global transformation, the new world order will give nation states the chance to exchange out-dated modes of behaviour for new ones and discover new ways of working together for the common good. Our future decisions and organisations must work to ensure that peace and prosperity is all inclusive — \textit{Per Mare Per Terras.}

Such a future will not happen by itself; it requires a new level of sophisticated understanding; the will to make tough decisions; an efficient allocation of resources; and, a concerted effort from the international community. Just as importantly, a secure future requires the development of enhanced mechanisms for mediating and resolving crises that can threaten national, regional, and global security. Reform is not an easy task especially in the
midst of financial crisis, but, if the United Nations is willing and more importantly, if Member States are supportive of new peacekeeping ideas, then anything is possible.

UNITED NATIONS REFORM

The UN simply provides a mirror to the realities of world politics.\textsuperscript{141}

Given the financial difficulties of the UN and the crisis of confidence in peacekeeping which now bedevils some of its operations, it is important to build momentum towards positive change which will lead to substantial reform of the UN’s peacekeeping operations. Over the years, the UN has developed limited doctrine for ground forces in peacekeeping operations, but if naval forces are to be integrated into peacekeeping, there are several issues that must be resolved, including Command and Control, Interoperability, Rules of Engagement, force structure, sovereignty, the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, and finance and logistics. These issues are resolvable, if and only if there is a concerted, co-operative political will on the part of the UN Member States, especially those of the Security Council.

Auspiciously, recent UN operations, show that the UN is becoming aware of the versatility and mobility of seagoing forces. Indeed, with the expansion of Exclusive Economic Zones out to 200 miles, and the increase in international drug smuggling, maritime missions are increasing in visibility and importance, and it is likely that the UN will soon develop more requirements for ships and navies, not just for peacekeeping, but for peace-enforcement as well.

POLITICAL FEASIBILITY

Individual Member States have been strong proponents, in theory, for multinational naval co-operation under the auspices of the United Nations. The strongest political proponent for a UN naval force was the former Soviet Union. On several occasions prior to the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, Soviet officials had called for some form of UN naval force. Perhaps the Russian leadership viewed multinational naval forces as being more acceptable and less provocative than national or alliance forces. Nevertheless, ire is sometimes aroused in the developing world about what can be perceived to be ‘imperialist gunboat diplomacy’. For example in 1990, the United States positioned an aircraft carrier off the coast of Colombia in an effort to combat narcotics smuggling. Unfortunately, the U.S. failed to inform the Colombian Government. After a diplomatic row, the American ship had to ignominiously return to port. Conceivably, a UN-sponsored naval force might have proved more acceptable to the Colombians. Ironically, those states which would form the nucleus for a UN naval force, would be those states whose involvement may be resented by the Developing World.

A second political barrier evolves from the coequal traditions of national sovereignty and national naval autonomy. Navies are traditional symbols of a nation’s sovereign status and national power. Admirals and the politicians who control them, tend to revere and coddle their navies to the point of nationalistic obsessiveness. For example, during the Gulf War, the Royal Navy insisted on a separate logistics and resupply network to that provided by Canada for the rest of the navies contributing forces in the Gulf. It would also

seem implausible that the United States Navy, for example, would agree to being controlled by the UN’s Military Staff Committee.

Naval forces are capable of circumventing the problems associated with traditional peacekeeping missions on sovereign territory. Naval vessels can carry out missions both in international and national waters under the doctrine of freedom of passage. Indeed, naval blockades in territorial waters could be permitted against lawbreakers under the UN Charter if authorised by the Security Council. The political problems associated with naval peacekeeping are no more difficult to resolve than those which baffle traditional peacekeeping. Multinational naval operations are, like all military endeavours, essentially political in purpose. If politicians discern a need for naval peacekeeping and there is sufficient political will to realise it, then the world will have warships plying the oceans of the world maintaining the peace.142

ADVANTAGES OF A STANDING UNITED NATIONS NAVAL FORCE

Sea power at the disposal of an alliance such as the United Nations possesses unprecedented strategic mobility.

Perhaps the greatest characteristic of UN naval forces, particularly as rapid reaction forces, is that they will be more capable of being employed as crisis intervention forces. Naval forces by virtue of their inherent mobility, flexibility and sustainability are ideally suited to crisis response. Ships have a freedom of manoeuvre which is denied to land forces. The persuasive value of naval forces in times of tension is unique. Naval forces are the masters of poise operations, they can be intrusive or out of sight, threatening or non-threatening, easily despatched and just as easily withdrawn. They are relatively self-sufficient and are often able to

carry their own air support. Many vessels such as corvettes and frigates, have general purpose capabilities and can adapt readily to a variety of non-military and military tasks. In support of land conflicts they can establish or run blockades and intervene to rescue nationals or refugees. They can remain on station at sea for literally months on end, or they can patrol the oceans of the world awaiting orders for new missions. As mentioned throughout this paper, naval forces offer a wide range of capabilities which can be brought to bear on any given situation, as well as, offer the political leadership with a combination of options depending on the type of force that has been assembled.

Multinational naval co-operation allows for both a prudent and economical means of achieving international security objectives. In a world which is becoming progressively smaller as a result of improved communications and technology, many nations are beginning to share common interests and common goals in the new international environment. These shared objectives provide the basis for combined naval operations. The inherent flexibility of naval forces gives them a particular utility which is very appealing to policy makers. As more nations unite in a common cause, combined multinational operations add to the effect – and the legitimacy – of whatever sanction is being enforced. In the process, coalition nations are afforded the opportunity to strengthen the ties that unite them.

On less of a theoretical level and more on a practical level, multinational naval operations allow nations to pool knowledge, resources and capabilities. Whether it be regional expertise, specific capabilities, intelligence or technical know-how, shared perspectives are sure to benefit the group as a whole. This has been proven time and again by STANAVFORLANT. In today’s austere fiscal environment, navies are constantly in search of ‘force multipliers’. By combining forces, not only are assets added to the cause, but
complementary capabilities have a synergistic effect, that can enhance the force's overall
effectiveness and potential. An example of this was the international mine clearing operations
in the Persian Gulf which drew on sweepers and hunters and heliborne capabilities from at
least eight nations.

As with every noteworthy idea there are inherent flaws, and one must be
mindful of the difficulties involved in international naval co-operation. While there are
certainly advantages gained through combining naval assets, there are also unique problems
and insufficiencies in the concept. Overall effectiveness is degraded by lack of standardisation,
dissimilar equipment, unfamiliarity with each other's operational practice, differences in
language, and crucially, in command, control, communications computers and intelligence.
(C4I). Force capabilities may tend toward the lowest common denominator. It may take
considerable time and effort before dissimilar navies can operate with a high degree of
proficiency, on a similar operational plane. Operating may have to take second priority to
training, as the more advanced navies help to develop the capabilities of potential allies.
Sensitive information and technological advances may have to be disseminated broadly for the
"common good" of the formation. Although a formidable task, mastery of these hurdles will
ensure an abundance of missions for the navies of the world.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has paved the way for
successful international agreement which as of yet is still unprecedented. The Law of the Sea
Convention provides a most congenial basis for the application of the principle of common
and comprehensive security. The concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind, in fact, is the
natural foundation of common security on the oceans of the world. The Common Heritage of
Mankind comprises three major components: an economic component – in which ocean
management must be developed, with particular regards for the needs of developing countries; an environmental component – which comprises the conservation of the oceans for future generations; and a military component – which requires that the oceans must be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.\footnote{Dr. Elisabeth Mann Borgese}

Notwithstanding, a United Nations Standing Naval Force will only come about when there is sufficient political will, sufficient training and infrastructure and sufficient funding to support such a multinational force. At the present time, a United Nations Standing Naval Force may still only be a dream. Perhaps there are real historical reasons why the Member States of the United Nations have not rallied around co-operative efforts upon the oceans of the world as they have on land. As we approach the new millennium and a new world order, perhaps these inhibitions will no longer be as strong as they once were. If this is true, then perhaps the time has come to rethink the possibilities of United Nations naval forces on the world’s oceans. The task of building an effective UN naval peacekeeping force is worth undertaking and it should be done quickly and with international support, including financial, military, and political support. It is simply anachronistic for the United Nations to avoid going to sea.

\textit{Dum Spiro, Spero}\footnote{While I breathe, I hope.}
## APPENDIX

**CANADIAN NAVAL PEACE OPERATIONS: 1956-THE PRESENT**

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<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tr>
<td>UN Emergency Force (UNEF) {Op RAPID STEP}</td>
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<td>HMCS MAGNIFICENT</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Sealift</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Forces in Cyprus (UNIFICYP) {Op SNOW GOOSE}</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>HMCS BONAVENTURE</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Sealift/ Helicopter Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS)</td>
<td>Vietnam (South China Sea)</td>
<td>1973</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) {Op SULTAN}</td>
<td>Central America (Gulf of Fonseca)</td>
<td>1990-92</td>
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<td>Peacekeeping Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Interdiction Force {Op FRICTION}</td>
<td>Persian Gulf</td>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>HMCS ATHABASKAN/ HMCS TERRA NOVA/ HMCS PROTECTEUR</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maritime Interdiction {Op FLAG post-hostilities}</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>HMCS HURON</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Interdiction Force {Op BARRIER}</td>
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